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
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Front cover:

"Gesigt van de plaats genaamt de Queekvaleij ... toebehorende aan de Weduwe Sacharias de Beer" // View of the farm named "De Queekvaleij" ... in possession of the Widow Sacharias de Beer, circa 1778 (Gordon Atlas II, 65. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam).



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Preface

This work derives from a research project of the Centre for the History of European Expansion. It was financed by the Faculty of Letters, which provided a postgraduate studentship for Drs. Pieter van Duin for two years. In this time he collected the great majority of the data on which this work is based in the *Algemeen Rijksarchief* in The Hague, and also wrote the first draft of chapters II to V of this book. A second version was written on the basis of these drafts by Dr. Robert Ross, but both authors were continually involved in the planning, revision and final execution of this work. Dr. Ross was also able to carry out a certain amount of research in Cape Town thanks to a grant for a short study trip most generously provided by the Netherlands Organisation for Pure Scientific Research.

The project was concerned with the macro-economy of the Cape Colony during the eighteenth century, that is to say during the period of rule by the Dutch East India Company after the colony had been fully established. The initial purpose of the project was the collection and publication of the extensive statistical material on numerous aspects of Cape economic life. This material is now presented in the Statistical Appendices to this volume, which may thus be considered to have the status of a source publication. The material has been presented as it was found in the archives, except that it has been rearranged to make it more accessible and a few obvious clerical errors have been corrected. As the research progressed, however, it became clear that we were able to use these data to write an interpretative essay on the nature of the Cape economy during this period, in which we challenge many of the accepted views on its structure. This now forms the body of this volume.

In addition to the organisation which funded part of this work, we are most grateful to Dr. Hans Heese and Dr. Nigel Worden for providing us with a certain amount of information which was not available in the The Hague archives, to Dr. Pieter Emmer and Dr. Thomas Lindblad for their incisive comments on an earlier draft of this work, and to Mr. G.J. de Moor for drawing the figures.

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Abbreviations

- ARA : Algemeen Rijksarchief (General State Archives), The Hague
- AYB : *Archives Year-Book for South African History*
- CA : Cape Archives
- JAH : *Journal of African History*
- RCC : G. McC. Theal (ed.), *Records of the Cape Colony*, 36 volumes, (London, 1897-1905)
- RCP : Resolutions of the Council of Policy at the Cape of Good Hope
- SSA : *Collected Seminar Papers of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies*,
London: *The Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*
- VOC : *Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Dutch East India Company)

Glossary

bandiet: convict transported to the Cape from Batavia.

dispensier: the VOC official responsible for the purchase and distribution of grain for the Company.

Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden: Governor-General (of the VOC) and Council at Batavia.

Heren XVII: the Gentlemen XVII, the Directors of the VOC.

Kamer: Chamber, one of the constituent organs of the VOC.

knecht: servant, often (and with regard to the population figures always) a man officially in the service of the VOC but nevertheless hired out to a farmer. Usually they acted as overseers.

Ommelanden: the immediate hinterland of Batavia.

opgaaf: the annual return of population and production; hence *opgaafrollen*, the rolls on which these were recorded.

pacht: contract or tender, either as to a concession to supply a product (above all meat) to the VOC at a specified price for a specified period, or as to a franchise of having the monopoly over the sale of a product, notably wine. In the latter case the franchise was annually auctioned. Hence *pachter*, concessionaire, lessee.

plakkaat: decree.

recognitiegeld: recognition money, either the quitrent charged for a farm, or the duty levied on products entering Cape Town (notably wine).

regenten: the Dutch ruling elite.

stadhouder: the position held by the Princes of Orange within the constitutions of each province of the Dutch Republic.

tap: house for the sale of alcoholic beverages.

vendurool: auction list.

wissel: bill of exchange.

Weights, Measures and Currency

pond : pound, approximately 500 grammes.

mud : measure of volume, approximately 1 hectolitre.

aam : measure of liquid volume, approximately 155 litres; hence
half-aam.

legger: measure of liquid volume, approximately 582 litres.

morgen: measure of land, approximately one hectare.


1 *Rijksdaalder* (Rixdollar) = 48 *stuivers*

1 *guilder* (*f*) = 20 *stuivers* (in the Netherlands) or 16 *stuivers* (in the Netherlands Indies)

1 *schelling* = 6 *stuivers*

1 *stuiver* = 8 *duiten*

In 1795, 1 Rixdollar was worth four English shillings.



"Gesigt van een Caapse Koorn, Wijn en Veeplaats" // View of a Cape farmstead, circa 1778 (Gordon Atlas I, 3f. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam).

I. INTRODUCTION

C.W. de Kiewiet, still the finest historian to approach the problems of South African society, once commented that the country "has advanced politically by disasters and economically by windfalls".¹ The disasters will not be dealt with in this work. The windfalls he meant were the discovery of diamonds (and later of gold) which, together with the introduction of wool-bearing sheep, transformed South Africa from a backward community of subsistence farmers and pastoralists, both black and white, into the dynamic capitalist economy of the twentieth century with all the massive contradictions of class, colour and status.

De Kiewiet's picture of the backwardness of South Africa before the economic watershed of the late nineteenth century has remained the conventional wisdom, at least as regards the study of the colonial economy. While signs of dynamism in the nineteenth century Cape have been recognised by those few authors who have worked on the period,² the backwardness of the colony at the end of the eighteenth century has yet to be fully challenged, or indeed fully investigated. Almost all academic writing on the colony's economic history has been permeated by the belief that, due to the mercantilist, monopolistic policy of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) which ruled the Cape Colony until 1795, the colony remained backward and impoverished. In this work we will investigate the truth of this proposition.

The colony had been founded in 1652 as a refreshment station for the ships of the VOC on their way to and from the Indies. Originally, the intention of the Dutch was to provide for their needs by trading with the Khoikhoi (or "Hottentots" as they called them), who were the indigenous inhabitants of the south-west tip of Africa. Since the Khoikhoi seemed to have large herds of sheep and cattle, it was hoped that sufficient meat could be acquired from them for the fleets, without the expense of a large colony. Speedily, however, this proved impossible, and by 1700 Khoikhoi society was well on the way to disintegration. Moreover, the Khoikhoi did not practice agriculture, so that within a few years of the foundation of the colony the commander of the Cape, Jan van Riebeeck, gave permission for a number of the VOC's employees to settle as farmers growing wheat and (later) wine on the slopes of Table Mountain, above the bay where the Company had its fort and garden and where Cape Town was beginning to grow up.³ Given the Cape's climate, which resembles that of southern Spain or California, it proved possible to build an agricultural economy based on

the classic staples of the Mediterranean, while at the same time to run cattle and sheep on the grassland and scrub bush of the area. For this, of course, labour was essential. This was very largely provided by importing slaves from the shores of the Indian Ocean, although later many Khoikhoi were also impelled to labour for the Dutch.

By the early years of the eighteenth century the Cape had taken on the pattern that was to last for over a century. Cape Town, at the far South-West of the colony, remained the only port, and the major market for Cape agricultural products. Inland from Cape Town there were wine and wheat farms, largely worked by slaves. These lay between the sea and the mountains of the Cape folded belt. Given the steepness of the passes over the mountains, bulk transport by ox-waggon was thoroughly impossible further east. In the interior, the whites were largely transhumant pastoralists known as *trekboers*, at a very low level of density, so that they quickly came to colonise an immense area of the interior of South Africa.

It is this economy, of port town, agricultural hinterland and pastoral periphery, that has generally been so negatively described by scholars. Even before the Second World War, the first generation of studies on the Cape, written by such authors as A.J.H. van der Walt, P.J. van der Merwe and Coenraad Beyers, stressed that the structural absence of markets for Cape products forced the settlers to adopt a way of life of subsistence agriculture and pastoralism.⁴ These ideas have survived into more modern studies. In his chapter in the *Oxford History of South Africa*, T.R.H. Davenport argued that the Cape farmers suffered as a result of the limited size of the market for their products. He claimed that "from the beginning of the eighteenth century the problem was ... over-production in terms of a market limited virtually to Cape Town and the ships."⁵ Similarly, in *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1820*, published as recently as 1979, Gerrit Schutte wrote of "a structural problem" caused by the restrictive practices of the VOC so that "the production of the Cape was too large for the local market" even if this could occasionally be concealed by chance circumstances.⁶ This theme is taken up by Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, the editors of the volume, who wrote of "the extreme simplicity of the economy", which had no stimulus for diversification, either internally or from the Company. This, they argue, largely determined the labour system of the colony, and thus its social relationships.⁷

Similarly, such few Marxist analyses of the early Cape as there have been give a very similar characterisation of Cape economy and society, if

in somewhat different language. Thus, for instance, Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore see the Cape during the eighteenth century as dominated by the mercantilist Company, so that much of the history of the Cape in the century that followed "can be seen in terms of the transformation of the Company outpost into a more fully capitalist society."⁸ Their definition of a "capitalist society" is in terms of the relations of production, and in this sense it is true that the "free" market for labour was limited in the eighteenth century Cape. Against this, the ethos of the colony's elite was certainly that of competitive capitalism and their economic actions were dominated by the fluctuations of the market.⁹ All the Cape's farmers, whether they produced grain, wine or stock, must be seen as tied to the market to a greater or lesser extent, and often totally.

It is notable that all these historians have given their portrayals of the Cape's economy without any extensive empirical back-up, even though immense quantities of evidence, statistical and other, exist on the nature of and changes within the economy of the Cape under the VOC. It is the intention of this work to test these sorts of theories against the evidence. When this is done, it becomes clear that the market for Cape agricultural produce was much larger, more dynamic and quicker growing than has previously been thought, so that a very considerable rate of agricultural growth was possible. This implies that capital accumulation occurred in the eighteenth century Cape to an extent that has generally not been appreciated.

To the extent that this claim can be justified, any description of the Cape's economic life in terms of "overproduction" must be not only empirically false, but also conceptually absurd, since it is difficult to imagine any entrepreneurs who would continue to produce for a structurally glutted market, on which, presumably, they would continually be operating at a loss. Indeed, none of the historians quoted above has ever denied that a large proportion of the Cape's farming community (and all those people who lived in Cape Town) were thoroughly within the network of the Cape market. Their argument is that the market, on which they were dependent, was always too small. Therefore, behaving as rational economic beings, a number of them withdrew from the orbit of the market on which they were unable to make a profit to become subsistence pastoralists, the *trekboers* of the South African interior. But, as Sir Keith Hancock pointed out in an unjustly neglected article about twenty-five years ago, "they did not all trek".¹⁰ If the overproduction thesis was correct, then it would be

predicted that the number of farmers engaged in producing those articles for which demand was deficient would decline and total production would decrease, until this forced the price for these goods to rise to the level at which their operations would be profitable. But this was not the case. As we will argue, the number of farmers engaged in producing wine and wheat for the Cape market, the labour force employed - measured in terms of the number of slaves they owned - and the total size of their production rose steadily, if unevenly, throughout the eighteenth century.

Hancock's observations on the Cape were made in the course of a discussion of the work of S.D. Neumark, which contains the main critique of the conventional wisdom concerning the Cape economy. However, the problem that Neumark was attempting to confront was not the structure of the economy as a whole, but rather the reasons for the expansion movement of white settlers which led to the spread of cattle and sheep farmers across a very large area of the Cape interior at a very low level of density. His concentration was thus almost exclusively on the frontier economy and the stock farmers, and his remarks on the economic life of the colony's core agricultural areas are not less scathing - and, we would argue, erroneous - than those made by his predecessors and successors. Nevertheless, his arguments are thoroughly germane to ours. In a welcome reaction to such semi-psychological interpretations of frontier expansion as "a love of adventure", he argued that "the predominance of economic motivation can hardly be in doubt", and stressed that the frontier must be seen as an "exchange economy maintaining close economic ties with the outside world."¹¹ In other words, the *trekboers* did not move outside the orbit of a totally glutted market, but merely into a more profitable sector of it. Neumark was concerned to demonstrate that the most distant *trekboer* depended on the market for vital commodities, such as guns, powder and lead, without which their existence would have been impossible. He also claimed that all *trekboers* did in fact produce for the Cape market, delivering not only cattle and sheep (for which, as Neumark was concerned to demonstrate, there was generally a demand that could scarcely be met) and derivative products such as soap and candles (both made from sheep fat) or butter, but also various naturally occurring commodities, above all ivory and wax.

Neumark's ideas have sometimes too readily been accepted. His work must be seen rather as a set of theses without full empirical support than as a fully researched economic history.¹² The main critique of his work, though, that of Leonard Guelke, has argued that the frontier economy, though

providing "a reasonable outlet for people with a little capital ... offered few prospects for sustained growth."¹³ But not only the frontier economy was, in Guelke's vision, unable to generate growth. Probably because he concentrates on the middle of the eighteenth century, Guelke argued that the market for the products of the agrarian South-West Cape, wine and wheat, remained slack, and that large numbers of arable farmers were heavily in debt. He does admit a considerable degree of stratification within the agrarian community, but in no way suggests that the minority of the flourishing farmers were able to sustain any level of economic growth. The whole economy remained, as he saw it, in the doldrums for lack of sufficient market outlets.¹⁴

Guelke's picture is based on two major arguments, neither of which is in itself sufficient. First, the stagnation of the economy as a whole, or indeed of major sectors of it, can in no way be induced from the indebtedness of numerous farmers. Someone must have been able to accrue the capital before it could be lent out at interest, nor would those capitalists have invested in agricultural production if no profits could have been gained from the working of wine and wheat farms. Similarly, the analysis of price series, the second pillar of Guelke's argument, can give no more than suggestions as to the developments of the economy unless much more is known on the processes of price formation, in other words on the balance between supply and demand. Guelke's views, and the very great contribution that his work has made to the study of the early Cape, derive from his concentration on the micro-economics of Cape farms. But the economy is both more and less than the sum of its parts, and his work needs to be complemented by an analysis at the macro-level.

It is indeed remarkable that no such analysis has yet been made. Rather it has been far too generally accepted that the presence and the policies of the VOC necessarily impeded the internal economic development of the colony. Historians have tended to accept the polemical statements of the VOC's opponents without attempting to test their truth. In particular, often without realising it, they have taken at face value the complaints of the Cape Patriots against the VOC's officials, which, deriving as they do from a group of prosperous farmers, must be considered as special pleading.¹⁵ These ideas were given strength by their endorsement, in 1801, by J.A. de Mist, later Commissioner of the Batavian Republic at the Cape. He wrote:

The embargo on freedom of trade and the difficulty experienced by the farmer in obtaining goods in exchange for the produce which he brought to the Cape Town market in ever increasing quantities, affected the prices of corn and wine so adversely that at times the farmer, arriving at the Cape after many a long day's trek at the slow pace of the ox, through the trackless veld, was unable to obtain a purchaser for his grain, and found himself obliged either to sell it, or rather, give it away for next to nothing, or else store it in hired granaries at a considerable loss to himself. Further (with shame be it said) the desperate wine farmer had more than once been seen knocking the pegs out of his barrels, and allowing the precious wine to turn to waste in order that the weary oxen might not have to drag the full casks over the veld back to the farm.¹⁶

Even though De Mist's memorandum gives the appearance of being an independent work based on original research - he had access to the archives of the VOC - it should not be seen as a piece of writing independent of the political struggles within the Netherlands at the time. De Mist was a leading member of the revolutionary movement that had overthrown the old Dutch system, of which the VOC was an integral part. It was thus natural for him to portray the Cape burghers as good Patriots who had been oppressed by the machinations of one of the Patriots' arch-enemies, the VOC, which after all had always had very close links with the *stadhouder* of the House of Orange.¹⁷ Historians should be careful not to believe such a characterisation without subjecting it to a deep-reaching criticism.

To the extent that the Cape economy can be seen as dynamic, as we argue in this book, so far can it be argued that the VOC policies did not work as an effective brake on the economy. Indeed, in many aspects of Cape economic life, the VOC, sometimes intentionally, was rather a stimulant for Cape economic growth. For instance, this can be seen in the very important, and hitherto unrecognised, exports of grain, as well as from the opportunities given to both merchants and producers to take advantage of the possibilities for profits that could be made outside the official VOC economic circuits.

This macro-economic analysis of eighteenth century Cape society, then, is based on a systematic exploration of production and consumption patterns, above all of the three major sectors of the agrarian economy, namely wine, wheat and stock-rearing. However, this must not be done in isolation, but rather the relationship of the Cape as a whole to the world economy of the eighteenth century must be investigated, and the results of this investigation fully incorporated into the analysis of the internal economy of the colony. This book attempts that task.

Our investigation is based on a number of well-known and less familiar sources which provide the relevant statistical information.¹⁸ Using this material we have attempted to construct time-series, across the eighteenth century, of the most important macro-economic variables (output, market size, price levels). In this way we hope to describe the relationships between supply and demand and the degree of market orientation of the eighteenth century Cape economy, and to demonstrate the growth (or lack of it) in the supply of, and demand for, the Cape's agricultural products. This of course entails a continual process of source criticism, since only on a detailed quantitative analysis of the relevant macro-economic variables can judgements be based with respect to numerous questions regarding the Cape's economy, in particular, whether it should be characterised as a stagnating economy with a chronic overproduction problem or as a relatively dynamic one with a substantial level of growth.

II. THE MARKET

One of the central questions posited by the debates on the nature of eighteenth century Cape society concerns the interrelationship between the output of the agrarian economy of the colony and the level of consumption of its products, in other words between supply and demand. Within the relatively limited framework of enquiry employed in this book, in which the micro-economics of the units of production are not brought into the analysis, we have chosen to investigate this relationship primarily by extensive discussions of the economic performance of the three major sectors of the agrarian economy, namely grain-growing, wine-growing and stock-raising, on the one hand, and the size of the market for these goods on the other. Before this is done, it is necessary to make some general remarks about the nature of demand, since these are applicable in greater or lesser degree to all three sectors. To begin with production would increase the temptation, far too common in the study of early Cape society, of ignoring the possibility of a large and economically crucial level of consumption.

For the purposes of discussion, the market for agrarian produce can be divided into three sectors: the internal market, that is to say consumption by the permanent or temporary non-agrarian residents of the colony itself; the provisioning of ships which put into Cape Town harbour; and exports. When it is impossible, or meaningless, to distinguish between the first two sectors, we have designated the combination of the two as the local market.

The Internal Market

To the extent that the primary agrarian products of the colony were basic foodstuffs, the level of internal demand for them was obviously dependent on the size of the colony's population and, more specifically as regards the market, on the size of that proportion of the population that was not itself engaged in agrarian activities. In this respect there were three major population groups to speak of, namely the officials and employees of the VOC, the non-agrarian freeburghers and the urban slaves.

Although by the end of the eighteenth century there was an increasing number of artisans and officials living in the small villages of the colony, notably Stellenbosch, their number would seem to have been negligible compared to those who lived in Cape Town. Cape Town, the only port and the capital of the colony, housed the great majority of VOC employees, such a high percentage, indeed, that the working assumption that

they were all to be found there, is not very inaccurate. In fact, to take one year as an example, in 1750, of the 1,331 men on the muster roll of the Company, all but 134 were living in Cape Town. Of the others 44 were employed in False Bay, where something approaching an urban settlement was beginning to grow up, and 33 were on Robben Island, either as prisoners or guards.¹ Even those who did not live in Cape Town had to buy their food, and thus formed part of the internal market. The Company's employees brought a considerable amount of money into the colony - in 1750, nominally, 197,880 guilders in wages.²

The total number of VOC employees grew steadily in the course of the century, from rather over 500 in 1701 to nearly 3,400 at the high point in 1789.³ The sharpest growth was in the late 1780s, after which attempts by the Company to cut costs brought the total down again by over a thousand.⁴ This economising was not popular with the Cape Town mercantile community. One intelligent, if self-serving member of it indeed claimed that the prosperity of the colony depended simply and directly on the size of the garrison.⁵

In addition to its paid employees, the VOC also relied on a bonded labour force, made up of slaves and of *bandieten*, men banished as criminals from various parts of Indonesia.⁶ These fluctuated in number between about 500 and about 750, with the exception of a figure of 946 which is given for 1789.⁷ As a result of the imbalanced sex ratio and the high mortality within the Company's slave lodge, the force had to be continually replenished by slaving voyages to Madagascar and the East African Coast. In total during the eighteenth century, around 3,000 slaves were imported for the Company's exclusive use.⁸

While reasonably accurate figures are available as to the number of VOC employees and slaves who lived in Cape Town, it is, because of the nature of the existing material, very difficult to estimate the number of private citizens, and their slaves, who also inhabited the city. The tax lists (*opgaaf* rolls), indeed, do not distinguish between the farming and non-farming population in the Cape district. In general Cape Town earned its money from its port, and by performing the urban functions necessary for the colony. There were thus large numbers of lodging-house keepers, retailers and craftsmen in the town. Indeed, in general there was no sharp distinction between these occupations, nor was there any clear occupational differentiation between the free and the slaves. Slaves naturally performed the great majority of the menial tasks - hauling water, cutting fire-wood,


cleaning the streets and so on - but there were also large numbers of more or less skilled artisans among their number. In addition, the retail trade in foodstuffs was largely in their hands.⁹

If it is virtually impossible to establish the number of urban citizens and their slaves, it is possible to make rough estimates of the total population of the city, even though the administrative district within which it fell, and for which population figures are available, also included a large stretch of countryside. On the basis of the *opgaaf* rolls for three widely separated years (1727, 1749 and 1773), it has been calculated that the urban, or, to be more precise, the non-farming population of the Cape district made up approximately one-third of the population of the colony as a whole.¹⁰ This would mean that the population of Cape Town increased from over 1,000 in the first decade of the eighteenth century to somewhere between 10,000 and 11,000 in the period 1789-93.¹¹ As well as the burghers, the free blacks, the slaves owned by these two categories, and the *knechten*, those figures include the VOC employees and the Company's slaves, but exclude wives, children and private slaves of Company officials, and the Khoisan. We will assume that this ratio holds good throughout the last hundred years of VOC rule, despite the fact that the available data do not allow the repetition of such calculations during the last two decades before 1795. This causes some difficulties for our analysis, since it is precisely during those decades that the population of the city seems to have been growing most swiftly. Also, most of our information on consumption of bread and meat derives from these years.

Some confirmation that the estimates of Cape Town's population are of the correct magnitude can be gained from an analysis of the number of houses in the city. In 1779, there were said to be 750-800 houses in the town.¹² When compared with the estimated population of the city for 1774-78 (about 7,400), this would entail an average of between 9 and 10 persons per house. This figure seems high, but certainly not impossible, when the presence of the garrison and of the numerous slaves is taken into account. It is, moreover, similar to the ratio (9.1) found between the number of houses in Cape Town during the First British Occupation, immediately after 1795,¹³ and the estimated population of the town during the period 1789-93. The approximations we have made would thus seem to have a certain amount of independent corroboration.

In Graph II.1 the total population of the colony is given. This graph can also be read, using the alternative scale, as the reconstructed popula-

GRAPH II. 1: THE POPULATION OF THE CAPE COLONY, 1704-1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



N.B. The total also includes *knechten*. The free population includes "free blacks".

tion of Cape Town. In fact, the total number of people within the colony will have been considerably greater than that given in the graph, since for various groups no information is available. The most important of these are the Khoisan, to the extent that they were already incorporated in the colonial society. They were almost all to be found on the farms, however, so that this lacuna in our information does not affect our conclusions as to the size of the urban market. Also, there is no information on the wives, children or slaves of the officials, who must have formed a not inconsiderable proportion of Cape Town's population. We have to assume that it would have been a constant proportion. Only the first decade of the century would have differed in this respect, as then many officials, led by the Governor, Willem Adriaen van der Stel, were illegally engaged in agriculture,¹⁴ and therefore presumably had many more slaves than was the case with their successors. After the recall of Van der Stel, the number of burgher-owned slaves increased sharply. For the major part of the century our estimates of the trend of urban consumption should therefore not be seriously affected, even though the figures on the total population are underreported.

As can be seen from Graph II.1, the population of the colony, and thus of Cape Town, increased more than ninefold during the course of the century, and, eliminating the less reliable years 1704-08, more than sixfold between 1709-13 and 1789-93. The growth was steady, averaging just under 2.5% per annum, with only one period of stagnation in the 1740s, when a few years of malaise in the agricultural economy meant that the number of slaves owned by the burghers decreased. For the rest, as is also shown in the graph, the burghers and their slaves - who together came to constitute the majority of both the total and the urban population - increased in number at roughly equivalent rates. After the recall of Van der Stel, and the consequent concentration of agricultural production in burgher hands, the burgher-owned slaves always slightly exceeded the burghers in number, until after the slave trade was abolished early in the nineteenth century. If the VOC employees and the Company's slaves are also taken into account, the ratio between free and slave fluctuated around one.

Shipping

The Cape Colony was founded to serve as a refreshment station for the ships of the Dutch East India Company on their journey between the Netherlands and Asia. It was not for several decades after 1652 that the colony

was able to fulfill the requirements of the *Heren XVII* in this regard, but once its economy got organised, from the last decade of the seventeenth century, the ships of the VOC, and of other nations, were able to buy in the wine, bread and meat that they required in Cape Town. In so doing, they provided a major market for the Cape's producers. To give some indication of the numbers involved, between 1720 and 1780, each year saw an average of between 9,700 and 11,600 men leave either Europe or Asia on the ships of the Dutch East India Company alone. Almost all these men, excepting those who had died on the way, would have come into Cape Town, where they would have spent several weeks recuperating from the long voyage. They would then still have a journey of around three months ahead of them.¹⁵ The potential of this market was thus considerable.


It was not merely the VOC ships which made use of the comforts of the Cape Town roadstead. There were also large numbers of vessels sailing under the flags of other European countries. It was these that in the latter part of the century provided the growth in the total shipping that touched at the Cape, and thus in that part of the market which was provided by the supplying of ships, as can be seen in Graph II.2.¹⁶ Whereas the number of Dutch ships remained relatively constant, with an annual total that fluctuated between 45 and 70, except during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in the early 1780s, the number of foreign vessels increased dramatically after about 1770. Before then, there had rarely been more than 20 a year, for the most part English and, after 1750, French. After 1772, in contrast, the total only twice dropped below 60, and from that year on the foreign ships always outnumbered the Dutch ones, something they had never done before. The peak was reached in 1783, when there were 151 foreign ships (including, indubitably, many that had been chartered by the VOC as an insurance against capture by the British), as against no more than 20 Dutch ones. This proportion did not last, but the numerical dominance of foreign ships was maintained.

The importance of the foreign shipping for the Cape economy was widely recognised. By the 1780s even the Governor and Council of the colony, in a letter to the *Heren XVII*, were prepared to write that:

the experience of many years has shown that the blooming and prosperity of this colony very largely depends on the arrival of foreign ships at this outpost, while in contrast a scarcity of them produces a relapse.

Foreigners had to be encouraged therefore, both to keep the citizens of the Cape contented and to ensure the advantage that the Company took from their

GRAPH II.2: NUMBER OF SHIPS IN CAPE TOWN HARBOUR, 1704 - 1793
(FIVE - YEAR AVERAGES)



presence, which derived from the manipulation of the meat market and the sum levied on the sale of Cape wine to foreigners. It was therefore most advisable, for the Company and for the colony as a whole, that the continued presence of foreigners in the Cape Town roadstead should be encouraged, even if this involved the relaxing of one of the VOC's monopolies.¹⁷ The point is that ships not belonging to the VOC had a choice whether or not they would put into Cape Town, whereas the VOC ships had to do so, by order of the *Heren XVII*. Moreover, the foreigners exercised their choice. When in the 1790s the price of meat at the Cape rose too high, the foreign ships attempted to cut their costs by buying lesser meat, or by avoiding the Cape altogether.¹⁸ The consequences extended far beyond the immediate sufferers, the butchers who had the monopoly on sales to foreign ships and the farmers from whom they bought stock. Immediately after the British occupied the Cape, one of its leading merchant officials, J.F. Kirsten, wrote that the consequence of this high price charged to foreigners by the meat monopolists, and the resulting decrease in foreign shipping, was that

the Houses have fallen in price; one half of them are without tenants, and that Class of Inhabitants who were used to subsist on a temporary small Traffick are reduced to mendicity.¹⁹

He was exaggerating, and we will show below that, in contrast to a number of meat traders and stock farmers, for agricultural producers the sales to foreign ships (or, for that matter, to those of the VOC) were not vital. But certainly they formed an important source of income, and a valuable market outlet for the farming community. Moreover, the money the ships and their crews brought into Cape Town, and spent on lodging, food, drink and the minor trade that Kirsten mentioned, may indeed have contributed, through this multiplier effect, to the prosperity of the colony in ways we have been unable to measure.

Exports

The Dutch East India Company did not found the Cape Colony in order to produce a supply of cash crops to be sold on the world market. Its profits derived from the inter-Asian trade and, increasingly, from the sale in Europe of agricultural products which could not be grown in that continent, either in raw form or made up into cotton cloths.²⁰ This complementarity did not exist between the Cape and Europe. Despite regular abortive efforts to promote the growing of cotton and indigo,²¹ the Cape did not produce any goods that could not be acquired in Europe itself, at least not in any

bulk, and the costs of transport would generally price Cape goods out of the market there.

On the other hand, the high cost of transport from the Cape was only applicable when the goods to be shipped exceeded a certain bulk. Whether they were on their outward or their homeward journey, the ships that arrived in Cape Town had consumed a certain proportion of their stores. The space in the holds that these had occupied was therefore available, and could be filled with Cape goods at, effectively, no opportunity cost to the VOC.

Equally, the lack of complementarity in climate between the Cape and Europe was to some extent balanced by a complementarity between the Cape and various parts of Asia. The communities of European descent in India and Indonesia had a clear cultural preference for foodstuffs which were as close as possible to those which they had known in Europe. For this reason, wheat from the Cape was in demand, for instance in Batavia, and wine was also much sought after as a valued substitute for the locally distilled arak. Therefore, as soon as there was a surplus of these commodities at the Cape, a ready export trade to Asia began.


For most of the eighteenth century, data on the export of Cape products are available.²² They give the quantities and destinations of the various products, and, for the period 1754-83, also their price, though this may be a conventional reckoning and is certainly too constant to give any indication of the actual fluctuations on the open market. The data only refer to exports by the Company itself, and even these are not complete. Before 1754 there is no mention of exports to Europe, which is unlikely to have been correct. For instance, Constantia wine was sent regularly, and formed a valuable, if minor article in the VOC's commerce.²³ Only after 1754 did the Cape government have to report its exports to Batavia, and so gave its total exports, whereas previously, in its reports to Amsterdam, it only mentioned those commodities which had been sent to Asian destinations. Also, it is clear that the registered exports of ivory were far below the quantities which must have been produced by the semi-professional elephant hunters who were very important in the colony's expansion into the interior. Edicts were occasionally issued which attempted to forbid the breaking of the VOC's monopoly on this product, the only one whose high value to bulk ratio made smuggling a viable proposition. It is doubtful whether they had any effect and the fact that there are no edicts after 1753 would seem to indicate, not that the practice stopped, but that high Company officials

took their cut.²⁴ Nevertheless, these exceptions are of relatively minor importance to the economy of the colony as a whole, and certainly for the second half of the eighteenth century the information is as good as one has any right to expect.

In the first half of the century, then, registered exports from the Cape consisted almost entirely of grain, especially wheat, which was sent to Batavia and, in lesser quantities, to the other Dutch factories in the East. There is no reason to suppose that, were complete information available, this pattern would be greatly altered. After 1748 wine is also mentioned for the first time, and after 1754 there are recorded the various stock products - salted butter, salt meat, tallow, fat and bacon. There were also small amounts of train oil, mainly derived from seals²⁵ (although no doubt the occasionally stranded whale was boiled down as well), and after 1770 by no means inconsiderable amounts of aloe were sent to Europe. Finally, occasionally small amounts of wax found their way onto the ships. For all that, as Graph II.3 clearly brings out, grain remained by far the largest component of the Cape's exports until the 1780s. Before then, the products of the grain farms, including peas and beans, provided more than half the exports of the colony by value, in all years but four - and those were years with poor harvests and very low total exports. Conversely, in the 1770s, the total value of the Cape's exports was very high, often over two hundred thousand guilders a year, and grains made up just about three-quarters of this total. Despite a decrease in the prices reckoned for agricultural products, these were the years with the highest total exports in the course of the century. By this stage, as will be shown below, a very considerable proportion of the Cape's grain production was exported.

In the 1770s, indeed, the old constraints on the growth of Cape exports were removed. The *Heren XVII* found it profitable to employ a few ships on the direct route between the Netherlands and the Cape. Between 1772 and 1774 no fewer than nine vessels were sent directly to the Cape, apparently largely carrying materials for the construction of the new hospital in Cape Town.²⁶ One of these was maintained at the Cape, for service in the slave trade and in ferrying goods between Table and False Bays.²⁷ One was sent to Batavia and one to Ceylon, but the other six returned to the Netherlands laden with Cape goods. The trade had its early difficulties. Optimistic attempts to send wool to Holland came to nothing, as the Cape farmers had yet to transfer to a breed of sheep with anything like a satisfactory

GRAPH II. 3: MONEY VALUE OF MAJOR EXPORT PRODUCTS, 1749 - 1793
(FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



N.B. The total also includes some other products.

fleece (although a number did have so-called Hollander sheep).²⁸ The hide production of the Cape was only sufficient for the needs of Cape Town and of the passing ships.²⁹ Even the grain exports were not all they might have been. Sales to the French plantations in the Mascareignes, which were in danger of famine, produced a better profit.³⁰ Bad harvests could make any exports at all dangerous.³¹ Timing was also a problem, because the ships had to leave before the wheat had been harvested, in order to avoid gales, and there was a great shortage of storage space at the Cape.³² Nevertheless, the Company officials were glad to see that good profits were made in the Netherlands.³³ This was not so surprising, since the *Heren XVII* had made a careful cost calculation of the possibilities for Cape wheat in the Amsterdam market, compared to its Polish and Zeeland competitors, and had come to the conclusion that, even including shipping costs, grain export from the Cape was a worthwhile undertaking.³⁴

The wine exports, in contrast, remained at a constant relatively low level. Since the European wine market was much more at the mercy of consumer tastes than that for wheat, the establishment of a new wine-growing area in that market was likely to be difficult, particularly as in general Cape wines were held not to compete as regards quality. There are thus no indications that the Directors of the VOC ever made any attempt to push ordinary Cape wine as a commodity for export to Europe, although small quantities were regularly sent. It was different with the wines from the two farms of Constantia, on the east slopes of Table Mountain. Even though the area is not more suitable for viniculture than many other parts of the South-West Cape - modern Constantia wine is good, but not exceptional in South African terms -, in the eighteenth century Constantia wines had an unrivalled reputation. The owners of the farms maintained this carefully, concentrating their production techniques on quality rather than quantity. They were able to do this because they had an assured and lucrative market. In the eighteenth century, for the first time, European wine connoisseurs were recognising the differences, not just between areas, but between individual wine farms.³⁵ Because of its exotic origin and because the VOC marketed it assiduously,³⁶ Constantia wine became desired a commodity around the courts of Europe. Eventually, after a series of hard negotiations with the owners of the farms, the VOC was forced to relinquish its monopoly over the sale of the wine, in return for a guaranteed supply of two-thirds of the annual harvest.³⁷ The chance of acquiring a few barrels of this highly prized commodity was one of the attractions of foreign captains putting

into Cape Town.³⁸ In addition, the owners of the farms conducted direct negotiations with Europe. In 1783 a German traveller wrote as follows:

It seems funny to hear an obscure African farmer talk of the monarchs of Europe as his customers. He sums up each one quite unaffectedly, as they stand in his books. At the moment, the King of Prussia is in greatest favour with him, as he has expressed himself in very complimentary terms with regard³⁹ to the last shipments of wine, and has paid for them most promptly.

While wine exports stayed steady through the century, those of wheat fell off sharply after 1781. The increased size of the local market and a series of bad harvests meant the end of the 1770s export boom. The result was that wine was now the major export product, while aloe and salted butter came to take on an increased importance. But, as regards the economy as a whole, the importance of exports decreased substantially. The relatively short period in which exports were of major importance to one of the sectors of Cape agriculture was over. This state of affairs would not recur until the opening of the British market to Cape wine after 1806.⁴⁰


III. GRAIN-GROWING

After an initial analysis of the market for Cape products on the basis of a description of the internal market, the number of passing ships and the export, it is necessary to investigate the development of the various production sectors. Was there a relationship between the increase of production and the enlargement of the market, and what were the accordances and differences in development between the various sectors (grain, wine and stock-keeping)? Is there a correlation observable between supply and demand, or, in other words, did the Cape farmers react adequately to developments in the market? Was this reaction equivalent for all sectors, or did one or more react more decisively than the others? The growth of production and investment will be analysed on the basis of a number of time-series and graphs, and will be brought into relation with the general course of the conjuncture.

The first sector that will be analysed is that of grain, or rather wheat, production.¹ Our argument is that there was a steady growth in wheat production in response to an increase in demand, so that, with the possible exception of a few years, the phenomenon of overproduction was not one with which the grain farmers had to contend. The first major problem that has to be confronted in this respect is the unreliability of the figures given in the *opgaaf* rolls. It is evident that, for grain, these were far too low. For instance, the relation between the *opgaaf* figures and the export figures in those years when the export was considerable is often ridiculous, even when the possibility for stockpiling by the VOC is taken into account.² This is particularly notable for the years 1773-76 and 1779-80, when grain exports were considerably higher than production as indicated by the official figures. Over the whole period 1769 to 1783, in terms of five-year averages, the quantity exported generally exceeds that said to have been produced, as is clearly brought out by Graph III.1. The reason that the production figures in the VOC period were far too low was that they formed the basis on which the taxes on grain were levied. By making false declarations, the Cape farmers could evade a large proportion of their taxation. Clearly, therefore, the *opgaaf* figures need to be multiplied by some coefficient if any sort of reliable vision of wheat production is to be obtained.

The problem is to find the right correction coefficient, which will cer-

GRAPH III. 1: WHEAT PRODUCTION ACCORDING TO THE OPGAAF FIGURES AND EXPORTS OF GRAIN, 1704-1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



N.B. The exports include some barley and rye, but overwhelmingly consist of wheat.

tainly not necessarily be constant throughout the eighteenth century. To begin at the end, valuable indications can be derived from the figures obtained under British rule, when evasion seems to have been far less, because the British demanded that the returns were made on oath and because the farmers were uncertain of the checks that would actually be made on them. The first two returns after 1795 were in 1798 and 1806.³ In the former year the comparable return was 110,025 *mud* wheat, in the latter 95,599.5 *mud*.⁴ In contrast to the foregoing period, these figures appear to include the grain that was kept by the farmers for their own consumption and for the next year's seed,⁵ with the result that the yield ratios for the early nineteenth century (nearly ten *mud* reaped to one *mud* sown) are far higher than for the years before 1795. Nevertheless, the existing detailed research on the period 1795-1806 describes grain production as stagnating. It is thus evident that the enormous increase in the returns (from 22,936 *mud* in 1795)⁶, as well as in the yield ratios, was not the result of spectacular growth, but rather of a far better registration of agricultural production.

The most reliable method of correcting the *opgaaf* returns before 1795, so that they fall within the same order of magnitude as those after that year, is to assume in the first place that those from the VOC period only referred to a certain proportion of the wheat which was brought to the Cape Town market, and thus excluded the wheat for own consumption and the next year's seed (the so-called "bread and seed corn"). Early in the eighteenth century the *opgaaf* rolls specifically give separate figures for "bread and seed corn" for five years, without the "normal" returns for these years being in any way unusual for the period.⁷ In these years the amount of "bread and seed corn" was never less than about four times the quantity of wheat recorded as having been sown. Therefore, a factor of four, being on the cautious side, was chosen in the following calculations. Assuming that this ratio did not change greatly in the course of the century, then the true level of production ("P") can be discovered by use of the formula $P = E (WR + 4WS)$, whereby "E" is the correction coefficient required to expose the level of evasion, "WR" the amount of wheat recorded in the *opgaaf* as having been reaped (and, it is assumed, the proportion destined for the market), and "WS" that amount recorded as having been sown.⁸ This equation can then be filled in for the last years of VOC rule (1789-93 and 1795) as follows: P can be assumed to be roughly equivalent to the value of the returns of the subsequent years (1798 and 1806), thus in the order of

100,000 *mud*; WS averages over the period 1789-95 c. 3,300 *mud*, WR over the same period c. 20,000 *mud*. Therefore $WR + 4WS = c. 33,000 \text{ mud}$. From this it follows that the correction coefficient "E" must be established, very approximately, at 3. In other words, of a quantity of some 60,000 *mud* destined for the market, the Cape farmers only declared one-third to the tax officials, resulting in an evasion level of two-thirds, at least in the last years of VOC rule.

This estimate can be confirmed in three ways. None of them is in itself watertight (any more than the calculations presented above are), but the degree of mutual support is sufficient for reasonably confident use of the result. The first of these confirmations relates to the yield ratio of wheat reaped to wheat sown, which, according to our argument, must be around $WR/WS + 4$ (including the "bread and seed corn", which did not figure in the usual *opgaaf*). Over the period 1789-93 this ratio would be 9.94, a figure which is practically equivalent to that over the period 1806-24.⁹ The assumption that the farmers kept on their farms approximately four times the amount of wheat that they had sown the previous year would therefore seem justified.

A second confirmation that the evasion estimate is approximately correct can be found in that, for those few years where the relevant information is available, the amount of wheat that was recorded as having been brought to market in Cape Town was indeed in the order of 60,000 *mud*. The returns of the barrier across the road into Cape Town are known for three years, September 1792, 1793 and 1794. In those years 63,332, 69,695 and 58,893 *mud*, respectively, officially entered the market.¹⁰ These would coincide with the *opgaaf* which was taken the following March, thus for 1793 (29,597 *mud*), 1794 (which unfortunately is missing) and 1795 (22,936 *mud*). Even the recorded production figures for the very good years 1793 and 1795 are not higher than between one-third and one-half of the amounts mentioned above. The discrepancy between the *opgaaf* figures and these figures on quantities brought to market is again striking.

Thirdly, in the 1780s, the *dispensier* of the VOC, who was the official responsible for buying in grain for the Company's own use, and who was thus well informed, estimated that a successful harvest would yield approximately 70,000 to 80,000 *mud*.¹¹ As can be seen from comparison with Statistical Appendix 6 (Table 1), this was indeed very approximately three times the *opgaaf* in good years, such as 1788, 1791, 1793 and 1795.

If it is accepted that in the last years of VOC rule it is necessary to work with a correction coefficient of 3, then this does not entail that such a level of evasion obtained throughout the century. From Graph III.1 it is obvious that there was a clear connection between wheat production and export.¹² Virtually throughout the century, the increases and decreases occur at the same time. However, after the 1740s, the two series show different trends. The *opgaaf* stagnates or declines, while the export steadily increases. This led indeed to the absurd fact that recorded production in the 1770s was often lower than the export. The declining trend in the *opgaaf* after the 1740s can therefore not be a reflection of reality; rather it is obvious that evasion increased. In the light of the expanding export, the growth of the internal market and the increase in the number of ships that put into the Cape after 1770, it can be gathered that the true production of wheat in the latter part of the eighteenth century was indeed far higher than that recorded in the *opgaaf*. Production must have been sufficient to meet the increasing demand in the various market sectors, as there are no serious shortages on record between the 1740s and the 1780s. With the fluctuations running more or less parallel to those of the exports, wheat production, in rough conformity with the latter, in reality steadily increased, not only in the first half of the century, but also in the second. Especially after 1770 an evasion estimate of two-thirds seems very realistic.


The problem is then to estimate the evasion level for the first half of the eighteenth century. One method that might be used is the comparison of *opgaaf* figures with the quantities that a particular farm had in its possession at the moment of the death of the owner, since there would then be an inventory made up, which would include the amount of grain in store. This method, used for instance by Du Plessis, does not seem sound, since it must necessarily ignore any grain from the previous harvest that had already been carted to market before the inventory was drawn up, or, alternatively, any grain which had been held on the farm for more than one year.¹³ It would thus seem more sensible to attempt a quantification of the total market. This is in itself a difficult undertaking, since, apart from the export, very few precise figures are available. Nevertheless, there are a number of indications which justify the assumption that the average inhabitant of Cape Town consumed approximately 2.5 *mud* wheat per year, and that somewhere in the order of 40 *mud* was provided to each passing ship. If these assumptions are correct, then the proportion of the wheat market

constituted by the passing ships was relatively small, and decreasing. Until around 1770 it mostly entailed no more than about 3,000 *mud* per annum, and then more or less doubled until in the period 1784-93 it was around 6,000 to 7,000 *mud*. As against this, the importance of the internal market was steadily rising. The consumption by the population of Cape Town increased from 3,000 to 4,000 *mud* at the beginning of the century to around 25,000 *mud* in the last decade of VOC rule. This figure is exclusive of the consumption by the various foreign regiments and other temporary increases of demand.¹⁴

To achieve a rough estimate of evasion for the first part of the century, then, it is first necessary to identify those years when, as a result of bad harvests, the export of grain was impossible, and in which there could therefore have been no question of overproduction. The most reliable years in this respect were 1726, 1727, 1739 and 1740,¹⁵ when wheat production can be assumed to have been roughly equivalent to the consumption on the local market. The consumption of wheat in these years by the population of Cape Town and by the passing ships, calculated on the basis of the assumptions outlined above, can then be compared with the *opgaaf* figures, to give an estimate of the level of evasion. This produces an average consumption - and therefore, it is assumed, average production - 1.3 times the *opgaaf*, which would suggest that the proportion of wheat not declared, about a quarter, was not so very large.¹⁶ Overproduction cannot have disturbed this calculation, but reduced consumption as a result of scarcity and high prices of wheat, or even a subsistence crisis, could have been expected. As far as we know, however, this was not the case. Apart from the importation of some rice in 1727, there is no evidence of shipments of grain to the Cape, in contrast to the situation during the seventeenth century. Apparently, in these years enough wheat was harvested to more or less satisfy the market in Cape Town and that of the passing ships, but not enough to allow exports. From this it can be concluded that our calculation of the consumption is not too far wide of the mark, i.e. evasion at the time did not exceed one-quarter.

The result of a total quantification of consumption is shown in Graph III.2. The three sectors, Cape Town, the passing ships and the export, together give a rough picture of the total market. The variation in the total is largely caused by the variation in the exports, as the other two sectors (which are based on a linear relationship) show far fewer fluctuations,

GRAPH III. 2: WHEAT CONSUMPTION, 1704-1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



especially towards the end of the eighteenth century. The graph shows that the supply of wheat to passing ships was always a small and declining percentage of the total. From 25 to 30% in the 1720s it went down to 10 to 20%, and from the 1750s was usually around 10% of the total. On the other hand, the internal Cape Town market was for most of the century the major source of demand for Cape wheat, so that the grain farmers were largely dependent on it. In general it formed almost half the total demand, as a result of the steady population growth throughout the century. The export, despite its frequent fluctuations and a slight tendency to grow in proportional significance, was generally around 35 to 45% of the total, though in good years considerably more. Nevertheless, the relative shares of the various sectors of demand for wheat appear to have been fairly stable, with the exception of the last ten years of the period. Before then, there were no spectacular qualitative changes in the grain market.

In quantitative terms, in contrast, the market grew considerably during the eighteenth century. The most spectacular growth occurred in the 1770s, as a result of the sharp rise in exports. Over the period 1774-78, which formed a peak in the demand for grain, it reached a level of almost 50,000 *mud*. Thereafter it flattened off somewhat, although the consumption figures for the 1780s must be too low, as the presence of large French garrisons and fleets which stayed longer in port are not included in our calculations. Thus over a period of seventy-five years, from 1704-08 to 1779-83 (the last ten years are less representative in this respect), the demand for Cape wheat increased by a factor of five to six. The export grew most quickly, the demand from passing ships most slowly. The internal market grew at much the same pace as the total consumption and was as such representative of the development of total demand.

Now that an estimate of the level of evasion for the period up to at least the 1740s, and from - probably - the 1770s, has been constructed and a very rough approximation of the total consumption for each half-decade has been made, it would be possible to be somewhat more definite about the real level of production - if only an evasion estimate could be given for the period in between and if it were possible to be certain over which years the estimates that have already been constructed are valid. A comparison of consumption estimates with the *opgaaf* (using five-year averages) shows a clear break in the middle of the century. Before 1748, the ratio between the two is never higher than 1.1. Thereafter it rises steadily, from 1.3 in the half-decade 1749-53 to 2.7 in the years 1774-78. The

average for the period 1774-93 is 2.5. Because the quantification of the consumption is a very rough calculation, these figures cannot be taken as a precise indication of the degree of evasion. On the other hand, they cannot be very far off the truth, and the great increase in the level of *opgaaf* evasion - which more than doubled - is clearly shown.

If the period 1709-48¹⁷ is considered as a single period in this respect, then the *opgaaf* figure can be multiplied by the coefficient 1.3, which produces a series of production figures in the same order of magnitude as the consumption. Similarly, the period 1774-93 can be thought of as a single unit, and the *opgaaf* multiplied by a coefficient of 3. For the intervening years, the most reasonable procedure would seem to be to assume that evasion increased at a gradual, steady pace. This would produce an evasion correction coefficient (rounded off to one decimal place) of 1.6 for the period 1749-53, 1.9 for 1754-58, 2.1 for 1759-63, 2.4 for 1764-68 and 2.7 for 1769-73. The overall result would then be a new production series, which is in the same order of magnitude as the consumption estimates.¹⁸ However, it should be stressed that these coefficients, producing certain levels of evasion, only relate to five-year averages and that the corrected production figures are no more than a rough approximation to reality. Annual fluctuations in the level of evasion will certainly have occurred, but it is not possible to do more than achieve some global idea of the trend of *opgaaf* evasion.

The growth in the level of evasion between the 1740s and the 1770s can be confirmed by an analysis of the number of slaves in relation to the amount of wheat that was sown, according to the *opgaaf*. This has been done for two representative years, 1753 and 1773. For these years the "pure grain farmers", defined as those who possessed no vines and less than 100 cattle and 500 sheep, were selected and the average number of slaves per *mud* of wheat sown calculated. Since these slaves were in all probability exclusively occupied with grain production, with the exception of a certain amount of hiring out during the peak periods of the wine harvest and a converse movement of slaves from wine farms or Cape Town to the grain farms during the wheat harvest, which for these calculations can be ignored, and since the number of Khoisan labourers in the grain areas, especially the Cape district, was still very small, this procedure should produce an indicative result. The amount of wheat sown, rather than reaped, was chosen for analysis, since it is less subject to such external factors as drought, which caused harvest failures. Given an expected increase in productivity

and a rise in the price of slaves over this period, it can be predicted that, if evasion had remained constant, the average number of slaves per *mud* sown would have decreased, or at least remained constant. This was not the case. The number of adult male slaves per *mud* increased from 0.60 in 1753 to 0.65 twenty years later, the number of adult slaves (female as well as male) from 0.69 to 0.78, the total number from 0.76 to 0.88. This would indicate that the *opgaaf* became steadily less trustworthy. In reality the amounts of wheat sown and reaped must have increased at least as fast as the number of slaves, and thus substantially more quickly than recorded in the *opgaaf*. The total number of slaves on the "pure grain farms" increased from an average of 7.9 per farm in 1753 to 10.7 in 1773, the number of adults from 7.2 to 9.4 and the number of adult men from 6.3 to 7.9. These are increases, in percentage terms, of 35.4%, 30.6% and 25.4% respectively. As against this, the total amount of grain sown on these farms only grew by 16.2% over the same period. Once again it is clear that evasion was becoming more and more general.

The question then arises as to why this level of evasion began to increase at the moment when it did, namely in the 1740s. In all probability this can be related to a major crisis in the grain sector during this period. Between 1743 and 1745 there were a number of complaints from the grain farmers about - so they claimed - their precarious financial position.¹⁹ In 1743 the official price for wheat had been lowered from eight to seven guilders per *mud*. The high taxes and costs were a source of annoyance, as were the bad harvests of 1738-40, which had worsened the financial position of these farmers. Many of them had to live in straitened circumstances and go deep into debt. They also complained of the irregular demand for wheat. If there was a good harvest, the farmers could not sell their produce immediately and often had to stockpile it for a long time. These complaints show that at some times there was a situation of overproduction. As a remedy for their difficulties the farmers requested that the old wheat price be reinstated, that the Company buy up the available stocks, that the fee for loan places be reduced and the "mill tax" abolished, and that more possibilities for free trade be created.


Thus the 1740s were marked by growing dissatisfaction among farmers. It is difficult to be certain to what extent the extremely sombre picture painted by the farmers was a true reflection of reality, or to what extent they were exaggerating. However, it is certain that the grain producers considered that they were in bad shape, and that they demanded an

improvement in their economic condition. Considering that the Company followed an economic policy that did not take the interests of the independent free-burgher into account, and thus did not respond to these complaints, the farmers were inclined to evade taxation as much as possible. In this respect the 1740s must have been a turning point. Since their complaints about low profit margins and difficult marketing were not met, the farmers were forced to keep their costs as low as possible, and they realised that the authorities had no check on widespread evasion of taxation. As a result, the proportion of grain harvested on which tax was levied decreased from around three-quarters to about one-third. In the official returns, the period of 1744-48 thus represented a peak in wheat production, which was never again paralleled during the period of Dutch rule.

This construction of the corrected figures for wheat production, which cannot be far removed from the original reality, now allows an analysis of the development of this sector. This is also the case with the investments in wheat, which can be described on the basis of the quantity of seed sown. Furthermore, the relation between these two series gives an indication of the yield ratio, from which some idea of the trend in the productivity of wheat farming can be gained.

Graph III.3. relates to wheat production - or rather that portion of it which was destined for the market - on the basis of the corrected *opgaaf* figures. This graph also shows the distribution between the three grain producing districts. It shows a slight decline in production in the 1710s and 1720s, caused by a large number of bad harvests, especially in Stellenbosch district. From the 1720s to the 1740s, subsequently, there was a steady growth, which resulted in a doubling of wheat production between 1724-28 and 1744-48. This was followed by light fluctuations, that of the late 1760s caused, for instance, by serious harvest failures in the Cape district in 1764-65. However, the 1770s saw a considerable rise in production, to a level above 50,000 *mud*, but this was succeeded by a sharp decline in the 1780s. Between 1782 and 1787 the harvests were generally bad, that of 1786 so disastrous that one million pounds of grain (approximately 5,500 *mud*) had to be imported from the United States.²⁰ Thereafter production returned to its former levels, or rather exceeded them, so that in the period 1789-93 they reached record height, averaging 55,000 to

GRAPH III. 3: WHEAT PRODUCTION ACCORDING TO THE CORRECTED OPGAAF FIGURES, 1709-1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



60,000 *mud* if our calculations are correct.²¹ 1793, indeed, the last year in the period that we have investigated systematically, recorded the highest production until then.²² If the years 1709-13 and 1789-93 can be considered representative for the trend, then an increase by a factor of three to four of wheat production in the eighteenth century can be observed.


The details of this trend were obviously not identical in all districts. The Cape district, which over the century as a whole was responsible for about half the total production, showed very much the same trend as the colony as a whole until the 1760s. In the 1770s and 1780s, however, there was in general stagnation or light decline in its production, though this was followed by a strong recovery after 1787. In the half-decade 1789-93 the Cape district produced a good 35,000 *mud*, nearly two-thirds of the colony's total and an absolute peak for the century, although it is notable that by 1798, when it delivered 32,962 *mud*, it had been far exceeded by Stellenbosch and Drakenstein together, which by then recorded a production of 77,063 *mud*.²³ This is however in accordance with a longer term pattern, in that Drakenstein district in particular reacted far more violently than the Cape to fluctuations in the conjuncture. Thus the farmers further inland must have been more heavily hit by the crisis of the 1740s, as a consequence of which Drakenstein production remained stagnant during the 1750s and 1760s. Thereafter, they reacted very positively to the improved demand in the 1770s, so that in that decade Drakenstein production increased very fast, while that in the Cape stagnated. However, perhaps because the farmers of this district were more dependent on loaned capital, they were again far more severely hit by the harvest failures of the 1780s than were their colleagues in the Cape district, so that at least temporarily the Cape farmers were once again the major producers for the market. It was only after the occupation by the British that the inland farmers could regain their supremacy. Clearly the interior districts were far more vulnerable in the event of sharp fluctuations within the grain sector. This derived from the far higher costs that they had to bear, largely because transport was such a major problem for a bulk good as wheat. It had to be carted to market in expensive waggons which themselves had to be regularly renewed. This was probably also the reason why the farmers of Stellenbosch district in general moved out of grain production to a more single-minded concentration on wine as the century progressed.

This pattern is, naturally enough, repeated in the development of the quantities of wheat sown, according to the corrected *opgaaf* figures, which is shown in Graph III.4. The main difference is that the curve of this graph in general shows fewer fluctuations, since it is far less affected by external factors, essentially deriving from irregularities in the climate, than is that of wheat harvested. The quantity of wheat sown is thus far more an indication and function of the investments that grain farmers were prepared to make, which in themselves derived from the expectations and perspectives of the farmers in respect of the market situation. Human economic decisions obviously lead to results that are less capricious and more related to a long term pattern than those that derive from the forces of nature. In this sense the quantities of wheat sown provide a more reliable indicator of structural trends and conjunctural developments than the amounts harvested. They are a very useful variable for our analysis, as they reflect the vision of the producers themselves on the economic situation.

As Graph III.4 shows, there were, apart from the stagnation in the 1710s and the 1720s, only two troughs in the otherwise continual growth, in the later 1740s and in the 1780s. The former was related to the crisis in the grain sector in these years. However, this decline was relatively small and was most pronounced in Drakenstein. By the 1750s it had given way to a recovery and slow increase. Evidently, those grain farmers who in the 1740s had been uncertain of their future had by the 1750s regained confidence in the market, or at least were prepared again to increase their production in the hope of improving their profits.

It is rather more difficult to discover the precise cause of the second trough, that of the 1780s. It is obviously related in some way to the serious harvest failures of those years. It cannot have been a consequence of lessened demand, since the decline in sales in this decade was related to the crash in exports, itself a result of the absence of surplus wheat within the colony. Rather it was the disappointing results of production that caused the fall in sales. It may have been the case that farmers did not have enough seed left over from the previous harvest to sow in the following season, but such a short-sighted policy cannot have been followed by all of them. Indeed it is notable that, after the meagre years were over, the farmers of the Cape district were able to increase their investments far more quickly than those further inland, who had scarcely recovered from the crash before 1793. Rather it would seem that the harvest failures hit

GRAPH III. 4: QUANTITIES OF WHEAT SOWN ACCORDING TO THE CORRECTED OPGAAF FIGURES, 1709-1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)




the less secure farmers so severely, that for several years they were unable to recover financially to a sufficient extent to allow further investment. Thus, in contrast to the difficulties of the 1740s, which can be characterised as a crisis of profitability and underconsumption, those of the 1780s must be seen as one of underproduction.

It is now necessary to analyse the yield ratio, that is the relation of the amount of wheat harvested to that of wheat sown. This can only be done on the basis of the *opgaaf* figures, so that once again the major assumptions we have made with regard to these need to be made explicit. These are, first, that the degree of evasion for wheat sown and wheat reaped was the same, or, at the least, that the proportional difference between them remained constant. If this was not the case, then it might be expected that the yield ratio would be higher than that actually observed, since there would be less reason to give false returns on wheat sown (which was not taxed) than on wheat harvested (which was). There is however one qualification to this, which is contained in our second major assumption, namely that the "bread and seed corn" was not included in the *opgaaf* of wheat harvested. As we argued above, it is assumed that it was always - being only an approximation - four times the amount of wheat sown. We have included the "bread and seed corn" in our calculations, which entails that the ratios we report are always greater by four than those we observed.

The development of the yield ratio is shown by Graph III.5. This brings out that the result of the harvest, and thus the yield, underwent sharp fluctuations. This "harvest conjuncture" was the consequence of a series of external (climatological and natural) factors that make any farming operation uncertain. These include, for instance, drought, storm-force winds, flooding, diseases, pests and so forth, all of which caused regular harvest failures. On the other hand, running through the short term fluctuations is a structural trend to be discerned. Over the course of the century, the yield on seed at the Cape declined slowly, but inexorably. Taking the colony as a whole, the highest figures are to be found in the years 1709-13 (12.53) and 1714-18 (12.86). Thereafter, five-year averages of the yield were never again above 12, and from 1764-68 were generally below 10. There was also a variation from district to district, with the Cape district being generally the highest.²⁴

The most reasonable explanation for the decline in yields was the steady exhaustion of the soil.²⁵ This meant that the supply side of the production process caused the farmers even greater problems. They had to invest more

GRAPH III. 5: YIELD RATIOS IN WHEAT FARMING, INCLUDING "BREAD AND SEED CORN,"
1704-1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



seed corn in order to achieve a desired production target. Thus in addition to natural disasters and conjunctural difficulties with demand, the farmers were confronted with a structural worsening of their production, so that in time their production costs were driven up. It is difficult to be certain what effect, if any, this may have had on the development of the grain sector, but it is not inconceivable that the sharp decline in the yield ratio over the period 1709-43 contributed to the crisis (and the feeling of crisis) in the 1740s. The slight rise in the following period was only temporary, probably the result of more marginal land not being used, or at least rested, and from the 1760s a further decline in the yield ratio can be seen. This was, however, compensated by the enlargement of demand in this period.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the general level of yields was remarkably high for the period. Even if the least favourable assumptions are made, namely that there was no differential evasion having a downward effect on the yield ratio observed, and that our corrections in relation to "bread and seed corn" are too high or even false, so that the *opgaaf* would give a fairly accurate picture of the yield, then the yields on wheat in the early part of the eighteenth century were at a level scarcely ever attained in Europe until after 1750, and then only in England, Belgium and the Netherlands.²⁶ If our assumptions are correct, then throughout the century the Cape out-produced any major European country. The reason for these remarkable results is clear. It did not lie in the superior technical efficiency of the Cape farmers, whose extensive methods were in this respect far behind north-west Europe, nor in the application of methods of rotation by means, for instance, of the introduction of courses of legumes. Even though considerable quantities of peas and beans were grown at the Cape, they do not seem to have been generally intercropped with wheat. Rather the Cape farmers exploited the fertility of the soil, which, in contrast to Europe, had not been worn out by centuries of agriculture. This they maintained, as we have seen rather ineffectively, by the use of exceedingly long fallow periods. In the eighteenth century it was reported that, when a piece of land had been used for two years, it was left fallow for the following two to three years, moreover, that there was still land which had never yet been put under the plough.²⁷ Forty years later, it was usual for two years of cropping to be followed by five years of fallow.²⁸ It was thus the abundance of land which enabled Cape farmers to achieve very respectable, and possibly extraordinarily good, results.

These various excursions into the technicalities of the statistics of wheat production and consumption are necessary preliminaries for the investigation of the essential problem with which this chapter is concerned, namely the degree to which Cape grain farmers reacted to the demands of the market, or, in other terms, the extent to which the Cape grain sector showed signs of economic growth, or alternatively was purely stagnant and suffering from chronic overproduction. Graphs III.1, III.2 and III.3 demonstrate clearly the very close connection between production and consumption. As is shown in Graph III.1, the agreement between the course of *opgaaf* and export - i.e. their respective fluctuations, not, of course, especially as regards the second half of the century, their trends in absolute terms - is good, except during the last ten years of the period, while that between the total consumption and the corrected *opgaaf* (Graphs III.2 and III.3) is perhaps not immediately obvious, but nevertheless unmistakable. These latter two variables are in the same order of magnitude, and show the same trend. This is of course to be expected, since the production curve was not constructed entirely independently of that of consumption. Rather the factors by which the original *opgaaf* returns were multiplied to produce corrected production figures were chosen in part as a result of estimates we had made of the level of consumption. However, the grounds on which the new production figures were construed are stronger than a simple comparison with consumption estimates alone. They derive from our total analysis, especially as regards the latter years of the eighteenth century. For this reason it is justifiable to speak of a correlation between the two variables. Moreover, for the period 1709-48 a very strong correlation coefficient, based on five-year averages, of 0.89 can be found between consumption and the original *opgaaf*.²⁹ These figures are not contaminated by each other. It is only the increased evasion of the latter part of the century which nullified this correlation thereafter. Nevertheless, the close connection between supply and demand is established.

This connection demonstrates the market orientation of the grain farmers. Although on the one hand the farmers had to respond to market conditions, on the other hand the harvest results determined the amounts that could be brought to market. This was above all the case with the exports, the extent of which was a consequence of the size of the surplus over and above that required for the local market. Against this, it was ultimately their expectations of what they could sell that were decisive for the farmers in setting their production targets. This is shown by the

exceptionally high correlation coefficient of 0.96 - although perhaps not too much should be read into this - between the (corrected) quantities of wheat sown and the consumption, over the whole eighteenth century. Economic growth was made possible by, and was closely related to, both demand and the capital available to the farmers as expressed in the investments that they could make, and these last two factors interacted very strongly.

This was at least the case in the long term. To analyse short term developments of the market and of the conjuncture in general, price data are necessary. However, unfortunately the price series that exist are rather flawed, so that a systematic analysis of prices over the whole eighteenth century, related to other variables, is impossible. Moreover, the information given by Du Plessis and Guelke is not consistent, even though both authors used data from auction lists.³⁰ Nevertheless, the information provided by Du Plessis makes clear that, on the one side, there is a connection, if a weak one, between price levels and production. High prices coincided with low production figures, especially in the years 1726, 1739 and 1749, and conversely low prices and high levels of production occurred together, most clearly in 1745 and 1752. In other years the connection is less obvious, since other factors, above all the development of demand, were also of influence on price formation.

In the longer term, the data presented by Guelke and Du Plessis present the following pattern: until the 1730s grain prices rose slowly in connection with a decline in production, but thereafter, in the late 1730s and 1740s, they remained at best stagnant, and apparently declined, at a time when there were generally good harvests. This is part of the explanation for the crisis of the 1740s. Subsequently, apart from a slight recovery around 1760, which was probably a result of the demand for wheat on the part of French war ships in the course of the Seven Years' War,³¹ prices remained at a low level until about 1770. It is in this period that the serious complaints of overproduction were to be found. In 1758 a near riot developed in Cape Town when farmers wanted to deliver to the Company, whose warehouses were already full.³² This was one of the incidents remembered later by the Patriots as the basis for their complaints as to the nature of the Cape economic system.³³ However, in these decades there were also shortages of grain, as in 1747, 1764 and 1765.³⁴ Only after 1770 did the price of wheat rise sharply, as demand was very favourable, and probably it remained high until the end of the VOC period.

The prices paid by the VOC were generally somewhat above those fetched at auction. At the beginning of the century the VOC price was *f* 8.5 per *mud*, dropping to *f* 8 in 1716 and *f* 7 in 1743. It remained at this level until the 1780s, when the general grain shortages forced it up to *f* 10 (and in 1785 even *f* 12) per *mud*. In the 1790s it would drop back slightly, but still remained above its 1743 level.³⁵ From the fact that the prices derived from auction lists were generally below those paid by the VOC, no false conclusions should be drawn, however. The auctions took place in the countryside, and any merchant who wished to profit from the differential would have to pay the high costs of transport to Cape Town. Indeed, it may be expected that prices would be lower the further farms were from Cape Town. This may explain the discrepancies between the prices given by Guelke and Du Plessis, neither of whom report the location of the auctions from which they took them. Certainly, this differential between auction prices and those paid by the VOC should not be seen as evidence for overproduction. Neither price data, nor the evidence of consumption and production reconstructions, would sustain the argument that overproduction - or, preferably, weak demand - was a serious problem for the Cape grain sector throughout the eighteenth century. For two or three decades before 1770, when prices were relatively low and stagnant, there may be evidence of a slight excess of supply over demand.³⁶ It is in this period that there were a number of complaints by farmers that they could not get rid of their produce, although there were also years in which demand was very strong, and could not be met.

After 1770, such overproduction problems as there may have been disappeared. The increase in demand in the 1770s and a series of harvest failures in the 1780s sent the price of wheat up high. Indeed, the difficulties of the 1780s led to a serious crisis of underproduction, and a threat of famine. Thereafter, in the last years of VOC rule, when production recovered, the slow disintegration of the VOC system in Asia meant that exports remained at a very low level, although it is not certain how far this was caused by an unwillingness on the part of the authorities to export until a sufficient stockpile had been accumulated. By 1795 there were over 36,000 *mud* in the Company's warehouses.³⁷ This may have entailed again a surplus on the supply side, but if so it was quickly absorbed during the First British Occupation.

In conclusion, it is clearly mistaken to characterise the eighteenth century as a period of stagnation for the grain sector. As regards production the *opgaaf* returns for wheat are most misleading, and demand also grew strongly. The internal market, made up by the demand from the inhabitants of Cape Town, formed the most important client in the long run. As a result of the continuous growth of the urban population this formed a stabilisation for total demand. At the same time, the fact that in general more than one third of the marketed grain was exported meant that the grain sector was tied to the world market, both for the distribution of its products, and for the importation of its labour force, as slaves. In both cases, though, this occurred within the limits set by VOC policy, so that the linkage to the world economy was not fully developed. Nevertheless, over and above everything, it is clear that the Cape grain farmers were commercial farmers producing primarily for the market. Despite occasional problems of profitability and demand, they were able to achieve a level of economic growth that was by no means negligible. In this sense, the dangers of overproduction have been much exaggerated, and can in no way be used as a proof of the backwardness of the Cape economy.

IV. WINE-GROWING


The second production sector to be analysed in detail is that of wine growing. In some respects, this analysis produces fewer problems than that of grain, but in others rather more. Nevertheless, the questions that have to be tackled are the same as in the case of grain, namely the development of supply and demand over the course of the century and the presence (or otherwise) of structural overproduction. In general, therefore, the main task is the analysis of the relationship between production and consumption and of the possibilities of economic growth and profits for the wine farmers, as offered by the market. Even more than wheat, wine, which was indeed almost a luxury, was a product destined for the market.

First it is necessary to determine the course of wine production, and of the number of vines (as an indication of investment). Graph IV.1 shows the output in the colony as a whole and in the various districts. It is based on the *opgaaf*, but in this case the figures from this source make a reliable impression, which makes our analysis far simpler.¹ There is not the same discrepancy between figures from before and after 1795 that there was in the case of wheat,² which applies to the figures of both output and vines. This is a consequence of a form of tax collection that, at least after the 1740s, differed markedly from that employed in the grain sector. Until 1743, tax was charged on the basis of the *opgaaf*,³ and therefore a certain degree of evasion is possible until then, although it should be remembered that in the case of grain evasion in this period was apparently far lower than later in the century. Thereafter, the duty was more than doubled, but was levied only at the moment when wine was brought into Cape Town. This came after the protest of wine merchants against a proposal to charge a heavy duty on the sale of wine to foreign ships, but it was also pointed out that the new procedure would reduce evasion. This was because all traffic into the town passed along a single road between the Devil's Peak and the sea, while, on the other hand, there was no reason for farmers to underreport their production.⁴

From Graph IV.1 it can be seen that in the period up to the mid-1740s production (or at least reported production) stagnated, but thereafter there were long periods of growth, interspersed with shorter breaks when production declined or remained steady. The latter occurred notably in the early 1760s and, though to a much lesser extent, again in the 1770s and

GRAPH IV. 1: WINE PRODUCTION ACCORDING TO THE OPGAAF FIGURES, 1704-1793
(FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)

LEGGERS




early 1780s, but a comparison with the number of vines shows that these were primarily the consequence of harvest failures, not of disinvestment.⁵ The top years were reached in 1787 (8,873 *leggers*) and 1788 (7,186 *leggers*). Over the half-century 1739-43 to 1789-93, the annual growth rate was 3.1%, and a fivefold increase of the output took place.

As in the case of the corn-fields, the vineyards were limited to the older districts between the mountains and the sea. Until the early 1740s the Cape district was the major production area - at least if the *opgaaf* is to be trusted fully - but thereafter, as the wine sector expanded, it was surpassed by Drakenstein district and, after around 1760, by Stellenbosch. After 1760, indeed, wine production in the Cape district stagnated and for the rest of the century revolved around an average of 600 *leggers* a year. In the other districts, in contrast, the growth was swift, especially in Drakenstein. At the high point of wine production, the late 1780s, Drakenstein produced over 60% of the output, and its production, together with that of Stellenbosch, increased by a factor of more than seven between 1740 and the end of the century. Whereas the Cape district remained the bread basket of the colony, it was the inland districts which had become its wine barrel.

Given the nature of wine production, it is also necessary to study the course of the figures for the number of vines, since these can be used as an indicator of investments. The curves presented in Graph IV.2 give an indication of the expectations of the wine farmers regarding the market possibilities in the long term. These show, obviously, the same pattern as wine output, with stagnation until the early 1740s and thereafter virtually uninterrupted growth. The major difference is that the contaminating effects of harvest failures are eliminated. The graph clearly shows, then, that in general wine farmers were able to acquire enough capital to make regular investments, and were prepared to do so. This would seem to indicate a general level of prosperity and of commercial optimism, in their economic behaviour if not always in their statements.⁶ Certainly at the end of the century this prosperity was reflected in the building of luxurious farmhouses, especially in the dominant wine districts of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein.⁷

In the long term, moreover, there was a slow rise in the productivity of the vineyards, as measured by the output per vine. The high point is to be found, though, in the 1740s and 1750s, perhaps because this was a long period during which the wine farmers were spared the effects of natural

GRAPH IV. 2: NUMBER OF VINES ACCORDING TO THE OPGAAF FIGURES, 1704-1793
(FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



calamities. However, it is necessary to be exceedingly careful with the concept of productivity when dealing with wine production, since a high output per vine would appear to go together with the making of low quality wine - and indeed the Cape wine generally had a reputation for being execrable.⁸ Thus the relatively low productivity of the Cape district, which is brought out by Table IV.1, may have resulted from the higher qua-

 Table IV.1: Productivity of the vineyards (leggers of wine per 1000 vines)

| | <i>Total colony</i> | <i>Cape district</i> | <i>Stellenbosch</i> | <i>Drakenstein</i> |
|---------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| 1724-33 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.55 | 0.53 |
| 1744-53 | 0.72 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 0.80 |
| 1764-73 | 0.65 | 0.47 | 0.66 | 0.72 |
| 1784-93 | 0.61 | 0.47 | 0.64 | 0.64 |

 lity vineyards, notably Constantia, that were to be found there, rather than from possible economies of scale inland.

A similar pattern can be discerned when productivity is measured in terms of labour. In order to make an estimate of this, we selected those farmers who could be considered exclusively wine producers - defined as those who sowed no grain and owned less than 100 cattle and 500 sheep - for the four years 1739, 1753, 1764 and 1773. Even though these years are relatively close together, they show a considerable rise in the level of production per slave, as can be seen from Table IV.2. The enormous growth that

 Table IV.2: Leggers of wine produced per adult male slave

| | <i>Cape district</i> | <i>Stellenbosch</i> | <i>Drakenstein</i> |
|------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| 1739 | 0.51 | 0.33 | 1.00 |
| 1753 | 0.45 | 1.53 | 2.81 |
| 1764 | 0.76 | 2.89 | 3.20 |
| 1773 | 0.96 | 4.15 | 5.35 |

 is demonstrated in these figures is not completely realistic, since it conceals the effects of the increasing use of Khoisan labour, especially in the inland districts. Nevertheless, it does not seem feasible that during this period the Khoisan were forced to work for the wine farmers in such increasing numbers as to have been responsible for such an enormous growth.

Rather the great expansion in production must have been accompanied by a sharp increase in the productivity of labour. As is shown in Table IV.3, the farms were increasing considerably in size. However, this was not ac-

Table IV.3: Average number of vines in "pure wine farms" (to nearest 1000)


| | <i>Cape district</i> | <i>Stellenbosch</i> | <i>Drakenstein</i> |
|------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| 1739 | 25,000 | 6,000 | 9,000 |
| 1773 | 32,000 | 30,000 | 31,000 |

companied by anything like a commensurate increase in the labour force. It is difficult to believe that the result could have been anything other than a sharpening of the level of exploitation of the slaves, men, women and children.

Whereas in the case of grain the estimation of production was the most problematic part of the analysis, in the case of wine it is for much of the century the consumption for which the data are the most difficult to work with. It is not possible to make even a rough quantification of the various sectors. Wine consumption is different in kind from that of bread, as wine is not a basic foodstuff. As a result consumption is not nearly as regular, and it is not possible to assume any constant, linear relationship between the size of the population, the number of ships in port etc., and the amount of wine drunk in Cape Town.

Luckily, for the second half of the eighteenth century a certain amount of information as to the taxation on wine and even the total quantity of wine marketed is available. From the 1750s on, the amount of tax paid on wine brought into Cape Town is known for a great many years, although the series contains gaps.⁹ Graph IV.3 shows the development of the taxation on wine for those years when the relevant information is available, and clearly brings out a rising trend. For a number of 24 years, in the period 1751-85, we still find a close correlation (a coefficient of 0.81) between the tax paid on wine and the *opgaaf* figures for the previous year. Considering those sixteen years, lying in the period between 1759 and 1785, for which the actual amount of wine brought into the city is recorded, which can be compared with the quantity said to have been produced, then the correlation coefficient is even higher (0.86). Indeed over this period an annual average of 96% of wine production (assuming the *opgaaf* is accurate)

GRAPH IV. 3: TAXATION ON WINE, 1724-1785.



was sent to the Cape market.¹⁰ Since farmers were quite likely to build up stockpiles, a perfect correlation is not to be expected. The close relation between the quantities of wine produced and brought to market is nonetheless clearly brought out by Table IV.4. Obviously, there is no reason to

Table IV.4: Leggers of wine produced and marketed, 1759-85¹¹

| | <i>Produced</i> | <i>Marketed</i> | | <i>Produced</i> | <i>Marketed</i> |
|---------|-----------------|-----------------|---------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1758-59 | 3273 | 3458 | 1774-75 | 2611 | 3006 |
| 1759-60 | 1831 | 1907 | 1775-76 | 5528 | 4054 |
| 1761-62 | 2768 | 2597 | 1777-78 | 2782 | 2453 |
| 1762-63 | 1999 | 2348 | 1779-80 | 5152 | 5239 |
| 1765-66 | 2786 | 2269 | 1780-81 | 5074 | 5416 |
| 1766-67 | 3406 | 2522 | 1781-82 | N.A. | 4754 |
| 1768-69 | 3772 | 2970 | 1782-83 | 2868 | 3309 |
| 1771-72 | 3784 | 3273 | 1784-85 | 4462 | 5033 |

suspect, on the basis of these data, that wine farmers suffered from an overproduction problem.

This supposition is confirmed by evidence of price trends. The data on the price of wine at auction (on the farms) that were collected by Guelke¹² show that there was no long-term decline in prices, as could be expected if the market tended to be saturated. Obviously there were substantial fluctuations from year to year, caused not only by market conditions but also by the fact that, given the inevitably small size of the sample each year, there is undue interference from random factors, such as the quality of the wine a particular farm happened to produce or its distance from the market (and hence transport costs). Nevertheless, the long-term trend is clearly stable, or indeed lightly upwards, despite the great increase in production.

Only for the export sector are detailed sales figures available. No more than a small proportion of the total wine production was exported, and, as the century progressed, this proportion became less. From being between 15 and 22% in the 1750s it had dropped to between 5 and 10% in the last decade of Company rule. Moreover, there is no correlation between wine production and wine exports, in contrast to the case of grain. Presumably the declining proportion of wine that was exported was the result of the increase in

other market sectors, although the VOC did not consider Cape wine worth exporting in large quantities.

There is another, indirect manner of gaining insight into the long-term trends of wine consumption on the internal market, and by the passing ships, namely by analysis of the wine franchises, or *pachten*, which, in contrast to the data on direct taxation, form an uninterrupted series for the whole eighteenth century. Every year, at the end of August, the VOC auctioned the franchise to sell wine, brandy and beer in quantities up to and including a *half-aam*, a barrel containing approximately 72 litres. There were seven franchises auctioned: by far the most lucrative was the right to sell Cape wine in Cape Town, which conveyed the monopoly on retail sales and, indeed, on public drinking houses (or *taps*). There were also rights to sell brandy, Cape beer and European liquor in Cape Town, to sell alcohol in Rondebosch, False Bay and Stellenbosch, and, from the 1750s, the right to sell wine to foreign ships.

Together these franchises contributed a very large proportion of the Company's income. In the last decade of VOC rule the sale of the liquor franchises brought in 38% of the government's income. If to this is added the taxes charged on wine and brandy entering Cape Town, then 49% of the average annual receipts of the VOC in the Cape derived in these years from the traffic in alcoholic beverages.¹³

The sums that rich Kapenaars were prepared to pay to exploit the franchises were presumably dependent on the current level of consumption in the *taps* of Cape Town. Moreover, after 1765, it was forbidden for wine to be brought into Cape Town between 1 February and 31 August, in an attempt to maintain the quality of the wine sold.¹⁴ Therefore, all wine merchants were used to calculating in advance the quantity they would be able to dispose of with some accuracy (though they might suffer unfortunate surprises), and presumably this calculation would have influenced the amount they were prepared to pay for the *pacht*. The higher the price of drink, and the fuller the inns were expected to be, the more had to be paid for the privilege of running them. Therefore, we can consider the price of the franchises as a reflection of the expected profits to be made in the following year, and, since it was not unusual for a single man to hold a franchise for many successive years, presumably these expectations were realised. Some *pachters* became exceedingly wealthy men. For this reason, assuming stable prices for the *pachters* in the long term, both while buying and selling, it can be assumed that the level of the VOC's income deriving from


the sale of the various franchises is a rough indication of the level of wine and brandy consumption in Cape Town.

In Graph IV.4 the course of the total drink franchise and of the most important part franchises - Cape wine, brandy and the sales to foreigners - are given. They show that until the 1760s the *pacht* incomes stagnated, but thereafter grew very fast. Between the years 1759-63 and 1789-93, a four-fold increase took place and the average annual rate of growth was 4.6%. Indeed, the sum paid for the Cape wine franchise grew even faster than this. Until the late 1750s it had been stagnating, or even declining somewhat. Thereafter it increased by an average of 5.5% a year. In the decade from 1774-78 to 1784-88 it tripled, and by 1790, the high point of the century, it had reached *f* 144,900, when a decade earlier it had been only *f* 34,600. After 1790 it again declined, but remained higher than in the 1770s. Similarly, the brandy *pacht* reached its peak in 1790 at *f* 68,100 after a long period of growth, that had begun somewhat earlier than the wine *pacht*. Thus in the forty-five years from 1744-48 to 1789-93, the brandy *pacht* increased tenfold, at an average annual rate of growth of 5.3%.

The third major franchise, that of sales to foreigners, displayed a notable pattern. From the 1750s, when it was begun, up to the late 1770s it grew slowly. In 1779, 1780 and 1781 it then increased very rapidly, as a result of the great expansion of foreign shipping during the fourth Anglo-Dutch War. In 1782 and 1783 it was forbidden to sell wine to foreigners - and the franchise was therefore temporarily discontinued.¹⁵ The direct cause of this was the relatively bad harvest in these years and the desire to avert shortages for the VOC itself. Probably there was also another argument. The sale of wine to foreigners formed a threat to the *pachters* of Cape wine, as the prices in the direct sale were lower. It also made it, probably, more difficult to prevent smuggling. To encourage the sales in Cape Town - probably largely of the *half-aam* barrels - and to discourage direct sales of larger units therefore optimized the Company's income. After 1783, indeed, the sums realised for the franchise to sell to foreigners fell as compared to before 1779, while the Cape wine *pacht* rose sharply.

The *pacht* system evidently gave considerable advantages to the *pachters*, and gave rise to frequent attempts to circumvent their privileges. Thus there were regular complaints from the wine *pachters* that others were infringing their monopoly, either through illegal selling (for which the

GRAPH IV. 4: VOC INCOME FROM PACHT OF SALES OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES.
1704 - 1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



penalty was a fine five times higher than that imposed for killing a slave by excessive punishment) or because the other *pachters* were exceeding the conditions of their licence.¹⁶ At the same time, on occasion wine farmers attacked the high level of monopsony of the wine *pachter*. Thus in 1774 various wine farmers complained that Martin Melck, the long-term franchise holder and himself a considerable wine farmer, refused to buy in wine from other producers, thereby begging them (an exaggeration). The request to the Council of Policy that henceforth no wine farmer should be allowed to hold the franchise was refused, because it would have tended to reduce the amount a potential *pachter* was willing to bid for the privilege.¹⁷ A few years later, another complaint was made against the Company's attempts to fix the prices at which the farmers could sell their wine. This was seen as enabling the *pachters* to make exorbitant profits. The VOC officials had issued the *plakkaat* in question in the hope of protecting foreigners from sharp practices, and thus persuading more to put into the Cape.¹⁸ This was a laudable intention, but thoroughly unnecessary, from the farmer's point of view, in the boom conditions of the early 1780s. The *pacht* was thus open to abuse, but this could never have been excessive, as otherwise other men, content with less abnormal profits, would have been prepared to pay the Company more for the privilege.

For the sixteen years for which the quantities of wine brought to Cape Town are known, it is possible to correlate these amounts with the level of the *pacht* (treated as the total of all the various *pachten*). Such a calculation yields a correlation coefficient of 0.62, which is not particularly high. This means that only a little more than one third ($r^2 = 0.38$) of the variation in the trend of the *pacht* was related to changes in the amount of wine that passed the barrier. The number of ships that put into Cape Town harbour in the year during which the *pacht* was auctioned formed a much more powerful prediction of the size of the *pacht*. For the same sixteen years the correlation between these two variables was 0.76, and if the war years 1780-84 (during which the continual presence of French fleets and the Luxembourg regiment in Cape Town abnormally increased the size of the market) are excluded, then the correlation is increased to 0.81 ($r^2 = 0.66$). In other words, in comparing the impact of factors of supply and demand on the size of the *pacht*, it would seem that some two-thirds of the variation in the level of the *pacht* can be related to the latter, i.e. to the variation in the number of ships in Cape Town harbour. This would seem to indicate that the aspirant lessees determined the size of their bids

largely on the basis of the number of the crews in town, as these formed a large proportion of the taverns' customers.

Over the whole eighteenth century, when correlations are made on the basis of five-year averages, high coefficients can be found between the *pacht* and the number of ships in Cape Town harbour (0.93), with the population of Cape Town as we have reconstructed it (0.87), with production (0.88), and with investments, i.e. the number of vines (0.90). It is not surprising that these variables appear indeed to be strongly linked. They demonstrate very much the same trend, namely stagnation until the middle of the century and thereafter sharp growth. Not too much reliance should therefore be placed on these exact figures. It is rather the coincidence of the trends which is important, since it demonstrates the extent to which the wine farmers were producing for the market and expanding their production to meet its demand. The *pacht* can be seen as reflecting the linkage between production and consumption.

The contrast between the weakness of the short-term correlation between the amount of wine brought to Cape Town and the *pacht*, and the relative strength of the long-term correlation between wine production and the *pacht* does have its meaning, however. What it demonstrates is that, although in the long term the wine farmers were able to respond to the demands of the market, as a rule in the short term this was not possible. If there had been a massive overproduction problem, then farmers would have been able at any time to step up their deliveries to Cape Town in order to supply an expanded market. The *pachters* (and no doubt the farmers) could nevertheless profit from such an increase, presumably by pushing up their prices, which is why there is also a relatively strong relationship between the level of the *pacht* and the best available indicator of the market's buoyancy, the number of ships in harbour. Apparently they could not do so by draining an excess of wine which might otherwise have been thrown away, although at times, of course, there will have been a temporary surplus.

On the other hand, with the exception of a few specialised farms, the farmers were not producing for export. Even though at its height, in the 1750s, exports of wine made up more than 20% of total wine production, there is no noticeable correlation between the two. This would seem to indicate that few farmers were basing their production decisions on the likelihood of being able to export their wines. To a certain extent, in the period before the great expansion of the market in the later decades of the century, the VOC bought in and exported the excess wine that was produced.

In general, though, VOC demand was relatively constant. It therefore constituted a declining proportion of total production. It was thus to the internal market provided by the population of Cape Town, and, perhaps above all, to the crews and pursers of the passing ships, that wine farmers had to look for their market.

As we have seen, the course of wine prices, as recorded at auctions on the farms, was relatively stable over the length of the century. Until the 1740s prices remained rather low. Wine sold at auction made a price well under 27 *Rijksdaalders* per aam. In the short run there were a number of notable fluctuations,¹⁹ which is in itself not surprising, since auction prices did not include the considerable costs of transport to Cape Town. Thereafter, in reaction to various bad harvests and rising demand as a result of the Anglo-French war of 1744-48, prices rose. This was the spur to the sharp growth in production that began in the 1740s. This increase led in its turn to a fall in prices, until the market picked up again with the Seven Years' War at the end of the 1750s. However, this boom too was of short duration, and only towards the end of the 1770s did prices again rise sharply. For subsequent years, data are not available, but it would seem that prices remained high until at least the 1790s.

It is notable that production continued to increase despite the occasional decline in prices. The farmers judged, correctly, that they would be able to sell their wine on what was, in the long term, an expanding market. Moreover, their profits were such that, even when the market was relatively slack, they were able to continue investing. Against this, in periods of growth of the market and high prices, production generally after some time came to outstrip demand, so that prices again fell, while the danger of overproduction was at times not too far away. Nevertheless, it was by no means only the supply side which determined the price. Periods of heavy demand, such as the 1740s (which indeed for the wine sector, dependent as it was on shipping movements, in contrast to the grain sector were no period of crisis at all) and the years around 1760, had an equivalent effect. This is most evident from the 1770s, when the strength of demand kept prices at a high level despite continued increases in production. The result was a period of great prosperity for the wine farmers.

It has been general to describe the eighteenth century Cape economy as one which did not expand and in which overproduction was the greatest

problem. As regards the wine sector, the evidence for such a proposition is either non-existent or highly unconvincing. For instance, Beyers compared the amount of wine bought by the VOC alone (a fraction of the total consumption) with the total production. On the basis of this he is prepared to argue over a massive wine surplus.²⁰ It is thus claimed that in the 1770s the supply outstripped demand, which is definitely false. There may of course have been occasions when this occurred. The *pachters* claimed as much in 1738.²¹ During the periods of sharp growth in the 1750s and the 1780s, similar phenomena may have occurred from time to time, but there are no indications that it was a structural, rather than an incidental, matter.

The strongest evidence for the reasonable market position can be found in the growth of the number of vines during the century, in the rapid increase of the sums paid for the Cape Town drink franchises and in the price levels, which remained stable, or rose slightly, as the century wore on. These are not phenomena consistent with a stagnant, glutted market, or indeed with an economy little concerned with market opportunities. Even if some data on consumption that have been presented here are somewhat speculative, there is no way to avoid the basic conclusion that there were many possibilities for growth within the economy. We have argued that this was the case as regards grain-growing. In the wine-growing sector this was even more so. Wine farmers were more heavily market-oriented than their corn-growing fellows, - to the extent that the two can be separated - and were thus even more able to profit greatly from the possibilities afforded by the market.

V. STOCK-FARMING AND THE MARKET FOR MEAT

The third sector of the Cape economy that has to be analysed is stock-raising. In contrast to grain and wine farms, which were virtually exclusively concentrated in the South-West Cape, ranching extended rapidly into the interior in the course of the eighteenth century. With the expansion of cattle and sheep farmers of European descent to the north and east the stock in their possession increased fast.¹ This was caused not so much by a growth in the number of cattle and sheep owned by the average farmer, but rather by the increase in the number of farmers.² This process of expansion led, moreover, to the dispossession of the Khoikhoi. In the course of the century they very largely lost their flocks and herds and their land, and very many were degraded to labourers on the European farms.³

There has been very considerable debate as to the degree to which the stock farmers of the South African interior were oriented towards the market.⁴ Nevertheless, two points would be generally accepted. First, they were to an important degree self-sufficient - though no-one really knows exactly to what degree. Secondly, they had nonetheless almost continual contact with the market. Certain requirements for their business and certain consumption goods had to be bought, and in theory they also had to pay taxes.⁵ This meant that they had to sell their produce - not only stock, but also some by-products - in order to raise the money they needed. In general they sold their stock to butchers and other cattle merchants who drove them to Cape Town and the South-West. There was thus clearly a marketing operation involved. What is uncertain, however, is the precise importance of the market in the ranching business. Giliomee, for instance, argues that:

There is abundant evidence of farmers owing more cattle than they could market. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, market prices in Cape Town were never high enough for the farmers to sell the majority of their stock at a profit. Secondly the stock farmers, with their meagre consumer needs, had little reason to convert cattle into money. Far from being mainly marketable commodities, livestock were predominantly capital and consumption goods.⁶

While there are obvious problems in Giliomee's formulation - any cattle raiser would only sell the majority of his stock in an effort to avoid bankruptcy, as in so doing he would be destroying his hopes of further income - the essence of this position, which is relatively widely accepted, is clear. It is however one that needs to be tested, not against the


suspect testimony of the stock farmers themselves, but against such statistical evidence as can be brought to bear on the topic.

Questions that need to be answered are: what relation can be found between production, as reflected first of all in the size of the colonial herds and flocks, and the consumption of meat?; what proportion of the herds and flocks was destined for the market?; what was the level of growth of the meat market in the eighteenth century?; can conjunctural variations be discerned in the stock sector?; to what extent is it justified to speak of economic growth in the stock sector?; who profited from such growth as there may have been? These are the questions that will be addressed in this chapter. As in the previous chapters, our general conclusion will be that the degree of both entrepreneurial rationality and market orientation is considerably larger than has generally been admitted.

The first requirement is an analysis of the growth of the colonial herds and flocks. Since the information on this derives from the *opgaaf*, the first question, once again, is related to the reliability of the *opgaaf*. Van der Walt and Guelke both consider that in general only a fifth to a third of the true holdings of a farmer was declared.⁷ Remaining on the cautious side, we will assume that the *opgaaf* figures have to be multiplied by a coefficient of three, in order to achieve an approximation to the true size of the colonial herds and flocks. We are also forced to make the assumption, for certain purposes, that the level of evasion was constant through time and in all districts, even though in fact we can show that this was not always the case. However, finer distinctions are in general beyond our power. We can thus assume that the *opgaaf* figures, though inaccurate as regards actual numbers, do give a reasonable picture of the trends of stock-holding.

Graph V.1 shows the development in the number of sheep, according to the uncorrected *opgaaf* figures.⁸ They demonstrate the steady growth in the total number of sheep in the possession of the colonial farmers during the eighteenth century, although this growth was on occasion interrupted by temporary declines. In the period 1714-28 there was a considerable decrease in the number of sheep. Especially between 1717 and 1722 the *opgaven* were very low. This decline was largely the consequence of disease and drought.⁹ There was a further slight stagnation in the late 1740s and again one in the early 1780s, largely as a result of the depredations of San (and perhaps Xhosa) raiding.¹⁰

GRAPH V. 1: NUMBER OF SHEEP IN POSSESSION OF THE COLONIAL FARMERS ACCORDING TO THE OPGAAF FIGURES, 1704 - 1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



N.B. An evasion estimate of two-thirds would produce figures which are three times as high, but the trend would be the same.


It can also be seen that the growth of the colonial flock began to accelerate after the middle of the century, the major increase occurring in the 1760s and 1770s. Taking the years around 1760 as a caesura, the growth rate over the period 1704-08 to 1759-63 measured 1.8% per annum; that from 1759-63 to 1779-83 2.6% per annum.¹¹ Over the century as a whole, assuming constant evasion, the colonial flock increased by a factor of six, with an annual growth rate of 2.1%.

The development of the number of sheep in each district clearly shows the movement inland, above all towards the east. The size of the flock in the Cape district stagnated until the 1740s and then slowly declined. That in Stellenbosch grew slowly until the 1770s and then fell off sharply. In Drakenstein, the size of the flock grew rapidly from the 1720s on, though there was naturally a decrease after a new district, that of Swellendam, had been carved out of it in 1746.¹² However, Swellendam never became a dominant sheep district. The sheep flock of a reduced Drakenstein grew considerably more vigorously than that of Swellendam, where, indeed, growth was always weak.

When the Graaff-Reinet district was created in 1787, it contained many of the major sheep-rearing areas, so that it became the most important district in this respect. As a consequence the flocks of the reduced districts of Drakenstein and Swellendam became smaller. In the five years 1789-93 Graaff-Reinet contained 56% of the total sheep flock of the colony. Moreover, it is notable that in one year, from 1786 to 1787, the total number of sheep in the colony increased by almost 100,000 (according to the *op-gaaf*). The decline in Drakenstein and Swellendam in that year was in the order of 50,000 sheep, while the new district contained almost 160,000. If the decline in Drakenstein and Swellendam was purely a consequence of the administrative changes, then it would mean that before 1787 at least 110,000 sheep on the Eastern border of the colony (and in reality more, since evasion continued after 1787) had escaped the eye of the magistrates. This figure could be even higher, if the (presumably natural) decline seen in this year in the Cape and Stellenbosch districts was also to be found further inland. This makes the whole problem of evasion (and, as we shall see, as a consequence the degree of market orientation) very tricky.

As is shown in Graph V.2, the course of the other major section of the ranching sector, that concerned with cattle-keeping, was in many ways similar to that of sheep. In the period 1714-23 there was a decline in the colonial herd, though this was less pronounced, and shorter, than in the

GRAPH V. 2: NUMBER OF CATTLE IN POSSESSION OF THE COLONIAL FARMERS ACCORDING TO THE OPGAAF FIGURES, 1704-1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



N. B. With regard to evasion the same applies as in the case of sheep.

sheep case. In addition, there were in the 1740s and in the 1760s periods of stagnation and slight decline. In fact the whole period from around 1740 to around 1770 was one of relative stagnation, or, at best, very slow growth, but thereafter a period of substantial growth began which, in contrast to the case of sheep, was not interrupted in the 1780s. Thus, partially as a consequence of effective settlement in the better watered far east of the colony, the whole period from the 1770s to the end of VOC rule saw a rapid and unbroken growth in the number of cattle.

It is thus possible to identify a caesura around 1770. In the period 1704-08 to 1769-73 there was an average annual growth of 1.8%. In the subsequent decade this averaged 4.9%, and over the twenty years to 1789-93 3.9% (though this latter figure is again rather suspect as a consequence of the administrative changes). It may well be the case that this growth was related to an improved market position, but this still needs to be proved. In any event, during the century as a whole, the number of cattle in colonial ownership increased by over six and a half times, somewhat more than the increase in the number of sheep.

An examination of the district totals shows, once again, a steady shift eastward in the course of the century, though this was less pronounced than in the case of sheep. In the Cape district the number of cattle remained more or less constant throughout the century, and in Stellenbosch there was a slight rise. This need not entail, however, that cattle-raising was more important than sheep-farming in the South-West. Rather, these cattle were no doubt generally the oxen required as draught-animals for the waggons and ploughs of the wheat and wine farms. They were thus not necessarily raised in the Stellenbosch and Cape districts, although there were important cattle farms to the north of Cape Town, in the region of Saldanha Bay.

In Drakenstein, but also in Swellendam district, there was a considerable growth throughout the century. The growth of the Swellendam herd (after the foundation of the district) was less rapid than in Drakenstein, but nevertheless Swellendam was more important as a cattle district than for sheep. With its wetter climate and generally lush grass, it was the main centre for the production of butter and the breeding of trek-oxen. Rich Swellendam farmers were apparently the only ones who were able regularly to market such animals.¹³

Graaff-Reinet, which contained many of the most important cattle-ranching areas, particularly in the Agter Brintjes Hoogte and towards the Zuurveld and the coast, became the most important district for cattle

immediately after its establishment. However, with 42% of the colonial herd in the years 1789-93, it was somewhat less dominant than as regards sheep. This meant that the rise in the *opgaaf* figures between 1786 and 1787 was slightly less pronounced. The number of cattle registered rose by 19,000, 23% of the 1787 total, as opposed to 26% for sheep.

To sum up, in the course of the eighteenth century the number of sheep increased from just over 75,000 to over 450,000, and the number of cattle from around 12,000 to around 82,000. These are at least the figures given by the *opgaaf*. If we assume constant evasion and apply a correction coefficient of three, then in reality the sheep totals would have increased from, say, around 230,000 to around 1,4 million, and the cattle totals, slightly more rapidly, from around 36,000 to around 250,000. If a higher level of evasion is postulated, then of course these figures would be commensurately higher.

In order to test to what extent this growth in the number of cattle and sheep owned by the colonial farmers was a response to improved market opportunities, and what proportion was destined for the market, it is necessary to attempt to quantify the level of consumption of meat and other animal products. It will then be possible to see if, and to what extent, the growth in the herds and flocks was correlated with that of the market.


The consumption of stock products can be divided between meat and other animal products. To begin with the latter, the sale of butter and tallow was of considerable importance for a number of stock farmers. Butter was largely produced in Swellendam district, where an average farmer producing it could make several thousand pounds a year, and also in the immediate neighbourhood of Cape Town, as those farmers who could deliver fresh butter were able to make good prices on the market. The latter received 8 to 16 *stuivers* per pound, while a more distant farmer, who was forced to market salted butter, would only receive 2 to 6 *stuivers* per pound. The result was that butter sales could be so important for some farmers, that they refused to deliver slaughter cattle in years when butter prices were high.¹⁴ Unfortunately it is impossible to provide any quantitative data on the level of butter and tallow production and consumption or their importance for the economy as a whole, except as regards exports, which, as we have seen, were of relatively minor significance. Therefore the further discussion will concentrate on the consumption of meat, which was anyway by far the most important animal product.

The market for meat, on account of the nature of the available material, has to be divided into four sectors: exports, local VOC consumption, consumption by foreign ships, and the internal market. The first, exports, were of marginal importance, as has already been shown. The second sector was the consumption by the VOC. Over the period 1725-76 there are precise figures on the amount of meat that the Company bought in to supply to its ships, to the hospital, to its slaves and to some of its own personnel.¹⁵ In this period, as is shown in Graph V.3, VOC consumption grew very considerably. In the period 1725-28, it was only 230,000 pounds a year; by 1744-48 it had risen to nearly 600,000 pounds and after a slight decline around 1750 and a period of low growth in the 1750s and 1760s it rose to over 850,000 pounds a year by the middle of the 1770s. Over the half-century as a whole, then, the growth rate of VOC consumption was not less than 2.7% per annum, which meant that the total increased by 270%. Moreover, as other figures demonstrate, this growth continued throughout the century. In 1779-80 the consumption was at least 900,000 pounds per year, and a decade later, in the period September 1789 to September 1790, when consumption was at its century-long high, it had reached 1,100,000 pounds.¹⁶

There is one further shortcoming of the material on VOC consumption. The lists on the period 1725-76 only refer to that meat that had been prepared by the butchers. In addition, a number of living sheep were delivered to the ships to be slaughtered in the course of the journey. In both 1779-80 and 1789-90, some 2,500 sheep a year were delivered live to the Company. This represents some 100,000 pounds of meat,¹⁷ or, for 1779-80, one ninth of the total butchered meat. If, for the previous period, this proportion was normal (and we have to assume, for want of better information, that it was), then the quantity of mutton consumed by the VOC needs to be increased by an amount rising from c. 25,000 pounds per annum in the 1720s to c. 95,000 pounds in the 1770s. On the other hand, we have no information on the number of slaughter cattle delivered live to the VOC, but it was in all probability of minor importance.

As regards the third sector, the consumption of meat by foreign ships, there are no long series. There is only a certain amount of sporadic information for the period after 1779, as a result of Wagenaar's researches. Thus in the period 1779-81, the contracted butchers, who had not only the exclusive right to deliver to the VOC but also the monopoly on sales to foreigners, provided 1,080,000 pounds of meat a year, plus a number of living sheep, to these ships.¹⁸ This meant that on average a foreign ship

GRAPH V. 3: QUANTITIES OF MEAT SUPPLIED TO THE VOC, 1725 - 1776
(FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



N.B. Of necessity a four-year average is given for the period 1724-28, a three-year average for the period 1774-78.

loaded 17,000 pounds of meat (excluding the live sheep). Since in precisely this period large French naval fleets put into the Cape, the 1780s saw the high point in sales of meat to foreigners.¹⁹ From 1781 to March 1782 several million pounds of meat were delivered to the foreign ships.²⁰ This naturally meant that the prices charged to foreigners increased rapidly, especially as in this traffic the losses in the deliveries to the VOC itself could be offset. The result of the continual rises, however, was that foreign captains regularly complained about the high prices, and as a consequence the level of sales decreased rapidly. In the year September 1789 to September 1790 only 223,000 pounds were delivered.²¹ This was equivalent to no more than 2,000 pounds per ship. Although it would seem that in this period foreign ships stayed in port in Cape Town for a shorter period and probably had smaller crews than a decade earlier, since there were no longer the great naval fleets, it is nevertheless clear that the quantity of meat foreign ships were prepared to buy had sharply decreased.

The consequence of this is that it would appear to be impossible to calculate the average meat consumption of a non-VOC ship, and thus to consider the sales of meat to foreigners to be a function of the number of foreign ships in Cape Town harbour. The fluctuations in the average sales were far too great for this, and were themselves partially the consequence of the price changes. Nevertheless, a certain pattern is clear. After 1770 the consumption of meat by foreigners increased enormously, reaching its peak in the early 1780s. Thereafter the market shrunk again, but the importance of this explosive growth cannot be denied.

The fourth sector that has to be included in our analysis is the internal market. In this case it is necessary to define this as the consumption by the inhabitants of Cape Town exclusive of part of the local VOC personnel, which is included in the figures on VOC consumption. There are two reasonably trustworthy figures on which a reconstruction of this market around 1790 can be based. First, in the period September 1789 to September 1790, the contracted butchers delivered some 30,700 sheep and 1,100 cattle for the purpose of consumption on the internal market.²² This represents c. 1,620,000 pounds of meat, as compared to the at least 1,423,000 pounds (see above) they sold in the same year to the VOC and to foreigners. The contracted butchers were thus major competitors of the private butchers. Indeed, since we know that in 1791 some 75,000 sheep were sold in Cape Town, of which 15,000 went to the VOC,²³ it can be calculated that by this time the contracted butchers supplied about half the internal market.

Unfortunately it is not known how many cattle were sold in the same year, but it can perhaps be assumed that the contracted butchers achieved the same market share. In that case the total sales of cattle on the internal market would have been around 2,200.

This means that around 1790 the total meat consumption of Cape Town (excluding part of the VOC) must have been of the order of 3,180,000 pounds a year (60,000 sheep and 2,200 cattle). As the non-VOC population of Cape Town was slightly under 10,000, this means that the average Capetonian ate almost one pound of meat a day. This is the same amount as was distributed to the servants and slaves of the VOC, according to the meat lists. It would thus appear that our calculations are not far from the truth, but the data are too scanty to allow a full quantification of the meat market across the whole eighteenth century, both as regards the sales on the local market or to foreigners and as regards the total consumption. In the case of grain this was necessary (and possible), enabling the making of a comparison between the development of consumption and that of production. However, as regards stock this is not feasible, since there is no immediate connection (at least in absolute terms) between the two variables in question - the total size of the colonial herds and flocks and the total amount of meat consumed.

Nevertheless, it is possible to give some rough indication of the dimension of meat consumption. Indeed, it is possible to make two cross-sections, for the periods around 1781-82 and around 1790, when an approximation of the annual total consumption is possible, and to compare these with the number of cattle and sheep in the colony. In the year from May 1781 to April 1782 the contracted butchers slaughtered in total 34,000 sheep and 5,000 cattle. This is equivalent to 2,930,000 pounds of meat.²⁴ This figure relates to the sales to the VOC, to the foreign ships and to a proportion of the internal market. In addition we assumed that some 5,000 living sheep must have been delivered, half to the VOC (see above) and half to foreign ships. This is equivalent to some 200,000 pounds of meat. More important, an estimate must be given of the amount of meat delivered on the internal market by the private butchers. Since it is probable that they had a somewhat larger share of the market than a decade later, while on the other hand the population of Cape Town was at this time about twenty per cent smaller than around 1790, we may assume that their deliveries were roughly equivalent to those of 1790 (half of the size of the market of that year) and thus in the order of 1,600,000 pounds. This would mean that the total

consumption on the market would have been in the order of 4,750,000 pounds of meat. It is further assumed that the *opgaaf* figures for stock need to be multiplied by a factor of three to compensate for underrecording, and if they are then converted into pounds of meat, this would mean that around 1781-82 there were approximately a hundred million pounds of meat "on the hoof" in the colony. This means that in this year at most 5% of the total number of cattle and sheep were delivered to the market to be slaughtered. An evasion correction coefficient of 5 would reduce this figure to around 3%.

For the period around 1790 a similar calculation of the annual meat consumption is possible. In that period the VOC took about 1,200,000 pounds of meat (including 2,500 live sheep), the foreign ships 323,000 pounds (assuming the same number of sheep can be included) and the inhabitants of Cape Town approximately 3,180,000 pounds (see above). In total this meant about 4,700,000 pounds, about the same as around 1781-82. The market may have shrunk somewhat because of the decline in the quantity that foreign ships were prepared to buy against the higher prices. On the other hand, the increase in the population of Cape Town had continued unabated, so that the internal market now accounted for around two-thirds of the total market, even excluding part of the local VOC consumption. As is the case in the grain sector, it is clear that the internal market for meat became ever more important, and by the end of the eighteenth century was responsible for the stabilisation of total demand. However, the total consumption declined as a percentage of the potentially available meat. The latter can be calculated at about 130 million pounds in 1790, so that only a good 3.5% of the stock was sent to market annually (or 2% at the higher evasion estimate).

By then, however, Graaff-Reinet was by far the most important ranching district. In 1791 it was said to provide Cape Town with meat for nine months of the year.²⁵ This was equivalent to about 3,500,000 pounds. If - it is admittedly a big "if" - the level of evasion in Graaff-Reinet was of the same order as that of the colony as a whole, then there were about 60 million pounds of meat "on the hoof" in that district, so that almost 6% of the herds and flocks was sold as slaughter stock every year.

From these calculations the conclusion can be drawn that only a small proportion of the total herds and flocks eventually landed in the Cape meat market. In addition, a number of cattle and sheep were used for the production of articles other than meat, in the first place butter. That

this should not be neglected can be seen from the fact that a shortage of slaughter animals was felt in the 1780s, because, among other reasons, the farmers in the interior were unwilling to sell large numbers of cattle and sheep as a consequence of the high butter and soap prices.²⁶ Moreover, there was a very substantial market for draught-oxen. The grain and wine farmers of the South-West Cape needed regularly to replace their oxen, which were indispensable for their ploughing, while large numbers were also required for transport. These oxen generally did not live longer than two or three years before being worn out. Finally, a number of the cattle and sheep that were destined for the meat market died on the way.²⁷ Thus, taking into account trek-oxen and mortality, in reality the proportion of the herds and flocks that were sold every year must have been considerably higher than the 3.5 to 5% that we have calculated above. The proportion of sheep and cattle that were linked to the market would be even higher, were it possible to estimate the number used in the production of butter, soap and so forth. Exactly what that proportion was cannot be calculated, but it is clearly considerably higher than the figure, presented above, for sales on the Cape Town meat market.

Nevertheless, in the widest sense, it may be possible to give some indication of the proportion of the flocks and herds that was used annually for consumption purposes, in whatever form, including consumption on the farms, which at no point entered the market. Considering that the population of Cape Town was approximately a third of that of the whole colony (excluding the Khoisan) and considering that the country-dwellers were far more carnivorous than those of the city, and may therefore be assumed to have eaten twice as much meat as the latter, this would mean that meat consumption outside Cape Town was no less than four times that of the city.²⁸ Since it can be calculated that around 1790 about 3% of the colony's sheep and cattle were slaughtered for consumption on the internal market (assuming that about half of the VOC consumption should be included in it as well), it follows that consumption on the farms must have been in the order of 12%. If our estimate of the level of underrecording in the opgaaf rolls and the above calculations are approximately correct, this would have meant that some 15% of the sheep and cattle were slaughtered every year for meat. In addition there was the considerable market for draught oxen, as well as those cattle which were kept for the production of butter and other animal products. This would mean that perhaps the double of the above figure, i.e.

a quarter or a third of the stock, was used every year for both direct consumption and various economic purposes.

This rather speculative figure is, once again, of course dependent on the correctness of our estimates of underrecording. Should the level of evasion be higher than we have proposed,²⁹ then this figure would be rather too large. Moreover, *the stock that was purchased or raided from Khoikhoi* or Xhosa are not included in these calculations. As against this, a certain number of sheep and cattle would have been slaughtered for the benefit of the Khoisan in service of the farmers, and without stock of their own, which would provide a correction in the opposite direction. All in all, then, it would seem not unreasonable, although fairly speculative, to put the figure of that part of the live-stock used for annual consumption purposes (both market and non-market) at between a quarter and a third of the total, while the proportion destined or used for the market could easily have been in the order of 10%, at least for the last portion of the eighteenth century, for which we have reasonably reliable information.

Considering that the herds and flocks had to reproduce themselves and that there was a long-term trend towards their expansion, so that a hundred per cent exploitation was in no way feasible, these were by no means small proportions. Although of a rather speculative nature, they would seem to demonstrate not only the considerable extent to which the herds and flocks were used for direct consumption on the farms, but also the undeniable market orientation of many or most of the stock farmers. Moreover, seen against the background of the various factors that limited the potential supply, the actual supply of stock products, meat in particular, to the market cannot have been much smaller than the potential. The existence of a major problem of "overproduction" is unlikely and the market will rather have been in danger of displaying shortages, either as a result of swiftly growing demand or of difficulties on the supply side. The consequence of this would have been a relatively high degree of sensitivity to pure fluctuations.

Even though the total consumption of stock products on the Cape market may have been rather small in terms of the total number of live-stock in the colony, there was nevertheless a large rise during the course of the eighteenth century. This applies to all consumption sectors. The consumption of meat by the VOC quadrupled over the period from the 1720s to the end of the century. The amount consumed on the internal market probably increased in the same proportion as the population. After 1770 sales to

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foreigners increased enormously. Also the export of meat products, which began in the 1750s, shows a rising trend in the second half of the century. It is thus impossible not to conclude that the market for meat and other animal products grew considerably in the course of the century. This was to the advantage, first of the contracted butchers, secondly of the private butchers, who were increasingly competed against by the contractors on the steadily rising internal market, and thirdly of the stock farmers, who, above all in periods during which demand was rising fast, were to benefit by increasing the sale prices of sheep and cattle.

It is also clear that there was a certain relationship between the development of the meat market and the growth of the colonial herds and flocks. Admittedly detailed consumption figures are only available for the meat bought in by the VOC, but as far as we can see these are fairly representative of the growth of the market as a whole. The correlation between the VOC meat consumption and a weighted value for the total stock is high (0.90), but perhaps not too significant as in both curves the trend is strongly upwards.³⁰ It is of interest to note that the meat market reacted to decreases or temporary stagnation in the total flocks and herds, and that this reaction generally only occurred after a certain interval. Thus the slight decrease in the total number of sheep in the late 1740s is mirrored by a decrease in VOC purchases in the early 1750s. Similarly, the stagnation of the total cattle herd began to be apparent from the early 1740s, but it was only at the end of the decade that the VOC purchasers reacted to this development, which probably brought higher prices in its wake. Apart from the fact that shortages and higher prices normally only appeared after some time, the delay derived from the fact that contracts with the butchers were only renewed every five years. Nevertheless, with this reservation, the relation between supply and demand is clear. Indeed, as will be shown below, both sides of the market played their part in determining prices and the conjuncture.

An important factor underlying this relationship is evidently that, as was remarked above, the supply of cattle and sheep was not unlimited. Only a - probably fairly constant - fraction of the total herds and flocks could be sent to market annually. Thus it is possible to see the growth of the total herds and flocks as determining the potential supply of meat. First, as we have seen, a large proportion was destined for consumption on the farms themselves. Secondly, the cattle were used to supply other markets as well, especially those for salted butter and for trek-oxen. Thirdly, a

considerable proportion had to be kept for reproduction. Finally, the farmers were only prepared to sell their beasts for slaughter for a price that they considered reasonable.³¹ The latter factor was of course an economic motive in its own right, and can explain to a large extent why there were occasional complaints of shortages of slaughter cattle and sheep. In general, these complaints referred to artificial shortages, which were caused by measures to reduce the price paid to farmers and which disappeared as soon as the butchers were prepared to pay higher prices.³²

Thus it was not only a question of demand accommodating to developments on the supply side, but certainly also of the supply side actively responding to opportunities - or the absence of these - as provided by the market and purchasers of stock. This pattern of interaction was reflected in, and revolved around, the price fluctuations which will be analysed in more detail below. If there was a certain elasticity on the demand side, there was equally elasticity on the supply side. A minor price rise could produce an increase in supply, although this will in itself have been held within bounds by the limits of the total demand and the consequent danger of price falls, as well as by those inherent limits to supply mentioned above. Contrariwise, to the extent that farmers had alternative income possibilities, in the form of butter or soap sales, for instance, a small decrease in the price offered for sheep and cattle may have led to a considerable decrease in the supply, even though not all farmers will have been able to react in this way.

At this point, it is necessary to analyse the prices of stock and meat. A difficulty arises in that there are a number of distinct series, which do not relate to the same sort of sales, but nevertheless, where they overlap in time, they show sufficient similar trends for them to be used in conjunction. The various series are: first, auction prices for sheep and cattle, that is the sale prices that were made in the interior; secondly, contract prices, that is the price for beef and mutton for which, after a competitive tender, the VOC contracted with a combine of butchers to buy its requirements of meat, generally for a period of five years; thirdly, there are a certain amount of scattered data on the prices for meat sold to Cape Town citizens and to foreigners.

To begin with the auction prices for sheep, these derive from the work of Thom, covering the period 1701-52, of Guelke, for the period 1717-79, and our own compilation from the auction rolls for the period between 1779

and 1790.³³ They show that, after a slow drop in the period 1701-13, there was a sharp rise, so that the century-long high was reached around 1720. Thereafter prices remained rather low for over half a century, with only short peaks around 1747 and in the early 1760s. Only after 1780 was there again a sharp rise. The auction rolls show high points in 1784 (*f* 4.20 per breeding sheep) and in 1788 (*f* 4.05). The butchers claimed in this period that the prices were even higher, around *f* 6 in the period 1786-91, but their complaints may have included exaggerations.³⁴ Nevertheless, it is clear that such prices were not necessarily excessive, since in 1782 and 1786 *plakkaten* were issued which attempted to limit the price of sheep to *f* 3.40 and *f* 4.50 respectively.³⁵ It is probable that part of the discrepancy, at least, derives from the price differentials between such different categories of sheep as wethers and breeding ewes, which, as a result of deficiencies in our data, we are unable to take into account.

As regards cattle auction prices, we possess data gathered by Guelke covering the period 1717-79, and a variety of scattered information from the subsequent decade.³⁶ This shows again that prices from 1717 to the early 1720s were at a relatively high level, but then a long decline set in, only broken by a short peak in the 1730s. As was the case with sheep prices, the absolute low point was reached in the early 1740s. Thereafter prices recovered a certain amount, but remained generally stable from the 1750s through to 1780, fluctuating between 5 and 10 *Rijksdaalders* per ox. Subsequently there was again a sharp rise. Whereas in 1779 a price of 5 Rds. was mentioned, and in 1782 still one of 6 Rds.,³⁷ by 1784 complaints were made that the price of an ox had risen from 8 Rds. to 15, or even 20 Rds.³⁸ By 1789, however, the worst was apparently past, since by then a price of only 8 Rds. was mentioned. It would thus seem that cattle prices generally ran parallel with those of sheep, although, especially in the period 1750-80, the fluctuations were less acute.

It is not difficult to relate some of these developments in the prices made for sheep and cattle to the growth of the colonial flocks and herds. The very high prices in the period 1717 to 1726 were caused by the scarcity of slaughter beasts - itself a result of the epidemics that had broken out in those years.³⁹ The same is at least partially true of the second half of the 1740s, when a small numerical decrease, related to a plague of locusts, pushed the prices up, if not to the heights reached two decades earlier.⁴⁰ Thom, indeed, describes these periods as crisis years.⁴¹ It is obvious, again, that the potential supply of live-stock was not unlimited, as

decreases in the number of sheep and cattle had an immediate effect on prices. It is more difficult to find a direct cause for the brief rise in prices in the 1730s, since the number of sheep and cattle was still steadily rising. It is unlikely that the farmers put fewer animals on the market in an attempt to prevent a further price decrease, but, if this was their tactic, it could not succeed, and, as a result of the continued growth of the number of sheep and cattle, in the early 1740s prices reached their lowest point. Similarly, the price stagnation after 1750 must be seen against a background of continually increasing herds and flocks.

On the other hand, various of the price fluctuations are clearly the result of variations on the demand side. Thus, the price rise of the late 1740s was not only the consequence of locust plagues, but also of the Anglo-French war in Asia, as, particularly in 1744 and 1748, large numbers of English ships put into Table Bay.⁴² Similarly, during the Seven Years' War there was a period of boom, as this time the French fleets were responsible for an increase in the demand for meat and other animal products.⁴³ This boom must have been responsible for the rise in sheep prices at the beginning of the 1760s. Also in the 1770s the increasing number of foreign ships improved the market conditions, although admittedly this cannot be directly seen in higher meat prices. Indeed, it was in the trade with foreigners that the butchers were able to make the highest profits, since they were able to charge higher rates to the foreign pursers.⁴⁴

This became increasingly evident in the 1780s, when sales to foreigners rose enormously. It is true that in the early 1780s there was also a drop in the total number of sheep, but this was relatively slight and occurred after a long period of considerable growth. Moreover, in the later 1780s, when sheep prices were at their peak, the colonial flock was again growing. In addition, cattle numbers were also increasing considerably, but, once again, cattle prices were very high, as is evident for the year 1784. Part of this rise was due to the profits that farmers could make by concentrating on butter production, so that less cattle were offered for sale, but in general the sharp rise in the price of both sheep and cattle can be attributed to the enormous increase in the demand for meat. This demand was quickly felt in the interior. Almost immediately a situation of "relative scarcity" was created, since the farmers demanded continually higher prices and were not prepared to sell below a given (and rising) rate. By 1780 scarcity was threatening and already in 1781 demand had exceeded supply - given a particular price level. It was not until the end of the decade that

prices began to decline again, as a result of decreasing demand and a continuing growth in the number of sheep and cattle available. In addition, after 1789 the butter price declined, so that the competition from this sector became less important.⁴⁵

It was in the interior of the Cape Colony that supply and demand, personified by the stock farmer and the butchers' agent, came into contact. While the farmers were spared trouble and expense as a result, they were nevertheless dependent on the arrival of these travelling buyers, who were naturally inclined to concentrate their purchases with the larger farmers, so that they could complete their activities as quickly as possible. For this reason the sales on the part of the smaller, and more distant, farmers were often uncertain.⁴⁶ However, the negotiations on the farmsteads were themselves determined by the state of the meat market in Cape Town. The butchers' agents were thus required continually to balance the prices, so as to avoid both hold-ups on the part of the producers and complaints and price-fixing (which would undoubtedly lead to a drop in the middle-man's profits) on the part of the consumer.

These difficulties can be illustrated by a number of complaints. Thus, in the years 1716, 1718 and 1723, when stock was scarce, the contracted butchers objected against the low price for meat paid by the VOC,⁴⁷ as they did again in 1747, when the buying price of a sheep had risen to 16 *schellingen*.⁴⁸ Then in the 1780s complaints came thick and fast. Thus in 1782 the private butchers argued that they were suffering losses as a result of the high prices they had to pay for slaughter stock. They therefore requested that the stock farmers be required to sell their sheep for no more than 8 *schellingen* each, or otherwise to be allowed to raise the prices for the Cape burghers. This latter proposal was accepted by the Council of Policy, provided the butchers did not buy for more than 9 *schellingen*.⁴⁹ However, even this arrangement did not last long, as the following year both private and contracted butchers were allowed to increase their prices - though in the latter case only for sales to foreigners, a favour that they had been refused in the previous year.⁵⁰ In the conditions of the 1780s, though, no arrangement could last, and further requests of a similar nature were made in two of the three subsequent years.⁵¹ In 1787, moreover, the contracted butchers, in an attempt to increase their potential markets, asked to be allowed to sell the by-products of their slaughterhouses (hides, fat and so on) to foreign ships.⁵²

It was not only the butchers who might enter complaints if opportunities on the market were bad. There were also regular complaints from the stock farmers that they were not receiving sufficient cash for their sales of stock, butter and soap to be able to cover their expenses and pay the taxes that were levied on the farms they held from the Company (not that they tended to do that anyway).⁵³

Essentially, prices were formed on the market in Cape Town. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse developments here more closely. The only price series for meat which exists for the eighteenth century as a whole is that for the meat *pacht*, or tender, that is those prices which the VOC agreed to pay for the meat delivered to it. In general, this contract ran for five years, although when meat prices were high, as between 1718 and 1720, and in the late 1740s, the agreement was made for a shorter period, as the Company hoped that the price would soon drop. On the other hand, there were occasions, especially in the 1780s, when the prices in other sectors of the meat market rose appreciably during the running time of the agreement, but the contractors were required to deliver at the same relatively low price, so that their profits on sales to the VOC were nominal, or non-existent.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, it is clear that at least until the 1770s the *pacht* price, which showed in general a decreasing trend, ran parallel to that of the price of sheep and cattle at auction. Thereafter, as the local market and the possibilities of sales to foreign ships grew, the privileges that accrued to the contracted butchers were sufficient for them to be prepared to offer low prices to the Company in an effort to acquire them. While this pattern had existed before the 1770s, thereafter it took on extreme forms. Thus in 1779-81 and again in 1789-90 (the only years for which detailed information is available), J.G. van Reenen and his partners, who held the contract, booked considerable losses in their business with the VOC.⁵⁵ They could compensate for this because, like their predecessors, they were granted access to the VOC's grazing grounds in the Groene Kloof, and to the Company's shambles, and because they had the monopoly on sales to foreigners. Thus, while Van Reenen had agreed to charge the VOC 4 *duiten* per lb. meat, the foreigners had to pay at least 2 *stuivers* or 16 *duiten*, and were forbidden from seeking out a competitor who might charge less.⁵⁶ Moreover, the price steadily increased in the course of the decade. In 1783, the Council of Policy gave permission to the contracted butchers to charge foreigners 3 *stuivers* per pound, while the price for a sheep was set at 20 *schellingen* and for a head of cattle at 20 *Rijksdaalders*.⁵⁷ In 1789 the

price was again raised, to four *stuivers* a pound.⁵⁸ It is not surprising that over this period the foreigners were less and less inclined to buy meat at the Cape, and thus the sales declined.

In the 1780s, the Cape burghers, too, had to pay higher prices than the Company. In 1782, the price for a pound of mutton was raised from one *stui-ver* to one and a fifth, and in 1783 the butchers received permission to raise their prices to two *stuivers*.⁵⁹ In the winter of 1786, the meat price for Cape burghers even reached two and two-fifths *stuivers*, temporarily,⁶⁰ but by 1789 it had dropped to between one and a half and two *stuivers*,⁶¹ and by 1791 the private butchers were prepared to sell mutton for one and a half *stuivers* and beef for one and a fifth.⁶² In general, then, meat prices for Cape citizens were higher than those for the VOC, and those for the inhabitants of False Bay even higher,⁶³ though they were lower than those charged to foreigners. Thus, in a sense, the Cape Town citizens too may have profited from the high prices charged to foreigners and from the increase in the sales to them. This was especially so since the private butchers managed to profit by selling to foreigners as well, at below the official prices, although the government and the contracted butchers attempted to put a stop to this breaking of privileges.⁶⁴

Furthermore, there were other possibilities for the butchers to sell at above the going rates. Sales to Dutch warships, or to those Dutch or foreign ships hired by the VOC, were not covered by the *pacht*, and in the 1780s, during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, this led to considerable profits. Equally, when in 1786 the VOC was forced to take extra quantities of meat to supply its ships, because of the shortage of bread, these purchases were also at a higher price than that of the *pacht*.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, these advantages were not enough to end the struggle between the contracted butchers and those who did not hold contracts.⁶⁶ On the contrary, the market share of the contractees seems to have been increasing in the course of the 1780s.

These disturbances do nevertheless not affect the general impression that the prices determined from auction records and, to a lesser extent, from the *pacht* reflect the conjuncture reasonably accurately. For the last part of the century, however, it is more realistic to base the analysis on the prices levied on Cape Town burghers and foreigners, since the *pacht* prices were by this stage highly artificial. Bearing these qualifications in mind, it is possible to identify two major turning points in the course of the century, namely in the 1740s and the 1780s.

While the 1780s have already been discussed at length, the 1740s need some further examination. In the early part of the 1740s, cattle, sheep and meat prices reached their century long low, probably as a result of an excess on the supply side. After 1747, however, the prices rose again. This may have been due in part to the decline in the total number of sheep and cattle in the colony, but this cannot have been of major importance. The declines were relatively small, 6.7% in the case of sheep and 8.9% in that of cattle between 1746 and 1747. Since there must have been a surplus only the year before, a decline of this magnitude can scarcely have led to immediate problems of supply and to sharp price rises. Nevertheless, in the case of both stock and *pacht* prices, notable rises did occur. This was presumably a consequence of the combination of a rise in demand, as the number of foreign customers for Cape meat temporarily increased sharply (see above), and a relatively slight fall in potential supply. It may be that the price drop in the early 1740, moreover, was not just the result of factors specific to the meat sector, but also part of a general depression in the colony's economy at large. We have already seen how the grain sector went through a crisis in this period as well. As Robert Shell has demonstrated, the number of VOC servants who requested permission to leave the Company and set up as burghers and the number of loan farms issued (indicative of pastoral investment) both declined very sharply in the early 1740s, to pick up again after the price rise of 1746.⁶⁷

At this point it is necessary to make some concluding remarks on the question of the market orientation of the stock farmers. It could indeed be argued that, if the expansion of stock-farming was the result of careful economic calculation, then there would be a close correlation between the issue of new loan farms and the state of the market. In good times, for stock farmers, far more men would be prepared to enter the business than in bad. This, then, could be a crucial experiment for the settling of this hotly debated topic. There is a snag, however. In the conditions of the time, a man sought out a favourable piece of land, and probably occupied it for several years, before officially requesting it from the Company. By so doing, he acquired *de facto* security of tenure,⁶⁸ but at the same time became liable for land tax. Therefore, it would only be during good times that a pastoralist would be prepared to accept the extra liabilities of registering a farm in exchange for the benefits, so that this was not a direct reflection of the actual expansion of stock-farming. A direct

relationship between high prices and large numbers of new loan grants is therefore to be expected, but need not be considered as proof of an economically motivated expansion of the colony and the market orientation of the stockfarmers, nor its absence a falsification of that proposition.

A relationship between the two variables can nevertheless be found, at least in global terms, for the period between about 1720 and about 1760.⁶⁹ Thereafter the relationship is not so clear, but the massive expansion of the colony between 1770 and 1786 certainly occurred simultaneously with a great increase in the colony's general prosperity, even if this did not immediately manifest itself in rising meat prices. It did so again, however, in the early 1780s, when, as never before, the enormous expansion of demand was crucial for the sharp rise in prices.

Concluding, then, it is clear that the eighteenth century Cape saw a great expansion both in stock production and in the size of the market. Neither side of the equation was as dynamic as it might have been, perhaps, as certainly neither was free of various structural constraints, but in neither case was the growth negligible. Moreover, the two sides were closely lined. The analyses in this chapter have on occasion been tentative, but the fact that they have been at all possible shows the extent to which Cape stock-farming was not merely a primitive, self-sufficient activity. Rather it was to a considerable degree a market-oriented business able and willing to respond to the possibilities offered by shifts in demand.

VI. IMPORTS

The sale of agrarian produce and urban services to the ships in Cape Town and the direct exports to Europe and the East necessarily brought money into the colony in large quantities, as did the activities of the VOC, which was continually required to export bullion to the Cape to cover the operating costs of its administration there. This money must have found its way out of the colony again, since there is no indication that large hordes of gold and silver built up at the Cape.¹ If anything, the colony tended to be short of circulating medium, as is shown by the necessity for introducing an inconvertible paper currency towards the end of the VOC period.²

This fact then gives rise to other obvious questions, namely those concerning the manner in which this money left the colony. Some of it went as the repatriated fortunes of Company officials. This could be considerable. The executors of Governor Rijk Tulbagh send *f* 105,000 to his heir in the Netherlands in 1771-72,³ while two generations in South Africa as high officials were enough to set the Swellengrebel family up as prosperous members of the Dutch *regenten* class.⁴ But such fortunes were made slowly by comparison with the immense sums that could be accrued in Bengal, for instance⁵, and were relatively few in number. It was generally only the very highest officials who were able to do so, as the others usually remained in the colony, where indeed they had often been born.⁶ Even when the amounts sent to members of the VOC employees' families, either as remittances during the lifetime of the official concerned or as an inheritance after his death, are considered, it seems unlikely that a very large proportion of the money which came into the colony drained away down these channels. Rather it must have been used, to an extent hitherto unrecognised, to pay for the colony's imports.

These imports came through two channels, either through the VOC or via private traders. The amount of information which is available for either stream is limited, but, in the nature of things, it is much more extensive for the Company imports than for the private trade. For the former, for twenty-six years between 1748 and 1776, the accounts of the Company's sales in South Africa have survived. The annual turn-over varied considerably, from a good *f* 39,000 in 1766-67 to almost *f* 152,000 in 1751-52.⁷ There is no clear trend in these figures, although they were obviously high in the late 1740s and early 1750s, and again during the Seven Years' War around 1760. For this reason, it is tempting to see the figures as a reflection of

the changing income levels of the colony, since they are clearly not related to population growth. Nevertheless, there are so many other possible explanations which cannot be controlled for, that such a statement must be treated with considerable reserve.

Two matters are particularly germane. First, the sales were not only to the colonists, but also to the ships in the harbour (though it is unclear whether to both VOC and other ships). With regard to certain commodities, such as masts and anchors, this is clear, and could be allowed for, but for many others - rope, copper, even canvas - there were sufficient potential users in the colony for such a sharp distinction to be impossible. Secondly, since the VOC did not have a monopoly on many of the products sold at Cape Town, a change in the competitive conditions could adversely affect the level of VOC sales. To give one example, around 1750 the VOC was selling some £ 15,000 worth of Javanese sugar a year at the Cape. By the 1770s, this had dropped to almost nothing. It is difficult to believe that this was caused by the inability of the colony's inhabitants to pay for sugar. There may have been difficulties in Javanese supplies, though this seems unlikely as the sugar industry of the Batavian *Ommelanden* had been destroyed after the Chinese revolt of 1740 and recovered only slowly, so that a reversed trend could be predicted.⁸ Rather it would seem that VOC sugar was driven out of the market by the production of the French plantations in the Mascarenes, perhaps in exchange for grain. While the VOC attempted to control coffee imports from the islands, they did not do so as regards sugar. The result was a shift in the Cape's imports from the historically visible to the invisible. Something similar may have been happening to explain the slow decline in the sales of Indian cotton cloths - by far the largest single class of commodity - by the VOC.

For the imports through channels other than those of the VOC, there is only the most fragmentary information. The only quantitative data available are at best suggestive of the lower limits of the value of imported goods. Even the mechanisms of the trade are uncertain. Nevertheless, there seem to have been three main ways for imports to reach the Cape, other than via the VOC. The first was on board of the foreign ships. While there is no indication that such ships were fitted out especially to trade to the Cape (though J.G. van Reenen tried to charter one in 1782),⁹ the ships that put into Table Bay used the opportunity to unload a certain amount of their cargo, if for no other reason than to pay for the provisions they purchased there. The goods they sold probably included Mascarene sugar and Indian

cotton goods, and certainly those slave traders sailing from the African east coast and Madagascar to the Americas unloaded a portion of their cargo in South Africa.¹⁰ Also, undoubtedly, a number of European manufactured goods entered the colony in this way.

The second stream of goods came on the ships of the VOC from the East. Because of Company regulations to maintain its own share of the business, East Indian agricultural products and cotton goods were forbidden on this route, though undoubtedly a certain quantity was smuggled in. The main import to the Cape Colony via this channel, though, were slaves. It was regular for the officers (and indeed the lower ranks) of the Company to bring with them a number of slaves on their voyage back from Batavia to Europe, and to dispose of them at the Cape. Until the last years of the Company's rule, this traffic almost certainly accounted for the majority of the Cape's slave imports. From 1767 onwards, it is true, the importation of Indonesian slaves was officially banned in a series of resolutions, because of a number of potentially rebellious conspiracies, particularly among the Buginese. The evidence, which is admittedly scanty, would however seem to suggest that these regulations were effectively dead letters, and that a regular, if occasionally interrupted, trade in Eastern slaves continued to the end of the century.¹¹

The third channel by which private imports entered the colony was on the VOC shipping from Europe. This was possible because the merchants were able to acquire the rights to the cargo space which was allotted to the crews. Each crew member was allowed to take with him one chest of goods. Some of them undoubtedly were able to use this space to trade on their own account, but many of those who entered the service of the VOC did so because they were destitute. Therefore they did not have the capital to stock even a small chest. But this did not mean that the cargo space went unutilised. Rather the seamen were provided with a chest of goods, but also with a contract to deliver it to a merchant in Cape Town (or presumably Batavia). It would seem that there were in Amsterdam a number of agents specialised in this intermediary commercial function.¹²

In the nature of things, the goods that were imported in this way were normally low bulk, high value articles, in contrast to the VOC's own imports which were often used as ballast on the ships. Mentzel indeed states that such goods as soap and Dutch cheese were often brought in this way to the Cape. Later, in the 1780s, at least one importer concentrated his activities not on luxury and consumption goods, but on agricultural

implements.¹³ In the system that Mentzel describes, in the years around 1740, this trade was still largely in the hands of individual seamen and officers¹⁴, but as time went on, various merchants were able to specialise in this branch of trade. By 1780, two major companies had developed, which between them seem to have dominated a large proportion of the import trade. In both these companies, Cruywagen and Co. and Le Fèbre and Co., a number of officials were represented, since their position gave them an advantageous position in the mechanism of trade.¹⁵ Not unnaturally, they then became the butts of the Patriot movement of the 1780s, as various of the Patriot leaders were themselves engaged in such trade.¹⁶ But of the activities of the private citizens even less is known than of the officials, with one exception. That was, as so often, Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen, who was able to take advantage of the time his father spent in the Netherlands (as a representative of the Cape Patriots) to have no less than f 136,232 worth of goods imported in no more than two years.¹⁷ Clearly, even though there were administrative obstacles to entry into the import business, once these were overcome, it could be a lucrative operation.

Within the context of this work, it would be satisfactory to be able to give some sort of estimate of the monetary value of private imports to the Cape Colony. To the extent that these were paid for by direct or indirect barter, this would seem a hopeless task. There seems to be no way of estimating how much the visiting ships and their crew expended on provisions, or in the lodging houses and wine shops of Cape Town. On the other hand, it is possible to give some indication of the level of money transfers from the Cape Colony to at least the Netherlands, since for these use was made of the offices of the Company.


In general terms there were two ways of making money over from Africa to Europe. The first was to make use of the service of the VOC for sending bills of exchange (*wissels*). The procedure was that the money that was to be transferred was paid into the Company's coffers in Cape Town. The information that this had been done was sent to Amsterdam, so that the creditor could present himself at the Company's offices there (generally just after the major sales of products in the spring of each year) to collect the sum due to him. The advantage that the Company gained from this transaction lay in the fact that the enormous sum of money that they had to ship each year from the Netherlands was thereby considerably reduced, while the VOC could also make use of the money for the considerable period of time between deposition and collection.¹⁸ The system did, of course, require that the

Chambers of the Company in the Netherlands possessed sufficient liquidity to cover the debts so incurred, which was not always the case. Particularly in the 1780s, with the disruptions of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, this caused problems, as the total of VOC bills of exchange, including those from Indonesia and India, was then running at some £ 4,000,000 a year.¹⁹ The restrictions that were placed on the drawing of bills of exchange were irksome to the Cape merchants, and they petitioned for a return to the previous unlimited facilities.²⁰ As can be seen from Graph VI.1, the sums involved were very substantial, rising to an annual average of nearly £ 600,000 in the period 1784-93.²¹

The second method that was widely employed was rather more complicated. It derived from the possibility that the VOC gave its employees of having their salaries paid in the Netherlands, not where they were serving. Initially this was introduced to allow the dependents of the Company servants to enjoy at least some of their husband's, father's or children's income. Increasingly, though, it came to be used to allow Cape merchants to settle their debts in Europe. If the merchant were not himself a Company employee, or if his income did not cover the extent of his debt, then he could approach a VOC servant and agree to pay his salary in Cape Town. The money that was owed by the Company could then be collected by the merchant's correspondent in the Netherlands. As can be seen from Graph VI.1, the sums involved could be large, increasing from over £ 20,000 at the beginning of the century, to over £ 150,000 by the 1780s.²² Moreover, from the few extant lists of the authorisation for this type of payment²³ it is clear that the same Amsterdam individuals and firms handled as large a proportion of this traffic as in the case of the *wissels*.²⁴ They included at least one man, Godlob Silo, who had himself served as an official of the VOC in South Africa before returning to the Netherlands, where he established himself in this line of business in Amsterdam.²⁵

The problem with interpreting the information on both these two forms of payment is the same; there is no easy way of deciding whether the sums that were transferred to the Netherlands were used to settle debts with the suppliers of commodities, or were merely remittances to kin or as preparation for retirement. Nevertheless, since a high proportion of the bills were made by burghers, not by officials,²⁶ and since there were other methods of transferring money to Europe, via the other European companies whose ships put in at the Cape,²⁷ of whose extent nothing is known, it is safe to assume that by the last decades of the eighteenth century the level of

GRAPH VI. 1: WISSEL TRANSFERS TO, AND PAYMENT OF WAGES IN, THE NETHERLANDS, 1704-1793 (FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)



N.B. The data relating to payment of wages (i.e., the category "transfer" in Statistical Appendix 13) are rather incomplete. This affects the reliability of the curve, particularly as regards the periods 1714-18, 1719-23, and 1784-88, when information is available for only one year.

remittances to pay for imports was of the order of half a million guilders, running from a few hundred thousand to over three-quarters of a million. This gives at least an indication of the degree of prosperity achieved by the Cape economy during the eighteenth century.

VII. CONCLUSION

In this work we have presented, and we hope have not unsuccessfully demonstrated, the following three propositions:

- 1) all major sectors of the Cape's agrarian economy, namely the production of wheat and wine and the ranching of sheep and cattle, underwent continual, if relatively gradual, expansion;
- 2) this growth was in response to a steady expansion of the market, both external and, particularly, local, not to some non-economic urge resulting in "overproduction";
- 3) this expansion led to a general increase in wealth in the colony (though we have presented no data on the distribution of wealth).

This interpretation differs considerably from those that have been generally propounded in the historiography. As we pointed out in the introduction, it has been too commonly assumed that the farmers' own complaints on their poverty and on the absence of markets reflected economic reality. As a matter of course, historians should consider such expressions of grievances to be special pleading, and they should therefore subject them, where possible, to independent testing. This we have done, and we consider that in general they cannot be corroborated, as is indeed not surprising when it is realised that they were made sporadically. The Cape farmers, like all entrepreneurs at all times, did not believe that they were operating in the best possible economic climate, and therefore did all they could to improve that climate. But, in the circumstances within which they did have to act, as a body they found reason to expand and opportunity to flourish.

To claim that the agrarian economy as a whole expanded does not, it should be stressed, necessarily imply anything about the degree of success of individual operators within it. It is quite possible, theoretically, that the benefits of this expansion would be concentrated in a relatively small number of hands, and it is certain that the distinctions of wealth between the richest and the poorer farmers were very considerable.¹ Nevertheless, the indications are clear that property holding remained widely spread, and did not result in the development of a small group of very rich men monopolising the production of the colony. In 1814, for instance, although eleven men owned six or more farms, 73% of Cape farms were in the possession of individuals whose only agrarian property they were.²

Throughout this work, we have attempted to make clear the degree of certainty that can reasonably be ascribed to any of our assertions. Nevertheless, even our minimalist positions have considerable ramifications for the history of colonial South Africa, both in the eighteenth century and subsequently. Our argument in favour of a steady, market-based expansion of agrarian production is in itself an important re-interpretation of the economic history of the period, but it has corrolaries which stretch far beyond the purely economic realm.

To a certain extent these have been spelt out elsewhere.³ This is not the place to discuss them in detail. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that a view of the eighteenth century agrarian economy of the Cape which sees it as essentially prosperous and expanding necessarily calls into question a view of contemporary white society as atavistic, not oriented to the market and bound by its own customs. Rather it is much more compatible with a view which sees at least large numbers of Cape farmers as enterprising agrarian capitalists, who were increasingly demanding their place in the government of a colony in which they were the dominant, but not the ruling class. Only in the nineteenth century would this dominance be established and confirmed. It is certainly most plausible to see the agrarian expansion which we have documented in this work as providing the basis for the class structure of the Cape countryside as it was not only in the eighteenth century, but also for a long period thereafter.

Appendix I : The Consumption of Wheat in Cape Town and by the Passing Ships

In 1786-87, it was reported that the Cape Town bakers and households required 30,000 *mud* wheat per year.¹ In 1788, a requirement of 35,000 *mud* is reported.² In this period the permanent population of Cape Town must have been around 10,000 persons, so that a consumption figure of 3 to 3.5 *mud* per head per year would have to be assumed. In fact, the population for whom the bakers had to provide bread was in these years rather greater. It is true that the Company's slaves and, partially, the garrison (who probably received bread both from the Company and from the private bakers) were supplied by the VOC, so that the figure of 10,000 would have to be reduced. Against this, a number of population groups are not included in this figure. These included the personal slaves of Company servants, those Khoikhoi living in Cape Town, the crews of the passing ships and the French garrisons, which in these years were very large. The population figures are thus rather too low than too high, as the bakers would have had to provide bread for the foreign ships (around 100 per year at this period) and the foreign garrisons. From January 1783 to early 1788 the Meuron regiment was stationed at the Cape, while from December 1787 to 1791 there was the Württemberg regiment, which consisted of 2,000 men. It is thus clear that there were several thousand more consumers than are included in the above calculation, so that a figure for wheat consumption per head per year of 2.5 *mud* would seem not unreasonable. We are forced to assume that the possibly abnormal years 1786-88 were in this respect representative for the whole century.

Information from later would seem to suggest that this was so. In 1801, when Cape Town's population, including the British troops and the Navy, numbered between 23,000 and 24,000, the wheat consumption of the town was more than 40,000 *mud*. This was the amount that had been collected with difficulty in previous years, as there was considerable scarcity at that time. A number of other returns suggest that wheat consumption at the time would normally rather be in the order of 50,000 *mud*. In the situation of scarcity of 1801, rationing was introduced, on the basis of 1 lb. wheat (equivalent to 1.5 lb. bread) per day.³ The estimate of 2.5 *mud* per head per year is equivalent to a good 1.2 lb. wheat per day (or 1.8 lb. bread). It would thus appear that our estimate is approximately correct, though perhaps slightly on the high side. It seems nevertheless to be the best basis of making a global quantification of consumption.

This estimate can be supported by certain earlier data deriving from the VOC's own accounting. For the accounting year 1718-19 it is known that the total VOC consumption consisted of 3,898 $\frac{5}{8}$ *mud*. For the following year it was calculated that the lowest possible requirement would be 5,774.5 *mud*. In the years 1719-20 the harvests were meagre, and wheat was only available "mondjes maat".⁴ These figures, then, which give a break-down of the amounts of wheat supplied to the different categories of people for whom the Company was responsible, demonstrate that consumption by the various Company servants and those in the hospital ran at an average of 2.2 *mud* per head per year, while the slaves received 1.9 *mud*. Considering the shortages in these years, and the fact that the garrison was probably supplied by the private bakers as well, our figure of 2.5 *mud* per Capetonian per year under normal conditions seems once again approximately correct.

It is also possible to use these figures to calculate approximately the requirements of the shipping. In 1718-19, each VOC ship took off 22 *mud* for making hard bread. In a normal year it would have been a greater amount. Further, in 1740 5,000 *mud*, in 1747 8,000 and in 1787 12,000 *mud* was bought in by the VOC,⁵ presumably meant for consumption both by the local Company establishment and by the ships. We assume that the consumption by the slaves and the garrison in 1740 - a year with a bad harvest - was 2 *mud* per head, and in the other two years 2.5 *mud*. This is admittedly a very rough estimate, ignoring the distinctions between the various ranks of VOC servants, and between them and the slaves, who also ate rice. Nevertheless, if this holds, then, after subtracting the consumption by the garrison and the slaves, it is easy to calculate that each VOC ship took on average 40 *mud* - rather more in the good years than in the bad. A figure for VOC consumption in 1788 (17,892 *mud*) appears to be an exception to this pattern.⁶ According to our calculations, no more than 13,000 to 14,000 *mud* would have been consumed, again taking into account the garrison, slaves and ships. However, this occurred in a year of a very good harvest, following on the most serious disaster of the century, so that we can assume that the additional 4,000 *mud* was used as stockpiling against further shortfalls.

In general, then, this information would seem to make plausible that the average VOC ship would have taken on c. 40 *mud* wheat at the Cape. This is indeed precisely the quantity loaded by one ship in 1777.⁷ Since there is no information as to the requirements of the foreign ships, we have assumed, for the purposes of a global estimate of consumption, that they bought in as much as the VOC ships.

Appendix II : Note on Sources

When they do not derive from published material, which is mentioned in the footnotes, the great majority of the data used in this work were gathered in the *Algemeen Rijksarchief* (ARA) in The Hague. The main exception to this is a certain amount of ancillary price information which was collected from the so-called *vendu* rolls in the Cape Archives (M.O.O.C. 18/8 - 10/15), and a number of the district break-downs in the *opgaaf* figures for the years between 1773 and 1778, when they are not available in The Hague. For these last we are indebted to Dr. Hans Heese and Dr. Nigel Worden.

Since a full listing of the precise location of all the sources used would entail a superfluous relisting of the detailed inventories held in the ARA, we will restrict ourselves to describing where the specific classes of information are to be found in the annual papers sent from the Cape. The *opgaaf* lists (until 1773) and the meat lists (from 1725 to 1776) can be found easily in the inventory. A long letter, which served as an annual report and was written in March of each year, contains information on the *opgaaf* totals (important after 1773 when the roll was no longer sent to the Netherlands), the strength of the garrison (also to be found in the muster rolls in the *Zeeland Kamer* section of the VOC archive), the wine *pacht* (also to be found in the resolution book on 31 August each year), the meat *pacht*, and on Company finances. It also contains a certain amount on the Company exports, but fuller information on this, including prices, is to be found in a long letter to Batavia written around November each year, which is to be found in the *Uitgaande Brievenboek*. Information on the *wissels* is to be found scattered through the letters to Amsterdam, but is more conveniently collected in the *Algemene Grootboeken* of Batavia, to be found in the *Koloniaal Archief* (K.A.) series, for those years when these survive in a condition in which they can be utilised. These also contain detailed information on the yield of the various taxes. Finally, there are a number of incidental reports, frequently included in the resolution book, which we have found of great value and for which we have given precise references.

NOTES

Chapter I

1. C.W. de Kiewiet, *A History of South Africa; Social and Economic*, (Oxford, 1941), 89.
2. The dynamism that has been recognised is seen to have derived primarily from the African peasant producers. See Colin Bundy, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*, (London, 1979). For further discussions see William Beinart, Peter Delius and Stanley Trapido (eds.), *Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850-1930*, (Johannesburg, 1986), especially the editors' "Introduction", and Robert Ross, "The Origins of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cape Colony", in *ibid.*
3. On these processes, see Richard Elphick, *Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa*, (New Haven and London, 1977), and Leonard T. Guelke, "The Early European Settlement of South Africa", Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1974.
4. A.J.H. van der Walt, *Die Ausdehnung der Kolonie am Kap der Guten Hoffnung (1700-1779): Eine historisch-ökonomische Untersuchung über das Werden und Wesen des Pionierlebens im 18. Jahrhundert*, (Berlin, 1928); P.J. van der Merwe, *Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek (1770-1842)*, (The Hague, 1937); *idem*, *Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie*, (Cape Town, 1938); C. Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte, 1777-1791*, (Johannesburg, 1930).
5. T.R.H. Davenport, "The Consolidation of a New Society: The Cape Colony", in L.M. Thompson and M. Wilson (eds.), *The Oxford History of South Africa*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1969-1971), I, 198.
6. Gerrit Schutte, "Company and Colonists at the Cape", in Richard Elphick and Herman Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1820*, (London, 1979), 204.
7. Herman Giliomee and Richard Elphick, "The Structure of European Domination at the Cape, 1652-1820", in *ibid*, 368.
8. Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, "Introduction" to Marks and Atmore (eds.), *Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa*, (London, 1980), 20-1.
9. This somewhat controversial thesis will be demonstrated in the course of this work.

10. W.K. Hancock, "Trek", *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, X, (1958), 339.
11. S.D. Neumark, *The South African Frontier: Economic Influences*, (Stanford, 1957), 3-5.
12. This has indeed not prevented his work from being on occasion accepted uncritically. See e.g. Susan Newton-King, "The Labour Market of the Cape Colony, 1807-1828", in Marks and Atmore (eds.), *Economy and Society*, 170; and Tony Kirk, "The Cape Economy and the Expropriation of the Kat River Settlement, 1846-1853", in *ibid.*, 226.
13. Leonard Guelke, "Frontier Settlement in Early Dutch South Africa", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, LXVI, (1976), 41; see also his thesis, cited in footnote 3 above, and his "The White Settlers, 1652-1780", in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*.
14. See Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell, "An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in the Cape Colony, 1652-1731", *Journal of Historical Geography*, IX, (1983).
15. For an analysis of this, see Robert Ross, "The Rise of the Cape Gentry", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, IX, 2, (1983).
16. J.A. de Mist, *The Memorandum of J.A. de Mist*, translated and edited by K.M. Jeffreys, (Cape Town, 1920), 175-6.
17. On this question, see Gerrit Schutte, *De Nederlandse Patriotten en de Koloniën: Een onderzoek naar hun denkbeelden en optreden, 1770-1800*, (Groningen, 1974); on De Mist, and the context of his attack on the VOC, see Simon Schama, *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813*, (New York, 1977).
18. The full materials that were investigated are presented in the Statistical Appendices, at the end of this work. See Appendix II for a brief note on the sources we used.

Chapter II

1. VOC 11634.
2. For the full figures on the earning power of the Company employees, see Statistical Appendix 13. Not all the money was paid out in Cape Town. In 1750, indeed, only f 131,000 as against the f 197,880 that was noted in the muster rolls. For the reason behind this anomaly, see chapter VI.
3. See Statistical Appendix 1, Table 1.

4. A.L. Geyer, *Das wirtschaftliche System der niederländischen Ost-Indischen Kompanie am Kap der Guten Hoffnung, 1785-1795*, (München and Berlin, 1923).
5. H.B. Thom (ed.), *Willem Stephanus van Ryneveld se Aanmerkingen over de Verbetering van het Vee aan de Kaap de Goede Hoop*, (Cape Town, 1942), 41.
6. James C. Armstrong, "The Slaves, 1652-1795", in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 85-90.
7. See Statistical Appendix 1, Table 2.
8. Armstrong, "Slaves", 78.
9. Robert Ross, "The Occupations of Slaves in Eighteenth Century Cape Town", *Studies in the History of Cape Town*, II, (1979).
10. *Ibid.*, 14.
11. See Statistical Appendix 3 for our reconstruction of both the total and the urban population. Statistical Appendix 2 contains the original *opgaaf* figures as to the number of burghers (including the Free Blacks), the latter's slaves and the *knechten*.
12. H.C.V. Leibbrandt, *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Requesten (Memorials), 1715-1806*, 2 vols. (Cape Town and London, 1905), II, 776.
13. J. Barrow, *An Account of Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1801-3), II, 340, gives a number of 1,145 houses.
14. The most recent discussion of this is Gerrit Schutte, "Company and Colonists at the Cape", in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 192-6.
15. J.R. Bruijn, "De personeelsbehoefte van de VOC overzee en aan boord, gezien in Aziatisch en Nederlands perspectief", *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, XCI, (1976), 22.
16. See for the figures on which this graph is based Statistical Appendix 4. They are derived from Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 333-5.
17. *Gouverneur & Raden* (G. & R.) to *Heren XVII*, 31.1.1789, VOC 4331, f. 335.
18. Gerard Wagenaar, "Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen; sy aandeel in die Kaapse geskiedenis tot 1806", M.A. thesis, Pretoria, 1976, 81-3.
19. C.F.J. Muller, *Johannes Frederik Kirsten oor die toestand van die Kaapkolonie in 1795*, (Pretoria, 1960), 57.
20. On the VOC's financial situation, see J.P. de Korte, *De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording in de Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, (Leiden, 1984); and J.J. Steur, *Herstel of ondergang: de voorstellen*

- tot redres van de VOC*, (Utrecht, 1984). A forthcoming volume of *Inter-continenta*, by J.J. Steur, will contain an account of the annual imports of the Company into Europe.
21. Resolutions of the Council of Policy (RCP), 20.7.1756, VOC 4202, f. 353. In this resolution references are given to reports on previous failures, in letters to the *Heren XVII* of 22.5.1720, 28.4.1727 and 25.2.1728.
 22. See Statistical Appendix 5.
 23. See below, ch. IV.
 24. See e.g. O.F. Mentzel, *Life at the Cape in the mid-Eighteenth Century; being the Biography of Rudolf Siegfried Alleman*, edited by M. Greenlees and K.M. Jeffreys (Cape Town, 1920), 95; Anders Sparrman, *A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope*, edited by V.S. Forbes, translated by J. & I. Rudner, 2 vols. (Cape Town, 1975-6), I, 294-303; K.M. Jeffreys (ed.), *Kaapse Plakkaatboek*, 6 vols. (Cape Town, 1944-1951), II, 214 (9.2.-1745), 244 (20.3.1753); RCP, 6.11.1755, VOC 4199. For a description of an elephant hunting trip to the Xhosa, see CA C 354, f. 313.
 25. The seals were shot largely on Dassen Island, to the north of Table Bay. See e.g. O.F. Mentzel, *A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope*, translated by G.V. Marais and J. Hoge, edited by H.J. Mandelbrote, 3 vols. (Cape Town, 1923, 1924, 1944), I, 179, II, 138; Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, II, 603; H.C.V. Leibbrandt, *Letters Despatched; Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope, 1695-1708*, (Cape Town, 1896), 39; RCP, 4.2.1755, VOC 4199; Daghregister, 21.1.1775, VOC 4281; G.McC. Theal (ed.), *Belangrijke Historische Dokumenten verzameld in de Kaap Kolonie en Elders*, 3 vols. (Cape Town, 1896-1911), III, 34, 58, 84; RCP, 8.1.1788, VOC 4335. At the end of the century British and American whalers came to Saldanha Bay - see RCP, 24.2.1792, VOC 4357. Not all the oil was exported, as much was needed for lubrication for the waggons and ploughs of the colony - see CA BRD 12, 209.
 26. VOC 4277, f. 361.
 27. On the necessity of this, see RCP, 4.9.1756, VOC 4202, f. 374.
 28. G. & R. to *Heren XVII*, 6.7.1773, VOC 4268.
 29. RCP, 15.5.1773, VOC 4269. Nevertheless, when Cape private merchants were allowed to send ships to Europe on their own account, they shipped considerable quantities of hides. Information from Mw. E. van Eyck van Heslinga.

30. RCP, 8.12.1772, VOC 4269.
31. G. & R. to *Heren XVII*, 27.4.1772, VOC 4270.
32. G. & R. to *Gouverneur-Generaal*, Batavia, 29.5.1775, VOC 4281.
33. RCP, 20.4.1773, VOC 4274.
34. See the costing made in J. van Ghesel, "Plan om den handel van tarwe van de Caab bij aanhoudendheid te kunnen drijven", published in *Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht*, XXVIII, (1872), 203-5.
35. F. Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle, Tome I. Les structures du quotidien: le possible et l'impossible*, (Paris, 1979), 201.
36. On the marketing of the VOC, see Woodruff Smith, "The European-Asian Trade of the Seventeenth Century and the Modernization of Commercial Capitalism", *Itinerario*, VI, 2, (1982), 68-90.
37. G.J. Jooste, "Die geskiedenis van wijnbou en wijnhandel in die Kaapkolonie, 1753-1795", M.A. thesis, Stellenbosch, 1973, 143.
38. See above, ftn. 17.
39. Cited in Mentzel, *Description*, II, 111-2.
40. On this, see D.J. van Zyl, *Kaapse Wyn en Brandewyn, 1795-1860*, (Cape Town and Pretoria, 1975).

Chapter III

1. In addition to wheat, barley and rye were grown, but their importance was small and even declining, so that this chapter will be limited to wheat production. However, in Statistical Appendix 6 the *opgaaf* returns for all branches of agricultural production (both grains and wine) are given.
2. Compare the *opgaaf* figures in Statistical Appendix 6, Table 1, with the export figures in Statistical Appendix 5, Table 2. See also below, ftn. 12.
3. For these figures, see D.J. van Zyl, "Die geskiedenis van die graanbou aan die Kaap, 1795-1826", *AYB*, XXXI, (1968), 1, 273, and H.B. Giliomee, *Die Kaap tydens die Eerste Britse Bewind, 1795-1803*, (Cape Town and Pretoria, 1975), 186-7, 189, 191; for 1806, see also *RCC*, VI, 76. Van Zyl notes that the production figures from 1798 "cannot be considered to be absolutely trustworthy, since the farmers kept their returns as low as possible to evade the taxes" (178). In other words, there was

still evasion during the British period, but this cannot have been as considerable as under the VOC.

4. The full total for the whole Cape in 1798 was 138,028 *mud*, and that for 1806 137,993 *mud*. In order to make a comparison with the VOC period, however, we have ignored wheat production in Swellendam, Graaff-Reinet and (in 1806) Uitenhage districts, since before 1795 the inhabitants of these districts did not have to return their production of grain in the *opgaaf*. A *mud* is a measure of volume approximately equivalent to a hectolitre, containing c. 180 lb. wheat.
5. This is not explicitly mentioned by either Van Zyl or Giliomee, but is *inter alia* demonstrated by the fact that the amount of wheat brought to the market in Cape Town in the years after 1795 (for which data do exist) was always considerably less than the *opgaaf* figures. In 1798, for instance, it amounted to only 43,715 *mud*, as against an *opgaaf* of 138,028.
6. In fact, the figure that is given for 1795 (for which year the original returns for the Cape district have not survived) is 32,936 *mud*. However, the total return for the Cape district (22,780 *mud*) is far too high, given the amount of wheat sown (1,813 *mud*), which would give a yield ratio far in excess of that in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein districts, as well as that in previous years. The most reasonable explanation for this discrepancy is a copying error, so that the true *opgaaf* for the Cape district would be 12,780 instead of 22,780 *mud* and the *opgaaf* for the whole colony 22,936 *mud*. Alternatively, the amount sown in the Cape district would be erroneous, being 2,813 instead of 1,813 *mud*, so that the figure for the total amount sown would have to be 4,336 instead of 3,336, while the total amount reaped would still be 32,936 *mud*. The latter possibility, however, makes no great difference for our further argument and calculations. See for the extant *opgaaf* figures for 1795 RCC, I, 296-7.
7. These years, with the respective ratios of "bread and seed corn" to quantities sown, were 1709: 4.39; 1710: 7.39; 1711: 5.21; 1713: 5.18; 1715: 3.97.
8. We are assuming that WS has to be increased by the same factor as WR, as otherwise the degree of evasion would have become obvious as a result of improbable yield ratios.
9. The average yield ratio for twelve years in the period 1806-24 is 9.6; calculated from Van Zyl, "Graanbou", 174.

10. Giliomee, *Eerste Britse Bewind*, 158; Van Zyl, "Graanbou", 178, 273. The figures for the quantities of wheat brought to market after 1795 are somewhat lower.
11. Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 141; VOC 4331, f. 473: Report by W.F. van Oudtshoorn. It may be assumed that this figure relates to the quantity that could be brought to market, as this is what the *dispensier* had obviously a clear notion of.
12. The export figures include rye and barley as well as wheat. However, since the vast majority of the exported grains were wheat, this distinction has practically no effect on the correlation between exports and the *opgaaf*.
13. A.J. du Plessis, *Die geskiedenis van die graankultuur tydens die eerste eeu*, Annale van die Universiteit van Stellenbosch, B. 11 (1933).
14. See Appendix I for a justification of our assumptions. See Statistical Appendix 7, Table 1, for the figures we constructed on the consumption of wheat in the different market sectors.
15. There are a number of other years, in which there is no mention of exports in the Outgoing Letterbook or in the Resolutions, but for which the *opgaaf* was not particularly low. It is possible that in these years - 1735, 1736 and 1738 - wheat was exported but that no record was kept of it. In the year 1711, no wheat was exported, and the *opgaaf* was relatively low, but there is no mention of anything like a harvest failure; in 1712, it was said that export was not possible, but no reason for this was given and the harvest was not bad. For these years, then, it is not quite clear what the problem was, and therefore they have been excluded from our calculation.
16. For the years 1719-21, when exports were at a minimum, our calculation of the consumption figure would even suggest that it was more or less equivalent to the *opgaaf*.
17. The period 1704-08 is left out, because the Van der Stel affair seriously affects the accuracy of the *opgaaf* figures for these years.
18. See Statistical Appendix 7, Table 2.
19. These can be found in the Cape Archives, BRD 12, 196-210.
20. VOC 4315, f. 576.
21. Once again it should be stressed that this only relates to that proportion of the harvest that was brought to market. If the "bread and seed corn" is included, production is then almost 100,000 *mud*.

22. The *opgaaf* for 1741 is fractionally higher than that of 1793, but a very different correction factor has to be applied.
23. This of course assumes that the level of evasion was more or less the same in all districts. It might be that a differing efficiency of the local administration meant that this was not the case. The sharp change in the proportionate production of the Cape and Drakenstein/Stellenbosch might seem to suggest this, although we have seen that variation between the districts occurred more than once, and argued that the same general mechanism was at work. Nevertheless, should the difference in production levels be the result of differential evasion, then our arguments as to the fortunes of the different districts are irrelevant. This would however not affect our discussion of the development of the colony's total production.
24. Again, this might suggest that evasion was highest in the other districts, since it can be argued that a low yield ratio could partially be the result of a high degree of evasion. However, the difference between the Cape district and Drakenstein declined in the latter part of the century, when evasion was clearly increasing, suggesting that other factors, natural or in terms of agricultural technique, were responsible. See for the yield ratios for five-yearly periods Statistical Appendix 7, Table 3.
25. RCP, 9.2.1787, VOC 4328, f. 80.
26. B.H. Slicher van Bath, "De oogstopbrengsten van verschillende gewassen, voornamelijk granen, in verhouding tot het zaaizaad, ca. 810-1820", in: *Bijdragen tot de agrarische geschiedenis*, (Utrecht, 1976).
27. Gerrit Schutte (ed.), *Briefwisseling van Hendrik Swellengrebel Jr. oor Kaapse Sake, 1778-1792*, (Cape Town, 1982), 230-33.
28. Evidence of A.J. Louw, 12.1.1827, RCC, XXXIV, 315.
29. The correlation between export and *opgaaf* is more problematical to work with, as the size of the former was very much dependent on that of the latter. Incidentally, all our correlation coefficients are based on the linear relationship "r".
30. Du Plessis, *Graankultuur*, 78; Guelke, "Early European Settlement", 264.
31. RCP, 16.12.1760, VOC 4222; 10.3.1761, VOC 4225.
32. RCP, 27.2.1758, VOC 4212, f. 447.
33. Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 33-4.
34. RCP, 9.5.1747, VOC 4170, f. 329; 29.5.1764, VOC 4239, f. 536; 22.1.-1765, VOC 4239, f. 598.

35. Du Plessis, *Graankultuur*, 80; J.H.D. Schreuder, "Die geskiedenis van ons graanbou, 1752-1795", M.A. thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1948, 92.
36. This, it will be remembered, is the period for which we are most uncertain as to the precise level of evasion. For this reason, the production figures for these decades are the most speculative. It might be thought that the growth of wheat production over this period, as shown in Graph III.3, would suggest that overproduction was never a serious problem, but such a conclusion would stretch the evidence too far.
37. Van Zyl, "Graanbou", 179.

Chapter IV

1. For the reasons explained below, we are therefore not in agreement with Guelke ("Early European Settlement", 259) where he claims that wine, like grain, was underrecorded by about 50%. This can only strengthen the argument which we made in the last chapter that it is impossible to calculate the level of evasion from a comparison of *opgaaf* and inventories, at least in the two cases where the *opgaaf* records produce (grain and wine), rather than capital (such as stock).
2. See Van Zyl, *Wyn en Brandewyn*, 10-11.
3. This can be seen from the perfect correspondence in this period between the wine tax and the *opgaaf* of the previous year, at *f* 3 per *legger* wine. See for figures on the wine tax Statistical Appendix 8, Table 1. See also below, ftn. 9.
4. RCP, 22.2.1743, VOC 4153, f. 483-7. Between 1750 and 1770, the duty was generally to be calculated (which is possible when the quantity of wine is given) at *f* 7.20 per *legger*, thereafter at *f* 6.60.
5. See Statistical Appendix 6 for the annual *opgaaf* figures on the quantity of wine produced and the number of vines.
6. See for instance RCP, 12.11.1765, VOC 4242, where numerous farmers requested that the government forbid the transport of wine to Cape Town too soon after the harvest, as this practice was driving down the reputation and thus the price of all Cape wine. See also below, ftn. 14.
7. Ross, "Cape Gentry", 205-6.
8. E.g. Mentzel, *Description*, III, 30, 59; H.B. Thom (ed.), *Willem Stepha-nus van Rijneveld*, 39.

9. See Statistical Appendix 8, Table 1, which gives both figures on taxation and, for a certain number of years, on quantities of wine brought to Cape Town. The latter are reproduced in Table IV.4.
10. In the 1790s, this proportion fell to between 60% and 80%, to judge from the two years (1793 and 1795) for which information is available. See Van Zyl, *Wyn en Brandewyn*, 104-5; Giliomee, *Eerste Britse Bewind*, 158, 190.
11. The production figures refer to the *opgaaf* return of the first year mentioned, the consumption figures to the period from September to September of each year. All figures are rounded off.
12. Guelke, "Early European Settlement", 264.
13. Jooste, "Wynbou en wynhandel", 58. See Statistical Appendix 8, Table 2, for the figures on the *pacht*.
14. *Kaapse Plakkaatboek*, III, 61; Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, II, 779.
15. Kathleen M. Jeffreys (ed.), *Kaapse Archiefstukken lopende over het Jaar 1782*, (Cape Town, 1931), 234; *idem*, *Kaapse Archiefstukken lopende over het Jaar 1783*, (Cape Town, 1933), 164.
16. *Kaapse Plakkaatboek*, II, 110-11, 176-8, 236-7; III, 21-2, 60-62; IV, 14-5, 61-2. Cf. Robert Ross, "The Rule of Law at the Cape of Good Hope during the Eighteenth Century", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, IX, (1980), 7-8.
17. RCP, 6.12.1774, VOC 4278.
18. *Kaapse Plakkaatboek*, III, 122; Cape Archives, Leibbrandt's *afschriften*, Vol. 61, 31-2.
19. Guelke, "Early European Settlement", 264.
20. See Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 137-8. This information is repeated in Giliomee, *Eerste Britse Bewind*, 189.
21. RCP, 25.9.1738, VOC 4137, f. 180.

Chapter V

1. The best descriptions of this process are still Van der Walt, *Ausdehnung* (1928), and Van der Merwe, *Trekboer* (1938), together with Guelke, "Early European Settlement" (1974).
2. In 1739, for instance, the average number of sheep reported by those farmers throughout the colony who had any was 398, in 1773, 333. Given the possibility of increased evasion, these figures should be treated with caution, but, apart from the question of the level of inequality

between farmers, they do not suggest an increase in the average stock-holding.

3. For this process, see Richard Elphick, "The Khoisan to c. 1770", in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 21-30; Shula Marks, "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", *JAH*, XIII, (1972), 70-80; and Susan Newton-King, "Background to the Khoikhoi Rebellion of 1799-1803", *SSA*, X, (1981).
4. For a review of this debate, see Robert Ross, "Capitalism, Expansion and Incorporation on the South African Frontier", in Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared*, (New Haven and London, 1981), 212-22.
5. A high proportion of the debts of frontier farmers were for the non-payment of land taxes. This is revealed by the probate records in the Cape Archives.
6. Hermann Giliomee, "The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812", in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 294.
7. Van der Walt, *Ausdehnung*, 77; Guelke, "Early European Settlement", 259. Although these figures are based on a comparison of *opgaaf* and inventories, the problems that this causes in the case of grain do not apply.
8. See for these Statistical Appendix 9, which gives the available data on sheep, cattle, horses and pigs.
9. Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*, 233.
10. Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, ch. II.
11. The rate of increase from 1759-63 to 1789-93 was 2.9% per annum, but this figure is less reliable, because the period straddles the foundation of Graaff-Reinet district in 1787, which has considerable consequences for the number of sheep recorded. Incidentally, the comparison of periods of a different length has of course its draw-backs.
12. Convenient maps of the eighteenth century districts are to be found in J.S. Bergh and J.S. Visagie, *The Eastern Cape Frontier Zone 1660-1980: A Cartographic Guide for Historical Research*, (Durban, 1985).
13. Neumark, *South African Frontier*, 58.
14. Sparrman, *Voyage*, I, 233-4; Susan Newton-King, "Some notes on the political economy of Graaff-Reinet in the late eighteenth century", unpublished paper (1981), 9.
15. See Statistical Appendix 10, Table 1. VOC consumption thus included part of the internal market as well.

16. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 44, 81. These figures seem to have been representative for the period, although annual fluctuations were maintained. Thus over the period May 1789 to May 1792 the Company bought in 2,743,349 lb. meat, and 8,112 living sheep, but over 1792-93, in contrast, the total annual consumption had dropped to c. 68,000 lb. meat and c. 2,200 sheep. See *ibid.*, 81, and VOC 4356, f. 346.
17. In the 1780s a sheep was considered to provide 42 lb. meat and 6 lb. fat; slaughter cattle on average provided 300 lb. meat each. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 45.
18. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 50.
19. For the circumstances surrounding the presence of these fleets, see G.McC. Theal, *History of South Africa*, 11 vols. (London, 1892-1919), II, 182-3.
20. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 65.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, 84.
23. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 219.
24. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 65.
25. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 219.
26. Newton-King, "Political economy of Graaff-Reinet"; cf. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 70-71; Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 270.
27. See for instance H. Lichtenstein, *Travels in Southern Africa in the Years 1803 and 1806*, 2 vols., translated by A. Plumtre, (Cape Town, 1928-30), I, 446; Van der Merwe, *Trekboer*, 61, 126-34; RCC, XXIX, 428.
28. By this we mean, of course, the consumption of meat from the herds and flocks in the possession of the farmers. In addition, much game was consumed.
29. As noted above, Guelke has estimated it at between two-thirds and four-fifths.
30. The method used was again to convert the total number of sheep and cattle into "pounds of meat" at the rate given above (ftn. 17). It is notable that the correlation between VOC consumption of mutton and the number of sheep in the colony is far higher (0.97) than that between the consumption of beef and the number of cattle (0.67). The reason for this is evidently the fact that there were many other uses for cattle beside slaughter. On the other hand, not too much should be read into even strikingly high correlations, since in all cases the trend was steadily upwards.

31. Jeffreys (ed.), *Kaapse Archiefstukken, 1782*, 191.
32. *Ibid.*, 9-10.
33. H.B. Thom, *Die Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerdery in Suid-Afrika*, (Amsterdam, 1936), 50; Guelke, "Early European Settlement", 264.
34. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 130-32, 155, 188; Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 46, 80, 89, 112.
35. *Kaapse Plakkaatboek*, II, 136-7; Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 130-32, 155.
36. Guelke's data ("Early European Settlement", 264) relate to trek-oxen, the other information, largely culled from Leibbrandt and Wagenaar, to slaughter cattle. Even though the level will have been different in the two cases, it is unlikely that the trend of the price developments will have differed greatly.
37. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 46.
38. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 144.
39. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 80; Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 188.
40. *Kaapse Plakkaatboek*, II, 223.
41. Thom, *Skaapboerdery*, 50.
42. Theal, *History*, II, 60.
43. Theal, *History*, II, 88-9.
44. See G. & R. to *Heren XVII*, 10.10.1775, VOC 4281, in which it is mentioned that the number of foreign ships visiting the Cape had forced down the price the Company paid for meat, because the butchers could make such profits by selling to foreigners.
45. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 46, 57-8.
46. *Ibid.*, 91.
47. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 43, 47, 54.
48. *Ibid.*, 78. The value of the different money units were as follows: 1 *Rijksdaalder* was equivalent to 2.4 guilders (*f*), 8 *schellingen*, or 48 *stuivers*; 1 guilder was equivalent to 20 *stuivers*; 1 *schelling* was equivalent to 6 *stuivers*; 1 *stuiver* was equivalent to 8 *duiten*.
49. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 130-32.
50. *Ibid.*, 137-9; Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 69-71, 74.
51. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 144, 155, 167-8.
52. *Ibid.*, 175-6.
53. Van der Walt, *Ausdehnung*, 87-90; CA GR 1/1, Notulen Heemraden 1.11.-1790; on the *recognitiegeld* for their farms, see *Kaapse Plakkaatboek*, II, 229, 231-2; III, 53, 142, 171, 178.

54. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 42. See for the VOC contract prices Statistical Appendix 10, Table 2.
55. Ibid., 48, 93. See also the letter of Governor Van Plettenberg, cited in ftn. 44 above.
56. Ibid., 52.
57. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 137-8; Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 74.
58. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 80, 92.
59. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 130, 138-9.
60. Ibid., 168.
61. Ibid., 188, 190; Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 80, 92.
62. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 216.
63. Ibid., 179.
64. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 53-4.
65. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 179.
66. Ibid., 188-9; Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 54, 86.
67. Robert Shell, "European Immigration to the Cape Colony: The Forgotten Factor in Frontier Settlement and European Expansion, 1701-1793", Unpublished Seminar Paper, Yale 1979, 19-20.
68. A short description of this can be found in L.C. Duly, *British Land Policy at the Cape, 1795-1844: A Study of Administrative Procedures in the Empire*, (Durham N.C., 1968); see also Van der Merwe, *Trekboer*, 63-132. For the lack of relation between land-holding and land registration, see H.A. Reyburn, "Studies in Cape Frontier History, I: Land, Labour, and Law", *The Critic*, (1935), 42; and Leonard Guelke, "Land Tenure and Land Settlement at the Cape, 1652-1812", unpublished paper, Cape Town, 1982.
69. For loan farm grants, see Guelke, "Frontier Settlement", 40.

Chapter VI

1. If they had done, this would have become apparent in the inventories *post mortem* held in the Cape Archives.
2. H.L.G. Swart, "Developments in currency and banking at the Cape between 1782 and 1825, with an account of contemporary controversies", Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1953.
3. VOC 4265, f. 290 and 409, and VOC 4268, f. 131.
4. Schutte (ed.), *Briefwisseling van Hendrik Swellengrebel*, 26-7.

5. F. Lequin, *Het personeel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in de achttiende eeuw, meer in het bijzonder in de vestiging Bengalen*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1982), I, 156-7.
6. Schutte, "Company and Colonists", in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 187.
7. See Statistical Appendix 11.
8. Leonard Blussé, "Batavia: The Rise and Fall of a Chinese Colonial Town", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, XII, (1981), 176-8.
9. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 135.
10. N.A. Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa*, (Cambridge, 1985), 41-8. In 1782, Governor van Plettenberg commented that the French "remove much money from this country" through their slave trade. *Missive van Bewindhebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie, geschreven den 13 October 1785, met copie van alle de stukken, brieven, resolutiën etc. relatief tot het werk van de Caab* (better known as the *Kaapse stukken*), 4 vols., (The Hague, 1785), III, 37.
11. Worden, *Slavery*, 43-5.
12. These individuals can be traced from a number of printed contracts (with blanks where the specific details of each shipment were to be filled in), which can be found in the collections of estate papers in the Cape Archives, Orphan Chamber series (MOOC).
13. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 130-39.
14. Mentzel, *Description*, II, 77-9.
15. Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 157.
16. Notably, as in so many aspects of the Cape economy at this time, the Van Reenen family.
17. Wagenaar, "Van Reenen", 138.
18. On the problems of the VOC's finances, see F.S. Gaastra, "De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw: de groei van een bedrijf; Geld tegen goederen. Een structurele verandering in het Nederlands-Aziatisch handelsverkeer", *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, XCI, (1976), 249-72.
19. *Ibid.*, 259.
20. Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, I, 293.
21. See also Statistical Appendix 12.
22. These figures were calculated by comparing the nominal wage bill of the Company's establishment at the Cape, as recorded in the muster rolls,

- with the amount that was actually disbursed there, which was recorded in the annual accounts. See Statistical Appendix 13.
23. Most of these disappeared during the large-scale destruction of the archives of the VOC, notably those concerning the Dutch end of the organization, during the course of the nineteenth century. The hundreds of meters which survived, though immense and most valuable, are but a shadow of the original glory. Apparently only one such list was kept in Cape Town.
 24. One of these lists was published in K.M. Jeffreys (ed.), *Kaapse Archiefstukken lopende over het Jaar 1780*, (Cape Town, 1928), 279-300. Four others are to be found in VOC 4245, 4249, 4257 and 4273.
 25. The individual in question, Godlob Silo, was skipper of *De Drie Heuvelen*. He was at the Cape in 1753-54, during which time he made a slaving trip to Madagascar, and again, for a few weeks, in 1755, before setting up as a merchant in Amsterdam. See J.R. Bruijn, F.S. Gaastra and I. Schöffner, *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries*, 3 vols. (The Hague, 1979-1986), II, 541, and III, 415.
 26. The degree of burgher involvement in the bill of exchange system fluctuated. In three sample years, it varied as follows: 1749: 62%; 1769: 32%; 1789: 41%.
 27. Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 44.

Chapter VII

1. Guelke and Shell, "Early Colonial Landed Gentry".
2. Duly, *British Land Policy*, 16.
3. Ross, "Cape Gentry" and "Origins of Capitalist Agriculture".

Appendix I

1. Report by T.C. Ronnekamp, RCP, 8.1.1787, VOC 4328, 11 ff.
2. Report by W.F. van Oudtshoorn, VOC 4331, f. 473.
3. RCC, IV, 158-9.
4. G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Deel VI, 1720-1723*, (Johannesburg, 1968), 13-4.
5. A.J. Boëseken, "Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse en die 18e eeuwse samelewing aan die Kaap", AYB, (1944), 158, 161, ftn. 70; Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 141.

6. Report by W.F. van Oudtshoorn, VOC 4331, f. 473.
7. J.S. Stavorinus, *Reizen van Zeeland over de Kaap de Goede Hoop...1768-1791*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1793), II, 81.

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Appendix 1, Table 1
Company Establishment (1701 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Number</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Number</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Number</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1701 | 531 | 1732 | 1016 | 1763 | 1340 |
| 1702 | 586 | 1733 | 877 | 1764 | 1616 |
| 1703 | N.A. | 1734 | 1112 | 1765 | 1489 |
| 1704 | N.A. | 1735 | 1070 | 1766 | 1689 |
| 1705 | 542 | 1736 | 1035 | 1767 | 1554 |
| 1706 | 531 | 1737 | 909 | 1768 | 1579 |
| 1707 | 527 | 1738 | 1062 | 1769 | 1695 |
| 1708 | 513 | 1739 | 981 | 1770 | 1704 |
| 1709 | 621 | 1740 | 1141 | 1771 | 1800 |
| 1710 | 640 | 1741 | 1170 | 1772 | 1963 |
| 1711 | 732 | 1742 | 1163 | 1773 | 2165 |
| 1712 | 632 | 1743 | 1050 | 1774 | 2151 |
| 1713 | 591 | 1744 | 1089 | 1775 | 2019 |
| 1714 | 654 | 1745 | 1204 | 1776 | 1981 |
| 1715 | 714 | 1746 | 1195 | 1777 | 1790 |
| 1716 | 711 | 1747 | 1318 | 1778 | 1614 |
| 1717 | 744 | 1748 | 1353 | 1779 | 1656 |
| 1718 | 756 | 1749 | 1067 | 1780 | 1687 |
| 1719 | 736 | 1750 | 1331 | 1781 | 1794 |
| 1720 | 800 | 1751 | 1334 | 1782 | 2177 |
| 1721 | 794 | 1752 | 1563 | 1783 | 1918 |
| 1722 | 831 | 1753 | 1439 | 1784 | 1904 |
| 1723 | 814 | 1754 | 1503 | 1785 | 2155 |
| 1724 | 829 | 1755 | 1492 | 1786 | 2316 |
| 1725 | 731 | 1756 | 1255 | 1787 | 2913 |
| 1726 | 787 | 1757 | 1465 | 1788 | 3245 |
| 1727 | 981 | 1758 | 1458 | 1789 | 3392 |
| 1728 | 941 | 1759 | 1375 | 1790 | 3209 |
| 1729 | 863 | 1760 | 1354 | 1791 | 2890 |
| 1730 | 920 | 1761 | 1386 | 1792 | 2168 |
| 1731 | 1000 | 1762 | 1296 | 1793 | 2331 |

Appendix 1, Table 2
Slaves in possession of the Company (1702 - 1795)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Number</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Number</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Number</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|
| 1702 | 358 | 1734 | N.A. | 1766 | 619 ¹ |
| 1703 | N.A. | 1735 | 724 | 1767 | 550 |
| 1704 | N.A. | 1736 | N.A. | 1768 | (550) |
| 1705 | N.A. | 1737 | N.A. | 1769 | 531 |
| 1706 | N.A. | 1738 | 664 | 1770 | (618) |
| 1707 | N.A. | 1739 | 662 | 1771 | (612) |
| 1708 | N.A. | 1740 | 654(m) | 1772 | 563 |
| 1709 | 471(v) | 1741 | 639 | 1773 | (599) |
| 1710 | N.A. | 1742 | 605(a) | 1774 | (669) |
| 1711 | 560 | 1743 | 680 | 1775 | 654 |
| 1712 | 568 | 1744 | (750) | 1776 | 710 |
| 1713 | 441 | 1745 | (820) | 1777 | 681(a) |
| 1714 | 467 | 1746 | (825) | 1778 | 730 |
| 1715 | 437 | 1747 | (801) | 1779 | N.A. |
| 1716 | N.A. | 1748 | (832) | 1780 | 759 |
| 1717 | N.A. | 1749 | (786) | 1781 | 795 |
| 1718 | N.A. | 1750 | (712) | 1782 | 766 |
| 1719 | 599(s) | 1751 | 685 | 1783 | 744 |
| 1720 | 494(s) | 1752 | 644(a) | 1784 | 737(a) |
| 1721 | 517(s) | 1753 | 694 | 1785 | 869 |
| 1722 | N.A. | 1754 | 681 | 1786 | N.A. |
| 1723 | 553 | 1755 | 508 | 1787 | N.A. |
| 1724 | 580 | 1756 | (596) | 1788 | N.A. |
| 1725 | N.A. | 1757 | 615 | 1789 | 946 |
| 1726 | 664 | 1758 | (577) | 1790 | N.A. |
| 1727 | 695/701(a) | 1759 | 609 | 1791 | 517 ¹ |
| 1728 | N.A. | 1760 | 580 | 1792 | N.A. |
| 1729 | 704 | 1761 | 613 | 1793 | 582(a) |
| 1730 | N.A. | 1762 | 590 | 1794 | N.A. |
| 1731 | N.A. | 1763 | 644 | 1795 | 534(o) |
| 1732 | 616 | 1764 | 568 | | |
| 1733 | N.A. | 1765 | (618) | | |

N.B. These figures include *bandieten* (criminals or political prisoners).

Sources: when not otherwise mentioned these figures derive from the *Grootboeken* (KA 10752 - 10798), which give the number of slaves and their capital value at the end of each financial year. Those numbers given between brackets are reconstructions based on the amount of meat consumed in the slave lodge in the month of July for the given year, as given in the meat lists; until 1746 this was 1 lb. meat a day, thereafter 3/4 lb. a day (see RCP 2.5.1747, VOC 4170, f. 331). The other figures come from the following sources:

- a Armstrong, "Slaves", 86.
- m C.F.J. Muller, "Die Geskiedenis van die Vissery aan die Kaap tot 1752", AYB (1942), 92.
- o ARA, Oost-indisch Comite (OIC) 151, f.153.
- s R.C.-H. Shell, "Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope, 1680 - 1731", Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1986, Ch. V.
- v F. Valentyn, *Description of the Cape of Good Hope*, 2 vols, (Cape Town, 1972-3), II, 243.

¹ This excludes 81 held by the VOC for sale. VOC 4352, f.971.

Appendix 2, Table 1
 Population, total Cape Colony (1701 - 1795), 1
 (Free persons including Free Blacks, *knechten*, slaves)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1701 | 418 | 242 | 295 | 310 | 69 | 702 | 109 | 40 | 40 |
| 1702 | 502 | 270 | 337 | 333 | 90 | 653 | 120 | 41 | 36 |
| 1703 | 571 | 280 | 349 | 363 | 89 | 705 | 126 | 54 | 41 |
| 1704 | 542 | 291 | 386 | 371 | 81 | 752 | 135 | 52 | 49 |
| 1705 | 568 | 288 | 408 | 395 | 120 | 764 | 128 | 53 | 46 |
| 1706 | 554 | 295 | 409 | 411 | 66 | 804 | 138 | 59 | 56 |
| 1707 | 513 | 290 | 426 | 412 | 128 | 841 | 149 | 55 | 62 |
| 1708 | 491 | 307 | 472 | 453 | 79 | 981 | 166 | 61 | 90 |
| 1709 | 627 | 331 | 433 | 496 | 98 | 1317 | 240 | 89 | 113 |
| 1710 | 656 | 339 | 458 | 470 | 94 | 1294 | 260 | 99 | 122 |
| 1711 | 545 | 337 | 462 | 412 | 114 | 1232 | 290 | 113 | 136 |
| 1712 | 649 | 343 | 472 | 486 | 94 | 1238 | 255 | 108 | 117 |
| 1713 | 627 | 360 | 495 | 500 | 99 | 1502 | 266 | 135 | 107 |
| 1714 | 517 | 286 | 397 | 385 | 114 | 1386 | 231 | 96 | 81 |
| 1715 | 552 | 303 | 401 | 381 | 86 | 1485 | 284 | 205 | 181 |
| 1716 | 626 | 351 | 431 | 420 | 68 | 1871 | 317 | 110 | 113 |
| 1717 | 667 | 372 | 453 | 436 | 84 | 1950 | 351 | 117 | 105 |
| 1718 | 691 | 390 | 490 | 482 | 92 | 1885 | 321 | 124 | 106 |
| 1719 | 781 | 412 | 497 | 508 | 88 | 1897 | 338 | 124 | 110 |
| 1720 | 653 | 405 | 494 | 514 | 83 | 1884 | 326 | 133 | 104 |
| 1721 | 639 | 410 | 516 | 536 | 92 | 1907 | 339 | 121 | 118 |
| 1722 | 644 | 420 | 516 | 538 | 98 | 1978 | 360 | 135 | 138 |
| 1723 | 679 | 433 | 544 | 589 | 119 | 2224 | 408 | 139 | 151 |
| 1724 | 706 | 450 | 577 | 599 | 116 | 2407 | 446 | 159 | 152 |
| 1725 | 722 | 474 | 614 | 654 | 128 | 2675 | 488 | 185 | 158 |
| 1726 | 723 | 481 | 643 | 696 | 107 | 2793 | 533 | 199 | 175 |
| 1727 | 763 | 488 | 683 | 750 | 105 | 2941 | 566 | 227 | 184 |
| 1728 | 737 | 493 | 706 | 777 | 122 | 2867 | 560 | 234 | 212 |
| 1729 | 739 | 517 | 730 | 795 | 79 | 2836 | 590 | 244 | 238 |
| 1730 | 725 | 500 | 734 | 802 | 105 | 2926 | 612 | 246 | 253 |
| 1731 | 765 | 526 | 770 | 859 | 83 | 3140 | 649 | 265 | 249 |
| 1732 | 780 | 537 | 806 | 847 | 93 | 3238 | 697 | 262 | 259 |
| 1733 | 793 | 547 | 839 | 895 | 117 | 3384 | 711 | 314 | 300 |
| 1734 | 814 | 567 | 863 | 955 | 120 | 3452 | 759 | 337 | 307 |
| 1735 | 856 | 582 | 891 | 989 | 133 | 3790 | 789 | 337 | 323 |
| 1736 | 897 | 622 | 922 | 1038 | 148 | 4033 | 837 | 369 | 353 |
| 1737 | 924 | 645 | 964 | 1074 | 143 | 4206 | 831 | 394 | 350 |
| 1738 | 901 | 641 | 993 | 1077 | 136 | 4199 | 810 | 403 | 345 |
| 1739 | 916 | 647 | 984 | 1072 | 127 | 4155 | 819 | 389 | 381 |
| 1740 | 964 | 679 | 1022 | 1120 | 134 | 4070 | 823 | 403 | 399 |
| 1741 | 1019 | 670 | 981 | 1136 | 126 | 3871 | 819 | 370 | 376 |
| 1742 | 1073 | 696 | 991 | 1173 | 120 | 4506 | 913 | 380 | 364 |
| 1743 | 1075 | 700 | 1025 | 1172 | 124 | 3804 | 815 | 377 | 366 |
| 1744 | 1070 | 730 | 997 | 1193 | 121 | 3555 | 778 | 410 | 360 |
| 1745 | 1107 | 732 | 1028 | 1193 | 102 | 3452 | 811 | 408 | 354 |
| 1746 | 1202 | 782 | 1074 | 1265 | 109 | 3416 | 850 | 459 | 343 |
| 1747 | 1221 | 811 | 1099 | 1296 | 101 | 3329 | 826 | 452 | 368 |
| 1748 | 1294 | 830 | 1086 | 1298 | 81 | 3322 | 821 | 419 | 360 |
| 1749 | 1318 | 872 | 1157 | 1315 | 83 | 3470 | 856 | 450 | 360 |
| 1750 | 1364 | 902 | 1216 | 1378 | 72 | 3591 | 888 | 465 | 383 |

Population, total, 2

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|--------------------|-------------------|------------|------------|
| 1751 | 1393 | 922 | 1226 | 1400 | 83 | 3751 | 914 | 470 | 452 |
| 1752 | 1416 | 968 | 1277 | 1421 | 88 | 3834 | 956 | 474 | 358 |
| 1753 | 1478 | 1026 | 1396 | 1519 | 114 | 4137 | 1031 | 491 | 386 |
| 1754 | 1499 | 1040 | 1428 | 1552 | 103 | 4280 | 1077 | 543 | 379 |
| 1755 | 1597 | 1110 | 1662 | 1655 | 96 | 4342 | 1132 | 531 | 394 |
| 1756 | 1461 | 993 | 1384 | 1285 | 90 | 4069 | 1005 | 393 | 320 |
| 1757 | 1509 | 1019 | 1412 | 1392 | 105 | 4135 | 1042 | 433 | 350 |
| 1758 | 1563 | 1064 | 1481 | 1467 | 101 | 4105 | 1021 | 460 | 346 |
| 1759 | 1650 | 1118 | 1552 | 1441 | 109 | 4354 | 1068 | 437 | 361 |
| 1760 | 1756 | 1166 | 1599 | 1634 | 128 | 4551 | 1100 | 463 | 373 |
| 1761 | 1782 | 1198 | 1681 | 1696 | 114 | 4648 | 1133 | 473 | 399 |
| 1762 | 1822 | 1228 | 1733 | 1720 | 121 | 4882 | 1183 | 453 | 365 |
| 1763 | 1862 | 1278 | 1831 | 1779 | 127 | 5072 | 1214 | 508 | 421 |
| 1764 | 1977 | 1329 | 1859 | 1849 | 111 | 5302 | 1303 | 563 | 424 |
| 1765 | 2002 | 1345 | 1923 | 1871 | 129 | 5509 | 1319 | 541 | 531 |
| 1766 | 2065 | 1393 | 3034 | 1966 | 117 | 5582 | 1363 | 569 | 463 |
| 1767 | 2100 | 1422 | 2070 | 2018 | 107 | 5594 | 1546 | 543 | 496 |
| 1768 | 2114 | 1454 | 2084 | 2066 | 100 | 5681 | 1471 | 562 | 493 |
| 1769 | 2147 | 1468 | 2184 | 2132 | 78 | 5650 | 1537 | 548 | 369 |
| 1770 | 2136 | 1517 | 2256 | 2179 | 89 | 5660 | 1569 | 510 | 481 |
| 1771 | 2218 | 1538 | 2333 | 2212 | 77 | 5631 | 1634 | 533 | 537 |
| 1772 | 2283 | 1576 | 2263 | 2251 | 87 | 5971 | 1676 | 550 | 518 |
| 1773 | 2300 | 1578 | 2318 | 2269 | 90 | 6102 ¹ | 1707 | 564 | 529 |
| 1774 | 2324 | 1658 | 2412 | 2275 | 95 | 6077 | 1770 | 583 | 547 |
| 1775 | 2461 | 1682 | 2429 | 2405 | 91 | 6472 | 1835 | 645 | 599 |
| 1776 | 2552 | 1712 | 2503 | 2450 | 98 | 6602 | 1931 | 662 | 625 |
| 1777 | 2744 | 1846 | 2667 | 2610 | 96 | 7378 | 2216 | 790 | 775 |
| 1778 | 2789 | 1857 | 2667 | 2678 | 81 | 7380 | 2171 | 798 | 791 |
| 1779 | 2873 | 1918 | 2861 | 2817 | 68 | 7894 | 2283 | 834 | 761 |
| 1780 | 2913 | 1922 | 2806 | 2859 | 65 | 7776 | 2305 | 840 | 771 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1782 | 3074 | 1932 | 2626 | 2744 | 31 | 7535 | 2415 | 857 | 765 |
| 1783 | 3158 | 2042 | 2821 | 3019 | 24 | 7808 | 2533 | 804 | 805 |
| 1784 | 3180 | 2124 | 3005 | 3073 | 27 | 8453 | 2649 | 858 | 889 |
| 1785 | 3238 | 2207 | 3022 | 2148 | 23 | 8497 | 2735 | 878 | 788 |
| 1786 | 3280 | 2260 | 3116 | 3164 | 29 | 8676 | 2810 | 1007 | 711 |
| 1787 | 3740 | 2594 | 3710 | 3708 | 34 | 9231 | 3303 | 1147 | 931 |
| 1788 | 3481 | 2440 | 3389 | 3351 | 43 | 8931 | 3075 | 951 | 853 |
| 1789 | 3448 | 2485 | 3562 | 3483 | 32 | 9044 | 3091 | 938 | 796 |
| 1790 | 3613 | 2406 | 3464 | 3491 | 39 | 9405 | 3118 | 929 | 922 |
| 1791 | 3699 | 2367 | 3466 | 3396 | 23 | 9694 ² | 3431 | 1047 | 1025 |
| 1792 | 3946 | 2778 | 3642 | 3601 | 31 | 9130 | 3322 | 1010 | 851 |
| 1793 | 4032 | 2730 | 3466 | 3602 | 12 | 9046 | 3590 | 1132 | 979 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1795 | 4259 | 2870 | 3963 | 3837 | 23 | 11555 ³ | 5284 ³ | N.A. | N.A. |

1 Changed from 7102 (error Cape district).

2 Changed from 6694 (error in both Cape district and total).

3 Includes juveniles.

Appendix 2, Table 2
Population, Cape district (1701 - 1795), 1

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1701 | 172 | 122 | 125 | 144 | 52 | 493 | 78 | 22 | 24 |
| 1702 | 226 | 141 | 152 | 154 | 75 | 431 | 86 | 25 | 20 |
| 1703 | 268 | 150 | 155 | 162 | 70 | 469 | 90 | 36 | 24 |
| 1704 | 292 | 165 | 177 | 177 | 57 | 517 | 101 | 34 | 31 |
| 1705 | 275 | 160 | 175 | 180 | 59 | 506 | 92 | 39 | 30 |
| 1706 | 257 | 155 | 180 | 174 | 46 | 537 | 100 | 39 | 34 |
| 1707 | 230 | 148 | 188 | 161 | 53 | 556 | 101 | 35 | 27 |
| 1708 | 238 | 165 | 204 | 196 | 45 | 659 | 114 | 38 | 57 |
| 1709 | 294 | 180 | 211 | 212 | 70 | 893 | 175 | 59 | 75 |
| 1710 | 280 | 177 | 211 | 187 | 65 | 841 | 186 | 66 | 74 |
| 1711 | 256 | 178 | 155 | 105 | 76 | 812 | 194 | 75 | 86 |
| 1712 | 286 | 177 | 200 | 185 | 72 | 682 | 171 | 69 | 78 |
| 1713 | 273 | 185 | 225 | 196 | 79 | 931 | 186 | 90 | 64 |
| 1714 | 231 | 141 | 153 | 129 | 70 | 755 | 139 | 63 | 50 |
| 1715 | 256 | 153 | 154 | 138 | 55 | 833 | 195 | 164 | 151 |
| 1716 | 304 | 191 | 173 | 155 | 38 | 1067 | 209 | 60 | 64 |
| 1717 | 322 | 213 | 191 | 179 | 64 | 1146 | 228 | 67 | 75 |
| 1718 | 350 | 212 | 201 | 205 | 56 | 1072 | 219 | 68 | 60 |
| 1719 | 425 | 231 | 193 | 199 | 58 | 1178 | 233 | 80 | 65 |
| 1720 | 309 | 225 | 207 | 216 | 52 | 1165 | 229 | 89 | 64 |
| 1721 | 308 | 223 | 191 | 213 | 60 | 1129 | 229 | 76 | 79 |
| 1722 | 312 | 242 | 217 | 239 | 71 | 1248 | 259 | 95 | 95 |
| 1723 | 319 | 242 | 231 | 253 | 86 | 1434 | 309 | 103 | 112 |
| 1724 | 346 | 259 | 255 | 277 | 80 | 1514 | 339 | 119 | 109 |
| 1725 | 339 | 266 | 260 | 316 | 89 | 1642 | 362 | 132 | 116 |
| 1726 | 338 | 262 | 278 | 331 | 77 | 1642 | 381 | 141 | 129 |
| 1727 | 371 | 262 | 284 | 354 | 74 | 1732 | 395 | 155 | 135 |
| 1728 | 352 | 259 | 291 | 366 | 83 | 1689 | 398 | 154 | 160 |
| 1729 | 358 | 276 | 315 | 372 | 52 | 1679 | 422 | 167 | 182 |
| 1730 | 358 | 274 | 330 | 384 | 68 | 1773 | 438 | 160 | 192 |
| 1731 | 361 | 287 | 343 | 397 | 56 | 1856 | 454 | 179 | 179 |
| 1732 | 351 | 286 | 355 | 388 | 68 | 1907 | 460 | 174 | 191 |
| 1733 | 359 | 290 | 380 | 418 | 84 | 1999 | 468 | 203 | 218 |
| 1734 | 371 | 304 | 397 | 459 | 86 | 2054 | 503 | 226 | 210 |
| 1735 | 399 | 307 | 407 | 462 | 93 | 2268 | 518 | 233 | 212 |
| 1736 | 407 | 330 | 421 | 505 | 108 | 2403 | 551 | 254 | 235 |
| 1737 | 420 | 351 | 454 | 514 | 92 | 2494 | 529 | 260 | 221 |
| 1738 | 402 | 342 | 458 | 505 | 92 | 2387 | 524 | 252 | 208 |
| 1739 | 410 | 347 | 447 | 505 | 83 | 2414 | 531 | 245 | 217 |
| 1740 | 435 | 359 | 456 | 534 | 87 | 2351 | 542 | 258 | 235 |
| 1741 | 452 | 352 | 449 | 538 | 86 | 2261 | 526 | 217 | 212 |
| 1742 | 483 | 361 | 420 | 559 | 80 | 2794 | 614 | 225 | 205 |
| 1743 | 481 | 357 | 432 | 544 | 73 | 2221 | 506 | 250 | 200 |
| 1744 | 482 | 377 | 409 | 564 | 71 | 2086 | 471 | 235 | 192 |
| 1745 | 499 | 377 | 421 | 555 | 67 | 2023 | 506 | 235 | 191 |
| 1746 | 525 | 394 | 425 | 570 | 69 | 1989 | 530 | 257 | 182 |
| 1747 | 552 | 425 | 464 | 594 | 69 | 2038 | 520 | 257 | 211 |
| 1748 | 557 | 428 | 463 | 601 | 50 | 2013 | 490 | 236 | 202 |
| 1749 | 600 | 455 | 493 | 612 | 51 | 2127 | 532 | 241 | 201 |
| 1750 | 622 | 465 | 492 | 632 | 48 | 2162 | 545 | 256 | 225 |

Population, Cape district, 2

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|------------|------------|
| 1751 | 630 | 475 | 494 | 637 | 52 | 2242 | 552 | 270 | 222 |
| 1752 | 639 | 495 | 518 | 628 | 59 | 2249 | 570 | 269 | 206 |
| 1753 | 662 | 525 | 551 | 666 | 79 | 2422 | 608 | 293 | 214 |
| 1754 | 686 | 532 | 589 | 693 | 67 | 2526 | 624 | 320 | 211 |
| 1755 | 708 | 552 | 595 | 723 | 62 | 2502 | 642 | 305 | 214 |
| 1756 | 567 | 417 | 424 | 443 | 61 | 2300 | 523 | 176 | 149 |
| 1757 | 595 | 532 | 423 | 443 | 67 | 2362 | 538 | 198 | 171 |
| 1758 | 627 | 463 | 449 | 472 | 63 | 2300 | 553 | 217 | 164 |
| 1759 | 663 | 496 | 461 | 501 | 74 | 2452 | 564 | 207 | 178 |
| 1760 | 697 | 508 | 484 | 516 | 67 | 2519 | 558 | 204 | 184 |
| 1761 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1762 | 751 | 556 | 533 | 589 | 56 | 2658 | 602 | 216 | 172 |
| 1763 | 768 | 577 | 552 | 596 | 63 | 2709 | 610 | 263 | 214 |
| 1764 | 792 | 598 | 564 | 627 | 48 | 2783 | 649 | 296 | 209 |
| 1765 | 802 | 610 | 547 | 607 | 58 | 2860 | 668 | 313 | 221 |
| 1766 | 787 | 612 | 612 | 662 | 58 | 2847 | 660 | 324 | 239 |
| 1767 | 806 | 632 | 622 | 677 | 61 | 2882 | 715 | 298 | 249 |
| 1768 | 805 | 634 | 593 | 669 | 56 | 2847 | 718 | 303 | 253 |
| 1769 | 789 | 618 | 602 | 683 | 42 | 2849 | 753 | 282 | 151 |
| 1770 | 767 | 617 | 615 | 690 | 54 | 2827 | 751 | 253 | 238 |
| 1771 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1772 | 817 | 636 | 611 | 706 | 48 | 2990 | 809 | 292 | 263 |
| 1773 | 834 | 630 | 661 | 763 | 48 | 3081 ¹ | 815 | 300 | 283 |
| 1774 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1775 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1776 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1777 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1778 | 986 | 723 | 806 | 889 | 47 | 3749 | 1050 | 381 | 361 |
| 1779 | 973 | 741 | 816 | 936 | 29 | 4048 | 1083 | 421 | 359 |
| 1780 | 970 | 720 | 816 | 953 | 26 | 3847 | 1075 | 419 | 360 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1782 | 977 | 697 | 784 | 918 | 13 | 3612 | 1068 | 472 | 365 |
| 1783 | 958 | 702 | 767 | 906 | 7 | 3778 | 1122 | 391 | 401 |
| 1784 | 951 | 713 | 827 | 948 | 9 | 4189 | 1193 | 411 | 449 |
| 1785 | 968 | 731 | 841 | 946 | 4 | 4078 | 1214 | 397 | 389 |
| 1786 | 930 | 716 | 845 | 922 | 6 | 4088 | 1204 | 543 | 281 |
| 1787 | 954 | 785 | 893 | 978 | 10 | 4217 | 1212 | 459 | 343 |
| 1788 | 952 | 790 | 897 | 1029 | 8 | 4215 ² | 1274 | 442 | 400 |
| 1789 | 942 | 793 | 924 | 994 | 10 | 4029 | 1227 | 456 | 376 |
| 1790 | 1012 | 822 | 944 | 1062 | 11 | 4428 | 1228 | 448 | 490 |
| 1791 | 931 | 682 | 875 | 944 | 6 | 4630 ³ | 1486 | 546 | 606 |
| 1792 | 1153 | 956 | 1040 | 1098 | 7 | 4177 | 1423 | 529 | 422 |
| 1793 | 1169 | 896 | 952 | 1135 | 0 | 4238 | 1745 | 643 | 563 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1795 | 1294 | 1057 | 1265 | 1341 | 15 | 6068 ⁴ | 2981 ⁴ | N.A. | N.A. |

1 Changed from 4081 (assumed to be an error).

2 Changed from 5215 (assumed to be an error).

3 Changed from 6630 (obviously an error).

4 Includes juveniles.

Appendix 2, Table 3
Population, Free Blacks, Cape district (1720 - 1773)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>m</u> | <u>wm</u> | <u>b</u> | <u>g</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1720 | 46 | 44 | 25 | 33 | 0 | 20 | 11 | 3 | 1 |
| 1721 | 49 | 43 | 20 | 24 | 0 | 23 | 11 | 4 | 2 |
| 1722 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1723 | 45 | 44 | 17 | 22 | 0 | 35 | 12 | 5 | 6 |
| 1724 | 49 | 47 | 26 | 34 | 0 | 38 | 10 | 3 | 4 |
| 1725 | 47 | 47 | 23 | 35 | 0 | 39 | 13 | 4 | 2 |
| 1726 | 49 | 49 | 27 | 37 | 0 | 58 | 19 | 7 | 3 |
| 1727 | 50 | 48 | 27 | 34 | 0 | 64 | 17 | 6 | 7 |
| 1728 | 49 | 51 | 33 | 37 | 0 | 53 | 17 | 6 | 7 |
| 1729 | 51 | 58 | 40 | 42 | 0 | 58 | 25 | 14 | 11 |
| 1730 | 55 | 56 | 40 | 40 | 0 | 70 | 27 | 11 | 12 |
| 1731 | 48 | 60 | 45 | 42 | 0 | 55 | 29 | 10 | 12 |
| 1732 | 46 | 62 | 41 | 34 | 0 | 65 | 30 | 7 | 11 |
| 1733 | 50 | 60 | 55 | 40 | 0 | 60 | 28 | 7 | 15 |
| 1734 | 50 | 63 | 56 | 49 | 0 | 67 | 33 | 17 | 10 |
| 1735 | 57 | 65 | 61 | 56 | 0 | 61 | 35 | 21 | 10 |
| 1736 | 55 | 69 | 54 | 57 | 1 | 66 | 31 | 17 | 11 |
| 1737 | 54 | 79 | 70 | 55 | 0 | 68 | 24 | 14 | 9 |
| 1738 | 62 | 73 | 68 | 46 | 0 | 54 | 24 | 9 | 13 |
| 1739 | 56 | 84 | 79 | 62 | 0 | 54 | 20 | 20 | 16 |
| 1740 | 56 | 82 | 81 | 59 | 0 | 60 | 26 | 8 | 11 |
| 1741 | 57 | 78 | 73 | 44 | 0 | 40 | 22 | 10 | 19 |
| 1742 | 54 | 71 | 52 | 64 | 0 | 21 | 14 | 5 | 8 |
| 1743 | 61 | 75 | 70 | 67 | 0 | 34 | 9 | 9 | 7 |
| 1744 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1745 | 63 | 71 | 61 | 63 | 0 | 25 | 13 | 6 | 3 |
| 1746 | 64 | 72 | 55 | 67 | 0 | 23 | 10 | 9 | 3 |
| 1747 | 63 | 80 | 65 | 75 | 0 | 28 | 14 | 7 | 2 |
| 1748 | 59 | 80 | 56 | 84 | 0 | 30 | 6 | 3 | 1 |
| 1749 | 75 | 91 | 60 | 88 | 0 | 33 | 8 | 6 | 1 |
| 1750 | 90 | 92 | 55 | 83 | 0 | 29 | 8 | 2 | 1 |
| 1751 | 91 | 98 | 58 | 89 | 0 | 34 | 7 | 1 | 2 |
| 1752 | 94 | 111 | 57 | 72 | 0 | 44 | 6 | 5 | 0 |
| 1753 | 98 | 117 | 65 | 83 | 0 | 55 | 10 | 3 | 2 |
| 1754 | 100 | 118 | 68 | 84 | 0 | 51 | 6 | 5 | 2 |
| 1755 | 95 | 121 | 60 | 86 | 0 | 48 | 8 | 4 | 2 |
| 1756 | 76 | 96 | 29 | 37 | 0 | 41 | 6 | 1 | 2 |
| 1757 | 85 | 90 | 20 | 20 | 0 | 42 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| 1758 | 88 | 94 | 29 | 34 | 0 | 42 | 4 | 3 | 0 |
| 1759 | 84 | 110 | 35 | 43 | 0 | 61 | 8 | 2 | 1 |
| 1760 | 91 | 112 | 36 | 46 | 0 | 49 | 4 | 0 | 2 |
| 1761 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1762 | 96 | 115 | 31 | 36 | 0 | 54 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| 1763 | 99 | 119 | 39 | 39 | 0 | 69 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| 1764 | 113 | 118 | 41 | 40 | 0 | 67 | 8 | 2 | 2 |
| 1765 | 116 | 119 | 21 | 30 | 0 | 55 | 11 | 4 | 3 |
| 1766 | 113 | 132 | 47 | 43 | 0 | 72 | 10 | 3 | 2 |
| 1767 | 111 | 133 | 39 | 56 | 0 | 59 | 13 | 0 | 2 |
| 1768 | 113 | 139 | 38 | 49 | 0 | 64 | 9 | 5 | 5 |
| 1769 | 108 | 126 | 49 | 49 | 0 | 51 | 9 | 0 | 1 |
| 1770 | 100 | 123 | 39 | 44 | 0 | 55 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| 1771 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1772 | 96 | 120 | 43 | 50 | 0 | 50 | 10 | 0 | 1 |
| 1773 | 104 | 114 | 53 | 57 | 0 | 44 | 7 | 0 | 3 |

N.B. Before 1720, the Free Blacks are not mentioned as a separate group in the *opgaaf*. After 1773 the Cape district *opgaven* are not available.

Appendix 2, Table 4
 Population, Stellenbosch district (1701 - 1787), 1

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1701 | 119 | 61 | 80 | 80 | 9 | 139 | 26 | 14 | 16 |
| 1702 | 142 | 63 | 85 | 84 | 7 | 145 | 28 | 12 | 15 |
| 1703 | 164 | 64 | 91 | 101 | 11 | 143 | 29 | 14 | 15 |
| 1704 | 122 | 62 | 103 | 89 | 20 | 149 | 26 | 15 | 16 |
| 1705 | 157 | 67 | 118 | 102 | 33 | 174 | 28 | 14 | 16 |
| 1706 | 146 | 72 | 111 | 103 | 16 | 184 | 30 | 20 | 17 |
| 1707 | 141 | 69 | 102 | 109 | 43 | 189 | 35 | 20 | 28 |
| 1708 | 110 | 61 | 117 | 106 | 21 | 172 | 30 | 23 | 25 |
| 1709 | 161 | 66 | 78 | 113 | 17 | 255 | 48 | 28 | 34 |
| 1710 | 160 | 70 | 90 | 113 | 15 | 265 | 46 | 30 | 42 |
| 1711 | 129 | 69 | 130 | 133 | 16 | 240 | 71 | 33 | 40 |
| 1712 | 155 | 67 | 97 | 118 | 14 | 300 | 49 | 33 | 31 |
| 1713 | 147 | 78 | 106 | 120 | 11 | 319 | 47 | 38 | 30 |
| 1714 | 114 | 59 | 73 | 87 | 24 | 357 | 52 | 26 | 24 |
| 1715 | 116 | 61 | 75 | 76 | 16 | 309 | 51 | 31 | 18 |
| 1716 | 133 | 65 | 80 | 86 | 17 | 425 | 63 | 37 | 29 |
| 1717 | 152 | 63 | 86 | 86 | 12 | 438 | 65 | 40 | 17 |
| 1718 | 133 | 68 | 91 | 85 | 15 | 422 | 58 | 35 | 24 |
| 1719 | 146 | 67 | 102 | 98 | 12 | 398 | 57 | 39 | 23 |
| 1720 | 148 | 66 | 96 | 93 | 12 | 348 | 51 | 27 | 26 |
| 1721 | 137 | 69 | 111 | 103 | 18 | 369 | 54 | 27 | 24 |
| 1722 | 137 | 61 | 103 | 92 | 13 | 343 | 58 | 25 | 29 |
| 1723 | 129 | 64 | 105 | 105 | 10 | 333 | 48 | 23 | 28 |
| 1724 | 136 | 64 | 109 | 107 | 15 | 383 | 57 | 24 | 28 |
| 1725 | 149 | 70 | 121 | 111 | 20 | 449 | 67 | 33 | 27 |
| 1726 | 144 | 74 | 118 | 127 | 13 | 494 | 75 | 34 | 35 |
| 1727 | 140 | 75 | 135 | 152 | 19 | 548 | 91 | 42 | 34 |
| 1728 | 134 | 73 | 128 | 132 | 21 | 527 | 85 | 45 | 32 |
| 1729 | 147 | 81 | 140 | 157 | 17 | 544 | 88 | 48 | 38 |
| 1730 | 120 | 71 | 138 | 144 | 17 | 468 | 76 | 44 | 35 |
| 1731 | 132 | 73 | 134 | 157 | 14 | 523 | 87 | 52 | 40 |
| 1732 | 145 | 75 | 139 | 155 | 12 | 538 | 95 | 49 | 41 |
| 1733 | 154 | 76 | 135 | 164 | 18 | 537 | 102 | 59 | 47 |
| 1734 | 145 | 79 | 139 | 176 | 14 | 573 | 107 | 66 | 51 |
| 1735 | 154 | 81 | 130 | 174 | 14 | 603 | 117 | 57 | 61 |
| 1736 | 164 | 87 | 127 | 174 | 17 | 608 | 116 | 60 | 62 |
| 1737 | 163 | 84 | 131 | 174 | 22 | 599 | 114 | 70 | 61 |
| 1738 | 158 | 86 | 125 | 170 | 16 | 646 | 105 | 78 | 70 |
| 1739 | 164 | 86 | 116 | 168 | 21 | 658 | 105 | 74 | 80 |
| 1740 | 161 | 82 | 123 | 169 | 22 | 622 | 99 | 78 | 79 |
| 1741 | 173 | 83 | 120 | 170 | 18 | 589 | 106 | 83 | 84 |
| 1742 | 176 | 88 | 116 | 165 | 20 | 578 | 95 | 79 | 67 |
| 1743 | 173 | 84 | 111 | 165 | 33 | 559 | 102 | 81 | 71 |
| 1744 | 172 | 93 | 113 | 158 | 33 | 512 | 101 | 81 | 74 |
| 1745 | 163 | 92 | 114 | 153 | 19 | 544 | 103 | 75 | 64 |
| 1746 | 163 | 86 | 107 | 153 | 19 | 483 | 91 | 87 | 62 |
| 1747 | 156 | 89 | 111 | 166 | 19 | 449 | 86 | 85 | 66 |
| 1748 | 173 | 84 | 100 | 162 | 17 | 429 | 90 | 92 | 71 |
| 1749 | 171 | 94 | 110 | 154 | 15 | 432 | 92 | 94 | 68 |
| 1750 | 175 | 101 | 127 | 162 | 11 | 492 | 110 | 95 | 68 |

Population, Stellenbosch district, 2

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slq</u> |
|-------------|---------------|------------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1751 | 202 | 112 | 151 | 190 | 15 | 538 | 126 | 90 | 128 |
| 1752 | 180 | 109 | 141 | 184 | 12 | 502 | 125 | 85 | 54 |
| 1753 | 173 | 107 | 154 | 191 | 14 | 516 | 124 | 72 | 58 |
| 1754 | 196 | 129 | 192 | 225 | 22 | 618 | 141 | 84 | 66 |
| 1755 | 185 | 125 | 183 | 212 | 18 | 589 | 145 | 78 | 57 |
| 1756 | 178 | 124 | 169 | 187 | 17 | 542 | 135 | 75 | 62 |
| 1757 | 168 | 118 | 180 | 188 | 24 | 510 | 144 | 92 | 63 |
| 1758 | 176 | 122 | 190 | 199 | 23 | 535 | 135 | 89 | 73 |
| 1759 | 188 | 129 | 193 | 187 | 24 | 554 | 138 | 97 | 80 |
| 1760 | 191 | 131 | 203 | 204 | 28 | 580 | 150 | 89 | 79 |
| 1761 | 183 | 121 | 206 | 197 | 31 | 625 | 144 | 93 | 85 |
| 1762 | 181 | 118 | 210 | 201 | 32 | 624 | 152 | 89 | 83 |
| 1763 | 177 | 116 | 219 | 198 | 32 | 641 | 150 | 84 | 81 |
| 1764 | 204 | 115 | 210 | 209 | 31 | 652 | 167 | 96 | 87 |
| 1765 | 209 | 114 | 221 | 206 | 32 | 677 | 150 | 78 | 77 |
| 1766 | 211 | 177 | 238 | 216 | 29 | 692 | 158 | 95 | 88 |
| 1767 | 219 | 120 | 234 | 212 | 24 | 701 | 169 | 90 | 89 |
| 1768 | 216 | 121 | 238 | 229 | 20 | 697 | 174 | 97 | 79 |
| 1769 | 214 | 122 | 241 | 223 | 20 | 707 | 171 | 100 | 80 |
| 1770 | 222 | 125 | 242 | 221 | 18 | 712 | 167 | 82 | 87 |
| 1771 | 244 | 132 | 256 | 227 | 14 | 731 | 178 | 90 | 96 |
| 1772 | 257 | 133 | 264 | 237 | 15 | 697 | 169 | 85 | 82 |
| 1773 | 260 | 133 | 253 | 228 | 23 | 729 | 192 | 88 | 85 |
| 1774 | 260 | 137 | 258 | 236 | 21 | 768 | 200 | 96 | 93 |
| 1775 | 286 | 144 | 243 | 225 | 22 | 783 | 202 | 100 | 100 |
| 1776 | 316 | 160 | 256 | 238 | 17 | 809 | 207 | 110 | 104 |
| 1777 | 312 | 150 | 257 | 246 | 16 | 944 | 248 | 106 | 120 |
| 1778 | 313 | 161 | 242 | 239 | 18 | 968 | 245 | 121 | 131 |
| 1779 | 310 | 157 | 263 | 238 | 12 | 949 | 255 | 117 | 126 |
| 1780 | 303 | 157 | 250 | 233 | 12 | 983 | 258 | 127 | 124 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1782 | 338 | 157 | 224 | 214 | 6 | 1006 | 270 | 107 | 118 |
| 1783 | 321 | 161 | 248 | 221 | 6 | 1004 | 292 | 129 | 124 |
| 1784 | 328 | 187 | 283 | 254 | 7 | 1078 | 287 | 143 | 134 |
| 1785 | 315 | 199 ¹ | 290 | 253 | 8 | 1119 | 317 | 156 | 148 |
| 1786 | 326 | 200 | 289 | 259 | 7 | 1164 | 329 | 154 | 161 |
| 1787 | 309 | 198 | 311 | 276 | 4 | 1170 | 346 | 176 | 148 |

 1 Changed from 399 (obviously an error).

Appendix 2, Table 5
 Population, Drakenstein district (1701 - 1787), 1

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slq</u> |
|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1701 | 127 | 59 | 90 | 87 | 8 | 139 | 26 | 14 | 16 |
| 1702 | 134 | 66 | 100 | 95 | 8 | 145 | 28 | 12 | 15 |
| 1703 | 139 | 66 | 103 | 100 | 8 | 93 | 7 | 4 | 2 |
| 1704 | 128 | 64 | 106 | 105 | 4 | 86 | 8 | 3 | 2 |
| 1705 | 136 | 62 | 115 | 113 | 28 | 84 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1706 | 151 | 68 | 118 | 134 | 4 | 83 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1707 | 142 | 73 | 136 | 142 | 32 | 96 | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| 1708 | 143 | 81 | 151 | 151 | 13 | 150 | 22 | 0 | 0 |
| 1709 | 172 | 85 | 144 | 171 | 11 | 169 | 17 | 2 | 4 |
| 1710 | 216 | 82 | 157 | 170 | 14 | 188 | 28 | 3 | 6 |
| 1711 | 160 | 90 | 177 | 174 | 22 | 180 | 25 | 5 | 10 |
| 1712 | 208 | 99 | 175 | 183 | 8 | 256 | 35 | 6 | 8 |
| 1713 | 207 | 97 | 164 | 184 | 9 | 252 | 33 | 7 | 13 |
| 1714 | 172 | 86 | 171 | 169 | 20 | 274 | 40 | 7 | 7 |
| 1715 | 180 | 89 | 172 | 167 | 15 | 293 | 38 | 10 | 12 |
| 1716 | 189 | 95 | 178 | 179 | 13 | 379 | 45 | 13 | 20 |
| 1717 | 193 | 96 | 176 | 171 | 8 | 366 | 58 | 10 | 13 |
| 1718 | 208 | 110 | 198 | 192 | 21 | 391 | 44 | 21 | 22 |
| 1719 | 210 | 114 | 202 | 211 | 18 | 321 | 48 | 15 | 22 |
| 1720 | 210 | 114 | 202 | 211 | 18 | 321 | 48 | 15 | 22 |
| 1721 | 194 | 114 | 191 | 205 | 19 | 371 | 46 | 17 | 14 |
| 1722 | 194 | 118 | 214 | 220 | 14 | 409 | 56 | 18 | 15 |
| 1723 | 195 | 117 | 196 | 207 | 10 | 387 | 43 | 15 | 8 |
| 1724 | 231 | 127 | 208 | 231 | 23 | 457 | 51 | 13 | 11 |
| 1725 | 231 | 127 | 208 | 231 | 23 | 457 | 51 | 13 | 11 |
| 1726 | 224 | 127 | 213 | 215 | 21 | 510 | 50 | 16 | 15 |
| 1727 | 224 | 127 | 213 | 215 | 21 | 510 | 50 | 16 | 15 |
| 1728 | 234 | 138 | 233 | 227 | 19 | 584 | 59 | 20 | 15 |
| 1729 | 234 | 138 | 233 | 227 | 19 | 584 | 59 | 20 | 15 |
| 1730 | 241 | 145 | 247 | 238 | 17 | 657 | 77 | 24 | 11 |
| 1731 | 241 | 145 | 247 | 238 | 17 | 657 | 77 | 24 | 11 |
| 1732 | 252 | 151 | 264 | 244 | 12 | 661 | 80 | 30 | 15 |
| 1733 | 252 | 151 | 264 | 244 | 12 | 661 | 80 | 30 | 15 |
| 1734 | 251 | 161 | 287 | 279 | 18 | 651 | 77 | 35 | 19 |
| 1735 | 251 | 161 | 287 | 279 | 18 | 651 | 77 | 35 | 19 |
| 1736 | 234 | 160 | 275 | 266 | 10 | 605 | 80 | 29 | 18 |
| 1737 | 234 | 160 | 275 | 266 | 10 | 605 | 80 | 29 | 18 |
| 1738 | 247 | 155 | 266 | 274 | 20 | 685 | 98 | 42 | 26 |
| 1739 | 247 | 155 | 266 | 274 | 20 | 685 | 98 | 42 | 26 |
| 1740 | 272 | 166 | 293 | 311 | 13 | 761 | 111 | 34 | 30 |
| 1741 | 272 | 166 | 293 | 311 | 13 | 761 | 111 | 34 | 30 |
| 1742 | 284 | 176 | 312 | 304 | 13 | 793 | 142 | 39 | 27 |
| 1743 | 284 | 176 | 312 | 304 | 13 | 793 | 142 | 39 | 27 |
| 1744 | 284 | 176 | 312 | 304 | 13 | 793 | 142 | 39 | 27 |
| 1745 | 280 | 181 | 324 | 313 | 15 | 848 | 141 | 52 | 35 |
| 1746 | 280 | 181 | 324 | 313 | 15 | 848 | 141 | 52 | 35 |
| 1747 | 298 | 184 | 327 | 320 | 20 | 825 | 149 | 45 | 46 |
| 1748 | 298 | 184 | 327 | 320 | 20 | 825 | 149 | 45 | 46 |
| 1749 | 303 | 194 | 354 | 353 | 26 | 919 | 154 | 47 | 50 |
| 1750 | 303 | 194 | 354 | 353 | 26 | 919 | 154 | 47 | 50 |
| 1751 | 326 | 205 | 574 | 359 | 23 | 1022 | 170 | 55 | 56 |
| 1752 | 326 | 205 | 574 | 359 | 23 | 1022 | 170 | 55 | 56 |
| 1753 | 341 | 210 | 379 | 386 | 29 | 1113 | 188 | 64 | 68 |
| 1754 | 341 | 210 | 379 | 386 | 29 | 1113 | 188 | 64 | 68 |
| 1755 | 341 | 213 | 410 | 402 | 28 | 1166 | 181 | 73 | 67 |
| 1756 | 341 | 213 | 410 | 402 | 28 | 1166 | 181 | 73 | 67 |
| 1757 | 342 | 214 | 421 | 399 | 23 | 1083 | 183 | 70 | 84 |
| 1758 | 342 | 214 | 421 | 399 | 23 | 1083 | 183 | 70 | 84 |
| 1759 | 342 | 214 | 421 | 399 | 23 | 1083 | 183 | 70 | 84 |
| 1760 | 368 | 238 | 443 | 417 | 25 | 1097 | 182 | 67 | 85 |
| 1761 | 368 | 238 | 443 | 417 | 25 | 1097 | 182 | 67 | 85 |
| 1762 | 368 | 238 | 443 | 417 | 25 | 1097 | 182 | 67 | 85 |
| 1763 | 394 | 235 | 412 | 428 | 22 | 1021 | 187 | 70 | 80 |
| 1764 | 394 | 235 | 412 | 428 | 22 | 1021 | 187 | 70 | 80 |
| 1765 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1766 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1767 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1768 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1769 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1770 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1771 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1772 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1773 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1774 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1775 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1776 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1777 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1778 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1779 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1780 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1781 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1782 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1783 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1784 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1785 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1786 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1787 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1788 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1789 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1790 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1791 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1792 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1793 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1794 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1795 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1796 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1797 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1798 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1799 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1800 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1801 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1802 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1803 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1804 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1805 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1806 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1807 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1808 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1809 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1810 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1811 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1812 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1813 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1814 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1815 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1816 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1817 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1818 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1819 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1820 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1821 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1822 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1823 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1824 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1825 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1826 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1827 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1828 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1829 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1830 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1831 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1832 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1833 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1834 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1835 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1836 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1837 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1838 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1839 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1840 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1841 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1842 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1843 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1844 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1845 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| 1846 | 414 | 247 | 455 | 449 | 20 | 1034 | 204 | 76 | 92 |
| | | | | | | | | | |

Population, Drakenstein district, 2

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|-------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1751 | 368 | 231 | 410 | 402 | 16 | 773 | 192 | 94 | 84 |
| 1752 | 396 | 251 | 438 | 428 | 17 | 836 | 208 | 101 | 80 |
| 1753 | 438 | 273 | 488 | 465 | 18 | 956 | 245 | 107 | 91 |
| 1754 | 401 | 252 | 423 | 426 | 14 | 895 | 247 | 112 | 86 |
| 1755 | 483 | 301 | 514 | 500 | 16 | 1026 | 283 | 125 | 105 |
| 1756 | 491 | 318 | 556 | 427 | 11 | 1024 | 291 | 122 | 93 |
| 1757 | 511 | 327 | 569 | 534 | 11 | 1064 | 302 | 122 | 95 |
| 1758 | 511 | 328 | 566 | 532 | 12 | 1055 | 280 | 132 | 85 |
| 1759 | 533 | 335 | 603 | 483 | 9 | 1122 | 304 | 118 | 86 |
| 1760 | 594 | 358 | 622 | 613 | 24 | 1204 | 316 | 146 | 88 |
| 1761 | 596 | 365 | 646 | 623 | 25 | 1244 | 322 | 136 | 101 |
| 1762 | 594 | 373 | 669 | 618 | 23 | 1337 | 363 | 128 | 88 |
| 1763 | 618 | 399 | 715 | 643 | 22 | 1414 | 366 | 139 | 102 |
| 1764 | 679 | 421 | 714 | 685 | 24 | 1478 | 389 | 148 | 111 |
| 1765 | 679 | 417 | 769 | 710 | 31 | 1509 | 393 | 132 | 111 |
| 1766 | 705 | 434 | 778 | 698 | 25 | 1561 | 421 | 122 | 118 |
| 1767 | 705 | 441 | 784 | 723 | 15 | 1558 | 538 | 132 | 132 |
| 1768 | 697 | 457 | 788 | 742 | 18 | 1564 | 441 | 127 | 139 |
| 1769 | 717 | 479 | 837 | 780 | 12 | 1580 | 447 | 137 | 121 |
| 1770 | 715 | 497 | 894 | 791 | 9 | 1621 | 492 | 139 | 131 |
| 1771 | 724 | 505 | 850 | 792 | 16 | 1644 | 492 | 142 | 161 |
| 1772 | 730 | 502 | 829 | 794 | 18 | 1716 | 512 | 152 | 159 |
| 1773 | 754 | 516 | 857 | 791 | 15 | 1764 | 527 | 164 | 155 |
| 1774 | 774 | 544 | 875 | 793 | 16 | 1779 | 552 | 193 | 164 |
| 1775 | 797 | 539 | 868 | 814 | 12 | 1808 | 556 | 183 | 174 |
| 1776 | 838 | 562 | 897 | 837 | 14 | 1887 | 588 | 202 | 171 |
| 1777 | 887 | 599 | 919 | 886 | 17 | 2112 | 636 | 249 | 260 |
| 1778 | 914 | 612 | 972 | 943 | 12 | 2170 | 665 | 265 | 243 |
| 1779 | 993 | 640 | 1053 | 984 | 19 | 2314 | 718 | 276 | 257 |
| 1780 | 982 | 653 | 1028 | 1017 | 15 | 2355 | 742 | 276 | 273 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1782 | 1124 | 702 | 1018 | 1030 | 7 | 2381 | 837 | 259 | 269 |
| 1783 | 1144 | 730 | 1068 | 1133 | 6 | 2477 | 835 | 259 | 256 |
| 1784 | 1149 | 737 | 1102 | 1138 | 8 | 2526 | 862 | 271 | 276 |
| 1785 | 1184 | 768 | 1111 | 1191 | 8 | 2559 | 882 | 283 | 227 |
| 1786 | 1233 | 808 | 1178 | 1166 | 11 | 2607 | 918 | 277 | 245 |
| 1787 | 1298 | 850 | 1268 | 1226 | 9 | 2748 ¹ | 1219 | 472 | 407 |

1 Changed from 3748 (assumed to be an error).

Appendix 2, Table 6
Population, Stellenbosch and Drakenstein (1788 - 1795)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|------------|------------|
| 1788 | 1226 | 814 | 1172 | 1112 | 15 | 3775 | 1281 | 464 | 425 |
| 1789 | 1215 | 813 | 1210 | 1135 | 12 | 3908 | 1312 | 449 | 398 |
| 1790 | 1225 | 803 | 1151 | 1122 | 14 | 3891 | 1304 | 435 | 394 |
| 1791 | 1218 | 830 | 1181 | 1151 | 9 | 3911 | 1328 | 439 | 383 |
| 1792 | 1248 | 865 | 1191 | 1215 | 14 | 3808 | 1306 | 436 | 399 |
| 1793 | 1298 | 878 | 1205 | 1256 | 0 | 3792 | 1299 | 447 | 381 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1795 | 1309 | 880 | 1207 | 1258 | 0 | 4300 ¹ | 1690 ¹ | N.A. | N.A. |

N.B. For these years there are no separate figures for the two districts.

1 Includes juveniles.

Appendix 2, Table 7
Population, Swellendam district (1746 - 1795)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|------------|------------|
| 1746 | 145 | 76 | 144 | 140 | 3 | 118 | 40 | 7 | 7 |
| 1747 | 149 | 79 | 154 | 153 | 1 | 113 | 42 | 8 | 9 |
| 1748 | 176 | 85 | 144 | 146 | 0 | 129 | 38 | 8 | 13 |
| 1749 | 175 | 89 | 159 | 159 | 0 | 168 | 39 | 12 | 17 |
| 1750 | 188 | 100 | 170 | 162 | 1 | 186 | 42 | 15 | 16 |
| 1751 | 193 | 104 | 171 | 171 | 0 | 198 | 44 | 16 | 18 |
| 1752 | 197 | 113 | 180 | 181 | 0 | 247 | 53 | 19 | 18 |
| 1753 | 205 | 121 | 203 | 197 | 3 | 243 | 54 | 19 | 23 |
| 1754 | 216 | 127 | 224 | 208 | 0 | 241 | 65 | 27 | 16 |
| 1755 | 221 | 132 | 233 | 227 | 0 | 225 | 62 | 23 | 18 |
| 1756 | 225 | 134 | 235 | 228 | 1 | 203 | 56 | 20 | 16 |
| 1757 | 235 | 142 | 240 | 227 | 3 | 199 | 58 | 21 | 21 |
| 1758 | 249 | 151 | 276 | 264 | 3 | 215 | 53 | 22 | 24 |
| 1759 | 266 | 158 | 295 | 270 | 2 | 226 | 62 | 15 | 17 |
| 1760 | 274 | 169 | 290 | 301 | 9 | 248 | 76 | 24 | 24 |
| 1761 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1762 | 296 | 187 | 321 | 312 | 10 | 263 | 65 | 20 | 22 |
| 1763 | 299 | 186 | 345 | 342 | 10 | 308 | 88 | 22 | 24 |
| 1764 | 302 | 195 | 371 | 328 | 8 | 389 | 98 | 23 | 17 |
| 1765 | 312 | 204 | 386 | 348 | 8 | 503 | 108 | 18 | 22 |
| 1766 | 362 | 230 | 406 | 390 | 5 | 482 | 124 | 28 | 18 |
| 1767 | 370 | 229 | 430 | 406 | 7 | 453 | 124 | 23 | 26 |
| 1768 | 396 | 242 | 465 | 426 | 6 | 573 | 138 | 35 | 22 |
| 1769 | 427 | 267 | 504 | 446 | 4 | 514 | 166 | 29 | 17 |
| 1770 | 432 | 278 | 505 | 477 | 8 | 500 | 159 | 36 | 25 |
| 1771 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1772 | 479 | 305 | 559 | 514 | 6 | 568 | 186 | 21 | 14 |
| 1773 | 452 | 299 | 547 | 487 | 4 | 528 | 173 | 12 | 6 |
| 1774 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1775 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1776 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1777 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1778 | 576 | 361 | 647 | 607 | 4 | 493 | 211 | 28 | 26 |
| 1779 | 597 | 380 | 729 | 659 | 8 | 583 | 227 | 20 | 19 |
| 1780 | 658 | 392 | 712 | 656 | 12 | 591 | 230 | 18 | 14 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1782 | 635 | 376 | 600 | 582 | 5 | 536 | 240 | 19 | 13 |
| 1783 | 735 | 449 | 738 | 759 | 5 | 549 | 284 | 25 | 24 |
| 1784 | 752 | 487 | 793 | 733 | 3 | 660 | 307 | 33 | 30 |
| 1785 | 771 | 509 | 780 | 758 | 3 | 741 | 322 | 42 | 24 |
| 1786 | 791 | 536 | 804 | 817 | 5 | 817 | 359 | 33 | 24 |
| 1787 | 505 | 353 | 627 | 539 | 2 | 823 | 352 | 26 | 24 |
| 1788 | 597 | 390 | 636 | 454 | 5 | 725 | 328 | 20 | 16 |
| 1789 | 605 | 392 | 679 | 586 | 0 | 782 | 328 | 11 | 12 |
| 1790 | 657 | 333 | 569 | 531 | 6 | 746 | 359 | 27 | 27 |
| 1791 | 794 | 307 | 568 | 506 | 5 | 780 | 372 | 26 | 18 |
| 1792 | 766 | 300 | 561 | 475 | 4 | 784 | 348 | 23 | 11 |
| 1793 | 786 | 290 | 459 | 389 | 6 | 655 | 301 | 20 | 16 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1795 | 848 | 337 | 581 | 477 | 4 | 818 ¹ | 403 ¹ | NA | NA |

1 Includes juveniles.

Appendix 2, Table 8
Population, Graaff-Reinet district (1787 - 1795)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>men</u> | <u>women</u> | <u>boys</u> | <u>girls</u> | <u>kn</u> | <u>slm</u> | <u>slw</u> | <u>slb</u> | <u>slg</u> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|------------|------------|
| 1787 | 674 | 408 | 611 | 689 | 9 | 273 | 174 | 14 | 9 |
| 1788 | 706 | 446 | 684 | 756 | 15 | 216 | 192 | 25 | 12 |
| 1789 | 686 | 487 | 749 | 768 | 10 | 325 | 224 | 22 | 10 |
| 1790 | 719 | 502 | 800 | 776 | 8 | 340 | 227 | 19 | 11 |
| 1791 | 756 | 548 | 842 | 795 | 3 | 373 | 245 | 36 | 18 |
| 1792 | 779 | 666 | 850 | 813 | 6 | 361 | 245 | 22 | 11 |
| 1793 | 779 | 666 | 850 | 813 | 6 | 361 | 245 | 22 | 19 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1795 | 808 | 596 | 910 | 761 | 4 | 369 ¹ | 210 ¹ | NA | NA |

1 Includes juveniles.

Appendix 3

Total population (free persons, Company personnel, slaves, knechten) and an approximation of the population of Cape Town (1704 - 1793; five-year averages)

| <u>Period</u> | <u>total population</u> ¹ | <u>Cape Town (to nearest 100)</u> ² |
|---------------|--|--|
| 1704-08 | 3367 | 1100 |
| 1709-13 | 4960 | 1700 |
| 1714-18 | 5327 | 1800 |
| 1719-23 | 6165 | 2100 |
| 1724-28 | 7796 | 2600 |
| 1729-33 | 8874 | 3000 |
| 1734-38 | 10756 | 3600 |
| 1739-43 | 11378 | 3800 |
| 1744-48 | 11420 | 3800 |
| 1749-53 | 12675 | 4200 |
| 1754-58 | 13716 | 4600 |
| 1759-63 | 15074 | 5000 |
| 1764-68 | 17838 | 6000 |
| 1769-73 | 19221 | 6400 |
| 1774-78 | 22165 | 7400 |
| 1779-83 | 25002 | 8300 |
| 1784-88 | 28862 | 9600 |
| 1789-93 | 31342 | 10400 |

N.B. Where certain data are missing, a four-year, a three-year etc. average is used. This also applies to other appendices where five-year averages are given, and also to the graphs.

- 1 This figure excludes certain categories, notably the families of VOC officials, their private slaves and the Khoisan.
- 2 This is assumed to be roughly one-third of the total (see Chapter II).

Appendix 4
 Number of ships in Cape Town harbour (1700 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Foreign</u> | <u>Dutch</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Foreign</u> | <u>Dutch</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1700 | 18 | 43 | 61 | 1747 | 21 | 53 | 74 |
| 1701 | 20 | 46 | 66 | 1748 | 35 | 49 | 84 |
| 1702 | 24 | 55 | 79 | 1749 | 19 | 56 | 75 |
| 1703 | 27 | 48 | 75 | 1750 | 21 | 60 | 81 |
| 1704 | 22 | 46 | 68 | 1751 | 17 | 48 | 65 |
| 1705 | 18 | 46 | 68 | 1752 | 18 | 60 | 78 |
| 1706 | 30 | 43 | 73 | 1753 | 21 | 52 | 73 |
| 1707 | 27 | 39 | 66 | 1754 | 13 | 56 | 69 |
| 1708 | 23 | 47 | 70 | 1755 | 18 | 52 | 70 |
| 1709 | 12 | 47 | 59 | 1756 | 9 | 46 | 55 |
| 1710 | 17 | 60 | 77 | 1757 | 2 | 55 | 57 |
| 1711 | 30 | 43 | 73 | 1758 | 14 | 52 | 66 |
| 1712 | 19 | 48 | 67 | 1759 | 16 | 55 | 71 |
| 1713 | 24 | 42 | 66 | 1760 | 21 | 60 | 72 |
| 1714 | 17 | 47 | 64 | 1761 | 18 | 53 | 71 |
| 1715 | 21 | 61 | 82 | 1762 | 14 | 45 | 59 |
| 1716 | 11 | 55 | 66 | 1763 | 22 | 50 | 72 |
| 1717 | 23 | 66 | 89 | 1764 | 28 | 50 | 78 |
| 1718 | 26 | 62 | 88 | 1765 | 10 | 57 | 67 |
| 1719 | 27 | 63 | 90 | 1766 | 14 | 50 | 64 |
| 1720 | 20 | 67 | 87 | 1767 | 25 | 50 | 75 |
| 1721 | 28 | 76 | 104 | 1768 | 26 | 40 | 66 |
| 1722 | 33 | 68 | 101 | 1769 | 35 | 57 | 92 |
| 1723 | 20 | 76 | 96 | 1770 | 26 | 52 | 78 |
| 1724 | 15 | 73 | 88 | 1771 | 46 | 48 | 94 |
| 1725 | 8 | 65 | 73 | 1772 | 60 | 58 | 118 |
| 1726 | 13 | 15 | 88 | 1773 | 59 | 54 | 113 |
| 1727 | 6 | 77 | 83 | 1774 | 73 | 53 | 126 |
| 1728 | 12 | 69 | 81 | 1775 | 64 | 56 | 120 |
| 1729 | 8 | 73 | 81 | 1776 | 65 | 58 | 123 |
| 1730 | 11 | 56 | 67 | 1777 | 67 | 45 | 112 |
| 1731 | 10 | 73 | 83 | 1778 | 66 | 51 | 117 |
| 1732 | 16 | 61 | 77 | 1779 | 65 | 48 | 113 |
| 1733 | 10 | 66 | 76 | 1780 | 64 | 44 | 108 |
| 1734 | 12 | 69 | 81 | 1781 | 59 | 29 | 88 |
| 1735 | 10 | 74 | 84 | 1782 | 93 | 14 | 107 |
| 1736 | 11 | 57 | 68 | 1783 | 151 | 20 | 171 |
| 1737 | 9 | 78 | 87 | 1784 | 122 | 49 | 171 |
| 1738 | 12 | 77 | 89 | 1785 | 117 | 53 | 170 |
| 1739 | 11 | 64 | 75 | 1786 | 74 | 72 | 146 |
| 1740 | 12 | 50 | 62 | 1787 | 90 | 70 | 160 |
| 1741 | 13 | 60 | 73 | 1788 | 106 | 68 | 174 |
| 1742 | 20 | 50 | 70 | 1789 | 113 | 76 | 189 |
| 1743 | 16 | 46 | 62 | 1790 | 101 | 56 | 157 |
| 1744 | 27 | 54 | 81 | 1791 | 119 | 64 | 183 |
| 1745 | 18 | 53 | 71 | 1792 | 94 | 60 | 154 |
| 1746 | 11 | 53 | 64 | 1793 | 75 | 53 | 128 |

Source: Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 333-5.

Appendix 5, Table 1
Exports on behalf of the VOC: money value in guilders
(1749 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>total</u> | <u>grains & pulses</u> | <u>wines</u> | <u>stock products¹</u> | <u>other²</u> |
|-------------|--------------|--------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1749 | 55760 | 16592 | 39168 | | |
| 1750 | 59922 | 36498 | 23424 | | |
| 1751 | 135457 | 72865 | 62592 | | |
| 1752 | 174436 | 112804 | 61632 | | |
| 1753 | 93863 | 69479 | 24384 | | |
| 1754 | 166192 | 127269 | 38174 | 747 | |
| 1755 | 204395 | 119352 | 75336 | 9459 | 245 |
| 1756 | 180961 | 95465 | 70032 | 15216 | 245 |
| 1757 | 113067 | 51334 | 56460 | 5042 | 172 |
| 1758 | 138773 | 78945 | 46464 | 13359 | |
| 1759 | 127146 | 94374 | 32454 | 316 | |
| 1760 | 136075 | 90884 | 42012 | 2950 | 226 |
| 1761 | 114811 | 65791 | 39053 | 9731 | 233 |
| 1762 | 100249 | 24355 | 56571 | 19231 | 88 |
| 1763 | 169125 | 94865 | 49066 | 25136 | 56 |
| 1764 | 107556 | 48286 | 45456 | 13810 | |
| 1765 | 89389 | 21945 | 48900 | 18538 | |
| 1766 | 159047 | 110564 | 42912 | 5567 | |
| 1767 | 127441 | 79603 | 42240 | 5591 | |
| 1768 | 116045 | 71584 | 42432 | 2025 | |
| 1769 | 126002 | 81523 | 41760 | 2720 | |
| 1770 | 131453 | 85467 | 37004 | 8975 | |
| 1771 | 120499 | 73417 | 38126 | 8953 | |
| 1772 | 152306 | 99945 | 44396 | 7957 | |
| 1773 | 198498 | 141912 | 41050 | 15527 | |
| 1774 | 223778 | 171282 | 40206 | 12280 | |
| 1775 | 182858 | 140230 | 34188 | 8430 | |
| 1776 | 213982 | 166841 | 39921 | 7210 | |
| 1777 | 140072 | 97429 | 40194 | 2118 | 321 |
| 1778 | 111318 | 78193 | 29392 | 3724 | |
| 1779 | 214382 | 159868 | 46112 | 6753 | 1638 |
| 1780 | 153900 | 114592 | 34727 | 3444 | 1131 |
| 1781 | 147911 | 115159 | 27878 | 3748 | 1121 |
| 1782 | 34283 | 25374 | 1144 | 7765 | |
| 1783 | 66714 | 16639 | 29524 | 20547 | |
| 1784 | 30330 | NIL | 19690 | 10640 | |
| 1785 | 48097 | 590 | 32428 | 15079 | |
| 1786 | 43398 | NIL | 35145 | 8253 | |
| 1787 | 82397 | 17078 | 45953 | 19366 | |
| 1788 | 144433 | 70811 | 54340 | 17431 | 1851 |
| 1789 | 74518 | 1463 | 56661 | 12589 | 3805 |
| 1790 | 78406 | 17613 | 43296 | 12317 | 5180 |
| 1791 | 144140 | 70718 | 45408 | 18839 | 9175 |
| 1792 | 58509 | 9639 | 30811 | 11350 | 6709 |
| 1793 | 133287 | 56783 | 60368 | 16136 | |

N.B. The prices and money value of the various products are only known for the period 1754-1783. The figures for 1749-53 and 1784-93 were calculated on the basis of the prices for 1753-4 and the early 1780s respectively, and are thus not completely accurate. Also, rounding off can lead to small discrepancies.

1 Butter, tallow, fat, meat and bacon.

2 Prices and money value of ivory exported are unknown.

Appendix 5, Table 2

Exports of grains, overwhelmingly wheat, in *mudden* (1706 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1706 | 1400 | 1736 | N.A. | 1766 | 16613 |
| 1707 | 4005 | 1737 | 5550 | 1767 | 11941 |
| 1708 | 5310 | 1738 | N.A. | 1768 | 10838 |
| 1709 | 3839 | 1739 | NIL | 1769 | 12312 |
| 1710 | 3446 | 1740 | NIL | 1770 | 14240 |
| 1711 | NIL | 1741 | 18963 | 1771 | 12335 |
| 1712 | NIL | 1742 | 16743 | 1772 | 16972 |
| 1713 | 2769 | 1743 | 10212 | 1773 | 28266 |
| 1714 | 4375 | 1744 | 5828 | 1774 | 33047 |
| 1715 | 6300 | 1745 | 10064 | 1775 | 28004 |
| 1716 | 5548 | 1746 | 17483 | 1776 | 35857 |
| 1717 | 6563 | 1747 | 10508 | 1777 | 17824 |
| 1718 | 6563 | 1748 | 6438 | 1778 | 12987 |
| 1719 | 1750 | 1749 | 2441 | 1779 | 32074 |
| 1720 | 55 | 1750 | 4732 | 1780 | 22566 |
| 1721 | 35 | 1751 | 10035 | 1781 | 23401 |
| 1722 | 3500 | 1752 | 15300 | 1782 | 4082 |
| 1723 | 4375 | 1753 | 9361 | 1783 | 2759 |
| 1724 | 3500 | 1754 | 18401 | 1784 | NIL |
| 1725 | 7000 | 1755 | 17663 | 1785 | 100 |
| 1726 | NIL | 1756 | 14248 | 1786 | NIL |
| 1727 | NIL | 1757 | 7813 | 1787 | 2686 |
| 1728 | 3675 | 1758 | 12099 | 1788 | 12040 |
| 1729 | 5550 | 1759 | 14740 | 1789 | 74 |
| 1730 | 2775 | 1760 | 13764 | 1790 | 2762 |
| 1731 | 6660 | 1761 | 10114 | 1791 | 11937 |
| 1732 | 6475 | 1762 | 12964 | 1792 | 1613 |
| 1733 | 10175 | 1763 | 14470 | 1793 | 9679 |
| 1734 | 8000 | 1764 | 6930 | | |
| 1735 | N.A. | 1765 | 2905 | | |

Appendix 5, Table 3

Exports of peas and beans, in *mudden* (1710 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1710 | 16 | 1758 | 116 | 1776 | 125 |
| | | 1759 | 5 | 1777 | 220 |
| | | 1760 | 227 | 1778 | 157 |
| 1743 | 3460 | 1761 | 116 | 1779 | 113 |
| 1744 | 999 | 1762 | 111 | 1780 | 105 |
| 1745 | 1240 | 1763 | 185 | 1781 | 125 |
| 1746 | 1314 | 1764 | 370 | 1782 | 125 |
| 1747 | NIL | 1765 | 296 | 1783 | 42 |
| 1748 | 222 | 1766 | 389 | 1784 | NIL |
| 1749 | 74 | 1767 | 291 | 1785 | NIL |
| 1750 | 629 | 1768 | 190 | 1786 | NIL |
| 1751 | 855 | 1769 | 236 | 1787 | 130 |
| 1752 | 1241 | 1770 | 164 | 1788 | 46 |
| 1753 | 777 | 1771 | 74 | 1789 | 98 |
| 1754 | 851 | 1772 | 90 | 1790 | 144 |
| 1755 | 555 | 1773 | 91 | 1791 | 46 |
| 1756 | 375 | 1774 | 123 | 1792 | 28 |
| 1757 | 116 | 1775 | 126 | 1793 | 12 |

Appendix 5, Table 1
Exports on behalf of the VOC: money value in guilders
(1749 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>total</u> | <u>grains & pulses</u> | <u>wines</u> | <u>stock products¹</u> | <u>other²</u> |
|-------------|--------------|--------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1749 | 55760 | 16592 | 39168 | | |
| 1750 | 59922 | 36498 | 23424 | | |
| 1751 | 135457 | 72865 | 62592 | | |
| 1752 | 174436 | 112804 | 61632 | | |
| 1753 | 93863 | 69479 | 24384 | | |
| 1754 | 166192 | 127269 | 38174 | 747 | |
| 1755 | 204395 | 119352 | 75336 | 9459 | 245 |
| 1756 | 180961 | 95465 | 70032 | 15216 | 245 |
| 1757 | 113067 | 51334 | 56460 | 5042 | 172 |
| 1758 | 138773 | 78945 | 46464 | 13359 | |
| 1759 | 127146 | 94374 | 32454 | 316 | |
| 1760 | 136075 | 90884 | 42012 | 2950 | 226 |
| 1761 | 114811 | 65791 | 39053 | 9731 | 233 |
| 1762 | 100249 | 24355 | 56571 | 19231 | 88 |
| 1763 | 169125 | 94865 | 49066 | 25136 | 56 |
| 1764 | 107556 | 48286 | 45456 | 13810 | |
| 1765 | 89389 | 21945 | 48900 | 18538 | |
| 1766 | 159047 | 110564 | 42912 | 5567 | |
| 1767 | 127441 | 79603 | 42240 | 5591 | |
| 1768 | 116045 | 71584 | 42432 | 2025 | |
| 1769 | 126002 | 81523 | 41760 | 2720 | |
| 1770 | 131453 | 85467 | 37004 | 8975 | |
| 1771 | 120499 | 73417 | 38126 | 8953 | |
| 1772 | 152306 | 99945 | 44396 | 7957 | |
| 1773 | 198498 | 141912 | 41050 | 15527 | |
| 1774 | 223778 | 171282 | 40206 | 12280 | |
| 1775 | 182858 | 140230 | 34188 | 8430 | |
| 1776 | 213982 | 166841 | 39921 | 7210 | |
| 1777 | 140072 | 97429 | 40194 | 2118 | |
| 1778 | 111318 | 78193 | 29392 | 3724 | 321 |
| 1779 | 214382 | 159868 | 46112 | 6753 | 1638 |
| 1780 | 153900 | 114592 | 34727 | 3444 | 1131 |
| 1781 | 147911 | 115159 | 27878 | 3748 | 1121 |
| 1782 | 34283 | 25374 | 1144 | 7765 | |
| 1783 | 66714 | 16639 | 29524 | 20547 | |
| 1784 | 30330 | NIL | 19690 | 10640 | |
| 1785 | 48097 | 590 | 32428 | 15079 | |
| 1786 | 43398 | NIL | 35145 | 8253 | |
| 1787 | 82397 | 17078 | 45953 | 19366 | |
| 1788 | 144433 | 70811 | 54340 | 17431 | 1851 |
| 1789 | 74518 | 1463 | 56661 | 12589 | 3805 |
| 1790 | 78406 | 17613 | 43296 | 12317 | 5180 |
| 1791 | 144140 | 70718 | 45408 | 18839 | 9175 |
| 1792 | 58509 | 9639 | 30811 | 11350 | 6709 |
| 1793 | 133287 | 56783 | 60368 | 16136 | |

N.B. The prices and money value of the various products are only known for the period 1754-1783. The figures for 1749-53 and 1784-93 were calculated on the basis of the prices for 1753-4 and the early 1780s respectively, and are thus not completely accurate. Also, rounding off can lead to small discrepancies.

1 Butter, tallow, fat, meat and bacon.

2 Prices and money value of ivory exported are unknown.

Appendix 5, Table 2

Exports of grains, overwhelmingly wheat, in *mudden* (1706 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1706 | 1400 | 1736 | N.A. | 1766 | 16613 |
| 1707 | 4005 | 1737 | 5550 | 1767 | 11941 |
| 1708 | 5310 | 1738 | N.A. | 1768 | 10838 |
| 1709 | 3839 | 1739 | NIL | 1769 | 12312 |
| 1710 | 3446 | 1740 | NIL | 1770 | 14240 |
| 1711 | NIL | 1741 | 18963 | 1771 | 12335 |
| 1712 | NIL | 1742 | 16743 | 1772 | 16972 |
| 1713 | 2769 | 1743 | 10212 | 1773 | 28266 |
| 1714 | 4375 | 1744 | 5828 | 1774 | 33047 |
| 1715 | 6300 | 1745 | 10064 | 1775 | 28004 |
| 1716 | 5548 | 1746 | 17483 | 1776 | 35857 |
| 1717 | 6563 | 1747 | 10508 | 1777 | 17824 |
| 1718 | 6563 | 1748 | 6438 | 1778 | 12987 |
| 1719 | 1750 | 1749 | 2441 | 1779 | 32074 |
| 1720 | 55 | 1750 | 4732 | 1780 | 22566 |
| 1721 | 35 | 1751 | 10035 | 1781 | 23401 |
| 1722 | 3500 | 1752 | 15300 | 1782 | 4082 |
| 1723 | 4375 | 1753 | 9361 | 1783 | 2759 |
| 1724 | 3500 | 1754 | 18401 | 1784 | NIL |
| 1725 | 7000 | 1755 | 17663 | 1785 | 100 |
| 1726 | NIL | 1756 | 14248 | 1786 | NIL |
| 1727 | NIL | 1757 | 7813 | 1787 | 2686 |
| 1728 | 3675 | 1758 | 12099 | 1788 | 12040 |
| 1729 | 5550 | 1759 | 14740 | 1789 | 74 |
| 1730 | 2775 | 1760 | 13764 | 1790 | 2762 |
| 1731 | 6660 | 1761 | 10114 | 1791 | 11937 |
| 1732 | 6475 | 1762 | 12964 | 1792 | 1613 |
| 1733 | 10175 | 1763 | 14470 | 1793 | 9679 |
| 1734 | 8000 | 1764 | 6930 | | |
| 1735 | N.A. | 1765 | 2905 | | |

Appendix 5, Table 3

Exports of peas and beans, in *mudden* (1710 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1710 | 16 | 1758 | 116 | 1776 | 125 |
| | | 1759 | 5 | 1777 | 220 |
| | | 1760 | 227 | 1778 | 157 |
| 1743 | 3460 | 1761 | 116 | 1779 | 113 |
| 1744 | 999 | 1762 | 111 | 1780 | 105 |
| 1745 | 1240 | 1763 | 185 | 1781 | 125 |
| 1746 | 1314 | 1764 | 370 | 1782 | 125 |
| 1747 | NIL | 1765 | 296 | 1783 | 42 |
| 1748 | 222 | 1766 | 389 | 1784 | NIL |
| 1749 | 74 | 1767 | 291 | 1785 | NIL |
| 1750 | 629 | 1768 | 190 | 1786 | NIL |
| 1751 | 855 | 1769 | 236 | 1787 | 130 |
| 1752 | 1241 | 1770 | 164 | 1788 | 46 |
| 1753 | 777 | 1771 | 74 | 1789 | 98 |
| 1754 | 851 | 1772 | 90 | 1790 | 144 |
| 1755 | 555 | 1773 | 91 | 1791 | 46 |
| 1756 | 375 | 1774 | 123 | 1792 | 28 |
| 1757 | 116 | 1775 | 126 | 1793 | 12 |

Appendix 5, Table 4
Exports of wines, in *amen* (1748 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1748 | 2000 | 1763 | 1765 | 1778 | 1226 |
| 1749 | 1632 | 1764 | 1812 | 1779 | 2000 |
| 1750 | 976 | 1765 | 1894 | 1780 | 1393 |
| 1751 | 2608 | 1766 | 1712 | 1781 | 1158 |
| 1752 | 2568 | 1767 | 1652 | 1782 | 49 |
| 1753 | 1016 | 1768 | 1632 | 1783 | 1113 |
| 1754 | 1941 | 1769 | 1612 | 1784 | 860 |
| 1755 | 3121 | 1770 | 1552 | 1785 | 1404 |
| 1756 | 2772 | 1771 | 1612 | 1786 | 1580 |
| 1757 | 2065 | 1772 | 1920 | 1787 | 2010 |
| 1758 | 1803 | 1773 | 1780 | 1788 | 2393 |
| 1759 | 1307 | 1774 | 1792 | 1789 | 2461 |
| 1760 | 1727 | 1775 | 1444 | 1790 | 1880 |
| 1761 | 1361 | 1776 | 1748 | 1791 | 1994 |
| 1762 | 2345 | 1777 | 1708 | 1792 | 1354 |
| | | | | 1793 | 2655 |

Appendix 5, Table 5
Exports of butter, in *ponden* (1754 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1754 | 1868 | 1768 | 5787 | 1781 | 9698 |
| 1755 | 28171 | 1769 | 7774 | 1782 | 14837 |
| 1756 | 37058 | 1770 | 27978 | 1783 | 27633 |
| 1757 | 11113 | 1771 | 27910 | 1784 | 25951 |
| 1758 | 29755 | 1772 | 22985 | 1785 | 36777 |
| 1759 | NIL | 1773 | 23165 | 1786 | 20129 |
| 1760 | 7377 | 1774 | 11953 | 1787 | 42937 |
| 1761 | 15884 | 1775 | 10086 | 1788 | 32025 |
| 1762 | 31413 | 1776 | 10134 | 1789 | 26475 |
| 1763 | 56294 | 1777 | NIL | 1790 | 22686 |
| 1764 | 33967 | 1778 | 11256 | 1791 | 42190 |
| 1765 | 49451 | 1779 | 10026 | 1792 | 27682 |
| 1766 | 15906 | 1780 | 7039 | 1793 | 39355 |
| 1767 | 15978 | | | | |

Appendix 5, Table 6
Exports of fat, meat and bacon, in *ponden* (1756 - 1783)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1756 | 4100 | 1761 | 2100 | 1782 | 7667 |
| 1757 | 6225 | 1762 | 4000 | 1783 | 42960 |
| 1758 | 15200 | 1763 | N.A. | | |
| 1759 | 3300 | 1764 | 1560 | | |
| | | 1765 | 7970 | | |

Appendix 5, Table 7
Exports of tallow, in *ponden* (1772 - 1791)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1772 | 5300 | 1777 | 19265 | 1787 | 11746 |
| 1773 | 73610 | 1778 | 1040 | 1788 | 28673 |
| 1774 | 76790 | 1779 | 29150 | 1789 | 11562 |
| 1775 | 47240 | 1780 | 8463 | 1790 | 20105 |
| 1776 | 36000 | 1781 | 4144 | 1791 | 10276 |

Appendix 5, Table 8

Exports of aloe, in *ponden* (1779 - 1792)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1779 | 3944 | 1788 | 5004 |
| 1780 | 3883 | 1789 | 10283 |
| 1781 | 3056 | 1790 | 14000 |
| | | 1791 | 24797 |
| | | 1792 | 18132 |

Appendix 5, Table 9

Exports of ivory, in *ponden* (1788 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|
| 1788 | 2038 |
| 1789 | 2493 |
| 1790 | 801 |
| 1791 | N.A. |
| 1792 | 701 |
| 1793 | 416 |

N.B. In fact much more ivory must have been exported than is indicated by the official figures.

Appendix 5, Table 10

Exports of train oil, in *amen* (1755 - 1763)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1755 | 12 | 1760 | 12 |
| 1756 | 12 | 1761 | 12 |
| 1757 | 16 | 1762 | 5 |
| | | 1763 | 3 |

Appendix 5, Table 11

Exports of wax, in *ponden* (1777 - 1779)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|
| 1777 | 1000 |
| 1779 | 600 |

Appendix 6, Table 1
 Agricultural production, total Cape Colony (1701 - 1795), 1

| Year | vines | leggers | | wheat(mudden) | | barley(mudden) | | rye(mudden) | |
|------|----------------------|---------|---------------------|--------------------|--------|----------------|-------|-------------|--|
| | | wine | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | |
| 1701 | 1664400 | 1135 | 646 | 3868 | 58.5 | 584 | 365 | 2496 | |
| 1702 | 1648650 | 1025 | 612.25 | 4528.5 | 55 | 475 | 350.5 | 2873 | |
| 1703 | 1746000 | 970.5 | 631.5 | 4107.5 | 50 | 359 | 297 | 1783 | |
| 1704 | 1852000 | 1032.5 | 572 | 4044 | 54.5 | 516 | 249.5 | 1999 | |
| 1705 | 1917800 | 1076 | 841.75 | 2339.75 | 45.25 | 144.5 | 450 | 910 | |
| 1706 | 1912050 | 1132 | 717.5 | 4331 | 55.5 | 546 | 261 | 1673 | |
| 1707 | 1895600 | 1356 | 769 | 6059 | 50.75 | 549 | 291.5 | 2536 | |
| 1708 | 1998500 | 1288 | 900.75 | 8472 | 23.75 | 282 | 396 | 4021 | |
| 1709 | 2258300 | 1411.5 | 1312 | 7364 ⁴ | 64.75 | 521 | 305 | 1299 | |
| 1710 | 2729300 | 1190 | 1582.5 | 20264 ⁵ | 73.5 | 1107 | 375 | 175 | |
| 1711 | 2891600 | 1094.5 | 1737.5 ² | 11468 ⁶ | 100.5 | 1407 | 168 | 520 | |
| 1712 | 2488500 | 1036.5 | 1527.5 | 12652.5 | 105.5 | 1168 | 148.5 | 700 | |
| 1713 | 2701500 | 1816.5 | 1437 ³ | 13066 ⁷ | 79.5 | 886 | 141 | 822 | |
| 1714 | 2282160 | 1617 | 1284.5 | 12360 | 62 | 647 | 116.5 | 164 | |
| 1715 | 2819600 ¹ | 1347.5 | 1435 | 9181 ⁸ | 69.75 | 904 | 25 | 140 | |
| 1716 | 2092900 | 1148.5 | 1576.25 | 16087.5 | 89.5 | 982.5 | 73.5 | 458 | |
| 1717 | 2333100 | 1111 | 1627 | 15319 | 87.5 | 1296.5 | 42.5 | 359 | |
| 1718 | 2264100 | 1386 | 1543.5 | 13193.5 | 68 | 748 | 35.5 | 284 | |
| 1719 | 2342250 | 1104.25 | 1539 | 12295 | 69 | 979.5 | 52.5 | 239 | |
| 1720 | 2182100 | 677.5 | 1554.5 | 8884 | 83.25 | 964 | 42 | 212 | |
| 1721 | 2322400 | 1177.5 | 1787 | 10041.25 | 122 | 1424.5 | 57 | 319 | |
| 1722 | 2261700 | 1006 | 1575.5 | 13827 | 100.5 | 1485.5 | 64 | 367 | |
| 1723 | 2379200 | 1625.5 | 1754.5 | 16209 | 127 | 1672.5 | 64 | 485 | |
| 1724 | 2349400 | 1096.75 | 1590 | 14803 | 109.5 | 1664 | 42 | 351 | |
| 1725 | 2344300 | 1133 | 1718.5 | 15403 | 86.25 | 982 | 52 | 327 | |
| 1726 | 2282900 | 1068 | 1954 | 7530.5 | 107.5 | 954 | 53.5 | 357 | |
| 1727 | 2308000 | 1025.5 | 2102 | 8775.5 | 115.5 | 1469 | 73.5 | 489 | |
| 1728 | 2169500 | 1012.5 | 2322.25 | 11265 | 113.25 | 1300 | 72 | 512 | |
| 1729 | 2247400 | 1040.25 | 2093.75 | 16386.5 | 118.75 | 1684 | 125 | 1338 | |
| 1730 | 2355300 | 1336.5 | 2536.75 | 12927.25 | 220.25 | 3308 | 179.5 | 1410 | |
| 1731 | 2363200 | 1624 | 2325.25 | 16662 | 189.75 | 2665 | 163 | 1759 | |
| 1732 | 2287100 | 1458 | 2356.5 | 19669 | 178 | 2480 | 207 | 2617 | |
| 1733 | 2454500 | 1405 | 2433 | 21880 | 147 | 1967 | 107 | 1092 | |
| 1734 | 2336300 | 1272.5 | 2343 | 18871 | 151 | 2301 | 94 | 986 | |
| 1735 | 2783400 | 1889.5 | 2562 | 20309 | 184 | 2185 | 83 | 832 | |
| 1736 | 2797900 | 1289 | 2512.5 | 17268.5 | 152.5 | 1809 | 97.5 | 878 | |
| 1737 | 2739000 | 1569.5 | 2465 | 14932.5 | 148 | 1687 | 155 | 1622 | |
| 1738 | 2573500 | 963.5 | 2579 | 15765 | 226 | 2582 | 155 | 1320 | |
| 1739 | 2333700 | 860.5 | 2951.5 | 8196 | 189.5 | 1093.5 | 154.5 | 902 | |
| 1740 | 2425300 | 937.5 | 3673 | 9631 | 382.25 | 4755 | 259.5 | 995 | |
| 1741 | 2353000 | 1028.5 | 3139.5 | 29762 | 217 | 3041 | 179 | 2040 | |
| 1742 | 2404100 | 1204.5 | 3333 | 26232 | 210.5 | 2884 | 144.5 | 1583 | |
| 1743 | 2670000 | 1981.5 | 3136.5 | 21357 | 204.5 | 2848 | 157 | 1360 | |
| 1744 | 2840000 | 2188 | 2864 | 19675 | 179.5 | 2651 | 74 | 642 | |
| 1745 | 3033500 | 2070.5 | 3276 | 27438 | 211 | 3299 | 157.5 | 1175 | |
| 1746 | 3150000 | 2086.5 | 2939.5 | 23670 | 157.5 | 2149 | 96 | 1026 | |
| 1747 | 3317000 | 2909.5 | 2698.5 | 19270 | 152.5 | 1878 | 84 | 1018 | |
| 1748 | 3224500 | 2347.5 | 2624 | 19767 | 171 | 2647 | 70.5 | 828 | |
| 1749 | 3486700 | 2132.5 | 2577.5 | 13271 | 253.5 | 2887 | 79 | 521 | |
| 1750 | 3958000 | 4316 | 2356 | 12116 | 228.5 | 2518 | 90 | 788 | |

Agricultural production, total, 2

| Year | vines | leggers | | wheat(mudden) | | barley(mudden) | | rye(mudden) | |
|------|---------------|---------|-------------------|---------------------|-------|----------------|------|-------------|--|
| | | wine | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | |
| 1751 | 3847000 | 2970.5 | 2434 | 17127 | 287.5 | 4351 | 104 | 1225 | |
| 1752 | 3971500 | 2050.5 | 2673 ⁹ | 21221 | 293 | 4359 | 88.5 | 1047 | |
| 1753 | 4167500 | 1909 | 2728.5 | 22396 | 197.5 | 2390 | 78.5 | 493 | |
| 1754 | 4148000 | 2267.5 | 2722 | 25375 | 214 | 3332 | 65.5 | 904 | |
| 1755 | 4607500 | 3321 | 2444 | 16770 | 219 | 2765 | 87 | 1097 | |
| 1756 | 4720000 | 4130 | 2374 | 19031 | 228 | 3653 | 57 | 708 | |
| 1757 | 4583000 | 3019 | 2299 | 11813 | 158.5 | 1787 | 45 | 353 | |
| 1758 | 4691000 | 3272.5 | 2986 | 20463 | 197 | 3195 | 57.5 | 819 | |
| 1759 | 4620000 | 1831 | 2240 | 14353 | 170 | 2188 | 48 | 595 | |
| 1760 | 4734000 | 2830 | 2173 | 14871 | 161 | 1981 | 16 | 184 | |
| 1761 | 4577600 | 2767.5 | 2351 | 20128 | 177 | 2503 | 25 | 334 | |
| 1762 | 4396000 | 1998.5 | 2308 | 16532 | 174 | 2218 | 25 | 252 | |
| 1763 | 4714000 | 2805.5 | 2370 | 19530 | 191.5 | 2252 | 35 | 377 | |
| 1764 | 5103000 | 3730 | 1944 | 9964 ¹⁰ | 192 | 1895 | 27.5 | 216 | |
| 1765 | 5071000 | 2786 | 1962 | 8653 | 256 | 2422 | 24 | 211 | |
| 1766 | 5155900 | 3406 | 2933 | 23073 | 369 | 3660 | 10 | 89 | |
| 1767 | 5265000 | 3521 | 2538 | 15178 | 209 | 2250 | 26.5 | 389 | |
| 1768 | 5815000 | 3772 | 2497 | 13914 | 184 | 1818 | 11 | 166 | |
| 1769 | 5852000 | 4624.5 | 2303 | 12953 | 163 | 1652 | 1 | 10 | |
| 1770 | 5853000 | 3976 | 2374 | 14276 | 165 | 1605 | 4 | 65 | |
| 1771 | 5976000 | 3784 | 2557 | 14244 | 169 | 1714 | 1 | 5 | |
| 1772 | 5761000 | 1934.5 | 2780 | 17480 | 226 | 2126 | 19 | 216 | |
| 1773 | 7240000 | 5332 | 3172 | 24775 | 170 | 1830 | 4 | 52 | |
| 1774 | 6809000 | 2611 | 3095 | 18824 | 204 | 2356 | 3 | 30 | |
| 1775 | 6293000 | 5528 | 3001 | 17440 | 190 | 2033 | 2 | 20 | |
| 1776 | 8271200 | 4223 | 2828 | 17345 | 216 | 2086 | 2 | 10 | |
| 1777 | 7875000 | 2782 | 3374 | 18639 | 226 | 1890 | 3 | 30 | |
| 1778 | 7673600 | 4525 | 2951 | 17350 | 160 | 1480 | 2 | 20 | |
| 1779 | 7809000 | 5152 | 3406 | 19986 | 155 | 1600 | 8 | 100 | |
| 1780 | 7701600 | 5074 | 3154 | 19480 | 160 | 1640 | 4 | 50 | |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1782 | 7642100 | 2868 | 2632 | 13400 | 222 | 1580 | - | - | |
| 1783 | 7925000 | 3245.5 | 2658 | 14983 | 168 | 1400 | - | - | |
| 1784 | 8004000 | 4462 | 2392 | 12266 | 166 | 1250 | 2 | 20 | |
| 1785 | 8357500 | 4879 | 2336 | 11485 | 126 | 1160 | - | - | |
| 1786 | 8728000 | 5519 | 2108 | 4070 | 180 | 780 | - | - | |
| 1787 | 12037300 | 8873 | 2708 | 11110 | 1178 | 4371 | 2 | 20 | |
| 1788 | 9565000 | 7186 | 3257 | 22280 | 439 | 3539 | 17 | 215 | |
| 1789 | 9101000 | 5070 | 3016 | 13210 | 562 | 2945 | 4 | 30 | |
| 1790 | 9620000 | 5860 | 2746 | 19680 | 597 | 5990 | 4 | 25 | |
| 1791 | 10111400 | 6158 | 3131 | 20566 | 189 | 2164 | 3 | 50 | |
| 1792 | 10010000 | 5259 | 2661 | 12809 | 151 | 453 | 30 | 330 | |
| 1793 | 9933300 | 5874 | 4571 | 29597 | 332 | 1871 | 21 | 146 | |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1795 | 9972410 | 6271.5 | 3336 | 22936 ¹¹ | 138 | 1735 | 18 | 216 | |

N.B. The figures for barley and rye are not available after 1777, but they can be calculated on the basis of the district figures. Except for the years immediately after the harvest failure of 1786, when efforts were made, primarily in the Cape district, to make up for the prevailing scarcity of grain, a declining trend can be observed in the production of these crops during the latter part of the century. It is not likely that this is the result of greater evasion than in the case of wheat.

Notes for Appendix 6, Table 1.

- 1 Changed from 5819600 (error Cape district).
- 2 Changed from 1732.5 (error in total).
- 3 Changed from 1837 (error Cape district).
- 4 Another 5756 *mud* "bread and seed corn" is mentioned in the *opgaaf*, so that in total 13120 *mud* was reaped.
- 5 11701 *mud* "bread and seed corn" reaped, so the total was 31965 *mud*.
- 6 9058 *mud* "bread and seed corn" reaped, so the total was 20526 *mud*.
- 7 7448 *mud* "bread and seed corn" reaped, so the total was 20514 *mud*.
- 8 5700 *mud* "bread and seed corn" reaped, so the total was 14881 *mud*.
- 9 Changed from 2773 (error in total).
- 10 Changed from 9864 (error in total).
- 11 Changed from 32936 (see chapter III, footnote 6).

Appendix 6, Table 2
 Agricultural production, Cape district (1701 - 1795), 1

| Year | vines | leggers | | wheat(mudden) | | barley(mudden) | | rye(mudden) | |
|------|----------------------|---------|------------------|-------------------|--------|----------------|-------|-------------|--|
| | | wine | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | |
| 1701 | 644500 | 350 | 223.5 | 1480 | 27 | 313 | 81.5 | 698 | |
| 1702 | 626500 | 246 | 165 | 1272 | 17.25 | 159 | 71 | 694 | |
| 1703 | 708500 | 300 | 163 | 1118 | 19.25 | 128 | 64.5 | 482 | |
| 1704 | 763000 | 276 | 151 | 1191 | 15 | 127 | 70.5 | 692 | |
| 1705 | 723000 | 286 | 232 | 845 | 18.5 | 88 | 96 | 372 | |
| 1706 | 692550 | 346 | 171.5 | 1059 | 20 | 222 | 60.5 | 386 | |
| 1707 | 699500 | 380 | 218 | 1858 | 23.5 | 318 | 96 | 1014 | |
| 1708 | 752100 | 427 | 368.5 | 3960 | 15.5 | 192 | 158 | 1874 | |
| 1709 | 936800 | 503.5 | 471.5 | 4066 | 37.5 | 327 | 116 | 773 | |
| 1710 | 978000 | 408 | 553.5 | 8165 ⁴ | 39.5 | 280 | 158.5 | 75 | |
| 1711 | 1211400 | 424.5 | 678.5 | 5158 ⁵ | 63 | 695.5 | 64.5 | 266 | |
| 1712 | 941500 | 431.5 | 486 | 4565 | 47.5 | 622 | 40 | 271 | |
| 1713 | 1100500 | 664 | 544 ³ | 4941 ⁶ | 43 | 540 | 51.5 | 292 | |
| 1714 | 767000 | 514 | 403 | 4454 | 33.5 | 399 | 21 | 5 | |
| 1715 | 1394000 ¹ | 537 | 472.5 | 3987 ⁷ | 42.25 | 616 | 13 | 70 | |
| 1716 | 687600 | 436.5 | 440.5 | 5893 | 41.5 | 623 | 26.5 | 214 | |
| 1717 | 1020700 | 409.5 | 546 | 5788 | 54.5 | 907 | 16 | 170 | |
| 1718 | 843000 | 542 | 520.75 | 5347 | 32.5 | 415 | 11.5 | 147 | |
| 1719 | 917100 ² | 374 | 523.5 | 4537 | 37 | 548 | 14.5 | 102 | |
| 1720 | 803000 | 292 | 536 | 4343.25 | 43 | 487.5 | 10 | 86 | |
| 1721 | 909600 | 448.5 | 552.5 | 3587 | 68 | 796 | 14.5 | 113 | |
| 1722 | 918000 | 409.5 | 612 | 6677 | 59 | 921 | 12 | 132 | |
| 1723 | 1087000 | 737 | 776.5 | 8060 | 80 | 1161 | 12.5 | 125 | |
| 1724 | 1019900 | 436.5 | 713.5 | 7777 | 85.5 | 1351 | 7.5 | 56 | |
| 1725 | 1028300 | 443.5 | 692.5 | 7085 | 55.75 | 639 | 14.75 | 47 | |
| 1726 | 915100 | 395 | 732 | 3057 | 83.5 | 671 | 8 | 40 | |
| 1727 | 959500 | 433 | 847 | 3476 | 66.5 | 834 | 4.5 | 31 | |
| 1728 | 880800 | 501.5 | 875 | 5172 | 75.5 | 842 | 7.5 | 41 | |
| 1729 | 957000 | 527 | 864 | 6401 | 78 | 1180 | 16.5 | 257 | |
| 1730 | 991800 | 494 | 967.75 | 6256 | 131.75 | 2200 | 34.5 | 331 | |
| 1731 | 1002000 | 602 | 985.25 | 7347 | 126.75 | 1635 | 31 | 345 | |
| 1732 | 957000 | 571.5 | 1054.5 | 8467 | 121 | 1656 | 52 | 723 | |
| 1733 | 1092000 | 586 | 1043 | 9802 | 95 | 1288 | 13 | 158 | |
| 1734 | 1069300 | 498 | 1035 | 8973 | 99 | 1506 | 15 | 198 | |
| 1735 | 1382000 | 754 | 1179 | 9946 | 120 | 1435 | 11 | 132 | |
| 1736 | 1331500 | 551 | 1189 | 7849 | 108 | 1291 | 23 | 245 | |
| 1737 | 1285000 | 729.5 | 1110 | 7302 | 100 | 1164 | 39 | 525 | |
| 1738 | 1162000 | 387 | 1170 | 7424 | 161 | 1909 | 22 | 337 | |
| 1739 | 1003000 | 367.5 | 1283 | 3754 | 85 | 457 | 20 | 224 | |
| 1740 | 1113000 | 407.5 | 1639 | 4327 | 185.5 | 2402 | 51 | 263 | |
| 1741 | 1036000 | 446.5 | 1438 | 13578 | 132 | 2111 | 43.5 | 812 | |
| 1742 | 1064000 | 486 | 1668 | 12301 | 148.5 | 2219 | 38.5 | 581 | |
| 1743 | 1147000 | 775 | 1429 | 10232 | 119.5 | 1884 | 33 | 409 | |
| 1744 | 1193000 | 746 | 1278 | 9034 | 99.5 | 1853 | 23 | 229 | |
| 1745 | 1271000 | 628.5 | 1603 | 12769 | 128 | 2277 | 46.5 | 833 | |
| 1746 | 1318000 | 904 | 1490 | 13251 | 87 | 1567 | 42 | 618 | |
| 1747 | 1417000 | 1082 | 1404 | 10363 | 105.5 | 1443 | 25 | 425 | |
| 1748 | 1278500 | 851 | 1382 | 10913 | 123.5 | 2133 | 25.5 | 379 | |
| 1749 | 1377000 | 755.5 | 1271 | 7072 | 184 | 2191 | 21 | 233 | |
| 1750 | 1649000 | 1775 | 1194 | 6210 | 148 | 1746 | 35.5 | 368 | |

1 Changed from 4394000 (obviously an error).

2 Changed from 9171000 (as 1).

3 Changed from 944 (error, checked from list).

4 Also 4585 *mud* "bread and seed corn".

5 Also 3743 *mud* "bread and seed corn".

6 Also 2808 *mud* "bread and seed corn".

7 Also 1327 *mud* "bread and seed corn".

Agricultural production, Cape district, 2

| Year | vines | leggers | | wheat(mudden) | | barley(mudden) | | rye(mudden) | |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------|--|-------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
| | | wine | | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | sown | reaped |
| 1751 | 1493000 | 1267.5 | | 1280 | 9471 | 192.5 | 3135 | 38 | 525 |
| 1752 | 1558000 | 663 | | 1403 | 11523 | 200 | 3045 | 31.75 | 434 |
| 1753 | 1649000 | 536 | | 1394.5 | 11925 | 149.5 | 1905 | 31.5 | 215 |
| 1754 | 1624000 | 736 | | 1456 | 14891 | 175 | 2838 | 17 | 235 |
| 1755 | 1688500 | 992 | | 1317 | 10134 | 165 | 2180 | 36 | 501 |
| 1756 | 1797000 | 1424 | | 1352 | 12053 | 181 | 3124 | 20 | 299 |
| 1757 | 1671000 | 1049 | | 1333 | 7452 | 119.5 | 1348 | 9 | 58 |
| 1758 | 1755000 | 1149.5 | | 1887 | 12899 | 145 | 2480 | 19.25 | 319 |
| 1759 | 1616000 | 495 | | 1234 | 8256 | 142 | 1828 | 10 | 250 |
| 1760 | 1551000 | 787 | | 1237 | 8640 | 116 | 1502 | 6 | 68 |
| 1761 ¹ | 1511600 | 720.5 | | 1359 | 12377 | 142 | 1757 | 9 | 115 |
| 1762 | 1301000 | 541.5 | | 1412 | 11046 | 151 | 1838 | 12 | 126 |
| 1763 | 1339000 | 504.5 | | 1470 | 11891 | 148.5 | 1527 | 11 | 140 |
| 1764 | 1428000 | 699 | | 1214 | 6361 | 155 | 1525 | 24.5 | 176 |
| 1765 | 1304000 | 541 | | 1219 | 5224 | 210 | 1985 | 15 | 117 |
| 1766 | 1290900 | 687 | | 1595 | 12465 | 298 | 2785 | 5 | 57 |
| 1767 | 1259000 | 646 | | 1362 | 8574 | 159 | 1640 | 18.5 | 263 |
| 1768 | 1540000 | 737 | | 1282 | 7747 | 143 | 1388 | 5 | 91 |
| 1769 | 1256000 | 698.5 | | 1189 | 7849 | 131 | 1360 | 0 | 0 |
| 1770 | 1266000 | 637 | | 1157 | 7650 | 133 | 1265 | 3 | 45 |
| 1771 | 1200000 | 589 | | 1325 | 7654 | 131 | 1379 | 1 | 5 |
| 1772 | 1140000 | 338.5 | | 1466 | 9390 | 171 | 1786 | 7 | 91 |
| 1773 | 1860000 | 837 | | 1388 | 11365 | 122 | 1320 | 2 | 42 |
| 1774 | 1462000 | 476 | | 1352 | 9220 | 150 | 1906 | 3 | 30 |
| 1775 | 1350000 | 896 | | 1309 | 8100 | 137 | 1583 | - | - |
| 1776 | 1318200 | 575 | | 1248 | 8135 | 141 | 1566 | 2 | 10 |
| 1777 | 1447000 | 361 | | 1363 | 7839 | 184 | 1540 | - | - |
| 1778 | 1429600 | 557 | | 1131 | 5790 | 116 | 960 | - | - |
| 1779 | 1365000 | 753 | | 1380 | 8060 | 120 | 1220 | 4 | 50 |
| 1780 | 1257600 | 643 | | 1311 | 7880 | 131 | 1270 | 1 | 20 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1782 | 1311000 | 498 | | 1194 | 5940 | 190 | 1180 | - | - |
| 1783 | 1298000 | 400.5 | | 1243 | 6880 | 131 | 1080 | - | - |
| 1784 | 1241000 | 585 | | 1259 | 6138 | 145 | 1130 | - | - |
| 1785 | 1064500 | 416 | | 1142 | 5490 | 102 | 960 | - | - |
| 1786 | 1079000 | 476 | | 1388 | 1540 | 146 | 510 | - | - |
| 1787 | 1238800 | 653 | | 1550 | 5930 | 1138 | 3701 | 2 | 20 |
| 1788 | 1309000 | 649 | | 1968 | 12740 | 409 | 3179 | 16 | 185 |
| 1789 | 1095000 | 489 | | 1974 | 8300 | 550 | 2805 | 3 | 20 |
| 1790 | 1360000 | 603 | | 1676 | 14190 | 596 | 5980 | 4 | 25 |
| 1791 | 1272000 | 421 | | 2012 | 12771 | 146 | 1675 | - | - |
| 1792 | 1084000 ² | 619 | | 1649 | 7680 | 131 | 293 | 27 | 290 |
| 1793 | 863000 | 544 | | 3046 ³ | 18132 ⁴ | 326 | 1836 ⁶ | 18 | 106 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1795 | 898030 | 939.5 | | 1813 | 12780 ⁵ | 133 | 1715 | 15 | 187 |

1 Not available, but calculated as the total minus Stellenbosch and Drakenstein.

2 Changed from 100084000 (obviously an error; the correct figure can be calculated on the basis of the other returns).

3 Changed from 30046 (as 2).

4 Changed from 118132 (as 2).

5 Changed from 22780 (see Ch. III, ftn. 6).

6 Changed from 6836 (assumed to be an error).

Appendix 6, Table 3
 Agricultural production, Free Blacks, Cape district (1724 - 1773)

| Year | vines | <u>leggers</u> <u>wine</u> | <u>wheat(mudden)</u> | | <u>barley(mudden)</u> | |
|------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------|
| | | | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> |
| 1724 | | | 1 | 4 | | |
| 1725 | | | | | | |
| 1726 | | | 4 | 14 | | |
| 1727 | | | 12 | 14 | 2 | 15 |
| 1728 | | | 12 | 15 | 3 | 25 |
| 1729 | | | 5 | 20 | 2 | 12 |
| 1730 | | | 7 | 25 | 3 | 20 |
| 1731 | 6000 | | 15 | 30 | 8 | 10 |
| 1732 | 5000 | 0.5 | 8 | 30 | | |
| 1733 | | | 7 | 30 | 1 | 15 |
| 1734 | 5000 | 1 | 4 | 10 | | |
| 1735 | | | 4 | 15 | | |
| 1736 | | | 4 | 30 | | |
| 1737 | 6000 | 2.5 | 8 | 25 | 1 | 15 |
| 1738 | 5000 | 1 | 3 | 10 | | |
| 1739 | 5000 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 1 | 5 |
| 1740 | 3000 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 15 |
| 1741 | 8000 | 1 | 4 | 12 | 2 | 8 |
| 1742 | | | | | | |
| 1743 | 10000 | 10 | | | | |
| 1744 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | |
| 1745 | | | | | | |
| 1746 | 10000 | 8 | | | | |
| 1747 | 10000 | 6 | | | | |
| 1748 | 10000 | 4 | | | | |
| 1749 | 10000 | 4 | | | | |
| 1750 | 30000 | 20 | | | | |
| 1751 | 12000 | 7 | | | | |
| 1752 | 10000 | 4 | | | | |
| 1753 | 20000 | 2 | | | | |
| 1754 | 10000 | 1 | | | | |
| 1755 | 15000 | 10 | | | | |
| 1756 | 20000 | 12 | | | | |
| 1757 | 20000 | 10 | | | | |
| 1758 | 20000 | 16 | | | | |
| 1759 | 20000 | 1.5 | | | | |
| 1760 | | | | | | |
| 1761 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | |
| 1762 | | | | | | |
| 1763 | 15000 | 3 | | | | |
| 1764 | | | | | | |
| 1765 | | | | | | |
| 1766 | | | | | | |
| 1767 | | | 5 | 30 | | |
| 1768 | | | 5 | 30 | | |
| 1769 | | | 5 | 30 | | |
| 1770 | | | 4 | 20 | | |
| 1771 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | |
| 1772 | | | 5 | 30 | | |
| 1773 | | | 10 | 40 | | |

N.B. The empty cells mean that no Free Black was recorded as producing that commodity in that year. No Free Black was ever recorded as producing rye.

Appendix 6, Table 4
 Agricultural production, Stellenbosch (1701 - 1787), 1

| Year | vines | leggers | | wheat(mudden) | | barley(mudden) | | rye(mudden) | |
|------|---------------------|---------|--------|-------------------|-------|----------------|-------|-------------|--|
| | | wine | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | |
| 1701 | 428600 | 366.5 | 220 | 1314 | 7.5 | 62 | 129.5 | 874 | |
| 1702 | 494650 | 370 | 252.5 | 1880.5 | 12.5 | 121 | 113 | 985 | |
| 1703 | 455500 | 340.5 | 202.5 | 1424 | 10.5 | 91.5 | 114.5 | 692 | |
| 1704 | 510000 | 417.5 | 203 | 1421 | 8.5 | 86 | 91 | 723 | |
| 1705 | 592000 | 389 | 288 | 707.5 | 17 | 32 | 128.5 | 288 | |
| 1706 | 628500 | 418 | 275.5 | 1581 | 14.5 | 143 | 99.5 | 655 | |
| 1707 | 533000 | 503 | 257.5 | 1923 | 10.25 | 98 | 99 | 825 | |
| 1708 | 522500 | 368.5 | 234.75 | 1917 | 5.75 | 51 | 110.5 | 1005 | |
| 1709 | 551500 | 414.5 | 407 | 1915 | 18 | 130 | 94 | 130 | |
| 1710 | 884800 | 426 | 516.5 | 6270 ² | 22 | 285 | 106.5 | - | |
| 1711 | 859900 | 321.5 | 499.5 | 3032 ³ | 23.5 | 341 | 49.5 | 193 | |
| 1712 | 604800 | 321.5 | 476.5 | 3884 | 36 | 121 | 38 | 257 | |
| 1713 | 582000 | 540.5 | 425.5 | 4568 ⁴ | 17 | 119 | 45 | 527 | |
| 1714 | 619040 | 513 | 469.5 | 4046 | 13.5 | 79 | 59 | 15 | |
| 1715 | 667900 | 343.5 | 474.5 | 2933 ⁵ | 14.5 | 203 | 5.5 | 51 | |
| 1716 | 579800 | 342 | 571.5 | 5436 | 23.75 | 159 | 27.5 | 87 | |
| 1717 | 606100 | 311 | 537.5 | 4801 | 10 | 164.5 | 6 | 41 | |
| 1718 | 588400 | 395.5 | 465.5 | 3528.5 | 13.5 | 124 | 12 | 50 | |
| 1719 | 647950 | 351.25 | 470 | 3723 | 18.5 | 217.5 | 15.5 | 43 | |
| 1720 | 629800 | 150 | 449 | 1746.75 | 21.25 | 221 | 19.75 | 47 | |
| 1721 | 616500 | 301.5 | 522.5 | 2966.5 | 26 | 339 | 34.75 | 95 | |
| 1722 | 603700 | 286.5 | 413 | 3156 | 17.5 | 234 | 17.75 | 64 | |
| 1723 | 480200 | 333 | 352 | 2801.5 | 16.5 | 207.5 | 27.75 | 136 | |
| 1724 | 488500 | 242 | 350.5 | 3010 | 12 | 188 | 15.5 | 184 | |
| 1725 | 518000 | 276 | 442.5 | 3594 | 18 | 188 | 16 | 106 | |
| 1726 | 538000 | 295 | 506 | 1931.5 | 16.5 | 211 | 21.5 | 192 | |
| 1727 | 604500 | 287 | 581 | 2053.5 | 36 | 470 | 39 | 262 | |
| 1728 | 583000 | 253.25 | 599 | 1868 | 27.75 | 328 | 39.5 | 256 | |
| 1729 | 600000 | 259.5 | 559.75 | 4681.5 | 24.75 | 337 | 53.5 | 457 | |
| 1730 | 543000 | 327.5 | 598 | 2764.25 | 40.5 | 557 | 61.25 | 439 | |
| 1731 | 563700 | 435.5 | 568.5 | 4193.5 | 36.5 | 688 | 59.5 | 662 | |
| 1732 | 523100 | 358 | 573 | 4830 | 38 | 587 | 59 | 838 | |
| 1733 | 530500 | 311.5 | 569 | 4471 | 35 | 455 | 38 | 398 | |
| 1734 | 523000 | 341.5 | 550 | 3966 | 33 | 518 | 40 | 296 | |
| 1735 | 555400 | 504 | 573 | 4797 | 41 | 496 | 31 | 322 | |
| 1736 | 538000 | 318.5 | 502.5 | 3795 | 29.5 | 347 | 34 | 287 | |
| 1737 | 533000 | 370 | 517 | 2999 | 32 | 338 | 41 | 347 | |
| 1738 | 552500 | 257.5 | 550 | 3143 | 49 | 474 | 75 | 530 | |
| 1739 | 539500 | 211.5 | 590.5 | 1871 | 63 | 533 | 89 | 441 | |
| 1740 | 534000 | 234 | 731 | 1917 | 101 | 1140 | 111 | 351 | |
| 1741 | 494000 | 230.5 | 582 | 5081 | 56 | 522 | 64.75 | 465 | |
| 1742 | 538600 | 324.5 | 638.5 | 6051 | 36 | 449 | 57 | 544 | |
| 1743 | 595500 | 457 | 575.5 | 3744 | 46 | 406 | 59 | 337 | |
| 1744 | 645000 ¹ | 568 | 582 | 3960 | 41 | 426 | 17 | 103 | |
| 1745 | 657500 | 502 | 659 | 5383 | 41 | 483 | 36 | 316 | |
| 1746 | 645000 | 331.5 | 526 | 3057 | 37 | 255 | 23.5 | 131 | |
| 1747 | 681500 | 557.5 | 479 | 3008 | 26 | 172 | 17 | 153 | |
| 1748 | 725000 | 542.5 | 423 | 2538 | 15 | 113 | 11 | 71 | |
| 1749 | 853200 | 420 | 435 | 2032 | 29 | 320 | 20.5 | 87 | |
| 1750 | 974000 | 1036 | 442 | 2058 | 45 | 491 | 14.5 | 38 | |

1 Changed from 6450 (obviously an error).

2 Also 3104 mud "bread and seed corn".

3 Also 2512 mud "bread and seed corn".

4 Also 2208 mud "bread and seed corn".

5 Also 2509 mud "bread and seed corn".

Agricultural production, Stellenbosch, 2

| Year | vines | leggers | wheat(mudden) | | barley(mudden) | | rye(mudden) | |
|------|---------------|---------|------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | | wine | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | sown | reaped |
| 1751 | 1008000 | 696 | 477 | 2811 | 54 | 709 | 16 | 149 |
| 1752 | 993500 | 525.5 | 445 | 3343 | 60 | 958 | 15 | 124 |
| 1753 | 1024500 | 561 | 439 | 3462 | 22 | 237 | 7 | 48 |
| 1754 | 1240000 | 709 | 487 | 3880 | 27 | 354 | 10 | 62 |
| 1755 | 1242000 | 913 | 388 | 2045 | 35 | 382 | 11 | 100 |
| 1756 | 1190000 | 1144 | 356 | 2253 | 32 | 411 | 14 | 166 |
| 1757 | 1157000 | 829 | 361 | 1516 | 19 | 285 | 8 | 55 |
| 1758 | 1168000 | 909 | 403 | 2380 | 28 | 355 | 8 | 130 |
| 1759 | 1161000 | 514 | 373 | 2565 | 22 | 290 | 18 | 163 |
| 1760 | 1294000 | 943 | 330 | 2670 | 21 | 219 | 2 | 15 |
| 1761 | 1274000 | 963 | 302 | 2215 | 12 | 150 | 3 | 25 |
| 1762 | 1245000 | 614 | 298 | 1623 | 6 | 70 | 1 | 5 |
| 1763 | 1295000 | 869 | 329 | 2990 | 23 | 405 | 8 | 70 |
| 1764 | 1511000 | 1256 | 226 | 1210 | 18 | 140 | -- | -- |
| 1765 | 1616000 | 952 | 253 | 1360 | 23 | 242 | -- | -- |
| 1766 | 1582000 | 1102 | 444 | 3549 | 46 | 680 | 1 | 2 |
| 1767 | 1735000 | 1188 | 418 | 2595 | 22 | 415 | 2 | 32 |
| 1768 | 1688000 | 1251 | 413 | 2119 | 16 | 280 | 2 | 30 |
| 1769 | 1814000 | 1484 | 346 | 1614 | 13 | 180 | -- | -- |
| 1770 | 1683000 | 1008 | 373 | 2086 | 17 | 190 | 1 | 20 |
| 1771 | 1836000 | 1114 | 311 | 1700 | 20 | 200 | -- | -- |
| 1772 | 1807000 | 548 | 253 | 1830 | 11 | 80 | 2 | 22 |
| 1773 | 1998000 | 1530 | 430 | 3380 | 14 | 260 | -- | -- |
| 1774 | 1942000 | 772 | 396 | 2337 | 14 | 190 | -- | -- |
| 1775 | 1393000 | 1659 | 359 | 1980 | 5 | 100 | -- | -- |
| 1776 | 2169000 | 1132 | 243 | 2070 | 26 | 180 | -- | -- |
| 1777 | 2314000 | 849 | 385 | 2190 ² | 5 | 30 | 1 | 10 |
| 1778 | 2207000 | 1387 | 354 | 2230 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 1779 | 2217000 | 1395 | 375 | 2636 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 1780 | 2264000 | 1436 | 310 | 2320 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | |
| 1782 | 2314000 | 498 | 194 ¹ | 1220 | 5 | 100 | -- | -- |
| 1783 | 2361000 | 1018 | 166 | 1050 | 19 | 190 | -- | -- |
| 1784 | 2319000 | 1292 | 110 | 730 | 10 | 50 | -- | -- |
| 1785 | 2536000 | 1485 | 141 | 850 | 8 | 80 | -- | -- |
| 1786 | 2846000 | 1935 | 111 | 520 | 20 | 200 | -- | -- |
| 1787 | 2788000 | 2123 | 140 | 690 | 14 | 300 | -- | -- |

1 Changed from 1194 (obviously an error).

2 Changed from 1190 (assumed to be an error; c.f. total).

Appendix 6, Table 5
Agricultural production, Drakenstein (1701 - 1787), 1

| Year | vines | leggers wine | wheat(mudden) | | barley(mudden) | | rye(mudden) | |
|------|---------|-----------------|---------------|-------------------|----------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | | | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | sown | reaped |
| 1701 | 591300 | 418.5 | 202.5 | 1074 | 24 | 209 | 154 | 924 |
| 1702 | 527500 | 409 | 195 | 1376 | 25.25 | 195 | 166.5 | 1194 |
| 1703 | 582000 | 330 | 266 | 1565.5 | 20.25 | 139.5 | 118.25 | 609 |
| 1704 | 579000 | 339 | 218 | 1432 | 31 | 303 | 88 | 584 |
| 1705 | 602800 | 401 | 321.25 | 787.25 | 9.75 | 24.5 | 225.5 | 249 |
| 1706 | 591000 | 368 | 270.5 | 1691 | 21 | 181 | 101 | 632 |
| 1707 | 663100 | 473 | 293.5 | 2278 | 17 | 133 | 96.5 | 697 |
| 1708 | 723900 | 492.5 | 297.5 | 2595 | 2.5 | 39 | 127.5 | 1142 |
| 1709 | 770000 | 493.5 | 433.5 | 1383 | 9.25 | 41 | 95 | 10 |
| 1710 | 866500 | 356 | 512.5 | 5829 ¹ | 12 | 225 | 110 | 100 |
| 1711 | 820300 | 349.5 | 559.5 | 3278 ² | 14 | 163 | 54 | 180 |
| 1712 | 942200 | 283.5 | 565 | 4203.5 | 22 | 425 | 70.5 | 172 |
| 1713 | 1019000 | 612 | 467.5 | 3557 ³ | 19.5 | 324 | 44.5 | 328 |
| 1714 | 896120 | 590 | 412 | 3860 | 15 | 169 | 36.5 | 144 |
| 1715 | 757700 | 467 | 488 | 2261 ⁴ | 13 | 144 | 6.5 | 43 |
| 1716 | 825500 | 370 | 564.5 | 4758.5 | 29 | 200.5 | 19.5 | 156 |
| 1717 | 706300 | 390.5 | 543.5 | 4730 | 23 | 225 | 20.5 | 148 |
| 1718 | 832700 | 448.5 | 557.25 | 4318 | 20.75 | 209 | 12.25 | 87 |
| 1719 | 777200 | 379 | 545.5 | 4035 | 13.5 | 214 | 22.5 | 94 |
| 1720 | 749300 | 235.5 | 569.5 | 2794 | 19 | 256 | 12 | 79 |
| 1721 | 796300 | 427.5 | 712 | 3487.75 | 28 | 289.5 | 18 | 110 |
| 1722 | 740000 | 310 | 550.5 | 3994 | 24 | 330.5 | 34 | 171 |
| 1723 | 812000 | 555.5 | 626 | 5347.5 | 30.5 | 304 | 26.75 | 224 |
| 1724 | 841000 | 418.5 | 526 | 4016 | 12 | 125 | 19.75 | 184 |
| 1725 | 798000 | 413.5 | 583.5 | 4724 | 12.5 | 155 | 21.5 | 174 |
| 1726 | 829800 | 378 | 716 | 2542 | 7.5 | 72 | 24 | 125 |
| 1727 | 744000 | 305.5 | 674 | 3246 | 13 | 165 | 30 | 196 |
| 1728 | 705700 | 257.5 | 848.5 | 4225 | 10 | 130 | 25 | 215 |
| 1729 | 690400 | 253.75 | 670 | 5304 | 16 | 167 | 55.5 | 624 |
| 1730 | 820500 | 515 | 970.5 | 3907.5 | 48 | 551 | 84.5 | 640 |
| 1731 | 797500 | 586.5 | 771.5 | 5121.5 | 26.5 | 342 | 73.25 | 752 |
| 1732 | 807000 | 528.5 | 729 | 6372 | 19 | 237 | 93 | 1056 |
| 1733 | 832000 | 507.5 | 821 | 7607 | 17 | 224 | 56 | 536 |
| 1734 | 744000 | 433 | 758 | 5932 | 19 | 277 | 39 | 492 |
| 1735 | 846000 | 631.5 | 810 | 5566 | 23 | 254 | 41 | 378 |
| 1736 | 928400 | 419.5 | 821 | 5624.5 | 15 | 171 | 40.5 | 346 |
| 1737 | 921000 | 470 | 838 | 4631.5 | 16 | 185 | 75 | 750 |
| 1738 | 859000 | 319 | 859 | 5198 | 16 | 199 | 58 | 453 |
| 1739 | 791200 | 281.5 | 1078 | 2571 | 41.5 | 103.5 | 45.5 | 237 |
| 1740 | 778300 | 296 | 1303 | 3387 | 95.75 | 1213 | 97.25 | 379 |
| 1741 | 823000 | 351.5 | 1119.5 | 11103 | 29 | 408 | 71 | 763 |
| 1742 | 801500 | 394 | 1026.5 | 7880 | 26 | 216 | 49 | 458 |
| 1743 | 927500 | 749.5 | 1132 | 7381 | 39 | 558 | 65 | 614 |
| 1744 | 1002000 | 874 | 1004 | 6681 | 39 | 372 | 34 | 310 |
| 1745 | 1105000 | 940 | 1014 | 9286 | 42 | 539 | 75 | 1026 |
| 1746 | 1187000 | 851 | 923.5 | 7362.5 | 33.5 | 327 | 30.5 | 277 |
| 1747 | 1218500 | 1270 | 815.5 | 5899 | 21 | 263 | 42 | 440 |
| 1748 | 1221000 | 954 | 819 | 6316 | 32.5 | 401 | 34 | 378 |
| 1749 | 1256500 | 957 | 871.5 | 4167 | 40.5 | 376 | 37.5 | 201 |
| 1750 | 1335000 | 1505 | 720 | 3848 | 35.5 | 281 | 40 | 382 |

1 Also 3382 mud "bread and seed corn".
2 Also 2803 mud "bread and seed corn".
3 Also 2432 mud "bread and seed corn".
4 Also 1864 mud "bread and seed corn".

Agricultural production, Drakenstein, 2

| Year | vines | leggers | | wheat(mudden) | | barley(mudden) | | rye(mudden) | |
|------|---------------|---------|--|---------------|--------|-----------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | | wine | | sown | reaped | sown | reaped | sown | reaped |
| 1751 | 1346000 | 1007 | | 677 | 4845 | 41 | 507 | 50 | 551 |
| 1752 | 1420000 | 862 | | 825 | 6355 | 33 | 356 | 42 | 489 |
| 1753 | 1494000 | 812 | | 895 | 7009 | 26 | 248 | 40 | 230 |
| 1754 | 1284000 | 822.5 | | 779 | 6604 | 12 | 140 | 38.5 | 607 |
| 1755 | 1677000 | 1416 | | 739 | 4591 | 19 | 203 | 40 | 496 |
| 1756 | 1733000 | 1562 | | 666 | 4725 | 15 | 118 | 23 | 243 |
| 1757 | 1755000 | 1141 | | 605 | 2845 | 20 | 154 | 28 | 240 |
| 1758 | 1768000 | 1214 | | 696 | 5184 | 24 | 360 | 30 | 370 |
| 1759 | 1843000 | 822 | | 633 | 3532 | 6 | 70 | 20 | 182 |
| 1760 | 1889000 | 1100 | | 606 | 3561 | 24 | 260 | 8 | 101 |
| 1761 | 1792000 | 1084 | | 690 | 5536 | 23 ¹ | 596 | 13 | 194 |
| 1762 | 1850000 | 843 | | 598 | 3863 | 17 | 310 | 12 | 121 |
| 1763 | 2080000 | 1432 | | 571 | 4649 | 20 | 320 | 16 | 167 |
| 1764 | 2164000 | 1775 | | 504 | 2393 | 19 | 230 | 3 | 40 |
| 1765 | 2151000 | 1293 | | 490 | 2069 | 23 | 195 | 9 | 94 |
| 1766 | 2283000 | 1617 | | 894 | 7059 | 25 | 195 | 4 | 30 |
| 1767 | 2271000 | 1687 | | 758 | 4009 | 28 | 195 | 6 | 94 |
| 1768 | 2587000 | 1784 | | 802 | 4048 | 25 | 150 | 4 | 45 |
| 1769 | 2782000 | 2442 | | 768 | 3490 | 19 | 112 | 1 | 10 |
| 1770 | 2904000 | 2331 | | 844 | 4540 | 15 | 150 | -- | -- |
| 1771 | 2940000 | 2081 | | 921 | 4890 | 18 | 135 | -- | -- |
| 1772 | 2814000 | 1048 | | 1061 | 6260 | 44 | 260 | 10 | 103 |
| 1773 | 3382000 | 2965 | | 1354 | 10030 | 34 | 250 | 2 | 10 |
| 1774 | 3405000 | 1363 | | 1347 | 7267 | 40 | 260 | -- | -- |
| 1775 | 3550000 | 2973 | | 1333 | 7360 | 48 | 350 | 2 | 20 |
| 1776 | 4784000 | 2516 | | 1337 | 7140 | 49 | 340 | -- | -- |
| 1777 | 4114000 | 1572 | | 1626 | 8510 | 37 | 320 | 2 | 20 |
| 1778 | 4037000 | 2581 | | 1466 | 9330 | 44 | 520 | 2 | 20 |
| 1779 | 4227000 | 3004 | | 1651 | 9290 | 35 | 380 | 4 | 50 |
| 1780 | 4180000 | 2995 | | 1533 | 9280 | 29 | 370 | 3 | 30 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | | |
| 1782 | 4017100 | 1872 | | 1244 | 6240 | 27 | 300 | -- | -- |
| 1783 | 4266000 | 1827 | | 1249 | 7053 | 18 | 130 | -- | -- |
| 1784 | 4444000 | 2585 | | 1023 | 5398 | 11 | 70 | 2 | 20 |
| 1785 | 4757000 | 2978 | | 1053 | 5145 | 16 | 120 | -- | -- |
| 1786 | 4803000 | 3108 | | 609 | 2010 | 14 | 70 | -- | -- |
| 1787 | 8010500 | 6083 | | 1018 | 4490 | 26 | 370 | -- | -- |

1 Changed from 230 (obviously an error).

Appendix 6, Table 6

Agricultural production, Stellenbosch and Drakenstein (1788 - 1795)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>vines</u> | <u>leggers</u> | <u>wheat(mudden)</u> | | <u>barley(mudden)</u> | | <u>rye(mudden)</u> | |
|-------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | <u>wine</u> | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> |
| 1788 | 8256000 | 6537 | 1289 | 9540 | 30 | 360 | 1 | 30 |
| 1789 | 8006000 | 4581 | 1042 | 4910 | 12 | 140 | 1 | 10 |
| 1790 | 8260000 | 5257 | 1070 | 5490 | 1 | 10 | - | - |
| 1791 | 8839400 | 5737 | 1119 | 7795 | 43 | 489 | 3 | 50 |
| 1792 | 8926000 | 4640 | 1012 | 5129 | 20 | 160 | 3 | 40 |
| 1793 | 9070300 ¹ | 5330 | 1525 | 11465 | 6 | 35 | 2 | 40 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | |
| 1795 | 9074380 | 5332 | 1523 | 10156 | 5 | 20 | 3 | 29 |

¹ Changed from 907300 (obviously an error; the correct figure can be calculated).

Appendix 7, Table 1
Consumption of wheat, in *mudden* (1704 - 1793; five-year averages)

| <u>Period</u> | <u>internal</u> ¹ <u>market</u> | <u>passing</u> ² <u>ships</u> | <u>exports</u> ³ | <u>total</u> |
|---------------|---|---|-----------------------------|--------------|
| 1704-08 | 2805 | 2760 | 2143 | 7708 |
| 1709-13 | 4133 | 2736 | 2011 | 8880 |
| 1714-18 | 4440 | 3112 | 5870 | 13422 |
| 1719-23 | 5138 | 3824 | 1943 | 10905 |
| 1724-28 | 6498 | 3304 | 2835 | 12637 |
| 1729-33 | 7395 | 3072 | 6327 | 16794 |
| 1734-38 | 8963 | 3272 | 6775 | 19010 |
| 1739-43 | 9483 | 2736 | 9183 | 21402 |
| 1744-48 | 9518 | 2992 | 10064 | 22574 |
| 1749-53 | 10563 | 2976 | 8374 | 21913 |
| 1754-58 | 11430 | 2536 | 14045 | 28011 |
| 1759-63 | 12563 | 2760 | 13210 | 28533 |
| 1764-68 | 14865 | 2800 | 9845 | 27510 |
| 1769-73 | 16018 | 3960 | 16825 | 36803 |
| 1774-78 | 18470 | 4784 | 25544 | 48798 |
| 1779-83 | 20835 | 4696 | 16976 | 42507 |
| 1784-88 | 24053 | 6568 | 2965 | 33586 |
| 1789-93 | 26118 | 6488 | 5213 | 37819 |

1 Based on the assumptions regarding the population of Cape Town (see Appendix 3; here not rounded off) and on the consumption figure of 2.5 *mud* per person per year.

2 Based on the consumption figure of 40 *mud* per ship.

3 This includes all grains, but wheat was by far the most important of these.

Appendix 7, Table 2
 Production of wheat, corrected opgaaf figures, in mudden
 (1709 - 1793; five-year averages)

| <u>Period</u> | <u>correction coefficient</u> | <u>total Cape Colony</u> | |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|
| | | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> |
| 1709-13 | 1.3 | 1975 | 16852 |
| 1714-18 | 1.3 | 1941 | 17197 |
| 1719-23 | 1.3 | 2135 | 15927 |
| 1724-28 | 1.3 | 2519 | 15022 |
| 1729-33 | 1.3 | 3054 | 22756 |
| 1734-38 | 1.3 | 3240 | 22658 |
| 1739-43 | 1.3 | 4221 | 24746 |
| 1744-48 | 1.3 | 3745 | 28553 |
| 1749-53 | 1.6 | 4086 | 27562 |
| 1754-58 | 1.9 | 4874 | 35512 |
| 1759-63 | 2.1 | 4806 | 35874 |
| 1764-68 | 2.4 | 5700 | 33975 |
| 1769-73 | 2.7 | 7120 | 45213 |
| 1774-78 | 3.0 | 9149 | 53759 |
| 1779-83 | 3.0 | 8888 | 50887 |
| 1784-88 | 3.0 | 7681 | 36727 |
| 1789-93 | 3.0 | 9675 | 57517 |

| <u>Period</u> | <u>Cape district</u> | | <u>Stellenbosch</u> | | <u>Drakenstein</u> | |
|---------------|----------------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> |
| 1709-13 | 711 | 6993 | 605 | 5114 | 660 | 4745 |
| 1714-18 | 620 | 6622 | 655 | 5394 | 667 | 5181 |
| 1719-23 | 780 | 7073 | 574 | 3742 | 781 | 5111 |
| 1724-28 | 1004 | 6907 | 645 | 3239 | 870 | 4876 |
| 1729-33 | 1278 | 9951 | 746 | 5444 | 1030 | 7361 |
| 1734-38 | 1478 | 10788 | 700 | 4862 | 1062 | 7008 |
| 1739-43 | 1939 | 11490 | 811 | 4853 | 1471 | 8404 |
| 1744-48 | 1861 | 14646 | 694 | 4666 | 1190 | 9242 |
| 1749-53 | 2094 | 14784 | 716 | 4386 | 1276 | 8392 |
| 1754-58 | 2791 | 21823 | 758 | 4588 | 1324 | 9101 |
| 1759-63 | 2819 | 21928 | 685 | 5066 | 1301 | 8879 |
| 1764-68 | 3203 | 19378 | 842 | 5200 | 1655 | 9397 |
| 1769-73 | 3524 | 23710 | 925 | 5729 | 2672 | 15773 |
| 1774-78 | 3842 | 23450 | 1042 | 6484 | 4265 | 23764 |
| 1779-83 | 3846 | 21570 | 784 | 5420 | 4258 | 23897 |
| 1784-87 | | | 377 | 2093 | 2777 | 12782 |

| | <u>Cape district</u> | | <u>Stellenbosch and Drakenstein</u> | |
|---------|----------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|---------------|
| | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> | <u>sown</u> | <u>reaped</u> |
| 1784-88 | 4384 | 19103 | 3296 | 17624 |
| 1789-93 | 6214 | 36644 | 3461 | 20873 |

 N.B. These figures of quantities of wheat sown and reaped should not be taken at face value, but rather as a rough approximation of the contours of real production and investment levels. Nevertheless, Graphs III.3 and III.4 are based on these figures.

Appendix 7, Table 3

Yield ratios in wheat production (1704 - 1793; five-year averages)

| <u>Period</u> | <u>total colony</u> | <u>Cape district</u> | <u>Stellen- bosch</u> | <u>Draken- stein</u> |
|---------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1704-08 | 10.64 | 11.81 | 10.00 | 10.27 |
| 1709-13 | 12.53 | 13.84 | 12.45 | 11.19 |
| 1714-18 | 12.86 | 14.68 | 12.24 | 11.77 |
| 1719-23 | 11.46 | 13.07 | 10.52 | 10.54 |
| 1724-28 | 9.96 | 10.88 | 9.02 | 9.60 |
| 1729-33 | 11.45 | 11.79 | 11.30 | 11.15 |
| 1734-38 | 10.99 | 11.30 | 10.95 | 10.60 |
| 1739-43 | 9.86 | 9.93 | 9.98 | 9.71 |
| 1744-48 | 11.62 | 11.87 | 10.72 | 11.77 |
| 1749-53 | 10.75 | 11.06 | 10.13 | 10.58 |
| 1754-58 | 11.29 | 11.82 | 10.05 | 10.87 |
| 1759-63 | 11.46 | 11.78 | 11.40 | 10.82 |
| 1764-68 | 9.96 | 10.05 | 10.18 | 9.68 |
| 1769-73 | 10.35 | 10.73 | 10.19 | 9.90 |
| 1774-78 | 9.88 | 10.10 | 10.22 | 9.57 |
| 1779-83 | 9.73 | 9.61 | 10.91 | 9.61 |
| 1784-87 | | | 9.55 | 8.60 |
| | | | <u>Stellenbosch and Drakenstein</u> | |
| 1784-88 | 8.78 | 8.36 | | 9.35 |
| 1789-93 | 9.94 | 9.90 | | 10.03 |

 N.B. These figures include the "bread and seed corn", which is assumed to be a constant of four times the quantity sown.

Appendix 8, Table 1
 Taxation on wine (*recognitiegeld*) and quantities of wine brought
 to market (1724 - 1785)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>wine tax</u> <u>(quilders)</u> | <u>quantity marketted</u> <u>(leggers)</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1724 | 4852 | |
| 1726 | 3399 | |
| 1727 | 3204 | |
| 1729 | 3037 | |
| 1735 | 3817 | |
| 1738 | 4708 | |
| 1739 | 2890 | |
| 1741 | 2812 | |
| 1742 | 3085 | |
| 1743 | 3613 | |
| 1751 | 22575 | |
| 1752 | 18117 | |
| 1753 | 19641 | |
| 1754 | 12731 | |
| 1755 | 16803 | |
| 1757 | 17536 | |
| 1759 | 24899 | 3458.25 |
| 1760 | 16006 | 1907 |
| 1761 | 19650 | |
| 1762 | 18562 | 2597 |
| 1763 | 16906 | 2348.125 |
| 1764 | 19512 | |
| 1766 | 16345 | 2269 |
| 1767 | 18155 | 2521.5 |
| 1769 | 21385 | 2970.125 |
| 1772 | 21600 | 3272.75 |
| 1775 | 19840 | 3006 |
| 1776 | 26756 | 4053.625 |
| 1778 | 16120 | 2452.5 |
| 1780 | 34577 | 5239 |
| 1781 | 35742 | 5415.5 |
| 1782 | 33359 | 4754.375 |
| 1783 | 21839 | 3309.25 ¹ |
| 1785 | 33220 | 5033.375 |

 N.B. The figures for the wine tax are rounded off.

¹ In this year (i.e. 1 September 1782 to 31 August 1783) 430
leggers were also sold to the French garrison.

Appendix 8, Table 2

VOC income from the auction of the franchises to sell alcoholic beverages (*pachten*), in guilders (1700 - 1793), 1

| <u>Year</u> | <u>total</u> <u>pacht</u> | <u>wine</u> <u>pacht</u> | <u>brandy</u> <u>pacht</u> |
|-------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1700 | 49220 | 38300 | |
| 1701 | 29850 | 22650 | |
| 1702 | 41980 | 34000 | |
| 1703 | 49760 | 39400 | |
| 1704 | 44310 | 32650 | |
| 1705 | 47880 | 39100 | |
| 1706 | 49430 | 37200 | |
| 1707 | 49075 | 33700 | |
| 1708 | 51450 | 34900 | |
| 1709 | 48525 | 31075 | |
| 1710 | 48945 | 35200 | |
| 1711 | 43730 | 31160 | |
| 1712 | 62275 | 42925 | |
| 1713 | 57675 | 40825 | |
| 1714 | 48720 | 28620 | |
| 1715 | 42175 | 24020 | |
| 1716 | 48820 | 28450 | 11560 |
| 1717 | 41780 | 25100 | 8000 |
| 1718 | 36800 | 20500 | 6200 |
| 1719 | 36440 | 23350 | 6800 |
| 1720 | 31970 | 18600 | 7000 |
| 1721 | 28330 | 16800 | 5850 |
| 1722 | 45350 | 28650 | 10100 |
| 1723 | 43375 | 24100 | 12225 |
| 1724 | 43200 | 25300 | 10400 |
| 1725 | 45950 | 26300 | 8250 |
| 1726 | 60550 | 37625 | 14100 |
| 1727 | 47425 | 28850 | 10475 |
| 1728 | 42650 | 24925 | 10325 |
| 1729 | 51950 | 30900 | 12800 |
| 1730 | 23600 | 12600 | 4050 |
| 1731 | 34760 | 21250 | 5325 |
| 1732 | 36660 | 21760 | 7000 |
| 1733 | 37835 | 21350 | 7725 |
| 1734 | 48625 | 32000 ¹ | 6825 |
| 1735 | 53225 | 36600 | 7250 |
| 1736 | 51285 | 32000 | 7235 |
| 1737 | 36295 | 25000 | 5325 |
| 1738 | 42725 | 30500 | 6800 |
| 1739 | 39350 | 24500 | 6950 |
| 1740 | 41475 | 24725 | 10250 |
| 1741 | 40875 | 28400 | 7200 |
| 1742 | 41195 | 29125 | 7645 |
| 1743 | 34600 | 20100 | 8175 |
| 1744 | 32750 | 23000 | 5350 |
| 1745 | 35400 | 23350 | 7075 |
| 1746 | 30325 | 19150 | 5875 |
| 1747 | 26525 | 19150 | 3825 |
| 1748 | 30400 | 19900 | 6725 |
| 1749 | 33150 | 19000 | 8950 |

 1 1734 was the first year in which the wine *pacht* was not auctioned in four separate parts but as a single unit.

Pachten, 2

| <u>Year</u> | <u>total</u> <u>pacht</u> | <u>wine</u> <u>pacht</u> | <u>brandy</u> <u>pacht</u> | <u>sales to</u> <u>foreigners</u> |
|-------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1750 | 35750 | 22000 | 9525 | |
| 1751 | 32950 | 20000 | 8125 | |
| 1752 | 46875 | 24300 | 16725 | |
| 1753 | 50575 | 30000 | 13800 | |
| 1754 | 44725 | 24400 | 14750 | |
| 1755 | 40050 | 28500 | 7175 | |
| 1756 | 50500 | 27100 | 17000 | |
| 1757 | 54550 | 24100 | 24500 | 500 |
| 1758 | 54525 | 22875 ¹ | 23250 | 775 |
| 1759 | 28025 | 12300 | 8375 | 2700 |
| 1760 | 43925 | 18000 | 14350 | 6000 |
| 1761 | 50175 | 20700 | 17975 | 6300 |
| 1762 | 57350 | 20000 | 23000 | forbidden |
| 1763 | 61850 | 23200 | 24750 | 3325 |
| 1764 | 68200 | 31000 | 24550 | 3000 |
| 1765 | 57475 | 27400 | 22300 | 2100 |
| 1766 | 53025 | 22000 | 23300 | 800 |
| 1767 | 57725 | 26100 | 22600 | 3000 |
| 1768 | 61900 | 28000 | 24300 | 4100 |
| 1769 | 71400 | 34500 | 26300 | 5300 |
| 1770 | 78525 | 40000 | 26000 | 6200 |
| 1771 | 76825 | 36300 | 25400 | 8800 |
| 1772 | 72050 | 32300 | 26325 | 6000 |
| 1773 | 77775 | 32000 | 26975 | 9300 |
| 1774 | 75125 | 35550 | 25050 | 8500 |
| 1775 | 72000 | 29000 | 27625 | 8750 |
| 1776 | 86175 | 36200 | 33400 | 9500 |
| 1777 | 82325 | 35200 | 34200 | 6100 |
| 1778 | 82475 | 32000 | 34600 | 8000 |
| 1779 | 76575 | 32200 | 18300 | 18500 |
| 1780 | 107550 | 34600 | 29300 | 34300 |
| 1781 | 125625 | 45000 | 37100 | 32700 |
| 1782 | 103950 | 50600 | 42700 | forbidden |
| 1783 | 117200 | 61400 | 49550 | forbidden |
| 1784 | 164325 | 71500 | 55950 | 25400 |
| 1785 | 160750 | 74500 | 52950 | 19000 |
| 1786 | 167350 | 86500 | 49950 | 18000 |
| 1787 | 194500 | 123000 | 45200 | 14200 |
| 1788 | 216800 | 137000 | 57100 | 9300 |
| 1789 | 222650 | 140000 | 52000 | 10800 |
| 1790 | 241700 | 144900 | 68100 | 8500 |
| 1791 | 196150 | 90000 | 66000 | 18300 |
| 1792 | 127650 | 51500 | 48000 | 9200 |
| 1793 | 131550 | 45050 ² | 60850 | 8100 |

 N.B. As a rule the total exceeds the sum of the three pachten given, as the minor franchises are not included in the table. The figures are rounded off.

- 1 In 1758, the wine pacht was originally bought up by four men for f18375, but was later bought in as a single unit by Pieter Broedersz., who had to pay f4500 extra for the privilege.
- 2 In 1793, the wine pacht was again taken up in four separate parts.

Appendix 9, Table 1
 Livestock in possession of the colonial farmers, total
 Cape Colony (1701 - 1795), 1

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 1701 | 681 | 9704 | 53126 | 375 |
| 1702 | 746 | 11682 | 62055 | 358 |
| 1703 | 870 | 12553 | 69218 | 400 |
| 1704 | 913 | 11256 | 67190 | 440 |
| 1705 | 1014 | 11964 | 76423 | 448 |
| 1706 | 1055 | 11746 | 69483 | 325 |
| 1707 | 1261 | 12671 | 79314 | 159 |
| 1708 | 1586 | 14320 | 89553 | 293 |
| 1709 | 2014 | 19553 | 128968 | 274 |
| 1710 | 2081 | 20080 | 131630 | 184 |
| 1711 | 2253 | 20743 | 116256 | 250 |
| 1712 | 2256 | 17484 | 120941 | 230 |
| 1713 | 2146 | 17559 | 120720 | 197 |
| 1714 | 2176 | 16557 | 120208 | 289 |
| 1715 | 1894 | 15085 | 97631 | 237 |
| 1716 | 2325 | 16575 | 78819 | 403 |
| 1717 | 2356 | 15298 | 62200 | 556 |
| 1718 | 2548 | 16202 | 64381 | 867 |
| 1719 | 1586 | 15827 | 66965 | 1069 |
| 1720 | 1143 | 16262 | 67104 | 872 |
| 1721 | 1304 | 16292 | 68130 | 907 |
| 1722 | 1428 | 15336 | 66593 | 820 |
| 1723 | 1753 | 21888 | 88837 | 1181 |
| 1724 | 1881 | 19204 | 87122 | 991 |
| 1725 | 2069 | 20779 | 90429 | 879 |
| 1726 | 2174 | 19637 | 90372 | 808 |
| 1727 | 2399 | 19966 | 93818 | 694 |
| 1728 | 2611 | 21083 | 97570 | 634 |
| 1729 | 2877 | 19033 | 92178 | 548 |
| 1730 | 3164 | 22107 | 116822 | 736 |
| 1731 | 3471 | 24141 | 123972 | 859 |
| 1732 | 3775 | 25982 | 129117 | 809 |
| 1733 | 4085 | 26824 | 135014 | 751 |
| 1734 | 4498 | 29225 | 139315 | 1002 |
| 1735 | 5001 | 32030 | 146727 | 925 |
| 1736 | 3966 | 32473 | 144081 | 914 |
| 1737 | 4271 | 33332 | 142892 | 847 |
| 1738 | 4430 | 33876 | 151075 | 937 |
| 1739 | 4728 | 31146 | 143397 | 664 |
| 1740 | 5142 | 32598 | 158745 | 895 |
| 1741 | 5193 | 32025 | 152037 | 693 |
| 1742 | 5623 | 33613 | 164680 ¹ | 525 |
| 1743 | 5789 | 34916 | 169440 | 613 |
| 1744 | 5749 | 31901 | 160950 | 496 |
| 1745 | 6193 | 31641 | 162305 | 553 |
| 1746 | 6597 | 33733 | 163559 | 548 |
| 1747 | 6776 | 30740 | 152605 | 485 |
| 1748 | 6807 | 31375 | 152092 | 429 |
| 1749 | 5732 | 31773 | 158349 | 390 |
| 1750 | 4818 | 33527 | 165534 | 279 |

 1 Changed from 184680 (error Cape district).

Livestock, total, 2

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 1751 | 5024 | 33250 | 161344 | 256 |
| 1752 | 5615 | 34168 | 175341 | 424 |
| 1753 | 6136 | 36243 | 191511 | 477 |
| 1754 | 6106 | 36224 | 195189 | 585 |
| 1755 | 6852 | 37624 | 205263 | 414 |
| 1756 | 7043 | 36420 | 198132 | 425 |
| 1757 | 7062 | 35783 | 192988 | 356 |
| 1758 | 7302 | 34586 | 191812 ² | 340 |
| 1759 | 7835 | 34571 | 200217 | 396 |
| 1760 | 8240 | 34282 | 203635 | 334 |
| 1761 | 7298 | 33363 | 198913 | 493 |
| 1762 | 8457 | 33575 | 198512 | 354 |
| 1763 | 5329 | 33523 | 199339 | 333 |
| 1764 | 6077 | 33424 | 201052 | 317 |
| 1765 | 6207 | 33986 | 204429 | 341 |
| 1766 | 5487 | 34849 | 217361 | 339 |
| 1767 | 7006 | 36160 | 238992 | 414 |
| 1768 | 7004 | 36786 | 250978 | 500 |
| 1769 | 7437 | 38012 | 244558 | 569 |
| 1770 | 7883 | 37357 | 258250 | 456 |
| 1771 | 8188 | 37977 | 264943 | 387 |
| 1772 | 8514 | 38665 | 271002 | 432 |
| 1773 | 9061 | 39019 | 285094 | 354 |
| 1774 | 9438 | 40923 ¹ | 312855 | 319 |
| 1775 | 9653 | 44554 | 302965 | 421 |
| 1776 | 9857 | 50711 | 353639 | 308 |
| 1777 | 12690 | 64356 | 397437 | 390 |
| 1778 | NA | 61961 | 376433 | NA |
| 1779 | NA | 64957 | 377814 | NA |
| 1780 | NA | 63635 | 355659 | NA |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1782 | NA | 55828 | 298959 | NA |
| 1783 | NA | 62762 | 310904 | NA |
| 1784 | NA | 60243 | 308429 | NA |
| 1785 | NA | 64776 | 315946 | NA |
| 1786 | NA | 64015 | 335023 | NA |
| 1787 | NA | 83096 | 433972 | NA |
| 1788 | NA | 80921 | 445557 | NA |
| 1789 | NA | 77857 | 431555 | NA |
| 1790 | NA | 83467 | 467321 | NA |
| 1791 | NA | 83543 | 467669 | NA |
| 1792 | NA | 83246 | 487481 | NA |
| 1793 | NA | 82110 | 475205 | NA |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1795 | 14523 | 71664 | 418817 | 125 |

1 Changed from 30923 (assumed to be an error).

2 Changed from 151812 (error Drakenstein).

Appendix 9, Table 2
Livestock, Cape district (1701 - 1795), 1

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|-------------|
| 1701 | 368 | 4204 | 30693 | 99 |
| 1702 | 370 | 4975 | 33550 | 130 |
| 1703 | 418 | 5148 | 37958 | 171 |
| 1704 | 400 | 5043 | 39900 | 132 |
| 1705 | 451 | 5308 | 43600 | 150 |
| 1706 | 412 | 5332 | 36500 | 82 |
| 1707 | 476 | 5696 | 39080 | 43 |
| 1708 | 714 | 6826 | 48980 | 152 |
| 1709 | 886 | 9576 | 68174 | 112 |
| 1710 | 985 | 9556 | 67180 | 76 |
| 1711 | 1093 | 10358 | 50468 | 142 |
| 1712 | 1023 | 6603 | 55225 | 58 |
| 1713 | 1029 | 7739 | 56650 | 51 |
| 1714 | 846 | 5650 | 42860 | 138 |
| 1715 | 815 | 5517 | 36436 | 117 |
| 1716 | 961 | 5352 | 28049 | 100 |
| 1717 | 1027 | 4224 | 17035 | 216 |
| 1718 | 1054 | 5224 | 21414 | 208 |
| 1719 | 930 | 4800 | 24020 | 307 |
| 1720 | 737 | 5721 | 27260 | 304 |
| 1721 | 747 | 5603 | 27810 | 365 |
| 1722 | 853 | 6308 | 29218 | 381 |
| 1723 | 1046 | 7799 | 32776 | 498 |
| 1724 | 1109 | 7129 | 32338 | 455 |
| 1725 | 1143 | 7894 | 36161 | 421 |
| 1726 | 1122 | 5410 | 29369 | 380 |
| 1727 | 1216 | 6086 | 32383 | 262 |
| 1728 | 1371 | 6689 | 34742 | 266 |
| 1729 | 1493 | 5551 | 30091 | 157 |
| 1730 | 1631 | 6396 | 39564 | 250 |
| 1731 | 1686 | 6606 | 37984 | 328 |
| 1732 | 1833 | 6790 | 38128 | 448 |
| 1733 | 1934 | 6514 | 36830 | 414 |
| 1734 | 2146 | 7902 | 39779 | 559 |
| 1735 | 2382 | 8618 | 41472 | 491 |
| 1736 | 2329 | 8858 | 39040 | 458 |
| 1737 | 2345 | 8948 | 41552 | 349 |
| 1738 | 2254 | 9029 | 43174 | 569 |
| 1739 | 2311 | 9749 | 44751 | 255 |
| 1740 | 2498 | 8508 | 45895 | 487 |
| 1741 | 2328 | 8919 | 46655 | 407 |
| 1742 | 2581 | 8588 | 45890 ¹ | 239 |
| 1743 | 2542 | 8807 | 44740 | 304 |
| 1744 | 2569 | 8267 | 47600 | 208 |
| 1745 | 2703 | 7655 | 43130 | 251 |
| 1746 | 2311 | 8082 | 41539 | 268 |
| 1747 | 2810 | 7575 | 40474 | 222 |
| 1748 | 2830 | 8145 | 38542 | 211 |
| 1749 | 2636 | 7579 | 37112 | 175 |
| 1750 | 2479 | 7589 | 35440 | 140 |

1 Changed from 119890 (assumed to be an error).

Livestock, Cape district, 2

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1751 | 2423 | 7857 | 36755 | 124 |
| 1752 | 2578 | 7854 | 36820 | 171 |
| 1753 | 2756 | 8748 | 41260 | 175 |
| 1754 | 3043 | 9069 | 44743 | 244 |
| 1755 | 2945 | 9338 | 46000 | 98 |
| 1756 | 2833 | 7923 | 41250 | 161 |
| 1757 | 2903 | 8217 | 40454 | 155 |
| 1758 | 2945 | 7904 | 39986 | 96 |
| 1759 | 3108 | 7975 | 42811 | 176 |
| 1760 | 3117 | 7525 | 45040 | 174 |
| 1761 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1762 | 3237 | 7253 | 40340 | 219 |
| 1763 | 2758 | 6875 | 38548 | 217 |
| 1764 | 2524 | 6856 | 36505 | 203 |
| 1765 | 2508 | 6264 | 34196 | 213 |
| 1766 | 1627 | 6406 | 35450 | 193 |
| 1767 | 2654 | 6079 | 34014 | 232 |
| 1768 | 2478 | 6059 | 34448 | 340 |
| 1769 | 2706 | 6729 | 34870 | 360 |
| 1770 | 2818 | 6531 | 34320 | 246 |
| 1771 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1772 | 3041 | 5918 | 31666 | 284 |
| 1773 | 3115 | 6103 | 41060 | 216 |
| 1774 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1775 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1776 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1777 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1778 | 3409 | 7135 | 28560 | 86 |
| 1779 | 3682 | 7198 | 26395 | 132 |
| 1780 | 3531 | 7843 | 26370 | 145 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1782 | 3318 | 6897 | 19880 | 178 |
| 1783 | 3764 | 7398 | 21390 | 178 |
| 1784 | 3840 | 7381 | 22606 | 153 |
| 1785 | 3594 | 7014 | 19881 | 62 |
| 1786 | 3393 | 6666 | 25544 | 61 |
| 1787 | 3361 | 7809 | 22369 | 38 |
| 1788 | 3544 | 7290 | 24537 | 122 |
| 1789 | 3736 | 7421 | 20450 | 120 |
| 1790 | 4382 | 9712 | 24468 | 140 |
| 1791 | 3798 | 8484 | 21500 | 222 |
| 1792 | 3754 | 7288 | 20304 | 0 |
| 1793 | 5044 | 6570 | 19581 | 10 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1795 | 4125 | 8681 | 12967 | 27 |

Appendix 9, Table 3

Livestock in possession of Free Blacks, Cape district (1720 - 1773)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1720 | 6 | | | 6 |
| 1721 | 3 | 30 | | 3 |
| 1722 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1723 | 5 | | | 2 |
| 1724 | 2 | 44 | | |
| 1725 | 8 | 26 | | |
| 1726 | 6 | 52 | 80 | 2 |
| 1727 | 10 | 46 | 187 | 3 |
| 1728 | 9 | 44 | 210 | |
| 1729 | 9 | 43 | 200 | |
| 1730 | 14 | 58 | 214 | |
| 1731 | 16 | 47 | 205 | |
| 1732 | 15 | 32 | 180 | |
| 1733 | 19 | 48 | 195 | |
| 1734 | 21 | 54 | 310 | |
| 1735 | 33 | 46 | 190 | |
| 1736 | 27 | 54 | 173 | |
| 1737 | 29 | 66 | 250 | |
| 1738 | 6 | 34 | 130 | |
| 1739 | 20 | 36 | 250 | |
| 1740 | 21 | 46 | 100 | |
| 1741 | 14 | 16 | 200 | |
| 1742 | | | | |
| 1743 | | | | |
| 1744 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1745 | 7 | 24 | | |
| 1746 | 7 | 30 | | |
| 1747 | 6 | 28 | | |
| 1748 | 8 | 32 | | |
| 1749 | 6 | 38 | | |
| 1750 | 12 | 34 | | |
| 1751 | 12 | 26 | | |
| 1752 | 8 | 22 | | |
| 1753 | 13 | 44 | | |
| 1754 | 8 | 28 | | |
| 1755 | 8 | 32 | | |
| 1756 | 12 | 68 | | |
| 1757 | 8 | 72 | | |
| 1758 | 12 | 48 | | |
| 1759 | 12 | 66 | | |
| 1760 | | 58 | | |
| 1761 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1762 | | 164 | 8 | |
| 1763 | 7 | 196 | | |
| 1764 | 1 | 138 | | |
| 1765 | | 147 | | |
| 1766 | 7 | 140 | | |
| 1767 | 7 | 134 | | |
| 1768 | 1 | 122 | | |
| 1769 | 1 | 114 | | |
| 1770 | 6 | 18 | | |
| 1771 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1772 | 4 | 63 | 100 | |
| 1773 | 6 | 68 | 100 | |

 N.B. The empty cells denote no possessions by Free Blacks in that year.

Appendix 9, Table 4
Livestock, Stellenbosch (1701 - 1787), 1

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1701 | 164 | 2931 | 12470 | 173 |
| 1702 | 196 | 3660 | 15788 | 129 |
| 1703 | 206 | 3968 | 15760 | 137 |
| 1704 | 239 | 3132 | 13890 | 212 |
| 1705 | 257 | 3645 | 17755 | 175 |
| 1706 | 312 | 3353 | 17910 | 179 |
| 1707 | 356 | 3227 | 20074 | 98 |
| 1708 | 344 | 3266 | 17498 | 71 |
| 1709 | 506 | 4625 | 29939 | 108 |
| 1710 | 506 | 4670 | 29000 | 68 |
| 1711 | 532 | 4543 | 30318 | 54 |
| 1712 | 497 | 4622 | 26180 | 71 |
| 1713 | 504 | 4093 | 25620 | 62 |
| 1714 | 625 | 4606 | 32279 | 68 |
| 1715 | 323 | 3570 | 23200 | 45 |
| 1716 | 641 | 4148 | 20928 | 147 |
| 1717 | 630 | 4130 | 17958 | 158 |
| 1718 | 661 | 3901 | 15036 | 223 |
| 1719 | 362 | 3676 | 14104 | 339 |
| 1720 | 231 | 3554 | 13983 | 313 |
| 1721 | 309 | 3500 | 13660 | 305 |
| 1722 | 314 | 3067 | 13555 | 202 |
| 1723 | 367 | 4864 | 18469 | 169 |
| 1724 | 394 | 4105 | 17160 | 155 |
| 1725 | 476 | 4461 | 17888 | 181 |
| 1726 | 509 | 4832 | 19789 | 170 |
| 1727 | 572 | 4593 | 19752 | 268 |
| 1728 | 590 | 5098 | 21907 | 267 |
| 1729 | 703 | 5364 | 20402 | 244 |
| 1730 | 664 | 5062 | 20729 | 246 |
| 1731 | 738 | 5006 | 22702 | 224 |
| 1732 | 820 | 5687 | 24929 | 219 |
| 1733 | 889 | 5832 | 25865 | 170 |
| 1734 | 1014 | 5919 | 27017 | 309 |
| 1735 | 1090 | 6672 | 27885 | 331 |
| 1736 | 706 | 5701 | 27117 | 290 |
| 1737 | 767 | 6018 | 25410 | 307 |
| 1738 | 854 | 6173 | 25451 | 279 |
| 1739 | 974 | 5723 | 25638 | 332 |
| 1740 | 1027 | 5443 | 26215 | 309 |
| 1741 | 1069 | 5858 | 27906 | 259 |
| 1742 | 1105 | 6913 | 29480 | 256 |
| 1743 | 1111 | 6921 | 31150 | 235 |
| 1744 | 1178 | 5893 | 26700 | 247 |
| 1745 | 1355 | 8957 | 43125 | 220 |
| 1746 ¹ | 1240 | 5926 | 27375 | 220 |
| 1747 | 1237 | 5104 | 24525 | 180 |
| 1748 | 1097 | 4299 | 19375 | 142 |
| 1749 | 1011 | 5114 | 24180 | 152 |
| 1750 | 757 | 5586 | 28660 | 83 |

¹ This year saw the foundation of Swellendam district, and thus the decrease in the Stellenbosch totals.

Livestock, Stellenbosch, 2

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1751 | 860 | 6046 | 29055 | 97 |
| 1752 | 889 | 5680 | 28220 | 210 |
| 1753 | 901 | 5594 | 28420 | 201 |
| 1754 | 438 | 6069 | 30280 | 242 |
| 1755 | 1019 | 5667 | 30224 | 276 |
| 1756 | 1078 | 5582 | 30200 | 254 |
| 1757 | 962 | 5489 | 28938 | 173 |
| 1758 | 1055 | 5273 | 30720 | 198 |
| 1759 | 1216 | 4990 | 30660 | 182 |
| 1760 | 1302 | 4865 | 29889 | 127 |
| 1761 | 1276 | 5005 | 31943 | 210 |
| 1762 | 1362 | 4957 | 28717 | 120 |
| 1763 | 767 | 4539 | 26160 | 110 |
| 1764 | 899 | 4589 | 28969 | 101 |
| 1765 | 937 | 5384 | 30201 | 114 |
| 1766 | 993 | 5511 | 34525 | 106 |
| 1767 | 1132 | 6315 | 40540 | 158 |
| 1768 | 1080 | 5603 | 38698 | 160 |
| 1769 | 1158 | 5583 | 29106 | 153 |
| 1770 | 1229 | 5843 | 41786 | 190 |
| 1771 | 1290 | 5415 | 38668 | 210 |
| 1772 | 1413 | 5641 | 41774 | 140 |
| 1773 | 1418 | 5487 | 42335 | 138 |
| 1774 | 1599 | 5910 | 43400 | 120 |
| 1775 | 1693 | 5727 | 41200 | 165 |
| 1776 | 1770 | 8770 | 52344 | 174 |
| 1777 | 2113 | 8198 | 52970 | 175 |
| 1778 | 1882 | 7366 | 49594 | 147 |
| 1779 | 1937 | 8291 | 50220 | 148 |
| 1780 | 2165 | 7197 | 38476 | 153 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1782 | 1982 | 6975 | 32290 | 100 |
| 1783 | 1886 | 7827 | 29405 | 80 |
| 1784 | 2056 | 6308 | 28738 | 70 |
| 1785 | 1901 | 7613 | 31710 | 65 |
| 1786 | 2037 | 6527 | 29630 | 40 |
| 1787 ¹ | 2026 | 5459 | 20136 | 36 |

1 The drop in the figures for 1787 was caused by the foundation of Graaff-Reinet district in that year.

Appendix 9, Table 5
Livestock, Drakenstein (1701 - 1787), 1

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1701 | 149 | 2569 | 9963 | 103 |
| 1702 | 180 | 3047 | 12717 | 99 |
| 1703 | 246 | 3437 | 15500 | 92 |
| 1704 | 274 | 3081 | 13400 | 96 |
| 1705 | 306 | 3011 | 15068 | 123 |
| 1706 | 312 | 3061 | 15076 | 179 |
| 1707 | 429 | 3748 | 20160 | 98 |
| 1708 | 528 | 4228 | 20375 | 70 |
| 1709 | 622 | 5352 | 30855 | 54 |
| 1710 | 590 | 5854 | 35450 | 40 |
| 1711 | 628 | 5842 | 35470 | 54 |
| 1712 | 736 | 6259 | 39536 | 101 |
| 1713 | 613 | 5727 | 38450 | 84 |
| 1714 | 705 | 6301 | 45069 | 83 |
| 1715 | 756 | 5998 | 37995 | 75 |
| 1716 | 723 | 7075 | 29842 | 156 |
| 1717 | 699 | 6944 | 27207 | 182 |
| 1718 | 833 | 7077 | 27931 | 436 |
| 1719 | 294 | 7351 | 28841 | 423 |
| 1720 | 175 | 6987 | 25861 | 255 |
| 1721 | 248 | 7189 | 26660 | 237 |
| 1722 | 261 | 5961 | 23820 | 237 |
| 1723 | 340 | 9225 | 37592 | 514 |
| 1724 | 378 | 7970 | 37624 | 381 |
| 1725 | 450 | 8424 | 36380 | 277 |
| 1726 | 543 | 9395 | 41214 | 258 |
| 1727 | 611 | 9287 | 41683 | 164 |
| 1728 | 650 | 9296 | 40921 | 101 |
| 1729 | 671 | 8118 | 41685 | 147 |
| 1730 | 869 | 10649 | 56529 | 240 |
| 1731 | 1047 | 12529 | 63286 | 307 |
| 1732 | 1122 | 13505 | 66060 | 142 |
| 1733 | 1262 | 14478 | 72319 | 177 |
| 1734 | 1338 | 15404 | 72519 | 134 |
| 1735 | 1529 | 16740 | 77370 | 103 |
| 1736 | 931 | 17914 | 77924 | 166 |
| 1737 | 1159 | 18366 | 75930 | 191 |
| 1738 | 1322 | 18674 | 82450 | 89 |
| 1739 | 1443 | 15674 | 73008 | 77 |
| 1740 | 1617 | 18647 | 86635 | 99 |
| 1741 | 1796 | 17248 | 77476 | 27 |
| 1742 | 1937 | 18112 | 89310 | 40 |
| 1743 | 2136 | 19188 | 93550 | 74 |
| 1744 | 2002 | 17741 | 86650 | 41 |
| 1745 | 2135 | 15029 | 76050 | 82 |
| 1746 ¹ | 2165 | 11201 | 56725 | 60 |
| 1747 | 1963 | 9258 | 48950 | 73 |
| 1748 | 2077 | 9691 | 49775 | 83 |
| 1749 | 1407 | 8802 | 45923 | 63 |
| 1750 | 938 | 8307 | 43024 | 53 |

¹ The foundation of Swellendam district in this year caused the figures for Drakenstein district to drop.

Livestock, Drakenstein, 2

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|-------------|
| 1751 | 1122 | 8722 | 45374 | 33 |
| 1752 | 1401 | 8995 | 50966 | 43 |
| 1753 | 1644 | 10207 | 59951 | 101 |
| 1754 | 1734 | 9560 | 58085 | 99 |
| 1755 | 1973 | 10594 | 65103 | 40 |
| 1756 | 2198 | 11183 | 63803 | 10 |
| 1757 | 2265 | 10730 | 63869 | 28 |
| 1758 | 2342 | 10298 | 61616 ² | 56 |
| 1759 | 2470 | 10354 | 65334 | 38 |
| 1760 | 2699 | 10642 | 67538 | 33 |
| 1761 | 2689 | 10610 | 66390 | 35 |
| 1762 | 2673 | 10747 | 67611 | 15 |
| 1763 | 1664 | 10667 | 66719 | 6 |
| 1764 | 1962 | 10733 | 68098 | 13 |
| 1765 | 2073 | 10717 | 71665 | 14 |
| 1766 | 2124 | 11107 | 76290 | 40 |
| 1767 | 2364 | 12579 | 95000 | 24 |
| 1768 | 2505 | 12867 | 101185 | 0 |
| 1769 | 2519 | 13168 | 102155 | 56 |
| 1770 | 2738 | 13652 | 106015 | 20 |
| 1771 | 2857 | 14151 | 114090 | 26 |
| 1772 | 3137 | 14610 | 118705 | 8 |
| 1773 | 3470 | 15367 | 127380 | 0 |
| 1774 | 3640 | 17888 | 154415 | 15 |
| 1775 | 3697 | 18729 | 149625 | 6 |
| 1776 | 3742 | 22908 | 199400 | 8 |
| 1777 | 4674 | 23625 | 193119 | 37 |
| 1778 | 4629 | 24417 | 194670 | 0 |
| 1779 | 4861 | 26256 | 208849 | 0 |
| 1780 | 5013 | 26618 | 203929 | 0 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1782 | 5015 | 25676 | 181339 | 0 |
| 1783 | 4812 | 26067 | 183319 | 0 |
| 1784 | 4868 | 25404 | 178525 | 50 |
| 1785 | 4718 | 26061 | 175455 | 8 |
| 1786 | 5049 | 25986 | 183059 | 4 |
| 1787 ¹ | 7215 | 25555 | 144625 | 40 |

1 The foundation of Graaff-Reinet district in this year caused a drop in the figures for Drakenstein.

2 Changed from 21616 (obviously an error).

Appendix 9, Table 6

Livestock, Stellenbosch and Drakenstein (1788 - 1795)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> | <u>pigs</u> |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1788 | 6861 | 23399 | 128885 | 30 |
| 1789 | 6891 | 22227 | 123380 | 35 |
| 1790 | 6700 | 21597 | 117243 | 25 |
| 1791 | 6780 | 21818 | 117243 | 30 |
| 1792 | 6705 | 21608 | 115872 | 36 |
| 1793 | 6772 | 22155 | 111217 | 100 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | |
| 1795 | 6772 | 22220 | 118318 | 98 |

Appendix 9, Table 7
Livestock, Swellendam (1746 - 1795)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1746 | 581 | 8524 | 37920 |
| 1747 | 766 | 8803 | 38656 |
| 1748 | 803 | 9240 | 44400 |
| 1749 | 678 | 10278 | 51134 |
| 1750 | 644 | 12045 | 58410 |
| 1751 | 619 | 10625 | 50160 |
| 1752 | 747 | 11639 | 59335 |
| 1753 | 835 | 11694 | 61880 |
| 1754 | 871 | 11526 | 62091 |
| 1755 | 915 | 12025 | 63936 |
| 1756 | 934 | 11732 | 62879 |
| 1757 | 931 | 11347 | 59727 |
| 1758 | 960 | 11111 | 59490 |
| 1759 | 1041 | 11252 | 61412 |
| 1760 | 1122 | 11250 | 61168 |
| 1761 | NOT AVAILABLE | | |
| 1762 | 1185 | 10618 | 61844 |
| 1763 | 740 | 11442 | 67912 |
| 1764 | 692 | 11246 | 67480 |
| 1765 | 689 | 11621 | 68367 |
| 1766 | 743 | 11825 | 71096 |
| 1767 | 856 | 11187 | 69438 |
| 1768 | 941 | 12257 | 76647 |
| 1769 | 1044 | 12532 | 78427 |
| 1770 | 1098 | 12331 | 76129 |
| 1771 | NOT AVAILABLE | | |
| 1772 | 923 | 12496 | 78557 |
| 1773 | 1058 | 12062 | 74319 |
| 1774 | NOT AVAILABLE | | |
| 1775 | NOT AVAILABLE | | |
| 1776 | NOT AVAILABLE | | |
| 1777 | NOT AVAILABLE | | |
| 1778 | 1878 | 23043 | 103609 |
| 1779 | 1922 | 23212 | 92350 |
| 1780 | 1787 | 22037 | 86884 |
| 1781 | NOT AVAILABLE | | |
| 1782 | 1576 | 16280 | 65450 |
| 1783 | 1922 | 21470 | 76790 |
| 1784 | 2350 | 21150 | 78560 |
| 1785 | 2173 | 24088 | 88900 |
| 1786 | 2042 | 24836 | 96790 |
| 1787 ¹ | 1732 | 18830 | 88442 |
| 1788 | 1762 | 17764 | 61110 |
| 1789 | 1627 | 15834 | 56775 |
| 1790 | 1932 | 18783 | 75110 |
| 1791 | 1950 | 18496 | 66174 |
| 1792 | 2080 | 19427 | 70110 |
| 1793 | 1815 | 18462 | 63212 |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | |
| 1795 | 2348 | 14490 | 65052 |

1 The foundation of Graaff-Reinet district in this year caused a drop in the figures for Swellendam.

Appendix 9, Table 8
Livestock, Graaff-Reinet (1787 - 1795)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>horses</u> | <u>cattle</u> | <u>sheep</u> |
|-------------|--|---------------|--------------|
| 1787 | 980 | 25443 | 158400 |
| 1788 | 1191 | 32468 | 231025 |
| 1789 | 1355 | 32375 | 230950 |
| 1790 | 1424 | 33375 | 250500 |
| 1791 | 1560 | 34745 | 262680 |
| 1792 | 1804 | 34923 | 281195 |
| 1793 | The totals given are the same as in 1792 | | |
| 1794 | NOT AVAILABLE | | |
| 1795 | 1278 | 26273 | 222480 |

Appendix 10, Table 1

Meat supplied to the Company, in *ponden* (1725 - 1776)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>beef</u> | <u>mutton</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>beef</u> | <u>mutton</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1725 | 117922 | 64994 | 1751 | 311019 | 189988 |
| 1726 | 84743 | 141388 | 1752 | 351129 | 224575 |
| 1727 | 106611 | 148409 | 1753 | 317142 | 242541 |
| 1728 | 103895 | 153887 | 1754 | 330230 | 331815 |
| 1729 | 96126 | 118442 | 1755 | 282073 | 282910 |
| 1730 | 102378 | 95097 | 1756 | 342357 | 269262 |
| 1731 | 108455 | 128795 | 1757 | 341825 | 277830 |
| 1732 | 145050 | 114161 | 1758 | 354717 | 297194 |
| 1733 | 131515 | 90371 | 1759 | 353363 | 316809 |
| 1734 | 149392 | 112362 | 1760 | 304743 | 393507 |
| 1735 | 151416 | 114343 | 1761 | 292589 | 279877 |
| 1736 | 155662 | 110245 | 1762 | 310121 | 288153 |
| 1737 | 181940 | 97879 | 1763 | 317192 | 303151 |
| 1738 | 241190 | 117059 | 1764 | 365495 | 338140 |
| 1739 | 200090 | 128948 | 1765 | 348699 | 297737 |
| 1740 | 195165 | 144880 | 1766 | 346978 | 323052 |
| 1741 | 183572 | 155546 | 1767 | 335299 | 304633 |
| 1742 | 182711 | 280786 | 1768 | 323945 | 305161 |
| 1743 | 243732 | 274773 | 1769 | 342333 | 321619 |
| 1744 | 298212 | 323543 | 1770 | 350752 | 345971 |
| 1745 | 344967 | 278922 | 1771 | 319375 | 411505 |
| 1746 | 375851 | 259020 | 1772 | 381632 | 463489 |
| 1747 | 311721 | 219283 | 1773 | 432239 | 480746 |
| 1748 | 356271 | 201570 | 1774 | 395829 | 480059 |
| 1749 | 296262 | 157403 | 1775 | 300839 | 524086 |
| 1750 | 324435 | 188001 | 1776 | 152148 | 703981 |

Appendix 10, Table 2

Prices of meat supplied to the Company (*pacht* prices; 1701-1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>ponden meat</u> <u>(duiten)</u> | <u>sheep</u> <u>(stuivers)</u> |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1701 | 20 | 60 |
| 1706 | 14 | 140 |
| 1708 | 13 | N.A. |
| 1715 | 16 | 114 |
| 1718 | 24 | 160 |
| 1719 | 24 | 160 |
| 1720 | 24 | 160 |
| 1721 | 24 | 160 |
| 1723 | 22 | 150 |
| 1724 | 17.5 | 120 |
| 1725 | 16 | 120 |
| 1726 | 15 | 114 |
| 1727 | 16 | 114 |
| 1728 | 12 | 77.8 |
| 1729 | 11 | 84 |
| 1732 | 11 | 84 |
| 1737 | 11 | 84 |
| 1742 | 5 | 72 |
| 1747 | 14 | 96 |
| 1748 | 7 | 90 |
| 1749 | 11 | 96 |
| 1754 | 5 | 72 |
| 1759 | 6 | 72 |
| 1764 | 8 | 60 |
| 1769 | 5 | 60 |
| 1774 | 3 | 28 |
| 1779 | 4 | 18 |
| 1784 | 5.5 | 24 |
| 1789 | 8 | 42 |
| 1793 | 6 | 33 |

 N.B. These prices were maintained until the next auction of the *pacht*, that is until the next date given in the table.

Appendix 11

Gross receipts from VOC sales in Cape Town, according to the *Rendementen*, in guilders (1748 - 1776)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Dutch</u> | <u>Indiase</u> ¹ | <u>Bengal</u> | <u>Coast</u> ² | <u>Surat</u> | <u>Ceylon</u> | <u>Tutu-</u> <u>corin</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------------------|--------------|---------------|------------------------------|--------------|
| 1748 | 65713 | 17694 | 10896 | 28607 | 20046 | 7870 | | 150826 |
| 1749 | 31534 | 28472 | 11000 | 19522 | 27397 | 11053 | | 128978 |
| 1750 | 31140 | 42601 | 10971 | 30477 | 28500 | 7680 | | 151369 |
| 1751 | 27918 | 18065 | 7679 | 31118 | 23679 | 4885 | | 113344 |
| 1752 | 55675 | 24319 | 2797 | 32588 | 28899 | 7575 | | 151853 |
| 1753 | 43247 | 27484 | 554 | 23916 | 16630 | | 456 | 112287 |
| 1754 | 31680 | 10579 | 89 | 13966 | 4833 | | | 61147 |
| 1755 | 16326 | 37783 | 837 | 10949 | 5324 | 1038 | | 72257 |
| 1756 | 20732 | 16721 | 2205 | 2078 | 6017 | 99 | | 47852 |
| 1757 | 22403 | 15519 | 4203 | 14368 | 8600 | | 1842 | 66935 |
| 1758 | 26300 | 2961 | 631 | 6121 | 19625 | | 843 | 56481 |
| 1759 | 49645 | 16186 | 1187 | 20593 | 23301 | | | 110912 |
| 1760 ³ | 47961 | 10603 | 3444 | 24426 | 46274 | | | 132708 |
| 1761 ³ | 39257 | 17967 | 4837 | 31882 | 27430 | | | 121373 |
| 1762 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | |
| 1763 | 30641 | 11758 | 11511 | 41148 | 19980 | | | 115038 |
| 1764 | 44598 | 9552 | 3597 | 34248 | 18679 | | | 110674 |
| 1765 | 28309 | 15250 | 1267 | 75693 | 24415 | | | 144934 |
| 1766 | 20224 | 8047 | 5850 | 29174 | 26042 | | | 89337 |
| 1767 | 9580 | 2036 | | 2426 | 25073 | | | 39115 |
| 1768 | 31544 | 6953 | 18905 | 39268 | 25854 | | | 122524 |
| 1769 | 36993 | 2703 | 5941 | 33384 | 22936 | | | 101957 |
| 1770 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | | | | |

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Dutch</u> | <u>Batavia</u> <u>bought</u> | <u>Java</u> | <u>Ambon/</u> <u>Banda</u> | <u>Bengal</u> |
|-------------|---------------|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| 1771 | 26376 | 138 | 1088 | 651 | 237 |
| 1772 | 16745 | 1268 | 2267 | 998 | |
| 1773 | 30223 | 4452 | 3705 | 996 | 81 |
| 1774 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | |
| 1775 | 30737 | 485 | 2029 | 426 | 396 |
| 1776 | 31612 | 597 | 2360 | 756 | |

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Coast</u> | <u>Surat</u> | <u>Ceylon</u> | <u>China</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1771 | 18574 | 27077 | 130 | 23 | 74294 |
| 1772 | 20472 | 26982 | 332 | 30 | 69094 |
| 1773 | 27752 | 4919 | 71 | 41 | 72240 |
| 1774 | NOT AVAILABLE | | | | |
| 1775 | 15814 | 29162 | 262 | 23 | 79334 |
| 1776 | 15547 | 22254 | 366 | 44 | 73536 |

N.B. The year given is that in which the accounting year, which ran from 1 September to 31 August, ended. The totals are calculated.

1 "Indiase" refers to goods exported through Batavia.

2 "Coast" refers to the Coromandel Coast.

3 In these two years the VOC sold Cape wheat, to a value of f46274 (profit f2722) in 1759-60 and f28560 (profit f1680) in 1760-61.

Appendix 12

Wissel transfers from the Cape to the Netherlands, in guilders
(1702 - 1793)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1702 | 24513* | 1733 | 115724 | 1764 | 102118 |
| 1703 | N.A. | 1734 | 64203 | 1765 | 287921 |
| 1704 | 36497* | 1735 | 12371* | 1766 | 352865 |
| 1705 | 30565* | 1736 | 157551 | 1767 | 161531 |
| 1706 | 28827* | 1737 | 124733 | 1768 | 169767 |
| 1707 | 16041* | 1738 | 146408* | 1769 | 147565 |
| 1708 | 29616* | 1739 | 169910* | 1770 | 129515 |
| 1709 | 113121* | 1740 | 92612 | 1771 | 200727 |
| 1710 | 119709* | 1741 | 213969* | 1772 | 183126 |
| 1711 | 51084* | 1742 | 224350* | 1773 | 231724 |
| 1712 | 43691 | 1743 | 236210* | 1774 | 483434 |
| 1713 | 79021* | 1744 | 160047 | 1775 | 339616 |
| 1714 | 38534 | 1745 | 178228 | 1776 | 288444 |
| 1715 | 81654* | 1746 | 232512 | 1777 | 298444 |
| 1716 | 77312 | 1747 | 302302 | 1778 | 178926 |
| 1717 | 49689 | 1748 | 258690 | 1779 | 299999 |
| 1718 | 206936 | 1749 | 154794 | 1780 | 299999 |
| 1719 | 39838 | 1750 | 253193 | 1781 | 200002 |
| 1720 | 42691 | 1751 | 321752 | 1782 | 186719 |
| 1721 | 21929 | 1752 | 284063 | 1783 | 271371 |
| 1722 | N.A. | 1753 | 427762 | 1784 | 648374 |
| 1723 | 94078* | 1754 | 330785 | 1785 | 804228 |
| 1724 | 163828* | 1755 | 398798 | 1786 | 376731 |
| 1725 | 161148 | 1756 | 271169 | 1787 | 994950 |
| 1726 | 127365* | 1757 | 334991 | 1788 | 529421 |
| 1727 | 162304* | 1758 | 218688 | 1789 | 499820 |
| 1728 | 69218 | 1759 | 219431 | 1790 | 516774 |
| 1729 | 47081* | 1760 | 190481 | 1791 | 507394 |
| 1730 | 110044 | 1761 | 197757 | 1792 | 499999 |
| 1731 | 80039 | 1762 | 53568 | 1793 | 399997 |
| 1732 | 114351* | 1763 | 83504 | | |

N.B. * = "light" money, implying that 1 Rijksdaalder was not equivalent to 2.4, but to 3 guilders, or, in other words, that 1 guilder was not equivalent to 20, but rather to 16 stuivers. The figures are rounded off.

Appendix 13

The payment of wages in South Africa and the Netherlands, in guilders
(1711 - 1789)

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Nominal</u> | <u>Transfer</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Actual</u> | <u>Nominal</u> | <u>Transfer</u> |
|-------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|
| 1711 | 64689 | 96732 | 32043 | 1751 | 148876 | 200040 | 51164 |
| 1712 | 69856 | 87432 | 17576 | 1752 | 138855 | 222348 | 83493 |
| 1713 | 62419 | 82788 | 20369 | 1753 | 159490 | 216768 | 57278 |
| 1714 | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | 1754 | 130562 | 220224 | 89662 |
| 1715 | 74289 | 106500 | 63639 | 1755 | 135661 | 217320 | 81659 |
| 1716 | N.A. | 111348 | N.A. | 1756 | N.A. | 189204 | N.A. |
| 1717 | N.A. | 111192 | N.A. | 1757 | 146577 | 195564 | 48987 |
| 1718 | N.A. | 112368 | N.A. | 1758 | N.A. | 191928 | N.A. |
| 1719 | N.A. | 109680 | N.A. | 1759 | 124078 | 190656 | 66578 |
| 1720 | N.A. | 119748 | N.A. | 1760 | 133270 | 199068 | 65798 |
| 1721 | N.A. | 120360 | N.A. | 1761 | 96853 | 200088 | 103235 |
| 1722 | N.A. | 117456 | N.A. | 1762 | 110488 | N.A. | N.A. |
| 1723 | 83665 | 123504 | 39839 | 1763 | 95745 | 200688 | 104943 |
| 1724 | 66562 | 114972 | 48410 | 1764 | 127742 | 211140 | 83398 |
| 1725 | N.A. | 92028 | N.A. | 1765 | N.A. | 206856 | N.A. |
| 1726 | 77651 | 110484 | 32833 | 1766 | 125602 | 210336 | 84734 |
| 1727 | 85326 | 117960 | 32634 | 1767 | 114163 | 216048 | 101885 |
| 1728 | N.A. | 116748 | N.A. | 1768 | 134272 | 214380 | 80108 |
| 1729 | 89553 | 110340 | 20787 | 1769 | 127837 | 222732 | 94895 |
| 1730 | N.A. | 122700 | N.A. | 1770 | 138116 | 223788 | 85672 |
| 1731 | N.A. | 128820 | N.A. | 1771 | 130529 | 222432 | 91903 |
| 1732 | 79079 | 129972 | 50893 | 1772 | 155297 | 216948 | 61651 |
| 1733 | N.A. | 126708 | N.A. | 1773 | 146497 | 230004 | 83507 |
| 1734 | N.A. | 148440 | N.A. | 1774 | N.A. | 237084 | N.A. |
| 1735 | 79471 | 149520 | 70049 | 1775 | 134945 | 260832 | 125887 |
| 1736 | N.A. | 141012 | N.A. | 1776 | 146047 | 260148 | 114101 |
| 1737 | N.A. | 190380 | N.A. | 1777 | 113424 | 254124 | 140700 |
| 1738 | 129779 | 134304 | 4525 | 1778 | 123239 | 241944 | 118705 |
| 1739 | 114428 | 149076 | 34648 | 1779 | 95844 | 245412 | 149568 |
| 1740 | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | 1780 | 115529 | 250440 | 134911 |
| 1741 | 113868 | 164412 | 50544 | 1781 | 150290 | 302628 | 152338 |
| 1742 | 119282 | 169476 | 50194 | 1782 | 197128 | 370440 | 173312 |
| 1743 | 119559 | 161592 | 42033 | 1783 | 176794 | 330732 | 153938 |
| 1744 | 98628 | 173328 | 74700 | 1784 | N.A. | 309504 | N.A. |
| 1745 | 131742 | 171600 | 39858 | 1785 | 161498 | 325668 | 164170 |
| 1746 | 98628 | 204072 | 105444 | 1786 | N.A. | 372996 | N.A. |
| 1747 | 128587 | 189060 | 60473 | 1787 | N.A. | 433380 | N.A. |
| 1748 | 137950 | 201108 | 63158 | 1788 | N.A. | 466380 | N.A. |
| 1749 | 131670 | 169728 | 38058 | 1789 | N.A. | 464304 | N.A. |
| 1750 | 131000 | 197880 | 66880 | | | | |

N.B. The category "Nominal" in the table refers to the sum which was nominally paid out in wages at the Cape, calculated as twelve times the monthly salary bill recorded in the *monster* rolls; the category "Actual" to that recorded in the account books as having actually been paid. The category "Transfer", the difference between them, refers to what must have been disbursed in the Netherlands. The figures are rounded off.