Pride, Prejudice and Manchurian Heritage: North Korean Migrants and Memories of a Land Left Behind

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METHODOLOGY: Description of the Survey and Interview Project

How are the factors described in the previous section reflected in the survey sample and in this thesis as a whole? In this section, I answer those questions. I begin by looking in detail at the constitution of the survey sample, and then go on to review the structured survey questions.

Survey Sample

352 re-settled North Koreans took part in the structured survey, representing 1.22 percent of the resettled defector-migrant population in South Korea at the time the survey was conducted.[1] Once inapplicable cases were removed, total participation was 328 (1.13 percent of the resettled defector-migrant population). The remaining 24 respondents had spent fewer than 12 years in North Korea, or did not provide information sufficient to discern how long they had been in North Korea before leaving.[2] Therefore, these respondents were omitted. Of the 328 participants who remained, 240 were female and 88 were male.

What follows are the major demographic data for the defector-migrant respondents, and then an in-depth review of the sample looking at gender, age, place of origin/residence, year of migration, and social class. I compare the sample to the make-up of the defector-migrant

[1] The Ministry of Unification publishes two figures for the resettled North Korean population. The first figure includes those arrivals currently undergoing state intelligence service investigation or receiving education at one of two resettlement centers known collectively as Hanawŏn. The second only includes defector-migrants completely at liberty in South Korean society having completed the resettlement process. In March 2016, the first figure was 29,137 and the second was 28,786, indicating that 351 people were in the resettlement process at the time. The comparisons in this chapter use the latter of these two figures.

[2] I consider 12 years the bare minimum amount of time that one needs to spend in North Korea in order to be considered socialized North Koreans. However, this is arbitrary and there is an ongoing debate over the appropriate age. Some argue for a minimum of 15 years, others 18 (or higher). For a discussion of this debate, see Stephen White et al., "The Political Resocialization of Immigrants: Resistance or Lifelong Learning?" *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2008): 268-281.

community in terms of these attributes, using data gathered and regularly published by the South Korean Ministry of Unification.

Demographics of North Korean Defector-Migrant Participants

Number of respondents	328
Median age	46
Number of female participants	240 (73.2%)
Pre-migration	
Average number of years spent in North Korea	35
Average year of defection	2004
Completed high school or above in North Korea	231 (70.4%)
Born or lived in border region province	262 (79.9%)
Post-migration	
Average number of years spent in China	4
Average number of years spent in South Korea	7
Average year of arrival in South Korea	2007
Completed high school or above in South Korea	70 (21.3%)

Gender



Gender breakdown of the structured survey sample (N=328).

The gender division of the sample mirrors the current reality of escape from North Korea: it contains many more females (240) than males (88). Probably the best-known facet of the rapid growth of the defector-migrant North Korean population in the 21st century is that the percentage of females contained within it has increased consistently year-on-year since the 1990s.

	Structured Survey Sample	**Ministry of Unification (March 2016)**
Male	88 (27%)	8507 (30%)
Female	240 (73%)	20279 (70%)
Total	328	28786

Over the course of divided Korean peninsula history from 1953 to 1998, a mere 947 North Koreans migrated to South Korea. A large majority (831, 88 percent) of these were men. Thereafter, the pendulum swung rapidly the other way. In the three years between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2001, a further 1043 people migrated from North to South, 46 percent of whom were female. By 2015, the percentage of female arrivals had reached 80 percent of the annual total (1025 out of a total of 1276), and as of March 2016, when the fieldwork for this thesis was carried out, the gender breakdown of the resettled migrant population in South Korea (29,137 people in total) had reached almost exactly 70 percent female, 30 percent male. As of

September 2019, per the most recent statistics prior to publication of this thesis, the number had risen to 72 percent.



Gender breakdown of the structured survey sample compared with Ministry of Unification figures for the defector-migrant community (N=328).

The social history of North Korea since the late 1980s helps to explain why male migration has become so constricted both in absolute and relative terms during the post-famine period. According to Pak Kyŏngsuk, a demographer at Sŏul National University, "That women escaped the North more than men reflects the phenomenon that during the food crisis women moved to find food. Men were tied to their official production units and so found it harder to move, whereas women, who were not under the auspices of official production units, could move comparatively freely to trade or exchange goods."[3]

In the late 1980s and 1990s, the North Korean state frayed badly and the social contract was abrogated for all but a few of the most fortunate in the elite political class and strategic industries. With famine encroaching upon life for the small middle and much larger working class, the state attempted to stall the collapse of key social control structures by enforcing male attendance at workplaces. A traditionally patriarchal society in spite of putative adherence to communist orthodoxy, men were obliged to attend workplaces that were stipulated by the state, whereas women were by and large not. When the food security crisis hit, therefore, North

[3] Pak Kyŏngsuk, *Puk'ansahoewa kulchŏltoen kŭndae: in'gu, kukka, chuminŭi sam* 북한사회와 굴절된 근대: 인구, 국가, 주민의 삶 [North Korean Society and its Refracted Modernity: Population, State, and the Lives of the People] (Sŏul: Sŏul National University Press, 2013), 218.

Korean women, who had in any case always been under relatively less state scrutiny than their fathers, husbands, and brothers formed the marjority of those positioned to cross the border into China to find work and food.[4]

Two decades of this female-led migration pattern has produced notable social implications, particularly in regions of North Korea abutting the Sino-DPRK border, where most migrants leaving North Korea originate. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is hard even to *find* young women in the center of the border city of Hoeryŏng, let alone to *marry* one, because so many of the city's young females have crossed the border into China and either entered into relationships there and/or migrated on to South Korea.[5] Though on balance it is likely that the anecdotal evidence presented in the book *Hoeryŏngsaramdŭl kiŏk sok iyagirŭl tŭllyŏjuda* presents a somewhat sensationalized description of Hoeryŏng, and in any case is only about the situation in one border town, albeit a prominent one, the changes wrought by large-scale outward female migration – as well as the marketization (*shijanghwa*) phenomenon, which is driven in large part by female economic participation[6] – to institutions such as marriage is not in any serious doubt.

That being said, amongst these negative social impacts of outward female migration from North Korea, there has been at least one positive impact, and that is on North Korea-related research. Any migration out of North Korea increases the sum of our knowledge about the country. That is a given. But outward *female* migration is particularly helpful in this respect, because research shows that women tend to be less encumbered by egotistic and historical baggage than their

[4] Hazel Smith, *North Korea: Markets and Military Rule*, 228-230.
[5] Kim Sŏk'yang, *Hoeryŏngsaramdŭl kiŏk sok iyagirŭl tŭllyŏjuda,* 107.
[6] No Gwinam, "sijangi ŭmjigin pukhanyŏsŏngŭi kil: sijang, kyŏngjaenggwa yongmang, pukhan yŏsŏng" 시장이 음직인 북한여성의 길: 시장, 경쟁과 욕망, 북한 여성 [The path of North Korean women who move the market: market, competition and ambition, North Korean women], 314-352 in *Pukhanŭi kwŏllyŏkkkwa ilsangsaenghwal* 북한의 권력과일상생활: 지배와 저항 사이에서 [Domination and Resistance: Everyday Life in North Korea], ed. Hong Min and Pak Sunsŏng (Sŏul: Hanul, 2013).

male counterparts, and thus make far better survey and interview project respondents.[7] This phenomenon was noted by historian Anthony Beevor, who said of his own research into the Battle of Stalingrad during World War II:

> It is certainly true that those who had read lots of official histories, particularly Russian soldiers and veterans, were basically filtering all their experiences through what they had read afterwards. And that, of course, is no good at all. But what was very interesting was that the women were very different, because they hadn't read the official accounts, and their memories were far more reliable.
>
> At the time, the women had kept their mouths shut and their eyes open, and the men had been so humiliated by the Stalinist system that, now they were in control of history; they were the ones who were able to tell us foreigners what happened. But of course, it was a totally censored, totally expurgated version of what had happened.[8]

In general, though this of course depends to a degree on the area of inquiry that a survey is designed to explore, female defector-migrants make the best respondents. All other things being equal, it is objectively more helpful to ask women about life anywhere, in this case North Korea, than men.

Age

The ages of the participants in the structured survey ranged from 17 to 82. Nobody in the sample was born before the creation of modern Korea in 1910.[9] Two participants were in their eighties at the time the survey was conducted, and therefore could recall the Japanese colonial era that ended in August 1945. One of these was born in the northeasterly port city of Ch'ŏngjin

[7] Men are more likely to have been in the military in large numbers or simply to have read or heard histories that color their views. Sir Anthony Beevor, "Desert Island Discs," broadcast on BBC Radio Four, February 19, 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08fdhjs (last accessed September 17, 2019).
[8] Sir Anthony Beevor, "Desert Island Discs," broadcast on BBC Radio Four, February 19, 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08fdhjs (last accessed September 17, 2019).
[9] I follow Adrian Buzo in situating the moment of modern Korea's creation in 1910, when a "thoroughgoing modernizing elite – Japanese, with a measure of Korean collaboration – supplanted the existing political and economic elite." Adrian Buzo, *The Making of Modern Korea* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2002), vii.

in 1932, the other in October 1934 in P'yŏngyang, when today's North Korean capital was still an industrial outpost of the Japanese Empire known as Heijo. The sample also includes 55 people in their 60s and 70s. The figure below shows the age breakdown of the sample.



Age breakdown of the structured survey sample (N=328).[10]

The greatest imbalance between the survey sample and general defector-migrant population is in this category of age. In part this was an inevitable outcome of the fact that it was neither possible from an ethical standpoint nor desirable from a practical one for the survey project to try and capture opinion from children and teens under 17, who do not qualify as "socialized North Koreans" because they left when they were too young. Given that children (0-9) constitute 4.27 percent (1228 people) of the total defector-migrant population in South Korea, that makes a non-trivial difference to the median age of the respondents in the survey (46 years). People under forty are also underrepresented in the sample, while those over forty are overrepresented. Young people aged between 20 and 39 make up just 33 percent percent of the sample, whereas they constitute 57.63 percent of the referent population, in this case the defector-migrant population. People between 40 and 82 constitute 66 percent of the survey sample, but just 26.2

[10] The survey sample is sub-categorized into decades to facilitate like-for-like comparison with Ministry of Unification statistics on the general defector-migrant population. As a consequence, I do not break down the cohort aged 60+ (because the Ministry of Unification does not do so).

percent of the referent population. This is reflected in the table below, which shows the extent of the difference.



	0-9	**10-19**	**20-29**	**30-39**	**40-49**	**50-59**	**60+**	**Total**
Survey Sample	0	2	51	58	97	63	57	328
Ministry of Unification (March 2016)	1228	3416	8128	8460	4788	1544	1222	28786

The age range of the structured survey sample compared with Ministry of Unification figures for the defector-migrant community (N=328).

In addition to reflecting the absence of children and teens under 17, the preeminence of older respondents in the sample when compared to the referent population is explained by the socio-economic characteristics of each strata of the defector-migrant population. Elderly defector-migrants generally do not work in South Korea; a majority live on welfare provision, assistance from family members where available, and payments for occasional work – which may include participation in survey projects such as this one. Elderly participants in this survey frequently made the joke during interviews that living in South Korea, where welfare payments are made on time and seem generous compared to the situation in North Korea, is like living under "true socialism."

Conversely, younger resettled North Koreans are far more likely to be in full-time education or work than older adults and the elderly. Annual surveys conducted by the Hana Foundation in South Korea show that average incomes of working defector-migrants are rising, but that the benefits of this shift to higher incomes are concentrated in the younger end of the age distribution. Such people are far more likely to have a South Korean educational background, which is vital for most forms of social and economic advancement.[11]

Hana Foundation data show that in 2013, the average income of a resettled North Korean after tax was ₩1.414m KRW (approx. $1245 USD). A year later in 2014 it had reached ₩1.471m KRW ($1295 USD), and by 2015 it had risen to ₩1.546m KRW ($1361 USD).[12] These numbers are below the average for South Korea as a whole, and as a result, in 2015, 61.4 percent of resettled North Koreans in the South were categorized as lower class, compared to 44.6 percent of the South Korean population as a whole, while 35.8 percent of resettled North Koreans were categorized as middle class compared to 53 percent of the population as a whole.[13] Nevertheless, the fact remains that average defector-migrant incomes are increasing, and one consequence of it is that interest in participation in survey projects, for which the remuneration is comparatively modest, continues to decline among members of the working-age population, whereas it has not declined among older cohorts.[14]

[11] Korea Hana Foundation, *2015 Social Survey of North Korean Refugees in South Korea* (Sŏul: Hana Foundation, 2016).
[12] Korea Hana Foundation, *2015 Social Survey of North Korean Refugees in South Korea*, 12.
[13] Korea Hana Foundation, *2015 Social Survey of North Korean Refugees in South Korea*, 14.
[14] Had I been willing or indeed able to compensate participants at a higher rate, it would have been possible to attract a larger number of young participants. However, for ethical and methodological reasons I deemed this inappropriate.

Origin



The four border region provinces of North Korea (from left): North Pyongan, Chagang, Ryanggang, North Hamgyŏng. | Image: Google Maps

Most resettled North Koreans now living in South Korea were born and grew up in the border provinces of North Korea, particularly the most northeasterly province of all, North Hamgyŏng (number one on the map), followed by Ryanggang (number two). This is reflected in the survey sample; 152 respondents hail from North Hamgyŏng and 49 from Ryanggang, a combined total of 61 percent of the survey sample.[15]

Perhaps contrary to expectations, however; whereas Ryanggang is marginally over-represented in the sample compared with the overall defector-migrant population (49 people, or 15 percent of the sample, compared with 3819 people, or 13.27 percent of the defector-migrant community), as is P'yŏngyang (22 people or seven percent versus 615 people or three percent), North Hamgyŏng is actually under-represented, in spite of its apparent dominance in absolute numbers (152 people or 46 percent versus 18069 people or 62.78 percent of the defector-migrant population).

[15] It is notable also that the defector-migrant population from Ryanggang (major city: Hyesan) is today growing more quickly than that from North Hamgyŏng. No compelling explanation for this intriguing shift has been put forward to date.



	Kangwŏn	Namp'o	Ryanggang	Chagang	South P'yŏngan	North P'yŏngan	P'yŏngyang
Survey Sample	10	0	49	2	9	11	24
Ministry of Unification (March 2016)	557	131	3819	199	981	774	615

	South Hamgyŏng	North Hamgyŏng	South Hwanghae	North Hwanghae	Kaesŏng	Missing	Total
Survey Sample	24	152	9	4	0	36	328
Ministry of Unification (March 2016)	2577	18069	429	400	71	164	28786

Places of origin of the structured survey sample compared with Ministry of Unification figures for the defector-migrant community (N=328).

The data show that where 65 percent (214) of the sample is from "borderland regions", this number is 79 percent (22,861) for the defector-migrant community as a whole, and where seven percent (24) of the sample come from P'yŏngyang, this number is just three percent for the defector-migrant community as a whole (615). The figures for the interior are similar for both groups, at 17 percent (56) for the sample and 18 percent (5310) for the defector-migrant community. 36 people did not respond to the question about origins in such a way as to be included in the figures. One can assume that this was mostly for security reasons, but a small number of respondents were born in China or Japan then moved to Korea at a young age, meaning that their place of origin falls outside the geographical limits of DPR Korea.



Percentage of structured survey sample from border region, interior, and P'yŏngyang compared with Ministry of Unification data on the defector-migrant community as a whole (N=328).

Year of Migration



Years of departure from North Korea of the structured survey sample (N=328).

The survey sample is spread relatively evenly across the era of mass migration from North Korea, which I define for quite obvious reasons as starting in 1997. There are spikes in 1998

(when 42 (12 percent) of the survey sample migrated out of North Korea) and 2004 (31; nine percent).

Groups one and two in Chung's typology ("system selective migrants" of the period 1945-1950, and war refugees of the Korean War from 1950 to 1953) migrated from the northern to southern zone (or DPRK to ROK, depending on whether the migration occurred before or after 1948) before 1953. Accordingly, the vast majority of members of those groups had passed away at the time the survey was conducted. As a result, groups one and two are essentially absent from the data. Group three (Cold War "heroes who returned to the state" between 1962 and 1993) also constitutes a very small part of the sample. In spite of the fact that chronologically speaking it represents a lengthy span of divided Korean history (29 years), the number of defector-migrants to make the leap from one Korean state to the other in this period was tiny, and only one person in the survey sample falls into this third group. That person, a male born in Ch'ŏngjin in the 1950s, defected from North Korea in 1975 at the age of 19. At the time, he was an agent of the Department of State Political Security[16] operating in the border county of Ryongch'ŏn in North P'yŏngan Province.[17]

As noted previously, members of groups four through six (post-Cold War "returning brethren" of 1993-97; "escaping residents" of 1997 to 2004; and "new settlers (*saet'omin*)" of the mid-2000s to the present day) form the bulk of respondents in all contemporary defector-migrant survey and interview research. This research is no different. Indeed, the largest number of participants

[16] Carved out of the Ministry of Public Security in 1973, the Department of State Political Security has been the state security organ of the DPR Korean state for almost half a century. It was succeeded by the Department of State Security in 1982.
[17] Ryongch'ŏn would become infamous in 2004 when it was partially destroyed by an explosion on the international railroad line south from the DPRK-PRC border to P'yŏngyang, which Kim Chŏngil 's private train had traversed hours before.

in the structured survey left North Korea in 1998 (42), followed by 2004 (31), then 1997 and 2000 (both 21), and 2007 and 2013 (both 20).

This makes it obvious why it is important to have a wide variety of years of departure in a survey sample. The past is always another country, and a person who left the DPRK in response to the economic hardships of the 1990s is almost certain to be different in a multitude of ways to a person who left in the 2000s. A person who departed North Korea in or after the year 2005 is more likely to have left for different reasons again, such as education for themselves or their children, and is more likely to have crossed the border in an instance of "chain migration", which changes the opportunity-cost calculation of departure.

Socio-Economic Class

As with other 20th century "socialist economies," the North Korean social and economic structure does not lend itself to the use of simple measures of individual or family income to gauge socio-economic class. This is because income is not a good predictor of access to resources. Historically, resources are distributed by the state, and while popular propaganda has it that this is done equitably, in practice access to resources is primarily decided on grounds of political rather than economic power.

In North Korea this problem is particulary acute, since the extent to which income affects socio-economic stauts has changed considerably over the course of modern DPRK history, mostly at the expense of political control. In the Kim Ilsŏng and to a lesser extent the Kim Ilsŏng-Kim Chŏngil joint leadership periods, state distribution of foodstuffs and necessities through the Public Distribution System, or PDS, was the most important means through which family life

and social stability were maintained. This changed during the late-Kim Chŏngil era, and in the current period, income has become a much better predictor of social status.

To take this incrementally shifting economic structure into account in research design is not a simple task, and the survey does not accomplish it to my satisfaction.[18] The "class structure" of the sample was measured using a schema that asked respondents to assess their personal or family living conditions three years prior to their date of departure from North Korea, and to rank their responses on a scale from one to five. One represents affluence and five indicates grave food insecurity verging on or actually resulting in starvation. The question was designed and implemented for the first time during a prior survey in 2013, and has been repeated in a follow-up survey in early 2019.[19] Though relatively effective in some senses, this form of question does not capture the contours of social and economic life in periods of DPR Korean history more (or indeed less) than three years before a respondent's departure. It is by its very nature a snapshot, and therefore necessarily limited.

Three years prior to departure from the DPRK was selected as the date of assessment of class status on the informed basis that bringing the point of assessment away from an individual's moment of departure from North Korea would go some way toward eliminating differences in living conditions that might appear or intensify immediately prior to departure, effects that would be a direct result of preparing for departure. For instance, in the period prior to departure a female market trader might not go to work in the market as regularly as had hitherto been the case, which would have a negative impact on household income for the pre-migration period

[18] There was no room in the survey to take account of changes in individual livelihoods over time.
[19] Published outputs from the previous survey project are: Christopher Green, "The Sino-North Korean Border Economy: Money and Power Relations in North Korea," *Asian Perspective* 40, no. 3 (July-September 2016): 415-434; Adam Cathcart, Christopher Green and Steven Denney, "How Authoritarian Regimes Maintain Domain Consensus: North Korea's Information Strategies in the Kim Chŏngŭn Era," *Review of Korean Studies* 17, no. 2 (2015): 145-178; Green, Denney, and Gleason, "The Whisper in the Ear."

and would not reflect the actual socio-economic circumstances that an individual was living in when they made the decision to leave North Korea.



The class breakdown of the structured survey sample, indicating that a meaningful proportion of participants (19 percent) were from comfortable backgrounds/lived comfortably by North Korean standards three years prior to migration (N=328).

As the figure shows, the survey sample is not wholly dominated by people who were destitute prior to their departure from North Korea. There is a large number of poor and very poor people in the sample (55 percent). This is unsurprising: North Korea is a poor country that provides scant welfare assistance. But at the same time, the sample undermines the poverty fallacy; namely, the perception that the main or only reason why a North Korean citizen would choose to leave the country is socio-economic hardship.

While more than a third of survey respondents did fall into the destitute category three years prior to departure, and nearly 20 percent self-assessed as "able to buy enough to survive, but not able to buy clothing," a sub-optimal standard of living by any measure; the number of those living in secure economic circumstances was almost equal to it (150, or 42 percent of the survey total, combining groups two and three), and more than four percent of the sample would have been considered wealthy in most circumstances. The sample also undermines the bias fallacy, by

demonstrating that a significant percentage of the survey sample lived in comfortable conditions prior to departing North Korea, decreasing (though not eliminating, given the possibility that migration was driven by potentially lethal clashes with the state) the possibility of their harboring strong anti-regime sentiment.

Survey Questions

This project compares and contrasts forms of self-understanding and pride in factors of national identity amongst resettled North Koreans. It does so both in general, by political generation, and by sub-dividing the sample into those who lived in border provinces of the DPRK prior to their escape and resettlement in South Korea, and those who either lived in the interior or in the capital, P'yŏngyang.

To this end, respondents were asked three batteries of questions, in addition to providing demographic data on their current and former socio-economic status.[20] The first battery discussed the notion of "true Koreanness" and what being Korean means.[21] It asked the following (in Korean):

"Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Korean. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is:"

1. To have been born in DPRK (*pukhanesŏ t'aeŏnanŭn kŏt*)

[20] The basis of the questions is the national identity component of the International Social Survey Programme. The survey can be downloaded in several languages from the following URL: http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fStudy/ZA5950

[21] The first battery of questions mirror those used in Q56 of the International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III - ISSP 2013 (unique identifier: ZA5950), apart from number seven ("To understand DPRK history and follow DPRK traditions"). It was felt that the ISSP question ("To feel Korean") was insufficiently precise. In number six ("To have Korean bloodline"), bloodline (*hyŏlt'ong)* replaced ancestry (*chosang*). There is a discussion of the meaning of "true" in the phrase "true North Korean" in the Results chapter.

2. To have DPRK citizenship (*pukhan kukchŏgŭl kannŭn kŏt*)
3. To have lived in DPRK for most of one's life (*saengaeŭi taebubunŭl pukhanesŏ sanŭn kŏt*)
4. To be able to speak Korean (*chosŏnŏrŭl hal su innŭn kŏt*)
5. To respect DPRK institutions and laws (*pukhanŭi chŏngch'ijedowa pŏbŭl chonjunghanŭn kŏt)*
6. To have Korean bloodline (*pukhanin hyŏlt'ongŭl kajigo innŭn kŏt*)
7. To understand DPRK history and follow DPRK traditions (*pukhanŭi yŏksarŭl ihaehago pukhanŭi chŏnt'onggwa kwansŭbŭl ttarŭnŭn kŏt*)
8. To follow Confucian teachings (*yugyoŭi karŭch'imŭl ttarŭnŭn kŏt*)

Respondents answered by choosing one of the following responses: very important (*maeu chungyo*); somewhat important (*taso chungyo*); not very important (*pyŏllo chungyohaji anhŭm*); not important at all (*chŏnhyŏ chungyohaji anhŭm*); or cannot choose (*sŏnt'aekhal su ŏpta*).

The second battery of questions pertained to feelings of closeness to geographical constructs at a range of scales.[22] It asked the following (in Korean):

"How close do you feel to….?"

1. Your family
2. Your town or city
3. Your province
4. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
5. Republic of Korea

[22] The second battery of questions mirror those used in Q55 of the International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III - ISSP 2013 (unique identifier: ZA5950). However, it augments the original with a number of additional options. The ISSP original asked only how close respondents feel to: 1) Your town or city; 2) Your country; 3) Korea; and 4) East Asia.

6. People's Republic of China
7. Asia

Respondents answered by choosing one of the following responses: very close (*maeu kakkapke*); somewhat close (*taso kakkapke*); not very close (*pyŏllo kakkapchi anhŭm*); not close at all (*chŏnhyŏ kakkapchi anhŭm*); or cannot choose (*sŏnt'aekhal su ŏpta*).

The third battery of questions asked respondents to assess their subjective feeling of pride in twelve different factors of what we may call "Koreanness."[23] It asked the following (in Korean):

"How proud are you of DPRK in each of the following?"

1. The way socialism works (*sahoejuŭiga chaktonghanŭn pangsik*)
2. It's political influence in the world (*segyeesŏŭi chŏngch'ijŏk yŏnghyangnyŏk*)
3. It's economic achievements (*kyŏngjejŏk sŏngch'wi*)
4. It's social security system (*sahoe pojang chedo*)
5. It's scientific and technological achievements (*kwahakkisurŭi sŏngch'wi*)
6. It's achievements in sports (*sŭp'och'ŭesŏŭi sŏngch'wi*)
7. It's achievements in arts and literature (*yesulgwa munhagesŏŭi sŏngch'wi*)
8. The Mt. Baekdu bloodline's achievements in political leadership (*paektuhyŏlt'ongŭi chŏngch'ijŏk ridŏsibŭi sŏngch'wi*)
9. Armed forces (*kunsaryŏk*)
10. Anti-Japanese revolutionary history (*hangil hyŏngmyŏngnyŏksa*)

[23] The third battery of questions mirror those used in Q58 of the International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III - ISSP 2013 (unique identifier: ZA5950). However, it augments the original with several options that pertain directly to the DPRK: number eight ("The Mt. Baekdu bloodline's achievements in political leadership"), number ten ("Anti-Japanese revolutionary history"), and number twelve ("The achievements of the chuch'e ideology").

11. It's fair and equal treatment of all groups in society (*sahoeŭi modŭn chiptandŭre taehan kongjŏnghago p'yŏngdŭng han taeu*)
12. The achievements of the chuch'e ideology (*chuch'esasangŭi sŏngch'wi*)

Respondents answered by choosing one of the following responses: very proud (*maeu charangsŭrŏpta*); somewhat proud (*taso charangsŭrŏpta*); not very proud (*pyŏllo charangsŭrŏpchi anhŭm*); not proud at all (*chŏnhyŏ charangsŭrŏpchi anhŭm*); or cannot choose (*sŏnt'aekhal su ŏpta*).

When reviewing the survey with experts both within and outside the defector-migrant community, several suggestions for improvements were put forward. First, it was suggested that item eight in the "true North Koreans" battery, "To follow Confucian teachings (*yugyoŭi karŭch'imŭl ttarŭnŭn kŏt*)," might not be the most appropriate terminology. This may have impacted the results for that item, but it is not central to the research, which does not focus in any way on contemporary Confucianism or the history of Confucianism in Korea.

Second, it was suggested that both the legacy of the Korean War and the achievements of North Korea's ad hoc transition to a market economy should be added to the pride battery. Events in North Korea in recent years lend weight to these suggestions. First, under Kim Chŏngŭn, North Korea has refocused official culture toward commemorating the Korean War alongside the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle. This is visible in actions such as the establishment of a Korean War cemetery on the outskirts of P'yŏngyang, which opened on July 25, 2013.[24] Second, the market economy has developed into a complex nationwide phenomenon that touches almost every family in one way or another, and would be likely to elicit clear views from respondents.

[24] "North Korea opens cemetery for war heroes," video, AFP news agency, YouTube, July 25, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y3g9l-Iscs0 (last accessed July 3, 2019).

Methodological Limitations

The structured survey did not use a random cross-sectional sample of the defector-migrant population resettled in the Republic of Korea, which is standard operating procedure under normal conditions. This was for two reasons.

First, though there is an official database of all resettled North Koreans in South Korea, which is managed by the state and used for bureaucratic functions, it is closed to the public and thus not available for academic uses. Only through this government database could a random cross-sectional sample have been obtained. A good second choice, a stratified sample, in which the reference population is divided into strata and then a probability sample taken from each stratum, could not be taken for the same reason.

Second, some segments of the defector-migrant community in South Korea face an ongoing security threat. A proportion have relatives in North Korea who may be in danger of mistreatment by the state because of a relative's decision to leave the DPRK. Those for whom family safety is a legitimate concern may choose to remain anonymous in South Korean society to mitigate this threat. One consequence of this is that even if it were possible to access the aforementioned database and attempt to take a fully randomized sample of it, many of those randomly selected would refuse to participate. It would thus in any case be impossible to access all parts of the defector-migrant community in appropriate proportions. People who already have dense network connections or who defected with their entire family or in a chain are likely to be less conscious of security concerns. This can result in overrepresentation of certain types

of defector-migrant in the sample for reasons that the data collection method cannot capture or eliminate.[25]

Taking these limitations into account, and having judged it to be the best option available under the circumstances, a non-probability sample was taken that met project criteria of accessibility, geographical proximity, and willingness to participate. The sample was drawn in the first instance from personal networks and then expanded through snowball techniques using network nodes (well-connected individuals accessible to us) in the defector-migrant community. The major networks were: (1) The defector-migrant congregation of church in southern Sŏul; (2) The defector-migrant congregation of a much smaller church in western Sŏul unconnected to the first church; (3) Attendees at a community sporting event in western Sŏul; (4) One of a network of 23 state-run Hana Centers that helps resettle new arrivals in South Korea; and (5) Young defector-migrants whose participation was obtained through snowballing from other participants across cohorts 1-4.

While unavoidable, this non-probability sampling methodology creates a number of problems. First and foremost, the survey sample is not an accurate reflection of the defector-migrant population. And second, the survey sample is small. As noted, 352 people were surveyed, falling to 328 once conditions on duration of residency in North Korea were applied. Even if a random cross-sectional sample had been taken, a sample of this size would still have a sampling error of 3-5 percent at the 95 percent confidence level. As it wasn't random, the potential for error is even greater.[26]

[25] The finger of blame is often pointed at the state security body, the Ministry of State Security. Family remaining in North Korea may pay the requisite bribe to have their departed relatives registered with the authorities as deceased, a common method by which to avoid state censure.

[26] To counter sampling problems to some extent, the sample was constantly reevaluated throughout the survey period (which spanned four months). The channels by which the sample was obtained were tweaked several times (adding additional respondents from one channel and reducing the intake from another, for instance) so that, overall, it would reflect the defector-migrant population, albeit only in some key ways. This approach, while clearly

A second significant limitation concerns the formation of self-understandings. In the process of defection and resettlement, defector-migrant self-understandings are likely to be altered. Not all in identical ways, of course. John Berry's multidimensional model of acculturation suggests four categories of change: assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization.[27] Individuals follow different paths, and these lead to different outcomes. But they certainly do change. As Stuart Hall notes, identities are produced, "never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation."[28] Then, self-understandings depend in part on contingent external factors including location, thus removing a native-born North Korean from North Korea whilst still expecting that individual to produce – and articulate – themselves in an identically "North Korean" way would be a mistake.

The common response to this critique is to say that only defector-migrants who most recently left North Korea should be sampled. But this may not always be necessary, as the critique itself appears to be overblown. If we average the structured survey results across three groups: (1) new arrivals (those having spent 1 year or less in South Korea); (2) newly resettled (2-5 years in South Korea); and (3) fully resettled (6+ years in South Korea), the data suggest that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, opinions remain more or less similar across groups. [29] The takeaway is, then, that attitudes towards certain qualities of life and experience in North Korea are resilient, and may well not be strongly impacted by the length of time one has spent in South Korea.[30] By

sub-optimal, was somewhat successful. The sample did end up reflecting the reference population closely in several important respects, which I highlight in the section comparing the survey sample with the general population. Nevertheless, it cannot be treated as representative; and in this thesis, it is not.

[27] Fao Gao, "Imagined identity of ethnic Koreans and its implication for bilingual education," *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 15, no. 3 (2012): 344

[28] Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in *Colonial discourse and post-colonial theory: a reader*, ed. Patrick Wheatsheaf and Laura Chrisman (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 222-237.

[29] Is there truly a difference between having only spent eight months in South Korea and 2.5 years? It's hard to say. The cut offs are somewhat arbitrary and new research suggests that the effects of exposure in South Korea on defector-migrant attitudes towards North and South Korea is minimal.

[30] See Steven Denney and Christopher Green, "Chuch'e and the Everyday: Does Ideology Matter for Ordinary People in North Korea? Insights from Interviews and Surveys with North Korean Defector-Migrants," presented at

extension, then, we may hypothesize that attitudes also survive the defection and resettlement process largely intact.

Of course, this is not true for all topics: a defector-migrant's view of democracy as a system of political organization changes with prolonged exposure to that system. Moreover, one cannot ever *guarantee* that the act of migrating out of North Korea itself does not have a decisive impact on self-understandings. All one can say that in the case of items explored in this thesis, neither resettlement nor exposure to South Korea per se seem to have a significant impact on responses. This supports the claim that the attitudes shown are resilient opinions of people who came of age in North Korea. It can be tentatively claimed that in this case, survey responses represent North Korean perspectives and not merely opinions of a defector class.

Further detailed information on the project structure, history, timeline, participants, funding, and further efforts made to counter methodological limitations is contained in the Appendix to this thesis.

the Association of Asian Studies Annual Conference in Denver, March 2019. What this does not, however, guarantee is that the act of migrating out of North Korea itself is not having a significant or even decisive impact on the formation of self-understandings thereafter.