

Contemporary Politics

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccpo20

How population size affects power-sharing: a comparison of Nigeria and Suriname

Wouter Veenendaal & Leila Demarest

To cite this article: Wouter Veenendaal & Leila Demarest (2020): How population size affects power-sharing: a comparison of Nigeria and Suriname, Contemporary Politics, DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2020.1855739

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2020.1855739

Published online: 10 Dec 2020.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2020.1855739

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

How population size affects power-sharing: a comparison of Nigeria and Suriname

Wouter Veenendaal and Leila Demarest

Institute of Political Science, Leiden University Leiden, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT

Theories on consociationalism and power-sharing posit that such arrangements are more likely to succeed in small societies. A small population size would produce close-knit, personal relations between political elites from different groups, resulting in consensual political relations. However, the empirical basis for these arguments is very shallow, as size effects have not been systematically analysed. In this paper we conduct a comparison of power-sharing politics in Nigeria and Suriname, which are the largest and smallest countries in the world that have implemented such arrangements. We find that informal power-sharing practices in both countries are remarkably similar: political elites rely on patron-client networks to maintain support, while inter-elite relations in both countries are strongly adversarial. Instead, we find that the main difference between the countries is in fact institutional in nature: in Nigeria power-sharing is enforced by strict formal rules, while Suriname has a very weak formal framework to engender power-sharing.

KEYWORDS

Power-sharing; population size; political institutions; comparative politics; informal politics

1. Introduction

Classical studies on consociational democracy and power-sharing posit that such arrangements are more likely to be successful in small societies (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 65–70; Bogaards, 1998; Daalder, 1974, pp. 610–611). According to these publications, the profound external vulnerabilities of small states compel national elites to cooperate, while the close connections and face-to-face contacts between politicians contribute to a consensual and harmonious political environment. However, following the third wave of democratisation power-sharing arrangements have been implemented in countries of all shapes and sizes, ranging from small states like Fiji and Lebanon to large countries like Malaysia and South Africa. Empirically, the size of countries seems to have little explanatory power for the success of democratic development, as power-sharing has failed to prevent democratic breakdowns in some smaller countries while it has been relatively successful in some larger ones. These observations call into question some of the core assumptions of classical theories on consociational democracy, as well as the broader

CONTACT Wouter Veenendaal w.p.veenendaal@fsw.leidenuniv.nl Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, AK 2333, Leiden, The Netherlands

literature on the effects of population size on democratic development (Diamond & Tsalik, 1999; Ott, 2000).

Addressing this discrepancy between theory and practice, this article aims to examine how population size influences the functioning and success of power-sharing politics. Since small states are generally excluded from comparative investigations (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015), as far as we know thus far no systematic comparative analyses of the characteristics and performance of power-sharing in large and small countries have been conducted. As a result, the specific causal mechanisms by which population size affects the nature and success of power-sharing arrangements remain unclear. In this article, we provide an in-depth comparison between Nigeria (population: 200 million) and Suriname (population: 600,000), which to our knowledge are the largest and the smallest countries in the world in which power-sharing arrangements have been implemented. By comparing these extreme cases (Seawright & Gerring, 2008), we can most effectively pinpoint the effects of size on the performance of power-sharing arrangements.

We define the success of power-sharing on the basis of two dimensions: the absence of civil conflict and the survival of democracy. In recent decades both Nigeria and Suriname have been able to prevent the outbreak of large-scale violence between ethnic groups. Suriname has remained stable since the ending of its bloody Interior War in the early 1990s, while Nigeria has been able to avert a resurgence of the Biafra war of secession which ended in 1970. Although Nigeria has experienced further violence, in particular in the Niger Delta and North-Eastern regions, it has remained stable at its centre and the conflict lines of the Biafra war have not re-escalated into violence. The relative success in conflict prevention is, furthermore, combined with the survival of weak democratic regimes in both countries. While Nigeria is currently categorised as a partial democracy by Freedom House (2019), Suriname is classified as 'free'. Given that Freedom House tends to underestimate the informal challenges to democracy in small states (Erk & Veenendaal, 2014), the quality of democracy in both countries may actually be regarded as quite comparable.

These observations lead us to question whether size is in fact a relevant factor for explaining power-sharing success, or whether it should be discarded. To address this question, this article provides an in-depth historical analysis of the institutional arrangements that have been implemented to realise power-sharing in both Suriname and Nigeria. In light of the aforementioned theoretical assumptions about size effects, we specifically zoom in on the relationship between politicians representing the various population segments. On the one hand, we find evidence against some of the theoretical assumptions made in the literature about the effects of size on power-sharing, in particular the view that smaller size improves inter-elite connectedness and supports consensual and harmonious political interactions. We find that elites in both countries are closely integrated and adopt similar modes of political behaviour (e.g. clientelism, vote buying, horse-trading), but that the smaller size of Suriname certainly does not generate a more consensual style of politics.

On the other hand, we do find some key differences between Suriname and Nigeria in the extent to which power-sharing has been constitutionally mandated and institutionalised: Nigeria has a much more stringent formalisation of power-sharing politics, while power-sharing in Suriname has been predominantly informal and uncodified in

nature. We argue that this difference can explain why both countries have similar outcomes with regard to power-sharing, regardless of their differences in size. Rather than promoting consensual inter-elite behaviour, we argue that Suriname's small size allows for closer inter-elite monitoring and control. Nigeria's large size and diversity may make inter-elite accountability more difficult, yet this weakness of scale appears to have been compensated through enhanced formalisation. In sum, while consociational theory has primarily assumed that state size affects the informal dynamics of power-sharing in the form of consensual inter-elite behaviour, we actually find that the main difference between power-sharing in Suriname and Nigeria is the extent to which it has been formalised. This finding is in line with recent studies that show a link between population size and the formalisation or institutionalisation of politics (Gerring & Veenendaal, 2020).

To advance our arguments, we start off with an overview of the theoretical literature on power-sharing, institutions, and population size, paying specific attention to the mechanisms by which smallness and institutional arrangements are believed to encourage the development of power-sharing politics. Subsequently, we explain our comparative approach and methodology in more detail, and provide a short overview of the origins and contemporary functioning of power-sharing politics in our two cases. In the analytical sections of our article, we zoom in on the ways in which Suriname's small population size and Nigeria's huge dimensions have affected the characteristics and dynamics of power sharing in these two countries. Finally, in the conclusion we summarise our findings and highlight how these feed into the broader literature on power-sharing in new democracies.

2. The literature on power-sharing, political institutions, and population size

Scholars have long been concerned that social and cultural diversity, whether based on ethnicity, language, religion or other foundations, may hamper democratic development and induce violent conflict (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1977). The exact empirical relationship between diversity and democracy (Gerring et al., 2018), and diversity and stability (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005) remains debated. However, the prevalence of conflict along identity lines as well as group-based authoritarianism, especially in the Global South (Marshall, 2005; Vogt et al., 2015), does indicate that heterogeneity can be an important cause for concern. The political predicament of countries like Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and Syria continues to provide empirical support for the potential dangers of diversity.

On the other hand, since the 1960s scholars have noticed that plural democracies can exist and even thrive, given the right circumstances. In his classic study of four small and plural European democracies – Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland – Arend Lijphart famously analysed how the political institutions of these countries facilitated and even stimulated the survival of democracy (1969, 1977). This arrangement, which Lijphart and other scholars working in this tradition labelled 'consociational democracy', consists of four specific institutional benchmarks: (1) grand coalitions between political parties representing the main segments, (2) mutual veto powers, (3) proportionality, and (4) segmental autonomy (see Daalder, 1974; Lehmbruch, 1967; Barry, 1975; Steiner,

1981). While the term 'consociationalism' has gradually been transposed by the more straightforward notion of 'power-sharing', the arguments of the consociational school remain authoritative to the present day.

Consociational democracy was initially an exclusively empirical concept, but it rapidly developed into a prescriptive model that would be implemented in other countries as part of a process that Lijphart called 'consociational engineering' (1977, pp. 223–238). Over the past decades, power-sharing arrangements have been adopted in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Burundi, Cyprus, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritius, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. The empirical record of these experiments has been mixed at best, yet power-sharing continues to be seen as the best – if not only – viable path to democratic governance in divided societies (Binningsbø, 2013; Elkins & Sides, 2007; Norris, 2008).

The international community's post-Cold War consociational approach to resolving violent conflicts has also sparked a new research agenda on the factors that make these types of arrangements successful. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), for example, expand on Lijphart's institutional benchmarks by defining four dimensions of power-sharing: political, economic, military, and territorial. They find that conflict is less likely to recur when peace agreements arrange for power-sharing in multiple of these dimensions. Other scholars have built further on this work to argue that military and territorial power-sharing institutions are particularly successful in preventing conflict (e.g. Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Martin, 2013). At the same time, it has become clear that formal institutions by themselves are not (always) able to guarantee the survival of power-sharing frameworks.

From the start, scholars working in the consociational tradition have recognised this as well. Lijphart and others highlighted a set of more informal 'favourable factors' that they regarded as conducive to consociational democracy, one of which is a small country size (Bogaards, 1998; Lijphart, 1977, pp. 65–70). Lijphart notes that it is 'no coincidence' that the four original consociational democracies are all relatively small, and Daalder even proclaims consociational democracy to be 'the privilege of small states' (1974, p. 610). According to these scholars, a small population size has both direct and indirect consequences for power-sharing and democracy, at both domestic and international levels. Domestically, the proximity and close connections between elites representing different segments is assumed to engender an atmosphere of mutual goodwill, increasing the chances of power-sharing to succeed. Externally, the vulnerability and external threats faced by small countries are argued to compel political leaders to cooperate for the sake of national unity and survival (Lijphart, 1977).[1] In short, a small country size is argued to positively affect the more informal political environment that is required for successful power-sharing politics.

Similar arguments appear in the broader literature on the political effects of population size. Various scholars have noted that small states are significantly more likely to have democratic political regimes (Anckar, 2002; Anckar, 2008; Diamond & Tsalik, 1999; Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018), and this statistical pattern is argued to stem from the closer connections between citizens and politicians, as well as the more intimate and personal relations between politicians. While small states are generally expected to have more homogenous populations, in diverse small states the geographical proximity between members of different groups is argued to enhance the likelihood of 'overarching

loyalties' (Bogaards, 1998; Lijphart, 1977). The potential exception to this pattern are small archipelagic states, where the geographical boundaries and distance between islands may undermine the consensual nature of the political system. These arguments can be illustrated by means of a comparison between two small Eastern African island states: Comoros and Mauritius. While the former has a much more homogenous population, profound inter-island conflicts have undermined stability and democratic development. Conversely, Mauritius – which consists of one main island and a much smaller second one – has been hailed as one of the most successful African democracies, despite being an exemplary case of a plural society.

Another mechanism through which small states may be more likely to foster democratic political regimes is that they have lower chances to experience violent conflict or state breakdown (Gerring & Veenendaal, 2020).[2] Population size is a well-known predictor of civil war, for instance, although whether this is due to substantive or methodological reasons – given common battle-related deaths thresholds for civil war datasets – remains an open question (Sambanis, 2004).[3] Besides population size, territorial size has also been associated with violent conflict. Buhaug et al. (2009), for example, find that violent conflict is more likely to break out at larger distances from capital cities. A likely reason for this is that especially in developing countries, governments do not have the administrative and military capacity to project their power over the whole of their territory (Herbst, 2014). This makes rebellions in remote outskirts more likely. Moreover, in large heterogenous developing countries, different parts of the country commonly face varying levels of economic development due to geographical factors and colonial legacies. When specific cultural groups inhabit marginalised economic areas, this can spur grievances against the (distant) state government and lead to violence (Stewart, 2002). These challenges to political stability may in turn undermine democratic development. In small states, closer connections between political elites may avert disaffection and violence-producing rifts.

In sum, a small population size is generally argued to increase the chances of power-sharing success because of the assumed close relationships between political elites. However, the literature also highlights a number of risks associated with the profoundly informal nature of politics in small states (Baldacchino, 2012; Sutton, 2007). Indeed, the very personal relations between politicians entail that institutions are commonly ignored or circumvented, undermining their performance and effectiveness (Corbett, 2015; Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). This poses a dilemma for the implementation of power-sharing arrangements: while smallness may present fruitful informal conditions for power-sharing, at the same time it may hamper the functioning and salience of formal power-sharing institutions. As a result, the survival of power-sharing politics in small states may depend mostly on the persistence of a favourable informal political culture, and can likely not to the same extent be protected by institutional safeguards as in larger states. Conversely, while larger states are likely to have an informal culture that is less supportive of power-sharing, the functioning of power-sharing institutions is likely to be proportionally stronger.

In short, according to the academic literature the success of power-sharing depends on a combination of institutional (or formal) and non-institutional (or informal) factors. Both the consociational school and the broader literature on the political effects of scale would regard a small population size as a factor that is conducive to the informal aspects of

power-sharing, namely the promotion of harmonious inter-elite ties. However, the relation between formal and informal dimensions of power-sharing is still relatively vague, and has been criticised by various scholars (Andeweg, 2000; Bogaards, 1998; Lustick, 1997). Empirically, very little research has been conducted on the interaction between formal and informal factors, and on the differences between small and large states. As a result, it is unclear whether power-sharing in large states differs substantially from small ones, and whether these differences can be found in the formal or the informal functioning of power-sharing politics. By drawing a comparison between the largest and smallest country in the world in which power-sharing experiments have been launched, we aim to address this gap in the literature.

As mentioned in the introduction, Nigeria and Suriname can be regarded as extreme cases for investigating the link between population size and power-sharing. As Seawright and Gerring highlight (2008, p. 297), the purpose of comparing extreme cases is to conduct an exploratory analysis of the relationship between two variables. The selected cases are particularly interesting because they at first hand do not even suggest a relationship between size and the success of power-sharing. Both countries have remained relatively stable for several decades, yet both are also characterised by relatively weak democratic institutions. Given that the success of power-sharing has theoretically been linked to both formal institutions and informal inter-elite practices, we focus specifically on these dimensions in our case studies.

Our analysis is based on various stages of fieldwork in Nigeria and Suriname, as part of which a total number of 90 political experts (68 in Nigeria and 22 in Suriname) were interviewed by means of semi-structured interviews. Our respondents were selected with an aim to obtain variation in institutional and political perspectives, meaning that we have conducted interviews with officials working in different (political) functions (e.g. the executive and legislative branches, but also journalists and NGO representatives), and representing different political parties and factions. Given the exploratory nature of our research, we believe that interviews are a particularly suitable method for this analysis.[4]

3. Suriname

3.1. Development of power-sharing institutions

With a population of 600.000, Suriname is the smallest country in South America. Due to its particular colonial history, which centred around a plantation economy based on slavery, indentured labour, and ethnic and racial admixture (or 'creolization'), the country is culturally regarded as part of the Caribbean (Lewis, 2004). Suriname was governed as a Dutch colony from the mid-seventeenth century until 1954, when domestic autonomy was obtained, followed by complete independence in 1975. Despite its small size, the (forced) influx of migrants throughout the colonial era means that Suriname has a very heterogeneous society, consisting of five or six significant ethnic groups.[5] Since the introduction of universal suffrage in the 1940s, political mobilisation has mostly occurred on an ethnic basis, with the major parties all representing – and catering to – specific ethnic groups (Hoefte, 2013; Sedney, 1997). Similar to the Dutch consociational style of politics, as part of the so-called 'fraternization politics' (Dutch: *verbroederingspolitiek*), all major Surinamese political parties governed together in grand

coalitions. This system remained in place until the early 1970s, when the increasingly polarising issue of independence resulted in the breakdown of grand coalitions, and a Creole-dominated government instigated Suriname's transition to independence (Dew, 1994).

Before and after the attainment of independence, Surinamese political institutions strongly resembled those of its former Dutch colonial power, including a parliamentary system of government, proportional elections, and a multiparty system. However, in 1980 a coup d'état resulted in the instalment of a military regime spearheaded by Desi Bouterse, leading to a seven-year abrogation of democratic rule. The military takeover was initially greeted with quite some enthusiasm, primarily due to Bouterse's vow to end the tradition of 'ethnic politics' which was broadly associated with economic stagnation, political deadlock, and mounting corruption (Dew, 1994). However, after six years the regime had become notorious for its human rights abuses, involvement in drugs trafficking, and international affiliation with rogue states like Cuba and Libya. On top of that, in 1986 an Interior War erupted between the military and the Jungle Commando, a Maroon rebel group headed by Bouterse's former bodyguard Ronnie Brunswijk. Domestic and international pressures forced Bouterse to initiate a process of political liberalisation, leading to the drafting of a new constitution in 1987 (Sedney, 1997).

The new constitution essentially restored the old institutional framework, but provided for a more powerful president elected by and from among parliament.[6] Free and fair elections in 1987 produced a landslide victory for the old ethnic parties, while Bouterse's newly established pan-ethnic National Democratic Party (NDP) suffered a dramatic defeat. Suriname thus initially reverted to power-sharing politics and grand inter-ethnic coalition governments. However, the 2010 elections resulted in a shocking victory for Bouterse's NDP, which formed a coalition with Javanese and Maroon parties. Five years later, the NDP became the first party in Suriname to obtain an absolute majority of parliamentary seats. Even though this party dominated the Surinamese government for ten years, its pan-ethnic nature to some extent ensured a continuation of the power-sharing tradition, since all ethnic groups retained at least some access to state positions and resources (Singh, 2014). The 2020 elections resulted in a defeat for the NDP and the reinstalment of a coalition government by the 'old' ethnic parties.

3.2. Informal functioning of power-sharing politics

Whereas the Surinamese political system contains some institutional features that are believed to stimulate power-sharing politics, none of those institutions have been deliberately adopted to facilitate power-sharing. Instead, 'consociational' institutions were essentially carbon-copied from a colonial power which itself had a longstanding tradition of consociational politics, and have since remained largely unchanged. Given the amplified powers of the presidency, the 1987 constitution in fact represents a shift away from power-sharing institutions (Dew, 1994). In similar fashion, while Suriname has some degree of decentralisation, its districts and resorts remain quite powerless vis-à-vis the omnipotent national administration. As a consequence, the Surinamese tradition of power-sharing is not so much grounded in institutional rules, but rather stems from informal political practices and traditions, and in particular the personal relations between key politicians (Veenendaal, 2020).

Political parties in Suriname have a very hierarchical structure, with one or a few powerful leaders at the top and very little intra-party democracy (Ramsoedh, 2018). Most of the political leaders who established the first ethnic parties in the 1940s retained their positions for decades on end, and some even resumed leadership of their party after the return to democracy in the late 1980s. Both as a result of this longevity and the small and intimate nature of Surinamese politics, political leaders know each other very well, and these personal connections often determine political cooperation and conflicts. The success of fraternisation politics in the 1950s and 1960s is commonly attributed to the cooperative relations between Johan Adolf Pengel (leader of the Creole NPS) and Jagernath Lachmon (leader of the Hindostani VHP), while the death of Pengel and subsequent election of the new NPS-leader Henck Arron in 1970 presaged the end of fraternisation politics (Meel, 2014; Sedney, 1997). After the return to democracy in 1987, Lachmon resumed leadership of the VHP and as such in the 1990s contributed to new power-sharing governments headed by the new NPS-leader Ronald Venetiaan.

As in other small states, politics in Suriname thus primarily focuses on personal connections rather than ideological convictions or programmatic concerns (Ramsoedh, 2018; Veenendaal, 2020). The main focus of political leaders is to make sure that their party and the ethnic group it represents retain access to state resources and services, meaning that the key aim of all political parties is to become part of the government. As a result, power-sharing cannot really be attributed to a consensual style of politics or an intrinsic conviction of the need for cooperation between various ethnic groups, but is primarily the result of the desire of each political and ethnic group to 'be accommodated' (Dutch: *geaccommodeerd worden*). However, the likelihood of cooperation between parties is strongly dependent on the personal relations between their leaders, as well as their historical records of cooperation and conflict. The result is that government formation is often a highly unpredictable and nontransparent process, with an outcome that may be highly surprising. For example, after the 2010 election an astonishing coalition was formed between NDP-leader Bouterse and Ronnie Brunswijk, the leader of the Maroon *A-Combinatie* party who had been Bouterse's main enemy during Suriname's bloody Interior War in the late 1980s (Evers & van Maele, 2012).

In the absence of ideological or programmatic considerations, coalition formation in Suriname mostly comes down to a process of horse-trading in which important portfolios and functions are allocated. Positions in the government are obviously the most highly coveted prises, but the process of accommodation extends to ambassadorships, directorships of (semi-)governmental organisations, and even individual employees of specific ministries. As a Surinamese journalist indicates:

> "It is a jostle, a horse trading. First, it is about the money-making ministries, starting with public works. This is a great prize, because it involves projects with millions, and you can give them to your friends. Then negotiations will focus on TCT [transport, communication, and tourism], and this cake will be divided. "You put this person here, you this one here." Then, ambassador posts, other ministries, this and that. And you understand that the more parties involved, the more complicated this distribution becomes."

Since Suriname's various ethnic groups traditionally work in different professions, certain ministries have long been dominated by particular parties and individuals, with the employees of these ministries often belonging to the same ethnic group. For example,

since many Hindostanis have found employment in legal professions, the Ministry of Justice is traditionally headed by a Hindostani minister and contains many Hindostani employees. Conversely, since most Maroons live in the interior parts of the Suriname, the Ministry of Regional Development is usually dominated by a minister and civil servants of Maroon descent.

Both the traditional literature on consociationalism and the literature on the democratic effects of a small population size presume that the intimate social connections between politicians in small societies generate a more harmonious and consensus-oriented political environment, providing a fertile ground for power-sharing politics. Contradicting the assumptions of both these literatures, the relations between politicians and political parties in Suriname are actually remarkably antagonistic and polarised (Ramsoedh, 2016). While the country is often branded as an exemplary multi-ethnic society or even a 'rainbow nation' (Hoefte & Veenendaal, 2019), in practice relations between ethnic groups have always been tense (Hoefte, 2013). The case study literature confirms that this was particularly the case during the heyday of fraternisation politics in the 1950s and 1960s, when there was a widespread fear among Creoles that Hindostanis – who already dominated Suriname's economy – would also come to dominate politics in the country (Dew, 1994; Sedney, 1997). The success and survival of the grand coalitions in this period can basically be explained by the fact that the political leaders needed this cooperation to realise the emancipation of their own ethnic group, and to solidify their own leadership positions in the process (Buddingh, 1995).

The need to secure resources and services for the ethnic group continues to be the main impetus for political cooperation nowadays. However, the main fault line in contemporary Surinamese politics runs between the traditional ethnic parties and Bouterse's pan-ethnic NDP (Singh, 2014). Antagonism between these blocks can to a large extent be explained by the contentious legacy of Bouterse's military dictatorship in the 1980s, and in particular the 1982 December killings for which the president was recently convicted by Suriname's military court. However, interview respondents also indicated that the NDP is broadly (and increasingly) regarded as a Creole-dominated party, and Hindostanis in particular complained about discrimination by the NDP government. The 2020 elections were won by the traditional ethnic parties, which in turn immediately triggered fears of political victimisation among NDP supporters.

In short, contra to the expectations discussed in the theory section, power sharing in Suriname cannot be attributed to a more intimate and consensual political environment or the notion of a profound external threat. In addition, while some power-sharing institutions are in place, these were not deliberately adopted and have only had a limited impact on the survival of power-sharing politics in the country. Instead, power-sharing in Suriname is primarily the result of the need for each ethnic group to obtain and retain access to state resources. The ascension of former dictator Bouterse to the presidency in 2010 was perceived as shock not just because of the notorious legacy of his regime, but also because it threatened to terminate the tradition of power-sharing. According to some observers, since 2010 Surinamese politics have become more similar to those of neighbouring Anglophone Caribbean states such as Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, which in line with their winner-take-all politics have experienced much more hostile relations between ethnic groups (Singh, 2014). On the other hand, in contrast to political parties in these countries, the ruling NDP professes to be a multi-

ethnic party, and is indeed supported by voters of various ethnic backgrounds. In this regard, the party may in fact be more similar to the Nigerian political parties that will be discussed below.

4. Nigeria

4.1. Development of power-sharing institutions

With a population currently estimated at 200 million, Nigeria is the most populated country on the African continent (World Population Prospects, 2019). It is also one of the most diverse with around 250 distinct ethnic groups (Graf, 1988, pp. 5–6; Mustapha, 2009, p. 562). The three largest groups are the Yoruba, which originate from the South-West of the country, the Igbo originating from the South-East, and the Hausa-Fulani who inhabit the North. The latter group encompasses the original Hausa inhabitants of the region as well as the Fulani conquerors of the nineteenth century who have adapted to local Hausa customs. Sharp cleavages exist between these ethnic groups as well as among them and other minority groups. Nigeria is also religiously divided with around one half of the population adhering to Islam (concentrated in the North and South-West) and the other half to Christianity (concentrated in the South-East as well as the South-West as Yoruba's can practice both religions).

Nigeria became independent from Britain in 1960 with a Westminster majoritarian parliamentary system and a federal structure built around three regions: the North, (South-)East, and (South-)West (Diamond, 1983; Graf, 1988, pp. 25–40; Suberu, 2001, pp. 19–30). This structure caused ethnic and regional tensions from the onset. Arguably the core conflict line, which is still in existence today, is between the North and the South of the country. These regions were only joined together as one state by Governor Lugard in 1914 and distrust between politicians from both sides was high. The South had been developed economically and socially under colonial rule, while the North had been ruled indirectly through the Hausa-Fulani emirs who resisted modernisation. At time of independence, Southerners feared to be marginalised by the North's demographic majority, while Northerners feared domination by the South's, and in particularly the South-Eastern Igbo's, educational and economic advancement. Meanwhile, minorities feared domination by the majority groups in the tripodal federal structure.

In the first years of Nigeria's independence, intergroup distrust was fuelled further due to a general economic malaise, the 1963 population census in which all groups inflated their numbers to gain more political power, and the (Northern-dominated) federal government's active support for a power change in the Western region (Diamond, 1983; Graf, 1988, pp. 25–40; Suberu, 2001, pp. 19–30). In January 1966, a military coup brought an end to Nigeria's First Republic. The coup was committed by predominantly Igbo majors, which raised fears in the North of Igbo dominance. The coup itself was quelled, but military rule was installed by the head of the army, General Aguiyi-Ironsi, himself an Igbo. To maintain Nigerian unity, Ironsi declared a unitary state, further arousing suspicions of Igbo domination. A Northern-led countercoup took place in July 1966 and federalism was reinstalled, now as a 12-state structure with six states in the North and six in the South. Meanwhile, violence had broken out against Igbo migrants in the North and South-West. This led to their return to their home region and a declaration

of independence of the South-East as the state of Biafra. The subsequent secession war lasted from 1967 to 1970 and was eventually won by the federal government.

The instability that ensued Nigeria's first federal republic had a substantial impact on the further development of power-sharing institutions in the country. After the Biafran war, the military government of Gowon declared a policy of 'no victor, no vanquished' and while military rule persisted, the representation of different ethnic groups was ensured in the military councils, army, and bureaucracy (Mustapha, 2006). With the return to democracy in 1979, stringent constitutional measures were put in place by the military regime to safeguard Nigerian unity. To prevent ethnic dominance through elections, a US-inspired presidential system was installed with a strong executive president that needed to be elected by a majority of the votes and at least a quarter of the votes in two-thirds of the states, rather than a simple majority (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 635–638). The president was also elected jointly with a vice-president, which allowed for an informal agreement that the president and his vice could not both hail from the North or the South (see also below). Political parties were prohibited from having a sectional character and relying on cultural symbols (Bogaards, 2010; Diamond, 1982, pp. 631–643). Executive committees needed to include representatives from two-thirds of the states and membership must be open to all Nigerians. Furthermore, the principle of 'federal character' was enshrined in the constitution (Suberu, 2001, pp. 111–140; Mustapha, 2009). This principle requires that all governments recognise the diversity of their national or state territories in their composition and functioning. The Second Republic was again overthrown in 1983, and while the Third Republic was short-lived (1993), the constitutional mechanisms to safeguard Nigeria's unity have survived into the Fourth Republic, in place since 1999.

Territorial decentralisation has also been a major feature of Nigerian power-sharing politics. Indeed, Gowon installed a 12-state federal regime in 1966 to break the dominance of the majority ethnic groups and placate tensions, but decentralisation continued over time (Akinyele, 1996; Suberu, 2001, pp. 79–110). Minority groups continued to clamour for their own state, in which they could have their own majority and the number of states increased to 19 (1976), 21 (1987), 30 (1991), and eventually the current 36 states (1996). The number of Local Government Areas (LGAs) has similarly increased.

Lower-tier administrative areas come with important constitutionally guaranteed benefits, which has naturally spurred their growth. For instance, each state has the right to a Minister in the federal government and accompanying departments and agencies. This ensures that each state has a say in federal politics and derives benefits in the form of public funds. In 1996, the federal character principle was also strengthened by the creation of an implementing agency, the Federal Character Commission (Demarest et al., 2020; Mustapha, 2009). This commission has mandated that each state has the right to an equal share of employees in government ministries, departments, and agencies. At the state-level, each LGA has to be ensured of its share of public employment. While equal distributions are not yet achieved in many areas of the public service, the federal character principle and the commission have at least set out formal goals and a framework in which to achieve them. Finally, Nigeria's fiscal structure, installed under military rule, redistributes federal revenue to the states on an (almost) equal basis (Suberu, 2001, p. 59). This distribution of public funds across Nigerian territory can be considered economic power-sharing.

Nigeria's formal power-sharing institutions have been able to safeguard national unity and avoid large-scale conflict between its ethnic groups. This does not mean, however, that the current federal structure is accepted by all. Indeed, many groups still feel left out. This is in particular the case for groups which do not have their 'own' state or LGA, in which they form the majority. Though Igbo's constitute one of the largest groups, an important share also continues to feel marginalised by the federal state, leading to repeated cries for restructuring, and even secession (LeVan, 2019, pp. 185–193). Violent conflict in the Niger Delta region has also led to increased revenue flows to these oil-producing states as well as a federally funded (and expensive) amnesty programme for former rebels (Agbiboa, 2013). These forms of disaffection have often been fuelled by the nature of Nigeria's informal politics.

4.2. Informal functioning of power-sharing politics

Constitutional prescriptions and majoritarian voting ensure that political success in Nigeria relies on a party's ability to unite divergent groupings. The largest parties today, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and All Progressives Congress (APC), can be described as grand coalitions bridging ethnic and regional lines. The PDP emerged as the dominant party during the first 15 years after Nigeria's 1999 transition to democracy. It had actively been constituted as an encompassing party, uniting different ethnic factions, in order to ensure victory and stability upon transition (LeVan, 2019, pp. 38–66; Lewis & Kew, 2015). Opposition parties could be described as more regionally based, with in particular the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) in the North and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) in the South-West. Yet in 2013, the APC was created, which merged the CPC, ACN, and other parties, and later won the 2015 and 2019 general elections.

Nigeria's grand coalition parties cannot be associated with a particular ideology or programme, but are principal vehicles to gain access to public funds. This 'sharing of the national cake' (e.g. Kendhammer, 2015) ensures that each cultural group has a reward, and hence, stake in the Nigerian state. Formal institutions support this practice by ensuring a share of public employment and revenue. As a state commissioner of the Federal Civil Service Commission said:

> "Commissioners assure that all states and Local Government Areas are represented. Senators, Honorable Representatives, and civil servants all want their people to be represented. It is the idea of "helping their people in government" as a way of garnering support […] Vacancies are allocated per state. Certain stakeholders, such as Members of Parliament also receive some slots to give to their states"[7]

Yet political positions also provide the opportunity to derive private benefits from public funds. Contract inflation and payments without completing a government contract are among the most common instruments of political corruption in the country. Joseph has aptly described this behaviour as prebendalism: the practice of accruing private rents from public office as a shared norm among elites (Joseph, 1987). This practice benefits political elites rather than their followers, but ensures the former's support for the Nigerian federal structure. The importance of obtaining access to the state is further demonstrated by politicians' frequent party-switching.

Political parties have also devised informal power-sharing rules. The most well-known agreement is that a president and vice-president cannot both be from the North/South or Muslim/Christian. Yet, in the National Assembly as well, leadership and chairmanship positions of committees are distributed on a regional basis. Informal power-sharing agreements can also limit the number of times a politician from a particular background can run for office. The term 'zoning' is commonly used to indicate such schemes in which positions rotate among localities/ethnicities (e.g. Graf, 1988, pp. 80–81), even down to the most local level (Vinson, 2017).

While these agreements to some extent foster stability, they are also frequently disregarded, however. Indeed, the PDP's loss in 2015 can be brought back to the 2011 presidential candidacy of Southerner Goodluck Jonathan (LeVan, 2019, pp. 38–66; Lewis & Kew, 2015). For many Northerners within the party this violated an informal rotation agreement that a Northern candidate would be put forward. As a result, many Northern stalwarts left the PDP and joined the APC. On other levels as well, politicians – both from the PDP and APC – have refused to pave way for candidates from other groups, fostering political tensions. Nigeria's substantial oil revenues and the importance of access to the state for wealth acquisition make it particularly difficult for leaders to relinquish power.

As a result of the regular disregard for informal power-sharing rules, relationships between political elites cannot be described as harmonious and consensual. Moreover, the importance of getting a share of the national cake also engenders distrust and the fear that others are gaining more out of Nigeria's political bargain. While political fallouts may be quickly resolved if this can improve access to resources (e.g. by returning to a previous political party), politicians are generally on their guard about who gets what. To improve their positions, politicians also have an incentive to incite their followers against other groups by spurring fears of marginalisation (Sklar, 1976). Hence, rather than moderating the demands of their followers as in Lijphart's model (1977), the reverse is true. Political corruption and large wealth gaps between elites and their followers unfortunately ensure that claims of marginalisation often ring true for the general public.

5. Comparing power-sharing in Suriname and Nigeria

The outcomes of power-sharing policies in Suriname and Nigeria have been remarkably similar, even though these countries differ vastly in size. Both countries have been able to avert conflict recurrence, and both can be characterised as weak democracies. From that perspective, smaller size does not appear to bring additional benefits to Suriname in terms of stability and democratic development, as hypothesised in both the consociational literature and the broader literature on the democracy-promoting effects of small scale. Why do the vast discrepancies in size not result in different outcomes? Our analysis suggests that the answer can be found in the extent to which power-sharing has been institutionalised. While the small size of Suriname eliminates the need to codify or formalise power-sharing institutions, in Nigeria power-sharing can only survive under stringent rules that enforce power-sharing politics.

This difference in the formalisation of power-sharing politics appears to be directly related to the size of these countries. While there obviously are some other notable differences between our cases that might have had an effect – think of geographical location,

colonial legacies, or economic foundations – there is no evidence that any of these factors has affected the level of institutional formalisation. In fact, despite their vast differences in size, we can observe some remarkable parallels between our cases. In both countries different ethnic groups found themselves joined together because of colonial powers' policy choices.[8] Although both countries became independent with institutions that can be categorised as consociational – proportional voting in Suriname and federalism in Nigeria – inter-group competition and tensions were high from the onset. Centrifugal strains in both countries led to a military take-over with the proclaimed goal of safeguarding national unity and eradicating ethnic politics, but both Nigeria and Suriname proved unable to prevent an ensuing outbreak of secessionist conflict from the Maroon and Igbo groups, respectively.

Nigeria and Suriname both eventually returned to democratic politics, even though this process experienced more setbacks in Nigeria. Under democratic rule, power-sharing came to the forefront again in both countries. Interesting in this regard is that power-sharing politics in both countries emerged largely from a homegrown negotiation process rather than an externally mediated endeavour. This sets Suriname and Nigeria apart from many post-conflict countries in the 1990s where external actors were strongly involved in consociational engineering through peace agreements, among which Bosnia–Herzegovina, Iraq, and Northern Ireland, for example (McCulloch & McEvoy, 2018). This of course also has implications for the generalizability of our findings, as discussed in the conclusion.

As mentioned, the foregoing similarities do not mean that size has no effect. In our analysis, we have specifically focused on the formal and informal practices of power-sharing, as this is where the literature expects scale effects to occur. Informal power-sharing practices did not appear to differ substantially in both countries. Upon the return to democracy, Suriname and Nigeria adopted power-sharing policies of which the core principle is that each group receives its share of public revenue. In Suriname, these clientelistic practices are referred to as 'being accommodated', while in Nigeria, it is widely known as 'sharing the national cake'. These political cultures have been maintained until today and are arguably the main reason for Nigeria's and Suriname's relative stability. Political elites benefit the most from these bargains, however, and in both countries widespread patron-client linkages and political corruption continue to undermine democratic consolidation. The economic 'horse-trading' nature of the power-sharing bargain also fuels antagonistic intergroup relations in both Nigeria and Suriname, irrespective of their different sizes.

With regard to formal power-sharing institutions, we did find important differences. While power-sharing policies such as proportional voting and coalition governments can be regarded as part of the colonial legacy of Suriname, very little formal institutional engineering has taken place since independence, while in Nigeria a constitutional anchoring of power-sharing was deemed necessary with every return to democracy. Suriname's relatively vague 1987 constitution does not include specific measures to promote national unity, but political elites rather relied on the return to informal bargaining processes about public revenue for stability. This stands in contrast to Nigeria's constitutional federal character principle and the legally mandated prohibition of ethnic parties. In short, power-sharing in Nigeria strongly relies on constitutional and legal provisions, while power-sharing in Suriname stems from an informal political practice that is sustained by close, personal ties among politicians, and between politicians and voters.

These differences relating to the formalisation of power-sharing politics may explain why Nigeria is similar to Suriname in terms of power-sharing outcomes regardless of their vast differences in size.

For example, political parties in Nigeria and Suriname serve the same purpose of providing access to the state. Yet intergroup bargaining takes place on an intra-party basis in Nigeria, and on an inter-party basis in Suriname. The obligation of intra-party bargaining in Nigeria is enshrined in an ethnic party ban that ensures successful parties consist of grand interethnic coalitions that distribute political positions across groups, even before elections take place. Furthermore, the federal character principle provides additional guarantees that all groups will get access to public revenue regardless of electoral outcomes. Suriname has for most of its political history had ethnically based parties. Proportional voting requires these parties to engage in coalition negotiations, but the success of coalition negotiations, and the eventual distribution of positions, relies to a large extent on personal relations between politicians. Some observers of Surinamese politics expected that Bouterse's pan-ethnic NDP would break this pattern and instigate a move towards intra-party bargaining processes. However, the outcome of the 2020 elections appears to signal a shift back to Suriname's multi-party power-sharing traditions, as the victorious Hindostani-dominated VHP formed a coalition with smaller Maroon (ABOP), Creole (NPS), and Javanese (PL) parties.

Furthermore, Suriname has maintained a unitary state system, which has proved to be sufficient to accommodate its diversity. Nigeria, however, has implemented substantial decentralisation policies to provide different ethnic groups with their own states and LGAs. Although decentralisation from 3 autonomous regions at time of independence to 36 states today has also been criticised for strengthening the role of the central state through fragmentation (e.g. Suberu, 2001, pp. 79–110), fiscal federalism ensures a steady revenue flow to diverse areas of the country and groups. This dissimilarity between Nigeria and Suriname clearly stems from their vast differences in territorial and population size, as well as from the geographical distribution of various groups. While Suriname's ethnic groups are to some extent geographically dispersed, the smallness of the country ensures that all districts have a multi-ethnic demography. Indeed, the capital city and political centre of Paramaribo – which together with its suburbs houses two-thirds of the Surinamese population – itself has a profoundly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural population.

While Suriname has over time maintained an informal style of power-sharing, Nigeria has chosen to rely on stronger formal power-sharing institutions. Indeed, a purely informal style of power-sharing would have likely been disastrous in Nigeria as the informal power-sharing agreements adopted by politicians as add-ons to the formal rules are in fact regularly disregarded, often leading to tensions and conflict. The large number of ethnic groups and political elites in Nigeria – as opposed to the long-standing rule of a small number of key politicians in Suriname – may hamper elites in holding each other accountable, hence breeding distrust. The adoption of numerous formal institutions, appears to partly alleviate this accountability problem. Hence, while it appears to be the case that Suriname does enjoy the hypothesised benefit of small states with regard to power-sharing, albeit without clear harmonious relations between elites, Nigeria has been able to compensate the negative effects of its large size through the implementation of formal measures.

6. Conclusion

As we discussed in the theoretical sections of this article, classical consociational scholarship posits that a small population size carries a number of advantages for power-sharing politics. Crucially, these advantages are not in any way linked to the institutional prescriptions of consociational democracy, but rather relate to the informal political environment in which power-sharing occurs. Specifically, Lijphart believed that smallness would stimulate consociationalism due to (1) the closer connections between political elites, and (2) the severe external vulnerability of small states (Lijphart, 1977). As we indicated, this notion that 'small is beautiful' (Schumacher, 1973) also appears in the broader literature on the political effects of scale, although more recent empirical studies of politics in small states also points to a number of drawbacks such as personalistic politics and patron-client linkages (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018).

Contrary to both the consociational literature and the small-is-beautiful-perspective, our analysis reveals that Suriname does not have a more consensual or harmonious informal political culture that would facilitate power-sharing. In fact, the informal practices of power-sharing in Nigeria and Suriname were found to be remarkably similar. In both countries the main objective of power-sharing is to allocate state resources to various groups, resulting in a type of politics that centres on horse-trading, patron-client linkages, and corruption. Intriguingly, while Lijphart and other consociational scholars expected population size to primarily affect the *informal* dynamics of power-sharing, we have found that the differences between Suriname and Nigeria mostly relate to the *formal* implementation of the power-sharing arrangement. Specifically, we have found that Nigeria's vast dimensions and geographical dispersion of cultural groups have called for a much more stringent implementation of power-sharing rules – a lesson the country has arguably had to learn the hard way. Among the strongest regulations facilitating power-sharing in contemporary Nigeria are (1) decentralisation and fiscal federalism, (2) fixed rules about the allocation of portfolios and government jobs to representatives of different states, and (3) the ban on political parties with an exclusively ethnic appeal.

In contrast, power-sharing in Suriname has historically not depended on rigid regulations. The country essentially inherited its consociational institutions, but re-democratisation in the late 1980s resulted in a strong increase in presidential power and the adoption of a relatively weak, and on many accounts vague constitution. As such, while it is true that power-sharing in this country has always depended on informal mechanisms, these are clearly not in line with what consociational scholars would predict. Power-sharing in Suriname has primarily been facilitated by the need for each ethnic group to retain access to state resources, which remains the driving force of government formation. While power-sharing is certainly facilitated by the close connections between political elites, these relations are by no means harmonious or friendly, and in fact Surinamese politics are very antagonistic and polarised in nature. In the end, however, the pragmatic need to obtain resources for the own ethnic group trumps the hostility between the leaders of political parties.

These findings have direct relevance for the academic literature on consociational democracy and power-sharing, but it remains important to be careful when generalising about their implications. Current power-sharing practices and research are primarily

directed at finding those facets of power-sharing institutions that promote stability after civil war. Most of these post-conflict cases are situated in the Global South. From that perspective, the cases of Suriname and Nigeria may have more relevance than the classical Western-European cases of Lijphart and colleagues. In particular, our cases show that stability is possible even when inter-group co-existence is a relatively recent phenomenon – in comparative perspective – characterised by distrust, and general respect for colonial borders prevents serious external threats. On the other hand, Nigeria and Suriname have developed their power-sharing largely through endogenous, homegrown processes, whereas more recent cases have seen external interventions by mediators introducing power-sharing measures. Nevertheless, our research highlights that informal dimensions of power-sharing, and the potential impact of size on these dimensions, may deserve attention in their own right. Whereas formal institutions, their strength, and comprehensiveness, have received most attention in the literature on post-Cold War power-sharing, scale effects and informal inter-elite relations may have to be taken into account as well.

With these caveats in mind, our results could indicate that power-sharing in (demographically and territorially) large countries depends on a very strict set of institutional rules that guide the actions and behaviour of political elites. Conversely, in small countries the success of power-sharing may depend more on the informal incentives of individual leaders to cooperate. Since politics in small states tends to be much more informal, personal, and ultimately fluid in nature, as a result of which political institutions are often ignored or circumvented (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018), formal rules may be less likely to yield strong effects than in larger countries.

Notes

1. Similar arguments have been used to explain the emergence of democratic corporatist frameworks in small European states (cf. Katzenstein, 1985).
2. The World Bank's stability-nonviolence indicator shows a clear correlation with state size (World Bank, 2020).
3. Gerring and Veenendaal (2020) find that the relationship between state size and civil war is in fact curvilinear, with mid-sized states being the most likely to experience civil conflict.
4. While we occasionally use excerpts from these interviews to illustrate our analytical narrative, for reasons of confidentiality these excerpts have not been linked to individual respondents. Privacy considerations also prevent us from mentioning the names of our interview respondents.
5. According to the most recent census of 2012, the main groups inhabiting Suriname are East Indians (known as 'Hindostanis' – 27,4%), Maroons (21,7%), Creoles (15,7%), Javanese (13,7%), Amerindians (3,8%) and a small but growing group of Chinese (1,5%). An additional 13,4% of the population identified as 'mixed', and there is a growing group of (mostly illegal) Brazilian immigrants.
6. As a result, Suriname now has a so-called mixed republican system, which constitutes a hybrid between a parliamentary and presidential arrangement. This system is also used in Botswana and post-Apartheid South Africa.
7. Quote is based on written notes, and is hence not ad verbatim.
8. With a key difference being that Nigeria's population antedates the onset of colonialism, while Suriname's society was essentially created by colonialism through processes of (forced) migration.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This work was supported by Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research [Grant Number VENI-451-16-028] and the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) [Grant numbers V426117N & V427418N].

Notes on contributors

Wouter Veenendaal is assistant professor of political science at Leiden University. His research focuses on the political effects of population size, with a particular focus on the politics and democracy in small states. He is the (co-)author of *Politics and Democracy in Microstates* (Routledge, 2014), *Democracy in Small States: Persisting Against All Odds* (OUP, 2018), and *Population and Politics: The Impact of Scale* (CUP, 2020).

Leila Demarest is assistant professor of political science at Leiden University. Her research focuses on democratization, social movements, and political parties, with a geographical focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent articles include 'Nigeria's Federal Character Commission (FCC): A critical appraisal' in *Oxford Development Studies* (with Arnim Langer and Ukoha Ukiwo), and 'Men of the People? Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria's Fourth Republic National Assembly' in *Democratization*.

ORCID

Wouter Veenendaal http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5572-4669
Leila Demarest http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6887-9937

References

Agbiboa, D. E. (2013). Have we heard the last? Oil, environmental insecurity, and the impact of the amnesty programme on the Niger Delta resistance movement. *Review of African Political Economy*, *40*(137), 447–465. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2013.816946

Akinyele, R. T. (1996). States creation in Nigeria: The Willink Report in retrospect. *African Studies Review*, *39*(2), 71–94. https://doi.org/10.2307/525436

Anckar, C. (2008). Size, islandness, and democracy: A global comparison. *International Political Science Review*, *29*(4), 433–459. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512108095722

Anckar, D. (2002). Why are small island state democracies? *The Round Table*, *365*(365), 375–390. https://doi.org/10.1080/0035853022000010344

Andeweg, R. (2000). Consociational democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *3*(1), 509–536. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.509

Baldacchino, G. (2012). Islands and despots. *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, *50*(1), 103–120. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2012.642119

Barry, B. (1975). Review article: Political accommodation and consociational democracy. *British Journal of Political Science*, *5*(4), 477–505. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400008322

Binningsbø, H. (2013). Power sharing, peace and democracy: An obvious relationship? *International Area Studies Review*, *16*(1), 89–112. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865912473847

Bogaards, M. (1998). The favourable factors for consociational democracy: A review. *European Journal of Political Research*, *33*, 475–496. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006887312649

Bogaards, M. (2010). Ethnic party bans and institutional engineering in Nigeria. *Democratization*, *17*(4), 730–749. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2010.491197

Buddingh, H. (1995). *Geschiedenis van Suriname*. Het Spectrum.

Buhaug, H., Gates, S., & Lujala, P. (2009). Geography, rebel capability, and the duration of civil conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *53*(4), 544–569. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709336457
Corbett, J. (2015). Everybody knows everybody: Practicing politics in the Pacific islands. *Democratization*, *22*(1), 51–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.811233
Corbett, J., & Veenendaal, W. (2018). *Democracy in small states: Persisting against All Odds*. Oxford University Press.
Daalder, H. (1974). The consociational democracy theme. *World Politics*, *26*(4), 604–621. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010104
Demarest, L., Langer, A., & Ukiwo, U. (2020). Nigeria's Federal Character Commission (FCC): A critical appraisal. *Oxford Development Studies* (published online).
Dew, E. (1994). *The Trouble in Suriname, 1975-1993*. Praeger.
Diamond, L. (1982). Cleavage, conflict, and anxiety in the second Nigerian Republic. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *20*(4), 629–668. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00000288
Diamond, L. (1983). Class, ethnicity, and the democratic state: Nigeria, 1950-1966. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *25*(3), 457–489. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500010549
Diamond, L., & Tsalik, S. (1999). Size and democracy: The case for decentralization. In L. Diamond (Ed.), *Developing democracy: Towards consolidation* (pp. 117–160). The John Hopkins University Press.
Elkins, Z., & Sides, J. (2007). Can institutions build unity in multiethnic states? *American Political Science Review*, *101*(4), 693–708. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070505
Erk, J., & Veenendaal, W. (2014). Is small really beautiful? The microstate mistake. *Journal of Democracy*, *25*(3), 135–148. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2014.0054
Evers, I., & van Maele, P. (2012). *Bouterse Aan de Macht*. Amsterdam.
Freedom House. (2019). *Freedom Around the World*. www.freedomhouse.org
Gerring, J., Hoffman, M., & Zarecki, D. (2018). The diverse effects of diversity on democracy. *British Journal of Political Science*, *48*(2), 283–314. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341600003X
Gerring, J., & Veenendaal, W. (2020). *Population and politics: The impact of scale*. Cambridge University Press.
Graf, W. D. (1988). *The Nigerian state*. James Currey Ltd.
Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2003). Institutionalizing peace: Power sharing and post-civil war conflict management. *American Journal of Political Science*, *47*(2), 318–332. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00022
Hegre, H., & Sambanis, N. (2006). Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war onset. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50*(4), 508–535. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706289303
Herbst, J. (2014). *States and power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and control* (2nd edition). Princeton University Press.
Hoefte, R. (2013). *Suriname in the long Twentieth century: Domination, Contestation, Globalization*. Palgrave Macmillan.
Hoefte, R., & Veenendaal, W. (2019). The challenges of nation-building and nation-branding in multi-ethnic Suriname. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *25*(2), 173–190. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2019.1602371
Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. University of California Press.
Jarstad, A. K., & Nilsson, D. (2008). From words to deeds: The implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace accords. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *25*(3), 206–223. https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940802218945
Joseph, R. A. (1987). *Democracy and Prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the second Republic*. Cambridge University Press.
Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). *Small states in world Markets*. Cornell University Press.
Kendhammer, B. (2015). Getting our piece of the national cake: Consociational power sharing and neopatrimonialism in Nigeria. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *21*(2), 143–165. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2015.1032023
Lehmbruch, G. (1967). *Proporzdemokratie: Politisches system und Politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Österreich*. Mohr.

LeVan, A. C. (2019). *Contemporary Nigerian politics: Competition in a time of transition and Terror*. Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, G. (2004). *Main Currents in Caribbean Thought: The historical Evolution of Caribbean society in its ideological aspects, 1492-1900*. University of Nebraska Press.
Lewis, P., & Kew, D. (2015). Nigeria's hopeful election. *Journal of Democracy*, *26*(3), 94–109. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0039
Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational democracy. *World Politics*, *21*(2), 207–225. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009820
Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. Yale University Press.
Lustick, I. (1997). Lijphart, Lakatos, and consociationalism. *World Politics*, *50*(1), 88–117. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100014738
Marshall, M. G. (2005). Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004. A Macro-Comparative Perspective. Report prepared for the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), Government of the United Kingdom. Center for Systemic Peace, Arlington (Virginia), United States.
Martin, P. (2013). Coming together: Power-sharing and the durability of negotiated peace settlements. *Civil Wars*, *15*(3), 332–358. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2013.842747
McCulloch, A., & McEvoy, J. (2018). The international mediation of power-sharing settlements. *Cooperation and Conflict*, *53*(4), 467–485. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718761760
Meel, P. (2014). *Man van het Moment: Een Politieke Biografie van Henck Arron*. Prometheus/Bert Bakker.
Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005). Ethnic polarization, potential conflict, and civil wars. *American Economic Review*, *95*(3), 796–816. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201468
Mustapha, A. R. (2006). Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Nigeria. Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 24. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Mustapha, A. R. (2009). Institutionalising ethnic representation: How effective is the federal character commission in Nigeria? *Journal of International Development*, *21*(4), 561–576. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1573
Norris, P. (2008). *Driving democracy: Do power-sharing institutions work?* Cambridge University Press.
Ott, D. (2000). *Small is democratic: An examination of state size and democratic development*. Garland.
Ramsoedh, H. (2016). Democracy and political culture in Suriname. In R. Hoefte, M. Bishop, & P. Clegg (Eds.), *Post-Colonial Trajectories in the Caribbean: The three Guianas* (pp. 30–45). Routledge.
Ramsoedh, H. (2018). *Surinaams Onbehagen: Een Sociale en Politieke Geschiedenis van Suriname, 1865-2015*. Verloren.
Sambanis, N. (2004). What is civil war? Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *48*(6), 814–858. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704269355
Schumacher, E. (1973). *Small Is beautiful: A study of Economics as if people Mattered*. Blond and Briggs.
Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research: A menu of qualitative and quantitative options. *Political Research Quarterly*, *61*(2), 294–308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077
Sedney, J. (1997). *De Toekomst van ons Verleden: Democratie, Etniciteit, en Politieke Machtsvorming in Suriname*. Vaco.
Singh, C. (2014). Suriname and the Limits of consociationalism. *Journal of Third World Studies*, *31*(1), 131–148. https://doi.org/10.2307/45198767
Sklar, R. L. (1976). Ethnic relations and social Class. In A. O. Sanda (Ed.), *Ethnic relations in Nigeria: Problems and prospects* (pp. 146–157). University of Ibadan.
Steiner, J. (1981). Review: The consociational theory and beyond. *Comparative Politics*, *13*(3), 339–354. https://doi.org/10.2307/421901
Stewart, F. (2002). Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. CRISE Working Paper 1. Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.
Suberu, R. T. (2001). *Federalism and ethnic conflict in Nigeria*. United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Sutton, P. (2007). Democracy and good governance in small states. In E. Kisanga, & S. Danchie (Eds.), *Commonwealth small states: Issues and prospects* (pp. 201–217). Commonwealth Secretariat.
Veenendaal, W. (2020). Does smallness enhance power-sharing? Explaining Suriname's multi-ethnic democracy. *Ethnopolitics*, *19*(1), 64–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1590078
Veenendaal, W., & Corbett, J. (2015). Why small states offer important answers to large questions. *Comparative Political Studies*, *48*(4), 527–549. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414014554687
Vinson, L. T. (2017). *Religion, violence, and local power-sharing in Nigeria*. Cambridge University Press.
Vogt, M., Bormann, N.-C., Rüegger, S., Cederman, L.-E., Hunziker, P., & Girardin, L. (2015). Integrating data on ethnicity, geography, and conflict: The ethnic power relations data set family. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *59*(7), 1327–1342. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715591215
World Bank. (2020). *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
World Population Prospects. (2019). The 2019 revision. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.