

ROBERT ROSS

# Beyond the Pale

Essays on the History of Colonial  
South Africa

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∞ TO CHARLOTTE, ERICA, AND ARTHUR



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## Preface

 The essays published in this volume represent some of the attempts I have made over the last decade or so to understand the history of the Cape Colony before the advent of industrialization in the 1870s. Obviously they remain essays, written for specific, and differing, occasions, although I hope that they form a reasonably coherent whole. I have done my best to eliminate overlaps between the pieces and to show their links to each other.

Of the eleven essays in this volume, five (Introduction, Chapters 2, 4, 6, and 10) are published here for the first time. The others, though they have all been more or less extensively revised for this book, were first published in the following journals and collections, and I would like to thank the publishers and editors for permission to reproduce them here. Chapter 1, "The Cape Economy and the Cape Gentry," contains sections from three other papers: "The Rise of the Cape Gentry," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 9 (1983); "The Origins of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cape Colony: A Survey," in William Beinart, Peter Delius, and Stanley Trapido (eds.), *Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850-1930* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1986), 56-100; and "The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835," in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840*, second edition (London and Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longmans, 1989; rev. ed., Middleton, 1988) 243-82. In its current form, however, it, too, is new. Chapter 3, "Going Beyond the Pale," was originally published in Dutch, as *De Wijngaard des Heeren? De oorsprong van "die blanke Baasskap" in Zuid-Africa* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), and written in collaboration with my Leiden colleagues Dik van Arkel and Chris Quispel. Chapter 5 was first published in *Population Studies* 19 (1975), 210-22; Chapter 7 in the *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 9 (1980), 5-16; Chapter 8 in *African Perspectives* 5 (1982), 7-37; and Chapter 9 in H. Diederichs and G. C. Quispel (eds.), *Onderschied en minderheid: sociaal-historische opstellen over discriminatie en vooroordeel* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1987), 201-22.

Librarians and archivists at a variety of institutions, but above all at the Africa-Studiecentrum, Leiden, the *Algemene Rijksarchief* at The Hague, and the Cape Archives Depot in Cape Town, have invariably proved understanding and helpful in the face of my requests. The University of Leiden, by whom I have been employed, with occasional interruptions, while these essays were being written, has provided, in its various manifestations, a stimulating intellectual environment in which to work. On one occasion, though, the administration sent me a questionnaire asking me to list my international contacts. In some unwarranted irritation, I replied that I collaborated with the invisible college of researchers into the history of colonial South Africa, spread across three continents. Perhaps it was an inappropriate response at the time, but it did give voice to the encouragement and support that I, and others, I hope, have received from a wide-flung group of researchers. We have tried to avoid the fallacy that academic work is a zero-sum game, and I believe that, in general, we have succeeded in building a (young) research tradition that is productive, open, and free of rancor and jealousy. There have, of course, been others who have aided me in various ways in the writing of the papers in this book, but who would not claim to be members of this college. They have been as helpful as the others. Perhaps the ease with which we go about our business is not as unusual in academia as might be thought. The two categories include: Roger Beck, William Beinart, Vivian Bickford-Smith, Leonard Blussé, Henry Bredekamp, Colin Bundy, Clifton Crais, Patricia Davison, Wayne Dooling, Saul Dubow, Richard Elphick, Piet Emmer, Stan Engerman, Vernon February, Hermann Giliomee, Martin Hall, Shamiel Jeppe, Joke Kardux, Bea Koetsier, Adam Kuper, Thomas Lindblad, Candy Malherbe, Shula Marks, John Mason, Lalou Meltzer, Herman Obdeyn, John Parkinson, Nigel Penn, Mary Rayner, Roger Schofield, Carmel Schrire, Pam Scully, Rob Shell, Mary Simons, and Stanley Trapido. But special mention should be made of Pieter van Duin, Dik van Arkel, and Chris Quispel, for the intellectual companionship of collaborative writing, of Susie Newton-King, for her enthusiasm and hospitality in Cape Town, and of Nigel Worden, for his continued help in all sorts of ways, beyond the bounds of collegiality, or even friendship.

Above all, I want to thank my family for the joy and the understanding they have given me. Our children had not yet been born when the first of these essays was written, but since then they have been central to my life, as indeed, Tilla already was long before then. In this I feel enormously privileged, and to them I dedicate this book.


*Leiden*  
*June 1992*

R.R.

## Beyond the Pale



# Introduction

 The essays in this book are part of a process of intellectual endeavor that has been occupying me for over a decade and a half. It began when, during the writing of *Adam Kok's Griquas*,<sup>1</sup> about a group of “coloreds” who established a number of small polities in central South Africa, I found that the conventional descriptions of the Cape Colony’s history were unable to account for the version of South African history manifested from the Griquas’ successive capitals of Philippolis and Kokstad. As I saw it then, the failure of the Griquas to maintain their independence and prosperity was a consequence of their being a taxonomic anomaly in the new world of colonial South Africa, dominated as it was by a web of farmers, land speculators, merchants, and government officials, with the occasional lawyer, minister of religion, and journalist. It therefore became necessary to make a number of hypotheses about class formation and the entrenchment of racial prejudice within the wider world of colonial South Africa. At the time, I had neither the space nor the competence to explore the issues raised in any detail. In the work represented in this volume I have attempted to follow the path implicitly laid out then.<sup>2</sup>

The central argument around which the chapters in this book orbit, some closer and some further away, is about class formation and domination. Essentially, I am making a claim that seems innocuous and uncontroversial but one not generally reflected in the literature. It is that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the colony at the Cape of Good Hope came under the domination of a class that, though composed of immigrants and their descendants, was not an extension of Europe but something specifically colonial. Its basis was the control of land, of labor (a somewhat more problematical affair), and of the internal and external trade of the colony. This control was buttressed by, made possible by, or perhaps consisted of, the institution of slavery, and after emancipation, and to a certain extent before then (but not very long before), by the establishment of a racist order of white supremacy.

I repeatedly return to the theme that there was continuity, at a particular

level of abstraction, in a number of the processes of South African history across the divide caused by the economic revolution in the country's history that followed on the discovery of, first, diamonds and then gold in the last third of the nineteenth century. Exactly how pronounced this continuity was, and what forms it took, varies considerably depending on the subject under discussion, and much that developed after 1870—for instance, the system of migrant labor, with all that involved, or the forms of international capitalist involvement in South Africa—was evidently new. Much that historians have seen as crucial to the development of twentieth-century South Africa, particularly in terms of capital accumulation, class formation, and class ideology, can be identified before 1870. I would not want to argue that pre-industrial social relationships and ideologies *determined* what happened thereafter, only that they provided a legacy on which the makers of twentieth-century South Africa, of all backgrounds, could and did build.

Obviously, the class that had arisen to dominate the Cape Colony in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was not without its internal divisions, between the farmers and the merchants, between wholesalers and retailers, between Cape Town and the countryside, between the west and the east, and, after 1800, between the Dutch and the English. Nor did this power extend to control over the colonial administration, in the formal sense, until the granting of representative governments in the Cape Colony in 1872. Before then, the republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State could not escape from what, in the twentieth century, would be known as neo-colonialism, and, indeed, the autonomy of even the Cape Colony after 1872 was circumscribed by its relationship with London, as represented both by the capital market and by the imperial government. These divisions, internal and external, were the issues of politics. Those politics, however, remained very largely within the limits beyond which that class's dominance within the colony would have been threatened. In particular, it was its supremacy over the darker skinned laborers of the colony that had to be, and was, preserved against all attacks. As I argued in the introduction to *Adam Kok's Griquas* with regard to an analogous issue,<sup>3</sup> it is essentially futile to try and separate the two strands of their control, since without the exploitation of the underlings the races would not have been unequal and without the identification of the underlings on the basis of physiognomic criteria, or race, class exploitation and its justification would have taken on quite different forms.

By the same token, a truly rounded analysis of the development of the colony's class structure would need to examine the ways in which the actions, and in particular the resistance, of the slaves, the Khoisan, and their post-emancipation descendants shaped the relationships that emerged within the colony. It would also need to look at how the Xhosa, Thembu, and Sotho on the colony's borders similarly shaped those relationships as opponents in war, as trading partners in peace, and as laborers. Elsewhere I have attempted to discuss certain themes of slave resistance and to analyze various aspects of

slave life.<sup>4</sup> The various studies in this book, in contrast, are primarily concerned with the “white” society that dominated the colony. Now, obviously, it should be impossible to discuss the rulers without being attentive to the actions and opinions of the ruled,<sup>5</sup> and I hope that I have not done so. However, it should be stressed that nowhere in this book will the reader find that full synthesis of the viewpoints and actions of all those involved in the development of colonial South African society. Such a study has yet to be written, and I would hope that this volume may form part of the preliminaries to such a synthesis.

The chapters included in this volume are divided into five sections. In the first, on economy and class formation, I am essentially making two claims. The first is that the Cape Colony was much more market-oriented in its economic life than has generally been realized. This can be seen in two ways. On the one hand, the leading sectors of agriculture were the wine and wheat farms of the southwest Cape and commercial pastoralism in the interior. These were dependent on the market in Cape Town, both as an outlet for their products and, at least as regards the former, as a source for the slave labor needed to work the farms. On the other hand, there was a steady increase in the number and power of the merchants, in the sophistication of the credit market, in the amount of money in circulation, and in the regulation of the colonial currency.

The second claim is that, as a result of this commercialization and of the agrarian prosperity that accompanied it, from around the 1770s on, the indigenous upper class was fully constituted. It consisted, on the one hand, of the merchants, who were no longer dependent on the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* or VOC), and, on the other, of the richer farmers. Initially, the latter were to be found primarily in the southwest of the colony, within easy reach of Cape Town. The poor transportation system meant that bulk goods could only be transported to market over a relatively short distance, and certainly could not be profitably produced inland from the major mountain chains of the Cape. This limited the agricultural elite to the wine and wheat farmers in the Boland and Swartland. The pastoralists of the interior could not acquire either the influence or the wealth to allow them to be considered part of what has been termed the “Cape gentry,” although those wholesale butchers, with whom they had somewhat strained relations, were clearly a major element in this new upper class. From the early nineteenth century onwards—perhaps earlier in, for instance, the southern plains around Swellendam—the Cape gentry became evident throughout the whole of the Cape Colony, as coasting traffic. Later, the establishment of a wool industry allowed the extension, not of commercial pastoralism, which had been there since the initial colonial settlement of the Cape interior a generation earlier, but of, at least, islands of considerable prosperity. In Chapter 1 I try to chart the processes whereby this came about and in chapter 2 I analyze both the regional diversities and the colony-wide similarities in the

pattern of landholding which these processes had created by the mid-nineteenth century.

The ruling class depended above all on its control over the labor force of the colony. With regard to some, probably a majority, of the laborers, the institutions of slavery were sufficient even for the purposes of South African settlers. Eventually, though, in 1838, when the abolition of slavery took effect, this legal sanction for domination was removed. Was the consequence of this that the balance of power in the countryside was radically changed, or were the farmers able to maintain their old supremacy even under differing legal and extra-legal circumstances? A cursory knowledge of the farm labor situation in the Cape Province during the twentieth century would seem to suggest that the latter was the case,<sup>6</sup> and indeed in general I argue in Chapters 1 and 3 that the ruling class of the Cape countryside was largely able to negate the effects of emancipation.<sup>7</sup>

It is obviously of crucial importance to understand how this degree of continuity, if such it was, was achieved. Part of the answer must lie in the degree to which the ex-slaves were able to find means of subsistence other than work on the farms of their former masters or of other ex-slaveowners.<sup>8</sup> But, as I argue in Chapters 1 and 3, there was more to it than that. Even before emancipation, a goodly proportion of the laborers on the farms of the Cape Colony, particularly in the eastern districts, was nominally free, the Khoisan. During the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early decades of the nineteenth, most of the Khoisan within the colony were transformed from independent pastoralists and hunter-gatherers into farm laborers held in a system of oppression that in many ways resembled slavery.<sup>9</sup> When, in 1828, all civil disabilities pertaining to the Khoisan (and indeed to other free persons of color) were removed by Ordinance 50, the effects of that measure were limited.<sup>10</sup> What had happened was that the techniques that had evolved for maintaining control over the juridically free were not abolished by this measure of emancipation. What is more, I argue that the experience gained in the colony with regard to the Khoisan was then used to ensure the continued quasi-slavery of those who were now ex-slaves.

There is an obvious converse to this argument. Even if emancipation did little to change the content of the oppressive relationships between the Cape's landowners and their laborers, the fact that the legal relationships were altered meant that new justifications for that role had to be developed. Chapter 3, which is the result of my cooperation with Dik van Arkel and Chris Quispel, investigates the ways in which a specifically racially based social stratification came into being within the Cape Colony. It attempts to apply the insights gained from van Arkel's work on the origins of anti-Semitism in Europe to South Africa. The results of this historiographical experiment demonstrate the advantages of this form of controlled historical cross-fertilization by providing specific hypotheses about the development of the stigmatization of the

Khoi, and later of the slaves, and of the sharp narrowing of the range of social interaction between the farmers and, in particular, the Khoi and the free blacks. These effects seem to have been the result of economic changes during the early nineteenth century, thus coinciding with the proletarianization of the Khoisan. It was this process that provided both the institutions and the ideology for the later negotiations of emancipation.

The basic argument advanced in Chapter 3 is that something akin to the racial ordering of modern South Africa did indeed come into existence well before the discovery of diamonds, and later of gold, in the interior of the country, and the accompanying revolution in social and economic relations. This ordering did not, however, obtain from the foundation of the colony by the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century. During the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth centuries, there was still a certain degree of openness in the social relations of the Cape Colony, in two senses. First, there is no evidence for a developed racist ideology and, second, status was not ascribed on the basis of racial criteria, and only marginally on the basis of origin. In other words, partial non-European ancestry in no way precluded the reaching of the highest positions in society open to those who had been born at the Cape. The reasons for this are again twofold. On the one hand, the Dutch East India Company held the real positions of power firmly in the hands of its own employees, who formed an elite not open to the mass of the colony's inhabitants but only (at the high and middle levels of the colony's officialdom) to immigrants from Europe or the sons of officials.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the system of slavery paradoxically formed a block to development of a racial order. The fact of being a slave, or of being free, was in itself sufficient to place a man or woman in his or her position in society, although there were numerous gradations of status on both sides of the legal divide. While the slaves were all of at least partial non-European descent, the converse was not true. Those whose families had been free for more than one generation, and who had thus been able to lose the stigma of having once been a slave, were potentially equal to all other free men and women within the colony, excepting, of course, the high officials of the company.

In the course of the early nineteenth century, this situation changed. The first reason for the change was the incorporation of large number of Khoisan into the colonial economy in very disadvantaged positions. The exploitation of men and women who were never legally slaves was exceedingly severe during the establishment of colonial settlement in the interior of the colony. It was achieved by a variety of means, which together had the effect of making most of these people dependent on the colonists for their subsistence, of decreasing their mobility between potential employers, and, in general, of depressing their status to that of largely rightless quasi-serfs. In order to justify this process, to attempt to gain control over those Khoisan who had at least temporarily escaped such degradation, and to combat the missionaries who argued for the

liberation of the Khoi from their spiritual and temporal bondage, a racist ideology with regard to the Khoisan was articulated more clearly (though never very clearly) in the colony.

With the emancipation of slaves in the course of the 1830s, the (ex-)slave-owners were confronted by the same problems of control that the employers of Khoi labor (often of course the same people) had largely successfully overcome a decade or so earlier. Moreover, after the ending of civil disabilities for the Khoi in 1828 as a result of Ordinance 50, it was shown that the same techniques could be used, with minor modifications, to deal with nominally free labor. The re-establishment of control over the former slaves, and, indeed, over the Khoisan, was not without its difficulties, but nevertheless, by the 1850s, particularly with the enactment of successive Master and Servant Ordinances, a sharp degree of stratification had once again been ensured. This time it was not backed by slavery but by race.

Studies of racial stratification in South Africa follow one of two strategies. Either they point to the massive divergence between the rich, powerful, and white and the poor, powerless, and black, or they concentrate on the interface, the line of cleavage, between the two main groups. If the latter strategy is followed, as it was, for example, in *Adam Kok's Griquas*, then what seems clear-cut when the wide picture is viewed becomes much more uncertain. Distinctions clear in the statistical mass become fuzzy when the detail of social relations and social taxonomies at the border between the various social groups in the country is examined.<sup>12</sup> But, in order to understand the fine texture of Cape society, it is necessary to maintain this oscillation between the two ways of examining South African society. Chapter 4, therefore, discusses a number of those distinctions at the margin, by looking at some of the key tropes within the colonial world. It is thus about the etiquette of race. To the majority of the inhabitants of the Cape, those who spoke Dutch or proto-Afrikaans, "etiquette" meant not only the conventions of behavior, as in its English usage, but also retained its original meaning of "label." It suggests that conventional behavior in some way fixed the place of the participants within the social field. It is a pun of great significance for historians, especially those concerned with the past of a colony.

The last three sections of this book are in a sense buttresses of the major lines of argument in the first two. Section III departs, at least implicitly, from the thesis that the expansion of the Cape Colony and its ruling class, both territorially and in terms of power and wealth, was inseparable from its sharp numerical increase, even if eventually that population growth would set up tensions within the colony that would force a readjustment of colonial practices. For this and for other reasons I undertook a preliminary investigation of the historical demography of the white population of the Cape in the eighteenth century, a task made much easier (and indeed, if the truth be told, suggested) by the availability of the printed genealogies of the white settlers.<sup>13</sup>

These provided a reconstruction of the Cape population of European descent, which was, in many ways, equivalent to those which the historical demographers of European villages painstakingly take months, if not years, to complete. The principal difficulty with the Cape material was that deaths were not recorded, so that a large number of the demographic variables which might have been expected could not be calculated. In Chapter 5, I present the results of the investigation I made into these sources, in which the high levels of nuptiality and fertility among the colonial population is demonstrated, and also the substantial replacement rate of one generation by another. This last shows that married women born before 1730 had on average 2.75 daughters who themselves eventually got married. In other words the population was doubling at least every generation (of thirty to forty years). Obviously the health of the colonists contributed significantly both to their high fecundity and to their (presumed) relatively low mortality, but population growth was not entirely a factor exogenous to the rest of the social system. The population's health itself was a consequence of the high standard of living, which itself derived largely from the exploitation of slave and Khoikhoi labor. Moreover, as is argued in Chapter 6, the high levels of fertility were in part a result of the economic independence of the settler men and women at a relatively young age. Territorial expansion and Afrikaner population growth thus reinforced each other in a spiral that was to encompass the whole of southern Africa.

Thereafter, I address the question of the intellectual constructions by which the Cape was governed. Racial ideologies were not the only props for the social order. The law, religion, and the appropriation of the past played roles at least as significant. Once again, investigation of these matters reveals a colony unexpected in its complexity. The law was used in the eighteenth century to maintain the authority of the Dutch East India Company. This, generally, but by no means necessarily, entailed supporting the masters against the slaves. Where the interests of the company, either material or ideological, were at stake, the slaves had a freedom of access to the courts, even to accuse their masters, that was most unusual in a colonial setting. The Khoisan were even more clearly able to make use of the colonial government, both as witnesses in criminal cases and in what were effectively civil suits. Company officials did not need to support the burghers at all costs. Realizing the weakness of their control over at least the country districts of the colony, and even to a certain extent over Cape Town, they could not rule out the possibility of receiving assistance in their task of preserving order even from those groups who were the greatest threats to that order, and who were, in general, the most oppressed by the law.

In Chapter 9, dealing with Afrikaner religion, the argument presented is in many ways analogous to those advanced earlier in this book. On the one hand, it is claimed that the strange blend of Calvinism and nationalism that has dominated Afrikaner religious and political life during the twentieth cen-

tury is not, as has been argued, entirely a creation of industrial South Africa, but rather is a small, if crucial, transformation of an ecclesiastical tradition widely established in colonial South Africa *before* the mineral revolution of the later nineteenth century. On the other hand, this tradition, and the piety that accompanied it, did not come to the Cape Colony from the Netherlands of Jan van Riebeeck and the first colonists. It was built and developed under the changing circumstances and social arrangements within colonial South Africa, very largely, I argue, in the course of the nineteenth century. In part, it was a response to the emancipation of slaves and the need to find new solutions to the problems of existence in a world in which the old certainties had disappeared. And, in part, it derived from the far greater spiritual and material investment that was made in the Cape after the demise of the Dutch East India Company and the arrival of the British.

In the final chapter, I return, as it were, to the beginning, not of this book but of the tradition of intellectual enquiry of which it forms a part. I discuss the historical controversy that took place during the first half of the nineteenth century concerning the relations between the Cape Colony and the African inhabitants of the southern tip of the continent. The principal participants were Donald Moodie and the Rev. John Philip. At stake in their argument was not merely the truth about the past, whatever that may be, but, above all, the policy the colonial government should apply towards the Cape's Xhosa neighbors and Khoisan inhabitants. As has been the case ever since, the investigation of history in South Africa then was part of the wider political debate about the country's future. Writing in the early 1990s, I cannot pretend that the essays in this book do not themselves form a slight and rather tangential contribution to that debate. However, I have always been aware of the fact that I am writing about a country that is not my own, even though I love it very much. I leave it to others to see what use, if any, they can make now of what have been, in intention though certainly not in fact, merely attempts to understand and to describe a part of South Africa's past.

Any researcher follows a course dictated by the exigencies of circumstance as well as by the logic of inquiry and of thought. This has certainly been the case with me. Since I live in the Netherlands, almost without reflection I have worked more on the time when the Dutch East India Company was in control of the Cape—that is, till the end of the eighteenth century—than on the subsequent British-ruled period. The advantages of a large, friendly, and efficient archive a quarter of an hour away by train naturally have tended to outweigh any feeling that in this way the historical record is being biased. After all, many nineteenth-century sources are published, and most are in English, so that it might be imagined—though wrongly—that they would attract more researchers than the three-hundred-word sentences of eighteenth-century Dutch officialdom. But when the products of my practice—it would be mistaken to call it a policy, for it was far too haphazard for that—are collected in a single volume, then its effects become evident. The essays in this volume

often do not deal with what happened after the demise of the Dutch East India Company, or alternatively they do so with less certainty, and with more reliance on the work of other historians. It is, however, my conviction that the changes of government in the years between 1795 and 1806, when the British conquered the Cape from the VOC, gave it back to the Dutch (by now the Batavian Republic), and then repossessed it, make this period a caesura in the Cape's history only in certain respects. As regards the government of the Colony, the coming of the missions, the military power of the colonists as against the Xhosa, and, to some extent, the international economic framework within which the colony operated, the British takeover evidently mattered. The slave trade would have been abolished under British pressure even without a British conquest, as it was in the Dutch Caribbean. In terms of the processes of class formation and capital accumulation in the countryside, the more important breaks, if they have to be found, would be in the 1770s, when the gentry found their voice in the Patriot movement; and then in the 1830s, with the ending of civil disabilities for the Khoisan (actually in 1828), the emancipation of slaves, the Great Trek, the entry of the Mfengu into the colony, and the changes in the administrative and legal structure of the colony following the Commission of Enquiry.<sup>14</sup> But the same arguments could be made for any caesura chosen in South African history, whether the 1830s, the 1870s, the first decade of the twentieth century, the depression, 1948, or whatever. According to some criterion, these are all of considerable importance, but because no one factor dominates all others in the South African past (or, indeed, in the South African present), there are always enormous continuities that stretch across whatever separations may be made. Periodization must always be arbitrary, and *ad hoc*.

Two other comments might be made on the choice of the papers included in this volume. First, they all deal in the first instance with the ruling class of the colony as it was being formed and with the ways in which it maintained its rule. Obviously, it has been impossible analytically to split this off from the slaves, Khoisan, and unprivileged European sailors and soldiers over whom they had control, just as at the time such a segregation was impossible. A ruling class must have someone to rule over. But the emphasis in at least this selection of my work has been on the ways in which the richer and the more powerful among the inhabitants of the Cape Colony shaped the society in which they lived, though certainly not on their own. Second, this book has also, though with exceptions, particularly in the last section, been about the more tangible ways in which that class maintained its position, rather than its attempts to acquire legitimacy for its rule from all the inhabitants of the colony. The nature of what might be called the "hegemonic project" of the Cape's rulers, and the extent to which it was successful, are not subjects to which I address much attention here, although I hope to do so in the not too distant future. The concerns of this book are much more down to earth, as was necessary to rescue a historiography from what I saw to be the mistaken emphases under which it was suffering.<sup>15</sup>




❧ PART ONE

Economy and Class  
Formation in the  
Cape Colony



## The Cape Economy and the Cape Gentry

 In 1651, on the advice of two of their officers who had been shipwrecked in Table Bay (where Cape Town was to be founded) and had spent a year there, the directors of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), the *Heren XVII*, decided to found a small permanent station at the Cape of Good Hope. They did not hope for commercial gains in South Africa itself, and, indeed, the Cape station was to be run at a considerable loss throughout the 143 years of its existence. Rather, as their instructions to their first commander, Jan van Riebeeck, made plain, the *Heren XVII* saw the Cape as a refreshment station for the large fleets they sent every year from Europe to the East. It was essential that the ships might find there “the means of procuring vegetables, meat, water and other needful refreshments and by this means restore the health of their sick.”<sup>1</sup> The settlement that grew up around the VOC’s station, later to be known as Cape Town, was thus in the first instance a port of call on the oceanic shipping routes.

The VOC establishment was generally able to fulfill many of its fleets’ requirements itself. The fort was sited at one of the few points on the southwestern coast where fresh water was always available and the company controlled land alienation and irrigation rights. Vegetables for the ships’ crews were grown, largely by slaves, in the company’s gardens in Table Valley. Firewood was cut from the company’s closely guarded preserves on the slopes of Table Mountain and, later, further inland by the large force of company-owned slaves and also by its European employees.<sup>2</sup> The dockyard, too, was manned by a combined slave and European workforce.<sup>3</sup>

The hospital probably provided better conditions for the sick—and certainly better rations—than an East India ship would have done. Cape Town was undoubtedly also far superior as a place for recuperation than a ship’s deck could be.<sup>4</sup> Yet, quite soon after Van Riebeeck established the Cape station, it became clear that the VOC would not itself profitably produce the staple foodstuffs of bread and meat needed by the fleets, nor could it achieve the supply of wine necessary to keep the sailors contented and to serve as a preservable anti-scorbutic. Nor could the VOC acquire what it needed by trade

with the local inhabitants, the Khoikhoi.<sup>5</sup> So, from 1657, servants of the company were encouraged to leave employment at Cape Town and set up as farmers. It took thirty years, and the extension of settlement beyond the slopes of Table Mountain, before agriculture was sufficiently well established to meet the cereal requirements of even the company itself. But, now that Europeans had learned how to exploit the virgin soils of the Cape, further expansion, of both arable and pastoral activities, would be limited only by the necessity of conquering the land and by the quality of land in the conquered territory.<sup>6</sup>

More or less simultaneously with the first agricultural freeburghers, men (and a few women) began to settle at the Cape to engage in a range of other occupations. Some became keepers of drinking and lodging houses, serving the needs of the passing ships. Others became shopkeepers and general traders, bakers and brewers, builders and carpenters, smiths, coopers and potters, and even silversmiths.<sup>7</sup> With an increasingly large company establishment, Cape Town quickly grew into a modest town.

By around 1700, then, the economic basis for the colony's continued existence had been laid. The port, its town, and the agricultural and pastoral hinterland had become firmly rooted, their existence never again to be seriously threatened by attack from within the colony. Several hundred slaves had been imported from all the shores of the Indian Ocean as the basis for the colony's labor force. The first Africans, in this case Khoisan, had been at least semi-proletarianized in European service. Nevertheless, by comparison with the early nineteenth century, the Cape Colony in 1700 was minuscule. By the 1830s, however, its population had risen from around 2,000 to about 150,000,<sup>8</sup> and it stretched, no longer just to the Berg river, but to the Orange and the upper Kei. Cape Town was no longer a village of some 70 houses;<sup>9</sup> it had grown to more than 1,500 dwellings and nearly 20,000 inhabitants.<sup>10</sup> Although Cape Town was still by far the largest settlement in the Cape, it was no longer the only one that could reasonably be called a town; Stellenbosch, Paarl, Worcester, Genadendal, Swellendam, Port Elizabeth, Graaff-Reinet and Grahamstown were now all substantial villages, and more. Though by no means at the end of its development, the colony was nearing maturity, and its settlers were beginning to agitate for a parliament.

Historians have tended to consider this qualitative and quantitative change as something natural and, in comparison with the socio-economic revolution that followed on the mineral discoveries of the late nineteenth century, unimportant. After all, was not such a story of growth characteristic of all colonies of white settlement and of slave societies—and the Cape was both? The Cape's success story was, in fact, far less spectacular than those of, for example, British North America or the West Indies. The economic history of the pre-industrial Cape Colony needs to be written in terms comparable to those of other colonies that concentrated on the increase of production, the development of export crops, and the establishment of instruments of trade and commerce. But a strictly economic history is not enough, of course. It is nec-

essary to couple this with a discussion of the class structure that emerged in tandem with this economic growth, dominated by those I (and others) have designated the Cape gentry, and to consider the racial structure that was inherent in, yet not encompassed by, both.

## Production

The expansion of the Cape's population and land area between 1700 and the 1830s was matched by and predicated upon a steady increase in both the production of agricultural commodities, notably wine and grain, and the numbers of cattle and sheep. This can be demonstrated by an analysis of the annual tax returns, known as the *opgaaf*. Unfortunately, these were subject to considerable underrecording, especially during the VOC period. Their unreliability was least pronounced in the case of wine production, because, after 1744, the VOC no longer taxed wine production on the basis of the *opgaaf* but instead charged £7.4 for each barrel that entered Cape Town. This new impost could not be evaded and was thus much more favorable to the VOC. It also removed any motive to underreport wine production. As is shown in Figure 1.1, production rose rather regularly throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: in 1725, 1,133 *leggers* (about 660,000 liters) of wine were produced, in 1775, 5,528 (nearly 3 million liters), and, in 1806, 9,643 *leggers* (over 5.5 million). The only major discontinuity was the sharp rise in the 1820s to a peak of 21,147 *leggers* (over twelve million liters) during the minor boom caused by the temporary preference given Cape wine on the British market. This boom did not last, and there was a small decrease in production in the 1830s.<sup>11</sup>

It is far less easy to provide figures for grain production or for stock holding, where underreporting was rife. For example, between the *opgaven* of 1795 and 1798 the colony's wheat production is recorded as having increased by 419 percent, its cattle herd by 351 percent, and its sheep flock by 346 percent, an unbelievable rate of growth. The dramatic rise in the figures was due to the farmers' fears after 1795 that the new British government would punish evasion much more severely than the company had done. Nevertheless it is possible to make rough estimates of the level of evasion for both grain and stock.<sup>12</sup>

The reconstructed development of wheat production is outlined in Figure 1.2. As with wine, it shows the steady rise in production levels from, perhaps, 15,000 hectoliters in the 1720s to more than 50,000 by the 1770s and more than 130,000 by 1806. In only one decade, the 1740s, did production seem to be running ahead of consumption, but this was shortly solved by a combination of poor harvests and an increase in the foreign shipping in Table Bay after the outbreak of war.<sup>13</sup> From the 1780s on, the danger was that the Cape would be short of grain—and on one occasion it did have to import one million pounds from the U.S. to avert a potential shortfall.<sup>14</sup> This was probably

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


Figure 1.1 Wine production, 1700–1839, in thousands of leggers. Note that 1 legger is equivalent to 582 liters. Source: Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, and Ross, "Relative Importance."

because the Cape's poor roads restricted the economic cultivation of grain to those areas from which the market could be reached without crossing a major mountain pass. Only towards the end of the eighteenth century were any attempts made to extend the area of potential arable land by developing coastal shipping. The initial experiment, in the Mossel Bay area in the 1780s, failed because of a temporary decline in the market following the end of the fourth Anglo-Dutch War.<sup>15</sup> After the British takeover, this project was revitalized, and the plains from Caledon to Mossel Bay, and also around St. Helena Bay to the north, became growing centers of grain production.<sup>16</sup> Wheat produc-




Figure 1.2 Wheat production, 1700–1839, in thousands of hectoliters. The figures up to 1800 are based on the reconstructions proposed in Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*. The figures for 1795 through 1804 are missing, or at least exist in such small numbers that they are not included in this graph. Source: Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, and Ross, "Relative Importance."

tion as such may have declined in the early nineteenth century, but this decline was offset by a considerable increase in the production of other grains, notably barley.<sup>17</sup>

Figures 1.3 and 1.4 give the reconstructed totals for the colonial cattle herd and sheep flock. In the 1720s the colony had more than 250,000 sheep and




Figure 1.3 Cattle numbers, 1700–1839, in thousands. The figures up to 1795 are reconstructions. The maximum figure given assumes that one-quarter of the true value was recorded in the *opgaaf*; the minimum figure given assumes that one-third of the true value was recorded. Source: Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, and Ross, "Relative Importance."




Figure 1.4 Sheep numbers, 1700-1839, in thousands. The figures up to 1795 are reconstructions. The maximum figure given assumes that only one-quarter of the true value was recorded in the *opgaaf*; the minimum figure given assumes that one-third of the true value was recorded. Source: Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, and Ross, "Relative Importance."

less than 100,000 cattle. In the 1770s there were more than a million sheep and around 250,000 cattle, and the numbers continued to grow thereafter, to more than 1.75 million sheep and 300,000 cattle by the 1820s. This was the result of the steady *trekboer* expansion into the Cape's interior, which had been conquered from Africans—the Khoisan and, later, the Xhosa. The pastoral farmers were engaged in raising slaughter stock, for their own consumption and to be driven to the Cape Town market, and also draught oxen for transport and ploughing in the agricultural southwest. The VOC made a few abortive attempts to introduce Dutch wool-bearing sheep, but only with the arrival of the merino, which was suited to the Cape's arid environment, did wool production become important, expanding rapidly through the first half of the nineteenth century.<sup>18</sup>

This demonstration of the steady, if unspectacular, rise in the Cape's agricultural production through the eighteenth century has depended, as noted, on the manipulation of heavily underreported tax figures. However, the growth in the number of slaves owned by the Cape's burghers, those free persons not in the employ of the VOC, provides an independent confirmation of expansion. In 1720, the burghers owned just under 2,500 slaves, and in 1790 nearly 14,500. Slaveownership was thus increasing fairly steadily, at about 2.56 percent a year, on average. This increase was largely the result of immigration rather than natural population growth. Since there were usually around four adult men for every adult woman in the slave population, without immigration the number of slaves would have declined fast. It is against reason to suppose that the slave trade necessary to achieve such a population increase would have occurred if the slaves had not been required to work in a steadily expanding agricultural sector, since probably only around a third of these slaves resided in Cape Town.<sup>19</sup>

### The Market for Cape Products

The steady growth of production was a response to a continual increase in the size of the market for agricultural products, both at the Cape and overseas. Notwithstanding the intermittent complaints of the farmers, Cape agricultural produce found a ready market. Exports never played the predominant role as in the frequently export-led economies of the New World. With the exception of elephant hunting, no sector produced exclusively, or even predominantly, for the overseas market. The early exports consisted largely of wheat to the Asian factories (trading sites) of the VOC, where European consumption patterns put a high value on the supply of bread, and also of butter and wine.<sup>20</sup> For a time in the 1770s, too, Cape wheat production was sufficient to allow considerable shipments to Amsterdam, where, so it was calculated, it could compete with Polish grain.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, this trade did not produce, either for the VOC or for the Cape grain farmers, such great profits that the Cape wheat production could expand explosively, and a series

of bad harvests, coupled with local market expansion during the fourth Anglo-Dutch War of the 1780s, meant that production for export was no longer feasible. Thereafter, grain production was never again sufficient for more than a trickle of exports, although it expanded sufficiently to meet local demand, if with difficulty.<sup>22</sup>

Wine exports, particularly to Europe, were at a much lower level during the eighteenth century, because Cape wines were too inferior or too expensive to find large markets overseas, except for the fine wines from the two Constantia estates on the slopes of Table Mountain. After the second British conquest of 1806, a new market did open up for a while, as a result of the imperial preferential tariffs, leading to a considerable increase in production until the abolition of the tariff advantages ended the boom. Substitute markets, largely in Australia and South America were found, but they were insufficient to absorb the temporary glut. A large number of bankruptcies ensued among wine farmers in this, the only—rather mild—Cape example of the pattern of boom and bust characteristic of slave economies everywhere.<sup>23</sup>

In the days before refrigeration, direct exports of stock products were limited. A certain amount of tallow was sent to Europe, and salted Cape butter was sold in some quantities in Batavia (modern Jakarta),<sup>24</sup> while the early commercial development of what was to become Port Elizabeth was based on the salting of meat for Mauritius.<sup>25</sup> Surprisingly, there is no indication of eighteenth-century export of hides, though this was to become important in the mid-nineteenth century. Wool sales were beginning in the 1820s and 1830s, when acclimatization of merino sheep occurred,<sup>26</sup> but wool exports were not of major importance until the 1840s.

In all cases, except perhaps for wine production during the early nineteenth century, the local market considerably exceeded exports as an outlet for the Cape's agricultural produce. This can be demonstrated by comparing the amounts brought into Cape Town, or the amounts said to be required by the urban population, with the quantities sent overseas.<sup>27</sup> These figures are not always available before the late eighteenth century but, on the reasonable assumption that the consumption patterns of Capetonians and of the visiting ships did not change drastically in the course of the eighteenth century, a sufficiently accurate reconstruction can be made of the earlier period to support this conclusion.<sup>28</sup> It must be noted, however, that Cape Town did not comprise the entire local market for wine and grains; there was also a regular exchange of produce between the wheat and wine farms.

Stock production was somewhat less oriented to the market. A considerable proportion of the natural increase of the herds and flocks was used by farmers to build up viable stocks and for their own needs. They also sold stock to the agrarian districts that needed meat and, more important, to be used as draft oxen, frequently in short supply, and without which crops could not have been grown, harvested, or transported to town.<sup>29</sup> In the late eighteenth century only between about 3 and 4 percent of the colony's cattle and sheep were butchered

annually in Cape Town, a meager figure that does not represent the whole of the pastoralists' involvement with the market. Virtually all farmers maintained links of varying strength with the Cape Town market and responded to its pressures. These pressures became steadily greater as, in any given district, European settlement became more firmly established. From its beginning, the most active of the colony's entrepreneurs invested in the opening up of the most distant areas of the colony; their goals were to supply their own farms with oxen, to ensure deliveries of meat for the Cape market, and, later, to pioneer wool production.<sup>30</sup>

## Imports

Before 1807, the most important imports of the Cape Colony were slaves, without whom the economy could not have functioned. Over the 155 years of this traffic the total imported must have been several tens of thousands. While the VOC itself organized a fair number of expeditions to provide slaves for its own use, much of this trade was privately organized, with slaves imported in small lots, either as part of the illegal, but tolerated, perquisites of VOC sailors and officers or off-loaded from the slavers rounding the Cape of Good Hope from Madagascar or Mozambique for the Americas.<sup>31</sup>

The remaining imports to the Cape were cotton and other textiles, largely from India, and a wide range of consumer goods, led by the tropical products such as coffee, tea, sugar, and spices but eventually including European manufactures as the white Cape community became more established and its tastes more developed. There were also agricultural and other implements, and materials, such as iron, for fabricating them. Significantly, the import business of the Van Reenen family during the 1780s, then the most diversified, enterprising, and successful entrepreneurs in the colony, concentrated on the import of agricultural tools.<sup>32</sup>

The Dutch East India Company did not attempt to impose a monopoly over imports to the colony, except for spices, coffee, and sugar. Other goods were quite legally imported, both from Europe and the East, either in the space allowed to individual sailors on VOC ships,<sup>33</sup> or by foreigners. Nor did the VOC levy duties on these imports, since this was a personal perquisite of the chief law officer, the *fiscaal*. As a result, we have no figures on imports, except for those goods sold by the VOC, which were in all probability a relatively small proportion of total imports. But, some indication of the level of private trading can be gathered from the quantities of money transferred to Europe through VOC channels. Such transfers ran at about f425,000 a year in the 1750s, rising to f600,000 by the late 1780s.<sup>34</sup> After the arrival of the British, exact figures for imports were produced; during the first British occupation (1795–1802), imports averaged £280,000 a year (or 1,120,000 rixdollars). Information is unavailable for the Batavian period, but, after 1806, until the

end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, imports were low, under £100,000 annually. Since this was also a period of high military expenditure in the colony there was probably a build-up of cash in the Cape. Thus, as trade became easier after 1813, the value of imports grew quickly, only dropping below £300,000 four times up to 1835, when they stood at an all-time high of £534,000.

The pattern of exports paralleled that of imports, though consistently at a much lower level. For the VOC period precise figures are not available, but the speed with which silver coinage drained out of the colony would seem to indicate a considerable excess of imports over exports.<sup>35</sup> During the Napoleonic wars, exports were almost always under £100,000 a year, but, after 1813, they rose steadily to reach a value of £370,000 in 1834. Of these exports, a proportion ranging between 92 percent (in 1824) and 77 percent (in 1822) was Cape products, the rest being re-exports from Asia and Europe, principally to Mauritius and Réunion.<sup>36</sup> The balance of Cape trade was conspicuously negative; between 1807 and 1835, for which there are definite figures, in only three years did exports exceed imports and, indeed, the deficit was often larger than the volume of exports. In part, this deficit would have been counterbalanced by such invisible exports as the supplying of ships in the harbor, but this activity could not have led to anything like an equilibrium in the balance of trade.

The colony's trade imbalance was resolved over the long term by transfers of money, first from the Netherlands, and then from Great Britain, for the government administration, the army, and the navy. The Cape's agriculture was kept in business above all, and its economy allowed to expand even during the wine and wool export booms, by the absorptive qualities of the military and governmental sectors of the colony's economy. W. S. van Ryneveld was quite correct in seeing the commercial prosperity of the Cape as dependent on the size of its garrison.<sup>37</sup> The economy's growth in the first half of the nineteenth century was largely financed by British military remittances.<sup>38</sup>

Recognition of the importance of the Cape's internal market for agricultural producers is nonetheless a recognition of the strength of the economy's links to the world economy. The ships and the garrisons were considerable consumers in their own right and provided the commercial opportunities on which the non-rural population of the colony could subsist. The income they generated was spent within the colony, leading to the creation of more income.<sup>39</sup> Large proportions of the non-agrarian population of the colony either were the direct agents, first of the Dutch East India Company and later the British state, or acquired their living by providing them with services, though rural economic growth also, of course, fostered its own merchants and artisans, who in turn became consumers of bread, meat, and wine. In this way the effects of the world economy penetrated far deeper into Cape society than might appear from an analysis of direct purchases by outsiders.

## The VOC and the Economy

This picture of the Cape economy as enjoying steady expansion throughout the eighteenth century does not accord with the traditional view presented in much of the historiography. In that view, the farmers of the wheat and wine districts of the southwest Cape are seen as debt-ridden, inefficient operators, only able to make a reasonable living by getting their hands on one of the lucrative revenue leases for the sale of wine or meat. They are seen as suffering from the creeping disease known as "overproduction," so that, far too often, their wine had to be poured down the rivers and their wheat left to rot in the barns, because the price it would fetch in Cape Town would not cover the cost of transporting it there.<sup>40</sup> This view has taken hold largely because historians took at face value the farmers' own statements about their prosperity, always a most dangerous historical practice. In their petition of 1779—before, it should be noted, the outbreak of the war that was so valuable to the Cape and so disastrous to the VOC—the farmers gave as an example of the problems caused by the Cape marketing system the glut of 1757. It is reasonable to assume that, if a similar crisis had occurred later, it would have been brought to the notice of the *Heren XVII*, and there is no independent evidence that it was.<sup>41</sup>

The traditional view of the Cape's economy thus derived from the petitions of Cape burghers from 1779 on, endorsed by the memorandum written by Commissary A. A. Uitenhage de Mist in 1802, before he went to the Cape to rule it in the name of the revolutionary Batavian republic.<sup>42</sup> It must therefore be seen, not as a statement of fact, but as the fossilization in academic writing of late eighteenth-century political rhetoric. Both De Mist's memorandum and, as will be shown, the petition of 1779, were attacks on the VOC, the latter during its existence, the former after the demise of the Dutch *ancien régime*, of which it was a major pillar.

The control the VOC exercised over the economy, and, indeed, over the society, of the Cape Colony was always limited. The main task of the high officials was to keep the costs of the Cape as low as possible, since there was never any hope that the station would make a profit for the VOC. At the same time, the economy had to fulfill the role set for it by the *Heren XVII*: the victualling of the company's ships and the supply of various products, above all wheat, to Batavia. And, like most eighteenth-century officials, of commercial companies or of European governments, they saw no reason why they should not exploit their offices for personal gain, prohibitions of the *Heren XVII* notwithstanding. (After the dismissal of Governor Willem Adriaan van der Stel,<sup>43</sup> officials could no longer engage directly in production, but they retained privileged access to the import trade in particular.)

The VOC had the legal right to impose monopolies over the sale of goods from outside the Cape, over shipping, and over the purchase of the produce

of Cape farms,<sup>44</sup> but it exercised this right only in part. With regard to the sale of imports, the VOC had certain advantages, though these fell far short of total control over the colony's economic life. The large number of ships it sent annually from Europe to the East carried unused cargo space in which it could import bulk, low-value goods, including iron and coal, without transport costs. Thus these dominated the trade.<sup>45</sup> The VOC was also the sole importer of goods whose production it monopolized at the source, the spices of the Moluccas, Banda, and Sri Lanka—cloves, nutmeg, mace, and cinnamon.<sup>46</sup> It also tried to enforce a monopoly on tobacco imports in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and on coffee imports towards the end of its rule,<sup>47</sup> but the first monopoly fizzled when the company itself developed no large trade in tobacco and instead focused increasingly on the importation of Asian goods into Europe.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, it made no attempt to acquire a monopoly in products like Indian textiles, that did form a major component of its imports into Europe. Thus, as the number of non-Dutch ships putting into Cape Town harbor increased in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the VOC's share of the importation to the Cape apparently declined.

As to shipping, the VOC, even had it wished, could not have isolated the colony from the world's traffic putting into Cape Town harbor. Even its most arbitrary measure along these lines—prohibiting the Cape colonists from chartering or outfitting their own ships for the trade in eastern waters—probably had little effect on the colony's economy;<sup>49</sup> after the prohibition was lifted in 1792, the colonists sent out only a few ships.<sup>50</sup> Even in the favorable conditions of the early nineteenth century, Cape-based international shipping got no further than the route between South Africa and Mauritius, Réunion, and Madagascar.

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less than 100,000 cattle. In the 1770s there were more than a million sheep and around 250,000 cattle, and the numbers continued to grow thereafter, to more than 1.75 million sheep and 300,000 cattle by the 1820s. This was the result of the steady *trekboer* expansion into the Cape's interior, which had been conquered from Africans—the Khoisan and, later, the Xhosa. The pastoral farmers were engaged in raising slaughter stock, for their own consumption and to be driven to the Cape Town market, and also draught oxen for transport and ploughing in the agricultural southwest. The VOC made a few abortive attempts to introduce Dutch wool-bearing sheep, but only with the arrival of the merino, which was suited to the Cape's arid environment, did wool production become important, expanding rapidly through the first half of the nineteenth century.<sup>18</sup>

This demonstration of the steady, if unspectacular, rise in the Cape's agricultural production through the eighteenth century has depended, as noted, on the manipulation of heavily underreported tax figures. However, the growth in the number of slaves owned by the Cape's burghers, those free persons not in the employ of the VOC, provides an independent confirmation of expansion. In 1720, the burghers owned just under 2,500 slaves, and in 1790 nearly 14,500. Slaveownership was thus increasing fairly steadily, at about 2.56 percent a year, on average. This increase was largely the result of immigration rather than natural population growth. Since there were usually around four adult men for every adult woman in the slave population, without immigration the number of slaves would have declined fast. It is against reason to suppose that the slave trade necessary to achieve such a population increase would have occurred if the slaves had not been required to work in a steadily expanding agricultural sector, since probably only around a third of these slaves resided in Cape Town.<sup>19</sup>

### The Market for Cape Products

The steady growth of production was a response to a continual increase in the size of the market for agricultural products, both at the Cape and overseas. Notwithstanding the intermittent complaints of the farmers, Cape agricultural produce found a ready market. Exports never played the predominant role as in the frequently export-led economies of the New World. With the exception of elephant hunting, no sector produced exclusively, or even predominantly, for the overseas market. The early exports consisted largely of wheat to the Asian factories (trading sites) of the VOC, where European consumption patterns put a high value on the supply of bread, and also of butter and wine.<sup>20</sup> For a time in the 1770s, too, Cape wheat production was sufficient to allow considerable shipments to Amsterdam, where, so it was calculated, it could compete with Polish grain.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, this trade did not produce, either for the VOC or for the Cape grain farmers, such great profits that the Cape wheat production could expand explosively, and a series

of bad harvests, coupled with local market expansion during the fourth Anglo-Dutch War of the 1780s, meant that production for export was no longer feasible. Thereafter, grain production was never again sufficient for more than a trickle of exports, although it expanded sufficiently to meet local demand, if with difficulty.<sup>22</sup>

Wine exports, particularly to Europe, were at a much lower level during the eighteenth century, because Cape wines were too inferior or too expensive to find large markets overseas, except for the fine wines from the two Constantia estates on the slopes of Table Mountain. After the second British conquest of 1806, a new market did open up for a while, as a result of the imperial preferential tariffs, leading to a considerable increase in production until the abolition of the tariff advantages ended the boom. Substitute markets, largely in Australia and South America were found, but they were insufficient to absorb the temporary glut. A large number of bankruptcies ensued among wine farmers in this, the only—rather mild—Cape example of the pattern of boom and bust characteristic of slave economies everywhere.<sup>23</sup>

In the days before refrigeration, direct exports of stock products were limited. A certain amount of tallow was sent to Europe, and salted Cape butter was sold in some quantities in Batavia (modern Jakarta),<sup>24</sup> while the early commercial development of what was to become Port Elizabeth was based on the salting of meat for Mauritius.<sup>25</sup> Surprisingly, there is no indication of eighteenth-century export of hides, though this was to become important in the mid-nineteenth century. Wool sales were beginning in the 1820s and 1830s, when acclimatization of merino sheep occurred,<sup>26</sup> but wool exports were not of major importance until the 1840s.

In all cases, except perhaps for wine production during the early nineteenth century, the local market considerably exceeded exports as an outlet for the Cape's agricultural produce. This can be demonstrated by comparing the amounts brought into Cape Town, or the amounts said to be required by the urban population, with the quantities sent overseas.<sup>27</sup> These figures are not always available before the late eighteenth century but, on the reasonable assumption that the consumption patterns of Capetonians and of the visiting ships did not change drastically in the course of the eighteenth century, a sufficiently accurate reconstruction can be made of the earlier period to support this conclusion.<sup>28</sup> It must be noted, however, that Cape Town did not comprise the entire local market for wine and grains; there was also a regular exchange of produce between the wheat and wine farms.

Stock production was somewhat less oriented to the market. A considerable proportion of the natural increase of the herds and flocks was used by farmers to build up viable stocks and for their own needs. They also sold stock to the agrarian districts that needed meat and, more important, to be used as draft oxen, frequently in short supply, and without which crops could not have been grown, harvested, or transported to town.<sup>29</sup> In the late eighteenth century only between about 3 and 4 percent of the colony's cattle and sheep were butchered

annually in Cape Town, a meager figure that does not represent the whole of the pastoralists' involvement with the market. Virtually all farmers maintained links of varying strength with the Cape Town market and responded to its pressures. These pressures became steadily greater as, in any given district, European settlement became more firmly established. From its beginning, the most active of the colony's entrepreneurs invested in the opening up of the most distant areas of the colony; their goals were to supply their own farms with oxen, to ensure deliveries of meat for the Cape market, and, later, to pioneer wool production.<sup>30</sup>

## Imports

Before 1807, the most important imports of the Cape Colony were slaves, without whom the economy could not have functioned. Over the 155 years of this traffic the total imported must have been several tens of thousands. While the VOC itself organized a fair number of expeditions to provide slaves for its own use, much of this trade was privately organized, with slaves imported in small lots, either as part of the illegal, but tolerated, perquisites of VOC sailors and officers or off-loaded from the slavers rounding the Cape of Good Hope from Madagascar or Mozambique for the Americas.<sup>31</sup>

The remaining imports to the Cape were cotton and other textiles, largely from India, and a wide range of consumer goods, led by the tropical products such as coffee, tea, sugar, and spices but eventually including European manufactures as the white Cape community became more established and its tastes more developed. There were also agricultural and other implements, and materials, such as iron, for fabricating them. Significantly, the import business of the Van Reenen family during the 1780s, then the most diversified, enterprising, and successful entrepreneurs in the colony, concentrated on the import of agricultural tools.<sup>32</sup>

The Dutch East India Company did not attempt to impose a monopoly over imports to the colony, except for spices, coffee, and sugar. Other goods were quite legally imported, both from Europe and the East, either in the space allowed to individual sailors on VOC ships,<sup>33</sup> or by foreigners. Nor did the VOC levy duties on these imports, since this was a personal perquisite of the chief law officer, the *fiscaal*. As a result, we have no figures on imports, except for those goods sold by the VOC, which were in all probability a relatively small proportion of total imports. But, some indication of the level of private trading can be gathered from the quantities of money transferred to Europe through VOC channels. Such transfers ran at about f425,000 a year in the 1750s, rising to f600,000 by the late 1780s.<sup>34</sup> After the arrival of the British, exact figures for imports were produced; during the first British occupation (1795–1802), imports averaged £280,000 a year (or 1,120,000 rixdollars). Information is unavailable for the Batavian period, but, after 1806, until the

end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, imports were low, under £100,000 annually. Since this was also a period of high military expenditure in the colony there was probably a build-up of cash in the Cape. Thus, as trade became easier after 1813, the value of imports grew quickly, only dropping below £300,000 four times up to 1835, when they stood at an all-time high of £534,000.

The pattern of exports paralleled that of imports, though consistently at a much lower level. For the VOC period precise figures are not available, but the speed with which silver coinage drained out of the colony would seem to indicate a considerable excess of imports over exports.<sup>35</sup> During the Napoleonic wars, exports were almost always under £100,000 a year, but, after 1813, they rose steadily to reach a value of £370,000 in 1834. Of these exports, a proportion ranging between 92 percent (in 1824) and 77 percent (in 1822) was Cape products, the rest being re-exports from Asia and Europe, principally to Mauritius and Réunion.<sup>36</sup> The balance of Cape trade was conspicuously negative; between 1807 and 1835, for which there are definite figures, in only three years did exports exceed imports and, indeed, the deficit was often larger than the volume of exports. In part, this deficit would have been counterbalanced by such invisible exports as the supplying of ships in the harbor, but this activity could not have led to anything like an equilibrium in the balance of trade.

The colony's trade imbalance was resolved over the long term by transfers of money, first from the Netherlands, and then from Great Britain, for the government administration, the army, and the navy. The Cape's agriculture was kept in business above all, and its economy allowed to expand even during the wine and wool export booms, by the absorptive qualities of the military and governmental sectors of the colony's economy. W. S. van Ryneveld was quite correct in seeing the commercial prosperity of the Cape as dependent on the size of its garrison.<sup>37</sup> The economy's growth in the first half of the nineteenth century was largely financed by British military remittances.<sup>38</sup>

Recognition of the importance of the Cape's internal market for agricultural producers is nonetheless a recognition of the strength of the economy's links to the world economy. The ships and the garrisons were considerable consumers in their own right and provided the commercial opportunities on which the non-rural population of the colony could subsist. The income they generated was spent within the colony, leading to the creation of more income.<sup>39</sup> Large proportions of the non-agrarian population of the colony either were the direct agents, first of the Dutch East India Company and later the British state, or acquired their living by providing them with services, though rural economic growth also, of course, fostered its own merchants and artisans, who in turn became consumers of bread, meat, and wine. In this way the effects of the world economy penetrated far deeper into Cape society than might appear from an analysis of direct purchases by outsiders.

## The VOC and the Economy

This picture of the Cape economy as enjoying steady expansion throughout the eighteenth century does not accord with the traditional view presented in much of the historiography. In that view, the farmers of the wheat and wine districts of the southwest Cape are seen as debt-ridden, inefficient operators, only able to make a reasonable living by getting their hands on one of the lucrative revenue leases for the sale of wine or meat. They are seen as suffering from the creeping disease known as “overproduction,” so that, far too often, their wine had to be poured down the rivers and their wheat left to rot in the barns, because the price it would fetch in Cape Town would not cover the cost of transporting it there.<sup>40</sup> This view has taken hold largely because historians took at face value the farmers’ own statements about their prosperity, always a most dangerous historical practice. In their petition of 1779—before, it should be noted, the outbreak of the war that was so valuable to the Cape and so disastrous to the VOC—the farmers gave as an example of the problems caused by the Cape marketing system the glut of 1757. It is reasonable to assume that, if a similar crisis had occurred later, it would have been brought to the notice of the *Heren XVII*, and there is no independent evidence that it was.<sup>41</sup>

The traditional view of the Cape’s economy thus derived from the petitions of Cape burghers from 1779 on, endorsed by the memorandum written by Commissary A. A. Uitenhage de Mist in 1802, before he went to the Cape to rule it in the name of the revolutionary Batavian republic.<sup>42</sup> It must therefore be seen, not as a statement of fact, but as the fossilization in academic writing of late eighteenth-century political rhetoric. Both De Mist’s memorandum and, as will be shown, the petition of 1779, were attacks on the VOC, the latter during its existence, the former after the demise of the Dutch *ancien régime*, of which it was a major pillar.

The control the VOC exercised over the economy, and, indeed, over the society, of the Cape Colony was always limited. The main task of the high officials was to keep the costs of the Cape as low as possible, since there was never any hope that the station would make a profit for the VOC. At the same time, the economy had to fulfill the role set for it by the *Heren XVII*: the victualling of the company’s ships and the supply of various products, above all wheat, to Batavia. And, like most eighteenth-century officials, of commercial companies or of European governments, they saw no reason why they should not exploit their offices for personal gain, prohibitions of the *Heren XVII* notwithstanding. (After the dismissal of Governor Willem Adriaan van der Stel,<sup>43</sup> officials could no longer engage directly in production, but they retained privileged access to the import trade in particular.)

The VOC had the legal right to impose monopolies over the sale of goods from outside the Cape, over shipping, and over the purchase of the produce

of Cape farms,<sup>44</sup> but it exercised this right only in part. With regard to the sale of imports, the VOC had certain advantages, though these fell far short of total control over the colony's economic life. The large number of ships it sent annually from Europe to the East carried unused cargo space in which it could import bulk, low-value goods, including iron and coal, without transport costs. Thus these dominated the trade.<sup>45</sup> The VOC was also the sole importer of goods whose production it monopolized at the source, the spices of the Moluccas, Banda, and Sri Lanka—cloves, nutmeg, mace, and cinnamon.<sup>46</sup> It also tried to enforce a monopoly on tobacco imports in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and on coffee imports towards the end of its rule,<sup>47</sup> but the first monopoly fizzled when the company itself developed no large trade in tobacco and instead focused increasingly on the importation of Asian goods into Europe.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, it made no attempt to acquire a monopoly in products like Indian textiles, that did form a major component of its imports into Europe. Thus, as the number of non-Dutch ships putting into Cape Town harbor increased in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the VOC's share of the importation to the Cape apparently declined.

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no more than a quarter, and there were alternative uses for cattle, notably as draught oxen and producers of butter. In the face of competing buyers, contracted butchers could not drive down the purchase price and thus harm the Cape farmers.<sup>54</sup> The VOC did require all foreign ships visiting Cape Town to buy their meat from the contracted butchers, who could charge the foreigners monopolistic prices and so recoup the losses suffered in their sales to the VOC. Evidently, then, the more foreign ships that put into Table Bay, the lower the company's own expenses; local officials did what they could to foster these visits.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, the game could only be played so far, since Cape Town could price itself out of the market of victualling the fleets of Europe's other trading nations.<sup>56</sup> In this, as in so many of its activities, the company could only seal off the colony to a very limited extent from the world market.

The influence the company had over Cape society declined during the latter part of the eighteenth century. There were three principal reasons for this. First, the fortunes of the VOC as a whole stagnated and, after 1780, went into sharp decline, as can be seen from the basic figures of income and expenditure. Until 1780 there was never a decade in which the revenue it received from the sale of its products in Europe was less than the total cost of its *equipage*, which represented virtually all its costs, including the financing of its running losses within Asia. But, whereas its expenditure over the period 1780–95 was £299 million, its income was no more than £207 million; the former exceeded the latter by 44 percent.<sup>57</sup>

The Cape was, and always had been, one of the significant contributors to the total deficit, making a loss of over £300,000 a year. Throughout the 1780s major efforts were made to reduce this sum, but largely without result.<sup>58</sup> The long-term ossification of the company's decision-making structures, the costs of territorial rule in the East, and increased competition from English, Danish, and Chinese merchants, combined with the shocks of the fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–84), had driven the VOC to the point of bankruptcy.<sup>59</sup>

Second, the relative importance of the VOC in the colony's economy had declined, and its share of the market for the Cape's agricultural produce decreased. The Cape was attracting more and more foreign ships whose quartermasters bought provisions for further voyages and whose crews spent time ashore, while the VOC itself did not increase the number of ships it sent to Table Bay. In no year after 1771 did Dutch ships exceed those of other European nations.<sup>60</sup>

Third, the general level of wealth of the wine and wheat farmers increased substantially in the late eighteenth century. Leonard Guelke has shown that the average net value of the estates of cultivators, as recorded in the inventories drawn up after their deaths, increased from £9,300 in 1731–42, to £14,030 in 1751–62, to £24,330 in 1771–80.<sup>61</sup> As yet, comparable data for years after 1780 have not been collected, but it may be surmised that the trend continued. Evidence for the growth in prosperity of Cape farmers at the end of the eighteenth century can be found, for instance, in the physical structure of the




Figure 1.5 The building of new farms.

Cape's farms—only in the latter part of the eighteenth century was there any significant building of Cape farmsteads—or rather it was then that they were built at considerable expense. (See Figure 1.5 for the dates of building, or major alteration, of the surviving farms.)<sup>62</sup> With their intricate plaster-work and luxuriously timbered yellowwood floors and ceiling, to say nothing of the furniture they contained, these houses are witness to the fact that their owners, the wine farmers of the southwest Cape, were doing well enough to create their own unique chateaux. The houses were designed not by professional architects, whose work was largely limited to Cape Town, but by anonymous craftsmen, probably mainly by slaves, one of whom is remembered as having designed and built at least three of these houses.<sup>63</sup>

S. P. van Braam, a traveler to the Cape around 1780, wrote that he had seen on the farms "a magnificence which I am certain in general can be found

in no other colony, nor even in the richest cities of any country in the world.”<sup>64</sup> The Commissioner Hendrik Breton, at the Cape in 1783, wrote that,

on various farms, that I expressly visited, I found a far from simple life, and nothing except signs of prosperity, to the extent that, in addition to splendour and magnificence in clothes and carriages, the houses were filled with elegant furniture and the tables decked with silverware and served by tidily clothed slaves.<sup>65</sup>

The boom caused by the war that did much to reduce the company to bankruptcy also brought a long-term growth in the wealth of the richer Cape farms—a prosperity not spread evenly throughout the colony. The same families seem to have remained active as wine farmers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Of 53 families<sup>66</sup> in which at least one member owned 10,000 or more vines in 1731 in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein districts, 29 still did in 1752, 22 did in 1782, and as many as 19 had 20,000 vines or more in 1825.<sup>67</sup> Of 70 such families in 1752, 38 were still present in 1782 and 30 around 1825; of the 83 in 1782, 55 could still be found 43 years later. In 1825, the 19 families<sup>68</sup> that had been present in every year investigated since 1731 had between them 41 percent of the total vines in the colony and formed 43 percent of all those farmers who had 20,000 or more vines.<sup>69</sup> Once established, a family could be expected to continue in wine farming for as long as there were adult sons to continue the family name. There was thus considerable continuity within the most important sector of Cape agriculture. The circulation of the Cape farming elite cannot have been as rapid as has sometimes been claimed.<sup>70</sup>

### The Officials of the Company and the Cape Patriots

By the last decades of the eighteenth century, the VOC could no longer exercise its patronage to control the colonial society of the Cape, and its officials were vulnerable to attack. Such an onslaught came from the Cape Patriot movement of the 1780s and 1790s. This was, in effect, a movement of the Cape gentry, resulting from the economic changes of the latter decades of the century. The immediate trigger for the explosion of political feeling was the high-handed action of the *fiscaal* against one particular burgher, Carel Hendrik Buitendag.<sup>71</sup> Nourishment for the movement may have come, by example, from the revolt of thirteen of the sixteen British colonies on the North American mainland, as well as from those Dutch politicians and populists who, from 1781, were challenging the authority of the Prince of Orange (who was not only *stadholder* of the Netherlands but also *opperbewindhebber*, chief director, of the VOC). In addition, various Dutch patriots were greatly concerned with the problems of the Dutch colonial empire and its ruling companies.<sup>72</sup> As it developed, however, the Cape Patriot movement became increasingly concerned with the local interests of the colony. Its initial pamphlets, spread around Cape Town in 1778, may have derived their arguments

from the ideas of the Enlightenment, and, in particular, from the anti-Orangist strain within Dutch political thought, but once the movement became organized it drew its inspiration from the issues of local society, in particular the division of wealth.

This local orientation is evident in the main expression of Patriot demands, a memorial drawn up in 1779 and presented to the *Heren XVII*.<sup>73</sup> After a somewhat unconvincing attempt to portray the Cape economy as in desperate straits, the memorial attacked the activities of various company officials and presented a list of suggestions for the better organization of the colony. The *fiscaal*, W. C. Boers, and the secretary of the Council of Policy, O. M. Bergh, were accused of meting out summary and unjustified punishments to burghers for piffling offenses. Implicit in these charges was a claim by the burghers to treatment equivalent to that granted company officials. In a fashion, they were attacking the hierarchical system of the colony and demanding a position of equivalence. No longer would they acquiesce in being dutiful subordinates to the *regenten* of the VOC.

The burghers also charged officials with corruption and speculation. Throughout the colony's history there had been complaints that members of the government disobeyed the *Heren XVII*'s prohibition on private trade and the ownership of land and that the perquisites the officials enjoyed were exorbitantly high.<sup>74</sup> Whether matters got worse during the 1770s is debatable. It has been claimed that Ryk Tulbagh, the governor who died in 1771, "had kept a watchful eye on every official, and allowed no one to overstep the directions concerning farming and trading, or to take a fee that he was not entitled to." All the same, Tulbagh himself died wealthy, to an extent that could certainly not have derived from his salary. In contrast, Joachim Van Plettenberg, who succeeded him, is said to "have permitted his subordinates to do almost as they chose. The result was a condition of affairs in which no transaction with government could be carried out without bribery, in which many of the officials farmed and traded openly, and the colonists generally became discontented."<sup>75</sup> Perhaps matters became laxer under Van Plettenberg; certainly the officials became more organized. There were no longer any complaints, as there had been seventy years earlier, that the officials were monopolizing production and out-farming the settlers—the middle-sized wine and wheat farms of the Southwest Cape were by now far too efficient and well established for this to have been feasible. The principal complaints now were directed against two trading firms, Cruywagen and Co. and Lefèvre and Co., both of which had several high officials among their partners; they dominated the export trade, making large profits as a result of their oligopolistic position. In this there was a coincidence of interest between the gentry and the merchants,<sup>76</sup> since the farmers realized that the two firms kept the prices for imported goods they were buying at a higher level than would have been the case with a liberalization of trade.

The same coincidence of interest can be seen in demands that the Patriots

made for reorganization of the colony. Several of the 1779 memorial's clauses related to matters exclusively affecting the Capetonians, including complaints about illegal trading by small stall-holders on the beach of Table Bay and by the various Chinese and Javanese exiles who had been banned to the Cape and were said to be behind much slave theft. Others were of more general nature, such as the measures to reduce the arbitrariness of Cape justice and to see that it cost less. The demands for free trade and for the right of Cape burghers to run their own ships to the East and to Holland would also benefit both townsmen and farmers, especially since these ships would largely export agricultural products and import slave labor, mostly for the countryside.<sup>77</sup> In this category of demand, the most important was that the burghers might be allowed to punish their own slaves "without being allowed to tyrannize them," and that the cost of chaining or jailing a slave be reduced. The VOC's monopoly on the legal use of force, even with respect to the relations between master and slave, had long been one of the bulwarks of company rule,<sup>78</sup> and, in challenging it, the burghers were making a very real claim to co-dominance in the most vital aspect of colonial society, its labor relations.

More clearly to the advantage of the gentry were demands that the company officials give up their privileged position in the buying in of grain and wine, especially that destined for export. They proposed to leave the fixing of the grain price entirely in the company's hands, no doubt because otherwise the clash of interests between urban consumers and rural producers within the Patriot movement itself would have become too pronounced. Rather they demanded that burghers, not company officials, be appointed as intermediaries. No doubt some of the signatories believed that they themselves would acquire these potentially lucrative positions. The agriculturalists also believed that burghers, whose tenure of office would be regularly renewable, would be free from any form of favoritism, so that the market would be fairly distributed. At the same time, the rationalization of the land policy, which the memorial also proposed, could only have led to even more land being claimed by the wealthier farmers of the Cape.

One notable absence from this memorial is any mention whatsoever of the contract to supply meat to the company (the *pagt*), a contract much hated by the interior stock farmers.<sup>79</sup> Few, if any, of the interior farmers were represented in the Patriot movement. Their political upsurge would take a different, more violent, and in some ways more radical course in the 1790s.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, one of the burgher representatives who composed the memorial, Jacobus van Reenen, had himself made a fortune as a meat *pagter*, and his son now held that lucrative contract.<sup>81</sup> The Patriots were always cool-headed enough not to attack their own interests.

Support for the Patriot movement came from the inhabitants of Cape Town and from the wheat and wine farmers of the southwest Cape. The 1779 memorial was drawn up by four men, Jacobus van Reenen, Barend Jan Artoys, Tieleman Roos, and Nicholaas Godfried Heyns, who had been chosen by the

three *burgerraden* of Cape Town and the four *heemraden* of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein as representatives of 404 other burghers who, presumably, subscribed to its tenets. Somewhat over 15 percent of the Cape's free adult males (excluding those in the service of the VOC and the Khoisan) subscribed to it, a surprisingly high proportion given the difficulties of political organization in the colony. All but three of them were literate enough to sign their own name.

The signatories included a number of Cape Town entrepreneurs and merchants, including the Van Reenen family. Among the farmers, a comparison of the Stellenbosch and Drakenstein *opgaaf* of 1782 with the 1779 signatories shows that, of the 122 farmers who said they owned 10,000 or more vines, 53 (or 43 percent) had signed the memorial three years earlier. By contrast, of the 333 inhabitants of the district returning 100 or more sheep only 18 (or 5 percent) had signed. While the difficulties of collecting signatures from the distant parts of the colony would obviously have been great, these figures do reflect a real difference of support for the formal Patriot movement between the southwest Cape and the interior, which was also reflected in its program.<sup>82</sup>

Evidently there were many in the Cape, particularly among the richest farmers, who considered the Patriots' tactics of open attack on the company officials counterproductive. No doubt they were. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Cape was becoming recognized in the Netherlands as the pleassest, if not the most lucrative, of the Dutch colonies, and thus one to which the country's rulers, including the Prince of Orange and the company's advocate, would send their protégés and relations.<sup>83</sup> Nevertheless, even in 1784, at the height of the wartime boom, a group of fourteen leading farmers who had remained aloof from previous agitation were prepared to add their names to a memorial demanding changes in the economic system of the colony.<sup>84</sup> In part, they were probably trying to protect themselves from the slump that would follow the end of the war, but there was clearly common ground between them and the Patriots, and thus among almost all substantial Cape burghers. The political and economic order that had been suitable when the Cape was no more than a refreshment station could now no longer serve. The colony had come of age.

### The Consolidation of Gentry Power

In 1795 the Cape was conquered by the British as part of their global strategy in the French revolutionary wars and, in the same year, the VOC went out of business, its assets transferred back to the Dutch state. The economic restrictions over the Cape imposed by company policy were entirely revoked, but political power over the central organs of colonial government remained in the hands of the governors. During the following short period (1803–1806) when the Cape was ruled by representatives of the Batavian republic (as the Dutch state was called during the period when the Netherlands were domi-

nated by revolutionary France), Commissioner De Mist had plans to allow elections to the consultative bodies he set up, thereby acceding to a Patriot demand. But these plans were quietly dropped later, and the British high Tory governors of the Cape from 1806 on were glad to keep appointments to consultative bodies under their own control. Not until the 1850s would elections be held.

The local gentry was, nevertheless, further entrenched. After all, the government in Cape Town could not impose its will on the districts without acquiescence of the leaders of country society. The *heemraden*, whose powers were increasing during the early nineteenth century, were appointed from among the most notable and most experienced individuals of the districts, and they had to be owners of landed property to be eligible for this office.<sup>85</sup> It is not surprising that they did nothing to the disadvantage of the class to which they belonged.

The Commissioners of Eastern Enquiry, who conducted investigations in the 1820s, were sensitive to the problems caused by concentration of power in the hands of local notables. They focused criticism on the *heemraden* on two main grounds: first, their extensive opportunity to exercise influence and maintain the structure of rural society by setting the level of land taxation for their fellow farmers;<sup>86</sup> and, second, their enormous powers as regulators of labor relations in the colony. The commissioners wrote that the *heemraden's*

views of impartiality or of justice in cases in which the coloured classes were engaged before them, were much persecuted by the prejudices and habits that have become almost hereditary amongst them, as well as the lower classes of the white inhabitants. As tribunals of justice, therefore, or even as forming a collective magistracy of police, invested with considerable power over the coloured inhabitants and with a discretionary power over the white inhabitants, that was liable to much abuse in consequence of its remoteness from observation or control, we cannot . . . contemplate the continuance of them without endeavouring to point out the means at least of correcting the evils they have engendered.<sup>87</sup>

The statistics the commission collected on the jurisdiction of the *heemraden* seem to bear this out.<sup>88</sup> It is true that there were a large number of convictions for maltreating a slave or a Khoisan, but it is not clear in how many of these cases the accused was the master himself, and in how many his employees.<sup>89</sup> Moreover, as leaders of local society, the *heemraden* had a duty, as they saw it, to prevent brutality against slaves that could lead to revolt; still, they could punish slaves for bringing false complaints and accusations, and did so, almost as often as, and more severely than, they punished those who ill-treated their laborers. For the rest, barring a large number of cases of assault (apparently largely between slaves),<sup>90</sup> the major effort of the *heemraden* was aimed at a revealingly undifferentiated set of offenses: "desertion, vagabonding and theft." Even though the office of *heemraad* was abolished, in accordance with the advice of the commissioners, there is no evidence that the local administrations subsequently became any less responsive to gentry interests, while the

introduction of juries, on which only property owners could serve, certainly strengthened the gentry's power to suppress more serious "crimes."<sup>91</sup>

The reverse side of this power can be seen in the reaction to government attempts to impose unwelcome measures on the slaveowners. Driven on by humanitarian impulses in Great Britain, the Cape government introduced systems for the control of slave treatment like those adopted in the British West Indies. The result was total non-cooperation. The Burgher Senate in Cape Town refused to promulgate the relevant ordinances, forcing the governor to do so on his own, an action of dubious legality. None of the *heemraden* were present when the magistrate of Stellenbosch published the Ordinance. Attempts to issue punishment books that were supposed to be filled in by each owner led to a riot, described by the appointed Protector of Slaves as a "state almost of insurrection." Of the 3,024 slaveowners in the Cape and Stellenbosch districts, no more than 76 completed their returns in June 1831, and a year later the number had dropped to two. A Dutch Reformed clergyman who had tried to persuade his flock to abide by the regulations was forced to abandon his parish. The authorities in Cape Town simply could not impose their will on the countryside against the wishes of the local gentry.<sup>92</sup>

### Currency, Credit, and Banking

The continued dominance of the gentry within Cape rural society depended on two accommodations. The first was with the organs of credit and trade, which indeed worked to entrench the Cape elite's dominance of colonial society. The second was with the stock farmers of the interior. Market-oriented agriculture clearly required an efficient monetary system and commercial network, while its expansion, both in territory and in intensity, necessitated access to credit. In the eighteenth century, financial arrangements were rather informal. With regard to currency, the Cape was linked into the monetary system of the Dutch Empire and the Indian Ocean, and, as a result, a large variety of coins was in circulation, all in silver, and hence readily convertible. The Spanish *real* (or pieces-of-eight) were the most popular, because their purity was most trusted, Spanish America being by far the greatest source of the world's silver. The VOC's annual shipments of coin to the Cape, which provided a large proportion of the colony's money, therefore always contained a certain number of *reals*, although, increasingly, the company attempted to replace them with Dutch *guilders* so as to keep in the Dutch Republic the profits derived from minting coin.<sup>93</sup> The British found it necessary to pay their troops in Spanish dollars.<sup>94</sup>

Credit arrangements were also largely informal; individuals with capital lent it out particularly to those who were beginning an agricultural enterprise, at, usually, 5 percent interest. Many creditors were company officials themselves, who had better opportunities to accumulate wealth but fewer avenues for investment, since they could only invest in agricultural production by the

use of straw men.<sup>95</sup> Thus Joachim von Dessin, founder of the South African Library, had f25,919 out at interest at his death in 1761, lent to 33 different people, many of whom were farmers.<sup>96</sup>

A number of burghers engaged in this practice, and it seems that some of them retired from farm ownership to become rentiers at the end of their life.<sup>97</sup> In addition, the funds of the church were used to provide mortgages<sup>98</sup> and the *Wees-en-Boedelkamer* (the Orphan Chamber of which Von Dessin was long-time head) acted as a fairly large-scale provider of credit, since it administered the estates of those who died without heirs in South Africa, at least until the heirs could be found. Since there were many single, uprooted men in the service of the VOC, this fund could grow rapidly. In 1720 it was more than two hundred thousand rixdollars, by 1780 it had risen to nearly four hundred thousand, in 1800 it was over a million, and by 1830 the Chamber's capital was just about three million (admittedly devalued) rixdollars.<sup>99</sup>

The activities of the Orphan Chamber and the church were largely concerned with long-term mortgages. There was also a need for short-term commercial credit to enable tradespeople to pay for their wholesale purchases before they could resell them, a need fulfilled in part by private lenders but even more by the licensed auctioneers. Public sales, for instance of imported goods, had to be done through the medium of such men, and their rights were protected by their being the first claimants in the case of bankruptcy. As a result, they were able to provide credit for the purchasers of goods at auctions, while, because of their privileged position, they could also limit participation in the auctions to those merchants whose credit they trusted. They were also allowed to charge the high interest rate of 10 percent.<sup>100</sup>

Between 1782 and 1808, considerable changes occurred in all these matters; for example, the metallic basis of the currency was abandoned. In 1782, confronted with a disruption of supplies of silver during the fourth Anglo-Dutch War, the Cape government issued money on stamped parchment. The proclamation of a new currency was accompanied by a promise that it would be redeemed by the company when sufficient hard money became available, and by a strict prohibition on the export of specie from the colony.<sup>101</sup> The latter provision proved a complete dead letter, and the inconvertibility of the Cape currency led to an increased hemorrhage of silver from the colony. The company did honor its commitment to buy back the notes it had issued, but in 1792 paper money once again had to be issued.<sup>102</sup>

After the British capture, paper currency was employed until 1825, theoretically backed by government land and buildings, not silver.<sup>103</sup> The steady drain of metallic currency from the colony continued, ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding,<sup>104</sup> and the value of the rixdollar fluctuated considerably, although the trend was steadily downwards. After regaining par in 1806, after the war, it devalued steadily until by 1821 it was worth only about one shilling and six pence, or three-eighths of its face value.<sup>105</sup> In 1825, the British treasury decided to make all the currencies of the Empire dependent on ster-

ling. The rixdollar faded out of existence, replaced by British coinage and promissory notes, until on March 31, 1841, it ceased to be legal tender,<sup>106</sup> resulting in vigorous protests in the Cape Colony. A petition signed by 2,115 people was sent to London, requesting in vain that the Ordinance be rescinded. In 1793, the Cape government set up the first bank at the Cape to provide mortgages, and fifteen years later a second linked bank was established to provide short-term credit for the mercantile community. The latter penetrated fairly well into Cape Town's commercial community, but was operated so conservatively that it only served to ensure that established merchants were strengthened, but newcomers not helped.<sup>107</sup> The banks were somewhat less cautious in their dealings with the farmers, and the Lombard (mortgage) bank was badly hit in the later 1820s after the crisis in the wine industry caused a fall in the value of agricultural property.

As the colony's economy grew, the government banks could not meet the demands made on them, simply for lack of funds, and attempts were made to set up private banks. The first attempt, by J. E. Ebden in 1826, was blocked by the government, largely in order to safeguard the revenue it received from the state institutions.<sup>108</sup> Such a policy could not last in the laissez-faire climate of the nineteenth century. Pressure for the establishment of a private banking system not backed by the government grew sharply, with the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, for instance, attributing the bankruptcy of several of its members to temporary cash-flow problems which the Discount Bank could not alleviate.<sup>109</sup> As a result, the first private Cape bank was founded in 1837, rapidly followed by others until, in 1843, the government banks abandoned their normal banking operations and became mere adjuncts of the colonial treasury.<sup>110</sup> The new banks were in Cape Town, of course, as the government banks were, but also in the interior of the colony, which had previously been thought impossible. As late as 1824, for instance, the president of the Discount Bank had declared that the lack of commercial knowledge made it unwise to provide the same services in Graaff-Reinet or Grahamstown as in Cape Town.<sup>111</sup> The spread of local banks tied the credit structures into the local structures of power and wealth, thus strengthening the gentry's hold over district society.

### Territorial Expansion

The second major accommodation the richer farmers of the southwest Cape had to make was to ensure that there was no serious conflict of interest between them and the primarily stock farmers of the interior. As we have seen, the Patriot memorial of 1779 made no mention of the latter's grievances. Their 1784 memorial did mention them, because its signatories had no direct interest in the meat trade and because its drafter, Johannes Swellengrebel, had traveled to the Sneeuwberg and been shocked by the primitive conditions under which the *veeboeren* lived.<sup>112</sup> However, the Graaff-Reinet colonists were

still hostile towards the central government and, by extension, towards the social order being established in the southwest Cape.<sup>113</sup> In the course of the early nineteenth century, though, the steady commercialization of the interior would bind its white inhabitants into the social order of the colony, though as the Great Trek would show, never entirely.

From around 1720 until deep into the nineteenth century, the great majority of farmers living to the north and east of the Breede River had drawn most of their income, in cash or in subsistence, from their flocks of sheep and herds of cattle. With diminished rainfall compared to the southern coast, the stock population (and hence the human population) could nowhere be dense, and the farmers were often forced to be transhumant.<sup>114</sup> It was against this ecological background that so-called *trekboer* society developed.

To one official the *trekboers* "lived as animals on the *veld* with the animals,"<sup>115</sup> and a rich colonist expressed the fear that the inhabitants of the Camdeboo, near modern Graaff-Reinet, "will become a completely savage nation."<sup>116</sup> But the stereotype of the frontier farmers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as indigent, nomadic, and devoid of links to the market—or even of any economic rationality—does not stand up to detailed historical investigation. The expansion of colonial farmers into the Cape interior was, in general, a response to correctly perceived economic opportunities, within the framework of a land tenure system that precluded subdivision,<sup>117</sup> an expanding population, and a kinship system that stressed the importance of the economic independence of every young married pair.<sup>118</sup>

A number granted grazing rights on the fringes of white settlement were owners of arable farms in the southwest, who used their new ranches to run draft oxen for their ploughs and wagons. In 1731, all the grazing land acquired to the east of the Gourits River near Mossel Bay, then the most distant settlement, was owned by men with other agricultural property further west, including, in Johannes Cruywagen, probably the richest burgher of the time.<sup>119</sup> In the 1770s, to give another example, Jacob van Reenen, the colony's major butcher, had farms spread as far as the Hantam in the north and the mouth of the Gamtoos in the east, both on the margins of settlement.<sup>120</sup>

For these few, then, the establishment of frontier farms was a way of balancing their agricultural portfolio. In the great majority of cases, though, the people of the frontier were there because they were unable to compete for more valuable farms closer to the market. As Leonard Guelke argues, at a certain stage of European colonization, the availability of "free" land—free in that it did not have to be paid for, not in that it did not have to be conquered—meant that individuals with little capital could achieve an independent existence, albeit through a farm economy largely at a subsistence level. This does not mean that the *trekboers* were behaving in some atavistic, un-economic manner. Rather, under the conditions of early European settlement, in North America as well as in South Africa, subsistence agriculture (or pastoralism) "for a brief period . . . made good economic sense." Frontier farmers

"retained liberal (individualistic) commercial outlooks," and were thoroughly prepared to exploit such market opportunities as were offered.<sup>121</sup> If Guelke's theoretical analysis is accepted, and surely it must be, then the essentially empirical question becomes one of ascertaining when, in any given region of the South African interior, the conditions developed that would allow for increased market orientation. Guelke argues that the degree of commercialization before 1779 was not sufficient to bring the switch over from subsistence pastoralism. He may well be right in regard to some regions but there are clear indications of specialized butter production in the Swellendam area by this date, among a number of similar developments.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, for the great sweep of what were later to become the Cape midlands, from the Sneeuwberg south to Algoa Bay, and probably also for the northern borderlands of the Bokkeveld and the Roggeveld,<sup>123</sup> this was the latest date at which such a characterization could be made—less than two decades, it should be remembered, after the colonial conquest and settlement of the eastern districts.<sup>124</sup>

Both then and later, settlers in the interior were engaged in almost desperate efforts to conjure a cash income out of everything that would allow their basic capital—their flocks and herds—to build up.<sup>125</sup> After 1770, the interest of the major butchers in the Graaff-Reinet sheep flocks, and conversely of the frontier farmers in the fluctuations of the Cape Town market, is evident. By then the Cape butchers were complaining that they could not get the supplies of meat they required because the Graaff-Reinet farmers found it more profitable to sell soap (made from sheep fat) and butter, given the current prices.<sup>126</sup> In other, more technical terms, a price cross-elasticity of supply was operating.

A measure of the degree of commercialization is the fact that the eastern farmers immediately petitioned against the introduction of paper money. Probably their vehemence derived from their experience with the alternative form of money circulating in the interior, the so-called *slagters briefjes*, promissory notes issued by the traveling butchers that could only be cashed in Cape Town. The bankruptcy of a butcher of consequence would have widespread repercussions deep into the *platteland* if those caught with his *briefjes* could not meet their obligations.<sup>127</sup>

Whatever may have been the reason for their initial settlement there, by the late eighteenth century the farmers of the eastern Cape were being drawn, willingly, into the orbit of commerce. However this may be, thereafter it was only on the desert fringes of the northwest Cape, if there, that white subsistence farmers were still to be found.

Throughout the early nineteenth century, commercialized pastoralism intensified. Its most spectacular component was the development of wool production, first along the southern coast and later throughout what became known as the Eastern Province. From the 1840s onwards wool came to dominate the colony's exports, and a large proportion of European capital invested in South African agriculture went into the establishment of wool farms.<sup>128</sup> Nevertheless, the importance of wool for the economic development of the

colony should not be exaggerated. The sale of meat, hides, skins, and draft oxen remained a considerably larger source of income even for sheep farmers than did the sale of wool.<sup>129</sup> Moreover, the improvement of transportation, both the coastal shipping and newly built roads across the mountain passes, encouraged the spread of market-oriented agriculture. The early nineteenth century saw the great expansion of what production in the rolling hills behind both the south and west coasts,<sup>130</sup> while further inland it became possible to introduce new cash crops on a wide scale, notably dried fruit in the Breede River valley and tobacco in the Little Karoo.<sup>131</sup> The agricultural history of the colony during the nineteenth century, which is only known in the broadest outlines, is therefore basically the story of a steady intensification on the basis of the widespread, if low level, commercialization achieved by the end of the VOC period.

### The Intensification of Commerce

In the almost totally agrarian society of the Cape, it is easiest to judge the level of commercialization by the development of small country towns which came to serve as district centers. In 1800 there were no more than four such centers,<sup>132</sup> none much greater than a European village. Barrow, who visited them all, wrote approvingly of Stellenbosch and Paarl, both neat if dispersed settlements, with 70 and 30 houses respectively. Lichtenstein, who was in Swellendam a few years later, described it as containing a fair number of hand-craft workers and traders, who catered mainly to those on the road. Graaff-Reinet, though, was not yet a thriving commercial center.<sup>133</sup>

The absence of towns of any size did not mean an absence of commercialization. Throughout the South African interior, trading began not with settled traders but with the peddlers (the *smousen*) and butchers' agents. As early as 1774, the Council of Policy had reason to complain of those persons who "for some time back . . . have made it their business to wander about everywhere in the Interior, from one District to another, with goods and merchandise, conveyed on wagons, horses or pack oxen, thus causing many irregularities in the said districts."<sup>134</sup> It decided to forbid this trade, practiced not only among the European settlers but also already among the Xhosa, but the prohibition was neither observed nor enforced; Cape Town merchants, including officials, were already providing financial backing for such trading trips.<sup>135</sup>

Only after a period of time did the volume of trade in a district rise to the point where it became viable for permanent stores to be opened. In the areas of white settlement, though not, for instance, in the Transkei, this coincided with foundation of the country village, and usually of a Dutch Reformed church. It was a process that repeated itself throughout the colony as the nineteenth century wore on. In one district after another, small towns were founded as local agriculture became sufficiently profitable and attracted mer-

chants and craftsmen. The development of Graaff-Reinet is exemplary in this. In 1811 the Circuit Commission reported that there were 25 traders settled there, and two years later it reported that the local shopkeepers were complaining that they had to pay a license fee to trade while the "country peddlers" were exempt from such an exaction, an anomaly removed shortly thereafter.<sup>136</sup> By the 1830s, it had become a sizable commercial center, visited by many farmers from further north who were thus spared the annual trek to Cape Town,<sup>137</sup> and in 1865, Graaff-Reinet had 11 bakers, 26 boot and shoemakers, 35 blacksmiths, and 108 "merchants, wholesale and retail dealers." By this time there were more than 4,000 such individuals in the colony, less than a quarter of whom lived in Cape Town. The great majority were scattered through the 37 settlements described in the census as "municipalities" or "villages," which formed the nodes of an extensive commercial network.<sup>138</sup>

The spread of permanent mercantile establishments throughout the Cape Colony depended on the goodwill and financial support of the major Cape Town merchant houses, as did the foundation of the country banks. These merchant houses were set up on a new footing after the British take-over of the colony. Under the VOC the main import houses had been tied to the Netherlands—not only the official-led consortia of Le Fèvre and Co. and Cruywagen and Co., which exploited their position within the VOC, but also their opponents, including the Van Reenen family, which, among their many activities, imported agricultural implements, hops, wine, and clothing from Holland. After 1806, these links no longer existed. Merchants needed connections instead in London, where the foundation of the Cape of Good Hope Trade Society in 1825 was of crucial importance.<sup>139</sup> In order to succeed, Cape merchants needed not only sufficient capital, acumen, and luck, but also the ability to straddle the old and the new worlds of the Cape Colony. They contributed thereby to the homogenization of the Cape's ruling class; several of the most successful British merchants married into established Cape families.<sup>140</sup>

The firm of Barry and Nephews, one of these Cape families, provides the most significant example of merchant penetration of the Cape countryside.<sup>141</sup> Joseph Barry, the senior partner, arrived in South Africa in 1819 and soon began in the coasting trade. He was primarily responsible for opening up Port Beaufort, at the mouth of the Breede River, as outlet for the products of the Swellendam plains. This was a business full of risks, above all of shipwreck, and Barry became insolvent in 1827, though in two years he cleared his debts and, in partnership with his two nephews, took over a considerable portion of the business between Swellendam and Port Beaufort. In time the Barrys opened ten stores, ranging from Worcester to Mossel Bay.<sup>142</sup>

In time, such a thickening of the Cape's commercial network occurred throughout the colony. The pioneer in opening the east was Frederik Korsten, who in 1811 took on a contract to supply Mauritius with salt meat from Algoa Bay (now Port Elizabeth). His raw materials were cattle from the Zuurveld and other eastern Cape districts and salt from the Uitenhage pans. From

this base he diversified into sealing, whaling, and, later, wool.<sup>143</sup> Korsten was followed by many others as the century progressed.<sup>144</sup> While in time considerable political differences arose between those merchants who traded with the Xhosa and Mfengu peasantry, and the gentry, particularly of the Eastern Cape,<sup>145</sup> no such tension existed, in general, between the gentry and those merchants who served them. The coincidence of interest ensured that gentry power was not challenged from this quarter.

## Land

So far this chapter has tended to fall into the pattern of far too much of the historiography of South Africa by considering the activities of the white colonists to the exclusion of both the indigenous inhabitants of the country and the imported laborers, who, in this period, were almost exclusively slaves. When two of the basic factors of production, land and labor, are considered, such neglect becomes impossible. It is clear that a necessary condition of the establishment of colonial agriculture was the generally forcible removal of the African population from the land, and also the establishment of slavery there. The European conquest of the Cape Colony, and later of the rest of South Africa, was a violent process; so was the slave trade.

The Dutch may not have systematically rounded up the indigenous population of the Cape Colony and exported the survivors to make way for plantation agriculture, as they had done on Banda; they may not have smashed systematically all peasant agricultural communities, as they did in parts of the Moluccas. But, nevertheless, the acts of Europeans, Dutch and British, not of some imperialist God, caused the disintegration of the Khoisan society in the Cape. The white farmers established their farms across the whole of the colony south of the Orange and west of the Gamtoos; as they drove deeper into the interior of the Cape Colony they brought about the steady impoverishment of the Khoisan of each succeeding region. They took their stock, expropriated their grazing and water holes, exterminated their game, and made life for the Khoisan in any other status than as laborers for the whites impossible.

By the 1790s the conflict between colonists and Khoisan had become part of a much larger confrontation, between the colonists and the more thickly settled Xhosa, who lived further east.<sup>146</sup> From the beginning this was a conflict about land; in its later phases also about labor. The steady thrust eastward of the official border was justified on the grounds of military security, but it was certainly also caused by the colonists' desire for ever more farms. In the early phases of the conflict, in the 1770s and 1780s, the struggle had been about the rich grazing grounds of the upper Fish River, in the areas known to the colonists as the *Agter Brintjes Hoogten*, then the most important cattle breeding district of the colony.<sup>147</sup> Thereafter, the locus of conflict moved south, until, in 1811, it broke out in the *Zuurveld*, the rich summer grazing along the coast between the Sundays and the Fish Rivers. This marked the

first effective operations of the British army against the Xhosa.<sup>148</sup> From then on, the professional military was in charge, from the colonial side, of a series of military encounters that lasted almost a hundred years. They were usually assisted by units of the burgher militia from the eastern districts.

The gentry benefited from this process of aggrandizement at one remove. For obvious reasons, the commercialized agriculture on which they based their power could only flourish after the original inhabitants of an area had been subdued. Rich men, such as the Van Reenens, owned farms on the margins of settlement, supervised by hired servants (*knechten*), who, together with the *trekboeren*, confronted the local Khoisan. A few of these Boers may have worked their way up to the status of established commercial farmer, but more often they were replaced, when a district became commercially viable, by offshoots of the richer families closer to the markets or, in the nineteenth century, directly by immigrants from Great Britain.

In the nineteenth century, commercial farmers followed closely on the activities of the British army. As the wool industry became established, hunger for sheep farms was a prime motive.<sup>149</sup> More than four hundred requests for land grants in Queen Adelaide Province (approximately the modern Ciskei) were made before the colonial secretary Lord Glenelg rescinded its annexation.<sup>150</sup> Robert Godlonton, the 1870 settlers' leader, and his cronies appear as land-hungry warmongers, although this is hard to document since, as Peires notes, "few contemporaries were prepared to risk libel suits" by detailing their activities in public.<sup>151</sup> A number of satirical comments in the *South African Commercial Advertiser* make clear, however, that their behavior was well known and widely, if privately, discussed.<sup>152</sup> The most expansionist of British governors, Sir Harry Smith, was a close associate of this group, and his actions, both on the eastern frontier and in what became the Orange Free State, led directly to considerable extension of their activities.<sup>153</sup>

Because the colony's financial stability depended on the subventions from the imperial treasury for the British forces in South Africa, and since the forces involved were used largely against the Xhosa on the eastern frontier, it could be said that the colony was kept in business by its eastward expansion.<sup>154</sup>

The struggle for the land did not end with the conquest of a particular region, even when the original African inhabitants were then expelled or enslaved. In many areas, large tracts of ground were unavailable to European farmers for decades.<sup>155</sup> In some cases, this was purely a consequence of the inefficiency of the Colonial Surveyor's department, so that so-called squatters occupying the land were, in fact, colonial farmers who had staked out their claims but had yet to receive official recognition. But in some areas—the southeast of Graaff-Reinet district being perhaps the clearest example—large communities of squatters, Xhosa, Khoi, and white, existed for a considerable length of time despite protests by dominant local whites. The colonial state simply did not have the power to expel all those who were considered undesirable, until, in the case of Graaff-Reinet, the 1860s. Even after an area had

been divided among colonial farms, the new owners often found that the income to be derived by collecting rent from African tenants, and the unrest their expulsion would otherwise cause, long outweighed any profits that might accrue from other forms of exploitation. In the western Cape, where fertile land had long been in short supply, squatter communities were rare and marginal, and the few that existed on crown land were often destitute.<sup>156</sup> In this heartland of the colony, colonial agriculture was too well established by the mid-nineteenth century for it to be otherwise. In the east, in contrast, the process of gentrification had not yet been completed, though by 1850, or a decade later, it was well advanced. The gentry and their allies were dominant and well able to win any battles they collectively thought to be vital.

## Labor

The commercial agriculture run by the gentry was based on a labor force largely divorced from independent access to the means of production, and generally kept subservient by force or the threat of it. In the agricultural South-west Cape they were generally, though not exclusively, slaves, brought to the colony from all the shores of the Indian Ocean, from Natal to New Guinea, with the largest numbers probably coming from Mozambique, Madagascar, the Indian sub-continent, and East Indonesia.<sup>157</sup> In the eighteenth century, approximately half the non-Khoisan population of the colony were such slaves. The farming community relied on slave labor to a degree that is rare, in comparative terms. Around 1800, about 66 percent of all farmers owned at least one slave, and, if the pure pastoralists, who used more Khoisan labor, are excluded, this figure rises to 90 percent.<sup>158</sup> In few if any New World colonies were land ownership and slave ownership so concurrent.

Until a decade or so ago, Cape slavery had an image of "mildness."<sup>159</sup> The reason for this was probably the fact that the slave economy of the Cape differed considerably from those of the New World. Eugene Genovese and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese have written of a pattern common throughout the western hemisphere in which,

First the slave holding countries—those in which slavery dominated the economies—exhibited stunning levels of profitability and prolonged periods of economic growth. Second, in every case the boom rested on the export sector and approximated reliance on a single crop. And third, in each case the end of the boom left in its wake an economic wreck.<sup>160</sup>

At the Cape, this pattern did not occur; growth there was gradual. The wine boom of the 1820s came closest to the patterns of slave economies in the New World, but was of an altogether different scale than, for instance, the expansion of cotton in the American South after 1790, and moreover occurred after the imports of slaves had ended.<sup>161</sup> Profitability was not exceptional, though it was apparently satisfactory.<sup>162</sup> The massive holdings, the impersonality, and

the regimentation of, say, the West Indian sugar estates, did not develop in the Cape. Slaveholders could articulate a defense couched in the language of paternalism, as slaveowners did everywhere, although the evidence suggests that they did not do so until slavery as an institution began to be challenged, both in Britain and at the Cape, in the early nineteenth century.<sup>163</sup> Since slavery at the Cape was a face-to-face institution, paternalistic arguments may have been, in this respect at least, more credible than in many other parts of the British Empire.

That the slaveholders' justification could be believed does not mean, of course, that it should be. Elsewhere, I have written that "a mild slave regime is a contradiction in terms."<sup>164</sup> As has recently been abundantly demonstrated,<sup>165</sup> the system of labor control known as Cape slavery, far from being benevolent paternalism, was harsh, brutal, and bloody. From the point of view of the masters it had to be so, since slave resistance to oppression was continual, if unorganized and individualistic.

The initial accumulation of capital in the agricultural sector of the Cape Colony was only possible because of the systematic use of force against the laborers who worked the wine and wheat farms of the southwest of the colony. This was sanctioned by government, and only partially mitigated by the slaves' access to the courts and, also, to the Protector of Slaves.<sup>166</sup> Nevertheless, as has been argued elsewhere, the process of accumulation was continually shaped by the struggle of slaves against their oppression. The development of the agricultural structures and the processes of class struggle cannot be divorced from one another.

Away from the southwest Cape, capital accumulation came largely through the original incorporation of the Khoisan into the labor process on the farms. Khoikhoi with independent access to land within the colonial boundaries were a rarity by 1800, and, significantly, most of these seem to have been in the western portion of the colony,<sup>167</sup> where the more highly capitalized farmers could use slave labor and were thus prepared, from an early period, to allow a few Khoikhoi villages an independent existence, as reservoirs of seasonal labor. Even these Khoikhoi eventually had no alternative to selling their labor power in order to survive. In the east, too, where virtually all available land was on or beyond the margins of settlement (occasionally internal margins), Khoisan were not necessarily reduced to servitude. There remained a certain scope for Khoi mobility, both physical and social.<sup>168</sup> Those who did work on the farms were indispensable as laborers, and often had an important function in the management of the farm.<sup>169</sup> Once the Khoisan were reduced to the status of laborer on the white farms, they were held under control by force. The use of violence was rampant during the first decades after the white conquest of the eastern districts of the Cape Colony, probably in part because of the commercialization those districts were undergoing at the time.<sup>170</sup> It was this violence in the colony as a whole that the legislative measures of 1809 (the Caledon Code) and 1812 were designed to curb.<sup>171</sup> These laws, which

introduced a pass system for the Khoikhoi and demanded the registration of work contracts, and which re-established the practice of "apprenticing" Khoisan children, had the effect of immobilizing Khoisan children and hence their families.<sup>172</sup> With their bargaining power diminished by these measures, and further reduced by such practices as the payment in stock, which could not be moved,<sup>173</sup> large numbers of Khoikhoi were fully tied to a particular farm. The British claimed that by introducing the control of a legal apparatus, they were saving the Khoisan from a Hobbesian state of nature in which the control of labor required the systematic use of force. There is every indication that they succeeded. The missionaries' complaints against the maltreatment of the Khoikhoi die away in the course of the 1810s. Eastern Cape society was being tamed, and the way opened for its domination by a new gentry.

### Emancipations

Until the 1820s and 1830s, a large proportion of the colony's laborers were held in their position by the legal bonds of slavery, or by the provisions of the Khoi codes of 1809 and 1812, which did allow escape, as slavery did not (for instance via the mission stations), for a minority of Khoi, but which effectively ensured the thralldom of the majority. Between 1828 and 1838, the legal disabilities on the slaves and Khoi were removed. In the long term, though, the position of a large proportion of these laborers did not change to any great extent. In the aftermath of Ordinance 50 of 1828, which abolished any legal distinction between the Khoi and other free persons, and of the emancipation of slaves, which became effective in 1838,<sup>174</sup> class relations in the countryside remained more or less constant. The gentry's control over the *platteland* was unchallenged and the terms of its dominance only marginally altered. Thus, in the sense of class domination, these two most important humanitarian decrees in the colony's history were non-events. The question of why a complete change in the legal status of the laborers—and thus theoretically in the attitude of the colonial authorities to the status quo—should have led to so little alteration in the actual relations of production is one of the most important in South African history. The possible amelioration of labor repression following the proclamations, and the subsequent hardening of control through the middle of the century, represent crucial moments at which other more subtle methods of labor control were substituted for the legal institution of slavery, or the blatant brutality of early Graaff-Reinet.

The impetus for changes in the law came from Britain,<sup>175</sup> from the change observable in the late eighteenth century in the British ruling class's perspective of the proper relations between master and servant.<sup>176</sup> This ideology found a specifically South African form in the writing of British missionaries who were able, by returning to a higher level of abstraction in their discourses, to impress on the British government the necessity of abolishing the judicial disabilities on the Khoisan by Ordinance 50 of 1828.<sup>177</sup> Since these legal

adjustments did not develop out of the configuration of class forces at the Cape itself, their translation into South African conditions was bound to be problematic.

Legal provisions may or may not create a comprehensive shift in the structure of social relationships. Whether or not they do so depends, in addition to their actual content, on the power that those who benefited under the old order still wield and, in the Cape, the extent to which governmental officials were really willing and able to implement the changes.<sup>178</sup> In the case of the emancipations, the old order re-established itself in the longer run.

In the contemporary ruling class at the Cape, the struggle for the maintenance of their control was about "vagrancy." It was certainly a "problem" of considerable proportions. In 1838 W. B. Boyce, a Wesleyan missionary, reckoned that of the 50,000 "free coloreds" and "hottentots" in the colony, 8-10,000

are wandering over the country, having no *regular* employment, occasionally compelled by hunger or induced by the desire of obtaining intoxicating liquor, to work for a few days, but chiefly living without any *visible* means of subsistence, on waste lands, and in the neighbourhood of town and villages. The flocks and herds of the farmers are the main support of this mass of idleness and vice.<sup>179</sup>

In this, Boyce was articulating the perception of the landowners and officials, from the governor down, that many—no one really knew then or now how many—of the poorer members of Cape society had managed to escape from the clutches of the colonial labor process.<sup>180</sup> The proportion, whatever it was, would grow later that year with the ending of "apprenticeship," the four-year period of forced labor for ex-slaves following their emancipation. No direct action could be taken to eradicate the perceived evil, since the Colonial Office in London, under prompting from the humanitarians, vetoed a vagrancy ordinance as being contrary to the provisions of Ordinance 50.<sup>181</sup> No hindrances might be placed upon the right of the Khoikhoi and, after 1838, of the ex-slaves to move around the colony as they wished.

Certainly, the 1830s and 1840s were a period of considerable mobility among the agricultural labor force. Every place that could possibly have received those laborers seems to have done so. There was a considerable migration into Cape Town, with many of those who came to town having no choice but to live in great poverty and squalor. They joined Cape Town's newly freed (after 1838) domestic servants who moved out of the houses in which they had been slaves to the newly built slums where they were free of supervision.<sup>182</sup> The small towns of the western Cape also grew sharply in population, as did the mission stations, with those in the east receiving many Khoisan in the early 1830s, in response to the threat of a vagrancy act, and those in the west in 1838, when apprenticeship ended.<sup>183</sup> At the other extreme were those ex-slaves and Khoisan who moved beyond the colony's boundaries to the Griquas in Transorangia,<sup>184</sup> the "Nieuwland" in the Caledon River valley,<sup>185</sup> or to the aptly named "Freemansland" in modern Maclear district.<sup>186</sup>

The opening of the Kat River area to Khoikhoi settlement in 1829 brought groups migrating from all over the eastern part of the colony, often under considerable difficulty.<sup>187</sup> This was the most complete method of escape and, at least in the short run, probably the most successful.

Those who came to the mission stations, and probably also those who traveled around the country as "vagrants," did so because they were afraid of a "contract for life."<sup>188</sup> They knew, too, that any reimposition of a pass system would lead to abuses. One farmer, on being presented with a valid pass from Genadendal, tore it up and then took the Khoi to the magistrate in the hope of having him convicted for having no pass and then assigned to his captor as a laborer.<sup>189</sup> In the long run, though, it proved impossible for the great majority of the Khoisan and ex-slaves to escape proletarianization.

Even if Boyce's figures are no exaggeration, this still meant that 80 percent of the free "coloreds" and Khoisan had some visible means of support in 1838, the free "coloreds" probably concentrated in Cape Town, the Khoikhoi mainly found in the rural areas, and therefore in farm labor. The mission stations could, after all, have taken only a small proportion of these people, and there are indications that Khoikhoi and "bastards" were being squeezed out of independent occupations during the early part of the nineteenth century.<sup>190</sup> The farmers themselves had been able to develop a considerable arsenal of techniques for holding their laborers under control, and these they could maintain even after the emancipations. Perhaps the most widespread of such practices, now that the various forms of apprenticeship had become illegal, were: refusal to allow laborers to leave with stock they had been paid as wages; debt bondage—often established with the help of the magistrates' courts; and alcohol addiction, which had the additional advantage of ensuring dismissal from the mission stations.<sup>191</sup>

This is not to say that the farmers did not experience temporary inconveniences, especially just after the ending of apprenticeship on 1 December 1838, an unfortunate timing, right in the middle of the wheat harvest. *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, the newspaper that served as spokesman for the farming community, published this editorial on 3 May 1839:

It is now a fact, which is no longer open to any doubt, that the greatest number of farmers have been deserted by those late apprentices, and are unprovided with hands for agricultural labour. The effect of this scarcity upon the agricultural produce of the colony must be apparent. Already a good quantity of the crops and fruits of the late season has been allowed to dry and rot on the field, for want of means to collect or thrash. The ploughing season is approaching, and the corn farmers, being inadequately provided with hands (a great part of them hardly with any) contemplate with sorrow and regret the comparatively insignificant quantity they will be able to sow, and still less quantity produceable for the market and consumption.<sup>192</sup>

Just how much of this was exaggeration is uncertain, but the statistics of agricultural production do show a sharp decline from 1838 to 1841. Thereafter, the figures show a return to the level of the 1830s, and swiftly rise above that

level.<sup>193</sup> If the statistics are to be trusted (and I think that for at least some districts they may be, of only as rough indications), then the disruption caused by emancipation to the production of the principal slave-worked crops was no more than a temporary hiccough.

This had been achieved in part by the implementation of legislation. The Master and Servant Ordinance of 1841 gave employers a degree of power over their laborers they had not had since before Ordinance 50 in 1828. Contracts might now be for three years (though only one year was allowed for ex-slaves) and the levels of work and wages had to be specified. Breach of contract was made a criminal offense, but against this a laborer's right of complaint was guaranteed. The farmers protested that the measures were not stringent enough, and one of the acts of the Cape parliament, after it had been instituted in 1854, was to strengthen the employers' position in the new Master and Servant Act of 1856. Nevertheless, the indications are that from 1841 employers' control over those in their service was once again considerable.

In time, almost all of those who were on the road had to capitulate and be reabsorbed into the labor process. Their problem, in essence, was that, as we have seen, there was little land in the more hospitable parts of the colony on which they could settle. Where they did manage to find a small plot, they were likely to be driven off by the magistrate. Open land still existed into the 1870s (though probably not much later) in the drier parts of the cape midlands and the northwest Cape, but in the southern and southwest Cape "squatting" on crown land was an option for only a few families.<sup>194</sup> This was a consequence of a deliberate policy. When moves were made in 1837 to make small grants to those Khoisan "whose industry and good conduct has enabled them to acquire a certain amount of property in cattle and sheep," the official response was clear:

I am much disposed to question the expedience of the policy of settling Hottentots on land of their own. . . . The most desirable result would be that they would be induced to work for wages as free labourers. Whatever tends to counteract that object seems to me inadvisable, with a view of the interests of all classes.<sup>195</sup>

No one in any position of power or influence within the Cape Colony doubted that the place of the Khoisan and the ex-slaves could only be as "free men who depend on employment for food and on character for employment."<sup>196</sup> There might be certain adjustments at the margins of class, to which the mission station contributed, but any radical moves that might have led to the establishment of a smallholder class, analogous to the later eastern Cape peasantry, were crushed. The basic lines of social relations throughout the old areas of the Cape were not affected.

Throughout this chapter I have deliberately avoided describing the economy of the Cape Colony, or of its agrarian sector, as "capitalist." In the articles on which the chapter is based, the unguarded use of the term came in for a certain amount of criticism.<sup>197</sup> Arguments on whether or not the Cape


was capitalist are, I feel, essentially futile, or at least alien to the ways in which I think. I have no wish to join what is, no doubt unwittingly, a philosophically idealist or neo-Platonist concern with "essences," capitalist or other, that has bedeviled too much of South African historiography.

Nevertheless, certain concluding comments are in order. First, by the middle of the nineteenth century the agricultural sector of the Cape's economy was both almost entirely commercialized and served by a proletarianized labor force. I use "proletarianized" to mean that the laborers were entirely divorced from any independent access to the means of production, though they were still held in service, in many cases, by ties stronger than the market alone. The commercialization of the economy was an essential component of gentry power, and as such went back, in many parts of the colony, far into the eighteenth century. The proletarianization of the labor force may have been a result of the emancipations of 1828 and 1838; but if I am correct in considering those decrees to have been largely non-events as far as production is concerned, then its sources must be sought far further back in the colony's past. It is all a matter of definition, and as such largely a sterile subject for discussion.

Second, the domination of the South African countryside by the gentry continued to extend geographically until well into the nineteenth century. Clifton Crais has written that the eastern Cape Boers attempted, "by a sort of cultural mimesis, to reproduce a cultural 'model' which had its origin in the development of a colonial slavery."<sup>198</sup> This description is accurate as far as it goes, but it does overlook the extent to which the process of gentrification—if the word may be used in that sense—was as much a consequence of the migration further south or west of people brought up in gentry families (or in Britain) as it was one of the first conquerors of an area adopting the gentry way of life and instruments of power. At all events, by the 1870s, virtually all the Cape Colony, the wool-producing southern part of the Orange Free State, and much of Natal was under gentry control. The economic revolution in class structure that occurred in the wake of the discovery of gold and diamonds, dramatic though it was, was limited to those parts of the country, which had not previously been under gentry control, that is the Transvaal, the northern Free State, and northern Natal, very much the backwaters of pre-industrial South Africa. After the early twentieth century, with few exceptions, the South African countryside as a whole, outside the African reserves, became what it had long been in the Cape: a land, not of plantations, nor of smallholders, but of large owner-occupied farms worked by a harshly exploited black labor force. This social landscape did not spring up overnight. It was only established after a long struggle within the white political process and, more important, against the African tenancies, and these struggles significantly affected the eventual form of capitalist agriculture on the highveld and elsewhere.<sup>199</sup> But in the course of their struggles the capitalizing farmers had a model towards which they were steering: that of the settler farm as it later

came to be found throughout British colonial Africa, from the Cape to the White Highlands of Kenya.<sup>200</sup> This was, of course, only one possible model for colonial agricultural exploitation, in contrast, for instance, to the plantations of much of the colonial world or the family farms of New England. Moreover, it was a specific historical construction. It was developed in the Cape Colony during the first two centuries of European colonial rule and then extended further and further north. It was in fact the specific form that gentry domination of the rural economy took.

## Montagu's Roads to Capitalism: The Distribution of Landed Property in the Cape Colony in 1845

 The gentry of the Cape Colony, as noted in Chapter 1, were able to maintain domination over the countryside as a result of their control over both labor and land. Until 1834, control over labor was guaranteed, in part though not totally, by slavery and by the quasi-legal methods used to hold in bondage many of the nominally free.<sup>1</sup> After 1834 (or, to be more precise, after 1838, when the "apprenticeship" that required ex-slaves to work for their former owners came to an end), many of the informal means of labor control were maintained. One of these was the farmers' near-monopoly over the land, which allowed them to exclude most laborers from independent access to land on which to grow their own food or keep their own stock; in consequence they had no option but to work for the farmers, at least for much of the year.

Mission stations could accommodate the families of some of the workers—and, as in the U.S. emancipation experience, allowed the partial withdrawal of women and children from the agricultural labor force. But they were never large enough to provide anything like full subsistence to their residents. Only a few areas of mountain slope and semi-desert were outside the supervision of the farming community, and these areas, though still registered as crown land, were under continual attack from the farmers, who sought control over their unruly inhabitants and engrossment of the land for their own farming operations.<sup>2</sup>

If their near monopoly on land gave the farmers a significant edge in their struggle for control over those they hoped would be their laborers, then distinctions in the value of land (evidently determined by its acreage and by its productivity) gave some farmers an edge over others within the farming community itself. Within each district a relatively small group of men were seen as leaders of society, holding civil and ecclesiastical office and generally dominating the district's affairs,<sup>3</sup> deriving their preeminence from their landed wealth relative to that of their fellows.

No district ran the same course. The agrarian history of the Cape Colony as a whole cannot be extrapolated from the experience of Stellenbosch dis-

trict, or Graaff-Reinet, for example. Certain uniformities of trajectory, though not of timing, may perhaps be discerned among the various parts of the colony. Indeed, I have argued, in Chapter 1 above, that this is the case at a certain level of abstraction; but it is a matter for empirical investigation, not for a priori reasoning. In particular, in the first half of the nineteenth century, there were probably variations between the old agrarian heartlands of the southwest Cape—the Boland, the Swartland, and, to a certain extent, the Overberg<sup>4</sup>—and the more recently conquered, largely wool-producing areas of the eastern Cape.<sup>5</sup> Potentially, distinctions can also be made between the areas where the English 1820 settlers established themselves, particularly Albany district and the rest of the eastern Cape.

Some evidence on these questions derives from an 1845 evaluation of all the land and buildings in private ownership within the colony, apparently excluding mission and other ecclesiastical land. This valuation was made on the initiative of John Montagu, the colonial secretary in Cape Town, in order to provide the basis for a rate on immovable property to be used to finance improvement of the colony's roads.<sup>6</sup> Since, by the 1840s, there had been a market in land in the Cape Colony for more than a century, and since the gradual abolition of the loan place system (begun in 1814) had been completed, this was an obvious way of generating new revenue.

The year 1845 actually is a good time to begin the sort of analysis made possible by the valuation, even though, in the east, it was a year of drought. The colony had been at peace, relatively speaking, with the Xhosa for nearly a decade, so land values were not distorted by any wartime destruction. Also, the emancipation of the slaves had been completed in 1838, and the area that had relied most on slave labor, the southwest, was coming to terms with a system of labor organization not based on slavery. In addition, there had been time for readjustment after the exodus of numbers of Afrikaners (but probably not that many landowners) during the Great Trek of the 1830s.<sup>7</sup> Finally, the expansion of wool production in the eastern Cape, with its associated rise in property values and land speculation, was under way. Altogether, an analysis of the valuation of 1845 permits a partial investigation of the structure of the landowning class of the Cape Colony at an interesting moment in its development, although the conclusions would be strengthened if a subsequent revaluation could be found, for comparison's sake.

The first half of the nineteenth century had seen an expansion of all sectors of the Cape's agricultural economy.<sup>8</sup> Wine production, which enjoyed a short-lived boom in the 1820s, had by 1845 reached a little above that level, at approximately ten million liters. Wheat production had increased by about a quarter over the same period, and had moved out beyond the mountain ranges that had formed major barriers to bulk agricultural production until the early nineteenth century. Swellendam, in particular, had become the largest grain growing district. Whereas in the eighteenth century the Dutch had not even bothered to collect production figures and taxes from east of the mountains,

the area was now opened up as the result of coasting traffic into such now forgotten harbors as Port Beaufort at the mouth of the Breë River. Wheat was not the only grain crop of importance. Indeed, it provided only just under 60 percent of the value of the grains grown in the colony in 1845, according to the official figures. The other 40 percent consisted of barley, rye (a small proportion), oats, and oat hay.<sup>9</sup> Even though the figures are suspect in the extreme, especially the ten million pounds weight (just under 5,000 tons) of oat hay said to have been grown in Albany district, they do point to the importance of fodder crops, for sale particularly to the British army; in the frontier districts of Albany and Somerset much of the agricultural, though not stock-keeping, activity went into supplying the army.

Indeed, British military disbursements represent an enormously important facet of the Cape's economy in the mid-nineteenth century, as evidenced by an examination of the colonial balance of trade. On the one hand, wool production and exports were increasing rapidly. In 1845, for the first time, wool exports through Cape Town exceeded those of wine, but were only just over half of those moving through Port Elizabeth. In total, wool exports from the Cape Colony in 1845 were worth £176,741, or approximately 41 percent of the total exports, a proportion that would rise to about two thirds a decade later. However, the Cape exported only about 43 percent, by value, of what it imported, putting the balance of trade wildly in the red, to the tune of more than half a million pounds. Nor was this an isolated phenomenon; for decades the Cape had exported about half of what it imported without experiencing any apparent balance-of-payments crisis or other economic difficulty. The shortfall was made up by what amounted to capital transfers to pay the British army and naval establishments.<sup>10</sup> Without the continual threat of frontier conflict to draw military interest, the Cape would have been, economically, a far poorer place.<sup>11</sup>

### The Rating

It is against this background that the valuation, or rating, of 1845 can be discussed. A number of versions of it exist. Two tabulations were made shortly after it was compiled, and these are reproduced (with the correction of one trifling error in arithmetic) in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Table 2.1, which gives the total ratable value of each district, was published to provide an indication of the base from which the Road Board could raise revenue, and also to justify an allocation of the board's resources to the various districts of the colony, an important matter given the continual strains between the eastern and western divisions. Table 2.2, on the other hand, was a tabulation produced for the debates on the level of the qualified franchise. The Road Board rates gave the politicians and officials of the mid-nineteenth century a rough approximation of the number of men who would receive the vote, or the right to be elected, and their distribution across the colony, at each of the proposed levels.

TABLE 2.1  
*Total Valuation of Immovable Property, 1845*  
 (All values in pounds sterling)

District/veldcoronetcy	Valuation	Number	Mean
Cape Town and Green Point	1,298,048	3,458	375
Cape Division	605,805	872	649
Stellenbosch	627,641	1,180	716
Swellendam	585,440	878	667
George	285,405	537	531
Clanwilliam	192,828	523	369
Worcester	255,982	587	436
Beaufort	162,196	502	323
Total western divisions	4,013,345	8,537	470
Albany	588,352	1,665	353
Uitenhage	372,995	981	380
Somerset	179,366	428	419
Graaff-Reinet	398,693	656	607
Cradock	221,911	382	581
Colesberg	147,728	622	238
Total eastern divisions	1,809,045	4,734	382
Total	5,822,390	13,271	439

SOURCE: *Report . . . upon the Operations of the Central Road Board . . . 1843-53*, Cape Parliamentary Paper, G3'55, 5.

The rating had one major disadvantage for this purpose, and for those of historians: it recorded the value of individual properties, as recorded in the Land Office, but not that of property owners. Thus, the slum empire of Cape Town landlord J. A. H. Wicht was represented by the seventy or more properties he owned in the poor quarters of the town, and not by a single consolidated figure representing his holdings.<sup>12</sup> More problematically, the building up of large estates by the purchase of a number of farms, should it have occurred, does not show up in this sort of cross-tabulation. It is, thus, impossible, purely on the basis of this presentation of the Road Board's figures, to see to what extent the growth of the wool industry, for instance, was leading to the expansion of the land ownership of those who were succeeding in this branch of business and to the squeezing out of those who were unable to jump on the wool wagon. Nor is the existence of relations of tenancy, multiple ownership, or heavy mortgaging, for instance, evident in this form.

Some of these deficiencies can be remedied, in large part, by examining the original registers held in the Cape archives,<sup>13</sup> although these are, unfortunately, incomplete. The ratings for the municipalities of Cape Town and Grahamstown were not redone for the Road Board, and the originals for these two towns are to be found in the respective municipal archives.<sup>14</sup> In addition, the records for Swellendam district seem to be missing entirely, most unfortunate since the southern plains were both the major growth area for cereal production and the first part of the colony in which wool production became

TABLE 2.2  
*Numbers of Properties Valued at the Rates Shown*  
 (All values in pounds sterling)

District/ veldcornetcy	Below 100	100– 199	200– 299	300– 499	500– 999	1,000– 1,499	1,500– 1,999	2,000– 2,999	over 3,000
Cape Town and									
Green Point	529	929	632	568	458	192	80	54	16
Cape District	76	134	134	218	108	97	54	23	28
Stellenbosch	98	213	155	221	303	129	42	17	2
Swellendam	106	146	108	112	155	181	47	16	7
George	66	94	48	108	106	70	40	5	0
Worcester	34	94	114	149	147	37	11	1	0
Clanwilliam	41	101	107	133	124	13	3	1	0
Beaufort	85	130	54	97	118	17	1	0	0
Uitenhage and									
Port Elizabeth	169	197	147	210	190	51	9	4	4
Albany	499	378	161	260	271	59	19	15	3
Somerset	30	56	65	144	113	19	0	1	0
Cradock	35	62	51	109	120	27	7	1	0
Graaff-Reinet	87	91	62	192	171	40	10	3	0
Colesberg	83	249	149	90	47	3	0	0	1
Total	11,938	2,844	1,987	2,611	2,431	935	323	141	61

SOURCE: British Parliamentary Paper 1362 of 1851, *Further Papers Relative to the Establishment of a Representative Assembly at the Cape of Good Hope*, 171.

fully established. Nevertheless, Swellendam contained only about 10 percent of the value of the colony, and 6.6 percent of the properties, so that its absence is not a disaster.

The original registers record the veldcornetcy, and the name of each property and its value, and also the name of the owner and, generally, whether the owner was also the occupier of the farm or house.<sup>15</sup> They do not give the acreage of a property, except in rare circumstances (usually, to note town or village plots). However, in view of the wide variations in the use that could be made of a given unit area of ground, depending on its location and natural endowments, this is not such a problem; throughout this chapter calculations are in terms of values, not of acreage. If the owner was not himself the occupier, the occupier's name and the owner's place of residence are given. Some few farms were described specifically as being unoccupied or as being occupied by servants (presumably not tenants). Frequently, though, there is no evidence of anyone but the owner being on the land, although it was not the owner's place of residence. Most often the various farms in this category are adjacent to each other in the lists, though this does not mean that they were actual neighbors. The clear indication is that judicially separate entities were being worked as a single unit. On the other hand, multiple ownership was also recorded, together with whether or not all the owners were present. At times, notably for George district, a certain amount of information on the crops grown on the farm is also given.<sup>16</sup>

For the purposes of this chapter, a sample was drawn from the register for further analysis. For this, 37 of the 151 (24.5 percent) veldcornetcies were chosen by the use of a table of random numbers, including 20.6 percent of the properties in the colony, excluding the Swellendam district and Cape Town. (Their approximate location is given in Figure 2.1.) Cape Town was excluded because of the differing administrative structure of the town and because I wished, initially, to concentrate on rural or small-town properties. Grahamstown, on the other hand, was to be included but it did not turn up. In Table 2.3 the percentage distribution of the property values in the sample and in the total population are given; from this it can be seen that the sample provides a fairly accurate approximation of the population as a whole, but that the two extremes are somewhat underrepresented. The reasons for this have to do with the difficulties inherent in using a cluster sample in a situation where particular values are concentrated in specific clusters, which might not necessarily appear in the sample.

### The Distribution of Property

An examination of the basic tables shows much of considerable interest. First, there is the concentration of landed values in and around Cape Town. Cape Town and Green Point by themselves contained 22 percent of the value of the colony, and the neighboring veldcornetcies (*sic*) of Rondebosch and Wynberg undoubtedly also were very valuable. Cape Town and the Cape district between them had 72 percent of all the colony's properties valued at over £3,000, and those in the district were largely concentrated in Cape Town's suburbia, rather than in the wheat growing areas of the Tjgerberg and Swartland.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, the properties with the lowest values were disproportionately to be found in Cape Town, Albany, and, to a lesser extent, Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the towns contained a large number of small and decrepit properties, as is evidently the case in Cape Town, with its cheap and nasty slums alongside Table Bay, and its low-cost rental houses in what was to become District Six.<sup>18</sup> The same was probably true of the Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth districts, and may have been the case in all the colony's towns. Thus 40 percent of the properties in Fort Beaufort veldcornetcy, many of which were rented to officers in the British army, were worth less than £200, while the *erven* in the dorp of Richmond, in the Uitsluis veldcornetcy of Graaff-Reinet, only recently laid out, averaged no more than £71. In the more established villages property values were rather higher. Thus, the 37 properties in Wellington of one acre or less averaged £157.

In the case of Albany special factors were at work. It may be that the original plots granted to the 1820 settlers, which were generally small, had not yet been consolidated, which would have had the effect of increasing the number of low-valued properties in the district. Much more important, though, was




Figure 2.1 District boundaries and approximate locations of the veldcornetries in the sample. (For an explanation of the numbers, see Table 2.6.)

TABLE 2.3  
*Percentage Distribution of Properties in Various Value Classes*

Below 100	100– 199	200– 299	300– 499	500– 999	1,000– 1,499	1,500– 1,999	2,000– 2,999	over 3,000
TOTAL COLONY								
14.6	21.4	15.0	19.7	18.3	7.0	2.4	1.1	0.5
TOTAL, LESS CAPE TOWN AND SWELLENDAM								
14.6	19.8	14.1	21.6	20.4	6.3	2.2	0.8	0.5
IN SAMPLE								
10.9	13.9	12.3	22.4	27.2	9.2	3.0	1.0	0.2

TABLE 2.4  
*Gini Coefficients of Inequality*

Cape Town	.513
Cape District	.532
Stellenbosch	.440
Swellendam	.477
George	.410
Worcester	.403
Clanwilliam	.374
Beaufort	.427
Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth	.459
Albany	.517
Somerset	.327
Cradock	.359
Graaff-Reinet	.399
Colesberg	.366
Total colony	.486

the inclusion of the Kat River settlement in Albany district. The great majority of the district's low-valued plots were there. The only Kat River veldcornectcy in the sample, that under Andries Pretorius, which included Maasdorp, Fairbairn, Readsdales, and Philipton, averaged only £104 per plot, less than half of the average for any other veldcornectcy investigated.<sup>19</sup>

The exceptional nature of the returns for Albany, Cape Town, and the Cape division, and the importance of the extremes in the distribution of values in these districts, can be confirmed in another way. As is shown in Table 2.4, when the Gini coefficients of inequality are calculated, only these three districts give results higher than for the colony as a whole.

For the rest, the tables confirm what would otherwise be suspected. Land values were highest in the agricultural southwest of the colony. The figures for the Cape division were probably dragged down by the effect of the *sandveld* farms inland from Saldanha Bay; on the other hand, the average for the Koeberg veldcornectcy, at £1,090, was one of the highest in the sample. The

very highest were in the Stellenbosch district, with the Mosselbanks River averaging £1,169; Groot Drakenstein, £1,127; and the Bottelary £1,075. The old wine farming areas were clearly still comparatively prosperous.<sup>20</sup> Swellendam district, too, was apparently wealthy, as might be expected given growth in grain and wool farming in the area. Although it did not have the highest average value of any district, being somewhat behind Stellenbosch, it did have the highest modal value: it was the only district where this was over £1,000, and it also had the largest number of farms worth £3,000 outside the immediate environs of Cape Town. Since Swellendam was a region of old loan farms, of much greater dimensions than the freehold farms of Stellenbosch and the Cape, presumably those farmers who had managed to convert these into grain and sheep, or indeed horse-breeding, estates had done very well, and had driven up the value of their property.<sup>21</sup>

In the essentially pastoral regions outside the southwest, the longer settled areas of Clanwilliam, Worcester, and Beaufort districts were, in general, worth less than the area that was in process of becoming the Cape Midlands. Both Graaff-Reinet and Cradock districts had an average valuation considerably above those for the more westerly regions of the Karoo, the Bokkevelen, Roggevelden, and Hantam. This would also have been the case for Albany and, presumably, for Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth, if the averages for these districts had not been dragged down by the factors discussed above. At the level of the veldcornetcy the prosperity of at least parts of these districts is clear. Koenap, immediately to the north of Grahamstown, had the highest average value outside the southwest, at £898, closely followed by Buffelshoek, in Graaff-Reinet district, with £896. At the bottom end of the scale, though, was Colesberg district, between the Sneeuwberg and the Orange River, which, even though it had the largest number of sheep in the colony, had only a small proportion of merinos, about 9.5 percent of the total.<sup>22</sup> Clearly, the rise in land values that accompanied the introduction of woolled sheep to the Eastern Province had yet to reach north of the Sneeuwberg. A decade later, it had penetrated deep into what was by then the Orange Free State.<sup>23</sup>

This material clearly demonstrates that the great landowners of the east had not taken over large blocks of the countryside and had it registered as single farms. However, as has already been mentioned, the summary figures do not allow either as possibility or demonstration as fact that certain individuals had been able to acquire large numbers of farms and so to dominate the economic life of a particular region. In order to decide between these alternatives, it is necessary to return to the original records, where certain trends become evident. First, in the agricultural southwest, owner occupancy was almost universal. In Stellenbosch district, it was not considered necessary to note the owner's residence, since it was assumed that the owner would live on the farm, while, in four out of the five Cape district veldcornetcies in the sample, owner occupancy was virtually universal. (The exception was in the arid northwest of the district, where, for instance, the six farms that made up

the Langebaan Peninsula were all owned by the same man.) The Kat River was also an area of owner occupiers. Elsewhere, the pattern was far more variegated, and it is probable that the sampling procedures used have failed to reveal the full pattern. Certainly I am unable to explain all the differences that show up in the full tabulation, given as Table 2.5, and it would be tedious to translate all the detail into words. Some points, though, are clear. Land occupied exclusively by servants was to be found only in the Graaff-Reinet district and in parts of Uitenhage. Land claimed but not occupied was only to be found in the east (with a tiny exception in the Nieuwveld of Beaufort district). Presumably, it was only there that this sort of speculative claim was thought worthwhile. The other distinctions are less easily explicable. In the arid northwest, for instance—in the Cold Bokkeveld, Namaqualand, and the Camiesberg—farmers needed two farms in order to survive, or guaranteed access to unclaimed land which served as communal dry-season grazing (*trek-veld*), so the level of owner occupancy was low. But why a fifth of the Camiesberg was let out to tenants and none of Namaqualand is mysterious. There may, of course, have been differences in the registration practices. Similarly, in Somerset district, the two neighboring veldcornetcies of Zwagershoek and the East Riet River show different patterns of tenancy, perhaps connected to the later conquest of the latter region, to the east of the Great Fish River.<sup>24</sup> Again, in George district, the veldcornetcy of Mossel Bay on the southern plains shows a considerable family likeness to the outer portions of the southwest Cape proper, and would presumably have shown even more likeness to Swellendam district if the data for that area had survived. The veldcornetcy of Attaquas Kloof, on the other hand, no more than forty kilometers to the north of Mossel Bay but across the mountains in the Little Karoo, was already showing the Byzantine intricacies of tenure the area was to exhibit in the early twentieth century, which would contribute to the large numbers of “poor whites” to be found there.<sup>25</sup>

The most interesting veldcornetcies in the sample, in terms of land engrossment, absentee landlordism, and speculation, would seem to be the Coega at the mouth of the Sundays River in Uitenhage district, the Koenap to the north of Grahamstown in Albany, and the one identified in the records as Alewyn Smit's, which covered an area around Beaufort West and the southern slopes of the Nieuwveld. I propose to examine each of these areas in somewhat more detail, and also that of Buffelshoek in Graaff-Reinet, as a sort of control.

The most notable feature of the Coega is the great proportion of the veldcornetcy that had come into the hands of J. G. Cuyler, the well-known (or more accurately, perhaps, notorious) *ex-landdrost* of Uitenhage. He owned just under a quarter of the veldcornetcy, with an estate worth £4,200, more than three times that of any other resident. Indeed, while he was *landdrost*, some said that his landed possessions compromised the disinterestedness his position required.<sup>26</sup> Another £7,150 (or 41 percent of the veldcornetcy's

TABLE 2.5  
*Proportions of Owner Occupancy in Sampled Veldcornetcies*

District/no. veldcornetcy	I	II	III	IV	V
CAPE					
1 Blauwberg	99.2	0.8			
2 Koeberg	100.0				
3 Berg River	100.0				
4 Agter Groen Kloof	76.6	15.9	7.4		
5 Tijgerberg	100.0				
STELLENBOSCH					
6 Bottelary	100.0				
7 Groot Drakenstein	100.0				
8 Wagonmakers Valley	100.0				
9 Klein Drakenstein	100.0				
10 Mosselbank River	100.0				
11 Honigberg	100.0				
GEORGE					
12 Mossel Bay	79.1	6.1	13.2	1.6	
13 Attaquas Kloof	57.0	2.9	22.5	17.6	
WORCESTER					
14 24 Rivers	78.3		21.7		
15 Voorst Bokkeveld	97.7	0.8	1.6		
16 Cold Bokkeveld	61.3	38.7			
17 Klein Zwart Berg	94.8	5.2			
18 Voorst Omtrek Midden Roggeveld	79.2	16.3	4.5		
CLANWILLIAM					
19 Upper Oliphants River	78.7	17.2			
20 Berg and Lange Valley	80.9	11.7	7.4		
21 Onderroggeveld	67.9	30.2	1.9		
22 Camiesberg	52.8	27.8	19.5		
23 Namaqualand	59.0	41.0			
24 Mouth of Oliphants River	79.4	20.1			
BEAUFORT					
25 Nieuwveld (Alewyn Smit)	47.1	35.2	15.8	2.0	
UITENHAGE					
26 Coega	38.2	55.1	2.2	0	4.6
27 Winterhoek	59.6	21.0	15.4	4.0	0
ALBANY (KAT RIVER)					
28 Andries Pretorius	96.6	0	2.5	0.9	
ALBANY					
29 Kocnap	48.1	9.8	36.1	6.0	
30 Fort Beaufort	49.9	0.5	37.5	12.1	
SOMERSET					
31 Zwagershoek	80.9	11.6	4.8		
32 East Riet River	79.0	0.8	15.8	4.5	
CRADOCK					
33 Brak River	86.5	13.5			

District/no. veldcornetcy	I	II	III	IV	V
34 Klaas Smits River	85.0	15.0			
GRAAFF-REINET					
35 Uitvlugt	59.4	13.4	14.6	9.9	3.8
36 Agter Sneeuwberg	69.4	4.5	8.9	4.1	6.6
37 Buffelshoek	75.2	10.9	0.4	0.7	12.9

KEY: I—Percentage owner occupied. II—Percentage where the owner does not reside, but where there is no evidence of anyone else. III—Percentage where the occupier is not the owner, usually a tenant. IV—Unoccupied. V—Occupied by servants.

value) was owned by non-residents, most of whom lived in either Uitenhage or Port Elizabeth, although there was one owner of over £1,000 worth of the area who was at the time in England. In general, the non-resident owners had not put in tenants on their farms, and in only two cases is it definitely stated that the farm was under the care of "servants." Exactly how the farms were worked is not clear, but it may be that even so close to Port Elizabeth they were being held speculatively, waiting for the land price to rise. More likely, though, is the possibility that the grazing was "sour," and that the farms were occupied only during the summer rains.

In the Koenap, too, a large proportion (35 percent, worth £14,800) of the equity was owned by men who lived outside the veldcornetcy; 24 percent was owned by residents of Grahamstown and, of this, 11 percent by one man. However, almost all of this land was occupied and presumably out at rent. Only one farm, worth £500, was unoccupied; its owner was specifically stated to live outside the Koenap, although the residences of the owners of the other four farms (worth in total £2,050), none occupied, are not given. In at least three cases the occupant of a farm was a member of the family of its owner. All the same, the evidence is that outsiders were acquiring the land in this rich sheep-farming district not only for the purposes of speculation, but also to rent it out. On the other hand, more than half of the value in this veldcornetcy was in the hands of its residents, who owned eleven of the eighteen estates (often comprising more than one farm), valued at over £1,000.

In Alewyn Smit's veldcornetcy, in the Nieuwveld, on the northern edge of the Little Karoo near Beaufort West,<sup>27</sup> a large proportion of the land, 67 percent in total, was in the hands of men who owned more than one farm in the division. About 600 square kilometers, worth £4,375, or 19 percent of the division's equity, was owned by a single man, George William Prince; it made up 13 of the 22 farms, measuring around a thousand square kilometers. He had purchased it for £6,380 in January of 1841, in partnership with two other Cape Town merchants; this large estate was sold as a single lot by a speculator who had acquired the farms of men who had joined the *voortrekkers* in Natal or the Orange Free State.<sup>28</sup> Prince was recorded as living at Steenrotsfontein in the veldcornetcy itself, so it would appear that he was actually farming the land, or at least part of it, and not merely waiting for the

TABLE 2.6  
*Total Valuations and Numbers of Properties in Sampled Veldcornetcies*

District/no. veldcornetcy	Total valuation	Number of properties
CAPE		
1 Blauwberg	16,350	20
2 Koeberg	19,625	18
3 Berg River	11,650	18
4 Agter Groen Kloof	11,775	22
5 Tijgerberg	19,775	29
STELLENBOSCH		
6 Bottelary	32,265	30
7 Groot Drakenstein	50,725	45
8 Wagonmakers Valley	50,332	113
9 Klein Drakenstein	34,000	57
10 Mosselbank River	14,025	12
11 Honigberg	8,475	29
GEORGE		
12 Mossel Bay	28,475	34
13 Attaquas Kloof	25,912	61
WORCESTER		
14 24 Rivers	18,870	30
15 Voorst Bokkeveld	16,150	23
16 Cold Bokkeveld	9,700	25
17 Klein Zwart Berg	2,860	11
18 Voorst Omtrek Midden Roggeveld	14,400	44
CLANWILLIAM		
19 Upper Oliphants River	10,712	25
20 Berg and Lange Valley	12,825	27
21 Onderroggeveld	31,675	58
22 Camiesberg	10,000	30
23 Namaqualand	4,325	15
24 Mouth of Oliphants River	15,900	41
BEAUFORT		
25 Nieuwveld (Alewyn Smit)	22,831	80
UITENHAGE		
26 Coega	17,425	37
27 Winterhoek	12,740	58
ALBANY (KAT RIVER)		
28 Andries Pretorius	9,230	88
ALBANY		
29 Koenap	42,220	47
30 Fort Beaufort	27,560	100
SOMERSET		
31 Zwagershoek	41,040	60
32 East Riet River	39,727	102
CRADOCK		
33 Brak River	47,510	79
34 Klaas Smits River	22,500	52

District/no. veldcorncetcy	Total valuation	Number of properties
GRAAFF-REINET		
35 Uitvlugt	35,902	120
36 Agter Sneeuwberg	26,600	37
37 Buffelshoek	20,625	23

price to rise. Indeed, relatively little of the veldcorncetcy's equity (18 percent, or £4,232) was owned by men who lived outside its borders, and many of these were residents of the neighboring dorp of Beaufort. Obviously, there was a move towards consolidation, but not towards absenteeism.

Even in the new wool-producing districts, land consolidation and absentee ownership were far from regular. The veldcorncetcy of Buffelshoek, in the southeast of the Graaff-Reinet district, shows a very different pattern, though one probably more typical in 1845 than those of the areas close to Grahams-town and Port Elizabeth.<sup>29</sup> Virtually all the farms were owner occupied, there was little land consolidation, and under 5 percent of the equity (£1,025 out of £20,625) was owned by people who were not residents of the veldcorncetcy. Nevertheless, the average value of the properties in Buffelshoek was, as has been pointed out, the second highest of any veldcorncetcy outside the southwest Cape, and only £2 behind the highest, the Koenap.

The old agricultural heartland of the southwest Cape thus showed a consistent pattern of owner occupancy, no doubt most of them members of families that had dominated the region for generations.<sup>30</sup> Outside the Cape and Stellenbosch districts, matters were much more diverse. In some areas, owner occupancy was virtually universal, in others a high proportion of the land was held by a small number, either for their own use or to be rented out to tenants.

In some ways this is a depressing conclusion. It would seem to suggest that the grid that has to be used to understand land ownership in the Cape Colony cannot be on the scale of the region or even of the district, but at the level of the individual veldcorncetcy. At any rate the sample would have to be considerably larger. In addition, the probabilities are that labor organization would be almost as variegated.<sup>31</sup>

On the other hand, from this very diversity a most important conclusion can be drawn: When the agricultural history of South Africa, or of any significant portion of it, is examined in detail, it becomes clear just how great were the differences between the various parts of the country at any given time. Certain universals are evident. The exploitation of the mainly black labor force has been general, although at different times and in different places it has taken a variety of forms, from slavery to share-cropping to wage labor.<sup>32</sup> Eventually all parts of the country were brought into the nexus of markets and credit, though at widely varying rates and periods. By the mid-nineteenth century, and usually much earlier, virtually all the Cape Colony as then defined

had come within that nexus. But the point is that this happened in a number of ways and with great differences of timing. The variations were to be found not just among the main agricultural regions of the colony but within them. Obvious distinctions can be drawn between the southwest, the northwest, and the east, but also between Albany and Graaff-Reinet, even between the Zwagershoek and the East Riet River in Somerset. This has been shown herein to have been the case with regard to distribution of landed property, but similar, if not so finely textured, differences are apparent in any facet of the colony's and the country's agricultural history.

The question this raises is of the extent to which the various profiles revealed by the 1845 cross-section merely represent different moments in a single developmental cycle of agrarian exploitation. Are the distinctions that can be observed merely the result of, on the one hand, the century and a half that separated the conquest of the far southwest from that of, say, Colesberg district; and, on the other hand, of the different lengths of time elapsing between that initial conquest and the area's full incorporation into the market economy? The latter differences were determined by access to coastal markets and the regions' varying suitability for particular systems of agricultural production. The use of the concept of the developmental cycles, initially developed for the study of family structures, does allow simplification of the complex data but not into a single model. Rather, at least two distinct cycles were in operation: the rating intersected them at varying points in their trajectories. The two cycles led eventually to the same outcome: the division of the countryside into holdings usually managed directly by their owner and the owner's family. In longer-settled districts of the colony this division had been achieved long before 1845. Elsewhere, a distinction can be observed between, on the one hand, those parts of the country where claims to and exploitation of the land were contemporary and intertwined and, on the other, areas where it was possible to make speculative claims to land well in advance of its full economic utilization.

Because of changes in land tenure arrangements introduced by Governor Sir John Cradock in 1814, the single most important fact determining which of the two models would obtain in a given area was the date of its conquest.<sup>33</sup> Those areas settled before 1814—the southwest Cape proper, those districts such as Worcester and Clanwilliam (and probably Swellendam) which immediately adjoined it, and the old core of the Graaff-Reinet district in the Sundays River valley—followed the first course, with relatively little speculation in land.<sup>34</sup> In regions more recently conquered, or at least settled—Uitenhage, Albany, much of the Fish River valley, and also much of the drier central Karoo, including Beaufort and the southwest part of Graaff-Reinet<sup>35</sup>—it was possible for the rich and the well-connected to acquire land in the expectation, generally justified, that its value would rise. This pattern was also followed further north after the establishment of the Orange River Sovereignty (later the Orange Free State) in 1848.<sup>36</sup> The slow transfer to commercial stock farm-

ing, or pastoralism, thus postdated acquisition of the land, whereas in older areas of the colony landownership was immediately accompanied by introduction of an admittedly less intensively commercial exploitation. Clearly, the changes in the form of the colonial state, as British rule became more entrenched, and in the extent to which this could be exploited for individual gain, were crucial in determining this. The parameters of gentry control, and the nature of the ruling gentry class, were thus different in the east than in the west, with evident political consequences.<sup>37</sup> Their reality was, however, no less evident.




∞ PART TWO

# Racial Stratification and Ideologies



## Going Beyond the Pale: On the Roots of White Supremacy in South Africa

 The function that an institution performs at any given moment cannot necessarily explain its origin. Thus, as has become clear in the recent debates on twentieth-century South Africa, the forms of racial domination which culminated in apartheid were for a long period compatible with the particular structure that South African capitalism took on. However, twentieth-century white supremacy was at least in part an adaptation to new circumstances on the part of institutions that had existed in South Africa before the mineral revolution of the late nineteenth century. In this chapter, arguments are developed on how the system of racial domination came into being, focusing on what seems to be the crucial period, namely the first sixty years of the nineteenth century in the Cape Colony.<sup>1</sup>

Certain concepts developed by Van Arkel to explain the growth of anti-Semitism in Europe are useful here.<sup>2</sup> Van Arkel argues that the necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions for the origin of racism are, first, the stereotyping of the discriminated group, second, social distance between them and the discriminators, and third, the terrorizing of potential discriminators to ensure that they also engage in discriminatory practices.

These concepts require more explication. By stereotyping is meant the attribution to the discriminated group of negative characteristics, in such a way that the distinctions on the basis of race are consistent with the basic system of belief of the group as a whole. If the value system of the discriminating group cannot accommodate the racial stereotypes, then clearly either the stereotypes will disappear or the value system will be so amended as to make it once again consistent with the stereotypes. Thus, to give an example, while Christianity dominated Western thought patterns, an alien people could be stereotyped as heretics, as heathens, as godless, as in the thralls of superstition, and so on, but not as excessively religious. Only as Western society became secularized could such a description become an insult.

Once they are embedded in the culture of a given group, negative stereotypes can be very persistent, and can long outlive the historical situation in which they were created. Van Arkel indeed argues the stereotype of the Jew

as a parasitical, usurious moneybag, that was to cause so much harm in the Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was largely created in the early Middle Ages and was maintained throughout the very different circumstances of approximately a millennium. Such stereotypes can go into hibernation, as it were, and become dormant, if still present and a threat, for long periods of time. However, should some subsequent social situation warrant it, they can once again become functional and of importance, awakening out of their winter sleep. This can only happen, of course, when intervening events have not led to their elimination. Both at, and indeed before, their conception and in subsequent periods, negative stereotypes can be corrected by frequent and open interaction between the discriminators and members of the discriminated group, which would show the inherent falsity of such generalizations. In other words, there must be considerable social distance between the two groups in question for stereotyping to take root and to be maintained. However, there is no necessary temporal priority for stereotyping or social distance, and in practice they no doubt generally evolve simultaneously and in mutual interdependence.

Social distance does not necessarily, or indeed usually, entail an absence of contact between individuals from the groups in question, only that such contacts are not open and equal. Interaction between discriminators and discriminated is often intense, but only within strictly delineated bounds, referred to here as labeled interaction. The fixed role patterns of people from the different groups can then act to strengthen rather than to weaken the racial stereotypes. The rigidly defined behavioral codes and etiquette that govern the relations of, say, a master or mistress with his or her servant, or a client with a pawnbroker, will do nothing to diminish the negative ideas which the one has of the other. People who only meet under very specific conditions will have their whole vision of each other determined by the circumstances of their meetings. If they do not encounter each other outside the bounds of that single, highly structured relationship, and if they do not have a variegated pattern of interaction with each other, then the stereotypes which are consonant with this labeled pattern of interaction will only grow in power and general acceptance with further social intercourse. The concentration within specific occupations of individuals from particular putatively racial groups, so characteristic of racial orders, is at once a strengthening of and a necessary support for those orders.

Van Arkel's third concept, the terrorization of potential discriminators, is perhaps the most difficult to grasp. It does not refer to the violence inflicted on the victims of racism, brutal though that so often is. Rather, it refers to the process whereby all those who, in the opinion of the discriminators, should also behave as racists, are forced to do so. Social pressure, economic sanctions, and actual violence or the threat of it are employed to impress particular patterns of behavior on those who may at first not have been willing to adopt them. In such circumstances, those who have been forced to act as racists will,

in their turn, frequently internalize the opinions of those who drove them into that position.

The operation of terrorization is in itself dependent on the degree to which the political authorities have been able to monopolize the use of violence, and the uses to which they put that monopoly. It can be that the state itself is prepared to enforce the code of racial behavior on all its subjects. This is then state terrorization. On the other hand, it may be that the state apparatus is opposed to racism, or to the acts of terror which accompany it, either from genuine "liberal" convictions, or because it considers any political initiative on the part of its subjects, particularly of a potentially violent nature, to be highly reprehensible. If the state is able to impose its will on its subjects, then incipient racism will be counteracted and disappear. There are historical examples of such a process, notably with regard to the position of the Jews in early medieval Byzantium. More frequently, however, the state's ability to counteract such terrorization is limited, either by a lack of firm control over the population or by its unwillingness to jeopardize its relations with its main supporters. In such a circumstance, it may be surmised, racism can flourish, irrespective of opposition to it on the part of the country's rulers.

What follows cannot be called a rigorous testing of Van Arkel's arguments, in a different situation. However, his concepts guided our investigation of South African racism, allowing connections and significances to emerge that would not otherwise have done so. This work can thus be seen as an exercise in controlled cross-fertilization of ideas.

## Refutations

Although the patterns of racial stratification in modern South Africa are consonant with the industrial capitalist structure of that society, they cannot, we believe, be seen as resulting solely from the country's industrialization. The various institutions that finally came to be called apartheid must have had their roots in pre-industrial South Africa. The Randlords, the Afrikaner nationalists, the capitalist farmers, and the skilled white workers could only build the world they did because the foundations for it had been laid in a pre-existing order of racial stratification. It is tempting to understand this pre-existing order as the process of colonial conquest itself.

Such an understanding is implicit in plural society theory, though it is admittedly more concerned with the consequences of ethnic distinctions than with their causes.<sup>3</sup> The theory holds that many colonial societies consisted of discrete, usually racial, segments whose only point of contact was in the marketplace. Without elaborating on the shortcomings, or indeed the merits, of plural society theory as a description of modern South Africa, there can be no doubt that the processes of colonial conquest, particularly of the Africans, had many deep-reaching effects still important even in modern society. Indeed, the entire Marxist theory concerning the articulation of modes of production,

whatever its own value, derives from the recognition of the centrality of colonial conquest. The concept of pluralism is predicated upon the existence of discrete units, generally of an ethnic nature, which make up a particular society and meet only under certain specific conditions. In the classic model developed by J. S. Furnivall for colonial Southeast Asia, the meeting occurred only in the market place.<sup>4</sup> Plural society theory cannot, however, explain why the boundaries between the various groups come into being, except as expressions of distinct, immutable differences of culture. Such an explanation inevitably leads to tautologies.

In the case of pre-industrial South Africa this failure is of major importance because the degree of distinction between one social group and another was far less than it was later to become. In the eighteenth-century Cape Colony, there existed no rigid line between "white" and so-called "colored," but rather a variety of status variations based on many different criteria, and by no means congruent one with another.<sup>5</sup> In this sense, social life, particularly in Cape Town, was still open and social mobility, in both directions and with little concern for "race," was still fully possible.

This can be demonstrated in various ways, although to do so is to impose artificial, anachronistic categories on eighteenth-century Cape society, which did not see itself as divided along racial lines, but rather as containing a multitude of statuses. People thought of themselves, and of others, as men or women, as company officials or burghers, as slaves or "hottentots," as *koopman* or common sailor, as Buginese or Malagasy, and to a certain extent as Christian or heathen.<sup>6</sup> There is no indication of any group ideology developing along the lines that were later to become the bases of South African society. The eighteenth-century Cape was in no way a plural society in the sense that Furnivall, M. G. Smith, or Leo Kuper would define it, with specific ethnic blocks maintaining identities of their own and meeting only under specific, defined conditions. A better way to describe it might be as a polyphonic, if discordant, society.

Nevertheless, one of the groups distinguished in the Cape was the free blacks. It might appear that such a name in itself implied that blackness was an important criterion of social taxonomy. Slaves and free blacks, together with the Khoisan and those known as "bastard hottentots," might seem to be contrasted with the non-blacks who held all the leading positions within the society, in contradiction of the claim made here that no "racial" groups were distinguished. It is, therefore, necessary to investigate in more detail developments in the position of this group, in particular, the extent to which "free blackness" was an ascribed and immutable status.

Free blacks as a separate group seem to have been first so defined in 1720, when they came to be registered as a separate group in the tax lists. This was a reflection, apparently, of a change in the structure of the militia, whereby freed slaves no longer fulfilled normal military duty but acted instead as the Cape Town fire service (itself, surely, an inversion of the stereotype of slaves

as arsonists).<sup>7</sup> Thus the assignation "free black" in fact had less to do with color than with a former servile (or criminal) status. In other words, it was not an inheritable status. This is evidenced by the fact that the proportion of free blacks not born at the Cape was always substantially higher than the proportion of first generation South Africans among the manumitted slaves. The percentages in question were a minimum of 60 for the former, as against 49 for the latter, taken over the century as a white. The difference was made up of those who had been banned to the Cape from Indonesia or Sri Lanka as criminals and had remained after serving their sentence.<sup>8</sup> These were also considered free blacks. If, however, the children of free blacks had themselves been considered black, then this discrepancy in the proportions would have been impossible, unless we assume that Cape-born manumitted slaves had a far higher mortality than those who had been born elsewhere, which is against reason. Even given the low fertility of the group, in the course of time the children of the free blacks would have pushed up the proportion of Cape-born free blacks above that deriving from manumissions. Indeed, the status of free black was only recognized within Cape Town. In the countryside, where admittedly few slaves were manumitted, those who were, and their descendants, merged unnoticed into the general burgher population<sup>9</sup>

The most important case regarding the position of the free blacks occurred in 1791. It is worth analyzing this in rather more detail, since, although it has been used to argue the opposite, it brings out clearly the points argued here. Four years earlier, at the instigation of the Burgher militia officers, the Council of Policy had instituted a new corps in the militia, the Free Corps, for those men "who though not born in slavery have not been born in wedlock and for that reason cannot very well be enrolled among the burghers doing service; also that they cannot very well be employed with those at the Fire engines and public works, who have been born in slavery." Jan Smook, married to an ex-slave, complained that his sons, though born in lawful wedlock, had been refused enrollment in one of the burgher companies, in contrast to other sons of ex-slaves who had been able to conceal their birth. The militia captains responded that the "real intention" of the *Krijgsraad* had been "that such residents whose father or mother had been born in a state of slavery should belong to and do service in the Free Corps [the militia company in question], in order thus to be dissociated from the burghers, as otherwise the establishment of such a corps would not have been necessary."<sup>10</sup>

It should be noted how late in the period of Dutch rule the Smook case occurred.<sup>11</sup> Two further points are of great importance. First, Smook was a burgher, with all the privileges that entailed, and presumably his ex-slave wife had not robbed her sons of the status acquired by patrilineal descent. Indeed, on the very day the Council of Policy confirmed the establishment of the new corps, it also acquiesced in the suggestion that Smook be appointed corporal in another militia company, thus confirming his acceptable social status. In addition, he was at the time one of the butchers who held the contract to

deliver meat to the VOC, one of the most important positions in the economic life of the colony.<sup>12</sup> Second, although it was later rather loosely stated that this corps consisted of "Bastards and Mistiches [mestizos or half-castes],"<sup>13</sup> it is clear from the discussions that the colony's elite, both burgher and official, was merely extending the stigma of slavery by one generation, not making a racial stigma. This was the opinion of the essayist Samuel Hudson, who wrote, "One Generation does away the Stain [of slavery] and though it may be remembered by some Ill-natured persons they are generally received by the Inhabitants according to their present situation in life. If wealthy, by the first in the settlement."<sup>14</sup> This is a strong rebuttal of the argument, often proposed, that, as the colony's economy grew, from around 1770 on, the level of racial discrimination increased. There is no indication of a taxonomy based on race, only of one based on descent.

Accordingly, it is a mistake to impose categories of race developed later upon an analysis of the eighteenth century. Even an investigation of the rate of miscegenation is scarcely necessary.<sup>15</sup> Not only was the word miscegenation not coined until the middle of the nineteenth century,<sup>16</sup> but the data collected show that the children of manumitted slaves (particularly women), and certainly their grandchildren, were absorbed into what was to become the "white" population of South Africa. With no specific mulatto group, even such ideas as a "mulatto escape hatch" are inapplicable.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, though the distinction between slave and free in the eighteenth-century Cape Colony was fairly firm, it was by no means impermeable. Within the free population, stratification was not based on race, and the only important barrier to social mobility, and then only in one direction, was between the burghers and the high company officials.<sup>18</sup> Certainly in its early years, the Cape Colony cannot be described as a plural society.

### *Religion*

At the end of the eighteenth century the way was theoretically open for society in the Cape Colony, and in South Africa as a whole, to develop in a direction radically different from that which, in the end, it took. In part, this was because racial identities were not what they would later become.

Various historians have tended, consciously or otherwise, to seek the cause of racial antagonism in feelings of distaste, acquired in early childhood, for "other" sorts of people. This line of argument is related to the so-called "primordial school" in the social sciences, which assumes that the social position of every person is determined to a large extent by membership in a particular group. Skin-color, language, ethnic and cultural ties are of great importance in this. The feeling of belonging to such groups is thought to be acquired in the first years of life, even before an independent consciousness develops. Precisely because these ideas are acquired so early and so unconsciously, and thus are "primordial," they are difficult to correct in later life. Thus, from the very beginning, Europeans may have had feelings of racial exclusiveness that could

easily lead to racial tensions. Such an analysis may well have a certain synchronic explanatory power, or in other words provide insights into the processes whereby existing distinctions are maintained. However, if it can be shown that many of the identities, such as those important in modern South Africa, are historical constructions, with roughly datable origins, then it follows that "primordial" feelings, however important, must be seen as consequences and not causes of domination and subjection.<sup>19</sup>

In the period dealt with in this chapter, domination and subjection had not yet led to the formation of racial identities. The ideological justification for a policy of racial domination was largely absent. It might be thought that the Calvinist belief of the colonists would provide such a justification, and this is a well-known theme in the historiography of white South Africa. In what is probably the most subtle analysis of the process, Jan J. Loubser wrote:

The Calvinist conceptions of man and of order introduce a two-class distinction between the elect and the damned, the order of grace and the order of nature. Although all men are created in the image of God and are equally sinful as a result of the Fall, the elect has a special position of responsibility to implement the will of God in the world. In the order of nature God ordained that some should rule and some obey, and so on, and the order of grace never violates the order of nature. These conceptions obviously provide justification for inequality and the limitation of equality strictly to the community of the elect in situations where such arrangements are deemed necessary or desirable.<sup>20</sup>

It is a short step from there to a belief in which whites were seen as the elect, as the rulers, and the blacks as the damned, the inferior who had to obey. Rigorous racial subjugation could thus easily be justified, and even brought into being.

Loubser was preceded in his argument by other South African historians, including I. D. MacCrone, Sheila Patterson, Eric Walker, the so-called "frontier school" in general, and also by many Afrikaners (but not, notably enough, by that good son of the manse, W. M. Macmillan).<sup>21</sup> Their arguments cannot be described as illogical, except for those materialists who assume a priori that ideas can never play such an important role in the creation of a society, a "vulgar Marxist" position which we do not share. Loubser's arguments are unsound on much simpler and more empirical grounds.

Loubser seems to have assumed that the great majority of those who first settled at the Cape were sophisticated Calvinists, or that the colonists became such, and that the Cape Colony to a certain extent was a Calvinist theocracy. None of these assumptions stand up. It is indeed most unlikely that there has ever existed a Calvinist theocracy of any size that held fast to such uncompromising dogmas. The hard logic of predestination was seldom consonant with the milder psychological situation of conversion or with the acceptance of God's grace, which made possible the acceptance of outsiders into the community of the saved. Without such an escape, religious feelings would have been smothered by Calvin's theological logic. Thus, in reality, the sharp di-

chotomy of the world Loubser derives from the Calvinists' rigid doctrine was never experienced as such by a large proportion of its adherents. Even the most orthodox Calvinists experienced something that resembled conversion. For the Dutch, the most famous example is Abraham Kuyper, for the English-speaking world, the Great Awakening of New England in the 1740s; for South Africa, perhaps the "revival" of the 1860s.<sup>22</sup>

Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that Loubser's understanding of Calvinist dogma was an accurate interpretation of Calvin's theology and its practice, considerable problems would arise in interpreting it as the driving force behind the development of a stratified society in South Africa. First, it was not the task of the Dutch East India Company to promote the Kingdom of God on Earth; its task was purely commercial. Though a distinction is often made between the business orientation of the VOC and the more militant Calvinism of its West Indian counterpart, this distinction does not hold, not because the VOC can be shown to have been Calvinist inspired, but because the West Indian Company cannot.<sup>23</sup> The most important regulations for the government of the VOC's overseas territories, the 1642 Statutes of Batavia, do contain a clause laying down that only the Reformed religion was to be permitted within the jurisdiction of the company.<sup>24</sup> However, this clause never seems to have been enforced, not even in Batavia or in Sri Lanka, where the missions were most active.<sup>25</sup> In a certain sense it was enforced at the Cape. No other church was founded until, in 1780, after a long struggle, the Lutherans were allowed to found a congregation.<sup>26</sup> This did not mean, however, that any high level of religious feeling is discernible among the officials at the Cape—there is no indication that the high company officials, as a group, considered their church duties as any more than nominal. In a frequently cited passage, François Valentijn, a clergyman who visited the Cape in 1714, described a service he conducted as follows:

I found that the church members totalled 40 men and 48 women only, including those in the return fleet, of whom there were a number, and it was entirely surprising that among those who approached the Table there was no Member of the Council of policy, and apparently also none of them was a church member.<sup>27</sup>

This state of affairs does not seem to have changed greatly during the course of the eighteenth century. The author of the company's journal, for instance, regularly recorded which clergyman preached in the Cape Town church, but was too uninterested to record the text of the sermon. Moreover, ministers were always VOC employees, directly under the authority of the governor, who would have squashed any attempt to impose a Calvinist theocracy according to the dictates from Geneva. When, in 1708, a certain Ds. Le Boucq took steps in this direction, he was quickly removed from the Cape and sent to Batavia.<sup>28</sup> In addition, there were never enough ministers for them to have more than a superficial impact on the society. During most of the eighteenth century only five churches existed in the Cape Colony, and even they did not

always have their own minister.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, they were all in the far southwest of the colony. An area like the Agter Sneeuwberg, later to become the center of a strict Dopper congregation, was for at least twenty years after the first colonists had settled there (in about 1770) more than 800 kilometers from the nearest church.

This brings us to the question of whether, despite the small number of Calvinist ministers and the lack of encouragement they received from the VOC authorities, there was not a general acceptance by the colonists of Calvinist notions about the division of humanity. Once again there is no clear evidence that this was the case. The colonists did not bring Calvinism with them to South Africa in their baggage, at least not in large numbers. Admittedly some Huguenots came to the country as refugees from religious persecution in France but their deep beliefs seem to have been as quickly swallowed up as their language. The great majority of the colonists came, in approximately equal numbers, from the Netherlands and from Germany.<sup>30</sup> With a few exceptions, the Germans would have been brought up as Lutherans or as Catholics, while by no means all the Dutch would have been connected to Reformed churches and even those who were, would not necessarily have been fervent Calvinists. The VOC recruits were generally seen as the scum of society, not the sort of people who have had the inner certainty of salvation said to have been characteristic of the hard core of successful Calvinist merchants. A few went to the East as adventurers, hoping to become rich, or because family connections gave them a reasonable chance of acquiring a high position. The great majority went because they had no other choice; the VOC's continual labor shortage allowed them to escape from bitter poverty. Often they were forced to take service with the company; a number of towns imposed a voyage to the East as a punishment and the Delft Chamber had contracts with the local orphanages to provide recruits.<sup>31</sup> Such were the men who, once they had served their contract, provided a steady stream of recruits to the white population at the Cape for a century and a half. Their way of life would have been more likely to convince them of their eternal damnation than eternal salvation, and would hardly have made them rigid Calvinists.

Even if they did not arrive with, so to speak, the *Institutiones Christianis Religionis* and the Heidelberg catechism, the white population of South Africa might, of course, have developed a more stringent Calvinism there. At first sight this seems likely; the Afrikaners of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were well known for their piety and the rigidity of their dogmas. It could be argued that the transition from the poverty of a VOC soldier to the relative prosperity of many of the Cape free burghers would have made the people in question receptive to Calvinist doctrines of predestination, especially when confronted with so many men and women, notably the slaves and the Khoisan, who were self-evidently damned. As an argument this is plausible, but unfortunately there is, once again, no empirical confirmation of it. Above all, as a result of the low number and poor quality of the ministers, a religious

ideology of this sort can only be discerned among the Cape's whites late in the nineteenth century. There is at least no evidence for it any earlier. The general impression of the Cape settlers in the eighteenth century was not one of piety. Valentijn, whose knowledge of the countryside was admittedly limited, considered that the farmers were even less religious than the citizens of Cape Town. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the farmers seemed to a number of observers to be "teetering on the edge of heathendom," to use Elphick's words.<sup>33</sup> Ironically, Calvinism seemed to have been reduced to no more than the rituals of marriage and baptism, symbols of the kinship of a widely diffused people. As carriers of true Reformed religion, the Afrikaners of the eighteenth century are far from exemplary.

During the last decades of the century the reports that had once described the farmers as near-heathens began to complain about their excessive and cloying piety.<sup>34</sup> This might be a consequence of anti-religious prejudices on the part of the observers, but Heinrich Lichtenstein and John Barrow were not less religious than O. F. Mentzal and S. W. Cloppenburg. Rather it is clear that in the course of the 1780s and 1790s a religious revival had taken place. The leading figures in this were Ds. Helperus Ritzema van Lier, a young and talented Dutch minister who had been a very promising natural scientist before his religious conversion, and Ds. M. C. Vos, also a minister, who had been born at the Cape but brought up in the Netherlands.<sup>35</sup> They found a willing audience for their message, particularly in Cape Town and around Tulbagh. Vos had indeed received his vocation to preach the gospel in Bible-reading circles in Cape Town around 1775.

These men were Calvinists, but not of the sort that Loubser describes. Van Lier could write:

Are the least not our fellow creatures? Do we not have *one* Father, has *one* God not made us? Did God not choose the base, the foolish, the despised of this world? Why should we then refuse to have any dealings with those of whom some will be united with us throughout eternity before the throne of the Lamb?<sup>36</sup>

He was much interested in missions. He was closer to the Moravians than any other Reformed minister; when his sister died she was engaged to one of the first London Missionary Society missionaries, and John Philip would later write a memorial of one of his converts in which he was fulsome in his praise for Van Lier.<sup>37</sup> Vos, too, was quickly able to conquer resistance to the fact that he preached among the slaves of his congregation. He preached his first sermon after accepting his charge in Tulbagh to the great missionary text "Go forth into all the world; preach the gospel to all creatures."<sup>38</sup> Van Lier also preached a sermon in which he was most attached to this text. Nevertheless, the piety around Tulbagh about which Lichtenstein complained a decade later was far more evident among the whites than among the slaves.<sup>39</sup>

These men, their converts, and those who, in 1799, founded the South African Missionary Society were no social reformers.<sup>40</sup> Their attention was

almost exclusively concerned with the spiritual well-being of those who had been placed under their charge. Nevertheless, they were Evangelical Christians, and such an approach, which recognizes that all sinners can be brought to the Lord, is difficult to reconcile with the dichotomy between the saved and the damned which, according to Loubser, contributed to the establishment of the racial structure of South Africa.

Calvinism of a type more consistent with Loubser's model did develop in South Africa, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the far northeast of the Cape Colony, in the districts of Colesberg and Middelburg, where a small number of large families formed the basis of the *Gereformeerde*, or congregations known as the "Doppers."<sup>41</sup> This was an area which, from the beginning of white settlement in the 1770s, was known for the piety of its inhabitants, presumably as a consequence of the influence of one or two individuals. One missionary, a mulatto from Guyana, considered the farmers in this area remarkable for their "aspirations for the word of God,"<sup>42</sup> but all the same the historian of the Doppers could find no clear hunger for a strict Calvinist doctrine before the middle of the 1830s.<sup>43</sup> A Calvinist justification for a racially ordered society did not arise any earlier than that, and only much later did it spread to the great mass of the Afrikaner population. Probably only during the first years of South Africa's industrialization did the new Calvinism, represented by such figures as Abraham Kuyper, become the orthodoxy of Afrikaner "civil religion," to the extent that it ever did. As in the Netherlands, it was particularly attractive to the "kleine Luyden" (literally "little people.")

Even if an ideology of racial domination did not arise in the eighteenth century on the basis of a Calvinist dichotomy between the damned and the saved, it is still possible that other taxonomies could have led to the same result. The most obvious of these is the distinction between Christians and heathens.<sup>44</sup> However low the enthusiasm for the performance of their Christian duties may have been—and this obviously varied considerably from individual to individual—the Europeans were conscious and proud of their status as Christians. From the first years of the colonization of the Cape of Good Hope, they distinguished themselves from the Khoikhoi, the autochthonous inhabitants generally and mistakenly known as the hottentots, and from the slaves, among whom they lived, on the basis of their Christianity. Christianity was the sign of their culture, of their civilization. The rites of baptism symbolized entry into the community, to such an extent that men and women were prepared to travel for two to three months in order to have their children christened, and, of course, to fulfill various other social and economic commitments. Around 1770 a "bastard" attempted to bribe a minister to baptize him so that he would be fully accepted by the landowners among whom he lived.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, until the end of the century the term "white" itself was not used at the Cape. Instead, it was recorded how many "Christians" and how many "hottentots" or "bastard hottentots" went on a

specific commando raid, for instance.<sup>46</sup> This was the line along which Cape society was divided.

It was not a closed barrier. People who were not of European descent could become Christians, at least in the sense that they could be baptized. The rule of the Synod of Dort was that only those with Reformed parents might be baptized as infants. However, only for a short period in the 1660s was any attempt made to impose this rule strictly. Thereafter, slaves and slave children were regularly admitted to baptism.<sup>47</sup>

Some slaveowners resisted any attempt by their slaves to become Christians, but others, including the VOC, welcomed it. All VOC slaves who were born at the Cape were baptized, but none of those brought to the Cape as slaves were.<sup>48</sup> In total, during the period of slavery, some three thousand slaves and free blacks were baptized, either as infants or as adults, into the Dutch Reformed Church in Cape Town alone.<sup>49</sup> Admittedly this was no more than twenty a year on average, and the majority were the slaves of the company, which also sponsored other slaves at their baptism. Nevertheless, it demonstrates a regular acceptance of certain slaves into the ranks of Christians, which is not consonant with any argument that assumes a strict social division between Christians and heathens.

Not only slaves were baptized. People of Khoikhoi descent also had this privilege, if in smaller numbers. In the *opgaaf* roll for Graaff-Reinet of 1798, some 121 persons, including 54 adults, were described as "baptised Bastards."<sup>50</sup> This is a small number compared with the 8,974 Khoikhoi registered in the district that year, but the church in Graaff-Reinet had been founded only six years earlier and it is unlikely that many of these people would previously have journeyed the eight hundred kilometers to the nearest church.

Baptism was not a meaningless ritual for the Khoikhoi. In addition to its spiritual advantages, it conferred valuable status. A case is known of a baptized "bastard" who, refused a privilege (to buy drink), asked indignantly what right anyone had to treat him as a hottentot: he was after all a Christian. More important, some Khoikhoi were related by descent or marriage to whites. Gilliomée comments that, in 1798, of the seventeen "bastards" who were both baptized and married, the wives of five had direct ancestors who were Europeans.<sup>51</sup>

Equally, there is no indication that baptized slaves and "bastards" were seen as a sort of second-class Christian, nor that they were more readily excluded from communion than were whites. The Graaff-Reinet "bastards" were probably chiefly admitted to the church on the basis of a confession of faith, and thus had the same rights as every European church member. On the other hand, the whites did not automatically become members of a church. We have already cited Valentijn's comments. It would appear that, in the 1780s, for which figures are available, at least twice as many people married in all the parishes of the Cape as were admitted to full membership of the church.<sup>52</sup> Considering that these two rites were undergone at approximately

the same age and that not everyone got married, this would seem to suggest that at least half of the white population of the Cape were not full members of the church. This can, therefore, not have been an important distinguishing symbol of social status, at least not along racial lines.

The distinction between Christian and heathen was not firm. Individuals could cross it, in both directions. This does not mean that the role of religion was unimportant, or an invention of modern historians. Religion was for many people a major determinant of social status, both their own and that of others. Nevertheless it is clear that in Cape Town, on the frontier, and, as is shown by Sparrman's description of a "bastard" family where one brother was a Christian and the other not, in the agricultural districts of the southwest Cape, it was neither a strong nor an all-determining distinction.<sup>53</sup>

### *Stereotyping of Khoikhoi and Slaves*

An ideology of racial exclusiveness on the basis of Christian dogmas cannot be seen to have existed in South Africa before 1800. There is, however, the possibility that such an ideology may have developed as a result of the very negative stereotype that Europeans of that period had of the inhabitants of other continents in general and of those of Southern Africa in particular. Once again, at first sign such an explanation is highly plausible. In the eighteenth century, formally racist theories of mankind began to be formulated by Europeans.<sup>54</sup> In the New World in particular, the view that whites had of blacks steadily deteriorated, especially in what were to become the United States, as the system of Negro slavery became more entrenched and vital to the economy.<sup>55</sup> As a result of the increasing technical prowess of Europe compared to the rest of the world, European ethnocentrism became more and more pronounced, although it would only reach its peak in the heyday of imperialism during the second half of the nineteenth century, as the men and women from beyond the seas, and particularly those from Africa, were seen more and more as inferior beings.

In the forefront of this degradation were the Khoisan of the Cape of Good Hope. Although before the colonization of the Cape a certain division of opinion existed among travelers who put in there as to the virtues of these people,<sup>56</sup> after 1652 the picture became very clear. Writer after writer referred to them in exceedingly denigrating terms, frequently merely repeating each other's words. A short section on the Khoikhoi became obligatory in any volume of travel memoirs for a traveler to the East. These travelers usually stayed only a few days in Cape Town and thus did not come into contact with any Khoikhoi except those who lived on the edge of the town in extreme poverty, and who were often addicted to drink. Stories of their drunkenness, their grease-covered dirtiness, and their language, always compared to the gobbling of turkeys (hence the word "hottentot") became current in Europe.<sup>57</sup>

Such ideas quickly found their place in the world of science. Winthrop Jordan writes, of eighteenth-century observers of the Khoikhoi, that, "on the

basis of direct observation, they usually decided that the Hottentots were the most appallingly barbarous of men."<sup>58</sup> Linnaeus even went so far as to question whether the Khoisan should be considered as human at all, or merely as apes. This image has been maintained. Even Jordan, pitying the lot of the West African slaves and their descendants, could write that "the West African 'true negro' was the unlucky victim of a casually conceived connection with a people who were, measured by the standards of modern anthropology, probably the most primitive of all the aborigines known to Europeans before the second half of the eighteenth century."<sup>59</sup> Before this time the word "hottentot" had acquired a new meaning, in addition to its designation of a group of people. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines it as "a person of inferior intellect or culture; one degraded in the scale of civilization or ignorant of the usages of civilized society," and gives various examples from 1726 on.<sup>60</sup> The Dutch equivalent of the *O.E.D.*, *Van Dale*, is somewhat more succinct. For it, among other things, a hottentot is "a rough and uncivilized stupid person."<sup>61</sup>

This stereotype has survived in South Africa well into the twentieth century. From around the 1830s on, it was regularly found in the fictional literature written by whites about the so-called "Cape Coloureds," where it certainly reflected popular attitudes. Indeed, in all probability the popular attitudes of whites have outlived those in the novels, since in recent decades openly derogatory racist opinions have tended to disappear from "respectable" white writing, although they have often been maintained in a shadowy, rather unconscious way.<sup>62</sup> The stories of the travelers about the drunken, filthy stupidity of the Khoi, which led to their being so denigrated by the men of eighteenth-century science, were to be found again, in different form but with the same content, in the works of men like Charles Boniface and Andrew Geddes Bain in the 1830s and 1840s, and from then on right through the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries.

Before the early nineteenth century, in contrast, such a view, although occasionally present, was not universally held by white residents of the Cape Colony. Even outside the colony, François Le Vaillant depicts the Khoikhoi as romantic, Rousseauesque figures in his idylls of the beautiful Narina and the faithful Klaas (both honored in the naming of South Africa's two most handsome species of birds), although most subsequent South African historians have considered that a man with such a positive view of the Khoikhoi could not be trusted on anything.<sup>63</sup> Expressions of appreciation for the Khoikhoi, of a more prosaic and concrete nature, can be found in many places within Cape European society as well. The most laudatory white writing on the Khoikhoi comes from J. G. Grevenbroek in the last decade of the seventeenth century. In a letter to an unknown Dutch clergyman, he expresses astonishment "that Rumour, never bearing a clear report, should have acquired such strength in her course and proved so tenacious of falsehood that those half-truths that are spread abroad about our Africans should have reached

your ears.”<sup>64</sup> His own experience was entirely at odds with this accepted stereotype:

I found this people with one accord in their general daily life living in harmony with nature's law, hospitable to every race of men, open, dependable, lovers of truth and justice, not unacquainted with the worship of some God, endowed, within their own limits, with a rare nimbleness of mother wit, and having minds receptive of instruction.

It was their contact with the Europeans that degraded them, he maintains: “From us they have learned blasphemy, perjury, strife, quarreling, drunkenness, trickery, brigandage, theft, ingratitude, unbridled lust for what is not one's own, misdeeds unknown to them before and, among other crimes of deepest die, the accursed lust of gold.”

Grevenbroek is obviously delivering a backhanded compliment here, as he is prepared to admit that the Khoikhoi of his time were in many ways depraved as a result of European colonialism; but this admission can in no way be construed as an argument for their subjugation to the whites and their incorporation into the labor process of the colony. Grevenbroek was clearly a believer in the noble savage, *avant la lettre*, claiming that “In whiteness of soul [the Khoikhoi] are superior to many of our countrymen.”<sup>65</sup> However, it should not be thought that Grevenbroek did not understand the nature of Cape society. He had already been at the Cape for eleven years when he wrote this work, albeit as Secretary to the Council of Policy, and only a few months previously he had retired to become a much respected Stellenbosch burgher.

It is of course impossible to know to what extent Grevenbroek's views were shared by his fellow colonists. Probably not very many would have expressed themselves in a comparable way; nevertheless, there is clear evidence of behavior among the white Cape colonists that is incompatible with the idea of universal acceptance of a stereotype that saw the Khoikhoi as half-animals, as such irredeemable savages that the only existence conceivable for them was as servants of the white man. Most cogently, such evidence can be found relating to the government. In part this derived from the continual state of tension between the Dutch East India Company and the burghers, which meant that the company was at times prepared, if not to find allies among the Khoikhoi, at least to refrain from joining all attempts to subdue them. Thus the Commissioners-General Nederburgh and Frijkenius, who had considerable difficulties with the Cape burghers during their stay, mainly on matters of taxation, wrote in 1793 that it would have been better for the company if there had never been any white settlement at the Cape. Rather, they said, it would have been preferable to have relied on the Khoikhoi to provision the Dutch ships, since “This people, which has had to experience the superiority of the whites in the most striking way, is of a most good-natured disposition, and particularly suited to agriculture and stock raising.”<sup>66</sup> More concretely, the Court of Justice and the administration treated Khoikhoi and whites in

very much the same way. Khoi could lay charges against whites in court, and regularly appeared as witnesses against them.<sup>67</sup> By no means infrequently, the secretary to the government sent out letters to the *landdrosts* of the outlying districts ordering them to investigate complaints that white farmers had withheld wages from the Khoi servants.<sup>68</sup> This sort of administrative action is not consistent with a level of stigmatization throughout the colony sufficient in itself to justify the exercise of racial domination.

There are also strong, if inferential, reasons for arguing that a similar absence of stigmatization was to be found in layers of the Cape white society other than the very highest. It is notoriously difficult for historians to penetrate the ways of thought of those who were at best barely literate, but it is suggestive—though not conclusive—that even those who have argued that South African racism began on the eighteenth-century frontier have been unable to find any clear examples of racist behavior, let alone racist thought, there.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, if the social psychological hypothesis is allowed, that racist stigmatization is only possible in circumstances where contact between the racist and the victim is either very slight or confined within rigid channels and to particular aspects of human life,<sup>70</sup> then it becomes clear that the conditions for such stigmatization were absent in the eighteenth-century Cape. Especially in the eastern Cape, Khoikhoi and whites ate and drank together,<sup>71</sup> slept together,<sup>72</sup> prayed together,<sup>73</sup> fought alongside each other,<sup>74</sup> hunted together,<sup>75</sup> and generally worked together in the farms and households of the colony.<sup>76</sup> This is not to say that such contacts were as between equals. In general, in all these activities, whites were the richer, the more powerful, and the leaders. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that such activities were compatible with a heavy degree of stigmatization, which could only come into being as the interaction of white and Khoikhoi slowly became canalized into a single oppressive pattern.

The limitations of this argument must be made clear at this point. It is not a claim that white treatment of the Khoisan peoples of southern Africa was mild and beneficent. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nor can it be denied that many whites had particularly negative views towards some of the Khoisan, with the consequence that they made decisions of a callous brutality rarely equaled in human history. In 1777, the Council of Policy, the central governing body of the colony, responded thus to a letter from the frontier *veldcornetten*: “as all measures to bring about peace with the rapacious Bushmen Hottentots have proved fruitless, it has been necessary to decide to consent to the proposal in the above-mentioned letter, that they should be attacked with strengthened commandoes and in this way extirpated.”<sup>77</sup> All that is asserted here is that such inhumanity was not manifested towards *all* the Khoisan of the Cape Colony and not backed up by an ideology that made *all* Khoisan fit for nothing else except extermination or menial labor in the service of the whites. Still less was this the case with the attitude of Europeans to all those who did not derive from their own peninsula of Eurasia.

The same may be said of Europeans' treatment of slaves. Such stereotyping of the Khoisan as existed was not transferred to the slaves, at least until the two groups merged in the post-emancipation period. Rather, at least among the higher ranks of Cape society, slaves were generally preferred to whites for specific tasks within the economy. This was not because whites were deemed unsuitable for menial jobs within the colony. The Cape Town garrison and the sailors on the ships of the Dutch East India Company worked under conditions and subject to disciplines comparable to those the slaves had to endure. Rather it was thought that slaves were more useful for such jobs because they were cheaper and, crucially, less unruly. In 1717, in a famous report, the Council of Policy, by a majority of six to one, argued in favor of slaves as "farm hands and agriculturalists" over European immigrants. The governor, M. P. de Chavonnes, gave the most cogent reason why no more European workmen should be sent out: "We are amply supplied with drunkards, who keep our hands full."<sup>78</sup>

There was never any uniform stereotype of the slave population of the Cape. The slaves themselves came from multifarious backgrounds from all shores and cultures of the Indian Ocean. Rather than lump them all together into a single ideological category, the slaveowners consistently applied distinct attributes to each "nationality" of Cape slaves. The principal distinction was between the slaves from the Indonesian archipelago (of whom the Bugis were renowned as vengeful, though the women were considered the most constant lovers) and those from the west coasts of the Indian Ocean, whether Malagasy or Mozambiquan. South Indians and Bengalis were also seen as a separate group, much prized, probably because they were scarce at the Cape.<sup>79</sup> Robert Semple, writing in about 1800, summed the matter up as follows:

Without the inactivity or dulness of the Mozambiquer or the penetrative genius of the Malay he [the Malabari] forms an excellent medium between the two. More intelligent, more industrious and more active than the former; more docile and more affectionate than the latter, he unites steadiness with vivacity, and capability of instruction with winning manners.<sup>80</sup>

What can be concluded from this sort of material is that no racial stereotype was applied by Europeans to all other groups of men and women they encountered at or imported to the Cape. This conclusion is strengthened when it is noted that many of the initial accounts whites gave of the Xhosa or Tswana were far from derogatory.<sup>81</sup> This may seem a relatively minor matter in South Africa, where such uniformity of stereotyping never existed, even in the industrial period. There was, indeed, a tendency in this direction in the nineteenth century as distinct images of the component groups of the so-called "colored" population were collapsed into at most two relatively comprehensive stereotypes, but the arrival of large numbers of Africans once again diluted this. The point made here is essentially a negative one, though none the less important for that: the Europeans did not bring with them such prejudices of the extra-European world as to induce them to construct their new

society entirely along racial lines, nor, by 1800, had the processes of social stratification yet led to the development of an ideology based on a dichotomous view of humanity: "themselves" (the whites) and "the others" (everyone else in a single lump).

*The Economy and the Labor Situation under the VOC*

In addition to the apparent absence of ideological justification for a policy of outright racial domination in the eighteenth century, whether based on religion or on racist stereotyping, economic pressure for the total incorporation of all potential laborers into the colonial economy at the lowest possible cost had not yet emerged. In 1780, numerous Khoikhoi, especially but not exclusively in the eastern districts of the colony, retained a degree of freedom of action and of economic independence they had largely lost (or retaken in another form) by 1820.

The question then arises why the level of exploitation of indigenous labor was below that which was subsequently achieved. It cannot have been the result of stagnation of the Cape economy under the VOC; as we have seen, the economy was not stagnant. The massively expanding stock-raising business was neither purely (nor even largely) for subsistence, nor unaffected by fluctuations in the conjuncture of the Cape market. Moreover, there was continual investment throughout the colony in the major agricultural products of wine and wheat. Had there not existed a reasonable market for these goods, then the continual cultivation of new land and the intensification of agriculture on already cleared land would probably not have occurred.<sup>82</sup> The labor for this agricultural and pastoral expansion had to come from somewhere. Emigration from the Netherlands to the Cape on such a scale as to produce an agricultural proletariat was never possible, among other reasons because of the immense drain on the labor resources of northwest Europe caused by the great maw of the VOC.<sup>83</sup> The choice, therefore, was between subjection of the indigenous inhabitants, the Khoisan, and importation of labor from some other part of the world, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries meant as slaves.

In fact, it was no choice, since the Europeans attempted to do both. During the first decades of colonial settlement, however, they discovered that the force necessary to subject the Khoikhoi and require them to work on the farms was far too great to make it a paying proposition, even if VOC authorities in the Netherlands had allowed this to be done. The Khoikhoi were even more able than the slaves to escape from the supervision of an underpoliced colony. The late seventeenth century saw numerous Khoisan migrating north from the southwest Cape towards Namaqualand and the Orange River; others carried on a guerrilla war, intent on driving the Europeans out of South Africa.<sup>84</sup> Against this, slaves were particularly cheap at the Cape in comparison to the trading world of the middle Atlantic. Thus it was that the wine and wheat estates of the southwest Cape became dependent for their regular supply of

labor on slaves imported from the Indonesian archipelago, India, Madagascar, and Mozambique. Khoikhoi were used only as seasonal labor, during the harvest period. As late as 1789, a farmer in the Tygerberg hired fourteen Khoi for a total of 148 man-days to help with the harvest, at a cost of 72 rixdollars.<sup>85</sup> As the colonists came more and more to monopolize the grazing land of the Cape, and thus steadily to erode Khoikhoi herds, when they did not blatantly steal them,<sup>86</sup> the Khoisan gradually lost the means of support outside the harvest months. Slowly, then, the Khoikhoi became a full-time agricultural proletariat; yet, because labor could still be imported regularly from shores of the Indian Ocean, the Khoikhoi were not vital to the agricultural economy of the southwest, and no coercive measures were applied to compel them to work for the colonists.

With their expansion into the South African interior,<sup>87</sup> European stock farmers came to rely on the Khoisan in two contradictory ways. At least for the first generation or so, the invaders of a particular region needed the cooperation of various of its previous inhabitants. The South African environment there is harsh and requires that those who hope to run sheep and cattle on the semi-desert of the Karoo or the better grassed Camdeboo or Bruyntjes Hoogte possess considerable knowledge of the vagaries of the *veld* and the seasonal requirements of the stock.<sup>88</sup> The whites must have acquired this knowledge from the Khoikhoi, since there seems no evidence that the *trekboers* ever experienced great difficulties in adapting to the requirements of new areas of settlement. That the herdsmen on the *trekboer* farms were almost invariably Khoikhoi must be significant. The incoming Europeans learned from and adapted to the way of life of their predecessors on the land.<sup>89</sup>

Khoikhoi were also of immense value to the *trekboers* as fighters. Frontier expansion in South Africa was anything but peaceful. Throughout the eighteenth century there was continual guerrilla warfare between the settlers and the "*bosjesmans-hottentots*" (the hunter gatherers of the South African interior), reinforced by those Khoi who had lost their stock or who had left the service of whites. At times the Europeans were driven out of particular stretches of the country.<sup>90</sup> In an attempt to counter this and to launch their own conquest of the land, a series of expeditions, "commandoes" in South African parlance, was mounted. As we have seen, the aim of these expeditions was often the bloody one of exterminating the enemy, while, as a by-product, children were captured and held, in effect, as slaves. But, in these expeditions, frequently the majority of the colonial force was of Khoikhoi extraction. Indeed, in their plans for a major commando in 1774, the governor and council expected 100 Europeans and 150 "bastard hottentots" to take part.<sup>91</sup> This proportion seems to have been maintained until the Khoikhoi rebellion of 1799,<sup>92</sup> while, in the northwest of the colony, Khoikhoi were employed in expeditions against the Orange River Kora as late as 1834.<sup>93</sup> Indeed, the Europeans could probably not have conquered much of the interior of the Cape Colony, without the assistance of some of its indigenous inhabitants.

It would of course be highly anachronistic to consider the “*bosjesmans-hottentots*” as proto-nationalist freedom fighters and the Khoikhoi who fought with the Boers as proto-quislings, but the question does arise why so many Khoikhoi were loyal allies of the Boers for so long, even though they were, in the long term, in the process of being dispossessed of their land and reduced to the status of agricultural proletarians. Such a question, however, derives from a belief that social groups are a *Volk für sich*, or ethnically self-conscious. No such consciousness influenced Khoikhoi actions. Certain Khoikhoi derived a number of advantages from cooperating with the whites. Insofar as they were still stock holders—and it is probable that many who went on commando were, or at least expected to inherit stock—then they shared with the Boers an interest in the suppression of stock thieves, as the “*bosjesmans-hottentots*” were usually seen. Indeed, it was usually the Khoi herdsman who was killed in any San or Xhosa attack on white-owned cattle or sheep. Those who had stock no doubt hoped to use the whites as a means of regaining their lost status (if they did not join the “*bosjesmans-hottentot*” bands). Equivalent forms of clientship had been common in Khoikhoi society, and such expectations were not always in vain, even with Boer encroachment. In any case, the Khoikhoi had little option; they could join the “*bosjesmans-hottentots*” and fight the Boers, or they could go into service with the whites and hope that life would remain bearable, in which case they could at least then remain on their old land and engage in their old profession, herding. A European might have declared that he “owned” a particular stretch of ground, but the Khoi still considered it as belonging to his forefathers.<sup>94</sup> That might not be enough to keep a man or woman in servitude, but it was certainly some slight compensation for that servitude. Some Khoikhoi maintained a modicum of economic independence despite being in Boer service. In 1798, Khoikhoi on “white” farms owned an average of five cattle and twenty-three sheep each.<sup>95</sup> Some were treated by the Boers, if not as equals, at least as respected subordinates. They had a degree of access to the religious institutions of the colonists. A few established loose kin ties with the Boers. Many more maintained their own family links within Khoikhoi traditions. Those who had entered the service of the Boers voluntarily, and who had something to bring with them that the Boers needed, especially enjoyed a position of trust and of some responsibility.<sup>96</sup>

On the other hand, from the beginning of white settlement in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony, the regular reports of disgusting brutalities perpetrated on Khoisan in the Boers’ service cannot be dismissed as the propaganda of British nationalists and missionaries against Afrikaners, although no doubt that had something to do with why John Barrow, for instance, chose to publish the stories.<sup>97</sup> The Graaff-Reinet magisterial archives show that virtually every Boer family was, at some stage or another, incriminated in such activity.<sup>98</sup> The use of naked force to control labor on the eastern Cape farms,

not for the first or the last time in the history of white South African agriculture, was systematic.

This poses a problem. It seems inconceivable that men and women who at one moment were treated with some respect and trust, and on whom the Boers relied to a considerable degree for the day-to-day running of their farms, would at the next be flogged to death on petty pretexts, or that, if such a punishment—even without fatal consequences—had been inflicted on a member of a Khoikhoi family, his or her relatives would remain in the faithful service of the farmer, except under extreme pressure. Such contradictory human behavior is inherently implausible. It is suggested as a hypothesis, therefore, that a distinction was made by both the whites and the Khoisan between, on the one hand, those Khoikhoi who had been able to maintain some economic independence, and who had come into the Boers' service on a more or less free footing, and those who had been reduced to utter poverty, or indeed had been captured on commandoes. Only the latter, we propose, were likely to have been mishandled by the Boers. They were seen as potential cattle thieves. They might well have been in contact with the "*bosjesmans*-hottentots," or indeed with the Xhosa, with whom they stood a far better chance of being assimilated. In the eyes of all stock holders, whether they were white or Khoi, they were dangerous, and thus targets for aggression and brutality.

Such a distinction cannot be demonstrated empirically. Whether one group included almost all the victims of Boer violence during the eighteenth century is unknown, and possibly not knowable, given the survival of archival material. From the 1790s on, especially in the aftermath of the 1799 rebellion, the two categories collapsed into one. The whites no longer needed the local environmental expertise of the Khoikhoi, and certainly they were less than enthusiastic about Khoikhoi cattle and sheep consuming the precious grazing land on their farms and using up potential labor time at a period when they wanted to expand their own operations. The revolt had shown that many of those who were thought trustworthy were, in fact, potential rebels. On the other hand, their position as labor tenants had probably impoverished the Khoikhoi still further and tended to turn them into stock thieves, a pattern of behavior previously reserved for the "*bosjesmannen*," the San ("rubbish men"), or their equivalents.

The contention of this chapter has been, first, that it is not sufficient to ascribe the growth of racial discrimination in South Africa to the consequences of industrial capitalism. In its pure form—if capitalism could ever be pure—capitalism is color blind. However, when a pre-capitalist and pre-industrial order of racial or other domination exists, capitalism can profit greatly from the continued existence and transformation of the system. This was the case in South Africa, but to say this is to challenge historians to demonstrate the existence and explain the origin of that system.

Second, the racial order of modern South Africa was in no way inherent in colonial society from its foundation. In the eighteenth century the social distinctions within at least the free population were not strictly determined, although there was a certain amount of stereotyping of the black population by the whites. There was no racist ideology, either secular or disguised in religious terminology. In other words the stereotype had not yet become functional within the colony, above all, we believe, because the economy had not yet forced the whites to incorporate all Khoisan as workers in exchange for a steadily decreasing remuneration.

These arguments imply that a crucial change in the social structure of colonial South Africa occurred in, to give the widest possible margin, the century before the discovery of diamonds in 1868. However, it is possible to narrow that margin considerably, before the 1840s. The abolition of slavery and the change in the judicial status of the Khoikhoi after Ordinance 50 of 1828 appeared to have minimal consequences for the labor structure of the colony. This would seem to suggest that by 1830 there had developed a system of labor control with regard to the Khoisan that could fairly easily be imposed on the ex-slaves or on the Africans who began to enter the colony from the 1820s. This system was also used, with variations deriving from the different proportions of Africans and whites, by the *voortrekkers* in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, another reason to expect that the system of labor control had developed before the Great Trek of the 1830s.

These arguments in favor of a considerable degree of openness during the eighteenth century do not preclude the possibility that society had acquired a "closed" character even before the VOC had to give way to the British in 1795. There are some indications that this did occur on a small scale, but it is unlikely that a major shift in labor relations, at once the most important indicator of and a determinant factor in the process, occurred before the end of the century. For empirical reasons it is therefore sensible to concentrate on the period after the second British conquest in 1806.

It is also sensible for theoretical reasons. Changes in the labor structure and the racial order of the Cape Colony are assumed to be related to changes in the position of the colony within the world economy. Major shifts must have occurred as a result of the transfer of the Cape from the domination of the VOC to that of the British Empire. We argue that measures such as the Caledon Code, an attempt by the governor, the Earl of Caledon, to regulate Khoi labor in 1809, made much more stringent control over Khoisan labor possible, given the way in which they were implemented.

## Conjectures, 1800–1830

### *The Coming of the British*

It is not difficult to provide possible causes for a hypothesized change in the nature of the social relations of the Cape Colony during the first three

decades of the nineteenth century. First of all, the rule of the VOC had disappeared for good in 1795, when the British first conquered the Cape. After an intermezzo of three years under the rule of the Batavian republic, following the Peace of Amiens, in 1806 the Cape was again conquered by the British, this time definitely.

Of the consequences of absorption of the Cape into the British Empire, the most far-reaching was the abolition of the international slave trade in 1807, followed twenty-seven years later by the abolition of slavery itself. Linked to this, and deriving from the same "humanitarian" impulse was Ordinance 50, promulgated in 1828, removing all legal discrimination against the Khoikhoi—discrimination largely imposed in 1809 and 1812. The arrival of the British army altered the power relations in the eastern Cape so profoundly that, in 1812, the colony for the first time had clear military supremacy over the Xhosa. Large numbers of colonists had arrived in South Africa from Great Britain, and this emigration was so stimulated by the British government that in 1820 some four thousand British settlers arrived at the Cape.

In the same period, African societies of the interior were convulsed by the wars known as the "Difaqane." And the continued growth of the white burgher population led to tensions within Cape society resulting from increasing land shortage, which became entangled with a certain anti-British and anti-humanitarian sentiment and, coupled with the continued difficulties on the Xhosa frontier, eventually led to the Great Trek and the foundation of Afrikaner settlements in what were to become the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and Natal.

Another series of major changes was introduced to South Africa from Europe. The first merino sheep had reached South Africa before 1795; their interbreeding with the Cape hairy, fat-tailed sheep to create a wool-bearing ram would have occurred under continued VOC rule, but was certainly stimulated by the British presence. Also, although the first missionaries to the Khoikhoi arrived at the Cape in 1792, at the invitation of one of the VOC's ministers in Cape Town, without British rule there would never have been so many nor would they have become so influential, since the evangelical revival was much weaker in the Netherlands than in Britain.

### *Government and Rich Burghers*

The relationship between the government and the rich underwent significant changes during this period. The VOC as a commercial firm and its officials as individual, though illegal, merchants believed that the Cape Colony should be run at as small a loss and as big a personal gain as possible. Company servants were forbidden to own agricultural land (although some did, by using front men), with the result that, without common economic interests between the high officials and the elite of the landowners, the relation between them was one of suppressed enmity, with little contact.<sup>99</sup> In 1779, for instance, there were no sons of Cape burghers among the ninety-four highest

officials, since, although more than half had been born at the Cape, all had fathers who had been company servants.<sup>100</sup> Undoubtedly some of these men's mothers were free burghers' daughters, and there was a fair number of such marriages, but there is no indication that this produced a single undivided interest group. Nor did such a network spread far into the countryside. The VOC officials from time to time were prepared to take the most unusual step for a colonial government of supporting slaves against their masters, on the grounds that otherwise they could not maintain their control over the colony.<sup>101</sup> Usually, though, they took the opposite line, and for the same reason.

In the first decade of the nineteenth century this pattern changed considerably. The old hidden enmity between the government and the landowning class was replaced by a certain degree of cooperation. It was not that the Cape became any more democratic; Lord Charles Somerset, governor from 1814 to 1826, was at least as autocratic as any of his Dutch predecessors. Rather, the new colonial rulers wanted other things from the colony than the VOC officials had, and they were not prepared to pay the price of a direct conflict with the landowners. They took measures against the landowners in such matters as labor control only when directives from London forced them. Moreover, such measures as they did take, like the Caledon Code of 1809, though well-intentioned, in fact played right into the hands of the Cape landowners. It would be a mistake to assume that the Cape landowners came to control the Cape government; successive governors were far too concerned with their own power and dignity to allow this. It was simply that the interest of the new government seldom came into conflict with that of the landowners, and many of the measures taken were very much to the latter's advantage.

At the local level, the shift of power is even clearer. At the end of the eighteenth century the *heemraden*, who were chosen from the richest inhabitants of a district to act as district councillors, increased their power with respect to the central government.<sup>102</sup> Their judicial competence was extended and their control over the distribution of land became further entrenched. The government in Cape Town was unable to impose its will on the countryside in opposition to them, not even in the early nineteenth century when the British took more direct measures to achieve this.<sup>103</sup>

It is clear that there is a close connection between the increase, on the one hand, of the Cape landowners' power and influence over the central government and, on the other, of their prosperity, from at least the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Expansion of Cape agriculture occurred throughout the century but was most impressive during its last decades, allowing a considerable augmentation of wealth.

### *Economic Changes*

In the last years of Dutch East India Company rule, booms and slumps in the economy succeeded each other with great regularity, as the market expanded and contracted in response to the presence of troops engaged in the

wars among the European powers of the late eighteenth century. Evidently, the economy as a whole, without regard to the wars, was growing steadily and becoming more sophisticated. In the 1780s, a local currency was introduced at the Cape.<sup>104</sup> Somewhat later, the commissioners instituted a government-run loan bank designed to augment, and to tap the profits of, the considerable internal credit market, until then entirely in private hands.<sup>105</sup>

In the last two decades of the century, growing Cape prosperity and the impending bankruptcy of the VOC had radically altered the balance of economic power between them. The economy of the Cape came to depend on the VOC even less than before. With the first British occupation of the colony, their separation became complete, and no comparable check on the colony's economic growth was re-established even during the short interlude of Batavian rule. The consequence was that the Cape economy continued in its new pattern of development, as an autonomous entity linked to the world economy only by the currents of international trade and investment, which was manifested, above all, in the fluctuations of Cape currency. While the VOC had acted, in part, as a brake on the colony's development, it had also served, to some degree, as an insulation for the colony, and it was this insulation that was removed after 1795. In the long run, the result was the total incorporation of the Cape Colony, and much of the rest of southern Africa, into the orbit of the world economy, a process to be completed after the establishment of the mines. In the shorter term, one effect of the new economic system was a steady devaluation of the rixdollar against the British pound. From an original value of four shillings (£0.20) it decreased to no more than 1s. 6d., 37.5 percent of its original worth. In 1825 the rixdollar was stabilized and the Cape became, for the first time, a full part of the British imperial monetary system.<sup>106</sup>

The consequences of this devaluation are of importance, for it meant that those who had access to sterling for the satisfaction of their economic needs were at a great advantage: the merchant community, which flourished during this period, the public officials, and the government.<sup>107</sup> The losers were mainly some of the primary producers of the colony, among them farmers, who had few ways to escape from the financial pressures this put on them. Attempts to improve agricultural methods were sporadic and had little success. A number of committees were set up to find ways of improving the notoriously poor quality of Cape wines, and thus to raise the incomes of both the farmers and the government. That it was Lord Charles Somerset, the governor, who took this initiative and even chaired the first meeting, would seem to indicate that the government was fully aware of the problems faced by the farming community. Somewhat later the government again played an active role in the protests against ending imperial preference in tariffs on Cape wines imported into Britain. However, these commissions seem not to have achieved results sufficient to maintain farmers' incomes.<sup>108</sup>

In one field there was a major achievement, however—in the methods of

sheep husbandry,<sup>109</sup> when, from around 1800, measures were taken to substitute wool-bearing merino sheep for the old, fat-tailed Cape race, by a process of crossing. While this was certainly not a consequence of the British takeover, nor of the economic problems it created—the first merinos had been brought to the Cape before 1795—the development was aided by the activities first of the Batavian and later of the British authorities.

Nor were farmers able to increase the size of their labor force through immigration of workers. The international slave trade was abolished in 1807, and it would take until the abolition of slavery itself before normalization of the sex-ratios and the slaveowners' attempts to raise the slave birth-rate would ensure that the slave population would begin to increase by natural means.<sup>110</sup> Attempts to import white indentured labor, principally from Ireland, failed almost completely.<sup>111</sup> The Cape farming community was forced to rely, almost entirely, on the population already resident in South Africa.

Farmers were thus faced with the necessity of at once raising their level of production and keeping their costs to an absolute minimum. The methods open to them to do so were limited. It could not profit them to increase the level of exploitation of Cape slaves beyond a certain level, for a great deal of their capital was already tied up in slaves. Slaves may have been increasingly diverted from luxury occupations into those more directly productive, but this is most difficult to ascertain. The first quarter of the nineteenth century saw a considerable growth in Cape Town itself, where the labor force was largely slave, and it seems unlikely that there was any increase in the proportion of slaves engaged in agricultural labor. In absolute terms, the number of agricultural slaves would have declined. At abolition in 1834, out of a total of 34,742 slaves, only 10,988 (30 percent) were classified as field laborers as against 15,574 (44 percent) domestics, despite the fact that the government paid less compensation to the former owners for abnegation of their rights over domestic slaves than over field laborers.<sup>112</sup>

The main option remaining open to the farmers was, therefore, an expansion of their labor force by incorporating more Khoisan. To keep their costs as low as possible, as they needed to do, the farmers could not lure Khoisan by paying attractive wages, as, in theory at least, in a "free market" of labor. Coercion, legal or extralegal, was the order of the day.

### *Toward a Racial Stratification*

Abolition of the slave trade did not, in itself, mean the ending of the practice of slavery, and a small illegal import of slaves continued, but the increase of the slave population was, as noted above, far below that required by economic growth. According to the *opgaaf* rolls there were 29,681 slaves in 1806, and only 2,679 more in 1826, an increase of 9 percent.<sup>113</sup> Nor did confiscation of slave ships and enforced employment of the slaves confiscated with them as "prize negroes" provide a solution. Allowing free Africans to enter the colony was not a viable alternative; in precisely this period the government was forced

by problems on the borders with the Xhosa to forbid employment of free Africans on the farms, although the measures it took were not fully effective.<sup>114</sup> As a result there were only two possible ways to satisfy the demand for labor on the farms: either to import cheap, unskilled labor from Europe or to increasingly incorporate the Khoi. But, as indicated above, attempts made to solve the labor problem by migration from Europe failed. It proved impossible to keep the Europeans on the farms after they arrived in South Africa, despite their contracts. In the towns far higher wages were paid, particularly for skilled workmen, and many European indentured laborers managed to find better work there and escape their contractual obligations. The ability to speak and (sometimes) read English gave them an enormous advantage over the Khoi and greatly increased their chances of upward social mobility. As Christians also, the Europeans enjoyed an important advantage over the "heathen" Khoisan.<sup>115</sup> The subjection of the Khoisan into de facto slavery was not a simple process, however, and, paradoxically, it took place in a period when the British government and the missionaries were making efforts to give the Khoisan an equal position with other colonial subjects.

In the so-called Caledon Code of 1809, the Earl of Caledon, governor of the Cape Colony, promulgated his vision of the position of the Khoisan as a "free people" in his instruction to the *landdrost* of the Cape District. "The original natives of this Country," he said, "the Hottentots, must be considered and treated as free people, who have a lawful abode in the Colony, and their persons, property and possessions ought for that reason to be protected the same as those of other free people."<sup>116</sup> Caledon sought to bring the Khoisan under the jurisdiction of the Cape government and end the misuse the farmers were making of their Khoisan laborers. At the same time he sought to resolve the labor shortage by a better system of registration.

From 1809 the Khoisan were registered and given a fixed place of residence; they could leave only with official permission, and even then they would be required to carry a pass. Farmers with Khoisan in their employ had to sign a contract with them in the presence of local authorities, setting down, among other things, the wages to be paid. At the end of the contract period the Khoisan were free to leave, and no debts incurred could interfere with this. Ill-treatment would be grounds for declaring a contract null and void. The proclamation stipulated the sum a farmer might deduct from wages for subsistence, and confirmed the workers' right to complain of mistreatment. The contents of the proclamation were to be made known to every Khoisan in the colony.

W. W. Bird, who wrote a description of the colony in 1822, described the code as the "Magna Charta" of the Hottentots: "It rescued the Hottentots," he said, "from a system of hardship and cruelty which would, in the course of a short time, have extinguished the race."<sup>117</sup> But in practice things were otherwise. The Khoisan's illiteracy made efficient functioning of the contract system difficult. Also, since it was impossible now for the Khoisan to travel

freely, it became easier for a farmer to hold Khoisan on a farm; they could not change their place of residence without his permission. Khoisan who complained of low wages, bad treatment, or whatever had to travel, often for several days, to a magistrate's office, and were likely to be picked up on the way for vagrancy and sent back.

In 1830 John Bigge noted that by reducing the mobility of the Khoisan the proclamation depressed wages.<sup>118</sup> With execution of the contract left to the farmers and local authorities, it became an instrument of exploitation. Local authorities who administered the contracts were to decide whether a Khoisan could leave a particular farm. The central government abandoned any influence on the labor market in favor of the local authorities and to the Khoisans' disadvantage.

In 1812, after a new proclamation,<sup>119</sup> farmers could keep Khoisan children on the farm on which they had grown up as "apprentices" for ten years, from their eighth to their eighteenth birthday. The *landdrost* had to give permission for Khoi children to be held as apprentices.

The whole process typifies British policy. On the one hand, there was the intent to give all groups in Cape society, except the slaves, an equal position as "free people," and attempts were made to protect its weakest free members, in this case the Khoisan. On the other hand, the British government favored the farmers. Missionaries who tried to protect the Khoisan could not induce the British to allow Khoisan to own land, which would have provided them with a genuine independence.

In the early nineteenth century most missionaries saw their task to be not merely conversion of the Khoisan, but also to gain for the converts a good education and hence the chance to build an independent life. Missionaries tried to provide the Khoisan at the various stations with an elementary education—which would enable them also to read the Bible—and with training in various crafts.<sup>120</sup> Missionaries acted as negotiators and protectors for the Khoisan. They also took control over their income and, on various mission stations, tried to establish savings banks.<sup>121</sup> As a result, a number of Khoisan were enabled to establish themselves as independent entrepreneurs, as wagon-riders, wood-cutters, and salt boilers.<sup>122</sup> In 1826, twenty-six Khoisan in Bethelsdorp owned wagons, largely used to transport goods they themselves had produced.<sup>123</sup> In a letter to the L.M.S., one missionary quoted a Khoisan who had said, "'We never had a waggon and now there are more than 20 waggons at Bethelsdorp belonging to us Hottentots.'" <sup>124</sup> Later the Khoisan received contracts from the central government for military transport and for work in the postal service.<sup>125</sup> Missionaries made attempts to get government employment also for Khoi carpenters, tailors, smiths, and others, but in this there is no evidence that they were successful.<sup>126</sup> Many even of the mission Khoisan still had to work on the farms as seasonal laborers.

The Khoisan's chance for upward social mobility as a result, principally, of missionary activity was only temporary. By 1822, Dr. John Philip was com-

plaining of the competition Khoi wagon-riders were encountering from English and Dutch farmers who increasingly tried to monopolize this sector, previously mostly Khoisan.<sup>127</sup> Those Khoisan who in 1826 were granted a major military contract were hindered in many ways by the farmers and local authorities, for instance by being required to perform other labor for the government.<sup>128</sup> Missionaries' reports include fewer and fewer references over the next years to Khoisan working independently, and more references to the Khoi being hindered, or totally prevented. For example, at the end of the 1820s they were forbidden to cut wood.<sup>129</sup> By 1830 probably few independently operating Khoi remained.

How can this failure be explained? The influence of the missionaries, to begin with, was never great. Only a limited number of Khoisan could be admitted to the mission stations, and missionaries had paltry financial means. Most of the money had to be raised by the Khoisan themselves. The majority of Khoisan on the mission stations remained in the service of local farmers; in 1807, 900 of the 1,267 Khoisan at Bethlesdorp were working on the surrounding farms. A similar proportion was working for farmers near Genadendal, in the west. The government's Committee for Agriculture noted, in 1808, that: "arriving in Baviaans Kloof [Genadendal], most of the Hottentots were absent, because of the harvest of the neighbouring farmers, so that there were no more than 150 in total present."<sup>130</sup> According to Dr. Philip in 1826, the majority of Khoisan on the mission stations still had to work in the service of the farmers.<sup>131</sup>

During the Batavian period, in 1805, Governor Janssens was convinced that the missionaries believed all the malicious stories the Khoi were spreading about the farmers and that the cause of the change in relations between Khoi and farmers was a result of their "instigation."<sup>132</sup> In 1806 James Read wrote that, if the British had not come, Bethelsdorp would have been forced to shut down.<sup>133</sup> But any improvement following the arrival of the British must have been temporary; in a report submitted to Caledon by Colonel Collins in 1809 the closure of Bethelsdorp was again recommended,<sup>134</sup> while, in his letter of instructions to Collins, Caledon had written that "... the Hottentot Establishment at Bethelsdorp ... appears to be of no public utility nor does Dr. Van der Kemp seem to direct the labour of the people to any particular end."<sup>135</sup> In 1812, Lieutenant-Colonel Graham accused the missionaries of inciting the Khoisan not to work for the farmers.<sup>136</sup>

Attempts to expand the mission stations themselves were repeatedly blocked by the central government, yet in practice it was impossible for Khoisan to own land outside the mission stations. In 1817, establishment of a new station at Groot Fontein was forbidden altogether on the grounds that in this thinly populated region a new station would draw needed labor away from the farmers.<sup>137</sup> In 1825 and 1830, the mission station of Theopolis even had to give up land.<sup>138</sup> The settling of Khoisan on the stations was made difficult in a policy that dated from the Batavian period when, in 1805, Janssens

ruled that no Khoi who in the previous year had worked for a farmer or lived on a farm could be admitted to a mission station.<sup>139</sup> Dr. Philip wrote: "... whether it were the original intention of the Colonial Government to oppose the Institutions and force the Hottentots into the service of the Boors [by the introduction of an oppressive tax] there cannot be a question but that its direct tendency is to do both."<sup>140</sup>

Even the missionaries' efforts to educate the Khoi were interfered with. Once again it was Janssens who, in 1805, forbade the teaching of writing to Khoi because "this is not absolutely necessary for the first rudiments of civilization."<sup>141</sup> The following quotation from a letter written by Read in 1815 summarizes the government's policy towards the mission stations: "... a gentleman here lately speaking the sentiments of government disapproved reading writing etc. etc., saying if the Hottentots are brought on this the farmers will have no labourers."<sup>142</sup>

Nor was there support for the missions from local authorities, who were closely linked with the farmers and often of farming stock themselves. Local officials, indeed, were the principal target of missionaries' complaints. The activities of Colonel Cuyler, *landdrost* of Uitenhage, provide a good example of the role local authorities played with regard to the mission stations and the Khoisan. In 1811, Cuyler gave orders to six Khoisan who lived at Bethelsdorp to work at the magistracy of Uitenhage. This was the first of a series of his attempts to get Khoisan to work illegally for himself, his family, and his friends.<sup>143</sup> In 1819, he arranged that Khoisan who were paid to work on government buildings would labor on his own farm. The same occurred with Khoisan impressed for defense of the district.<sup>144</sup> Prisoners also were required to work for Cuyler and his cronies. The missionaries and their lay allies protested in vain against this state of affairs.<sup>145</sup> There were even attempts, later, to get Cuyler's pension withdrawn, but this failed, on the argument, as was later said, that "the errors imputed to Colonel Cuyler were those of the established system of the colony."<sup>146</sup>

Because the Cape government was itself too weak, effective power frequently had passed into the hands of the main representatives of the farmers' interests, "the very men who all along have been the greatest oppressors of the people of colour."<sup>147</sup> Informal power structures arose, as with Cuyler, that made it possible, often against official policy, to increase considerably the pressure on the Khoisan. Local authorities used their power to pay Khoisan low wages. Mackay, *landdrost* of Somerset, was accused of this; according to Pringle, an idealistic journalist who often spoke out for the "colored" people, Mackay had two Khoisan in his employment who received fifteen rixdollars a year—previously they had received from the government fifty rixdollars a year, plus food, clothing, and housing.<sup>148</sup>

Local officials also dominated legal proceedings, determining which cases would be prosecuted. The circuit courts, initiated by the British in 1811, did hear cases brought by Khoisan, but rarely ruled in their favor. As early as

1813, Read complained of the working of these courts, hoping there would be improvements when English judges were appointed. That his hope was in vain<sup>149</sup> was shown by the Commission of Enquiry of the 1820s, which also commented of the *heemraden*, the district officials, that in matters concerning coloreds they were "much perverted by the prejudices and habits that have become almost hereditary among them."<sup>150</sup> The transfer to a British judicial system in 1827 did not seem to improve the Khoisan position. Juries had the same representatives of the farming interests who had previously used their power to the disadvantage of the Khoisan. Indeed, the Commissioners of Enquiry asked the colonial secretary for protection for the Khoi and the "bastards" against "the prejudiced and sometimes the hostile feelings" of at least a large proportion of the men who would sit on the juries, who had to be house-owners, or those with a three-year lease on their house. In practice, though not in theory, and except in Cape Town, they were exclusively white and disproportionately of English descent.<sup>151</sup>

Farmers increasingly had a free hand with respect to the Khoi and sought, in a large number of ways, to force Khoisan into their service. The apprenticeship system entailed not only ten years of a youth's cheap labor but also that the farmer could make use of the labor of parents who were not prepared to abandon their offspring.<sup>152</sup> The commando raids, too, though less bloody than in the eighteenth century, took many prisoners, who were then usually compelled to work for five years; the San were even required to work for twenty years without pay.<sup>153</sup> Then again, Khoisan who owned stock could graze their cattle only on the land of a white farmer, since within the colony they could not own land, and the price for this was, of course, paid in labor.<sup>154</sup> The numbers of Khoi hit by this measure were augmented by the custom of paying them in kind, generally in stock.<sup>155</sup> After a contract had been completed the Khoi were generally forbidden to remove the stock they "owned" since the stock were still considered part of the farmer's own flocks and herds. Khoisan were forced either to abandon their stock, in other words their income, or to resume service with the farmer.<sup>156</sup> Then again, Khoisan who had incurred debts—and, given the low wages, there must have been many of these—could only clear their debt by performing labor. In 1828, the missionaries accused a tenant farmer from near George of deliberately trapping his laborers into such indebtedness.<sup>157</sup> It seems unlikely that this was the only such case. Moreover, Khoi were frequently unable to pay district rates, known as *opgaut*, or fines imposed by the courts, and farmers were prepared to advance such money owed, in exchange, once again, for labor.<sup>158</sup>

Khoisan were forced into the farmers' service, however, primarily because they simply had no other means of subsistence. They could not acquire their own land, the mission stations had great difficulty in expanding, and it was made increasingly difficult for them to work independently. In general the Khoisan were thus too poor to subsist except by working for the farmers.<sup>159</sup>

As numerous travel accounts relate, the Khoisan were harshly dealt with

by the farmers, yet travel accounts published in Europe, publicizing the cruelty, seem to have had little impact in South Africa. Missionaries like Johannes van der Kemp and James Read attempted to change this by informing the British public directly of the slaves and the Khoisan's tribulations. A letter from Read, published in the *Transactions* of the London Missionary Society in 1808, did have a great impact. In this he described the murder of an entire family, including a newborn baby. Severe maltreatment, including brandings, putting out of eyes, and floggings, was common, he wrote; "I could multiply the accounts of such as I have mentioned and of a more horrid nature, but should be perhaps as little believed as Vaillant and Barrow."<sup>160</sup> In a later letter Read cited General Dundas's opinion that half the farmers deserved to be hanged for atrocities committed against the Khoisan.<sup>161</sup> In 1810 he wrote that he had a list of eighty-four unpunished murders committed against the foundation of Bethelsdorp some twelve years earlier.<sup>162</sup> John Campbell, sent to South Africa on a tour of inspection for the L.M.S., threatened to publish a "black book" which would report all the unpunished crimes of farmers against Khoisan.<sup>163</sup>

In time, whites' concern about the physical abuse of the Khoisan diminished. After 1815 virtually no more references to it appear. All the cases cited by Pringle, for example, date from before 1816. There was also a definite shift in the farmers' complaints about the missionaries. Initially they had feared that the Khoisan who received schooling were being taught "false doctrine."<sup>164</sup> John Campbell, himself a missionary, wrote of his predecessor Van der Kemp that

Had [he] been more aware of the importance of civilization, there might at least have been more external appearance of it than there now is. He seems to have judged it necessary rather to imitate the savage in appearance than to induce the savage to imitate him. The Doctor would appear in public without hat, stockings or shoes and probably without a coat—perhaps considering his conduct countenanced by what Paul says of his becoming all things to all men that he might gain some.<sup>165</sup>

Some Boer and some British missionaries felt themselves insufficiently raised above the Khoisan. Some complained of their colleagues who went so far as to marry Khoisan or slave women. One missionary wrote, in 1817, that "those few farmers who were friends to missionaries before . . . now became their enemies," because of the public scandals caused by missionaries' adulteries with Khoisan women.<sup>166</sup> As the labor shortage increased and problems were less often complained of, George Barker, the missionary of Bethelsdorp, wrote in 1821 that he was increasingly approached by farmers who thought that he had an unlimited supply of laborers at the station at Bethelsdorp. When he could not satisfy them, tensions arose.<sup>167</sup> Missionaries on other stations suffered comparable complaints. Many farmers thought that the missionaries were continually trying to excite the Khoisan against them and were hence an obstacle to a solution of the labor problem.

In the eighteenth century many farmers lived very isolated lives, especially

in the frontier districts where the power of the free Khoikhoi and San was still fairly great. San stock theft was a major threat to such farmers, and it is understandable that fear for life and property dominated their activities. With some of their Khoikhoi and San workers only recently captured, the fear of rebellion was real. In response, many farmers relied on violence to control their Khoi servants and to persuade them of the futility of resistance. On the isolated farms, government was not close enough to help control. In the frequently hostile circumstances, mishandling forced labor in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries can be seen as desperate attempts by European farmers to survive. Not until about 1810 did labor become a scarce commodity; before then, those Khoisan who did not work were merely a dangerous nuisance, to be dealt with summarily, and easily replaced.

The British did not manage to bring the entire colony under their effective control, but they did bring with them a better organized judicial structure. Pressure from London, under the influence of humanitarians, to improve the position of the Khoisan may also have had an effect, making the use of force against the Khoisan less necessary. However, by 1800, the power of the independent Khoisan was definitely broken. The increasing custom of flogging Khoisan and slaves in the prisons for offenses committed on the farms is a clear indication that in a large part of the colony the government was assuming control.<sup>168</sup>

The decline in complaints about cruelty was, however, largely a consequence of an increased scarcity of labor. If in the eighteenth century the Khoisan were a nuisance to the farmers, in the nineteenth, as potential laborers, they were a scarce and costly good. Any extreme forms of maltreatment could result in a worker's temporary or permanent inability to work. Violence was certainly still used, but primarily to compel work, not to remove a worker from the labor process.

A quasi-official violence thus came to dominate social relationships. Europeans who cooperated with attempts by missionaries and government to improve the conditions of Khoisan and slaves were themselves terrorized and forced to accommodate. In October, 1831, Jane Philip wrote: "Even when individuals more enlightened than the generality of the Dutch have differed from their countrymen and have obeyed the laws or recommended others to obey them they have met with the greatest insults and abuses."<sup>169</sup> She gives two illustrations of this process. Jacob Daillier, a justice of the peace in Paarl, obeyed the government's proclamations and encouraged others to do so. He also decided on his own to emancipate all his female slaves on a given day. For this he was first insulted by the other colonists, then pelted with rubbish, and finally threatened with assassination; he sought protection from the local *veldcornet*. Tobias Herald, the minister at Paarl, "perhaps the most generally popular of any clergyman connected with the Dutch church," called on his congregation to conform to the 1830 slave ordinance that was supposed to have improved the lot of the slaves, and for this he was accused of meddling

in politics. He was glad, when he was transferred, to escape the wrath of his parishioners. Other letters from missionaries point to the process of terrorization that was occurring. In 1835, William Elliot wrote that

*He who joins not in the general outcry against missionaries and their friends is regarded as an enemy of country. . . . [Nevertheless,] a few respectable families among the whites are still friendly to the London [Missionary] Society and others have withdrawn their support merely from the influence of their neighbours.*<sup>170</sup>

Ordinance 50 in 1828 had removed the requirement for Khoisan to carry passes. Behind this British ordinance was a genuine desire that every inhabitant of the colony (except the slaves) be equal before the law and that Khoisan be granted "liberty to bring their labour to the best market"; they were to be ensured of the enjoyment of personal freedom and the use of such property as they were able to accumulate.<sup>171</sup> It did not have the desired effect, primarily, no doubt, because the proclamation was not accompanied by an equivalent extension of the powers of the central government. As a result, implementation was left to those same local authorities who had used their power to increase the oppression of the Khoi.<sup>172</sup> Also, Ordinance 50 failed to give Khoisan any opportunity to acquire property.<sup>173</sup> It failed as the whole government policy towards the Khoisan had failed. The intentions may have been worthy, but no means were provided to realize them. Moreover, Ordinance 50 came too late. By 1828, the social contrasts within the colony had grown so great, in part as a result of the developments sketched here, that the position of "colored" people as a whole was reduced. By then the population of South Africa was divided into two groups, a free European group and a colored group (including slaves) who, except in Cape Town, had to labor on conditions set by the Europeans. In 1830 Bigge made no distinction among Khoisan, "bastards," and slaves, although the former two were officially free and worked under contract.<sup>174</sup>

### Stabilization of the Racial Pattern, 1830-1860

In the period 1800-1830, as we have seen, the relations between the Europeans and the "colored" population became significantly more rigid. The colored population, irrespective of their previous status, were thought of as a subordinate class fit only to perform labor for whites. The Cape Colony seemed to be heading towards a racially divided society long before the discovery of gold or diamonds.

A number of developments in this period hypothetically could have eased that situation but did not. Ordinance 50 of 1828, which entailed the repeal of the Caledon Code, and the abolition of slavery in 1834 had robbed the farmers of their most important means for maintaining control over the colored population. The rise of an entirely new economic sector, the wool trade, could have had a considerable influence on the society. Also, increased im-

TABLE 3.1  
*Wine Production, Stellenbosch District*  
(In leggers)

1828	17312
1829	12617
1830	12812
1831	15596
1832	14323
1833	11805
1834	9371
1835	12190
1836	13020
1837	N.A.
1838	13915
1839	N.A.
1840	12202

SOURCE: *Cape Blue Books*.

migration of free Africans into the colony could have solved the labor crisis. And then there was the Great Trek. Did die-hards leave the colony because the government was gaining excessive influence over the "proper" relations between master and servants? If so, the Great Trek could be a demonstration of the increased power of the "liberal" central administration. The departure of the worst extremists among the Boers might then have given the British greater opportunities to help its colored population. We might have expected that in the Trekker republics social relationships would have been sharper, and in the colony less sharp with liberalism having a mitigating influence.

If the emancipation of slaves and Ordinance 50 did actually give the farmers problems of control over their laborers, this should find expression in the production figures for grain and wine. Although the data are not very trustworthy (their compilation reveals numerous signs of administrative carelessness), and although the information on grain production does suggest that immediately after the emancipation farmers were in some difficulty, to a large extent the low production in these years can be explained by the long drought on the Cape between 1837 and 1840. For, thereafter, the production figures returned to their pre-emancipation level.<sup>175</sup>

Production figures do not tell the whole story, of course. Ordinance 50 allowed the colored population much greater freedom of movement, which could have been used to extract higher wages, with the result that the production of the white farm-owners could remain the same while their profits decreased sharply. However, Ordinance 50 as implemented seems not to have been that unfavorable to farm-owners. The labor relations that had developed since the beginning of the century were not seriously affected. And, perhaps most important, the Ordinance did not permit Khoikhoi and ex-slaves to acquire land, with the result that unless they went to town or to one of the mission stations they were forced to serve the farmers. As we have seen, the

TABLE 3.2  
*Wheat and Barley, Cape, Stellenbosch, Worcester,  
 and Swellendam Districts*  
 (In bushels)

1828	430035
1829	432228
1830	N.A.
1831	283119
1832	307924
1833	413807
1834	422249
1835	380061
1836	N.A.
1837	N.A.
1838	288721
1839	277765
1840	273539
1841	314428
1842	426688
1843	492991

SOURCE: *Cape Blue Books*.

mission stations had too little land to offer a reasonable living to all Khoisan who wished to take refuge there, and many were forced to work, for at least part of the year, as seasonal laborers. This worked well for the farmers. Although the abolition of slavery entailed the exchange of forced labor for some form of wage labor, a farmer would, however, not wish to pay a laborer for an entire year when labor was only required for a few weeks or months in the seasonal rhythm of farm production. Seasonal migrant labor was preferable. It was enhanced also by an increase in the mobility of the colored population following emancipation and Ordinance 50. Farmers adapted easily to the new system of wage labor, particularly as they already had been used to hiring each other's slaves to cover the differing peaks in the labor demand entailed by the annual cycles of crops.

Nigel Worden has concluded that the farmers' grip on the production factors of land and capital—and thus ultimately on labor—was unweakened.<sup>176</sup> They were helped by the government, which took no measures that might have allowed Khoi and ex-slaves to settle independently on a piece of land. Colonial Secretary Lord Glenelg wrote, as follows, in reaction to a request by John Philip that the Khoi be given land:

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The farmers were concerned about the economic consequences of the greater freedom of movement the "colored" population was thought to have, but they were also fearful of revolt. Around 1850 there was widespread fear, in part, because of the Kat River rebellion on the eastern frontier. The appendix to the report of a commission set up in 1851 to report on the possibility of introducing an anti-squatter law printed the following letter from a farmer: "Dear fellow burghers, I wish you to bear in mind . . . that the black classes wish to exterminate the male white classes and that this will take place

in politics. He was glad, when he was transferred, to escape the wrath of his parishioners. Other letters from missionaries point to the process of terrorization that was occurring. In 1835, William Elliot wrote that

He who joins not in the general outcry against missionaries and their friends is regarded as an enemy of country. . . . [Nevertheless,] a few respectable families among the whites are still friendly to the London [Missionary] Society and others have withdrawn their support merely from the influence of their neighbours.<sup>170</sup>

Ordinance 50 in 1828 had removed the requirement for Khoisan to carry passes. Behind this British ordinance was a genuine desire that every inhabitant of the colony (except the slaves) be equal before the law and that Khoisan be granted "liberty to bring their labour to the best market"; they were to be ensured of the enjoyment of personal freedom and the use of such property as they were able to accumulate.<sup>171</sup> It did not have the desired effect, primarily, no doubt, because the proclamation was not accompanied by an equivalent extension of the powers of the central government. As a result, implementation was left to those same local authorities who had used their power to increase the oppression of the Khoi.<sup>172</sup> Also, Ordinance 50 failed to give Khoisan any opportunity to acquire property.<sup>173</sup> It failed as the whole government policy towards the Khoisan had failed. The intentions may have been worthy, but no means were provided to realize them. Moreover, Ordinance 50 came too late. By 1828, the social contrasts within the colony had grown so great, in part as a result of the developments sketched here, that the position of "colored" people as a whole was reduced. By then the population of South Africa was divided into two groups, a free European group and a colored group (including slaves) who, except in Cape Town, had to labor on conditions set by the Europeans. In 1830 Bigge made no distinction among Khoisan, "bastards," and slaves, although the former two were officially free and worked under contract.<sup>174</sup>

### Stabilization of the Racial Pattern, 1830–1860

In the period 1800–1830, as we have seen, the relations between the Europeans and the "colored" population became significantly more rigid. The colored population, irrespective of their previous status, were thought of as a subordinate class fit only to perform labor for whites. The Cape Colony seemed to be heading towards a racially divided society long before the discovery of gold or diamonds.

A number of developments in this period hypothetically could have eased that situation but did not. Ordinance 50 of 1828, which entailed the repeal of the Caledon Code, and the abolition of slavery in 1834 had robbed the farmers of their most important means for maintaining control over the colored population. The rise of an entirely new economic sector, the wool trade, could have had a considerable influence on the society. Also, increased im-

TABLE 3.1  
*Wine Production, Stellenbosch District*  
(In leggers)

1828	17312
1829	12617
1830	12812
1831	15596
1832	14323
1833	11805
1834	9371
1835	12190
1836	13020
1837	N.A.
1838	13915
1839	N.A.
1840	12202

SOURCE: *Cape Blue Books*.

migration of free Africans into the colony could have solved the labor crisis. And then there was the Great Trek. Did die-hards leave the colony because the government was gaining excessive influence over the "proper" relations between master and servants? If so, the Great Trek could be a demonstration of the increased power of the "liberal" central administration. The departure of the worst extremists among the Boers might then have given the British greater opportunities to help its colored population. We might have expected that in the Trekker republics social relationships would have been sharper, and in the colony less sharp with liberalism having a mitigating influence.

If the emancipation of slaves and Ordinance 50 did actually give the farmers problems of control over their laborers, this should find expression in the production figures for grain and wine. Although the data are not very trustworthy (their compilation reveals numerous signs of administrative carelessness), and although the information on grain production does suggest that immediately after the emancipation farmers were in some difficulty, to a large extent the low production in these years can be explained by the long drought on the Cape between 1837 and 1840. For, thereafter, the production figures returned to their pre-emancipation level.<sup>175</sup>

Production figures do not tell the whole story, of course. Ordinance 50 allowed the colored population much greater freedom of movement, which could have been used to extract higher wages, with the result that the production of the white farm-owners could remain the same while their profits decreased sharply. However, Ordinance 50 as implemented seems not to have been that unfavorable to farm-owners. The labor relations that had developed since the beginning of the century were not seriously affected. And, perhaps most important, the Ordinance did not permit Khoikhoi and ex-slaves to acquire land, with the result that unless they went to town or to one of the mission stations they were forced to serve the farmers. As we have seen, the

TABLE 3.2  
*Wheat and Barley, Cape, Stellenbosch, Worcester,  
 and Swellendam Districts*  
 (In bushels)

1828	430035
1829	432228
1830	N.A.
1831	283119
1832	307924
1833	413807
1834	422249
1835	380061
1836	N.A.
1837	N.A.
1838	288721
1839	277765
1840	273539
1841	314428
1842	426688
1843	492991

SOURCE: *Cape Blue Books*.

mission stations had too little land to offer a reasonable living to all Khoisan who wished to take refuge there, and many were forced to work, for at least part of the year, as seasonal laborers. This worked well for the farmers. Although the abolition of slavery entailed the exchange of forced labor for some form of wage labor, a farmer would, however, not wish to pay a laborer for an entire year when labor was only required for a few weeks or months in the seasonal rhythm of farm production. Seasonal migrant labor was preferable. It was enhanced also by an increase in the mobility of the colored population following emancipation and Ordinance 50. Farmers adapted easily to the new system of wage labor, particularly as they already had been used to hiring each other's slaves to cover the differing peaks in the labor demand entailed by the annual cycles of crops.

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in the next harvest when on each farm there will be many blacks."<sup>186</sup> Many farmers reported that they had been warned by their servants of the approaching massacre of the whites. One said, "I have been asked by the wife of Lendor, whether I knew that the blacks intended to murder all the whites and that all blacks who were disinclined to join them and who were unanimous with the whites would receive the first ball in the head."<sup>187</sup> Even the English authorities, who tended to discount the chances of any rising, began to be nervous. The Justice of the Peace G. D. Burnette from Paarl wrote that, "I have not been able to trace such reports to any authentic source, but the extreme anxiety shown by persons better acquainted with the coloured people than I am, lead me to think that such a report cannot be so widely and generally circulated, and believed by many to be true, without some foundation."<sup>188</sup>

The clearest expression of this anxiety can be seen in the events surrounding the withdrawal of the squatter bill introduced in the Legislative Council in 1851. The bill sought to forbid squatting on government land and the practice of "land held by tickets of occupation that the government granted to Mission societies."<sup>189</sup> The smaller farmers supported the bill because they believed they could monopolize labor by keeping potential laborers on parcels of land too small to sustain them, forcing them to work for the whites. On the other hand, they feared that squatters with insufficient land would turn to theft to increase their income. Thus, in supporting the bill, they hoped to put a stop to further squatting and at the same time prevent potential laborers from expanding their holdings to the point of self-sufficiency. Despite the wide support the bill enjoyed, it was withdrawn. Crucial in this decision were the frightening reports of resistance from the "colored" population. It seemed more sensible not to stir up trouble and "to remove as completely as possible any subject affecting or supposed to affect the coloured people."<sup>190</sup>

From this situation several things become apparent. Most interesting, perhaps, is the indication that there existed "colored" squatters. It seems still to have been possible, or once again to have become possible, for agricultural laborers to lead an independent existence, even though most still had to perform agricultural labor for whites for part of the year. Our initial suppositions about the 1840s and 1850s, therefore, have to be modified, and a new picture emerges: Some "colored" laborers were able to survive outside the farms for much of the year; their mobility was sufficient and the control over them not sufficient to prevent fear of a revolt, even panic. The threat—or fear of threat—deriving from the colored population was so great that government was forced to withdraw legislation thought to threaten "colored" interests. In other words, some Khoi and ex-slaves had managed for some time and with reasonable success to resist their total proletarianization.

It was, of course, considered normal for the "colored" population to be compelled to labor. Measures against vagrants were demanded not because they were thought to be criminals, despite occasional accusations of theft, but

TABLE 3.3  
*Wool Exports, Cape Colony*  
 (In 1000 lb.)

1833	113
1836	373
1839	586
1842	1429
1845	3195
1851	5447

SOURCE: Tony Kirk, "The Cape Economy and the Expropriation of the Kat River Settlement, 1846-53," in Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (eds.), *Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa* (London: Longman, 1980), 229.

because indolent vagrants injured farmers by not engaging in regular labor—to which the continual call by the farmers for introduction of vagrancy and Masters and Servants Laws testifies. These independent "coloreds" were thus seen as a threat to the social order. Both whites and blacks were to know their place. A petition, signed by "six hundred corn and wine farmers," stated in 1849 that "Petitioners have suffered considerably for want of proper judicial protection and adequate laws to secure them against the dishonesty of the coloured classes, since their emancipation who have become generally so idle, dishonest and unsettled in habits."<sup>191</sup>

In the wool-producing regions of the eastern Cape, too, where there was a considerable demand for labor, wages were even lower than in the traditional agricultural areas, though the flourishing wool business might have seemed ready to pay its laborers more. The production of wool was not important in the Cape colony until after around 1830. Wine was the colony's most important export. After 1830 this began to change, when farmers who engaged in the breeding of woolled sheep began to have success. To give one example, the partnership of J. F. Reitz and M. van Breda began in 1817 to specialize in wool production and increased production from 2,401 pounds of wool in 1818 to 17,000 pounds in 1833.<sup>192</sup> After 1835 increased import made it easier to acquire merino sheep.<sup>193</sup> Since the wool prices on the international market continued to rise, as the English demand for wool increased and the production of the British flocks declined, the growth of a South African wool industry was unhindered. By 1851 51 percent of the Cape's exports consisted of wool.

It would appear reasonable that in a time of fast expansion and great profits farmers would not have had too much trouble recruiting laborers. Entrepreneurs would have been able to pay higher wages and thus attract laborers from the agricultural regions. However, in general, wages were lower and labor was shorter in the new wool-producing areas than in the agricultural southwest. The most likely explanation is that to begin as a wool farmer meant borrowing large sums—great stretches of land were required for grazing, and woolled sheep were expensive. The first wool farmers probably had come from the

class of rich farmers who could finance these investments themselves. Many later wool farmers probably got their start from compensations paid out to slaveowners after emancipation in 1834. Either way, most of those who wished to expand their wool production did not have enough ready cash and had to borrow. The maintenance of a business after the death of its founder also required loans, since by the Roman-Dutch inheritance laws of partible succession, a son who wished to take over the farm would have to buy out his siblings. In addition, wool-producing areas were some distance from the harbors, and transport was often difficult to arrange, especially since Australian competition meant that production had to be as cheap as possible.

The merchants of Cape Town and other ports were usually the financiers and transport operators, thereby increasing their grip on the wool production. After 1840 a number of rich Englishmen were attracted to the colony by the rising wool prices and the possibility of investing their money in sheep production,<sup>194</sup> leading to a state of economic euphoria in which prices, especially for land, could rise quickly. Speculation in land was rife. The consequences for farmers were disastrous. As Gilchrist explains, "A spirit of speculation (for it would appear that wherever they go the English will speculate) gives rise to frequent changes of property . . . and sales of land are often made more upon speculative principles than with a view to farming."<sup>195</sup> Thus many farmers, drawn by the lure of easy money to buy more land, got deeper into debt. They could only survive by keeping their labor costs low. These financial problems must have marginalized a large group of farmers, who were in continual difficulties without ever going under—a situation characteristic of many areas where racism takes root.<sup>196</sup> Farmers who attempted to make improvements but had no success would be induced to oppress even more.

Both wool farmers and Khoisan were thus the victims of too optimistic expectations and of too ready credit. This could conceivably have lessened the divisions between them, while class antagonism within the white population, between financiers and merchants on the one hand and farmers on the other, could have arisen. Yet, as we have seen, the capital loaned to the farmers did not come from the farmers' region—it was not the richer farmers among local whites who provided credit, but outside financiers, private investors from England, and merchant houses in the ports. A strengthening of the farming community's unity over against the outsiders was a more likely result than any sharpening of divisions within that community itself.

The arrival of large groups of Africans in the colony could also have been disruptive. From the 1820s, increasing numbers of Africans tried to enter the colony in search of work, largely, but not exclusively, as a result of internal political developments within African society. In particular, the rise of the Zulu kingdom forced many to leave their homes and to seek refuge in the colony. Also, the pressure of colonial expansion on Xhosa society was probably just as disruptive for many communities. The pressure of large numbers of Africans on the border was a serious problem for the British government.

While these people could be used as farm laborers, the entry of large groups of Africans could, it was feared, lead to turmoil like the repeated wars with the Xhosa.<sup>197</sup> Originally, a system of limited admission was applied; Ordinance 49 of 1828 gave farmers permission to employ Africans from outside the colony as servants.<sup>198</sup> There were a number of restrictions: new immigrants could only work in a limited number of districts; they were required always to carry a pass issued by the *veldcoronet*; and, on entering the colony, they had to report to the district magistrate, who either gave them work or put them again over the border. The number of such Africans increased quickly, during 1836 in particular, when some 17,000 Mfengu crossed the border in the aftermath of Hintza's war.<sup>199</sup> Although their numbers were considerable, they seem not to have offered a significant reduction of the labor shortage, and a large proportion of the colony remained closed to the new immigrants. In those areas where they were allowed to work, they were valued; as the civil commissioner of Fort Beaufort wrote, in 1857: "These people are visibly improving, and duly appreciate the advantages of order and good government."<sup>200</sup> However, in the same year his colleague from Colesberg wrote: "Notwithstanding the assistance derived from this class, there remains, however, a general complaint of the want of servants."<sup>201</sup>

The Mfengu and other Africans were much less of a nuisance to the farmers than the Khoi. They were prepared to be paid in kind, which was advantageous to farmers who were short of cash. Yet, African societies were in general still too strong for enough to be induced to take service on the European farms. There were too few immigrants to relieve the labor shortage. Also, inexperienced in the methods of European agriculture, the Africans could not, without training, be employed for all tasks, and some Europeans thought the male Africans not used to real labor. The civil commissioner of Cradock wrote:

... it will be some time before the [Xhosa] will be of much use in agriculture. Their idle habits they have brought with them into the colony; and it will be very difficult to impart within them a liking for the labor attending the cultivation of land, seeing that, in their own country, all the drudgery of this pursuit devolved upon the female sex. I refer particularly to the elder male [Xhosa], who, after growing up in idleness in [Xhosaland], have only been driven by sheer want to seek a livelihood. The young [Xhosa] may, by proper training and treatment, be made as useful a servant as those of any class of our mixed population.<sup>202</sup>

Only in Albany, where the greatest number of the African immigrants settled, did the magistrates report any alleviation of labor problems.

It might be thought that the British government would have had a liberalizing effect on the structure of Cape society. Certainly Ordinance 50 and emancipation were such attempts. The introduction of a British system of government in the 1820s should have reduced the power the farmers in the interior had been able to acquire, and the Great Trek did increase the power of the British at the expense of the Afrikaner farmers.<sup>203</sup> All the same, the British

system of administration was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in the number of government officials and, as noted above, many local power holders still had strong local roots and could misuse their power to the detriment of the Khoi. The complaints of missionaries about the local officials did not decrease after 1827. It is true that the position of *heemraden*, which had been filled by a person chosen from the local population, was now abolished and British civil commissioners and resident magistrates were placed over the districts, but the elected local councils remained. Nor would the introduction of a British legal system, with its important role for juries, have weakened the position of the farmers.<sup>204</sup> In addition, as in previous decades, the great distances between settlements and the shortage of government officials promoted local autonomy. Moreover, it was important to London that the Cape not cost too much; the budget had to be covered, as far as possible, by taxpayers in the colony and, as a result, the government was heavily dependent on the most important taxpayers, namely the farmers and other entrepreneurs, who were not in favor of increased government interference on behalf of the colored population. The great degree of autonomy the British allowed to the Cape thus had the effect of ensuring that colonial interest groups grow in influence; no matter which European faction became more powerful, the colored population suffered.

During the period 1830–1870 the Cape Colony underwent great socio-economic and political changes. But, all the same, it does not appear that a major shift in labor relations occurred. All major white groups in the existing system of labor control grew in power. Their own economic position forced all farmers, including wool producers, to maintain or to strengthen the existing system. Although Ordinance 50 posed some problems in this, the general demand for vagrancy control and the masters and servants laws shows the existence of an ideology in which repression of all laborers not of white European descent remained the way of things. Only so could traders and financiers reasonably expect that their investments to support farmers would be profitable. Indirectly, thus, the oppression of the labor force was seen as a matter of state. Despite appearances to the contrary—Ordinance 50, the emancipation of slaves, equality before the law, and so on—between 1830 and 1870 the British became increasingly involved in reinforcing, even extending, the oppressive racial system of the Cape countryside. Only in and around Cape Town could the government's liberalizing influence make itself felt at all.

## The Etiquette of Race

With warranted arrogance, historians and other social scientists often proclaim their goal to be the uncovering of the structures of the societies that they study. This is, indeed, merely an alternative description for the process of abstraction essential to all increase in understanding. We are attempting to reveal that which was hidden—hidden, that is, from the participants in the events and processes we describe. But there is a price to be paid. That which is hidden from the participants in a process by definition cannot be the conscious motivation for their actions. Rather this motivation has to be found in their own conceptualizations of society. However, most people, most of the time, reveal the ways in which they think about the society in which they live through their actions, not through theoretical disquisitions upon it. Nowhere is this more the case than with regard to racism. Racism is a motivation for actions (unfortunately), not those actions themselves. It is in the encounter between individuals and in their behavior towards each other that the racism of a society is manifested. Studying these subjects requires investigating that which is “on the surface” of human interaction, concentrating on the superficial, or the shallow, and temporarily ignoring the “deep structures” of society. To focus on the superficial or shallow is generally thought to be unworthy; indeed it is among the sharpest of insults a scholar can use against another. But, even if there are “structures” which somehow “determine” the course of the past, it is only through their manifestations in the relationships between individuals that they can become evident. Occasionally, it is worth trying to look at those surface manifestations.

In this chapter, I present three vignettes of social interaction at the Cape. They are all about equality and inequality, about who might and who might not be admitted to the society of peers in the Cape Colony. The actions and behavior I describe express and encapsulate the broader patterns of stratification in the society as a whole, patterns that were, and always have been, formed by a multiplicity of factors, of which race was only one, perhaps not even the most important in comparison with gender.

## Of Sex and Freedom

In 1827, a pamphlet was published in Cape Town entitled *Papers Relating to the Manumission of Steyntje and Her Children* and containing the proceedings of a series of court cases which went all the way to the Privy Council in London, the final court of appeal throughout the British Empire. Both the legal disputes themselves and the facts on which it was based, which were not greatly in dispute, provide a fascinating insight into a highly sensitive and contested aspect of social relations at the Cape.

The most salient facts of Steyntje van de Kaap's life seem clear.<sup>1</sup> She was born in Cape Town before 1783,<sup>2</sup> the daughter of one Lea, or Letje, a slave woman from the Malabar coast of India. Both Lea and her daughter were the slaves of Johan Georg Stadler, who had been born in 1732 in southcentral Germany and arrived at the Cape, aged 30, in 1762.<sup>3</sup> When Steyntje became a "grown up girl, so that [she] could take a man," she was flogged by her master, who was by then a widower, until she agreed to have sex with him. So was her sister, Pamela. Both Steyntje and Pamela had sons—Steyntje's was born in 1799 and named Jacob, or Japie—who were considered by their grandmother, and by the other slaves in the house, to be Stadler's children. Stadler indeed is said to have acknowledged his paternity on his deathbed in 1800 and to have been relieved to know that his brother-in-law would provide for Jacob, at least.

When Stadler died, by then aged about 68, Steyntje and the other slaves were put up for sale by the Orphan Chamber, which curated the estates of all those who died leaving underage heirs. Steyntje initially protested against these proceedings to the Chamber's board, but did not persist in the suit out of fear of punishment, so she later claimed. While some of the other slaves remained in possession of Stadler's family, Steyntje was purchased by Hendrik Weber (or Weever), another German immigrant of relatively advanced years, who had arrived in the Cape in 1765.<sup>4</sup> Steyntje was hesitant about this at first, because Weber had the reputation of being harsh to his slaves. Stadler's family offered to buy her back, but Weber, by this time separated from his wife, offered to make Steyntje the mistress of his household—that she should also be his own mistress was clearly part of the bargain—and, eventually, to free her. Steyntje considered that this would be the most advantageous course for her future, and agreed. At least as to the first part of his promise, Weber was as good as his word. Steyntje lived with Weber on a level of apparent equality, sat with him at table, and in company, and dressed in the clothes of a burgher woman. Weber arranged for her to be instructed in the precepts of the Christian religion as a prelude to baptism and manumission. Eventually she bore their daughter, Christina, in Weber's own bed.

From then on, things began to go badly for Steyntje. Weber went bankrupt, and the Court of Justice distrained all his possessions, including Steyntje and her two children, to be sold at auction to satisfy his creditors. Steyntje had

not yet been freed, and there was no way Weber could now effect this. He is said to have taken to drink in consequence of his grief at the fate of his mistress and their children. On 11 January 1804, Steyntje was sold to Carel Willem Dieleman for 1,398 rixdollars, and, after his death in 1813, was passed into the possession of one George Anderson, who married Dieleman's widow, Adriana Berrangé.

Steyntje, who had two further children in the subsequent years (by whom we do not know), remained in slavery in Cape Town, apparently acting as a house servant. In 1816 she petitioned for her freedom, presumably on the advice of the newly appointed Protector of Slaves. With the introduction of the slave registry her circumstances would have become better known. The Cape Court of Justice rejected her plea, however—or rather that of the Protector acting on her behalf. On appeal, the governor, Lord Charles Somerset, overturned the decision of the lower court, and granted Steyntje her freedom. Anderson took the case to the Privy Council in London, where, despite the services of Steven Lushington and Henry Brougham, both among London's leading lawyers—and ironically, among Britain's most prominent abolitionists<sup>5</sup>—he failed to have Steyntje's slavery confirmed. She was therefore manumitted, and so, since they had evidently been born to a free mother, were her children. This decision was made in 1822, when Steyntje was around 40. I cannot discover how much longer she lived.

Steyntje claimed, and was eventually granted, her freedom on the basis of a resolution dated 17 January 1772 of the Council of the Indies, the highest authority within the Dutch overseas empire. Since this resolution had been lawfully transmitted to the Cape from Batavia, it was held to be law there too. It laid down, first, that the children begotten on female slaves by their masters could not be sold, but must be emancipated at their master's death and, second, "that also the mothers of such children, or female Slaves by whom they are procreated, after the decease of their masters, whether their estates may be insolvent or not, may not be sold, but shall be emancipated by their testamentary executors or curators of their estates." The first provision, an established part of Cape law, was included in the codification known as the Statutes of India, and also in *Fiscaal Denysen's* 1813 abstract of the laws concerning slavery in force at the Cape.<sup>6</sup> The second, in contrast, was not generally known at the Cape, which may account for the length of time it took Steyntje to make her claim for freedom.

The matters of dispute in Steyntje's case were twofold. The first was whether Steyntje had actually been Stadler's mistress and whether he was the father of her child. The problem for the courts was that the evidence on this was very shaky, since one woman had died before her evidence on the matter could be rechecked, and since Lea, Steyntje's mother, admitted she had been drunk at the time she made her statement. The second issue was whether the provisions of the Council of the Indies's resolution extended to cover sales forced upon a slaveowner by his bankruptcy, as was the case with Weber. The

Privy Council was of the opinion, with regard to the first point, that if there was any reason to suppose that Stadler had not been Jacob's father, some evidence to this effect would have been brought forward and, with regard to the second, that Steyntje's sale to Dieleman gave him, at the most, only the right to her services during Weber's lifetime, so that, at Weber's death, Steyntje was automatically manumitted. It, therefore, decreed her freedom.

In this case it was not, it should be stressed, the sexual relationship between Steyntje and her successive masters that was at issue. The authorities at the Cape did not question the right of an unmarried or widowed slaveowner to the body of his female slaves.<sup>7</sup> In the case in question, Stadler raped both Steyntje and Pamela—such is surely the interpretation that would be given to his actions by any court of law. Neither the lawyers in London nor the Cape courts based their decision on the fact that Steyntje had been forced. Stadler's and Weber's behavior towards their slave women were considered to be acceptable, whether or not it was laudable. So far as I am aware, throughout the 180 years of slavery at the Cape, not a single man, slave or free, was convicted for raping a slave woman.<sup>8</sup> In this, as in so many other senses, her body was not her own.

This particular case revolved rather around the contradiction between slavery and kinship. A slave woman could not claim freedom simply because she had been her master's concubine, but only when she had a child by him. As Wedgwood's famous abolitionist medallion made clear, one could not be both a slave and a brother. Provided it could be proved, which was not easy,<sup>9</sup> the fact of kinship took precedence over the fact of slavery. Slaves who could claim descent from the free could thereby claim entry into the ranks of the free, and so could their mothers. Their slave ancestry would be remembered and marked for a further generation, but probably not for much longer.<sup>10</sup>

## On Table Manners and Missionaries

The question between us and the government was one of civilization. The criterion of a people's civilization with Lord Charles Somerset was whether the people used knives and forks, and the experiment was to be made at Bethelsdorp and Theopolis, and more particularly at the former place.<sup>11</sup>

Before Andries Waterboer was allowed to accept an invitation to dine with Sir Benjamin D'Urban he was put through a course of training in manners at Mrs. Philip's own table.<sup>12</sup>

The first of the above quotations is Dr. John Philip's summary of the conflict between the London Missionary Society and the colonial government when he arrived in South Africa in 1819. It refers to the question of whether the Khoikhoi of the mission stations were to be admitted to full participation in the life of the colony, or were to be kept in a state of dependency and oppression. What would later become a rather dubious political slogan,

"Equal rights for every civilized man," was at this stage common ground between the governor and the missionaries, or, at least, so Philip thought, as he threw himself into the task of "civilizing" the Bethelsdorp Khoi, with James Read as his main local agent.

Some eight years later, in the *Researches in South Africa*, Philip published a letter on the results of his endeavors, which he considered to have been successful. Whether or not his depiction of Bethelsdorp in 1825 is accurate is for present purposes irrelevant; what matters are the criteria of civilization he employed, which were somewhat broader than those used by Lord Charles. Philip wrote as follows:

Many Hottentots have now substantial, clean, and commodious houses, indicating a degree of comfort possessed by few of the frontier boors, [*sic*] and far surpassing the great body of the English settlers. The sheep-skin caross, with its filthy accompaniments, has disappeared, and the great body of the people and of the children are clothed in British manufactures. The people belonging to Bethelsdorp are in the possession of fifty wagons; and this place, which was lately represented as the opprobrium of missions, is at the present moment a thriving and rapidly-improving village. Instead of the indifference to each other's sufferings, and the exclusive selfishness generated by the oppressions they groaned under, and the vices which follow such a state of things, their conduct to each other is now marked with humanity and Christian affection, of which a beautiful line of almshouses, (the only thing of the kind in the colony,) and their contributions to support the poor, furnish striking examples. In addition to their other exertions, a spacious school-room, valued at five-thousand rix-dollars, in which the youth are taught to read, both in the English and Dutch languages, and many of them also instructed in writing and arithmetic, has been erected at the expense, and by the hands, of the Hottentots. A church of larger dimensions has recently been commenced. Bethelsdorp, moreover, possesses the best blacksmith's shop on the frontier, or, indeed, in the colony. Other trades, especially those of the mason, thatcher, sawyer, &c., are successfully followed by many inhabitants of Bethelsdorp.

Domestic society is founded in the union between husband and wife. Among all civilized nations this union has been esteemed sacred and honourable; and from it are derived those exquisite joys or sorrows, which can embitter all the pleasures, or alleviate all the pains, in human life. At the introduction of our missions among the Hottentots, their sexual connexions were of the most casual and temporary nature. Without any standard of morals, they were abandoned to the grossest licentiousness. The marriage covenant has been introduced by the gospel; it is now regarded by the Hottentots at our missionary institutions as an indissoluble alliance; and young females who have lost their characters have now no chance of being asked in marriage, or even noticed, by respectable young men of their own nation.

And all this despite the fact that in the neighborhood of Bethelsdorp "you may . . . see all the vices of civilization, without (except in a very few individual cases) any of its virtues."<sup>13</sup>

The missionaries were divided as to the question of what was the proper conduct of their flocks within the church, even though they tended to agree as to what it should be outside. The issue was what degree of emotion could be shown with propriety. John Philip wrote on the matter as follows:

A stranger entering the place of worship at Bethelsdorp does not now observe, what he might have witnessed six or seven years ago, the agitation and cries of the people, so great as for a time to interrupt the preacher; but he may observe what is not less interesting, a congregation hanging on the lips of the speaker, the intelligent eye, the silent tear, the devotional attitude, the calm of meditative reflection, or the alternations of hope and fear, joy and sorrow, exhibited in the countenance as the speaker awakens the painful recollections of his hearers, pours into the wounded heart the balm of consolation, or agitates or composes them by the grandeur of the world to come, the joys of heaven, or the miseries which await the finally impenitent. Common observers, who have never reflected upon the progress of civil society, have displayed much petulance and ignorance in their remarks on some of these appearances at some of our missionary stations on which we are now commenting. When they make their caustic and sneering remarks upon the exclamations and groans of an uncivilized congregation, they forget that there is scarcely any medium in such circumstances between not feeling at all, and giving full vent to the expression of their feelings. Human beings emerging from a savage state are like children much agitated; they can neither suppress nor control their passions under any extraordinary excitement.<sup>14</sup>

In writing these words, Philip may well have been reacting, at least unwittingly, to a description of a service some fifteen years earlier by the British Moravian traveler, the Rev. C. I. Latrobe. What Latrobe saw, and above all heard, on the mission station near George, later to be known as Pacaltsdorp after its founder, did not impress him;

After Mr. Pacalt had spoken about two minutes, a woman began to make a strange tremulous noise. Supposing her to be suddenly seized with illness, I was surprised to find no one ready to help and lead her out, till her neighbours, catching the infection, the noise spread throughout the whole assembly, the men uttering deep groans. In his prayer, the missionary affectionately remembered us, and we were sorry to be so much disturbed, by the continuance of these jarring sounds. On expressing our astonishment at the disturbance thus occasioned to the service, Mr. Pacalt informed us, that it had been considered a sign of conviction, by the power of the Word. But supposing even that true conviction of sin might, in some, produce this effect, who does not see that insincerity may easily adopt such external marks, to gain the good opinion of men, whose piety and truth being unsuspected, are willing to believe others incapable of so great a fraud.<sup>15</sup>

If, then, Philip saw the state of quiet contemplation as that appropriate to churchgoers when their initial excitement in confronting the Christian message gave way to a more regular Christian life, he nevertheless personally continued to be moved by the strong outward expression of emotion when he encountered it. In 1842, on a tour of the interior, he visited the mission stations the French missionaries had established in Lesotho and wrote as follows:

I have never preached under any circumstances where so much feeling was manifested as at Thaba Bossu and Morijah. At Thaba Bossu we were obliged to leave the congregation without being able to conclude the service, and at Morijah the excitement was scarcely less. The people seemed to weep till they were exhausted, and then retired, everyone to be alone.

One of the natives said—this was the next day—“Do not talk to me of the Preacher, it was God who was in the midst of us.”<sup>16</sup>

To some extent, then, Philip considered civilization to bring losses as well as benefits with it, though the benefits, of course, greatly outweighed the costs. Even if the implicit, and somewhat stereotyped, idea behind Philip's comments stressed the emotionality of those who had not yet become Christian, such a relativism is attractive, if rare in the context of the nineteenth-century Cape.

In his description of Bethelsdorp, Philip was clearly enunciating those traits that were essential to civilized behavior, and those material conditions of life from both of which the attainment of civilization could be concluded. These traits included a quiet and attentive demeanor in church, sobriety, monogamy and premarital chastity, and regular productive labor, at least for men, while the women were expected to withdraw from such labor outside the sphere of home-making; the material conditions included the building of decent, stone, square houses, and clothing of European style, and preferably manufacture. Philip had explained to the inhabitants of Bethelsdorp that if they achieved these standards they could hope to be freed from the oppression under which they were suffering, since any argument for civilization was, he believed, unanswerable.<sup>17</sup>

In the long term, Philip's hopes for Bethelsdorp did not materialize. The later history of Bethelsdorp does not lend a great deal of support to the contention either that its inhabitants maintained the level of material success concomitant with Philip's idea of civilization, or that they were accepted as equals by leaders of the society in which they lived.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, there are numerous indications that the criteria of civilization Philip used were accepted by many Cape colonists. One of the clearest indications of this was given by the leading 1820 settler, Thomas Philipps, in his evidence before the British parliament's Select Committee on Aborigines in 1836. He was asked by the members of the committee whether, in the Cape Colony, there were "any social distinctions prejudicial to intercourse founded on colour." He replied: "No, I think less in our colony than any other. I have seen slightly coloured ladies and gentlemen in the same room with Europeans; everything depends on their education and conduct." Philipps was then asked "Would it be thought an affront to a European to meet a native man of colour?" He replied: "No, certainly not; provided his rank in society was the same; there is no distinction of that kind."<sup>19</sup> Once again, there may well have been others in the colony, particularly among the "slightly coloured ladies and gentlemen," who felt otherwise about the matter, and what precisely Philipps meant by his qualifier "slightly" is open to considerable question. But this, really, is beside the point; what matters is the ideological commitment of a man who was one of the most important public figures in the colony to equality both before the law, as had been established by Ordinance 50, and in society. For Philipps education, conduct, and rank, not color, formed the criteria for acceptance, and thus the microcosms on the basis of which the whole of society was to be evaluated.

## On Handshaking

The interaction between those who lived in the Cape Colony in the nineteenth century was as much physical as verbal. As everywhere, it was when people met and took leave of each other that they demonstrated most clearly whether or not they conceived each other to be equals. The rituals that accompanied such moments were thus of great significance for the maintenance of the social order. As elsewhere, it was the offering and taking of a hand that was as important as anything that was said—and, indeed, on occasion nothing needed to be said. The following quotations, I believe, demonstrate the importance of such actions in the continual affirmation and recreation of the desired ranking of Cape society.

William Burchell, botanist and traveler, 1811.

A young boor on horseback . . . was passing by; but, seeing us, he approached and dismounted; saluted us with '*Dag!*' and gave his hand to each of us in turn, in a cold and unmeaning manner, by merely touching palms. One might have expected that he would have had a long chat with his brother boor; but he, at that time, not thinking of any thing to say, they stood insensibly looking at each other for about five minutes, without exchanging a single word. The stranger, whom no-one seemed to know, then repeated his '*Dag!*' which we all in like manner returned, mounted his horse, and proceeded on his way.

This ceremony of passing strangers halting to salute each other, has long been common, although at present an expiring one, among those colonists who dwell in the more remote corners of the country. Rarely visiting or visited, they think that a *Christen-mensch* (a Christian), so they term all white men, should never be passed without salutation. This practice doubtless took its rise, originally, from that pleasure which the first settlers took on meeting a white man in these distant places of their banishment from the world; a meeting which, in those days, could have been a circumstance of rare occurrence. As population increases, this sentiment wears out, and with it the customs derived from it; no longer the token of that neighbourly and mutual good-will which it formerly implied.<sup>20</sup>

James Backhouse, missionary traveler, 1838.

Such of the company as remained, assembled again in the evening, when the coloured servants were also present. After expressing our concern for their spiritual welfare, my companion offered to shake hands with a coloured woman. The Scotchman who had interpreted for us, called him aside, and with evident good intention warned him against shaking hands with Coloured people, if he hoped to make his way with the White population. G. W. Walker thanked him for this kind intention, but replied, that God had created of one blood all the nations of men, and Christ had died for all men, and we believed our Gospel message to be to the Coloured People as well as to the White, we could not forbear this token of christian regard to them, on such occasions, whatever the effect might be on those of whiter skin. This feeling toward Coloured People has given way in Southern Africa, since the emancipation of the slaves.

John William Colenso, Anglican priest, in Natal, 1853.



his sword out of the scabbard, shook it at him, and trampled his foot on the ground. But the most amusing [*sic*] part was a couple of hours after the people had dispersed, Sir Harry sent for the magistrate, Macomo and the Interpreter. When introduced, Macomo extended his hand, for which Sir Harry gave him his foot on his neck, and then brandished his sword over his neck.<sup>26</sup>

According to Xhosa tradition, during this humiliating burlesque Maqoma said: "You are a dog, so you act like a dog. This thing was not sent by Victoria, who knows I am of royal blood as she is."<sup>27</sup>

Sir Harry Smith and the Ngquika chiefs, a few days later, at the ceremony for the annexation of the Ciskei, or British Kaffraria as it was then known.

I rode into the circle formed by the followers [of the chiefs], the chiefs having all assembled in the centre, bearing in the right hand a serjeant's halberd, well sharpened, the emblem of war; in my left, my baton of peace and authority, surmounted by a brass knob. I directed each chief to come forward and touch whichever he pleased—it was immaterial to me—they all most cheerfully touched the symbol of peace. I then in a very impressive manner read and explained the proclamations with various comments, threats and promises as the tenor of the documents turned; which being concluded, each chief came forward and kissed my foot; a custom of their own in doing homage; exclaiming "Inkosi Inkulu!" (great chief). I then shook hands with each, never having previously done so—three cheers were most sonourously given by the "British Kaffrarians" and the troupes in honour of Her Majesty, and thus I trust has commenced the foundation of the improvement of their social condition and the future tranquility of the border.<sup>28</sup>

Robert Ross, historian, 1971–72.

After the church services of the Griqua Reformation Movement at Kranshoek, near Plettenberg Bay, those present shake hands with every other participant. The congregation has been standing in a circle and then, led on the occasions I have witnessed it by the head of the women's section, the circle is, as it were, turned inside out, so that it files past itself. At the New Year's celebration this entails several hundred handshakes.<sup>29</sup>

Joseph Lelyveld, journalist, 1983.

A few days later, while he was having his tank filled at the gas station in Enkeldoorn, the ZANU man drove up. Of course, he instantly recognized Farmer Hoffman with his voortrekker beard, recognized him with pleasure, it seemed, as a progressive Afrikaner who had readily accepted the full implications of the Mugabe policy of "reconciliation" in the new Zimbabwe, for the ZANU man could not have known the private thoughts and sense of shame that gripped the farmer after he had given way without even a tiny demur at their first encounter. Now, to his astonishment, Kas [Hoffman] saw something he had never seen or dreamed of seeing in his first fifty-three years in Enkeldoorn. His new friend from ZANU, this black man, was advancing on him with a wide smile and an outstretched hand.

"You know, I never shook a black man's hand," Kas said. "We don't mix with them at all."

"What did you do?" I asked again.

His eyes were downcast and his voice was practically a whisper when he made his confession. "I shook it," he said.<sup>30</sup>

Christopher Hope, South African novelist, returning after a long exile in Europe, 1987.

At the end of the evening [in Soweto] one of my inquisitors offers me his hand. Without thinking, I shake it. A look of astonishment, almost of pain, spreads across his face. I have remembered too late the special 'Soweto shake'—a clasp of the hands, a circling of thumbs, and a final hand clasp. His surprise gives way to pity.

'Ah, Chris—,' a rueful shake of the head—'you've been away too long!'<sup>31</sup>

*Highveld Style*, magazine, 1989.

The advice on social etiquette goes both ways. Frances [Beasley] spends a lot of time explaining to whites the black handshake. "There's the crossover handshake, common everywhere except Swaziland. And then there's the African version of the Western handshake, a limp hand to show you offer no resistance."<sup>32</sup>

The opinions of Thomas Philipps, John Philip, quoted above, and many other members of the white elite were not universally held. This is illustrated by the information on handshaking I have been able to discover. Handshaking as greeting is obviously an expression of equality. Both in the Cape Colony and in "English" Natal, handshaking was racially restricted. The offering or not offering of a hand was a gesture which encapsulated the totality of inclusion and exclusion which in itself was determined by the reduction of all of the multi-variegated aspects of life to the single "fact" of presumed racial distinction.<sup>33</sup>

Evidently there was a conflict within the Cape Colony throughout the nineteenth century as to the criteria for inclusion in the ranks of proper society, and thus also, and more importantly, as to the ways in which society should be organized. This was a matter fought out in part in the arena of politics and in part in the arena of labor organization, but equally in the arena of everyday interaction. Here, indeed, gender roles were specifically formed. The two realms, the personal and the political, themselves could not be separated, as was demonstrated most clearly, perhaps, by the difficulties which Cecil John Rhodes got himself into right at the end of the century. Rhodes, at the time prime minister of the colony, began his election campaign in 1899 stressing the need for "Equal rights for every white man south of the Zambezi." In so doing he was mainly concerned to point up the exclusion from political rights of Britons who had emigrated to the Transvaal. However, he was called to book by the "colored" voters of Cape Town, so that he had to change the slogan to "Equal rights for every civilized man."<sup>34</sup> Rhodes, who was not verbally sophisticated, had tripped up on a distinction that was quite clear to most of the inhabitants of the colony. There was a great difference between demanding equal rights for every white men and for every civilized man in the Cape Colony—and no one in the society before Olive Schreiner<sup>35</sup> would have included women in the statement. Between these two concepts—"white" and "civilized"—lies much of the tension of the colony's history.




❧ PART THREE

# Population and Family Formation



## The “White” Population of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century

 This chapter presents the conclusions of an inquiry into the character and mechanics of population growth in the eighteenth century among the European immigrants to the Cape Colony and their descendants. While many of the standard demographic measures could not be calculated, because of certain lacunae in the data, it did prove possible to discover at least the main contours of settler population growth and fertility, though not mortality.<sup>1</sup>

The first principal source for data on the “white” population, which, as will become apparent, was not of exclusively European descent, is J. A. Heese’s *Die Herkomst van die Afrikaner 1657–1867*,<sup>2</sup> a thorough, unbiased, and careful piece of work on the rate of immigration into the “white” population of South Africa. The second are the so-called *opgaaf* rolls, the annual censuses. They include the free black population of Cape Town, because before 1720 and after 1773 it is impossible to separate free blacks from the other inhabitants of the Cape district.<sup>3</sup> The third and primary source are the genealogies compiled initially by C. C. de Villiers towards the end of the last century and published as *Geslachts-Registers der Oude Kaapsche Families*,<sup>4</sup> and, since then, checked and amended by genealogists.

There are three major defects to these available genealogies. First, immigrants’ children are under-represented, at least after 1780, when the Lutheran church in Cape Town, to whose records De Villiers did not have access, was founded.<sup>5</sup> Second, because the *Geslachtsregisters* only rarely record deaths, it was impossible to produce either crude or age-specific death rates, ordinarily of crucial importance in any demographic study.<sup>6</sup> The construction of statistics on fertility, too, becomes difficult when it cannot be determined whether a woman ceased to have children because of her, or her husband’s, death, or for other reasons. Moreover, information on the proportion of men and women who never married rests on decidedly dubious assumptions, which is unfortunate because, as I argue below, discrepancies in this regard are of considerable importance beyond the narrow realm of demography.

The reason for the deficiency in death records is clear. Because Calvinism

did not hold that a ritual after death would enhance the chances for salvation, it was not thought necessary to have a minister present, who might have left a record of the event. Moreover, since churches were few, and concentrated in the southwest part of the country, who would want to cart a corpse over what might easily be a distance of a hundred miles for a ceremony with no theological purpose? Each farm maintained, instead, and most still do maintain, its own plot of hallowed burial ground. Even in Cape Town, where burial in a communal graveyard was obviously necessary, a minister was rarely present. And only after 1759 were church sextons required to file notices of those they had buried.<sup>7</sup>

A third problem with the *Geslagsregisters* is the difficulty of deciding how real the community was to which these genealogies referred. They included, as Theal maintained, "Europeans and persons of European descent," but what this means is unclear, since large numbers of people who would not have been classified as "white" in twentieth-century South Africa were baptized and married by the Nederduitsch Gereformeerde Kerk (N.G.K.).<sup>8</sup> How far De Villiers and later genealogists have excised such records from their genealogies, and what biases this practice (if it existed) introduced into the statistics derived from them, cannot be determined. Racial ideas since the late nineteenth century have been quite different, after all, from those of the eighteenth. It is clear, however, that a large number of persons of other than pure European ancestry are included in these registers. J. A. Heese's inquiry into the national origin of the Afrikaner population, which demonstrated that in 1807 about seven percent of the Afrikaner gene pool was "nie-blank," "not-white," was based to a large extent on the *Geslagsregisters*.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, the community of those who were baptized and married did correspond closely with the dominant group within the colony. The Christian *rites de passage* remained the sign of acceptance not just into the church but also, and above all, into that community. Their importance is evident in this description given by Anders Sparrman of a social situation he encountered during his travels in the 1770s:

I saw two brothers . . . the issue of a Christian man and a bastard negress of the second or third generation. One of the sons, at this time about 30 years of age, seemed not to be slighted in the company of the Christian farmers, though, at that time, he had not been baptized. The other, who was the elder brother, in order to get married and become a farmer, as he then was, had been obliged to beg, and probably even bribe, to be baptized.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the community defined by baptism, which is the object of this study, was a real, if not entirely self-contained, segment of the Cape population.

The limitations of the genealogies notwithstanding, as a demographic source they are surprisingly good, with far fewer limitations than a knowledge of the travel literature might lead one to suppose. For instance, O. F. Mentzel wrote that, because of the problems of transport, "farmers who live in the remote interior come to town so rarely that they bring walking children for

TABLE 5.1  
Gross Free "White" Population of the Cape Colony  
(Including free blacks and excluding *knegten* and company employees)

Year	Adult men	Adult women	Boys	Girls	Total
1700	418	222	295	610	1,245
1705	568	288	408	395	1,659
1710	656	339	458	470	1,923
1715	552	303	401	381	1,637
1720	653	405	494	514	2,066
1725	722	474	614	654	2,464
1730	725	500	734	802	2,761
1735	856	582	891	989	3,318
1740	964	679	1,022	1,120	3,785
1745	1,107	732	1,028	1,193	4,060
1750	1,364	902	1,216	1,378	4,860
1755	1,597	1,110	1,662	1,655	6,024
1760	1,756	1,166	1,599	1,634	6,155
1765	2,002	1,345	1,923	1,871	7,141
1770	2,136	1,517	2,256	2,179	8,088
1775	2,461	1,682	2,429	2,405	8,977
1780	2,913	1,922	2,806	2,859	10,500
1785	3,238	2,207	3,022	2,148	10,615
1790	3,613	2,406	3,464	3,491	12,974
1795	4,259	2,870	3,963	3,837	14,930

SOURCE: Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, 114-15.

baptism, and sometimes several at a time."<sup>11</sup> If such practices had been at all frequent, the consequences for demographic analysis would have been dire, but occasions of this type would be revealed in the genealogies as multiple baptisms, the number of which can be checked. Only 11 women out of a sample of 298 were recorded as baptizing more than one child at a time, well within the range for multiple births that might be predicted. These figures show, moreover, that baptism was not likely to have been delayed after birth for more than, say, four to six months, because, otherwise, women who knew they were again pregnant would have been loath to travel to the churches, knowing that the arduous journey would have to be repeated shortly. From the baptismal records it is thus possible to establish the age of any individual with an accuracy of not less than six months.

Throughout the eighteenth century, the South African European-descended "white" population was increasing at a great rate. From the gross figures, as provided by the *opgaaf* lists (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1), it can be seen that in 1701 the population was around 1,250, that it had doubled by 1725, doubled again by 1755, and doubled a third time by 1785. By the end of the century it had reached 15,000, a gross growth rate of about 2.6 percent per annum. The only time population declined was during the small-pox epidemic of 1713, but, after that slide, recovery was quick and the 1713 figure was reached again by 1718. Another epidemic of the disease in 1755,




Figure 5.1 Total white population, 1701-1793.

which was limited to Cape Town, also produced a slackening in the rate of growth.<sup>12</sup> For the rest of the century there was continuous, cumulative, and rapid growth.

In part, this growth was due to immigration. The received orthodoxy is that immigration to South Africa ended in 1706, when the Dutch East India Company changed its policy of encouraging the settlement of the tip of the continent by family units, and did not restart until the British took over at the beginning of the next century.<sup>13</sup> Now it is true that most of the *stamvaders* ("fathers of the tribe") of the more extensive Afrikaner families had reached the Cape by 1700. The large Huguenot contingent had arrived, as well as such well-known Afrikaner family names as Van der Merwe, Van Dyk, Van Wyk, Van Zyl, Pretorius, and Smuts. On the other hand, many notable Afrikaners are descended in the male line from men who arrived at the Cape during the middle and later years of the eighteenth century. Examples of these are the Hertzogs, Hofmeyrs, and Graafs. In fact, throughout the century a continual stream of immigrants entered the South African "white" population. Many members of the Cape garrison left the service of the Company to work as servants for the farmers or townsmen, before setting up on their own. In all

TABLE 5.2  
*Immigrants Marrying into the South African "White Population, 1657-1807*

Period	Men	White women	Non-white women
1657-1687	63	53	8
1688-1717	300	156	50
1718-1747	317	91	72
1748-1777	565	49	145
1778-1807	738	64	205

the *opgaaf* lists, this category (the *knegten*) contained about a hundred men, until the 1780s when war made the Company less willing to allow its servants to take civil employment. Many men seem to have entered the South African "white" population without going through this initial process of indenture.

The immigration that did take place was largely male, especially after the earliest years of the settlement. Heese has listed the marriages in which one or both partners were first-generation "whites," in either the geographical or the social sense (see Table 5.2). The effects of the sexual imbalance can be seen in Table 5.1: Adult females were constantly outnumbered by males, in a ratio that varied between a high of 100 to 180, in the aftermath of the small-pox epidemic of 1713, to a low of 100 to 144 in 1755.<sup>14</sup> For children, not surprisingly, there was no clear sex pattern, with girls outnumbering boys rather more often than not.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the immigrants cannot have had a particularly great lasting effect on population growth, for many of them, failing to find mates, would have left no legitimate offspring.<sup>16</sup> Even when the surplus men are left out of account, which would discount the great majority of immigrants, the general trend still shows (Table 5.1) almost continual growth at a high rate. The extension of the area of "white" settlement at the Cape of Good Hope, which proceeded throughout the eighteenth century—and until at least the 1860s—resulted therefore principally from the natural increase of what was originally a small but healthy and fertile "white" population at the beginning of the century.

To see more exactly the mechanisms at work, I took a sample from the *Geslagsregisters* of 10 percent of those women who were born at the Cape before 1760 and who did marry.<sup>17</sup> There were 298, for whom information was sought on the dates of their baptism, their marriages, the baptisms of their husbands—provided they were not immigrants—and of their children, and their children's sexes and whether they married. Such data are not invariably available, and some individuals had to be discarded because of this, although occasionally I could estimate the date of a birth or a marriage from those of siblings or of the first child. The information recorded is, I concluded, generally quite complete and of a reasonably high order of accuracy.

An analysis of the lives of these women demonstrates what a general knowledge of the travel literature and similar sources would have led one to suspect,

TABLE 5.3  
*Age at First Marriage for South African "White" Women*

	Born before 1730		Born after 1730		Total
	Husband immigrant	Husband non-immigrant	Husband immigrant	Husband non-immigrant	
Number	48	61	42	128	279
Mean	21.3	21.5	21.3	20.6	21.0
Median	20.0	19.5	19.6	19.3	19.6

TABLE 5.4  
*Distribution of Ages of South African "White" Women at First Marriage*

Age	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	5	4	27	23	29	33	25	29	17	19	14
24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35 +
	8	13	9	6	2	1	5	2	1	5	2

that Afrikaner women generally married young, had children at regular and short intervals thereafter, and remained fertile well into middle age. A considerable proportion of these children reached maturity to breed at the same high rate.

## Marriage

The age at which Afrikaner women reached puberty cannot be determined, for obvious reasons, but by their middle teens girls seem to have been considered ready for marriage. The youngest age at which any girl is known to have married was 13 years 4 months, a figure that might have to be increased by up to 6 months to allow for late baptism. After that age, women soon married. Of the 279 women in my sample whose ages at marriage could be determined, 147 (53 percent) were married before they were 20 and another 88 (33 percent) before age 25. The mean age at marriage was 21 years, the median 19.6, and the calculated mode 17 years, figures which do not seem to have been significantly different for those born before or after 1730.<sup>18</sup> There was a slight tendency for those women who married immigrants to be older than those who did not, but the difference was not significant statistically.<sup>19</sup> (See Tables 5.3 and 5.4.)

Women tended to marry men older than themselves, the mean difference in age between husband and wife being 5 years and 6 months, so that, as is shown in Table 5.5, the mean age at marriage for men was 25 years 3 months.<sup>20</sup> To a certain extent, this was a result of the imbalance in the sex ratio, but it could be argued that a far greater divergence might have been

TABLE 5.5  
*Age of South African "White" Men at Marriage, Compared to Age of Wife*

Age of wife	No. of husbands older	No. of husbands younger	Mean age of husbands	Median age of husbands	Mean difference between spouses*
Under 20	85	6	25.2	23.5	+ 93
20-24	32	15	25.3	24.9	+ 33
25-29	3	7	23.9	22.6	- 48
Over 30	1	8	26.9	24.6	- 114
Total	121	36	25.3	23.1	+ 66

\*Age in months. Positive values indicate that the husband was older.

TABLE 5.6  
*Age of South African "White" Men at Marriage, by Age of Wife*

Husband	Wife under 20	Wife 20-24	Wife over 25	Total	Percentage
Under 20	8	2	2	12	8
20-24	48	25	10	83	52
25-29	19	19	5	37	23
30-34	11	3	4	18	11
Over 35	6	2	1	9	6
Total	89	48	22	159	100

TABLE 5.7  
*Remarriage of South African "White" Women and Men*

	No.	No. remarrying	Percentage remarrying
Women marrying immigrants	95	21	22
Women not marrying immigrants	201	33	16
Total women	296	54	18
Men immigrants	82	18	22
Men non-immigrants	173	35	20
Total men	255*	53	21

\*The number of men included is smaller than the number of women because only those men whose marriage to a woman in the sample was their first were included.

predicted in view of the fact that in many societies such a gap between male and female ages at marriage occurs despite a balanced sex structure. Moreover, it has been argued that male ages at marriage are remarkably "sticky," remaining in the middle to late twenties for almost all European populations, while female ages at marriage fluctuate much more greatly in reaction to economic circumstances.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, the relatively young ages of marriage at the Cape provide further evidence for the hypothesis that the majority of men were able to escape from the control of their parents at a relatively young age and set up on their own.<sup>22</sup> (The full distribution of these ages is

TABLE 5.8  
*Age at Last Birth by Age at Marriage  
 for South African "Whites"*

Age at marriage	Mean	Median	Mode
Under 20	36.3	36.8	37.8
20-24	40.3	41.3	43.3
Over 25	40.1	41.0	42.1
Total	37.9	39.3	42.3

NOTE: Only those women who did not remarry, and whose husbands did not, were included.

fancy increases. Unfortunately it is not possible to quantify the extent of this underestimate, and hence to allow for it.

The age at which a woman ceased to have children is therefore difficult to ascertain, for, in the absence of information about deaths, it is impossible to be sure why she ceased childbearing. Nevertheless some points can be made, particularly when consideration is restricted to those women who neither remarried nor died in time to allow their husbands to remarry. Thus, on the one hand it can be shown that 62 out of 138 such women (44.9 percent) were over 40 when they had their last child, and, on the other hand, if it is assumed that the age at last birth was distributed unimodally, and if information were available as to which marriages lasted beyond the menopause, and consideration restricted to them, the modal age of this hypothetical group should correspond to the modal age of the observed sample, as the number of marriages terminated by death should increase monotonically with age. As can be seen from Tables 5.8 and 5.9, this figure lay in the early 40s, while computation gives a value of 42.3 for the mode.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, there is a definite relationship between the age of a woman at marriage and the birth of her last child, as those who married before they were 20 ceased to be fertile about 5 years younger than those who remained unmarried into their 20s. With this caveat, then, it can be stated, tentatively, that Afrikaner women in the eighteenth century remained fertile into their early 40s, other things being equal. In a sizeable minority of cases, of course, other things were not equal, and this produced the distribution shown in the tables.

### Family Size

The consequence of the pattern of early marriage, frequent childbearing, and a relatively long fertile period was naturally that Afrikaner families became very large. It is not possible to construct figures for the size of completed families, for, by definition, a completed family is one in which the marriage has not been broken, by death or divorce, before the age of, say, 45. In the circumstances of eighteenth-century South Africa it is not possible to deter-

TABLE 5.9  
*Age of South African "White" Women at the Birth of Their Last Child*

Age at marriage	Under 30	30-34	35-39	40-44	Over 45	Total
Under 20	16	8	23	18	6	71
20-24	6	5	9	18	6	44
Over 25	3	3	6	12	4	28
Total	25	16	38	48	16	143
Percentage of Total	17	11	27	34	11	100

mine this. Nevertheless, rather crude formulations are possible, because it is known how many children any individual woman had, even if we cannot guess why she ceased childbearing. (See Figure 5.2 for the total spread without regard to extraneous factors.) Thus, the mean number of children of all married women was 5.8 and the median 6. If the sample is restricted to those women who took at least one non-immigrant husband, thereby eliminating a certain amount of under-registration, then the mean rises to 6.5 and the median to 7. On the other hand, those who married immigrants tended to have fewer children anyway, even when they were registered with the N.G.K. Thus the mean number of children born to women who had at least one was 6.6, but it was 7.0 for those who married at least one non-immigrant husband and 5.6 for those who only married immigrants.

Recorded in another way, the probability of any bride's having 7 or more children was 0.47. If she married a Cape-born man, the probability rose to 0.52, and if she had at least one child, the probability of having 7 or more was 0.56. On the other hand, if she married an immigrant, the probability was 0.39, unless she had at least one child, whereupon the chance of having at least seven was 0.51.

The only indication given in the sources that a marriage ended before the end of the fertile period is when one or other of the couple remarried. The occurrence of the second marriage evidently shows that the first had ended some time before. This is obviously not a foolproof method of discovering when marriages have ended, for many widows and widowers doubtless did not remarry,<sup>27</sup> while, on the other hand, a few marriages are excluded from consideration by this criterion because the husband remarried although his first wife survived to the end of her fertile period. For instance, if the genealogists did not confuse two men of the same name, Allewyn Smit's first wife was at least 49 years old when she died (her twelfth and last child was born then), but nevertheless she is not included in the following calculation because Smit remarried, incidentally fathering another 12 children, the last being born when he was 85. All the same, imposing such criteria on the data gives some indication of the degree of bias that their particular quality imposes, compared to standard procedures. Thus, the mean number of children born to those women in the sample who neither remarried themselves nor left wid-

owed husbands who remarried was 6.1, and the median 7. This figure varied with the age at which the women married, the mean number of children born to women married under 20, between 20 and 24, between 25 and 29, and over 30 being 7.4, 5.1, 4.5, and 3.4 respectively. The probability of any of these women having 7 or more children was 0.52, a figure made up of a probability of 0.64 for those married under the age of 20 and 0.22 for those who were over 25 when they married.

In passing, it is no doubt worth noting that the general pattern of fertility and family formation, insofar as it can be reconstructed, corresponds closely to the hypothetical model of natural fertility. There is no indication that women attempted to restrict their fertility once they had borne a "target" number of children; rather they continued to bear children for as long as they were biologically able to do so. In the conditions of early South Africa, of course, this is not surprising.<sup>28</sup>

### Replacement

It is theoretically possible that the large family size of the Afrikaners might have been offset by a correspondingly high mortality rate among infants, children, and adolescents. For any population not to decline, in the absence of large-scale immigration, each married woman must have on average at least one daughter who herself marries and begins breeding. Thus, the rise in the South African "white" population was ultimately due to the fact that each generation more than replaced itself. The 282 women in the sample for whom full information is available among them produced 814 male and 824 female children. Of these, 463 boys and 527 girls married. This means that each married woman had, on average, 1.87 married daughters. Even this figure is artificially low, because the marriages of many of the daughters born late in the century were no doubt missed by the compilers of the genealogies, whose work became much less complete after 1800. If, therefore, only the daughters of those mothers who were born before 1730 are taken into account, the ratio rises to 2.75. As virtually all the women in question would have been at least 30 years old in 1800, this must represent the true replacement rate of the population.

It will be seen that a rather smaller proportion of men than of women married. If it is assumed that there was no difference in mortality between males and females before puberty and that the five-year differential in the mean age at marriage may be left out of account, then it can be shown that about 10 percent more of adult Cape-born men than women failed to find legitimate spouses. This was evidently the result of the imbalance in the sex ratio of the immigrants. Now, in a society in which there was a large number of Khoisan, slave, and "bastard" (half-caste) women,<sup>29</sup> all of whom were doubtless subservient to the whites, it is unlikely that such a high proportion of men would have remained celibate. Rather, they appear to have entered unions with

women categorized (at least later) as "colored," which might or might not have been stable, but which almost certainly resulted in at least the male offspring being cast out of pukka (proper) Christian society. The demographic study of early colonial South Africa reveals, therefore, not only an immense population growth which forced and enabled the great expansion of the territorial area of the colony, but also suggests a continual process of recasting and redefining the lines of social stratification within the greater society of which the population with which this chapter has been concerned formed the dominant section. Generation by generation, so it would seem, the poorer and less well-connected male members of the Christian community were pared off into the mass of "non-white" underlings, for no doubt it was these people who were least able to acquire white wives. So began the process of equation between economic and racial stratification that has bedeviled South Africa ever since.

What did these rules lead to in practice? In the most simple case, that of a widow or widower, the estate was divided equally among the children, both sons and daughters. Any surviving spouse received half of the joint estate by virtue of the community of property, the other half being distributed among the children of the deceased. Should there be no surviving issue (including grandchildren) of the man or woman who died, then once again the surviving spouse received half the estate and the heirs of the deceased, traced through the parents, the other half, even if the heirs were not resident in South Africa, or indeed not known.<sup>6</sup> Should only one of the parents survive, then one received half of the estate and the descendants of the other parent (who might, of course, be only half-siblings of the deceased) would divide the other half. Should both parents be dead, distribution would be made among siblings and half-siblings of the deceased, although in this case the latter would naturally receive a lesser share. To give a concrete example:

in an estate distributed in 1771 the deceased had left five whole brothers and sisters and one half-brother on his mother's side. The five whole brothers and sisters were first awarded one half of the estate and then they took their share with the half-brother in the other half of the estate.

In other words, they each received eleven sixtieths of the total, and the half-brother one twelfth.<sup>7</sup> Should the deceased's parents have no living descendants, then the process took place according to the same principle at the level of the grandparents, and so on.

These, then, were, and to a very large extent still are, the rules of inheritance for intestate succession according to the Roman-Dutch law of South Africa. They could be negated by the making of a will, but even then complete disinheritance (or, conversely, the concentration of the estate in one person's hands) was impossible, unless some offense against the parents, provable at law, had been committed. Rather, each individual had to receive no less than one third of the sum that would have been due had there been no will. This was termed the *legitimate portion*. It was abolished in Natal in 1863, and in the Cape in 1874, but in the Orange Free State in 1892 and, in the Transvaal, only in 1902.<sup>8</sup> It is my impression that, at least in the Cape, in the eighteenth century wills were not generally employed to benefit one member of the family over another. When they were made, their purpose was to assign particular pieces of property, such as a favorite slave, to a particular heir, not to get around the limitations of the succession laws or to move in the direction of unigeniture. Equally, in the nineteenth century the use of testamentary disposition to benefit one child over another was not general. The Commission on the Law of Inheritance reported in 1865 that, as a body, the landowners of the Cape Colony were so far from calling for greater freedom in the making of wills that they did not make use of the freedom that the law already allowed them.<sup>9</sup>


The other method whereby the effects of the law of inheritance could be

avoided was by the making of an ante-nuptial contract. In general, this ensured that the property each partner brought into a marriage, or inherited during it, would proceed to the heirs, and thus not in part to the spouse. (It also had beneficial effects in the case of bankruptcy.) Less frequently, property and income acquired during a marriage were kept separate. As a result, it was possible to ensure that the division of a husband's estate at the death of his wife (or theoretically vice versa, but in practice this will have occurred only rarely) could be entirely obviated. The possibilities inherent in this were rarely resorted to by the South African farming community, although in the nineteenth century the, largely, British merchants tended to make more use of this provision of the law.

The clearest consequence of this system of inheritance was that property was divided and redivided at regular intervals. In the first place, at the death of either the husband or the wife, a settlement had to be made with the children. If they were of age, they could demand their portion, which would be at least one sixth of the total value of the joint estate if a will had been made, and one half of the estate if one had not been made. This entailed either that the farm as a running concern would be sold, and the proceeds divided among the heirs, or that a valuation would be made of the estate with the heirs receiving their portions in cash. In the latter case, the survivor would in all probability be forced to take out a loan to pay off his or her children and step-children.

This practice would be strictly followed if there was a chance of a second marriage, as otherwise it was likely that the children of the first marriage would lose out to any born later. Indeed, the accounts of everyone with minor children who remarried had to be presented to the Orphan Chamber, a government body charged with protecting the rights of these minors. In practice, however, there seems to have been a difference depending on whether it was the husband or the wife who survived. A widower was sometimes able to ensure that the valuation of the estate's property was unrealistically low, generally with the consent of his children. The consequence was that a widower would often be able to maintain his farm as a working entity without increasing his debts to a crippling extent. A man might often be in debt to his children without their demanding payment, and this sum would then be charged against his estate at his death. No such consideration was shown to widows, at least to those with adult children. There are strong indications that many women were able to maintain control over the jointly-owned land, but that the movable property required to keep the farms running—stock, slaves, various forms of working capital—had to be sold to meet the demands of the heirs. She had to hope either that she would remarry, and that her second husband would have the capital to build the property up again, or, alternatively, that she could take out a mortgage whereby the farm could be brought back to a working footing.<sup>10</sup>

## The Developmental Spiral of the White Family and the Expansion of the Frontier<sup>1</sup>

 The historiography of the expansion of white settlers and pastoralists into the interior of South Africa has been dominated by the metaphor of the flood. Thus, in the *Oxford History*, we read:

Around 1730 thick forests beyond the Great Brak river diverted the eastward trek over the first coastal ranges . . . to spread along the Gamtoos and Sundays rivers to reach Camdeboo just before 1770. Here it joined the main northerly stream similarly diverted by about 1730 by aridity beyond the Oliphants-Doorn river junction into the interior plateaux (the Warm and Cold Bokkeveld) along the mountains skirting the great Karoo.<sup>2</sup>

While the process of expansion may have seemed like a flood to Khoisan who were its victims, such metaphors are of no help for the analysis of its actual dynamics. A human society, of course, is not an undifferentiated fluid mass, but rather more like a colony of amoeba, which grows by the continual fission of its constituent parts. In more prosaic terms, one needs to analyze the ways in which Afrikaner families split to establish new units of agricultural and pastoral production that could accommodate the massive population growth and, perhaps almost incidentally, vastly increase the area under white exploitation. And since some capital was required for even this activity, it is fruitful also to examine how property passed from generation to generation to provide the material basis for the development of new farms.<sup>3</sup>

Looking at these factors, it becomes obvious that three closely interrelated processes lie at the heart of settler expansion. First, there is the fast growth of the white population of the colony, which in the eighteenth century was doubling in approximately every generation. Thereafter, with the effects of British immigration, the rate of increase was even higher, so that the white population of the country in the 1870s was between fifteen and twenty times that of the 1790s, entailing a doubling in under twenty years.<sup>4</sup> Second was an increase in wealth, via conquest and internal economic growth, and, third, a recurring fission within particularly Afrikaner families. The first two factors are fairly well understood, but it should be noted that population growth was not exogenous, but only possible at the level achieved because the colony's

wealth prevented any famine-related mortality crises, and also because it was possible for large numbers of men and women to marry, raise children, and set up homes. Mortality was low and fertility relatively unrestrained by any constraints of economic dependence.

In this chapter, the emphasis is on family fission. I concentrate on describing the system of inheritance as it operated under the Roman-Dutch law of the Cape Colony, of major importance because it was through the transfer of property from one generation to the next that new family units of production and consumption came into being; and I analyze the *opgaaf* roll of 1749 in an attempt to show how legal principles were manifested in the social structure.

### The Law of Inheritance: Considered Formally

The law of intestate succession in colonial South Africa was based on the law of Holland, as it had been laid down by the charter of the Dutch East India Company, as renewed by the States General of the United Provinces, the Netherlands' sovereign body, on 10 January 1661. That law was, in its turn, the result of a compromise between various laws in use in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland. Presumably, since all the VOC's constituent chambers were in these two provinces, the differing practices of the rest of the Netherlands did not need to be taken into account. In particular, these aspects of the charter were based on the *plakkat* (decrees) of 25 January 1580 and 18 December 1599, and on an elucidation of the former *plakkaat* of 13 May 1594.<sup>5</sup>

That legal system was based on four relatively simple rules:

1. Complete community of property was established between husband and wife at marriage, but was not maintained after the death of either of the partners.
2. Descendants of the deceased took priority over ascendants.
3. Within any generation, there was complete equality of division, irrespective of age and sex.
4. Rights to an inheritance were maintained after the death of the inheritor, so that the portion he or she would have received was divided among his or her heirs. With regard to this rule, it should be noted that rule 1 took precedence, so that these rights could only be acquired by descent (or ascent), not by marriage.

These rules, it should be stressed, are my own abstraction of the principles behind the law of intestate succession in force throughout the possessions of the Dutch East India Company. Although the *Plakkat* themselves laid down the rights of succession at a considerably lower level of abstraction, I believe that, by the application of these principles, the actual practice in any given case of inheritance can be deduced.

What did these rules lead to in practice? In the most simple case, that of a widow or widower, the estate was divided equally among the children, both sons and daughters. Any surviving spouse received half of the joint estate by virtue of the community of property, the other half being distributed among the children of the deceased. Should there be no surviving issue (including grandchildren) of the man or woman who died, then once again the surviving spouse received half the estate and the heirs of the deceased, traced through the parents, the other half, even if the heirs were not resident in South Africa, or indeed not known.<sup>6</sup> Should only one of the parents survive, then one received half of the estate and the descendants of the other parent (who might, of course, be only half-siblings of the deceased) would divide the other half. Should both parents be dead, distribution would be made among siblings and half-siblings of the deceased, although in this case the latter would naturally receive a lesser share. To give a concrete example:

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In other words, they each received eleven sixtieths of the total, and the half-brother one twelfth.<sup>7</sup> Should the deceased's parents have no living descendants, then the process took place according to the same principle at the level of the grandparents, and so on.

These, then, were, and to a very large extent still are, the rules of inheritance for intestate succession according to the Roman-Dutch law of South Africa. They could be negated by the making of a will, but even then complete disinheritance (or, conversely, the concentration of the estate in one person's hands) was impossible, unless some offense against the parents, provable at law, had been committed. Rather, each individual had to receive no less than one third of the sum that would have been due had there been no will. This was termed the legitimate portion. It was abolished in Natal in 1863, and in the Cape in 1874, but in the Orange Free State in 1892 and, in the Transvaal, only in 1902.<sup>8</sup> It is my impression that, at least in the Cape, in the eighteenth century wills were not generally employed to benefit one member of the family over another. When they were made, their purpose was to assign particular pieces of property, such as a favorite slave, to a particular heir, not to get around the limitations of the succession laws or to move in the direction of unigeniture. Equally, in the nineteenth century the use of testamentary disposition to benefit one child over another was not general. The Commission on the Law of Inheritance reported in 1865 that, as a body, the landowners of the Cape Colony were so far from calling for greater freedom in the making of wills that they did not make use of the freedom that the law already allowed them.<sup>9</sup>

The other method whereby the effects of the law of inheritance could be

avoided was by the making of an ante-nuptial contract. In general, this ensured that the property each partner brought into a marriage, or inherited during it, would proceed to the heirs, and thus not in part to the spouse. (It also had beneficial effects in the case of bankruptcy.) Less frequently, property and income acquired during a marriage were kept separate. As a result, it was possible to ensure that the division of a husband's estate at the death of his wife (or theoretically vice versa, but in practice this will have occurred only rarely) could be entirely obviated. The possibilities inherent in this were rarely resorted to by the South African farming community, although in the nineteenth century the, largely, British merchants tended to make more use of this provision of the law.

The clearest consequence of this system of inheritance was that property was divided and redivided at regular intervals. In the first place, at the death of either the husband or the wife, a settlement had to be made with the children. If they were of age, they could demand their portion, which would be at least one sixth of the total value of the joint estate if a will had been made, and one half of the estate if one had not been made. This entailed either that the farm as a running concern would be sold, and the proceeds divided among the heirs, or that a valuation would be made of the estate with the heirs receiving their portions in cash. In the latter case, the survivor would in all probability be forced to take out a loan to pay off his or her children and step-children.

This practice would be strictly followed if there was a chance of a second marriage, as otherwise it was likely that the children of the first marriage would lose out to any born later. Indeed, the accounts of everyone with minor children who remarried had to be presented to the Orphan Chamber, a government body charged with protecting the rights of these minors. In practice, however, there seems to have been a difference depending on whether it was the husband or the wife who survived. A widower was sometimes able to ensure that the valuation of the estate's property was unrealistically low, generally with the consent of his children. The consequence was that a widower would often be able to maintain his farm as a working entity without increasing his debts to a crippling extent. A man might often be in debt to his children without their demanding payment, and this sum would then be charged against his estate at his death. No such consideration was shown to widows, at least to those with adult children. There are strong indications that many women were able to maintain control over the jointly-owned land, but that the movable property required to keep the farms running—stock, slaves, various forms of working capital—had to be sold to meet the demands of the heirs. She had to hope either that she would remarry, and that her second husband would have the capital to build the property up again, or, alternatively, that she could take out a mortgage whereby the farm could be brought back to a working footing.<sup>10</sup>

one of the heirs, it is now reoccupied, either with funds inadequate to its full cultivation, or upon capital borrowed at the rate of six, or perhaps eight, per cent interest; which presses as a dead weight upon the new possessor, probably, for half his lifetime. The rest of the sons either purchase farms on credit, and enter upon them in the same embarrassed state; or, if they cannot effect this, they migrate to the frontier districts, and become graziers.

To Thompson, this continual dispersal of aggregated capital could only have deleterious effects on "the means of improvement, and the progress of society."<sup>21</sup> Elsewhere, the heavy debt burden imposed on peasants by introduction of a partible system of inheritance was a major cause for protest, as, for instance, in the anti-Semitic movements of nineteenth-century Germany and Austria.<sup>22</sup> But this was not the case in South Africa, where the attachment to the ground, built up from generation to generation, was never so great that impossible levels of indebtedness were assumed. Rather, farmers could move elsewhere.

It is perhaps useful to consider the alternative, a rigorous system of uni-geniture, not an entirely hypothetical possibility, since in the nineteenth century British settlers did agitate for a system of primogeniture.<sup>23</sup> Under such a system, one child, generally the eldest son, could maintain himself as his father had done, but his brothers would not be able to find the capital to begin on their own,<sup>24</sup> and in consequence they would have to find employment with other farmers, or as craftsmen. The results of such a system in the Cape Colony would have been a general intensification of economic life, an increased density of white population, and a considerably more pronounced degree of economic stratification within the white community.<sup>25</sup>

### The Timing of Independence

An inheritance system, of course, by definition, regulates the transfer of property from the recently dead to the still living. It is possible for property to be transferred during the lifetime of the parents, or for future inheritors to be able to build up working capital with only marginal help from their seniors. At the Cape, though, such strategies were not employed as often as might be expected. While the custom was followed of giving children a few cows or sheep at birth, which would then become the mothers of a new herd, in general independence was linked to the cycle of the family as a whole, not, for example, to the age of the men and women concerned. On the other hand, within certain limits it was possible for men to marry on the basis of the expectation of an inheritance before they actually received it, although those men whose fathers had died were likely to marry at a somewhat younger age than those whose fathers were still alive.

If we examine the 1749 *opgaaf*, in combination with the genealogies published by C. C. de Villiers and C. Pama,<sup>26</sup> and if we then trace a single family, the Du Toits, through the eighteenth century, the reasons for this view will

become clear. The *opgaaf* of 1749 represents the situation during the first main phase of colonial expansion into the Cape interior. Between 1746 and 1770, it is estimated, the number of stockholders in the colony increased from 223 to 600, while the land available increased tenfold.<sup>27</sup> Admittedly much, but by no means all, of this land was semi-desert Karoo, but even elsewhere there was enough and to spare. It was a time of relative quiescence in the long struggle between the colonists and the Khoisan. On the southern plains the Hessequa and Inqua chieftainships seem to have disintegrated in the first third of the century, and their subjects to have become farm laborers,<sup>28</sup> while along the northern escarpment, from the Hantam to the Nieuwveld, there seems to have been an intermission of relative peace.<sup>29</sup> The colonists had not yet begun to threaten the San of the Sneeuwberg or the Khoikhoi of the Sundays River valley, who were to prove their most formidable opponents.

In 1749, the free population of the Cape (excluding those in the service of the VOC) was listed at 4,662, of whom 2,190 were considered adults, 1,318 of them men and 872 women, and 2,472 juveniles, with slightly more girls than boys. Among them they possessed 5,136 slaves, of whom 3,470 were adult males. In June of that year, 1,067 men were in the service of the company, and 83 other men out on contract from the company. The company also owned about 700 slaves. There were also an unknown number of assimilated Khoikhoi and half-castes, both of which groups were known as "bastards" and not taxed, unlike the 314 free blacks living in Cape Town.<sup>30</sup>

Perhaps a quarter of the entire free population lived in Cape Town. The rest of that population was entirely rural; even in Stellenbosch most of the inhabitants were farmers, artisans, merchants, or wine sellers. Four hundred seventy-two held substantial agricultural property, of whom 285 grew either grain or grapes (or both); 187 held only stock. The former were all within 70 or 80 miles of Cape Town, since the problems of bulk transport limited the effective area for cultivating cash crops to the area between the sea and the passes over the Cape's mountain ranges. Thus the districts of the Cape and Stellenbosch were almost entirely grain or grape growing, and Swellendam purely pastoral, while Drakenstein district was mixed.<sup>31</sup>

Even in the country, between 10 and 20 percent of the adult males were immigrants, while hardly any of the women were. The sex ratio was thus highly unbalanced. For every 100 adult women, there were, in the Cape District, 144 men, in Stellenbosch 181, in Drakenstein 158, and in Swellendam 196. This was despite the fact that a certain number of free black women had "passed" into the "white" population.<sup>32</sup> In consequence, there was a certain amount of economic selection (in the social Darwinian sense of the term), ensuring that poor men did not marry. In Table 6.1, the distribution of those named in the list of 1749 is set out, by marital status, district, and economic position. As can be seen, the agricultural district of Stellenbosch contained substantially more married men without farms than did Swellendam,<sup>33</sup> while the mixed district of Drakenstein occupied an intermediate position. This had,

TABLE 6.1  
*Afrikaners Doing Opgaaf, by Marital Status,  
 District, and Possession of Agricultural Property*

	Stellenbosch		Drakenstein		Swellendam	
	With	Without	With	Without	With	Without
Married men and widowers	56	37	159	51	79*	10
Men marrying after 1749	4	33	8	80	10	37
Men never marrying	3	15	11	25	7	6
Widows	11	2	30	2	4	0

SOURCE: De Villiers and Pama, *Geslagsregisters*, and *opgaaf* roll for 1749.

\*Includes one man who had been living with a woman for many years, but never legally married her.

NOTE: This table excludes some 63 men who were not currently married but could not be traced in De Villiers and Pama, and whose past and future marital history was consequently not known. In general, few of them will have ever married.

however, not led to any difference in the mean age at first marriage for men—calculated for those living in Stellenbosch in 1749 the mean age was 26 years and 11 months (the median, 26 years and 6 months), while for Swellendam the comparable figures were 27 years exactly and 26 years and 8 months. Clearly, there is no significant difference between these figures, although the Stellenbosch distribution had a much less pronounced central tendency. In Stellenbosch, 8.5 percent of men married under the age of 20, which no Swellendammer did, while, at the other extreme, 17 percent of those in Stellenbosch who did marry did not do so for the first time until they were 35 or over, as opposed to 9.5 percent for Swellendam. It can be seen that the marriage patterns in the stock raising district were considerably more homogeneous than in the agricultural one, a fact which seems to have been related to the degree of internal stratification within the white communities of the two areas.

The difference in the extent of stratification becomes even more apparent when the groups presumed to be co-resident are examined.<sup>34</sup> In 1749 there were 93 of these in the 3 rural districts, containing in all 270 of those who did *opgaaf*, or 35 percent. There was no significant difference in proportions among the various districts. When their structure is examined, it is found that 50 percent were fathers and their sons, 26 percent groups of brothers, and 16 percent widows and their sons (the remaining 8 percent were rather more complicated than these clear groups). Once again, the proportions in the various districts did not differ significantly.

The difference among the districts does become clear when attention is paid to men without either a farm, or kin with whom they may be assumed to have been living. These men must, in most cases, have been employees of some more wealthy farmer. Now, since a sheep run required fewer men to act as overseers, and so on, than did a wine or grain farm, it might be expected that there would have been fewer people without substantial agricultural property

in the purely pastoral district of Swellendam than in the agricultural district of Stellenbosch. This prediction would be strengthened by the fact that a sheep flock might be divided and a portion given to a son to enable him to start up on his own, while this would not be possible with a vineyard or cornfield. This is indeed the case. Whereas 54 percent (98 out of 182) of those listed for the district of Swellendam had substantial agricultural property, only 36 percent (66 out of 180) of those in the district of Stellenbosch did so.<sup>35</sup>

This conclusion is strengthened when the residential groups are divided between those in which one or more members possessed substantial agricultural property and those in which none did. It can then be seen that in 9 cases out of the total of 93 each member had property, while in 13 none did. In the remaining 71 cases (76 percent), at least one member of the group had property, but not all did. It is noteworthy that the completely propertyless groups were most frequent in Stellenbosch, where they formed 30 percent of the total number (7 out of 23). On the frontier the family to a rather larger degree cared for those without farms—perhaps because it was more certain that in a later stage of their life they would acquire one. Thus, 35 percent of those in Swellendam who were in this unenviable position were able to find succor with a member of their kin; the comparable figure for Stellenbosch was only 18 percent. In this case, Drakenstein rivaled Swellendam. This means that groupings of adults were larger in the pastoral districts—they averaged 3.2 persons doing *opgaaf* in Swellendam and only 2.3 in Stellenbosch, with Drakenstein occupying an intermediate position.<sup>36</sup>

Within this context the process of fission within families can be seen. As yet there are not enough data to distinguish between the frontier and the southwest, but the 93 co-residential groups in 1749 demonstrate different stages in the same cycle and so give an idea of the way in which things happened. They show that whenever one member of the family group possessed substantial property so, except in one case, did the father. (It is notable that this one case was that of Gerrit Romond, who, at the age of at least 67, was the oldest of the non-immigrants. There was not yet any substantial group of elderly men who might have reached the age of retirement, at least in the more recently settled country districts.) On the other hand, the converse was not true. In a certain number of cases the sons possessed property as well as the father, but in only 15 percent of cases (6 out of 41) in which the father had a farm was one or more of his presumably co-resident sons also economically independent. In this case, where the families were living, or whether they possessed wheat, wine, or stock farms, does not seem to have made any difference. What is more, the vast majority of men who had farms and sons of the right age had at least one son still living with them. In total, there were 23 men who had been married before 1730 who did not have co-resident kin, but only 5 of these had sons who were born before 1730 and were still alive, all apparently living away. Moreover, in three of these cases there were other, late teenage, sons who presumably could have done much of the work that was

TABLE 6.2  
*Places of Residence of Those Afrikaner Men Whose Fathers Were Still Alive and  
 Living in One of the Three Rural Districts in 1749*

District of father's residence	Son residing with father	Son residing elsewhere		
		Stellenbosch	Drakenstein	Swellendam
Stellenbosch	17	7	3	4
Drakenstein	60	1	9	0
Swellendam	22	1	0	5

SOURCE: De Villiers and Pama, *Geslagsregisters*, and *opgaaf* roll for 1749.

necessary. Although it was clearly possible for a man to run a farm on his own, or rather with the help of his wife, their hired servants, and such slaves as they possessed, when there were sons of a suitable age, at least some remained to help work the land and herd the flocks.

As was shown above, bachelors were much less likely to possess farms than married men. In itself this is not so surprising, for clearly as a man grew older he was more likely both to have gotten married and to have come into possession of a farm. Nevertheless, it is possible to control for such factors by comparing the chances of marriage among those within a single age group who still lived with their fathers or their widowed mothers, and those who did not. It can be predicted that those whose fathers were still alive would be substantially less likely to be married, because they were less likely to be independent and to possess their own farm. This was, indeed, the case, although, because of the size of the various samples, it can only be demonstrated for the age group 25–29, which was, anyway, that in which the mean age at marriage fell. Of the men in this age group who were not living with either parent—almost always because their father was dead—59 percent (44 out of 79) were married, in contrast with only 18 percent (4 out of 22) who were still in the parental household.

What is clear is that only after the death of the father did fission in the family tend to occur, at least outside the agricultural southwest. Of those men whose fathers were alive and living in one of the three rural districts, 77 percent were still with them (see Table 6.2) However, taking just the Stellenbosch district, only 55 percent were still with their fathers, as opposed to 84 percent in the other two districts. The importance of the father's death in initiating the process of fission is emphasized by the fact that 30 (59 percent) of those men whose mothers were alive but widowed had moved away from them. On the other hand, these women were rarely completely alone; only 7 of the 31 women who had male adult offspring did not have at least one living with them, although in some cases just a teenager.

Thus, the provisions of the law notwithstanding, widows seem to have been under much greater pressure to deliver up an inheritance to their children than were widowers. In part, this stems from the fact that the age gap between a

mother and her sons was, on average, less than that between a father and his sons, because of the lower age of women at marriage. Sons would have reached the age at which they demanded to leave home and set up for themselves more often during their mother's lifetime than during their father's. But the differing practice depending on the sex of the deceased parent is quite clear since few sons came into substantial property before their father's death. In six cases out of the seven recorded in the 1749 *opgaaf* where this was the case, the mother of the propertied son was still alive, so that his property cannot have been acquired by inheritance from her.

The evidence only partially suggests that the early Boer households were what was later designated as "patriarchal."<sup>37</sup> Clearly, a man whose father died when both were young had a much greater chance of achieving economic independence early than one whose father lived into his own old and his son's middle age. On the other hand, parental pressure could only keep a man at home for a limited period. By the time a man was about thirty, or perhaps a little younger, he would be likely to be married, and would probably have escaped from parental control, even if his father was still alive. The longer a district had been settled, the higher the proportion of families to reach this stage. The clear differences that emerge between Stellenbosch and the more recently settled frontier districts in 1749 thus represent the differing stages the two areas had reached in their development. Regions, as well as families, had to grow to maturity, and, by 1749, Swellendam and Drakenstein had not yet done so.

These processes may, of course, be investigated by another route, by following the vicissitudes of a single family over a long period of time. The family I have chosen for this exercise, the Du Toits, was selected purely for reasons of convenience, although it does, I think, illustrate the points I have been making.

The first Du Toit to come to South Africa, François, the *stamvader* as the Afrikaner genealogists call him, arrived in 1689 from French Flanders, perhaps as a Huguenot refugee. He settled in Dal Josaphat, in the district of Drakenstein, where he became a leader of the local community and served for a long time as *heemraad*. None of his male descendants had moved out of the—very extensive—district before 1773. He had four sons (Andries, Pieter, Stephanus, and François), all born in the 1690s. By 1727, when the *stamvader* was an old man, they had all married and all except one had left home. It is significant that Stephanus, the one who remained at home, was the last to marry, although he was not the youngest, and it is perhaps somewhat surprising that, when the old man died a little later on, it was the eldest son, Andries, not the one who had remained at home, who came into possession of the major portion of the family's wealth, the vineyard. However, all four brothers were noticeably richer after their father's death than they had been before.

After 1743, the various families' histories were affected by the chances of

mortality and, to a lesser extent, of birth. Thus it was not Andries but Pieter, the next-to-eldest, who lived on into his seventies and maintained his substantial family about him, although his sons assembled a certain amount of property themselves before his death—albeit only stock, not a vineyard like that which their father had been able to purchase. At the family's height in 1764, when Pieter was sixty-seven and his sons between forty-seven and twenty-five, it consisted of the old man, his six married sons, all with property in sheep, one of his sons-in-law, and one grandson-in-law, neither of whom had any sheep or cattle. Two of his adult grandsons had left home and were living together. However, after both married during the next year, both returned to the main Du Toit family, for they were there in 1769, just after the old man's death. At this stage—precisely how long after his death is not known—the family was still together, and the major portion of the property was still in the widow's hands, but by 1773 the family had completely split even though the widow was still alive if elderly (seventy-eight) and, by now, a propertyless dependent on one of her sons. It may be significant that Pieter's grandsons seem to have been prepared to leave their fathers earlier than his own sons had left him, perhaps a matter of "force of personality" or perhaps related to the general development of the district.

None of the other families was nearly so long lasting. Andries, the eldest of the four brothers, died in the late 1740s, and his sons all seem to have moved away from their mother as they grew to maturity, although she was never left on her own, and she maintained control of the original family property into her old age. On the other hand, the children of François, the youngest and, as it happened, the poorest of the four, remained with their mother after their father's death.

The fourth of the brothers, Stephanus, was clearly in a somewhat difficult position, and he provides a good example of how family farms coped with their labor requirements. As chance would have it, six daughters grew to maturity before the first son. It is, therefore, not surprising that his sons-in-law tended to live with him for a while after their marriage. This was generally not the practice, but, in his case, there were clearly not sufficient male descendants to provide young, adult, white farm help, so affinal kin were brought in. Once Stephanus's eldest son had reached maturity, the in-laws moved away and this son lived and, no doubt, worked with his father.

In the details of their arrangements, the Du Toits differed one from the other, as indeed they no doubt differed from those of other farming families. Nevertheless, they illustrate the sort of strategies which were employed to ensure family survival, and also the limits within which such strategies had to be set. Thus they exemplify the processes of white territorial expansion.

For P. J. van der Merwe, whose superb books were based on writings of people outside the farming community, whether European travelers or company officials, virtually all farmers' sons were able to acquire what they needed

to set up as independent farmers, either by working as a *knecht* (hired servant) for another farmer or, more frequently, by the natural increase of the few cattle and sheep they had received at birth.<sup>38</sup> As might be expected from someone writing in the late 1930s, van der Merwe did not proceed to test the statements of his literary sources against the statistical records of the *opgaaf* rolls. When this testing is done, it can be shown that full independence generally waited until the death of a man's father; thereafter, all the sons would have enough to begin by themselves, though, initially, not at the level their father had enjoyed.

But the point is that these new starts were possible. Leonard Guelke has commented that the farmers on the frontier of the Cape Colony were there because they were relatively poor, because they did not possess the capital to acquire and work one of the wine or wheat farms of the southwest Cape, and not, as Neumark argued, because in stock farming they could achieve the best returns for their capital. Guelke is certainly correct in this, but, as he recognizes, there is a converse side to his argument.<sup>39</sup> Relatively poor they may have been, destitute and entirely without capital they certainly were not. As a result, the increased white population of the Cape Colony produced networks of settlement ever more extended in space, and only marginally more finely meshed. The expansion of territory was possible because of the relative strengths of the autochthonous inhabitants and the invaders and because the cycles of white families made such an expansion, in the form it took, attractive.



∞ PART FOUR

# The Rule by Law

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## The Rule of Law in the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century

As is the case for all societies, the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope was governed by a legal system, by what might in the loose sense of the term be called a rule of law. This can be seen from the immense volume of surviving legal archives—the records of the criminal court cases for a single year can easily run to more than a thousand pages of manuscript, and the deposits of civil cases are even more voluminous<sup>1</sup>—and the large number of *plakkaten* (decrees) issued by the Cape's government in the eighteenth century.<sup>2</sup> The Roman-Dutch law of the Republic of the Netherlands, as selected and amended first to suit the requirements of an eastern trading empire and then of the port and colony of the Cape, was used to settle disputes and to maintain public order and the rights of property. The code of law by which the Cape was governed was based on a system to which more concentrated legal thought had been given, at a higher theoretical level, than any other in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To be sure, there were no jurists of any standing whatsoever at the Cape at the time. Most of the members of the Court of Justice had no legal training at all. Nevertheless, the codifications and textbooks they used were among the finest products of the greatest period of Dutch intellectual history. It is doubtful if the “modernity” of the legal system of any other country would compare favorably with that of the Netherlands in the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, like every slave society, like every European country at the time,<sup>3</sup> perhaps like every society everywhere, *de facto*, the Cape was not governed by the rule of law in the narrowest sense of the word. The law was certainly not imposed “uniformly” or “fully impartially,” with the result that the “severity of the sentences depended . . . largely on the legal status of the offender or the person offended against.”<sup>4</sup> It would be anachronistic to expect anything else, and the Dutch authorities admitted as much openly and without shame. When, after the British capture of the Cape in 1795, the Court of Justice was informed that slaves would merely be hanged or beheaded, and no longer subjected to prolonged forms of the death penalty, as under the Dutch East India Company, it replied as follows:

With regard to slaves . . . the equality of punishment ceases when they commit offences against Europeans or free persons, particularly their masters; but this distinction is not peculiar to this country; on the contrary it is grounded upon analogy with the criminal law, according to which the distinction of persons is one of the essential points by which the degree of punishment is measured in most civilised nations, and this distinction is especially founded upon the Imperial laws or the Roman law, which from its exactness is not only acknowledged as the law when all other laws are silent, but is particularly recommended as such in the statutes which have been issued in the Dutch Indies relative to slaves, and are observed here.<sup>5</sup>

To a modern western liberal, for whom equality, above all before the law, is a cardinal necessity for just government, these words may be anathema. Nevertheless, the general acceptance of liberal views by Europeans came only after the French Revolution, which was at its height when these words were written, though its effects had only reached South Africa in the form of a conquering English fleet, not as an ideology. Before that time, the principles were different; the ruling ethos of European society was not equality but hierarchy, and the task of the courts of law, among others, was to maintain this necessary subordination of underlings and superiority of masters. The British, it should be noted, did not object to differential sentencing, but only to the barbarity of breaking slaves alive on a cross. Given the way in which the courts were used by the British ruling class to enforce deference, the new rulers of the Cape could hardly object to the way in which the Dutch had used the law to maintain distinctions of status between master and slave.

Because the law was used to maintain the social structure of the Cape Colony, even if often in a violent and brutal way, the slave population was not completely without legal rights. Although the effect their Indonesian experience had in forming Dutch attitudes to such matters must not be ignored, what position the Cape slaves possessed was due largely to the conflict between the VOC and the burghers or free inhabitants of the colony. This conflict was always latent and occasionally explicit.<sup>6</sup> It was based on the opposition inherent in the fact that the company was at once government and consumer, and the burghers at once producers and subjects, while local company officials were also afraid that burghers would report their (illegal) private trading to the company directors in the Netherlands. This conflict came into focus in the law courts, and in particular in the issue of the legal status of slaves, just because this was one arena in which the authority of the company was imposed on the burghers. The presence of two members of the Burgher Council on the court (except when employees of the company were on trial) did little to mitigate the control of company officials over administration of justice. No separation of powers among judiciary, legislature, and administration existed at the Cape. All were concentrated in a very few hands.

As a class, then, the main body of slaveowners at the Cape was remarkably powerless, as opposed to most other European colonies that relied on slave labor, where large planters had, at the least, great influence over the conduct of government. This affected Cape slaves in two ways. On the one hand, al-

though the company itself owned some six hundred slaves throughout the eighteenth century and its high officials (who held the high government offices) had numerous personal slaves, there is some evidence of preferential treatment of its own slaves. Because the economic competition offered by the burghers represented a threat to the company's hegemony, its officials seemed ready to inflict harsh punishments on the slaves of private citizens and risk damaging this competing labor force, in the name of the public good, so in this sense most (but not all) slaves fared ill under company rule. On the other hand, and for the same reasons, the majority of slaveowners failed to attain control of the principal institutions of Cape legislation and justice and so the legal position of slaves was actually strengthened, relatively speaking. Thus, for as long as the company maintained its hegemony over the colony, the balance of power gave the slaves (and the Khoi)<sup>7</sup> a certain bargaining power that they lost, I would argue, with the collapse of the company at the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>8</sup>

This strengthened legal position is most evident in the opportunities slaves had to make legal complaints against their owners and to give evidence against them. It does not seem that the Court of Justice treated the evidence of a slave as any more or less trustworthy than that of a white, even including the master. This remarkable competence seems to have been brought to the Cape, like so much else relating to legal organization, from Batavia. In the original *Statuten van India* of 1642, it was laid down that "whenever they have been treated mercilessly by their masters or mistresses, slaves are allowed to complain to the judge, provided they have good and cogent reasons, otherwise [they] will be flogged and sent back home."<sup>9</sup> At the Cape, and very likely further east as well, this rule was interpreted widely. Slaves might not only complain of their own treatment but also might report the harsh punishment meted out to their fellow bondsmen. The largest proportion of cases instigated by slaves against their masters resulted from a master having brought about the death of one of his slaves, generally as a result of overpunishment.<sup>10</sup> A typical case occurred in 1732, when Jan Crugel, a farmer from the Joostenberg in Stellenbosch district, was accused of flogging his slave Maarten so severely that he died. The only witness to the event—at least the only ones who were prepared to talk—were Maarten's fellow slaves. They testified that, some time previously, Maarten had run away, only to be captured two or three days later by a shepherd. Crugel had ordered him to spend the night chained to a wagon and then had him tied in a *poolse bok* (a form of rack) and flogged with a *sjambok*, the hippopotamus-hide whip that has remained the symbol of white dominance in South Africa. After this treatment he ran away again, was caught again two days later, was thrown onto the threshing floor of the farm and flogged once more. This time the punishment proved too severe and he died a short time later. His fellow slaves did not complain immediately: it took them a while to pluck up the courage to visit the *landdrost* (magistrate) of Stellenbosch. As a result, by the time the surgeon came to investigate the cause of the death, he

could only state that the medical evidence seemed to confirm the testimony of the slaves. Crugel was convicted and fined a hundred rixdollars, and the court ordered that those slaves who had given evidence against him be sold out of his possession, or that of any of his family.<sup>11</sup>

In many ways, this case was a classic example of Cape justice working, somewhat belatedly, for the protection of the slave population. The central government reserved the right of punishment, even of slaves, to itself, at least when ordinary domestic chastisement was not deemed sufficient. The procedure seems to have been quite regular and the sum paid in fines by a convicted master was constant (and low, a quarter of that demanded of those who broke the liquor laws). It was not necessary for the slave to die for the same laws to be brought into operation. For instance, in 1768, Pieter Casper Hammes was fined the ordinary amount of a hundred rixdollars for knocking out his slave, September van Bougis, with an iron hammer. September had been doing bad work in the forge Hammes ran, and answering him back, annoying him so much, according to Hammes, that he smacked the hammer he was using into the back of September's head. Rather surprisingly, September survived and, when he came to, complained to the *fiscaal*.<sup>12</sup> Beyond these occasional bursts of temper, which might nevertheless have disastrous consequences for the slaves, really persistent assaults on slaves could be punished more severely. In 1767 Jan Henrick Gerhard was banned from the Cape Colony for life for repeated violence towards his slaves.<sup>13</sup> This seems to have been an isolated case, which shows the limit beyond which the Court of Justice would not go in disciplining the more unruly members of the white population. Judicially, the killing of a slave by a free man was always "mishandling" and excessive punishment, never murder. A master might fear financial consequences from laying into his slaves too hard, but certainly never capital punishment.

In view of the leniency with which assaults on slaves were generally treated by the Cape Court of Justice, it might be argued that the Court gave slaves no effective protection against their masters. To a certain extent this is true. The fear of punishment can never have been a deterrent to the actions of the slaveholders, though the shame of the court action may conceivably have been.<sup>14</sup> The principal advantage slaves gained from the law derived from the fact that those slaves who witnessed against their masters (including all those who had been the victims of assaults) had to be sold to another, hopefully more humane, owner, if their charges were deemed not to have been malicious. Clearly this could be a real advantage, and thus access to the law, which is what the right to testify entailed, was a real privilege. It is instructive to compare (just for once) the Cape with the antebellum American south in this respect. In the U.S., opposition to the possibility of a black's giving evidence against a white was so great that, to quote Eugene Genovese, "In Louisiana in 1840 the ultimate irony occurred, when a white man who had incited slaves

to insurrection had to be acquitted because their confessions could not be used against him."<sup>15</sup>

Even the Spanish law code of the late middle ages, renowned as recognizing the personality of the bondsman, only allowed the slave to accuse his master of specific, serious offenses, such as treason or murdering his wife.<sup>16</sup> This contrasts greatly with the calm assurance of the Cape *fiscaal* when he was asked if it was normal for slaves to make complaints against their masters, and if they had the competence to do so. Daniel van de Hengel claimed that:

This had happened many times, and no-one was unaware that slaves are often ill-treated by their masters, in which case they are just as much entitled to complain as are their masters in the opposite case. As that is the position here, he has nothing more to say in the matter.<sup>17</sup>

Two years earlier, in fact, the *fiscaal* had argued that if the testimony of slaves and Khoisan was not accepted against "so-called Christian believers, then in the interior of the country away from the Cape the law would not be able to operate."<sup>18</sup> Clearly, for the company to keep control over its unruly, unprofitable, and thinly settled colony, it needed all the help it could get, even when that help came from slaves.

In general, control was exercised against the slaves. While the need to maintain control over the colony might on occasion lead to the company's allying itself with individual slaves against their owners, in general the interests of the VOC, and thus of the members of the Court of Justice, tended to coincide with those of owners. After all, it was the slaveowners who were responsible for producing the goods on which the company relied to provision its ships, even if the actual labor was mainly slave. In addition, all social, religious, and national ties linked the company officials, who were, after all, usually slaveholders themselves, to at least the more substantial of the burghers. Moreover, the only real threat to the colony could come from slaves. The burghers might from time to time complain about the commercial policy that deprived them of business opportunities, but they would never engage in any serious attempt to overthrow the rule of the VOC. Nor, except for the frequent disturbances and stabbings outside Cape Town's pubs—which were, in any case, generally the doing of sailors—did whites tend to disturb the peace of the colony.<sup>19</sup> The primary trouble they caused the Court of Justice came from infringements against the various economic regulations the company had decided to impose. Of these, the limitations on the sale of alcoholic beverages, above all wine and brandy, were the most notable. With the slaves, it must be admitted that there was never any suggestion of a slave revolt with sufficient momentum to challenge the bases of white power. Only for a few years in the late 1730s was there even a suggestion of panic, especially after a group of runaways had nearly succeeded in their attempt to burn Cape Town to the ground.<sup>20</sup> Rather it was only at the level of the individual farm and household that slaves would present a constant danger to their masters.

all such punishments were carried out in public, generally at a regular spot, although those said to have looted wrecked ships were hanged summarily on the beach. Moreover, so that everyone would have a constant reminder of the consequences, the corpse of the executed would be left, as the formula had it, "until the birds and the wind destroy it." Thus the execution ground, on the edge of Cape Town, approximately where the central railway station now stands, was adorned with rotting bodies.

As a back-up to the vicious system of punishments, torture was employed to extract confessions. This was thought necessary because the Roman-Dutch law insisted that anyone who was to be executed should first admit his or her guilt. This treatment was not reserved for slaves, but might also be imposed on free men, especially sailors. Relatively few suspects were actually sent to the torture chamber, and once there the sight of the instruments was frequently enough to produce the required statement. Nevertheless, the degree to which the entire system was based on the knowledge among the population that torture would be used to extract confessions can be seen from the adjustment in the rules of court procedure that the British were forced to introduce after they conquered the Cape in 1795. Because they considered torture to be inhuman, they abolished its use, but soon found that about half the convicted murderers were not being executed, knowing that this could not be done without a confession, and therefore that they only had to remain resolute under questioning for the court to be forced merely to sentence them to prison. Since this did not seem to the British authorities to meet the requirements of justice, they had to alter the conditions for conviction and execution, so that it was no longer necessary for the culprit to confess. The customary rules of judicial proof had to be considered sufficient.<sup>29</sup>

The efficiency of the judicial terror with which the government attempted to control the colony and to maintain the social order depended on the quality of its police and detective work. This was notably poor. In Cape Town, the *caffers* and the *burgerwagt*, a sort of police militia,<sup>30</sup> patrolled the streets, but their chance of catching criminals in the act must have been slight. When crimes were committed within a household there must have been a reasonable chance of identifying the guilty party, but more organized theft, for example, can only have been detected by tracing the stolen goods, apparently a fairly rare occurrence, especially since the Chinese community usually acted as the receivers and was particularly difficult to penetrate.<sup>31</sup> In addition, sailors on the numerous ships were always available to take goods out of the country. However, in the absence of statistical data on the number of crimes committed, it is impossible to give any indication of just how unsuccessful the authorities were in apprehending criminals.

In the countryside, although some crimes were the work of slaves who remained with their masters,<sup>32</sup> the most serious problem came from slaves who ran away. To counteract this, burghers had to rely on their own strength, since company forces rarely penetrated across the Cape flats. Thus the commando

system, which was a militia force also used against the Khoisan, was employed, above all, against large groups. It was not particularly successful. At the end of the century, H. Lichtenstein wrote that, in the mountains between modern Wolseley and Ceres:

A thousand places of concealment offer the wished for asylums to slaves deserting [the farmers'] service and bands of these robbers not infrequently take advantage of the favourable nature of the spot to harbour in it for a long time together, living on the plunder of the neighbouring flocks and herds, gardens and fields. From time immemorial, this mountain had never been free from marauders, notwithstanding that parties have frequently been sent against them, and numbers have been brought to justice. Some half-instructed travellers have confounded these people with the Bosjesmans; but they have no relation whatever with them.<sup>33</sup> They are much less addicted to murder; but they are not so easily taken, on account of the firearms which they have for defending themselves.<sup>34</sup>

Clearly, then, the law could not be imposed on all criminals—as the courts defined them—but then no society in the world has ever had a police system of that efficiency. Given the vast distances in the countryside and the nature of the society in the port city of Cape Town, the authorities probably were less effective than they would have been in contemporary Europe. Certainly, they had few funds at their disposal, and their net of agents was thinly spread. However, no system of government has ever been able to apprehend all those it wished to question, let alone to know who committed every crime that comes to their attention. There have always been differences in the degree to which they could penetrate the various strata of the societies they claim to rule, while the personal power and social status of the offender have invariably tended to influence the attitudes of sentencing bodies. The failings of the legal system at the Cape of Good Hope were neither unique nor even particularly extreme. Even the severe punishments were employed in the Netherlands. The legal system's task was to maintain the preeminence of the VOC within a general system of social stratification. Too many of the inhabitants of the Cape had all too good cause to regret its success in achieving these ends.

## The Changing Legal Position of the Khoisan in the Cape Colony, 1652–1795

One of the principal themes of history of the Cape Colony during the rule of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) is the slow breaking of the independence of the indigenous peoples of the Cape, the Khoisan.<sup>1</sup> This process consisted of two distinct operations. On the one hand, the Dutch fought a long guerrilla war with cattle raiders, generally known as “*bosjesmans-hottentots*,” interspersed with periods when they were content to pay what amounted to protection money, or rather protection sheep and cattle.<sup>2</sup> On the other, those Khoisan who owned cattle were slowly stripped of their property and forced to become either raiders or agricultural laborers and shepherds for the white farmers, if they could not escape from the orbit of the colony altogether. While it is relatively easy to grasp the first of these processes as a historical researcher, since there exists abundant material in the form of complaints from farmers who had been robbed and reports of the expeditions sent against the robbers,<sup>3</sup> it is much more difficult to gather hard evidence on the subjugation of the Khoisan to the farmers, which eventually led to a position in which they became virtual bondsmen. For example, there exists no information as to the number of cattle and sheep still in the possession of the Khoisan at any given date before 1798, nor as to the proportion of Khoi who had been forced into the service of the farmers. At least this is so during the Dutch period, although the British administration at the beginning of the nineteenth century did collect information of this sort. As a consequence, the historian can either give up in despair and so miss one of the vital problems of early South African social history, or attempt to use an indirect approach. I attempt the latter course.

An analysis of the shifts in the legal status of the Khoisan between the foundation of the Cape colony in the middle of the seventeenth century and its conquest by the British about 150 years later provides evidence on this matter. The records of the High Court of Justice in Cape Town (which dealt with all serious cases) have been preserved, and copies of them exist in both The Hague and Cape Town archives. But it is not merely a case of looking where there happens to be information, without regard for the potential value

of that information as an index of real phenomena. Subordination to the legal system of the colony entailed, so far as the Khoisan were concerned, subordination to white farmers. This was because, during the Dutch period, there was no conscious theory of imperial rule in the Cape Colony. Later, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for murder or theft to go unpunished in a colony could only mean that that colony was not yet under the full control of the colonizing power. Indeed, it was almost a question of definition. The prime test of the control a colonial administration exercised over the territory it claimed to rule was its ability to monopolize legitimate force, and thus turn all other users of force into criminals. But in the eighteenth century the Dutch in South Africa did not claim such powers. In no sense did they contend that they had taken possession of a stretch of Africa and, therefore, had to rule it and all its inhabitants. Rather, the officials of the company exercised jurisdiction over persons, that is, over the employees of the VOC, over the free burghers (the farmers and townspeople, generally of European descent, who were not in service of the company), and over the slaves owned by the company, by its servants, and by the burghers.

The Dutch did not initially seek any authority over the Khoisan, preferring to maintain the patterns they had used in Asia, where local people remained under their indigenous legal system until well into the nineteenth century and where even immigrant communities in Dutch towns, such as the Chinese in Batavia, appointed leaders to administer justice in their own community.<sup>4</sup> So the VOC in South Africa only came to judge over the Khoisan when there was no other authority that could do so, that is, when the indigenous political institutions had completely disintegrated and, as noted above, when the Khoisan were forced either to become farm laborers or cattle and sheep raiders. In other words, because the imposition of Dutch legal authority on the Khoi was a gradual, unplanned process, and in no way an integral part of the establishment of the Cape Colony, the shifts in the legal status of the Khoisan provide a usable index of their shifting social position.

Thus it was that the instructions Jan van Riebeeck received when he left the Netherlands in 1651 to found the Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope were largely concerned with the building of a fort (probably mainly for protection against the English) and with the growing of vegetables for the passing ships. However, the following passage was included, to provide the basis of relations with the Khoisan:

You will also make inspection near the fort for the land best suited to depasturing and breeding cattle, for which purpose a good correspondence and intelligence with the natives will be necessary, in order to reconcile them in time to your customs, and to attach them to you, which must be effected with discretion, above all, taking care that you do not injure them in person, or in the cattle which they keep and bring to you, by which they be rendered averse to our people, as has appeared in various instances.<sup>5</sup>

While a similar prohibition was repeated to the white inhabitants of the colony throughout the rest of the century,<sup>6</sup> there seem to have been no other

clear directions from Amsterdam on the policy the officials at the Cape were to adopt with regard to the Khoisan. However, when there was a serious clash between the company and the Khoi they did authorize the adoption of strict measures. In 1653, when the interpreter Herry and his following absconded with the complete cattle herd of the colony, killing the herdsman, the VOC directors, the Heren XVII,<sup>7</sup> ordered that:

on getting into our hands the person guilty of the murder of the boy he should be punished with death, as an example to others: and that on getting hold of Herry, unless he has been accessory to the murder, he should be banished to Batavia, there to be employed in chains on the public works.<sup>8</sup>

This plan was not put into operation, since Van Riebeeck was unable to discover precisely who was guilty of the murder.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the Heren XVII later ordered Van Riebeeck to be cautious in dealing with the Khoikhoi, and only to take such drastic measures as enslaving the immediate following of Herry and shipping them off to Batavia, or having them work in chains, collecting wood, if provocation became acute.<sup>10</sup> In general, it is clear that the Heren XVII preferred to consider the Khoikhoi to be an independent people, against whom revenge must be taken should they murder a white,<sup>11</sup> but who must, in general, be conciliated, both for the purpose of persuading them to return escaped slaves<sup>12</sup> and to "draw them more and more towards us with their cattle."<sup>13</sup> Nor was there any clear policy as to the legal position of the Khoi laid down by the various commissioners of the company who visited the Cape at regular intervals during the course of the seventeenth century.<sup>14</sup> It was left to the officials in South Africa itself to determine precisely how they should deal with the Khoisan, particularly when disputes arose between Khoi and Europeans.

It should not be thought that, though the Dutch eventually crushed all independent Khoisan polities, their relations with the Khoikhoi chiefs were necessarily inimicable. There were conflicts, but these were certainly not willed by the Khoikhoi chiefs. Nor did the company officials generally favor an aggressive policy. Such clashes as there were most frequently arose as a result of actions of the less controllable subjects of both groups, the free burghers on the one hand and the more or less independent hunters, the San, on the other.<sup>15</sup> The leading political authorities on both sides had far more interests in common than not, at least where the prevention of crime was concerned. The most serious crimes were the same in both cultures. The VOC officials feared insubordination perhaps most of all—though this was not something Khoikhoi could commit against Europeans—but over and above this their concern was to protect the company's and their own possessions from theft, and to prevent the acts of violence and murder that so often accompanied such robberies. As for European contacts with the Khoikhoi, it was the Europeans' stock that was most attractive and also most open to theft, although especially in the early years of the colony much metal was also stolen. Similarly, the

Khoikhoi chiefs considered stock theft to be the greatest possible threat to their authority. Herder societies were always fragile entities, and likely to collapse if they lost large numbers of stock. Moreover, the position of a Khoi leader depended almost entirely on his wealth, and on his ability to protect the wealth of his subjects. It is symptomatic that the concepts "wealthy man" and "chief" were equated in the Cape Khoi language.<sup>16</sup> As a consequence, the Khoi chiefs were usually willing to collaborate with the Dutch to capture and punish the cattle rustlers and sheep rievors of the Cape, many of whom were quite prepared to kill in the course of their actions. Such theft, even from the Dutch East India Company, struck too close to the heart of the Khoi social structure for them to act otherwise.<sup>17</sup>

As a consequence, it was customary for Khoi who had fallen foul of the Dutch to be handed over by the VOC to be punished by the respective Khoi chiefs. This was certainly the policy of Van Riebeeck<sup>18</sup> and it reached its apogee in 1673 when four Khoi belonging to the Cochoqua tribe, which was at that time at war with the company, were brought into the fort by the company's allies, and the Cochoquas' enemies, the Chainouqua. It was established by the governor and council that these men had participated in the murder of a burgher and soldier a few months earlier.

Whereupon they were given back to the [Chainouqua] Hottentot Captains Cuyper and Schacher, with a statement of their confessions, that they might act with them as their prisoners, in the manner usual with them, and as they might think proper. The permission had scarcely been pronounced, when all the Hottentots who had collected to the number of more than 100, could no longer restrain their fury and bitter enmity, but called out, "beat the dogs to death, beat them to death," accompanying their words with such a shout of horrid joy, as if their enemies were already at their feet, and they triumphing over them: each of them furnished himself with a good cudgel and impatiently awaited the delivery of the condemned persons: these, being at length brought in front of the gate (of the castle) and given over, were so welcomed and saluted with sticks; that one after the another they sunk on the ground and expired.<sup>19</sup>

In a sense this illustrates with peculiar poignancy the theme of this chapter. In the establishment of political authority, particularly in a conquest state such as the Cape Colony, the boundary between crime and war, and thus between jurisdiction and policy, was narrow, but as yet the Dutch had not crossed that boundary.

Five years later, a group of "rebel plundering Hottentots"<sup>20</sup> who had previously been incarcerated by the company, but had escaped, was recaptured by the Khoikhoi and brought into the castle. On this occasion, they were hung, on the orders of the governor, but only after the Khoi chiefs who had effected their arrest had been informed of this procedure and had merely answered "dats goed."

In the decade in which these events occurred, the Cape government had for the first time to decide on its competence to sentence a Khoikhoi who had been "detrIALIZED" and had lived all her life in Cape Colony, spoke Dutch, had gone to church and "become habituated to our manners and mode of

dress." Judicially, the case is of particular interest since Sara, the woman in question, had committed suicide, and thus no motives of revenge, and scarcely any of setting of an example, played a role in the arguments as to the treatment of her corpse. The *fiscaal*<sup>21</sup> claimed that:

She had enjoyed, like other inhabitants, our protection, under the favor of which she loved; as this animal (*bestie*) then, has not only, actuated by a diabolical inspiration, transgressed against the laws of nature, which are common to all created beings; but also, as a consequence of her said education, through her Dutch mode of life, against the law of nations and the civil law; for having enjoyed the *good* of our kind favor protection, she must consequently be subject to the rigorous punishment of evil; seeing that those who live under our protection, from whatever part of the world they may come and whether they be christians or heathens, may justly be called our subjects—and as this act was committed in our *territorium*, and in a free man's house under our jurisdiction; which should be purified from this foul sin, and such evil doers and enemies of their own persons and lives visited with the most rigorous punishment. It is upon these grounds claimed and concluded by the *fiscaal* that the said dead body, according to the usages and customs of the United Netherlands, and the general practice of Roman law, be drawn out of the house, below the threshold of the door, dragged along the street to the gallows, and there hanged upon a gibbet as carrion for the fowls, and the property of which she died possessed confiscated for the payment, therefrom, of the costs and dues of justice.<sup>22</sup>

This mixture of natural law ideology and the concepts of territorial jurisdiction was accepted by the Court of Justice and Sara's body was consequently dishonored.

In a certain sense this case was most exceptional. Presumably because it was forced upon them in what was still a very small, face-to-face community, Dutch authorities were persuaded that they had to take action in a case where the criminal and the victim were both Khoi, or rather where they were both the same individual. With the exception of one case in which a Khoi had been wronged and made use of the colonial authorities to obtain redress in a civil action—a man from one Khoi tribe had bitten another, and the Dutch imposed compensation of one cow<sup>23</sup>—it was to be well into the eighteenth century before the Cape court was again confronted with such matters. This was a conscious decision at least sometimes. As late as 1741, a group of *bosjesmans* under their leader, Keijser, clashed with the Guriqua Khoi under Captain Hanibal, in the region of the Verloren Valley, north of the Piquetberg, about a hundred and fifty kilometers from Cape Town. Keijser and his followers who, according to the Guriqua, "sought war against them," persuaded the son of the Guriqua captain, Claas Hanibal, to come to them. At first, the meeting went peacefully, with pipes of tobacco being smoked, but then Keijser stabbed Claas, who attempted to escape by swimming across the Verloren Valley, but was hit by the *bosjesmans'* arrows and, as he came back to shore, killed. Keijser and his associates then crossed the river and rounded up such Guriqua cattle as they could lay their hands on.

The upshot of this fracas was that the Guriqua went to the *landdrost* of Stellenbosch to persuade him to take action against Keijser. Keijser, however,

claimed that he had a right to make war on the Guriqua since he himself had previously been stabbed by Claas Hanibal and because, during the last grain harvest, while they had been helping the boer Henrick Crugel, a Guriqua Khoi, Spring in 't veld, had abducted a woman from among Keijser's followers. The rights and wrongs of the matter were of little importance to the Dutch *landdrost* and the Council of Policy, to whom he submitted his decision for approval. Rather, on the one hand, they were uncertain if they had any jurisdiction over Keijser, "who has always considered himself a sovereign chief of his own people" and, on the other, they made a careful calculation of the relative costs of each decision. The Guriqua were reckoned, rightly, to be too powerless to cause trouble for the Europeans, unlike the *bosjesmans*, who would certainly attack the outlying farms. Moreover, Keijser "has always been a faithful champion (*voorstaander*) of the Europeans, even against his own people (*natie*).<sup>24</sup> As a consequence, it was not difficult for the Council of Policy—which, it should be noted, was almost identical in personnel to the Court of Justice—to conclude that there was no reason to take any measures to arrest Keijser.<sup>24</sup>

Given the ever present danger of raids by so-called "*bosjesmans*-hottentots," it is not surprising that the Dutch authorities were disposed to treat such matters as political, not judicial. Nevertheless, from about the middle of the eighteenth century, crimes committed by one Khoi against another were routinely brought before the Court of Justice in Cape Town. To take one example out of many, in 1751 a 20-year-old Khoi, Klaas, was condemned to be broken alive, with the coup de grace, for having murdered two other Khoi, Plaatje and Nietje, who worked with him on the farm of Jacobus Botha. Klaas accused one of his victims of trying to abduct his wife.<sup>25</sup> The colonial authorities felt they had to take action in this sort of case to preserve order on the farms, and because there was no longer any other legal body to deal with the matter. At least where Klaas, Plaatje, and Nietje were concerned, it is clear they were no longer under the authority of any Khoi chief. Rather it was their employer who had day-to-day control over them. When matters occurred that were outside his competence, they were referred to the *landdrost* of Stellenbosch and the Court of Justice, which claimed the exclusive right to punish criminal behavior within the orbit of the colony, even if that orbit was still defined in personal rather than in territorial terms. As a consequence, the moral code of the Dutch was, at least partially, imposed on the Khoisan. Khoi adultery does not seem to have been punished, but there were several prosecutions for the more serious crime of "sodomie." It does not appear that Khoi were ever executed for these acts, with the exception of one man who had violated a cow in 1736.<sup>26</sup> Legal regulation of Khoisan sexual behavior was, interestingly, intermediate between that of white and slave behavior. Whites were occasionally arrested and tried for adultery, unlike either Khoi or slaves, a consequence no doubt of the fact that only whites could be "legally" married. Insofar as it is possible to generalize from the few cases available, it would

seem that punishment for Khoi "*sodemieten*" ran parallel with that meted out to whites, who were rarely if ever executed for this crime after the middle of the century; whereas slaves were still, routinely, drowned.<sup>27</sup>

To a certain extent this divergence was an example of Khoi legal status. Whereas the European and slave populations were always clearly subject to the laws of the colony, with the one group obviously treated with far greater severity than the other, throughout the eighteenth century there remained a certain doubt where the Khoi were concerned, at least in those matters where the Dutch realized that they might be dealing with actions that, though considered criminal by European law, might be allowed under Khoi custom. In one case a 13-year-old "Outenique" Khoi, Suyverman, who had been "used as a woman" by a runaway slave for two months in the district of Swellendam, was asked if such behavior was known among the Khoi and if he realized that he was doing wrong. His reply, at least as translated and then recorded in officialese, was that "I have never previously seen such things in my country, from which I presume that it must be evil." He was flogged, and put on Robben Island for five years for sodomy.<sup>28</sup>

A similar problem faced by company officials related to the treatment of Khoi witchcraft. Witchcraft was not a crime in South Africa, especially as the Netherlands were largely spared the witchcraft hunting craze of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, no one, no matter what his or her background, ever came before the court to answer any such charge.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, on two occasions, the court had to deal with Khoi who had murdered fellow Khoi because they were thought to be witches. The court did not treat this defense as completely worthless, and neither of the two murderers was put to death. In the first case, this may have been because the culprit, one Valentijn, was considered not to be in possession of all his faculties of reasoning, and thus not responsible for his actions.<sup>31</sup> He was sent to prison on Robben Island to see whether he was or not. In the other case, there was no such mitigation; the court conducted an investigation to discover whether the justification that Cobus Anthonij, a 25-year-old Khoi living in the neighborhood of Swellendam, gave for his actions was acceptable within the tenets of Khoikhoi culture. The court ascertained that he had almost certainly exceeded his competence, as "among the hottentots, whenever someone is bewitched by another, he would in turn bewitch the other." They did not sentence him to death, as they would ordinarily have done in such circumstances, but ordered him to be flogged, branded, and incarcerated in chains for life on Robben Island.<sup>32</sup>

The fact that the colonial courts bothered to make this sort of investigation shows that, even into the last decades of the rule of the VOC at the Cape, the Khoisan were seen as a distinct group whose legal tradition had to be respected and who were not subject to the full extremities of Dutch law. As has been shown, the Dutch judicial authorities had to cope with infringements

against their own code of criminal law, but not against that of the indigenous society, for all that the two frequently ran parallel.

As a consequence, while Dutch authorities slowly began to take an interest in crimes committed within the Khoi community—or rather only when Khoi had left their community and become totally dependent on white employers—they were, from the foundation of the colony, necessarily concerned with conflicts between Khoi and members of the colonial society, that is, slaves and whites. In the early years Khoi criminals were tried and punished with the agreement and cooperation of Khoi chiefs. After around 1700, however, this ceased to be the case, as more Khoi achieved positions within the society in which no Khoi chief had the slightest power, or really even interest, over them. Nevertheless, the Dutch could not treat their relations with the Khoisan as purely judicial and devoid of any political overtones. The running guerrilla war—sometimes of greater, sometimes of lesser intensity—which they waged with the so-called “*bosjesmans-hottentots*” made this impossible. One visitor to the Cape in the middle of the eighteenth century observed that Khoi in service on the farms guided the raiding *bosjesmans* to the herds they wished to steal.<sup>33</sup> Certainly, the Khoi on the farms considered that a commando<sup>34</sup> of farmers against the *bosjesmans* would put them in such danger that it was necessary to gather and defend themselves, a sign that the distinction between the two groups was not clear in the minds of those who were most affected by the measures taken against the robbers.<sup>35</sup>

There is at least one case of a boy who worked on a farm in Outeniqualand, who was not only described as a *bosjesman* but indeed could not even speak Khoi language, and for whom there was no competent interpreter available in Cape Town.<sup>36</sup> Almost certainly, the boy in question had been captured by one of the commandoes, which generally doubled as attempted massacres (where the adults were concerned) and “slave” raids (although of course they were never so called) for children.<sup>37</sup> He was one of the losers in the long war between the Khoisan and the colonists. Thus, Khoisan who had, for instance, murdered their master or absconded with his sheep were likely to join one of the groups of *bosjesmans* and continue their attack on the colony. The best-known example of this was probably the case of Jager Afrikaner, who began his career on the farm of Pieter Pienaar in Namaqualand, but became the most important chief of the raiding groups on the lower Orange River and founder of a dynasty that was to control much of central and southern Namibia for the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century.<sup>38</sup> It was these ex-farm servants who, almost certainly, swelled the *bosjesmans* bands to the powerful groups, often with more than a hundred members, with which the whites had to contend in the latter part of the eighteenth century.<sup>39</sup> As early as 1738, the first of these large bands, in the Bokkeveld and on the edge of the main granary of the colony in the Swartland, gave the clearest statement of the political intent of their attacks, claiming that:

they [the *bosjesmans*] did this to drive them [the whites] out of their land while they still lived in their land, and that this was just a beginning, as they would do this to all the people living around there, and, if this did not help, they would burn all the sown corn that stood in the fields as soon as it was ripe, so that they would be forced to leave their land.<sup>40</sup>

By the end of the century, there was a further danger, at least in the far east of the colony, when with the beginning of the Hundred Years' War between the colonists and the Xhosa, the Khoi who worked on the farms had the opportunity of joining with the latter against their masters. This happened most obviously in the "hottentot revolt" of 1799, when the British commander, Brigadier Vandeleur,<sup>41</sup> reported that, in the district of the Zwartkops River (between modern Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown), "the Hottentots . . . have to a man deserted their Masters" and that "this contagion of the Hottentots has extended into the Long Kloof, where I understand they are also running away from their masters and joining the Renegades in this country."<sup>42</sup>

The fact that what began as a conflict between individuals could so easily spill over into war, into the large-scale conflict of two communities, had definite consequences for the legal position of the Khoisan within the Cape Colony. In the first place it meant, in fact if not in theory, that they were in general held communally responsible for the crimes committed by a single Khoi or by a small group. Especially in the last quarter of the century, when the hunts for *bosjesmans* became particularly intense, the white commandoes did not stop to check whether their targets had been guilty of some offense against the farmers. Rather, they shot first. Their concern was "die pernicieuse natie, zo niet ten enemaal uijt te roeijen, ten minste tog te beteugelen" ("if not to exterminate this pernicious nation entirely, at least to curb them")<sup>43</sup> The only really safe Khoi were Khoi who participated in the commandoes. Second, as has been shown, whites occasionally had to refrain from taking judicial actions that would have disturbed the peace of the colony. Nevertheless, to a certain extent because the Dutch maintained a somewhat artificial distinction between those they considered hottentots and the *bosjesmans*, Khoisan, particularly but not exclusively those in service of farmers, were frequently tried and punished for offenses against colonists. The most common of these were stock theft and assault on slaves, since the difference between the social status of the two social groups not infrequently gave rise to conflicts, while the deracination of Khoi whose society was falling apart, on the one hand, and newly imported slaves on the other, could only lead to a high incidence of conflict in the quarters where most of them lived together.<sup>44</sup> But the Khoi not only attacked white property, human or bovine, but also, often, the whites themselves; and perhaps failing in their attempts to reach the nearest *bosjesman* group, most were executed in Cape Town for their action.<sup>45</sup>

While no white man was ever executed for killing a Khoi, whites were tried and sentenced for offenses against the Khoisan. In 1672, almost contempo-

raneously with the earliest trials of the Khoi, a free burgher, Willem Willemsz., from Deventer, mortally wounded a Khoi (and, what was more, one of a group with which the company was at that time allied, the Chainouqua).<sup>46</sup> Willemsz. seems to have fired a shotgun loaded with small shot into the body of the Khoi at close range. He managed to escape to Europe aboard a Danish ship; he was duly banned from the Cape for life, and his property confiscated.<sup>47</sup> In Europe he was able to obtain a pardon from the Prince of Orange and next year returned to the Cape to claim his property, but company officials suspected that the pardon was forged, interned Willemsz. on Robben Island, and wrote to the Prince of Orange to check whether he had indeed issued such a pardon. Their argument against the release of Willemsz., interestingly, was "to prevent any apprehended mischief and particularly to avoid causing any new disturbance among the native tribes, (who are a free people over whom we had no jurisdiction and who are vindictive beyond all example, and will not be satisfied before they have revenged upon the offender, the death of a father, brother or relation)."<sup>48</sup> Willemsz. was finally exiled to Batavia. In order to keep the peace, in other words, the rulers of the Cape were prepared to override the orders of even the Prince of Orange. The theme of subordinating the strict dictates of justice, and even of legal hierarchy, to the requirements of colonial safety had begun already.

Despite this pragmatism, there remained a definite differential in the sentencing of whites, slaves, and Khoi. The latter two suffered capital punishment for murdering each other, and, if they murdered a white, were put to death in a particularly gruesome, painful way. Whites, on the other hand, did not die for the murder of a Khoi, or for that matter, of a slave, even when a murder was peculiarly cold blooded and unprovoked, although there were occasions when Dutch authorities came near to doing so. The case that, in a sense, made clear what the limits were occurred in 1744. In that year Martinus Spangenburg, a thirty-year-old farmer, arrived at the farm of the widow Mouton, near the Piquetberg, looking for one of "his hottentots" who had run away. He believed that the Khoi who were there were withholding information from him, so he took one of them, Couragie, outside, first beat him and then, when he attempted to escape, shot him.<sup>49</sup>

During Spangenburg's trial, the prosecuting *landdrost* of Stellenbosch demanded that he be hung. The court did not accept this, and by a small majority sentenced Spangenburg to have a shot fired over his head and then to be banned for life. As was routine, the sentence was then passed on to the governor, Hendrik Swellengrebel, for confirmation; it was refused, Swellengrebel, in effect, appealing against the decision of his own court to the higher authority of the government in Batavia. He considered that Spangenburg should indeed be hung, arguing that:

it is not permitted to enter the house of an absent neighbor armed with a loaded flintlock to treat his employees, who had come in from their work and sat eating, with great effrontery, still less to beat them with the butt of the gun, let alone, in such a

terrible way, to shoot the unfortunate heathen like a dog when he attempted to escape. Moreover, it cannot be argued that there was in this case any necessity or that the shot Hottentot resisted or had threatened the prisoner, who was in fact the initial aggressor. Moreover, he has lived for a long time in this country, first as a farm servant (*boere-knecht*) and later as a burgher, and so is well aware that the Hottentots are considered as free inhabitants of this land and that strict edicts (*plakkatén*) have been issued against the maltreatment of these poor people. . . . Moreover, since in this thinly settled country, in the past, such terrible actions had been practiced, perhaps equivalent to the present case and that these natives were treated in barbarous ways and put to death, as if they were wild animals and not humans, brought forth by the same creator, God's chastising hand has punished (*verzwaart*) this land and many calamities of which the sorrowful examples of the recent past remind us, were caused.

Swellengrebel cited the *plakkaat* of 8 December 1739, which reiterated the frequent prohibitions on cattle trade with the Khoi and laid down that such traders, if they were "disturbers of the general peace and violators of law and freedom, according to the seriousness and circumstances of the case, without any exception would be punished corporally, yes even with death."<sup>50</sup> Despite Swellengrebel's pleas, there does not seem to be any record of Spangenburg's being executed. Thus, just as with the slaves, the Khoi could not hope for full protection of the law, which in the eighteenth century dictated that criminals who committed serious offenses—and often, of course, relatively trivial ones to our modern eyes—be put to death.

Nevertheless, the Khoi did receive some protection from the law, although, without the possibility of enforcement, these *plakkatén* would remain dead letters. The network of government officials was far too stretched to be able to inquire into all events of which it may have heard rumors. Clearly what was required was the right of Khoi to complain to the authorities about maltreatment they had suffered and about murders committed against their fellows and in their presence. In effect, crimes against the Khoisan could only be punished if Khoi evidence was treated as equivalent to that of a white, since there would rarely be a white man or woman present when a crime was committed, still less one prepared to describe what he or she had seen truthfully. Richard Elphick has argued that:

In some cases Khoikhoi were able to initiate actions, in others they were key witnesses establishing the guilt of whites. I have not found examples in this period of the court discounting evidence simply because it came from Khoikhoi—though after 1713 such racist attitudes did in fact become apparent.<sup>51</sup>

While the first part of his statement is undoubtedly true—there are numerous examples throughout the eighteenth century, as well in the previous period—the second is far more dubious. Elphick argues on the basis of a single decision of the court of 2 June 1729.<sup>52</sup> It is therefore worth analyzing this case in some detail, since the matter is less clear cut, and more suggestive, than he makes out.

The *landdrost* of Stellenbosch, Pieter Lourentz, had come to hear that six burghers and one *knecht* had pursued, under Captain Hobeze, a number of

"hottentots" who had stolen some of their cattle, and on overtaking them "had put some of these hottentots to death in a brutal (*onmenschenlijke*) way." However, he had no hard proof of this and requested the advice of the court as to how he should further proceed. The answer of the court was as follows:

On the one hand the enormity of the crime was noted. On the other it was said that the case was only based on the single deposition of one hottentot directed against Christians, without further evidence. It was to be feared that if one came directly to believe the bare word of these heathen, that the wavering and vengeful nation would try to bring more Europeans into distress, as had occurred several times. Moreover, the court had no knowledge of the *factum* or the *Corpus Delicti*, nor had any of the injured hottentots come to complain.

The court therefore ordered the *landdrost* of Stellenbosch to release his prisoners and take no further steps in the matter.

The statement of the court certainly contains evidence of racist attitudes which may have influenced its behavior. However, it would seem more reasonable to suppose that it came to its decision to throw out the case largely on technical legal grounds. The evidence that the *landdrost* presented was so weak that it seems unlikely he could have gotten a prosecution, no matter who his witness had been. In particular, Dutch law required that all evidence be corroborated by at least one other person. The evidence of one man is no evidence at all.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, it would seem that the court ordered the *landdrost* not to proceed in order to save time and expense on a case that would certainly have been thrown out. Whatever their racist attitudes may have been, the Dutch officials did not generally let them interfere with their business of running the colony as smoothly as possible, and of making a profit, for the company and for themselves.

A more typical case occurred nine years later. A certain *boereknecht*, Harmanus Cloppenburg, had shot a Khoi in the Verloren Valley, north of the Piquetberg. The unfortunate Schagger Hantje had been attempting to prevent Cloppenburg from driving off ten cows he claimed were due to his master because the Khoi were camped on his master's ground. Two other Khoi complained to Cape Town, investigations were carried out, and Cloppenburg was arrested and put on trial. While there seem to have been a few inconsistencies in the reports of the witnesses, which might have allowed Cloppenburg such hope as anyone could ever have of securing an acquittal in the Cape Court of Justice, he did not choose that track. Rather, as the *fiscaal* argued:

the suspect claimed that he should not be punished for this crime, because the prosecutor could only produce three, more or less confirmatory, relations by two hottentots and one slave. The prosecutor argues otherwise because, if it were permitted for the *knegten*, who are hired on the more distant farms, to be their own judges, many murders would be committed against these people on such flimsy pretexts and many of the arrogant *posthouders* would find themselves heirs to their inheritable cattle. Also as can be imagined, the officer of justice could not take the slightest action against the clandestine trade since they could not be tried for lack of sufficient European evidence, in the same way as in the present case the suspect is trying to persuade the prosecutor

and this court that the witnesses were just heathens and he is a Christian and therefore they are to be ignored and he, as a so-called Christian, to be believed.<sup>54</sup>

The Cape government always felt that it needed all the help it could get to control its un-policed and under-administered colony. Unlike most slave colonies, slaveowners might find themselves before the courts as a result of accusations by their own slaves.<sup>55</sup> There was thus no reason why the evidence of Khoisan should not be accepted, too.

Although such was the aim of the Cape government, it is far from certain how far it was ever achieved. The farmers against whom the *landdrost* of Stellenbosch was ordered not to proceed in 1729 certainly escaped justice because Pieter Lourents did not present an acceptable case, but the problem remains: why was he unable to collect sufficient evidence to prove his assertions, or alternatively to disprove them so that he would never have mentioned the matter in court? It is far from inconceivable that pressure from the local community made him unable to pursue the matter further. Away from Cape Town, in a small town, with little contact with his fellow officials, he would certainly have been subject to such pressure, if it had existed, but evidence for such influence would naturally not have found its way into the official records of the Dutch East India Company, and is also unlikely to have come to the ears of travelers, the main source for the eighteenth-century history of the Cape. Certainly, Khoikhoi who traveled to complain to the *landdrost* were on occasion held and beaten by the burghers whose farms they passed.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, it is clear that toward the end of the eighteenth century the judicial position of the Khoi deteriorated radically. Two examples should make this clear. In 1797 the *landdrost* and *heemraden* of Stellenbosch wrote to the Cape government (by this time under British control), to ask for a decision as to whether a Khoi might summon a white woman for the payment of a debt:

The undersigned *Heemraden* objected to having the case heard before their college, as they are ignorant of whether or not a hottentot has the right to summon a burgher before the College, and of whether, once being allowed, it would open a door and give the hottentots the idea that they are on a footing of equality with the burghers. The *landdrost* was of a contrary opinion and stated clearly that a hottentot should be recognised before the law in the same way as himself and that this constituted the true equality since before the law all were of equal standing.<sup>57</sup>

Thirty years later, the Commissioners of Enquiry into the state of the Cape Colony recorded that, before 1819,

it was not customary to administer oaths to Slaves, Hottentots, and persons of similar condition, on account of their ignorance of all religious obligation, and that altho' the evidence of such persons was and had been received by way of information, and not of proof, except where it was confirmed by other circumstances, yet that this usage was not conformable to Law, and that consequently such evidence had been at all times open to objections to credit, or as they are technically called, 'reproaches.'<sup>58</sup>

As we have seen, the officials of the Dutch East India Company never had any such scruples. Their legal system was more nakedly an arm of government than that which succeeded them, but the latent conflict between company officials and burghers had the effect of affording some legal protection to the Khoisan, at least where the company was able to exert its authority sufficiently (see ch. 7). It is not chance that the three most important challenges to the authority of the company initiated by burghers all stemmed from disputes about the Khoisan. The dispute between the free burghers and Governor Willem Adriaen van der Stel that came to head in 1706 was largely a struggle for control of economic resources, notably access to the market provided by VOC ships, but also very definitely including the right to trade in cattle with the Khoikhoi. Whether or not Van der Stel was acting out of altruistic motives or merely attempting to corner the meat supply to the VOC, his ostensible motive for forbidding burghers from undertaking cattle trading expeditions to the Khoi was the fact that a previous one had been not so much a mercantile encounter as a full-scale cattle raid.<sup>59</sup> Twenty years later, when Barbier was trying to raise the burghers of Stellenbosch against the company, one of the grievances he tried to play on was the use of Khoi evidence against burghers who had been on a trading expedition to the Nama that had ended in violence.<sup>60</sup> Finally, some decades after Etienne Barbier was executed, the arrest of Carel Buitendag, which gave the occasion for much pent-up feeling to burst out in the Patriot movement, was brought about by his behavior toward Khoisan in the Bokkeveld and by the policy of the government to keep the less controllable burghers out of the more distant districts where they might attack the Khoi.<sup>61</sup>

While company officials made occasional attempts to control the burghers' subjection of the Khoisan, it is clear that they were slowly but surely losing their grip on the country. With the Cape making a loss at the best of times, and the VOC as a whole steadily weakening financially, there was no possibility of the Cape administration's extending to keep pace with the Boers as they moved into the interior. On one occasion, a farmer from the far east of the colony, who had come to Cape Town on his annual trip, was so sure of his rights over his Khoi workers that he attempted to kidnap one of them from the house of the *fiscaal* himself, where he had taken refuge in an attempt to avoid having to return with his *baas*. By 1778, the governor, Joachim van Plettenberg, on his tour of the interior, reported that there were no longer any Khoi who were not in service with a farmer.<sup>62</sup> In a sense, the company accepted this situation. They did not attempt to impose regulations by demanding contracts between Khoi and their employers. This was left for their successors—first the government of the Batavian republic, and later the British.<sup>64</sup> The proclamation issued by the Earl of Caledon in 1809 ordained that all agreements between Khoi and farmers be written and registered with the local *landdrost*, but at the same time it effectively tied the Khoi to their masters by laying down that:

the Hottentots going about the country, either on the service of their masters, or on other lawful business, must be provided with a pass, whether of their commanding officer, if in the military service, or the master under whom they serve, or the magistrate of the district, on penalty of being considered and treated as vagabonds.

The British prided themselves that this measure had been to the benefit of the Khoi themselves, and "had rescued them from a system of hardship and cruelty, practised towards them by the Boers, which could, in the course of a short time, have extinguished the race."<sup>65</sup> The fact that the British dared voice such sentiments shows how far the company had lost its legal grip on the Cape *platteland* and how the Khoi had, by the end of the eighteenth century, been reduced to the level of unfree servants. Rights they might have retained, but they could no longer exercise them.

∞ PART FIVE

Toward an  
Intellectual History



## The Rise of Afrikaner Calvinism

In 1948, the National Party, under D. F. Malan, a minister of religion turned politician, captured power in South Africa. The basis of its support was, of course, the Afrikaners, those descendants of European immigrants to South Africa who spoke their particular variety of Dutch, known as Afrikaans. They came to support Malan in 1948 in sufficient numbers to form a parliamentary majority. The reasons for their support (not in itself a particularly large swing<sup>1</sup>) are, naturally, complex, but they presumably include the acceptance not merely of that part of the party's programme that was known as apartheid and that, as is notorious, related to the domination of the South African blacks by the whites, but also of what has been called the "civil Religion" that was propagated by the National Party and its leader.<sup>2</sup> This was, and to a large extent remained, Calvinist throughout the period of National Party dominance, even though the requirements of government and the implementation of the apartheid programme meant that South Africa never became a Calvinist theocracy, whatever that might have been. Nevertheless, in general those Afrikaners who voted for the National Party and are members of one of the three reformed churches (the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk*, the *Nederduitse Hervormde Kerk*, and the *Gereformeerde Kerk*) that are almost exclusively Afrikaans and represent a considerable majority of the Afrikaners, are assumed to accept, at least passively, the Calvinist perspective of the National Party and the Afrikaner establishment.

This orientation leads to the further assumption, made by many within the nationalist Afrikaner tradition and by many sociologists, that the Afrikaners' Calvinism is a primordial attachment, a given. From this starting point, it is thought that much else about modern South African society follows. However, such "givens" can themselves become the objects of historical research. In fact, Afrikaner social and religious self-identity, or self-stereotype, is a historical construct of relatively recent date.<sup>3</sup> As André du Toit—not coincidentally an anti-nationalist Afrikaner—has shown in a series of important articles, political Calvinism cannot be traced back to before the late nineteenth

century, and was not widely accepted among Afrikaner nationalists until the 1930s.<sup>4</sup>

The theological justification for political Calvinism derived in large measure from developments in Dutch Protestantism during the nineteenth century. The influence of Abraham Kuyper, the leading protestant political theologian of the late nineteenth century, and prime minister of the Netherlands from 1901 to 1905, was crucial here.<sup>5</sup> Kuyperian Calvinism was to provide a main strand in Afrikaner nationalism. However, it could gain a hold in South Africa only because it introduced no more than a minor variant on an established theological tradition. The dominant strain of Afrikaner theology was Calvinist long before it became nationalist. The nineteenth century saw a steady increase in what can be called the level of religiosity of the Afrikaners, without which the Christian nationalist ideology would not have gained a hold.

### Early Stirrings

The increase of religious sentiment among Afrikaners during the nineteenth century contrasts with their considerable religious malaise prior to 1800. Christianity was, indeed, the defining criterion for admission to white society. Parents might bribe a minister to baptize their children,<sup>6</sup> baptism obviously being viewed in such cases as of social, not sacramental, significance. But, despite all such data, the indications of a low level of interest in religion are clear. Churches were few and widely spaced: many Boers lived at least a hundred, even up to eight hundred miles from the nearest one. Even in Cape Town, among the high officials of the company, there were few signs of deep Calvinist adherence. In 1714, François Valentijn, a clergyman in the employ of the Dutch East India Company, wrote of a service he held there that church members totaled forty men and forty-eight women only, including those traveling in the return fleet, and that among those who approached the table (to take communion) there was no member of the Council of Policy, and apparently also none of them who was even a church member. In the country districts, he reported, matters were worse.<sup>7</sup> Theological debate was at a minimum, primarily because clergymen were appointees of the Dutch East India Company, and were in any case few in number. The monopoly the church held, at least until the 1780s, did not further discussion.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, until the last years of the century there is no indication of any house meetings, Bible study groups, or such similar religious events outside the direct context of the church services. While all the whites seem to have been baptized, fewer than half of those Afrikaners who reached adulthood became members of the church. There is thus every reason to echo the words of the historian of the Stellenbosch parish—Stellenbosch was the most important of the country villages and churches—that the eighteenth century was a period of great religious decline.<sup>9</sup>

In a sense it is not surprising that the Calvinism of the Netherlands was not maintained in South Africa. Those who went to South Africa were the dregs of European society, ingested by the great maw of the Dutch East India Company with its insatiable appetite for manpower.<sup>10</sup> Many were not brought up in the Reformed religion, but as Lutherans or Catholics, not the sort of people whom Calvinists would have thought assured of salvation. It could be, of course, that a transition from the destitution of a company soldier to the relative prosperity of a Cape burgher might have led to a receptivity to the predestinarian aspects of Calvin's teachings, but if this was so, there is no empirical confirmation of it and it is furthermore unlikely, since Calvinism was a religion that required weekly attendance of the faithful to hear the exposition of the word by a learned minister. Given the far-flung settlement pattern of European settlers in the Cape Colony, such regular discipline was impossible for most.<sup>11</sup> In the course of the nineteenth century, the situation changed. Although the government of the Cape Colony passed from the hands of the Dutch to the English around 1800, in religious matters the first significant signs of change can be discerned even earlier, resulting in a transformation in Afrikaner religious experience.

The first stirrings of the new religious mentality occurred in the 1770s, significantly in Cape Town. M. C. Vos, the first South African to be called to the ministry, relates in his autobiography that he had been connected to a Bible reading circle there.<sup>12</sup> Clearly, in the cosmopolitan world of the port town, developments in European sensibility, above all the doctrines of Pietism, quickly found a hearing. This process was strengthened following the arrival in 1786 of Helperus Ritzema van Lier, a brilliant and pious Dutch minister. Van Lier's prospects of achieving in the Netherlands the position his talents deserved were probably hindered by the fact that his father had shortly before this taken off with the funds of the smallest Dutch province, Drenthe. Under Van Lier's influence, the religious life of Cape Town flourished, if temporarily.<sup>13</sup> Van Lier cooperated closely with the missionaries when, in 1792, they began to arrive in South Africa. His sister, but for her death, would have married J. J. Kicherer, a Dutchman who came with the first group of London Missionary Society missionaries. And Machtelt Smith, Van Lier's most prominent convert, was later to be an ally and friend of the London Missionary Society, whose superintendent, John Philip, wrote a memorial of Van Lier's sister.<sup>14</sup> From this circle was founded the South African Missionary Society, whose influence spread into certain areas of the countryside.<sup>15</sup> European travelers of a more rationalist stamp were later to complain of their excessively cloying piety.<sup>16</sup>

The initial burst of religious enthusiasm did not spread to the entire colony, by any means. It was too much the consequence of a few individuals' personalities and had no institutional base. No movement founded in Cape Town could have achieved success in the world of the Cape countryside anyway, or, for that matter, could have conquered the exceedingly heterogenous society

of the port city itself. In the course of the succeeding decades, though, what had at first been particular and specific to a few small areas of the colony became much more general. While it is difficult to document this precisely, since the existing church history of the Afrikaners has tended to concentrate on the formal, the institutional, and the theological rather than on religious mentality, the picture that emerges seems quite clear, nonetheless. It is one of a steady rise in commitment to the tenets of an evangelical brand of Calvinism, culminating, in the 1860s, in a major outbreak of religious enthusiasm, a revival, and also in a series of bitter theological and ecclesiastical debates—which not infrequently ended up in the state courts.<sup>17</sup>

### The Revival

The revival in the Cape echoed similar outbursts of the Holy Spirit in the United States and Britain, outbursts discussed at a conference in Worcester, in the Cape Boland, a few weeks before the Cape revival took hold.<sup>18</sup> It found its main inspiration not in the formal services of the church, but in the informal prayer meetings. In the past such movements had generally been disapproved of by Calvinist ministers, who considered them a threat to the discipline of the church.<sup>19</sup> But as rigid disciplinarian Calvinism came to be tempered by a more emotional evangelicalism, such meetings, often beginning around Witsun, inspired the cautious welcome of many ministers. At first they had attracted few worshippers. Now, suddenly, the gatherings became crammed, the atmosphere became emotional, and the ministers lost control over their flocks. The first outbreak of revival occurred in the village of Montagu, which had been without a minister for several years, a fact that demonstrated to the Rev. N. J. Hofmeyr, one of the first professors at the newly established Stellenbosch theological seminary, that the revival was the work of the Holy Spirit.<sup>20</sup> But there was considerable ambivalence among the leaders of the church itself, as can be seen in the attitude towards the revival of the two Andrew Murrays, father and son, both leading ministers in the Dutch Reformed church at the Cape. The older Murray had for years been praying for such a revival, and had been carefully reading the accounts of similar upwellings in his native Scotland and elsewhere,<sup>21</sup> and when the revival finally came his son was at the heart of the movement—not surprisingly, given his powerful character and preaching, soon to make him the leading figure in the Cape church of the late nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the younger Rev. Andrew Murray was profoundly ambivalent toward the outbursts of uncontrolled emotion and during one such meeting tried to quell the uproar, proclaiming, “I am your minister sent by God. Silence.” When this failed, he stormed out of the meeting shouting, “God is a God of order, but this is disorder.”<sup>22</sup> The power of the praying was such that at least one young woman, shortly to become a missionary wife, was overcome and fell into what some would describe as a trance.<sup>23</sup>

The power of the Holy Spirit crossed the social divides of Cape society,

and a number of so-called "colored" and African servants, who had believed that God was only for white people, were now declaring for Christ.<sup>24</sup> In a wide sweep of the Cape Colony, starting in the core agricultural areas of the southwest Cape but spreading north and east through the Karoo, a wave of enthusiasm swept over men and women and pulled them in. Hofmeyr described the events in the Breede River valley as follows:

A prayer meeting was started [in 1859] which no more than three or four individuals could be induced to attend. But as soon as the awakening impulse of God's Spirit was felt, old and young, parents and children, whites and blacks, at almost every farm were desirous to join in social prayer and immediately prayer meetings were multiplied. And the interest manifested in these religious meetings continues, after the lapse of four and five months, unabated.<sup>25</sup>

Not every parish was so affected, but the spirit took hold in at least twenty-five *gemeenten* (parishes) in the Cape and the Orange Free State<sup>26</sup> and, a year or so later, spread to the farthest outposts of white settlements.<sup>27</sup> Andrew Murray, Sr., wrote that "there has been a wonderful change brought about among us. In almost every house where you come the subject is the 'opwekking' or the prayer meetings." A contemporary newspaper reported that "The congregation heard to their great consternation, many of their number pour out their hearts before the throne of God's grace. Penetrating, powerful and majestic, as a storm crashing through the trees, were prayers of some of those present. All those who heard them seem to have been moved to the core by these things, since this solemn meeting induced wonderment on every face."<sup>28</sup>

### The Transformation of the Cape Church

How had this transformation come about? For one thing, the character of the Cape church's leadership changed dramatically between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The deadening hand of the Dutch East India Company was removed. There were now many more ministers in the colony, large numbers of them of Scots origin; the agreement of theological tradition within the Dutch and Scots churches made such men attractive to a British government seeking to anglicize the Cape, so it paid their wages. These men, in most cases, had spent a few terms in the Netherlands during their training, most often at the University of Utrecht where most were members of the influential student society *Sechor Dabar*, inspired by Willem Bilderdijk, Isaak Da Costa, and other leading lights of the Dutch religious movement known as the *Réveil*. An increasing number of South Africans themselves had also trained for the ministry in Europe and came under the same influences. Together, the Scots and the South Africans were instrumental in bringing about the widespread shift in religious attitudes among white South Africans, in part because numerous new parishes had been set up throughout the length and breadth of the Cape.<sup>29</sup>

The new ministers saw themselves as stout Calvinists. Their main theological battles were against the proponents of an Arminian liberalism (who considered the dogmas of salvation propounded by the Calvinists to be suspect),<sup>30</sup> and in support of the maintenance of true Reformed religion. This was the main thrust of all Andrew Murray the younger's theological writing, and of the combined efforts of the ministers who sought to establish the first theological college in the Cape, so that prospective ordinands would no longer have to travel to the Netherlands and be exposed to dangerous liberal influences that were seen as unduly influencing the life of the Dutch church, and against which the *Réveil* struggled.<sup>31</sup> Andrew Murray the younger's predecessors, Abraham Faure and G. W. A. van der Lingen, the most prominent figures in the Cape church during the first half of the nineteenth century, were men of much the same stamp as Murray. Faure's theological education had been formed by reading the work of Jonathan Edwards, the leader of the Great Revival in New England in the 1740s.<sup>32</sup> Faure's nephew, who later became the leader of the church liberals, said this of a sermon by his uncle: "The sermon ended with terrible threats of hell and damnation, the sufferings of the damned and the various chambers of hell were described in the fullest detail. I often felt sick with terror. Nor were these endless agonies to be the portion only of naked and godless sinners; even the best were in imminent peril for they might not belong to the elect and only the elect could escape the clutches of the Devil."<sup>33</sup> Van der Lingen, for his part, had been educated in Holland, where he came under the influence of the writings of Bilderdijk and Da Costa, though he does not seem ever to have heard them in person.<sup>34</sup> None of these men, Faure, Van der Lingen, or Murray, seemed to have any difficulty in reconciling their Calvinist predestinarian doctrines with active evangelical work.

The religious movement was almost entirely non-political, at least in the overt sense. There was a certain amount of gently phrased disapproval of the Great Trek,<sup>35</sup> but, apart from that, direct involvement of the church in the political life of the colony was limited to matters of direct concern to it, such as the subsidy of the church by the state,<sup>36</sup> or terrible public scandals like the running of trains on Sunday.<sup>37</sup> But the churchmen themselves were not apolitical. After the establishment of the Cape parliament they attempted to ensure that their representatives were moral, God-fearing men. Candidates for Parliament might even be nominated by the church council.<sup>38</sup> Yet there was no Calvinist political program. The Cape parliament was entirely secular. The Cape Dutch Reformed church propagated a universalist, not a nationalist faith, except in so far as some ministers, notably Van der Lingen, saw themselves as members of the *Nederduitsch*, or Dutch, nation, not as Afrikaners.<sup>39</sup> Van der Lingen, who was the most articulate of these *dominees* on the affairs of this world, directed his anger against the liberal "Spirit of the Age," as Da Costa had done before him.<sup>40</sup> His opponents were the proponents of "progress" and were both Afrikaner and English.<sup>41</sup> What was at issue was the extent

to which the *dominees* and elders of the Dutch Reformed church could impose their mores on at least the country dwellers of the colony.

It is axiomatic that major religious changes are related in some way or other to shifts in the socio-economic structure, but it is very difficult to pin a precise relationship down, especially in the absence of any hard data on the lives of the people concerned. It is an arguable hypothesis that the steady increase in the density of commercialization of colonial South Africa during the nineteenth century, coupled with the need to recreate the patterns of social stratification in the aftermath of the abolition of slavery and during the process of conquest and subordination of the blacks, together challenged the sense of social order and thus made many Afrikaners more receptive to this predestinarian, emotional form of religion. In general, an uncertainty as to one's place in this world may well make one more concerned with one's place in the next—which, in the well-known Weberian feedback loop, may well do much to improve one's standing on this earth.

### The Voortrekkers and the Church

This chapter has dealt largely with the great mass of white colonial South Africa—the settled, commercial farmers who were in regular touch with their *dominee* and, through him, the newspapers, and the merchants, with world events. It has not dealt with the Afrikaner frontiersmen, who often had no fixed residence and lived deep in the interior with rather minimal links to anyone else: the archetypical *voortrekkers* of the Great Trek and the early Transvaal. These people are said, in their isolation, to have had no intellectual resource except the Bible and to have built their own highly idiosyncratic fundamentalist Christianity on the basis of it alone. Such people certainly did exist. The language of some *voortrekkers*, notably Charl Celliers, is indeed drenched in references to the Old Testament. They believed, not entirely without reason, that the Lord of Hosts was with them. They identified with the Israelites of whom they read in their Bibles.<sup>42</sup> But they were not the racial Calvinists of the twentieth century. It is difficult to find any tenets of predestination and election in their thought.<sup>43</sup> Limiting religious freedom to those churches which professed the tenets of the Calvinist Heidelberg catechism, as they did on occasion, was merely a gesture to eliminate discord.<sup>44</sup> So, the successors of the *voortrekkers* republic in the Transvaal were quite prepared to elect as their president T. F. Burgers, a *dominee* whose liberal views had led to the Cape synod's convicting him of heresy and suspending him from his charge. The ministers of the dominant church in the Transvaal, the *Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk*, had indeed supported Burgers in his conflict with the Cape's orthodox establishment. Later they threw him out of office, but not because of his theological unsoundness.<sup>45</sup> Once again, only at the end of the nineteenth century can the first glimmerings of a national Calvinism be

discerned.<sup>46</sup> And only after 1902 did the modern political theology that saw the Afrikaners as God's chosen people begin to be elaborated.

Among the farmers and stock keepers of the interior, however, two significant fundamentalist movements did develop. The first was that of the so-called *Jerusalemgangers*—"those who are going to Jerusalem"—with whom Livingstone came into conflict, a small and short-lived group that has had an influence on the image of the Afrikaners out of all proportion to its true importance. This group was first noticed by the ecclesiastical establishment in 1838 in a distant part of Swellendam parish.<sup>47</sup> It was said to have based its actions on the apocalyptic vision of the Book of Joel: "And it shall come to pass that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions."<sup>48</sup> In the days after the Great Trek, this call to prophetic leadership was answered, many justifying their resistance to the British by pointing to the marginalia in their Dutch editions of the Bible where the seventeenth-century republicans equated the falling monarchies of the Book of Revelation with, among others, the English. They were led by the "prophet" Johan Enslin, who was to become the most obscure of the contenders for political leadership in the new Transvaal republic, and the "prophetess" Mietje Gous. Relatively quickly, though, they were absorbed into the more orthodox churches of the Transvaal.<sup>49</sup> The prophetic tradition was unable to strike deep roots in Afrikaner consciousness. (It was, however, an Afrikaner, P. Le Roux, who helped found the African Zionist churches after 1905. Le Roux, incidentally, had in his early years been close to the elderly Andrew Murray, Jr., who, for a while, had been very interested in faith healing, the most notable characteristic of these churches.<sup>50</sup>)


The group into which the *Jerusalemgangers* were absorbed was the *Gereformeerde Kerk*, better known as the Doppers. Once again, they probably derived from the influence of one or two individuals upon their neighbors in a relatively isolated community, this time in a small area of the northeast Cape, around modern Colesberg and Burgersdorp. It is, however, certain that, from the very beginning of European settlement in this area in the last decades of the eighteenth century, the general level of piety was considered to be greater there than elsewhere in the colony.<sup>51</sup> The historian of the Dopper could find no specific signs of strict Calvinism in this area until somewhat later in the nineteenth century, after the establishment of regular church services in the area and the spread, not merely of Bibles, but also of a number of Dutch Calvinist theological treatises.<sup>52</sup> These, together with the growth, for reasons which are far from clear, of a particular conservative local way of life, led in the 1850s and 1860s to a bitter ecclesiastical conflict.

The initial issue in the conflict was the legality of singing hymns in church; some would have limited this to the Psalms. Coupled with the intransigence of a peculiarly insensitive minister, this issue led to the secession of a fair number of the area's Afrikaners from the official Dutch Reformed church and

to the formation of the *Gereformeerde* or so-called Dopper church.<sup>53</sup> The movement did not remain purely local, finding support among a number of Dutch ministers from those churches in the Netherlands that had themselves split off from the main ecclesiastical establishment. These men, of whom Ds. Dirk Postma was the most prominent, took the Dopper principles into the Orange Free State and Transvaal.<sup>54</sup> In many ways, the importance of the Dopplers for later South African history is that it was out of a development of their tradition that nationalist Calvinism developed in Potchefstroom after 1902, to be picked up by theologians and politicians of other churches. The theology and practice of the Dopplers before 1900 were in no way nationalist. Those of the original core, around Colesberg, were notable for their loyalty to the (British) Cape Colony, and most did not trek to the new republics of the north. In the republics, particularly the Transvaal, adherence to political and religious factions did tend to be coterminous, and much of the political strife of the early years of the Transvaal was about the precise ecclesiastical arrangements to be established. Nevertheless, these conflicts were more about personalities and resources than about the details of theology, and there was no sense, even among the most fervent Calvinists, that theirs was an exclusive, national religion. Postma even argued for toleration of the Roman Catholics in the Transvaal, with the argument that a church could only be protected by the "word of truth."<sup>55</sup>

The Dopplers were renowned for their specific mode of dress, a short jacket worn by the men, allowing their white shirts to peep out above the trouser, that may have given them their name. With the enormous socio-economic and political changes after the late nineteenth century, this mode disappeared, and there are no South African equivalents of the Amish. The social content of their theology also changed, to build on the great growth of Calvinist ideas and the widespread increase in religious fervor during the nineteenth century among the Afrikaners of both the Cape and the northern republics. That theology could be used by those intellectual entrepreneurs who constructed Afrikaner ethnicity from the 1880s on.<sup>56</sup> Such a construction was not a necessary consequence of the theological tenets of the Calvinist churches. As Allan Boesak and Beyers Naudé, among others, have shown, Calvinist tenets can just as easily be used to build up a non-racial South Africa.

## Donald Moodie and the Origins of South African Historiography

 The historiography of South Africa began, as it has continued, in acrimonious debate. The first debate was conducted, at greater or lesser intensity, from 1827 until the early 1840s, a period of great political and social turmoil in the Cape Colony. This time of unrest saw the lifting of Khoisan civil disabilities by Ordinance 50 of 1828, the emancipation of slaves, and the Master and Servant Ordinance of 1841—the principal measure of “redemption,” by which the old master class re-established its control over its ex-slaves (and over the Khoisan as well). There was, also, the 1835 war between the colony and the Xhosa, followed by annexation of the Ciskei by the governor of the Cape, Sir Benjamin D’Urban, and the rescinding of that annexation by the colonial secretary in London, Lord Glenelg. The main protagonists in this spirited historical debate the Rev. Dr. John Philip, superintendent of the London Missionary Society in South Africa, and Donald Moodie, an ex-lieutenant in the Royal Navy and now one of the colony’s leading settlers. The subject of the argument was the causes for subjugation of the Khoisan to colonial domination during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The debate was, and most historical writing in South Africa ever since has been, an argument not merely about the country’s past but also about its present and future.

Most historians have been unaware of this debate altogether, though they frequently use one of its key texts, a collection of documents called *The Record, or A Series of Official Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Tribes of South Africa*. Donald Moodie published this work in Cape Town in three parts between 1838 and 1841. It relates to the years between 1649 and 1690 and between 1769 and 1781, with an additional section republishing the “Journal of a Tour to the North-Eastern Boundary, the Orange River and the Storm Mountains,” written by Colonel Collins in 1809. Though it was not an explicit work of history, historians of the seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and early nineteenth-century Cape have found it of enormous value. Moodie also left twenty-six volumes of transcripts of other historical documents, all now in the Cape archives. Many had been copied by a

clerk. A number of documents cannot now be traced in the original in the archives, which were systematized only after Moodie had completed his own work.

The modern historiography of South Africa goes back to Moodie's published work, though it was not the first major historical source published in the Cape Colony—Van Riebeeck's journal had been published in the *Het Nederduitsch Zuid-Afrikaansch Tydschrift* more than a decade earlier.<sup>1</sup> In his volumes, Moodie attempted to hide behind a mask of what now would be called academic neutrality. He had sworn an oath, analogous to that of attested translators, that he would

fairly, and faithfully, publish the whole of "the Documentary Evidence regarding the treatment of the Tribes beyond the boundary of the Colony, by the Government, the Local Functionaries, and the Colonists, as well as the treatment of the latter by those Tribes, the provocation given, and received, on either side" . . . without *mutilation* or *partial* extracts: and also . . . that I will in like manner publish, all such relevant and authenticated Documents as either have been, or may hereafter be, furnished to me, towards the full development of the Truth; and I further swear, that I will not, in making extracts from Official Documents, which bear relation to subjects, *not* within the scope of my inquiries, omit any thing whatever, which relates to that subject; but that I will, honestly and impartially, give the contents of such Documents, without regard to the character of the facts therein stated, or the inferences which may be drawn from them, whether for, or against, the Colonists, or the Colonial Government.<sup>2</sup>

As if to emphasize his official, neutral status, Moodie reproduced this oath in his introduction to *The Record*. It might serve as an article of faith for all publishers of historical documents.

Yet Moodie's protestations of innocence should not deceive us. He was no amateur historian, snuffling around in the records of government to satisfy his own curiosity. He did his work as an official of the colonial government, appointed with the express sanction of D'Urban, and in performance of his duties (for which he was paid the not inconsequential annual salary of £400) as Protector of Slaves for the Eastern Division of the Colony, even after that office had been unnecessary for more than two years—the reason given was that he had not yet completed his final report as Protector. The actions of governments, and certainly of colonial governors, are rarely without ulterior motives; certainly this one was not, but those motives are not apparent at first sight in Moodie's published work. Moodie was, after all, obsessed with a historical topic only tangential to D'Urban's own concerns. That topic is the subject of this chapter. It should be recognized that *The Record's* theme was only part of a wider historical debate, which was in turn only a part of a much wider conflict about the shape of South African society.

### The Glenelg Dispatch

Moodie performed his historical researches in the course of a campaign launched in Cape Town by the governor and the colonial secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel John Bell, to justify their actions, and those of the colony as a whole,

against the accusations contained in a dispatch sent to Cape Town by Lord Glenelg, secretary of state for the colonies, on 26 December 1835.<sup>3</sup> This was about the most scathing rebuke for a colonial government imaginable short of dismissing the governor himself. It rejected and reversed the most important measure taken by the Cape government on its central problem, the relations between the colony and the Xhosa on its eastern frontier. In the aftermath of the war just ended, known to the Xhosa as Hintza's war,<sup>4</sup> the Cape had annexed the country between the Keiskamma and the Kei Rivers as Queen Adelaide Province. Lord Glenelg, with full backing of the British cabinet, rescinded this annexation and ordered that the Xhosa chiefs living there be considered independent rulers with whom treaties could, and should, be made to regulate future relations between the colony and the Xhosa.

The grounds for Glenelg's decision related to the causes of the war. He formulated the question as follows: "whether the invasion of the colony by the [Xhosa]<sup>5</sup> was provoked by such wrongs as afforded them a legitimate cause of war, or whether it is correctly designated by you as 'unprovoked aggression.'"<sup>6</sup> His conclusion was succinct:

In the conduct which has been pursued towards the [Xhosa] nation by the colonists, and the public authorities of the colony, through a long series of years, and which the short period of your administration could not have enabled you to correct, the [Xhosa] had ample justification of the war into which they rushed with such fatal imprudence at the close of last year.<sup>7</sup>

Presumably only the fact that D'Urban had been in the colony too short a time to change the course of policy saved him from immediate dismissal, though his dilatory and unsatisfactory reply to the dispatch did lead to his recall a year later. Glenelg's judgment is in many ways borne out by modern scholarship.<sup>8</sup> What concerns us here, though, is the basis upon which Glenelg founded his decision. He regretted that he had not received any account of the matter from D'Urban himself, so that he was compelled to draw his conclusions from "less authentic sources of information." This gave him the opportunity to use information received via the evangelical lobby in Britain, led by Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton and known as the "philanthropists," and from some of the Cape missionaries, especially Dr. John Philip. As a consequence, Glenelg was able to write:

I have . . . been led to the study of a large mass of documents, of which some are accessible to the public at large, and others have been brought under my inspection by the voluntary zeal of various individuals, who, from many different motives, interest themselves in this discussion. These researches have afforded me some advantages for forming a correct conclusion as to the causes and probable effects of the war, which I could not have found in the perusal of any reports, however minute and elaborate, drawn up by any single writer, even though possessed of all the means of knowledge so peculiarly at your command.<sup>9</sup>

He could not offer the proof for his arguments, because this would have led him both to break the confidence of some who had provided information

privately and to discuss the credibility of various witnesses in an unseemly manner. At the Colonial Office, the dispatch had gone through three drafts and received the minutes of all officials of any consequence, as well as Glenelg and his junior minister, and Glenelg had convinced his colleagues in the cabinet of the correctness of his decision. With rather more difficulty, he also persuaded King William IV not to block the cabinet's judgment.<sup>10</sup>

The Glenelg dispatch's principal arguments pertained to the (recent) past of the Cape Colony in its relations with the Xhosa. These, in their turn, were founded, or purported to be founded, on research in the archives of the Colonial Office. The historical, almost scientific, nature of the dispatch was even more explicitly put. In a passage added after cabinet discussions and with the King, Glenelg admitted that he could have been wrong, an admission of fallibility praiseworthy but rare among politicians and historians. Glenelg recognized that his sources might be flawed, largely because the Cape government had supplied no explanation of the causes of the war. D'Urban, he said, might be "in possession of facts of which I am ignorant, the knowledge of which would have irresistibly dissuaded the adoption of some of the measures" he proposed. If D'Urban believed that Glenelg was under "any such misapprehensions" and had made a "cardinal error respecting the facts of the case," he was to suspend the execution of his instructions until the Colonial Office could respond to arguments he might make.<sup>11</sup>

This careful passage of Glenelg's only exacerbated the friction between Cape Town and London. Moreover, Glenelg's dispatch of 26 December 1835, sent on one sailing ship, crossed with a letter of D'Urban's sent on another ship six weeks earlier (on 11 November), in which he set out his policy for the settlement of the new province. D'Urban, apparently, and erroneously, believed he had answered Glenelg's arguments in that letter, and was thus totally unprepared for Glenelg's complete rejection, to which he did not reply in full until 9 January 1837—though he ingenuously dated his reply some eight months earlier. This dilatory procrastination, combined with his evident unwillingness to carry out the policy pronounced by London, was unacceptable, and resulted in his dismissal.<sup>12</sup>

By this time, Moodie was beaver-ing away among the records of the central government in Cape Town. He had contacted the magistrates of each district in search of conclusive rebuttals of Glenelg's view of South African frontier history. As often is true with such projects, the research took too long and soon lost its political topicality. The list of historical documents Moodie issued, and forwarded to the Colonial Office in London, noted which of the documents he had found had been published earlier in British parliamentary papers.<sup>13</sup> The committee set up to monitor Moodie's work reported to those who subscribed to *The Record* that less than 5 percent of the papers on the Xhosa had been made public before.<sup>14</sup> The implication was that the basis for the decisions taken in London was unreliable. The Colonial Office, and certain leading figures in government, the most important of which was the third Earl

Grey, did eventually change their minds about the wisdom of annexing the Ciskei.<sup>15</sup> As a consequence, in 1848, what had briefly been Queen Adelaide Province became British Kaffraria. However, that decision was taken for reasons entirely unconnected to the historical debate discussed in this chapter.

### John Philip and the *Researches in South Africa*

Donald Moodie was chosen to carry out this work, in part, because he was a friend of those who had to make the decision and was known to be a man of appropriate views; and also because he had shown considerable interest in the historical records. Between the emancipation of slaves and the beginning of his work on the archives, he had apparently served as a roving investigator for the colonial Government, especially to make recommendations about the Griquas,<sup>16</sup> and had apparently provided suitably damning comments about John Philip and the missionaries. Like many Cape colonists, Moodie detested Philip as the instigator of many disastrous, unwarranted, and interfering actions by the British government. Philip, it was thought, was trying to create a mission-run theocracy, a "South African Paraguay," at the Cape.<sup>17</sup> For their part, Philip and some of his fellow missionaries, along with allies like newspaper editor John Fairbairn,<sup>18</sup> who was Philip's son-in-law, saw their task as protecting the Cape's Khoisan and ex-slaves, as well as the Xhosa and others across the border.

Moodie's official reports criticized Philip and another of his allies, the poet and publicist Thomas Pringle, whose account of history Moodie condemned as pure political propaganda. Of them he wrote:

For the purpose of engaging the public sympathy upon the side of the coloured classes and thereby influencing the public measures of the Government to adopt a course which may be favourable to the object of individuals: the most palpable falsifications of history and the most obvious misstatements of current events, has been, and continues to be, consistently adhered to.<sup>19</sup>

His own historical research had convinced him that "the early state of the hottentots was not such actual slavery" as previously supposed. Nevertheless, their treatment was harsh. As Philip put it, "their contentment under that state was never very marked, except as contrasted with the hostile feelings which accompanied their subsequent insurrection."<sup>20</sup>

This was the beginning of an attack on Philip's view of Cape history that was to pervade Moodie's work over the next few years. Philip's views are set out most fully in the two-volume report published in London in 1828, called *Researches in South Africa: Illustrating the Civil, Moral and Religious Condition of the Native Tribes Including Journals of the Author's Travels in the Interior; Together with Detailed Accounts of the Progress of the Christian Missions, Exhibiting the Influence of Christianity in Promoting Civilization*, to give it its full, unwieldy title. It was essentially a campaigning volume,

whose task was to persuade the British government that the policies then employed in South Africa towards the Khoisan were unjust and should be changed. Missionaries of the London Missionary Society had been protesting to successive governments at the Cape for a quarter of a century that their charges among the Khoisan population of, in particular, the eastern Cape were oppressed and denied civil and religious liberties.

The *Researches* was, in this sense, a continuation of work begun by earlier missionaries, notably Dr. J. T. van der Kemp and James Read.<sup>21</sup> It differed less in its content than in its public. Articles in the *Transactions of the London Missionary Society* and memorials to the Colonial Office<sup>22</sup> could not create a scandal sufficient to get things done in the long term, despite Van Der Kemp's and Read's responsibility for the considerable turmoil that followed investigation of their charges of colonists' acts of cruelty and murder against the Khoisan by the "Black Circuit" of the Cape Court of Justice of 1812. Philip, who had the ear of influential members of the British parliament, especially Thomas Fowell Buxton, leader of the evangelical anti-slavery movement, was also able to act at a moment when the contract Earl Bathurst had held over the Colonial Office for fifteen years was finally lifted. The result, at least by Philip's own account, was that measures granting the Khoisan equality before the law with all other free men and women in the colony were enacted by the British parliament; these were to serve as a means of evaluating any ordinances promulgated by the colony.<sup>23</sup>

Philip's *Researches* was, thus, a direct political intervention on behalf of the oppressed Khoisan. Philip was led to undertake this task out of sympathy with the mission stations over which he was director. He believed that oppression hindered the conversion and salvation of the Khoisan. His argument was typical of what must be described as the cultural imperialism of nineteenth-century missionaries, arguing that Christianity and civilization were indivisible, and Christianity and savagery incompatible. As Philip put it: "I am satisfied, from abundance of incontrovertible facts, that permanent societies of Christians can never be maintained among an uncivilized people without imparting to them the arts and habits of civilized life."<sup>24</sup>

Philip himself was a Scotsman who had worked as a weaver in Kirkcaldy and Dundee. With an almost engaging chauvinism for his country and class, he viewed civilization as the way of life of "the labourers and artisans . . . in the manufacturing districts of North Britain." This meant monogamy and premarital chastity, sobriety, regular and productive labor, "clean and commodious" housing (tidy enough to keep books from disintegrating), clothing of British style (and manufacture), school attendance, a pensive rather than ecstatic demeanor in church, and so on.<sup>25</sup> In one particularly revealing passage he contrasted civilization to idleness and continued with this metaphor:

Civilization bears to religion a relation similar to what foliage bears to the tree. Trees are not planted in our gardens for the sake of their leaves; but without leaves, in their

seasons, the garden would be without beauty, and the fruit neither well flavoured nor abundant.<sup>26</sup>

Without some degree of material prosperity, then, the labors of the missionaries to win souls for Christ would be in vain.

Moreover, Philip thought that civilization itself depended on the elimination of poverty, as far as possible. In his analysis, he followed the political economists, notably his fellow Scot, Adam Smith. In *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith argued that poverty would be minimized in a society in which all were free to follow their own self-interest, and that this entailed, above all, order, good government, liberty, and individual security from arbitrary actions.<sup>27</sup> Or so Philip presented Smith's views.<sup>28</sup>

Philip attacked the colonial government of the Cape for having condoned the oppression of the Khoisan by the white population, and even by its own officials, and for having enacted measures that made that oppression easier rather than more difficult. In his *Researches* is a long analysis of the proclamation issued by the Cape governor, the Earl of Caledon, in 1809 on the rights and duties of the Khoisan, which had been heralded as the "Magna Charta of the Hottentots,"<sup>29</sup> arguing that it reinforced their oppression by destroying their mobility, and hence any bargaining power they might have had. Governor Sir John Cradock's additional proclamation three years later exacerbated the problem, by allowing the detention of minors under the pretext of "apprenticeship." The only hope of escape still open to the Khoisan was to join a mission station. Philip stressed that in these new villages the Khoisan's level of "civilization" had increased following on their conversion, but that they were still under pressure from local farmers and, above all, from the magistrates and lower officials.

While most of the *Researches* was concerned with the two decades since the British had taken over control of the Cape, it also sought to explain the Khoisan's initial degradation, which was not, he believed, a result of innate faults (though they were seen as still sunk in "heathendom" when the colonists arrived). Indeed, the first Europeans to reach the Cape found "the inhabitants rich in cattle, living in a happy and comfortable manner and possessed of sufficient spirit to repel aggression and to resent unjust treatment," and, further, "remarkable for the excellence of their morals, . . . they kept the law of nations better than most civilized people and . . . they were valiant in arms."<sup>30</sup> Even after the Dutch founded a colony, all the records Philip had seen praised Khoisan virtues, particularly their honesty and their disinclination to theft. What happened to the Khoisan was, in Philip's view, the consequence of an inability to cope with the advance of the colonists.

Early in the colony's history, Philip writes, "as the colonists increased in number and began to feel their security and strength, and the difficulty of supplying their wants by barter and fair purchase, their encroachments daily augmented, until they were no longer endurable."<sup>31</sup> Philip believed that the interests of the Dutch East India Company had been best served by encour-

aging the Khoi to be productive pastoralists and trading partners, but "The rapid growth of the colony, however, soon placed this beyond their power; and the successive governors, wither from weakness or a want of correct information were led, first to wink at the aggressions of the colonists, and finally to aid them in their enterprises."<sup>32</sup> The result was a succession of cattle and sheep raids on the Khoi, depriving them of their means of subsistence. Describing one expedition in 1702, Philip writes that such attacks recurred over the next seventy years. The Khoisan had welcomed the colonists "with the generosity which marked their character and which disposed them to share with their friends and allies all that their own necessities did not require," unaware of "the insatiable and boundless desires of a rising community of mercantile adventurers."

As they lost their land and flocks, these once rich herdsmen had to choose among famine, retiring with a few sheep and goats into the mountains, or "sinking into servitude as the herdsmen and domestics of the boors [*sic*]." Eventually, not even escape would be feasible, as the colony grew in strength and numbers. Philip describes the final apotheosis:

Every addition of territory requiring additional hands to cultivate it, the colonists, after having deprived the poor natives of their springs of water, now penetrated into the deserts and mountains to seize their women and children, and to reduce them to slavery on the lands which their husbands and fathers had occupied as a free and independent people. The aborigines, who had for a long time suffered with exemplary patience the injuries inflicted upon them, finding that no retreat could protect them from the cruelties of their oppressors, sought resources of annoyance from the desperate condition to which they were reduced; and the colonists, smarting under the reaction of the accumulated evils they had heaped upon them during the space of seventy years, and which could no longer be endured, formed the project of making the colonial government a party in assisting them to enslave or exterminate all that remained of the original inhabitants.

Enslavement or extermination could be achieved only by persuading the government of the justice of their cause by sending it "the most vilifying representations, imputing to the Bushmen the most depraved and pernicious propensities, and accusing them of incessantly plundering the property of the colonists." The government agreed with the colonial temper insofar as to

find that in the year 1774, the whole race of Bushmen or Hottentots, who had not submitted to servitude, was ordered to be seized or extirpated; the privilege of slavery was designed exclusively for the women and children; the men, whose habits disqualified them for the purposes of the colonists, and whose revenge was probably dreaded, were destined to death.<sup>33</sup>

The result was a series of murderous commandoes throughout the border regions that Philip describes in considerable and bloody detail. The Khoisan fought back against these continued assaults, and ironically, because they defended themselves, their reputation for savagery—and hence the justification for the attacks—increased.

Philip makes no distinction between the "Hottentots" and the "Bushmen."<sup>34</sup> He believed that the Bushmen or *bosjesmans* had suffered from a concerted effort to blacken their reputation, so as to give farmers an excuse for attacking them. He did concede that, on occasion, they had stolen from colonists, but he saw these acts as perpetrated by Khoisan who had lost their cattle and refused to submit to the slavery suffered by their fellows in the colonists' service. He described the origins of the Bushmen in a few succinct sentences.

Deprive [a pastoral people] of their flocks and herds, and you scarcely leave them any alternative but to perish, or to live by robbery. This was the case with many of the Hottentot tribes during the seventeenth century. Driven to desperation by the loss of their cattle, they were occasionally forced by hunger to seize a few sheep or cattle belonging to the colonists. To evade their pursuers, and to have the opportunity of devouring their spoil in peace, they would naturally seek refuge in the most inaccessible places in the mountains.<sup>35</sup>

These then became the Bushmen. As a result, the Bushmen's character deteriorated sharply. Philip cites approvingly "a philosophical writer" who claimed that if you "Treat men as wild beasts . . . you will make them such; and by joining the ardour of revenge to their yet untamed barbarity, they will grow every day more intractable and more dangerous."<sup>36</sup> This happened to the Bushmen, for whom robbery became a necessity for existence and vengeance the motive for all actions. The commando system transformed the Bushmen

from peaceable, contented and useful neighbours, and visitors, into ferocious and vindictive enemies, till they rivalled in some measures, the colonists themselves in cruelty and rapacity. Stripped of their plains and fountains, deprived of their flocks and herds, and finally robbed of their wives and children, and, followed with the rifle, even to their hiding places among the caverns and holes of the rocks, they had few resources besides plunder, no gratification but revenge.<sup>37</sup>

The character of those Khoisan who had remained in colonial servitude also declined, without any governmental supervision of their masters and without the freedom even to change masters. As a result, Philip writes:

A deep and habitual gloom and depression of spirits took the place of that hilarity which had formerly distinguished them. Their indolence increased to a degree hardly credible, and they became more and more addicted to gluttony and drunkenness. For this last vice they were indebted entirely to their new masters. Their numbers began greatly to decline, the very structure of their bodies was said to have shrunk, and to have lost its force and agility, and the whole race seemed rapidly hastening to annihilation.<sup>38</sup>

The arrival of the missionaries from the last years of the eighteenth century broke this cycle of degradation but they were hampered in their work by the laws of the colony and the actions of officials. The great bulk of Philip's *Researches* is concerned with these matters. In general, the principal thrust of

his argument contains the most plausible explanation for the destruction of Khoisan autonomy.<sup>39</sup>

I do not mean to justify Philip as a historian. Rather, it is of interest to note his sources, which were of three types. For the period after about 1800 he could rely on the reports of successive missionaries of the London Missionary Society. He also had access to the travelers' accounts that have become the stock-in-trade of Cape historians.<sup>40</sup> And he had at least a selection of documents from the Cape archives, from which he provided long extracts, suitably translated, from the journal kept by Johannes Starrenburg, *landdrost* of Stellenbosch, on his trading trip to the Nama in 1705; and also extracts from reports of successive commandoes against the Bushmen between 1774 and 1791. He had in his possession, too, the investigatory report of the 1702 raid on the Inqua Khoi and the Xhosa, and Colonel Richard Collins's journal of his tour through the east of the colony more than a century later, in 1809, material that had come to light during investigations of the Commission of Eastern Enquiry in the 1820s.<sup>41</sup> Collins's journal was available to the commissioners, perhaps in its entirety or perhaps only in a somewhat abbreviated copy, along with a digest from the archives chronicling events in the relations between colonists and Khoisan from the first settlement of the Dutch in 1652. This latter had been prepared by P. B. Borchers, then a member of the Cape Council of Justice.<sup>42</sup> Borchers's diggings in the archives of the Cape were, so far as I am aware, the first such researches. Presumably the work he initiated led to others' interest in the material in the Cape's government offices. Philip was able to borrow, and make copies of, a number of important documents.<sup>43</sup>

### The Select Committee on Aborigines

Initially Philip's investigations did not cause much stir, although the published *Researches* did. In consequence, on Philip's return to the Cape, the governor, Sir Lowry Cole, refused to grant him an audience. The *landdrost* of Somerset, W. Mackay, brought a successful libel suit against Philip because of certain comments in the *Researches*, and won substantial, and probably punitive, damages. Philip was saved from financial ruin by the subscriptions of evangelicals in Britain, but the Mackay verdict was regarded as destroying the credibility of the *Researches*, at least by those who did not want to believe it.<sup>44</sup>

In 1836 and 1837, Philip's arguments once again became politically topical, because they were used by the influential Select Committee on Aborigines of the British parliament. This committee was dominated by Thomas Fowell Buxton, the British anti-slavery evangelical—to the extent that any gathering that included W. E. Gladstone could ever be said to have been dominated by anyone else. While its activities ranged over virtually the entire imperial world, from Canada to New Zealand, its principal focus was on South Africa. The

forty-six witnesses it examined included twenty-nine with direct personal experience of the Cape, among them John Philip, Andries Stockenström, James Read, Senior and also Junior, Hans Hallbeck of the Moravians, and also Andries Stoeffel, a Khoi from the Kat River, and Dyani Tshatshu, a minor Xhosa chief. A few presented testimony favorable to the settlers' interest, especially Colonel T. F. Wade, Acting Governor of the Cape for a few months in 1833-34; Major W. B. Dundas; and the Rev. William Shaw of the Wesleyan missionary society. These last, however, were in a definite minority; indeed, there were even some military men who held views not greatly divergent from Philip's own. With the stand thus packed, the committee came to conclusions that, given its chairman, might have been anticipated before it even met.

The committee was scathing about both the general effects of colonialism and the specific policies pursued in South Africa. In its final report, it argued that intercourse with Europeans, including Britons

has been, unless when attended by missionary exertion, a source of many calamities to uncivilized nations.

Too often, their territory has been usurped; their property seized; their number diminished; their character debased; the spread of civilization impeded. European vices and diseases have been introduced amongst them, and they have been familiarized with the most potent instruments for the subtle or the violent destruction of human life, viz. brandy and gunpowder.

It might be presumed that the native inhabitants of any land have an incontrovertible right to their own soil: a plain and sacred right, however, which seems not to have been understood. Europeans have entered their borders uninvited, and, when there, have not only acted as if they were undoubted lords of the soil, but have punished the natives as aggressors if they have evinced a disposition to live in their own country.<sup>45</sup>

This last argument seems to have referred in particular to the Xhosa. No matter what cause was admitted for the hostilities between colonists and Xhosa, the result was always that the Europeans declared Xhosa territory to be forfeit.<sup>46</sup> As to the Khoisan, the committee believed that, when the Dutch arrived, they were "numerous and rich in cattle. It was observed of them, that they keep the law of nations better than most civilized people." From the time of Van Riebeeck, however, colonists had begun "the system of oppression [that] never slackened till the Hottentot nation were cut off and the small remnant left were reduced to abject bondage," which only ended with the passing of Ordinance 50 in 1828. For some Khoisan there was an alternative fate:

There were other Africans of the same or kindred tribes [to the Hottentots] who were early designated under the term of Bushmen, from their disdaining to become bondsmen, and choosing rather to obtain a precarious subsistence in the fields or forests. From their fastnesses they were apt to carry on a predatory warfare against the oppressors of their race, and in return were hunted down like wild beasts.<sup>47</sup>

This process, they said, had culminated in the extermination orders and the Great Commando of the 1770s.

These historical arguments of 1836–37 provided backing for a policy radically opposed to what most Cape settlers, and its governing elite as well, would have preferred. This is most clearly seen in relation to the Xhosa, where the committee enthusiastically endorsed abandonment of Queen Adelaide Province and the instructions given to Sir Andries Stockenström, one of its key witnesses, as lieutenant-governor of the eastern province. Also, legislation to curb “vagrancy,” which was thought, no doubt correctly, to be primarily aimed at the Khoisan, was henceforth ruled out.<sup>48</sup> For a short while the “philanthropic” policy propounded by the missionaries, above all Philip, was in the ascendancy.

It is not surprising in the circumstances that the Cape conservatives encouraged Moodie’s researches. In June of 1836, before implementation of the Glenelg dispatch was certain, at least in Cape Town, the colonial secretary there, Colonel John Bell, wrote a memorandum noting that Moodie had not completed his last report as Protector of Slaves but that this was “an object which, however important, is certainly not equal either in value or interest at the present time, to that on which he is now employed and on the eve of completing.”<sup>49</sup> Later, when this question was settled, the support Moodie’s researches were thought to give to the settler and the official point of view led to long continuation of his employment as a researcher.

Against this background, the polemical nature of Moodie’s *The Record* becomes clear. Unable to publish all the material that he collected, Moodie had to choose, and select that which related directly to the historical arguments of Philip and the Select Committee on Aborigines. The first part of *The Record* is concerned with Van Riebeeck and his immediate successors. Like all historians, Moodie wanted to begin at the beginning, in this case of the Cape Colony, not of South African history. He also wanted to respond to the disparaging description of Van Riebeeck’s policy towards the Khoikhoi. The material on the 1770s was included because of the central role this period and the Great Commando of 1776 had played in Philip’s analysis of colonial history.<sup>50</sup> There were even some communications between Moodie and Philip about what should be published.<sup>51</sup> The journal of Colonel Collins, which makes up the last part of *The Record*, was also published with a polemical point in mind, as this journal had appeared earlier, by order of the British parliament, in a collection of documents prepared for the use of the Select Committee on Aborigines.<sup>52</sup> Moodie reprinted it, not only to make it more widely available, but to point out the omissions in the Colonial Office’s version. Some sections had not been published previously and others had been severely edited. Moodie made clear what those cuts were, either by a direct comment or by printing the excised passages in italics. Many of these were innocuous, such as Collins’s comments on the game he shot, but a number of long passages, notably on Bethelsdorp and other missionary institutions, in which Collins was exceedingly critical of the line Philip and the Select Committee on Aborigines were to take, were omitted.<sup>53</sup> Even some seemingly in-

nocent omissions were considered the result of bias. Since Collins met the Xhosa chiefs east of the Zuurveld it was believed that the Xhosa had not reached the area by 1809, and, therefore, that the colonists were justified in expelling them from that area. The inference Moodie clearly intended his readers to draw was that the parliamentary paper's omission of this matter was willful and that the seemingly impartial collection of documents prepared in London was deliberately and unscrupulously biased.<sup>54</sup> As the oath he himself had taken showed, he must have believed that only by publishing all the documents would the truth become apparent, and that the truth would vote for the settler and the official position.

### Libel Cases

Moodie's activities led to considerable controversy at the Cape, as, for example, the attack on Sir Andries Stockenström in his function as lieutenant governor for the eastern districts of the colony. Since Stockenström had been appointed by Lord Glenelg to carry out the new policy towards the Xhosa, and since he had also been one of the most important witnesses before the Select Committee on Aborigines, he had been greeted on his return to the colony by an avalanche of assaults from the settlers of Grahamstown, and others, and by non-cooperation from the governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban. The personal vilification left him with little time to establish the peaceable relations with the Xhosa that were his principal task. Only the support he received from the Graaff-Reinet farmers—among whom he had grown up, and with whom he had worked as *landdrost* of that district—and also from army officers, provided the strength he needed to continue his work.<sup>55</sup>

The attack on Stockenström was personal, many-faceted, and delved deep into the past. It appears to have included references to his role as one of the law officers who had proceeded against the so-called Slachters Nek rebels of 1815.<sup>56</sup> Most notorious at the time was an attempt to have Stockenström indicted for the murder of a Xhosa during the 1819 war. During court proceedings, it became clear that, while on commando, Stockenström had shot a Xhosa who was hidden in the bushes, armed with an assegai, but also that he had done all he could to prevent the indiscriminate slaughter of Xhosa, despite a personal reason for vengeance in the death of his father, who some years before had been ambushed by the Imidange. The version put about was that Stockenström had shot the Xhosa, whose age was decreased by several years, while he was unarmed and preparing to surrender.

As two libel cases made clear, in the concoction of this story Moodie played a considerable part by searching the archives for information and hunting up persons who would swear affidavits to Stockenström's infamous conduct. Indeed, the editor John Fairbairn was clearly referring to him when he published this comment in the leading humanitarian organ at the Cape, the *South African Commercial Advertiser*:

No man's honor, no man's life is secure in a community where *individuals drawing the emoluments of an office long after that office has expired* are enabled, from that circumstance, to lead the unwary and ill-informed into a belief that *they are employed by Government to collect Evidence* against life and honor.

Included among those who might be concerned in this "villainy unparalleled since the days of Titus Oates" (the perpetrator of the Popish Plot in the reign of Charles II) it was suggested, was "the unprincipled place hunter in Graaff-Reinet."<sup>57</sup> On a later occasion Fairbairn commented that he had received a letter "referring to certain extracts taken and permitted to be taken from the Records of certain offices, for the purposes of aiding and furthering the criminal conspiracy, lately detected, against the life and honor of the Lieutenant Governor."<sup>58</sup> The whole business, he was later to write, smacked of "jobbery," a term that referred to the use of government funds to provide an income for friends and personal clients.<sup>59</sup>

Moodie sued Fairbairn for libel and won the case on the grounds that there was no evidence of a conspiracy. Shortly afterwards Stockenström sued the magistrate of Albany, Duncan Campbell, for spreading the same rumor, but lost his case also, rather to his surprise. Still, in the course of the trial, evidence came out that justified the original comments Fairbairn had made. At any rate Fairbairn thought so, for he published the proceedings of the courts in his paper and issued a pamphlet containing the records of the two cases. These be prefaced with the comment:

Mr Moodie and Capt. Campbell did, in an *irregular* manner prosecute, *in conjunction with each other*, an *extrajudicial* enquiry into the conduct of Capt. Stockenström, and that they both placed themselves in correspondence with a *private individual* named Chase, who, from the statements thus conveyed to him, spread about the pretended results of those irregular proceedings, and from this source flowed the malicious rumours against Capt. Stockenström.<sup>60</sup>

Moodie clearly did not feel vindicated by this verdict, and obtained an interdict to prevent any further distribution of the pamphlet, arguing that two documents had been omitted from the trial record<sup>61</sup> (they were actually irrelevant). The conclusion that any unbiased observers at the time, and any unbiased modern historians as well, would have drawn is clear; Moodie was using his position to acquire information that would discredit the political opponents of the Grahamstown and official party.

### The Compilation of *The Record*

Moodie's attack on Stockenström was followed by an attack, equally vitriolic, on John Philip. As editor of *The Record*, Moodie attempted to preserve the facade of impartiality and to let the official papers speak for themselves. When he launched his own attack on Philip's interpretations of South African history he did so as a member of the committee responsible for overseeing

1774 had returned complaining that they could not operate effectively with restrictions placed on their activities. The Council of Policy then acceded to their request that they be allowed to extirpate (*uijt roeijen*) the rapacious Bushmen.<sup>75</sup> This expression, used after the relative failure of the first commandoes, makes a considerable difference to the history of frontier policy. Philip's error in this was careless and culpable, though the basic moral point is surely unaffected.

Moodie drove his point time and again in letters to Philip and to the colonial government, and then published the ensuing correspondence as a pamphlet. He did not suggest that Philip may have made a careless error of date, though, even at the time, this was clear—a British parliamentary paper had already published an accurate summary of the order in question.<sup>76</sup> Philip eventually pointed out the relevant passage, without any great emphasis.<sup>77</sup> Moodie eventually published the resolution in English translation, but his rendition of *uijt roeijen*, the term used by the Council of Policy, as “root out” is much weaker than the original.<sup>78</sup> Whether by accident or design, the Dutch version of *The Record* ceased before it reached the year 1777. Considering the vehemence with which Moodie had claimed that no such order had been issued, and considering the fact that Abraham Faure had written to him in connection with the controversy that he, Faure, vaguely remembered having read a resolution on the “uitroeying der Bosjesmannen, or some similar expression,”<sup>79</sup> can this not be seen as a deliberate evasion, as an attempt to ensure that the political points *The Record* was trying to make went unchallenged?

### The Reception of *The Record*

The arguments aroused by the publication of Moodie's *The Record* evidently continued outside the written sphere. A traveler who visited the Cape in 1842 noted how “the publication of the authentic Cape records” had “agitated the respectable portion of this colony.”<sup>80</sup> When it seemed that official funds would not be sufficient to allow the work to be completed, a committee was formed to raise the necessary money. It was headed by Colonel Christopher Bird, a former colonial secretary, and Hendrik Cloete, a leading Cape Town lawyer. A number of prominent Cape Town citizens each provided £50 so that Moodie could continue his work until subscriptions to *The Record* could arrive. The eventual list of subscribers contained many of the prominent inhabitants of the colony. Sir Benjamin D'Urban, by now retired and living in Wynberg, ordered four copies.<sup>81</sup>

The motive the committee cited for its fund-raising was the recently published extracts from the archives which “purport to be official and which are calculated to excite fresh prejudices against our fellow colonist, and further irritate the already wounded feelings of those who suffer under the most odious, though . . . unfounded, imputations from which they have hitherto had no means of escaping except by flight.”<sup>82</sup> As an example, they referred

to a 1780 resolution of the VOC Council of Policy relating to the first war with the Xhosa, given in evidence to the Select Committee on Aborigines. Moodie's researches revealed that the preamble had been omitted, thus leaving out the argument that the Xhosa were considered to have been the aggressors.<sup>83</sup> The fund-raising committee was, in consequence, enthusiastic about Moodie's work. Plans were even afoot to have *The Record* translated into French and German, but these came to nothing.<sup>84</sup> Those who read in *The Record* what they wanted to believe considered that publishing as complete a set of official and other documents as possible.

will place in its true light the conduct of successive governments and the people of the Cape of Good Hope towards the Native tribes of South Africa, more especially towards the [Xhosa]; with the view of thereby refuting the calumnious statements, which, whether from misinformation or by design, have so misled the European Governments of the Parent Country, and the civilized world at large, as to the true character of the people of this colony.<sup>85</sup>

When this statement was published in the *Government Gazette*, the impression was given that the new governor, Sir George Napier, was associating himself with these remarks. This brought a sharp rebuke for the committee from Napier, who pointed out that he had only said that the publication of the documents was an important step towards an unbiased history of the colony, and had made no comment on the content of *The Record*.<sup>86</sup> Nevertheless, Napier was prepared to allow the use of public funds for the continuation of the work, because he heeded their representations. Before doing so, he had consulted with Sir Andries Stockenström, who as lieutenant-governor of the eastern province was responsible for granting access to material still held in magisterial offices.<sup>87</sup> While it must have given Stockenström some wry satisfaction to have a veto over his old adversaries' activities, he did not see fit to impose it.

Lord Glenelg in London had queried Moodie's still receiving his salary as Protector of Slaves long after the need for that office had disappeared, especially since he had not yet completed his final report.<sup>88</sup> On receiving Napier's dispatch, however, Glenelg was convinced that Moodie's researches should be continued for six months "in view of the high degree of local importance which appears . . . to be attached" to them.<sup>89</sup> His successor cut the funds in an economy drive.

The conservative press at the Cape realized that *The Record* was directed primarily against Philip and was convinced that it had struck home. The editor of the *Graham's Town Journal*, Robert Godlonton, eager to attack Philip, repeated Moodie's claim that no order had ever been given for the "extermination of the Bushmen."<sup>90</sup> And the *Ware Afrikaner* wrote that "the publication of our archives is not only a very useful work, but has so far provided a most blessed rebuttal of every accusation made against the colonists."<sup>91</sup> That paper directly accused Philip of being the editor responsible for the excisions from Collins's journal when it was published by the British parliament, though

it is difficult to see how he could have been.<sup>92</sup> *De Zuid-Afrikaan* wrote in an extensive article that, however prejudiced a reader of *The Record* might have been at first, after he had read it

he would be forced to admit that, not just in one, or two, or four or six cases, but in every case in which, in the Report of Mr. Buxton's committee, an important conclusion was made on the basis of specific documentary evidence, that evidence is not able to stand comparison of a moment; and that the true searcher after the "truth" will do no more than this. He will arise from his research and feel shame that the magnanimous opinions of intelligent and charitable men have been so misled, and [would have] feelings of the most bitter resentment against the perpetrator of this wrong.

It proceeded to list the points on which the committee had been misinformed: the treatment of the Khoi after 1652, the question of Bushman origins, the Khoi population in 1652, the extirpation order, and the circumstances of the first frontier war with the Xhosa. It concluded that the accuser, Dr. Philip, was "totally without credibility," and that any attempt to defend him would be in vain. In short,

for their attacks on the compiler of the colonial archives, the colony can thank the supporters of this remarkable priestly-political speculator for a full but very composed exhibition of perhaps the most wicked misleading which anyone has ever dared perpetrate in the field of politics, and their history will provide a lesson for future legislators of the colony to obtain their information from the best available sources and to watch out for the unauthorized quackery of conscienceless agitators.<sup>93</sup>

J. C. Chase, a participant in the attack on Philip, recalling some two decades later his own pamphlet *Some Reasons for Our Opposing the Author of the "South African Researches,"* which had largely been published in *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, said that "it was written in troublous times—amid much excitement and political strife."<sup>94</sup>

To Fairbairn, editor of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, fell the principal responsibility for defending his father-in-law, John Philip. He performed the task with the mix of exaggerated politeness and vitriol characteristic of so much of the nineteenth-century press as he argued that Philip had on occasion been careless, but commented as follows on the contents of *The Record* and the actions of the people around Moodie:

... it is shown that the *Colonists on Commandos* in the short period of ten years slaughtered *Two thousand, four hundred and eighty of the natives in a single district*:—and that this statement is given to the world by Mr. Cloete and Colonel Bird ... as a defence of colonial character.

Had these documents been produced before the system of extermination was abandoned, and for the purpose of compelling the British Government to arrest the work of destruction, the parties might justly have claimed praise for their humanity, and money for their labor. But that work has been accomplished long ago by others, particularly by the Commissioners of Inquiry,<sup>95</sup> who judged it sufficient for all practical purposes, to state generally the result of their researches into this most painful subject, sparing the Colonists the grief and horror which a publication of the details must have occasioned. And for this proper delicacy, this avoidance of unnecessary exposure, they are now publicly censured by Mr. H. Cloete and Col. Bird, who beg Four hundred

pounds a year and the salary of a clerk for their friend Mr. Donald Moodie to enable him to complete the frightful picture.<sup>96</sup>

This was unanswerable, though no doubt it failed to convince those who were not prepared to be convinced.

Thereafter, the controversy died the death of most controversies, that of exhaustion. *The Record* was left as a partial collection, and no further publication of historical material was sanctioned by the Cape government until establishment of the Cape Archives at the end of the nineteenth century, in quite different political circumstances.<sup>97</sup> Moodie left for Natal, where he became colonial secretary and toyed with the idea of writing a history of the Cape, though he never did. Philip was now growing old, and, anyway, he had been dragged back unwillingly into the historical debate he had abandoned more than a decade earlier. Fairbairn, too, was more concerned with current events than with the colony's past. Historical research in South Africa was almost non-existent for nearly half a century, and when it returned the immediacy of the 1830s had disappeared. But Moodie's work had set the pattern for much later research. It had opened debate on a number of topics, notably the position of the Bushmen and the policy towards the eastern frontier, still of importance today, on which his painstaking work still provides the most accessible evidence. It also set the style for much historical writing on South Africa, in its naive belief that attention to the documents could settle everything, without either a critical discussion of the implied biases or an enduring engagement with present issues.



# Notes

## Abbreviations

ARA	Algemene Rijksarchief (General State Archives), The Hague.
AYB	<i>Archives Year book for South African History.</i>
BPP	British Parliamentary Paper.
CA	Cape Archives.
c.s.	<i>cum suis</i> (with others).
JAH	<i>Journal of African History.</i>
KP	K. M. Jeffreys et al. (eds.), <i>Kaapse plakkaatboek</i> , 6 vols. (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1944–1951).
LMS	London Missionary Society, also the archives of that body, now the Congregational Council for World Mission, held in the School of Oriental and African Studies, London.
PRO	Public Record Office, London.
RCC	G. Mc. Theal (ed.), <i>Records of the Cape Colony</i> , 36 vols. (London: for the Cape Government, 1895–1906).
SACA	<i>South African Commercial Advertiser.</i>
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies.
SSA	<i>Collected Seminar Papers of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London: The Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.</i>
UCT	University of Cape Town.
UNISA	University of South Africa.
VOC	<i>Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie</i> (Dutch East India Company), also the archives of that body in ARA.

## Introduction (pp. 1–9)

1. *Adam Kok's Griquas: A Study in the Development of Stratification in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

2. It may be, indeed, that my opinions as to the methodology of historical research have led me to give a too “ideal” description of the way in which I went to work. This reconstruction of my intellectual development is thus as self-serving and untrustworthy as most autobiographies, no more and no less.

3. *Adam Kok's Griquas*, 3.

4. My works in which the slaves' experiences are the center of attention include

*Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); "Oppression, Sexuality and Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope," *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 6 (1980), 421-34; and "The Occupations of Slaves in Eighteenth-Century Cape Town," *Studies in the History of Cape Town* 2 (1980), 1-14.

5. As too much South African historiography has demonstrated, it is necessary to frame this sentence in the normative mode.

6. On this see Pamela Scully, *The Bouquet of Freedom: Social and Economic Relations in Stellenbosch District, South Africa, c. 1870-1900* (Cape Town: Center of African Studies, 1990); idem, "Criminality and Conflict in Rural Stellenbosch, 1870-1900," *JAH* 30 (1989); Francis Wilson, Alide Kooy, and Delia Hendrie (eds.), *Farm Labour in South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1977).

7. The volume of essays emanating from the July 1989 Cape Town conference on "Cape Slavery—and After," edited by Nigel Worden and Clifton Crais, should do much to increase our knowledge of this crucial moment in the South African past.

8. The comparative literature on the effects of emancipation is vast. For good entries into the material, at least insofar as it concerns New World slavery (more apposite for present purposes than, for instance, African slavery), see Stanley L. Engerman, "Economic Adjustments to Emancipation in the United States and British West Indies," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 12 (1982); idem, "Slavery and Emancipation in Comparative Perspective: A Look at Some Recent Debates," *Journal of Economic History* 46 (1986); and Steven Hahn, "Class and State in Postemancipation Societies: Southern Planters in Comparative Perspective," *American Historical Review* 95 (1990).

9. The research of Susan Newton-King, Nigel Penn, and Henry Bredekamp, above all, will do much to resolve the issues involved here. In the meantime, see Richard Elphick and V. C. Malherbe, "The Khoisan to 1828," in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840*, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longmans, 1989), 3-66.

10. On this underresearched topic, see Jay Naidoo, *Tracking Down Historical Myths: Eight South African Cases* (Johannesburg: Ad. Donker, 1989), Ch. 2; Leslie C. Duly, "A Revisit with the Cape's Hottentot Ordinance of 1828," in M. Kooy (ed.), *Studies in Economics and Economic History* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

11. Gerrit Schutte, "Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795," in Elphick and Giliomee, *Shaping*, 297.

12. On this problem, see P. C. van Duin, "Ras, Klasse en Status: Rassendiscriminatie in Zuid-Afrika en de ontwikkeling van de sociale structuur van Kaapstad van de 17e tot de 20e eeuw," unpublished paper (1988).

13. C. C. de Villiers, *Geslagsregisters van Ou Kaapse Families*, 2nd ed., edited by C. Pama, 3 vols. (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1965).

14. J. B. Peires, "The British and the Cape, 1814-1834," in Elphick and Giliomee, *Shaping*, 490-99.

15. It should be mentioned that the most important intellectual contribution to the development of the ideas presented in this volume, apart from the numerous discussions with Dik van Arkel and Chris Quispel which led to "Going beyond the Pale," was the work for *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1987), which I wrote together with Pieter van Duin.

## I. The Cape Economy and the Cape Gentry (pp. 13-49)

1. D. Moodie, *The Record* (reprinted Amsterdam and Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1960), 1:7.

2. A. Appel "Die Geskiedenis van Houtvoorsiening aan die Kaap, 1652-1795," MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch (1966).
3. M. F. de Chavonnes and Baron van Imhoff, *The Reports of De Chavonnes and His Council and Van Imhoff on the Cape* (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1918), 130; O. F. Mentzel, *A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope*, translated by H. J. Mandelbrote, 3 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1921-44), 2:152.
4. Anna Boësen, "Die Nederlandse Kommissaris en die 18de eeuse samelewing aan die Kaap," *AYB* (1944), 145ff.
5. Richard Elphick, *Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), esp. Ch. 5.
6. On the establishment of the settlement see Leonard Guelke, "Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers, 1657-1780," in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840*, 2nd ed. (London and Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longmans, 1989), 69-73.
7. G. C. de Wet, *Die Vryhede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting 1657-1707* (Cape Town: Historiese Publikasievereniging, 1981), Chs. 6-10.
8. The figure in 1700 refers to the Europeans and the slaves, and thus not to the Khoisan who still inhabited the great majority of what was to become the Cape Colony. See Pieter van Duin and Robert Ross, *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century*, Intercontinenta, Vol. 7 (Leiden: Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1987), 112-15.
9. R. Raven-Hart, *Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1702: The First 50 Years of Dutch Colonization as Seen by Callers*, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Balkema, 1971), 2:402, citing Christoffel Langhansz, who was in Cape Town in 1694.
10. In 1822 there were 1,468 houses (W. W. Bird), *State of the Cape of Good Hope in 1822* (Reprinted in Cape Town: Struik, 1966), 338. For further statistical information see the *Cape of Good Hope Blue Book and Statistical Register*, in the PRO in manuscript until 1837, thereafter printed.
11. J. J. Janse van Rensburg, "Die Geskiedenis van die wingerdkultuur in Suid-Afrika, 1652-1752," *AYB* (1954), 2; G. J. Jooste, "Die Geskiedenis van Wynbou en wynhandel in die Kaap Kolonie, 1652-1795," MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch (1973), 132ff; D. J. van Zyl, *Kaapse wyn en brandewyn, 1795-1860* (Cape Town and Pretoria: HAUM, 1974); Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, 133-35.
12. With regard to livestock ownership, this could be done by comparing individual farmers' *opgaaf* returns with inventories of their estates taken shortly afterwards. See A. J. H. van der Walt, *Die Ausdehnung der Kolonie am Kap der Guten Hoffnung (1700-1779)* (Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1928), 77; Leonard Guelke, "The Early European Settlement of South Africa," PhD thesis, University of Toronto (1974), 259. The same procedure has been used, e.g., by A. J. du Plessis, "Die Geskiedenis van die Graankultuur tydens die Eerste Eeu, 1652-1752," *Annale van die Universiteit van Stellenbosch* (Cape Town, 1933), to establish the level of evasion with regard to grain, but this is highly suspect, since any grain marketed between the harvest and the making of the inventory would not appear in the latter, while conversely any grain held for longer than one year would reduce the apparent level of evasion. Since a far smaller proportion of stock would have been marketed, the distortions caused by this problem would have been far lower in this case. Levels of what evasion were determined, very approximately, by estimating levels of consumption in those years when it is known that supply and demand were in equilibrium and comparing them to the *opgaaf*. For a detailed explication of this, see Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, Ch. 3.
13. Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, Ch. 3.
14. ARA VOC 4315, 576.
15. C. F. J. Muller, *Johannes Frederik Kirsten oor die Toestand van die Kaapkolonie in 1795* (Pretoria: UNISA, 1960), 61; G. McC. Theal (ed.), *Belangrijke Histo-*

*rische Dokumenten over Zuid-Afrika; deel III* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1911), 36–38; D. G. van Reenen, *Die joernaal van Dirk Gysbert van Reenen*, edited by W. Blommaert and J. A. Wiid (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1937), 285.

16. John Marinowitz, "Rural Production and Labour in the Western Cape, 1838–1888, with Special Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts," PhD thesis, University of London (1985), 18; E. H. Burrows, *Overberg Outspan: A Chronicle of People and Places in the South Western Districts of the Cape* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1952), 233; H. L. G. Swart, "Die ontwikkeling van handel aan die Kaap tussen die jare 1785 en 1806," MA thesis, UCT (1949), 89–93.

17. Robert Ross, "The Relative Importance of Exports and the Internal Market for the Agriculture of the Cape Colony, 1770–1855," in G. Liesegang, H. Pasch, and A. Jones (eds.), *Figuring African Trade: Proceedings of the Symposium on the Quantification and Structure of the Import and Export and Long Distance Trade of Africa in the Nineteenth Century* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1985), 257.

18. Alan Mabin, "The Rise and Decline of Port Elizabeth, 1850–1900," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 19 (1986), 275–303.

19. Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, 10, 114–15. Unfortunately, it has as yet proved beyond the ingenuity of scholars to reconstruct the level of slave imports to the Cape, but, since there are no customs figures, or their equivalents, to do so would entail relying on the annual slave population figures given here.

20. On these exports, see Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, Ch. 2.

21. "Plan om den handel van tarwe van die Kaap bij aanhoudendheid te kunnen drijven," *Kroniek van het Historische Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht* 26 (1872), 203–5.

22. D. J. van Zyl, "Die Geskiedenis van Graanbou aan die Kaap, 1795–1826," *AYB* (1968), 1:222–33.

23. Mary Rayner, "Wine and slaves: The Failure of an Export Economy and the Ending of Slavery in the Cape Colony, South Africa, 1806–1834," PhD thesis, Duke University (1986), Ch. 4.

24. Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, Ch. 2; F. de Haan, *Oud Batavia: Gedenboek*, 2 vols. (Jakarta: G. Kolff, 1922), 2:542.

25. See, e.g., reports of the Commission of Circuit for 1812, RCC 9:89 and for 1813, RCC 10:98.

26. This period saw the heyday of the colony's largest wool estate, that owned by Van Breda, Reitz, Joubert and Co., near Cape Agulhas. See Burrows, *Overberg Outspan*, Ch. 4.

27. When these figures are available for the eighteenth century they are given in Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, Ch. 3; for the nineteenth century, see Van Zyl, "Graanbou," 273, and Van Zyl, *Kaapse wyn en brandewyn*, 104–5.

28. For an attempt to do this, see Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, Ch. 3.

29. E.g., RCC 4:195.

30. On the first group, see Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell, "An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in the Cape Colony, 1682–1731," *Journal of Historical Geography* 9 (1983), 272; Gerard Wagenaar, "Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen: Sy aandeel in die Kaapse Geskiedenis tot 1806," MA thesis, University of Pretoria (1976), 12. On the problem in general, see Guelke, "Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers," 84–93, and "The Making of Two Frontier Communities: Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century," *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 12 (1985); Susan Newton-King, "Some Thoughts about the Political Economy of Graaf-Reinet in the Late Eighteenth Century," unpublished paper (1984).

31. James C. Armstrong and Nigel Worden, "The Slaves, 1652–1834," in Elphick and Gilliomme, *Shaping*, 112–19.

32. Wagenaar, "Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen," 137–39.

33. The estate papers in the archive of the Orphan Chamber (CA/MOOC) contain numerous printed forms that record the contract by which a sailor was bound to deliver his chest to a named merchant in Cape Town.

34. Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*, Ch. 3.

35. See below, p. 33.

36. Ross, "Relative Importance," 254.

37. W. S. van Ryneveld, *Aanmerkingen over de Verbetering van het vee aan de Kaap de Goede Hoop*, edited by H. B. Thom (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1942), 41.

38. Ross, "Relative Importance," 248–60.

39. This is of course the multiplier effect of economic theory. For a useful exposition, see G. R. Hawke, *Economics for Historians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 63–74.

40. For recent statements of this view, see M. F. Katzen, "White Settlers and the Origin of a New Society, 1652–1778," in Monica Wilson and L. M. Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968–71), 1:198; Gerrit Schutte, "Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652–1795," in Elphick and Giliomee, *Shaping*, 316. Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (London: Longmans, 1980), 21, would seem to accept a weaker version of this view, stressing the monopoly position of the VOC rather than the production difficulties of the farmers. This view of the company and the Cape market is implicit in such older works as Van der Walt, *Ausdehnung*; P. J. van der Merwe, *Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek, 1770–1842* (The Hague: Van Stockum, 1937), and idem, *Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van de Kaapkolonie (1657–1792)* (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1938). The major statement of revision is William B. Freund, "Society and Government in Dutch South Africa: The Cape and the Batavians, 1803–6," PhD thesis, Yale University (1971).

41. C. Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die laatste Kwart van die achttiende eeu en die die voortlewing van hul denkbeeld*, 2nd ed. (Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik, 1967), 33–34.

42. J. A. de Mist, *The Memorandum of Commissary J. A. de Mist*, edited by K. M. Jeffreys (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1920), 175–76.

43. Schutte, "Company and Colonists," 303–7.

44. Strictly speaking this last should be called a monopsony.

45. This is based on an examination of the Rendementen, annual lists of VOC sales in Cape Town, which are held in the Algemene Rijksarchief. There are extant lists for 26 years in the eighteenth century, covering the period 1747–77.

46. The best surveys of the VOC's activities are F. S. Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC* (Haarlem: Fibula van Dishoek, 1982), and idem, "The Shifting Balance of Trade of the Dutch East India Company," in L. Blussé and F. S. Gaastra (eds.), *Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading Companies During the Ancien Régime* (Leiden: Marthinus Nijhoff, 1981), 47–70. For the establishment of the monopoly of cloves in the Moluccas see G. J. Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen: de Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de bevolking van Ambon, 1656–1696* (Dordrecht: Foris, for the Koninklijke Institute voor Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde, 1987). For Dutch Sri Lanka see, above all, D. A. Kotalawe, "Agrarian Policies of the Dutch in South-West Ceylon," A. A. G. *Bijdragen* 14:3–33. Dutch Banda awaits its modern historian, but for an indication of the process of conquest see John Villiers, "Trade and Society in the Banda Islands in the Sixteenth Century," *Modern Asian Studies* 15 (1981), 723–50.

47. There were numerous *plakkaten* against the sale of tobacco. The last seems to have been issued in 1740. See KP 2:188. For coffee, see *ibid.*, 4:85.

48. Gaastra, *Geschiedenis van de VOC*; J. J. Steur, *Herstel of Ondergang: De*

*Voorstellen tot redding van de V.O.C.* (Utrecht: HES, 1984), esp. 237–46; J. P. de Korte, *De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording in de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Leiden: Marthinus Nijhoff, 1984).

49. A request to this effect was made on 18 July 1719: H. C. V. Leibbrandt, *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Requesten (Memorials)*, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1905), 1:49, but was refused. It was repeated at intervals through the eighteenth century.

50. *Plakkaat* of 21 Nov. 1792, PK 4:141–55; Wagenaar, “Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen,” 145–50; A. Boësen, “Die Nederlandse Kommissarisee en de 18de eeuwse samelewing aan die Kaap,” *AYB* (1944), 177–78. On the case of the *Herstelder*, owned by the whaling company Fehrzen & Co., which was captured by the British during its voyage to the Netherlands, see PRO HCA 32/668/82 and O. G. de Wet et al. to General Craig, July 1796, RCC 1:408–10.

51. E.g., ARA VOC 4278, *Resolutiën van de Politieke Raad*, 6 December 1774.

52. E.g., ARA VOC 4319, Governor and Council to XVII, 1 July 1786, 22ff; Jooste, “Geschiedenis van Wynbou en Wynhandel,” 132ff.

53. For grain prices see Guelke, “Early European Settlement,” 264; Du Plessis, “Geschiedenis van die Graankultuur,” 80; J. H. D. Scheuder, “Die Geschiedenis van ons graanbou (1752–1795),” MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch (1948), 42–67. For complaints, see, e.g., Leibbrandt, *Requesten*, 1:135, 154–55, 160–67.

54. For the conditions of the meat *pacht*, see the *Resolutiën van de politieke Raad* for 1 February at, usually, five-yearly intervals. For the best analysis of the meat market in the last decades of the company rule, see Wagenaar, “Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen,” Chs. 2 and 3. See also Van Duin and Ross, *Economy*.

55. See their concerns on the sales of Constantia wine, cited above in note 52.

56. Wagenaar, “Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen,” 82; Muller, *Johannes Frederik Kirsten*, 85–86. It was possible for a ship to travel from Europe to Asia (or the reverse trip) without putting into port, and St. Helena was always available to allow rewatering.

57. The figures are drawn from F. S. Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC* (Haarlem: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1982), 135.

58. See in particular the papers in ARA VOC 4347; also A. L. Geyer, *Dass Wirtschaftliche System der Niederländischen ost-Indischen Kompanie am Kap der Guten Hoffnung, 1785–1795* (Munich and Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1923), 9–38.

59. On this see Gaastra, “De VOC,” and Johan de Vries, *De economische achteruitgang der Republiek in de achttiende eeuw* (Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1969), 179.

60. Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 333–35.

61. Guelke, “Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers,” 92–94.

62. These data were abstracted from Hans Franssen and Mary Alexander Cook, *The Old Buildings of the Cape* (Cape Town: Balkema, 1980). For each farmhouse, only the date of the first building, or major rebuilding, was recorded. Stellenbosch/Drakenstein was taken to include modern Stellenbosch, Somerset West, Pearl, Franschoek, and Wellington districts; Swartland to include Malmesbury, Darling, Piquetberg, and Clanwilliam; and Overberg to include Tulbagh, Ceres, Worcester, Robertson, Caledon, Bredasdorp, and Swellendam. Urban dwellings were not included. For the use of analogous information, see W. G. Hoskins, “The Rebuilding of Rural England, 1570–1640,” *Past and Present* 4 (1954), and R. Machin, “The Great Rebuilding: A Reassessment,” *Past and Present* 77 (1977). See also the comment of C. de Jong, *Reizen naar de Kaap de Goede Hoop . . . 1791–1797* (Haarlem: François Bohn, 1802–1803), 2 vols., 2:139: “Het bouwen is hier niet slechts een liefhebberij, het is een drift, een dolheid, een besmettelijke razernij die meest alle mensen heeft aangetast.” (Translation: “Building here is not only a pleasure, it is a craze, a madness, an infectious rage that has attacked almost everyone.”)

63. H. Roy de Puyfontaine, *Louis Michel Thibault 1750–1815: His Official Life*

at the Cape of Good Hope Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1972); Fransen and Cook, *Old Buildings*, 242.

64. Cited in S. D. Naude, "William Cornelis Boers," *AYB* (1950), 2:413.

65. Cited in *ibid.*, 414.

66. In this context, by "family" I mean those people who have the same surname.

67. The sources for these statements are the *opgaaf* rolls for the relevant years from the Cape Archives, as prepared for computer analysis by Hans Heese and Van Zyl, *Kaapse wyn en brandewyn*, 312-41.

68. These were the families Cloete, De Villiers, De Vos, Du Plessis, Du Preez, Du Toit, Joubert, Le Roux, Malan, Marais, Minnaar, Morkel, Myberg, Retief, Roux, Theron, Van Brakel, and Van der Byl.

69. These figures are of the order of those that might be expected by normal demographic wastage. Cf. K. Wachter and P. Laslett, "Measuring Patriline Extinction for Modeling Social Mobility in the Past," in K. Wachter, E. A. Hammell, and P. Laslett, *Statistical Studies of Historical Social Structure* (New York and London: Academic Press, 1978), 113-35.

70. E.g., Freund, "Society and Government," 81.

71. N. G. Penn, "Anarchy and Authority in the Koue Bokkeveld, 1739-1779: The Banishing of Carel Buijtendag," *Kleio* 17 (1985), 24-43; Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 38.

72. Gerrit J. Schutte, *De Nederlandse Patriotten en de Koloniën: Een onderzoek naar hun denkbeelden en optreden, 1770-1800* (Groningen: Tjeenk Willink, 1974), *passim*.

73. Printed in *Kaapse Geschillen* (otherwise known as *Kaapse Stukken*), (The Hague: by order of the States General, 1785), 4 vols., 1:29; see also Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 26-27, 32-61.

74. This, of course, had been the basis of the charge against Willem Adriaan van der Stel in 1705-1707. See Schutte, "Company and Colonists," 303-9. For further examples, see O. F. Mentzel, *Life at the Cape in the Mid-Eighteenth Century, Being the Biography of Rudolf Siegfried Alleman*, translated by M. Greenless (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1920), 78, 128-30; *idem*, *A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope (1787)*, translated by G. V. Marais and J. H. Hoge, edited by H. Mandelbrote, 3 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1921-44), 1:27, 138. These works relate to the 1730s and 1740s but were written much later, perhaps after Mentzel had heard of the charges of the Patriot Movement.

75. G. McC. Theal, *History of South Africa under the Administration of the Dutch East India Company*, 2 vols. (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1897), 2:156-57. Although Tulbagh's annual salary was never more than f12,400, his executors transmitted at least f105,000 to his heir in the Netherlands when they wound up his estate. See ARA VOC 4265, 2901, and 409, and VOC 4268, 131.

76. Tensions between these two groups were to develop later. See Schutte, "Company and Colonists," 314.

77. See Armstrong and Worden, "Slaves," 110-22, 147; R. Elphick and R. Shell, "Intergroup Relations: Khoikhoi, Settlers, Slaves and Free Blacks," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 213; F. R. Bradlow and Margaret Cairns, *The Early Cape Muslims* (Cape Town: Balkema, 1978), 139; Robert Ross, *Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Routledge, 1982), 13-14.

78. See below, Ch. 7.

79. E.g., Carel van der Merwe c.s. to Landdrost Graaf-Reinet, in Minutes of Graaf-Reinet Landdrost and Heemraden, 1 November 1790, CA GR 1/1, 36-37.

80. Hermann Giliomee, "The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812," in *Shaping*, 440-42.

81. Wagenaar, "Johannes Gijsbertus van Reenen," Chs. 1 and 3.

82. These figures have been compiled by comparing the list of signatures in *Kaapse Geschillen* 1:73–75, with the *opgaaf* list for Stellenbosch and Drakenstein for 1782, of which I have an alphabetized print-out produced by the Institute of Historical Research of the University of the Western Cape (with thanks to Hans Heese).

83. See, for instance, the letters from Joachim van Plettenberg, C. J. van der Graaf and W. C. Boers to the Stadhouder, ARA Stadhouderlijk Secretarie, 1186–1192; it is notable that barrels of Constantia wine were seen as an acceptable gift from a client to his patron. See also G. J. Schutte (ed.), *Briefwisseling van Hendrik Swellengrebel Jnr. oor Kaapse Sake, 1778–1792* (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1982), 91, 120, on the protection which the company advocate, F. W. Boers, gave to his nephew, W. C. Boers, who was *fiscaal* at the Cape.

84. The circumstances under which this memorial was presented are made clear in Schutte (ed.), *Briefwisseling van Hendrik Swellengrebel*, 196–201, letter XXV, which shows that it was in fact composed in the Netherlands and was intended to be an intervention in the debates within the VOC over the Cape.

85. For an overview of their powers, see the “Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry on the Administration of Government,” RCC 27:356–58, and the “Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry upon Criminal Law and Jurisprudence,” RCC 33:47ff.

86. “Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry upon the Administration of Government,” RCC 27:377, and “Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry upon the Finances,” RCC 27:406.

87. “Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry upon the Administration of Government,” RCC 27:377–78.

88. “Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry upon Criminal Law and Jurisprudence,” RCC 33:329–39.

89. It is certainly true that in the eighteenth century most cases of brutality which came to the notice of the authorities were committed by hired overseers, or by sons of the slaveowners. See Ross, *Cape of Torments*, 29–37.

90. If they had been slaves assaulting free men, the case would have been too serious for the court of *Landdrost* and *Heemraden* to deal with.

91. On this see Mary Rayner, “Slaves, Slave-Owners and the British State: The Cape Colony, 1806–1834,” *SSA* 12 (1981), 26, 31; I. Edwards, *Towards Emancipation: A Study in South African Slavery* (Cardiff: J. Lewis and Son, 1942), 126–35.

92. Rayner, “Slaves, Slave-Owners and the British State,” 27–28; Edwards, *Towards Emancipation*, 102, 120; Mrs. Jane Philip to LMS, 31.10.1832, LMS archives (in the School of Oriental and African Studies, London), South African Incoming Letters, 13/1/D.

93. F. S. Gaastra, “De Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in de zeventiende eeuw: de groei van een bedrijf. Geld tegen goederen, een structurele verandering in het Nederlands-Aziatisch handelsverkeer,” *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 91 (1976), 254; KP 3:136; Proclamation by Sir David Baird, 23 Jan. 1806, RCC 5:305–6.

94. Brian Kantor, “The Rixdollar and Foreign Exchange,” *South African Journal of Economics* 38 (1970), 70.

95. For the operations of J. H. Blankenberg in this respect, see CA MOOC 14/36/ii.

96. J. L. M. Franken, “’n Kaapse huishoue in die 18e Eeu uit Von Dessin se Briefboek en Memoriaal,” *AYB* (1940), 1:53.

97. See, e.g., the estates of P. J. Coetse (deceased 1776), CA MOOC 14/59/14; Johan Smith (deceased 1776), CA MOOC 13/17/24 and Andries van Sittert (deceased 1786), CA MOOC 14/68/4.

98. "Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry to Earl Bathurst on the Finances," RCC 27:459.

99. "Geschiedkundig Tafereel der Weeskamer," *Het Nederduitsch Zuid-Afrikaanse Tijdschrift* 9 (1832), 301-11.

100. "Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry . . . on the Finances," RCC 27:459.

101. KP 3:135-36.

102. *Ibid.*, 3:161-62. Indeed the company was forced to mint guilders, a denomination that had never previously been sent overseas, in order to meet this debt. See *Resolutien van de Hoge Mogende Heeren Staaten Generaal der Vereenigde Nederlandsche Provinciën: 1785, 1344-45* (21 Dec. 1785). Under the Batavian Republic coins were also struck specifically for the Cape, but when they arrived De Mist considered the situation too precarious and ordered that they be sent on to Batavia, to avoid capture by the British: C. Scholten, *De Munten van de Nderlandse Gebeidsdelen Overzee, 1601-1948* (Amsterdam: J. Schulman, 1951), 66. I owe this information to my colleague F. S. Gaastra.

103. Macartney to Dundas, 20 Oct. 1797, RCC 1:189-90.

104. Geyer, *Wirtschaftliche System*, 80.

105. Kantor, "Rixdollar," citing BPP 438 of 1826, *Papers Respecting a British Metallic Circulation at the Cape of Good Hope*, 28. The figures were calculated on the basis of the premium which had to be paid for the various bills in England, particularly for the army and navy commissariats. Since the military expenditures at the Cape provided the main channel for the transfer of funds from the Cape to England, and since a merchant could pay into the army accounts and have his agent draw an equivalent amount from the army's account at the exchequer in London, these premiums provide an index of the real value of the Cape rixdollar, at least in relation to sterling.

106. Kantor, "Rixdollar," 86-88.

107. Documents referred to in the report of the Commissioners of Enquiry upon the Cape of Good Hope, BPP 496 of 1827, 13. CA CO 36, Dashwood to Cradock, 6 Aug. 1812, cited in Swart, "Developments in Currency and Banking at the Cape Between 1782 and 1825, with an Account of Contemporary Controversies," PhD thesis, UCT (1953), 251.

108. Marian George, "John Bardwell Ebdon: His Business and Political Career at the Cape, 1806-1849," AYB (1986), 1:17-26.

109. See the annual report of the Commercial Exchange for 1834, cited in R. F. M. Immelman, *Men of Good Hope: The Romantic Story of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, 1804-1954* (Cape Town: Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, 1955), 114.

110. Kantor, "Rixdollar," 88.

111. Evidence of John Marshall, 28 Dec. 1824, RCC 19: 414.

112. See P. Cloeten, "Journaal van eene landtogt die den ondergetekende met den Wel edelen heer Mr. Hendrik Swellengrebel in den jare 1776 gedaan heeft," in E. C. Godée Molsbergen (ed.), *Reizen in Zuid-Afrika in de Hollandse Tijd: Vierde del, Tochten in het Kafferland, 1776-1805* (The Hague: Marthinus Nijhoff for the Lindshoten Vereeniging, 1932), 1-38.

113. Giliomee, "Eastern Frontier," 440-42.

114. See the classic study by P. J. van der Merwe, *Trek: Studies oor die mobiliteit van die Pioniersbevolking aan die Kaap* (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1945).

115. Schutte (ed.), *Briefwisseling van Hendrik Swellengrebel*, 100.

116. Cited in Van der Merwe, *Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie*, 244.

117. Leonard Guelke, "Land Tenure and Settlement at the Cape, 1652-1812," in L. Martin and K. J. Friedlaender (eds.), *History of Surveying and Land Tenure in South*

*Africa, I: Surveying and Land Tenure in the Cape, 1652-1812* (Cape Town: UCT Department of Surveying, 1984); Lesley C. Duly, *British Land Policy at the Cape 1795-1844: A Study in the Administrative Procedures in the Empire* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1968), Ch. 1; below, Ch. 6.

118 These latter two factors are not independent of each other. See Robert Ross, "Capitalism, Expansion and Incorporation in South Africa," in Howard Lamar and L. M. Thompson (eds.), *The Frontier in History: North America and South Africa Compared* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), 218-22.

119. Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell, "An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in the Cape Colony, 1682-1731," *Journal of Historical Geography* 9 (1983), 272; André Appel, "Die distrik Oudtshoorn tot die tagtigerjare van die 19e eeu: 'n socio-historiese studie," *AYB* (1988), 2:8.

120. Wagenaar, "Johannes Gijsbertus van Reenen," 12; for a description of the former farm, transformed a generation later into a flourishing grain and fruit growing enterprise, see G. McC. Theal (ed.), *Belangrijke Historische Dokumenten verzameld in die Kaap Kolonie en elders*, 3 vols. (Cape Town: for the Government, 1896-1911), 3:380, and for one of the latter, W. Blommaert and J. A. Wiid (eds.), *Die Joernaal van Dirk Gysbert van Reenen* (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1937), 57.

121. Leonard Guelke, "Frontier Settlement in Early Dutch South Africa," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 66 (1976), 42, and idem, "Comment in Reply" to William Norton, "Frontier Agriculture—Subsistence or Commercial?," both in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 67 (1977), 465-66. Guelke's work began as a long polemic against S. D. Neumark, *Economic Influences on the South African Frontier, 1652-1836* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957). While this latter work was most valuable in demystifying the history of the *trekboers* and arguing for the economic rationality of their actions (although in many ways P. J. van der Merwe had already done the same for those who took the trouble to read Afrikaans), Neumark's specific arguments are often implausible, notably his belief that stock farming provided a better return on capital than arable farming, and was thus preferable, even though a mass of evidence demonstrates that the *trekboers* had a lower standard of living than the gentry of the southwest. Moreover it should be borne in mind that Neumark's empirical data should be treated with the utmost caution.

122. Neumark, *Economic Influences*, 58-59; Ross, "Capitalism, Expansion and Incorporation," 216-17.

123. For instance, the inspection trip of the *Commissie van Veeteelt* in 1804 describes a population that to all appearances had been settled and commercialized for at least a generation. See Theal (ed.), *Belangrijke Historische Dokumenten* 3:335f.; Van der Merwe, *Trek*, 122-39.

124. Van der Walt, *Ausdehnung*, 74-75.

125. It is in this context, rather against his own intention, that the data provided by Neumark, *Economic Influences*, 58-94, on soap, wax, and tallow production take on their meaning.

126. Kathleen M. Jeffreys (ed.), *Kaapse Archiefstukken lopende over het Jaar 1782* (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1931), 191; cf. Wagenaar, "Johannes Gijsbertus van Reenen," 70.

127. See the cases of Jonas Albertus van der Poel, butcher, Ca CJ 2944/377, 11 Sept. 1788; Johannes Davel, CA CJ 2945/392, Aug. 1789; and Jan Hendrik Stroebel, CA CJ 2945/393, Aug. 1789.

128. Tony Kirk, "The Cape Economy and the Expropriation of the Kat River Settlement," in Marks and Atmore (eds.), *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa*, 216-46; A. C. M. Webb, "The Agricultural Development of the 1820 Settlement down to 1846," MA thesis, Rhodes University (1975), Ch. 5.

129. Ross, "Relative Importance," 252-53.
130. In the eighteenth century, wheat production in Swellendam was so small that the Dutch did not even bother to tax it. By 1815, though, it had grown to around 40,000 hectoliters; RCC 5:52. As regards the west coast, statistical data are lacking because of the composition of the districts, but for the importance of coastal traffic, which began at the beginning of the century, see, for example, Cape Parliamentary Papers, *Select Committee Report on the Berg River*, 1858, and Marincowitz, "Rural Production and Labour," 18-23.
131. *Blue Book of the Cape Colony*, 1859, JJ 5; Appel, "Die distrik Oudtshoorn," Chs. 13 and 16.
132. This excludes the mission village of Genadendal, which was then the largest settlement in the colony outside of Cape Town.
133. John Barrow, *An Account of Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa*, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1801-1803), 1:112-14, 2:349-53, 363; H. Lichtenstein, *Travels in Southern Africa in the Years 1803, 1804, 1805 and 1806*, translated by A. Plumptre, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1928-30), 1:200.
134. KP 3:93. I have followed the translation in Moodie, *Record* 3:24.
135. Moodie, *Record* 3:21-34. Susan Newton-King, "Commerce and Material Culture on the Eastern Cape Frontier, 1784-1812," *Collected Seminar Papers of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies*, London: *The Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* 14 (1988), 1-32, describes the goods which the various trekboers acquired. See also J. B. Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1981), 98; Roger B. Beck, "The Legalization and Development of Trade on the Cape Frontier, 1817-1830," PhD thesis, University of Indiana (1987), esp. Chs. 4 and 6; the letter by Mr. Crout, cited in Neumark, *Economic Influences*, 147; and W. A. Maxwell and R. T. McGeogh (eds.), *The Reminiscences of Thomas Stubbs* (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1978), 100.
136. RCC 7:299.
137. Andrew Steedman, *Wanderings and Adventures in the Interior of Southern Africa*, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, 1835) 1:124.
138. Cape Parliamentary Paper, G20 1866, *Census*, 1865, passim. It should be noted that this list excludes the mission stations which, although often with a larger population than the small town, fulfilled a very different function within the colony's economy.
139. George, "Ebden," 21; Immelman, *Men of Good Hope*, 59-70.
140. George, "Ebden," passim; *Dictionary of South African Biography* (Cape Town and Johannesburg, Tafelberg for the Human Sciences Research Council, 1972-), 2:606-7; A. P. Buirski, "The Barrys and the Overberg," MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch (1952), 7-9; T. A. van Ryneveld, "Merchants and Missions: Developments in the Caledon District 1838-1860," BA honours thesis, UCT (1983), 13.
141. The Dutch name for this firm gave rise to one of the Cape's first advertising slogans: "Als jij lekker wilt leven, koop bij Barry en Neven," Burrow, *Overberg Outspan*, 255.
142. Buirski, "Barrys," 94.
143. Reports of the Commissioners of Circuit for 1813 and 1814, RCC 9:89 and 1:98; *Dictionary of South African Biography* 2:371-72; Basil A. Le Cordeur, *The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 1820-1854* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1981), 39.
144. J. B. Peires, "The British and the Cape, 1814-1834," in Elphick and Giliomee, *Shaping*, 472-73; Le Cordeur, *Eastern Cape Separatism*, 40, 123-29; Dubow, *Land, Labor and Merchant Capital*, 15f; Dolores Fleischer and Angela Caccia, *Merchant Pioneers: The House of Mosenthal* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1983).

145. Stanley Trapido, "'The Friends of the Natives': Merchants, Peasants and the Political and Ideological Structure of Liberalism at the Cape, 1854-1910," in Marks and Atmore, *Economy and Society*, 247-73.

146. Peires, *House of Phalo*, Chs. 4 and 6; cf. J. S. Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963).

147. Giliomee, "Eastern Frontier," 433-34, 445-46.

148. Ben Maclellan, *A Proper Degree of Terror: John Graham and the Cape's Eastern Frontier* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1986).

149. See T. E. Kirk, "Progress and Decline in the Kat River Settlement, 1829-1854," *JAH* 14 (1973), 421, and idem, "The Cape Economy and the Expropriation of the Kat River Settlement," 241.

150. On this, see below, Ch. 10.

152. E.g., SACA, 1.10.1836.

153. Timothy Keegan, "The Making of the Orange Free State, 1846-1854: Sub-Imperialism, Primitive Accumulation and State Formation," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 17 (1988), 26-54.

154. Ross, "Relative Importance."

155. Dubow, *Land, Labour and Merchant Capital*, 64-82; see also the regular sections on squatting in the annual *Blue Book of the Cape Colony*. This process could lead to the acquisition of enormous tracts of land by certain individuals, notably the 100,000 acres accumulated around Beaufort West by Sir John Molteno, later first Prime Minister of the Colony. See P. A. Molteno, *The Life and Times of Sir John Molteno*, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1900), 1:52-53, cited in Tony Kirk, "Self-Government and Self-Defence in South Africa: The Interrelationship Between British and Cape Politics, 1854-1856," D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University (1972), 296.

156. For instance, the magistrate of Tulbagh wrote in 1856 that the squatters on Crown lands "are generally found in a state of destitution, with hardly any visible means of livelihood. In many cases children are found in the condition of complete nudity." *Blue Book of the Cape Colony*, 1857, FF9. Such a statement has to be treated with caution, but is certainly plausible, since the choice between destitution and farm labor was by no means an easy one. For further information, see below; Nigel Worden, "Cape Slave Emancipation and Rural Labour in a Comparative context," unpublished seminar paper, Centre for African Studies; and *Proceedings and Evidence Given before the Committee of the Legislative Council Respecting the Proposed Ordinance to Prevent the Practice of Squatting on Government Land* (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1852).

157. Ross, *Cape of Torments*, 13-14; Nigel Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 41-48; and Armstrong and Worden, "Slaves," 110-22.

158. Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa*, 29.

159. Edwards, *Towards Emancipation*, 33.

160. Eugene D. Genovese and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "The Slave Economies in Political Perspective," in idem, *Fruits of Merchant Capital: Slavery and Bourgeois Property in the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 43.

161. Van Zyl, *Kaapse wyn en brandewyn*, Chs. 9 and 10; Rayner, "Wine and Slaves," Ch. 1.

162. Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa*, Ch. 5.

163. On this, see John Mason, 'Hendrik Albertus and His Ex-Slave Mey: A Drama in Three Acts,' unpublished paper. Conference on Cape Slavery and After, Cape Town (1989).

164. Ross, *Cape of Torments*, 1.

165. Ibid., passim; Nigel Worden, "Violence, Crime and Slavery on Cape Farmsteads in the Eighteenth Century," *Kronos* 5 (1982), 43-60.

166. See below, Ch. 7; Mason, "Hendrik Albertus and His Ex-Slave Mey."

167. On these groups, see most recently, V. C. Malherbe, "Diversification and Mobility of Khoikhoi Labour in the Eastern Districts of the Cape Colony Prior to the Labour Law of 1 November 1809," MA thesis, UCT (1978), 26-27.

168. V. C. Malherbe, "Diversification and Mobility," passim; idem, "The Life and Times of Cupido Kakkerlak," *JAH* 20 (1979).

169. See below, Ch. 3.

170. Susan Newton-King, "Background to the Khoikhoi Rebellion of 1799," *SSA* 10 (1981), 8, and personal communication.

171. See below, Ch. 3.

172. Marais, *Cape Coloured People*, 116-19; below, Ch. 3, pp. 95-99.

173. Newton-King, "Background," 8; below, Ch. 3, p. 96.

174. Although the slaves were officially emancipated on 1 December 1834, there followed a four-year period of "apprenticeship," during which they were subject to much the same legal bonds as under slavery.

175. Among the most useful recent works on the ideological nature of British abolitionism and its relations to the industrial revolution are David B. Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975); Howard Temperley, "Capitalism, Slavery and Ideology," *Past and Present* 75 (1977); and Frederick Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labour and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890-1925* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), Ch. 2. For an application to the Cape, see Rayner, "Slaves, Slave-Owners and the British State," and idem, "Wine and Slaves," 248-60.

176. In this I part company with Susan Newton-King, "The Labour Market of the Cape Colony, 1807-1830," in Marks and Atmore, *Economy and Society*, 171-207, who argues that Ordinance 50 was the result of the labor demands of the 1820 settlers. It would seem that the recent work on the abolition of slavery tends to support the old argument of Macmillan, *Cape Coloured Question*, and Harry A. Gailey, "John Philip's Role in Hottentot Emancipation," *JAH* 3 (1961), by showing that the British rulers were ideologically predisposed to accept Philip's humanitarian arguments. In contrast, it seems unlikely that the 1820 settlers had enough political clout to force their economic demands through the Colonial Office, and Newton-King does not demonstrate that they did so. See also Robert Ross, 'James Cropper, John Philip and the *Researches in South Africa*,' in Hugh Macmillan and Shula Marks (eds.), *Africa and Empire: W. M. Macmillan, Historian and Social Critic* (London: Temple Smith for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1989), 140-52.

177. On the judges in this context, see L. C. Duly, "A Revisit with the Cape's Hottentot Ordinance of 1828," in Marcelle Kooy (ed.), *Economics and Economic History: Essays in Honour of Professor H. M. Robertson* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

178. It is also necessary to beware of colonial exaggerations: see Macmillan, *Cape Coloured Question*, 221.

179. W. C. Boyce, *Notes on South African Affairs from 1834 to 1838* (Grahamstown: Aldum and Harvey, 1838), 119.

180. Governor Napier, cited in C. F. J. Muller, *Die Oorsprong van die Groot Trek* (Cape Town and Johannesburg: Tafelberg, 1974), 190-91, and the other spokesmen cited there; André du Toit and Hermann Giliomee, *Afrikaner Political Thought: Analysis and Documents, Vol. I, 1780-1850* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1983), 110-11. For a view of the legal machine and its prejudices, see Duly, "A Revisit with the Cape's Hottentot Ordinance of 1828"; A. Sachs, "Enter the British Legal Machine: Law and Administration at the Cape 1806-1910," *SSA* 1 (1970), 13; for earlier expressions, see Macmillan, *Cape Coloured Question*, Ch. 16.

181. The extent to which the special position of the Cape, with its Khoisan, was the cause of the Colonial Office's rejection of the Cape vagrancy laws is evident in the fact that a similar ordinance emanating from Jamaica was not rejected. See W. A. Green, *British Slave Emancipation: The Sugar Colonies and the Great Experiment* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 174.

182. Shirley Judges, "Poverty, Living Conditions and Social Relations: Aspects of Life in Cape Town in the 1830s," MA thesis, UCT (1977); Robert Ross, "Cape Town: Synthesis in the Dialectic of Continents," in Robert Ross and Gerard J. Telkamp (eds.), *Colonial Cities* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 105-22; Cape Parliamentary Paper, *Select Committee Report on the Sanitary State of Cape Town*, unnumbered (1857), 35-36.

183. J. S. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937*, reprint ed. (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1967), 191. Macmillan, *Cape Coloured Question*, 238; B. Krüger, *The Pear Tree Blossoms: A History of the Moravian Mission Stations in South Africa* (Genadendal: Moravian Book Depot, 1967), 196.

184. Robert Ross, *Adam Kok's Griquas*, Chs. 3 and 4, in which the movement is alluded to but not understood.

185. Information on this group under the leadership of Carolus Baatje, which has never been studied, probably because they were almost annihilated by the Sotho in 1865, can be found in G. McC. Theal, *Basutoland Records*, 3 vols. (Cape Town: W. Richards and Sons, 1883), esp. Vol. 1:30, 34 et seq., and in the archives of the Methodist Missionary Society, now in the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. See also Peter Sanders, *Moshoeshoe, Chief of the Sotho* (London: Heinemann, 1975), 285; H. J. van Aswegen, "Die verhouding tussen Blank en Nie-Blank in die Oranje-Vrystaat, 1854-1902," *AYB* (1971), 1:207-14.

186. Ross, *Adam Kok's Griquas*, 109, 165.

187. Kirk, "Progress and Decline," 413; Peires, "The British and the Cape," 484; J. C. Visagie, "Die Katriviernedersetting, 1829-1839," PhD thesis, UNISA (1979), Chs. 2 and 3.

188. Cited in Macmillan, *Cape Coloured Question*, 238. See also Edna Bradlow, "The Khoi and the Proposed Vagrancy Legislation of 1834," *Quarterly Bulletin of the South Africa Library* 39 (1985), 99-106; and Stanely Trapido, "The Emergence of Liberalism and Making of 'Hottentot Nationalism,' 1815-1834," unpublished paper, Institute of Commonwealth Studies (1990). Despite the immense ruling class bias in the sources, I am sure that other such statements could be found in missionary, magisterial, or court records, and possibly in Cape folklore, an uninvestigated field.

189. Krüger, *Pear Tree Blossoms*, 190.

190. Malherbe, "Diversification and Mobility," passim; below, Ch. 3, pp. 96-97.

191. Nigel Worden, "Adjusting to Emancipation: Freed Slaves and Farmers in the Mid-Nineteenth Century South-Western Cape," in Wilmot G. James and Mary Simons (eds.), *The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), 31-39; below, Ch. 3, pp. 99-100, 105-109; also Van Ryneveld, "Merchants and Missions," 61-62.

192. Cited in Du Toit and Giliomee, *Afrikaner Political Thought*, 74.

193. Information taken from the annual *Blue Book of the Cape Colony*, see also below, Ch. 3, pp. 103-105.

194. *Blue Book of the Colony*, 1857, FF9.

195. Napier to Glenelg, 9 November 1837, cited in Worden, "Adjusting to Emancipation," 36.

196. Editorial, *SACA*, 21.11.1838.

197. The most explicit case of this is Helen Bradford, "Highways, Byways and Cul-de-Sacs: The Transition to Agrarian Capitalism in Revisionist South African History," *Radical Historical Review* 46/7 (1990), 81-82. Her criticisms do not take into

account the need I felt to argue against the received wisdom on the colonial economy, Marxist as well as other. In addition, she assumes, a priori, that there must have been a major difference between VOC and British rule—whereas it can be argued that the Cape government temporarily became more protectionist after 1795—and that the emancipation of Khoisan and slaves between 1828 and 1838 must have had a major effect—whereas I believe that the evidence shows that, at least in the short term, the ex-slaveholding class was successful in its efforts to minimize the consequences of those measures.

198. Clifton C. Crais, "Slavery and Freedom along a Frontier: The Eastern Cape, South Africa, 1770–1838," *Slaves and Abolition* 11 (1990), 193.

199. Timothy Keegan, *Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa: The Southern Highveld to 1914* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1986); Helen Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in Rural South Africa, 1924–1930* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987); Jeremy Krikler, "Agrarian Class Struggle and the South African War," *Social History* 14 (1989), 151–76.

200. See, e.g., M. P. K. Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement in Kenya* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1976); P. Mosley, *The Settler Economies: Studies in the Economic History of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900–1963* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); J. M. Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895–1914," *JAH* 20 (1979), 487–505.

## 2. Montagu's Roads to Capitalism (pp. 50–65)

1. On this, see especially below, Ch. 3, 105–109.

2. On this, see Nigel Worden, "Adjusting to Emancipation: Freed Slaves and Farmers in Mid-Nineteenth-Century South-Western Cape," in Wilmot G. James and Mary Simons (eds.), *The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989); John Marincowitz, "Rural Production and Labour in the Western Cape, 1838 to 1888, with Special Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts," PhD thesis, University of London (1985); Saul Dubow, *Land, Labour and Merchant Capital: The Experience of the Graaf-Reinet District in the Pre-Industrial Rural Economy of the Cape 1852–1872* (Cape Town: Centre for African Studies, UCT, 1982).

3. This has been worked out in most detail for Stellenbosch. See Mary I. Rayner, "Wine and Slaves: The Failure of an Export Economy and the Ending of Slavery in the Cape Colony, South Africa, 1806–1834," PhD thesis, Duke University (1986); Pam Scully, "'The Bouquet of Freedom': Social and Economic Relations in Stellenbosch District, 1870–1900," MA thesis, UCT (1987); and Hermann B. Giliomee, "Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870–1915," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 14 (1987), 38–64.

4. Cape, Stellenbosch, and Swellendam, and parts of Worcester districts. See map 2.1.

5. Uitenhage, Albany, Somerset, Graaf-Reinet, Cradock, and Colesberg districts.

6. The valuation was conducted by "competent persons," who tendered for the right to value each district. See *Report . . . Upon the Operations of the Central Board of Commissioners for Public Roads*, Cape Parliamentary Paper, G3 of 1855, 5.

7. Two farms in East Riet River veldcornetcy, Somerset East, which were described as being rented (by the prominent 1820 settler families of Bowker and Atherstone) from the estate of the late Louis Trechardt. For the opportunities which the trek gave for land speculation in Beaufort West district, see below.

8. The statistics in this summary are taken from the Cape of Good Hope, *Statis-*

*tical Blue Book of the Colony*, for 1845, and for other years as appropriate for purposes of comparison.

9. The relative importance of the various crops was estimated by multiplying the volume of the harvest (as reported in the *Blue Book* by the resident magistrate for each district) by the price he reported.

10. There were a number of other smaller "invisible exports," notably the victualling of merchant ships, but these could never have given the Cape any economic stability without the British military.

11. This point is worked out in more detail in Robert Ross, "The Relative Importance of Exports and the Internal Market for the Agriculture of the Cape Colony, 1770-1855," in G. Liesegang, H. Pasch, and A. Jones (eds.), *Figuring African Trade: Proceedings of the Symposium on the Quantification and Structure of the Import and Export and Long Distance Trade of Africa in the Nineteenth Century* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1985), 248-60.

12. Digby Warren, "Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters: Municipal Politics in Cape Town, 1840-54," MA thesis, UCT (1986), 253.

13. CA CRB 129.

14. Respectively CA 3/CT 7/1/2/1 and subsequent volumes and CA 3/AY 7/1/1/1.

15. In Stellenbosch district this information was not given, very probably because owner occupancy was so universal that it was not thought relevant.

16. It was through this information, used in A. Appel, "Die distrik Oudtshoorn tot die tagtige jare van die 19de Eeu: 'n socio-eonomiese studie," *AYB* (1988), 2:107, that I discovered the existence of the original registers.

17. None of the four veldcornetries concerned, two in Rondebosch and two in Wynberg, turned up in the sample, which contributed to the underrepresentation of the highest values.

18. Warren, "Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters," 38-39.

19. It is remarkable that Tony Kirk, in his brief discussion of the valuation, describes Albany as "the district of the small proprietor," failing to realize that the small proprietors in question were not part of the constituency of Grahamstown politicians like Godlonton and Cock, but, as he has shown elsewhere, of their great adversaries. See "Self-Government and Self-Defence in South Africa: The Inter-Relations Between British and Cape Politics, 1846-1854," D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University (1972), 70-71, and "The Cape Economy and the Expropriation of the Kat River Settlement, 1846-1853," in Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (eds.), *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (London: Longmans, 1980), 226-46.

20. There is, of course, the suspicion that vineyards were valued as part of the immovable property of a farm, which would artificially inflate the value of the wine growing areas, as opposed to the sheep raising ones. Though equivalent to a vineyard as the farm's working capital, a sheep flock could scarcely be described as immovable. On the other hand, this difference in valuation procedures seems unlikely, as it would have skewed values (and thus taxes) far too much in favor of the eastern province although it would also have meant that less money would have been expended on building roads in the east.

21. On landholding, see Lesley C. Duly, *British Land Policy at the Cape, 1795-1844: A Study of Administrative Procedures in the Empire* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1968), and above all Leonard Guelke, "Land Tenure and Settlement at the Cape, 1652-1812," in L. Martin and K. J. Friedlaender (eds.), *History of Surveying and Land Tenure in South Africa, I: Surveying and Land Tenure in the Cape, 1652-1812* (Cape Town: UCT Department of Surveying, 1984); on farm dimensions between Cape Town and the mountains, see Leonard Guelke, *The South-western Cape Colony 1657-1750: Freehold Land Grants*, Occasional Paper No. 5, Geography Publication Series (Waterloo: Geography Department, University of Wa-

terloo, Ontario, 1987); on Caledon district, a major section of Swellendam, see T. A. van Ryneveld, "Merchants and Missions: Developments in the Caledon District 1833–1850," BA hons. thesis, UCT (1983).

22. This figure is taken from the *Blue Book* of 1846, p. 382; for comparison, 46.5 percent of sheep in Graaf-Reinet were woolled. It may be that the Colesberg land values were further depressed by the drought of which the Civil Commissioner complained in his report for the *Blue Book* for 1845, p. 301.

23. See Robert Ross, *Adam Kok's Griquas*, 66–81; Timothy Keegan, "The Making of the Orange Free State, 1846–1854: Sub-Imperialism, Primitive Accumulation and State Formation," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 17 (1988), 26–54.

24. For the boundaries of the eastern Cape veldcornetcies, see J. B. Bergh and J. C. Visagie, *The Eastern Cape Frontier Zone 1660–1980: A Cartographic Guide of Historical Research* (Durban: Butterworth, 1985).

25. See, e.g., W. M. Macmillan, *The South African Agrarian Problem and Its Historical Development* (Johannesburg: CNA for the Witwatersrand Council of Education, 1919).

26. On Cuyler's methods of acquiring land, see the "Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry to Earl Bathurst on Mr. Hugh Huntley's Case," 5 Jan. 1826, RCC 25:251f.; Bourke to Bathurst, 29 Jan. 1827, with enclosures, RCC 30:185 et seq.; Bourke to Hay, 7 Nov. 1827, RCC 34:105, and numerous other letters in the various volumes of the RCC.

27. CRB 129 does not give a geographical location to the veldcornetcies in Beaufort District, but see the *Cape Almanac* for that year, in which it is at least made clear in which part of the district each veldcornetcy was to be found.

28. SACA, 13.1.1841.

29. The two Cradock district veldcornetcies in the sample were in this respect far more similar to Buffelshock than to the Koenap.

30. On these, see, e.g., Ch. 1 above.

31. See, for example, Van Ryneveld's comment that, "the Caledon district [part of Swellendam] largely defined itself in terms of the boundaries of labour migration from the [missionary] institutions" of Genadendal and Elim, in "Merchants and Missions," 8.

32. No order or evolutionary sequence is implied by this list.

33. See Duly, *British Land Policy at the Cape*.

34. Large estates could be built up, as in the holdings of Reitz, Breda, and Joubert and Company near Cape Agulhas, but these were not held with a view to speculating on rising land values. See above, p. 37.

35. Dubow, *Land and Labour*, esp. Ch. 4.

36. Keegan, "The Making of the Orange Free State."

37. Clifton C. Crais, "Gentry and Labour in Three Eastern Cape Districts," *South African Historical Journal* 18 (1986), 125–46; Basil A. le Cordeur, *The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 1820–1854* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1981).

### 3. Going Beyond the Pale (pp. 69–110)

1. This chapter is an amended and partial translation of a short work which I wrote in Dutch with D. van Arkel and G. C. Quispel, on the basis of a series of seminars which we gave at the University of Leiden between 1979 and 1982. It is entitled *'De Wijngaard des Heeren?': Een onderzoek naar de wortels van 'die blanke baasskap' in Zuid-Afrika* and was published in the *Cahiers Sociale Geschiedenis* by Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, in 1983. The language in which it was published restricted its dis-

37. John Philip, *Memoir of Mrs. Matilda Smith* (London: F. Westley, 1820).
38. Mark 16:15; see G. and G. Fagan, *Church Street in the Land of Waveren* (Tulbagh: Tulbagh Restoration Committee, 1975), 33; Hanekom, *Van Lier*, 247.
39. Lichtenstein, *Travels*, 2:121.
40. William M. Freund, "The Career of Johannes Theodorus van der Kemp and His Role in the History of South Africa," *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 86 (1973), 379-80.
41. B. Spoelstra, *Die "Doppers" in Suid-Afrika, 1760-1899* (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1963), 12-13.
42. Corner, in Spoelstra, "Doppers," 22.
43. Spoelstra, "Doppers," 63-85.
44. Frederickson, *White Supremacy*, 170.
45. Anders Sparrman, *A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope . . .*, edited by V. S. Forbes, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1975), 1:264.
46. E.g., D. Moodie, *The Record* (reprinted Amsterdam and Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1960), 3:26, 44.
47. *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, Deel I (1651-1669)* (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1957), 390.
48. ARA VOC 4347.
49. Hanekom, *Van Lier*, 198; Elphick and Shell, "Intergroup Relations," in Elphick and Giliomee, *Shaping*, 121.
50. Giliomee and Elphick, "The Structure of European Domination," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 322; Hermann Giliomee, *Die Kaap tydens die Eerste Britse Bewind* (Cape Town: Hollandsch Afrikaansche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1975), 15.
51. Hermann Giliomee, "The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 324-25.
52. Spoelstra (ed.), *Bouwstoffen*, 1:562, 567-68, 572, 576, 582.
53. Sparrman, *Voyage*, 1:264.
54. See, e.g., Ernst van den Boogaart, "Colour Prejudice and the Yardstick of Civility: The Initial Dutch Confrontation with Black Africans, 1590-1635," in Ross (ed.), *Racism and Colonialism: Studies in Ideology and Social Structure* (The Hague: Marthinus Nijhoff, 1982); Léon Poliakov, "Racism from the Enlightenment to the Age of Imperialism," in *ibid.*
55. Winthrop D. Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes towards the Negro, 1550-1812* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1969).
56. Jan Lucassen, "Hollanders over de Khoikhoi, 1595-1652," *Doctoraal skriptie*, Leiden (1971).
57. R. Raven-Hart, *Cape Good Hope, 1652-1702: The First Fifty Years of Dutch Colonisation as Seen by Callers* (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1971).
58. Jordan, *White over Black*, 226.
59. *Ibid.*
60. Shula Marks, "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *JAH* 13 (1972), 55.
61. "Een ruw en onbeschaafd dom mens," C. Kruyskamp (ed.), *Van Dale: Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal*, 10th ed. (Utrecht: Van Dale, 1976), 997.
62. V. A. February, *Mind Your Colour: The Coloured Stereotype in South African Literature* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1981).
63. E.g. Theal, *History of South Africa Under the Dutch East India Company* 2:379, 382.
64. I. Schapera and B. Farrington (eds.), *The Early Cape Hottentots* (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1933), 173.

65. Ibid., 175.
66. ARA VOC 4136, 12.
67. See below, Ch. 8.
68. E.g., Bergh to Landdrost Swellendam, 8 April 1774, ARA VOC 4278.
69. MacCrone, *Race Attitudes*: Martin Legassick, "The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography," in Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (eds.), *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (London: Longmans, 1981).
70. For a definition of "labeled interaction," see Dik van Arkel, "Inleiding" in D. van Arkel et al. (eds.), *Van Oost naar West: Racisme als mondiaal verschijnsel* (Baarn: Ambo, 1990), 15.
71. E.g., Case 10 contra Theunis Roelofsz, 16 Oct. 1727, ARA VOC 4105.
72. Giliomee, "Eastern Frontier," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 324–25.
73. ibid., 325.
74. Moodie, *The Record*, Part 3, passim.
75. E.g., E. C. Godée Molsbergen, *Reizen in Zuid-Afrika in de Hollandse Tijd*, 4 vols. (The Hague: Marthinus Nijhoff, 1916–1932), 3:270; Resolusies van de Raad van Politie, 6 Nov. 1755, ARA VOC 4199.
76. E.g., Burgher Memorial of 17 Feb. 1784, cited by Van der Merwe, *Trekboer*, 187.
77. Resolution of the Council of Policy, 6 June 1777, cited by P. J. van der Merwe, *Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek* (The Hague: Van Stockum, 1938), 41.
78. M. P. de Chavonnes et al., *The Reports of De Chavonnes and His Council and Van Imhoff on the Cape* (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1918), 88.
79. Cf. Ira Berlin, "Time, Space and the Evolution of Afro-American Society in British Mainland North America," *American Historical Review* 85 (1980), 59.
80. Robert Sempel, *Walks and Sketches at the Cape of Good Hope* (reprinted Cape Town and Amsterdam: A. A. Balkema, 1968), 49; cf. M. Gerbeau, "Les minorités mal-connus: Esclaves Indien et Malais des Mascaraignes au XIXe siècle," in *Migrations, minorités et échanges en Ocean Indien XIX–XX siècles* (Aix-en-Provence: IHPOM, 1978), 187–89.
81. This is clearly shown in the reports printed in Godée Molsbergen, *Reizen in Zuid-Afrika*.
82. Pieter van Duin and Robert Ross, *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1987).
83. Bruijn, "Personeelsbehoefte."
84. L. F. Maingard, "Studies in Korana History, Customs and Language," *Bantu Studies* 6 (1932); Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 8; Marks, "Khoisan Resistance," 70–74; J. C. van Oordt, *Kaapse Taalgief* (Cape Town: privately published, 1952), 4:18.
85. CA CJ 2945, 120, venduroll, nalatenschap Jan Necker, 18 May 1789.
86. Richard Elphick, "The Khoisan to c. 1770," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*.
87. On this process and for the competing explanations of it, see, e.g., van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging* and *Trekboer*; S. G. Neumark, *Economic Influence on the South African Frontier, 1652–1836* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957); Leonard Guelke, "Frontier Settlement in Early Dutch South Africa," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 66 (1976), and "The White Settlers, 1652–1770," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*; Robert Ross, "Capitalism, Expansion and Incorporation on the South African Frontier," in Howard Lamar and L. M. Thompson (eds.), *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981).

88. P. J. van der Merwe, *Trek: Studies oor die Mobiliteit van die Pioniersbevolking aan die Kaap* (Cape Town: Bloemfontein and Port Elizabeth: Nasionale Pers, 1945).
89. Ross, "Capitalism, Expansion and Incorporation."
90. Marks, "Khoisan Resistance,"
91. Moodie, *The Record*, 2:26, 35.
92. Susan Newton-King and V. C. Malherbe, *The Khokhoi Rebellion in the Eastern Cape, (1799-1803)* (Cape Town: Centre for African Studies, 1981).
93. Report of J. H. Redelinghuijs, November 1833, CA GH 19/4.
94. Susan Newton-King, "Background to the Khoikhoi Rebellion of 1799-1803," *Collected Seminar Papers of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, The Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* 10 (1981), 9.
95. Hermann Giliomee, "Eastern Frontiers," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 300.
96. See below and V. C. Malherbe, "Diversification and Mobility of Khoikhoi Labour in the Cape Colony," MA thesis, UCT (1978).
97. Michael Streak, *The Afrikaner as Viewed by the English, 1795-1854* (Cape Town: Struik, 1974), Chs. 1 and 2.
98. Susan Newton-King, personal communication; see also Newton-King, "Background," in Newton-King and Malherbe, *Khoikhoi Rebellion*.
99. See above, Ch. 1.
100. Gerrit Schutte, "Company and Colonists at the Cape," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 187.
101. Below, Ch. 7.
102. P. J. Venter, "Landdroos en Heemrade, 1682-1827," *AYB* (1940), above all 11-17.
103. J. T. van der Kemp to Caledon, 14 Jan. 1811, cited in Hermann Giliomee, "Die administrasie tydperk van Lord Caledon," *AYB* (1966), 2:303; Truter to Cradock, 15 June 1812, *RCC* 8:439.
104. H. S. Swart, "Developments in Currency and Banking at the Cape Between 1782 and 1825, with an Account of Contemporary Controversies," PhD thesis, UCT (1953), 6-7.
105. *Ibid.*, 17.
106. Brian Kantor, "The Rixdollar and Foreign Exchange," *South African Journal of Economics* 38 (1970).
107. R. F. M. Immelman, *Men of Good Hope: The Romantic Story of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, 1804-1954* (Cape Town: Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, 1954).
108. D. J. van Zyl, *Kaapse wyn en brandewyn, 1795-1860* (Cape Town and Pretoria: HAUM, 1975), 51-77.
109. Thom, *Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerdery*.
110. In 1832, there were 33,629 slaves in the colony, scarcely more than in 1806. *PRO CO/53/69*, 236-37.
111. Susan Newton-King, "The Labour Market of the Cape Colony, 1807-1828," in Marks and Atmore (eds.), *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa*, 185ff.
112. BPP 215 of 1837, *Accounts of Slave Compensation Claims*, 351-61.
113. *RCC* 29:488; Returns of the Slave Population, *RCC* 25:204.
114. J. B. Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1981), 103-6.
115. Newton-King, "Labour Market," 175.
116. Instructions for the Landdrost of the Cape District, 1 April 1809, *RCC* 6:471.

117. W. W. Bird, *The State of the Cape of Good Hope in 1822* (London: John Murray, 1823), 6–7.
118. "Report of J. T. Bigge upon the Hottentot and Bushman Population of the Cape of Good Hope and of the Missionary Institutions, 28 Jan. 1830," RCC 35:306.
119. "Proclamation of Sir John Cradock Concerning the Registration of Hottentots and the Apprenticeship of Hottentot Children," RCC 8:385.
120. Instructions from Hardcastle to Bethelsdorp, in which he requests that the emphasis be laid on the training of young Khoisan as carpenters, wagonmakers, and tailors, 1 Dec. 1808, LMS 3/1/D.
121. Campbell to Philip, 23 Nov. 1819, LMS 8/1/D.
122. Campbell to LMS, Sept. 1814, LMS 6/1/B; Report of Bethelsdorp missionaries, LMS 6/1/B.
123. Read to LMS, 23 Jan. 1812, LMS 5/1/B.
124. Report of Bethelsdorp missionaries, Feb. 1815, LMS 6/1/B.
125. Philip to LMS, 17 Aug. 1822, LMS 8/5/A; Khoisan were transporting military stores from Algoa Bay to Grahamstown.
126. Campbell to Philip, 23 Nov. 1819, LMS 8/1/D.
127. Philip to LMS, 17 Aug. 1822, LMS 8/5/A.
128. Philip to LMS, Nov. 1826, LMS 10/1/E.
129. "Memorial of the Directors of the LMS, 4 July 1825," RCC 22:133.
130. Van der Kemp to the Colonial Government, cited in Memorial of the LMS, RCC 30:169; see also "Journal van de Commissie tot verbetering van veeleelt en landbouw," Truter papers, CA A76, 6.
131. Philip to LMS, cited in RCC 30:140.
132. Janssens to Van der Kemp, 3 May 1805, LMS 3/1/C.
133. Van der Kemp to LMS, 10 July 1806, LMS 3/3/A.
134. "Report of Colonel Collins to the Earl of Caledon," RCC 7:109–10.
135. Caledon to Collins, 12 Sept. 1808, cited in Giliomee, "Administrasietydperk van Lord Caledon," 291.
136. Read to LMS, 8 Aug. 1812, LMS 5/1/E.
137. Corner to LMS, 26 July 1817, LMS 5/1/E.
138. Philip to LMS, 18 Dec 1830, LMS 12/1/D.
139. Giliomee, "Administrasietydperk van Lord Caledon," 29.
140. Philip to LMS, Nov. 1826, cited in "Memorial of the LMS," RCC 30:172.
141. Annual Report Bethelsdorp, 1805, LMS 3/1/D; Janssens to Van der Kemp, 3 May 1805, LMS 3/1/B.
142. Read to LMS, 20 Jan. 1815, LMS 6/1/A.
143. Cuyler to Bethelsdorp missionaries, 30 April 1811, LMS 4/4/C.
144. Secretary to Gov. to R. Wilmot Horton, 1 Nov. 1825, RCC 23:376–77.
145. Ibid.
146. Bourke to Hay, 7 Nov. 1827, RCC 24:105.
147. Philip to LMS, 12 June 1834, LMS 14/1/C.
148. T. Pringle to LMS, 23 Dec. 1825, LMS 9/4/C.
149. Read to LMS, 3 March 1813, LMS 5/2/B.
150. "Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry on the Finances of the Colony," Sept. 1826, RCC 21:386–94.
151. "Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry upon Criminal Law and Jurisprudence," Aug. 1827, RCC 33:112–14; A. Sachs, *Justice in South Africa* (London: Chatto and Heinemann, 1973), 60–61.
152. Read to LMS, 8 Aug. 1812, LMS 5/1/E.
153. "Evidence Given by H. C. D. Maynier, 25 April 1825," RCC 21:386–94.
154. Giliomee, "Eastern Frontier," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 300.
155. Ibid.

156. Philip, Report for 1830, LMS 12/2/A; Bigge and Colebrook to Bathurst, 3 Jan. 1825, RCC 30:170.
157. Anderson to LMS, 1828, LMS 10/2/D.
158. P. S. Joubert, 27 June 1822, cited in Philip, "Remarks on the Opgaaf," RCC 30:170.
159. "Report of J. T. Bigge upon the Hottentot and Bushman Population of the Cape of Good Hope and of the Missionary Institutions," 28 Jan. 1830, RCC 35:313-14; Report of the South African Mission for 1830, LMS 12/4/A.
160. Cited by Giliomee, "Administrasiedyk van Lord Caledon," 299.
161. Read to LMS, 2 Oct. 1807, LMS 4/4/D.
162. Annual Report Bethelsdorp, 1810, LMS 4/3/C.
163. Campbell to LMS, 21 Sept. 1814, LMS 5/4/D.
164. Van der Kemp to LMS, undated [1803], LMS 2/3/D; Annual Report Bethelsdorp, 1809, LMS 4/1/E.
165. Campbell, *Travels in South Africa*, 94-95.
166. Evans to LMS, 20 May 1817, LMS 7/2/A.
167. Barker to LMS, 8 Jan. 1821, LMS 8/3/A.
168. "Report of J. T. Bigge on the Courts of Justice," RCC 26:24.
169. Jane Philip to LMS, 10 Oct. 1832, LMS 13/1/C.
170. Elliot to LMS, 16 Feb. 1835, LMS 14/3/B.
171. John Philip to T. F. Buxton, 1 July 1828, cited in W. M. Macmillan, *The Cape Colour Question* (London: Faber and Gwyer, 1927), 217; see also Newton-King, "Labour Market," 198.
172. Philip to LMS, 12 June 1834, LMS 14/1/C.
173. "Report of J. T. Bigge on the Hottentot and Bushman Population of the Cape of Good Hope and of the Missionary Institutions, 28 Jan. 1831," RCC 35:306.
174. J. W. Bigge to W. Huskisson, 12 May 1828, RCC 35:201.
175. J. N. C. Marincowitz, "Rural Production and Labour in the Western Cape, 1838-1888, with Special Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts," PhD thesis, University of London (1985), 30.
176. Nigel Worden, "Post-Emancipation Labour in the Cape Town Hinterland, 1838-1856," Paper presented to the tenth biennial conference of the South African Historical Society, Cape Town (1985), 10.
177. *Ibid.*, 9.
178. On the Tot system, see Pamela Scully, "Liquor and Labour in the Western Cape, 1870-1900," in Charles Ambler and Jonathan Crush (eds.), *Liquor and Labour in Southern Africa* (Athens, Ohio, and Durban: Ohio University Press and University of Natal Press, 1993).
179. Se CA LCA 6, *passim*.
180. *Cape Blue Book*, 1846, 441-43.
181. Marincowitz, "Rural Production," 310.
182. Report of the Civil Commissioner, Stellenbosch, on Dr. Philip's Memorial, 7 July, 1834, CA LCA 6/34.
183. Memorial of the Inhabitants of Beaufort District, 29 July 1834, CA LCA 6/34.
184. Cape of Good Hope, Legislative Council, *Master and Servants: Documents on the Working of the Order in Council of 21st July 1846* (Cape Town: Saul Solomon, 1849). In a survey included in this publication ten of the nineteen magistrates reported that contract breaking was the most important complaint of employers against their laborers. Nine of them mentioned desertion. Other frequently mentioned complaints included cheek and laziness.
185. *Master and Servant*, *passim*.
186. *Proceedings of and Evidence Given before the Committee of the Legislative*

*Council Respecting the Proposed Ordinance "to Prevent the Settling and Squatting upon Government Lands"* (Cape Town: Saul Solomon, 1852), 31.

187. *Ibid.*, 49.
188. *Ibid.*, 47.
189. Marincowitz, "Rural Production," 89.
190. *Ibid.*, 103.
191. SACA, 13.1.1846, cited in Marincowitz, "Rural Production," 83.
192. Thom, *Skaapboerdery*, 301, 304.
193. *Ibid.*, 308.
194. Tony Kirk, "The Cape Economy and the Expropriation of the Kat River Settlement, 1846–1857," in Marks and Atmore (eds.), *Economy and Society*, 237.
195. G. C. Gilchrist, *The Cape of Good Hope* (Glasgow: David Bryce, 1844), cited in Kirk, "Kat River Settlement," 237.
196. For comparative material, see, e.g., H. J. Puhle, *Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussischer Konservatismus im Wilhelmischen Reich (1893–1914): Ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Nationalismus in Deutschland am Beispiel des Bundes der Landwirte und der Deutsch-Konservativen Partei* (Hannover: Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstituten den Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1967); Stephen Hahn, *The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850–1890* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
197. Peires, *House of Phalo*, 103–5.
198. *Ibid.*
199. Monica Wilson, "Cooperation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape Frontier," in M. Wilson and L. M. Thompson, *Oxford History of South Africa*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969–71), 1:249.
200. *Cape Blue Book*, 1856, 593.
201. *Ibid.*, 599.
202. *Ibid.*, 1857, FF2.
203. Printed in F. J. Muller, *Die Britse Owerheid en Die Groot Trek* (Johannesburg: Simonium Uitgewers, 1963), facing p. 87.
204. For further information of the introduction of a British administrative and judicial system, see J. K. Fryer, "The Government of the Cape of Good Hope, 1825–54: The Age of Imperial Reform," *AYB* (1964), 1.

#### 4. The Etiquette of Race (pp. 111–121)

1. Unless otherwise stated, this section is based on *Papers Relating to the Manumission of Steyntje and Her Children* (Cape Town: George Greig, 1827).
2. In 1816 she was recorded in the slave registers as being 39, which would mean that she had been born about 1777. However, she had her first child in 1799, after having begun to cohabit with her master from the age of about 15. Therefore a somewhat later date of birth seems more plausible.
3. C. C. de Villiers, *Geslagsregisters van Ou Kaapse Families*, 3 vols., edited by C. Pama (Cape Town and Amsterdam: A. A. Balkema, 1966), 3:919.
4. This assumes that he is the Jan Hendrik Weber, born in Honnef, in De Villiers, *Geslagsregisters*, 3:1107. It is, however, interesting to note that another Weber, Johan Valentin, had children in the 1780s by a certain Lea v. d. Kaap. While one should never rule out coincidences, it is at least plausible that these were Steyntje's half-siblings and that their father was in some way related to Hendrik Weber.
5. Lushington indeed had a hamlet in the Kat River settlement named after him in gratitude for his abolitionist work.
6. RCC 9:150.

7. All the qualifying epithets in this sentence are important. While I know of no cases of homosexuality between masters and slaves, this is much more likely to be because such relationships were either non-existent or were effectively kept secret, since the general condemnation of sodomy and buggery remained harsh throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See Robert Ross, "Oppression, Sexuality and Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope," *Historical Reflections/Réflexion Historiques* 6:2, and Arthur N. Gilbert, "Buggery and the British Navy, 1700–1861," *Journal of Social History* 10 (1976), 72–98. The adultery of a married man, on the other hand, could and did on occasion cause him very considerable difficulties. See, for instance, the case of David Malan Davidsz. in 1789, as reported in Nigel Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 149.

8. This statement is based on a reading of the sentences passed by the Cape Court of Justice in criminal cases between 1700 and 1828, and on Anna Boëseken, *Slaves and Free Blacks at the Cape, 1658–1700* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1977), and H. B. Fine, "The Administration of Criminal Justice at the Cape of Good Hope, 1795–1828," PhD thesis, UCT (1991). There were three partial exceptions. In 1687, the schoolmaster of the company's slave lodge was banished to Mauritius for "eenige vuyligheden (certain obscene actions)," not further specified, with his pupils (Boëseken, *Slaves and Free Blacks*, 48). In the case of Diederik Bleumer in 1776, the offense for which he was fined 100 rixdollars—not a ruinous sum of money, though a considerable one—was adultery rather than rape, even though he threatened a "bastard hottentot" and two of his slaves with a whipping if they did not comply with him (Case 7 of 21 Aug. 1777, ARA VOC 4288). In 1822, a "bastard hottentot" was found guilty of raping a seven-year-old slave girl, and was scourged, branded, and put to labor on the public works for seven years. Here, no doubt, it was her youth—and perhaps his lowly status—that led to the conviction (Fine, "Criminal Justice," Annexure I, 121). There may, of course, have been presentments to the lower courts, but if so, they were not considered serious enough for a criminal trial to ensue. For a possible exception, see Report of the Protector of Slaves for 1827, RCC 32:70.

9. The Protector of Slaves reported a number of cases in which a slave woman's claims for freedom on the grounds of having had a child by her master were dismissed. See PRO CO 53/48, 232, 235, 370.

10. For the argument behind this statement, see above pp. 73–74.

11. John Philip, "A Narrative Written for Buxton," in LMS archives, Africa Odds, Philip Papers, Box 3/5.

12. W. M. Macmillan, *The Cape Colour Question: A Historical Survey* (London: Faber and Gwyer, 1927), 174.

13. John Philip, *Researches in South Africa Illustrating the Civil, Moral and Religious Condition of the Native Tribes*, 2 vols. (London: James Duncan, 1828), 1:220–24.

14. Ibid.

15. C. I. Latrobe, *Journal of a Visit to South Africa in 1815 and 1816 with Some Account of the Missionary Stations of the United Brethren* (London: L. B. Seeley, 1818), 144.

16. John Philip, Journal, 7 March 1842, LMS Archives, South African Journals, Box 4. For the problems which the (white) Dutch Reformed church had, somewhat later in the nineteenth century, with the display of religious emotion, see below Ch. 9.

17. Philip, *Researches*, 1:213–14.

18. Jane Sales, *Mission Stations in the Eastern Cape, 1800–1852* (Cape Town and Rotterdam: A. A. Balkema, 1979).

19. British Parliamentary Paper, *Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements); Together with the Minutes of Evidence*, BPP 538 of 1836, 47.

20. William J. Burchell, *Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa*, edited by Isaac Schapera, 2 vols. (London: Batchworth, 1953), 1:158.

21. James Backhouse, *A Narrative of a Visit to the Mauritius and South Africa* (London: Hamilton, Adams and Co., 1844), 117–18.

22. J. W. Colenso, *Ten Weeks in Natal: A Journal of the First Tour of Visitation among the Colonists and Zulu Kafirs of Natal* (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1855), 45, cited in Jeff Guy, *The Heretic: A Study of the Life of John William Colenso, 1814–1883* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983), 48.

23. N. Pos, *Een Stem uit Zuid-Afrika: Mededelingen betreffende den Maatschappelijken en Godsdienstigen toestand der Kaapkolonie* (Breda: P. B. Nieuwenhuijs, 1868), 36 (my translation).

24. C. L. Stretch, *The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch*, edited by Basil A. Le Cordeur (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman for Rhodes University, 1988), 131–32.

25. Lt. Col. M. C. Johnstone, "Statement of a Conference . . . with Kreili, 21 August 1846," in British Parliamentary Paper, *Correspondence with the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope Relative to the State of the Kafir Tribes on the Eastern Frontier of the Colony*, BPP 786 of 1847, 179–80.

26. SACA, 22.12.1847.

27. S. E. K. Mqhayi, *Ityala lamaWele*, 7th ed. (Lovedale: Lovedale Press, 1931), 109, cited and translated in J. B. Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981), 166.

28. Harry Smith to Grey, 23 Dec. 1847, in British Parliamentary Paper, *Correspondence with the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope of the Colony*, BPP 968 of 1848, 24.

29. Personal observation: on the movement see J. Leeuwenberg, "The Griqua Reformation Movement in the 20th Century," unpublished paper, Institute of the Commonwealth Studies, London (1971).

30. Joseph Lelyveld, *Move Your Shadow: South Africa, Black and White* (New York: Times Books, 1985), 366–67.

31. Christopher Hope, *White Boy Running* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1988), 260.

32. "The Facilitors: A Guide to the Intelligent Liberal," *Highveld Style*, Aug. 1989, 49. (I owe this reference to Susan Newton-King).

33. Charles van Onselen's recent paper, "Race and Class in South African Countryside: Cultural Osmosis and Social Relations in the Sharecropping Economy of the South-Western Transvaal, 1900–1950," *American Historical Review* 95 (1990), 117, contains a fascinating paragraph on handshaking between white landowners and black sharecroppers (and much else besides), as an illustration and demonstration of the main theme of his article, namely the close economic and social ties among all those living in this poor area.

34. Robert I. Rotberg with Miles F. Shore, *The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 610–11.

35. On Schreiner, see particularly Ruth First and Ann Scott, *Olive Schreiner* (New York: Schocken Books, 1980).

## 5. The White Population of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century (pp. 125–137)

1. The original version of this paper contained a number of references to comparative material for New England, French Canada, Britain, and France. I have excised these from this version. For the material on the former two, see Philip J. Greven, *Four*

*Generations: Population and Land in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), and J. Henripin, *La Population canadienne au début du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: INED, 1954).

Since this article was first published, Leonard Guelke has been engaged on a large-scale project to reconstitute the colonial settler population up to 1750. As he points out in the article which he has published on settler demography, the results he has obtained are, on certain points, "substantially different" than mine. While it may be the case that these discrepancies result from sampling procedures, it is much more likely that they derive from the differences in our respective research designs. In rewriting this paper, I have assumed this to be the case, and I have pointed out why the different methods we have followed have led to divergent results. The divergences themselves, indeed, provide additional information on the demographic history of early colonial South Africa. (Leonard Guelke, "The Anatomy of a Colonial Settler Population: Cape Colony 1657-1750," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21 (1988), 453. See also N. B. Gouws, "The Demography of Whites in South Africa Prior to 1820," *South African Journal of Demography* 1 (1987), 7-15.)

2. Cape Town: Balkema, 1971.

3. Pieter van Duin and Robert Ross, *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1987), 114-26, gives a detailed breakdown of the *opgaaf* figures.

4. C. C. de Villiers, *Geslacht-Register der Oude Kaapsche Families*, 3 vols. (Cape Town: Van de Sandt and De Villiers, 1893-94). On the process of compilation G. McC. Theal wrote as follows:

The materials for this work were collected by Mr. C. C. de Villiers of Cape Town, assisted by his wife, during many years of close application. All the baptismal and marriage entries of European descent in the Church registers of Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Paarl, Tulbagh, Malmesbury and Graaf-Reinet, from the foundations of these churches to the end of the eighteenth century, were copied. Unfortunately, these registers are not complete, so in an endeavour to supply what was wanting, the wills and inventories in the office of the master of the Supreme Court and the documents in the Registry of Deeds were carefully examined and copious notes were made from them. Old family bibles were sought out and yielded some information. The public archives were next turned to, but before the first series of papers in them was completely examined, the indefatigable worker was suddenly struck down by death, and his widow did not long survive him. (*History of South Africa under the Administration of the Dutch East India Company* (1652-1795), 2 vols. (London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1897), 2:387.

Thereafter, Theal and an assistant took 19 months to arrange the material and put it through the press, and while doing so they received more information with which to fill out the work. Since then, South African genealogists have checked and added to the work, and their emendations were included in the second "completely revised edition, augmented and rewritten" by C. Pama and published as *Geslagsregisters van die Ou Kaapse Families/Genealogies of Old South African Families*, 3 vols. (Cape Town and Amsterdam: A. A. Balkema, 1966), which I have used.

5. On this see J. Hoge, "Die Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk aan die Kaap," *AYB* (1938), 2.

6. It should be possible to do so using the *Geslagsregisters* in combination with another source, namely the probate records in the Cape Archives. These give the names of those heirs who were alive at the moment of their relative's death. Since Roman-Dutch inheritance law was strict, it should be possible to establish which members of a given family had survived to a given date and what were (or would have been) their ages at that date. This will then allow the construction of one or more life tables, on the basis of which further computations can be made. I hope that this method, which I have not been able to apply to this work, will help elucidate many of the problems left by my (and indeed Guelke's) work.

7. See C. G. Botha, *Collected Works*, 3 vols. (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1965), 3:134.
8. Anon., "The Origin and Incidence of Miscegenation at the Cape Colony during the Dutch East India Company's Regime," *Race Relations Journal* 20 (1987), 22-27; cf. J. A. Heese, "Postscript," *Familia* 12 (1975), 101.
9. Heese, *Herkoms*, 41.
10. Anders Sparrman, *A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope . . . from the Year 1772-1776*, edited by V. S. Forbes, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1975-76), 1:264.
11. O. F. Mentzel, *A Geographical-Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope*, edited by H. J. Mandelbrote, translated by H. J. Mandelbrote, G. V. Marais, and J. Hoge, 3 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1921, 1924, 1941), 2:122.
12. Robert Ross, "Smallpox at the Cape of Good Hope in the Eighteenth Century," in *African Historical Demography* (Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, 1977), 416-28.
13. See, e.g., E. A. Walker, *The History of Southern Africa*, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957), 76, 88.
14. This is a frequent pattern in colonial and frontier situation. See, e.g., H. Moller, "Sex Composition and Correlated Culture Patterns of Colonial America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 2 (1945), 113-53, and R. Thompson, "Seventeenth Century English and Colonial Sex Ratios: A Postscript," *Population Studies* 28 (1974), 153-65.
15. Obviously, this depended not only on the sex ratio at birth and the sex-specific mortality but also on the moment at which "girls" became "women" and "boys" became "men," at least for the purposes of the *opgaaf*.
16. As noted above, this study deals with the legitimate or legitimized. See also above, Ch. 3.
17. Since the registers are not complete after 1800, there was a fair chance that children born to women after this date would have been missed by the compilers, thus distorting the pattern.
18. These figures are more or less the same as those found by Guelke for all women who were adult in 1731, although substantially higher than those for women who were adult in 1705. The latter figure, however, is, I believe, misleading, since Guelke only knows the age at marriage of 30 percent (80 out of 268) of the women in his set, and these would have been predominantly those who had been born in South Africa, who would have been considerably younger than the immigrants. To give an example, it is much more likely that a woman born in, say, 1689 and marrying in 1704 is included in his statistic than one marrying in the latter year but born several years earlier, before the Huguenot immigration of the late 1680s. Moreover, there is in general a slight downward bias in his figures, because marriage seems generally to have constituted the point at which, for the purposes of the *opgaaf*, "girls" became "women." Less than 1 percent of "women" had never been married in 1731. Thus someone aged 16 in 1731, say, would be included in the statistics if she was married, but not if she was not.
19. Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-tailed test,  $\chi^2 = 3.34$ . Therefore  $0.20 > P > 0.10$ .
20. Guelke's figures are higher because he included in his statistics a number of immigrants, whose age at marriage was presumably much higher than that of native-born South Africans.
21. See E. A. Wrigley, "Family Limitation in Pre-Industrial England," *Economic History Review* 19 (1966), 88.
22. See below, Ch. 6.

23. Guelke found the opposite for those who were adult in 1731. According to his statistics (p. 455), a slightly higher proportion of men than women who had been widowed had remarried at least once by 1731 (73 percent—72 of 98—as against 71 percent—108 of 153). However a much higher proportion of men than women were on their first marriage in 1731 (79 percent as against 68 percent of those who had ever been married) and more males than females of those who were married for the first time in 1731 would remarry at some stage in the future. I suspect, but cannot prove, that the differences we have found have to do with changes in the sex-specific mortality rates over the course of the century.

24. Heese, "Postscript."

25. See E. F. Watermeyer, "The Roman Dutch Law in South Africa," in E. A. Walter (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire: Volume 8, South Africa*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 870–71.

26. The mean age at the birth of the last child was 37 years 9 months, and the median 39 years 3 months. As in other cases in this chapter, the mode was calculated by the formula  $\text{Mean-Mode} = 3(\text{Mean-Median})$

27. According to Leonard Guelke's researches, 15 percent (23 out of 153) of the adult settler women at the Cape in 1731 who had ever been widowed would never remarry. The mean age at widowhood of these women was 41. See "Anatomy," 455, 471.

30. For a discussion of this, see Wrigley, "Family Limitation," 106–8.

31. It should be pointed out that the sex ratio among the slave population was even more imbalanced than among the white, because a high proportion of the slaves imported were males and because the slave population did not reproduce itself to any great extent. The *opgaaf* lists show that the number of adult male slaves per hundred females decreased throughout the century from 600 in the wake of the smallpox epidemic of 1713 to 252 in 1793. Also there was generally a preponderance of males among the slave children. On the effects of this imbalance, see Robert Ross, "Oppression, Sexuality and Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope," *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 6 (1980), 421–34.

## 6. The Developmental Spiral of the White Family and the Expansion of the Frontier (pp. 138–151)

1. This chapter consists of an amalgamation and reworking of two unpublished papers, "The Frontier and the White Family: Some Hypotheses," presented in absentia to a conference of the South African Historical Association in 1979, and "The Roman Dutch Law of Inheritance, Landed Property and Afrikaner Family Structures," presented to the Conference on the History of the Family in Africa, SOAS, Sept. 1981. A preliminary version of the former paper was also given to a seminar of the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure in 1976.

2. M. F. Katzen, "White Settlers and the Origin of a New Society, 1652–1778," in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *The Oxford History of South Africa*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969–71), 1:211.

3. In "Time and Social Structure: An Ashanti Case Study," in Meyer Fortes (ed.), *Social Structure: Essays Presented to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1953); see also his "Introduction" to J. Goody (ed.), *The Developmental Cycle in Domestic Groups* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

4. In 1795, the white population of the Cape was around 15,000. By 1875, the white population of South Africa was around 300,000. Approximately three quarters of these lived in the Cape Colony.

5. See W. M. van der Westhuizen, "Erfopvolging by versterf in Suid-Afrika," *Tyd-*

skrif vir Hedendaags Romeins-Hollandse Reg 11 (1948) and 12 (1949), for a description of these various measures.

6. C. G. Botha, *Collected Works*, 3 vols. (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1962), 2:77.

7. *Ibid.*, 2:76.

8. N. J. van der Merwe and C. J. Rowland, *Die Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg*, 5th ed. (Pretoria: J. P. van der Walt & Seun, 1987). In 1822, however, a proclamation was issued by which the property of those subjects of the United Kingdom who were married outside the colony was to be subject to those laws which they would have enjoyed in Great Britain. Those who married in the colony had to make an ante-nuptial contract to escape the rigors of the Roman-Dutch law of succession. RCC 14:459.

9. Report of the Law of Inheritance Commission for the Western Districts, Cape Parliamentary Paper G.15 (1865), xviii.

10. Carnegie Commission, *Die Armblanke-Vraagstuk in Suid-Afrika, Deel I, Plattelandsverarming en Plaatsverlating*, by J. F. W. Grosskopf (Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia, 1932), 46.

11. Leonard Guelke, "Land Tenure and Settlement at the Cape, 1652-1812," in C. Martin and K. J. Friedlaender (eds.), *Land Tenure in South Africa, I, Surveying and Land Tenure in the Cape, 1652-1812* (Cape Town: UCT Department of Surveying, 1984); L. C. Duly, *British Land Policy at the Cape, 1795-1844: A Study of Administrative Procedures in the Empire* (Durban, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1968).

12. This statement is confirmed by my analysis, performed since this paper was written, of the valuation of all the landed property of the Colony, excluding Cape Town and (for reasons of archival survival) Swellendam district, to be found in CA CRB 129. However, by then, in the southern coastal district around George and Knysna, which was to become the main center of poor whiteness in the Cape, there were already signs of multiple ownership (but not subdivision) to an extent not found elsewhere. See above, Ch. 2.

13. Carnegie Commission, *Armeblanke-vraagstuk*, 1:46.

14. Guelke and Shell, "Early Colonial Gentry," 283, n. 32.

15. Duly, *British Land Policy*, 14.

16. John Barrow, *An Account of Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa*, 2 vols. (London: A. Strahan for T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1801-1804), 2:384.

17. On this, see above, Ch. 1.

18. On this change, see Duly, *British Land Policy*, passim.

19. See above, Ch. 1.

20. L. T. Guelke, "The Early European Settlement of South Africa," PhD thesis, University of Toronto (1974), 325-27. In all the various periods and wealth classes studied by Guelke, with the exception of stock farmers with assets above f5,000, total debts were over 20 percent of total assets.

21. See George Thompson, *Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa*, edited by V. S. Forbes, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1967-68), 2:94.

22. D. van Arkel, personal communication.

23. This agitation is clear from Thompson, *Travels*, 2:385. It continued throughout the century, surfacing, for instance, in the evidence before the Law of Inheritance Commission, 37.

24. For the purposes of example, I am here ignoring the position of women as inheritors and transmitters of property, although of course they were of considerable, and complicating, importance.

25. Obviously this does not imply that the white community was unstratified, only that, in the counterfactual case, stratification would have been considerably sharper.

26. Based on *opgaaf* roll for 1749, ARA VOC 4177, and C. C. de Villiers and C.

Pama, *Geslagsregisters van Ou Kaapse families*, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Cape Town: A. Balkema, 1965).

27. Guelke, "Early European Settlement," 215; Nigel Penn, "Pastoralists and Pastoralism in the Northern Cape Frontier Zone during the Eighteenth Century," in Martin Hall and Andrew B. Smith (eds.), *Prehistoric Pastoralism in Southern Africa*, South African Archaeological Society, Goodwin Series, 5 (1966), 62–68.

28. Richard Elphick, *Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979, 234, and in Richard Elphick and V. C. Malherbe, "The Khoisan to 1828," in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652–1840*, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longmans, 1989), 22.

29. Penn, "Pastoralists and Pastoralism," 65.

30. P. C. van Duin and Robert Ross, *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1987), 112–14.

31. In the following analysis I have not considered the Cape district because the undifferentiated presence of townsmen and women in the lists would confuse much of what I am trying to demonstrate. That the other districts were so clearly agricultural is shown by the fact that only twenty people in the those districts who owned slaves did not also admit to owning substantial agricultural property. I have defined "substantial agricultural property" as a vineyard, a wheatfield, or stock in excess of twenty cattle or sheep.

32. A certain number of black men also "passed," but it is significant that there were no men in the list with recognizably "black" names (van der Kaap, van Bengalen, and on), except in the special section at the end of the Cape district list.

33. Using a  $\chi^2$  test the difference is significant at the .001 level.

34. I have treated as co-resident groups those sets of recognizable kin who appear on the *opgaaf* roll in adjacent positions. As Susan Newton-King has pointed out (personal communication n.d. [1990]), it is an assumption that they were living together, as "they may just have stood next to each other in the queue before the drosdy [magistracy] at *opgaaf* time." However, as I hope this chapter demonstrates, plausible explanations of family structure can often be made on the basis of such an assumption. It may indeed be that not all members of a co-resident group actually went to do *opgaaf*. Since I have no way of being certain on whose farm the propertyless and kinless men were living, I have excluded them from consideration here. What I give is thus a minimalist interpretation of the co-resident groups.

35. This difference was significant at the .01 level, as were all others subsequently reported in the rest of this chapter. Both proportions are still relatively high. In Graaff-Reinet in 1798, for instance, only 26 percent of the "Inhabitants" held farms. See Hermann Giliomee, "The Eastern Frontier, 1770–1812," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 455.

36. It should be noted that these figures have no relation to household size as usually defined, as they exclude children, wives, servants, co-resident cousins, and more distant kin.

37. They may have been patriarchal in the early nineteenth-century sense of the word, which then meant "living like the Biblical Patriarchs," or in our terms "transhumant pastoralists."

38. P. J. van der Merwe, *Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaap Kolonie* (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1938), 178–79. Van der Merwe did, however, make considerable use of oral testimony, collected from *trekboere* in the northern Cape, in his *Trek: Studies oor die Mobiliteit van die Pioniersbevolking aan die Kaap* (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1945).

39. Leonard Guelke, "Frontier Settlement in Early Dutch South Africa," *Annals*

of the Association of American Geographers 66 (1976), 25–42; idem, "Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers, 1657–1780," in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping*, 66–108; and "The Making of Two Frontier Communities: Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century," *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 12 (1985), esp. 434–36. See also S. D. Neumark, *Economic Influences on the South African Frontier, 1632–1837* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).

## 7. The Rule of Law in the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century (pp. 155–165)

1. These are to be found in the VOC series in the *Algemene Rijksarchief* in the Hague, and also, somewhat less conveniently arranged, the Cape Archives.

2. Published in M. K. Jeffreys (ed.), *Kaapse Plakaatboek*, 6 vols. (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1944–51).

3. The nearest exception might be England. For a useful summary of the debate on this matter see Philip Jenkins, "Into the Upperworld?: Law, Crime and Society in English Society," *Social History* 12 (1987), 93–102, and also William Goodwin's contemporary comment that crime consists of "those offences which the wealthiest part of the community has no temptation to commit," which Jenkins cites on p. 99.

4. T. R. H. Davenport, "The Consolidation of a New Society: The Cape Colony," in M. Wilson and L. M. Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968–71), 1:297.

5. RCC 1:302–9.

6. The two major episodes in this fight were the attack on the governorship of Willem Adriaan van der Stel, which came to a head in 1706, and the Cape Patriot movement of the 1780s. On these, see Gerrit Schutte, "Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652–1795," in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652–1840*, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longmans, 1989), 303–15.

7. See below, Ch. 8.

8. The evidence for this statement, which I have insufficient space to develop here, can be found, for example, in Coenraad Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die laaste kwart van die agtiende eeu en die voortlewing van hul denkbeelde*, 2nd ed. (Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik, 1967).

9. J. A. van der Chijs (ed.), *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakkaatboek*, 16 vols. (Batavia/Jakarta: Landsdrukkerij, 1885–97), 1:573.

10. Statistical justification for this and other similar statements cannot be given, but the evidence is sufficiently consistent for figures only to confirm the obvious.

11. Case 6 contra Jan Crugel, 29 May 1732, ARA VOC 4120.

12. Case 22 contra P. C. Hammes, 12 Nov. 1768, ARA VOC 4255.

13. Case 10 contra Jan Hendrik Gerhard, 2 July 1767, ARA VOC 4251.

14. John Mason, "Hendrik Albertus and His Ex-Slave Mey: A Drama in Three Acts," unpublished paper presented to the Conference "Cape Slavery and After," UCT (1989).

15. Eugene D. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Role: The World the Slave Made* (New York: Random House, 1974), 40.

16. F. Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 51–52.

17. Case 11 contra Johannes Ley, 28 July 1740, ARA VOC 4146.

18. Case 2 contra Harmen Cloppenburg, 27 Jan. 1738, ARA VOC 4135.

19. On the most important exception to this, see Nigel Penn, "Estienne Barbier: An Eighteenth Century Social Bandit?," *Social Dynamics* 14 (1988), 1–19.

20. On this matter, see Robert Ross, *Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).

21. In the nineteenth century, masters could send their slaves to work on the communal tread-mill, a heavy form of punishment. See M. D. Teenstra, *De Vruchten mijner werkzaamheden, gedurende mijne reize over de Kaap de Goede Hoop, naar Java en terug, over St. Helena, naar de Nederlanden, 1830*, edited by F. C. L. Bosman (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1943), 195–96. I do not know if this practice was followed earlier.

22. Case 11 contra C. D. Persoon, 14 July 1763, ARA VOC 4237.

23. Case 14 contra Robbert Schot, 27 Dec. 1731, ARA VOC 4117.

24. These are published in *KP* 3:1–7.

25. Case 5 contra Bellisoer van Bengal c.s., 22 March 1736, ARA VOC 4131.

26. Case 22 contra January van Bengal en April van Bengal, 30 Sept. 1762, ARA VOC 4233.

27. The information presented in the subsequent paragraphs has been inferred from a systematic study of the court proceedings.

28. Anders Sparrman, *Travels in the Cape 1772–1776*, edited by V. S. Forbes, translated by H. and I. Rudner, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1976–77), 2:257.

29. See A. Sachs, *Justice in South Africa* (London: Heinemann, 1973), Ch. 2; H. B. Fine, “The Administration of Criminal Justice at the Cape of Good Hope, 1795–1828,” PhD thesis, UCT (1991).

30. For its foundation see *KP* 1:295.

31. This is shown by numerous cases in the Court Records.

32. They were generally convicted of petty larceny, of such commodities as sheep, vegetables, and wine.

33. This distinction cannot always be sustained, certainly by the late eighteenth century when slave and Khoisan resistance often coalesced. See Ross, *Cape of Torments*, Ch. 4; Nigel Penn, “Droster Gangs of the Bokkeveld and Roggeveld, 1770–1800,” *South African Historical Journal* 23 (1990), 15–40.

34. H. Lichtenstein, *Travels in Southern Africa in the Years 1803, 1804, 1805 and 1806*, translated by A. Plumptre, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1929–30), 1:168.

## 8. The Changing Legal Position of the Khoisan in the Cape Colony, 1652–1795 (pp. 166–180)

1. On the distinction between the Khoikhoi and the San, and the use of the term Khoisan (a portmanteau expression) for when no distinction is made, see Richard Elphick, *Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), and below Ch. 10.

2. P. J. van der Merwe, *Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek (1770–1842)* (The Hague: Van Stockum, 1937), Ch. 3.

3. Ibid., passim; Shula Marks, “Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *JAH* 13 (1972).

4. For an example of this, see L. Blussé, “Batavia 1617–1740: The Rise and Fall of a Chinese Colonial Town,” *Journal of South-East Asian Studies* 12 (1981).

5. Donald Moodie, *The Record: Or a Series of Official Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Tribes of South Africa* (reprinted Amsterdam and Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1960), 1:8.

6. *KP* 1:45, 60, 96, 140, 180, 228–29, 267, 271, 301, 316, 329, 333.

7. These were the directors of the VOC in the Netherlands.

8. Moodie, *The Record*; 1:54. On the episode as a whole, see Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*, 104.

9. Moodie, *The Record*, 1:60.

10. H. C. V. Leibbrandt, *Précis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Letters Received*, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Cape Times for the Government Printers, 1899), 1:230-31.

11. Moodie, *The Record*, 1:350.

12. *Ibid.*, 1:387.

13. *Ibid.*, 1:390.

14. A. J. Böeseken, *Nederlandsche Commissarissen aan de kaap, 1652-1700* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1938), 77-83.

15. At least after around 1662, with the crushing of the Peninsula Khoi. See Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*, Ch. 5.

16. G. Harinck, "Interaction between Xhosa and Khoi: Emphasis on the Period 1620-1750," in L. M. Thompson (ed.), *African Societies in Southern Africa* (London: Heinemann, 1969), 164.

17. This analysis follows closely that of Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*, 43-49.

18. See, for instance, D. B. Bosman (ed.), *Dagbregister gehouden by den oppercoopman Jan Anthonisz. van Riebeeck*, 3 vols. (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1952-55), 2:111.

19. Moodie, *The Record*, 1:331.

20. *Ibid.*, 1:364-66.

21. The *fiscaal* was the chief legal officer of the Cape Colony and acted as prosecutor, except where crimes were committed outside the Cape district, when his place was taken by the *landdrost*, or magistrate, of the relevant district.

22. Moodie, *The Record*, 1:22.

23. ARA VOC 4061, case of 18 Oct. 1708. There may have been other civil cases, but I have not been able to examine the records of civil cases after 1715. These exist in the Cape Archives, but are exceedingly voluminous, and unindexed.

24. ARA VOC 4148, Resolutes van de Raad van Politie, 19 May 1741. Four years earlier, Keijser had been on a trading expedition with a group of whites to the Great Nama, during which he had raided and shot the Nama captain Gal. See *relaas* of Gaaren, Hale, and Home, 14 March 1739, in ARA VOC 4142, case against E. Barbier, 12 Nov. 1739, and Nigel Penn, "Estienne Barbier: An Eighteenth Century Cape Social Bandit?," *Social Dynamics* 14 (1988), 7-9.

25. ARA VOC 4184, case 13 contra Claas, 22 July 1751.

26. ARA VOC 4131, case 7 contra Arnoldus, 12 April 1736; ARA VOC 4255, case 13 contra Suyverman and David, 16 June 1768; ARA VOC 4260, case 13 contra Prins, 21 Sept. 1769.

27. Robert Ross, "Oppression, Sexuality and Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope," *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 6 (1979), 431-33.

28. ARA VOC 4255, Case 13 contra Suyverman and David, 16 June 1768.

29. For this see Marijke Gijswijk-Hofstra, "The European Witchcraft Debate and the Dutch Variant," *Social History* 15 (1990), 181-94.

30. An exception should perhaps be made in the case of a slave who attempted to doctor the food of his fellow slaves to stop them from continually hitting him. To do this he bought various medicines from the Khoi. However, he was explicitly punished for attempted poisoning, not for the use of magic. ARA VOC 4288, case 10 contra April van Bengalen, 21 Aug. 1777.

31. ARA VOC 4288, case 4 contra Valentyn, 25 Jan. 1753.

32. ARA VOC 4301, case contra Cobus Anthonij, 8 Nov. 1781.

33. N. L. de la Caille, *Travels at the Cape, 1751-53*, translated and edited by R. Raven-Hart (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1976), 41.

34. A commando was an expedition by the burgher militia.
35. ARA VOC 4271, case 13 contra Kleydbooy c.s., 31 Dec. 1772.
36. ARA VOC 4255, case 13 contra Suyverman and David, 16 June 1768. Certain points concerning this case are in order. First, there were Khoi available who could perfectly adequately act as interpreters of detailed investigations, although frequently white farmers were used in that role. On the distinction between Khoi and the various "San" languages, see Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*, 29. Second, Khoisan were never legally enslaved, although the bondage of captives was scarcely different and arguably harsher.
37. See above all Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 46–55.
38. For the early career of Jager Afrikaner, see J. Campbell, *Travels in South Africa* (London: Black, Parry and Co. and T. Hamilton, 1815), 299, 305–6, 366–67. Some idea of this section of Cape society can be gathered from Pienaar's request to the Dutch government in 1794 that he might be allowed to organize commandoes against the San, in exchange for the bounty price of 15 rixdollars per adult and 10 rixdollars per child. The Council of Policy forbade this, as the purpose of the bounty system which they had recently introduced was to encourage commandoes to clemency, not to further the capture of and trade in large numbers of San. ARA VOC 4360, 75, Resoluitiën van de Raad van Politie, 11 Jan. 1794.
39. Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 7–64; Marks, "Khoisan Resistance," 70–74.
40. Cited in *Ibid.*, 8.
41. This was thus during the First British Occupation of the Cape.
42. RCC 1:453.
43. Landdrost and Krijgsraad, Graaff-Reinet to Governor, 23 April 1787, cited in Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 48.
44. Examples of this conflict are numerous in the judicial records of the Cape. For an exploration of this theme, see Robert Ross, *Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), Ch. 4.
45. Once again examples can be found in most years throughout the century. It would be vain to try to give a complete list.
46. Moddie, *The Record*, 1:320.
47. *Ibid.*, 1:326, 344.
48. *Ibid.*, 1:322.
49. ARA VOC 4162, Case 12 contra Marthinus Spangenberg, 2 April 1744.
50. KP 2:168.
51. Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*, 186.
52. ARA VOC 4112, Criminele Regtsrolle, 2 June 1729.
53. On the Dutch law of evidence and procedure, see Johannes van der Linden, *Verhandeling over de judicieele practijcq of form van procedeeeren*, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Leiden: Erven H. Gartman, 1829), 2:220–47.
54. ARA VOC 4138, case 2 contra Harmanus Cloppenburg, 16 Jan. 1738.
55. See above, Ch. 7.
56. ARA VOC 4142, case 25 contra E. Barbier, 12 Nov. 1739, *relaas* of Garren, Hale, and Hori, 14 March 1739.
57. Cited in André du Toit and Hermann Giliomee, *Afrikaner Political Thought: Analysis and Documents, Volume 1, 1780–1850* (Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip, 1983), 94.
58. RCC 33:79.
59. Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*, 228–29; Gerrit Schutte, "Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652–1795," in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652–1840*, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longmans, 1989, 303–7.

60. Penn, "Estienne Barbier."
61. C. Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die laaste kwart van die agtiende eeu en die voortlewing van hul denkbeelde*, 2nd ed. (Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik, 1967), esp. 165-66; Schutte, "Company and Colonists," 309-15; Nigel Penn, "Anarchy and Authority in the Koue Bokkeveld, 1739-1779: The Banishing of Carel Buijtingdag," *Kleio* 17 (1985), 24-43.
62. ARA VOC 4344, case contra Hermanus Pieterse, 8 Oct. 1789.
63. KP 6:24.
64. RCC 7:211.
65. [W. W. Bird], *State of the Cape of Good Hope in 1822* (London: John Murray, 1823), 8.

## 9. The Rise of Afrikaner Calvinism (pp. 183-191)

1. N. M. Stultz, *Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-1948* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1974).
2. T. D. Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1975). See also J. J. Loubser, "Calvinism, Equality and Inclusion: The Case of Afrikaner Calvinism," in S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization* (New York: Basil Books, 1968), 368.
3. E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
4. André Du Toit, "No Chosen People: The Myth of the Calvinist Origin of Afrikaner Nationalism and Racial Ideology," *American Historical Review* 88 (1983), 920-52; idem, "Captive to the Nationalist Paradigm: Prof. F. A. van Jaarsveld, and the Historical Evidence for the Afrikaner's Ideas on His Calling and Mission," *South African Historical Journal* 16 (1984), 49-80; idem, "Puritans in Africa? Afrikaner 'Calvinism' and Kuyperian Neo-Calvinism in Late Nineteenth-Century South Africa," *Comparative Studies in Sociology and History* 27 (1985), 209-40.
5. A. Kuyper, *Calvinism: Six Stone Lectures* (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1899); idem, "La crise sud-africaine," *Revue des deux mondes* 157 (1900), 481-533; M. E. Kluit, *Het protestantse reveil in Nederland en daarbuiten 1815-1865* (Amsterdam: Paris, 1970).
6. A. Sparrman, *A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope . . . 1772-1776*, 2 vols., edited by V. S. Forbes (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1975-76), 1:264.
7. F. Valentijn, *Beschrijvinge van Kaap der Goede Hoop, met de zaken daar toe behorende*, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1971-73), 2:259.
8. J. Hoge, "Die geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk aan die Kaap," *Archives Year-Book for South African History* (1939) 1:1-244.
9. A. L. Geyer, *Die Stellenbosse gemeente in die agtiende eeu* (Annals of the University of Stellenbosch, IV, B. 1) (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1926), 74.
10. J. R. Bruijn, "De personeelsbehoefte van de V.O.C. overzee en aan boord, bezien in Aziatisch en Nederlands perspectief," *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 91 (1976), 218-48.
11. Andrew Ross, *John Philip (1775-1851): Missions, Race and Politics in South Africa* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1986), 21.
12. M. C. Vos, *Merkwaardig verhaal aangaande het leven en de lotgevallen van M. C. Vos* (Amsterdam: Saakes, 1824).
13. T. N. Hanekom, *Helperus Ritzema van Lier (1764-1793)* (Cape Town and Pretoria: N. G. Kerk, 1959).

14. J. Philip, *Memoir of Mrs. Matilda Smith, Late of Cape Town* (London: Westley, 1824).
15. W. M. Freund, "The Career of Johannes Theodorus van der Kemp and His Role in the History of South Africa," *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 86 (1973), 376–90.
16. H. Lichtenstein, *Travels in Southern Africa in the Years 1803, 1804, 1805 and 1806*, translated by A. Plumptre, 2 vols. (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1928–30), 2:121.
17. T. N. Hanekom, *Die liberale Rigting in Suid-Afrika: 'n Kerkhistoriese studie* (Stellenbosch: Christen-Studentenvereniging-Maatskappij, 1951).
18. N. J. Hofmeyr, *A Brief Account of the Present Revival of Religion in Some Parts of the Colony* (Cape Town: A. & S. Robertson and N. H. Marais, 1860), 3.
19. W. B. Van der Vyver, "Die Geskiedenis van die Stellenbosse gemeente, 1800–1830," *AYB* (1958), 215–341; Hanekom, *Liberale Rigting*.
20. Hofmeyr, *Brief Account*, 4.
21. Du Plessis, *Andrew Murray*, 33.
22. *Ibid.*, 206.
23. *Ibid.*, 207.
24. *Ibid.*, 209; M. C. Kitshoff, *Gottlieb Wilhelm Antony van de Lingen: Kaapse Predikant uit die negentiende eeu* (Groningen: V.B.B., 1972), 153.
25. Hofmeyr, *Brief Account*, 5–6.
26. Kitshoff, *Van der Lingen*, 153.
27. S. Hofmeyer, *Twintig jaren in Zoutpansberg: een verhaal van twintig jarigen arbeid onder de heidenen in de Transvaal* (Cape Town: J. H. Rose, 1890).
28. Kitshoff, *Van der Lingen*, 153, 161.
29. Jean Du Plessis, "Colonial Progress and Countryside Conservatism: Essay on the Legacy of Van der Lingen of Paarl, 1831–1875," MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch (1988), 83–86 and Appendix.
30. I. Hexham, "Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism," *African Affairs* 79 (1980), 201.
31. Kitshoff, *Van der Lingen*, 92–116.
32. H. A. Heyns, "Die Kerklike werksaamhede van Abraham Faure," *AYB* (1950), 1:37–38.
33. D. P. Faure, *My Life and Times* (Cape Town: Van de Sandt de Villiers, 1907), 22.
34. If they had made any impression on him in person, it would surely not have escaped the attention of his biographer, M. C. Kitshoff.
35. A. Dreyer, *Die Kaapse Kerk en die Groot Trek* (Cape Town: Van de Sandt de Villiers, 1929).
36. W. E. G. Solomon, *Saul Solomon: The Member for Cape Town* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1948), 144.
37. Kitshoff, *Van der Lingen*, Ch. 2.
38. S. Trapido, "White Conflict and Non-White Participation in the Politics of the Cape of Good Hope," PhD thesis, University of London (1970), 45.
39. Du Plessis, "Colonial Progress and Countryside Conservatism," 115–25, 236–44.
40. Du Plessis, "Colonial Progress and Countryside Conservatism," 151, citing G. W. A. van der Lingen, *Iet, doch niet al, wat er te zeggen is op de oordeelvelling van den Papieren 'Zuid-Afrikaan'* (Cape Town: Van de Sandt de Villiers & Tier, 1853). Van der Lingen was referring to Isaak Da Costa's famous polemic, *Bezwaren tegen den geest der eeuw* (Leiden: Herlingh & Zoon, 1823).
41. Du Plessis, esp. Ch. 2; André du Toit, "The Cape Afrikaners' Failed Liberal Moment," in Jeffrey Butler, Richard Elphick and David Welsh (eds.), *Democratic Lib-*

*eralism in South Africa: Its History and Prospect* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 35–63.

42. The examples are usefully collected together in J. Alton Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier: The Theological Foundation of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1652–1910* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), esp. Ch. 4, though the general argument of this book is diametrically opposed to that of this chapter.

43. Andries Pretorius perhaps came closest when, on his death bed, he wrote admonishing his children to “take care that you ensure your calling and election.” (Ziet dus to, dat gijlieden uwe roeping en verkiezing vast maakt), cited in Gustav S. Preller, *Andries Pretorius: Lewensbeskrywing van die voortrekker Kommandant-General* (Johannesburg: Akfrikaanse Pers, 1937), 490. Clearly he, or his amanuensis, knew the key terms of Calvinism, but like so many Calvinists had not mastered the central paradox of his faith, namely the relationship between predestination and personal responsibility.

44. Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, 141.

45. *Ibid.*, 159.

46. Du Toit, “Puritans in Africa?”; Templin, *Ideology on a Frontier*, Chs. 6–8.

47. Dreyer, *Die Kaapse kerk en die Groot Trek*, 6–8.

48. Incidentally, the passage continues: “and also upon your servants and upon your handmaids in those days, will I pour out my spirit” (Joel 2:28–29), but this does not seem to have taken root.

49. J. P. Claasen, “Die Jerusalemangers: Met bysonder verwysing na J. A. Enslin,” MA thesis, UNISA (1978).

50. B. Sundkler, *Zulu Zion and Some Swazi Zionists* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), Ch. 1.

51. B. Spoelstra, *Die “Doppers” in Suid-Afrika, 1760–1899* (Cape Town, Bloemfontein and Johannesburg: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1963), 22–23.

52. Spoelstra, *Die “Doppers,”* 24–25.

53. *Ibid.*; H. D. Longland, “Die Geskiedenis van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde gemeente Colesberg, 1825–1875,” *AYB* (1967), 202–90.

54. Spoelstra, *Die “Doppers,”* Ch. 7.

55. *Ibid.*, 212.

56. On this see Hermann Giliomee, esp. “Constructing Afrikaner Nationalism,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18 (1983), 83–98, and “The Beginnings of Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness, 1850–1915,” in Leroy Vail (ed.), *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (London: James Currey, 1989), 21–25.

# 10. Donald Moodie and the Rise of South African Historiography (pp. 192–211)

1. *Het Nederduitsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Tydschrift*, from March/April 1824 on. My especial thanks are due to Candy Malherbe and Nigel Worden for sending me copies of various material from the Cape archives and the South African Library.

2. Moodie, *The Record*, 1:8; italics in original.

3. My evidence for this is largely circumstantial (though no doubt the D’Urban papers in Cape Town might make things clearer). As things now stand, it is mainly a matter of timing. D’Urban acknowledged the receipt of the Glenelg dispatch on 23 March 1836 (*Copies or Extracts of any Further Despatches which have been Received from, or Addressed to the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, Relative to the Late Caffre War*, BPP 503 of 1837, 19–20) and Moodie was appointed to carry out his work at some stage before the 24th of June of the same year. See W. M. Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton: The Making of the South African Native Question*, 2nd ed.

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 172, and Donald Moodie, *An Inquiry into the Justice and Expediency of Completing the Publication of the Authentic Records of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope Relative to the Aboriginal Tribes* (Cape Town and London: A. S. Robertson and J. Richardson, 1841), 11.

4. It was so known, not because Hintza, the Xhosa king, had been a major participant, but because he was callously and brutally murdered by British officers in the aftermath of the war.

5. The original had "Caffre" in this place. Following the example of J. B. Peires, *The Dead Shall Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle Killing of 1856-7* (London: James Currey, 1989), xii, I have banished this insulting word even from quotations.

6. *Cape of Good Hope, Caffre War and the Death of Hintza*, BPP 279 of 1836, 61.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Notably in J. B. Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1981), Ch. 6.

9. *Ibid.*, 60.

10. On the making of the dispatch, see J. G. Pretorius, "The British Humanitarians and the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1834-1836," *AYB* (1988), 1: 160-77.

11. *Ibid.*, 167.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Donald Moodie, *List of Official Documents, Explanatory of the Relations between the Colonists of the Cape of Good Hope and the Independent Native Tribes* (Cape Town: Gazette and Trade List, 1836). See the list of enclosures in Napier to Glenelg, 11.4.1838, CA GH 23/12, 64-65.

14. H. Cloete and C. Bird, *Report of the Committee to the Subscribers to the Fund for Printing and Publishing the Documentary Evidence Relative to the Intercourse of the Colonists and Cape Government with the Native Tribes* (Cape Town: Saul Solomon, 1838), 8.

15. Pretorius, "The British Humanitarians and the Cape Eastern Frontier," 176.

16. P. H. Kapp, "Dr. John Philip: Die Grondlegger van liberalisme in Suid-Afrika," *AYB* (1985), 126.

17. J. C. Chase, *Some Reasons for Our Opposing the Author of the "South African Researches," the Rev. Dr. John Philip, Superintendent of the London Society's Missions in South Africa* (Cape Town: A. S. Robertson, 1838), 10. In the eighteenth century the Jesuits had ruled Paraguay to the exclusion of any lay authorities.

18. On Fairbairn, see H. C. Botha, *John Fairbairn in South Africa* (Cape Town: Historical Publication Society, 1984).

19. "The Social Position of the Colored Classes in this Portion of the Colony from the Year 1786," CA VC 888, 9.

20. *Ibid.*, 24.

21. Christopher Saunders, "James Read: Towards a Reassessment," *SSA* 7 (1977), 19-25; Ido H. Enklaar, *Life and Work of Dr. J. Th. van der Kemp 1747-1811: Missionary Pioneer and Protagonist of Racial Equality in South Africa* (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1988).

22. See, e.g., the Memorial of the Directors of the LMS, 4 July 1825, RCC 22:133-37.

23. Andrew Ross, *John Philip: Missions, Race and Politics in South Africa* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1986), 108-9; Robert Ross, "James Cropper, John Philip and the Researches," in Hugh Macmillan and Shula Marks (eds.), *Africa and Empire: W. M. Macmillan, Historian and Social Critic* (London: Temple Smith for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1989), 140-53.

24. John Philip, *Researches in South Africa Illustrating the Civil, Moral and Religious Condition of the Native Tribes*, 2 vols. (London: James Duncan, 1828), 1:219.

25. *Ibid.*, 1:218-23.

26. *Ibid.*, 1:204.

27. István Hont and Michael Ignatieff, "Needs and Justice in *The Wealth of Nations*: An Introductory Essay," in *idem* (eds.), *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

28. Philip, *Researches*, 1:370-71.

29. *Ibid.*, 1:142; for an example of the sort of comment to which he is referring here, see [W. W. Bird], *State of the Cape of Good Hope in 1822* (London: John Murray, 1823), 6-7.

30. Philip, *Researches*, 1:3.

31. *Ibid.*, 1:17.

32. *Ibid.*, 1:36.

33. *Ibid.*, 1:41-42.

34. On this see, e.g., Richard Elphick, *Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); J. Parkington, "Soaqua and Bushmen: Hunters and Robbers," in C. Schrire (ed.), *Past and Present in Hunter Gatherer Studies* (Orlando, Florida: Academic Press, 1984), 151-74; Carmel Schrire, "An Inquiry into the Evolutionary Status and Apparent Identity of San Hunter-Gatherers," *Human Ecology* 8 (1980), 9-32.

35. Philip, *Researches*, 2:1-2.

36. Cited in *Ibid.*, 2:4. I have not been able to identify the "philosophical writer."

37. Philip, *Researches*, 1:54.

38. *Ibid.*, 1:57.

39. See, above all, Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*.

40. The editions to which Philip would have referred were probably A. Sparrman, *A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, Towards the Antarctic Polar Circle and Round the World, but Chiefly into the Country of the Hottentots and Caffres*, 2 vols. (London: G. G. J. & J. Robinson, 1785; John Barrow, *An Account of Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa in the Years 1797 and 1798*, 2 vols. (London: A. Strahan for T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1802-1803); F. Le Vaillant, *Travels into the Interior Parts of Africa, by Way of the Cape of Good Hope, in the Years 1780, 81, 82, 83, 84 and 85*. English translation (London: G. G. J. & J. Robinson, 1790); A. Bogaert, *Historische reizen door d'oostende deelen van Azie . . . mitsgaders . . . 'tgeen aan de Kaap de Goede Hoop in den jaare 1706 is voorgevallen* (Amsterdam: Nicholaas ten Hoorn, 1711).

41. On this see J. B. Peires, "The British and the Cape, 1814-1834," in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840*, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longmans, 1989), 490-98.

42. *Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants of Southern Africa, within the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope or beyond the Frontier of that Colony: Part I, Hottentots and Bosjesmen; Caffres; Griquas*, BPP 50 of 1835, 9-15.

43. For the circumstances, see *Correspondence between Donald Moodie, Esq. Compiler and Editor of the Cape Records, and the Rev. John Philip D.D., Author of Researches in South Africa* (Cape Town and London: A. S. Robertson and J. Richardson, 1841), 28, 41.

44. Ross, "James Cropper, John Philip and the *Researches*," 141.

45. *Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines: (British Settlements); with the Minutes of Evidence*, BPP 425 of 1837, 5. On the drafting of the report, see Elizabeth

Elbourne, "To Colonize the Mind: Evangelicals and Missionaries in Britain and South Africa," D. Phil. diss., Oxford, 1992, Ch. 8.

46. *Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines*, 31.

47. *Ibid.*, 25f.

48. W. M. Macmillan, *The Cape Coloured Question: A Historical Survey* (London: Faber and Gwyer, 1927), 233-46.

49. This memorandum was presented in evidence in the libel case Moodie v. Fairbairn (for which see below), the proceedings of which were published as *Report of the Trial Stockenström versus Campbell, for Libel, in the Supreme Court Cape Town, February 28, 1838, with Notes from the South African Commercial Advertiser. To Which Is Added Report of the Trial Moodie versus Fairbairn* (Cape Town: G. J. Pike, 1838). The memorandum in question is quoted on p. 3.

50. See Philip, *Researches*, 1:41-46.

51. Moodie, *The Record*, 5:1.

52. BPP 50 of 1835, 9-15.

53. E.g., Moodie, *The Record*, 5:21-22.

54. Some Cape journalists took his point; e.g., *Ware Afrikaner*, 3.8.1841.

55. Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 181; C. W. Hutton (ed.), *The Autobiography of the Late Sir Andries Stockenström Bart.*, 2 vols. (Cape Town: J. C. Juta and Co., 1887), 2:59-61; cf. Pretorius, "British Humanitarians and the Cape Eastern Frontier," 298.

56. Stockenström certainly remembered it as such. Hutton (ed.), *Autobiography of the Late Sir Andries Stockenström*, 2:59. It has been claimed by Leonard Thompson that the episode at Slachters Nek only entered South African historical consciousness after Henry Cloete had resuscitated it in his lectures on the Great Trek in 1852. See *The Political Mythology of Apartheid* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 122-23. However, Stockenström's part in the affair was certainly being used against him in 1851, before Cloete's lectures, by the same people who attacked him in 1836-37. See Basil A. Le Cordeur, "Robert Godlonton as Architect of Frontier Opinion (1850-1857)," *AYB* (1959), 2:33, citing the *Graham's Town Journal*, 5.4.1851. Unfortunately I have not been able to consult the *Graham's Town Journal* for the 1830s to see if these claims were being made then.

57. SACA, 6.7.1836.

58. SACA, 13.8.1836.

59. SACA, 18.4.1838.

60. See *Stockenström v. Campbell and Moodie v. Fairbairn*, 1.

61. SACA, 14.4.1838. A second edition of the pamphlet was published later the same year, with the documents in question appended.

62. Cape Town: Saul Solomon, n.d. [1841].

63. *Remarks*, 27-31, cf. Robert Ross, *Adam Kok's Griquas: A Study in the Development of Stratification in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 24.

64. *Remarks*, 18-23; Saunders, "James Read," 15-26; Ross, *John Philip*, 90-94; Martin C. Legassick, "The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries, 1780-1840: The Politics of a Frontier Zone," PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles (1969), 288-90.

65. *Remarks*, 23-27, cf. J. B. Peires, *House of Phalo*.

66. *Remarks*, 2; Moodie is here citing BPP 425 of 1837, 26.

67. *Remarks*, 3, cf. Elphick, *Kraal and Castle*, passim; Robert Ross, "Smallpox at the Cape of Good Hope in the Eighteenth Century," in *African Historical Demography* (Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, 1977), 416-28. It may be significant that Moodie did not publish the material from the Cape Archives on the smallpox

epidemic of 1713, but rather relied on the hearsay account of the traveler, Ds. François Valentijn.

68. For the most recent exchange, see Jacqueline S. Solway and Richard B. Lee, "Foragers, Genuine or Spurious? Situating the Kalahari San in History," with commentary, *Current Anthropology* 31 (1990), 109-46.

69. Donald Moodie, *South African Annals: Origin of the Bushmen* (Cape Town: Saul Solomon, 1855).

70. *Remarks*, 7; Moodie is here quoting from Thomas Pringle, *African Sketches* (London: E. Moxon, 1834).

71. See, for example, Chase's comment in *Some Reasons*, 2, that "in South Africa the latest visited clans of the Bushmen, Coranna, Hottentot, Bechuana or Zoola tribes, gives the direct falsehood to those outrageous representations of the natural character of the African savage, who is known to be vicious and degraded in the extreme." On the process in general, see Clifton C. Crais, "The Vacant Land: The Political Mythology of British Expansion in the Eastern Cape, South Africa," unpublished paper (1990), and idem, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in South Africa: The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

72. Philip, *Researches*, 1:41-53.

73. Philip had borrowed the originals from his then friend, the Rev. A. Faure, who in his turn had had them from "a close relative," probably his uncle who had been secretary of Stellenbosch district from 1784 and then *landdrost* of Swellendam. Philip had returned the materials to Faure, but they then got mixed up with Faure's personal papers. Only after Philip's request did Faure ferret them out and return them to the Stellenbosch magistracy where they belonged. See *Correspondence*, 41.

74. *Correspondence*, 25.

75. For this episode see P. J. Van der Merwe, *Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek (1770-1842)* (The Hague: Van Stockum, 1937); in general, N. G. Penn, "Pastoralists and Pastoralism in the Northern Cape Frontier Zone during the Eighteenth Century," in Martin Hall and Andrew B. Smith (eds.), *Prehistorical Pastoralism in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: South African Archeological Society, Goodwin Series No. 5, 1976), 62-68. The text of the resolution of the Political Council runs as follows: "dat alle middelen om de Roofzuchtige Bosjesmans Hottentotten tot stilstand te brengen, vrugteloois zijn aangewend, heeft men dierhalve moeten besluiten, om in die bij voorsz. missive gedaane voorstelling, om dezelve door sterkere Commando's te doen attacqueeren, en langs dien weg uijt te roeijen, te bewilligen." (Cited in Van der Merwe, *Noordwaartse Beweging*, 41.)

76. BPP 50 of 1835, 6.

77. Moodie, *Correspondence*, 57. Once again, though, the date is given wrongly, as 16 (instead of 6) June 1777.

78. Moodie, *The Record*, 3:70. It is noteworthy that the *Nieuw zak-woordenboek der Nederduitsche en Engelse taalen* (Dordrecht: A. Blussé & Zoon, 1808), for instance, gives "extirpate" as the first meaning for "uitroeien."

79. Moodie, *Correspondence*, 42. *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, supplement to 16.4.1841, translated "extirpate" back into Dutch with the same word, "uitroeijen."

80. Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841 and 1843*, 5 vols. (Philadelphia: C. Sherman, 1844), 5:424-25, cited in the "Introduction" to the 1960 reprint of *The Record* (Amsterdam and Cape Town: A. A. Balkema), vi.

81. Moodie, *Correspondence*, appendix.

82. Cloete, et al. to Napier, 2 Feb. 1838, CA GH 28/13, 244-47.

83. See CA GH 28/13, 248-57. For the original, see K. M. Jeffreys (ed.), *Kaapse*

*Archiefstukken lopende over het jaar 1780* (Cape Town: Cape Times Beperk, 1928), 58.

84. Kapp, "Dr. John Philip," 219.

85. Reprinted in SACA, 28.3.1838.

86. SACA, 5.5.1838.

87. Napier to Stockenström, 7.2.1838, CA LG 60, 107-10.

88. Glenelg to Napier, 12.3.1838, CA GH 1/119, 96-100.

89. Glenelg to Napier, 5.9.1838, CA GH 1/123, 103-6.

90. *Graham's Town Journal*, 3.1.1838.

91. *Ware Afrikaner*, 10.8.1841. (This and the following two notes are my translation from the Dutch.)

92. *Ware Afrikaner*, 3.8.1841. It would, however, appear that the excisions were made in London, not Cape Town. Theal's transcription of Collins's journals from the PRO records (RCC 7:20-86) includes those passages omitted in BPP 50 of 1835. The possibility remains, though, that Theal was working with a complete copy sent to London in 1809 or 1810, and that the Commissioners of Enquiry were provided with an incomplete version in Cape Town. 50 of 1835 is in fact a transcript of the papers the Commissioners had received. Unfortunately I have not been able to make the requisite checks in the PRO.

93. *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, 16.4.1841.

94. Letter to Sir George Grey, 3.5.1858, bound into a copy of *Some Reasons for Our Opposing the Author of the "South African Researches,"* in the South African Library, Cape Town, call mark, G11 c16.

95. On these, see Peires, "The British and the Cape," 494-98.

96. SACA, 18.4.1838.

97. The beginnings were perhaps with the publication of G. McC. Theal (ed.), *Basutoland Records: Copies of Official Documents of Various Kinds, Accounts of Travellers &c, Collected and Arranged by Order of the Honourable J. W. Sauer, Secretary for Native Affairs* (Cape Town: W. A. Richards and Sons, 1883), shortly after the revision of Lesotho to imperial, as opposed to Cape government, rule. On this, see Elizabeth A. Eldredge, "Land, Politics and Censorship: The Historiography of Nineteenth Century Lesotho," *History in Africa* 15 (1988), 197-99.

# Glossary

<i>baas</i>	Master, hence <i>baasskap</i> , mastery.
"bastard"	In Dutch, this word means mongrel or half-caste, rather than illegitimate. "Bastard-hottentots" were thus those who were descended from Khoisan and European or slave parents.
<i>Bergenaars</i>	"Mountaineers," the appellation of a group of rebel Griqua around 1820.
<i>boere-seuns</i>	The male children of an Afrikaner farmer; "seun" came to mean "male child," rather than "son"—in other words it lost its kinship connotations, at least in part.
<i>bosjesman</i>	Literally "woodman," anglicized as Bushman; in the eighteenth century usually found as " <i>bosjesmans-hottentotten</i> ," referring to those who lived by hunting, gathering, and waging war against the colonists.
<i>burgerraad</i>	The Council representing the interests of the citizens of Cape Town; hence <i>burgerraden</i> , the councillors.
<i>burgerwagt</i>	The night patrol of Cape Town's streets.
burgher	A man with full rights of citizenship.
caffer	The <i>fiscaal's</i> assistants, as executioners and policemen in Cape Town. Usually these men were themselves convicts, banned to the Cape from Indonesia. Also used as an ethnonym for Xhosa, whence it has become a highly insulting term for Africans.
Dopper	A member of the strict Calvinist <i>Gereformeerde Kerk</i> .
dorp	Village, or small town.
erf	A town plot (the plural of which is <i>erven</i> ).
<i>fiscaal</i>	The chief law officer and prosecutor of the colony.
<i>heemraad</i>	District councillor (the plural of which is <i>heemraden</i> ).
Heren XVII	The directors of the VOC in the Netherlands.
karoo	The semi-desert of the Cape interior, characterized by a sparse vegetation of sclerophyllitic bushes.
<i>knegt</i>	Farm servant, usually of European descent (the plural of which is <i>knegten</i> ); sometimes written <i>knecht</i> ( <i>knechten</i> ).
Khoikhoi	The autochthonous herders of Southern Africa, once known as "hottentots." The word is often shortened to Khoi, especially as an adjective. Khoisan, a portmanteau word, is used to refer to the Khoi and the San together, as well as in those contexts where no distinction can be made between them.

<i>koopman</i>	Merchant.
<i>landdrost</i>	District magistrate.
<i>opgaaf</i>	The annual tax on agricultural production.
<i>opperbewindhebber</i>	Chief director (of the VOC), a position held by the Prince of Orange as <i>stadhouder</i> .
<i>opstal</i>	The buildings on a farm.
<i>pachter</i>	Contractor, to provide the VOC with meat, or to exploit the franchise for the sale of wine in Cape Town.
<i>plakkaat</i>	Edict (the plural of which is <i>plakkatén</i> ).
<i>platteland</i>	Countryside.
<i>posthouder</i>	Commander of a small military post.
<i>real</i>	Spanish silver coin.
<i>regent</i>	Member of the ruling elite of the Dutch cities.
<i>rixdollar</i>	Dutch coin, worth 48 stuivers (2 guilders and 8 stuivers), or in the East (where the exchange rate of gold and silver was different), 60 stuivers (3 guilders). In 1805 it was worth about 4 English shillings but later was devalued.
<i>San</i>	the autochthonous hunter-gatherers of the Cape. Although San is an insulting term in the Khoikhoi language, it now generally replaces "Bushman" or "bosjesman," which are pejorative ethnonyms in English and Afrikaans.
<i>sandveld</i>	Sandy semi-desert to the north of Cape Town.
<i>slagter</i>	Butcher; their <i>briefjes</i> , or promissory notes, served as currency in the eastern Cape.
<i>smous</i>	Hawker.
<i>stadhouder</i>	The hereditary position of the Princes of Orange as head of government of the Dutch Republic.
<i>stamvader</i>	Literally, "father of the tribe"; used to denote the founders of white families at the Cape.
<i>trekboer</i>	Transhumant pastoralist.
<i>trekveld</i>	Common land, into which cattle and sheep were driven in the dry season.
<i>veeboer</i>	Cattle and sheep farmer.
<i>veldcornet</i>	Elected head of the civilian militia of each sub-district or veld-cornetcy.
<i>voortrekker</i>	An Afrikaner who was among the first white conquerors of any region, particularly during the Great Trek.

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