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Order and Crime: Criminal Groups' Political Legitimacy in Michoacán and Sicily

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Chapter 5.

Cosa Nostra: Tracking Sicilian Mafia's Political Legitimacy

At 2012, *El Komander*, popular Mexican "narco-singer", released his new single entitled "La mafia se sienta en la mesa" (Mafia Takes a Sit on the Table). *El Komander*, the artistic name of Alfredo Ríos, as well as other performers of the so-called *narcocorridos* (or, as it was later named, *movimiento alterado*) were forbidden to perform public concerts in Mexico. That was also the case in Michoacán, where a local public officer argued that Komander's ban was due to the lyric's songs, which touch "very sensitive topics" (Velázquez, 2018). Certainly, most of his songs are dedicated to assert Mexican "narcos" as stylish and brave popular heroes. However, the lyrics of "La mafia se sienta a la mesa" were slightly different. Instead of glorifying exclusively Mexican "narcos", this song did "[...] a twentieth-century history seen from the mafia's point of view" (Ravveduto, 2014), in which "someone" in Sicily did start "everything": "*En un pueblito en Sicilia, un hombre empezó las cosas. Fue el padrino en la familia y fundó la Cosa Nostra. Desde Italia a Nueva York, traficó vino y tabaco. La mafia lo bautizó, fue el primer capo de capos*" (In a small town in Sicily, a man started everything. He was the godfather in the family, and founded the Cosa Nostra. From Italy to New York, he trafficked wine and tobacco. The mafia baptized him; he was the first chief of chiefs).⁵⁵

In this research, it is not an overriding concern to decide if "everything started" or not in Sicily. However, it becomes relevant to underline this song as a narrative habit that connects the social imaginary about criminal groups from two allegedly distant cases such as Mexico and Italy. How remote are they? And even more, how different or similar? The Italian case in general and Sicilian in particular count with a significantly long history of the mafia's existence. Indeed, this southern island's past and current context cannot be understood or explained without analyzing how the mafia experience influenced the social life setting since the nineteenth century. According to Jane and Peter Schneider, the ghost of the "myth of Sicily" has been constantly prowling Sicilian studies. This myth, they argued, suggests that Sicilian history can only be explained through mafia's history, like if there were no other players in the historical construction of Sicilian culture. As a consequence, a set of non-modern features such as familism, corruption, and patriarchy use to be understood as a mafia heritage to Sicilian society, rather than as a broader socio-cultural construction (Schneider and Schneider, 2005).

Thus, social investigation on Sicily has often been in need to fight back the preconceived idea of a pre-modern society in which mafia only makes stronger this condition. Indeed, the

⁵⁵ At the moment of writing these lines, the video clip on YouTube has more than 15.5 millions of reproductions. Indeed, later in the song, *El Komander* continues honoring Colombian, Japanese, Russian and Mexican mafias while keeps looking to that "small town in Sicily" as the place where everything started. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jgGOW6Aoks8>

"myth of Sicily" tends to cancel or diminish other agencies. From a political legitimacy perspective, the myth is not only impossible but also unreasonable. As a relevant social agent, CN is a historic Sicilian player who participated in the social order setting while interacting with other local, national, and transnational agencies (Schneider and Schneider, 2005, 502-503). In this regard, mafia is an agent between others that, in the case of Sicily, despite their heterogeneity joint around an anti-mafia movement that has been becoming powerful in the last decades by disputing CN's influence in defining the local social order through political legitimacy practices. This research agrees with the idea of fighting back the "myth of Sicily" even when, also in terms of political legitimacy, local political agents had historically shaped their endeavors in relation to CN and vice versa. To do so, special attention is given to the interaction between CN and these other players that also configures local power and, even more, the state as Migdal discussed it (1988).

The Sicilian mafia is a significantly older criminal group case. As a result, this case helps for comparison because it offers a wide specter of sources and resources of legitimacy across different historical stages. The outcome is diverse data for new insights on what are commonalities between both cases, and what is specific. Sicilian mafia analysis dates back to the middle nineteenth century and even before – that means, even before the creation of the Italian State. In this regard, Sicily's case requires making use of historical references with relatively more frequency. However, this research makes use of both primary and secondary sources. On the one hand, it comes back to previous works to document CN's historical performance in terms of political legitimacy while, on the other, it also makes use of original data collected in fieldwork carried out during November of 2018 and February 2019 in the Sicilian towns of Palermo, Catania, and Partinico. In this research, CN works as a secondary analytical case. Nevertheless, it gives the analytical pattern to conduct the comparison. However, before getting into the last and comparative chapter, this chapter is exclusively dedicated to analyze, first, briefly around CN as a political legitimacy agent in Sicily. Later, the second and most relevant part in this chapter addresses explicitly CN legitimacy endeavors also guided by the Table 1 structure.

In other words, this chapter structure is the same as in Michoacán's except that here it is compelled in a single chapter instead of two. In the case of Michoacán, the context description (chapter three) and the criminal group political legitimacy performance (chapter four) were divided. However, here both were gathered into one single. Initially, CN's context is explained by analyzing how to locate the criminal group and the concept of the mafia in the Sicilian and Italian recent history. It involves doing what, in the case of Michoacán, was called drawing the "big picture" of the political legitimacy context. It includes recognizing how the criminal group is one among other local political agents performing practices of legitimacy. Later, following Table 1, the second and most relevant section addresses CN's sources and resources of legitimacy analysis. Finally, and also following Michoacán's chapters' structure, an emblematic in which CN's political legitimacy interest runs across all

legitimacy sources is analyzed. That case is the 2019 procession of Saint Agatha in Catania. After this, the whole case comparison comes on the sixth and last chapter where, based on the cases' references, the conceptual discussion is expanded, and the cases are compared, contrast, and jointly analyzed.

5.1. The Big Picture: The Sicilian Mafia in Sicilian History

Across the literature on the Italian mafia, there is a lively debate on what the mafia is, and denials of the mafia's existence were common for decades (Santino, 2011, 5). Before the eighties, when the *mafioso* Tommaso Buscetta broke the omertá to reveal the CN's structure, names, rituals, and organization, there were voices claiming that the mafia was no more than a myth. As for how Santoro called it, in order to get to the current debate, mafia studies has also passed through a "recognition problem", based on identifying those elements and features characterizing mafia phenomenon (2015, 7). Currently, although the aforementioned difficulties in defining organized crime (Von Lampe, 2002 and 2017), the debate is still evolving. For instance, while conceptions of the mafia have tended to point towards underlining and understanding "how" mafia shapes and is shaped by the society in which it happens (Santoro, 2015; Santino, 2015), organized crime conceptions primordially deal with answering "who" is the criminal, as if they were not immerse into a broader social context. Before exploring the Sicilian mafia political legitimacy performance, it is needed an exploration on this case, context, and concept. Given the historical background of the case, this needs to start by analyzing how CN is intimately tied up with Italian State formation.

5.1.1. *Mafia and the Italian State: Parallel Histories?*

Across its history, the Sicilian mafia (as well as the Camorra and the 'Ndrangetha with their specificities) has had displayed authority practices in their very local context. Since these practices did contain political content around defining the ruler and the ruled, they deserve special attention from a state-building perspective. Similar to the case of Michoacán, these practices have been continuously linked to formal authority. In this case, the complexity is not minor but certainly much more ancient. In the case of Sicily, this phenomenon of authority overlapping is called *intreccio* or "interweaving". As a result, during certain times, the institutions of the state cannot be distinguished from informal and criminal structures. Moreover, other local agents need to be included to decode the local political legitimacy equation. Thus, how the legal and illegal agent relate becomes relevant, which points the analysis towards a state-building investigation. What is the relationship between CN and the Italian state? Any answer will need to take in consideration that, differently from Michoacán, the Sicilian mafia parallels (or even predates) the modern Italian state, which first unified in 1861.

Since Italian unification, mafias and the state have coexisted. However, despite the blurred line between where the mafia ends and the state begins, during certain episodes, the mafia acted close to what is expected from a modern state. For instance, as Dickie said, the Italian criminal organizations did have a broader territorial presence within "their" regions compared to the Italian state presence during the *Risorgimento* – the process headed by Giuseppe Garibaldi through which Italy was first unified as a single country (2015, 30). Another example in this regard is homogeneity, a modern conceptual expectation that almost no modern state complied with. Indeed, as will be seen in the second section when analyzing the criminal group's political legitimacy performance, CN experienced periods of more unification than the Italian state. That was the case even after the Second World War. Between the sixties and the nineties, CN seemed unified through *omertà* (the code of silence which will be explained later as part of the legitimacy performance analysis), and other inner rules reviewed later (except for certain exceptions as *pentiti*), whereas the Italian public officers and some official institutions "[...] acted in different ways, with some parts preferring to collude with mafia organizations (by fear or interest), and other parts choosing to fight the mafia" (Catino, 2014, 206).

Sicily's history before the *Risorgimento*, wanders between the forgetfulness and indifference of different metropolis. Neither the Naples kingdom nor the Spanish crown (even under different dynasties) worried about installing a strong authority on the island. On the contrary, as long as minimum control and order were guaranteed, these empires continually negotiated with local landlords operating under feudalist regimes. As a result, these landlords became private security guarantors that kept peasants submissive and established a sort of local economic and violence administration inside the island. To what extent these people became later *mafiosi* is hard to answer. However, when the modern Italian state was born, their first decades during the nineteenth century were not very different from the latter empires in this regard. This research does not argue that, during this period, CN was a state into the state, nor the state itself, but that the criminal group was developing legitimacy practices as well as statehood practices by providing governing institutions. Even when there was not yet a name to call it, mafia was already able and prepared to keep doing authority functions. Despite the creation of the new central authority:

"[...] the State failed to monopolize the use of physical force in large areas of western Sicily and, therefore, could not hope to enforce legislation. It is only in this context that the origin and development of *mafia* can be understood. *Mafia* was born of the tensions between the central government and local landowners on the one hand, and between the latter and peasants on the other. At the same time, however, *mafia* helped manage these distinct but interrelated tensions and struggles since it provided a specific code through which members of the various social classes and groups arranged themselves" (Blok, 1974, 92).

As a tension and struggle manager, especially CN comply with a mediation and directive function that fills the space of a more or less absent State authority. By the time state-building

was promoted in Sicily (especially in the first decades of the twentieth century), the mafia was already functioning in Sicily. Gambetta stated that the mafia is primarily “[...] a specific economic enterprise, an industry which produces, promotes, and sells private protection” (1993, 1). Whereas on the other hand, from a political perspective, a recurrent analytical starting point is to consider mafias, and specifically CN, as an anti-state agent –or, to be more precise, *the* parallel or anti-state agent *par excellence* in Sicily (dalla Chiesa, 2014, 3; Gunnarson, 2008, 54). However, in the end, both perspectives recognize CN’s mediation and decision functioning in Sicily’s local public life. According to this perception, the mafia is a counter-state agent as reviewed before, whose ambition and political objective points against the current and legal state authorities. However, there is no evidence of CN attempting to somehow fully replace them.

Moreover, indeed the Italian state-building process has happened, through different historical moments, through a relation between the mafia and the legal authority of corruption, mediations, and negotiations; but also of confrontation – especially with Benito Mussolini, and during the eighties with the *Maxiprocesso* –as will be explained later in this chapter together with its political legitimacy relevance for the case. Especially since the early twentieth century, the Italian state has sought to create a discourse of pre-modernity around the mafia. After the Second World War, Italy removed the monarchy and became a democratic republic. Under the new political system, this posture on mafia was reinforced by the central government, which looked especially at the mafia in Southern Italy as a symbol of backwardness in the region (Dickie, 2015, 335). It was believed that with progress the mafia would naturally disappear. That argument was close to Putnam’s, who explained the difference between North and South of Italy by the presence or absence of social capital (1993).

Therefore, is CN a counter-state agent? For Santino, this perception is a “diffuse” understanding of the phenomenon, which has also contributed to create what he calls the “most diffused stereotypes” on the Sicilian mafia (2011, 5-7). Capodici and Moccia think that mafia is “[...] almost a state into the state” (2016, 10). They follow the words of Pietro Grasso, a former Sicilian judge in charge of prosecutions against CN members, who defined mafia as a “power parallel to the state”. According to Capodici and Moccia, that explains why mafia has been able to promote rules whose respect became imposed as if they were laws (2016, 11). Dickie’s definition of mafia closely follows this argument. He argued that *mafiosi* are much more than only brutal delinquents. Given that mafia infiltrates the State institutions such as the police, judiciary, local councils, and ministries, thus mafia conforms a “parallel governing class in Southern Italy” (2015, 30). This does not suggest two States struggling against each other, but one sole susceptible to become captured by criminal organizations by taking their attributions and tasks into criminals’ hands. However, behind this observation, Dickie did also observe the essential contradiction when it comes especially to mafia and the state in Sicily: despite CN’s illegal agency that conceptually opposes it to

the legal authority, quickly in its history mafia did spread throughout the formal institutions to the point when it becomes impossible to determine “[...] where does the sect end, and the State begins” (2015, 93). Consequently, at least in the case of Sicily, the development of CN and the Italian state cannot be separated.

5.1.2. The Mafia and the Social Order in Sicily

At least in the case of mafia studies, scholars and legal frameworks had improved their conceptions to the point of recognizing that mafia understanding needs to consider how the criminal organization had influenced the Sicilian and Italian socio-cultural setting and vice versa (Santoro, 2015; Dickie, 2015; Santino, 2015; La Spina, 2015; Merlino, 2014; Gambetta, 1993). However, at the same time, especially the CN have historically developed practices and rituals that enhance the criminal group’s cohesion, identity and unity, i.e., influencing and potentially defining the local social order definition –more about this will be explained along this chapter. This means that those scholars dealing with mafia phenomena need to simultaneously tackle the fact that CN is both social agent and social system (Interview in field no. 18, 2018). Indeed, that tension sets the primary analytical challenge for when it comes to understanding the CN. It involves analytically capturing CN’s political legitimacy component as a criminal agent output, while understanding and having a look into how the social conditions interact with the agent, i.e., mafia as a social order input and output. As said earlier, this dilemma is more or less recurrent along the scholars and had produced fruitful debates addressing the sociological dimension of criminality.

Jane and Peter Schneider have contributed to that debate when arguing that “[...] a closer look at the social and cultural aspects of the mafia reveals it to be an engine of insecurity, its order-enhancing structures and solidarity-building rituals frequently distorted by rivalries and provocations” (Schneider and Schneider, 2003, 82). They also studied the “inside” mafia angle, observing “[...] a secretive fraternal order whose norms and ritual practices situate its members ‘outside’ normal society and, in their minds, ‘above’ it” (Schneider and Schneider, 2003, 101). Both observations coexist and one does not cancel the other. Paoli’s argument that the CN provides normative order makes sense from the point of view of this tension (Paoli, 2003, 124-125). As a provider of local historical order, CN becomes a politically relevant agent that also sets and promotes their own rules, while dealing with other agents to keep their mandate. Somehow, Paoli’s argument reconciles the tension. However, from the political legitimacy perspective, it is necessary to go deeper into how that order is preserved, reformulated, or lost over time.

5.1.3. Sicily and the Concept of the Mafia

Given the already explored complication of the mafia-State relations, and because CN have been historically holding a political interest in terms of defining the local social order, the

concept of mafia becomes both relevant as difficult to outline. How to define this criminal group from a political legitimacy perspective? While CN has historically played like a distinctive agent, at the same time it has not been against the Italian State destruction, nor has developed any political statement tending to that. Nando Dalla Chiesa pointed out a profound observation around this problem. While criticizing the limits and possibilities of a war against the mafia, he detected and remarked that those who are promoting it might found that: "[...] the anti-state is not so anti-state as it seems. Alternative and opposed to the rule of law but enveloped and communicating and communicating with the state of affairs, what works in the concreteness of every day. Outlaws but socially and morally legitimate" (2014, p. 3). This research argues that CN did participate in shaping the local social order through both contingent and systematic sovereignty practices.

Moreover, the state is neither homogenous nor unified (Das and Poole, 2004; Migdal, 1988). Hence, as it was with Michoacán as the previous research case, this criminal group needs to be taken into account as one of several parts of the state, coexisting with one dominant image of it, but all of them continually defining the state image as a whole. As a result, CN legitimacy analysis relates to the definition of the social order. Hence, rather than a counter-state, from a political legitimacy discussion, the mafia and specifically CN is realized here in two senses. First, given their sovereignty and legitimacy practices, as a relevant local social agent participating in the definition of the domestic social order. And secondly, CN needs to be considered as a social system through which, in the case of Sicily, power and violence have been historically mediated (Blok, 1974). Santino presented a close this idea when he questioned himself about mafia's political accountability. According to him, mafia is a political subject in a double sense:

- 1) As criminal association, is a power group and a political one in a Weberian sense having the essential characteristics of this group category, namely: a) a set of rules (ordering), b) a territorial dimension, c) physical coercion, d) an administrative apparatus able to ensure compliance with the norms and enforce physical coercion.
- 2) The mafia, as a criminal association and with the social bloc of which it is part, constitutes a broader system of power, and is a source of production of politics in the overall sense, as it determines or contributes to determine decisions and choices concerning the management of power and the distribution of resources (Santino, 2011, 39-40).

Finally, and before proceeding to CN political legitimacy performance, following the argumentation here is needed a conceptual stance around the word "mafia". Indeed, the mafia has been used as an umbrella term (Santoro, 2011, 2). Not only as a synonym for organized crime, but also to refer to a certain way of structuring groups and social relations – such as groups in power, or specific social fields. Moreover, "mafia" also stands for broadly referring to hierarchical and cohesive illegality. Nevertheless, this umbrella concept has been built through time as a result of both empirical CN references, as well as for a large set of features linked to mafia notion usually produced by mass media. Thus, to clarify the concept, mafia

discussion here runs across empirical, theoretical and conceptual references based on the Sicilian mafia. The issue of the mafia and its interest in legitimacy stresses what Santino called the “*produzione mafiosa della politica*” (mafia production of politics) (2011, 40). This approach to the notion mafia enables a focus on how legitimacy was and is explicitly searched by CN, as well as how this search has been participating in the local social order definition. This performance is analyzed in detail and with empirical references in the following section, which follows the operative distribution of legitimacy sources and resources for criminal groups presented in Table 1.

5.2. The Sicilian Mafia: Sources and Resources of Legitimacy

After briefly reviewing the conceptual and historical dimensions of the Sicilian mafia and its political legitimacy interest, now the central question addresses the sources and resources of legitimacy with which CN has been historically and is currently participating in the Sicilian context. CN’s long history has changed over time in struggling with legitimacy. In this regard, the time frame for this research case is considerably longer than the previous, and the sources of legitimacy have not been constant, consistent, and static but unsteady, contingent, and firmly attached to the specific historical stage. Thus, in order to provide data for this issue, this section makes use of both primary and secondary sources. The former was collected during fieldwork; however, for building the latter, this research makes usage of other studies already published about this case. Currently, during the twenty-first century, CN has been experiencing a relatively weak period in terms of authority confirmation. That results from the strengthening of a local anti-mafia movement whose legitimacy relevance for CN, as well as for the Sicilian context, is analyzed later as part of the “portrayal of the enemy” source.

Indeed, Sicily has been experiencing a proportionally direct relation between CN’s undermining of legitimacy and the anti-mafia movement’s enhancement of political legitimacy. However, this phase is not an exception but a confirmation of how important political legitimacy is to explain the whole criminal and political configuration in Sicily. "Totò" Riina, the *capo di tutti i capi* commanded the violence of CN during the nineteen eighties and nineties, died at 87 in November of 2017 in a hospital at the Northern city of Parma. Riina was serving his 26 life sentences. Bernardo Provenzano, Riina’s successor and CN’s operational boss of all bosses, also died in July of 2016. After Provenzano’s death, the *The New York Times* stated: "While its extortion and protection rackets survive, however, the Sicilian Mafia has never fully recovered from the backlash to its bloody legacy" (Roberts, 2016). Indeed, that legacy was covered by a historical authority-building struggle, covered with many political legitimacy specters. Analyzing that backlash, then, needs to be done through a legitimacy lens, in which CN’s ups and downs become visible and rational. Before enlisting the empirical references, here it is needed to underline an analytical warning that will be observed across the data. On the contrary to Michoacán, where LCT and LFM were

interested in having the most exposure possible, when it comes to their political legitimacy claims CN has historically been in the shadows.

For instance, after the First World War, the mafia did not appear publicly as a result of the iron-fisted strategy carried out by the fascist government. However, after the Second World War, CN made a sort of comeback precisely expressed through political legitimacy claims. Consequently, from the sixties until the early eighties, Sicilian CN did expose their mandate without more significant resistance. In terms of political legitimacy, this promoted a more prominent campaign for legitimacy. Since the late nineteen-nineties, CN has had to retreat into the shadows again as a result of the anti-mafia movement's success. Of course, this has an impact on the mandate intensity and profile, as well as in its political legitimacy performance. A relevant and interesting output from this, concerns that this criminal group's political legitimacy performance have historically rested less on material resources (although there have been some), whereas is plenty of non-material and internal manifestations including founding narratives, catholic symbols, initiation rituals, and internal codes. Following Claessen again, this CN's preference for a non-material legitimacy performance is explained because this group spent long periods being an authority (whose legitimacy was mostly based in violence and fear) rather than trying to become one (1988). Except for the recent decades and the Mori operation period (both explained later), CN's challenge was usually to hold the legitimate authority based in fear and violence, rather than achieving it.

Finally, before delving into the CN analysis, two interrelated characteristics of the Italian social landscape should be mentioned: religiosity and the role of the family. According to Doxa, an Italian research center, by 2014, three out of four Italians were Catholic (2014). Moreover, according to the same source, the majority of the population support secularized values (such as freedom of expression and non-religious education); also 62% believe that the dogmas and precepts of the Catholic Church condition the lives of people in general. Moreover, even 75% of the non-Catholics shared this opinion (2014). This is indeed materialized in the importance of the family in the Italian social structure and practices, including patriarchy and hierarchy, and particularly in the most religious areas. Indeed, following the same survey, only the Northwestern part of the country held a more significant part of atheist and agnostics with 41%. The South, where Sicily is located, counted with only 20% of the people declared atheist or agnostic (2014). Through several practices, CN grounded its legitimacy interest on these features as will be seen below. To structure a discussion that later enables the comparison, the coming sections follows the Table 1 on the Operative Distribution of Legitimacy Sources and Resources for Criminal Groups.

5.2.1. Symbolic Sources

Regarding CN's symbolic sources analysis, the referred CN preference for not becoming publicized as a group never meant not to be publicly known as the local and severe authority,

whose mandate is as real as their existence despite the shadiness. Moreover, the symbolic sources profile from CN exhibits how relevant it has been for this group's internal cohesion rather than for external obedience. To some extent, it seemed that this criminal group had understood the latter as a consequence of the former. In other words, the symbolic legitimacy displaying first pointed towards gaining loyalty and discipline from *mafiosi* (current and potential), and later the respect from locals, and not the other way around. Since the local people's support comes as a consequence rather than the main objective, many of the CN symbolic sources had also the *mafiosi* as a legitimacy audience. As a result, the idea of internal cohesion before outward expression dominates the global Sicilian symbolic legitimacy setting. It is not that CN disregarded the interest in discipline and loyalty from the general Sicilian population. However, symbolic sources of legitimacy show that inner cohesion is primary, and the rest comes as a consequence.⁵⁶ How do these two elements, not-publicity and inner-cohesion over popular support, shape CN's symbolic legitimacy ground? Following the Table 1, the symbolic sources are subcategorized into three subtypes: social contract offer, agenda's spread and/or justification, and the spread of symbols.

5.2.1.1. Proposed Social Contract

The "proposed social contract" subtype source of legitimacy becomes expressed through a) granting public services (material resource), b) promoting belonging and cohesiveness, and a trustworthy mandate (non-material resources). Regarding these non-material resources, CN used legitimacy to improve the referred interest in enhancing the inner structure: hierarchy and structure.⁵⁷ On the one hand, the Sicilian mafia is hierarchical and needs a commandment to guarantee loyalty. Its structure is designed that way, so the hierarchy spills into the criminal group.⁵⁸ For instance, regarding the hierarchy, through a sort of "division of labor", CN decides who order crimes (the *mandanti*) and who commits them (the *sicari*)" (Schneider and Schneider, 2003, 98). On the other hand, regarding the structure, Santino explained how every *famiglia mafiosa* has "[...] a variable number of 'soldati', the so-called 'man of honor', organized by dozens, and a *capo* [chief]; three or more contiguous families integrate a *mandamento*, which has its own *capo*" (2011, 24). Family reference, in this case, works parallel as a symbol of trustworthy shelter (very similar as in Michoacán), but also as a practical parameter of structuring the criminal group hierarchy.

⁵⁶ Interestingly, these inner ties efforts enhancing does not necessarily mean that every *mafioso* knows all CN's members, Varese recovered the words of Antonio "Nino" Calderone, a *pentito* who said that, despite being a secret society, not even those who have grown inside CN since childhood "know the identity of all the affiliated" (2017, 14).

⁵⁷ As it was with LFM and LCT, also in this case the research did not get data on the CN granting public services as a material resource in the social contract offer subtype.

⁵⁸ In this regard, Schneider and Schneider argued: "[...] the *cosca* is structured internally along lines of age and privilege, with new recruits, the 'soldiers,' being expected to take greater risks and receive lesser awards" (2005: 503).

In the end, however, this double function points towards internally promoting belonging, cohesiveness, and a trustworthy mandate. In other words, building an internal social contract that later is spread towards the locals in the shape of a ruler and ruled relation. Moreover, externally (this is, towards the local Sicilian people), rather than promoting a trustworthy mandate as a symbolic legitimacy element, CN attempted to offer a strong mandate especially during the second half of the twentieth century, in which any social contract possibility was guided through docility from locals and official authorities (Dickie, 2015). Impunity is the key word here. Since the nineteen-eighties, Sicily has been experiencing a directly proportional relation between impunity and the mafia's symbolic legitimacy success. As long as impunity has been decreasing, so any mafia social contracts offered some possibility – for example, in the eighties the Maxi-Trial explains this switch. As a consequence, CN became unable to offer any strong mandate during the following decades. In other words, the effective mafia production of politics, as Santino defined it (2000), directly depends on the successful exercise of corruption and impunity practices between *mafiosi* and official authorities. It was because of this why dalla Chiesa suggested, in his Anti-mafia manifesto, that “legitimacy” is one out of the five mafia-forces that anti-mafia should dismantle in order to succeed (the other four being “material invisibility”, “conceptual invisibility”, “expansiveness”, and “impunity”).

Although it is not an exclusive CN practice (Schneider and Schneider, 2003), *omertà* needs to be considered as a powerful resource of legitimacy in the social contract offer dimension. *Omertà* practices of honor are those in which individuals keep silent on certain illegalities or deviant actions in favor of prioritizing the criminal group's integrity as a superior interest. This spirit recalls the Hobbesian idea of a social contract in terms of conceding to a superior entity the individual willingness in order to preserve a social order (Hobbes, 1998; Hurd, 1999). However, in this case, the pact does not address the individual faculty for killing others (*homo homini lupus*), but the faculty of keeping silent in favor of the superior entity, i.e., the criminal group. As an unwritten code, *omertà* is a non-material resource of legitimacy that denies the legal authority by compelling the illegal through silence (Sergi, 2014). In other words, *omertà* has not only the practical function of preserving the secrecy of the perpetrators against the potential threat that the law might represent. Moreover, this code has a powerful symbolic role in internally configuring a social contract between the CN's members.

5.2.1.2. *Agenda's Spread and/or Justification*

The "agenda's spread and/or justification" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through a) publications and written codes (material resources), b) founding narratives, songs, anthems, and public messages (non-material resources). As in the case of Michoacán, here the proposed social contract bases its symbolism on the criminal groups' endeavors to establish the basis for a shared destiny. As a particular non-material resource, the myths are related to the criminal group agenda's spread and justification. In this case, the mafia-

founding narratives, as symbolic sources of legitimacy, play a significant role in both sides. Regarding the agenda's spread, this is done by promoting a general explanation of the criminal group's existence. On the other hand, as an agenda's justification, myths also work as epic or heroic justifications of the criminal group's preservation. The mythic and apologetic stories of Osso, Mastrosso, and Carcagnosso as well as Beati Paoli's, play the symbolic role in this regard. Both stories played both roles. Moreover, both stories help to improve the inner cohesion of the group in the sense of the already reviewed social contract offer subtype source of legitimacy. Given that the audience of both aimed more the actual and potential members, rather than the general public, they work for promoting belonging and cohesiveness, which in the end is also a symbolic source but related to the aforementioned social contract offer field.

Indeed, in Sicily, *mafiosi* spread their founding myth narratives. Balandier described the sociological function of myths in explaining and shaping the historical sense of social order (1970), and Migdal observed a connection between the acceptance of the state's myth and the state's desired social order (1988). In this case, two versions have been running. According to the first one, around the fifteenth century, three Spanish brothers and knights escaped from the Iberian Peninsula and shipwrecked in Trapani, in the South of Sicily. The brothers Osso, Mastrosso, and Carcagnosso later settled in different regions where nowadays the three bigger Italian criminal groups are based. Osso, the older brother, stayed in Sicily and founded CN; Carcagnosso made it to Naples, where he founded the Camorra; and, Mastrosso crossed the strait of Messina, arrived in Calabria in the Southern part of continental Italy, and founded the 'Ndrangheta. According to scholars, especially this latter criminal group still using this narration as part of their initiation ritual (Dickie, 2015, 29; Paoli, 1994, 217). Osso, Mastrosso, and Carcagnosso's exile is an exceptional story in the sense of strongly uniting the three criminal groups at least in origin. Somehow, the allegory of their separation serves as anticipated destiny.

During the following decades, each criminal group seemed to have a separate or at least distinct story, although they kept dealing with the Italian state and under the same historical process. Especially in terms of identity, each of them built their own path. The second founding myth focuses mainly on CN and Sicily during a random period between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to this story, a secret cult in Sicily named Beati Paoli acted as a fraternity of pre-modern vigilantes that challenged local political and religious powers and carried out justice across the island. Their secrecy, power, and challenging of authority were defining features as the mafias' predecessors. Beati Paoli's myth reinforced another myth, namely, that the mafia grew out of Sicily's feudalist peasant past, whereas CN rose hand in hand with the capitalist, liberal and modern Italian nation-state (Schneider and Schneider, 2011, 10). Given that no historical references to the sect have been found, this reference becomes more into a powerful mythical narration rather than a historical allusion. Journalistic versions say that Toto Riina, *capo di tutti i capi*, handed copies among

mafiosi of the novel *I Beati Paoli*, initially published in the Sicilian press at the beginning of the twentieth century, and later as a book (Domínguez, 2016).

In this case, the fact that CN welcomed and treasured their founding narrative, either factual or mythological, shows its interest in legitimacy. In the end, these founding myths especially work in improving criminal groups' inner cohesion. Moreover, by condensing an identity, these stories draw a single origin that promotes group identity based on pride, selectiveness, bravery, and more. As a narrative tool, the stories are also powerful enough to encourage belonging and embrace a shared destiny (such as how other identity discourses do so as well). The myths also serve to discursively confirm that mafias are real and formal organizations, rather than social behaviors or lifestyles: even when anyone can pretend to be a "man of honor", not everyone can become one. It is only the criminal group itself who accepts and denies membership. In the end, despite the truthfulness or falseness of these myths, the rationality accompanying the stories uncovers their relevance as a narrative tool and identity builder, both elements concerning political legitimacy.

Finally, in the field of written codes, Dickie's book reproduced a copy of a sort of mafia handbook dated in 2007 enlisted inner rules in a single typescript sheet full of misspells (2015, 129). This text is considerably smaller and discrete compared to the LCT code. Moreover, in this case, the code is also addressing CN's members, rather than locals in Sicily or an ambiguous general audience. LCT, for instance, also addressed their members in the code's prose; however, the distribution plan launched by the Mexican criminal group offers a completely different publicity profile in this regard. Across this CN's code, moral beliefs and values (concerning the symbols spread, analyzed in the following chapter) take part shaping the expected behavior of the elements. Among them were to respect the wife, as well as criteria to not accept new CN members – anyone having relatives in the police, or who had emotionally cheated on his family, having bad behaviors, or anyone who does not stick to traditional moral values (Dickie, 2015, 128-129). In this regard, these cases also show how these groups made justified crime on the one hand, but also their particular agenda on the other. Finally, this is another example in which, even when categorizing implies artificially locating each empirical reference within one of the sources and resources, in the practice the empirical references overlap.

5.2.1.3. Dissemination of Symbols

The "symbol's spread" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through a) identity symbols in ornaments and documents (material resources), and b) rituals, values, moral beliefs, and religiosity (non-material resources). In this regard, here it is convenient to analyze carefully CN's initiation rituals. Although this practice has been least performed by CN in the recent years, the whole platform works as symbol spreading platform. On the one hand, it enables the empirical basis of the criminal group's fictional membership. On the other, the ritual

involves a variety of symbols that shape the group's identity. As it became publicized, the membership also became a restricted feature within CN: "[...] mafia offers its members the privilege of exclusivity and belonging. A symbolically laden rite of entry and effort at lifelong socialization states them 'outside' normal society and, in their view, 'above it'" (Schneider and Schneider, 2005, 503). In order to achieve this goal, the magic that spread the initiation rituals become essential. In this regard, following Catino, the initiation rituals (as well as the *omertà*), embody the spread of values and moral beliefs between the CN members. All of them, non-material resources of legitimacy inserted in the symbols spread dimension. In his words:

Rules exist both within a family, and between families: a system of formal regulations, sometimes in written form, of formal criminal constitutions. These rules discipline organizational life, from the recruiting phase on.³ Initiation rites too are strictly regulated, in ways that differ from organization to organization and with varying levels of rigidity. The oath taken to be a member of the organization, as a *man of honor*, is binding for life,⁴ and it requires a subordination of all allegiances to mafia membership. Honor and secrecy (*omertà*) are key inspiring principles of members' duties (2014, 180-181).

In the case of CN, initiation rituals are also the space in which material symbols become materialized. Indeed, many identity symbols have been used such as blood, religion, and secrecy get combined within this ceremony. According to different versions, the mafiosi get together with new members around a table with a gun and knife at the center. The "Godfather", i.e., the mafioso who is inviting the newbie, explains him the rules and afterward pricks his finger to extract blood that is spilled over the image of a Catholic saint image, usually the virgin. The image burns into the newbie's hands who repeat the oath: "If I betray the Cosa Nostra, let my flesh burn like this sainted woman" (Dickie, 2015, 41).⁵⁹ The prick is what allegedly gives the name to the ritual: the *Punciuta*, Sicilian for "sting".⁶⁰ Only affiliates can attend the ritual (Varese, 2017, 16). Although the ritual wanders between ambiguous reality and media spectacularism (movies have already reproduced it), as a narrative habit it helps to realize a relevant piece on the importance that CN gives to symbolic legitimacy. According to a Palermitan magistrate, CN had to change the ritual nowadays as a protection strategy. Given the judicial investigation improvements, then for Sicily's official authorities become easier to trace *mafiosi* through recognizing who did attend the ritual, as well as who were accompanying (Interview in field no. 4, 2018). The practices might change, but the symbolism persists. Perfect metaphor for CN's history.

⁵⁹ Varese made a suggesting point when remembering that, within the Occidental culture, swearing entails entering the sphere of religious forces. Thus, he continued, as a solemn liturgy contains three elements: the promise of loyalty, the invocation of fearing superior forces, and the punishment for perjury (2017, 18).

⁶⁰ Across this ritual, the symbolism is constantly operating around specific elements. The blood, for instance, works as a bond creation. The oath, on the other hand, enhance honor while reaffirming the idea of belonging and cohesiveness. Finally, legitimacy is borrowed from an already legitimate symbol as it is the virgin image.

Also, on the grounds of non-material resources, religiosity and moral beliefs come together when it comes to CN's spread of symbols. The Sicilian mafia not only borrows Catholic iconography in symbols, practices, and the general belief setting for legitimacy purposes, but has translated Catholic morality as the justice parameter to the point in which the Catholic faith works as the rule that *mafiosi* should respect. In other words, religiosity is a political legitimacy reference that structure CN while also organizes morality standards. According to the Italian magistrate Roberto Scarpinato, "The head of Cosa Nostra, Michele Greco, was a practicing Catholic, who died in prison without with the Bible in his hands without collaborating with justice. Pietro Aglieri, an important leader of the mafia, during the period of his hiding, made a priest come to his retirement to celebrate mass. After being captured, he got a degree in theology. He has always refused to cooperate with justice since his Catholic formation had taught him that the important thing is to repent before God and not before men — the same opinion as Riina's wife, Ninetta Bagarella" (2011).⁶¹ Following this logic, a *mafioso* does not rule his life through men's rule, but through God's mandate.

5.2.2. Performance-Centered Sources

According to Sciarrone, the mafia is a phenomenon of a secret society, which also needs a certain degree of social recognition (2016). His idea hits into a critical CN angle. That is, while indeed this criminal group prefers to keep in the shadows regarding publicity avoidance, at the same time, as an illegal social agent interested in political legitimacy it also needs to be simultaneously recognized as an ultimate authority. How to manage this contradiction? The answer somehow addresses to the understanding of the "performance-centered" sources of legitimacy. To some extent, the actions undertaken under this source umbrella make CN visible, whereas the "portrayal of the enemy" sources also make them visible but as a result of CN's enemy's interest – as will be explored later, after this section. In other words, this section analyzes the actions that CN launched for becoming visible although shadowy, while achieving and preserving social recognition and authority building. Afterward, by analyzing CN's stance against their enemies, a section will examine the actions launched by other local social agents making CN visible but to undermine the same social recognition and mandate. Following Table 1, the performance-centered sources are subcategorized into three subtypes: provision of governing institutions, philanthropy (carrots), and coercion (sticks). The latter two are grouped into one unique section in order to sharpen the analysis.

5.2.2.1. Provision of Governing Institutions

⁶¹ This is my translation from the transcript of the discourse made by Elisa Norio. More on religiosity as a source of legitimacy for CN is analyzed later in this chapter when reviewing the case of the procession of Saint Agatha.

The "provision of governing institutions" subtype source of legitimacy is expressed through a) taxation and economy (material resource), and b) security and justice managing, as well as labor regulations (non-material resources). The Sicilian case shows how the mafia was able to provide governing institutions for decades by crisscrossing the local cultural code with *mafiosi* power, through violence, corrupting official authorities or simply by becoming the *de facto* authority. An example of this is the already referred idea of *intreccio* or "interweaving", as well as the hinge function that mafia displayed as factual government models – usually as solving-conflict or mediation agents. Usually, by promoting and protecting this institution providing, CN extracts concrete benefits that not necessarily are exclusively economic profits, but indeed political recognition and reaffirmation. In other words, this is criminal mediation launched and consolidated the criminal group's mandate. Particularly before the anti-mafia movement enhancement, CN did this to the point that quietly and violently spread the idea that no Sicilian public life can happen without the mob (Schneider and Schneider, 2003). In the words of Sciarrone:

Mafia groups can find opportunities for growth where it is problematic to guarantee the protection of property rights and the execution of contracts. In these cases, they can behave as a sort of private government of the economy, specializing in the production and sale of protection, or proposing themselves as mediators and guarantors of transitions that take place in contexts characterized by high uncertainty. It is important to point out that the mafias are not an anti-State, they rather seek cohabitation with the institutions (2016).⁶²

Moreover, rather than seeking local support or sympathy, the Sicilian mafia has historically sought local resignation to the mafia's authority. This is different from Michoacán. There, the criminal group displayed a confusing public portrayal oscillating between a friendly criminal group in the discourse, and a bloody violent one in the practice. In Sicily, the mafia did not register friendly claims in this sense. On the contrary, the historical public display pointed towards a strong criminal authority – especially after the Second World War and until the nineteen-eighties and nineties. Actually, challenging that premise is at the core of the anti-mafia fight and also of some academics. Schneider and Schneider did so with the aforementioned Sicilian myth concept (2005), but also Santino, Santoro, Dickie, and others. Either from activism or from the field of ideas, both have been counteracting CN's symbolic legitimacy. However, as said earlier, CN needs to be understood in different historical stages. During the second half of the nineteenth century, i.e., after the Italian unification, from a legitimacy perspective, CN could be described as a feudal but strong mediator and authority.

To some extent, the Italian mafia and the Italian state have had significant legitimacy clashes during the nineteenth century after the Risorgimento, later against Mussolini's fascist government, and finally in the last decades of the twentieth century in the context of the Maxi Trial. These confrontations have been happening due to how political authority has been

⁶² This is my translation from Italian.

configured in those regions where the mafia has and had a presence, and the legal and official authority has had some or none at all. That is, where the effective power displaying of the national state had been weak and, as a consequence, “[...] *mafiosi* were invested by a variety of public functions” (Paoli, 1994, 213). By acting as judges, mediators, as well as protectors, argued Arlacchi, *mafiosi* became a sort of condensation of what was expected from the state. Following his idea: “[...] honor transformed itself into authority, and finally into legitimacy. The legitimacy, then in its turn, turned into a further source of confirmation and amplification of honor” (1983, 114-115). Hence, interestingly legitimacy worked as an instrument that enabled the whole authority-building process on the one hand, but not only. In the case of CN, it also seemed to feed the sense of honor that in the end reinforce *mafiosi*’s mandate. This cycle started lasted until the First World War ended, when CN became Mussolini’s enemy during the Mori’s operation – which is analyzed later as an “expression against formal authorities” subtype source.

The first explanation on mafia studied by Italian official authorities took place during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it did not talk about "the mafia" but about the “*questione Meridionale*” (the Southern question). For Anton Blok, whose work is an obligated reference in the study of the mafia in Sicily, given the developing differences between the Italian regions, the Southern question was the background in which nineteenth century *mafiosi* operated as violent entrepreneurs that served as mediators between the town and country, i.e., the state and the countryside (Blok, 1974; Watts, 2016, 70).⁶³ However, this criminal proto-institutionalism lasted with ups and downs during the twentieth century. Moreover, this mediation is part of all the set of tangible mafia elements that became visible as a result of the formation of a central government apparatus (Blok, 1974, 89-90). Nevertheless, more than not having a clue on the phenomenon, Italian official authorities exhibited contradictory diagnoses that only detected a phenomenon of infiltration (Puccio-Den, 2015, 75). Interestingly, while in practice both mafia and public officers were actually interacting (i.e., the *intreccio*), in the legal definition the formal authority was unable to

⁶³ In this regard, CN has an interesting similarity with LFM and LCT regarding the economy angle. This is, that both developed governing functions addressing to regulate the local agro-industrial and farming production. Coincidentally, in both cases the citrus were deeply relevant in this regard. This phenomenon is analyzed in the last chapter.

recognize the mafia.⁶⁴ This idea again recalls how interrelated and interconnected are the Italian state and the mafia historical processes.⁶⁵

Somehow, quickly in the nineteenth century, the Southern question became more a legitimacy problem of the early Italian political modernity, rather than only a criminal one. As effective but atypical power holders, *mafiosi* held an unusual position during these years –that, indeed, persisted with more or less similarity during the twentieth century. On the one hand, *mafiosi* did count with active political and territorial control experience (Arlacchi, 2007, 152-159). However, as mediators, the mafia was not necessarily against the central government. On the contrary, their existence and persistence addressed that middle point: between being the real ruler while letting the central government exist and realize their governing limitations. In an interesting article, Santino analyzed and described sixteen historical moments of the mafia between 1861 and the early years of the twentieth century. His intention was to underline how the mafia already surrounded Sicily's public life, even when it was discretely or barely named. Since then, he argued, the mafia has been building its "political subjectivity", the core activity of mafia association, which also involved the formal authority (2015, 71). As a result, quickly in the story, state and mafia became nearly indistinguishable, and the twentieth century only contributed to the confusion and complexity.

⁶⁴ This drastically changed in the eighties of the twentieth Century, when the Italian penal code was modified. With this new "anti-mafia law" (Santino, 2011, 17) the Italian law stopped punishing "the criminal" as an individual *mafioso*, and start doing so by punishing the *associazione di tipo mafioso* (mafia-type association), i.e., to punish the resulted bonding from belonging the mafia. By unifying La Torre and Rognoni law projects presented, this apparently small change was a significant legal improvement that later contributes to two goals. In the first place, eliminated the ambiguity and uncertain contour of this social phenomenon. The law eliminated the culturist confusion about who is and how a *Mafioso* looks like and, instead, established a criminological criterion in order to define and punish how mafia associations are (Puccio-Den, 2015, 80). Moreover, two types of illegal associations were codified, criminal and the mafia association, in which the presence of intimidation, the associative bond, the subjection, and the *omertà* configured this innovative legal type. After more than a century dealing with the mafia, the Italian State had finally achieved its own RICO laws –that is, the set of regulations used in the United States in order to dismantle local mafias (Dickie, 2015, 595). In the second place, once the penal code started to distinguish between the criminal association and the *mafiosi* association, the judicial system legal capacities significantly improved and the biggest trial against the mafia in the Italian history was launched: The Maxi Trial. The relevance of this law deserves to be included here literally in order to observe how the Italian legality did transform a criminal type from an individual prosecution to a social and relational phenomena: "The association is of the mafia type when those who are part of it, make use of the force of intimidation of the association bond and of the condition of subjection and of silence that results from committing crimes, to acquire directly or indirectly the management or in any case the control of economic activities, of concessions, of authorizations, public tenders or services or to realize profits or advantages unfair for oneself or for others, or in order to prevent or hinder the free exercise of the vote or to obtain votes for oneself or others in election consultations" (quoted in Santino, 2011, 18).

⁶⁵ Two ideas need to be underlined and reiterated in this regard. In the first place, at least in the case of Sicily, the Italian State formation holds an intimate link to criminality. Second, and from a legitimacy perspective, who gets on top as the dominant authority results from the foundational interconnection between the legal and illegal authority.

From a practical perspective, CN has historically attempted (and usually successfully) to comply with specific governing duties. Gambetta, for instance, suggested that the main one in this regard is the security provision service (1993). He named this security as a private one. However, the mafia “service” is directly related to the government’s lack of security provision. The action that embodies this idea is the extortion, named as *pizzo* and also with particularities as it was reviewed in the case of Michoacán. Indeed, as happens in Michoacán, in Sicily the practice of extortion connects all performance-centered legitimacy subtype sources: provision of governing institutions, philanthropy, and coercion. From the perspective of the institutions providing, any likeness with the legal state taxation is no coincidence. How many influence and inspiration does *pizzo* took from state taxes is hard to measure. Despite similarities, Varese observed a distinction. According to him, "Mafia taxation is personalized, unlike (at least in theory) than that imposed by the State, and often men of honor ask for additional payments in kind" (2017, 39). Nevertheless, both *pizzo* and state taxation have a powerful similarity: paying them validates the social norms of who is asking for it, either the mafia or the state. On the other hand, *pizzo* is also a platform through which CN has handed out Sicilians several sticks and much fewer carrots.

5.2.2.2. *Philanthropy and Coercion: Carrots and Sticks*

The "philanthropy" subtype source of legitimacy becomes expressed through a) gifting (material resource), and b) promises and hope generation (non-material resources). On the other hand, the "coercion" subtype becomes expressed through a) weapons and ammo control (material resource), and b) fear and use of threat or violence (non-material resource). Across the Italian criminal groups, *pizzo* is a practice that condenses the mafia seal of authority affirmation, although this is mostly through fear and the use or threat of violence, but without promises of benefits or generating hope across locals. CN and the *pizzo* in Sicilian is not the exception but a particularly illustrative confirmation of this. According to Dickie, *pizzo's* term originally comes from the medieval prison life in Naples. Those inmates who recently arrived at the prison had to pay several sorts of informal taxes charged by the veteran inmates, including one for the small space in which they slept. To not pay that *pizzo* meant to suffer punishments that went from insults to being assassinated (2015, 56). Following the idea, Santino argued that:

The activity [of asking for *pizzo*], controlled by a ‘*camorrista di giornata*’, consists in extortion, practiced *una tantum* or repetitively on non-affiliated prisoners. The ‘*pizzo*’ (from *vagnarsi u pizzu*: bathe the beak) or the ‘*lampa*’ (the candle to ascend in front of a sacred image) is a ticket that you pay to ‘*fancisi*’, i.e., to the affiliates, for buy security and protection” (2015, 43). Besides, as a powerful phenomenon, *pizzo* phenomenon has historically become “[...] one of the fundamental practices of mafia action. *Pizzo* is a crime that has the function of accumulation and territorial domination, while being a form of criminal taxation, in competition with the State (Santino, 2011, 72).

As a criminal-political performance, asking for *pizzo* becomes a validation of the same set of social norms imposed by mafia (Di Trapani and Vaccaro, 2014, 15). This has both symbolic and practical utilities for CN. As a performance, it helped to reaffirm authority. In practice, it transformed basic needs such as authoritative functions into favors and obedience, i.e., sticks. In other words, this research understands *pizzo* as an overwhelming sovereign practice through which CN displays performance-centered sources of legitimacy by shaping the provision of governing institutions, but most importantly, oscillating between violently offering carrots and (mostly) sticks to victims, who eventually become the ruled. More than a simple extortion, as a practice it reunites the elements that configure how the ruler and the ruled relate in contexts where the state authorities are neither completely distinguishable nor completely distinct. Probably, the most relevant empirical reference in order to sharpen this is assassination of Libero Grassi by, presumably, CN members.

Addiopizzo is a Palermitan NGO dedicated to fighting *pizzo* practice since 2004. Its slogan appeals not only to conviction but also to a sense of dignity concerning those who ask as well as those who pay for *pizzo*: "*Un intero popolo che paga il pizzo è un popolo senza dignità*" (An entire people that pays for *pizzo*, is a people without dignity). The phrase was inspired by Libero Grassi, a Sicilian entrepreneur who produced pajamas in Palermo. CN assassinated him in 1991 for his opposition to paying *pizzo*. Indeed, Grassi's words went against a relevant resource of legitimacy spread by CN when extorting fear. Moreover, his diagnosis was accurate: by spreading this fear, CN attempted to undermine locals' dignity through *pizzo*, while simultaneously enhanced the criminal group's authority. Grassi opposed this practice when no one else did and made his opposition public on national TV: "I do not pay because I do not want to renounce to my entrepreneur dignity" (quoted in Di Trapani and Vaccaro, 2014, 32). Actually, after the first ask for "contributions", Grassi asked help to the police. As a consequence, three extortionists were incarcerated. However, that provoked that *pizzo* petitions became dangerous threats (Dickie, 2015, 691). Grassi decided to publish a letter in the local media addressed to his "*Caro estortore*" (dear extorter):

I wanted to warn our unknown extorter to save the phone calls from the threatening tone and the expenses for the purchase of fuses, bombs, and bullets, as we are not available to make contributions and we put ourselves under police protection. I built this factory with my own hands, I have been working for a lifetime, and I do not intend to close...If we pay 50 million, they will then return to the office asking for more money, a monthly fee, we will be destined to close up shop in a short time. This is why we said no to the 'Geometra Anzalone' and we will say no to all those like him (Grassi in the *Giornale di Sicilia*, January 10, 1991, quoted in Addiopizzo, 2018).

Since Grassi's assassination, especially the Palermitan civil society has progressed in conforming anti extortion organizations. Addiopizzo and SOS Impresa, an entrepreneur association born in Sicily's capital for the same purpose, are clear examples in this regard. In the case of the first one, since the very beginning, Addiopizzo realized that legitimacy was the game they need to play in order to challenge *pizzo* as a spread and respected norm by

Sicilians. Somehow, Addiopizzo's story can be followed through stickers. One day before being founded, in 2004, Palermo woke up with a large number of stickers pasted across its downtown streets. The stickers included the phrase: "*Un intero popolo che paga il pizzo è un popolo senza dignità*" (An entire people that pays *pizzo* is a people without dignity) (Addiopizzo, 2018). Once working, the NGO carried out a project that is still working today. By offering legal advising, Addiopizzo approaches to local shops to convince them of 1) do not pay *pizzo*, 2) denounce with the police the extortion, and 3) promote to expand the anti-*pizzo* culture. The cherry on the top of this process is also a sticker with a cross that states: "*Consumo critico. Addiopizzo. Pago chi non paga*" (Critical Consume. Addiopizzo. I pay to those who do not pay [*pizzo*]).

Indeed, the strategy involves not only producers and sellers but also (and especially) consumers (Di Trapani and Vaccaro, 2014, 45). Consumers supposedly also realize that they share responsibility in the definition of social order when it comes to mafia presence. The sticker can be found in Palermo and is also a sign of affiliation to the NGO. Currently, according to their webpage 999 businesses are affiliated to Addiopizzo, more than 13 thousand consumers support them, and 184 schools are currently involved in anti-*pizzo* training (checked in March 21, 2019 at www.addiopizzo.org). Addiopizzo designed and carried out the creation of a list that includes both businesses and consumers committed to anti-*pizzo*. After collecting them, the NGO printed a booklet and uploaded it to their website. Publicity and spread were the main idea. A member of explained a poster stick to a wall of Addiopizzo's headquarters, at Palermo: "Those are declaration of gangsters about Addiopizzo, they are evaluating to either extort or not shops affiliated, and said, 'There will be more problems than the advantages [profits] to get to them [to extort]'" (Interview in field no. 14, 2018). Indeed, the police and judges are also working together with the NGO. Behind this strategy of adding more and more to their cause, there is much more than solidarity. There is a web that first points to become consolidated and, second, to enhance the inner ties against mafia. Interestingly, this might sound pretty much like the mafia's symbolic agenda.

As long as CN was united through inner ties, it became much easier to build and later operate the mandate. Indeed, if the mafia and anti-mafia struggle is played out over legitimacy, the case of *pizzo* and Addiopizzo is an emblematic example. While narrating how the NGO Addiopizzo was created, Di Trapani and Vaccaro quoted a Sicilian merchant resistant to the anti-*pizzo* mission. According to the authors, the man said with deep conviction that, in Sicily, "[...] everything is mafia, thus nothing is mafia. We are all *mafiosi*, so the mafia is a way like another to order society, to do what the central government does not know or does not want to do" (2014, 13). Since the last decade, Addiopizzo's have been making firm steps towards changing the situation. Nevertheless, the merchant's statement as well as Addiopizzo's success confirm the aforementioned directly proportional relation, in which the mafia's (in)capacity to perform violence and ruler functions defines how mafia's legitimacy performs. This statement can be traced across history: strong mafia during the late nineteenth

century or post Second World War on the one hand; and weak mafia during fascism or since the late nineteen-nineties and current century.

Even when *pizzo* is still being practiced, as an ongoing phenomenon Addiopizzo has successfully undermined CN's legitimacy. This organization "[...] clearly represents a discontinuity element within anti-mafia's history" (Di Trapani and Vaccaro, 2014, 127). They have done and continue to do so by "spreading the values of social justice and honesty in a difficult social environment plagued by Mafia" (Vaccaro, 2012, 23). One of the criticisms of the organization is that, so far, the strategy is mostly working in the wealthy neighborhoods of Palermo while the most marginal zones still work under mafia rule (Dickie, 2015). Indeed, this is a symptom that reinforces that this is an ongoing phenomenon in Palermo and to some extent in Sicily. In any case, the context in which Addiopizzo has been succeeding is the same that was described under a strong promotion of the culture of lawfulness. In this regard, it can be argued that denying paying *pizzo* is also a "rebellion behavior for legality". Despite being an illegal practice, since it was the mafia who promoted and validated the norm, and it was also the mafia who was mainly defining the social order, thus, to defy and not follow it becomes a rebel attitude.

Currently, there are no trustworthy figures on how many extortion cases have been happening, as well as how many of them have *mafiosi* as the responsible. However, at least on the streets of Palermo the *pizzo* spirit is still prowling around. On the one hand, the locals who still have in mind the symbolic "mafia arriving" for asking *pizzo*: glue in the businesses entrance lock (Interview in field no. 14, 2018) as well as neighbor's whispering.⁶⁶ On the other hand, there are the migrants coming from Africa and Asia who either do not fear or at least react different to both mafia and *pizzo* practice. As analyzed earlier, when it comes to *pizzo* migrants also get related as perpetrators or as victims. For instance, as perpetrators, Varese argued that CN difficulties in asking *pizzo* to human traffickers coming from Northern Africa are due to their lack of contacts. Moreover, the Sicilian mafia has also problems in charging landing *pizzo* as traffickers can easily change the arriving point into the island, putting this activity out of mafia control (Varese, 2017, 47). On the other hand, as victims, the migrant business owners that become victims of *pizzo* certainly doubt to ask for help to the police due to their legal situation (Interview in field no. 14, 2018). Organizations such as Addiopizzo together with official authorities such as the police and judges still have significant challenges in this regard.

⁶⁶ In this regard, Addiopizzo had already documented the how CN, at Palermo, charges *pizzo* differently depending on the neighborhood. Moreover, usually this geographical distribution for asking *pizzo* uses to coincide with the local police patrolling distribution (see Picture 13). In this regard, to some extent, *pizzo* in Palermo also works for CN as neighborhoods control mechanism through which the criminal group mark affirms their presence in the territory depending on the area of the city.

The use or threat of violence is a non-material resource of legitimacy inserted in the “Coercion” subtype source. *Pizzo* is, in this regard, a practice that makes this resource visible. However, during the nineteen-eighties and nineties, CN increasingly displayed violence with public assassinations. Some of them were against emblematic victims in Sicilian history.⁶⁷ These events took Sicily outside of the shadows, while reinforcing the CN's (bloody) authority. In other words, the eighties and nineties mafia violence, served for making public stands against their enemies, i.e., those whose interest was against mafia control and social order definition. However, the last decades have been contrastingly different regarding violence. As said earlier, from a legitimacy perspective, CN has been undermined in the last decades as a result of confrontations especially against the anti-mafia movement. A consequence the criminal group's violence has decreased. However, the absence of violence does not mean absence or cancelation of the CN's political legitimacy performance. Santino exposed an idea around this. First, as a private type, mafia violence implies in the first place rejecting the Weberian monopoly of the state's use of force. Second, it makes competition for the internal and external command prevail in order to impose “[...] the mafia control on the social context, on the daily life and the economic and political choices” (2011, 31). In the third place, since violence and impunity used to go together in Sicily, then mafia violence was usually a part of how both formal and factual authority was established.

Finally, Santino made an interesting parallel with Arendt's instrumental understanding of violence: mafia violence is an instrument, i.e., a channel through which the essential mafia objectives can be achieved. Moreover, he said, this idea is inscribed in a vision in which it is legitimate to look for self-justice without involving the formal authority. As a result, violence is a non-renounceable attribute of the mafia (2011, 31-33). In this regard, abandoning the use of violence would also mean renouncing their authority and, consequently, one of the main sources of legitimacy. To some extent, Dickie coincided with the latter point by stating that, without violence, there is no mafia. However, he also followed the idea that violence is not the end nor the last goal by admitting, for the mafia, violence is only “the beginning” (2015, 346). For instance, to corrupt the legal institutions, cut the citizens' life options, avoid justice, and transform mafia's mediation into the tribunal's alternative are goals that this scholar listed between the achievements that mafia can gain through violence. Indeed, these ideas on mafias and violence enable to start this section on CN sources and resources of legitimacy. As it was

⁶⁷ The shift could be explained through the tragic appearance of emblematic victims, the so-called “excellent cadavers” (Schneider and Schneider, 2001, 431; Paoli, 2003, 12) and the work they did against mafia before being assassinated precisely by *mafiosi*. During the seventies, eighties, and nineties, mafia killed well-recognized local individuals with diverse professional profile and ideology. These people common denominator was precisely their labor against CN. The “excellent cadavers” symbolism was powerful enough to inspire and improve the anti-mafia work and, consequently, to undermine CN political legitimacy by unifying this movement that became the most significant criminal group threat to its mandate. Contrary to what used to happen with the so-called *Lupara Bianca*, i.e., mafia victims who have been killed in a way their corps cannot be found, the “excellent cadavers” were publicly exposed. With more or less public attention, each assassination took a place in the public debate domain and inspired new generations and sympathizers to keep anti-mafia actions. Along the “excellent cadavers” profile there are journalists, bishops, judges, authorities, etcetera.

in the case of LFM and LCT, violence becomes instrumental, and this also affects the political legitimacy discussion.

5.2.3. Portrayals of the Enemy

Before starting this analysis, it is necessary to consider that, given this criminal group shadowy presence, most of CN expressions against enemies have actually been reactions. In other words, the historical relation between the Sicilian mafia and other social agents oscillates between a lasting ambiguity and contingent and spontaneous stances against those enemies. Possibly, the first “mafia enemy displaying” was Mussolini’s regime, when the attacks against the mafia were swift and aggressive that CN did not react enough quick nor strong to make a stand against fascism. However, especially over the last several decades, CN faced what can be considered new powerful but peaceful enemies, i.e., the heterogeneous anti-mafia movement. Di Trapani and Vaccaro argued that “[...] a force prevailing outside the law, like the mafia, could not do without triggering a reaction against it” (2014, 15). In this regard, CN has a particular stance towards the current law. As a consequence of the mafia’s role in the state-building process in Southern Italy, as well as the resulting interweaving with the legal authorities, the Sicilian mafia was not necessarily portraying and standing against an enemy or the current law as long as their authority did not become questioned. This oscillation is analyzed above. Following Table 1, “portrayal of the enemy” is subcategorized into: expressions against formal authorities, expressions against other (non-formal) authorities, and stances towards the current law. The three subtypes are expressed through a) documents (material resource), and b) negotiations and confrontations (non-material resources).

5.2.3.1. Expressions Against Formal Authorities

During the last decade of the nineteenth century and up to before the First World War, the Italian state made more or less successful efforts towards democracy, whereas the Southern question remained both vague and real. Nevertheless, when the Great War began, the deep inner division provoked two postures among Italian politicians regarding whether to participate or not in the war. Among those who agreed with military involvement was Benito Mussolini, who promoted one of the first nationalist discourses in Italy in the twentieth century. In May 1915, Italy signed an agreement with London stating that, in case of winning, the regions of Trentino, Alto Adige and Trieste (which belonged then to the Austro-Hungarian Empire) would become Italian (Irimiás, 2014). In the Italian commanders’ mind, nationalism and unification were the keywords during the war. In this regard, the Southern question was not an issue during war times and, thus, given for granted inside the unification discourse. However, when the war ended, winning territories stopped being the priority, and the task was now to promote unification by improving the central government commandment.

Mussolini found on CN in particular and mafias in general, his main enemy to that purpose (Woodiwiss, 2017, 247). That was the first time that CN faced the formal authority as an enemy. The “Mori-operation” carried out in Sicily by the fascist Italian government after the First World War was the first and perfect example in this regard. In charge of Cesare Mori, also known as the “Iron Prefect” due to his iron-fisted actions against CN in Sicily, this operation intended to undermine the mafia’s authority publicly: *mafiosi* were aggressively captured, their families held as hostages, and their possessions sold at ridiculously low prices. As a consequence, around 450 *mafiosi* arrests were carried out all around the island, as well as countless violent intimidations (Dickie, 2015, 272). The political legitimacy game was indeed being played but mostly through the violence and fear arenas. However, as discussed before, this game not only concerns the agents disputing legitimacy but also the audiences of that legitimacy interest. This case was not the exception. When the Second World War started, Mussolini's regime turned his sight again to the North and, by doing so, gave breath to the "Southern question".

For CN, this meant a rest from the repressive fascist dictatorship that lasted for decades given the fail of fascism during the war. Scholars of mafia identify this mafia comeback as a sort of resurrection that, indeed, also shaped the mafia’s most violent version in Italian history (Dickie, 2015; Schneider, 2018). Democracy also returned eventually but, before, the war's aftermath brought the Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories (AMGOT) to Sicily. The AMGOT was a transitory governing body mainly commanded by the United States and the United Kingdom and mostly implemented in the Axis countries. At 1943, after the Husky Operation (code name for the military operation Allied Invasion of Sicily) launched, the Allies invaded Sicily and installed the AMGOT that lasted until February of 1944. Despite apparently being a short time, the AMGOT period served as a transitory stage from which mafia took advantage to recover political relevance. Almost from its ashes, *mafiosi* quickly resumed, in the devastation of the Allied government and the people in the war-devastated streets.⁶⁸

Under the AMGOT administration, the foreign authorities faced many difficulties in establishing order. As a British former police officer and member of Sicily’s AMGOT contingent described the situation after landing in Syracuse, in the Southeastern part of the island: "Apart from being told that we were to endeavor to re-establish the civil administration, particularly the police, in areas captured by the Allies, and to liaise between the Allied Forces and the public, we had received neither pre-training nor directives of any

⁶⁸ Among the mafia studies, the notion of *intreccio* is close to the “hinge” idea and, somehow, attempts to tackle these cases. Translated as "interweaving", it refers to corrupt scenarios in which mafia involves its political or economic interests into the public authorities’ agenda (Schneider and Schneider, 2003, 18; Rakopoulos, 2018, 184). However, this idea restricts the action to pragmatic corruption; on the contrary, understanding mafia as a hinge presumes to take these actions beyond towards a political legitimacy interest.

kind on the type of work we were expected to carry out" (Rawlings, 1987, 35). Although the destruction, *mafiosi* knew the field and the codes and were indeed prepared to do the job. After observing to what extent AMGOT officers and *mafiosi* became intimate to establish local law and order, Sicilians withdrew their confidence from AMGOT (Dickie, 2015, 323). Nevertheless, instead of playing against the mafia's interest, this output was utterly convenient for the criminal group in order to restore their mandate. On the other hand, the new Italian democratic era would sooner or later have to face how to deal with the mafia's return, and its power increasing. Henceforth, especially within the two immediate postwar decades, CN's power became more and more effective all-around Sicily. This process implied widespread violence and, as a reaction, a heterogeneous anti-mafia movement emerged shaping also the local legitimacy panorama.

Some of the anti-mafia members should be considered as "other non-formal authorities" (and, thus, analyzed in the coming section. However, some others were legal and official authorities and, hence, needs to be analyzed since they belong to the CN's stance against formal authorities. This is the case of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, whose names and faces can be currently found all around Palermo in particular and Sicily in general – as a matter of fact, Palermo's airport was named *Aeroporto Falcone Borsellino*. Very close to Palermo's port, in the corner of the principal avenue Via Cala and the small alley Via Mura della Lupa a big mural is featured with a picture of Falcone and Borsellino together. Made by the photojournalist Tony Gentile in March of 1992, the shot portrays two smiling accomplices. Are these two judges, assassinated by the mafia, the strongest anti-mafia symbol? The question is certainly hard to answer. However, Falcone and Borsellino have indeed become a symbol that unites almost all of the anti-mafia sectors, and a representation of the general stand against the mafia.

Their historic weight is especially relevant in terms of legitimacy because, on the one hand, their death condensed years of the anti-mafia fight which, eventually, undermined CN's legitimacy; and on the other, their symbolism works as an actual civil society power that threatens any political legitimacy chance for the mafia currently. Both Falcone and Borsellino were born in Palermo, in 1939 and 1940 respectively. Their careers inside the Sicilian judicial field brought them to closely work with Rocco Chinnici, an anti-mafia judge. Rocco was one of the first inside the Sicilian legal system in understanding a legitimacy aura around the mafia. Therefore, Chinnici looked for public support to the anti-mafia cause by leaving his office at Palermo's Justice Palace and attending schools and public events to speak about anti-mafia and, of course, about mafia (Dickie, 2014, 606). His assassination in 1983 in a car bomb by *mafiosi* caused public commotion. To some extent, Falcone and Borsellino were inspired by Chinnici's example and promoted justice against the mafia from a broader space that was not limited to courts, but which began and finished precisely at courts. According to Santoro, three new actors joined the arena of Mafia studies during the eighties and

increased knowledge of the the phenomenon: the historians, the judges, and the *pentiti* (2011, 13). Falcone and Borsellino were fundamental in the inclusion of the latter two.

During the nineteen-eighties, Falcone and Borsellino lead the first and emblematic Sicilian Pool Anti-Mafia. Together with other magistrates and judicial men, the pool boosted the greatest anti-mafia legal achievements in the twentieth century: the *Maxiprocesso* (Maxi Trial). The relevance of the Poll and the Maxi Trial was the success that both had in taking CN out of the shadows, pointing them out as culprits of Sicily's security and violence, and questioning the criminal group's authority, including their practices as *pizzo*. Held between 1985 and 1986, the Maxi Trial collected legal evidence against Mafiosi thanks to Tommaso Buscetta's witness declarations. As the very first official *pentito*, Buscetta's declarations were the first to be heard by the Sicilian judicial system.⁶⁹ These helped Falcone to launch the Maxi Trial by collecting data from the first hand, but also implied to definitely confirmed CN existence, which for some was still considered as a myth. The Maxi Trial made use of a relevant legal change happened years before. Only days after General dalla Chiesa's assassination, a substantial law change related to mafia prosecution was approved into the penal code. Pio La Torre and Virginio Rognoni promoted and achieved the urgent approbation of those projects of law that each of them proposed in the Italian parliament.⁷⁰

Led by Falcone, the Anti-mafia Pool achieved to detect CN members participating in the so-called French Connection (the drug trafficking scheme through which tons of heroin was smuggled from Turkey to the United States and passing by Marseille, in France, and Canada), as well as in the Pizza Connection (a judicial investigation conducted in the United States by the DEA and FBI, through which was found that millions of dollars from heroin selling were laundered through pizza parlors owned by CN members) (Chepesiuk, 1999, 105-108). However, based on Buscetta's confessions, the Pool finally arrested 366 *mafiosi* during September of 1984. More than three years later, in December of 1987, the verdict indicated life imprisonment for nineteen CN members including Riina, and other shorter sentences as well as 114 absolutions (Dickie, 2015, 638). Nevertheless, the Maxi Trial success did not only rest on the penalties but also in how the structure was uncovered mainly thanks to many conversations between Falcone and Buscetta.

Falcone and Borsellino assassinations by CN are the only expression registered against them. On May 23, 1992, as Falcone and his wife were coming back to Palermo, hundreds of kilograms of explosives that had been installed by mafia on the highway detonated. The explosion caused their death, as well as other police officers that were accompanying

⁶⁹ More than a decade before, in 1973, Leonardo Vitale also confessed and became the very first *pentito*. However, judges did not take his words seriously by adducing madness. Due to that, all the alleged by Vitale were declared innocent.

⁷⁰ The already referred Rognoni-La Torre law resulted from this process. Falcone and Borsellino participated in its design whose legal relevance helped changing how the legal prosecution against mafia was made.

Falcone. The attack was executed by the "man of honor" Giovanni Brusca. Less than two months later, on July 19, Borsellino was also assassinated. A car bomb parked outside his mother's house exploded and caused his death together with bodyguards and police officers that were accompanying him. Riina ordered both attacks. And, of course, both had a legitimacy intention, which was to publicly display that mafia's power was still valid, no matter if it was by violent means. Currently, former offices of Falcone and Borsellino, inside Palermo's Justice Palace work as a museum in which it is explained how and with which resources (technological, political and judicial) they did fight mafia. Inside Falcone's office, a big wooden shelf shelters the several original Maxi Trial folders. Besides, on his desk, there is a package of the favorite Falcone's cigarettes. The symbolism of those rooms draws a before and after in Sicily's modern history.

Finally, in recent times, the Palermo mayor Leoluca Orlando became one of the last representative examples of CN's formal authority enemy.⁷¹ Orlando is a Sicilian politician who was Palermo's mayor from 1985 to 1990, later from 1993 to 2000, and also currently since the 2012 elections. Moreover, he has also been elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies as well as the European Parliament. Since his first electoral victory, Orlando held an openly anti-mafia discourse, which has also been coherent with his mandates. Although his many controversies with the parties opposition as well as with civil society members, he is still being recognized for the legacy of honesty anti-mafia fight that he had been building for decades. "At least he is indeed honest", said a Sicilian NGO member (Interview in field no. 13, 2018). At 2001, Orlando published *Fighting the Mafia and Renewing Sicilian Culture*, a sort of *memoirs* that also reviewed Sicily's transition towards the twenty-first century. In the first line of the Prologue, he stated: "It was June of 1999 when Palermo finally ceased to be a Third World city –a city of which a French traveler in the previous century justly said that 'even the lemon and orange blossoms smell of corpses'- and became a great European city at last" (2001, 1).

According to Orlando, 1999 was the first year with no mafia-related murders (and only eleven in total). Hence, on the summer of that year he felt a "[...] survivor's special guilt, and also a survivor's unique responsibility: to tell the story as it happened" (2001, 2 and 8). Palermo and Sicily's success, argued Orlando, is due to a civic conscious change towards improving

⁷¹ Another example in this regard is Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, General Division at the Italian Carabinieri. At 1982, dalla Chiesa became the Palermo prefect and the coordinator of a national anti-mafia campaign. His appointment symbolized the "State's desire to present a strong public anti-mafia posture, so was his assassination an assertion [from mafia] of utter disrespect for that effort" (Schneider and Schneider, 2003, 100). General dalla Chiesa fought against the red brigades, a Marxist-Leninist Italian armed organization. As a result of his successful work, dalla Chiesa was later appointed as anti-mafia coordinator in Italy. His appointment as Palermo prefect, in charge of stop mafia violence in the whole Sicily, lasted only a bit more than four months. On the night of September 3, 1982, a "man of honor" murdered dalla Chiesa and his wife inside his car. According to journalistic reports, the assassination was ordered by Salvatore "Totò" Riina, former CN's capo di tutti i capi (Verdú, 2017).

a culture of lawfulness. Mass media, culture, education, and urbanism were the four channels through which the strategy did run, he argued. Nowadays, Orlando has switched his agenda towards a new topic: support the migrants coming mostly from Africa (van der Zee, 2017). Geographically, Sicily has become relevant not only for the migration coming from Africa to Italy but also to the whole of Europe. According to a Palermitan magistrate, countless boats with refugees and migrants, in general, are currently arriving in Malta. However, given this island's small size, the easiest and almost exclusive option is to get afterward into Sicily (Interview in field no. 4, 2018). Together with NGO's, Orlando has led a campaign to cancel the residence permit, the paperwork that any Non-European citizen needs in order to legally stay within the Schengen space. The battle is open. However, in the meantime, migration has been changing Sicilian public space, including the mafia and its legitimacy expectations.⁷²

5.2.3.2. Expressions Against Other (Informal) Authorities

After the Second World War, and as a result of the more and more clear mafia presence, little by little a new agent took part in the Sicilian political legitimacy landscape, i.e., the Sicilian anti-mafia movement. During the second half of the twentieth century, the anti-mafia emerged as a platform to challenge CN's authority, mainly built out from a left political identity (Schneider and Schneider, 2001, 431). During the nineteenth fifties and sixties, specific individuals and small groups promoted anti-mafia actions. However, as a movement, it started to become much more expanded and organized during the seventies and onwards. Hence, increasing its work and structure meant also increasing effectiveness in disputing legitimacy against the mafia. Initially atomized, the anti-mafia movement eventually became more organized in spite of its heterogeneity. As said earlier, some of the anti-mafia members belong to the official authorities, while many non-state actors shape the rest of this anti-mafia movement. The specter includes NGO's such as Addiopizzo and Libera; think tanks

⁷² Based on the data collected, two argumentative lines concerning how CN and migration come together were detected during this research. First, no relation has been observed between the two phenomena. Since no criminal records had already associated some link between migrants and mafia, then no elements prove neither of the associative possibilities (Interview in field no. 4, 2018). The second line points to suggest that CN and migrants are indeed related. Within this line, migrants appear both as the new local mob as well as victims of several crimes –threats, prostitution, extortion, human trafficking, and etcetera (Varese, 2017, 39-47). Three paths are opened up in this regard: Confrontation, collaboration, and complication. As confrontation, Vice News reported that Nigerian gangs in Sicily (especially one called Black Axe) might be either challenging or competing with CN mostly in drug and human trafficking (Modarressy-Tehrani and Dedman, 2017). Vice News made public a video in which two CN bosses' debate on how to control Black Axe. On the other hand, as collaboration, The Guardian reported that an unusual collaboration between CN and Nigerian mafias was taking place in Palermo's streets (Tondo, 2016). Finally, as complication, this hypothetical scenario suggests that migration and CN are not related with migrants and refugees except as for victims, which might be making things difficult for CN. Although Sicilian criminal groups, Italian or Nigerian, did find already business opportunities in migrants' disgrace, since most of the migrants come from difficult backgrounds in which violence and threats are common, then mob's threats impact find higher resistance from migrants (Lataz Nadeau, 2018). Moreover, on the contrary to locals, these people arriving in Sicily do not carry with the cultural and historical fear to the mafia, which makes CN to improve intimidation, and, somehow, legitimacy tactics – this scenario seems to be particularly happening with specific crimes such as pizzo (Varese, 2017, 37-38).

dedicated to mafia studies such as the Centro Siciliano di Documentazione "Giuseppe Impastato"; and journalists as Pino Maniaci and its broadcasting media Telejato. For Sicilians, realize to experiencing public life beyond and without mafia is possible, becomes an incentive that in the end delegitimizes mafia.

After the Second World War, the confrontation between mafiosi and local civilians became violently explicit. Hence, implicitly, it meant to recognize the hostility, antagonism and, thus, enmity. For mafia, violence was the common denominator for answering the anti-mafia challenges. This practice became an involuntary manner of portraying mafia's enemies. Hence, following the silence and discretion code, CN never spoke publicly about their "enemies" except for intimidating them and, usually, materially eliminating them. Giuseppe Impastato, a Palermitan journalist and activist also known as "Peppino", was possibly one of the first CN non-formal authority's enemies. He was the son of a *uomo di onore* (Italian for "man of honor", which is the euphemism for *mafioso*). However, during his adolescence, Peppino turned ideologically leftist, broke up with his family, and became an anti-mafia activist. At 1977, Peppino created Radio Aut, an independent streaming radio through which mafia activities were publicly condemned, which naturally might provoke dislike from CN since the criminal group was being pointed as a social harm. CN's legitimacy, impunity, and mandate might be at stake as a result of Peppino's work. A year later, he did run for the municipal elections of Cinisi, in Sicily. However, in May of that year, dynamite on the train rails provoked Peppino's death. Initially, the official authority (allegedly corrupted by the mafia) did not blame CN. However, his death moved civilians (including his mother and brother) to investigate the crime, who helped to prove the mafia's responsibility (Varese, 2017, 207). As Cavadi pointed out, Peppino's case exhibits two complications of the mafia's conceptualization: 1) borders (how to trace where does mafia ends and formal authority begins), 2) agency (mafia as a social actor and mafia as social system that structures social order):

[Peppino's case show that] it became impossible to separate the condemnation of mafia (as a system) from the contrast with mafia (as subjects). It is relatively easy to write books or launch proclamations or hold rallies against the mafia (in a generic, absent, anonymous sense); but it is another matter to be critically related to this or that mafia member with name, surname, and address. For Peppino the mafia had a face, indeed dozens of faces: the face of the father, of uncles, of neighbors, of family friends...Distinguish, in each of them, the human dimension [...] from the social role of the mafia [...] is really challenging (2018, 43).

Another emblematic case of expression against a non-formal authority, was Giuseppe Puglisi's assassination, also by a CN *uomo di onore*. On September 15, 1993, the Catholic priest Puglisi was assassinated outside his home in Palermo. Pino, as he was known, became a sort of anti-mafia priest. His work focused on Brancaccio, a Palermitan neighborhood close to the central train station allegedly under mafia control. Puglisi was brave enough to spoke loud against mafia during the liturgy during a time and place in which that might literally

imply a life risk. Moreover, aside of breaking the silence on mafia through sermons and homilies, he also opposed to letting mafiosi lead the processions, Catholic festivities and rituals with great relevance for the local people – more about this will be analyzed later. Probably, his most visible work was done for children. He rescued children from the streets by giving them new chances, and worked to change their mind on Mafiosi, often seen as idols (Corvaia, 2012, 60). Pino was murdered on his 56th birthday. A “man of honor”, Salvatore Grigoli, shot him once and years later would confess the crime as well as reveal Pino’s last words: “I was expecting you”, words that inspired Marco Corvaia’s book title: *Pino se lo aspettava* (Pino was expecting it). Twenty years later, in 2013, Pope Francis beatified Pino, who became a martyr. Currently, his tomb inside Palermo’s cathedral is an important symbol for the anti-mafia catholic congregation. Violence against *pentiti* needs to be considered as part of the mafia’s portrayal of its enemies. Indeed, most of the cases suffered aggressive and spectacular violence addressed directly to the *pentito*’s families (Moss, 2001, 327). As a performance, that violence was intended to send a message to current and potential traitors that could affect the organization’s interests. Fernando dalla Chiesa is one of the most prominent leaders and minds promoting anti-mafia and son of one of the general dalla Chiesa. In his text called *Manifesto dell’ Antimafia*, he stated that the manuscript drafting was:

[...] born close to and due to these considerations. From the conviction that the fight against the mafia: a) is not only or above all a question of magistrates and forces of order; b) it is not a phenomenon that directly concerns only three or four regions of Italy; c) cannot consist only in a peaceful and painless process of future generations legality education; d) nor can it be exhausted in the complaint” (2014, IX).

Finally, migration and specifically Nigerian gangs in Palermo and operating throughout Sicily’s ports might become (or possibly already are) another potential non-formal enemy for CN. To what extent these newly arrived gangs may become an enemy is an ongoing process. However, in case of being so, the dispute will definitely happen through the clash of sovereign practices. As Varese stated: "The most worrying element for the Sicilian mafia is the arrival in Palermo of foreigners, who question the territorial sovereignty of CN, do not respect the rules and in some cases are willing to confront the local mafia" (Varese, 2017, 45). Indeed, violence might become a potential output from that possible clash. Given that the control of those sovereign practices is in the middle of the dispute, two scenarios might pop up in terms of enemy portraying. First, as part of a collaboration scheme, if both criminal groups act as homogeneous illegal agents, hence an outcome might be violence addressed against CN enemies or people who threaten their authority in general. On the other hand, under a confrontation scheme, the result might be more widespread violence in Sicily – at least until any local agent, including of course the government, recover the sovereign practices exercise.

5.2.3.3. Stances Towards Current Law

In Sicily's capital city, Palermo, the twenty-first century started with the celebration of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The convention started in November and, by December the document was already finished and ready to be signed by the parties. "With the signing [...] the international community demonstrated the political will to answer a global challenge with a global response. If crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement", said Kofi A. Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations in the document's foreword (2000, iv). The symbolism of celebrating in Palermo was relevant for the locals. Sixteen years later, at 2016, both local and national governments signed the Pact for Palermo, through which millions of euros were invested in infrastructure projects for the city. Later, at 2018, Palermo was declared the Italian capital of culture. This is consequence of how CN have been standing towards the current law since the late nineties to nowadays. The CN code during the Mori operation was to hide from the authoritarianism. Later, impunity became the stand towards the law since the Second World War and until the Maxi Trial. However, afterward, the equation changed the power balance, and CN became shady again. Authoritarianism is not anymore the law but the effective rule of law.

The literature on criminal groups, organized crime, and the mafia has continually dealt with understanding how these phenomena and the political system come together (Vanucci, 2015; Dino, 2015). Are authoritarianism and totalitarianism regimes that inhibit the creation or consolidation of criminal groups? Is democracy fertile ground for the emergence of these groups? Although these questions will not be addressed here, taking a look at the Italian experience under Mussolini's government might be helpful for that discussion. Unlike the previous democratic efforts, since fascism took power in Italy the victories against mafia were more evident than ever before. As Dickie pointed out, since Mussolini declared himself as the dictator, in 1925, the southern question became solved through straightly fighting the criminal organizations and, at the time, gave him the perfect enemy to defeat and forge the nation (2015, 272). As it is expected from a dictatorship, quickly in the story, severe and violent punishments were carried out in order to dismantle any other power that challenged the central government, as the mafia did. Organically, Sicily became the first battlefield.

According to the Palermitan NGO member's words, Palermo is currently a "safe place", in which although the existence of CN, being a victim of violent crime is becoming less and less possible: "When we work in the streets at night paying stickers [...] we know that for sure, if something happens, there will be like [police] helicopters and cars [for taking care of us]" (Interview in field no. 14, 2018). According to the United Nations, the number of mafia-type homicides in Italy decreased almost 80% between 1992 and 2012 (UNODC, 2014). Massari calculated this decrease by the criminal group and her data showed that CN homicides went from 152 in 1992 to only 10 in 2010 (Massari, 2013, 83). The percentage decrease in this case is of 93.4%. Compared to the other Italian criminal groups, CN experienced the more significant reduction in this regard: 'Ndrangeta's decrease in the same period was of 54.7%, Camorra of 85.7%, the Sacra Corona Unita (a smaller criminal group

in the Southern region of Apulia) is of 66.6%, and the total decrease including CN's numbers is of 80.3%, such as UNODC calculations including up to 2012 (own calculations based on Massari's data).

Compared to what the seventies and eighties showed, the change in fatal violence cases is evident. However, as Massari herself stated in her chapter, "Murder is the paradigmatic expression of mafia power" (2013, 83). Thus, other non-pragmatic expressions still happening already that are also relevant in order to make an analysis of the current legitimacy conditions. Which are those expressions and how to detect them in order to do a political legitimacy analysis? What is currently the role of mafia violence for either recover or consolidate a mafia mandate? Indeed, Palermo and Sicily in general had gone through a significant public life transformation based on improving their justice procuration and administration, as well as through shocking moments –as a consequence of emblematic victims such as Falcone and Borsellino, but also as a result of the big picture consequences. According to Varese, 557 fugitives were captured in Sicily between 1992 and 2006, a figure that illustrate the prosecution hard work (2017, 35). However, beyond police and courts, another transformation occurs, i.e., that one happening in the streets that shaped the rise of the so-called "civil society".

To some degree, the current century has been the background in which Sicilian civil society crystalized. In 2017, *The Guardian* categorized Palermo as a resilient city, i.e., capable of healing and recovery. Palermo, it was argued, moved from being a mafia battlefield to cultural capital, referring to the Italian capital of culture award (Tondo, 2017). As a social change, it was the result of a consecution of forces switching several conditions, including the legitimacy setting — for instance, how Sicilian civil society promotes anti-mafia professionally through a constellation of both professional and sustainable NGOs, including Libera and Addiopizzo. The former was born "[...] with the purpose of involving and supporting all those who are interested in the fight against mafias and organized crime", through these commitments: [...] the law on the social re-use of assets that have been confiscated from organized crime; the education of democratic lawfulness promotion; the fight against corruption; the camps for anti-mafia education; the support of victims of the mafia and their families; the campaigns promoting social justice policies; and the projects on jobs, development, and anti-usury activities" (Libera, no-date).

Generally speaking, the strategy of CN towards the enemy as well as towards the current law has been not making public stands against them. On the contrary, CN's enemies (including the anti-mafia) have systematically pointed out *mafiosi* as the enemy (Dalla Chiesa, 2014; Vaccaro, 2012). In other words, we can speak about CN's enemies because their enemies have spoken loudly. Speaking loudly and publicly about the mafia became a strategy that the anti-mafia followed to challenge the violent reaction that CN experienced during the nineteen eighties and nineties. At least in Palermo, people now speak about the mafia; different from

the CN, which now has adopted a strategy of silence in order to go unnoticed (Interview in field no. 4, 2018). *Io ricordo* (I remember), is a documentary released in Sicily in 2008. Produced by the “Progetto Legalità” Foundation and directed by Ruggero Gabbai, the movie is a trip through Sicilian mafia violence from the victim’s perspective. In the film, a father tells his small son about mafia violence consequences in Palermo. The narration is almost pedagogic, taking the kid on a journey through the emblematic places and people of Palermo’s anti-mafia community, along with interviews with victims’ relatives.

At some point, while the man tells the boy about how the pool anti-mafia created the files for launching the Maxi process, he abruptly stops and asks the kid: "Gelato?"; the boy, who wears a t-shirt with "It’s not about being a winner. It’s about being a champion", quickly answers: "Yes, but keep telling me the story, papa" (Gabbai, 2008). The anti-mafia movement has for decades been pushing towards portraying a public image of who and what the mafia is while attempting to fight it through education and justice. *Io ricordo* is a relevant example in this regard. As a "portrayal of the enemy" strategy, whereas CN portrays their enemies almost exclusively through committing violence against them (either discrete or scandalous), anti-mafia chooses an educational strategy based on speaking out against the mafia. By doing so, the anti-mafia also forced CN to implicitly take a stand and portray mafia’s enemies as well. Currently, Palermo’s primary use the film in order to teach the students about mafia, anti-mafia, as well as a speaking-out strategy: by talking about it, both on the streets and in the schools, a path through which mafia’s authority might become undermined opens (Interview in field no. 13, 2018).

5.3. Across Legitimacy Sources and Resources: *La Festa di Sant’Agata*

Francisco de Zurbarán, painter during the Spanish Golden Century, created "Santa Águeda" between 1630 and 1633. The painting represents the image of this Catholic woman saint, Águeda or Agatha, standing with a sober expression while holding her breasts on a tray. This iconography alludes to the martyrdom lived by Agatha during the torture that killed her, in the third century AD. Allegedly, she rejected Quintianus, the Sicilian proconsul under Decio’s Roman Empire. Agatha had already offered her virginity to Jesus Christ and defender herself until her death (Kissin, 1992, 20-21). Quintianus ordered her torture that consisted, among other things, of cutting off her breasts. After Agatha’s death, the Mt. Etna volcano located in the Sicilian town of Catania, exploded. The lava did not enter the city, and the miracle was attributed to Agatha, who became the Saint patron of Catania – as well as for breast cancer patients, among others due to the breast reference (Kissin, 1992, 19). Since centuries ago, around February 5 is celebrated her memorial at Catania, an eastern-maritime town in Sicily. Saint Agatha’s procession planning lasts months and, as the second most massive Catholic procession in the world (only after the Holy Week in Seville, Spain), it is and has been the Catania celebration (Merlino, 2014, 120).

5.3.1. *The Sicilian Mafia and Catholic Processions*

How did the mafia and specifically CN become related to Saint Agatha and her procession? Moreover, what is the criminal political legitimacy interest behind the ritual? During the last decade, Italian, Sicilian, and foreigner press reported that, according to the local prosecution, CN controlled the whole ritual preparations and execution between 1999 and 2005 (Staff Proceso, 2010; EFE, 2008). The Sicilian mafia decided who was the organizing coordinator, the procession's route, coordinated public vendors, organized the fireworks spectacle, etc. As a consequence, as it is argued here, this relation runs across the three sources of legitimacy that are studied here. Specifically, even when all the Italian criminal groups have become related to religion through different manners (always Catholic or, at least, Christian), Saint Agatha's rite at Catania is a representative example of how a single phenomenon becomes involved into and across all the criminal groups sources and resources political legitimacy analyzed in this research. Granting public services; promoting belonging and cohesiveness; displaying public messages; spreading images and identities as well as rituals, moral beliefs and religiosity; providing taxation by asking *pizzo* and regulating labor; offering leisure events and gifting; creating fear and, finally, standing against formal authorities. All of these are material and non-material criminal resources of legitimacy that CN performed through Saint Agatha's procession.

Indeed, historically Italian mafias have been constantly related to Catholicism through different paths (Merlino, 2014; Dino, 2008).⁷³ According to the *pentito* Calderone, the image of the Virgin of the Annunciation is used for CN's *punciuta*'s rite. In *Gli uomini del disonore. The Sicilian mafia nella vita of the great pentito Antonino Calderone*, by Pino Arlacchi, cited by Deborah Puccio-Den, this ritual, which took place in 1962 in Catania, is recounted by Calderone himself: "Uncle Peppino asked Calderone: 'With what hand do you throw?' and then he poked with a pin of hook the index finger of the hand that Calderone had indicated him, in order to spill some drops of his blood on a small sacred image. It was the Virgin of the Annunciation, the patroness of the Cosa Nostra" (Calderone quoted by Arlacchi in Puccio-Den, 2011, 311). The *Madonna dell'Annunciazione* has been also associated as CN's patron saint (Merlino, 2014, 118). Another *pentito*, Leonardo Messina, confessed how he was responsible of organizing the procession of Our Lady of the Annunciation. He also narrated how he walked next to the saint during the procession and also confessed sarcastically that there was no way in which the priest did not realize that CN was organizing it (Dino, 2008; Merlino, 2014, 118).

⁷³ Across all the possibilities in which both agents have been related, collaboration, submission, victimization, and confrontation are representative examples. Regarding the confrontation, only until 1993 (the same year in which the priest Giuseppe Puglisi was murdered) Pope John Paul II claimed to *mafiosi* for their crimes during discourses precisely pronounced at Sicily; while on June of 2014, Pope Francis excommunicate all *mafiosi*.

When it comes to religiosity, the Sicilian case needs to address how CN and Catholicism interweave (Dino, 2008). From a political legitimacy perspective, it produces both pragmatic and ideological syncretism. Pragmatically, CN attempts to embody the moral capital and authority that the Catholic institution and faith have within a Catholic society such as Sicily. On the other hand, ideologically, CN embraces Catholic beliefs and uses them as a source for promoting practices through which validates their internal and external practices. Initiation rituals are examples that condense that syncretism. While it has the pragmatic function of reinforcing authority, it also makes use of Catholic symbols worshiped by *mafiosi* (Melino, 2011, 67). Saints are already legitimate symbols useful for CN, who attempts to borrow or transfer veneration to the criminal organization. Catholic processions are also great examples in this regard. As well-rooted centennial rituals, to control them meant to acquire or reinforce authority. Nevertheless, the mafia also shows respect to the saint and ritual. By doing so, CN looks to borrow or transfer the locals' respect and devotion to the symbols (already legitimate) towards them.⁷⁴

Dino argued that, after the Falcone and Borsellino assassinations in 1992, the Sicilian mafia entered into a crisis due to local discredit. When Provenzano led the organization, CN saw in religion a platform through which to change its bad reputation. Religiosity, she argued, “[...] gives identity and strength to criminal organizations” (Dino quoted by Staff Proceso, 2010). During the procession of 2004 at Catania, the *fercolo* that contains Saint Agatha's relics stopped in front of the house of Catania's mafia boss Giuseppe Magnion, who left the jail days before, and stayed there for a few minutes. Fireworks were thrown during that stop. Moreover, undercover agents photographed members of Santapaola's family next to the *fercolo* carrying the reliquary casket that later seated in the front lines during the mass at Catania's cathedral (Melino, 2014, 122; Dino, 2008, 29). According to journalistic reports, Santapaola's members are CN's representation at Catania (Staff La Razón, 2008). Why did CN attempt to control Saint Agatha's festivities? Any analysis needs to consider how, as a public power display, it also influenced the criminal group's identity.

5.3.2. Saint Agatha's Procession: 2019 Edition

Currently, Saint Agatha's procession works as a politically disputed field. Furthermore, Saint Agatha's symbolism operates as a holistic legitimacy resource through which political disputes between local agents take place. The 2019 edition of the procession lasted more than a month, from January 2 to February 12. Nevertheless, the main activities took place from February 3 to 5. In the first, the procession for *l'offerta della cera* (the offer of wax) (see Picture 11 in the Appendix). The next day was Aurora's mass as well as the *Giro esterno*

⁷⁴ In this regard, Merlino argued: "Evidence suggests that the practice of financing, organizing and performing a central role in religious processions in honor of local patron saints has occurred throughout the history of the organization [CN]" (2014, 109).

(external tour), in which Saint Agatha's relics went around the outside neighborhoods in the city, a rainy day that made it slow. Finally, the great mass took place at 10 am with Saint Agatha's image at Cathedral's dais (see Picture 12). After the mass ended, the time for the *Giro interno* (internal tour) came. This could be considered one of the most, if not the most relevant moment during the whole procession, i.e., the time when Saint Agatha's relics went out of the Cathedral and traveled through via Etnea, the main Catania's downtown street. However, things went particularly different during the 2019 edition.

A few meters after going out of the Cathedral, the *fercolo* stopped. An enormous number of devotees were surrounding it, while also the security cordon was broke, and crowds were across the path in which Saint Agatha's was supposed to walk through. After minutes of confusion and chaos, Claudio Consoli, the *capo-vara* (the chief of the procession coordination staff), ordered to come back to Cathedral. The decision turned the situation even more troubled. A man yelled at Consoli: "*Pagliaccio!*", "*Buffone!*" (Clown), whereas during the live streaming, a commentator for the local TV qualified the decision as sad but fair "mostly due to security [conditions]". "Is a sad and sour epilogue", replied her colleague, "Sour but fair", she insisted. "This is a truly complicated moment, a very hard one!" replied another commentator. Only one thing became clear: there were no conditions to keep walking and, thus, comply with the ascending towards Saint Julian church. The *giro interno* would not be complete this year. After coming back to Cathedral, and in the middle of confusion, Monsignor Barbaro Scionti who remained standing on the *fercolo* during the chaos, took the microphone and said:

In il nome del Padre, del Figlio, e dello Spirito Santo. Dobbiamo fare una preghiera di riparazione, perché quello che è avvenuto è molto grave. I devoti di Sant'Agata, con Sant'Agata, non sono ostaggio di nessuno. I devoti di Sant'Agata sono per Sant'Agata [...] Cari delinquenti, perché di questo si tratta, cari delinquenti, siete soli e isolati. Adesso fate silenzio perché dobbiamo pregare. Questa e la risposta.

In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. We must make a prayer of reparation, because what has happened is very serious. The devotees of Saint Agatha, with Saint Agatha, are not hostage to anyone. Saint Agatha devotees are for Saint Agatha [...] Dear delinquents, because this is what it is about, dear delinquents, you are alone and isolated. Do silence because we have to pray. This is the answer.

After his speech, the *fercolo* entered into the church. Indeed, Scionti was somehow not only diagnosing what was happening in the middle of the chaos, but also defining accused, accusations, and even solutions. Nevertheless, the question remained: who are these *delinquenti*? Was the Monsignor referring to irresponsible devotees that did not behave properly and let the procession continue? Was he suggesting a sort of organized plot? Maybe both? Mattia Gangi, a local journalist, wrote a column for *Catania Today* which stated: "With that reprimand launched against the "delinquents" [...] the church seems to have proposed

the ancient question that has always permeated the celebration of Saint Agatha: who takes, for real, the decisions within the path? Is it the people and, with it, also the criminal organizations or, instead, the authorities of the State, the Committee for the Celebrations and the Archdiocese? This is a question which might seem to have been answered by the *capovara* with his behavior" (2019). Indeed, the references “*siete soli*” and “*ostaggio*” are the proof of the existence of a dispute for who has the devotion: between the “delinquents” and the faithful. For this research, Scionti’s words need to be analyzed 1) together with the very particular moment in which they were pronounced, 2) as well as considering the procession’s history and 3) as part of narrative strategies.

In this regard, it does not matter if Scionti or Consoli knew who interfered, and why, with the procession. It is also irrelevant if those “delinquents” were a reference to *mafiosi*. What really matters is to realize how the procession receives real and potential challenges, which involve how different local agents have been and still interested in having, preserving, or challenging the control of the procession. The church, the state, and the mafia have been involved in this dilemma in recent Catania history. Emphasizing the aforementioned idea, Saint Agatha’s procession is a field in which local political legitimacy becomes challenged. The procession has two characteristics that produced this scenario. In the first place, the various and potentially confronted agents that have been politically using and currently use the rite. And second, the many sources and resources of political legitimacy involved in one sole celebration. In the end, by controlling the procession, the agents might obtain a tool through which they can display themselves as well as their political presence towards a significant audience and together with an already valid and very well appreciated ritual. Additionally, as a political tool, the procession is a way to access to how the city is social and politically structured and restructured.

5.4. Closing Remarks: Chapter V Summary

After elaborating on the particular CN context and political legitimacy efforts, the following are closing remarks derived from this fifth chapter. In the first place, Sicilian CN needs to be understood in the historic Italian state-building context. In this regard, certain CN political legitimacy practices have been as modern as the Italian state. This centennial accompaniment experienced between the official authority and the mafia gives the pattern to explain, if not Sicily’s history, at least how CN performed their political legitimacy attempts. Indeed, CN did and still participates in the Sicilian social order shaping through contingent and systematic sovereignty practices. Besides, rather than a counter-state, this chapter adopted a twofold CN definition. First, defined as a criminal group interested in the local social order definition. And secondly, defined as a local social system through which power, authority, and violence become mediated, i.e., CN as the mafia production of politics source. Moreover, this chapter describes how Sicily also became a profoundly and high-density contested political legitimacy field.

Especially over the last five decades, Sicily has experienced a dense concentration of political agents taking place in the local social order definition. In Sicily, however, although the heterogeneous composition of these political agents, many of them joint under the anti-mafia claim. As a consequence, CN faced a massive resistance that, in the last decades, undermined their political legitimacy specter and capacity. This chapter argued how CN has been going and coming from the shades when it comes to their political legitimacy claims. After the First World War, the mafia did not appear publicly as a result of the iron-fisted strategy carried out by the fascist government. However, after the Second World War, CN made a comeback expressed through political legitimacy claims. Consequently, from the sixties until the early eighties, Sicilian CN exposed their mandate without more significant resistance. In terms of political legitimacy, this promoted a more prominent display of mafia legitimacy.

However, since the *pentiti* phenomena, the Maxi Trial and the judicial achievements against the mafia, the rest of the nineteen eighties and most of the nineties became decades of contestation for political legitimacy. Finally, during the current century years, CN had to become shadowy again due to a lack of success precisely in the legitimacy arena against the aforementioned anti-mafia movement in Sicily. However, generally speaking, CN's preference for a non-material legitimacy performance is explained because this group spent long periods being a local authority rather than trying to become one (1988). Regarding CN sources and resources of legitimacy, this criminal group is and has been much more orthodox when attempting legitimacy. Orthodoxism is particularly evident in two CN's legitimacy attempts. First, by CN's preference to not appear publicly over becoming publicized in the sense of having a public presence, as well as advertised, i.e., spreading identity symbols. Finally, the second orthodox feature concerns how CN permanently prioritizes inner cohesion over popular support, which in the end is another manner of gaining and using legitimacy.