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**Jihad and Islam in World War I : studies on the
Ottoman Jihad on the centenary of Snouck
Hurgronje's "Holy war made in Germany"**

Zürcher, Erik-Jan; Buskens, Léon; Lüdke, Tilman et al.; Zürcher, Erik-Jan

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DEBATES ON
**ISLAM &
SOCIETY**

JIHAD AND ISLAM IN WORLD WAR I

Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of
Snouck Hurgronje's "Holy War Made in Germany"

Edited by Erik-Jan Zürcher



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Jihad and Islam in World War I

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Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of
Snouck Hurgronje's "Holy War Made in Germany"

Edited by Erik-Jan Zürcher

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Preface

The centenary of the beginning of the First World War was commemorated with conferences and seminars around the world in 2014. Most commentary examined the war from the point of view of the European participants and their western allies. The role of the Ottoman Empire in the war was also the subject of several scholarly meetings. The fifth annual conference of the Leiden University Center for the Study of Islam and Society (LUCIS) organized by Prof. Dr Erik Jan Zürcher added a Leiden perspective to this topic.

The conference and the book that resulted from it fit LUCIS's goals very well. LUCIS aims to explore the diversity of Muslim societies through high-quality, evidence-based research. By bringing together experts from different backgrounds – including journalists, policy-makers, teachers, activists and opinion leaders – we stimulate discussion, increase knowledge and promote understanding of Islam as a religion, a political system and a cultural practice. The examination of the use of religion in the First World War aptly expands our understanding of Islam as a system of norms embedded in society and expressed within very specific historical circumstances.

The conference 'Jihad and other uses of Islam in World War I. Instrumentalization of religion by the Ottoman Empire, its allies and its enemies' took place in Leiden on 13–14 November, 2014. This volume is based on the papers delivered at that conference. It appears exactly a hundred years after the pamphlet published by the famous Leiden professor Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje "Heilige Oorlog Made in Germany" (Holy War Made in Germany), from which the conference took its thematic cue.¹

The papers in this book show how the use of Islam by political powers such as the Ottoman State and Germany affected the experience of Muslim subjects of the Ottoman sultan, but also that of individual Muslims serving in the German armies. It had an impact on the life of contemporary scholars of Islam and the Middle East in Europe such as Snouck Hurgronje when they had to define their position vis-à-vis the call for jihad initiated by the Ottomans against the allied forces. Examining jihad as an instrument for military but also cultural goals also extends the meaning of this instrument to domains not generally considered. At times when the appeal and the fear for Muslim holy war, exactly because of the universalist ambitions of jihad, are exploited everywhere in rather

absolute terms, this book reminds us yet again that the motives behind and the effects of this phenomenon are in fact very diverse.

We would like to thank Erik Jan Zürcher for his efforts in making the conference a success and especially for his commitment to bringing the results of the conference into print immediately afterwards. Our colleagues from Leiden University Press are also warmly thanked for their help in the publication process.

Petra M. Sijpesteijn

Director Leiden Centre for the Study of Islam and Society
Leiden, 19 October 2015

Note

- 1 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, "Heilige Oorlog Made in Germany," *De Gids* 79/1 (1915), 115–147.

Introduction

The Ottoman Jihad, the German Jihad and the Sacralization of War

Erik-Jan Zürcher

In 2014–2015 Jihad was everywhere. When the Iraqi imam Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri proclaimed himself “Caliph of all Muslims” under the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in July 2014 in a sermon recorded at the al-Nuri mosque in Mosul, he constantly referred to Jihad and called on all Muslims to join his “Islamic State” (IS). Later he announced that he was leading a Jihad that would lead to the conquest of Rome and Spain. When tens of thousands of volunteers joined the Islamic State from the Middle East, but also from Europe, America and Australia, these volunteers were called Mujahideen by themselves and Jihadis by international media. Jihadi quickly became a household word, and even a nickname, in the Western world, as in the case of the British Muslim Muhammad Emwazi, who became known as “Jihadi John” when he appeared in recordings showing the ritual slaughter of prisoners of the Islamic State.

Of course, both Baghdadi’s proclamation of the Caliphate and his declaration of Jihad were contested. Governments and religious authorities throughout the Arab world denounced Jihad as being contrary to Sharia. They pointed out that a Jihad could not be directed against other Muslims. In the West, political leaders like Prime Minister David Cameron in the U.K. and President Barack Obama in the U.S. declared (without any serious argument) that “Islam was a religion of peace” and that IS was “barbaric” and Baghdadi’s Jihad “unislamic.”

This kind of argument had also been a feature of the last time a Caliph officially declared a Jihad. As it happened, this took place almost exactly a century before al-Baghdadi climbed the stairs of the minbar of the great mosque in Mosul. It is with that Jihad, the one proclaimed by the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph Mehmed V Reshad in November 1914, that this volume is concerned.

The Ottoman declaration of Jihad was controversial from the start. The Ottoman Empire had concluded a secret defensive alliance with the German Empire on 2 August 1914 and had mobilized shortly thereafter.

Until late October the Ottoman political leadership had maintained an armed neutrality, hoping that Germany would win the war before it became necessary actually to join the fighting. After the German defeat on the Marne in mid-September it was clear that the war on the western front would not be won quickly and German pressure on the Ottomans to join the war effort increased.¹ By late October the Young Turk leaders in Constantinople gave in and an Ottoman naval squadron was ordered to attack Russian naval installations in the Black Sea. Even though this was a deliberate provocation designed to bring about war with Russia and its allies, the Ottoman government officially maintained that it had been under attack and that its navy surprised Russian ships that were mining the northern entrance to the Bosphorus. This was a blatant lie, but the war was presented to the Ottoman population as having been imposed on a country committed to maintaining peace. This was important, and not only in terms of propaganda. It was directly relevant to the nature of a possible Jihad, as broad consensus had grown among Muslim scholars that in an offensive Jihad, in other words: when the Islamic state was trying to enlarge the *Dar al-Islam* (Abode of Islam) at the expense of the *Dar al-Harb* (Abode of War), the duty to fight was a communal one (*farz al-kifâya*), which could be devolved on a part of the Islamic community such as the army. If, on the other hand, the Islamic state was under attack, fighting was seen as an individual duty (*farz al-‘ayn*) and it was incumbent on every single Muslim to make a contribution.²

A month after the naval attack that led to the Russian declaration of war (followed by those of France, Britain, Serbia and Montenegro), the Ottoman sultan proclaimed a Jihad. This proclamation was followed by a supporting legal opinion, a *fatwa*, from the highest religious authority, the Sheykh ul-Islam and by a proclamation to the army and navy by the sultan and his war minister, Enver Pasha. In all of these statements, the Jihad was justified with the argument that the Islamic state (the Ottoman Empire) and the Muslim community had come under unprovoked attack from Russia, France and Britain. The proclamation and the fatwa primarily targeted the Muslim subjects of France, Britain and Russia in their colonies, calling upon them to resist their oppressors. The fatwa also defined joining the fight against the Islamic (Ottoman) state as a grave sin that would carry the severest penalty in the hereafter for any Muslim who did so.

Of course, the Jihad declaration caused debate within the Islamic world. It was rejected by religious authorities in the different Entente colonies and in British-occupied Egypt and either rejected or quietly ignored by important players in the Ottoman periphery, such as the Idrisids in Asir and the Hashemite Sharif of Mekka. It also immediately

gave rise to a heated academic debate in Europe. The trigger of this debate was the article, or rather manifesto, published by the famous Leiden scholar Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje in January 1915 and entitled “Heilige Oorlog Made in Germany”³ (Holy War Made in Germany). As Leon Buskens shows in this volume, the article was a vitriolic attack on Snouck’s German colleagues (who before the war had also been close friends), whom he accused of being the instigators of the Ottoman Jihad proclamation. In Snouck’s eyes calling for Jihad was a totally irresponsible appeal to an essentially mediaeval concept that threatened to undo the attempts to bring Muslim peoples into the modern world by reconciling their personal faith with the demands of the legal-rational state and secular society. As we see in Buskens’s chapter, Snouck felt so deeply about this issue because he had personally invested most of his professional life, both as an academic and as a colonial policy advisor, in this programme.

Snouck’s article was immediately translated into English as “Holy War Made in Germany” and gained wide currency in the countries of the Entente as well as in the United States, and it has regained prominence in academic debates in the last thirty years under the impact of the publication of Edward Said’s *Orientalism* in 1978.⁴ A hundred years after its first publication it is still being debated, and for that reason alone it is very fitting that the Leiden University Centre for the Study of Islam and Society sponsored a two-day conference on Jihad in World War I in November, 2014 and that Leiden University Press is publishing the proceedings in 2015, the centenary of the appearance of “Heilige Oorlog Made in Germany.”

Snouck’s main criticism of his German colleagues was that they had allowed their nationalist fervour to override their academic integrity. The dispute, as Buskens shows, was not about putting academic knowledge to political use *per se* but about the *kind* of political use to which it was put. In Snouck’s eyes, both the World War itself and the idea of instrumentalizing religion for the war effort were abhorrent. The German Islam scholars for their part were hurt and surprised by the attack by their friend, as they saw patriotism as their first duty, something that transcended academic considerations. They were German citizens first and academics second, and saw nothing wrong in making their expertise available for the war effort, just as Snouck himself had made his expertise available to the Dutch colonial authorities in the East Indies.

If Snouck had been a citizen of one of the belligerent states rather than an inhabitant of neutral Holland, he would probably have been less surprised or incensed by the attempts to sacralize the war through the proclamation of Jihad. Sacralization of war was everywhere in 1914–1915. As Mehmet Beşikçi informs us in his chapter in this volume, there is

a growing literature on the various uses of religion for mobilization in Europe in World War I and the recent study by Philip Jenkins, *The Great and Holy War*,⁵ has the issue as its central theme. For those of us who have become used to seeing World War I primarily as a tragic, useless and, if we are to believe Christopher Clark in his celebrated *Sleepwalkers*,⁶ avoidable waste of human life, it comes as a surprise to see that religious leaders in all of the belligerent countries embraced and sacralized the war. The precise way in which this happened differed from country to country. In Russia, the state and the official Orthodox Church were deeply entwined, as were the Habsburg monarchy and the Catholic Church. But in Great Britain, Germany, and even in the French Third Republic with its militant laicism, the vast majority of religious leaders identified with the war and proclaimed service to the fatherland a religious duty. Only the Vatican under Pope Benedict xv consistently advocated peace, but that was of course also the only institution not functioning within a national or imperial state and the only one primarily having supra-national status.

In Germany, the attitude of the leading religious figures, both in the Lutheran Church and in academia, was an extreme example of the sacralization of war. As Jenkins argues,⁷ this attitude should be understood as a paradoxical legacy of the liberal theology that German theologians and church historians had done more than anyone else to develop in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The hallmarks of this theology had been textual criticism and historicism which led to an understanding of the Bible as just one expression of God's plan, anchored in a specific time and place. While liberating in many ways, this understanding had also opened the door to an understanding of the German nation as God's new chosen people and of the Wilhelmine empire as God's kingdom on earth, with a civilizing and Christian mission in this world. It is this legacy that explains why 29 German church leaders and theology professors signed a manifesto in September 1914 (when the Battle of the Marne was still raging) that is in some ways reminiscent of the Ottoman proclamation of Jihad two months later. In this "Aufruf Deutscher Kirchenmänner und Professoren und die evangelischen Christen im Ausland" (Call of German Ecclesiastic Leaders and Professors to Evangelical Christians Abroad) which was directed primarily at Anglo-Saxon Protestants, Germany was depicted as a peaceful country that had come under unprovoked attack and a Christian nation that had to defend itself against "Asiatic barbarism." Germany had every right to ask for God's succour for its people and its emperor. In other texts prominent theologians declared loyalty to the throne to be as important as following the gospels.

To sum up: sacralization of the war, both to legitimize it for public opinion at home and abroad and to mobilize the population was ubiquitous. Every belligerent state engaged in it, but the religio-patriotic fervour was particularly strong among the Protestant German elite, which may help to explain why Snouck's German colleagues may have had few qualms about supporting or even instigating the proclamation of Jihad.

The Ottoman Jihad thus fits a wider pattern in which states appealed to coreligionists at home and abroad to support their war effort, but as the only Muslim power and indeed the only independent Islamic state involved in the conflict, the position of the Ottomans was at the same time unique, and the Ottoman efforts to sacralize their war also deserve to be examined on their own. This is what this book attempts to do. The structure of the collection is such that there are contributions on the role of the Germans (including the controversy started by Snouck Hurgronje), on that of the Ottomans (in terms both of the Jihad policy and of its effects), and on that of their adversaries, both Arab and British. In other words: the organizing principle is basically that of the different actors in the conflict and this is intentional, as one of the aims of the organizers of the conference (and the editor of this volume) has been to give agency to Middle Eastern actors where the academic debate, perhaps as a result of Snouck's influence, has been focused almost exclusively on the German role.

The chapter structure will be self-evident to the reader of the book. It is, however, also possible to discern a number of recurrent themes that transcend the actor-based approach that underlies it. In what follows I should like to discuss four of these themes, by trying to answer four questions on the basis of a "cross-reading" of the different chapters.

Was Snouck Right and Was the Jihad "Made in Germany"?

The first theme obviously is the one that is directly connected with Snouck Hurgronje's famous manifesto: was the Jihad indeed a German invention, or did it have authentic Ottoman roots? Different authors in this volume seem to give different answers to this question, but I think they may not necessarily be contradictory.

As Tilman Lüdke shows, some German politicians dreamed about the effects of a German-inspired campaign to stir up the Muslims in the colonial possessions of Britain and France to compensate for the relative lack of success of German imperial expansion overseas. He quotes the liberal political Friedrich Naumann, who as early as 1889 stated that in the

case of a world war “the caliph of Constantinople will once more uplift the standard of Holy War. The sick man will raise himself for the last time to cry aloud to Egypt, to Sudan, to East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan and India: ‘War against England!’”

This was when Bismarck was still at the helm of German foreign policy and before the more aggressive and adventurist foreign policy of Emperor Wilhelm II had started. During the latter’s reign the idea seems to have gained more currency. Max von Oppenheim (who would play a crucial role in 1914) discussed Pan-Islamism with Sultan Abdülhamid during his first travels in the Middle East in 1895 and the Kaiser very publicly identified himself with the fantasies about Germany’s ability to mobilize the Muslims during his 1898 visit to Damascus and Jerusalem. Famously, he declared himself to be the friend of the 300 million Muslims of the world during his visit to the mausoleum of Saladin in Damascus. By 1914 speculation about the possibilities of instrumentalizing the Muslims for the German war effort was widespread enough for the German foreign ministry to ask Oppenheim to come up with a memorandum on the issue, which he duly produced under the title of “Die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde” (Bringing about a Revolution in the Muslim Territories of our Enemies), the document that would form the basis for the work of the Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (Intelligence Office for the East) and which is discussed in the contributions by Lüdke and Gussone.

In Istanbul, meanwhile, the vice-commander in chief and war minister Enver Pasha seems to have had doubts about the advisability of a Jihad declaration in a situation in which the empire was so visibly linked to European Christian allies, preferring a call by the Sultan to Muslims in the colonies of the Entente instead, but his chief of the general staff, the German General Bronsart von Schellendorf was strongly in favour.

All of this seems to support the thesis that the declaration of Jihad was primarily the result of German policies. On the other hand we learn from Mustafa Aksakal in his contribution that “the concept of Jihad occupied a quotidian place in the Ottoman cultural register.” He clearly demonstrates that Snouck was wrong when he supposed that Jihad was essentially a mediaeval practice that had no place in the modern Muslim world. The Ottoman government officially declared Jihad six times between 1768 and 1922. Even though it is equally true, as Şükrü Hanioglu writes in his chapter, that the Ottomans seem largely to have abandoned the practice after the Tanzimat – and accordingly refrained from proclaiming a Jihad in 1853 (the Crimean War), 1877 (the Russo-Turkish War), 1911 (the Italian invasion of Tripolitania) and 1912 (the Balkan War) – Jihad remained an important and emotive concept that

was widely used in exhortations to soldiers and press publications. Jihad was part of the Ottoman political vernacular. The fact that the Ottomans officially declared Jihad in six cases and refrained from doing so in four others can perhaps be explained by their desire to gain European support – this was evident in 1853 and 1877, and also in 1911–1912, but not in the very short Greek war of 1897. There is little doubt, however, that on a grassroots level, the concept played a role even in those wars when Jihad was not officially declared.

Hanioglu's chapter seems to offer a way to reconcile the two positions. He argues that, while on the one hand the Ottomans went along with the unrealistic expectations of the Germans and declared a Jihad that aimed at triggering uprisings in India, North Africa and Central Asia, on the other hand they also promoted Jihad to achieve purely Ottoman policy objectives, notably the galvanizing of the Arab and Kurdish populations of the empire. In the case of the Arabs of southern Iraq, who had been going over to the Shia in large numbers in the preceding decades, the carefully tailored Ottoman Jihad campaign specifically aimed at this community seems to have been quite successful. The leading Shi'i mujtahids of Najaf and Kerbela all supported it emphatically and it caused the British serious problems during their attempts to fan out northwards from occupied Basra. In the Arab peninsula the Ottoman Jihad campaign was much less successful, and remarkably the only major local player to support it was also a Shi'i, the Zaydi Imam Yahya in the Yemen.

The conclusion would seem to be that on the one hand the Jihad proclamation was the product of German strategic thinking, but on the other hand an appeal to Jihad was indeed part of the existing "toolbox" of the Ottoman state, even in the early twentieth century. Ottomans and Germans both used it, but with different aims and expectations. These different aims were closely connected to the different audiences the proclamation, or rather proclamations, were aimed at.

Who Was the Proclamation of Jihad Aimed At?

As Oppenheim's memorandum makes very clear, the Germans intended the Jihad proclamation as a weapon against the Entente. The aim was to incite Muslims in the colonies of France and Great Britain and in the imperial possessions of Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia to revolt, thereby forcing these countries to divert military resources from the European fronts, or at the very least preventing them from bringing colonial troops over to Europe. The strategic decisions of 1914, opposed by General Otto Liman von Sanders (the head of the German military

mission) but wholeheartedly supported by Bronsart von Schellendorf, Enver and Cemal, can be understood only in this context. The incursion of relatively small contingents of Ottoman troops into north western Persia, the attempt to open up the road to the Caucasus by encircling and defeating the Russian army at Sarıkamış in December and the attack on the Suez Canal in February were all based on the premise that these actions would encourage local Muslims to rise in revolt. The concept of the Suez Canal campaign in particular was predicated on the assumption of a simultaneous rising in Egypt. Logistically the movement of 30.000 soldiers through the heart of the Sinai desert was an impressive achievement, but it was clear from the start that this force was far too weak to cross the canal and threaten the British position in Egypt on its own.

At the same time Şükrü Hanioglu's and Mehmet Beşikçi's contributions both show that the Jihad proclamation was also important for *internal* use within the Ottoman Empire. As discussed earlier, Hanioglu focuses on the attempts to use Jihad rhetoric to rally the Shi'i Arabs of Iraq and to counter Russian agitation among the Kurdish tribes. But of course the vast majority of the Ottoman conscript army was raised among the peasants of Anatolia, and Beşikçi demonstrates that the use of religion, and particularly of a rhetoric of Jihad, was a military necessity as "Islamic themes and symbols constituted a common language which the Ottoman state could draw on when motivating the masses" at a time when patriotism (Ottoman or Turkish) was still the preserve of an educated elite.

The proclamation of the Jihad thus addressed different internal and external audiences and the actual documents published in November 1914 reflect this. The original fatwa signed by 29 leading ulema stated that it was the duty of every Muslim to defend the Islamic state that was under attack, and the emphasis of the document is very much on rallying the Muslim subjects of France, Britain and Russia. In the Sultan's proclamation to the army and navy, as one would expect, the emphasis is on the need for the soldiers to be ready to sacrifice themselves in the defence of Islam.

How Was the Message of Jihad Mediated?

Of course, proclaiming a Jihad in itself was not enough. The message had to reach the population. In very different ways a number of the contributions to this volume draw our attention to ways in which the message of Jihad was mediated.

The start of the mediation process was the solemn proclamation of the fatwa, first to a select group of high dignitaries by the Şeyhülislam (chief of the ulema), and then to the population at large through a solemn public reading at the Fatih mosque by the fetva emini (the keeper of the fatwas), and to the army and navy through proclamations of the sultan and the minister of war.

Public meetings were an important means of communication. As Hanioglu shows, the Shi'i clergy in Iraq used it very effectively to raise the population. Nicole van Os produces evidence that in 1914 women as well as men were involved in these public meetings, something that would have been unthinkable ten years earlier.

The message was spread more widely through posters carrying a simplified text of the fatwa in more everyday language than that of the original. As we know also from other occasions (the constitutional revolution of 1908, the boycotts of 1908, 1909 and 1912, the mobilizations of 1912 and 1914) posters were an effective means of communication even though the vast majority of the Ottoman population was illiterate. Those who could read would explain the posters to those who could not. Still, posters were an urban phenomenon and in the countryside where 80 per cent of the population lived, the state relied primarily on oral communication by imams and village elders, as Mehmet Beşikçi shows in this volume.

As everywhere else, in the Ottoman Empire too, World War I was an era of censorship and propaganda. Journalism and literature were harnessed to the war effort, even if they were of necessity less effective tools than in societies with a high rate of literacy and large-circulation newspapers and journals. Erol Köroğlu describes how Islamic motifs, and the theme of holy war, played a substantial role in the early phase of the war (1914–1915) but became much less important later on, when hopes of a successful Jihad had dwindled. In the poetry that Köroğlu reviews, references to Islam and to Turkishness (and Turkish nationalism) were closely entwined, and this is something of a recurrent theme in the chapters of this book. In the Ottoman Empire of the early twentieth century the concept of the “nation” in its modern European sense had entered the vocabulary of the urban elite, but national identity was primarily defined in religious terms.⁸ Religion thus became an ethnic marker defining the boundaries of the nation. At the same time, the instrumentalization of religion by the modernizing and centralizing state (from Mahmud II, through Abdülhamid II to the Young Turks) had led to a different form of nationalization of Islam. The Ottoman Empire had always supported an official Islam that propagated ideas about the interdependence of state and religion and turned these into

a hegemonic state ideology, but with the growth of the modern and centralized state in the late nineteenth century, state control over religion had increased markedly and Islam had been turned into an effective tool for legitimization and mobilization in the service of the empire.⁹

Of course, the German Jihad propaganda also relied on mediation. The German propaganda effort coordinated by the Nachrichtenstelle primarily worked through two sets of communities: Muslim prisoners of war and political refugees from the Entente colonies. In his analysis of the Halbmondlager (Half Moon Camp), the POW camp constructed in Wünsdorf south of Berlin to hold Muslim prisoners of war from the British and French armies, Martin Gussone shows to what lengths the German authorities went to portray Germany as a friend of Islam and to recruit Muslim POWs as volunteers. The newspaper *al-Jihad*, produced by the Nachrichtenstelle in a number of different languages, was distributed here and at the sister camp in Zossen that was destined for Muslim POWs from the Tsarist army. The message was conveyed even more forcefully, and dramatically, by the purpose-built and German-designed mosque erected in the camp. Gussone shows that, in line with the worldwide Jihadist ambitions of the German Empire, this mosque deliberately incorporated stylistic elements from a range of Islamic civilizations. Its programme of calligraphic inscriptions included belligerent texts like Sura 47, verse 8 from the Koran, which, according to Gussone, “should be interpreted as a call to the prisoners of war to join the Jihad.”

Refugees from the colonial possessions of the Entente were courted in an effort to spread the message of Jihad, but they proved to be a problematic asset for the Germans, not only because they worked in relative isolation and the Entente was on high alert in countries like Egypt and Algeria, but also because they were motivated by nationalism rather than by any idea of a global Islamic movement led from Constantinople. Their agendas coincided with that of the Germans and Ottomans only in that they had shared enemies. Networks of agents were created in North Africa, Central Asia and South Asia, but they were not strong enough seriously to threaten the position of the Entente. After the war, during his exile in Berlin, Enver Pasha would try to use these networks to build his “General Revolutionary Organisation of the Muslim World” (Umum Alemlî İslâm İhtilâl Teşkilatı), but this attempt at creating a “Green International” also failed.

Mediation was not by words, written or spoken, alone. As the abovementioned example of the mosque in the Half Moon Camp in Wünsdorf shows, architecture was also used to convey an ideological message. Hans Theunissen shows how Cemal Pasha commissioned both major restorations and new buildings in Damascus during his three

years as governor of Syria (1914–1917). The building works had a triple message: laying out a new broad and straight avenue that served as an axis connecting the old city centre to the Hejaz railway station, with modern buildings in “national” style, conveyed a message of modernity and state power; restoring the main classical Ottoman building complex, the Selimiye, emphasized the Ottoman character of Damascus and Syria; the clearing of the area surrounding the Umayyad mosque and Saladin’s mausoleum, as well as the plans for the refurbishment of the latter, linked the Ottoman state of 1914 emphatically to a glorious Islamic past.

Was the Proclamation of Jihad a Failure?

It has become almost a commonplace in the historiography of the Middle East in World War I to say that the German-inspired call to Jihad was a complete failure, and it is an indisputable fact that neither mass desertions of Muslim soldiers in the British, French and Russian armies nor large-scale uprisings in their imperial possessions took place. But the contributions to this volume show that this negative assessment has to be nuanced.

As Hanioglu, Aksakal and Beşikçi, and in a sense also van Os, demonstrate, side by side with the German-inspired Jihad campaign aimed at foreign Muslim populations, there was an authentically Ottoman effort to mobilize and motivate the Ottoman population on the basis of religious arguments and symbols, among which the concept of Jihad was important. This kind of religiously based mobilization had a long history and it was deeply embedded in the historical consciousness of the Ottoman state and the Muslim parts of its population (over 80 per cent by 1914). This Jihad was quite effective. Not only was it possible for an emphatically Sunni state like the Ottoman Empire to gain the support of the Shi’i minority, and for a Turkish-dominated state to motivate other ethnic groups like Kurds, Arabs and Circassians, it also played a considerable role in maintaining morale in the Ottoman army.

It is certainly true that enormous numbers of soldiers deserted from the Ottoman army, specifically in 1917–1918, when conditions in the army became almost unbearable. By 1918 the army was undermanned and undersupplied, and faced with vastly superior British manpower and equipment it could manage an orderly retreat at best. But ultimately, the Ottoman Empire – just like Austro-Hungary – lost the war because Germany lost the war, and the fact that its army, composed overwhelmingly of illiterate Muslim villagers, managed to fight off the onslaught of three of the world’s greatest powers for four years, shortly after it had

been defeated by four small Balkan States in a matter of weeks, was a sensational performance. The offensive actions at Sarıkamış and at the Suez Canal were over-ambitious failures, but defensively the performance at Gallipoli, Kut al-Amara and twice at Gaza was much better than expected. That the Ottoman army proved so strong on the defensive is something that cannot be understood without taking into account the religious motivation of the soldiers, which contributed significantly to maintaining morale. In other words: the Jihad, and more generally reference to religion, certainly helped to mobilize and motivate Ottoman society, and it could be argued that the authentic *Ottoman* Jihad described by Aksakal and Hanioglu was a success and that, on the other hand, the more ambitious *German* one was not.

The Arabs, both within the empire and outside, were the prime target of the Ottoman-German Jihad propaganda, as millions of them lived in the vulnerable borderlands of the empire in the south and under French, Italian and British rule in close proximity to the empire. How did they react? This is the question addressed primarily in the contributions by Umar Ryad, Joshua Teitelbaum and Şükrü Hanioglu to this volume.

The remarkable success of the separate campaign targeting the Shi'is of Iraq described by Hanioglu has already been discussed above. Among the Sunni Arabs of the Mashreq and the Arabian peninsula the propaganda had less tangible results. It is true that in the more densely populated and centrally controlled areas of Syria and Palestine the leading Arab families generally stayed loyal to the Ottoman throne until the end, even if some of their members favoured the idea of decentralization. But in the borderlands of the empire, in the areas where the Ottomans had less direct control and had to rely on persuasion and negotiation, the results were less good. The major players of the Arabian peninsula, the Rashidis in the Northern Najd, Ibn Saud to the south, the Hashemites in Mekka, the Idrisids in Asir and Imam Yahya in Yemen all acted on the basis of their own interests, with the Rashidis and Imam Yahya supporting the Ottomans, Ibn Saud maintaining neutrality and the Idrisids and Sharif Huseyn opting for collaboration with Britain. It was the rebellion of the Sharif of Mecca that caused the Ottomans the most headaches, and not just because of its military potential (which was rather limited). As Joshua Teitelbaum shows, the Sharif with British help established a propaganda campaign built on religious argument and he stopped only just short of claiming the caliphate for himself (as he would do in 1924). What rendered his argument effective was the systematic distinction between the empire and caliphate on the one hand and the ruling Committee of Union and Progress on the other,

he depicting the latter as consisting of both unbelievers and Turkish nationalists, who lacked legitimacy and had nothing to offer to Muslims and Arabs.

The one instance where the Jihad, or at least strong religious motivation, may be said to have played a role in supporting the Ottoman war effort in the Arab peninsula did not concern the Arabs. It was the defence of Medina. The beleaguered Ottoman garrison managed to hold on to the city even after it had become an isolated outpost, under the command of a general, Fahrettin Pasha, who had publicly vowed to the Prophet Muhammad that he would never desert him. The tenacity of the Ottoman resistance at Medina, which actually extended beyond the armistice of 30 October 1918, certainly owed something to religious motivation. In that sense it is an extreme example of the strong defensive performance of the Ottoman army referred to above and of the effectiveness of the “Ottoman” Jihad.

As far as the effect of the Jihad proclamation on Arabs outside the empire is concerned, the position of one of the leading Arab intellectuals of his age, Ahmed Rida, as analysed by Umar Ryad in this volume, is illustrative. Rida was a Shi'i Muslim from southern Lebanon, who had become a leading member of the movement for Arab cultural revival with a reputation also in the larger Muslim world. In 1914 he lived in Egypt, and winning over someone like Rida would have been essential if the call for Jihad was to be effective among Arabs abroad. But he was not won over. Essentially Rida saw the war as a power struggle between European states whose conflict was imported into the Middle East. He was not swayed by the Jihad propaganda and assessed the events primarily, even almost exclusively, in terms of the chances they might offer for the establishment of an independent Arab state. For this purpose, he came to see the British as the best hope. Interestingly, his opinion on both the Jihad and World War I in general seems to have come closest to that of Snouck: he deplored the way the “civilised” world of Europe had used its knowledge to produce mass violence and death and he saw the Jihad proclamation as just a cynical cover-up for a materialistic war.

All in all there are plenty of reasons to assess the “German” Jihad aimed at raising the global Muslim community, the *Umma*, against the Entente a failure, but of course such an assessment profits from the benefit of hindsight. In 1914 it was not at all clear that it could not work.

Oppenheim, who authored the key programmatic text of the German Jihad effort, was not someone who had dreamt up these ideas in a study in Berlin. He had lived in Egypt for 15 years before the war, so his assessment that there was deep-rooted resentment against British rule there was based on personal observation and countless conversations

with Egyptians. He was mistaken in thinking the resentment could be translated into active support for the Ottoman caliph, but the potential for rebellion was certainly there, as the immediate post-war period would show. The British took the danger seriously enough to deport quite a few Egyptian nationalists and suspected Ottoman agents to Malta and elsewhere.

In this respect, Ahmad al-Rawi's discussion of John Buchan's *Greenmantle* is interesting, because it shows that as late as the first years of World War I (the book appeared in 1916) a senior figure in British intelligence actually shared the expectations of Max von Oppenheim as far as the mobilizing potential of Islam was concerned. Buchan's book is full of references to a "great stirring in Islam" and the "dried grasses" that "would catch fire if you used the flint and steel of their religion." In an indirect way he seems to express disagreement with Snouck Hurgronje. Where Snouck starts his manifesto by reporting a conversation with a progressive, intellectual Turkish gentleman who condemned religious fanaticism and war (a Turkish equivalent of Ahmad Rida), Buchan's character Sir Walter, a senior British official, is made to say "The ordinary man again will answer that Islam in Turkey is becoming a back number, and that Krupp guns are the new gods. ... Yet – I don't know. I don't quite believe in Islam becoming a back number. ... The Syrian army is as fanatical as the hordes of the Mahdi."

What this shows is that by 1914 fear of a worldwide Jihad was widespread, and that therefore the German hope that it could be an effective weapon did not seem so far-fetched. It was when the Ottomans and Germans actively tried to play the Jihad card that it proved of little practical value, at least in its southern borderlands and beyond the borders. Perhaps it is true to say, as Sultan Abdülhamid did in his memoirs (whose authenticity is doubtful), that "the threat of Jihad was more powerful than Jihad itself."

That is, of course, as true today as it was when the Sultan said it (if he said it). The call for Jihad issued by the "Caliph" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has had some success. His Islamic State has conquered a number of provincial towns in Syria and Iraq and one major city (Mosul). It has been able to attract thousands of volunteers from all over the world, volunteers who have quite often exercised extreme and demonstrative violence, but, shocking as this may be, this is not what ultimately fuels the fear of Jihad in the western world. It is the uncertainty about the degree of support for the Jihad among the large Muslim communities in European and American countries, the feeling of living on a volcano (a metaphor used by al-Baghdadi himself), that creates fear and that makes the call for Jihad effective. By the same token, a clear rejection of the

Jihad by the large majority of the Muslims in the Western world would show up Abu Bakr's Jihad as an empty threat, just as much as the actual proclamation of Jihad by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed v ultimately deprived the Ottomans of a powerful weapon, the *threat* of a worldwide Muslim rebellion, in World War I.

Notes

- 1 Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914. The Ottoman Empire and the First World War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, chapter 5.
- 2 For the history of the concept and practice of Jihad see Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History. Doctrines and Practice*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006 [translation of *Le jihad: origines, interprétations, combats*, Paris: Téraèdre, 2004].
- 3 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, "Heilige Oorlog Made in Germany," *De Gids* 79/1 (1915), 115–147.
- 4 Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Pantheon, 1978.
- 5 Philip Jenkins, *The Great and Holy War. How World War I Became a Religious Crusade*, New York: HarperOne, 2014.
- 6 Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914*, London: Allan Lane, 2012.
- 7 Jenkins, Op. Cit., 74–85.
- 8 Erik Jan Zürcher, "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908–1938," in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, Leiden: Brill, 2000, 150–179.
- 9 Sultan Abdülhamid's ban on the import of non-Ottoman Korans is a particularly striking example. Cf: Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Importance of Being Secular: Islam in the Service of the National and Pre-National State," in: C. Kerslake, K. Öktem en P. Robins (ed.), *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity. Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010, 55–68.

1 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, “Holy War” and Colonial Concerns

Léon Buskens¹

In memory of Christien Lieftrinck-Snouck Hurgronje (1914–2014)

Introduction

In the January 1915 issue of the leading Dutch cultural journal *De Gids* Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) published an article under the provocative title “Holy War made in Germany.” The article offered a mixture of cynically worded scholarly analysis of great acuity, which characterizes Snouck Hurgronje’s works, and vehement moral condemnation of the war craze. The author was by then one of the most respected scholars on Islam in the Western world, president of the board of the prestigious *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, and a professor at Leiden University. He had become famous through his monograph on *Mecca*, based on fieldwork in the Holy City, through his seminal studies on Islamic law and his work as an adviser for Islamic affairs in the Dutch East Indies. He held one of the oldest chairs in Arabic studies in Europe and assumed his authority on policy matters of Islam and colonialism with *gravitas*.

Snouck Hurgronje considered the declaration of Jihad, “holy war”, issued by the Ottoman government in November 1914 to be the work of Germany, guided by its famous orientalist scholars in the field. He condemned his friends’ and colleagues’ involvement in the war effort in the strongest moral terms. The war itself was already an act of the utmost barbarism, but the declaration of Jihad also sabotaged the colonial project of civilizing the Muslim world, to which Snouck Hurgronje had given his best forces. In his rejoinder to Becker in 1915 he explains his strong condemnation of the orientalist’s involvement in the Jihad proclamation by portraying himself as:

A Dutchman, who has intensively engaged himself during the best part of his life in a practical and theoretical manner with the Islam problem, and whose aim therein always has been the promotion of a friendly rapprochement between the world of Islam and our world.²

In the letters to his teacher and friend Theodor Nöldeke Snouck Hurgronje continuously expressed his abhorrence of the war in an even more personal way. He condemned it as an act of utter barbarism, comparing the feuding Bedouin favourably to the warring parties, in that they at least were more careful in shedding blood.³ He gave his friend Nöldeke the happy news of his wife's pregnancy saying:

May the new male or female world citizen be a harbinger of peace!⁴

Snouck Hurgronje was referring to the birth of his daughter, named Christien after her father and a paternal aunt, which would take place on 17 December 1914, a few months after the war had erupted and when her father had turned almost 58 years old. Christien would be the only child born of the marriage of Snouck Hurgronje with a much younger Dutch lady, although much later in life she would be happy to discover that she had five half-brothers and half-sisters from her father's two Islamic marriages to women from West Java's elite during his stay in the Dutch East Indies between 1889 and 1906.

For Snouck Hurgronje the main culprit in the German fabrication of Ottoman Jihad was his colleague and friend Carl Heinrich Becker (1876–1933), at that time professor at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Bonn. Becker felt utterly insulted by Snouck Hurgronje's "unfair" attack. He published a reply in *De Gids* and several other articles to defend himself and Germany.

Becker writes in a letter to his colleague Hartmann immediately after receiving an off-print of Snouck Hurgronje's article on 13 January 1915:

And that should still be supposed to be neutral. You might well have concluded that the insinuation against me that I would have sacrificed my scholarly conscience, exclusively rests on an insufficient knowledge of German and on a misunderstanding caused by this. I am very sad. And apart from that he is wrong; ...⁵

And a few weeks later, on 6 February 1915, again to Hartmann:

But the more I have thought about the matter, the more painful Snouck's behaviour becomes to me. As a human being he has lost much in my eyes.⁶

Before the war Becker was not only an esteemed colleague, but a friend, who stayed at Snouck Hurgronje's house while visiting Leiden. Their

complicity as founders of a scholarship of contemporary Islam which would be useful to society expressed itself in an extensive correspondence. Their friendship was severely damaged by the polemic about the Ottoman declaration of Jihad, as the break in their correspondence and the bitter remarks of both gentlemen about each other in letters to other colleagues show. The Great War not only destroyed an entire generation of young men and considerable parts of Europe and brought an end to the great Ottoman and Austrian empires and the brief German colonial episode, but also profoundly affected the republic of letters by wounding old friendships.

In this chapter I will explore this harsh polemic between colleagues and friends. They argue not only about a proper understanding of the rules of Islamic law on Jihad and the caliphate, and other scholarly facts, but much more on moral issues. They do not question whether an islamist should be involved in the use of his scholarship in policy-making. The application of Orientalist knowledge is self-evident, the issue for them is what is the proper, moral, way to use it. Snouck Hurgronje proclaims himself a defender of the pre-war academic internationalism, promoting civilization at large, while Becker stresses the need to be a good patriot first. In the end Snouck Hurgronje also claims his right as a good patriot to defend Dutch colonial interests in the Indies. As such the debate and their strong feelings reveal their convictions about the social use of scholarship and the different ethical values that they take into account, as well as the various interests to which they give primacy.

My study concentrates on Snouck Hurgronje's understanding of the facts and the way he constructed his ethical judgement. I will not try to establish whether he was right or wrong in his assessments and analyses, since I am not a specialist on the history of the Ottoman Empire or on the Great War. My concern is the history of Orientalist scholarship and its relations with colonial and nationalist policy-making; thus I focus on the role of scholars in the instrumentalization of Islam. Studying the scholars' involvement in the war effort enables me also to contribute to bigger issues in what has become known as the "Orientalism" debate due to Edward Said's famous book. It is striking to see how much has been written about the German involvement in the Ottoman Jihad declaration and about this very polemic. The analyses of, and ethical judgements on, these scholars by students of our time and their disagreements on this reveal profound shifts in the self-understanding of scholars and their role in society.

Snouck Hurgronje's Defusing of Dangerous Intellectual Weapons Made in Germany⁷

Snouck Hurgronje opens his attack on the war craze with a report of a conversation he had with "a Turk of a highly intellectual type" more than ten years before. The gentleman severely condemned religious fanaticism and wars motivated by political or economic interests, their destructive powers worsened by technological progress. This ethnographic "view from afar", which immediately establishes the author's authority by autopsy, provides a strong critique of European culture on which Snouck Hurgronje builds his argument. Taking a detour should bring Europeans to reason, while the vignette at the same time proves that Snouck Hurgronje is right in his analysis that Muslims are capable of progress and that the violence of the erupting war is imposed on them from outside rather than being of their own making.

Snouck Hurgronje continues by expressing his own horror of the war in strong terms. He and the "Turk" share the same ideals of "general religious peace and freedom of thought", which sets them apart from both the supporters of the war and the traditional scholars of Islam, the *'ulama*. Then follows an analysis of the doctrine of Jihad, a war against unbelievers, the institution of the caliphate, and Ottoman rule which demonstrate the author's credentials as a first rank scholar of Islam and a master of its languages. For Snouck Hurgronje the mixture of religion and politics which rules the relations between Muslim and unbelievers in classical Islamic law is a "mediaeval" phenomenon. More "developed" Muslims, partly as a result of the beneficial influence of colonialism, have started to question this medieval mixture of religion and politics.⁸ He continues to show his understanding of Islamic history and Arabic in his analysis of the Ottomans' claim to the caliphate, which he considers not well founded, but rather a "usurpation," and which does not mean much in practice.⁹ However, new means of communication have created the opportunity to abuse the institution for "panislamic" propaganda, which constitutes a menace to colonialism. The revolution of the Young Turks of 1908 was a blessing in that it brought an end to this medieval mixture of religion and politics, and they did not want to interfere with Muslims living under non-Muslim rule.¹⁰ Due to European pressure the Ottoman Empire was however forced to revive "the fetish of the Caliphate" and Jihad.¹¹ Snouck Hurgronje continues to argue that presenting any war of the Ottoman Empire as a holy war can only be the product of foreign interference, since every war in which the Ottomans were involved would be by definition a holy war.¹²

This observation leads Snouck Hurgronje to turn his critical eye to recent German pamphlets which offer interpretations of Turkey's involvement in the war. He first discusses a brochure written by Hugo Grothe, who is a specialist in economics and a scientific traveller, but clearly lacks the philological credentials properly to understand what is going on in the Ottoman Empire, as his limited knowledge of the Turkish languages shows.¹³ Grothe contends that Germany can help Turkey in rebuilding the country, but that it should support Germany in its turn by proclaiming Jihad. Snouck Hurgronje claims that the proclamation of a holy war against the enemies of Islam who occupy the lands of the Muslims as has recently taken place in Istanbul, and which characterizes the fighting of colonized Muslims at the sides of their English, French and Russian masters against Germany and Austria as "a great sin" has been "suggested by Grothe and his intellectual kin."¹⁴

Snouck Hurgronje describes the contents of this proclamation and the following demonstration in a mixture of critical scholarly analysis and caustic prose. For him this is only a theatre piece that the cynical elite organized to harness the credulous common people to their own goals. Then he turns his criticism to his "esteemed colleague" Carl Heinrich Becker, who shares Grothe's views on the relations between Germany and Turkey and has also "been swept away by the incredible jihad-craze, which at present seems to possess German statesmen."¹⁵ In a number of recent publications, especially in the pamphlet *Deutschland und der Islam* published in the series *Der Deutsche Krieg* (1914), Becker advocated Germany's involvement with Turkey in modernizing the country. These utterances are in stark contrast to the opinions of other German scholars, notably the other founder of contemporary Islam studies, Martin Hartmann, professor in Berlin. Hartmann showed himself highly critical of Ottoman rule, their "usurpation" of the caliphate, and the extremely dangerous threat of a holy war, as many quotations chosen by Snouck Hurgronje prove (277–279).

Becker's recent opinions endorsing the caliph and Jihad are also in contrast to his earlier analyses of Turkey, "expressed by him in former times of quiet scientific work", as Snouck Hurgronje documents amply.¹⁶ Snouck Hurgronje shows himself surprised and disgusted by the fact that "... her best friend [Germany, LB] is exciting her [Turkey, LB] to universal religious war, and presently turns over to her the Mohammedan prisoners who fought against Germany, in order to submit them to a politico-religious conversion cure."¹⁷ He goes on to offer an explanation for this astonishing error in sound judgment:

We can only attribute all this to the lamentable upsetting of the balance, even in the intellectual atmosphere, of what we used to call the civilized world. For in normal times we know that the Germans are far too sensible and logical to digest the enormous nonsense that a thing which in general would be considered as a shame for mankind and a catastrophe for Turkey can become good and commendable as soon as Germany places herself behind or beside the Crescent.¹⁸

Snouck Hurgronje expects that German scholars will soon start to condemn this “despicable game that is being played with the Caliphate and the holy war.” He does not dare to foretell to what extent the call to war will be successful among Muslims, but is not too worried for the Dutch East Indies. The elite has been immunized “against this politico-religious mixture of deceit and nonsense” by a “conscious educational policy towards the native population which history has entrusted to our care” in combination with “our centuries-old guarantee of complete religious liberty for our Mohammedans.”¹⁹ The Dutch do not have to worry too much about

... the peculiar sort of ‘intellectual weapons’ which now for the first time are put into circulation with the trademark ‘made in Germany’. Still, we keep hoping in the interest of humanity that Germany will before long withdraw the new product from the market.²⁰

Snouck Hurgronje concludes his article in an authoritative style with a paragraph of cultural critique which echoes the ethnographic opening in which he presented his educated Turkish interlocutor criticizing religious fanaticism. Snouck Hurgronje discusses once again the doctrine of Jihad, a “mediaeval” institution, which however forbids war against fellow Muslims. This view offers an important lesson for his times:

... the consideration of strife within the sphere of the community as impious, provides an excellent foundation for the highest social civilization and is rather humiliating for the modern world.²¹

He refers to Martin Hartmann as sharing his point of view, severely condemning Christians who out of patriotism sin against God’s commandments not to kill, but rather to love one’s neighbour. Snouck Hurgronje sees it as the task of the colonizers to teach their Muslim subjects to expand their view of community to all mankind and to teach them how to live in peace with all mankind.

To modern states which have Mohammedans as subjects, protégés, or allies, the beautiful task is reserved of educating these and themselves at the same time [emphasis added LB] to this high conception of human society; rather than leading them back, for their own selfish interests into the way of mediaeval religious hatred which they just were about to leave.²²

Exchanges between Becker and Snouck Hurgronje

Snouck Hurgronje's article made Becker very upset, as can be reconstructed from the abundant exchange of letters between Snouck Hurgronje, Becker, Hartmann, Nöldeke and Goldziher. This correspondence, and the ideal of scholarship and ethics that it translates, has been analysed by Christiaan Engberts.²³ Becker felt insulted by this attack on his scholarly integrity and his ethics and betrayed by somebody whom he considered to be a friend. He stopped writing to Snouck Hurgronje for several months, but they communicated indirectly via their colleagues Nöldeke and Hartmann. Hartmann initially reacted favourably to Snouck Hurgronje in a letter, but soon took sides with Becker. Maybe his change of opinion was also motivated by personal concerns, as he kept hoping to improve his rather difficult situation at the Seminar für orientalische Sprachen in Berlin.

Becker was outspoken in letters to Hartmann: Snouck Hurgronje misunderstood him because of an inadequate knowledge of German. But they themselves also made a mistake: they thought that Snouck Hurgronje was "one of them", but he turned out to betray them. Despite his claims he is far from neutral. Becker decided to reply to Snouck Hurgronje with an extensive article in a German periodical in February 1915. Snouck Hurgronje obtained the right to reply with an article in the issue of 1 May 1915, to which a *Schlusswort* by Becker is added. Finally Becker is also granted a rejoinder in *De Gids*, the Dutch cultural journal which had published Snouck Hurgronje's first article.

In his public reply Becker took up the issues that had already come up in the private correspondence with his colleagues.²⁴ He presented Snouck Hurgronje's article as a *Schmähschrift*, "slander", uncritically reproducing the false allegations of Germany's enemies England and France, in which *Bosheit*, "malice" is his guiding principle. This already starts with the title, which echoes the accusations on the issue published earlier, with the same pun "made in Germany", in *The Times*. Becker expresses his surprise about this attack since he considers Snouck Hurgronje to be an outstanding scholar, a "Master", and somebody close to Germany

through professional and personal ties. Despite the intense feeling of hurt and disappointment Becker intends to reply in a scholarly way to all the allegations.

In the first part of his article Becker summarizes Snouk Hurgronje's argument, stressing his malice in the selection of quotations from German publications. He also demonstrates that Snouck Hurgronje's allegation that Becker has converted himself to a new view on the caliphate of the Ottomans out of patriotism rests on a misunderstanding of German syntax, implying a rather grave error on the part of the great Master who was thought to be infallible until then.²⁵

In the second part Becker contrasts his realism with the pacifist Utopia which Snouck Hurgronje defends in his study, while holding on to the theoretical views expounded in the medieval treatises on Islamic law instead of accepting the realities of new ideas and practices as observed in contemporary Muslim societies. Becker fully admits that Jihad in its World War I version is a new phenomenon, reflected also in the neologism *jihad akbar* used as a title in the Ottoman publication of the five *fatwas* which, like the theatrical proclamation, stresses the individual obligation of the war,²⁶ but he does not see why Snouck Hurgronje wants to limit the use of the term to the medieval understandings of the *fiqh* books.²⁷ The new understanding is a form of "Europeanisation" of the war, in line with that of Turkey itself.²⁸ In this struggle for survival, *Existenzkampf*, which Germany and Turkey share, all means are permitted, a view that structures his entire reply. Besides this scholarly criticism of Snouck Hurgronje's limited understanding of new developments in Islam, and a political defence of the use of this weapon in the war, he also exposes Snouck Hurgronje's serious lack of critical sense. In Becker's view Snouck Hurgronje uncritically accepts the allied slander on the German-Turkish war effort.²⁹ In the third and final part Becker explains and defends Germany's policy in matters Islam and the Ottoman Empire. He discusses the different views of the Ottomans' claim to the caliphate, which the British supported as long as it served their interests in maintaining order in India. He contrasts his realism in accepting a political usage of the caliphate and pan-islamism with Snouck Hurgronje's critique of the Ottoman claims to the caliphate, which Snouck Hurgronje grounds in the "authentic" meaning of the institution as in the legal treatises of medieval scholars.³⁰ Becker repeatedly explains why Holland does not need to worry about possible damage to its interests in the Dutch East Indies, while he subtly criticizes the earlier Dutch educational policy in the colony in a footnote.³¹ Then he argues that the holy war was not made in Germany, if only out of respect for its neighbours' colonial interests. Snouck Hurgronje underestimates the agency of the Turkish

elite. Germany does not want to colonize Turkey either, but is a true friend. Turkey has a future as an Islamic state, but in European style.³²

Becker demonstrates that he is also capable of formulating a strong rhetorical ending in his last paragraph. He stresses the respect that all Islam scholars, and especially those from Germany, feel for Snouck Hurgronje, but argues that the latter's article shows him to be a victim of fanaticism, in the form of pacifism and do-goodism. Holland prides itself on being in a position to repair the bonds of scholarly internationalism through its neutrality. Unfortunately, the derailing of Snouck Hurgronje has made the performance of this ideal and very real pacifism immensely more difficult.³³

Snouck Hurgronje replied to Becker in the same periodical in May 1915.³⁴ His rejoinder is characterized by a surprisingly mild tone, and he explicitly stresses the importance of friendship. He admits his mistake in the understanding of Becker's phrasing in German. But he maintains his contention that Becker has changed his scholarly views for political reasons, and continues to object to the primacy that Becker gives to patriotism in his analysis of Ottoman institutions and policies. Snouck Hurgronje contrasts this view with his own constancy of opinion and his lifelong involvement in furthering peaceful relations, grounded in 30 years of personal relations with Muslims (290). He feels insulted by the suggestion that he is uncritically following the propaganda of the Allies (289), and stresses his deep academic knowledge (290). The instrumentalization of the Jihad weapon is the undoing of his life's work aimed at creating peaceful relations between the world of Islam and the West (291). He also maintains his conviction that Germany is not a good ally for Turkey, and sticks to his criticism of Germany's Islam policy and its involvement in the Jihad proclamation. He concludes that as a patriot he should also defend Dutch colonial interests in the East Indies. He considers the use of the Jihad weapon to be a crime: it is an invitation to murder for ill-willing fanatics and may cause considerable harm.

He ends his rejoinder in his well-known rhetorical style, by proclaiming the *jihad akbar*. Not according to the Ottoman understanding, but to its authentic meaning, in the way that the prophet Muhammad understood it, being a return to the virtues of self-control.

Becker has the last word in the same issue.³⁵ He appreciates the desire for conciliation and goodwill expressed by Snouck Hurgronje. The debate is not about scholarly issues, but rather about political views, aimed at Germany's Islam policy. Since they will not convince each other, there is no need to continue. Becker keeps coming back to Snouck Hurgronje's cynical wording and sense of ridicule, which shows how deeply he has been hurt by a man whom he respects greatly. He protests against the

tarnishing of the emperor, and points out how much Snouck Hurgronje shares with the press of the enemies because of his choice of language. He also objects again to the fact that Snouck Hurgronje keeps insisting on Becker's "conversion" in scholarly interpretations.³⁶

The last part serves to demonstrate how much Snouck Hurgronje himself has been motivated by national and personal concerns in his condemnation of the use of the Jihad weapon. Snouck Hurgronje in his rejoinder refers to his defence of Dutch interests in the East Indies, but Becker turns this into the main motive that has structured his condemnation of the war effort from the beginning.³⁷ He explains to German readers Snouck Hurgronje's beneficial influence in transforming the harsh Dutch Islam policy into a humane and liberal one. However, Snouck Hurgronje has been under constant attack for this from Christian politicians. Claims to Jihad and pan-Islamism are a direct menace to this ethical policy and to his own reputation. However, for Germany and its ally Turkey the use of Jihad is entirely justified, which explains their controversy.

Becker ends by seeking a consensus. He expresses the hope that the revolt by Muslims against their colonial oppressors will in the long run result in a more humane policy towards them being instigated by England and France. In this way the war may contribute to the achievement of a colonial Islam policy that Snouck Hurgronje has been advocating all his life. Becker concludes that their disagreement is about method only. He and Snouck Hurgronje ultimately strive towards the same goals: to further the well-being of their countries and of the Asian peoples.³⁸

Contrary to their usual policy, but because of "international courtesy", the editors of *De Gids*, the Dutch periodical which published Snouck Hurgronje's initial article, offered Becker the opportunity to reply in its second issue of 1915. Becker again stressed the political nature of their disagreement, and the legitimacy of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in using Jihad and pan-Islamism as weapons in the war. Germany and Turkey share many interests and therefore fight together, not for sentimental reasons. The holy war is, however, not of German making. The article does not contain anything new compared to the contributions discussed earlier. The editors explicitly mention that Snouck Hurgronje declined the offer to publish a rejoinder. He only asked for a mention of his disagreement with Becker's view that the Dutch government had profoundly changed its Islam policy in the East Indies in recent years. He underlined its consistency for centuries, to which religious political parties started to protest, however, during the nineteenth century, pretending that the government took too lenient an attitude towards Islam.

Further Development of the Polemic

Snouck Hurgronje apparently considered his criticism of the holy war made in Germany so important that in January 1915 he had the article included in the second edition of his essays on Dutch Islam policy aimed at an audience of colonial administrators, *Nederland en de Islâm*.³⁹ In the preface he corrects his misunderstanding of German syntax in his critique of Becker's views. He stresses his neutrality, but he also repeats his anger and concern about the dangerous use of Islam in the war effort in strong personal words.

Later in 1915 Richard Gottheil, a famous semiticist and Zionist activist, had an English translation published in New York without the author's permission. During that same year Snouck Hurgronje would publish two more articles on the holy war in a Dutch newspaper, explaining his views to a general audience. In the years to come he would follow with great interest the revolt in Arabia and the demise of the caliphate, expressing his analyses in a series of articles in popular and scholarly publications. In 1917 he drew attention to a semi-official explanation by the Committee of National Defence of the Jihad declaration aimed at Muslims, and an official correction issued by the Ottoman government limiting Jihad to states with which Turkey was at war.⁴⁰

Becker also continued his scholarly involvement in the war by publishing about Turkey and Islamic policy during and after the war. He also contributed a series of necrologies of former students who fell victim to the war effort. One of them was Erich Graefe, killed at the Marne in 1914, who had published a scholarly analysis of the call to Jihad of the Sanusiyya against the Italian colonizers of Tripolitania in Becker's journal *Der Islam* in 1912, which offers further context to the present analysis. Becker had cherished high expectations of this lamneted martyr for the Nation. In 1916 Becker was appointed to the Ministry of Culture and designed a new policy to further the academic study of foreign cultures and countries. After the war he would obtain even more important political positions, culminating in two appointments as a Minister of Culture. All this would keep him from seriously continuing his scholarly work until his early death in 1933.

Snouck Hurgronje included the English translation, with minor revisions, in 1923 in volume III of his collected studies, published in Germany, together with his other essays about the war and its aftermath. It seems that Becker would have preferred to forget about the painful polemic, but that he felt forced by Snouck Hurgronje's decision to reprint his articles to select his own publications on the issue for the second

volume of his collected studies published in 1932, which was dedicated to his teachers, among them Snouck Hurgronje.

Main Themes in the Debate

A number of themes dominate in Snouck Hurgronje's analysis of Germany's involvement in the Ottoman proclamation of holy war. Underlying his understanding of Germany prompting the Ottoman government to proclaim Jihad is a general view of the evolution of human societies. He constantly contrasts a medieval Muslim society, in which religion and politics are fused and in which unbelievers are excluded from the community on the basis of their non-adherence to Islam, with a modern civilization characterized by a separation between religion and politics and an inclusive view of humanity. The categories have not only an analytical, but also a moral dimension: modern civilization is superior to medieval barbarism. Snouck Hurgronje understands colonialism not only as an economic phenomenon serving the interests of the colonizers, but also as a civilizing project which will benefit the colonized by introducing them to modernity. His thinking is elitist, in that he stresses the gap between the educated elite and the credulous common people, who are liable to fanaticism. Education is the main tool to bring modernity to the elite, who will understand the virtues of separating religion and politics. Snouck Hurgronje criticizes the traditional Islamic scholars, the *'ulama*, who want to stick to the medieval mixture of religion and politics, embodied by the teachings of Islamic law. A modern educated elite will replace them, and this will be a faithful collaborator in the colonial project.

Snouck Hurgronje shares this contempt for political Islam with many of his fellow scholars, notably Martin Hartmann. His view of the place of Islamic law in a modern colonial society is linked to this judgement. Islamic law should be limited to the sphere of private life. The colonial authorities should guarantee freedom of religion to Muslims, allowing them to practise rituals that do not conflict with public order, such as the pilgrimage to Mekka. However, Islamic law does not have a place in the ordering of public life. This stress on religious freedom and limiting Islam to the private sphere entails a particular understanding of secularism rooted in Dutch history.

This particular understanding of the history of human society and the role of religion has strong implications for the ethics of scholarship. A proper understanding of the way societies develop and the merits of separating religion and politics prompts scholars to work for the common

good by promoting world peace, education and progress. Scholars can contribute to progress by endorsing the colonial project which brings education, progress and peace to people still living in the Middle Ages, such as Muslims fusing politics and religion. Snouck Hurgronje rejects and despises the racism of many of the advocates of colonialism: all people are capable of progress thanks to education. Scholars should advocate such a humanistic approach to colonialism.

Snouck Hurgronje was, together with Becker and Hartmann, one of the founders of the study of contemporary Muslim societies.⁴¹ These scholars had all earned their credentials as serious philologists and historians, demonstrating the required linguistic and analytical skills. Unlike many of their colleagues they did not consider the study of contemporary Islam beneath them. They consciously wanted to serve their countries and the cause of the colonized and of world peace by making their scholarly expertise available to the colonial administration. This project of applied Islamic studies, shared with eminent orientalist in other European countries and promoted in international congresses of Orientalism and colonial sciences, became endangered by the German war policy towards the Ottoman Empire which traded progress, secularism and internationalism for narrow minded patriotism, ushering Muslims back into the Middle Ages where religion and politics were fused.

For Snouck Hurgronje proper scholarship was epitomized by soundness of knowledge and sharp analysis, combined with a moral sense of engagement in society. His harsh judgement of Becker demonstrates his belief in objective criteria for scholarship. Becker was both wrong in his analysis, as implied by his sudden, entirely politically motivated change of views on Turkey, and in his moral position-taking. His colleague and friend had sacrificed scholarly truth to nationalist politics, thereby endangering world peace, progress and the interests of both colonizing and colonized people.

Although Snouck Hurgronje also sharply criticized other authors, especially Grothe, Becker had to bear the brunt of his attack. I think we may understand this as a compliment: of all the Germans involved in the war effort he deemed only Becker to be *satisfaktionsfähig*, being at the same intellectual level. Grothe was a mere economist and traveller, whom he could not take too seriously given his lack of a good command of the Turkish language, criticized in a footnote.⁴² Snouck Hurgronje clearly expressed his hope that his German colleagues would understand their error and repent, revoking the dangerous policy that they helped to invent.⁴³ He counted on the support of Martin Hartmann, who shared his opinion on the Ottoman empire and whom he considered to be the foremost specialist on Turkey in Germany. Unfortunately Hartmann had,

unlike the gentleman Becker, “an exceedingly lively temperament” which led him to too exaggerated analyses and kept him from convincing his colleagues.⁴⁴ It is amusing to see that his German colleagues in their letters vented a similar opinion about the character of Snouck Hurgronje,⁴⁵ who was, like Hartmann, also the son of a protestant minister, but socially and financially much more successful.

In order to understand these themes properly it is useful to relate them briefly to Snouck Hurgronje’s life and work.

Echoes of Snouck Hurgronje’s Personal Experiences⁴⁶

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje seems to many to be an arch orientalist because of his mixing of scholarship, political activism and personal interest, although Edward Said does not pay much attention to him in *Orientalism*, perhaps also because he did not read German or Dutch. This mixing is exactly what Snouck Hurgronje reproached his German colleagues for in the essay under discussion. The stately mansion on the Rapenburg, which he acquired in 1919 also to give lodgings to foreign colleagues at a time when Leiden did not yet have proper hotels, showed that his scholarly action did not leave him poor.⁴⁷

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje was the first legitimate child of the second marriage of his father, a protestant minister who had left his first wife for the much younger daughter of a fellow minister. His first name Christiaan suggests that he had to make up for his father’s sin, as perhaps did an elder sister with a similar first name who was born before the father’s divorce had become official through the death of the first spouse. After their father’s death he went to study theology at Leiden University, while living with his widowed mother and sickly sisters. His faith faltered and he showed more interest in a historical critical approach to the origins of Islam, resulting in a doctoral thesis on the origins of the pilgrimage ritual in Mecca. Thanks to his gift for languages and sharp wit he soon became an outstanding specialist on Islamic law.

His lust for knowledge and adventure was such that he managed to convince the Dutch government to send him on a mission to Arabia in 1884–1885 to gather information about the Indonesian pilgrims in Mekka. The government was worried about dangerous ideas they might pick up on pan-Islamic ideals, which might lead to unrest in the colony. Snouck Hurgronje was not satisfied with remaining in Jedda at the Dutch consulate. He had himself circumcised, converted to Islam, adopting the name ‘Abd al-Ghaffar, and moved to Mekka to stay with Indonesian friends. There he gathered extensive information about history, Islamic

scholarship, the Indonesian colony, but also mundane aspects of daily life, partly thanks to his liaison with an Abyssinian slave woman whom he had acquired. Snouck Hurgronje was a friend of the German scholar Julius Euting, who had travelled earlier in Arabia with the Frenchman Charles Huber, where they had discovered an important stela with inscriptions from the pre-Islamic period, the so called "Teyma stela." His endeavours to recover the stela, which the earlier travellers had had to leave behind as Huber had been murdered by a Bedouin, made him suspect in the eyes of the French consul in Jedda, De Lostalot, who was trying to obtain the stela for France. These suspicions were strengthened by the Algerian exile Si Aziz who had offered his help both to the French consul to recover the stela, and to Snouck Hurgronje to introduce him in Mekka. De Lostalot circulated rumours about the presence of an unbeliever in Mekka, which made the Ottoman governor order Snouck Hurgronje to leave the holy city without delay.

Snouck Hurgronje was very close to his German colleagues from the beginning of his scholarly career. He went to study with Theodor Nöldeke in Strassburg in 1880–1881 after obtaining his doctorate at Leiden University, and maintained a lifelong correspondence with him, Snouck Hurgronje writing in Dutch while Nöldeke replied in German.⁴⁸ In the second half of the nineteenth century Germany was the main model for *Bildung* in the Netherlands, and German an important scholarly language. Snouck Hurgronje published mainly in Dutch and in German, for example his two volume monograph on Mekka appeared in German, and only the second volume on ethnography was translated much later into English. Snouck Hurgronje's network of colleagues was extensive, covering the entire world, and he maintained it, like many of his contemporaries, by writing letters and attending the international Orientalists' congresses. In this network German colleagues occupied a privileged place.

His monograph on Mekka and the two accompanying volumes of photographs brought him scholarly fame. He was not content with his teaching positions at the University of Leiden and the Delft Institute for Colonial Administrators and in 1889 eagerly accepted a position in the Dutch East Indies as an adviser for Islamic affairs, where he would stay until 1906. Snouck Hurgronje did extensive research on lived Islam and collected many materials. He played a vital role in the "pacification" of Aceh, advising the Dutch army on how to deal with the resistance stirred up by Muslims scholars. His intelligence work led again to the publication of several important scholarly monographs and numerous articles. Towards the end of his stay he felt that his pleas for the promotion of the interests of the native population were not always respected.

In 1906 Snouck Hurgronje accepted the chair of Arabic and Islamic studies at Leiden University, while keeping his position as an adviser to the colonial government. As a professor in Leiden he was strongly interested in educating members of the Indonesian elite in accordance with his ideals about their vital role in the development of their country. The first Indonesian to obtain a doctorate at Leiden University in 1913, under Snouck Hurgronje's guidance, was Hoesein Djajadiningrat, the nephew of his faithful friend Raden Aboe Bakar with whom he had shared a house in Mekka and who took care of his pregnant slave after he had to leave in a hurry. In his insistence on the possibility of educating a secular elite to bring the Muslim world to modernity we may hear echoes of this recent success. Likewise his insistence on separating religion and politics might refer to his personal convictions, which seem to be related to an agnostic position. His negative views of the *‘ulama* and Jihad may partly be rooted in his experiences in the field during the Aceh war. This extremely violent war, which Snouck Hurgronje witnessed from nearby, may have fed his strongly articulated disgust of the war craze.

The ideal of scholarship that permeates Snouck Hurgronje's condemnation of Becker is clearly related to the few biographical elements offered so far. Snouck Hurgronje was an outstanding scholar, who played a decisive role in the creation of the study of Islam in Western academia. In his scholarship he was cosmopolitan. He was an excellent fieldworker, gifted in gathering information in the field with the help of faithful informants and assistants, with whom he maintained correspondences over decades. He also developed an extensive network of colleagues and friends in Western academia, and was one of the leading figures in the congresses of Orientalist scholars and in the creation of the orientalist overview of Islam *par excellence*, the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.⁴⁹ For him this scholarship was an international activity, with which biases on race or nationalism should not interfere. It was also knowledge that should be applied, in the interests of both the colonizers and the colonized.

Snouck Hurgronje served his country, but he also wanted to emancipate the Muslims and improve their lives. Together with his Leiden neighbour, the legal scholar Cornelis van Vollenhoven, he was one of the advocates of the so-called "ethical policy" that the Dutch government should follow in the East Indies. This same ethical position led to a strong condemnation of his German colleagues' faulty scholarship and wrong political choices during World War I.

Scholarly War Efforts

Orientalist scholars were involved in the war effort on both sides in various ways. They advised on policy towards Muslims in the colonies and on the possible instrumentalization of Islam, as Snouck Hurgronje and Becker did, worked in intelligence (as in the *Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient* in Berlin), in producing propaganda (as the journal *Der Dschihad* published for the Muslim prisoners of war in Berlin), in scholarly research in the field or in the study, or directly participated in action on the battlefield with their specialist skills (as translators, such as Hellmut Ritter). So far I have found hardly any questioning of this involvement as such. On the contrary, both Snouck Hurgronje and Becker, like many of their contemporaries, considered the use of scholarship and the action of scholars in the administration of Muslims to be one of the aims of their work. Snouck Hurgronje and Carl Heinrich Becker were, together with colleagues like Martin Hartmann and Alfred Le Chatelier, among the founding fathers of the study of contemporary Islam which understood itself as an applied science and actively sought to address the problems of policy-making in colonialism and international relations. They justified their scholarly work by its immediate relevance for society.

This wish to serve the nation by scholarship was strengthened by feelings of patriotism which were quite strong on all sides during the war. Snouck Hurgronje seems to have been among the rare exceptions to prefer peace to action and to defend internationalism. Becker clearly disapproves of his utopian pacifism, and attacks it as unworldly, and later on presents it as serving his national and personal interests in colonial policy in disguise. The scholarly *Einsatz* resulted in the massacre of many promising scholars, such as the already mentioned Erich Graefe, about whose fate Snouck Hurgronje enquires at Becker's request in England and France.⁵⁰ Hellmut Ritter was also among Becker's young *promoti* in action. In 1916 he sent out copies of his doctoral thesis to his colleagues with the mention that he was "on campaign", z.z. *im Felde*, and gave as his address the Navy post office in Berlin, since he was serving as an interpreter with the VI. Ottoman army in Baghdad. Fortunately he survived the war. Perhaps he gathered something more than the texts of war poetry that he published afterwards in his *Mesopotamische Studien* (1919–1923). Well before World War II he went to Istanbul and remained there until 1949 (and returned there again from 1956 until 1969).

The proclamation of Jihad seems not to have had much success. It hardly stirred any uprisings against the colonial masters, nor did it help much to rally Muslims to the Ottoman cause. The Germans gave privileged treatment to Muslim prisoners of war, also by offering them

a mosque and periodicals full of propaganda about Jihad in the hope that they would be willing to join forces with them, as has been amply documented in recent studies. The few who were eventually sent to Turkey were very badly treated there. German scholars were not only involved in providing them with reading materials, but also used the soldiers from the French, British and Russian colonial empires as informants for their linguistic, ethnomusicological and ethnographic studies. It is unclear to what extent this served the war effort, but it led to detailed ethnographic monographs afterwards, such as *Sitte und Recht in Nordafrika* by Ernst Ubach and Ernst Rackow (and others), published in 1923.⁵¹

The intelligence office in Berlin created during the war, *Nachricht-enstelle für den Orient*, seemed to be the place where the real brains behind the German Islam policy were working, especially Max Freiherr von Oppenheim and Karl-Emil Schabinger Freiherr von Schowingen.⁵² The first had as a confidant the Tunisian mufti Shaykh Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi who stayed in Berlin; the latter translated his pamphlet *Haqiqat al-jihad* into German, while Martin Hartmann provided a preface to that text which presented the Jihad against the colonizers as an individual obligation, *fard al-'ayn*, for every Muslim.⁵³ Snouck Hurgronje ought rather to have directed his wrath at Von Oppenheim and Schabinger, but again he might not have deemed these men to be worthy of his scholarly attention.

Even if the proclamation did not work out as planned, the colonizing nations thought it wise to request the explicit loyalty of their Muslim subjects. In London *The Times* published a series of declarations from Muslims in India on 12 November 1914, while the Aga Khan had already expressed his support on 4 November. The Russians had the mufti of the Caucasus issue a fatwa against the Ottoman proclamation.⁵⁴ However, *The Times* did not offer its readers the text of the five Ottoman *fatwas*, as Becker added “the censor knows why.”⁵⁵

On the French side Louis Massignon volunteered on the Dardanelles battlefield and later joined the Sykes-Picot negotiations, where he met T.E. Lawrence. Becker praises Massignon's patriotism, and sends him his regards through his correspondence with Snouck Hurgronje.⁵⁶ The *Revue du monde musulman* published an impressive series of expressions of loyalty from Muslim leaders, both in facsimile and in translation, from North and West Africa under the title *Le salut au drapeau. Témoignages de loyalisme des musulmans français* (1916). Already in December 1914 the same journal published an issue under the title *Les musulmans français et la guerre. Adresses et témoignages de fidélité des chefs musulmans et des personnages religieux*. This issue opened with a reference to Snouck Hurgronje's highly critical article. It also contained a letter from the

sultan of Morocco encouraging his Muslim subjects fighting in Europe to defend France. For Becker the praise that Snouck Hurgronje obtained from the French in for example *Le Temps* of 20 January 1915 demonstrated once again that his scholarly analysis was in fact a support for the allied cause, which made his claim to neutrality questionable.⁵⁷

Nachleben

The involvement of orientalist scholars in the war effort and the Ottoman Jihad has become the subject of numerous historical studies from the 1980s onwards. The polemic between Snouck Hurgronje and Becker has aroused special attention, and led to new polemics, such as between Peter Heine (1984) and Ludmila Hanisch (1992). Recently (2014) Dietrich Jung published an overview article with extensive references offering a lesson for the area studies debate and for the understanding of the Arab spring. Wilfried Loth and Marc Hanisch collected a series of case studies on the German involvement in the Jihad (2014). Christiaan Engberts is preparing a study on the ideals about the scholarly *persona* that he is reconstructing from the correspondence that resulted from the clash between the two scholars. For me two of the most enlightening studies on the debate were the articles by Schwanitz (2003) and Hagen (2004).⁵⁸ In order to understand the German scholars' involvement in the war effort we also need a solid view of Germany's Oriental policy, which was an important part of her foreign policy.⁵⁹

It would be interesting to review this abundant body of literature. Its sound historical research would clarify many of the issues raised by the two protagonists. It would also nicely contrast the concerns and ethics of scholars who thought they were serving their countries, the Muslims and humanity at large by their applied Islam studies, with those scholars of the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first who have been ushered into post-colonial thinking by Edward Said. However, all this falls outside the scope of this article, but remains a *desideratum* for another occasion.

Conclusion: Orientalism as Cultural Critique

The clash between Snouck Hurgronje and Becker was not about their actual involvement in society and politics as such, but about bad scholarship, wrong decisions, dangerous policy and scholarly ethics. The main question was not whether or not to use scholarship for

policy matters, but *how* to use it properly. They disagreed about the values that should guide scholars in their involvement and analysis. For Becker, and for many of his German colleagues, as for their French and British counterparts, patriotism was a supreme value, especially in times of war. Snouck Hurgronje strongly condemned this choice. For him the international dimension of orientalism, expressed in the international congresses of orientalists in their publication projects such as the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, and in their networks of correspondence and friendships, came first. He combined his cosmopolitan vision with an endorsement of the colonial project aimed at civilizing Muslims and thereby bringing them from the Middle Ages to modernity. Education of an elite and the separation of religion and politics, implying religious freedom for Muslims to practise their rituals, were important tools for creating this modernity. This international project would contribute to world peace and progress, for which he considered some elements from the Islamic tradition more apt than Christianity. The war endangered both his scholarly project of the study of contemporary Islam and accompanying social aim of the modernization of Muslims, to which Snouck Hurgronje had devoted his life.

Understood in this manner Orientalism also offered a tool for criticism of Western culture. Snouck Hurgronje repeatedly contrasted the Islamic condemnation of war against co-religionists and of strife in general as impious with the war craze that dominated his times. His article was not only a defence of Dutch colonial interests, but much more an expression of utter concern about the destruction of civilization and a moral indignation about the barbarism of war, by a man who had seen sufficient action himself.

The practice of orientalism as a cultural critique, in the tradition of the *Lettres persanes* and the budding science of anthropology, did not yet lead to a radical self-critique, questioning the relationship between the production of knowledge and its social uses to exercise power. However, its relativism could go together rather well with advocating a policy of education and “ethical administration”, aimed at increasing the welfare of “the natives”, as the engagement of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and Cornelis van Vollenhoven shows. A more radical epistemological critique would emerge only in the 1970s, through the work of scholars such as Foucault, Rodinson and Said. Since then the polemic between Snouck Hurgronje and Becker has served as a case for numerous analyses in the wake of the Orientalism debate. The case under review may serve as yet another reminder of the necessity of such constant self-criticism and self-questioning. We are living again in times full of rhetorics about the dangers of extremism, radicalization, pan-Islamism and Jihad, and

scholars are engaged in the war effort as much as ever, this time also dealing with "the enemy within." It is striking to see that now, as 100 years ago, the subject of Jihad is at the top of the research agenda. Perhaps the Master from Leiden could teach us a grain of caution in our commitments and opinions.

Notes

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- 2 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, *Verspreide geschriften III*, Bonn and Leipzig: Kurt Schröder Verlag; 1923; p. 291.
- 3 Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld (ed.), *Orientalism and Islam. The Letters of C. Snouck Hurgronje to Th. Nöldeke from the Tübingen University Library*, Leiden: Documentatiebureau Islam-Christendom; 1985; p. 194.
- 4 Van Koningsveld, *Letters Snouck Hurgronje to Nöldeke*, p. 192.
- 5 Ludmila Hanisch (ed.), *Islamkunde und Islamwissenschaft im Deutschen Kaiserreich. Der Briefwechsel zwischen Carl Heinrich Becker und Martin Hartmann (1900–1918)*, Leiden: Documentatiebureau Islam-Christendom; p. 82.
- 6 Hanisch, *Briefwechsel Becker und Hartmann*, p. 84.
- 7 All references are to the English translation reprinted in Snouck Hurgronje's collected studies volume III (Snouck Hurgronje 1923).
- 8 Snouck Hurgronje, *Verspreide geschriften III*, p. 263.
- 9 Ibid., p. 265.
- 10 Ibid., p. 267.
- 11 Ibid., p. 268.
- 12 Ibid., pp. 268–269.
- 13 Ibid., pp. 269–273.
- 14 Ibid., p. 272.
- 15 Ibid., p. 274.
- 16 Ibid., p. 279.
- 17 Ibid., p. 282. On Muslim prisoners in Germany see also Martin Gussone's contribution to this book.

- 18 Ibid., p. 282.
- 19 Ibid., p. 283.
- 20 Ibid., pp. 283–284.
- 21 Ibid., p. 284.
- 22 Ibid., p. 284.
- 23 Christiaan Engberts, *Orientalists at War*, Leiden: unpublished paper; 2014.
- 24 All references are to the version reprinted in Becker's collected studies: Carl Heinrich Becker, *Islamstudien II*, Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer; 1932; pp. 281–304.
- 25 Becker, *Islamstudien II*, pp. 286; 297.
- 26 See its reproduction in *Welt des Islams* 3(1915) no. 1, p. 5.
- 27 Becker, *Islamstudien II*, pp. 288; 293.
- 28 Ibid., p. 293.
- 29 Ibid., pp. 294–295.
- 30 Ibid., p. 298.
- 31 Ibid., pp. 287 and 287 n. 2; 301.
- 32 Ibid., p. 303.
- 33 Ibid., p. 303.
- 34 All references are to the version reprinted in Snouck Hurgronje's *Verspreide geschriften III*, pp. 285–292.
- 35 All references are to the version reprinted in Becker, *Islamstudien II*, pp. 304–309.
- 36 Ibid., p. 306.
- 37 Ibid., pp. 307–309.
- 38 Ibid., p. 309.
- 39 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islâm*, Leiden: E.J. Brill; 1915; second enlarged edition; (orig. 1911).
- 40 Snouck Hurgronje, *Verspreide geschriften III*, pp. 327–354.
- 41 Jean-Jacques Waardenburg, *L'Islam dans le miroir de l'Occident. Comment quelques orientalistes occidentaux se sont penchés sur l'islam et se sont formé une image de cette religion*. I. Goldziher, C. Snouck Hurgronje, C.H. Becker, D.B. MacDonald, L. Massignon, Paris & La Haye: Mouton; 1963.
- 42 Snouck Hurgronje, *Verspreide geschriften III*, p. 270.
- 43 Ibid., p. 282.
- 44 Ibid., p. 279.
- 45 E.g. Hartmann to Becker, in Hanisch, *Briefwechsel Becker und Hartmann*, p. 83.
- 46 For information on Snouck Hurgronje see: Waardenburg, *L'Islam dans le miroir*; Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld, *Snouck Hurgronje en de Islam*, Leiden: Documentatiebureau Islam-Christendom; 1987; Jan Just Witkam, 2007, "Inleiding"; in: Snouck Hurgronje, Christiaan; *Mekka*, Amsterdam: Atlas Contact; pp. 7–184; Arnoud Vrolijk and Richard van Leeuwen, *Arabic Studies in the Netherlands. A Short History in Portraits, 1580–1950*, Leiden: Brill 2014, pp. 117–150; Léon Buskens and Jan Just Witkam (eds.), *Scholarship in Action. Essays on the Life and Work of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje*, Leiden: Brill; forthcoming.
- 47 His daughter described daily life in the imposing house, which has carried his name since its sale to the Leiden University Fund shortly after his death, in an unpublished memoir: Christien Liefcrinck-Snouck Hurgronje, *Snouck Hurgronje Huis*, Den Haag: unpublished typescript; 1991.

- 48 Van Koningsveld, *Letters Snouck Hurgronje to Nöldeke*.
- 49 Proof of his reputation as a leading scholar of Islam is his inclusion in the special issue of the *Revue du monde musulman* 12(1910) no. 12, on "Trois maîtres des études musulmanes", together with Martin Hartmann and Edward G. Browne. I owe this reference to the generosity of Claude Lefébure.
- 50 Letter from Snouck Hurgronje to Nöldeke 23 December 1914 in Van Koningsveld, *Letters Snouck Hurgronje to Nöldeke*, p. 117.
- 51 Apart from the essay by Martin Gussone in this volume, see on the Muslim (and other colonial) prisoners of war in Germany for example Margot Kahleyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg. Kriegsgefangene im 1. Weltkrieg. Ansichten und Absichten*, Berlin: Museum für Völkerkunde; 1998; Franziska Roy, Heike Liebau and Ravi Ahuja (eds), *"When The War Began We Heard of Several Kings." South Asian Prisoners in World War I Germany*, New Delhi: Social Science Press; 2011; Benedikt Burkard and Céline Lebreton (eds), *Gefangene Bilder. Wissenschaft und Propaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Petersberg: Michael Imhof Verlag; 2014.
- 52 On the relations between applied Islam studies and German intelligence before, during and after World War I, see Larissa Schmid, "Competing Visions of Area Studies in the Interwar Period: The School of Oriental Languages in Berlin", *Middle East – Topics & Arguments* 4(2015), pp. 50–60.
- 53 Cf. Peter Heine, "Salih ash-Sharif at-Tunisi, A North African Nationalist in Berlin during the First World War", *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* no. 33 (1982), pp. 89–95.
- 54 Becker, *Islamstudien II*, p. 287, n. 1.
- 55 Ibid., p. 303, n. 1.
- 56 Engberts, *Orientalists at War*, pp. 5–6.
- 57 Becker, *Islamstudien II*, p. 304.
- 58 Peter Heine, "C. Snouck Hurgronje versus C.H. Becker. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der angewandten Orientalistik", *Die Welt des Islams* 32(1992) no. 1, pp. 378–387; Ludmila Hanisch, "Gelehrtenverständnis, wissenschaftliche Rationalität und politische 'Emotionen'. Ein Nachtrag", *Die Welt des Islams* 32(1992) no. 1, pp. 108–123; Dietrich Jung, "The 'Ottoman-German Jihad': Lessons for the Contemporary 'Area Studies' Controversy", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 41(2014) no. 3, pp. 247–265; Wilfried Loth and Marc Hanisch (eds), *Erster Weltkrieg und Dschihad. Die Deutschen und die Revolutionierung des Orients*, München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2014; Engberts, *Orientalists at War*; Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, "Djihad 'Made in Germany': Der Streit um den Heiligen Krieg 1914–1915", *Sozial. Geschichte* 18(2003) no. 2, pp. 7–34; Gottfried Hagen, "German Heralds of Holy War: Orientalists and Applied Oriental Studies", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 24(2004) no. 2, pp. 145–162.
- 59 The literature on this issue is extensive, with quite polemic views. See, for example, Jennifer Jenkins, "Fritz Fischer's 'Programme for Revolution': Implications for a Global History of Germany in the First World War", *Journal of Contemporary History* 48(2013) no. 2, pp. 397–417. I owe this reference and a meeting with the author to Larissa Schmid, with whom I had fruitful discussions during my stay at ZMO in Berlin.

2 The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad*

Mustafa Aksakal

Why did the Ottoman empire proclaim Jihad in November 1914 and who was the proclamation's genuine author? Did the impetus come from Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German emperor, whose faith in Jihad stemmed from the desire to undermine Berlin's rival empires, Britain, France, and Russia, who all ruled over large Muslim populations? Or did the proclamation originate with the Ottomans themselves and, perhaps more specifically, with the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, the men who ruled the empire during World War I? In truth, the proclamation had both German and Ottoman origins. In this chapter, I focus on the latter, to examine Ottoman uses of Jihad both before and after November 1914.

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje's The Holy War "Made in Germany" (1915)

In 1915, one of the foremost European Islamicists, C. Snouck Hurgronje, in several publications denounced his German colleagues for inducing the Ottoman government to issue a world-wide call for holy war. In particular, Snouck chastised his fellow scholars Martin Hartmann and Carl Heinrich Becker for allowing political expediency to prevail over academic integrity.¹ He charged them with resuscitating "a thoroughly mediaeval institution, which even the Mohammedan world was outgrowing."² The German government, aided by its academics, "for their own selfish interests [was leading the Ottomans back] into the ways of mediaeval religious hatred which they were just about to leave."³

Jihad in the Ottoman Register before 1914

The 19 November 1914 issue of the *İslam Mecmuası* (the journal of Islam), published in Istanbul, carried a number of documents related to the Ottoman proclamation of Jihad. It included the Jihad proclamation itself, the call to Jihad by Sultan Mehmed Reşad V, the fatwas issued by the

sheikhülislam authorizing the move, the statement by the top military commander, Enver Pasha, and, finally, “a few words” of editorial comment by the publication’s director, Halim Sabit.⁴

The Ottomans did not need German blandishments to convince them of the advantages of issuing a Jihad declaration in 1914. By employing Jihad the state was mobilizing the support of its Muslim subjects in a time of war. This policy was aimed in particular at the empire’s Arab inhabitants, whose leaders the British courted and whose allegiance the state sought to secure.⁵ Contrary to what Entente propaganda was wont to argue, the declaration stemmed neither from an Ottoman desire for a global Muslim empire nor from a German gambit. The state’s use of Jihad in 1914, moreover, was far from unprecedented. Ottoman history shows us that the centralized state, along with its religious authorities, military and political leaders, and – beginning in the mid-nineteenth century with the emergence of the institutions of mass society and its outlets – newspaper editors, journalists and intellectuals, understood and employed the powerful ideological energies that “Jihad” could mobilize. They also understood the dangers of such an ideology. While Jihad had the potential to unify Muslims against intruders, it could also, in their diplomatic relations, estrange the Ottomans from the European powers and, at home, speed up the disintegration of the multi-confessional empire by sparking hostilities between its Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Thus for much of the nineteenth century the government in Istanbul sought to join the European concert, not to fight it. It was not for nothing that the Ottomans’ understanding of international law included not only “holy war” but also “holy peace.”⁶

The concept of Jihad occupied a quotidian place in the Ottoman cultural register, and its motley everyday presence as well as the state’s repeated use of Jihad-as-holy-war throughout the long nineteenth century make it odd that the best-known Ottoman Jihad declaration – that of November 1914 – has been largely understood as a “jihad made in Germany.” Jihad was a prominent cultural concept, and usages of the term “Jihad” spilled into a wide variety of meanings. The jolly seventeenth century traveller and adventurer, Evliya Çelebi, for example, characterized his patron’s most intimate marital moments devoted to “the propagation of the species” as a “greater jihad.” His patron was the grand vezir, whose wife, Kaya Sultan, was a strong-willed woman, we are to understand.⁷ During the years of the Crimean war (1853–1856), in another case, a certain Ayşe travelled to Istanbul to join the “jihad” – never mind that the state had not, and did not, issue a call to holy war during that war against Russia. Ayşe’s initiative leaves us wondering about the meanings

and function of Jihad, but it also demonstrates its evidently broad appeal. Whether she intended to take up arms or perhaps was expressing her willingness to serve as a field nurse remains unknown. She may also have simply expected the state to reward her patriotism monetarily and to send her home, which is how the episode ended.⁸ Even though the documentation lacks detail, we can say at least that her case was not unique; the same year a woman by the name of Nazıma presented similar intentions.⁹

In the Ottoman world one did not even have to be Muslim to wage “jihad.” When Maronite Christians in Mount Lebanon felt threatened by the growing number of Protestant missionaries from the United States in the 1820s, the Maronite patriarch saw his church fighting a “struggle [original: *jihād*, M.A.] with all our power against those Biblemen.”¹⁰ For the early Ottoman period, Linda Darling and Cemal Kafadar have each emphasized the situational character and fluidity of the ways in which the concept Jihad was employed. And they have differentiated Jihad from *gaza*, two related but distinct categories often simply rendered into English as “holy war.”¹¹ Both Darling and Kafadar have shown that “holy” by no means meant “in line with Islamic law” and that, perhaps counter to our modern expectations, Christian corsairs – or an Armenian prince and a Greek princess, for that matter – could be featured in epics and stories as warrior heroes fighting shoulder to shoulder with Muslims.¹² Thus the meaning of “jihad” went beyond any one legal-doctrinal definition and signified a generic call for marshaling all-out effort in the face of great challenges. Such a broad understanding explains why the new coins minted in the crisis years under Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839), for example, were named “jihadiye” coins.¹³

In Arabic the word *jihād* connotes “striving.” The concept appears in the Koran without a definitive explanation and thus over the centuries it has been interpreted by scholars in various ways. *Jihād* has been defined as the internal, entirely peaceful struggle carried on by the individual believer striving to honour divine expectations *and*, at other times, as external, violent warfare waged against non-Muslims.¹⁴ The internal, peaceful form, moreover, has been referred to as “greater jihad,” whereas the external, violent form has been referred to as “lesser jihad.”¹⁵ Thus the fact that the Young Turk government of the Ottomans in 1914 declared the war against Britain, France, and Russia (and Serbia and Montenegro) a “greater jihad” (*cihad-ı ekber*) seems to betray, at first sight, a stunning ignorance of classical Jihad doctrine on the part of the Ottoman leaders.¹⁶ Could the Young Turks and their German allies have got their Jihad so wrong?

The Ottoman Jihad in 1914

The Jihad proclamation was first deliberated upon, then prepared in the form of five legal opinions or fetvas (*fatwā*), endorsed by 29 religious authorities, blessed formally by the sultan, received by the members of the Ottoman chamber of deputies, presented in a closed ceremony to political, military and religious dignitaries on 11 November, and then, with great fanfare on 14 November, a Saturday, read out publicly by the Custodian of the Fetva (*Fetva Emini*), Ali Haydar Efendi, to a large crowd assembled outside the Mosque of Mehmed the Conqueror in the Fatih neighbourhood of Istanbul, not far from the Haliç, the fabled Golden Horn.¹⁷ All this took time and was not accomplished in a single day but rather over the course of several weeks. There are still other “correct” dates for the proclamation. Arnold Toynbee’s *Islamic World since the Peace Settlement* puts the declaration on 23 November, the day on which, as Toynbee notes not incorrectly, “the Sultan-Caliph” Mehmed v (Reşad) “promulgated” the fetvas “signed by the *Sheykhul-Islām*,” the highest-ranking religious dignitary.¹⁸ Gottfried Hagen, who has published a collection of pan-Islamic pamphlets found at the University of Heidelberg, has shown that the first publications of the fetva appeared as early as 7 November.¹⁹ And, in fact, even earlier, on 3 November – thus immediately after the Ottoman surprise attack on Russian Black Sea ports on 30 October and the Russian declaration of war on 2 November – *İkdam*, the large Istanbul daily and no friend of the ruling Union and Progress regime, had urged that “the declaration of jihad against these states who are the enemies of Islam” had become a “duty for all Muslims.”²⁰

What seems more plausible than Young Turk ignorance, however, is the erasure of the line between the individual’s and the state’s efforts in the age of anti-colonial mass movements and total war. The erasure between the personal and the official, the internal and the external, amounted to the “secularization of jihad”, to draw on Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet’s description of the phenomenon in Iran.²¹ But if “jihad” became secularized through its employment for secular, political ends, then the reverse also became true and resulted in the “Islamization of politics” or, put differently, the “politicization of Islam.”²² Both framings point to a new type of convergence of politics and religion in the nineteenth century. What was new was not the convergence itself but the extent to which it was employed by the state in a new era of mass society and universal conscription armies. In other words, a century so often described as a century of secularization was, in fact, in the Ottoman case just as in societies all across Europe, one in which religion became ever more prominently a part of international conflict. İsmail Kara’s analysis

and painstaking translation of excerpts from some 70 publications and manuscripts appearing in the late Ottoman period clearly illustrate this process.²³ Anti-colonial struggles, whether armed or not, became framed as Jihad from Indonesia to western Africa.²⁴

During the period from 1768 to 1922, the state issued official Jihad declarations on at least six occasions.²⁵ In 1773, the state declared Jihad during the war against Russia that led to Russia's annexation of the northern Black Sea region.²⁶ And again in 1809 it did so against its own Serbian population,²⁷ accompanied by eight banners to be "unfurled for jihad."²⁸ In 1829 the state declared Jihad against Russia for supporting the Greek revolt: "[b]ecause the Russians have incited the Greek Orthodox to wage war [against us] in pursuit of independence and because this war has thus been caused by hostility towards the Islamic faith and therefore is a religious struggle, jihad has become an obligation for all those between the ages of twelve and seventy of the people of Islam."²⁹ It did so again in the one-month-long Greek-Ottoman war of 1897, a rare victory during this long stretch of Ottoman defeats.³⁰ In 1914 the declaration was aimed collectively against the Entente powers, Britain, France and Russia, and their allies. And in 1919, religious leaders in Mustafa Kemal's resistance movement – hence technically not the Ottoman state – declared Jihad against Greece, to mobilize support for Mustafa Kemal against both the Greek armies in May 1919 and against the British-controlled government in Istanbul.³¹

This type of accounting, however, focusing on declarations of war, is inadequate because it omits the many other instances in which the state employed the concept of Jihad. In mid-1821, for example, in the face of the Greek uprising that led to an independent Greek state in 1832, the palace sent out directives to officials in Istanbul and its vicinity "to call upon the Muslims to bind their hearts together" and "to observe the 5 times daily prayers," reminding them that in the age of the Prophet Muhammad "when *shari'a* was followed, *jihad* performed and the religious beliefs were firm, ... the Muslims were victorious."³² In explaining why the Ottomans had suffered so many military defeats since the eighteenth century, the sultan's court historian, delivering his sovereign's imperial decree in 1826, claimed that the Ottomans' earlier victories had flowed "from the virtue of the sword of jihad (*seyf-i cihad sayesinde*)."³³ The army of Mehmed Ali, the governor of the province of Egypt, was known as the *Jihadiye*. When in 1831 he sent his forces into Syria against those of the sultan with the intention of capturing the Ottoman capital, Sultan Mahmud II had fetvas issued against the ambitious governor and his son, the *Jihadiye*'s commander, declaring them "rebels."³⁴ Sultan Mahmud II's own troops – newly reorganized, all-Muslim, and renamed in 1826 –

had marched under the banner of “The Trained Triumphant Soldiers of the Prophet Muhammad.” During the Crimean war, even though the state did not declare Jihad, as we have seen, the special taxes collected to support that war were designated “jihad donation (*iane-i cihadiye*)” and “jihad taxes (*rüsumat-ı cihadiye*).”³⁵ And throughout the uprisings across the Balkans during the 1870s and the 1877–1878 war with Russia, the state subsidized the publication of books on Jihad – although here, too, because of its potential international consequences, it refrained from declaring Jihad publicly.³⁶

What inspired these continued uses of religion by the state in the nineteenth century? Virginia Aksan suggests that this turn towards religion in military and political affairs reflected a state policy of Islamization, or re-Islamization – a “revival of religious fervor” necessitated by the need “to recreate an [Islamic] ‘orthodoxy’ in the face of both Muslim and non-Muslim challenges to legitimacy.”³⁷ Over the long nineteenth century Ottoman elites employed an “image of Islam” in the manner of an “invented tradition” by blending religion with resistance to European encroachments, often by depicting the Prophet Muhammad “as an exemplar in war.”³⁸ Butrus Abu-Manneh has linked this development to the ascendancy among the Ottoman elites of sufi mystics from the Khalidiye branch of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order. The Khalidiye had been moulded by the experience of British imperialism in India and had abandoned previous quietism in order to achieve not only religious but also “political regeneration.”³⁹ By the end of the nineteenth century, cadets at the war college who missed prayers or did not fast during Ramadan were receiving disciplinary demerits.⁴⁰ Maintaining those practices was deemed necessary because “the survival of the Sublime State depends on the preservation of the Islamic faith”, and all civil and military members of the state had to understand “the sacredness of their duty.”⁴¹

Already by 1826, the rhetoric used for the mobilization of the army by military leaders and state bureaucrats increasingly cast non-Muslims and non-Turks as “politically or militarily” unreliable.⁴² To be sure, the vast, complex empire of the Ottomans did not adhere to a single set of unidirectional policies or one consistent ideology in its approach to the challenges of modernity. Far from it: internationally the Sublime Porte sought to join the European concert, while domestically, beginning in 1839 with the *Tanzimat* reforms (the “re-orderings”), it put in place laws, and even granted semi-autonomous constitutions in the attempt to hold Christian communities inside the Ottoman imperial frame. But prevalent attitudes associated with Islam and Jihad pushed the other way, and they played a central role in the way the state

and its elites, and increasing segments of the Muslim public, defined themselves. The Habsburg empire, also a multinational state, could counter centrifugal pressures by coupling legally enforced religious toleration with an emphatic association of the dynasty, culturally and ceremonially, with the Catholicism to which the overwhelming majority of its subjects belonged. In the Ottoman lands, religiously far more heterogeneous, national cleavages were reinforced rather than undercut by religious identities. The dilemmas of the multi-national state that was also multi-confessional could not have been demonstrated more starkly.

Those at the helm of the Ottoman state were well aware of the self-destructive potential built into instrumentalizing Islam. Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) sought to use jihad as a diplomatic lever, not as an actual military policy; “the threat of *cihad*,” as one historian put it, “was more effective than the call itself.”⁴³ Islam could be the sword that united Muslim Ottomans from the Balkans to Arabia but it could at the same time be the sword that sliced into the Ottoman body politic cutting out Christians and Jews. In moments of violence against Christians the state rushed to punish the alleged transgressors, often summarily without adequate investigation, in the effort to calm European diplomats and, gradually, European public opinion. Thus the commander on whose watch inter-communal violence broke out in Lebanon in 1860 was put to death alongside two aides.⁴⁴ Similarly, about 30 participants were swiftly executed for the gruesome slaying of the German and French consuls by a mob in Salonica in 1876, murders that had been prompted by the conversion of a young Bulgarian woman to Islam and the woman’s subsequent detention and concealment by her relatives. In the ensuing chaos, according to reports, the ringleaders demanding the woman’s release claimed that “the holy war is about to commence.”⁴⁵ In the war against Russia in 1877, Sultan Abdülhamid II decided it would be prudent to refrain from an Ottoman Jihad declaration, a calculation that did not prevent the sultan from receiving a Muslim delegation from Russian Dagestan and explicitly blessing its Jihad declaration against the Russian state with an imperial decree (a *ferman*).⁴⁶ His prudence was certainly vindicated, as the Ottomans had the European powers on their side at the Berlin Congress, which overturned much of Russia’s military successes and the treaty it had imposed at San Stefano. Similar calculations anticipating international support from the great powers meant that the Ottomans not only did not declare Jihad during the Crimean war or the Russian war of 1877–1878, as we have seen, but also not, as we shall see, during the Italian war of 1911–1912 and the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913.⁴⁷ When in 1894, during large-scale massacres of

Armenians, European papers reported that the Ottomans were engaged in Jihad against their Christian subjects, the state took quick steps to deny the charge.⁴⁸

In all its modern wars the military used Jihad in its conscription and recruitment efforts, in the training and drilling of troops, and in its efforts at rallying army and society behind the flag. In so doing, Sultan Abdülhamid II, for one, believed himself in good company. Shortly after the “Bulgarian massacres” of 1876 that had so exercised European opinion, the sultan complained that “We are accused in Europe of being savages and fanatics ... [Yet] unlike the Czar, I have abstained till now from stirring up a crusade and profiting from religious fanaticism, but the day may come when I can no longer curb the rights and indignation of my people at seeing their co-religionists butchered in Bulgaria and Armenia.”⁴⁹ By 1892, the day *had* come “In England, Russia and France there are Bible Societies which become exceedingly rich through the donations of rich and fanatical Christians who bequeath all their wealth to them in their wills ... Although the English, Russian and French governments seem not to be involved in their activities, they secretly aid and abet them in sending missionaries into darkest Africa. In this way they spread their beliefs among the local population. By increasing the numbers of their followers this religious influence is then transformed into political leverage ... Although it is obviously desirable to take firm measures against them, if open opposition is brought to play the Sublime Porte will suffer the vexing interventions of the three powers’ ambassadors. Thus the only way to fight against them is to increase the Islamic population and spread the belief in the Holiest of Faiths.”⁵⁰ What did Abdülhamid II mean by declaring his intention to “increase the Islamic population”? Perhaps policies aimed at winning converts in foreign lands. But the massacres of Armenians in the mid-1890s, during which entire villages of terrified Christians sought safety in mass conversion to Islam, suggests that one way the Muslim population could be increased was by decreasing the Christian one.⁵¹

The military distributed publications to army chaplains, some written by the chaplains themselves, others by officers, with stories intended to fortify morale and impart lessons of courage and sacrifice. Typically such stories were built around the ideal of Jihad in terms that conflated religious and secular goals. In one such booklet Jihad meant “unity, fulfilling shari’a law, contributing to the health of the nation, protecting the dignity and glory of the state, building up the country, bringing aid to the umma, [and] preserving the homeland.”⁵² In another, *The Virtues of the Champions of Islam* (“Mujahideen”), Colonel Osman Senai insisted on loyalty, discipline and purity of heart and purpose.⁵³ In *Jihad*

is the *Lord's Command*, published in 1910, the fictional Little Halil – an Ottoman G.I. Joe – presents himself to the recruitment officer. The officer, however, sends the recruit back home upon learning that Halil has no one but an elderly mother and an unmarried sister, and that his father had died after fighting in many a campaign. Halil, with much gusto, objects to his rejection and explains that it had been his mother herself who had sent him.⁵⁴ Thus the recruitment officer is portrayed as compassionate, Halil and his family as eager for Jihad. Such publications, written by officers, religious scholars⁵⁵ and by the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress that would unseat Abdülhamid II in 1908/9 and seize power in a coup in 1913,⁵⁶ cast further doubt on the assumption that it took German machinations to produce the Jihad declaration of 1914.

When the Italians opened the bombardment of the Libyan coast in early October 1911, a play by Mehmed Sezai entitled *The Sacred Jihad, or the Ottoman-Italian War in Tripoli* was performed in Izmir/Smyrna almost immediately.⁵⁷ “Jihad” played such an important role as a rallying cry among both the regular units and the irregular local resistance in the Italian-Ottoman war that even though the state issued no formal call to holy war, both contemporary observers and subsequent scholars have assumed it had.⁵⁸ A religious gloss on the conflict was encouraged by both sides, as “the Catholic Church and the Pope blessed the Italian fighters and praised God for helping them to replace the Crescent with the Cross in Libya.”⁵⁹ It was not lost on Ottoman officers fighting in Tripoli, including the empire’s future minister of war, Enver, that Italian propaganda was aimed at exploiting ethnic differences and setting the local Arab population against the “Turks.” Italian propaganda held out a deal to Ottoman Arabs: “Let it not be hidden from you that Italy (may Allah strengthen her!), in determining to occupy this land, aims at serving your interests as well as ours, and at assuring our mutual welfare by driving out the Turks ... They have always despised you. We, on the other hand, have studied your customs and your history. We know that you keep your word, and that the Turks oppress you by taxation and conscription. We respect your noble religion because we recognize its merits, and we respect also your women. Woe unto him who will venture to touch them! It is true that we belong to another faith, but we also are People with a Book (Ahl el Kitab), and we practice justice and give alms to the poor. We recognize the rights of all men, and especially of the Arabs, about whom history records so many great things ... There is no doubt that with God’s help, we shall drive the Turks out of this country.”⁶⁰ Those concerned with salvaging the empire hoped to counter such challenges by employing Islam – and Jihad – to strengthen the

bonds crucial for holding together the empire's various parts. Thus, while the Italians were appealing to Arab nationalism, the Ottomans knew that they held the Islam card.

Since Italy had grabbed Libya with no *casus belli* other than a determined desire for empire,⁶¹ the Ottomans expected the great powers to rein in their Italian colleagues. In fact, not a few European observers sympathized with the Ottomans and saw international law on their side.⁶² Ottoman expectations of effective support, however, were bitterly disappointed. It was in the Libyan war, with the Balkan inferno hard on its heels, that the officers and leaders of 1914 cut their teeth; these "Christian" aggressions were the crucible that imbued them with a deep sense of violation and victimhood.⁶³ This generation embodied the lesson that "our honor and our people's dignity cannot be preserved by those old books of international law, but only by war."⁶⁴

It was this sense of victimization that could legitimize oppression of Christians in the Ottoman empire. Between January and June 1914 the state had ethnically "cleansed" – as the Russian ambassador quoted Talat Bey, the Ottoman minister of interior, as saying – the coastal regions around Izmir of their Greek Orthodox population.⁶⁵ From 1912 to 1924, the percentage of non-Muslims in Ottoman Asia Minor plummeted from roughly 20 per cent to less than 2 per cent.⁶⁶ Only a portion of this reduction can be accounted for by the forced emigration in Spring 1914 of 200,000 Greeks or the 192,000 refugees that left Asia Minor after the official exchange of populations agreement signed between Greece and Turkey in 1923.⁶⁷ Nor can it be explained away by the food shortages and disease that hit Christians and Muslims alike. The disgusted analysis of the young political scientist Ahmed Emin (Yalman), a man who would later become a famous Turkish journalist and writer, makes plain that not all Turks supported these "religious" policies, policies Emin was convinced were cynical at their core. But his dissent also demonstrates the extent to which these policies had already begun to be implemented among non-Turkish Muslims before the November declaration. From his perch at Columbia University, young Emin assessed the latest period in Ottoman history in his 1914 doctoral dissertation: "[r]eligion was used as a basis of agitation to secure popularity ... Phrases like "Ottomanism," and the "unity of all elements of population in Turkey without distinction of creed and religion" were still cited; but the meaning given to them was no longer the meeting of the different elements on a common and neutral ground through mutual sacrifice as citizens of the Ottoman empire possessing equal rights."⁶⁸

Complicating the picture, Enver Pasha told Kaiser Wilhelm II on 22 October 1914 that a declaration of Jihad would be imprudent since the

Ottomans were in alliance with Christian powers. He offered instead to have the sultan-caliph call on all Muslims under British, French and Russian rule to rise up in rebellion.⁶⁹ Did Enver really oppose the Jihad declaration? Certainly not. As we have seen, the Ottoman leadership, and Enver himself, promoted the idea of Jihad to mobilize both soldiers and civilians alike. With the stock of all the neutrals rising during the July crisis and the first months of the war – after Germany had met with unexpected resistance in Belgium and France, and Austria-Hungary in Serbia – Enver was exploiting Wilhelm II's one-dimensional understanding of Jihad. "Jihad" was not the magic wand of the German emperor's imagination. It was not a weapon that could be activated upon the signal of the Ottoman sultan-caliph, the nominal head of all Muslims but in reality a ceremonial head of state in 1914. As for the Ottomans, they had scored a major diplomatic victory by signing an alliance with Germany, the great power of their choice, on 2 August. They had used the July crisis to break out of an international isolation which they believed was slowly strangling them. Once they had signed the alliance, however, they strove to stay out of the war while salvaging the alliance with Germany into the post-war period, during which they hoped to reform the empire under the relative international security that would be provided by the alliance with Berlin. During the summer of 1914 and throughout the war, moreover, the Ottomans were able to draw on enormous German military aid.⁷⁰

The Ottoman leadership had long embraced the idea of using Jihad to mobilize the people for the state's defence. As early as 7 August – three days prior to the controversial arrival in Istanbul of the two German warships, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, and three whole months prior to the Jihad declaration – Enver wrote to Cavid Pasha at Fourth Army Headquarters in Baghdad, "War with England is now within the realm of possibilities. Contact ... [the local Arab leaders]. Since such a war would be a holy war [*böyle bir harb mukaddes olacağına*] ... it will definitely be pertinent to rally the Muslim population ... in [neighboring] Iran under Russian and English rule to revolution."⁷¹ He added, "I invite everyone to come to the state's defense in this war" in which "Muslims will rise up" and "end Christian rule over Muslim peoples."⁷² Thus, in their communications with Arab leaders, statesmen in Istanbul utilized Islam to build up an image of brotherhood. "But should our enemies wish to soil our land with their filthy feet," Enver wrote to the regional notable Nakibzade Talib Bey of Basra on 10 August, "I am convinced that Islamic and Ottoman honor and strength will destroy them."⁷³

This evidence does not mean that Berlin did *not* press hard for the Jihad declaration in 1914. After all, the Kaiser's faith in Jihad – or in "war by revolution" – was long-standing, and it made perfect geo-strategic

sense.⁷⁴ But the manifold presence of Jihad in Ottoman international and domestic politics throughout the nineteenth century down to 1914, and its presence in both popular and state publications and in the internal correspondence among Ottoman officials, moreover, make a strong case that Jihad would have been an important aspect of Ottoman warfare in 1914 without Wilhelm II and the German orientalist.

The long general report that was read to the assembled members at the 1916 annual congress of the Committee of Union and Progress – the ruling party – also suggests that the Ottomans themselves had made Jihad part and parcel of their warfare. The congress, presided over personally by Grand Vezir Said Halim Pasha and Minister of the Interior Talat Bey and held in late September 1916 in the Nuruosmaniye neighborhood in Istanbul, spoke about the current war as a “jihad.”⁷⁵ An official military publication issued to village councils in the same year makes the following points: “[t]hose of us between the ages of twenty and forty-five are obligated to serve in our military whenever we are called to defend our beloved homeland and our holy religion. To answer this call and rush immediately to the recruiting station is for us religion and honor. Being called into the military is one of God’s commands. If they are needed [for the defence] of the state during wartime those over the age of forty-five will also be called [to service]. All able-bodied Muslims are obligated by their religion to participate in jihad. On the battlefield we must remember how the Prophet and his comrades fought wars for their faith and honor.”⁷⁶ In 1916, the state was only too aware that casting the enemies as Christians often led to the breakdown of stable relations between Muslim and Christian populations within the empire. In this particular publication the author, Major Mehmed Şükrü, an army recruiting officer in Zonguldak on the Black Sea, addressed directly the role of non-Muslims. Even though fighting on behalf of the state was a religious duty, non-Muslims should be full participants in this struggle to save the state: “[o]ur Christian and Jewish friends are also the children of this homeland. Together with us they, too, are obligated to fight against the enemy for the defense of our homeland, that is to say, for their mother, and to spill their blood and to kill and be killed on this journey. And so just as Muslims, Christians, and Jews harvest the fields together and make a living, in wartime they must fire cannons and rifles, throw bombs, and wield swords together.”⁷⁷

In the nineteenth century the call to Jihad was a common node around which Muslims organized their resistance against European (and, in the Philippines, U.S.) domination. From Indonesia to India and to Iran, all around the Ottomans religiously-driven revitalization and resistance movements had been mobilizing for decades. Ottoman

rulers were certainly circumspect in employing this tactic themselves, because for much of the nineteenth century Ottoman governments had sought to become members of the European state system. When they did embrace Jihad, however, they did so primarily for domestic reasons, to mobilize the loyalty of a majority-Muslim society behind an Islamic empire. Had the Jihad indeed been “made in Germany” it is unlikely that publications intended to foster morale and cultivate an Islamic Ottoman identity would have continued all throughout the war even after its global impact, in which Kaiser Wilhelm II had put so much faith, had proven so negligible. And yet, a steady stream of publications appeared unabated down to 1918.⁷⁸ The author of *Holy Jihad is a Religious Duty (Cihad-ı Mukaddes Farzdır)*, like Ahmed Emin, read Jihad as a domestic, wartime policy of social mobilization although, unlike Ahmed Emin, he gave it a positive rather than a negative report card: “[p]eople of Islam! Whatever your nationality, whatever your language, the Lord has declared all of us brothers and sisters.”⁷⁹

Conclusion

Jihad had many faces. It could be a key component in forging an alliance with a non-Muslim European power such as Germany and be employed against other non-Muslim European powers at the same time. It could be an ideology hostile to non-Muslims in the Ottoman empire and, at other times, explicitly include non-Muslims in the Ottoman fold. Jihad could be evoked against Muslims as well as Christians. The Ottoman leadership thought of Jihad instrumentally, using it wherever they thought it would benefit the interests of the state. These contradictions point to the malleability of Jihad in Ottoman life of which the 1914 declaration was one episode in a history of many.

Notes

* This chapter is a modified version of my “‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad”, in *War in History* 18 (April 2011), pp. 184–199.

1 C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Holy War “Made in Germany”* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s, 1915), introduced by Richard J.H. Gottheil, translated by Joseph E. Gillet (New York: Putnam, 1915), originally published as “Heilige Oorlog made in Germany,” *De Gids: Nieuwe Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen* (Amsterdam) 79 (1915), pp. 1–33.

2 Ibid., p. 80.

3 Ibid., p. 82.

- 4 *İslam Mecmuası*, No. 15, 6 Teşrin-i sani 1330 (November 19, 1914): "Cihad-ı Mukaddes İlanı," "Beyanname-i Hümayun Sureti," "Cihad-ı Mukaddes İlanı ve Fetava-yi Şerife," "Başkumandanlık Vekaletinin Beyannamesi Sureti," *İslam Mecmuası* Tarafından Birkaç Söz." The preceding issue, No. 14, appeared on 5 November 1914.
- 5 Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 187.
- 6 The Habsburg-Ottoman Treaty of 1664 was described as *mübarek sulh*, or holy peace: see Viorel Panaite, *The Ottoman Law of War and Peace: The Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers* (Boulder: East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 79.
- 7 Robert Dankoff, *An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Çelebi* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 121.
- 8 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), A.MKT.MHM 58/97, 1270 (1853).
- 9 BOA, İ.DH 306/19416, 1270 (1853).
- 10 Patriarch Yusuf Hubaysh quoted in Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 131.
- 11 Linda Darling, "Contested Territory: Holy War in Comparative Context", *Studia Islamica* 91 (2000), p. 133; Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 79–80.
- 12 Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, pp. 67–68 and 83.
- 13 Şevket Pamuk, "The Great Ottoman Debasement, 1808–1844: A Political Economy Framework", in *Histories of the Middle East: New Directions*, ed. Israel Gershoni, Hakan Erdem, and Ursula Woköck (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 28–29.
- 14 Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 1–2.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- 16 Hülalü, *Pan-İslamizm*, p. 209.
- 17 For the sultan's Jihad declaration and the fetvas, in Ottoman Turkish with Arabic translation, showing the 29 signatures and the sultan's instructions "I order the promulgation of this declaration. Mehmed Reşad", see BOA, İ.DVİT 1/28, 4 Muharrem 1333 [22 November 1914]. For the public events that unfolded on 14 November 1914 see 'İslam'ın Günü', *Tanin*, 15 November 1914. There is little scholarship on Ali Haydar Efendi, but see the sketch by Mehmet Gündoğan, *Ahıska'lı Ali Haydar Efendi* (κ.σ.) (Afyon: Medrese Kitabevi, 1996). For photographs of the ceremonies of 11 and 14 November in Istanbul and a photograph of the public declaration in Medina see Stanford J. Shaw, *Triumph and Tragedy: November 1914–July 1916*, vol. 2, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2008), pp. 751–753.
- 18 Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs: 1925*, vol. 1, *The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 43.
- 19 Gottfried Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg: Flugblätter und Flugschriften in arabischer, persischer und osmanisch-türkischer Sprache aus einer Sammlung der Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1990), p. 3.

- 20 *İkdam*, “Gaza-i Ekber – Silah Başına”, 3 November 1914; *İslam Mecmuası* (The Islamic Review), appearing in Istanbul, published the “noble fetvas” alongside a “jihad proclamation” in its issue of 19 November 1914: “Cihad-ı Ekber İlanı ve Fetva-yı Şerif,” *İslam Mecmuası*, 6 Teşrin-i Sani 1330, Sayı 10, 440–441.
- 21 Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 144. For the Iranian Jihad declarations see Mohammad Hassan Kavousi Araghi and Nasrollah Salehi (eds.), *Jihadieh: The Holy War Fatwas of the Grand Ulama and Mujtaheds in World War I* (Tehran: Unit for Documentary Publication, 1997).
- 22 Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- 23 İsmail Kara, *Hilafet Risâleleri*, 5 vols., *İslam Siyasî Düşüncesinde Değişme ve Süreklilik* (Istanbul: Klasik, 2002–2005).
- 24 Michael Francis Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The umma below the winds* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Cheikh Anta Babou, *Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).
- 25 Stanford Shaw’s comment on the 1914 declaration shows that Jihad remains an understudied topic in Ottoman history: “the Ottomans had never really resorted to it [jihad] in all the wars that they had fought with Russia since the beginning of the eighteenth century.” See Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I*, vol. 2, p. 760.
- 26 BOA, C.HR 90/4492, no month, no day, 1773.
- 27 BOA, C.HR 52/2567, 10 May 1809.
- 28 BOA, C.AS 414/17121, 14 Cemaziyelahir 1224 (27 July 1809).
- 29 BOA, C.HR 38/1864, no month, no day, 1244 (1829).
- 30 According to Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, pp. 256 and 370, though the circumstances of this declaration remain ambiguous.
- 31 Günter Seufert and Christopher Kubaseck, *Die Türkei: Politik, Geschichte, Kultur* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004), p. 84; Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (New York: The Overlook Press, 1999), p. 282; Klaus Kreiser, *Atatürk: Eine Biographie* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), pp. 153–155. The religious language used by Mustafa Kemal’s resistance movement was downplayed, if not omitted, in later accounts: see Erik-Jan Zürcher, “The vocabulary of Muslim nationalism,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 137 (1999), pp. 81–92.
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- 38 Gottfried Hagen, "The Prophet Muhammad as an Exemplar in War: Ottoman Views on the Eve of World War I," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 22 (Spring 2000), p. 156.
- 39 Abu-Manneh, *Islam and the Ottoman Empire*, p. 8.
- 40 Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 94–97.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 97.
- 42 Hakan Erdem, "Recruitment for the 'Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad' in the Arab Provinces, 1826–1828," in *Histories of the Modern Middle East: New Directions*, ed. Israel Gershoni, Hakan Erdem, and Ursula Woköck (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 190.
- 43 Karpát, *Politicization of Islam*, p. 234.
- 44 Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000; 1962), p. 17.
- 45 "Salonica after the Assassinations," *The Times*, 3 June 1876.
- 46 Karpát, *Politicization of Islam*, pp. 86–87.
- 47 Eyal Ginio, "Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream," *War in History* 12 (April 2005), pp. 161 and 177.
- 48 BOA, Y.A.HUS 321/32 (1312/1894).
- 49 Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, p. 46.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 114.
- 51 Selim Deringil, "'The Armenian Question Is Finally Closed': Mass Conversion of Armenians in Anatolia during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895–1897," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51 (April 2009), pp. 344–371.
- 52 *Cihad Emr-i Hakdır* (Dersaadet: n.pub., 1326/1910), pp. 2–3.
- 53 Osman Senai, *Fezail ül-Mücahidin* (Istanbul: Kütübhan-e İslam ve Askeri, 1320/1904), pp. 1–16 and 24–29.
- 54 *Cihad Emr-i Hakdır*, pp. 3–9.
- 55 Hagen, "The Prophet Muhammad as Exemplar in War," pp. 145–172.
- 56 See M. Şükrü Hanioglu's discussion of the 1907 publication *Hayy ale-l-felah* in *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 213 and 435, note 535.
- 57 Mehmed Sezai, *Cihad-ı Mukaddes yahud Trablusgarb'da Osmanlı-İtalya Cengi* (İzmir: Keleşyan Matbaası, 1327/1911); Günver Güneş, "II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İzmir'de Tiyatro Yaşamı," *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 18 (2005), pp. 151–171; Ö. Faruk Huyugüzel, *İzmir Fikir ve Sanat Adamları (1850–1950)* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2000), pp. 400–401.

- 58 G.F. Abbott, *The Holy War in Tripoli* (London: Longman's, Green, 1912), pp. 38 and 100–105; Rachel Simon, *Libya Between Ottomanism and Nationalism* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1987), pp. 11 and 87.
- 59 Simon, *Libya*, p. 87.
- 60 Abbott, *Holy War in Tripoli*, pp. 193–194.
- 61 Timothy W. Childs, *Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya, 1911–1912* (New York: Brill, 1990), p. 36.
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- 65 Giers to Sazonov, 26 June 1914, *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, Series I, vol. 3, no. 386, 334.
- 66 Erik-Jan Zürcher, “Griechisch-orthodoxe und muslimische Flüchtlinge und Deportierte in Griechenland und der Türkei seit 1912,” in *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Klaus J. Bade et al. (Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink, 2007), pp. 623 and 627.
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- 76 Mehmed Şükrü. *Heyet-i İhtiyariye* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1332/1916), pp. 44–45.
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- 78 See, for example, the book by the former sheikhulislam, Musa Kâzım, *İslam'da Cihad* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye ve Şürekası, 1333/1917).
- 79 The phrase “holy jihad” was widely used and not considered redundant. *Cihad-ı Mukaddes Farzıdır* (N.p., 1332/1916), pp. 4–5.

3 (Not) Using Political Islam

The German Empire and Its Failed Propaganda Campaign in the Near and Middle East, 1914–1918 and Beyond

Tilman Lüdke

Introduction

The defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II brought to an end what Bloch has termed the imperial phase of German history (1871–1945).¹ There is an ongoing debate whether Germany's imperial policies were carefully planned or rather opportunist in nature. Archival evidence strongly suggests the latter, particularly where German policies in the Near and Middle East are concerned. Yet there were also authors suggesting the existence of a sinister German imperial project, aiming at the establishment of direct or indirect German control over the region's peoples and resources. Events in and around World War I are frequently quoted to support this view: the German-Ottoman alliance was concluded between unequal partners; clearly the weaker party was the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian genocide is often referred to as a kind of test-run for the Holocaust. There is also the suggestion that German policies between 1914 and 1945 were marked by continuity; German military and political decision-makers in 1939 merely took out of the drawers the blueprints of 1914 that had been deposited in those drawers in 1918. Moreover, these German policies were, in turn, presumably the blueprints for all kinds of inhuman, brutal, anti-western and anti-semitic sentiments and the behaviour of Muslims up to the present.²

The myth that Germany pursued a deliberate and structured Near and Middle East policy with clearly defined ends is surprisingly resilient. Like every myth it contains several grains of truth. After 1890 Germany did indeed wish to create an empire of its own; and after 1898 the Germans did consider the Middle East as a promising region in which to set up an informal empire in alliance with the supposedly moribund Ottoman Empire.³ To that purpose, German capital was used to push forward the so-called "Baghdad Railway", and to prepare the ground for a German imperial project entailing German settlers in Anatolia (which was soon

scrapped for want of the ability to achieve it).⁴ Germany's colonial rivals were greatly concerned with the strategic implications of these policies: with the Bagdad Railway extended towards Kuwait (its originally intended terminus) German soldiers could be transported to the Persian Gulf in less than a week: a march on British-held India would then be facilitated. Given the nineteenth century history of British obsessions with the "Great Game" and a Russian threat to India, this was a renewed Imperial scare. The good relations Germany enjoyed with the Ottoman government seemed to facilitate such policies even more.⁵

These ambitious schemes notwithstanding, Germany rather saw itself frustrated in its imperial undertakings before 1914. German imperial possessions did not seem to amount to much (but in strictly territorial terms were by no means unimpressive), yet German military and political decision-makers realized quite clearly that territory or population was not the backbone of empire: it was infrastructure. The British Empire might have been a patchwork of possessions of various sizes the world over, but Britain had not only the Royal Navy, but also the infrastructure to keep it operational. Germany possessed no such thing. By 1909, it was tacitly acknowledged that the Germans had lost the naval arms race, and no degree of technological superiority could obscure the fact that any German battle-cruiser far from home would eventually have to surrender for lack of fuel. Even for the most patriotic German an uncomfortable realization had dawned by 1914: Germany was weak, not strong, and surrounded by potentially hostile powers (a hostility German policies before 1914 had done nothing to ward off).⁶ A potential German ally in the Middle East was thus regarded as valuable.

The German-Ottoman Alliance

When representatives of the Ottoman and German Empires put their signatures to the treaty of alliance on 2 August 1914, two very strange partners were united. Germany was a heavily industrialized European Great Power. The Ottoman Empire was a predominantly agrarian empire with a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, which suffered from several problems of long duration. First, an increasing number of non-Muslims in the Empire tried to break away from imperial control and desired to set up their own national states. By 1914, several such groups had already succeeded in doing so. A Greek national state became independent in 1832, a Serbian and Romanian state in 1878. At the time of the revolution of 1908 Bulgaria, having enjoyed *de facto* independence

since 1877, proclaimed full independence. Yet one should not be too hasty in judging the internal political climate within the empire, as more recent research has revealed. While there were doubtless separatists in every group, and even in the Muslim community there were some who were opposed to the ongoing preservation of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious mode of life, the majority of Muslims and non-Muslims seem to have preserved good mutual relations.⁷ Thus it appears that the fears of internal disintegration, which in all likelihood played a prominent part in the eventual decision of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to create a Muslim national state rather than preserve a multi-ethnic empire, were probably exaggerated.

Internal disintegration thus seems to have been less of a problem. Colonial encroachment by the European powers, on the other hand, was an on-going and real threat to the Empire's survival.⁸ Finding a protector against this encroachment consequently seemed of vital importance to the Ottoman government. Much has been written about the internal workings of alliances, yet while it is by now firmly established that very few alliances or ententes are "cordial" in nature, it is unusual for an ally to turn on another.⁹ Thus, if the impression can be created that the security of one ally (in this case the Ottoman Empire) is of importance – or even of vital importance – to the other (in this case Germany), the preconditions for an alliance are laid.

This was the military dimension of the German-Ottoman alliance. Germany might have been a strong industrial and military power, but it was located in the centre of Europe. Its choice of allies in the decades before the war had been as deficient as its general foreign policy: where Bismarck left a Germany with secure ties to all powers except France (thus practically guaranteeing an equilibrium and peace in Europe) in 1890, by 1914 Germany was allied with Austria, suffering from a weak industry and internal strife between its many nationalities, and Italy, the weakest of all the European industrial powers and politically highly unreliable due to its manifold political clashes with Austria. In addition, the almost criminal negligence or incompetence of Germany's political elite caused most of Bismarck's security architecture to be dismantled. In 1914 Germany faced a two-front war with weak allies.¹⁰ An alliance with the Ottoman Empire was an interesting proposition: the Ottomans might attack Russia from the south and thus subject the "Russian steam roller" to the same problems as Germany – a two-front war. Thus one of the reasons why Emperor Wilhelm II overruled the initial objections of German military and political decision-makers to the alliance was the German monarch's conviction "that the Empire could do something against Russia."¹¹

Yet, in German eyes, the real Ottoman secret weapon was something else: Islam. Since the sixteenth century, Ottoman sultans had added “caliph” to their long list of titles. For 300 years after the conquest of Egypt (1516–1517), little political use had been made of this title.¹² But when Ottoman sultan Abdülhamit II came to power the caliphate began to be used as an Ottoman diplomatic weapon – sometimes with considerable success, which doubtless fuelled German imagination.

The belief that Islam possessed a mobilizing potential for Muslims when it came to combatting colonizing powers was, in itself, neither naïve nor unfounded. The French in Algeria were the first to experience this phenomenon: in the absence of anything akin to Algerian nationalism, ‘Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir¹³ referred to Algeria as “Dar al-Islam”, which Muslims were called upon to defend against the infidel invaders. Similar situations occurred during the entire nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: examples include the Indian “mutiny” of 1857–1858 as well as the Mahdiyya in the Sudan (1881–1898), the protracted resistance of Mullah ‘Abdallah Hassan in Somalia against British, French and Italian colonization or the anti-Italian struggle of the Sanusiya Sufi-Order in Tripolitania.

Moreover, the substitution of “Islam” for “nationalism” had another effect: Europeans were increasingly led to believe that what motivated Muslims most was “Islam”, in the sense of a universal religion rather than particularist nationalism. Thus the idea that pan-Islam existed, and that Muslims were prepared to fight for what Europeans perceived to be “Islam”, and that such readiness to fight might be harnessed in the service of one of the warring camps seemingly was not entirely unfounded. Put to a reality check, however, such notions very quickly proved erroneous.

Perceptions of Islam

In the context of this chapter I shall not focus on “Islam” itself, but rather on the perception of Islam by the European powers in 1914, and on the meaning of “Islam” as a socio-political factor in Muslim societies. The basic question is: as what could Islam be perceived in 1914? Was it a universal religion? Was it a set of social and political values? Was it a militant ideology? And, secondly, which element in Islam was the more important: the universal global idea of the *umma*, which in principle ruled out the fact that Muslims could become nationalists, or local/regional culture, language, perhaps ethnicity, which made Muslims feel themselves to be inhabitants of their home regions first, and members of the *umma*

second? It seems impossible to do these crucial questions justice in a short chapter; what one may do, however, is to analyse briefly how Europeans saw Islam by the outbreak of World War I.¹⁴

While Europeans regarded Islam mainly as a form of aberrant religion (from the Christian point of view) during the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age, they became more interested in the social and political aspects of Muslim societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹⁵ By the early twentieth century, one might argue that Islam had established itself firmly on the research agendas of European scholars. True, the number of “Orientalists” was small and their impact limited, but every European country by the outbreak of war in 1914 had a small number of specialist scholars at its disposal.¹⁶ Their ranks were swollen by career diplomats, administrators and politicians, who had often served in colonies with substantial Muslim populations; and, last but not least, there were the eccentrics: dilettantes dealing with “the Orient” in the most varied ways. Some of them, like Wilfred Scawen Blunt in Britain, became lifelong advocates of the rights of the colonized populations, and thorns in the flesh of colonial and colonizing politicians; some developed ingenuous, not altogether well-founded theories of how the colonized Muslims might be used for the interests of one European Great Power against its rivals. One of the most noteworthy examples of the latter kind was German baron Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, who may with some justification claim to be the most influential individual in bringing about the German pan-Islamic Propaganda during World War I.

No serious Orientalist could ever be accused of having misconceived Islam as one monolithic body. They were very well aware that “Islam”, even if regarded only as a religion, was deeply fragmented. The rather obvious split between Sunnis and Shi’ites was complemented by the existence of a multitude of other religious movements, some only in the widest sense “Islamic.” The differences in the socio-cultural expressions of Islam were also duly noted: to name but a few examples, there was the state Islam of the Ottoman Empire, headed by the sultan-caliph; there was the academic-legal Islam of Al-Azhar university in Cairo; there were, on the opposite end of the scale, Muslim brotherhoods in more remote areas of the world, for example all over Africa. These were usually treated with some contempt – German Orientalists cursorily brushed off African Islam as “Negerislam”, Black Islam, in the sense of a third- or fourth-rate Islam of no concern to Orientalists and colonial powers alike. But it was especially these highly de-centralized Muslim brotherhoods who had demonstrated their militant potential at several occasions: in Algeria, in Libya, the Sudan, Somalia, etc.¹⁷ “Islam” obviously could, and

did, make Muslims fight.¹⁸ Muslim resistance, without exception, had eventually been overcome, sometimes at a hefty price, but the crucial question remained: would it be possible to unite all Muslims in a revolt against colonialism per se, regardless of where and under what rule these Muslims lived? The Germans believed, or rather allowed themselves to be persuaded, that such a possibility did exist.¹⁹

They were not the only ones. Harold Nicolson, permanent under-secretary in the British Foreign Office, warned his superiors in 1911 of the dangers of Ottoman pan-Islamic propaganda: “[t]his would only assist towards the creation of a power which, I think, in the not too far distant future – should it become thoroughly consolidated and established – would be a very serious menace to us and also to Russia ... Germany is fortunate in being able to view with comparative indifference the growth of the great Mussulman [*sic*] military power, she having no Mussulman [*sic*] subjects herself, and a union between her and Turkey would be one of the gravest dangers to the equilibrium between Europe and Asia.”²⁰

It was exactly this special German situation – her apparent status as a non-colonizer (Nicolson omitted the considerable concern German colonial administrators and missionaries expressed about anti-colonial Islamic activities in practically all German colonial territories) – and her emerging rivalry with Britain which had led German politicians and diplomats to cotton on to the potential appeal of a German-led Islamic propaganda campaign. As early as in 1889 the liberal Friedrich Naumann had prophesied that in case of a world war “the caliph of Constantinople will once more uplift the standard of Holy War. The sick man will rise himself for the last time to cry aloud to Egypt, to the Sudan, to East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan and India: “War against England!” It is not unimportant to know who will support him on his bed when he utters this cry!”²¹ Naumann’s views were echoed by Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf, who was to become chief of the general staff of the Ottoman Army in 1914, and most importantly Max Freiherr von Oppenheim. Although at the margins of the German political establishment, the baron managed to persuade the German government to set up an elaborate apparatus for conducting pan-Islamic propaganda from 1914 to 1918.

With the benefit of hindsight it can be argued that this propaganda campaign failed: yet what were the reasons for this failure? Was the central mistake that the pan-Islam the Germans had been appealing to did not exist? Had the Germans, perhaps, been attributing too much importance to Muslims’ identity as Muslims, disregarding the great differences between Muslim societies?

Pan-Islam vs. Muslim Nationalism: Reality or Chimera?

The erroneous German view of Ottoman “Muslim policy” could be explained by what the Western powers must have viewed as the stirrings of global Muslim solidarity in the face of colonial encroachment. Muslims did fight when their independence was threatened: this had been amply proved in the cases of Algeria, the Sudan, the Caucasus, Libya, to name but a few. Yet even so a sober analysis of these localized conflicts pitching Muslims against Western colonizers could give the Western powers reason to be cautiously optimistic. Muslims had often held off colonial conquest for years, if not decades, yet they had ultimately been defeated.

On the other hand the Western powers were aware that Muslims could not accept such defeats as permanent. “Islam” was, after all, seen as a “fanatical religion”; it exhorted its adherents to conduct permanent holy war against the infidels, and particularly so where the infidels had conquered territories regarded as *Dar al-Islam*. Consequently, Muslim colonial populations were regarded with a great deal of apprehension. Even if they seemed to acquiesce in colonial control, there might be smouldering resentment, which the right call to Jihad at the right time under the right conditions could blow up into an open conflagration. Localized revolts or resistance movements might be overcome; a global Muslim Jihad against the colonial powers might not. As has already been pointed out, regardless of the rather disdainful views of Western Orientalists about the very existence of pan-Islam, politicians feared it greatly – that is to say, politicians of those powers which had colonial possessions to lose. The Germans, on the other hand, began to ponder the idea of using this “Muslim weapon” in case of need.

Pan-Islam, in principle, is a tautological expression. One of the very foundations of Islam is the idea of the *umma*, the world-wide community of all Muslims, which is supposed to have a deeper meaning than any particular ethnic, cultural or political identities. Pan-Islam, however, is a useful term to describe the political consequences of this feeling of solidarity and belonging together of Muslims. Pan-Islam centred, of course, on the figure of the caliph, and it is partly this orientation which must be seen as one of the central weaknesses of pan-Islam as a movement.

It might be argued that, amongst all Islamic institutions and legal terms, the caliphate is one of the worst-defined. Its very origins were an act of improvisation. After the death of the prophet two systems of succession were pitched against each other: that of election of the most dignified member of the community against that of family relationship with the prophet. The two positions eventually translated into Sunna and

Shi'a. The first caliph, Abu Bakr, came into office through an election, but this was not recognized by part of the community (which became the Shi'a). In later centuries all sorts of caliphal oddities could be observed: there could be more than one caliph (in the tenth century there was a Sunni caliph at Baghdad, a Shi'ite caliph at Cairo and a rival Sunni caliph at Cordoba). Caliphs also could be powerless figureheads, their spiritual influence notwithstanding. It might be argued that the Mongols abolished the caliphate for the first time, killing the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad in 1258 (thus in effect abolishing it 666 years before the Turkish Grand National Assembly). According to (official) Ottoman legend, in 1517 Ottoman sultan Selim I was proclaimed caliph by the last member of the Abbasid dynasty in Cairo. Becoming caliph meant a great increase of prestige for the Ottoman sultans.²² There is beautifully preserved diplomatic correspondence, for example, with the Indian Mughals:²³ externally they are oozing politeness, if not deference, to the addressee, yet on the other hand Ottoman correspondence is often full of subtle insults, such as depictions of an Indian Mughal seeking protection from the superior Ottoman sultan-caliph. It is generally acknowledged that the Ottoman sultan was accorded a particularly exalted position, as far as Muslim rulers were concerned, from the sixteenth century onwards.

Yet being caliph and interested in maintaining one's credibility as the world's most powerful Muslim ruler could also turn out to be troublesome and expensive.²⁴ Consequently, from the mid-sixteenth century on the Ottomans used their title of caliph rather sparingly. It was not until the long rule of sultan Abdülhamid II that Ottoman pan-Islamic activity was pursued with renewed vigour. Abülhamid II was perhaps not the first to use the "Muslim weapon" against colonial encroachment, but certainly the Muslim ruler who used it with the greatest effect. Not only was he able to instil in Indian Muslims loyalty to the Ottoman sultanate – amongst other things evidenced by *hutba* being read in his name in Indian mosques – but he was even able to demonstrate his pan-Islamic powers to colonial powers: the sultan could, if he saw fit, exert his influence on behalf of the colonial powers, and make sure that their Muslim subjects were quiet and obedient. The opposite, however, also held true: although never tried in practice, a call of the Ottoman sultan for Jihad could have potentially devastating consequences for the colonial powers. It was therefore in their interest not to treat the Ottoman Empire aggressively. This seemingly obvious conclusion was arrived at by all the colonial powers, notably Britain – and also by their potential rivals, notably Germany.

The Germans, then – and particularly diplomat cum dilettante-Orientalist Max Freiherr von Oppenheim – had it all pat. It sounded

too good to be true: ally Germany with the caliph; have the caliph declare Jihad; see the Muslims rising in revolt in droves, and see the enemies of Germany reeling from the pan-Islamic conflagration. And, of course, see Germany profit handsomely from these developments.

It was too good to be true. Muslims did indeed feel solidarity with the Ottoman Empire during World War I; but Muslim nationalists very soon made it overly clear that their main interest was the independence of their home countries from all outside powers – including the Ottomans. Yet the deep rifts between different interpretations of Islam had never been overcome. During the First World War many, if not most, Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and outside it realized that this was not their war; they feared the deprivations and ravages of war, saw it as entirely unnecessary and did their best to preserve their neutrality. Muslims thus were not “fanatical masses”, but rather coolly pragmatic. The lack of fanaticism was one of the most important reasons for the abject failure of the German pan-Islamic propaganda campaign. Yet how had the German – and not only German, but Western – misreading of the possible behaviour of Muslims come about?

The possible answer lies in two arguments: first, Muslims acted by and large pragmatically and not ideologically. Second, the Committee of Union and Progress had by 1914 already squandered a good deal of its Muslim credentials, the gravest of which was to reduce the sultan-caliph to little more than a figurehead.

Political Errors: The Young Turks and the Sultan-Caliph

Although Kansu has argued to the contrary, the revolution of 1908 was not particularly revolutionary.²⁵ A long period of autocratic rule came to an end; but it has to be noted that the constitution of 1876 was reinstated, not created, at that time. There certainly was no regime change and more importantly, little desire for such. The sultan complied with the wishes of his loyal people, was duly celebrated with enraptured cries of “Padişahımız çok yaşa (Long live our sultan!)”, and seemed, for the time being, to have avoided the worst as regards his own person. Abdülhamid remained sultan-caliph. Matters came to a head less than a year later, when the attempted counter-revolution of 31 March 1909 failed. Abdülhamid was deposed and sent into internal exile.²⁶

At the time it seemed the obvious course to take for the Committee of Union and Progress. Abdülhamid, it appeared, was an incorrigible

autocrat; as long as he remained sultan the revolution and its achievements could not be safe, and consequently only by removing him could such safety be gained. Yet, on the other hand, it gradually dawned on the Young Turks that in doing so they had committed a grave political error: in the revolution of 1908 they had converted an autocratic into a constitutional monarchy. This did not clash with Islamic law. However, as the monarch in question also happened to claim the caliphate with some reason, the Young Turks had created the legal novelty of a constitutional caliph, which most Muslims regarded as impossible. Finally, in 1909, they had deposed the caliph, although, in terms of Islamic law, no charge could be brought against him. The caliphate was not abolished, but it was an open secret that sultan-caliph Mehmet V. Reshat was under the firm control of the Ottoman government (if not directly the Young Turks), and that both the sultanate and the caliphate had been seriously reduced in power.

For the leading political force of what claimed to be a Muslim empire, the Young Turks indeed had behaved strangely, if not to a certain extent suicidally.²⁷ For a long time this course of action has been explained by the Young Turks' disregard for Islam, making them appear to be predecessors of Kemalist laïcism. However, now an alternative interpretation seems possible: the Young Turks, in their majority, did not discard Islam as an important socio-political element, yet they strove to reform Islam, a reformation which would see a national Islam – or a Muslim nationalism – prevail over the *umma*-based pan-Islam espoused during the reign of Abdülhamid.

The Reformation of Islam

Today some Muslim scholars, as well as many Western observers of Islam critical of its supposed incompatibility with modernity, Western values, democracy and the rule of (secular) law, point to the need for a reformation of Islam. Yet it might be argued that such a reformation has already taken place, namely in and after World War I; and “reformation” is a term used intentionally, for this Islamic reformation did indeed have striking similarities to the European reformation of Christianity.

Two dimensions of this reformation have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the issue of religious reform. Luther initially had no intention to offer a fundamentally different interpretation of Catholic Christianity (and even less so did Henry VIII of England). But, as it turned out, “reformation” would soon turn into a move away

from fundamental Catholic doctrines, and particularly the leadership of the pope. The accusation that I use here supposedly uncritically Christian developments as a parallel for developments in nineteenth century Islam might be countered by the fact that, for instance, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani pointed out that Islam in fact needed a reformation – with himself as a Martin Luther.²⁸ Yet the reformation of Islam was not transforming into a theological process of modernization, but into one of nationalization – which had also been an integral part of the European Christian reformation.

This phenomenon, transferred to the Muslim world, is what, for want of a better term, I would call the reformation of Islam. Muslim nationalists in the making realized that Islam was not opposed to nationalism, but on the contrary could serve as a vital social glue to form national communities. It was to serve the state and to be under state supervision; and the formation of national states of Muslims was not in contradiction to the concept of the *umma*: Muslims simply would have to develop a dual personality. On the one hand, as Muslims, they could continue to be part of the *umma*; on the other hand, as nationals, their loyalty was due to their nation and national state. It might be argued that these Muslim nationalists thus, many years before Clifford Geertz, had discovered that “Islam” might be a universal concept, but had a deeply different character depending on the ethnicity, place of residence and culture of Muslims all over the world.²⁹ World War I would see this new doctrine of “national Islam” being put into practice.³⁰

Rather than identifying nationalism as a danger to the idea of a Muslim *‘umma*, intellectuals and politicians were beginning to regard nationalism as a helpful tool for the defence or acquisition of political independence for the Muslim community.³¹ It would not be wrong to argue that this symbiosis of Islam and nationalism was that which motivated most (eventually successful) anti-colonial movements in all parts of the Muslim world: many of the anti-colonial thinkers and political leaders adhered to concepts originating in Europe, such as nationalism and even socialism, but none of them rejected the mobilizing power of religion.³²

This topic is arguably far too vast to be done justice to within the context of a chapter of an edited volume; yet suffice it to say that European powers, including the Germans, were well aware of it by the outbreak of World War I. Rebekka Habermas has demonstrated that a lively debate on Islam, on its “positive” and “negative” aspects – always within the framework of German colonialism – existed at the very latest by around 1900.³³

The Proclamation of Jihad-i Ekber: Disappointment

Although the German-Ottoman alliance was concluded on 2 August 1914 – the day war broke out in Europe – the Ottoman government successfully procrastinated about entering the war. It was not until the end of October that the Ottoman fleet – greatly reinforced by two German cruisers having sought sanctuary in the Golden Horn and later been acquired by the Ottoman navy – was ordered to attack Russian harbours and shipping in the Black Sea. The inevitable Russian declaration of war was followed soon afterwards by similar declarations by Britain and France: the Ottoman Empire was at war. Two weeks later the event the Germans set such great stock by occurred: “Jihad-i Ekber (the greatest of all jihads)” was proclaimed in front of the Fatih Sultan Mehmet mosque in Istanbul. Eyewitnesses reported an enthusiastic reaction by the local Muslim populace. However, soon afterwards reports by German diplomats from the Ottoman provinces painted a less rosy picture: most Ottoman Muslims reacted with indifference to the proclamation. There was no indication at all of a global Muslim uprising on behalf of the Ottoman sultan-caliph. Clearly the proclamation and the lustre of the caliphate had been insufficient to produce the (German-)desired results. Max von Oppenheim was undeterred: if an Ottoman proclamation failed to produce a Jihad, a protracted German propaganda campaign would in due course lead to success. The practical outcome of this thinking was the “Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (Intelligence Office for the East)”, an institution with the predominant task of carrying out pan-Islamic propaganda.

German Propaganda Operations: The Intelligence Office for the East (IOfE)

German officialdom was initially reluctant to accept Oppenheim's proposals and also quite unwilling to bear the considerable (expected) cost of the IOfE. Oppenheim's rather dubious personality, which led the German establishment to regard him more as a dandy than a diplomat, also might have been a reason for the lack of official enthusiasm for the IOfE. The baron's views about pan-Islam were by no means unanimously accepted. They were based on the information he had obtained through intensive contacts with an older generation of Egyptian or other Middle Eastern elites, not through intensive study and detached observation or analysis.³⁴ Oppenheim also had an inclination to exaggerate and invent, which both his official superiors and the

German Orientalists, who claimed the monopoly of qualified knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs, often frowned upon. Thus both the baron and the IOFe remained on the fringes of the Foreign Office and did not get the attention they thought they deserved. In all likelihood Oppenheim's propaganda institutions, the IOFe and from April 1915 his "Nachrichtenstelle der Kaiserlich Deutschen Botschaft (Intelligence Office of the Imperial German Embassy)" in Istanbul, represented attempts to incorporate Oppenheim into the establishment, from which he felt excluded.³⁵

The IOFe, which the baron founded in September 1914, was initially paid for by Oppenheim himself; only in 1915 was the organization properly funded by the Foreign Office. At first it did not even get proper accommodation. Lack of office space necessitated its move from the Foreign Office building in the Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin, to the *Reichskolonialamt* (Imperial Colonial Office), and eventually to a spacious flat in the Tauentzienstrasse.³⁶ The IOFe began its existence as an organization short of both manpower and funds. In the beginning it set out to produce propaganda material, notably war reports about the situation on the Western Front, and a propaganda newspaper for Muslim POWs under the title *al-Jihad*; later both the personnel and tasks to be performed expanded continuously, often taxing the IOFe staff's stamina to breaking point. This reflected the German official attitude, which regarded pan-Islamic propaganda as an interesting and potentially worthwhile experiment, but remained nevertheless focused on the Western Front. The war in the Middle East was regarded as Turkey's business. Yet the differences in German and Ottoman interests in the Middle East, which were soon to emerge, made a central organization of German and Ottoman propaganda impossible and strongly contributed to its ultimate failure.

The personnel of the IOFe consisted of academics, diplomats, businessmen and missionaries, many of whom had practical experience of work in the Near and Middle East. In spite of official scepticism and their own doubts about the existence or appeal of pan-Islam before the war, a considerable number of German Orientalists served in the IOFe. As a later commentator noted, "The facility with which sincere and dextrous hands may shape cases on either side of a controversy, leaves no doubt that, in the future, the propagandist may count upon a battalion of honest professors to rewrite history, to serve the exigencies of the moment, and to provide the material for him to scatter hither and yon."³⁷ The institution was structured into sections, each headed by a German and encompassing both German and Middle Eastern personnel.

Internal Organisation of the IOfE

I, 1: Arabic Section, German personnel:

- Professor Eugen Mittwoch, director (became director of IOfE 03/16–11/18)
- Dragoman Pröbster (served as vice-consul and dragoman in Morocco before the war)
- Dragoman Schabinger (Oppenheim's successor as director of IOfE 03/15–02/16)
- Apprentice Dragoman Schröder
- Dr. Ruth Buka
- Dr. Curt Prüfer (became the leading German intelligence agent in Syria and Palestine)

I, 2: Arabic Section, Arab Personnel:

- Dr. Ahmad Vali (Egyptian, lecturer at Faculty of Oriental Languages, Berlin University)
- Shaykh Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi (Tunisian, also a member of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa, the Unionist Secret Service led by Enver Pasha)
- Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Shawish (Egyptian, famous pan-Islamic radical, also a member of TM)
- Dr. Muhammad Mansur Rifat (Egyptian doctor, nationalist radical in exile in Switzerland)
- 1st lieutenant Rabah Bou Kabouya (formerly of the French army, wrote propaganda leaflets under the namen of Al-Hajj 'Abdallah)
- Two grandsons of the famous Algerian independence fighter 'Abd al-Qadir

II, 1: Persian section, German Personnel:

- Professor Oskar Mann, director (died in 1915)
- Dr. Sebastian Beck (succeeded Mann in 1915, later professor in Faculty of Oriental Languages, Berlin University)

II, 2: Persian Section, Iranian Personnel:

- 'Asadullah Khan Hidayah
- Takizade, a Persian constitutionalist
- Kazemzade (Hidayah, Takizade and Kazemzade formed Persian Committee in Berlin)

III, 1: Turkish Section, German Personnel:

- Professor Martin Hartmann, director
- Dr. Walter Lehmann
- Dr. Gotthard Jäschke

III, 2: Turkish Section, Turkish Personnel:

- Halil Halid Bey (former Ottoman consul-general in Bombay)
- Selaheddin (Ottoman naval commander, working as translator)
- Dr. Saadi (journalist, sacked for reasons of “unreliability and homosexuality”)

IV, 1: Indian Section, German Personnel:

- Ferdinand Grätsch, director (missionary)
- Dr. Helmut von Glasenapp
- Ernst Neuenhofer (businessman)
- Mr. Walter (missionary)

IV, 2: Indian Section, Indian Personnel:

- 18 members of the Indian Independence Committee in Berlin, among whom were:
- Har Dayal (famous Hindu revolutionary)
- Virendranath Chattopadhyaya (also acted as German agent in the Balkans)

v: Chinese Section:

- Dr. Herbert Müller

vi: Russian Section:

- Harald Cosack
- Georgian and Tataric members (most importantly Georgian National Committee active in the final months of the war)

Further Members:

- Heinrich Jacoby (businessman, director of “Persian Carpet Company”, representative of IOFe in Switzerland until 1918, organized contacts with Egyptian nationalists in Geneva)
- Dr. Willy Haas (replaced Jacoby in 1918)
- Friedrich Perzynski (specialist and dealer in oriental art, became the editor-in-chief of the “Neuer Orient (New Orient)”, the periodical publication of the IOFe)³⁸

The institution was organized as a “Kollegiatsbehörde (democratic institution)”, which had no hierarchy. If Oppenheim had designed it that way in the expectation that the expertise of different backgrounds and careers could be put to best use, the result was quite the opposite. According to Oppenheim’s successor, consul Schabinger, the absence of a hierarchy meant that decisions could only be made when consensus

between the members existed. This was, however, rarely the case. The director of the IOFe had only one, quite powerful, tool in order to ensure compliance: most of the members of the IOFe were of military age and could be threatened to be put at the disposal of the military authorities. This rather cynical instrument appears to have been necessary to provide at least some leadership, which was lacking in the initial months of the existence of the IOFe. Schabinger was arguably better suited to provide such leadership than Oppenheim; he was used to the hierarchical system of the diplomatic service and an authoritarian and energetic personality. While the consul sometimes trod on the toes of his subordinates, especially the oriental employees of the IOFe, many of whom were extremely sensitive with regard to protocol and personal honour, Schabinger's task fully justified a tough stance; it was left to him to forge an efficient organization after Oppenheim's departure for Istanbul in March 1915. Schabinger was often exasperated with the academics, as "they were not at all used to doing regular and punctual work."³⁹ Such tensions between a professional civil servant on the one hand and academics on the other was probably inevitable; the frequent clashes between Schabinger and oriental employees of the IOFe or frequent contributors, such as the Egyptians Dr. Ahmad Vali and Dr. Muhammad Mansur Rifat, likewise might largely be ascribed to differences originating in cultural attitudes rather than to personal malice on either of the two sides.

The German staff members of the IOFe were also quite frequently at loggerheads with each other or otherwise dissatisfied with the state of affairs, as indicated by a lengthy report by Dr. Max Adler, who from September 1914 onwards was in charge of the POW newspaper *Al-Jihad* and of despatching periodical war reports. The report was written in response to harsh criticisms from the Foreign Office accusing the IOFe of ineffectual work and the production of useless material. Dr. Adler fully concurred. He proposed the transfer of responsibility for the war reports to local consulates in the Middle East, which were better suited to producing up-to-date material than the IOFe. Thus local attitudes and expectations could also be taken into account. The POW newspaper had two problems: only a fraction of the prisoners was literate, and the rather makeshift nature of the newspaper made the prisoners regard it with the greatest suspicion. Instead of *Al-Jihad*, he argued, Turkish newspapers should be used and read out by literate prisoners. Dr. Adler also complained that German members of the IOFe had not consulted him regarding the publication of suitable "oriental" articles in the German press. The organization for the supply of news to the Middle East also was sadly deficient, as was the sifting through the foreign press, especially

of the Entente states. Through such neglect a most valuable propaganda tool, namely to prove the Entente's enmity towards Islam from its own press, was ignored. Under such circumstances Dr. Adler declared himself unable to continue his work for the institution and he left on 1 June 1915.⁴⁰

Although Oppenheim had designed the IOFe as an institution for both the gathering of intelligence and using this information for propaganda purposes, the second activity increasingly became the mainstay of the IOFe.⁴¹ The first task was gradually assumed by the national committees, with whom Oppenheim had inaugurated contacts from August 1914. Initially these consisted of an Indian Committee ("Indian Independence Committee", hereafter IIC, in Berlin) and the "Young Egyptians" (in Geneva). The Young Egyptians were particularly useful for their ability to communicate with Egypt from neutral Switzerland. Later the IOFe came to cooperate with a Georgian and a Persian Committee. In 1915 Director Jacoby of the Persian Carpet Company Ltd. began to work with the Egyptian nationalists in Geneva, most intensively with Muhammad Farid and Muhammad Fahmy, the latter being the successor of Mustafa Kamil as leader of the Egyptian *Hizb al-Watan*. Jacoby seems to have been a charming and efficient character, and his work with the Egyptians in general yielded good results.⁴² In Berlin relations between Schabinger and "oriental" members of the institution or the nationalist committees were often strained, usually due more to differences of aims pursued by the Germans and the nationalists than to personal disagreements.⁴³ The Germans had a basically rational and logical attitude as far as the formulation of policies for the Entente colonies was concerned, which might be summed up as "win the war first, squabble about the spoils later." The nationalist committees naturally put their own goals, foremost the independence of their countries, above those of Germany or the Ottoman Empire. None of them wanted a German Egypt or India, and the majority of Egyptians, although desirous of getting rid of the British, opposed a reincorporation of their country into the Ottoman Empire as an ordinary province. The leader of the Young Egyptian committee bluntly expressed this view by saying that "we would rather have British than Turkish rule."⁴⁴

There were also deep rifts between rival factions of Egyptian nationalists. In their attempts to support all factions and Ottoman aspirations at the same time the Germans merely wasted their energy. In the case of the Egyptians, Khedive Abbas Hilmi desired to be reinstated as viceroy, but had a rival for his claim in Ottoman Grand Vizier Sa'id Halim Pasha. There was also little love lost between Abbas Hilmi and Enver Pasha, who suspected the Khedive of being ready to refrain from hostile acts against

the British in exchange for access to his enormous wealth in Egypt, in which Enver was probably correct. Once told that the Ottoman army would conquer the country for Turkey and not for Abbas Hilmi the Khedive swiftly lost interest and even tried his hand at counter-propaganda in Egypt. Frightened by an attempt on his life, which he blamed on the CUP, he went first to Vienna and later to Switzerland. While Enver and Sa'id Halim were probably glad to be rid of the Khedive the Germans continued to regard him as vital to the outbreak of a popular rebellion. Thus, although the Egyptian nationalists were ready to act without the Khedive's support, the Germans thought this to be impossible.

While most of the Egyptian nationalists were of a fairly conservative upper class background the Indian Independence Committee consisted of avowedly radical revolutionaries. They had been marginalized by the course of moderation then adopted by the Indian national congress. The radicals were also deeply divided over the policies to pursue in order to achieve Indian independence. The result was frequent back-stabbing, the Indian revolutionaries often acting as if the "opponents" were not the British but other members of the committee. Under these circumstances success for Ottoman propaganda in India was most unlikely. In fact the only success scored by the IIC (as alleged by Schabinger, and not corroborated by other sources) was the acquisition of information which played a role in the torpedoing and sinking by a German submarine of the armoured cruiser HMS *Hampshire*, on which Lord Kitchener travelled to Russia in 1916.⁴⁵

In their recruitment of propaganda agents the Germans exhibited the same almost pathological mistrust as when dealing with potential intelligence agents. This attitude became more problematic as the Germans were not exactly spoilt for choice. The number of individuals who could carry out such work in the Near East was small, and there were no professional agents. The majority of volunteers for propaganda work failed to overcome the distrust of the German authorities and the IOFE.

Caution was in some cases justified, in regard to both individuals and proposed operations, and as to what the IOFE could hope to achieve generally. Schabinger reported to the Foreign Office on 5 February 1916 his misgivings about the plan to incite the Afghan army to march on India, then under consideration by the German military and civilian leadership. Schabinger believed that most probably the invading Afghans would be opposed both by the British and by a large part of the Indian population; worse, the Japanese might be tempted to invade India, which they had coveted for a long time.⁴⁶ The result could only be a conflagration in India which would prolong, and not shorten, the war. Britain could not

be expected to make peace with her enemies in Europe in order to retain an unstable colony it might lose for good within a short time. Schabinger instead proposed to have the Afghans march on Russian Central Asia and Iran, where they could join the Turkish army.⁴⁷

The IOFe's propagandist successes, on the whole, were modest, if not disappointing. In a report of summer 1916 Schabinger listed rising anxiety of the French and the British about the loyalty of their Muslim troops and the colonies as among the most important successes. Defectors were few in number. In one case the British replaced Indian troops on the Western Front with British troops, due to the presence of Shaykh Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi, who had called for Holy War from the German trenches with the aid of a megaphone.⁴⁸ British and French recruitment in the colonies seems to have become more and more difficult in the course of the war, but this may rather be ascribed to news from the front which described the atrocious living and fighting conditions, and less to pan-Islamic propaganda from the IOFe.

Schabinger's conclusion was surprising, although possibly accurate: the real fruits of the propaganda could be reaped only after the end of the war (which Schabinger still expected to be won by Germany in 1916).⁴⁹ Oppenheim himself was a trifle less modest. Although he admitted that his revolutionary propaganda did not yield the expected results (revolts in India), he maintained that the propaganda had occasionally been reason for great anxiety for the British and had served to keep them from sending additional troops to the Western Front. The cooperation with the IOFe, in the baron's opinion, nevertheless had done the Indian nationalists no end of good. "The revolutionary propaganda was a failure. But I always said that the Indian nationalists would advance in their quest for national independence, and that truly happened."⁵⁰ While World War I certainly was a watershed in British-Indian relations and inaugurated the end of British rule in the subcontinent the results of the work of the IIC and the IOFe could only be called negligible.

Conclusion

World War I was a crucial event in the history of the modern world, and also in the history of the modern Middle East. It saw the end of an era: after an existence of more than 600 years (the longest-lived Muslim empire ever) the Ottoman period in the Middle East ended in the aftermath of Ottoman defeat. In five turbulent years after the end of the war Turkey emerged as a national republican state, while Iran and

Afghanistan saw the rise of authoritarian, modernizing monarchies. A large part of the remainder of the Middle East was put under mandatory rule by Britain and France.

There are two possible narratives to describe World War I and its aftermath in the Middle East. The first is that of an empire fighting its last struggle for survival. The Ottoman government set out to defend and reinforce the “sick man on the Bosphorus”; in order to do so, it secured an alliance with Germany and fought – ultimately unsuccessfully – on nine different fronts. Defeat at the end of the war put paid to the idea of Ottoman survival. Abandoning the Ottoman idea as finished, the Turkish nationalists under the command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk then rallied their forces, defeated the invaders of Anatolia and founded a national state. The alternative narrative sees the policy of the Ottoman government in a different light. It goes along with the idea that the Committee of Union and Progress did indeed wish to save the empire from defeat and dismemberment, but had already given up hope of securing strong internal cohesion. The war was consequently fought on two fronts: an exterior one, which aimed at defending the empire against Entente invasion, and an interior one, in which population groups suspected of disloyalty were earmarked for expulsion, if not physical eradication. The most prominent group experiencing this policy during the war was the Armenians (Assyrians were also affected), yet documents have surfaced which give reason to believe that Greeks and Jews might have been destined for the same fate, had the end of the war not intervened. The Young Turks thus showed comparatively little interest in defending the empire as it was, but performed important actions allowing the Turkish nationalists to complete their work after the war.

Both “battles”, in spite of all differences, were fought in the name of Islam. Yet the striking difference – and this was never properly understood by the German allies of the Ottomans – was the nature and character of the Islam in question: Islam as a propaganda tool to exhort Ottoman and non-Ottoman Muslims to fight for the defence of the Ottoman Empire was a classical Islam, the age-honoured concept of Muslims being requested to defend *dar al-Islam* against the forces of *dar al-harb*. The Islam of the second narrative, one might argue, was a reformed Islam: an Islam that served the interest of the nation, could be put under state control and was mainly a social glue to hold together the body politic of an emerging nation.

Notes

- 1 See Bloch, Charles, *Das Dritte Reich und die Welt: Die deutsche Außenpolitik 1933–1945* (translated from the French by Wolfgang Kaiser) (Paderborn: F. Schöningh 1992), pp. IX–XV.
- 2 See Schwanitz, Wolfgang G., *Islam in Europa, Revolten in Mittelost: Islamismus und Genozid von Wilhelm II und Enver Pascha über Hitler und al-Husaini bis Arafat, Usama bin Laden und Ahmadinejad sowie Gespräche mit Bernard Lewis* (Berlin: Trafo-Verlag 2013).
- 3 Craig, Gordon A., *Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1945: Vom Norddeutschen Bund bis zum Ende des Dritten Reiches* (München: C.H. Beck 1980), particularly at pp. 268–297.
- 4 For German economic penetration of the Middle East see, for example, Kurt Grunwald, “Penetration Pacifique – The Financial Vehicles of Germany’s ‘Drang nach Osten,’” in *Germany and the Middle East*, ed. Jehuda Wallach (Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Faculty of Humanities, Aranne School of History, Institute of German History 1975), pp. 85–103. For German railway projects in the region see, for example, Pinhas Walter Pick, “German Railway Constructions in the Middle East,” in *Germany and the Middle East*, ed. Jehuda Wallach (Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Faculty of Humanities, Aranne School of History, Institute of German History 1975), pp. 72–85.
- 5 Lewin, Evans, *The German Road to the East: An Account of the “Drang nach Osten” and of Teutonic Aims in the Near and Middle East* (London: Heinemann 1916).
- 6 Ferguson, Niall, *The Pity of War* (London: Penguin Books 1999), pp. 87–101.
- 7 Doumanis, Nicholas, *Before the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013).
- 8 See for example Anderson, M.S., *The Eastern Question 1774–1923* (London: Macmillan 1966).
- 9 See for example Alexander, Martin S., *Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War* (London: Routledge Chapman & Hall 1998); Angelow, Jürgen, *Kalkül und Prestige: Der Zweibund am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Cologne/ Weimar/ Vienna: Böhlau 2000).
- 10 Craig, *Deutsche Geschichte*, pp. 205–226.
- 11 Lüdke, Tilman, *Jihad made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War* (Münster: LIT-Verlag 2005), p. 43.
- 12 Özcan, Azmi, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877–1924)* (Leiden: Brill 1997), pp. 1–40.
- 13 Abd al-Qadir (Sidi el-Haddsch Abd el-Kader Uled Mahiddin), 1808–1883 was a Muslim scholar who after the French invasion of Algeria in 1830 became the leader of Algerian resistance. In 1847 he had to surrender to the French. After five years in captivity in France he was released, and eventually settled in Damascus. Generously compensated by a French pension of 100,000 Francs he played a positive role during the upheavals of 1860, protecting many Christians.
- 14 There is a vast literature describing European Views on Islam – and vice versa. See for example Hourani, Albert, *Europe and the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1980), pp. 1–18; Rosenthal, Franz, *The Classical Heritage in Islam*

- (Oakland: University of California Press 1975), pp. 1–14; Daniel, Norman, *The Arabs and Mediaeval Europe* (London: Longman 1975), pp. 1–22; Dakhliya, Jocelyne and Vincent, Bernard, *Les Musulmans dans l'histoire de l'Europe*, vol. 1: *Une integration invisible* (Paris: Albin Michel 2011); Fox, Jonathan, "Two Civilisations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West", *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 38, No. 4, 2001, pp. 459–472; Salamé, Ghassan, "Islam and the West", *Foreign Policy* No. 90, 1993, pp. 22–37.
- 15 Lewis, Bernard, *Islam and the West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993), pp. 3–42; Hourani, Albert, *Europe and the Middle East*, Berkeley, pp. 1–18. Rosenthal, Franz, *The Classical Heritage in Islam* (London: 1975), pp. 1–14.
 - 16 For the evolution of Oriental studies in Germany see for example Wokoeck, Ursula, *German Orientalism: The Study of the Middle East and Islam from 1800 to 1945* (London: Routledge 2009).
 - 17 Martin, B.G., *Muslim Brotherhoods in 19th Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1976).
 - 18 Steele, David, "Britain and Egypt 1882–1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism", Wilson, Keith M. (ed), *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East: The Anglo-Egyptian Experience 1882–1982* (London: Mansell 1983), p. 2.
 - 19 Kröger, Martin, "Revolution als Programm: Ziele und Realität deutscher Orientpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg", in Michalka, Wolfgang (ed.), *Der Erste Weltkrieg: Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse* (München: 1994), pp. 366–391.
 - 20 Heller, Joseph, *British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire 1908–1914* (London: Frank Cass 1983), p. 39.
 - 21 Stoddard, Philip H., *The Ottoman Government and the Arabs: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkilat-i Mahsusa*, unpublished ts (PhD. Thesis), Princeton 1963, p. 14.
 - 22 There are, however, indicators that becoming "curators of the holy places (Quddam al-Haramayn)" in Mekka and Medina held even greater prestige than the title of caliph. See Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, p. 8.
 - 23 See for example Dale, Stephen. *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Farooqhi, N.R. "Six Ottoman Documents on Mughal-Ottoman Relations during the Reign of Akbar", *Journal of Islamic Studies* 7:1 (1996), pp. 32–46.
 - 24 Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, pp. 4–5.
 - 25 Kansu, Aykut, *1908 Devrimi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları 1995).
 - 26 Zürcher, E.J., "The Ides of April: A Fundamentalist Uprising in Istanbul in 1909?", in Van Dijk and de Groot, A.H.: *State and Islam* (Leiden: Research School CNWS 1995), pp. 64–76.
 - 27 Ahmed Tarabein, "Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi: The Career and Thought of an Arab Nationalist", in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi et al., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 109.
 - 28 Mishra, Pankaj, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt against the West and the Remaking of Asia* (London: Penguin Books 2013), p. 102.
 - 29 Geertz, Clifford, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago et al.: Chicago University Press 1971).

- 30 For the supposed opposition of Islam and Nationalism see for example Al-Bazzaz, 'Abd al-Rahman, "Islam and Arab Nationalism", *Welt des Islams* New Ser., Vol. 3, Issue 3–4, 1954, pp. 201–218.; see also Steppat, Fritz, "Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil: Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der ägyptischen Nationalbewegung", *Welt des Islams*, New Ser., Vol. 4, Issue 4, 1956, pp. 241–341; Haim, Syliva G., "Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism", *Welt des Islams*, New Ser., Vol. 4, Issue 2–3, 1955, pp. 124–149.
- 31 Steppat, "Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil", p. 332.
- 32 See also Baram, Amatzia, "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East", in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 1990), pp. 425–448; Yalman, Ahmet Emin, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1930); Schulze, Reinhard, *Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert* (Leiden: Leiden University Press 1990); Ayooob, Mohammed, "The Revolutionar Thrust of Islamic Political Tradition", in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 3, no. 2 (Apr. 1981), pp. 269–276; Lee, Dwight E., "The Origins of Pan-Islamism", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Jan., 1942), pp. 278–287.
- 33 Habermas, Rebekka, "Debates on Islam in Imperial Germany", in *Islam and the European Empires*, ed. David Motadel (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), pp. 231–253.
- 34 Wilhelm Treue, "Max Freiherr von Oppenheim: Der Archäologe und die Politik", *Historische Zeitschrift* 209, Heft 16, (December 1969), pp. 37–74, particularly p. 64.
- 35 Schowingen, Karl Emil Schabinger von, *Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter, Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen eines kaiserlichen Dragomans* (unpublished ts, Baden-Baden 1962/63), p. 115.
- 36 Treue, "Max Freiherr von Oppenheim", p. 60. Funding remained one of the main problems of the IOFe. Consul Karl Emil Schabinger von Schowingen, Oppenheim's successor as director of the institution (23 March 1915 to 22 February 1916), pointed out that during his term of office the IOFe was given a monthly allowance of only 5,000 RM; the institution needed considerably more. Schabinger's successor Prof. Mittwoch asked the Imperial German treasury for 100,000 RM at the end of the financial year 1917–1918. Oppenheim himself invested large sums of money, which the imperial organizations refused to refund in February 1918. Schabinger described this situation aptly by stating "that the Odol- Toothpaste- and Mouthwash Company invests more in its advertising than Imperial Germany for its war propaganda". See also Schabinger, *Mosaiksplitter*, p. 150 ff.
- 37 Lasswell, Harold D., *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1927), p. 53.
- 38 OPA, AB, Chapter XIV: Political. Report by Prof. von Glasenapp on the members of the IOFe, 05.06.1935.
- 39 Schabinger, *Mosaiksplitter*, p. 126.
- 40 PAFO, File R1501, A17982, Berlin, 05.06.1915: Adler to Wesendonk.
- 41 Schabinger, *Mosaiksplitter*, p. 132.
- 42 Ibid., p. 133.
- 43 Ibid., pp. 150–155.
- 44 PAFO, File R21126, AZ A33044, Geneva, 02.12.1914: Geissler to Foreign Office; File R21127, AZ A2903, Berlin, 22.01.1915: Oppenheim to Foreign Office.

- 45 Schabinger, *Mosaiksplitter*, p. 133. The sinking of the *Hampshire* has become the object of a flourishing industry of speculation and conspiracy theories. Although there is no definite proof most naval historians agree that the ship probably struck a mine; however, if it was not a stray mine (the sinking thus being simply an accident), but a minefield laid by the Germans they would have had to know in advance the projected course of the cruiser, which deliberately avoided popular shipping routes. The same holds true for the sinking of the ship with torpedoes.
- 46 Although this idea sounds far-fetched, the Japanese had enjoyed high military prestige in Germany since their victory over the Russians in 1905. They were regarded as the expanding power in eastern Asia, particularly after the conquest of the German protectorate Kiauchow in late 1914.
- 47 Schabinger, *Mosaiksplitter*, pp. 136–139.
- 48 Ibid., p. 145.
- 49 Ibid., pp. 146–149.
- 50 Oppenheim, *Zur Nachrichtenstelle der deutschen Botschaft in Konstantinopel*, p. 3.

4 Domestic Aspects of Ottoman Jihad

The Role of Religious Motifs and Religious Agents in the Mobilization of the Ottoman Army

Mehmet Beşikçi

Introduction

Discussions on the Ottoman proclamation of the Great Jihad (*Cihad-ı Ekber*) in World War I usually focus only on its repercussions on the Muslim communities living outside Anatolia and tend to take Anatolian Muslims for granted. In fact, the Ottoman Jihad propaganda had a very important Anatolian dimension as well.¹ From its declaration of general mobilization on 2 August 1914 through to the end of the war, the Ottoman government constantly had recourse to the Jihad rhetoric to justify its mobilization effort in Anatolia, especially in the field of military recruitment. It put it about that Islam was under attack by the infidel enemy and that therefore it was incumbent upon every Muslim to join the fight against that enemy.

The instrumentalization of religion was a widespread phenomenon in European countries during World War I, and every belligerent state used religious motifs in one way or another to mobilize greater support for its war cause.² But, as this chapter argues, the Ottoman case had one distinctive characteristic in this respect: The rhetoric of Jihad was a military necessity; it was the only mobilizing theme that could justify the conscription system which constituted the basis of Ottoman manpower mobilization.³ In this sense, this chapter also suggests that, regardless of a proclamation of an official Jihad at a specific date for a grand politico-military objective, a less ambitious and motley, or more ordinary and quotidian form of Jihad rhetoric was already embedded in the Ottoman discourse aiming to justify military service and mobilization. If the sultan-caliph had not proclaimed an official “Great Jihad” on 14 November 1914, the Ottoman state would still have needed, and resorted to, the Jihad rhetoric to legitimize its domestic mobilization of manpower. As will be discussed in detail below, this Jihad rhetoric was not invented with the Ottoman entry into World War I; it was already there, almost as an everyday phenomenon in the

state's repeated uses of Jihad, perhaps since the beginning of Ottoman conscription in the early nineteenth century, as the centralizing state "understood and employed the powerful ideological energies that jihad could mobilize."⁴ But the extent of the mobilization in World War I pushed the Ottoman state to intensify the Jihad rhetoric by employing new religious propaganda motifs and tools and revitalizing those that already existed. This chapter sheds light on these motifs and tools by arguing that in the transmission of Jihad rhetoric to the masses oral methods of propaganda were as important as printed words and images, and imams, both in mosques and in the army, were the main agents of this transmission.

Jihad Rhetoric as a Military Necessity

A rhetoric of Jihad as a military necessity involved two main aspects. The first is related to the socio-cultural identity of the Ottoman army. At the threshold of, and during, World War I the Ottoman military was overwhelmingly a Muslim institution and the majority of the enlisted men were peasants from Anatolia. Attempts had been made after the 1908 Revolution to include non-Muslim Ottomans in the military; with changes made to the conscription laws in 1909 and especially in 1914, more non-Muslims were conscripted.⁵ But more inclusion did not mean equality. Especially after the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, the performance of non-Muslim soldiers in the Ottoman army was severely questioned by various Ottoman commanders and nationalist Young Turk circles, many of whom claimed that non-Muslim soldiers' reluctance to fight and desertions constituted a main factor bringing about the Ottoman defeat.⁶ As the idea of Ottomanism began to die away and Turkish nationalism quickly arose after the Balkan defeat, the suspicion about the reliability of non-Muslims increased. Thereafter, whereas the enlistment of non-Muslim Ottomans continued, they were treated in a discriminating way and usually employed in unarmed labour battalions.⁷ The defeat at Sarikamış in the early phase of World War I on the Caucasus front turned this discrimination into a more widespread and standard practice, especially for Ottoman Armenians.⁸ Moreover, the inclusion of non-Muslims did not change the Islamic ideological character of the Ottoman military, nor did it change the everyday symbols and soldiers' subculture. In fact, except for occasional reference to a vague Ottoman brotherhood,⁹ the discourse of military service served to re-Islamize the Ottoman identity rather than create a secular Ottoman citizenry.

Because of the rural background of the serving men, Islamic themes and symbols constituted a common language which the Ottoman state could draw on when motivating the masses. Islamic discourse offered a cognitive framework which was actually the only common ground on which the elitist nationalist perspective of the urban Young Turks could meet rural Muslim masses. Patriotic messages were not entirely ineffective, but they were meaningful only as long as they were communicated within a religious envelope.¹⁰ Islamic discourse in its popular form was the only available language by which the two parties could understand each other. As Erik-Jan Zürcher has stated, “most of the empire’s soldiers hailed from Anatolia” and, therefore, when the need to mobilize the population in times of war emerged, “appealing to the religious worldview of the peasant population of Anatolia made good sense.”¹¹ And, no less importantly, it was also the only language that could be used for the mobilization of non-Turkish Muslim peoples of Anatolia, such as the Kurds, the Circassians and the Laz people.

The second aspect of the military necessity is related to morale, or the need to convince soldiers to remain in service and continue fighting until the end of the war. World War I was a prolonged conflict of attrition. Therefore, maintaining soldiers’ endurance and morale was as important as recruiting them. Religious motifs seem to have played an important role in increasing the endurance level of the troops, especially in coping with the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of the battlefield, as Alexander Watson has observed in the cases of the British and German armies during World War I.¹² Research has shown that the Ottoman conscription system had always suffered from a legitimacy crisis from its beginning; avoiding military service in the form of desertion had been a chronic problem since the beginning of the system.¹³ The problem of desertion became much more widespread during World War I. As will be shown below, the Jihad rhetoric, it was hoped, would also be useful in preventing desertions.

Jihad Pamphlets and Religious Books for the Soldier

Against this background, it is not surprising that the number of propaganda pamphlets that were devoted to explaining Jihad to the Anatolian masses increased remarkably with the declaration of Ottoman mobilization.¹⁴ Such pamphlets were written in simple language or, to use a description by an author of such a pamphlet, “in a language that everybody could understand”.¹⁵ Citing relevant verses from the Koran and

the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, they almost invariably described military service as a binding religious duty (*farż-ı ‘ayn*) for all Muslims.¹⁶ Sometimes the very title of the pamphlet directly stated this religious duty, as in the case of an anonymous text the title of which is “The Holy Jihad is a Binding Religious Duty”.¹⁷

In Islam, the term “*farż-ı ‘ayn*” implies that when the Muslim community is under attack, that is, when the Muslim community needs to defend itself against an infidel enemy, joining the Jihad becomes an individual obligation for each member of the Muslim community.¹⁸ Therefore, such pamphlets often needed to emphasize the point that the Ottoman Empire as the representative of the world’s Muslim community was on the defensive in this war as it was attacked by the wicked Christian powers of Europe, such as Britain, France and Russia. As a continuation of this line of argument, these propaganda pamphlets frequently mentioned the 126th verse of Nahl sura of the Koran¹⁹ and claimed that it was the right of the Ottomans to wage war against the attacking infidels with the same kinds of weapons and methods (*mukabele-i bilmisl*).²⁰

Another considerable point that the Jihad pamphlets frequently stressed is that whereas serving in the military and fighting on the battlefield was incumbent upon eligible men, the other sections of society also could and should serve the war effort in various ways. Since the mobilization order initially involved recruiting men between the ages of 20 and 45, a Jihad pamphlet claimed that those who were younger than 20 and older than 45 were also included in the Jihad duty, to which each one was supposed to contribute “as much as his strength and power” would allow.²¹ In congruence with the totalizing nature of warfare during World War I, the author argued by citing the 60th verse²² of the al-Anfal sura of the Koran that the Muslim community was religiously held responsible for a total mobilization involving not only military preparation, but also economic and technological readiness for war.²³ The role of Muslim women was also stressed in this respect. The Jihad pamphlets frequently stated that when they were needed to help the fighting men, Muslim women were also supposed to participate in the jihad effort by doing such jobs as sewing uniforms, knitting socks and preparing bandages for the troops. Such jobs were defined as the religious duties of women.²⁴

While most of these Jihad pamphlets were written in the format of a short prose item, there are also examples that were published as collections of poems, which are quite short, simple and easy for soldiers to memorize.²⁵ Some of these Jihad pamphlets were published and distributed free of charge by the National Defence League (*Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*), a semi-voluntary association which had organic ties

with the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter, CUP) government and contributed to its war policies with various activities including propaganda.²⁶

Similarly, a dramatic increase occurred during the war in the number of religious manuals/pamphlets which were usually published under the title of “religion book for the soldier” (*askere din kitabı*). Again written in simple language, such religious manuals were meant to have a double function. On the one hand, they were written to provide Ottoman Muslim soldiers with a basic religious (Islamic and Sunni) education. On the other hand, they aimed to remind potential draftees, enlisted men and also officers why military service was also a religious duty and why a good Muslim also needed to be a good soldier and vice versa. Apparently, one of the main reasons for a remarkable increase in this literature on the eve of and during World War I was the need to strengthen and reinforce the soldiers’ morale which had been constantly eroded due to almost continuous Ottoman wars and defeats.²⁷ Indeed, whereas the practice of using religious manuals as a tool of both education and propaganda in the Ottoman army goes as far back as the establishment of a modern army during the reign of Mahmud II, their number remarkably increased on the eve of and during World War I.²⁸ Those which were written after the Ottoman entry into World War I put more specific emphasis on the necessity to join the Jihad and obey the conscription.

On the other hand, it should be added that, rather than being an individual intellectual production on the part of the Ottoman ulema, these manuals were usually directly commissioned from their authors by the CUP government and the War Ministry. So, if the practice of religious education and propaganda in the Ottoman army opened up a new space to be filled by an Islamic discourse, this space was under the supervision of the authorities. Therefore, if Ottoman Muslim soldiers were to be educated in terms of religion, this education was expected to be given within the official version of Islam, namely according to the religious approach that was regarded as “correct” by the Ottoman state. In this sense, the government preferred to work with those religious figures which it considered to be practising the “correct” version of Islam and regarded as “trustworthy.” Members of the ulema such as Ömer Fevzi, Üryanizade Ali Vahid or İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, who were chosen to write such manuals, came from the religious circles that were close to the CUP government; they either already had organic ties with the CUP government or, if they did not have such overt political engagements, still supported the government’s war effort during World War I.²⁹

These religion books for the soldier invariably emphasized that Islam required all Muslims to be good soldiers and that obeying the call to arms

was not only a religious but also a moral obligation. One such manual simply stated that “only those who do not withhold from sacrificing their lives and souls for their fatherland can go to heaven”; then it continued to explain that a Muslim man would be interrogated in the next life about how well he performed his military service, just as he would be interrogated about his performance of prayer and fast.³⁰ Another religion book for the soldier equated service for the fatherland with the true faith and claimed that any Muslim who betrays his fatherland also betrays his religion.³¹ Such manuals described evasion of service and desertion as great sins to be punished severely in the next life. They also repeatedly stressed that Muslims should go to war willingly and enthusiastically since this was among the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad.

Oral Propaganda

There is no doubt that printed words and images became extremely important propaganda tools during World War I, and the Jihad pamphlets and religion books for the soldier that have been mentioned above constituted a significant element in Ottoman wartime propaganda. But the print propaganda also posed a major challenge in the Ottoman case. First of all, there was the problem of illiteracy. The literacy rate of Ottoman society did not exceed 10 per cent in 1914 and it did not get any better during the war years.³² Moreover, even this low literacy rate was mainly an urban phenomenon; the Ottoman peasant soldiers were almost entirely illiterate.³³ Then, how could propaganda messages that were contained in such publications as Jihad pamphlets or religion books for the soldier reach their target audience in an overwhelmingly illiterate society? Secondly, there was the problem of poor infrastructure. One of the infrastructural aspects that differentiated the Ottoman Empire from other belligerents in World War I was its very low level of development in terms of the means of communications and transportation.³⁴ Then, by what means could the mobilizing Jihad rhetoric be conveyed to the rural masses?

Before discussing the consequences of these problems and questions, we first need to approach the concept of propaganda from a multi-dimensional perspective. The phenomenon of modern propaganda is usually understood as the written and published word and image,³⁵ conveyed through modern means of communications, which Benedict Anderson defined as “print capitalism.”³⁶ It is true that Ottoman print capitalism had been on the rise since the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), and a noteworthy increase occurred in the number of

published newspapers and periodicals in the Second Constitutional Era (1908–1918).³⁷ Yet, this increase was still far from being a considerable transformation in the infrastructure, especially as regards its effect on provincial Anatolia. The poor infrastructure of modern media technologies in the Ottoman context has led some scholars to conclude that Ottoman propaganda in World War I failed (and it was even doomed to fail), especially in comparison with those in European countries.³⁸

In fact, the approach that confines the phenomenon of propaganda in World War I within the limits of printed word, and image tends to be technologically determinist. This approach underestimates, for example, the importance of oral methods that constituted a significant element of wartime propaganda. Oral propaganda methods, both modern and “traditional”, were as important and widely used as print propaganda in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the repertoire of Ottoman wartime propaganda was actually much wider than assumed, which included such oral means as sermons, religious memorial services (*mevlid*), religious advice, folk songs and even rumours. As is obvious, religious oral methods of propaganda were numerous, and they provided a fertile ground for the transmission of the jihad propaganda.

However, enlarging the scope of our approach to wartime propaganda still leaves an important question unanswered: how could these oral methods resonate with the rural masses and enlisted men? In this respect, the role of the lesser ulema, namely the middle- and low-ranking religious functionaries such as prayer leaders (imams), was critical in communicating the religious motifs of Ottoman Jihad propaganda to its target audience. It was not only the imams of village and town mosques across Anatolia, who acted as leaders of religious practices in their own local Muslim communities, but also the imams who were employed in the Ottoman army who played an important intermediary role in convincing people to support the Ottoman mobilization for war.

Imams and Their Sermons

In fact, the use of sermons and the preachings of the lesser ulema as a political tool for shaping public opinion expanded considerably right after the 1908 Revolution. The new Young Turk regime quickly realized the potential of this tool in mobilizing greater political support in a society where the rate of literacy was so low.³⁹ The political power of the period also wanted to use sermons and preaching as a tool to define “the correct form of religion” according to its own perspective.⁴⁰ In its programmes of 1908, 1909 and 1911, the CUP had already attributed

considerable importance to organizing and carrying out “admonitions, sermons, and religious guidance” (“*vaaz, hutbe ve irşad*”) in order to gain more legitimacy in society.⁴¹ The CUP’s club of Şehzadebaşı in İstanbul established a committee of ulema members, including such religious figures as Ömer Adil, Musa Kazım, Abdürreşid İbrahim, Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı, Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi.⁴² This committee issued various popular publications, the most prominent of which was the series called “religious admonitions” (*mevaiz-i diniye*).⁴³ Moreover, in order both to provide sufficient and proper training for prospective imams and preachers and to fill the vacancies in village and town mosques, two new schools (*Medresetü’l Vaizin* and *Medresetü’l Eimme ve’l Huteba*) were established in 1913.⁴⁴

Another aspect of the instrumentalization of sermons and preaching for political purposes on the eve of World War I was the debate on the simplification of Friday sermons in terms of both their content and language. Friday sermons had traditionally been delivered in Arabic in the mosques across the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵ But the desire to make them have a greater effect on the Muslim people was accompanied by the wish to make them also more understandable for them. This debate involved opinions ranging from a radical view arguing that sermons must be delivered entirely in Turkish to an opposing point of view arguing that they should remain in Arabic. Responding to such demands, the office of the shaykh ül-Islam avoided making a radical change, but could also not entirely disregard the demands for simplification. As a consequence, the office proposed a solution halfway between the two extremes, and established a post of “pulpit preacher” (*kürsü şeyhi*) in the Friday mosques, who would provide the congregation with an interpretation of the sermon in Turkish. And, in practice, Friday sermons in Anatolia in this period began to include Turkish statements to varying degrees.⁴⁶

On the other hand, it should also be noted that the relationship of religious functionaries with the Young Turk regime was not always trouble-free, especially where the issue of military service was concerned. For example, when in 1909 a new conscription regulation stipulated that medrese students who had not passed their exams on time were no longer exempt from military service, considerable discontent developed among religious circles.⁴⁷ But their relationship with the government generally became more cooperative on the eve of World War I, basically due to two main factors. Firstly, whereas their traditional exemption status was restricted, the new conscription law of 1914 clarified ambiguities and made it certain that, along with certified imams, those who were uncertified but had permanent jobs in village mosques would also be

exempt.⁴⁸ Secondly, the financial situation of imams was improved with rises in their salaries and additional posts of employment in 1914.⁴⁹

Religious propaganda activities that were carried out by imams on the Ottoman home front (namely in the civilian sphere) have been relatively well documented. For example, immediately after the declaration of the Great Jihad Friday sermons in mosques throughout the empire emphasized the duty of all Muslims to join the war effort.⁵⁰ The imams who were employed in mosques in the provinces and villages were assigned the task of providing oral presentations about the Jihad fatwa for the illiterate.⁵¹ Religious memorial services that were devoted to those who died on the battlefield began to be performed in mosques from the early days of the war. Invitations to these religious services were usually publicized in newspapers.⁵² Their purpose was usually described as “praying for the permanent victory and success of our army and navy.”⁵³

Imams were the main performers of such propaganda activities through mosques. Sermons supporting the Ottoman war cause began to be delivered regularly as part of an organized programme. In İstanbul and various provincial centres, the National Defence League organized many such sermons for propaganda purposes at mosques on the eve of the war. These sermons were delivered in a series not only on Fridays but also on other days of the week. At least one day a week was usually reserved for women. For such sermons, the imams were specifically assigned the task to “preach to, advise and encourage” (*vaaz, nasihat ve teşvikât*) those attending.⁵⁴ The imams who were selected for this task were members of a committee of the ulema that was constituted within the office of the shaykh ül-Islam; the committee oversaw that the imams selected were properly preaching to the people about their religious duty in the war.⁵⁵

Village imams were influential outside mosques as well. They were prominent figures in organizing military recruitment at the village level. The mobilization procedure in 1914 required all eligible men in a village to get ready at the same time, gathering in the village square. Then the imam, together with the village headman (*muhtar*), was in charge of overseeing this gathering process and then escorting the group to the nearest town's recruiting office.⁵⁶

Army Imams

On the other hand, authorities regarded the role of army imams as equally important in terms of maintaining enlisted men's endurance and morale

throughout the war. The personnel structure of the Ottoman army had permanent posts for religious functionaries who were supposed to act like army chaplains. In fact, the practice of employing imams in the military as religious educators and motivators of the troops began as early as the military reforms of Selim III (r. 1789–1807); then it became a more standardized practice after Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839) abolished the Janissaries and established a Western style standing army (*Mansure Ordusu*).⁵⁷ Attempts at military modernization in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not aim to exclude religion from the military sphere; on the contrary, routine religious obligations were observed, even during fighting. From the state authority's point of view, as in many other European modernization projects of the time, military modernization and religion were definitely not mutually exclusive, as long as the state itself defined the correct form of religion and that form served to legitimize the state.

When the Ottoman army underwent a major reorganization after the Balkan defeat in 1913 to create a more efficient army structure,⁵⁸ the system of army imams was also revised. In parallel with the increasing number of units and personnel, a new organization and salary structure was set up to provide appointments and training for imams who would serve in the Ottoman battalions and regiments. In the new arrangement, each battalion was to have a permanent imam in its personnel – hence the popular name in Turkish, “battalion imams” (*tabur imamları*) – and battalion imams in a regiment would be supervised by the regimental imam, who was also called “regimental mufti” (*alay müftüsü*). After the declaration of mobilization on 2 August 1914, the size of the Ottoman army increased remarkably, and accordingly the need for army imams also increased. To match this increasing demand, additional posts were introduced to bring about more standardization.⁵⁹

What exactly was the job description of army imams? Their job was actually quite varied, since they were expected not only to lead prayers, recite the Koran and perform other Islamic rituals, but also to promote troop morale during the war. A battalion imam was primarily supposed to provide the troops with basic religious education. This seems to have been taken seriously by Ottoman commanders. For example, Vasfi (Sarisözen), who served in the Ottoman army as a reserve officer during the war, notes in his memoirs that when Vehip (Kaçı) Pasha, the commander of the Third Army after February 1915, came to Kelkit (today a district of Gümüşhane) to inspect a military unit stationed there, he examined soldiers' religious knowledge and, as he saw their poor level of religious education, ordered the battalion imam to be imprisoned temporarily with only basic rations.⁶⁰ Moreover, a good battalion imam was also

supposed to arouse the troops' fighting enthusiasm not only with his preaching, but also by setting an example such as the one observed by Erich R. Prigge, a German officer who served as an aide-de-camp of the commander of the Fifth Army, Liman von Sanders, in Gallipoli; he notes in his diaries a scene, in which a battalion imam was the first one getting out of the trench to start a fight against the landing enemy forces.⁶¹ Again in Gallipoli, the commander of the 19th division Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) gave an order on 15 May 1915 which demanded that battalion imams be placed in the front row during combat to encourage the fighting spirit of soldiers.⁶²

The help of army imams was particularly useful at difficult times such as when desertions increased or discipline dissolved on the battlefield. Especially in the second half of the war, the Ottoman army suffered from increased desertion rates. Almost 17 per cent of all the men enlisted (approximately 500,000) deserted.⁶³ In trying to prevent desertions, Ottoman military authorities frequently assigned battalion imams to preach to soldiers against desertion.⁶⁴ Such preaching usually exalted martyrdom and being a holy warrior (*şehitlik ve gazilik*); by reciting relevant verses from the Koran (especially the al-Anfal sura, verses 15–16)⁶⁵ and mentioning the deeds of Prophet Muhammad.⁶⁶ These sermons also emphasized that desertion was a great sin forbidden by Islam. In 1918, the Ottoman War Ministry even needed to organize a special series of sermons against desertion, performed by a group of mobile imams sent from Istanbul to the battlefronts. Troops were obliged to attend these sermons which usually took place in front of the whole regiment.⁶⁷

The army imams worked to confirm and justify the official military discipline in religious terms. They also aimed to create ethical pressure on those who were not enthusiastic fighters. For example, as part of the punishment for desertion, battalion imams refused to administer burial services for those soldiers who committed suicide.⁶⁸ There is also evidence that commanders sometimes asked battalion imams to preach against self-mutilation, which was another way of avoiding service.⁶⁹

As for the deserters who never showed up for duty or, having already escaped service, roamed the countryside, imams were also useful for the official attempts to convince them to rejoin the forces. For this purpose, Ottoman authorities sometimes formed groups of intermediaries who would talk to deserters in their vicinity, advising them to surrender to the authorities. Such groups were called "advisory commissions" (*heyet-i nasiha*), which usually included local imams, as well as local notables and government officials.⁷⁰

Was Jihad Rhetoric Really Effective?

How effective were the religious motifs for the Ottoman mobilization of manpower in World War I? Was the Jihad rhetoric's target audience, namely the Muslim rural masses, really convinced and moved by it? While it is difficult to give an accurate answer to such questions, we can approach them on two levels. The first is the individual level, namely the war experiences of individual soldiers as expressed in their documents, namely their memoirs and diaries. Of course, though their number has fortunately increased in recent years, such texts of individual experiences are not as many in the Ottoman case as they are in European countries, mainly because Ottoman enlisted men were overwhelmingly illiterate.⁷¹

Regarding the reception of Islamic religious motifs in general and the Jihad rhetoric in particular, the available documents mostly reveal an ambivalent attitude on the part of Ottoman soldiers. While one can argue that at a general level Ottoman soldiers became more religious in the face of the hardships of war, the reception of religious propaganda conveyed through imams was not uniform. For example, Private Emin (Çöl), who served both on the Gallipoli and Sinai-Palestine fronts throughout the war, notes in his memoirs that when he was in Gallipoli he was frankly moved by the dedication of an imam sent from Istanbul to preach to his regiment.⁷² Military authorities also sometimes observed the extensiveness of such attitude, as in the case of the 30th Division headquarters on the Caucasus front, which reported on 10 October 1914 that the sermons delivered by battalion imams had positive effects on the troops' morale.⁷³ Moreover, turning to religion and praying regularly also seem to have been common among Ottoman POWs. For example, Private Hüseyin Fehmi (Genişol), who was held captive by the British on the Iraq/Mesopotamia front and imprisoned in the Bellary camp in India, observes in his diary that most Ottoman POWs in the camp started to pray regularly, respected imams and attended religious rituals en masse.⁷⁴ In such examples, one can observe that, as was the case with soldiers in European armies, there was a tendency among Ottoman soldiers to turn to religion during World War I. But it is obvious from soldiers' own documents that this "religiosity" did not amount to running to their deaths because of some blind acceptance of martyrdom; it was rather an indication of their belief that God's mercy would allow them to return to their homes alive.

On the other hand, not every soldier was so easily inclined to be moved by the Jihad rhetoric and army imams' sermons. For example, the reserve officer Süleyman Nuri, who served on the Gallipoli and Caucasus fronts and then deserted, saw the army imams as nothing but

the mouthpiece of the corrupt CUP government. For him, their sermons only served to cover up the meaningless war, in which the Ottoman soldier was sent to his death in vain.⁷⁵ Moreover, it is also important to note that not all army imams were uniform in their acceptance of the authorities' attitudes and messages. Sometimes the army imams themselves could be critical of certain practices in the army, as in the case of Abdullah Fevzi Efendi, a medrese teacher who joined the army as a volunteer and became a battalion prayer leader. For example, he condemned the harsh treatment of enlisted men by officers, such as by beating, as one of the main factors that undermined the morale and cohesion of Ottoman troops.⁷⁶

A similar dual, or ambivalent, situation can also be observed at the general level. On the one hand, the Ottoman state was able to mobilize some three million men and managed to keep its armies on the battlefield until the last days of the war; compared to its failure in mobilization during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, this was a remarkable success.⁷⁷ Based on this fact, it is possible to argue that the Ottoman religious propaganda in World War I was actually effective in terms of mobilization of manpower, which in turn contributed to the increased vigour of the army. But on the other hand, one can also say that, as mentioned earlier, neither severe penal laws nor references to the jihad rhetoric against avoiding military service could prevent desertion from becoming a major problem. However, it should not be forgotten that, in either case, religious propaganda constituted only one factor among many.

Jihad and Anatolian Alevis

The main religious references of the Jihad rhetoric came from the Sunni tradition, but Anatolia was also the home of the non-Sunni Alevi population. How did the Ottoman Jihad propaganda target the Anatolian Alevis in general and the Alevi enlisted men in the army in particular? How did they react to such propaganda? While the case of the Alevis in the Ottoman mobilization still remains an understudied subject, it is certain that there were no permanent posts in the Ottoman army for Alevi religious functionaries, nor were there any signs that any such religious men were employed temporarily by the Ottoman military during World War I.

Available evidence suggests that a practical way of communicating the Jihad rhetoric to the potential and serving Alevi enlisted men was to get help from the Bektashi order. In fact, the Bektashi order had many followers and supporters among the Young Turks; some even claimed that

Enver and Talat pashas were followers of the order.⁷⁸ It is certain that such close ties facilitated political cooperation between two groups. In 1915, with the “wish and consent” of Enver Pasha, the Bektashi order formed a volunteer regiment (*Bektaşî Alayı* or *Mücahidin-i Bektaşîye*) under the leadership of Çelebi Cemaleddin Efendi, the sheikh of the Hacı Bektaş Lodge during the war.⁷⁹ While accurate numbers are lacking, estimates of the number of men that the Bektashi volunteer regiment recruited, mostly from the Alevi population, included many as 7,000 men.⁸⁰ But besides recruiting volunteers, the order was also expected to ensure the support of the Alevis for the war effort and increase the morale of Alevis enlisted men in the army. Unlike the non-combatant character and mostly logistical services of the the Mevlevi Volunteer Battalion that was established for similar purposes,⁸¹ the Bektaşî Regiment was also used as a combatant militia force on the Gallipoli and the Caucasus fronts.⁸²

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the Ottoman Jihad rhetoric as a military necessity in justifying conscription and large-scale mobilization of manpower during World War I. It has argued that the Jihad rhetoric had a very important domestic dimension in that it targeted the Anatolian Muslim masses, which constituted the backbone of the Ottoman army, no less than it targeted Muslims living outside Anatolia. Jihad as a rhetoric justifying military service actually existed before World War I; therefore, wartime uses of Jihad were not necessarily connected with the proclamation of the Great Jihad on 11 November 1914, but that declaration certainly intensified such uses. As has been shown, in transmitting the Jihad rhetoric to the masses oral methods of religious propaganda were as important as and, perhaps, more extensive than, print propaganda. Imams were the main agents of this transmission, and the chapter has shed light particularly on the army imams, hitherto an understudied subject in the history of Ottoman World War I.

Did the Ottoman Jihad propaganda leave a legacy for Republican Turkey? As concluding remarks, this study can give only some speculative answers to this question, leaving the floor open for further discussions and prospective research on the subject. First of all, one can suggest that the enormous amount of energy invested by the wartime government in religious propaganda to communicate with the Anatolian population further reinforced the already existing Islamic language in Turkish nationalism, facilitating the association of Turkishness with being Muslim. This is at least visible in the continuation of justifying conscription

in Islamic terms in the republican era, even when the state became militantly secular. Secondly, when the state got extensively engaged in religious propaganda during World War I, it also attained a larger space of intervention in the realm of religion, as a result of which it produced a religious discourse according to its own definition of “correct” Islam. It can be speculated that this increase in the state’s power of intervention in the realm of religion, which further increased during the mobilization of the National Struggle (1919–1922) of the Ankara government, was inherited by the republican state.

Notes

- 1 Hasan Kayalı’s important study must be acknowledged for pointing at the domestic aspect of the Ottoman Jihad declaration in World War I, though his study’s scope of “domestic” seems to have tended to focus more on the Ottoman Middle East: Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 187–188.
- 2 There is a growing literature on various uses of religion for mobilization in the European theatre of World War I. For a little selection of the recent publications see Annette Becker, *War and Faith: The Religious Imagination in France, 1914–1930*, trans. Helen McPhail (New York: Berg, 1998); Gangolf Hübinger, “Religion and War in Imperial Germany”, in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 125–136; Michael Snape and Edward Madigan (eds.), *The Clergy in Khaki: New Perspectives on British Army Chaplaincy in the First World War* (London: Ashgate, 2013); Jonathan H. Ebel, *Faith in the Fight: Religion and the American Soldier in the Great War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). But there is still a dearth of studies on the Ottoman experience.
- 3 On the history of Ottoman conscription see Mehmet Beşikçi, “Mobilizing Military Labor in the Age of Total War: Ottoman Conscription before and during the Great War”, in Erik-Jan Zürcher (ed.), *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour, 1500–2000* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), pp. 547–580; Erik-Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice, 1844–1918”, in Erik-Jan Zürcher (ed.), *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 79–94.
- 4 Mustafa Aksakal, “‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad”, *War in History*, vol. 18, no. 2 (April 2011), p. 187.
- 5 Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni* (İstanbul: Simurg, 2000); Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu, “Inclusion and Exclusion: Conscription in the Ottoman Empire”, *Journal of Modern European History*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2007), pp. 264–286.

- 6 Fikret Adanır, "Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–1913", in Ronald G. Suny, Fatma M. Göçek and Norman M. Naimark (eds.), *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 113–125.
- 7 Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Ottoman Labour Battalions in World War I", in Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik J. Schaller (eds.), *The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah* (Zürich: Chronos, 2002), pp. 187–196; Mehmet Beşikçi, *Between Voluntarism and Resistance: The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 129–139.
- 8 After the Sarıkamış defeat, during which various Ottoman commanders claimed that many Armenians collaborated with the Russians, the acting commander-in-chief Enver Pasha issued an order to all military units on 25 February 1915 instructing that "Armenians shall strictly not be employed in mobile armies, in mobile and stationary gendarmeries, or in any armed service." See Kamuran Gürün, *The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed* (Nicosia: Rustem, 2001), p. 206.
- 9 It is important to note that the discourse of "comradeship in arms" (*silah arkadaşlığı*), which began to be expressed in newspapers and journals by Young Turk intellectuals discussing the 1909 regulations as a motif that would unify Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans was hardly visible on the eve of and during World War I. See, for example, Hüseyin Cahid, *Tanin*, 23 June 1909. Also see Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni*, p. 128.
- 10 This is not to say that Turkish nationalism and Islamic discourse were mutually exclusive. On the contrary, as Hobsbawm argues, nationalism and religion were often close allies. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 124, 150.
- 11 Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Islam in the Service of the Caliphate and the Secular State", in Erik-Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the Nation Building* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 277–278.
- 12 Alexander Watson, *Enduring the Great War: Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 93–100.
- 13 Veysel Şimşek, *Ottoman Military Recruitment and the Recruit, 1826–1853* (MA Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2005); Gültekin Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok: Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti'nde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum, 1826–1839* (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2009); Beşikçi, "Mobilizing Military Labour in the Age of Total War."
- 14 For a short bibliographical survey of these "jihad pamphlets" see Abdullah Taha İmamoğlu, "I. Dünya Savaşı'na Bibliyografik Bir Katkı", in H. Çetin and L. Erdemir (eds.), *Yüzo. Yılında I. Dünya Savaşı ve Mirası Bildiri Kitabı*, Volume 1 (Çanakkale: Çanakkale Valiliği Yayınları, 2015), pp. 151–179.
- 15 Hasan Fehmi, *Kürsi-i İslamdan Bir Hitab: Cihad Hakkında Ehl-i İslama, Asker-i İslama* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1916), p. 4.
- 16 See, for example, İsmail Faik, *Cihad* (İstanbul: Koçunyan Matbaası, 1915), p. 1; Halil Hilmi, *Cihadda İslamın Vazifesi* (İstanbul: Necm-i İstikbal Matbaası, 1914), p. 7; Hasan Fehmi, *Kürsi-i İslamdan Bir Hitab*, p. 10.

- 17 *Cihad-ı Mukaddes Farzdır* (İstanbul: n.p., 1916).
- 18 When Jihad involves expanding Islam and the Muslim community, then Jihad is a collective community (*farz-ı kifaye*), and joining it is a voluntary choice. See Tobias Heinzelmann, *Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Genel Askerlik Yükümlülüğü, 1826–1856*, trans. Türkis Noyan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2009), p. 14.
- 19 Nahl sura, verse 126: “And if you punish [an enemy, O believers], punish with an equivalent of that with which you were harmed.” See <http://quran.com/16/126> (accessed on 6 December 2014).
- 20 See, for example, Musa Kâzım, *İslamda Cihad* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye ve Şurekası, 1917).
- 21 Halil Hilmi, *Cihadda İslamın Vazifesi*, p. 8.
- 22 Anfal sura, verse 60: “And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wrong.” See <http://quran.com/8/60> (accessed on 6 December 2014).
- 23 Halil Hilmi, *Cihadda İslamın Vazifesi*, pp. 2–3.
- 24 See, for example, Mehmed Halis, *Cihad-ı Ekber* (İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabhanesi, 1917), p. 6. Also see Hasan Fehmi, *Kürsi-i İslamdan Bir Hitab*, 15; Halil Hilmi, *Cihadda İslamın Vazifesi*, p. 5.
- 25 See, for example, Feyzullah Sacid, *Ordumuza Armağan: Ordunun Tekbiri, Cihad-ı Ekber Destanı, Gökten Ses* (İstanbul: İktbal Kitaphanesi, 1914). Here is an example of the poems this pamphlet contains: “O the army of Islam, the army of revenge! / March, overtake, attack, go beyond! / Never mind deserts, nor mountains and stones / Time is up: Attack! / So let hell break loose” (“*Ey İslam ordusu, İntikam ordusu! / Yürü, geç, atıl, aş / Ne çöl bil, ne dağ taş! / Vakit oldu: Hücum et / Ki kopsun kıyamet!*”) (p. 13).
- 26 For a few such examples see *Cihad-ı Ekber: Her Müslüman Okusun ve Okutsun* (İstanbul: Ahenk Matbaası, 1914); Musa Kazım, *İslamda Cihad*. And quite a few of the ones that were sold, not free of charge, declared on their front pages that their sales revenues would be donated, partly or entirely, to the Ottoman war effort. See, for example, Halil Hilmi, *Cihadda İslamın Vazifesi*; Mehmed Halis, *Cihad-ı Ekber*.
- 27 See İsmail Kara, “Cumhuriyet Devrinde Askere Din Dersleri: ‘İyi Asker İyi Müslüman, İyi Müslüman İyi Asker Olur’”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 166 (October 2007), pp. 48–53. This essay is a brief survey of the religion book for the soldier literature from the late Ottoman period to early republican Turkey.
- 28 For a few examples of this increased literature see Ömer Fevzi, *Osmanlı Efradına Maneviyat-ı Askeriye Dersleri: Maneviyat Askerin Ruhudur* (İstanbul: Mekteb-i Harbiye Matbaası, 1909); this book had new editions in 1910 and 1911; Ömer Fevzi, *Maneviyyat-ı Askeriye Makaleleri* (İstanbul: Mekteb-i Harbiye Matbaası, 1911); Ali Rahmi, *Orduda Terbiye-i Maneviye ve Ruhiye* (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1911); Hüseyin Hakkı, *Osmanlı Efradının Takviye-i Maneviyatı* (İstanbul: Reşadiye Matbaası, 1914); İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, *Gazilere Armağan* (İstanbul: n.p., 1915); Üryanizade Ali Vahid, *Askerin İlmi-hali* (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1917).

- 29 İsmail Kara, *İslâmcıların Siyasî Görüşleri*, 1: *Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet*, 2nd edition (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2011), pp. 60–78, 88–91.
- 30 Üryanizade Ali Vahid, *Askerin İlmihali*, pp. 13, 18.
- 31 İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, *Gazilere Armağan*, p. 43. Another religion book for the soldier, which was written later during the early years of the Turkish republic at the request of Fevzi Çakmak, the chief of the Turkish general staff, emphasized that “military service is the sixth pillar of Islam” and if it was not carried out well, the other pillars would be incomplete too: Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, *Askere Din Kitabı*, 2nd edition (İstanbul: Ebüzziya Matbaası, 1945), p. 195.
- 32 Benjamin C. Fortna, *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 20–21.
- 33 *Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi*, 1: *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Siyasi ve Askeri Hazırlıkları ve Harbe Girişi* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1970), p. 227.
- 34 Erol Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey during World War I* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 17–23.
- 35 Of course, we should also add film here, since cinema was also used to a certain extent for propaganda during World War I in all the belligerent countries, including the Ottoman Empire.
- 36 See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (London: Verso, 1993).
- 37 Irvin Cemil Schick, “Osmanlı Döneminde Matbuat Kapitalizmi”, *Virgöl*, no. 126 (January–February 2009), pp. 58–63. Also see Irvin Cemil Schick, *Bedeni, Toplum, Kâinatı Yazmak: İslam, Cinsiyet ve Kültür Üzerine* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), pp. 215–270.
- 38 This is, for example, Erol Köroğlu’s argument in his otherwise excellent research on Ottoman propaganda and literature in World War I. See Erol Köroğlu, *Propagandanın Millî Kimlik İnşasına: Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, 1914–1918* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004). This book remains a seminal study in its field.
- 39 Kara, *İslâmcıların Siyasî Görüşleri*, p. 85.
- 40 For a discussion on this point see Recai Doğan, “Osmanlı’nın Son Döneminde Yaygın Din Eğitiminde Vaaz ve Vaizlik”, *Diyanet Dergisi*, vol. 35, no. 1 (January–February–March 1999), pp. 171–206.
- 41 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler*, 1: *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi* (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984), pp. 72, 90; Kara, *İslâmcıların Siyasî Görüşleri*, p. 88.
- 42 Doğan, “Osmanlı’nın Son Döneminde Yaygın Din”, p. 184.
- 43 *Mevaiz-i Diniye*, vol. 1, (İstanbul: Daru’l-Tıbaatü’l Amire, 1912); *Mevaiz-i Diniye*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Amire, 1913).
- 44 Nesimi Yazıcı, “Osmanlıların Son Döneminde Din Görevlisi Yetiştirme Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler”, *Diyanet Dergisi*, vol. 27, no. 4 (October–November–December 1991), pp. 55–123. Also see Zeki Salih Zengin, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde İslahat Çalışmaları Çevresinde Medreselerin Kuruluş Sistemi ve İdari Teşkilatı”, *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi (OTAM)*, no. 9 (1998) pp. 431–449.
- 45 Mustafa Baktır, “Hutbe”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, 1998, Vol. 18, pp. 425–428.

- 46 See Recai Doğan, “Cumhuriyet Öncesi Dönemde Yaygın Din Eğitimi Açısından Hutbeler”, *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol. 39, no. 1 (1999), pp. 491–533.
- 47 Amit Bein, *Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 52–56; also see Amit Bein, “Politics, Military Conscription, and Religious Education in the Late Ottoman Empire”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 38 (2006), pp. 283–301.
- 48 See “Mükellefiyet-i Askeriye Kanun-ı Muvakkatı”, 29 Nisan 1330/12 May 1914, *Düstûr*, series II, vol. 6, pp. 662–704, especially Article 91.
- 49 Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives, İstanbul (BOA), MV., 234/67, 29 March 1914; “Muhasasat-ı Askeriyye Kanun Layihasına Merbut Cetvel Suretidir,” *Meclis-i Mebusan Kanun Layihaları*, vol. 1 (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1992), pp. 351–352; Stanford J. Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I*, vol. 1: *Prelude to War* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2006), p. 129.
- 50 Philip H. Stoddard, *Teşkilat-ı Mahusa*, trans. Tansel Demirel (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1993), p. 29.
- 51 Stanford J. Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I*, vol. 2: *Triumph and Tragedy, November 1914–July 1916* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2008), p. 1165.
- 52 See, for example, “Mevlid-i Nebevi Kiraatı”, *İkdâm*, 25 November 1914.
- 53 “Ayasofya’da Mevlid-i Nebevi”, *İkdâm*, 14 November 1914. For similar *mevlids* which were organized by the National Defence League see “Mevlid-i Nebevi Kiraatı”, *İkdâm*, 24 November 1914; “Mevlid-i Nebevi Kiraatı”, *İkdâm*, 25 November 1914; “Mevlid-i Nebevi Kiraatı”, *İkdâm*, 17 February 1915.
- 54 “Vaaz ve Nasihat”, *İkdâm*, 24 September 1914.
- 55 “Cuma Günkü Vaazlar”, *İkdâm*, 28 January 1915.
- 56 For a first-hand account of such a gathering scene in a village by a reserve officer see Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 15th edition (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004), p. 63.
- 57 Kemal Beydilli, *Osmanlı’da İmamlar ve Bir İmanın Günlüğü* (İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2013), pp. 23–26; Kemal Beydilli, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde İmamlık”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, 2000, Vol. 22, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2000), pp. 181–186; Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700:1870: An Empire Besieged* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2007), p. 328.
- 58 Beşikçi, *Between Voluntarism and Resistance*, pp. 102–107.
- 59 For further basic information on Ottoman army imams see Mehmet Beşikçi, “Askerlik ve Din: Osmanlı Ordu İmamları”, *Derin Tarih*, special issue of World War I (2014), pp. 126–133; Mustafa Birol Ülker, “Tabur İmamlığından Moral Subaylığına”, *Çanakkale 2015*, no. 6 (August 2010), pp. 18–25.
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- 61 Erich R. Prigge, *Çanakkale Savaşı Günlüğü*, trans. Bülent Erdemoğlu (İstanbul: Timaş, 2011), p. 74.
- 62 Ülker, “Tabur İmamlığından Moral Subaylığına”, p. 25.
- 63 For a detailed analysis of the problem of desertion in the Ottoman army in World War I see Beşikçi, *Between Voluntarism and Resistance*, Chapter 5.
- 64 *Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi*, vol. 4, part 2: *Sina-Filistin Cephesi* (Ankara:

- Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1986), p. 762. For similar religious practices, for example, on the Gallipoli front see Emin Çöl, *Bir Erin Anıları: Çanakkale-Sina Savaşları*, ed. by Celal Kazdağlı (İstanbul: Nöbetçi Yayınları, 2009), p. 59.
- 65 Anfal sura, verse 15: “O you who have believed, when you meet those who disbelieve advancing [for battle], do not turn to them your backs [in flight].” Verse 16: “And whoever turns his back to them on such a day, unless swerving [as a strategy] for war or joining [another] company, has certainly returned with anger [upon him] from Allah, and his refuge is Hell – and wretched is the destination.” <http://quran.com/8/15,16> (accessed on 6 December 2014). This verse was quoted, for example, in İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, *Gazilere Armağan*, pp. 6–7.
- 66 For an analysis on this point see Gottfried Hagen, “The Prophet Muhammad as an Exemplar in War – Ottoman Views on the Eve of World War I”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 22 (Spring 2000), pp. 145–172.
- 67 See, for example, Sami Yengin, *Drama'dan Sina-Filistin'e Savaş Günlüğü (1917–1918)* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2007), p. 79.
- 68 Süleyman Nuri, *Uyanan Esirler: Çanakkale Siperlerinden ТКР Yönetimine* (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2002), pp. 92–93.
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- 70 BOA, DH.KMS., 49-1/18, 31 October 1918; BOA, DH.ID., 180/52, 4 June 1914.
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- 72 Emin Çöl, *Bir Erin Anıları*, p. 59.
- 73 “30. Tümen Sarıkamış Harekâtı Ceridesi”, *Askerî Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, no. 122 (January 2009), p. 437.
- 74 Hüseyin Fehmi Genişol, *Çanakkale'den Bağdat'a Esaretten Kurtuluş Savaşı'na: Cephede Sekiz Yıl Sekiz Ay (1914–1923)*, ed. by Mustafa Yeni (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), pp. 92, 100, 136.
- 75 Süleyman Nuri, *Uyanan Esirler*, pp. 137–142.
- 76 Abdullah Fevzi Efendi, *Çanakkale Cephesinde Bir Müderris*, ed. by Ali Osman Koçkuzu (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2010), pp. 129, 144, 170–171.
- 77 On the Ottoman army's transformation from its Balkan failure to its increasing performance in World War I see Mehmet Beşikçi, “Balkan Harbi'nde Osmanlı Seferberliği ve Redif Teşkilatının İflası”, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, no. 110 (Spring 2012), pp. 27–43; Beşikçi, *Between Voluntarism and Resistance*, Chapter 2. Also see Mesut Uyar and E. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2009), pp. 235–279.
- 78 Hülya Küçük, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Bektaşiler* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2003), pp. 97–98; Engin Öncüoğlu, *Osmanlı Ordusunda Gönüllü Tarikat Alayları* (MA thesis, Hacettepe University, 2004), p. 37.
- 79 Turkish General Staff Military Archives, Ankara (ATASE), BDH, Klasör 1942, Dosya 223, Fihrist 1–19.

80 Küçük, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Bektaşiler*, p. 103.

81 On the Mevlevi volunteers see Nüri Köstüklü, *Vatan Savunmasında Mevlevihaneler: Balkan Savaşlarından Milli Mücadeleye* (İstanbul: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2005).

82 Küçük, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Bektaşiler*, p. 103; Öncüoğlu, *Gönüllü Tarikat Alayları*, p. 91; Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I*, vol. 1, p. 377.

5 Ottoman Jihad or Jihads

The Ottoman Shīʿī Jihad, the Successful One

M. Şükrü Hanioglu

In his provocative *Holy War Made in Germany*, the Dutch orientalist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje maintained that the Ottoman grand Jihad declared in November 1914 was a German invention aimed at stirring up Muslims under Allied rule.¹ Hurgronje further claimed that German orientalists and public intellectuals such as Carl Heinrich Becker, Hugo Grothe and Martin Hartmann, who had previously derided and ridiculed Jihad as a medieval institution and a threat to the civilized world, reinterpreted it after the July crisis to serve the interests of German war aims.²

Kaiser Wilhelm II's late nineteenth century manifestations of friendship with the Muslim world and Max von Oppenheim's infamous *Denkschrift betreffend die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde* (*Memorandum Concerning the Fomenting of Revolutions in the Islamic Territories of Our Enemies*) penned in October 1914³ made many contemporary observers believe that the Ottoman grand jihād was merely an implementation of the German plans prepared before the Ottoman entry into the Great War. Likewise, on 21 October 1914, Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf, Chief of the General Staff of the Ottoman Field Troops, stated that one of the major expectations of Germany from the Ottoman Empire was a declaration of Jihad after the Ottoman entry into the war.⁴

Indeed, the Kaiser approached the Ottoman Minister of War Enver Pasha on 22 October, a week before the bombardment of the Russian Black Sea ports, and inquired about the possibility of a declaration of Jihad in the wake of Ottoman entry into the Great War.⁵

There is no doubt that the German war planners wished to use a Jihad declared by the Ottoman Caliph to its fullest extent to incite the substantial Muslim populations under Allied rule to rebel. In fact, the establishment of the *Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient* under the auspices of the German Foreign Ministry and Oppenheim's appointment as the director of that body reveal that the Germans desired to make the most of the Ottoman Jihad.⁶ This bureau published a journal called *al-Jihād* in

a number of languages, including Arabic, Tatar and Russian, on a regular basis between 1915 and 1918 and produced a host of leaflets and appeals to be distributed in India, Afghanistan, North Africa and Central Asia.⁷

It should be stressed; however, that “official jihad” had become an almost forgotten tool of propaganda after the Tanzimat was initiated in 1839. Having changed its official ideology and become an empire of Ottoman citizens regardless of religion and ethnicity, the empire refrained from declaring a holy war against Christian powers during several subsequent conflicts.

Similarly the leaders of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress decided not to declare an official Jihad against Italy, although they characterized the resistance in Tripoli of Barbary exclusively in Islamic terms. Furthermore, the Balkan states’ declaration of Holy War against the Ottoman Empire in 1912 and their “cross against crescent” rhetoric did not prompt a similar response from Istanbul.⁸ Instead, the Ottoman sultan advised his troops, including battalions of Christian soldiers who wore crosses on their collars, to defend the fatherland like their forefathers who had shed their blood to accomplish that goal.⁹ Unlike the Balkan leaders, the Ottoman Minister of War asked his troops “to protect those sites considered sacred by different races.”¹⁰

Thus the immediate declaration of Jihad in the Great War seemed to be a departure from post-Tanzimat Ottoman policy. Furthermore, the Ottomans’ declaration of Jihad while allied with the Christian powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary was legalistically problematic. Pointing to this issue, the Ottoman Minister of War Enver Pasha told the Kaiser that the Ottoman declaration of Jihad would be imprudent and that instead the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph as the commander of the faithful should simply ask the Muslims under British, French, or Russian rule to rebel.¹¹

All of this leads one to assume that the Ottoman declaration of Jihad was nothing other than a cynical act carried out for the sake of appeasing the German empire and its ruler who had unrealistic expectations from his weak eastern ally. While there is some truth in this thesis, the fact is that the Ottoman leadership did view Jihad as a tool that might help advance Ottoman strategic plans and prevent backstabbing by unreliable Muslim elements of the empire.

Therefore, while the Germans unrealistically expected major uprisings in India, North Africa and Central Asia to follow from the declaration of Jihad, the Ottoman leadership had four relatively more realistic objectives: first and foremost, using the weapon of an independent Jihad in the first front that had opened even before the Ottoman declaration of global Jihad; second, galvanizing the Muslim populations in Arabia against

Allied encroachments and preventing local leaders from changing sides; third, receiving better support in the areas heavily inhabited by the Kurds who had become a major target of Russian policies aimed at winning them over; and, finally, benefiting from the Jihad in special operations in Iran and Azarbaijan.¹²

Thus, instead of an asset to be projected into faraway lands such as India and Central Asia the Ottoman war planners considered Jihad a strategic weapon that would assist them in defending their empire. For the Ottoman leaders the most important service of the Jihad would be on the Iraqi front that opened immediately following the Ottoman entry into the Great War. The Ottoman leaders knew that the impact of the declaration of Jihad in Arabia would be minimal.

The Ottoman authorities rightly assumed that the local rulers who had been won over by the Ottomans, such as the Zaydī leader Imām Yahyā Ḥamid al-Dīn in Yemen and Saʿūd ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz of Ḥaʿil, would fight the war on the Ottoman side. On the other hand, the Ottoman leaders knew that the declaration of Jihad would not affect Abd al-Azīz ibn al-Saʿūd's decision to collaborate with the Entente powers despite the deal cut immediately before the war that made him the hereditary Ottoman governor of Najd.¹³ Likewise, Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Idrīsī, who had turned down all Ottoman offers and established a *de facto* Sufi state in ʿAsīr, would not pay any heed to such a declaration.¹⁴ As for Sharif Ḥusayn, he would pursue his ambitious plans regardless of the Ottoman religious propaganda.¹⁵

The intensified British naval activity in Ottoman territorial waters and the Royal Navy's virtual blockade of the entrance to the Shatt al ʿArab that started before the Ottoman entry into the Great War¹⁶ had been an unambiguous signal of where the first front in the Middle East would be opened. The British also brought a brigade from India and kept it in Bahrain as an expeditionary force. As expected, two days after the opening of hostilities, the British captured Fao, whence they marched on Basra. Faced with only sporadic Ottoman resistance, the British expeditionary force quickly captured the town of Basra on 22 November, and the remaining Ottoman troops hastily retreated northwards to form a new line of defence.¹⁷

For the Ottoman war planners, who viewed Jihad as a strategic weapon, the effect of a holy war would be first tested on the Iraqi front that had opened in Basra. Optimally, this should be in the form of an independent Jihad since the Sunnī Hanafī Ottoman centre could not rally the heavily Shīʿī population directly. Hoping for an independent Jihad in southern Iraq, Ottoman war planners crafted the declaration of global Jihad with care. They feared that an Ottoman declaration of Jihad justified in strict

Sunnī terminology would jeopardize a jihad led by Shī'ī mujtahids (jurisconsults) in the shrine cities of Iraq. It should be remembered that Shī'ī mujtahids acting on their own had issued a call for Jihad against the Allies a few days before the official Ottoman declaration of holy war.

Hence, the original collection of Ottoman fatwās issued by the Şeyhülislām Ürgüblü Hayri Efendi made just a single reference to the Caliphate, an institution that the Shī'īs did not recognize.¹⁸ Nonetheless the Ottoman authorities did not circulate these fatwās in southern Iraq, being aware that turning this undertaking into a Sunnī holy war would jeopardize the prospects of the Shī'ī Jihad in Iraq. Likewise the more detailed scholarly appeal for Jihad that appeared in the original fatwās circulated throughout the empire. In this collection, the text referred to the Ottoman administration as the Islamic government and the sultan as the sultan of the Muslims without making frequent and clear-cut references to the Caliph.¹⁹

Two weeks after the Şeyhülislām issued the declaration of the grand Jihad, the Ottoman cabinet issued its first own decree regarding the holy war on 25 November. That ruling stated that the fatwās and orders issued by mujtahids regarding the Jihad would be cabled from Najaf and Karbala free of charge and the related expenses would be met by the Ministry of the Interior's special funds.²⁰ The cabinet decision did not mention that this Jihad was independent of the Ottoman global Jihad. Indeed, the Shī'ī mujtahids shaped the first Jihad experiment in the Ottoman Empire through a wide range of fatwās issued in its support. This was a different Jihad from the global Jihad.²¹ In effect, the Ottoman war planners launched two Jihads upon their entry into the Great War: a Sunnī Jihad which would provide minimal help to the Ottomans but would, however, appease the Germans; and a Shī'ī Jihad which would yield important strategic advantages. In fact, this was the major successful Ottoman Jihad initiative during the Great War.

The Ottoman decision to launch a Shī'ī Jihad did not come out of the blue in 1914. It was a result of the historical rapprochement between the Ottoman centre and its Shī'ī subjects in Iraq after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

The rapid expansion of Shī'ism in southern Iraq at the turn of the twentieth century was one of the major concerns of the Ottoman government under Abdülhamid II.²² The ascendancy of the Usūlī school of Shī'īte jurisprudence advocating for the primacy of the 'ulamā' as interpreters of Islamic law and Imāmī traditions had been a source of annoyance for the Hamidian regime. The sultan, wishing to counteract the expansion of Shī'ism and the Iranian missionary activities, sent Sunnī 'ulamā' to the region and launched extensive campaigns of Sunnī

propaganda.²³ In addition he made overtures to the Shī'ite mujtahids to win them over to the cause of pan-Islamism.²⁴ The results, however, were disappointing. By the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the Shī'ites had gained a considerable majority in the region due to the mass conversion of tribesmen, much to the dismay of the Ottoman centre, and the attempts to persuade the Shī'ite mujtahids to support Ottoman Panislamism did not produce any tangible results.²⁵

The reinstatement of the constitutional regime in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution dramatically changed the relationship between the Ottoman centre and the region. Seizing the opportunity, the Shī'is launched a major educational reform programme by opening a number of schools and madrasas and started publishing *al-Ilm*, a major Shī'ī scholarly journal, in 1910.²⁶ The new regime also facilitated a debate on argument for Sunni-Shī'ite unity promoted by Shī'ī scholars such as Muḥammad Ḥusayn Na'inī and Muhammad Ḥusayn Kashīf al-Ghīta. The Committee of Union and Progress likewise gave strong support to the ideal of Sunni-Shī'ite cooperation. It also worked with local political leaders such as Nakibzāde Talib Bey, who negotiated the most delicate deals with other Arab leaders, such as 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn al-Sa'ūd, on behalf of the Ottoman government.²⁷

In 1910 the CUP backed a mujtahid initiative led by Muḥammad Kāzīm Khurāsānī and other major Shī'ite religious leaders. They issued a strong fatwā stating that "it is obligatory upon all Muslims to unite in order to defend the Islamic lands and to guard all the Ottoman and Iranian territories against the foreigners and their attacks. We remind all Muslims of the brotherhood by which God has joined the believers. We also call upon them to protect the noble Islamic banner."²⁸ This fatwā issued against Russians was the first major joint Sunni-Shī'ī religious initiative in the region. The Sunni 'ulamā' of Baghdad and prominent religious figures such as Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā gave their enthusiastic support to the initiative. In 1911 the same mujtahids and others joined them in issuing a stronger fatwā against the Italian aggression in Tripoli of Barbary and Benghazi. They invited all Muslims to participate in a Jihad against the Italian invaders.²⁹

Whereas the Ottoman centre opted not to declare a Jihad against the Italians, the Shī'ite mujtahids' calls for holy war turned southern Iraq into a hotbed of anti-Italian activity during the war over Tripoli of Barbary.³⁰ The Committee of Union and Progress and the Ottoman centre viewed this development as the emergence of an invaluable resource to be exploited in future conflicts. They did not have to wait too long.

The government in Istanbul launched a major propaganda offensive after the declaration of the Ottoman global Jihd. The Ottoman consulate

in Jakarta became the centre for disseminating the Jihad material to the Muslim communities in the large geographic area of South and Southeast Asia.³¹ Copies of the Ottoman Jihad fatwās in Turkish, Arabic, Persian, Urdu and Tatar were smuggled in substantial numbers into India and Central Asia to satisfy the Germans, who nurtured great expectations for the reception of the holy war.³²

Obviously this was not the Ottoman priority. For the Ottoman war planners the most important Jihad was not the Sunnī but the Shī'ī one. For the Ottoman government this independent Jihad was not merely an issue of propaganda aimed at inciting Muslims in different parts of the world but a crucial means of defence.

The small Ottoman garrison in Basra consisted of 8,000 ill-trained recruits and reservists who could not resist the well-equipped and combat-ready British expeditionary force of 15,000 troops sent from India.³³ The Ottoman authorities, therefore, approached the leading mujtahids in the shrine cities and Baghdad to invite them to support the war efforts of the Islamic state. They received affirmative responses from all.³⁴

A day before the official declaration of the Ottoman global Jihad, a major meeting attended by all leading mujtahids of the shrine cities, ulama, local shaykhs and tribal leaders was held in Najaf. The mujtahids and ulama told the audience of 40,000 (a figure provided by the Ottoman sub-governor of Najaf) in passionate Islamic language that they should participate in the Jihad. The organizers and the Ottoman sub-governor decided to organize at once a militia force of 5,000 to 6,000 men to be followed later by new volunteer reinforcements.³⁵ On 11 November, the government instructed the Ottoman governor in Baghdad to distribute all Jihad fatwās and orders issued by mujtahids in shrine cities free of charge.³⁶ The mujtahids churned out a plethora of fatwās in a short period of time, and the local Ottoman telegraph offices sent copies of these fatwās to every town in the region. These fatwās helped the Ottoman authorities enormously in recruiting militia and strengthening the local resistance against the advancing British. In the meantime, the Ottoman Minister of War Enver Pasha dispatched Süleyman Askerî, the director of the Special Organization, to Iraq with the hope of creating a strong local resistance movement similar to that which had taken place in Benghazi two years earlier.³⁷

Most of the fatwās issued by the leading 'ulamā' were in Arabic, although a number of fatwās were written in Persian. The Ottoman government additionally instructed local administrators to collect fatwās or opinions from all leading mujtahids so that the impact would be stronger. Leading Shī'ī mujtahids, including Abd al-Ḥusayn

Asad Allāh, Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Yas, ‘Alī al-Nakhjawānī, ‘Alī Rafīsh, Ismā‘īl al-Sadr (the grandfather of Musa al-Sadr of Lebanon), Mahdī al-Khurāsānī, Muḥammad Amīn Asad Allāh, Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ḥā’irī al-Māzandarānī, Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Muḥammad Kāẓim Yazdī, Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ḥabbūbī, Muḥammad al-Sayyid ‘Alī al-Tabrīzī, Muḥammad Taqī al-Shirāzī, Muṣṭafā al-Ḥusaynī al-Kāshānī and Muṣṭafā al-Nakhjawānī al-Īrānī al-Muhājir, provided a large number fatwās and opinions calling upon Muslims for a Jihad against the Allies.³⁸ Also a joint fatwa signed by 23 leading mujtahids rallied the Shī‘ī population against the Allied invasion.³⁹

Not surprisingly, these fatwās did not make any reference to the fatwā collection used in the Ottoman declaration of global Jihad. Just as the Ottoman material refrained from employing distinctly Sunnī language, the fatwās issued by the leading mujtahids avoided obvious Shī‘ī references. When after the Allied declarations of war Ottoman officials approached the leading mujtahids for fatwās, they posed the question in non-sectarian terms as well:

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The request at hand for a fatwa, from the learned ‘ulamā’, [concerns] what scholars of the faith and those who make clear the provisions of the Sharī‘a of the chief of the messengers (upon him be the blessings of the Lord of the Worlds) is in this legal matter. For the seven countries, Russia, England, France, Japan, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, have declared war today on the Sublime Islamic Ottoman State ... and from all directions, by land and by sea, have attacked the Islamic lands (al-mamālik al-Islamiyya), and have taken to plundering their possessions, killing their men, taking captive their women, and destroying (hadm) the lands of the Muslims. Is it therefore the obligation of all Muslims (al-taklīf ‘alā ‘umūm al-muslimīn), of every madhhab, milla, and ṭarīqa, to repel the unbelievers (kuffār) from the Islamic lands, and to fight [them] and to confront [them], or not?

And if one is able to go forth, to fight, and to give of one’s wealth, but stays quiet in one’s house, what is God’s judgment (ḥukm), in a clear and explicit way? Please provide an explanation to the first part of this question, adorned and stamped with the noble seal (al-khātīm al-sharīf).

Provide us with a fatwa, that God may reward you.⁴⁰

The responses given to this inquiry likewise avoided any overt Shī‘ī references. For instance, Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī plainly responded that “With the attack of the unbelievers (*kuffār*) on the lands of the

Muslims it is obligatory (*wājib*) – when there is ability (*qudra*) – upon the Muslims at large so capable (*al-mutamakkanīn min ‘āmmat al-muslimīm*) to defend against them (*difā‘uhum*), when there does not exist a sufficient number (*man bihi al-kifāya*) already.”⁴¹

Some authorities even maintained that all Islamic sects were in agreement that the Muslims should fight against Christian encroachments. It is interesting that those mujtahids refrained from making any references to the Ottoman alliance with Christian powers in these responses, and presented the war as one between Islam and Christianity.

For example, Shaykh al-Sharī‘a al-Aṣfahānī commented that:

The Islamic sects (*madhāhib*) today consist of the Sunnī sects, Imāmism, Ismā‘īlism, Zaydism, Wahhābism, and the Khārijites. All the ‘ulamā’ of these sects are in agreement and consensus that, with the attack of the kuffār against the lands of the Muslims, and their engaging in killing their men and robbing their property and raising the work of kufr and forsaking the word of Islam and the truth ... that it is obligatory upon every capable Muslim to expend his effort and what ability he has to repel the kuffār and the mushrikīn attacking the lands of Islam and to break his advance ... to expend their efforts to subdue them and free themselves from the agony of the hereafter, not to fail to achieve what is within reach, not to be pleased with shirking this ... one of them with his property, a second with his soul, a third by using weapons, a fourth by using standing and honor, a fifth by employing wile and deliberation, a sixth by using arms and archery. Thus did God say: ‘Make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses you can, to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy’ [Q. 8:60]. And all that we have said is with respect to those Muslims of the groups enumerated [above]. Each one of them constitutes an element of force and a part of preparations.

O brother believers, o Muslim peoples: Awaken from your sleep, you are woken by guns and cannons and the religion of war. Be not pleased that the word of tawhīd be replaced by talthīth [“the trinity”], calls to prayer (*ādhān*) by church bells (*nāqūs*); [be not pleased that] your men become the servants and slaves of the kuffār, and your women and children prisoners and slave girls for the most wicked among them, belonging to one hand and the next. Fight the kuffār with cheerful face, with bodies raised and unsheathed from their clothes, with stomachs empty of food, such that you do not extend your hands to the kuffār seeking their charity you lose your honor. Maintain your honor, honor yourselves [lit., make your faces white] before the Prophet so that your independence remains forever and ever, God willing.⁴²

By responding favourably to the Ottoman request and depicting the Allied war as a Christian crusade against Islam, the leading Shī'ī mujtahids helped the Ottoman centre to resist the initial attack in southern Iraq, much to the dismay of the British war planners.⁴³ The local militia and volunteer units responding to the calls of mujtahids facilitated the orderly retreat of the Ottoman regular forces. In addition the fatwās issued by the local religious authorities prevented any manifestations of anti-Ottoman and Arab nationalist sentiments.

Upon strong urging by the Ottoman authorities, the leading mujtahids also depicted the Ottoman state as the defender of the entire Muslim world without making any references to the Caliphate. For instance, Muḥammad Kāzīm al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī decreed that:

It is not hidden from anyone that the European states, and especially England, Russia, and France, have from the earliest days always been transgressing and encroaching upon the Islamic territories (mamālik), such that they have violated most of the Islamic territories. And they have no intention in these transgressions (ta'addiyāt) but the erasure of the religion (maḥw al-dīn), God forbid! In recent times their objectives have been made clear. They have attacked the territories of the Sublime Ottoman Empire (mamālik al-dawla al-'aliyya al-'uthmāniyya), may God strengthen it to give victory to Islam, and the long hand of transgression is on the verge of reaching the two holy sanctuaries (al-ḥaramayn al-sharīfayn) and the shrines of the virtuous imāms (mashāhid al-a'imma al-ṭāhirīn), peace be upon them. They have attacked the Islamic lands, their inhabitants, their honor, and their possessions.

Thus it is obligatory (yajibu) upon the tribes living on the war fronts (thughūr), and upon all able Muslims – should there not be a sufficient number among them [the tribes] to protect the borders – to protect their borders and defend the territory of Islam (bayḍat al-Islām) such as they can. God is He who provides victory, aid, and support to the Muslims.⁴⁴

With the exception of a reference to the “virtuous imāms” the fatwā lacked an exclusive Shī'ite tone, and presented the struggle as one led by the Ottoman empire in defence of the Islamic world.⁴⁵ Likewise, Muḥammad Taqī al-Shīrāzī's fatwa painted a threat to the entire Muslim community:

The attacks of the aggressing enemies have approached the holy places (ḥurām) of God, the holy places of His messenger, and the shrines of

the virtuous imāms, God's blessings be upon them all. These [people] desire to shed, by means of their aggression, the blood of the Muslims and disgrace the sanctity of their religion. The danger has escalated, God forbid, to the lands of the Muslims, their places of worship, their senses, and their minds. Thus it is obligatory upon all the tribes living on the war fronts, and upon all Muslims, to protect their war fronts and their borders and to defend the territory of Islam howsoever they can. God is He who provides victory and aid. Fear you God, fear you God in this, O Muslims (ma'āshir al-muslimīn). Peace be upon you, and God's mercy and blessings.⁴⁶

As compared to the official Ottoman fatwā collection initially issued by the Şeyūlislām and followed by many leading Sunnī 'ulamā', these documents adopted a decisively passionate tone and rhetoric and consequently had a deeper effect on the targeted audiences. In fact, the Shī'ite Jihad, carefully crafted by mujtahids in Iraq, was the most successful one for the Ottomans. The only comparable Jihad initiative was the one launched in the Yemen with the help of another non-Sunnī religious authority, Imām Yahyā, who had signed a contract commonly known as the Da'an Treaty with the Ottomans in 1911.⁴⁷ Imām Yahyā called on his Zaydī followers for Jihad and the Ottomans made most of it in their fight against the British. The region composed of Yemen, Aden and 'Asīr was a much smaller theatre of war, however.⁴⁸

By contrast, the Ottoman Sunnī or global Jihad did not provide any tangible results. Unlike their German allies, the Ottoman war planners regarded the issue as a strategic one. They thought that the Sunnī Jihad would help them rally the Kurds in central and northern Iraq and Iran against the enemy. For this Jihad, the Ottomans used translations of the original Ottoman Jihad fatwās. Various Ottoman authorities maintained during the early stages of war that a large number of irregular Kurdish units including those in Iran responded favourably to the Ottoman Sunnī Jihad and joined the war effort.⁴⁹ The Kurdish affirmative response to the Ottoman call for Jihad was, of course, too little to meet the expectations. Interestingly enough no major Sunnī Arab leader in Arabia followed suit. On 23 November the Ottoman authorities sent a message to 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn al-Sa'ūd asking him to help the Ottoman Jihad and refrain from any clashes with Sa'ūd ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz, the emīr of the House of Rashīd in Ha'il.⁵⁰ 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn al-Sa'ūd, who had cut a deal with the Ottoman government immediately before the Great War, had no such desire to cooperate with this request, however. In fact, a rather long fatwa issued by Shaykh Sulaymān ibn Siḥmān on 22 June 1915 provides an insight regarding the Wahhābī reaction to the Ottoman

Jihad. The following question was put before Shaykh Sulaymān ibn Siḥmān, a leading Wahhābī religious authority and a scholar who had major influence over ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn al-Sa‘ūd: “What is your opinion, may God magnify your virtue, concerning the Turkish state and the Christians, may God curse them all? Which of them is greater in unbelief and which of the two is it preferred to support over the other? Provide us with a fatwā that you may be recompensed. May God grant you Paradise. Amen.”⁵¹

The main points of his response were as follows:

There is no doubt that those apostate Turkish forces (al-‘asākīr al-Turkiyya) and others are greater in unbelief than the Jews and the Christians, as one learns from the Shaykh al-Islam’s [Ibn Taymiyya’s] words and as he explained the matter in the case of the Nuṣayrīs. It is known that they [the Turkish forces] feign Islam, make the proclamation of faith, offer the Friday and congregational prayers, and appoint qāḍīs when they overcome a territory. Nonetheless the Shaykh al-Islam’s [Ibn Taymiyya’s] words apply in their case, as you can see, and as the Shaykh al-Islam Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb also made clear in the tenth level of what he said concerning God’s words, “The places of worship belong to God; so call not, along with God, upon anyone” [Q. 72.18].

As for which of the two groups [the Turkish state or the Christians] it is preferred to support over the other, Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya has remarked in his al-Jawāb al-ṣaḥīḥ, concerning God’s words ... “The Romans have been vanquished in the nearer part of the land; and, after their vanquishing, they shall be the victors in a few years. To God belongs the command before and after, and on that day the believers shall rejoice in God’s help; God helps whomsoever He will ...” [Q. 30:1–5] ... If you understand this, then it ought to become clear to you that these Turks [in the current day], even if they make the proclamation of faith, are more severe in unbelief [than the Christians] on account of their apostasy from Islam, and greater in harm against the Muslims than the Christians, as the Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya explained.

However, seeing as the Christians have gotten the upper hand over the Turks in our day, and that they are the nearer enemy, then should they [the Christians] provide those before them [the Turks] security and make it possible for them [to persist] in their affairs, then their [the Christians’] fame has ascended and their harm to the people of Islam has expanded. What we were seeking, and what we were asking and beseeching God for, was that He confound the both of them as parties set against one

another; that He cause the one to taste the might and strength of the other; that He tie down the one with the other; that He not setup for them a standard and bring them into mutual allegiance against Islam; that He prolong hostilities between them; that He set the people of Islam in security and wellbeing against the evil of the both of them; and that He give victory to the religion and its Prophet and its Book and its believing servants.⁵²

Wahhābī scholars also took issue with the fact that the Ottomans had an alliance with the German empire, and were under the influence of this Christian power.⁵³ Despite these strong criticisms of the Ottomans for cooperating with the Christian Germans, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn al-Sa‘ūd signed a treaty of alliance with the Christian British in Darin in December 1915.⁵⁴

Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Idrisī, who had established a Sufi state in ‘Asīr with the help of the Italians and the British, responded to the Ottoman Jihad in a similar vein;⁵⁵ he too signed a treaty with the British in April 1915.⁵⁶ Likewise, even before the declaration of the Ottoman grand Jihad Sharif Ḥusayn promised the British, who had been requested to abstain from holy war, that he “would take, of his good will, no measure of Turkish interest.” He reiterated his unequivocal promise in November 1914 and dispelled the deep British fear of “the Holy Cities endorsing the Holy War.”⁵⁷ Unlike the Shī‘ī mujtahids, Sharif Ḥusayn maintained that the alliance of the Ottoman empire with Christian powers and the German aggression made the declaration of a genuine Muslim Jihad impossible.⁵⁸ Interestingly, when Sharif Ḥusayn initiated the Arab Revolt against Istanbul in 1916, the leading Shī‘ī mujtahids issued fatwās in support of the Ottoman state.⁵⁹

In conclusion, while the Ottoman Shī‘ī Jihad was a success, the Sunnī/global one was a failure for both Berlin and Istanbul. The accomplishment on the Shī‘ī front prompted the Germans to continue their efforts in this regard.⁶⁰ Likewise the Ottoman authorities used the Shī‘ī card against the Allies until their loss of Mesopotamia. Many scholars of Islam found it surprising that a state possessing the Caliphate received strong support from Shī‘ī mujtahids and the Zaydī leadership while Sunnī leaders paid almost no heed to its calls. Indeed, from a religious viewpoint this was an astounding development. For those who understood the bitter power struggle in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire, including many Ottoman war planners, however, this result was a predictable one.

[illegible]

FIGURE 5.1 Telegram sent by the Ottoman governor of Najaf and Karbala to the Interior Ministry in Istanbul (in Turkish).

Notes

- 1 C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Holy War "Made in Germany"* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1915).
- 2 Ibid., pp. 34 ff.
- 3 Ernst Jäckh Papers, Yale University Sterling Memorial Library, Ms group 466.
- 4 Kâzım Karabekir, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Anıları* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007), pp. 364–366.
- 5 Mustafa Aksakal, "'Holy War Made in Germany' Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad", *War in History*, 18/2 (2011), p. 195.
- 6 Lionel Gossman, *The Passion of Max von Oppenheim: Archeology and Intrigue in the Middle East from Wilhelm II to Hitler* ([Cambridge]: OpenBook Publishers, 2013), pp. 92–94.
- 7 Tilman Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War* (London: Global, 2005), pp. 118 ff.
- 8 While there was no official response to the cross against crescent rhetoric, those pro the Committee of Union and Progress press strongly criticized it and encouraged Muslims to take the anti-Islamic attitude of the Balkan allies into serious consideration. See, for example, Ahmed Agayef, "Dedik Ya, Hilâl ve Salib Cidâli", *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 20 October 1912.
- 9 "Beyannâme-i Hümayûn", *Tanin*, 12 October 1912.
- 10 See "Beyannâme", *Cenin*, 19 October 1912.
- 11 Aksakal, "'Holy War Made in Germany'", p. 195. Interestingly, a German diplomat also underlined the difficulties in this regard. See Gottfried Galli, *Dschihad der heilige Krieg des Islams und seine Bedeutung im Weltkriege unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Interessen Deutschlands* (Frieberg im Breisgau: C. Troemers, 1915), p. 6 ff.
- 12 For more information on the Ottoman use of Jihad in special organizations in Iran see Mustafa Arıkan, "Arşiv Vesikalarına Göre Osmanlı-İran İlişkileri, 1914–1918", unpublished M.A. Thesis, Gazi University (Ankara), 2010, pp. 21–22 and 31–32.
- 13 BOA-DH. SYS 25/103 [28 May 1914]. The 12th article of the contract signed between the Ottoman administration and Abd al-Azîz ibn al-Sa'ûd is as follows: "If, God forbid, war erupts between the Sublime State and foreign nations, or if there occurs an internal disturbance in any province whatsoever, and the government were to request the said governor a force to join its own forces, then it is incumbent upon the governor to man a sufficient force, complete with its ammunition and subsistence means, and respond the call immediately according to his power and ability."
- 14 In fact, during the war the Ottoman government annulled the pardon which had been granted to Muḥammad 'Alî al-İdrisî on 16 October 1912 on the grounds that he and his followers "have not until now changed their former way action and activities and have stubbornly continued their rebellion and revolt." See BOA-BEO, file 333422 [2 December 1916].
- 15 For Sharif Ḥusayn's plans see Joshua Teitelbaum, "Sharif Husayn ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman Order: From Chieftaincy to Suzerainty", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34/1 (1998), pp. 106 ff.

- 16 See A.J. Barker, *The First Iraq War, 1914–1918: Britain's Mesopotamian Campaign* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009), pp. 18–20.
- 17 *History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918*, ed. F.J. Moberly, vol. 1 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1923), pp. 99–132.
- 18 “Kâffe-i Müslimîn Üzerine Cihadın Farziyeti Hakkında Fetavâ-yı Şerife”, *Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 13/ 314 [19 November 1914], p. 12.
- 19 “Meclis-i Âli-i İlmi'nin Cihad-ı Ekber Hakkındaki Beyannâmesi”, *Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 13/ 315 [26 November 1914], pp. 9. 19–20. Despite this, a later pamphlet written by Abdülaziz Çâviş and addressing all Muslims made frequent references to the Caliphate. In fact the pamphlet gave the publication place as “Dâr al-Khilâfa al-'Aliyya” instead of Istanbul. See *Balâğh 'âmmlî-jamî' ahl al-Islâm* (Dâr al-Khilâfa al-'Aliyya: al-Maṭba'a al-Khayriya 1333 [1915]).
- 20 Under-Secretary of the Grand Vizier's Office Emin Bey to the Ministry of the Interior [25 November 1914],/no. 1246–324172, BOA-DH. EUM. 4. Şb. 1 (1323 M 7).
- 21 While praising the fatwâs issued by the Shī'ī mujtahids, the Ottoman religious press acknowledged them as a part of a separate Jihad although it asked all Muslims to join the effort. See “Cihad-ı Mukaddes ve Mezheb-i Ca'ferî”, *İslâm Mecmuası*, 1/15 [19 November 1914], p. 445.
- 22 Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 99–126.
- 23 Selim Deringil, “The Struggle against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-Propaganda”, *Die Welt des Islams*, 30/1–4 (1990), pp. 49 ff.
- 24 Gökhan Çetinsaya, “The Caliph and the Mujtahids: Ottoman Policy towards the Shiite Community of Iraq in the late Nineteenth Century”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 41/4 (2005), pp. 561–574.
- 25 Yitzak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 48.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 53.
- 27 See the coded telegram from Şüleyman Şefik Pasha, the governor and commander of Basra to the Ministry of the Interior [22 June 1914], BOA-DH. KMS. 2/2–2.
- 28 As translated by Yitzak Nakash from *al-Ilm*, 1 (1911), pp. 434–436. Nakash, *Shi'is of Iraq*, p. 58.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 59.
- 30 *Ibid.*
- 31 From the political affairs department of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of the Interior [19 January 1915],/no. 2184–60200, BOA-DH.EUM. 6. Şb. 2/63 (1333 Ra. 3).
- 32 Ministry of the Interior's note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [23 January 1915], *ibid.*
- 33 See *History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918*, ed. F.J. Moberly, vol. 1 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1923), pp. 100–101.
- 34 The Ottoman authorities asked the governor in Baghdad to report whether certain mujtahids in Karbala, Najaf and Samarra had issued fatwâs inviting Muslims to join the Jihad. See the Minister of the Interior Talât Pasha to the

- acting governor of Baghdad [17 December 1914],/no. 11, BOA-DH. ŞFR. 48.42 (1333. M. 29) and BOA-DH. EUM. 7. Şb, 2/52 (1333. S.1).
- 35 Sub-governor Zihni Bey to the Ministry of the Interior, Najaf, [11 November 1914], BOA-DH. EUM. 4. Şb. 1/18 (1323 M).
- 36 Coded telegram from the Ministry of the Interior to the Baghdad Province [11 November 1914], BOA-BOA-DH. EUM. 4. Şb. 1/18 (1323 M).
- 37 Ahmet Tetik, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umur-ı Şarkıyye Dairesi)*, vol. 1, 1914–1915 (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), p. 15.
- 38 Copies of these fatwās are in DH.EUM.6. Şb, 2/25 (25 M 1333). Some of these were reproduced in Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, *Wathā'iq al-thawra al-'Irāqīyya al-kubrā wa-muqaddimātuhā wa-natā'ijuhā, 1914–1923*, vol. 1: *Ḥarb al-'Irāq 1914* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mu'arrikh al-'Arabī, 2009), pp. 23–32. These fatwas were not issued at the same time. For instance, it had taken the Ottoman authorities a long time to persuade Muḥammad Kāzīm Yazdī, *the marja al-taqlīd* of Najaf, with whom they were on bad terms, to join the effort. See Werner Ende, “Iraq in the World War I: The Turks, the Germans and the Shi'ite Mujtahids' Call for Jihād”, *Proceedings of the Ninth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabistes et Islamisants*, ed. Rudolph Peters (Leiden: Brill, 1981), pp. 65–66.
- 39 For the text see “Heilige Befehle Sämtlicher Grossen Müdschtehiden”, *Die Welt des Islams*, 1/3–2 (August 1915), pp. 131–133.
- 40 Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, *Wathā'iq al-thawra al-'Irāqīyya*, vol. 1, p. 29.
- 41 Ibid., p. 30.
- 42 Ibid., p. 31. Similarly, an appeal issued by the leading Shī'ī mujtahids of the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala made the following statement: “As the mujtahids of the Ja'fari sect, we, at the moment, ask all Muslims and comrades of religion to get united as brothers.” “Necfe ve Kerbelâ Müctehidlerinin Beyannâmesi”, *Vak'a-i Kerbelâ Münâsebetiyle, Rusların İstifâdelerini Bildiren: Tahran'dan İstanbul'a Bir Mektub*, ed. Ali Eşref (Istanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1332 [1915]), p. 2.
- 43 Sir Percy Cox stated that “the Turks ... utilize[d] the factor of *Jahad* [sic] with more effect. At Basra, Amara, and in Arabistan this factor was producing some results”: *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918*, p. 161.
- 44 DH.EUM.6.Şb, 2/25 (25 M 1333); and Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, *Wathā'iq al-thawra al-'Irāqīyya*, vol. 1, p. 25.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 DH.EUM.6.Şb, 2/25 (25 M 1333); and Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, *Wathā'iq al-thawra al-'Irāqīyya*, vol. 1, p. 26.
- 47 BOA-DVN. 37/1 [20 October 1911].
- 48 See the Ottoman grand vizier's telegram to Imām Yahyā thanking him for his efforts in the *jihād* against the enemies of the Ottoman state. BOA-BEO, file 326306 [25 April 1915].
- 49 See, for instance, the Under-Secretary of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior [2 January 1915]/no. 2011–59357, BOA-DH-EUM. 2. Şb. 3/43 (1333 S 15).
- 50 See the Minister of the Interior Talāt Pasha's telegram to 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn al-Sa'ūd in Arabic and dated Muharram 2, 1333 [20 November 1914], BOA-DH. ŞFR. 47/97 (1333 M 2).

- 51 "Shaykh Sulaymān ibn Siḥmān's Treatise Concerning the Turks and the Christians: Which is Less Harmful, etc," Library of Prince Salmān at the University of King Sa'ūd, Ms. 3422, ff. 134–145. I am grateful to Cole Bunzel for drawing my attention to this important fatwa and for providing me with a translation of the entire text.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 See 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Abd al-Laṭīf's endorsement of Ibn Siḥmān's fatwā: "[there is] a distinction between when the state was independent and today when it is in the hands of the Christians and subservient to them, it no longer having independence apart from the unbelieving Germans. I hope that God will extend his judgment of enmity and hatred between them till the Day of Resurrection, and set their mutual might and strength against each other." Ibid., p. 145.
- 54 *The Expansion of Wahhabi Power in Arabia, 1798–1932: British Documentary Records*, vol. IV, 1902–1916, ed. A.L.P. Burdett (Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Editions, 2013), pp. 628–632.
- 55 Despite knowing Muḥammad 'Alī al-Idrisī's position, the Ottoman authorities expressed the desire to have him join the Jihad. See "Muhterem Sunûsî Kardeşlerin Cihad-ı Mukaddese İştirakleri", *İslâm Mecmuası*, 1/15, p. 445.
- 56 Johannes Reissner, "Die Idrisiden in 'Asīr: Ein historischer Überblick", *Die Welt des Islams*, 21/1–4 (1981), p. 175.
- 57 H.W.V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. VI (London: Henry Frowde, 1924), pp. 120–121.
- 58 T. A Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (The Complete 1922 Text) (Fordingbridge: Castle Hill Press, 1997), p. 33.
- 59 Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, *Wathā'iq al-thawra al-'Irāqiyya*, vol. 2: *al-Iḥtilāl al-Barīṭānī 1915–1919* (Beirut: Dār al-Mu'arrikh al-'Arabī, 2009), pp. 11–12. They declared the following: "[i]t is not hidden that the occurrence of a rumor to the noble 'ulamā' of Najaf has reached us, concerning what is well-known in the case of Sharif of Mecca, that they wrote in support of his case. We were surprised at this obvious and detestable lie and plan and evident attack. Far be that from them! I don't think that any Muslim would expect such from the likes of them. We ask God for protection from deceit, in both words and deeds, and victory for Islam and the Muslims. Muḥammad Kāzīm al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī [28 November 1916]."
- 60 For instance, in early 1915, the Germans paid a large sum and obtained a fatwā to be used in Southern Iraq and Iran from four leading mujtahids in Karbala. See Ende, "Iraq in the World War I: The Turks, the Germans and the Shi'ite Mujtahids' Call for Jihād", *Proceedings of the Ninth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabistes et Islamisants*, pp. 56–77.

6 Propaganda or Culture War

Jihad, Islam, and Nationalism in Turkish Literature during World War I

Erol Köroğlu

During the period of the jealously guarded absolute power of the CUP, from the *Bab-ı âli* (Sublime Porte) Raid of 23 January 1913 until the defeat in 1918, the government banned the publication of even the slightest opposition in newspapers and periodicals. In particular, the outbreak of war in 1914 in Europe and the declaration of a general mobilization in the Ottoman Empire brought about the introduction of military censorship. With the introduction on 7 August 1914 of a temporary law, the existing censorship became even stricter.

Actually, the regime had planned an even stricter censorship than the one they implemented. Kâzım Karabekir, who at the time was Chief of Intelligence at the Office of the General Staff, included in his memoirs of the war an event related to the introduction of censorship. He had a meeting on 3 August 1914 with İsmail Canbulat, an Under-Secretary in the Interior Ministry and one of the most eminent members of the CUP, who said that, with the exception of *Tanin* which was the mouthpiece of the government, all newspapers would be closed to prevent them from publishing anti-war views. Karabekir opposed this move and said that it would destroy the credibility both of *Tanin* and of the constitutional system and would also be in conflict with the principle of “armed neutrality”. He later complained to Enver Pasha about this proposal. Enver accepted his views and prevented the newspapers from being shut down.¹

Nevertheless, the official censorship regulation introduced a few days later was also very strict and all-encompassing. According to this new regulation, no new newspapers or press agencies were to be founded; newspapers could not publish additional editions; all newspapers were to be distributed only after having been taken to the censorship room at the Istanbul Post Office, where they were to be checked and stamped as being “in accordance with regulations” and finally signed by the censorship official and censorship officer on duty; and no telegrams were to be sent in languages other than Turkish, Arabic or French.²

Despite the censorship, the period between the outbreak of the war in Europe and the Ottoman empire's entry as an ally of Germany and Austro-Hungary contained a very fierce and aggressive Ottoman propaganda effort aimed at Ottoman public opinion in order to prepare it for the ultimate result of entry into the war. The Turkist movement in particular was sliding very quickly towards Turanism and becoming immersed in warmongering and propaganda of a Turanist and pan-Islamist nature in the months of August–November 1914. There is evidence that the Turkist movement did not begin this activity spontaneously or in an uncoordinated fashion, but as a result of a concerted effort arising from a single centre and was operating systematically, following precise orders.

A short cautionary notice was published at the end of the 71st issue of *Türk Yurdu*, the famous Turkist magazine, on 6 August 1914. According to this notice, due to the political situation the *Türk Yurdu*, published once every fifteen days, would henceforth be published monthly, while the weekly *Türk Sözü* would be published once every fifteen days.³ Notwithstanding this, the next issue of the *Türk Yurdu* appeared only four and a half months later, on 10 December 1914, with no explanation regarding the delay, while *Türk Sözü* would never again be published. If this delay were the result of paper shortages or other similar difficulties, it would most certainly have been explained in the next issue. Kâzım Karabekir interpreted this interruption in the following way: “[t]his means that for some reason the *Türk Yurdu* preferred to keep silent throughout the general mobilization. In this way *Tanin* newspaper was reinforced with some of the journalists of the *Türk Yurdu*.”⁴

Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, in the chapter of his memoirs titled “Summer of 1914”, observes how the political leadership and the cultural sphere were pursuing the same aims. “It was generally felt that we were Germany’s ally and that we would end up entering the war.” He also mentions a conversation he had with Celâl Sahir. According to Celâl Sahir, who was a latecomer to the CUP but nevertheless very close to both Talât Pasha and Ziya Gökalp, the Ottoman State should have conquered Egypt and the Caucasus to get closer to both the Islamic and Turkish worlds, because if it did not, the state would inevitably fall apart. The real aim of this operation would have been of an economic nature, because by then the Ottoman treasury was incapable of finding enough foreign loans even to pay its outstanding debts. In this way it would have gained control of Egypt’s cotton and of Baku’s oil, putting an end to its difficulties. Yahya Kemal was aware that in reality the source of these words was not Celâl Sahir and that they were just words “put out to convince people of the need to enter the war”.

According to Yahya Kemal, in those days there were two approaches, one negative and the other positive. According to the negative approach there was no possibility of trusting the Allied Powers and of opening the Straits because this would have meant giving too much latitude to Russia. The positive approach, on the other hand, was the one put forward by Celâl Sahir and was also very frequently heard. Enver Pasha used this approach to justify an offensive war. According to Yahya Kemal, all subsequent disasters were the result of this logic, because if the war had been organized as a defensive one the results would have been very different. He concludes by saying, "In those days, when it was like having been left with one horse and three shoes, the conquest of the Caucasus and of Egypt was the most popular currency."⁵

Poetical Propaganda during the Mobilization

At that time, Kâzım Karabekir was an officer of the general staff and, like Yahya Kemal, a nationalist who thought that precedence should not be given to Turan or to an Islamic union, but to Anatolia.⁶ Karabekir underlined the fact that the blame for the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war as a result of Turanist and pan-Islamist dreams lay on the Turkists operating in the cultural sphere, and he devoted a large part of his *Birinci Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik?* to the subject of war propaganda during the period of mobilization. According to Karabekir, in those days the press repeated these points: Germany's victory is a sure thing; Muslims should not lose an opportunity to become free; the Islamic world is awaiting the orders of its Caliph to revolt; it is impossible for the Balkan nations of Romania, Greece and Bulgaria to enter the war against Germany; there is no harmony among the Allied Powers and the moment the Ottomans enter the war revolts by the Turks of Russia and by the Muslims in other parts of the world will put Russia and Britain into a wretched condition.⁷

As early as 8 August, Ziya Gökalp was claiming, in his poem "Kızıl Destan" (Red Epic) published in *Tanin*, "The lands of the enemy will be ruined! / Turkey will grow and become Turan!"⁸ This rather provocative poem was presented by the newspaper with the words "Our readers should keep in mind that 'Gökalp Beyefendi' will continue following the events muddling Europe and describing and analysing them with such national language and a national philosophy."⁹ In his book, Karabekir includes an extract from a long poem entitled "Türkün Yolu" (The Path of the Turk) published in *Donanma Mecmuası* (Magazine of the Navy), dated 19 October 1914:

Carefully look and perceive you will
 Of the longing spirit of Algeria, Morocco
 India, Tunisia, Zanzibar, Java, the Caucasus
 There is the love of the Turk

Happily and without awe he will go
 He will demolish mountains even if of steel they are
 If his resolution you don't know, learn you will
 The Turk's path is the one leading to the "True homeland".¹⁰

Let us concentrate a little more in detail on Ziya Gökalp's "Kızıl Destan." When it was first published in *Tanin*, it was presented as a commentary on the war in Europe and it began with the epigraph, "The lands of the enemy will be in ruin! / Turkey will grow and become Turan!" This epigraph reflects the main underlying idea of the poem, made up of 24 stanzas of five lines each. Gökalp begins by spurring Turks to cooperate in the recently declared general mobilization, as early as the first stanza and defines the war as a "moment of heroism". The poem can be interpreted as a reflection of a sly happiness. The Ottoman Empire had just signed an alliance with Germany, but had not yet entered the war. When seen from this point of view, it is clear that Gökalp, remembering all the pain of the Balkan War, was happy about the slaughter in Europe, which he considered to be the main reason for the bad situation in which the Ottoman Empire found itself: "The land of civilisation will be red blood! / Each of its regions will be a new Balkan!"¹¹

Gökalp tried to recount the reasons for the war in poetic fashion and went back a few years before the war, concluding that everything was due to the hostility of "the Cross" towards Islam. It was because of this enmity that the Libyan and Balkan wars had started, but in the end the Christian countries had started quarrelling among themselves. In the midst of this confusion, the Serbian nationalist Princip killed the Austro-Hungarian crown prince and his wife, putting Serbia and the German world on a collision course. Gökalp interpreted phase by phase the events leading to war and made clear that he supported Germany, while at the same time showing how all this affected the Turks: "The Hungarian said: Don't think that I want to stay, / I would like to let loose my horse, / I would like to avenge the Turks / The Altay lands will become a great country / The Sultan will be the sovereign of Turan!"¹²

Even if it was not clearly stated, in this poem it is Germany that is right and Gökalp has the German Kaiser speak as if he were a Muslim: "The Kaiser has declared to the soldiery and population: / Let your heart reunite in chain! / Trampling the enemy is like praying, / Faith will be the

guide of my army! / The All-Compassionate will protect us!”¹³ The last stanza of the poem looks as if it had been written expressly for Muslims: “The Englishman has imprisoned *Sultan Osman*, / With it hostage he will hold India, Amman! / Islam has recognised its enemy, / Soon there will be happiness: / It will be the *Quran*, which takes its revenge!”¹⁴

This poem, which was written when the Ottoman empire was still neutral, shows clearly the attitude of the CUP and of the writers close to it. Their goal was to enter the war as an ally of Germany as soon as possible. Germany’s early victories were the main factors used to convince the people that there would be a quick victory, as a result of which not only would the lost territories be regained, but, thanks to Russia’s defeat, the Turan union would also be achieved. Thus while Gökalp was on the one hand commenting on the war in an “impartial” way saying, “they will fight among each other growing weaker and this will give us an advantage”, on the other, he was implying “let’s enter the war as soon as possible so that we can get the maximum benefit”.

Tevfik Fikret as a (False?) Propagandist of Jihad

There are other examples of this propaganda literature and I will discuss some of them below but before that I would like to concentrate on two important poems about the war and declaration of Jihad by Tevfik Fikret (1867–1915), who was undisputedly the most important and famous poet of that period. Tevfik Fikret, who would die during the first year of the war, on 19 August 1915, was anti-CUP and vehemently against the participation of the Ottoman empire in the war. After the Ottoman Empire’s entry into war and consequent declaration of Jihad, the poet published a poem entitled “Fetâvâ-yı Şerîfe’den Sonra: Sancak-ı Şerîf Huzurunda” (After the sacred fatwa: in the presence of the sacred banner), in the 1227th issue of *Servet-i Fünun*, dated 27 Teşrinisani 1330/10 December 1914. The poem starts with the note, *Müfti’ül-enâm Hazretlerine ithaf olunmuştur* (Dedicated to the holy mufti/şeyhülislam of the Koran) and it is stated that it is recounted by a pious warrior. This “pious warrior” repeats over and over again throughout the poem that in the name of religion he is ready to face any difficulty and also to die. The poem ends with an almost masochistic note:

As difficulties oppress me, my joy and calm increase;
Towards my God
I am always favourably disposed, in submission and forbearing
Whether I die or live, I am happy in any case!¹⁵

Those who do not know the relationship between Tevfik Fikret and the CUP and the way he wrote poems criticizing them may think that this is a simple poem of religious propaganda. Actually, those who know the literary environment of those days will also know that Fikret was against both religion and the CUP and notice immediately how, contrary to appearances, this poem was ironic and satirical. In an astute manoeuvre, Fikret had managed to write a poem of opposition that would not have damaged him and that would not have been censored. Probably the Unionists were angered by this poem, but there was nothing they could do.

Yet this is just one way of explaining the situation. When we produce a close reading of the poem, we feel the exaggeration, but it becomes harder to look at it as a satire, although the pompous style of the title, the subtitle and the dedication supports this interpretation. The poet also gives the completion date at the end of the poem in an unconventional way, in the *Hijri* calendar, as “aşrû muharrem’il-harâm 1333”, in order to exaggerate the level of religiosity. Yet Tevfik Fikret does another important thing and uses a pious Muslim warrior as his poetical voice/persona all through the poem. We listen to this persona’s voice as if he is in front of the *şeyhülislam* when he is announcing the sacred fatwa of Jihad. He accepts the fatwa and contemplates it. Therefore, the whole poem turns into an interior monologue of this warrior and we develop empathy towards him, through seeing his emotions and psychological mood.

The Muslim warrior accepts the ceremonial banner that was present during the announcement of the fatwa as the banner owned by the prophet, and he sees it as the last hope of millions. Even its light hissing sound in the wind is heard as the harbinger of a holy victory. Although the real colour of the banner is pale, its blessed sacredness will illuminate everything with red and green lights. The poetic voice calls the banner “wave of consolation” and begs it to flow towards the martyrs in order to wake up the sleeping Muslim world. He also calls on the sword of holy war to shed blood and kill the enemies of Islam. The warrior sees the black conscience of the Western civilization as an abyss that will be filled only by death. The Western civilization is a vengeful and poisonous dragon that will burn the resigned and calm Muslim warrior, but every drop of his blood will damn the dragon. The warrior hallucinates about angelic wings and horses that will carry the already dead souls to help him. The warrior will be thankful to Allah and ready for Jihad. He gave up his belongings and hopes for the sake of religion, and now he will walk unwaveringly even if volcanoes fall on him. Now, God’s help (*avn-i Hüda*) is his torch and the prophet’s banner is his shelter, and it means eternal conservation and salvation for him. The angels will save him from

the enemies. And in this way, the poem ends: "As difficulties oppress me, my joy and calm increase; / Towards my God / I am always favourably disposed, in submission and forbearing / Whether I die or live, I am happy in any case!"

For a public figure such as Tevfik Fikret who was known as a strict opponent of religion, the poetic voice of that poem was undoubtedly a fanatic and the poet openly displayed his stance through the abovementioned features such as its exaggerated title and subtitle and unconventional *hijri* dates. Yet it is not easy to see the poem as a mere ridicule because the persona displays an honest and integrated person-ality all over the poem. It seems that the poet tried to understand and poetically represent a certain way of thinking. Tevfik Fikret was not mocking the pious warrior here although he emphasized the futility of this warrior's belief in holy war. The poet used certain words in the poem and they were taken from both the Jihad fatwa and the sultan's royal declaration to the army and navy about that fatwa.

This last feature of the poem in particular makes us think about the possibility of Tevfik Fikret's writing this poem as a propaganda poem. We do not have any information on this issue, but the propaganda effort of the government was very ambitious and persistent at that time. Of course, it is a speculation but perhaps he wrote and published this poem in order to get rid of governmental pressure. He used the very vocabulary of the propaganda effort but he framed the poem in such an exaggerated way that the government was not able to use it for further propaganda efforts.

Tevfik Fikret as an Anti-War Poet

Tevfik Fikret wrote a second and long, 153 line poem entitled "Harb-i Mukaddes" (holy war), but he did not or could not publish it before his death in 1915. This second poem is the ultimate opposite of "in the presence of the sacred banner". Perhaps he wrote it not to be published but to clear his conscience because he had written and published the former poem. The latter poem seems like a long melodramatic oratory. It starts with a cry due to the ongoing war's distress: "Alas! The fire of war hasn't burnt out yet / We are ruined day by day because of war's suffering / It is better to die at once with the zeal of victory, / Actually all earth moulded with human blood."¹⁶ Then he curses all national leaders who rush all humanity into war. But then he directs his rage against the Ottoman warlords and their supporters: "O, these nonsense-writers talking about the guarding religion / As if the blood [that spilt] in Balkan

[Wars] were insufficient, / Now encourage the people with hell, / Telling Allah's and his prophet's order / Encourage the millions to the war with *Kuran* and the prophet's sayings / Turn everybody into bloody earth.”¹⁷

After this introduction, Fikret tells of all those martyrs who died in vain and left their orphans in misery. He mentions the Russian front and the Sarıkamış Battle, saying that “his corpse is not in the paradise but on the Caucasus plains” (*Cennette değil lâşesi Kafkas ovasında*), and then he describes in detail how soldiers died painfully and in horrible ways. All the same, the war is not limited to ultimately bloody but small battlefields. Home fronts are more awful due to the war-created misery and poverty. While every family is in mourning, the wives of martyrs have to be prostitutes. Fikret describes in detail the rise of prostitution and points to the state as the encouraging and responsible agent of this situation.

The misery on the home front is not limited to the widows but also to the mothers of martyrs. They become beggars. Fikret concludes the poem by cursing the entire war: “Damn you! Damn you! O, ‘holy war,’ / You tarnished all creatures / Damn you, damn you! O, tragedy of war, / You’re a blow to humanity, o, effort of war! ...”¹⁸

The main difference between “After the Sacred Fatwa” and “Holy War” is undoubtedly their approach to the war: the former is implicit, cautious and ironic, but the latter is explicit, righteous and furious. Fikret constructs his anti-war attitude in “Holy War” through direct observation and detailed illustrations. Yet in the first poem he uses a persona that is totally different from himself and he tries to understand and construct a pious warrior’s psychology. He does this in order to show the illusions of Muslims and pro-Jihad people, but in the end the psychological portrayal of the warrior is very akin to the literary depictions of heroes by pro-war writers. The very words in particular he borrowed from the fatwa and the royal declaration create ambiguity in the interpretation of the poem. Was it propaganda or criticism? We may also say that it was criticism disguised as propaganda.

Typical Jihad Propaganda Texts

I would like to quote the piece Mehmed Akif wrote in his long poem, “Berlin Hatıraları” (memoirs of Berlin), which he started to write when he was in Germany as a special agent sent by the Ottoman state in order to make pan-Islamic propaganda for the Muslim prisoners of war in Germany. At the end of this poem, he is anxious about the Allied raid on Gallipoli and the Ottoman soldier replies and soothes him with an absolute self-confidence:

– Don't be afraid!
 Even hell we would stop on our chests;
 This is God's way, there is no returning!
 Not a single stone of the private quarters of our families will fall!
 Unless the last soldier at war is martyred.
 If this great crowd in front of us should attack us viciously;
 If armies should arise from the seas, navies rain from the clouds;
 If where we are volcanoes,
 Should erupt and a bitter red wind should envelop the horizons;
 Isn't there a single faith on our front;
 A common joy, sadness, aim, conscience;
 Haven't we all got a single heart in our breasts ... It won't surrender!
 Even if the world should fall down, this front would resist!
 In the same way the craziness of humanity falls to pieces on the
 horizon,
 When trying to overwhelm God,
 In the same way that illusions fighting the light of truth;
 Are after sparks of ardour forgotten,
 Thus the Doomsday in front of us will be assembled.
 Soon this front will be relieved ...¹⁹

As is seen in this piece, the heroic voice in this poem and Tevfik Fikret's pious warrior are not very far from each other. Yet Fikret evaluates this heroism as an illusion while Akif unhesitatingly thinks of it as heroism. Yet there is one more important difference between them. Mehmet Akif gives us a very sharp narrative full of original expressions and imagination. Therefore, his poetic approach is more akin to Fikret's "Holy War" poem. The literary approach, however, is very different in propaganda literature in general, in which schematic concepts and phrases chosen by the political authorities are passed on to literary writers to be used in their propaganda pieces. Therefore, we see the repetition of similar elements in propaganda literature. Is there a typical literary text making Jihad propaganda that will help us understand the mechanism? Yes, we can look at a certain theatrical play, written by Muhyiddin Baha [Pars], *Halife Ordusu Mısır ve Kafkasya'da* (The Caliph's Army in Egypt and the Caucasus). It was published in Bursa in *Rumi* 1331 (1915–1916). The completion date at the end of the play is given as "21 Haziran sene 1331" (3 July 1915).²⁰

This didactic and schematic play opens with Turkish university students discussing the outbreak of war in Europe. All of them will be reserve officers when the general mobilization is declared. One of those students worries about the calamities that the war will cause and

the ultimate annihilation of Western civilization. His friends, however, evaluate it as a divine opportunity for revenge and think that “the war that burns Europe will illuminate Asia.”²¹ Then they chide their friend who is worried for Europe, asking “will we abandon our enslaved brothers in India, Egypt, Iran, and the Caucasus and instead of them, will we worry about the ones who enslaved them? Shall we have pity on the oppressor instead of the oppressed? ...”²² Meanwhile, the play refers often and in a similar vein to an important injury of Ottoman public opinion, i.e. the defeat in the Balkan Wars. A character, for instance, compares the new war and the Balkan: “Don’t mention that damned war to us! ... We didn’t do it; it is not the war of youth but senility, not the war of a nation but treachery. This new war will be fought by Muhammed’s umma, Oguz Khan’s nation; and history is full of this umma’s, this nation’s heroism.”²³

The attitude of integrating Islam umma and the Turkish nation, which is evident in the above passage, will continually be repeated all through the play, and Turk and Islam will be mentioned as synonyms or identical twins as if there is no conflict or problem between them. Actually this attitude had been invented even before the war by the late Ottoman Turkists such as Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp tried to theorize it and worked hard to show it as natural. Gökalp was the ideologist of the party and had the overall responsibility for cultural affairs. His “Millet ve Vatan” article published in the 67th issue of *Türk Yurdu* dated 28 May 1914 was the last part of his “Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak” (Turkification, Islamization, Modernization) series. At the end of this article Gökalp comes back to the fatherland concept and puts forward the example of intersecting groups. There are two nations: the one deriving from nationhood and the other deriving from religion.

There is, in fact, a homeland of Islam, which is the beloved land of all Muslims. The other one is the national home, which, for Turks, is what we call Turan. The Ottoman territories are that portion of Islamdom that has remained independent. A portion of these is the home of the Turks, and is at the same time a portion of Turan. Another portion of them is the homeland of the Arabs, which is again a part of the great Arab fatherland. The fact that the Turks have a special love for the home of the Turks, Turan, does not necessitate that they forget the Ottoman land which is a small Muslim homeland, or the great land of all Muslims. For national, political and international ideals are different things and all are sacred ideals.²⁴

We see lots of formulations in this play which are congruent with Gökalp’s flexible definition. One of the young students/reserve officers, for instance, says “that great ruler who thought that even the entire world would not be enough for one sultan [Selim II] first decided to

gather the complete Islamic universe under the banner of the Caliphate. Tomorrow the Muslims of three continents who will run to fight under the flag of *jihad* will impose the great principle of Islamic unity of which Sultan Selim first laid the foundations ...”²⁵ The play progresses, always mentioning the umma and the nation together. All Muslims all over the world wait for the banner of the Caliph: Turks, Circassians and Georgians in the Caucasus; Arabs in Egypt; and (Muslim) Hindus in India ...

The third act of the play takes place at the Russian Front. We see that the Russian officers are not only fighting against the Turkish army but also dealing with the Muslims in their own army: “[t]hose issued fatwas sparked the Islamic hearts. Neither threats nor banishment, not even death is enough to extinguish the flames of enmity in the Muslim hearts.”²⁶ Indeed the Muslim soldiers in the Tsarist army join the Turkish army and they together devastate Russians. The next act opens with a scene near the Suez Canal in which British agents try to bribe an Arab shaykh against the Ottomans. But the shaykh and his men insultingly kick the British out because they are ignited after the fatwa of Jihad. After the British, Turkish officers visit the shaykh and he openly pledges his alliance to the Caliph and his decision to join the Ottoman army. We also see Indian Muslims in the British army in Suez, who prepare to unite with the Ottoman army in the subsequent act. British forces also have the same experience that the Russians had against the Ottoman army. An Ottoman officer cries at the end of the play, “Come on soldiers, come on co-religionists, come on every individual of the Caliph’s army, the success of Islam is in front of you, go forward, always go forward ...”²⁷

The Relationship of Religion and Nationalism in Ziya Gökalp’s Poetry

I argued in my dissertation and in two books in Turkish and English that I prepared from that dissertation that the Ottoman war propaganda effort was inefficient during World War I due to some material conditions.²⁸ Turkish intellectuals who did not produce sufficient propaganda were encouraged by Ziya Gökalp to produce cultural material focusing on Turkish national identity. I can claim here that the same applies to the Jihad propaganda. Although we can find other propaganda works like Muhiddin Baha’s play, it is really hard to discover original literary and propagandistic texts. Therefore it will be better for us to focus on Gökalp’s literary production on this issue, as we did above during the discussion of his “Red Epic” poem. Gökalp had actually published poems connecting religion and nationalism since the first Balkan War. His

poems on the religion-nationalism connection were published in dailies and magazines between 1913 and 1918. He published his first poetry compilation, *Kızıl elma* (Red Apple), in 1914 and the poems he wrote and published after that date were compiled into a second book, *Yeni Hayat* (New Life) in 1918. Due to his changing ideological proclivities and political agenda, his first book is more agitative and propagandist, while the second book is composed of cooler poems that aim at defining and organizing national life.

Gökalp's first poem in *Kızıl elma* about Islam and Turkism is "Polvan Veli", a 16-quatrain narrative poem in which an epic and heroic fairy tale is told. The ruler of India sends the most famous wrestler of the country, *Devpençe* (giant paw), to Turkistan to challenge and defeat the Turkish wrestler Polvan Veli. The Khwarezm Khan in Khiva is not a Muslim and does not like the Muslim Polvan Veli's Islamization of the people. Therefore he sees this match as an opportunity to get rid of Polvan Veli and announces that the defeated wrestler will be executed. Devpençe, on the other hand, is also a Muslim and Polvan Veli learns this in the mosque where Devpençe's mother is praying for her son's success. Polvan Veli decides to lose the match in order to save a co-religionist. Yet, an accident happens during the wrestling and Polvan Veli saves the khan's life. Because of this incident, the khan and all the Turan people become Muslim.

Gökalp had formerly published this poem in *Halka Doğru* (towards the people) magazine in 11 April 1913. There are specific phrases in the poem such as "Muhammad's lion", "Muslim hero", "warrior" (*mücahit*) and "divine guidance" (*ilahi irşat*). Although the poem does not contain explicit Jihad propaganda, it seems like an early harbinger of Jihad propaganda due to its affirmation of Turks' early conversion to Islam, thus associating Islam with Turkish nationalism. Obviously, Gökalp uses the religion and nationalism connection as an agitation tool that will resonate easily with public opinion due to the Balkan War's social psychological depression. Similarly, his poem "Asker Duası" (soldier's pray) which was first published in *Halka Doğru* in 16 May 1913 is a typical example of this situation. We see a praying soldier in this poem who wishes for the wellbeing of his fatherland and religion. His road is *gaza* (holy war) and the ultimate destination is martyrdom; his banner is *tawhid* (*tevhid*, oneness) and his flag is the crescent. We can infer from this relatively early poem why Islam and Turkish-ness become synonyms in subsequent Jihad propaganda.

The merging of religion and nationalism was sealed by Gökalp after the outbreak of the war in Europe in his "Tawhid" poem. He first published this poem in *Tanin* on 14 August 1914 and declared that no dissent would

be tolerated in this new period: "There cannot be several souls in the country, / or more than one conscience, / a beloved cannot be shared, / there is no God but God! // There is an exuberance of bodies, / but hearts are united, / there is no individual but society! / there is no God but God!"²⁹

Actually Gökalp predicts the proclamation of Jihad in "Türkün Tekbiri" (The Turk's Allahu Akbar) which was published even before the above poem, on 9 August 1914, and three months before the proclamation:

God's will,
Sprang from the people,
We proclaimed the jihad,
God is great ...

We obeyed the banner,
Came to the far,
to the old country,
God is great ...

Bloods mixed,
The khans concurred,
The souls united,
God is great,
Praises to God ...³⁰ (p. 60)

It seems that the proclamation of Jihad was discussed in CUP quarters and this dream was merged with the Turan ideal, yet there was no mention of Egypt's conquest at that time.

Beside this and other similar poems, the most detailed poem about Jihad from this period was the "Red Epic" that was discussed above. Actually, Gökalp's use of the word Jihad stopped after these poems. The poems he compiled in 1918's *Yeni Hayat* were the poems that were written and published after 1915. His poem entitled "Religion", which was published in *Tanin* on 20 January 1915 under the title of "Religion according to a Turk", is a typical example of how Gökalp and other Turkists thought of religion: "My religion is neither hope nor fear; / I worship my God because of love! / Without a fear of paradise or hell, I do my duty"³¹ This is the opening quatrain of the poem and we see here that religion was only a social glue in Gökalp's solidarist nationalism. He demotes the complex nature of religion into a simple emotion of affection. Here, religion is only a tool for creating social affection and harmony in the future nation-state's "new" national life. We know that Gökalp and

other Turkists developed and inseminated this interpretation towards Islam mainly in *Islam* periodical and advocated the construction of the specific Turkish version of secularism through legal regulations until 1918. Hence, the great number of poems about religion in Gökalp's *Yeni Hayat*. Those poems were prescriptive texts proclaiming how religion should be.

Yeni Hayat's poem most related to the idea of Jihad is "Union of Islam" (*İslâm İttihadı*) (p. 129). Gökalp publishes this poem for first time in this book and it is an argumentative, essay-like poem like most of the poems in the book. He opens the poem with a definition of what a caliph is not: the caliph is not a sovereign-pope, neither a pope who acts like a ruler, nor a Dalai Lama, nor the Tsar who rules his country's church with power. The caliph is the ruler of an imaginary state that embraces all Muslims. There are independent khans but they are all affiliated with the caliph. He is *de jure* the sultan of all Islamic sultans and *de facto* the sultan of the Turkish country. For an Islamic unification, first every Muslim state should gain its own independence, then it should obey the orders of the caliph in order to form a political unity. If this is not possible at the present time, the caliph should put this dream aside and improve his own country. "We need to establish at first the foundation of a contemporary [he means modern here] state", he says and concludes the poem indicating the necessity of being strong in the international sphere in order to be effective. Therefore unity of Islam is a far away dream and the caliphate is only a *de jure* position. Obviously this is not important for Gökalp, as the most important things for him are the nation and nationality. As a result, he minimizes the importance of the power of religion for the sake of the construction of national life. Islam is nothing more than a useful vehicle for Turkish nationalism after that time and it would never be an autonomous power. Thus, it becomes easier to understand why the issue of Jihad proclamation was abandoned easily in literature and in the areas of propaganda.

It seems that the issue of Islamic unification and Jihad were used as levers in order to get the support of their ally Germany. It was abandoned after a while, even long before the Arab Revolt. Similarly, it was used in order to agitate Ottoman citizens during the period between August and November 1914, when public opinion was being prepared for the war. Obviously, Turkist elites did not think very differently from Tevfik Fikret about the usefulness of the Jihad idea, but they were not direct and honest like him. The only person who approached this issue seriously was the literary leader of Islamists in Istanbul, Mehmet Akif. His approach, however, was more traditional, deeper or perhaps more authentically religious than the Turkists'. He was interested in the brotherhood of

umma. We see an idealism of Islamic umma in Mehmet Akif's poems, which is very realistic. Even when he was part of the Jihad propaganda mechanism during his official visit to Germany to make propaganda for the Muslim prisoners of war in German camps, he was far from romanticism and exaggeration. His "Islamic brotherhood" approach would be passed on to the national struggle movement in Anatolia after the defeat in the First World War. Yet this war would also end eventually and Islam's agitative effect would be redundant. This deep-rooted Islamic brotherhood propaganda, just like the Jihad propaganda that stormed the country for a short while, would be abandoned by the new nation-state's elites and the establishment of a new secular state would start.

Notes

- 1 Kâzım Karabekir, *Birinci Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Emre, 1994 [1937]), pp. 166–170.
- 2 Ibid., pp. 170–171.
- 3 "Ahvâl-i hâzıra dolayısıyla bademâ 'Türk Yurdu' ayda bir kere, 'Türk Sözü' on beş günde bir kere neşredilecektir." "İhtar," *Türk Yurdu* 71 (24 Temmuz 1330/6 Ağustos 1914) translit. ed., vol. 3, p. 396.
- 4 Karabekir, p. 172. Kâzım Karabekir discusses the period and the propaganda process in detail and through different cases in this book.
- 5 Beyatlı, *Çocukluğum, Gençliğim, Siyâsî ve Edebî Hâtıralarım*, pp. 132–133.
- 6 At least they both claimed that they were Anatolian nationalists, even though such an approach was at the time in the minority and very inconspicuous, in their autobiographies written after the war.
- 7 Karabekir, p. 189.
- 8 "Düşmanın ülkesi viran olacak! / Türkiye büyüyüp Turan olacak!" Ziya Gökalp. *Ziya Gökalp Külliyyatı 1: Şiirler ve Halk Masalları*, ed. By Fevziye Abdullah Tansel. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1952, p. 102.
- 9 "Okuyucularımız bilmelidir ki Gökalp Beyefendi olayları takip ederek Avrupa'yı altüst eden olayların hep böyle milli bir lisanla milli bir felsefesini yapmaya devam edecektir." Ibid.
- 10 "Çeşm-i dikkatle bak eder ihsas / İhtiyak-ı derun Cezayir, Fas / Hind, Tunus, Zengibar, Cava, Kafkas / Aşkî orarlarda hep Türkün // Gidecek şimdi bimehaba şen / Yıkacak dağlarda olsa ahenden / Azmini bilmiyor isen öğren / Yolu şimdi Asıl vatan' Türkün." Ibid., pp. 195–196.
- 11 "Medeniyet yurdu al kan olacak! / Her ucu yeni bir Balkan olacak!" Şiirler, ibid.
- 12 "Macar dedi: Sanma, kalmak isterim, / Atımı meydana salmak isterim, / Türklerin öcünü almak isterim, / Altay yurdu büyük vatan olacak! / Turan'ın hakimi sultan olacak!" Şiirler, p. 104.
- 13 "Kayser ilan etti askere, halka: / Kalbiniz birleşsin, olun bir halka! / Düşmanı

- çiğnemek tapmaktır Hakka, / Ordumun rehberi iman olacak! / Bizi esirgeyen Rahman olacak!” Şiirler, p. 105.
- 14 “İngiliz gasbetti Sultan Osman’ı, / Bununla tutacak Hind’i, Amman’ı! / İslamlık tanıdı kimdir düşmanı, / Çok geçmez ki mesut bir an olacak: / Düşmandan öç alan Kuran olacak!” Şiirler, ibid.
- 15 “Artar, beni ezdikçe belâ, hazz u huzurum;/ Ben Rabbime doğru / Her an müteveccih, mütevekkil ve sabûrum; / Ölse de ne mutlu bana, kalsam da ne mutlu!” Tefvîk Fikret, *Bütün Şiirleri*, İsmail Parlatır and Nurullah Çetin, eds. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 2001), pp. 666–668.
- 16 “Eyvâh ki yanan âteş-i harb sönmedi elân / Günden güne mahvolmadayız kahr-ı vegâdan. / Bir hamlede ölmek ne revâ şevk-i zaferle, / Yuğruldu bütün rû-yı zemîn hûn-ı beşerle.” Tefvîk Fikret, *Bütün Şiirleri*, İsmail Parlatır and Nurullah Çetin, eds. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 2001), p. 669.
- 17 “Ey dîni siyânet diye hep herze yazanlar / Az geldi, evet, sanki o Balkan’daki kanlar, / Teşvîk ediniz şimdi cehennem ile artık, / Allah ile peygamberinin emrini nâtık / Âyât ü ehâdis ile milyonları ahrbe, / Kalbeyeyiniz herkesi bir kanlı türâbe ...” Ibid., p. 670.
- 18 “Lânet sana! lânet sana! ey ‘harb-ı mukaddes’, / Sensin bütün ekvâm eden böyle mülevves / Lânet sana lânet sana! ey hâile-i harb, / İnsanlığa bir darbesin, ey gâile-i harb!” Ibid., p. 673.
- 19 “– Korkma! / Cehennem olsa gelen göğsümüzde söndürürüz; / Bu yol ki Hak yoludur, dönme bilmeyiz, yürürüz! / Düşer mi tek taşı, sandın, harîm-i nâmûsun? / Meğer ki harbe giren son nefer şehîd olsun. / Şu karşımızdaki mahşer kudursa, çıldırsa; / Denizler ordu, bulutlar donanma yağdırsa; / Bu altımızdaki yerden bütün yanardağlar, / Taşıp da kaplasa âfâkı bir kızıl sarsar; / Değil mi cephemizin sînesinde iman bir; / Sevinme bir, acı bir, gâye aynı, vicdan bir; / Değil mi sîne de birdir vuran yürek ... Yılmaz! / Cihan yıkılsa, emin ol, bu cephe sarsılmaz! / Nasıl ki yarmadan âfâkı pâre pâre düşer, / Hudâyı boğmak için saldıran cünûn-i beşer, / Nasıl ki nûr-i hakikatle çarpışan evhâm; / Olur şerâre-i gayretle âkîbet güm-nâm, / Şu karşımızdaki mahşer de öyle haşrolacak. / Yakında kurtulacaktır bu cephe ...” Mehmet Akif Ersoy, *Safahat: Eski ve Yeni Harflerle Tenkitli Neşir*, ed. By M.E. Düzdağ (İstanbul: İz, 1991), pp. 324–325.
- 20 For its transliteration to Latin alphabet see İsmail Kara, ed., *Hilafet Risâleleri: İslâm Siyasi Düşüncesinde Değişme ve Süreklilik*, 3. Cilt: Meşrutiyet Devri (İstanbul: Klasik, 2003), pp. 383–426.
- 21 “Avrupa’yı yakan Asya’yı tenvir edecek.” Ibid., p. 387.
- 22 “Hindistan’da, Mısır’da, İran’da, Kafkas’ta Avrupalılara esir olan kardeşlerimizi bırakıp, onları bu hale koyanlara, mazlumları bırakıp zalimlere mi acıyalım? ...” Ibid.
- 23 “Bize o melun harpten bahs etme! ... Onu biz yapmadık; o milletin değil bunaklığın, hıyanetin harbi idi; o, milletin ruhunu boğmak isteyenlerin harbi idi. Bu yeni harbi Muhammed ümmeti, Oğuz Han milleti yapacak; o ümmet, o millet ki tarih onların kahramanlıklarıyla doludur.” Ibid., p. 389.
- 24 Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, trans. and ed. Niyazi Berkes (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959), pp. 78–79.

- 25 “Dünyayı bir padişaha az gören o büyük hükümdar, evvelâ İslâm âlemini livâ-yı hilafet altına toplamaya karar vermişti. Yarınalem-i cihad altına koşacak üç kıta Müslümanları, Sultan Selim’in temel taşı koyduğu İslâm bina-yı ittihadının umde-i azametini vaz’ edecekelr ...” Ibid., p. 391.
- 26 “Neşr edilen fetvâlar kulûb-ı İslâmı ateşledi. Ne tehdit, ne nefy, hatta ne de ölüm, İslâm kalplerinde yanan ateş-i kini söndürmeye kifâyet etmiyor.” Ibid., p. 402.
- 27 “Haydi askerler, haydi dindaşlar haydi halife ordusu efrâdı, İslâmın ikbâl-i müşâ’a’ı ileride ileri, dâima ileri ...” Ibid., p. 426.
- 28 See Erol Köroğlu, “From Propaganda to National Identity Construction: Turkish Literature and the First World War”, Ph.D. Dissertation, Istanbul: Boğaziçi University, 2003; *Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1914–1918): Propagandadan Millî Kimlik İnşasına*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2004; *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Turkish Literature during World War I*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007.
- 29 “Yurtta birkaç can olmaz, / Birden çok vicdan olmaz, / Ortaklı cânan olmaz, / Lâilâheillâllah! // Gövdelerde kesret var, / Gönüllerde vahdet var, / Fertler yok, cemiyet var! Lâilâheillâllah!” Şiirler, p. 59.
- 30 “Hakk’ın muradı, / Halktan fırladı, / Açtık cihadı, / Allah’u ekber ... // Uyduk sancağa, / Geldik uzağa, / Eski toprağa, / Allah’u ekber ... // Kaynaştı kanlar, / Anlaştı Hanlar, / Birleşti canlar. / Allah’u ekber, / Velillâh-ül hamd ...” Şiirler, p. 60.
- 31 “Benim dinim ne ümittir, ne korku; / Allah’ıma sevdiğimden taparım! / Ne Cennet, ne Cehennem’den bir korku / Almaksızın, vazifemi yaparım.” Şiirler, p. 111.

7 Gendering Jihad

Ottoman Muslim Women and War during the Early Twentieth Century*

Nicole van Os

Women may go out to serve the community in a number of situations, the most important being:

- 1) Jihad (by appointment) – if the enemy is attacking her country and the men are not enough to protect it and the imams give a fatwa for it, as the blessed women of Iraq and Chechnya did, with great sadness, if the men are absent even [*sic*] they are present.¹

Introduction

In November 1914 the fatwas issued by the Shaykh ül Islam Hayri Efendi, in which Muslims were called upon to take up arms against those who attacked Islam, who seized and looted Muslim countries and who made the Muslim populations captive, were read to an audience of allegedly almost 100,000 Muslims at the Fatih Mosque in Istanbul. In the very first of these fatwas it becomes clear who should get engaged in the struggle against the attackers: “all Muslims, ... young and old, cavalry and infantry, ... Muslims from anywhere”. Their contribution to the struggle, moreover, should be not just “financial” but also “physical.”² Whom did he mean when referring to “all Muslims, young and old”? Did he include Muslim women? The words “cavalry and infantry” rather point at the contrary. This is confirmed in the address to the army and navy a few days after these fatwas by Sultan Mehmet Reşat v. He addressed in particular those serving in his army and his navy, addressing them as his “heroic soldiers” (*kahraman askerlerim*) and his “soldier-sons” (*asker evladlarım*).³ His address, moreover, was followed by a text from the military commander, Enver Pasha.⁴

A week later in the same periodical in which the texts of the fatwas and the other texts were published. However, Shaykh Salih Şerif

Tunusi explicitly included women in an article published in a dialectic form of questions and answers:

Q – What is the extent of jihad when enemies like these attack us?

A – For all Muslims; male, female ... non-breadwinner, breadwinner ... infantry, cavalry ... for all believers jihad becomes a duty applicable to all (*farz-i ayn*) when our enemies such as the French, English, and Russian attack us like that from all sides.⁵

But what did he expect women to do? What were Ottoman Muslim women expected to do when the call for Jihad was issued in November 1914? Were they to contribute physically or financially? Or were there other ways in which they could and should contribute? The sources are rather silent regarding this. At the time the Jihad was declared hardly any women's periodicals appeared. Authors in other periodicals or newspapers did not seem interested in posing, let alone, answering these questions. Why not? Why was the need to discuss the role of women in Jihad not felt? And if this need was not felt, how did men and women know what women could and should do? What did they do during World War I? How were these activities justified even if they meant transgressing the existing gender divisions?

Presents for the Soldiers

While women in general were not supposed to be part of the military force as such, Ottoman Muslim women were explicitly called upon to contribute to the military effort as civilians as early as the 1870s, when the Ottoman Empire was fighting off insurgents in the Balkan provinces and Russia.

A few months after the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out in July 1875 and Ottoman soldiers were sent to quash it, an anonymous author made a direct appeal to Ottoman (Muslim) women in the Thessalonian women's periodical *Ayine*:

Our soldiers are struggling in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sacrificing their lives to defend us and our homeland against the enemies. Although our soldiers, thanks to the kindness of our Sultan, have more than sufficient drinks, food and clothing at their disposal and do not need anything else, it occurred to us that we also should send a present in the name of the fatherland (*vatan*) from here to feel good and to show that we love

our soldiers as our beloved ones, because we saw in the newspapers that in Istanbul some are collecting and donating 'woollen jackets' (hırka), others 'flannel undershirts' (fanila) and 'short bodied coats' (nimten), that is, 'heavy outer shirts' (mintan) and we felt it would be appropriate if we would, within the limits of our possibilities, also do such a thing.⁶

The wording chosen in this appeal seems to stress the rather secular character of the donations. The readers were asked to "send a present in the name of the fatherland" to soldiers who did not need anything. As such the donations were explicitly dissociated from the Islamic context of *zakat* (alms) and *sadaka* (voluntary alms) and turned into *hediye* (presents) and *iane* (donations). In this way it became possible to address not only the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, but also the non-Muslims and ask them to contribute.

A few days after Serbia declared war on 1 July 1876 the French daily *Stamboul* called upon women to join forces and collect money and goods for war victims with a reference to "the miracles of devotion which we have been able to admire in the other capitals of Europe."⁷ That same day, the Ottoman Turkish newspaper *Vakit* (Time) published an article praising Armenian women in Erenköy, because they had founded an organization to produce surgical materials and night- and underwear for the sick and wounded.⁸ A day later, the same newspaper called upon Ottoman Muslim women not to fall behind "our Christian compatriots," (*hristiyan vatandaşlarımız*) and to establish an organization with five or ten women.⁹ A few days later the newspapers announced to its readers that such a committee had indeed be formed in Istanbul.¹⁰ Subsequently women in Thessalonica were called upon not to stay behind, and the establishing of a committee under the presidency of the wife of the governor of Thessalonica was announced.¹¹

The (very) short Greek-Ottoman war of 1897 was another occasion on which Ottoman Muslim women became actively involved in fundraising to support not only war orphans, but also wounded soldiers and their families. A "Donation Committee of Ottoman Ladies" (*Muhadderat-ı Osmaniye İane Komisyonu*) was formed under the presidency of the daughter of the Grand Vezir.¹² For several weeks, lists containing the names of generous donors, male and female, and the amounts of their donations to the committee were published in the "Ladies' Gazette" (*Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete*).¹³ Women belonging to families from the ruling elites, national or local, thus became instrumental in involving Ottoman women, Muslim and non-Muslim, in campaigns to the benefit of the Ottoman military.

The committees mentioned above seem to have been short-lived. The Young Turk Revolution of July 1908 opened the way to the establishment of longer lasting organizations. Immediately after the Young Turk Revolution Ottoman women, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, in cities such as Istanbul, Edirne and Thessalonica became engaged in associational work to support the soldier-heroes of the revolution. They had, in their eyes, been maltreated under the old regime and continued to defend the Ottoman Empire, not only against the traditional forces who staged a counter-revolution in April 1909, but also against the continuously imminent external threats. Ottoman women contributed together with men by donating money and goods to the many local, neighbourhood-based charitable organizations (*cemiyet-i hayriye*) that were established in Istanbul,¹⁴ while women also established all-female committees and organizations. Through these committees and organizations women donated in particular all sorts of textiles: warm underwear, socks and padded vests and other clothes against the winter cold; bedding, dressing materials and shirts for the wounded soldiers.

Women of all creeds participated in these organizations and committees. An organization founded in Edirne in December 1908 by Emine Semiye, daughter of Cevdet Pasha, *Hizmet-i Nisvan Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi* (Women's Service Charitable Organization), for example, consisted of ten Muslim members and six non-Muslim members. Muslim as well as Christian women generously donated to the organization padded vests for the Ottoman soldiers.¹⁵ During the war against Italy (September 1911–October 1912) existing women's organizations in, for example, Thessalonica turned their charitable work from supporting schoolgirls and poor families to donating bedding, dressings and clothing to soldiers.¹⁶

In the aftermath of the counter-revolution of April 1909, to mention one more example, the *Osmanlı Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi* (Ottoman Women's Charitable Organization) was one of the first organizations founded explicitly by 30 women from prominent Ottoman and foreign families in Istanbul with the aim of improving the situation of Ottoman soldiers by focusing on the improvement of the situation in hospitals.¹⁷

These activities in general did not raise questions regarding propriety. The Ottoman (Muslim) women donating these goods belonged to the families of civil servants and bureaucrats and purchased the goods they donated or produced them themselves within the confines of their homes. The goods were not handed to the soldiers directly, but through intermediaries. Initially newspapers that functioned as propaganda platforms carried out this function, but soon organizations such as the Red Crescent, which was founded in April 1911, took over the coordinating role. The army and its soldiers, therefore, remained at a comfortable

distance and demanded no direct involvement from the women, although some would have liked this to be different. "Unlike our brave foremothers we cannot fight on the battlefield; we are deprived of the honour to fight our enemies face to face" complained the ardent nationalist Nezihe Muhlis in a letter to the daily *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* (Interpreter of the Truth), which was reproduced on the bulletin board of the Ottoman Fleet Organization during the Tripolitanian War.¹⁸

The Balkan Wars, however, brought war and the soldiers literally closer to women in the main urban areas of Thessalonica and Istanbul.

Balkan Wars

During the first years after the Young Turk Revolution tension between the Ottoman Empire and its Balkan neighbours had been building up slowly but irreversibly. Immediately after 1908 Bulgaria had been confronted with an economic boycott, because it had declared independence and annexed the previously autonomous province of East Rumelia. Goods from Austria-Hungary were also boycotted, because it had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. These boycotts were followed by another one as a result of the crises around Crete. This boycott of 1910–1911 was actually directed against Greece, but also affected relations between the Ottoman Muslims and the Ottoman Greek Orthodox (*Rum*).¹⁹

The popular press proved to be instrumental in both creating public awareness and calling upon that public to take action. During these boycotts, the popular press published numerous calls from both the editors but also the public to participate in them. Both boycotts found a large public response. Since women's periodicals formed an intrinsic part of that popular press from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onwards, and since women constituted a considerable part of the public that was addressed, women also actively participated in the discussions: female authors actively called upon their readers to refrain from buying boycotted wares.

The boycotts contributed to the rising political tension which eventually led to the Balkan Wars. On 2 October 1912, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria, which had joined forces in the Balkan League, demanded that the Ottomans implement reforms in Macedonia to, amongst other aims, improve the situation of the non-Muslim population in that province. The ultimatum evoked the reaction of the Ottoman public in Istanbul.

On 4 October 1912 a meeting took place at the Hippodrome in Istanbul (*Sultan Ahmet*) where war was demanded. Although the majority of



FIGURE 7.1 “Another picture of the war manifestations at Sultan Ahmet,” *Servet-i Fünun*, 1114, 27 Eylül 1328 (10 October 1912), 508

the participants were male, women were certainly not absent, as some photographs published in *Servet-i Fünun* (Wealth of Science) show. A few days later on 8 October 1912 the First Balkan War broke out. It ended formally on 20 May 1913, to be followed immediately by the Second Balkan War which broke out on 16 June 1913 and lasted until 18 July 1913. During these wars women’s voices were not absent in the press. They were, together with men, publicly debating what to do.

So, for example, Mehmed Ubeydullah in an article in *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Home) argued that the religious traditions (*hadith*) included many examples of women who had actively participated in war. Taking part in war was, he stated, a communal duty which, if observed by some, would absolve the others who did not observe it (*farz-ı kifaye*). For children, women, the blind and other “impaired” people, however, it was neither necessary (*vacib*), nor proper (*caiz*) to participate in war. On the other hand, if the enemy attacked, he wrote, taking part in the war became an individual duty applicable to all (*farz-ı ayn*). In such a case a woman did not even have to ask permission from her husband to participate in the war according to his interpretation of the religious laws relating to this subject. Since the Balkan War had started with the Ottomans being attacked, Ottoman women had to take up their duty in his view.²⁰

What exactly it was they should do he did not say. Beyond discussion, however, was the idea that Ottoman Muslim women had to make a contribution to the war in one way or another. By this time, the Ottoman Red Crescent had established its women's central committee, *Hilal-i Ahmer Hanımlar Heyet-i Merkeziyesi*.²¹ This committee would in due time play a pivotal role in the war-time activities of Ottoman women together with the *Müdafaa-i Milliye Osmanlı Hanımlar Heyeti* (Ottoman Women's Committee for National Defence), the women's branch of the *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (National Defence Organization). This organization had been founded at the instigation of the CUP following the coup of January 1913.²² Abdullah Cevdet, at the time cited its aims briefly as "[to] collect donations, register volunteers, enlighten the minds of the people."²³ As such the organization served as a well-lubricated propaganda machine, reaching into the farthest corners of the Empire, consciously trying also to involve the not always compliant non-Muslim population and women.²⁴ Within a few weeks after its establishment local women's branches had been set up not only in various parts of Istanbul, such as Beşiktaş,²⁵ and Makriköy,²⁶ but also in Bursa,²⁷ Trabzon,²⁸ Ankara,²⁹ Diyarbakır³⁰ and İzmir.³¹ Women in these branches organized patriotic meetings with female speakers and collected money and goods. The *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* and the Red Crescent cooperated closely and seem to have worked out a division of labour between them: the former supported in particular the soldiers in the field and their families, the latter those who were wounded or ill. Both organizations turned into the major coordinating institutions for those women who, during the Balkan Wars and later during World War I, increasingly became involved in the "industry" of war donations as individuals and in organizations.

While the *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* and its women's branches were established relatively late to play a major role during the Balkan Wars, this was not the case for the Women's Centre of the Red Crescent. Within a few days after the First Balkan War erupted, it actively called upon women to sew underwear for the wounded soldiers, distributed cloth to this aim and also provided patterns which women could use. The materials could be picked up from the Red Crescent Headquarters, but the sewing was supposed to take place in the private homes of the women.³²

The *Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti* received 30 per cent of the money collected by the *Makriköy İlane-i Harbiye Komisyonu* (Makriköy War Donations' Committee), which had been founded immediately after the start of the Balkan Wars³³ and which had a separate women's branch, the *Makriköy İlane-i Harbiye Kadınlar Komisyonu* (Makriköy War Donations Women's Committee) presided over by Fehime Nüzhet, a well-known author and speaker at patriotic rallies.³⁴

Women and women's organizations not only actively participated in producing linen and bandages for the Red Crescent, but they also opened and equipped hospitals for wounded soldiers brought in from the front lines. The *Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti* (Organization for the Advancement of Women), for example, opened a small hospital with 100 beds, which it kept going for two months.³⁵ The members of the *Kadıköy Donanma-yı Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye Hanımlar Şubesi* (Kadıköy Ladies' Branch of the National Support for the Ottoman Fleet) spent close to 1,000 lira of the money they collected on establishing a hospital with 100 beds at the building of the *Osmanlı İttihad Mektebi* (Ottoman Union School) in Haydarpasha, while the *Osmanlı Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi* equipped a ward with 300 beds at the *Şişli Etfal Hastanesi* (Şişli Children's Hospital) and donated the wherewithall for 100 beds to the hospital in the Taşkısla barracks.³⁶ According to Messadet Bedir-Khan, women opened in total 12 hospitals during the Balkan Wars including the hospital of the *Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti*, a hospital at a former school in Haydarpasha, plus one in Erenköy with 60 beds and one in Kadırga with 200 beds. The figures she gives may be exaggerated, though. Her statement that more than 5,000 "*Musulmanes*" had worked as sick attendants during the Balkan Wars certainly was.³⁷

Between the end of 1908 and October 1912, several initiatives were taken by the military authorities at the Gülhane military hospital to educate Ottoman women to become sick attendants in order to employ them at military hospitals. While a limited number of Ottoman women indeed attended these early courses, it remains unclear whether any Muslim women were amongst them. Moreover, the women attending seem to have used their newly required knowledge not to nurse strange men in hospitals, but to take care of the sick and ill at home in a more professional way. By the time the Balkan states had mobilized for war and the declaration of war was imminent, the Red Crescent took a first initiative to provide courses for sick attendants.

Having seen the not wholly successful efforts of the Gülhane hospital, Dr. Besim Ömer Pasha, who also had been involved in the foundation of the Red Crescent and its women's centre, started to try to convince the Board of the Red Crescent of the need to establish a so-called *hastahane-mektebi* (hospital with training facilities) where male and female sick attendants could be trained. Although the Board did not allow him to build new premises to that end, he was allocated some space at the Kadırga hospital to set up such a hospital-school to train ten women. These women would be sent to families in need of sick attendants and thus not employed at hospitals.³⁸ The classes were announced in the newspapers and both men and women were invited to apply.³⁹ The school

was closed down, however, before it could even get started, because the premises were needed for the wounded soldiers from the Balkan Wars.

The Kadirga hospital, however, was one of the few hospitals where nine Muslim women were able to work as hospital attendants during the Balkan Wars; four of them Tatar women students from Russia who had initially come to the Ottoman Empire to work as volunteers to support the Red Crescent and “to wake up their Ottoman Muslim sisters.”⁴⁰

The reason this particular hospital seems to have been one of the first to employ Muslim sick attendants was probably that it used to be a maternity ward which was also used for educating midwives who, during their first year, also had to take courses in nursing. Obviously the women working there stayed on when the birth clinic was turned into an actual hospital with male patients due to the war.

The work of the women in this hospital must have inspired Besim Ömer to undertake another effort to organize professional education for nurses. In February 1913 women were once more invited by the *Hilal-i Ahmer* to apply to attend a six month course. The women had to be healthy and between 25 and 35 years of age, able to read and write (without a specification of what language) and prepared to serve for at least five years with the *Hilal-i Ahmer*. They would receive food and clothes and a small payment if they attended the courses for six months and participated in the practical exercises.⁴¹ How many women applied remains unclear.

The lack of interest in these courses did not mean that there were no female sick attendants and nurses in Ottoman hospitals. Several sources refer to a clear majority of foreign women working as volunteers.⁴² At the Kandilli hospital, for example, founded at the palace of Celâleddin Bey⁴³ with a capacity of 50 beds, not Ottoman women, but two *soeurs*, and a few English and French women worked as volunteers.⁴⁴ Although the total number of professional sick attendants remained limited and the majority of them were probably foreign or non-Muslim, some “Turkish and Muslim” women seem to have worked as volunteers during the Balkan Wars at the hospitals in Istanbul.⁴⁵ *Servet-i Fünun*, for example, published photographs of Muslim women at work at Gülhane and Haydarpasha hospitals during the Balkan Wars, referred to as *hanımlarımız* (our ladies) and *les dames turques* (the Turkish ladies) in the captions in Ottoman Turkish and French, respectively.⁴⁶

Moreover, it is not always clear from the sources whether the women involved in caring for the wounded were Ottoman or foreign, Muslim or non-Muslim. We know that some of the members of the *Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti* were actively involved in working at the hospital founded by the organization.⁴⁷ Some of the members of the *Osmanlı Kadınlar Cemiyet-i*



FIGURE 7.2 “A room at the Gülhane hospital where one sees Turkish women as nurses for the first time” [*Une salle de l’hôpital de Kulhané où on voit pour la première fois les dames turques en infirmières*], *Servet-i Fünun*, no. 1118, (25 Teşrinievvel 1328/7 November 1912)

Hayriyesi also actively participated in the nursing of a total of 300 wounded soldiers and 60 wounded officers for a period of six months during the Balkan Wars.⁴⁸ It remains unknown, though, whether the members of these organizations working as sick attendants included Muslim women or not.

Ottoman Muslim Women and the Declaration of Jihad

By the time the Jihad was declared in November 1914, Ottoman women, Muslim and non-Muslim, had been involved in activities supporting the military and soldiers for many, many years. There was no need to ask whether they should or should not participate in the war effort and there was little discussion on what they should do. Despite the occasional reference in Ottoman periodicals and newspapers of the period to women battling side by side with men in history and contemporaneously, taking up weapons and fighting in the forefront was not what was expected from Ottoman women.

The women’s periodical *Kadınlar Dünyası* (Women’s World) of 19 December 1914, however, did carry a picture of women in military



وطن ایستینجه قادین ده عسکر اولور

FIGURE 7.3 “If the Fatherland wants it, women can become soldiers too” [*Vatan isteyince kadın da asker olur*], *Kadınlar Dünyası*, 155, 6 *Kanunuevvel* 1330 (19 December 1914), frontpage. The women in the picture rather look like British female volunteers from the Voluntary Aid Detachment. Their uniforms have been Ottomanized by adding badges with a star and crescent.

dress on its cover. The outfit of the women, who look very much like women belonging to the British Voluntary Aid Detachment, an agency sending off female volunteers, had been Ottomanized by the addition of badges with a star and crescent (Fig. 7.3). A few months earlier, in

July 1914, the periodical had featured an article on women and military service. In this article, the editors of the *Kadınlar Dünyası* referred to the women in the early days of Islam who participated in battles like men, while they also reminded their readers of *Kara Fatma* (Black Fatma), who “hiding her gender, succeeded in getting the rank of captain due to her courage and effort” in the Crimean War.⁴⁹ An unknown author writing in *Türk Yurdu*, moreover, referred to the Turkish past of the Ottomans: “[a]ccording to Turkish customs, women take part in war and battle side by side with the ruler.”⁵⁰ It is indeed not unlikely that at least some Ottoman (Muslim) women got involved in fighting. Women, often cross-dressing to hide their gender, are known to have participated in battles in many places and eras.⁵¹ Some female warriors are known to have fought alongside Ottoman soldiers in the various wars of the nineteenth century.⁵² Other women actively participated in the struggles to oust the foreign forces which had occupied parts of Anatolia after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I.⁵³

While the women active during the nineteenth century and those fighting during the War of Independence have taken their place in Turkish (and Kurdish) historiography, the period of World War I proves to be a blind spot. Both *Kadınlar Dünyası* and *Welt des Islams*, for example, refer to an article from *Tanin* according to which a group of 100 women – partly with and partly without weapons – took to the battlefield in Erzurum.⁵⁴ Further research may reveal more on women who actively took up their weapons to fight the enemy.

Despite the picture of the female volunteers and the reference to the women in Erzurum, the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* do not seem to have favoured women’s active participation on the battlefield. In the first editorial in December 1914 after a break of four months due to the shortage of paper, Ulviye Mevlan, the publisher of the periodical, made this clear. Although, “Ottoman women will and can fulfill their duty to the fatherland including taking up the weapons”, she wrote, “today our brave sons, our hero soldiers do not want their women, their mothers, their sisters to take up weapons.” While she claimed that the most important duty of women in these days was to give birth to children to create a stronger army, she also made clear that “women’s duties will become more serious, thousands of women will feel the compulsion and the need to work either for the Red Crescent or – not counting as [working] at the front, but in reality not less dangerous than it – the services. ... There is no doubt women will play a large role.”⁵⁵ Thus, just before the periodical stopped appearing, the editors sent a telegraph to Enver Pasha to inform him that he could count on their active support.⁵⁶ What did these and other Ottoman women do? They simply did what they had been doing before.



FIGURE 7.4 Women of the Hilal-i Ahmer Hanımlar Heyet-i Merkeziyesi at work, *Servet-i Fünun*, 28 Mayıs 1331 (10 June 1915), 68

The scale of their activities changed, though. World War I, with its wholesale mobilization, increased the need for military uniforms even more. No longer could textiles or uniforms be imported. The Ottoman army had to fall back on the resources in its own country in order to equip its soldiers.⁵⁷ The efforts to develop local industries were not enough and the authorities called upon the population of the Ottoman Empire to contribute through the mediation of the *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* and the *Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti* and its *Kadınlar Merkezi*. The appeal was not made in vain: the newspapers reported daily about the generous and patriotic gifts from citizens all over the empire and several women's organizations which had been founded with different aims turned their activities to production for the army.

A returning phenomenon was the campaigns for "winter presents." The first one was launched by the Istanbul governorship with an advertisement on 15 September 1914.⁵⁸ A few days later the *Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Kadınlar Merkezi* issued a declaration asking the public to donate "winter presents" *in casu* clothing like warm underwear, vests, socks and gloves.⁵⁹ While the girls and women at its *Hilal-i Ahmer Hanımlar Darüssınaası* (Red Crescent Ladies' Craftworkhome) turned from producing fine needlework to sewing winter clothes and knitting socks, The Red Crescent's Women's Centre also called upon its members repeatedly to come to its home to participate in the work or to do so at home.⁶⁰

Moreover, it successfully called upon women all over the country to establish local women's branches of the Red Crescent and to set to work. In quite a few towns in Anatolia the wives of local governors or other high bureaucrats established such branches and presided over them.⁶¹

The "winter present" campaign was highly successful: the *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, which collected the goods and distributed them, reported regularly that it received large numbers of gifts from towns all over the empire.⁶² Subsequently, the *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* renewed the invitation to the Ottoman public to donate "winter presents" for soldiers during the Gallipoli Campaign, at the end of the summer of 1915 with a new winter coming up.⁶³

Besides the women of the Red Crescent and the National Defence Organization several women's organizations answered these calls and also set to work. In October 1914, the *Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti* organized a concert combined with lectures whose "yield [was] meant for the purchase of warm underwear for the army."⁶⁴ The women of the *Türk Kadınları Bıçkı Yurdu* co-operated closely with the Defence Organization. Its pupils and alumnae produced tens of thousands of pieces of underwear for the army. They were partly produced from materials delivered by the Defence Organization. To be able to deal with the demand, they even invited women who wanted to participate in sewing to come and work at their workshops for a salary.⁶⁵

The girls and women working at the workshops of the organization which had been founded to stimulate the consumption of locally produced goods, the *Mamulat-ı Dahiliye İstihlaki Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi*, and those who worked for the organization in their own homes were set to work and produced more than 100,000 pairs of socks and other pieces for the *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* instead of fancy dresses for Ottoman ladies.⁶⁶ A photograph taken in one of the organization's workshops shows the women working on navy caps.⁶⁷

This organization also decided to set up its own hospital close to its shop and workshop in old Istanbul, which was financed by the incomes generated by the shop and workshops. In the end the total number of beds at this hospital was 150. The organization, moreover, donated a field hospital with 300 beds and necessities.⁶⁸ In May 1916 the hospital was closed for unclear reasons. Subsequently, the organization assisted in the opening of another hospital, *Zapyon Askeri Hastahanesi* (Zapyon Military Hospital), by providing a fully equipped hospital ward with 150 beds.⁶⁹

Other organizations also took hospitals under their wing. The *Osmanlı Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi* continued its work at the Şişli Etfal Hastanesi, but also worked for the former Russian hospital in Nişantaşı,



FIGURE 7.5 Women at work at one of the workshops of the Mamulat-ı Dahiliye İstihlaki Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi. "Women's fate and women's work: Letter of a young Turkish woman from Constantinople," *Die Islamische Welt*, 1, 7, 1917, 380–383.

which had been turned into the Pangaltı Military Hospital to nurse wounded soldiers brought in from Çanakkale.⁷⁰ The supplies for the hospital were partly obtained through the *Mecruhın-ı Gaza-ı Asakir-i Osmaniye İlane Komisyonu* (Committee for Donations to the Wounded Ottoman Gazi Soldiers) which was founded under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the battles in Çanakkale had started and wounded soldiers had started to pour into Istanbul.⁷¹ This Committee was not only central to the collection and allocation of money and supplies donated from abroad, but also seems to have served as an intermediary to order materials from especially Austria-Hungary until this was no longer possible in September 1916.⁷²

This committee also sent several articles including bales of cloth to be turned into bedding to the *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti Kadıköy Merkezi Hanımlar Şubesi* (Women's Branch of the Kadıköy Centre of the National Defence Organization)⁷³ which was closely involved with the "Botter" Hospital in Kadıköy,⁷⁴ as we learn from the correspondence between women from the organization including its president, Reşide Bekir, the widow of the famous confectioner Hacı Bekirzade Muhittin, and the committee.⁷⁵

While many of the goods produced by the women reached the soldiers and the wounded in the hospitals through intermediary organizations, the newspapers also reported on individual women from the Istanbul elite and women's organizations who visited the soldiers in the hospitals to bring them more luxury products such as chocolate, oranges and cigarettes. Before World War I this was rare, but the upsurge of patriotism due to the influx of wounded men from Çanakkale seems to have been the major drive behind women's taking this step, including those for whom seclusion had been rather strict until then: women of the Ottoman imperial dynasty. The very visibility of war brought home took women even a step further beyond the traditional gender borders: an increasing number of Ottoman Muslim took the courses offered by the Red Crescent to become sick attendants over the years and actually worked as volunteers or paid staff in the hospitals in Istanbul and beyond.

Only a few months after the Balkan Wars had ended, in February 1914, the Red Crescent announced the start of a course for nursing aids which would consist of 18 lessons of two hours each on Fridays and Sundays.⁷⁶ Between 40 and 50 women participated in the course and at the end of the five month course 27 women successfully took the exam. These 27 women, who were all wives and daughters of prominent Ottoman officials and Muslim, received their certificate during a ceremony in the presence of the First *Kadın* of the Sultan, of Naciye Sultan, granddaughter of Sultan Abdülmecid and the wife of Enver Pasha, and her mother and other palace women.⁷⁷ In his speech at the ceremony Besim Ömer stressed the importance of the event and pointed out that these women served as examples to counter any social resistance the professional nursing school the *Hilal-i Ahmer* wanted to establish might generate.⁷⁸

Understanding that the involvement of Ottoman Muslim women in the nursing of wounded males would mean a serious transgression of existing gender norms for which it would not be easy to create public support, the Red Crescent made conscious efforts to massage public opinion into accepting this shift. Firstly, it continued to organize courses for women belonging to the Ottoman establishment who wanted to serve as voluntary nursing aids. Secondly, it launched a strong public campaign through regular dispatches of announcements, messages and communiqués to the newspapers, the many public lectures of Besim Ömer and other members of the *Hilal-i Ahmer*, the publication of photographs and articles in popular magazines such as *Servet-i Fünun* by popular authors like Fatma Aliye, and the "vulgarization of the work of the Red Crescent through illustrated post cards."⁷⁹ Meanwhile, Besim Ömer in particular continued to try to establish schools for those who wanted to work as volunteers, but also for professional sick attendants and nurses.

پښتو ژبې د

مطبعه سی :

اسکې مکتب ملک فارشوند

تلفاز آدومې :

استانبول : نوت فون

ژوند فون

چشمه کوثری جیاد ، مصور عثمانی غز تمسید

پښتو ژبې د

ساح امتیاز و مدبر مسئول :

احمد احسان

تلفون نو مرسو :

استانبول : ۱۵۰۶

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FIGURE 7.6 Fifteen Ottoman Muslim trained nursing aids leaving for the front wearing their travel outfit. *Servet-i Fünun*, 31 Mayıs/May 1917, front page

Despite the continuation of the training of professional sick attendants *cum* midwives at Kadirga hospital,⁸⁰ the new courses opening in Istanbul⁸¹ and the founding of schools in Edirne,⁸² Izmir⁸³ and Erzurum, the *Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Kadınlar Merkezi* and Besim Ömer felt that the process of setting up a proper network of nursing schools within the Ottoman empire was lagging behind what they had hoped for. Only at the very end of World War I did Besim Ömer succeed in convincing the Board of the Red Crescent to allocate money and a building to found such a school.

Still, his diligent work was not left without result: during World War I a considerable, but still limited,⁸⁴ number of Ottoman (Muslim) women worked as voluntary nursing aids or professional sick attendants in the hospitals, initially mostly in the hospitals in Istanbul, but later also elsewhere in hospitals in the towns of Anatolia and in field hospitals right behind the front. It is not just the propaganda publications with their photographs that bear evidence of this, but also the long lists of the names of women working in the hospitals available in the archives of the Turkish Red Crescent and the registers containing the names of those who received a Red Crescent medal.⁸⁵ These registers also show that the socio-economic background of the women involved in nursing changed. While the women working in the hospitals during the first years of World War I seem to have been volunteers belonging to families of the middle and higher level bureaucracy, the women receiving medals in the later years seem to have been working to earn their living. These hospitals offered impoverished women the opportunity to earn a meagre income and, more importantly, a meal and, sometimes, also housing: important benefits for women affected by the war.⁸⁶

Conclusion

By the time the Jihad was declared in November 1914, men (and women) in the Ottoman empire had got used to women's active participation in society. As Selma Rıza wrote to those present at the 1914 Conference of the International Council of Women in Rome, Ottoman women, during the Balkan Wars:

ha[d] unfolded all the energy, accumulated since long years, to come to the aid of their compatriots and to take their place in public and social life. ... Their attitude has been so dignified and measured at this start that even the most severe and retrograde spirits cannot find anything to reproach them; they have, on the contrary, almost been forced to recognize the importance of the feminine role in society.⁸⁷

The question, therefore, was not whether they should contribute to the war effort. They had been doing so for many, many years. Nor was there much discussion on what they should do. Over those years, the range of their activities had been growing slowly but steadily: from simply donating money and goods in a rather anonymous way, to a more active involvement in the organization of donation campaigns and the actual establishment of women's organizations to the explicit aim of supporting soldiers and their families. Most of this work could be and was done from within all-female environments such as the private homes of women or special locations assigned to them. The public space Selma Rıza referred to was, in general, an all-female public space guaranteeing the "dignified" and "measured" attitude which the "retrograde spirits" could hardly disapprove of. Even the work as nursing aids mostly took place within the confines of private homes.

Only during World War I did Ottoman Muslim women have to step out of these all-female environments. Not to become soldiers. Certainly, rhetoric regarding female soldiers was occasionally used. This rhetoric did not serve, however, to encourage women to become soldiers themselves. Rather it was used as a metaphor to show how women had shown their patriotic love in other times and places and to justify the activities of women during World War I. These activities such as their work as nursing aids, after all, more than before meant a transgression of the existing gender borders. At the same time this work, in which women took a caring role and as such actually confirmed their femininity rather than belied it, remained more within these borders than if women actually had become soldiers. Their Jihad was not a Jihad of armed struggle, but rather a Jihad of supporting the armed struggle fought by men.

Notes

* This article is largely based on the research done for my PhD thesis: "Feminism, Philanthropy and Patriotism: Female Associational Life in the Ottoman Empire," Leiden University, October 2013.

1 "Women of the Islamic State: A manifesto on women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade" [Translation and analysis by Charlie Winter, February 2015] (<http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/women-of-the-islamic-state3.pdf>, accessed 14-02-2015).

2 "Kafe-i müslimin üzerine cihadın farziyeti hakkında fetva-ı şerife," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 314 (6 Teşrinisani 1330/ 19 November 1914): 12–13, quotation 12.

3 "Cihad-i ekber hakkında beyanname-i hazret-i hilafetpenahi," *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 314, (6 Teşrinisani 1330/19 November 1914): 14.

- 4 “Başkumandanlık Vekaletinin beyannamesi,” *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 314, (6 Teşrinisani 1330/19 November 1914): 14–15.
- 5 Salih El-Şerif El-Tunusi, “Fisebilillah, cihadın hakikatı, gayesi, hükmü, mücahidinin vezaifi,” *Sebilürreşad* 13, no. 315, (13 Teşrinisani 1330/26 November 1914), pp. 20–24, quotation 22.
- 6 “Hanımlara hayıra davet,” *Ayine*, no. 3 (16 Teşrinisani 1291/28 November 1875), p. 3.
- 7 “Secours aux blessés; appel aux dames,” *Stamboul*, 12 July 1876, p. 1.
- 8 “Dünkü nüshamızda ...,” *Vakit*, 30 Haziran 1292 (12 July 1876), p. 3.
- 9 “Hanımlar gayret,” *Vakit*, 1 Temmuz 1292 (13 July 1876), pp. 1–2.
- 10 “Muharebede mecruh olan ...,” *Vakit*, 2 Temmuz 1292 (14 July 1876), p. 3; “Secours aux blessés,” *Stamboul*, 21 July 1876, p. 1.
- 11 “Asakir-i Osmaniye meçruhini için ...” and “(Pazartesi çıkarılan ilave),” *Ayine*, no. 33 (1 Ağustos 1291 (= 1292!)/13 August 1876), p. 1.
- 12 Şadiye, “Şeref-i nisvan-ı islam ve muhadderat-ı osmaniye iane komisyonu,” *Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete*, no. 124 (7 Ağustos 1313/19 August 1897), pp. 2–3.
- 13 See, for example, “Tebliğat-ı resmiye,” *Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete*, no. 120 (10 Temmuz 1313/22 July 1897), pp. 1–2; “Tebliğat-ı resmiye,” *Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete*, no. 121 (17 Temmuz 1313/29 July 1897), pp. 1–2 and subsequent issues.
- 14 “İane-i askeriye cemiyatı,” *Yeni Gazete*, 23 November 1908, p. 4.
- 15 Emine Semiye, “Kadın Mecmua-ı Muhterimesine,” *Kadın*, no. 9 (8 Kanunuevvel 1324/21 December 1908), p. 2; “Şuun-u Nisvan: ‘Hizmet-i Nisvan’ Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi,” *Kadın*, no. 10 (15 Kanunuevvel 1324/28 December 1908), p. 16; “Şanlı asker kardeşlerimiz ...,” *Yeni Edirne*, 8 Kanunuevvel 1324 (21 December 1908), p. 8; “Şanlı asker kardeşlerimiz ...,” *Yeni Edirne*, 9 Kanunuevvel 1324 (22 December 1908), p. 4; and subsequent issues.
- 16 See, for example, “Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i Nisvaniye’nin ilk eser-i şefkatı”; Zekiye, “Trablusgarb Muavenet-i Milliye Heyet-i Muhterimesine”; “Şefkat Cemiyet-i Hayriyesine arz-ı şükran,” all in *Rumeli*, 31 Teşrinevvel 1327 (13 November 1911), p. 1.
- 17 “Hanımlarımızın fedakarlığı,” *Tanin*, 18 Eylül 1325 (1 October 1909), p. 3; “Von der Mädchenschule in Nischantasch,” *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 29. March 1914, p. 1.
- 18 Nezihe Muhlis, “Nezih bir nida-yı hamiyet,” *Donanma*, 3, no. 2 (26) (Nisan 1328 / April/May 1912), pp. 59–64, quotation 61. Nezihe Muhlis would later become known under the name Nezihe Muhittin.
- 19 For an extensive discussion of this boycott which was used as a “political weapon” against foreign states see Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, “Muslim Merchants and Working-Class in Action: Nationalism, Social Mobilization and Boycott Movement in the Ottoman Empire 1908–1914” [Unpublished PhD-Thesis, Leiden: Leiden University, 2010].
- 20 Mehmed Ubeydullah, “İçtima ve siyaset: islam kadınları,” *Türk Yurdu* 2, (1328), pp. 861–866.
- 21 *Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti 1329–1331 Salnamesi* ([İstanbul:] Ahmet İhsan ve Şürekası, n.d.[1332 (1915–1916)]).
- 22 Although the official date of foundation of this organization according to its

- statutes was 1 February 1913, it seems to have been in existence somewhat earlier: Nâzım H. Polat, *Müdâfaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1991, pp. 17–21.
- 23 A[bdullah] C[evdet], “Ağlatan bir sahne-i fazilet”, *İctihad* 3, no. 51 (24 Kanunusani 1328/6 February 1913), pp. 1163–1164, quotation 1163.
 - 24 Eyal Ginio, “Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream”, *War in History* 12, 2 (2005), pp. 156–177; Nadir Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sosyal Devlet* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp. 305–306.
 - 25 At a meeting for women of the branch in Beşiktaş, for example, Fatma Aliye, Fehime Nüzhet, Salime Servet and Nur Halime addressed the audience: “Hanımlara konferans: Müdafaa-i Milliye Beşiktaş Şubesinden”, *Tanin*, 7 Mart 1329 (20 March 1913), p. 5. See also “Türk hanımlarının toplanışı”, *Büyük Duygu*, no. 2 (16 Mart 1329/29 March 1913), pp. 31–32; “Für die Nationalverteidigung”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 20 March 1913, p. 2; see also Nâzım H. Polat, *Müdâfaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1991), pp. 80–81; Şefika Kurnaz, *II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Türk Kadını* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1996), p. 203.
 - 26 “Müdâfaa-i Milliye: tehhür”, *Tanin*, 29 Mart 1329 (11 April 1913).
 - 27 “Müdâfaa-i Milliye: Brussa hanımlarının hamiyetperverlikleri”, *Tanin*, 15 Şubat 1328 (28 February 1913), p. 3.
 - 28 “Müdâfaa-i Milliye: Trabzon hanımları”, *Tanin*, 23 Şubat 1328 (8 March 1913), pp. 4–5; “Die patriotischen Frauen von Trapezunt”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 27 February 1913, p. 1.
 - 29 “Die Nationalverteidigung”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 28 Februar y1913, p. 2.
 - 30 “Die nationale Verteidigung”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 4 March 1913, p. 1.
 - 31 “Patriotische Opferstimmung in Smyrna”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 14 March 1913, p. 1.
 - 32 “Hilal-i Ahmer”, *Tanin*, 1 Teşrinievvel 1328 (14 October 1912), p. 5.
 - 33 Türkiye Kızılay Arşivi, (hereafter TKA), 93/10, 11 Teşrinievvel 1328 (24 October 1912).
 - 34 Fehime Nüzhet, “Varaka: Senin ceride-i muhterimesi müdüriyetine”, *Senin* (= *Tanin*), 8 Teşrinievvel 1328 (21 October 1912), p. 5.
 - 35 “Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti”, *Halka Doğru*, no. 48 (6 Mart 1329 [*sic* This should be 1330]/19 March 1914), p. 383; Messadet Bedir-Khan, “A propos de l’article de Madame Delaunay”, *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 125 (4/17 January 1914), pp. 1–2; “Halide Hanımefendinin hitabesi”, *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 134 (8 Mart 1330/21 March 1914), pp. 4–5.
 - 36 “Sanitätshilfe: Eine Danksagung”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 1 December 1912, p. 2; “Die Hilfsaktion. Dank”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 6 December 1912, p. 2; “Die Wohltätigkeitsgesellschaft der osmanischen Damen”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 2 March 1913, p. 1; Forinne [*sic*] Lütfi, “Şerike-yi mesaimiz ...”, *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 100–113 (12 Teşrinievvel 1329/25 October 1913), p. 7; *Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti 1329–1331 Salnamesi*, pp. 172–174.
 - 37 Messadet Bedir-Khan, “A propos de l’article de Madame Delaunay”, *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 125 (4/17 January 1914), pp. 1–2.
 - 38 Besim Ömer, *Hanımefendilere Hilal-i Ahmer’e dair konferans* (İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan ve Şurekası, 1330), pp. 75–77.

- 39 "Hilal-i Ahmer", *Tanin*, 25 Eylül 1328 (8 October 1912), p. 5.
- 40 *Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti 1329–1331 Salnamesi*, p. 126. See also TKA, 413/13, 14 Teşrinievvel 1328 (27 November 1912); TKA, 413/14, 14 Teşrinievvel 1328 (27 November 1912); TKA, 413/22, 22 Teşrinievvel 1328 (5 December 1912); TKA, 413/42, 29 Teşrinievvel 1328 (12 December 1912); "Türklük Şuunu – Şimali Hemşirelerimiz", *Türk Yurdu*, 4, no. 14 (18 Nisan 1329/1 May 1913), p. 464.
- 41 TKA, 193/23, [23 Kanunusani 1328 (5 February 1913)].
- 42 Such as, for example, the sources on decorations. The easiest accessible listing is the one in the *Nişan Defterleri: Hilal-i Ahmer Madalyaları*. Other places to find references to recipients of medals are the catalogues of the *Dahiliye Nezareti: Kalem-i Mahsus*, the *Meclis-i Vukela Mazbataları*, and those with the *İrade-i Taltifat*. Within the latter category especially the files with specific decrees relating to decorations are relevant: *Taltifat-ı Nisvan* (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (hereafter BOA), Dosya Usulu İradeler Tasnifi (hereafter DÜİT) 44) and the *Taltifat-ı Memurin: Hilal-i Ahmer Madalyaları* (BOA, DÜİT 47).
- 43 Son of Cemile Sultan, daughter of Sultan Abdülmecid. The Palace was torn down in 1914. <http://www.cemilesultan.com/hakkimizda.php> (consulted 5 January 2011).
- 44 *Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti 1329–1331 Salnamesi*, p. 165.
- 45 Selma Rıza, "Turquie", in International Council of Women, *Report on the Quinquennial Meetings, Rome 1914* (Karlsruhe: G. Braunsche Hofbuchdruckerei und Verlag, [1914]), pp. 391–394 (accessed through <http://www.archive.org>).
- 46 "Mecruh gazilerimiz: Gülhane hastahanesi'nde bir koğuş [photograph]", *Servet-i Fünun*, no. 1118 (25 Teşrinievvel 1328/7 November 1912): front cover; "Gazi Osmanlılar: Haydarpaşa hastanesinde ameliyat salonu, hanımlarımızın muavenet-i şefkatkaranesi [photograph]", *Servet-i Fünun*, no. 1121 (15 Teşrinisani 1328/28 November 1912): front cover.
- 47 "Halide Hanımefendinin hitabesi", *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 134 (8 Mart 1330/21 March 1914), pp. 4–5; "Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti", *Halka Doğru*, no. 48 (6 Mart 1329 [sic] This should be 1330)/19 March 1914), p. 383; Nezihe Muhittin, *Türk Kadını* (Istanbul: Numune Matbaası, 1931), pp. 84–85.
- 48 "Die Hilfsaktion. Dank", *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 6 December 1912, p. 2; "Die Wohltätigkeitsgesellschaft der osmanischen Damen", *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 2 March 1913, p. 1.
- 49 Kadınlar Dünyası, "Askerlik ve kadınlar", *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 148 (20 Haziran 1330/3 July 1914), p. 2.
- 50 "Kadın Efendi Hazretlerinin asker evladlarına muhabbet ve şefkati", *Türk Yurdu*, 8, no. 6 (21 Mayıs 1331/3 June 1915), p. 2627.
- 51 See, e.g. Karin Hagemann, "'Heroic Virgins' and 'Bellicose Amazon': Armed Women, the Gender Order and the German Public during and after the Anti-Napoleonic Wars", *European History Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (2007), pp. 507–552; Dianne Dugaw, *Warrior Women and Popular Balladry 1650–1850* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996 [reprint with new preface of original 1989]); David Hopkin, "Female Soldiers and the Battle of the Sexes in France: The Mobilization of a Folk Motif", *History Workshop Journal*, 56 (Autumn 2003), pp. 78–104; Remke Kruk, *The Warrior Women of Islam: Female*

- Empowerment in Arabic Popular Literature* (London, New York: IBTauris, 2014); Julie Wheelwright, "‘Amazons and military maids:’ An examination of female military heroines in British literature and the changing construction of gender", *Women's Studies International Forum* 10 (1987), pp. 489–502.
- 52 Zeynep Kutluata, "Gender and War during the Late Ottoman and Early Republican Periods: the Case of Black Fatma(s)", [unpublished MA thesis, Sabancı University, Istanbul, 2006].
- 53 *Milli Mücadele’de ve Cumhuriyet’in İlk Yıllarında Kadınlarımız* (Ankara: T.C. Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, 1998), pp. 28–141; Zeki Sarıhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Kadınları* (Bursa: Nilüfer Belediye Başkanlığı, 2009⁴ [birinci baskı: Ankara: Çankaya Belediyesi katkılarıyla Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği, 2006]), pp. 203–254.
- 54 See e.g. M[artin] H[artmann], "Der Glaubenskrieg und unsere Frauen", *Welt des Islams* (1) 3, no. 2 (1915), pp. 144–145 which was a reproduction of an article in *Tanin* from 8 January 1915 on women at the border near Erzurum who were fighting side by side with men against the Russians. See also Ulviye Mevlan, "Geçinmek ihtiyacı", *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 160 (10 Kanunusani 1330/23 January 1915), p. 2, who was probably referring to the same group of women.
- 55 Ulviye Mevlan, "Hal-ı hazırda kadın", *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 154 (29 Teşrinisani 1330/12 December 1914), p. 1.
- 56 "Harb-ı Umumi ve Kadınlar", *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 161 (17 Kanunusani 1330/30 January 1915), p. 2.
- 57 Nicole A.N.M. van Os, "Ottoman Muslim Women and Work during the First World War", in *War and Empire: World War One and the Ottoman Empire*, eds. M. Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2015 (forthcoming)).
- 58 "Askere hedaya-yı şitaiye", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 2 Eylül 1330 (15 September 1914), p. 3.
- 59 Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Hanımlar Heyet-i Merkeziyesi, *Takvim – 1 –*, İstanbul, 1331, pp. 64–65.
- 60 "Muhterem Osmanlı Hanımlarına", *Turan*, 18 Teşrinisani 1330 (1 December 1914), p. 3; "Hilal-i Ahmer’deki dikişler", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 7 Kanunuevvel 1330 (20 December 1914), p. 3; "Ein Aufruf an die türkischen Frauen", *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 2 December 1914; "Mecruhin gazata yardım", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 28 Kanunusani 1330 (10 February 1915), p. 4; "Osmanlı hanımlarına", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 18 Şubat 1330 (3 March 1915), p. 4; "Vom Roten Halbmond", *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 5 March 1915, p. 3. According to the German newspaper "patriotic Turkish women" were invited, while *Tasvir-i Efkar* refers to "Ottoman ladies." "Dikişe davet", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 19 Nisan 1331 (2 May 1915), p. 2.
- 61 Such was the case, for example, in Konya in October/November 1914 and in Kastamonu in May 1915. TKA, 28/16, 26 Ağustos 1330 (8 September 1914); TKA, 28/24, 13 Teşrinievvel 1330 (26 October 1914); TKA, 28/29, 9 Teşrinisani 1330 (22 November 1914); TKA, 28/160, 2 Mayıs 1331 (15 May 1915); TKA, 28/177. See also Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Hanımlar Heyet-i Merkeziyesi, *Takvim – 1 –*, p. 59.
- 62 See, e.g., "Hedaya-yı şitaiye", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 6 Teşrinievvel 1330 (19 October 1914), p. 3; "Hedaya-yı şitaiye", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 1 Kanunuevvel 1330 (14 December 1914), p. 3.

- 63 “Gazilerimize hedaya-yı şitaiye hazırlayalım”, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 11 Ağustos 1331 (24 August 1915), p. 2; “Askerlerimize hediye-i şitaiye”, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 19 Ağustos 1331 (1 September 1915), p. 2.
- 64 “Zum besten der Soldaten”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 23 October 1914, p. 3.
- 65 “Hediye-i şitaiye”, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 27 Eylül 1330 (10 October 1914), p. 4; Lebib Selim, “Türk kadınlığının harb-ı umumideki faaliyeti”, *Türk Yurdu*, IX, 5, 5 Teşrinisani 1331 (18 November 1915), pp. 2812–2816.
- 66 Lebib Selim, “Türk kadınlığının harb-ı umumideki faaliyeti”, *Türk Yurdu*, IX, 4, 22 Teşrinievvel 1331 (4 November 1915), pp. 2797–2799.
- 67 “Frauensichksal und Frauenarbeit: Brief einer junge Türkin aus Constantinopel”, *Die Islamische Welt*, 1, 7, 1917, pp. 380–383.
- 68 Draft letter of Melek hanım, the president of the organization, dated 15 Ağustos 1331 (28 August 1915) in BOA, Hariciye Nezareti, Siyasi Kısım (hereafter, HR.SYS), 2174/3, 20 May 1915. In this letter she quotes the number of beds as 95 and 150, respectively. Other sources refer to 100 and 160 beds and even 170 beds, respectively. “Frauensichksal und Frauenarbeit: Brief einer junge Türkin aus Constantinopel”, *Die Islamische Welt*, no. 7, pp. 380–383; Lebib Selim, “Türk kadınlığının harb-ı umumideki faaliyeti”, *Türk Yurdu* 9, no. 4 (22 Teşrinievvel 1331/4 November 1915), pp. 2797–2799; Lebib Selim, “Türk kadınlığının harb-ı umumideki faaliyeti”, *Türk Yurdu* 9, no. 5 (5 Teşrinisani 1331/18 November 1915), pp. 2812–2816; “İstihlak-i Milli Kadınlar Cemiyeti”, *Tanin*, 17 Eylül 1332 (30 September 1916), p. 3.
- 69 “İktisadi haberler: İstihlak-i Milli Kadınlar Cemiyeti”, *İktisadiyat Mecmuası*, no. 69 (21 Eylül 1332 /4 October 1916), p. 7; “İstihlak-i Milli Kadınlar Cemiyeti Hastahanesi”, *Tanin*, 21 Nisan 1332 (4 May 1916), p. 4; “Teşekkür – İstihlak-i Milli Hastahanesi sertababeti’nden”, *Tanin*, 22 Nisan 1332 (5 May 1916), p. 3; “İstihlak-i Milli Kadınlar Cemiyeti Hastahanesi sertababeti’nden”, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 22 Nisan 1332 (5 May 1916), p. 2. The Zapyon hospital was located in a Greek school which had been confiscated by the authorities to be used as a hospital. During the war many schools (especially those of Christian minorities) were indeed (partly) turned into hospitals.
- 70 “Grand Concert”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 28 July 1915, p. 5; “Für das Krankenhaus in Nischantasch”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 1 August 1915, p. 3; “Grand Concert”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 1 August 1915, p. 5; “La société de bienfaisance des dames ottomans”, *Lloyd Ottoman*, 27 October 1917, p. 3; BOA, HR.SYS, 2174/2, 19 January 1915; BOA, HR.SYS, 2174/3, 20 May 1915. For information on the history of the hospital which was turned into a Russian hospital again after the war see Nuran Yıldırım, “Rus Hastanesi”, *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1994), Vol. 6, p. 370.
- 71 Letter of the organization dated 29 Temmuz 1331 (11 August 1915), an undated list of the wanted articles and a draft response to the *Pangaltı Osmanlı Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi* dated 15 Ağustos 1331 (28 August 1915) in: BOA, HR.SYS, 2174/3, 20 May 1915; See also several documents at BOA, HR.SYS, 2174/2, 19 January 1915.
- 72 When it was no longer possible to purchase the supplies needed for the hospitals from Austria-Hungary the Committee was dissolved and the money left in its

- accounts was transferred to the *Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti*. Dispatch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 4 Eylül 1332 (17 September 1916) in: BOA, HR.SYS, 2174/3, 20 May 1915.
- 73 The branch in Kadıköy seems to have been particularly active during the second half of World War I. “Grande fête champêtre”, *Lloyd Ottoman*, 2 August 1917, p. 3; “Grande fête champêtre”, *Lloyd Ottoman*, 3 August 1917, p. 4; “La fête de Féner Baghtché”, *Lloyd Ottoman*, 3 August 1917, p. 4; “Kadıköy hanımlarının faaliyeti”, *Tanin*, 7 Temmuz/July 1334/1918, p. 4; “Konferans”, *Tanin*, 6 Ağustos/August 1334/1918, p. 4; “Kadınlara Konferans”, *Tanin*, 13 Ağustos/August 1334/1918, p. 4.
- 74 This hospital was housed in the “Botter” mansion which is actually located at Fenerbahçe and had been built as a summer house by one of the tailors of Abdülhamid II, J. Botter, who was of Dutch origin.
- 75 Letter signed Pakize dated 31.6.1331 (13 September 1915); draft letter of the Committee dated 10 Eylül 1331 (23 September 1915) in BOA, HR.SYS, 2174/3, 20 May 1915; Receipt signed Pakize Zeki dated 20 Eylül 1331 (3 October 1915) reporting the arrival of the slippers; account for the transporting costs of the slippers dated 21 Eylül 1331 (4 October 1915); letters expressing gratitude from the women’s organization and the board of the hospital dated 27 Eylül and 3 Teşrinievvel 1331 (10 and 16 October 1915), respectively, all in BOA, HR.SYS, 2174/2, 19 January 1915.
- 76 “Die Kurse für Krankenpflegerinnen”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 15 February 1914, p. 2; “Havadis-i dünya: kadınlar hastabakıcılığı”, *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 130 (8 Şubat 1329/21 February 1914), p. 9.
- 77 “Der Rote Halbmond”, *Osmanischer Lloyd*, 14 July 1914, p. 3; “Hilal-i Ahmer’de bir resm-i bihin”, *Servet-i Fünun*, no. 1206 (3 Temmuz 1330/16 July 1914), p. 74. The last article contains a full list of all the women receiving their diplomas including the names and ranks of their fathers and husbands. A year later, in retrospect, Besim Ömer declared that the aim had been “the creation and instruction of a corps of Muslim male and female nurses”: Bessim Ömer, “La fondation, la réorganisation du Croissant-Rouge et son action pendant les guerres de Tripolitaine et des Balkans”, *Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge* 46, no. 183 (1915), pp. 419–428, quotation 428 (emphasis added).
- 78 “Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti reis-i sanisi muallim doktor Besim Ömer Paşa nutku”, *Servet-i Fünun*, no. 1212 (14 Ağustos 1330/27 August 1914), pp. 124–125.
- 79 Bessim Ömer, “La fondation, la réorganisation du Croissant-Rouge”, p. 428.
- 80 In September 1914, for example, six Muslim women graduated from the courses at the Kadirga hospital for female hospital attendants. TKA, 331/5, 11 Eylül 1330 (24 September 1914).
- 81 TKA, 193/88, 23 Eylül 1330 (6 October 1914); TKA, 193/95, 12 Teşrinievvel 1330 (25 October 1914); “Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti’nden”, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 11 Teşrinievvel 1330 (24 October 1914), p. 4.
- 82 TKA, 157/24, 23 Eylül 1330 (6 October 1914); TKA, 157/30, 4 Teşrinisani 1330 (17 November 1914).
- 83 TKA, 336/2, 6 Teşrinievvel 1331 (19 October 1915); TKA, 336/3, 11 Teşrinisani 1331 (24 November 1915); N.O., “Eine Krankenpflegerinnenschule in Smyrna”, *Welt des Islams* (1) 3, nos 3/4 (25 March 1916), p. 225; “İzmir’de hastabakıcı hanımlar”, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 30 Haziran 1332 (13 July 1916), p. 2.

- 84 “Die Frauenbewegung in der Türkei”, *Neues Wiener Journal (Mittagblatt)*, 23 August 1916, p. 3.
- 85 See footnote 45, 46.
- 86 See, for example, “Hastahane hemşiresi”, *Vakit*, 20 Teşrinisani/November 1917, p. 2; “Hastabakıcı aranıyor”, *Tanin*, 5 Mayıs/May 1918, p. 4; “Kolordu için jamım aranıyor”, *Tanin*, 6 Haziran/June 1918, p. 4.
- 87 Selma Rıza, “Turquie”, in International Council of Women, *Report on the Quinquennial Meetings, Rome 1914* (Karlsruhe: G. Braunsche Hofbuchdruckerei und Verlag, n.d. [1914]), pp. 391–394, quotation 392–394 (accessed through <http://www.archive.org>).

8 Architectural Jihad

The “Halbmondlager” Mosque of Wünsdorf as an Instrument of Propaganda

Martin Gussone

In the camp at Wunstorf a splendid mosque, correct in every architectural feature, had been erected as a gift of the Kaiser to the Mohammedans of the camp. ... The photographs represent how successful the Germans were in their propaganda.¹

During World War I two camps for Muslim prisoners of war were established in Wünsdorf and Zossen about 50 km south of Berlin: the *Halbmondlager* and the *Weinberglager*. In the *Halbmondlager* a mosque was built and a cemetery for the prisoners was located in the nearby village of Zehrendorf. (Fig. 8.1) These efforts were not an end in itself, but were part of the Jihad concept of the German *Intelligence Office for the East* (NfO = *Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*). This project intended to persuade Muslim prisoners of war to change sides and join the Ottoman–German Alliance against the British and French Entente.

Based on contemporary photos, plans and archival material this chapter presents an analysis of the history of the two camps and the mosque, interpreting them as the materialization of Germany’s Jihad propaganda. The incorporation of the mosque into the Jihad concept will be demonstrated by the stylistic analysis of its architectural and epigraphic programme. A brief outline of the propaganda in the camps and an evaluation of its results complement this overview.²

Special Camps for Muslim Prisoners of War as Part of a Jihad Concept

Soon after the beginning of the war the number of prisoners reached an unexpectedly high number.³ Among them were Muslims, because auxiliary troops from the Indian and African colonies were fighting on the side of the British and the French, whereas the Russians employed troops from the Crimea, Kazan and the Caucasus.⁴ Ger-



FIGURE 8.1 Map of the area south of Berlin where the camps were located, based on topographic map, 'Truppenübungsplatz Zossen', M 1:100.000, Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme, Berlin 1936

man propaganda criticized this deployment of non-European soldiers, using racist arguments and chauvinist caricatures and slogans such as “Circus of the peoples of our enemies” (= ‘Völkerzirkus unserer Feinde’).⁵

At the same time, however, the German side planned to use the Muslim prisoners to serve its military and political ends.⁶ In this context prisoners from North Africa and India were valued more highly than the prisoners who fought on the side of the Russians.⁷

Just before Turkey’s entry into the war, in September 1914, a group of selected Muslim prisoners of war was transported to Istanbul, exposing them as extras in the staging of the declaration of the “Holy War”.⁸ At about that time, in autumn 1914, the renowned archaeologist and expert on the Near East, Max von Oppenheim, developed the concept of gathering the Muslim prisoners of war in a special camp,⁹ where they would be demonstratively well treated, instead of “releasing” (= deporting) them in great numbers to Turkey as originally planned.¹⁰ The underlying idea was to stir up the prisoners of war and to initiate a Jihad, together with the Ottoman Empire, which would be coordinated by the *Intelligence Office for the East*.¹¹

The “special treatment” of the Muslim prisoners of war as “guests” of the German Emperor Wilhelm II was a propagandistic means to win sympathy and support for the Central Powers. It referred to the emperor’s well-known journeys to the “Orient”, his good relations with the Ottoman sultan, and his notorious Damascene promise of friendship to the “300 million Mohammedans” (= “300 Millionen Muhammedaner”).¹² Moreover, it was intended to motivate Muslim combatants fighting on the side of the Entente to change sides. Finally, the programme aimed at incitement to rebellion and turmoil in the English and French colonies (= “*Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde*”),¹³ in order to keep in the colonies forces that were actually needed in European theatres of war.

For the African/French and Indian/British prisoners of war the so-called *Halbmondlager* was erected close to the military facilities of Wünsdorf about 50 km south of Berlin. The Asian/Russian Muslim prisoners of war were kept in the *Weinberglager*, near Zossen, situated approx. 6 km to the northeast. Allegedly the camps were built “according to specified guidelines”, and their planning principles were to comply with the “character of modern settlements.”¹⁴ In addition, a cemetery for the deceased inmates of the camps was located in the nearby village of Zehrendorf.¹⁵

In its finished condition the *Halbmondlager* included 50 barracks and associated outbuildings for 4,000 prisoners. The prisoners were housed



FIGURE 8.2A Prisoners of war at Wünsdorf during prayer (*Der Große Krieg in Bildern*, 1915, 10 and 17)




FIGURE 8.2B Plan of the 'Halbmondlager' at Wünsdorf, with the mosque in the middle (section of topographic map 3846, M 1: 25,000, 1920)

separately, divided “by sects [i.e. religion] and nationalities” in three distinct areas. According to functional zoning criteria the meeting place and the mosque with the central bath house were located at the centre of the camp. The main façade of the mosque was orientated to the south, aligned with the camp entrance.

The *Weinberglager* was planned to keep 12,000 prisoners. It included 12 fenced areas with barracks and utilities separated by open spaces, and three separate special areas. Each of the 12 basic units corresponded to a battalion of 1,000 men being divided into four barracks and outbuildings. The three special areas contained washing and bathing facilities with 12 tents, hospital and sick-bay. The entrance was on the west side; the quarters for the guards and food storage were situated to the south, as in the case of the *Halbmondlager*.

The analysis of the layout of both camps and their ratio of occupancy shows clearly that whereas the camps share similar structures, their design differs significantly in details. Both camps were divided into sections for battalions of about 1,000 men, each section being provided with supply facilities. But whereas the *Weinberglager* was planned for a dense occupation with a factor of 60 m² camp area per prisoner, the *Halbmondlager* had a factor of approximately 103 m² camp area per prisoner. Moreover, the occupancy rate of the barracks, which was regarded as the standard of quality,¹⁶ was much higher in the *Weinberglager* with 200–250 prisoners per barracks, than in the *Halbmondlager* with 80 inmates per barracks. In addition, it appears that the sanitary facilities in the *Halbmondlager* were more generously proportioned than those in the *Weinberglager*.

The comparison of the two camps shows that the abovementioned “planning guidelines” were interpreted differently. Obviously the demands for the layout of the two camps were measured using double standards. The *Weinberglager*, initially occupied by diverse nationalities with mixed religious affiliation and later mainly designated for Russian Muslim prisoners, represented the “second class” standard solution, whereas the *Halbmondlager* was a privileged flagship facility, intended to demonstrate the good treatment of Muslim prisoners of war.




FIGURE 8.3A Picture of the Weinberg Camp during World War I (Field service postcard 1917, archive author)




FIGURE 8.3B Plan of the former Weinberg Camp superimposed on a map of the area (based on section of topographic map 3746, M 1: 25.000, and plan of prisoner camp, after August Gärtner, "Einrichtung und Hygiene der Kriegsgefangenenlager," in Wilhelm Hoffmann, ed., *Hygiene. Handbuch der ärztlichen Erfahrungen im Weltkriege 1914–1918*, 7, Leipzig: Barth, 1922, Fig. 50)

The Design of the Wünsdorf Mosque – Architecture as Means of Propaganda

The Wünsdorf mosque is the first mosque in Germany that was planned for religious functions and use, and that was erected with architectural ambitions. Although the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries already saw the creation of several “follies” situated in landscape gardens and described as “Mosque” or “Moorish Temple”, these structures served as fancy buildings or staffage architecture and had no religious function.¹⁷ Apart from that it is very likely that existing premises were fitted for religious use for Muslims who stayed for some time in Germany as the members of Ottoman embassies (since 1763) or prisoners of war (e.g. 1735 or 1870–1871).¹⁸ In the case of the Wünsdorf Mosque, however, different prerequisites had to be fulfilled. Particular care was given to its design, which was deemed to be of particular importance as “the mosque should not be a construct of fantasy, that agrees with European taste, but may offend the religious sensibilities of the indigenous.”¹⁹

From the outset the erection of a mosque was part of Max von Oppenheim’s propaganda concept. He suggested in his memorandum “Exploitation of Muslim prisoners of war” (= “*Benutzung der kriegsgefangenen Muhammedaner*”, dated 2 October 1914):

One should build a small mosque for them. It will be easy to erect a cheap timber construction and facilities to perform their religious obligations (washings), furthermore “an appropriate ‘Muhammadan’ clergy (prayer leader) has to be provided for them.”²⁰

In his memorandum von Oppenheim possibly incorporated initiatives of Ottoman representatives as similar proposals had also been communicated by Freiherr von Wangenheim, German ambassador in Istanbul. He reported in early December 1914 that the Shaykh ül-Islam had expressed the wish that a mosque for worship should be provided for the Muslim prisoners of war in Germany.²¹ Soon afterwards, at the end of December 1914, the Foreign Office, the Vice General Staff and the War Ministry reached an agreement to build a mosque and, after further negotiations, that the funds should be provided by the War Ministry and the General Staff.²² In the first half of January, the design for the mosque was developed and sent to the Vice General Staff, together with a cost estimate, following a meeting in the War Ministry on 17 January, as mentioned by Rudolf Nadolny, who served as representative of the Foreign Office at the Vice General Staff and became director of its political section.²³

It seems that several variants for the layout of the mosque were designed. On 20 February 1915 two drafts with cost estimates of 20,000 and 80,000 Marks are discussed. The lower cost alternative was deemed sufficient to erect an appropriate building.²⁴ Therefore the construction had to be inexpensive and to comply with the provisional character of the building. At the same time, a proper and dignified appearance was to be achieved:

For the design [of the mosque] an architectural expression has to be found, to satisfy – as far as possible – the senses and imagination of the Muhammadan believers.²⁵

One month later, on 18 March 1915, a new draft for the mosque was presented, which had been designed by the construction department of the War Ministry (in consultation with the Vice General Staff) in a sort of “peer review” process: The original design was made by “governmental builder” Erich Richter (title: “*Regierungsbaumeister*”) and revised (“expanded and complemented”) by “privy senior building counsellor” August Schultze (title: “*Geheimer Oberbaurat*”).²⁶

The cost was estimated at 45,000 Marks, which corresponds to an average of the first estimates, mentioned above, and exactly to the actual construction costs.²⁷

For the design expert advice was obtained from the Tunisian propagandist Salih al-Sharif, who was engaged by the Sublime Porte, as well as from Max von Oppenheim. They submitted detailed proposals for the construction and furnishing of the mosque that took into account both functional and ritual aspects.²⁸

Salih al-Sharif proposed rules for the prisoners of war camps which comprised, among others, precise rules for the use of the planned mosque.²⁹ The idea to build a mosque for each group of the “French, Russian and Indian Mohammedans, to respond to their specific cultural characteristics”, which was also taken up and supported by von Oppenheim, probably came from Salih al-Sharif.³⁰

This was not realized, presumably for reasons of cost. Instead, two tent barracks were converted into a prayer room in the *Weinberglager* of Zossen and a minaret was erected in August 1915.³¹

The converted barracks, however, had no specific characteristics of Islamic architecture and should be regarded as purely functional buildings without architectural ambition. After all, it is difficult to know to what extent the architectural design of the mosque was influenced by Max von Oppenheim and Salih al-Sharif, but it is very likely that they were responsible for its spatial and functional programme.




FIGURE 8.4 Full colour perspective drawing of the Wünsdorf mosque (Alexander Backhaus, *Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland. Gegen 250 Wirklichkeitsaufnahmen aus deutschen Gefangenenlagern mit einer Erläuterung* von Prof. Dr. Backhaus, *Siegen, Leipzig and Berlin: Montanus, 1915, frontispiece*)

Finally the mosque was erected within five weeks in summer 1915 as a timber-frame construction by the company Stiebitz & Köpchen from Berlin-Charlottenburg,³² but prisoners of the camps were probably also involved in the building process, as was usual for the erection of barracks.³³

The mosque was inaugurated on 13 July 1915, at the beginning of Ramadan. The event was celebrated with speeches, religious ceremonies

use of the Muslim prisoners of war, which was one precondition to the establishment of the *Intelligence Office for the East* and the establishment of the *Halbmondlager*.³⁹ As the construction of a mosque in the planned Muslim prisoners' camp was already proposed at that time, it is very likely that the plans concerning the mosque were also known and approved by Wilhelm II. The funding from his private purse, however, failed because of the resistance of the treasury. Instead, the mosque's construction was financed from the regular budget of the military administration of the prison camps.⁴⁰ Regardless of these facts the myth of the "sponsoring" of the mosque by the Kaiser was circulated and lived on.⁴¹ Thus the diplomatic efforts and the construction of legends led to the intended result in terms of popular perception and later reception. Wilhelm II was regarded if not as the factual principal of the Wünsdorf Mosque, at least as the ideal or implied sponsor. This rather obscure relation corresponds to the assessment of the mosque as a propagandistic means that was developed in a "tug of war" between the various offices and bureaucratic apparatuses.

The design of the Wünsdorf Mosque is a collage compiled from a number of models. Parts of its elements served functional purposes, whereas other "modules" were probably intended to reflect the heterogeneous origins of its inmates, thus resembling a historicist "*Mosque-model kit*."⁴²

Prior to the iconographical analysis of the various elements of the mosque it seems appropriate to point out that the fancy constructions of exoticism are characterized by a certain degree of vagueness or fuzziness.⁴³ Similarly, the Wünsdorf Mosque seems also to refer to a number of models and diagnostic stylistic features of Islamic Art. On a closer look at the construction in detail, however, the structure rather turns out to be a purely Prussian functional building.

The most important model for the Wünsdorf Mosque is the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, even though its layout shows clear deviations.

This is to say that it is not an exact copy, but a free adaptation. Thus, the Dome of the Rock is a *solitaire*,⁴⁴ whereas the Wünsdorf Mosque is not freestanding, but a composite of various structures. The Dome of the Rock was the model for the core structure with the prayer room; the other parts of the building follow different models. A vestibule with additional functional rooms extends the core structure to the south, with a minaret rising on the eastern wing of the vestibule. To the north is placed a courtyard with ablution facilities. The ensemble is completed by a bathhouse which is situated on the northern edge of the courtyard. The bathhouse appears to be a subordinate annex. Actually it was built before the mosque and represents the origin of the entire structure, which is proven by a photograph of it before the mosque was built.⁴⁵ Next to the



FIGURE 8.6 “Greetings from Jerusalem” – the Dome of the Rock (postcard Kalil Michel and fils, Bethlehem, ca. 1900, archive author)

orientation towards Mekka it defined the orientation and placement of the mosque.

The common features of the Dome of the Rock and the core structure of the Wünsdorf Mosque are essentially structural, which is clearly recognizable in the ground plan and in sectional views: both show a basilical cross section with a central dome-vaulted room surrounded by one or two lower ambulatories, which are accessible by four entrances that are aligned with the cardinal directions.

The interior of the Wünsdorf Mosque is composed of a central domed space and an ambulatory. Compared to the Dome of the Rock, however, the size ratio of the central space and the ambulatory differs significantly and the role of these two elements is reversed. Whereas in the Dome of the Rock the central, domed space is occupied by the sacred rock and remains inaccessible, in Wünsdorf it serves as central prayer room. The ambulatory, on the other hand, which in Wünsdorf is blocked by the minbar and the mihrab, lost its “original function” for the ritual circumambulation of the sacred rock at the temple mound in Jerusalem and became a kind of aisle.

The mihrab plays only a subordinate role in the spatial concept of the Dome of the Rock; in Wünsdorf it is the central focal point of the prayer room, together with the minbar. Formal details of the mihrab and the minbar resemble Ayyubid or Mamluk furnishings. A comparative example can be found at the Aqsa-Mosque in Jerusalem – in close




FIGURE 8.7 *Plan of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem (after Anton Springer and Joseph Neuwirth, Das Mittelalter, Handbuch der Kunstgeschichte 2, Leipzig: Seemann, 1909, Fig. 96)*

proximity to the Dome of the Rock. The basic shape of the Wünsdorf minbar, however, rather evokes the interior fittings of German classicist-protestant churches.

The row of arcades serving as a connecting link between the Dome of the Rock and the surrounding area of the Temple mount was probably used as model for the Wünsdorf Mosque as well. The combination of these arcades and the Dome of the Rock was a popular motif on contemporary photographs, where the arcades appear to fuse with the Dome of the Rock. This corresponds to the situation at the Wünsdorf Mosque, where they served as a model for the vestibule in front of the domed central structure.

Even if the details of the origins and background of the construction of the Dome of the Rock are debated and controversial,⁴⁶ its importance for the architectural history of Islam is beyond doubt: the Dome of the Rock “is not only the oldest surviving major monument of Islam, but in all



FIGURE 8.8 Entrance of German Emperor Wilhelm II into Jerusalem, 1898 (Memorial postcard, *Palästina-Kaiser-Reise 1898*, no. 18. Hermann Vogel, *Kunsthandlung Leipzig*, archive author)

probability also the first Islamic monument, by which an aesthetic work of rank should be created”: a building of exceptional beauty, significance and perfection.⁴⁷ Equally beyond doubt is its religious significance to Islam, as this “time-honored rock [is considered] as the most sacred place on earth next to the Ka’aba” in Mekka.⁴⁸ It is in keeping with this essential significance of the Dome of the Rock that it was chosen as the perfect model for the Wünsdorf mosque. The Dome of the Rock is – next to the Ka’aba and the mosque of Medina – the one Islamic sacral building of universal importance for the overwhelming majority of Muslims⁴⁹ and – due to its singular layout and freestanding placement on the temple mound – it has a very strong visual significance.

The Dome of the Rock is not only a Muslim sanctuary, but was also associated with and revered by Christians as the location of Solomon’s temple and *Templum Domini* since its occupation by the crusaders.⁵⁰ Its relevance for the German (European) audience at the end of the nineteenth century is indicated by the sheer volume of travel literature on the Middle East which increased dramatically after the 1870s.⁵¹ These books were mainly written by Christian authors as a combination of tourist travel guide and “pilgrimage manual”, with extensive descriptions of the “Holy Places.” In the present context this is of interest, as it testifies to the long-lasting Christian appropriation of Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock, which continued well into the early twentieth century.



FIGURE 8.9 *The Kaiser's visit to the Dome of the Rock, 1898 (Ernst von Mirbach, Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898, Berlin: Mittler, 1899, p. 248A)*

One of the most prominent pilgrims to Jerusalem was Emperor Wilhelm II (the Kaiser), who made the “pilgrimage to the Holy Land” in 1898 with an extensive sightseeing programme. The tour of the “Holy sites” included a visit to the temple mound and the Dome of The Rock, which earned particular appreciation and high esteem from the emperor.⁵²

His voyage on the occasion of the inauguration of the Church of the Redeemer in Jerusalem was part of the complex ecclesiastical policy of the Hohenzollern dynasty⁵³ and was closely connected with Prussian political and economic interests in the “Orient.”⁵⁴ This became apparent when the emperor showed demonstrative friendliness towards the Ottoman empire and the Muslims, claiming friendship with “300 million Mohammedans,”⁵⁵ in combination with allusions to the crusades by the use of symbols of medieval crusader states and references to emperor Friedrich II.⁵⁶ Illustrated reports of this voyage repeatedly show the Dome of the Rock⁵⁷ as a kind of visual mediator that endows the new Prussian buildings in Jerusalem with a superior sense of mission.

Further enhanced by the legend of the emperor's present to the Muslims, the Wünsdorf Mosque appears to have become part of the imperial self-image, which evokes the Dome of the Rock not just as a sign of his closeness to the Muslim world and a souvenir of his pilgrimage, but also as an idealized allusion to the medieval crusader states. This is not to say that in designing the Wünsdorf Mosque it was intended to refer to this complex ideological background. Given the mass distribution of illus-



FIGURE 8.10 German album commemorating the German emperor's visit to Palestine in 1898 (Ludwig Schneller, *Die Kaiserfahrt durch's Heilige Land*, Leipzig: Wallmann, 1899, front cover)



COOK'S CRUSADER.

Imperial Knight Templar (the German Emperor—to SALADIN). "WHAT!! THE CHRISTIAN POWERS PUTTING PRESSURE UPON YOU, MY DEAR FRIEND!! HORRIBLE! I CAN'T THINK HOW PEOPLE CAN DO SUCH THINGS!"

*** The Kaiser sympathises with the Turk.*

FIGURE 8.11 Contemporary cartoon mocking the emperor as "Cook's Crusader" (a reference to the tour operator Thomas Cook), postcard based on sketch in *Punch*, 15 October 1898 (archive author)

trated pilgrim guides and memory-books of the pilgrimage of Wilhelm II, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that for the contemporary beholder the latent content of these visual triggers was clear enough.

Apart from the Dome of the Rock the design of the Wünsdorf mosque shows several references to prominent examples of Islamic architecture which combine clear regional references with politically motivated associations.⁵⁸

Thus, the decoration of the triple-arched entrance façade with its *sebka* design (a decorative pattern derived from intertwining arcs) clearly refers to Andalusian models. Most prominent examples are the Alhambra of Granada or the Giralda and the Alcazar in Seville. These examples stand for the sphere of west Islamic architecture, which at that time was known to a wide audience in Germany and used extensively as a model by designers via pattern books.

The walls of the side wings of the mosque are organized horizontally by alternating coloured bands in red and grey. The standard model for this type of surface design was Mamluk architecture, in particular the tomb mosques in the necropolises of Cairo. The most famous prototype from this group is the Qaitbay Mosque which was one of the icons of nineteenth century Orientalism.

Another detail that points to this direction is the combination of turret-like substructure and minaret, despite the latter being clearly inspired by Ottoman models. Since around 1900 the outer appearance of Ottoman mosques with a domed central structure and round, pointed minaret had come to represent the stereotype model of the mosque. In this case, however, it should probably also be understood as a reference to the allied Ottoman empire.

Finally, the ogee arches of the forecourt are a characteristic feature of Indo-Islamic architecture of the Mughal period, which had already entered nineteenth century oriental revival architecture, but still kept its Indian provenance, even if its appearance at the Wünsdorf Mosque is just a vague hint.

To sum up, it is obvious that the Wünsdorf Mosque is a compilation of a number of elements and models from different regions and periods of the Islamic World that were known from the art-historical survey literature. The stylistic eclecticism of the Wünsdorf Mosque with its many unrelated details conforms formally with the late period of Historicism, while its design mirrors the state of research of Islamic art history in Germany and its preferences. The citation of Islamic architecture from al-Andalus and Cairo should probably embrace the prisoners of war coming from the French colonies, while the faint memory of Mughal architecture was a reference to the Indian prisoners. According to the




FIGURE 8.12 *The different stylistic features of the mosque that refer to different traditions in Islamic architecture (Martin Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’ zwischen Ġihad-Propaganda und Orientalismus,” Beiträge zur Islamischen Kunst und Archäologie (BIKA) 2, 2010, Fig. 4–12*

lesser regard for the Russian prisoners of war from the Crimea, Kazan and the Caucasus, it seems to be consistent that the Wünsdorf Mosque did not show any references to this region or to Central Asia.⁵⁹

Thus the formation of details and the choice of regional models are not arbitrary but rather determined by geo-political considerations, although they obviously reflect more the ideas and projections of their German builders than what the prisoners from those countries might have perceived as a correspondence to their “domestic architecture.”

Inscriptions and Epigraphic Programme

The Wünsdorf Mosque was decorated with inscriptions, the majority of which were located inside the prayer room. The analysis of the integration of the Wünsdorf Mosque in the concept of propaganda surrounding the *Halbmondlager* is complemented by the reading of the inscriptions and a partial reconstruction of its epigraphic programme.

The function of the inscriptions can be seen from various perspectives. On the one hand inscriptions with religious significance or information




FIGURE 8.13 Map showing the origin of the architectural references used in the mosque as well as the geographical origins of the Muslim prisoners of war, based on map in Leo Frobenius and Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, eds, *Deutschlands Gegner im Weltkriege*, Berlin-Grunewald: Klemm, [1925], suppl.; other images s. Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager,’” 2010, Fig. 5–11

on builders, etc., belong to the usual decorative programme of Islamic religious buildings.⁶⁰ On the other, the graphical appearance of Arabic writing supports the “Islamic” or at least “Oriental” character of a building or object designed for European viewers – as various pseudo-arabic script-like decorations testify, which found their ways into European art.⁶¹

For the target group of the Wünsdorf Mosque, the Muslim prisoners of war, Arabic writing conveyed religious content as it represented their sacred language⁶² – no matter whether the person in question was literate or illiterate. For the literate viewer the symbolic meaning of the writing was complemented by its semantic function. But in most cases inscriptions are not to be read, but estimated by their inherent symbolic value, thus being understandable for illiterate or non-Arabs as well. As Ettinghausen stressed:




FIGURE 8.14A *Picture of the mosque's interior showing some of the inscriptions* (Der Große Krieg in Bildern, 1915, 10, 16.2)

An inscription in impressive Arabic letters, the vehicle of the Koran, had the most sacred and solemn connotations and made the viewer conscious of being a member of the umma, the community of Muslims. Thus writing can have a symbolic meaning.⁶³




FIGURE 8.14B Plan of the mosque showing which part is depicted in the photographs of the interior (Der Große Krieg in Bildern, 1915, 10, 16.2)

Unfortunately it is not possible to reconstruct the entire inscription programme since – to the best of my knowledge – not all areas were recorded photographically.⁶⁴ Those parts that were recorded comprise the area of the mihrab and minbar in the south of the mosque and about a quarter of the interior between the eastern and the southern exits. The remaining 3/4 of the interior space – and the inscriptions that were presumably placed in this part – is not documented.

The painting of the mosque's interior was done by the court painter André of Potsdam.⁶⁵ It is highly probable that he was also responsible for the implementation of the inscription, which was probably predesigned by Max von Oppenheim and/or Salih al-Sharif.⁶⁶ From details of the design it is very obvious that the inscriptions were not written by an Arab calligrapher.⁶⁷ Rather they were, as can be seen from their execution, copied by someone from a template (not written), who could not write Arabic and did not know the criteria by which Arabic calligraphy is judged.

The Arabic characters appear not fluently and written, but rather stiff and constructed. This lack of understanding or ability is also visible in the disproportion of the characters to each other and the inaccurate and incorrect execution of individual letters.⁶⁸ The division and separation of individual components of the inscription on separate lunettes can be regarded as atypical; otherwise rather compression and entanglement



FIGURE 8.15A Inscription of the Muslim creed (*shahada*) (Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Museum Europäischer Kulturen, VII 27498). Detail, whole image s. Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager,’” 2010, Fig. 13



FIGURE 8.15B Inscription of the invocation of God (*basmala*) (Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Museum Europäischer Kulturen, VII 27498). Detail, whole image s. Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager,’” 2010, Fig. 13 2010, Fig. 15

of individual characters can be observed in calligraphic realizations of religious formulas.⁶⁹

The inscription above the entrance in the northern courtyard is not readable. Only the hexagram which frames the inscription can be discerned.⁷⁰ According to Islamic folklore, the hexagram is the seal of King Solomon and is used to ward off demons, which have to obey him.⁷¹

The most prominent position was held by the large-scale inscription with “Quran verses in yellowish tint on green bottom artistically framed” divided between the 16 lunettes above the openings towards the ambulatory.⁷² Altogether eight of them are documented. They contain a fragment of the *shahada*, the Islamic confession of faith, which thus occupied half of the lunettes. The content of the remaining half can not be reconstructed without further photographic records.

In the inscription on the mihrab we can read the *basmala* – one of the most important religious formulas in Islam, which is therefore

also most commonly used in calligraphy and building inscriptions – intertwined with spiral tendrils in a similar manner as the inscriptions in the lunettes.⁷³

In addition, rectangular panels were placed above the four exits. Their inscriptions on a light background were rather plain, lacking ornamental decoration and calligraphic ambition.⁷⁴ Above the southern entrance the panel on the right hand side shows a two-line greeting and blessing formula.⁷⁵ Above the eastern entrance, a part of a two-line text is preserved, which can be recognized as the 8th (7) Verse of Sura 47, “*Mohammad*”:⁷⁶ “*O believers, if you help God, | He will help you, | and confirm your feet.*”⁷⁷

The analysis of the recognizable inscriptions makes a strong argument that they were placed according to a preconceived programme. The writing is no pseudo-script, but readable and it is very likely that the decision for a certain text was not arbitrary, but was meant to communicate a specific, comprehensible message to its reader.⁷⁸ The choice of texts and symbols – the hexagram as Seal of Solomon, the *shahada* and *basmala* as well as a greeting and blessing formula give rise to the assumption that the substantive claim and the complexity of the inscription programme were rather limited. Most components as *shahada* and *basmala* can also be found in many other buildings, so that we may see them as the “lowest common denominator”.

This corresponds to the observation that the stylistic appearance of the mosque was designed to be of universal validity (with regional priorities). In this sense the inscriptions had also to be limited to the most essential formulas and concepts of faith, to be generally comprehensible and easily recognized by all Muslim prisoners of war – no matter whether they came from North Africa or India or whether they were educated or illiterate. Considering that the sophisticated propaganda which was compiled for them in the prisoners’ magazine *al-Jihad* by the academic agitators⁷⁹ was inaccessible to the majority of the prisoners of war who came from simple, uneducated backgrounds, an elaborate inscription programme with subtle meanings would have been useless anyway. In this respect the selection of the inscriptions does not appear to be random, but very specifically focused on the (probably) simple needs of Muslim prisoners of war of the *Halbmondslager*.

There is, however, one exception to this general assertion. The Koranic quotation of sura 47 “*Mohammad*”, verse 8 (7) is more specific and meaningful. This sura, whose other verses have to be considered as well, was also called *War* (“*Der Krieg*”) as Max Henning pointed out.⁸⁰ It is interpreted in this sense in comments to Rückerts’ transmission, in which this sura was characterized as “*a thundering sermon for battle*” (= “*donnernde*

Kampfpredigt)”⁸¹ containing “a clear declaration of war, to those who oppose the mission of Muhammad.”⁸² This was obviously transferable to war opponents of the Ottoman–German Alliance. Moreover, it was in accordance with Ottoman Jihad-preaching and should be interpreted as a call to the prisoners of war to join the Jihad.⁸³

The link to contemporary Jihad literature can be established in the person of Salih al-Sharif, already mentioned above as responsible – together with von Oppenheim – for the functional concept of the mosque. In his book *Die Wahrheit über den Glaubenskrieg*⁸⁴ (*The Truth about the religious war*) he explains the nature and meaning of Jihad to a German audience.⁸⁵ He addresses the final question: what the duties of the warrior on the path of God may be. He enumerates ten duties and supports his argument by references to the Koran. First comes “Valour” (*Tapferkeit*), second “Trust in God” (*Vertrauen auf Gott*) is designated: “the belief that he will fulfill well his promise to let us win, when we stand up to the enemy and follow his orders and fully comply with the means by which the overcoming of the enemy is brought about in accordance with our power ...”⁸⁶ By explaining this second duty he refers to the Koran and to sura 47, as shown above, the one which was also written above the exit to the east inside the mosque: ‘as God told (47, 8): If you help God, he will help you, and confirm your feet.’⁸⁷

It seems very likely, that this coincidence is not accidental, but proves the integration of the Wünsdorf Mosque in the Jihad concept of the *Intelligence Office for the East* with epigraphic means.

Actors

Several actors were involved in the further development of the propaganda concept and its implementation in the prisoners of war camps in Wünsdorf and Zossen, but their cooperation was not always productive. There was a conflict of responsibilities between the military and the civilian spheres: as described above, the concept of a camp for Muslim prisoners of war and the related propaganda was initiated by von Oppenheim and further developed by civilian experts for the Middle East at the *Intelligence Office for the East* (NfO), which was assigned to the Foreign Office. On the other hand, the War Ministry and the General Staff, clearly associated with the military sphere, represented on site by the camp commanders, were responsible for the maintenance and the organization of the camps.⁸⁸

Initially propaganda in the camps was supposed to be disseminated mainly by indigenous propagandists. These propagandists were con-

nected with the NfO, but subordinate to the camp commander, who was responsible for the propaganda in the camps.⁸⁹ But also in this case the civilian and military sides had differing ideas about the propagandistic approach and the treatment of the prisoners of war, so mutual mistrust and quarrelling about questions of authority were inevitable.⁹⁰ This difficult situation was additionally complicated by differing perceptions of the treatment of the Muslim prisoners by the Ottoman-German allies.⁹¹

Finally, an important but very heterogeneous group of actors were the prisoners of war themselves. However, they appear only rarely as active individuals, but were mainly depicted as anonymous types, on which racist stereotypes were projected.⁹²

Propaganda with and in the Prison Camps⁹³

Basically, the propaganda was motivated by various considerations. In addition to the propaganda writings aimed at the Islamic world, the *Halbmondlager* and its mosque were also intended to demonstrate to the European opponents the exemplary treatment of prisoners of war by the German side.⁹⁴

The supply of prisoners of war in World War I was not just a logistical problem. The general treatment of prisoners of war was still insufficiently regulated by international law, which led to reciprocal recriminations of “inhumane treatment of prisoners of war” by the opponents.⁹⁵ Against this background picture postcards as well as descriptions and illustrations in books and magazines should demonstrate “reality footage from German prison camps” (= “*Wirklichkeitsaufnahmen aus deutschen Gefangenenlagern*”),⁹⁶ which suggested above all normality, fair treatment of the prisoners and friendly behaviour of the prison staff, and the adequate supply and free exercise of religion in the camps.

Apart from the propaganda directed towards foreign recipients, the internal perspective, i.e. objectives oriented to the German audience, should be considered. It has been argued that one goal of the dissemination of images of “exotic prisoners of war” was the intention to present German superiority over the variety “of the peoples of his enemies.”⁹⁷ However, the presentation of the mosque in conjunction with information campaigns about Islam and the proclamation of the friendship of the Kaiser to the Muslim world can also be seen as a promotion for the acceptance of the Ottoman–German Alliance within Germany.⁹⁸ This is of particular importance for an assessment of how the mosque and its



FIGURE 8.16 Propaganda depicting the benevolent attitude of German officers in the camps (Doegen, *Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung und Schicksal in Deutschland, Kriegsgefangene Völker 1*, Berlin: Politik und Wirtschaft, 1921, Pl. 5.2)

architectural form were perceived and “read”, and inevitably entails a consideration of the respective reception requirements of the different target groups.

After initial secrecy considerations photos and reports of the prisoners were produced in large numbers and disseminated widely.⁹⁹ The distribution was carried out by postcards, by reports in the general propaganda newspapers with appropriate visual material and by the agencies of the *Intelligence Office for the East* abroad.¹⁰⁰ Visits of high-ranking Ottoman politicians and journalists were also part of the propaganda.¹⁰¹ However, the main focus of the propaganda, which began in February 1915, was targeted at the inmates of the prisoner of war camps. The correspondence of the prisoners with their relatives was intended also to enhance the propaganda effect in their homelands which were considered as an “area to be revolutionized” (= “*Revolutionierungsgebiet*”).

The underlying idea was developed by Max von Oppenheim with his *Intelligence Office for the East*, and later modified by Rudolf Nadolny. The aim was to win the prisoners for military use in the “Orient.”¹⁰² Another general objective was to bring about sympathy for Germany among the prisoners, so that they would return to their homelands as Germany’s “followers.”¹⁰³ To achieve these goals, various means of propaganda were used: “a. religious influence; b. Guidance and education through meetings and lectures, lessons, groups trips to the capital, etc.; c. good

treatment, supply and clothing.”¹⁰⁴ Thus the living conditions in the camps ought to be subordinated to the objectives of the propaganda. The Muslim prisoners of war were enabled to pray and were supplied with food according to their religious rules. Furthermore, the special treatment also affected the labour of the prisoners that was to be done without compromising the propaganda.¹⁰⁵

However, since the implementation of the propaganda was directed and supervised by the camp commanders and the military supervisory staff, it was militarized after a short time, and the originally rather idealistic goals and approach soon focused on pragmatic and military goals, as Gerhard Höpp has stressed.¹⁰⁶ To this end, a combination of political education and religious instruction was carried out in the camps. The lectures about history, geography and economy were politically biased, intending to agitate: “to plant hatred against the oppressors of the Muslim peoples, aiming at the liberation of North Africa.”¹⁰⁷ The propaganda efforts were supplemented by newspapers in several languages, some of them suggestively named *al-Jihad*.¹⁰⁸ For educational purposes libraries with selected books in the languages of the prisoners of war were installed. Also drill took up a lot of time, even if, due to the lack of training staff, they still used the French regulations and commands.¹⁰⁹

As a consequence of these efforts in September 1915 about 800 volunteers were registered in the *Halbmondlager* and about 1,000 volunteers in the *Weinberglager*.¹¹⁰ Earlier considerations to integrate the Muslim Jihad volunteers into German troop contingents were dismissed. Instead, they were supposed to become part of the Ottoman army. In October 1915, negotiations with the Ottoman authorities resulted in an agreement regarding the equipping and use of the Muslim prisoners of war. Between February 1916 and April 1917 several units of Jihadists were transported to Turkey. Gerhard Höpp counted a total of 1,100 Tatars, 1,084 Arab and 49 Indian prisoners of war who were formally enlisted as volunteers in the Ottoman army.¹¹¹ A small number of volunteers were engaged as translators or for special missions to promote Jihad in other regions such as Persia or Afghanistan.¹¹²

That is to say that the German propaganda strategy was partly successful in recruiting volunteers, although this was probably motivated rather by better conditions for the Jihad volunteers in the prison camps than by the persuasiveness of the propagandists and their credibility.¹¹³

Failure and/or Success of the Jihad Concept and Its Related Propaganda

It is commonly assumed that the recruitment of Muslim prisoners of war in the Zossen and Wünsdorf camps to fight a Holy War failed. One reason for this was the structural deficits of the general Jihad strategy.¹¹⁴ Apart from that, it was probably illusory to expect that the assignment of the Muslim prisoners of war might have a decisive effect – even if we assume that the prisoners of war “just escaped from a bloody battlefield” – might have been motivated to join another war campaign, as Höpp has pointed out.¹¹⁵

Additionally – especially with regard to the French prisoners of war – reprisals against their relatives were feared. Furthermore, the Muslim prisoners of war who had served in the French or British army expected a loss of pension claims if they changed sides.¹¹⁶

But most decisive were probably fundamentally different views and a “lack of coordination between the military and civilian authorities” on the German side about the design of their Jihad propaganda and its implementation.¹¹⁷ From the beginning there were differences and conflicts over authority. Thus, for instance, the Foreign Office and the NfO supported the massive dissemination of information about the *Halbmondlager* – as they expected from its construction alone a positive propaganda effect. On the other hand, the General Staff and the War Ministry referred to security concerns and the need for secrecy with respect to militarily relevant information, arguing against extensive publishing activities.¹¹⁸ Finally, the belief that propaganda concerning the *Halbmondlager* would be beneficial won out, but the permanent controversies were not productive.

A further reason for complications was rivalries between the various indigenous agitators, and the fact that their suitability and loyalty were appreciated differently by the military (camp commander and personal) and the civilian protagonists (NfO, AA).¹¹⁹ Already in the summer of 1915 the camp commander tried to engage mainly German agitators for the propaganda on site. He considered appointing “Merchants, who were familiar with the Arab customs and the ... colloquial language”, so that “they should act enlightening through lectures” – but of course “in close consultation with the Commandant”, etc.¹²⁰ The assignment of indigenous propagandists as well as the influence of the NfO was, however, to be pushed back, if not even eliminated.¹²¹

More discrepancies arose from the intention of the Ottoman side to acquire more influence on the propaganda in the camps. One example is the appointment of the successor to Imam Ibrāhīm in the *Weinberglager*

in the spring of 1916 by Ottoman authorities without consultation with the German Foreign Office.¹²² Another reason for irritation had been visits by high-ranking Ottoman politicians, expressing views about the propaganda work that did not always correspond to the ideas of the German War Ministry.¹²³

The disagreement between the Ottoman–German Alliance partners in terms of Jihad propaganda became more visible when Jihad volunteers were to be sent to the Ottoman empire. Thus, the Ottoman Minister of War, Enver Pasha, suggested omitting the swearing in of Jihad volunteers. Moreover, the Ottoman offer to settle in the Ottoman empire craftsmen from among the Muslim prisoners of war who did not want to participate in the war led to irritation on the part of the German War Office, as this would undermine its Jihad propaganda.¹²⁴

Lastly, the Ottomans used the Jihad volunteers mainly at the Iraqi front where they were expected to write enthusiastic letters to their fellow jihadists still remaining in Wünsdorf and Zossen describing their successful inclusion in the Ottoman army and the weakness of the British enemy. In fact, however, there was a lot of dissatisfaction due to inadequate accommodation, subsistence and poor treatment by the Ottoman officers, which led to insubordination and desertion.¹²⁵

As the Ottoman authorities anyway preferred settlers and workers instead of soldiers, the Jihad propaganda was ended at the end of 1916; protests by the French and Russian governments against the recruitment of Jihad volunteers probably played no decisive role.¹²⁶

The deportation of Muslim prisoners of war to Turkey as settlers was also delayed. Instead, the Muslim prisoners of war were now increasingly used – because of a general shortage of labour forces – outside the camps for work in factories and in agriculture, which probably mainly affected the *Weinberglager*. Moreover, the occupancy of the *Halbmondlager* was reduced by the fact that African and Indian prisoners of war were transferred to Romania in March 1917 because they could not bear the climate in Wünsdorf and suffered heavy losses.¹²⁷

Thus Jihad propaganda in the Muslim prisoner of war camps of Wünsdorf and Zossen was effectively achieved only from February 1915 until December 1916. It appears evident that the military goals of the Jihad concept and its related propaganda focused on the prisoners failed, but it has to be concluded, however, that there were nevertheless some notable effects, if we may judge the success of propaganda as being influential and disseminating disinformation.

In this regard the report by Conrad Hoffmann, an American YMCA secretary, is of interest:



FIGURE 8.17 *Military drill in front of the mosque at Wünsdorf (Conrad Hoffmann, In the Prison Camps of Germany, New York: Association Press, 1920, 256A)*

In the camp at Wunstorf a splendid mosque, correct in every architectural feature, had been erected as a gift of the Kaiser to the Mohammedans of the camp. Every detail of equipment had been carefully copied, including the courtyard with its marble footbaths, the colored lights of the mosque, prayer rugs, and all.

The photographs represent how successful the Germans were in their propaganda. [Emphasis mine]

I was told that some 15,000 Mohammedans from these camps were thus recruited, disciplined, goosenstepped, equipped with German uniforms, and sent to Macedonia and Palestine to supplement the German and Turkish armies there.

When I visited the camp for Russian Mohammedans I saw several companies of these men who had volunteered, return to the camp in full dress parade order. At the head were the German officers on horseback, followed by a band, and after them row on row of well-disciplined Russians now transformed into efficient German troops.¹²⁸

It can therefore be concluded that the propaganda was not successful enough “to create usable troops” of military significance, let alone to win the Great War, but was highly influential in posing a severe threat to the colonial empires of France and Great Britain.¹²⁹

It is clear that the initial ambitious concept of Jihad propaganda was already condemned to failure by the conflicting objectives and the lack of agreement between the parties involved as well as by the uncoordinated processes of realization. Moreover, it has to be concluded that there was no coherent German Jihad concept that was implemented consistently. Rather there existed a heterogeneous network of diverse interests and ambitions which mutually disabled and weakened each other.

However, the Wünsdorf Mosque with its strong visual impact seems to have fulfilled at least its pretended purpose: to express the friendship of the German Reich to the Muslim peoples' (= "*das Freundschaftsverhältnis des Deutschen Reiches zu den islamitischen Völkern zum Ausdruck zu bringen*")¹³⁰ by providing the long lasting myth of German friendship towards the Muslims with an iconographic condensation of the German stirring up of the Muslim prisoners of war.

Aftermath

Following the end of World War I the two camps were closed and the remaining prisoners largely repatriated. Until the early 1920s predominantly former Russian prisoners of war still remained. The *Halbmondlager* was used until the mid-1920s, when the last Muslim residents left Wünsdorf due to the economic crisis.¹³¹ The mosque was still visited on high holidays from Berlin. In around 1930, the mosque was demolished after the building had allegedly fallen into disrepair due to lack of care and the Turkish embassy had expressed no interest in its further preservation.¹³² It is likely that after the more conveniently located mosque in Berlin-Wilmersdorf was inaugurated in April 1925¹³³ there was no need to maintain the Wünsdorf mosque any more. At the beginning of the 1930s barracks and garages for tanks were built in the area of the former *Halbmondlager*, in the area of the former *Weinberglager* a settlement was located.¹³⁴

Notes

- 1 Conrad Hoffmann, *In the Prison Camps of Germany*, New York: Association Press, 1920, p. 82. Full quotation, "photograph" and discussion on pp. 207–208 of this chapter.
- 2 The presentation of the historical background of the *Halbmondlager* and *Weinberglager* (Crescent camp and Vineyard camp) is based on material in the archive of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin (PA-AA), all research regarding this topic is beholden to the seminal work of the late Gerhard

Höpp: s. Gerhard Höpp, *Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg, 1915–1945. Geschichtlicher Abriss und Bibliographie*, Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1994; Gerhard Höpp, ed., *Fremde Erfahrungen*, Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1996; Gerhard Höpp, “Die Privilegien der Verlierer. Über Status und Schicksal muslimischer Kriegsgefangener und Deserteure in Deutschland während des Ersten Weltkrieges und der Zwischenweltkriegszeit,” in Höpp, *Fremde Erfahrungen*, 1996, pp. 185–210; Gerhard Höpp, “Die Wünsdorfer Moschee: Eine Episode islamischen Lebens in Deutschland, 1915–1930,” *Die Welt des Islams. Neue Serie* 36 (2), 1996, pp. 204–218; Gerhard Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark: als Kriegsgefangene und Internierte in Wünsdorf und Zossen, 1914–1924*, Zentrum Moderner Orient Studien 6, Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1997; Gerhard Höpp “Frontenwechsel: Muslimische Deserteure im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg und in der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Gerhard Höpp und Brigitte Reinwald, eds, *Fremdeinsätze. Afrikaner und Asiaten in europäischen Kriegen, 1914–1945*, Zentrum Moderner Orient Studien 13, Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 2000, pp. 129–141. Gerhard Höpp’s legacy is kept at the Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin. Extensive pictorial material is kept at the Museum Europäischer Kulturen, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin (legacy Otto Stiehl). Gratitude is owed to these institutions for support and the opportunity to study their exhibits.

- 3 Alexander Backhaus, *Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland. Gegen 250 Wirklichkeitsaufnahmen aus deutschen Gefangenenlagern mit einer Erläuterung von Prof. Dr. Backhaus*, Siegen, Leipzig and Berlin: Montanus, 1915, pp. 5–6.
- 4 Wilhelm Doegen, *Unter fremden Völkern: eine neue Völkerkunde*, Berlin: Politik und Wirtschaft, 1925; Leo Frobenius and Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, eds, *Deutschlands Gegner im Weltkriege*, Berlin-Grunewald: Klemm, [1925]; cf. Höpp, “Die Privilegien der Verlierer,” 1996, p. 187; Gregory Martin, “Koloniale Truppenkontingente im Ersten Weltkrieg 15,” in Höpp and Reinwald, *Fremdeinsätze*, 2000, pp. 15–34; Gilbert Meynier, “Les Algériens dans l’Armée française, 1914–1918,” in Höpp and Reinwald, *Fremdeinsätze*, 2000, pp. 39–56.
- 5 Leo Frobenius, *Der Völkerzirkus unserer Feinde*, Berlin: Eckart, [1916]; cf. Höpp, “Die Privilegien der Verlierer,” 1996; Höpp, “Frontenwechsel,” 2000, pp. 308–310; Christian Koller, “Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt:” *Die Diskussion um die Verwendung von Kolonialtruppen in Europa zwischen Rassismus, Kolonial- und Militärpolitik (1914–1930)*, Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Überseegeschichte 82, Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001; Christian Koller, “Deutsche Wahrnehmungen feindlicher Kolonialtruppen,” in Franziska Roy, Heike Liebau and Ravi Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser. Indische Kriegsgefangene in deutschen Propagandalagern 1914–1918*, Heidelberg: Draupadi, 2014, pp. 145–164; Janos Riesz, “Afrikanische Kriegsgefangene in der deutschen Propaganda,” in Benedikt Burkard and Céline Lebret, eds, *Gefangene Bilder. Wissenschaft und Propaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Schriften des Historischen Museums Frankfurt am Main 35, Petersberg: Imhof, 2014, pp. 58–71.
- 6 Oppenheim 1914 (“Denkschrift Die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde” = “Memorandum. Arousal of revolution in the Muslim territories of our enemies”), PA-AA, R 20937; published in Tim Epkenhans, “Geld darf keine Rolle spielen” [II. Teil], *Archivum Ottomanicum* 19, 2001, pp. 121–136; cf. Höpp,

- “Die Privilegien der Verlierer,” 1996, pp. 185–187; Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, “Max von Oppenheim und der Heilige Krieg. Zwei Denkschriften zur Revolutionierung islamischer Gebiete 1914 und 1940,” *Sozial.Geschichte* 19 (3), 2004, pp. 28–38 and 45–55; Tilman Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War*, Studien zur Zeitgeschichte des Nahen Ostens und Nordafrikas 12, Münster and London: LIT, 2005; Stefan M. Kreutzer, *Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser. Max von Oppenheim und die Neuordnung des Orients (1914–1918)*, Graz: Ares, 2012.
- 7 Oppenheim 1914 (“Benutzung der kriegsgefangenen Muhammedaner” = “Exploitation of Muslim prisoners of war”), PA-AA, R 21244; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 38.
 - 8 See Karl Friedrich Maximilian Schabinger Freiherr von Schowingen, *Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter. Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen eines kaiserlichen Dragomans*, Baden-Baden, 1967, pp. 102–109.
 - 9 Oppenheim 1914 (“Benutzung”); regarding his archaeological works see Gabriele Teichmann and Gisela Völger, eds, *Faszination Orient: Max von Oppenheim, Forscher, Sammler, Diplomat*, Köln: DuMont, 2001; Ulrike Dubiel, ed., *Abenteuer Orient: Max von Oppenheim und seine Entdeckung des Tell Halaf*, 30. April bis 10. August 2014, Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn, Tübingen and Berlin: Wasmuth, 2014.
 - 10 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 35–37.
 - 11 Regarding Oppenheim’s activities during World War I, the *Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient* (NfO) and the German-Ottoman Jihad concept see Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany*, 2005; Maren Bragulla, *Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient. Fallstudie einer Propagandainstitution im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Saarbrücken: VDM, 2007; Kreutzer, *Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser*, 2012; Wilfried Loth and Marc Hanisch, eds, *Erster Weltkrieg und Dschihad. Die Deutschen und die Revolutionierung des Orients*, München: Oldenbourg, 2014; and also the chapter by Tilman Lüdke in this volume.
 - 12 Ernst von Mirbach, *Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898*, Berlin: Mittler, 1899, p. 204; cf. Jan Stefan Richter, *Die Orientreise Kaiser Wilhelms II. 1898: eine Studie zur deutschen Außenpolitik an der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Hamburg: Kovač, 1997, p. 139; in general see Gudrun Gorka-Reimus, ed., *Der Traum vom Orient: Kaiser Wilhelm II. im Osmanischen Reich*, Potsdam: Stiftung Preußische Schlösser und Gärten Berlin-Brandenburg, 2005; Ilona Baytar, ed., *İki dost hükümdar = Zwei befreundete Herrscher: Sultan II. Abdülhamid, Kaiser II. Wilhelm*, Yayın. Turkey, Büyük Millet Meclisi, Milli Saraylar Daire Başkanlığı 53, İstanbul: Avrupa Kültür Başkenti, TBMM Milli Saraylar, 2009.
 - 13 Oppenheim 1914 (*Denkschrift*); cf. Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, “Djihad ‘Made in Germany’: Der Streit um den Heiligen Krieg 1914–1915,” *Sozial.Geschichte* 18 (2), 2003, pp. 7–34; Kreutzer, *Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser*, 2012.
 - 14 A[ugust]. Schultze, “Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus für Kriegsgefangene in Wünsdorf, Prov. Brandenburg,” *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung* 36 (25), 1916, pp. 177–178, pp. 177–178; cf. Wf. “Unsere Kriegsgefangenenlager,” *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung* 35 (37), 1915, pp. 241–244.
 - 15 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 131–137.

- 16 August Gärtner, "Einrichtung und Hygiene der Kriegsgefangenenlager," in Wilhem Hoffmann, ed., *Hygiene. Handbuch der ärztlichen Erfahrungen im Weltkriege 1914–1918*, 7, Leipzig: Barth, 1922, pp. 180–190.
- 17 Well known are the monuments of Sanspareil (1744), Schwetzingen (1779–1791) and Potsdam (1792 and 1841–1843), a great number of temporary structures of the late 18th and early 19th century, erected in smaller gardens, disappeared soon, overview s. Stefan Koppelkamm, *Der imaginäre Orient. Exotische Bauten des achtzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in Europa*, Berlin: Ernst, 1987, pp. 28–39.
- 18 Potsdam (1732), Berlin (1763) and Schwetzingen (1870–1871), s. Muḥammad 'Abdallāh, *Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland*, Graz, Wien and Köln: Styria, 1981, pp. 13–21; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, 10–12.
- 19 "eine Phantasie-Moschee ..., die zwar nach unseren Begriffen stilvoll ist, das Gefühl der Eingeborenen aber beleidigt," remark of Rittmeister Zürn after a visit to the Halbmondlager, 20 February 1914, PA-AA, R 21245, f. 36 (32).
- 20 Oppenheim 1914 ("Benutzung"): "Man sollte ihnen eine kleine Moschee einrichten, was sehr leicht durch einen billigen Bretterbau möglich ist, ferner eine Gelegenheit zur Verrichtung ihrer religiösen Verpflichtungen (Waschungen)," and "ein eigener muhammedanischer Geistlicher (Vorbeter) wäre für sie zu bestellen," PA-AA, R 21244, f. 4 (3).
- 21 PA-AA, R 21244, f. 51 (38).
- 22 PA-AA, R 21244, f. 91. 104, cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 113–114.
- 23 "Stellvertreter des AA [Auswärtiges Amt] beim stellvertretenden Generalstab der Armee," Schabinger, *Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter*, 1967, p. 130; Rudolf Nadolny and Günter Wollstein, *Mein Beitrag. Erinnerungen eines Botschafters des Deutschen Reiches*, Köln: DME, 1985(2), p. 85.
- 24 PA-AA, R 21245, f. 36 (32).
- 25 Schultze, "Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus," 1916, p. 178.
- 26 Schultze was also author of the report about the mosque: ZdB 36, 25.03.1916 (25).
- 27 Schultze, "Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus," 1916, p. 180. Probably the real construction cost had been higher than expected (and reported). A later document estimated a sum of 60,000 Marks for the erection of the Mosque: see: PA-AA, R 78240 ("Betrifft: Moschee auf dem früheren Truppenübungsplatz Zossen" = "Regarding: Mosque on the former military training area Zossen"), 5 September 1924.
- 28 PA-AA, R 21245, f. 64 (49).
- 29 al-Sharif al-Tunisi 1915 ("Ordnung des Betriebes in den Dingen der Gäste, die gezwungenermassen gegen uns in den Reihen unserer Feinde gekämpft haben" = "Organization of the operations in the things of the guests who have fought by force against us in the ranks of our enemies"), 18 February 1915, PA-AA, R 21245-2, f. 25 (21).
- 30 Oppenheim 1915 ("Denkschrift über die Organisation der Behandlung der muhammedanischen und indischen Kriegsgefangenen" = "Memorandum on the organization of the treatment of the Muhammedan and Indian prisoners of war"), 27 February 1915, PA-AA, R 21245-2, f. 64 (49).
- 31 Margot Kahleyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg – Kriegsgefangene im 1. Weltkrieg. Ansichten und Absichten*, Berlin: Museum für Völkerkunde, 1998, p. 120, Photo 64.

- 32 ZdB 36, 25.3.1916 (25), p. 180.
- 33 Doegen, *Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung und Schicksal in Deutschland*, Kriegsgefangene Völker 1, Berlin: Politik und Wirtschaft, 1921, p. 38; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 60.
- 34 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 114–115 and 118–119.
- 35 The euphemism “more guests than prisoners” often appears in contemporary reports about the *Halbmondlager*, for example in *Illustrierte Geschichte des Weltkrieges 1914/15* [1915], no. 44, p. 376.
- 36 PA-AA, R 21244-2, f. 81 (61); PA-AA, R 21245, f. 164 (119).
- 37 At least Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi was received by Wilhelm II in audience on 9 February 1915, cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 114, even if he could not take up the issue in the audience: see Schabinger, *Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter*, 1967, p. 113.
- 38 PA-AA, R 21245, f. 165–166 (120).
- 39 Schwanitz, “Djihad ‘Made in Germany,’” 2003, p. 18.
- 40 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 114.
- 41 *Teltower Kreisblatt*, 17 July 1915, 4 (Legacy Höpp ZMO); the founding myth of the Wünsdorf Mosque being a present from emperor Wilhelm II to the Muslim prisoners of war circulated until the 1980s, see ‘Abdallah, *Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland*, 1981, p. 24; until it was corrected by Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 119.
- 42 For a more detailed analysis with further reading on this topic see Martin Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’ zwischen Ġihad-Propaganda und Orientalismus,” *Beiträge zur Islamischen Kunst und Archäologie (BIKA)* 2, 2010, pp. 204–231.
- 43 Regarding the phenomena of “*Unschärfe*” (vagueness) vs. “*Familienähnlichkeit*” (family likeness) cf. Andrea Polaschegg, *Der andere Orientalismus: Regeln deutsch-morgenländischer Imagination im 19. Jahrhundert*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte 35 (269), 2005, pp. 126–132 and 219–231.
- 44 Cf. K.A.C. Creswell and James W. Allan, *A short account of early Muslim architecture*, Aldershot: Scolar, 1989, pp. 19–40.
- 45 Backhaus, *Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland*, 1915, p. 26, Fig. 2: showing the bathhouse with poles in front of it, probably as tentative markings of the mosque’s position.
- 46 Exemplary: Amikam Elad, *Medieval Jerusalem and Islamic worship: holy places, ceremonies, pilgrimage*, Islamic history and civilization 8, Leiden, New York: Brill, 1995, pp. 158–163; Julian Raby and Jeremy Johns, eds, *Bayt Al-Maqdis – ‘Abd al-Malik’s Jerusalem*, Oxford studies in Islamic art 9. 2. Jerusalem and Early Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- 47 Oleg Grabar, *The formation of Islamic art: revised and enlarged edition*. New Haven: Yale University, 1987, pp. 46–64, is particularly influential.
- 48 Rudolf Kriss and Hubert Kriss-Heinrich, *Volksglaube im Bereich des Islam 1. Wallfahrtswesen und Heiligenverehrung*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1960, p. 141.
- 49 To make use of the kaaba would obviously have been impossible.
- 50 Heribert Busse, “Vom Felsendom zum Templum Domini,” in Wolfdietrich Fischer and Jürgen Schneider, eds, *Das Heilige Land im Mittelalter. Referate des 5.*

- interdisziplinären Colloquiums des Zentralinstituts für fränkische Landeskunde*, Neustadt a. d. Aisch: Degener, 1982, pp. 19–31; Adrian Boas, *Jerusalem in the time of the Crusades: Society, landscape and art in the Holy City under Frankish rule*, London: Routledge, 2001.
- 51 Stefan Böntert, *Friedlicher Kreuzzug und fromme Pilger – liturgiehistorische Studien zur Heilig-Land-Wallfahrt im Spiegel deutschsprachiger Pilgerberichte des späten 19. Jahrhunderts*, Liturgia condenda 27, Leuven and Walpole/MA: Peeters, 2013.
 - 52 Mirbach, *Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898*, 1899.
 - 53 Thomas Hartmut Benner, *Die Strahlen der Krone. Die religiöse Dimension des Kaisertums unter Wilhelm II. vor dem Hintergrund der Orientreise 1898*, Marburg: Tectum, 2001.
 - 54 Erwin Roth, *Preußens Gloria im Heiligen Land. Die Deutschen und Jerusalem*, München: Callwey, 1973; Richter, *Die Orientreise Kaiser Wilhelms II. 1898*, 1997.
 - 55 Mirbach, *Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898*, 1899, p. 204; cf. Richter, *Die Orientreise Kaiser Wilhelms II. 1898*, 1997, p. 139.
 - 56 Mirbach, *Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898*, 1899; Ludwig Schneller, *Die Kaiserfahrt durchs Heilige Land*, Leipzig: Wallmann, 1899; cf. Gorka-Reimus, *Der Traum vom Orient*, 2005, p. 55.
 - 57 Schneller, *Die Kaiserfahrt durchs Heilige Land* 1899, p. 196.
 - 58 Here only a short overview is given. For a more detailed analysis with further reading see Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’ zwischen Ġihad-Propaganda und Orientalismus,” 2010.
 - 59 Regarding Russia’s “Orient” see David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the Emigration*, Cambridge: Yale University Press, 2010; Patty Wageman, Inessa Kouteinikova and Olga Atroschenko, eds, *Russia’s Unknown Orient*, Rotterdam: NAI Publishers, 2010.
 - 60 Erica Cruikshank Dodd and Shereen Khairallah, *The Image of the Word. A Study of Quranic Verses in Islamic Architecture*, Beirut: American University, 1981.
 - 61 For the use of pseudo-arabic in Renaissance art see Rosamond E. Mack, *Bazaar to Piazza: Islamic Trade and Italian Art. 1300–1600*, Berkeley: University of California, 2001.
 - 62 Sheila Blair, *Islamic calligraphy*, Edinburgh: University Press, 2006, esp. pp. 3–40.
 - 63 Richard Ettinghausen, “Arabic Epigraphy: Communication or Symbolic Affirmation?,” in D.K. Kouymjian, ed., *Near Eastern Numismatics: Studies in Honor of George C. Miles*, Beirut, 1974, p. 280.
 - 64 See SMB-PK MEK, VIII-EU-27498; equals Schultze, “Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus,” 1916, p. 179, Fig. 6, cf. Kahleyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg*, 1998, p. 123, Fig. 63; in both cases the inscriptions are nearly unreadable by image scale and raster. See also *Der Große Krieg in Bildern* 10, 1915, p. 36, cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 195, Abb. 34. See also: SMB-PK MEK, VIII-EU-27499, cf. Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’ zwischen Ġihad-Propaganda und Orientalismus,” 2010, Fig. 13–15.
 - 65 Schultze, “Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus,” 1916, p. 180.
 - 66 As explained above, Oppenheim and Salih al-Sharif were responsible for the

functional concept of the Wünsdorf Mosque. In this regard they are also very likely to be the originators of the epigraphic programme which linked the mosque with the Jihad propaganda.

- 67 For the reading and translation of the inscriptions and discussions about their importance for the construction I would like to thank particularly Martina Müller-Wiener and Daniel Redlinger. All possible errors are mine.
- 68 For example at the tambour the ligatures *mīm ḥā'* and *dāl* are wrong in lunette 3 'Muḥammad'; on the panel above the exit to the south in each case by the words *illā* und *allāh* the *alif* is written as *lām*, courtesy M. Müller-Wiener Bonn/Berlin.
- 69 See Ernst Kühnel, *Islamische Schriftkunst*, Monographien künstlerischer Schrift 9, Berlin and Leipzig: Heintze & Blanckertz, 1942, pp. 55 and 84; cf. Blair, *Islamic calligraphy*, 2006. The isolated depiction of short writings in the lunettes corresponds to plates in Ottoman mosques; Cornelius Gurlitt, *Die Baukunst Konstantinopels*. 1. Textband (1907), 2.1. Tafelband (1910), 2.2. Tafelband (1912), Berlin: Wasmuth, 1907–1912, T 2.1, p. 19.f.; later often depicted in popular standard works.
- 70 Postcard: "Halbmond-Lager in Wünsdorf-Zossen. Vorhof der Moschee," cf. Gerhard Kaiser and Bernd Herrmann, *Vom Sperrgebiet zur Waldstadt. Die Geschichte der geheimen Kommandozentralen in Wünsdorf und Umgebung*, Berlin: Links, 2007 (4), p. 42; at the entrances of the south and west no inscriptions are visible (see Kahlelyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg*, 1998, pp. 120–123, Fig. 60–62), and at the eastern entrance they are not to be expected due to symmetry.
- 71 Cf. EI, IX: 822b, SULAYMĀN b. DĀWŪD, CD-ROM Edition v. 1.0, Leiden 1999.
- 72 Schultze, "Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus," 1916, p. 180. The fields are numbered consecutively starting at the pulpit counterclockwise. Visible are fields 16 and those from 1 to 5. The panels 16 and 4 show only spiral tendrils without writing. In lunettes 1 to 3 and 5, we read: [F1] "illā [F2] allāh [F3] muḥammad [F5] rasūl". For panels 15 and 6 one can therefore reconstruct as the beginning and end of this section the inscription: [F15] "lā ilāha [F16] – [F1] illā [F2] allāh [F3] muḥammad [F4] – [F5] rasūl [F6] allāh". Corresponding to Sura 37:35: "There is no God but God" and Sura 48: p. 29, "Muhammad is the Messenger of God." The prefix "ashhadu an" – "I believe [that]" is often skipped in inscriptions, cf. Kühnel, *Islamische Schriftkunst*, 1942.
- 73 Of this inscription the eastern half is clearly visible: SMB-PK MEK, VIII-EU-27499; Schultze, "Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus," 1916, p. 179, Abb. 6; cf. Kahlelyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg*, 1998, 123, Photo 63; Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 195, Abb. 34. The end of the formula "ar-Rahman ar-Rahim" is recognizable and can be supplemented by "Bismillah" to the complete *basmala* Cf. EI, I:1084a, BASMALA, CD-ROM Edition v. 1.0, Leiden 1999 ("Im Namen des barmherzigen und gnädigen Gottes" after Rudi Paret, *Der Koran*. Digitale Bibliothek 46, Berlin: Directmedia [CD-ROM], 2004).
- 74 The panels on the exits to the east and the south can be seen on the abovementioned photo of the interior. The two corresponding exits to the north and the west are likely to have been provided with similar panels. SMB-PK MEK, VIII-EU-27498; equal to Kahlelyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg*, 1998, p. 123, Fig. 63, for readability see above.

- 75 Above can be read “*as-Salam ...*” below “*wa ... rahmatu,*” which can be supplemented to the greeting and blessing formula “*as-Salam [‘alaikum] wa rahmatu [Allah wa barakātuhu]*”: “*Peace [be with you] and mercy [of God, and his blessing].*”
- 76 “In tanšurū allāh yaṇšurukum wa yuṭabbit aqdāmakum”: For the reading of the texts and Koranic assignment I would like to thank Ibrahim Salman (Tartus/Berlin).
- 77 German version used: Paret, *Der Koran*, 2004. Common in 1915 was the translation of Max Henning, *Der Koran*, Leipzig: Reclam, 1901 (8. [7]: “*Oh ihr, die glaubt, wenn ihr Allah helft, wird er euch helfen und eure Füße festigen*”: cf. Max Henning (translator), Ernst Werner and Kurt Rudolph, eds, *Der Koran*. Leipzig: Reclam, 1968, p. 437) or a recourse to the classic transmission of Friedrich Rückert 1888 (p. 8/7: “*Ihr die da glaubet, steht ihr Gott bei, | So steht er euch bei | Und festigt eure Tritte,*” after Friedrich Rückert (translator), Hartmut Bobzin and Wolfdietrich Fischer, eds, *Der Koran in der Übersetzung*, Würzburg: Ergon, 1995, p. 376). English interpretation: “*O believers, if you help God, | He will help you, | and confirm your feet,*” after Arthur John Arberry (translator), *The Koran interpreted*, London: Allen & Unwin and New York: Macmillan, 1955.
- 78 Cf. Dodd and Khairallah, *The Image of the Word*, 1981, p. 71.
- 79 Höpp, *Fremde Erfahrungen*, 1996, p. 103; Bragulla, *Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*, 2007, p. 84.
- 80 Henning, *Der Koran*, 1901, 238, note. 2, cf. Henning, Werner and Rudolph, *Der Koran*, 1980, p. 437.
- 81 Rückert, *Der Koran*, 1888 (1980), p. 526.
- 82 Rückert, Bobzin and Fischer, *Der Koran in der Übersetzung*, 1995, p. 544.
- 83 “4. Und wenn ihr die Ungläubigen trifft, dann herunter mit dem Haupt, bis ihr ein Gemetzel unter ihnen angerichtet habt; dann schnüret die Bande. 5. ... Und hätte Allah gewollt, wahrlich er hätte selber Rache genommen; jedoch wollte er die einen von euch durch die anderen prüfen.” (“4. When you meet the unbelievers, smite their necks, then, when you have made wide slaughter among them, tie fast the bonds; 5. ... He would have avenged Himself upon them; but that He may try some of you by means of others.”), German: Henning, *Der Koran*, 1901, p. 238; English interpretation: Arberry, *The Koran interpreted*, 1955; commentary: cf. Henning, Werner and Rudolph, *Der Koran*, 1968, p. 436.
- 84 Karl E. Schabinger (trans.), *Schaich Salih Aschscharif Attunisi, Haqiqat Aldschihad, Die Wahrheit über den Glaubenskrieg*, Berlin: Reimer, 1915; cf. Bragulla, *Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*, 2007, pp. 64–70, see also Schabinger, *Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter*, 1967, pp. 108–114.
- 85 Cf. Schwanitz, “Djihad ‘Made in Germany,’” 2003, pp. 13–16.
- 86 “[D]er Glaube daran, dass er sein Versprechen, uns siegen zu lassen, durchaus erfüllen wird, wenn wir dem Feinde standhalten und seine Befehle befolgen und die Mittel vollkommen beachten, durch die die Überwindung des Feindes herbeigeführt wird, nach Maßgabe unserer Kraft; ...”
- 87 “... wie Gott gesagt (47:8): wenn ihr Gott beisteht, so steht er euch bei und stellt euch fest auf die Füße”. Schabinger (trans.), *Aschscharif Attunisi*, 1915, pp. 10–12. English interpretation after Arberry, *The Koran interpreted*, 1955.

- 88 Doegen, *Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung und Schicksal in Deutschland*, 1921; Gärtner, "Einrichtung und Hygiene der Kriegsgefangenenlager," 1922.
- 89 Cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 70.
- 90 See Schabinger, *Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter*, 1967; Nadolny and Wollstein, *Mein Beitrag. Erinnerungen eines Botschafters des Deutschen Reiches*, 1985; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 69 and 74–75.
- 91 Cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 79–85.
- 92 Britta Lange, "Ein Archiv von Stimmen. Kriegsgefangene unter ethnografischer Beobachtung," in Nikolaus Wegmann, Harun Maye and Cornelius Reiber, eds, *Original/Ton. Zur Mediengeschichte des O-Tons*, Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 2007, pp. 317–341; Franziska Roy, Heike Liebau and Ravi Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser. Indische Kriegsgefangene in deutschen Propagandalagern, 1914–1918*, Heidelberg: Draupadi, 2014.
- 93 This section about the propaganda in the prison camps, based on the seminal work of Gerhard Höpp and expanded by results of recent research, was integrated in this chapter to contextualize the architectural record.
- 94 Backhaus, *Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland*, 1915; cf. Kahleyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg*, 1998; Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany*, 2005; Bragulla, *Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*, 2007, pp. 17 and 39; Margot Kahleyss, "Indische Kriegsgefangene im 1. Weltkrieg – Fotografien als Quellenmaterial," in Roy, Liebau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, pp. 233–261.
- 95 Traceable in dozens of memoirs of former prisoners of war (of each side), blaming the prison conditions as insufferable and the enemy prison staff as barbaric: see, for example, Carl P. Dennett, *Prisoners of the Great War. Authoritative Statement of Conditions in the Prison Camps of Germany*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919; cf. Heather Jones, *Violence against Prisoners of War in the First World War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, with further example cases. Thus it was urgently necessary for German propaganda to counteract this by publishing "official", apologetic reports depicting the fair treatment of the prisoners; for the German side see Doegen, *Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung und Schicksal in Deutschland*, 1921, pp. 2–4; Backhaus, *Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland*, 1915, pp. 5 and 24; regarding the mechanisms of war propaganda in World War I see Troy Paddock, *World War I and Propaganda*, Leiden: Brill, 2014. Summarizing: Kenneth Steuer, *The American YMCA and Prisoner of War Diplomacy with the Central Powers during the First World War*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009; Kenneth Steuer, "German Propaganda and Prisoners of War in World War I," in Troy Paddock, ed., *Propaganda in World War I*, 2011.
- 96 Backhaus, *Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland*, 1915.
- 97 Frobenius, *Der Völkerzirkus unserer Feinde*, 1916; Backhaus, *Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland*, 1915, pp. 6 and 22.
- 98 Bragulla, *Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*, 2007, p. 18.
- 99 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 69. Regarding the use of photography as medium for propaganda see Ludger Derenthal and Stefanie Klamm, eds, *Fotografie im 1. Weltkrieg*, Leipzig: Seemann, 2014.
- 100 For an overview about images of the camps see Kahleyss, *Muslime in Branden-*

- burg, 1998; cf. Margot Kahleyss, "Indische Kriegsgefangene im 1. Weltkrieg – Fotografien als Quellenmaterial," in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, pp. 233–261; for a permanent exhibition of related material: see Garnisonsmuseum Wünsdorf (<http://www.buecherstadt.com/de/museen-kunst/>), February 2015. Regarding the agencies abroad see Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany*, 2005.
- 101 *Der Große Krieg in Bildern*, 17, 1916, pp. 36–37.
 - 102 Oppenheim 1914 ("Revolutionierung").
 - 103 Oppenheim 1914 (*Organisation der Behandlung*), PA-AA, R 21245-2, f. 74 (69).
 - 104 "a. religiöse Beeinflussung; b. Belehrung und Unterweisung durch Besprechungen und Vorträge, Unterricht, gruppenweise Ausflüge in die Reichshauptstadt usw.; c. gute Behandlung, Beköstigung und Bekleidung": Nadolny 1914; "Beeinflussung der mohammedanischen Gefangenen," January 1915, PA-AA.
 - 105 PA-AA, R 21245, f. 131; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 39–41. 69–71.
 - 106 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 70.
 - 107 Abu'l-Arabi, PA-AA, R 21247, f. 103; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 72.
 - 108 Höpp, *Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg*, 1994, pp. 8–13; Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 101–112; Liebau, "Hindostan," in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014.
 - 109 PA-AA, R 21244, f. 103, cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 40.
 - 110 PA-AA, R 21250, f. 186–189; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 79.
 - 111 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 83, verweist auf PA-AA, R 21253–PA-AA, R 21256; cf. Heike Liebau, "Hindostan. Eine Zeitung für südasiatische Kriegsgefangene in Deutschland 1915–1918," in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, pp. 261–285.
 - 112 Kreutzer, *Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser*, 2012; Heike Liebau, "Das Deutsche Auswärtige Amt, Indische Emigranten, und propagandistische Bestrebungen unter den südasiatischen Kriegsgefangenen im "Halbmondlager,"" in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, pp., pp. 137.
 - 113 S. Ahuja, "Vergessene Konfrontationen. Südasiatische Soldaten in deutscher Kriegsgefangenschaft 1915–1918," in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, pp. 59–61; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 89; see also Hoffmann, *In the Prison Camps of Germany*, 1920, p. 83.
 - 114 Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany*, 2005, pp. 186–197; Kreutzer, *Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser*, 2012, pp. 167–169.
 - 115 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 89.
 - 116 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 89; Liebau, "Das Deutsche Auswärtige Amt," in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, pp. 139–140.
 - 117 The conflicts between the military and civilian/political spheres also affected the activities abroad, clearly to be seen by comparison of the respective protagonists' memoirs. For example Nadolny and Wollstein, *Mein Beitrag. Erinnerungen eines Botschafters des Deutschen Reiches*, 1985, pp. 85–106; vs. Gerold von Gleich, *Vom Balkan nach Bagdad: militärisch-politische Erinnerungen an den Orient*, Berlin: Scherl, 1921; cf. Hans Werner Neulen, *Feldgrau in Jerusalem: das Levantekorps des*

- kaiserlichen Deutschland*, München: Universitas, 1991, pp. 201–212; cf. Kreutzer, *Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser*, 2012, pp. 143–145.
- 118 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 69; cf. Brigitte Hamann, *Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wahrheit und Lüge in Bildern und Texten*, München and Zürich: Piper, 2004; Anton Holzer, “Die Schlacht der Bilder. Fotografie, Propaganda, Krieg,” in Ludger Derenthal and Stefanie Klamm, eds, *Fotografie im 1. Weltkrieg*, 2014, pp. 32–34.
 - 119 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 74–75, PA-AA, R 21250–R 21252; Liebau, “Das Deutsche Auswärtige Amt,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, pp. 131–134.
 - 120 “[I]n Frage kämen z. B. Kaufleute, die Dank ihrer Bildung und ihrer wirklichen Vertrautheit mit arabischen Sitten und der in Marokko, Algerien, Tunesien gesprochenen Umgangssprache die Garantie böten, dass sie in ständiger Fühlung mit der Kommandantur unter den hiesigen Gefangenen aufklärend wirken und durch Vorträge über aktuelle, geschichtliche, geographische, handels- und kolonisationspolitische Themata wirklich nützliche Arbeit leisten könnten,” Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 75–76, PA-AA, R 21250.
 - 121 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 76; Liebau, “Das Deutsche Auswärtige Amt,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, pp. 131–134.
 - 122 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 76–77, PA-AA, R 21258.
 - 123 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 73–74; Höpp, “Frontenwechsel: Muslimische Deserteure,” 2000, p. 312. This is to be seen in the context of the complex relation between the German-Ottoman allies, being also a recurrent issue in the memoirs mentioned above: see, for example, Gleich, *Vom Balkan nach Bagdad*, 1921, in accordance with the German point of view; in contrast Joseph Pomiankowski, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches: Erinnerungen an die Türkei aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges*, Zürich: Amalthea, 1928, critical about the attitude of superiority demonstrated by German officers; cf. Neulen, *Feldgrau in Jerusalem*, 1991, pp. 181–189; Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany*, 2005, pp. 140–149; Kreutzer, *Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser*, 2012, pp. 112–117.
 - 124 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 80–81.
 - 125 See reports of the German consul in Aleppo, PA-AA, R 21255, and of the German ambassador in Istanbul, PA-AA, R 21256; also comments on this topic in several memoirs, for example Gleich, *Vom Balkan nach Bagdad*, 1921, pp. 138–139; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 83–84.
 - 126 PA-AA, R 21261, f. 25; cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 84–86.
 - 127 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 50–51 and 85; Liebau, “Das Deutsche Auswärtige Amt,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, p. 137; Richard Kuba, “Ein Ethnologe auf dem Kriegspfad. Leo Frobenius und der Erste Weltkrieg,” in Benedikt Burkard and Céline Lebre, eds, *Gefangene Bilder. Wissenschaft und Propaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Schriften des Historischen Museums Frankfurt am Main 35, Petersberg: Imhof, 2014, pp. 102–117.
 - 128 Hoffmann, *In the Prison Camps of Germany*, 1920, p. 82, to be regarded as critical observer, is citing wrong information (“gift of the Kaiser”) or strongly

exaggerated ("15.000 volunteers"). Apart from errors such as the incorrect spelling "Wunstorf" (or mix-up with the town near Hannover), it is apparent that he is replicating disinformation, thus – as an example – confirming unintentionally that German propaganda efforts were to a certain degree successful. The impact of disinformation seems to have been effective until recently, cf. Steuer, *The American YMCA and Prisoner of War Diplomacy*, 2009, ch. 11.

- 129 Meynier, *Les Algériens dans l'Armée française, 1914–1918*, 2000, pp. 38 and 52, stated for 1915 Maghrebian "Germanophilie" and a receptivity towards German propaganda, but considered an ability of the French military leadership (from 1916 onwards) to keep the North African soldiers loyal. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 89, argues that better conditions for Muslim soldiers on the French side, enabling religious practice, were "direct reactions" to the special treatment of Muslim prisoners in German prison camps. Concerning the "Indian" (South Asian) prisoners, Ahuja, "Vergessene Konfrontationen. Südasiatische Soldaten in deutscher Kriegsgefangenschaft 1915–1918," in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, *Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser*, 2014, pp. 48–51, describes almost a propaganda competition between the German and British sides. The perceived danger of colonial troops changing sides is also visible in its harsh criticism by British propaganda, s. To-make-men-traitors 1918.
- 130 Nadolny, "Entwurf für die Immediatseingabe an Wilhelm II," 27 March 1915, PA-AA R 2144.
- 131 Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, pp. 139–147; cf. Kaiser and Herrmann, *Vom Sperrgebiet zur Waldstadt*, 2007, pp. 63–65.
- 132 For discussion about the moving or demolition of the mosque between 1924 and 1929 see PA-AA – R 78240/R 78421, cf. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 1997, p. 150.
- 133 Manfred Backhausen, ed., *Die Lahore-Ahmadiyya-Bewegung in Europa*, Wembley UK: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Lahore Publications, 2008, pp. 56–64.
- 134 Hans Georg Kampe, *Wünsdorf. Geburts- und Entwicklungsstätte der deutschen Panzertruppen*, Militärgeschichtliche Blätter. Hönnow: Meißler, 1997, pp. 12–25; Kaiser and Herrmann, *Vom Sperrgebiet zur Waldstadt*, 2007, pp. 48–50 and 71–76.

9 War, Propaganda and Architecture

Cemal Pasha's Restoration of Islamic Architecture in Damascus during World War I

Hans Theunissen

In the following I am sending a few notes on the German survey of Damascus. The copy I am sending, from which the accompanying plan is taken, was torn down on the last day of the German occupation, from the wall of a German official's room, and with his permission.

Those who knew Damascus before the war will recognize that great alterations have taken place ...¹

With these words James Hanauer begins his short article in which he reports on the changes in the urban fabric and built environment of Damascus during World War I when Ahmed Cemal Pasha (1872–1922), Ottoman Minister of the Navy, was stationed in Syria as governor-general and commander of the 4th Army. Cemal Pasha arrived in Syria in December 1914 and left in December 1917.² During his three-year stay he ruled Syria in an authoritarian way and his “reign of terror” alienated the local population from Ottoman rule.³ Cemal Pasha's policies were directed at strengthening Ottoman state power in Syria and increasing the sense of Ottomanness among the local population. Hoping to become the founder of a modern and developed Ottoman Syria, he embarked upon ambitious plans of urban modernization in the main cities of Greater Syria such as Beirut, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Aleppo and Damascus. His modernization project comprised the widening of existing streets, the building of new roads both between cities as well as within urban centres, and the construction of public parks, ponds, fountains and various public buildings ranging from state offices, schools, banks and post offices to hotels.⁴ In the beginning of 1916 Minister of War Enver Pasha sent the Swiss architect and director of the German Fine Arts Academy in Rome, Maximilian Zürcher (1868–1926), to Damascus. Zürcher became Cemal Pasha's architectural consultant and was responsible for the planning and designing of various projects,⁵ most of which were never realized.⁶ In his dedication in a copy of *Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina*



FIGURE 9.1 Hanauer's German plan of wartime Damascus. Courtesy of the Palestine Exploration Fund, London.

und Westarabien Cemal Pasha refers to this period of cooperation with Zürcher as an “era of serious works.”⁷

Another part of Cemal Pasha's ambitious plans consisted of the restoration of selected pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Islamic monuments. Among the projects were the restoration of the citadels of Jerusalem, Aleppo and Damascus, clearing the Noble Sanctuary in Jerusalem of detrimental additions, the restoration of the Aqsa Mosque, the restoration of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya and the ‘sanitization’ of the environment of the Great (Umayyad) Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din in Damascus. In the same period the Ottomans also undertook the restoration of the Holy Mosque in Mekka.⁸ These restoration activities in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire mainly focused on symbols of state power (citadels) and religious architecture (mosques and tombs) and aimed at heightening the government's profile in the Arab provinces and at gaining Muslim support for the Empire during World War I.

Cemal Pasha's interest also extended to pre-Islamic antiquities. On 1 November 1916 he had a meeting with the German archaeologist Theodor Wiegand (1864–1936) who served in the German army in Syria. During this meeting Cemal Pasha expressed his wish to place the monuments of Syria under special supervision provided he could




FIGURE 9.2 Cemal Pasha's dedication in *Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina und Westarabien*: 'A mon ami M. Zürcher! Souvenir de l'époque de travaux sérieux! Klosters: le 28.9.19. A. Djémal.' Courtesy of Erik-Jan Zürcher, Leiden.

find the right person for that task. The German consul Julius Loytvet-Hardegg immediately suggested that Wiegand was the most suitable man for that job. Subsequently Cemal Pasha appointed Wiegand as Inspector-General for the Antiquities of Syria and Palestine and head of the *Deutsch-Türkische Denkmalschutzkommando für Syrien und Palästina* (German-Turkish Monument Protection Unit).⁹ In his introduction to *Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina und Westarabien* Cemal Pasha lists the goals he wanted to achieve with his initiative: creating a reliable inspection service, preventing the construction of detrimental new buildings inside and in the direct environment of ancient structures, cleaning ruins, prohibiting the local population from using ruins as building materials, providing better access to ruins and accommodation for visitors, and collecting antiquities.¹⁰ The clearing of "detrimental buildings" and the demolition of residential and religious architecture for the widening of streets or the construction of new roads turned out to be one of Cemal Pasha's most problematic policies because it implied expropriations of private property for high prices and led to opposition, court cases and, last but not least, resentment towards the Ottoman authorities and Cemal Pasha in particular.¹¹ Although his urban policies were also directed at gaining

popular sympathy, Cemal Pasha's *modus operandi* merely fuelled the melt-down of Arab support for the Ottomans.

In recent years Cemal Pasha's rule in Syria has attracted the attention of a number of scholars who usually also deal with aspects of his urban policies. Kayalı (1998) only summarizes his urban policies, but clearly links these to the state's policy to assert central authority.¹² Hudson (2008) argues that Cemal Pasha's "program of architectural and archaeological patronage was central to his attempts to re-mobilize much-depreciated Islamic capital to consolidate his control over Muslim Damascus and muster popular support for the failing empire."¹³ However, she mainly focuses on the *Deutsch-Türkische Denkmalschutzkommando für Syrien und Palästina*. Consequently German specialists such as Wiegand play a dominant role in her discussion of Cemal Pasha's urban works.¹⁴ The most recent discussion of Cemal Pasha's programme of public works is presented by Çiçek (2014) who argues that urban modernization and restoration were aimed at strengthening Ottoman state authority (and diminishing foreign influence) and at creating loyal citizens by investing in the infrastructure and thus (economic) development of Greater Syria.¹⁵ Çiçek focuses on modernization and restoration but, unlike Hudson, does not pay attention to the religious-propagandistic dimension of Cemal Pasha's wartime urban works. None of these three authors deals with Cemal Pasha's projects in detail, and as a consequence their discussion is limited to general overviews which pay little attention to World War I as the context of Cemal Pasha's urban works and their religious-propagandistic function in times of war. Moreover, the role of the Germans is often over-emphasized, whereas the role the Ottomans themselves played is almost invisible. In this chapter I provide a complementary point of view by focusing on three specific projects in more detail: the renovation of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya, the "sanitization" of the area around the Great (Umayyad) Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din, and the construction of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard. I will present chronological reconstructions of the projects, try to determine what their goals were and describe what kind of works were carried out. I argue that all three projects formed part of a programme of Ottomanization and pan-Islamic propaganda which aimed to strengthen Ottoman state authority in Syria and gain popular support among the Muslim population for the empire in times of war. This programme materialized in various urban works which emphasized a shared Islamic past and a joint Muslim goal during the war, and paved the way for a (planned but unrealized) common future under Ottoman rule after the war.



FIGURE 9.3 *The Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya Complex shortly after World War I (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

The Second Conqueror of Egypt

On 11 May 1916 Cemal Pasha obtained the sum of 6,000 *lira*¹⁶ from the Ministry of Pious Foundations for the restoration of the most prominent sultanic complex built in Ottoman Damascus.¹⁷ The document dealing with the finances for the restoration refers to the mosque of the complex as the Selimiye and the hospice and dervish lodge as the Süleymaniye. In reality we are dealing with a large multi-functional complex which consists of two main components: the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. The Takiyya (mosque-hospice complex) was constructed on the orders of Sultan Süleyman (1520–1566) in the years 1554/55–1558/59 and consisted at that time of a mosque, ablution pool, guest rooms, a hospice (composed of a kitchen, bakery, refectory and pantry), caravanserais with stables, and latrines. The complex was designed by chief royal architect Sinan. With the complex Sultan Süleyman visually confirmed the consolidation of Ottoman political power in Syria after his father's conquest of the region in 1516. The adjacent madrasa complex reached completion in 1566/67, early in the reign of Süleyman's successor Selim II (1566–1574) and consists of a religious school with a prayer hall-classroom and rooms for staff and students, and a shopping arcade. By the end of the sixteenth century the complex was enlarged with a dervish convent.¹⁸ However, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the construction of the complex was generally




FIGURE 9.4 *The Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya Complex in the second half of the nineteenth century (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

attributed to Sultan Selim I (1512–1520), who had conquered Damascus in 1516 and Egypt in 1517. Consequently the complex was usually referred to as the Takiyya or Mosque of Selim.¹⁹ According to Wiegand Cemal Pasha expressed his admiration for Selim I, the conqueror of Egypt, “by restoring the buildings of this sultan in Syria.”²⁰ Cemal Pasha considered Selim I as his role model and he had the ambition to capture Egypt as Selim I had done 400 years before. In a telegram dated 19 January 1915 Enver Pasha wrote to Cemal Pasha “God willing I shall be able greet you as the Second Conqueror of Egypt.”²¹ However, all Cemal Pasha’s efforts to reconquer Egypt from the hands of the “imperialist” British failed. Nevertheless this did not stop him from restoring the complex. There were apparently more reasons for Cemal Pasha than just his personal admiration for Selim I.

Originally the complex played an important role in the yearly hajj. The buildings were located in the meadows along the Barada river to the west of Damascus *intra muros*. In this area named “al-Marj al-Akhdar” or “Gök Meydan” (Green or Sky Blue Hippodrome) pilgrims would assemble before embarking on the last part of their journey to Mekka. During the hajj season the complex offered various facilities (such as lodging and food) to certain groups of pilgrims (for instance dervishes). The complex thus also articulated the role of Damascus as an important station on the Ottoman hajj route and the role of the Ottoman dynasty as guardians of the Holy Cities and defenders of the hajj.²² In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries parts of the complex were used as a Naqshbandi

dervish lodge,²³ a religious school²⁴ and a refuge for the destitute.²⁵ By the beginning of World War I the complex seems to have been in a run-down state; at least that is what German and Ottoman sources indicate. The German officer Hans von Kiesling labelled the complex dilapidated.²⁶ Mehmed Nihad Bey (1880–1945), the Ottoman architect in charge of the restoration, was even more gloomy. In his memoirs he gives an extensive (and almost apologetic) description of the neglected state of the complex. He also writes that no part of the complex still retained its original function.²⁷ The sad state of the buildings and loss of proper function no doubt formed additional reasons for Cemal Pasha to initiate a meticulous (and costly) renovation. The complex was by far the most prestigious Ottoman monument in Damascus and its run-down state must – in the eyes of Cemal Pasha – have been symptomatic of the lack of state authority in Syria. If the empire wanted to reassert central authority it should also take responsibility for its most emblematic monuments. As such the project was also the result of the ongoing discussion about “national heritage.”²⁸ Islamic architectural landmarks in particular played an important role in this discussion as a means to “raise consciousness of the value of the Islamic past.”²⁹ Cemal Pasha also explicitly referred to this goal in his meeting with Wiegand.³⁰

The restoration of the complex was a symbolic act which aimed at reaffirming the vigour of the state, raising its visibility and thereby strengthening its authority. Moreover, it is likely that Cemal Pasha would have ensured that after the renovation the complex would have regained functions in accordance with its high status, for instance as part of a religious university,³¹ and in line with urban developments in the close vicinity. The area around the complex had from the late nineteenth century onwards developed into a cluster of medical and educational institutions including the Medical Institute and Gureba Hospital, the Pedagogical Academy and the Council for Education. Not surprisingly this cluster in 1923 merged into the Syrian University.³² The various religious functions of the complex throughout history attested to the long-standing Ottoman role as champions of Sunni Islam and thus also supported the claim to the caliphate, which from a late Ottoman point of view had passed to the Ottomans as the result of the conquests of Selim I. Renovating the complex thus also aimed at the reaffirmation of Ottoman religious authority in Damascus and the realignment of the local population with the religious standards and religious and educational practices of the modern Ottoman state. As such the project was also the outcome of a pan-Islamic propaganda programme which tried to gain support for the state and to increase the sense of Ottomanness among the local population based on Sunni Muslim solidarity.



FIGURE 9.5 *The Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya Complex shortly after World War I. The building behind the Takiyya is the Gureba Hospital (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

Mehmed Nihad Bey had come to Medina in the spring of 1915 for the construction of the new Islamic University (“Medrese-i Külliye”) in that city. A year later in Damascus he met Cemal Pasha, who asked him to take charge of the restoration of the Takiyya-Madrasa complex. Subsequently he was appointed Head Architect for Syria in April 1916 by the Ministry of Pious Foundations. In the same period Cemal Pasha secured the funding for the project from the same ministry. Mehmed Nihad Bey arrived in Damascus in the summer of 1916 and the project must have started shortly thereafter. The deplorable state of the complex necessitated a comprehensive renovation. The complex was first cleaned and cleared of added constructions. Thereafter began the renovation of the walls, domes, arches, windows and doors.³³ The more delicate restoration work included renewing the gypsum plaster windows with coloured glass and the tilework of the complex. According to Mehmed Nihad Bey some of “the valuable tiles had been stolen.”³⁴ However, the rather cryptic sentence in his memoirs that he “had the broken tiles removed and again inserted into their place”³⁵ does not really enlighten us about the work done. The tilework no doubt formed one of the most important decorative features of the complex and gave it an unquestionably Ottoman visual identity.³⁶ Necipoğlu gives the following description of the tilework of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya:



FIGURE 9.6 *The Madrasa al-Salimiyya during the renovation: Damascus – The dervish lodge of Sultan Selim (Şâm – Sulţân Selîm dergâhı). Courtesy of Wolf-Dieter Lemke, Berlin.*



FIGURE 9.7 *The Madrasa al-Salimiyya during the renovation: Damascus – The entrance of the dervish lodge of Sultan Selim (Şâm – Sulţân Selîm dergâhı kapısı). Courtesy of Wolf-Dieter Lemke, Berlin.*

Arched lunettes with underglaze-painted tile revetments decorating the porticoes of the guest-houses and the hospice visually unify the central courtyard ... The window lunettes are decorated with underglaze-

painted tiles of uniform design in white, sage green, cobalt blue, turquoise, and a pale red that tries in vain to approximate the intense tomato red of Iznik. Lacking naturalistic flowers, the designs are dominated by palmettes, rosettes, and saz leaves. The local workshop that produced them in the late 1550s seems to have been associated with Süleyman's renovation of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem with tile revetments. According to Mustafa 'Ali and the signature of a Persian tilemaker, 'Abdullah Tabrizi, the renovation project was completed in 1551–1552. Perhaps the potters moved to Damascus after the conclusion of work at the Haram (briefly resumed in 1561–1562), establishing a local industry that catered to the needs of late-sixteenth century Ottoman monuments in the city. In terms of their colour scheme and patterns, the locally produced tiles of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya are less innovative than those made in Iznik for the sultan's mosque complex at the capital. They nevertheless introduced to Damascus a novel mode of decoration associated with Ottoman visual culture.³⁷

Although the tile lunettes on the façades of the mosque, the guest-house, and the hospice do indeed contribute to the visual coherence of the various buildings around the courtyard, Necipoğlu's observation that "the window lunettes are decorated with underglaze-painted tiles of uniform design in white, sage green, cobalt blue, turquoise, and a pale red" is not correct. There are in fact four distinctly different sub-groups of designs which use various colour palettes, and this remarkable diversity – when understood correctly – reveals a fascinating history which begins in the second half of the sixteenth century and ends with Cemal Pasha's renovation project.³⁸

The 12³⁹ guest rooms of the Takiyya – six on each side of the courtyard – have entrances and windows crowned with tile lunettes in two slightly different designs. The designs of the lunettes above the entrances are all the same (Type 1a), as are those above the windows (Type 1b). The tile revetments above the entrances use the colours cobalt blue, turquoise, green, black, white and aubergine purple. The tile revetments above the windows use the same colours but slightly less aubergine purple. This regular distribution of tile lunettes with a specific design and colour scheme either above an entrance or a window is unusual for sixteenth-century Damascus. The tile lunettes of the Zawiyya al-Sa'diyya (Zawiyya Sa'd al-Din al-Jabawi) (1560s), the Derviş Pasha Mosque (1571–1574/75) and the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque (1586–1591) are in fact almost all different from each other and not distributed in any kind of regular sequence. Some colours used on the tile lunettes of the guest rooms also vary substantially in tone and saturation. The greens range from bright to



FIGURE 9.8 Tile lunette Type 1a. Photograph by the author.



FIGURE 9.9 Tile lunette Type 1b. Photograph by the author.

very dark, the turquoises from azure blue to a more green turquoise and the aubergine purples from a deep purple to almost black. In addition, most tile lunettes of the guest rooms do not exactly fit in the available space. Sometimes parts of the borders have been cut off to fit the tiles in the available space; in other cases additional tile strips have been inserted to fill empty spaces.



FIGURE 9.10 *Tile lunette Type 3. Photograph by the author.*

Two other tile lunettes on the façade of the mosque have an identical design (Type 2) which is a variation of those of the guest rooms (Type 1). However, these tiles are not glazed and as a consequence the pigments are discoloured and faded.

The courtyard façade of the hospice shows by far the greatest variety in tile patterns. Of the 11 tile lunettes six panels above the windows have the same design and colours as the lunettes above the windows of the guest rooms (Type 1b). Two other lunettes above entrances have a design that resembles those of the lunettes of the guest rooms, though it is not identical (Type 3). Interestingly, the designs of these two lunettes are painted in a more refined manner than those on the tile panels of Type 1. The tiles of these two lunettes are also smaller than those of the other lunettes. Moreover, these two lunettes use less black (and more cobalt blue), a light green, only a little pale aubergine purple, and the turquoise is often discoloured (turned grey). One of these lunettes shows traces of a rather clumsy later restoration. However these two tile panels, unlike most of the other tile lunettes, fit perfectly into the available space.

Another tile panel above the main entrance of the hospice uses the same design as that of the lunettes above the entrances of the guest rooms (Type 1a), but is painted in a different colour palette. Apart from cobalt blue, green, turquoise, aubergine purple, white and black (only for thin lines) this lunette also uses a thick, dull red slip which tries to imitate the bright tomato red of İznik. A slightly different design but with the same colours is also used for the nine tile lunettes⁴⁰ in the interior of



FIGURE 9.11 Tile lunette Type 1c (with red) in the interior of the mosque.
 Photograph by the author.

the mosque (Type 1c). In addition the tile lunettes in the interior of the mosque have a wide aubergine purple border, whereas the tile panel above the entrance of the hospice only has a very narrow aubergine purple border. This wide border was necessary because the tile makers used approximately the same design (in dimensions) as outside, but because the lunettes in the interior were of a slightly different shape and higher (five tiles in stead of four tiles) they added a wide border in order to bridge the difference in shape and height. The use of a thick red slip is intriguing because sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Damascene tilemakers never used this colour (but used aubergine purple instead) because they could not master the production of tomato red, unlike their contemporary colleagues in İznik.⁴¹ The rare tiles with tomato red in buildings in Damascus are all imports from İznik. However, the tile lunettes with red in the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya do not resemble İznik tiles from the second half of the sixteenth century in either design, style or colours. Interestingly, the patterns of the tile panels often have more in common with cuerda seca tile lunettes produced in Istanbul in the first half of the sixteenth century.

The last sub-group consists of two tile lunettes above windows (Type 4). One of these two lunettes is partially preserved and consists of only five tiles. The second lunette is complete and decorated with a cartouche with the calligraphed text of (part of) an invocation in Arabic: Verily, there is no god but God (لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ حَقًّا حَقًّا) surrounded by an intricate pattern



FIGURE 9.12 *Tile lunette Type 4. Photograph by the author.*

consisting of mainly arabesques, rosettes and palmettes. The second, partially preserved panel is decorated with similar motifs but has a wide border with rosettes. The colours used on these two panels are mainly dark cobalt blue, light blue (more azure than turquoise), white, black, green and aubergine purple. Interestingly, the design of these two tile lunettes bears a close resemblance to the designs of the tile lunettes of the Zawiyya al-Sa'diyya which was renovated by Lala Mustafa Pasha,⁴² when he was governor-general of Damascus in the years 1563–1567/68,⁴³ and the tile lunette above the entrance in the interior of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya which was completed in the same period, in 1566/67.⁴⁴ Chronologically speaking the Zawiya al-Sa'diyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya were the first (still existing) buildings in Damascus decorated with tile revetments after the completion of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya (1558/59).⁴⁵

The adjacent Madrasa al-Salimiyya, which was completed in 1566/67, is also decorated with tile revetments. Necipoğlu, however, does not give a description of this tilework. The tiles are used on the entrance façade and in the interior of the prayer hall-classroom. The windows and entrances of the rooms around the courtyard do not have any tile decoration, unlike the guest rooms of the Takiyya. The spandrels above the entrance are inlaid with tiles decorated with a pattern of palmettes, rosettes, arabesques and saz leaves in cobalt blue, green, turquoise, black, white and aubergine purple. Both the design and the colours used closely resemble those of the tile lunettes of the Takiyya (Types 1–3). One important difference, however, is that turquoise blue has been used only for details. The main



FIGURE 9.13 Tile lunette in the Zawiyya al-Sa'diyya. Photograph by the author.




FIGURE 9.14 Tile lunette in the interior of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. Photograph by the author.

colours are cobalt blue and green. The white upper wall of the entrance façade has a tile border decorated with palmettes and arabesques in cobalt blue, green, black and white. The background of most tiles is a warm white; some tiles, however, have a blue-ish white background. This same border is also used in the interior as a separation between the lower tiled



FIGURE 9.15 *The entrance façade of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. Photograph by the author.*

walls and the (nowadays) undecorated white upper walls. Here too we see tiles with two different nuances of white as background. The lower walls of the prayer hall-classroom are decorated with tile panels. Originally there must have been 12 tile panels. However, two panels are no longer extant.⁴⁶ The panels consist of two types of repeating modular tiles: border tiles which combine a border motif of palmettes and arabesques with a surface filling repetitive pattern of cartouches filled with arabesques, and stylized, curving tendrils which emanate from palmettes and rosettes and end in saz leaves. The design is painted in cobalt blue, green, turquoise and black on a white background. The second type of tile is decorated with only these last motifs. Once laid together these tiles form panels with larger repetitive patterns. Not all tiles have the same colours. The background of part of the tiles is a warm ivory white, whereas other tiles have a cold bright white background. The cobalt blue on these last tiles is a thick blue slip; the cobalt blue on the ivory white coloured tiles, however, has no relief. The greens sometimes have different nuances and the turquoise on the ivory white tiles is sometimes discoloured just as in the two tile lunettes of Type 3 in the Takiyya. The mihrab is also tiled with five vertical rows of identical tiles with a pattern of cartouches with palmettes and arabesques surrounded by Chinese cloud band motifs and borders with palmettes and arabesques. The design is painted in cobalt blue, green, turquoise and black on a white background. Once again some tiles have a soft white background, whereas other tiles have a bright white



FIGURE 9.16 *The interior of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. Photograph by the author.*

background. Some of these last tiles also have some details of the Chinese cloud bands painted in cobalt blue. The cobalt blue on these tiles is also a blue slip. The spandrels above the mihrab are inlaid with tiles with a decoration of palmettes, rosettes, arabesques and saz leaves similar to the design on the spandrels on the façade of the building. Above the entrance in the north wall is a tile lunette with a design which – as mentioned before – resembles the designs of the two slightly earlier tile lunettes of Type 4 in the Takiyya and the tile lunettes of the contemporary Zawiyya al-Sa'diyya. (Figs 9.12–14) The design is painted in cobalt blue, green, turquoise, black and white. When compared with the tile lunettes in the Takiyya and the Zawiyya al-Sa'diyya this tile panel uses more green. On some tiles the turquoise is discoloured. Above the cupboards in the middle of the west and east walls are two other tile lunettes with an identical design painted in cobalt blue, green, turquoise, aubergine purple, black and white. Both the design and the colours used closely resemble those of the tiles of the spandrel on the façade of the building and the tile lunettes of the Takiyya (Types 1–3). One important difference from the Takiyya tile lunettes, however, is that – as on the spandrel tiles – turquoise blue has been used only for details. The location of these two tile lunettes is unusual because in a sixteenth-century Damascene context tile lunettes were mainly used to accentuate entrances and windows, not cupboards. Two wall cupboards in the interior of the mosque of the Takiyya are also crowned with tile lunettes, but these complement the



FIGURE 9.17 *Original (sixteenth-century) and copied (1916–1918) tiles in the interior of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. Photograph by the author.*

tile lunettes above the windows in this building. However, none of the windows in the madrasa is crowned with tile lunettes; only the entrance in the north wall. Therefore this specific combination in the madrasa is unusual.

On the basis of this formal analysis some conclusions can be drawn. It seems likely that we are dealing with tiles from two distinctly different periods: the 1550s–1560s and the years 1916–1918. Only four tile lunettes of the Takiyya belong to the original sixteenth-century tilework: the two tile panels of Type 3 and the two tile panels of Type 4. The tiles of the two lunettes of Type 3 have different sizes, the designs are more refined and have more details, the tiles have slightly different colours and the turquoise often turned out discoloured. This discolouration links these tiles to the slightly later tiles of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya, some of which also suffer from the same imperfection. This probably explains why the tilemakers in later projects (i.e. after the Takiyya, beginning with the Madrasa al-Salimiyya) no longer applied turquoise to larger surfaces, but restricted their use of this colour to smaller details and borders. It also explains why during the renovation of 1916–1918 these tile lunettes were replaced with new panels. It is thus likely that originally part of the tile lunettes had a similar design and were painted using the same colour palette. The tiles of the two lunettes of Type 4 use exactly the same colour palette, though sometimes in different nuances. The aubergine purple, for instance, is much darker. These two tile panels



FIGURE 9.18 *Cuerda seca* tile lunette of the Sultan Selim Mosque in Istanbul (1520s). Photograph by the author.

closely resemble tile lunettes in other sixteenth-century buildings in Damascus. The combination of two different types of design (Types 3 and 4) in one building is not unique. Exactly the same two types of design (one with stylized vegetative and floral motifs and one with religious epigraphy)⁴⁷ are also combined in the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque which was built in 1586–1591, some 30 years after the completion of the Takiyya. The tile designs of the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque were thus most likely inspired by those of the Takiyya. Like the two tile panels of Type 3 in the Takiyya, the resembling tile panels in the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque are painted less schematically, and are more refined and with more details than the tile panels of Type 1 in the Takiyya which were made in the years 1916–1918. The colour palettes of the sixteenth-century tiles of the Takiyya and the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque are also comparable although, as in the other sixteenth-century buildings with tiles in Damascus, the tilemakers of the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque also avoided using turquoise for large surfaces. The sixteenth-century decorative programme of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya (like that of the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque) was thus based on a combination of two different tile designs (Types 3 and 4). The source of inspiration for the design of the tile lunettes of Type 3 was most likely formed by *cuerda seca* tile panels from the 1520s–1550s in mosques and other buildings in Istanbul. This further strengthens the hypothesis that tilemakers – some of whom may originally have worked in the royal ceramics workshop in Istanbul – moved to Damascus after finishing

their work on the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. The sixteenth-century tilework of the Takiyya was characterized by the use of three main colours: cobalt blue, green and turquoise, and three supporting colours: black, white and aubergine purple. This is confirmed by a nineteenth-century description of the tiles of the Takiyya:

The oggee pediments over the doorways and grated windows of these apartments were fitted with exquisitely designed tiles, made expressly for their places. The colours were rich dark blue, delicate green, and turquoise blue, all outlined in black.⁴⁸

All other 40 tile lunettes were made in the years 1916–1918 as part of Cemal Pasha's renovation. Interestingly, Wulzinger and Watzinger, who studied the complex in early 1917 as members of the *Denkmalschutzkommando*⁴⁹ and published the first description of the complex after the war, only indirectly refer to the renovation⁵⁰ and describe tile panels without red.⁵¹ Von Kiesling, who visited the complex in the same period,⁵² also still describes the old situation.⁵³ This suggests that the tile lunettes of the Takiyya were replaced later in 1917 or in 1918. None of the subsequent studies dealing with the Takiyya mentions the renovation project and the replacement of the tiles. Consequently, the present tile lunettes are generally accepted as the original sixteenth-century tilework.⁵⁴

However, the refurbishment profoundly changed the visual message of the Takiyya. Instead of a decorative programme based upon a combination of tile lunettes with religious epigraphy and stylized vegetative and floral decorations in the same colour palette, the new tilework created a visual hierarchy with different designs and colour palettes for lunettes above windows and entrances of the guest rooms, above windows and entrances of the hospice and in the interior of the mosque. Highest in the visual hierarchy are the tile lunettes with red above the main entrance of the hospice and in the interior of the mosque. The use of the colour red in these last tile lunettes suggests a conscious attempt to upgrade the status of Süleyman's Takiyya from a complex using a – in late Ottoman eyes – provincial visual language to a complex expressing an imperial Ottoman visual identity by copying the colour palette of classical sixteenth-century Iznik tilework. The tilework of the Takiyya was made more Ottoman than it had ever been. Thus the link between the imperial centre and an Ottoman provincial capital was reinforced by superimposing an idealized state on the provincial past. This was a case of an invented tradition which could be interpreted as a visual expression of a process of top-down Ottomanization.

As in the Takiyya the tile revetments of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya can also be divided into sixteenth-century tilework and twentieth-century tilework. Tilework that was still present in 1916 was retained. A nineteenth-century description of the tiles in the interior suggests that the present lay-out of the tilework conforms to the original situation:

The walls were covered with glazed tiles; those of the *mihrab*, the niche on the south side, were especially beautiful, and the largest I had seen – much too large to be drawn in my sketch-book full size. I told the sheikh that I regretted this. He instantly went to his house on the opposite side of the court, and brought me some very large well-made Turkish paper, and I made a careful drawing of a tile which measured fifteen inches and a quarter by twelve inches and one-eighth, which well represents the style and character of the tiles throughout the building.⁵⁵

During the renovation of 1916–1918 missing (and possibly also damaged) tiles were replaced with new tiles. This is confirmed by Von Kiesling who visited the madrasa during the renovation in late 1916 or early 1917.⁵⁶ Tiles in the borders (on the façade and in the interior) and the tile panels on the lower walls of the interior (including the *mihrab*) with an ivory white background have a sixteenth-century origin.⁵⁷ Those with a blue-ish, bright white background and a blue slip have a twentieth-century origin. Von Kiesling also noticed some of these differences.⁵⁸ The tilework of the spandrels both on the façade and above the *mihrab* in the interior is also of twentieth-century origin, as are the two lunettes above the cupboards.⁵⁹ The lunette above the entrance in the north wall of the prayer hall-class room, however, has a sixteenth-century origin. Most of the new tiles were no doubt directly inspired by the original tilework, both in design and in colour palette, because they were used to repair existing tile panels and had to fit in as perfectly as possible. Nevertheless there are small but visible and tactile differences. The two tile lunettes above the cupboards, however, were directly inspired by the new tile lunettes of the Takiyya.

The tilework of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya (particularly the tile panels on the lower walls) uses motifs which we also find on underglaze-painted tilework produced by the royal workshop of ceramics in Istanbul from the first half of the sixteenth century. Similar motifs are also present on part of the Ottoman tilework of the Dome of the Rock which was most likely the direct predecessor of and source of inspiration for the tilework of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. This should not come as a surprise because the tilemakers for both projects most likely belonged to the same group of ceramicists. These tilemakers, some of whom may have

originated from Süleyman's royal workshop of ceramics in Istanbul, were familiar with both the designs of the cuerda seca tradition and the designs of underglaze-painted tilework.⁶⁰ Later Ottoman tilework from the second half of the sixteenth century in Damascus shows that the Damascus tilemakers – from a distance and after some delay – followed developments in design from İznik, but stuck to the typical Damascus colour palette of cobalt blue, green, turquoise, black, white and aubergine purple. The tilework of the Derviş Pasha Mosque and tomb (1570s) and the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque (late 1580–early 1590s) for instance also uses elements of the naturalistic floral style (tulips, roses, carnations, hyacinths, etc.) characteristic of İznik tilework.

The new tilework was most likely made by staff and students of the School of Applied Arts established by Cemal Pasha in the Missionary School of the Sœurs de Charité. From 1916 to 1918 this school had a German director, Karl Stöckle (1872–1931), who was also a member of Theodor Wiegand's *Deutsch-Türkische Denkmalschutzkommando für Syrien und Palästina*.⁶¹ There was also a workshop in the Takiyya-Madrassa complex itself where new gypsum plaster windows with coloured glass were made.⁶² The specialist artisans responsible for these new windows were brought from Istanbul by Mehmed Nihad Bey. Two of them later died as a consequence of the difficult and unhealthy working conditions in wartime Damascus. Mehmed Nihad Bey himself was also forced to abandon his work because of illness (malaria). He returned to Istanbul in the spring of 1918; in July 1918 he resumed his work for the Ministry of Pious Foundations. Supervision of the renovation project was taken over by Reşid Bey who, in October 1918 when British and Sherifial forces captured Damascus, only narrowly managed to escape leaving behind all his personal belongings and returned to Istanbul completely destitute.⁶³ Although the renovation project was nearly finished when Mehmed Nihad Bey left, it is possible that it was actually never fully completed. For Mehmed Nihad Bey the project resulted in a bitter aftertaste. In 1919 he was asked critical questions about the “excessive” sum of money he had “wasted” on the renovation of a complex in a city which was no longer part of the Ottoman Empire. This incident once again underlines the political motives behind the renovation project.⁶⁴ As long as Damascus was Ottoman it was well-spent money; once lost it was wasted money.

The Second Salah al-Din

Another important project of Cemal Pasha's focused on the environs of the Great (Umayyad) Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din (Saladin)



FIGURE 9.19 *The Great (Umayyad) Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din (Saladin) shortly after World War I (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*




FIGURE 9.20 *Antique remains before the clearing (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

to the north of that mosque. On 11 May 1916 Cemal Pasha obtained the sum of 100,000 *kuruş* from the Ministry of Pious Foundations for the expropriation and demolition of buildings that in the course of time had encroached on the Madrasa al-Kallasa and the Madrasa al-ʿAziziyya and the adjacent tomb of the Ayyubid ruler Salah al-Din (1137/8–1193).⁶⁵ Although the relevant Ottoman document only mentions the environs of the two madrasas, in practice Cemal Pasha’s “cleaning up” operation also aimed at the demolition of buildings encroaching on the Umayyad Mosque itself. The goal was to clear pre-Islamic remains in the area of detrimental additions,⁶⁶

accentuate both the Umayyad Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din (by creating more “monumental” entrance-ways) and obtain less obstructed views of these religiously important monuments by clearing their immediate surroundings.⁶⁷ The ruinous state of many of the buildings including the Madrasa al-ʿAziziyya formed a further detraction and thus motivation for the sanitization of this area.⁶⁸ Although the concept of “glorification by isolation” originates in Europe, Ottoman urban modernizers had in the second half of the nineteenth century already adopted this policy of “selective preservation” of important



FIGURE 9.21 *Antique remains after the clearing (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

monuments.⁶⁹ In this light Cemal Pasha's project is merely a continuation of an already well-established Ottoman practice, which however – as we will see – in the case of Damascus served pan-Islamic wartime propaganda.

The tomb of Salah al-Din throughout Ottoman times had gained the attention of Ottoman rulers. A painted Ottoman-Turkish text on a tile lunette in the interior of the tomb (dated 1027 AH/1617–1618 CE) refers to Salah al-Din as the Conqueror of Jerusalem (“Fātiḥ-i Maḳdis”). In the same text Sultan Osman II (1618–1622) is mentioned as “His Majesty Sultan Osman Khan, the Champion of Islam” (“Ḥāzret-i Sultān ‘Osmān Han Gāzi”). The newly-enthroned, young and ambitious Sultan Osman II apparently wanted to be associated with the Champion of (Sunni) Islam *par excellence* who had reconquered Jerusalem from the European Crusaders in 1187 and whose Arabic title was “al-Sultān al-Ghāzi.” In the second half of the nineteenth century this important symbolic link between Salah al-Din and the Ottoman sultans gained new momentum. Ziya Pasha, Ottoman governor of Damascus from February to June 1877, started a renovation of Salah al-Din's tomb. This renovation coincided with the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman War in April 1877.⁷⁰ It is likely that the present state of the interior of the tomb with its partially tiled walls is the result of this renovation.⁷¹ A year later, in 1878, Sultan ‘Abdülhamid II commissioned a new, white marble sarcophagus in Ottoman Baroque-Rococo style for the tomb. ‘Abdülhamid II thus consciously appropriated Salah al-Din's reputation in the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman war in order to bolster his status as caliph and sultan.⁷² In November 1898 the German Kaiser Wilhelm II during his tour of the Ottoman Empire also visited Damascus and the tomb of Salah al-Din. During his stay in Damascus he delivered a speech on German-Muslim friendship and an eulogy of Salah al-Din in which he described the Ayyubid ruler as “the greatest hero of all past rulers, the noble man whose rank increased by teaching his enemies how heroes ought to be; the fearless fighter, the great Sultan Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi.”⁷³ In 1900 the Kaiser presented a gilded brass laurel mourning wreath in remembrance of his visit to Salah al-Din's tomb. This wreath was installed in a glass display case at the foot of ‘Abdülhamid II's sarcophagus.⁷⁴ By the beginning of the twentieth century Salah al-Din's exemplary role was well established both in the Ottoman Empire and beyond.⁷⁵ Hence it comes as no surprise that during World War I Cemal Pasha tried to take advantage of Salah al-Din's reputation among the local Muslim population by associating himself with this Champion of Islam against the European Crusaders and presenting himself as the leader of an Ottoman-led counter-crusading




FIGURE 9.22 *The tiled interior of the tomb of Salah al-Din with the white marble sarcophagus given by Sultan 'Abdülhamid II and the lamp with the monograms of Wilhelm II and Sultan Mehmed V (Reşad) (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

Jihad against the imperialist invaders of the Islamic World. 'Ali Fu'ad Erden in his memoirs mentions that wherever and whenever Cemal Pasha appeared in public he was described in laudatory poems as the "Second Salah al-Din."⁷⁶ In this case Cemal Pasha consciously used pan-Islamic rhetoric in order to rally Syrian support for the Ottoman cause and fight the "imperialist British and French" and undermine the "separatist Arabists."⁷⁷ Cemal Pasha also used Salah al-Din's name and fame to counterbalance French and British influence in Syria. In 1915 he confiscated a French Crusader church complex in Jerusalem and transformed part of the complex into a new Islamic University named after Salah al-Din. This religious academy had to provide an Ottoman alternative for French schools in the area and break the hegemony of Islamic universities under British control in Egypt and India.⁷⁸

Cemal Pasha's attempt to profile himself as the Second Salah al-Din made it necessary to honour the First Salah al-Din by renovating his tomb and its direct environs. Although the money for the project was assigned in May 1916 the clearing and renovation operation apparently made only slow progress because on 8 December 1917 (just before Cemal Pasha left Damascus) Wiegand wrote to his wife that Cemal Pasha had recently agreed to plans for the construction of the entrance to the Umayyad Mosque and clearing of the area around the tomb of Salah al-Din "after the architect sent by the Ministry of Pious Foundations had wrecked the site because he only demolished without knowing how to secure what remained."⁷⁹ It is possible that this architect of the Ministry of Pious Foundations was Mehmed Nihad Bey who was also responsible for the renovation of the Takkiya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. This reference corroborates the fact that Cemal Pasha used mainly Ottoman personnel for the renovation of religious monuments in Damascus.⁸⁰ Thus not only did the finances for the projects come from the Ministry of Pious Foundations, but also some of the supervising personnel and specialist artisans; additional personnel were hired locally. These religious sites (as religious foundations) fell under the administration of the Ministry of Religious Foundations, and this explains why this ministry was directly involved. However, it is also important to note that Cemal Pasha apparently carefully avoided too much direct and visible German involvement, at least in the renovation of "sensitive" religious architecture.⁸¹ He was no doubt aware of anti-German feelings among the Syrian population who also blamed the Germans for the misery the war had brought them. Moreover, in the eyes of Cemal Pasha the Germans were useful political and military allies in the international arena, but

when it came to internal Ottoman affairs he tried to control German attempts to get a more direct grip on Ottoman Syria.⁸² This no doubt included the religious realm, which was the prerogative of the Ottoman state.

Cemal Pasha's modernization of Damascus also attracted the attention of the Francophone press in Europe which, as part of anti-Ottoman propaganda, severely criticized Cemal Pasha's urban works. He was accused of the systematic demolition of Arab monuments, "even Salah al-Din's tomb would have been destroyed if the German Kaiser hadn't just donated a lamp."⁸³ This lamp with the monograms of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Sultan Mehmed V (Reşad) and dated 1333/1915 symbolized German-Ottoman brotherhood in arms during World War I.⁸⁴ (Fig. 9.22). Although the tomb was not demolished, it is not unlikely that this would indeed have happened in a later phase. Mehmed Nihad Bey's personal archive contains two different designs for new tombs in revivalist styles for Salah al-Din by architect Kemaleddin Bey, the head of the Directorate for Construction and Restoration of the Ministry of Pious Foundations in Istanbul. One design has a more Mamluk-Arab revivalist character; the other design is in the style of the Ottoman revivalist "National Architecture Renaissance." This last style was an attempt to create a patriotic architecture which could refer back to a glorious Ottoman-Islamic past.⁸⁵ These designs suggest that "sanitization" was most probably only the first step in a much more extensive renovation of the area of the Umayyad Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din.⁸⁶ The Ottoman renovation of the Umayyad Mosque itself in the years 1895–1910 after the destructive fire of 1893,⁸⁷ which had "punctuated the incorporation of the 'Arab' past into present-day Ottoman identity,"⁸⁸ would thus have been followed up by the cleaning of the area around the mosque and the construction of a new tomb for Salah al-Din. This tomb would have formed the nucleus of an Ottoman *lieu de mémoire* devoted to Jihad against European Crusaders by consciously linking the final resting place of Salah al-Din to the graves of the "martyred" Ottoman airmen who died in plane crashes in 1914 and were buried in the small cemetery next to the tomb of Salah al-Din.⁸⁹ Although Kemaleddin Bey's designs only mention Salah al-Din,⁹⁰ it is not impossible that the design in Mamluk-Arab revivalist style was a design for a new tomb for Salah al-Din and that the second design in Ottoman revivalist style was the design for a martyrium-tomb for the Ottoman pilots. Two of the "martyrs" were also honoured with a monument at the site of their crash and all three with a monument in revivalist style in Istanbul.⁹¹ Cemal Pasha's Salah al-Din project in Damascus, however, never left the drawing board. After he left the city in December 1917 the clearing



FIGURE 9.23 *The graves of (from left to right) Rasid (observer) Sadık Bey, Tayyareci (pilot) Fethi Bey and Tayyareci (pilot) Nuri Bey. The names of the airmen are written in Ottoman-Turkish on the small dark name boards in front of the graves (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

operation must have dragged on without ever being completed, as can be deduced from Hanauer's description of the area published after World War I:

The great columns of the Roman portico at the east end of the Hamidiyeh Bazaar and the smaller Byzantine colonnade in the former Booksellers' Bazaar, were cleared of the masonry built around them, and set free on all sides. ... The buildings in the region north-west of the Great Mosque and limited on the north by the street running between the Mausolea of Bibars and Saladin, were also demolished during the war, Saladin's tomb alone being spared. The heaps of ruin extend eastward as far as the street commencing at the eastern foot of Madinet el Arūs, and running northward, as far as the above-named street between the Mausolea.⁹²

The Absolute Ruler of Syria

At the point '1' there stood, till the commencement of the Great War, 'a huge old plane tree,' which, according to Murray's Guide for 1868, had 'a custom-house inside it.' This famous tree, as well as the other remarkable

one, at the northern entrance to the Tentmakers' and Saddlers' Bazaar, was swept away when the roads and streets were widened in 1915 by order of Jamâl Pasha.

From the point '1,' the road along the south side of the Tekiyeh Enclosure runs in a straight line due east as far as the new square '2,' in front of the new terminus of the Hedjaz railway. Here a large and imposing station-house with pillared portico and modern 'Sarcenic' façade, arrests our attention. ...

From the Hedjaz station square, a short but wide road leads northward down an inclined plane or ramp, and joins the road up to Şalâhiyeh at the iron bridge over the Barada close to the Victoria Hotel.

From the station square, the great Boulevard of Jamâl Pasha, with its avenues of shady trees, fountains and flower-beds, reaches eastward as far as the tram-line that passes the Citadel on its way to the Merjêh and Şalâhiyeh. At the eastern end of this 'Boulevard' we notice on our right the 'Mushiriyeh,' or Military Administration Building, with a flower garden (marked 'b'), in front of it, and on our left, just opposite, another smaller flower-garden, in which, after the retreat of the Allies from Gallipoli, a very large model, made of cement, etc., representing the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmora, was especially constructed for propaganda purposes. The depression representing the great water-way was flooded from the canal 'Nahr Banias,' and three toy ships floated on the surface of 'the Sea of Marmora.' The sense of proportion shown in the construction of this model may be gathered from the fact that these ships rivalled the mountains on either side in size, and a fourth vessel would have quite choked up 'the sea'!⁹³

Hanauer's description above adequately summarizes the most important component of Cemal Pasha's urban modernization project: the widening of existing streets and the construction of new straight and wide roads, an ideal of Ottoman urban modernizers since the second half of the nineteenth century.⁹⁴ In addition he mentions an interesting example of war propaganda in the front garden of the Military Headquarters: a model of the 1915 Battle of Çanakkale which must have had special meaning for Cemal Pasha as Minister of the Navy.⁹⁵ Cemal Pasha's road building activities mainly concentrated on the area to the west of Dasmascus *intra muros*, where since the second half of the nineteenth century a modern Ottoman city centre had emerged.⁹⁶

The widening of existing roads and the construction of new ones led to expropriations and the demolition of existing buildings in the years 1915–1918. For the construction of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard (Cemal




FIGURE 9.24 *Cemal Pasha Boulevard after World War I (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

Paşa Caddesi, shortly after the war renamed Nasr Street) part of the old governor's Saray, at that moment used as Military Headquarters,⁹⁷ the Saray Square, and a number of military barracks and depots⁹⁸ along the existing narrow road (Darb al-Marj) to the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya were demolished. At the beginning of the new boulevard near the citadel, the widening of Sanjaqdar and Darwishiyya Streets and the construction of the new boulevard⁹⁹ resulted in the partial demolition and modification or complete demolition of four mosques,¹⁰⁰ a madrasa,¹⁰¹ the flea market¹⁰² and numerous houses. Watzinger remarked that “not only the front halves of many houses but also a revered mosque were demolished much to the bitterness of the Arabs.”¹⁰³ Although Cemal Pasha also ordered the demolition of Ottoman buildings, these had mainly military and administrative functions. It is likely that in the eyes of Cemal Pasha these buildings were anyhow no longer representative enough and that he planned to construct new ones either along his new boulevard or in other parts of the city. However, when it came to religious buildings he was much more discriminatory. Whereas Arab mosques were wiped off the map with one stroke of a pen,¹⁰⁴ religious buildings from the Ottoman period were carefully integrated in his plans. Both the Takiyya al-Mawlawiyya (Mevlevi Lodge, 1585) and the Mosque and Tomb of Lutfi Pasha (1520s–1530s) were maintained; the last building was also modified and renovated in 1917. Part of the complex of Lutfi Pasha even extended on to the pavement of the new boulevard.¹⁰⁵ (Fig. 9.1)



FIG. 9.25A–B Cemal Pasha Boulevard with the Tomb of Lufti Pasha extending on the sidewalk (from postcards in the collection of the author).



FIGURE 9.26 *Cemal Pasha Boulevard with the Ottoman flag-shaped parterres (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

The ruthless way in which Cemal Pasha proceeded with his project further contributed to the resentment of the local population towards Ottoman rule caused by his other policies and acts, and the misery the war had brought. It also illustrates how Cemal Pasha considered himself to be the Absolute Ruler of Syria who would suffer no contradiction.¹⁰⁶

Work on his boulevard began most likely in 1915,¹⁰⁷ before the arrival of Zürcher in early 1916. Cemal Pasha in his memoirs writes that the new street was made by “a Jewish engineer named Wilbuschewitz.”¹⁰⁸ It is thus not clear whether Cemal Pasha’s architectural consultant Maximilian Zürcher was actually involved in the planning and designing of the boulevard itself or whether he later only contributed to the designs for new buildings along the street. Cemal Pasha was exceedingly proud of the street which he named after himself. In his memoirs he writes, “The boulevard I had constructed in Damascus is, I think, not surpassed in beauty in any city of the east.”¹⁰⁹ The *pièce de résistance* of Cemal Pasha’s urban projects was a 650 metre long and 45 metre wide street consisting of two lanes lined with trees. In the middle of the two lanes was a promenade also lined with two rows of trees. Between the two rows of trees were parterres with grass, shrubs and single trees. At three intervals the parks alternated with circular ponds. At the beginning of the boulevard near the citadel, the promenade was decorated with parterres in the shape of the Ottoman flag (crescent moon and star)



FIGURE 9.27 *The square in front of the Hejaz Railway Station (to the right) and Cemal Pasha Boulevard (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

and a small fountain. After the war the star of this symbol of Ottoman rule was replaced by a (similarly symbolic) kiosk in Parisian style and the crescent-shaped parterre remodelled (Fig. 9.24). At the end of the boulevard on the square in front of the Hejaz Railway Station Cemal Pasha wanted a monumental fountain.¹¹⁰ From this square another new wide road, Sa'd Allah Jabi Street built in 1916–1917,¹¹¹ connected the Hejaz Railway Station to the Barada river bridge, and from there to the Marja Square and Salihiyya. Cemal Pasha contacted Wiegand and told him that he wanted Karl Wulzinger to design the new fountain. In a letter to his wife (dated 10 January 1917) Wiegand gave the following description: “[t]he ‘water feature’ should be Oriental, but not a building with a roof (sebil), it should be a fountain, but it should also have cascades, it should, however, not obscure the station and thus be low to the ground. But that will make the cascades difficult then. It should also have lions and the paws of one of these lions should rest on a Turkish banner – well all that will probably be hard to realize. But Wulzinger has made a design and in any case an axonometric perspective will be made.”¹¹² Like many other of Cemal Pasha’s plans this fountain never materialized.

In addition Cemal Pasha had planned to build along the new boulevard a complete range of new public buildings such as a new military headquarters building (replacing the partially demolished complex), a court of justice, a post and telegraph office and various other government




FIGURE 9.28 Construction of Sa'd Allah Jabi Street during World War I (from a postcard in the collection of the author).



FIGURE 9.29 The middle part of Cemal Pasha Boulevard with empty plots of land (to the right of the street) (from a postcard in the collection of the author).

offices such as the municipality.¹¹³ A number of these offices were at that moment still located in the nearby Marja Square, the centre of late Ottoman administration. Cemal Pasha's plans suggest that he wanted to relocate part of this centre to the new ceremonial axis of modern Ottoman Damascus. Among the papers of Kemaleddin Bey in the archive of



FIGURE 9.30 *The crossroads of modern Ottoman Damascus: Boulevard Cemal Pasha, the square in front of the Hejaz Railway Station, Saïd Allah Jabi Street, and in the upper right corner the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya Complex (from a postcard in the collection of the author).*

Mehmed Nihad Bey is also a design for a new six-storey high commercial building at the beginning of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard opposite the Citadel and the Military Headquarters.¹¹⁴ Before the construction of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard and the widening of the Sanjaqdar Street this area had been occupied by a number of buildings which were either partially or completely demolished. The plot of land was the property of the Ministry of Pious Foundations, and head architect Kemaleddin Bey made a design for the new building which closely resembled his designs for similar buildings (*Vakıf Han*) in Istanbul.¹¹⁵ Among the other commercial buildings Cemal Pasha wanted to construct along his street were a bank, a hotel and a bathhouse. In 1917 he also began building a mosque named after himself next to the Takiyya al-Mawlawiyya at the end of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard opposite the Hejaz Railway Station. The mosque was apparently never finished.¹¹⁶

The Cemal Pasha Boulevard aimed at creating a straight and wide connection between the old city *intra muros* and the modern Ottoman city centre. This connection would function as a ceremonial axis from the restored Umayyad Mosque (1895–1910) and renovated (or new?) tomb of Salah al-Din (1916–1918) via the modern shopping arcade Suq al-Hamidiyya (1883–1890)¹¹⁷ and the monumental Cemal Pasha Boulevard (1915–1918) to the new Hejaz Railway Station (1913–1917),¹¹⁸

and the renovated Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya (1916–1918) which formed the centre of a developing campus of higher education and medical services. From there an extension of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard created a connection with the Hamidiyya barracks.¹¹⁹ Already during World War I the street was used for various parades which showcased the (military) presence of the Ottoman state and “allowed” the local population to express their allegiance to the state during the war.¹²⁰ The Cemal Pasha Boulevard thus had an important wartime propaganda function. In addition the promenade soon turned out to be a favourite location for the inhabitants of Damascus to go gallivanting.¹²¹ Last but not least, the new street redirected the ceremonial hajj route in Damascus itself which, before the completion of the Hejaz Railway Station in 1917, was still orientated at (the) Qadam (Station) in Midan to the south of Damascus *intra muros*. Although the war had interrupted the yearly hajj it is likely that the authorities after the war would have used the Cemal Pasha Boulevard for some of the religious processions held before the departure of the pilgrims embarking on the last leg of their journey by train from the new Hejaz Railway Station.¹²² The plan for a fountain – an important form of Islamic charity – in front of the station, the construction of the Cemal Pasha Mosque next to the Takiyya al-Mawlawiyya opposite the station, and the renovation of the nearby Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya complex which throughout Ottoman times had played an important role in the yearly hajj further strengthens the hypothesis that his boulevard also served pan-Islamic propaganda (Fig. 9.30)

Two documents dated 21 September 1918 deal with the expropriation by the municipality of all land twenty metres deep on both sides of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard. These documents corroborate that the authorities – even after Cemal Pasha had left Syria and shortly before the capture of the city by British and Sherifial troops in October 1918 – were still occupied with the creation of the Ottoman ceremonial axis, which, however, was never completed.¹²³

The restoration of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya, the sanitization of the area around the Umayyad Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din, and the modernization of the street network of Damascus, which included the construction of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard, all formed part of Cemal Pasha’s comprehensive programme of Ottomanization. His interest in pre-Islamic antiquities and Islamic patrimony in combination with modernization policies is emblematic of late Ottoman modernity.¹²⁴ As such he was a man of his time. However, in the case of Cemal Pasha’s Damascus World War I provided an extra impulse selectively to appropriate the Arab-Islamic past into the Ottoman

present and to focus more than ever before on Ottoman-Islamic heritage in combination with modernization.¹²⁵ This strategy served top-down Ottomanization and pan-Islamic wartime propaganda which aimed to reassert Ottoman state authority in Syria and gain support for the empire among the local Muslim population during World War I. Ironically, Cemal Pasha's surge of state-led Ottomanization and pan-Islamic propaganda had an adverse effect. Discriminatory restorations and unscrupulous urban modernization merely reinforced the resentment caused by his "reign of terror" and further alienated Syrians from Ottoman rule in spite of the fact that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they had become more Ottoman than ever before.¹²⁶

Notes

- 1 James Edward Hanauer, "Notes on Changes made in the City during the Great War", *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 56, no. 2 (1924), p. 68.
- 2 M. Talha Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria. Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914–1917* (London-New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 1–12.
- 3 Hasan Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar. Osmanlıcılık, Erken Arap Milliyetçiliği ve İslamcılık (1908–1918)* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), pp. 217–226. For Cemal Pasha's own memoirs dealing with his stay in Syria see Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar*, İstanbul 2001, pp. 172–371.
- 4 Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, pp. 16–24, 191–194; and Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2001), pp. 364–367.
- 5 Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, p. 193; Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar*, 364; p. and Ali Fu'ad Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Suriye Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003), pp. 173–175.
- 6 Cemal Pasha's projects were collected in two albums which were kept in the Ministry of the Navy. See Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, p. 366; and Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, p. 175. My attempt to find these albums in the Archive of the Maritime Museum (*Deniz Müzesi Komutanlığı Deniz Tarihi Arşivi*) in Istanbul was unfortunately not successful.
- 7 Anonymous, *Suriye ve Filistin ve Garbi 'Arabistan Abidat-i 'Atikası/Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina und Westarabien* (Berlin: Reimer, 1918). The complete text of the dedication in French is as follows: 'A mon ami M. Zürcher! Souvenir de l'époque de travaux sérieux! Klosters: le 28.9.19. A. Djémal.'
- 8 Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, pp. 194–196; Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar*, pp. 364–367; Ali Cengizkan, "Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk'in Katkıları, Evkaf İdaresi ve Mimar Kemalettin", in *Mimar Kemalettin ve Çağı: Mimarlık/Toplumsal Yaşam/Politika*, ed. Ali Cengizkan (Ankara: Mimarlar Odası & Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, 2009), pp. 180–190.
- 9 Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar*, pp. 369–370; Erden, *Suriye hatıraları*, pp. 176–177; Hans von Kiesling, *Damaskus. Altes und Neues aus Syrien* (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche

Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1919), p. 34; Theodor Wiegand, *Halbmond im letzten Viertel. Archäologische Reiseberichte* (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 1985), pp. 198–202; Carl Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand* (München: C.H. Beck, 1944), p. 289; Leila Hudson, *Transforming Damascus. Space and Modernity in an Islamic City* (London-New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008), pp. 124–125; and Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, pp. 194–196.

- 10 Ahmed Cemal Paşa/Ahmed Djemal Pascha, “İfade-i meram/Vorwort”, in *Suriye ve Filistin ve Garbi ‘Arabistan Abidat-i ‘Atikası/Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina und Westarabien*, unpaginated. See also Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 35; Wiegand, *Halbmond*, pp. 198–202; and Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, p. 194. The main goal of the members of the *Denkmalschutzkommando* itself seems to have been the studying, publication and preservation of antique remains. See Theodor Wiegand, “Denkmal-Schutz in Syrien”, *Klio: Beiträge zur alten Geschichte* 15 (1918), pp. 422–425. Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand*, p. 289, mentions Cemal Pasha’s goal with the publication: “Er sprach von einer Veröffentlichung der antiken und islamischen Denkmäler im Bereich der 4. Türkischen Armee, durch die er bei der Bevölkerung das Verständnis für die eigene Vergangenheit wecken wolle.” According to Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand*, p. 298, Wiegand did not have a high opinion of Cemal Pasha’s “coffee table book.” “Von der wissenschaftlichen Publikation verspreche ich [Wiegand] mir sehr viel, von der anderen natürlich gar nichts als ein Bilderbuch, das ich auch nicht mit meinem Namen decken möchte.” The members of the *Denkmalschutzkommando* after the war published a series of six scholarly studies: Theodor Wiegand (mit Beiträgen von Friedrich Freiherrn Kress von Kressenstein), *Sinai* (= *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutsch-türkischen Denkmalschutzkommandos*, Heft 1) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1920); Albrecht Alt, *Die griechischen Inschriften der Palästina Tertia westlich der ‘Araba* (= *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutsch-türkischen Denkmalschutzkommandos*, Heft 2) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1921); Walter Bachmann, Carl Watzinger, Theodor Wiegand (mit einem Beitrage von Karl Wulzinger), *Petra* (= *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutsch-türkischen Denkmalschutzkommandos*, Heft 3) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1921); Carl Watzinger und Karl Wulzinger, *Damaskus: die antike Stadt* (= *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutsch-türkischen Denkmalschutzkommandos*, Heft 4) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1921); Karl Wulzinger und Carl Watzinger, *Damaskus: die islamitische Stadt* (= *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutsch-türkischen Denkmalschutzkommandos*, Heft 5) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1924); Franz Weissbach, *Die Denkmäler und Inschriften an der Mündung des Nahr El-Kelb* (= *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutsch-türkischen Denkmalschutzkommandos*, Heft 6) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1922).
- 11 Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, pp. 191–196; and Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand*, pp. 300 and 319.
- 12 Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar*, pp. 225–226.
- 13 Hudson, *Transforming Damascus*, p. 123.
- 14 *Ibid.*, pp. 122–126. Hudson also makes a number of factual mistakes. For instance *ibid.*, p. 125: “One project particularly important to Jamal was the renovation of the *Selimiyya mosque complex built in the 1550s and 1560s by the Ottoman Sultan Selim, who had conquered Egypt* [*italics added*] – as Jamal himself was hoping to

do in the Suez campaigns he led against the British.” The Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya was built in the years 1554–1559 by Sultan Süleyman (1520–1566) whose father Selim I had conquered Egypt in 1517. The adjacent Madrasa al-Salimiyya, however, was completed by Süleyman’s successor Selim II in 1566–1567.

- 15 Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, pp. 191–196.
- 16 Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 202, gives the sum of 150,000 Deutschmark.
- 17 BOA DH.ŞFR 63/296 (dated 28 Nisan 1332 Rumi/8 Receb 1334 AH/11 May 1916 CE): Şam’daki Selimiye câmi’-i şerifiyle Süleymâniye ‘imâret ve tekiyesiniñ bu sene yapılan ta’miri için taleb buyurılan altı bin liralık ...
- 18 Gülru Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire* (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), pp. 224–230.
- 19 Josias Porter, *Five Years in Damascus: Including an Account of the History, Topography, and Antiquities of that City ...* (London: John Murray, 1855), 2 vols., I, p. 76: “The mosk and hospital of Sultan Selim is a splendid structure, and beautifully situated on the banks of the river west of the city.”; Isabel Burton, *The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine, and the Holy Land: from my Private Journal* (London: Henry S. King & Co., 1875), 2 vols., I, p. 25: “The first building we passed was imposing – the Tekiyeh, founded in 1516 by Sultan Salim I. for the accommodation of Meccan pilgrims.”; Karl Baedeker, *Palästina und Syrien: Handbuch für Reisende* (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1875), p. 509: “Die Tekkiye ist um das Jahr 1516 von Sultan Selim gebaut und zwar besonders zum Zwecke der Beherbergung von Pilgern, wozu sie auch jetzt noch dient.”; and Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, *Vom Mittelmeer zum Persischen Golf. Durch den Haurân, die Syrische Wüste und Mesopotamien* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer (Ernst Vohsen), 1899–1900), 2 vols., I, p. 62: “Damaskus ist der Hauptsammelplatz für die nach Mekka ziehenden Pilgerkarawanen und bildet die letzte grosse Station auf den Routen von Nordwesten und Nordosten nach den heiligen Stätten. Der Beherbergung dieser Pilger dient vornehmlich die grosse, von Sultan Selim (um 1516) zu diesem Zwecke erbaute Tekkije, von deren schönen Minarets sich eine herrliche Rundsicht über die Stadt bietet. In dem riesigen Hofe dieses Gebäudes und auf den benachbarten Feldern, wo zahlreiche Zelte aufgeschlagen werden, sammeln sich alljährlich die Gläubigen zu ihrem frommen Zuge.” See also Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 77.
- 20 Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 20: “Djemal Pascha überträgt seine Vorliebe für Sultan Selim, den Eroberer Ägyptens, auch auf die Bauten dieses Sultans in Syrien. Ich ging deshalb vormittags 9 Uhr nach der Selimije- und Tekije-Moschee und sah mir die Erneuerungsarbeiten an, für die Djemal vom Evkafministerium 150 000 Mark verlangt und bekommen hat.”
- 21 Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, p. 39: “Inşallah sizi Mısır Fatih-i sanisi olarak selamlamaya gelirim.” Cf. Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, p. 195: “Upon a request from Hüseyin Vassaf to the ‘second conqueror of Egypt,’ Cemal ‘restored, decorated, and furnished’ the tomb of Muhyiddin al Arabi, one of the most prominent figures in Sufi history. The tomb was built by the first conqueror of Egypt, Selim II [sic].” Cf. Stefan Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels. Stadt, Architektur und Gesellschaft des osmanischen Damaskus im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert”, *EJOS* 9, no. 1 (2006), p. 412.

- 22 Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, pp. 225 and 229; Kiesling, *Damaskus*, pp. 76–77; Esra Doğan, “Kaçar Dönemi Sefernâmelerinde Osmanlı Hac Kervanları”, in *Dersaadet’ten Haremeyn’e Surre-i Hümayun*, eds. Yusuf Çağlar & Salih Gülen (İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2008), pp. 220–221; and Murat Kargılı, *Kutsal Yolculuk Hac. Kartpostallarla Hac Yolu* (İstanbul: Denziler Kitabevi, 2014), p. 20.
- 23 Hudson, *Transforming Damascus*, pp. 96 and 122.
- 24 Alfred von Kremer, *Topographie von Damaskus* (Wien: Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1854–1855), 2 vols., II, p. 29.
- 25 Burton, *The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine, and the Holy Land*, I, p. 25: “The Tekiyeh now serves as a ‘refuge for the destitute.’”
- 26 Kiesling, *Damaskus*, pp. 78, 84–85.
- 27 Cengizkan, “Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk”, pp. 187–188.
- 28 For this discussion see Wendy Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology, and the Visualization of History in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Wendy Shaw, “Museums and Narratives of Display from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic”, *Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World* 24 (2007), pp. 253–279; and *Scramble for the Past. A Story of Archaeology in the Ottoman Empire 1753–1914*, eds. Zainab Bahrani, Zeynep Çelik & Edhem Eldem (İstanbul: Salt, 2011).
- 29 Zeynep Çelik, “Defining Empire’s Patrimony: Late Ottoman Perceptions of Antiquities”, in *Scramble for the Past. A Story of Archaeology in the Ottoman Empire 1753–1914*, eds. Zainab Bahrani, Zeynep Çelik & Edhem Eldem (İstanbul: Salt, 2011), p. 469.
- 30 Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand*, p. 289: “Er sprach von einer Veröffentlichung der antiken und islamischen Denkmäler im Bereich der 4. Türkischen Armee, durch die er bei der Bevölkerung das Verständnis für die eigene Vergangenheit wecken wolle.”
- 31 In the sixteenth century (and later) the professorship of the religious school was assigned to the Hanafi mufti of Damascus. See Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, p. 225.
- 32 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, 1–1014, pp. 168–184, 473–474, 493–494, 503–504. Jean Sauvaget, *Les monuments historiques de Damas* (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1932), p. 78, indicates that the Takiyya had become a faculty of medicine (after World War I and before 1932).
- 33 Cengizkan, “Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk”, p. 188.
- 34 Ibid., p. 187: “... kıymetli çinileri çalınmış ...” The theft of and international trade in Islamic artefacts (in particular tiles) was a concern of both late Ottoman intellectuals and authorities and played an important role in the ongoing debate on the empire’s cultural heritage. For the theft of and trade in tiles in Syria see Marcus Milwright, “An Arabic Description of the Activities of Antique Dealers in Late Ottoman Damascus”, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 143, no. 1 (2011), pp. 8–18.
- 35 Cengizkan, “Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk”, p. 188: “Bozuk çinileri söküp tekrar yerlerine koydurdum.”

- 36 In the Ottoman revivalist “National Architecture Renaissance” which emerged as the main architectural style in the period from 1908 onwards, tilework played a dominant role as an architectural decoration. This no doubt contributed to the importance of the refurbishment of the tilework of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. For the “National Architecture Renaissance” see Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building. Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle-London: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 16–46.
- 37 Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, p. 227.
- 38 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 664, mentions an earlier Ottoman restoration in 1261/1845. It is not known what kind of works were carried out as part of this restoration.
- 39 The plan and axonometric projection of the Takiyya in Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, p. 223, mistakenly show only 10 guest rooms. Unfortunately the plan contains several other mistakes. A correct plan is in Karl Wulzinger und Carl Watzinger, *Damaskus: die islamitische Stadt* (= *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen des deutsch-türkischen Denkmalschutzkommandos*, Heft 5) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1924), 110; or in Abd Al-Qadir al-Rihawi and Émilie E. Ouéchék, “Les deux Takiyya de Damas. La Takiyya et la Madrasa Sulaymāniyya du Marǧ et la Takiyya As-Salimiyya de Šālihiyya”, *Bulletin d’Études Orientales* 28 (1975): between pp. 224 and 225.
- 40 All tile lunettes have the same design. However, in one of the panels four tiles have been incorrectly positioned, thus creating a slightly distorted design.
- 41 Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, p. 13.
- 42 Abdurrezzak Tek, “Sa’dilik ve Sa’diyye Kültürünün Bursa’daki Temsilcileri”, *T.C. Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 18, no. 1 (2009), p. 227.
- 43 Enver Çakar, “xvi. Yüzyılda Şam Beylerbeyiliğinin idarî taksimatı”, *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 13, no. 1 (2003), pp. 364–365. Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, p. 44, give ca. 970 AH/1562–1563 as the date. Cf. Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 136, footnote 436.
- 44 Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, p. 225.
- 45 Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, pp. 13–15 and 17. The no longer existing Lala Mustafa Pasha Mosque built in 1566/67 also had tilework. For this mosque see Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 136; and Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, pp. 44 and 52–55.
- 46 One panel on the west wall and another panel on the north wall. Some of the missing tiles are nowadays in museums such as the National Museum in Deir ez-Zor (Syria) which before the civil war had a small panel with six tiles on display. These tiles must have been removed from the Madrasa al-Salimiyya after 1918 because some of the tiles have a warm ivory white background and others a cold, blue-ish white background.
- 47 Seven tile lunettes of the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque have a design which resembles that of the Type 1–3 lunettes of the Takiyya. However, 28 other tile lunettes of the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque have unique designs which resemble the designs of the Type 4 lunettes of the Takiyya.

- 48 Charles Wilson, *Picturesque Palestine, Sinai and Egypt* (London: J.S. Virtue & Co., 1881), 4 vols., II, p. 163. For a rare nineteenth-century photograph of the hospice with its tile lunettes (unfortunately not clearly visible) see Badr el-Hage, *Des photographes à Damas 1840–1918* (Paris: Marval, 2000), p. 98. More nineteenth-century photographs of the complete complex are on pp. 77, 104, and 105.
- 49 Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand*, p. 299: “Am 21. Januar [1917] trafen Wulzinger und Watzinger nach sechstägiger (!) Fahrt von Jerusalem in Damaskus ein. Nach den ersten Orientierungsgängen wurde sofort mit der Aufnahme der islamischen Bauten begonnen, zunächst der Selim- und Suleiman-Moschee, die als erste türkische Baudenkmäler auf arabischem Boden gerade im Auftrag des Paschas restauriert wurden.”
- 50 Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, p. 111: “Die Sulaimânije ist das Geschenk der osmanischen Eroberer an die syrische Stadt, ein novum. Es war kein Zufall, daß sich Dschemal Paschas Eifer besonders der Erhaltung dieses Baues zuwandte.”
- 51 Ibid., p. 111: “Ferner wirken als farbige Belebung die Kielbogigen Fayencelünetten, die über allen Fenstern und Türen eingefügt sind In der Zeichnung gehen diese Fliesen durchaus mit den persisch-osmanischen Mustern des 16. Jahrh. überein. Gefüllte Kranz- und Kelchpalmetten verschlingen sich mit den an Spitze und Kanten eingerollten Lanzettblättern. Die Fliesen, die technisch zu den sogenannten türkischen Halbfayencen gehören, da sie unter durchsichtiger Glasur auf einer Engobe gemalt sind, werden doch wahrscheinlich in einer Damaszener Werkstätte hergestellt sein, da nirgends Bolusrot angewendet ist und nur ein tiefes Kobaltblau als Grund, hellgrün in zwei Nuancen, kaltes Meergrün (vert émeraude) und warmes saftiges Gelbgrün, neben einem braunen Manganviolett vorkommen. Letzteres dient auch zur Konturierung ...”
- 52 In late 1916 or early 1917. Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 78: “Die von Dschemal Pascha in die Wege geleitete Restaurierung hat erst begonnen.” Von Kiesling was a military friend of Wiegand whom he visited in Damascus somewhere in the period January–March 1917 before he was sent to Mesopotamia as commander of the 56th Ottoman infantry regiment. See C. Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand*, p. 302.
- 53 Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 80: “Auch die Suleimanie, die größere und imposantere der beiden Tekkien, besitzt prachtvoll Fayencen. Hier finden sie sich hauptsächlich in Spitzbogen- und Kielbogenform über den Zellentüren des Hofes zu einem harmonisch zusammenschwingenden Ornament vereinigt. Als besonders eigenartig muß bei diesen Fayencen die sonst überaus seltene Zusammenstellung von Blau und Gelb erwähnt werden. Merkwürdig ist, daß, die rote Farbe, die bei den Azulejos der maurischen Kunst häufig ist, bei sämtlichen in Damaskus vorgefundenen Fayencen nicht vorkommt.” Von Kiesling mistakenly writes that the tiles combine the colours blue and yellow. He is probably mixing up the tiles of the Dome of the Rock and those of the Takiyya. His second observation, however, is important because it corroborates that the original tiles of the Takiyya did not use the colour red.
- 54 For instance Sauvaget, *Les monuments historiques de Damas*, pp. 78–81; Godfrey Goodwin, “The Tekke of Süleyman I, Damascus”, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*

110–111 (1978–1979), pp. 127–129; and Çiğdem Kafesçioğlu, “‘In The Image of Rûm’: Ottoman Architectural Patronage in Sixteenth-Century Aleppo and Damascus”, *Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World* 16 (1999), pp. 70–96. The first scholarly publication which mentions the renovation project is Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 413. Weber, however, does not deal with the refurbishment of the tilework.

55 Wilson, *Picturesque Palestine, Sinai and Egypt*, II, p. 164.

56 Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 79: “Die teilweise zerstörten Kachelflächen sind durch Neuinzufügungen ergänzt.” Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, pp. 112–114, give a description of the tiled walls and mihrab, but do not mention the tiled spandrel, the tiled border and the tile lunettes. Wulzinger & Watzinger also do not mention the renovation; their description on page 113, however, corroborates that the original layout of the tilework was maintained: “Im Innern der Moschee fesselt uns vor allem die Bekleidung der Wände mit Fliesen, die auch statt Marmorprofilen den Mihrâb umfahren. Teppichartige Felder werden von lockeren Rankenmuster durchzogen, in das regelmäßig Mandorlen mit Arabesken eingestreut sind; gleiche Lanzettblattarabesken in den Randleisten; die Farben sind Hellblau, Dunkelblau, helles und dunkles Grün und Weiß. Die Mihrâb-nische hat ein halbes Zehneck als Grundriß. Jeder Zehneckstreifen ist einzeln gerahmt und umschließt in den Farben der Wände Mandorlen, die auf einen weißen Grund mit dem chinesischen Wolkenmuster (Tschü) in Hellgrün und Blau gebracht sind.”

57 Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 80: “Im Mihrab der Selimie befinden sich hervorragend schöne Kacheln. Ihr Muster ist ein teppichartiges, das die ältesten und schönsten persischen Elemente in sich schließt. Weiße Linien wechseln mit blaugemusterten Kachelreihen, voneinander jedes einzelne Stück die typische Dekorationsordnung des persischen Teppichs aufweist, nämlich das Mittelmedaillon und das Eckmedaillon. Als Füllung ist das Wolkenband verwendet, das die persische oder besser gesagt zentralasiatische Teppichknüpfkunst aus China übernommen hat.”

58 Ibid., p. 79: “Hierbei ist der Unterschied zwischen alten und neuen Fayencen ganz deutlich erkennbar. Während die alten Arbeiten viel künstlerischer, feiner in der Linienführung, viel schwungvoller in der Zeichnung der Arabesken sind, sieht man der modernen Kachel überall das Gezwungene des Handwerks an, das in der peinlichen Nachahmung einer gegebenen Vorlage seine Stärke sucht. Der Unterschied zwischen dem Handwerker und dem frei schaffenden Künstler tritt deutlich zutage. Auch die Technik hat sich trotz aller Bemühungen noch nicht auf die Höhe der alten erheben können. Es ist noch nicht gelungen, die satte warme Farbgebung der alten Stücke zu erreichen. Das Weiß alter Fayencen ist elfenbeinfarben, während neue stets ein kaltes blaues Weiß zeigen; auch der tiefe Ton von Blau und Grün ist noch nicht erreicht. Die Farbauftragung bei neuen Kacheln ist viel plumper und dicker.”

59 On two photographs taken during the renovation (see Figs 9.6–7) the spandrels of the façade are still empty. The new tiles apparently had not yet been inserted. On one of the photographs the upper row of border tiles is also not yet (re-)installed. This is also the case on the drawing by Karl Stöckle in Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, p. 107.

- 60 See Gülru Necipoğlu, "From International Timurid to Ottoman: a Change of Taste in Sixteenth-Century Ceramic Tiles", *Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World* 7 (1990), pp. 136–170; and idem, "The Dome of the Rock as Palimpsest: Abd al-Malik's Grand Narrative and Sultan Süleyman's Glosses", in *Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World* 25 (2008), pp. 57–65.
- 61 Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 80: "Das ganze altorientalische Kunsthandwerk wurde dort getrieben, Fayencen gemalt, Gipsfenster hergestellt, Metallarbeiten gemacht, Gewebe geknüpft." The drawing of one of the tile lunettes published in Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, p. 106, was also made by Karl Stöckle. For this school see Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", p. 500; and Stefan Weber, "Images of Imagined Worlds. Self-image and Worldview in Late Ottoman Wall Paintings of Damascus", in *The Empire in the City. Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, eds. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp & Stefan Weber (Beirut: Orient Institut, 2002), p. 159.
- 62 Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 80.
- 63 Cengizkan, "Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk", pp. 188–190.
- 64 The costly urban modernization projects also attracted criticism from both Ottoman and German officers. See Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, p. 196; and Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, pp. 174–175. The Syrian journalist Muhammad Kurd 'Ali later also remembered the Takiyya project as a grotesquely lavish restoration. See Hudson, *Transforming Damascus*, p. 122.
- 65 BOA DH.ŞFR 63/298 (dated 28 Nisan 1332 Rumi/8 Receb 1334 AH/11 May 1916 CE): "Câmi'-i şerif-i Emeviye'ye muttaşıl Kellâse ve 'Azîziye medreseleri havâlilerindeki mebânîniñ istimlâkiyle Şalâh el-Dîn-i Eyyübî hâzretleri türbe-i şerifesiniñ hâl-i sâbıkına i'âdesi için taleb buyurılan yüz biñ gurusluk havâle-nâme pöstaya verilerek şarfi telğrafla evkâf müdiriyyetine tebliğ kılınmışdır efendim." For this area see Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, pp. 62–66; and Abd al-Razzaq Moaz, "Note sur le mausolée de Saladin à Damas: son fondateur et les circonstances de sa fondation", *Bulletin d'études orientales* 39–40 (1987–1988), pp. 183–189.
- 66 Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand*, p. 299: "Als nächste Aufgabe [after the study of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya in early 1917] kam die Untersuchung der Omaiadenmoschee und ihrer Umgebung, des antiken Tempel- und Marktbezirks, in Frage, die dadurch erleichtert war, daß Dschemal befohlen hatte, die an die Umfassungsmauern des Bezirks angebauten Häusern und Läden zu enteignen und abzureißen."; and Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 36: "Seit unter Leitung des schweizerischen Ingenieurs Hauck die Freilegung erfolgt ist, bildet sie zusammen mit den byzantinischen Säulen des westlichen Marktdurchgangs nicht nur ein malerisches Denkmal alter längst entschwundener Zeit, sondern auch eine reizvolle Unterbrechung des dichten Straßengewirrs der modernen Stadt."
- 67 Nineteenth-century European travellers often describe the dense urban fabric of the area around the Umayyad Mosque. For instance Burton, *The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine, and the Holy Land*, 1, pp. 84–85: "I think you would regret missing the roof of the book bazar, which leads to the west gate of the Mosque. On its left is a curious flight of steps through private houses. Arriving at the

head of these stairs you can see four massive columns in a line, and at each end a square pier of masonry with a semi-column on the inner side. The shafts alone are visible from the bazar, as the capitals rise over the domed roof. The people will not mind our scrambling over their roofs, as we are 'harim,' and then we can examine both capitals and superstructure. These pillars formerly formed part of the magnificent pagan temple, which must have extended some 600 yards square, for there are columns here and there in situ, all in four straight lines. They are unnoticed, because the bazars, houses, and mud walls cling to them like wasps' nests. They support a rich and beautiful arch, of which only a fragment remains above the roofs; but if you examine this remnant you will say that it is one of the finest of ancient art in Syria. This noble gateway must have been at least 80 feet long and 70 feet high." ; and Porter, *Five Years in Damascus*, I, pp. 64–65: "Leaving the mosk by the southern door, called *Bab ez-Ziâdeh*, we observe two colonnades running southward parallel to each other. Following the line of these through the silk-thread bazaar, we enter the silversmiths' bazaar, to the roof of which we ascend by a rather difficult staircase, and from it obtain one of the finest views of the southern side of the mosk. Here we see a long range of round-arched windows, which, together with the character of the masonry, seem to indicate that the whole of this wall was erected before the Mohammedan era. At the south-western angle is a section of masonry with pilasters, of a still earlier date; and on proceeding to the great windows in the end of the transept we can trace with ease and accuracy the limits of another ancient fragment. This latter is of high antiquity, and formed part of a once splendid edifice. It was left in its present position in order to preserve a spacious doorway whose sides and top are richly ornamented with sculptured scroll-work and leaves, somewhat similar in design and execution to those in the great temple at Bâ'albek. On each side of this door is a smaller one of similar workmanship. The circular top of that on the east can just be seen above the roof of the bazaar; but by looking down a little opening to a chamber on the west, its fellow may be perceived entire." See also pp. 61–62. For similar descriptions see Kremer, *Topographie von Damaskus* I, pp. 34–48, and II, pp. 10 and 12; and Baedeker, *Palästina und Syrien*, pp. 502–506.

68 Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 38, describes the area as "düster und verfallen."

69 Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul. Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 59–63.

70 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", p. 665, dates the renovation by Ziya Pasha to 1293 AH/1876 CE. However, it is likely that the year 1293 is not hijri (AH) but *rumi* (financial year). Hence the renovation coincides with the short governorship of Ziya Pasha in 1877 and the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman war which in Turkish is called the '93 *harbi*' because it coincides with the *rumi* year 1293 (1877–1878 CE).

71 The tile lunette from 1618 was most likely already present in 1877. However, most of the other tiles – among which are seventeenth- and eighteenth-century tiles made in Damascus – that either complement the tile lunette on the upper wall or decorate the lower walls and niches were probably added to the interior during

- the renovation of 1877. The earliest known photographs of the interior of the tomb date from after this renovation and already show the present tile decoration.
- 72 Stefan Heidemann, "Memory and Ideology: Images of Saladin in Syria and in Iraq", in *Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image*, eds. Christiane Gruber & Sune Haugbolle (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 60–61.
 - 73 Abdel-Raouf Sinno, "The Emperor's Visit to the East as Reflected in Contemporary Arabic Journalism", in *Image and Monument: Baalbek 1898–1998*, eds. Hélène Sader, Thomas Scheffler & Angelika Neuwirth (Beirut: Orient Institut, 1998), pp. 115–136. Electronic version at <http://www.abdelraoufsinno.com/periodicals.html>. Quotation taken from electronic version p. 19.
 - 74 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", p. 665. The wreath is nowadays kept at the Imperial War Museum. See <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/30083872>.
 - 75 Late Ottoman hajj pilgrims often visited the tomb during their stay in Damascus. See for instance Yusuf Çağlar, "Mahmil-i Şerif'in Surre-i Hümayun'la İstanbul'dan Haremeyn'e Hac Yolculuğu", in *Dersaadet'ten Haremeyn'e Surre-i Hümayun*, eds. Yusuf Çağlar & Salih Gülen (İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2008), p. 40.
 - 76 Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, p. 231.
 - 77 Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, pp. 56–58.
 - 78 Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar*, p. 368; and Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, pp. 180–184.
 - 79 Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 267.
 - 80 Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 36, mentions the Swiss engineer Hauck who was involved in clearing the antique remains of later additions.
 - 81 The only German specialist involved in the renovation activities of religious architecture seems to have been Karl Stöckle who, as director of the School of Applied Arts, was involved in the production of new tilework for the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya.
 - 82 Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, pp. 150–159.
 - 83 Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 237.
 - 84 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 665–666. The lamp still hangs above the white marble sarcophagus given by Sultan 'Abdülhamid II in the tomb of Salah al-Din.
 - 85 Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, pp. 16–34.
 - 86 The archive of Mehmed Nihad Bey also contains a design by Kemaleddin Bey for a new Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The Noble Sanctuary including the Aqsa Mosque had already been cleared of later additions on the orders of Cemal Pasha. This may also have been the first step in a much more comprehensive renovation project which included constructing a new Ottoman-revivalist Aqsa Mosque. Both Kemaleddin Bey and Mehmed Nihad Bey were in 1922 involved in the restoration of the monuments of the Noble Sanctuary. See Cengizkan, "Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk", pp. 183–184 and 192.
 - 87 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 106–108.
 - 88 Çelik, "Defining Empire's Patrimony", p. 469.

- 89 All three airmen died before the outbreak of World War I during flights to Egypt. Fethi Bey and Sadık Bey crashed their plane on 27 February 1914 near Lake Tiberias. Nuri Bey died on 11 March 1914 when his plane crashed in the Mediterranean Sea near Jaffa. His co-pilot İsmâ'il Hakkı Bey survived the crash. Subsequently, the bodies of the "martyrs" were brought to Damascus and buried next to the tomb of Salah al-Din. See Heidemann, "Memory and Ideology", pp. 61–62; Nureddin Van, "Journey from Istanbul to Cairo and the First Turkish Air Martyrs: Fethi, Sadık and Nuri Beys", *Ozean Journal of Social Sciences* 5, no. 3 (2012), pp. 119–129; and Afife Batur, *M. Vedat Tek. Kimliğinin İzinde bir Mimar* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2003), p. 121.
- 90 Cengizkan, "Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk", pp. 194–195: "Şâm-i şerif'de inşa edilecek Şalâh el-Dîn-i Eyyûbî hâzretlerinin türbelerinin projesidir."
- 91 For the monument for Fethi Bey and Sadık Bey at the crash site see Heidemann, "Memory and Ideology", pp. 61–62. For the monument in Istanbul see Batur, *M. Vedat Tek*, pp. 121–123 and 347–348; and Klaus Kreiser, "Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1840–1916", *Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World* 14 (1997), p. 113.
- 92 Hanauer, "Notes on Changes", pp. 70–71. Photographs in the Creswell Archive (<http://creswell.ashmolean.org/HomePage.html>) show the remains of demolished buildings after World War I (EA.CA.5459; EA.CA.5467–5468; EA.CA.718–720). Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, Tafel 4c, also shows the "heaps of ruin."
- 93 Hanauer, "Notes on Changes", pp. 68–69.
- 94 For these roads see Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 151–153 and 681–690. For this ideal see Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul*, pp. 49–81.
- 95 Cf. Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 198: "An der Wand [in the house of Cemal Pasha] ein scheußliches Ding von Seidenteppich in blau und braun: die Landkarte der Dardanellen nebst Ortsbezeichnungen, gewidmet von einem Frauenklub. Donnerwetter! Ich lobe krampfhaft die feine Technik des Gewebes."
- 96 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 1–454; and Stefan Weber, "Der Marğa-Platz in Damaskus. Die Entstehung eines modernen Stadtzentrum unter den Osmanen als Ausdruck eines strukturellen Wandels (1808–1918)", *Damaszener Mitteilungen* 10 (1998), pp. 291–344, Tafel 77–88. Weber's groundbreaking study of late Ottoman Damascus is published in English as Stefan Weber, *Damascus, Ottoman Modernity and Urban Transformation (1808–1918)* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2009).
- 97 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 674–675.
- 98 Ibid., pp. 632–634.
- 99 Ibid., pp. 683–684, 687 and 690.
- 100 Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, p. 59; Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 465–468 and 657–658; and idem, "Der Marğa-Platz in Damaskus", pp. 325 and 335.
- 101 Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, p. 59, mention a "Medrese Kadschmâsiye"; Weber, "Der Marğa-Platz in Damaskus", p. 153, footnote 468, mentions a Madrasa al-Bayramiyya.
- 102 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 468–469; and idem, "Der Marğa-Platz in Damaskus", p. 325.

- 103 Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand*, p. 300: "Er hatte von der Innenstadt aus seinen breiten 'Boulevard' nach dem neuen Bahnhof durchbrechen lassen, wobei nicht nur die vorderen Hälften vieler Häuser, sondern auch eine altehrwürdige Moschee zur Erbitterung der Araber hatte fallen müssen."; and *ibid.*, p. 319: "Auch sonst kam es immer wieder aus Gründen der Verkehrserschließung oder wegen Straßenerweiterungen zu überflüssigen Zerstörungen antiker und altarabischer Bauten, von denen die Formation meist erst nach der Durchführung Kunde erhielt – 'wie denn das Wort "démolir" für die junge Generation etwas Faszinierendes zu haben scheint." Sie also Wiegand, *Halbmond*, p. 267.
- 104 Cf. Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, p. 114: "Açılacak olan caddeler şehir haritası üzerinde kırmızı çizgilerle çizilir ve ertesi sabah cadde açılmasına başlanırdı."
- 105 Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, pp. 58–59: "Jetzt als Durchgang des n. Bürgersteiges am Boulevard Dschemal Pascha gestaltet, stellt es einen Neubau mit den alten Werkstücken dar. Die frühere W.-Fassade ist das Hauptschmuckstück. Großes querliegendes Zierfeld. Schlingbänder teilen zwei Kreise und ein Quadrat ab. Dies Mittelfeld wird von Streifen mit Blattzinnen und Steinschnittmustern umzogen. Alles in zartestem flachen Relief, wahrscheinlich zum Teil für Pastenausfüllung vorbereitet und unvollendet geblieben (gerauhter Grund). Ganz ähnlich F2 (I) und F4 (I) kleine Kuppel, zwölfseitiger Tambur mit Fenstern renov., darunter das Grab des L. (zur Seite gerückt). Lutfi Pascha starb 957 (1550)." This Ottoman "anomaly" was demolished not long after World War I (before 1932 because Sauvaget, *Les monuments historiques de Damas*, no longer mentions the building). For the fate of Ottoman architecture in Syria after World War I see Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpugh, "An Uneasy Historiography: the Legacy of Ottoman Architecture in the Former Arab Provinces", *Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World* 24 (2007), pp. 27–43.
- 106 Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, p. 132: "O, resmen değil, ama fiilen Suriye ve Filistin'in Umumi Valisi ve 'hakim-i mutlak' idi." See also Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, p. 3. Erden also criticizes the construction of Cemal Pasha's opulent roads. See Erden, *Suriye Hatıraları*, p. 114.
- 107 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 151–153 and 687.
- 108 Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar*, p. 365. Gedaliah Wilbuschewitz (1865–1943) was of Russian-Jewish descent and had migrated to Ottoman Palestine in 1892. He was a mechanical engineer and founded a machine and metal-casting factory in Jaffa. During World War I he served as chief engineer to Cemal Pasha in Damascus. See Yehuda Slutsky, "Wilbuschewitz", in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, eds. Fred Skolnik and Michael Berenbaum (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2007), 26 vols., XXI, p. 58.
- 109 Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar*, p. 366.
- 110 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 151–153. Cf. Kiesling, *Damaskus*, pp. 92–93: "In diesem Quartier sind auch die neuen Straßenanlagen, die Dschemal Pascha geschaffen hat und von welchen eine, der Dschemal-Pascha-Boulevard, seinen Namen trägt. Durch die Niederlegung alter Gebäude, die Verbreitung bestehender Staßenzüge ist hier eine etwa 800 m lange schöne Promenade entstanden, auf beiden Seiten mit Fahrstraßen und innen mit einer jungen Anlage geschmückt, in der Wasserbassins in Abständen wiederkehren und zugeschnittene Boskets den Gangsteig einrahmen."

- 111 Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", p. 689.
- 112 Wiegand, *Halbmond*, pp. 232–233. Cf. Watzinger, *Theodor Wiegand*, p. 300: "Er beauftragte Wulzinger mit dem Entwurf eines Brunnens vor dem neuen Bahnhof nach dem Vorbild des Achmetbrunnens in Konstantinopel." See also Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", p. 421.
- 113 Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar*, p. 366.
- 114 Cengizkan, "Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk", pp. 192–193.
- 115 Ibid., pp. 192–193. Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", p. 468, mentions that in 1933–1934 a new building for the Syrian Administration for Pious Foundations (Awqaf) was built on this apparently still empty plot of land.
- 116 Wulzinger & Watzinger, *Damaskus*, p. 57; and Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 413 and 646. Sergey Kravtsov, "Reconstruction of the Temple by Charles Chipiez and Its Applications in Architecture", *Ars Judaica* 4 (2008), p. 37, footnote 42, mentions that the Russian-Jewish architect Joseph Barsky, who migrated to Jerusalem in 1907 designed "a mosque, a school, and a park in Damascus under the guidance of [Gedalia] Wilbuschewitz." It is possible that this mosque designed by Barsky was Cemal Pasha's mosque at the beginning of his boulevard which was built by Wilbuschewitz.
- 117 See Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 209–223.
- 118 Ibid., pp. 421–423 and 487.
- 119 Ibid., pp. 631–632.
- 120 Ibid., pp. 151–153; Hudson, *Transforming Damascus*, p. 123. Cf. Kiesling, *Damaskus*, p. 93: "Hier spielte an kühlen Sommerabenden türkische oder deutsche Regimentsmusik und alles wanderte auf und ab, um den seltenen Genuß auf sich wirken zu lassen."
- 121 Ibid., p. 92.
- 122 For a description of these processions in the late Ottoman period see for instance Çağlar, "Mahmil-i Şerif", pp. 37–43.
- 123 BOA DH.UMVM 102/52 (dated 21 Eylül 1334 Rumi/15 Zi 'l-hicce 1336 AH/21 September 1918): "... Şâm'da kâ'in Cemâl Paşa Câddesiniñ tarafeyninden yigirmişer metrönuñ belediye nâmına istimplâki ..."; and BOA DH.UMVM 155/86 (dated 21 Eylül 1334 Rumi/15 Zi 'l-hicce 1336 AH/21 September 1918): "... Şâm'da Cemâl Paşa Câddesiniñ tarafeyninden yigirmişer metrönuñ belediye nâmına istimplâki ..."
- 124 See *Scramble for the Past. A Story of Archaeology in the Ottoman Empire 1753–1914*, eds. Zainab Bahrani, Zeynep Çelik & Edhem Eldem (İstanbul: Salt, 2011).
- 125 Cf. Çelik, "Defining Empire's Patrimony", p. 469: "Indeed, attention to Islamic culture was as central to late-Ottoman thinking as the desire to compete with Europe for a reputation for modernity."
- 126 Cem Emrence, *Remapping the Ottoman Middle East. Modernity, Imperial Bureaucracy and the Islamic State* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 55–74; and Weber, "Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels", pp. 1–454.

10 The Man Who Would Be Caliph

Sharīfian Propaganda in World War I^{*}

Joshua Teitelbaum

The purpose of Sharīfian propaganda during the war was first and foremost to gain Muslim, Arab and British recognition of the Hashimite family as rightful heirs to the Islamic Caliphate in place of the Ottoman family. To do this, *Sharīf* Husayn ibn ‘Ali had to control as much Arab territory as possible, since a Caliph who controlled only the Hijaz would be a laughing stock.

In order to contextualize Sharīfian WWI propaganda, we first need a clear understanding of the status of the Caliphate on the eve of the war, British ideas about the Caliphate before the war, and the Hashimite family’s understanding of their role in Islam. But first, a look at propaganda itself.

What Is Propaganda and What Was Its Nature in World War I?

Propaganda has been with us from time immemorial, whenever one side in a conflict wishes to maintain the support of its own population, gain new adherents to its cause, or demoralize the opposing side. In modern times we rarely speak of propaganda. Instead we use terms such as information operations, or psychological operations. In the modern Middle East we still have ministries that aim to guide public opinion, such as the ubiquitous “Ministry of Information” (*wizārat al-i‘lām*).

Propaganda is a “systematic form of PURPOSEFUL PERSUASION that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media channels.”¹ It can also be understood as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”² Both definitions stress the systematic nature of these efforts to influence. In World War I the use of propaganda came into its own

with primarily Britain and Germany realizing its importance and devoting considerable, methodical and institutional effort to it.³

The Caliphate on the Eve of War: Ottomans, British, Arabs and Hashemite

Reigning (1876–1909) a few years before the start of the conflict, Sultan Abdülhamid II was widely recognized as Caliph. The Ottomans had claimed the Caliphate for centuries, and this was confirmed by the swearing of fealty (*bay'a*) by all the top civil and religious officials. In Abdülhamid's case, the Ottoman constitution, which came into effect at the end of December 1876, enshrine the link between the Sultanate and the Caliphate in law. To the *bay'a* and the constitution, Abdülhamid added three other traditionally recognized justifications to buttress his claim to the august office: hereditary rights, divine will and military power. Divine will originated with the Ummayyad Caliphs who saw themselves as the Caliphs of God – Abdülhamid needed to add nothing; hereditary rights were invoked by Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566), Abdülhamid's ancestor, and Abdülhamid told all that the Caliphate was his by virtue of his being a descendant of the House of Osman. As for power and dominion, no one could argue that Abdülhamid did not control a vast empire. The justification of having enough power to protect Muslims is a long-standing qualification for the Caliphate.⁴

The one criterion lacked by the Ottomans, of course, was that they were not descended from the tribe of Quraysh. Buzpinar dismisses this criterion as based on a weak hadith, but admits that it was defended by the eleventh-century jurist al-Māwardī and that it was popular amongst Arabs in the nineteenth century.⁵ Nonetheless, it is generally viewed as true that most Muslims in the empire accepted the Ottoman Caliphate despite the absence of Qurayshi descent.

Yet as the century crept to a close, there were those within and without the Ottoman empire who began to call the Caliphate of the House of Osman into question. There had been military disasters which demonstrated a lack of Ottoman control; there was nascent Arab nationalism, which was transitioning through a kind of Islamic nationalism to a more secular one and which sought to throw off the Turkish yoke; and there were the British, who sought to weaken the Ottomans by calling into question their right to the Caliphate.

It was against this background that, when seeking an alternative to the Ottoman Caliphate, Arab nationalists and the British were wont to turn towards the Sharif of Mecca, who was indeed widely regarded a

descendant of the Prophet from the tribe of Quraysh. Yet the Sharif's writ did not extend beyond the Hijaz, and even in the Hijaz itself the Ottoman Vali limited it at times. To vie for the Caliphate, the Sharif would need to control more territory.

In the latter years of the nineteenth century and in the first years of the twentieth, Arab nationalists began to articulate their vision of a polity that would eventually replace the Ottoman framework. By the time Sharif Husayn ibn 'Alī al-Hāshimī assumed the mantle of the Sharifate in Mekka in 1908, three ideas were in circulation that would have an impact on Husayn's vision of the post-Ottoman order, and therefore influence Sharifian propaganda during the war. These were: the idea of a spiritual Sharifian or Arabian Caliphate; the importance of the Arabs, and of the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula in particular in an Islamic revival; and the important role the Hijaz should play in a post-Ottoman polity. While the polity that Husayn envisaged borrowed from previous formulations, it included ideas developed from his own experience as the leader of an Arabian chieftaincy. Husayn's vision was of suzerainty, a *ri'āsa*. And it was at this target that he directed his wartime propaganda.

The notion of a Sharifian Caliphate in Mecca has roots that go back to at least the fifteenth century, and is not solely of European invention, as suggested or implied by several researchers. C. Snouck Hurgronje was probably the first scholar to assert so decisively that the idea had solely European roots. "The idea of a Caliphate of the Shereefs of Mecca has been ventilated, more than once, by this or that European writer on Islam, but, in the Moslem world, it has never been broached, and no one of the Shereefs from the House of Katada – rulers in Mecca and in varying portions of West Africa ever since the year 1200 AD – ever thought of such a thing."⁶

Recent research has demonstrated, however, that this is not true. Richard Mortel has shown that at least three Muslim historians from the fifteenth century mentioned the idea quite positively. Taqī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Fāsi, for example, a fifteenth-century historian of Mekka, wrote of Sharif Abū Numayy (r. 1254–1301) that, "were it not for his [Zaydi] *madhhab*, he would have been [a] suitable [choice] for the caliphate ..."⁷

The idea's trail can be picked up again in the nineteenth century, and earlier in that century than has previously been thought. Disappointed with Ottoman reforms, Muslims in Northern Syria in 1858 were reported to support the establishment of a "new Arabian state under the sovereignty of the Shereefs of Mecca."⁸ In 1860, the idea "of using the Grand Sheriff as a kind of Caliph" to oppose the French in Egypt was discussed in British government circles.⁹ Buzpinar notes that there was some obscure talk

in 1876 by Ottoman reformers, of which Abdülhamid was aware, of “separating the caliphate from the sultanate and transferring it to the former Amir of Mecca, Sharif Abdülmuttalib.”¹⁰ And even Abdülhamid himself told a journalist that “England’s aim is to transfer the Great Caliphate from Istanbul to Jidda in Arabia or to a place in Egypt and by keeping the Caliphate under her control to manage all the Muslims as she wishes.”¹¹

It would seem, then, that the idea was already about in the fifteenth century, and then revived, perhaps in only embryonic form, in the mid-nineteenth century. Martin Kramer picks up the story about ten years later in the historical record. The idea of a Sharifian Caliphate in Mecca began to be propagated in the late 1870s by John Louis Sabunji, G.C.M. Birdwood, James Zohrab and even Jamāl al-Dīn “al-Afghānī” al-Asadabādī, although by the last a bit less enthusiastically. The most active on behalf of the idea – Muslim or European – was Wilfred Scawen Blunt, who was in contact with all the above.¹² Blunt espoused a solely spiritual Caliphate, not unlike the papacy.¹³

As we move forward in time, we also see evidence of movement in about 1880 in Bukhara among Muslims to establish a Muslim federation with the Sharif of Mekka as the Caliph,¹⁴ and that towards the end of the century the idea appeared to be quite widespread. British Muslim Marmaduke Pickthall noted that when in Syria in 1894–1896 he heard “Muslim Arabs talking more than once” about the Sharif of Mekka becoming “the spiritual head of the reconstituted realm of El Islam, [and] the Khedive of Egypt the temporal head.”¹⁵

The idea of an Arabian/Sharifian Caliphate became more widely known in the Arab world with the serialization of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawākabī’s (c. 1849–1902) book *Umm al-Qurā* in Rashīd Riḍā’s *al-Manār*, April 1902–February 1903. This work purports to be the minutes of the meeting of a secret Muslim society in Mekka to work for a spiritual Qurayshi Caliphate to be headquartered in the holy city. The Caliph would have political power only in the Hijaz. The existence of the society and its goals were soon being repeated in diplomatic correspondence, and even made it into Negib Azoury’s *Le Réveil de la nation arabe*. As Sylvia Haim demonstrates most convincingly, *Umm al-Qurā* was taken from Blunt’s *The Future of Islam*.¹⁶

Both Azoury and Rashīd Riḍā advocated a spiritual Sharīfian Caliphate in Mekka. Azoury, who published his book in 1905, suggested that an Arab sultan with political power would be headquartered in Mekka, while the Hijaz would be an independent state headed by the Caliph of all the Muslims.¹⁷

Riḍā elaborated on the idea of a spiritual Caliphate. In 1911 he founded a secret society called the Society of the Arab Association (*Jam’iyyat*

al-Jami'a al- 'Arabiyya), whose aim was to unite the emirs of the Arabian Peninsula who would then join with the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Sharif 'Abdallah, Husayn's son, passed through Egypt three years later, met Riḍā, and was inducted into the society. Riḍā proposed that Husayn be made president of a union of Arabian rulers, who would maintain independence internally but defend each other against foreign enemies.

In 1915, Riḍā gave the British a full explanation of his programme. Entitled "The General Organic Law of the Arab Empire", it supported a spiritual Sharifian Caliphate in Mekka, with temporal rule to be held by a President and Council of Representatives to be headquartered in Damascus.¹⁸

It is clear, then, that the idea was afoot.¹⁹ But what did the Hashimites themselves know of the idea, and, if anything, what did they make of it? Our first piece of evidence comes from al-Afghani. Blunt wrote in 1885: "Amongst other things, he [Afghani] told me that it was he himself who had suggested to the Sherif el Huseyn [Husayn ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Awn] ... to claim the Caliphate, but El Huseyn had said it was impossible without armed support, and the Arabs could never unite except in the name of religion."²⁰

James Zohrab wrote home extensively, beginning in 1879, of rumours of the existence of a "secret society" in Mekka whose objective was "to restore the Khalifate to the Arabs of the Hedjaz."²¹ Zohrab was in the Hijaz during the tenure of Sharif Husayn ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Awn (and into the second term of Sharif 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib). It is not unreasonable to surmise that these ideas were already circulating in the Hijaz, and might even have been mentioned by Sharif Husayn ibn Muḥammad himself.

Kawākibī (and Blunt) was impressed by the many supposed qualities of the Arabs of the Peninsula, such as their independence, their freedom from foreign rule and influence, and their knowledge of Islam and the observance of its precepts. Moreover, Kawākibī believed, they practised equity and possessed a strong *esprit de corps*. The Arabian Peninsula itself was particularly well suited to be the headquarters of the Caliph, since it contained the Ka'ba, the Prophet's Mosque, and was centrally located for Muslims.²² This argument in favour of the Arabs was to find an echo in the proclamations of Sharif Husayn's revolt (see below) and in the writing of Husayn's son, 'Abdallah.²³ Yet both of these elaborated on the idea by personalizing it. For they were not simply Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, and not simply Quraysh: they were of the house of the Prophet.²⁴

All this suggests that upon assuming office, Sharif Husayn was most probably very well disposed towards the issue of a Sharifian Caliphate, spiritual or otherwise. The notion resided in the collective historical

memory of the house of Hāshim, where there were also feelings of primacy coming from Qurayshī lineage and being of the Prophet's family. The issue was also a topic of general discussion, most famously by al-Kawākibī.

There was no reason, therefore, that an ambitious man such as Husayn would not have considered the possibilities, should they present themselves.

It will never be known for certain just when Husayn began to see the possibility of a Sharifian Caliphate as a realistic one. Although it appears that the *zeitgeist* gave ample reason for him to harbour such wishes, it seems that it was the British who gave him the idea that it might actually be attainable.²⁵ Elie Kedourie and Ernest Dawn agree that in the initial contacts between 'Abdallah, Ronald Storrs (Oriental Secretary in Cairo) and Field Marshal Lord Kitchener (the British Agent in Cairo) in February and April 1914, the Sharif was interested primarily in maintaining the emirate of the Hijaz in his and his family's name. But upon the Ottomans' entry into the hostilities on 31 October 1914, Kitchener fired off a message to 'Abdallah in which he raised the issue of the Caliphate for the first time. Kitchener, it has been noted, "had cherished for a long time the idea of an Arab Caliphate ...". The message was sent (after embellishment by Storrs in Cairo) the next day, 1 November 1914. He asked for the help of the Arab nation, and added a key phrase: "It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring."²⁶ The effect on Husayn of such a statement by a man of Kitchener's stature must surely have been electric. These were heady words indeed.

While Snouck Hurgronje, Kedourie and Kramer emphasized that the notion of a Sharifian Caliphate was a European invention and implied that it was without Arab local validity, we have shown that the idea was actually local and quite old, and therefore most likely part of Husayn's primordial historical memory; it resonated with him. Kitchener's statement therefore did not fall on a *tabula rasa*, as far as Husayn was concerned.

After having read the text, Husayn told Storrs' messenger of his reluctance to revolt. The time was simply not right, said Husayn, but he was fomenting rebellion. He then discussed the Caliphate. He was cautious, but was considering the issue. He said, "There no longer exists a Caliphate ... for their [the Ottomans'] rule projects ... deeds that are all contrary to religion. The Caliphate means this, that the rule of the book of God should be enforced, and this they do not do."²⁷ Kedourie is right in pointing to Husayn's hesitation on the subject, for what he was considering had been talked about for years, but no real opportunity had yet presented itself.

Clearly Husayn's interest in the Caliphate was high, but it was 'Abdallah who pushed things along. Kedourie sees 'Abdallah's hand behind the letter of 14 July 1915 which initiated what was to be known as the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. The letter demanded – apparently for the first time – that “Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for Islam.” Although Kitchener, in the 31 October 1914 message, had been vague and circumspect (“It may be ...”), it was most certainly tantalizing, and there was no reason for Husayn not to hope and believe that he was the object of Kitchener's statement. High Commissioner McMahon twice reiterated Kitchener's general comment in his letter to Husayn of 30 August 1915, and went even further to note that Britain would welcome the Caliphate's reversion to a “true Arab born of the blessed stock of the Prophet,” a certain reference to the Quraysh, and an implied reference to the Hashemites.²⁸ Kitchener was most probably talking about a spiritual Caliphate à la Blunt (a papacy of Islam), which was a popularly held Western notion, yet Husayn had no reason to believe that Kitchener and McMahon were referring to this type of Caliphate.²⁹

Although there is reason to believe that Husayn by this time was aware of the idea that there were those who conceived of the modern Caliphate as involving a separation of spiritual and temporal powers, Husayn did not subscribe to this notion. There is no reason to believe that Husayn had in mind any type of Caliphate other than the traditional Sunni type, involving temporal as well as a form of spiritual/religious authority or right to lead the *umma* stemming from his being descended from the Quraysh and the Prophet.³⁰

Husayn's ambitions and belief that he could achieve a grand role as a Muslim Arab leader and Caliph were nurtured by contacts with Arab nationalists as well. There is evidence of nascent Arab nationalist support for Husayn as early as 1911, when he received a letter of support for his activities against the Ottoman Vali from some Arab members of the Ottoman Parliament. These deputies gave him their blessing for the religious leadership (*ri'āsa dīniyya*) of the Arab regions.³¹ In that same year, 'Alī Riḍā al-Rikābī, the Ottoman Muḥāfiẓ of Medina, wrote to Istanbul complaining of Husayn's anti-Ottoman activities, and noted that he was assisted by “the revolutionary Society of the Arab Revival” which aimed to set Husayn up as Caliph.³²

The Arab nationalist societies of al-Fatat and al-'Ahd were active once the war began in recruiting the Hashemites to lead them. There were several approaches by the societies in 1915 both to Husayn in Mekka and to Faysal when he was in Damascus. These initial contacts led the Hashemites to believe that they had full Arab support. Husayn's ambitions

were thus augmented, as was the possibility of implementing them. At a family conference in Ta'if in June 1915, it was decided in principle to start a revolt and to begin negotiations with Britain.³³

We should not close here without discussing actual, verbalized Hashemite claims to the Caliphate prior to the Revolt. Given that the notion was about for hundreds of years, certain statements about the Caliphate by Husayn and 'Abdallah cited by Kedourie, yet attacked by Dawn as inconclusive, can now be given further weight, thus strengthening Kedourie's position that the Caliphate was a consuming desire for Husayn. In late December 1915 Husayn wrote to the Sudanese leader 'Alī al-Mirghānī on the possibility of the former assuming the Caliphate:

I had not claimed before to be the qualified chief of the Emirs (the Caliph) but I explained to them more than once that I was ready to extend my hand to any man who would come forward and take the rein of authority. I was, however, chosen in every quarter and even forced to take up the question of their future prospects.³⁴

In a verbal message from 'Abdallah to McMahon which accompanied the Sharif's letter of 18 February 1916, 'Abdallah requested 3,000 pounds sterling "for myself and my scheme"; when queried, the messenger explained that 'Abdallah's scheme was to choose a "powerful Islamic Committee from the Arab countries to offer his father the Khalifate. The latter is aware but feigns ignorance of these measures." In a move that could only have greatly increased Husayn's hope of the Caliphate, Storrs sent the money along.³⁵

Our third example took place in October, a few months after the Revolt broke out. 'Abdallah asked Storrs nonchalantly during a meeting in Jeddah in October 1916 if he would address his father by the title *amir al-mu'minīn*, a title most properly attached to the Caliph. Storrs knew this, and demurred, but it shows the direction of 'Abdallah's and Husayn's thinking.³⁶

Husayn's Caliphate and territorial ambitions were influenced, therefore, by three factors. First, there was the general idea – current in Muslim circles from at least the fifteenth century – that the Sharif of Mekka was the legitimate claimant to the Caliphate. Second, communications from both the British and Arab nationalists after he assumed the Sharifate in 1908 augmented his Caliphate ambitions and brought them into the realm of what he thought might actually be attainable. Third, the British and the Arab nationalists also influenced Husayn to believe that he had support for his ambition to achieve Hashimite territorial sovereignty

over much of the Arab world. It may be assumed, therefore, that these elements combined to create in Husayn's mind a powerful mix of personal aspirations and the perceived ability to implement them.

Husayn aspired to the Caliphate in its traditional meaning, as a temporal and spiritual office. As to borders, he wished to control the Arabian Peninsula, Syria and Iraq, but was probably willing to accept some modifications, and not receive everything at once. In his grand strategy the Revolt should lead to a fitting, Muslim replacement for the Ottoman empire, and not simply a truncated Hijazi state controlled by a secular ruler. Throughout the war and until he actually declared himself Caliph in 1924, Husayn consistently maintained these aspirations and gave voice to them in his wartime propaganda.

Sharifian Propaganda in World War I: Text and Action

Meanwhile, in Mekka, Husayn had begun planning those aspects of the Revolt that would be centred there. He was also trying to form alliances with the nearby tribes and the townsfolk of Mekka. The latter, because of their financial dependence on the Ottoman Empire, were reluctant, and in March 1916 Husayn tried to starve them into "cooperation." In what was a form of propaganda, or at the very least an intelligence operation aimed at getting the support of Hijazis, he actually asked the British to blockade the Hijazi coast and cut off its trade; the townsfolk could perhaps be convinced to cooperate in order not to lose their livelihood and, in fact, their food supply.³⁷ The total blockade went into effect on 15 May 1916, and its announcement was communicated to "the Arab Chiefs and the Sheikh of Jeddah" by the commander of the British man-of-war *Suva*.³⁸

It was a masterstroke – Husayn had calculated correctly. In mid-May 1916, meetings of notables, merchants, heads of guilds, "ulama", and the shaykhs of the quarters were held in Mekka, some of which were attended by 'Abdallah. Those present bemoaned the calamity of the blockade and talked about concluding peace with Britain. At some meetings, oaths of allegiance to the Sharif were sworn. The Ottoman acting governor and commandant of Mekka, Binbashi Mehmed Zia Bey, wrote that "an attitude of distrust of the [Ottoman] Government began to appear among the people, and words to the following effect were current: 'Let us invite British protection,' 'Let us declare our independence,' 'Expel all the Turks from Hejaz.'" On 17 May the Ottomans deployed troops in Mekka in anticipation of a revolt. Husayn protested, saying that the comments made at the meetings had been misinterpreted and that the troops would

cause unnecessary alarm. By the night of 9 June the Ottomans noticed suspicious movements by armed men around Mekka, and the first shots were fired on 10 June soon after morning prayers. Zia Bey telephoned Husayn: "The Bedouin are revolting against the Government; find a way out." Husayn replied sarcastically, "Of course we shall," and hung up. The Revolt had begun in Mekka the Revered.³⁹

The empire's highest religious official, the *Şeyhülislam*, issued a fatwa on 7 November 1914, just a week after Kitchener's message to Husayn. The official proclaimed a Jihad and called upon the world's Muslims to take up arms against the Entente powers who were "enemies of Islam." The Sultan himself issued his own proclamation on 11 November, exhorting his armed forces to throw the infidels out of the Dār al-Islām, the Abode of Islam. A third proclamation issued by both the *Şeyhülislam* and the Sultan-Caliph on 23 November required the people to obey the Koran, as demanded by the *Şeyhülislam*, his fatwa, and defend the holy places and Islam.⁴⁰

Both the Sultan-Caliph and Husayn appealed, as part of their propaganda, to Islamic legitimacy. With secular Arab nationalism only in its nascent phase, Husayn had to emphasize Islam, yet he did this by stressing that it was the Arabs who were best suited to lead Islam. As for the Ottomans, their appeal was to their Arab subjects on the basis of Islamic solidarity.⁴¹

The Ottoman propaganda was carried in several Arabic-language papers, such as *Jarīdat al-Sharq* and *al-Ālam al-Islāmī*, which appeared in 1916 as part of a concerted Ottoman effort. In these papers, the Ottoman war effort was presented as duty and opportunity for Muslims to defend their faith.⁴²

In opposing *al-Qibla*, the Sharif Husayn's newspaper, *Jarīdat al-Sharq* and *al-Ālam al-Islāmī* could not play the Arab card. Instead, their propaganda centred on accusations that it was Husayn who had caused *fitna* (internecine fighting). He was a traitor to his faith and to the Caliph, whom he had abandoned at a time of crisis.⁴³

Husayn was acutely aware that in leading a revolt against the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, he had rebelled against the centuries-old Islamic order. He also knew that the idea of Arabism was not an easy sell. To affirm that he was not causing *fitna*, he repeatedly claimed that he was doing his duty to rebel against a leader who violated the shari'a. This justification appears in a series of proclamations and articles published in early issues of Husayn's newspaper, *al-Qibla*.⁴⁴

Al-Qibla was an important vehicle of Sharifian propaganda. Even the name, *al-Qibla* (towards Mekka, the direction of prayer), was Islamically legitimizing and a reminder to Muslims that their religion commanded

them to turn towards Mekka not just in prayer, but in their hearts, to their new leaders, to the Sharif of Mekka, Husayn ibn 'Alī, instead of the Ottoman Caliph. While we have no independent verification of the periodical's circulation, at least an indication may be obtained from *al-Qibla's* claim in 1919 that it had a circulation of 5,000, with most copies distributed outside the Hijaz.⁴⁵

Al-Qibla was part of both the Hashimite and British propaganda effort. The idea for publishing *al-Qibla* originated with Syrians in Cairo, who proposed it to the British. It won the hearty endorsement of Fu'ād al-Khaṭīb, who wrote to Clayton that "there is not the least doubt, that it will always remain loyal to the Allies and particularly to Great Britain." The British funded it, supplied the equipment, and endeavoured to furnish the paper with "favourable and authentic war news." Dispatches from Cairo were thoroughly examined before they were sent on to Mekka. As Clayton wrote, "The first number of the Kibla was naturally read over rather carefully in the Arab Bureau, as it was an experiment and required careful checking."⁴⁶

The first proclamation, published in Egypt on 25 Sha'ban 1334 [26 June 1916]⁴⁷ was primarily a diatribe against the CUP; it was guilty, Husayn insisted, of oppressing the Hijaz economically, murdering Arab nationalists, and violating the shari'a. Husayn bemoaned the economic woes of the Hijaz caused by the entry of the Ottomans into the war, and by the ensuing British blockade (for which, it will be remembered, he was greatly responsible): "[t]he middle class," he proclaimed, "[have been forced to] sell the doors of their houses, their chests of drawers and even the wood from the ceilings of their houses after selling all their furniture and clothes in hunger." He decried the brutality of the ruling Ottoman triumvirate of Enver, Talāt and Cemal, in the hanging of 21 Arab nationalists. And he attacked the CUP at length for changing and violating the shari'a. His proclamation mentioned an article in an Istanbul paper that was "disrespectful" of the Prophet, and he attacked the CUP for rejecting the *shar'i* rules of inheritance which give a man a portion double that of a woman. The CUP was accused of limiting the power of the Sultan-Caliph. Moreover, the CUP had ordered the troops fighting Husayn not only to break the fast of Ramadan, but also to shell the Ka'ba.⁴⁸

The second proclamation, dated 21 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1335 [20 September 1916],⁴⁹ blamed the triumvirate for causing the downfall of the Empire by alienating Britain and France, and further crimes against the *shari'a* were elucidated, particularly relating to the honour of women. Ottoman soldiers had taken the young girls (*mukhaddarat*) of the 'Awali bedouin, near Medina, to the military barracks, an act "condemned by the Islamic

shari'ah and the Arab [sense of] honor." Cemal was accused of organizing a women's society in Syria, and forcing the society to hold a reception where the women sang to the men. They had therefore disobeyed the word of God by violating the honour of women, and the 'Islamic state' (*dawlat al-Islam*) had been sacrificed to the personal ambitions of the triumvirate. This proclamation embodied Husayn's idea of the lawful state: it had to be headed by a Caliph, embrace all the *umma*, and rule according to the *shari'a*. Ottoman rule, according to Husayn, clearly no longer fitted the bill.⁵⁰

The third proclamation, dated 4 Safar 1335 [10 December 1916],⁵¹ was the first issued after Husayn assumed the self-proclaimed royal dignity, and is signed "King of the Arab Countries." It is an attempt to transition an Islamic identity into an Islamically informed Arab one. In this proclamation he elaborated on the link between Arabism and Islam, declaring that national (*qawmiyya*) and patriotic (*waṭaniyya*) duty was the same as the religious duty of the Muslim, namely, to follow the *shari'a* and to revolt against those who "took the religion of God as an amusement and as a game."⁵² The fourth proclamation, dated 10 Jumada al-Ula 1335 [4 March 1917], was important for announcing the omission of the Sultan's name from the *khuṭba*, a move which Husayn declared he had previously avoided out of reverence for tradition.⁵³ That it took nearly a year to take this symbolic crucial step demonstrated his cautious approach to delegitimizing the Ottoman Caliphate.

The Hijazi "ulama" issued their own statement in March 1917.⁵⁴ It began by claiming primacy to speak since they were the "ulama" of the Haramayn, and expressed their outrage at the un-Islamic behaviour in government, "where Muslim women employed by the Government and exposed in public places unveiled before men of strange nations." It is best to let the statement speak for itself:

We endeavoured to please God and avoid a rebellion so long as it was possible. We rebelled in order to please God, and He gave us victory and stood by us in support of His law and religion, and in accordance with a wisdom known to Him which would lead to the uplifting of this people.

Every Moslem heart in the Ottoman Empire, even among the Turks in Anatolia and among the members of the Turkish royal family in the palaces, prays God for our success, and God always answers the prayers of the oppressed and the righteous.

There is no doubt about it, that if the inhabitants of those countries which the Unionists have lost through their alliance with Germany in this war had revolted against those oppressors, just as we did, they

would have no more been regarded as belligerents and would thus have saved their countries for themselves. But if things should continue as they are, no territory will remain for this empire.

If you keep this in mind and remember what the Indian paper *Mashrek* wrote on September 12th and 19th on the subject of the disqualification of the Beni Osman to be the Caliphs of Islam, you will understand that we have risen in order to avert these dangers and to put the Islamic rule on a firm foundation of true civilisation according to the noble dictates of our religion.

If our revolution were only to preserve the integrity of our country and to save it from what has befallen other Islamic countries, it is enough, and we are amply justified.

We have done what we ought to do. We have cleansed our country from the germs of atheism and evil. The best course for those Moslems who still side with and defend this notorious gang of Unionists, is to submit to the will of God before their tongues, hands, and feet give witness against them.

It is a great mistake to suppose that in rising against this party we are rising against a legitimate Caliph possessing all the legal or, at least, some of the conditions qualifying him to be such.

What does the Mohammedan world say of the Beni Osman who pretend to be Caliphs of Islam, while for many years they were like puppets in the hands of the Janissaries; tossed about, dethroned, and killed by them, in a manner contrary to the laws and doctrines established in the books of religion on the accession and dethronement of Caliphs – which facts are recorded in their history?

We want those who are present here to tell you who are far away that we shall confess before Almighty God, on the last day, that today we do not know of any Moslem ruler more righteous and fearing God than the son of His Prophet who is now on the throne of the Arab country.

We do not know any one more zealous than he in religion, more observant of the law of God in words and deeds, and more capable of managing our affairs in such a way as would please God. The people of the Holy Land have proclaimed him their King simply because, in so doing, they would be serving their religion and country.

As to the question of the Caliphate, in spite of all that is known of the deplorable condition in which it is situated at the present moment, we have not interfered with it at all and it will remain as it is pending the final decision of the whole Mohammedan world.

Other statements at the beginning of the war, written by Husayn, *al-Qibla's* editor Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, or Fu'ād al-Khaṭīb, were

published in early issues of *al-Qibla*.⁵⁵ The premiere issue of the paper, in August 1916, for example, had pre-empted an Ottoman accusation of *fitna*: the Turks had abandoned religion, and this in itself was “*fitna* in every sense of the term.”⁵⁶ Husayn was out to save Islam and the Caliphate from the CUP. The Young Turks’ treatment of the Caliph was also attacked: they had imprisoned him and many “*ulama*”, thus humiliating the Caliphate and shaming Islam before the world. Those who behaved in such a manner, wrote *al-Qibla*, had “exceeded the divine statutes of God, and he who transgresses the divine statutes is an oppressor.”⁵⁷ And finally, expressing the perceived integral link between Arabs and Islam, the paper attacked the Young Turks for proposing a translation of the Koran into Turkish, for a “Qur’an not in Arabic is an imperfect Qur’an, and a copy of it remains *jahiliyyah*.” An article by Fu’ād al-Khaṭīb exhorted all Muslims to fight on behalf of the fatherland, and for the cause of Muslims everywhere.⁵⁸

Thoroughly grounded in Islam, whose message the Arabs had the most right to convey, the Revolt’s propaganda presented itself to the Islamic world. But what was Husayn planning?

“King of the Arab Nation”

On 29 October 1916, Colonel Wilson in Jeddah received the following telegram:

According to wish of public and assembled Ulema the Great Master, HisMajesty Our Lord and Lord of all el-Hussein Ibn Ali has been recognised as King of Arab nation and he will be recognised as religious head until Moslems are of one opinion concerning Islamic Caliphate ...

The telegram was signed by ‘Abdallah as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The news was unnerving to British officials, who had seen no indication that Husayn had intended to make such a move. “This is rather a bomb,” minuted a Foreign Office official drily.⁵⁹

British astonishment notwithstanding,⁶⁰ Husayn’s move was entirely consistent with his pretensions. Claiming Kingship of the Arabs was a direct threat to the Ottomans and their Caliphate, for it asserted sovereignty over key Ottoman territory. Indeed, the issue had been raised twice on earlier occasions, but the British had not dealt with it seriously.⁶¹

The assumption of kingship took place at his palace in Mekka, with assorted guests in attendance. The event was carefully orchestrated by

‘Abdallah as a propagandistic spectacle, on the pretext of celebrating the Muslim New Year, 1335, which began on 28 October 1916. It was to seem like a guileless response to a demand made spontaneously by the notables and “ulama”. A long address and a petition from the “ulama” and notables recognizing Husayn as King of the Arabs was read by a religious official, and the reading was frequently corrected by ‘Abdallah, who knew the text by heart (a sure indication of his authorship). The head of the French mission in the Hijaz, Colonel Brémont, reported that his French Muslim officers present at the occasion had difficulty understanding the address, as it was delivered “in very classical Arabic with a Syrian accent, no word of which [they] understood.” ‘Abdallah telegraphed Brémont announcing his father’s new title, and added that Brémont’s Muslim aide, Lieutenant Colonel Cadi, “as well as all the members of the French delegation had attended the ceremony.”⁶²

‘Abdallah had managed to force the merchants, *shuyūkh al-ḥārāt* and notables of Jeddah into a coalition with Husayn. Several notables who were close to ‘Abdallah were instructed to spread rumours that Husayn had been recognized by England, France, Russia and Italy as well as all the neutral countries. They were also to keep a record of those who decorated their shops and houses in honour of the event. A committee of some major figures in town held a reception. And the merchants, *shuyūkh al-ḥārāt* and notables were ordered to send a boilerplate congratulatory telegram, whose text had been authored by ‘Abdallah. The head of the telegraph office was instructed not to send any telegrams which deviated from the formula. Over 2,500 telegrams of congratulations reached the Sharif from Jeddah, wrote *al-Qibla*.⁶³ Even taking exaggeration into account, ‘Abdallah, it appeared, had done his work well, to the discomfort of those whom he had coerced. It was the assessment of a British agent that “the people in Jeddah are not pleased with the Sherif declaring himself King.” Those who had sent telegrams or who in other ways had expressed support for Husayn were now bound to him in writing. If Husayn failed, the Ottomans would not treat them kindly.

The text of articles in *al-Qibla* and of the announcement of Husayn’s new title stopped just short of proclaiming him Caliph. The revolt was aimed, he declared, not at the reigning Caliph but at the CUP. Nevertheless, the language was so suggestive that his intentions were unmistakable.

The petition, read out as a proclamation by ‘Abdallah, reflected the same theory of the primacy of the Arabs in Islam first articulated by al-Kawākabī, elaborated upon by Rashid Rida and later echoed by ‘Abdallah in his memoirs, that “God singled out the children of Isma‘il” and that the Arabs were the most exalted of nations because they spread the message of *tawḥīd*. Quoting Muslim (the compiler of a canonical compilation of

hadiths), the petition stressed that the Prophet had been chosen because he was an Arab, of Quraysh, of the Bani Hāshim. The petition then turned to Husayn, praising his connection to the Prophet, and stating that the petitioners did not know a more pious and God-fearing emir. He was the “Saviour of Islam,” and he would lead the Arabs to freedom from those who had oppressed them. The petition then stated, “We recognise His Majesty our lord and master al-Husayn ibn ‘Ali as our King, we the Arabs, and he will act amongst us according to the book of God Almighty and the laws of His Prophet, prayer and peace upon him.” It concluded with an oath of allegiance to him as their “religious authority [*marja’ dīnī*] pending the decision of the Islamic world in the matter of the Islamic Caliphate.”⁶⁴ Although the petition declared him King of the Arabs and not Caliph, the qualifications specified for the former included those for the latter.

An account of the event was printed in *al-Qibla* alongside the text of the petition; it endeavoured to show that the “*ulama*” and the notables had spontaneously come to Husayn. All had gathered, it was reported, for the purpose of persuading Husayn to assume the mantle of “King of the Arabs (*malik ‘alā al-‘Arab*) and [to be] their religious authority (*marja’ dīnī*) until the Islamic world reached a unanimous opinion in the matter of the Islamic Caliphate.” Shaykh ‘Abdallah Sarraj, head (*ra’īs*) of the “*ulama*” of Mekka and chief qadi, entered the Hashimite Palace to inform Husayn that the crowd demanded that he come to them. The groups submitted the petition to Husayn when he joined them. He exclaimed, “I have never thought it necessary for you to do such a thing ... I swear to you by Almighty God that this had never occurred to me.” The audience then insisted that he accept their wishes, he complied, and a proclamation was read establishing his new title. Fu’ād al-Khaṭīb then stepped forward to proclaim the loyalty of Syrians to the new King.⁶⁵

To further his propaganda against the Ottomans, Husayn also caused a fatwa to be issued and sent to India’s Muslims, where support for the Ottoman Caliphate was strong.⁶⁶ The text begins with an attack on the CUP who “had evil intentions towards our religion.” One had only to go to Istanbul, continued the fatwa, to see “Moslem women employed in the Postal and Finance Administration in the same way as men are with perfect coquetry and unveiled, meeting men of various nationalities and going about their business. To obey these people would be to disobey God; so we chose to invoke their anger, and not that of God.” An article had appeared in an Indian paper that assessed the Ottomans as unqualified for Caliphate. The fatwa mentioned this article, and continued:

Today we do not know of any Moslem ruler more righteous and fearing God, than the son of His Prophet, who is now on the throne of the Arab Country. We do not know anyone more zealous in religion, more observant of the Laws of God in words and deeds, and more capable of managing our affairs in what would please God, than he is. The Arabs have proclaimed him King over them only because in doing so they would be serving their religion and country. As to the question of the Khalifat, in spite of all that is known of the deplorable condition in which it is situated at the present moment, we have not interfered with it at all and will remain as it is pending the final decision of the whole Mohammedan world.

The fatwa was signed by all the leading “ulama” of Mekka.⁶⁷ As Ruhi wrote, the proclamation was “a step towards the Caliphate.”⁶⁸

A few months after the assumption of the kingship *al-Qibla* printed the speech of “a representative of Medina” under a banner *bismillah* headline. The “representative” addressed the *Sharif* as “His Highness [*jalāla*] our Master [*mawlānā*] *Amīr al-Mu’minīn* and the Caliph of the Messenger of the Lord of the Worlds our Lord and Lord of all, *Sharīf al-Husayn bin ‘Ali*.”⁶⁹ Other numerous articles asserted the illegitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate and the qualifications of Quraysh and the Prophet’s house.⁷⁰

“The Great Applier of God’s Law”

Since Husayn desired to portray himself as a true Islamic ruler, in strong contradistinction to the Caliph and the other rulers of the empire, he administered justice in a very different way from the Ottomans.

Before 1916 the shari’a courts seem to have functioned under the Ottomans’ typical leniency in the application of the *ḥudūd* (sing. *ḥadd*) punishments, the Koranic penalties prescribed for certain crimes, such as the amputation of a hand or foot for theft.⁷¹ Snouck Hurgronje, writing of the late nineteenth century Hijaz, hints that the *hudūd* were used, but that the religious law, “by its marvellously mild application secures a way out for all offenders.”⁷² Ochsenwald, who covers the period 1840–1908, confirms the lax use of the *ḥudūd*. He notes that “[p]unishment for such crimes as burglary and forgery consisted of flogging and short prison sentences.”⁷³

When he began the Revolt, Husayn posed as the defender of Islamic law against the secularizing reforms of the Young Turks. His call was not a national one, as this would have generated little response, but an

Islamic call. In his first proclamation, he singled out the changes the empire had instituted in the *sharī* laws of inheritance (*mirāth*): it had established the *mirāth niẓāmī*, which gave newfound equality to males and females in inheritance. In general, all the *qawanīn* (secular laws) were applied in the Arab lands, but less so in the Hijaz, and the *mirāth niẓāmī* not at all.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, Husayn cited this *niẓām* as one of the reasons for his revolt, when he accused the Young Turks of having the gall to mock God's word in the Koran, where He said that the man's part was twice that of the woman ("*lil-dhakar mithl ḥaẓẓ al-unthayayn*").⁷⁵ With his pretensions to lead the Arab world, opposition to the *mirāth niẓāmī* was designed to strike a strong cord among traditionally minded Muslim males in Syria and Iraq.

The Young Turks were perceived all over the empire as anti-*sharī*. At home in Anatolia, the counter-revolution of April 1909 took up the slogan "the Şeriat is in danger, we want the Şeriat!"⁷⁶ In February 1910 the Ministry of Justice wrote to the Ministry of Finance with a proposal to reorganize the courts in the Hijaz. When 'Abdallah and the other Hijazi deputies learned this, they wrote to the Grand Vizier that "the presence of any courts other than the *sharī'a* would be unacceptable in the holy cities of Islam." Perhaps because of their letter, and the opinion of Talāt that the *sharī'a* law was better suited than secular law to Hijazi society, the *sharī'a* courts of the Hijaz remained under the *Şeyhülislam*, the top religious figure in the Empire.⁷⁷ But the threat to the *sharī'a* remained. In 1913 and 1915 the Young Turks weakened the independence of the *sharī'a* courts by placing them under the authority of the secular Ministry of Justice.⁷⁸

Therefore, when the revolt began, Husayn moved rapidly to demonstrate his commitment to the *sharī'a*. The *Sharīf* never ceased to emphasize that he abided by it, and British observers found his application of *sharī'a* law worthy of note. The fourth issue of *al-Qibla* carried an announcement that Husayn had ordered the reorganization of the *sharī'a* court in Mekka. Good salaries would be paid to all officials, and the court would be conducted according to religious law. Fees were to be lower than those set by the Ottomans, and officials who charged more than the official rate would be fired.⁷⁹

The carrying out of the *ḥudūd* was something of which Husayn was quite proud. For instance, in 1918, four men imprisoned in Yanbu' made an escape but were caught. The organizer of the escape, who had been imprisoned on Husayn's orders, received the *ḥadd* of having both a hand and a foot amputated. *Al-Qibla* noted that this was the first time this type of *ḥadd* had been applied in the Hijaz, and therefore the people were happy that the *sharī'a* was being put to use against serious criminals.⁸⁰ The British were shocked, but refrained from making any official protest.

Wilson, who discussed the incident with Husayn informally, noted that the act “created a good deal of diverse criticism on the part of the nobles of Jeddah.” Husayn’s reply was that this *ḥadd* was the punishment laid down for rebellion or acts against public security or against the government by the shari‘a.⁸¹

Foreign observers noted that the *ḥudūd* were applied with particular fervour during the hajj, as Husayn wished to impress the *ḥujjāj* with his Islamic zeal as part of his propaganda efforts.⁸² An incident was reported in *al-Qibla* in 1923 under the headline, “Applying the *Ḥudūd al-Shar‘iyya*.” The paper said that two pickpockets had been caught working one of the pilgrimage caravans. They were taken to Mekka, where the *ḥadd* was applied as the crowd chanted the Koranic passage, “*al-sāriq wal-sāriqa fa-qta‘ū aydiyahumā*” (“As for the thief, both male and female, cut off their hands”).⁸³

In late February 1917, the French mission received a letter from a Hashimite official stating that the government would no longer tolerate the importation of alcoholic beverages. The French would, however, be allowed a small amount for personal use, as long as the customs officials were informed when it was brought into the Hijaz.⁸⁴ A few days later, *al-Qibla* trumpeted the new policy as evidence of the *Sharif*’s concern for the shari‘a. (So as not to upset the merchants, it was announced that all stocks of alcoholic beverages would be purchased by the government.)⁸⁵

Acts of unlawful intercourse were apparently also a problem addressed by Husayn to demonstrate his Islamic credentials as opposed to those of the Ottoman regime ... Writing in May 1920, the British agent in Mekka, Ihsanullah, reported that Husayn was “greatly grieved [about] the daily spreading of adultery in the holy city, and that during the last month twenty-three ... virgin girls [were] found [to be] pregnant.” Ihsanullah noted a case wherein an adulterer from the Jiyad quarter of Mekka had been arrested and jailed. The woman, he added, was sent to jail, “where she [would] remain forever.” “Indecent women,” of whom Ihsanullah noted 150 in Mecca, were incarcerated in a special prison.⁸⁶

In another case, *al-Qibla* reported that a court had sentenced some wine drinkers to the *ḥadd* of lashes. After the sentence had been carried out, the offenders were drafted into the army or sent to work on the railway.⁸⁷ Reporting from Mekka, British representative Captain Ajab Khan noted the puritanical streak in Mekka’s administration:

Liquors, Music, Gramophones, singing and dancing are prohibited to the public. A certain Sheikh of a ‘Hara’ [quarter] was recently reported for illicit distilling of ‘Aruck’ at his house for his own use[.] [O]n searching his house, distilling apparatus was found and captured[,] and with-

out any further trial, all the distilling pottery was flung at the head of the defaulting Sheikh and an award of 80 lashes was also inflicted on him.

Historically, some Muslim jurists viewed the use of cannabis as a crime, but the state's reaction to it varied, perhaps because, as Rosenthal reasons, it was not barred by "the authority of express statements creditable to the very highest religious sources."⁸⁸ In punishing sellers, however, Husayn followed the strictest interpretation of the jurists, and outlawed the sale of hashish in Mekka. Shipments were confiscated, and the dealers were fined and imprisoned. (This resulted, wrote Ajab Khan, in lowering the quality of the herb available in the holy city.) Hashish was sometimes sold by the most well known of the élite: in 1920, for instance, a large quantity was found in the house of Muḥammad al-Shayba, of the family that held the keys to the Ka'ba. Only Shayba's high status saved him from being imprisoned.⁸⁹

After the fall of Medina in January 1919, *al-Qibla* made a point of warning that sitting in the city's coffee houses and running shops and government offices during prayer time would no longer be tolerated. From now on, said the paper, everyone must go to the mosque.⁹⁰ Captain Zia, the Turkish officer who had been sent to negotiate the surrender of Medina, told the British that Husayn was unfit to run "civilized areas," "witness his ruthless application of effete Koranic punishments, such as [the] cutting off of hands and feet for minor offences"; Zia said, "such action has already gone far to alienate all intelligent Moslem opinion outside of Hejaz."⁹¹

Symbols and Spectacle as Propaganda

Husayn gave his state the standard symbols: first a flag, then stamps, and finally coins in 1923, the last several months before he declared himself caliph.

The flag of Husayn's kingdom was a red chevron with three horizontal stripes: black, white and green. Black was for the 'Abbasids, white for the Umayyads, green for the Shi'a of 'Alī, and red was for the ashraf of Mekka. It appears that Mark Sykes himself designed the flag; our sources are not only Sykes' biographer, but Husayn himself. During one of his conversations with Wilson touting his ambitions and his belief that Britain supported them, he told the British Agent that his national flag was the Arab national flag, and had been designed by a British official, Mark Sykes; the flag symbolized Hashimite rule over the Arabs. As a result, he was entitled to rule over the Arab world.⁹²

Ami Ayalon notes that stamps are important for conveying messages for mass domestic and international consumption. "They reflect ideologies, aspirations and values, attesting to political, social and cultural ideas ..."⁹³ It is unclear just on whose initiative Hijazi postage stamps were printed. According to Storrs it was his idea, although the diplomatic record shows that McMahon had telegraphed the Foreign Office that "Shereef requests to be provided with issue of postage stamps." In either case, both parties had an interest in showing *Sharifian* independence from the Ottomans, and stamps were an often-used indication of independence. Storrs was acutely aware of the propaganda value of stamps: "[s]hortly after the Arab Revolution, we found that is success was being denied or blanketed by the Enemy Press (which was of course quoted by neutrals), and we decided that the best proof that it had taken place would be provide by the issue of Hejaz postage stamps in Arabic." This would be helpful, noted Storrs, in spreading "the Arab propaganda" worldwide. During the hajj, he observed, letters could be sent from Mekka to the entire Muslim world, demonstrating that there was now an independent Arab-led Muslim state and it was not a British invention, but a real polity, as demonstrated by the stamps.⁹⁴

Husayn's first designs were rejected by the British as not good enough (they were of monuments in the Hijaz), and they set T.E. Lawrence, then an intelligence officer in the Survey Department of Egypt, the task of redesigning them. The designs finally chosen were of calligraphy and abstract geometrical motifs based on monuments in Cairo. The central motif in all the stamps was the calligraphic *Makka al-Mukarrama* (Mecca the Revered), and they bore the simple legend "Hijaz Mail" (*Barīd Hījāzī*). Contemporary observers pronounced the stamps beautifully designed and executed. Husayn was proud of his stamps, and often publicized international reaction to them.⁹⁵

The stamps were first issued on 26 September 1916. While it is difficult to assess their actual propaganda value, they did travel across the Atlantic fairly quickly, where they were reviewed in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (JAOS) quite favourably for their beauty. But for our purposes, it is important to note that JAOS also commented that Husayn's postage "proved documentarily" that "the newly formed independent state of the Hijaz" was "an accomplished fact."⁹⁶

The above holds true for stamps issued from 1916–1917. There are no signs of Husayn's greater ambition in them, and the legend *Barīd Hījāzī* was rather limiting for the "King of the Arab Lands." Terms such as "government," "state," "Arab" and "Hashimite" were conspicuously absent, no doubt because of British reservations. But after 1921, with his ambitions clipped by the British, Husayn issued stamps that were

more in keeping with his far-reaching goals: these stamps carried the legend "*al-Ḥukūma al-ʿArabīyya al-Hāshimīyya*" (the Hashimite Arab Government). Finally, in 1924, he issued stamps with a gold overprint, "*Tidhkār al-Khilāfa*" (Commemorating the Caliphate), in honour of his assumption of the title.⁹⁷

Similarly, Husayn began issuing coins by simply overstriking Ottoman, Egyptian and Austrian Maria Theresa thaler coins with the logo *al-Hijaz*. It was not until September 1923, a few months before he assumed the caliphate, that Husayn actually minted his own coins, with a decidedly more royal flavour. These carried, *inter alia*, the following logos: "Hashimite Arab Government" (*al-Ḥukūma al-ʿArabīyya al-Hāshimīyya*); "Struck at Mecca the Revered, Capital of the Arab Government"; and "Husayn bin ʿAli, Reviver of the Arab Lands" (*Nāhid bil-Bilād al-ʿArabīyya*). Most of the coins were in bronze and silver, while the highest denomination, one dinar, was gold. They were all dated with the year of Husayn's accession, AH 1334, and with the regnal year, 8 (a few were minted with the ninth regnal year).⁹⁸

Propaganda could be legal, printed or visual. In the Bedouin society which made up much of the Hijaz, Husayn's son Faysal was adept at the spectacle of propaganda. On 4 January 1917, after consolidating his hold over the tribes along the coast North of Mekka, Faysal put on a show as he marched to Wajh. Here it is as described by Lawrence. Even allowing for his hyperbole, the procession of over 10,000 must have been a sight to see, effective propaganda, and quite the spectacle:

The march became rather splendid and barbaric. First rode Feisal in white, then Sharraf at his right in red head-cloth and henna-dyed tunic and cloak, myself on his left in white and scarlet, behind us three banners of faded crimson silk with gilt spikes, behind them the drummers playing a march, and behind them against the wild mass of twelve hundred bouncing camels of the bodyguard, packed as closely as they could move, the men in every variety of coloured clothes and the camels nearly as brilliant in their trappings. We filled the valley to its banks with our flashing stream.⁹⁹

As leaders of an established empire, the Ottomans had proclaimed Jihad at least six times between 1768 and 1922. Their proclamation this time around was aimed specifically at mobilizing the empire's Arab subjects and securing their allegiance in the face of British incitement.¹⁰⁰ For them it was not an exceptional occasion. But it most certainly was for *Sharif* Husayn. He had to protect his project against accusations of sedition, arouse still embryonic passions of Arab nationalism against

a legitimate Islamic sovereign, and demonstrate that he provided a real alternative to the Ottoman Caliphate. This formed the core of the Hashimite propaganda efforts during the war as he countered those of the Ottomans.

We are entitled to ask if *Sharif* Husayn's wartime propaganda was successful. The answer should be no – at least for the most part. Most of the empire's Arab subjects remained loyal to the Sublime Porte until it was all over.¹⁰¹ Certainly, the British did put Hashimites in power in Transjordan and Iraq, which was something of an imperial achievement, but Husayn himself achieved little. As for his dear project of achieving the Caliphate, when the Ottomans abolished it in 1924 he was quick to claim the office – but no one was really listening.

Notes

- * The author would like to thank Marissa Young for her research assistance.
- 1 Richard Nelson, *A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 232–233, capitalization in the original.
- 2 Gareth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999, third edition), p. 6.
- 3 M. Sanders, "Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 1975), pp. 119–146. See also M.L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda During the First World War, 1914–18* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982).
- 4 This is especially true of the Hanafi tradition: S. Tufan Buzpinar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdulhamid II: 1877–1882," *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 36, no. 1 (1996), pp. 60–61.
- 5 Buzpinar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate", p. 62.
- 6 C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Revolt in Arabia* (New York: Putnam, 1917), pp. 34–35.
- 7 Richard Mortel, "Zaydi Shi'ism and the Hasanid *Sharifs* of Mecca", *IJMES* 9 (1978), pp. 461–462. The other two historians were Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Maqrīzī (d. 1442), and Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Mahasin Yūsuf ibn Taghribirdī (d. 1470). Al-Fāsi's singling out of Abū Numayy was most probably due to his reigning during the time of the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate by the Mongols in 1258; Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century* (Leyden: Brill, 1931), pp. 183–184, also notes that the *Sharifs* of Mekka were at one time Zaydi Shiis.
- 8 FO 78/1389, J.H. Skene (Aleppo) to Earl of Malmesbury, No. 33, 7 August 1858, enclosing copy Skene to Charles Alison, No. 20, 31 July 1858.
- 9 FO 78/1514, 12 December 1860, cited in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, Vol. x, Part II, The Last Years of Peace* (London: HMSO, 1938), p. 824. The editors note that there "is no real evidence of Arab support for the idea."

- 10 Buzpinar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate", pp. 63–64.
- 11 Ibid., "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate", p. 64. See Buzpinar's footnote 15 for his Ottoman source of the quotation.
- 12 Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 10–22. Sabunji was a former Syrian Catholic priest turned journalist from Diyarbekir who settled for several years in England; Birdwood was an Indian civil servant; Blunt was a Victorian poet and politician; Zohrab was British consul, Jeddah, from October 1878 to July 1881.
- 13 Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp. 52–54.
- 14 Sylvia G. Haim, "Blunt and al-Kawakibi", *Oriente Moderno*, vol. 35 no. 2. (1955), p. 136.
- 15 Quoted in Sylvia G. Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 28.
- 16 It has been shown that Kawakibi borrowed his ideas from Blunt (Haim, "Blunt and al-Kawakibi"); Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), pp. 107–114; Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movement* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p. 31.
- 17 Eliezer Tauber, "Three Approaches, One Idea: Religion and State in the Thought of Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Najib 'Azuri and Rashid Rida", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 21 (1994), pp. 190–198.
- 18 Tauber, "Three Approaches"; Eliezer Tauber, "Rashid Rida's Political Attitudes During World War I", *Muslim World*, Vol. 85 (1995), pp. 107–121; Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movement*, pp. 109–117.
- 19 While the idea was the subject of discussion, it is not my intention to suggest that it was widely accepted; the popularity of the notion among wide circles of people would be quite difficult to assess, given the nature of our sources. Yet I do intend to suggest that Husayn thought that it might be accepted one day, given the right circumstances.
- 20 Quoted in Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, p. 20. Given al-Afghāni's poor reputation for telling the truth, one should take his statement with a grain of salt, although it is not unlikely.
- 21 FO 195/1251, Zohrab (Jeddah) to Marquis of Salisbury, No. 34, 6 August 1879 (quoted); FO 78/3314, Zohrab (Jeddah), 8 February 1881, quoted in Kramer, op. cit., 15.
- 22 Haim, "Blunt and al-Kawakibi."
- 23 See C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 69–86.
- 24 Yisrael Gershoni, "Ha-Leum Ha'Aravi, Beyt Hashim ve-Suriya ha-Gedola bi-Khtavav shel 'Abdallah, Helek Rishon", *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. 25 (1975), pp. 1–26.
- 25 On the Caliphate *zeitgeist* in Britain see Peter Hopkirk, *Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire* (New York: Kodansha USA, 1997); Buzpinar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate"; and John Buchan, *Greenmantle* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916).
- 26 Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 48–54; the Kitchener quotation is on p. 52. The quotation on Kitchener's long held favouring of an Arab Caliphate is

taken from Jukka Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920* (London: Athlone, 1969), p. 18; on Kitchener and the Caliphate see Sir George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener* (New York: Macmillan, 1920), Vol. 3, pp. 53–54. Kedourie and Dawn have debated Husayn's Caliphate aspirations in the pages of *IJMES* (9 [1978], pp. 120–130; 10 [1979], pp. 420–426). Kedourie argues that Husayn was primarily interested in the Caliphate after the Kitchener message. Dawn says that the Caliphate “was of interest to Husayn primarily as an instrument in his efforts with the British to gain kingship for himself and as much territory as possible for himself and the Arabs” (p. 423). But Dawn does not deny that Husayn was interested in the Caliphate, only that it was a primary motivating factor. For this article's purposes, that he was interested in the Caliphate at all shows just how grand his ambitions were, and how they affected his propaganda during the war.

- 27 L/P&S/18/B22, “Shorthand Note taken by Messenger [Ali Asghar] of a discourse by the Sherif of Mecca”, undated [first week of December 1914]. This paper is also in Wingate Papers, 134/8/114–116, where it is dated 9 December 1914.
- 28 Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 52; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939), p. 414 (letter of 14 July 1915).
- 29 Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp. 52–52; Thomas Arnold, *The Caliphate* (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 146–147, 170–171, 189–200. Kedourie has also shown the influence of ‘Abbas Ḥilmī, Storrs, Wingate and Clayton in lobbying for a Sharifian Caliphate, although most of this effort came after the initial Kitchener communications: see Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 1914–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 7–64. Wingate was particularly active, writing to several movers and shakers in London in the spring and summer of 1915 and enclosing a memorandum from the Grand Qadi of the Sudan, Sir Sayyid ‘Alī al-Mirghānī, who also favoured a Sharifian Caliphate. In a letter dated 17 November 1915, Mirghānī wrote to the *Sharif*, presumably with Wingate's authority, urging him to “rise and take over the reins of the holy Arabian Koreishite Khaliphate, which you represent, being a direct descendant of our Holy Prophet” (Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab*, pp. 42–43).
- 30 Indeed, Husayn's newspaper *al-Qibla* was later to take issue with the notion of a separation between the spiritual and temporal functions of the Caliph; Islam, wrote *al-Qibla*, does not recognize a spiritual Caliphate akin to the Papacy (*al-Qibla*, 21 Shawwal 1335 [9 August 1917]).
- 31 The letter's authenticity is disputed in the anti-Hashimite treatise, Anīs Ṣāyigh, *Al-Hashimiyyun wa-al Thawra al-‘Arabīyya al-Kubrā* (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘a, 1966), pp. 22–24, but Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p. 11, believes the letter to be authentic. The text of the letter is in Sulayman Musa, *al-Ḥaraka al-‘Arabīyya* (Beirut: al-Nahār, 1982), p. 57.
- 32 Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movement*, pp. 49–50.
- 33 Eliezer Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War I* (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 57–82.

- 34 FO 371/2767/30674, McMahon to Grey, No. 26, 7 February 1916, enclosing Hussein to Sayyid Ali El Morghani, 28 December 1915, cited in Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab*, pp. 122–123.
- 35 FO 371/2767/45855, McMahon to FO, No. 42, 29 February 1916, enclosing note on the verbal messages from ‘Abdallah, and FO 141/461/1198/48, Memorandum of R. Storrs, 11 March 1916, both cited and discussed in Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab*, p. 123.
- 36 FO 882/5, Storrs’ diary of visit to Jeddah, 17 October 1916; Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab*, pp. 144–145. Dawn’s contention (IJMES 10 [1979] p. 424) that the title claimed by Husayn, *amīr al-mu’minīn*, “had long since lost its connection with the caliph and had become a rarely used title of honor” conflicts with that of Gibb: “until the end of the Caliphate as an institution, *amīr al-mu’minīn* was employed exclusively as the protocollary title of a caliph, and among the Sunnis its adoption by a ruler implied a claim to the office of caliph” (H.A.R. Gibb, “Amir al-Mu’minin,” *Encyclopedia of Islam*, Second Edition).
- 37 Antonius, p. 191. That the blockade was instituted at Husayn’s request is attested to by McMahon, who telegraphed the FO on 4 June 1916: “Our blockade of Hedjaz which it should be remembered was instituted at the urgent and repeated request of Shereef himself.” (FO 371/2778/187291, no. 487). The British had initiated a partial blockade as early as late 1914, which led Husayn to complain about the lack of grain in the Hijaz (Wingate Papers [WP] 134/8/114–116, Shorthand notes taken by x of a discourse by Sherif of Mekka, which took place in privacy on the roof of his palace, 9 December 1914). In mid-1915, the British decided to allow restricted imports of food to Jeddah via Port Sudan and Suakin at the urging of McMahon, who believed that stoppage of supplies alienated the Arabs (WP 134/6/11–12, Clayton to Wingate, repeating FO to High Commissioner, received Erkowit 14 May 1915; WP 134/6/36–37, Clayton to Cheetham, 20 May 1915). This policy met with approval in the Hijaz (WP 136/1/146–147, Report of the third visit of Messenger “G” to the Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali at Mekka, 25 January 1916). See also Colman, pp. 96–101, and Sheila Scoville, “British Logistical Support to the Hashimites of Hejaz: Ta’if to Ma’an, 1916–1918”, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1985, pp/ 51–53.
- 38 Text in *Arab Bulletin* [AB], no. 21, 15 September 1916; WP 136/6/29–30, Wingate to Wilson, 7 May 1916.
- 39 *Arab Bulletin*, No. 21, 15 September 1916.
- 40 Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 140–141.
- 41 Cleveland, “The Role of Islam as a Political Ideology in the First World War”, p. 86.
- 42 Ibid., “The Role of Islam as a Political Ideology in the First World War”, p. 88.
- 43 Ibid., “The Role of Islam as a Political Ideology in the First World War”, p. 93.
- 44 The texts of these proclamations can also be found in: *Revue du Monde Musulman* 46 (1921), pp. 1–22; *Revue du Monde Musulman* 47 (1921), pp. 1–27, *Revue du Monde Musulman* 50 (1922), pp. 74–100, where they appear in Arabic and French; the first proclamation appears in English in FO 371/2775/196445. They have been discussed, from different angles, in William L. Cleveland, “The Role of Islam as a

- Political Ideology in the First World War”, in Edward Ingram (ed.), *National and International Politics in the First World War: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie* (London: Cass, 1986), pp. 84–101; and in Dawn, pp. 75–86.
- 45 Jorgen Baek Simonsen, “How to Use and Misuse History in Printing: Jihad and World War I”, *Culture and History*, Vol. 16 (1997), pp. 122–1126.
- 46 FO 882/14: W.H. Deedes to General Staff Officer [Intelligence GSOI], 19 August enclosing note by Fuʿad al-Khatib, 19 July 1916; Clayton to Private Secretary, Khartoum, 25 July 1916; and WP 140/5/68–70, Clayton to Wingate, 21 September 1916. See also Bruce Westrate, *The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916–1920* [University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992], pp. 110–111.
- 47 It was not published in *al-Qibla*, which appeared first on 15 Shawwal 1334 [14 August 1916].
- 48 First proclamation, *Revue du Monde Musulman* 46 (1921), pp. 20–21.
- 49 There is some confusion over the date of this proclamation. The versions published in *Arab Bulletin* no. 25, 7 October 1916 and in *Revue du Monde Musulman* 47 (1921), 12–13, are dated 11 Dhu al-Qaḍah 1334 [9 September 1916]. The text in Sulayman Musa, *Al-Thawra al-ʿArabiyya al-Kubrā: Wathaʿiq wa-Asanid* (Amman: Daʿira al-Thaqāfa wal-Funūn, 1996), pp. 77–81, and in *al-Qibla*, no. 11, 21 Dhu al-Qaḍa 1334 [20 September 1916] carries that date.
- 50 Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 81–82.
- 51 The text in *Revue du Monde Musulman* 47 (1921), pp. 5–11, carries the date Saffar 1335 [November 1916]; the text in Suleyman Musa, *Wathaʿiq*, and in *al-Qibla*, no. 31, 3 Saffar 1335 [10 December 1916] carries that date.
- 52 Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, pp. 77.
- 53 Text in Musa, *Wathaʿiq*, pp. 78–82, where it is dated 10 Jumada al-Ula 1335 [3 March 1917]; and in *al-Qibla*, no. 58, 11 Jumada al-Ula 1335 [4 March 1917].
- 54 Available online, “Proclamation of the Ulema Regarding Independence from Turkey, March, 1917”, citing Charles F. Horne, *Source Records for the Great War*, Vol. IV (National Alumni 1923). http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/arabindependence_ulema.htm.
- 55 Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb (1886–1969) was born in Damascus and embodied “all the ideological complexities of the Ottoman-Arab Muslim elite of his generation.” For him, “Arab rights and Islamic order were inseparable parts of the political whole” (Cleveland, p. 87). Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb and Fuʿad al-Khaṭīb both had connections to British intelligence (see *Arab Bulletin*, no. 37, 4 January 1916). For more on Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb see Amal Ghazal, “Power, Arabism and Islam in the Writings of Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb”, *Past Imperfect*, Vol. 6 (1997), pp. 133–150.
- 56 *Al-Qibla*, no. 1, 15 Shawwal 1334 [14 August 1916], quoted in Cleveland, p. 89.
- 57 *Al-Qibla*, no. 10, 17 Dhu al-Qaḍah 1334 [14 September 1916]; no. 1 15 Shawwal 1334 [14 August 1916], both cited in Cleveland, p. 91.
- 58 *Al-Qibla*, no. 3, 22 Shawwal 1334 [21 August 1916], cited in Cleveland, pp. 90–91.
- 59 FO 371/2782/218006, McMahon to FO, no. 945, 31 October 1916, transmitting Wilson’s no. 436 of 29 October 1916, which includes ‘Abdallah’s announcement; FO 371/2782/217652, ‘Abdallah (Mekka) to FO, 29 October 1916, minute by George

Clerk dated 31 October 1916. Husayn's title was rendered by the Hashimites into English as "King of the Arab Nation," into French as "*Roi de la nation arabe*," and into Arabic as "*malik al-bilād al-ʿarabiyya*."

- 60 "The telegram of Emir Abdulla was a complete surprise to me," wrote Wilson to McMahon (FO 371/2782/23317, Wilson to McMahon, no. 12, 31 October 1916, enclosed in McMahon to Grey, 9 November 1916).
- 61 See Joshua Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia* (New York: New York University Press, 2001), pp. 107–108.
- 62 FO 371/2782/242002, Wilson to McMahon, no. 14, 5 November 1916; FO 371/2782/220734, McMahon to FO, no. 960, 2 November 1916, transmitting telegrams from Brémont passed on by French Military Attaché (Doynel de San Quentin) in Cairo. When Cadi found out that it was now trumpeted throughout Mekka that he had just congratulated the *Sharif* on becoming King in the name of France, he immediately took to his bed with a diplomatic "fever."
- 63 FO371/2782/23317, Wilson to McMahon, no. 12, 31 October 1916, enclosed in McMahon to Grey, 9 November 1916. *Al-Qibla*, 3 Muharram 1335 [29 October 1916]. On 1 November 1916, Wilson telegraphed that there had been an official announcement stating that "Our Allied Governments had sent congratulations to Shereef expressing pleasure at his action" (FO 371/2782/219490, Wilson to McMahon, no. 452, 1 November 1916, relayed in McMahon to FO, no. 955, 1 November 1916).
- 64 *Al-Qibla*, 3 Muharram 1335 [29 October 1916]. A translation of parts of the petition can be found in Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab*, pp. 145–146.
- 65 *Al-Qibla*, 3 Muharram 1335 [29 October 1916]. Husayn also published a speech by Sāmī al-Bakrī, of the Damascus Bakris, stating that "the Syrians and the Iraqis are happy today with the swearing in of their king" (*al-Qibla*, 10 Muharram 1335 [5 November 1916]).
- 66 See Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
- 67 FO 371/2783/255868, McMahon to Grey, 2 December 1916, enclosing the *fatwa* which is enclosed in Wilson to Director, Arab Bureau, 14 November 1916.
- 68 FO 371/2782/23317, Note by Hussein Effendi Ruhi, 30 October 1916, enclosed in Wilson to McMahon, no. 12, 31 October 1916, enclosed in McMahon to Grey, 9 November 1916.
- 69 *Al-Qibla*, no. 56, 4 Jamadi al-Ula 1335 [25 February 1917]. Husayn's response, printed in the same issue, was typically self-deprecating, stating only that the people of the country had decided to abide by the decision of the rest of the Muslim world on the Caliphate issue.
- 70 See, for example, the following in *al-Qibla*: a two-part article by F[u'ād al-Khaṭīb?], 27 Jamadi al-Thani [19 April 1917] and 2 Rajah 1335 [23 April 1917], denying the Ottoman claim to the Caliphate; an article published on 25 Jamadi al-Ula 1335 [18 March 1917] quoting an article from the Cairene paper *al-Kawkab*.
- 71 On this leniency see Haim Gerber, "Sharia, Kanun and Custom in the Ottoman Law: The Court Records of 17th Century Bursa," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2(1981), pp. 131–147: "We know that large parts of the orthodox *sharia* were hardly ever in use, e.g., the criminal law which involved amputation of

- limbs and the like.” Indeed, these punishments, except for the death penalty for apostasy, were officially abolished under the Penal Code of 1858: see Noel J. Coulson, *A History at Islamic Law* (Edinburgh University Press, 1964), p. 151.
- 72 Snouck Hurgronje, *Mecca*, p. 189. Snouck Hurgronje makes the blanket statement (pp. 182–183) that Hanafi *fiqh* was applied in all religious matters and in family matters, but that “all other matters were decided according to the new secular law (called al-Qanun al-Munif) which replaced the Shar’ al-Sherif (Sacred Law).” This seems a bit of an oversimplification, and contributes to the general confusion over the issue.
- 73 Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University), p. 89.
- 74 “When local Ottoman townspeople died, their property was divided according to Qur’anic injunctions, with recourse to a qadi or mufti if necessary” (Ochsenswald, *Religion, Society*, p. 87). Muhammad ‘Abd al-Jawad Muhammad, *Al-Taṭawwur al-Tashrīfī fī al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘udiyya* (Cairo: Cairo University Press, 1977), pp. 40–41, also stresses this.
- 75 Muhammad, pp. 40–41. The quotation is from Surah IV:11.
- 76 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 215.
- 77 Hasan Kayali. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 216.
- 78 Stanford and Ezel Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, II, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975* (Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 306–307. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London: Hurst, 1998 [rpt. of 1964 edition]), pp. 415–416, puts this reform in 1916, but does not indicate whether it came before or after the beginning of the Sharif’s Revolt.
- 79 *Al-Qibla*, 25 Shawwal 1334 [24 August 1916].
- 80 *Al-Qibla*, 27 Sha‘ban 1336 [6 June 1918].
- 81 FO 686/38, General Notes on Conversations with King Hussein on [sic] Jeddah on 2, 3, and 4 June 1918, by Wilson, 6 June 1918.
- 82 FO 686/28, Jeddah Report, 11–30 August 1922; FO 371/8943/E 2478, Pilgrimage Report, 1922, enclosed in Marshall to Curzon, no. 11, 31 January 1923; FO 371/10006/E 289, Report on the Economic Conditions in the Hedjaz Vice-Consul L.S. Grafftey-Smith, enclosed in Bullard to Curzon, no. 12, Overseas Trade, 31 October 1923.
- 83 *Al-Qibla*, 31 May 1923. The verse is from v:38. For another such incident see FO 686/26, Extracts from Report from Agent-Mekka, enclosed in Jeddah Report, 10 May 1920.
- 84 MAE, Djeddah (consulat), carton no. 529, 27 February 1917.
- 85 *Al-Qibla*, 14 Jamadi al-Ula 1335 [7 March 1917]. In 1919, *al-Qibla* wrote that Indian newspapers had praised Husayn for this policy (2 Rajah 1337 [2 April 1919]).
- 86 FO 682/12, Ihsanullah to British Agent, Jeddah, 19 May 1920.
- 87 *Al-Qibla*, 15 Sha‘ban 1337 [15 May 1919].

- 88 See Franz Rosenthal, *The Herb: Hashish versus Medieval Muslim Society* (Leiden: Brill, 1971).
- 89 FO 686/12, unidentified intelligence agent in Mecca [Nasirudin?] to British Agent (Jeddah), no. 79, 6 August 1920. The term used in this report is "grass," and I assume that hashish is the substance intended, particularly since the Arabic for weeds or grass is hashish.
- 90 *Al-Qibla*, 15 Sha'ban 1337 [15 May 1919].
- 91 FO 371/4166/21996, Interview with Captain Zia, sent from Constantinople by the Turks to negotiate the surrender of Medina, 19 January 1919, enclosed in Cheetham to FO, no. 39, 24 January 1919.
- 92 Shane Leslie, *Mark Sykes, His Life and Letters* (London: Cassell, 1923), p. 280; Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*, p. 198, citing FO 141/679, file 4088/17, Wilson, 5 June 1918; Arnold Rabbow, *Div-Lexicon Politischer Symbole* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1970), pp. 179–180. According to Khayrīyya Qāsimīyya, *al-'Alam al-Filastīnī* (Beirut: PLO, Markaz al-Abḥāth, "Abḥāth Filastīniyya" series, no. 21, 1970), Sykes was not responsible for creating the flag: she cited in this respect Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, who said that the three horizontal stripes were created by al-Fatat; Husayn only added the red chevron.
- 93 FO 371/2774/148524, McMahon to FO, no. 639, 30 July 1916; Ami Ayalon, "The Hashemites, T.E. Lawrence, and the Postage Stamps of the Hijaz", in Asher Susser/Aryeh Shmuelevitz (eds.), *The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World: Essays in Honour of the late Professor Uriel Dann* (London: Cass, 1995), pp. 15–30; *al-Qibla*, 7 Shawwal 1335 [26 July 1917], quotation on page 16.
- 94 Ayalon, "The Hashemites, T.E. Lawrence, and the Postage Stamps of the Hijaz", p. 16.
- 95 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 96 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 97 *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.
- 98 *Al-Qibla*, 20 September 1923; Chester Krause and Clifford Mishler, *1995 Standard Edition of World Coins* (White Plains, NY: Krause Publications, 1994), pp. 1797–1800; Tim Browder, "Coinage of Hejaz Kingdom", *Numismatic Scrapbook Magazine* 26 (1960), pp. 3489–3496. I wish to thank Dr. Michael Bates of the American Numismatic Society for these numismatic references.
- 99 T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (New York: Doubleday, 1935), pp. 140–141.
- 100 See Mustafa Aksakal's contribution to this volume.
- 101 Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire* (London: I.B. Taurus, 1998), p. 175.

11 A German “Illusive Love”

Rashīd Riḍā's Perceptions of the First World War in the Muslim World

Umar Ryad

The inevitable event comes to pass ... as enticed by the vanity of the Great States. It was thought that their politicians due to their shrewdness were able to hold down the fire in the stove so that its evil will not extend to its neighboring places. Europe that is filled with gunpowder and dynamite thought to secure itself from the flame against which Bismarck had already warned ... forgetting God's general justice in all nations and peoples.¹

This is what Shaykh Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935) wrote in early August 1914, a few days after the Great War broke out in Europe. Linking its anticipated calamities for humanity with the Koranic description of the Day of Resurrection, he perceived the war as *al-ṭāmma al-ṣuḡhrā* (the Minor Disaster) putting it on a scale with *al-ṭāmma al-kubrā* (the Great Disaster), which is a Koranic allusion to the Last (Judgment) Day.

Riḍā is no doubt one of the most intriguing figures in modern Islamic history. As an heir to the *Salafiyya* reformist movement of his time, his religious and political views and activism are crystallized in his well-known journal *al-Manār* (The Lighthouse, 1898–1935) published in Cairo. Before World War I, Riḍā became involved in open and secret political societies that aimed at the struggle against colonial interventions in the Muslim World. World War I and its aftermath created a global moment which influenced many world events and actions. During the war, Riḍā not only continued his pre-war activities, but became involved in other attempts to further the cause of Arab independence which the war had triggered. Riḍā aspired to set up an Anglo-Arab alliance that could guarantee Arab independence and save both the temporal and spiritual authority of Islam.² In his search for alternative outlooks for the imperial world order through his political activities, Riḍā formulated specific views of the war and the political, military and religious consequences of the German-Ottoman alliance in it as a “European war”. His views are remarkable examples of how Muslim reformists of that age perceived

World War I as a great event in global history. We argue that the war had many paradoxical influences on Riḍā's anti-westernist tone and political choices.

As the power of the Ottoman empire was vanishing from the politics of world order, Jihad, pan-Islam, pan-Arabism and the Caliphate became ideologized terms during the war years. Muslim intellectuals and activists took their political courses of action according to their preference for one ideology over another as a remedy for the Muslim political malaise; and Riḍā was no exception. He had an "idealized" hope of establishing a sense of belonging and nationalism among his Muslim and Arab compatriots. Many of his generation tried to create their own alternative politico-cultural options. Riḍā aimed at establishing a political and religious unity among Muslims to the extent that he was sometimes obliged to call for British-Arab friendship and an Arab-Zionist entente. In that sense, Europe's proclaimed centrality in the world political order moulded Riḍā's perceptions of Europe itself in his quest for an imagined Islamic and Arab unity. As we shall see, his growing pessimism and frustration emanated from his perception of an unbalanced world order and the unfair rules of the international political game and rivalries. These troubled relations in the *Weltpolitik* had their implications for the scope and shape of his pan-Islamic nationalist visions even after the war. Riḍā's attitudes reflect the fact that Islamic nationalism, and pan-Islamism in general, was an ambivalent project containing reactionary and changeable components in a greater world of politics and pragmatism.³

Early German-Ottoman Alliance

As a religious concept, Jihad became a political instrument to mobilize public opinion in favour of the political cause of the Sublime Porte. In different political and military contexts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottomans exploited the term as a rallying cry seeking support for their national and international policies. Nevertheless, it was the discourse of the Great War that vigorously revitalized its validity on both the Ottoman and German sides. The jihadization of the Ottoman participation on the German side was certainly the product of a Ottoman-German joint project. Whether it was a "holy war made in Germany" or not, Jihad was a significant node in politics throughout the war years.⁴

Besides such religious justifications, many pan-Islamists, nationalists, intellectuals and religious scholars among Riḍā's contemporaries perceived Germany as the only European Power that had befriended

Islam without having obvious interests in Muslim territories.⁵ Despite the global character of this Jihad propaganda in the Muslim world, not all Muslim religious scholars had accepted the religious justification for that war. This holds true for Riḍā, who was an influential spokesman for the Arab and Muslim nationalism of his age. He did not champion the idea of joining the German side, nor did he show any sympathy for the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Ironically, as a pan-Arabist seeking "Arab religious nationalism"⁶ during the war Riḍā was not involved in this Jihad debate. Unlike other fellow Muslim ideologues who were drawn into the Ottoman-German propaganda coalition, Riḍā was not a proponent of the Ottoman participation in what he saw as a "European war." As Riḍā was an influential pan-Islamic defender of the Caliphate at a later stage, in the early 1920s, a re-reading to his writings in *al-Manār* from the war years therefore adds other aspects to the Muslim religious and political discourse regarding the Ottoman decision to enter the Great War on the German side. His lack of interest in a German coalition and support for Anglo-Arab cooperation could also be understood against his background as belonging to the Syrian community in Egypt that did not share the political views of the local population because of their pro-British stance. Anti-British and pro-Ottoman Egyptian nationalists even depicted the Syrians, including Riḍā, as *dukhalā* (intruders) and collaborators with the British in Egypt. The Syrians were much more interested in the Syrian cause than in the Egyptian nationalist question.⁷

From the start, Riḍā was cautious about giving full support to the German-Ottoman alliance. His views were nevertheless inconsistent, as he constantly tried many political strategies before and during the war to achieve what he saw as his goal of Arab unity. In his early career, he considered the Ottomans to be "the representatives of that Islamic temporal independent power."⁸ In reaction to Kaiser Wilhelm's declaration of himself as a protector of all Muslims during his well-known visit to the Ottoman empire in 1898, Riḍā did not object to the Sublime Porte's alliance with any European power, but he stressed that one should not forget that the whole of Europe was "an enemy" for Muslims. However, since Germany had no "greedy ambition" in the Ottoman empire the Germans were better allies than all the other European nations.⁹ Riḍā also received with great enthusiasm the Kaiser's visit to Saladin's tomb in Damascus when he laid a wreath and hung a lamp of "solid silver" on the tomb.¹⁰ At this point, Riḍā moreover saw the German emperor as the "leader of the best-organized army" whose admiration for Saladin emanated from his acknowledgment of the latter as "the greatest warrior" of Islam.¹¹

Before the war, Riḍā's early political responses to the German interests in the Ottoman empire changed over the course of time. Despite his early positive attitude towards the Ottoman-German alliance, Riḍā was always frustrated about all kinds of colonialism in the Muslim world. As early as 1904, he became convinced that Germany wanted to disturb the balance of power in Europe by its alliance with the Russians during the Russo-Japanese war. Riḍā expected that the supremacy in the world would be divided between the Anglo-Saxons and Germans in the end.¹² However, despite its knowledge and civilization, Germany followed a policy of "selfishness" in its colony in East Africa. By exhibiting such behaviour, Germany would gradually lose its status among Muslims, who would ultimately give their preference to British rule above that of other European nations.¹³

Arabism versus Ottomanism

Riḍā's understanding of the Great War should be seen in conjunction with his fluctuating political positions in the pre-war period and during the war. In the beginning he was an advocate of the integrity of the Ottoman state and its ability to resist imperialism. For the Caliphate, the Arabs were more significant for the religious sphere of the empire, while the Turks were much needed for its supremacy in the field of political and military power. For him "the Arab is the germ (*jurthūma*) of Islam while the Turk is its piercing sword."¹⁴ Therefore, in that period he worked for strong Turkish-Arab relations which might bring prosperity to the empire. To realize his Arab nationalist ideas, he was ready to back the Young Turks in their demands for democratic rule and an anti-corruption programme, but he was anxious about their possible adoption of a western-style nationalist type that would maximize their sense of nationalism for the supremacy of the Turkish race above other ethnicities in the Empire. Therefore, his position was divided between his hope for democracy brought about by the Young Turks and the necessity of resisting their Turkish nationalism which he saw as the task of the Caliph.¹⁵

After the deposing of Sultan Abdulhamid, Riḍā sided with the CUP. In 1909, he travelled to Istanbul to seek financial support for the establishment of his future school for training Muslim missionaries, *Dār al-Da'wā wa al-Irshād* (House of Preaching and Guidance). Although he was much interested in Turkish-Arab reconciliation, he regularly warned against a racial type of Turkish nationalism.¹⁶ His school plan was initially accepted on the condition that its language should be Turkish and its

supervision and finance should be under Shaykh al-Islam's budget. Riḍā objected and after a few months he became frustrated as he had begun to feel that the CUP government wanted to use his school as a tool for their Turkification policies. Embittered he went to the British Embassy in Istanbul and declared the CUP to be a group of atheists and freemasons who exploited Islam for their political ends.¹⁷

In 1911 Riḍā established the "Society of Arab Association" in Cairo with the aim of achieving unity among the Arab rulers of the Arabian Peninsula and cooperation with Arab societies in Syria, Iraq and Istanbul against the CUP. He sent emissaries to most of these Arab rulers in the Arabian Peninsula in an attempt to convince them of the necessity of establishing a pan-Arab empire covering Syria, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula.¹⁸ Riḍā lost this hope for unity due to the CUP's Turkification policy in the empire and the violation of Arab rights. Since Islam and Arabism were almost synonymous in his view, any attempt to weaken Arabism was therefore an assault against Islam itself.¹⁹

A German "Illusive" Love

While his attack on the CUP government was reaching its peak, Riḍā became very outspoken in his reservations about the Ottoman-German alliance. More than a decade after the Kaiser's visit to the Sublime Porte, Riḍā profoundly reconsidered his position regarding the reality and meaning of this perceived German friendship with the empire. The Porte was not supposed to get any benefit from Germany, except in training and organizing the Ottoman army. For him, it was actually the leaders of the CUP that were harming Muslims because of their "arrogant" policies.²⁰ The appearance of Germany on the political scene after the Kaiser's visit to Istanbul had increased British agitation and prompted the creation of a new Russian-British coalition against the Sublime Porte. Almost three years before World War I, due to the change in European policies in the East, Riḍā now completely changed his earlier views regarding the German-Ottoman rapprochement by saying:

It was of the worst luck for the Muslim world – East or West –, when it was deceived by the German Kaiser in this new political stage. Istanbul, Tehran and Fes [Morocco] were misled by his showing of inclination and love to the Islamic world and his wish to maintain its [Muslim] states independent, cherished and powerful.²¹

In Riḍā's opinion, the German "illusive" love did not benefit the Islamic world and "the voice of the Kaiser in greeting ... the millions of Muslims had been foreboding and the beginning of misery."²²

As World War I was approaching, Riḍā became suspicious about the effect of the international diplomatic conferences of his time, since secret agreements between colonial states always interfered with the outcome of their resolutions.²³ By then, he was lamenting that Germany had misused the concept of Ottomanism through the leaders of the CUP in order to achieve its own political interests. An example of that was the German intervention in the issue of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria and its facilitating German Zionist Jews to occupy the Holy Land in Palestine.²⁴ Riḍā launched a severe attack against the CUP leaders by depicting them as "enemies of Arabs and Islam." Because of their Turcification policy and what he saw as support for Zionists, Riḍā attacked them for their "lack of Islamic feeling," as contrasted with what he saw as Bismarck's deep religiosity. Religion was significant in any military confrontation, as any combat troops believing in God and the Hereafter would have much more resolution and endurance in wartime. In that sense, German leaders built their unity on the "rock of faith," while the Ottoman CUP leaders built their union on the "sand of atheism."²⁵

At this juncture, Riḍā lost his faith in the Ottoman empire. He saw the Great War as a suitable opportunity for the Arabs to launch a revolt against the Ottomans and liberate their countries from the empire's repression. Therefore, his political opportunism did not inhibit him from approaching the British Intelligence Department in Cairo, also responsible for the propaganda section of the Arab Bureau,²⁶ trying to convince them of the influence which the Arab Association could exercise on the Arab officers in the Ottoman army and their willingness to rebel against their Ottoman and German commanders. However, as will become clear later, Riḍā also held reserved attitudes towards the British authorities because of their ambitions in Arab regions.²⁷

By the end of 1912 Riḍā was organizing the Ottoman Administrative Decentralization Party (*Ḥizb al-lā markaziyya al-idāriyya al-‘uthmānī*) with other pan-Arabists in Cairo; and was elected as its president.

Before the war, the German Consulate reported to Berlin about the activities of Syrian exiles in Cairo led by Riḍā. It is reported that he met the German emissary in Cairo and discussed the dream of establishing an independent Arab caliphate under the Khedive of Egypt ruling Syria and Arabia. Riḍā asked for German diplomatic support in acquiring armaments against the Anglo-French – a request which was quickly refused.²⁸ Probably after this failure with the Germans, Riḍā started to develop a feeling of antipathy towards what he saw as German colonial

ambitions in the Muslim world for two reasons, namely due to their great interest in the Berlin-Baghdad Express (or Baghdad Railway) and German solidarity with the Young Turks. With this, Germany was eager to increase its economic interests in Palestine and to strengthen its colonial schemes in the Ottoman empire without "shedding a drop of German blood."²⁹ If Germany continued to consolidate its supremacy in the same manner in the coming years, Riḍā anticipated, British military power would never be able to "stop the stream of German greed."³⁰

Meanwhile, Riḍā also became concerned about the Arab provinces in the Ottoman empire falling into the hands of imperialist European powers. This fear strongly increased after the Ottoman defeat by the Italians in Libya and in the Balkan War. In 1912 he travelled to India on a lecture tour; and on his way back to Egypt he passed through Kuwait and Masqat in order to persuade Arab leaders of the necessity to establish an independent Arab state.³¹ In a pamphlet he warned the Arabs against the intention of western foreigners to gain control over Syria and the Arabian Peninsula as a first stage in their plan "to destroy the Ka'ba and transport the Black Stone and the ashes of the Prophet to the Louvre."³²

Riḍā hoped that the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War would shake the CUP leaders in Istanbul. For him, Ottoman political rulers were only concerned with strengthening the power of European states in the Ottoman empire, while unwisely ignoring the potential opportunities to cooperate with the Arabs. In order to solve this problem, he proposed changing Istanbul into a purely military base, and moving the capital of the empire to the Arab city of Damascus or to the Anatolian city of Konya.³³

Despite Riḍā's generally explicit anti-Zionist stance, he later became an advocate of an Arab-Zionist entente before the war. He saw no problem in the fact that Syrians would draw on Jewish capital in order to develop projects in their country, since the Jews, he asserted, controlled European finance.³⁴ In 1913, an Egyptian Zionist reported to the Zionist Head Office in Berlin that some representatives of the Decentralization Party, Riḍā's secret society, wanted to conclude an agreement "with us." This meeting was supposed to take place during the visit of these decentralizationists to the First Arab Congress in Paris in 1913. Despite his short-term support for a Zionist-Arab entente, Riḍā speculated that the CUP was actually helping the Zionists in Palestine. There were therefore two options open to the Arabs: either to conclude an agreement with the Zionist leaders or to oppose Zionists in every way, first by forming competing societies and companies, and finally by taking up arms and forming armed gangs against them.³⁵ The objective of his advocacy for a Zionist-Arab entente was not only to work towards Arab independence from Ottoman rule, but

it was also meant to frustrate the “plots” of certain Arab Christians who, he thought, wanted the Great Powers to occupy the Arab provinces.³⁶ In the beginning of the summer of 1914, Riḍā withdrew his support for such an entente; and now he accused the Zionists of seeking a Jewish state that would stretch from Palestine to Iraq.³⁷

The Ottomans in a “European” War

After the outbreak of the war, Riḍā thought that there were other reasons for the Great War than the political official version released by European states and Russia regarding its causes. The primary reason was the European and Russian fervour and competition in attaining world dominance. Russia aimed at increasing its international supremacy by annexing the Slavic peoples in the Balkans and Austria, whereas Germany hoped to impose its supreme authority not only on Europe but worldwide. Therefore, Germany organized its land and sea forces in such advanced ways according to natural sciences and military techniques. Britain’s competition with the Germans in building navies was due to Britain’s keen desire to preserve a supreme sea power in its colonies. On the other hand, France extended its colonies at the cost of weakening Muslim North Africa and its treasures by agitating for internal conflict and wars. The French were shrewd enough to increase the deployment of foreign troops to defend France in lieu of exposing their youth to die during the war.³⁸

For Riḍā, such great nations in terms of science, industry, wealth and civilization were determined to spend hundreds of millions of what they had “sucked” from the wealth of the colonized peoples. European powers were going to “shed the blood and destroy the civilization [of those people ...] simply for the sake of their greed, and love for supremacy on earth despite their camouflage of consolidating peace by means of war ...”³⁹

At that time, Riḍā was impressed by German power. He belittled the European anti-German propaganda that blamed the German Emperor Wilhelm II (1859–1941) for “flooding” Europe in a “sea of blood.”⁴⁰ But he was not outspoken in supporting the idea of the Ottoman participation in that war, unlike some other religious scholars of his age. As he expected that the war was going to continue for years, the Sublime Porte was too poorly equipped to fight against such great powers.⁴¹ Disastrous as the war was, Riḍā bemoaned that the most civilized nations were amassing their powers and recruiting other neutral nations to fight on either side only for the sake of retaliation against each other. In Riḍā’s words,

nobody would be safe from this war. Everybody should be troubled about its nature and the evil that would destroy thousands of one's "human brethren." How great would be the loss to the world every hour in terms of scientists, philosophers, artisans and farmers leaving helpless widows and children behind!⁴²

In Riḍā's mind, all European nations were well equipped to launch war. Their military advance was based on competition in inventing weapons, but Germany was the best prepared for war. As it was primarily a war of competition, on the Triple Entente side the French were the "most intelligent and courageous", while the Britons were known for their "sagacity" and "wisdom" in their politics; and for their "justice" in their colonies. This is why these two countries were capable of stretching their colonial power over many nations. The sense of competition on the German side, on the other hand, was based on the refining of their skills in science, military, work, industry and commerce; and consequently on increasing their national treasures. Other states indulged in the war merely as subordinates to these nations. For Riḍā, among all these nations the Ottoman empire played second fiddle in the war, as the Porte did not have the mentality to challenge or compete with European powers in terms of military power, science and technology, except for the superficial Ottoman imitation of the western external modes of life.⁴³

In the first months of the war, the British declared a Protectorate over Egypt by deposing Khedive Abbās Ḥilmī II (1874–1944) and nominating his nephew Ḥusayn Kāmil (1853–1917) as the Sultan of Egypt. Riḍā neither enthusiastically received the news, nor publicly opposed it. It sufficed for him to describe it as a direct consequence of the Ottoman declaration of war.⁴⁴

Due to its dissatisfaction with the French contacts with Syrian Christian activists, the British administration in Egypt tried to exploit that party as an opposition movement in the Arab territories during the war. The anti-Ottoman attitude of Syrian intellectuals in Egypt and their demand for Arab unity suited the British interests in the Ottoman empire. Because of their aspirations for Arab unity and Riḍā's dream of establishing an Arab caliphate, Riḍā and other members of the party agreed to negotiate cooperation with the British authorities.⁴⁵ Their agreement included written conditions that had to be conveyed to the British government. If it was accepted by the government in London, it should be officially reported by Reuter's News Agency. In return, Arab societies would commit themselves to inciting revolts in the Arab provinces. Riḍā's party was given 1,000 Egyptian pounds to finance sending emissaries into the empire. Among their tasks were to report

that the British were prepared to supply arms and ammunition for the revolts and to appeal to Arab soldiers to desert from the Ottoman army.⁴⁶

Riḍā expected Britain or Germany to have the most decisive influence during the war. The British were known for their patience and ability to multiply the number of their professional military staff. Although they did not have obligatory military service, the British were deploying workers which consequently interrupted their national production. However, if the Germans were going to win the war, he anticipated, Germany would not hesitate to impose its authority on Europe and unseat other European powers in the hearts of their colonies.⁴⁷ However, for him, the worst result of the war was that Europeans had already started to exert more efforts to increase their military powers and arms, and to amplify their ability and readiness to launch more wars in the future.⁴⁸

Riḍā's perceptions of the war were based on his reading of the news available to him in the Arabic press.⁴⁹ Like many of his peers, he was keen to follow the news about the war fronts in Europe and the Middle East.⁵⁰ However, he was sceptical of the coverage of the war in the press. Telegrams, political, scientific and historical newspapers were filled with lies, paradoxes, abuses, misrepresentations and camouflage. Even official reports were censored and had to be mistrusted.⁵¹

In his analysis of the progress of the war, Riḍā's anti-colonial tone was evident, and he was hoping for a solution to the Eastern Question after the war. Almost nine months after its start, Riḍā argued that as love for authority is intrinsic for the human being, no nation would succumb to the power of others, despite the fact that the human structure could only be established on the independence of all nations and races. Monopoly of power and rule by the victorious side in this war would also be short-lived. Riḍā anticipated that, if there had been no firm guarantee for fulfilling general justice or equality for all nations and races, the Great War would undoubtedly have been the most unfortunate war for humanity. The to-be-defeated nations would not give up. They would persist in lobbying and creating new fronts that would definitely lead to a similar or even more "evil war" in the future.⁵²

During the war, German and Ottoman workers continued their work on the Berlin-Baghdad Railway for military purposes. Although Riḍā considered this Ottoman-German railway project as one of greatest good deeds of Sultan Abdulhamīd II, he strongly criticized the Sultan's agreement to give the Germans ownership rights to the strip of land that extended alongside the railway in the heart of the Ottoman empire. Riḍā predicted that this railway, which was primarily established for the protection of the Ottoman empire, would one day endanger its existence. This railway that was supposed to be the "heart" of the empire was given

to foreigners: "how can anybody live while his heart is in the hands of others?!"⁵³ It was a great opportunity for Germany to manipulate and consolidate her existence within the empire in the long run. Riḍā did not entirely trust the Germans. By way of analogy for the German tactics in the war, he wrote that some Germans owned pieces of land in France and Belgium which they had actually used as trenches, basements and arms caches during the war. It was also reported that a German had prepared a football ground beside an important Belgian military base in Belgium, which had been found to conceal an underground store for heavy German canons once war broke out. Therefore, all German political and military promises to the empire in return for such privileges had to be suspected. It was better for the empire to keep its territories intact from any foreign rule than to expand its annexation of other regions.⁵⁴

Riḍā was convinced that Germany would never give the Ottoman empire its full independence in the event of victory. Therefore, the Ottomans were urged neither to put their army and navy in German hands, nor to make the German language obligatory in the secondary educational system. It was a fatal mistake that the Sublime Porte had made it possible for the Germans to act in all the empire's financial, military, scientific and technical matters. Besides, it had enabled the Germans to own thousands of miles of railway track which crossed important metal mining areas.⁵⁵ Riḍā again harshly attacked the leaders of the CUP for their unbelief and their aim of undermining the construction of the *umma* in order to "establish another building, 'ornamented' by the Jews and 'designed' by the Germans."⁵⁶

For Riḍā, even such Ottoman-German collaboration in the war would never result in any integration between the two races, as the Turks, due to their nationalist keenness in preserving their language, would always resist their assimilation into the German race or any other nation.⁵⁷ For Riḍā, the aim of the CUP leaders was merely to revive a "Turkish" *aşabiyya* (group solidarity based upon kinship) above Islam by means of their Turcification of military education and the army.⁵⁸

The First World War: Un-Islamic War

At the beginning of the war Riḍā did not frankly abandon his loyalty to the Ottoman empire, but was still confining his criticism to the CUP. However, he was anxious about the politically bad ramifications for non-Muslim minorities in the empire after the abolition of the Capitulations during the war and the propaganda of the Jihad declaration. The Jihad

propaganda incited Muslims to kill British, French or Russian “infidels,” which endangered unarmed Europeans. Mobs and attack incidents were also reported in the press.⁵⁹

As has been mentioned, Riḍā did not take any direct part in the Jihad ideologization campaigns during the war, but held antipathetic attitudes to the Ottoman Turkification policy and distrust of the Arabs. At this time, Riḍā reassured Syrian Christian minorities in his homeland that Islam would preserve their rights despite the Ottoman decision to enter the war.⁶⁰ In the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram*, he asked Muslims in Syria not to be deluded by any religious justification provoking them to attack their non-Muslim compatriots. For him, all these calls to fight non-Muslims under the motto of “pan-Islam” were baseless and corrupting to the Koran and its verses. Referring to the Ottoman political leaders without mentioning the CUP explicitly, Riḍā argued that the proponents of the war, who depicted it as pan-Islamic by quoting from the Koran were paradoxically those who were actually ignorant of the Islamic faith and neglecting their religious duties. Their major objective was merely power and authority, not religion by any means. For Riḍā, it was an excuse to attack Syrian Christians if they became inclined towards western Christians or acquired any feeling of animosity to Muslims and the Sublime Porte, since neither love nor hate was a solid criterion for punishing anybody from an Islamic point of view. Muslims and Christians were therefore requested to demonstrate their loyalty to the state and to cooperate for the sake of its industrial, economic and social welfare in conformity with the sharia.⁶¹

Unlike many Muslim religious supporters of the German-Ottoman Jihad declaration, Riḍā deemed the Ottoman participation in the Great War as being against the Islamic percepts of war. Therefore, he was eager to search for examples in Muslim history indicating the difference between the Islamic precepts of war and the nature of the Great War of Europe. In his view, this war, which Europeans propagated as “civilizational”, was nothing but a clear-cut indication of the “beastly” and “illusive” materialist character of European civilization in contrast to their assertion of loving truth, values, peace and justice.⁶²

In Riḍā’s metaphoric words, the world of civilization resembled “an idolatry temple” where a statue of military power was erected: putting one foot on the truth, while the other rested on values; raising with the right hand the banner of dominance and authority and with the left the banner of desire and lust. People were divided between these two poles: “those prostrating or kneeling to the statue, and those burning incense or providing offerings [to the idols].”⁶³ Instead of changing science into a source of human happiness, justice and mercy, the “civilized”

world of Europe made it a source of cruelty, injustice and misery. As for Germany, it had exploited its wide knowledge and mastery of arts to invent "instruments of destruction" and "death." Riḍā was shocked by the news about Germany's unbelievably destructive canons and submarines, and the toxic gas producing green smoke that was fatal to human beings. Riḍā interpreted these new inventions in the light of the Koranic verse: "[t]hen watch for the Day when the sky will bring a visible smoke; covering the people; this is a painful torment" (Q. 44: 10–11).⁶⁴

Riḍā contrasted the behaviour of the European powers in the Great War with what he saw as the "Islamic merciful ethics" of Arab conquests, which Islam had primarily stipulated to minimize war disasters.⁶⁵ He bemoaned that nations and states of his time, including Muslims, were deceived by what they perceived in that war as "values" of sciences and techniques for "human civilization". Giving several examples from Muslim normative sources, Riḍā emphatically contrasted this war with those wars launched by the Companions of the Prophet in early Islam, who were, in his view, known for their "mercy," "compassion" and "justice." In comparison, he asserted for instance that Muslims did not impose heavy taxes on the people of conquered regions, except the "small" amount of *jizya* (taxes) on non-Muslims levied in return for Muslims defending them. On the contrary, one of the ramifications of this war of the so-called "European civilization" was that European colonial powers imposed huge amounts of fines and taxes on their colonies and on other European opponents during the war in order to multiply their wealth and authority. As an example, Riḍā gave Belgium which became subject to heavy war taxes and fines after the German invasion.⁶⁶ If the Belgians had one day invaded Germany, Riḍā added, they would also have enforced upon it "shame" and "humiliation", the way they had behaved in their colony in the Congo.⁶⁷

Riḍā dismissed any religious or sectarian connection with the Great War as was claimed by some. It was a "war of nations," but not a war among religions. Warring European nations spared no effort to justify and convince their peoples of the need for the war. Apart from a few philosophers, women, socialists and clergymen who defended Christianity as a religion of peace, the majority of Europeans supported the idea of war. Riḍā argued that there was no European nation that was going to launch this war against the will of the majority opinion in its country, except Russia where people had no majority opinion.⁶⁸

The Great War was in Riḍā's view an entirely "greedy" materialistic war which had nothing to do with religion. It was even contrary to the "peaceful" message of Jesus. If the spirit of Christianity had been subjected to the authority of materialism in Europe, this war would never

have happened. Riḍā's stripping the war of any religious meaning was a message against the Ottoman officers and their decision to join Germany in the war on an Islamic religious basis. Riḍā did not trust the news that was spread regarding the fact that the Ottoman decision to enter the war was primarily the result of Enver's support for it and his influential role in the CUP, since the majority of Ottoman decision-makers in his view were strongly in favour of the war. Therefore, it was a war launched by the state, but run by the CUP. Even if the Chamber of Deputies (or *Meclis-i Mebusân*) had agreed to it, it was not a war of the Ottomans, since it did not represent the majority of people in the empire.⁶⁹ In sum, these Ottoman policy-makers were, for Riḍā, as materialistic as their European military and political counterparts.⁷⁰

The Arab Question

It is obvious that Riḍā's religious and political views of the Great War were formulated on the basis of his engagement in the Arab Question. His eagerness to replace the Ottoman Caliphate with an Arab one after the war pushed him in the direction of negotiating with the British authorities in Egypt about his readiness to mediate between Britain and Arab rulers when the war spread in the Middle East. During the first years of the war, he continued his efforts to persuade British Intelligence in Cairo of his ability through the Decentralization Party to influence Arab officers in the Ottoman army to rebel against their Ottoman and German commanders.⁷¹

Riḍā's outspoken anti-CUP stance before and during the war caused him trouble. As early as 1914, the Ottoman authorities established an intelligence bureau that was committed to keeping track of Arab anti-Ottoman activists. In about a year, it received more than 4,000 reports and files of suspects that contained almost 9,000 dossiers.⁷² After the outbreak of war, the wave of arrests and executions reached a high level. Riḍā, among others, was sentenced to death by a military court in 'Aleyh in absentia. He and other convicts were ordered to appear before the court within ten days, "otherwise they would be declared criminals whose civil rights would be annulled and whose property had to be confiscated."⁷³

After the outbreak of the war, Riḍā's political choice quickly became evident when he became convinced that Great Britain was going to support the Arabs and Muslims in their independence if the Allies won the war. He felt that British officials in Egypt and the Sudan were initially in favour of an Arab caliphate.⁷⁴ In Riḍā's nostalgic imagination,

Mekka should be the seat of this Arab Quraishite caliphate as its religious centre, whereas Damascus should be the seat of a president and a secular government.⁷⁵

In a meeting with Ronald Storrs, the Oriental Secretary at the British residency in Cairo, and Gilbert Clayton, Sudan Agent and Director of Intelligence for the Egyptian Army, Riḍā was given assurances that "in the event of Turkey joining the enemies of England in this war, England would not associate the Arabs with the Turks and would consider them as friends and not as enemies."⁷⁶ These promises gave Riḍā "pleasure" and "satisfaction". Therefore, he believed in Britain as the only alternative power that would help the Arabs "in every possible way and would defend them from any aggression."⁷⁷

Such promises from the British authorities in Cairo were never formalized. If the Arabs drove the Turks and the Germans out after the war, Riḍā's proposal of Arab independence included Arabia, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, the countries lying between the Red Sea, Bahr El-Arab, the Persian Gulf, the frontiers of Persia and Anatolia and the Mediterranean Sea.⁷⁸ To the British authorities he fervently stressed the religious significance of the Arab Peninsula and the Arab eligibility for "the Caliphate which is the highest Islamic post."⁷⁹

Believing in such promises, Riḍā regularly stressed that Britain was preferable for many Muslims to Russia, Germany and France for her justice and the religious freedom given to her subjects in the colonies. But his British-Arab friendship should not connote full British authority or protection over them, especially the Holy Shrines of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula.⁸⁰ An Arab Caliphate dependent on British authority was not acceptable to Riḍā, as the majority of Muslims were expected to refuse "an Arab puppet caliphate in the Arab Peninsula."⁸¹ If the British were going to support the Arabs in their causes, they would "gain the friendship and loyalty of more than one hundred million of her Mohammedan subjects, because they would then be confident that the precepts of the Koran and the sanctity of the holy places will not be interfered with."⁸²

In a conversation with Sir Mark Sykes, Riḍā was unshakable in his demand for full Arab independence with no partition or annexation by any foreign power. He confirmed to Sykes that the Arabs "were more intelligent than Turks and that they could easily manage their own affairs."⁸³ Even so the British were probably not taking Riḍā seriously. British authorities in Egypt were moreover thinking of the idea of sending Riḍā into exile in Malta during the war.⁸⁴ Mark Sykes wrote about him a few months after their meeting in Cairo:

A leader of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic thought. In conversation he talks much as he writes. He is a hard uncompromising fanatical Moslem, the mainspring of whose ideas is the desire to eliminate Christian influence and to make Islam a political power, in as wide a field as possible. He said that the fall of Constantinople would mean the end of Turkish military power, and therefore it was necessary to set up another Mohammedan state to maintain Mohammedan prestige. I asked him if the action of the Sultan in accepting the dictation of the German Emperor was in consonance with the independence of the Caliph, whether such people as Enver, Talaat, Javid, and Carasso could be considered as Moslems, whether the Committee of Union and Progress had not slaughtered Khojas and Ulema without mercy, whether the whole policy of the young Turks had not been originally anti-religious in the widest sense. To this he replied that in the eyes of Islam, Turkey represented Mohammedan independence, and that the actions of individuals had no influence on this view, and that when he had criticized the actions of the Committee, he had been subject to attack and loss of prestige ... I understand that Shaykh Reshid Riḍā has no great personal following but that his ideas coincide with those of a considerable number of the Arab Ulema. It will be seen that it is quite impossible to come to any understanding with people who hold such views, and it may be suggested that against such a party force is the only argument that they can understand.⁸⁵

During the war in 1916, Riḍā discovered the bitter fact that the British authorities were not willing to provide the Arabs with any support. Therefore, he turned to Sharif Ḥusayn of Mekka, but still confirmed his allegiance to the Ottoman Caliphate, which he distinguished from the CUP government.⁸⁶ He thought that supporting the Arab Revolt would therefore lead to the independence of the Hijaz, which was a "precautionary measure meant to save this holy territory from the control of the Allied powers."⁸⁷ Due to this changing course, Riḍā became suspected by the French and British intelligence services in Cairo. At this time, he was satisfied with the manner in which Sharif Ḥusayn handled the question of Hijaz independence. He even congratulated him on his recognition by the Allied powers as "the King of the Hijaz," wishing him to become "the King of the Arabs." Soon Riḍā regretted his earlier enthusiasm about Sharif Ḥusayn when he knew about the latter's secret agreements with the British about the independence of Syria and Iraq after the war.⁸⁸

A Look forward: War Aftermath

In response to the entry of the US into the war on the side of the Allies and President Wilson's call to end all wars in 1917, Riḍā hoped that the war would end with full liberation for all "weak" nations.⁸⁹ However, he lamented the calamities of the war and the loss of tens of thousands of productive human beings in the fields of industry, agriculture and trade. For Riḍā, through its Imperial Navy Germany became the "inventor of vices of destruction and murder" in the world. Carrying naval guns on their ships, the Germans were not inhibited from killing humans and destroying goods and products on armed or unarmed ships, just to cause Britain and the Allies to lose their naval power.⁹⁰

Riḍā's expectation of British victory in the war against the Germans came true. For him, the British were known for their "political cunning" and ability to fuel the enmity of other western states against Germany. In a conversation with an unnamed German orientalist, Riḍā agreed that although Germany overpowered England in sciences, arts and works, it lacked politics. In another conversation with some friends in Cairo during the war, it was said that Germany was going to have to cooperate with Russia if they wanted to get the Britons out of Egypt and India. Riḍā rejected this as impossible simply because Britain was cleverer than Germany in "striking" nations with each other, just like "the waterfall striking a rock with another."⁹¹

After Germany's initial phase of power and supremacy in world order, the German defeat caused its disastrous fate. For Riḍā, the end of the war was a result of a political game between "learned and wise" and "ignorant and fool" counterparts in conflict. Due to their political manoeuvring, the British were able to convince the Americans to come and rescue them and the Allies from the possible military "hell" that was supposed to be caused by Germany. In his words:

England used two 'amulets' in order to get the American 'serpent' out of its hole ... First of all, its call to rescue the freedom of nations and peoples from German supremacy that threatened to enslave the world. Secondly, the cunning of the Jews and their financial authority in that country, after England had promised them to return the Kingdom of Israel [and] the Holy Land as a reward ... in spite of [of the rights of] the original possessors of the land, the Arabs: either Christians or Muslims.⁹²

At this "Wilsonian moment,"⁹³ Riḍā found that Wilson's "stunning speeches" added significant moral support to the military and financial

power unleashed by the Allies against the Germans. By stipulating such an “attractive” programme for peace, Wilson’s words had a magic effect on German socialists and workers, especially his point regarding the freedom of sea in war and peace. German socialist leaders threatened their government into yielding to Wilson’s peace conditions; otherwise they would push German workers to go on strike.⁹⁴ Riḍā considered the end of the war a victory for the Americans on the surface, but the real winner was Britain. Moreover, Germany lost the war merely because of its “arrogance” and “despising” of the Americans.⁹⁵

As a Muslim religious scholar, Riḍā tried to analyse the world political order in religious terms. By referring to the Koranic verses (Q. 7:128, 20:132, 28:83) indicating that “the [best] outcome will be for *al-mutaqqūn* (the righteous/pious)”, some Muslims wondered how the British people were victorious in this war when they were not “righteous” in the Muslim religious sense. Riḍā disagreed with the views in the classical Muslim Koranic exegesis confining the meaning of such verses to obedience to God and fulfilling religious duties. He considered this interpretation as “narrow-mindedness” and “misunderstanding” of the contents of the verses, as the term *taqwa* (piety) has various meanings in the Koran depending on the change of context. Muslim exegetes lacked the knowledge that could enable them to deduce such sociological and political issues from the Koran and Sunna. As the word *taqwa* literally means “protect”, Riḍā notes that the German people might have exceeded the English in their “military *taqwa*” for securing their military power. But the German politicians failed to protect themselves against internal conflicts with German socialists on the one hand, and were not clever enough to escape international discontent with their politics and collaboration with the Turks against the Arabs. The British, on the other hand, were more skilled in their political and diplomatic “*taqwa*,” because they were able to strengthen their political ties with many world leaders, including Arabs.⁹⁶

Germany’s economic, scientific and military progress was therefore not enough to win the war. The British politically skilled “deviousness” was able to vanquish the German colonial ambitions. Many years after the war in the context of his discussions about the causes of the Palestinian riots (also known as the Western Wall Uprising) in 1929, Riḍā again made it clear that the British were much cleverer than any other nation in propaganda that was able to twist political realities. He lamented that the Arabs in their policy against the Jewish settlement in Palestine did not take any lessons from World War I. For him, all Europeans denigrated and disparaged the oriental peoples. In their international relations the Britons, just like all Europeans, had respected the rights and

promises of powerful nations only. Riḍā concluded that World War I was a propaganda war. The Anglo-French propaganda disseminated that the German state was "a military state with a cruel heart, rude, and lavish in greed, bloodshed, looting of money ... and enslaving humans."⁹⁷ The British propaganda portrayed their fight as self-defence and defence of other "brothers in humanity." The power of this propaganda had provoked the American policy and German socialists and workers that finally obliged Germany to yield and sign a compromise. Riḍā was convinced that the Britons were the most "cunning" in breaching their treaties by twisting their contents according to their own perspectives, as Bismarck had once argued.⁹⁸

Riḍā died in 1935 and he only witnessed the first two years of the Nazi regime. In his eyes, the Nazi ideology was born out of the political aftermath of World War I. It was a logical result of the political competition among European states to gain power. In his later years, Riḍā proposed Islam as a solution for the civilizational problems and political conflicts of Europe and the United States. He argued that since World War I, Europeans had organized many congresses, but their state of affairs was like "a mill donkey which goes around while languishing in one place."⁹⁹ As "might makes right," Riḍā insisted that powerful European states did not value any rights of weak nations in politics. For him, the Treaty of Versailles had been primarily entered into in order to weaken Germany. Its restrictive terms were the reason Nazi Germany tried to undermine the treaty by rebuilding its armed forces against the will of Europe. Out of fear of Nazi power, some of the Allies started to negotiate the conditions of another new treaty with Germany. Riḍā was of the view that the Allies had treated Germany unfairly and arrogantly despite their acknowledgment of its superiority in sciences, industry and systems. Hitler's rise in Germany was a new stage in European politics. In Riḍā's words, "[Germany's] *mujaddid* (renewing) leader uttered a shout of violation at this treaty and is rebuilding air and naval forces of the army. This had terrified them [the Allies], just as the roaring of a lion that scares a sheep." *Al-Manār* believed that European leaders had now reconsidered their positions because they knew perfectly well that any decisions about peace or war were in Hitler's "hands;" and any destruction or construction of Europe could be uttered from between his "lips". Therefore, the Allies were keenly listening to Hitler's annual speeches, which regularly gave warnings to his opponents. But despite this political change in Europe, Islam remained in Riḍā's perspective the only solution for the corruption of all these western states and nations. Therefore, Muslims should stand shoulder to shoulder with one another in propagating their religion in Europe.¹⁰⁰

Conclusion

Riḍā's engagement with World War I was part of his general image of Europe and world politics. In general, he was influenced by the increasing flow of information and images in the press across the Muslim world on the one hand, and by his pragmatic political choices on the other. As a famous Muslim writer with a global readership across the Muslim world of his time, his representations certainly played a role in the popularization of European thought in the Muslim mind.

Remarkably enough, Riḍā did not involve himself in the Jihad debate and remained silent about the religious meaning of the Ottoman fatwa during World War I. As a pan-Arabist Riḍā was much engaged in underlining its political causes and the consequences of the war in the region. Throughout the war years, he was convinced that either Germany or Great Britain was going to rule the world order after winning the war. He argued that materialist ideas among Europeans would push Europe to a wholesale and dreadful war after which the strongest state would rule the world.¹⁰¹ Due to his dreams of establishing an Arab caliphate, he was not really enthusiastic about the Ottoman coalition with Germany. He rode the wave of Arab nationalism in that stage of his career. The CUP alliance with Germany brought a radical imbalance to the world order, which deprived the Arabs and Muslims of the chance to obtain their rights.

Although Riḍā regularly praised Germany's militarism against the Allies, he knew perfectly well that that country had its ambitions in the Muslim world as well. In his quest for new pragmatic solutions to the decline of Islam in the religious and political sense, Riḍā was ready to tread any possible political path in the pre-war and war period. But his ambitions to realize Arab unity reached deadlock when he lost his hope of finding any "beneficiary" coalition in his political dreams. He finally came to the bitter conclusion that all liberation and independence promises made by Europeans were merely lip service. For him, even German ultra-nationalists were anti-Arab by nature.¹⁰²

Riḍā attempted to offer alternative civilizational discourses based on Islamic culture and tradition. In the end, his paradoxical view of Europe and his disenchantment reflected that of a whole generation of Muslims, who experienced the World War in the Middle East; his ideas were rearticulated and re-asserted by the following generation in relation to the European powers and their ideas in the new world order¹⁰³ in the years to come after World War I.

Notes

- 1 *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/9 (August 1914), p. 667.
- 2 Mahmoud Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Re-reading Rashīd Riḍā's idea on the *Caliphate*", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 117/2 (1997), p. 263.
- 3 See, for example, Götz Nordbruch, "The Arab World and National Socialism", available at: http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles///Files/Om_SDU/Centre/C_Mellemoest/Videncenter/Nyheder/2011/1103GN.pdf (last access 9 November 2014); cf. Götz Nordbruch, "'Cultural Fusion' of Thought and Ambitions? Memory, Politics and the History of Arab–Nazi German Encounters", *Middle Eastern Studies* 47:1 (2011), pp. 183–194.
- 4 Mustafa Aksakal, "'Holy War Made in Germany'? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad", *War in History* 18:2 (2011), pp. 184–199. See Wolfgang Schwanitz, "Euro-Islam by 'Jihad Made in Germany'", in Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain (eds.), *Islam in Inter-War Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 271–286; Raouf Abbas Hamed, "Germany and the Egyptian Nationalist Movement 1882–1918", *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Bd. 28, Nr. 1:4 (1988), pp. 17–24; id., "The Role of Islam in German Propaganda in the Arab East during the First World War: War: Aims, Means, Results and Local Reactions", in O. Farschid, M. Kropp and S. Dähne (eds.), *The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean* (Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2006), pp. 391–414.
- 5 Abdel-Raouf Sinno, "The Role of Islam in German Propaganda in the Arab East during the First World War: War: Aims, Means, Results and Local Reactions", in O. Farschid, M. Kropp and S. Dähne (eds.), *The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean* (Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2006), pp. 391–414.
- 6 Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism," 257.
- 7 E. Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War 1* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p. 164. The founder of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, Mustafā Kāmil, was the first to coin this term. About him see Fritz Steppat, "Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafā Kamil. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der ägyptischen Nationalbewegung", *Die Welt des Islams* 4/4 (1956), pp. 241–341.
- 8 Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 256.
- 9 *Al-Manār*, vol. 1/19 (August 1898), pp. 356–359.
- 10 As quoted in Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power* (Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 14.
- 11 *Al-Manār*, vol. 1/36 (December 1898), pp. 711–715.
- 12 *Al-Manār*, vol. 6/24 (March 1904), pp. 946–953. See, for example, John W.M. Chapman, "Russia, Germany and the Anglo-Japanese Intelligence Collaboration, 1896–1906", in Mark Erickson and Ljubica Erickson, *Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005). Cf. *Al-Manār*, vol. 8/7 (June 1905), pp. 279–281.
- 13 *Al-Manār*, vol. 7/18 (Nov. 1904), p. 719; *al-Manār*, vol. 8/5 (May 1905), p. 194.
- 14 As quoted in Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 257.
- 15 Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 257.

- 16 As quoted in Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 261.
- 17 Tauber, *The Arab Movements*, pp. 112–113.
- 18 Ibid., p. 3.
- 19 Ibid., pp. 3–5. See also Eyal Zisser, "Rashīd Riḍā: On the way to Syrian nationalism in the shade of Islam and Arabism", in Adel Bashara (ed.), *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers and Identity* (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 123–140.
- 20 *Al-Manār*, vol. 14/5 (May 1911), pp. 382–386.
- 21 *Al-Manār*, vol. 14/10 (October 1911), p. 752.
- 22 *Al-Manār*, vol. 14/10 (October 1911), pp. 753–754.
- 23 *Al-Manār*, vol. 15/4 (April 1912), p. 303.
- 24 *Al-Manār*, vol. 15/11 (November, 1912), p. 838.
- 25 *Al-Manār*, vol. 16/2 (February 1913), p. 131.
- 26 See, Bruce C. Westrate, *Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916–1920* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).
- 27 See E. Tauber, "Rashīd Riḍā and Political Attitudes during World War I", *The Muslim World* 85:1–2 (1995), pp. 107–121. Cf. E. Tauber, "Three Approaches, One Idea: Religion and State in the Thought of 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Kawākibī, Najīb 'Azūri and Rashīd Riḍā", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 21:2 (1994), pp. 190–198; E. Tauber, "Rashīd Riḍā and Faysal's Kingdom in Syria", *The Muslim World* 85 (1995), pp. 235–245; E. Tauber, "Rashīd Riḍā as Pan-Arabist before the World War I", *The Muslim World* 79/2 (1989), pp. 102–112; E. Tauber, "The Political Life of Rashīd Riḍā", *Arabist: Budapest Studies in Arabic* 19–20 (1998), pp. 261–272.
- 28 Donald M. McKale, *War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the Era of World War I* (Kent State University Press, 1998), pp. 42–43.
- 29 *Al-Manār*, vol. 16/8 (August, 1913), p. 625.
- 30 *Al-Manār*, vol. 16/8 (August, 1913), pp. 623–626. Cf., *al-Manār*, vol. 17/2 (January 1914), pp. 148–152.
- 31 Tauber, "The Political Life", p. 262.
- 32 Ibid., p. 263.
- 33 Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 263.
- 34 Neville Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I* (University of California Press, 1976), pp. 153–154.
- 35 Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism*, p. 189.
- 36 Ibid., p. 204.
- 37 Ibid., p. 213.
- 38 *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/9 (August 1914), pp. 670–671.
- 39 *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/9 (August 1914), pp. 670–672.
- 40 *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/9 (August 1914), p. 671. See also *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/10 (Sept. 1914), pp. 798–800.
- 41 *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/9 (August 1914), p. 720.
- 42 *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/12 (Nov. 1914), pp. 950–955.
- 43 *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/12 (Nov. 1914), pp. 953–954.
- 44 *Al-Manār*, vol. 18/1 (Feb. 1915), pp. 53–61.
- 45 Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (University of California Press, 1997).

- 46 Tauber, *The Arab Movements*, pp. 16–17.
- 47 *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/12 (Nov. 1914), p. 953. See also, pp. 958–959.
- 48 *Al-Manār*, vol. 18/2 (March, 1915), pp. 141–152. Here Riḍā quoted some of the works of the German military general and historian Friedrich von Bernhardi (1849–1930), who considered war as a “biological necessity” in accordance with natural causes. Riḍā entitled his article “The State and the Germans and the Two Opposing Directions resembling belief and unbelief.” For more about the project see, for example, Friedrich von Bernhardi. *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg* (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1912); *Vom heutigen Kriege*, vol. 1 *Grundlagen und Elemente des heutigen Krieges*, and vol. 2 *Kampf und Kriegführung* (Berlin: Mittler, 1912).
- 49 *Al-Manār*, vol. 18/4 (May 1915), pp. 307–312. He used to brief his readers on the developments on the battlefield on all fronts. To deduce “good” news and “useful” opinions from newspapers was difficult for Riḍā. Magazines were more careful in selecting their news about the war.
- 50 See, *al-Manār*, vol. 17/12 (Nov. 1914), p. 955.
- 51 *Al-Manār*, vol. 18/4 (May 1915), pp. 307–312.
- 52 *Ibid.*, p. 312.
- 53 *Al-Manār*, vol. 18/6 (July, 1915), pp. 472–473.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 473.
- 55 *Al-Manār*, vol. 19/3 (Aug. 1916), pp. 153–160. In order to support his views, Riḍā quoted a conversation between King Edward VII (1841–1910) and Daisy Greville (1861–1938), Countess of Warwick, in which she asked the king about the reason for his hatred of his nephew Wihlem II. In his answer, King Edward completely denied any animosity towards Wihlem, but his anxiety about the German imperial inclination to occupy any region even if it were his country.
- 56 *Al-Manār*, vol. 19/3 (Aug. 1916), p. 165.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p. 166.
- 58 *Al-Manār*, vol. 19/9 (Feb. 1917), pp. 555–562.
- 59 See McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, pp. 123–136.
- 60 *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/12 (Nov. 1914), pp. 956–958.
- 61 *Ibid.*, pp. 957–958. See also *Al-Manār*, vol. 17/11 (Oct. 1914), pp. 868–880.
- 62 *Al-Manār*, vol. 18/3 (April, 1915), pp. 182–192. He sarcastically called it *al-Harb al-Madaniyya al-‘Uzma* (the Great Civilizational War) or sometimes *Harb al-Madaniyya al-Urubiyya* (the War of European Civilization).
- 63 *Al-Manār*, vol. 18/3 (April, 1915), p. 182.
- 64 *Ibid.*, pp. 182–183.
- 65 *Ibid.*, p. 183.
- 66 See Henri Pirenne, *Belgium and the First World War*, introduced by Sarah Keymeulen and forwarded by David Nicholas (The Brabant Press, 2014).
- 67 *Al-Manār*, vol. 18/3 (April, 1915), p. 185.
- 68 *Al-Manār*, vol. 18/10 (Nov. 1915), pp. 746–752.
- 69 *Ibid.*, pp. 750–752.
- 70 *Ibid.*, p. 752.
- 71 Tauber, “Rashīd Riḍā”.
- 72 Tauber, *The Arab Movements*, p. 37.
- 73 *Ibid.*, p. 52.

- 74 Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 263.
- 75 Ibid., p. 268.
- 76 "Translation of a Memorandum by Rashid Rida", Wingate Papers 135/7/61; as quoted in Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 264.
- 77 Ibid., p. 264.
- 78 As quoted in Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 264.
- 79 Wingate Papers 101/17/3-5; as quoted in Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 266.
- 80 Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 267.
- 81 Ibid., p. 267.
- 82 Ibid., p. 265.
- 83 Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1971), p. 62, as cited by Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 268.
- 84 Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 268.
- 85 "Policy in the Middle East II. Select Reports and Telegrams from Sir Mark Sykes. Report No. 14 (Secret)." From Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bart., M.P., to the Director of Military Operations Shepherd Hotel, Cairo, 14 July 1915. London, India Office Records L, P&S/10/5255, as quoted in Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 268.
- 86 Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism", p. 269.
- 87 Ibid., p. 269.
- 88 Ibid., p. 270; see *al-Manār*, 20/1 (July 1917), pp. 33-47.
- 89 *Al-Manār*, vol. 20/1 (July 1917), pp. 48-61.
- 90 *Al-Manār*, vol. 20/8 (May 1918), pp. 364-365.
- 91 *Al-Manār*, vol. 21/7 (April, 1920), p. 338.
- 92 Ibid., p. 339.
- 93 See Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, 2007).
- 94 *Al-Manār*, vol. 21/7 (April, 1920), p. 339. See John L. Snell, "Wilson's Peace Program and German Socialism, January-March 1918", *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 38 (1951), pp. 187-214.
- 95 *Al-Manār*, vol. 21/7 (April, 1920), pp. 339-340. See also other post-war articles about peace, vol. 20/5 (January 1918), pp. 246-248; 20/10 (October 1918), pp. 444-446; 21/1 (December 1918), pp. 17-37; 21/3 (May 1919), pp. 138-150; 21/4 (June 1919), pp. 189-197; (October 1919), pp. 291-296; 21/6 (October 1919) pp. 297-304; 21/7 (April 1920), pp. 371-376.
- 96 *Al-Manār*, vol. 21/7 (April, 1920), pp. 341-344.
- 97 Ibid., p. 342.
- 98 Ibid., p. 343.
- 99 *Al-Manār*, vol. 35/1 (July 1935), pp. 33-40.
- 100 Ibid., pp. 33-40.
- 101 *Al-Manār*, vol. 21/7 (April, 1920), p. 344.
- 102 *Al-Manār*, vol. 30/6 (Dec. 1930), pp. 450-468.
- 103 Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of anti-westernism in Asia* (Colombia University Press, 2007), p. 11.

12 John Buchan's British-Designed Jihad in *Greenmantle*

Ahmed K. al-Rawi

John Buchan (1875–1940) was the director of British Intelligence in the last two years of World War I and a novelist, too. His novel, *Greenmantle* (1916), examined the decaying stages of the Ottoman empire with a specific focus on radical Islamic movements. *Greenmantle* reveals Buchan's Western elitist views and the continuation of his imperialist conviction of the deterioration in the East and Islam in comparison to the Christian West. In fact, he presents Muslims as medieval and superstitious people who can easily be mobilized for Jihad. The chapter argues that Buchan's novels can be read as tools to influence the beliefs of a whole generation and as works that echo the prevalent cultural and political views and stereotypes about Islam and Muslims in Britain at the time of World War I.

By 1900 the British empire had spread over five continents and controlled many different regions, hoping to make use of their unexploited wealth and to "secure to Great Britain the freedom to sell all over the world the products of her growing interests" (Rose, Newton, and Benians 1940, v). The British politicians and intelligentsia who theorized the ideologies of the empire played a major role in maintaining, expanding and strengthening the British empire as well as managing the affairs of the colonized peoples. John Buchan, a prominent empire commentator in the Edwardian period, was strongly influenced by the ethos of empire in his early fiction and polemics (Lownie 1995). In the 1916 "Preface" to the third edition of *A Lodge in the Wilderness* (1906), Buchan said that "our Empire is a mystic whole which no enemy may part asunder, and our wisest minds are not given to the task of devising a mechanism of union adequate to this spiritual unity" (Buchan 1922, x). Hence, the "wisest minds" had a duty towards the empire, impelling them to "devise" methods and "mechanisms" to strengthen it. This emphasis on a spiritual dimension to the British people's "duty" to maintain the empire can be connected to the other important forces, beside the pursuit of free trade, that determined the make-up of the British empire. These were "the impulses of evangelical religion" and the "missionary societies" (Rose, Newton, and Benians 1940, vi). It was claimed at the time that Britain

had a divine message that must be achieved because it was God's will. In the 1920s Edward Byers made a comparison between the Israelites and the British, in the sense that both were chosen by God and had "the temporal blessings" of "the possession of certain land". Byers argued that Britain must be "the greatest on earth" and that "the greatest race on earth is the Anglo-Saxon" (Byers 1922, 8 and 13). In brief, Christianity and commerce were the decisive factors and forceful motives that shaped the British empire.

As a result of the empire's expansion, the British were encountering various cultures and religions that were different from their own. The East, and Islam in particular, was seen as exotic, unstable and often decadent, because the civilizations of the colonized countries did not match Western and European norms and values. The "imperial attitude meant thinking of people – encountered in daily business – as being of a different and inferior kind; thinking of them as agreeable or disagreeable, but always as different" (Daniel 1962, 154).

At the beginning of World War I, the British government became more aware of the importance of the psychological warfare to "counter the detrimental effects of German propaganda upon British interests and prestige, particularly in neutral countries" (Taylor 1980, 880). In fact, the director of British special intelligence, Brigadier-General C.R. Cockerill, suggested on 29 November 1915 that "the war of words should now demand 'as much attention as the economic war'" (ibid., 876). This "war of words" certainly echoed in Buchan's mind, and it must have further motivated him to focus on subtle propaganda techniques. As Buchan was exempted from military service during World War I for medical reasons, he decided to serve his country in the area of propaganda.

Before the Great War, Buchan had been Thomas Arthur Nelson's partner in his publishing company. In his autobiography, he mentioned the active efforts carried out by this printing house during the Great War in the way cheap books on a variety of topics and languages were distributed to various countries:

We were a progressive concern, and in our standardised Edinburgh factories we began the publication of cheap books in many tongues. On the eve of the War we must have been one of the largest businesses of the kind in the world, issuing cheap editions of every kind of literature, not only in English, but in French, German, Magyar, and Spanish, and being about to start in Russian. (Buchan 1940, 138)

These activities are regarded as propaganda efforts which reached such a state during this period that even fiction and literary criticism were

used as effective tools. For instance, Sir Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe* and *The Talisman*, which narrated the Crusades "with an Anglicised Richard Lionheart storming the Holy Land", were exploited and used as a "defining episode in the emergence of English nationalism" (Bar-Yosef 2001, 94). In February 1916, Lord Newton became nominal head of the propaganda organization, aided by many others like "Miles Lampson (in charge of film propaganda), the poet Alfred Noyes, John Buchan, J.D. Gregory and Stephen Gaselee" (Taylor 1980, 884). Also in 1916, Buchan met Ernest Hodder-Williams, who was then responsible for managing the Hodder and Stoughton publishing company and was "involved in the publication of government propaganda" (Smith 1965, 292). Historically speaking, *Greenmantle* was the first of Buchan's novels published by that company. Having in mind the writer's strong Christian devotion and upbringing and following Walter Scott's examples (Matthew 2004), Buchan clearly intended to write a modern doctrinal Crusade in *Greenmantle*.

As for John Buchan's knowledge of Islam, he did not have direct contact with Muslims and Easterners, although he frequently depicted them in his works. To get his information Buchan depended entirely on books, newspaper coverage, accounts from friends and contacts, and, during the war, intelligence reports: these were not always accurate accounts (Al-Rawi 2009b). His single visit to the East was to Turkey in the spring of 1910. Buchan visited Constantinople with "his wife and Gerard Craig-Sellar", and reported taking lunch with the "Sultan's brother and dining at embassies" (Lownie 1995, 116), where he found a "pure Arabian Nights" atmosphere, and visited some places further east near Erzurum (Buchan 1993, 2). Later, Constantinople was depicted in his novel *Greenmantle* (1916), before and during its fictional capture by the Russians in World War I. Buchan's view of "the East", and specifically Muslims, as a medieval and superstitious people, while being also mysterious and exotic, produces a powerful, subliminal dynamic in his fiction which uses the East as a touchstone to compare it with the West.

Background to Buchan's Fiction and Ideology

In his early work on South Africa, *The African Colony: Studies in the Reconstruction* (1903), Buchan revealed his ideas on the disparity that existed between the British people and the other races, and set criteria for distinguishing between the two:

Between the most ignorant white man and the black man there is fixed for the present an impassable gulf, not of colour but of mind. The native

... lives and moves in a mental world incredibly distant from ours. The medium of his thought, so to speak, is so unique that the results are out of all relation to ourselves. Mentally he is as crude and naive as a child, with a child's curiosity and ingenuity, and a child's practical inconsequence. Morally he has none of the traditions of self-discipline and order, which are implicit ... in white people ... With all his merits, this instability of character and intellectual childishness make him politically far more impossible than even the lowest class of Europeans. (1903, 289–290)

Buchan depicts South Africa in *Prester John* (1910) as a response to his experience working there in 1901–1903 (Lownie 1995, 70–85). Critics have discussed at length his treatment of Africans in that work,¹ but there is a religious dimension in the novel. The plot of *Prester John* has as its basis the medieval story of Prester John who was believed in the Europe of the Middle Ages to be a strong oriental king from Ethiopia. He was thought to possess the ability “to break the power of Islam and restore Jerusalem to Christendom ... The rumour gained so much credence in Europe that messengers and letters were sent to the East in search of the non-existent King” (Whitaker 1952, 74–79; Aljubouri 1972, 26). As Buchan himself noted, Prester John became “a generic name for any supposed Christian monarch in unknown countries” (Buchan 1903, 21). In fact, Buchan's use of this Christian legend came at a time when many writers viewed the war in the East as a new crusade due to the efforts of the British government. British Orientalists like Sir Mark Sykes and Sir Stephen Gaselee were influenced by these crusading ideas that were “central to the way in which the Great War was anticipated, imagined and understood” (Bar-Yosef 2001, 93 and 95). Buchan's revival of this mythical Christian figure can be seen as a reminder of the possibility of weakening the Muslim Ottoman bloc that was manifested in *Greenmantle*. His Christian sense of duty was not foreign to him because it was “part of his Calvinist training” and his observation of the “Free Church” (Mann 1999, 8), although he himself had no leanings towards missionary activity or to supporting missionary work.

In fact, Buchan treated Islam as an entity that was entirely different from the civilized West. In his first attempt at a “novel of Empire”, *The Half-Hearted* (1900), Buchan described the East during the “closing years of the nineteenth century”. Lewis Haystoun has written a book about Kashmir, and is standing for Parliament. His friend Winterham speaks in support of Lewis at a public meeting, saying: “I should back Lewis if he were a Mohammedan or an Anarchist. The man is sound metal, I tell you, and that's all I ask” (Buchan 1935, 113). As can be seen from this

casual assigning of "a Mohammedan or Anarchist" to the most extreme contrast to a white Scottish laird, Victorian Britain perceived these groups negatively because they were linked historically with a residual fear of "the Turk" and were a reminder of the Ottoman threat against Western interests (Smith 1977, 16).

Finally, in *The Half-Hearted*, we can see an expression of British imperialist anxiety over a Russian military threat against its interests in the region. At Bardur, Lewis speaks with a Scot who says, "It is assumed that Russia has but to find Britain napping, buy a passage from the more northerly tribes, and sweep down on the Punjab ... It is a mere matter of time till Persia is the Tsar's territory, and then they may begin to think about invasion" (Buchan 1935, 229). Buchan notes that Russia is the "step-daughter of the East"; therefore, "some day when the leader arrives they will push beyond their boundaries and sweep down on Western Europe, as their ancestors did thirteen hundred years ago. And you have no walls of Rome to resist them, and I do not think you will find a Charlemagne" (Buchan 1935, 228). In fact, Buchan uses the theme of a foreign invasion against Britain, or the destruction of its interests abroad, in many of his novels, particularly in *The Thirty-Nine Steps* (1915) and later *Greenmantle* (1916). For example, Buchan emphasizes in *Greenmantle* that one has to remember "the old torrential raids which crumpled the Byzantine Empire and shook the walls of Vienna" (1916, 7). In these two novels, Germany, instead of Russia, becomes the disturber of the geopolitical system dominated by the British. If the system breaks down, a possible regression to barbarism will occur, which is an expression of Buchan's principal theme of the thin line between civilization and chaos.

Buchan's *Greenmantle*

When Buchan worked for British Intelligence, he wrote *Greenmantle* during World War I when the Ottomans, with the help of the Germans, were fighting the British. Hence, the writer used his novel as a work of propaganda that aided the war effort (Al-Rawi 2007). In fact, Buchan may have been directly influenced by the Dutch orientalist C. Snouck Hurgronje whose works were translated into English. The titles most relevant to the period of *Greenmantle*'s composition include *The Holy War: "Made in Germany"* (1915) and *Mohammedanism* (1916). In *Greenmantle*'s preface, Buchan mentioned that the events taking place were not unrealistic:

Let no man or woman call its events improbable. The war has driven that word from our vocabulary, and melodrama has become the prosiest

realism. Things unimagined before happen daily to our friends by sea and land. The one chance in a thousand is habitually taken, and as often as not succeeds. (Buchan 1916, vi)

Buchan retained the dream of the ever expanding British empire but shifted his idea towards Islam and the decaying Ottoman empire so as to address wider problems that destabilized the status quo, such as the rise of radical Islamic movements. This chapter argues that Buchan's *Greenmantle* falls into Edward Said's concept of Orientalism since it expresses elitist ideas about the East and Muslims (Al-Rawi 2009a). In this chapter, the novel is analysed as a historical document relative to the events that occurred before and during World War I. Indeed, the novel's historical details, as will be shown, are consciously used to propagate positive ideas of the British empire and present negative stereotypes of the German and Ottoman powers. Before the historical discussion, it is important to highlight the main theme of the novel which is Jihad.

Greenmantle's Plot

The plot of *Greenmantle* revolves around the notion that Muslims are following the orders of the Ottoman sultan in having an utter belief that a new leader or the Mahdi has arrived and will lead them to their final destiny. This Mahdi descends from the family of the Prophet Mohammed:

There's a great stirring in Islam, something moving on the face of the waters. They make no secret of it. Those religious revivals come in cycles, and one was due about now. And they are quite clear about the details. A seer has arisen of the blood of the Prophet, who will restore the Khalifate to its old glories and Islam to its old purity. His sayings are everywhere in the Moslem world. All the orthodox believers have them by heart. That is why they are enduring grinding poverty and preposterous taxation, and that is why their young men are rolling up to the armies and dying without complaint in Gallipoli and Transcaucasia. They believe they are on the eve of a great deliverance. (147)

As there was an actual conflict between the Germans and the British, Buchan made the Germans and the Ottomans the enemies in the novel, in view of the Central Powers' alliance which included the Ottoman and German empires. The Ottoman Sultan was believed by some Muslims to be the sole leader of the Islamic world with a supreme religious authority. "During World War I, when the Ottoman empire was the ally

of Prussia and Austria-Hungary, the sultan in Istanbul, in his capacity as Commander of the Faithful, had called upon all Muslim subjects of the British, French, and Russian empires to wage jihad against their colonial masters" (Kepel 2002, 44).

Sir Walter, one of the senior British officials, describes in the novel the political condition of Islam in the East immediately preceding World War I:

The Sheikh-ul-Islam is neglected, and though the Kaiser proclaims a Holy War and calls himself Hadji Mohammed Guilliamo, and says the Hohenzollerns are descended from the Prophet, that seems to have fallen pretty flat. The ordinary man again will answer that Islam in Turkey is becoming a back number, and that Krupp guns are the new gods. Yet – I don't know. I do not quite believe in Islam becoming a back number. ... But in the provinces, where Islam is strong, there would be trouble. Many of us counted on that. But we have been disappointed. The Syrian army is as fanatical as the hordes of the Mahdi. The Senussi have taken a hand in the game. The Persian Moslems are threatening trouble. There is a dry wind blowing through the East, and the parched grasses wait the spark. And that wind is blowing towards the Indian border. Whence comes that wind, think you? (6)

The British wanted to discover who was manipulating the cause of religion, since they could use the same tactic and achieve their aim by following the motto of divide and rule in the sense of dividing the Muslims' bloc to weaken the Ottomans' control. Sir Walter asks, "Supposing there is some Ark of the Covenant which will madden the remotest Moslem peasant with dreams of Paradise?" (15). Such a belief leads to the conclusion that the British, like the Germans, thought to obtain the secret power to control Muslims by designing and manipulating a new religious leader. The Ottoman Army and the Muslim nations as a whole were thought to be easily driven and led as long as someone knew their weak and sensitive points. Despite the fact that the Ottoman empire was weak at the time, the British thought of Islam as being a formidable power. As Major Hannay puts it, "It looks as if Islam had a bigger hand in the thing than we thought ... I fancy religion is the only thing to knit up such a scattered empire" (15). Therefore, Muslims should be alienated from the political and religious authority of the Ottoman sultan. In this sense, a new leader has to be created, representing the character of the Mahdi.

According to the novel, the Germans used the same tactic, knowing quite well the sacredness of religious matters for Muslims. Having a

powerful intelligence force in the region, the British concentrated their efforts on knowing what really moved the masses, as Sir Walter says:

I have reports from agents everywhere – pedlars in South Russia, Afghan horse-dealers, Turcoman merchants, pilgrims on the road to Mecca, sheikhs in North Africa, sailors on the Black Sea coasters, sheep-skinned Mongols, Hindu fakirs, Greek traders in the Gulf, as well as respectable Consuls who use cyphers. They tell the same story. The East is waiting for a revelation. It has been promised one. Some star – man, prophecy, or trinket – is coming out of the West. The Germans know, and that is the card with which they are going to astonish the world. (15–16)

As part of the British plot, Hannay, the British intelligence officer, was sent to the Germans to find out their secret plans with regard to the Muslim world. According to Sir Walter, Hannay was chosen because he had “a nose for finding out what our enemies try to hide”. In addition, he was “brave and cool and resourceful” (16). Hannay, in disguise, tries to win over the Germans by praising them in an exaggerated manner and hinting indirectly at their secret project: “[y]ou are the cleverest people in the world. You have already half the Mussulman lands in your power. It is for you to show us how to kindle a holy war, for clearly you have the secret of it. Never fear but we will carry out your order” (57).

In order to create a proper Mahdi or Muslim leader, the figure has to be characterized with specific traits to attract the majority of the Muslims. One of the characters in the novel, Mr. Blenkiron, who is American, states, “To capture all Islam – and I gather that is what we fear – the man must be of the Koreish, the tribe of the Prophet himself ... Then he’d have to be rather a wonder on his own account – saintly, eloquent, and that sort of thing. And I expect he’d have to show a sign, though what that could be I haven’t a notion” (28–29).

The secret behind Greenmantle lies with a mysterious German woman, von Einem, whom British Intelligence wanted to locate. But the real Greenmantle fell ill and died of cancer, leaving the Germans with a problem since “you can’t have a crusade without a prophet” (182). In order to show that the Ottomans are fools for believing in a false prophet, the British officer, Sandy Arbuthnot, shows up afterwards wearing a green mantle. Ironically, Buchan describes the condition of the Ottoman soldiers watching the awaited prophet pass by:

As he rode it seemed that the fleeing Turks were stricken still, and sank by the roadside with eyes strained after his unheeding figure ... Then I

knew that the prophecy had been true, and that their prophet had not failed them. The long-looked for revelation had come. Greenmantle had appeared at last to an awaiting people. (271)

In order to depict British supremacy, the German and Ottoman plots to control Muslims have to fail, whereas the British scheme succeeds. Poetic justice seems to be the final solution for Buchan to end his novel, where the military and intelligence strength of Britain prevails. In the following section, a broader historical background is offered for one further to understand Buchan's sources in writing *Greenmantle*.

***Greenmantle* and Its Historical Roots**

During British colonial rule, most national and religious movements, whether in the Arab and Muslim world or elsewhere, were viewed as unjustified and violent. For instance, the Indian Sepoy revolt against the British rule in 1857 angered the British empire and led to outrageous massacres against the Indians (Blunt 2000). In the late nineteenth century, Muhammad Ahmad led a revolution in Sudan and proclaimed himself the Mahdi in 1881. The Sudanese rebels scored successive victories, like capturing Khartoum in January 1885 after a battle in which General Gordon was killed. The Mahdists were able to exert their control over many parts of Sudan (Holt 1958). Referring to the Sudanese Mahdi, Major Richard Hannay in *Greenmantle* advises the Germans not to play with the religious sentiments of the Africans:

It is waiting for you – the Mussulmans of Somaliland and the Abyssinian border and the Blue and White Nile. They would be like dried grasses to catch fire if you used the flint and steel of their religion. Look what the English suffered from a crazy Mullah who ruled only a dozen villages. Once get the flames going and they will lick up the pagans of the west and south. This is the way of Africa. How many thousands, think you, were in the Mahdi's army who never heard of the Prophet till they saw the black flags of the Emirs going into battle? (56–57)

Buchan could have been inspired to draw the character of Greenmantle from Muhammed Ahmed, his “crazy Mullah” of the Sudan. In *Greenmantle*, Sir Walter says that “Islam is a fighting creed, and the mullah still stands in the pulpit with the Koran in one hand and a drawn sword in the other” (7). This terrifying image suggests that even the religious man has a duty to fight the “Kaffirs” or the infidels. Islam is shown as

an uncontrollable force in the British empire, exemplified by historical events, particularly the Mahdi revolt in the Sudan. If the British tried to interfere, then Muslims “would be like dried grasses to catch fire ... Look what the English suffered from a crazy Mullah who ruled only a dozen villages” (55). The Germans played a major role in creating this prophet; hence, the British wanted to interfere before their enemy gained a serious advantage with its Muslim tool. Sir Walter says that containing the Islamic threat is a “life and death” matter. “I can put it no higher and no lower” (9). The only way to counter the Islamic Jihad is by controlling its leader, Greenmantle, because “you can’t have a crusade without a prophet” (204). After the original Greenmantle had died, Sandy Arbuthnot was forced to agree to impersonate him, and the long-looked for revelation had come. Greenmantle had appeared at last to an awaiting people (307). This act suggests that the Turkish Muslims are highly credulous as they have not questioned the identity of the new prophet. It also shows that a Christian white man can lead Muslims to their own advantage: an extension of the empire’s own logic.

As for Sandy Arbuthnot, he is regarded as one of the most important characters in *Greenmantle*, who is disguised as the Mahdi by the end of the novel. He is described as a cultivated traveller having a deep knowledge of the Muslim world:

If you struck a Mecca pilgrimage the odds are you would meet a dozen of Sandy’s friends in it. In shepherds’ huts in the Caucasus you will find bits of his cast-off clothing, for he has a knack of shedding garments as he goes. In the caravanserais of Bokhara and Samarkand he is known, and there are shikaris in the Pamirs who still speak of him round their fires. If you were going to visit Petrograd or Rome or Cairo it would be no use asking him for introductions; if he gave them, they would lead you into strange haunts. But if Fate compelled you to go to Lhasa or Yarkand or Seistan he could map out your road for you and pass the word to potent friends. (26)

***Greenmantle* Prototypes**

A Scot, Sandy played the role of the second Greenmantle, who guided and led all Muslims. This character was very important because we can find Buchan’s view on the role the British empire aspired to play in the Muslim world. Sandy was supposed to stand for Aubrey Herbert (1880–1923) and to a lesser extent T.E. Lawrence (1888–1935); in both cases, Sandy was shown as a superior man. In fact, many British people

were viewed in Britain in this way; for instance, Herbert mentioned in his second book of memoirs *Ben Kendim* (1924) that "there is a quality in some Englishmen that is rarely possessed by men of other nations" (Herbert n.d., xiv–xv). Further, Buchan's son, Lord Tweedsmuir, said that most of his father's characters were "usually an amalgam of two or three real people, often going through the adventures of several other real-life figures" (Master 1987, 22). Many critics assumed that Sandy was Aubrey Herbert alone because Buchan mentioned in his autobiography that Sandy was "reminiscent of Aubrey Herbert" (Buchan 1940, 195). Also, Buchan was Herbert's Oxford contemporary and, according to Herbert's granddaughter, Margaret FitzHerbert, Buchan wrote a letter in September 1923 to a friend after hearing about Herbert's death, saying:

I am greatly saddened this week ... The most delightful and brilliant survivor from the days of chivalry ... he was the most extraordinary combination of tenderness and gentleness, with the most insane gallantry that I have ever known – a sort of survivor from crusading times. I drew Sandy in *Greenmantle* from him. (FitzHerbert 1983, 1)

Unlike T.E. Lawrence, Herbert was not directly involved in the Arab Revolt of 1916 that was hinted at in *Greenmantle*, and he did not play a role in agitating Arab Muslims against the Ottomans. Instead, he worked hard to support the Albanians against the Ottomans after the Balkan Wars and was actually offered the throne of Albania after the end of World War I (Waugh 2004). So, Sandy was originally meant to "commemorate" Herbert, but was "soon altered to fit Lawrence while Lawrence, perversely, was altered to fit Sandy". This change happened in the novel after the capture of Erzurum when Lawrence started to take "over the person of Sandy and the romantic ideals he represented for John Buchan" (Buchan 1993, 1–2). In reality, Lawrence, according to his own claim, played a major role in the capture of Erzurum by the Russians by secretly coordinating with Arab officers serving in the Turkish army (Lawrence 1977, 34; Orlans 2002, 27; Hart 1989, 71); therefore, Sandy appeared at the end of the novel as a liberator of the same city.

Indeed, there were common views shared between Herbert and Buchan. Herbert, for instance, was appointed in March 1904 as honorary attaché in the British Embassy in Constantinople; the new post greatly increased his enthusiasm for the East. Herbert mentioned once that he was sent to the "never logical" East because he got the experience out of "travell[ing] widely" together with a "fairly fluent smattering of several Eastern languages" (Herbert 1919)² that included Turkish, Arabic, Greek and Albanian. After being released as a prisoner in Mons in 1914,

Herbert received a letter from Mark Sykes in which he was urged to join the intelligence work, so in December 1914 he became involved with the Arab bureau of intelligence in Cairo together with T.E. Lawrence. Sykes said that “the Turks will not be able to keep the field and the people will welcome our arrival on the coast say in June or July when Germany should be on her last legs” (FitzHerbert 1983, 144).

During the Battle of Mons in 1914, Herbert had written the following: “[o]ur feelings were more violently moved against Germany as the disturber of Europe”. Readers could find numerous references in *Greenmantle* showing Germany as a vile enemy that was ready to destroy its friends and enemies alike, and its might expanded due to its manipulation of the Greenmantle figure. Also, Buchan clearly accused the Germans of being merciless and treacherous people who were used to back stabbing; as his character Blenkiron said, “Germany’s like a scorpion: her sting’s in her tail, and that tail stretches way down into Asia” (160).

During his stay in Egypt, Herbert visited other Muslim lands like Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia as part of his work. In the beginning of *Greenmantle* Buchan describes the character of Sandy who seemed to be typically applied to Herbert as a man who:

rode through Yemen, which no white man ever did before. The Arabs let him pass, for they thought him stark mad and argued that the hand of Allah was heavy enough on him without their efforts. He’s blood-brother to every kind of Albanian bandit. Also he used to take a hand in Turkish politics, and got a huge reputation. (12)

Indeed, some of the ideas in Buchan’s *Greenmantle* were influenced by Herbert’s views. For instance, the latter mentioned that he saw the Egyptian Sultan at his palace in Cairo on 8 March 1916. The Sultan said that the British “did not understand the Moslems or what was their fraternity”, and Herbert commented by saying that “[w]e English were *bons enfants*, but did not understand the East”. In *Greenmantle*, Buchan echoed Herbert’s comments when Sandy stated, “The West knows nothing of the true Oriental. It pictures him as lapped in colour and idleness and luxury and gorgeous dreams. But it is all wrong” (205).

On the other hand, some critics believed that Sandy’s description closely matched Lawrence of Arabia’s for his active participation in the Arab Revolt as well as for other historical details, though this is a weak claim because Lawrence was sent to Hejaz only in 1916. Other scholars believed that Lawrence took over the character of Sandy only after the spread of Lawrence’s reputation as a champion of Arab rights. David Stafford, for instance, mentioned that Buchan used to receive

Lawrence in the 1920s as a "frequent visitor" to his house at Elsfield near Oxford, "where Buchan was drawn to him by the sense of adventure and youthful possibility which he symbolized" (Stafford 1983–1984, 2–3).

Buchan himself admitted in a radio interview broadcast in 1936 that he met Lawrence in 1915 and 1918 (Smith 1965, 207). Also, in *A Prince of the Captivity* (1933), Buchan clearly referred to Sandy as T.E. Lawrence. In this novel, the character, Falconet, informed his friend, Adam, that he had done a "hundred men's jobs in the war", but most people were not aware of these achievements. Otherwise, "you'd have been as famous as Lawrence – the Arabian fellow" (Buchan 2003a). In fact, this reference caused Lawrence to write an angry letter to Edward Garnett on 1 August 1933 in which he criticized Buchan who used to take "figures of today and projects their shadows on to clouds, till they grow surhuman and grotesque: then describes them ... It sounds a filthy technique ..." (as quoted in Smith 1965, 280). Lawrence was against the "filthy technique" followed by Buchan because it meant creating unbelievable supermen. Finally, Buchan used Lawrence as Sandy in *The Island of Sheep* (1936), observing that he was a man who knew "the Near and Middle East like a book" (Buchan 2003b, 18).

As a Briton who feels responsible for all Muslims, Sandy visits Egypt and Palestine in *The Three Hostages* (1924) to become the organizer of the holy pilgrimage to Mekka. This time, he talks of preparing aeroplanes to take Muslim pilgrims to their destination. He says:

I'm a hamelidari on a big scale. I am prepared to bring the rank of hadji within reach of the poorest and feeblest. I'm going to be the great benefactor of the democracy of Islam, by means of a fleet of patched-up 'planes and a few kindred spirits that know the East. (Buchan 1924, 137)

As with *Greenmantle* in which he becomes the chosen prophet, Buchan sets up a fictional world where Sandy makes possible pilgrimage, the most important religious act for a Muslim. This implies a colonial attitude because it suggests such inefficiency and economic dependence on the part of Muslims that they are unable to take charge of their affairs and act independently. Sandy's role in Buchan's novels is to be a mediating contrast with the Western and Muslim characters. By inflating his intellectual abilities and infinite intrigues, Sandy's character confirms Buchan's idea of the superiority of the British, particularly the Scottish, over other races and indicates the writer's continuous imperialist belief that the British are destined to participate in the most intricate matters of other nations and religions.

Back in 1915, Lawrence wrote a confidential report in the *Arab Bulletin* entitled "Syria, The Raw Material", in which he pointed to the British plans of establishing a state in Syria with "really prepared groundwork or a large body of adherents" as long as it was "a Sunni one, speaking Arabic, and pretending to revive the Abbasides or Ayubides" (Lawrence 1917).

It was not just the Germans or the Ottomans but also the British who had in mind the pretentious revival of the Islamic Caliphate in order to serve their interests.³ Based on this, it is possible that Buchan heard about the British war schemes as narrated by Lawrence and later documented them in *Greenmantle*.

On 9 December 1914, Lawrence was sent to Cairo to work as a "subaltern attached to the military intelligence department of the Egyptian expeditionary force" (James, 2004). He said later in *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1926) that his mission in Cairo was meant to change and "build a new people in the East", clarifying that from their "oriental railway station", as Herbert called the intelligence office in Cairo, "we began to work upon all chiefs, far and near" (Lawrence, 1986, p. 58). In January 1916, a new section was created in the intelligence bureau responsible for "manipulating Arab nationalism to frustrate French imperial ambitions" as well as to destabilize the Ottoman rule in Hijaz (James 2004). In reality, the aim behind the sending of Lawrence to Arabia in late 1916 was to stir up a revolution and "set the parched Eastern grasses afire in a way that the Ottoman Empire did not expect" (Hitchens 2004, 106). In another work, *Revolt in Arabia* (1927), Lawrence confessed that he was searching for a leader to agitate Arabs against Turks: "[m]y visit was mainly to find the yet unknown master-spirit of the affair, and measure his capacity to carry the revolt to the goal I had conceived for it". In another context, Lawrence stated that he travelled to Arabia to find his "armed prophet" who "succeeded in revolutions" (Lawrence 1927, 13).

As a result of the British support, Sharif Hussein of Mekka, one of prophet Muhammad's descendants, started his revolt on 5 June 1916. In Buchan's *Nelson's History of the War*, the Sharif was described as "the most powerful prince of Western and Central Arabia. He was the real ruler of Mecca, and, along with his able sons, exercised a unique authority due to his temporal possessions and his religious prestige as sprung from the blood of the Koreish" (Buchan 1915–1919, 117). Thus, Buchan was aware of the existence of Sharif Hussein, and he used him to embellish the portrayal of the Greenmantle figure.

But what literary critics ignored was that Buchan could also have had someone else in mind when he portrayed the character of the first Greenmantle. This prophet, who was made by "that damned German

propaganda" (206) and run by Hilda von Einem, died because of cancer and could not achieve his goals. "Greenmantle is dying – has been dying for months" (204). The first Greenmantle figure appears to be a delineation of Wilhelm Wassmuss (1880–1931) who was also known as the "German Lawrence of Arabia" (Sykes 1936; Olson 2013, 52; Manjapra 2006).

In 1909, Wassmuss was actually made the German Consul to the Persian Gulf in Bushire and later Shiraz. Major Percy Cox, the British Consul General at Bushire, in 1910 expressed serious concerns regarding Wassmuss' arguments about the German rights in the Persian Gulf (Henderson 1948, 64). During World War I, Wassmuss was instrumental as consular official in agitating the Muslim Persian tribes against British forces. Then, the Government of India felt "uneasy about the internal situation" because the overall conditions were increasingly deteriorating, and "Persia, worked upon [by] the intrigues of the enterprising German emissary Wassmuss" (Cruttwell 1982, 345), was about to enter the war. In the fictional story of *Greenmantle*, Buchan wrote the following: "Persian Moslems are threatening trouble. There is a dry wind blowing through the East, and the parched grasses wait the spark. And that wind is blowing towards the Indian border" (6). The revolt against the British was feared to start in Persia, crossing through Afghanistan to reach India. In reality, the possibility of an Islamic Jihad against the British in India was "a recurring nightmare" (Bar-Yosef 2001, 90–91) for Earl Kitchener (1850–1916) and his British commanders. As Sir Walter exclaimed in *Greenmantle*, most of the British interests would be at stake if a Muslim revolt occurred: "Hell ... may spread. Beyond Persia, remember, lies India" (7).

As a matter of fact, the German plan to wage a propaganda war in India through Afghanistan against the British dated back to 1914. It was first suggested by a Swedish explorer called Sven Hedin (1865–1952) who "claimed that the east was ripe for revolt and the Afghans 'burning with desire' to free India from the British". Such a plan would be achieved only by agitating the Emir of Afghanistan against British rule (Hughes 2002, 450). In reality, when Wassmuss lost his German Diplomatic Code Book which included all his encoded secrets, the British forces were able to decipher his plans and Wassmuss was forced to flee. In an article published in February 1916, Wassmuss was reported to be fleeing without his box that contained "thousands of violently inflammatory pamphlets printed in English, Urdu, Hindu, Punjabi, and Sikh, and addressed to the Indian Army, calling on it to take the opportunity presented by the war of throwing off the hated yoke of England". There was also "a special appeal to the Mohammedans in that army, urging them to join in a Holy War against the infidel English" (Machray 1916, 351). In the fictional story

of *Greenmantle*, one of the first agents to report a strange occurrence in the East was Harry Bullivant, Sir Walter's son, who worked as a muleteer between Mosul and the Persian border. Bullivant reached some findings as he handed over a small paper on which three words were written: "Kasredin", "cancer", and "v. I.". These codes were later deciphered by the British. After the death of the first Greenmantle, a new prophet appeared as Buchan wanted to prove that the British Greenmantle was better than the German version, as stated above.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Buchan expresses in his treatment of Islam the anxiety of the British empire by stressing its perceived fearful and uncontrollable nature as well as its "fanatical" adherents. Any outsiders, whether they be "fanatic" Muslims or "chauvinist" Germans or Ottomans, were seen as disturbers of the British world order, so they were consciously and continuously vilified. Buchan's novels aimed to enhance the sense of unity and faith in Great Britain and, as previously stated, he affirmed that the British empire was "a mystic whole" which relied on the "wisest minds" to keep its "spiritual unity". Surely, Buchan viewed himself as one of those elites and intelligentsia who were responsible for shaping the philosophical basis of this empire through his work and writings. His fiction, especially *Greenmantle*, offers a world where the British organize and control the affairs of Muslims and clearly shows the aspiration of the empire by conveying the popular views of British society in the form of propaganda. Within this framework for an imagined empire, the British had to remain superior and everything had to be in order so that the system would continue functioning properly.

Though this was still the period of the early twentieth century, the British intelligentsia viewed Islamic Jihad as a very important issue, inspiring policy-makers to exploit it in order to encourage Jihad against Britain's adversaries and prompting Buchan to use it as a central theme in *Greenmantle*. In the two cases, Jihad is used as a mobilization tool disguised in the form of religion to serve political objectives.

Notes

- 1 See for instance Robert MacDonald's *The Language of Empire* (1994), Patrick Brantlinger's *Rule of Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism* (1988), and

Craig Smith, "Every Man Must Kill the Thing He Loves: Empire, Homoerotics, and Nationalism in John Buchan's 'Prester John'," *NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction* (Winter, 1995).

- 2 I relied on this online edition throughout this study, so only page numbers will be cited afterwards.
- 3 Buchan himself wrote in *The Last Secrets of Final Mysteries of Explorations* (1924) that someone called Thomas Kejth became the governor of Medina, one of the respected Muslim cities, in 1815. He was "a deserter from the 72nd Highlanders" and worked in "one of the strangest posts ever held even by a Scot!" (Buchan 1924, 214).

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