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Im/politeness: A 21st Century Appraisal

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Citation

Terkourafi, M. (2019). Im/politeness: A 21st Century Appraisal. *Foreign Languages And Their Teaching*, 1(6), 1-17. doi:10.13458/j.cnki.flatt.004629

Version: Publisher's Version

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Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/85287>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

21 世纪(不)礼貌研究

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摘要:近二十年来,(不)礼貌研究已从言语行为理论和会话含义理论的分支,逐步发展成为跨界面、跨学科的研究领域。学界普遍认同从个体言语行为、语言间接性、说话者意图、面子等角度解释礼貌现象皆存在不同程度的问题。据此,本文厘清(不)礼貌研究发展的四条主要轨迹,以期完善现存理论问题。首先,(不)礼貌研究的兴起。早期不礼貌理论的构建多基于对现有礼貌理论的应用,其理论化程度及对语言现象的解释力仍有待提高。随着网络的普及与发展,“匿名化”和“快节奏”等在线交际特点触发了不礼貌语料的产生,如“仇恨言语”(hate language),这为不礼貌理论的建构提供了大量的数据支撑。其次,(不)礼貌与面子的分离研究。先行研究发现面子作为“个人需求”的观点不具有文化普遍性,面子与礼貌无必然关联性。本文认为厘清面子1、面子2、礼貌1、礼貌2之间的内在关系是解决这一问题的根本。研究表明,个体文化中少部分词汇化指称(lexicalized reference)的面子1可表征为词汇化指称的礼貌1。其他词汇化指称的面子1则表征为不礼貌、冲突、过分礼貌等非礼貌范畴的概念,即属于礼貌2的研究范畴;而面子2没有具体的心理现实(psychological realization),是超出具体行为范畴的分析概念。然而这一概念却十分重要,它是跨文化比较研究中的“标尺”。倘若我们将面子1作为礼貌2的基础,那么学界对面子—礼貌的关系之争就可以消除。再次,(不)礼貌与规约。规约意义并不是语言表达的既有属性,而是具体语境下所赋予的表达式意义(expression-in-context)。这与框架理论视角下的“最简语境”(minimal context)一致。研究表明,规约表达可以在很大程度上实现(不)礼貌(礼貌2),其评价性本质对具体文化下(不)礼貌现象的诠释有着重要的作用。最后,(不)礼貌与道德、情感。道德与礼貌相互关联,但二者并非永远方向一致,在冲突下道德与礼貌也会背向而驰。此外,道德与礼貌研究的关联性在于它既是非技术性概念也是技术性概念,正如礼貌1与礼貌2的区别一样。情感,往往是在违反道德的相关情境下,需首要考虑的问题。先行研究指出,情感可分为策略性情感和无意识情感,前者与评价礼貌相互关联。基于上述对已有文献的回顾和分析,本研究认为(不)礼貌研究的兴起、(不)礼貌与面子的分离研究、(不)礼貌与规约、以及(不)礼貌与道德、情感这四个方面应是未来研究的主要趋势。

关键词:礼貌1,礼貌2,不礼貌,面子1,面子2,规约,道德,情绪,情感

中图分类号: H0 文献标识码: A 文章编号: 1004-6038(2019)06-0002-17

1. One two many understandings of politeness

The politeness landscape of the early twenty-first century looks quite different from that of the late twentieth. Up until that point, the field was dominated by two or three theories all of which placed themselves in the Gricean tradition in pragmatics. While applications of these theories in different cultures turned up repeated challenges, no major overhaul of their theoretical premises followed as a result. Twenty years on, the field has gained a prefix in front of its name—variably written as im/politeness or (im) politeness—indicating its newly expanded scope, and a wealth of theoretical proposals and methodological tools have developed to study this. Some might speak of the fragmentation of the field, others of a coming of age. In this brief overview, I will focus mainly on four trends—the rise of impoliteness, the decoupling of im/politeness from face, the importance of conventionalization, and the relationship of im/politeness to morali-

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ty and affect. As these continue to be hotly debated, they can be expected to shape theoretical developments in im/politeness research in the years to come.

Several of these trends were presaged in Gino Eelen's incisive "Critique of Politeness Theories", a revised version of the author's 1999 University of Antwerp PhD thesis (Eelen, 2001). Eelen identified five features of "politeness" as it is used to characterize behavior in *everyday* discourse (2001: 32 – 48). These features are: (i) evaluative, (ii) argumentative, (iii) with a focus on "polite", (iv) normative, and (v) modal/reflexive. Briefly, "evaluative" means that characterizing someone or something as 'polite' or 'impolite' amounts to passing a judgement: always a negative one in the case of 'impolite', usually (but not always) a positive one in the case of 'polite.' "Argumentative" means that this judgment serves certain social goals: it is used as a reason to include or exclude people, ratify or sanction behavior, and so on; politeness is never disinterested. A focus on "polite" further means that only politeness is an accepted social goal, which in turn means only ways of being polite can be socially constituted, taught, socialized into etc.; on this view, impoliteness is what results when we depart from these accepted paths and cannot be separately theorized. "Normative" refers to the fact that politeness as an everyday notion involves social norms or standards shared by many people and against which a behavior or person is measured. Finally, "modal" refers to the fact that politeness is optional, and "reflexive" to the fact that it involves a comparison with alternative ways of achieving the same thing.

Eelen's goal in dissecting the everyday notion of politeness in this way was to show that these same features also characterize implicitly a number of late 20th century *theoretical* approaches to politeness, ultimately limiting their scope as well as their ability to provide *scientific* explanations for the phenomena analyzed. In developing this argument, Eelen was elaborating on a distinction between Politeness1 (first-order politeness) and Politeness2 (second-order politeness) originally put forward by Watts et al. (1992). However, contrary to that earlier work, in which the emphasis was on Politeness2 as "a more technical notion that can only have a value within an overall theory of social interaction" and the need to distinguish it from Politeness1 (1992: 4 – 5), for Eelen "a struggle over the representation of reality is taking place within politeness1 [...] an adequate scientific approach should [...] avoid choosing this or that representation" but rather make "the struggle over them the object of research" (2001: 45 – 46). Thus, in Eelen's book, the distinction between Politeness1 and Politeness2 is given center-stage and serves to ground much of the critique that follows.

Eelen's lead was followed by many early 21st Century scholars, who, rather than trying to avoid the pitfalls of the five features he identified as characteristic of the everyday notion (Politeness1), instead turned them into the object of investigation itself. Embracing the idea that lay understandings of politeness are inherently evaluative, argumentative, focused on polite, normative and so on, these scholars began to ask why that is so and what this can tell us about the functions of politeness in everyday life. They thus shifted the focus from the scientific concept of politeness (Politeness2) – Eelen would argue that we never had a full-fledged theory of that anyway and some might argue that this is not even possible – to the everyday notion (Politeness1) as the only viable object of investigation. My point in highlighting this here is to underline the fact that this shift of focus also meant a change of object of investigation. In other words, despite partial overlap in terminology and data, the older and newer theories of politeness

are theories of *different things*: they draw their conceptual repertoires from different fields, use different data, and have different goals. Ultimately, they are trying to explain different phenomena. This is important to keep in mind, since the success of any (scientific) endeavor should be judged according to its aims: does it do (well) what it set out to do?

2. 20th century beginnings: explaining indirect language use

The field of politeness studies can be said to have been inaugurated by Robin Lakoff's 1973 short proceedings article "The rules of politeness or minding your p's and q's", followed by the publication of Brown and Levinson's multi-page essay "Universals in language usage: Politeness" (Brown & Levinson, 1978) and (chapters in) Leech's *Principles of Pragmatics* (1983), preceded by his 1977 paper "Language and tact". None of these works were complete books. Their authors did not have the awareness of establishing a new field in its own right and it is only in retrospect that they can be claimed to have done so. The first book dedicated to politeness is the 1987 re-issue of Brown and Levinson's essay with an extensive introduction clarifying their argument and responding to early criticisms of their work.

These early authors' concern was with explaining language use, in particular, indirect language use. Indirectness, in this case, is to be understood as a departure from speaking according to the maxims of conversation (Grice, 1975), giving rise to conversational implicatures, that is, additional propositions conveyed by the speaker's utterance and needed to bridge the gap between what the speaker said and what she or he really meant in context. Thus, a speaker who says (or, in this case, writes):^①

(1) I don't suppose you have an email address or something for this hotel as I need to ask a couple of questions before I book

actually means 'please give me the hotel's email address' and is understood to have phrased their request as a statement in order to be polite. Searle (1975) had already drawn a link between politeness and indirect speech acts, proposing the former as a motivation for the latter, and it was only a matter of time before others would take on the task of working out the details of this proposal.

This early association with speech act theory and with Grice's theory of conversational implicature explains many of the early theories' main characteristics: their dealing with politeness at the level of individual utterances, their emphasis on the speaker and on the speaker's intention, their claim that politeness increases proportionately with indirectness (measured as the number of inferential steps needed to get from what the speaker says to what she or he really means). Practically all of these claims have been called into question by later research. However, it is important to remember what these early theories' goals were: they were trying to account for what seemed like departures from the most rational (i. e., efficient) way of getting things done through language. This much is made clear by Brown and Levinson when they write:

"The C [ooperative] P [rinciple] defined an 'unmarked' or socially neutral (indeed asocial) presumptive framework for communication; the essential assumption is 'no deviation from rational efficiency without a reason'. Politeness principles are, however, just such principled reasons for deviation. Linguistic politeness is therefore implicated in the classical way, with maximum theoretical parsimony, from the CP." (1987: 5)

A number of (English) everyday expressions seemed irrational if interpreted literally and



these early approaches set out to explain how these expressions worked (and why they were rational after all) . In doing so ,they became a necessary complement to speech act and implicature theories ,serving to show how those frameworks could continue to be used to explain everyday language use ,even though their predictions were hardly ever confirmed on the surface (most of our daily language use is indirect to various degrees) .

To do this ,Brown and Levinson introduced the notion of face as concern for one's public image from the work of sociologist Erving Goffman. By reaching out for an explanation for language use outside of language and into the disciplines of sociology and psychology ,Brown and Levinson set the foundation for true interdisciplinarity in politeness research. At the same time , this move shook politeness theories (and pragmatic theories more generally) to their core. For it became apparent that notions developed within the philosophy of language ,such as speech act , implicature ,and speaker's intention ,were of little use when it came to explaining the range of phenomena that the notion of face brings to the fore – nor were matters of (propositional and illocutionary) meaning the most central ones any more. ②

3. 21st century extensions: evaluation in and through interaction

While early approaches to politeness aimed to provide a theoretical account for a subset of utterances defined as indirect ,and ended up proposing face as the reason for this ,more recent approaches have taken the opposite direction. That is ,they start out from an interest in face and how this is constituted in and through language ,and try to identify the linguistic (and paralinguistic) means by which this is achieved. This is clearly a different ,and much larger ,project. For it concerns not a subset of utterances but the totality of speakers' (and hearers') communicative behavior ,with increasing attention being given to the use of paralinguistic cues (gaze , body posture ,facial expressions ,if co-present; emoticons if online ,etc.) . Essentially ,the object of investigation is now interaction itself as a process by which people come to make evaluative judgements about each other.

Multiple trends in pragmatics scholarship over the past 20 years have contributed to this shift. It has ,for instance ,become apparent that speech acts cannot be identified with individual utterances but are rather negotiated over longer sequences ,for which the term “speech event” (Leech 2014) is more appropriate. Politeness too ,then ,becomes a discourse-level phenomenon ,better dealt with at the level of genre (Blitvich 2010) or entire conversations (Usami , 2002) . Relatedly ,the centrality of the speaker and his/her Gricean intention to pragmatic meaning ,and to politeness in particular ,has been questioned (Arundale 2008; Terkourafi 2008) and explanations have shifted to the notions of accountability (Haugh 2013a) and perlocutionary effects as made evident in subsequent discourse (Terkourafi 2012) . One could indeed debate (as some have done; cf. Arundale ,1999; Spencer-Oatey ,2000/2008; Terkourafi ,2005a) to what extent ‘politeness’ is still the best name for this expanded field. As it is impossible to cover all of these trends here ,in the remainder of this article I will focus on four trends which I consider to be rather emblematic of the current state of affairs in im/politeness research.

3.1 From politeness to impoliteness and beyond

That linguistic behavior is not only used to communicate politeness but also impoliteness has been an early realization of politeness researchers. Reflecting corresponding work on politeness ,early attempts to study impoliteness took the form of classificatory schemes: for instance ,

Lachenicht (1980) posited four “aggravation” strategies (off record, bald on record, positive, and negative), and Culpeper (1996) proposed a hierarchy of five impoliteness strategies mirroring Brown and Levinson’s politeness strategies but being oriented to face-attack rather than face-maintenance (see also Bousfield 2008: 83–87). Yet, despite these and a few other notable exceptions (e.g., Kienpointner, 1997; Tracy & Tracy, 1998), impoliteness remained under-theorized and under-researched until the early years of the 21st century. Since then, a number of single-authored and edited volumes (Bousfield, 2008; Bousfield & Locher, 2008; Culpeper, 2011; among others), the LIAR series of conferences (short for *Linguistic Impoliteness and Rudeness*) starting in 2006, and, most recently, a dedicated journal (the *Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict*, est. 2013) have done a lot to elevate impoliteness to an object of study in its own right.

In a rare instance of life mirroring academia, a change in social mores in the wake of the internet and Computer Mediated Discourse (CMD) has accelerated this trend. Surrounded by what seems like a rising tide of impoliteness in the (public) social sphere, researchers have pointed to the anonymity (Suler, 2004) and fast pace (Immordino-Yang et al., 2009) of online communication, as well as the exponential amplification of one’s own voice on social media as reasons for such phenomena as flaming, trolling, and cyber-bullying, with face-attack sometimes praised and pursued as an end in its own right. Moreover, the blurring of the boundary between the private and the public brought about by CMD (Georgakopoulou & Vasilaki, 2018) has led to a sense that, under the influence of the internet, things that would not have been acceptable to say in the past are becoming more commonly written/heard. This includes instances of hate speech and the fine line that separates this from free speech (e.g., Culpeper et al., 2017; Terkourafi et al., 2018), raising issues with the real-world consequences of public displays of sanctioned behavior that go well beyond what original theories of politeness aimed to cover.

The study of impoliteness is probably also the domain where the “discursive struggle over politeness” (Watts, 2003) – that is, the fact that the same event may be evaluated differently, as ‘polite’ and as ‘impolite’, by different people – becomes most apparent. The availability of data from multiple commentators in the form of online polylogues (e.g., Lorenzo-Dus et al., 2011) makes it possible to study recipients’ divergent uptakes, creating new loci where the intersection of new types of data and methods of analysis is driving theoretical developments. All of these social developments have made newly available a wealth of impoliteness data, which a separate theory of impoliteness, rather than one piggy-backing on a theory of politeness, is called to address.

3.2 Decoupling im/politeness from face

Although the notion of face, and how this can be imperceptibly constituted, enhanced, maintained, threatened, or attacked through language might be thought to provide the link between behaviors from unmarked politeness to rudeness jointly referred to as im/politeness, the association between (linguistic) im/politeness and face has been questioned. Critics of this association make two related points: (a) Western (specifically, Anglo-) notions of face are not adequate to capture the essence of politeness in other cultures (e.g., Arundale, 2013), and (b) the appeal to indigenous notions of face does not always lead to politeness-relevant evaluations (e.g., Hinze, 2012).



The first critique is not new: it is already inherent in the multiple terms and perspectives, including Japanese *wakimae* (Ide, 1989), centripetal vs. centrifugal face-orientations (Mao, 1994), group face (Nwoye, 1992) or Zulu *hlonipa* (de Kadt, 1998), Spanish *confianza* (Bravo, 1999), face as the place one belongs (*uchi*) vs. the place one stands (*tachiba*) (Haugh, 2005), and the Chinese notions of *lian* 臉, *mian*(zi) 面(子), and *yan* 顏 (Kádár & Pan, 2012; Zhou & Zhang, 2017), that researchers working on im/politeness from different cultural angles have championed over the years. While clearly challenging the adequacy of the particular notion of face advocated by Brown & Levinson as grounded in the *individual's* social wants, this critique does not, for that matter, refute the importance of *some culturally-specific* notion corresponding (though not equivalent to) to Anglo face for analyzing linguistic behavior in these different cultures. These proposals, then, can be said to illustrate notions of Face1 in Terkourafi's (2007) sense, that is, culture-specific instantiations of an abstract, universalizing notion of Face2, which is itself not complete until shaped through specific sociohistorical circumstances (Terkourafi 2009a). Because of this, Face2 cannot be directly instantiated in conversation (in other words, Face2 cannot be used to analyze interaction) but merely serves to bring together what the various culture-specific notions have in common. According to Terkourafi (2007), the shared characteristics of all the culture-specific notions are two: their biological grounding in the affective dimension of approach vs. withdrawal, and their "directedness" to Other. However, what has psychological reality for individuals and can be used to ground evaluations of im/politeness is only Face1 (which will be called different names and have different contents in different cultures).

The second critique targets specifically these culturally specific notions of Face1 and argues that when lexemes corresponding to these notions are used in conversation, they do not always refer to behavior evaluated as "polite". Rather, as Hinze writes for Chinese business interaction in particular, "concern for *mianzi* and *lian* frequently has very little — if anything — to do with politeness and often engenders acts of impoliteness, and acts of politeness often result in a negative impact on one or more interactants' *mianzi* and/or *lian*" (2012: 23). On the basis of this finding, Hinze argues that we need to "reconsider the application of terms such as 'face', *mianzi* and *lian* as key analytical tools for postulating theories on Chinese politeness.

It seems to me that this critique can also be addressed. In the excerpt about *mianzi* and *lian* from Hinze's article above, politeness is used in its Politeness1 sense, based on whether participants themselves would characterize certain behaviors as "polite" or "impolite"; and indeed, Hinze offers several good examples where "politeness" is not what is at issue for these participants when these terms are used. However, as is well-known since at least Eelen (2001), Politeness1 is normative and argumentative, and therefore explicit characterizations as "polite" or "impolite" may serve many other goals than effecting an evaluation of someone's behavior. At the same time, it seems to me, evaluation of behavior is clearly taking place in Hinze's examples and the use of the terms *mianzi* and *lian* is partly how this evaluation comes about. However, explicit mention of these terms is not required for evaluation to take place either. Our problem here is that we are dealing with everyday words in different languages ("polite" in English, "mianzi" in Chinese) and attempting to capture interactional phenomena which are not limited to instances where these lexemes are used to describe what is going on. I believe the confusion stems from a lack of understanding of the relationship between Face1 and Face2 and

Politeness1 and Politeness2. Figure 1 is a first attempt at visually representing this relationship.




Figure 1 The relationship between language-specific terms for Face1 , language-specific terms for Politeness1 and Politeness2

Figure 1 shows what happens intra-culturally. Languages have specific lexicalized ways (lexemes but also multiword expressions) for talking about face and about politeness (the two inner ovals). These lexicalized references however do not exhaust the ways in which the relevant culture-specific notions are realized in conversation.^③ Moreover, only a small part of these lexicalized references to Face1 will also be explicitly characterized as ‘polite’ (= Polite1) by speakers of those languages (the intersection between the two inner ovals). Other lexicalized references to Face1 may be characterized as ‘impolite’, ‘aggressive’, ‘overpolite’ etc., falling outside Politeness1 but still within the scope of Politeness2 (the rest of the left-hand inner oval). At the same time, there are lexicalized references to Politeness1 which do not explicitly refer to Face1 (the rest of the right-hand inner oval). These include those argumentative and normative uses highlighted above and still have an impact on Face1 (even if not mentioning it explicitly). What binds all of this together is the notion of Politeness2, which I have previously defined as all linguistic behavior seen through the lens of its potential to impact face (Terkourafi 2005a:252). It should by now be clear, in light of the distinction between Face1 and Face2 just discussed, that the relevant notion of face in this definition is Face1. In other words, Politeness2 is the domain of Face1. Face2 has no role in this process since it has no psychological reality for speakers (it is an ‘underspecified’ analytical construct needed primarily as a basis for cross-cultural research; see below). Rather, the relationship between Face2 and the three other notions can be represented as in figure 2.

Figure 2 shows what happens cross-culturally. People from different cultures try to constitute their Face1s in different ways – they are aiming at different targets, so to speak – because they have different understandings of what Face1 is (the socioculturally specific notions of Face1 prevalent around each of them). These different understandings delimit what constitutes Politeness2 in each culture. Intraculturally, Politeness2 includes not just behavior explicitly characterized or evaluated as ‘polite’, but also behavior characterized as ‘impolite’, ‘appropriate’, ‘rude’ and so on (in fact, “all linguistic behavior seen through the lens of its potential to impact [Face1]” as just explained). It is important to understand why we need such a notion of Politeness2. A behavior is not an instance of politeness (either Politeness1 or Politeness2) unless it meets some definition of politeness; that is, unless it is evaluated as ‘polite’ in the case of Politeness1, or it has an impact on Face1 in the case of Politeness2. We cannot know in advance of applying one of these definitions which linguistic behaviors are polite, and therefore we would not know which behaviours to include in our analysis and which to leave out. For the same reason, we need a notion of Face2. Without such a notion, comparisons across cultures become impossible because we have no neutral, culture-independent ‘measuring stick’ (*tertium comparationis* or ‘third term of a comparison’) to help us decide what constitutes Face1 in

each culture so as to then use that culture-specific and psychologically real notion of Face1 to help us identify linguistic behaviours impacted by it (Politeness2) . At the same time ,Face2 itself is an analytical abstraction outside the domain of observable behavior (the rectangle at the bottom of the figure) . Face2 is not relevant to the analysis of data of interaction.




Figure 2 The relationship between Face2 ,Face1 ,Politeness2 and Politeness1

Once the relationship between face and politeness is elucidated in this way and Face1 is understood as the basis for Politeness2 ,much of the critique against face as the basis for politeness melts away. For instance it has been claimed that Face1 can be a concern not only “in interpersonal interactions but in intergroup settings as well”; that it can be not only “saved and lost [but also] given and sacrificed”; that it is “not limited to the social attributes of individuals (or even groups) [but also of relationships]”; that it can be understood as an “individual’s possession” and “the purpose of social engagements”; and finally ,that interaction can be “simultaneously face-threatening and face-supportive”. We can theoretically account for all of these possibilities if ,in our search for Face1 equivalents across cultures ,we are guided by the two properties of Face2: its biological grounding in the dimension of approach/withdrawal ,and its directedness toward Other. With respect to this second point ,in Terkourafi (2007: 318 – 319) ,I wrote:

“Face2 is irreducibly relational. [. . . It. . .] is grounded in the interactional dyad: people do not ‘have face’ and cannot ‘do face’ in isolation. Without an Other to whom they may be directed ,face concerns do not arise. It is awareness of the Other ,as distinct from Self ,that raises the possibility of approaching or withdrawing that constitutes face. The moment face concerns arise may be prototypically identified with the moment Other enters Self’s visual field (or ,is represented in Self’s consciousness) ,creating the possibility of interaction realized as approach/ withdrawal.

At the same time , [. . .] Self will have several faces concurrently ,as many as there are Others involved in a situation. Putting this somewhat schematically ,if I am interacting with an interlocutor in front of an audience ,I make (and am aware of making) a bid for face not only in the eyes of my interlocutor ,but also in the eyes of each of the members of that audience taken separately and as a group. And the same applies to each of them. Since face is relational , bids for face are always bi-directional. As Self makes a bid for face in the eyes of Other ,by the very same token Other too makes a bid for face in the eyes of Self.

Speaking about Self and Other does not mean they are to be understood as monolithic entities co-extensive with the physical body. Rather ,Self and Other are sociopsychological con-

structs. In the physical presence of one participant I may be simultaneously apprehending several Others, some of whom I may be approaching while withdrawing from others. There is nothing preventing the same instance of behavior achieving approach on one level and withdrawal on another [...] so long as these are directed at different Others.”

I quoted this section at length because it contains many of the answers to the objections above. If Self and Other are sociopsychological constructs, they can apply both *above* and *below* the level of the individual, to the level of groups (and intergroup relations) on the one hand, and to the level of the different capacities (or roles) in which a person may relate with others on the other, raising the possibility that some of these roles may be threatened while others are simultaneously supported. Moreover, if Face2 is irreducibly relational, then it will naturally include Face1 notions referring to relationships rather than to individuals themselves. Furthermore, if the Other is “by definition implicated not only in the generation, but also in the fulfillment of face concerns. [...] Securing [Other’s] response is the aim of face-constituting behavior” (2007: 319 – 320), then we can also do justice to emic understandings of face as a tangible possession that interactants can possess apart from the interaction at hand (Haugh, 2013b). Finally, acknowledging that Face1 is simply shorthand for the metaphors and terms instantiating Face2 in different cultures (which may not rely on a face metaphor at all, but instead refer, for instance, to the “insider-outsider continuum” for Chinese or the heart-mind in Thai (Haugh 2012: 17) allows for theoretical accounts of im/politeness (or Politeness2) that are not unduly limited to “an individually based social want or aspect of identity” (Arundale, 2012: 9) while at the same time “not neglect [ing] the perspectives of users themselves” (Haugh 2012: 13). In light of this discussion, it seems to me that the link between im/politeness and face can and must be retained. Relinquishing this link would lead to much being lost (starting with our ability to conduct cross-cultural research in a principled way), while nothing would be gained that is not already gained by adopting an abstract, underspecified notion of Face2 (such as that proposed by Terkourafi 2007).

3.3 The importance of conventionalization

The reliance of im/politeness on conventionalized expressions has been a recurring empirical finding of im/politeness research since its inception. Several studies in different languages and using different methodologies have found that people routinely constitute each other’s face (= Face1) by repeating the same expressions over and over again rather than creating new ones and that sometimes these repeated expressions are evaluated more positively than more indirect ones (for an overview, see Terkourafi 2015). However, this finding was not sufficiently theorized in the context of theories that saw politeness as a particularized implicature generated by the speaker’s intention.^④ It has also been downplayed in more recent discursive approaches to politeness, which emphasize the “discursive struggle over politeness” and hence participants’ divergent evaluations in this regard (e. g., Watts 2003). This last trend can be traced back to Eelen (2001), who argued that quantitative analysis has the effect of averaging out the variability inherent in people’s productions and perceptions of im/politeness, with the result that ‘group norms’ are proposed that have little empirical validity at the individual level (2001: 141 – 146).

While that is certainly true, it is also well known that people make statistical generalizations based on the input that they receive, and that statistical knowledge (knowledge about how frequently things happen) is an important part of people’s knowledge about the world, including



their knowledge about language (cf. Goldberg 2006 ,esp. 54 – 58) . Given this and the empirical finding that conventionalized expressions are prevalent in realizing im/politeness (Politeness2) cross-linguistically ,an important part of people’s emic knowledge about im/politeness would be missed if we had no way of accounting for the repetitive nature of their im/politeness behavior. That is the starting point of Terkourafi’s (2001; 2005a) frame-based approach to im/politeness ,which places conventionalization ,rather than (semantic) indirectness , at the heart of an explanatory theory of Politeness2. On this view ,an expression is conventionalized for some use relative to a context for a speaker if it is used frequently enough in that context to that speaker’s experience.

The reference to the *speaker’s experience* in this definition means that we can expect different expressions to be conventionalized at different places and times. This accords with an early comment by Brown and Levinson that “only a subset of indirect speech acts are idiomatic in a language or rather in a population ,this being an area of considerable subcultural difference” (1987: 138) . However ,unlike Brown and Levinson ,who saw the possibilities for conventionalization as ultimately constrained by face ,emphasizing the universality of indirect speech acts in this regard (1987: 142) ,the frame-based approach emphasizes ethnic gender class etc. diversity ,assuming a much greater role for the specific socio-historical circumstances of each language variety/group (Terkourafi 2009a) . Thus ,it makes no predictions regarding which expressions will become conventionalized ,leaving this to a complex interplay of language-internal and language-external factors. Since conventionalization is now understood as an additional layer of knowledge about the frequency with which linguistic expressions are used to achieve certain ends in context (Terkourafi 2015) ,even ‘direct’ utterances such as those containing imperatives can be conventionalized relative to the contexts in which they are frequent (Terkourafi 2005b) .

The reference to the speaker’s experience in the definition of conventionalization above also leads to some further consequences. First ,by maintaining a firm experiential grounding ,it allows that a speaker’s repertoire of conventionalized expressions may shift over time to the extent that his/her experience also changes (for example ,as s/he becomes older ,moves social circles ,or moves to a different country and learns a new language ,including a new set of interactional conventions) . It thus engenders a certain dynamicity that is often missing from more static ,enumerative approaches *à la* Brown and Levinson. Second ,the experiential grounding of conventionalization in individual experience means that the extent to which two speakers’ repertoires of conventionalized expressions will overlap will depend on the extent to which their experience of the world is also similar. Thus ,without presupposing that people *will* share a repertoire of conventionalized expressions (and therefore allowing for eventual disagreements in this regard ,acknowledging the reality of the “discursive struggle over politeness”) ,the frame-based approach to politeness at the same time allows that people *may* share a repertoire of conventionalized expressions and ,moreover ,predicts *when* this might be the case ,namely ,when their experience of the world is similar. This takes us back to Bourdieu’s (1990) notion of the habitus , and his positing that similar conditions of existence will lead to the development of homologous habitus (Terkourafi 2001: 181) .

A second aspect of the above definition of conventionalization worth highlighting is that an expression is said to be conventionalized *relative to a context*. In other words ,conventionalization is not a property of expressions by themselves but of expressions-in-context. This ,again ,

follows from the experiential grounding of conventionalization in the speaker's experience. Expressions are necessarily experienced in rich, fully actualized contexts, in which their face-impacting potential can also be observed. Generalization to other contexts can then follow to the extent that new contexts are felt to pattern with the original ones. This has important consequences both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, it means that, much like expressions can be treated as constructions in the sense current in Construction Grammar (cf. Goldberg 2006), contexts too can be treated as more schematic conceptual representations abstracted over actual contexts and retaining only some general information about the speaker, the addressee and the setting with all specificities removed – what are called in the frame-based approach “minimal contexts” (Terkourafi 2009b). The view that expressions are conventionalized relative to minimal contexts acknowledges the fact that im/politeness is not encoded in linguistic expressions themselves but arises out of their interaction with their surrounding context – and therefore is always subject to cancellation. Methodologically, this means that to identify which expressions are conventionalized we should not be looking for the most frequent expressions overall but for those that are most frequent relative to different minimal contexts – understood as constellations of extra-linguistic features consisting of observable information about the participants (their age, gender, class, ethnicity, etc.) and the setting of an exchange. In short, conventionalization being a property of expressions-in-context, it cannot be sought outside of them.

But what is the link between conventionalization and im/politeness? Before answering this question, it is important to clarify one thing: not all im/politeness relies on conventionalization but only that which passes unnoticed. That is the part of im/politeness (Politeness2) that the frame-based approach set out to account for and while, as highlighted at the start of this section, it is by no means an insignificant part, there are certainly other, more marked instances of im/politeness which require deliberate reasoning about the speaker's intention to arrive at a positive or negative evaluation of the speaker's utterance. In the case of conventionalized expressions, however, the need for such reasoning is circumvented by the frequent co-occurrence of the expression with the context in which it is encountered i. e., by conventionalization itself. That is because conventionalization is *inherently evaluative*. What is frequent to our experience is automatically positively evaluated simply because that's the way we've always done it and seen it done and it didn't occur to us to do it in any other way.^⑤ The conventionalized expressions we are exposed to at an early age have a particular advantage in this respect — for they set the tone for what will be normal (read: positively evaluated) by us for the rest of our lives, automatically rendering any behavior that departs from these expectations less natural and worthy of attention. Another way of understanding this is by means of a metaphor: when a child learns how to eat different types of food, implicit in this act of learning is that this is the correct way of eating these types of food – which automatically renders all other ways of achieving the same goal wrong or at least effortful and suspect. Contrary to earlier approaches to politeness, then, in the frame-based approach the im/politeness of linguistic expressions comes not from their departure from some standard of rational efficiency, but rather from their adherence to the way things have ‘always’ (= to the speaker's experience) been done.

Culpeper (2010) usefully extended this approach to conventionalized impoliteness formulae and showed that accounting for such sanctioned uses of language requires attention not just to frequency of use but also to metadiscourse about impoliteness. The complex interplay of fac-



tors leading to conventionalization is likely to be a lively area of research in future. Another intriguing area for future research concerns the possibility of conventionalization of content rather than just form, with a concomitant extension to sequential aspects of the organization of talk.

3.4 The relationship of im/politeness with morality and affect

A final area of intense activity in current im/politeness research concerns the relationship of im/politeness with morality and affect. While these notions have only of recent made their entry into the relevant literature, prompting Xie (2018) to speak of a “moral turn” in im/politeness research, morality and politeness have been intertwined in everyday discourse from early on. Terkourafi (2011) discusses how being moral and being polite have been considered two sides of the same coin in many parts of the world since ancient times, while their dissociation, at least in Western European culture, can be traced back to the late middle ages and the rise of the court and the related notion of *courtoisie* (courtesy). From then on, politeness became only skin-deep, something exhibited in superficial manners, while true morality became the domain of the clergy and religious affiliation. This trend was accelerated by the gradual entrance of women into the public sphere, whereupon politeness became a female concern, culminating in Mills’ (2003) proclamation that politeness in Britain is stereotypically associated with the speech norms of middle-class white women.

In recent im/politeness theorizing, two different sources for this notion can be identified: the notion of morality as discussed in sociology and psychology, and the notion of moral order as discussed in ethnomethodology and especially the work of Harold Garfinkel (Haugh, 2013c). Morality in psychology stands for “the prescriptive judgements of justice, rights, and welfare affecting how people ought to relate to each other [. . . which . . .] represents western secular views of morality and operates within an ethics of autonomy”. In sociology, relevant discussions have been inspired by Goffman’s understanding of the interactional order as morally-loaded and have focused on interactional contexts outside of routinised activity, where morality is specifically at issue. Morality in this context is discussed as a lay notion corresponding to specific historicized understandings and ideologies.

Garfinkel’s moral order, on the other hand, concerns taken-for-granted understandings that enable us to make sense of our everyday activities and the activities of those around us. These understandings are claimed to be *inherently* moral inasmuch as they are used as the basis for justifying (or contesting) our own actions and those of others, prompting Haugh to argue that “the moral order is what grounds our evaluations of social actions and meanings as . . . “polite”, “impolite”, “overpolite” and so on” (2014: 173). This understanding of the moral order as a technical construct is indeed very close to the evaluative link between conventionalization and im/politeness discussed in the previous section. Ideas of positive evaluation, morality and correctness are intimately intertwined in this link and it can be hard to tease them apart, a feeling further intensified by the fact that assessments of one can easily tip over into the other. A cursory search online returns over 6 000 hits for the phrase “rude or immoral” and close to 600 for “impolite or immoral”.^⑥ Clearly, the two notions are often conflated in talk about normative behavior.

Nevertheless, politeness and morality do not always go hand in hand and tensions can arise when they pull in opposite directions. Blitvich and Kádár discuss a recent incident, in which a White House employee with the Trump administration was asked to leave the restaurant where

she was dining by the owner of the restaurant on the grounds that she “work [s] in the service of an ‘inhumane and unethical’ administration” and that sometimes “people have to make uncomfortable actions and decisions to uphold their morals”.^⑦ As Blitvich and Kádár write: “[w]hereas many scholars argue that incivility is necessarily immoral [. . .], this case study brings to the fore the fact that citizens may resort to uncivil, impolite behaviour in order to uphold moral values.” The tension between morality and politeness highlighted in this incident is in fact the same age-old tension underlying the dissociation of the two notions since the middle ages. Blitvich and Kádár use the variability in the comments received when the incident was posted online to argue that morality, like politeness, is situated and the object of a discursive struggle. As can be seen from this short discussion, morality in im/politeness research is relevant both as a lay and as a technical notion and raises many of the same issues as the distinction between Politeness1 and Politeness2.

Emotions and affect, on the other hand, have been primarily discussed in relation to what happens when a moral transgression occurs. Goffman (1967: 23) discussed how harm to another’s face causes “anguish” while harm to one’s own face causes “anger” and it is remarks such as this that motivated the biological grounding of the notion of Face2 in the affective dimension of approach vs. withdrawal proposed by Terkourafi 2007 (section 3.2 above). More recently, Terkourafi et al. (2018) have argued that experimental contexts often encode default attributions of affect, which can unwittingly bias politeness interpretations. These ideas hark back to early work by Slugoski (1985) that ‘liking’ is an important variable that can independently affect politeness evaluations and must therefore be distinguished from social distance, something which is conceded by Brown and Levinson themselves (1987: 16).

A broader role for emotions and affect is reserved in Arndt and Janney’s (1985) model of “interpersonal supportiveness”, placed within a wider model of “emotive communication” as “the conscious, strategic modification of affective signals to influence others’ behavior” (Arndt & Janney, 1991: 529), as well as in recent work by Langlotz and Locher (2013), for whom “[i]f we can strategically manipulate our emotional orientations to influence our relationships with our interactional partners [. . .], then interlocutors must be expected to pay close attention to the presence or absence of emotional signals for making sense of their actual social position relative to the other” (2013: 96). These last two sets of authors are aligned in drawing a distinction between strategic and spontaneous shows of emotions, and considering only the former to be relevant to assessments of im/politeness. They thus embed their discussion of emotions in a discussion of multimodality and focus on emotions as *information about* the message being conveyed. It would, however, be interesting to investigate also emotions themselves as *the message* being conveyed, as verbalized expressions of emotion presumably also impact im/politeness assessments.

4. Closing thoughts

As I hope to have shown in this brief overview of recent developments in im/politeness research, the field has come a long way since its beginnings as a ‘sidekick’ to theories of speech acts and implicatures. As the number of dedicated conferences and publications also attest, im/politeness is now a field of its own, lying at the intersection of pragmatics and neighboring fields such as sociology and psychology, and driving developments in the study of language in interac-



tion. I identified four such recent developments: the rise of impoliteness ,the relationship of im/politeness with face ,the importance of conventionalization ,and the notions of morality and affect ,while also highlighting in passing the growing attention given in im/politeness studies to online communication and to multimodality. Researchers are likely to occupy themselves with these issues in the years to come.

Acknowledgements

This article materialized out of a month-long visit to the PRC during May 2018. I am indebted to Prof. Zhang Shaojie for his hospitality during that visit ,to Prof. Zhao Yongqing and Dr. Zhou Ling for the invitation to write this article and ,especially ,to Dr. Zhou in her capacity as editor of this special column ,for her patience while this article was being written. All remaining errors are my own.

Notes:

- ①Source: https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/FAQ_Answers-g1389361-d7809051-t3106646-I_don_t_suppose_you_have_an_email_address_or.html; accessed 3/3/2019.
- ②In this early work ,both the definitions of directness (defined as speaking in accordance with Grice’s maxims) and of face (inspired by Goffman’s work but also by the English folk notion; Brown & Levinson , 1987: 61) hail from theoretical frameworks that can be seen as Anglo-centric. This may be seen as a further limitation on their applicability to non-Anglo cultural settings.
- ③This view accords with Haugh’s comment that “an emic perspective on face1 is not limited to talk about it using explicit folk terms as it also encompasses experiences of face1(work) where ‘the emic or folk terms would not normally apply since they lie outside the folk discourse or ideology on face in that culture’” (2013b:9) .
- ④The distinction between Particularized Conversational Implicatures (PCIs) and Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs) is taken from Grice (1975) and refers to the difference between additional propositions conveyed by the speaker’s utterance (implicatures) that are derived on the basis of what the particular speaker wanted to convey on an occasion of use (PCIs) vs. what any speaker would mean by using this expression ,all else being equal (GCIs) . For an application of this distinction to Brown and Levinson’s framework , see Arundale(1999) and Terkourafi(2001; 2003) .
- ⑤The tendency to evaluate positively the familiar is found in many domains of experience and is not limited to language.
- ⑥6 ,110 hits for “rude or immoral” ,590 hits for “impolite or rude” using google. com(date of search: 13 March 2019) .
- ⑦ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2018/06/23/why-a-small-town-restaurant-owner-asked-sarah-huckabee-sanders-to-leave-and-would-do-it-again/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3223aa127f15

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ABSTRACTS

Im/politeness: A 21st Century Appraisal p. 1. *Marina TERKOURAFI*

In the past twenty years im/politeness studies have grown from a small number of theories that aimed to account for indirect language use to a vibrant field of study lying at the intersection of pragmatics and neighboring fields such as sociology and psychology. After briefly surveying this trajectory I identify four recent developments: the rise of impoliteness, the relationship of im/politeness with face, the importance of conventionalization, and the notions of morality and affect. I discuss each of these in some detail, concluding with open questions that are likely to occupy researchers in the years to come.

Key Words: Politeness1; Politeness2; Impoliteness; Face1; Face2; conventionalization; morality; emotions; affect

Approaches to (Chinese) Linguistic Politeness p. 18. *Dániel Z. KADAR & ZHANG Sen*

In the present paper we overview a variety of approaches to linguistic politeness. Politeness research has become one of the most robustly developing areas if not the most robust in pragmatics. There is perhaps no such a thing as “politeness research” in singular any longer, considering the multidisciplinary character of the field, hence our use of the plural form approaches in the title of the paper. We pursue special interest in Chinese linguistic politeness and its research in Chinese academia, that is this paper has a culturally situated rather than “general” scope, not only because providing a full-fledged overview of approaches to politeness is beyond the boundaries of a single publication, but also because politeness research and its methodologies have already been summarised in various publications. We aim to propose ways in which politeness research which is currently heavily “Anglo” in scope can be “reinterpreted” and efficiently adopted by Chinese academia.

Key Words: linguistic politeness; research approaches; Chinese

The Impact of Context Knowledge on the Choice of Polite Request Discourse by Non-native Chinese Learners: An Experimental Pragmatic Study p. 29. *ZHOU Ling*

Intercultural pragmatics claims that context represents two aspects of world knowledge called prior context knowledge and actual situational knowledge. Both of them make an impact on second language learners in intercultural communication. Based on the theory of intercultural pragmatics, this study aims at exploring how prior context knowledge and actual situational context knowledge affect non-native Chinese learners’ choices of polite request discourse when they use Chinese in interactions by designing a series of pragmatic experiments and drawing on data from them. The results reveal that both prior context and actual situational context knowledge jointly affect the choices of polite request discourse, but in different ways. The prior context knowledge plays a prominent role in the choice of use among lower-level learners; on the contrary, actual situational context knowledge plays a prominent role in the choice of use among advanced-level learners. The present study can provide some references and implications for broad-