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The State, Entrepreneur, and Labour in the Establishment of the Iranian Copper Mining Industry: The Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine 1966-1979

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Chapter One

Introduction

The High Economic Council of Iran held a critical meeting in late 1971 to discuss a newly discovered copper ore deposit in Kerman province, Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine, which was identified as the second largest copper ore body in the world at the time. The head of Council, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the king of Iran, ultimately declared:

“Considering the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine is noteworthy and since negotiations with four or five foreign corporations did not reach a conclusion, then instead of a foreign company gaining its [the mine] profit, we ourselves will exploit it. It was necessary to find a foreign investor due to the extensive initial investment required and because of our lack of knowledge of the mining industry. So, no investor stepped in. Bring together the experts and get to work.”¹

This was a decisive moment in the history of an immensely rich copper deposit which had received attention from copper industries worldwide when news of its exploration was announced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As a result, the new mine, which was in the hands of Iranian mining entrepreneurs, was transferred to the state and Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine was nationalised.

Prior to nationalisation of the mine, Iranian mining entrepreneurs, the Rezai brothers, explored the copper ore reserve in 1966. A year later,

¹ High Economic Council report, 1971.

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in partnership with a British mining company, Selection Trust, they established a new company to proceed with the exploration. However, the project was beyond their financial capability. They therefore approached several financial institutions for a loan, but made no progress and all negotiations failed. Subsequently, the Iranian state stepped in, and the mine was finally nationalised in 1972, when the state commenced the \$1.4 billion mega project of Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine.² The whole of Iran's copper industry was later nationalised on 11 July 1976.

In order to establish one of the biggest copper complexes in the world the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine absorbed a significant workforce including skilled and non-skilled workers, experts, engineers and managers from different parts of Iran, as well as recruiting from other countries such as the US, UK, Korea, Philippines and Pakistan. The presence of this population in a remote area, practically untouched by modern institutions and technology, compelled the company to set down an industrial relations and social policy including housing, urban design, wages, education and healthcare for the employees, as well as the local inhabitants who had until then only been involved in subsistence farming and animal husbandry. However, the society were not bystanders in the process, and the social forces were actively chasing their interests in the developmental plan. They obliged the planning authority, implicitly and explicitly, to consider their demands in the policy-making in order to shape their favoured conditions for the future. Therefore, the formation of Sarcheshmeh

² William Branigin, "Iranian Protest Ousts US Workers," *Washington Post*, November 14, 1978, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/11/14/iranian-protest-ousts-us-workers/0ff0b79a-51a6-4206-be93-86848dcee18b/?utm_term=.983353fb0574 ; Mehdi Zarghamee, Interviewed by Author, November 3, 2016.

Copper Mine was subject to various internal and external pressures including the government, the company, and other forces who were mindful of common interests from one side, and local society which included the local populace and company employees from the other side.

This thesis is a study of the history of the establishment of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine in Iran from 1966 to 1979.³ This period corresponds with the development of the mine from its early days of in 1966 to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, when the mine became operational. This study focuses principally on what happened in the past, and why, employing Marc Bloch's methodology on the structure of an historical study.⁴

The central question of this thesis is how did key components shape the foundation of the Iranian copper industry, the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine, from both the mining aspect and the social aspect? To that aim, it focuses on the interactions of various social forces; mainly those of the state, including technocrats, mining entrepreneurs and workers. Specifically, this study asks how did the state forces, along with the structural causes, shape the relationship between the state and mining entrepreneurs, as well as the state and workers, in the context of the evolving domestic and international environments?

3 Iran has the ninth largest copper reserves in the world and Sarchehmshe Copper Mine is the largest copper ore deposit in Iran. See Naser Bozorgmehr, "Iran Dara-ye Haft Darsad-e Zakhayer-e Ma'dani-ye Jahan Ast" [Iran has 7 Percent of Mineral Reserve of the World], *Samt Newspaper*, Sharivar 28, 1394[September 19, 2015], 5.

Iran has considerable natural resources, mainly oil, gas, and, mineral deposits, including fourth largest proven oil reserves and the largest proven natural gas reserves according to BP Statistical Review of World Energy (Jun 2015). It also has the 15th largest mineral reserves.

4 Daniel Chirot, "The Social and Historical Landscape of Marc Bloch," in *Visions and Methods in Historical Sociology*, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 38.

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The importance of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine is not confined to the size of its deposit, which is still one of the largest in the world,⁵ but also its reliance on the latest modern technologies and management practices over the period under consideration. The Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine played host to a large industrial labour force in the Iranian mining industry.⁶

A significant portion of this thesis will be on the social and economic history of modern Iran, focusing on its mining history, labour history and the historiography of industrialisation in the Pahlavi era. It also contributes to the global history of copper, based on the status of giant world copper mining companies, particularly Selection Trust and Anaconda, in the formation of the Iranian copper industry. The uniqueness of this research is that it is the first academic work on the history of mining in Iran.⁷ However, the scarcity of studies on the Iranian mining industry, from sociological and historical perspectives, creates little space to deliver a critical argument in dialogue with relevant literature on mining. As a result, the study mostly offers

5 There are a number of large copper ore bodies in Iran, such as Songun in West Azerbaijan province or Khatunabad in Kerman province, but the Iranian copper industry is still extensively fed by the deposits at Sarcheshmeh.

6 The first experiences of Iranian workers in large-scale copper mining occurred outside of Iran. As with the Iranian oil industry, whose labour force was initially formed in the oil fields of the Caucasus in southern Russia in late 19th and early 20th centuries, Iranians made up the majority of those working in the copper mine in Elizabepoul province in Russia. Iranians also comprised 27.5 percent of the workers in the Kedabek copper smelting plant in 1912. See Touraj Atabaki, "Disgruntled Gusts: Iranian Subaltern on the Margins of Tsarist Empire," in *The State and the Subaltern: Modernisation, the Society, and the State in Turkey and Iran*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 42; Mansur Mo'adel, *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1993), 123; Belova, quoted in Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 51.

7 There are two books by Keramatollah Alipur and Iraj KIA, but these neither take a specific socio-economic approach nor develop arguments on any particular discourse. The books deal with the procedures put in place by official institutes in the mining sector in the Qajar and Pahlavi eras and explain mining legislation, regulations, and laws. Keramatollah Alipur, *Tarikh-e Zaminshenasi VA Ma'dan dar Iran [History of Geology and Mining in Iran]* (Tehran: Sazeman-e Zaminshenasi va Ekteshafat-e Ma'dani, 1380[2001]); Iraj Kia, *Moruri Mokhtasar be Tarikhcheh-ye Ma'aden-e Iran [A Brief Review on History of Mining in Iran]* (Tehran: Negin, 1374 [1995]).

critical engagement with a few works whose core arguments are related to the social, industrial and labour history of Iran.

A Review of the Historiography of Modern Iran

Historical studies on contemporary Iran have two principal characteristics which have profoundly influenced the trend of Iranian historiography, as well as the structure of accumulated knowledge regarding Iran's recent past. The studies mostly consist of a macro-structural framework as well as a top-down view towards the social transformations.⁸ The former's pitfall originated from the structural elimination of micro facts to determine the concepts and classify social specifications and historical changes. The existence of an intrinsic kind of reductionism in the macro approaches, based on the inevitable omissions, undermines the formation of an inclusive knowledge system.⁹ As a result, the vision of the issue is narrowed to identify the critical historical sequences and conceptualise them into larger structures. Focusing on the details of a specific case, including the extraction of experiences, the interactions between different forces and the dominant structure proffers the key to acquiring an in-depth

8 For instance, Homa Katouzian and Ahmad Ashraf are the two prominent scholars whose macro-structural studies have retained a vital status among the works on the history of modern Iran. The former denies the existence of social classes in Iran based on a Marxist definition, but he states that what has existed is the society. It meant that the state has never represented an upper class in Iran; therefore, political upheavals are generated from the struggle between the state and society rather than rooted in class conflict (See Homa Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran* (London: I.B Tauris, 2006)). The later scholar, Ashraf, identifies the Iranian bourgeoisie as a weak social class which has not been able to preserve its autonomy from the state or other social classes, such as clerics. As a result, the Iranian bourgeoisie found no opportunity to dictate its value system onto society. See Ahmad Ashraf, *Mavane'-e Tarikhi-ye Roshd-e Sarmayedari dar Iran* [Historical Obstacles of Development of Capitalism in Iran] (Tehran: Zamineh, 1359[1980]).

9 Kaveh Ehsani, "Tarikhnegari-ye Sarmayedari-ye San'ati dar Iran: Zarorat-e Gozar AZ Tarikhnegari-ye Ebtadaei" [The Historiography of Industrial Capitalism in Iran: Must Exceed the Primary Historiography, *Goftogu Quarterly* 41(1383) [2004]: 110.

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understanding of the larger structure and fundamental relationships present in Iranian society.¹⁰

The structural elimination existent in the macro approach also neglects the disparities across distinct social groups and economic sectors. It then negates the exclusivity of the social dynamism which is generated from interactions between different forces. For instance, the emergence of a modern work discipline in a rural community contested the cultural system, leading to a disruption of the dominant order. The way that the local community comprehends the alterations constitutes a unique experience which can be divergent among different social groups as well as among economic sectors.¹¹ In a study of industrial relations, which partly concerns this thesis, Buroway insists that attention must be given to geographical and historical variations. The national characteristics in labour relations and the structure of the state are critical components in the history of class struggles. For example, the theories which are built on the studies of developed countries, suggest an inappropriate framework to examine labour relations in developing or underdeveloped countries.¹²

10 Cyrus Schayegh discusses this issue in two separate articles regarding Middle East History and Iranian History. He states that the current lack of micro-approaches in the historical analysis should be attended too. See Cyrus Schayegh, "Seeing like a State: An Essay on The Historiography of Modern Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42, no. 1 (February 2010): 37-61; Cyrus Schayegh, "Small is Beautiful," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 46, no. 2 (May 2014): 373-375.

11 Zachary Lockman insists on the importance of the variations that existed among different societies, and even among different enterprises within the same society. See Zachary Lockman, *Workers and Working Class in the Middle East* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), xxvi.

12 Michael Buroway, "The Anthropology of Industrial Work," *The Annual Review of Anthropology* 8 (October 1979): 231-266. In another critical study on the Zambian copper belt, Ferguson insists on the uniqueness of the experience. He outlines, at the time of economic fall in the Zambian copper belt, that not all miners had taken a straightforwardly modernist path, and there were differences in experience that could be divided into two groups—localist and traditional, and cosmopolitan. These two separate ways of living existed in parallel and were not exclusive to particular classes, levels of wealth, levels of education, or ethnicities. See James Ferguson, *Expectation of Modernity: Myth and Meaning on the Zambian Copper Belt* (California: University of California Press, 1999).

The second specification is that the historiography of modern Iran has mainly focused on social changes based on a state-centric and top-down approach, which principally omitted the critical role that other social forces have played in social dynamism. In other words, it sheds light on the social transformations via the lens of rulers; that is macropolitical history, which is mostly concerned with foreign relations and military, diplomatic and religious issues.¹³ The focus on ordinary people as the active agents of socio-political transformations is the most recent and least developed in the historiography of modern Iran.¹⁴

There are also two further specific elements which have affected historical studies with regard to Iranian workers and the state. First is the significance of the oil industry in Iran, which has drawn the attention of scholars, but in so doing has led to other sectors being overlooked. It has left a picture of Iranian workers, and their relationship with their employer and the state, closely tied to the experience of workers in only one particular sector.¹⁵ Second, although Donald Quataret states that Iran has been an exception in the Middle East, with its considerable scholarly involvement with its

13 Touraj Atabaki, Marcel van den Linden, "Twenty Century Iran: History from Below-Introduction," *International Review of Social History* 48, no. 3 (December 2003): 354-355.

14 Ibid. 354-355.

15 Dipesh Chakrabarty used 'subaltern pasts' to express pasts which have been omitted, though not intentionally, by the major narratives of dominant institutions. Subaltern pasts are not merely limited to a minority past but can also be associated with a majority past. In the context of this work, we see that the oil industry has received much more attention in historical research than the other industrial sectors. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 101. A famous Iranian novelist, Belqeys Soleymani, has also observed the issue in Persian novels. She states that the Iranian proletarian literature is mostly influenced by the living and working conditions of the workers in Iran's oil industry. See Belqeys Soleymani, "Dost Daram Qeseh-ye Ma'aden ra Benevisam [I like to Write the Story of The Mines], Interviewed by Yaser Sistaninejad," *Asr-e Mes*, no. 66, Esfand 93[February 2014], 179.

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labour history,¹⁶ it must be noted that the scholarship has been mostly devoted to the political role of labour and its relationship to the organisations and unions. According to Assef Bayat, “The history of the working class in Iran consists of accounts from trade unions, with a particular focus on the period between 1941-1953, rather than a history of labouring men and women, their work, community, culture, and politics.”¹⁷

The historical study of the working class in the framework of labour unions and organisations, titled ‘Old Labour History’, has shaped two sets of scholars, Marxist and Non-Marxist, in regard to contemporary Iranian society. The former relies on class conflict and exploitation of the mode of labour relations, which is reinforced by factual pieces of evidence on the appalling working conditions in most economic sectors in early 20th century Iran. The worker is then regarded as the political agent whose resistance is tightening the organisational activities of labour unions, which instigates a significant gap between the context of everyday activities and cultures of these very workers. For instance, Jalil Mahmudi and Naser Sa‘idi delineate the working conditions of labourers in the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods in Iran. Their argument promoted the role of labour unions and the internalisation of socialist ideas in Iranian working class resistance, leading to the workers’ empowerment to protest for their rights

16 Donald Quataret, “Labour Unrest in Egypt, 1906-90,” *Review (Fernand Braudel Centre)* 18, no. 1 (1995): 117.

17 Assef Bayat, “Historiography, Class, and Iranian Workers,” in *Workers and Working Class in the Middle East: Struggles, Histories, and Historiographies*, ed. Zachary Luckman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 165.

without being directly led by political bodies such as socialist organisations.¹⁸

In his book, Habib Lajevardi, one of the leading representatives of the Non-Marxist view, examines the relationship between the working class and the state in the contemporary history of Iran.¹⁹ Lajevardi trailed political development in Iran through the formation of labour unions and their interactions with the state. His core argument asserts an inverse relationship between the intensity of labour union activity and the power and stability of the Iranian state. When the state is in a dominant and stable position, it turns into an autocratic regime which subsequently does not permit union activities.

The cultural turn in the 1950s and 1960s drew the attention of labour historians, as one of the leading sub-disciplines of social history, to the living experiences and culture of the working class outside the framework of trade unions and organisations.²⁰ In turn, this initiated a new labour history, a school which was founded and developed by a new Marxist historian, E. P. Thompson. He distanced himself from the dominant structural approach in working class history and determined experience as a critical element in the unmediated understanding of the workers' conditions. Whereas, hitherto, workers were identified in the context of political acts and labour movements, Thompson, in his classic book 'The Making of the English Working

18 Jalil Mahmudi and Naser Sa'idi, *Shoq-e Yek Khiz-e Boland: Nokhostin Etehadyeha-ye Kargari dar Iran 1285-1320* [Towards a Subtle Rise: The First Labour Unions in Iran 1906-1941] (Tehran: Nashr-e Qatreh, 1381[2002]), 118-119.

19 Habib Lajevardi, *Labour Unions and Autocracy in Iran* (USA: Syracuse University Press, 1985). Touraj Atabaki has identified this work as a turning point in the non-Marxist historiography of the Iranian working class. See Touraj Atabaki, "The History and Historiography of Labour and Working Class in Iran (Persia)," in *Handbook of Global History & Work*, eds. Karin Hofmeester and Marcel van der Linden (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 181-199.

20 Marcel van der Linden, *Labour History: The Old, the New, and the Global*, *African Studies* 66, no. 2-3 (August & December 2007): 169-180.

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Class', traces the formation of the working class in England based on the workers' culture, traditions, and value systems, since this subjective component frames the workers' conception of their current state.²¹ According to Thompson, the class experience, as reflected in traditions and value systems, was transformed into class consciousness.²²

The recent view of new labour history has lately received attention in some studies regarding the contemporary history of Iran. In his work, Atabaki examines the formation of the working class in the Iranian oil industry.²³ He primarily traces the labourers' social roots in the early years of the establishment of the oil industry, prior to its major expansion in the region, social relationships, and the work culture of the indigenous tribal people who were recruited by the oil company. He also focuses on labour relations, class structure, and the influence of foreign powers in the formation of the working class and displays the new industrial order encounter with local labour resistance in its various forms, including leaving their jobs.²⁴ More than five decades later, the industrial order was deployed to the Sarcheshmeh Copper Project, a place where the majority of the labour force consisted of locals who grew up in an agrarian environment. In contrast with how the oil workers reacted in the early decades of the oil industry, such as leaving their jobs, the workers showed less confrontation with the new order at the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine. It demonstrates that the

21 E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage, 1966). Thompson's works, especially the mentioned book, are considered as the foundations of New Labour History.

22 Ibid. 9-10.

23 Touraj Atabaki, "From Amaleh (Labourer) to Kargar (Worker): Recruitment, Work-Discipline and Making of the Working Class in Persian/Iranian Oil Industry," *International Labour and Working-Class History* 84 (Fall 2013): 159-175.

24 Ibid. 169.

modern order was not the sole trigger for the workers' reactions in the oil industry, but that other elements, the workers' cultural backgrounds, for instance, as well as working and living conditions, framed the way the people viewed the new order.

In his article, Kaveh Ehsani elaborates on a critical opinion about the establishment of two oil company towns in Iran, Abadan and Masjed Soleyman, as the towns' designs by British architect, James M. Wilson, took no account of the local culture and were based on a hierarchical model that was dominated by an exploitative attitude.²⁵ The importance of environment and space supports the fundamental role that those components play in the socialisation of the labour force. These same issues also arose decades later when the state constructed a town next to the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine to house the workforce and their families. Despite the contribution of an Iranian architect, Abdolaziz Farmanfarmaian, there was no real creative process and the design basically copied the research that had been carried out in developed countries. In this blind copying process, there was no effort to make the design compatible with local socio-geographical realities.

In two separate studies, Jafari and Jefroudi examine the Iranian oil workers agency in a political framework in Pahlavi's reign.²⁶ The former tends to legitimise the Iranian oil workers' agency in the social and economic contexts and states that oil workers' acts of protest

25 Kaveh Ehsani, "Social Engineering and Contradiction of Modernisation in Khuzestan's Company Town: A Look at Abadan and Masjed-Soleyman," *International Review of Social History* 48, no. 3 (December 2003): 361-399.

26 Peyman Jafari, "Reasons to Revolt: Iranian Oil Workers in the 1970s," *International Labour and Working-Class History* 84 (Fall 2013): 195-217; Maral Jefroudi, "Revisiting the Long Night of Iranian workers: Labour Activism in the Iranian Oil Industry in the 1960s," *International Labour and Working-Class History* 84 (Fall 2013): 177.

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originated from their political consciousness during the period of unrest leading to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The latter focuses on the period between the 1953 coup and the late 1970s, particularly in the restrictive atmosphere that followed the 1953 coup, when all labour unions and working-class activities were banned by state order. Jefroudi creates a narrative in the face of the dominant intellectual view that workers' activities were almost absent during this period, especially in the 1960s. Both studies suggest a counter-narrative of the Iranian oil workers' activities in social and political contexts, while neither elaborates on the role of the state's views in controlling oil workers in the state-owned oil industry. Reflection on the unmediated experiences of workers alone cannot explain the historical status of the working class, e.g. how the emergence of paternalism in social policy and the mode of management affected the labour activities.²⁷ This is particularly important in the Iranian oil industry because of the social policy that was developed and laid down to govern the workers' living and working conditions.²⁸ To understand the working class, we must consider it in a broader social, political,

27 A well-known quote from Karl Marx: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under the circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past." It hardly needs saying that consideration of economic structure has been overwhelmingly crucial in Marxist thought. Thompson was attempting to free Marxism from the economic determinism.

28 Azam Khatam's insightful paper comparing two state-led mega projects in southern Iran unfolds about the extent to which the attitude of the state has a critical effect on workers. The first project is the oil industry in Abadan, which was established in the early 20th century; the other is the gas project in A'saluyeh, which was run after the 1979 Revolution. Both were established and managed by the state through the same organisations. The critical point is that the first one displays a consideration towards social phenomena, while that was notably absent in 'Asaluyeh. Briefly, the attention received by the first project was an important factor in the high standard of urbanisation that developed in the area. In contrast, 'Asaluyeh is now faced with a human catastrophe—largely due to a lack of social concern on the part of the state, working and living conditions are poor. Khatam's study reveals a substantial reversal in the approach of the state towards the labour force. See Azam Khatam, "'Asaluyeh dar Ayeneh Abadan: Az Sherkat-Shahr ta Ordugaha-ye Karkonan-e Naft dar Iran" [A Comparative Studies of 'Asaluyeh and Abadan: From Company Town to Workers' Camp], *Goftogu Quarterly* 60 (1390) [2011]: 65-79.

and cultural context.²⁹ The labour process is framed by social and economic structures, political conditions, cultural patterns, and powerful agents, such as the state and entrepreneurs.

Conceptual Framework

Before elaborating on the conceptual details, it needs to be noted that this study is built upon a multidisciplinary approach within which it aims to decentralise the role of specific agents or structures. However, attention will be paid mainly to the interactions between different forces within the social structures at both a macro and micro level.³⁰

The field of social history principally reconsiders the classical top-down model in historical studies and, as an alternative, proposes a bottom-up view through which light is shed on the social transformations seen through the lens of the bottom layers of society. That view has been crystallised in the new labour history, which promotes worker agencies by focusing on the worker's experience. The classical dichotomy of structure-agent can be expressed here as structure-experience, and omitting either side of this dichotomy constructs a framework insufficient to comprehend the relationship between the different forces.³¹ Therefore, emphasis must be put on the

29 Sherry Vatter, *Militant Journeymen*, "Nineteenth-Century Damascus: Implications for the Middle Eastern Labour History Agenda," in *Workers and Working Class in the Middle East*, ed. Zachary Lockman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 13.

30 Pier Bourdieu states that the so-called "difficult" spots, places that bring together different people who have a minimum in common and are obliged to live together, must be explained through a multilayer and complex representations in order to move away from a single and central, quasi-divine point of view. He suggests a type of perspectivism which is based on the reality of the social world rather than subjectivist relativism. See Pier Bourdieu, "The Space of Point of Views," in *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, ed. Pier Bourdieu et al. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 3-4.

31 Emilia Viotti da Costa argues that we must be conscious of the dichotomy of experience versus structure. We should not be ignorant by following the fashionable view that emphasises experience nor the "old fashion of structure". We should not be ignorant of the other side. See Emilia Viotti da Costa, "Experience versus Structures: New Tendencies in the History of Labour and the Working Class in Latin

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workers' agency as well as structural conditions and external parameters, such as labour relations, capital accumulation, management, and the nature of work. The primary aim of this thesis is to keep the dichotomy mentioned above at a distance and, instead, to suggest a new perspective, underlining the interactions of various forces.

It must also be noted that the core of this thesis relies on social phenomena. As the focus is on the relationship between different social forces during the establishment of a mining complex, it could structurally draw attention towards the struggles amongst different forces which are generally identified in a political framework. Therefore, the study could be overwhelmed by political and economic phenomena, leading to the avoidance of social phenomena. For instance, some essential ascriptions to the state, mainly from a Marxist viewpoint, presupposed the reality of a structural bond between the state and the economic interests of the dominant class. This thesis tends to distance itself from the Marxist idea, and instead considers social phenomena as a critical component based on Polanyi's argument on the state's relationship with the other social forces.³² Polanyi states that what determines the state's view is not merely shaped by upper-class interests, but also the legitimacy which must be constructed in society and amongst the people. This draws the state into line with lower class interests as well, as was observed in the Pahlavi era, particularly when implementing a series of top-down social reforms called 'The White Revolution' in 1963, which

America-What Do We Gain? What Do We Lose?" *International Labour and Working-Class History* 36 (Fall 1989): 3-24.

32 Fred Block and Margaret Somers, "Beyond Economic Fallacy: Karl Polanyi," in *Visions and Methods in Historical Sociology*, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 68-69.

significantly influenced the state-society relationship within Iran's developmental plans in the 1960s and 1970s.³³

Focus must also be directed to the state view towards the workers and the local entrepreneurs to determine the structure of the Iranian state, as well as the ways the workers and local entrepreneurs dealt with the top-down development which impacted on the state decision-making system from above and determined the structure of dominant relationships between them. As a result, the recognised specific type of state, which will be elaborated on shortly, is constructed in specified socio-political conditions along with the interaction of internal and external elements. Meanwhile, attention is also paid to society, as was clarified earlier, to highlight the role of social forces, mainly the working class, which effectively played a role in the development of the Iranian copper industry and establishment of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine.

Iranian Developmental State

The recent global economic crises, as well as newly developing economic powers such as China, has turned scholars' attention again towards the interventionist approaches which promote the state's role in economic development and industrial strategy. Chief amongst them is the current idea of reverting again to the developmental state, as the centre of attention, with scholars revisiting the question of

33 Executing a set of top-down socio-economic reforms called the White Revolution by the Shah's government from 1962 to 64. The most controversial reform was the focus on the system of landholding in Iranian agriculture. The Land Reform Law dealt with multitude aspects from the transfer of ownership to the provision of agricultural services. The primary law determined that the maximum land ownership by one person is to be one village of six dang or a maximum total of six dangs in a number of villages. The seeming gains of the first implementation of the Law brought about a more extensive plan which is generally known as Phase Two. See McLachlan, K. S. "Land Reform in Iran," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, ed. Fisher, W. B. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 684–714.

interventionism and the significance of the state's status in the social and economic development framework.³⁴

The critique towards state interventionism goes back to the 1970s and 1980s during the emergence and expansion of neoliberalism, which identified any interventionist policy as a rigid barrier against the pathway of economic development. Instead, the more attention was paid to promoting self-regulation of the market. As a result, what had been introduced as the constructive role of the state was avoided, so that state intervention was determined in order to perform primary functions in an economic system.

Neoliberalism was reinforced by world powers, initially implemented by Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s, and it rapidly spread across the globe as a dominant economic trend. However, underpinning the constructive role of the state confronted the ideas which were inspired by the state-oriented developmental pathway of East Asian countries. In his research on the origins of Japan's economic progress, Chalmers Johnson examines the causes of the miraculous economic growth of Japan, which was based on a state interventionist economic policy.³⁵ Contrary to neoliberalist principles against interventionism, Johnson proved that this policy made a profound contribution to the state of Japan's economic achievements. To argue this case for critical growth, he created the idea of the developmental state, which is built upon four pillars: first, a small, capable elite state bureaucracy whose duty it is

34 The argument has recently been raised in various economic institutes. For instance, see a series of recent articles here: <http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2018/02/07/new-speri-paper-revisiting-the-developmental-state/>

35 Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracles: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

to design the industrial structure policy as well as the industrial rationalisation policy. The former focuses on identifying the industries to be developed and the latter pays attention to choosing the most appropriate means of development to manage the competition in industrial sectors in order to promote their effectiveness.³⁶ Second is the perfection of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the economy.³⁷ The third is establishing an efficient pilot organisation.³⁸ Fourth is a stable political system which prepares appropriate space for the bureaucratic system, efficient pilot organisation and perfection of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the economy.³⁹

In contrast to the economic development theories, the developmental state stands on sociological principles based on its emphasis on human skill as well as institutional capability. It is an idea based on a society whose success is bonded with attention to social phenomena in order to reproduce the specified social settings as well as institutional structure. Thereafter, Johnson's idea was promoted by other scholars, such as Amsted, Rodrick,⁴⁰ Evans and Patrick⁴¹, whilst Haggard suggested that growth originates from the expanding capability of the citizens and the workers.⁴²

36 Ibid., 314-315

37 Ibid., 317-319.

38 Ibid., 319-320.

39 Ibid., 315-316.

40 Dani Rodrick (2008) *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

41 Peter Evans, *The Challenge of 21st-century Development: Building Capability Enhancing States*. Working Paper for the United National Development Program 2010 "Capacity Is Development," Global Event (New York: UNDP).

Peter Evans and Patrick Heller, "Human Development, State Transformation, and the Politics of the Developmental State," in *The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State*, eds. Stephan Leibfried, Evelyn Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah D. Levy, and John D. Stephens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 691-713.

42 Stephen Haggard, *Developmental State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 4.

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The argument for the developmental state must distance itself from the question of how much the state intervenes, but attention must be paid to the type of state and its consequence.⁴³ That means that the developmental state is not determined by a single tight framework but can be varied, based on the different structural specifications of the state. For example, Leftwich framed it into a political structure and merged the concept of democracy into the theory of the developmental state. He then suggested two types of developmental state: democratic and non-democratic.⁴⁴

In Iran, the establishment of Sazeman-e Barnameh va Budjeh [Budget and Plan Organisation] and its state-centric approach towards a developmental plan, within which the private sector was framed as an arm of economic growth, achieved great success in the 1960s. Peaking with a miraculous 16 percent industrial growth in the mid-1960s, it is renowned as the golden period of Iranian industrialisation; a significant achievement which was reached through state control along with private sector cooperation.⁴⁵ The state was also identified as the key contributor to social development by defining the industrial project as the rod of social development within a specific geographical region. Since the mines usually lie in remote areas of Iran, the project facilitated the presence of the state in the area by creating a welfare policy and developing social facilities.

43 Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: State and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 10-11.

44 Adrian Leftwich, *States of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Adrian Leftwich, *Democracy and Development: Theory and Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

45 The government-business relationships are generally divided into three types of self-control, state control, public-private cooperation. See Chalmers Johnson, "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept," in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumming (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 57.

The exploration of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine started in the golden period of the 1960s when the mining entrepreneurs, the Rezai brothers, established an exploration team in the area. Later, in partnership with the British mining company Selection Trust, they proceeded with the project. However, the mine was ultimately nationalised and its ownership transferred to the state. Based on the mine's ownership and management, the establishment of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex from 1966-1979 is divided into three phases:

1- The KMC⁴⁶ period from 1966-1967: This period refers to the start of the initial exploration which was accomplished by the Rezai brothers.

2- The KCI⁴⁷ period from 1967-1971: The size of the project was beyond the Rezai brothers' capability; then, in partnership with a British company, Selection Trust, the Rezai brothers established KCI to proceed with the exploration. The operation significantly expanded under KCI's management; however, the joint venture could not secure the finances required. Therefore, the Iranian state stepped in and the mine was nationalised.

3- The SCMCK⁴⁸ period from 1972-1979: The mine was nationalised and came under the control of SCMCK, which was a state company. In an agreement with a giant American mining company, Anaconda Copper Mining Company became the consultant and Parson Jordan became the contractor, and the SCMCK proceeded with establishing

46 Kerman Mining Corporation

47 Kerman Copper Industries

48 Sarcheshmeh Copper Mines Corporation of Kerman

the operation of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex.⁴⁹ The presence of the state brought about a significant transformation in the development of the project. Moreover, the replacement of the mining entrepreneur with the state, which came out of the nationalisation of the mine, placed the people in closer and more frequent contact with the state.

Each episode is attributed with characteristics based on the relationship of state-entrepreneur, state-worker and entrepreneur-worker.

Therefore, this study frames the relationships mentioned above within the context of a developmental state and will prove that the establishment of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine, as one of the state's mega-projects in the 1960s and 1970s, meets the four specifications of a developmental state raised by Johnson. The Iranian developmental was also based the paternalist mode of governance, referring to the design and implementation of the social policies and mode of management in the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine. It consisted of the means of development from the state as well as the company management, focusing on the significance of organisational control, as it partly contributes towards the structure of the wider system of social control, which reflects the power relations in society as a whole. Although some draw the line between the state and the company, I would rely on Timothy Mitchel's idea regarding the elusiveness of the state's boundary with society in order to trace the

49 The whole Iran copper industry was nationalised in 1976 and the company name was changed to National Iranian Copper Industries Corporation (NICICO).

pathway of the paternalistic mode of governance in managing the projects during the establishment of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine.⁵⁰

The two traditional stances towards labour relations are a coercive system and a paternalist system. An extreme example of the coercionist system is represented during the period when forced labour was legal worldwide. The labour force was directly exploited, like slaves, in harsh conditions without recognition of any freedom, either in their choice of work or in their right to make demands about wages or other primary rights. The response of early capitalist employers to labour scarcity was to institute coercive practices which were sustained until the beginning of the 20th century, particularly in the colonial states.⁵¹ Workers were often monitored and there were sometimes strict rules in place against trivial matters, such as talking to fellow workers or even whistling, which could have been punished by a fine or even dismissal.⁵² The transformation in social relations, profound changes in the nature of the workplace, along with the development of human rights and apparent limitations in the ability of coercive systems to improve efficiency, signalled the widespread decline of the coercionist discourse, so that eventually a shift occurred in labour relations and paternalism emerged.⁵³

The idea of paternalism in managerial strategy was created in opposition to the coercive views towards labour relations, including

50 Timothy Michel, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 1 (March 1991): 77-96.

51 John Sender and Sheila Smith, *The Development of Capitalism in Africa* (New York: Methuen, 1986), 46-47.

52 Keith Grint, *Sociology of Work* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 118.

53 For examples see Donald Reid, "Industrial Paternalism: Discourses and Practice in Nineteenth-Century French Mining and Metallurgy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 27, no. 4 (October 1985): 579-607; Michael Burawoy, *The Politics of Production: Factory Regime under Capitalism and Socialism* (London: Verso, 1985).

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any kind of forced labour regime. It principally arose, along with the promotion of social phenomena, to absorb more workers into the industrial units and to be more productive though persuasive as well as repressive means of management.⁵⁴ The structural cause of scarcity in both skilled and unskilled workers led to the deployment of industrial paternalism in France in the 19th century, in which companies conducted a developed welfare policy by offering housing, schools, health care and other social services.⁵⁵

Such policies of persuasion assume more importance in workplaces located in remote areas, to which workers tend to be less keen to move. However, inevitably, many cases did not fit precisely into any one specific category and there continued to be a mixture of different employment conditions from soft elements of coercionism to some characteristics of paternalism.⁵⁶

The second specification of the Iranian developmental state is the source of the state's income, which profoundly relied on oil rather than manufacturing and exporting. The increasing oil income was generated from the growth in oil production as well as rising oil prices in the late 1960s, and particularly during the first oil boom in the 1970s, which enhanced the state's confidence to expand interventionism to accelerate socio-economic progress, leading towards what the Shah portrayed as "the Great Gates of Civilisation".

54 Donald Reid, "Industrial Paternalism: Discourse and Practise in Nineteenth-Century Mining and Metallurgy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 27, no.4 (October 1984): 582- 584.

55 Paternalism was primarily conducted in the oil industry in Iran. See Touraj Atabaki, "From Amaleh (Labourer) to Kargar (Worker): Recruitment, Work-Discipline and Making of the Working Class in Persian/Iranian Oil Industry," *International Labour and Working-Class History* 84 (Fall 2013): 159-175; Kaveh Ehsani, "The Social History of Labour in the Iranian oil Industry: The Built Environment and the Making of the Industrial Working Class 1908-1941" (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2014).

56 Patrick Joyce, *Work, Society and Politics: The Culture of Factory in Later Victorian England* (London: Methuen, 1980).

The considerable injection of oil money into the economy produced greater freedom in the state's decision-making process as well as allowing state technocrats to create developmental plans. It also influenced the shaping and increase of the paternalist mode of governance which had been embedded in the Iranian society. The growing significance of social phenomena, as well as the embodied paternalist mode of governance and the increasing oil income, led the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine to sometimes infringe on the structure of a modern organisation which is principally built upon purposive rational action, according to Max Weber's idea on the representation of four types of action.⁵⁷ This is a characteristic partly echoed in the whole mode of governance in the Pahlavi era, as was observed in managing a large organisation such as the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine. To conclude, a developmental state was constructed based on paternalist approach in social policy and mode of governance as well as petrol-based income. I suggest to name it the 'petro-paternalist developmental state' in order to specify the structure of the Iranian state related to studying the development of the copper industry in the late 1960s and 1970s.

The Local Reaction and Workers' Response to the Copper Mining Development

Until this point, the conceptual framework has proposed a top-down model to shape the contribution of so-called 'forces from above'. Now, the social phenomena will be driven to the midpoint, focusing

⁵⁷ In a classical division, Max Weber suggested four types of action: instrumental, value, effectual, and traditional. See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 120.

on the lower layers of society; the way that the people determine their contribution in the formation of the modern copper industry and the manner through which they imposed their will to the company and the state at different stages.⁵⁸ In a broader view, it focused on how the people resisted against the authorities and what the authorities did to mitigate the people's resistance.

The Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine assembled a massive labour force, as well as advanced technology and modern management, in a remote mountain area where the locals were mostly involved in agriculture and animal husbandry. In effect, diverse kinds of forces, from the state institutes, technocrats and the Royal Court to the local authorities, company employees, local ordinary people and local elites, contributed to the development of the mine. The social setting and the natural environment were transformed, leading to conflict among the various forces in the three stages, as previously indicated, during the establishing process.

The shift in ownership and the change in management changed the social policy and industrial relations, leading to improved living and working conditions. These are the two components which contribute to shaping people's collective identity and the formation of a social class. The significance of the class formation is in regard to making a crucial link between class structure and class struggle. It shows the ways in which they shape class capacities and thus the balance of power within a class struggle. Class formation involved in formal organisation, as well as any form of collectively constituted social

⁵⁸ Roberts states that combining the variables of proletarianization such as wage-work and degree of control with those to do with state and identity must be considered for research on the class formation. See B. R. Roberts, "Peasant and Proletarians," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 16 (August 1990): 374.

relations which facilitate solidarity behaviour in pursuit of class interest, is an instance of class formation.⁵⁹

Marx linked the construction of social class with the mode of production and elaborated on two phases in the formation of a working class: “class in itself” and “class for itself”, which are determined by class consciousness. The former refers to the workers being unaware of their common interests against the dominant social class, while the latter builds upon the expansion of class consciousness in the working class. The core argument maintains the structural effect on leading the subjective dimension of the class formation. However, Ira Katznelson raised criticism against the classical dichotomy of Marx, and stated that class formation consists of a multi-level process, each intensely contributing to the process of shaping the working class. According to Katznelson, “Class is a junction term. Questions about the content of each level and the connections between levels of class constitute the very heart of the analysis of class formation.”⁶⁰ Then, he states that class formation consists of four distinct levels: structure, ways of life, dispositions, and collective action.⁶¹ The first level comprises the workers’ status regarding property rights and the ownership network in society.⁶² That is a structural cause which determines the social being of the worker whose economic life is built upon wage labour within the context of capitalism. The solid economic structure creates less space to activate the workers’ agency and to initiate a structural

59 Erik Olin Wright, *Class Counts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 192.

60 Ira Katznelson, “Working Class Formation: Construction Case and Comparison,” in *Working Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western European and the United States*, eds. Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 22.

61 *Ibid.*, 9.

62 *Ibid.*, 17.

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transformation in the economic system. However, the worker's agency comes into effect at the second level, based on the workers' active role in framing their way of life into a specified framework. That contrasts with the political apparatus's intention to engineer the working-class formation based on its priorities and interests, which can be identified through examining its mode of governance and the social policies. The choices that exist at the second level in the formation of the working-class enable the workers to construct their way of life based on their interests. That characteristic makes daily life a conflict zone between different forces; mainly the state, the company and people who have tried to impose their wills. The third level indicates the workers' conception of the changes. It focuses on the workers' interpretation of their status and their relations with other social groups, as well as their living and working conditions in society. Finally, the fourth level focuses on the presence of the working-class agency within social-political trends, leading to embedding the working-class interests into social and political transformations. Katznelson's multi-layered view of enhancing the capability of the concept of class dealing with the social phenomena complexity is in contrast with Marx's idea, which divided it into two strict categories.

Capitalism structurally generates an imbalanced class relationship, backing the dominant class, constructed upon the ownership of means of production as well as capitalist status in the mode of production. That leads to producing a continual class struggle between the capitalists and working class. However, Wright states that certain conditions can redesign class relationships by minimising the level of

struggle and leading to the formation of class compromise. The Marxist discourse commonly criticises class compromise since it distorts the working-class struggle against capitalism. However, Wright also offers class compromise as a constructive strategy in resistance against capitalism if it meets particular characteristics. He then suggests the division of class compromise into two categories of positive class compromise and negative class compromise.⁶³ Wright defines the former as an episode of the anti-capitalism process to lay the ground for the progression of the socialist movement. In his article, ‘How to be an anti-capitalist today’, Wright indicates four different strategies to face capitalism: smashing, taming, escaping and eroding capitalism.⁶⁴ He suggested taming capitalism as the most effective method to reduce its harms. In the early period of anti-capitalism, taming capitalism, the class struggle can be converted to class compromise. The mechanism of conversion originates from enhanced status of the workers struggling with the employer, based on the two sources of working-class power: structural power and associational power. The former is generated upon the status of the workers in a tight labour market as well as the location of a particular group of workers in an industrial sector, and the latter represents the institutional power of workers through labour unions and workers’ councils. However, the negative class compromise presents a settled struggle without participation from the working-class organisational power. Furthermore, it does not cover both sides’ requirements, but leads to a loss and win game. In fact, there is no element of

63 Erik Olin Wright, “Class Struggle and Class Compromise in the Era of Stagnation,” *Transform*, no. 11 (2012): 24-25.

64 Erik Olin Wright, “Why Class Matters,” *Jacobin*, December 23, 2015, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/12/socialism-marxism-democracy-inequality-erik-olin-wright/>

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organisational power in reconciling between the workers and the rulers, for instance, in an authoritarian political regime which suppresses the labour unions and labour councils, such as during the period of Mohammad Reza Shah. As a result, the concessions given to the working class are aimed at reducing the class conflict without meeting either sides' interests. Consequently, it generates a fragile compromise with a high potential of a return to struggle.

These phenomena were shown in workers-state relationship in the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine, particularly during the unrest leading to the 1979 Iranian Revolution when the workers sometimes rose against the revolutionaries. Although the industrial workers' demands in the private sector were less politically oriented until the final stage of the revolution from October 1978 onwards, the public workers presented more sympathy with the people's street protests, as Ahmad Ashraf stated.⁶⁵

Sources

This thesis relied on oral sources as well as documentary text. I conducted semi-structured interviews with some retired staff, and locals who were still living in the villages in the mountains near the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine. I also interviewed the former top managers who currently live in different parts of the world, including two former managing directors of the company and one former deputy. Moreover, I interviewed locals who might not have worked in

65 Ahmad Ashraf, "Kalbodshekafi-ye yek Enqelab: Naqsh-e Kargaran-e Sana'ti dar Enqelab-e 57" [Autopsy a Revolution: The Role of Industrial Workers in the 1979 Revolution], *Iran Nameh* 26, no. 3-4 (2011): 4-53.

the mine but witnessed the social transformation that went along with the construction of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine.

I also visited several archives, private and public ones, named later in this study. This enabled me to cross-check the oral claims and also provided me with the advantage of solid documents, which are usually preserved from the ravages of time and manipulation. However, the documents are mostly official and can lead us to draw a state-oriented picture. The oral sources assisted me in avoiding that pitfall.

Primary Sources:

British Library, London

Library, Museum and Document Centre of Iran Parliament, Tehran;

National Library and Archives of Iran, Kerman;

National Library and Archives of Iran, Tehran;

Personal Records of Reza Niazmand, Tehran;

Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine Archive, Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex, Rafsanjan;

Selection Trust Archives, LSE Library Archives and Special Collections, London;

The Centre of Research and Documents of Presidency, Tehran;

The National Archives, London;

Newspapers, Journals, and Magazines: Yad, Mardom, Nameh-ye Mardom, Kayhan, Etela‘at, Rastakhiz-e Kargaran, Nameh-ye Otaq-e Bazargani, Keyhan International, Financial Times.

Outline of Chapters

This thesis consists of four chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter one is an introduction which primarily delivers a brief explanation of the establishment of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine and its importance. After a critical review of the existent literature on the social and labour history of Iran, it elaborates on the research question as well as the conceptual framework, based on the theory of the developmental state, to study the state relationship between the state, entrepreneurs and workers, with particular attention given to the formation of the working class in the Iranian copper industry and the workers agency within this process. The chapter ends with information on the primary sources of this study.

Chapter two will examine the labour force and state of the Iranian mining industry in the contemporary history of Iran within social and political contexts. It focuses on different agents, including the state institutes, from the Reza Shah period in 1925 until the end of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign in 1979. The focus is on the political and economic changes throughout the period, with particular attention to industrial development, specifically the mining industry, to understand the active forces in the power structure of the social system. The argument is put forward on the structure of the state's social and economic views and the growth of the industrial working class in that specified period, with particular attention given to social and political events at both a national and international level in the 1960s and 1970s. That prepared the ground for entering into the mining industry and the development and establishment of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex.

Chapter three will focus on the nationalisation of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine in order to understand the state and mining entrepreneurial relations within the idea of a developmental state framework.⁶⁶ To do that, I shall examine the various elements of a developmental state, with particular attention to the establishment of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine, by analysing the critical participation of the human agents, including the Shah, the statesmen, technocrats, and mining entrepreneurs, as well as the state institutions. Those could not be understood without assessing the social and political conditions on a national and international level in the 60s and 70s, including the cold war, the oil boom in the 70s, and the domination of a semi-colonial order in Iran during one of Iran's most politically stable periods in the Pahlavi era.

Chapter four shifts towards the lower strata to assess the contribution of the various agents, including the indigenous people, workers, company management, ecological settings and human settings of the regions, in the formation of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine during the three phases mentioned, based on the impact of management and ownership. These factors forced the implementation of a developed social policy, leading to the transformation of the economic

⁶⁶ State documents and official correspondence applied the word the 'nationalisation' of Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine. However, some scholars, such as Ahmad Ashraf in dialogue with the author, insist that nationalisation is not a right term, but rather the mine became state-owned. Their concern is over the term "nationalisation," which predominantly evokes confiscation in Iran's political discourse due to the wave of nationalisation of private business in the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution. This is the terminology used in nationalist and socialist parties. "According to British practice, nationalisation implies ownership and control of industries which have been taken over from private enterprise in the national interest." See K. C. Bhandari, *Nationalisation of Industries in India, Doctrinaire Adherence Redundant* (Academic Publishers, 1962). Some scholars have defined different types of nationalisation. For instance, Keith Coleman describes various types, including Confiscation, Partial Confiscation, Classical Nationalisation, Partial Nationalisation, and Negotiated Nationalisation. See Keith Coleman, *Nationalisation: Beyond the Slogans* (Ravan Press, 1991). Based on that definition, it is correct to refer to the "nationalisation" of the Sarcheshmeh Copper Mine.

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conditions and the workers' way of life, which in turn, led to the formation of particular class relations and class compromise