

Does Issue Importance Predict Learning about Candidates?

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Forthcoming: *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*

Abstract

A long-standing argument is that policy voting is more likely on issues the voter considers subjectively important. However, existing evidence is highly mixed. We leverage panel data from the 2008-2009 ANES Panel to investigate the relationship between subjective issue importance and a key mechanism thought to link it and policy voting: candidate knowledge. Using both lagged dependent variable and fixed effect models we find little evidence that subjective issue importance predicts candidate knowledge or learning. Our results suggest that one reason for lack of consensus about whether subjective issue importance moderates policy voting is the lack of a clear connection between it and this important mediator. Our results thus point to the need of stronger measures for subjective issue importance.

Keywords: Issue Importance; Political Knowledge; Panel Study; Policy Voting

Word Count: 2933

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Debates over public policy are central to elections. This naturally raises the question of how much weight voters give to issue considerations. Skeptics of issue voting may, for instance, point to the generally low levels of knowledge in mass publics, unstable issue attitudes, stable partisan convictions, and evidence of partisan persuasion as proof that issues play a minimal role in voter decision making (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Freeder, Lenz, & Turney, 2019; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2004; Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015; Lenz, 2012; Mason, 2018; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2018). If true, the implications for democratic politics may be dire insofar as this implies that the mass public is unable or unwilling to hold elected officials to account for their policy actions in office.

One prominent rejoinder to worries about a paucity of issue voting is to argue that voters may not base their votes on just any issue, but instead on issues they consider *subjectively important*. A subjective sense of issue importance should be associated with a greater motivation to seek out and learn information about political candidates, thereby facilitating attitude-consistent behavior (Bizer, Visser, Berent, & Krosnick, 2004; Converse, 1964; Holbrook, Berent, Krosnick, Visser, & Boninger, 2005). This argument has a long trajectory in political science due in no small part to its *prima facie* plausibility. However, empirical research has delivered at best inconsistent evidence that subjective issue importance moderates issue voting (cf: Belanger and Meguid 2008; Fournier et al. 2003; Krosnick 1988; Miller, Krosnick, and Fabrigar 2017; Visser, Krosnick, and Simmons 2003; Granberg and Holmberg 1986; Grynaviski and Corrigan 2006; Hinckley, Hofstetter, and Kessel 1974; Niemi and Bartels 1985; Leeper and Robison, n.d.). Why has this literature produced such disparate results?

We focus attention on one of the key factors thought to mediate the relationship between subjective issue importance and issue voting: candidate knowledge. While theorized to connect

importance and voting, there is a paucity of work exploring whether subjective issue importance is related to candidate knowledge. Existing work, moreover, possesses some important methodological limitations, as we address below. One possible reason for the lack of a clearer finding connecting subjective issue importance and policy voting may stem from a lack of a strong empirical relationship between subjective importance and knowledge.¹

We address this important limitation by utilizing data from the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Survey. The ANES Panel is a nearly ideal instrument for considering the relationship between subjective issue importance and candidate knowledge. Issue importance was measured at the beginning of the campaign, and before knowledge was assessed, which should ameliorate concerns of reciprocal causation. Knowledge, meanwhile, was measured at four different points during the campaign which enables an exploration of how importance relates to initial knowledge as well as *learning* over time. Finally, issue importance was re-measured near the end of the campaign which facilitates a novel analysis focused on whether changes in importance predict subsequent changes in knowledge. Our analyses have a clear conclusion: subjective issue importance does not reliably predict candidate knowledge or learning. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of issue voting, and the general “issue public” hypothesis, in the conclusion.

Theory

One prominent theory of voting behavior roots voting in a spatial logic wherein voters consider candidates in terms of their relative proximity on policy issues (Downs, 1957; Jessee, 2009; Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008). A seemingly necessary precondition for voting based on relative proximity, however, is *knowledge* about where the candidates stand in policy space, both

relative to one another and to oneself. After all, if one places a conservative candidate to the *left* of a liberal candidate, then mistakes in applying one's policy positions to the vote choice are a likely consequence.

Knowledge is the possession of factually accurate information about an object (Lupia, 2016). A precondition for knowledge is the acquisition of information about the object in question with this acquisition process influenced by a person's motivation to acquire object-relevant information (Prior, 2007). Knowledge about candidates' policy stances should thus vary across individuals due to general levels of political interest and knowledge (Barabas, Jerit, Pollock, & Rainey, 2014; Zaller, 1992). However, this type of knowledge should also vary within individuals, i.e. between issues. Policies vary in their relevance for a person's material interests, values, and group loyalties such that some issues are considered *subjectively* important while others are not (Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995; Eaton & Visser, 2008). Importance, meanwhile, is thought to motivate attention to information regarding the policy (Holbrook et al., 2005; Visser et al., 2003). As Boninger et al. (1995, p. 161) suggest, "to attach personal importance to an attitude is to commit oneself to think about the object [and] to gather information about it" in order to "design one's actions in accord with that attitude". We postulate the following hypothesis based on this line of reasoning:

H1: The subjective importance of an issue should be positively associated with candidate knowledge and learning on that issue, all else equal

The logic behind why a sense of subjective issue importance should predict subsequent candidate knowledge/learning is plausible. However, empirical demonstrations that subjective issue importance is related to, much less causes, learning about candidates is surprisingly thin. On the one hand, some studies consider the relationship between "objective" indicators of issue

public membership and do indeed find that individuals who belong to groups theorized to believe an issue is particularly important tend to pay greater attention to the issue (Bolsen & Leeper, 2013; Iyengar, Hahn, Krosnick, & Walker, 2008) and learn as a result (Henderson, 2014). While consistent with the idea that *subjective* issue importance should be related to knowledge, this evidence is ultimately indirect on the point. As Henderson (2014, p. 640) notes, “demographic measures...can include some individuals who care little about the issue and exclude others who care a great deal”. A more direct test thus of Hypothesis 1 thus requires assessing individual’s own assessments of issue importance.

There is some research directly focused on connecting subjective issue importance with candidate knowledge. However, studies along these lines are relatively rare and possess some important limitations. Krosnick’s (1988, 1990) influential studies, for instance, show that subjective importance is associated with placing Presidential candidates further apart on policy scales but not that these placements are *accurate* in nature. Moreover, these studies involve bivariate analyses using cross-sectional data; it is thus unclear whether they persist in the face of controls for potential omitted variables or whether these perceptions cause importance judgments rather than vice versa given that subjective importance may be caused by factors such as group identification (Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995). Holbrook et al. (2005), meanwhile, show that subjective importance is related with accurate recall of candidate statements using both observational and experimental data. However, respondents who can accurately recall a statement by a candidate may nevertheless fail to correctly assess how two candidates compare ideologically, which is the more crucial precondition for political action (Converse, 1964; Freeder et al., 2019). Finally, we note a discordant finding regarding non-candidate knowledge: Price et al. (2006) find that subjective importance is negatively related to knowledge on health

care policy (albeit statistically insignificantly so in multivariate analyses). More work is clearly required to test this relationship.

Data

We turn to the ANES 2008-2009 Panel survey to test the hypothesis that issue importance is positively related to candidate knowledge and learning. Respondents on the ANES 2008-2009 Panel completed a series of surveys beginning in January 2008 and culminating, for our purposes, in November 2008. Importantly, respondents were asked to record the subjective importance of a variety of policies, and their perceptions of the candidate's stance on them, at multiple time points thereby enabling an investigation of the over-time relationship between importance and learning. This is the best available panel dataset in the US context given the paucity of times that subjective importance has both been measured and measured prior to candidate knowledge in other ANES panel surveys. One exception is the 1974-76 ANES Panel where respondents ranked the importance of ten general issues in 1974. In Online Appendix C we provide analyses of whether these rankings predicted candidate knowledge in 1976 and find the same patterns as below.

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is candidate knowledge. Respondents were asked to place Barack Obama and John McCain on a policy scale for ten public policies in June, September, October, and November 2008; see Table OA1 for question wordings. These issues pertained to salient political issues, including same sex marriage, social welfare policies, immigration, and the Iraq war. Knowledge is a dichotomous variable where a score of 1 indicates that respondents placed Obama to the left of McCain. This coding scheme is consistent with a variety of studies on candidate, and party, knowledge and speaks to a fundamental task behind candidate knowledge:

ascertaining the relative positioning of the two major party candidates (Freeder et al., 2019; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Sniderman & Stiglitz, 2012).

One potential concern with a binary measure of knowledge is whether the test is ‘too easy’ and hence whether there will be sufficient variation in knowledge to estimate learning effects over the course of the campaign. Figure 1 plots mean knowledge levels for each of the issues when they were first asked about. While there is one issue where initial knowledge levels are quite high (withdrawing troops from Iraq), Figure 1 should allay concerns about variation as many Americans were unable to correctly place the two candidates on the remainder of the issues (see also: Freeder et al., 2019).

Independent Variable

Our core independent variable is subjective issue importance. Respondents were asked to indicate “how important to you personally” the issue was to them on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely important; importance is rescaled to 0-1 in the analyses below). Importance ratings were first assessed in January 2008 for all issues save for setting a deadline for withdrawing troops from Iraq where it was first asked in June 2008. Importance was then measured again in October 2008 save for one issue (tax increases on the non-wealthy).

Analytical Strategy

We leverage the panel nature of our data in two respects to strengthen claims regarding the relationship between subjective issue importance and candidate knowledge. First, we utilize a lagged dependent model approach. We begin by predicting candidate knowledge in Wave 6 (June) based on the respondent’s level of issue importance and a variety of controls that could plausibly serve as causes of both subjective importance and candidate knowledge. We include controls for the extremity of the respondent’s attitude on the issue, partisan identity strength,

ideological extremity, general political knowledge, political interest, news attention, and core demographics. All these items were measured in either January or February 2008; see Online Appendix A (p. 4) for more details. Then, for analyses using data from the subsequent three waves (Wave 9 [September], Wave 10 [October], and Wave 11 [November]) we also include an indicator for whether the respondent was correct *on the previous wave*. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable enables us to model *change* in knowledge between the waves, i.e. learning (Finkel, 2008).

The ANES 2008-2009 Panel is unique in that it assesses subjective importance twice for each issue. This enables us to treat the data as a two-wave panel and model knowledge using a fixed-effect logit model. Here, we stack the dataset at the wave (or time) level with the subsequent analysis enabling us to estimate the equivalence of a first-difference model wherein changes in X (importance) predict changes in Y (knowledge; Danckert, Dinesen, & Sønderskov, 2017; Finkel, 2008). The chief advantage of this method is that it accounts for all unobserved time invariant factors at the individual level that may be related to importance and knowledge, thereby providing further confidence in the causal relationship between the two variables, although time *varying* omitted variables may still be a concern.

Results

We begin with models pertaining to our first analytical approach. Recall that this approach is based on logit models predicting candidate knowledge based on importance, control variables, and the respondent's prior level of knowledge (for Wave 9-11 analyses). Figure 1 summarizes the results of our analyses by plotting the average marginal effect of importance, i.e. the average change in the probability of a correct response given a change from low to high importance (Hanmer & Kalkan, 2013); see Tables OA9-OA12 for full model results. We plot

results both for issue by issue analyses as well as from analyses wherein we stack the dataset at the level of the respondent within a given wave (“Overall”). In other words, each observation in these models is a respondent/issue dyad. These latter models incorporate issue-specific fixed effects and individual-level clustered standard errors and thus provide an overall assessment for the relationship between importance and knowledge irrespective of the specific issue in question (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009; see Table OA8 for full model results). Empty circles indicate coefficients that are statistically insignificant using a $p < 0.05$ standard, while filled circles indicate statistically significant coefficients.

[Insert Figure 2 Here]

Figure 2 communicates a clear point: subjective issue importance does not reliably predict candidate knowledge or learning over time. None of the “Overall” coefficients is statistically significant. Of the thirty-eight issue-specific models, meanwhile, importance only emerges as a statistically significant predictor in two instances, both in the November wave. Ultimately, Figure 2 provides meager evidence that subjective issue importance is related to, much less causes, candidate knowledge.

We now turn to our fixed-effect models of candidate learning. Recall that here we stack the dataset such that observations are clustered within individuals across two different time points (rather than within individuals across issues as in the “Overall” models reported in Figure 1). Issue importance was measured in January and October 2008 for all issues save for setting a deadline to remove troops from Iraq where it was measured in June and October. Candidate knowledge, meanwhile, was measured in June, September, October, and November. For the fixed effect models we focus on knowledge responses in June and November and thus estimate models predicting whether a change in importance between January and October is associated

with a change in knowledge between June and November.² We use November as the second wave for the knowledge items to allow for a delayed effect of the change in importance. Beyond importance we also control for variables we have repeated observations on for this time frame (PID extremity, ideological extremity, political interest, news attention, economic evaluations, and political discussion). We also include a dummy variable for the wave to account for general time trends.

[Insert Figure 3 Here]

Figure 3 again plots the average marginal effect of issue importance for models done on each issue; Table OA7 provides the full model results. The conclusion is the same as earlier: subjective issue importance is unrelated to candidate knowledge.

Conclusion

We began with a puzzle: why has the claim that subjective issue importance moderates issue voting met with such inconsistent results? We proposed considering the relationship between importance and candidate knowledge to gain greater traction on this question. Using the best available observational evidence we then showed that there is scant evidence that subjective issue importance is related to, much less causes, candidate knowledge. Thus, one reason for inconsistency in this literature is likely the lack of a relationship between these two concepts.

We utilize data from one country in one election. How might this impact our conclusions about issue importance and knowledge? We can think about this issue from both a temporal and country perspective. In the former case, we see reasons to think that importance could plausibly matter more or less in the late 2000s than in previous years. On the one hand, increasing media choice over the latter part of the twentieth century means that motivation matters more for

explaining why some people learn about political matters and others do not (Prior, 2007). Issue importance, meanwhile, is theorized to impact knowledge acquisition precisely because of its motivational properties. We would thus expect importance to better predict knowledge in our current media environment than the broadcast news era described by Prior (2007). On the other hand, increasing elite polarization means that parties are sending clearer cues about where they stand, which may make it easier to everybody to infer candidate positions, thereby attenuating the role of importance (Levendusky, 2010). Importantly, we find little evidence for either supposition in an analysis of an ANES panel conducted in the mid-1970s as importance again did not reliably predict knowledge (Online Appendix C). Time, at least within this particular case, does not seem to matter for our central conclusion.

Moving to a different electoral context, on the other hand, could plausibly augment the relationship between importance and knowledge for reasons alluded to above. Subjective importance could plausibly matter more in multi-candidate/party elections insofar as one requires more motivation in such contexts to correctly assess the relative ordering of the candidates. At the same time, the nature of the electoral system could point in the opposite direction. Party ideology matters more for coalition formation in some countries than others with the public better able to correctly place parties in the former context (Fortunato, Stevenson, & Vonnahme, 2016). Importance could plausibly matter less in such contexts because the political environment supplements the knowledge acquisition process. Ultimately, these suppositions require further data collection efforts integrating measures of subjective importance onto national surveys in a diverse array of electoral contexts to disentangle the general relationship between importance and knowledge.

We believe that there are three potential paths forward based on this evidence. First, some skeptical readers might conclude that the mixed results of the importance/voting literature, combined with the lack of any clear connection between importance and knowledge here, suggests moving on from the idea that importance moderates issue voting. We are skeptical of this conclusion. The underlying theory behind why importance should matter for voting behavior is, to us, deeply plausible. Moreover, we believe the evidence that issue importance influences other outcomes, e.g. reactions to issue frames (Lecheler, de Vreese, & Slothuus, 2009) and selective exposure (Holbrook et al., 2005), to be more robust in nature and thus that further research on issue importance in the voting process is warranted.

A second possibility is that importance might influence the knowledge acquisition process but is insufficient for delivering knowledge gains. Perhaps subjective importance motivates attention to news regarding the issue at hand, for instance, but an additional factor is required for individuals to translate this information into knowledge and hence act based on the attitude. One likely candidate here is general political knowledge (Zaller, 1992). We consider this possibility in Online Appendix B via interactions between importance and general knowledge. However, we find scant evidence of a consistent positive interaction between the two variables in predicting candidate knowledge or learning. More work is needed to validate this initial conclusion and to consider the broader possibility that the influence of subjective importance is moderated by other individual- or contextual-variables.

A final possibility is that importance does play the role we think it does, but that existing survey measures of subjective importance are not adequately capturing the concept. The measures of subjective importance on the ANES tend to reveal distributions tilted toward high levels of importance (see Figure OA1). This may mask important differences between those who

‘truly’ believe an issue to be important and respondents reporting high importance because they believe this is what they should say on a survey about politics. A necessary path forward is thus to consider alternative ways of assessing subjective importance. We believe there are three potential avenues here. First, respondents could be asked to *rank* issues rather than rating them as doing so will attenuate some of the positive skew in importance ratings mentioned above. This strikes us as a plausible way forward, although evidence discussed in Online Appendix C shows that importance still fails to predict candidate knowledge even when measured in this way on the ANES 1974-76 Panel. Second, importance judgments could be inferred from behavioral choices as a way of avoiding social desirability concerns. Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan (n.d.) provide an example of this strategy via the use of conjoint experiments wherein importance is inferred from the willingness of respondents to make policy tradeoffs. This method avoids social desirability issues but involves significant survey costs so may not be feasible in many contexts. Finally, the assessment of subjective importance here relies on a single item, which almost surely results in a less reliable estimate of importance than would be obtained using a multi-item index. Future work should investigate measuring importance via multiple items to improve their overall reliability. One way or the other the future investigation of subjective importance in public opinion research requires stronger measures.

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
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Footnotes


1. We investigate whether candidate knowledge amplifies proximity voting in Online Appendix D and find that it does in bivariate models.
2. Knowledge was not measured in June for the Iraq deadline issue. We thus instead use September and November for the dependent variable.

Figure 1: Initial Knowledge Levels




Notes: Markers provide the proportion correct for each knowledge item with 95% confidence intervals. Estimate are taken from the first time that knowledge is assessed: Wave 6 (June) for all issues save for the Iraq Deadline which was first asked about in Wave 9 (September).

Figure 2: Issue Importance Dose Not Reliably Predict Candidate Knowledge



Notes: Markers provide the average marginal effect of issue importance with 95% confidence intervals. “Overall” indicates effects from a model using the stacked dataset wherein each row in the dataset is an Individual/Issue dyad. The number of observations for the “Overall” models ranges from 6139 (November) to 8560 (June). The mean number of observations for the issue specific models are: 951 (June), 863 (September), 563 (October), and 613 (November).

Figure 3: Changes in Importance are Unrelated to Changes in Knowledge



Notes: Markers provide the average marginal effect of issue importance from fixed effect logit models with 95% confidence intervals; see Tale OA7 for the underlying models. The mean number of observations across models is 288.

Online Appendices for

“Does Issue Importance Predict Learning about Candidates?”

Contents


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 - b. Table OD2: Analyses with controls

Table OA1: Issue Measures and Timing

Issue Label	Question	Importance Measured In...	Knowledge Measured In...
"Same Sex Marriage"	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose an amendment to the U.S. Constitution banning marriage between two people who are the same sex?	January (Wave 1) & October (Wave 10)	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), and November (Wave 11)
"Tax Rich"	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose raising federal income taxes for people who make more than \$200,000 per year?	January (Wave 1) & October (Wave 10)	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), and November (Wave 11)
"Tax Non-Rich"	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose raising federal income taxes for people who make less than \$200,000 per year?	January (Wave 1)	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), and November (Wave 11)
"Senior Drug Costs"	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government paying for all of the cost of prescription drugs for senior citizens who are living on very little income?	January (Wave 1) & October (Wave 10)	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), and November (Wave 11)
"Medical Care"	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government paying for all necessary medical care for all Americans?	January (Wave 1) & October (Wave 10)	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), and November (Wave 11)
"Habeas Corpus"	Imagine that the U.S. government suspects a person in the United States of being a terrorist. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the government being able to put this person in prison for months without ever bringing the person to court and charging him or her with a crime?	January (Wave 1) & October (Wave 10)	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), and November (Wave 11)
"Terror Wiretaps"	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government being required to get a court order before it can listen in on phone calls made by American citizens who are suspected of being terrorists?	January (Wave 1) & October (Wave 10)	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), and November (Wave 11)
"Ill. Imm. Work Stay"	Citizens of other countries who have come to live in the United States without the permission of the U.S. government are called "illegal immigrants." Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose allowing illegal immigrants to work in the United States for up to three years, after which they would have to go back to their home country?	January (Wave 1) & October (Wave 10)	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), and November (Wave 11)
"Path to Citizenship"	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens?	January (Wave 1) & October (Wave 10)	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), and November (Wave 11)
"Iraq Deadline"	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose setting a deadline for withdrawing all U.S. troops from Iraq?	June (Wave 6), September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), November (Wave 11)	September (Wave 9), October (Wave 10), and November (Wave 11)

Notes: All analyses in Figure 1 use importance as recorded on the first possible wave.

Figure OA1: Distribution of Issue Importance Items



Notes: Responses are from January 2008 save for the Iraq question which is from June 2008.

Table OA2: Temporal Stability of Importance Ratings

Issue	Correlation between T1 and T2
“Same Sex Marriage”	0.67
“Tax Rich”	0.51
“Senior Drug Costs”	0.51
“Medical Care”	0.48
“Habeas Corpus”	0.45
“Terror Wiretaps”	0.47
“Ill. Imm. Work Stay”	0.57
“Path to Citizenship”	0.52
“Iraq Deadline”	0.53

Overview of Control Variables

1. Issue Extremity
 - a. Respondents were asked to place themselves on the same 1-7 scale as they eventually placed the candidates. Respondents placed themselves on the issues in January for nine of the issues and in June for the Iraq deadline item.
 - b. Issue extremity is a folded version of their placement such that a score of 4 is rescaled to = 1, and extreme values (1,7) = 4. Rescaled to range from 0-1 in the analyses.
2. General Political Knowledge
 - a. Respondents were asked six general knowledge items in February 2008:
 - i. How many times can an individual be elected President?
 - ii. How many years is a US senator elected?
 - iii. How many US senators from each state?
 - iv. How many years is a US House Representative elected?
 - v. Who becomes President after the President and Vice President?
 - vi. What percentage of votes needed to override a Presidential veto?
 - b. We recoded each item into a binary variable (1=correct, 0=otherwise). General political knowledge is the mean number correct (scaled to range from 0-1).
3. PID Extremity
 - a. Respondents were asked their partisan identification in January. This item is a folded version of the 7-pt identification scale; 1 = Pure Independent, 4 = Strong Partisan (0-1 scale in analyses).
4. Ideological Extremity
 - a. Respondents were asked their ideological identification in January. This item is a folded version of the 7-pt scale (1= Moderate; 4 = Extreme Liberal/Conservative; scaled 0-1 in analyses).
5. Political Interest
 - a. Respondents were asked in January to indicate “how interested are you in information about what’s going on in government and politics” on a scale from “not interested at all” (=1) to “extremely interested (=5). Scaled 0-1 in the analyses.
6. News Attention
 - a. In January, respondents were asked “during a typical week, how many days do you [watch/listen to/watch or read/read] news on” TV/the radio/the Internet/printed newspapers. Responses were only minimally correlated so we include each item as a separate predictors (scaled 0-1).
7. Retrospective and Prospective Economic Evaluations
 - a. Retrospective evaluations: In January and October respondents were asked to whether the “economy in the country as a whole” was (much) better, about the same, or (much) worse than “one year ago”. Prospective: Respondents were also asked on these waves to indicate whether the “economy, in the country as a whole” will be (much) better, about the same, or (much) worse). Both are scaled to range from 0-1 with higher values indicating more positive evaluations.

8. Days Spent Talking Politics
 - a. Respondents were asked in January and October: “during a typical week, how many days do you talk about politics with family or friends?”. Rescaled to range from 0-1, higher values indicate more days per week discussing politics.
9. Demographic Variables
 - a. Gender: 1 = Female; 0 = Male
 - b. Age: Continuous variable (scaled 0-1)
 - c. Race: 1 (base) = White, Non-Hispanic; 2 = Black, Non-Hispanic; 3 = Hispanic; 4 = Other
 - d. Education: Continuous variable (scaled 0-1)
 - e. Income: Continuous variable (scaled 0-1)

Bivariate Models

Table OA3. Bivariate Analyses, Stacked Data File

	(1) June	(1) September	(1) October	(1) November
Importance	0.47** (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)	0.35* (0.17)	0.34+ (0.18)
Knowledge_t1		1.59** (0.10)	1.68** (0.14)	1.64** (0.11)
Taxes on Rich	0.96** (0.12)	0.52** (0.15)	0.75** (0.21)	1.00** (0.20)
Taxes on Non-Rich	-0.42** (0.12)	-0.67** (0.16)		-0.41* (0.17)
Senior Drugs	0.69** (0.11)	0.11 (0.15)	0.35* (0.17)	0.58** (0.17)
Health Care	0.85** (0.11)	0.15 (0.15)	0.54** (0.19)	0.20 (0.17)
Habeas Corpus	0.73** (0.11)	0.25+ (0.15)	-0.30+ (0.17)	0.50** (0.19)
Wiretaps	0.25* (0.11)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.44* (0.19)	0.01 (0.17)
Illegal Imm. Work Stay	-0.22+ (0.12)	-0.66** (0.15)	-0.23 (0.19)	-0.65** (0.20)
Path to Citizenship	0.19 (0.12)	-0.27+ (0.14)	-0.39* (0.19)	0.11 (0.18)
Iraq Deadline			0.97** (0.17)	1.10** (0.17)
Constant	-0.67**	-0.58**	-0.82**	-1.06**

	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Observations	8686	7634	5158	6218
Respondents (Clusters)	969	878	1072	1051

Standard errors in parentheses

Results are weighted

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OA4 Wave 6 (June) Knowledge, Bivariate

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Non Rich Taxes	(4) Senior Drugs	(5) Health Care	(6) Habeas Corpus	(7) Wiretaps	(8) Illegal Work Stay	(9) Path to Citizenship
Importance	0.54* (0.26)	0.55+ (0.33)	0.83* (0.32)	-0.20 (0.33)	0.96** (0.37)	0.58 (0.36)	0.61* (0.31)	0.27 (0.32)	0.27 (0.31)
Constant	-0.71** (0.16)	0.25 (0.20)	-1.36** (0.26)	0.47+ (0.24)	-0.17 (0.27)	-0.01 (0.26)	-0.52* (0.23)	-0.76** (0.24)	-0.36 (0.22)
N	964	967	966	966	966	964	964	963	966

Standard errors in parentheses; Results are weighted; + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OA5. Wave 9 (September) Knowledge, Bivariate

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Non Rich Taxes	(4) Senior Drugs	(5) Health Care	(6) Habeas Corpus	(7) Wiretaps	(8) Illegal Work Stay	(9) Path to Citizenship	(10) Iraq
Importance	0.46 (0.29)	0.10 (0.52)	-0.40 (0.39)	-0.27 (0.35)	0.06 (0.43)	-0.17 (0.42)	0.33 (0.34)	-0.05 (0.35)	-0.07 (0.33)	0.03 (0.09)
Knowledge_t1	1.34** (0.21)	2.93** (0.35)	1.22** (0.22)	1.88** (0.22)	1.85** (0.22)	2.01** (0.22)	1.35** (0.20)	1.05** (0.21)	1.38** (0.20)	
Constant	-0.69** (0.20)	-0.77* (0.35)	-0.78* (0.31)	-0.41 (0.28)	-0.58+ (0.35)	-0.40 (0.33)	-0.75** (0.26)	-0.93** (0.27)	-0.68** (0.26)	1.17** (0.30)
N	874	640	875	875	874	875	875	871	875	1133

Standard errors in parentheses; Results are weighted; + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OA6. Wave 10 (October) Knowledge

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Senior Drugs	(4) Health Care	(5) Habeas Corpus	(6) Wiretaps	(7) Illegal Work Stay	(8) Path to Citizenship	(9) Iraq Deadline
Importance	0.45 (0.36)	-0.09 (0.65)	-0.76 (0.49)	1.63** (0.62)	0.69 (0.50)	0.54 (0.49)	0.49 (0.47)	0.57 (0.48)	-0.04 (0.10)
Knowledge_t1	1.48** (0.26)	2.84** (0.44)	1.95** (0.29)	1.77** (0.29)	1.52** (0.28)	1.25** (0.27)	1.25** (0.27)	1.34** (0.27)	2.36** (0.29)
Constant	-0.77** (0.26)	-0.50 (0.48)	0.15 (0.40)	-1.23** (0.47)	-1.24** (0.40)	-1.14** (0.42)	-0.99** (0.37)	-1.16** (0.37)	0.08 (0.41)
N	528	381	530	531	530	529	529	530	1070

Standard errors in parentheses; Results are weighted; + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OA7. Wave 11 (November) Knowledge, Bivariate

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Senior Drugs	(4) Health Care	(5) Habeas Corpus	(6) Wiretaps	(7) Illegal Work Stay	(8) Path to Citizenship	(9) Non Rich Taxes	(10) Iraq Deadline
main										
Importance	0.97** (0.35)	0.53 (0.63)	-0.21 (0.57)	0.39 (0.55)	-0.42 (0.54)	-0.43 (0.54)	1.06* (0.44)	1.27** (0.47)	0.01 (0.34)	0.04 (0.11)
Knowledge_t1	1.28** (0.27)	1.98** (0.37)	1.28** (0.30)	1.42** (0.30)	2.01** (0.29)	1.69** (0.28)	1.23** (0.28)	1.16** (0.27)	1.60** (0.20)	2.75** (0.30)
Constant	-1.17** (0.27)	-0.37 (0.43)	0.10 (0.45)	-0.74+ (0.42)	-0.23 (0.41)	-0.56 (0.41)	-1.99** (0.37)	-1.34** (0.35)	-1.22** (0.27)	-0.63 (0.43)
N	517	520	515	518	517	516	518	515	1037	1045

Standard errors in parentheses; Results are weighted; + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Multivariate Models (In-Text Figures)**Table OA8: Model Results (“Overall” Analyses)**

	(1) June	(2) September	(3) October	(4) November
Importance	0.17 (0.16)	-0.30 ⁺ (0.16)	0.23 (0.18)	0.20 (0.19)
Extremity	0.32 ^{**} (0.11)	0.27 [*] (0.12)	0.09 (0.15)	0.11 (0.13)
Knowledge (T-1)		1.45 ^{**} (0.09)	1.54 ^{**} (0.12)	1.58 ^{**} (0.10)
Taxes on Rich	1.09 ^{**} (0.13)	0.69 ^{**} (0.16)	0.82 ^{**} (0.21)	1.12 ^{**} (0.21)
Taxes on Non-Rich	-0.41 ^{**} (0.14)	-0.65 ^{**} (0.16)		-0.36 [*] (0.17)
Senior Drugs	0.79 ^{**} (0.12)	0.21 (0.16)	0.38 [*] (0.18)	0.70 ^{**} (0.17)
Health Care	1.01 ^{**} (0.12)	0.32 [*] (0.15)	0.62 ^{**} (0.20)	0.32 ⁺ (0.17)
Habeas Corpus	0.87 ^{**} (0.12)	0.38 [*] (0.15)	-0.29 (0.18)	0.61 ^{**} (0.19)
Wiretaps	0.34 ^{**} (0.12)	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.44 [*] (0.20)	0.05 (0.17)
Illegal Imm. Work Stay	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.61 ^{**} (0.15)	-0.25 (0.19)	-0.63 ^{**} (0.21)
Path to Citizenship	0.29 [*] (0.13)	-0.23 (0.15)	-0.38 ⁺ (0.20)	0.17 (0.18)
Iraq Deadline			1.11 ^{**} (0.18)	1.23 ^{**} (0.18)
Political Interest	0.87 ^{**} (0.27)	1.01 ^{**} (0.25)	1.03 ^{**} (0.29)	0.64 [*] (0.31)
General Political	1.03 ^{**}	0.28	0.85 ^{**}	0.49 ⁺

Knowledge	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.29)
TV News	0.25 (0.17)	0.12 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.24)	-0.55** (0.20)
Internet News	-0.14 (0.14)	0.14 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.17)
Newspaper News	0.06 (0.13)	0.02 (0.13)	0.20 (0.19)	0.17 (0.14)
Radio News	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.38** (0.14)	0.13 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.19)
PID Extremity	0.56** (0.16)	0.41* (0.16)	0.45* (0.21)	0.06 (0.17)
Ideological Extremity	-0.11 (0.17)	0.13 (0.16)	0.33 (0.21)	0.08 (0.22)
Age	-0.63* (0.29)	-0.14 (0.28)	-0.84* (0.41)	0.53 (0.35)
Income	0.09 (0.25)	0.98** (0.26)	0.42 (0.32)	0.35 (0.32)
Education	0.76** (0.22)	0.06 (0.21)	0.44+ (0.26)	0.39 (0.28)
Female	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.11 (0.15)	0.11 (0.13)
Black	-0.20 (0.23)	-0.07 (0.22)	0.38 (0.28)	-0.34 (0.28)
Hispanic	-0.34+ (0.18)	0.12 (0.20)	0.36 (0.35)	-0.40 (0.26)
Other	0.37 (0.40)	0.65+ (0.33)	0.10 (0.26)	-0.16 (0.23)
Constant	-2.44** (0.28)	-2.17** (0.29)	-2.52** (0.43)	-2.08** (0.40)
Observations	8560	7520	5077	6139
Clusters (Respondents)	955	865	1052	1033

Standard errors in parentheses

Results are weighted; Standard errors are clustered at the individual level; + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OA9. Wave 6 (June) Knowledge

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Non Rich Taxes	(4) Senior Drugs	(5) Health Care	(6) Habeas Corpus	(7) Wiretaps	(8) Illegal Work Stay	(9) Path to Citizenship
Importance	0.39 (0.35)	0.53 (0.45)	0.43 (0.43)	-0.39 (0.46)	0.92 ⁺ (0.48)	-0.13 (0.40)	-0.21 (0.39)	0.29 (0.40)	-0.05 (0.40)
Extremity	0.24 (0.31)	-0.26 (0.35)	0.54 (0.33)	0.74* (0.33)	0.09 (0.30)	0.63* (0.27)	0.42 (0.31)	0.02 (0.31)	0.49 ⁺ (0.30)
Political Interest	0.81 ⁺ (0.44)	0.93 ⁺ (0.48)	-0.12 (0.46)	1.08* (0.48)	1.62** (0.47)	1.41** (0.48)	1.31** (0.44)	0.60 (0.46)	0.57 (0.43)
General Political Knowledge	1.23** (0.46)	2.28** (0.49)	-0.35 (0.46)	0.78 ⁺ (0.47)	1.54** (0.48)	2.28** (0.51)	1.01* (0.44)	0.40 (0.45)	0.74 ⁺ (0.41)
TV News	-0.24 (0.33)	0.30 (0.36)	0.60 ⁺ (0.34)	0.41 (0.33)	-0.29 (0.35)	1.06** (0.36)	-0.25 (0.34)	0.01 (0.33)	0.83** (0.31)
Internet News	-0.05 (0.26)	-0.02 (0.28)	-0.27 (0.26)	-0.10 (0.27)	-0.26 (0.27)	-0.10 (0.28)	0.04 (0.26)	-0.23 (0.26)	-0.35 (0.25)
Newspaper News	0.03 (0.27)	0.24 (0.27)	0.02 (0.26)	0.24 (0.26)	0.26 (0.29)	0.06 (0.29)	-0.18 (0.25)	-0.15 (0.26)	0.11 (0.24)
Radio News	0.11 (0.27)	-0.09 (0.29)	-0.44 (0.28)	-0.26 (0.28)	-0.13 (0.29)	-0.30 (0.28)	0.15 (0.26)	0.06 (0.27)	0.05 (0.26)
PID Extremity	0.34 (0.29)	0.79* (0.32)	-0.02 (0.27)	0.67* (0.32)	0.96** (0.31)	0.81* (0.32)	1.33** (0.29)	0.23 (0.32)	0.25 (0.27)
Ideological Extremity	0.08 (0.30)	0.55 (0.34)	-0.47 (0.32)	-0.21 (0.33)	-0.15 (0.35)	-0.45 (0.33)	-0.22 (0.30)	-0.02 (0.31)	-0.16 (0.29)
Age	-1.45** (0.55)	-0.15 (0.57)	-0.70 (0.54)	-0.31 (0.54)	-0.27 (0.57)	-1.17* (0.58)	-0.01 (0.57)	-0.81 (0.52)	-0.83 (0.50)
Income	-0.66 (0.51)	0.45 (0.52)	-0.13 (0.51)	0.19 (0.49)	-0.24 (0.52)	0.41 (0.49)	0.21 (0.49)	0.05 (0.47)	0.41 (0.43)
Education	1.28** (0.42)	0.52 (0.43)	0.60 (0.43)	1.55** (0.45)	1.11* (0.44)	0.80 ⁺ (0.46)	0.26 (0.41)	0.23 (0.41)	0.90* (0.37)
Female	0.12 (0.20)	-0.60** (0.23)	0.53** (0.20)	-0.26 (0.21)	0.12 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.41* (0.21)	-0.03 (0.20)	0.18 (0.19)
Black	-0.05 (0.39)	-0.62 ⁺ (0.33)	0.01 (0.35)	-0.17 (0.35)	0.22 (0.40)	-0.11 (0.38)	-0.50 (0.37)	-0.64 (0.41)	-0.02 (0.35)
Hispanic	-0.83* (0.40)	-0.10 (0.45)	0.16 (0.36)	-0.73 ⁺ (0.38)	-0.45 (0.43)	-0.50 (0.37)	-0.51 (0.38)	-0.18 (0.41)	-0.11 (0.36)
Other	0.19	0.38	-0.52	0.69	0.36	0.81	0.03	0.49	1.12*

	(0.57)	(0.62)	(0.55)	(0.58)	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.59)	(0.51)	(0.49)
Constant	-1.82**	-2.43**	-1.32**	-2.10**	-2.63**	-3.01**	-2.14**	-1.10*	-2.28**
	(0.57)	(0.67)	(0.48)	(0.60)	(0.58)	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.52)	(0.48)
N	950	953	952	952	952	950	950	949	952

Standard errors in parentheses

Results are weighted

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OA10. Wave 9 (September) Knowledge

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Non Rich Taxes	(4) Senior Drugs	(5) Health Care	(6) Habeas Corpus	(7) Wiretaps	(8) Illegal Work Stay	(9) Path to Citizenship	(10) Iraq
Importance	-0.38 (0.41)	-0.76 (0.71)	-0.78 (0.51)	-0.49 (0.55)	0.34 (0.55)	-0.08 (0.50)	0.04 (0.44)	-0.34 (0.46)	-0.63 (0.46)	-0.22 (0.39)
Extremity	0.87** (0.30)	-0.39 (0.55)	0.21 (0.40)	0.44 (0.44)	-0.07 (0.37)	-0.23 (0.34)	0.21 (0.34)	0.46 (0.33)	0.41 (0.39)	0.66* (0.31)
Knowledge_t1	1.24** (0.22)	2.83** (0.36)	1.18** (0.22)	1.76** (0.23)	1.59** (0.23)	1.80** (0.24)	1.17** (0.21)	1.03** (0.21)	1.38** (0.20)	
Political Interest	1.19* (0.53)	2.40** (0.84)	0.83+ (0.50)	1.33* (0.52)	1.39** (0.51)	0.84 (0.51)	0.51 (0.49)	0.58 (0.50)	1.24* (0.53)	1.85** (0.53)
General Political Knowledge	0.58 (0.49)	0.04 (0.84)	-0.07 (0.49)	1.14* (0.51)	0.52 (0.56)	0.31 (0.53)	-0.14 (0.47)	-0.09 (0.50)	-0.04 (0.48)	1.04+ (0.57)
TV News	0.06 (0.36)	0.36 (0.54)	0.25 (0.35)	-0.49 (0.41)	0.70+ (0.42)	0.29 (0.41)	0.40 (0.36)	0.26 (0.38)	-0.53 (0.36)	0.03 (0.38)
Internet News	0.01 (0.30)	0.06 (0.45)	0.70* (0.28)	0.43 (0.31)	0.01 (0.30)	-0.35 (0.31)	-0.22 (0.29)	0.24 (0.29)	0.42 (0.29)	-0.76* (0.35)
Newspaper News	0.13 (0.31)	0.35 (0.44)	-0.02 (0.30)	-0.04 (0.33)	-0.04 (0.33)	-0.66* (0.30)	-0.18 (0.28)	0.08 (0.28)	0.53* (0.27)	1.15** (0.33)
Radio News	0.05 (0.30)	0.17 (0.48)	-0.89** (0.29)	-0.33 (0.31)	-0.41 (0.33)	-0.03 (0.31)	-0.29 (0.30)	-0.48 (0.30)	-0.75* (0.29)	-0.04 (0.35)
PID Extremity	0.96** (0.34)	0.31 (0.52)	-0.11 (0.33)	0.43 (0.36)	0.60 (0.37)	0.49 (0.35)	0.40 (0.32)	0.51 (0.32)	0.07 (0.30)	1.26** (0.38)
Ideological Extremity	-0.04 (0.33)	0.36 (0.58)	0.33 (0.35)	-0.09 (0.39)	0.06 (0.36)	0.27 (0.35)	0.51 (0.33)	-0.41 (0.33)	0.45 (0.33)	-0.61 (0.39)
Age	-0.39 (0.63)	0.86 (0.83)	-1.26* (0.58)	0.60 (0.68)	0.06 (0.66)	-0.56 (0.64)	1.23* (0.57)	-0.92 (0.57)	-0.33 (0.57)	-0.27 (0.65)
Income	-0.01 (0.57)	1.78* (0.78)	0.65 (0.55)	0.35 (0.60)	2.42** (0.58)	0.74 (0.62)	1.49** (0.55)	0.97+ (0.54)	1.23* (0.54)	2.14** (0.53)
Education	-0.09 (0.45)	0.42 (0.68)	-0.42 (0.45)	0.27 (0.49)	0.47 (0.45)	0.77 (0.48)	0.58 (0.43)	-0.56 (0.44)	-0.25 (0.44)	0.94+ (0.52)
Female	-0.68** (0.22)	-0.80* (0.38)	0.39+ (0.22)	0.11 (0.24)	-0.37 (0.25)	0.06 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.21)	0.16 (0.22)	-0.32 (0.26)
Black	-0.24 (0.38)	0.50 (0.51)	0.33 (0.37)	0.29 (0.43)	0.02 (0.41)	0.54 (0.48)	-0.79* (0.37)	-0.59 (0.40)	-0.34 (0.37)	-0.11 (0.36)
Hispanic	0.16 (0.40)	0.72 (0.65)	0.66 (0.41)	0.80+ (0.45)	-0.06 (0.46)	-0.27 (0.40)	-0.26 (0.42)	-0.22 (0.41)	0.17 (0.43)	-0.40 (0.41)
Other	0.59 (0.53)	5.11** (1.21)	0.88+ (0.45)	0.63 (0.57)	0.66 (0.58)	0.76 (0.63)	1.70** (0.65)	-0.55 (0.66)	0.42 (0.49)	2.87** (1.01)
Constant	-2.08**	-3.44**	-1.34*	-2.68**	-3.83**	-1.66*	-2.90**	-1.42*	-1.92**	-2.59**

	(0.56)	(0.81)	(0.56)	(0.67)	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.54)	(0.58)	(0.68)	(0.60)
N	861	630	862	862	861	862	862	858	862	1112

Standard errors in parentheses

Results are weighted

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OA11. Wave 10 (October) Knowledge

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Senior Drugs	(4) Health Care	(5) Habeas Corpus	(6) Wiretaps	(7) Illegal Work Stay	(8) Path to Citizenship	(9) Iraq Deadline
Importance	0.24 (0.46)	0.71 (0.81)	-0.22 (0.62)	1.04 (0.68)	0.52 (0.54)	0.36 (0.59)	1.08 ⁺ (0.57)	0.53 (0.56)	-0.62 (0.50)
Extremity	0.26 (0.40)	-1.09 ⁺ (0.64)	-0.60 (0.48)	0.75 ⁺ (0.41)	0.33 (0.39)	0.17 (0.41)	-0.68 ⁺ (0.41)	0.14 (0.42)	0.49 (0.33)
Knowledge_t1	1.45 ^{**} (0.26)	2.79 ^{**} (0.48)	1.82 ^{**} (0.31)	1.67 ^{**} (0.30)	1.41 ^{**} (0.29)	1.16 ^{**} (0.28)	1.45 ^{**} (0.26)	1.31 ^{**} (0.27)	2.08 ^{**} (0.32)
Political Interest	0.83 (0.58)	0.70 (0.89)	1.04 ⁺ (0.62)	1.33 ⁺ (0.69)	1.56 [*] (0.68)	0.29 (0.59)	0.55 (0.60)	0.66 (0.66)	2.02 ^{**} (0.64)
General Political Knowledge	0.66 (0.63)	1.80 (1.12)	1.18 (0.82)	0.59 (0.68)	0.94 (0.66)	0.57 (0.69)	0.29 (0.63)	0.19 (0.66)	2.04 ^{**} (0.76)
TV News	-0.25 (0.46)	0.76 (0.95)	-0.38 (0.58)	-0.55 (0.61)	0.10 (0.46)	0.35 (0.44)	-0.39 (0.44)	-0.41 (0.45)	-0.80 (0.58)
Internet News	-0.14 (0.35)	0.28 (0.57)	-0.78 ⁺ (0.41)	-0.88 [*] (0.38)	-0.26 (0.35)	-0.17 (0.34)	0.58 ⁺ (0.34)	0.00 (0.36)	0.16 (0.44)
Newspaper News	0.54 (0.35)	1.17 [*] (0.57)	0.62 (0.47)	0.91 [*] (0.40)	-0.26 (0.37)	-0.65 ⁺ (0.36)	0.58 (0.40)	-0.16 (0.38)	0.00 (0.44)
Radio News	-0.11 (0.36)	-0.05 (0.62)	0.64 (0.40)	0.15 (0.43)	-0.36 (0.39)	0.37 (0.36)	0.34 (0.37)	0.66 ⁺ (0.37)	-0.67 (0.46)
PID Extremity	-0.24 (0.41)	0.06 (0.69)	0.98 [*] (0.48)	0.63 (0.47)	0.68 ⁺ (0.41)	0.86 [*] (0.41)	-0.43 (0.39)	0.19 (0.43)	1.10 [*] (0.44)
Ideological Extremity	0.97 [*] (0.42)	0.87 (0.73)	0.08 (0.43)	0.87 ⁺ (0.47)	-0.33 (0.40)	-0.01 (0.42)	0.83 [*] (0.41)	-0.01 (0.43)	0.29 (0.47)
Age	-1.61 [*] (0.77)	-3.07 [*] (1.48)	-0.66 (0.80)	-1.79 [*] (0.87)	-0.59 (0.90)	0.24 (0.76)	-0.80 (0.73)	-1.23 (0.83)	-0.17 (0.91)
Income	1.15 ⁺ (0.70)	0.93 (1.18)	0.35 (0.76)	1.73 [*] (0.76)	-0.09 (0.75)	0.98 (0.77)	0.61 (0.75)	-0.29 (0.72)	-0.36 (0.85)
Education	-0.37 (0.56)	0.87 (0.88)	-0.24 (0.59)	-0.01 (0.65)	1.03 ⁺ (0.60)	0.60 (0.58)	-0.19 (0.54)	0.83 (0.58)	1.46 [*] (0.64)
Female	0.50 ⁺ (0.28)	-0.12 (0.46)	0.16 (0.33)	-0.07 (0.29)	0.37 (0.28)	0.33 (0.28)	-0.13 (0.27)	0.19 (0.30)	-0.17 (0.33)
Black	0.95 [*] (0.48)	0.99 (0.68)	0.66 (0.65)	0.20 (0.59)	-0.05 (0.51)	-0.26 (0.54)	0.16 (0.48)	0.38 (0.52)	0.47 (0.48)
Hispanic	-0.14 (0.64)	0.22 (0.84)	0.59 (0.69)	0.76 (0.75)	0.38 (0.72)	0.69 (0.78)	-0.45 (0.64)	-0.52 (0.70)	1.39 [*] (0.63)
Other	0.75 (0.69)	0.00 (.)	0.66 (0.94)	-0.37 (0.54)	-0.67 (0.79)	-0.37 (0.63)	0.18 (0.74)	0.17 (0.58)	1.11 (1.01)
Constant	-2.28 ^{**} (0.76)	-2.93 ^{**} (1.07)	-1.70 ⁺ (1.02)	-3.18 ^{**} (0.97)	-3.16 ^{**} (0.88)	-3.32 ^{**} (0.85)	-1.97 ^{**} (0.74)	-1.61 ⁺ (0.83)	-2.55 ^{**} (0.85)

N	520	364	522	523	522	521	521	522	1050
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Standard errors in parentheses

Results are weighted

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OA12. Wave 11 (November) Knowledge

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Senior Drugs	(4) Health Care	(5) Habeas Corpus	(6) Wiretaps	(7) Illegal Work Stay	(8) Path to Citizenship	(9) Non Rich Taxes	(10) Iraq Deadline
Importance	1.38** (0.48)	0.53 (0.84)	0.65 (0.73)	0.35 (0.61)	-0.89 (0.62)	-0.61 (0.57)	1.47* (0.62)	0.59 (0.64)	0.58 (0.52)	-0.38 (0.52)
Extremity	-0.54 (0.42)	-0.28 (0.54)	-0.83 (0.55)	0.22 (0.40)	0.17 (0.40)	-0.17 (0.44)	-0.29 (0.47)	0.71 (0.50)	-0.31 (0.39)	0.88* (0.38)
Knowledge_t1	1.25** (0.27)	1.97** (0.40)	1.14** (0.31)	1.28** (0.32)	2.03** (0.30)	1.52** (0.28)	1.42** (0.27)	1.11** (0.26)	1.65** (0.20)	2.61** (0.34)
Political Interest	0.45 (0.60)	0.66 (0.98)	0.42 (0.66)	1.64* (0.70)	0.73 (0.68)	1.58** (0.59)	0.15 (0.61)	0.15 (0.67)	-0.22 (0.49)	1.94** (0.64)
General Political Knowledge	1.57* (0.73)	2.10* (0.87)	0.06 (0.68)	1.25+ (0.74)	1.46* (0.72)	0.93 (0.72)	-1.57* (0.69)	0.33 (0.64)	0.05 (0.45)	0.30 (0.68)
TV News	-0.50 (0.48)	-0.24 (0.68)	-0.64 (0.48)	0.22 (0.51)	0.25 (0.48)	-0.64 (0.49)	-1.87** (0.53)	-1.11* (0.46)	-0.56 (0.36)	-0.59 (0.50)
Internet News	-0.95** (0.34)	-0.24 (0.56)	0.09 (0.40)	-0.29 (0.42)	-0.81* (0.41)	-0.20 (0.37)	-0.04 (0.36)	0.23 (0.34)	0.16 (0.27)	0.32 (0.42)
Newspaper News	0.33 (0.37)	-0.16 (0.52)	0.20 (0.43)	0.14 (0.45)	0.42 (0.41)	-0.69+ (0.38)	1.20** (0.39)	0.47 (0.34)	0.02 (0.26)	0.25 (0.45)
Radio News	0.07 (0.36)	0.24 (0.68)	-0.22 (0.43)	0.42 (0.42)	-0.20 (0.39)	0.11 (0.39)	-0.02 (0.37)	0.13 (0.35)	-0.23 (0.28)	-0.13 (0.42)
PID Extremity	0.08 (0.43)	-0.11 (0.50)	0.25 (0.45)	0.38 (0.46)	0.50 (0.43)	0.13 (0.44)	-0.17 (0.42)	0.03 (0.41)	0.00 (0.30)	-0.59 (0.45)
Ideological Extremity	0.79+ (0.41)	0.22 (0.66)	0.72 (0.52)	0.32 (0.49)	0.34 (0.49)	0.11 (0.48)	-0.53 (0.47)	0.88+ (0.46)	-1.10** (0.32)	0.41 (0.44)
Age	-0.54 (0.72)	1.59 (0.99)	1.03 (0.90)	0.95 (0.80)	-0.52 (0.85)	0.89 (0.77)	0.01 (0.81)	0.42 (0.79)	0.17 (0.55)	1.95* (0.81)
Income	0.69 (0.72)	1.26 (0.99)	1.22 (0.79)	0.82 (0.87)	0.50 (0.82)	-0.19 (0.80)	-0.42 (0.77)	0.66 (0.79)	-0.62 (0.51)	0.81 (0.79)
Education	-0.25 (0.55)	0.32 (1.01)	0.80 (0.63)	1.08+ (0.64)	0.68 (0.62)	0.49 (0.57)	1.21* (0.56)	-0.74 (0.59)	0.53 (0.41)	0.68 (0.65)
Female	0.07 (0.28)	0.83* (0.40)	0.07 (0.32)	0.56+ (0.31)	-0.37 (0.29)	-0.13 (0.28)	0.38 (0.30)	0.09 (0.27)	-0.13 (0.20)	0.51+ (0.31)
Black	-0.75 (0.54)	-1.33* (0.56)	0.25 (0.63)	-0.16 (0.55)	0.07 (0.56)	-1.34* (0.55)	-0.74 (0.50)	0.50 (0.62)	-0.01 (0.41)	-0.25 (0.46)
Hispanic	-0.89 (0.70)	-1.15 (0.72)	-0.18 (0.62)	-0.78 (0.53)	0.24 (0.62)	-0.11 (0.54)	-1.17+ (0.62)	0.44 (0.62)	-0.12 (0.42)	-1.00* (0.49)
Other	0.27 (0.60)	-0.22 (0.87)	-0.91 (0.64)	-0.41 (0.71)	0.30 (0.58)	0.24 (0.53)	-1.70* (0.78)	0.56 (0.56)	-0.62 (0.55)	-0.38 (0.85)
Constant	-2.13* (0.48)	-3.14** (0.84)	-1.62 (0.73)	-4.72** (0.61)	-1.97* (0.62)	-1.43+ (0.57)	-0.60 (0.62)	-2.11** (0.64)	-0.21 (0.52)	-3.27** (0.52)

	(0.89)	(1.05)	(0.99)	(0.89)	(0.81)	(0.79)	(0.83)	(0.78)	(0.52)	(0.79)
N	511	514	509	512	511	510	512	509	1023	1028

Standard errors in parentheses

Results are weighted

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OA13. Fixed Effect Logit Results

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Senior Drugs	(4) Health Care	(5) Habeas Corpus	(6) Wiretaps	(7) Illegal Work Stay	(8) Path to Citizenship	(9) Iraq Deadline
Importance	-0.44 (0.68)	-1.17 (0.98)	0.23 (0.76)	1.48 ⁺ (0.84)	-0.28 (0.77)	-0.49 (0.63)	-1.21 ⁺ (0.65)	0.11 (0.64)	0.18 (0.54)
Extremity	0.30 (0.49)	0.60 (0.70)	0.59 (0.45)	0.03 (0.50)	-0.95* (0.47)	0.09 (0.44)	0.28 (0.47)	0.17 (0.46)	-0.22 (0.42)
Survey Wave=2	0.45 ⁺ (0.25)	1.04* (0.42)	0.32 (0.29)	-0.13 (0.31)	-0.71** (0.27)	-0.24 (0.25)	-0.33 (0.23)	-0.36 (0.26)	0.30 (0.25)
PID Extremity	0.07 (0.69)	0.17 (1.15)	-0.89 (0.73)	-1.00 (0.77)	-1.52 ⁺ (0.79)	0.87 (0.69)	-0.41 (0.73)	-0.42 (0.64)	-0.71 (0.69)
Ideological Extremity	0.10 (0.62)	-0.01 (0.76)	-1.10 ⁺ (0.57)	-0.94 (0.63)	-0.35 (0.63)	0.02 (0.51)	0.89 (0.60)	-0.11 (0.52)	0.22 (0.49)
Political Interest	0.31 (0.95)	-2.42 ⁺ (1.41)	1.13 (0.92)	0.57 (0.98)	-1.97 ⁺ (1.07)	-0.43 (0.80)	0.53 (0.78)	-0.06 (0.82)	0.94 (0.85)
TV News Exposure	-0.89 (0.77)	2.86* (1.17)	-0.08 (0.77)	1.37 ⁺ (0.82)	-0.59 (0.83)	-0.27 (0.72)	-0.25 (0.72)	0.90 (0.70)	0.88 (0.75)
Radio News Exposure	0.25 (0.59)	-1.59 (0.99)	-0.30 (0.59)	-1.36 ⁺ (0.78)	-1.11 ⁺ (0.67)	-0.62 (0.53)	0.16 (0.60)	-0.17 (0.56)	0.31 (0.48)
Internet News Exposure	1.08 ⁺ (0.60)	-0.66 (0.87)	-0.28 (0.63)	-2.21* (0.86)	0.60 (0.72)	0.81 (0.57)	0.24 (0.57)	-0.46 (0.55)	-1.04 ⁺ (0.60)
Print News Exposure	-1.25 (1.04)	-3.15* (1.59)	-0.37 (0.77)	-1.26 (0.82)	0.13 (0.67)	0.47 (0.76)	0.01 (0.69)	0.47 (0.68)	-0.60 (0.76)
Days Talk Politics	-0.28 (0.70)	2.20 ⁺ (1.13)	-0.26 (0.73)	-0.01 (0.81)	1.94* (0.88)	-0.24 (0.72)	-0.39 (0.70)	0.57 (0.66)	-1.07 (0.77)
Retrospective Econ Eval	-0.69 (0.84)	0.02 (1.34)	-0.25 (0.97)	0.80 (1.04)	-0.17 (0.98)	-0.36 (0.79)	-0.47 (0.79)	-1.04 (0.89)	-1.61 ⁺ (0.88)
Prospective Econ Eval	-0.46 (0.64)	0.96 (1.04)	0.28 (0.64)	0.89 (0.67)	0.74 (0.61)	0.67 (0.62)	0.65 (0.62)	-0.25 (0.56)	0.17 (0.68)
Observations	324	214	288	238	274	316	312	334	294

Standard errors in parentheses

Results are weighted

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Online Appendix B

In the conclusion to the manuscript we raised the possibility that importance would interact with general knowledge to predict candidate knowledge. To investigate this possibility we again stacked the data within each wave and predicted candidate knowledge based on subjective importance, general knowledge, issue fixed effects, and the full set of interactions between these variables (and, of course, the other control variables used in the original models).³ Figures OB1-OB4 plot the average marginal effect of importance across general knowledge by issue.

The general idea here is that importance might *motivate* attention, but that general knowledge is required to translate that attention, and the information acquired from it, into candidate knowledge. Supportive evidence for this claim would manifest in consistently *positive* interactions between the two variables. And, indeed, the occasional positive interaction does emerge in the Figures below. However, flat or even negative interactions are more common. There is thus scant evidence that general knowledge interacts with subjective importance to influence candidate knowledge.

³ General knowledge is a scale formed by averaging together six binary knowledge items (1=correct) measured in February 2008. The knowledge items pertain to general features of the US political system, e.g. the number of votes needed to override a veto, the length of a Senator's term in office, and Presidential succession.

Figure OB1: June 2008




Figure OB2: September 2008




Figure OB3: October 2008





Figure OB4: November 2008



Online Appendix C

In text we relied on data from the 2008-2009 ANES Panel. We focus on this panel for two reasons. First, it is a rare one in that it asks for individual's subjective issue importance at two different time points, which enable novel fixed-effect analyses. Second, and even more importantly, other ANES panels do not contain the relevant measures needed to explore subjective importance and candidate knowledge. The 1956-60 panel does not query respondents about subjective importance matters. The 1992-1996 Panel does ask respondents to indicate the subjective importance of some items, but only in the 1996 survey which obviates the advantages of using panel data. The 2000-2004 Panel survey asks respondents on the 2000 arm to rate the importance of several issues. Unfortunately, the candidate placement items that our knowledge measures are built on are asked on the pre-election wave of the ANES surveys and the 2000-2004 Panel participants only took part in the *post*-election wave of the 2004 ANES.

Omitted from the above is the 1972-1976 ANES Panel. This panel does indeed incorporate an assessment of subjective issue importance (in 1974) and candidate knowledge (in 1976). We discuss these measures here.

Respondents in 1974 were asked to indicate whether each of ten issues were important or not important to them and, then, rank the "important" issues in terms of their importance. The ten issues are: honesty in government; taxes; inflation; energy shortages; unemployment; U.S. relations with foreign countries; racial issues, including busing; combating crime and drugs; consumer protection; and pollution.

This way of asking about subjective importance deviates in two important aspects from how subjective importance is typically asked about on subsequent ANES surveys. First, individuals are *ranking* an issue based on its importance rather than *rating* it. This naturally leads to more variation in measured subjective importance relative to a rating measure where ratings may skew toward higher values across issues. Such a method could plausibly better differentiate between "truly" important issues and less important ones. Second, the issues here are more general than is typically the case. The typical process on subsequent ANES surveys (including the 2008-2009 ANES Panel) is to ask respondents for their attitude toward a more specific policy (e.g. a constitutional amendment to ban same sex marriages; whether spending on services should be increased or decreased; whether the government should provide a guaranteed job and standard of living, etc.); ask them to rate how important the issue is to them; and ask them to place the candidates on that same original scale. This more general method could plausibly attenuate some of the potential impact of importance on subsequent candidate knowledge.

Importance was measured in 1974. Candidate placements, and hence knowledge, was assessed in 1976 for the following policies with plausibly relevant importance policies in parentheses: whether the government should provide a guaranteed job and standard of living (unemployment); whether the rights of the accused should be protected or crime should be stopped regardless of their rights (combating crime); whether to use school busing to achieve integration or keep children in neighborhood schools ("racial issues, including school busing"); government aid to

minorities (also for “racial issues”); and whether tax rates should be increased for those with high income or kept the same for all (“taxes”).

Tables OC1-OC2 below provide regression results analogous to those offered in text. In each case we provide two models: one without control variables (other than issue fixed effects in the case of the stacked model) and one with control variables. The coefficient for importance in the stacked model is essentially zero and statistically insignificant in Table OC1. The subjective importance of racial issues does positively predict knowledge on the aid to minorities question in the bivariate model (Table OC2), but this effect turns null when controls are added. Importance is *negatively* predictive of knowledge on rights to the accused, meanwhile, even when controls are added and an insignificant predictor in the other three cases. The key result is thus the same: subjective importance does not consistently predict later knowledge.

Table OC1: ANES 74-76 Panel, Stacked Dataset Analysis

	(1) No Controls	(2) Controls
Issue Area Importance Rank	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Accused	-1.52** (0.09)	-1.70** (0.12)
Busing	-1.57** (0.09)	-1.65** (0.12)
Aid to Minorities	-0.70** (0.09)	-0.79** (0.12)
Tax Rate	-0.81** (0.08)	-0.86** (0.11)
Attitude Extremity (1974)		-0.07* (0.04)
Number of Issues Said "Important"		-0.06+ (0.03)
PID Extremity (1974)		0.12* (0.05)
Ideological Extremity (1974)		0.23** (0.06)
Follow Politics (1974)		0.22** (0.07)
Female		0.48** (0.12)
Non-White Respondent		1.31** (0.19)
Income (1976)		0.01 (0.01)
Education (1974)		0.18** (0.02)
Age		0.00 (0.00)
Constant	0.94** (0.11)	-1.20** (0.42)
Observations	4952	3650
Pseudo R^2	0.056	0.146

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OC2: ANES 74-76 Panel Analyses

	(1) Guaranteed Job	(2) Guaranteed Job	(3) Accused	(4) Accused	(5) Busing	(6) Busing	(7) Aid Minorities	(8) Aid Minorities	(9) Tax Rate	(10) Tax Rate
Importance of Unemployment	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)								
Importance of Combating Crime/Drugs			-0.06* (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)						
Importance of Racial Issues					0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)		
Importance of Taxes									-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)
Extremity		-0.03 (0.08)		-0.06 (0.08)		-0.18* (0.09)		0.01 (0.07)		-0.17* (0.07)
Number of Issues "Important"		-0.12+ (0.07)		-0.10+ (0.06)		-0.07 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.06)		-0.01 (0.06)
PID Extremity (1974)		0.16+ (0.09)		0.17+ (0.09)		0.09 (0.08)		0.15+ (0.09)		0.03 (0.09)
Ideological Extremity (1974)		0.25* (0.11)		0.24* (0.10)		0.42** (0.09)		0.15 (0.10)		0.11 (0.10)
Follow Politics (1974)		0.36** (0.11)		0.05 (0.11)		0.28** (0.10)		0.17 (0.11)		0.24* (0.11)
Female		0.23 (0.22)		0.63** (0.20)		0.57** (0.19)		0.72** (0.20)		0.19 (0.20)
Non-White Respondent		0.97** (0.36)		1.24** (0.30)		1.40** (0.29)		1.90** (0.36)		0.91** (0.33)
Income (1976)		0.00 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)		0.02 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)
Education (1974)		0.26** (0.04)		0.13** (0.04)		0.18** (0.04)		0.21** (0.04)		0.14** (0.04)
Age		0.00 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)		0.01* (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)
Constant	1.00** (0.18)	-1.74* (0.85)	-0.28+ (0.16)	-1.49* (0.75)	-0.67** (0.10)	-3.22** (0.72)	0.06 (0.10)	-2.88** (0.78)	0.20 (0.17)	-1.06 (0.79)
Observations	958	770	915	672	1130	856	953	707	996	645
Pseudo R ²	0.000	0.109	0.004	0.082	0.000	0.122	0.004	0.116	0.000	0.055

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Online Appendix D

One reason we may care about subjective importance is because it may augment the political behavior of citizens. In particular, importance could strengthen the role of issue considerations in voting behavior. Results on this front have been mixed as we discuss in-text, which we suggested may be related to importance's (lack of) relationship with candidate knowledge.

One question that may arise is whether issue voting is greater for those that know where the candidates stand on the issue. We can investigate this question with the Panel data.

We first calculated a relative proximity score for each issue. This score is calculated as follows: $|\text{Respondent W1 Issue Attitude} - \text{Mean Placement of Obama on Issue in Wave 11 by Highly Knowledgeable Respondents}| - |\text{Respondent W1 Issue Attitude} - \text{Mean Placement of McCain on Issue in Wave 11 by Highly Knowledgeable Respondents}|$. Higher values on this variable thus indicate greater proximity to John McCain. We use respondents Wave 1 issue attitudes to avoid the possibility that respondents are adopting the position of their favored candidate (Lenz 2012). We use mean placements of the candidate's issue positions, and particularly those for respondents who score in the top quintile of general political knowledge, to further bypass this issue, and the related one of projection, that would emerge if we were to instead use the individual's own placement of the candidate (Krosnick 1988). We use placements from the November wave under the assumption that these should be the most 'accurate' placements due to learning over the course of the campaign.

The dependent variable in our analyses is reported vote choice which takes on a value of 1 if the respondent reported voting for John McCain and 0 for Barack Obama. Table OD1 provides a first cut. Here we use logit models to predict vote choice using relative proximity (rescaled to range from 0 (min proximity to McCain) to 1 (max proximity)), whether the respondent correctly placed the two candidates on that issue in October, and their interaction. The coefficient for relative proximity is often, but not always, positive and in only one case positive and statistically significant (indicating the expected proximity effect emerged among those that did not correctly place the candidates). In all cases save two, meanwhile, a positive and significant interaction term emerges, meaning that proximity has a significantly more positive impact among those with knowledge than those without knowledge.

Table OD2 repeats this process but now adds demographic controls and controls for respondent partisanship, ideology, and economic evaluations. The inclusion of these latter three predictors perhaps naturally reduces the precision of the proximity interaction terms which remain positive in direction but only statistically significant in two instances.

Table OD1: Proximity and Knowledge Interactions, Bivariate Analyses

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Senior Drugs	(4) Health Care	(5) Habeas Corpus	(6) Wiretaps	(7) Illegal Work Stay	(8) Path to Citizenship	(9) Non Rich Taxes	(10) Iraq Deadline
Proximity	0.25 (0.31)	-0.48 (0.69)	-0.60 ⁺ (0.34)	0.68 (0.50)	0.15 (0.40)	0.58 (0.43)	0.60 ⁺ (0.32)	-0.10 (0.29)	0.12 (0.29)	0.20* (0.10)
Knowledge	-0.27 (0.29)	-1.37** (0.37)	-2.09** (0.23)	-0.77** (0.25)	-1.09** (0.32)	-0.31 (0.26)	-0.45 ⁺ (0.25)	-0.73 (0.45)	-0.80** (0.31)	-0.17 (0.37)
Interaction	1.42** (0.42)	2.54** (0.76)	1.12* (0.56)	1.72** (0.60)	2.55** (0.50)	0.80 (0.52)	1.23** (0.43)	1.36** (0.51)	1.65** (0.40)	0.15 (0.11)
Constant	-0.30 (0.21)	0.57 ⁺ (0.34)	0.83** (0.14)	0.26 (0.21)	-0.08 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.20)	0.01 (0.26)	-0.08 (0.23)	0.28 (0.35)
N	913	913	913	908	910	913	910	910	912	917

Standard errors in parentheses

Results are weighted

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ **Table OD2: Proximity and Knowledge Interactions, Bivariate Analyses**

	(1) SS	(2) Rich Taxes	(3) Senior Drugs	(4) Health Care	(5) Habeas Corpus	(6) Wiretaps	(7) Illegal Work Stay	(8) Path to Citizenship	(9) Non Rich Taxes	(10) Iraq Deadline
Proximity	0.49 (0.42)	-0.71 (1.16)	-0.79* (0.36)	0.38 (0.77)	-0.46 (0.54)	0.81 (0.62)	0.72 (0.48)	0.10 (0.39)	0.11 (0.36)	0.21 (0.18)
Knowledge	-0.10 (0.42)	-1.68* (0.69)	-1.74** (0.33)	-0.55 (0.34)	-0.60 (0.44)	-0.14 (0.34)	-0.45 (0.36)	0.58 (0.81)	-0.49 (0.39)	-1.09 ⁺ (0.66)
Interaction	0.37 (0.63)	1.63 (1.25)	0.72 (0.77)	0.67 (0.91)	1.69* (0.69)	0.23 (0.72)	0.22 (0.61)	-0.00 (0.90)	1.50* (0.59)	0.02 (0.19)
PID	3.77** (0.51)	3.89** (0.48)	3.73** (0.51)	3.67** (0.51)	3.68** (0.52)	3.83** (0.53)	3.92** (0.53)	3.77** (0.49)	3.83** (0.49)	3.42** (0.50)
Ideology	2.73** (0.50)	2.72** (0.54)	2.86** (0.54)	2.91** (0.54)	2.84** (0.54)	2.91** (0.53)	2.72** (0.56)	3.00** (0.50)	2.78** (0.49)	2.99** (0.55)
Retrospective Economic Eval	3.10** (0.68)	2.85** (0.74)	3.36** (0.69)	3.09** (0.70)	2.91** (0.66)	3.16** (0.70)	3.09** (0.71)	3.21** (0.68)	2.84** (0.66)	2.86** (0.70)
Prospective Economic Eval	0.38 (0.69)	0.09 (0.66)	0.03 (0.72)	0.26 (0.66)	0.32 (0.70)	0.31 (0.67)	0.28 (0.71)	0.38 (0.67)	0.55 (0.72)	0.28 (0.64)
Age	0.84 (0.60)	1.21* (0.61)	0.71 (0.66)	0.83 (0.60)	0.79 (0.64)	1.12 ⁺ (0.65)	0.94 (0.60)	1.14 ⁺ (0.61)	0.79 (0.62)	0.91 (0.59)
Income	0.21 (0.57)	-0.06 (0.59)	-0.24 (0.58)	-0.04 (0.61)	-0.28 (0.60)	0.23 (0.61)	0.03 (0.59)	0.18 (0.63)	0.46 (0.60)	0.66 (0.71)
Female	0.14 (0.28)	0.12 (0.29)	0.11 (0.32)	0.04 (0.29)	0.21 (0.29)	0.18 (0.28)	0.02 h(0.29)	0.15 (0.27)	0.34 (0.28)	0.34 (0.33)

Black	-2.50** (0.79)	-2.65** (0.81)	-2.49* (1.18)	-2.31* (0.92)	-2.38** (0.82)	-2.37** (0.74)	-2.38** (0.74)	-2.35** (0.75)	-2.40** (0.76)	-2.27* (0.97)
Hispanic	-1.33* (0.57)	-1.39+ (0.72)	-1.40* (0.60)	-1.14* (0.54)	-1.42** (0.53)	-1.27* (0.64)	-1.21* (0.59)	-1.30* (0.63)	-1.15+ (0.62)	-0.96+ (0.53)
Other	-1.65* (0.72)	-1.45+ (0.76)	-1.57* (0.74)	-1.69* (0.73)	-1.38+ (0.75)	-1.46+ (0.75)	-1.48* (0.69)	-1.54* (0.75)	-2.00* (0.81)	-1.43* (0.68)
Constant	-4.78** (0.90)	-3.19** (1.18)	-3.30** (0.90)	-4.06** (0.83)	-4.07** (0.88)	-4.98** (0.97)	-4.49** (0.96)	-5.10** (1.00)	-5.07** (0.79)	-3.82** (0.97)
N	903	905	905	900	901	903	902	900	902	903

Standard errors in parentheses

Results are weighted

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$