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ETHNIC IDENTITY, DEMOGRAPHIC CRISES  
AND KHOSA-KHOIKHOI INTERACTION

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Tribes no longer exist, at least in the writings of Africanists, but they tend to be replaced by very similar looking entities, going under a variety of aliases. Perhaps purely as a result of laziness of thought, there remains a tendency of write of *the Zulu*, *the Tswana*, or *the whomever*, and not to probe the assumption that these units have some actual existence. Nevertheless, like all working assumptions, this has to be continually re-examined. In this paper, therefore, I return to one of the classic problems in southern African history (in the broadest sense), namely that of the relationship between the Khoisan and the Bantu-speaking Africans. It has of course been widely studied, especially by linguists and physical anthropologists, and, to a lesser extent by archeologists. These disciplines show complementary results. Linguistics shows that many loan-words crossed from Khoisan to the Bantu languages - though not, apparently, in the reverse direction - and that this occurred to its greatest extent in the various Nguni languages of the south-east coastal belt.<sup>1</sup> Physical anthropology has shown that the proportion of Khoisan genes in the Bantu speaking population increases from north to south.<sup>2</sup> The archeological evidence is less clear. For eastern Zambia, Phillipson has argued that "the Early Iron Age folk and their late stone age neighbours... can be shown to have existed in several regions" and that "throughout the first millenium the two populations clearly to a large extent maintained their own separate identities".<sup>3</sup> This situation seems to have lasted until "four or five centuries ago." If there is evidence that this was not the case further south, I am not aware of it.<sup>4</sup> Certainly, until late in the nineteenth century "Bushman" groups survived in several areas of southern Africa, in close contact with iron-using peoples.<sup>5</sup> Admittedly they were often, though by no means always, to be found in such inhospitable places as the mountains of the Drakensberg and the Kalahari desert.

There would seem to be no reason why these somewhat divergent findings from the disciplines of archaeology, linguistics, and physical anthropology should be incompatible. There is no reason why efforts should be made to formulate a hypothesis of Khoisan-Bantu relationships which would serve to "explain" them all. Rather it should be recognized that they are the outcome of

different historical situations of contact between the two groups of people. However, the recognition of this only increases the ultimate problem. For every individual case a new history has to be conjectured and verified, something that offends against Occam's Razor. Nevertheless, it would seem useful to describe historical examples of Khoisan-Bantu interaction, which may serve as models for the description of the deeper past.

#### I

In this paper I will not deal with the contacts between "Bushman" and Bantu-speakers, since a hunter-gatherer society obviously reacted very differently to crisis than a pastoralist one.<sup>6</sup> Rather I will restrict myself to the most obvious form of contact between Bantu-speaking Africans and Khoikhoi on one boundary between the two peoples that later became the eastern border of the Cape of Good Hope. In this area, in the latter half of the eighteenth century the most southwesterly Nguni-speakers, the Xhosa, and the most easterly Khoi pastoralists were living little separated from each other. It is also clear that during this period there occurred a definite process of assimilation of Khoi to Xhosa or other communities. The evidence for this process is not particularly satisfactory, as there are scarcely any accounts before the large scale settlement of white farmers in such areas as the Ager Bruintjies Hoogte (on the Fish river, near modern Somerset East) confused the pattern of relationships. As a result, options for individuals became, if not more numerous, at least different, so that after around 1780 the processes of assimilation changed radically. Nevertheless, there is enough evidence to give at least indications of how things happened before then.

The evidence shows that there were at least three groups who were in various stages of assimilation from Khoi to Xhosa when they were overtaken by written records.<sup>7</sup> It is thus possible to study the process of assimilation in a less abstract way. These groups were the Gonaquus, the Gannakwebe, and the Hinde. The evidence that remains about the three peoples is somewhat different. For the Gonaquus, the account left by Anders Sparrman of his visit to the Gamtoos river in December 1775 is by far the most detailed and trustworthy. Sparrman himself was aware of the fact that the Gonaqua at the time were no "pure" Xhosa but, that "they were certainly a mixture of Hottentots and Caffers, as their language had an affinity with both these nations; in the natural blackness of their complexions, in the great strength and robustness of their limbs and lastly in the height of their stature, they bore a greater resemblance to the Caffers, several of whom they likewise had at that time among them".<sup>8</sup> In addition, Sparrman believed the Gonaqua were circum-

cised and, most importantly, "in some sort tillers of the ground," sowing sorghum, which they used mainly to brew beer. On the other hand, it seems clear that they were nomadic and certainly lived in huts that were far from the well-built, more or less permanent, structures of the Xhosa. Even the hut of the Captain, Kees, "consisted only of a few poles set up slanting in the earth with a ragged mat thrown over them, which of course admitted the wind in several places and let in the rain in wet weather."<sup>9</sup> In fact, it seems to have been little more than a sun shade and Sparrman thought they would be forced to provide themselves with better dwellings for the rainy season in the winter.

It seems clear from this account that the Gonaqua at the time were a remnant group of Khoi, certainly in no way to be compared, as regards their power, to those "Maghanan" who, a century before, had been regular traders with the Xhosa and who, according to tradition, had been able to give refuge to important Xhosa chiefs, had held the balance of power between rival Xhosa groups, and had contracted marriage alliances with leading Xhosa.<sup>10</sup> It was not only the important chiefs who had found refuge with the Gonaqua. Sparrman's account suggests that genetic admixture had been happening for generations, and he met "pure" Xhosa among the Gonaqua. This only strengthens the impression that the Gonaqua were far poorer in the 1770s than they had been a century or so earlier since refugees do not settle with the destitute if they have any option.

By the early eighteenth century, the Gonaqua had suffered from the disruption of their social and economic structure, probably as a result of war with the Xhosa and among themselves; but quite probably the wars were in their turn caused by dispute over the spoils of the disadvantageous trading with the Europeans. In 1702, Dutch farmers on a massive cattle raid were still able to remove over 2000 cattle and as many sheep from the Inqua but "found no [other] wealthy tribes between Hessequa [near modern Swellendam] and the Xhosa," while a Dutch expedition that visited the area east of the Gamtoos in 1752 reported that many of the Khoi who "had used to be rich in cattle... now live as Bushmen by stealing, by hunting, and from what they find in the veld or along the beach".<sup>11</sup> Even those who remained recognizable Khoi began to practice agriculture - at least by the 1770s - and, according to their enemies, to have relationship of clientship with the Xhosa.<sup>12</sup> But this process was certainly not total or irreversible. When European farmers began to arrive in number, the Gonaqua seem to have considered these to offer a chance to resuscitate their fortunes, not totally without reason. The Xhosa claimed that their main grievance against the Europeans was that "they could not suffer the Gonna Hottentots who daily stole their cattle, to reside among the christians, but desired that the christians should drive them away, in order that they

should be able to get their cattle".<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the *opgaaf* lists of taxable property drawn up by the colonial administration at the end of the eighteenth century show that at least some of the Khoi had accumulated considerable herds of cattle.<sup>14</sup>

For the Gqunukhwebe, who represent a further stage in the process of assimilation from Khoi to Xhosa, the evidence is not so clear. It is, however, evident that this group was considered to be of Khoi origin and "the other chiefs affect to despise Konga from his not belonging to the chieftain stock".<sup>15</sup> According to Soga, writing early in this century, "to this day [they] are spoken of by the Ama-Xhosa as Ama-Lala or Hottentots."<sup>16</sup> The name itself is also, it would seem, a derivative of Gonaqua. The Gqunukhwebe achieved this status as a recognized, albeit inferior, Xhosa "tribe" during the eighteenth century. Presumably a number of Khoi had taken up Xhosa agricultural pursuits as a response to the crisis that I have argued hit the Gonaqua in the last decades of the seventeenth century. There may also have been a certain amount of intermarriage between Xhosa and Khoi during this period, and there are suggestions that some Khoi were granted positions of influence within the Xhosa chiefdoms, where their rootlessness with Xhosa society can only have been to the advantage of the chiefs, who would have seen them as totally dependent. Nevertheless, the formation of the Gqunukhwebe shows that this did not invariably occur. The traditions state that a councillor of the Xhosa chief Tshiwo was able to weld at least some of the ex-Khoi together as a formidable force within the internecine Xhosa politics of those years.

One of the interesting parts of this tradition, which was published as early as 1829 by C. Rose, is that there is evidence even at such an early date, that the tradition was being remade to hide the Khoi origins of the Gqunukhwebe. Rose reported that:

in the reign of Tshiwo... the Gqunukhwebe ancestor Quaani [Kwane] was a great soldier and favourite and to him and one other the execution of the chief's orders was intrusted; these orders were often tyrannical - destruction of whole kraals, the seizing of cattle and the massacre of their wretched owners, - and Quaani evaded them, by sending some of the cattle to the chief, and concealing the families in a far distant part of the country, remote and shut in by the mountains. This had continued for some years when suspicion arose and the other captain asked him whether he always obeyed the commands of his chief; and on finding that he did not, they quarrelled and Quaani left the kraal of Tshiwo and told his enemy that he went to gather his people together. He was absent for many days, when one night Tshiwo's favourite queen was surprised

by his entering her hut and giving her the following instruction: "At the dawn of the day go to Tshiwo's, and then look to the hills, and you will see my warriors". The queen followed his instructions, and as she looked towards the hill, she exclaimed, "what do I see, is it mimosa bushes? they grew not yesterday!" She looked again, and cried out that they were armed men come to surprise them, and Tshiwo was sorely disheartened. Then Kwane came down with a hundred young men, with their shields and assegais, and their war plumes, and Kwane and his warriors kneeled before the chief, and laid their arms at his feet, and then followed the children and cattle, and Kwane said to Tshiwo, "These are the people that you ordered me to destroy, behold, I have saved them". And Tshiwo took unto himself a portion of the people and of the cattle, and gave the remainder to Kwane, and bestowed on him a territory on the sea-coast of 70 miles in length and 12 miles in breadth, and said unto him, "I adopt you as a son, you are now of the Ama-Tshawe [clan of the chief], and should a son of mine raise his assegai against you, raise yours against him, for you are his equal."<sup>17</sup>

This, it would appear, was an attempt at camouflage which had not deceived many Xhosa, at least not by the time the traditions were frozen during the nineteenth century.

It is very possible that there was a more successful piece of camouflage, though as a consequence the evidence naturally is far less clear. Still it would certainly seem that the amaNtinde were originally a Khoi group that became so totally assimilated to the Xhosa that they were provided with a genealogy linking them to the Xhosa lineage. But in 1809 Collins wrote that "it is not so easy to account for the name... of the vassals of Teachoo, who are called Tindees. The last chief is the son of Banguee, and grandson of Kyka, who was probably a son of Tzee, but this I did not hear positively asserted, and I understood that it is a doubtful matter among the Kaffers. It is possible that he may be of Ghonaqua origin, for a great portion of his people belong to that nation. His appearance is said to be that more of a Hottentot than of a Kaffer, and he has Hottentot wives."<sup>18</sup> By the time Soga came to write, a century or so later, Ntinde was said to be a son of the left-hand house of Ngeonde or of his father Togu.<sup>19</sup> The confusion is symptomatic. It seems reasonable to assume that over the course of the nineteenth century a Khoi group had become fully incorporated within Xhosa society to the extent that they received a place in the official genealogy, albeit a lowly one; in Soga's Xhosa genealogy, they

are the only group said to descended from a left-hand house.

There are indications that the sort of process that occurred in the region of the Ciskei in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a repeat of similar acculturation further to the east a century or so earlier. Thus the sailors from the wreck of the Portuguese *Santo Alberto* in 1593 met a certain chief "Luspanee" in the region of the Mthatha river.<sup>20</sup> The tribe he ruled over were mixed agriculturalists growing millet and owning many cattle and fattailed sheep. The indications that they were not fully incorporated into Southern Bantu culture are, on the one hand, the physical description that João Baptista Lavanha gave of the chief - not in itself a particularly meaningful piece of evidence - and the "small villages, with huts made of reed mats, which do not keep out the rain." However, it is only the material that seems to indicate the Khoi background of these people, for the description of their layout, though very fragmentary, would seem to accord with the symbolic system general for the Nguni.<sup>21</sup>

## II

To demonstrate that individuals and groups who had "been" "Khoi" "became" "Xhosa" is to beg one vital question: what did it mean to "be" Khoi or Xhosa? Clearly, the fact of assimilation over a long period shows that there is no genetic distinctiveness between the two groups that has any meaning for historical analysis. Rather "being" a Khoi - or a Xhosa - entailed following a particular mode of existence. In part this consisted of adopting a distinct value system but, even more importantly, it concerned an interrelated complex of economic activities and juro-political arrangements. Distinct models of social organization thus existed and the "societies" could thereby remain discrete, despite a continual transfer of personnel from one status to another. In theory individuals were free to choose which of the two or more modes of existence they would follow, although in practice there would be a high degree of inertia, as men and women would find it easier to remain within the mode of existence in which they were initially socialized, and to adopt another only as a result of *force majeure*. However, in conditions of great social upheaval the number of people who would find it attractive, or be forced, to "become" something else would of course increase.<sup>22</sup>

For the purposes of this paper, only the shortest sketch of Xhosa and Khoi models of society is required. For the Xhosa, it will perhaps suffice to quote from the account of a party of Portuguese who were wrecked on the Transkei coast in 1635. At least this procedure has the advantage of avoiding anachronism. As to food production, the diarist reported that the Africans

living near the coast

all have dogs... with which they hunt wild pigs, and stags, as well as buffaloes, elephants, tigers and lions... The women do all the work, planting and tilling the earth with sticks to prepare it for their grain, which is millet as large or larger than linseed. They have maize also, and plant large melons which are very good, and beans and gourds of many kinds, also sugar cane, though they brought us very few of these. Cows are what they chiefly value: these are very fine and the tameest cattle I have ever seen in any country. In the mild season they live chiefly on it, making curds and turning it sour, which was little to our taste. They also eat a certain root which resembles spurge laurel, and they say it is very strengthening. There are others yielding a fine seed, which also grows under ground. They eat this with great enjoyment, and also the gum from the trees.<sup>23</sup>

Further, it was noted that distinctions of wealth were based on cattle ownership and that the "kings" were able to accumulate more wives than the commoners.

The contrast and points of congruence with Khoi society are clear. For the present argument, two points regarding Khoi social structure are relevant. First, the Khoi were dependent for their food on their flocks and herds, on their hunting, and on what they gathered in the veld. It seems that the only crop which a Khoi group was recorded as having grown was dagga (cannabis).<sup>24</sup> The consequence of this was that Khoi population density was necessarily low. Secondly, political authority among the Khoi was far from stable and, in general, rather weak. The power of the chief depended on his personal wealth, and was scarcely backed by any ritual authority. At its height, as among the "Hamecunqua" or "Inqua" in the 1680s, the chief could exercise considerable power.<sup>25</sup> But this seems to have been purely the result of the strong position that "Hijkon" had gained from the strategic central point within the trade pattern of the interior that he commanded. Indeed, it has been argued that the true meaning of "Hamecunqua" is "people of the wealthy man" or "people of the chief" (ǀam-!Khukwa in Khoi) and that "Hijkon" can better be transcribed as "Gei!khu" (great chief).<sup>26</sup> In other words, the terms of "wealthy man" and for "chief" were the same; when a man became wealthy, he would be considered a chief. The most authoritarian, and therefore presumably the wealthiest, Khoi chief in the middle of the eighteenth century, 'Khola, known to the colonists as Ruyter, began his career in a completely different area of South Africa from that in which he

gained power, and moved from the Roggeveld to the Keiskama river only after he had murdered a fellow Khoi and had to flee the justice of the Cape Government. Nevertheless, he was able to exploit the unsettled conditions on the eastern border of the Cape Colony to establish himself as an exceedingly powerful man.<sup>27</sup>

Chiefly power could be considerable when the chief was wealthy enough. Hijkon's orders were obeyed "with running and jumping", while 'Kohla maintained his authority with a policy of terror reminiscent of that later employed by Shaka.<sup>28</sup> However, this degree of power was exceptional and also very fragile. By the 1770s 'Kohla had lost the major part of his following, while the Hancunqua power does not seem to have survived the seventeenth century. This is in itself not surprising. Although there could be considerable continuity among Khoi political authorities, as sons were able to succeed to the possessions and the position of their fathers, in the nature of Khoi society riches could not be guaranteed. Elphick has argued that there was a continual cycle of formation and erosion of herds - and thus of wealth and power - within Khoi society. Individuals and groups who had been rich in cattle and sheep became poor and were reduced to living as San "rubbish men".<sup>29</sup> It is not certain how far this was the case before the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for which Elphick can present evidence, but clearly the possibility was there.

It is clear that the fragility of Khoi society and authority derived from the susceptibility of their economy to crises which were likely to be caused either by stock disease or climatic disasters, and to the possibility of steady erosion of their herds under the pressure of outsiders. But it cannot be argued that it was the vulnerability of their economy per se that led to the exceptionally high likelihood of Khoi abandoning their own culture and assimilating to another, whether it be European or Xhosa. (Admittedly, assimilation is scarcely the word to describe their steady subjugation to the status of bondsmen and women in the colonial society). After all -- to limit the argument to Khoi relations with the Xhosa -- it would be difficult to maintain that the societies of Nguni-speakers were invulnerable to the effects of climatic or other disaster and consequent famine. War, and the consequent dislocation of productive activities is a population regulator of great efficiency and Xhosa society of the eighteenth century could scarcely be described as peaceful.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, it may be that in agricultural societies the rhythm of the conjuncture was faster than among the Khoikhoi, as harvest failures occurred more frequently than massive stock deaths. Rather the distinction rests on the nature of crisis in the two societies. For the Khoi, disaster entailed the massive elimination of herds of cattle and flocks of sheep. Even assum-



ing that a viable breeding stock survived the disaster, Khoi economy could not function in its old way for several years. For individual Khoi this meant that they had to enter into a relationship of clientage with a more fortunate stockholder, or they had to subsist entirely on the products of hunting and gathering, to become San. In any case, both politically and economically, Khoi tribal life had to be built up again, almost from scratch. Xhosa society - or for that matter any other Nguni or Sotho unit - had other resources, other bases of legitimacy. Chiefly authority rested on more foundations than the almost exclusively economic ones of a Khoi Captain. Thus a Xhosa chief would be able to ride out a storm which would sink his Khoi counterpart, and could also easily act as a patron for impoverished Khoi.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, while it took years, if not decades, to build up a herd which had been ravaged and reduced almost to naught, crops could be sown again at once and, providing there were no more disasters, the agricultural sector of the economy could return to full productivity in two or at most three years. For instance, Beinart has argued that after the raids of Zulu *impis* during the Mfecane "the Mpondo soon adapted to their conditions by exploiting the resources of the well-watered valleys in which they had settled and by becoming more assiduous cultivators."<sup>32</sup>

This argument as to the relative success of Khoi and Xhosa societies in combating ecological and man-made disasters would seem to entail that there would be reason to expect slow seepage of Khoi assimilating to Xhosa society. At least this would have been true for the women, and it was in terms of women's work that Xhosa economic life differed most profoundly from that of the Khoi. It is difficult to imagine that many women were ever allowed, or perhaps, willing, to abandon agricultural activities, especially as political power depended on the ability of a chief to attract followers, which would be furthered by control over the agricultural products - and children - of a large number of wives. It was probably different for the men since on occasion various political groupings may have found it advisable to take refuge among the Khoi before rebounding into Xhosa society -- perhaps by virtue of a following of Khoi that they may have been able to attract -- in a higher social position.<sup>33</sup>

If this analysis is correct, in areas where both modes of existence were feasible, it could be expected that in the course of a century or so, all the Khoi would "become" Nguni, and leave little trace in the historical record. This is especially so as Khoi men performed more or less the same tasks as Xhosa ones - largely herding and fighting - while the women would merely have added agricultural techniques to their packet of abilities without abandoning the gathering ones. However, the area of the Ciskei, where the examples of contact in historical times are

receded, is an important ecological frontier. West of the Ciskei, the main Nguni crop, sorghum, could not be grown for lack of sufficient rain during the growing season. Although regular in the Transkei and Ciskei, such levels of precipitation do not occur further along the coast.<sup>34</sup> Therefore it was in this area that the balance and complementarity between pastoralist Khoi and mixed agriculturalist Xhosa was maintained.

Similar ecological frontiers were to be found in the contact zone between Swana and Khoi, to the north of the Orange river, and west of the Kalahari in Kamibia. Certainly, on the Orange river there are clear indications of a process similar to that along the Visa.<sup>35</sup> Precolonial Kamibia, in contrast, has been little studied, but, interestingly, there are indications of a reverse process. The Ju Khoi, or Berg Dama -- physically negroid, linguistically Khoi -- can be seen as a group who had been forced to abandon the area in which agriculture was feasible and, moving south, had no option but to assimilate to the Nama groups they found there, albeit in a subordinate role.<sup>36</sup>

This argument has had to be based on the assumption that crises of subsistence occurred with some regularity in both Khoi society and in those social structures that came to be known as Nguni. This cannot be exclusively demonstrated nor falsified, although it is known that such a crisis hit what was to become Zululand at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while Elphick's account of precolonial history is predicated on such recurrent crises.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, there seem to be no pre-industrial societies for which we have sufficient evidence over a long period in which periodic demographic crises were absent. To postulate that it was otherwise among the Nguni is to accept the "Myth of Merrie Africa", as Hopkins has characterized it.<sup>38</sup> On the contrary, as I hope I have demonstrated, to build such concepts into an analysis of precolonial Africa can provide valuable insights from the reconstruction of that history. It may be that only the "structure" of early African society and history can be grasped, but this does not mean that the effects of high and low "conjuncture" and indeed of the concrete "événements" should be ignored.<sup>39</sup>

#### NOTES

1. On this see H.O.J. Westphal, "The Linguistic Prehistory of Southern Africa: Bush, Kwani, Kottentot and Bantu Linguistic Relationships," *Africa*, 33(1963), 237-65; and the various works by Christopher Ehret, notably "Agricultural History in Central and Southern Africa, ca. 1000 B.C. to A.D. 500", *Transafrican Journal of History*, 4(1974).
2. Philip Tobias, "The Biology of the Southern African Negro" in W. Hammond-Tooke (ed.), *The Bantu-Speaking Peoples of*

3. *Southern Africa* (London, 1974), 35.  
D.W. Phillipson, "Population Movement and Interaction in African Prehistory: Some Examples From the Last Two Thousand Years in Eastern Zambia" in *African Historical Demography*, (Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1977), 127.
4. Idem, *The Later Prehistory of Eastern and Southern Africa* (London, 1977), ch. 10.
5. See K.K. Barriecourt, *Prehistoric Man in the Ciskei and Transkei* (Cape Town, 1977).
6. For recent accounts of this relationship see J.B. Wright, *Bushman Raiders of the Drakensberg* (Pictorialitzburg, 1971) and "San history and non-San historians" in *Collected Seminar Papers on the Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries* [Institute of Commonwealth Studies] 8(1977); G.B. Silberbauer and A.J. Kuper, "Kgalagari Masters of Bushmen Herds; Some Observations", *African studies*, 25(1966), 171-79; Margot Russell, "Slaves or Workers? Relations between Bushmen, Tswana and Boers in the Kalahari", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2(1975/76), 178-97.
7. The advent of writing had two important effects, for the historian, in this connection. First, concrete detailed records provide far better information and secondly, traditions tend to become fixed and the progressive concealment of Khoi origins, which were generally held to be somewhat disreputable, was no longer possible.
8. Anders Sparrman, *A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope...* ed. V.S. Forbes, 2 vols.: (Cape Town, 1976-77), 2:16.
9. *Ibid.*, 2:13.
10. F.C. Godee Molsbergen, *Reizen in Zuid Afrika in Hollandse Tijd* (4 vols.: Hague, 1916-1932), 4:61; Gerrit Harinck, "Interaction Between Xhosa and Khoi, Emphasis on the Period 1620-1750" in *African Societies in Southern Africa*, ed. Leonard H. Thompson (London, 1969), 159.
11. Richard Elphick, *Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa* (New Haven, 1977), 229, 231; Godee Molsbergen, *Reizen*, 3:292.
12. *Ibid.*, 3:288.
13. Donald Moodie, *The Record...* (reprinted, Amsterdam, 1960), 3:91
14. H. Gilliomee, "The Cape Eastern Frontier, 1770-1820" in *The Shaping of South African Society*, ed. Richard Elphick and H. Gilliomee (London, 1978).
15. Moodie, *Record*, 5:9.
16. J.E. Soga, *The South-Eastern Bantu*, (Johannesburg, 1930), 117. The strictures on the use of this work expressed by J.B. Peires would not seem to apply in this case. See Peires, "The Rise of the Right-hand House" in the *History and Historiography of the Xhosa*, *History in Africa*, 2(1975), 113-25.

17. cited in Soga, *South-Eastern Bantu*, 113-19. I am informed by Professor J.A. Louw of UNISA that modern Gqunukhwebe tradition does not reject Khoi ancestry. See also A.Z. Nguni, *Ibali Isamayankhwebe* ( Lovedale, 1947 ).
18. Moodie, *Record*, 5:9.
19. Soga, *South-Eastern Bantu*, 112 and genealogy facing p. 81.
20. C.S. Boxer, *The Tragical History of the Sea, 1589-1629* (Cambridge, 1959), 122.
21. A.J. Kuper, "The Structure of the Southern Bantu Kraal", unpublished paper, 1978.
22. These ideas derive from Edmund R. Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure*, (London, 1964). I have applied them to nineteenth-century southern Africa in my *Adam Kok's Griquas, A Study in the Development of Stratification in South Africa* (Cambridge, 1976), esp. 9-11.
23. G. McC. Theal, ed. *Records of South-Eastern Africa*, (8 vols.: Cape Town, 1898-1903), 8:204-05.
24. E.J. Mkar et al, *The Journal of Hendrik Jacob Wikar (1779) ... and of Jacob Coetzé (1760) and Willem van Reenen (1791)*, ed. E.E. Mossop, (Cape Town, 1935), 125.
25. Olof Bergh and Isaac Schrijver, *Journals of Olof Bergh and Isaac Schrijver*, ed. E.E. Mossop, (Cape Town, 1931), 233.
26. Barinck, "Interaction," 164.
27. Sparrman, *Voyage*, 2:123; Godée Holsbergen, *Reizen*, 3:287-89.
28. Bergh and Schrijver, *Journals*, 233; Sparrman, *Voyage*, 2:124.
29. See, e.g. the testimony of Francis Galton in his *Narrative of an Explorer in Tropical South Africa* (London, 1853), 68-69.
30. Alan MacFarlane, *Resources and Population; a Study of Gurung of Nepal* (Cambridge, 1976).
31. Interesting, if not particularly exact, parallels can be drawn with the variations in political authority in the Pacific. See the classic article by Marshall Sahlins, "Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 5 (1962-63), 285-303.
32. W. Beinart, "Economic Change in Pondoland in the Nineteenth Century", *Collected Seminar Papers on the Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Institute of Commonwealth Studies) 7(1976), 27.
33. Barinck, "Interaction," 159.
34. J. Bertin et al, *Atlas of Food Crops*, (Paris, 1971); J.H. (Cambridge, 1955), 1:242-43.
35. L.F. Malinard, "The Brikwa and the Ethnic Origins of the Bathaping," *South African Journal of Science*, 30(1930), 597-602.
36. E. Vedder, "The Bergdama" in G.H.L. Euhn, H. Vedder and

- L. Fourie, *The Native Tribes of South-West Africa*, (2d ed.: London, 1966), 37-39.
37. See e.g. Martin Hall, "Ethnography, Environment and the History of the Nguni in the Eighteenth Centuries," *Collected Seminar Papers on the History of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* [Institute of Commonwealth Studies] 8(1977) 16-19; Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*, 23-43.
38. A.G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London, 1973), 10.
39. The references are of course to Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris, 1949). For an investigation of these approaches to time in precolonial Africa see Robert Ross, "Van structuur tot evenement in de Afrikaanse geschiedenis," *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 91(1978).