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## **Ancient Grammar in Context**

Sluiter, I.

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## Ancient Grammar in Context

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VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT TE AMSTERDAM

# Ancient Grammar in Context

Contributions to the Study of  
Ancient Linguistic Thought

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT


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op gezag van de rector magnificus  
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Promotor: prof.dr. D.M. Schenkeveld  
Referenten: prof.dr. C.J. Ruijgh  
prof.dr. S.R. Slings

*To my mother*

*To the memory of my father*



## STELLINGEN

1. De opkomst van ideeën over het Latijn als een (Aeolisch) dialect van het Grieks is mede een gevolg van de politieke verhouding tussen Griekenland en Rome in de eerste eeuw voor Christus.

Vgl. M. Dubuisson, *le latin est-il une langue barbare?*, *Kiema* 9 (1984), 55-68.

2. De inhoud van de vorige stelling onderstreept het belang van de studie van de (culturele) context van linguïstische theorieën in de Oudheid.

3. In Plato's *Euthydemus* 271b1-5 slaan de woorden τὴν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν op een (gering) verschil in lengte.

Vgl. P. Chantraîne, *Etudes sur le vocabulaire grec*, Paris 1955, 159; G.J. de Vries, *Mnemosyne* 25 (1972), 42.

4. Het vóórkomen van het ἀξίωμα τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον ἐν τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ ἥττον in de Stoïsche lijst van samengestelde *axiomata* bij Diogenes Laërtius (VII 69), moet mede verklaard worden met behulp van de ethische theorieën van de Stoa.

Vgl. I. Sluiter, On "Ἡ διασαφητικός and propositions containing ΜΑΛΛΟΝ/ΗΤΤΟΝ, *Mnemosyne* 41 (1988), 46-66.

5. Het Griekse nonsens-woord (τὸ) βλίτρι is in laatste instantie de bron voor de uitdrukking "to Bliktri" in de 116<sup>e</sup> brief van Sara Burgerhart.

Vgl. I. Sluiter, To Bliktri, *TNTL* 102 (1986), 207-213.

6. In *Anthol. Pal.* XI 335,4 is de pointe van het epigram dat een grammaticus de onjuiste vorm Κυνέγειρ gebruikt had.

Tegen: Paton (Loeb ed.) en Aubreton (Budé ed.). Vgl. I. Sluiter, *Perversa Subtilitas*. De kwade roep van de grammaticus, *Lampas* 21 (1988), 41-65.

7. Tot nu toe hebben onderzoekers van de antieke taalkunde te weinig gebruik gemaakt van het vele waardevolle materiaal dat de oud-Christelijke schrijvers te bieden hebben.

Vgl. dit proefschrift.

8. De term ἐπιρρήματα in de kopjes van het lexicon van Zonaras is geen bezwaar om een driedeling van de woordsoorten in nomina, verba en indeclinabilia als het principe van ordening van dit lexicon te aanvaarden.
9. Het (laten) toepassen van "levend Latijn" is een zinnige aanvulling op de meer gebruikelijke didactische werkvormen in het onderwijs in het Latijn.
10. Het gebruik van slecht Latijn of Grieks in een leergang is nooit verdedigbaar, ook niet op didactische gronden.
11. Het is zinloos wetenschappelijk onderzoek te subsidiëren als niet tegelijkertijd voorzien wordt in financiële steun bij het publiceren van de resultaten ervan.
12. Het (professioneel) uitgeven van je eigen proefschrift is een schizofrene bezigheid.
13. Een leuke laatste gaat niet op be-.

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## *Preface*

It would not surprise me if we discovered that Martianus Capella had just finished a thesis similar to the one you have before you now, when he wrote "*homo est animal grammaticum*" ("man is a grammatical being") (4,349), although he still had the intellectual honesty to acknowledge that this is an example of an incorrect definition. Writing a thesis involves the danger of developing a hopelessly one-sided world-picture. I gladly take the opportunity to thank here the persons who tried to guard me from this - whether successfully or not is not for me to decide. They at least helped me to get this book off my desk. Unfortunately, I see it landed in your hands.

Several light-years ago, Professor D.M. Schenkeveld suggested that I read Apollonius Dyscolus. I have never regretted listening to him at that time. I thank him for giving me so much room while I was preparing this book, and for his sincere criticism when I finally let him read it. Did I mention his patience yet? I consider it a privilege to have worked for such an intelligent scholar, who is at the same time a very able and efficient manager.

Professor S.R. Slings always was the William of Baskerville to my Adson of Melk. I thank him for his penetrating criticism (always sit down before you read one of his letters), and for his valuable suggestions.

Professor C.J. Ruijgh carefully read my work and saved me from many errors. If it were not for my stubbornness he might have saved me from more. He also obliged me by the lightning-speed with which he performed this feat.

Professor P.H. Schrijvers sent me his useful comments on chapter IV: another very fast worker.

At an earlier stage, Professor C.H.M. Versteegh and dr. G.R.W. Dibbets showed their interest.

My friends and colleagues at the Vrije Universiteit cheerfully bore up with me and my grammarians. They must be heartily sick of both by now. Professor A.J. Kleywegt and dr. Elseline Vester especially helped me by their professional and personal advice.

My colleagues of the VU University Press had to cope with the extra work during the times when I was absent. On top of that they had to produce one more book - probably not even a bestseller at that. I did not hear any complaints, I hope not just because I was not there to complain to.

Research for this project was partially supported by the Foundation for Linguistic Research, which is funded by the Netherlands Organization for Research, NWO.

Mrs. M.L. Vaalburg-Darbon kindly corrected my English. Any remaining howlers were surreptitiously slipped in by me after she had seen another "final version".

Finally, I thank Mr. and Mrs. Rienks, Maaïke and Pier for their friendship and hospitality, and Margriet for all the music and general support in distress. My sisters and especially my mother, to whom this book is dedicated, were always faithfully there, and honestly tried to find my work interesting. Now that this work is finished, I shall try to be a bit more sociable ... for the next couple of days or so.

Amstelveen, April 1990.

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

*modesto tamen et circumspecto iudicio  
de tantis viris pronuntiandum est, ne  
quod plerisque accidit, damnent quod  
non intelligent* (Quint. 10,1,26).

The study of ancient linguistic thought enjoys an increasing popularity, the last few decades having produced a number of valuable studies and important progress having been made. Some long-standing assumptions, such as the battle between analogists and anomalists, and the separation of technical from philosophical grammar, were discarded and are no longer regarded as structuring principles for the modern approach to ancient grammar. Useful surveys of the *status quaestionis* may be found, for instance, in Siebenborn 1976, Taylor 1986 and, most recently, Householder 1989.

One of the major insights gained in recent years is that the ancient philosophers, rhetoricians, philologists and grammarians deserve to be studied for their own sakes, not just as forerunners of linguistic theories developed in later centuries. It is recognized that the violent superimposition of later theories and principles may obscure or misconstrue intrinsically sensible and valuable material. Moreover, consensus exists on the fact that the history of grammar is not monolithic. A philosopher is not a grammarian, nor is a rhetorician. Their contributions to the general progress of linguistic insights is often no more than a by-product of their activities. Therefore, it is imperative to put each source into context and to realize the status of its contributions.<sup>1</sup> This is one of the reasons why it is so very difficult to write a complete history of ancient grammar. Our sources suffer from large chronological *lacunae*, and what we do have is not even uniform. School books and scientific works are simply too heterogeneous to bear unqualified comparison. The problem of the chronological *lacunae* can be solved at least partially, if the grammatical views hidden in the Christian writers are taken into account.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Taylor 1986, 187.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. Neuschäfer 1987, 134f., who discerns a line of development running from the Alexandrian philological study of Homer, through the "school philology" of the Roman Empire to the Christian philology, represented by Origen, applied to the Bible. The connection between Origen and the Alexandrian school is especially close. Cf. also the influence of Philo. See also Schäublin 1974, 37; cf. Chapter III section 5; Chapter IV section 5.

In this study, too, the ancient theories themselves will be the focus of attention. They will be explained as much as possible by means of their direct context, by parallels taken from related works and by referring to the wider cultural context in which they originated.<sup>3</sup> This by no means implies that the use of modern terminology is shunned at all cost - that would be very unpractical for one thing. Our modern way of describing linguistic phenomena can at times offer illuminating parallels for ancient usage. However, the use of modern parallels here will be restricted to just that. A partial resemblance between ancient and modern linguistic thought must never lead to putting ancient grammar on a theoretical Procrustes-bed.<sup>4</sup> There are too many instances of wrong answers resulting from wrong questions.

The studies presented here share an emphasis on two points: Throughout it will be stressed that ancient linguistic thinking was essentially semantically oriented. Ancient students of language virtually always considered language as an instrument for conveying meaning. Of course there also is a strong morphological (and phonological/phonetic) interest in Antiquity. But as soon as the level of the single word is left behind, it is the meaning - not just the structure - that is central. Often this brings the grammarian into close proximity to the philosopher of language. This does not mean that there is no syntax at all in Antiquity. On the contrary, many syntactic observations were made, but they always serve the purpose of establishing or confirming semantic relationships.<sup>5</sup>

The second theme of this book is the relationship of grammar in the strict sense to other disciplines occupied with the study of language from whichever aspect. It is well-known that grammar emancipated only slowly from its philosophical, rhetorical and philological origins, but it is not always realized just how slowly. Traces of these origins are remarkably persistent. This book aims at showing how the contributions of the several disciplines were interconnected and integrated into consistent, linguistic theories at various stages of the history of ancient linguistics.

Sometimes, the influences are direct and felt to be so even in Antiquity - an example is the Stoic separation of form and meaning taken over by Apollonius Dyscolus.<sup>6</sup> Sometimes, the influence is there, under the surface, and

---

<sup>3</sup> This idea is by no means new. It was expressed in 1839 by Schmidt (75) and in 1847 by Skrzeczka (2) and Jahn (2) (*ex ipsorum grammaticorum mente*). It was revived by e.g. Baratin and Desbordes 1981.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Kahn 1969, 158; Egli 1986, 281.

<sup>5</sup> Hunger 1978, 15 points out that right up to and including the Byzantine era, syntax was never an autonomous area; there was a kind of vacuum between word-grammar and philosophical digressions, cf. Donnet 1967, 22ff.; 31.

2 <sup>6</sup> Already to be found in Plato's *Cratylus* 394b2ff., see chapter I section 2 ?

the grammarians realize it is, but apparently do not want it to interfere with their theories - an example is the Epicurean theory on the origin of language, which was kept away from the (Latin) grammatical theory of the interjection as much as possible. This may have been related to the "school-book status" of many of our Latin sources, which tended to avoid unnecessary complications. Often, the influence is there, but it is neither alive and understood nor productive any more - an example is the development of words like *λεκτόν* and *λέξις*; even though a Stoic sense may still be detected in some contexts, the words were also used by the same writers in more "technical", but unphilosophical, applications.

My material consisted of everything both Greek and Latin grammarians had to say on the indeclinable parts of speech, the prepositions, adverbs, conjunctions and interjections, over a very long period (ca. 500 B.C. - ca. 1200 A.D.). Since this yielded a rather unwieldy mass of data, I chose to organize this book as a series of case-studies, rather than as the originally envisaged exhaustive historical survey of the theories on the *indeclinabilia*. This choice had two advantages, namely that I could leave out many uninteresting pieces of information (thus, hopefully, earning the lasting gratitude of my readers), but also could add more general problems from the history of ancient linguistics, which were related to the cases selected. Therefore, this book will contain remarks on issues as divergent as the origin of language, ancient theories of causation, cosmic sympathy etc. Moreover, I have allowed ample room for discussing problems relating to the (philological) interpretation of our sources.

Each chapter represents a different approach to the general problem of "grammar and context": In the first the starting point is the earliest period of linguistic observation, with emphasis on the *Stoa*; the second centres around a *grammarian*, namely Apollonius Dyscolus; in the third I start from a *grammatical phenomenon*, viz. the so-called "causal" use of *ὅτι*; the last chapter deals with a *part of speech*, the interjection. Accordingly, chapters I, II and III work from Greek to Latin, whereas the opposite is true for chapter IV.

In chapter II the examples are mostly taken from the *adverbs*; in chapter III from the *conjunctions*, in chapter IV from the *interjections*. The *preposition* is not dealt with separately. In all chapters the practical parallels with philosophy, rhetoric and philology will be demonstrated.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> While preparing this book, I heard from Mr. Baratin that he was working on a thesis which had a set-up similar to the one of this book. Since he was to concentrate on the Latin theories of the conjunctions, I have paid relatively little attention to that part of my material in this study. Unfortunately, Mr. Baratin's book, *La naissance de la syntaxe à Rome*, Paris 1989, reached me too

A list of abbreviations may be found at the end of the book. I shall refer to modern studies by the name of the author and year of publication. For full references, see the bibliography.

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late for me to be able to study it and take its result into account here. I hope to review it in *Mnemosyne*.

## Chapter I - THE STOA

### 0. *Introduction*

In other parts of this study many instances will be given of the relationships between rhetoric, philosophy, philology and grammar. This chapter serves a triple purpose: In the first place it will give a brief survey of the early development of linguistic thought. Hardly surprising, the interrelatedness of the various disciplines dealing with language is especially easy to see at these early stages, where differentiation and specialisation have hardly yet occurred. Further, right from the beginning there is a marked emphasis on the semantic aspects of language.

Secondly, I shall describe some of the more striking aspects of Stoic philosophy, with special emphasis on the strong linguistic component in that philosophical school. Plato and Aristoteles will not be discussed separately.

Thirdly, this chapter serves as a warning and a preventive antidote: The lacunary state of our sources often tempts one to ascribe all kinds of linguistic tenets to the Stoa; it is relatively easy to make the most beautiful theoretical constructions, which, however, must remain entirely speculative. Baratin and Desbordes rightly pointed out the danger of tracing all kind of theories back to the Stoa, whose doctrine we know mainly through this very activity of reconstruction from later sources.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, it is not always clear what is original Stoic theory and what was added to it later.<sup>2</sup> As an example, I shall discuss the way in which the grammarians applied the concept of *συνπάρθεια*. Although there are clear connections with some basic ideas of the Stoa, grammar has gone its own way here. The result seems to be a perversion of the original theory.

### 1. *First linguistic observations*

#### 1.1. *Glossography; synonymy*

From the tentative beginnings of what was eventually to become "technical

---

<sup>1</sup> 1986, 216.

<sup>2</sup> Pohlenz 1939, 51f. n. 2.



grammar",<sup>3</sup> the utmost importance was attached to *meaning*, understandably so, since many grammatical categories are evidently distinguished on semantical or pragmatic (logical) grounds. On an implicit level there are the great number of etymologies which to a greater or lesser degree are hidden in the works of the Greek poets.<sup>4</sup> Explicit consideration of the meaning of words appears for the first time in the collections of glosses, lists of difficult words from Homer.<sup>5</sup> More thoughts about language and linguistics originated in the circles of sophists and philosophers.<sup>6</sup>

The sophists also devoted part of their time to synonymy. Instead of explaining glosses, however, they tried to differentiate as much as possible between apparent synonyms, describing the correct context for each of them.<sup>7</sup> Prodicus was especially famous (or notorious) for this subtle procedure of διαίρεσις,<sup>8</sup> so much so that Socrates, ironically, almost apologizes when he is about to lump together τελευτή, πέρας, and ἔσχατον without more ado.<sup>9</sup> The whole principle of διαίρεσις probably rested on the belief that each word should convey only one meaning,<sup>10</sup> and the meaning be expressed by one word only. The

---

<sup>3</sup> "Technical grammar" owes its inverted commas to the fact that it is virtually impossible to regard grammar as an independent science in Antiquity. Some parts (notably those dealing with the formal aspects of language) developed more independently and did so faster than others, but, generally speaking, too strict separations between "technical" and "non-technical" students of language can be dangerously misleading.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. of the name Astyanax, Hom. Z 402f. τὸν ῥ' Ἐκτῶρ καλέεσκε Σκαμάνδριον, αὐτὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι/ Ἄστυνάκτ'· οἶος γὰρ ἔρύετο Ἴλιον Ἐκτῶρ, where -αναξ is variated by ῥύομαι and Ἄστυ- represents Ἴλιος. These lines have been suspected of being an interpolation, though. See further Ar. *Rhet.* II 23 (1400b17ff.), where etymology is given a rhetorical function, cf. Rank 1951, 11.

For many examples, see Lersch 1841, 3ff.; Rank 1951, e.g. 84ff.; Pfeiffer 1968, 3ff.

<sup>5</sup> Pfeiffer 1968, 12.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 16ff.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Collart 1978, 196.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. Lersch 15ff.; Bluck on Pl. *Meno* 75e1ff. Prodicus (that is to say, Plato's version of him) may be seen in action Pl. *Prot.* 339e1ff. As a technical term for distinguishing alleged synonyms διαίρειν is used.

<sup>9</sup> Pl. *Meno* 75e1ff.

<sup>10</sup> For views on homonymy, see chapter II section 3.3.

existence of true synonymy would be a symptom of a deficient one-to-one correspondence of word and meaning.<sup>11</sup>

Distinguishing synonyms and demanding a proper choice of words gained a permanent place in later linguistic theory, more specifically in rhetoric. Accordingly, ἀκυρολογία, the use of an improper word, was regarded as one of the three major vices of speech.<sup>12</sup> One should not for example apply ῥύγχος ("snout") to a human being,<sup>13</sup> but πρόσωπον. The difference is expressed in sentences built on the model "διαφέρει (τὸ) Α καὶ Β".<sup>14</sup> Interestingly, the Stoics are explicitly said to have made a similar differentiation: οἱ μέντοι Στωϊκοὶ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων ἡγοῦνται τὸ μένειν, τὸ ἡρεμεῖν, τὸ ἡσυχάζειν, τὸ ἀκινητεῖν, τὸ ἀκινητίζειν κτλ.<sup>15</sup> In grammar, too, the differentiation of synonyms was to have quite a follow-up.<sup>16</sup>

## 1.2. Protagoras and the moods and genders

Protagoras' contribution to the history of linguistic thought is of a different nature. His case illustrates the risks of neglecting the context in which apparently "technical" observations were made. He was credited in Antiquity with being the first to distinguish grammatical genders and kinds of sentences; he distinguished prayers, questions, answers and commands.<sup>17</sup> Fehling,<sup>18</sup> however,

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. the well-known Democritus fragment B 26 D.-K. in which the τύχη character of language is proved from this very existence of synonymy, among other things. Cf. Siebenborn 1976, 19f.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. *FDS* II 604A (*Anon. de impropriis*, p. 138,2ff. Nickau) ἀκυρολογία ἐστὶ λέξεων τῶν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον ἀναστρεφόμενων οὐ προσεχῆς χρήσις.

<sup>13</sup> As was done in comedy, cf. *LSJ s.v.* 2; perhaps also in colloquial (affective) usage?

<sup>14</sup> *L.L.* διαφέρει δὲ ῥύγχος καὶ πρόσωπον κτλ.

<sup>15</sup> "The Stoics, however, think that to remain, to be at rest, to keep quiet, to be immovable, to remain motionless differ from one another etc." (*SVF* II 500).

<sup>16</sup> E.g. Cramer *AP* 296,29f. (from the Epimerisms on Hom. A 1): Διαφέρει μῆνις κότου· κότος μὲν ἐστὶν ὄργη· μόνιμος πρὸς τὸ ἀντιλυπῆσαι ὀρώσα, μῆνις δὲ ἡ ἀπλῶς μνησικακία. Ammonius dedicated a complete work to this single topic (*de adfinium vocabulorum differentiis*, ed. K. Nickau, Leipzig 1966). This work should not be ascribed to the fourth-century grammarian Ammonius; rather, it goes back to the lexicon by Herennius Philo from Byblos (2nd cent. A.D.) entitled περὶ τῶν διαφόρων σημανομένων (cf. Schmid-Stählin II 867; Hunger 1978, 49). Examples of the formula διαφέρει τὸ Α καὶ Β are to be found in the Christian writers also, e.g. in Origen, *in Ps.* 36 (37), 1. See Neuschäfer 1987, 140; 142. For the history of the *differentiae verborum* on the Roman side, cf. Brugnoli 1955, 7ff.

<sup>17</sup> D.L. IX 53; Ar. *Poet.* 1456b15ff. See Schenkeveld 1984, 292f. and 328.

insists that these distinctions were nothing more than a by-product of Protagoras' demonstrative criticism of Homer.<sup>19</sup> In the very first line of the *Iliad* Homer was supposed to have made two major mistakes, viz. that he did not use the optative, as befits someone praying to the goddess, but the imperative, thus improperly commanding her,<sup>20</sup> and in the second place that he took μήνυ to be feminine, as the congruent adjective οὐλομένην shows, whereas Protagoras maintained it had to be masculine,<sup>21</sup> probably on the ground that μήνυς is a male passion.<sup>22</sup> Now, these distinctions were clearly made entirely on semantic grounds. According to Aristotle,<sup>23</sup> Protagoras called the three grammatical genders ἄρρενα, θήλεα and σκεύη. The last name, in particular, clearly suggests an approach that was "biological" in origin, rather than grammatical: the stress is on sex, rather than on formal, grammatical gender. Later theory replaces σκεύη, "inanimate objects", with the technical οὐδέτερον, "neuter".

Along the same lines are the comic suggestions of Socrates in Aristophanes' *Nubes* to bring about a greater uniformity between morphologic and

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<sup>18</sup> 1965, 212ff.

<sup>19</sup> It may be remarked that Protagoras' program (Pl. *Prot.* 338e6ff. ἡγοῦμαι ... ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι, ἃ τε ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἃ μὴ) would have been subscribed by most of the later grammarians. Criticism of the poets and being able to judge them on the basis of a firm knowledge of language was the ultimate goal of the study of grammar, cf. DTh. *GG* I i 5,4ff.; Classen 1829, 16f.; Lehrs 1865, 39 rightly draws attention to the fact that a *moralis interpretatio* is meant here, not a technical one.

<sup>20</sup> Apparently Protagoras assumed a one-to-one relationship of modus and "speech-act" (cf. Schenkeveld 1984a, 326ff., esp. 328.). His mode of prayer corresponds to the optative, answer to the indicative, question to the subjunctive (dubitative), and command to the imperative, cf. Gomperz 1922, 367.

<sup>21</sup> Ar. *S.E.* 173b19ff. Alternatively, Protagoras may not so much have intended to criticize Homer, as to draw attention to the fact that what we consider to be a correct use of language is also based on what we are used to, on authority. Thus, anyone using μήνυς as a feminine noun could base himself on the authority of Homer and everyone would accept its correctness, whereas in fact he would be making a mistake. Conversely, the correct masculine gender would generally give the impression of being false. In this interpretation Protagoras would be anticipating later theories on the "Kriterien der Sprachrichtigkeit".

<sup>22</sup> So Gomperz 1922, 367. Cf. for the idea that masculine gender increases the force of the expression and is thus not only a formal phenomenon, but also related to the notional load of a word, SchHom. O 626c: δεινὸς ἀήτης should be read, rather than δεινὸς ἀήτης; ἢ γὰρ ἀρσενική ἐκφορὰ ἐμφαντικώτερον τὸν λόγον ἀπεργάζεται καὶ τὸν ἄνεμον σφοδρότερον δείκνυσι.

<sup>23</sup> Ar. *Rhet.* III 5 = Prot. fr. 80 A 27 D.-K. (II 262).

semantic characteristics of words: A female ἀλεκτρυών should not be called by the same name as her male *pendant*. Socrates, like a true champion of ὀρθοέπεια,<sup>24</sup> suggests distinguishing the two by calling hím an ἀλέκτωρ and hér an ἀλεκτρύαινα (*Nub.* 658ff.).<sup>25</sup> It is clear that Socrates has been credited here with an exaggerated version of the views of Protagoras.

### 1.3. *Early "philology"; ὑπερβατόν*

Plato's *Protagoras* has another *novum* to offer to the linguistic tradition. Protagoras' interest in poets and their interpretation causes him to enter into a fervent discussion with Socrates on the correct explanation of a poem of Simonides in which the following line occurs (*Pl. Prot.* 339b1ff.): ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν.<sup>26</sup> Protagoras accuses Simonides of contradicting himself because later on in the poem he objects to Pittacus' words: χαλεπὸν ... ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.<sup>27</sup> The whole ensuing discussion is worthwhile for its many shrewd observations, for instance on the difference between γενέσθαι and ἔμμεναι (340b4ff.), the exact connotations of a word such as χαλεπὸν (341a5ff.) and the implications of the use of the particle μὲν (343c7ff.). Moreover, the technique of interpreting by means of paraphrases (e.g. 343e6ff.), quotations from other poets (340c8ff.) and supporting arguments derived from the immediate context of the poem itself (341d9ff.), does not give the impression of a primitive stage in the development of philology at all. All these feats are achieved by Socrates in this dialogue, who poses as an adept of Prodicus. On various occasions the latter is called upon to confirm the correctness of Socrates' observations (340b4ff.; 340e8ff., esp. 341b8ff.).

There is one point in the discussion which is of special interest because it is the first instance of the linguistic use of the word ὑπερβατός to indicate an

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<sup>24</sup> Ὄρθοέπεια or ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων means the correctness of language. It may apply either to one's choice of words, e.g. the avoidance of an indiscriminate use of alleged synonyms, or to the correspondence between expressions and things meant, as in the discussion about the gender of μῆνις. This last aspect will play a dominant role in virtually all of ancient etymology (see section 1.4.). I agree with Siebenborn 1976, 14 n. 3 (*contra* Fehling 1965, 216) that one should not try to construe a difference between ὀρθοέπεια and ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων.

<sup>25</sup> In the same vein he suggests (669ff.) changing the ending of κάρδοπος into a feminine one, because as it is, gender and ending seem to contradict each other (it is ἡ κάρδοπος). Here we find an explicit reference to the theory of ὀρθοέπεια in the words ὀρθότερον λέγεις (679).

<sup>26</sup> "It is difficult to become truly a good man."

<sup>27</sup> "It is difficult to be good" (339c4f.).

inverted word order. Socrates uses the term while defending the view that ἀλαθεία (his paraphrasis for ἀλαθέως) is not to be taken with ἀγαθόν, but with χαλεπόν (343d6-e2): οὐκ ἀληθεία ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς - εὐήθεις γὰρ τοῦτό γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου - ἀλλ' ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄσμανι τὸ ἀλαθέως.<sup>28</sup> Socrates regards Simonides' statement as a reaction to the words of Pittacus that it is difficult to be a good man. According to Socrates, Simonides means to say that it is not being a good man which is difficult - this is simply impossible - ; what is truly difficult is becoming one (343c6-344a6). Therefore, ἀλαθέως must be transposed to the end of the sentence (οὕτω φαίνεται ... τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον).<sup>29</sup>

It should be noted that all the linguistic observations made in the Protagoras passage finally serve a philosophical end. Socrates is not doing philology for its own sake. Whereas Protagoras tries to limit the discussion to the field of ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης, in which he is a specialist, Socrates manages even here to broaden the question and to return to more basic issues. In his uninterrupted *exposé* on the poem (342a6ff.) he again starts with a linguistic, or rather a stylistic observation, namely that of the βραχυλογία of Spartans and Cretans, which in early times was affected by philosophers as well. He then proceeds to analyse Simonides' poem as a conscious attempt to emulate Pittacus by demolishing the truth of Pittacus' words (343b7ff.). And then Simonides' meaning is analysed in such a way, some additional verses being taken into account as well, that he turns out to be a Socratic *avant la lettre* (esp. 345d6ff.).

A similar use of "philological" techniques to convey a philosophical message

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<sup>28</sup> "Not 'truly good', he does not use the word ἀλήθεια for this [namely ἀγαθόν] as if some persons are truly good, while others are good, but not truly so - for that would be stupid and not like Simonides - but one has to understand ἀλαθέως in the poem as transposed [or: one has to take it that ἀλαθέως can be skipped (and saved for later) in the poem]." As a verbal adjective, ὑπερβατός can refer in principle to the fact that one can "pass over" the constituent in question. However, perhaps it is better to connect it with causative ὑπερβαίνειν (or rather: ὑπερβῆσαι, cf. ὑπερβιάζειν) - this would explain the technical meaning "which is (or: can be) transposed", cf. Longinus π. ὑψ. 22,2 ὑπερβίβασεν; 22,3 ὑπερβιάζειν.

<sup>29</sup> "So it appears that ἀλαθέως (truly) is rightly put at the end" (344a4f.). For later theory, cf. Lausberg 1960, § 462, 3b; 716.

may be found in the Derveni papyrus.<sup>30</sup> This very early papyrus contains a highly allegorical discussion of an Orphic Theogony.<sup>31</sup> Here, too, we find examples of paraphrasis and the explanation of the meaning of single words,<sup>32</sup> and criticism of other interpreters who misunderstood the poem.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, in col. IV 4-6 we read: Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ [πατρὸς ἐοῦ] πάρα θέ[σ]φρατον ἀρχὴν / [ἀ]λκὴν τ' ἐγ χεῖρεσσι ἔ[λ]αβ[ε]γ καὶ δαίμον[α] κυδρόν· / [τα]ῦτα τὰ ἔπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐό[ν]τα λαυθά[νει].<sup>34</sup> It is unclear what exactly is supposed to be wrong with the order in this case.<sup>35</sup> The ensuing lines suggest that πατρὸς ἐοῦ πάρα is to be taken with ἀλκὴν τε κτλ. However, at first sight this is contradicted by col. V 2f.: οἱ δὲ οὐ γινώσκου[τες] / τὰ λεγόμενα δοκοῦσι τὸν Ζᾶνα παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ / πατρὸς [τῆν] ἀλκὴν [τε καὶ] τὸν δαίμονα λαμμά[νειν] (*sic*).<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, the text quoted last may only refer to a wrong interpretation given by unknowledgeable persons to verses which have in fact been restored to correct order. Their interpretation would then have been too literal for our commentator, who prefers an allegorical explanation: Whatever Zeus takes into his hands, can no longer be wild and chaotic; it becomes calm and allows combinations to be formed.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> I thank Professor Slings who kindly drew my attention to this papyrus. I have not been able to consult the edition (of the Heraclitus-fragments only?) by K. Tsantsanoglou and G.M. Parassoglou; I used the provisional edition in the appendix to *ZPE* 47 (1982).

<sup>31</sup> The papyrus is dated ca. 350 B.C. by Merkelbach 1967, 21.

<sup>32</sup> E.g. col. VI 1ff.; VII 1ff.; VIII 3ff.; XII 7f.; XIX 7ff.; XXII 2ff.

<sup>33</sup> E.g. col. V 2f.; VIII 3ff.; XIX 5f.

<sup>34</sup> "When Zeus had taken from his own father [or: from the good father, cf. col. XXII 1ff.] the ordained sovereignty and had taken his strength and his glorious power in his hands': It escapes notice that these words do not stand in the correct order."

<sup>35</sup> Professor Ruijgh (personal communication) suggests that θέσφρατον ἀρχὴν, an apposition to ἀλκὴν and δαίμονα, should have come after these words. This would also have resolved the syntactic ambiguity of τε ... καί: As it is, Zeus may be supposed to have taken three things (A, B τε καὶ Γ) from his father instead of two (B τε καὶ Γ (=A)).

<sup>36</sup> "Those who do not understand what is said, think that Zeus took the strength and the power from his own father."

<sup>37</sup> Cf. for the former chaotic state col. V 6 παράσσοι καὶ κ[ωλ]ύοι τὰ ὄντα συνίστασθαι (subject?); for the calming effect of Zeus' hands col. V 7 διὰ τὴν θάλψιν (warming, fomenting); for the resulting orderly combination col. V 9f. ὅσα δ' αἶν ἀφθῆν ἐπικρα[τεῖται. ἐπικ]ρατηθὲν δὲ μίσηται / τοῖς ἀλλ[οις].

#### 1.4. Etymology

After the implicit etymologies found in the Greek poets (see above, section 1.1.), there is a long Greek tradition of explicit etymology, in which we are confronted with the "philosophical obsession with meaning", as Mrs. Rawson uncomplimentarily puts it.<sup>38</sup> Although I have no intention of going into details here, it may safely be remarked that meaning is indeed what matters most in the etymological *Spielerei* of Socrates in Plato's *Cratylus*. The formal problems of how one word develops phonologically from another, are hardly touched upon at all.

To our view large parts of ancient etymology to our view look suspiciously like a kind of linguistic catch-as-catch-can. Nothing seems to be barred, as long as the desired meaning is found in the alleged origin of the word in question. There were four principal categories of word-change: The change of one letter into another (1), the addition of one or more letters (2), the removal of one or more letters (3), and the interchanging of place of two or more letters within a word (4). It will be clear that these "rules" in practice exhaust the possibilities of what one can do with letters.<sup>39</sup> In the *Cratylus* the first three categories may be found and - moreover - the word πάθος/πάσχω is applied to words that undergo these changes.<sup>40</sup> In part the gymnastics necessary to arrive at the desired meaning may not be completely serious, as many of the etymologies in the *Cratylus* certainly are not.<sup>41</sup>

In Aristotle, etymologies serve the purpose of *a posteriori* confirming Aristotle's interpretation of a given word. He never starts from etymological

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<sup>38</sup> 1985, 129.

<sup>39</sup> See e.g. Lersch 1841, 96ff.

<sup>40</sup> *Crat.* 394b2ff.: οὕτω δὲ ἴσως καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν σκοπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα ἢ μετακέεται ἢ ἀφῆρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις παντάπασιν γράμμασιν ἔστιν ἢ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις. The last type means that a completely different word is used, e.g. Ἀστυάναξ and Ἐκτωρ. Cf. further *Crat.* 431c7 ἐλλείπειν, προστιθέναι; 432a1ff. ἐάν τι ἀφέλωμεν ἢ προσθῶμεν ἢ μεταθῶμεν τι...ἐάν τι τούτων πάθη; 399b6f. Τούτων τοίνυν ἐν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄνομα πέποιθεν...; in Varro, a threefold system may be found in *LL VI 2* and *38*. Varro also knows of the fourfold system though, cf. *LL V 6* (*quadripertita ratio*, cf. Ax 1986a, 211). Cf. for threefold and fourfold divisions, Usener 1892, 582-648 (1913, 265-314).

<sup>41</sup> As when ἦρωες is almost derived from ἔρωες because heroes spring from the love of a god for a mortal woman or of that of a goddess for a mortal man. Socrates then quickly gives the argument a turn and derives ἦρωες from ἐρωτάω or εἶρειν ("to say"), the ἦρωες suddenly (and humorously) appearing as the fore-runners of the ῥήτορες καὶ σοφισταί (*Crat.* 398c6ff.). Cf. Lersch 1838, 31-4.

considerations, but the importance of etymology lies in the fact that it represents the (ἔτυμος, "true") view of reality of the earliest Greeks. Etymology, therefore, has the value of an argument based on *auctoritas*.<sup>42</sup>

However, the most famous etymologists in Antiquity were the Stoics. But rather than starting from their etymology, I shall first say something about the interrelated character of the Stoic philosophy. Then, I will discuss their views on the origin of language and the relation between these views and their ideas on the gradual corruption of mankind, thus showing a link between linguistics and ethics. Here, their etymological principles will also be taken into account. After that, the Stoic theory of meaning will be described and attention will be paid to its connection with their materialistic physical ideas. Finally, we shall take a look at an illustrative example of a perverted use of quasi-Stoic notions in later grammar. In each of these sections I will try to outline succinctly how Stoic ideas penetrated into later grammar and influenced it.

## 2. *The Stoa*

### 2.1. *Coherence of their system*

One of the most interesting phenomena in the philosophical system of the Stoa is its internal cohesion, of which the Stoics themselves were extremely proud. The three major parts, physics, logic and ethics are interrelated in many ways and theories developed in one part may have consequences for either or both of the others.<sup>43</sup> Since the Stoics were very careful in their terminology-their over-consciousness is one of the main objections raised by their adversaries -<sup>44</sup> one way of tracing these correspondences is to check the use of the same or similar terms in all three fields. The use of the term ἀκολουθία may serve as an example.

#### 2.1.1. Ἀκολουθία

The Stoa believes that a divine λόγος permeates the whole cosmos as a supreme rational principle, creating order everywhere. This rational order may be indicated by the terms ἀκολουθία and τάξις, τάξις representing the structural orderliness itself, i.e. the fact that one thing follows another, ἀκολουθία adding

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<sup>42</sup> Cf. Eucken 1869, 246. Eucken has collected all etymologies occurring in Aristotle.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Long 1974, 108; 119f.

<sup>44</sup> E.g. Cic. *Fin.* IV 7; *TD* IV 3-6; 32.



the idea that one thing follows *from* another, i.e. introducing a notion of causal nexus. Often, however, these two words seem to be used as mere synonyms.

Long has demonstrated the importance of these concepts in all three fields of the Stoic philosophy.<sup>45</sup> In physics they indicate the order of cause and effect, the chain of causation,<sup>46</sup> where the idea of συμπλοκή/ἐπιπλοκή also plays a major role. Everything in the world is interconnected.<sup>47</sup> Thus, ἐπιπλοκή may indicate the linkage of events in the necessary chain of fate.<sup>48</sup>

Now, the relationships between objects and facts in the physical world find a correlate in logic in the relationships between propositions.<sup>49</sup> A state of affairs may be expressed by means of a simple *axioma*, such as "it is light", "it is day". To indicate relationships between states of affairs, non-simple, complex, *axiomata* are used, which are severally characterized by the conjunction linking their parts. We should realize that because the connections between states of affairs in the nature of things are *real* to the Stoa, they never doubted that conjunctions have a well-defined meaning of their own,<sup>50</sup> since these reflect such connections linguistically. Thus the relationship of συμπλοκή was expressed by means of the συμπλεκτικοὶ σύνδεσμοι ("connective conjunctions"), that of ἀκολουθία by means of the συναπτικοὶ and παρασυναπτικοὶ

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<sup>45</sup> 1971, 95f.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Phot. *Bibl.* 249, 440a4-5 Bekker: διαφέρει δὲ τῆς τύχης (sc. ἡ εἰμαρμένη) ὅτι ἡ μὲν εἰρμόν ἔχει καὶ τάξιν καὶ ἀκολουθίαν; *SVF* II 917 οἱ Στωϊκοὶ εἰρμόν αἰτίων, τουτέστι τάξιν καὶ ἐπισύνδεσιν ἀπαράβατον; 945 κατὰ εἰρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν ... τῶν πρώτων τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα γινομένοις αἰτίων γινομένων καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ συνδεομένων ἀλλήλοις ἀπάντων; 946 ... καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν αἰτίων ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὸν ἄνωθεν εἰρμόν καὶ τὸ ἐπεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις αἰεὶ τὰ ὕστερα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἀνέναι, δι' αὐτῶν γενόμενα καὶ ἄνευ ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν γενόμενα, δουλεύειν τε τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν τὰ ὕστερα ...; see further Pease *ad Cic. ND* 1,55.

<sup>47</sup> This idea is much older than the Stoa, of course. It is ascribed to Pythagoras and left its marks e.g. in Pl. *Meno* 81c9f. ἄτε ... τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης. I shall return to this concept when I discuss the problems concerning συμπάθεια.

<sup>48</sup> Blank 1982, 31.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. DeLacy 1945, 255 "The causal relations that exist between objects in the physical world correspond to the relation of consequence between propositions in logical analysis". There is also a subtle distinction in terminology: αἰτία is used of the proposition, αἴτιον of its non-linguistic *pendant* in the physical world, Forscher 1985, 87.

<sup>50</sup> Frede 1978, 64; cf. Frede 1977, 74.

("conditional-hypothetic" and "hypothetic-causal").<sup>51</sup> Their nomenclature as well as the description of their meaning were to be taken over by "technical" grammar.<sup>52</sup> (On the Latin side, the name of the *coniunctiones continuativae* corresponds to the notion of the *causarum continuatio*.)<sup>53</sup>

However, it is not only in physics and logic that ἀκολουθία plays an important role. It is perhaps its ethical consequences, i.e. the consequences for our moral behaviour, that make ἀκολουθία into such a central concept.<sup>54</sup> "The

<sup>51</sup> D.L. VII 71ff. For the word-formation παρα-συναπτικοί, cf. Sluiter 1988a, 57 and n. 25.

<sup>52</sup> E.g. DTh. GG I i 91,2 (συναπτικοὶ express ἀκολουθία, but no ὑπαρξίς [i.e. they do not give information about the factuality of the states of affairs referred to]; παρασυναπτικοὶ indicate both ὑπαρξίς and τάξις); cf. SchDTh. 102,15ff.; 283,28ff.; 286,5f. (from 286,8 the practical synonymy of τάξις and ἀκολουθία again appears); 436,1.

Apollonius notes that εἰ and ἀκολουθεῖ are equivalents, and adds the typical Stoic example of a complex *axioma*, viz. the one built by means of the simple *axiomata* ἡμέρα ἐστίν and φῶς ἐστίν: *pron.* 7,14-16 καὶ ὁ εἰ συναπτικός ἰσοδυναμεῖ τῷ ἀκολουθεῖ ῥήματι, ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ φῶς εἶναι - εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστίν (cf. *coni.* 220,8ff.). The relationship of ἀκολουθία means that the order of the events cannot be changed, neither in physical reality, nor in its linguistic representation; if it is, the result will in the latter case be a false statement. Apollonius mentions this explicitly, e.g. with regard to propositions expressing cause and effect (*synt.* 347,7ff.): "I move, because I walk", may be true, but "I walk, because I move" is not, because τὸ ἀκόλουθον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ συνδέσμου ("the order signified by the conjunction") has been neglected. Cf. further SchDTh. 288,5ff.: Οὗτοι (sc. οἱ συναπτικοί) τάξις σημαίνουσιν ἡγούμενου πρὸς ἐπόμενον ἢ γοῦν ἀντιστροφὴ ψεῦδος εἰσάγει. "εἰ φῶς ἐστίν, ἡμέρα ἐστίν, εἰ νύξ ἐστίν, σκότος ἐστίν" οὐ πάντως· ἐν νυκτὶ γὰρ ὄντος σεληναίου φωτὸς ἢ πυρείου, οὔτε ἡμέρα ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ φῶς, οὔτε σκότος καίτοι νυκτὸς οὕσης. Τὶ οὖν; "εἰ ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆς ἐστίν, ἡμέρα ἐστίν, εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆς ἐστίν" πῶς ἀληθεύει; "Ὅτι ταῦτα φυσικὴν εἶχον ἀκολουθίαν. ('Αντιστροφή may concern the order of the constituents or their meaning. Therefore, two examples are given, one in which the order is inverted, the other in which antonyms are used.).

Blank (1982, 16f.; 31) also notes how elaborately Apollonius uses the concepts of ἐπιπλοκή and ἀκολουθία. As he puts it, "the linkage of the elements of language is supposed by Apollonius to be of the same sort as the articulation of the elements and events in the universe" (1982, 31). This holds good not only for conjunctions, but also for syntax as a whole. For the conjunctions, cf. *synt.* 14,4ff. οἱ τε σύνδεσμοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν λόγων τάξεις ἢ ἀκολουθίας τὰς ἰδίας δυνάμεις παρεμφαίνουσιν. Householder's translation "conjunctions, too, may vary in force according to their position in the sentence or the context" is clearly wrong; it is evidently not the position of the *conjunctions* that is discussed here and "sentence or...context" is hardly illuminating either. For the whole syntax being eventually based on correctly making συμπλοκαί/ἐπιπλοκαί, cf. *synt.* 2,3ff.). To Apollonius ἀκόλουθος/ἀκολουθία even is equivalent to ἀνάλογος/ἀναλογία (Blank 1982, 79 n. 32.), both denoting the element of rationality in language in which Apollonius firmly believed.

<sup>53</sup> Cic. *ND* 1,55; cf. Pease *a.l.*

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Kahn 1969, 171f.

cardinal assumption of the Stoics is that man can put himself in touch with the rational course of events and effect a correspondence between them and his own actions and intentions".<sup>55</sup> Ἀκολουθία is of vital importance in the τέλος-formulas: Living according to nature is ὁμολογουμένως or ἀκολούθως ζῆν.<sup>56</sup> Our relationship to God, too, is determined by the fact that we have an ἐπιπλοκή with Him.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, the Stoa was also a practical philosophy in that it furnished precepts on how to function in the everyday world, providing us with a theory of καθήκοντα. The καθήκον is also based on the principle of ἀκολουθία, as its definition "τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ" shows.<sup>58</sup> And, finally, there is the theory of the virtues: These cannot be separated from one another—they are linked by mutual ἀκολουθία. If you have one, you have them all.<sup>59</sup>

This gives us an example of how thoroughly constructed the Stoic system was. To my mind the case of ἀκολουθία justifies the method of looking for more internal relationships in Stoic philosophy by checking their terminology, always, however, guarding against imposing correspondences that are not really there. The safest method of achieving this is by concentrating on the more remarkable terms. The more colourless a word is, the more likelihood of its being used without any ulterior motives.

This introduction also serves to underscore the fact that the Stoa is not a school of grammar. Their linguistic theory functions in the context of a whole philosophy and Frede is, therefore, fully justified in admonishing us that a description of Stoic grammar should do more justice to its connections with other parts of their philosophy (1978, 74). However, the Stoics did carefully systematize those aspects of "grammar" that they needed, and sometimes even went a little further than perhaps would have been strictly necessary. Moreover, later grammarians used the ideas they found in the Stoa as a starting-point from which to develop their more "technical" theories.

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<sup>55</sup> Long 1971, 95; Forschner 1981, 84: "Der gute Mensch wird bestimmt in Termini der ἀκολουθία".

<sup>56</sup> D.L. VII 89.

<sup>57</sup> Epict. 2,14,27.

<sup>58</sup> SVF III 494. Forschner paraphrases (1981, 186): "Die Folgerichtigkeit und gesetzliche Ordnung des Lebensvollzug". Cf. Long 1971, 96.

<sup>59</sup> Ἀντακολουθία, cf. SVF III 295-304; Forschner 1981, 205.

### 2.1.2. Ἡ διασαφητικός

I applied this principle of putting a particular view attributed to the Stoics into the context of their whole philosophy in my 1988 article on ἡ διασαφητικός.<sup>60</sup> As the example discussed there is of special interest (a linguistic phenomenon having apparently been introduced into the logical part of Stoic philosophy because of its relevance to ethics), I shall briefly summarize the results of that article here.

It was shown that the list of molecular propositions and the corresponding conjunctions given by Diogenes Laërtius (VII 69ff.) cannot solely be explained by referring to formal, truth-functional logic. The *axiomata* formed by means of the conjunction ἡ (ἡ διασαφητικός, "which makes it clear (that something is the case)") are an example of *axiomata* for which it is hard to find a strictly "logical" function.<sup>61</sup> Now, it is true that arguments like this, based on relationships of "more" and "less", had always had a place in logic - they traditionally belonged in the logic of relation. Via Aristotle and Theophrastus, they found a place in the logic of the Stoa as well. The Stoics could not simply take over their traditional form (of the type " $S_1$  more-P than  $S_2$ "), since their logic did not work with terms, but rather with propositions, i.e. they did not substitute names for their variables, but sentences, representing propositions (*axiomata*). They had to adapt the form of these arguments in such a way that their schema of two *axiomata* connected by one or more conjunctions could remain intact, yielding sentences (or rather propositions) of the type " $\Sigma_1$  more than  $\Sigma_2$ ".

The reason why they went to this trouble, I submitted, was because they could use this kind of complex *axiomata* very well: To the Stoics they were useful and necessary, since they expressed one of their foremost *ethical* principles, namely ἐκλογή ("choice"), more specifically the Stoic ἀξία ἐκλεκτική. This is the kind of (relative) estimation that plays a part in making choices between προηγμένα, those "indifferent things" (ἀδιάφορα) that cause us to undergo a positive impulse or inclination (ὄρμη). Examples are health, as opposed to illness, wealth as opposed to poverty etc.

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<sup>60</sup> For another example of the relationship between a linguistic phenomenon and the other parts of Stoic philosophy, see Brunschwig 1978, 58-86.

<sup>61</sup> Diogenes' Laërtius' example (VII 72) is μάλλον ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστὶ. The obscurity of this example is caused mainly by the fact that Diogenes builds all complex *axiomata* from two of the three sentences ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, φῶς ἐστὶν and νύξ ἐστὶν plus one or two σύνδεσμοι. A later example (ApD. *coni.* 221,18) is βούλομαι πλουτεῖν ἢ πένεσθαι. Here, one makes clear (διασαφεῖν) that one chooses wealth and rejects poverty.

The non-simple *axiomata* formed by means of μάλλον (ἤττον) ἤ are eliminative - they may be used to choose one possibility and (at the same time) to reject another. The fact that μάλλον ἤ-formulas seem to have functioned of old in ethical discussions (even in Aristotle and Theophrastus the examples have an ethical colouring) enhances the probability of their belonging in the ethical context of ἐκλογή.

Apart from considerations of traditionality, their ethical use would thus constitute an extra reason for the adoption of μάλλον ἤ-*axiomata* in the list of Diogenes Laërtius, especially since there are no good grounds on which to assign a strictly formal logical role to these *axiomata*.

The grammarians took over the description of the eliminative semantic value of ἤ from the Stoa and duly called this use "διασαφητικός".<sup>62</sup>

## 2.2. *Original state of language; etymology; connections with ethics; origin of language*

If we take a closer look at the Stoa's conception of the nature of language, we may notice that here, too, there is a definite affinity with some of their ethic convictions. Language was originally in perfect rational order, i.e. there was a direct and simple mimetic relationship between the form of words and their meaning.<sup>63</sup> The first words (πρῶται φωναί) imitated in their forms the meanings they were to express.<sup>64</sup> This is most clear in those words which denote a sound, since their onomatopoeic character is the perfect illustration of this principle. Thus, *hinnitus* means the neighing of a horse and sounds like it too, and the same goes for *balatus* and the bleating of a sheep.<sup>65</sup> With words that are still original but do not denote a sound, things are a little more complicated. There, the resemblance between expression and meaning is less direct. But most words show more complications even than these: They have been gradually alienated from their origins because of letters having disappeared or changed

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<sup>62</sup> Cf. ApD. *coni.* 221,16ff.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. e.g. Barwick 1957, 30f.; Pinborg 1962, 156; Frede 1977, 68f. The "latent and unacknowledged conflict between the Stoic theory of meaning and the Stoic theory of etymology" (Lloyd 1971, 64f.; cf. Long 1974, 135) would have to rest on an identification of meaning and expression which allegedly takes place in Stoic etymology, whereas these two should be kept strictly separated according to the theory of the σημαϊνόμενον and σημαϊνόντα (for which see section 2.3.). However, the conflict may not be as serious as it seems, considering the isomorphism (which is not to say "identity") of expression and meaning, and the sign-function of the expression.

<sup>64</sup> Origen, c. *Celsum* I 24 μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. for this and the following, Aug. *dial.* 6 Pinborg.

place, having been added or changed altogether. They have, in short, been corrupted.<sup>66</sup> It is the task of *etymology* to follow these changes as it were in the reverse direction and so to arrive at the original form - and therefore at the same time the original and true meaning - of the word in question.<sup>67</sup> The theory of etymology is based on the assumption that the meaning of a word is unaffected by any changes that may occur in its form. This principle is stated explicitly by Socrates in the *Cratylus*.<sup>68</sup>

This whole procedure of the gradual corruption of language strongly resembles the ethical theory of διαστροφή.<sup>69</sup> There, it is man who from a state of perfect rationality and harmony with nature is corrupted because he is misled by external appearances which wrongly seem true to him, and is, moreover, contaminated by his surroundings.<sup>70</sup> This makes for a perversion of one's λόγος, which in its turn entails making wrong judgements. This same syndrome is described by saying someone has πάθη in his soul.<sup>71</sup>

The relationship between primitive man and the original state of language may be illustrated by a passage taken from Philo of Alexandria. He describes the link of rational order in the name-giver and rational order in expressions and meanings in this way (*de opif. mundi* 150): 'Ακράτου γὰρ ἔτι τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως ὑπαρχούσης ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ μηδενὸς ἀρρωστίματος ἢ νοσήματος ἢ πάθους παρεισεληλυθότος, τὰς φαντασίας τῶν σωμάτων καὶ πραγμάτων ἀκραιφνεστάτας λαμβάνων εὐθυβόλους ἐποιεῖτο τὰς κλήσεις, εὖ μάλα

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<sup>66</sup> *Corruptio vocum*, Aug. *l.l.* Cf. Colson 1919, 25f.; Blank 1982, 10 and 21f. Notice the *quadrupertita ratio*.

<sup>67</sup> Schmidt 1839, 23f.

<sup>68</sup> 394b2ff.; cf. section 1.4. note 40.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Pohlenz 1948, 123ff.; Barwick 1957, 60; Gnifka 1984, 60 and n. 131; *SVF* III 228-236. Διαστροφή is an Epicurean concept as well, cf. Schrijvers 1974, 349.

<sup>70</sup> E.g. D.L. VII 89 διαστρέφασθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν ἕξωθεν πραγμάτων πιθανότητας, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατήχησιν τῶν συνόντων· ἐπεὶ ἢ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους. Cf. especially *SVF* III 229.

<sup>71</sup> E.g. *SVF* III 382 καὶ οὐ κακῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τοῦ λόγου διαστροφᾶς εἶναι τιθέμενοι καὶ λόγου κρίσεις ἡμαρτημένας. For πάθη as wrong judgements, cf. e.g. Cic. *TD* III 24. Compounds of στρέφομαι are much used in these contexts, cf. e.g. *SVF* III 389 ... πάντες δ' οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται ("abandon") τὸν λόγον.

στοχαζόμενος τῶν δηλουμένων, ὡς ἅμα λεχθῆναί τε καὶ νοηθῆναι τὰς φύσεις αὐτῶν.<sup>72</sup>

This passage takes us to the question of the Stoic view on the origin of language. For whereas the very principle of etymology sufficiently informs us about the Stoic views on the primitive state of language itself, it is not so easy to see how according to them this state came about in the first place. Philo is not the best of witnesses in this respect, since it stands to reason that he cannot but work with one namegiver, namely Adam. The testimony of Origen indicates the primitive relationship between words and things, but does not add anything about the origin of the words. In fact, we have no explicit testimonies about this question at all - it may well be that the Stoa paid as little attention to this question as Plato's *Cratylus* does. The nature of the original words is far more important than their origin.

The Stoa and the *Cratylus* share the characteristic of having to postulate the invention of language, rather than its evolution:<sup>73</sup> Only in this way can there be a fully rational correspondence between word and meaning. The identity of the namegiver(s) is relatively unimportant. In Plato, the singular and plural are used almost indifferently.<sup>74</sup> For the Stoa it has been suggested that the first namegiver(s) was/were the first king(s).<sup>75</sup> In itself this is not unlikely, considering the Stoic interest in kings.<sup>76</sup> They held that only wise men (σοφοί) could be true kings<sup>77</sup> and lawgivers.<sup>78</sup> Lawgiver (νομοθέτης) was one of the

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<sup>72</sup> "For when rational nature still was untainted in the soul, and no weakness or disease or emotional disturbance had come in, he grasped a pure conception of the presentations of bodies and things and gave them names which hit the target, because he envisaged their meanings very well, so that their nature was at the same time expressed and thought". The whole passage bristles with Stoic terminology. Cf. Philo *de opif. mundi* 148; *quaest. in Gen.* I 20.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Fehling 1965, 220f.; cf. chapter IV section 3.3.3.

<sup>74</sup> Singular: e.g. 388e1ff.; 404b3; 406b6; 418c8f.; plural: 397c8ff.; 401b6f.; 411b4ff.; 418a2.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Frede 1978, 68ff.; Blank 1982, 77 n. 5.

<sup>76</sup> Works entitled *περὶ βασιλείας* are attested for Persaeus Citieus (*SVF* I 435), who was attached to the court of Antigonus Gonatas (D.L. VII 36); Cleanthes (*SVF* I 481) and Sphaerus (*SVF* I 620), a pupil of Zeno and Cleanthes who later went to the court of Ptolemaeus Philopator. Hellenistic monarchies apparently were a source of inspiration in this respect.

<sup>77</sup> E.g. D.L. VII 122; *SVF* III 617; 619.

<sup>78</sup> *SVF* III 619: οἱ Σταϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι δογματίζουσιν, βασιλείαν ... νομοθετικὴν ... μόνῳ προσάπτοντες τῷ σοφῷ. Cf. Luc. *vitarum auctio* 20 (Mercurius, in an attempt at selling Chrysippus): μόνος οὗτος σοφός, ...

words adopted in the *Cratylus* to denote the name-giver (e.g. 389a2). Moreover, Seneca tells us that according to Posidonius the wise men were kings in the Golden Era of Saturnus (Κρόνος) from which all corruption was absent.<sup>79</sup> However, in the same letter he adds that men's need for laws only originated when times grew worse - the laws, however, were still given by wise men.<sup>80</sup> Blank thinks a Stoic theory of kings being the first namegivers would best explain the Epicurean criticism on this point in Lucretius and Diogenes of Oenoanda.<sup>81</sup> However, this criticism can in itself be sufficiently explained by reference to the *Cratylus*, where a single νομοθέτης is mentioned several times (see above, note 74).

There is one more testimony for the theory of the royal namegiver, but it is again insufficient to ascribe the theory to the Stoa. Varro connects his *quartus gradus etymologiae* with a king, more exactly with a *rex Latinus*.<sup>82</sup> The words analysed in this department of etymology are all very old,<sup>83</sup> and they belong to the time of a mythic king, who established language and culture, the first *impositor* of words. It cannot be proved that Varro is dependent on a Stoic source here. We must conclude that we are in the dark about the identity of the Stoic first name-giver,<sup>84</sup> and that we may justly doubt its relevance.

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μόνος ... βασιλεὺς ῥήτωρ πλούσιος νομοθέτης.

<sup>79</sup> Sen. *Ep.* 90,5: *Illo ergo saeculo quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse regnum Posidonius indicat.*

<sup>80</sup> *O.c.* 90,6.

<sup>81</sup> 1982, 77 n. 5; cf. *Lucr.* V 1041ff.; *Diogenes of Oenoanda col. IV 3ff. W.* (cf. *Chilton* 1962, 163ff.).

<sup>82</sup> *LL* V 8 and 9. Cf. *Pfaffel* 1981, 240f.

<sup>83</sup> *Pfaffel* 1981, 238.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. *Fehling* 1965, 222. One could even tentatively think of the λόγος itself functioning as the first namegiver, in which case the Stoics would have found a kind of compromise between the namegiver theory and the concept of language as a natural product of humanity. [Is this what *Dahlmann* (1964, 7) means by his words "So war dem Menschen die Sprache von Natur gegeben, das heisst sie war richtig" (my emphasis)? Cf. also *Pohlenz* 1948, 41: "Die Namen sind vom menschlichen Logos durch bestimmten Willensakt gegeben (θέσει), aber sie sind zugleich natürlicher Ursprung (φύσει), weil die beigelegten Bezeichnungen der Physis der benannten Dinge entsprachen."] We should not forget that the Stoa's position in the group of the "mythological" explanation of the origin of language, is due mainly to its etymological theories. If a word can, ideally spoken, tell us something about its meaning, it must have been composed by someone who knew what he was doing. This position derives from the *Cratylus*, but it may well have been only the etymological part that was borrowed by the Stoa and expanded upon. Perhaps, then, according to the Stoics language was



### 2.3. Theory of meaning; link with physics; consequences in grammatical theory

We saw that the principle of etymology is a separation of form and meaning of a word, the meaning remaining unaffected irrespective of what happens to the form of a word. In fact, the whole Stoic theory of meaning, which is perhaps their most important contribution to the history of logic and grammar,<sup>85</sup> is based on this bipartition.

The Stoics divided the field of logic into dialectic and rhetoric. Dialectic is subdivided into ὁ περὶ τῶν σημαυνομένων τόπος and ὁ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπος.<sup>86</sup> The τόπος περὶ φωνῆς deals with a number of formal aspects of language, a theory of the parts of speech among them. The theory of meaning, developed in the τόπος περὶ σημαυνομένων, was quite unique in Antiquity and has long been completely misjudged as a kind of pedantic insistence on terminological distinctions, which were generally held to be utterly irrelevant to the issues at stake.<sup>87</sup>

The theory comprises the following: The Stoics distinguish the form of a word, i.e. the expression (φωνή, σημαῖνον), its meaning (σημαινόμενον, δηλούμενον, πράγμα), and that to which it refers in reality (τυγχάνον).<sup>88</sup>

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natural, while at the same time it enjoyed all the advantages of being created by a supremely rational being - think again of the legitimation of etymology. The suggestion I make here finds some support in Cic. *Rep.* III 3: *eademque* (sc. *mens divina*) *cum accepisset homines inconditis vocibus inchoatum quiddam et confusum sonantes, incidit has et distinxit in partes* (i.e. it applied διάρθρωσις, cf. chapter IV section 3.3.2.), *et ut signa quaedam sic verba in rebus inpressit, hominesque antea dissociatos iucundissimo inter se sermonis vinculo conligavit*. However, this text has the disadvantage that it clashes with the general primitivistic tendencies of the Stoa, for which see chapter IV section 3.3.3. *Non liquet*.

<sup>85</sup> So Coseriu 1975, I 116.

<sup>86</sup> "The part on meanings", "the part on sound", D.L. VII 43.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. e.g. Steinthal 1890, 274: "Es muss stark hervorgehoben werden, dass die stoische Logik tief unter der aristotelischen steht. Kommt man von den Analytiken zur stoischen Logik, so kann man zunächst nur besinnungslos staunen: so jäh ist der Sturz!"; 275: "Ihre Logik ist ... fade und trivial biz zum Abstossen"; 279: "Aus dieser empiristischen Richtung der nacharistotelischen Logik erklärt sich ihr Formalismus und ihre Platteheit im allgemeinen, wie auch manche bedeutsame Einzelheit."

<sup>88</sup> Cf. S.E. *AM* VIII 11f.; *SVF* II 168. The word τυγχάνον is explained by Frede 1978, 32 and 74f. n. 1, as meaning "that which has the quality signified (by a noun)", i.e. it is derived from τυγχάνω "to obtain". LSJ put it s.v. A II 2 b (under the general caption of "to express a coincidence"). Although the connotation of "*res fortuito obiecta*" (Schmidt 1839, 55 n. 78) cannot be excluded, I prefer Frede's view. *SVF* II 236 (οὔτοι (sc. οἱ Στωϊκοί) ... τὰ πράγματα

Φωνή is a physical entity, it is the sound we emit when we say something. Therefore, it is corporeal, a σῶμα. The same holds good for the τυγχάνου.<sup>89</sup> If there is a man Dion to whom we refer in using the expression Δίωv, this Dion is corporeal as well. The meaning, on the other hand, is something which can only be thought, it is an ἀσώματον, a rare phenomenon in the materialistic philosophy of the Stoa. It shares this characteristic of being incorporeal with the void, time and space only.

There is a hierarchical order running from inarticulate sound through articulate sound irrespective of meaning, to articulate meaningful sound.<sup>90</sup> The latter two stages are called λέξις and λόγος respectively. Λέξις may be either one word or a string of words, which is looked upon from its non-semantic side, λόγος in principle may also be one word or a combination of words, but it is always meaningful - it is a combination of form and meaning.<sup>91</sup>

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τυγχάνοντα καλοῦσι· τέλος γὰρ τὸ τυχεῖν τούτων) cannot support LSJ's interpretation; it is a banal etymology.

<sup>89</sup> We should realize that even "abstract nouns" as we call them, such as δικαιοσύνη, to the Stoics correspond with (material) mind in a certain disposition - its τυγχάνου would therefore be corporeal.

<sup>90</sup> D.L. VII 57.

<sup>91</sup> Müller 1943, 8ff.; Ax 1986b, 191ff.; 199; 204ff. *Contra* Schmidt 1839, 21 n. 37, according to whom one word can never be λόγος. If meaning alone should be taken into account, the word λεκτόν is used, cf. chapter II section 1.4.4. Later theory equated λέξις with "one word" and λόγος with "a combination of words"; this explains the later definitions of βαρβαρισμός and σολοικισμός, e.g. *FDS* II 598 (Polyb. *de barb. et sol.* 283,4f. Nauck): βαρβαρισμός ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημα ἐν μιᾷ λέξει περὶ (παρά?, cf. *FDS* 601) τὴν παρ' ἐκάστοις συνήθειαν; *FDS* II 601 (*Anon. de barb. et soloec.* 186f. Valck.): Σολοικία δὲ καὶ βαρβαρισμός τούτῳ διεντηνόχασιν ἀλλήλων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σολοικία περὶ πλείονας γίνεται λέξεις ἀκαταλλήλως πλεκομένας, καὶ τὸ σημαϊνόμενον ἐναλλάσσει ... ὁ δὲ βαρβαρισμός περὶ μίαν γίνεται λέξιν, καὶ μόνῃς τῆς φωνῆς ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημα. The Stoic definition in D.L. VII 59 runs as follows: ὁ δὲ βαρβαρισμός ἐκ τῶν κακιῶν λέξις ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν εὐδοκίμωντων Ἑλλήνων, σολοικισμός δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος. In practice, it is easy to see how this could correspond to faults in one or more words respectively, but the point is that βαρβαρισμός affects the λέξις only, something going wrong in the articulation of a string of sounds, independent on the ensuing meaning, whereas a σολοικισμός affects the combination of sound and meaning which constitutes a λόγος. Barwick (1922) tried to derive the Latin grammatical theory of the "virtues" corresponding to βαρβαρισμός and σολοικισμός, viz. the tropes and figures, from the Stoics as well. However, Baratin and Desbordes (1986) have definitively eliminated this possibility by pointing out that to the Stoics *Hellenismos*, the virtue of speech *par excellence*, was the norm - there are no "virtues" to outdo the norm. Moreover, the Stoic virtues of speech are nothing like tropes and figures, but good Greek, consisting of clarity, conciseness, decency and elegance (i.e. non-trivial speech, the opposite of ἰδωτισμός, D.L. VII 59).

In this case, too, a clear correspondence with physical theory may be noted: Only σώματα are capable of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν. The somatic expressions share in this trait in that they may affect the hearer acoustically.<sup>92</sup> Apart from that, they may undergo various changes, as we already saw when discussing etymology. That the τυγχάνοντα are capable of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν goes without saying. But, as is clear from the very theory of etymology, meanings cannot undergo changes - this fits their incorporeal character which prevents them from both ποιεῖν or πάσχειν.<sup>93</sup>

As a matter of fact, although there are no explicit Stoic testimonies to the impossibility of meanings being affected, we find it in the form of a rule - without the physical explanation, of course - in an ancient grammarian who has undergone a marked influence of the Stoics, Apollonius Dyscolus.

Apollonius adopts the Stoic division of linguistic matters into expressions and meanings throughout his work.<sup>94</sup> The point we are investigating at the moment is mentioned by him several times, most succinctly in his rule: τῶν ... φωνῶν τὰ πάθη, καὶ οὐ τῶν σημαυνομένων.<sup>95</sup> This means that the meaning of a word cannot be affected in any way by the changes its form may incur.<sup>96</sup> For Apollonius the possibility of a certain πάθος having occurred in a

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<sup>92</sup> *SVF* II 387.

<sup>93</sup> *SVF* II 363.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. chapter II *passim*; see e.g. his explicit remarks *adv.* 119,1f. and *coni.* 213,15f. He himself calls attention to the important influence of the Stoa on his work, *coni.* 214,1ff. πρὸς οἷς καὶ αὐτοὶ τι ἐπινοήσαντες μετὰ τῆς δεούσης σαφηνείας παραδώσομεν, οὐκ ἔκτος γινόμενοι κατὰ τὸ παντελὲς τῆς τῶν Στωϊκῶν δόξης.

<sup>95</sup> "Modifications affect the sounds, not the meanings", *adv.* 158,14f.; cf. 209,17f.; *coni.* 254,1ff.; *saep.* Conversely, the letters constituting a πάθος can never by themselves convey meaning, 158,11f. οὐδέποτε πλεονασμὸς λέξεως λείπεται εἰς τὸ δηλούμενον τῆς λέξεως. In later sources the same sentiment may be found. It is likely that in those cases it derives from Apollonius rather than directly from the Stoa. E.g. SchDTh. 285,25f. τὰ πάθη τὸ δηλούμενον οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦσιν. Choer. *ps.epim.* 14,4f. (Why can ἔνι also have the meaning of a verb - sc. ἔνεστι - but is ποτί < προσί always a preposition?) Διότι κατὰ πάθος γινομένη τὴν ἰδίαν σημασίαν ἐφύλαξε ("because it has only arisen from a modification, but it has kept its proper meaning").

<sup>96</sup> To Apollonius, meaning is the most important factor in the context of etymological questions. Cf. e.g. *adv.* 194,27ff.: νόσφι is derived from the στερητικὸν νο- and ἔπεσθαι. Thus, it means "the contrary of συνέπεσθαι", cf. *Et. Orion* s.v. νόσφι and Cramer *AO* I 292,28ff.

Etymology may constitute an essential part of the argument. The formal connection existing between θαμά and ἄμα is supported by their meanings, *adv.* 153,5ff.: τὸ γὰρ πυκνῶς γινόμενον ὑφ' ἑνα καὶρὸν γίνεται - "that which happens frequently, happens [at any given moment] at that same moment". ὑφ'

word may even be rejected if such a πάθος entails a change in meaning. Thus, at *adv.* 136,28ff. he objects to the possibility that φρονῶ might derive from φρενῶ by simply changing ε to ο. In that case a change of meaning (ἔννοια)<sup>97</sup> would also occur, and that is unacceptable since - again - τὰ πάθη οὐ τῶν λεκτῶν, τῶν δὲ φωνῶν (136,32).<sup>98</sup> Interestingly, this principle which was essential for etymology and was founded in the Stoic theory of meaning, has here found an apparently independent application in the later grammatical theory of pathology, which cannot be traced back to the Stoa.<sup>99</sup>

Wackernagel derives the origin of pathology from dialectology.<sup>100</sup> In that context, too, the Stoic principle of the constancy of meaning, was applied by Apollonius. He explicitly links dialectology and pathology<sup>101</sup> in the following statement, which from the rest of its wording clearly betrays the Stoic influence we noted before (*adv.* 208,6f.): τὰ ἐγγυρόμενα πάθη κατὰ τὰς ἑτεροιώσεις τῶν διαλέκτων τῶν φωνῶν ἐστίν, οὐχὶ τῶν δηλουμένων.<sup>102</sup> This statement justifies a method frequently employed by Apollonius, viz. to use dialect forms in explaining either specific πάθη, or - more generally - the

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ἕνα καιρόν is κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρόν, cf. *Et. Gud.* 254,13ff.; *SchDTh.* 280,27; *Lex. Vindobon.* 185,16 Nauck; *ApD. conii.* 230,18; *Cramer AO I* 451,1ff. θαμά = πυκνόν. ἅμα < θαμά: τὸ γὰρ πυκνὸν καὶ ἐπάλληλον ἅμα γίνεται καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καιρῷ.

Trypho is criticized (*adv.* 174,1ff.) for not having given a satisfactory explanation of the meaning of αὐτως as well as of its form. Apollonius himself explicitly demonstrates that πόθεν from which he wants to derive πώμαλα is suitable from a semantical point of view to serve as ἔτυμον (*adv.* 190,21ff.).

<sup>97</sup> Ἔννοια comprises all the notional aspects of a word, i.e. its semantic and syntactic load. The word φρενῶ means "to make wise", φρονῶ is "to be wise".

<sup>98</sup> Changes of meaning are acceptable, though, if there is also a change in part of speech, as when from a perf. pass. (ἔψαλται) a *nomen actionis* is derived (ψάλτης). Cf. *adv.* 161,13ff. Πάνυ γέλοιόν ἐστι τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν σημασίαν ἀπαιτεῖν ἕν τε τοῖς ἐπιρρήμασι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι κτλ.

<sup>99</sup> See Wackernagel 1876; Ax 1986a, 199ff. Wackernagel (1876, 22f.) decidedly rejects the possibility that the Stoics had anything to do with the origins of pathology.

<sup>100</sup> In passing I remark that the use of dialects to facilitate an etymological explanation may already be found in Pl. *Crat.* 408e8ff. - the meaning of ἥλιος is explained more easily if one starts from the Doric form ἄλιος. Cf. *Crat.* 398d2; 405c4; see also Slings 1976, 46 and notes.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Egenolff 1878d, 168.

<sup>102</sup> "The modifications occurring in the alterations of the dialects affect the sounds, not the meanings." Cf. *synt.* 484,11f.

word-forms he finds himself confronted with.<sup>103</sup> He also applies rules which are specific to one dialect to explain forms which are in themselves *koinè*.<sup>104</sup>

We have, therefore, seen that later grammarians underwent terminological influence from the Stoa (ἡ διασαφητικός), took over some of their linguistic principles (the separation of form and meaning)<sup>105</sup> and adapted these principles to new contexts (dialectology and pathology). Sometimes, however, the result of their studies could not be reconciled to the philosophical principles they started from.

### 3. *Later grammatical theory and the relationships between σημαίνόμενα, σημαίνοντα and τυγχάνοντα*

#### 3.1. Συμπάθεια

Whereas later grammar can often be shown to build on philosophical foundations - as in the principles of pathology which found support in philosophical etymology -, often it simply works with concepts which have become cultural common coin. The Stoic (or more generally philosophical) element contained in them is not felt as such any longer, and theories developed on their basis might have been unacceptable if put back into their original context. An example is the theory of συμπάθεια, one of the wilder offshoots of the relationships between form and meaning.

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<sup>103</sup> In *de adverbio* Attic is cited most (seven times), especially for its ἐπέκτασις, the lengthening of a vowel, followed by Aeolic, Doric and Ionic. The dialects of the Sicyonians and Syracusans are each used once (164,17 and 197,5).

<sup>104</sup> The individual dialects are frequently described as deviations from the *koinè*. I give here some examples of his use of the dialects:

(1) Forms occurring in dialects only (and not in the *koinè*) may be quoted as parallels for a πάθος, e.g. *adv.* 149,19ff.

(2) To defend the ἀναλογία of a form, which is not ἀνάλογος by the standards of *koinè*, it may be shown to behave in accordance with dialectal rules, e.g. *adv.* 177,5ff.

(3) Changes peculiar to certain dialects are applied to obtain intermediate steps in the development of a *koinè* word, e.g. the Ionic change of long α into η (*adv.* 134,31ff.; 148,25f.). Sometimes several dialects are necessary to explain a word or its use, e.g. *adv.* 154,14ff. on the use of ἔνθεν and ἔνθα; 190,22ff. on πώμαλα, a specifically Attic word formed by means of a specifically Doric pathos.

(4) Apollonius also uses dialectal forms as a test: A satisfactory explanation of a word should also account for dialectal variants, e.g. *adv.* 156,8ff.; 170,4ff.

<sup>105</sup> Here Stoic influence appears from the terminology. The principle itself is already found in Plato's *Cratylus*.

The συμπαθεια referred to here, is a supposed influence exerted by the meaning of a word on its form, causing that form to undergo changes. These changes usually consist of the adoption or loss of letters.<sup>106</sup> I shall argue that traces of this principle may be found in Apollonius Dyscolus. It was, as far as we know, first stated explicitly by Trypho. After having discussed Wackernagel's alternative interpretation of σύμπαθεια, we shall investigate what Stoic authority there may have been for this grammatical tenet. Although the Stoics, too, knew of the notion of συμπαθεια, they never extended the philosophical context in which it belonged to language. Objections of a philosophical nature would have arisen if they had done so. On this point the grammarians clearly went their own way.

### 3.1.1. Συμπαθεια; a grammarian's contribution

In *adv.* 127,17ff. Apollonius explains the length of the form οἰμοιμοῖ from the continuity of the πάθος it expresses.<sup>107</sup> Considering the exceptional status of the ἐπιφωνήσεις, the exclamations, this example does not mean much.<sup>108</sup> But in *adv.* 176,12ff. we find a similar case. There we are told that τῆλε has a sister-form τηλοῦ: ὃ <μή>ποτε ἐδύνατο καὶ τῶ τέλος παρακεῖσθαι, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐντελὲς εἶναι τελοῦ, εἶτα κατ' ἐπέκτασιν τηλοῦ· τὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τέλους συντείνοντα μεγεθύνεται. The first part of this passage gives no problems: "(τηλοῦ) might be a form related to τέλος, so that its original form is τελοῦ,<sup>109</sup> and then, lengthened, τηλοῦ". The last part, which contains the explanation (γάρ) of the first, is more difficult. Μεγεθύνεται<sup>110</sup> refers to the lengthening of ε to η, witness γάρ. A parallel passage (*adv.* 193,20ff.) runs as follows: τὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τέλους δικνούμενα μεγεθύνεται.<sup>111</sup> Apparently, συντείνοντα is synonymous to δικνούμενα, which makes an interpretation of συντείνοντα as "referring to" or something similar unlikely. Moreover, "τηλοῦ" is

<sup>106</sup> These πάθη may be indicated by the words πλεονασμός, ἔνδεια, cf. e.g. ApD. *synf.* 185,14f.

<sup>107</sup> Τοῦ γὰρ πάθους ἐπιμένοντος ἐπεκτείνεται, αἰ̄ αἰ̄ αἰ̄, οἰ̄ οἰ̄ οἰ̄. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν θρήμου αἰαί, οἰοί. τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ οἰμοιμοῖ.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. chapter IV section 3.2. and 6.3.2.

<sup>109</sup> Ἐντελὲς applies to a form which has not undergone any πάθη. It is a synonym of ὀλόκληρον, for which cf. Wackernagel 1876, 15. Τὰ ἐν πάθει and τὰ ὀλόκληρα are explicitly contrasted, e.g. ApD *coni.* 257,1ff. (Trypho).

<sup>110</sup> The verb is applied as a *terminus technicus* by Trypho *apud* ApD. *pron.* 65,21ff.

<sup>111</sup> "That which penetrates towards an end is lengthened."

an ἐπὶ τέλους συντείνου. I would, therefore, suggest that τὰ ... ἐπὶ τέλους συντείνονται explains the *meaning* of τηλοῦ ("far, distant", in time and in space): τηλοῦ is "something which strains towards an end (τέλος)" [because one is always far *from something*; being far away implies a τέλος] and this "straining" has consequences for the *form* of the word, which accordingly "strains" itself as well, and is thus lengthened.<sup>112</sup>

Now, if we try to discover the grammatical source of this principle, we find that Trypho, the grammarian Apollonius names most often, either neutrally reporting his views, or to express assent or dissent, knew of the phenomenon ὅτι συνέπαθεν ἢ φωνῇ τῷ σημαυνομένῳ, "that the word-form was sympathetically affected with the meaning".<sup>113</sup> Thus, the word ἡμικύκλιον, "half-circle", comes from ἡμισυ-κύκλιον, the word *meaning* "half" being reduced to half its original *form*. In the same way, φιλήτης, "thief", has developed from ὑφελέτης, apparently by the theft of a couple of letters.<sup>114</sup> Let me give only one more example, in which the term μεγαθύνεται figures: *Et. M.* 820,16f. Ὁ παρατατικός πάντοτε μεγαθύνεται κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἢ χρονικῶς ἢ συλλαβικῶς ...(.24ff.) Ἄξιον δὲ ζητῆσαι διατί πάντοτε μεγαθύνεται ὁ παρατατικός; καὶ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐπειδὴ ὁ παρατατικός πλέων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν σημασίαν τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος...τούτου χάριν ὡς πλεονεκτῶν κατὰ τὴν σημασίαν τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν.<sup>115</sup> Normally

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<sup>112</sup> There may have been a play on ἐπέκτασις - συντείνω; cf. *pron.* 27,25 τείνεται "is lengthened".

It is highly unlikely that the words could mean "words referring to τέλος, are lengthened". Apart from the intrinsic improbability of the existence of such a rule, it is nowhere attested. Nor do I believe that our sentence can possibly refer to the lengthening of last-but-one syllables. Τὰ ἐπὶ τέλους συντείνονται would be a ridiculously obscure and - again - unparalleled way of expressing this. Besides, there is an entirely satisfactory and unambiguous *terminus technicus* for the same notion, viz. ἡ παρεδρεύουσα. Cf. παραλήγουσα, παρατελευτώσα, παρατελευταία.

<sup>113</sup> Fr. 130f. v. Velzen: Λιμός, ἢ λείψις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. γίνεται παρὰ τὸ λείπω λείψω λιμός· καὶ ἄφειλε διὰ διφθόγγου γράφεσθαι· ἀλλὰ συνέπαθεν ἢ φωνῇ τῷ σημαυνομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔνδειαν δηλοῖ, τούτου χάριν καὶ ἔνδειαν φωνήεντος ἀνεδέξατο, ὡς Τρύφων.

<sup>114</sup> Fr. 131 v. Velzen: ... καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑφελέτης, γέγονε φιλήτης, ἐπειδὴ ἔνδειαν σημαίνει· ὁ γὰρ κλέπτης ἔνδειαν ποιεῖ κτλ. Many examples are adduced by Lehrs 1865, 321ff. n. 234. Mrs. Rawson adds Varro *LL* 5.133 (*laena quod de lana multa*), but there it is not explicitly stated that the addition *quod de lana multa* is meant to explain the addition of the letter *e* (*laen-* as opposed to *lan-*).

<sup>115</sup> "The imperfect is always lengthened at the beginning [i.e. in the first syllable] either by a temporal augment or by a syllabic one...It is worthwhile to ask why the imperfect is always lengthened. And we can say that since the

speaking, the imperfect could hardly be considered the result of a real πάθος - here, the addition of the augment entails a definite change of meaning. But by a strange twist in the reasoning this additional meaning in respect of the present is adduced as the explanation for the additional element in the word-form.

The grammarians also knew of a less phantastic form of συμπάθεια,<sup>116</sup> but that is immaterial here. Our συμπάθεια τῆς φωνῆς τῷ δηλουμένῳ seems to be an expansion of the idea of a correspondence between form and meaning occurring, as we saw, in the Stoic πρῶται φωναί, and in general supposed to have occurred whenever a word originated. In those cases the form *imitated* the meaning envisaged. To a grammarian it may have seemed a small step from such a correspondence to arrive at an actual influence of meaning on expression.<sup>117</sup>

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imperfect is more in meaning than the present...therefore, because it surpasses the present in meaning, it also does so in the beginning".

<sup>116</sup> By the term συμπάθεια Apollonius indicates the relationship of, for instance, consonants belonging to the same type (*adv.* 157,19: τ is συμπαθέστερον to δ). The word is also used for forms which are more closely associated with each other than with other forms belonging to the same paradigm (συνζυγία, ἀκολουθία) (cf. chapter II sections 1.2. and 2.3.1.). Thus, Apollonius remarks that genitive and dative are sympathetic (*synt.* 42,3ff.; *adv.* 173,16; cf. e.g. MichSync. § 126, 981) as opposed to nominative, accusative and vocative, which have a συμπάθεια of their own. The same holds for present and imperfect tenses compared with perfect and pluperfect (*adv.* 173,15). In the correlative adjectives and adverbs there is συμπάθεια between the interrogative and "anaphoric" (indefinite relative) correlatives (πότερος, ὀπότερος (*adv.* 173,19f.)) and the relative and "antapodotic" ones respectively (ὄφρα, τόφρα (*adv.* 173,21)). Apollonius argues that because the correlative adverbs belong together in pairs, the existence of ὄφρα does not entail that of \*τόφρα and \*ὀπόφρα, but only of τόφρα (*adv.* 173,14ff.). (Ἀναφορικά denotes the indefinite relatives (ὅπως, ὅτηνίκα), τὰ διχὰ τοῦ τ are the relatives (ὡς, ἤνίκα), τὰ μετὰ τοῦ τ or τὰ ἀνταποδοτικά are the demonstrative correlatives (πῶς, τηνίκα etc.), see Schneider *al.*) The last example he gives is that of the συμπάθεια (προσπάθεια; cf. 202,8 and 202,13) of local adverbs with a σχέσις ἐν τόπῳ and εἰς τόπον (i.e. indicating place-where and place-whither respectively) (*adv.* 202,1f.). Συμπάθεια means no more than that these forms co-occur (συνυπάρχειν, *adv.* 173,14 and 18) - i.e. if one of them exists, so does the other (c.q. the others) - and may sometimes be homonyms: in that case they are συνεμπτώσεις, words in which two or more forms coincide (cf. chapter II section 3.3.), such as ὧδε, which means either "here" or "hither" (*adv.* 202,28ff.). Incidentally, in these cases of συμπάθεια there are no real πάθη either - in this respect the examples are parallel to the συμπάθεια of the form and meaning of the imperfect.

<sup>117</sup> Lehrs 1865, 321, takes it that a transfer has been made from the interjections, where the principle is understandable, to the other parts of speech, where it is not. The difference between these stages is marked implicitly by Lehrs, when he assigns the more innocent idea of birds' names being mostly derived from their respective sounds to the teacher of Trypho, Didymus, and comments on the next, "fatal" step made by Trypho himself with the words: "Discipulus eius Trypho iam ὑπὲρ σκάμματα" (322, n. 234). Incidentally, since the word συμπάθεια is not found in the context of Didymus' etymologies, I



However, many a Stoic probably would not have approved of such a procedure at all. To them the idea that a σῶμα showed συμπάθεια with an ἀσώματον ought to have been anathema.<sup>118</sup> For how can something incorporeal produce such an effect? Although some Stoics may have taken a less severe view, I do not think this theory can be connected with the Stoa in any extant source (see below, note 133).<sup>119</sup>

Before discussing a possible connection with the Stoa, however, I must first say a word about Wackernagel's interpretation of the συμπάθεια-phenomenon.<sup>120</sup> According to him, the principle means that, once a word's original meaning has been gradually changed and thus obscured, that word will be increasingly liable to further corruption. He believes this to be the only interpretation to explain the use of συμπάθεια, for in the alternative view discussed above (meaning influences form), there is no πάθος of the meaning at all for a formal πάθος to correspond with; rather, the meaning of the word involved *constitutes* such a πάθος by itself.<sup>121</sup> Now, some support for this interpretation may indeed be

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prefer to compare his observations with the theory of the πρῶται φωναί (onomatopoeic words) and keep them out of the discussion of συμπάθεια.

If my interpretation of the τηλοῦ-passage is correct, Lehrs (324 n.) is wrong in finding only one comparable case in Apollonius, namely *pron. 27,27* (his reference is incorrect), where it is asked how it comes about that τίς can be a monosyllabic noun with a short vowel, and Apollonius - after having remarked that this is no serious objection to its being a noun since this reflects only on the form, not on the meaning - suggests: ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἡ σύντομος τῆς πύσεως ἀνάκρισις τὸ μακρὸν ἰ παρητήσατο (i.e. τίς by itself constitutes a short question). Does Schneider *a.l.* confuse ἀνάκρισις and ἀπόκρισις?

It should be noticed that in both cases Apollonius somewhat hesitatingly introduces his explanation by means of μήποτε and ἴσως respectively.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. *SVF* I 518 where the fact that ψυχή is a σῶμα is deduced from the existence of συμπάθεια between body and soul: ἔτι δὲ ὁ Κλεάνθης φησὶν· οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι, οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι. Cf. *SVF* II 790; 791.

<sup>119</sup> Frede 1977, 68f. draws attention to the fact that in the matter of the exact nature of the relationship between σημαίνόμενα and σημαίνοντα considerable confusion seems to have set in.

<sup>120</sup> 1876, 29f.

<sup>121</sup> 1876, 29: *Si enim πάθος idem in notionem atque in formam cadit, formae vero πάθος in ἐνδεία formae antea plenae inferenda positum fuit, etiam notionis πάθος ad ἐνδειαν notioni ab hac antea alienae addendam pertinuerit necesse est. Quod certe absurdum est. Namque et λείπω et ἥμισυ iam per se inopiam exprimunt.* Wackernagel's Latin deserves to be translated even if it is quoted in a footnote only: "For if the meaning is affected by the same *pathos* as the form [which is necessary for the word συμπάθεια to be apt, I.S.], but the *pathos* of the form lies in the introduction of ἐνδεία, 'deficiency', of a form which was complete before, it is necessary that the *pathos* of the meaning, too, refers to a deficiency attaching to the meaning, which formerly was

found,<sup>122</sup> but Wackernagel builds a most unsatisfactory case, since the application of his interpretation to the examples is unconvincing,<sup>123</sup> and the only

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untouched by it. This, certainly, is absurd. For λείπω as well as ἥμισυ already express the deficiency by themselves."

<sup>122</sup> Several cases can be adduced where a form which has already undergone a πάθος is by the same token found liable to further pathological changes, e.g. ApD. *coni.* 234,1f. τὰ πάθη τοῖς τύποις συνεκτρέχει; *synt.* 67,11. Most important perhaps, because attributed to Trypho, is ApD. *coni.* 232,14ff. The question is whether ἔκρηι is an adverb or a conjunction. There are severe objections to both possibilities. Apollonius criticizes Trypho: "Ἐδει τὸν Τρύφωνα καὶ τὴν φωνὴν καταστήσαι τοῦ ἔκρηι, εἰ ὅπως δύναται τῇ ἑκὼν παρακεῖσθαι. καὶ φησιν ὅτι, "καθὸ ἠλογήθη ἢ φωνή, δύναται ἐπίρρημα καθίστασθαι, ἠλογημένον ἐν τῇ τάσει, καθότι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ φωνῇ". The general idea is that since the form cannot be explained rationally anyway, the anomalous accent should not be taken to count for much. (Incidentally, Apollonius fully agrees with this view, cf. *coni.* 234,1f. cited above and *adv.* 135,11ff. πᾶν σχῆμα λέξεως, τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν προκειμένων μορίων ἀποβαλὼν ἐν πάθει, εἰς τὸν τόνον μεταβάλλεται τὸν δυνάμενον τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ πάθους ἀναδέξασθαι. This characteristically condensed sentence means that "every word-form, which as a result of *pathos* is no longer similar to earlier [i.e. originally parallel] forms (for τῶν προκειμένων μορίων, 135,11, see Schneider, *comm. a.l.*) receives another accent, which agrees with those forms which the word in question resembles after having undergone the *pathos*"; Cf. 138,10f. This rule would indeed apply especially well to the text of Homer, since its accentuation dates from the time of Aristarchus, and is a mixture of older and younger forms. The younger ones comply with (Aristarchean) contemporary rules.) In this case, however, Apollonius, of course, immediately objects that ἔκρηι could then just as well be a conjunction-Trypho's argument is invalid. The whole passage deals with elements of the expression, φωνή, only.

Other examples are SchHom. A 81 where an unusual σύνθεσις brings about an unusual accent; Theogn. Cramer *AO* II 162,3ff.: different accent explained by four other anomalies; Hdn. *GG* III ii 922,17ff. anomalous gender responsible for a deviant declination. In all these cases one formal exception brings about another one. It is only twice that I have found the explicit idea of a divergent *meaning* explaining a formal aberration: *Et. M.* 806,9ff. it is stated about χαμᾶζε: καὶ ὡς διήλλαξε πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα περὶ τὸ σημαϊνόμενον, διήλλαξε καὶ περὶ τὸν τόνον - not a very illuminating example since the meaning ascribed to e.g. Ἄθηναζε is "ἀπ' Ἀθηνῶν". The other example is Choer. *GG* IV i 388,15ff. where it is remarked that ἰδοῦ, ἰού and οὔ are exceptional, since they are the only adverbs in -ου with a different meaning from either a local one or that of a quantity. This is taken to account for their divergent accentuation as well; see chapter IV section 6.3.2.1.

<sup>123</sup> The examples are λιμός, "hunger", deriving from λείπω, "to leave behind", by means of a loss of letters which corresponds to the notion of ἔνδεια inherent in λείπω; and ἡμικύκλιον, which I have already discussed. Wackernagel says (o.c. 30): *Quam enim linquendi fames, quam partis dimidia sella excitat memoriam?* Whereas his point, though weak, may be upheld in the case of λιμός, his taking ἡμικύκλιον primarily as the name of a kind of chair is completely unconvincing to me, the more so since no allusion to the fact that we are supposed to interpret the word in this way can be found in the context. As far as I can see, there is nothing to prevent ἡμικύκλιον from having its primary meaning of "half-circle" here.

text he adduces in support of his claim is irrelevant in this respect.<sup>124</sup> His only point is, therefore, that the meaning, too, should be affected for the notion of συμπάθεια to be apt. But I do not think this is necessary at all; I see no objection to the use of συμπάθεια if the πάθος *is* the meaning, and *affects* the φωνή. The latter is thus sympathetically affected by the former.

Now, the grammarians may actually have thought they had some Stoic authority for their use of συμπάθεια,<sup>125</sup> since συμπάθεια plays a not unimportant role in Stoic philosophy as "das naturgemässe Zusammentreffen gewisser Vorgänge in den verschiedenen Teilen der Welt",<sup>126</sup> for instance the influence of the moon on the tides.<sup>127</sup> Thus, it is a manifestation of an "organicistic"<sup>128</sup> world view and it is in the first place a physical phenomenon, affecting σώματα (see above, section 2.3.). As such, it is used to prove that the soul is a σώμα - since otherwise no συμπάθεια between body and soul could exist.<sup>129</sup> This means that what we would call psychological sympathetic influence,

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<sup>124</sup> He cites *GG* III ii 247,19ff. (*Et. M.* 148,8ff.): ἀρπεδέεσσα· ἡ ἄγαν πεδυνῆ κατὰ συγκοπὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀρί συγκειμένη. πέπονθε δέ, ἵνα μὴ σημαίνηται ἡ ἄγαν ὁμαλὸς ὁδός· ὁδοῦ γάρ ἐστιν ἐπίθετον...οὕτως Ἡρωδιανὸς καὶ Δίδυμος and remarks (1876, 30) *Etiam hic πάθος ad notionem refertur, sed ita ut multo distinctius, quid auctor voluerit, discerni possit: collatis enim quae statim sequuntur apparet, Herodianum vocabulo ἀρί nullam omnino vim tribuisse indeque elisionem τοῦ ι repetisse.* The sentence to which Wackernagel refers, runs thus: πέπονθε δέ ὄμως τῷ ἐρθύρις Αἰολικῶς, ἐρίθυρις γὰρ ἡ μεγάλη θυρίς. Here ἐρί clearly *is* supposed to have meaning, and that none other than its normal emphatic one: it is duly paraphrased by means of μεγάλη. Quite apart from this, Wackernagel's forced efforts to keep μὴ in the text make the whole sentence unintelligible. The text may be accepted after deleting μὴ and (preferably) the first πέπονθε δέ, Lobeck's solution mentioned by Wackernagel 1876, 30 n. 1.

<sup>125</sup> It should be stressed from the start, however, that the συμπάθεια-theory cannot be taken to apply to words like ἐγώ, of which we have a Chrysippean etymology, and in this way be directly associated with the Stoa. Here, as in its Latin follow-up by P. Nigidius (*Gellius NA* X 4), no πάθη are explained at all, but ἐγώ is held to show an *original* natural relationship between its form and meaning, because in pronouncing the word we more or less point our lips towards ourselves. The word συμπάθεια is nowhere applied to πρώται φωναί. I find Dahlmann 1964, 9 highly confusing in assigning this etymology of ἐγώ to the συμπάθεια-theory. He is, however, entirely correct in pointing out the context of this etymology; it is used as corroborative evidence for the fact that the ἡγεμονικόν is situated in the heart, not in the head, for it is at the heart, c.q. the chest our lower lip points when we pronounce the first syllable of ἐγώ. Etymology, therefore, has consequences in ethics.

<sup>126</sup> Zeller 1923, 172f.; cf. 171 n. 2; a large collection of places is to be found in Pease on *Cic. de div.* 2,34.

<sup>127</sup> *Cic. de div.* 2,34.

<sup>128</sup> Cf. v. Raalte 1988, 194; 205ff., for the influence of Theophrastus on this point.

32 <sup>129</sup> *SVF* I 518; II 790; 791.

which can make us resemble someone other than our physical parents, may also be reduced to a physical phenomenon.<sup>130</sup> Pease remarks that here, as in other fields, Stoic theory was applied to furnish justification of popular superstitions; for instance, συμπάθεια came to be acknowledged as a principle of medicine and divination.<sup>131</sup>

The occurrence of the "real" Stoic notion of συμπάθεια combined with the sometimes confusing effects of the Stoic theory of etymology, may well have brought Trypho to his singular step - for he seems to be responsible for this development. On the other hand, Lehrs links the whole affair explicitly with the Stoa,<sup>132</sup> because he finds examples of the συμπάθεια τῆς φωνῆς τῷ δηλουμένῳ in Varro and Seneca.<sup>133</sup> However, I do not find his examples convincing.

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<sup>130</sup> *SVF* II 753 (πῶς ἄλλοις γίνονται ὅμοιοι οἱ γεννώμενοι καὶ οὐ τοῖς γονεῦσιν;). Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ συμπαθεία τῆς διανοίας.

<sup>131</sup> *L.L.* 412. Much later, the Neo-Platonists, first of all Plotinus, gave συμπάθεια an almost universal application. Cf. A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire de la divination dans l'Antiquité*, Paris 1879 (New York 1975), 82ff.

<sup>132</sup> 1882, 322 n.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.* One Varronic example concerns the explanation of the word *vallum* by means of the resemblance of the letter V to the forked sticks that are used to fortify a *vallum* (*LL* V 117) - this is not really an example of the phenomenon we are investigating presently, but goes one step further on the downhill path to perdition - it belongs in the category where there is allegedly a resemblance between the *written* form of a word (shape of letters, form of accent) and the meaning of the word - for examples, see Lehrs, *LL* and cf. chapter IV section 6.3.2.1.; the second example ascribed to Varro is *Apul. de diphthong.* § 25: *saeculum per e breve deberet notari, quoniam a sequor, vel ut placet Varroni, a sene derivatum est. sed quia rem productissimam designabat, placuit ut eius principalis syllaba significationis causa produceretur et per diphthongum plane dignosceretur.* However, this example cannot with certainty be considered Varronian, because it is not clear how far the quotation runs. It might as well be the derivation from *senex* only that Apuleius found in Varro. This leaves us with the passage from Seneca (*quaest.nat.* II 56): *Dicimus enim ut splendere sic fulgere. At illis (antiquis) ad significandum hanc e nubibus subitae lucis eruptionem mos erat media syllaba correpta ut dicerent fulgere* (older Latin: *fulgēre*; classical: *fulgēre*). In this case, firstly, *correpta* does not necessarily refer to a change in the original pronunciation (the original word could have imitated the "thing meant") and if it does, I do not think this is Stoic "orthodoxy", if such a thing ever existed.

### 3.2. Σημαῖνον and τυγχάνον

If we consider once more the possible relationships between σημαῖνοντα, σημαίνόμενα and τυγχάνοντα,<sup>134</sup> we may say that of these three, σημαίνόμενα and τυγχάνοντα lack a direct one-to-one correspondence.<sup>135</sup> A λεκτόν, which may be a bearer of truth and falsity, is not identical with the referents involved in the state of affairs expressed in the sentence. Σημαῖνοντα and σημαίνόμενα have a quite complicated connection, not only in the case of those words which still clearly show traces of their origins, but also in those where πάθη of various kinds have left their marks.<sup>136</sup> The relationship between σημαῖνοντα and τυγχάνοντα has hardly been discussed so far. In the strictest sense there is none, considering the intermediary function of the σημαίνόμενα.<sup>137</sup> Nevertheless there is a text which suggests the existence of this very correspondence between σημαῖνοντα and τυγχάνοντα. However, this may be due to some misunderstanding of the Stoic theories. But I must again stress the possibility that the confusion originated within the Stoa.

In those first words "which imitate the things",<sup>138</sup> it is not quite clear which elements of the triad are involved. When the first words denote sounds, σημαίνόμενον and τυγχάνον seem to coincide. This may explain Augustine's distinction of a category of words in which there is a resemblance of word to thing in *tactus*:<sup>139</sup> *Mel, quam suaviter res ipsa gustum, tam suaviter nomen tangit auditum ... lana et vepres, ut audiuntur verba, sic illa tanguntur.*<sup>140</sup> In

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<sup>134</sup> The lack of direct sources forces us to tread carefully here.

<sup>135</sup> It is this fact which forms one of the major differences between the Stoic and Aristotelian theories on the relationship of language and reality, cf. Forscher 1981, 76ff.; Nuchelmans 1973, 54f.; *SVF* II 168 (Ammon. in *Ar. Int. CAG* 4,5,17,24ff.:) πρότερον ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διδάσκει διὰ τούτων, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ προηγουμένως καὶ προσεχῶς ὑπ' αὐτῶν [sc. ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων] σημαίνόμενα, καὶ ὅτι τὰ νοήματα, διὰ δὲ τούτων μέσων τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον δεῖ παρὰ ταῦτα ἐπινοεῖν μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ὅπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὑποτιθέμενοι λεκτόν ἠξίουσι ὀνομάζειν. In Plato an intermediary between sound and the things themselves is also lacking, cf. Barwick 1957, 76.

<sup>136</sup> Pinborg 1962, 156 talks about the "Isomorphie zwischen sprachlichem Inhalt und Ausdruck".

<sup>137</sup> Cf. Pinborg *ll.*

<sup>138</sup> Origen *c. Cels.* I 8.

<sup>139</sup> *Dial.* 6 Pinborg.

<sup>140</sup> "Just as honey itself affects the taste pleasantly, so its name, 'mel', affects the hearing smoothly ... Just as the words 'lana' (wool) and 'vepres' (brambles) are heard, so the things themselves are felt" (transl. B. Darrell

theory, the Stoics cannot have held such a view, because here clearly a correspondence is described between the somatic thing, the object in the outer world, i.e. the *τυγγάνον*, and the expression. This is evident from the fact that here *mel, lana* and *vepres* *ποιοῦσιν*, they touch, c.q. are touched. The neglect of the role of the *σημαινόμενον* seems most un-Stoic, however risky this kind of arguments may be.

Now, although Augustine is not uncritical of Stoic etymology, there is no reason to assume he is consciously misrepresenting their theories here.<sup>141</sup> The origin of the confusion is easy to find (words denoting sounds) and we can, moreover, trace this part of the theory to one of the fragments of Varro, who was one of Augustine's main sources on etymology: fr. 113 G.-S. runs thus: *syllabae ... aliae sunt asperae aliae leves, aliae procer<a>e, aliae retorridae, aliae barbarae aliae Graeculae, aliae durae aliae molles: asperae sunt, ut trux crux*<sup>142</sup> *trans; leves, ut lana luna; procerae sunt quae vocalem longam extremam habent aut paenultimam, ut facilitas; retorridae sunt quae mutam habent extremam, ut hic hoc; barbarae sunt, ut gaza; Graeculae, ut hymnos Zenon; durae, ut ignotus; molles, ut aedes.*<sup>143</sup> It is clear that Varro is drawing up a rather impressionistic inventory of the sound effects of syllables.<sup>144</sup> His examples show, however, that

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Jackson).

<sup>141</sup> His critical attitude appears from *dial. 6: De origine verbi quaeritur, cum quaeritur unde ita dicatur, res mea sententia nimis curiosa et minus necessaria ... Quod si omnino multum iuvaret explicare originem verbi, ineptum esset aggredi quod persequi profecto infinitum est. Quis enim reperire possit, quidquid dictum fuerit unde ita dictum sit?* According to Augustine the general lines on which a word is to be derived will in most cases be clear to everyone, provided we know what the word means. Only the details will probably remain controversial - but these are irrelevant anyway. On the other hand, sometimes the origin of a word is so completely obscure that we should not foster any hope of ever being able to explain it. ...[*originem verbi*] *persequi non quidem ultra soni similitudinem possumus, sed hoc non semper utique possumus. Innumerable sunt enim verba, quorum origo, de qua ratio reddi possit, aut non est, ut ego arbitror, aut latet, ut Stoici contendunt (l.l.).*

But there is no trace of irony or doubt in the description we are dealing with now, of the ways in which words may be related to their meanings.

<sup>142</sup> Also one of Augustine's examples.

<sup>143</sup> "Some syllables are harsh, others smooth, some are extended, others shrivelled, some are barbarian, others half-Greek, some are hard, others soft. Harsh are e.g. *trux crux trans*; smooth: *lana luna*; extended are those syllables that have a long last or penultimate vowel, like *facilitas*. Shrivelled are those that end in a mute consonant, like *hic hoc*. Barbarian is e.g. *gaza*; half-Greek, *hymnos Zenon*; hard, *ignotus*; soft, *aedes*." The fragment comes from Varro *de grammatica (disciplinarum liber I)*.

<sup>144</sup> Cf. already Pl. *Crat.* on the sound-effect of 'letters', e.g. 426c1ff.

he did not mean to establish a relationship between meaning (or, for that matter, τυγχάνου) and sound here. It is hard to see how *aedes* could be called *mollis* in any other way than because of its sound. The same objection holds, for instance, for the *asperitas* of *trans* and especially for the "*retorriditas*" of *hic* and *hoc*, but the fact that *Graeculae* and *barbarae* are mentioned in the same context is decisive: Here Varro clearly means those words which have a foreign phonetic structure, because they contain the un-Latin sounds *z* and *y*. Therefore I suggest that Augustine has been guilty of a little *Hineininterpretieren*.

### 3.3. Comic effects

There is another text which suggests a relationship between σημαῖνον and τυγχάνου. I add it because it shows how morsels of grammatical wisdom were employed in a humorous context. *Anth.Pal.* XI 383 (Palladas) laments the fate of a donkey that has fallen in the hands of a grammarian:<sup>145</sup>

Ἦν ἄρα καὶ κἀνωσι Τύχη χαλεπή τε καὶ ἐσθλή,  
καὶ Κρόνος ὠρονομεῖ τετραπόδων γένεσιν.  
ἐξότε γὰρ καὶ τοῦτον ὄνον χαλεπὸς χρόνος ἔσχευ,  
ἐξ ἀλαβαρχείης γραμματικοῦ γέγονεν.  
τλήθι φέρειν λοιπόν, κἀνθήλιε· γραμματικοῖς γὰρ  
οὐδὲ τέλος κριθῆ, κρῖ δὲ μόνον λέγεται<sup>146</sup>.

Κρῖ was one of the examples the grammarians usually adduced for ἀποκοπή in Homer.<sup>147</sup> Other examples are δῶ for δῶμα, and μάψ for μαψιδίως. The implication of the grammarians' habit of shortening the form of the word κριθῆ, is apparently that an equivalent reduction of the donkey's rations of real κριθή is to be expected. Here, as in Augustine, it is a relationship between σημαῖνον and τυγχάνου that is alluded to. However, we may freely acquit the author of this little epigram of any attempt at conscious theorizing.

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<sup>145</sup> For more epigrams in which grammatical theory and grammarians are made fun of, cf. Sluiter 1988b.

<sup>146</sup> "So for mokes, too, there is sinister and good Fortune, and Saturn rules the nativities of beasts also; for ever since evil time befell this donkey, it has become a grammarian's instead of being in the alabarch's palace. But bear it patiently henceforth, donkey; for grammarians *crithe* (barley) has no end, but is called only *cri*." (transl. W.R. Paton).

<sup>147</sup> It was so used ever since Ar. *Poet.* 1458a4f.; cf. Ennius' joke *gau* (= *gaudium*), *Ann.* 574 Vahlen.

#### 4. Conclusion

In this chapter I briefly discussed the first symptoms of linguistic awareness in ancient Greece. From the first, linguistic thought took a great interest in the meaning of words. Early manifestations of this interest were, for instance, the simple explanation of difficult words in Homer and other poets, or the study of apparent synonyms. In this first stage the study of language always served some ulterior end. It was related to the study of the poets and a rhetorical interest (Protagoras in Plato) or to philosophy (Socrates in Plato; P. Derveni).

A marked interest in matters linguistic was found in the Stoa. It was shown that theirs was a tightly coherent system, the consequences of their views on the rationality and original perfection of the universe being worked out for all three major parts of their philosophy. Therefore, their linguistic observations can never be understood out of context.

The Stoics held that originally language was in a perfect state, words and meanings standing in a one-to-one relationship. The later corruptions of language, which obscured the true meaning of the words, could be remedied by the study of etymology. It was a necessary presupposition of etymology that the meaning of the words was left intact, whatever happened to their forms. Although it is clear enough how the Stoa envisaged the original state of language, it is uncertain how they thought this original state had come about.

After an account of the Stoic theory of meaning, with its tripartition into *σημαινόμενα*, *σημαίνοντα* and *τυγχάνοντα*, we turned to some of the effects of these views on later grammatical theory. Although the principle of a strict separation of form and meaning was adopted in later grammar and may be considered a truly Stoic inheritance, we saw that grammar also went its own way and developed some of the principles it had taken over, in a quite un-Stoic way. This should warn us not to regard a theory as philosophical, just because it developed from philosophical origins. The aims of philosophy and later grammar no longer coincided. The original, philosophical drift of a concept was not necessarily alive any longer - different questions produced different answers.





## Chapter II - APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS

### 0. Introduction

Since it is not my intention to write a formal history of grammar, I shall omit quite a large period. I shall not deal with the exact nature and extent of the grammatical knowledge possessed by Aristophanes of Byzantium, Aristarch and their immediate successors. Grammar in Antiquity had a hard time freeing itself from the strangling embrace of other disciplines, first and foremost from philosophy and rhetoric, but also from the literary involvement with the ancient writers. Grammar was never autonomous in Antiquity, when the central role of grammar in education almost forced it to be non-specialistic.<sup>1</sup>

After Frede 1977 for instance, Taylor (1986, 175; 187) again drew attention to the discontinuity in the development of "grammar". Instead of a fluent continuum of one new insight evolving from the last and leading on to the next, we are confronted over the centuries with different groups of people, pursuing different objects and obtaining different results, which nevertheless somehow or other contribute to the whole of grammatical knowledge.

It is very hard to see what happens between the third and first centuries B.C., our sources being in a far from ideal state. What is clear, however, is that from its philosophical, rhetorical and philological origins there slowly emerges a grammatical system, even fit to be condensed into a schematic form in the interest of school-practice.<sup>2</sup> The correctness of language, which, under different aspects, was an object of study to philosophers (ὀρθόπεια), orators

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<sup>1</sup> Incidentally, medicine underwent a partly comparable development. The relationship, especially the epistemological one, between medicine and grammar is a recurring feature of the *Scholía* on Dionysius Thrax, e.g. 2,4ff.; 110,26ff; cf. Horstmanshoff 1987, 346 who points out that in the later Empire grammarians, rhetors, philosophers and doctors were looked upon as belonging to the same branche; see further Schrijvers 1987, 374. Although there always was a strong anti-theoretical medical tradition (doctors as craftsmen), the more scientific approach strongly emphasized the philosophical and rhetorical aspects of medicine, from which it derived its status. The result was that medicine eventually had to emancipate itself again from philosophy (as in humoral pathology) and rhetoric (as in the *prognosis*). This was not effected until long after Antiquity (Horstmanshoff 1987, 433f.).

<sup>2</sup> For some grammatical papyri, cf. Wouters 1979: P. Yale 446v. is dated to the first century A.D. (*ibid.* 47-60) as is P. Heid. 197 (*ibid.* 125-34). For the papyri as representatives of grammatical handbooks, cf. *ibid.* 42 and Fuhrmann 1960, 29-34; 145-55 (on the *Techne* ascribed to Dionysius Thrax).

(ἑλληνισμός) and philologists (διόρθωσις)<sup>3</sup> became an important element in the τεχνικόν, which was either an independent part of the γραμματικὴ τέχνη or one of its ὄργανα or "tools".<sup>4</sup> Grammar - at least in theory - became a discipline in its own right. In practice however, the ties with its three mother-sciences were too tight to be radically severed.

There are no grammatical source-texts of a reasonable extension until Varro, who is a highlight, be it an idiosyncratic one.<sup>5</sup> His place in the history of ancient linguistics still requires further clarification.<sup>6</sup> For the rest, we have names and fragments, but hardly anything substantial, until we are offered more than a glimpse of a grammarian who is generally recognized as representing a new stage in the whole development: Apollonius Dyscolus.

The work of Apollonius (and, to a lesser extent, that of his son Herodian) illustrates a period in the history of grammar in which the influence of philosophy and philology in particular, should still not be underrated - it makes itself felt on nearly every page. However, it forms the background to their work, rather than its aim. Far from being a Stoic philosopher doing technical grammar as a sideline, Apollonius is a grammarian whose work is based on scientific principles which happen to be philosophical in origin. The exact philosophical drift of the concepts and ideas he employs, is alive no longer - not at least to the grammarians - and it is certainly not productive: The eventual outcome of Apollonius' studies was not necessarily in accordance with Stoic tenets, even if their starting-points were. With this one proviso, it is indeed impossible to distinguish technical from philosophical grammar in this period.<sup>7</sup>

Nor can Apollonius be considered a philologist whose grammatical inquiries serve only to solve literary problems. The purpose of his work is not only to provide an instrument for the study of the poets,<sup>8</sup> especially Homer, although

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Siebenborn 1976, 24; Ax 1979, 304.

<sup>4</sup> Siebenborn 1976, 33.

<sup>5</sup> Although even the extent of his idiosyncrasy is difficult to establish with certainty.

<sup>6</sup> Although excellent work has been done already by e.g. Dahlmann 1964, Fehling 1956/7 and especially Taylor 1974.

<sup>7</sup> Blank 1983a, 59: "The Stoic system is not opposed to technical grammar in Antiquity, but lies at its very roots" (*contra* e.g. Preller 1864, 101 and Gudemann, Pauly-Wissowa *RE* VII 1780-1811).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. chapter I note 19.

this is important.<sup>9</sup> His ambition is to provide a framework for the solution of those problems as well which arise out of everyday usage, by giving a general theory of grammatical regularity.<sup>10</sup>

His contribution to the emancipation of grammar is an important one, because elements of varying provenance are united into one clearly worked-out system, designed as an instrument for problem-solving. Moreover, he seems to be quite aware of the fact that his approach to grammar is different from that of both his philosophical and his philological predecessors. For in stressing the fact that the scope of syntax extends to all kinds of linguistic usage, not just that of the poets (cf. n. 10), he consciously sets himself apart from the philologists. But he also notices that many philosophical ideas are irrelevant to grammatical studies - even though he freely recognizes his debt to the Stoics.<sup>11</sup>

The thread connecting him to his predecessors as well as to his successors is at the same time the unifying element in his views of language: the absorbing relevance of semantics. Blank (1982, 23) believes "that Apollonius Dyscolus put semantic considerations at the very heart of his syntactical theory". In fact, to Apollonius' mind, this so-called "syntactical" theory would probably not differ in any fundamental sense from a semantic theory, syntax being nothing more than the exterior representation of combined meanings. Although in practice the result is a combination of words, i.e. combinations on the level of the expression, the

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. e.g. *synt.* 2,1f. τὴν ἐκ τούτων (sc. τῶν φωνῶν) γινομένην σύνταξιν εἰς καταλληλότητα τοῦ ἀποτελοῦς λόγου, ἣν πάνυ προήρημαι, ἀναγκαιοτάτην οὕσαν πρὸς ἐξήγησιν τῶν ποιημάτων. Here syntax is considered a diorthotic (philological) instrument. Siebenborn 1976, 34, perhaps underrated the importance of the philological aspect of Apollonius' work, when he describes it as a "Spezialschrift zu [einer Teil] des Hellenismus", i.e. a specialistic study devoted to a part of a part (viz. ἑλληνισμός) of the τεχνικόν of grammar.

<sup>10</sup> See Lange 1852a, 3f. note 6; Blank 1982, 10; 53. Cf. e.g. *synt.* 51,7ff.; 183,14ff. εἰς γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο τὰ τῆς συντάξεως ἀπεδείχθη, ἵνα καὶ τὰ λεληθότα τῶν ὑπερβατῶν, ὄντα καὶ κατὰ τὸ σύνθητες, ἔχηται τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦ λόγου, καὶ μὴ μόνον τὰ παρὰ ποιηταῖς ὡς ἐξαιρέτᾳ τις ὑπολαμβάνουσι; 413,13ff. χρῆ οὖν νοεῖν ὡς οὐ μόνον ποιητικῆ ἄδεια ἐν ἐλλείψει λέξεων καταγίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνήθεις λόγου.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *coni.* 213,8ff. οἱ δὲ καὶ ὀνόμασιν ἄλλοτρίοις προσχρησάμενοι ἤπερ τοῖς εἰς γραμματικὴν συντείνουσι, Στωϊκᾶς παρεισφέρουσι δόξας, ὧν ἡ παράδοσις οὐκ ἄγαν χρειώδης πρὸς τὴν εἰς γραμματικὴν συντείνουσαν τεχνολογίαν. See *coni.* 214,2f. for his recognition of his indebtedness to the Stoa.

explanation for these combinations is always sought on the level of meaning, syntax being a function of semantics, no more.<sup>12</sup> I shall return to this later.

In studying Apollonius Dyscolus the modern distinctions between phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics should recede into the background. Apollonius took over the Stoic bipartition of form and meaning, the latter incorporating at least the last three modern categories mentioned above. It is amusing to read how modern grammarians defend their views on the importance of meaning in the face of the champions of autonomous syntax and to realize that we are just about back where we started. To give just one very recent example: how Apollonius would have approved of Mrs. Wierzbicka's words (1988, 1): "If semantics is to be defined as a study of meaning encoded in natural language, then syntax is simply one part of semantics".<sup>13</sup> The important difference between Apollonius Dyscolus and Mrs. Wierzbicka is, of course, that in Apollonius' day autonomous syntax was quite unimaginable, although some people took a different view on the respective relevance of form and meaning.<sup>14</sup>

In the first part of this chapter I will pay attention to some key-notions from the work of Apollonius and discuss a number of relevant passages. Apollonius regards language as a hierarchical structure (1.1.), whose various levels have a symmetrical construction (isomorphism, 1.2.).

Language may be studied from its formal side or from a semanto-syntactical aspect. The latter is intrinsically more important, since it is not liable to corruption. Linguistic regularity means that all words of a sentence stand in the appropriate relationships to one another from both a syntactic and a semantic point of view. These two aspects merge into the notion of καταλληλότης. Correct usage may refute (ἐλέγχειν) wrong usage, either in daily conversation or in a literary context (1.3.).

If one studies language and understands its underlying principles, even difficultly discernible mistakes may be detected and corrected. The combination

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 28ff., esp. 35 syntax is a part of the ἔννοια of a word; Skrzeczka 1853, 15; ApD. *synt.* 1,2-2,1 (where this is implicitly indicated by means of the opposition to the φωναί); *adv.* 128,13.

<sup>13</sup> See also Wierzbicka 1988, 3: "Grammar is not semantically arbitrary. On the contrary, grammatical distinctions are motivated (in the synchronic sense) by semantic distinctions." This should be compared with Blank 1982, 34f., describing how in Apollonius all elements in a syntactic analysis should correspond to elements in a semantic one. Within certain parts of speech, semantic distinctions are made which have syntactic consequences: "The implication is ... that such distinctions are syntactically relevant, because they are semantically relevant: they affect the ἔννοια." See below, section 1.3.

<sup>14</sup> See section 1.4.4., with note 100.

of a rationalistic, logical approach to language and a close adherence to observed linguistic fact is a characteristic of Apollonius' method that is related to the Stoic methodological principles. Apollonius uses two sets of criteria to decide in matters of correct or wrong linguistic usage, one derived from textual criticism, the other from the study of ἑλληρισμός. He integrates these approaches into a new genre of grammatical work. His method of expressing καταλληλότης in a kind of word-pictures of the corresponding λεκτά creates a new context in which there is a one-to-one correspondence between λεκτόν and expression; here, too, Apollonius borrows from the Stoa (1.4.).

In the second part of this chapter I will investigate how Apollonius puts these principles into practice in his work on adverbs.

The third and last part deals with the concept of μερισμός, the assignment of words to the various parts of speech. Here, I shall discuss the phenomena of μετάληψις (translation) and συνέμπτωσης (coincidence).

## 1. Apollonius on the structure of language; hierarchy and isomorphism

### 1.1. Hierarchy

Apollonius strongly believes in the basic orderliness and logic of language.<sup>15</sup> This appears quite markedly in the very beginning of his main work, the *Syntax*. Here, Apollonius extensively discusses the hierarchical structure of language<sup>16</sup> and the isomorphism, the internal structural resemblance of the several levels (letter/elementary sound, syllable, word, (παρεπόμενα, "accidentia" of the parts of speech), sentence).<sup>17</sup> No doubt he shows the influence of the Stoa here. It is noteworthy in this respect to mention, apart from the well-known passage from Diogenes Laertius,<sup>18</sup> the fact that Chrysippus was allegedly the first to use the term στοιχείον not only for a letter, but also for a λέξις. In this way he

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<sup>15</sup> See especially Blank 1982, *passim*. Blank's work was an important source of inspiration for this chapter.

<sup>16</sup> A hierarchical structuring was a standard principle of organisation in ancient textbooks, cf. Fuhrmann 1960, 122; Holtz 1981, 55. Holtz 1981, 59 ultimately traces this principle back to Pl. *Crat.* 424c5-425a and considers it an elementary didactic method.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Priscian III 108,9f.; Priscian closely follows the work of Apollonius and Herodian, cf. e.g. II 1,1ff.

<sup>18</sup> About the hierarchical structure in the discussion of the τόπος περιφωνῆς, D.L. VII 56ff.; see Egli 1967, 56f., Sluiter 1988a, 48 n. 6.

indicates the similarity of the relationship between letter<sup>19</sup> and λέξις to that between λέξις and λόγος.<sup>20</sup>

This is exactly what Apollonius describes. Στοιχεῖα (letters) do not enter ἐπιπλοκαί at random, but ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ δέον συντάξει (*synt.* 2,5).<sup>21</sup> In this way syllables come into existence, for which the same rule holds good. They form words, which in turn enter constructions on the basis of τὸ κατάλληλον (regular semantic and syntactic congruence) and so, finally, the αὐτοτελής λόγος is formed (*synt.* 2,8ff.). For upon each word a νοητόν is, as it were, grafted, a meaning that can be thought, which functions as a στοιχεῖον ... τοῦ λόγου (*synt.* 2,11). The parallelism between these elements, which stand in a climbing hierarchical order, is emphasized by the explicit comparison which follows (*synt.* 2,11ff.): καὶ ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰς συλλαβὰς ἀποτελεῖ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιπλοκάς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ σύνταξις τῶν νοητῶν τρόπον τινα συλλαβὰς ἀποτελέσει διὰ τῆς ἐπιπλοκῆς τῶν λέξεων. καὶ ἔτι ὄν τρόπον ἐκ τῶν

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<sup>19</sup> Στοιχεῖον for letter (as a synonym of γράμμα) is much older. It is frequent in Plato, who makes Socrates say in the *Phaedrus* (274d2) that the γράμματα are an invention of the Egyptian Theuth and in the *Philebus* that Theuth was the one who called the letters στοιχεῖα on the basis, it may be added, of their function (18c6). The alleged reason for the distinction of the letters was to create an intermediary stage between the essential unity of φωνή on the one hand, and its multiplicity and infiniteness on the other. For letters can be counted and thus represent "number". The use of στοιχεῖον may serve to stress the structural function of the element, *in casu* the letter; cf. D.L. VII 56 τῆς δὲ λέξεως στοιχεῖά ἐστι τὰ εἰκοσιτέσσαρα γράμματα. Maybe the term στοιχεῖον originally referred to the letters as members of the alphabet, rather than of the words; in the same way λέξις originally was any φωνή ἑναρθρος rather than a specific word from a specific sentence, cf. chapter I n. 91. However, this makes no difference for the hierarchical build-up of the system. For the importance of writing in ancient grammatical theory (leading to the use of letter, where we would have expected sound), see Desbordes 1987; for convenience's sake I shall nevertheless refer to the formal level of language by the terms phonological, morphological etc. Notice that the possibility of writing a word is connected with its being "articulate", cf. chapter IV section 3.2.1.

<sup>20</sup> Galen. *de placit. Hipp. et Plato*. VIII 3, 673,3-6; Ps. Theodosius (ed. Goettling) 37,26; Schmidt 1967 (1839), 38; Elink Sterk 1845, 17 n. 3. Cf. ApD. *synt.* 2,10f. τὸ ... ἐξ ἐκάστης λέξεως παρυφιστάμενον νοητόν τρόπον τινα στοιχεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ λόγου. The comparison between extra-linguistic στοιχεῖα and linguistic ones is older still, cf. Pl. *Th.* 201d8ff.; 202e3ff.

<sup>21</sup> "According to proper rules of structural ordering" (transl. Householder).

συλλαβῶν ἢ λέξεις, οὕτως ἐκ τῆς καταλληλότητος τῶν νοητῶν ὁ αὐτοτελής λόγος.<sup>22</sup>

The correspondence is the following: On the level of the sound-expression στοιχεῖα, letters, combine into syllables which combine into words. On the fundamentally different level of the meaning, the νοητά of the λέξεις combine into "syllables", which in turn form an αὐτοτελής λόγος. Notice that the meanings are not at once complete; they are but the elements of the αὐτοτελής λόγος. The exact reference of the "syllables" on the level of meaning is not quite clear. Perhaps the meaning of word-groups is envisaged. However this may be, the well-formed sentence is built up from νοητά, which must be combined in the proper way.

This idea can be connected with the Stoic theory of complete and incomplete meanings. A complete meaning, or λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές, is the independent semantic content of an uttering. Λεκτὸν is more specific than σημαίνομενον, in that it refers to a state of affairs that can be evoked by uttering it, i.e. a state of affairs that is independent of its referents and exists by virtue of its being pronounced.<sup>23</sup> The content of a λεκτὸν may also be indicated by the word πρᾶγμα ("state of affairs").<sup>24</sup>

Λεκτὰ ἐλλιπῆ are the predicates,<sup>25</sup> which cannot effectuate a complete λεκτὸν unless they are predicated of someone or something, i.e. when, on the level of the expression, the "subject-slot" is filled in by means of a πτώσις.<sup>26</sup> For the Stoics the ἀξίωμα was the norm for a λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές, it was the λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές *par excellence*.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> "And just as the elements [i.e. letters] in their combinations complete syllables, so too does the syntax of the intelligibles complete syllables in a certain sense, through the combination of words. Again, as the word comes from the syllables, so does the complete sentence come from the regularity of the intelligibles" (transl. Blank 1982, 30).

<sup>23</sup> So Müller 1943, 38.

<sup>24</sup> Long 1971, 76.

<sup>25</sup> Πτώσεις are nowhere said to be incomplete λεκτά and should not be so considered (cf. Frede 1977, 63ff.; *contra* Schmidt 1967 (1839), 57; Müller 1943, 46).

<sup>26</sup> Nuchelmans 1973, 55ff.

<sup>27</sup> Müller 1943, 50; Nuchelmans 1973, 57: "A κατηγορημα was seen as a kind of schema for axiomata: By filling in the name-positions around the given predicate one forms a full-blown assertion". Müller, who is rarely used in modern studies but whose careful book has proved most useful, describes κατηγορημα as "das Prädikat als der von der Verbform bezeichnete Bedeutungsinhalt bzw. Sachverhalt" (48).



Now, if we compare the Stoic theory with Apollonius' description of the structure of language, it is at once clear that, although the former is clearly at the basis of the latter, the emphasis lies elsewhere. Both parties are interested in the relationship between expression and meaning, but Apollonius wants primarily to explain the correctness of the expression, whereas for the Stoics the theory of the λεκτόν serves the twofold purpose of making a corrective addition to the ontology of the Peripatos and of supporting their logic.<sup>28</sup> In this context it is important to realize that for the grammarians the complete, grammatically well-constructed sentence no longer has anything to do with the ἀξίωμα als "Normfall". The very word ἀξίωμα is absent from Apollonius' work.

## 1.2. *Isomorphism*

Apart from the hierarchy of linguistic levels, I mentioned their isomorphism as an important notion in Apollonius' work. Methodologically this isomorphism or structural similarity of linguistic levels is a basic condition for the application of analogy. It enables Apollonius to make an extensive use of comparison, both of elements of the same hierarchical level and between elements which strictly speaking belong to different levels of language,<sup>29</sup> especially between phonology and syntax. This kind of analogy is the theme of the beginning of the *Syntax*,<sup>30</sup> but it is also a recurrent feature of the rest of his work. This means that he has not just borrowed the phenomenon in the one context in which it may have become more or less common, viz. the hierarchy of linguistic levels itself. It has, on the contrary, been integrated into his whole approach to linguistic problems.

Least important are those cases where we are dealing with simple terminological matters. One example must suffice here: In *de adverbio* (121,14ff.) Apollonius stresses the necessity of the presence of a verb for the construction of an adverb, even in the case of the so-called ἐπιφωνήσεις.<sup>31</sup> Apollonius then defends the fact that he calls even a word like οὔμοι an adverb by adducing a

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<sup>28</sup> Frede 1977, 59: Like the Stoa, Aristoteles considered both persons or things and qualities as corporeal, but he did not have an ontological label to attach to the state of affairs of "x being cold", "that x is cold", which is not a body. The Stoic σημαίνόμενα could account for these states of affairs by conferring a special status upon them. See chapter I section 3.2.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Steinthal 1891, 226ff.; Wackernagel 1876, 20f.

<sup>30</sup> On both levels the same πάθη operate, cf. *synt.* 3,3ff.

<sup>31</sup> It should be noted that the instances Apollonius quotes for these ἐπιφωνήσεις are all adverbs which may be construed καθόλου with all verb-forms, and which say something about the πράγμα of the (unexpressed) verb, see below section 2.3.3.

parallel example from another linguistic level (121,23f.): οἴμοι may be called an adverb καταχρηστικώτερον (i.e. for lack of a proper or better term), just as syllables which consist of no more than one letter, may still be called syllables.<sup>32</sup> This example is not very striking in itself in that it primarily illustrates κατάχρησις of linguistic terminology, which is, of course, not connected with any specific level at all.

More striking is the fact that it is a matter of course for Apollonius to illustrate syntactic pleonasm for instance, by means of phonological or morphological ones,<sup>33</sup> and syntactic combinations by means of a sample of phonotactics *avant la lettre*.<sup>34</sup> Apart from such comparisons of phonology and syntax - certainly the most striking consequence of the basic symmetry in the structure of language - Apollonius often observes that there is a similarity of structure between elements of language which, although belonging to the same hierarchical level, to our minds do not necessarily function in a comparable way.

On the level of the parts of speech (words), for instance, Apollonius in various places in his work comments on those adverbs that are special in that they form συζυγίαι, groups of forms which belong together in one way or another.<sup>35</sup> These are the correlative adverbs, like πότε, τότε, ὅτε, ὀπότε, or the local ones (ποῦ, πόθεν, πόσε). The mutual relationship of the adverbs belonging in these συζυγίαι may be compared to that existing between several cases of the noun, or tenses of the verb: In other words, there is a

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<sup>32</sup> Schneider, comm. a.l. wrongly paraphrases *quem in numerum etiam interiectiones referendae sunt, etiam unius syllabae sono prolatae (velut ᾠ)*, thus completely ignoring the addition οὐκ οὔσαι συλλήψεις στοιχείων. These words, however, contain the reason why syllables consisting of one letter only, do not deserve the name συλλαβή unless καταχρηστικώτερον: syllables are *per definitionem* combinations of letters (cf. *synt.* 2,6; 2,11f.; Prisc. *GL* III 108,5-109,3, esp. 109,1 *syllaba comprehensio litterarum aptissime coniunctarum*; DTh. 16,6ff.; SchDTh. 57,12-21; 204,29f.; 508,31ff.). The best parallel is *synt.* 4,2ff. This very same comparison between different linguistic levels is found *synt.* 67,7f. (ὅ λόγος συλλαβαὶ καὶ αἱ μονογράμματα).

<sup>33</sup> *Coni.* 252,33ff. (phonology/syntax); *synt.* 197,13ff. (morphology/syntax).

<sup>34</sup> *Synt.* 449,1ff., correspondence between στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου and στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως; *synt.* 81,4ff., since the article expresses *anaphora*, pronouns which have the value of introducing an entity or person (δείξις) cannot be construed with them: ὃν γὰρ τρόπον κάπτι τῶν στοιχείων ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι τὰ ὑποτακτικὰ οὔποτε προτακτικὰ γινόμενα τῶν οἷς ὑπετάγη, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον στοιχείου λόγον ἐπέχοντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπιδείκνυται (... "in the same way the parts of speech, which can be considered as a letter, exhibit this phenomenon").

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Steinthal 1891, 306 and see section 2.3.1.

correspondence between the παρεπόμενα, or accidents, of the several parts of speech.

The local adverbs have so-called τοπικὰ διαστάσεις or σχέσεις τοπικαί,<sup>36</sup> i.e. they exhibit several semantic nuances (place where, whither and whence). The τοπικὰ διαστάσεις are said to relate to one another as do the *genera nominis* (*adv.* 201,9ff.) in the matter of their distribution over a certain number of forms: Just as there are nominal forms which are used for both masculine and feminine referents, so can some local adverbs indicate with the same form both the place where and the place whither (for instance ἄνω).

Both correlative and local adverbs show the influence of the phenomenon of συμπάθεια (προσπάθεια).<sup>37</sup> This phenomenon also exerts its influence in the cases of the nouns (genitive and dative). Just like a dual genitive coincides with the dative, an adverb like ἄνω represents both the adverbs ἐν τόπῳ and εἰς τόπον.<sup>38</sup> One sees that Apollonius can compare the local nuances of the adverbs with the *genera* and the *casus nominis* almost indifferently - in both cases there is a manifest regularity. Elements of the "paradigms" formed by the correlative and local adverbs are similar to aspects of the κλίσις of nouns and verbs.<sup>39</sup>

The correspondence between the organisation of the cases and that of the σχέσεις τοπικαί is sufficiently explained by Apollonius' view on the intrinsic symmetry existing both inside and between linguistic levels. There is no trace of a localistic case theory in the extant work of Apollonius - he never assumes a

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<sup>36</sup> Σχέσεις is paraphrased in the Scholiasts by μεθέξεις (SchDTh. 60,7), and συντάξεις καὶ σημασίαι (SchDTh. 98,20). Uhlig *ad synt.* 474,3-4 explains "*habitus personae reive significatae*". The word is possibly Stoic in origin and denotes an externally (co-)determined state or relationship (cf. Forschner 1981, 63f.) or directedness.

Διάστασις may mean "difference" ("division"), thus indicating the fact that several local meanings can be "distinguished" (cf. the use of διαφορά for "separate usage", e.g. *coni.* 221,16). But I prefer to take it as indicating the spatial relationship, the space or distance described by a local adverb. In this interpretation ("from where to where") it is least suited to describe the adverbs ἐν τόπῳ, but then again it is hardly ever so used; cf. *adv.* 201,1f., where the whole construction makes the combination less harsh. Priscian avoids the terminological difficulty and simply translates *loci significatio* (e.g. III 83,9f.; 84,11). Cf. the Latin translation of the difficult term διάθεσις into *significatio*, Jeep 1893, 197ff.; Flobert 1981.

<sup>37</sup> See chapter I section 3.1., note 116.

<sup>38</sup> Apollonius adds that now and then this causes confusion even in those instances where separate forms do exist, e.g. ποῦ (*adv.* 202,14ff.).

<sup>39</sup> *Adv.* 201,25ff.: The τοπικὰ διαστάσεις have a προσπάθεια which exists ἐπ' ἄλλων μερῶν λόγου also. Examples: ἐν πτώσεσι (shorthand for: "in the part of speech 'noun' in the cases"), ἐν ῥήμασιν etc.

local meaning as the basic semantic value of the cases.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, as we saw, he can compare the τοπικὰ σχέσεις almost indifferently with various παρεπόμενα of the noun (and, for that matter, the verb).<sup>41</sup> The order of the τοπικὰ σχέσεις he adopts in *adv.* 201,2f. is a logical, not a "grammatical" one. Further, what may tell against localistic tendencies is the fact that it is τὰ ἐν τόπῳ and τὰ εἰς τόπον which are said to have a basic similarity to one another,<sup>42</sup> whereas among the cases, genitive and dative belong most closely together, as opposed to the triad nominative, accusative and vocative.<sup>43</sup>

We have seen that the symmetry of linguistic structure allows Apollonius to compare elements both of the same and of different linguistic levels. It is clear that the intrinsic orderliness and regularity of language and the structural similarity of levels are mutually determined.

There are two passages which, in making use of the very same principle of the comparability of linguistic elements, take us to the very heart of Apollonius' theory of language. I shall discuss them in the next two sections.

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<sup>40</sup> It is still common at least to consider the possibility of Apollonian inspiration for a possible localistic case-theory in Maximus Planudes (Bachmann *AG* II 121,22ff., esp. 122,23ff.), although scholars tend to reject it. I think the theory can be vindicated neither for Apollonius nor for Maximus Planudes. Schneider puts SchDTh. 549,22ff. among the fragments of Apollonius' ὀνομαστικόν (*GG* II iii 68,8ff.), a doubtful decision in view of the absence of localist interpretations in what we know of Apollonius' case-theory (mainly *synt.* 405-433; here, the principal values attributed to the cases are the following: the accusative is used to denote the semantic role of *patiens* in active, transitive sentences; ὑπό + genitive is used for the *agens* of a real passive; the genitive expresses the source of a πάθος of the subject in the case of verbs like ἀκούειν, ὀσφραίνεσθαι and ἐρᾶν (417,3ff.); the dative has the value of περιποίησις, or "procuring" - it is used also when neither of the others can be used (429,1f.) (especially when the action is an "ἀντιπεποιημένον", as in γυμνάζομαι σοί.)).

I suspect that in SchDTh. 549,22ff. (where the primary object is to explain the traditional order of the cases) and even in Planudes a somewhat exaggerated version of the intra-level symmetry propagated by Apollonius (possibly partially through the intermediary of Priscian, Murru 1979, 89ff.), is all there is to the alleged "localism". Nowhere does Planudes explain the non-local usages of the cases on the basis of the local ones. See on this topic Robins 1974; 1984; Murru 1979 (in favour of Planudes being a localist); Chanet 1985; and especially Blank 1986 (against).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. SchDTh. 98,32ff.

<sup>42</sup> *Adv.* 202,1f.

<sup>43</sup> Müller 1943, 94ff. believes the Stoic theory of the cases derives from their theory of causes. See *ibid.* 119f. for the συγγένεια of nominative, vocative and accusative case.

### 1.3. *Structure and semantics*; καταλληλότης and ἔλεγχος

#### 1.3.1. Καταλληλότης

In *coni.* 218,7ff. we are told that, just as not every noun may be accompanied by an article, so it is impossible to join every σύνδεσμος to every sentence indiscriminately. This passage is illuminating for two reasons. In the first place Apollonius again introduces a comparison with another part of speech, thus showing once more his conviction that the same basic principles can and should be applied in very different constructions. This time, however, the implications are more far-reaching: The reason a conjunction cannot always be joined to a sentence, or, for that matter, an article to a noun, is that there is a semantic impediment. The constituents of a sentence can give it such a semantic load as would clash with that of the σύνδεσμος in question. The sentences "it is day" and "it is light" cannot, according to this principle, be joined by the σύνδεσμος "or"; nor could the sentences "it is day" and "it is night" be joined by the σύνδεσμος "and".

Now, in the very centre of his *Syntax*, in the beginning of the third book, Apollonius gives us an extensive discussion of the single most important notion in all of his work, viz. καταλληλότης, grammatical regularity and correctness. It is Apollonius' professed object to give a careful *exposé* in his *Syntax* of the καταλληλότης τοῦ αὐτοτελοῦς λόγου.<sup>44</sup> A sentence is κατάλληλος if all its parts are syntactically congruent and semantically compatible. Καταλληλότης refers to the mutual relationships of the constituents of a sentence; it is the notion into which symmetry of structure and semantics merge.<sup>45</sup>

In principle, the demand for compatibility is limited: There is no point in asking for it if a part of speech lacks the relevant characteristics. Primarily, one should look for compatibility in the παρεπόμενα of a word, its grammatical *accidentia*. Thus, a plural pronoun in the nominative should go with a plural verb in the correct person (*synt.* 280,4ff.). These παρεπόμενα are felt to contribute something to the total semantic impact of a word. If a word is indeclinable, its lexical semantic value is taken into account: If that is identical with or related

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<sup>44</sup> *Synt.* 1,3f.; cf. Blank 1982, 28ff.

<sup>45</sup> Apollonius explicitly excludes the possibility of ἀκαταλληλία resulting from incorrect reference to extra-linguistic entities, as when one points out a woman as "he": οὐ ... ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τὸ ἀκατάλληλον ἔστιν ἢ κατάλληλον, ἐν δὲ τῇ συντάξει τῶν λέξεων, αἷς παρέπεται τὸ μεταποιεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ δέον, τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀπάντοτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων (*synt.* 275,6ff.).

For κατάλληλος cf. Blank's Appendix, 1982, 55f; Blank, *ibidem* 28, takes καταλληλότης to be the syntactic *pendant* of morphological analogy. See below section 1.4.4. for the relationship of καταλληλότης and the Stoic λεκτά.

to the meaning conveyed by a grammatical accident like tense, there is immediate danger of incompatibility and ungrammaticality. This is why χθές, "yesterday", may not be combined with a future tense. I will return to this when I come to the discussion of Apollonius' definition of the adverb (section 2.3.3.).

Another example where the lexical value may play a role,<sup>46</sup> and not just the παρεμφάσεις of the morphosemantic categories (to use a modern term) of one of the principal parts of speech, is the passage from which this discussion started, *coni.* 218,7ff. Here, the basic incompatibility of antonyms ("day", "night") seems to be taken into account, although Apollonius would probably have considered the incompatibility to rest not so much in the words "day", "light" and "night", as in the propositions formed by their means; conjunctions by their very nature join sentences. Usually, however, Apollonius concentrates on the καταλληλότης occurring in the combination of noun or verb, which are the most important, or ἐμψυχότατα parts of speech, with another part of speech.<sup>47</sup>

Decisive for καταλληλότης in short is the question whether or not two words<sup>48</sup> agree with each other, in all the meanings of the word. Again referring to our passage from *de coniunctionibus*, we can only construe words with τῷ δυναμένῳ ἐπιδέξασθαι, that which can *accept* them. The consequence of all this is that τὸ ἀκατάλληλον is considered primarily to originate from flexion (*synt.* 279,5ff.). For as soon as words that are marked for categories such as case or number, person or tense, enter into constructions, they need compatible elements for the construction to be well-formed, or rather they should reject incompatible ones. Thus, the parts of speech that are most liable to suffer from ἀκαταλληλότης are the *declinabilia*. However, we saw that indeclinable parts of speech are not automatically exempt from syntactic restrictions.

Apollonius' main instrument to guarantee καταλληλότης is negative in character: it is a principle of falsification *avant la lettre*. He is concerned not so much with proving the correctness of an expression, as with discrediting wrong ones by substituting a more correct alternative. Correct usage refutes the incorrect. Sometimes a construction which is felt to lack optimal congruency

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<sup>46</sup> Lexical semantic compatibility of adverb and verb does play a role in the Latin grammarians, e.g. Servius IV 415,20ff.: *quotiens sunt autem adverbia quae significant ad locum, iungamus ea his verbis similiter quae habent significationem euntis, ut pergo illuc etc.*; [Sergius] IV 510,14ff.; Pompeius V 247,1ff.: *... non enim passim debemus quaecumque verba istis localibus adverbis iungere, sed pro rerum qualitate debemus etiam verba coniungere ... scire debemus quoniam non iungis in loco nisi rei quae est in loco etc.*

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *synt.* 28,6 and *adv.* 121,5ff.

<sup>48</sup> I use the word "word" with the same vagueness here, as Apollonius employs φωνά in the first lines of his *Syntax*, cf. Blank 1982, 29.

has to be accepted for lack of an alternative - it is correct because it cannot be refuted. But whenever a more correct alternative does exist, the persistent use of the improper form creates a κακία.<sup>49</sup> The process of discrediting faulty linguistic usage is called ἔλεγχος.<sup>50</sup>

### 1.3.2. "Ἐλεγχος

The most usual way of applying ἔλεγχος is to confront the questionable word in a certain construction with the correct form of the same word, *synt.* 288,5ff. αἱ ... λέξεις ... ἀναμεμερισμέναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας θέσεις, τὰς ὀπωσδήποτε παρεμπιπτούσας εἰς οὐκ ἐπιβάλλουσιν θέσιν διελέγχουσιν διὰ τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀκολουθίας.<sup>51</sup> 'Ἐλέγχω often means no more than "exposing, bringing to light, discovering". It is a test, a signal that something is wrong.<sup>52</sup>

As remarked above, many constructions cannot easily be rejected, because their incorrectness cannot be demonstrated by substituting a more fitting inflected form:<sup>53</sup> There is no better way to express the same meaning than by

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<sup>49</sup> *Synt.* 193,21ff., where it is assumed that Homer is excused on the grounds that the proper word did not exist in his day.

<sup>50</sup> The same principle of correct usage refuting (διελέγχειν) incorrect usage is applied to medicine by Basilius of Caesarea, cf. Gnlika 1984, 68: Basilius asserts that medicine should not be condemned and abolished just because some had made a perverse use of it; rather one should ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς ... χρήσεως τὸ ὑπ' ἐκείνων παραφθειρόμενον διελέγχειν (*PGM* 31, 1048). The latter passage stands in the tradition of a well-known protreptical topos (cf. Pl. *Euthd.* 307bc; Cic. *TD* 2,11f.); see Hartmann 1889, 293 and 302ff. (ἀπελεγτικὸς λόγος as the negative part of protreptic).

<sup>51</sup> "When words have been subclassified [i.e. when they have separate inflected forms for separate semanto-syntactical functions, I.S.] ... according to their proper applicational positions [in the structure], they act by means of their grammatical correctness [or: the regularity of their paradigm, I.S.] as restraints on words which, for whatever reason, have by chance come into a position where they don't belong." (transl. Householder, who comments "i.e. the proper word for a given slot serves to drive out an improper word"). Cf. *synt.* 270,8ff. πᾶν ἀκατάλληλον ἔχει ἐπανόρθωσιν διὰ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦ σχήματος; Blank 1982, 44; the same principle holds for the detection of πάθη. Here, the corresponding δλόκληρα make clear what has happened (cf. *pron.* 38,22ff.).

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *synt.* 301,9ff., cf. 62,11; 288-90.

<sup>53</sup> *Synt.* 282,1ff., esp. 4f. οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε ἔλεγχον ἔχει τὸν ἴδιον μετασηματισμόν, i.e. there is no inflected form to refute the construction; cf. 283,1ff.; 290,1ff. (ἐμοὶ αὐτῶ and ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ are both correct, ὅτι μὴ ἐνεχώρει (exists) τὸ δυνάμενον ἐλέγξαι τὴν κακίαν; 290,5ff. ἐαυτοὺς for "ourselves" is correct, ὅπερ ἦν ἂν ἐν κακίᾳ εἰ διηλέγχετο ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμαντοῦς, ὡς παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἡμαρτημένον. ἀνεξέλεγκτον οὖν καθεστῶς ἀδεστέραυ τὴν σύνταξιν κατὰ τῶν προσώπων ἐποιήσατο (cf. 269,1ff.); 289,4ff. αὐτός may be combined with all three persons ἔνεκα τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν ἀκόλουθον πρόσωπον κατὰ συζυγίαν ὃ συνελέγχει τὸ ἀλλότριον

using the questionable word under discussion. This last point is very important because it is related to the problem of the relationship obtaining between form and meaning. The original one-to-one correspondence was lost in the subsequent corrupting development of language. The result was that any one expression - out of context - could correspond to a number of meanings,<sup>54</sup> and there were several other types of misfitting between expression and meaning. One of these is the fact that meanings might lack a proper expression. For Apollonius the implication is that if an improper one is used for lack of better, it cannot be proved wrong.

In principle Apollonius' grammar is normative, meaning that the best solution should be the only one. Nevertheless, Apollonius is realist enough to see that the language he studies, is a far cry from its ideal origins. He notices the irregular correspondences of form and meaning. In some cases language is deficient in that it does not offer an alternative, better solution, thus creating the necessity of *κατάχρησις*. At other times it offers more than one possibility, none of which can be rejected on firm grounds. One can ask oneself, however, which is the more regular. Thus, one often encounters a preference for one solution to another on the grounds that it is *καταλληλότερον*, or *ἀναλογώτερον*.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, even if a word offers an irregularity (mostly a morphological one), Apollonius will try to find the regularity underlying the aberration.<sup>56</sup>

Although the principle of the one-to-one relationship of form and meaning can hardly ever be attained if one starts from everyday usage, it still remains an ideal situation, and sometimes one comes pretty close: In *adv.* 205,12ff.

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τοῦ προσώπου; 286,5f. ἄν is indeclinable: there is, therefore, no ἀνθυπαλλαγή of a different form which would make the incorrectness of γράψω ἄν evident.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld 1984a, 331.

<sup>55</sup> This applies especially in morphology. Cf. *adv.* 187,14ff. (χαμαῖθεν or (Attic) χαμαῖθεν?): τὸ οὖν πρὸς Ἀττικῶν πάλιν λεγόμενον ἀναλογώτερον καθέστηκεν κτλ.; cf. further *adv.* 175,25-176,5; 176,23ff.; 196,7 (ἀλογώτερον); 200,22ff.

<sup>56</sup> E.g. *adv.* 173,8ff. ὅθεν δοκεῖ μοι καὶ τὴν Δωρικὴν διάλεκτον τῷ μὲν προκατειλεγμένῳ λόγῳ ὅπως ἀναγινώσκειν, ... τῷ μέντοι μᾶλλον αὐτοῦς συγκαταβιβάζειν τὰ ἐπιρρήματα ὅπως, ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἀναγνώσεις λόγου ἔχεισθαι. Cf. Egger 1854, 45 (whose quotation of *pron.* 14,2f. is irrelevant to his point); Fehling 1956, 257; Camerer 1965, 185f.; Blank 1982, 17 "Once the cause of an irregularity is understood, the irregularity is no longer a threat to the rule, since it follows a rule itself and it is the knowledge of the rule which gives the analogical/rational system its flawless continuity ..., allowing it to deduce the correct form of any and every linguistic phenomenon"; *contra* Steinthal 1891, 340, note 2.



Apollonius puts it as follows - the occasion is the question whether or not it is correct to use εἴσω for two different τοπικαὶ διαστάσεις -: ὅπερ παντὶ μέρει λόγου παρακολουθεῖ τὸ διελέγεσθαι εἰς ἀκαταλληλότητα, ὅταν ἑτέρα τις χρῆσις ἢ κατ' ἰδίαν μόνον σημασίαν. τὸ γράφει οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐπὶ πρώτου ἢ δευτέρου τεθείη, ἐπεὶ ἀπομεμέρισται τὸ γράφω καὶ γράφεις εἰς τὰ πρόσωπα ... ἐξαιρέτως οὖν ἀναμερισθὲν τὸ ἔνδον ἀναγκαίως διελέγχει τὴν δισσην χρῆσιν τοῦ εἴσω.<sup>57</sup> Whenever a form is used exclusively to express one particular meaning, which would, we may add, be superfluous if there were no need for it to express that meaning, such a form in turn causes all intruders into its domain to be termed incorrect.

Let me add one more observation: There is, as we saw, no one-to-one correspondence of form and meaning in Greek after the corruption of language had set in. We should bear in mind, however, that this rule only holds good if one starts from the expression and tries to explain it. In that case - as long as the context is ignored - we may be able to think of more than one meaning represented by the words. We shall see that in the case of the λεκτόν it is another story (see section 1.4.4.).

#### 1.4. *The hidden mistakes*

##### 1.4.1. *Λεληθότα and reason*

The second passage which leads us from the comparison of different linguistic elements to another important theoretical principle, is *synt.* 183,9ff.<sup>58</sup> Apollonius has just argued that the natural way of construing a pronoun is to put it in front of the verb it is construed with, if the pronoun has an independent accent; it is irrelevant whether or not this ὀρθοτόνησις is caused by a preposition. In case of enclisis, the pronoun comes after the verb. Rules like this cannot simply be refuted by giving counter-examples. Everyday sentences like (*synt.* 183,12) σήμερον ἐλάλησα κατὰ σοῦ or σήμερόν σε ἔθεασάμην, or verses like καὶ τυ φίλιππον ἔθηκεν may seem to be in order, but appearances are deceptive. As a matter of fact, though hard to discern, they have undergone hyperbaton. Ἡ δέουσα κατάστασις (*synt.* 184,1f.), "the correct conformation (of the sentence)", is in complete harmony with the general rule.

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<sup>57</sup> "For [see Schneider, *Tractatus* 157 and *ad pron.* 103,7] it is an *accidens* of every part of speech to be convicted of irregularity, when another word is used in that one particular meaning only. For γράφει, 'he writes', could never be used for the first or second person, because to those persons γράφω, 'I write', and γράφεις, 'you write' have been expressly assigned ... Therefore, since ἔνδον is assigned (to the meaning 'within') exclusively, it necessarily refutes the double usage of εἴσω."

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 49; 85 n. 24.

Apollonius illustrates this as follows (*synt.* 184,7ff.): ὡς εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συναπτικῶν τις ὑπολάβοι ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ παρασυναπτικῶν μὴ ἴστασθαι τὸ καὶ ἀρκτικούς αὐτοὺς εἶναι, εἰ φαίημεν φῶς ἐστίν, εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν. αὐτὸ γὰρ μόνον τῇ συνθέσει τὸ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν δευτερεύει, οὐ μὴν τῇ διεξοδικῇ ἐπαγγελίᾳ· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται ἢ διάνοια τὸ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, καὶ τότε ἐπιδέχεται τὸ φῶς ἐστίν, καὶ οὐ πάντως οὐχὶ προτακτικὸς ὁ εἰ συναπτικός, καίτοι γενόμενος καὶ ὑποτακτικὸς ἐνίστε, οἷ τε παρὰ τοῦτον ἐσχηματισμένον.<sup>59</sup>

In this passage Apollonius compares two cases in which the natural, rational order of words, the order which most clearly reflects the intended meaning, has been inverted. The comparison is meant as an argument: The underlying thought is that, in the case of the inverted order of πρότασις and ἀπόδοσις of a conditional period, the inversion of the logical order leaps to the eye, and no one will combat the validity of the general rule on the basis of the occurrence of this kind of counter-examples. Therefore, one should agree that appearances may be deceptive and that although a sentence looks familiar enough and cannot at first sight be condemned, it may still be in a less-than-perfect state. It is the function of a Syntax to state the basic rules in order that deviations from the rule, whether due to poetic licence or firmly rooted in everyday usage, even when they almost escape notice (λεληθότα) may be detected and understood (*synt.* 183,14f.).<sup>60</sup>

What I am concerned with here, is not so much the comparison itself, but the point it tries to make: According to Apollonius it is the task of the grammarian to provide a system, a framework, which will enable him to correct language, not only in those cases where mistakes are evident, but also when they may well escape the less well-equipped student or user of language.<sup>61</sup> Hidden mistakes are more common than one might suppose: they are a feature of everyday usage as well as a literary phenomenon (see above, section 0. of this chapter).

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<sup>59</sup> "As when someone supposes in the case of the conditional or causal conjunctions that the rule, that they especially favour the beginning of sentences, holds no longer if we say 'it is light, if it is day'. For 'if it is day' comes second in (physical) position only, but not in semantic sequence: For the mind first accepts 'if it is day', and then 'it is light', and it is absolutely not true that conditional εἰ is not prepositive, although it may be postponed now and then, and the same holds for the words that derive from it." For διεξοδικῇ ἐπαγγελίᾳ, see Uhlig's note *a.l.*

<sup>60</sup> Interestingly, we may now compare P.Derveni col. IV 6: [τα]ῦτα τὰ ἔπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐό[υ]τα λαυθά[ναι], see chapter I section 1.3.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 14ff. on *synt.* 51,1ff.

Λεληθότα *per definitionem* cannot be detected by simple observation. The only instrument by which they can be discovered is reason, because reason alone can both explain the causes underlying our observations and formulate general rules.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, reason helps to find out *why* an error can be hard to detect.<sup>63</sup> The knowledge that Apollonius shows an interest, and a very marked one at that, in hidden facts, rules and causes, leads us to his epistemological principles and to the criteria he applies in deciding in questions of right and wrong linguistic usage.<sup>64</sup>

#### 1.4.2. Kriterien der Sprachrichtigkeit; analogy and the Stoa

It is not my intention to duplicate the work done by Siebenborn (1976) and Blank (1982) on the epistemological principles of ancient grammar in general and Apollonius in particular. What I want to point out is the relationship between Apollonius and the Stoa in this respect, too.

The history of the "Kriterien der Sprachrichtigkeit" has been studied *in extenso* by Siebenborn (1976). The three main criteria to be distinguished are analogy, linguistic usage and the literary tradition. Whereas the latter two criteria characterize an empirical point of view, analogy adds a rationalistic, dogmatic element.<sup>65</sup> Although as a heuristic device it starts from empirical data, its claim to discover that which originally was hidden, is based on the a-

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<sup>62</sup> A well-known principle, cf. e.g. Cic. *Fin.* V 58 *consideratio ... rerum ... earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes indagare ratio potest, ...*

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *synt.* 316,5: It is insufficient to explain a seemingly irregular phenomenon like a neuter plural subjunctive construed with a singular predicate as a Βοιώπιον ἔθος: αὐτό γὰρ τοῦτο ἐπιζητεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς (how it comes about that) λαμβάνει τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τοῦ οὐδετέρου.

<sup>64</sup> See also Blank 1982, 11ff.

<sup>65</sup> Siebenborn has shown that the implementation of the concept of *analogia* underwent a rather drastic change. For the Alexandrians it was "die Normierung einer unsicheren Form durch meist nur eine einzige ähnliche sichere Form" (1976, 13; cf. *ibid.* 83.) The comparison of two words is an abbreviated version of the proportional analogy with four members (cf. *ibid.* 64). This form of analogy is more closely related to the empirical than to the "logical" one (*ibid.* 125f.). For later grammarians it came to be "die Normierung morphologisch unsicherer Fälle durch Zuweisung zu einer umfassenden Regel" (*ibid.* 13). In this way, it began to cover non-evident material (cf. Galenus 18,2,26,6 Kühn: ἀναλογισμὸς δ' ἐστὶ λόγος ἐκ τοῦ φαινομένου ὁρμώμενος καὶ τοῦ ἀδήλου κατάληψιν ποιούμενος). Thus, a reconciliation of empirical and rational principles emerges. In early Greek epistemology there was a tendency to consider observation and reason as mutually exclusive (Lloyd 1966, 123). Exceptions are e.g. Anaxagoras' *dictum*: ὄψις τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα (S.E. *AM.* VII 140; D.-K. 59B21a), cf. Hdt. 2,33 (Lloyd 1966, 337ff.). Cf. on Aristophanes' conception of analogy Callanan 1987, 107ff. and Schenkeveld 1990 (forthcoming).

prioristic assumption of some underlying regularity. Blank has demonstrated (1982, 12ff.) that Apollonius, like his contemporaries Galen and Claudius Ptolemaeus, successfully brought about a compromise between empiricism and a logical, rationalistic approach to his particular field of research. Both the grammarian, the doctor and the astronomer went farther in their rationalisation (description of causes, underlying principles and so on) than a strictly empirical approach would have warranted. For strict empiricism, too, knows of an analogistic heuristic procedure, called the *μετάβασις εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον*.<sup>66</sup> The difference between empirical and "logical" analogy is, that in the former case no abstractions of rules or causes result from the analogistic procedure,<sup>67</sup> whereas logical analogy uses induction to formulate explanations or general rules on the basis of the empirical data.<sup>68</sup> The next step is to apply such a rule or explanation to a new problem.<sup>69</sup>

If we turn to the Stoa, we find that on the one hand they share with the empiricists the stress on empirical data as the primary source of knowledge.<sup>70</sup> But on the other hand, apart from their basically rationalistic world-picture - the *λόγος* penetrating our whole cosmos - they, too, had a method of looking behind what is evident (*ἐναργῆ*) and of finding out what is obscure (*ἄδηλα*), and this method, too, is called *μετάβασις*.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Empirical analogy is known especially from medical sources (cf. section 0. note 1). Cf. Fehling 1956, 264 n. 2 (Fehling, however, does not distinguish "logical" and empirical analogy); Deichgräber 1965, 301ff.; Hankinson 1987, 333f.; 336.

<sup>67</sup> Deichgräber 1965, 70; Hankinson 1987, 344.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Siebenborn 1976, 124f.: The logical medical school stressed the importance of aetiology, the description of hidden causes. They drew deductive conclusions about the appropriate medication from the causes of each illness (explained on the basis of humoral pathology or physiology) (*ἔνδειξις* or *indicatio*).

<sup>69</sup> There is a slight, but unavoidable circularity in this procedure. The four-member proportional analogy leads to a *κανών* (cf. SchDTh. 309,9; 454,14), which functions as a criterium for *dubia*. Siebenborn (1976, 66) wrongly believes that the *κανόνες* make the analogistic procedure supervacuous; in fact they become a new basis for it.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Forschner 1981, 68ff.

<sup>71</sup> S.E. *AM.* VII 25; Nuchelmans 1973, 52f. Forschner 1981, 152 calls attention to the fact that according to the Stoics there is a parallelism in the way natural and conscious judgments are formed, i.e. in the way one acquires knowledge of empirical facts and knowledge based on rational procedures. A very succinct description of the Stoics rational procedures applied to empirically established material is to be found in Cic. *Fin.* IV 8: *iam argumenti ratione conclusi caput esse faciunt ea, quae perspicua dicunt, deinde ordinem sequuntur, tum, quid verum sit in singulis, extrema conclusio est. ... quid, quod*

Our main sources for Stoic *μετάβασις* are Diogenes Laertius (VII 51ff.) and Sextus Empiricus.<sup>72</sup> In the latter (*AM.* XI 250) we find it stated that: παντὸς γοῦν πράγματος αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ γίνεται κατάληψις ἥτοι κατὰ ἐνάργειαν περιπτωτικῶς ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν περιπτωτικῶς πεφημότων ἀναλογιστικὴν μετάβασιν, καὶ ταύτην ἥτοι ὁμοιωτικὴν ..., ἢ συνθετικὴν ... ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν.<sup>73</sup> In *AM.* VII 25 we are told that according to the Stoics we can acquire knowledge of the ἄδηλα by means of σημεῖα and ἀποδείξεις "κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν".<sup>74</sup> Here, too, the possibility of *μετάβασις* is based on the a-prioristic assumption of underlying regularity.

The Stoa firmly believed in the basic rationality of the world.<sup>75</sup> It is, moreover, their epistemological conviction that we can also reach knowledge of that which is not evident by starting from the empirical data and reasoning from there. They had their reservations about empirical generalizations, but managed to avoid them by combining generalized *conditionals* with a rule of instantiation (type: if something is a man, it is mortal; Socrates is a man),<sup>76</sup> another compromise between a logical and an empirical approach. This allowed them to start from the empirically ascertained facts of the present<sup>77</sup> and apply their logical σχήματα to that material. It is clear that this kind of compromise

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*plurimis locis quasi denuntiant, ut neque sensuum fidem sine ratione nec rationis <sine> sensibus exquiramus, atque ut eorum alterum ab altero <ne> separemus?*

<sup>72</sup> Nuchelmans *l.c.* has shown that there is a slight discrepancy between these sources, *μετάβασις* in S.E. being considered the *genus* of this heuristic means, in D.L. a *species* only.

<sup>73</sup> "For certainly the apprehension of every object, whether sensible or intelligible, comes about either empirically by way of sense-evidence or by way of analogical inference from things which have appeared empirically, this latter being either through resemblance ... or through composition ... or by way of analogy" (transl. Bury). Analogy can either work by magnification (from man to Cyclops) or by diminution (from man to pygmy).

<sup>74</sup> "Through inference from the evident" (transl. Bury).

<sup>75</sup> It is now widely recognized that it is fundamentally wrong to explain the Stoics' view on anomaly as if they felt language was in principle unsystematic, irregular. This clashes with the most basic tenets of their school, cf. Fehling 1956, 264 n. 2.

<sup>76</sup> Kahn 1969, 164ff.; cf. S.E. *AM.* I 86 and XI 8ff.; 11, for the way in which a καθολικόν is accordingly expressed without the use of the quantifier "all".

<sup>77</sup> For their ontological restrictions on the status of past and future, cf. e.g. Kahn 1969, 165.

between empiricism and rationalism would have met with the approval of Apollonius and several of his contemporary fellow-scientists.<sup>78</sup>

Finally, it should be noted that the Stoa did undertake a search for that which is unclear in linguistic matters as well: they studied etymology (see chapter I section 2.2.).<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Apollonius had no qualms about formulating general rules of the type: all *x* do *y*, although he was always prepared to accommodate all the exceptions he could possibly think of. The rules themselves are based on observation. It is a firm principle of ancient grammar that the majority will constitute the rule (cf. e.g. Egger 1854, 45). If a variant is rare, it cannot impose itself upon the rest. Apollonius expresses this concisely as follows (*pron.* 72,6f.): παντι προϋπτον ὡς ἡ πλείων παράθεσις τῆς ἐλάσσονος κανῶν, "it is evident to anybody that the largest number of examples (which can be adduced for a phenomenon) makes out the rule for the minority." Cf. *pron.* 25,30f.; *coni.* 252,19f.; *synt.* 250,5; SchDTh. 94,18ff.; 582,19f.; Choer. *GG* IV 1,118,18ff.; MichSync. § 126, 983f.; as the Academic basis for the conduct of daily life, cf. S.E. *AM* VII (*Adv. Log.* I) 175.

Opposition comes from the side of Socrates in Pl. *Crat.* 437d1ff. (Cra. 'Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ἐκείνως ἐσθίμαινεν. So. Τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Κρατύλε; ὡς περ ψήφους διαριθμησόμεθα τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔσται ἡ ὀρθότης; ὁπότερα ἂν πλείω φαίνηται τὰ ὀνόματα σημαίνοντα ταῦτα δὴ ἔσται τάληθῆ; Cra. Οὐκ οὐκ εἰκός γε. So. Οὐδ' ὀπωπιούην, ὦ φίλε). Later, S.E. *AM*. I (*Adv. Gramm.*) 225 combats the conviction ὅτι ἐκ πλειόνων ἐστὶ τὸ καθολικὸν παράπηγμα (rule) and pleads for the equivalence of exceptions, on the basis of συνήθεια (227).

The empirical basis of grammar speaks from the definition preserved in the *Tέχνη* of Dionysius Thrax (5,2f.): Γραμματικὴ ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεύσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων. Notice that ἐμπειρία in this context does not intend to detract from the epistemological status of grammar (it is not meant as an opposition to τέχνη), but rather points to its methodological basis. This is manifest from the title of the work, if from nothing else. Cf. also Siebenborn 1976, 123; 133f. Ax 1979, 306 n. 19 points out that there is an inconsistency between Siebenborn's interpretation of the definition of grammar in the *Tέχνη* as representing "die empirische Methode der induktiven Regelgewinnung" and the fact that Siebenborn (*ibid.* 27 n. 2) places the systematizing of grammar after Dionysius Thrax. The systematics of grammar need not, however, have been developed to their full extent in order to allow Dionysius to study "normal usage" which can be established numerically. Thus, Siebenborn's inconsistency primarily rests in his own formulation, rather than the ὑποκείμενα πράγματα.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Schmidt 1839, 23f. The keyword *latet* appears in Aug. *dial.* 6: *Quam* (sc. *originem verbi*) *persequi non quidem ultra soni similitudinem possumus, sed hoc non semper utique possumus. Innumerabilia sunt enim, quarum origo de qua ratio reddi possit aut non est, ut ego arbitror, aut latet, ut Stoici contendunt.* Cf. *latet multa et sim.*, Varro *LL* VII 2; 45; 73; IX 92. For the similarity of the principles applied in etymology to the procedure of μετάβασις, cf. Nuchelmans 1973, 53: "This creative power of the human mind [sc. μετάβασις] ... amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses etc." Note that these are the elements of the *quadrupertita ratio*, cf. Ax 1986a.

#### 1.4.3. *Linguistic usage and literary tradition; the genre of the Syntax.*

Various scholars have noticed the fact that the two remaining major "Kriterien der Sprachrichtigkeit" can have a different application depending on the genre of grammatical study they are employed for.<sup>80</sup> In the διόρθωσις, the "textual criticism" of a work by a certain writer, συνήθεια, *consuetudo* is the style and language of that particular writer, while παράδοσις is primarily his "tradition", the editions of his works with the learned comments, if any, which have come down to the scholar. In the study of ἑλληνισμός<sup>81</sup> συνήθεια is contemporary educated usage,<sup>82</sup> and παράδοσις stands for the literary tradition in general, which may support or avoid a certain idiom. Analogy was used in both genres.<sup>83</sup>

It is hardly surprising that Apollonius shows an awareness of both sets of criteria.<sup>84</sup> Indirectly, this is a trace of his indebtedness to both the philological and the philosophical tradition, of which in the last resort διόρθωσις and ἑλληνισμός are the "technical" manifestations. However, Apollonius' work is neither purely diorthotic in character (since it is not devoted to any one text which he systematically strives to put in order), nor is it a τέχνη περὶ ἑλληνισμῶν. Siebenborn (1976, 34) thinks it is a study of a specialistic part of ἑλληνισμός, like the monographs on orthography which had started to appear.

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<sup>80</sup> See esp. Siebenborn 1976, 81.

<sup>81</sup> Works with titles like τέχνη περὶ ἑλληνισμοῦ/ἑλληνισμῶν had a predominantly morphological interest, see Fehling 1956, 258ff.

<sup>82</sup> See Versteegh 1986; cf., however, Uhlig ad *synt.* 51,9, and see n. 84 on Origen.

<sup>83</sup> I will not take the minor criteria systematically into account here. However, notice that for orthographic matters Apollonius knew of the supplemental criterium of διάλεκτος (*adv.* 161,8ff.).

<sup>84</sup> The diorthotic ones: e.g. *synt.* 6,1ff.; there are many places where Apollonius mentions Homeric usage, e.g. *coni.* 233,10; 239,21ff.; *synt.* 196,3ff. (cf. 195,7ff.); 215,2ff.; 223,13f. (cf. 222,12ff.).

The set of criteria related to ἑλληνισμός: e.g. *synt.* 162,7ff.; general linguistic usage e.g. *synt.* 54,12; 60,1; 167,10. A combination of both is found in *synt.* 51,8, where Apollonius takes into account both the correction of ποιήματα and that of ἡ ἀνὰ χεῖρα ὀμλία. Notice that παράδοσις is in itself ambiguous, having the connotations of both textual and literary tradition, and moreover designating the work of previous scholars which has come down to later times (cf. Schneider ad *pron.* 94,16). For the partial overlap of the criteria of linguistic usage and that of the literary tradition, see Siebenborn 1976, 54ff.; Blank 1982, 14 does not explicitly distinguish everyday linguistic usage and poetic (Homeric) usage. Origen interestingly knows, like Apollonius, of both applications of the criterium of συνήθεια. With the word συνήθεια he refers either to ordinary, everyday usage (not restricted to that of the educated Greeks, cf. Neuschäfer 1987, 144) or to Biblical idiom (cf. Neuschäfer 1987, 143).

But Apollonius apparently laid claim to something else: his work is an instrument for all students of both διόρθωσις and ἑλλητισμός, or, for that matter, ὀρθογραφία.<sup>85</sup> It functions on a different level from these three (cf. *synt.* 7,6ff.): Διόρθωσις, ἑλλητισμός and ὀρθογραφία are all, primarily, concentrated on the (phonological/morphological) expression. A knowledge of the system of language on the level of the meaning, as described by Apollonius, is necessary to justify the decisions one takes in any one of the other disciplines.<sup>86</sup> Apollonius offers us explanations of τὰ λεληθότα and he does so with the help of the criterium of καταλληλότης which belongs first and foremost to the level of meaning.<sup>87</sup> In this respect he differs from the students of the other linguistic disciplines as he differs from the philosophers, because of his unswerving attention to the problems connected with the expressions. Apollonius rightly claims that his is an important contribution to the study of language (*synt.* 51,7ff.).

#### 1.4.4. Καταλληλότης and τὸ ἐξῆς: *the perfect construction of language*

What Apollonius does, then, is to present a general view of the linguistic system. On the way, he shows how various problems can be solved, whether arising from contemporary usage or from the study of (mainly) Homer. In this way he contributes to the fields of both διόρθωσις and ἑλλητισμός and borrows from their methodology without committing himself to either. His major terrain is not morphology, but the relationship between the expression and the meanings they express, the study of the common mean of our syntax and semantics;<sup>88</sup> he focuses on the καταλληλότης τοῦ αὐτοτελοῦς λόγου.

This καταλληλότης or semanto-syntactical analogy is ideally represented by a sentence whose construction is entirely perspicuous because all its elements are put in their proper place: A sentence of this formation is called τὸ ἐξῆς<sup>89</sup> or

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<sup>85</sup> Note that orthography is relevant only to those problems where a mistake would not be obvious in reading aloud; in other words, orthography also is primarily concerned with τὰ λεληθότα: Siebenborn 1976, 38; Blank 1982, 9.

<sup>86</sup> For the function the study of ἑλλητισμός can have for διόρθωσις, cf. *synt.* 51,8f.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 28.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 27f.

<sup>89</sup> Householder 1981, 74 comments (ad *synt.* 109,8): "to hexes, Latin *ordo*, i.e., perhaps, the structure before any deletions, insertions, substitutions, or transpositions have been applied by the poet"; (see e.g. *synt.* 175,9f.); cf. Householder 1989, 134; Blank 1982, 55 says that the neuter adjective κατὰλληλον "can denote the sense (ὁ νοῦς, τὸ ἐξῆς) or the intent of an utterance".



ἡ (δέουσα/κατὰ φύσιν) ἀκολουθία.<sup>90</sup> In *synt.* 184,1f. (quoted at the beginning of section 1.4.1.), it is represented by ἡ δέουσα κατάστασις.<sup>91</sup> Like τὸ ἐξῆς, this expression emphasizes the structural orderliness of a sentence, which in turn implies semanto-syntactical perfection.<sup>92</sup>

At this point we should return to the passage quoted at the beginning of section 1.4.1. It will be remembered that the sentence φῶς ἐστίν, εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν (*synt.* 184,7ff.), was an example of an evident hyperbaton, the conditional protasis and the apodosis being inverted. The example is clearly recognizable as Stoic in origin; it is the prototypic *συνημμένον*, the complex conditional axiom. I do not think this example was selected at random by Apollonius, but I suspect its selection was occasioned by its similar use in Apollonius' sources. It appears that the indifference of the order of the two *axiomata* which constitute the *συνημμένον* is Stoic theory as well.<sup>93</sup> The λεκτόν, the asomatic entity

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Κατάλληλον and τὸ ἐξῆς are then synonymous, e.g. Alex. Aphrod. in Ar. *Met.* CAG I 141,11 (however, cf. the use of ἀκατάλληλον 141,6: ἔχει δέ τι ἡ λέξις ἀκατάλληλον ... δοκεῖ γὰρ δι' αὐτῆς τὸ ἀντικείμενον λέγειν οὐ προεῖρηκε.) Κατάλληλον, too, although primarily referring to the word-order of the phrase, is explained (141,13f.): τοῦτο γὰρ συμφώνον εἶναι τοῖς προειρημένοις; 185,22. Usually, τὸ ἐξῆς (and also ἡ ἀκολουθία, τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν) terminologically stresses the structural aspect, whereas κατάλληλον focuses on the semanto-syntactical relationships within an uttering. Cf. *adv.* 122,16ff. "Ἐπι φαμὲν οὕτως, καλῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος γράφει, καὶ ἔστι κατάλληλος ὁ λόγος: ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων συμφέρεται τῷ ἰδίῳ συντάγματι ... [but] (ὁ καλῶς ἄνθρωπος γράφει) μεταξύ ... γινόμενον τὸ ἐπίρρημα δύο πτωτικῶν ... οὐκ ἔχει τὴν καταλληλότητα τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ῥῆμα.

<sup>90</sup> *Pron.* 42,8f. (with the familiar opposition to τὰ ἐν ὑπερβατῶ, cf. Baar 1952, 33 on Nicanor, who always tries so to arrange his punctuation that particles come in the second position in a sentence. When reporting another possibility, he points out the hyperbaton (SchHom. I 528; Y 157) and prefers the first one (SchHom. A 435; O 152), although sometimes his own position is not made explicit); *coni.* 235,17; *synt.* 23,8.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *synt.* 177,3f.: προφανὲς ὡς ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ὁ λόγος καταστήσει τὸ δέον τῆς συντάξεως.

<sup>92</sup> It is worked out by τοῦ ἐπιρρήματος ἐπὶ τὸ ῥῆμα φερομένου (semanto-syntactical) and τῆς ἀνωθυμίας ἐπὶ τὴν δέουσαν θέσιν τῆς ἐγκλίσεως (structural; an enclitic should come after the word it belongs with) (*synt.* 184,2ff.). Cf. the combination of τῆ συνθέσει and τῆ διεξοδικῆ ἐπαγγελίᾳ (*synt.* 184,9f.) in the comparison with the conditional period.

<sup>93</sup> S.E. AM. VIII (= *Adv. Log.* II) 110f.: τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ *συνημμένῳ* ἀξιομάτων τὸ μετὰ τὸν "εἰ" ἢ τὸν "εἴπερ" τεταγμένον ἡγούμενον τε καὶ πρῶτον καλεῖται, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν λῆγόν τε καὶ δεύτερον, καὶ εἰάν ἀναστρόφως ἐκφέρηται τὸ ὅλον *συνημμένον*, οἷον οὕτως "φῶς ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἐστίν"· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ λῆγον μὲν καλεῖται τὸ "φῶς ἐστίν"· καίπερ πρῶτον ἐξενεχθέν, ἡγούμενον δὲ τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν"· καίπερ δεύτερον λεγόμενον, διὰ τὸ μετὰ τὸν "εἴπερ" σύνδεσμον τετάχθαι. (111) ἡ μὲν οὖν σύστασις τοῦ *συνημμένου* ... ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι

expressed by the *συνημμένον*, is unaffected by any irregularities on the level of the expression; a *λεκτόν* is always fully *κατάλληλος*. Incidentally, it will be remembered that the Stoics considered the axiom as the "Normfall" of the *λεκτόν*.

Now, there is an inherent difficulty about the theory of the *λεκτόν*, namely that *per definitionem* a *λεκτόν* cannot be expressed in words. However, since the Stoics had no option (neither do we), they did make verbal representations of the incorporeal *λεκτά*. In this way two new relationships between the *λεκτόν* and the expression emerged. For, firstly, these representations consisted of normalized Greek,<sup>94</sup> and secondly the Stoics used the same terminology to describe both the expressions and the *λεκτά*.<sup>95</sup> Incidentally, the relationship of the *λεκτόν* and its word-picture is the second context in which we may rightly speak of a one-to-one correspondence. Such a relationship between expression and meaning also existed in the original state of language.<sup>96</sup> It does not hold, however, in later stages of normal Greek. - It would seem that the grammatical

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δὲ δοκεῖ κτλ.

Notice that the first *πρῶτον* and *δεύτερον* primarily refer to the logical order (i.e. the logical priority of the antecedent to the consequent); this also implies a "logical ordering" of the expression.

<sup>94</sup> As Egli puts it (1978, 150; 1986, 300f.): "Stoic loquia (*lekta*) are designated by expressions of a normalized Greek. They have the same structure as these Greek expressions. Thus, in most technical uses they serve approximately the same purpose as "semantic structures" or "semantic representations" in modern linguistics and philosophy of language." There is no other means to express a *λεκτόν*, although it is *per definitionem* an inadequate method. It is precedented, however, in Stoicism itself. One very basic Latin example is Sen. *Ep.* 117,13 *video Catonem ambulantem. Hoc sensus ostendit, animus credit. corpus est quod video, cui et oculos intendi et animum. dico deinde: "Cato ambulat." "non corpus", inquit, "est quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii dictum."* It is clear that *Cato ambulat* is not looked upon as a phonological string here, but as an asomatic meaning. But Seneca, of course, has to make do with writing down a sentence.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Lloyd 1971, 64f.; Kneale & Kneale 1971, 143; Frede 1977, 60; 68. Frede (1977, 69) rightly upholds that "it would be natural for the Stoics to use the same terms to refer to a feature of the *lekton* and the corresponding feature of the expression, as in fact we see they did". He mentions the use of *ἐνικόν* and *πληθυντικόν* as examples. Cf. Frede 1978, 58; see also Skrzecka 1855, 8: "Die für die dreifach getheilte Zeit gewählte Bezeichnung ist auch auf die *grammatischen Formen*, welche dieselben bezeichnen, übertragen"; he adds that it is not always clear whether we are dealing with the grammatical or the semantic category. A sketch of the relationship between the domains of *λέξις* and *λεκτόν* in the Stoic temporal system is given by Müller 1943, 90.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. chapter I section 2.2.; chapter II section 1.3.2.

concept of τὸ ἐξῆς and its equivalents ultimately derives from the perfect state of the Stoic λεκτά, be it in a special sense.

The difference between the physical expression and the asomatic meaning was relevant to Apollonius and he often applies it for instance, in his remarks on pathology, dialectology and etymology.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, he is most emphatic in giving precedence to the semantic aspects of a word over the formal ones.<sup>98</sup> Should morphology and syntax contradict each other when one tries to establish the correct μερισμός of a word, syntax/ἔννοια is decisive.<sup>99</sup> He attacks anyone who gives undue weight to morphological considerations.<sup>100</sup> The independence and priority of meaning appear from the fact that the meaning of a word is unaffected by whatever happens to its form (*adv.* 136,32): τὰ πάθη οὐ τῶν λεκτῶν, τῶν δὲ φωνῶν. This use of the term λεκτόν seems to be in agreement with the "orthodox" Stoic one. However, Apollonius usually applies the word in a definitely un-Stoic sense. In *adv.* 158,20 (concerning ἄβαλε and its alternative forms) he points out that: τὸ βάλε ἀφαίρεσις διὰ τὸ ἐν λεκτῶ καταλιμπάνεσθαι τὸ α.<sup>101</sup> Λεκτόν indicates a meaningful word here, i.e. it is used as the Stoic term λόγος, designating the meaningful linguistic string, the combination of λέξις and a semantic component. Apparently there was some confusion about the exact denotation of technical terminology, especially where problems such as asomatic meaning *versus* somatic expression are concerned.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Cf. chapter I section 2.3.

<sup>98</sup> Meaning is superior to form and is more or less independent of it (principle of etymology, cf. chapter I section 2.2.; 2.3.); form, however, can be influenced by meaning (*adv.* 127,18ff.), see chapter I section 3.1.

<sup>99</sup> *Adv.* 134,22ff.: οὐ ... τὰ παρὰ ... τι τῶν παρεπομένων ταῖς φωναῖς ἐκφερόμενα περιγράφεται τοῦ δέοντος μερισμοῦ.; in practice: 141,14f.

<sup>100</sup> *Adv.* 164,20ff. (esp. 29f.).

<sup>101</sup> "Βάλε is a case of *aphaeresis*, as can be gathered from the fact that ᾗ is left as a meaningful word [and has not therefore been added pleonastically to an ἐντελής 'βάλε']". Cf. *pron.* 59,1; 59,6; *coni.* 233,2; 253,5; *adv.* 195,16 (with Schneider's *comm. all.*). Schneider wrongly assigns two different meanings to λεκτόν in his *Index* (viz. *quod per se proferri potest*, *vox* and *vox quatenus aliquid significat*): in each passage the connotation of semanticity is present. Notice that the word never occurs in the *Syntax*.

<sup>102</sup> According to Frede (1977, 69) this confusion, which was caused by the use of the identical terminology for expression and λεκτόν, was especially augmented by the ambiguity of the term λεκτόν itself ("what can be said", "what is said"), which came to be used for the expression, instead of the meanings expressed. I would suggest that this use of λεκτόν was a consequence, rather than one of the sources of the confusion, for never in the Stoic testimonies do we find it used in this perverse way. Frede traces the confusion to the

Another example of a similar nature in Apollonius is *adv.* 188,31 (τὸ Δεκέλεια) τὸν δῆμον τοῦ σημαينوμένου δηλοῦντος.<sup>103</sup>

We can conclude that the perfect representations which we are offered now and then by Apollonius in his description of τὸ κατάλληλον, are word-pictures of the λεκτά of the sentences in question. In these representations all ambiguities have been solved as far as possible. However, the asomatic character of the λεκτόν has somewhat receded into the background: it has no direct relevance to Apollonius' purpose. The *axioma* as standard λεκτόν has also disappeared. It is sufficient for Apollonius to have recourse to at least one kind of expression in which form and meaning find an ideal correspondence.

Often it is an underlying *logical order* that is described by τὸ ἐξῆς etc.; often, too, all the παρεμφάσεις of the original expression are made explicit.<sup>104</sup> In any case, the paraphrases or word-pictures or whatever we want to call them, serve an interpretive end, rather than a structural one. I think this is the case even in those sentences which strike one as abnormal - or even ungrammatical-Greek.<sup>105</sup> On closer inspection, the interpretive intentions of these passages cannot be doubted. This fits in with the essential unity of semantics and syntax. Of the examples quoted by Blank and Householder, the most striking one is the position of the possessive pronoun in *synt.* 205,13-227,15.

Householder observes that several times Apollonius replaces a possessive pronoun with the genitive of the personal pronoun, which is placed in the so-called attributive position.<sup>106</sup> He marks these word-groups as ungrammatical because "normal personal pronouns in the genitive cannot stand between article and noun in ordinary Greek" (1981, 13). Apollonius himself is well aware of this

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grammarians Chaeres (= Chaeris), cf. Blau 1883, 56ff., esp. 65), cf. S.E. *AM* I 81 (opposing λεκτά and νοητά).

<sup>103</sup> "The meaning denoting the deme Deceleia." Cf. further the rather vague expression *adv.* 154,4 κατὰ τὴν τοπικὴν ἐκφορὰν (combining a semantic and a formal element). See also Schenkeveld 1984, 35 who points out that Apollonius confuses σημαῖνον (ῥῆμα) and σημαינוμένον (κατηγορημα) in *synt.* 403,1 (cf. Müller 1943, 48f.).

<sup>104</sup> E.g. the circumscription of the value of a mood, *GG* II iii 96,21ff. νευικήκοι ὁ ἐμὸς παῖς = εἶθε ἀκούσαιμι ὅτι ὑπάρχει νευικήκως ὁ παῖς μου.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 45f., quoting *synt.* 414,6 τρέμω διὰ σέ which serves as an explanation of τρέμω σε, cf. note 113; Householder 1981, 11f.; 16.

<sup>106</sup> The examples from our passage are *synt.* 208,9; 210,6; 210,7; 210,19; 211,20f.; 212,8; 213,14; 214,7; 214,10; 215,12.

rule.<sup>107</sup> Schneider, too,<sup>108</sup> regards these passages as an illustration of the liberties Apollonius allows himself in matters of word-order.

In fact, however, all examples but one can be defended. The rule forbidding "attributive" position of the genitive of the personal pronoun in a possessive construction holds good for the enclitic pronouns and postpositive αὐτοῦ (= *eius*) only. However, the possessive pronoun usually corresponds with the orthotonic pronouns (type ἐμοῦ) and with αὐτοῦ (= *ipsius*). They are used, as Apollonius remarks, to indicate ἀντιδιαστολή, i.e. they have a *contrastive* value.

Now, it is true that the personal pronoun ἐμοῦ in ordinary Greek cannot stand between article and noun, but αὐτοῦ (= *ipsius*) can:<sup>109</sup> In the paraphrases offered by Apollonius, αὐτοῦ is emphatic; it cannot simply be replaced by αὐτοῦ because, as Apollonius points out, there is no identity between the subject of the sentence and the referent of αὐτοῦ. It should be noticed moreover, that by Apollonius' time αὐτοῦ and τούτου have become more or less interchangeable; incidentally, the difference between αὐτοῦ and αὐτοῦ had begun to disappear as well.

This means that all Apollonius' examples containing αὐτοῦ or αὐτῆς are perfectly acceptable Greek.<sup>110</sup> This leaves only one problematic case, viz. *synt.* 208,9 τὸν ἐμοῦ δοῦλον. However, in this case, too, Apollonius' intention is clearly interpretive:<sup>111</sup> In *synt.* 208,6ff. he discusses the fact that the possessive pronoun always has the value of a genitive, while its case-ending is solely determined by the noun it belongs with. In order to show this, he replaces the possessive pronoun with a genitive, without changing the order of the word-group.<sup>112</sup> However, since the result is irregular, he is somewhat apologetic in

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<sup>107</sup> Cf. *synt.* 218,14ff.; 2210,12ff.; *pron.* 65,1ff.

<sup>108</sup> *Comm.* 69f.; cf. *Tractatus* 161.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. KG I 564 Anm. 3. In *synt.* 212,8 the value of τῷ αὐτοῦ θάρσει is made completely clear by the preceding τῷ ἰδίῳ κτήματι.

<sup>110</sup> Notice that examples like κάλλεος εἵνεκα οἶο (210,5) = εἵνεκα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κάλλους may have had the additional advantage of making clear that the Homeric pronoun is translated by the combination of article plus pronoun.

<sup>111</sup> It is in itself a well-known phenomenon that a native speaker trying to explain the meaning of a construction in his own language will often take recourse to paraphrases which are in themselves quite unnatural and would not easily occur in everyday usage.

<sup>112</sup> 208,8ff.: δυνάμει γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὕτως, τὸν ἐμὸν δοῦλον ἔπαισα, φησὶν τὸν ἐμοῦ δοῦλον ἔπαισα, ὅπερ οὐκ ἄλλο τι γενήσεται ἢ τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ.

presenting this paraphrase (note *δυνάμει*, 208,8ff., and the immediate replacement of the dubious expression with the correct *ἐμαντοῦ*).<sup>113</sup>

Summing up, it is true that the word-pictures of the *λεκτά* often strike one

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<sup>113</sup> Householder's remark (1981, 13) that *πρὸς ταῖς ἐμαῖς θύραις* (209,2f.) is puzzling since it is not the correct deep structure, is nonsense.

The other examples of ungrammatical Greek may be dealt with briefly here:

- *synt.* 413,5ff. *τρέμω σε* is explained as *τρέμω διὰ σέ*. Apollonius tries to make explicit the difference in relationship between the accusative with a verb like *τρέμω*, which cannot become the subject of a passive sentence, and a "normal" accusative with a transitive verb. Since everyday Greek did not offer any alternative construction, he had to make do with this preposition group. Although this construction is never attested, in itself nothing much seems wrong with it - it was probably as perfectly understandable to Apollonius' contemporaries as it is to us. I must say that I really do not see why a "surface-ungrammatical" form (Householder 1981, 16) *eo ipso* cannot be a helpful paraphrase. Note Apollonius' addition (*synt.* 413,7f.) that these verbs express *αὐτοπάθεια*, which excludes the possibility of passivation; this, too, is a semantic explanation.

- *synt.* 431,1ff.; esp. 431,11ff.: the construction of *μέλει* + (article + infinitive). Here, too, we have a rare, but perhaps not an impossible construction, cf. KG II 43ff. (e.g. X. Cy. 1,6,16 (however, here the infinitive construction is resumed by an anaphoric pronoun in the genitive, which makes a difference: *τὸ ἀρχὴν μὴ κάμνειν τὸ στρατεύμα, τούτου σοι δεῖ μέλειν*)). However this may be, in this case, too, the interpretive intention is clear: It must be demonstrated that the infinitive is a nominative (and, thus, subject). The article can have this clarifying function for all parts of speech, letters and even sentences, KG I 31; cf. 36 Anm. 3.

- *synt.* 408,10ff. *βούλομαι ἐμαντὸν περιπατεῖν*: Householder himself admits that this construction is in order if the pronoun is contrastive, cf. KG II 30ff. The construction has an interpretive purpose. The reason why the reflexive pronoun need not be expressed in these cases, is that these sentences express *αὐτοπάθεια*. This *αὐτοπάθεια* is explained in 409,1ff. by means of a paraphrase with *ἐμαντὸν*. Cf. once again the circumspect introduction with *δυνάμει*, 408,10.

- those cases, too, where Apollonius presents a representation of *τὸ ἐξῆς* (Householder 1981, 11) may be explained interpretively, the question being "What goes with what": For to Apollonius' mind this is a question of syntactosemantics. Cf. *synt.* 315,7ff.; 175,7ff.

- *synt.* 45,11f. Apollonius polemizes against Trypho (*synt.* 43,5ff.) who holds the view that the infinitive is a noun if it is combined with the article, but a verb in the other cases. Apollonius reacts by adding articles in cases where according to Trypho the infinitive is verbal in character. This yields sentences like the following: *τὸ φιλολογεῖν βούλομαι ἥπερ τὸ πλουτεῖν*; cf. *adv.* 132,10ff. *βούλομαι γράφειν, κἀν μετὰ ἄρθρου, προηρούμην τὸ φιλολογεῖν ἥπερ τὸ ῥαθυμεῖν*. The advantage of these sentences is, again, their clear illustration of Apollonius' point. Skrzeczka's view (1861, 17ff.) purporting that "er dieses Beispiel [the passage from the *Syntax*], ohne auf den Sprachgebrauch Rücksicht zu nehmen, nur um seinen Satz zu behaupten, selbst gebildet hat" is not quite correct, cf. KG II 43ff., e.g. S. OC 442.

as unusual Greek, but then they are meant to be more than just normal Greek: they represent the true meaning.<sup>114</sup>

The concept of τὸ ἐξῆς was to be a fruitful one. Apart from its indicating the correct, grammatical order,<sup>115</sup> it had been frequently used before Apollonius by Nicanor<sup>116</sup> to denote a sentence from which all grammatically unnecessary elements have been removed, without any changes in the order of the rest. Such a skeleton sentence is meant to facilitate the interpretation and the construction of the sentence.<sup>117</sup> The parts which are not strictly necessary for this goal are called διὰ μέσου.<sup>118</sup> This becomes technical scholiastic terminology.<sup>119</sup> What is διὰ μέσου is considered to impede a quick grasp of the meaning. The concepts of τὸ ἐξῆς and διὰ μέσου result in the

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<sup>114</sup> I am not sure about Apollonius' view on the relationship between the "word-picture λεκτά" and the actual expressions. There does not seem to be a fixed way for the one to develop out of the other. Although the four categories of change (*quadrupertita ratio*, Ax 1986a), are found, they are not applied systematically at all, especially not in syntactic matters. Morphologically, matters lie somewhat different.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. also *syn.* 109,8; 176,15 and the practice of the scholiasts, e.g. SchEur. *Hipp.* 1 *et saep.*

<sup>116</sup> Who is never quoted in the work of Apollonius, but fairly often in that of Herodian (see Index by Ludwich in *GG* III ii).

<sup>117</sup> Baar 1952, 27; 111. Nicanor tried to make the structure of the sentence come out as clearly as possible. This is also apparent from his theory of punctuation, see Blank 1983a, 60: he prefers to punctuate as early as possible, i.e. as soon as a complete sentence has been formed.

<sup>118</sup> Baar 1952, 111: διὰ μέσου is a group of words which interrupts the expected course of a sentence or which is not missed if left out.

<sup>119</sup> See e.g. SchAesch. *Suppl.* 166-7 (Smith I 70,9); SchEur. *Ph.* 550; *Hipp.* 812; (τὸ ἐξῆς e.g. SchEur. *An.* 1273); SchHor. *Carm.* III 5,6-8 (Porphyrius): *Turpis maritus vixit et hostium, pro curia inversique mores, consenuit socerorum in armis* [Ὑπερβατόν sic ordinandum: et hostium socerorum in armis consenuit. Nam illa per exclamationem [per medium est], quae Graece διὰ μέσου inlata esse dicuntur: "Pro curia inversique mores!"]. It is taken over along with the rest of the pagan grammatical terminology by the Christian interpreters, cf. Neuschäfer 1987, 232 (Origen); with ἐν μέσω for διὰ μέσου: Joh. Chrysostomus, *fragm. in Jerem.* PGM 64, 929B-C (on *Jer.* 20:9-10: τὸ "ὄτι ἤκουσα ψόγον" ... ἀποδέδοται τῷ "καὶ εἶπον· οὐ μὴ ὀνομάσω" ... τὴν γὰρ αἰτίαν τῆς σιωπῆς τέθεικε. τὸ δὲ "ἐγένετο ἡ καρδία μου ... " ἐν μέσω κείται. ἡ δὲ ἐννοιά ἐστίν ... (follows a paraphrasis); cf. also Diodorus Tarsensis, *CCSG* 6,271,88ff. (in *Ps.* 44:6): Τὰ βέλη σου ἠκονημένα, δυνατέ· λαοὶ ὑποκάτω σου πεσοῦνται ἐν καρδίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῦ βασιλέως] παρέγκειται ὁ στίχος τὸ 'λαοὶ ὑποκάτω σου πεσοῦνται'. Ἡ γὰρ ἀκολούθῃ ἐστὶ· τὰ βέλη σου, δυνατέ, ἐν καρδίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ τότε λαοὶ ὑποκάτω σου πεσοῦνται· νῦν δέ, καθὼς εἶπον, παρέγκειται ὁ στίχος καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν ἀσάφειαν. For διὰ μέσου indicating a parenthesis, see also chapter IV section 1.

admonitions of Gregorius Corinthius not to be disturbed by the seeming complexity of Greek sentences,<sup>120</sup> but to begin calmly construing them by looking for the verb and the corresponding noun in the nominative and to go on from there<sup>121</sup> - this sounds disturbingly like a school practice which the writer knows from experience, although it now seems to be out of fashion.

### 1.5. *Recapitulation; semantics*

To sum up the preceding sections, it is evident that Apollonius regarded language as an ordered symmetrical whole, hierarchically organized in several levels, which are characterized by the isomorphism of their internal structure. Language can be studied from a formal or a semantic point of view. Semantics are intrinsically more important than φωναί. This is especially manifest from the fact that semantic considerations are of a higher order than morphological ones and are decisive in matters of μερισμός.

The whole concept of καταλληλότης is essentially semantic in character. Καταλληλότης can be a characteristic of any expression. Often, however, there is something wrong with language as it presents itself to us, either in the form of daily usage or in a literary context. In the case of problems, the grammarian should use his reason. He should do so especially if he cannot have recourse to literature and the usage of his specific author, or to the works of earlier grammarians and daily usage, in order to try to find out what is wrong: For reason can detect even hidden mistakes because it can apply the system of rules and regularity underlying the actual presentation of language. To the tools of the grammarian belongs the falsification-principle of έλεγχος, which similarly rests on a semantic basis. At all times there is the καταλληλότης, the principle of rational analogy, which holds good for the *meaning*. This meaning can be represented by a kind of would-be λεκτόν, which is, as it were, put back into expression.

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<sup>120</sup> Gregorius believes the order of words in Greek is a rather random affair (§ 6,37ff. Donnet (cf. 6,44 άδιαφορίαν)) although φυσικώς the noun comes first, then the verb etc. The pupil is stimulated to reconstruct this order.

<sup>121</sup> § 5,30ff. Donnet; cf. § 16, 104ff. when sentences are complicated: μή συγγέου υπό τών μεσεμβολημάτων (cf. τὰ διά μέσου) αλλά πρώτον ζήτηι τὸ ὄνομα καί τὸ ῥήμα καί συναπτε πρὸς ἄλληλα, εἶτα τὰ μεσολαβοῦντα σύνταττε κτλ.



## 2. *The grammarian at work; Apollonius on the adverb*

The grammatically correct sentence consists of parts of speech fulfilling certain requirements of regularity in their mutual relationships. Donnet has pointed out (1967, esp. 38ff.) that ancient grammar is primarily a word grammar or a philosophical (logical) one. "Structural" grammar, with truly syntactic aims, is lacking. Apollonius' work is a perfect mixture of these two aspects of ancient linguistics. As a consequence, the parts of speech are an extremely important linguistic category and it is of vital interest to Apollonius to be able correctly to identify a word as belonging to one category or another (*μερισμός*). And this is, indeed, a question we find him occupied with many times.

If Apollonius discusses the *μερισμός* of a word, an important criterium is whether or not a word conforms to the definition of a given part of speech. In the rest of this chapter I shall first study Apollonius' definition of the adverb and put it into the context of the rest of his work (2.). Then, I shall look into some aspects of Apollonius' method in establishing the *μερισμός* of a word (3.).

Before discussing the first part of *de adverbio* (119,5-125,5) I shall state some principles from which I will work. In scholarly discussions about ancient linguistics it was for a long time not uncommon to consider Apollonius' definition as a more or less autonomous and independent entity. It was interpreted as such and was compared with other definitions which have come down to us. Often, the definition was criticized on the basis of other data, either derived from the work of Apollonius himself or from other ancient writers, or from later theories on this matter.<sup>122</sup> It should be stressed that this procedure is methodologically sound, since a definition should be autarchic. However, its usefulness is limited, unless one is interested in finding the "correct" definition only, and one regards ancient grammarians as contemporary colleagues, to be combated or supported according to the degree of their agreement with one's own views.

Since I am not primarily interested in the correctness or faultiness of Apollonius' definition, I will not isolate it from its immediate context or from the rest of Apollonius' work. Rather, I intend to profit from the fact that this definition of the adverb has not come down to us by itself. A lot of material has come with it that may prove helpful in its interpretation. This material consists of three parts. In the first place, Apollonius explains his own definition (119,7-125,5). Secondly, in the discussion of the words with unclear *μερισμός*, the

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<sup>122</sup> So e.g. Schoemann 1862, 166f.; 1871, 229; Steinthal 1891, 320.

question whether or not the definition applies to a word is an important criterium (126,27-145,25; e.g. 128,13ff.). Finally, there are a number of other places in his work (especially in his *Syntax*), where Apollonius tells us something about his views on the adverb.<sup>123</sup>

I will, therefore, regard the definition as the result, rather than the starting-point of Apollonius' linguistic studies. The question whether Apollonius made a success of his definition recedes into the background. This approach to a definition is legitimate only in cases like this, where we try to describe an historical situation, to assess the extent of grammatical knowledge of a certain author, and to understand the linguistic thought in a certain period, and where we have at our disposal more, and more extensive expressions of his opinions by the author himself. Should we have the definition only, speculations about the intentions of the author would be idle. In that case the criterium of self-sufficiency of a definition would certainly hold.

Since such is not the case here, I shall try to interpret the definition in the light of what we know about Apollonius' opinions on the adverb. Where the definition is ambiguous, Apollonius is given the benefit of the doubt. This does not detract from the fact that ambiguity in a definition is objectionable. But it is methodologically relevant to realise that interpretation and criticism should be applied in this order.<sup>124</sup>

There is one case in which this method is not unproblematic. If Apollonius has simply taken over an existing definition, his definition may indeed have been the starting-point, rather than the result, of his inquiries. Although this cannot be absolutely excluded, it is highly unlikely. Certainly, Apollonius was influenced by his predecessors and the Stoa has definitely left its mark,<sup>125</sup> but it is improbable indeed that it should have done so on Apollonius' actual theory of the adverb, which played a marginal role in Stoic "grammar". Moreover, in principle Apollonius did not borrow uncritically nor did he follow anyone blindly. Anyone who has read only a few pages will be able to confirm as much. The cases where he enters into polemic discussions with his predecessors are legion. As an example one might take the beginning of *de pronomibus*, in which he presents us with a critical doxography of earlier grammarians. He criticizes even

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<sup>123</sup> These testimonies should be used with care, because discrepancies caused by Apollonius' having changed his mind on some points, may occur, cf. Lehrs 1843, 120. Generally speaking, however, *synt.* and *adv.* are very close to each other where our subject is concerned.

<sup>124</sup> So already Lange 1852a, 44.

<sup>125</sup> Especially in matters of division in presentation. Cf. for Stoic influence Blank 1982, 5; 41; 52; Barwick 1957, 26.

the names applied by his predecessors to the pronouns (*pron.* 3,9ff.). A similar passage in *de adverbio* has possibly been lost.<sup>126</sup> In *de coniunctionibus*, too, after clearly stating his debt to the Stoa, he still claims room for contributions of his own (*coni.* 213,9-314,3).<sup>127</sup> In *de adverbio* Apollonius never spares his predecessors his criticism either. Apollonius was perfectly able to form an independent judgment on his subject. However, whereas it is improbable that he took over material from his predecessors uncritically, one cannot and should not rule out the possibility that he was - terminologically or otherwise-influenced.<sup>128</sup>

To facilitate the understanding of what follows, I will state from the beginning my interpretation of the definition. Then I will analyse the structure of the passage 119,5-125,5, paying special attention to Apollonius' method. Finally, I will explain my interpretation. This method will of necessity create some overlaps, but it will relieve the section about the interpretation of a lot of complicating, though interesting, material.

### 2.1. Translation of the definition; anticipation of conclusions

Apollonius begins his work *περὶ ἐπιρρημάτων* by stating the bipartition he means to impose on his work. Since every part of speech can be studied from two angles, the *ἔννοια* and the *σχῆμα τῆς φωνῆς*,<sup>129</sup> he will divide the presentation of his material accordingly. The *λόγος ὁ περὶ τῆς ἐννοίας* takes up the first part (119,5-126,24-(145,25)); the *λόγος ὁ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς φωνῆς* runs from 146,1 (*ἐχομένως σκεπτέον καὶ περὶ τῶν*

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<sup>126</sup> Cf. Schneider *comm.* 136f.

<sup>127</sup> Cf. Caujolle-Zaslavsky 1978, 435, who claims that Apollonius as a grammarian rejects the complications caused by the philosophical approach of grammar by the Stoics, referring to e.g. *coni.* 213,8ff. οἱ δὲ ... Στωϊκὰς παρεισφέρουσι δόξας, ὧν ἡ παράδοσις οὐκ ἄγαν χρειώδης πρὸς τὴν εἰς γραμματικὴν συντείνουσαν τεχνολογίαν. Incidentally, I consider the relative *ὧν*-clause to be restrictive. For the positive influence of the Stoa on Apollonius, cf. Frede 1977, 71ff.

<sup>128</sup> The only source for this definition one might reasonably think of, is Trypho. However, we know nothing about his definition of the adverb.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. the Stoic *σημαινόμενον* and *φωνή*.

ἐν ταῖς φωναῖς σχημάτων) to 200,32.<sup>130</sup> The study of the ἔννοια is in its turn divided into:

-the definition of "adverb" and its discussion (119,5-125,5);

-the syntax of the adverb as relating to the correctness of the name ἐπίρρημα (125,6-126,23);

-the discussion of a number of words which are problematic as to their μερισμός (126,24-145,25); this part is to be looked upon as a kind of appendix to the first part, cf. 126,24ff. I shall not consider the subdivisions of the second part here.

The definition runs as follows (119,5f.): "Ἔστιν οὖν ἐπίρρημα μὲν λέξις ἀκλιτος, κατηγοροῦσα τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς, ὧν ἄνευ οὐ κατακλείσει διάνοιαν.

"An adverb is an indeclinable part of speech saying something about the verbs, in all their forms or part of them, without which (verbs) it cannot make the sense complete".

Apollonius subsequently deals with the different sections of this definition and treats first the ἀκλισία (119,7-120,18), then the clause κατηγ. τῶν ἐν τ. ῥήμ. ἐγκλίσεων (...) ὧν ἄνευ κτλ. (120,18-122,34); finally, he discusses the words καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς (123,1-125,5).

Before entering into a more detailed discussion I shall briefly state the major problems involved in this definition and give a survey of my proposed solutions and conclusions.

The first question is the meaning of the phrase τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων. I will maintain the view that this means "the declined forms of the verb", thus rejecting the possibility that ἐγκλίσεις exclusively means "moods" here. In this interpretation the phrase is almost synonymous to ῥημάτων *tout court*, so that the next question is: Why did Apollonius go to this extent of terminological trouble at all?

The answer to this second question lies in the interpretation of another clause of the definition, to wit καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς: Adverbs can either modify *all* forms of a given verb, or *part* of them. In the latter case there are combinatory restrictions caused by the fact that the meaning of the adverb is related to that of one of the verbal categories (tense, mood, person); therefore the adverb may be semantically incompatible with some elements of the verbal

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<sup>130</sup> Notice that λέξις, like μέρος τοῦ λόγου, can refer either to the category "part of speech" (thus enabling Apollonius to discuss the "meaning of the part of speech 'adverb'"), and the individual word belonging in such a category (thus giving him the opportunity to discuss the 'form of the respective adverbs'). Cf. Lallot 1985, 116.

paradigm, some of its ἐγκλίσεις. This does not amount to saying that adverbs cannot be combined with all verbs. Never does Apollonius discuss the restrictions which obtain between (semantic classes of) verbs and certain adverbs (e.g. verbs of motion and adverbs indicating the "place where"). If Apollonius had used ῥημάτων instead of the more elaborate phrase in his definition, the reader might easily have been misled: Apollonius may, therefore, have felt that his formulation was clearer and more exact. Little did he know.

The addition of ὧν ἄνευ κτλ. was added in order to subsume under the definition those adverbs which to all appearances form an independent uttering, like καλῶς, οἴμοι or ναί. According to Apollonius, these words are adverbs and thus exhibit the major characteristic of their part of speech, i.e. they are construed with a verb: Only this time, the verb is not physically present, but has to be understood from the linguistic or situational context. It may well have been all the more desirable to point out the fact that the adverbs by themselves cannot form an independent predicate, because a number of them were considered by the Stoa to belong to the part of speech ῥῆμα, probably because they made up part of the κατηγορημα. The difference between adverb and verb was in this way pointed out clearly in the definition.

The ὧν ἄνευ-clause, however, creates a problem of its own: by concentrating on the failure of the adverb to form a complete predicate, and, consequently, on the necessity of the presence of a verb, it causes the combination of adverb + participle to fall outside the definition. Apollonius shows some awareness of this problem himself in his discussion of the clause in question.

## 2.2. Structure

### 2.2.1. "Ἔστιν ... ἐπίρρημα ... λέξις ἄκλιτος (adv. 119,7-120,18)

According to Apollonius, the indeclinability of the adverb is an evident (empirical) datum; it is προὔπτον (119,7), but Apollonius devotes an ἀπόδειξις to it all the same. This is the typical combination of empirical data and a logical approach of someone who believes in the basic rationality of language: even the evident must be explained.<sup>131</sup>

The argument of the ἀπόδειξις is the following: Whenever nouns start behaving syntactically like adverbs, they also formally adapt to their new status, i.e. they turn into ἄκλιτοι. This is most important. According to Apollonius a word comes to *be* a certain part of speech, as soon as it takes over its function,

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<sup>131</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 14. Things that are evident, are so on the basis of either observation or common sense. They can either be the starting-point of an ἀπόδειξις or, as here, be combined with one.

i.e. its meaning. One can understand how this works, if one realizes that he always describes what we would call "syntactical functions" in terms of the parts of speech.<sup>132</sup> For syntactical functions to be fulfilled by different parts of speech is not a familiar notion in ancient linguistics.<sup>133</sup> Syntactical relationships can, of course, by definition occur only when two or more words are combined. There is no such thing as a syntax of one word.<sup>134</sup> Therefore, the complete meaning of a word (syntax being a function of the semantic characteristics of a part of speech, cf. section 0. note 12) can be ascertained only by the use one makes of a word in an uttering. It is only then that one can state its *μερισμός*.

To return to the *ἀπόδειξις*: Apollonius uses a potentially declinable word (to wit *ταχύ*) to demonstrate and test the relationship between (adverbial) meaning/function and indeclinability. *Ταχύ* in *τὸ ταχύ περιπατεῖ μειράκιον* ("the quick boy walks around") is declinable, as appears from the genitive *τοῦ ταχέος μειρακίου*. But it is not so any longer in *ταχύ περιπατεῖ τὸ μειράκιον* ("the boy walks around quickly"), as is shown by *ταχύ περιπατοῦντος τοῦ μειρακίου*. If even declinable words "freeze" when they are used adverbially, it will be clear that the adverbs themselves must be indeclinable as well.<sup>135</sup> The argumentation is briefly summed up in 120,15-18 *ἀπόδειξις οὖν ... ἐξημέχθη*.

2.2.2. Κατηγοροῦσα τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων ... ὧν ἄνευ οὐ κατακλείσει διάνοιαν (*adv.* 120,18-122,34)

In this passage two clauses of the definition are discussed in a kind of "ring-composition". Recapitulating his arguments about the *ἀκλισία* (120,19-22), Apollonius starts this new section of his discussion with the remark that it is now also clear (*σαφές*, 120,19) ὡς κατηγορεῖ (*sc.* τὰ ἐπιρρήματα) τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων. This, however, has not been demonstrated in what precedes, but rather it has been presupposed in the part dealing with the

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<sup>132</sup> Cf. Steinthal 1891, 222f.

<sup>133</sup> In *synt.* 481,2ff. Apollonius describes how a local meaning, which is usually imparted by an adverb, may also be conveyed by a "syntax" of preposition plus noun, but this is not quite the same thing. Cf. Steinthal 1891, 344f. See further section 3.3.1.1.

<sup>134</sup> Steinthal 1891, 341.

<sup>135</sup> The declinable words are of course the only ones in which the difference can be demonstrated, but at the same time the argument has an *a fortiori* character, since to demonstrate the *ἀκλισία* of *πρωτικά* is certainly no sinecure, cf. *δπου γε*, 120,16.

ἀκλισία.<sup>136</sup> Σαφές cannot, therefore, indicate more than προὔπτον in 119,7 did. It is not a conclusion, but a generally acceptable presupposition.

From 120,22 onwards Apollonius concentrates on the relationship between adverb and verb, comparing it with that between adjective and substantive noun.<sup>137</sup> This comparison is the more legitimate since substantive nouns and verbs are the θεματικώτερα μέρη τοῦ λόγου: the other parts of speech are subservient to them.<sup>138</sup> In 121,14ff. the necessity of the presence of a verb is discussed, which applies even in those cases where it is not physically there, as with the ἐπιφωνήσεις.<sup>139</sup> The inclusion of οἶμοι in the category of the adverbs is defended by a terminological comparison with another level of language (121,23f., see above section 1.2.).

The natural link between adverb and verb is not only acceptable on the basis of the experience of any user of Greek, one may also ἐξ ὑποδείγματος πιστώσασθαι τὸν λόγον (121,27; cf. ἀπόδειξις 119,7). Accordingly, Apollonius proceeds to test the ὦν ἄνευ-theory by means of a test for optionality (122,1ff.), from which it appears that the verb may not be omitted. In yet another comparison, he equates the necessity of a verb to an adverb with that of a noun to an ἄρθρον (cf. note 138).

After a short remark about negatives and affirmatives (122,13-15, see below), Apollonius again focuses on κατηγορεῖν τῶν ῥημάτων and introduces a test based on the order of words (122,16ff.). Ὁ καλῶς ἄνθρωπος γράφει is a semanto-syntactical *monstrum*. Καλῶς is, as it were, encapsulated in a nominal group where it is a *corpus alienum* and it cannot be construed with the verb, where it would be at home, because it is held captive within the boundaries of

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<sup>136</sup> There, the adverbial character was deduced from the fact that the πτωικά in the cases under discussion were construed with verbs (and in a different way from their normal construction with verbs at that - cf. section 3.2.1. on πύξ and λάξ). *Adv.* 120,1 one should read with Matthias (*ap. Schneider, comm. a.l.*) ῥήματα instead of ὀνόματα.

<sup>137</sup> This comparison is a common one in Apollonius, cf. *adv.* 120,2 and 120,7f. the use of ἐπικεῖσθαι and Schneider *comm.* 140 ad 120,22; further e.g. 123,6ff.; 125,23; 126,9ff.; Lallot 1985, 85 points out that in the definition of the adverb attributed to Dionysius Thrax the words "ἐπιλεγόμενον ῥήματι", while playing on the etymology of ἐπί-ρρημα, may contain an implicit comparison with the adjective (ἐπί-θετον). He compares SchDTh. 95,20; 233,24. However, Lallot is wrong to explain from this analogical scheme the incorrect assumption that the Greek grammarians never noticed the possibility of construing an adverb with an adjective or another adverb, although it is true that they concentrated on its use with verbs. For references, see note 230.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Lange 1852a *passim*; his whole article is meant to demonstrate how the structure of the *Syntax* is based on the supremacy of these two parts of speech.

<sup>139</sup> For the ἐπιφωνήσεις, see below section 2.3.4. and chapter IV section 6.3.1.

the nominal group. From the fact that it cannot be construed at all in this sentence, it follows that the adverb can only be construed correctly with the verb, or at least with a word capable of expressing *παῖγμα*. Thus, from 122,16 onwards Apollonius returns to the clause *ὅτι κατηγορεῖ τῶν ῥημάτων τὸ ἐπίρρημα*. This whole passage, therefore, is built up chiasmically (*κατηγ. - ὦν ἄνευ :: ὦν ἄνευ - κατηγ.*).

#### 2.2.2.1. *Excursus: adv. 122,13-5*

It seems likely that the paragraph 122,13-15 is wrongly placed in its present position; it should be put after 121,26 (cf. Schneider *comm. a.l.*). As it stands, it interrupts the two passages which are meant to test the hypothesis that an adverb without a verb does not yield a complete meaning, and that if a verb and an adverb are both present in a given sentence, they ought to be construed together; at the same time it is missing in the enumeration of the adverbs which seemingly lack a verb to complete their meaning (121,14ff.).

Another good reason for putting *adv. 122,13-5* immediately after 121,27 is the fact that in two passages which are in all likelihood dependent on Apollonius,<sup>140</sup> this is the preserved order. I refer to SchDTh. 95,26ff., where we find an uninterrupted treatment of the three cases in which a sentence

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<sup>140</sup> According to Schneider, it is highly likely, but not certain, that in those cases where the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax are in agreement with Priscian, they both go back to Apollonius Dyscolus, see *praef.* to GG II iii, v. Schneider here corrects the more extreme view of Dronke 1856, 554. However, I would not object to this more stringent assertion either, in view of the fact that wherever we can compare the combination of Priscian and the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax with material from Apollonius, they do indeed represent his views. The definitions of the adverbs and the pronouns cannot decide this matter, since Priscian and the Scholiast are not in agreement here. Schneider's reservation seems to be built in mainly to discredit the testimony of Priscian and the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax concerning Apollonius' definition of the conjunction (see Schneider *comm.* 120). And this is the point on which the whole discussion has concentrated from the very beginning (cf. e.g. Lersch 1840 (II) 139; Elink Sterk 1845, 50; Jahn 1847, 14; Egger 1854, 207 all of whom are in favour of considering the definition found through the combination of Priscian and the Scholiast, as Apollonian. Dronke 1856, 554 is the first to formulate this state of affairs as a general rule. On the other hand, Schneider 1874, 183; *comm.*; and *epim.*; and Skrzeczka 1853, 5; 11 object to the identification of the definition as Apollonian and thus reject the general rule about the combination of Priscian and the Scholiast. I think it very unlikely that Priscian and the Scholiast would be in agreement in the use of a different source from Apollonius. Whose authority would have had the same weight? In that case we would certainly have to assume that the definition by Apollonius himself was lost already in Antiquity, which I find unlikely. Notice also that Priscian mentions Apollonius in his book on conjunctions (III 95,13f.). It is *a priori* likely that, if Priscian and the Scholiast followed Apollonius in their discussions of the adverb and the preposition, which they did, they did as much in the case of the conjunction.



containing an adverb lacks a verb. The verb has to be supplied, either from the context or from our extra-linguistic knowledge. These three cases are:<sup>141</sup>

-φεῦ and οἴμοι, which depend on a διάθεσις ῥηματική, since people who wonder or complain have previously undergone something;

-ναί and οὐ, which cannot be said unless we have been asked a question (ἔγραψας;)

-εὔ etc. which presuppose an activity to which such an ἐπιφώνησις can refer.

The second text is from Priscian, who offers, of course, only two of the above-mentioned possibilities. He is also aware of the third, but discusses it, as was to be expected of a Latin grammarian, under the heading of the interjection (see chapter IV). Priscianus III 62,16ff. deals with the obligatory presence of a verb with an adverb. He continues (62,18ff.) *quamvis enim ab aliqua persona per se proferantur adverbia, necesse est ea vel ad ante dicta ab alia persona verba referri, ut si quis me interrogaverit "bona est superbia?" et respondero "non", vel per ellipsin dici, ut si recitante aliquo dixerō "bene, diserte, eloquenter": utique enim subauditur "dicitis"*.<sup>142</sup>

Apart from its position, *adv.* 122,13-5 contains another problem. The text runs as follows: καὶ τὸ καταφατικὸν δὲ <καὶ τὸ ἀποφατικὸν>, ἰδίᾳ λεγόμενον, πάλιν πρὸς ἀπαρτισμὸν τοῦ ῥήματος τοῦ λεγομένου παραλαμβάνεται· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν "ἔγραψας;" φωνὴν φημὲν "ναί" ἢ "οὐ".<sup>143</sup> At first sight it would seem that this passage perverts the relationship between verb and adverb, if indeed Apollonius means to say that the adverb syntactically completes the sense of the verb in this case. Schneider's paraphrasis is not very helpful: "*proferuntur tamquam complementa verbi, quod antea interrogantes protulimus*". Moreover, if we look for parallels, the same inversion of the role of adverb and verb seems to be present in *synt.* 349,5f. ἡ ἐπερώτησις ἀναπληρωθεῖσα διὰ τῆς καταφάσεως ὑποστρέφει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὀριστική.

However, both passages can be explained quite satisfactorily in their respective contexts. The lines from *de adverbio* indicate that in the context under discussion, viz. the one-word sentences "yes" and "no" in reply to a

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<sup>141</sup> Cf. chapter IV section 6.3.1.

<sup>142</sup> "For even though adverbs may be uttered independently by someone, it is necessary to construe them either with the words said before by some other person, as when someone having asked me: 'is pride good?' I answer 'no'; or that they are used elliptically, as when I shall say, if someone is reciting: 'well, clearly, eloquently'; for in all these cases 'you speak' is understood."

<sup>143</sup> "Also, the affirmation and the negative, said by themselves, are used in their turn to complete the verb that has been mentioned; for it is in reaction to the word 'have you written?' that we say 'yes' or 'no'."

question, the adverbs do in fact refer to a verb, although it is not expressed in the same sentence as the adverbs, but in the preceding one. These one-word sentences belong to the same class as appreciative comments like *καλῶς* and exclamations like *οἴμοι*. The emphasis is, therefore, on the words *τοῦ ῥήματος τοῦ λεγομένου*. Nevertheless, the *Wortlaut* of the sentence suggests the influence of the other context in which *ναί* and *οὐ* would be discussed, an example of which is *synt.* 346,5ff.

This passage deals with the value of the indicative mood, which is also called *ἀποφατική* (affirmative); the term *ὀριστική* is more specific in that it explicitly points to the declarative, defining illocutionary force, whereas *ἀποφατική* is more general: affirmation can also be expressed by adverbs.<sup>144</sup> Nevertheless, the fact that affirmativeness is an essential characteristic of the indicative, goes unchallenged. For as soon as it loses this characteristic, it stops being a real (declarative) "indicative", and turns into a question.<sup>145</sup> It can be restored to its previous status by giving it back the lacking characteristic, viz. that of affirmation (349,1ff.): ἡ δὴ οὖν προκειμένη ἡ ὀριστικὴ ἔγκλισις τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλουσα μεθίσταται καὶ τοῦ καλεῖσθαι ὀριστικὴ. εἰς γὰρ ἐπέρωτησιν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐγχαρεῖ, ἠνίκα φαμὲν "γέγραφας; λελάληκας;" καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀληθές, φαμὲν οὐ· εἰ δὲ ἀληθές εἴη τὸ γεγραμέναι, φαμὲν ναί. καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἐπερώτησις ἀναπληρωθεῖσα διὰ τῆς καταφάσεως ὑποστρέφει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὀριστικὴ.<sup>146</sup>

Thus, the passage from the *Syntax* means that when a question is supplemented by an affirmation (which is therefore construed with a verb in the

<sup>144</sup> Cf. *synt.* 346,5ff. ἡ ... καλουμένη ὀριστικὴ καλεῖται καὶ ἀποφατικὴ. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι κοινῆς μὲν ἐννοίας εἶχετο <τὸ> καλεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἀποφατικὴν ... ἰδίας μὲντοι ἐννοίας ἔχεται ἡ ὀριστικὴ· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης ἀποφανόμενοι ὀριζόμεθα.

<sup>145</sup> Notice that the mood is linked to a specific speech act here; see Schenkeveld 1984a, 338; 347.

<sup>146</sup> "The indicative mood which we are now discussing, sometimes lays aside its affirmativeness and its right to the name indicative, when it enters into yes-no questions [or rather: 'for it then passes into yes-no questions', I.S.], as when we say gegraphas? ("have you written?") or lelalekas ("have you spoken?"), and if the corresponding affirmation would not be true, we answer ou ("no", "not"), but if it is true that we have written [or spoken] we say nai ("yes"). And so the interrogative, when completed by an affirmative response, turns again into an indicative" (transl. Householder). Cf. *synt.* 164,7ff. καὶ δὴ ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν πάμπολλά ἐστι παρυσιστάμενα, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὀριστικοῖς αὐτὸς ὁ ὀρισμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐξ αὐτοῦ νοουμένην κατάφασιν, ὅπου γε καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐρωτήσεις ἀνθυπαγόμεν τὸ ναί ἢ οὐ ἢ ῥῆμα ὀριστικόν, ὡς ἂν πάλιν ἐγκειμένης τῆς καταφάσεως κατὰ τὰ ὀριστικά. (11) γράφεις; λέγω κατ' ἐρώτησιν, καὶ τὸ ἀνθυπαγόμενον ἐστὶν ἢ ναί ἢ γράφα.

indicative mood-minus-affirmation) it turns back again into an indicative, i.e. into a statement. The adverb *ναί* might here be considered "pure affirmation", an *ὄνομα καταφάσεως*, to create a parallel to *εἶθε* being called an *ὄνομα εὐχῆς* (*synt.* 351,12). Accordingly, *ναί* may be replaced by the verb in the indicative mood, and *ναί γράφω* is felt to be pleonastic (349,7ff.). It is clear, then, that *ἀναπληρωθεῖσα* (*synt.* 349,5f.) does not relate to syntactic completion, but to (a kind of lexical) completion of the semantic value of the indicative, from which something had been taken away in order to turn it into a question.

Whereas the passage from *de adverbio* emphasizes the fact that here, too, there is a verb in the context with which the adverb may be construed, the text from the *Syntax* focuses on the lexical semantic completion of an indicative; the necessary element of affirmation may be made explicit by means of the affirmative adverb.

### 2.2.3. Καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς (*adv.* 123,1-125,5)

In this passage Apollonius again employs the comparison of the relationship between adverb and verb with that of adjective and substantive, this time with a view to the restrictions on the combinations of adverbs with the moods, tenses and persons of the verb.

Once again, the paragraph dealing with *οὐ*, (*ναί* and) *μή* (124,8-14), looks suspicious in its present place. It interrupts Apollonius' argument about the tenses and returns to the combinations of adverbs with different moods. However, I think it wise not to meddle this time, on the assumption that Apollonius has structured this passage rather freely.<sup>147</sup>

Apollonius shows how the fact that some adverbs are bound by combinatory restrictions, may be used to solve cases of *ἀμφιβολία* (123,13ff. (moods); 26ff.; 124,21ff. (tenses)). I will return to this when I discuss the phenomenon of *συνέμπτωσις*. Ambiguity can occur in the use of both the moods and the tenses.

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<sup>147</sup> Dronke suggests to put this paragraph after 123,16 *τύπτεσθε* (see *app.crit. a.l.*). This, however, leaves unexplained SchDTh. 96,6-8 and 272,20-25, both entirely Apollonian in content, where the order is just as strange as in Apollonius. SchDTh. 96,6ff.: *μερικῶς δέ, ὡς τὰ χρονικά· τὸ γὰρ χθές οὔτε τοῖς ἐνεστώσιν οὔτε τοῖς μέλλουσι συντάσσεται, ἀλλ' οὔδὲ τὸ μή τῇ ὀριστικῇ ἐγκλίσει, οὔδὲ ἢ οὐ ἀπόφασις προστακτικοῖς.* SchDTh. 272,20ff.: *<Τὰ δὲ μερικῶς> οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ μόρια, φημί τὰ ἐπιρρηματικά, εὐθετεῖ πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐγκλίσεις· ἰδοὺ γὰρ τὸ ἄγε μόνους προστακτικοῖς συντάσσεται, καὶ τὸ εἶθε μόνους εὐκτικοῖς συντάσσεται, καὶ τὸ εἴαν μόνους ὑποτακτικοῖς· καὶ πάλιν τὸ χθές οὐ δύνασαι τάξαι ἐπὶ μέλλοντος, οὔτε τὸ αὔριον ἐπὶ παρωχητότος, οὔτε τὸ μή ἐπὶ ὀριστικῶν, οὔτε τὸ οὐ ἐπὶ προστακτικῶν.*

Schneider's acrobatics (*comm. a.l.*) in trying to smooth out the argument are ineffective and unnecessary.

The section on the tenses has two distinct parts, the first of which (123,16-124,7) centres on the bipartition of τὰ παρωχημένα versus τὰ μὴ παρωχημένα. Some temporal adverbs can only be combined with past tenses, some are exclusively compatible with tenses that are non-past, and a third category may be combined with either group, since it has a non-specific temporal meaning. If a verb-form (or, for that matter a participle, which strictly speaking forms a part of speech of its own) is ambiguous and may represent either a past or a non-past tense (as e.g. λέγων, "while I am reading, while I was reading"), the combination with certain adverbs allows us to decide which meaning to assign to the verb.

The second part (124,15ff.) takes a closer look at τὰ παρωχημένα. Technically speaking, these include for Apollonius: παρατατικός (imperfect; completely left out of account here); παρακείμενος (perfect); ὑπερσυντέλικος (pluperfect) and ἀόριστος (aorist).<sup>148</sup> The aorist can have the values of both the perfect and pluperfect. One can see which temporal value applies, by looking at the temporal adverb joined to the aorist. For an adverb like πάλαι can be construed with past tenses only, *and not, by the same token, with a perfect.*

The difficulty is obvious. Formally speaking the perfect belongs to the past tenses (124,22), yet it has present meaning.<sup>149</sup> Accordingly, in *synt.* 288,1f. we read that the perfect is an ἐνεστῶσα συντέλεια, denoting τὸ ἅμα νοήματι ἡνυσμένον.<sup>150</sup> Should we indicate the respective tenses on a continuum, the perfect would be very close to the present ("recent past"), while the pluperfect is much "more past".<sup>151</sup>

The recognition of the present value of the perfect is due to the Stoics,<sup>152</sup> who developed a very accurate terminology of the tenses: They combined a word for the position in respect of the present on the continuum (viz. ἐνεστῶς and

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<sup>148</sup> This quadruple division is very common in later grammarians, cf. SchDTh. 403,25f.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. Schöpsdau 1978, 285f.

<sup>150</sup> Skrzecka 1855, 11: "ἅμα νοήματι ἡνυσμένον giebt ... ungefähr die Bestimmung, welche andre durch ἄρτι geben. Cf. SchDTh. 251,1f. καλεῖται παρακείμενος [sc. ὁ γέγραφα] διὰ τὸ πλησίον ἔχειν τὴν συντέλειαν τῆς ἐνεργείας. The value of the perfect is often described as "close to the present": SchDTh. 249,16f. ὁ δὲ παρακείμενος νοεῖται ἀπὸ τοῦ παρακείσθαι καὶ ἐγγυὺς εἶναι τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος τὴν πράξιν αὐτοῦ· δηλοῖ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸ πολλοῦ χρόνου πεπραχθῆαι τὸ πρᾶγμα.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. Müller 1943, 79f. for the difference between the Stoic and the grammatical approach to the tenses.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. e.g. Pinborg 1975, 92ff.

παρωχημένος) with one indicating the extension or completion of the action (παρατατικός and συντελικός).<sup>153</sup> The problem in Apollonius is that he uses the notions past/present and imperfect/perfect alternatively. For he argues that an adverb with the connotation "past" cannot be combined with a present-tense verb. Therefore, πάλαι can be construed with a pluperfect, but not with a perfect. This implies that the perfect is felt as a present-tense verb. The terminological confusion implied is the following: The perfect tense is "present" (124,16), but it is also "perfect", "complete" (124,19). Formally speaking "perfect" falls under the scope of "past". Therefore, it can be upheld of the aorist that ἐμπεριέχει ... τὸ παρωχημένον τοῦ παρακειμένου καὶ τοῦ ὑπερσυντελικού (124,22f.).<sup>154</sup>

The combinatory restrictions of adverbs and the *personae* of the verb are dismissed briefly (125,2-5).

#### 2.2.4. Recapitulation

Having described the structure of Apollonius' discussion of his definition of the adverb I will briefly sum up the methodological means which he employed in this passage:

-a combination of empirical data, immediately acceptable to every user of language, and rational argumentation and tests; both factors are supposed to support each other mutually.<sup>155</sup>

-the comparison of different levels of linguistics or of elements which belong to the same level. This technique was shown to spring from Apollonius' conviction that language is essentially orderly and one. The conception of language as a highly organized system is confirmed by the possibilities it offers to combat its own internal ambiguities.

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<sup>153</sup> Thus, they call the perfect ἐνεστῶς συντελικός, SchDTh. 251,4 (cf. *synt.* 288,1f.). I shall not go into the intricacies of the temporal theory of what we call aspect here. Cf. chapter III, note 18.

<sup>154</sup> "It embraces ... the past tenses of the perfect and the pluperfect." Cf. Skrzeczka 1855, 11; "Das *Perfectum* ... wurde von den Stoikern für ein Tempus der Gegenwart angesehen. Dieser Meinung scheint Apollonius nicht unbedingt beizustimmen, sondern angenommen zu haben [sic] dass durch das *Perfectum* eine Handlung bezeichnet werde, welche der Vergangenheit angehöre, sich aber in der Gegenwart vollende." See also Schöpsdau 1978, 286 n. 22.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 14.

### 2.3. Interpretation

#### 2.3.1. "Ἔστιν ... ἐπίρρημα ... λέξις ἄκλιτος

The adverb's ἀκλισία<sup>156</sup> does not offer any problems of interpretation. Contrary to nouns, verbs, participles and pronouns, adverbs are not susceptible to flexion.

Thierfelder's criticism (1935, 42 n. 1) to the effect that Apollonius neglects the question whether a series like οἴκοι οἴκοθεν οἴκαδε can reasonably be distinguished from a paradigm of declension, is perhaps justified from his point of view. Apollonius considered these forms the result of derivation, not of inflection. Thierfelder implies that Apollonius should have thought more about the fundamental difference, if any, between derivation and flexion. However, this was never an issue, as far as I know, to the ancient grammarians as it is to modern ones.<sup>157</sup> To Apollonius, inflection is coupled first and foremost with the πτώσεις or διαθέσεις/χρόνοι.<sup>158</sup> An adverb has neither and is therefore an ἄκλιτον, even if the relationships existing between some adverbs resemble flexional ones (see above, section 1.2.).

Moreover, Thierfelder's argument is unsound. He finds fault with Apollonius for calling the adverbs ἄκλιτα (= καθ' ἓνα σχηματισμὸν ἐκφερόμενα), but nevertheless talking about ἐξ ἀκολουθου προφορᾶς (*adv.* 201,18f.) as opposed to καθ' ἓνα σχηματισμὸν παραλαμβάνόμενα (*adv.* 202,14). However, neither of the elements that Thierfelder sets against each other here, are used exclusively in the opposition of *declinabilia* to *indeclinabilia*. Καθ' ἓνα σχηματισμὸν ἐκφερόμενα in *adv.* 202,14 does not reflect the principle of ἀκλισία, but expresses the homonymy, the συνέμπτωσις (see section 3.3.) of different τοπικαὶ διαστάσεις. In other words, καθ' ἓνα σχηματισμὸν does not always refer to the indeclinability which adheres to the adverbs by definition, it can also be used in those cases where a word is accidentally used in one form, without its being indeclinable.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Cf. e.g. *adv.* 128,33 καθ' ἓνα σχηματισμὸν (so also 119,7; 120,17f.); *synt.* (e.g.) 47,8; 73,5; 73,7.

<sup>157</sup> Cf. e.g. Schwyzer-Debrunner II 411; I 618f.; Jannaris 1897 (1968), 138 (§ 434); Pinkster 1972, 63ff.; Matthews 1974, 37ff.; Janson 1979, 80.

<sup>158</sup> For words belonging to the domain of the noun and the verb respectively. Cf. *synt.* 325,12ff. To the definition of the verb the clause was added that verbs should signify tense ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις μετασχηματισμοῖς (*GG* II iii 71,38ff.) in order to distinguish them from the temporal adverbs.

<sup>159</sup> See e.g. *adv.* 131,8ff.: δεῖ (and λείπει) + inf. are used καθ' ἓνα σχηματισμὸν, because the infinitive is μονοπρόσωπον (131,6).

Τὸ ἀκόλουθον, on the other hand, is often no more than "the logical, regular, expected form", e.g. *adv.* 167,1-3: dativus τόνω : adverb τόνω :: dativus πόρω : (τὸ ἀκόλουθον) adverb πόρω; 187,33f. παρὰ ... τὴν ἐκεῖνος ... τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἦν ἐκευνόθεν. For ἀκολουθία cf. Steinthal 1891, 346: "Solche zu derselben Reihe, Akoluthie, gehörige Formen bilden die Differenzirungen eines dieser Reihe zu Grunde liegenden Begriffes"; an example is the τοπικαὶ διαστάσεις. It may be noticed in this context that even συζυγία and συζυγεῖν are said of adverbs, not only of local ones, but of any series of adverbs where some regularity of derivation is in evidence.<sup>160</sup> Apollonius represents a period in the study of grammar in which older and vaguer meanings of *termini technici*-to-be are used alongside the more clearly defined, really "technical" meanings, cf. Steinthal 1891, 306: "Ueber den Terminus συζυγία ist zu bemerken, dass er ursprünglich eine weitere Bedeutung hatte, nämlich die Vereinigung in irgend einer Rücksicht zusammengehöriger Formen". The term probably originated in a rhetorical context.<sup>161</sup>

Thus, Apollonius' terminological habits cannot be used to convict him of contradictions. There is, however, another place where the general validity of the ἀκλισία of the adverbs seems to be undermined: in *synt.* 279,12 it is stated that σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ ἐπιρρήματα are indeclinable. Here, however, Apollonius does not intend to say that some adverbs are susceptible of μετασχηματισμός, but rather that some of them semantically share certain verbal categories, such as tense, cf. *synt.* 283,9ff.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> E.g. *adv.* 161,28f. καὶ καθὼς ἀπὸ μιᾶς συζυγίας τῶν ῥημάτων (viz. in -ζω) μία σχέδον καὶ ἡ συζυγία τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων (viz. in -στυ); 172,8; 178,16; 183,10 (the correlative adverbs).

<sup>161</sup> Cic. *Top.* 12 mentions arguments based on *coniugatio*/συζυγία: a συζυγία consists of words with the same origin, but different formation, as *sapiens, sapienter, sapientia*, cf. Quint. 5,10,85 (*coniugatum*); Fortunatianus 116,8ff. Halm. This *coniugatio* reminds one of what Aristotle calls συστοιχία (*Top.* 114a26ff.). Aristotle calls the adverbs belonging in such a συστοιχία "πώσεις", *Top.* 114b33ff.; *Rhet.* 1364b34; cf. 1366b28ff. For rhetorical arguments based on this principle, cf. e.g. *Top.* 118a34ff.; 119a4ff.; 124a10ff.; 151b30ff. (Συζυγία occurs only once in the *Topica* and means "pair" there (*Top.* 113a12).) Varro's assigning the adverbs to two distinct categories, according to the presence or absence of a link with a verbal or nominal stem (*LL VIII* 9; X 14; esp. X 16) may be inspired by the same context. The first category is susceptible to *declinatio voluntaria* (derivational morphology), the second is not (Taylor 1974, 14). Notice that the adverbs which belong to the *genus fecundum* are characterized by being unmarked for cases and tenses, the characteristics of constituents belonging to the nominal and verbal domain respectively. Their "fecundity" goes hand in hand with their being indeclinable in a strict sense. Cf. Elink Sterk 1846, 11; Taylor 1974, 16ff.

<sup>162</sup> *Contra* Lange 1852a, 30 n. 54.

### 2.3.2. Κατηγοροῦσα τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων

The difficulty of this part of the definition rests mainly in the exact meaning of ἐγκλισις and in the question of what precisely is expressed by the words κατηγοροῦσα τῶν ἐγκλίσεων. In *adv.* 120,19-22 Apollonius, as we saw, summarizes his argument about the ἀκλισία of the adverb, at the same time smoothing the way to his discussion of the next part of the definition. The text runs as follows: ὡς δὲ καὶ κατηγορεῖ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων, σαφὲς πάλιν καὶ διὰ τοῦ προκειμένου λόγου, ἐν οἷς πάντα τὰ πτωτικὰ ἐπιθετικά, κατηγοροῦντα οὐ τῶν ὀνομάτων, τῶν δὲ ῥημάτων, ἐπιρρήματα ἐγένετο, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀκλισίαν ἀνεδέχετο.<sup>163</sup>

One can see that Apollonius allows himself simply to substitute τῶν ῥημάτων (120,21) for the more elaborate τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων (120,19).<sup>164</sup> In general it should be noted that Apollonius uses the word ἐγκλισις only once in the discussion of the definition, apart from 120,19 where ὡς ... κατηγορεῖ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων is clearly programmatic (it serves to demarcate the next clause of the definition that will be dealt with). In 123,3 ἐγκλίσεις is named in one breath with the (χρόνοι and) πρόσωπα. This is the passage, where the clause καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς is explained. We read that the capacity of adverbs to be combined with "the verbs" (τοῖς ῥήμασι, 123,1) is limited by their semantic features. If an adverb's meaning is similar to or identical with that of a verbal category (moods (ἐγκλίσεις), tenses, person), it can only be construed with verb-forms which are semantically compatible with it in that category. Only such constructions, we may add, yield a result that is κατάλληλος (see section 1.3.1. above). Should an adverb be unmarked for any category, there are no combinatory restrictions in that respect.

This passage increases our suspicion towards the wording of the definition: τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασι ἐγκλίσεων is again replaced with the simple ῥήμασι; moreover, it seems highly unlikely that ἐγκλίσεις can have the same meaning in the definition itself as here, at the only relevant place in its interpretation where it reoccurs. For in that case Apollonius extends his definition in 123,1ff., by replacing ἐγκλίσεις with the triad ἐγκλίσεις, χρόνοι and πρόσωπα here.

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<sup>163</sup> "And that they say something about the *enkliseis* of the verbs is clear also from the preceding argument; for all adjectives with case-endings that did not say something about nouns but verbs, became adverbs and received their indeclinability." Provisionally, I translate κατηγορεῖν with "to say something about something"; cf. section 2.3.2.2.

<sup>164</sup> So, too, in *adv.* 120,9ff.; cf. further 120,1f.; 121,8; 121,14; 122,21f.; 123,1; and outside the discussion about the definition e.g. 128,14; 141,3; 141,14f.; *synt.* 440,8 *et saep.*



### 2.3.2.1. "Ἐγκλισις"

Steinthal (1891, 275f.) distinguishes three meanings of the word ἔγκλισις:<sup>165</sup>

- "ἔγκλισις ... bezeichnet noch bei Apollonios ganz allgemein Wortbeugung und Wortform, wie κλίσις, ἔγκλιμα, κλίμα, προφορά, ἔκφορά, ἀπόφανσις";<sup>166</sup>

- form of the mood, in other words the morphological category;

-(semantic value of the) mood.

The first-mentioned of these meanings is rare. However, it explains why Apollonius can call the infinitive an ἔγκλισις.<sup>167</sup> Apollonius' definition of ῥῆμα runs as follows (*GG* II iii 70,28ff.): ῥῆμα τοῖνον ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου ἄπτωτον ἐν ἰδίους μετασχηματισμοῖς διαφόρους χρόνους δηλοῦν μετ' ἐνεργείας ἢ πάθους ἢ οὐδετέρου τούτων, προσώπων <τε καὶ ἀριθμῶν *add.* R. Schneider> σημαντικόν, ὅτε καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσεις δηλοῖ.<sup>168</sup> It is evident that the latter part of the definition was added in order to accommodate the infinitive, which lacks the characteristic of "mood" and is, therefore, also devoid of person and number.<sup>169</sup> It has to signify tense and verbal gender only, to qualify as a verb. At the same time, this makes it into the most neutral

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<sup>165</sup> I will not take the use of ἔγκλισις in the prosodic sense into account here.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. the examples of this general meaning in Skrzecka 1853, 4 n. 1 and Schneider *ad adv.* 119,5-6; *synt.* 113,5ff. (ἔγκλιμα (tense, person)); *adv.* 173,24 (κλίμα (tense)). "Ἐγκλισις seems to mean "conjugation" in *synt.* 341,12ff. (although the singular might also stand for the plural, in which case it means "moods"): οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπαρέμφατα πάντως αἰτιατικὴν ἀπαιτεῖ, πῶσιν δὲ τὴν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀριστικοῖς καὶ τῇ ὑπολοίπῳ ἐγκλίσει συντασσομένην. Cf. further *Simpl.* in *Ar. Cat.*, *CAG* 8,37,10ff.: πτώσεις γὰρ τῶν ὀνομάτων οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκάλουν οὐ μόνον τὰς πέντε ταύτας τὰς νῦν λεγόμενας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρακειμένας ἐγκλίσεις ... ὅθεν καὶ τὰς νῦν καλουμένας μεσότηας πτώσεις ἐκάλουν.

<sup>167</sup> Cf. Schoemann 1862, 36 n. 2.

<sup>168</sup> "A verb, then, is a part of speech without cases which indicates in its own conjugated forms different tenses, with activity or passivity or neither, signifying persons and numbers when it also makes clear the dispositions of the soul [i.e. the moods]." To take ὅτε as a "*relativischer Anschluss*" here ("and in that case it also makes clear ...") is unnecessary; moreover it would yield an incorrect sense. Ὅτε + indicative is "when" here, cf. *SchDTh.* 72,15ff. quoted in the next note and *pron.* 9,12f. in the definition of the pronoun; for the meaning *adv.* 129,18; see also section 3.1, note 263.

<sup>169</sup> Cf. *SchDTh.* 72,10ff.: φησὶ δὲ πάλιν προσώπων τε καὶ ἀριθμῶν εἶναι αὐτὸ παραστατικόν, καὶ οὐκ αἰεὶ, ἀλλ' ὅτε καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσεις δηλοῖ, ὃ ἐστὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς βουλήσεις, ἵνα περιλάβῃ καὶ τὰ ἀπαρέμφατα· ταῦτα γὰρ ψυχικὴν βούλησιν μὴ ἐμφαίνοντα οὔτε προσώπων οὔτε ἀριθμῶν ἐστὶ παραστατικά κτλ.

"mood" (in a slightly catachrestic sense).<sup>170</sup> According to Hahn 1951, 3, a verb-form *is* an ἔγκλισις and *has* (if this applies) a διάθεσις (in the sense of ψυχικὴ διάθεσις). This distinction does indeed often work.<sup>171</sup>

As was the case with more *termini technici*,<sup>172</sup> Apollonius' usage fluctuates, the different meanings occurring side by side. Moreover, it is easy to see how close to each other the different nuances may come. The difference between the first and second meaning is somewhat blurred by the fact that a verb-form is never marked for mood alone: In addition it will at least have the features of tense and verbal gender, and in some cases it will be marked for person and number as well.<sup>173</sup>

Thus, the difference between ἔγκλισις "inflected form" and ἔγκλισις "mood-form" cannot always be sharply defined. It is noteworthy that ἔγκλισις and ῥῆμα are very often virtually synonymous.<sup>174</sup> ῥῆμα, too, can mean "inflected form" (= "verb-form"),<sup>175</sup> and it can even come very close to meaning

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<sup>170</sup> Cf. Armbruster 1867, 19ff.; Choer. *GG* IV ii 4,32ff.

<sup>171</sup> However, Steinthal (1891, 280 note) rightly draws attention to the fact that Apollonius' terminology with regard to ἔγκλισις and διάθεσις is hardly rigid. Moreover, if we compare *synt.* 324,10ff. with *adv.* 131,2, it seems Apollonius plays on this terminological freedom to strengthen his argument. In the former passage he defends the status and position of the infinitive as the γενικωτάτη ἔγκλισις. In that context he carefully avoids calling the deficiency of the infinitive "ἔγκλισις", since that would almost amount to an overt contradiction: The γενικωτάτη ἔγκλισις would then be the only ἔγκλισις without ἔγκλισις. However, when Apollonius temporarily wants to undermine the verbal status of the infinitive in order to find support for his view of the construction of δεῖ and χρή, he piles on terms which are usually associated with verbs, only to deny their being applicable to the infinitive. Not only are they devoid of ψυχικὴ παρέμφασις, they are no ῥήματα ἔγκλισεως μεμοιραμένα at all! Cf. chapter IV section 3.2.1.

<sup>172</sup> Cf. above on συζυγία. Other examples are παράθεσις (cf. O. Schneider, 1843, 651) and διάθεσις, which occurs in Apollonius as verbal gender and mood (Steinthal 1891, 275f.); further, it can denote "im Allgemeinen ... ein besonderes Verhalten ... ohne dass dieses als wirkend oder durch eine andere Wirksamkeit hervorgerufen gedacht werden kann" (Skrzecka 1858, 3). It is used for "die spezifisch verbalen Sprachinhalte im Gegenüberstellung zu den nominal bezeichneten", Camerer 1965, 193; *synt.* 354,11 (χρονικὴ διάθεσις).

<sup>173</sup> Cf. for tense *synt.* 354,11: "Ἦδη μέντοι καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐγγυνομένης χρονικῆς διαθέσεως ἐν τῇ ἐγκλίσει διαποροῦσι τινες ...; for verbal genus *synt.* 394,7f.: διαλαβεῖν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐγγυνομένης διαθέσεως καθ' ἐκάστην ἔγκλισιν ..., and a little further in the most general meaning (396,2) ἡ παθητικὴ ἔγκλισις. An ἔγκλισις can be marked for person and number also, cf. *synt.* 290,9ff.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. Skzrecka 1861, 14f.

<sup>175</sup> E.g. *synt.* 327,12

"mood-form".<sup>176</sup> This makes the question why Apollonius went to the trouble of using τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων instead of τῶν ῥημάτων all the more pressing.

The closeness of the second and third shades of meaning distinguished by Steinthal (form of the mood and modal content respectively) rests on what is by now a familiar basis: the Stoic habit, inherited by the grammarians (and by us), of referring to elements of the λέξις and the σημαίνόμενον in the same terminology. Whereas these levels should, strictly speaking, be carefully kept apart, the identity of the terminology used to refer to them facilitates a looser usage.

If ἐγκλις has the wider meaning of *forma per flexionem nata*,<sup>177</sup> it does, it is true, refer primarily to the level of the expression, but I do not see the fundamental difference from a word like πτώσις, which also has a function at both levels of language.<sup>178</sup> I think ἐγκλις itself can also signify the semantic counterpart of the expression. This appears from e.g. *synt.* 290,9ff.: πᾶσαι γοῦν αἱ ἐγκλίσεις, μερισθεῖσαι εἰς πρόσωπα καὶ ἀριθμούς, τὸ ἀκατάλληλον συνελέγουσιν διὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ τῶν προσώπων.<sup>179</sup> Ἀκαταλληλία can only be proved on semantic grounds, so an ἐγκλις, apart from having the formal characteristics of the grammatical categories involved, must also contain their meaning: An ἐγκλις designates person and number as well as tense.<sup>180</sup>

On these grounds I think it likely that κατηγοροῦσα τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων means: "saying something about (modifying) the verbs in their various forms". This paraphrase is meant to bring out the fact that τῶν

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<sup>176</sup> E.g. *synt.* 375,5; zie Skrzeczka *l.c.*

<sup>177</sup> Skrzeczka 1853, 4 n. 1; Steinthal 1891, 320; Schneider *comm.* 138.

<sup>178</sup> See Müller 1943, 47 and 94ff.

<sup>179</sup> "All the finite forms, being characterized for person and number, admit grammatical error in regard to agreement for person and number" (transl. Householder). Since the infinitive is the only ἐγκλις which is unmarked for person and number, it can be freely combined with each person and number; however, since it does share in the features of verbal genus and tense, an awkward combination in that field can cause τὸ ἀκατάλληλον. Cf. *synt.* 352,6ff. (γράφω = πράγμα + συμπαραεπόμεια + ἐγώ); 353,1ff. (γράφω = πρόσταξις + πράγμα + ἀριθμοὶ + πρόσωπα).

<sup>180</sup> Every mood-form automatically coincides with a tense-form. Further, some moods contain a certain temporal semantic value, e.g. the imperative always implicates a future action (cf. *synt.* 96,10f.). See Schenkeveld 1983, 84 (parallel taken from Dionysius of Halicarnassus). Apart from this, there is also a relationship between the actual tense and the mood of a verb, cf. Apollonius' discussion of the problems connected with the optatives and imperatives of past tenses. See *synt.* 354,11ff., cf. Schöpsdau 1978, esp. 284ff.

ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων primarily indicates the semantic contents of the various verb-forms with which an adverb may enter into semanto-syntactical relationships (i.e. the meanings conveyed by the verb-forms). However, there is an undeniable interference from the level of the expression in this definition which still has to be explained. I refer to the emphasis on the different forms (+ meanings) of the same verbs which is caused by the elaborate phrasing of τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων. This problem remains unsolved for now.

Apart from corroborating the interpretation defended here, we should also try to exclude the possibility that ἔγκλισις means "mood" (*modorum vis*) here, since that is by far the most common meaning of the word in Apollonius.<sup>181</sup> This would limit the reach of Apollonius' definition to a small number of adverbs (esp. ἄγε, εἴθε), which more or less have the value of the indicator of a mood.<sup>182</sup> Moreover, the use of κατηγορεῖν would be inappropriate: *aliud est enim convenire h.e. construi cum modis posse, aliud autem edicere aliquid de modis, κατηγορεῖν τῶν ἐγκλίσεων*.<sup>183</sup> And what about the adverbs which are supposed to define the moods καθόλου? This seems a strange way of indicating the adverbs which say something about the action indicated by the verb, a group which would virtually be excluded from the definition in the case of exclusive concentration on the moods.<sup>184</sup> Adverbs of the type ἄγε and εἴθε allowing construction with all moods, are non-existent.

The interpretation of ἐγκλίσις = "moods" can only be defended by demonstrating that "modal" adverbs are of overwhelming importance to Apollonius. However, this is far from evident from the discussion of the adverb, ἐγκλίσις being immediately replaced by a combination of ἐγκλίσις, χρόνοι and πρόσωπα. When it comes to giving examples, the χρονικά ἐπιρρήματα take up by far the most space. Εἴθε is not mentioned at all yet, and ἄγε, οὐ and μή together are dealt with in twelve lines, which seems hardly excessive.

In the passage dealing with the μερισμός of δεῖ and χρή, it is true,

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<sup>181</sup> See e.g. Schoemann 1862, 166f.; 1871, 228f.; Schenkeveld 1984a, n. 140. But cf. Schoemann 1862, 64 for an example of *modus* = "Verbalform"!

<sup>182</sup> Two out of the three groups of adverbs distinguished by Schoemann would thus fall outside the scope of the definition, to wit the ones referring to the action indicated by the verb and the ones which only indicate the emotions of the speaker, Schoemann 1871, 231.

<sup>183</sup> Schoemann 1871, 229.

<sup>184</sup> See Apollonius' examples *adv.* 123,4 (καλῶς and οὕτως).

ἄγε and εἴθε are mentioned twice,<sup>185</sup> but this should not lead to inferences about a special status for "modal" adverbs: *if* δεῖ and χρή are adverbs, they can only be "modal" and would thus be pre-eminently comparable to ἄγε and εἴθε: For just as ἄγε and εἴθε can be μερικῶς combined with the imperative and optative ἐγκλίσεις, δεῖ and χρή would be construed with the infinitive ἔγκλισις only, if they were adverbs.<sup>186</sup> But since the infinitive is the only ἔγκλισις that lacks a modal value (ψυχικὴ διάθεσις), it cannot be construed with a "modal" adverb. Note that there is no objection at all to the infinitive being construed with an adverb.<sup>187</sup> However, since the whole presentation of the problem concentrates on a comparison with the "modal" adverbs, it is logical that other specific categories, such as the temporal adverbs, are not brought into the discussion here. Nor are there any other testimonies to be gleaned from Apollonius' work which would betray a unique position for the "modal" adverbs.<sup>188</sup>

However, there is yet another way to defend Schoemann's interpretation, which I derive from the study of Schenkeveld on the distinction of the grammatical moods.<sup>189</sup> Schenkeveld analyses the way in which the Stoic λεκτά were thought to be represented on the level of the expression. Partly, of course, there were the grammatical moods, which were, however, fewer in number than the different kinds of λεκτά. In principle this is irrelevant, since there is no

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<sup>185</sup> *Adv.* 128,21f.; 131,21 (in the latter passage ἐγκλίσεις does mean "moods"; see section 2.3.2. Cf. *synt.* 334,3; 336,1f.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. *synt.* 334,3.

<sup>187</sup> E.g. *adv.* 124,4ff.: a χρονικὸν ἐπίρρημα can be decisive for the correct interpretation of an infinitive (which, being a ῥῆμα, is marked for tense; cf. *synt.* 295,4ff.).

<sup>188</sup> A survey of the remaining places where ἄγε and εἴθε are discussed in the *Syntax*, yields the following result: *synt.* 284,4f. there is nothing exceptional in ἄγε and εἴθε being mentioned, because the χρονικὰ ἐπίρρηματα were discussed just before this passage. Nine times εἴθε and/or ἄγε are mentioned without other groups of adverbs (e.g. the χρονικά) being taken into account as well (*synt.* 350,6-351,13; 353,1ff.; 353,14-354,1; 359,1; 360,18; 365,6ff.; 371,2; 372,12; 474,9). Twice the reverse is the case (*synt.* 294,11ff.; 317,2ff.). With the exception of *synt.* 474,9, however, all these passages belong in the discussion of the moods in book III of the *Syntax*. It is only to be expected that attention is paid in such a context to the modal adverbs; this proves nothing as to their hypothetically exceptional status. The same goes *mutatis mutandis* for the position of the temporal adverbs in *synt.* 294,11ff.: συνέμπτως of the tenses can be solved by means of temporal adverbs. On the other hand, there is no reason why the modal adverbs should not have been mentioned in *synt.* 317,2ff., if they really were so essential to Apollonius' theories on the adverb.

<sup>189</sup> Schenkeveld 1984a. Apollonius' definition is discussed *ibid.* 344ff. and note 140.

one-to-one correspondence between the expressions and the λεκτά. One expression could represent different λεκτά. However, the counterparts of the Stoic λεκτά can also be found among other kinds of speech than the verb, more specifically, in that group of adverbs which σημαίνονμενον ἐγκλίσεως ἐπιδέχεται, "take up the meaning of a mood", and in expletive particles.<sup>190</sup> Thus, it might be argued that modal adverbs like ἄγε and εἴθε can function as representatives on the level of the expression of the Stoic λεκτά προστακτικά or ἀρατικά; they would, in other words, perform much the same task as the imperative and optative moods.

The argument for taking ἔγκλισις in our definition as "moods", derived from the Stoic speech-act theory, would have to be something like the following: Once one tries to establish which elements correspond with the several λεκτά on the level of the expression, it becomes imperative to find such a correlate for each and every λεκτόν. It would be convenient if Apollonius' definition aimed at just these modal adverbs, since they "would form a good candidate for the parallels to the *lekta* we were looking for".<sup>191</sup>

Although Schenkeveld's conclusions on the necessity of finding correlates for all λεκτά are in themselves justified, and although he is right, too, in looking for these correlates not only among the possibilities offered by the verb, but also in the other parts of speech, I doubt whether it is necessary to connect Apollonius' definition of the adverb with a speech-act theory. The following arguments tell against such a connection:

In the first place the adverbs were distinguished relatively late. Pohlenz thinks this happened under the influence of the Alexandrian grammarians who tried to attain completeness in their description of language.<sup>192</sup> Their aims in the study of grammar differed from those of the Stoa.<sup>193</sup> This makes it unlikely that the adverb was considered primarily as a means to fill out open places in a speech-act theory.

However, this does not prove anything about the way the Stoa handled this part of speech once they themselves had accepted it. More important, therefore, is the fact that here of all places, in the expressions for order or prayer/wish,

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<sup>190</sup> Schenkeveld 1984a, 346.

<sup>191</sup> Schenkeveld 1984a, 344. This goes, indeed, for words like μά and ναί, but not for ἄγε and εἴθε, as will be argued below.

<sup>192</sup> 1939, 167 (= Kl. Schr. 55) and 182 (= Kl. Schr. 70); see also Schoemann 1862, 11.

<sup>193</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 5, who adds that this need be no reason for a difference in method.

the speech-act theory did not have any lacunas. It is true, there is no one-to-one relationship between sentence types and illocutionary forces in the Stoa; one expression may have more than one illocutionary force - but, conversely, it stands to reason that once an expression was found to correspond to a particular illocutionary force in a natural and satisfactory way, there would have been no urge to look for alternatives. There was no specific need to trace a correlate expression for the speech acts of order and wish, because there were separate ἐγκλίσεις with just that function.<sup>194</sup>

It might be argued that ἄγε would be relevant to a speech-act theory, because it solves cases of ambiguity - this is true, but it does not entail the interpretation ἐγκλισις = mood. For ἀμφιβολία may be resolved also by means of temporal adverbs, as we saw.

In generalizing my preceding point, I would maintain that, whatever the function of ἄγε and εἴθε in a speech-act theory may be, this should not preclude us from accepting the wider sense of ἐγκλισις in the definition.<sup>195</sup> For ἄγε and εἴθε "with the meaning of a mood" also fit in very well with the looser interpretation. On the other hand, the narrower meaning of ἐγκλισις means that we have to assume that Apollonius neglects all other adverbs in his definition, an unattractive solution indeed. As I said at the beginning of this section, Apollonius should have the benefit of the doubt.

Thus, ἐγκλισις does not mean "mood" or "mood-form" in our definition. It primarily signifies the inflected forms of the verb, and, like so many grammatical terms, it may also be used to designate the meaning conveyed by such a form. If ἐγκλισις itself can also signify the semantic level of the expression,<sup>196</sup> the combination with the verb κατηγορεῖν becomes less objectionable (see above). For, if ἐγκλισις means *forma per flexionem nata*, the use of κατηγορεῖν would have fitted badly.<sup>197</sup> Evidently, an adverb does not predicate something of the word-form of the verb, but it says something of the action described by the

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<sup>194</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld 1984a, 341: "They [sc. the Stoics] will have recognized the imperative and the optative as such, too". It is true that adverbs such as ἄγε and εἴθε were probably felt to contribute something important to a speech-act theory because they were, as it were, nothing but an indicator of the illocutionary force, since they lacked any context-independent lexical value of their own (cf. e.g. *synt.* 351,12 εἴθε is as it were an ὄνομα εὐχῆς).

<sup>195</sup> It should be noted that the Stoics, too, accorded both a wider and a narrower meaning to ἐγκλισις, cf. Schenkeveld 1984a, 336f.

<sup>196</sup> Even without this being added explicitly as in SchDTh. 292,4 τὰ δηλούμενα τῶν ἐγκλίσεων are annihilated by the addition of ἄν. (Camerer 1965, 176 translates "... die Modusendungen, deren Sinn aufgehoben wird".)

<sup>197</sup> Schoemann 1862, 166; cf. Schneider *comm. ad adv.* 119,5.

verb. However, this objection is no longer valid if we consider what was said above: It might even be upheld that it can be inverted. The fact that one cannot regularly *κατηγορεῖν* the form of a given word, may be taken as a clue to the fact that ἔγκλισις cannot signify the word-forms only. I need not, however, insist on this point. Instead I will turn to the term *κατηγορεῖν* itself:

### 2.3.2.2. *κατηγορεῖν*

*Κατηγορεῖν* occurs seven times in *de adverbio*; six of the seven places are to be found in the discussion of the definition.<sup>198</sup> In the *Syntax* it also occurs seven times, in various parts of the work. Apart from the verb, the noun *κατηγορήματα* is found three times, always in the reproduction of Stoic tenets.<sup>199</sup> Now, this state of affairs is in itself remarkable, the more so if we take into account the relative size of both works. Apart from that, the six cases of *κατηγορεῖν* in the discussion of our definition together with one case from the *Syntax* differ markedly from the rest.

Baratin (1978, 208) sketches the development of the meaning of *κατηγορήματα* as follows: "Le terme *κατηγορήματα* est réduit à désigner non plus ce qui est affirmé d'un sujet, mais ce qui est affirmé d'une chose quelconque, ce qui en est dit ... ce qui lui correspond du point de vue sémantique ... et par là finalement ce qu'une chose signifie ..." Now, it would seem that in the discussion of the definition, *κατηγορεῖν* is used in a more "old-fashioned" way than elsewhere: although the wider sense is appropriate everywhere, the complement of *κατηγορεῖν* in this group is always the word for another part of speech, as is its subject too, in most cases. Thus, in these passages *κατηγορεῖν* refers to semanto-syntactical relationships.<sup>200</sup>

In the other passages from the *Syntax* and the remaining one from *de*

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<sup>198</sup> Cf. in a similar context MichSyn. 1208ff. *κατηγορικά ... τῶν ῥημάτων*.

<sup>199</sup> These data are based on the Index by Schneider, which is not very reliable. *Synt.* 403,1 (= 281,28 B.) the word does not occur. Schenkeveld (1984a, 337) points out that in this case, too, Apollonius confuses *σημαῖνον* (*ῥήματα*) and *σημαινόμενον* (*κατηγορήματα*).

<sup>200</sup> *Adv.* 119,5; 120,5 (exceptional because in this case the subject of *κατηγορεῖν* is not the word for a part of speech, but ὁ λέγων); 120,9f.; 120,19; 120,20f.; 122,33f. [of these cases 119,5 is the definition itself; 120,19 repeats the clause from the definition and 122,33f. picks up the same phrase in conclusion of the section]; *synt.* 91,7 (example: ὁ Τρύφων γραμματικὸς ἐγένετο): καὶ σαφές ὅτι τὰ ῥήματα κατηγοροῦντα τοῦ ἐπιθετικοῦ εὐλόγως τὴν τοῦ ἄρθρου σύνταξιν παρέλειπετο.]



*adverbio*,<sup>201</sup> κατηγορεῖν indicates what a word tells us about either its lexical meaning or its other παρφυσιτάμενα,<sup>202</sup> the extra information a word conveys.<sup>203</sup> It is significant that in Herodian the "modern" meaning is virtually the only one attested.<sup>204</sup>

The concentration of instances of the less obvious use of κατηγορεῖν in a grammatical context of Apollonius' day looks suspicious. It might corroborate Schenkeveld's view (1984a, 344) that Apollonius' definition of ἐπίρρημα vaguely reflects the Stoic opinion of these words: they considered the adverbs as a part of the ῥήμα, because it was interpreted as a part of κατηγορήμα. This would also fit in well with the explanation of the Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax who explained the clause πιθεμένη κατὰ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων with the words ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ἐπίρρημα κατηγορημά φασιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι (SchDTh.

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<sup>201</sup> This passage (*adv.* 204,6ff.) in reality also belonged to the *Syntax*, cf. Schneider *comm. ad adv.* 201,1-210,5.

<sup>202</sup> Cf. Blank 1982, 32.

<sup>203</sup> *Synt.* 91,1f.: εἰ ... τὰ ῥήματα πρώτης κατηγοροῖη ποιότητος (*quae primum de qualitate aliqua loquuntur eamque quasi inducunt*, Uhlig *a.l.*); 36,8: τὸ τῶν ἢ τοῖν ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον οὐχ ἑνὸς γένους κατηγορεῖται (N.B. if γένος is taken to mean "a noun of a certain gender" this case may be numbered among the first group; I think it more likely, however, that the phrase means "τῶν etc. do not signify one specific gender" (and therefore it is unlikely that articles have been invented in order to make the gender of nouns explicit); 53,18: πάντοτε οὖν τὸ ἄλλοι συνέξει τὸ ἄρθροι, ἤνικα τοῦ κατηγορουμένου πλήθους ὄλου ἐστὶν ἐμπεριληπτικὸν τὴν τε διαίρεσιν πάλιν μερικτὴν ποιεῖται; 61,15ff.: (ἀμφοτέροι by itself indicates that something is known; therefore, it does not need an article) τὸ γὰρ "ἀμφοτέροι μέμασαν πολεμίζειν ἢδὲ μάχεσθαι" (H 3) κατηγορεῖ τῶν ἐγνωσμένων (viz. Hector and Paris). This may mean either "the sentence tells something about ...", or "ἀμφοτέροι (in this sentence) says something about ..."; 278,7 (on the alleged conflict of genders within the words ἐνδέκατος or ἐνδεκάτη): οὐ δὴ οὖν παρὰ τὸ εἰς ἐδύνατο τὰ τῆς συνθέσεως ἐγγίνεσθαι, ὅτι μὴ κατηγορεῖτο καὶ τὸ θηλυκόν (subj.) ("because in that case it could not have been used to say something of feminine words"): οὐδὲ μὴν παρὰ τὸ μία, ὅτι μὴ συγκατηγορεῖτο καὶ τὸ ἀρρενικόν; 437,2ff.: οὐ δὴ οὖν τὰ ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ λόγου ἐξαιρέτου συντάξεως ἔτυχεν, ἵνα πρὸς τὸ μεταπιθέμενον κατηγορηῖ ("betray") καὶ τῆς μεταθέσεως; *adv.* 204,16ff.: καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ κύκλω οὐ διὰ τῆς παραγωγῆς τὴν εἰς τόπον σχέσιν σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ καθὸ καὶ τὸ κύκλος κατηγορεῖ ("signify"!)" σχέσεως τοπικῆς.

<sup>204</sup> In Herodian, κατηγορεῖν always designates the relationship between signifier and denotatum; a word "κατηγορεῖ" an extra-linguistic entity. It can always be translated by "to signify", or, passive, "to be applied to, used for". E.g. *GG* III i 38,31 τὰ εἰς ὧν θηλυκὰ μὴ ἐπὶ πόλεων κατηγορούμενα ὀξύνεται; 123,4f. τὰ εἰς -λιος ὑπερτρισύλλαβα προπαροξύνεται, εἰ μὴ ὀρνέου κατηγοροῖη ...; 123,20; 195,15f. τὰ διὰ τοῦ -τερος τριβράχεια τότε βαρύνονται, ὅτε πυσματικὴν ἔνοιαν ἔχοι ἢ ἐκ δύο προσώπων ἓν τι τὸ κατηγορήμα ποιεῖται, πότερος ... ἕτερος ("when one word is made to signify two persons"). In *GG* III ii 909,25f. κατηγορεῖν means "to accuse of faultiness and reject".

95,19f.). The frequent comparison of adverb and adjective is another indication of Stoic influence,<sup>205</sup> which Apollonius adapts to his own purposes: Whereas to the Stoics the quasi-adjectival status of the adverb was a sign of their falling short of being an independent part of speech,<sup>206</sup> to Apollonius the similarity of the relationship of adverb to verb with that of adjective to noun fits in with his general ideas on the symmetry and regularity of language, without bringing him to the same conclusion.

Returning to *κατηγορεῖν*: it goes without saying that a Stoic terminological reminiscence in this word need have no repercussions on the interpretation of *ἔγκλισις*.

### 2.3.3. καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς

Apollonius' explication of the phrase *καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς* is perfectly straightforward and completely in accordance with his theory of grammatical (in)correctness explained above: Whenever an adverb has a semantic value similar or identical to that of a verbal category (mood, tense, (number), person),<sup>207</sup> its possible combinations with a verb are restricted to those forms which are semantically compatible with the adverb in question. Only those combinations can be styled *κατάλληλος*. If an adverb is unmarked for any category, then there are no syntactic restrictions in that respect. This principle is worked out in the *Syntax* (see also above section 1.3.1.) (316,10ff.): *ἐδείξαμεν ... ὡς οὐδὲν μέρος λόγου γίνεται ἀκατάλληλον ἐν ᾧ μὴ διεκρίθη, ὡς τὰ ἐπιρρήματα ἐν ἀριθμῷ, χωρὶς εἰ μὴ αὐτὰ δηλώσειεν ἀριθμόν, οὐδ' ἐν διαφόροις χρόνοις, χωρὶς εἰ μὴ αὐτὰ πάλιν διαστείλειε χρόνον, ὡς ἐν τῷ χθές, αὐριον καὶ ἄλλοις οἷς παρεθέμεθα.*<sup>208</sup> In this passage, the examples are

<sup>205</sup> Cf. Prisc. II 54: [*Stoici*] *quasi adiectiva verborum ea* (sc. the adverbs) *nominabant*. Cf. *adv.* 120,2; 120,7f.; 120,20ff.; 123,6ff.; 125,22ff.; 126,9ff.; Schneider *comm.* 139.

<sup>206</sup> Cf. Schoemann 1862, 157f.

<sup>207</sup> E.g. *ἄγε* (*ὄνομα προστάξεως synt.* 353,2) is identical to the modal content of ordering; *χθές* (*synt.* 489,7) is related to the temporal concept "past", but in addition to the information provided by a past tense, it indicates which point in the past one is talking about.

<sup>208</sup> "We have ... shown that no part of speech can be ungrammatical in respect of a category which it fails to distinguish [better: for which it is unmarked (*διεκρίθη* is passive), I.S.], e.g. adverbs cannot be wrong in regard to number unless they are numerical adverbs, nor in tense unless they are time-distinguishing adverbs like *chthes* ("yesterday"), *aurion* ("tomorrow") and the rest that we mentioned" (transl. Householder).

limited to the categories of number and tense, but mood, too, is often mentioned: in *synt.* 282,1-285,5 Apollonius declares that ἐπιρρήματα denoting something temporal cannot be construed with every tense, and ἐπιρρήματα denoting something modal cannot be construed with every mood. As we saw, in the passage from *de adverbio*, Apollonius does not restrict himself to giving examples of possible combinations, but proceeds to show that the use of certain adverbs can be decisive for the interpretation of ambiguous verb-forms (*adv.* 123,13-6): λέγετε is ambiguous, but if combined with ἄγε it can only mean an imperative; 123,26-124,7:<sup>209</sup> the forms of present participle and infinitive are identical to those of "imperfect" participle and infinitive: the use of a χρονικὸν ἐπίρρημα can be decisive for the interpretation; 124,21-5: an aorist can have the value of either a perfect or a pluperfect. In this case, too, the use of a certain χρονικὸν ἐπίρρημα can determine the choice.

Not only can an adverb help decide in cases of ambiguity, its influence can reach even farther (*synt.* 350,4ff.): (if one employs τὰ τῆς εὐχῆς ἐπιρρήματα παραστατικά with an εὐκτική ἔγκλισις) μήποτε τὰ τῆς συντάξεως δόξη κατὰ παρολκτὴν ἔχειν τὰ συνόντα ἐπιρρήματα, καθὸ ἡ ἔγκλισις δυνάμει ἐγκείμενον ἔχει τὸ εἶθε (ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εἶθε ἔγραψε Τρύφων, εἶθε ἐλάλησε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τῷ δέοντι παράκειται τὸ εἶθε, ἵνα ἡ ὀριστικὴ ἔγκλισις διὰ τοῦ παρακειμένου εὐκτικοῦ ἐπιρρήματος εὐκτικὴν σύνταξιν ἀναδέξῃται· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς διαφέρει τὸ ἔγραψεν Τρύφων τοῦ εἶθε ἔγραψεν Τρύφων):<sup>210</sup> there are cases where the addition of the modal adverb changes the modal value.

In short, an adverb governed by the μερικῶς-clause does not only suffer the negative consequences of this state of affairs, in that it is barred from some constructions by its semantic characteristics, there is also a positive side: it defines an aspect of the meaning of a ῥῆμα. A temporal adverb can determine the temporal meaning of a verb (πάσαι + aor.);<sup>211</sup> a modal adverb can

<sup>209</sup> The χρονικὰ ἐπιρρήματα are partly construed with certain tenses, partly - their meaning being indefinite - with every tense (e.g. νῦν and ἤδη). Cf. for the κοινὴ παράτασις τοῦ παντός χρόνου *synt.* 284,2f. and 489,10f. [τὸ νῦν] χρόνου ἐστὶ τοῦ γενικωτάτου ἐμπεριεκτόν, οὐ τέμνον τὸ ἐπιμεριζόμενον τοῦ χρόνου, διῆκον μέντοι δι' ὅλου and the commentary of Uhlig.

<sup>210</sup> "Perhaps this structure may seem to involve redundancy because of the accompanying adverbs, since the mood already contains the same force as *eithe* (in sentences like *eithe egrapse Tryphon* ["I wish Tryphon had written!"], *eithe elalese* ["would that he had spoken!"]) it is clear enough that the *eithe* is necessary, in order to make the indicative mood function in the optative construction, by means of the presence of the optative adverb. For obviously, there is a big difference between *egrapsen Tryphon* ("Tryphon wrote") and *eithe egrapsen Tryphon* ["If only Tryphon had written!"]" (transl. Householder).

supplement or emphasize the modality of a verb-form (εἴθε + opt.), determine it (ἄγε + an ambiguous form like λέγετε), or change it (εἴθε + ind. praet.).

Adverbs determining a verb καθόλου may be combined with all the forms of such a verb, because they lack any semantic connection with a verbal category, and are thus safe from incompatibility.<sup>212</sup> Since these adverbs have nothing in common with any of the characteristics of the verb *qua* verb, they determine the common mean of all forms of any one verb, in other words the πράγμα, cf. *synt.* 351,8ff.: *χρῆ μέντοι νοεῖν ὡς διαφέρει ἢ ἐκ τῶν ῥημάτων εὐκτική ἔγκλισις τῆς ἐπιρρηματικῆς τῷ τὰ μὲν ῥήματα μετὰ τοῦ συνόντος πράγματος σημαίνειν τὴν εὐκτικὴν διάθεσιν· τὸ γὰρ γράφοιμι εὐχὴ ἐστὶν πράγματος τοῦ γράφειν καὶ τὸ φιλολογοῖμι τοῦ φιλολογεῖν, τό γε μὴν εἴθε σχεδὸν ὄνομά ἐστὶν εὐχῆς· οὐ γὰρ συμπαρίσταται καὶ τὸ ἐν τίνι τὰ τῆς εὐχῆς.<sup>213</sup> This tells strongly in favour of Skrzeczka's conjecture, *adv.* 122,26 (in the discussion of the example ὁ καλῶς ἄνθρωπος γράφει; the adverb cannot be interposed between article and noun, unless it can be construed with a μετοχή), *δυναμένη καὶ τὸ γένος μηνῦσαι καὶ τὸ π<ρᾶγμα>*, ὅπερ ἐπιζητεῖ τὸ ἐπίρρημα.<sup>214</sup>*

The preponderantly semantic interest of Apollonius is reflected in this part of his definition of the adverb, which is a very good illustration of the principles expounded in the first sections of this chapter: What we call syntax, is a part of the σημαίνόμενον of the words involved. There is no autonomous syntax in Apollonius. Syntax is part of ἔννοια (cf. note 13 of this chapter). Thus, Apollonius can state explicitly (*adv.* 123,2; 123,6) that adverbs are construed with verbs σημασίας οὐκ ἀντικειμένης, ... τῆς φράσεως ... οὐκ ἀντιπιπτούσης.<sup>215</sup> The same principle comes to the fore even more strongly a few lines below (*adv.* 123,10f.): καὶ τινα τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων εἴργεται τῆς

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<sup>212</sup> Cf. *synt.* 316,10ff. quoted above.

<sup>213</sup> "We should note that there is a difference between the optative meaning conveyed by the verb form and the adverbial one in that the verbs signify the event-or-action along with the attitude (illocutionary force, *diathesis*) of wishing - so *graphoimi* ("I hope to write") is a wish for the act of writing, and *philologoimi* ("May I study") for the act of studying - but *eithe* is no more than [or rather: "so to speak" (σχεδόν) I.S.] a word for "wish" with no indication in it of what is being wished for" (transl. Householder). Cf. also *synt.* 352,6ff. καὶ ἔτι τὸ ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸ γράφω, καθὸ μετὰ πράγματος καὶ τῶν συμπαραπομένων τὸ γράφω ἐγκείμενον ἔχει τὸ ἐγὼ; *pron.* 23,19f. For πράγμα, cf. note 256.

<sup>214</sup> Cf. also *adv.* 121,25f.; see Lange 1852a,15ff. on Apollonius' theory of the μετοχή.

<sup>215</sup> Cf. for φράσις = "meaning" e.g. *pron.* 55,26; *adv.* 186,5; *coni.* 214,11 (where it may also mean "context").

συντάξεως ἔνεκα τοῦ σημαυνομένου.<sup>216</sup> Cf. *synt.* 284,4: the adverbs ὅσα σημαυνόμενον ἐγκλίσεως ἐπιδέχεται<sup>217</sup> are thereby subject to syntactic restrictions. Semantic features therefore entail syntactic consequences.

It is remarkable that nowhere the combinatory restrictions holding between certain (groups of) verbs and certain adverbs are mentioned.<sup>218</sup> However, O. Schneider 1845, 457ff. believes that such restrictions are given for the τοπικὰ ἐπιρρήματα and their σχέσεις: "denn, um ein Beispiel zu geben, da ποῦ wo? τῆν ἐν τόπῳ σχέσιν bezeichnet, so kann es nicht mit Verbis verbunden werden, die τῆν εἰς τόπον σχέσιν bezeichnen; fragt also jemand nach dem Ziele einer Bewegung und sagt ποῦ ἔρχεται, so wird diese Verbindung widerlegt (ἐλέγχεται) durch das topische Adverbium ποῦ, welches seiner Bedeutung nach eintreten muss, wo eine σχέσις εἰς τόπον vorliegt, und so die ἀκαταλληλότης einer solchen Verbindung beweiset" (458). Apollonian as this sounds, nowhere is the relationship between the (lexical) meaning of the verb and the acceptability of an adverb discussed by Apollonius himself, not even in the passage which O. Schneider quotes in support of his statements (*adv.* 205,10ff.). The ἀκαταλληλότης is based on the fact that an adverb (εἴσω) is employed in a meaning for which a separate adverb exists (ἔνδον) κατ' ἰδίαν μόνον σημασίαν<sup>219</sup> (*adv.* 205,13f.). Apollonius does not mention why a certain σχέσις τοπική would be obligatory. What matters is that a κατάχρησις, as the use of one adverb instead of another would be, is justified only when a more correct form, which could be applied as ἔλεγχος, is lacking.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> "And some of the adverbs are barred from construction because of their meaning."

<sup>217</sup> "Which take up the meaning of a mood".

<sup>218</sup> As in Latin grammar, see note 46 of this chapter.

<sup>219</sup> "In that one particular meaning".

<sup>220</sup> Cf. for the local adverbs in -ω also *adv.* 195,23ff. The emendations of Schoemann and Schneider (cf. Schneider *comm. a.l.*) have led to the following text: τὰ εἰς ω λήγοντα ἐπιρρήματα σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ καὶ τὸ εἰς τόπον ...: λέγω δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα. <ᾶ> ἀπὸ προθέσεως ἐσχημάτισται, ἰσοσυλλαβεῖ μὲν [μάλιστα] ταῖς προθέσεσιν, ἐὰν ὡσι δισύλλαβοι, μιᾶ δὲ πλεονάζει, εἰ εἶεν μονοσύλλαβοι, <ἐν> λήξει τῇ εἰς σ ἢ φύσει ἢ δυνάμει. This is no improvement compared to the text as constituted by Bekker. What does ὅτι μάλιστα mean? The examples of non-local adverbs in -ω to be found in 165,20ff. make one suspect that adverbs in -ω are not "mostly" local. The phrase <ᾶ> ἀπὸ προθέσεως ἐσχημάτισται suggests that there are also different derivations (which is true), without it becoming clear why only the adverbs derived from prepositions should be discussed here. In fact, it is almost exclusively the adverbs in -ω derived from prepositions which are local. "Almost exclusively", because a word like κύκλω (165,20) can also be considered as

And now it seems we have finally found the reason for the expression τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων: The fact that Apollonius is concerned solely with the combinatory restrictions between adverbs and certain forms of the paradigm of verbs, and not between adverbs and (semantically determined) groups of verbs,<sup>221</sup> may be the reason for the elaborate phrasing τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων. This represented Apollonius' intentions more exactly than τῶν ῥημάτων *tout court* would have done, since the latter expression would have left open the possibility that we have just excluded.<sup>222</sup>

#### 2.3.4. ὦν ἄνευ οὐ κατακλείσει διάνοιαν

On this final part of the definition Schoemann remarks (1862, 167): "In dem Schlusssatz der Definition bedeutet κατακλείειν διάνοιαν wohl nicht dasselbe wie κατακλείειν λόγον: denn dann wäre er wenigstens sehr überflüssig, da sich dies von jeder Wortgattung, ausser dem Verbum, von selbst versteht: er scheint sagen zu wollen, dass das Adverbium für sich allein keinen abgeschlossenen Sinn habe, sondern sich immer an ein Verbum anschliessen müsse, um richtig verstanden zu werden".

In itself, this seems a reasonable enough supposition, but in practice it cannot be upheld. The clause ὦν ἄνευ κτλ. was added to the definition in order

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having local value. Cf. 204,10ff. τὰ εἰς ὦ λήγοντα ἐπιρρήματα, ἡνίκα μὲν ἀπὸ προθέσεως παρῆκται, πάντως ἐστὶ τοπικά ... ἡνίκα δὲ ἀπ' ὀνομάτων, τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος σχέσιν παραλαμβάνει ἐπιρρηματικῶς νοουμένην ... καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ κύκλω οὐ διὰ τῆς παραγωγῆς τὴν εἰς τόπον σχέσιν σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ καθὸ καὶ τὸ κύκλος κατηγορεῖ σχέσεως τοπικῆς. Cf. further 204,19f.; SchDTh. 277,25ff. τινὰ δὲ δύο (sc. σχέσεις τοπικὰς δηλοῦ) ... ὡς τὰ εἰς ὦ παρὰ πρόθεσιν γεγυότα. So, too, SchDTh. 277,30ff. (Generally speaking, local meaning is often connected with derivation from prepositions, cf. *adv.* 154,3f. τὰ παρὰ πρόθεσιν παραγόμενα τῶν εἰς θεν ληγόντων κοινῇ χρῆται σημασία κατὰ τὴν τοπικὴν ἐκφορὰν). Thus, one should read with Bekker (and A) ..., λέγω δὲ ὅτε μάλιστα ἀπὸ προθέσεως ἐσχημάτιται ("especially when they are derived from prepositions"). ἰσοσυλλαβεῖ μὲν κτλ. For ὅτε, cf. note 168.

<sup>221</sup> This fits in with the principle of "word-grammar" as set forth by Donnet (1967, 39f.): "Les grammairiens traitent de questions de syntaxe, mais leurs réflexions, loin d'être centrées sur la fonctions grammaticale, sont dominés par des catégories qui relèvent de la morphologie ou, en tout cas, de la description du mot pris isolément." An example (1967, 40) is Apollonius' demonstration of the fact that a verb is construed with a specific case by showing that different tenses, moods and persons of such a verb all go with that same case (*synt.* 432,9ff.).

<sup>222</sup> The fact that in the discussion there are various less exact substitutions for the clause of the definition need not bother us here: As soon as this part of the definition comes into sight, the compact, but less exact form (123,1 τοῖς ῥήμασι) is immediately worked out by the triad ἐγκλίσεων, χρόνοις, προσώποις. In the rest of the discussion economy has won.

to subsume under the adverbs those words, too, that are to all appearances able to form independent utterings (the ἐπιφωνήσεις etc.).<sup>223</sup> Apollonius also draws attention to the existence of such a group in *synt.* 13,4ff. where the parts of speech are compared to vowels and consonants: the independence of vowels is shared by verbs, nouns, pronouns and the adverbs ἄπερ ἐπιλέγεται ταῖς γινομέναις ἐνεργείαις, ἤνικα ἐπιφθεγγόμεθα τὸ κάλλιστα τοῖς κατὰ τὸ δέον τι ἐνεργοῦσιν, ἢ ὑγιῶς ἢ καλῶς.<sup>224</sup> These words have a lexical semantic value of their own, even when they are uttered without an embedding construction, and they thus differ from the parts of speech which can do nothing but συσσημαίνεω (*ibid.* 14,2). - But, as Apollonius remarks *adv.* 121,4ff., in these cases the adverb does in fact belong with a verb as well, be it an unexpressed one: αἱ ἐπιφωνήσεις οὐδὲν ἄλλο εἰσὶν ἢ ἐπιρρήματα τῶν ῥημάτων <οὐκ> ἐπιγινόμενων.<sup>225</sup>

Thus far, there is nothing to contradict Schoemann's interpretation. However, if we take a look at *adv.* 120,25-121,4, a passage manifestly dealing with this part of the definition, we get into trouble. Apollonius declares that, just as adjectives always need a noun, τὸν αὐτὸν αἰεὶ τρόπον ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι ῥῆμα μὲν δίχα ἐπιρρήματος συγκλείων λόγον, ἐπίρρημα δὲ οὐ μὴν δίχα ῥήματος ἢ μετοχῆς, ἥτις δυνάμει ιδίωμα ἔχει τὸ τοῦ ῥήματος. καὶ οὐ τοῦτό φημι, ὅτι αἱ μετοχαὶ ἀπαρτίζουσι διάνοιαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰ ἐπιρρήματα καὶ ἐπὶ μετοχᾶς φέρεται.<sup>226</sup> Here, it is obvious at once that Schoemann's distinction between διάνοιαν and λόγον does not hold water: ἀπαρτίζειν διάνοιαν and συγκλείειν λόγον must either be synonymous in this passage, meaning "to complete the thought", or ἀπαρτίζειν διάνοιαν (121,3) should mean what Schoemann calls κατακλείειν λόγον and, vice versa,

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<sup>223</sup> See Schneider, *comm.* 141 and 147 *ad adv.* 127,14 for the interpretation of 121,24-6 of Schoemann and Schneider. Cf. section 2.2.2.1. of this chapter. One could rightly wonder if the inclusion in a definition of a clause which must seem irrelevant to the majority of adverbs is justified, but this, of course, is another matter entirely.

<sup>224</sup> "When they can be applied to actions in the situational context, as when we shout *kallista* ("very well" - i.e. "bravo") at performers who are doing something just right, or *hugios* ("soundly") or *kalos* ("well")" (transl. Householder). Cf. Prisc. III 114,9ff.

<sup>225</sup> "Exclamations are nothing but adverbs without accompanying verbs."

<sup>226</sup> "... in the same way one can imagine a verb which completes the sense (i.e. effectuates grammatical completeness) without an adverb, but not an adverb completing the sense without a verb or a participle, which virtually has the same characteristics as the verb. And I do not claim that participles complete the sense (i.e. can complete a sentence), but that adverbs may be construed with participles as well."

συγκλείειν λόγον (121,1) what according to him is κατακλείειν διάνοιαν. For, whereas it is perfectly in order to state that μετοχαί cannot complete a sentence,<sup>227</sup> it cannot be upheld that they leave the meaning of the adverbs unclear or unfinished.<sup>228</sup>

As far as I can see, συγκλείειν (κατακλείειν, συνέχειν, ἀπαρτίζειν) (τὸν) λόγον in Apollonius never means "to give (a word) a finished, complete meaning" (except when this meaning is included in the wider one). This makes it all the more likely that συγκλείειν λόγον and ἀπαρτίζειν διάνοιαν are synonymous, meaning *sententiam efficere*, "to complete the sense (and the sentence)" (cf. Schneider, *comm.* 140, in his Latin paraphrase).<sup>229</sup>

There is yet another point: Schoemann upholds that an ὧν ἄνευ-clause in the interpretation which is defended here, would be supervacuous, because it applies to all parts of speech but the verb, and is, therefore, irrelevant to the definition of the adverb. I think, on the contrary, that its addition is especially relevant in the case of the adverb. It will be remembered that the use of κατηγορεῖν may have been prompted by the historical view of the adverb as part of the verb. It may well be that here we have to do with another trace of the same state of affairs.<sup>230</sup> Nor would our definition be the only one in which the

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<sup>227</sup> A participle is not marked for person (*synt.* 113,3f.) or mood (*synt.* 292,11ff.; 432,14ff.).

<sup>228</sup> A participle does have πρᾶγμα, cf. *adv.* 122,26 and cf. note 256.

<sup>229</sup> This is a perfectly normal meaning of (κατακλείειν) διάνοιαν, cf. (συγκλείειν) *synt.* 90,14f.; 333,10; (ἀπαρτίζειν) 430,4.

<sup>230</sup> The almost exclusive concentration on the construction of adverb and verb, to the neglect of the combinations of adverb with noun, adjective or adverb, may be occasioned by this same historical development. Schoemann mentions the absence of these possibilities as a weakness of Apollonius' definition (1871, 228), but acknowledges the fact that Apollonius shares this deficit with his contemporary colleagues. The fact that Apollonius was not quite unaware of these constructions appears e.g. from *synt.* 73,5ff.; 85,5ff.; 453,3f.; 488,10ff.; 490,2; *pron.* 15,23ff.; cf. *GG* II iii 36,17ff. φασὶ γὰρ, ὅτι τὰ ἐπιρρήματα ἢ ῥήμασι θέλει συντάττεσθαι ἢ σπανίως ὀνόμασιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ "μὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν", "νῆ τὸν Δία ..."; SchDTh 258,13ff. Cf. Egger 1854, 199 on Apollonius' analysis of a comparative form into μᾶλλον plus a form of the positive degree (e.g. *synt.* 327,4f.). In later grammarians it was more generally recognized. MichSync., who depends on Dionysius Thrax in his list of the meanings of the adverbs, arranges this list on the principle of whether the adverbs in question are construed with a noun or a verb, starting with those which are construed adnominally. (The rest of his order corresponds with that of the *Techne*, with two minor exceptions, to wit the place of the τοπικά (motivated 1510ff.) and the refinement of separating the ἐπιρρήματα τάξεως terminologically from the ἐπιρρήματα χωρισμοῦ δηλοῦντα (1425f., cf. SchDTh. 100,9)). Nicetas of Herakleia (XI/XII Cent. A.D.; text in Boissonade *AG* II 340-93; cf. Tovar 1969) goes to the opposite extreme of concentrating on the adnominal



grammarian stressed the distinction between verb and adverb. The same goes for the definition of the verb, which is expressly said to indicate tense ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις μετασχηματισμοῖς, an addition<sup>231</sup> which can best be explained as an attempt at differentiation from the adverb.<sup>232</sup> Therefore, it is relevant, too, that the clause purporting that verbs alone can bring about grammatical completeness, should be added to the definition of especially the adverb. This is one of the major differences between the way adverbs and verbs can κατηγορεῖν. Therefore, I reject Schoemann's opinion that this clause is a superfluous addition.

Apollonius' choice to include this stipulation in his definition did cause him some problems as well. Its adoption explains why the participles, which can very well be construed with an adverb, as Apollonius realises,<sup>233</sup> have to be smuggled in more or less through a backdoor. The ὦν ἄνευ-clause seems to prevent their explicit mention in the definition.<sup>234</sup> It is never sufficient to add a participle to an ἐπιφώνησις in order to κατακλείειν διάνοιαν.<sup>235</sup> If Schoemann had been right, there would have been no reason for Apollonius to omit the participle from his definition. We now understand why Apollonius emphatically adds in *adv.* 121,3: οὐ τοῦτό φημι, ὅτι αἱ μετοχαὶ ἀπαρτίζουσι διάνοιαν<sup>236</sup>

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constructions to the complete exclusion of the more normal one (1054ff.).

<sup>231</sup> The Stoic definition of ῥῆμα runs: 'Ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον ἀσύνθετον κατηγορημα (D.L. VII 58). It does not contain any stipulations about tenses. In this respect the Stoa seems to take a conscious stand against Aristotle, who defines the verb as "φωνή συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ μετὰ χρόνου ἧς οὐδὲν μέρος σημαίνει καθ' αὐτό" (*Poet.* 1457a14f.). Apollonius could hark back to this.

The interpretation of ἀσύνθετον is a matter of dispute. According to Schmidt 1839, 44f. ῥῆμα is every verb-form outside the context of a sentence; Pohlenz thinks ἀσύνθετον is meant to bring out the difference with a predicate consisting of copula plus noun (1939 *Kl. Schr.* 53); cf. Forschner 1981, 70. Müller 1943, 51 takes it, rightly, I think, as the verbal part of the κατηγορημα, i.e. as the κατηγορημα without the πλάγαι πτώσεις which may form part of it.

<sup>232</sup> Cf. section 2.3.1. note 158.

<sup>233</sup> Cf. *adv.* 120,13f.; 121,4; 122,25ff.; 123,26ff.

<sup>234</sup> For the position of the μετοχαὶ in Apollonius' system, cf. Lange 1852a, 15ff. It may not be irrelevant to mention the fact that the participle was originally looked upon as an ἐγκλισις ῥήματος as well (cf. Steinthal 1891, 217; Priscianus II 549,1 *modum verbi casualem*).

<sup>235</sup> Cf. the way in which it is admitted after all that an ἀντωνυμία can form a complete sentence if combined with a verb (*synt.* 17,15ff.), whereas strictly speaking only a noun can achieve this.

<sup>236</sup> This does not contradict *synt.* 115,11ff. (esp. 13f.). Καθίσταται τὸν λόγον has been dealt with in 112,1ff. Here, Apollonius is interested in the construction ὁ ... (participle) οὗτός ἐστιν.

- a clear echo of the definition, and why he finds it necessary to remark in 122,24-30 that, whenever an adverb belongs to a participle, one will find that with the participle there will in turn be construed a verb in order that the sentence may be completed.<sup>237</sup>

If the antecedent of ὧν is ἐγκλίσεων, we are left with the problem of the infinitive, which strictly speaking cannot κατακλείειν διάνοιαν any more than the participle, cf. *synt.* 333,1ff.: οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐξ ἀπαρεμφάτου σύνταξις κατακλείει λόγον, εἰ μὴ ἀναπληρωθεῖη δι' ὧν ἀπαρέμφατός ἐστι.<sup>238</sup> A partial solution is to have ὧν refer to ῥήμασι,<sup>239</sup> the word-order is no objection.<sup>240</sup> This is, of course, a makeshift solution, since one is still confronted with the problem that not every ῥήμα that may be accompanied by an adverb, is able to complete a sentence. However, since it is very common to say that ῥήματα fulfil this function, the problem is at least less acute if we construe the relative this way. I plead emergency-philology.

#### 2.4. *The syntax of the adverb: adv. 125,6-126,23*

The discussion of the ἔννοια of the adverb is not complete until Apollonius has explained the correct position (σύνταξις) of the adverb *vis à vis* the verb. This discussion is related to the question whether the name ἐπίρρημα, interpreted as "word placed before the ῥήμα" (cf. Schneider, *comm. a.l.*), is correct. Apollonius admits that the adverb can be put before and after the verb - even in that case the adverb's name could be defended on the strength of the parallel with αὐτὸς ἐπιταγματική. But then he rules that the πρόταξις is the more correct position. And so we are presented with another succinct example of the function of the work of the grammarian. For in daily usage we find πρόταξις as well as ὑπόταξις (125,19f.), and we might therefore easily be led to believe that the relative position of adverb and verb is indifferent. But if we really do believe this, another ὑπερβατόν has escaped us. This is one of those cases where the empirical data of everyday usage clash with the results produced by the *ratio*. For Apollonius can demonstrate that the πρόταξις is correct and proceeds to do so by offering us the parallel construction of noun + adjective: Here, too, the adjective should come first. However, Apollonius realizes that this

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<sup>237</sup> ... πάλιν καὶ ῥήμα συγγενήσεται ὑπὲρ τοῦ συγκλεισθῆναι τὸν λόγον.

<sup>238</sup> "The construction with an infinitive cannot be a complete sentence unless those things are supplied whose lack makes it non-finite" (transl. Householder).

<sup>239</sup> So e.g. Egger 1854, 189.

<sup>240</sup> See Schneider, *Tractatus* 161.

parallel by itself may not be accepted as proof<sup>241</sup> and tries to corroborate it by means of a combination of empirical data - derived from Homer - and a new

<sup>241</sup> It is interesting to see how Apollonius anticipates a criticism here which elsewhere he himself extends to his predecessors: *adv.* 188,11ff. he mentions Trypho's explanation of forms like ἀμφοτέρωθεν, which contrast with the other adverbs in -θεν in that their penultimate syllable does not contain the same vowel as the genitive of the noun they derive from (or, if the genitive ends in a diphthong, its first vowel) (here an -ο). Trypho gives an *ad hoc* rule, to which Apollonius reacts: μήποτε δὲ βίαιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζητουμένου ἢ ἀπόλυσις ἐστι. [ἀπόλυσις, "solution", is rare, cf. *adv.* 185,11 and SchHom. B 12-4]. This is the principle of the vicious circle, well-known from Pl. *Meno* 79d2ff. onwards, especially to the sceptics but also to the Stoa (cf. Mates 1961, 83 and n. 95), cf. S.E. *PH* I 61 ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου κατασκευάζειν ἐπιχειρεῖν. In *PH* I 164 Sextus discusses the five τρόποι of the younger Sceptics which lead to ἐποχή. The name of the fifth is ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος which is described in § 169: ὁ δὲ διάλληλος τρόπος συνίσταται ὅταν τὸ ὀφείλον τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος εἶναι βεβαιωτικὸν χρεῖαν ἔχη τῆς ἐκ τοῦ ζητουμένου πίστεως. The *termini technici* for this kind of indecisive argument are ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος or ὁ διάλληλος λόγος (*PH* I 36). This terminology is found in the Stoa, too (*SVF* II 90,29): ὅπου γε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς καλεῖται τις διάλληλος λόγος, ὅς ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος· οἷον ποῦ Θεῶν οἰκεῖ; ἔνθα Δίων, καὶ ποῦ Δίων; ἔνθα Θεῶν· πέρας αὐτοῦ (= τοῦ διαλλήλου λόγου) οὐδὲν γίγνεται, ὅταν τὰ σημεῖα τοῦ πράγματος δι' ἀλλήλων συγκατασκευάζηται. [For ἀπεράντος, cf. Mates 1961, 82.]. This is a description of mutual implication, which may be considered a special case of circularity, cf. Ar. *An.Post.* 72b36ff. Circularity usually involves at least three elements (not necessarily syllogisms). However, consider the following three arguments:

- (1) (a > b) > (b > a)
- (2) ((a > b) and (b > c)) > (a > c)
- (3) ((a > b) and (b > a)) > (a > a)

If there are only two elements, as in (1), one can construe a three-element argument (cf. (2)) by substituting (a) for (c) in (2); the result is (3). Thus, one can conclude that a is true, if a is true (a,b,c, = propositions).

The *petitio principii* is not only found in the Sceptics and the Stoa, but it is described also in ApD., to wit in *pron.* 50,20 and at our place (*adv.* 126,2). In both cases the *ad hoc*-meanings given in LSJ are unnecessary: the technical meaning fits. *Pron.* 50,20 deals with the question of the correct spelling of ἐγώ(ν), with or without a final ν. Some people argue that the ν is a pleonasm, because τῷ is spelled without one, and πάντα ... ἀντωνυμία εἰς ν λήγουσα κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον, πάντως καὶ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον. However, this is circular in that one of the implied premisses anticipates knowledge of the conclusion: The underlying argument runs: If a pronoun ends in ν in the first person singular, it also ends in ν in the second person singular; second person τῷ does not end in ν; therefore, first person ἐγώ does not end in ν. However, it is impossible to ascertain whether the major is true, before the form of ἐγώ has been established: *petitio principii*. The same holds good for our passage, where there are two unknown factors, to wit the position of the adjective in relation to the noun and that of the adverb in relation to the verb. Since the major premiss states that adjective is to substantive as adverb is to verb, the question whether or not the adverb precedes the verb is the same as the question whether the adjective precedes its noun. The *petitio principii* is committed in this case by assigning a certain value to the minor ("the adjective precedes the noun"). Apollonius tries to circumvent the circularity by providing independent proof for this latter assertion. Notice the expression τί γὰρ μάλλον Α ἢ Β.

demonstration (ἀπόδειξις, 126,6): The ἀπόδειξις consists of testing the effect of adding the article to a combination of adjective and noun.<sup>242</sup> If the adjective precedes the noun, all is well, but if it follows it, the article has to be repeated. This is held to prove that the pre-position is the more normal. Only then does Apollonius return to the ἐπιρρήματα and add a test that is appropriate to that part of speech, viz. the position of the adverbial interrogative.

This text is a mini-demonstration of the "Kriterien der Sprachrichtigkeit" which Apollonius takes into account: reason, daily usage and the authority of the tradition - in this case it is the triad from the study of ἑλληνισμός that we recognize.

### 2.5. Recapitulation; Apollonius and the Stoa

In summing up, I again draw attention to those elements in the definition where Apollonius, consciously or not, makes a stand against his Stoic predecessors, or betrays their influence.

A trace of undiluted Stoic terminological influence might be seen in Apollonius' use of κατηγορεῖν in the definition and the ensuing discussion. This is perhaps best explained as an (unconscious?) reminiscence of the semanto-syntactical function the Stoics accorded to this kind of words: they formed part of the predicate.

Far more important are the points on which Apollonius disagrees with the Stoics, or adapts their doctrines, the most glaring instance being the independence of the adverb as a part of speech in its own right.<sup>243</sup> This independence is stressed by the stipulation added to the definition of the verb, that verbs signify tense ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις μετασχηματισμοῖς, a characteristic which was absent from the Stoic definition of the verb. This clause finds its counterpart not so much in the adverb's ἀκλισία, but rather in the adverb's potential lexical temporal meaning. On the other hand, the definition of the adverb stresses the fact that adverbs, as opposed to verbs, cannot by themselves complete a sentence. No matter how long the emancipation of the adverb had been effectuated by Apollonius' time, I submit that traces of the discussion can still be found.

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<sup>242</sup> Notice that ἐκ τῆς πολλῆς χρήσεως refers to *Homer's* regular practice. Here one can see once again that the empirical component of Apollonius' work should be analysed in material taken from daily life and traditional attestations.

<sup>243</sup> Antipater did recognize the μεσότης as a sixth part of speech. The recognition of the adverbs is not due to Apollonius; what I am concerned with here, is the way he still shows traces of building a case, irrespective of who started building it.

In the discussion of the definition we noticed how Apollonius integrated concepts borrowed from the Stoa into an entirely new context. The similarity of the adverb and the adjective is no reason for him, as it may well have been for the Stoa, to deny the adverb its independence; rather, he employed it in the context of the symmetrical and isomorphic build-up of language. Thus, it becomes an argument for the syntactic behaviour of the adverb, of its optionality (120,22ff.), its being construed *μερικῶς* (123,5ff.) or its regular position before the word it belongs with (125,22ff.).

### 3. Μερισμός

The discussion of the definition of the adverb is followed by a section (*adv.* 126,27-145,25) on words of which the adverbial status is dubious. Since it is imperative to Apollonius that each word is assigned to its proper part of speech (*μερισμός*)<sup>244</sup> - the parts of speech being the methodological framework of a word-grammarian - he discusses these problematic cases at length. What is more, such a procedure was apparently not unusual. All the cases discussed seem to have been an object of attention to Apollonius' predecessors, too (cf. *φασι*, *adv.* 126,27). Twice Apollonius explicitly refers to Trypho, in the discussions of *ἐκρητι* and *ὑπόδρα*. After Apollonius, the same problems are mentioned in our sources. Positions have often been taken up by this time, a particular point of view being brought forward without discussion.<sup>245</sup>

Apollonius usually structures his treatment of these problems as a *disputatio in utramque partem*.<sup>246</sup> The problem is mostly stated in simple terms from the outset: the word in question is either an adverb or another specific part of

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<sup>244</sup> *Μερισμός* can refer to three things, the assignment of a word to its proper word-class (1), the decision on how many and which words are formed by a group of letters (2), and, as the name of a grammatical work, the so-called *ἐπιμερισμός* or *σχέδος*, cf. Lehrs 1843, 126ff.

<sup>245</sup> Apart from the references mentioned by Schneider, see on *δεῖ* and *χρή* *Et.G.* 569,46-570,17; *Et.M.* 814,57f.; on *ἐκρητι* *Et. G.* 175,58; *Et.M.* 321,44ff. (this is not Apollonius' point of view); *ὑπόδρα* *Et. Or.* 157,6, representing the view of Philoxenus (second half of the first century B.C), cf. *adv.* 139,7-11; *πύξ* *Et. G.* 487,33; *Et.M.* 695,52. *πύξ* and *λάξ* are examples of the *ἐπιρρήματα ποιότητος* in DTh. (75,1) - the problem Apollonius brings forward, is not touched upon there; *πέντε κτλ.* *Et. G.* 172,18ff. (*κοινότης*); (*Et.M.* 290,42ff.); 305,21ff. (*κοινότης*); *ὄφελον* *Et. M.* 643,44ff., s.v. *ὄφελος* and *ὄφελον*; *ἀκέων* *Et.G.* 25,17ff.; 604,43; *Et. M.* s.v.; *Et. Or.* s.v.; *ἄνεω* *Et. G.* 48,4; *Et. M.* 105,16ff.

<sup>246</sup> This also was a structuring principle for Varro, cf. Fehling 1956, 268. However, Dahlmann 1964, 73ff., points out that Varro informs us about the views of other people *in propria persona*.

speech. Usually Apollonius begins by listing the arguments for the μερισμός favoured by his opponents (συνηγορία, *synt.* 334,1). It is not unlikely that the strategy for defending the rejected μερισμός is often also Apollonius' own.<sup>247</sup> These arguments being refuted, Apollonius proceeds to state his reasons for a different μερισμός. The passage dealing with the status of δεῖ and χρή is a good case in point.

### 3.1. Δεῖ and χρή; *disputatio in utramque partem* (*adv.* 128,10-133,12)

The question is whether δεῖ and χρή are adverbs, as is generally held (128,11), or verbs, as Apollonius thinks they are (129,16). This alternative is not stated all at once in this case.<sup>248</sup>

Apollonius starts by stating the ἀφορμὴ πλείστη, the many reasons, which can be adduced to defend the position that δεῖ and χρή are adverbs. This advocacy of the devil consists of two parts, one positive, the other negative in character. Apollonius first sums up three reasons why δεῖ and χρή should be considered adverbs (ἐκ συντάξεως, 128,13) and then adds two more to reject the possibility that they are verbs. In this passage the applicability of the definition of the adverb is the main criterium. It makes the transition from the positive to the negative part of the argument more fluent, in that Apollonius cites clauses of the definition not only throughout the positive part of the argument, but also in the beginning of the negative part. The discussion may be analysed as follows; I add the relevant clause of the definition:

Δεῖ and χρή are adverbs:

a) 128,13-4 ὅτι ἐπίκειται τὰ ἐπιρρήματα τοῖς ῥήμασιν (definition: κατηγοροῦσα τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων);<sup>249</sup>

b) 128,15-6 ὅτι μετὰ πτωτικῆς συντάξεως καὶ τῶν συνόντων ῥημάτων λόγον ἀποτελεῖ (definition: ὧν ἄνευ οὐ κατακλείσει διάνοιαν);<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld 1982, 253 n. 27.

<sup>248</sup> It is implied in 128,24 ἢ ... ἐν ῥήμασι σύνταξις (vs. τὰ δὲ ἐπιρρήματα, 129,4) and in the argument brought forward in 129,9-15, which is meant to combat the view that δεῖ and χρή are verbs (129,15 οὐ ῥήματα). In *synt.* 334,5ff. the additional possibility of δεῖ and χρή being σύνδεσμοι is discussed and rejected, and in *synt.* 335,5ff. that of their being infinitives.

<sup>249</sup> "Because the adverbs go with the verbs" - as δεῖ and χρή go with the infinitive.

<sup>250</sup> "Because (adverbs) complete the sentence in combination with a case and the accompanying verbs" - as δεῖ and χρή do in sentences like Ἀπολλώνιον χρή γράφειν.

b') 128,16 προτασόμενον ... ὑποτασόμενον (cf. 125,6-7 καὶ ἐν ὑποτάξει ... καὶ ἐν προτάξει);<sup>251</sup>

c) 128,21 καὶ μερικώτερον γε, καθότι καὶ τὸ ἄγε ἐπίρρημα τοῖς προστακτικοῖς καὶ τὸ εἶθε τοῖς εὐκτικοῖς (definition: καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς).<sup>252</sup>

Δεῖ and χρή are not verbs:

d) 128,23ff. They are καθ' ἓνα σχηματισμόν for the category of "person" (definition: ἄκλιτος);<sup>253</sup>

e) 129,9ff. Whenever two ἐγκλίσεις are construed together, they are a ῥῆμα προαιρετικόν, a *verbum cupiendi*, and an infinitive. Δεῖ and χρή are construed with an infinitive. Therefore, either they are *verba cupiendi* or they are not verbs at all.<sup>254</sup>

Apollonius then refutes each of the arguments mentioned above. His main point is the position of the infinitive as an ὄνομα πράγματος,<sup>255</sup> providing an ὀνοματικὴ κατηγορία τοῦ πράγματος.<sup>256</sup> The refutation of all five arguments of the opposing party is based on this nominal character of the infinitive.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> "In pre-position ... in postposition" - δεῖ and χρή can come either before or after the infinitive they are construed with.

<sup>252</sup> "And their construction is partial (with part of the forms of the verb), just as the adverb ἄγε goes with (ἐπίκειται) the imperatives and εἶθε with the optatives" - The construction of δεῖ and χρή is restricted (μερικῶς), in that they are combined with infinitives only.

<sup>253</sup> The argument runs thus: if verbs are construed with an infinitive (as a complement), they are still conjugated for person; adverbs construed with an infinitive are not marked for person. Δεῖ and χρή are unmarked for person, when construed with an infinitive. Therefore they are adverbs (and not verbs).

<sup>254</sup> The last step, the statement that δεῖ and χρή are no *verba cupiendi*, and thus cannot be verbs, remains implicit.

<sup>255</sup> 129,17; cf. Skrzeczka 1861, 15ff.

<sup>256</sup> 129,20. The term κατηγορία may be Stoic in origin, cf. Schoemann 1871, 239 n. 4. Camerer 1965, 193 neatly translates ὀνοματικὴ κατηγορία τοῦ πράγματος as "nominale Aussage (-form) über den (Verbal-) Inhalt". Cf. Nuchelmans (1973, 49f.) on πρᾶγμα: "an asomatic action or passion which is held to be true of some agent or patient, of a body or *soma* by which the *pragma* is caused"; see section 2.3.2.2.

<sup>257</sup> There can be no doubt, however, that Apollonius still considered the infinitive to be a verb, cf. 129,17f.: the infinitive is τὸ γενικώτατον ῥῆμα τὸ παρυφιστάνον τὸ οὐκ ἐγγυόμενον ἐν προσώποις, and his discussion in the *Syntax* (320,1-346,2). Skrzeczka 1861, 16 remarks: "Dass ... Apollonius den Infinitiv

Δεῖ and χρή are verbs:

*versus* a) 129,16-21: Starting-point of Apollonius' argument and at the same time an implicit rejection of the first argument of the opposition: each infinitive is an ὀνομαστική κατηγορία τοῦ πράγματος, and therefore an unqualified assignment of the infinitive to the verbs will not do. Δεῖ and χρή do enter into constructions with the infinitive, but not in its quality of verb, but rather in that of a ὡς πτωτικόν.

*versus* b) 129,21-131,2: The question in this case is: in what way do δεῖ and χρή form complete constructions, as adverbs or as verbs? Argument b) of those in favour of an adverbial δεῖ and χρή suggests that the construction of δεῖ or χρή plus an accusative and an infinitive should be analysed as that of an adverb plus a πτωτική σύνταξις plus a verb, resulting in a complete sentence. Apollonius counters this analysis by taking δεῖ or χρή as the verb, the infinitive as the πτωτική σύνταξις in the nominative case and the accusative as the "object" of the verb. He checks the validity of his analysis by substituting the indubitable verb λείπει for δεῖ in the sentence δεῖ Ἀπολλώνιον περιπατεῖν and the manifest noun ὁ περίπατος for τὸ περιπατεῖν. The resulting sentence λείπει Ἀπολλώνιον ὁ περίπατος does not strike one as particularly neat Greek,<sup>258</sup> but that is, again, not what is aimed at: the sentence has the advantage of an entirely perspicuous syntactic and semantic structure-it serves as the semantic representation of the problematic construction.

In anticipation of his reaction to argument e), which will be dealt with more fully in 132,3-14, Apollonius now remarks that δεῖ is characterized by a διάθεσις ἑλλειπτική (130,4), a transitive disposition signifying that something is lacking.<sup>259</sup> I suspect that it was this analysis of the meaning of δεῖ and χρή that induced Apollonius to offer a second way of construing these words.<sup>260</sup> He suggests that we can also say δεῖ Ἀπολλώνιος τὸ γράφειν, the verb δεῖ being construed with a πτωτική σύνταξις in the nominative and an infinitive in

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nicht vollständig dem Nomen gleichgestellt, sondern immer an seiner verbalen Natur fest gehalten hat, geht auch schon daraus hervor, dass er ihn ὄνομα ῥήματος, nicht etwa ὄνομα ῥηματικόν nennt".

<sup>258</sup> But cf. LSJ s.v. λείπω A I 3 b, Hom. χ 119 ἀνὰρ ἐπεὶ λίπον ἰοὶ ὀσπεύοντα ἀνακτα ... ("fail"). The difference is, of course, that ἰοὶ can be counted, whereas περίπατος cannot.

<sup>259</sup> Cf. *adv.* 119,8ff. and Schneider *comm. a.l.*

<sup>260</sup> The text of 130,9ff. is uncertain; I follow the reconstruction by Schneider.



the accusative case. This construction is not attested in Greek,<sup>261</sup> but it is not difficult to realize how Apollonius came to think of it. Δεῖ and χρή share the characteristic of indicating an ἔλλειψις τοῦ πράγματος (130,7f.) with the προαιρετικά and the εὐκτικά. For these by themselves do not express the πράγμα either, but this has to be substituted in the form of an infinitive, the ὄνομα τοῦ πράγματος. Now, Apollonius takes these infinitives to be in the accusative case (cf. *adv.* 132,7f., where προαιροῦμαι ἀναγινώσκειν is held to be the equivalent of προαιροῦμαι τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν).<sup>262</sup> Apollonius has probably projected this normal construction on δεῖ and χρή. The resulting Greek is dubious.

*versus* d) 131,3-19: The ἀκλισία of the verbs δεῖ and χρή for the category of "person" is caused by the fact that the infinitive - which is μονοπρόσωπον (131,6) - is construed with it in the nominative case: In such a construction all verbs would be μονοσημάτιστον (131,11), as is demonstrated by means of λείπει. The ἀκλισία, therefore, is accidental.

*versus* c) 132,2-3 (cf. 129,23-4): To invalidate the equation of the relationship holding between δεῖ/χρή + infinitive and ἄγε + imperative, for instance, Apollonius harks back to 129,16-21: The infinitive is the only mood which does not express modality, because it indicates τὸ οὐκ ἐγγινόμενον ἐν προσώποις.<sup>263</sup> Therefore, it is not a combination of (modal) adverbs (δεῖ/χρή) plus mood (infinitive) that we have to do with, but rather we are confronted with a case of ῥήματα (δεῖ/χρή), συντασσόμενα ὡς ὀνόμασι (the infinitives).

*versus* e) 132,3-14: The construction of the *verba cupiendi* is also based on the fact that the infinitive has the value of a nominal expression (the ἴδια ὀνομασία, 132,6) of the πράγμα of a verb. Therefore, this construction should not be looked upon as consisting of two ἐγκλίσεις either - which invalidates the major premiss of argument e). Rather, the *verba cupiendi* are also construed with an ὡς πτωτικόν. Notice the comparison of the προαιρετικά with δεῖ and χρή,<sup>264</sup> and cf. *versus* b).

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<sup>261</sup> Perhaps there is some influence from the personal construction πολλοῦ δέω + infinitive; cf. LSJ s.v. δέω B 2.

<sup>262</sup> Cf. *GG* II iii 88,39-89,30.

<sup>263</sup> "Das noch nicht an Personen sich zeigende" (transl. Skrzeczka 1861, 12). Cf. the definition of ῥήμα (*GG* II iii, 70,28ff.): ... προσώπων <τε καὶ ἀριθμῶν> σημαντικόν, ὅτε καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσεις δηλοῖ.

<sup>264</sup> 132,3-4 καὶ τὰ προαιρετικά.

All the arguments based on construction and meaning (syntax, cf. 132,13-4) having been enervated by the infinitive's quasi-nominal status, Apollonius proceeds to add two compelling reasons why δεῖ and χρῆ should be verbs. These reasons have to do with the form of the words. The first (132,15-23) is based on the fact that only to verbs can an augment be added. Since this is possible with δεῖ and χρῆ, too, they must be verbs.<sup>265</sup>

The second reason is the ending of δεῖ (132,24ff.) on the one hand, which can be explained as a contracted verbal ending, but has no adverbial parallel with the *circumflexus* and κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν ἔθος (132,27),<sup>266</sup> and the constitution of the form χρῆ (132,31ff.) on the other. Since in the foregoing discussion δεῖ had been the main focus of attention throughout, Apollonius first formally states that χρῆ is synonymous to it. The form is then explained as an ἀποκοπή from χρῆσι.<sup>267</sup> This implies that the imperfect should have been ἔχρη; however, it is ἔχρηῖν and this is remarkable because of its accent and its final ν, although the latter phenomenon is paralleled in ἦν.

### 3.2. Μετάληψις

Having seen a meristic problem being solved by means of a *disputatio in utramque partem*, let us look at another important aspect of the way Apollonius tackles such problems. As I pointed out in sections 1.4.4. and 1.5., arguments derived from the form of a word are held to be inferior to those derived from its meaning, which is related to the way it combines with other words, its syntax. In order to establish the semantic contents of a word, Apollonius frequently uses the technique of μετάληψις, the translation of a word into synonymous expressions.<sup>268</sup> Thierfelder (1935, 42) rightly points out, that

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<sup>265</sup> Apollonius ignores the possibility of inflection for other moods and tenses, maybe because they do not occur in Homer?

<sup>266</sup> "According to common usage." This remark was added because of Doric πεῖ. The accent was mentioned because of adverbs such as ἀθειέι, ἀμελεί, cf. Hdn. *GG* III ii 464,19ff.; 469,10.

<sup>267</sup> This assumed πάθος is supported by a parallel, according to Apollonius' professed methodological rules, cf. *adv.* 140,8: The burden of proof rests with those who assume any pathological changes. For a practical example cf. *adv.* 135,3ff.; 140, 8-30.

<sup>268</sup> For the classification of μετάληψις in the domain of the δηλούμενον, cf. *synt.* 147,7f. 'Ρητέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆ φωνῆ ἄρθρων καθεστῶτων, τῆ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν μεταλήψει ἀντωνυμιῶν. Herodian (*GG* III ii 70,14f.) interestingly separates the structural and the semantic element when he defends the ὀρθοτόνησις of σφίσι in Hom. K 210 "καὶ διὰ τὴν σύνταξιν (viz. after a preposition) καὶ διὰ τὴν μετάληψιν (it means "themselves")". I shall use the term μετάληψις throughout to indicate this technique of

Apollonius was very much dependent on these μεταλήψεις, since he had to work from the Greek into the Greek. This was hardly a problem to the Latin grammarians, who could use Greek to clarify Latin words. We have already met the μεταλήψεις which constitute an ideal semantic representation of the expression under discussion; in fact, in these cases Apollonius has created a metalanguage of his own, in which the semantic representations are not primarily meant as examples of well-formed Greek or as deep structures from which the actual sentences were derived; rather, every aspect of the meaning of the object phrase should be represented in the target phrase. The "translations" serve an interpretive end.<sup>269</sup>

Hoerschelmann (1880, 385ff.) gives a survey of the use made by Apollonius of the terms μεταλαμβάνειν, μετάληψις κτλ. He mentions the usages "Theil nehmen an etwas", "Eines nehmen anstatt eines Anderen", "gebrauchen" (o.c. 388), and the usage in the context of "Lautwandel" and more generally "umwandeln, verandern" (387). However, the most important meaning in Apollonius is "zu bezeichnen dass für einen Ausdruck ein anderer gleichwerthiger gesetzt werden könne, ohne dass der Gedanke darunter wesentlich verändert werde" (o.c. 385).<sup>270</sup>

In the use of this technique Apollonius could borrow from the discipline of rhetoric, where it was employed in various ways.<sup>271</sup> In the first place it was a means of clarification.<sup>272</sup> By substituting more familiar synonyms, a sentence or definition or text could be made more accessible. This makes the technique useful in various kinds of argumentation, and accordingly several τόποι are built on it. The reverse, viz. the exchange of poetic or more *recherché* words for

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translation or paraphrasing. Apollonius often applies the method without using the terms μεταλαμβάνειν, μετάληψις κτλ. "Implicit" μετάληψις is to be found e.g. *adv.* 129,24f. δεῖ περιπατεῖν σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον, λείπει ὁ περίπατος; 133,13ff. ὡς ἴσῃν ἔχον δύνανται τῷ ἕνεκα κτλ.; 143,23 ἀκέων δαίνυσθε (φ 89). ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ ἔστι τῷ ἡσυχῇ δαίνυσθε ἢ ἡσυχῶς δαίνυσθε.

<sup>269</sup> See section 1.4.4. The problem with Householder's 1981 essay is not the comparison between Apollonius and transformational grammar, which is indeed illuminating in some respects, but the undue stress on structure.

<sup>270</sup> Cf. Skrzeczka 1853, 15ff.; Lehrs, 1865, 19ff.

<sup>271</sup> I shall not take the use of μετάληψις as a στάσις into account here; cf. Russell 1983, 60ff.

<sup>272</sup> Cf. *Ar. Top.* 111a8: τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον ὄνομα; *Alex. in Ar. Top.*, *CAG* 2,2,156,20ff.: ὁ τόπος ἐκ μεταλήψεως ... μεταλαμβάνειν τὸ ἀσαφέστερον εἰς τὸ σαφέστερον; *Philop. in Ar. An.Pr.*, *CAG* 13,2,160,17f.: ἀποφατικὰς εἰς καταφατικὰς μεταλαμβάνει ὡσπερ ἀπὸ ἀσαφεστέρων καταφάσεων εἰς σαφεστέρων ποιούμενος τὴν μετάληψιν. Cf. [*Them.*] in *Ar. An.Pr.*, *CAG* 23,3,43,30; 141,12f.; *Anon. in Ar. An.Post.*, *CAG* 13,3,570,25f.; *Eustath.* 2,805,20 vdV. διασαφητικὴ μετάληψις.

well-known ones should be avoided.<sup>273</sup> In all cases, one should see to it that the substitute really is identical in meaning to the original word.<sup>274</sup>

A second rhetorical application is that of a figure of speech: This rested on a double substitution, viz. first that of a homonym and then of a synonym. Thus, *θοός* in the (exceptional) meaning "sharp", "pointed" (of a shape) was explained by the fact that *όξύς* is its synonym. However, *όξύς* is a homonym, meaning both "fast", and "sharp", and is strictly speaking synonymous with *θοός* only in the former meaning.<sup>275</sup> This *μετάληψις* is the key to Sextus Empiricus' cryptogram (*AM* I 314) "*εβαρβαρίζε τὸ ὄλον, ἔλκη ἔχον ἐν τῇ χειρί*".<sup>276</sup> This puzzling sentence is explained as the perfectly understandable "*εσύριζεν ὁ Πᾶν, σύριγγας ἔχων ἐν τῇ χειρί*".<sup>277</sup> *Συρίζω* is a homonym, meaning either "playing the pipe" or "speaking Syrian".<sup>278</sup> A synonym of the latter meaning is *βαρβαρίζω*. Likewise, *Πᾶν* is a homonym: it stands for the name of a god or

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<sup>273</sup> Cf. *Ar. Top.* 112a21f. *εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ χρὴ εἰς τὸ χαλεπώτερον τὴν μετάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι*; 149a5ff.

While denying that such a thing as the art of rhetoric is viable, Sextus Empiricus (*AM* II 54) upholds that anyone has a good style who knows *τινὸς ἔνεκα τὰς μεταλήψεις ποιούμεθα τῶν λέξεων, ἥτοι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ εὐθροημονεῖν, προσκοπὴν φέροντος τοῦ εὐθέος ῥήματος* (in fact this is one of the ways to create euphony, cf. Sluiter 1988c, 80ff.), *ἢ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τι σαφηνίζειν, ὡς ὅταν τὸ μὲν αἴτιον εἰς τὸ ποιοῦν μεταλαμβάνωμεν, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον εἰς τὸ δηλοῦν*.

<sup>274</sup> *Ar. Top.* 149a8ff.; cf. *Alex. in Ar. Top.*, *CAG* 2,2,479,8f.

The exception is the *τόπος* described in *Ar. Top.* 112a32ff.: There it is suggested that one might argue from the fact that a word is not used in its ordinary sense, but in a sense which can be established by means of an analogical procedure (*κατὰ τὸν λόγον*), which in practice is based on its etymology. Thus, *εὐψυχος* need not mean "courageous", as it usually does, but it might be taken as "*ὁ εὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων*" on the strength of *εὐελπις*, meaning "*ὁ ἀγαθὰ ἐλπίζει*". (See the note of the Budé editor, Brunswick.) This *τόπος* is called a *μετάληψις εἰς τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἐτυμολογίαν λόγον* in *Alex. in Ar. Top.*, *CAG* 2,2,175,18ff.; Alexander explains *κατὰ τὸν λόγον* as "according to an etymological procedure".

<sup>275</sup> Cf. Desbordes 1988, 96 n. 72; [Trypho] π. τρόπων (*Rhet.Gr.* VIII 738,7ff. Waltz: *μετάληψις ἐστὶ λέξις ἐκ συνωνυμίας τὸ ὁμώνυμον δηλοῦσα· οἶον "Ἐυθεν δ' αὖ νήσοισιν ἐπιπρόεηκε θοῆσι"* (Hom. ο 299); cf. SchHom. ο 299: *θοῆσιν*] *μεταληπτικὸν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ κίνησιν ὀξέος ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ σχῆμα*.

<sup>276</sup> "The whole spoke like a barbarian, while having wounds in its hand."

<sup>277</sup> "Pan played the pipe, holding the pipe in his hand."

<sup>278</sup> Strictly speaking, the homonymy is orthographical only: *σύριζω*, playing the pipe, has a long *υ*, *σύριζω*, speaking Syrian, a short one.

for ὄλον.<sup>279</sup> And, finally, σύριγξ is also a homonym, indicating the pipes or a kind of sore. In the latter meaning it is synonymous with ἔλκος.<sup>280</sup>

When applied to philology, μετάληψις was especially useful for translating poetical expressions into more ordinary ones. This was already common (school)-practice by the fifth century B.C.<sup>281</sup> It was also used more generally here to clarify one's interpretation of any given passage.<sup>282</sup> This application is found in Apollonius as well.<sup>283</sup>

But Apollonius does not only employ the philologic/rhetorical use of μετάληψις, there is one passage in which the rhetorical "double substitution" is put into practice as well, even though the actual word μετάληψις is not found there. In *adv.* 147,24ff. Apollonius explains the respective origins of εὔτε and ἦτε.<sup>284</sup> He derives εὔτε from ὅτε, whereas ἦτε comes from ἄ-τε or ἦ-τε, synonyms of ὡς-τε. This last point is demonstrated by an uncomplicated form of μετάληψις.<sup>285</sup> Now, from 150,15 Apollonius briefly tells us that sometimes εὔτε is used where ἦτε would have been expected and he explains (150,16ff.): ὄν γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ὡς ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅτε, Ἐκτωρ δ' ὡς Σκαιάς τε πύλας (Z 237), κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ τὸ εὔτ' ὄρεος (Γ

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<sup>279</sup> In this case it is the accent that is neglected: πᾶν *versus* Πᾶν.

<sup>280</sup> Eustathius (1,125-126,19 vdV.) neatly distinguished the two rhetorical applications of the term. The "double-substitution" variant was attributed especially to the γραμματικοί (1,126,14f. vdV.; 4,726,6ff. vdV.); cf. 3,582,2ff. vdV.

<sup>281</sup> Cf. Plato's habit of paraphrasing Homeric verses, e.g. *Rep.* II 379c9-e2; P. Derweni col. VIII 3ff. See chapter I section 1.3.

<sup>282</sup> Cf. e.g. Philop. in *Ar. Phys.*, *CAG* 16,85,26ff.: in order to explain the coherence of a passage Philoponus first submits that δέ should be read as a substitute for γάρ. This would make the lines which follow into an explanation of what went before. But Philoponus also has an alternative solution, in which an incision is made in the argument at the point in question. In that case δέ should not undergo μετάληψις with γάρ, but rather it starts a new line of reasoning, it is ἀρκτικός. Cf. *Simpl.* in *Ar. Phys.*, *CAG* 10,1055,20.

<sup>283</sup> Cf. e.g. *coni.* 236,16ff.; *adv.* 200,8ff. For obscurity caused by the substitution of a poetic word for a normal one, cf. the literary critic and rhetor Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Th.* 31).

<sup>284</sup> Apollonius regards disyllabic ἦτε as the original form and trisyllabic ἦτε as a "pathological" derivation (the πάθος is "διάστασις"). Cf. *adv.* 149,22f. and Schneider *ad adv.* 147, 24-150,19.

<sup>285</sup> *Adv.* 148,12-22: τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον σημασίαν τῷ ὡς, καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν αὐτὴν σύνταξιν (148,17f.); cf. τῆς μεταλήψεως (148,22).

10), σημαίνουν τὸ ὅτε, παρελιήφθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ὡς.<sup>286</sup> We see that ὡς is a homonym, meaning "when" and "as". In the former meaning it is synonymous to ὅτε, which in its turn is a synonym of εὔτε. Apollonius upholds that ὅτε could mean "as", and so, therefore, can its substitute εὔτε.

Along with many other concepts from pagan grammar, the technique of μετάληψις was taken over and applied in various contexts by the Christian writers.<sup>287</sup> These, of course, did have the benefit of being able to use a different language (Hebrew!) as a means of clarification. Incidentally, μεταλαμβάνειν can also be used for translating from the Hebrew.<sup>288</sup> More revealing of underlying theory is the debate of Gregory of Nyssa *contra Eunomium* 1,560: According to Gregory, Eunomius has maintained that God's qualification as "Father" should be interpreted as "having come into being from nothing", not as "having begot a Son". He infers this from the fact that the Father is ἀγέννητος, and that "Father" and ἀγέννητος are, therefore, synonymous. Gregory, however, argues that a word can have more than one connotation and that it is not admissible to use one μετάληψις to the exclusion of all the others. He realizes that a μετάληψις may cover a word only partially, and shows that Eunomius' line of reasoning is misleading and wrong. He does not, however, reject all μεταλήψεις; but he demands care in its application. One synonym does not necessarily cover a word completely. Although his example is not exactly a case of double-substitution μετάληψις, Gregory's careful observation would apply there, too. In rhetoric the result of the double substitution is a trope. However, in Apollonius a warning that the resulting

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<sup>286</sup> "For just as ὡς [when] is used instead of ὅτε [when] in the line 'But when Hector (had come to) the Scaean gate', in the very same way there is nothing to prevent that (εὔτε in) 'even as (the South wind sheds a mist over the peaks) of a mountain', since it means ὅτε [when], is used instead of ὡς [as]."

<sup>287</sup> Schäublin 1974,60 (on biblical ζητήματα): "Oft vermag eine Art synonymisches Verfahrens (διὰ ἐκ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως) Hilfe zu schaffen"; cf. *ibid.* 141 on the use of paraphrasis by Theodorus of Mopsuestia. See chapter III section 5 on the usefulness of these witnesses for the history of ancient linguistics.

<sup>288</sup> Cf. Eus. *P.E.* 7,8,8f.: ('Αδάμ) ... τὸν γηγενῆ δηλοῦν κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἑλλάδα φωνὴν μετάληψιν. Cf. Orig. *Selecta in Ps.*, PGM 12,1269 (in *Ps.* 23,10): Σημειωτέον δὲ, ὅτι οἱ τὰ Ἑβραίων ἠκριβωκότες φασὶ τὴν Σαβαώθ φωνὴν ἐν τῷ Ἑβραϊκῷ κειμένῃν εἰς Ἑλλάδος φωνὴν οἱ Ἑβδομήκοντα μεταλαμβάνοντες, ὅτε μὲν τὸ Κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων, ὅτε δὲ τὸ Κύριος κραταῖός ὅτε δὲ τὸ παντοκράτωρ ἔταξαν. Λέγουσι γοῦν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ κειμένη τοῦ Σαβαώθ ἢ μετάληψις εἰς τὸ Κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων γέγονεν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ Σαβαώθ ἐπὶ τοῦ Σωτήρος κεῖται, ἐρμητεύεται εἰς τὸ παντοκράτωρ.

expression was uncommon or ornate, would have been in order. Instead, he applies the principle at least this once as a matter of course.

In its more common form in Apollonius, μετάληψις was a method which by his time was well-established in grammatical theory. He can even reproach some of his predecessors for having restricted themselves in their treatment of the σύνδεσμος to a list of names, and an indication of which σύνδεσμοι were synonymous (τὰς γινόμενας μεταλήψεις ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτούς, τουτέστι τοὺς ἰσοδυναμοῦντας ἀλλήλοις (*coni.* 213,4)).<sup>289</sup> Moreover there had clearly been some discussion as to the value of μετάληψις in meristic questions even before Apollonius' time. Trypho had issued a warning against blindly trusting to this test: Although the value of εἰ can be paraphrased by means of ἀκολουθεῖ, these words evidently do not belong to the same part of speech (*coni.* 220,7ff.).<sup>290</sup>

The exact value to be attributed to the meristic results obtained by means of μετάληψις, was also a hot item in the question of whether or not prepositions and conjunctions should be looked upon as belonging to one part of speech. The Stoics actually did this, or rather, they had not yet separated them in two distinct parts of speech.<sup>291</sup> If we may believe Apollonius (*synt.* 457,12ff.), they relied heavily on the interchangeability of prepositions and conjunctions in some contexts. The prepositions (or προθετικοὶ σύνδεσμοι, as the Stoics called them, *synt.* 458,1f.) convey a syndesmic force in constructions like διὰ τὴν λυπηρῆ; (= ἔνεκα τίνος λυπηρῆ;) or ἐκ τῆς ῥαθυμίας (= ἔνεκα τῆς ῥαθυμίας).<sup>292</sup> However, in the beginning of *de coniunctionibus* Apollonius argues against the view that conjunctions and prepositions can be taken together

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<sup>289</sup> "The translations that were made from one into the other, that is their mutual relationships of synonymy." Cf. μετάληψις συνδέσμου εἰς σύνδεσμον, Eustath. 3,354,20 vdV.; *Od.* 1,59,22f. Stallb.; 1,338,9 Stallb. In Eustath. *Od.* 1,244,24 Stallb. this is ascribed to οἱ ῥήτορες. Cf. SchHom. A 117a; 131a; Z 149a; O 634; Y 105a1.

<sup>290</sup> It is interesting to notice that some formal logicians refused to accept their logical equivalence as well, cf. Alex.Aphr. in Ar. *An.Pr.* CAG 1,373,29ff.: οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι ταῖς λέξεσι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οὐκέτι δὲ τοὺς σημαυνομένους οὐ ταῦτόν φασι γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς εἰς τὰς ἰσοδυναμοῦσας λέξεσι μεταλήψεσι τῶν ὄρων. ταῦτόν γάρ σημαίνοντος τοῦ "εἰ τὸ A, τὸ B" [ἐν] τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ A τὸ B, συλλογιστικὸν μὲν λόγον φασὶν εἶναι τοιαύτης ληφθείσης τῆς λέξεως "εἰ τὸ A τὸ B, τὸ δὲ A, τὸ ἄρα B", οὐκέτι δὲ συλλογιστικὸν ἀλλὰ περαντικὸν τὸ "ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ A τὸ B, τὸ δὲ A, τὸ ἄρα B."

<sup>291</sup> Or, in the case of Posidonius (ca. 135-51), they did not accept the separation.

<sup>292</sup> *Synt.* 458,2ff. Cf. below section 3.3. note 385 for the syndesmic status of ἔνεκα.

on account of μεταλήψεις which are partial at best, and he defends their separation.<sup>293</sup>

### 3.2.1. Πύξ and λάξ (*adv.* 141,1-15)

For a closer inspection of the way Apollonius applies the technique of μετάληψις in meristic matters, let us turn to the passage dealing with the status of πύξ and λάξ. The question is, whether these words are adverbs or nouns.

The argument for including them with the nouns is based on the possibility of μετάληψις with πυγμαῖ, undeniably a noun; moreover, the ἀκκισία is invalidated as a counter-argument, because there are more ὀνόματα ἄκκλιτα.<sup>294</sup>

However, Apollonius rejects the μετάληψις as a decisive argument and supports his assigning πύξ and λάξ to the adverbs on account of their construction with verbs and by pointing out that the ἀκκισία cannot be explained by the word-form, as it should have been if πύξ and λάξ had been nouns.

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<sup>293</sup> Neither the actual word μετάληψις nor a related expression occurs in this context. However, cf. 214,18 τὰ ἴσην δύναμιν ἀναδεδεγμένα συνδέσμοις μόρια and 214,22 ἀνθυπάγονται. The latter word is a synonym of μεταλαμβάνονται, cf. 222,2f.; 222,9f. and 220,7ff. Another synonym is ἀντί τινος παραλαμβάνεσθαι, *synt.* 147,15.

The argument of *coni.* 214,4ff. runs as follows: 1) To prove the fact that σύνδεσμοι have meaning, Posidonius starts from a certain group of σύνδεσμοι, viz. the prothetic ones. These cannot be meaningless, since they are not interchangeable; if they are varied, the meaning of the compound verbs formed by their means also varies (214,4-8). Apollonius concentrates on this argument which is based on the combination of prepositions and conjunctions into one part of speech. This he will combat.

2) The "real" conjunctions that are formally speaking homonyms, are classified as conjunctions or adverbs on account of their meaning - Posidonius admits this (214,8-17).

3) It would have been consistent for Posidonius to have concluded that an incidental syndesmic use of a preposition also points to homonymy; such a word should be classified at one time as a preposition, at another time as a conjunction on the basis of its meaning. Instead he runs together two whole parts of speech and calls the most evident cases of preposition "σύνδεσμοι" (214,17-20).

4) But on the other hand, the suggestion made under 3), a kind of compromise between the strict separation and the combination of the two parts of speech, is completely unwarranted: for there is no exact correspondence between the preposition and the conjunction. If a conjunction is paraphrased with the help of a preposition, the addition of more parts of speech is necessary to obtain a correct representation of the meaning envisaged (214,20-6). Therefore, there is not even homonymy between prepositions and conjunctions - they should in all respects be kept apart.

Cf. the commentary by Kidd on Posidonius fr. 45.

<sup>294</sup> This is the first of a number of meristic problems in which ἀκκισία is a prominent feature of the argumentation.



Thierfelder (1935, 41-5) is very severe in his judgment on this passage. He has two major objections to Apollonius' argumentation, the first being his arbitrariness in accepting or rejecting *μετάληψις* as a criterium for *μερισμός*. I shall return to this below. His second objection concerns the faultiness of Apollonius' argument, which he explains as follows: According to Apollonius the *μετάληψις* with a noun should be rejected as a criterium on account of the fact that, like other adverbs, *πύξ* and *λάξ* are always construed with the verb (*ἐπὶ ῥῆμα φέρεσθαι*); besides, they are indeclinable (141,3-4). Apollonius then continues thus: *καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τὰ ῥήματα φέρηται, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν οὐδὲ καθ' ἓνα σχηματισμόν* (141,6-7).<sup>295</sup> This Thierfelder finds unacceptable. For *πυγμαῖ* is used in exactly the same meaning as *πύξ*, as is apparent from the very possibility of *μετάληψις*. He suggests that we read 141,7 as *οὐ<κ ἀεὶ> κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν*,<sup>296</sup> paraphrasing Apollonius' point as follows: "dass ein Nomen nicht bloss wie ein Adverb zum Verb konstruiert werden könnte, sondern auch noch 'in anderem Sinne', d.h. selbstverständlich: als (Subjekt oder) Objekt" (1935, 45).

I do not find this criticism justified. We can interpret the text as we have it without taking recourse to accusations of *captio* on the side of Apollonius. Thierfelder's problem with this passage rests on his interpretation of 141,6f., which he takes as follows: "For even though nouns [like *πυγμαῖ*] are also construed with verbs, it is not with the same meaning [as *πύξ*] nor in one form [like *πύξ*]." If read in this way, it is indeed hard to see what Apollonius intends to achieve with this argument, which simply does not make sense. I suggest, however, that we interpret it differently: "For even though nouns are also construed with verbs [supposing *πύξ* is a noun], it is not with the same meaning [as the adverb *πύξ*] nor in one form [like the adverb *πύξ*]." If *πύξ* had been a noun, it would have been in the nominative case<sup>297</sup> and thus would have been "subject" of the verb.<sup>298</sup> This appears from its form, which could not possibly be

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<sup>295</sup> "For even if nouns are construed with verbs, it is still not in the same meaning, nor in one (indeclinable) form."

<sup>296</sup> This is unnecessary anyway, cf. Schneider ad *pron.* 7,28 and 13,7.

<sup>297</sup> Cf. 141,13 the comparison with *πτύξ*, *πτυχός*, *πτύχες*.

<sup>298</sup> Exactly the same problem of describing the difference between the construction of noun + verb and adverb + verb, especially in cases where one might doubt whether a given word is a noun or an adverb, occurs *adv.* 119,8ff.; see section 2.2.2.

indeclinable if πύξ were a noun.<sup>299</sup> And since ἀκλισία would have been the only viable explanation of the fact that a manifest nominative form could be replaced by a dative, it cannot reasonably be upheld that πύξ is a noun.

I submit that by adding καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τὰ ῥήματα φέρεται κτλ. Apollonius anticipates a possible objection. For a moment he admits of the theoretical possibility that πύξ is a noun, only to deny that this yields the desired meaning in our construction. The same phenomenon of temporarily focalizing the problem from the standpoint of the opposing party recurs in 141,8 καὶ ἄλλα ὀνόματα ἄκλιτα ἂν εἴη.<sup>300</sup>

Apollonius therefore concludes that πύξ and λάξ are adverbs because of their syntax as well as their form. There is no attempt at misleading the reader.<sup>301</sup>

The other objection brought forward by Thierfelder concerned the arbitrariness in accepting or rejecting μετάληψις as a criterium for μερισμός:

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<sup>299</sup> 'Ακλισία would in that case have been inexplicable and therefore it is unacceptable. Notice once again the firm belief in the powers of reason, cf. *adv.* 168,7ff. (if ἐγγυτάτω and other such adverbs had been derived from the superlative ἐγγύτατος (instead of deriving from the comparative adverbs, as Apollonius believes), all superlatives should allow of such a derivation. However, this is not true): εὔπερ οὖν τὰ προκείμενα ἐπιρρήματα παρ' ὄνομα ἐγεγόνει, ἄπορον ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦν, παρὰ τί ἢ κακία τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιρρημάτων [viz. adverbs like ταχυτάτω]. If Apollonius' rule to the effect that superlative adverbs in -ω are not derived from nouns, is not universally valid, problems will arise which cannot be explained (ἄπορον) and that is unacceptable.

<sup>300</sup> Cf. 141,11: the ὀνομά τι ἐς διπλοῦν λήγον hints at πύξ again; cf. *synt.* 323,7f. where the use of τὰ ἐπιρρήματα is also shorthand for "supposing the infinitive is an adverb".

<sup>301</sup> A problem left undiscussed by Thierfelder is 141,15. I suggest we should read there οὐκ ἔχοντά τιν' ἄλλην σύνταξιν ἢ τήν <ἐπιρ>ρηματικήν. The Index by Schneider offers only one parallel for the combination σύνταξις ῥηματική, viz. *synt.* 189,14, dealing with the ἄρθρα ὑποτακτικά: ἐν ἀρχῇ ... λόγου παραλαμβάνόμενα εἰς σύνταξιν ῥηματικήν ("it ... stands at the beginning of its clause, construed with a following verb", transl. Householder): Since in our passage the foregoing discussion focuses on the different constructions of nouns and adverbs with verbs, this cannot be meant here. I have found the combination again in *adv.* 132,13f., where it means "the construction of a verb". This cannot be intended here either. 'Ρηματικήν wrongly suggests that, contrary to adverbs, nouns can have another construction apart from the one with verbs, but this is beside the point entirely. The point is that there are two constructions, viz. that of nouns plus verbs and that of adverbs plus verbs, and that these two constructions are different from one another. This last sentence of the discussion of πύξ and λάξ should therefore contain the conclusion that the adverbs πύξ and λάξ are construed with verbs, and that in no other way than by means of the adverbial construction. Therefore read ἐπιρρηματικήν. Cf. *adv.* 120,17. The error probably originated from 141,14 συντασσόμενα τοῖς ῥήμασι. For the same addition, cf. *coni.* 222,20.

"wo es Ap. für sein Beweisziel vorteilhaft erscheint, billigt er ihr unbedingten Beweiswert zu ...[his example is *synt.* 149,8ff.] Umgekehrt kann nach [*synt.* 118,2ff.] die Möglichkeit, den Satz γραμματικὸς παρεγένετο ὃς διελέξατο 'umzuwandeln' in γρ. παρεγένετο καὶ οὗτος διελέξατο, durchaus noch nicht beweisen, dass der 'hypotaktische Artikel' (d.h. das Relativpronom in nicht-verallgemeinernder Verwendung) ein Pronomen wie οὗτος sei, - denn (*pron.* 7,9f. in einer ähnlichen Sache) οὐκ, εἴ τι ἀντί τινος παραλαμβάνεται, εὐθέως ταύτων ἐκείνω ἔστιν" (1935, 42f.).

Now, *adv.* 141,1ff. is one of a series of places where μετάληψις is disqualified as the sole decisive factor for μερισμός, cf. e.g. *pron.* 7,9 quoted above.<sup>302</sup> This does not mean at all that μετάληψις is devoid of all "meristic" value. It cannot, however, decide the matter all by itself.<sup>303</sup> Only if a word shows the syntactical behaviour along with all other characteristics belonging to a certain part of speech, is μετάληψις a valid argument. This μετάληψις consists of substituting a word whose μερισμός is certain, for the word in question. In such a case the μετάληψις motivates the μερισμός of the word in question: it joins the part of speech of its substitute.<sup>304</sup>

Again a proviso should be made: incidental μετάληψις of two words stemming from different parts of speech cannot justify the combination of those two parts of speech in their entirety. Remember in this connection the adjectives which took on the adverbial ἀκλισία when construed with verbs - such an adjective virtually became an adverb. However, this did not induce Apollonius to

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<sup>302</sup> Cf. further *coni.* 222,9ff. τὰ ἀνθυπαγόμενα οὐκ εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ μέρη λόγου <παραλ>ηπτά <ἔσ>τιν ἐν τῷ καθόλου; *pron.* 64,3ff.; *coni.* 220,7ff.; *GG* II iii 35,13ff. (= SchDTh. 519,6ff.). A related idea is expressed in *pron.* 6,20f.: οὐ ..., εἴ τί τιμι κατὰ τι κεκοινώνηκε, τοῦτο πάντως ἐκείνω ταύτων ἔστιν.

<sup>303</sup> Cf. οὐκ ... εὐθέως *pron.* 7,9; οὐκ ... ἐν τῷ καθόλου *coni.* 222,9; to all likelihood also οὐ πάντως *pron.* 6,21; *coni.* 220,7; *GG* II iii 35,13ff., especially because of *pron.* 6,21 - but cf. Schneider, *Tractatus* 151 for οὐ πάντως "not at all" (note, however, that many of Schneider's examples need not be given this interpretation; but cf. e.g. *synt.* 94,15; 118,13; 118,16; 326,8ff.).

<sup>304</sup> Cf. *synt.* 150,9ff. ... καθότι καὶ ἄλλα μέρη λόγου, πάλιν μετατεθέντα τῆς ἰδίας συντάξεως καὶ ἄλλων ἀναπληρώσαντα τὰς ἰδιότητας, πάλιν τῆς τούτων ὀνομασίας ἔτυχεν ... οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον αἱ φωναὶ ἐπικρατοῦσι κατὰ τοὺς μερισμοὺς ὡς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν σημαυόμενα (which are established by means of μετάληψις). Some grammarians even went so far as to establish the correct accent of a word on the basis of μετάληψις (this is no doubt related to the concept of the *perfecta analogia*, where meaning, too, is taken into account): SchHom. M 137b αὐας] βαρυντονοῦσιν οἱ πλείους. Νικίας δὲ ὀξύνει διὰ τὸ μεταφραζόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ξηράς ὀξύνεται. εἶρηγαι δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὅτι οὐ δεῖ πρὸς μεταφραζόμενα τὰς λέξεις τοιοῦν. The warning comes from Herodian, of course. Cf. Steinthal 1891, 119.

do away with the part of speech "noun" and to use the denomination "adverb" for nouns, adjectives and adverbs indiscriminately.

The upshot of all this is that *μετάληψις* is a valuable diagnostic test, but can be rejected as an argument for *μερισμός* on account of remaining ambiguities. Such a case is *synt.* 118,12ff., dealing with the *μερισμός* of the "postpositive articles" (i.e. the relative pronouns) and the "anaphorical" pronouns (the demonstratives). Thierfelder quoted this passage in support of his criticism. Especially relevant is 118,13ff.: οὐ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ παρεπόμενον τοῖς ἄρθροις ἀπηνέγκαντο, καὶ ἄρθρα ἐστίν, εἴγε καὶ ἄλλοις διαφόροις διέστηκε τὰ μόρια<sup>305</sup> and 119, 13f. πῶς οὖν τοσαύτης διαφορᾶς οὔσης παραδέξεται τις τὸ ὕφ' ἐν μέρει λόγου ὑπάγειν τὰ ἄρθρα καὶ τὰς ἀντωνυμίας;<sup>306</sup>

It is clear so far that Apollonius was not in favour of drawing conclusions from *μετάληψις* automatically and without qualifications. But what about the one place put forward by Thierfelder where the *μετάληψις* allegedly has "unbedingten Beweiswert"? "Nach *synt.* [149,8ff.] [enthaltend] ὁ περιπατῶν κινεῖται und ὅς ἂν παραγένηται ἀναγινωσκέτω nich 'Artikel', sondern ἀόριστα μόρια (= Nomina indefinita), weil *μετάληψις* erfolgt in εἴ τις περιπατεῖ bzw. εἴ τις ἂν ἔλθῃ (NB. τις ist ein indefinites Nomen)" (1935, 43). A look at the context may prove helpful.

From *synt.* 147,6 onwards Apollonius discusses pronominal constructions of words which formally speaking are ἄρθρα. The definition of ἄρθρον states that it is a part of speech συναρτώμενον πτωτικοῖς κατὰ παράθεσιν προτακτικῶς ἢ ὑποτακτικῶς μετὰ τῶν συμπαραπομένων τῶ ὀνόματι εἰς γνῶσιν προὔποκειμένην, ὅπερ καλεῖται ἀναφορά (*GG* II iii 130,31ff.),<sup>307</sup> cf. *synt.* 148,6ff. σύνεστι τὰ ἄρθρα μετὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνθ' ὧν παραλαμβάνεται ἡ ἀντωνυμία.<sup>308</sup> However, in a sentence like Hom. A 12, ὁ γὰρ ἦλθε θεὸς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν,<sup>309</sup> there is no noun to accompany the ἄρθρον: ὅταν τὸ

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<sup>305</sup> "The mere fact that [pronouns] claim some of the properties of 'articles' doesn't make them 'articles', since the two word-types differ in other respects" (transl. Householder).

<sup>306</sup> "So when the difference is so great, how can anyone suppose that 'articles' and pronouns should be reduced to a single part of speech?" (transl. Householder). The Stoa classified the pronouns as a species of the ἄρθρον, *ApD. pron.* 5,13ff.; see note 314.

<sup>307</sup> "Attached to words with cases, used in construction [i.e. not forming a compound, I.S.], either prepositively or postpositively, with the accidents of the noun, to indicate something which is known already, which is called 'anaphora'."

<sup>308</sup> "Definite articles are used with those nouns which are represented by pronouns" (transl. Householder). Ἀν ἀντωνυμία is *per definitionem* a λέξις ἀντ' ὀνόματος, *pron.* 9,11.

<sup>309</sup> "For he came to the fast ships of the Greeks."

ἄρθρον μὴ μετ' ὀνόματος παραλαμβάνηται, ποιήσεται δὲ σύνταξιν ὀνόματος ... ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε οὐκ ἐγγινόμενον μετ' ὀνόματος δυνάμει ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παρελήφθη· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἢ σύνταξις αὐτοῦ προσεχώρει εἰς ἀντωνυμικὴν μετάληψιν (148,12ff.).<sup>310</sup> And again (149,2): καὶ σαφὲς ὅτι ἡ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὀνόματος τῷ ἄρθρῳ παραδώσει τὰ τῆς συντάξεως, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι γενήσεται τὸ ἄρθρον ἢ ἀντωνυμία, ἣ ἔστιν ἀντὶ παντὸς ὀνόματος κτλ.<sup>311</sup>

It is the syntactic behaviour of the ἄρθρον in question which makes a μετάληψις with a pronoun possible. In this kind of construction the ἄρθρον can be classified as an ἀντωνυμία, because it completely answers to the description of a pronoun and fulfils all requirements for being a pronoun.<sup>312</sup>

Apart from this (anaphorical) use of the ἄρθρον instead of a pronoun, there is another deviant σύνταξις and this is the one Thierfelder concentrates on (*synt.* 149,9ff.): ἡ ... μὴ οὕτως ἔχουσα, αὐτόθεν δὲ ἐν προλήψει τοῦ ἔσομένου προσώπου, ἀόριστον μετάληψιν τῶν ἄρθρων ποιεῖται (examples: ὁ περιπατῶν κινεῖται, ὃς ἂν παραγένηται, ἀναγινωσκέτω)· συμφερόμενον γὰρ παντὶ ὀνόματι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὄνομα ἀναδραμεῖται ἐν καθεστηκός, ὅπερ ἴδιον ἀορίστου.<sup>313</sup>

Again the definition of ἄρθρον does not apply, this time because the characteristic requirement of ἀναφορά is unfulfilled. There is in this case no

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<sup>310</sup> "When the article is used without a following noun, and it is construed like a noun ... it will necessarily translate into a pronoun, since, though not accompanying a noun, it is used with nominal force. Thus, its construction brought about the possible translation into a pronoun." (transl. Householder, adapted).

<sup>311</sup> "It is clear that deletion of the name will put its whole syntactic function upon the article, so that the article will become nothing but a pronoun, which stands for any noun" (transl. Householder).

<sup>312</sup> It may be added that the very definition of ἀντωνυμία as a λέξις ἀντ' ὀνόματος (*pron.* 9,11) implies an intrinsic increase in the value of μετάληψις. If anywhere, it should be here that μετάληψις is a vital test. It should be noticed in this context that μεταλαμβάνω is also used for the exchange of nouns and pronouns (cf. Hoerschelmann 1880, 386; e.g. *pron.* 26,16; 26,19; 8,17ff.). If, therefore, it is demonstrated that an article without a noun "ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παρελήφθη" (*synt.* 148,14f.) and that it takes over τὰ τῆς συντάξεως of the noun, it stands to reason that this kind of μετάληψις is felt to count heavily: In fact, this very μετάληψις is a fulfilment of the proprieties of the pronoun (*synt.* 150,10).

<sup>313</sup> "When the construction is not like that, but the article occurs in anticipation of an entity yet to be, then there is a transformation of articles into indefinites. For the article can combine with any noun and refer to any noun at all, though it is a single thing, and that is the mark of an indefinite" (transl. Householder).

γνώσις προϋποκειμένη, on the contrary: This ἄρθρον has an entirely indefinite reference. But this means that it cannot be a pronoun here either, because a pronoun characteristically refers to a πρόσωπον ὀρισμένον (*pron.* 9,11ff.). That is the reason why τις was accorded a nominal status in Apollonius.<sup>314</sup> An important argument for assigning the same μερισμός to ὅς would be the fact that τίς, τις, ὅς and ὅστις form a συζυγία (see section 2.3.1. above and 3.3.1.2. below).<sup>315</sup>

One more remark should be added: in the example discussed by Apollonius, the participle περιπατῶν was clearly not interpreted as if it were used instead of a noun. Apollonius explains such participles as a kind of attribute with the semantic connotation of πλῆθος: the addition of a restrictive modifier suggests that there is a group of two or more persons or things, from which those entities are selected that answer to the description expressed by the modifier.<sup>316</sup>

Thus here too, Apollonius looks at meaning and syntax in evaluating the μετάληψις. As soon as a noun is joined to the "ἄρθρον" in any of the constructions which are given as examples, the ἄρθρον automatically falls in with its original part of speech again.<sup>317</sup> It will be clear, therefore, that the

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<sup>314</sup> Cf. *pron.* 26,27-29,10. Τίς cannot be a pronoun, since it is ἄοριστος; it cannot be an ἄρθρον, because it lacks ἀναφορά. The Stoa is criticized for calling some ἄρθρα "ἀοριστώδη" (cf. Schenkeveld 1983, 75f.): this contradicts their expressing ἀναφορά. The only point Apollonius can think of to justify the name, is the fact that, whereas pronouns are without exception definite, the ἄρθρον is at least in one construction indefinite. The example is ... ὁ περιπατῶν κινεῖται. Although Apollonius does not seem really to have changed his mind on this problem between *de pronomibus* and the *Syntax*, he is much more explicit in the latter work.

<sup>315</sup> Cf. *GG* II iii 54,23ff.

<sup>316</sup> Cf. *synt.* 93,5ff.: a predicative participle is explained as having temporal value; an attributive one is either restrictive and indefinite or definite. Thus, ὁ δειπνήσας παῖς κομᾶσθω may either refer to a specific παῖς which we already know from the context (definite), or its reference is indefinite, viz. any child provided it has had dinner. In the latter case, the article was identified by the Stoics as an ἀοριστώδες μόριον (*synt.* 93,11ff.). This indefinite interpretation may be strengthened by the presence of a verb-form with the connotation of futurity (future, imperative, *synt.* 96,1ff.). In *synt.* 39,9ff. (esp. 40,1ff.) Apollonius distinguishes three possible interpretations for the article in the sentence ὁ τυραννοκτῆσας τιμάσθω (notice that there is some interference with the ideas on the function of the participle): There may be an ἀναφορά of a προϋφαστῶς πρόσωπον (40,1ff.): definite use (1); or connotation of πλῆθος (40,6f.) (2); or the article has an indefinite reference (3).

<sup>317</sup> Cf. *synt.* 150,3ff.: εἰ γοῦν συνενεχθεῖη τι τῶν ὀνομάτων ταῖς προκειμέναις συντάξεις, καὶ αὐτὸ καταστήσεται εἰς τὸν ἴδιον μερισμόν, ὁ Διονύσιος περιπατῶν κινεῖται κτλ.

arbitrary application of the criterium of μετάληψις imputed to Apollonius by Thierfelder, is not borne out by the evidence.

By way of summing up and as a transition to the next section I shall discuss one more passage. In the doxography at the beginning of *de pronomibus* Apollonius combats the view of the Stoics, who called ἄρθρα and ἀντωνυμῖαι together by the name of ἄρθρα and held the view that they belonged to one part of speech (*pron.* 5,13ff.). From *pron.* 8,12 onwards (κάκεῖνο δὲ προσθετέον, ὡς αἱ μὲν ἀντωνυμῖαι ἀντ' ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ ἄρθρα μετ' ὀνομάτων. πῶς οὖν <ἐν> μέρος λόγου τὸ μετὰ τινος καὶ ἀντί τινος;) <sup>318</sup> a whole series of differences between pronouns and articles is enumerated. Apollonius concludes (*pron.* 9,1ff.) that the Stoics used the same name for different entities and offers the alternative of separating the two parts of speech, calling the one ἄρθρον, the other ἀντωνυμία. The explanation of the Stoics' error is that they may have been fooled by the fact that some pronouns and articles are homonyms (*pron.* 7,23). <sup>319</sup> Their forms coincide (ὁμοφωνία, συνέμπτωσις). Μετάληψις allows one to detect homonymy: In different constructions a word can have different μεταλήψεις and this is an indication of its correct μερισμός in each context. Again we are warned that a context-dependent μετάληψις is insufficient evidence for combining two parts of speech which can otherwise be shown to have different characteristics. However, two different parts of speech may indeed have some forms in common. The correct μερισμός is established, as always, on syntactic and semantic grounds. We may again compare the case of the adverbial construction of adjectives: There, too, we had to do with συνέμπτωσις (*adv.* 120,14f.) which had to be classified by means of their semantic properties. And these, in turn, were established by "translating" them. <sup>320</sup>

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<sup>318</sup> "And this should be added, that the pronouns are used instead of the nouns, but the articles with the nouns. How then can that which goes with something and that which replaces something belong to one part of speech?"

<sup>319</sup> Cf. Steinthal 1891, 223f.

<sup>320</sup> Cf. e.g. *adv.* 120,11 (τὸ ταχύ) ἴσον ... ἔστι τῷ ταχέως (this is implicit μετάληψις).

### 3.3. Συνέμπτωσις

The last passage discussed in the previous section showed that μετάληψις could be especially useful in cases of homonymy or συνέμπτωσις. We have to do with συνέμπτωσις whenever one form expresses two or more conceptions or more than one combination of lexical and grammatical meaning of the same conception (as when two or more forms from the same paradigm coincide).<sup>321</sup>

In her 1988 article, Mrs. Desbordes gives an interesting survey of the various fields in which the concepts of homonymy and synonymy play a role, notably philosophy (dialectics), rhetoric and grammar. In philosophy, Aristotle uses ὁμώνυμος and συνώνυμος for the persons or things involved, not for the names/words - a word is not yet called a homonym.<sup>322</sup> Incidentally, this usage stems from Homer, who calls the Greater and the Lesser Ajax "ὁμώνυμοι" (P 720). It was apparently Speusippus who applied these concepts to the names.<sup>323</sup> In dialectics, the foremost problem involved seems to have been the relationship between names, definitions and things.

In rhetoric, homonymy is a cause of ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία) and it is evaluated differently in accordance with the context in which it occurs.<sup>324</sup> It belongs either in the *inventio*,<sup>325</sup> or, alternatively, it is looked upon as a cause of *obscuritas*, thus constituting a *vitium orationis* which should be avoided.<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> Cf. O. Schneider 1843, 653; Skrzeczka 1858, 9f. n. 2; 1853, 17; I was somewhat handicapped in my research here, because pages 18 and 19 of my photocopy of the latter article are regrettably lacking.

<sup>322</sup> Desbordes 1988, 52. The concept of the fourfold lack of correspondence between ὀνόματα and πράγματα goes back to Democritus as quoted in Proclus' commentary on the *Cratylus* (fr. B 26 D.-K.). One example of deficient correspondence is the phenomenon of ὁμωνυμία.

<sup>323</sup> See Desbordes 1988, 58f. for the terminological complications. For ὁμώνυμον applied to the name Ajax, see ApD. *pron.* 4,12f.

<sup>324</sup> Desbordes 1988, 76ff.

<sup>325</sup> Cf. Ar. *Rh.* 1401a13ff. (as a τόπος for an "apparent" enthymeme); 1404b37ff. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμῖαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακοῦργει), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμῖαι. Synonymy finds a place in *elocutio* and it is a useful means of *variatio*. Cf. the use of ἀσυνέμπτωσις (referring to the variety of *contents* in Homer) Eustath. 1,738,5f. vdV. (πολυειδῆς καὶ ὡς δυνατὸν ἀσυνέμπτωσις), cf. 3,693,30f. vdV. καὶ οὕτως ἐξέφυγον τὴν ἐν λόγῳ συνέμπτωσιν (sc. Zeus and Hypnos, Hom. O 18ff.; cf. Ξ 249ff.). καὶ οὕτω μὲν πολλαχού πολυειδῆς ὁ ποιητῆς ἔστι καὶ ἀσυνέμπτωσις.

<sup>326</sup> E.g. Quint. 8,2,13.



What does grammar take over from all this? Primarily two things, viz. the *capita de amphibolia* (cf. rhetoric) - these belong in the part of the Latin grammars dealing with the *vitia cetera* -; and the subcategories of the noun called *homonyma* and *synonyma*.<sup>327</sup>

When we turn to Apollonius again, we find that he acknowledges the subcategories ὁμώνυμα and συνώνυμα in the theory of the noun.<sup>328</sup> This is no more than a grammatical (semantic) sub-classification.

More interesting are Apollonius' views on the ambiguities caused by συνέμπτωσις<sup>329</sup> and on the ideal, but often non-existent one-to-one correspondence between forms and meaning, in other words, the rhetorical and philosophical application of the concept. Apollonius combines these aspects into a coherent doctrine: Since in his opinion the context will in principle solve any ambiguities caused by συνέμπτωσις,<sup>330</sup> language has no need to avoid συνέμπτωσις artificially.<sup>331</sup> Apollonius is therefore bitterly opposed to any *ad hoc* argument of the form ἵνα μὴ συνεμπέση.<sup>332</sup> Συνέμπτωσις is one of the

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<sup>327</sup> Desbordes 1988, 86ff. Mrs. Desbordes concentrates on the Latin grammarians. There are no early Greek grammatical attestations for the use of these words. See Uhlig ad DTh. *Technē* 36,1ff.; SchDTh. 236,1ff.; Prisc. II 59,13ff.

<sup>328</sup> GG II iii 50,26ff.

<sup>329</sup> Συνέμπτωσις is a cause of ἀμφιβολία, but ἀμφιβολία may also be almost synonymous with it, cf. Uhlig ad *synt.* 35,12. Ar. *Poet.* 1461a25 ἀμφιβολία is used in virtually the same way as Aristotle usually applies ὁμωνυμία, see Bywater *a.l.*

<sup>330</sup> An example is (*pron.* 52,4ff.) the string ΟΥΚΕΡΩ, which is in itself ambiguous (οὐ κερῶ, οὐκ ἐρῶ < ἐράω, οὐκ ἐρῶ < ἐρέω). The construction becomes self-evident as soon as the complement is added; for each of the above constructions takes another case (acc., gen. and dat. respectively). Cf. also *synt* 217,2f.

The Stoic theory of ambiguity is for a large part based on the neglect of the context, cf. Edlow 1975, 424f. (based on Galenus *de captionibus* cap. IV).

<sup>331</sup> The coincidence of word-forms was compatible with καταλληλότης, since it robs language of the possibility of ἔλεγχος by means of a more suitable form; cf. Lange 1852a, 31; section 1.3.2.

<sup>332</sup> This makes Blank's suggestion (1982, 37) that Apollonius applies this very principle in drawing up syntactic rules somewhat infelicitous. Apollonius' underlying thought in *synt.* 42,9 (and 68,2ff., which is indeed, as Blank rightly remarks, of another level) (Blank's examples) is not so much that the rules serve to avoid coincidences, but rather that they are necessary here to prevent the expression getting hopelessly confused, and thus virtually meaningless.

realities of language.<sup>333</sup> In the same vein he finds the idea totally unacceptable that some parts of speech have no other function than to clarify obscurities in the other parts of speech.<sup>334</sup> I have found only one case where Apollonius is not true to his principle in a morphological matter: In *adv.* 181,29ff. he remarks that the (Attic) accentuation of ἔγωγε and ἔμοιγε is intended to avoid τὸ ἀμφίβολον: The forms make it clear that here we have to do with a derivation by means of the suffix -γε, not the enclitic particle γε.<sup>335</sup>

In his rejection of the argument that forms change to avoid unwanted coincidences Apollonius seems to stand alone. In later grammarians, the avoidance of coincidences could either motivate why certain changes in the wordform had taken place or why they had not.<sup>336</sup> The phrase ἵνα μὴ συνεμπέση is

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<sup>333</sup> Cf. *pron.* 92,10f. against those who claim that τῷ is oxytonon because it should be set apart from the dative sing.: ἀλλ' εἰ ἔνεκα τούτου, ληρώδες ἄπειρα γὰρ τὰ συνεμπίπτοντα; *adv.* 159,17ff.: Trypho's suggestion that in ὤταν, a κληρικὸν ἐπίφθεγμα, the ν has been added "διὰ τὴν ἀντέμφασιν τὴν πρὸς τὰ ὄτα" is indignantly rejected. Apollonius sums up his objections in 159,22ff.: Πῶς δὲ οὐ γέλοιον αἰτεῖσθαι διὰ τὰς συνεμπτώσεις προσθέσεις συμφώνων ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις, ὅτε σχεδὸν πᾶσα λέξις ὑπ' ἀμφίβολον πίπτει, καὶ οὐ πάντως διὰ τὰς συνουσίας ἀμφιβολίας δεῖ προσνέμειν ἢ ἀφαιρεῖν σύμφωνα ἢ φωνήεντα. Notice the echo of Stoic theory: according to Chrysippus every word was "*natura ambiguum*", Gell. *NA XI* 12. Edlow 1975, 425 thinks this refers to psychological rather than semantic ambiguity: since every word is a sign, it may, like all signs, be misunderstood even while being semantically unambiguous. Neither interpretation (psychological or true semantic ambiguity) can be proved absolutely from the text of Gellius. Gellius states the positions of Chrysippus and Diodorus without choosing sides himself. Chrysippus apparently looks at the communicative process through the eyes of the addressee: This means every word can fail to achieve the correct result. Diodorus takes the point of view of the speaker and consequently maintains that no word is ambiguous, since the speaker knows what he wants to say. This latter view increases the probability of a psychological interpretation of the former.

<sup>334</sup> *Synt.* 35,10ff.: Apollonius considers it a major mistake for anyone to suppose that the article's only function would be the διάκρισις γενῶν in the nouns. The article has a clearly defined meaning and function of its own and, apart from that, it is unfit for the task of distinguishing the gender of nouns, because a form like τῶν is just as ambiguous in this respect as the words it is supposed to relieve of their ambiguities (*synt.* 36,6ff.).

<sup>335</sup> Cf. Hdn. *GG III* ii 24,27 (where the avoiding of συνέμπτωσης is not mentioned); *Et. M.* 314,55. For the tentative proposal of avoidance of συνέμπτωσης as an additional explanatory factor in Apollonius, cf. chapter III section 1.2., note 20.

<sup>336</sup> Cf. Wackernagel 1876, 8 for the use of πάθη and/or dialect forms to avoid συνέμπτωσης.

frequent.<sup>337</sup> Not only single words were taken into consideration, but also wordgroups, a fact which seems to be a reflection of the rhetorical theory of ambiguity originating from wrong word-boundaries.<sup>338</sup> Words were replaced in their entirety if an indecency would have resulted from the *συνέμπτωσης* (see above, section 3.2., and note 273).<sup>339</sup> Sometimes the avoidance of coincidences is even linked with certain dialects (Ionic, Doric).<sup>340</sup>

Herodian sides with the other grammarians against his father in this respect, for instance when he discusses the absence of *anastrophe* in the prepositions *διά* and *ἀνά* to prevent confusion with the accusative of *Ζεύς* and the vocative of *ἄναξ* respectively.<sup>341</sup> It is noteworthy that he applies the concept of *συνέμπτωσης* more than once to defend the similarity of words;<sup>342</sup>

<sup>337</sup> E.g. the nominative *Ζεύς* is used instead of *Δίς* to prevent *συνέμπτωσης* with the adverb meaning "twice", Eustath. 1,177,17 vdV.; cf. 1,251,9 vdV.

Alternative formulations may also be found. Cf. Eustath. 2,128,6 vdV.: the change of *ἄορ* into *ἄαρ* is made *διά τὴν πρὸς τὸ ξίφος συνέμπτωσιν* (notice the implicit *μετάληψις* to prevent confusion, see *Od.* 1,73,22 Stallb. quoted below); cf. 2,722,14 vdV. *Διὰ συνέμπτωσιν* to explain why a form does *not* occur, 2,829,11 and 13 vdV. The reverse formulation is *ἵνα πάντη ἀσυνέμπτωτα εἶεν* (A καὶ B), 3,307,26 vdV.; cf. *Od.* 1,73,22 Stallb.: "*Ὡψ* has a genitive which is properisponemon, *διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀσυνέμπτωτον, ἤγουν πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ*; 2,148,39 Stallb.

<sup>338</sup> E.g. *ἀπανευθενεων*, Eustath. 3,739,7 vdV.; cf. further the remarks in SchDTh. on the use of the diacritical mark of the *ὑποδιαστολή*; example: *ΕΣΤΙΝΑΞΙΟΣ* (*ἔστι Νάξιος/ἔστιν ἄξιος*), e.g. 156,11ff. Hdn. (in: *le "philétaeros" attribué a Hérodien* (ed. A. Dain) p. 76 nr.7 = p. 414 ed. Koch); the genitive *ἀνθέων* is preferred to *ἀνθῶν* to exclude confusion with *ἀνθ' ὧν*.

<sup>339</sup> E.g. Eustath. *Od.* 2,103,17f. Stallb.: *αἰδέσιμος* is preferred to *αἰδοῖος* because part of the latter word's paradigm coincides with that of "*τὸ σωματικὸν μόριον*"; cf. Hdn. *GG* III ii 273,7ff. (= Choer. *GG* IV i 487,12).

<sup>340</sup> Eustath. 1,772,20f. vdV. *παρεκκλίνουσι ... καὶ Ἴωνες τὴν τῶν λέξεων, ὅπη δυνατόν, ὁμωνυμίαν τὴν κατὰ συνέμπτωσιν ὁμόφωνον* (note the pleonastic formulation); cf. 4,324,2ff. vdV. *οἱ Δωριεῖς, ἐκφεύγοντες τὴν τῆς φωνῆς συνέμπτωσιν*.

<sup>341</sup> *Ἴνα μὴ συνεμπέση*, *GG* III i 425,15; 480,13f. This explanation goes back to Aristarch (*GG* III ii 53,12f.).

<sup>342</sup> The underlying theory is that two words which coincide in form will also come to coincide in accent, e.g. *GG* III i 417,2ff. *Λητώ, Κλειώ, Ἐρατώ* should have had a perisponemon accusative (from *-όα*). But this is not the case: *ὀξύνομεν διὰ τὴν συνέμπτωσιν τῆς εὐθείας. ὅτε γὰρ πτώσις ἑτέρα πτώσει συνεμπέση κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν, πάντως καὶ ὁμοτονεῖ*. Cf. *GG* III i 418,9f. The accusatives *αἰδῶ* and *ἠῶ* (*GG* III ii 33,19) do not fall under this rule, since in their case the nominatives and accusatives are not identical: *μὴ κρατούμεναι ὑπὸ τῆς συνεμππτώσεως κατὰ τὴν εὐθείαν, περισπῶνται, κατεχόμεναι τῷ λόγῳ τῆς συναλοιφῆς, οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ πτωτικοῦ χαρακτήρος. ἡ δὲ Λητώ καὶ Πυθῶ καθάπερ κατεχόμεναι ὑπὸ*

in those cases *συνέμπτωσης* is not avoided, but rather it triggers an analogical procedure to create a greater (visual/acoustic)<sup>343</sup> regularity in a paradigm. It seems that in these cases he employs the word *συνεμπίπτειν* and its derivatives, where his father would probably have spoken of *συνεκδρομή* (false analogy).<sup>344</sup>

### 3.3.1. *Συνέμπτωσης and μερισμός*

We have watched Apollonius establish the *μερισμός* of a word a number of times already. Usually, if there are two or more options, he checks the formal characteristics of a word and its semanto-syntactical behaviour against the definitions of the parts of speech for which the word at issue is a candidate. If the dubious word is a *συνέμπτωσης*, however, its form becomes irrelevant for its *μερισμός*. In those cases Apollonius is forced to concentrate his arguments on semantic and syntactic points only. We have seen a sample of such a situation in the case of *ὀ* and *ὄς*: in some constructions their value is paraphrased with the help of *τις*. It was remarked above (section 3.2.1.) that the main test for establishing such a separate meaning was *μετάληψις*.<sup>345</sup>

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της *συνεμπτώσεως* τῆς φωνῆς κατέχονται καὶ τῷ τόνῳ (cf. 335,24ff.).

<sup>343</sup> Cf. the peculiar note on the orthography of *χίλιοι*, *GG III ii 605,9ff.*: τὸ χίλιοι διὰ τοῦ ι γράφεται διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ἐν τῇ ἀρχούσῃ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν *συνεμπίπτων* ὀνόματι στοιχείου καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φυλάττει γραφὴν (e.g. *εἴκοσι* which begins with the Greek name of the epsilon, cf. Plutarchus' work *Περὶ τοῦ Εἰ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς*). The same goes for *χίλιοι*. Professor Ruijgh calls attention to the fact that the name of the letter was, in fact, originally *χεί*.

<sup>344</sup> Cf. *adv.* 142,9-19; 143,26; cf. on this kind of creative analogy also Phot. *Bibl.* 279 (532a1): ὁ τε *συνπλεκτικός* ἐγκλίνεται *μόνος*, ἴσως διότι τοῖς *παραπληρωματικοῖς* κατὰ φωνὴν *συνεμπίπτει* (the proof that one really has to do with two words in the case of *τε* is based on Aeolic, which makes a formal distinction between the two). I cannot explain the purport of this observation on Aeolic *το*. For *τε* as *παραπληρωματικός*, cf. Ruijgh 1971, 71ff.

<sup>345</sup> It is clear that *συνεμπτώσεις* are an interesting field of research if one wants to exclude the influence of formal arguments - the ancient authors dealing with these words are as if they were forced to come out with conceptual (semantic/syntactic) arguments. At first sight it would seem that we could in a similar way distil the purely syntactical views of the ancient grammarians, if any, by concentrating on those categories of meaning that can be represented by two or more parts of speech, i.e. the reverse of the "synemptotic" situation. For if arguments based on the *σημαινόμενον* are to be used at all, they evidently have to be of a syntactical rather than a semantical nature in this case. Examples from the sphere of the indeclinable parts of speech are the semantic categories of *δισταγμός* or *εἰκασμός*, *βεβαίωσις* and *παρακέλευσις*. Each of these categories can be realized by either an adverb or a conjunction. However, we always find it simply stated that an adverb or conjunction has a certain meaning; nowhere in our sources is the slightest attention paid to the fact that these semantic categories can have such a double implementation, let alone that

A group of words in which there is a kind of structural συνέμπτωσης is formed by the σύνδεσμοι which coincide with temporal or local adverbs e.g. ἐπεὶ, "when" (adv.) or "because" (conj.); ὅπου, "where" (adv.) or "since" (conj.).<sup>346</sup> The classification of ἐπεὶ is a relatively marginal issue to Apollonius,<sup>347</sup> but perhaps for that very reason all the more illustrative of some important principles underlying Apollonius' μερισμός. What strikes the modern reader, is that the use of ἐπεὶ as a subordinator, introducing a temporal subordinate clause, is without hesitation called adverbial by Apollonius. It will appear that there are at least two, and possibly three reasons for him to do so.

First of all it should be noted that certain categories of meaning are preferably, although not necessarily exclusively, linked with certain parts of speech. Thus, if a word expresses ἀναφορά, this tells in principle for its being an ἄρθρον, and if it expresses πράγμα, chances are that we have to do with a verb. As we shall see, the meanings which are primarily linked up with adverbs are τόπος, χρόνος and τρόπος (place, time and manner). Therefore, temporal meaning would in itself be sufficient reason to call a word an adverb, provided there are no formal objections to such a μερισμός. Moreover, causal meaning was almost automatically connected with conjunctions. In the case of ἐπεὶ this explains why it is considered an adverb if it has temporal meaning and a conjunction if it is causal (section 3.3.1.1.). Here I shall have occasion to add some remarks on the absence of the notion of subordination in Antiquity (section 3.3.1.1.1.).

Secondly, Apollonius considered the fact that a word belonged to a certain ἀκολουθία or συζυγία, valuable evidence for its μερισμός. Words pertaining to one ἀκολουθία belong to the same part of speech. The notion of συζυγία needs extending a little to make ἐπεὶ fit in. It can be used as an argument because

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syntactical observations were made on the basis of which the meristic decision was taken. In fact we only find that formal arguments - which do, of course, apply here - are made use of again.

As an example I give the full material for the category διαταγμός/εἰκασμός: adverbs: ἴσως, τάχα, τυχόν, σχεδόν, μή, (δήπου δῆθεν που); conjunctions: ἐάν, εἰ, ἥ.

Sources: adverbs: DTh. 80,2; ApD. *synt.* 494,3ff.; SchDTh. 101,1ff.; SchAp.Rhod. Γ 539a; P.Yale 446 col. ii 2ff.; 18; P.Lit.Lond. 182 col. ii 80-105; Cramer *AO* I 280,15ff.; Bekker *AG* I 309,20ff. Conjunctions: ApD. *synt.* 374,10ff.; 375,10ff.; SchDTh. 283,33f.; 284,2; Hdn. *GG* III ii i 110,25ff.; Cramer *AO* I 162,26ff.; MichSync. § 196, 1690ff.

<sup>346</sup> Cf. *coni.* 245,15ff. Notice that in the example of ὅπου "since", the Greek always has ὅπου γε (*coni.* 245,20). I will not discuss the syndesmic status of ὅπου separately - here too, it is causal *meaning* (μετάληψις with causal ὅτι, *coni.* 245,23) that is decisive.

<sup>347</sup> Cf. especially *coni.* 245,11ff.; *synt.* 483,3ff.

ὅτε does belong in a συζυγία, and ὅτε is synonymous to ἐπεὶ; this can be proved by means of μετάληψις (section 3.3.1.2.).

A third factor which may have played a role is that the Stoics paid relatively much attention to the conjunctions and virtually none to the adverbs. The conjunctions were related to the Stoic list of complex *axiomata*; they were necessary for the construction of such *axiomata*.<sup>348</sup> It cannot be excluded that the grammarians were inclined to assign those "connectors" that had no function in the Stoic list to the rest-category of the adverbs.<sup>349</sup> However, I shall leave this latter possibility out of account and discuss the former arguments, especially the first, in more detail.

### 3.3.1.1. Τρόπος, τόπος, χρόνος and causality

The importance of the three categories of local and temporal adverbs and those of manner, appears from their prominent position in the discussion of the interrogatives. Such a discussion is to be found in Apollonius' *Syntax* for instance (28,1-33,8), where it serves to underscore the superiority of nouns and verbs to the other parts of speech. After having discussed the order of the parts of speech and before dealing with the several parts of speech by themselves (*synt.* 28,1ff.) Apollonius gives a survey of the problem of the interrogatives: Why is it that interrogatives belong to only two parts of speech, namely the noun and the adverbs, and why are there various kinds of nominal and adverbial interrogatives?<sup>350</sup> As a matter of fact, it is this very state of affairs which to Apollonius indicates once again the prominence of nouns and verbs. For by means of nominal interrogatives we request information about a nominal constituent (*synt.* 29,1ff.), whereas an adverbial interrogative seeks information about an unknown διάθεσις, i.e. a verbal situation (*synt.* 32,9ff.). Such adverbs ask something about the ποιότης τῆς πράξεως, the nature or quality of the action,<sup>351</sup> or about the time when an action or event took place, or about the place where, whither, or whence.<sup>352</sup> The existence of nominal (adjectival) and

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<sup>348</sup> See chapter III.

<sup>349</sup> See chapter IV section 3.2.2. note 107. Cf. Lallot 1985, 93.

<sup>350</sup> The examples of adverbial interrogatives are πῶς, πότε, πηρὶκα, ποῦ, πῆ ("whither"), πόθεν.

<sup>351</sup> The most typical examples are axiological qualifications of the type εὖ, κακῶς, καλῶς, αἰσχρῶς, δικαίως, ἀδίκως.

<sup>352</sup> Cf. ps.Theodos. 22,28f.; Prisc. III 123,13ff. (for 123,20f., cf. ps.Theodos. 26,21ff.); Max.Plan. *synt.* 119,11ff., esp. 121,23ff. Modal: cf. [Serg.] IV 509,24ff.; Cled. V 20,29ff.

adverbial interrogatives is related to the quasi adjectival character of the adverbs (*synt.* 32,10f., see section 2.2.2.). Accordingly, the Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax remarks (SchDTh. 281,11ff.): 'Ἐκ τοῦ πῶς ζητεῖται τρόπος, τοῦ πηρὶκα χρόνος, τοῦ πόθεν τόπος καὶ τοῦ ποῦ καὶ πόσε.<sup>353</sup> In the same vein we read in SchDTh. 240,12ff.: καὶ τρία κατὰ τὸ σημαίνόμενον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιρρήμασιν (sc. τὰ ἐρωτηματικά): ἢ γὰρ πράξεώς εἰσι ζητητικά, ... ἢ τόπου ... ἢ χρόνου ... (240,15f.) πρόσκειται "κατὰ τὸ σημαίνόμενον", ἐπειδὴ κατὰ φωνὴν πλείονά εἰσιν, οἷον ...<sup>354</sup> Although in later discussions there is a greater variety in species of the interrogative adverbs (corresponding largely to the semantic refinements that were applied in distinguishing the several (semantic) types of adverbs), these three types remain dominant.

The pre-eminence of the χρόνου δηλωτικά and the τοπικά<sup>355</sup> is fairly evident.<sup>356</sup> The ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου are less familiar, at least terminologically.<sup>357</sup> However, there are several occurrences, the earliest not even in a "real" grammarian, but in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Comp.V.* 5,24ff.).<sup>358</sup> Now, Dionysius' interests are primarily rhetorical and philological. This state of

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<sup>353</sup> "By means of the interrogative πῶς ('how?'), we inquire into the manner, by means of πηρὶκα ('at what time?') into the time, by means of πόθεν ('whence?'), ποῦ ('where?') and πόσε ('whither?') for the place."

<sup>354</sup> "There are semantically speaking three kinds of adverbial interrogatives. For they either ask for the (manner of the) action, or for the place, or for the time ... 'Semantically speaking' was added, because from a formal point of view there are more of them, e.g. ..."

<sup>355</sup> DTh. 73,3; 76,2; cf. Schneider ad ApD. *adv.* 123,16.

<sup>356</sup> I suspect the organizing principle of the second part of *de adverbio* by Apollonius Dyscolus is a list of the endings which can be used to form local adverbs (from 176,7 onwards, after an initial alphabetical ordering).

<sup>357</sup> More usual is (ἐπ.) ποιότητος, which is used to the exclusion of τρόπου by e.g. ApD. (*adv.* 196,8f.; 12f.; 29; cf. 178,27; 205,3). I will not discuss the matter of the μεσότης here.

<sup>358</sup> "Ἐπι ... ἀμεινον ἐδόκουν εἶναι τὰ ῥήματα προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων, ἐπειδὴ πρότερόν ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὸ ποιῶν ἢ πάσχον τῶν συνεδρευόντων αὐτοῖς, τρόπου λέγω καὶ τόπου καὶ χρόνου καὶ τῶν παραπλησίω, ἃ δὴ καλοῦμεν ἐπιρρήματα. Schenkeveld 1983, 86 points out that DH has used (Stoic) διαλεκτικὰ τέχνη in this chapter. However, since he explicitly mentions the fact (*Comp.V.* 4f.) that he tried to work out a *rhetorical* theory on the basis of philosophical principles, but that this approach failed, it is not unlikely that he combined some of the principles found in the Stoic τέχνηαι with linguistic information from other sources, and built a new, but untenable, theory on that basis. This means that it is unnecessary to ascribe a theory of adverbs of time, place and manner to the Stoa. 'Ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου: cf. Schenkeveld 1983, 81; SchDTh. 281,11f.; 60,3ff.; 433,21; ps. Theodos. 87,3ff.; Max.Plan. *synt.* 71,27.

affairs should be combined with the fact that *τρόπος*, *τόπος* and *χρόνος* appear in the context of the interrogatives, which were used not only by the grammarians, but also to establish the rhetorical *περιστάσεις*.<sup>359</sup> Could the prominence of these three types of adverbs originate in rhetoric, one wonders?

Apart from the connection between adverbs of time, place and manner and the interrogatives, there is also the applicability of the term *σχέσις*. According to Ammonius (in *Ar. Int.*, CAG 4,5,11,15f.)<sup>360</sup> adverbs indicate *σχέσις* ... *τινα τοῦ κατηγορουμένου πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον*, a relationship of predicate to subject. Now, the types of adverbs which are usually indicated with the word *σχέσις* are the local and temporal adverbs (see section 1.2.). But there also is one instance where the adverbs of manner are included in this expression, viz. *ApD. adv.* 178,25ff.: "Ἐχοι δ' ἂν ἐπίστασιν καὶ τὸ ὄδε, συνήθως μὲν τὴν εἰς τόπον σχέσις δηλοῦν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ὀμηρικοῖς, ὡς Ἀριστάρχῳ δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ καθόλω μὴ τοπικῆς ἔχουσιν σχέσεως, τῆς δὲ κατὰ ποιότητά."<sup>361</sup>

In Latin grammarians the denotation *qualitatis* is, of course, the translation of ποιότητος (cf. *DTh.* 75,1) rather than of τρόπου.<sup>362</sup> However, we may wonder about Scaurus, whose definition of the adverb (*apud* Diomedes I 403,20f.) runs thus: *adverbium est modus rei dictionis ipsa pronuntiatione definitus, ut*

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<sup>359</sup> In rhetoric a *θέσις* may be turned into an *ὑπόθεσις*, a *quaestio finita*, by adding the so-called *περιστάσεις*, the circumstances (Martin 1974, 17). These also play a role in the *inventio*; they constitute the *loci argumentorum*. Hermogenes (II 212,19f. Spengel) divides the *περιστάσεις* into *τόπος*, *χρόνος*, *τρόπος*, *πρόσωπον*, *αἰτία*, *πράγμα* and mentions the fact that οἱ φιλόσοφοι had added a seventh item, namely *ἕλη*. Augustinus (141,20f. Halm) mentions seven categories, which can be found by posing the questions *quis quid quando ubi cur quomodo quibus adminiculis*.

The link with the (Aristotelian) theory of the categories is made in Quintilian (3,6,23ff.) in the context of the theory of *στάσεις*. Adamietz *a.l.* refers to the more usual context of the *loci argumentorum* 5,10,20ff. It should be noted that neither the Aristotelian categories nor the *περιστάσεις* are linked with the parts of speech in their original context (although the Aristotelian categories are meant as an instrument for analyzing predication (Pohlenz 1948, 69)).

<sup>360</sup> Cf. chapter IV section 6.1. note 215 for the correspondence of Ammonius' ordering of the adverbs to that of the *Techne*.

<sup>361</sup> "One could call ὄδε a problem, also, because in ordinary usage it means the relationship of the direction whither, whereas, as Aristarch thinks, in the work of Homer it usually does not express local relationships, but one of manner."

<sup>362</sup> E.g. *Char.* 248,8ff.; *Aug.* V 518; *Prisc.* II 91,20ff.; III 161,1.



*recte diligenter optime*.<sup>363</sup> Scaurus was probably influenced by the Stoics,<sup>364</sup> which makes me wonder whether such influence is also to be found in his definition of the adverb.<sup>365</sup> However, this is mere speculation and I shall not insist on this point. His definition is unique.<sup>366</sup>

Now, if manner, time and place are connected with adverbs on the level of the expression, what about causes?<sup>367</sup> For if our hypothesis that parsing is primarily based on certain meanings preferentially being linked with certain parts of speech, is to prove any good, we should demonstrate the likelihood of causes being linked with σύνδεσμοι. As a matter of fact, the linguistic elements that express causal relationships, were regarded as conjunctions from the very time they were seriously taken into consideration at all. As will be remembered, this was done by the Stoics, who formed their compound *axiomata* by means of two simple axioms and a conjunction. These compound *axiomata* were characterized by the conjunction which figured in them, and their names found a correlate in the name of the corresponding conjunction. Thus, the compound causal axiom was typified by the causal conjunction.<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>363</sup> "An adverb is a manner of the action defined by the very pronouncing of the word, e.g. 'well, carefully, very well'." Notice that an adverb according to Scaurus adds something to the meaning of the *res* (πράγμα) by means of a separate word, i.e. lexically, as opposed to temporal meaning for instance, which is inherent in the verb itself.

For Scaurus' definition we may compare the formulation of SchDTh. 101,1f. εἰκασμός ἐστίν ὁ μετὰ δισταγμοῦ εἰκάζων πρᾶγμα λόγος; 101,17f. καὶ εἴρηται ἐπιτάσεως ἢ παρατάσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιρρήματα, ἐπειδὴ δι' αὐτῶν ἐπιτείνομεν καὶ ἀξάνομεν τὰ πράγματα; 101,29f. βεβαίων γὰρ τις πρᾶγμα τοῦτω κέχρηται τῷ ἐπιρρήματι.

<sup>364</sup> This appears for instance, from his distinguishing the *appellatio* ("common noun") from the *nomen* ("proper noun") (Stoic: προσηγορία, ὄνομα), cf. *GL* I 300,25ff.

<sup>365</sup> The thought of the second meaning of *modus* inevitably crosses one's mind. However, Scaurus' examples leave no doubt that he does not envisage adverbs with the meaning of an ἔγκλις.

<sup>366</sup> Cf. Cleonius V 20,29ff.: *adverbium dictum est ideo quod coniunctum verbo vim eius explanet et impleat. nam cum dico lego, nec dicitur quem ad modum legam, sed adiecto adverbio exprimitur.*

<sup>367</sup> Cf. chapter III on the development of the notion of αἰτιολογικοὶ σύνδεσμοι.

<sup>368</sup> D.L. VII 72: αἰτιῶδες δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ συντασσόμενον διὰ τοῦ διότι οἷον διότι ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ αἰτίον ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου. The cautious οἷονεῖ and the similarly careful designation αἰτιῶδες are due to the fact that bodies only can constitute causes. A causal axiom is the linguistic representation of a real cause, cf. *SVF* II 118,5 Αἰτίαν δ' εἶναι λόγον αἰτίου ἢ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς αἰτίου;

Moreover, in the eyes of the Stoics, causes formed a class of their own, which was unrelated to other attendant circumstances. Whereas the Peripatetics had styled all those circumstances "causes" that have to be present for any action or event to take place, the Stoics had drastically reduced their number and no longer looked upon time and place as causes.<sup>369</sup>

To my hypothesis that causes are primarily connected with conjunctions on the level of the expression, it might be objected that διατί could be added to the list of interrogative adverbs.<sup>370</sup> This implies that causal meaning did not exclude such a classification. It is true that the "meristic" status of διατί was not uniformly agreed upon. It is either called an adverb, or an αἰτιολογικός σύνδεσμος, and perhaps it was sometimes looked upon as a nominal question.<sup>371</sup>

The fact that διατί - and especially διατί - was included among the adverbs can be connected with my hypothesis that the theory of the interrogative adverbs has something to do with the rhetorical theory of the περιστάσεις: This may not only explain the terminological surprise "τρόπος", but also the (rare) inclusion of "cause" among the adverbs. For "cause" is included in the rhetorical theory of the περιστάσεις as well as in the dialectical one of the categories.<sup>372</sup> We should thus assume that the diagnostic question διατί, establishing the nature of the περίστασις, is lumped together with the other interrogatives in grammatical theory.

It is unlikely that διατί should have been regarded as an adverb because of its form. Superficially, διατί may have seemed to parallel words like εἰσό etc.

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*SVF* II 119,41f. οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα κυρίως αἰτίον φασι, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον καταχρηστικῶς καὶ ὅλον αἰτιώδως; Cf. Sluiter 1988a, 46ff.

<sup>369</sup> Sen. *Ep.* 65,11.

<sup>370</sup> SchDTh. 433,13ff.: ποῖα τὰ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως; τὸ πόθεν ποῦ διατί πηρῖκα πῶς. Notice that διατί does not recur in 433,21ff. On the other hand, διὰ τοῦτο was sometimes called a σύνδεσμος, cf. chapter III n. 49. For λυατί, see chapter III section 3.1.3.

<sup>371</sup> Adverb: Hdn. *GG* III i 506,15f. (cf. Cramer *AO* III 280,4); *Et. M.* 471,16ff.; Choer. *ps.epim.* 66,15f.; Max. Plan. *synt.* 125,1ff.

Σύνδεσμος αἰτιολογικός: SchDTh. 585,19.

Nominal: ? Zonaras 1110 (although in all likelihood the caption ἐπίρρημα (which in Zonaras includes all indeclinabilia) is missing here, cf. the first lemma of 1111. Cf. also my remarks on ApD. below.

In the Latin grammarians *cur* is considered an interrogative adverb, Prisc. III 65,15; 137,18ff.; 123,23; Don. IV 362,26; [Asper] V 552,10f.; Aphthonius VI 201,27f., cf. *Excerpta Audacis* VII 348,14 and Dositheus VII 410,24 (with Jeep (1893, 278 n. 2) read *percunctandi* instead of *recusandi*); Sacerdos VI 442,20; Cassiod. VI 156,12ff.; Beda VII 267,28.

<sup>372</sup> Cf. note 359 αἰτία, *cur*; cf. Quint. 3,6,27.

It is a compound, consisting of a preposition and a noun. Such preposition groups (εἰςὄ etc.) are discussed in Apollonius' *Syntax* (478,13ff.; 480,21ff.). But there, it is argued that the meaning of such groups is adverbial; they indicate either time or place.<sup>373</sup> Since these preposition-groups (consisting of a preposition plus an ἄρθρον) clearly yield one simple meaning instead of a complex one, they are looked upon as a syntactic/semantic unity. Their meaning then causes them to be looked upon as adverbs.

This kind of argument could not have been put forward in the case of διατί, unless the semantic aspect was completely neglected. Since there is no confirmation for this line of thought in our sources, it is an unattractive solution to our problem. Apollonius, who did not associate causal meaning with adverbial status, certainly does not support such a theory. He pays attention to these causal words/word-groups in two contexts. The first is to be found at the end of *de adverbio*: There Apollonius asks himself to what part of speech the word τώ belongs (*adv.* 199,1ff.). The possibilities that are offered at the beginning of the discussion are an ἐπίρρημα αἰτίας παραστατικόν,<sup>374</sup> a σύνδεσμος αἰτιώδης or a preposition with an accusative case. In the latter case, τώ is supposed to have originated from διὰ τό, with ensuing ellipsis of the preposition and lengthening of the ο.<sup>375</sup> Apollonius decides in favour of the latter solution, after having discarded the option that he was dealing with a conjunction on the grounds that no μετάληψις could be effectuated with any

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<sup>373</sup> Εἰςὄ is a synonym of ἔως, which agrees in μερισμός with its demonstrative correlate τέως. Apollonius rejects the direct derivation of εἰςὄ from ἔως by means of an "inversion of all accidents of the word" (*synt.* 479,6ff.): exchange of length of syllables, transposition of the σ from the middle of the word to the end, and of the aspiration plus spiritus from first to last syllable. *Synt.* 481,8ff. it is set out how the different meanings can be explained. If combined with nouns indicating a place, preposition-groups will regularly have local meaning. The ἀναφορά expressed by the ἄρθρα makes a temporal nuance likely (482,1 χρόνου ὑπόμνησις). The reason the whole construction is felt to be adverbial, is that its meaning is one (482,3ff.) instead of complex. Apollonius concludes that in the case of εἰςὄ, ἐν ᾧ, ἐξ οὗ etc. we are dealing with adverbs "ἐκ παραθέσεως". Although Apollonius himself regularly uses ἐν ᾧ (and ἐν οἷς) as causal conjunctions (Schneider, *Tractatus* 158), he nowhere mentions this "συνέμπτωσις".

<sup>374</sup> Which would have been unique in its kind, if we except the questionable status of the interrogative διατί. It seems likely that Apollonius introduced this option solely for the sake of the argument to present an alternative (*disputatio in utramque partem*). However, he never seems explicitly to return to this possibility.

<sup>375</sup> Cf. the assumed ellipsis of διὰ in a construction like τρέμω σε, φεύγω σε (*synt.* 413,5ff.). There may be a play on the etymology of αἰτιατικός and αἰτιολογικός (*causativus*).

other causal conjunction ("therefore" cannot be replaced with "because", or "for").<sup>376</sup> The possibility of τῶ being an adverb has totally disappeared.

The second context is that of *synt.* 456,11ff. There, Apollonius treats διότι and καθότι as preposition-groups with the value of a σύνδεσμος.<sup>377</sup> This syndesmic value originates in the prepositions themselves, which often have a semantic value that is related to that of a σύνδεσμος (cf. section 3.2.).

Summing up, I think the representatives of causal relationships on the level of the expression were primarily associated with the part of speech of the conjunctions. This appears from the Stoic origins of the grammatical theory of the conjunction and from Apollonius Dyscolus. The counter-example διατί cannot be decisive: it is almost the only word expressive of a causal relationship to be now and then classified as an adverb. Probably this relates to its being an interrogative: such words were classified as either nouns or adverbs.

Thus, my hypothesis that adjuncts of time, place and manner will readily be associated with the part of speech adverb, whereas causal meaning will contribute to a word's syndesmic status, still stands. The fact that the difference became less pronounced in later theory can hardly be a serious objection.<sup>378</sup>

#### 3.3.1.1.1. Subordination

There is absolutely no trace here of the conception that the causal subordinate clause stands on a different level from the main clause: This is caused by the logical character of the relationship, the expression of which is analysed as follows: On two propositions A and B various logical operators may work, e.g. both/and, either/or, if/then: This excludes on principle any difference in status between coordinators and subordinators - the matter is passed over because it is entirely irrelevant to the problem. A proposition may be "one" in either of two ways: Either it is simple or it is united by a conjunction. In the

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<sup>376</sup> I.e. Apollonius rightly sees that the clause introduced by τῶ never contains the cause. Γάρ and ὅτι do share the characteristic of introducing the clause containing the cause, in accordance with the rule (*coni.* 239,16 οἱ ... αἰτιώδεις σύνδεσμοι μετὰ τῶν αἰτιῶν θέλουσι παραλαμβάνεσθαι).

<sup>377</sup> E.g. *synt.* 461,1ff.

<sup>378</sup> The example is the adverbial status of Latin *cum* in Charisius and Dositheus: *Char.* 291,25ff. the *coniunctiones finitivae* are discussed, *cum* among them (292,1ff.). However, Charisius does mention an alternative view, taking *cum* to mean *quo tempore*: *per hoc et adverbium esse potest temporis (ibid.)*. Cf. *Dos.* VII 418,23ff. Similarly, in his *Scholia* on *Ter. Eun.* 936 Donatus comments (the context being *Ter. Eun.* 934ff. *quae [sc. meretrices] dum foris sunt, nil videtur mundius, nec magis compositum quicquam nec magis elegans quam cum amatore cenam quom liguriunt*): *unum 'cum' praepositio est, alterum 'cum' coniunctio. Et dicitur haec figura πλοκή.*

latter case it is indeed a unity, but it also consists of two entities which individually are also independent propositions (Ar. *Int.* 17a8f.; cf. Ammon. in Ar. *Int.*, CAG 4,5,66,31ff.).

In the same way the automatical inference from temporal meaning to adverbial status ignores the whole problem of a hierarchical structure of sentences. A passage which illustrates how this works is Ammonius in Ar. *Int.*, CAG 4,5,68,10ff.: The issue is the fact that the sentence ἡλίου ὑπὲρ γῆν ὄντος ἡμέρα ἐστὶν forms a unity (εἷς ἐστὶν), but it neither seems to be ἀπλοῦς, nor is there a conjunction present in it. But on the other hand it is impossible that two ἀντοτελείς ἀποφάνσεις can be joined into one sentence without a σύνδεσμος being ἐνεργεῖα, i.e. *expressis verbis*, present. And indeed Ammonius upholds that here, too, a sentence which did contain a σύνδεσμος or the equivalent adverb was rephrased in such a way that the σύνδεσμος or the equivalent adverb are δυνάμει present still. The gen. abs. accordingly replaces a phrase introduced by the adverb ὅτε or the σύνδεσμος συναπτικός εἰ (25f.); the gen.abs. is thought to contain εἰ or ὅτε "δυνάμει". There is no difference in syntactical status. The difference is semantical only.

### 3.3.1.2. Συζυγία and μερισμός

Recalling our example mentioned in section 3.1., ἐπεὶ would thus be classified as an adverb if it has temporal value, but if causal, it would be regarded as a conjunction. Another factor for the μερισμός of a word is its belonging to a συζυγία: For all members of such a series of words belonging together in a certain respect tend to be reckoned to the same part of speech. Now, at first sight ἐπεὶ does not belong to a συζυγία at all. However, ἐπεὶ is a synonym of ὅτε, as appears from the possibility of μετάληψις, and ὅτε does form part of a συζυγία: Just like the fact that τις formed a συζυγία/ἀκολουθία with τίς, ὅς and ὅστις was used as an argument for its μερισμός,<sup>379</sup> so in this case, too, we are dealing with a συζυγία: ὅτε belongs in one group with πότε, τότε and ὁπότε, and indeed it is a relative temporal adverb. The respension ὅτε ... τότε or *vice versa* is an indication that the two words belong to the same part of speech.<sup>380</sup> Ἐπεὶ is a synonym of ὅτε and it can, moreover, be answered by the indubitable temporal adverb τότε.<sup>381</sup> Therefore, temporal ἐπεὶ is held to be an adverb.

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<sup>379</sup> See section 3.2.1.

<sup>380</sup> Cf. Lallot 1985, 87.

<sup>381</sup> SchHom. M 13a; notice the context (M 10ff.) ὄφρα μὲν ... τόφρα δέ ...· αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ... δὴ τότε ...

But the grammarians were not satisfied yet and tried to come up with an appropriate etymology for ἐπεὶ. Analogous to the other relative adverbs, a relative derivation of ἐπεὶ χρονικόν was looked for. Heracleides (*apud* ApD. *synt.* 483,3ff.) thought that the origin of ἐπεὶ was comparable to the adverbs εἰς, ἐν, ὧ, ἐξ οὗ. He derived it from the local adverb οὗ which changed into εἰ in Doric. It was then combined with the prefix ἐπί meaning ἀπό. The psilosis was not felt to be an objection.<sup>382</sup>

Apollonius, however, rejects this etymology, because it leaves the accent (484,8) and the meaning (484,11ff.) unexplained. In dialectal changes, it is the form only that can undergo πάθη. The meaning should be left intact, on the now familiar principle that a meaning, being incorporeal, cannot act or be acted upon. Since the original local meaning would have been lost in the new compound - which is unacceptable -,<sup>383</sup> ἐπεὶ should rather be considered a case of συνέμπωσις with the conjunction ἐπεὶ (which is derived from the συναπτικός "εἰ", and not from any adverb). And then we are on familiar ground again: Ἐπεὶ is not the only word in which a temporal adverb and a causal conjunction coincide.<sup>384</sup> The same goes for words like ὄφρα and ὅπως. Therefore, it is not at all strange, if ἐπεὶ functions in the same way: It is a causal conjunction, coinciding with a temporal adverb.<sup>385</sup>

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<sup>382</sup> This derivation found its way into e.g. Cyrillus' *Συναγωγή* (Bachmann *AG* I 227,4); it is probably based on the Homeric use of ἐπεὶ, denoting anteriority of the action or event in the temporal clause.

<sup>383</sup> Cf. *Et. G.* 197,30: ἐπεὶ ἐπίρρημα τοπικόν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀφ' οὗ (it then derives from ἐπί and εἰ); it is also a χρονικόν ἐπίρρημα instead of ἀφ' οὗ and ὅταν; 197,35ff. ἡλικία δὲ καὶ αἰτιολογικός παραλαμβάνεται, σύνδεσμός ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶν. Cf. also the various derivations in *Et. M.* 356,7ff.; Zonaras 854.

<sup>384</sup> For this broad use of "causal", cf. chapter III.

<sup>385</sup> ApD. *coni.* 245,18ff. If ἐπεὶ is causal, it can only be a conjunction. Cf. the μερισμός of μεταξύ and ἔνεκα. Neither word can be a preposition on formal grounds: The prepositions are a well-circumscribed group of 18 words which are characterized by the fact that they can be used both συνθέσει and παραθέσει. Μεταξύ has local meaning; therefore it is an adverb (cf. Lallot 1987, 84). Ἐνεκα is causal in meaning, which pleads for its being a conjunction. In this case, there is also the correspondence and confusion with the real conjunction οὐνεκα and the corresponding correlative τοῦνεκα which will have been of influence. Οὐνεκα is analysed as being either a simple conjunction, equivalent to ὅτι or a complex one, composed of οὗ ἔνεκα. In the latter meaning it finds a correlate in the demonstrative τοῦνεκα, which is not immediately derived from it, but is independently compounded out of τοῦ and ἔνεκα (ApD. *coni.* 237,23ff.) (cf. Schneider *ad coni.* 238,3-6 for the contradiction with *pron.* 57,4). Ἐνεκα and οὐνεκα were wrongly interchanged now and then, cf. ApD. *coni.* 239,3f. παρασυγχέοντες; Ammonius *diff.* 362; 473 Nickau; Lehrs 1865, 151: In these cases ἔνεκα was construed with a verb and οὐνεκα with a

#### 4. Conclusion

This chapter contained a study of the best of ancient grammarians, Apollonius Dyscolus. Apollonius has a clearly conceived image of the structure of language. This is an ordered, symmetrical whole, hierarchically organized in several levels, which are characterized by the isomorphism of their internal structure. The highest level of language is that on which meanings combine to form complete messages. The levels below have to do with the form of the expressions. This dichotomy of form and meaning is a Stoic inheritance.

In itself, language can be studied from a formal point of view as well as from a semantic one. However, semantics are intrinsically more important than the physical sounds (φωναί). Accordingly, if formal and semantic aspects of a word contradict each other, it is the semantic aspect that is decisive for establishing the part of speech such a word belongs to (μερισμός).

Another indication of the importance attached to meaning, is the concept of καταλληλότης. For this is essentially semantic in character: it indicates complete syntactic congruency and semantic compatibility; it is the notion into which symmetry of structure and semantics merge. Ideally speaking, καταλληλότης should be a characteristic of both the form and the meaning of any expression. In practice, however, it often happens that something is wrong with language as it presents itself to us, both in daily usage and in a literary context. One of the grammarian's diagnostic methods is the falsification-principle of ἔλεγχος, which similarly rests on a semantic basis. A word or a construction can be rejected only if there is an alternative linguistic means which conveys the same meaning in a more appropriate way.

In case of problems, the grammarian should use his reason. Should there be a problem in a (literary) text, he can also take recourse to literary parallels and the usage of his particular author - the same criteria that the pure philologist would apply. If a problem arises in everyday usage, he can consult the work of preceding grammarians and see if a confrontation with observed daily usage yields any satisfactory results. These criteria were applied by scholars who studied "correct Greek" or *Hellenismos*. The latter differed from Apollonius in that they were mainly interested in morphological matters. But if all else fails, reason is the ultimate refuge. Thus, a compromise is effected between an

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genitive: It is clear that both constructions facilitated the classification of ἔνεκα with the conjunctions. Thierfelder's explanation of ἔνεκα as a causal conjunction is weak (1935, 52 n. 4). In the case of ἔνεκα, therefore, the same factors work as for ἐπεὶ, namely semantics and correlatives.

empirical approach and the a-prioristic belief in underlying order. The Stoa had managed a similar compromise.

Whatever may go wrong with the form of the expression: at all times there is the *καταλληλοτης* holding good for the meaning. And here is another advantage of reason (or analogy) over the other criteria, namely that it penetrates immediately into the orderliness of the meaning. It is able to detect even those (formal) mistakes which completely escape the eye or the ear and refers us to the system of rules and the basic regularity underlying the actual presentation of language. The underlying system is used mainly to clarify and interpret the physical sentences which form the object of study of the grammarian. Apollonius represents the meaning of any sentence under discussion by means of a paraphrase. Thus, he makes a word-picture of the meaning, which in itself cannot, of course, be caught in words, because it functions on a fundamentally different level from those words. In these word-pictures Apollonius imitates the ideal one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning, which is mostly absent from real language.

After having surveyed Apollonius' views on the functioning of language and the role of grammar, we observed him at work. First a number of passages from Apollonius' work *de adverbio* were studied. His definition was interpreted on the basis of the ensuing discussion and parallel passages from his other works. It was shown that a quick grasping of Apollonius' meaning is often impeded by the fact that he uses his technical terms in a looser sense as well. We studied his use of *ἔγκλισις* and *κατηγορεῖν*. Further, it was made probable that the definition contains traces of implicit polemic against the Stoa. Especially those elements in the definition which stress the differences between adverb and verb, pointed in this direction. The definition was subsequently used by Apollonius as an important criterium for establishing *μερισμός*.

Like all Greek grammarians, Apollonius analysed linguistic structure into its smallest independent meaningful components, the parts of speech. These parts of speech were automatically associated with certain functions, or perhaps it is better to say that certain semantic categories were felt to call for a specific part of speech. The result is, that a correct *μερισμός* of any given word is equivalent to the correct description of its linguistic function. We watched Apollonius establishing the *μερισμός* of a number of problematic items and observed the techniques he applies: In his use of the *disputatio in utramque partem* he showed influence from rhetoric; *μετάληψις*, the technique of replacing a questionable word with a less problematic equivalent, was popular not only in rhetoric, as a means of clarification, but also in a philological context. It is one



of the means by which Apollonius tackles the problem of the coincidence of word-forms, homonymy (συνέμπτωσης).

Homonymy was a thorn in the skin of all students of language from the earliest times. It is one of the symptoms of an imperfect one-to-one correspondence of words and meanings. Apollonius accepts the existence of homonymy, satisfying himself with showing the linguistic factors which are of help in dealing with it: any ambiguities resulting from it will usually be cleared away by the context.

For the student of Apollonius it is interesting that in cases of συνέμπτωσης all recourse to formal arguments in establishing a correct μερισμός is made impossible. The grammarian is forced to come up with conceptual arguments, of a syntactic or semantic nature. It appears that semantic arguments again dominate the discussion. Certain categories of meaning were automatically associated with a particular part of speech. Time, place and manner are the most important semantic categories of the adverb. Causes are connected with syndesmic status. Since "time", temporal relationships, could be lexically expressed by adverbs only, no such thing as a temporal conjunction can exist in Antiquity.

Another important factor in establishing the μερισμός of a word was the question whether or not it shows relationships of a paradigmatic nature (συζυγία) with other words, the μερισμός of which was undisputed. In that case it follows its paradigmatic correlate.

## Chapter III - CAUSAL INA

### 0. Introduction

In this chapter the starting point will not be the sciences which were at the origins of grammar, nor one particular grammarian, but a grammatical phenomenon that we know of through virtually no other source than the grammarians. I refer to the so-called causal use of ἵνα.

As a matter of fact, the subject of causal ἵνα shows several affinities with the preceding chapter: ἵνα is a συνέμπωσις of a local adverb and a final and causal conjunction and, moreover, the grammarian who is most informative on this issue is no other than Apollonius Dyscolus. I mean to start from his extensive discussion, and to try and resolve the obscurities it contains. Then I shall look into the origins of causal ἵνα by comparing the history of the theories on causation to the history of the grammatical ideas on conjunctions.

I will argue that the whole concept of causal ἵνα rests for a large part on a terminological confusion. For, whereas a well-differentiated theory on the various types of causes had come down through the Peripatetics, distinguishing between efficient and final causes among other things, the grammatical terminology that was used to describe the conjunctions, was inherited from the Stoics, whose theory of causation was more monolithic. Therefore, the only term that penetrated into grammatical theory was αἰτιώδης or αἰτιολογικός, and this term embraced both the final and causal types of conjunctions. Some grammarians, however, apparently tried to give a more adequate description of the most current semantic value of ἵνα, calling it ἀποτελεσ(μα)τικός (final). In these grammarians, the word αἰτιολογικός came to be used for the purely causal conjunctions only. However, right up to the end of Antiquity, the broader use of the word also remained current.

This, I submit, made those grammarians who distinguished final and causal conjunctions, wonder what was meant by ἵνα αἰτιολογικός, which they took as "causal" in the strict sense. Possibly supported by the occurrence of a real, if rare and marginal (Alexandrian? colloquial?) usage, they came up with a theory of causal ἵνα, which, incidentally, became a lasting bother to grammarians.

I add some passages where ἵνα seems to be given a causal interpretation by ancient writers and a few places where causal ἵνα may actually occur. Finally, I briefly discuss the possible semantic development which may have led to a causal use of ἵνα. The chapter ends with a brief digression on the consecutive use of ἵνα and the relevance to the history of linguistics of the study of early Christian writers.

## 1. Apollonius Dyscolus on causal ἵνα<sup>1</sup>

### 1.1. Causal ἵνα in *de coniunctionibus*

In his long discussion of the causal conjunctions (*coni.* 234,13ff.), Apollonius states that ἵνα is used in three different ways, two of which are "syndesmic", one adverbial (local) (*coni.* 243,11ff.). As a σύνδεσμος it requires a subjunctive verb form, as an adverb it is followed by the indicative mood. The syndesmic use is normal, everyday usage; as an adverb it occurs in poetry. In this way the συνέμπωσις of the adverbial and "syndesmic" usages can be relieved of its ambiguity.

But the conjunction ἵνα is not quite straightforward either, for it is interpreted as either causal or final. The examples of causal ἵνα are: ἵνα ἀναγνῶ ἐτιμήθην, ἵνα λοιδορήσω ἐπεπλήχθην (243,21).<sup>2</sup> By their very nature the examples clearly betray their class-room origin. I will return to this point later.

The final use of ἵνα - which seems to be sneaking in through the back-door, since the issue was causal conjunctions - instigates a discussion of two other final conjunctions, to wit ὅπως and ὅφρα.<sup>3</sup> These words are part-synonyms of ἵνα, namely in its final meaning only. This is made clear by the examples Apollonius adduces, for these are derived from the ones he uses for final ἵνα, at least in the case of ὅπως.<sup>4</sup> It should be noticed that nowhere else in *de coniunctionibus* as we have it, are the final conjunctions given a separate treatment. We shall bear this in mind for the moment.

The most interesting part of Apollonius' discussion (from 244,24 onwards) is the brief treatment of the syntactic differences between causal and final ἵνα

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<sup>1</sup> In the following I disagree on a number of issues with Schöpsdau 1978, who uses much the same material to support his opinion that Apollonius ascribed the value of a preterite to the aorist subjunctive in *de coniunctionibus*, but corrected this view in the *Syntax*.

<sup>2</sup> "Because I had read, I was honoured; because I had used foul language, I was rebuked."

<sup>3</sup> *Coni.* 243,26-244,23. The strict order of Apollonius' exposé is often interrupted by short excursus which are linked to the main theme mainly by association.

<sup>4</sup> And ὅφρα is said to be synonymous to ἵνα and ὅπως, so that it cannot but be final.

and οἱ ἰσοδυναμοῦντες σύνδεσμοι.<sup>5</sup> We shall see that there is some confusion in this passage, which, however, will be clarified by means of the parallels from the *Syntax*.

The difference in construction, Apollonius explains, is a matter of verbal tense. A sentence containing final ἵνα is construed with a verb which refers to the future (μέλλοντα);<sup>6</sup> the "one that is used in a causal sense" (τὸν δὲ αἰτιολογικὸν λεγόμενον 244,27f.) is construed with a past tense (παρωχημένα). It will appear shortly that Apollonius himself cannot seriously uphold this difference, which rests on a somewhat forced interpretation of γράψω in "δὸς ἵνα γράψω" as a future indicative. However, at this stage of his exposition he confidently explains why the alleged difference between the final and the causal construction should obtain at all: τὰ γὰρ γεγονότα αἰτιολογεῖται, 244,28.

The most natural interpretation of this sentence is "for it is things past that are explained". This suggests that the past tense with which ἵνα supposedly is construed, is the tense of the *apodosis*.<sup>7</sup> Since the statement of the *apodosis* concerns something past, an explanation of it can be given, in this case by means of a causal *protasis* introduced by ἵνα. However, as Apollonius continues his exposé, it appears that he is discussing the tense of the *protasis*:<sup>8</sup> ἵνα αἰτιολογικός is followed by the aorist subjunctive, whereas he mentions that final ἵνα could be construed with a future tense, as in δὸς ἵνα γράψω. If Apollonius indeed wants to express the fact that the *protasis* should contain a

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<sup>5</sup> "The equivalent conjunctions." The latter addition could be taken to mean that Apollonius did consider ὅφρα and ὅπως to have a causal application after all, but I do not believe this is the case. Either he adds this clause for the sake of theoretical completeness or he means ἵνα + other final conjunctions vs. ἵνα + other causal conjunctions respectively and has expressed himself in his usual concise, not to say obscure, way. I think the latter explanation the more likely one. The places where ὅφρα is called a σύνδεσμος αἰτιολογικός (a.o. SchDTh. 439,27ff.; Choer. *GG* IV ii 275,3) cannot be used to support any but a final meaning for ὅφρα; they must be explained differently, see below.

<sup>6</sup> Although this is clearly not the only possibility, cf. καί 244,27; cf. Uhlig on *synt.* 382,3-9. Apollonius probably does not envisage the future tense only, but also e.g. imperatives, which have a future reference. Cf. Ruijgh 1985, 22ff.

<sup>7</sup> I use the words *apodosis* and *protasis* irrespective of their physical position in the sentence in respect to one another. In modern terms they are equivalent to governing and subordinate clause respectively. I prefer to use the Greek words in order to avoid the association of subordination. The use of *apodosis* and *protasis* is usually restricted to conditional and correlative periods; I have extended this usage somewhat for the occasion.

<sup>8</sup> 244,29ff.: ὁ γοῦν λέγων ἵνα γράψω ταῦτά μοι ἐγένετο, ὁμολογεῖ τὸ ἤδη γεγραφένα. ὥστε ἐνήργησεν ἤδη τὸ ἔγραψα καὶ αἰτίαν κατ' αὐτοῦ ἐπήγαγε.

past tense, we must interpret the sentence τὰ γεγονότα αἰτιολογεῖται differently, viz. as "things past are given as cause", τὰ γεγονότα being, so to say, a cognate accusative, which here has become subject of the passive construction.<sup>9</sup> But then again Apollonius subsequently undermines his self-created

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<sup>9</sup> This is in itself a very common construction, only in the case of this verb there are no parallels. Usually, the direct object becomes the subject of the passive construction, cf. e.g. Simpl. in Ar. *Phys.*, CAG 9,669,15 οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἡ διὰ τοῦ πλήρους τῶν ριπτομένων κίνησις αἰτιολογεῖται.

The only potential parallel that I know of for the construction of αἰτιολογέω that we should assume here, I do not consider a satisfactory one: in ApD. *coni.* 235,7ff examples are given of ὅτι αἰτιολογικός: ὅτι ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶν ὅτι περιπατῶ, κινουμαι ὅτι ἡπαιδεύτησας, δαρῆση. καὶ ἦν πάλιν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκ τοῦ συνδέσμου ἡτιολογημένον, τὰ δὲ δύο τὰ πρότερα αὐτόθεν πάλιν εἶχε τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἀληθῆ ἔπει οὐ πάντως ὅτι ἀνέγνωσ τιμηθῆση. <οὐ γὰρ> πάντως σύνεστι τῷ ἀναγῶναι τὸ τιμηθῆναι. (Incidentally, I feel an addition before or after ὅτι ἡπαιδεύτησας δαρῆση may not be imperative, but is very likely at least. Matthias suggests <ὅτι ἀνέγνωσ, τιμηθῆση>. In itself the necessity of a supplement has nothing to do with the meaning of ἔπει, contra Schneider *a.l.*)

The drift of the passage seems to be a distinction between cause and effect which are necessarily linked up with each other (αὐτόθεν) (it being day/it being light), *versus* cases of "optional effect": As soon as the effect is realized there need be, in these cases, no doubt as to its being related to its cause, but the cause by itself does not of necessity bring about the effect. Therefore the causal relationship has to be made explicit by means of the conjunction. Cf. Clem.Alex. *Strom.* VIII 9 = SVF II 347. (a distinction is made between an αἴτιον (ποιητικόν) and τὸ δι' ὃ): πολλὰ γοῦν ἐφ' ἐν ἀποτέλεσμα συντρέχει, δι' ἃ γίγνεται τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστὶ πάντα αἴτια· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐτεκνοκτόνησεν Μῆδεια, εἰ μὴ ὠργίσθη· οὐδ' ἂν ὠργίσθη, εἰ μὴ ἐζήλωσεν· οὐδὲ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ ἠράσθη· οὐδὲ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ Ἰάσων ἔπλευσεν εἰς Κολχούς· οὐδὲ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ Ἀργῶ κατεσκευάσθη· οὐδὲ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ τὰ ξύλα ἐκ τοῦ Πηλίου ἐτμήθη [cf. the opening of Eur. *Med!*] ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἅπασιν τοῦ "δι' ὃ" τυγχάνοντος, οὐ πάντα τῆς τεκνοκτοίας αἴτια τυγχάνει, μόνη δὲ ἡ Μῆδεια. Cf. also Cic. *Fat.* 35f. Such an effect should therefore be explicitly ascribed to a cause, and this is managed linguistically by the use of a causal conjunction (ἐκ τοῦ συνδέσμου, which is opposed to αὐτόθεν). This, I think, is what it says in this text, but as to the exact meaning of καὶ ἦν πάλιν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκ τοῦ συνδέσμου ἡτιολογημένον, I see more than one solution.

According to LSJ *s.v.* αἰτιολογέω it means: "the conjunction indicates that the cause resides in ...". Thus, τὸ τοιοῦτον (namely ἀπαιδευτεῖν, or rather ἡπαιδεύτησας) is put forward as a cause; this is effectuated by the conjunction, i.e. it is the conjunction ὅτι which makes us see the ἀπαιδευτεῖν as the cause of the beating which may take place in the future. If this is what the construction is like, we have indeed found a parallel for "τὰ γὰρ γεγονότα αἰτιολογεῖται".

But if τὸ τοιοῦτον can refer to ἡπαιδεύτησας, I do not see why it could not refer just as well to δαρῆσεσθαι or δαρῆση: This would enable us to apply the more usual construction of αἰτιολογέω, the interpretation being "and this (namely the δαρῆσεσθαι) is explained by means of the conjunction".

There is also a third and entirely different possibility, which I tentatively propose: The sequence, I think, would make any interpretation preferable which can oppose the last example(s) in their entirety to the first two: τὰ δύο τὰ πρότερα means "the two first mentioned examples", i.e. two combinations of a

opposition between causal ἵνα + past tense and final ἵνα + future tense (or verb-form with future reference) by comparing the ambiguous γράψω with the corresponding forms of κείρω: \*δὸς ἵνα κερῶ is non-Greek,<sup>10</sup> whereas the unambiguous aorist-form κείρω yields an acceptable construction.

This means that for the time being we have to conclude that in *coni.* 244,24ff. Apollonius leaves us uncertain whether after all there is a difference in temporal construction between ἵνα αἰτιολογικός and ἀποτελεστικός, and if so, what is its nature. Therefore it is useful to compare his remarks in *de coniunctionibus* with those found in his *Syntax*. After that I will briefly return to the views expounded in *de coniunctionibus*.

### 1.2. Causal ἵνα in the *Syntax*

There are two relevant passages, 381,10ff. and 388,9ff. In the former the issue is the tense of the *apodosis* after a *protasis* containing εἰάν or ἵνα ἀποτελεστικός. From 382,3 onwards Apollonius declares that if a preterite tense is used, ἵνα may also be taken as αἰτιώδης, his example being ἵνα φιλολογήσω παρεγενήθη Τρύφων.<sup>11</sup> This is said to be an equivalent of διότι ἐφιλολόγησα παρεγενήθη Τρύφων.<sup>12</sup> Apollonius then adds (382,5ff.) that: οὐ τοῦτο δέ φημι, ὅτι καὶ ἀποτελεστικῶς πάλιν οὐ δύναται ἀκούεσθαι. δύναται γὰρ πάλιν οὕτως ἀκούειν, εἰς τὸ φιλολογησαί με παρεγενήθη Τρύφων. - ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖν ἔσομένοις ἢ σύνταξις τοῦ αἰτιολογικοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. ἐπὶ γὰρ γεγονόσιν αἰ αἰτίαι ἐπιλέγονται. ὅθεν καταλληλότερος γίνεται ὁ αἰτιολογικὸς ἐπιφερομένων τῶν παρωχημένων ἵνα ὑβρίσω Θέωνα, οὐ

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ὅτι-clause with an *apodosis*. Could τὸ ἡτιολογημένον mean "the causal (complex) proposition"? Apollonius would then have invented (? I know of no earlier, nor, for that matter, of a later example of this use) a name corresponding perfectly to συνημμένον, συμπεπλεγμένον or διεξευγμένον: a perfect participle passive to indicate a species of the complex axiomata. Cf. D.L. VII 69. The problem is that there is no parallel for this use (but see below, section 2. with note 38 for another attempt at making the terminology uniform), and that there already existed a name for the causal complex axiomata, to wit, τὸ αἰτιώδες. Nevertheless, this is a suggestion that I would venture.

<sup>10</sup> For the comparison with Doric, cf. *synt.* 389,13ff.

<sup>11</sup> "Because I was studying, Trypho came by."

<sup>12</sup> *id.*

φήσομεν, ἀγανακτήσει Δίων, ἡγανάκτησεν δέ. ἐπὶ γε μὴν τοῦ ἀποτελεσματικοῦ ἔνεστι φάναι ἵνα ὑβρίσω Θέωνα παρέσται Τρύφων.<sup>13</sup>

In the context discussed here there is no room for doubt: The issue is clearly the tense of the *apodosis* (see especially the example ἵνα ὑβρίσω Θέωνα, οὐ φήσομεν ἀγανακτήσῃ etc.).<sup>14</sup> Apollonius' point is that whereas a final interpretation of ἵνα is possible irrespective of the tense of the *apodosis*, a causal interpretation is virtually excluded if a future tense is used in the *apodosis*. We should notice that the preference for a *past* event being explained by a causal *protasis* rests on logical grounds. One can only establish the fact that something has been caused by something else with certainty after the effect has actually come into existence. To Apollonius the use of past tenses in a causal context is, therefore, apparently prototypic. Incidentally, it may be remarked that Apollonius himself does not restrict himself to such prototypic examples in his discussion of the αἰτιολογικοί. We may compare the examples quoted in note 9 of ὅτι αἰτιολογικός.

Thus, the phrase ἐπὶ γὰρ γεγυόσιν αἰ αἰτίαι ἐπιλέγονται sheds a clear light on its ambiguous brother "τὰ γεγονότα αἰτιολογεῖται". The former cannot but signify that causes are attributed to things past and ἐπὶ γεγυόσιν must indicate the action or event expressed by the predicate of the *apodosis*.<sup>15</sup> It seems not unreasonable to suppose that this interpretation, which makes good sense, was at the bottom of the passage from *de coniunctionibus* as well - I shall return to this shortly (1.3.).

When we look at the other *Syntax* passage about causal ἵνα (387,1ff.),<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> "Now I don't mean that it may not also be taken as a purpose clause; it can have the sense of *eis to philologesai me paregenethe Tryphon* ('Tryphon came in order for me to study'). But the construction cannot have the causal interpretation in a future context; causes are attributed only in the past [or rather: for causes are attributed only to past events, i.e. retrospectively I.S.]. That's why the causal interpretation is more grammatical in a past context: if I start with *hina hubriso Theona* in the causal sense ('because I injured Theon'), I won't finish *aganaktesei Dion* ('Dion will be angry'), but *eganaktesen* ('was angry'). But in the final sense it's all right to say *hina hubriso Theona parestai Tryphon* ('Tryphon will come so that [rather: 'in order that' I.S.] I may insult Theon')" (transl. Householder).

<sup>14</sup> Ἐπιφερομένων τῶν παρωχημένων can hardly refer to both *protasis* and *apodosis* in this passage; for in that case Apollonius renders his argument unnecessarily obscure by apparently interpreting ἵνα ὑβρίσω in two different ways, one of which we know he rejected out of hand (cf. section 1.1. *in fine*).

<sup>15</sup> Schöpsdau (1978, 277) rejects the parallelism of these phrases and explains the one in *de coniunctionibus* as referring to the contents of the *protasis* and only the *Syntax* passage as dealing with the *apodosis*.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Schöpsdau 1978, 278f.

we find that again the context is important. Here, Apollonius is involved in the question why the so-called ἐπιζευκτικοί reject construction with verb-forms with past-tense endings. He explains this from the semantic incompatibility of the notion "past" and the connotation of futurity inherent in the σύνδεσμοι ἐπιζευκτικοί. For these convey a δισταγμὸς ... τῶν ὡς ἐσομένων πραγμάτων ... καὶ ἔτι τῶν ὡς τελεσθησομένων.<sup>17</sup>

In contrast with *synt.* 381,10ff. we have here to do with the tense of the *protasis* (cf. *synt.* 387,3 where \*ἐὰν ἔλεγον, \*ἐὰν πέποιθα are declared ungrammatical). Past and future cannot be thus united.<sup>18</sup> Therefore a form is

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<sup>17</sup> "Uncertainty about things that one expects will happen and, furthermore, about things that one expects will be completed/fulfilled." Uhlig has collected a number of parallels for this use of ὡς ad *synt.* 39,11. In some contexts the addition of ὡς indicates that the following word is used in a wider sense, cf. *adv.* 121,7f. τὰ μὲν ἄρθρα πρὸς τὰ πτωκῆ ἢ ὡς πτωκῆ ("the article is construed with declinable parts of speech or words that behave like them"; cf. Schneider, *Tractatus* 150f.). On the other hand, sometimes ὡς is just superfluous and does not add anything, cf. *pron.* 10,21 with *synt.* 39,11. I am sorely tempted to consider τὰ ὡς ἐσόμενα πράγματα and τὰ ὡς τελεσθησόμενα πράγματα as exponents of the former group ("things/actions that probably (according to one's expectations) will happen", "things/actions that will probably (according to one's expectations) be effectuated"), but I readily admit that I cannot prove this. The Greek for "things/actions that will happen" would be τὰ μέλλοντα (ἔσεσθαι) πράγματα. Cf. Schenkeveld 1982, 255.

<sup>18</sup> We are here confronted with the problem of the temporal value of the subjunctive aorist, which I will not enter into very deeply. If we compare the scheme in section 1.2. *in fine*, we see that the subjunctive should be past to generate a causal interpretation for ἵνα, but may not be so for final ἵνα to be possible. We should realize in the first place that causal ἵνα is excepted from the rule about causal conjunctions + past indicative. For the rest, the gist of the problem is this: The subjunctive mood has no preterite endings, since the meaning of the conjunctions [and the subjunctive mood is characterized by the fact that it does not occur without a conjunction] is basically incompatible with "past-ness": they imply futurity (*synt.* 387,1ff.). Therefore, the subjunctive cannot end in -ov: \*ἐὰν ἔλεγον is an unviable expression (at least in literary texts; in colloquial *koinè*, ἐὰν/ἄν gradually replaced εἰ, so that ἐὰν came to be construed with the indicative as well). ἵνα/ἐὰν ἀναγνώ are acceptable, because their ending does not indicate a past tense.

The meaning of ἐὰν ἀναγνώ is εἰ ἀνύσαιμι τὸ μαθεῖν. The value of the conjunction is still that of expressing τὸ ὡς ἐσόμενον, but the conjunctions are in themselves unmarked for παράτασις or ἄνυσις: This is the additional value contributed by the use of present or aorist stem respectively.

Παράτασις and ἄνυσις are temporal notions. Skrzeczka 1855,15 wrongly finds Apollonius unprecise, when he declares that the aorist subjunctive does not indicate "past-ness" (*synt.* 387,1ff.), and then uses words for present and past tenses when discussing the construction of certain conjunctions (*synt.* 389,6f.). He fails to see that παρωχημένος is used in a broader sense for all past tense forms, including all forms of the aorist stem, and in a stricter sense for the semantic value "past" (which is not identical with συντελείωσις).

Berrettoni 1989, 38f. rightly stresses the fact that in all Antiquity no separate word for "aspect" existed; he points out the intrinsic improbability of the hypothesis that the ancient grammarians would not have given a name to such a



used which does not express a past tense: ἵνα ἀναγνώ, ἔάν ἀναγνώ (*synt.* 388,2).<sup>19</sup>

The case of ἵνα αἰτιολογικός is again granted a separate mention (*synt.* 388,9ff.): Φαίνεται οὖν ὅτι ὁ αἰτιολογικός σύνδεσμος [i.e. ἵνα in its causal interpretation] τῇ πρὸς τὸν ἀποτελεστικὸν ὁμοφωνίᾳ συνήρπασε καὶ τὰ τῆς συντάξεως εἰς ταυτό, τάχα καὶ τῆς ἐπιρρηματικῆς ὁμοφωνίας συλλαμβανομένης τῷ λόγῳ· συντασσόμενα γὰρ τὰ ὀριστικὰ μετὰ τοῦ ἵνα ἐνδείκνυται τὸ τοπικὸν ἐπίρρημα "ἵνα τ' ἔτραφεν ἡδ' ἐγένοντο" (κ 417). ὁμόλογον γὰρ ὅτι οἱ αἰτιολογικοὶ παραφωχημένοι χρόνοι συντάσσονται, ὅτι ἔγραψα, ὅτι ἐνόησα.<sup>20</sup>

The double coincidence of ἵνα - which can represent an adverb and either of two kinds of conjunctions - has occasioned an exceptional construction for ἵνα αἰτιολογικός. Apollonius tentatively suggests that it was the formal coincidence with the *adverb* that stimulated a different construction, viz. that with the subjunctive, for all *syndesmic* uses of ἵνα; for the indicative is usually the sign that ἵνα is to be taken as an adverb.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, even if ἵνα is causal, and should normally speaking have allowed of (or even preferred) the construction with a past tense indicative, it construes with the subjunctive instead. This is only a secondary argument for Apollonius, who defends the unusual construction of causal ἵνα mainly by invoking the analogy with the construction of *final* ἵνα. This syndesmic use went hand in hand with a

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category, if, that is, it really was fundamentally different from the category χρόνος. I find this very convincing. See further Ruijgh 1985, especially 21ff.

Very wisely, Choeroboscus was later to cut short a similar discussion about the present and future tense endings of the aorist subjunctive (*GG* IV ii 278,23ff.). He does not want to explain this by saying that the subjunctive cannot indicate "past-ness": Κρεῖττον οὖν ἔστι λέγειν, ὅτι αὐταὶ αἰ καταλήξεις χαρακτηριστικαὶ εἰσι τῶν ὑποτακτικῶν, τουτέστιν ἢ εἰς ω καὶ ἢ εἰς μαι, καὶ μὴ ἀποδιδόναί αἰτίαν.

<sup>19</sup> Uhlig ad *synt.* 388,1 rightly calls attention to the fact that Apollonius does not mention the ind.praet. with ἵνα in an irrealis-construction.

<sup>20</sup> "Evidently the causal conjunction *hina* takes the same [subjunctive] construction as the purpose *hina* because of its identity of form, perhaps also influenced by the homophony of the [relative] adverb *hina* ('where'). When indicatives are construed with *hina*, it regularly has the locative sense [rather: it suggests the local adverb, I.S.], as in *Odyssey* 10,417 ... 'where they were born and brought up'. For it is well known that, otherwise, causal conjunctions are construed with past tenses, e.g. *hoti egrapsa* ('because I wrote') or *hoti enoesa* ('because I thought')" (transl. Householder). Notice the tentative suggestion that the homonymy with the local adverb also played a part: ἵνα μὴ συνεμπέσῃ ...! Cf. section 3.3.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *coni.* 243,12ff. where the use of indicative vs. subjunctive was the criterion for ἵνα being an adverb or a conjunction respectively.

subjunctive, whose endings do not indicate "pastness", and so the other syndesmic use of ἕνα was automatically combined with a subjunctive, too.

The following picture of the ideal, normative, prototypic construction of causal conjunctions has emerged from the foregoing: A causal conjunction is preferably construed with a preterite indicative in the *protasis* (*synt.* 389,4f.), the exception being causal ἕνα; this is caused by its homophony with the final conjunction (*synt.* 388,9ff.). The construction of a causal conjunction with a future tense in the *apodosis* is either neglected or cautiously rejected (*synt.* 382,7f.; cf. 382,9f., where the alternative construction with a past tense is called *καταλληλότερος*).<sup>22</sup> Apparently, a causal *protasis* combined with a future action or event is not considered prototypic.

A final conjunction may be construed with a past tense in the *apodosis* (*synt.* 382,5ff.), but not in the *protasis*, where a future tense is normal, *synt.* 387,7ff. Usually, it will be construed with a future or present tense in the *apodosis* as well (*synt.* 382,1f.). As long as we distinguish whether the tense of the *apodosis* or that of the *protasis* is under discussion, this picture is coherent enough. In a schematic representation it appears as follows:

	<i>protasis</i>			<i>apodosis</i>		
	semantic value			semantic value		
	pres.	past	fut.	pres.	past	fut.
causal		++			++	-
final		--	++	++	+	++

(+ = possible; ++ = preferential; - = cautious rejection; -- = impossible).

### 1.3. Recapitulation; Apollonius on causal ἕνα

If we re-read the passage from *de coniunctionibus* with the aforesaid in mind, we find that it is indeed confused.<sup>23</sup> Apollonius begins as if he is about to

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<sup>22</sup> Although, according to Uhlig *a.l.*, this is a case of *comparativus pro positivo*. The *theoretical* preference for a past tense has no serious practical consequences, cf. e.g. *coni.* 235,7 ὅτι ἡπαυδεύτησας, δαρῆση. This is, of course, one of those cases where the causal relationship is based on the explicit addition of the causal conjunction only, since there is no necessary, logical causal relationship between the two propositions.

<sup>23</sup> I disagree, therefore, with Schöpsdau (1978, 276 and 279f.), who maintains that the differences between *coni.* and *synt.* should be explained in terms of a development between the two works. He probably underestimates the influence that Apollonius' ideas on the functioning of causal conjunctions in general exercised on his view of the accompanying verbal tenses - therefore the tension between the construction of causal ἕνα and the other causal

discuss the distribution of tenses in causal and final *apodoseis* (244,27-8), but then abruptly switches to the use of the various tenses in the *protasis* (244,29ff.). He then gets mixed up, because ἵνα is the worst possible example with which to demonstrate the temporal characteristics of the *protasis*, since it is not construed with an indicative mood. It is explicitly called an exception *synt.* 388,9ff. Thus, he has to recant his affirmations about ἵνα γράψω containing a future tense, and feebly concludes by saying that he has now explained the cause of this ὑπόληψις. He never returns to the original question of the construction of causal vs. final conjunctions.<sup>24</sup>

Whereas the prototypic causal period preferably consists of a past-tense *protasis* and *apodosis*, ἵνα is exceptional in that it is not followed by a past tense indicative in the *protasis*; the use of that tense is avoided in this case in order to prevent confusion with the homophonous local adverb. Instead it is construed with a subjunctive on the strength of the analogous final conjunction. The fact that a subjunctive has no past-tense value has to be accepted into the bargain.

The phenomenon of causal ἵνα recurs in Apollonius' grammatical successors.<sup>25</sup> A notable exception is his son Herodian, who only discusses ἵνα in the context of the αἰτιολογικοί in the broader sense I will shortly describe. Herodian does not distinguish a separate category of ἀποτελεσματικοί or ἀποτελεστικοί. As we shall see, a causal meaning is never attributed to ἵνα by grammarians who do not also acknowledge a separate group of final conjunctions.

Thus, Apollonius knows of a causal use of ἵνα which he discusses at various places in his work. Moreover he has firmly conceived ideas about the

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conjunctions went unnoticed.

<sup>24</sup> The order of the works of ApD. is usually considered to be *pron., adv., conii., synt.* Dronke 1857,566; Schneider *GG* II iii vi ff. Cf. e.g. *synt.* 378,7f. ὅτι γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν παραπληρωματικῶν) ἔχει τινα δύναμιν, παρεστήσαμεν ἐν τῷ περὶ συνδέσμων. The problem is that the internal references are often contradictory, which was probably caused by the fact that, just like the lecture notes of Aristotle, Apollonius' work was being constantly revised and added to. However this may be, in the accepted order the later work would be more elaborate and careful on the matter of the construction of causal conjunctions. In general, Apollonius can be more concise in his *Syntax* on matters of detail which had received a more ample treatment in his works on the individual parts of speech.

<sup>25</sup> Choeroboscus, *GG* IV ii 275,8ff.; 277,24ff.; Sophr. *GG* IV ii 410,14ff.; MichSync. 1690ff. Donnet (notice that elsewhere (1369f.; 1437ff.) he uses αἰτιολογικοί in the broad sense, see below); *Lex. Vindob.* 105,7ff. With the exception of MichSync. each time the difference in construction *vis à vis* the final use is remarked upon.

syntactical characteristics of this conjunction. His examples derive from school practice and we may ask ourselves if we have to do with an Alexandrian colloquialism. Further, a number of his successors are also aware of this use of ἵνα.

## 2. *The origin of ἵνα αἰτιολογικός as a final conjunction; the theory of causation*

At this point several questions arise: How did the notion of ἵνα αἰτιολογικός develop? Does it correspond to any "real" linguistic phenomenon, or is it just a construction of the grammar schools? In order to answer the first question, we must take a closer look at the αἰτιολογικοὶ σύνδεσμοι and, in general, at the ancient ideas on causation.

At the root of the concept of ἵνα αἰτιολογικός lies Aristotle's distinction of four types of causes,<sup>26</sup> the essence, the material cause, the efficient cause and the final cause. It is only the last two that interest us. The efficient cause is the διὰ τί, the final cause is τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα. Now, the point is that these two "may as it were play into each other's hands" (Ross on *An.Post.* 94b12-20). Thus, in practice, efficient and final causes may frequently coincide (e.g. *An.Post.* 94b11f. διὰ τί δὲ ἀπὸ δείπνου δεῖ περιπατεῖν, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος δεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει).<sup>27</sup>

A second relevant point is the fact that one may ask for the final cause by saying διὰ τί,<sup>28</sup> E.g. *An.Post.* 94b8ff.: "Ὅσων δ' αἴτιον τὸ ἕνεκα τίνος-

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<sup>26</sup> *Phys.* II 3 (194b16ff.); *Met.* IV 2; *Met.* I 3 (983a26-32), and *An.Post.* II 11 (94a20ff.). The last passage differs in the second cause.

<sup>27</sup> "Why one has to take a walk after dinner, and what for one has to do so, does not make any difference." Cf. Ross on *An.Post.*, 643: "Between a purposive action (such as walking after dinner) and the ultimate result aimed at (e.g. health) there may intervene an event [viz. the descent of food into the stomach, I.S.] which as efficient cause serves to explain the occurrence of the ultimate result and may in turn be teleologically explained by the result which is its final cause.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. also Philopon. in *Phys.* CAG 16,241,16f.; Asclep. in *Metaph.* CAG 6,1,23,15ff. Donnet 1967, 35 remarks: "Sans doute est-il vrai que le but poursuivi se confond avec la cause de l'action ..."

οἷον διὰ τί περιπατεῖ; ὅπως ὑγιαίνει. διὰ τί οἰκία ἔστιν; ὅπως σῶζεται τὰ σκεύη.<sup>29</sup>

I should like to call special attention to the example which recurred twice already, to wit that of the constitutional after-dinner walk. We find it again *Phys.* 194b33f.: τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἢ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμεν "ἵνα ὑγιαίνει", καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον.<sup>30</sup> This example recurs in Apollonius: *synt.* 377,1ff. Τρύφων περιπατεῖ ἵνα ὑγιάνῃ,<sup>31</sup> and *coni.* 243,23f. Θέων διακινεῖ ἵνα ὑγιάνῃ.<sup>32</sup> It is a well-known fact that the grammarians do not aspire to originality in their examples. Thus, the similarity of examples can be used to trace back a tradition to its origins. Apollonius is the first,<sup>33</sup> as far as we know, to distinguish a grammatical sub-category of final conjunctions. It can be no coincidence that the example which illustrates this usage is the same as Aristotle's, who first distinguished a telic cause.

Whereas the idea that final and causal meaning differ from each other may have been borrowed from the Peripatos, Apollonius' theory of the conjunction is deeply influenced by the Stoa.<sup>34</sup> His main categories of conjunctions are the Stoic ones, i.e. the ones the Stoa needed to form their various kinds of complex axiomata (D.L. VII 69). Among these is τὸ αἰτιώδες, the causal complex axiom, formed by means of the conjunction διότι. The Stoic αἰτία-theory,<sup>35</sup> which has come down to us in a rather unclear series of sources, does not seem to have contained anything like a final cause. The Stoa indeed has well-defined

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<sup>29</sup> "And of all things of which the 'what for' is the cause - e.g. Why does he walk? In order that he may be healthy. Why is there a house? In order that the furniture is safe."

<sup>30</sup> "The final cause, e.g. 'health' of 'walking'. For why does one walk? We say 'in order that one may be (remain) healthy' and in so saying we believe we have given the cause."

<sup>31</sup> "Trypho walks in order that he may be healthy."

<sup>32</sup> "Theon takes physical exercise in order that he may be healthy."

<sup>33</sup> Or maybe Trypho, if the use of his name in the example means anything, as it well may, cf. the list of examples in note 42.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. chapter I section 2.1.2.; II section 3.3.1.1.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Forschner 1981, 87ff.; Görler 1987.

ideas about τὸ τέλος as is clear from their τέλος-formulae. However, to my knowledge they never use a sentence containing ἵνα to express this τέλος.<sup>36</sup>

The grammarians probably took over the Stoic term σύνδεσμοι αἰτιώδεις, which included final and causal conjunctions, but also words like ἐάν.<sup>37</sup> As an alternative (and much more popular) designation αἰτιολογικός came to be used,<sup>38</sup> whereas usually no separate category of ἀποτελεσματικοί was distinguished. Traces of this remain in the many places where ἵνα is called αἰτιολογικός, while evidently a final meaning only is envisaged.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> The normal way to indicate τὸ τέλος is the expression (τὸ) οὐ ἔνεκα, e.g. *SVF* III 2; 16; 17. Conversely, if ἵνα had been important in this respect, one would have expected this to be reflected in their theory of the axiom, cf. Sluiter 1988a, 60.

<sup>37</sup> A representative collection is found in DTh. 93,2: αἰτιολογικοί· ἵνα ὄφρα ὅπως ἔνεκα οὐνεκα διὸ διότι καθ' ὃ καθ' ὅτι καθ' ὅσον. As regards ἐάν, notice the following: Priscian calls ἵνα and *ut* "*adiunctivae*" *GL* III 95,15ff.; this is a translation of ἐπιζευκτικοί. The most common example of the ἐπιζευκτικοί is ἐάν which is linked with ἵνα in a number of texts: ps. Theodos. 48,3ff. (ἐάν signifying αἰτία); MichSync. 1369f.; Cramer *AO* 374,14 calling ἐάν "αἰτιολογικός"; Zonaras 1111 (ἵνα ... ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄν); *Et. M.* 471,6ff. (*id.*; in both cases Hom. H 353 is the occasion, cf. Chantr., *gramm.hom.* 268f., 278f. and 282f. on the final value of εἰ, "to see if"). For the reverse, viz. the explanation of ἐάν ... ἀντὶ τοῦ ἵνα, see SchArist. *Ran.* 175. Cf. Schenkeveld 1982, 251ff.

<sup>38</sup> Here, too, the uniformity of the terminology was probably a decisive factor in the vast preference accorded to αἰτιολογικός as against αἰτιώδεις. Cf. the names of the other σύνδεσμοι: συμπλεκτικοί, διαζευκτικοί, συναπτικοί, παρασυναπτικοί κτλ. Notice that the Stoic complex axiom "τὸ διασαφούν τὸ μᾶλλον κτλ." is reflected in the grammatical category of the σύνδεσμοι διασαφητικοί, cf. Sluiter 1988a, 57. Αἰτιολογικός evidently ousted the alternative candidate αἰτιατικός, since the latter was already in use as the *terminus technicus* for the accusative case.

<sup>39</sup> Αἰτιώδεις: Apollonius Sophista s.v. ἵνα; Porphyrius, *Quaest. Hom.* lib. I (ed. Sodano), 37,15ff.; Eustath. 4,624,22ff. vdV. (who mentions the other designations, viz. αἰτιατικῶς and καθ' αἰτίαν in the same breath). Αἰτιολογικός: DTh. 93,2; SchDTh. 439,27ff.; Hdn. Cramer *AO*. III 280,20f.; Choer. *ps. epim.* 63,13ff.; Greg. Cor. § 17,82ff.; *Et. M.* 471,6ff.; MichSync. 1369f.; 1432ff. (but cf. note 25); Eustath. see above. In Priscian the label *causales* covers a large group of conjunctions with different semantic values (*GL* III 94,25ff.) as well as the homonymous sub-group (*quasi proprio nomine*) (*ibid.* 95,10); cf. 95,13ff. In the Latin grammarians *causalis* is a normal label for *ut* (cf. Diom. I 408,23f.; Agroecius VII 121,9ff. (*ne*); Beda VII 287,6ff.; Caper VII 100,9f.; Prisc. *saep.*). (Charpin 1965 is irrelevant here.) I have only quoted grammatical or pseudo-grammatical sources thus far. Note that the Christian writers also take αἰτία and αἰτιατικός to include the telic cause (e.g. Theodorus of Mopsuestia on *Rom.* 7:4: οὐκ ἐπ' αἰτίας δὲ λέγει τὸ ἵνα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον τῷ πράγματι κατὰ τὸ σύνηθες αὐτῷ (i.e. it is not final, but consecutive). See further below, section 5). Cf. on the broader use of αἰτιολογικός also Skrzeczka 1869, 13.

If we look at Apollonius' treatment of the αἰτιολογικοί in *de coniunctionibus* once again, we now realize that although to him the αἰτιολογικοί are the strictly causal conjunctions only, he does discuss here not only this smaller group, but automatically adds the rest of the traditional group of the αἰτιολογικοί, including the final conjunctions. The place of the discussion of the final conjunctions seems, therefore, to be traditionally defined.

### 3. *The raison d' être of causal ἵνα*

The foregoing section explains the use of αἰτιολογικοί in a broader and a stricter sense, but we are still in the dark about Apollonius' motives for introducing a causal (in the strict sense) ἵνα next to his freshly recognized final one. In theory there can be various reasons for this, the first being that a causal value of ἵνα actually existed - at times we almost forget that even ancient grammarians may occasionally describe the actual linguistic facts.

A second possibility is that Apollonius (or Trypho, cf. note 33) was himself the victim of a misunderstanding, caused by the developments that were described in the preceding section: It is just conceivable that he adopted the term ἀποτελεσ(μα)τικός,<sup>40</sup> because he felt that this was a more adequate description of the most frequent use of ἵνα, but nevertheless was brought to believe that his predecessors called ἵνα "αἰτιολογικός", because it really could occasionally be the bearer of causal meaning. He then construed appropriate examples and the ghost-construction ἵνα αἰτιολογικός was born.

The third and to my mind most attractive solution is a combination of the other two: There was indeed some terminological confusion which was solved by promoting causal ἵνα to handbook status. This was made easier by the fact that causal ἵνα was a (colloquially) known, if marginal, linguistic possibility.

#### 3.1. *The existence of causal ἵνα*

Let me start with this latter point. The main difficulty in believing that the grammarians really knew of a causal ἵνα is the fact that they do not quote any

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<sup>40</sup> The origin of the term ἀποτελεσ(μα)τικός is not quite clear. In both forms the word is post-classical. In non-grammatical texts ἀποτελεσματικός is used especially in connection with astrology and other kinds of prophesying, e.g. Eustath. 3,378,9f. vdV.; 3,640,5f. vdV.; Vettius Valens, *Anthol.* 332,1. The collocation αἴτιον ἀποτελεσματικόν is found only once and may have been coined under the influence of the grammatical usage (Syrianus, in *Hermog. comm.* 1,106,7ff.): ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τεσσάρων στοιχείων σύγκειται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, πᾶσι καταφανές, τί δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τὸ ἀποτελεσματικόν τοῦ τοιοῦδε χρήματος, ὃ καὶ διαφόρους ἐποίησε τοὺς χαρακτῆρας, ἀπαγγέλλειν ἀδύνατον.

literary sources to confirm this usage,<sup>41</sup> as they do for all other kinds of grammatical phenomena. Virtually all examples of causal ἵνα bear the mark of their being constructed for educational purposes, illustrating a usage which, if literary, can have been rare and marginal at best.<sup>42</sup> Alternatively, causal ἵνα may have been a phenomenon of (Alexandrian?) colloquial language. This possibility, which would also account for the classroom examples, cannot be completely discarded, but it cannot be proved either.

For Apollonius I am afraid we can get no further than this, but there is more: Possibly encouraged by the fact that causal ἵνα was not utterly unimaginable after Apollonius, there are at least two later sources which managed to find a literary example. One of them is the *Lexicon Vindobonense*, the other the Christian writer Andreas of Caesarea.<sup>43</sup> Apart from these ancient causal interpretations of ἵνα, there are a few places where we may actually have to do with attestations of causal ἵνα. All in all, the material is extremely meagre, but it may warrant the rather conservative conclusion that there was a marginal usage in live Greek which corresponded to the grammarians' theories.

### 3.1.1. *Ancient causal interpretations of ἵνα*

The modern grammars of New Testament Greek cautiously mention causal ἵνα.<sup>44</sup> For its existence they lean heavily on the testimony of Apollonius Dyscolus. However, it is not necessary to postulate causal ἵνα in any of the proposed passages on linguistic grounds. A causal interpretation can only be defended by arguments of a theological nature and it so happens that such

<sup>41</sup> For the one exception, see below, section 3.1.1.

<sup>42</sup> The examples are the following:

ἵνα ἀναγνώ ἐπιμήθην: ApD. *synt.* 277,4f.; *coni.* 243,21; SchDTh. 400,22.

ἵνα ἀναγνώ Τρύφων ἐπιμήθη: SchDTh. 245,17f.

ἵνα ἀναγνώ ὠφελήθην: Choer. *GG* IV ii 278,1.

ἵνα ἀναστῶ ἠνιάθη Τρύφων: ApD. *synt.* 277,5.

ἵνα φιλολογήσω παρεγενήθη Τρύφων: ApD. *synt.* 382,4.

ἵνα ὕβρισω Θέωνα ... ἠγανάκτησεν (Δίω): ApD. *synt.* 382,10f.

ἵνα λοιδορήσω ἐπεπλήχθην: ApD. *coni.* 243,21f.

ἵνα γράψω ταῦτά μοι ἐγένετο: ApD. *coni.* 244,29.

ἵνα προκόψω ἐφθόνησάς με: Sophr. *GG* IV ii 410,15f.; Choer. *GG* IV ii 277,36 should be emended accordingly.

ἵνα τιμηθῶ ἐλυπήθης: Choer. *GG* IV ii 275,12; 276,3; 276,22.

ἵνα λαλήσω ἐτάχθην: MichSync. 1690ff. (after inversion of the examples).

<sup>43</sup> Of these two, it is of course only the composer of the *Lex. Vindob.* who can be credited with the ambition to find a case of ἵνα αἰτιολογικός.

<sup>44</sup> Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf § 456 Anm. 2 (discussing *Apocal.* 22:14; 16:15; *Marc.* 4:12; 4:22; *1 Petr.* 4:6); Moulton-Turner III 102. Cf. further Jannaris § 1741; Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr II 647 (causal *ut*).



arguments can always be countered by other theological arguments. The question is, however, whether such an interpretation of ἵνα is attested in any ancient source. I found indeed one place in the ancient Christian writers which supports a causal interpretation in one of the proposed passages.<sup>45</sup> In contrast with consecutive ἵνα, however, there are no theoretical remarks connected with the causal interpretation, which is given very drily in the form of a paraphrasis.

My example concerns one of the best candidates for causal ἵνα, viz. *Apocal.* 22:14: Μακάριοι οἱ πλύνοντες τὰς στολὰς αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἔσται ἡ ἐξουσία αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τοῖς πυλῶσιν εἰσέλθωσιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.<sup>46</sup> A causal interpretation of ἵνα is supported by the parallel passage from *Matth.* (5:3ff.) which reads μακάριοι ... ὅτι.<sup>47</sup> In his commentary on the *Apocalypse*, Andreas of Caesarea (s. VI) has the following entry (*PGM* 106,449): "Μακάριοι οἱ ποιοῦντες τὰς ἐντολὰς ἐμοῦ· ἵνα ἔσται ἡ ἐξουσία αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς, καὶ τοῖς πυλεῶσιν εἰσέλθωσιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν." - "Οὕτως δὲ μακαρισμοῦ ἄξιοι οἱ ποιοῦντες τὰς

<sup>45</sup> There is also a *varia lectio* at *Joh.* 9:2: τίς ἤμαρτεν, οὗτος ἢ οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, ἵνα τυφλὸς γεννηθῆ; here, ἵνα is probably consecutive (or, more precisely, inferential), although a final interpretation cannot be excluded either; the variant ὅτι proves that the scriba considered the clause to be causal/inferential, cf. Moulton-Turner III 102. These interpretations can at times be extremely close to one another, cf. the English example "It is raining, for I do not see anybody in the street". In such cases the consequence of a state of affairs is adduced as the *reason* from which that state of affairs is inferred. In the terminology of functional grammar, the ἵνα-clause has the syntactical function of disjunct here. Cf. Rijksbaron 1976, 52. See also section 5 note 82.

<sup>46</sup> "Happy are those who wash their robes clean! [For?] They will have the right to the tree of life and will enter by the gates of the city." Cf. in the same construction *Apocal.* 16:15 μακάριος ὁ γρηγορῶν καὶ τηρῶν τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτοῦ, ἵνα μὴ γυμνὸς περιπατῆ. Other candidates are *Marc.* 4:11f. ὕμιν τὸ μυστήριον δέδοται τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ Θεοῦ· ἐκεῖνοις δὲ τοῖς ἔξω ἐν παραβολαῖς τὰ πάντα γίνεταί, ἵνα βλέποντες βλέπωσιν καὶ μὴ ἴδωσιν. καὶ ἀκούοντες ἀκούωσιν καὶ μὴ συνιώσιν. Cf. *Matth.* 13:13 διὰ τοῦτο ἐν παραβολαῖς αὐτοῖς λαλῶ, ὅτι βλέποντες οὐ βλέπουσιν κτλ. (cf. *Is.* 6:9-10). The passage from Mark may be taken either in a causal sense ("because (it is written that they)..") or in a final one, or exegetically ("it happens to them in all respects that they ..."), cf. Moulton-Turner III 102. The strange coordination of a future indicative and an aorist subjunctive in the text from the *Apocalypse* may be due to John's limited command of Greek. Εἰσελθῶσιν may have been felt as a future, on the basis of ambiguous forms like ποιήσω.

<sup>47</sup> However, a final interpretation is also possible, if one construes ἵνα with πλύνοντες (cf. Blass-Debr.-Rehk. *l.c.*). If ἵνα is causal, the syntactic status of the clause introduced by it is not self-evident. I should say it is likely to be a disjunct here (motivation of the sentiment expressed in the previous sentence); in theory it can also introduce an adjunct, as it certainly does in the examples provided by the grammarians, see note 45.

ἐντολὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ· ἐξουσίαν γὰρ ἔξουσιν ἐν τῇ ἀλήκτῳ ζωῆ, τῷ ξύλῳ τῆς ζωῆς Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν ἐπαναπαύεσθαι κτῆ.<sup>48</sup>

I realize one cannot attach too much weight to this passage. Let us proceed, therefore, to the one *grammatical* source which managed to find a more or less literary example of causal ἵνα. The *Lexicon Vindobonense* 105,3ff. quotes a passage of Libanius to support the interpretation of ἵνα as καὶ διὰ τοῦτο,<sup>49</sup> remarking, moreover, that ἵνα in this usage καὶ μετὰ παρεληλυθότος συντάσσεται.<sup>50</sup> The passage in question is *Declam.* 34,40. A son has promised a talent to the gods if his very sick father recovers. The father does recover and proceeds to accuse his son, claiming that the loss of the talent has ruined him. In the course of his bitter complaints he indignantly asks: εἴτ' ὦ κατάρατε καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον φιλότιμε, ἐγὼ μόνος ἐδυστύχουν ἀφόρητα, ἵνα μοι δυστυχέστερον τῆς νόσον τὴν ὑγείαν ἀντέδωκας;<sup>51</sup>

If the *Lexicon* really means us to take ἵνα as "and therefore", its interpretation is obscure and unnecessary. A purely causal interpretation ("because") gives a fairly satisfactory sense, if we take ἀφόρητα as the father's present poverty. But this leaves the imperfect ἐδυστύχουν unexplained, and it is not, strictly speaking, what the *Lexicon* proposes. Ἴνα, therefore, is probably final here after all. Δυστυχέστερον should then be taken proleptically (in order that you should render me such health that was to turn out more unhappy than my illness), and the ἀφόρητα can no longer be the poverty to which the father sees himself reduced, but must refer to the illness. The likelihood of a final interpretation is increased by the echo of ἐδυστύχουν (referring to the illness) and δυστυχέστερον (referring to the restored health). However this may be, the

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<sup>48</sup> "Happy are those who keep my commandments; They will have the right to the tree of life and will enter by the gates of the city" - Truly those are worthy of being called happy who keep the commandments of God; for they will have the right in the unending life, to rest in Christ our Lord, the tree of life."

<sup>49</sup> Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο means, of course, "and therefore" instead of "because". This makes it equivalent to τῷ which on principle was rejected as a σύνδεσμος by Apollonius (see chapter II section 3.3.1.1.). Ancient grammatical sources sometimes did consider διὰ τοῦτο a σύνδεσμος, cf. Choer. *ps.epim.* 58,32ff. (Διὰ τοῦτο· δεικτικὴ ἀντωνυμία ἢ μᾶλλον ἐπιρρηματικὴ δεικτικὴ ἢ σύνδεσμος αἰτιολογικός) and the *Et. M.* 773,29ff. on τῷ.

<sup>50</sup> "... is construed with a past tense as well."

<sup>51</sup> "You cursed and excessively ambitious man, did I alone suffer unbearable misfortune, in order for you to render me such health as was to be more *unfortunate than my illness?*" (or: "and did you therefore render me such health etc.", or possibly even "because you rendered me such health etc."). Reiske: "*malim* δυστυχέστεραν".

important thing is that an ancient source has linked the theoretical concept of ἵνα αἰτιολογικός with a concrete, literary example.

The *Lexicon Vindobonense* also knows of another intriguing and unusual usage of ἵνα which it paraphrases as ὡσάν. This time the quotation derives from Johannes Chrysostomus (*de Sacerdotio*, ed. A.-M. Malingrey, SC 272, I 4,33ff.): ὅσοι δέ εἰσιν ἀφειδέστεροι τῶν αἰτιωμένων ταῦτά τε ἡμῖν ἀμφότερα ἐγκαλοῦσιν ὁμοῦ καὶ προστιθέασιν τὴν εἰς τοὺς τετιμηκότας ὕβριν, δίκαια πεπονημένοι λέγοντες αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰ μείζονα τούτων ἀτιμασθέντες ἔτυχον παρ' ἡμῶν ὅτι τοσοῦτους καὶ τηλικούτους ἀφέντες ἄνδρας, μειράκια χθῆς καὶ πρῶτην ἔτι ταῖς τοῦ βίου μερίμνας ἐγκαλινδούμενα, ἵνα χρόνον βραχὺν τὰς ὀφρῦς συναγάγωσι, καὶ φαιὰ περιβάλλωνται καὶ κατ'ήθειαν ὑποκρίνωνται, ἐξαίφνης εἰς τοσαύτην ἤγαγον τιμὴν ὅσην οὐδὲ ὄναρ λήψεσθαι προσεδόκησαν.<sup>52</sup> Ὡσάν indeed can have a causal shade of meaning.<sup>53</sup> The ancient grammarians nowhere discuss it under the causal conjunctions.

### 3.1.2. Examples of causal ἵνα

Gradually, we have entered the search for "real" causal ἵνα.<sup>54</sup> Here, the

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<sup>52</sup> "And all those detractors who are even less sparing in their accusations, accuse us of both these things at the same time and they add our insolent behaviour towards those that have honoured us, saying that they suffered what they deserved, even if they had received a still more ignominious treatment from our side, because they had dismissed such formidable men and of such an honourable age, in order all of a sudden to promote youths who only a short time ago were completely involved in all the antics of the worldly life, because (or: provided) they frowned for a short time and dressed in grey and feigned a sombre and serious attitude, to such an honour as they would not even in their dreams have expected to receive."

<sup>53</sup> Construed with a participle e.g. Lucian. *Alex.* 31; ApD. *synt.* 384,11. As ὡς ἄν, cf. KG II 461, e.g. Hom. θ 239; Pl. *Prot.* 335d4f.

<sup>54</sup> Such a search is rather destructive in character. It is easier to disclaim alleged instances, than to find new ones. In itself this indicates the absolutely marginal status of the phenomenon. The examples claimed by Schneider (index) for Apollonius can all be discarded. I only mention here the one example which has at least a semblance of verisimilitude, *synt.* 229,1ff. The issue is whether Zenodotus' change of σφῶέ into σφῶι is correct (this would imply that the second person pronoun σφῶι would become a third person pronoun merely by virtue of a change of accent): ἀλλ' ἔστι γε καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς παραδεδομένης γραφῆς ἐκεῖνο φάναι, ὡς μᾶλλον κατάρθωται ἵνα μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ οὕσα φωνὴ παρὰ τὴν ἐγκλισιν προσώπου μεταβατικὴ γίγνηται, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι ἐν ἀντωνυμίαις παρεπόμενον. "ἵνα can be taken in a final sense, if one supply "in order to avoid our being forced to accept that etc.". See Thierfelder 1935, 88 who rejects a causal use (claimed by Schneider) *coni.* 258,21f. (I think ἵνα simply means "where" there).

results are meagre indeed. I have found only one text where I can neither think of any objection to a causal interpretation, nor of a better (or even an acceptable) alternative. Two other texts I put forward in the knowledge that they can neither of them be considered decisive. However, they merit consideration. The last text quoted in the previous section is not included in these examples, because the nuance "provided that" (for which, however, I know no satisfactory parallel) cannot be excluded. I start with my trump ace:

*Anth.Pal.* IX 169 a poor schoolmaster laments his fate:

Μῆνις Ἀχιλλῆος καὶ ἔμοι πρόφασις γεγένηται  
 οὐλομένης πενίης γραμματικευσαμένῳ.  
 εἶθε δὲ σὺν Δαναοῖς με κατέκτανε μῆνις ἐκείνη,  
 πρὶν χαλεπὸς λιμὸς γραμματικῆς ὀλέσει.  
 ἀλλ' ὤν' ἀφαρπάξῃ Βρισηίδα πρὶν Ἀγαμέμνων  
 τῆν Ἑλένην δ' ὁ Πάρις, πτωχὸς ἐγὼ ἔγενόμην.<sup>55</sup>

Apart from the excellent sense the following arguments for a causal interpretation can be adduced here:

There is a chain of causation which runs from the rape of Helen and that of Briseïs via the μῆνις of Achilles to the poverty of the grammarian. The first two distichs call attention to the link between μῆνις and poverty, the last between the raped ladies and poverty - it does not make sense to take ὤνα as final in this connection. Moreover, I think πρὶν (vs. 5) would put an unpleasant and unnecessary emphasis on the inversion of cause and effect in the case of a final interpretation of ὤνα, whereas in a causal interpretation πρὶν has the function of stressing the anteriority of ἀφαρπάξῃ to ἔγενόμην.

There are two elements in this little epigram which point in the direction of a possible Alexandrian colloquialism. The first is its writer: The epigram is attributed to Palladas of Alexandria (s. IV p.Ch.). The second point is that it would not be the only vulgarism in this poem: Notice the use of πρὶν + ind. fut. (line 4), which is unclassical.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup> "The wrath of Achilles was the cause of pernicious poverty to me too, since I adopted the profession of a grammarian. Would that the "wrath" had killed me with the Greeks, before the bitter hunger of grammar had put an end to me. But all to let Agamemnon run away with Briseis, and Paris with Helen, I have become poor" (transl. Paton). Notice that Paton does not translate πρὶν. For the last couplet I would suggest: "But all because in former times Agamemnon raped Briseis and Paris Helen, I have become a beggar." See for the theme of this epigram Sluiter 1988b, 59ff.

<sup>56</sup> Reading ὀλέση does not help: in that case the construction is incorrect because the main clause lacks a negative. The combination εἶθε δέ is unclassical. It is not attested before the fourth century p.Ch. I found 27 instances in the *TLG* material. Two parallels stem from the *Anthologia Palatina*

My second example stems from the sermon *in qua Potestate* by Severianus of Gabala (s. IV p.Chr.).<sup>57</sup> This example has the definite drawback of textual uncertainties and I will not insist on its value:

Μωϋσῆς ὁ τοσοῦτος καὶ τηλικοῦτος ἀνὴρ ..., ᾧ διηρέθη θάλασσα, ... οὗτος, \*ἔν'\* ἔν τι τῶν ὑπὸ Θεοῦ κελευσθέντων τολμῆσας (τολμήση (M)) ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ μετρήσαι, καὶ μὴ τῇ θεῖα δυνάμει παραχωρῆσαι, ἀπαραίτητον ὑπέσχε τὴν δίκην. ὡς γὰρ ἔφθασεν ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν, λέγει πρὸς τὸν λαόν· "ὦ λαὸς σκληρὸς καὶ ἀπειθής, μὴ ἐκ τῆς πέτρας ταύτης δυνήσομαι ὑμῖν δοῦναι ὕδωρ;" καὶ τί πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Θεός; "ἀνθ' ᾧ οὐκ ἐδόξασάς με ἐνώπιον τῆς συναγωγῆς, οὐκ εἰσελεύσει εἰς τὴν γῆν ἣν ὠμοσα."<sup>58</sup>

The Migne text reads ἵνα and τολμῆσας which cannot be construed. The problem is that the corruption of τολμήση into τολμῆσας is unexplicable (unless from an optative τολμήσαι which is virtually unthinkable in a text of this quality and period).<sup>59</sup> If ἵνα could stand, however, it surely would have to be causal: Not only is it highly unlikely that Severianus can be credited with complicated teleological innuendoes, but furthermore the text itself contains a clear sign that it is a causal relationship which is envisaged between Moses' arrogance and divine retribution, viz. ἀνθ' ᾧ.<sup>60</sup>

The third example is better, if late. It features in the *Quaestiones* by Anastasius Sinaita (s. VII p.Chr.) (*PGM* 89,800). The question in which it occurs, is why there are four, only four and no more than four Gospels. In his reply Anastasius exclaims: μάταιοι πάντες καὶ ἀμαθεῖς, προσέτι δὲ καὶ τολμηροὶ, οἱ ἀθετοῦντες τὴν ιδέαν τοῦ Εὐαγγελίου, καὶ εἴτε πλείονα εἴτε ἐλάττονα τῶν εἰρημένων παρεισφέροντες Εὐαγγελίων πρόσωπα· οἱ

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itself; one even from Palladas: *Anth.Pal.* IX 167,2; cf. XVI 352,2. It is found six times in the Alexandrian Athanasius, which brings the total of certain Alexandrian instances up to 8.

<sup>57</sup> The text is in *PGM* 56,419 (cf. *CPG* 4193); I use the text as constituted by drs. Peter Stehouwer (unedited).

<sup>58</sup> "Moses, that great and honourable man ... for whom the sea parted ... he inescapably underwent his punishment because he had ventured to measure one of God's commandments with human reason. For when he came at the rock he said to the people: 'Hard and disobedient people, shall I be able to give you water from this rock?' And what did God say to him? 'Because you have not glorified me in front of the assembly, you shall not enter the land that I promised.'" Cf. *Num.* 20:2-13.

<sup>59</sup> Alternatively, the final H may have been misread for a Σ.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. *SD* II 661.

μὲν ἴνα πλείονα δόξωσι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐξευρηκέναι, οἱ δὲ τὰς οἰκονομίας Θεοῦ ἀθετήσωσιν (*sic*).<sup>61</sup>

There are several intriguing aspects to this passage. First of all, we are again dealing with an Alexandrian, although several centuries have passed between Anastasius and Palladas, let alone Apollonius. Secondly, at the end of the seventh century and during the eighth century A.D., colloquialisms found their way more and more into written language - if we look at the last sentence of the quotation, for instance, we remark the absence of a second ἴνα. These facts would again point in the direction of a possible Alexandrian colloquialism.

Another interesting point is the construction itself: The sequence μάταιοι ... οἱ ἀθετοῦντες ... ἴνα is remarkably similar to the Biblical μακάριοι οἱ πλύνοντες ... ἴνα (see above section 3.1.1. and note 46). Anastasius may have thought that he had actually adopted a Biblical idiom. In his adapted version, however, the original ambiguity of the ἴνα sentence, which could either be taken in a causal sense explaining μακάριοι, or in a final sense with the participle, was completely lost. For Anastasius breaks up the construction by adding a distributive apposition οἱ μὲν, οἱ δέ, leaving in principle only a causal interpretation of ἴνα. However, one may also connect this apposition not with μάταιοι κτλ., but with the participle παρεισφέροντες. In that case, the most obvious interpretation is that of "fated finality" and the text loses its value for my argument.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, even if the Biblical parallels are disparaged, the position of ἴνα tells against this solution. Therefore, the passage stands, if not as firmly as might have been hoped for.

Other examples I have not found. There are, however, a number of places where a causal interpretation would be perfectly in order, but which can equally well be final. Such passages may have helped at least to make the theoretical concept of ἴνα αἰτιολογικός less disturbing. As an example I quote a very prosaic remark from the *psalm-epimerisms* by Choeroboscus (20,10ff.):

Διατί πάντων τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν ἔσχατος τίθεται ὁ σύνδεσμος; ἴνα συνδήση καὶ συνδεσμήση πάντα τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ λεχθέντα μέρη τοῦ

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<sup>61</sup> "Foolish and stupid and, moreover, reckless are they who disparagingly reject the (present) form of the Gospel and who introduce either more or less forms than the Gospels we know. The former group [are foolish etc.] because they expect to have found more than the truth, the latter because they set at naught the plans of God."

<sup>62</sup> See section 5. The difference between a sentence expressing "fated finality" and a purely consecutive one is that the latter has the syntactical function of adjunct, while sentences expressing "fated finality" share in the characteristics of a disjunct: someone exterior to the action observes that one situation has resulted from another one - the exact causal nexus is immaterial.

λόγου.<sup>63</sup> Cf. SchDTh. 521,36f. ὁ δὲ σύνδεσμος τελευταίαν ἐπέχει τάξιν, ἐπειδὴ πέφυκε συνδεῖν τὰ προϋποκείμενα μέρη τοῦ λόγου.<sup>64</sup>

Before looking briefly at the possible semantic development of ἵνα which led to a causal interpretation, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the sparse rules Apollonius gave for the use of causal ἵνα do not apply in all the passages we found. Apollonius prefers a past tense *apodosis* and asks for an (aorist) subjunctive in the *protasis*, although causal conjunctions in general should preferably be construed with a past tense *protasis* as well. The texts from Palladas and perhaps Severianus tally with this prescription. The biblical example which was paraphrased by Andreas of Caesarea contains ἵνα + future indicative<sup>65</sup> and has no finite verb in its *apodosis*. Libanius' text has a combination of ἵνα + past indicative in the *protasis* and an imperfect in the *apodosis*. The latter situation obtains in Anastasius, too, who has a combination of ἵνα + aorist subjunctive in the *protasis*.

### 3.1.3. *Semantic development*

The last issue I want to discuss is the possible semantic development of ἵνα, which supported a causal interpretation. I can do no more here than give some suggestions as to how such a development may have come about.

In the first place there is the virtually indiscriminate use of ἵνατί, διὰ τί and τίνος ἕνεκα<sup>66</sup> (in later Greek) to ask for a cause or a reason. Originally ἵνατί (or ἵνα τί) asks for the goal, as e.g. Pl. *Smp.* 205a,<sup>67</sup> but later this is no longer necessarily the case, cf. e.g. *Act.apost.* 4:25 ἵνα τί ἐφρύαξαν ἔθνη καὶ λαοὶ ἐμελέτησαν κενά;<sup>68</sup> In this context one could

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<sup>63</sup> "Why is the conjunction put last of all the parts of speech? Because (or: in order that) it binds together and links up all parts of speech that were enumerated before it."

<sup>64</sup> "The conjunction occupies the last position because of its very nature it binds together the foregoing parts of speech."

<sup>65</sup> Which came to be used instead of the aorist subjunctive in later Greek, cf. my remark on the epigram by Palladas.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *Et. M.* 471,16; Zonaras 1110 Ἰνατί· διατί ἢ ἕνεκα τίμος. More testimonies are to be found in the Christian writers: Diodorus of Tarsus (*CCSG* 6,12,11f.): ἵνατί ...; Ἀντὶ τοῦ τίς ἢ αἰτία ἢ ποῖαν ἔσχον ἀφορμὴν τοῦ τοσοῦτου μίσους; (cf. further *ibid.* 24,91 (ἵνατί paraphrased by τίμος ἕνεκεν).

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *KG II* 520.

<sup>68</sup> "Why did the Gentiles rage and the people lay their plots in vain?" Cf. SchDTh. 585,19. Cf. Arist. *Pax* 409 ἵνα δὴ τί τοῦτο δράτον; - ὅτι ἡ ... (causal interpretation effected *a posteriori* by ὅτι ἡ) and Arist. *Nub.* 1192 ἵνα

imagine that, just as the question ἵνατί ἀναγιγνώσκεις; can trigger the answer ἵνα τιμηθῶ, so the question ἵνατί ἐπιμήθης; came to be answered by another ἵνα clause: ἵνα ἀναγνῶ. Interestingly, in the *Et. M.* 471,16ff. and in the *psalm-epimerisms* 66,17ff. it is remarked that when ἵνα is combined with τί, it is no longer followed by a subjunctive, but by a past tense indicative mood. This reminds one of the construction of causal conjunctions with past tenses, because causes explain things past. There can hardly be another reason for the insistence on a past tense. The change of subjunctive to indicative corresponds, of course, to a change in sentence type.

Secondly, apart from the "why" questions, there is the fact that in later Greek ἵνα clauses could virtually indiscriminately be substituted for infinitive constructions.<sup>69</sup> This holds not only for infinitives with the function complement,<sup>70</sup> but also for final substantivized infinitives of the type τὸ μή (+ inf.), τοῦ μή (+ inf.) (= ἵνα μή); εἰς τό (+ inf.) (= ἵνα).<sup>71</sup> One wonders if causal ἵνα might be connected with the frequent causal infinitive construction διὰ τὸ (inf.) and ἔνεκα τοῦ (inf.). This would explain the syntactical side of the development.

Thirdly, there is the possibility mentioned by Thierfelder.<sup>72</sup> He takes ἵνα λουδορήσω ἐπεπλήχθην as an ironical final sentence, comparing Plaut. *Bacch.* 812 *propterea hoc facio* (sc. *te vincio*), *ut suadeas gnato meo, ut pergracetur tecum, tervenefice*.<sup>73</sup> One can imagine that such ironical final sentences,

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δὴ τί ...; - ἵν' ... (final). The combination of ἵνα and τί is several times called an ἐπίρρημα ἐρωτήσεως, e.g. *ps.epim.* 66,15f.; *Et. M.* 471,6ff.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf* §§ 388-94.

<sup>70</sup> E.g. *Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf* § 392f.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf* § 399f.; 402; see *ApD. synt.* 382,7.

<sup>72</sup> 1935, 88 n. 1. Thierfelder's first suggestion is a little problematic. He explains ἵνα ἀναγνῶ ἐπιμήθην as "I was praised in order that I would read just as well in the future". Cf. *KG II* 381 for examples of a *protasis* with a subjunctive and an *apodosis* with a past tense. The causal use is a matter of interpretation anyhow; this is, of course, perfectly viable. However none of the examples quoted in *KG* mean "in order that I may even now...", for which one would rather expect a *present* subjunctive in our example anyway. In all cases the envisaged end of the action lies in the present or future exclusively, without a trace of a similar situation having obtained in the past.

<sup>73</sup> "This is what I do this (sc. binding you) for, to make you persuade my relative to play the Greek (i.e. revel) with you, you triple-dyed scoundrel." For ironical final sentences, cf. also *Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr II* 837, e.g. *Iuv.* 5,120f. *structorem interea, nequa indignatio desit, saltantem spectes*. For the development of a causal meaning from combinations like *propterea ... ut*,



expressing at the same time a motivation and a prohibition, are especially at home in colloquial usage. However, even of the few examples of causal ἵνα that we have, only a small part can be explained from this point of view.

The fourth relevant construction is that of ἵνα after verbs which express emotion:<sup>74</sup> Moulton-Turner<sup>75</sup> call attention to the ambiguous status of *quod*-sentences after verbs like *doleo* and *gaudeo*. Such sentences can express either a complement or a causal (subordinate) clause with the function of an adjunct, to put it in modern terms.<sup>76</sup> To their examples may be added the *Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis* XII: τῷ Θεῷ χάρις, ἵνα, ὡς ἐν σαρκὶ μετὰ χαρᾶς ἐγενόμην, πλείονα χαρῶ νῦν.<sup>77</sup> Another example comes from pseudo-Chrysostomus, from a *sermocinatio* of Jesus to Judas: καὶ ἵνα μικρὸν

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cf. Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr II 647: *ideo ut*, Cassiod. *var.* 2,32,3; *propterea ut*, Itala *Matth.* 13:13.

Irony is also one of the factors at the basis of the development of consecutive ἵνα, cf. Hom. B 357ff. εἰ δέ τις ἐκπάγλως ἐθέλει οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι/ἀπτέσθω ἧς νηὸς ἐυσσέλμοιο μελαίνης, ὄφρα πρόσθ' ἄλλων θάνατον καὶ πότμον ἐπίσπη, cf. KG II 397 Anm. 3 where this is not recognized.

<sup>74</sup> Here ἵνα is equivalent to ὅτι. Note also ἵνα after *verba voluntatis* and *iubendi* (cf. above on the infinitive constructions). Cf. Moulton-Turner III 138; Beda (*GL* VII 293,25f.) calls *ut* "*causalis*" in *Joh.* 17:24: *volo ut ubi ego sum et ipsi sint mecum* (i.e. in an object clause).

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Moulton-Turner III 138. E.g. *Joh.* 8:56 Ἀβραάμ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ἠγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμήν, καὶ εἶδεν καὶ ἐχάρη ("was glad that he should ...").

<sup>76</sup> Here, too, an infinitive construction would have been possible: χαίρω τῷ + inf.; χαίρω διὰ τό + inf. Without the article, cf. e.g. the construction of αἰσχύνεσθαι, KG II 73.

<sup>77</sup> "Thank God, that/because, as I was alive with joy, I am filled with even more joy now."

ἀλαβάστρον τοῖς ποσὶ καταθεθῆ, γογγύζεις.<sup>78</sup> Sentences like this may have had an intermediary function in the development of "purely" causal ἵνα.<sup>79</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

In the preceding sections I collected some material which indicated that in some contexts ancient writers interpreted ἵνα as having a causal value. Moreover, there were a number of possible attestations of a "causal" use of ἵνα in a non-theoretical context. However, if one asks oneself if the occurrence of the phenomenon of causal ἵνα in our grammatical sources is satisfactorily explained by real linguistic usage, some doubts are left. I therefore prefer to combine the two explanations I proposed earlier.

The origin of causal ἵνα seems to have been a terminological confusion which started from the distinction of the final conjunctions as a separate category of σύνδεσμοι. Since this group was not generally adopted, the tradition was as it were split in two. In one line, the αἰτιολογικοί kept including the final conjunctions, in the other the term αἰτιολογικοί was reserved for the strictly causal ones. Those who called ἵνα "ἀποτελεσματικός", tried to cope with the fact that their sources seemed to know a ἵνα αἰτιολογικός, in that they constructed examples of causal ἵνα. In so doing, they were supported by the fact that ἵνα could indeed not always be considered strictly final (consecutive and epegetic uses, the expression ἵνατί, the influence of Latin, colloquial usage).

The probability of this development is increased by the fact that causal

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<sup>78</sup> "You grumble that/because a tiny flask was poured out over my feet" (CPG 4984 λόγος εἰς τὸν φαρισαῖον καὶ εἰς τὴν πόρνην). The text continues μὴ σὺν προῖκα αὐτὸ ἔλαβον, ἵνα γογγύζη; (cf. my remarks in note 45). I used the collation by dr. K.H. Uthemann. Drs. H. Tevel in the middle of his work on his own thesis kindly called my attention to this passage. Maybe there is also some influence from the development in the use of ὅτι: In the contexts where ὅτι was used to introduce direct speech, it came to be replaced by ἵνα in late Greek (but this replacement was not fully effected until the Byzantine period), a development which was to lead to the modern Greek νά. Could a parallel and analogical shift of the causal use of ὅτι to ἵνα have taken place?

<sup>79</sup> By way of appendix I add that in itself a development from local or temporal adverb to causal one has many parallels (ὅπου, ὅποτε etc.). In the case of ἵνα, however, there is always the problem of the subjunctive. I can think of no better explanation than Apollonius' here, viz. the invocation of an analogy with the common final conjunction.

ὅτι does not appear in grammatical sources which do not explicitly distinguish a category of final conjunctions.

5. *Appendix: consecutive ὅτι; Christian writers as a source for the study of ancient grammar*

The causal use of ὅτι was not the only deviation from its most common interpretation that caught the attention of ancient linguists or commentators. In this excursus I will look at some of the ancient remarks on the consecutive use of this conjunction. This excursus serves mainly to make a methodological point, which deserves more attention in future studies of ancient linguistics: My point is that the ancient Christian writers in their commentaries on and explanations of the Bible often have useful material to offer to the student of ancient grammatical theory. Their methods and exegetical and critical instruments derive directly from their pagan grammatical training. Moreover, an enormous amount of their writings is preserved, even if it is not very well disclosed. Nevertheless, this material does fill some of the chronological gaps in the more strictly grammatical material. Although several studies by *patristici* have recently been dedicated to the importance and influence of pagan grammatical and rhetorical training in the writings of several Christian writers,<sup>80</sup> the reverse is hardly the case: As far as I know, no study exists of the material to be gleaned from the Christian writers for the benefit of the study of the history of grammar.

The consecutive use of ὅτι may serve as an example. Especially in later Greek, ὅτι took on other shades of meaning than the final one only. Partly under the influence of Latin *ut*, its use varied, but merged mainly into the consecutive. The intermediate step was probably the interpretation of "fated finality". The consecutive use of ὅτι is also discussed in our modern grammars.<sup>81</sup> The examples quoted there, some as early as Homer, are not all equally convincing. In several cases, especially where the Homeric instances are concerned, a final interpretation can be well defended, if one takes into account

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<sup>80</sup> Schäublin 1974; Neuschäfer 1987.

<sup>81</sup> E.g. KG II 379 Anm. 3; more examples may be found in Moulton-Turner III 102; Blass-Debrunner-Rehkopf § 391; Jannaris § 1951; in cases like Epict. II 2,16 οὕτω μωρὸς ἦν, ὅτι μὴ ἴδῃ; Clem.Rom. *Hom. PGM* 2,97 οὐ γὰρ ἐσμὲν οὕτως νῆπιοι, ὅτι ..., the use of οὕτω(ς) helps to steer us in the direction of a consecutive interpretation. Apollonius Dyscolus himself also often uses ὅτι like this, cf. Schneider, *Tractatus* 158.

who is speaking to whom: irony cannot always be excluded.<sup>82</sup> However, what interests me here, is the fact that at least one of the examples put forward by KG, is also mentioned by Eustathius. For this means that the question of right or wrong has to be postponed: what matters is the fact that a consecutive use was recognized in Antiquity also.

Eustathius makes the following remarks, triggered by X 326ff. (4,624,17ff. vdV.):<sup>83</sup> Ὅτι πολλάκις ὁ ποιητῆς τὰ ἐκ τύχης ὡς ἐξ αἰτίας τινὸς ἀποτελούμενα λέγει καὶ ἐκ προνοίας βουλευτικῆς, οἷον "ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ Νότος ὄκα ... /ὄφρ' ἔτι τὴν ὀλοὴν ἀναμετρήσαιμι Χάρυβδιν" [μ 427f. = KG *l.c.*]. τοιοῦτον κοινότερον καὶ τὸ "ἔπνευσε ἀνεμος ἵνα ὁ οἶκος καταρρυφῆ ἢ ἀπόληται ἢ ναῦς". ὁμοιον κἀνανταῦθα (vs. 327) ... ἵνα τι λαλήσῃ· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τύχην γενόμενον αἰτιατικῶς ἐξήνεγκεν κτλ.<sup>84</sup> The Scholia *a.l.* quote an anonymous (φασί) source for this opinion: τὸ ἐκ τύχης συμβεβηκὸς αἰτιατικῶς ἐξενήροχεν.<sup>85</sup>

Between the source of the Scholia and Eustathius I have found only one similar comment on a pagan text. The Scholiast on Pind. *Nem.* I 7b explains the phrase Ζητὸς Αἰτναίου χάριν as a poetical expression: ὁ δὲ τρόπος

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<sup>82</sup> KG's example from later Greek (Plut. *adv. Colot.* 1115a) is probably inferential. In this case, too, ἵνα can replace a ὅτι-sentence, cf. LSJ *s.v.* ὅτι B2; cf. sentences introduced by ἀλλὰ γάρ... See also section 3.1.1. note 45. The text runs: ποῦ γὰρ ὦν τῆς ἀοικήτου τὸ βιβλίον ἔγραφες, ἵνα ταῦτα συντιθεὶς τὰ ἐγκλήματα μὴ τοῖς ἐκείνων συντάγμασιν ἐντύχης ...; ("Where on earth were you that you ...") and even a final interpretation could be defended. In his polemical reply to Colotes, Plutarch would then insinuate that Colotes maliciously wrote in a wilderness, in order that he might not have to take those books into account which contradicted his proposition (viz. that Plato was followed in a number of his doctrines by Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus and all the Peripatetics).

<sup>83</sup> Τῇ ῥ' ἐπὶ οἷ μεμαῶτ' ἔλασ' ἔγχει δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς, /ἀντικρὺ δ' ἀπαλοῖο δι' αὐχένος ἦλυθ' ἀκωκῆ/οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀπ' ἀσφάραγον μελίη τάμε χαλκοβάρεα, /ὄφρ' ἄ τί μιν προτιείποι ἀμειβόμενος ἐπέεσσιν. This is an example of "fated finality", merging into the consecutive. In this case, there is a possible, but not a necessary consequence, which becomes reality.

<sup>84</sup> "Remarkable because the poet often mentions what happens accidentally as if it were effected on account of some cause and with planning forethought, as 'and swiftly the South wind came, that I might traverse again the way to baneful Charybdis (transl. Murray)'. A more everyday example of the same phenomenon is 'the wind blew that (in order that/so that) the house fell down or the ship was shipwrecked'. Here, too, we have a similar case: 'that it might speak'. For he presented something which had happened accidentally in a 'causal' construction." Note that both αἰτία and αἰτιατικῶς are used in the broad sense discussed above: they include final causes.

<sup>85</sup> "He presented something which had happened accidentally in a 'causal' construction." SchHom. X 328-9a<sup>1</sup> and a<sup>2</sup>: εἶωθε δὲ τὰ ἐκ τύχης ὡς ἐξ αἰτίας λέγειν.

ποιητικός ὥστε τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συμβαῖνον ὡς αἴτιον λαμβάνειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀσθῆναι τὸν ἐπίλυκον ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει τοῦ Αἰτναίου Διὸς ἐνίκησεν, ἀλλὰ νικήσαντος ἔμελλεν ἢ εἰς αὐτὸν ᾧδῆ ἀσθήσεσθαι.<sup>86</sup>

But this same phenomenon is noticed as a characteristic of Biblical linguistic usage by several Christian writers,<sup>87</sup> in the footsteps of Origen.<sup>88</sup> Origen (185-253) is followed by Diodorus of Tarsus (bishop from 378 to 394, teacher of Theodorus and Johannes Chrysostomus),<sup>89</sup> and he in his turn by his pupil Theodorus of Mopsuestia, who also was a pupil of Libanius, and a bishop from 392 until 428. His extensive note on *Ps.* 50:6 b may function as a *locus classicus*. It is quoted and translated completely in Schäublin 1974, 152f. with note 289. I mention only the beginning of the note, since that contains all we need right now: τὸ ὅπως κατὰ ἰδίωμα λέγει τὸ γραφικὸν οὐκ ἐπὶ αἰτίας, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαίως ἐκβάν ὡς αἰτίαν τεθεικώς· τίθησι γὰρ αἰεὶ τὸ αἰτιατὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰτίου ὅταν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπόμενον ᾗ τῷ αἰτίῳ.<sup>90</sup> It is funny to notice that the Christian concept of consecutive ἵνα

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<sup>86</sup> "The manner of speech is poetic, so that it presents that which happens accidentally, as a cause. For he did not gain his victory in order that the victory song might be sung at the festival of Zeus of the Aetna, but when he had gained his victory the ode addressed to him would be sung." The Scholiast explains that Hieron and his people are used to sing the victory odes during the games and the festival of Zeus of the Aetna. Didymus is quoted as an authority for the likelihood that this particular victory ode was indeed composed for this end also. The *scholium* then continues with our quotation.

<sup>87</sup> The main difference is the fact that in Homer the effect was not aimed at, but ἐκ τύχης, while in the Bible consequences are concerned which follow ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

<sup>88</sup> In commenting on *Ps.* 50:6 c-d ("Ὅπως ἂν δικαιοθῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου καὶ νικήσῃς ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαί σε (cf. *Rom.* 3:4)) he writes: οὐκ αἰτιατικὸν ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ ὅπως· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἡμάρτανον ὅπως ἂν δικαιοθῆ ὁ Θεὸς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ. ἐδικαιοῦτο δὲ ὁ Θεὸς εἰκότως ἀφ' ὧν ἐκεῖνοι εὐεργετούμενοι ἠγνωμόνου.

<sup>89</sup> *CCSG* 6, 314,90ff. (on the same psalm-text): Ἐπισημαντέον δὲ καὶ τῷ ἰδίωματι τῆς γραφῆς ὅτι εἶπεν "Ὅπως ἂν κτλ." οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ λαὸς ἡμάρτε τῷ Θεῷ ἵνα ὁ Θεὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαι δίκαιος ἀναφανῆ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἠγνωμόνησεν ὁ λαὸς, ἀναγκαίως ἀγνωμονηθεὶς δίκαια εἶχεν ἐγκαλεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνωμονοῦντας. Τὸ οὖν ὅπως οὐ κείται ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ αἰτίας - εἰ καὶ ἐμφαίνει τοῦτο - ἀλλ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐξηγεῖται ὅτι τοῦ λαοῦ ἁμαρτήσαντος, ὁ Θεὸς δίκαιος ἀναφανεῖται κρινόμενος πρὸς αὐτούς.

<sup>90</sup> "He uses ὅπως in accordance with the usage of the Scripture, not to denote 'cause' [including final cause, I.S.] but in a 'causal' representation of a necessary event. For he always gives that which is caused instead of the cause whenever it follows its cause of necessity." There are several parallels from the

finally finds its way into the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax also.<sup>91</sup> In this way the circle has been closed.

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work of Theodorus, mentioned by Schäublin 1974, 154 n. 294.

<sup>91</sup> SchDTh. 585,17ff. in *apparatu critico*. The relevant addition is the word ἀποβατικῶς to design this usage. A paraphrasis by means of the expected ὥστε is found in Joh. Chrysostomus, *PGM* 60,478; moreover, he uses ἔκβασις instead of ἀπόβασις.



## Chapter IV - THE INTERJECTION

### 0. *Introduction*

We have approached the study of ancient linguistics from three different angles in the preceding chapters. I shall now add a fourth and concentrate my research on one of the indeclinable parts of speech. Moreover, whereas in the first three chapters the emphasis was on the Greek sources, in this case the Roman grammarians will be the centre of attention. For there is one point in the theory of the indeclinable parts of speech on which the Romans claim to have made a substantial correction to their Greek predecessors: They separated the interjections from the adverbs and put them into a part of speech of their own.

Interjections, it is true, may seem to be somewhat of a marginal issue, but nevertheless I feel justified in discussing them rather extensively. There are various reasons for this. In the first place, the theories of the ancient grammarians on at least one of the indeclinable parts of speech will be discussed *in extenso* and fairly systematically. This should help us to acquire a clear image of the working of ancient grammar. Secondly, it will be seen that the theory of the interjections touches upon various essential problems of ancient linguistics, that of the origin of language among them. I shall take the opportunity to discuss such topics as they cross the path of my investigation. Moreover, there are again a number of minor problems of interpretation in the grammarians' texts. These will also be paid attention to.

I will start my inquiry with the relationship between grammar and rhetoric. The first remarks made in a Latin source about the kind of words that were later to be classified as interjections, are found in a rhetorical/philological context. It will appear that the grammarians allowed rhetorical theory to influence their discussions. In coping with the terminological discrepancies between rhetoric and their own discipline (section 1.), they used rhetorical concepts to extend their notion of what an interjection was. They combined the grammatical (and philosophical) idea that interjections serve to express an *emotion*, with the rhetorical (and philological) conception of "interjection" as any kind of addition to a sentence which interrupts the line of thought. This brought them to the insight that other parts of speech could also fill the (rhetorical) function of an interjection. In this case rhetoric made it easier for them to see how such a change of function worked. The phenomenon itself of parts of speech fulfilling the function of another part of speech and thus, according to the



ancient grammarians, becoming such a part of speech, was well-enough known (cf. chapter II) (section 2.1.).

Another sign of influence from the discipline of rhetoric is the attention devoted to the use of interjections in the creation of an impression of ἦθος, in the sense of "character portrayal". Among other linguistic means, interjections are regarded by the grammarians as clues to the speaker's age, sex, and social status. This sounds like an anticipation of some of the basic ideas of modern socio-linguistics (section 2.2.).

The most intriguing aspect of the Roman theory of the interjection is their defence of their "revolutionary" approach to these particles, and their reaction to the inherent tension in rationalizing as a straightforward part of speech a group of words which of its very nature has something irregular and irrational about it (section 3.). Although they do not manage to hide the intrinsic problems altogether, it will be argued that they at least went to some trouble to circumvent obvious self-contradictions. This is especially clear from their terminology. I will uphold that they described interjections as being *voce incondita*, avoiding on the whole the word *confusa*, in order to maintain a certain consistency between their chapters *de interiectionibus* and *de voce* respectively.

Further, they stressed any regularity that came to the fore, especially in the semantics of the interjection, generally declared to be that particle's only *accidens*. From a formal point of view, however, they saw that they must despair of regularity, and they therefore promoted the impossibility of legislation itself to the general rule. The only exceptions to the rule of irregularity were those interjections which had a formal, phonological resemblance to a more "organized" part of speech, in which case analogy immediately claimed its due (section 3.2.).

The difficulties of integrating the interjections into a theory of the parts of speech, are also manifest if one looks at the connection of the interjections with ancient theories on the origin of language. The grammarians seem to have treated this relationship with studied indifference, as it would have exposed once again the inherent weakness of their theory: How can the interjection be a full-blown, rational part of speech, if it is a relic of primitive, inarticulate language? (section 3.3.)

The problem of how to distinguish interjections from the homonymous adverbs was also solved ingeniously and consistently, but hardly convincingly. Three criteria were applied, which derived from the interjections' phonological nature, their meaning and their construction (section 4.).

After a brief description of the problems faced mainly by the church fathers in translating interjections (section 5.) I will turn to possible Greek

parallels with the Roman theory. In order to establish them, I must first isolate the relevant material - for since the Greeks did not recognize the interjection as a separate part of speech, it is not immediately clear where to find their theories, if any, about them. This investigation will show that almost every opinion the Romans held about the interjections can be paralleled from our Greek sources. But since Greek priority in this respect cannot be proved, I will have to leave it at that (section 6.).

## 1. Grammar and rhetoric

Our earliest witness for the use of *interiectio* in a linguistic context is Varro. The fragment in which it occurs,<sup>1</sup> clearly has a philological/rhetorical drift: *'egone illam? quae illum? quae me? quae non? sine modo,/mori me malim; sentiet qui vir siem'* [Ter. *Eun.* 65]. *Praecise: ... generat animi passionem. Quod novi generis cum non sit interiectio sed ademptio, tamen interiecti animi causa vocitamus.*<sup>2</sup>

Admittedly, this text is not altogether clear. What is clear, however, is that the extreme conciseness (*praecise*) caused by the self-interruptions in which words are left out (*ademptio*), produces the same effect as the use of an *interiectio* would have done, viz. the impression of *animi passio*.<sup>3</sup> Several

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<sup>1</sup> Jul. Romanus (Char.) 315,7 = Funaioli fr. 40, p. 203 = fr. 60 G.-S. This text should be connected with Char. 311,14ff. Cf. M. De Nonno, *la grammatica dell' Anonymus Bobiensis*, Roma 1982, 74 n. 60.

<sup>2</sup> "Abruptly: this procures the effect of emotionality of the soul. Although this is not an interjection of an unusual type, but rather an omission, we nevertheless exclaim it on account of the soul being 'interjected'."

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Donatus' remarks on Ter. *Eun.* 65 (1): *familiaris ἔλλειψις irascentibus; nam singula sic explentur: 'egone illam' non ulciscar, 'quae illum' recepit, 'quae me' exclusit, 'quae non' admisit. etenim <nec> necesse habet nec potest complere orationem, qui et secum loquitur et dolore vexatur.* (2) *nam amat ἀποσιωπήσεις nimia indignatio, ut Vergilius [A. I 135] 'quos ego ... !' etc.; Don. in Ter. Eun. 1050: quae narravit: nimius affectus in utramque partem defectus orationis amat; cf. Quint. 9,2,54 'Αποσιώπησις (= interruptio; reticentia) ... ostendit affectus ...; 9,2,57 Est alia non quidem reticentia, quae sit imperfecti sermonis, sed tamen praecisa velut ante legitimum finem oratio ... Macr. 4,6,17 exclamatio, quae apud Graecos ἐκφώνησις dicitur, movet pathos; 4,6,20 contraria huic figurae ἀποσιώπησις, quod est taciturnitas. nam ut illic aliqua exclamando dicimus, ita hic aliqua tacendo subducimus, quae tamen intellegere possit auditor. hoc autem praecipue irascentibus convenit.* The Greek term ἐκφώνησις has the same double reference: it may denote a "real" interjection, as well as a rhetorical construction, see below. E.g. Jul. Romanus (Char.) 313,1-3: *'vita deum immortalium', Cato Senex, ubi Statilius Maximus ἐκφώνησις, inquit, ἀρχαϊκή, ὡς ὦ πόπου,* and the Sch.Bob. on Cicero *pro*

emendations of this passage have been proposed; I give the one put forward in the *TLL: Praecise: ... generat animi passionem; quod novi generis cum non sit interiectio, sed ademptio, tamen interiecti <motus> animi causa <interiectionem> vocitamus.*<sup>4</sup>

The text of the Roman grammarian Romanus (Charisius) - from which the Varro-fragment was taken - continues with various other examples of sentences of an emotional nature, all of which lack a "real" interjection, i.e. a word belonging to the homonymous part of speech (*licet nulla sit interiecta particula*, Char. 315,14); they consist of the "normal" parts of speech.

Varro does not use the word *interiectio* in a grammatical sense to indicate the interjection as a part of speech, although he does describe words which the later grammatical tradition was to call interjections: *LL VII 93* we read: *'Euax' verbum nihil significat, sed effutitum naturaliter est.*<sup>5</sup> As further examples of this kind of words Varro mentions *hahae, eu* and *heu*.

If we look at the use of the word *interiectio* in rhetoric, we find that it mostly refers rather neutrally to a parenthetic word or word-group without any additional information on the emotionality conveyed by such a word or word-group. In other words *interiectio* can serve the same purpose as the words *δὲ μέσσω* (cf. chapter II section 1.4.4.). This makes it likely that the concept was also used in a philological context (text-interpretation),<sup>6</sup> and refers with its counterpart *ὑπερβατόν* to the logical order of a sentence. The rhetorical use is documented in Quintilian, who also knows of a separate grammatical meaning (1,4,19; 1,5,50). Rhetorically speaking we are according to him dealing with *interiectio* "... cum continuationi sermonis medius aliqui sensus intervenit"<sup>7</sup>

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*Flacco 39 o pastores nescio quos cupidos litterarum: 'Εκφώνησις.*

<sup>4</sup> "Abruptly: this procures the effect of emotionality of the soul. Although this is not an interjection of an unusual type, but rather an omission, we nevertheless call it an interjection because of the soul's emotions being thrown in." Cf. Diom. I 419,19 *fere quidquid motus animi orationi inseruerit ... numero interiectionis accedet*; Pomp. V 281,16ff. *nam interiectio est res quae exprimit animi motum. quidquid potest animi motum exprimere, sive in una re fuerit sive in multis, interiectio dicenda est.* (Here, too, the rhetorical use of *interiectio* is alluded to). *Praecisio*: Cf. auct. ad Her. 4,30,41: *praecisio est cum dictis quibus reliquum quod coeptum est dici relinquitur incohatum.*  
*Generat*: This metaphorical use of *generare* would be the first occurrence of its kind; it is not unusual after Augustus.

<sup>5</sup> "Hurray' is a word that in itself means nothing, but is a natural (spontaneous) ejaculation." For *naturaliter*, cf. Pellicer 1966, 329.

<sup>6</sup> In such cases as this the philological and rhetorical contexts are especially close; they relate to one another as description to prescription.

<sup>7</sup> "... when some meaningful element interrupts the course of speech."

(9,3,23; cf. 8,2,15).<sup>8</sup> This *figura verborum* is also called παρένθεσις<sup>9</sup> or παρέμπρωσις,<sup>10</sup> and in Latin *interpositio* or *interclusio* (*ibid.*). As I said, no mention is made in this context of any emotional effect being produced by such parentheses.

In this respect there seems to be a closer relationship between the rhetorical term *exclamatio* and the grammatical interjection than between the latter and its rhetorical counterpart. *Exclamatio* is described by Cicero as one of the means of achieving *ornatus*, and he pays explicit attention to its emotional character (*Or.* 135 ... *aut si est aliqua exclamatio vel admirationis vel questionis*).<sup>11</sup> So does Quintilian (9,2,26f.) when he lists *exclamatio* as one of the ways in which emotionality may be increased. He refers to short sentences expressing feelings like anger, joy, fear, admiration, pain, indignation, longing etc. Although in rhetoric *exclamatio* is by far the more frequent term for such sentences, Quintilian once calls his example an *interiectio* (9,3,29) (the same example that was adduced 9,2,26, viz. *Cic. Phil.* 2,64, recurs here). The rhetorical meaning of *interiectio* is, therefore, twofold: It may either refer to an emotionally neutral parenthesis or to an emotional exclamation. Quintilian distinguishes between true exclamations and artificial ones, only the latter being *schemata* (9,2,27).<sup>12</sup> One may compare Varro's *effutitum naturaliter* as cited above: interjections/exclamations belong to the field of *natura*, not that of *ars*. Incidentally, Quintilian nowhere explicitly classifies "real" interjections as true exclamations. As we shall see, the elements of "emotional appeal" and "naturalness" recur in the more strictly grammatical tradition.

According to Quintilian (1,4,20), the term *asseveratio* was applied by some to words like *eheu*. It is unclear in what respect, if any, the *asseveratio* differed

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<sup>8</sup> In a more philological context, Quint. 11,3,37 (on Verg. *A.* 1ff.): *interiectio est fato profugus et continuum sermonem, qui faciebat Italiam Lavinaeque dividit*. Cf. section 6.3. note 243.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *comm. Einsidl.* VIII 218,1ff.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *DH Amm.* 2,2; 2,15.

<sup>11</sup> "... or if there is any exclamation of admiration or complaint". Cf. auct. ad Her. 4,22 *Exclamatio est, quae conficit significationem doloris aut indignationis alicuius per hominis aut urbis aut loci aut rei cuiuspiam compellationem*.

<sup>12</sup> Since they belong to the department of *affectus*, they are *schemata*, i.e. *figurae sententiarum*, rather than *figurae orationis*: 9,3,97 *est ... posita inter figuras verborum exclamatio quam sententiae potius puto (adfectus enim est)*. Cf. Quint. 11,3,61.

from the *interiectio*.<sup>13</sup> Quintilian is our only witness for its use in a grammatical context as the name of a part of speech, and he rejects it.

## 2. Between grammar and rhetoric

### 2.1. Other parts of speech and word-groups functioning as interjections

Grammarians cannot be expected to give a rhetorical discussion of the interjection, and indeed they do not. They do, however, have to cope with the fact that if one looks at the whole of linguistic terminology,<sup>14</sup> the word "*interiectio*" was not confined to the part of speech, as appears from the preceding section. Thus, they usually remark that other parts of speech may also be used as interjections (*pro interiectione*), either by themselves or as a word-group: Don. IV 391,30f. *licet autem pro interiectione etiam alias partes orationis singulas pluresve subponere, ut 'nefas', 'pro nefas'*.<sup>15</sup> The difference

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<sup>13</sup> Pinborg 1961, 134 n. 27 thinks *asseveratio* is the translation of σχετλιασμός. I think it more likely that it translates (δια)βεβαίωσις, cf. DTh. *Techne* 85,1; *Corp. Gloss. Lat.* (ed. Goetz) II 270,13 s.v. διαβεβαίουμαι (*sic*): *adsevero*. This has the advantage of reducing the *adseverationes* to a well-defined subgroup of the interjection, whereas the σχετλιαστικά constitute its major category (cf. Jul. Romanus (Char.) 246,25f.). The example *eheu* has been doubted. Colson (1916, 27) unconvincingly suggest *euhoē* (which is a θειασμοῦ δηλωτικόν, DTh. *Techne* 86,1). Niedermann proposes *eu* which is never called anything but an *adverbium laudantis* in our grammatical sources (I.W. Beck, *de differentiarum scriptoribus Latinis*, Groningae 1883, 55 no.10). *Non liquet*.

<sup>14</sup> I.e. not only the strictly grammatical jargon, but that of other disciplines studying language, such as rhetoric, too.

<sup>15</sup> "One may also substitute one or more other parts of speech for the interjection, e.g. '*nefas*', 'oh horror', '*pro nefas*' 'oh horror'." Cf. Diom. I 419,14ff. Examples: *o mi, ellum, amabo, nefas, pro nefas, malum, miserum, infandum*; Char. 314,28ff. *pro Iuppiter*; Don. in Ter. *Eun.* 537 '*amabo interiectio est amantis etsi verbum sonat*'; Serv. in Verg. *A.* I 251 *infandum*; *A.* IV 591 *pro Iuppiter*; *A.* VI 21 *miserum*; Sergius IV 562,22ff. (from Plautus and Virgil) *nefas, infandum, pro dolor, pro pudor* (cf. Max. Vict. VI 204,23ff.); Clemens Scotus 101,31f. *solī autem interiectioni non anteponitur praepositio nisi illis dictionibus quae in [in] interiectionem transeunt, ut 'infandum', 'pro dolor'* (my corrections; the text ran: ... *quae in in interiectionem transeunt, ut 'infandum' pro 'dolor'*).

Attention should also be called to Dosith. VII 424,12 *licet autem pro interiectione* [τὸ αὐτὴν παρενθέσεως] *etiam alias partes orationis singulas pluresve subponere* ... Dositheus presents us with the same text as Donatus but for the part included between brackets. Indeed, these words may be a later addition, for Dositheus does not use Greek paraphrases to clarify the meaning of his Latin phraseology, as Priscian sometimes does. [The Greek translation which he gives of large parts of his work does not have this function. It does in Priscian who works from a Greek original *ex confesso*. By his translations Dositheus enables Greeks to use his work as a study-book for learning Latin. For Priscian, see e.g. III 14,19; III

between these interjections, or - from a grammatical point of view - pseudo-interjections, and the real ones consists in the fact that the former in themselves are *voces plenae* or *integrae*, while the latter are not, see section 3.2.: Sergius IV 518,25ff. *plerumque ... contingit ut et vox integra et quae aliam partem orationis efficiat, interiectio sit pro sensu.*<sup>16</sup> Servius in Don. IV 420,19ff.: *et plenus frequenter sermo pro interiectione habetur, si affectum significet ...*<sup>17</sup> The function "interjection" is assigned to these words or word-groups on the criteria of the presence of *affectus* and optionality.<sup>18</sup>

Sergius V 443,21ff. explicitly calls attention to the fact that these words should not be called *interiectiones tout court*; according to him they are *pro interiectionibus*: *cum autem plenas voces adhibemus ad exprimendos animi affectus, non tam interiectiones dicuntur quam pro interiectionibus, ut* [Verg. A. IV 590].<sup>19</sup>

This possibility of using "ordinary" words and especially word-groups as interjections is clearly a rhetorical conception. Once it is accepted that a formally perfectly normal word may function as an interjection, "interjections" gradually expand into whole sentences. The gradual transition from the grammatical to the rhetorical concept of "interjection" is best shown by Pompeius, who with his usual verbosity rises to the occasion (V 281,10ff.): *plane illud scire debes quod plerumque non solum integra pars orationis, sed elocutio*

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108,18 he gives the Greek original to clarify his Latin translation.] Nevertheless, it is an illuminating remark, as *interiectio* is clearly interpreted in its rhetorical sense, viz. that of παρένθεσις. I do not think that the text of the glosse - if that is what it is - can stand as it is. The only emendation which has occurred to me is 'id est ἀντὶ παρένθεσις', the abbreviation of 'id est' (ἰδ or ἰδ) being mistaken for τὸ. The possibility that τὸ *autem* is to be taken as "the word 'autem'" is of course untenable.

<sup>16</sup> "It regularly happens that a word which is pure and correct and which constitutes another part of speech, is semantically an interjection."

<sup>17</sup> "Often a full utterance, too, is considered to be an equivalent of an interjection, if it indicates emotion." Cf. Petrus grammaticus VIII 171,20ff. *Hoc quaerendum est, si potest integra elocutio interiectio dici, an non. Potest. Quomodo? Cum aliquid dolore cordis vel laetitia vel admiratione vel metu referimus, etiamsi longo tractu finiatur, ipsa elocutio interiectio dicenda est.*

<sup>18</sup> See e.g. Diom. I 419,16ff. quoted below (section 4.2.). The necessary presence of *affectus* increases the probability that there is rhetorical, rather than "philological" influence here: Parts of the sentence that can be left out if one wants to simplify the construction (διὰ μέσου), but which are not of an emotional nature, are never called *interiectio* by the Roman grammarians.

<sup>19</sup> "However, when we use full words to express the emotions of the soul, they are not called 'interjections', but rather 'equivalents of interjections'." Cf. Serv. IV 420,19ff. quoted above.

*omnis pro interiectione est.*<sup>20</sup> He proceeds by giving examples of growing complexity: *pro, nefas, pro nefas, pro nefas hoc contigisse*, culminating in (15ff.) '*pro Iuppiter optime nefas hoc contigisse*', *omnis ista elocutio pro una interiectione est. nam interiectio est res*<sup>21</sup> *quae exprimit animi motum. quidquid potest animi motum exprimere, sive in una re fuerit, sive in multis, interiectio dicenda est.*<sup>22</sup>

## 2.2. Rhetorical functions of interjections

Interjections themselves (as opposed to the term *interiectio*) can of course have various rhetorical functions. One is that of winning time (Don. in Ter. *Ad.* 789 *nota, quod ubi non invenit quid dignum loqueretur, ab interiectione coepit 'ei mihi'*).<sup>23</sup> Far more important, obviously, is that of heightening the *pathos*, since the emotional value of interjections is their principal characteristic.<sup>24</sup> Julius Romanus (Char. 311,16ff.) calls attention to the fact that interjections may also be used in a text which primarily represents a certain ἦθος: (*interiectiones*) *quae quamvis πάθους στάσιν <habeant>*<sup>25</sup> *nec ἦθους, invenimus tamen etiam*

<sup>20</sup> "You should know clearly that not only a pure and correct part of speech, but also a complete uttering may regularly be used as an interjection."

<sup>21</sup> *Res*, "thing", is a vague word for "word", cf. V 263,29.

<sup>22</sup> "By the good Jove, oh horror, that this should have happened', this whole utterance functions as one interjection. For an interjection is a thing which expresses the soul being moved. Everything that can express the emotion of the soul, either in one thing or in more, should be called an interjection."

<sup>23</sup> "N.B.: since he could not find anything suitable to say, he started with the interjection 'ei mihi'."

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Apsin. *ars rhet.* I 406,9f. Spengel: πάθος ποιούσι καὶ οἱ σχετλιασμοί, φεῦ καὶ οἴμοι· πάθος ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ ἀνακλητικά "θέαμα δεινόν, ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί".

<sup>25</sup> *Habeant* was suggested by Keil. I think the combination πάθους στάσιν <*habeant*> is objectionable from a semantic point of view: Surely, an opposition is intended between the use of interjections by authors who are known as *ethici*, and whose interest in stirring πάθος is at best mediocre, and the normal function of interjections, viz. to convey πάθος, or to increase the "pathetic" contents of a text. (Cf. also *Rhet. Gr.* I 358,27f. Spengel; 406,9, see previous note). But στάσιν *habere* would normally mean:

a) ἵστασθαι (absol. use), ἐστάναι, (εἶναι), cf. *Hebr.* 9:8 τοῦτο δηλοῦντος τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου μήπω πεφανερῶσθαι τὴν τῶν ἁγίων ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης σκηπῆς ἐχούσης στάσιν; Polyb. 5,5,3 (of the winds: "to have set in"). We cannot use this here, as the genitive would be awkward.

b) with gen. the principal meaning is: to make something stop. The only combination which is at all frequent, viz. ἀνέμου στάσις may mean a dropping, cessation of the wind (1), the direction, state of the wind (the wind in a certain direction) (2), and "*seditio ventorum*", a squall (3), cf. P.W. Walbank, *A Historical*

*apud eos qui videntur ethici mediocriter pathos solere concire.*<sup>26</sup> The function of the interjections is still to demonstrate or even (rhetorically) to create *pathos*, but this time the *pathos* is of such a moderate nature that the word ἦθος is a more apt designation for it. This is not the only place where interjections are related to ἦθος, nor is this the only way in which both notions are connected. For ἦθος can have other rhetorical connotations as well, and interjections can play a role in all of them. Therefore, I shall look a little closer into the concept of ἦθος, into the way interjections and other indeclinable parts of speech produce the effect of ἦθος, and into the relationship with πάθος.

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*Commentary on Polybius, ad I 48,2.* The first possibility may be left out of account. The second cannot be excluded completely (cf. the combinations of *status* with a defining genitive, e.g. Cic. *Fin.* 2,28 *iste non dolendi status*, OLD s.v. 6), although it leads us more or less to the *contradictio in terminis* that interjections produce an effect of "steady πάθος". This is not very likely, cf. Longin. π. ὑψ. 20,2 (though in a different connotation of στάσις): Εἰθ' ἵνα μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἰῶν στῆ (ἐν στάσει γὰρ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν, ἐν ἀταξίᾳ δὲ τὸ πάθος, ἐπεὶ φορὰ ψυχῆς καὶ συγκίνησις ἔστιν), εὐθὺς ἐπ' ἄλλα μεθήλατο ἀσύνδετα καὶ ἐπαναφορὰς (Longinus then quotes examples from Dem. 21,72). But, as I said, the possibility of the existence of a "state of instability" cannot be excluded. The third possibility generates the interpretation of interjections showing conflicting πάθη, not conflicting ἦθη—again this outcome is undesirable and unsatisfactory. I do not find it likely that στάσις hides Latin *status*; this does not solve much since the construction with an inanimate possessor of the *status* and the following genitive is again unparalleled.

I give three conjectures *exempli gratia*: 1. *quae quamvis πάθους signa sint nec ἦθους*. The reading στάσις would again have developed from a misinterpretation of an abbreviation, cf. n. 15 above. ςῖσσιϛ= *signa sint*, read as στάσις under influence of the Greek word immediately preceding.

2. Alternatively we could read τάσις instead of στάσις. (τάσις indicates "intensity" cf. LSJ s.v.), e.g. Plut. *Sulla* XVIII 3 of the intensity or momentum propelling a missile. In Hp. *Acut.* 37 the inverse confusion is found; here the MSS read τάσις instead of στάσις.

3. Supply <*indicent*>. However, this would be tantamount to again creating the second meaning of στάσις *habere* discussed above.

<sup>26</sup> "(Interjections) which although they have the (status of *pathos*?), not of *ethos*, we nevertheless find in those writers also, who being *ethici* seem usually to rouse *pathos* in a moderate way." It seems better to let *solere concire* depend from *videntur*, than to take it as part of an accusativus cum infinitivo dependent on *invenimus*. The passage apparently had a Greek source, which may explain the predicative use of *ethici* (ὄντες) (as a substantive, *ethici* is extremely rare, cf. *TLL* s.v. *ethicus* B 1). Furthermore, the meaning of *videntur ethici* ("who seem to be *ethici*") is not suitable here. Thirdly, in the passage 315,3ff. it is also the authors, not the interjections that excite *pathos*. Finally, if *qui videntur ethici* is taken together, one would have expected a subjunctive (although this cannot be decisive).

Cf. on πάθος in *ethici* 315,3ff. De Nonno 1982, 74 n. 60.



ῥΗθος is a very important concept in the theories of ancient rhetoric and I will not try to cover it all. However, a brief outline of the development of the term may be useful. ῥΗθος is used by Aristotle first and foremost to denote the presentation or self-presentation of the person described or the speaker, whereas πάθος refers to the reaction produced in the audience. Various scholars have pointed out that this state of affairs seems to reflect a primarily rhetorical approach to πάθος,<sup>27</sup> and a mainly poetical view of ῥΗθος.<sup>28</sup>

If we look for linguistic indicators of ῥΗθος, we find that the effect of ῥΗθος is produced, if a way of speaking is specifically related to factors like sex, age, and social status.<sup>29</sup> Aristotle feels language expresses ῥΗθος most clearly, if it informs us about the speaker's προαίρεσις, the motivation for his actions.<sup>30</sup> ῥΗθος "character(-portrayal)" is not unrelated to πάθος. The vigorous expression of ῥΗθος "character" produces the additional effect of πάθος<sup>31</sup> and the reverse may also be true; persisting πάθος contributes to the ῥΗθος of a certain passage.<sup>32</sup>

In later theory stress is put increasingly on the stylistic difference between "ethical" and "emotional" style.<sup>33</sup> Both types of style are thought to produce a certain effect on the audience. The result is that ῥΗθος and πάθος come to represent different stages on the scale of emotionality. They no longer differ in nature, only in degree, ῥΗθος representing the more subdued, sweeter emotions, πάθος the more vehement ones.<sup>34</sup> An example of this usage is formed by the text from Julius Romanus that was quoted at the beginning of this section.

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<sup>27</sup> Gill 1984, 153ff.

<sup>28</sup> Hagen 1966, 58.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Ar. *Rhet.* 1408a25ff. Cf. in practice SchHom. X 477b: ἠθικὸς ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀρμόδιος γυναικί (cf. Δ 20). Cf. Steinmann 1907, 35f.; Gill 1984, 157 n. 39; 159 n. 49. Hagen relates this use of ῥηθοποιία especially to the genre of the προγυμνάσματα.

<sup>30</sup> Ar. *Rhet.* 1417a16ff.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Kennedy 1972, 41; Gill 1984, 157.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. e.g. SchHom. Π 56-9a (where Achilles recounts to Patroclus the injurious deeds of Agamemnon) ... ἔστι δε ἠθικόν· ὅμοιον γάρ τοις θυμουμένους [in itself a πάθος] καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰδόμενος διηγεῖσθαι. Achilles is thus characterized as a θυμούμενος by his behaviour.

<sup>33</sup> Gill 1984, 155ff.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Zucker 1953, 19; Hagen 1966, 76.

A further refinement is found especially in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Stylistic overtones apart, ἦθος in Dionysius is either a rather neutral word for any personality or character, or it indicates a morally acceptable, decent character.<sup>35</sup> When Dionysius discusses the excellent ἠθοποιία in Lysias, the latter is what he means.

All this implies that by the time of our grammatical sources ἦθος and ἠθικός could be used in a number of contexts. In opposition to the more vehement sentiments, ἠθικός can refer to the complacent tone of a passage, to its friendliness and urbanity. Often the interpretation "personal" fits very well. Humorous undertones (διάχνυσις) can induce us to interpret ἐν ἦθει as "ironical(ly)".<sup>36</sup> But, of course, the primary meaning "indicative of (a certain) ἦθος" should not be forgotten either.

What, then, is the relationship between the indeclinable parts of speech and the *termini technici* ἦθος/ἠθικός? I shall first give a few other instances and then I shall return to the interjections.

The ancient commentaries on the use of the σύνδεσμος ἦ illustrate how close the different connotations of ἠθικός may be to one another and to the production of πάθος. ἦ may be labeled πειστικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν, as in SchHom. Z 518c<sup>1</sup> and c<sup>2</sup> in which Paris addresses Hector: this is a somewhat timid question of younger to elder brother.<sup>37</sup> It is styled ἠθικῶς μετὰ πείσεως ἢ διαβεβαιωτικῶς in Γ 46-52, where Hector addresses Paris in a sarcastic question, which may also be taken as a strong affirmation. These passages share the characteristic that they contain rhetorical questions; the questions are in themselves superfluous: no actual information is required. Their main function seems to be to typify the relationship of speaker to addressee. And indeed, ἦθος and ἠθικός often have the connotation of a characteristic, personal relationship of close relatives or friends.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Meerwaldt 1920, 18ff.; cf. 21 on the effect on the audience.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Kroll 1918. Hdn. *de figuris, Rhet. Gr.* III 92,29ff. Spengel: χαριεντισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος ἠθικός μετὰ χάριτος παριστῶν τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ἐπὶ τινι διάχνυσις ("merriment"); Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 34,3 Demosthenes is called ἀνηθοποιήτος, ἀδιάχνυτος. See also note 38. Cf. Zucker 1953, 20; Gill 1984, 162.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. SchHom. Z 518b<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> At first sight the use of ἠθεῦ(ε) (Z 518) may seem to have contributed to this judgment of the passage. However, the scholiasts do not connect ἠθεῦε with ἦθος, but with θεῖος or ἔθος (SchHom. Z 518a and b). Cf. further *Rhet. Gr.* I 428,2ff. Spengel: ἦθος ... ἐστὶ ψυχῆς διάθεσις ἐνεσκιρρωμένη καὶ δυσεξάλειπτος, οἶον τῶν πατέρων πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας; Quint. 6,2,13 ἦθος ... *non solum mite ac placidum sed plerumque blandum et humanum ... quod est sine*

But linguistic phenomena contributing to *ethos*, are, according to ancient commentators, used to rouse *pathos* as well.<sup>39</sup> Agamemnon's groan of anguish

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*dubio inter coniunctas maxime personas.* The reverse relationship appears from Cic. *ep.Att.* 10,10,6 *iuvenem nostrum non possum non amare, sed ab eo nos non amari plane intellego. Nihil ego vidi tam ἀνηθοποίητος, tam aversum a suis.* The correct interpretation of ἀνηθοποίητος and the relationship between these passages was pointed out already by Meerwaldt 1920, 23 n. 1; cf. Zucker 1953; Gill 1984, 162 n. 71.

In SchHom. I 622b the four speakers of the episode of the embassy to Achilles are characterized: Ὀδυσσεὺς συνετός, πανούργος, θεραπευτικός (i.e. "soothing", cf. *Rhet. Gr.* I 427,21 Spengel)· Ἀχιλλεὺς θυμικός, μεγαλόφρων· Φοῖνιξ ἠθικός, πρᾶος, παιδευτικός· Αἴας... Here the adjective ἠθικός is used of a human being. Phoenix makes a good impression, he is a friendly, decent person, but might not his relationship with and attitude towards Achilles, acquired over a long period, contribute to his being qualified as ἠθικός ("a real friend")? Ἦ is called ἠθικὸν καὶ ἐρωτηματικόν also in SchHom. Φ 583b which discusses Agenor's addressing Achilles in a defiant (ironical) question shortly before the fighting starts.

There are some other examples of σύνδεσμοι and ἐπίρρηματα whose use is deemed ἠθικός. So for ἡ διασαφητικός Cramer *AO* I 189,25 (on Hom. A 117); ἄρα: SchAp.Rhod. B 438 (here ἠθικός probably means "friendly", cf. B 437 περιπολλὸν ἔυφρονέων); and an example of ἐπίρρημα: SchEur. *Phoen.* 901 (δῆτα) ἠθικὸν ἐπίρρημα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς. In the latter passage the exact meaning of ἠθικός is difficult to establish. There is no irony nor does the tone sound particularly friendly. But δῆτα is said to be used instead of ἀληθῶς, which is an ἐπίρρημα βεβαιωτικόν, cf. SchHom. Z 518c<sup>1</sup> and c<sup>2</sup> and the examples quoted below: Ἠθικός may refer to the personal, urgent tone of the question.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. for mixed *ethos-pathos* effects: SchHom. *E* 648-54, where the use of very short sentences (κομματίζεω) is held to be either caused by θυμός or because it is ἠθικός "ironical".

Not only by using conjunctions and adverbs can the effect of ἦθος be produced; the same result is obtained by joining sentences asyndetically. An asyndetic style characterizes the ruler (SchHom. B 9: on Zeus' addressing the dream he sends to Agamemnon, cf. Eustath. 1,255,31 vdV.) and SchHom. Π 128a states more generally: παρατηρητέον δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἀσύνδετα τὴν προσωποποιίαν ὅτι ἐμφαντικωτάτη. Nor is there a clear-cut border between ἦθος and πάθος in the case of asyndeton. It is, as would appear from the comments of the Scholiasts, one of Homer's favourite ways of making his figures show that they are angry (SchHom. Γ 50; 53a) or are subject to πάθος in general (SchHom. Κ 9; X 295). It makes Homer's style γοργότερον, "more vehement, more vigorous" (Eust. 381,35ff.).

A Latin example in which both ἦθος and πάθος may be considered the results of asyndeton, is Don. in Ter. *Eun.* 821 *haec ἀσύνδετα instantis dominae vultum habitumque demonstrant.* On the one hand we are dealing with a *domina* and her *habitus* (ἦθος); on the other we learn that she is *instantis* and the way she speaks is indicative of the expression on her face (πάθος).

I started this chapter with a discussion of a fragment of Varro: There the rhetorical figure of *praecisio* was said to produce heightening of the emotional tone of the passage (i.e. the πάθος). We may now compare this passage with SchHom. X 111-22: After a long conditional protasis, in which Hector has deliberated on the possibility of putting down his shield and proposing the delivery of Helen to Achilles, Hector does not proceed with the apodosis, but interrupts himself with the words: ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο

when he sees that his brother is wounded, is called ἠθικὸν καὶ περιπαθές.<sup>40</sup> And the occasions where Achilles addresses the dead Patroclus have the same double effect on the audience, viz. that of imparting the emotion of the moment and that of stressing the special bond between the two friends.<sup>41</sup> The scholium on Σ 333 calls this type of speech ἔμψυχος, the very word Hermogenes uses, too, when he describes how an impression of ἦθος is effected by connecting the typical and appropriate words to each person.<sup>42</sup> This can be managed by applying decency, simplicity and τὸ κατ' αὐτῶν ἐμφαινόμενον ἀληθές καὶ ἐνδιάθετον.<sup>43</sup> And then, we are back to the interjections, for in dealing with "truth" Hermogenes explains (375,19ff.): "Ἰδιαί γε μὴν εἰσιν ἔννοιαι παρὰ τὰς προειρημένας τοῦ οἴου ἐμψύχου λόγου αἱ σχετλιαστικαί.<sup>44</sup> Σχετλιαστικαί are the Greek equivalents to the Roman interjections - apparently,

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θύμος; The scholiast comments that either the foregoing sentences introduced by εἰ should be read διαπορητικῶς or Hector is speaking κομματικῶς. On the other hand: δύναται ... καὶ ἠθικῶς ὁ Ἑκτωρ ἀπαξ ἐν μετανοίᾳ γενόμενος, πρὶν ἀνταποδοῦναι, διακόψαι τὸν λόγον. For another example of the relationship between μετάνοια and ἦθος, cf. SchHom. I 453a. In the passage discussed there, Phoenix has told how his mother had requested him to sleep with his father's mistress. He proceeds "τῇ πιθόμην καὶ ἔρεξα", on which the Scholiast reacts as follows: ἐν ἡθει δεῖ ἀναγινώσκειν ὡς μετανοοῦντος αὐτοῦ. This is a reading direction: Phoenix says this in quiet, subdued tones, thus indicating his regret for what he did. The commentator apparently did not visualize Hector's self-interruption as a brusque and emotional affair, but Hector regrets his impulse and now quietly faces reality again. Cf. SchHom. O 244a<sup>1</sup>: (τίη δὲ σὺ <νόσφιν ἀπ' ἄλλων> (the words are spoken by Apollo, who has come to assist the wounded Hector): ἠθικῶς πάνυ, ὡς πρὸς νοσοῦντά φαμεν "τί κατάκεισαι;" Here, ἠθικῶς must mean something like "softly", too. The phenomena of ἦθος and πάθος are close indeed and often it depends on the interpretation of the commentator whether a word or phenomenon is held to contribute to the ἦθος or the πάθος of any given passage. It may have been the presence of ἦ that was decisive in the diagnosis of ἦθος here. Cf. also Eustath. 4,585,3ff. vdV.

<sup>40</sup> SchHom. Δ 153b. Once again ἠθικός probably refers to the typical relationship between relatives, this time brothers. Cf. Ψ 94 (Achilles to Patroclus) ἠθείη κεφαλῆ, but see note 38.

<sup>41</sup> SchHom. Σ 333 περιπαθές καὶ ἠθικὸν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεώτας διαλέγεσθαι ὡς πρὸς ζῶντας. καὶ ἔστιν ἔμψυχον τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τῶν λόγων; SchHom. T 316a.

<sup>42</sup> Hermogenes, π.ιδεῶν 352,22ff. Rabe = *Rhet. Gr.* II 375,19ff. Spengel.

<sup>43</sup> "Truth and spontaneity apparent in them."

<sup>44</sup> "But apart from the afore-mentioned, expressions of indignation are peculiar to the kind of speech that is, so to say, alive." Examples are ὦ Ζεῦ, ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί, οἴμοι. Cf. Hagen 1966, 48.

interjections can contribute to ἦθος, character portrayal, as well as to the production of πάθος.<sup>45</sup>

And indeed, interjections - primarily indicators of *pathos* - in practice often indicate a combination of *pathos* and *ethos* (character portrayal, type portrayal).<sup>46</sup> These are closely interconnected in Don. in Ter. *An.* 751: *AU interiectio est consternatae mulieris.*<sup>47</sup> One step further brings us to comments which concentrate exclusively on the contribution interjections can make to the image of any given character - they may be characteristic for a specific group. Thus, Donatus (Don. in Ter. *H.* 347) comments: *HEM interiectio feminea ac matronalis* (sex and social status specified; no special emphasis on emotional value). In this category belong the many remarks in our Greek sources, where we are told that certain interjections are typical of seamen, hunters, grapetreaders, shepherds, goatherds and swineherds (there are a lot of different kinds of cattle in Greece and sheep apparently appreciated not being addressed as if they were goats); there is even one interjection which, it would seem, is

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<sup>45</sup> The same sentiment is expressed by pseudo-Dionysius, but he evaluates it differently. He rejects this method of striving for cheap effects which he sees in the μελεταί, the practical exercises in rhetoric, where character is simply represented by τὰ καλούμενα ἐπιφώνηματα, the so-called exclamations (περὶ τῶν ἐν μελέταις πλημμελουμένων = H. Usener and L. Radermacher, *Dionysii Halicarn. Opuscula* II 359,12ff.: ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦ ἦθους ἄγων ὑπάρχει τὰ καλούμενα ἐπιφώνηματα, προστυχοῦσαι τινες αὐτόματοι φωναὶ ἠθικαί.).

<sup>46</sup> Although the words *ethos* and *pathos* need not be explicitly used.

<sup>47</sup> "Au' is an interjection of a woman in dismay". Cf. *An.* 781 *conturbatae mulieris*; *Eun.* 680 *conturbatae feminae nec constantis sibi*; *Eun.* 899 *perturbatae mulieris*. See further on the Greek side e.g. Dem. *eloc.* 57, where αὐ' αὐ' is held to rouse *pathos* and Bachm. *AG* I 48,28 where it is called ἠθικόν (although the context does not allow us to establish the exact meaning of ἠθικόν here).

peculiar to "barbarians pulling something".<sup>48</sup> Age is the decisive factor in the use of words like τέττα and ἄττα, which are used to address older people.<sup>49</sup>

One more observation on the use of interjections, this time a stylistic one, deserves mention here. Pseudo-Probus (IV 255,28-256,14) has a long note on the stylistic level befitting certain interjections. Words like *hahaha* and *papae* mainly fit the lower genres,<sup>50</sup> and are avoided in the lyric poetry of Horace as well as in epic and tragedy.<sup>51</sup> (*E*)*heu* can be thrown in anywhere.

As we saw, the grammarians did not confine themselves to marking a word down as an interjection, but were also anxious to explain its (rhetorical) function. First and foremost, interjections increased the *pathos* of the text. They could be used for winning time. But they could also have the effect of *ethos* in either of two ways: They could convey the less vehement, quieter types of emotion and they could have a function in typifying a character. Accordingly, we find various observations in the ancient grammarians regarding the ἦθος, the impression of character, age, sex and social status that is suggested by the use of certain interjections. In so doing, they anticipated some aspects of our

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<sup>48</sup> Seamen: Hdn. *GG* III i 506,20 (Bachmann *AG* I 146,7f.; Bekker *AG* I 446,32f.); Theogn. Cramer *AO* II 161,8; ps. Theodos. 79,16f.; Zonaras 1623; Eustath. 3,230,11ff. vdV.; Suda II 396,1ff. Hunters: Theogn. Cramer *AO* II 161,8. Grapetreaders: Joh.Chrys. *PGM* 64,956 (*Fragm. in Ieremiam* (32:30)): "καὶ οἷδε ὡσπερ οἱ ληνοβατοῦντες ἀποκριθήσονται πρὸς πάντας τοὺς καθημένους ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς." Τὸ οἷδε οὐ καλῶς κείται παρὰ τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ ἢ Δάδ γὰρ ἐχρῆν κεῖσθαι. Δάδ δέ ἐστιν ἐπίρρημα τῶν ληνοβατοῦντων ἀποκρινομένων πρὸς τοὺς καταλέγοντας [*ad colligentes*]. Ὡσπερ τοίνυν, φησί, τὸ ἐπίρρημα τοῦτο λέγοντες προθύμως πατοῦσι τὴν σταφυλὴν, οὕτως ὑμᾶς καταπατήσει, ὡς ληνοβάτης ὁ Βαβυλωνίος ἅπαντα τὰ ἔθνη. (N.B. ληνοβατέω = ληνοπατέω. The Septuagint reads Αἰδαδ (*sic*) for the interjection.) Shepherds: Cramer *AO* I 118,14. Goatherds: Hesych. s.v. σίττα. Swineherds: Eustath. 3,230,15 vdV. Barbarians: ps. Theodos. 79,18; Suda 396,25 s.v. ἐποποῖ: ὦ εἶα ὦ εἶα· μίμημα βαρβάρων ἐξεγκόντων τι; Zonaras *ibid.*; cf. Arist. *Pax* 459ff. The Scholia *a.l.* comment: μμείται δὲ τοὺς βαρβαριστὶ ἐξέγκοντας and this leads us to the source of the corruption. For that is what it is, of course, if only because there is a signal lack of suitable barbarians in the Aristophanic context. v. Leeuwen *a.l.* explains the reading of the Scholiast, which is apparently at the basis of the later tradition as a *ludicrum dittographema* for βάρος τι; he is evidently right.

<sup>49</sup> See LSJ s.vv. Add Phot. *Bibl.* 279, 531a, 32ff. Τί ποτε γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ τέττα, μέχρι νῦν οὕτω συνομολογεῖται· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν σεπτικῆν ("reverential", see Suda s.v. ἀπάππα) αὐτὸ φωνὴν εἶναι φίλου πρὸς ἐταῖρον φασιν, οἱ δὲ "Κωτίλλε (l. Κωτίλε, "chatterbox") ὦ οὔτος", ἄλλοι δὲ πάλιν "σὲ λέγω". οἱ πλείους δὲ τῶν γραμματικῶν νεωτέρου φασιν εἶναι προσφώνησιν εἰς πρεσβύτερον. SchHom. Δ 412 (Diomedes addressing Sthenelos) is exceptional for giving the reverse explanation.

<sup>50</sup> ... *in comico carmine, leni scilicet et humili vel iucundo.*

<sup>51</sup> [Probus] almost exclusively mentions poetic genres because he starts from the prosodic characteristics of final syllables.

modern discipline of socio-linguistics. I have limited myself here to some illustrations of this fact, taken from the use of indeclinable words or their absence.

### 3. *The interjection in Roman grammar*

In this section and the following one attention will be paid to those observations of the Roman grammarians about the interjections that are of a more or less "technical" nature.<sup>52</sup> First and foremost, I shall discuss that focal point of grammatical lore, the definition (3.1.). Then, I will turn to those aspects of the grammatical doctrine which centre on the formal phonological aspects of the interjection, paying attention in particular to the terminological problem of the use of *inconditus* and *confusus* (3.2.). Finally, the relationship between interjections and primitive, rough-and-ready utterings will lead me to discuss the role, if any, played by the interjections in the origin and development of language according to ancient philosophy (3.3.).

#### 3.1. *Definitions*

The only element which recurs in every form of the definition of interjection is the fact that it expresses the *affectus, motus, passiones, sensus animi*, the emotions of the soul. This, plus the fact that we are dealing with a *pars orationis* (not unimportant in view of the most current Greek opinion) constitutes the whole of the definitions attributed to Julius Romanus (Char. 311,14f.)<sup>53</sup> and Cominianus (Char. 311,4f.). Both definitions are illustrated by several examples.

The third definition found in Charisius (311,10f.) and attributed to Q. Remmius Palaemon runs as follows:<sup>54</sup> *interiectiones sunt quae nihil docibile*

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<sup>52</sup> Barwick 1922, 35 remarks that the grammarians (esp. Donatus, Diomedes, Charisius and Dositheus) show a greater diversity in their discussion of this part of speech than they usually do.

<sup>53</sup> *Interiectio est pars orationis motum animi significans*. Cf. Jeep 1893, 7.

<sup>54</sup> Barwick 1922, 149 commits a serious *petitio principii* in his judgment of Palaemon's definition: In the case of the interjection, he argues, the school tradition strongly deviates from Palaemon, whom it otherwise follows. Jul. Romanus' definition, on the other hand, conforms to the school tradition. Moreover, Jul. Romanus borrowed his definition of the *adverb* from Palaemon. Therefore, one expects him to have done so in the case of the interjection also. Barwick concludes that the school tradition preserves the correct version of the Palaemonian definition. This clearly cannot be upheld. In addition to the

*habent, significant tamen adfectum animi*. Palaemon does not specify that an interjection is a *pars orationis*. That he did consider them as such, appears from Quint. 1,4,19f. The latter part of Palaemon's definition is the well-known *affectus-clausula*, but the former part is a new formulation which has no parallel in the whole of the antique theory of the interjection, except for the *ars Ambrosiana*, a commentary on Donatus probably dating from the seventh century A.D., which has conserved Palaemon's definition in a somewhat distorted form.<sup>55</sup> *Nihil docibile habent* does remind one, however, of the opposition, briefly alluded to above (section 1.), between *ars* and *natura*.<sup>56</sup> Interjections do not seem to fall under the sway of the *ars grammatica*, one cannot formulate a regular *doctrina* about them.<sup>57</sup> This idea does recur in other discussions, e.g. Diom. I 419,12f. *et siqua sunt similia, quae affectus potius quam observationes artis inducant*.<sup>58</sup> The inherent tension in the attempts of the grammarians to state rules about words which by their very nature are irregular, will be a recurrent theme in our discussion of the interjections.

The words *quae nihil docibile habent* also allow of another interpretation:<sup>59</sup> In Plato's *Cratylus* Socrates explains to Hermogenes that names are as it were instruments for name-giving. Imposing names means teaching

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objection of circularity, it may be remarked that the so-called "school tradition" is not uniform at all in the case of the interjection. Cf. Jeep 1893, 27 and Holtz 1981, 106 on the fluctuating doctrine on the interjection in Donatus.

<sup>55</sup> *Interiectiones, quae nihil docebile [sic] habent, significant tamen adfectum animi*, CCL 133 c, 179,22f.

<sup>56</sup> Hus 1965, 1 and 336 ignores this early attestation of *docibile*.

<sup>57</sup> In itself *docibilis* may have passive as well as active meaning, cf. *TLL* s.v., V 1, 1765f. Hus 1965, 336 distinguishes three values for the more common *docilis*: (1) "une valeur moyenne", to denote "un être pourvu d'une qualité naturelle et dynamique"; (2) "une valeur passive, qui rend le *docilis* susceptible d'être l'objet du *docere* ... que le *docilis* désigne la personne à laquelle s'adresse le *docere* ou la "connaissance" que transmet le *docere*". (The latter possibility is the rarer by much); (3) "une valeur active, ou mieux intransitive, par laquelle le *docilis* serait "celui qui a la faculté de *docere*." (According to Hus, this interpretation is virtually never found in practice). See for examples Hus 1965, 342ff.: *docilis* "full of teaching, who/which can teach" perhaps in Prop. 4,2,63 (the statue of Vertumnus addresses his creator: *qui me tam docilis potuisti fundere in usus*). However, I find this interpretation unnecessary and even undesirable here. See Hus 1965, 349.

<sup>58</sup> "And similar cases that are produced by emotions rather than by theoretical rules." The naturalness of interjections is opposed to their having meaning in Varro *LL* VII 93: '*Euax*' *verbum nihil significat, sed effutitum naturaliter est*.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Biese 1954, 14.



something about the things surrounding us and discerning them from each other. Socrates' concludes (388b12f.): "Ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστὶν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας ..."<sup>60</sup> Anyone who wants to make a correct use of names, should employ them for didactic purposes (388c6f. διδασκαλικῶς (χρηῖσθαι)). If we compare this text to the words ascribed to Palaemon, we find that the latter may also mean that the interjections are to be distinguished from the other part of speech, because only they cannot teach us anything about the state of affairs.<sup>61</sup>

I think this interpretation preferable, but we should not overlook the fact that the two possibilities offered here are closer to each other than it might seem at first blush: The fact that interjections do not signify, was related to their being "natural" in Varro; the absence of meaning implies the fact that interjections cannot be used to teach us anything; on the other hand, it is the naturalness of the interjections which prevent their being the object of teaching.<sup>62</sup> The lack of context or explanation for the words of Palaemon is bound to frustrate any attempt to come to a final choice between the two interpretations his words admit of.

Marius Plotius Sacerdos (s. III/IV A.D.) adds another new element: (VI 447,1ff.) *interiectio est pars orationis adverbio persimilis qua significantur animi variae passiones, quas quidam affectus dicunt.*<sup>63</sup> I shall return to the problems connected with distinguishing between adverbs and interjections below (section 4.2.).

Two more refinements were added to the basic definition (containing, as will be recalled, the fact that the interjection is a *pars orationis* and that it expresses the emotions of the soul), both by Donatus, viz. that the interjection signifies emotions *voce incondita* (*ars minor*, IV 366,13f.)<sup>64</sup> and that it functions

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<sup>60</sup> "A name is, therefore, a didactic instrument which is able to make distinctions in all that is."

<sup>61</sup> The Stoics would never have agreed with this representation of the didactic function of words, cf. S.E. *AM* XI 224: τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα οὐ διδάσκεται καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς. λεκτὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ διδασκόμενα, σῶμα δ' οὐκ ἐστὶ τὰ λεκτὰ.

<sup>62</sup> Διδάσκειν and its derivatives are also used in both constructions, i.e. with language as its subject and object, sometimes in the same context. Cf. Diogenes of Oenoanda's account of the origin of language, Fr. X col. II/III καὶ τῶν φθόνγων δὲ ἔνεκεν ... μήτε τὸν Ἑρμῆν παραλαμβάνωμεν εἰς διδασκαλίαν ... μήτε τῶν φιλοσόφων πιστεύωμεν τοῖς λέγουσι κατὰ θέσιν καὶ διδασχῆν ἐπιτεθῆναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν; cf. Lucr. V 1041ff.

<sup>63</sup> "An interjection is a part of speech which is very similar to the adverb. The various passions of the soul, which some call emotions ('*affectus*') are signified by it."

190 <sup>64</sup> "In the form of disordered sound".

*interiecta aliis partibus orationis (ars maior, IV 391,26f.).*<sup>65</sup> The latter remark is manifestly meant as an explanation for the name *interiectio*,<sup>66</sup> the former again has to do with the fact that interjections defy doctrinal description. *Incondita* refers to the irregular, disordered, confused, "artless" nature of the interjections, which will be discussed more fully in section 3.2. Later definitions have little to add to this.

Special mention may be made of Probus (IV 146,1ff.) and the so-called *Excerpta Audacis* (VII 356,1ff.) which depend on Probus. Here it is stated that: *interiectio est pars orationis ostendens animi motum per suspirationem.*<sup>67</sup> Although primarily indicating the general way in which interjections are uttered, *per suspirationem* (IV 146,1ff.) may also be associated with the idea of interjections' not being well-formed. Apart from suggesting the anguish or emotional state in general in which an uttering is made, sighing is itself suggestive of (excessive) aspiration, which as we shall see, could occur in interjections in unusual phonological context. The Greeks, too, draw attention to this characteristic of interjections (see section 6.3.2.). *Suspiratio* indicates a complete exclamation made with a sigh in Plin. *NH* praef. § 9.<sup>68</sup>

Noteworthy also is the following statement found in Augustinus' *Regulae* (V 524,8ff.): *interiectio non pars orationis est, sed affectio erumpentis animi in vocem ... quot sunt perturbati animi motus, tot voces reddunt et vocantur interiectiones quod interrumpant orationem.*<sup>69</sup> An explanation is not offered, but

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<sup>65</sup> "Thrown in between the other parts of speech." The same stipulations are found in Diomedes I 419,2ff.

<sup>66</sup> Such etymological explanations also occur without being added to the definition itself, e.g. Diom. I 419,3f.: *quae aliis partibus orationis interiaci et inseri solet.*

<sup>67</sup> "The interjection is a part of speech showing the movement of the soul in a sigh." Probus shows an almost compulsive repetitiveness of the phrase *per suspirationem*. He apparently considers this to be the test *par excellence* to establish whether or not a word is an interjection. See section 4.2.

<sup>68</sup> *O te felicem, M. Porci, a quo rem improbam petere nemo audet.* The particle *o* is combined with an exclamatory acc. c. inf. In this case, however, Probus would probably have classified the particle *o* as an adverb, see section 4.2.

<sup>69</sup> "An interjection is not a part of speech, but the emotion of the soul bursting into sound ... There are as many sound expressions as there are emotions of the disturbed soul, and they are called interjections because they interrupt the speech." One might wonder if the phrase *erumpentis animi in vocem* furnishes an acceptable parallel to the strange *animi interiecti causa* found in Jul. Romanus (Char.) 315,12 (cf. section 1.). In both cases *animus* stands for the seat of emotions and is almost synonymous with the emotions themselves. However, it seems more likely to me that the phrase *affectio erumpentis animi in vocem* is a contamination of two thoughts, namely that the interjections signify

we may well assume that it would have centred on the question of the number of the parts of speech and the separation of interjections from adverbs, for which see section 4.

Almost invariably examples of interjections are joined to the more theoretical remarks, and it is stated which emotions they express, as *significatio* is the only *accidens* of the interjection (Donatus, Diomedes, Asper, Julianus of Toledo).<sup>70</sup> The *significatio* is known either from *consuetudo* or from the context (Diom. I 419,4f.). Sometimes we are told that no complete list of interjections and meanings will or can be given, since the number of examples may virtually be augmented *ad libitum*.<sup>71</sup>

The same examples occur over and over again, whereas the emotions which are to be expressed generally stay within the limits of Quintilian's list given above (section 1.). To give just one example: Donatus (IV 391,26f.) informs us that interjections express the emotions *aut metuentis, ut ei; aut optantis, ut o; aut dolentis, ut heu; aut laetantis, ut euax*.<sup>72</sup> Yet, sometimes we do find something unexpected, as when Julianus Toletanus (V 320,5f.) tells us that: *solitum est parvulo dici 'totto', quando prohibetur comedere terram*.<sup>73</sup> I have not had the opportunity of testing the efficacy of this admonition myself, but I gladly mention it: any young parents among my readers should feel free to try it.

Unusual, to say the least, are the examples adduced by the somewhat shadowy and enigmatic Vergilius Maro (s. VII A.D.). Sounds like *rauc, sarap,*

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the *affectio* of the soul, and that their sound-form is unorganized, inarticulate, and the result of a random transformation of breath into sound, cf. Hilarius of Poitiers, in Ps. LI cap. 7, *PLM* 9,313: *Linguae humanae officium est, ut naturali impulsu ratione, motu vario eodemque moderato vocem in verba distinguat, exstetque per eam ex confuso erumpentis spiritus sono dissonans* (= *distinctus*, cf. *TLL* s.v. *dissonans*) *ad rerum intelligentiam sermo*. Here we have to do with the physiological function of the tongue in the process of articulation, see below section 3.3.2. The use of *spiritus* and *animus* suggests some kind of conflation (through *anima*?). For *erumpere* in cf. Quint. 11,3,51 *vox ... ultra vires urgenda non est. nam ... elisa in illum sonum erumpit cui Graeci nomen a Gallorum immaturo cantu dederint*. See further *TLL* s.v. *erumpo*, V 2, 840.

<sup>70</sup> See Tolkien 1904, 29, who reconstructs the order of the passage in Jul. Romanus (Char. 311,14-315,27).

<sup>71</sup> M. Plot. Sacerdos VI 447,11f.; Don. IV 366,16f.; Max. Vict. VI 205,3f.; Cled. V 26,22f.; Serg. VIII 158,35ff.; ars Ambros. 180,32ff.; ars Bonif. CCSL 133 b, 99,9f.

<sup>72</sup> "Either of someone who fears (*ei*), or of someone who wishes (*o*), or of someone who is in pain (*heu*), or of someone who rejoices (*euax*)."

<sup>73</sup> "We are used to say 'totto' to a toddler when we forbid him to eat earth."

*salecon, ehunave, cetiu, faticalpin* or *quesgoor* (giving a random selection only) result in one believing Virgil's remark, unlikely at first blush, that *nulla ... pene [= paene] earum ad dicendum nobis prompta est*.<sup>74</sup> Incidentally, Virgil's treatment of the interjection is not a very enthusiastic one. He reluctantly includes it among the parts of speech, but, according to him, it is hardly ever used and would never have been believed to be Latin, if it had not been absent from Greek discussions (176,3f.). This attitude is probably caused by the fact that Latin was not Virgil's mother tongue. Interjections are of course a typical phenomenon of colloquial language, which Virgil "rarely reads" (176,4). But since the Juliani and Vergilii are hardly representative, we had better return to their more orthodox colleagues.

### 3.2. Formal aspects of interjections

From a formal point of view, too, the inherent irrationality of the interjections constitutes a major drawback to the formulation of rules. The most prominent formal characteristic of interjections is that they lack any well-defined form. Interjections are *confusa voce*,<sup>75</sup> *voce incondita*,<sup>76</sup> or, in a related but different sense, *voce abscondita*.<sup>77</sup> In the following I will look into the use the grammarians made of these designations and their meaning. In particular, the differences with respect to their terminology in the chapters *de voce* will be investigated. For there is something strange here, which in anticipation of my results may roughly be described as follows: In the chapters *de voce* the grammarians distinguish a subgroup called *vox confusa*. By this term they mean disordered and inarticulate sound which cannot be written. It is opposed to *vox articulata*, to which all parts of speech belong.

Now, the interjections are mostly described as being *voce incondita*, which is no species of *vox* in the chapters *de voce*. But *incondita* is virtually synonymous to *confusa*. There is a tendency in modern research to equate *vox*

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<sup>74</sup> 176,1ff. ed. Huemer (BT). Dr. van der Laan of Leyden suggested to me that some at least of these words are oaths or asseverations (like *ecastor* or *mehercule*). *Sarap* probably derives from Sarapis or Serapis, in *ehunave* we may recognize the popular medieval exclamation *Iesu nave*.

<sup>75</sup> "Of confused sound." Sergius VIII 158,34 (*omnia, quae confusa voce proferuntur ad exprimendos affectus*); ars Ambros. 181,74 (*interiectio confusa est sono*), cf. 181,64 ('o' *interiectio vox confusa est et eadem saepius variatur* [meaning that it can vary semantically]).

<sup>76</sup> "Of disordered sound." Diom. I 419,1f.; Don. IV 366,13f.; Servius IV 420,18f.; Pomp. V 281,5f.; Verg. Maro 76,1ff.; Cassiodorus VII 215,22f.

<sup>77</sup> "Of obscure sound." Prisc. II 48,25.

*incondita* and *vox confusa* without more ado. But, as will be seen from this brief survey, in that case a contradiction is forced on the grammarians which to all appearances they themselves sought to avoid. I suggest, therefore, that the grammarians preferred to describe the interjections as *vox incondita*, avoiding in the context of the interjections the word *confusus* commonly found in the chapters *de voce*, in order to hide the tension between the interjections' irrationality and their inclusion among the parts of speech. For these belonged as a body to *vox articulata* or its equivalents, i.e. the exact opposite of *vox confusa* (3.2.1.).

After discussing this terminological matter I shall briefly discuss how formal irregularity affects the interjections' accent and meaning as well as their spelling. However, if an interjection shows similarity to a more regular part of speech, analogy will claim its due (3.2.2.).

### 3.2.1. *Vox abscondita, incondita, confusa; a terminological problem*

At first sight it is a logical step to compare the remarks found in the Latin grammarians on the *vox* of interjections with their theory of *vox* in the chapters *de voce*.<sup>78</sup> However, we are immediately confronted with the problem that, whereas *vox confusa* is a normal subtype of *vox* in the *de voce*-chapters, its use to designate interjections is rare and late. Moreover, nowhere does it occur in a formal definition. On the other hand, *vox incondita*, the most usual label for the interjections and reserved almost exclusively for them, never occurs in the *de voce*-passages. The third expression, *voce abscondita* is found in Priscian only. It occurs in the context of the interjections and I will start my research from it.

If interjections are *voce abscondita*, this implies that they do not follow the normal phonological rules of Latin, stating for instance, that no word should end in /h/: Prisc. II 19,26ff.: *Quaeritur, cur in 'vah', 'ah' post vocales ponitur aspiratio, et dicimus, quod apocopa facta est extremae vocalis, cui praeponebatur aspiratio; nam perfecta 'vaha' 'aha' sunt. ideo autem abscisione facta extremae vocalis tamen aspiratio mansit ex superiore pendens vocali, quia suum est interiectionis voce abscondita proferri. itaque pars absconditae extremitatis videtur congrue interiectionis naturali prolatione remansisse.*<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> This was done by e.g. Biese 1954, 14f. and Pinborg 1961, 132.

<sup>79</sup> "It is asked: why is there a breathing after the vowels in 'vah' and 'ah'? And we say, because an 'apocope' of the last vowel was made, which was preceded by the breathing. In complete form, it is 'vaha', 'aha'. And the reason why the breathing remains attached to the preceding vowel in spite of the last vowel being cut off, is that it is characteristic for the interjection to be uttered as an obscure sound. Therefore it seems congruous for part of the hidden

Priscian tells us that the form of the interjections is not "whole", "complete", "sound"; part of it is hidden, and so, therefore, is its pure and original form. To say that interjections are *voce abscondita* has the same implications as their opposition to *voces plenae* or *integrae*.<sup>80</sup> This view of interjections is peculiar to Priscian: *voce abscondita* is not a synonym of *voce incondita* or *confusa*, as we shall see, although it may have been chosen because of its likeness to *incondita*.

A parallel passage steers us in the direction of the *de voce*-chapters again, be it circuitously (II 48,22ff.): *In h ... non potest terminari syllaba. invenio tamen in 'vah' et 'ah' interiectionibus terminalem videri syllabae h, sed magis puto ... per apocopam hoc solere fieri, cum perfecta 'vaha' et 'aha' sint, vel quod abscondita voce solent interiectiones et huiuscemodi voces proferri, ut etiam 'ha ha' 'he he'*.<sup>81</sup> It is again clear that interjections may claim an exceptional phonological position by definition. But it is the examples adduced which take us further: Priscian's *huiuscemodi voces* are apparently onomatopoeic reproductions of laughter etc., which are called imitations of unwritable sounds elsewhere, cf. III 91,3f. *inter has (i.e. interiectiones) ponunt etiam sonituum illiteratorum imitationes ut risus 'ha ha hae' et 'phy' et 'euhoe' et 'au'*.<sup>82</sup> It is these *sonitus illiterati* which again remind one of the chapters *de voce* and it is time to look at these a little closer.

The thorough and careful study by Ax has shown that in Roman grammar *vox* is usually analysed by means of the application of either of two *dihæreseis* (1986b, 44): The first type, represented by Donatus, distinguishes between *vox articulata* and *vox confusa*,<sup>83</sup> on the criterium of whether or not a sound can be

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ending to remain behind because of the natural way of uttering an interjection."

<sup>80</sup> Cf. section 2.1. and Priscian II 13,4f. *nulla syllaba Latina vel Graeca per integras dictiones in eam (sc. h litteram) desinit*; cf. Servius IV 420,20.

<sup>81</sup> "No syllable can end in /h/. Yet I do find that in the interjections 'vah' and 'ah' the /h/ seems to be the last sound of the syllable, but I rather think that that is mostly the result of *apocope*, the complete forms being 'vaha' and 'aha', or if you like, it is because interjections and words like them are usually uttered in an obscured (sound-)form, as holds also true for 'ha ha' and 'he he'." *Vel quod* introduces an alternative formulation only. Cf. Diom. I 423,19f.

<sup>82</sup> "Among these (interjections) they also number imitations of sounds that cannot be represented in writing, as laughter 'ha ha hae' and 'phy' and 'euhoe' and 'au'." Notice that we are here dealing with a distinct sub-type, see below.

<sup>83</sup> For the physiological meaning of *articulatus*, see section 3.3.2.

written.<sup>84</sup> Priscian is our first example of the second type, which, confusingly enough, applies the term *articulata* (vs. *inarticulata*) to introduce another criterium, viz. that of intelligibility, meaningfulness ("Semantizität"). What Donatus called *articulata*, is now styled *literata*. Thus, a fourfold division is created, words being either (+writable, +meaningful), (+writable, -meaningful), (-writable, +meaningful), or (-writable, -meaningful). Priscian's examples of words which cannot be written, but are understood all the same, are *sibili hominum et gemitus* (II 5,12f.): *hae enim voces, quamvis sensum aliquem significant proferentis eas, scribi tamen non possunt.*<sup>85</sup>

Thus, the *sonitus illiterati* of the second type coincide with the *voces confusae* of the first: They cannot be written down in a clearly circumscribed way, we have to make do with a sort of *ad hoc* spelling. And, as appeared from the Priscian quotation above, some at least of the *sonitus illiterati* are also *voce abscondita*.

So far, we have seen that the term *vox abscondita*, applied primarily to interjections, also covered some words which were described in the chapter *de voce* as *sonitus illiterati*. We now turn to *vox incondita*.

*Voce incondita* may be translated "of a crude, confused, rough-and-ready sound-form". Paulus Diaconus (*Epitome Festi*) explains *inconditum* by *non ordinate compositum*. If one scans the Thesaurus s.v. *inconditus* two things stand out: In the first place, on various occasions *inconditus* is explicitly linked with *confusus*, the two being apparently near-synonyms.<sup>86</sup> Secondly, *inconditus* is often associated with barbarians, animals and/or the time when human, rational speech

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<sup>84</sup> Incidentally, it is hardly fair to adduce the chapters *de voce* as an argument for the so-called "confusion of written and spoken language" in the ancient grammarians: if *littera* is called the smallest part of *vox articulata* (e.g. Don. IV 367,9), that is a perfectly logical consequence of defining *articulata* in terms of writability. This may confuse us and we may not agree with this approach, but that is a different matter entirely and immaterial here. See Desbordes 1987, who quotes various passages illustrating the grammarians' awareness of the differences between "phonemes" and "graphemes", if I may be allowed this anachronism.

<sup>85</sup> "Human whistling and moaning': for although these sounds do convey a sentiment of sorts of the one who utters them, yet they cannot be written."

<sup>86</sup> E.g. Tert. *adv. Hermog.* 23,1 (CCSL I 416,24f.) *informem et confusam et inconditam ... materiam*; 41,1 (CCSL I 431,12f.) *inconditus et confusus et turbulentus fuit materiae motus*. Cf. also Cic. *Rep.* III 3 *cum accepisset (sc. mens divina) homines inconditis vocibus inchoatum quiddam et confusum sonantes, incidit has et distinxit in partis eqs.*

had yet to come into being.<sup>87</sup> I will return to the latter point shortly, but first things first: If *confusus* would have done just as well to describe the formal nature of the interjections, why did the grammarians introduce *inconditus*, thus creating an apparent terminological inconsistency? Let us compare the *de voce*-chapters with the ones on interjections again.

*Vox incondita* is found in Donatus, Diomedes, Servius, Pompeius, Vergilius Maro and Cassiodorus. I shall concentrate on Donatus and Diomedes.<sup>88</sup> Donatus' is the most straightforward case. As I said, in his chapter *de voce vox* is divided into *vox articulata* and *vox confusa*. The criterium applied is whether or not a sound can be written. His chapter *de interiectione* assigns the interjections as a body to *vox incondita*. No trace is to be found of a subdivision among the interjections themselves.<sup>89</sup> But if we substitute *confusa* for *incondita* a major problem arises in this seemingly simple scheme. The parts of speech belong as a group to *vox articulata* (Ax 1986b, 38ff.). If the interjections are deemed a part of speech, as they professedly are, their definition contains a *contradictio in terminis*.

In his chapter *de voce* Diomedes first divides *vox* into *vox articulata* and *vox confusa*, and then adds *vox modulata* as a third species. The primary criterium is whether or not the sound is produced by a rational being - which in practice generates the same division as the criterium of writability. *Vox articulata* is both "rational" and writable, *vox confusa* is neither. Moreover, he adds that *vox articulata* is produced by human beings, *vox confusa* by either animals or inanimate objects (since *vox modulata*, said of musical instruments, does not concern us, I shall leave it out of account here).

Now, if the characteristics of (-"rational", -writable) are inherent to interjections, they should indeed be included in *vox incondita/confusa*. But in that case the problems are multiplied: Apart from the objection that parts of speech should be *vox articulata* (and Diomedes also thinks interjections are a part of speech, I 419,1ff.), we would here have a *vox confusa/incondita* produced by human beings.

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<sup>87</sup> Cf. the passages quoted in the previous note and e.g. Sen. *consol. ad Polyb.* 18,9 (opp. *Latina verba*); Lact. *de ira* 7,7f., see below.

<sup>88</sup> Servius, Pompeius and Cassiodorus (*Excerpta*) contain a commentary on Donatus; Servius, moreover, does not have anything on *vox*; nor does Verg. Maro. Pompeius, on the other hand, expatiates eloquently on the summary account of Donatus *de voce* (V 99,9ff.), without, however, adding anything of significance. Cassiodorus is muddled and mentions *vox articulata* only (VII 215,4ff.).

<sup>89</sup> Donatus does, however, take into account the possibility that there are other *inconditae voces* than the interjections alone, IV 392,2f.; cf. Dosith. VII 424,15.



Here we may compare what Probus has to say on *vox*. His is an exceptional case, for after dividing (IV 47,3ff.) *vox* into *vox articulata* and *vox confusa* and stating that the former consists of human speech which may be taken down in writing, he divides *vox confusa* into *vox animalium* (e.g. the neighing of horses), *inanimalium* (e.g. the sound of cymbals) and *hominum*. This is elaborated as follows (47,11ff.): *est et confusa vox sive sonus hominum, quae litteris comprehendi non potest, ut puta oris risus vel sibilatus, pectoris mugitus et cetera talia ...*<sup>90</sup> In this case, therefore, human beings may produce *vox articulata* as well as *vox confusa*. However, we should notice that "ordinary interjections" like "o" are not necessarily included in Probus' examples.<sup>91</sup>

Apart from it not being clear from his examples whether or not all interjections are supposed to be part of *vox confusa*, it should be noticed that Probus himself never applies this term to them. His only remark that may refer to formal characteristics, is that interjections are produced *per suspirationem*.

A comparison of the passages *de voce* and *de interiectionibus* made it improbable that the grammarians kept the genus of *vox (confusa)* so well apart from the *accidens "voce incondita"* of the interjections by mere accident. Therefore, we should not follow Biese (1954, 15) and Pinborg (1961, 132), who unconditionally identify *vox incondita*, "unartikuliert", with *vox confusa*.<sup>92</sup> If we equate the two, we might be forcing a contradiction on the grammarians, which they themselves evidently sought to avoid. It cannot, of course, be denied that the contradiction itself is there. No matter how carefully the grammarians formulated their definitions, the rationalizing of the essentially irrational was an unrewarding task. It cannot be helped that the interjections do not conform to several of the characteristics of *vox articulata*, such as being *rationalis*,<sup>93</sup> or

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<sup>90</sup> "There is also human confused voice or sound, which cannot be caught in writing, e.g. laughter or whistling, or a bellowing of the breast etc."

<sup>91</sup> As a matter of fact, Probus may be the source of Priscian's division of the interjections in *interiectiones* and *huiuscemodi voces* (II 48,28 (?)). Such a division of interjections is sometimes also made in the grammarians' discussion of accent, e.g. in Cledonius V 79,16ff., see note 100 below. This anticipates a medieval theory to the effect that some interjections have a generally accepted semantic value and a more or less fixed (conventional) phonological pattern, whereas others do not, cf. Pinborg 1961, 124; 133.

<sup>92</sup> Pinborg does so on the strength of Pompeius V 281,5ff., where "o" is called a *vox confusa*, the term *voces inconditae* occurring immediately after. We should, however, take into account here Pompeius' habit of extensively paraphrasing Donatus' text. As we saw, *confusus* is a handy synonym for *inconditus*. I dare say Pompeius did not think about theories *de voce* when he made the substitution. I again call attention to the fact that the occurrences of *voce confusa* applied to interjections are rare and late.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Diom. I 420,11ff. (from the chapter *de voce*).

having and expressing *ars*.<sup>94</sup> But the grammarians cannot be accused of introducing an overt contradiction in their chapters *de interiectionibus*. The problem is there, under the surface, but *vox incondita* is not completely the same as *vox confusa*.

### 3.2.2. *Voce incondita*

The symptoms of the interjections' being *incondita voce* are primarily their oscillating orthography. Moreover, as was only to be expected, indistinct form was connected with the absence of a clearly circumscribed meaning, cf. Hier. *Commentarioli in Ps.* 88:16 *vel quod iubilus inconditos sonos proferens nequaquam sensus per verba distinguat*.<sup>95</sup>

In a few cases the *confusio* of the interjection is held to affect the *significatio* rather than the form.<sup>96</sup> One interjection may have several *significationes* and may thus be called *confusa*.<sup>97</sup> The combination *incondita significatio* is also attested once.<sup>98</sup>

Apart from the general vagueness ascribed to the interjections' form, regularity in accent is also despaired of. We often find statements to the effect that firm rules in this respect cannot be given: *accentus in interiectionibus certi esse non possunt* (Don. IV 392,2f.).<sup>99</sup> Nevertheless, if the interjections formally resemble "normal" parts of speech, Cledonius claims they are to be

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<sup>94</sup> Cf. the etymological explanation of the word *articulata*, Explan. in Don. IV 519,15ff. (dealing with *littera/vox*): *articulata* (sc. *vox*) *est quae scribi potest, quae subest articulis, id est digitis, qui scribunt* [cf. Audax V 323,6]; *vel quod artem habeat aut exprimat*. For the (primarily) biological/physiological meaning of *articulata*, cf. e.g. Lucr. IV 551-55; see section 3.2.

<sup>95</sup> "Or because joyous shouting, bringing forth indistinct sounds, does not by its words produce any clear meaning at all."

<sup>96</sup> For *confusus* denoting a semantic quality, cf. Gell. *NA* 10,20,9 *eademque omnia confuso et indistincto vocabulo "rogationes" dixerunt*; 13,31,5 *Quonam ... pacto legere ego possum quae non adsequor? Indistincta namque et confusa fient quae legero, et tuam quoque impediunt intentionem*.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. *ars* Ambros. 181,2ff. about *o*.

<sup>98</sup> *Ars* Ambros. 180,47ff.: *et verbis integris expremimus [sic] affectus, ut 'pro hoc me pati': ecce verba integra inconditam incipiunt habere significatiorem*. The opposite phenomenon, viz. that interjections manage to supply an intention that cannot be made clear by more organized linguistic means, is described by Clemens Scotus (109,3ff.): *quod conditus sermo exprimere non potest, plerumque interiectio explicat*.

<sup>99</sup> "There cannot be any certain accents in interjections." Cf. Dosith. VII 424,14f.; Cled. V 79,16ff., *ars* Ambros. 181,71vv.; [Prisc.] III 520,23ff.; 528,34f.

"accentuated" accordingly.<sup>100</sup> As *accentus* may be taken in the wide sense of "prosodic characteristics", it not only includes word-accent, but also the length of vowels and syllables, and breathings.<sup>101</sup> This might help to explain Cledonius' statement. Although he is not explicit as to the actual accent of his examples *papae* and *attat*, it would only be fair to presume he meant them to be pronounced *pápae* and *áttat* respectively, if he took *accentus* to refer to word-accent only. However, [Prisc.] III 528,34f. explicitly declares that the correct accent is *papaé*, hardly surprising in view of the Greek.<sup>102</sup> Now, *papae* is also discussed in the context of another prosodic rule to the effect that *omnes interiectiones longae sunt, si monosyllabae fuerint, ut heu; si vero duarum vel amplius syllabarum fuerint, quoniam speciem iam retinent partium orationis, ad exempla earum quibus similes erunt iudicandae sunt, ut papae attat*.<sup>103</sup> In this text we not only find the same examples (*papae*, *attat*), but also the same foundation for the general rule: As soon as interjections begin to resemble civilized parts of speech, they promptly start behaving like proper ones and agree with some kind of analogy.<sup>104</sup> In this case, however, it is not accent

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<sup>100</sup> Cled. V 79,16ff. *in his interiectionibus non possunt certi accentus reperiri, quae inconditis vocibus constant, ut heu va. certi sunt accentus in istis quae possunt distingui, ut papae, attat.* "possunt distingui" is to say that one can get a phonological grip on the words in question, which therefore receive an accent from analogy with more regular parts of speech (presumably a nom.plur. like *nautae* or *lupae* and a verb of the first conjugation, 3 sing. like *captat*). Note that according to Cledonius interjections are not invariably 'voce incondita'.

<sup>101</sup> The Greek word προσωδία, Latin *accentus* (Quint. 1,5,22), does not only embrace the accents in a narrow sense of the word, but - in later grammatical texts (from the second century p.Chr.n. onwards, cf. P. Hanschke *de accentuum Graecorum nominibus*, Bonnæ 1914, 110ff.) - also breathings and the length of vowels and syllables. Cf. e.g. SchDTh. 129,7; 454,9f. In Latin the relationship between accent and syllable-length is, of course, even more marked than in Greek.

<sup>102</sup> On the other hand, one does not get a uniform picture of this problem from the grammarians: cf. *Excerpta Audacis* VII 361,9ff., *interiectiones omnes, quia de graeco sermone mutuati sumus, ideo in novissimis syllabis fastigium capiunt, ut papae, attat, ehem.*

<sup>103</sup> "All interjections are long, if they are monosyllabic, as *heu*; if, however, they have two or more syllables (since they then look like a part of speech), they are to be judged by the example of those parts of speech, to which they will be similar." Max. Vict. VI 239,12ff.; cf. Mart. Cap. III 288.

<sup>104</sup> Conversely, Prisc. III 65,14ff. mentions the problems of stating rules for *adverbia primitiva*. These are mostly monosyllabic, and lack any material for comparison. The difficulties of accommodating monosyllables in a system of analogy had troubled the grammarians at least from the first century B.C. onwards (Philoxenus, *περί μονοσυλλαβῶν ῥημάτων*).

which is involved, but prosodic *length*.<sup>105</sup> It should be stressed that word-accent and length of syllables are, of course, especially narrowly bound up with each other in Latin, cf. [Prisc.] III 520,23ff. *in interiectionibus et in peregrinis verbis et in barbaris nominibus nulli certi sunt accentus, ideoque in potestate uniuscuiusque consistit ut, quomodo necessarium viderit, sic in metro ponat*.<sup>106</sup> I therefore take it that Cleonius does not specifically refer to word-accent.

The view that interjections practically lose their own character, once they have become so common as to start behaving according to recognizable patterns, is also found in Verg. Maro 176,15ff. According to him the only interjection we use with any frequency at all, namely *vae*, has to all practical purposes turned into a noun, a verb or - most probably - an adverb.<sup>107</sup>

Finally, a formal characteristic is also involved in the one passage that mentions that interjections do not form compounds with other words.<sup>108</sup>

Thus, interjections are characterized by a signal lack of explicit formal features. They are phonologically irregular and no firm rules as to their accent can be given. However, should an interjection have so distinct a form that it resembles a regular part of speech, it may accordingly behave in an analogous way.

### 3.3. Interjections, onomatopoeia and the origin of language

Donatus allows for the possibility that not only interjections, but other words, too, may be *voce incondita* (IV 392,2f. *accentus in interiectionibus certi esse non possunt, ut fere in aliis vocibus quas inconditas invenimus*,<sup>109</sup> cf. Dosith. VII 424,15). These *aliae voces* can be identified by comparing his remarks on accent IV 371,24f. *accentus in integris dictionibus observantur, in interiectionibus et in peregrinis verbis et in barbaris nominibus nulli certi*

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<sup>105</sup> Cf. [Probus] IV 256,5f. *item interiectio admirationis papae duabus longis constat, prima per unam productam vocalem, postrema per diphthongum*.

<sup>106</sup> "In interjections, foreign words and barbaric names there are no firm accents. Therefore everybody may use them in a metrical context just as one sees fit." Cf. for the relationship between word-accent, syllable-length and metrical usage Gell. *NA* IV 7, where the correct accents of the Punic names Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar in the *casus obliqui* are discussed.

<sup>107</sup> Again we are confronted with the *pandectes*-effect of the adverb: Each word which no longer fulfills its original role stops belonging to its original part of speech and turns into an adverb, e.g. Char. 252,29ff.; Clem. 88,17ff. Cf. Pinkster 1972, 42; Lallot 1985, 86.

<sup>108</sup> Clemens Scotus 37,19f.; 38,10.

<sup>109</sup> "As is generally speaking the case in the other words which we find to be of unestablished form, there can be no certain accents in interjections."

*sunt*.<sup>110</sup> Being *inconditus* entails uncertainty, rather than impossibility, of spelling. One may compare the modern Western European practice of adapting Russian names and the resulting wavering spelling, accent and pronunciation. Interjections may indeed be written - although we have no criterium to establish whether we have spelt them correctly or not, just as we can write *imitations* of sounds that in themselves cannot be written, like the sound of a creaking door, or one that is slammed, the hissing of a snake and other *sonitus illiterati*.<sup>111</sup> If we want to incorporate these unwritable sounds in regular linguistic utterings, we adapt them by applying the principle of onomatopoeia, the establishing of form for the unformed sound.<sup>112</sup>

Onomatopoeia is based on imitation (κατὰ μίμησιν, Demetr. *l.c.*), like Priscian's *imitationes*, and is bound up explicitly with *vox confusa*, i.e. sound that cannot be written, by Charisius 361,26ff.: *onomatopoeia est dictio ad imitandum sonum vocis confusae ficta, ut cum dicimus hinnire equos, balare oves,*

<sup>110</sup> "The accents are observed in complete, sound words; where interjections, foreign words and barbarian names are concerned, there are no firm accents." (This would be noticed in Latin sooner than in Greek, where the rules limiting word-accent were not violated or adapted in the case of foreign words, e.g. κεντρούριων.)

Another link between interjections and foreign names is established by Priscian II 19,37 (?)ff.: (Some Latin interjections have an *h* in word-final position) *nec mirum, cum in Syrorum Aegyptiorumque dictionibus soleant etiam in fine aspirari vocales, - interiectionum autem pleraeque communes sunt naturaliter omnium gentium voces* (an appeal to the *consensus omnium*). Cf. further section 3.3.1. on the association of *inconditus* with barbarian speech.

<sup>111</sup> Here another modern parallel offers itself, viz. the practice of our comics-writers, who also seem to have found generally accepted solutions for the writing of the unwritable:



<sup>112</sup> Cf. Lausberg 1960 § 548; Demetr. *eloc.* 2,94-8; Quint. 8,3,30; 8,6,31. In Plato's *Cratylus* Socrates draws attention to the difference between merely imitating a sound and the imitation applied when a word is made to "resemble" the thing denoted (*Crat.* 423c). Onomatopoeia lies somewhere in between.

*stridere valvas et cetera his similia*.<sup>113</sup> It is an activity related to the time when language originated.<sup>114</sup> Further, in itself onomatopoeia always refers to a noun or verb (or, for that matter, an adjective, adverb or participle) created to designate a sound or the production of the sound (*mugitus*, *mugire*). No interjections are formed by onomatopoeia, but rather it is words like the interjections themselves which are at the basis of an onomatopoeic formation (e.g. Demetr. *eloc.* 98 ἠέλιξε is formed from the ἀναβόησις ἐλελεῦ). It is seductive to interpret the statement that onomatopoeia has to do with names being given to *affectus* or πάθη<sup>115</sup> on these lines. Taken in this way, interjections being *voce incondita* and expressive of *affectus*, can be at the basis of onomatopoeic derivations. This, however, remains speculative and cannot in itself be considered sufficient evidence of the role interjections were assumed to have played in the originating of language: Apart from Demetrius - who is no grammarian and who would probably have classified ἐλελεῦ as an adverb anyway, no grammarian discussed this kind of "onomatopoeia".

I mentioned above that the expression *inconditus* is often associated with barbarians,<sup>116</sup> animals and the origins of language. Onomatopoeia, too, was connected with the origin of language, the link with the interjections being the *sonitus illiterati*. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to investigate how interjections are fitted into ancient accounts of the origin of language and, conversely, whether we can find any clearer traces of these accounts in the grammarians' discussions.

To start with the latter point: On this issue the Roman grammarians are separated from the philosophers by the self-imposed barrier discussed above.

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<sup>113</sup> "Onomatopoeia is a word created to imitate the sound of an indistinct uttering, as when we say that horses 'whinny', sheep 'bleat', doors 'creak', etc.". (Notice that this again gives us reason to connect the *sonitus illiterati* with *vox confusa*.) Cf. Diomedes I 460,1ff.: *onomatopoeia est dictio configurata ad imitandam vocis confusae significationem* (examples as above). See further Demetr. *eloc.* 95 οἶον ψόφοις εὐοικέναι.

<sup>114</sup> Demetr. *l.c.* 94 εὐοικεν γοῦν (sc. probably Ὀμηρος) ὀνοματουργῶν τοῖς πρώτοις θεμένοις τὰ ὀνόματα; Quint. 8,3,30 *non alia libertate quam <qua> illi primi homines rebus appellations dederunt*; 8,6,31 *et sunt plurima ita posita ab iis qui sermonem primi fecerunt*.

<sup>115</sup> Demetr. *eloc.* 94: τὰ κατὰ μίμησιν ἐκφερόμενα πάθους ἢ πράγματος; Quint. 8,3,30 (*Graeci*) *qui sonis etiam quibusdam et affectibus non dubitaverunt nomina aptare* (just like the first namegivers!); 8,6,31 *iis qui sermonem primi fecerunt, aptantes affectibus vocem: nam mugitus et sibilus et murmur inde venerunt*. However, the last mentioned examples should make us careful.

<sup>116</sup> The very word βάρβαρος is an onomatopoeic formation imitating the gibberish of non-Greeks.

Their choice to integrate the interjections in a theory of the parts of speech and thus to rationalize the essentially irrational made it *a priori* unattractive for them to stress the primitive aspects of the interjection. And since the Greek grammarians were only rarely explicitly occupied with the interjections as a separate category, chances are that we will not find much there either. From the grammarians one gets no more than a glimpse of the philosophical aspects of a theory of the interjection - and this glimpse consists of those sidelong references to barbarian language, animal sounds and the concept of onomatopoeia mentioned above. To this series may be added children's language to which I shall have occasion to return below (6.2.). I shall look briefly into the relation between these categories and the theories on the origin of language, and refute the view that the Stoics had any function for the interjection in such a theory.

### 3.3.1. *Children, animals and barbarians*

Children's words for "father", "mother" etc. are called ἄκλιτα and πρωτόθετα by Eustathius (2,815,15ff. vdV.; cf. *Od.* 2,113,17ff. Stallb.). The first qualification makes them into adverbs (or interjections), the second links them with the origin of language.<sup>117</sup> Children's language and primitive language are compared e.g. in Lucretius' description of the origin of language (V 1028-33; cf. 1022).<sup>118</sup> Lucretius sees an analogy between the ontogenetical and phylogenetical evolution of language, i.e. the way a child learns to speak is, as it were, a

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<sup>117</sup> The usual word for a "root-word", which may be at the basis of derivation without being derived itself, is πρωτότυπον. Eustathius also used πρωτόθετον in this function, e.g. 2,50,4 vdV.: τοῦ δὲ εἰλυμένος πρωτόθετον τὸ εἰλω. The connection with the origin of language appears only in the passages mentioned above and in 1,63,10ff. vdV. In *Od.* 2,113,18ff. Stallb. ἄττα is described as follows: καὶ ἔστιν ἡ λέξις ἀπαράγωγος, ἀκίνητος καὶ τὸ ὄλον εἶπειν πρωτόθετος. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀρχὴν τινα τοῦ ἄττα εὔρειν καὶ οὐδὲ ἐρμηνεῖαν ἔχει. 1,63,10ff. vdV. is a very interesting discussion of onomatopoeia and the correspondence between *significantia* and *significata*. In 1,63,27ff. vdV. the phenomenon of homonymy is explained in the following comparison: ὡς γὰρ τις ξενύζων μὲν πλείστους, οἰκίας δὲ μὴ τοσαύτας ἔχων, ὑφ' ἐνὶ σταθμῶ πλείους καταλύειν ἀφίησιν, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ὀνοματοθεσίαν ἡσυχολημένος τις πολλάκις ὀνόματι ἐνὶ πρωτοθέτῳ πολλὰ ὑπήγαγεν ἕτερα λαλοῦντα καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν εἰς ἓν. Πρωτότυπος and πρωτόθετος are connected in DTh. *Techne* 25,3f.: πρωτότυπον ... ἔστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην θέσιν λεχθέν. Notice that Eustath. 1,154,19ff. vdV. calls πόποι an ἐπίρρημα πρωτόθετον καὶ ἕως ὀνοματοπεποιημένον- once again the origin of language, onomatopoeia and an adverb (interjection, see section 6.) are interconnected.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Schrijvers 1974, 339 with n. 8. The most beautiful ancient description of a child's learning to talk is Aug. *Conf.* 1,8 and 13.

mirror in which we see a reflection of the historical process of man's learning to speak.

Just like children's language, the "language" of animals is sometimes connected with theories about the origin of language, in the sense that animals share in some of the lower, communicative faculties of man. This view is especially manifest in Aristotle, whose biological comparatism leads him to this kind of observations, and in Epicurism, where animals are regarded as the mirror of nature.<sup>119</sup> By the same token, they are supposed to reflect all that is "natural" in man. What we see in animal language is a reflection of a sub-human level of linguistic competence. Again Lucretius may be compared.<sup>120</sup> Animals are able to communicate their feelings of *metus*, *dolor* and *gaudia* to one another (Lucr. V 1061). *A fortiori* man should be able to develop a means of communication (V 1056ff.; 1087ff.). A similar observation is found in Aristotle, who regards the organisation of nature as an implicative hierarchy, each level bearing all the characteristics of the one before, plus some additional power. On the faculty of speech he remarks (*Pol.* 1253a9ff.): λόγον δὲ μόνος ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων ἢ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζώους (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἰσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλους), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.<sup>121</sup> This means that the human faculty of speech is bound up with the ethical content of what is to be expressed, whereas the expression of pleasure and pain stands at a level of evolution which man shares with all living beings. There is no explicit reference in this passage to the origin of language as there is in Lucretius, although there is the suggestion of a progressive evolution.<sup>122</sup>

In Lactantius the relationship between human and animal "speech" is also pointed out: Animals manage very well to express their emotions. Lactantius calls

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<sup>119</sup> Cic. *Fin.* 2,32 *bestiis, quae putat (sc. Epicurus) esse specula naturae.*

<sup>120</sup> V 1056ff. Cf. Schrijvers 1974, n. 11. See further D.L. X 75-6; DeLacy 1939, 88.

<sup>121</sup> "Of living beings only man has the power of speech. For the sound of voice is a sign of pain or pleasure, therefore other living beings also have it (for their nature has progressed to the experience of pain and pleasure and the capacity of indicating those things to each other), but the faculty of speech serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful, so that it also indicates right and wrong." Cf. Ax 1986b, 189 n. 207.

<sup>122</sup> Notice esp. μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε.



attention to the fact that animal sounds seem *inconditae*, at least to our ears. There is no reference to the origin of language in this text either.<sup>123</sup>

To the Stoa, matters are essentially different. Chrysippus<sup>124</sup> also indicated that there are several levels of sound production and his remarks link animal and children's language. Making sound in itself is achieved even by ravens, crows and children. However this is not *loqui*, but *ut loqui*. The fundamental difference is that there is no λόγος behind the sound-production of children and animals. Animals and children cannot even be credited with expressing their emotions, their πάθη/*affectus*, because they do not have any in the true sense. Emotions are wrong judgments. If something lacks the instrument for making judgments, it cannot, by the same token, be liable to true emotions.<sup>125</sup> There is no trace of a theory of the origin of language in Chrysippus' observations, but only the development of the faculty of speech in the individual human being is remarked upon; I shall return to this below, section 3.3.3.

The unintelligibility of animal and barbarian speech is often compared. Especially bird-sounds are an apt metaphor for the sounds barbarians produce and *vice versa*.<sup>126</sup> Barbarian words are connected with the interjections in that they share the qualification *inconditus* and difficult to spell (see above). There is only one text which applies the term *barbarus* to a primitive stage in the development of mankind. It is found in Manilius who is a rather meagre exponent of the "Kulturentstehungslehre" (see below).<sup>127</sup> He describes the origin of language in one line: *tunc et lingua suas accepit barbara leges. Barbara* alludes

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<sup>123</sup> Lact. *de ira* 7,7-8: *Nam cetera quae videntur esse homini propria, etsi non sunt talia in mutis (i.e. animals, which lack the power of speech), tamen similia videri possunt. Proprius est homini sermo, est tamen et in illis quaedam similitudo sermonis. Nam et dinoscunt invicem se vocibus et, cum irascuntur, edunt sonum iurgio similem et, cum se ex intervallo vident, gratulandi officium voce declarant. Nobis quidem voces earum videntur inconditae, sicut et illis fortasse nostrae, sed ipsis qui se intellegunt verba sunt. Denique in omni adfectu certas voces notas exprimunt quibus habitum mentis ostendant.* Notice the similarity of the last sentence to the definition of the interjection in the grammarians. It cannot be excluded that Lactantius was influenced by Lucretius, cf. Ingremeau (Budé-ed.) *a.l.*

<sup>124</sup> In Varro *LL VI* 56.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Dierauer 1977, 233f. Posidonius defends an adapted form of child- and animal-psychology, because he does not believe that all *affectus* derive from the activities of the λόγος.

<sup>126</sup> Cf. Dierauer 1977, 30f.; e.g. *Hdt.* 2,57; for more references see Dierauer 1977, 31 n. 33. Cf. also Hesych. *s.v.* χελιδόνος δίκη: τοὺς βαρβάρους χελιδόνιν ἀπεικάζουσι διὰ τὴν ἀσύμθετον λαλιάν.

<sup>127</sup> See Fehling 1965, 224.

to the inarticulateness of primitive sounds, which resemble the inarticulateness of a foreign language. Furthermore, *barbarus* has, of course, general overtones of lack of cultivation,<sup>128</sup> and that is exactly what the tongue suffered from before it had learned to talk properly.<sup>129</sup>

### 3.3.2. Διάρθρωσις and theories of the development of language

This takes us to a major factor which operated in the development of language, the process of articulation (διάρθρωσις).<sup>130</sup> Διάρθρωσις is a term used in a physiological sense for the development of, for instance, the embryo.<sup>131</sup> When applied to the tongue, it refers to the articulatory activities of that organ. Ἀρθρώω, too, seems to be used primarily in the physiological context of the development and usage of parts of the body.<sup>132</sup> As far as we know, Lucretius was the first to translate this term by *articulare* (IV 549).<sup>133</sup>

Now, it will be remembered that there are two mainstreams in the ancient theories on the origin of language.<sup>134</sup> The first sees language as an *invention* (in accordance with the traditional establishing of a πρῶτος εὐρέτης). This invention is attributed either to a god or to a kind of cult hero. The second explanation is more scientific in approach and combats the "mythological" views of the first one: It looks upon language as the product of an evolution from an animal existence to a civilized, more fully human situation.<sup>135</sup> Traditionally, the

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<sup>128</sup> This connotation is absent from older Greek.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. Sen. *Cons. ad Polyb.* 11,18,8 *barbarorum inconditus fremitus*; Dubuisson 1984, 55ff.

<sup>130</sup> Again note the terminological relationship: The process of διάρθρωσις is often applied to things that are συγκεχυμένος (= *confusus*): Porph. *ad Marcellam* 10: Συνάγοις δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπίλοις τὰς ἐμφύτους ἐννοίας καὶ διάρθρωσιν συγκεχυμένας καὶ εἰς φῶς ἔλκειν ἔσκοτισμένας πειρωμένη ... διάρθρωσίης δ' ἂν ἅ γε ἀκήκοας. The same opposition occurs (in a physical sense) Ar. *GA* 721b34: συγκεχυμένον vs. διηρθρωμένον γράμμα (of a birth-mark). The only passage where συγκεχυμένος is used of primitive language is Diod.Sic. 1,8,3.

For what it is worth, Σύγχυσις is the name used in the *Septuaginta* for Babel (*Gen.* 11:7-9).

<sup>131</sup> Cf. Dierauer 1977, 32f.; Ar. *HA* 504a7.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. Ar. *HA* 535a25ff.; cf. 536a4; *PA* 660a14ff.; X. *Mem.* 1,4,12.

<sup>133</sup> *Mobilis articulata verborum* (sc. *voces*) *daedala lingua*. Cf. Schrijvers 1974, 353f.

<sup>134</sup> Fehling 1965, 220ff. See chapter I section 2.2.

<sup>135</sup> Fehling 1965, 223ff.

most important representatives of the "invention" group are Plato's *Cratylus*<sup>136</sup> and the Stoa. The evolutionary theory is exemplified by Epicurism.

In the evolutionary conception of the origin of language the process of *διάρθρωσις*<sup>137</sup> consists in the gradual articulation and clarification of the primitive indistinct sounds produced by force of nature.<sup>138</sup> These primitive sounds would be the kind of interjections of pain, pleasure and fear discussed above.<sup>139</sup> *Διάρθρωσις* functions on a phylogenetical level here.

In the group of "mythical" theories a sub-distinction may be made. In the homonymous dialogue of Plato, Protagoras describes the invention of language as follows (322a5ff.): ἔπειτα φωνῶν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ οἰκίσεις καὶ ... ἤϋρετο.<sup>140</sup> In this case we clearly have to do with the beginnings of human civilization. Primitive man brings order into the unformed sounds and thus language springs into existence. But not all members of this "mythical" group apply the principle of *διάρθρωσις* to the primitive stage of language.

Although *διάρθρωσις* also plays a role in Stoicism, I do not believe it has anything to do with the origin of language there. From chapter I section 2.2. it should be clear that no parallelism between ontogenetical processes and phylogenetical ones can be attested in the case of the Stoics: On the contrary, a process to arrive at a perfect state is out of the question; *διάρθρωσις* can be important only in the development of the linguistic abilities of the individual

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<sup>136</sup> The *Cratylus* deserves mention here, because it was used as a point of reference in the discussion by the other ancient participants. It is not, however, primarily concerned with the origin of language at all, but with the relationship between words and things, and thus with the relationship between language and knowledge. If words are based on a supreme knowledge of the world, we can learn to know the world through a study of words. If words attach to things in a random way, in accordance with what the speakers arbitrarily agreed upon, words have no inherent cognitive value. Cf. Giussani 1896, 267ff.; Fehling 1965, 220ff., esp. 225f. Fehling argues that the special character of the *Cratylus* consists in its combining the "mythical" view of the origin of language with etymology.

<sup>137</sup> Fehling 1965, 224.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Pellicer 1966, 345: "Chez Lucrèce ... *natura* dans le thème de l'origine du langage se définit avant tout par son opposition à l'hypothèse d'une création volontaire, réfléchie, oeuvre de quelque homme supérieur, et peut-être par opposition implicite à l'idée que la divinité a pu intervenir dans le même sens."

<sup>139</sup> Our main sources for the Epicurean analysis of the origin of language are Lucr. V 1028ff. and a brief account in D.L. X 75f. (= Epic. *ep. ad Hdt.*). Cf. further *SEAM* I 142; *Philo Mut.* 262; Fehling 1965, 227f.

<sup>140</sup> "Then he quickly and ably articulated sound and names and invented houses and ..."

child, who at first cannot use his tongue at all, but subsequently learns to speak (*loqui*).<sup>141</sup> I have not found the word *διάρθρωσις* explicitly applied to this process, but if it had a function in the Stoic theory of the development of speech in the individual, it must have been this one. For *διάρθρωσις* does occur in the description of a closely related phenomenon, namely the development of the *προλήψεις* in a child, which are necessary for his epistemological and ethical functioning.<sup>142</sup> In the ethical part of Stoic philosophy, *διάρθρωσις* figures in the heading of a series of titles by Chrysippus. The works summed up belong to the *ἠθικοῦ λόγου τοῦ περὶ τὴν διάρθρωσιν τῶν ἠθικῶν ἐννοιῶν*.<sup>143</sup>

What, then, about the Stoics' views on primitive, inarticulate sound, on interjections?

### 3.3.3. *The Stoics, the origin of language and interjections*

In his 1961 article on "Interjektionen und Naturlaute", Pinborg so focused on the relationship between interjections and origin of speech that he telescoped a theory of the interjection into the different theories about the origin of language. He concluded that there were two mainstreams in Greek philosophical linguistics, a Stoicizing current emphasizing the rational content of this part of speech<sup>144</sup> and a current on Epicurean lines, which considered the interjection "ein Relikt der Ursprache und ein Naturlaut" (1961, 135). This theory has to be revised in various respects.

As will be remembered (chapter I section 2.2.) the Stoics believed that language, like man, was originally in perfect rational order. It is unclear in what way this rational order was initially effected. However this may be, original language, like original man, undergoes a process of gradual corruption (*διαστροφή*) and it is alienated from its origins. This process of corruption

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<sup>141</sup> Cf. Varro *LL* VI 56 (Chrysippus) discussed above. Cf. also Lucr. IV 549ff. and V 1031.

<sup>142</sup> These are closely related anyway. Cf. Epict. 1,17,1; 2,11,18; Pohlenz 1947, II 33.

<sup>143</sup> "Ethical work on the articulation of ethical concepts" (*SVF* II 8,28). Cf. the proposed supplement *SVF* II 4,37. See Barwick 1957, 60 and Epict. 2,17,7; 10; 13.

<sup>144</sup> Here, there seems to be a confusion of the rationalisation of the *affectus* and that of a linguistic means to express these *affectus*, cf. above section 3.3.1. Since *affectus* are undesirable, why should the Stoics have paid special attention to the correct (?) way of linguistically expressing them?

affects the whole kosmos.<sup>145</sup> Eventually, it leads to an ἐκπύρωσις, after which a new cycle starts. Evidently, there is no room in this picture for sub-human sounds gradually evolving into organized language. The general primitivistic tendencies of the Stoa, i.e. - schematically speaking - the belief in a general decline from perfection to destruction, decidedly tell against this.<sup>146</sup>

Moreover, in no way can the πρῶται φωναί that according to Origenes c. *Celsum* 24 were an "imitation of the things", be identified with the interjections. The examples our spokesmen adduce are onomatopoeic formations of the type *hinnire*, *balare*, *mugire*, for which see above. Even supposing that the examples are provided by later sources which partially, or even completely, misunderstood the Stoic intentions, we are not justified in drawing this kind of unwarranted conclusions on the strength of the meagre information we possess.

For, and this is my third and final point, the Stoics did not even recognize the interjections as a separate part of speech. It is unclear whether they took any notice of them at all in their discussions of the adverbs and even if they did, we should remember that not until Antipater was this part of speech added to the original five parts of speech distinguished by the Stoics. Considering, therefore, the relatively marginal status of the adverbs in Stoic linguistic theory and the absence of the interjections, I think it would be too much to attribute to them a rationalizing theory of the interjection.

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<sup>145</sup> For an extreme example of this kind of cultural pessimism, see Sen. *ep.* 90.

<sup>146</sup> Cf. Lovejoy & Boas 1935, 260ff.

### 3.3.4. *Recapitulation*

The results of this section are the following: In Antiquity there were two different approaches to the question of the origin of language. One group, the "mythical" one, assumed there had been a first namegiver (or namegivers). He created a language in which perfect, rational order obtained. Words and things denoted were related in a logical way. In these theories, evidently, there is no place for interjections, representing a sub-human animal stage of communication, at least not if this stage is seen as a preparation for the functioning of "real" language. There is not a trace left of any Stoic interest for such words.

The other group, represented by Epicurus, believed in a gradual evolution. One can get an idea of how this evolution worked by observing a child learning to speak. In this theory, interjections were regarded as prototypic, primitive utterings, which were used to give vent to feelings of anger, joy, fear, pain etc.

If the grammarians borrowed philosophical ideas for their theories of the interjection, they would have to use the material provided by this group. As a matter of fact, we do find some indications of the relationship between interjections and primitive language in the grammarians, but it is nowhere made explicit - and this can easily be explained by the same mechanism as operated in the grammarians' terminological procedures: Explicit reference to the primitiveness and sub-human nature of the interjections would have undermined their status as a full-blown *pars orationis*. This may be the reason why philosophical motifs were suppressed in this chapter of the *artes grammaticae*.

## 4. *Adverbs and interjections*<sup>147</sup>

### 4.1. *The separation*

The most important question regarding the Latin theory of the interjection is, of course, what made the Romans separate it from the adverbs? Julius Romanus (Char. 246,25ff.) devotes quite some attention to the diverse possible solutions of the meristic distribution of adverbs and interjections.<sup>148</sup> The

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<sup>147</sup> I also discussed the subject matter of this section in Sluiter 1989.

<sup>148</sup> This interesting and very complicated passage will be dealt with exhaustively in a monograph on Julius Romanus by Professor D.M. Schenkeveld (forthcoming). I will not, therefore, discuss it in detail, but remark the following only: I believe Romanus mentions three possibilities:

a) The interjections do not form a part of speech of their own; they belong with

principal objection to the combination of adverbs and interjections into one part of speech is the fact that interjections do not fulfil the foremost task of an adverb, namely that of closely adhering to the verb syntactically and semantically. Interjections may even occur in sentences which completely lack a verb, so that they clearly cannot be adverbs. To give one instance of this argumentation: Serv. in Verg. *A.* XII 486: *omne adverbium verbo cohaeret. unde 'heu', 'en' et 'attai' et similia, quia verbo cohaerere non possunt, separata fecerunt aliam partem orationis, scilicet interiectionem, quam sola Latinitas possidet.*<sup>149</sup> Incidentally, certain sources stress the fact that the Greeks refrained from separating interjections from adverbs because they thought that the interjections were in fact construed with a verb or that a verb might at least be understood.<sup>150</sup>

There is also the factor that the Romans had no use for the article as a separate part of speech, since Latin does not have any articles, although the suggestion that they only adopted the interjection to make up the (Aristarchean) canonical number of eight parts of speech is indignantly rejected at least once.<sup>151</sup> However, some of the Latin grammarians' descriptions of the parts of speech increase the suspicion that this suggestion is not completely unfounded,

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the adverbs (opinion of the Greeks, 246,25ff. and of an unidentified group (possibly the Greeks are meant again), 247,11f.).

b) The other extreme position is represented by Umbrius Primus, who assigns the interjections to a part of speech of their own, which is unrelated to that of the adverb. Although he does recognize the possibility of homophony of the adverbs with other parts of speech, he rejects the existence of such a relationship between the adverbs and the interjection (247,9f.).

c) The intermediate position is exemplified by Jul. Romanus himself: He puts the interjections into a separate part of speech, but realizes that interjections may often coincide with adverbs (247,3ff.).

<sup>149</sup> "Every adverb coheres with a verb. Therefore, because 'heu', 'en' and 'attai' etc. cannot cohere with a verb, they separately constitute another part of speech, viz. the interjection, which Latin only possesses." This argument is found in one form or another in Jul. Rom. (Char.) 246,23ff.; 248,7ff.; Diom. I 419,19ff.; Don. IV 386,23f.; 391,28ff.; Aug. V 518,23ff.; Dos. VII 424,10ff.; Clemens Scotus 108,17ff.

<sup>150</sup> Prisc. III 90,6ff.; cf. ApD. *adv.* 121,14ff. See further section 6.3.1.

<sup>151</sup> Jul. Romanus (Char.) 246,26ff. Note that the number of the parts of speech very long remained a matter of dispute. In the first century p.Ch.r.n. the critic and rhetor Dionysius of Halicarnassus was totally unaware of a canonical number (Schenkeveld 1983, 72f.). Quintilian accepts eight parts, but in the second century Herodian still separated proper and common nouns, as did Scaurus in the third (Diom. I 300,27). However, the Latin grammarians from the fourth century and later always adopt the number of eight parts.

or was at least shared by some of the ancient grammarians themselves.<sup>152</sup> Quintilian blandly states that the interjection fills the vacancy of the article (1,4,19):<sup>153</sup> *noster sermo articulos non desiderat ... sed accedit superioribus interiectio.*<sup>154</sup>

On the other hand, I think there is ample reason to believe that the Roman grammarians were actually induced to create the part of speech of the interjections by truly linguistic considerations, and not mere chauvinism. For what about the famous Stoic influence on Roman grammar? Without going into the question of the exact extent of this influence, I think no one will dispute its existence. However, in this particular case, Roman grammar seems to have taken a conscious stand against the Stoa in not accepting the *appellatio* or proper name as a separate part of speech,<sup>155</sup> a procedure which would also have brought the number of parts up to eight. It is not unlikely therefore that Palaemon, the founder of the Roman eight-parts system (Quint. 1,4,20) did make his readjustments of the Greek list on conceptual, rather than merely arithmetical grounds.

Nevertheless, adverbs and interjections were often hard to distinguish, as was noted in the very definition of the interjection by M. Plotius Sacerdos cited above (2.1.).

#### 4.2. *Distinctive features of interjections vs. adverbs*

The features which enabled the grammarians to assign a word in a certain context either to the adverbs or to the interjections were the following:

1. The form of the interjections (see also section 3.2.2.). This criterium assigns a number of words to the interjections straight away on account of their irregular formation, and is also used to distinguish between homonyms. In the latter case the explanation may needs be somewhat forced.

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<sup>152</sup> Diom. I 301,1f.; Cled. V 34,19ff.; Pomp. V 135,13ff.; cf. Serv. (?) IV 428,14f.; ars Bernensis VIII 63,15ff.; ars Ambros. 4,104ff.

<sup>153</sup> Although the addition of the interjection has in this case nothing to do with preserving eight parts of speech; this number is not mentioned until after our passage.

<sup>154</sup> "Our language has no need for articles ... but the interjection adjoins the parts of speech mentioned above."

<sup>155</sup> The Stoics had divided the part of speech of the nouns into proper and common nouns, cf. D.L. VII 57. (Incidentally, the Stoics knew five (or six) parts of speech.) Scaurus alone of the Latin grammarians seems to have taken over this feature of Stoic grammar, Diom. I 300,27.



2. The presence or absence of *affectus* (cf. Julius Romanus (Char.) 247,25f.). Clearly, there is some danger of subjectivity in applying this criterium. It is closely related to the third and last criterium: As interjections signify *affectus* only, they may be omitted without syntactical consequences. In other words:

3. "Optionality" of the word under discussion, i.e. the (lack of) syntactic and/or semantic coherence with verbs or the linguistic context in general (cf. Julius Romanus (Char.) 248,7ff.; 249,19ff.; Probus IV 146,14).

In general it should again be noted that in the case of the interjections the grammarians are confronted with the paradoxical problem of having to rationalize the linguistic functioning of a group of words which by its very nature defies such a procedure. There is tension between the essentially irrational character of the interjections and the attempts to cover them in a technical grammatical theory. This difficulty is most acute where decisions have to be taken about the emotional load conferred by interjections (the second criterium mentioned above).

The second and third criteria are succinctly described by Diomedes (I 419,17ff.) *et fere quidquid motus animi orationi inseruerit* (criterium 2), *quo detractó textus integer reperitur* (criterium 3), *numero interiectionis accedet*.<sup>156</sup>

Probus also stresses the emotional load of the interjections (IV 146,34ff) *sic et ceterae interiectiones ab aliis partibus orationis discernuntur, hoc est ut, quotiens animum per suspirationem commovere inveniuntur, tunc suae potestatis esse intellegantur*.<sup>157</sup> When applied to a homonym, the criterium works as follows (IV 146,8ff.): *heu, si cum animi affectu proferatur, hoc est per suspirationem* (cf. his definition, section 3.1.), *erit interiectio ut 'heu misero coniunx'* [Verg. *A.* 2,738]; *si vero heu simpliciter proferatur, erit adverbium respondentis, ut 'heu', vel laudantis, ut 'heu bene fecisti'*.<sup>158</sup>

To qualify as an interjection, a word should be used as a kind of autonomous uttering which is only expressive of the speaker's own feelings, without having any other function either in a narrowly linguistic or a pragmatic (social, communicative) context. - Even if the uttering of the interjection produces the effect of informing others about our state of mind, that is an

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<sup>156</sup> "And virtually everything that is added to our speech by the emotions of the soul, the removal of which leaves a sound text, belongs to the interjections."

<sup>157</sup> "In the same way the other interjections, too, may be discerned from the other parts of speech, i.e. that we understand them to be independent, whenever they are found to move the soul in a sigh."

<sup>158</sup> "If 'heu' is uttered with some agitation of the soul, i.e. in a sigh, it will be an interjection, e.g. 'heu misero coniunx', "'heu" my wife (snatched away) by miserable (fate)'; if on the other hand it is uttered just like that, it will be an adverb of answering, e.g. 'heu', or of praise, e.g. "'heu" well done.'" One wonders if in the latter example Greek εὖ was heard.

accidental by-product and by no means an intentional achievement on the part of the speaker. - If, on the other hand, the word in question is used to address a second person, *'si pro vocatione aliqua proferatur'* (Probus IV 146,14), it is an adverb. In the latter case a vocative and/or a verb in the second person may also be present. This seems to be the difference between the examples given by Probus (IV 146,11ff.) *hei mihi quantum mutatus ab illo Hectore*<sup>159</sup> (Verg. *A.* II 274) (expression of personal anxiety) and *hei mihi/pater esse disce ab illis, qui vere sciunt*<sup>160</sup> (Ter. *Ad.* 124f.), although the same combination *hei mihi* features in both. In the former example the speaker addresses no one in particular; in the latter there is a recognizable communicative intention. The addressee is supposed to take notice of the feelings of irritation and despair of the speaker. The whole distinction is, of course, somewhat forced.<sup>161</sup>

All the same, Probus' discussion is not entirely free from problems: (IV 146,21ff.) *o, si cum animi affectu proferatur, hoc est per suspirationem, erit interiectio, ut puta 'o mihi sola mei super Astyanactis imago'*<sup>162</sup> (Verg. *A.* 3,489; no verb present; expression of personal anxiety). *si vero o ad accusativum casum proferatur, erit adverbium exclamantis, ut 'o condicionem miseram', item 'o bellum magnopere pertimescendum'*.<sup>163</sup> Absence of a verb alone is apparently an insufficient reason to assign a word to the class of the interjections. From Char. 247,26f., too, it appears that occasionally adverbs may be construed with cases instead of verbs. A word like *o* may therefore be an adverb when combined with an exclamatory accusative.

But what, then, are we to think of another example adduced by the same Probus (IV 146,31f.): *va quemquamne hominem in animo instituere aut/parare quod sit carius, quam ipse est sibi* (Ter. *Ad.* 38f.)?<sup>164</sup> Here, *va* is called an *interiectio*

159 "'Hei mihi', how different from that Hector"

160 "'Hei mihi' learn to be a father from those, who really know."

161 Cf. Pomp. V 251,24ff. The distinction is not universally recognized, cf. e.g. Julianus' example *totto* (section 3.1. *in fine*), which clearly has a communicative intention. Ancient theory is not monolithic.

162 "'O' will be an interjection, if it is uttered emotionally, i.e. in a sigh, e.g. 'o image only that is left of my Astyanax'."

163 "If, on the other hand, 'o' is uttered in a construction with an accusative, it will be an exclamatory adverb, e.g. "'o' miserable situation', and again "'o' war, much to be feared'." The examples stem from Curt. 7,1,37 and Cic. *Cat.* 2,24 respectively.

164 "'Va' that anyone should take it into his head to procure a thing to be dearer to him than his own self" (transl. Sargeant (adapted)). *-ne* is a *coniunctio* according to ancient theory, cf. e.g. Probus IV 145,16ff.

because it is used *cum animi affectu*. Perhaps Probus instinctively felt that the tie between *va* and the exclamatory *accusativus cum infinitivo* was looser than the one between *o* and the *accusativus exclamationis* in the preceding example. The presence of *-ne* (in *quamquamne* etc.) may have exerted its influence here.<sup>165</sup> In that case *va* practically forms an exclamation by itself and represents a separate uttering expressive of the mood of the speaker only.

Something very similar is described in Julius Romanus (Char.) 313,18ff. *Em G. Gracchus ut lex Papiria accipiatur: 'pessimi Tiberium fratrem meum optimum interfecerunt. em! videte quam par pari sim'. at quidam em pro en volunt esse. sed decet commemorationi fraternae mortis ingemescere. itaque mora distinctionis par est ostendere adfectus.*<sup>166</sup>

If the interpretation of *quidam* is followed, *en* is an adverb adhering closely to *videte* (address of second person; demonstrative adverb).<sup>167</sup> Reading *em* followed by a pause implies that *em* is an independent uttering indicating the emotional state of mind of the speaker.<sup>168</sup> As an indication that we should read the passage so, we must punctuate after *em!* (*distinctio*).<sup>169</sup> This solution is preferred by Charisius as the more fitting, since a brother's death is involved. Thus, in this case also, it is the independence of the linguistic context and the fact that the word in question is not used to communicate anything,<sup>170</sup> if I may thus

<sup>165</sup> Cf. KS I 719f. (16).

<sup>166</sup> "Em' is used by C. Gracchus in his plea to get the *lex Papiria* accepted: "The most worthless people have killed Tiberius, my most excellent brother. "Em!" look how I resemble him'. But some claim that 'em' is used in lieu of 'en'. But it is fitting to moan at the remembrance of the death of one's brother. Therefore, it is suitable to show the emotionality by a pause, i.e. by punctuating." Cf. Diom. I 437,10ff.; 438,26 Diomedes declares that one of the reasons for interposing a *mora* is, "ut actus verborum emineat et luceat, qui ex aliquo moveatur affectu vel indignatione vel miseratione conlata".

<sup>167</sup> Cf. Don. IV 386,10 where the examples of a demonstrative adverb are *en* and *ecce*. There is, however, some confusion about *en* and *em*. Diomedes calls both *en* and *em* demonstrative adverbs in I 404,9; 419,11 *em* is called an interjection *quae intentius aliquid demonstrantem significat*. The sole difference between the interjection and the adverb seems to be the intensity of the demonstration.

<sup>168</sup> Cf. I.W. Beck, *de differentiarum scriptoribus Latinis*, Groningae 1883, 54 no. 6: *inter 'en' et 'em' ... : en cum ostendis, velut est ecce; em cum increpas*. Cf. Agroec. VII 114,13.

<sup>169</sup> Cf. note 178.

<sup>170</sup> It should be stressed again that not even the feelings of the speaker are intended to be communicated to anybody else. The speaker is, if anything, addressing himself. Cf. Don. in Ter. *Eun.* 65, quoted in note 3. The interjection is a sign of ἀυτοπάθεια, cf. ApD. *adv.* 127,12.

express it, which are decisive in classifying it as an interjection. In this case it is tantamount to deciding that *em* should be read, rather than *en*. For a pause as a test and sign of a looser syntactical relationship, cf. also ApD. *synt.* 305,13ff. There the question is whether *σύ* in *σύ γράφεις* is a nominative or a vocative: ὅπερ (viz. *σύ γράφεις*) ἐνούμενον εὐθείας ἐστίν, ὁμοιον τῷ ἐγὼ γράφω κάκεῖνος γράφει, ἐπεχόμενον δὲ κατὰ τὴν σύ καὶ ἐπιστρέφον τὸ προσφωνούμενον κλητικὴν ὁμολογήσει.<sup>171</sup>

Returning to the method of distinguishing homonyms, I shall discuss one more example, namely *heu*. At four places Cledonius discusses the status of *heu* and gives three different criteria for distinguishing the adverb *heu* from the interjection. At V 21,6ff. we read: *heu: quaerendum est quando adverbium sit respondendi, quando interiectio. si verbum sequitur, adverbium. si alteram partem orationis, interiectio est.* This corresponds to the third criterium mentioned above (this section *in initio*) and is by now familiar enough.

At V 21,20ff. the difference between the *interiectio dolentis* and the *adverbium respondendi* is marked by a prosodic feature (cf. the first criterium mentioned above):<sup>172</sup> *producta interiectio est, correpta adverbium respondendi.*<sup>173</sup> These words are not as straightforward as they may seem. For admittedly we do find the rule that all monosyllabic interjections are long (e.g. Max. Vict. VI 239,12ff.), but the same is upheld for monosyllabic adverbs (*ibid.* 237,9f.). Besides, we have to do here with a homonym, which in all interpretations contains the same diphthong, and should, therefore, be long.

Perhaps one should connect Cledonius' statements here with those at V 67,1f.: *heus, si raptim proferimus, adverbium est; si cum dolore, interiectio. sic et heu.*<sup>174</sup> Now, what exactly does *raptim* mean? *Raptim*, I submit, refers to the identical effect as produced by *corripere*, both being indicative of a way of articulating a syllable.<sup>175</sup> Moreover, I think we may safely take it that *raptim*

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<sup>171</sup> "When it is united in a single [phrase], it is nominative, parallel to *ego grapho* ('I am writing') and *ekeinos graphai* ('He is writing') [rather: *ego grapho kakeinos graphai* ('I write and he writes'); Householder's translation requires καὶ, I.S.], but if you hesitate after the *su* and use it to call the attention of your addressee, then it will be admitted [that *su* is] a vocative", transl. Householder.

<sup>172</sup> The *adverbia respondendi* are quite commonly distinguished as a semantic sub-group of the adverbs, cf. Jeep 1893, 278.

<sup>173</sup> "If it is lengthened, it is an interjection, if it is pronounced short, it is an adverb of answering."

<sup>174</sup> "If we utter '*heus*' rapidly, it is an adverb; if we utter it with pain, it is an interjection. The same goes for '*heu*'." Here, incidentally, the third criterium used by Cledonius (emotionality) also appears.

<sup>175</sup> Independent, of course, of the nature of the vowel. Cf. note 101.

*proferri* is synonymous with *cursim proferri* in the following quotation from Cledonius (V 31,31ff.): *Acutus qui cursim profertur, ut árma, excusso enim sono dicendum est; circumflexus qui tractim, ut Rôma.*<sup>176</sup> In its turn, *tractim proferri* is certainly identical to *producere*, as can be shown from Gellius (NA IV 6,6): "*succidaneae*" ... *littera i scilicet tractim pronuntiata; audio enim quosdam eam litteram in hac voce barbаре corripere.*<sup>177</sup> For in this text *corripere* is opposed to *tractim pronuntiare*. What, then, are the consequences for our passage?

Whether *heu* is an adverb or an interjection, its diphthong will be naturally long. However, sometimes it is uttered more rapidly (thus perhaps even creating an impression of correption?), sometimes it is drawn out. If it is an interjection, the *pathos* itself that induces us to utter it, makes us linger over its articulation. Therefore we produce it *tractim* with a circumflex accent. If, on the other hand it is an adverb, it is uttered with an acute accent, which creates the impression of its being shortened.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> "The one produced rapidly is the acute accent, as in *árma*. For it has to be said with an ejection of sound; the circumflexus is the one produced with a drawl, as *Rôma*." It is usual for the Roman grammarians to describe Latin prosody in terms of Greek grammar, cf. Kroll 1924, 17; Allen 1973, 151f. Roman grammarians do not simply equate the distribution of acute and circumflex accents with short and long vowels, cf. e.g. Prisc. II 7,13ff. *hâmis* vs. *hâmus*, cf. κῶμιος vs. κῶμος. See e.g. Mart. Capella 3,272f.

<sup>177</sup> "*Succidaneae*' ... with lengthened *i*, of course; for I hear that some take that letter short in this word, thus committing a barbarism."

<sup>178</sup> It cannot be excluded that Cledonius also had at the back of his mind the absence of a pause (to be stressed by punctuation) after *heu*, cf. above on Prob. IV 146,31f. and Char. 313,18ff. However, I do not find it likely. Admittedly, there are signs that the ancient grammarians were aware of the effect of a pause on the length of the preceding syllable (Apth. VI 37,26ff. *nam cum sermo terminatur et postrema clauditur syllaba, ad initium alterius transitum fieri manifestum est, quod intervallum aliquanti temporis intercapedinem sumit: sic syllabae naturalis brevitatis additamento temporis crescit*). But it would be too much to say that the word itself is *producta* in that case: The grammarians clearly state that the additional time involved is filled with silence, following the word in question (cf. also Apth. VI 77,20f. *mora temporis intercedente, quae in fine versus naturaliter contingit*). Although rhythmically speaking more time passes, this has no metrical consequences, and the context in which the grammarians discuss this phenomenon is metrical rather than rhythmical (musical), cf. Apth. VI 39,6ff. Moreover, they usually apply the concept of lengthening to cases where a syllable is naturally short. To my knowledge our place would be the only Latin source where such an effect is described on a syllable which is long already by nature. Cf. however Ruijgh 1987 for a similar theory in Dionysius of Halicarnassus - note that no monosyllables are taken into account there.

Further, the use of *correpta* would also be strange, since the reverse effect, the absence of a pause, is not normally regarded as the cause of shortening. This last objection could perhaps be countered by the observation that *correpta* need describe no more than a relative length in comparison with *producta*.

One problem is left, viz. the rule that in principle all monosyllables containing a naturally long vocal or diphthong, have the *circumflexus*.<sup>179</sup> However, the avoidance of *συνέμππως* may cause this rule to be ignored.<sup>180</sup>

Finally, at V 69,12f. Cledonius uses the second criterium (cf. this section *in initio*) of the interjections' emotional impact: (*heu*) ... *quando ingemiscentis est, interiectio est.*

### 5. Translating interjections

The uncertainties, especially the semantic ones, surrounding the interjections caused their translators not a little trouble. By way of a short excursus I will give a brief survey of the theoretical remarks devoted to the translation of the interjection. Hardly surprising, this is a terrain which is dominated by the Christian writers. For in Antiquity the Bible constituted the main translation-problem. In this section I will give some examples of how this problem was handled regarding the interjections.

In *epist.* 20<sup>181</sup> Jerome answers the request of Damasus (*epist.* 19) to explain to him the expression *osanna*.<sup>182</sup> In 20,3,8 Jerome completes his discussion of the second part of the word, viz. *anna*, which may represent two different Hebrew words: *Ex quo animadvertimus, si ex aleph scribatur 'anna', significari 'obsecro', si autem ex heth, esse coniunctionem sive interiectionem, quae apud Graecos ponitur δὴ et est in ὠσον δὴ, cuius interpretationem Latinus sermo non*

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<sup>179</sup> Cf. [Serg.] IV 524,24; Aphth. VI 192,24ff.

<sup>180</sup> Don. IV 371,25ff. *accentuum legem vel distinguendi vel pronuntiandi ratio vel discernendae ambiguitatis necessitas saepe conturbat*; Prisc. III 520,27ff. An example for this procedure is the homonym *pone*. If *pone* is a verb, nothing is the matter; if it is an adverb, it is accentuated on the last syllable. Priscian adds: *quod apud Latinos in ultima syllaba nisi discretionis causa accentus poni non potest (l.l.)*. The other frequent example is *ergo*. However, here the descriptions vary, cf. e.g. Prisc. *ibid.*; [Probus] IV 252, 21ff.; [Serg.] IV 525,11ff.; Velius Longus VII 53,3; *Excerpta Audacis* VII 330,17; 360,25f.

<sup>181</sup> Cf. Holtz 1981, 39 for the relationship between Jerome's remarks on the interjection with the theory of Donatus.

<sup>182</sup> On difficulties in translating *ὠσαννά*, cf. Orig. *in Matth.* 21:9 (*Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei*, lib. 16,19,62ff. (ed. E. Klostermann, *Origenes' Werke*, vol. 10,1. Leipzig 1935). Cf. Neuschäfer 1987, 106.

*exprimit*.<sup>183</sup> Notice that the doubtful expression "*coniunctionem sive interiectionem*" is caused by the fact that the Greek did indeed translate it by a conjunction (namely the σύνδεσμος δή), whereas in Latin no translation was made at all. Had it been translated, though, the emotional character of the plea would have demanded an interjection.

Jerome then says that, as the complete expression *osanna* could not easily be translated into Greek, the evangelists - with the exception of Luke who possibly did not want to puzzle his readers with doubtful Greek - simply took it over, just like *alleluia* and *amen* (20.4.10ff.).

Summing up, Jerome explains that just as Latin has its interjections, *ita et Hebraei inter reliquas proprietates linguae suae habent interiectionem, ut, quando volunt Dominum deprecari, ponant verbum petentis affectu et dicant 'anna Domine', quod Septuaginta dixerunt 'o Domine'. 'osi' ergo 'salvifica' interpretatur, 'anna' interiectio deprecantis est*.<sup>184</sup>

In *Tract. de Ps.* 114:4, too, Jerome observes how hard it is to make the Latin or Greek correspond as closely to the Hebrew as possible: *Proprietatem Hebraici Graecus et Latinus exprimere non possunt. Pro o in Hebraeo habet ANNA* (which, Jerome tells us, means *rogo et deprecor*) ... *non est enim mirantis, sed deprecantis affectus*.<sup>185</sup> Thus, *anna* is more explicit and less ambiguous than *o*.

Sometimes the possibilities of translation are severely doubted, as in Isidorus *Etym.* I 14: *Quae voces* (sc. the interjections) *quarum[cum]que linguarum propriae sunt, nec in aliam linguam facile transferuntur*.<sup>186</sup> The problem of finding a correct equivalent for interjections in translations could be solved in

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<sup>183</sup> "Therefore, we notice that *anna* means 'if you please', if it is written with an aleph; if it is written with a heth, it is a conjunction or an interjection, like the Greek δή in σώσον δή ('save us') [the Greek translation of *Osanna - osi-anna*], which in Latin is not expressly translated."

<sup>184</sup> "... so too the Hebrews have interjections among the other features of their language, so that, when they wish to beseech the Lord, they use the word of someone who makes a passionate appeal, and say *anna Domine*, which is rendered by the Septuaginta *o Domine*. Thus, *osi* translates 'save us', *anna* is an interjection of beseeching." Cf. Hier. *Comm. in Ps.* 117:25 (CCSL 72, 235).

<sup>185</sup> "Greek and Latin cannot express the Hebrew idiom. Instead of *o* Hebrew says 'ANNA' ... For the sentiment is not that of wonder, but of begging."

<sup>186</sup> "These words are peculiar to each language, nor can they be easily translated into another language." Cf. Aug. *PLM* 34,1241, *serm.dom.in monte c. IX* 23 cited below. Pinborg 1961, 133. Prisc. II 20,7f. *interiectionum ... pleraeque communes sunt naturaliter omnium gentium voces* seems to hold the contrary opinion, but he is not considering semantics, but describing a phonological phenomenon.

different ways. Most simply, the word under discussion might be taken over from object- to target-language, even at the risk of forming a *corpus alienum* there. Luke avoided this risk and chose a second option, viz. leaving out the exceptionable word. If the interpreter chose the hard way, he tried to determine the emotional value of the interjection - since no definite meaning could be assigned to it - and looked to see if the target-language possessed a word which would confer the same *affectus*. Apart from *hosanna*, another frequent example is *RACHA*: Augustinus (*PLM* 34, 1241, *serm.dom.in monte c. IX* 23) was told that *RACHA ... esse vocem non significantem aliquid sed indignantis animi motum experimentem. Has interiectiones grammatici vocant particulas orationis significantes commoti animi affectum ... Quae voces quarumque linguarum sunt propriae,*<sup>187</sup> *nec in aliam linguam facile transferuntur: quae causa utique coegit tam graecum interpretem quam latinum vocem ipsam ponere, cum quomodo eam interpretaretur non inveniret.*<sup>188</sup>

Augustinus also believes that *hosanna* should be considered an interjection: (*CCSL* 36,440 (*Tract. in Ioh. LI* 2)) *Quod ideo credendum est ita esse, quia neque Graecus neque Latinus hoc interpretari potuit sicut illud: "Qui dixerit fratri suo: RACHA [Matth. 5:22]. Nam et haec interiectio esse perhibetur, affectum indignantis ostendens.*<sup>189</sup> Thus, the impossibility of translation itself becomes an indication that a word is an interjection.

Yet, an example of translation of an interjection is also to be found in Augustinus: *de Mag. V* 15 [*Quis enim non videat, si quaeras*] *quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus 'Heu', responderi 'ὄ',*<sup>190</sup> but the point of

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<sup>187</sup> Cf. Isid. I 14 quoted above.

<sup>188</sup> "*Racha* is a word which does not mean anything, but expresses the mood of an indignant soul. These (small) parts of speech that express the affections of a disturbed soul, are called 'interjections' by the grammarians ... Each language has its own peculiar version of these words nor can they be easily transposed from one language into another: This is the reason that forced the Greek as well as the Latin interpreter to put the word itself in his text, because he could not find how to translate it."

<sup>189</sup> "The reason why this should be believed to be so, is that it cannot be translated in Greek, nor in Latin, just like 'who sayeth to his brother "*racha*". For that is also alleged to be an interjection, indicative of the emotion of indignation." Hier. *CCSL* 72,28, in *Matth. 5:22* says that *RACHA* means κένος, *id est inanis aut vacuus, quem nos possumus vulgata iniuria 'absque cerebro' nuncupare;* Chrysost. in *Matth. PGM* 57,248,43ff. τὸ δὲ ῥακά οὐ μεγάλης ἐστὶν ὕβρεως ῥῆμα ... ἀντὶ τοῦ σύ; Basilius of Caesarea, *Regulae PGM* 51, 432 τὶ ἐστὶ ῥακά; ἐπιχώριον ῥῆμα ἡπιωτέρας ὕβρεως, πρὸς τοὺς οἰκειοτέρους λαμβανόμενον.

<sup>190</sup> "For who does not see, if one would ask what the Greeks say for our *heu*, that the answer is ὄ."



Augustinus' text is not that interjections can be translated or that οἷ is necessarily the correct equivalent of *heu*, but to show that the words - Greek and Latin - which are here adduced as examples, are all used in meta-language, i.e. that they are in this case all of them *nomina*. Nevertheless, this is a translation of an interjection and the casual way in which it is introduced might even be taken to indicate that it was generally held that they could be translated.

## 6. Greek grammar and interjections

In the preceding sections I referred more than once to Greek views which inspired or reflected the Roman ones.<sup>191</sup> In order to facilitate a general overview I will now briefly consider the Greek evidence by itself.

Even when no separate word-class of interjections had yet been distinguished or at any rate acknowledged, the phenomenon itself existed of course<sup>192</sup> and the Greek grammarians usually classified the corresponding words as adverbs. I am well aware of the fact that any step I take beyond this statement may seem to betray my principles of looking for what the ancient grammarians have, not for what they lack. However, it will soon appear that the Greeks were also conscious of the fact that not all of their adverbs were equally straightforward; the status of some was in fact an issue among them. We should not forget that the adverb had a blanket function. Its *pandectes*-character tended to absorb all words of dubious status. The criteria for a word to belong to the class of adverbs were largely negative: If a word could not classify as any of the other parts of speech, it automatically fell under the adverbs.<sup>193</sup>

My method for trying to find out something about the Greek grammarians' views on "interjections" - despite the fact that they did not recognize them as a separate word-class - will be the following:

In the first place I will discuss a number of semantic sub-groups among the adverbs, whose adverbial status was debated. This would not entitle us to look upon them as a separate group but for two reasons. The first is, that the words

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<sup>191</sup> On the question whether there was some sort of mutual influence between Greek and Roman grammar or only a one-way traffic of theories, see Marrou 345f.; 349; 543 n. 2; 544 n. 7; Rawson 1985, 55; 64; esp. 68f.; 98.

<sup>192</sup> Servius IV 428,14f. kindly reminds us of this: *interiectionem Graeci non penitus non habent, sed inter partes orationis non computant.*

<sup>193</sup> See note 107. The Greek σύνδεσμοι were a rather heterogeneous group as well.

belonging in these sub-groups are often described by a series of words which may be translated as "exclamation", i.e. a vaguer word than "adverb" is used to designate them.<sup>194</sup> Secondly, the words so described are often lumped together and made the object of extensive discussions as to their characteristics, the more so since they do not entirely comply with the usual behaviour of adverbs. We even find the suggestion that they should be considered a separate part of speech.

When it has thus been established that such a sub-group of the adverbs really was an issue for the Greek grammarians, my second step in tracing their views on "interjections" will be to scrutinize the words for exclamations that are often applied to adverbs belonging in the semantic sub-groups mentioned above. Those contexts will then be taken into consideration as well where such words are not explicitly called adverbs. This will result in the discovery of a rather coherent theory which either anticipates or reflects the Roman theory of the interjection.

### 6.1. *The selection of the adverbs*

The adverbs were distinguished in a large number of semantically defined sub-groups. The *Techne* of Dionysius Thrax featured 26 such groups. Apollonius Dyscolus also knows many semantic categories for the adverbs although he does not classify them by this criterium.<sup>195</sup> If we consider the list in Dionysius Thrax, there are four, or possibly five groups which, as our other sources will confirm, are of an exclamatory character, to wit the *σχετλιαστικά*, *θαυμαστικά*, *παρακελεύσεως* and *θειασμοῦ*. The *εὐχῆς σημαντικά* are the fifth candidate. I will return to these later.

To start with the *σχετλιαστικά* (DTh. 77,1; ApD. *adv.* 121,19), they are mostly represented by the examples *παπαί*, *λού* and *φεῦ* and denote a plaintive mood.<sup>196</sup> They are explicitly linked with the interjections by e.g. Prisc. III

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<sup>194</sup> Alternatively, whenever a word is called an "exclamation" in a grammatical context, it will usually be classified as an adverb (not necessarily of a specified semantic sub-group).

<sup>195</sup> Apollonius mentions the following semantic sub-groups by name: *χρονικά* (e.g. *adv.* 123,16; 148,7); *ποιότητος* (e.g. *adv.* 196,8f.); *ἀριθμοῦ* (*adv.* 141,18); *τοπικά* (e.g. *adv.* 154,4ff.); *εὐχῆς* (*adv.* 157,27); *σχετλιαστικά* (*adv.* 121,21); *ἀποφάσεως* (*adv.* 124,8); *κατάφασις* (*adv.* 124,8) (= DTh. *συγκαταθέσεως*); *ἀπαγόρευσις* (*adv.* 124,10f.); *παρακελευστικά* (*adv.* 123,12); *πυγματικόν/κατὰ πεῦσιν* (*adv.* 172,9/172,11f.) (= DTh. *ἐρωτήσεως*); *ἐπιτατικόν* (*adv.* 130,7) (cf. *coni.* 223,4 τὸ ἐπιτατικὸν ἐπίρρημα, meaning *μᾶλλον* which is classified by DTh. under τὰ συγκρίσεως); τὰ εὐαστικά (*adv.* 121,21) (= DTh. *θειασμοῦ*).

In confrontation with the *Techne*, Apollonius lacks the categories of *μεσότητος*, *παραβολῆς* ἢ *ὁμοιώσεως*, *θαυμαστικά*, *εἰκασμοῦ*, *τάξεως*, *ἄθροίσεως*, *συγκρίσεως*, *συλλήψεως*, *ἀπωμοτικά*, *κατωμοτικά*, *βεβαιώσεως* and *θετικά*.

90,12f.: *interiectio tamen non solum quem dicunt Graeci σχετλιασμόν significat, sed etiam voces quae cuiuscumque passionis animi pulsu per exclamationem intericiuntur.*<sup>197</sup> By θειασμοῦ (δηλωτικά) (DTh. 86,1) are meant ecstatic or divinely inspired exclamations, as in the Bacchic rites. Signal examples are εὐοῖ (εὐοῖ) and εὐάν (εὐάν).<sup>198</sup> The θυμαστικά express surprise or even astonishment. The most current example is βαβαί. In SchDTh. 435,19ff. they are linked to the ἐκπληκτικά,<sup>199</sup> which we can safely add to our collection. In the Suda lemma ἄ ἄ the fourth category selected from the list in Dionysius Thrax, the adverbs παρακελεύσεως (in the Suda styled κελεύσεως), are connected in their turn with the ἐπιρρήματα ἐκπλήξεως.<sup>200</sup>

<sup>197</sup> "But the interjection does not only indicate what the Greeks call σχετλιασμός (indignant complaint), but also words which are in an exclamatory way interjected by force of any passion of the soul whatsoever." Cf. Jul. Romanus (Char.) 246,25ff., on which see above section 4.1.

<sup>198</sup> SchDTh. 102,1ff.; 282,22ff. Cf. ApD. *adv.* 121,19ff. εὐαστικά, a terminological development out of εὐάν itself; Harpocr. 141,6f. Εὐοῖ σαβοῖ...βακχικόν τι ἐπίφθεγμά ἐστι τὸ εὐοῖ; Bekker AG I 257,17 s.v. Εὐοῖ σαβοῖ: μυστικά ἐπιφθέγματα; CAG 4,5,11,26ff. (Amm. in Ar. *de interpr.*) τῶν ἐνθουσιαστικῶν ἐπιρρημάτων; Hesych. II 216 (nr. 6691) Latte εὐα· ἐπιφημισμός ληναϊκός (i.e. belonging to the Lenaea: "Bacchic"), καὶ μυστικός, καὶ ἕα.

A combination of the denotations σχετλιαστικά and βακχικά is found in Hdn. GG III i 503,8ff. καὶ καθόλου δὲ οὐ δεῖ τὰ σχετλιαστικά τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων οἶονεὶ βακχικά ὄντα ὑπὸ τὴν ἔντεχνον ἀκολουθίαν ἄγειν κτλ. (= Theogn. Cramer AO II 158,15ff.); cf. Hdn. GG III ii.i,209,1 σχετλιαστικόν καὶ βακχευτικόν (= Et. M. 481,15). Probus IV 146,6 (?) (si) ... *bacchamur*.

We can now solve a problem in Greg. Cor. p. 310 § 31,175 τὸ ἄν ἐπίρρημα θειασμοῦ καὶ λαμβάνεται ὡς ἠρωϊκὸν καὶ σύνδεσμος. By the first-mentioned possibility, the ἐπίρρημα θειασμοῦ, Gregorius clearly means /αν/ in εὐάν (εὐάν), cf. SchEur. *Troad.* 325 εὐ ἄν εὐ οἴ...βακχικά ἐπιφθέγματα· εἰσὶ δὲ ἐπιρρήματα θειασμοῦ. διόρισον [τὰ] δὲ [θειασμοῦ], οἶον εὐ οἴ εὐ ἄν. That ἄν should be a σύνδεσμος is quite straightforward ancient theory. Λαμβάνεται ὡς ἠρωϊκὸν is more problematic and the text is probably corrupt here. I suggest Gregorius had in mind the use of ἄν for ἄνα (mentioned by Greg. Cor. *dial.* 252f. as a characteristic of Doric), cf. SchHom. Ω 476b, where attention is drawn to ἀμβαίη (μ 77). (The only "linguistic" fact described by means of the word ἠρωϊκὸν is μέτρον.) Professor Ruijgh suggests e.g. λαμβάνεται <ἄντι τῆς ἀνά> (p.c.). See further SchHom. A 305a and the references *a.l.* Incidentally, the readings containing a ν (as in ἀνοχεθέειν, ε 120) go back to Aristarchus, cf. Wackernagel *Kl. Schriften* I 824.

<sup>199</sup> Cf. the ἐπιρρήματα ἐκπλήξεως, Suda I 2,1ff. (ἄ ἄ); SchArist. (Tzetzes) *Plu.* 220a; SchAesch. *Septem* 482a; cf. 482b; SchDTh. 435,17f.; ps. Theodos. 79,24f.

<sup>200</sup> A curious entry in the P.Lit.Lond. 182,97ff. runs as follows: ἐπικελευστικά, ἅπερ οἱ μὲν ἐπιφθέγ(γ)ματα καλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ συνεμφάσεις, οἱ δὲ|σχετλιασμούς. φεῦ, παπαῖ, ὦμοι. (On ὦμοι see below, section 6.3.1.) This is a rather peculiar testimony, as it is the only place where we find the form ἐπικελευστικά as a label for a group of adverbs. Besides, the use of

The last Dionysian group of adverbs that might at first sight deserve inclusion in our discussion was that of the εὐχῆς σημαντικά (DTh. 76,4).<sup>201</sup> Frequent examples are εἶθε, εἰ, αἶ. Their claims on inclusion in our group seem to be strengthened by an entry in the Suda (II 523,3): εἶθε· σχετλιαστικὸν ἐπίρρημα. καὶ εἰ ὁμοίως. However, I would suggest that this remark originated in a confusion about ἄ: This word can express a variety of meanings. In Eustath. *Od.* 2,77,42ff. Stallb. (Hom. ξ 361) we read: Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι τὸ ἄ κλητικὸν ἐπίρρημα ὄν καθὰ καὶ τὸ ὦ, ἔχει πρὸς τῇ κλίσει [I. κλήσει I.S.] ὡς πολλαχοῦ φαίνεται, καὶ τινα πλείω ἔμφρασιν ἐπὶ σχετλιασμῶ ἢ θαύματι κατὰ τοὺς παλαιούς ἢ καὶ ἄλλως οἴκτω ... (46ff.) Ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἄ ψιλοῦμενον καὶ περισπώμενον καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ αἶθε λαμβάνεται, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν, οἳ καὶ χρῆσιν εἰς τοῦτο παράγουσιν.<sup>202</sup> Clearly someone mistakenly concluded that since ἄ and αἶθε are synonyms when introducing a

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συνεμφάσεις is also strange. Maybe it hints at the fact that the function of these words is to underscore the mood of the uttering, although they do not do so in a grammatically correct, independent form (type: φεῦ, I'm hurt; φεῦ anticipates and summarizes the feeling which is described in the grammatically whole and correct sequence). Disturbing also is the discrepancy between the name of the particles and the examples which fit the designation *σχετλιασμοί* only. Ἐπικελεύομαι is virtually synonymous with παρακελεύομαι in Pl. *Phd.* 60e8. In a dream Socrates has heard the words ὦ Σώκρατες ... μουσικὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζου. He comments (ε7ff.): καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θεοῖσι διακελυόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν ... Cf. Burnet *a.l.* παρακελεύεσθαι is "*hortari aliquem ut aliquid faciat*"; ἐπικελεύειν is "*incitare facientem*". As to διακελ., according to Burnet it is used for variation's sake and is a frequent alternative in Plato for παρακελ. However, in our place it has to be taken as an alternative for ἐπικελεύειν - Socrates is so to say cheered on while passing in full speed like an athlete who is running a course. For ἐπικελεύειν cf. Plut. *Anton.* 77,2 μόλις ἢ Κλεοπάτρα ... τὸν δεσμὸν ἀνελάμβανεν (notice the imperfect), ἐπικελευομένων τῶν κάτωθεν αὐτῇ καὶ συναγωνιώντων; Dion. *Ant.Rom.* 2,41,3 οἱ ... θεαταὶ ἀγῶνος ... τῷ κατορθοῦντι τῶν σφετέρων ἐπικελεύσει τε καὶ παιανισμῶ πολλὴν ἐποίουν τῇν εἰς τὸ εὐψυχον ἐπίδοσιν. The latter place is interesting because the combination with παιανισμός stresses the exclamatory character of the ἐπικέλευσις (cf. the δεήσεις τε καὶ οἰμωγὰς that are in the sequence of the text said to be directed to those who were about to lose the game).

Notice how the names of *σχετλιασμός* and *ἐπιφθεγμα* are unambiguously coupled - I will return to this point shortly.

<sup>201</sup> Cf. *Et. M.* 26,50f.; Zonaras 96 s.v. αἶ.

<sup>202</sup> "One should know that ἄ, being a vocative adverb like ὦ, has in addition to the function of calling, as is often apparent, also some further connotation of indignant complaint or wonder (according to the ancients) or of pity ... The fact that ἄ with a *spiritus lenis* and an *accentus circumflexus* is also used instead of αἶθε is manifest from the ancients who induced ordinary usage to follow suit."

wish, particles introducing a wish are also synonymous to ᾗ in other, *in casu* "schetliastic", respects.<sup>203</sup>

There is another good reason not only to leave out of account here the particles introducing wishes, but also to have second thoughts about the adhortatory ones. As we have already seen in the chapter on the definition of the adverb by Apollonius Dyscolus, these adverbs are special. Both kinds are characterized by being semantically related very closely to the semantic load of the imperative and optative mood respectively. They do therefore comply with the first requisite of adverbs, to wit that of closely adhering to a verb. For this reason, it is safer to concentrate on the σχετλιαστικά, θαυμαστικά and θειασμοῦ δηλωτικά.

There is one more group of adverbs with an exclamatory character, several examples of which have been cited already. Eustathius mentioned the fact that ᾗ can be not only a σχετλιαστικόν, but also κλητικόν, προσφωνητικόν. There are a number of related expressions for these kind of adverbs. The "meristic" status of some of them was a matter of dispute. I will discuss one example:

Apollonius Dyscolus discusses the form of ᾗτᾶν (*adv.* 159,10ff.), which is problematic on account of its not being a βαρύτονον, as one would have expected on the analogy of the other adverbs in -αν. Besides, it has two accents. Didymus considered it a form related to the ἑταιρική ἐκφώνησις ἔτης (159,12), Trypho called it a κλητικόν ἐπίφθεγμα (159,17). He suggests that it is formed from the particle ᾗ followed by the meaningless extension τα. A /ν/ is added in order to distinguish the newly formed word from ᾗτα "ears". Apollonius firmly rejects this solution<sup>204</sup> and suggests the following κατάστασις for ᾗτᾶν: Some nouns have alternative forms in -αν with an identical meaning. Thus, there exists a form μεγιστᾶν next to μέγιστος and a form ξυνᾶν next to ξυνός. By the same token ἔτᾶν is considered equivalent to ἔτης.<sup>205</sup> The vocative case is identical to the nominative. Since vocatives often make for ἐπιρρηματικαὶ συντάξεις (e.g. Δάματερ, Ἡρακλες), ᾗ ἔτᾶν may well be explained as having such an origin.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> Cf. chapter II section 3.2. on rhetorical μετᾰλήψις.

<sup>204</sup> Cf. chapter II section 3.3. n. 333.

<sup>205</sup> Cf. Zonaras 1896.

<sup>206</sup> Skrzecka's remark (1853, 20f.) "ob er [= Apollonius] ΩΤΑΝ, welches er für ein παρώνυμον von ἔτης hielt ... wirklich zu den Adverbien gezählt habe ist zweifelhaft, zumal da er es mit Δάματερ, Ἡρακλες, τάλαν zusammenstellt" does not hold water (incidentally, S. does admit that Apollonius must have believed ᾗτᾶν to be an adverb, on account of *adv.* 160,10). Cf. *Et. G.* 141,28ff.

Now, since *ἐτᾶν* is looked upon as an adverb, and because of the comparison with *Et. G.* 141,28ff. quoted in the previous note, where the adverbial construction of the vocative *Δάματερ* is said to be applied ἐπὶ θαυμασμοῦ, it seems we should include the κλητικὰ ἐπιφθέγματα in our search for Greek views on "extraordinary adverbs". Another argument for doing so is the discussion in *SchDTh.* 419,11ff., where the adverbial status of ᾧ is defended against those who feel it is an article in the vocative case.<sup>207</sup> Should ᾧ (ῶ) be an adverb, it is classified as σχετλιασμοῦ καὶ ἀνακλήσεως. Thus, it is again associated with one of the categories of adverbs we are interested in.<sup>208</sup> In *SchEur. Phoen.* 269 ὡή is called an ἐπίφθεγμα ἀνακλήσεως.<sup>209</sup> Keeping in mind the way the Romans handled this category and especially Probus' criteria for distinguishing adverbs and interjections, we will also take this group of adverbs into consideration.

There is a passage in Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's *de Interpretatione*, which mentions the semantic similarity of the σχετλιαστικά, θαυμαστικά and θειασμοῦ δηλωτικά.<sup>210</sup> The passage is of intrinsic interest and I will briefly discuss it.

Ammonius wonders why Aristotle only distinguished ὄνομα and ῥήμα, whereas the grammarians adopt more parts of speech. He then comes to speak about the difference in semantic status between those parts of speech that have a function πρὸς ἀποφαντικοῦ λόγου γένεσιν<sup>211</sup> (*CAG* 4,5,11,11f.) and others: (11,14ff.) τὰ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ σημαίνουσι, σχέσιν δὲ τινα τοῦ κατηγορουμένου πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον δηλοῦσιν, ὥσπερ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν

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Δημήτερ [sic] καὶ Δαμάτερ [sic] διαφέρει. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς εὐκτικοῖς Δημήτερ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῆς θεοῦ, Δαμάτερ δὲ ἐπὶ θαυμασμοῦ. *Et. M.* 79,2ff. Ἐκ πόσων πτώσεων γίνονται τὰ ἐπιρρήματα; ἐκ πασῶν ... καὶ ἀπὸ κλητικῆς, ὡς τὸ Ἡράκλεις παρὰ Λουκιανῶ. Cf. *Et. M.* 436,11f.

<sup>207</sup> Cf. *ApD. synt.* 62,6ff.

<sup>208</sup> Cf. again Eustath. on ᾧ (*Od.* 1,388,6ff. Stallb.). 3,230,2ff. vdV. the difference between ᾧ and ᾶ is stated to be the fact that ᾧ is an exclamation of the unaffected soul (ψυχῆς ἀπαθοῦς), whereas ᾶ indicates that the soul is affected and disturbed (πάθος παραχῶδες δηλοῖ ψυχικόν).

<sup>209</sup> Cf. *SchAesch. Septem* 482a ἰώ] ἐπὶ κλησις τὸ ἰώ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπληκτικόν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ ᾧ πρόμαχε.

<sup>210</sup> The προσφωνητικά are not mentioned because they are not among Dionysius Thrax' sub-groups (or, anyway, because they did not belong in a traditional list of the semantic sub-groups of the adverb).

<sup>211</sup> "With a view to the coming-to-be of the categorical proposition."

ἐπιρρημάτων.<sup>212</sup> He then proceeds to enumerate the various semantic relationships expressed by the adverbs. It should be noted that his list shows a remarkable correspondence to that ascribed to Dionysius Thrax although his presentation differs widely from that of the *Techne*. He divides the adverbs into two groups, to wit those that have a function in an ἀποφαντικός λόγος,<sup>213</sup> and those that are capable of σημαίνειν, but can only be used in other εἶδη λόγου.<sup>214</sup> All categories distinguished by the *Techne* are represented in Ammonius; however, their order is different, at least in the first group. The relative order of the second group does correspond to that of the *Techne*.<sup>215</sup>

<sup>212</sup> "Others do not signify that, but indicate a relationship of the 'predicate' to the 'subject', as do most of the adverbs."

<sup>213</sup> 11,15ff.: They signify a σχέσις of predicate to subject, i.e. they tell us something about the way the predicate "belongs to" the subject, cf. 12,22ff.

<sup>214</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld 1984a. Cf. what was said above about the adverbs that have a natural semantic relationship to imperative and optative utterings.

<sup>215</sup> Cf. the following scheme; numbers between brackets refer to the order found in the *Techne*: Ammonius' ordering is entirely determined by semantical reasons.

		Ammonius and the <i>Techne</i>
Ammonius		<i>Techne</i>
Group I		
11,16	ὅπως	μεσότητος (2), ποιότητος (3), ἀθροίσεως (16) [συλλήψεως (21)], [cf. Amm. 12,1f.]
11,17	πότε ποῦ ποσάκις: ὠρισμ. ἀοριστ.	χρόνου (1) τοπικά (6) ἀριθμοῦ (5) ποσότητος (4)
11,18	τάξις	τάξεως (15)
11,19	τίνι παραπλησίως μᾶλλον/ἥττον	παραβολῆς ἢ ὁμοιώσεως (12) συγκρίσεως (18) [notice how (12) and (18) have been taken together on account of their semantic similarity]
11,20	ἐπίτασις	ἐπιτάσεως (20)
11,21	εἰκασμοῦ βεβαιωσ.	εἰκασμοῦ (14) βεβαιώσεως (24)
11,23	σχετλιασμ. θαυμασμ. ἐπισφραγ.	σχετλιαστικά (8) θαυμαστικά (13) ἀπωμοτικά (22) κατωμοτικά (23)
11,24ff.	λυσιτελέσ..θετικά	θετικά (25)
11,26ff.	θειασμ.	θειασμοῦ (26)
11,29	συγκαταθ.	συγκαταθέσεως (10)
11,30	ἀρν./ἀποφ.	ἀρνήσεως ἢ ἀποφάσεως (9)
Group II		
12,11	εὐχή ἀπαγορ.	εὐχῆς (7) ἀπαγορεύσεως (11)
12,12	παρακελ. ἔρωτησ.	παρακελεύσεως (17) ἔρωτήσεως (19)

If we look at his description of the σχετλιαστικά, θαυμαστικά and θειασμοῦ δηλωτικά, we find that they are all described as adverbs indicating a state of mind. They express ὅπως διακείμεθα πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, περὶ οὗ ἀποφαινόμεθα, ἢ ὡς σχετλιάζοντες ἢ ὡς θαυμάζοντες (21ff.) ... ἢ καὶ ἀνεπιτάτως τὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀκρότατον ἀγαθὸν χαρακτηριζομένην τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσιν ἀνευφημοῦντες ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνθουσιαστικῶν ἐπιρρημάτων ἐν τῷ εὔ εἶναι τοὺς κατόχους σημαίνοντων (26ff.).<sup>216</sup> They share the characteristic of indicating a state of mind in respect of the contents of the expression, with the adverbs introducing oaths, those with a deontic notion and affirmative or negative reactions to a previous speaker. It is worthwhile noticing that Ammonius has associated the σχετλιαστικά and θαυμαστικά more closely than the *Techne*.

## 6.2. Other expressions for "exclamatory adverbs"

In a number of passages cited thus far, we saw that the *terminus technicus* ἐπίρρημα was linked with various other expressions for "exclamation". The most important one is ἐπίφθεγμα.<sup>217</sup> But we also find ἐκφώνησις,<sup>218</sup> ἐπιφώνημα,<sup>219</sup> ἀναφώνημα.<sup>220</sup> Moreover, if we concentrate on the examples

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<sup>216</sup> "How we are disposed to the action about which we are making a statement, either as persons who are indignant or amazed ... or crying out at the top of our lungs the maximal disposition of utmost well-being of the soul, as by means of ecstatic adverbs indicating that the inspired persons are in a state of well-being"

The words ἐν τῷ εὔ εἶναι probably conceal an ἐπίρρημα ἐνθουσιαστικός, like εὐα οἱ εὐάν.

<sup>217</sup> SchDTh. 433,32ff. Καὶ πάλιν θειασμοῦ λέγεται ἐπιρρήματα. ἃ θειάζοντές τινες καὶ κάτοχοι τῷ Διουσω γινόμενοι ... ἐπιφθέγγονται καὶ λέγουσιν εὐάν εὐοῖ ταῦτα οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦ Διούσου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μανίας ἐστὶ ποιητής, καὶ ταῦτα <τὰ> ἐπιφθέγματα ὑπὸ τῶν μυστῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγεται. Ἐπάγεται δὲ αὐτοῖς ῥῆμα τὸ ἐπιφθέγγομαι, "εὐάν ἐπιφθέγγομαι" καὶ "εὐοῖ ἐπιλέγω". Cf. further Bekker *AG I* 49,5 (= 360,11f.).

<sup>218</sup> E.g. *ApD. adv.* 159,13; cf. *Hdn. GG III* 1,503,8ff. τὰ σχετλιαστικά τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων are irrational. For when the soul is disturbed or drunk, ἄλογοι ... καὶ αἱ ἐκφωνήσεις αὐτῆς.

<sup>219</sup> *Hesych.* p. 3 (1d) σχετλιαστικὸν ἐπιφώνημα. Cf. Bekker *AG I* 100 (s.v. ἴσσα); ps. *Theodós.* 79,16f.; *Zonaras* 1623. For the rhetorical notion ἐπιφώνημα cf. *Lausberg* 1960, § 879.

<sup>220</sup> *Et. Gud.* 1 s.v. ἄ: σχετλιαστικὸν ἀναφώνημα. Ἐναφώνημα also occurs e.g. 451,23 (s.v. ἰού) and *Et. M.* 822,33 s.v. ὤμοι. Cf. *SchAristoph. Nub.* 1452; *Hephaest.* π.ποιημ. 5,3.



which the grammarians give for ἐπιρρήματα of the categories selected above, and check the names by which they are identified, we can add to this list considerably. My next step, therefore, will be to consider the words that qualify as potential indicators of "interjections". After that I will investigate the opinions held by the grammarians about these words.

The words which deserve consideration, apart from those mentioned above, are ἐπιφώνησις,<sup>221</sup> ἀναφώνησις,<sup>222</sup> προσφώνησις,<sup>223</sup> πρόσφθεγμα,<sup>224</sup> πρόσρημα,<sup>225</sup> φώνημα,<sup>226</sup> ἐπιφημισμός.<sup>227</sup> Further, there are μίμημα (with various explicative adjuncts in the genitive),<sup>228</sup> and words like στεναγμοί, ὀλολυγμοί,<sup>229</sup> θρηνηδῆμα,<sup>230</sup> which are in themselves indicative of the nature of the interjection they signify. Broadly speaking, interjections can be divided into two groups, although this division is not yet explicit in Antiquity:<sup>231</sup> To the first belong those exclamations which are more or less standardized and have an accepted meaning among their users (these are indicated by ἐπίφθεγμα, ἐκφώνησις, ἐπιφώνημα, ἀναφώνημα, ἐπιφώνησις, προσφώνησις, πρόσφθεγμα, φώνημα, ἐπιφημισμός.) The second consists of onomatopoeic words, which as

<sup>221</sup> E.g. ApD. *adv.* 121,15.

<sup>222</sup> Cf. e.g. SchEur. *O.* 327; 332; SchHom. Π 46b (προαναφωνήσεις).

<sup>223</sup> E.g. Eustath. 1,776,33ff. vdV.

<sup>224</sup> ps. Theodos. 79,26f.

<sup>225</sup> Hesych. s.v. ὦ τᾶν.

<sup>226</sup> Zonaras 379.

<sup>227</sup> Hesych. Π 216 (6691) (Schmidt) s.v. εὔα; = Π 219 (6675) (Latte) who reads: ἐπευφημισμός ληναϊκός καὶ μυστικός. This is better than ἐπιφημισμός ("dedication", cf. Strabo 6,2,9), although I think ἐπευφημισμός is preferable.

<sup>228</sup> Κατὰ μίμησιν ὀρνέου φωνῆς, ps. Theodos. 79,3ff.; Suda Π 396,1ff. s.v. ἐποποιῖ. μίμημα βαρβάρων ἐξελκόντων τι; Zonaras *ibid.*; ps. Theodos. 79,18, cf. Arist. *Pax* 459ff. (see section 2.2.); μίμημα ὑλακτῆς κυνῶν, ps. Theodos. 79,21. Cf. SchAesch. *Suppl.* 827c.

<sup>229</sup> Plut. *Quaest. Plat.* X 1009d; in this text a comparison is made between the opposition of the parts of speech endowed with meaning (nouns and verbs) to "the rest" and the στεναγμοί and ὀλολυγμοί of actors, as the non-significant additions to their (meaningful) text. Their supplementary status also appears from the fact that they are often used *extra metrum*.

<sup>230</sup> Eustath. *Od.* 1,220,38ff. Stallb. (on ε 299).

<sup>231</sup> Cf. section 3.2.1. note 91.

it were capture in writing either animal sounds or human moaning, sighing etc. in forms which are ill-suited to codification (indicated by μίμημα etc.).<sup>232</sup>

As I said before, none of these words can be proved to have any technical sense and I do not mean to ascribe to them the technical meaning of interjection.<sup>233</sup> But the examples described by this series of words are elsewhere (sometimes even in the same context) called adverbs and often even adverbs of the types specified above. Moreover, some sort of special status was attached to these words as a group.

My case is strongest for ἐπίφθεγμα which never denotes a word belonging to a part of speech other than the adverb. The group προσφώνησις, ἐπιφώνησις, ἀναφώνησις and πρόσρημα may be looked upon with some doubts. They are also used of nominal constituents.<sup>234</sup> The reason for including προσφώνησις was a passage from Eustathius (1,776,33ff. vdV.) combined with a Scholium on Homer (Δ 412b<sup>1</sup>; b<sup>2</sup>). In the Scholium τέττα is called an ἐπίρρημα σχετλιαστικόν,<sup>235</sup> in Eustathius it is called a προσφώνησις.

Now, Nauck has shown that περὶ προσφωνήσεων constituted a chapter in a work called Λέξεις by Aristophanes of Byzantium. In this chapter Aristophanes discussed children's words for father, mother etc. These προσφωνήσεις (or προσφώνηματα,<sup>236</sup> or λέξεις προσφωνητικάι)<sup>237</sup> were as a group defined as

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<sup>232</sup> Cf. in Latin theory Priscian's *sonituum illiteratorum imitationes* (III 91,3) which are added to the *voces quae cuiuscumque passionis animi pulsu per exclamationem intericiuntur*. The distinction is not all too clear yet - sounds we make in showing various emotional reactions also fall under the category of the μίμηματα, e.g. ἰόφ, which, as the Scholiast on Aesch. *Suppl.* 827c tells us, ἔστι ἀποπτυσμοῦ μίμημα. The vagueness of the distinction is clear from the sequence: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀποπτύειν ἐπίφθεγμα ἐποίησεν. διὸ δεῖ τὴν ὑστέραν δασύνειν. In this case μίμημα and ἐπίφθεγμα are so closely related as to indicate the same phenomenon. In the same way Hesychius tells us κόγξ is an interjection used by those initiated in the mysteries. However, he adds, it is also an onomatopoeic imitation of the sound of a voting-pebble, just as βλόψ (to those living in Attica!) imitates the sound of the clepsydra. In the Middle Ages, the view that distinction should be made between interjections with a certain, conventional meaning and those onomatopoeic formations which are in themselves meaningless, gained wide acclaim, cf. Pinborg 1961, 133.

<sup>233</sup> Though cf. LSJ s.v. ἐπιφώνημα; ἐπίφθεγμα; ἀναφώνημα.

<sup>234</sup> Eustath. 3,732,1ff. vdV.: ἔχει ... τινὰς ἐπιφωνήσεις ὁ ποιητὴς ἀναλόγως τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν. ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸ σχέτλιος, ἐπιλεγόμενον τοῖς ἐπὶ τι σφοδροῖς καὶ ἀκατασχέςτοις, καὶ τὸ νήπιος, ὃ περ ἀναφώνησίς ἐστιν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ σημαυτικὴ τῶν ἀστοχούντων τοῦ δέοντος. For πρόσρημα, see LSJ s.v.

<sup>235</sup> Nauck 1848 (1963), 156 proposes to change ἐπίρρημα into ἐπίφθεγμα.

<sup>236</sup> Eust. 2,815,15ff. vdV.; Nauck 1848, 153.

πρωτόθετα and ἄκλιτα.<sup>238</sup> The latter characteristic makes them into adverbs. The former interestingly calls to mind the relationship between the origin of language and children's language, cf. section 3.3.1. The status of these words changed, however, for later grammarians construed nominative cases for them (e.g. πάππας).<sup>239</sup> As we saw, Apollonius Dyscolus still considered ὦτᾶν an adverb, but his motivation is the fact that vocative constructions often freeze into adverbial constituents. This implies precedence for the nominal status.

The difference between those adverbs which are used to address someone other than the speaker, and those which are just sounds uttered without communicative intentions - remember Probus' criteria for distinguishing interjections and adverbs - comes out clearly in Eustathius 3,230,9ff. vdV. βᾶ ... καὶ ταῦτα μὲν πρὸς τι, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ τινος φωνοῦντος πρὸς τινα ἕτερον. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τινες μιμητικαὶ φωναὶ αὐταὶ κατὰ αὐτοὺς τοὺς φωνοῦντας ... (e.g. ἀρῦ ὦ ὄψ μᾶ ψό βή).<sup>240</sup> Nauck considers it probable that Aristophanes devoted some attention to this latter group of interjection-like adverbs too.<sup>241</sup> That would make him the earliest grammarian to realize that these words did form some sort of a problem in the μερισμός. Other early testimonies about these exclamatory sounds stem from Trypho, Didymus and Apion;<sup>242</sup> this relegates the discussion of this sub-group of the adverbs to the second half of the first century B.C. and the first half of the first century p.Chr.n.

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<sup>237</sup> Cramer *AP* III 242.

<sup>238</sup> Eustath. 2,815,15ff. vdV.; cf. *Od.* 2,113,17ff. Stallb.; Nauck 1848, 153. The word πρωτόθετος is almost exclusively found in Eustathius. Apollonius Dyscolus usually calls words which are themselves not derived from another one πρωτότυπα. Cf. section 3.3.1. with note 117.

<sup>239</sup> Nauck 1848, 154 n. 6. This is colloquial usage as well.

<sup>240</sup> "Ba' ... And these are related to something, i.e. they are addressed on the part of a speaker to someone else. But there are also mimetic sounds which affect no one but the ones who utter them."

<sup>241</sup> He thinks a trace of Aristophanes' interest in interjections may be discerned in his note on the gloss συρβάβυττα (which Nauck emendates to σύρβα τύρβα), Nauck 161f. (cf. 241 = Slater 163).

<sup>242</sup> *ApD. adv.* 159,18; *Ammon.* 130 (Trypho) ; *ApD. adv.* 159,13 (Didymus); *Apion* 288,7ff. (ᾶ = ἐπίρρ.σχετλιαστ.)

### 6.3. The Greek "theory of the interjection"

Now that we have selected our material, let us take a look at the difficulties singled out for special treatment by the Greek grammarians. In the sections on the rhetorical functions of the interjection (2.2.), and their connection with the origin of language (3.3.) Greek parallels for Roman theory have been given already.<sup>243</sup> Some Greek material was given in the notes to section 5 as well. What interests me here in the first place, is the μερισμός of the Greek "interjections": As we shall see, their status as adverbs did not go unchallenged. We shall look briefly at the arguments with which their μερισμός as adverbs was supported for all that.

Secondly, the intrinsic irregularity of form of this group of adverbs was not lost on the Greek grammarians either. As signal examples of anomaly, the trio ἰδοῦ, ἰοῦ and οὔ will be discussed. With regard to the formal aspects of interjections we also find Greek parallels for the view that despite the intrinsic irregularity of the interjections, a formal resemblance to one of the other parts of speech brings about some sort of analogous behaviour. This is illustrated in the case of ὦ πόποι.

#### 6.3.1. Μερισμός

As I said, the "interjections" were not classified as adverbs by the Greek grammarians without discussion. According to some they did not deserve to be considered a part of speech at all,<sup>244</sup> according to others they should be given an independent position in the list of parts of speech.<sup>245</sup> The oldest full discussion of their status is to be found in Apollonius Dyscolus (*adv.* 121,14ff.). When he explains the part of his definition of ἐπίρρημα which runs "κατηγοροῦσα τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασι ἐγκλίσεων" (*adv.* 119,5f.), he stresses the

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<sup>243</sup> In this context it is especially interesting to add that a connection between exclamations and the text-interpretative notion διὰ μέσου is confirmed by our Greek sources, cf. section 1. with note 8. Cf. e.g. SchEur. *O.* 340 τὸ δὲ "δευῶν πόνων" ἐν μέσῳ ἀναπέφωρηται (the alternative being that it is construed with the rest of the sentence); *Ph.* 550 ὑπέρφευ ὑπεράγαυ. διὰ μέσου μετὰ σχετλιασμοῦ τὸ ὑπέρφευ ἀναπεφώρηται; *An.* 1273 ὦ ποτνι' ὦ γενναῖα. τὸ ἐξῆς ὦ πόπνια, Νηρέως γένεθλον, χαῖρε. ὥστε τὸ ὦ γενναῖα συγκοιμήματα κατὰ ἀναφώνησιν ἰδιάν ἐξενήνεκται; *Hipp.* 812 τὸ δὲ αἰαὶ τόλμας διὰ μέσου ἀναπεφώρηται, καὶ οὕτως τὸ ἐξῆς ἴσασται.

<sup>244</sup> Hdn. *GG* III i 503,9f. οὐδὲ μέρη λόγου τινὲς ταῦτα [sc. τὰ σχετλιαστικά] ἐνόμισαν. They are completely irrational.

<sup>245</sup> SchDTh. 272,7ff. (τινες) τὸ φεῦ καὶ τὸ οἴμοι... ὥθησαν μὴ εἶναι ἐπίρρηματα, ἀλλ' ἕτερα μέρη λόγου. Cf. SchDTh. 520,25ff. ἄλλοι δὲ ἔνδεκα [sc. λέγουσι εἶναι μέρη λόγου], διαχωρίζοντες τὴν προσηγορίαν ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὰ ἀπαρέμφατα ἐκ τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τὰ σχετλιαστικά ἐκ τῶν ἐπίρρημάτων.

fact that no adverb can be independent of a verb and he expands on this point as follows: (*adv.* 121,14ff.) Οὐ μόνον δὲ ῥητοῖς οὖσι τοῖς ῥήμασι κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἐπίρρημα προσφέρεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ σιγωμένοις, εἶγε καὶ αἱ ἐπιφωνήσεις οὐδὲν ἄλλο εἰσὶν ἢ ἐπιρρήματα τῶν ῥημάτων <οὐ>κ ἐπιγινόμενων, καθὼς τοῖς εὖ ἀναγινώσκουσι τὸ κάλλιστα ἐπιφωνοῦμεν καὶ τοῖς εὖ διατιθεῖσιν ἡμᾶς τὸ ἥδιστα, καὶ τοῖς ἀκριβοῦσι τὰς ἰδίας πράξεις καὶ τέχνας τὸ καλῶς ἐπιφωνοῦμεν.<sup>246</sup> As he is wont to do, Apollonius proceeds by dealing with a possible objection: If we are mentally to supply a verb with every adverb we find, what are we to do with οἴμοι and the other σχετλιαστικά καὶ εὐαστικά? Will they not automatically fall outside the scope of the adverbs?<sup>247</sup>

Apollonius' reaction to all this is twofold: In the first place the words in question might be called adverbs if one is prepared to stretch that notion a little (*καταχρηστικώτερον*, cf. chapter II section 1.2.). Furthermore, one might not even need to suppose these words to be second-rate adverbs: μή ποτε δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ δυνάμει ἀπὸ διαθέσεως ῥηματικῆς ἀνάγονται· οἱ γὰρ σχετλιάζοντες πεπόνθασι, τὸ δὲ παθεῖν πεῖσιν τινα τῶν ἐκ πράγματος δηλοῖ (*adv.* 121,24ff.).<sup>248</sup> As usual Apollonius gives us a heavily condensed version of his views. It is clear, however, that he means that the act of lamenting (*σχετλιάζειν*) itself has been caused by some kind of suffering. Since suffering means that one has undergone an action, a verb is implicit in the context. Therefore, "interjections" are also dependent of, and should be (mentally) construed with, a verb.

This explanation has been adopted by various grammarians, e.g. SchDTh. 95,26ff.: Διὸ [namely, because adverbs are always combined with verbs] ἐξήγησάν τινες, πῶς τὸ φεῦ καὶ τὸ οἴμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐπαγόμενον

<sup>246</sup> "Not only when the verbs are (physically) expressed in the construction of the sentence is the adverb construed with them, but also when they are not. For exclamations are nothing but adverbs without an expressed verb. Thus, we exclaim 'excellent' to those who read well and 'most kind' to people who do us a favour and 'well done' to anyone who does a fine job and performs his work well."

<sup>247</sup> The objection that *σχετλιαστικά* etc. cannot be construed with a verb is also prominent in the discussions in SchDTh. 272,7f. διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἐπιφερόμενον ῥήμα; 520,27ff. φασὶ γάρ, ὅτι τὰ ἐπιρρήματα ἢ ῥήμασι θέλει συντάττεσθαι ἢ σπανίως ὀνόμασιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ "μὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν" ... τὰ δὲ σχετλιαστικά οὔτε ῥήμασιν οὔτε ὀνόμασιν οὐκοῦν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐπιρρήματα. These passages are strongly influenced by Apollonius.

<sup>248</sup> "And perhaps they are themselves virtually derived from a verbal disposition. For people who are lamenting have undergone something, and having undergone something indicates passivity caused by an action (represented by a verb)."

ρήμα. Καί φαμεν, ἐπειδὴ δυνάμει καὶ ταῦτα ἀπὸ διαθέσεως ῥηματικῆς ἀνάγονται· οἱ γὰρ θαυμάζοντες ἢ σχετλιάζοντες προπεπόνυθασι δηλονότι.<sup>249</sup>

The same argument is employed by Apollonius when he discusses the status of οἶμοι/ῶμοι (*adv.* 126,27-128,9, in the passage about the meristic *dubia* (126,24-145,25)). As is his habit, Apollonius gives us a *disputatio in utramque partem*. Some people think οἶμοι and ῶμοι should be considered two parts of speech, the pronoun μοι being one of them. Adverbial status for these words is incompatible in their view with the fact that they are used exclusively to refer to a first person singular, whereas an adverb may be used in the same indeclinable, form with all persons indifferently. Only pronouns and verbs are marked for person. Therefore, if οἶμοι and ῶμοι are not verbs - which they clearly are not - they must be pronouns (127,29-127,4). Apart from this theoretical point, they also base their argument on the form of the words in question, but that is irrelevant to us now.

Apollonius realizes the need to explain why οἶμοι and ῶμοι cannot be combined with any verb form. He argues as follows (*adv.* 127,12ff.): Καθόλου τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐπιφθεγμάτων, ἐξ αὐτοπαθείας ἀναπεμπόμενα, τὴν περὶ τὸν λέγοντα μόνον πείσιν ἀφηγγεῖται, καὶ ἔνθεν οὐκ ἐπικοινωνεῖ δευτέρους καὶ τρίτους. Ἐφαμεν δέ, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ῥήμα φέρεται. καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον

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<sup>249</sup> "Therefore, some have asked themselves why it is that φεῦ and οἶμοι have no verb to be construed with. And we say this is because virtually they, too, are derived from a verbal disposition: For people who are amazed or who are lamenting clearly have suffered something previously."

Cf. SchDTh. 272,25ff. who elaborates on the καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς-clause of Apollonius' definition of adverb: (272,16f. τὸ δὲ ἐπίρρημα ποιεῖται πάντως αἰεὶ ποτε τὴν σύνταξιν πρὸς τὸ ῥήμα ἢ καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς ἢ αἰσθητῶς ἢ νοητῶς)...(25ff.) διὰ τοῦτο <δὲ> εἴρηται "ἢ καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς" ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστον μόριον ἔχει τὴν ἰδίαν σύνταξιν πῆ μὲν καθόλου, πῆ δὲ ἐν μέρει, πῆ δὲ νοητῶς, ὡς ὅταν εἴπω ἰαταταῖ ἢ ὄπποτοῖ, μηδὲν ἐπαγαγών· δίδωσι γὰρ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ ἐπιρρήματος ὅτι μέλλων σχετλιάζειν ταῦτα ἐφθεγξάμην· αἰσθητῶς δέ, ὅταν αὐταῖς ταῖς φωναῖς δεῖξω καὶ συντάξω τὸ ἐπίρρημα τοῖς ῥήμασιν· ἐν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν συντελοῦντων εἰς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν τοῦ λόγου. The same sentiment is expressed by Aug. V 518,26ff. *Graeci autem interiectionem ab adverbio non separant, propterea quia motus animi qualitati adsignant et haec omnia sub genere qualitatis putant adverbia. Sunt adverbia quantitatis, ut longe alte, qualitatis, ut bene, male.* It must be remembered that exclamations like "well (done)!" belonged with the σχετλιαστικά and the negatives and affirmations, because all three groups could to all appearances be used without an accompanying verb, cf. chapter II section 2.2.2.1.

Cf. for *qualitas*, Char. 248,8 *omnes ... adverbiorum cernimus semitas ire cum verbis sive per verba, nec potest ulla qualitas nisi verbo subsequente sonare*; in Prisc. III 91,20ff. *optime tamen de accentibus earum docuit Donatus, quod non sunt certi, quippe, cum et abscondita voce ... proferantur et pro affectus commoti qualitate, confunduntur in eis accentus, pro a.c. qualitate* should be interpreted as "according to the nature of the disturbed passion." Cf. further chapter II section 3.1.1.

πάλιν ἐπελύετο, ὡς πᾶν πάθος γίνεται ἔκ τινος διαθέσεως, ἴδιον δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων διάθεσις, καὶ ἦν κατὰ τοῦτό γε πάλιν ἐπίρρημα τὸ ὦμοι, ἐπεὶ διάθεσιν τὴν ἐκ ῥήματος ἀναπεμπομένην εἶχε.<sup>250</sup> Apollonius makes two points here: In the first place the exclusive relevance of ὦμοι to the first person singular is defended by introducing the concept of αὐτοπάθεια, which may be clarified by comparing *pron.* 34,30ff.<sup>251</sup> Secondly, he explains again how the words under discussion may be considered adverbs, even though no verb is explicitly present in the context. Πάθος implies activity on the part of someone who inflicts it. Activity and passivity (διάθεσις) are verbal features. Therefore, in a way ὦμοι and the like can be referred to a verb and should be considered adverbs.

Like their Latin colleagues, the Greek grammarians usually draw attention to the fact that the σχετλιαστικά inform us (if only quasi accidentally) about the state of mind of the speaker. There are no surprises in the emotions and so on, which they are said to express.<sup>252</sup>

### 6.3.2. Formal characteristics of the σχετλιαστικά c.s.

Apart from discussing its correct μερισμός, Greek grammarians also paid attention to the characteristics this group of adverbs had in common. Like their Latin counterparts, they were well aware of the intrinsic anomaly of these particles (Hdn. *GG* III i 503,8ff.): Καὶ καθόλου δὲ οὐ δεῖ τὰ σχετλιαστικά τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων οἰοῦναι βακχικὰ ὄντα ὑπὸ τῆν ἔντεχνον ἀκολουθίαν

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<sup>250</sup> "In general, such ejaculations which rise in us on account of a personal experience, only indicate that the speaker has undergone something. Therefore, it has nothing in common with second and third persons. Now, we said that it is not construed with a verb at all. That problem can be solved, because every affection originates in a disposition, and disposition is a characteristic of the verb. On that score ὦμοι would again be an adverb, because it has a disposition which has arisen out of [the action of] a verb." Cf. on this passage the commentary of Schneider *a.l.*

<sup>251</sup> There, too, Apollonius in the section of *de pronomibus* which deals with the meristic *dubia* of that part of speech, advocates the view that ὦμοι is an adverb. Of course he has to discuss the problem that ὦμοι cannot be construed with all persons like the other adverbs, which he solves as follows: τὰ σχετλιαστικά τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων, ἐξ αυτοπαθείας ἐκπεμπόμενα, αὐτὸ μόνον τοῦ ὑποκρινομένου προσώπου τὸ λυπηρὸν παρίστησι, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα πρόσωπα μετάβασιν ἀπήρηνται. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν καὶ τὸ δόξαν πρώτου προσώπου ἔμφασιν δηλοῦν. For αὐτοπάθεια, cf. also SchDTh. 431,22f. Probus' way of demarcating the domains of adverbs and interjections resembles the working with αὐτοπάθεια (IV 146,8ff.; see section 4.2. above).

<sup>252</sup> E.g. κακοπάθεια, SchHom. ξ 415; χαρμοσύνου, SchAristoph. *Nub.* 1170 (ιοῦ); λύπη, *Et. G.* 451,23; *Et. M.* 822,33; χαρά Zonaras 1115; cf. Zonaras 1130 s.v. ἴσσα: ἐπιφώνημα ἐπιχαρτικόν; SchDTh. 100,14f. ὁ γὰρ λυπούμενος ἢ δυσφορῶν λέγων ταῦτα τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν μόνου πείσιν ἀφηγγεῖται.

ἀγειν ... πασχούσης γὰρ ψυχῆς ἢ διακόρου ὑπὸ οἴνου οὔσης ἄλογοι δηλονότι καὶ αἱ ἐκφωνήσεις αὐτῆς.<sup>253</sup> As with the Latin grammarians, regularity is associated with the rules given by a τέχνη. Interjections will not be governed by λόγος. There are many examples of this sentiment, e.g. Hdn. GG III i 507,8f. τὰ σχετλιαστικά οὐ πεφρόντικε τῆς ἀκριβοῦς ἐξετάσεως.<sup>254</sup>

In practice the irregular behaviour of the σχετλιαστικά c.s. appears especially in their formal characteristics. They do not follow the normal rules for accent,<sup>255</sup> no sensible predictions can be made about their endings and they show a marked propensity for aspirations in unexpected places, as for instance in the middle of the word. These phenomena are often explained "sympathetically", i.e. by means of the theory of συμπάθεια of form and meaning discussed in chapter I. The most famous examples of anomalous accent seem to be the trio ἰδοῦ, ἰοῦ and οὔ, which I will discuss briefly.

#### 6.3.2.1. 'Ἰδοῦ, ἰοῦ, οὔ<sup>256</sup>

'Ἰδοῦ, ἰοῦ and οὔ are exceptional with regard to two rules, one of which states that πᾶσα δίφθογγος τελικὴ εἰς υ λήγουσα καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα τὸν τόνον περισπᾶται.<sup>257</sup> The other is even more specific and is restricted to the adverbs in -ου: They should be circumflexed and either have local meaning or end in -χου and derive from a word indicating a quantity (in -κισ or -χως).<sup>258</sup> Neither rule applies to ἰδοῦ, ἰοῦ and οὔ.<sup>259</sup> It should be

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<sup>253</sup> "And in general one should not try and include the adverbs that express sadness under any form of technical regularity ... for when the soul is suffering or intoxicated by wine its ejaculations will of course also be irrational." = GG III ii i 301,26ff.; GG III ii i 209,1 = *Et. M.* 481,15; Theogn. Cramer *AO* II 158,19ff.; SchDTh. 282,22ff.; 434,4ff.; Cramer *AO* I 45,5ff. τὰ δὲ σχετλιαστικά οὐδ' ὑπάγεται ἀναλογία, οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ ἐρρωμένης διανοίας πέμπεται.

<sup>254</sup> "Laments do not react favourably to diligent investigation."

<sup>255</sup> E.g. Hdn. GG III ii ii 933,18ff. *et saep.*

<sup>256</sup> Οὔ is apparently always oxytone according to Herodian (GG III i 494,20f.) and cannot but be oxytone in the context of this discussion, where it functions as an independent uttering.

<sup>257</sup> "Every diphthong in word-final position that ends in -υ and bears the accent is circumflexed." Cf. Choer. GG IV i 387,27ff.; *ps.epim.* 10,12ff.; SchDTh. 431,28ff.; Theogn. Cramer *AO* II 199,1ff.; SchEur. *Andr.* 250 (where καὶ οὔ should be supplemented after the two other exceptions) [further, instead of deleting καὶ ἦλθες, read καὶ ἐλθέ (271,20 ed. Schwartz) and instead of [τοῦτο] τὴν ἀντιδιαστολὴν (272,2 ed. Schwartz) read τοῦτο [τὴν ἀντιδιαστολὴν]].

<sup>258</sup> Hdn. GG III i 504,1ff.; SchDTh. 431,31f.; Choer. GG IV i. 387,37ff.; (cf. *ApD. adv.* 176,8ff.; 193,20ff.; 207,9ff.).



noted that in this context οὔ bears an acute accent. This is explicit ancient grammatical doctrine.<sup>260</sup> Modern practice follows the conventions observed in the manuscripts, which diverge from the extant theoretical accounts.<sup>261</sup>

Several explanations are offered for our trio's deviant accent. All of them somehow bear on the semantic relevance of the accent. Some sources note that these three adverbs fall outside the semantic category of the other adverbs in -ου<sup>262</sup>. Thus, Choeroboscus (*GG* IV i 388,15ff.) explains that ἰδοῦ, τοῦ and οὔ end in -ου, but that they neither have local meaning nor derive (by means of the ending -χου) from a word indicating a quantity, as do the other adverbs in -ου. Since, therefore, they are exceptional as to their meaning, there is no reason why the form, c.q. accent, should not be exceptional as well. This kind of reasoning goes back all the way to Trypho (*apud* Apollonius Dyscolus);<sup>263</sup> it is entirely based on the distinction of form and meaning. Corruption of either complicates the recognition of their relationship and facilitates corruption in the other. Although this is in itself correct, one is still obliged to explain the corruptions, as Apollonius for instance does more than once. He recognizes the fact that corruptions may entail other changes, because the word-form which came into being by the first corruption, demands certain formal characteristics.<sup>264</sup> Further there are false analogies (συνεκδρομαί), i.e. a word may misleadingly look like a certain part of speech. Συνεκδρομή causes a word to conform to rules that do not in fact apply to it.<sup>265</sup> Offering the presence of one exceptional phenomenon as an explanation for another without more ado, is a *iuxta hoc, ergo propter hoc*, and thus invalid reasoning from our point of view. This is indeed a rather crude implementation of a more sophisticated underlying theory.

The justification of an irregularity by the fact that other irregularities also

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<sup>259</sup> Ἰδοῦ is most remarkable because of the imperative ἰδοῦ - its accent may have been the result of a contamination of ἰδοῦ and τοῦ.

<sup>260</sup> Hdn. *GG* III i 504,6ff.

<sup>261</sup> Cf. on this matter *SD* II 591; 596 β.

<sup>262</sup> Cf. *SchDTh.* 431,31f.

<sup>263</sup> *ApD. con.* 232,14, cf. chapter I section 3.1. note 122.

<sup>264</sup> *Adv.* 135,10-3; see chapter I section 3.1. note 122.

<sup>265</sup> Cf. e.g. *ApD. adv.* 142,9-19; 143,26.

attach to the word in question can be attested from a number of later grammatical writers.<sup>266</sup>

Before offering this solution for the problem of the accent of ἰδοῦ etc., Choeroboscus put forward a more fantastic one: According to τινες "τὸ ἰδοῦ δεικτικὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὀξύνεται, ἐπειδὴ δεικνύοντες τῷ δακτύλῳ τὸν τύπον τῆς ὀξείας ἀποτελοῦμεν. τὸ δὲ ἰοῦ διὰ τοῦτο ὀξύνεται, ἐπειδὴ σχετλιαστικὸν ἔστιν, οἱ δὲ σχετλιάζοντες ὀξεία κέχρηται φωνῇ· τὸ δὲ οὐ ἀρνητικὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὀξύνεται, ἐπειδὴ ἀρνήσεως ἔστι δηλωτικόν, ἀρνούμενοι δὲ ἀνανεύομεν καὶ ἀποτελοῦμεν τὸν τύπον τῆς ὀξείας".<sup>267</sup> Here it is supposed that the gestures accompanying the exclamations are imitated in writing, so that tilting the head backwards-meaning "no" - is projected in the form of a slash on the writing material. This rather baroque explanation reminds one of the συμπάθεια-theory discussed above (chapter I section 3.1.). It is an extension of this theory in that the φωνή is

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<sup>266</sup> Thierfelder's claim (1935, 80) that Apollonius applied the same principle is not true without qualification. Apollonius never, as far as I know, uses the principle in its crude form. The examples quoted by Thierfelder do not hold water, since there Apollonius either argues that a seeming exception in fact does not fall under the rule (*adv.* 165,20ff.), or (as Thierfelder admits) applies the principle of συνεκδρομή discussed above. See chapter I note 122.

<sup>267</sup> "Ἰδοῦ has an acute accent, because we execute the form of the acute accent when we point with our finger. Ἰοῦ has an acute accent, because it is used in lamentation, and those who lament produce an acute (shrill) sound. The denial οὐ has an acute accent, because it signifies denial, and when we deny something we slant our head backwards and so execute the form of the acute accent." Cf. Choer. *ps.epim.* 10,11ff. ... ὡς μιμησάμενα τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἀνανεύσεως (here this explanation covers all three words); SchEur. *Andr.* 250 ὀξύνεται δὲ αἰεὶ καὶ οὐδέποτε βαρύνεται τὸ οὐ διὰ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν ἀνάτασιν τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ ἀπαρνούμενου. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατατιθέμενος καὶ τὸ ναὶ λέγων διὰ σχήματος τὴν <συγ>κατάθεσιν ποιούμενος κλίνει τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὁ δὲ ἀπαρνούμενος πρὸς τὸ ὄρθιον σχηματίζει αὐτήν. No consequences for the accentuation of ναὶ were ever attached to this line of thought.

The form of a written accent imitates something (a gesture, an intonation) which accompanies the uttering of an interjection in these theories. Conversely, the name of a letter is sometimes held to explain its form, rather than its sound, e.g. SchDTh. 321,14ff.: Τί ἐστὶ γάμμα; Σύμφωνον ἄφωνον μέσον τοῦ κ καὶ χ. Πόθεν γάμμα; Ἄπο τοῦ τὴν γῆν ἀμᾶν ἦτοι θερίζειν δρεπανοειδὲς γάρ ᾧ καὶ ὁ τύπος τοῦ γράμματος ὅμοιος; 321,7ff. Δέλτα is etymologically derived from "διάρτιον" and "τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐλλιπὲς τῇ ἐπάρσει": ἰσόπλευρον γάρ. Apparently, the point is that it is "completely balanced" and "not deficient in being elevated" (because of the delta's pyramidal structure? (Διάρτιος is not found in LSJ; it is a *hapax*, perhaps a mathematical or geometrical term. I suspect διάρτιος is no more than ἄρτιος to which δι- was added in order to supply the δ- necessary for the etymology. In the same way ἐλλιπὲς τῇ ἐπάρσει is a cumbersome phrase chosen because it provides -ελ-.) The epsilon (E) is a picture of an open mouth with a protruding tongue; 323,3ff. πόθεν χι; ... ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτὸ σχι εἶπον, ὅτι ἔχει ὀξείαν καὶ βαρεῖαν <ἀλλήλας> διὰ μέσον σχίζουσας.

not here the acoustic, phonological phenomenon, but rather the written representation.<sup>268</sup>

A third explanation of the accent of ἰδοῦ etc. is mentioned by the scholiast of Euripides (*Andr.* 250): 'Ἰδοῦ and ἰοῦ are oxytona to distinguish them (πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολήν) from their otherwise homonyms, the imperatives ἰδοῦ and ἰοῦ (constructed by the scholiast or his source for the occasion).<sup>269</sup> This explanation is rejected in the case of οὔ, which is not completely identical to οὔ,<sup>270</sup> in favour of the "imitation"-theory described above. Οὔ always has an acute accent because of the movement we make with our heads when we deny something. The permanency of the acute had by then already been made probable, because it had been linked to the meaning of οὔ: διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σημαίνειν καὶ ἀνυπαρξίας εἶναι δηλωτικὸν τὸ οὔ <οὐχ> ὁ τόνος ὁ ἀσθενέστερος ἐπετέθη αὐτῶ, ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ μεταβάλλεσθαι καὶ παντελῶς ἀποτίθεσθαι. μεταβάλλεται μὲν γὰρ εἰς βαρεῖαν ὡς ἐν τῇ συνεπίᾳ. ἀποτίθεται <δὲ> παντελῶς ἐν τοῖς ἐγκλινομένοις ὡς τὸ ἐγὼ εἰμι, ἐγὼ φημι. ὀξύνεται δὲ αἰεὶ καὶ οὐδέποτε βαρύνεται τὸ οὔ διὰ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν ἀνάτασιν τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ ἀπαρνούμενου (cf. Hdn. *GG* III i 504,6f.).<sup>271</sup>

Sometimes the rule itself is so formulated that it includes its exceptions, as

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<sup>268</sup> The explanation of ἰοῦ is closer to the earlier version of the συμπάθεια-theory; the earliest traces of this development are perhaps the sympathetic explication of the spelling of χειράδες, "chapped hands", which exists next to χειράδες and is etymologically derived from χεῖρ; if the orthographical problem has arisen from iotacism, we are in this case also dealing with the written representation, not the phonological characteristics, which undergoes συμπάθεια, cf. Hdn. *GG* III ii 605,29; Choer. *ps.epim.* 27,28ff.; Eust. 1,298,21 vdV.; *Od.* 1,253,44; 2,284,22 Stallb. The word is attested in D.L. I 81 in the spelling χειράδας.

<sup>269</sup> This explanation would be rejected offhand by Apollonius Dyscolus, cf. chapter II section 3.3. An alternative explanation for the imperative ἰοῦ is perhaps a confusion with ἰώ: In the latter case the explanation given by the scholiast would apply. But it is unlikely for such a confusion to have originated in the context of the discussion of the three homoeoteleutic words ἰδοῦ, ἰοῦ, οὔ.

<sup>270</sup> There is some polemic here, cf. Cramer *AO* I 45,2ff.

<sup>271</sup> "Because οὔ means 'nothing', 'by no means' and signifies that something is not the case, it is not accented by the weaker accent, which can be changed or removed altogether. (It changes into a grave accent when put in a context, and it is removed altogether in the case of the enclitics, such as ἐγὼ εἰμι, 'I am', ἐγὼ φημι, 'I say'). But it always bears the acute accent and never has the grave accent because of the attitude and the backward movement of the head of someone who says 'no'."

in the scholiast of Euripides. In the same way Choeroboscus gives the rule only in answer to the question about the acute accents of our trio.<sup>272</sup>

Only once is the irregularity linked up explicitly with the character of the σχετλιαστικά which rebut analogy (Cramer *AO* I 45,5ff.).

#### 6.3.2.2. Σχετλιαστικά *and analogy*; ὦ πόποι

Greek grammarians are also aware of the phenomenon that formal behaviour of interjections may be influenced by the fact that they resemble a part of speech that is subject to analogy. The accent of the "schetliastic" combination ὦ πόποι is, as we shall see, explained by the fact that it resembles the nominal group ὦ φίλοι. The combination ὦ πόποι has an interesting philological history.<sup>273</sup> It is found quite frequently in Homer and was accordingly adopted with some enthusiasm by his epigons.<sup>274</sup> Its meaning, however, was a matter of dispute. This was apparently occasioned by the use of ὦ, which led one to expect that the following word would be a noun in the vocative case.<sup>275</sup> Thus, Lycophron (*Alex.* 943) and Euphorion (fr. 136 Powell = 99 Meineke), always happy to accommodate the more obscure and far-fetched expressions of the epic vocabulary, took it to mean ὦ θεοί and declined it accordingly.<sup>276</sup> Their interpretation was rejected by Aristarchus, because he considered it unlikely that Zeus himself would then have used it (H 455; ν 140). Later, it was revived and advocated by Apion (fr. 108 Neitzel; cf. Hesych. s.v. πόποι). Via Apollonius Sophista the notion was passed on and grew to be long-lived in the grammatical tradition. Πόποι was explained etymologically as having originated by means of συναλοιφή or ἀφαίρεσις from ἔποποι (= ἐπόπται).<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> *ps.epim.* 109,8ff.

<sup>273</sup> For the following, cf. especially Lehrs 1882<sup>3</sup> (1964), 118-20; Meineke on Euphorion fr. 99; Neitzel on Apion fr. 118; Holzinger on Lycophron 943.

<sup>274</sup> E.g. ApRhod. 3,558 *et saep.*

<sup>275</sup> Cf. Lehrs *ll.* 119; Hdn. *GG* III i, 503,1ff.; SchDTh. 278,6ff.; Theogn. Cramer *AO* II 158,5ff.; Cramer *AO* IV 409,32ff.

<sup>276</sup> Perhaps πόπος, "god", belongs to the same category as στήτη, "woman", the learned riddle deriving from Hom. A 6 διαστήτην (διὰ στήτην) ἐρίσαντε.

<sup>277</sup> Ap.Soph. s.v. πόποι; Eustath. 1,155,3ff. vdV. πόποι λεγόμενοι οἰονεὶ ἔποποι κατὰ τοὺς παλαιούς, ὡς τὰ πάντα διοπτρεύοντες, ὅποιον δὴ τι καὶ ὁ δίοπος δηλοῖ, λέξις παρ' Αἰσχύλῳ ἡγεμονικὴ (i.e. "a word for 'leader'"); Cramer *AO* IV 409,32ff. ... εὐρομεν γὰρ ἐν πολλοῖς τὸ πόποι ἀντὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν τουτέστιν ὦ ἔποποι καὶ ἔφοροι καὶ διοπτρεύοντες πάντα θεοί. ὅθεν καὶ διόπτῃς καὶ ἐπόπτῃς παρ' Αἰσχύλῳ.

In most cases, the equation of the Homeric ὧ πόποι with ὧ θεοί was rejected by later grammarians, because it was seen as a violent imposition of later linguistic usage on Homer.<sup>278</sup> The bland statement that ὧ πόποι is a Dryopic idiom<sup>279</sup> may just conceivably have been a kind of compromise. In order to justify Lycophron's use of the expression some unknown grammarian may have pleaded special circumstances: Lycophron used πόποι ("gods") in the context of the story of Panopeus, the father of Epeios who was to build the Trojan horse. As a punishment for a false oath the gods (πόποι) made Panopeus' son a coward. It seems that, since Panopeus was a Phocian (Panopeus is also the name of a Phocian city), someone argued that the word πόποι was meant to lend a certain *couleur locale* to the story, being restricted to the dialect of Panopeus c.s. Why then Dryopic instead of Phocian? This is where we have to presume Lycophron's champion to have committed a real howler. He equated the early Phocians (and of course ὧ πόποι would have to be an archaic locution) with the Dryopians on the strength of Herodotus VIII 31: τῆς γὰρ Δωρίδος χώρας ποδεῶν στευνὸς ταύτη κατατείνει, ὡς τριήκοντα σταδίων μάλιστα κη εὔρος, κείμενος μεταξὺ τῆς τε Μηλίδος καὶ Φωκίδος χώρας, ἥπερ ἦν τὸ παλαιὸν Δρυοπίς. The relative clause belonging with τῆς ... Δωρίδος χώρας was misconstrued with τῆς ... Φωκίδος χώρας.<sup>280</sup> All this, of course, is speculative, since we have no more than the apodictic verdict that ὧ πόποι is Dryopic, without any additional information.<sup>281</sup>

To return, however, to the formal problems relating to ὧ πόποι: Its μερισμός was a matter of some dispute. It was unclear whether one was dealing with one or two adverbs, or with an adverb plus a noun (Cramer *AO* IV 409,32f.). Mostly, it was decided that there were originally two adverbs (ὧ was

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<sup>278</sup> E.g. Eustath. *ll.* τοῖς δὲ βιαζομένοις τὸν Ὅμηρον καὶ μετάγουσι πρὸς ἑτέρους ποιητὰς τὰ ἐκείνου (this seems a strange way of saying "projecting the usage of other poets back to him", which is apparently what is meant; can μετάγουσι πρὸς mean "combine with"? (Professor Slings, p.c.)) ἀρέσκει λέγειν τὸ ὧ πόποι ἀντὶ τοῦ ὧ θεοί, ἐπειδὴ εὔρηται ἐν τοῖς μεθ' Ὅμηρον οἱ θεοὶ πόποι λεγόμενοι κτλ.

<sup>279</sup> Plut. *aud.poet.* 22d1f. Δρύοπες δὲ πόπους τοὺς δαίμονας (sc. καλοῦσιν); SchHom. α 32 πόποι οἱ θεοὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν Δρυόπων φωνήν; SchLycophron 943 ἡ δὲ λέξις Δρυόπων.

<sup>280</sup> I owe the reference to Herodotus to the commentary on Lycophron 943 by Holzinger. However, Holzinger ascribes the theory of πόποι's Dryopic origins to Lycophron himself, which is, of course, untenable, since in Homer no link between this expression and the Phocian dialect can be made.

<sup>281</sup> According to Herodianus πόποι are Scythian god-statues (*GG* III i 187,24f.). Cf. Cramer *AO* I 447,20ff.; Theogn. Cramer *AO* II 158,5ff.; *Et. M.* 823,24ff. His source is unknown.

explicitly considered such e.g. Ap.Soph. s.v. ὦ) which together formed one μέρος λόγου in an ἐκ παραλλήλου construction,<sup>282</sup> a pleonastic combination of two synonymous expressions. This also explained why ὦ πόποι had two accents.<sup>283</sup> The word-group thus functioned as one adverb.

There remained the problematic accent of πόποι itself.<sup>284</sup> Its being oxytonous instead of perispomenon was explained, as I mentioned already, by adducing its resemblance to a noun. So e.g. SchDTh. 278,6ff.: τὰ <εἰς οἱ> σχετλιαστικὰ περισπᾶται τῶν εἰς αἰ περισπωμένων, οἶον ἀτταταῖ ὀττοτοῖ ... τὸ ὦ πόποι σημειῶδες, παπαῖ γὰρ περισπᾶται· ἐνομίσθη γὰρ ὡς ὄνομα εἶναι, διὸ καὶ ὀνοματικὴν ἔλαβε τάσιν. ὡς γὰρ ὦ φίλοι, ὦ θεοί, οὕτως ὦ πόποι. ἔστι δὲ δύο σχετλιαστικὰ ἐπιρρήματα.<sup>285</sup> This explanation ultimately derives from Aristarchus (Hdn. GG III 1 503,1ff.), who while rejecting the meaning "o gods", did acknowledge ὦ πόποι's resemblance to a noun-group. Thus, in this respect the Latin theory of the interjection was anticipated by the Greeks.

### 6.3.3. The Greek theory on the interjection; recapitulation

In this section we saw that many of the Roman views on the interjection can be paralleled from our Greek sources. The rhetorical aspects of the Greek "interjections" were not again discussed extensively (see section 2.2.). However, it will be remembered that in Greek theory, too, σχετλιασμοί were held to contribute to the creation of *pathos* as well as *ethos*; many exclamations were

<sup>282</sup> Cf. Eustath. 1,154,11ff. vdV.: ἐκ παραλλήλου δὲ καὶ τὸ ὦ καὶ τὸ πόποι δηλοῦσι τὸ αὐτό, ὡς ἐάν τις εἴποι "φεῦ παπαῖ". καὶ γὰρ τὸ "φεῦ παπαῖ" παράλληλα κείμενα τὴν αὐτὴν σημασίαν ἔχουσι. ἔστι δὲ σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου, ὅτε δύο λέξεις ὁμοῦ κεῖνται παράλληλοι προφορᾷ μόνῃ διαφέρουσαι, σημαίνουσαι δὲ τὸ αὐτό, οἶον ... τὸ λίαν πάνυ καὶ τὸ τυχὸν ἴσως; Cramer AO I 447,20ff.; IV 409,24ff.; Et. M. 823,24ff.

<sup>283</sup> Hdn. GG III i 503,1ff.; Cramer AO I 447,20ff.; Theogn. Cramer AO II 158,5ff.; Et. M. 823,24ff.

<sup>284</sup> ApD. adv. 177,2ff.; SchDTh. 278,6ff.; 431,26ff.

<sup>285</sup> "The *schetliastika* in οἱ have the circumflex accent on the last syllable, when those in αἰ also have it, e.g. ἀτταταῖ (next to) ὀττοτοῖ ... ὦ πόποι is exceptional, for παπαῖ does have the circumflex accent on the last syllable. This is because it was considered a noun, therefore it received a nominal accent. For we say ὦ πόποι just like we say ὦ φίλοι, ὦ θεοί." Here, the example ὦ θεοί seems to be an intrusion from the semantic discussion about ὦ πόποι, whereas Hesych. s.v. ὦ πόποι exhibits traces of the explanations of its accents when he paraphrases ὦ δαίμονες, ὦ φίλοι, ὦ θεοί (cf. Hesych. s.v. πόποι). Cf. further Hdn. GG III i 503,1ff.; Cramer AO I 447,20ff. (συνεξηκολούθησε τῇ ὀνοματικῇ πτώσει); Et. M. 823,24ff. (id.); Theogn. Cramer AO II 158,5ff.: ... λέγομεν δὲ βαρύνεσθαι αὐτό ὡς τὸ ὦ φίλοι, ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαβεῖν ὄνομα εἶναι τὸ πόποι.

associated with particular groups of people, such as shepherds or seamen. In passing it was remarked that on the Greek side one can also observe a "philological" approach to the interjection: Sometimes it is explicitly regarded as an intrusion in the normal syntactic structure of a sentence. The emotional nature of this kind of intrusive elements seems to be stressed by the use of descriptions such as ἀναπεφώνηται, which is more colourful than neutral words like παρέγκειται (cf. chapter II section 1.4.4. note 119).

Like their Roman colleagues, the Greek grammarians discussed the possibility that exclamations, which to all appearances form an independent utterance, cannot be regarded as adverbs. However, they did not all come to the same conclusions as the Romans had: Instead of separating interjections and adverbs, they explained the absence of a verb as deceptive. They argued that the emotions expressed by an exclamation had to be caused by some action - and since actions are expressed by verbs, a verb was potentially present in these contexts as well.

The groups of adverbs we studied, the σχετλιασμοί prominent among them, were characterized by their intrinsic irregularity. No τέχνη could sensibly predict their behaviour. However, analogy could be restored if an exclamation resembled a more normal part of speech. The case of ὦ πόποι was discussed as an example. For this principle Greek priority could be proved. In many of the other instances, however, it is impossible definitively to settle this matter.

## *7. Conclusion*

In this chapter we investigated the ancient theories on the interjection. It appeared that the Roman grammarians adopted ideas which had originated in a philological and rhetorical context and so developed the following picture of an interjection: all kinds of exclamations that interrupt the regular construction of the sentence could be called an interjection, provided they expressed the emotions of the speaker. This last addition seems to have been the grammarian's own.

Further, attention was paid to the rhetorical and stylistic functions of interjections: These could be used to increase the pathetic impact of a text, to win time, or to provide clues as to the speaker's sex, age and social status. The use of interjections can also be an indication of the stylistic level of a text.

According to the Roman grammarians, their (almost) universal adoption of the interjections as an independent and full-blown part of speech was an innovation. They had to cope, however, with the difficulties resulting from

incorporating an essentially irregular and irrational linguistic phenomenon into their rationalized system of the parts of speech. Several concessions of a terminological and conceptual nature had to be made to hide the intrinsic tension this procedure brought about.

Terminologically, they described the interjections as being *voce incondita* to prevent a glaring self-contradiction with their chapters *de voce*. For there an opposition was made between *vox articulata* and *vox confusa*; all parts of speech belong to the former one, while the latter term describes inarticulate sound. This made it less attractive to use *vox confusa* in describing the interjections, which had just been promoted to the status of a true part of speech.


On a conceptual level, the very impossibility of legislation was made into the general rule: an interjection was irregular by definition.

It is remarkable that the grammarians seldom refer to philosophical ideas on the interjections, although these did play a part in the (Epicurean) ideas on the origin of language. Stoicism probably had no use for them in their linguistic doctrine, since the primitive and sub-human nature of the interjection clashes with the Stoic views on the origin of language; we know nothing about Stoic views on "rationalized interjections" and it seems unlikely there were any. But in Epicurism the interjections were regarded as representatives of the earliest stages of language, from which the later, rational developments started. I argued that the silence of the grammarians on this issue can be explained by the same mechanism that probably influenced their terminological proceedings: They avoided calling unnecessary attention to any characteristics of the interjections that seemed to undermine their status as a true *pars orationis*.

We then turned to the problem of distinguishing adverbs and interjections. For the latter were not completely amputated from the former: Several words were regarded as homonyms of an interjection and an adverb and criteria had to be sought to distinguish them. Remarkably enough, the formal criterium was not completely neutralized by the homonymy. The manner of pronouncing the words in question was also taken into consideration. Further criteria were the presence or absence of *affectus* and the question whether the word could be simply omitted from its context, because it did not attach semantically or syntactically to any other constituent in the sentence.

After briefly surveying some remarks of (mostly) the Christian writers on translation-problems, the Greek parallels for the Roman theory were looked into. In some cases the Greek theory anticipated that of the Romans. In many other instances, it proved impossible to establish the extent of originality of the Roman theory.





## ABBREVIATIONS

The Greek grammarians are quoted after the edition of the *Grammatici Graeci* (GG), Leipzig 1878-1910 (Hildesheim 1965) by R. Schneider and G. Uhlig. The works of Apollonius Dyscolus are abbreviated *pron.* for *de pronominiibus* (GG II i); *adv.* for *de adverbio* (GG II i); *coni.* for *de coniunctionibus* (GG II i); *synt.* for the *Syntax* (GG II ii); and GG II iii for the fragments. Further I refer to the commentary by Schneider in GG II 1 (*comm.*), to his *epimetrum* (*ibid.*) (*epim.*), and to his *Tractatus de Apollonii consuetudine* (*Tractatus*) (in GG II iii). For the Latin grammarians I use the edition by Keil (*Grammatici Latini*); they will be quoted by the number of the volume, page and line. For Charisius, however the text of Barwick is used.

Bachmann AG = *Anecdota Graeca e codd. mss. bibl. reg. paris.* vol. I-II (ed. L. Bachmann), Leipzig 1828 (Hildesheim 1965).

Bekker AG = *Anecdota Graeca* I-III (ed. I. Bekker), Berlin 1814-21 (Graz 1965).

Boissonade AG = *Anecdota Graeca e codd. reg.* I-V (ed. J.Fr. Boissonade), Paris 1829-33.

CAG = *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca.* Berlin 1881-1907.

CCSG = *Corpus Christianorum, series graeca,* Brepols-Turnhout.

CCSL = *Corpus Christianorum, series latina,* Brepols-Turnhout.

Choerob. ps. epim. = Georgii Choerobosci *Epimerismi in Psalmos* (ed. Th. Gaisford), Oxford 1842.

CPG = *Clavis patrum graecorum vol. I-V* (ed. M. Geerard), *Corpus Christianorum,* Brepols-Turnhout 1974-87.

Cramer AO = *Anecdota Graeca e codd. mss. bibl. Oxoniensium* I-IV, (ed. J.A. Cramer), Oxford 1835-7 (Amsterdam 1963).

DTh. = Dionysius Thrax. The Τέχνη in his name is quoted according to the edition by G. Uhlig, GG I i, Leipzig 1883 (Hildesheim 1965).

Et. G. = *Etymologicum Graecae linguae Gudianum* (ed. F.W. Sturz), Leipzig 1818 (Hildesheim - New York 1973).

Et. M. = *Etymologicum Magnum* (ed. T. Gaisford), Oxford 1848 (Amsterdam 1962).

Et. Or. = *Orion Thebanus Etymologicon* (ed. F.W. Sturz), Leipzig 1820 (Hildesheim - New York 1973).

FDS = *Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker* (ed. K.-H. Hülser), Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt 1987-88.

Greg.Cor. = Gregorius Corinthius, *Le traité περί συντάξεως λόγου de Grégoire de Corinthe* (ed. D. Donnet), Bruxelles-Rome 1967.

MichSync. = Michael Syncellus, *Le traité de la construction de la phrase* (ed. D. Donnet), Bruxelles-Rome 1982.

PGM = *Patrologia Graeca* Migne.

PGL = *Patrologia Latina* Migne.

ps. Theodos. = ΘΕΟΔΟΣΙΟΥ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ περί γραμματικῆς (ed. C.G. Goettling), Lipsiae 1822.

SchDTh = *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem grammaticam* (rec. A. Hilgard), GG I iii, Leipzig 1901 (Hildesheim 1965).

SchHom = *Scholia graeca in Homeri Iliadem* (rec. H. Erbse), Berlin 1969-83; *Scholia graeca in Homeri Odysseam* (ed. W. Dindorf), Oxford 1855.

SVF = *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* (coll. I. ab Arnim), Leipzig 1905-24.

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## SAMENVATTING

Dit boek bevat een aantal detailstudies over de antieke grammatica. Uitgangspunt is dat de antieke ideeën over taal zoveel mogelijk binnen het in de Oudheid zelf gecreëerde kader verklaard moeten worden. Er worden dus alleen maar vergelijkingen met latere theorieën getroffen, wanneer dat verhelderend kan zijn voor de interpretatie van de antieke opvattingen.

Twee thema's lopen als een rode draad door het boek: Het eerste is de grote verwevenheid van alle antieke disciplines die zich met taalbeschouwing bezighielden: Filosofie, rhetorica en filologie droegen alle bij tot de toename van kennis van en inzicht in het functioneren van taal. Het is van belang zich te realiseren dat deze disciplines weliswaar ook "technische" inzichten in taal opleverden, maar dat dit neveneffecten van hun respectievelijke activiteiten waren. De context waarin dit soort van inzichten tot stand kwam, mag bij de beoordeling ervan niet verwaarloosd worden. Tegen de achtergrond van de bovengenoemde disciplines ontwikkelde zich allengs de echte grammatica, de studie van de interne opbouw van taal. De emancipatie van dit nieuwe vak verliep zeer langzaam, langzamer dan men gewoonlijk geneigd is aan te nemen. Zelfs Apollonius Dyscolus, de beroemde grammaticus uit de tweede eeuw na Christus, demonstreert nog op iedere bladzijde van zijn werk zijn band met filosofie, rhetorica en filologie.

Het tweede hoofdthema van het boek is de overwegend semantische gerichtheid van de antieke grammatica: Taal wordt in de Oudheid algemeen gezien als een instrument om een betekenis, een boodschap over te brengen. Het beschrijven van de syntactische structuren waarin die boodschap gevat is, is nooit een doel op zichzelf.

Het materiaal waarop deze studies gebaseerd zijn, is dat van de onverbuigbare woordsoorten, de *indeclinabilia*: prepositie, bijwoord, voegwoord en interjectie.<sup>1</sup> Dit materiaal wordt niet in zijn volledigheid gepresenteerd, maar in de vorm van een aantal zogenaamde "case-studies". Ieder hoofdstuk vertegenwoordigt daarbij een andere benadering van de materie. Hoofdstuk I gaat uit van de vroege taalbeschouwing in vooral de (Stoïsche) filosofie. Hoofdstuk II behandelt de beste grammaticus die de Oudheid heeft opgeleverd, Apollonius Dyscolus. Hoofdstuk III neemt een grammaticaal verschijnsel als uitgangspunt, namelijk het zogenaamde causale gebruik van de conjunctie *hina*, en hoofdstuk IV

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<sup>1</sup> De antieke begrippen zijn niet volledig in overeenstemming met de Nederlandse termen die hier gebruikt zijn.

tenslotte, beschrijft de antieke theorieën over een specifieke woordsoort, de interjectie. Deze aanpak brengt met zich mede dat in de eerste drie hoofdstukken het Griekse materiaal als uitgangspunt dient, terwijl in het laatste de nadruk op de Latijnse bronnen valt. De problemen die aan de orde gesteld worden, zijn zo uitgekozen dat ook meer algemene vragen uit de antieke taaltheorie aan bod kunnen komen. Voor dat soort van vragen, maar ook voor het oplossen van detailproblemen van interpretatorische aard is steeds ruimte gemaakt.

In hoofdstuk I komen eerst de vroegste producten van taalreflectie aan de orde: glossografie en de studie van (quasi-)synoniemen. Nadenken over taal gebeurt in dit stadium steeds in verband met iets anders: het verklaren van dichters of het beoefenen van (een bepaalde) filosofie. In de rest van het hoofdstuk wordt aandacht besteed aan de Stoa.

De Stoïci waren bijzonder trots op de grote interne coherentie van hun systeem, en het is dan ook noodzakelijk hun linguïstische opvattingen in de context van hun hele filosofie te plaatsen. Volgens de Stoa was taal oorspronkelijk volkomen rationeel opgebouwd - er was een duidelijke samenhang tussen woorden en hun betekenis. Naderhand raakte die samenhang verstoord, maar met behulp van de etymologie kan hij weer opgespoord worden. Men ging er daarbij van uit dat als woorden veranderden (gecorrumpereerd werden), de betekenis onaangetast zou blijven. Hoewel er geen twijfel aan kan bestaan dat de filosofen van de Stoa de oertoestand van de taal als een ideale beschouwden, zijn hun opvattingen over het ontstaan van die toestand veel minder duidelijk.

Na een beschrijving van de Stoïsche betekenistheorie, onderzoek ik enkele voorbeelden van de doorwerking ervan bij de latere grammatici. Die zijn weliswaar duidelijk beïnvloed door bijvoorbeeld de Stoïsche scheiding tussen vorm en betekenis, maar er zijn ook evidente voorbeelden van theorieën die een heel andere weg gegaan zijn dan in Stoïsch kader mogelijk was geweest. Dit hangt wellicht samen met het feit dat de filosofische ideeën tenminste ten dele gemeengoed waren geworden, zodat men zich van de oorspronkelijk filosofische context nauwelijks meer bewust was, laat staan dat men daaraan beperkende consequenties zou verbinden: de filosofie leeft niet steeds in de grammaticale theorie.

In hoofdstuk II is de aandacht gericht op een uitzonderlijke grammaticus, Apollonius Dyscolus. Apollonius heeft welomschreven opvattingen over taal en taalstructuur. Taal is een geordende, symmetrische eenheid, hiërarchisch georganiseerd in verschillende niveaus. De interne structuur van deze niveaus

vertoont een grote overeenkomst, wat impliceert dat elementen van verschillende niveaus toch met elkaar vergeleken kunnen worden. Het hoogste niveau is dat van de (onlichamelijke) betekenissen. Betekenissen gaan combinaties aan, waardoor complete boodschappen ontstaan. De lagere niveaus zijn die van de (fysieke) uitdrukking. Deze tweedeling van vorm en betekenis is een erfenis van de Stoa.

Taal kan zowel van zijn formele als van zijn inhoudelijke zijde bestudeerd worden. De inhoud, betekenis, is echter intrinsiek belangrijker dan de geluiden die de uitdrukking vormen. Mochten vorm en betekenis elkaar tegenspreken als het gaat om het indelen van een woord in een woordsoort (*merismos*), dan geeft het semantische aspect de doorslag.

Een tweede indicatie van het belang dat aan de betekenis gehecht werd, is de notie *katallèlotes*, die ook sterk semantisch van aard is. *Katallèlotes* is de totale syntactische en semantische regelmaat. De symmetrie van structuur en betekenis vallen in dit woord samen. Idealiter zou *katallèlotes* een eigenschap van vorm én betekenis van een uitdrukking moeten zijn, maar in de praktijk komt het er vaak op neer dat er iets mis is met het taalgebruik om ons heen, zowel in de dagelijkse conversatie als in literaire teksten.

Wanneer zich problemen voordoen moet een grammaticus zijn verstand, zijn rede, gebruiken. Bij moeilijkheden in een (literaire) tekst kan hij zijn toevlucht nemen tot literaire parallellen en het specifieke taalgebruik van de auteur die hij bestudeert - dezelfde criteria die een filoloog zou toepassen. Als er iets mis gaat in het dagelijks taalgebruik, dan kan hij ook de werken van vroegere grammatici raadplegen en proberen door observatie van het dagelijks taalgebruik het probleem op te lossen. Dit waren de criteria die gebruikt werden door geleerden die "correct Grieks", *Hellenismos*, bestudeerden. Deze geleerden verschilden van Apollonius doordat zij zich voornamelijk bezighielden met problemen van morfologische aard. Wanneer echter alle andere criteria falen, dan blijft de rede over.

Een belangrijk instrument voor de grammaticus is verder het falsificatieprincipe dat *elenchos* genoemd wordt. Dit is eveneens semantisch van aard. Een woord of een constructie kan alleen verworpen worden indien er een ander talig middel is dat dezelfde betekenis op meer gepaste wijze aanduidt.

Wat er ook fout gaat met de vorm van de uitdrukking, de *katallèlotes* van de betekenis blijft binnen het bereik van de rede. Het voordeel van dit criterium is namelijk dat het rechtstreeks in de regelmaat van de betekenis kan doordringen. Daardoor kan het ook die formele afwijkingen aan de kaak stellen die amper opvallen, en die dus door observatie alleen niet vastgesteld kunnen worden. De rede verwijst ons steeds naar het regelsysteem en de wezenlijke

regelmaat die ten grondslag liggen aan de feitelijke verschijningsvorm van de taal. De voornaamste theoretische functie van dit onderliggende systeem is dat het kan helpen bij de interpretatie en verheldering van de zinnen waarmee de grammaticus zich geconfronteerd ziet. De betekenis van deze zinnen wordt uitgedrukt door een parafraze. Zo'n parafraze heeft niet de status van een nieuwe zin die op zijn beurt verklaring behoeft, maar dient als een soort semantische representatie, een weergave van de (onlichamelijke) betekenis zelf, die noodzakelijkerwijs in de vorm van woorden gegoten wordt, omdat het ons onmogelijk is er op een andere manier over te praten. Zo'n afbeelding in woorden is een nabootsing van de ideale één-op-één verhouding die tussen vorm en betekenis zou moeten bestaan, maar die sinds de oertijd in de praktijk goeddeels verdwenen is.

Na dit overzicht van Apollonius' theoretische opvattingen over taal en de taak van de grammaticus volgt een behandeling van zijn praktische werkwijze. Uitgangspunt is Apollonius' geschrift over de bijwoorden. Een aantal passages daaruit wordt verklaard, in de eerste plaats de definitie. De interpretatie daarvan geschiedt met behulp van de bespreking die erop volgt en parallellen uit de rest van Apollonius' werk. De definitie is niet eenduidig, maar past volledig in zijn ideeën over taalstructuur. Een probleem bij de interpretatie van Apollonius blijkt te zijn dat hij technische termen ook in een ruimere zin gebruikt. In het vervolg van *de adverbio* gebruikt Apollonius zijn definitie als een belangrijk criterium om tot *merismos* te komen.

De belangrijkste eenheid in de taal-analyse van Apollonius is de woordsoort - dit kenmerk deelt hij met zijn antieke collega's. Men associeerde de woordsoorten haast automatisch met bepaalde functies, of liever gezegd, bepaalde semantische categorieën werden bij voorkeur vertegenwoordigd door een specifieke woordsoort. Dit resulteert erin dat een correcte *merismos* van een woord neerkomt op een correcte beschrijving van het linguïstische functioneren ervan en omgekeerd. Beschreven wordt hoe Apollonius de *merismos* van een aantal problematische woorden vaststelt. Terugkerende methodische elementen zijn de *disputatio in utramque partem* (bij de presentatie van zijn onderzoek), ontleend aan de rhetorica, en de *metalèpsis*. Deze laatste term duidt aan het vervangen van het woord in kwestie door een minder problematisch equivalent. Aan de *merismos* van dit equivalent kan men consequenties verbinden voor de *merismos* van het woord in kwestie. *Metalèpsis* was niet alleen een populair rhetorisch middel dat diende ter verheldering, maar het was ook een vertrouwde filologische techniek (parafraze!). Het is één van de manieren waarop Apollonius het probleem van het samenvallen van woordvormen, homonymie, te lijf gaat.

Homonymie (*synemptosis*) was een kwestie waarmee iedereen die nadacht over taal, geconfronteerd werd. Het is een symptoom van een onvolmaakte één-op-één correspondentie tussen vorm en betekenis, omdat één vorm meerdere betekenissen uitdrukt. Apollonius accepteert het bestaan van homonymie en stelt zich ermee tevreden aan te geven hoe een grammaticus met het verschijnsel om kan gaan: Hij wijst erop dat de context gewoonlijk afdoende is om de ambiguïteit die uit de homonymie kan voortvloeien, op te lossen.

Interessant is, dat *synemptosis* het een grammaticus onmogelijk maakt om zijn toevlucht te nemen tot formele argumenten om een *merismos* vast te stellen. Hij is gedwongen inhoudelijke argumenten voor zijn indeling aan te voeren, van syntactische of semantische aard. Opnieuw blijkt dat de semantische overwegingen overheersen. Sommige betekenis categorieën worden automatisch geassocieerd met een bepaalde woordsoort. Tijdsverhoudingen bijvoorbeeld kunnen alleen door bijwoorden (zoals "gisteren") worden uitgedrukt, als het tenminste gaat om uitdrukkingen die op zichzelf een woord vormen (dit laatste omdat werkwoorden natuurlijk door hun vervoeging heden, verleden of toekomst kunnen aanduiden). Het gevolg is dat er gedurende de hele Oudheid geen sprake kan zijn van een "voegwoord van tijd".

Een andere belangrijke factor bij de *merismos* is de vraag of een woord in een "rijtje" kan worden ondergebracht, dus of het paradigmatische relaties met andere woorden aangaat, waarvan de *merismos* mogelijk evident is. Is dat het geval, dan volgt het woord in kwestie de *merismos* van zijn "rijtje".

Hoofdstuk III gaat over een specifiek taalverschijnsel, dat wij eigenlijk vrijwel uitsluitend kennen door het getuigenis van de antieke grammatici: het zogenaamde causale gebruik van *hina*. Ik betoog dat de grammaticale theorie van de conjunctie tenslotte op twee verschillende filosofische bronnen teruggaat: De Peripatos, die veel werk op het terrein van de causaliteitsleer verzette en allerlei verschillende soorten van oorzaken onderscheidde, waaronder de *causa finalis* en de *causa efficiens*; en de Stoa, die een meer monolithische oorzakelijkheidsleer kende, maar waarvan de terminologie uiteindelijk zou doordringen in de grammaticale bronnen. Het gevolg was dat de grammatici in principe maar één woord hadden voor alle soorten van oorzakelijke verbanden (zowel causaal als finaal), namelijk *aitiodes*, of - in aangepast vorm - *aitiologikos*.

Later kreeg men echter behoefde aan een meer verfijnde terminologie. *Aitiologikos* bleef in gebruik voor "causaal", maar nu in de engere betekenis; voor "finaal" gebruik van de conjuncties werd de term *apoteles(ma)tikos* bedacht. Hier ligt waarschijnlijk de bron van verwarring: *hina* "opdat" kon nog steeds

aangeduid worden met de term *aitiologikos* in de ruimere zin van dat woord, maar *hina aitiologikos* kon makkelijk opgevat worden als "causaal *hina*" in de engere zin van het woord - het gevolg was dat men op zoek ging naar causale gebruikswijzen van *hina*.

Dit werd waarschijnlijk in zoverre vergemakkelijkt dat er werkelijk een marginaal causaal gebruik van *hina* bestond. Het is onduidelijk wat de oorsprong is van dit gebruik. Mogelijk was het een Alexandrijns colloquialisme.

In een excurs pleit ik voor een intensiever gebruik van de Oud-Christelijke schrijvers als bron voor de grammaticale opvattingen in de Oudheid.

In hoofdstuk IV staat een woordsoort centraal: de interjectie. In dit hoofdstuk komen dan ook de Latijnse grammatici volop aan bod, want de Griekse grammatici behandelden alle soorten uitroepen als bijwoorden.

Opnieuw is er aandacht voor de verhouding tot de retorische theorie. De invloeden op de grammatica vanuit de rhetorica komen aan bod en de retorische en stilistische functies van de interjectie worden besproken. Daarna volgt een korte beschrijving van de "technische" Romeinse theorie over de interjectie. Bij hun pogingen een in wezen onregelmatig en irrationeel taalverschijnsel als de interjectie te rationaliseren en in te passen in het taalkundige systeem ondervonden de Romeinse grammatici de nodige moeilijkheden. Op terminologisch en inhoudelijk gebied moesten zij concessies doen om de intrinsieke spanning van hun onderneming te verbergen.

Daarom beschreven zij de interjectie als bestaande uit *vox incondita* (ongestructureerd geluid), hoewel zij voor hetzelfde verschijnsel in hun *capita de voce* de term *confusa* (verward) gebruikten. Maar *vox confusa* beschreef daar nu juist allerlei geluiden die *niet* onder de woordsoorten gerangschikt konden worden. Daarom konden de grammatici deze term in hun hoofdstuk over de interjectie voor deze echte woordsoort moeilijk gebruiken - de tegenstrijdigheid zou er dan te dik bovenop liggen.

Inhoudelijk bleef de grammatici niet veel anders over dan de onregelmatigheid zelf tot de regelmaat te bombarderen: Als regel en per definitie was een interjectie dus onregelmatig.

Een complicatie was verder dat de grammatici de mogelijkheid toelieten dat sommige bijwoorden en interjecties homoniem konden zijn. Dat hield in dat zij criteria moesten aangeven met behulp waarvan men afhankelijk van de context kon beslissen of men met een interjectie of met het homonieme bijwoord van doen had. Inderdaad slaagden zij erin op vernuftige en consistente wijze zulke criteria aan te wijzen - of het onderscheid ook overtuigend is doet niet ter zake.

Na een beschrijving van de vertaalproblemen die interjecties opleverden (vooral bij de Christelijke schrijvers), volgt tot slot een overzicht van de Griekse parallellen voor de Romeinse theorie. Ondanks het feit dat de meeste Griekse grammatici de interjectie niet als aparte woordsoort erkenden, blijken zij toch de uitroepen als een bijzondere soort van bijwoorden gezien te hebben. Voor de meeste Romeinse opvattingen over de interjectie zijn dan ook Griekse parallellen aan te wijzen.