

Who Should Get a Say? Race, Law Enforcement Guidelines, and Systems of Representation

Forthcoming at *Political Psychology*

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Abstract: Most citizens agree that legislators should reflect their constituencies' stances. Yet constituents rarely speak in a single voice. Instead, constituents often vary not only in their policy preferences, but also in the degree to which a given policy impacts their lives. Politicians thus at times pursue targeted representation, offering increased input to especially-affected groups. As efforts to address anti-Black police misconduct make clear, such measures can protect vulnerable minority groups – but they may also be perceived to sideline the less-affected majority. We fielded two national survey experiments to investigate how Americans respond when legislators give more attention to some citizens than others. Results suggest that members of targeted groups react more positively on average than non-members, and that reactions among non-members are strongly driven by racial resentment. The impact of racial resentment is largely unaffected by the race and partisanship of the politician proposing the measure, but it is exacerbated in cases of a clear preference conflict between the African-American community and the broader constituency.

Key words: representation; racial resentment; police misconduct; legitimacy; equality; democratic norms

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Elected officials need to balance a variety of representational roles (Eulau & Karps, 1977). Citizens may expect them to reflect their constituents' political stances, provide constituency services, ensure material benefits for the district, or offer symbolic gestures to maintain a positive political dynamic (Griffin & Flavin, 2011; Harden, 2016; Lapinski, Levendusky, Winneg, & Jamieson, 2016). They may prefer representatives who follow their own consciences – acting as trustees – or who follow constituent preferences – acting as mandates (Carman, 2007; Mansbridge, 2003). While this multiplicity of roles surely complicates the task of representation, it also provides strategic officials with the ability to cater their representational style to constituency desires (Grimmer, 2013; Harden, 2016).

Studying public conceptions of “good” representation is crucial for understanding voter decision making and the strategic incentives facing elected officials. Questions of representational “style”, however, obscure a second aspect of representation: the segment of the constituency being targeted for representation (Bengtsson & Wass, 2010; Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan, & Ferguson, 1959). Research on the demand side of representation focuses on the representational goods that officials deliver to constituencies as a whole. Yet, as elected officials are well aware, constituencies rarely if ever speak in a single voice (Fenno, 1978). Instead, constituents often vary not only in their policy preferences, but also in the degree to which a given policy impacts their lives, which in turn impacts the likelihood that they will hold legislators accountable for policies (Campbell, 2003). Elected officials may thus be confronted with the choice of equally weighting constituent preferences or, alternatively, granting greater weight to more affected constituents.

Policing reform offers one clear illustration of why legislators may be motivated to engage in what we call “targeted representation”. African Americans are far more likely than

other citizens to have negative interactions with the police (Baumgartner, Epp, & Shoub, 2018; Jones, 2017). Various community oversight measures have been proposed to address this longstanding problem, with a recent surge in attention thanks to Black Lives Matters' 'Campaign Zero' initiative (Bayley, 2008; Sklansky, 2005; Walker, 2016). One recent and highly salient example was the creation of a civilian police board by Mayor Pete Buttigieg of South Bend, Indiana. While South Bend is majority White, African Americans comprise a majority of the board, which has been granted the power to "make all the decisions in police discipline" (Baptiste, 2019). These sorts of efforts can provide an important conduit for constituents who are particularly affected by a policy area to gain greater control over policy – but they may prove controversial if other (less-affected) constituents oppose the gesture.

How should we expect people to respond to public efforts at targeted representation? We investigate this question by examining reactions to proposals offering the African American community extra input to address police misconduct. We argue that reactions will be powerfully driven by one's relationship to the group being targeted (here, African Americans). We hypothesize that the target group will support the measure more than non-members, while non-members will polarize based on prior attitudes toward the targeted group. Given that the opinions of non-members are essential for the political acceptability of targeted representation, our study then further unpacks non-member reactions by looking at potential moderating factors. We argue that polarization among non-members should be most apparent when the politician proposing the measure is themselves a member of the targeted group, when the politician is from the opposing partisan camp, and when the target group's preference differs from that of other constituents.

To investigate our claims, we fielded two survey experiments (one pre-registered) of the US public. In the first experiment, we randomly varied whether or not a politician engaged in

targeted representation of African Americans, as well as two group attributes of the politician (race and partisanship). In the second experiment, we again manipulated targeted representation and the race of the politician, but we also randomly varied information about the reform that resulted from the consultation to address the potential impact of policy outcomes. Respondents were informed that the preferences reflected in the reform – whether of the local African-American community or the broader constituency – either conflicted or were consonant with one another.

Ultimately, we find support for our core claims that targeted individuals react more positively on average than the non-targeted and that reactions among the latter group are predominantly driven by racial resentment. We find mixed evidence regarding the conditions that might moderate this effect. While non-targeted individuals (i.e. non-African Americans) were generally unaffected by the race and partisanship of the politician involved, they were much more responsive to information concerning the policy implications of targeted representation. Incongruent preferences between the African-American community and the broader constituency played a key role here, increasing the effect of racial resentment and broadly worsening reactions to targeted representation.

Overall, our results suggest that people do not respond to targeted representation in a “principled” manner, as we find scant evidence of a generalized norm either for or against it. Instead, reactions are profoundly shaped by group dynamics: namely, membership in the targeted group, prior attitudes toward the targeted group, and inter-group conflict in policy preferences. Our findings are thus in line with literature suggesting that commitments to democratic ideals and principles are often readily sacrificed in the real world, where group-related considerations

tend to take the upper hand (Harbridge, Malhotra, & Harrison, 2014; Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1983).

Constituency Heterogeneity and Targeted Representation

How should we expect members of the public to react to instances of targeted representation? Research on the demand-side of representation offers a useful starting point for answering this question, as it reveals how individuals weigh different styles of representation. These studies suggest that the public prefers legislators who respond to constituency preferences over those who focus on constituency services or the preferences of other actors (Bengtsson & Wass, 2011; Carman, 2007; Doherty, 2013; Griffin & Flavin, 2011; Harden, 2016; Lapinski et al., 2016; Wolak, 2017). However, this work cannot tell us whether, and under what circumstances, *targeted* representation is viewed more or less favorably than broader constituency representation, as it focuses exclusively on the latter.

We expect that individuals will respond to targeted representation based on two (non-exclusive) considerations: beliefs about the policy implications of targeted representation and beliefs about whether targeted representation represents an *unfair* procedure for generating policy. Various studies show that people evaluate candidates, elected officials, democratic procedures, and even direct citizen involvement in a more favorable light when policy outputs align with the individual's predispositions (Ansolabehere & Jones, 2010; Esaisson, Gilljam, & Persson, 2017; Skitka, Winqvist, & Hutchinson, 2003; Werner, n.d.). Likewise, other studies show that individuals form attitudes toward elected officials and decisions based on their beliefs about the fairness of the procedures used to generate them (Bøggild, 2016; Gangl, 2003; Hibbing & Alford, 2004). Targeted representation is thus more likely to be deemed acceptable by those who believe that it benefits them (e.g. materially or symbolically) and/or that it improves the

decision-making procedure itself (e.g. by correcting existing inequities in democratic procedures).

We expect that the group being targeted for targeted representation will be a powerful influence on the inferences people make on these two fronts. On the one hand, social groups figure prominently in accounts of political attitude formation as a way for an “ideologically innocent” citizenry to nevertheless draw inferences about the implications of policy proposals (Conover, 1988; Converse, 1964; Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Nicholson, 2011). On the other, beliefs about social groups often include considerations of deservingness (Gilens, 1999; Walsh, 2012). The group involved may thus influence beliefs about whether targeted representation involves an unfair deviation from democratic norms or is instead a necessary corrective to an unfair status quo.

Our two baseline hypotheses build upon this group-centric understanding of political evaluations by considering the disparate reactions of those who belong to the group being targeted and those who do not. First, we expect that reactions will be more positive on average among the targeted than the non-targeted. Hearing that a politician is paying special attention to your group may signal that your own views are more likely to be heard in policy-making forums than would otherwise be the case. Similarly, it may also indicate that the resulting policy will be more likely to match your predispositions than if all constituents were treated equally, especially in cases where minority subgroups would otherwise be trumped by the majority (Bochsler & Hänni, 2017; Brighthouse & Fleurbaey, 2010).

For those outside of the target group, by contrast, we expect to find much greater variation. While some of these individuals may infer that targeted representation will offer improvements over broader constituency representation, others may be left indifferent or draw

the opposite inferences, perhaps even generating politically meaningful ‘backlash’ effects (Hersh & Schaffner, 2013). Our starting point is that a key dividing line for non-members should be attitudes toward the targeted group, as these will (1) subconsciously bias the “gut reactions” generated by targeted representation and (2) consequently push reasoning efforts towards inferences and evaluations that are consistent with initial reactions (Lodge & Taber, 2013). Thus, individuals with positive (negative) attitudes toward the targeted group will likely draw positive (negative) inferences about the policy and procedural implications of targeted representation, thereby generating positive (negative) overall reactions.

H1: Targeted representation will elicit more positive reactions among members of the targeted group than among non-members, all else being equal

H2: Reactions by non-members will be moderated by attitudes toward the targeted group (e.g. more positive prior attitudes will be associated with more positive evaluations), all else being equal

Moderating Conditions

On average, we expect that the target group will react more positively than non-members, while non-members will polarize based on prior attitudes toward the targeted group. Yet it is likely that other factors will influence reactions as well. Our focus here is on non-members since their responses will be the most likely driver of any potential electoral consequences (given that targeted representation generally involves the representation of a numerical minority). Additional elements of targeted representation may either reassure non-members negatively pre-disposed to targeted representation or alternatively lead those positively predisposed to question their positive gut reaction. We consider three potential moderating conditions: (1) the politician’s group identity; (2) the politician’s partisan identity; and (3) whether the preferences of the targeted group and the broader constituency conflict or overlap.

Efforts at targeted representation may originate from politicians who are themselves a member of the targeted group. Indeed, such politicians may be especially motivated to pay attention to fellow group members (Broockman, 2013). However, it is plausible that reactions will be more positive when a *non*-member is proposing it, particularly for individuals predisposed to respond negatively (e.g. those with negative attitudes toward the targeted group). These individuals may be “reassured” when a politician outside of the targeted group is involved, insofar as it signals that policymaking procedures and resultant policies will not be dominated by the views of the disliked group. A politician offering targeted representation to their own group, by contrast, could raise further worries of bias in resulting policies due to fears of “pandering” (Goldman, 2017; Hill, 2009).

H3: Targeted representation proposed by a politician who is a member of the targeted group will elicit more negative (positive) reactions among non-members with negative (positive) prior attitudes, all else equal

Our second moderating condition concerns another politically salient identity marker: partisanship. Party cues provide additional information about the policy implications of a reform (Petersen, Slothuus, & Togeby, 2010; Sniderman & Stiglitz, 2012) while also activating group-serving motivations (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015; Leeper & Slothuus, 2014). Reflecting the same logic highlighted above, we expect that non-members who are otherwise negatively predisposed to targeted representation should be somewhat reassured when a co-partisan is involved, leading them to react less negatively than they otherwise would. Conversely, those positively pre-disposed to targeted representation are likely to feel less assured of a favorable outcome when a politician from the “other side” is involved and should therefore react less positively than they otherwise would.

H4: Non-members with negative (positive) prior attitudes will react less negatively (positively) to targeted representation when it comes from a co-partisan (opposing partisan), all else equal

Finally, we consider the (dis)alignment between the policy preferences of the targeted group and the broader constituency. Targeted representation could plausibly involve cases where the preference of the targeted group either conflicts or aligns with the average constituency opinion. The acceptability of the resultant policy to the broader community should matter for two reasons. First, overlapping preferences between the majority and the targeted sub-constituency may shift assumptions about whether one would personally agree with the policy (Esaïsson, Persson, Gilljam, & Lindholm, n.d.). Second, the perceived representativeness of the consultation and the legitimacy of the policy outcome may increase where targeted representation results in a policy that also enjoys majority support (Bøggild & Petersen, 2016). Taking these points together suggests that (in)congruence may moderate polarization based on prior attitudes toward the group: congruence may improve reactions among the negatively predisposed by generating assumptions of a fairer process and a more desirable outcome, whereas incongruence may worsen reactions among the positively predisposed by drawing attention to problems of procedural unfairness.

H5: Non-members with positive (negative) attitudes toward the targeted group will react more (less) negatively to targeted representation when constituency opinion is incongruent (congruent) with the preferences of the targeted group, all else equal

Study 1

We examine Hypotheses 1-4 in Study 1. We recruited a national sample of American adults via Qualtrics' online panel in July 2018, with quotas on age and gender to ensure representativeness on these variables (relative to census data). Our sample comprises 2250

Table 1: Sample Characteristics: Race, Partisanship, and Racial Resentment

	Study Number	
	1 (n=2250)	2 (n=2299)
Race		
Asian	53 (2.4%)	81 (3.5%)
Black	251 (11.2%)	284 (12.4%)
Hispanic/Latino	129 (5.7%)	145 (6.3%)
Other	137 (6.1%)	89 (3.9%)
Prefer not to say	0 (0%)	26 (1.1%)
White	1680 (74.7%)	1674 (72.8%)
Partisan ID		
Democrat	951 (42.3%)	1020 (44.4%)
Independent	393 (17.5%)	405 (17.6%)
Republican	906 (40.3%)	874 (38.0%)
Partisan Strength		
Independent	393 (17.5%)	405 (17.6%)
Lean	353 (15.7%)	334 (14.5%)
Not Strong	628 (27.9%)	574 (25.0%)
Strong Partisan	876 (38.9%)	986 (42.9%)
Racial Resentment		
Mean	3.17	3.10
Standard Deviation	1.05	1.12

Notes: Additional sample statistics are provided in Tables OA1 (Study 1) and OD1 (Study 2)

respondents and, as Table OA1 demonstrates, is broadly reflective of the American mass public in terms of its demographic and political characteristics. Table 1, in turn, provides descriptive statistics concerning the sample's racial and partisan characteristics.

Respondents read a vignette describing a politician's proposal to address police misconduct in his local community, described in such a way as to broadly reflect the national contours of the problem. The vignette always began as follows:

Imagine a city called Everytown, USA. Black people in Everytown make up about 13% of the population, but they are disproportionately more likely to have negative interactions with the local police. These

interactions range from more frequent traffic stops to higher rates of being killed by the police.

The remainder of the text featured three randomized elements: Targeted Representation (Non-Targeted/Targeted), Politician Race (African American/White) and Politician Partisanship (Democrat/Republican). We followed previous work by randomizing the politician's race via his name, with respondents reading either about a politician named DeShawn Jackson or Jake Mueller (Broockman & Butler, 2017). The partisanship manipulation is straightforward: the politician was described as either a Republican or a Democrat.

The targeted representation treatment, meanwhile, varied the group of consulted constituents. In the Non-Targeted treatment, the politician focuses on the community as a whole:

[DeShawn Jackson/Jake Mueller], a local [Republican/Democratic] politician, has a proposal he thinks could help: he wants to work together with local residents to develop new police guidelines. [DeShawn/Jake] feels that it would be wrong to draw up new guidelines without getting input from the town's population as a whole. Even though that means the local black population might end up not agreeing with the final policy, for [DeShawn/Jake], "black residents shouldn't get more of a say just because they're the ones most affected by the issue." To put his proposal into action, [DeShawn/Jake] has recently held a town hall meeting with community leaders and everyday residents from the local community.

The politician in the Non-Targeted treatment advances a conception of public input that prioritizes district-level representation – i.e., each member of the community is offered an equal opportunity to provide input. The politician in the Targeted treatment, by contrast, prioritizes the African-American community. Consequently, the politician is described as obtaining input from the "town's black population" and that, while this "means that the local population as a whole

might end up not agreeing with the final policy”, the politician nevertheless believes that “black residents should get more of a say since they’re the ones most affected by the issue”.

We asked respondents three questions to assess their reactions to the vignettes. Respondents indicated their level of support for the proposal and their attitude toward the politician on a 0 (completely disagree / strongly oppose) to 10 (completely agree / strongly support) scale. They also indicated whether they thought the politician would be “very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not very helpful to you” if they “had a problem that [the politician] could do something about” (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1984). Our dependent variable is an index formed from all three indicators ($M=0$, $SD=1$), as exploratory factor analysis revealed these items strongly load onto a single dimension (Eigenvalue = 2.35; proportion of variance explained: 0.78; factor loadings range from 0.82 [candidate helpfulness] to 0.93 [candidate support]). Tables OA2-OA4 provide summary statistics for the index and its constitutive items. We analyze the three items individually in Online Appendix OB and find substantially similar results, as would be expected based on their strong inter-relationship.


Our hypotheses require three moderating variables. First, we compare members of the targeted group (African Americans) with non-members (everybody else) using responses to a racial self-identification item. In Online Appendix OC we consider the consequences of combining White and all other *non-Black* respondents and find substantially the same pattern of results among both groups. Second, we measured attitudes toward African Americans prior to the experiment using three standard racial resentment measures: “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve”; “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice...Blacks should do the same”; and “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class”.

These items were separated from the experiment via another experiment on a separate topic. We averaged responses together to form an index, which we rescaled to range from 0-1 (alpha = 0.73). Finally, partisanship was recorded on the post-test via the standard ANES branching format. Below we contrast responses from pure Independents with those from respondents who read a vignette involving a co-partisan legislator (e.g. Democratic respondents, including leaners, reading about a Democratic politician) or an opposing partisan (e.g. Democrats reading about a Republican).

Results

We argued in Hypothesis 1 that individuals in the targeted group would react more positively on average than non-members. We estimated three regression models to test this claim. We first regressed respondent evaluations on respondent race, whether they were assigned to the targeted representation condition, and the interaction of these two variables (while controlling for the other experimental factors). We then separately regressed Black and non-Black respondent evaluations on all three experimental factors and the full set of interactions between them. The results of these models can be found in Appendix Table A1. Figure 1 plots the average marginal effect of being assigned to the Targeted Representation condition broken down by respondent race to facilitate the interpretation of these interaction models. The top sub-graph in Figure 1 stems from the first model, which only controls for the other experimental conditions, while the bottom two sub-graphs are based on the three-way interaction models where the effect of targeted representation is allowed to vary across all of the conditions.

The results reported in Figure 1 are consistent with H1. Black respondents reported statistically and substantially more positive evaluations in the targeted representation treatment than in the non-targeted condition, with effect sizes of approximately 0.6 to 0.8 standard

Figure 1: Reactions to Targeted Representation, Study 1

Notes: Markers provide the average marginal effect of the targeted representation treatment with 95% confidence intervals. The model for the “Controlling for Politician Identity” sub-graph includes controls for politician race and partisanship. Full model results can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.

deviations on the evaluation measure. The effect of the targeted representation treatment among non-Black respondents, on the other hand, is never statistically significant. Meanwhile, the interaction between respondent race and targeted representation is statistically significant across all variations of politician race and partisanship (see Tables A1 and OA6). We thus find clear and consistent evidence in favor of H1, with targeted representation eliciting more positive reactions within the target group than outside of it.


We now turn to H2, where we argued that reactions to targeted representation among non-group members would be shaped by respondent attitudes toward the targeted group. To investigate this hypothesis, we took the non-Black subsample and regressed respondent evaluations on assignment to the targeted representation condition, racial resentment, their

interaction, and controls for the politician's race and partisanship. Model 4 in Table A1 provides the results for this regression, while Panel A in Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of the consultation treatment by level of resentment. Here we see clear evidence in support of H2: non-targeted respondents with low levels of racial resentment reported substantially more positive evaluations when the politician targeted African Americans than not, while the inverse occurs for respondents with high levels of racial resentment. The difference in reactions is substantial; respondents at the maximum level of racial resentment reported post-test evaluations approximately 2 standard deviations more negative than those at the minimum (difference: -2.14 [-2.44, -1.85]).

We next turn to the potential moderating conditions. In H3, we argued that non-members with negative attitudes toward African Americans would be more positively disposed toward targeted representation when a non-African-American politician was involved. We investigate H3 by regressing respondent evaluations on the representation treatment, politician race, racial resentment, and the full set of interactions between them (while still controlling for politician partisanship; see Model 5 in Appendix Table A1).³ Panel B in Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of the consultation treatment by resentment, with results separated by politician race. While evaluations were modestly less positive for a Black politician offering targeted representation than for a White politician, the three way-interaction between these variables is not statistically significant ($p=0.59$). We thus see little evidence in support of H3.

³ Figure 1 also offers some indirect evidence on this matter. The coefficient for targeted representation is numerically larger when paired with a White politician for non-Black respondents. However, the effect of targeted representation is not statistically significantly different when paired with a White rather than Black politician for non-Black respondents. The results of Wald tests comparing the equivalence of coefficients, within party treatment, in Figure 1 are: $F_{\text{Republican}}=1.09$, $p=0.30$, $F_{\text{Democrat}}=1.54$, $p=0.21$.

Figure 2: Reactions to Targeted Representation by Racial Resentment, Politician Race, and Politician Partisanship



Notes: Markers provide the average marginal effect of the targeted representation treatment with 95% confidence intervals. Full model results can be found in Table A1. All models focus only on non-Black respondents. Points/lines are horizontally offset in Panels B and C for legibility.

The final moderating condition we consider in Study 1 is partisanship. We argued in H4 that politician partisanship might either reassure racially resentful respondents or alternatively undermine positive reactions among the less resentful. We tested H4 by regressing respondent evaluations on an indicator for targeted representation, politician co-partisanship, racial resentment, and their interactions (while controlling for politician race). Panel C plots the results of the three-way interaction by showing the marginal effect of targeted representation by racial resentment (on the x-axis) separately for the three partisan groups (see Model 6 in Appendix

Table A1). Ultimately, Panel C shows little evidence that partisans followed the expected pattern. The effect of targeted representation among those at the maximum of resentment is approximately the same when the politician is a co-partisan ($b = -0.89 [-1.13, -0.65]$) as when he is an opposing partisan ($-0.92 [-1.17, -0.68]$). And, while targeted representation did have a greater positive impact among those at the minimum of resentment when the politician was a co-partisan ($1.42 [1.13, 1.71]$) rather than an opposing partisan ($1.15 [0.84, 1.46]$), this difference is not statistically significant ($F = 1.56, p = 0.21$). Thus, partisanship did not have the expected effect of either reassuring or undermining reactions.

Discussion

The results of Study 1 suggest that public reactions to targeted representation varies based on group membership and prior attitudes. This appears to be the case regardless of two politically relevant moderating conditions: the race and partisanship of the politician. However, Study 1 possesses some limitations that we seek to address in a second experiment. First, the vignette focused purely on a consultation, setting aside references to the policy outcome of that process. Consequently, respondents likely differed in their assumptions about how far targeted representation would shift policy away from the preferences of the broader constituency. This shortcoming raises theoretical problems as well: soliciting increased input from certain groups may or may not coincide with their having actual policy influence (Ulbig, 2008), and citizens may consider targeted consultations less problematic than targeted policy influence.

Second, the politician in our experiment explicitly suggests that African Americans will benefit from targeted representation, which compromises the neutrality of the baseline treatment and may have increased the impact of group considerations. Importantly, this language implies that our experiment compares two counterfactuals involving conflicting preferences between

local African Americans and the broader constituency: in the non-targeted condition, the politician explicitly paints the consultation as one that might disfavor African Americans, whereas in the targeted condition he suggests that the African-American community may win out over the broader community. These counterfactuals may well be the most politically relevant ones when it comes to law enforcement reforms given racial polarization on the issue (Fingerhut, 2017; Nadal, Davidoff, Allicock, Serpe, & Erazo, 2017). However, this setup prevents us from assessing whether targeted representation also polarizes reactions in situations where preferences are not as neatly divided.

Study 2

We fielded a second pre-registered survey experiment to replicate Study 1 while also addressing our final moderating condition and the potential issues identified above.⁴ Study 2 was fielded in November 2019 with a sample of 2299 American adults recruited via Qualtrics' panel using quotas on age, region, and gender to reflect census data. Once again, the resulting sample is broadly representative of the American public (see Table 1 for sample partisan and racial characteristics, as well as Table OD1 in the Supplementary Materials).

Respondents read a vignette describing efforts to address police misconduct with three elements randomly manipulated: Targeted Representation (Non-Targeted/Targeted), Politician Race (African American/White), and Preference Congruence (No Information/Congruent/Incongruent). The vignette began with the same introductory paragraph used in Study 1. Respondents then read the following text with two of the manipulations (targeted representation and politician race) indicated by brackets.

⁴ Our pre-registration form can be accessed here:
https://osf.io/mgka4/?view_only=21f7f190c0a6424ca601642007126fe8

[Jake Mueller/DeShawn Jackson], a local politician, has a proposal he thinks could help: he wants to work together with [local/local Black] residents to develop new police guidelines. To that end, he holds a town hall meeting with community leaders and everyday residents from the [local/Black] community.

In the wake of this initiative, city officials decide to adopt new police guidelines in line with the preferences expressed by the [local/Black] community members who attended [Jake's/DeShawn's] meeting.

The text of the vignette is similar to Study 1, but differs in three key aspects. First, we removed language suggesting that non-targeted representation could lead to outcomes at odds with the preferences of the African-American community. Second, we refrain from mentioning the partisanship of the politician in order to obtain enough power to investigate the impact of policy congruence. Finally, the text includes a new final paragraph discussing the policy consequences of the proposal.

The first version of this paragraph is shown above and informs respondents that the politician's proposal led to a reform reflecting the preferences of those who attended the meeting.⁵ The second version includes an additional sentence indicating that the preferences of those who attended the meeting (either "local" or "local Black" residents) were congruent with the alternative group's preferences. Thus, this sentence read as follows in the *targeted representation* condition: "Most other residents are also happy with the final policy, as they feel it broadly reflects what they wanted anyways". The final version of this treatment, meanwhile, states that preferences were *incongruent* between these two groups. Respondents in the targeted

⁵ This wording choice has a potentially important implication for our analyses, as evaluations of the proposal and politician in the Non-Targeted/No Information condition are substantially more positive than those in Study 1 concerning the Non-Targeted condition (see Table OD2). In Study 1, the mean ratings on the items tapping proposal agreement and candidate support in the Non-Targeted conditions were 5.47 [5.30, 5.63] and 5.20 [5.04, 5.37]. In Study 2, evaluations in the Non-Targeted/No Info conditions are over a full-scale point more positive (Agree proposal: 6.80 [6.53, 7.08]; Candidate support: 6.51 [6.24, 6.78]). This makes the comparison below more conservative.


representation condition, for example, read: “Most other residents, however, are disappointed with the final policy, as they feel it doesn’t reflect what they wanted”.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the proposal and politician on two separate items ranging from 0-10 using the same wording as in Study 1. As these two items are substantially correlated ($r=0.76$), our dependent variable is an index formed by averaging and then standardizing the resulting scale ($M=0$, $SD=1$). In Online Appendix E we analyze both items separately, finding the same patterns that emerge below. We assessed our key moderators (racial resentment and racial self-identification) in the same manner employed in Study 1, with the three resentment items again forming a reliable scale ($\alpha = 0.74$). Finally, in Online Appendix F we separately analyze White and all other non-Black respondents. Results are similar across the two groups, with one exception: racial resentment shaped how non-White respondents reacted to the White politician but had no similar effect among White respondents.

Results

Our first hypothesis holds that members of the targeted group should react more positively than non-members. As before we performed three regressions: (1) one where we regressed evaluations on respondent race, targeted representation, their interaction, and controls for other experimental factors; and (2) two where we interact all experimental factors separately for Black and non-Black respondents. Models 1-3 in Table A2 present these results, while Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of targeted representation.


Figure 3 provides further support for H1, although with some important variation. First, Black respondents reacted more positively on average to targeted representation than did non-Black respondents, as indicated by the significant interaction between respondent race and targeted representation in Model 1 in Table OA2 ($p<0.05$). Much as in Study 1, this took the form of a significant positive effect of targeted representation among Black respondents ($b=0.32$

Figure 3: Reactions to Targeted Representation, Study 2

Notes: Markers provide the average marginal effect of the targeted representation treatment with 95% confidence intervals. Full model results can be found Table A2.

[0.09, 0.55]) and a non-significant one across the rest of the sample ($b=0.003$ [-0.08, 0.09]). As the remainder of Figure 3 shows, however, Black respondents did not react equally positively to all versions of the vignette. Instead, positive reactions by Black respondents were primarily a response to targeted representation in the “Incongruent” condition (i.e. contrasting a scenario where non-targeted representation lead to African-American discontent with the policy against a scenario where targeted representation yielded a victory for the local African-American community over the broader constituency). Members of the targeted group are thus positively disposed to targeted representation when it represents a promise of better policy for the group.

We argued in H2 that the reactions of those outside of the target group would depend on their attitudes toward the targeted group. We again find support for this effect as seen in Panel A in Figure 4 (see Model 4 in Appendix Table A2). Targeted representation has a significant

Figure 4: Targeted Representation by Racial Resentment and Politician Race, Study 2

Notes: Markers provide the average marginal effect of the targeted representation treatment with 95% confidence intervals. Full model results can be found in Table A2. All models focus only on non-Black respondents. Points/lines are horizontally offset in Panel B for legibility.


positive effect on evaluations for those at the minimum of racial resentment ($b=0.21$ [0.02, 0.40]), but a negative one for those at the maximum (-0.17 [-0.33, -0.01]). The interaction between racial resentment and targeted representation, meanwhile, is negative and statistically significant ($p<0.05$). Thus, once more, we see no evidence of a broad backlash effect among the non-targeted, but rather polarization based on attitudes toward the targeted group.

We expected that the race of the politician offering targeted representation would serve as a moderating condition for these effects (H3). Panel B of Figure 4 assesses this hypothesis by

plotting the marginal effect of being assigned to the targeted representation condition by the (non-Black) respondent's level of racial resentment and the race of the politician in the vignette (see Model 5 in Appendix Table A2). On the one hand, the effects of targeted representation did not vary much across racial resentment when a White politician was involved – at least when controlling for the congruence treatments. Yet the same cannot be said for the Black Politician condition; here, the effect of racial resentment is stronger when the politician is Black rather than White ($F=8.80$, $p<0.01$). Given the vignette setup, we cannot say whether a White politician *reassures* the racially resentful or whether this reflects an *aversion* to the Black politician. But either way, we see stronger evidence in Study 2 that the politician's race can, under some circumstances, impact reactions.

Finally, we turn to the role of constituency preferences as a moderating condition. In H5, we argued that targeted representation involving congruent (incongruent) preferences between the targeted group and the broader constituency would undermine the positive (negative) impressions of those low (high) in resentment. Figure 5 provides some insight here by plotting the predicted value of the dependent variable according to the assigned representation and congruence treatment groups, broken down by respondent's racial resentment levels. We provide three versions of this basic figure: one that controls for politician race and two that separate out results by politician race (see Models 6-8 in Appendix Table A2).

Figure 5 shows that targeted representation had minimal influence beyond the role of racial resentment in both the No Information and Congruent Information conditions. Racial resentment plays a substantial role in structuring evaluations of non-Black respondents in both contexts. Meanwhile, the difference between those in the Targeted and Non-Targeted Representation conditions only differs across levels of racial resentment in one instance: when a

Figure 5: Targeted Representation and Policy Incongruence

Notes: Markers provide predicted values on the dependent variable (with 95% confidence intervals) by representation treatment and by respondent level of racial resentment. Politician race is controlled for in the top row of figures. Points/lines are horizontally offset for legibility. Full model results are provided in Table A2.

White politician offers targeted representation absent any additional information about policy preferences. Here, targeted representation is associated with more negative evaluations among those low in racial resentment (difference at minimum resentment between those in Targeted and Non-Targeted conditions = -0.50 [$-0.96, -0.03$]), but more positive evaluations among those high in resentment (difference at maximum resentment = 0.52 [$0.12, 0.93$]). At the same time, targeted representation did not result in significantly more positive evaluations at any level of resentment when preferences were congruent. This latter finding is inconsistent with H5, as we

predicted that overlapping preferences would engender better evaluations among those high in resentment.

Incongruent preferences, by contrast, have effects that are more consistent with our expectations. As the final column of plots in Figure 5 illustrates, respondents low in racial resentment reported substantially more positive evaluations in the targeted representation condition (difference at minimum resentment: 0.63 [0.30, 0.96]), while those high in resentment reported substantially more negative ones (difference at maximum resentment: -0.69 [-0.97, -0.41]) when controlling for politician race. Differences of a similar magnitude and precision emerge regardless of politician race (White Politician: 0.65 [0.20, 1.11] and -0.67 [-1.07, -0.27]; Black Politician: 0.59 [0.13, 1.06] and -0.70 [-0.109, -0.31]). These results align with what we saw in Study 1, suggesting that the experimental findings were influenced by the implied conflict between the preferences of the African-American community and those of the broader constituency. We thus see partial support for H5: an incongruent reform negatively impacted reactions, as expected, but a congruent one had no effect. Combined, our results suggest that – except for in cases of sharp divisions in constituency opinion – targeted representation poses little cost to legislators, but also perhaps little gain. We return to this point below.

Conclusion

Representation can take many possible forms. It is therefore crucial to understand what the public thinks constitutes “good” representation, especially insofar as public demands may constrain elite behavior. Past studies suggests that citizens generally prefer elected officials who reflect public opinion and work to align policy with the preferences of their constituents (Bengtsson & Wass, 2010; Carman, 2007; Lapinski et al., 2016). Yet this research has little to say about what citizens believe to be the appropriate *target* of representation (Eulau et al., 1959).

Must elected officials give equal weight to all of their constituents, reflecting the concerns and opinions of their districts *as a whole* (Dahl, 1971)? Or is it acceptable to target attention toward policy-affected groups, potentially sidelining the majority's preferences in the process (Brighouse & Fleurbaey, 2010; Mansbridge, 2003)?

In this article, we used two survey experiments conducted on US adults to examine how the public thinks about these issues. Results suggest that members of targeted groups react more positively on average than non-members, and that reactions among non-members are powerfully driven by racial resentment. The structuring effect of racial resentment was remarkably consistent across most of the moderating conditions that we examined, as it was for the most part unaffected by either the race or the partisanship of the politician involved (though the evidence of potential race effects was more mixed). Respondents were notably more affected, however, by information about the policy output's acceptability to both the African-American community and the broader constituency. Conflicting preferences played a key role here, negatively impacting reactions and increasing the effect of racial resentment.

More broadly, these findings have important implications for African American-police relations as well as theories of procedural fairness. First, on the specific case at hand: our research aligns with a long line of work suggesting the centrality of race in perceptions of the police, the use of deadly force, and police misconduct (Nadal et al., 2017; Peffley & Hurwitz, 2010). We build on these findings by suggesting that attempts to address this situation through a move toward more "democratic" policing (Sklansky, 2005) are themselves tainted by racial resentment and preference cleavages – an observation which may help to explain variation in the use of these measures across the US (Walker, 2016). At the same time, our findings also suggest that broader public reactions to these efforts are unlikely to be much improved or worsened by

the attributes of the politicians proposing them. Together, these results suggest that those concerned with ensuring public support for targeted representation measures should consider the relative size of the targeted group, policy preference divisions, and inter-group tensions within a given district; strategic decisions about which politicians should propose the measures, by contrast, appear to be less important.

Second, research on procedural fairness suggests that decision procedures that give equal weight to societal groups should be judged as fairer than those where input is unequally divided. Yet our results highlight the importance of paying more attention to context. Our starting point here is that political contests are inherently *inter-group* affairs that motivate people to evaluate policies, and the politicians that offer them, according to their fit with broader group interests and motives (Conover, 1988; Huddy, 2013). The specific groups involved in a “procedurally fair” versus “procedurally unfair” counterfactual should thus deeply matter for how people react to those procedures. As such, our research is consonant with the literature on political tolerance, which highlights that people tend to sacrifice generalized norms when informed of the precise groups that will benefit or be harmed by a decision (Grant & Rudolph, 2003; Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager, & Togeby, 2010). It also aligns with recent work suggesting that citizens may be more inclined to move away from majority-rule procedures when vulnerable minorities are involved (DeScioli & Bokemper, n.d.).

The openness toward targeted representation that we uncovered here may be a signal that even citizens in the majority are aware of how vulnerable certain minority groups may be to majoritarian rule, and that they are therefore open to deviating from a median-voter-centered approach to policy making (Bochsler & Hänni, 2017). But it may also reflect a recognition that the status quo itself – and by consequence a strictly procedural understanding of democratic

equality – are not necessarily “fair”: granting increased input to the African-American population could thus be seen as a means to address not only historical inequities in democratic influence (Krimmel & Rader, 2015), but also the procedurally unjust treatment of African Americans by the police under the current legislative framework. If this is indeed the case, then procedural justice theory may benefit from paying greater attention to the role of fairness restoration in the assessment of democratic processes.

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Appendix

Table A1: Study 1 Analyses (Figures 1 & 2)

	Figure 1 Analyses			Figure 2 Analyses		
	(1) Controlling for Pol. Characteristics	(2) 3-way Interaction (Non-Black)	(3) 3-way Interaction (Black)	(4) Panel A	(5) Panel B	(6) Panel C
Targeted Rep	0.08 ⁺ (0.04)	0.14 (0.09)	0.84 ^{***} (0.24)	1.29 ^{***} (0.10)	1.41 ^{***} (0.15)	1.42 ^{***} (0.15)
Black Resp.	-0.05 (0.10)					
Targeted Rep # Black Resp.	0.62 ^{***} (0.13)					
Dem Pol.	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.09)	0.47 ⁺ (0.24)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	
Black Pol.	0.02 (0.04)	0.13 (0.09)	0.25 (0.25)	0.00 (0.04)	0.04 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.04)
Targeted Rep # Dem Pol.		0.02 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.35)			
Targeted Rep # Black Pol.		-0.13 (0.13)	-0.25 (0.34)		-0.21 (0.20)	
Dem Pol. # Black Pol.		-0.09 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.35)			
Targeted Rep # Dem Pol. # Black Pol.		-0.03 (0.18)	0.18 (0.49)			
Racial Resentment				0.32 ^{**} (0.11)	0.28 ⁺ (0.16)	0.42 [*] (0.17)
Targeted Rep # Racial Resentment				-2.15 ^{***} (0.16)	-2.21 ^{***} (0.24)	-2.31 ^{***} (0.24)
Black Pol. # Racial Resentment					0.09 (0.23)	
Targeted Rep # Black Pol. # Racial Resentment					0.08 (0.32)	
Opposing Partisan						0.10 (0.15)

Independent						-0.17 (0.21)
Targeted Rep # Opposing Partisan						-0.27 (0.22)
Targeted Rep # Ind.						-0.28 (0.30)
Opposing Partisan # Racial Resentment						-0.19 (0.24)
Ind. # Racial Resentment						-0.13 (0.35)
Targeted Rep # Opposing Partisan # Racial Resentment						0.24 (0.35)
Targeted Rep # Ind. # Racial Resentment						0.56 (0.49)
Constant	-0.09*	-0.12 ⁺	-0.45**	-0.24**	-0.26*	-0.26*
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Observations	2240	1992	248	1992	1992	1992
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.000	0.136	0.117	0.118	0.123

Standard errors in parentheses

DV is an index of three items, where $M=0$, $SD=1$

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2: Study 2 Analyses (Figures 3-5)

	Figure 3			Figure 4		Figure 5		
	(1) Controlling for Other Conditions	(2) 3-way Interaction (Non-Black)	(3) 3-way Interaction (Black)	(4) Panel A	(5) Panel B	(6) Controlling for Pol Race.	(7) White Pol	(8) Black Pol
Targeted Rep	0.00 (0.04)	0.08 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.29)	0.21* (0.10)	0.11 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.16)	-0.50* (0.24)	0.18 (0.23)
Black Resp.	-0.06 (0.09)							
Targeted Rep # Black Resp.	0.32* (0.13)							
Black Pol.	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.11)	0.14 (0.32)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.19 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.04)		
Congruent Pref.	0.04 (0.05)	0.07 (0.11)	-0.32 (0.31)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.30+ (0.17)	-0.44+ (0.24)	-0.22 (0.23)
Incongruent Pref	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.24* (0.11)	-0.46 (0.30)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-1.09*** (0.16)	-1.42*** (0.24)	-0.78*** (0.22)
Targeted Rep # Black Pol.		-0.20 (0.15)	0.07 (0.44)		0.19 (0.19)			
Targeted Rep # Congruent Pref.		0.12 (0.15)	0.44 (0.42)			0.31 (0.23)	0.70* (0.33)	0.00 (0.32)
Targeted Rep # Incongruent Pref		-0.15 (0.15)	0.73+ (0.44)			0.76** (0.23)	1.15*** (0.33)	0.42 (0.33)
Black Pol. # Congruent Pref.		-0.19 (0.15)	0.03 (0.45)					
Black Pol. # Incongruent Pref		0.08 (0.15)	0.19 (0.46)					
Targeted Rep # Black Pol. # Congruent Pref.		0.09 (0.22)	0.03 (0.60)					
Targeted Rep # Black Pol. # Incongruent Pref		0.15 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.64)					

Racial Resentment	-0.58*** (0.11)	-0.78*** (0.16)	-1.28*** (0.19)	-1.78*** (0.27)	-0.84*** (0.25)			
Targeted Rep # Racial Resentment	-0.38* (0.16)	-0.08 (0.22)	0.21 (0.27)	1.02** (0.39)	-0.50 (0.36)			
Black Pol. # Racial Resentment		0.36+ (0.22)						
Targeted Rep # Black Pol. # Racial Resentment		-0.57+ (0.31)						
Congruent Pref. # Racial Resentment				0.56* (0.26)	0.94* (0.38)	0.25 (0.36)		
Incongruent Pref # Racial Resentment				1.63*** (0.27)	2.16*** (0.40)	1.14** (0.36)		
Targeted Rep # Congruent Pref. # Racial Resentment				-0.32 (0.37)	-1.04+ (0.54)	0.26 (0.51)		
Targeted Rep # Incongruent Pref # Racial Resentment				-1.53*** (0.38)	-2.34*** (0.55)	-0.80 (0.53)		
Constant	0.06 (0.05)	0.04 (0.08)	0.09 (0.20)	0.39*** (0.08)	0.47*** (0.10)	0.79*** (0.12)	1.02*** (0.17)	0.53*** (0.15)
Observations	2299	2015	284	2015	2015	2015	1000	1015
Adjusted R ²	0.015	0.020	0.019	0.063	0.064	0.080	0.105	0.061

Standard errors in parentheses

DV is an index where M=0, SD=1

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$