Religious Persecution and Transnational Compassion in the Dutch Vernacular Press 1655-1745

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Chapter 5

Promoting Prophets? Public Diplomacy and the War of the Camisards (1702-05)

> Those who say that the times of these crimes are past; that we will no longer see Bar Kokhba, Muhammad, John of Leiden, etc.; that the flames of the wars of religion are extinguished, do, it seems to me, too much honor to human nature. The same poison still subsists, albeit less developed; this plague, which seems smothered, reproduces from time to time germs capable of infecting the earth. Have not we seen in our day how the prophets of the Cévennes killed, in the name of God, those of their sect who were not sufficiently submissive?
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> - Voltaire to Frederick II of Prussia, from Rotterdam (1740)[761]

> It is a new trade, my Lord, to be a Camisard in England, and Holland; but there are a great many cheats who set up in that profession.
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> - Richard Hill to the Lord Treasurer (1704)[762]

When historians want to argue that confessional antagonism still affected European politics at the end of the seventeenth century, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes is usually the favored example. Paul Hazard, by contrast, used it as the beginning of a different narrative. In his 1935 *Crisis of the European mind*, Hazard presented the Revocation as a final aftershock, one that inadvertently brought together a new generation of philosophers, who, through the Dutch press, began to fire at Europe's religious foundations. Between 1680 and 1715, these

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761 'Ceux qui diront que les temps de ces crimes sont passés, qu'on ne verra plus de Barcochebas, de Mahomet, de Jean de Leyde, etc., que les flames des guerres de religion sont éteintes, sont, ce me semble, trop d'honneur à la nature humaine. Le même poison subsiste encore, quoique moins développé: cette peste, qui semble étouffée, reproduit de temps en temps des germes capables d'infecter la terre. N'a–t–on pas vu de nos jours les prophètes des Cévènes tuer, au nom de Dieu, ceux de leur secte qui n'étaient pas assez soumis?'; Voltaire to Frederick II of Prussia, 20 January 1742, in J. Esneaux (ed.), *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1822), p. 383.

762 Letter from Richard Hill to Sidney Godolphin, 5 August 1704, in W. Blackley (ed.), *The diplomatic correspondence of the Right Hon. Richard Hill, Envoy Extraordinary from the Court of St. James to the Duke of Savoy in the reign of Queen Anne, from July 1703 to May 1706*, vol. 2 (London, 1845), p. 398.

philosophers developed a vocabulary for fundamental skepticism towards the revealed truths of Holy Scripture, ancient philosophy, and canonical history.

In doing so, Hazard contended, they ultimately replaced a 'civilization founded on duty—duty to God, duty towards the sovereign' with a 'civilization founded on the idea of rights—rights of the individual, freedom of speech and opinion, the prerogatives of man as man and citizen'.[763] As Margaret Jacob pointedly summarizes, 'the Huguenot crisis provoked in 1685 by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was one catalyst that spurred radical assaults against absolutism in both government and dogma.'[764] In other words, the normative principles of sovereignty and confessional truth were fundamentally being questioned. Instead, the new generation wanted to find happiness on earth:

> Must we still go looking to the next world for that? Those adumbrations, those foreshadowings of the world to come, are altogether too vague, too hazy. […] Farewell to haloes, and harps and heavenly choirs! If we want happiness, we must get it in this world, and quickly. […] Only fools set their hopes on the time to come. Make the best of what our human state has to offer. Thus argued the apostles of the new morality, who set out to seek happiness in the here and now.[765]

Some exiles in the United Provinces may have developed or adopted this new morality. Yet it could hardly contrast more with the staunchly confessional message that other influential exiles were spreading. Within the comfort of exile, Jurieu and other pastors publicly admonished remaining Protestants to persevere and continue to profess the faith publicly, knowing that this was effectively a death sentence. For most Huguenots, leaving the security of property, family, and livelihood behind for an uncertain future in foreign lands—provided one did not get caught and end up in the galleys or prison—was hardly an option. This was certainly the case for the Huguenots of the Cévennes, a rugged mountain range in the south-east of the Central Massif. Most Cévenols were peasants, shepherds, and textile artisans, strongly bound to the remote lands they inhabited.[766] Only about five percent of them fled the realm to find religious freedom.[767] In 1685 the Cévennes had seen its share of *dragonnades*, but troops did not

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763 P. Hazard, *The crisis of the European mind 1680–1715* (New York, 2013), p. xvi.
764 M. Jacob, 'Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750. Book review', *The Journal of Modern History* 75–2 (2003), p. 387.
765 Hazard, *Crisis of the European mind*, p. 292.
766 C. Randall, *From a far country. Camisards and Huguenots in the Atlantic world* (Athens, GA, 2011), p. 13.
767 P. Joutard, *La légende des Camisards. Une sensibilité au passé* (Paris, 1977), p. 25.

have to be quartered everywhere. Fear of the impending violence had led many communities to convert en masse, well before the dragoons had actually reached their hamlets.[768]

The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes sent the Cévenols down a path that was in many ways the complete opposite of the one described by Hazard. Isolation kept forced converts in place, but as smoothly as the 'missionizing' may have appeared initially, distance also made the Catholization of Cévennes a difficult process. In France's rural areas, state supervision was relatively far away and most communities were religiously homogenous. Having made their overt submission to the religion demanded by the king, old religious sentiments continued to smolder beneath the surface. Fueled by the prophetic writings of the Refuge, which somehow made their way to the Cévennes, they soon resurfaced in a radical way.

Shortly after the Revocation, the Cévennes became home to a series of millenarian movements; throughout the mountains, young people believed themselves to be possessed and prophesied about the coming deliverance, urging their followers to abjure the new faith and return to God. In 1701, shortly after the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, the region saw another prophetic wave. Dozens of Huguenot prophets sprang up in the mountain hamlets and began to preach about the imminent fall of the Antichrist.[769] Suspecting a foreign plot, the authorities responded with vigor. Under the leadership of the Abbé du Chayla, Archpriest of the Cévennes and a fervent persecutor of the region's religious dissidents, hundreds of prophesying girls, boys, women, and men were locked away in prisons. On 24 July 1702 a group of Cévenol Huguenots marched to the house to free their imprisoned companions, in the process of which they caught the priest, dragged him to a nearby bridge, and stabbed him to death.[770]

Du Chayla's murder became the first act of a remarkably violent uprising, which set the Cévennes on fire for the next three years. French military commanders did not know how to respond to the insurgents' new form of hit-and-run guerilla warfare. According to modern estimates, even at the revolt's height there were never more than about 3000 active fighters.[771]

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[768] W. Monahan, *Let God arise. The war and rebellion of the Camisards* (Oxford, 2014), p. 18.
[769] L. Laborie, 'Who were the Camisards?', *French Studies Bulletin* 32–120 (2011), p. 56.
[770] Monahan, *Let God Arise*, pp. 56–63.
[771] L. Laborie, *Enlightening enthusiasm. Prophecy and religious experience in early eighteenth–century England* (Oxford, 2015), p. 27.

But the authorities tragically failed to properly distinguish between civilian and Camisard, taking the drastic measure of depopulating entire regions.[772] Hundreds of villages were burned to the ground and the civilian populations forced to emigrate. Children were often taken away to prevent any further recruiting.[773]

The so-called War of the Camisards was France's last war of religion. The insurgents built much of their religio-political worldview on Jurieu's *Accomplissement des prophéties*, believing that William III heralded a new age in which Protestantism would finally triumph.[774] Fought by inspired wool combers and baker's apprentices who believed that they heralded the apocalypse, the War of the Camisards provides an extreme case of politics based on the normative principle of confessional truth. David El Kenz and Claire Gantet have rightly argued that the revolt should be compared to that of the Anabaptists in Munster in the sixteenth century rather than to the nobility-led Huguenot revolts in seventeenth-century France.[775] It should be noted, however, that the Camisards' military objective was remarkably sober for an apocalyptic war: they simply wanted Louis XIV to reinstate the Edict of Nantes.[776] The revolt provides a striking example of the impact that the printed opinion which was produced in the United Provinces could have on other states. In chapters 3 and 4, we have seen that public debate about the persecution of the Huguenots was versatile. Although many pamphleteers provided arguments based on confessional truth, a considerable number of others provided secular analyses and warned about the dangers of sectarian politics. However, in the Cévennes Jurieu's prophecies and confessional discourse had clearly won the day.[777]

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[772] Although the number of insurgents never reached beyond 3000 fighting men, the first royal commander–in–chief, the Marshall of Montrevel, believed that there were about 20,000; ibid.

[773] R. Gagg, *Kirche im Feuer. Das Leben der südfraänzösischen Hugenottenkirche nach dem Todesurteil durch Ludwig XIV* (Zurich, 1961), p. 137.

[774] Laborie, 'Who were the Camisards?', 55.

[775] D. El Kenz and C. Gantet, *Guerres et paix de religion en Europe XVIe–XVIIe siècles* (Paris, 2008), p. 138

[776] Monahan, *Let God arise*, p. 182.

[777] Obviously, the French government offered a different analysis of the civil war. Analyzing the justifications surrounding the revolt, Chrystal Bernat asserts that for the Crown questions about the true faith were not so relevant. To the biblical and divine argumentation of the Protestants, the Catholic authorities responded with legal argumentation. To the authorities, the war proved that Calvinists were seditious and should therefore be eradicated from the realm. Indirectly, a war against one's sovereign was a war against God's order, but the question of lèse-majesté was dominant; C. Bernat, 'Guerres au nom de Dieu. Justifications sourdes de la violences et légitimations fratricides au tournant du Grand Siècle', in A. Encrevé, R. Fabre, and C. Peneau (eds.), *Guerre juste, juste guerre. Les justifications religieuses et profanes de la guerre de l'antiquité aux XXIe siècle* (Paris, 2013), pp. 201–220.

It is not surprising that to Hazard, the Camisards were the ideal-types of this old, disappearing Europe. He argued that when Cévenol exiles arrived in London after the revolt, 'filled with a sacred frenzy' and 'writhing on the ground in fanatical delirium', they were simply 'held up to ridicule in a puppet theatre' by their enlightened host society.[778] Hazard was apparently unaware thatduring the revolt, the English and Dutch authorities were rather sympathetic to the Camisard cause. As soon as news about the 1702 revolt reached the political centers of England and the Dutch Republic, different stakeholders began to see the Camisard cause as an excellent opportunity to strike a fatal blow at France from the inside. As Matthew Glozier and Gregory Monahan have shown, secret plans were made in England and the Dutch Republic to raise money to supply the insurgents with weapons and ammunition and to invade the Languedoc with an army of exiled Huguenots—an idea inspired by the unexpectedly successful Glorieuse Rentrée of the Waldensians in 1689.[779]

How was the revolt perceived in the Dutch Republic—the country that had produced much of the Camisards' ideological ammunition as well as the books that were supposedly changing the European mind? To many Reformed people, news about the vanguard of the apocalypse must have felt outlandish. Lionel Laborie has recently pointed out that in England the fanaticism of the insurgents was potentially problematic within this scheme. He asserts that Huguenot pamphleteers filtered out the millenarian elements of the revolt to uphold the reputation of the French exiles as loyal immigrants.[780] Morever, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2, early modern authories were usually very ill-disposed toward those who took up arms against their sovereign. In 1655, confessional solidarity had failed to trump the normative priniciple of sovereignty. That, at least, had been the public stance of the Dutch authorities.

This leads to several questions: What narratives did pamphleteers offer to sway contemporaries to the Camisard cause? If the efforts to help the Camisards were secret, why

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[778] Hazard, *Crisis of the European mind*, p. 296; for a much more nuanced exhaustive exploration of the reception of Camisard exiles in England see Laborie, *Enlightening enthusiasm*.

[779] M. Glozier, 'Schomberg, Miremont, and the Huguenot Invasions of France', in Onnekink (ed.), *War and religion after Westphalia*, pp. 121–154; Monahan, *Let God arise*; G. Gonnet, 'La "Glorieuse Rentrée"', *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 135 (1989), pp. 437–441.

[780] L. Laborie, 'Huguenot propaganda and the millenarian legacy of the *Désert* in the Refuge', *Proceedings of the Huguenot Society* 29–5 (2012), pp. 640–654; see also L. Laborie, 'The Huguenot offensive against the Camisard prohets in the English Refuge', in J. McKee and R. Vigne (eds.), *The Huguenots. France, exile & diaspora* (Brighton, Portland, Toronto, 2013), pp. 125–134.

was such propaganda published in the first place? Indeed, who were they actually trying to convince? In Chapter 2 we have seen that the Waldensians called for help abroad with a secular story about their fate, that was recast as a religious narrative by Dutch pamphleteers. The remainder of this chapter will investigate why with the Camisards it appears to have been the other way around. It will analyze, first, the early reception of the miracle stories coming from France and the strategies used by observers in the United Provinces to find out what was true about them. Secondly, it will explore the dynamics of the propaganda campaign surrounding the War of the Camisards, and compare it with the other printed news available to interested readers. Finally, this chapter asks if and why confessional argumentation fell out of favor during the conflict, and what was offered instead. In other words, do we see in the coverage of the Camisard revolt a shift from confessional normative principles to secular ones? Was there, if not a crisis, at least a struggle between European minds on how to interpret this peculiar revolt?

Reasoning Miracles

At the turn of the eighteenth century miracles were under siege. After having witnessed the panic among Europeans who had seen a comet in the sky,—now known as Halley's comet—Huguenot exile and early skeptic Pierre Bayle began his career as the 'philosopher of Rotterdam' with a full-fledged attack on the notion of miracles.[781] According to Bayle, miracles were incommensurable with God's perfect natural design. But they were not only the product of erroneous theological reasoning. To understand where they came from, the philosopher pointed to the corrupting force of long-distance communication. In his *Nouvelles de la République de Lettres*, Bayle observes that the number of miracles tends to increase the further one is away from them in time and space. Miracles from the New World were hence remarkably overrepresented.[782]

[781] A. Eddington, 'Halley's observations on Halley's Comet, 1682', *Nature* 83 (1910), pp. 372–373.
[782] H. Bost, 'Orthez ou le chant des anges. La VIIe Lettre pastorale de Jurieu', *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 135 (1989), p. 417.

A cunning skeptic, Pierre Bayle has long been recognized as one of the most important voices during the 'crisis of the European mind'.[783] In the late 1990s, Brendan Dooley built upon Hazard's thesis by arguing that skepticism also seeped into the realm of political communication about contemporary events, turning 'writers into speculators, information into opinion, and readers into critics'.[784] Bayle's double attack provides a compelling example of how theological and journalistic skepticism could become two sides of the same coin. Bayle was a thorn in the spiritual flesh of the Huguenot Refuge. But many theologians of the Refuge did not counter him by accusing him of having a blasphemous dependence on reason. Indeed, this would have been difficult, since the Bayle had himself been an early critic of blind faith in human reason. Instead, they began to develop justifications of the Protestant faith as a religion fully commensurable with reason. In doing so, they launched their own attack on miracles. These so-called *rationaux* were not intrinsically hostile toward miracles; in fact, they attested miracles belonged to the prime empirical proof that could lead reasonable men to have faith. Yet they presented false accounts of miracles as evidence of the dangers of superstition, because they made religion look irrational.[785] In other words, they, too, practiced journalistic skepticism in their efforts to salvage metaphysical truths.

While miracles were being declared dead in parts of the Republic of Letters, a new one was in the making in the small city of Orthez in Béarn. In the summer of 1685, a few months before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, inhabitants had begun to hear the singing of psalms, the origins of which were untraceable. It would suddenly start, day or night, and after a while die away again. Aside from the usual skeptics who looked for a human origin of the singing, increasing numbers of inhabitants became convinced that the angelic voices were God-sent. Many *nouveaux convertis* claimed that the heavens now sang the songs they used to sing in the church, before it had been shut down by the authorities. As one inhabitant put it, the stones started singing when humans were no longer allowed to. The city authorities were

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[783] For a recent exploration of Bayle as a secular pioneer see M.W. Hickson, 'Pierre Bayle and the secularization of conscience', *Journal of the History of Ideas* (2018), pp. 199–220.

[784] B. Dooley, *The social history of skepticism* (Baltimore, MD, 1999), p. 2; Anthony Grafton duly reminds us that historical source criticism has a much longer history, but he too identifies the decades around 1700 as a turning point, after which historians stopped finding comprehensive and moral truth in history and moved to more fragmentary 'critical thinking and the weighing of evidence'; A. Grafton, *What was history? The art of history in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 11.

[785] Israel, *Enlightenment contested*, pp. 68–69.

distressed by this and forbade Orthez's citizens to leave their homes after dark and gather to hear the singing. Yet they too heard the singing; one of the magistrates, no longer finding it credible to pretend that he had not, argued that it had to be the devil's work, meant to keep the Protestants from converting to Catholicism. Soon, the intendant and parliament of Béarn issued their own prohibitions of gathering to hear the singing, to the penalty of 500 to 2000 pounds.

This, at least, was the story that Pierre Jurieu shared with the world in his seventh pastoral letter, which was first published in December 1686.[786] Well aware of his time's intellectual climate, Jurieu expected criticism. To convince his public, he had to fight on multiple fronts. As Lorraine Daston argues, proof of miracles was established in the seventeenth century with recourse to conformation to dogma, public observation, and examination of deceit.[787] This last aspect was problematic. After all, both the singing and the reports about it could be products of deceit. Jurieu had to explain why he believed the miraculous stories coming from a place more than a thousand kilometers away from Rotterdam were actually true. As such, the pastoral letter is structured not so much as a celebration of God's miraculous intervention, but as a vindication. It starts off with an irritated tirade against the destructive skepticism of the time:

> One has to be rather bold in this age to dear to speak of prodigies, wonders, presages and other similar things. There was a time in which one believed in all of them, but in ours, one does not believe in anything.[788]

The pastor urged his international audience to steer a middle course between two extremes; one should not be gullible, like Catholics, because that leads to superstition. Yet he insisted that boundless skepticism is just as dangerous an attitude:

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[786] I have consulted an edition from 1688: P. Jurieu, 'VII. Lettre pastorale. Des chants & voix qui ont été entendus dans les airs divers lieux', in A. Acher (ed.), *Lettres pastorales addressées aux fideles de France, qui gemissent sous la captivité de Babylon* (Rotterdam, 1688); for the Dutch translation see P. Jurieu, *Pastorale of herderlijke brieven, aan de gelovige in Vrankryk, die onder de gevankenisse van Babel zyn suchtende* (The Hague, 1688), pflt 12474, pp. 97–112; for a general analysis of Jurieu's *Lettres Pastorales* see Van der Linden, *Experiencing exile*, pp. 179–194.

[787] L. Daston, *Wunder, Beweise und Tatsachen. Zur Geschichte der Rationalität* (Frankfurt, 2001), p. 54.

[788] 'Il faut être bien hardi dans ce siecle pou oser parler de prodiges, de merveilles, de presages & d'autres choses semblabes. Il y a eu un tems où l'on croioit tout: dans celui où nous sommes, on ne croit rien'; Jurieu, 'VII. Lettre pastorale', p. 145.

> According to our moderns, there are no sorcerers, no wizards, no possessions, no demonic apparitions, nor anything similar. It is a shame that these gentlemen have not pushed their confidence to deny the truth of the facts contained in Scripture. It would suit them well.[789]

Theologically, Jurieu defended miracles in a way that is reminiscent of Calvin, arguing that skeptics presuppose a false opposition between natural and supernatural causes. Earthquakes are natural phenomena but can at the same time serve as divine omens.[790] As to the specific events in Orthez, Jurieu gave a structural analysis of how to establish truth from evidence gained from a distance. First, a crucial aspect of the miracle was that it was public. If someone lied about it, he or she would immediately be discredited. Accordingly, those who did not believe this had to reject the authority of all historians writing about miracles; the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus also described publicly experienced miracles during the Roman siege of Jerusalem. Had Josephus lied about them, he would have unnecessarily ruined his reputation among his contemporaries. Jurieu subsequently argued that the other option is far more unlikely: why would thousands of people conspire and pretend to having heard something, even though it was hardly a matter of life and death? He believed this to be all the more the case since the people of Orthez knew that their intended public had not been raised in superstition and would not be particularly sensitive to miracle stories.

Second, Jurieu emphasized the credibility of the witnesses upon whose accounts he based his letter. He presented accounts of, among others, two exiled pastors from Orthez who had fled to Amsterdam, an inquisitive nobleman who had gone to the city to investigate the phenomenon, and a woman, whose gender, Jurieu reminded his readers, does not mean that

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789 'Selon nos modernes, il n'y a ni sorciers, ni magiciens, ni possessions, ni apparitions de demons, ni rien de semblable. C'est dommage que ces messieurs n'ont poussé leur assurance, jusqu'à nier la verité des faits contenus dans l'Ecriture, cela leur seroit fort commode'; ibid., p. 147.

790 Ibid., p. 149; Calvin theorized that since Revelation, God no longer communicated through 'supernatural' miracles, understood as disorderly occurrences that interrupted the divinely dictated natural order of the universe. Calvin refused to distinguish between a natural and a supernatural world, arguing that God was the sole creator of the world and everything in it. The difference between 'supernatural' and 'natural' events therefore lay in the eye of the beholder; it was a psychological rather than an ontological difference. God certainly communicated with the world through benevolent winds, timely deaths, or unexpected healing of the sick or wounded. Yet these were natural phenomena that would only appear miraculous to those to whom they were beneficial. The true miracle thus happens not in nature, but in the human mind that derives faith from it; M. Sluhovsky, 'Calvinist miracles and the concept of the miraculous in sixteenth–century Huguenot thought', *Renaissance and Reformation* 19–2 (1995), pp. 9–10.

she is devoid of 'honor, modesty, and conscience' as a witness.[791] He stressed, moreover, that the testimonies were taken under oath. He subsequently reported that the same had happened in the Cévennes. Normally, he would not have believed the Cevenols' story, because the mountains create echoes and the Cévenols were known to still openly sing psalms.

Yet since there was no reasonable doubt about the truth of the accounts from Béarn, however, the same had to be the case for the Cévennes. For this region too Jurieu offered several witness accounts, obtained through the Refuge community in Lausanne.[792] Playing devil's advocate, he acknowledged that several people retracted their statements about hearing psalms after they had fled to Switzerland. However, people desire to belong to a group, Jurieu argued. To fit in, they sometimes claim to have heard things that they had not actually heard. Indeed, it was almost inevitable that false witnesses mixed themselves among the true ones.[793] Interestingly, Jurieu failed to engage with the radicalization of this argument, namely, that all witness accounts may have come from what modern social psychologists call 'pluralistic ignorance'.[794] People may have claimed to have heard the voices out of fear of belonging to the unworthy, like the subjects in Hans Christian Andersen's *The emperor's new clothes*.

Finally, the pastoral letter changed from a defense based on reason back into a printed sermon, as Jurieu admonished his readers that the angels whose voices were heard would judge over those who do not praise God openly in the presence of the persecutors.[795] Other, perhaps more comforting interpretations, were left undiscussed. It is here that Jurieu inadvertently betrayed what must have caused him to believe the story; writing about it in the same year as the publication of his *Accomplissement des prophéties*, he must have felt that the strange tidings backed his story. He refrained from explicitly positioning the news in his larger eschatological framework, but it made him come to the same conclusions; clearly, God had put forth a call to (spiritual) arms.

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[791] '[…] l'honneur, […] la pudeur, & […] la conscience a fait de témoignage'; Jurieu, 'VII. Lettre pastorale', p. 158.
[792] Ibid., pp. 163–164.
[793] Ibid., p. 167.
[794] See D. Prentice and D. Miller, 'Pluralistic ignorance and the perpetuation of social norms by unwitting actors', *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 28 (1996), pp. 161–209.
[795] Jurieu, 'XVII. Lettre pastorale', p. 168.

There are basically two ways in which we can evaluate the impact of Jurieu's seventh *Lettre pastorale*. On the one hand, Jurieu's letters had a remarkably large readership, not only among the Refuge, but also among the *nouveaux convertis* in France. Through exiled ministers, he managed to reach many remaining Huguenot communities in France, to whom his letters were addressed and who provided him with input. Thanks to Jurieu, refugee printer Abraham Acher had managed to get a 15.9 percent market share in the Rotterdam book trade. Jurieu's distributor smuggled the letters from Rotterdam to Rouen in casks of dried herring, from whence they were shipped and sold in Paris. Jurieu's writings were so successful that people in the French capital believed that Acher paid the pastor to provide a steady supply of manuscripts.[796] Seeing how this dominant voice of the Refuge wrote about and supported the miraculous tidings from the rural south of France must have greatly reassured the remaining Huguenots that; although they lived in the periphery of the kingdom of France they simultaneously stood right at its center, with Protestant Europe's eyes fixed on them. At the same time, despite Jurieu providing one of the most remarkable accounts of what was happening in Revocation France, critics seemingly did not feel the need to take up the pen and reply to his letter. As Elisabeth Labrousse has pointed out, many Protestant intellectuals disagreed with Jurieu's millenarianism, but they refrained from taking up the gauntlet and starting a printed argument.[797]

This was different two years later, when strange tidings came from the Cévennes once again. On 3 February 1688, Isabeau Vincent, a fifteen-year-old shepherdess from Saou had begun to see visions and started to prophesy. The girl would lapse into a trance and preach the Gospel while she was sleeping, first in her native Occitan, but after some weeks also in fluent French, a language she could not speak while conscious. She preached against popery, admonished the *nouveaux convertis* to repent and abjure the Catholic religion, and claimed—strongly resembling Jurieu's predictions—that deliverance was nigh.[798] Attracting significant attention, Vincent prophesied until she was arrested in June, after which she was locked up in a cloister to silently live out her days. Soon, however, hundreds of young people all throughout

[796] Van der Linden, *Experiencing exile*, pp. 60–61.
[797] Labrousse, 'Political ideas of the Huguenot diaspora', p. 247.
[798] P. Joutard, 'The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. End or renewal of French Protestantism?', in Prestwich (ed.), *International Calvinism*, p. 363.

the Dauphiné—ranging between the age of eighteen months to eighteen years—similarly began to prophesy, miraculously infecting one another. One witness recounted how for every arrested child, several others would immediately spring up, making the movement a Hydra to its Catholic combatants.[799]

This time, several pamphleteers voiced their opinion in public. Most authors stressed their initial skepticism. In one pamphlet, published by the widow of Adriaan van Gaasbeek in Amsterdam, the anonymous author explained that he initially did not want to write about the matter because he deemed it to be fabulous, but had changed his mind because it had been verified by 'very credible people'.[800] Another anonymous author of a published letter from Geneva argued that he had wanted to give a detailed account about Vincent for a long time, but his correspondent rejected it so vehemently that he did not dare bringing it up. Struggling to find the right way of communicating the story of the little prophets to such a skeptic recipient, he made it a joint effort. He wrote up an account, and invited several preachers and philosophers to discuss it. He pointed out that all the 'disbelievers' and philosophers of his community who had gone to the region to disprove the myth, had come back perplexed and fully convinced about the truth of the matter. The author argued that at first glance, one could not help but laugh when seeing 'three shepherds, respectively eight, twenty-six, and fifteen years old, gathering and having a consistory with sixty penitents on their knees'.[801] But overall it was a sad story:

> One also has to cry, seeing how the prisons of Grenoble, Cret, and Valence are packed with preachers of all ages and both sexes […] and upon seeing the torn-down and burned barns and farmsteads where the children have preached, and this land, full of soldiers that feast upon it.[802]

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799 Anonymous, *Naukeurig verhaal en aanmerkingen, over de nieuwe en zeldzame propheten die zigh opdoen in't Delphinaat in Vrankryk* (Rotterdam, 1689), pflt 13078, p. 5.

800 'Soo verstaan wy nu, uyt seer geloofwaardige lieden, dat alles wat daer van gesegt is, waar soude sijn'; Anonymous, *Pertinent verhaal van de propheet, die in Vrankryk is opgestaan; waar in den naukeurigen leeser kan sien dat God geen aannemer van persoonen en is, want sy van kints–gebeente altyd de schapen gehoeydt heeft; gelyck u hier in 't brede wordt verhaaldt* (Amsterdam, 1688), pflt 12675.

801 '[…] drie Herders van 8, 26 en 15 jaaren, vergadert en Consistorie houdende met 60 Boetveerdige op de knyen'; Anonymous, *Naukeurig verhaal*, p. 4.

802 '[...] men moet ook schreyen alsmen vervolgens de gevangenhuysen van Grenoble, van Cret en Valence ziet opgepropt van deze predikers, van alle ouderdom, en beyderleye sexe, en van die geenen die haar hebben weezen hooren van alle soorten, alsmen de schuuren en hoeven ziet om veer gehaalt, of verbrand, om dat die kinderen daar gepredikt hebben; en dit gansche land vol soldaten, dieze op–eeten'; ibid., p. 5. The authorities

Taking the same approach as Jurieu, the author systematically tried to prove the truth of the matter through over twenty pages of testimony letters, and copies of transcribed sermons, and by listing the wide variety of different men and women who had testified, including noblemen, merchants, doctors, lawyers, men and women, the learned and the unlearned. Although they were kept anonymous, every account was accompanied by a brief description of the respective author, stating, for instance: 'Testimony of Mr. * + Doctor and Philosopher, naturally a bit unbelieving'.[803]

Jurieu took three months to report the story about Isabeau Vincent in his pastoral letters, but when he did, he offered a most rigorous analysis. In the pastoral letter signed 1 October 1688, he apologized to his readership for having taken so long to report on the prophecies in the Cévennes, assuming that they have heard about it by now through different channels. Yet the pastor wanted to take the time to be adequately informed so that he would not build his reflections upon falsehoods.[804] In the letter, and the one that followed it two weeks later, Jurieu again gave a twofold defense of the miracle.

First, he established that the described events were indeed a supernatural occurrence, against sceptics who argued that Vincent's condition was indeed medical, and therefore a natural phenomenon. Several physicians had examined the girl, but could not find a medical explanation for her trances. Jurieu stressed that skeptic people would argue that the girl could have heard sermons in the past and had retained something of them in her memory. However, the author asserted that the girl's preaching sounded nothing like sermons. Moreover, he asserted that skeptics could not explain why her brain only conveyed these things while she was asleep. Again playing devil's advocate, Jurieu wrote that some might argue that 'there are many effects in nature for which we can give no reason, and yet the machine is the only cause'.[805] In other words, with limited knowledge of the natural world, one cannot know for

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tried to destroy the movement by destroying the places where the prophets had preached; Gagg, *Kirche im Feuer*, p. 52.

[803] '[…] 't Getuygenis van M. *+ Doctor en Philosooph, van naturen wat ongeloovig'; Anonymous, *Naukeurig verhaal*, p. 11.

[804] [P. Jurieu], 'III. Lettre pastorale. Réponse à un sophisme de monsieur Pelisson tiré des privileges qui conviennent aux corps politiques. Reflexions sur le miracle arrivé en Dauphiné. Réponse aux objections des esprits forts', in Acher (ed.), *Lettres pastorales*, vol. 3 (Rotterdam, 1689), p. 59.

[805] 'Il y a tant d'effet dans la nature dont nous ne sçaurions render raison, & dont pourtant la machine est l'unique cause' ; ibid., p. 70.

certain what the limits of nature are. To counter this point, Jurieu argued that experience and reason teach us those limits:

> When extraordinary events consist only of corporal motions, one can with less injustice refer their causes to the machine. […] But to reason and speak divinely, without having learned anything, and without even the images of what they say remaining impressed upon the machine of the brain: that, I say, is entirely beyond the powers and action of the machine.[806]

According to Jurieu, this mode of skeptical thinking ultimately leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to determine whether Christ performed true miracles or not, simply because people do not have a full understanding of nature's operations.[807] The nature of the miracles was also important. The theologian remarked that 'a miserable monk who runs throughout Europe to heal the sick, to make the deaf hear and give sight to the blind, who undertakes to bless the Christian armies as if the success of their arms depended on his blessings', should rightly be denounced as an impostor.[808] At first, this distinction may look like a cheap sneer at Catholics, but it was grounded in theology. One of the central points the Reformed resisted was the idea that people could (or should) work miracles. Indeed, in the words of Robert Scribner, one of the Protestant Reformation's central ideas was that 'all sacred action flowed one-way, from the divine to the human'.[809] Girls miraculously preaching in foreign languages went against this dogma.

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[806] 'Quand les evenements extraordinaires ne consistent qu'en des mouvements corporels, on peut avec moins d'injustice en rapporter les causes à la machine. […] Mais raisonner & parler divinement, sans avoir rien appris & sans méme que les images de ce qu'on dit demeurent imprimées dans la machine du cerveau: cela, dis je, est entierement hors des forces & de l'action de la machine'; ibid., p. 71–72.

[807] Ibid., p. 72.

[808] '[…] un miserable moyne qui court l'Europe pour guerir les maladies, pour faire ouïr les sourds & render la veüe aux aveugles, qui entreprend de benir les armées chrêtiennes, comme si le succés de leurs armes dependoit de ses benedictions'; [P. Jurieu], 'IV. Lettre pastorale. Continuation dela refutation des sophisms pour l'infaillibilité de l'Eglise Romaine. Suite des reflexions sur le miracle de Dauphiné. Examen de la question si le tems des miracles est entierement fini', in Acher (ed.), *Lettres pastorales*, vol. 3 (Rotterdam, 1689), p. 81; Jurieu was probably referring to the miracle–working Capuchin friar Marco d'Aviano, who famously blessed the armies of the Holy League before the Battle of Vienna and exercised considerable influence over Emperor Leopold I. Marco d'Aviano was beatified by John Paul II in 2003. See J. Mikrut, *Die Bedeutung des P. Markus von Aviano für Europa* (Vienna, 2003).

[809] R. Scribner, 'The Reformation, popular magic, and the "disenchantment of the world"', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 23–3 (1993), p. 482.

Second, Jurieu developed a systematic method to establish the truth in long-distance communication. He argued that 'there are many declarations and reports of wise, enlightened, learned, intelligent, not superstitious, not prejudiced'.[810] These accounts were sent to 'men of letters', who had in turn asked critical questions, which were answered on the basis of careful empirical observation. Jurieu admitted that 'these testimonies of wise and honest people are not without a danger of illusion'.[811] But mistakes could only be made by a large number of people for a short period:

> A crowd of people can suffer an illusion just as much as two or three people. Thus, an event which appears surprising may mislead countless spectators and gain a false notoriety if it does not continue, and if people have neither the time, nor the liberty to examine it. But an event that lasts for eight months, which everyone had the liberty to carefully examine carefully hath had the liberty carefully to examine, and without prevention, such an event, I argue, never produced such false notoriety: And one will find no example of it. .[812]

Interestingly, Jurieu argued that free access to the press confirmed that the sources are, in fact, credible:

> Are there not everywhere these minds who honor themselves by calling into question and ridiculing all events of an extraordinary character? Who even doubt that there are in that very province these strong-minded people who do all they can to call into question what they themselves want to doubt? If we see one letter of one of these gentlemen it is enough to ruine the testimonies of a hundred wise and enlightened persons, who say, we have seen and heard it.[813]

People who persisted in this skepticism that defined his age suffered from what the pastor called an 'esprit fort':

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[810] '[…] ce sont plusieurs declarations & des relations de personnes sages, éclairées, sçavantes, intelligentes, non superstitieuses, non prevenües'; [Jurieu], 'III. Lettre pastorale', pp. 65–66.

[811] '[…] ce tesmoignages de gens sages & honnestes n'est pas sans peril d'illusion'; ibid., p. 66.

[812] 'Une foule de gens peut souffrit illusion tout de méme que deux ou trois personnes. Ainsi un évenement qui paroît surprenant peut trompe rune infinté de spectateurs & faire une fausse notoirité quand il ne dure pas & que les gens n'ont pas ou le temps, ou la liberté de l'examiner. Mais un évenement perseverant durant huit mois, que tout le monde a eu la liberté d'examiner avec soin, & sans prevention, jamais, dis je, un tel évenement n'a produit une fausse notorieté: Et l'on n'en trouvera pas d'exemple'; ibid., pp. 66–67.

[813] 'N'y a t'il pas par tout de ces esprits qui se sont honneur de revoquer en doute & même de tourner en ridicule tous les evenements qui ont un caractere extraordinaire? Qui doute qu'il n'y ait dans la province méme assés de ces fortes d'esprits qui sont tout ce qu'ils peuvent pour faire revoquer en doute ce dont eux mêmes veulent douter: si l'on voit une letter d'un de ces messieurs c'est assés pour ruiner les attestations de cent personnes sages & esclairées qui disent, nous avons vu & ouy'; ibid., p. 67.

> In my opinion, this is the greatest of all temerities, one of the greatest disorders in which the mind of man can fall, and a madness that does not appear human to me. […] These gentlemen raise their judgment above all those who are living and dead witnesses, and it must be that all who say and affirm, I have seen it and I have heard it, are liars.[814]

This time, Jurieu's reports attracted criticism. Several months after the publication of the pastoral letters, the *Antwoort van een hugenot aen een roomsch priester over het subject van de hedendaegse propheten in Vranckrijck* (*Answer of a Huguenot to a Catholic priest about the subject of the contemporary prophesies in France*) was published anonymously in The Hague, dated 30 May 1689.[815] In the letter a Huguenot exile gave his perspective on events to a priest, who had apparently mentioned Vincent in an earlier letter. The author regretted that Jurieu's voice spoke louder than that of more moderate men and was therefore wrongly regarded as representative. He argued that the reports about miracles should be seen as a prop for Jurieu's political ideas: his outrageous defense of popular sovereignty and the right of subjects to offer their loyalty to a different ruler. Through wishful thinking, human passions mixed with religious zeal, leading people to falsely assume that their designs agreed with providence.[816] People were only susceptible to miracles at certain moments in time. As such, the author continued, William III's campaign in England couldnot have succeeded without the help of several 'miracles'. Now that the stadtholder had set his sight on France, Jurieu took up the miracles in the Cévennes out of political necessity.

This association between Jurieu and William III was not spurious, since the pastor was closely connected to Orangist networks, which did indeed also link back to the Cévennes. Most notably, Jurieu was a friend of the Cévenol preachers François Vivens and Claude Brousson who had gone into exile in the United Provinces, from where they continued their efforts to organize Huguenot armed resistance in France under the patronage of William III.[817] The

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[814] 'C'est à mon sens la plus grande de toutes les temerités, un des plus grands dereglements où l'esprit de l'homme puisse tomber, & une folie qui ne me paroît pas humaine. […] Ces messieurs élevent leur jugement sur tout ce qu'il y a de témoins vivants & morts; & il faut que des gens qui disent & qui affirment, j'ay vû & j'ay ouy, soyent des menteurs'; [Jurieu], 'IV. Lettre pastorale', p. 83

[815] Anonymous, *Antwoort van een hugenot aen een roomsch priester over het subject van de hedendaegse propheten in Vranckrijck* (The Hague, 1689), pflt 13080.

[816] Ibid., p. 9.

[817] Both Vivens and Brousson returned to France in disguise, where they had to pay the ultimate price for the Huguenot cause. In 1692 Vivens died in a skirmish in the mountains. Brousson was broken on the wheel as a

author of the *Antwoort van een Hugenot* finally exhorted the priest to be careful with the letter, fearing that if his identity became public the people would hold him for a dangerous unbeliever and inform the authorities that he was an enemy of the state.[818]

In France, critical voices went a step further and actually argued that the stories were the product of an intentional plot to deceive. In 1689, Esprit Fléchier, bishop of Nîmes—the nearest big city to the Cévennes—wrote to the Duke of Montausier, asserting that there was no doubt that the whole thing had been fabricated in Geneva. The bishop claimed that a certain glassblower, Monsieur du Verre, had started to teach boys and girls the art of prophecy. In 1692, Catholic convert David-Augustin de Brueys made the story of the glassblower public in his *Histoire du fanatisme*, and, in fact, traced the origins of the movement back to Jurieu, who had first excited the malcontents in France with his *Accomplissement des prophéties*.[819] He described how du Verre taught the children psalms and parts of the Book of Revelation, as well as how to control and move their bodies in ways that would impress gullible people.[820]

Jurieu would find an unlikely defender in Pierre Bayle. In his 1702 *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, Jurieu's old rival argued that Brueys 'should never have insinuated without decent evidence that [Jurieu] had a soul as black as to suggest such a plan'.[821] He was probably right. There is no evidence to suggest that the prophetic movements were concerted by exiled Protestants or the Reformed communities in Geneva. Indeed, Genevas magistrates got the consent of the city's religious leadership to prohibit the movement in the city. Still, the little prophets had without doubt been inspired, consciously or unconsciously, by Jurieu's *Accomplissement des prophéties* and his pastoral letters. Followers must have been encouraged by the fact that they received coverage in the international press. At the same time, the printed discussions about Orthez and the little prophets reveal that many contemporary observers had become highly suspicious about the origins of events like these. Those who wanted to convince

rebel in 1698; Utt and Strayer, *Bellicose dove*; E. Gaidan, 'Le Prédicant François Vivens. Sa Mort d'Après un Témoin (1687–1692)', *Bulletin historique et littéraire* 40–9 (1891), pp. 479–481.

818 Anonymous, *Antwoort van een Hugenot*.

819 C. Blanc, 'Genève et les origins du movement prophétique en Dauphiné et dans les Cévennes', *Revue d'histoire suisse* 23–2 (1943), p. 236.

820 Ibid., p. 237.

821 Ibid.

their audiences of the truth of the matter in the Dutch press, thus had to back up their millenarian beliefs with reason.[822]

After the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, refugees had generated an international public sphere in which everything concerning the Reformed in France had become deeply politicized. People engaging with this public sphere had long learned not to take all reports at face value. They had become accustomed to seeing (foreign) political agendas behind news about miracles and dissident movements. Because local conflicts were influenced by foreign ideas, they were quickly regarded as the product of foreign meddling. Observers were aware that people from different sides were consistently targeting their attention through the printing press, making them consume the news with a critical eye.

Assuming the voice of the Camisards

Eight years after he had written his last pastoral letter, Jurieu's long desired revolt finally broke out. It is difficult to determine when he precisely found out about it, but it did not take long before the news about du Chayla's murder was reported in Dutch newspapers. On 17 August 1702, the *Amsterdamse Courant* reported rumors from Paris six days earlier.[823] It provided correct details about du Chayla's notoriety as a missionary, yet crucial details about the murder were lacking and some information was incorrect. The newspaper did not mention that the crowd had come to the house to demand the liberation of prisoners and that a skirmish had taken place. Indeed, no context about religious or political unrest was provided, apart from an unfounded detail that the murderers had offered to spare the priest's life if he would convert. This suggests that the report was based on Catholic sources; French religious leaders immediately began to hail du Chayla as a martyr.[824] The reporter, aware that the story might not be entirely correct, cautiously stated that it may have been 'overly passionate'.[825]

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[822] Jurieu was not the first Millenarian in the Dutch Republic to do so. As Andrew Fix has demonstrated, Dutch Millenarians were characteristically invested with the role of reason to give meaning to life: A. Fix, 'Dutch Millenarianism and the role of reason. Daniel de Breen and Joachim Oudaan', in Laursen (ed.), *Millenarianism and Messianism*, vol. 4, pp. 49–56.
[823] *Amsterdamse Courant*, 17 August 1702.
[824] Monahan, *Let God arise*, p. 66.
[825] '[…] ietwat passieus'; *Amsterdamse Courant*, 17 August 1702.

Throughout the rest of the civil war, journalists struggled to find reliable information about the war in the Cévennes. Shreds of (often conflicting) news came from different sources in Paris, Basel, Montpellier, Livorno, Geneva, Turin, or London. In June 1703, the political monthly *Mercure historique et politique contenant l'état présent de l'Europe* (*Polical and historical Mercury containing the present state of Europe*)—edited by the Huguenot minister and exile Jean de la Brune (?–1743?) and published by Henri van Bulderen (1683–1713) in The Hague—tellingly published an anonymous letter complaining about the scarcity of reports:[826]

> So far it has been rather difficult to learn about the truth of what is happening in the Cévennes […] There is something strange and very surprising about the whole affair, which has lasted for almost a year.[827]

For those curious news consumers who tried to make sense of the bits and pieces of information coming from newspapers, the publication of a Camisard manifesto in February 1703 must have come as a pleasant surprise. The twelve-page *Les raisons véritables des habitants des Cévennes sur leur prise d'armes* (*The true reasons of the population of the Cévennes for their taking up arms*), published in Amsterdam, was late but not unsuccessful; it was soon translated into Dutch, into German in Berlin, and into English in London [Fig. 9].[828] Charles-Joseph de la Baume (1644–1715) one of the first historians to write a book about the revolt from a Catholic perspective, judged the work to have been

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826 A. Juillard, 'Jean de la Brune (?–1743?)' , in Mercier–Faivre and Reynaud (eds.), *Dictionnaire des journalistes*, http://dictionnaire–journalistes.gazettes18e.fr/journaliste/433–jean–de–la–brune.

827 'Il a été assez difficile jusqu'ici d'être instruit au vrai de ce qui se passe dans les Sevennes […] il y a quelque chose de bien singulier & de bien surprenant, dans tout le cours de cette affaire, qui dure depuis près d'un an'; Anonymous**,** *Mercure historique et politique concernant l'état présent de l'Europe, ce qui se passe dans toutes les Cours*, vol. 3 (The Hague, 1703), p. 639.

828 Anonymous, *Les Raisons véritables des habitants des Cévennes sur leur prise d'armes dédié à Monseigneur le Dauphin* (Amsterdam, 1703); Anonymous, *Manifest van het volk in de Sevennes, wegens het opvatten der wapenen tegens de Koning van Vrankryk beneffens desselfs gebed* (Amsterdam, 1703); Anonymous, *Manifeste des habitans des Sevennes sur leur prise d'armes/Manifest der Völcker und Einwohner in der Landschafft Sevennen warum sie die Waffen ergriffen* (Amsterdam, 1703); Anonymous, *Sonderbahres und merckwürdiges Manifest der Einwohner in den Sevennischen Thälern der Französischen Provinz Languedoc darin die ihre trifftige und gar wichtige Ursachen oder Bewegungen anführen und entdecken/ warum sie anjetzo die Waffen ergriffen* (Berlin, 1703); Anonymous, *Manifeste des habitants des Cévennes sur leur prise d'armes* (Berlin, 1703); Anonymous, *The manifesto of the Cevennois shewing the true reasons which have constrained the inhabitants of the Cévennes to take up arms, dedicated to my lord the Dauphine* (London, 1703).

> perfectly well written but very dangerous and very fit to seduce the feeble-minded and the badly converted nouveaux convertis […] [describing] very vividly and eloquently the cruelties that they pretend we have committed.[829]

Presented as a manifesto, the work purported to speak with the voice of the insurgents and was accordingly published anonymously. As Antoine Court (1695–1760) already remarked in his monumental *Histoire des troubles des Cévennes* (*History of the troubles of the Cévennes*), it is very unlikely that it had indeed been written by a Camisard;[830] the author of the manifesto made mistakes about details of the revolt, which cannot be explained as the conscious rewriting of history for propaganda reasons. Instead, the work was probably written by one of the many émigré pastors who had settled in England or the Dutch Republic some two decades earlier. In any case, the author was well acquainted with the literature of the Refuge; the work was inspired by Jean Claude's *Plaintes des protestans*—one of William III's secular pieces of propaganda against Louis XIV—from which it borrowed several passages.[831]

The manifesto appeared around the same time that the Cévennes were first discussed within diplomatic networks. The Dutch ambassador to England, Marinus van Vrijbergen, first brought up the possibility of support for the Camisards to Grand Pensionary Heinsius on 20 February 1703, after having consulted with Sidney Godolphin, Lord Treasurer, and the Duke of Marlborough, commander of the allied forces.[832] However, it is unlikely that the pamphlet came from within the alliance's inner diplomatic circles. On 20 March, Van Vrijbergen emphasized to Heinsius that secrecy about the plans for military support was vital. He told his master that Godolphin would send two Huguenots to the region to inform the Camisards about their plans, but they would not meet with Heinsius on their way, 'because the secrecy is so general and absolute', that they did not want to give the slightest exception to it.[833] The

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[829] '[…] étoit parfaitement bien écrit, mais fort dangereux et très propre à séduire les esprits faibles et les nouveaux catho liques mal convertis. Il dépeint, avec les couleurs les plus vives que l'art et l'éloquence puissent trouver, les cruautés inouies qu'il prétend qu'on a exercée'; F. Puaux, 'Le "Manifeste des habitans des Sévennes" sur leur prise d'armes', *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 61–4 (1912), pp. 338–351.

[830] A. Court, *Histoire des troubles des Cévennes, ou de la guerre des Camisars, sous le regne de Louis le Grand*, vol. 1, bk III (Villefranche, 1760), p. 283.

[831] See Chapter 4; Puaux, 'Manifeste des habitans', 339.

[832] Letter from Marinus van Vrijbergen to Anthonie Heinsius, 20 February 1703, in A. Veenendaal (ed.), *Briefwisseling Anthonie Heinsius 1702–1720*, vol. 2 (The Hague, 1978), pp. 76–77.

[833] '[…] soo generael en absolut'; Vrijbergen to Heinsius, 20 March 1703, in ibid., p. 114.

author of the manifesto, by contrast, probably wanted to stir up the alliance's political centers. Stakeholders engaged in public diplomacy to influence the political authorities. There was little reason for those already pulling the strings to turn to the press.

That there was so little publicly available information about the War of the Camisards had a crucial advantage; it gave the author ample opportunity to present a positive image of the insurgents, unrestrained by potentially inconvenient facts about prophecy and atrocity. Nevertheless, by justifying a religious minority's revolt against a rightful sovereign for a general audience, the author was skating on thin ice. In order not to alienate potential allies, the writer of the manifesto steered away from any form of group identification that could spark controversy, most notably the question of prophesy. It is possible that the author did not know about the most recent prophetic outbreaks which had caused the initial clash with the authorities. But his failure to mention the Cévennes' rich history of prophetic movements that had caused such a stir in the late 1680s must have been an intentional omission.



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MANIFEST

Van die in de

SEVENNES,

Wegens het opvatten der Wapenen tegens den

KONING van VRANKRIJK.

HEt Volk van de Sevennes heeft altijd profeſſie gedaan van de Evangeliſche Religie, ſelfs verſcheiden eeuwen voor de Reformatie. Ten tijde van de Waldenſen en Albigoiſen waren de Sevennes vervuld met deſe luiden, en men ſiet door verſcheide Acten, datſe profeſſie gedaan hebben van deſelve Religie van de tegenwoordige Gereformeerden. De groote Kruis-vaarden der Pauſſen verwekten ſommige vervolgingen tegen deſelve, maar ſy bleeven gedurig ſtandvaſtig in haar Geloof. Haar yver wierd op 't nieuw verwekt in 't begin der Reformatie, en in weinig tijd was dit ganſche Land Gereformeerd, en is ſedert die tijd tot hier toe ſoo gebleeven. 'Ten is geen nieuwe Religie die men daar tegenwoordig ſoekt in te voeren; maar men ſoekt alleen de oude te mainteneren, waar van ſe ſedert ſoo veel tijd in poſſeſſie ſyn.

Vrankrijk heeft noit gehoorſamer en getrouwer onderdanen gehad voor ſijn Koningen, als onſe Vaderen en wy geweeſt ſijn; van het welke wy veel overtuigende bewyſen ſouden konnen bybrengen. Maar om niet lang te ſijn in onſe defenſie, ſoo ſullen wy ons vergenoegen met twee merkwaardige exempelen, die in de laatſte eeuw, onder de Regeeringe van Lodewyk de dertiende, en onder die van ſijn navolger, Lodewyk de veertiende, ſijn voorgevallen, die de ganſche wereld ſullen doen ſien, dat onſe getrouwigheid tegen onſe Koningen de proef kan houden.

Den Hertog van Montmorenci, Gouverneur van Langedoc, in den Jaare 1632. door de Koninginne Moeder, Maria de Medicis, en door Grafton, Hertog van Orleans, broeder van den Koning, gewonnen ſijnde, onderſtond een Oorlog aan te vangen, om den Koning te verpligten, ſig van den Cardinaal Richelieu te ontdoen, en ſig van ſijn perſoon

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9. *Manifest van het volk in de Sevennes, wegens het opvatten der wapenen tegens den koning van Vrankryk* (s.l., 1703). Resource: University Library Ghent.

Instead, the author described the Cévenol Huguenots as proto-Calvinists—like the Waldensians were considered to have been—, who had inhabited the region and had preached the Reformed faith for centuries.[834] Nevertheless, the manifesto was not clearly structured on the normative principle of confessional truth—like the *Plaintes des protestans* on which it built; the insurgents' adherence to the Reformed faith was not coupled to a Protestant truth claim. The author aimed for his readers to religiously identify with the insurgents, but he was careful not to draw the conflict along confessional lines. This is not to say that the pamphlet presented a fully secular understanding of the war; the author argued that divine providence led the Cévenols to take up arms for protection against the punitive expedition sent to the region following the lynching of du Chayla. It did not, however, take the form of what Alexandra Walsham had identified as 'anti-Catholic Providentialism', an act of divine intervention for the true faith.[835] Instead, providence was linked to the confessionally neutral right to counter violence with violence, 'being a law of nature, confirmed by the laws of God and men'.[836] In other words, the conflict was fought with divine grace, but it was not a war of religion:

> We may modestly ascertain that here is a tyrannical government, a military government, which is not regulated by justice, reason, or even humanity, and which all upright Frenchmen are obliged to oppose until peace and justice are fully restored in the kingdom.[837] It is to this that we call upon our compatriots. For it is not a matter of religion alone, but a law of nature, it is a right common to all the nations and religions of the world to oppose the violence of those, who without cause rob us of our goods and ruin our homes and our families.[838]

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834 Anonymous, 'Manifeste des habitants des Cévennes sur leur prise d'armes', transcription in H. Scheurleer (ed.), *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du XVIII^e siècle contenant les negociations, traitez, resolutions et autres documens authentiques concernant l'affaires d'etat*, vol. 2 (The Hague, 1725), p. 527; for the narrative of proto–Calvinism, see Chapter 1.

835 A. Walsham, *Providence in early modern England* (Oxford, 1999), p. 280.

836 '[…] qui est un droit de la nature autorisé par les loix divines & humaines'; Anonymous, *Manifeste des habitants*, p. 530.

837 This part is borrowed from Claude's *Plaintes des protestans.*

838 'Ainsi nous pouvons fort modestement assurer que c'est ici un Gouvernement Tyrannique, *un Gouvernement Militaire*, qui n'est reglé ni dela justice, ni de la raison, ni même de l'humanité, & que tous les bons François sont obligez de s'y opposer jusqu'à ce que la paix & la justice soient entierement rétablis dans le Royaume. C'est à quoi nous exhortons tous nos compatriotes, car ce n'est point une affaire de Religion seulement, c'est un droit de nature commun à toutes les Nations & à toutes les Religions du monde de s'opposer à la violence de ceux qui nous ravissent nos biens sans cause et qui desolent nos maisons & nos familles '; Anonymous, *Manifeste des habitants*, p. 530.

The manifesto concluded with a direct appeal to its proposed diverse and multiconfessional readership, asking 'all kings, princes, lords, states, and peoples, and all Christian men in general, our neighbors and compatriots to push back such an unjust domination, to which all of Europe will have to bow if this violence and barbarity is not stopped'.[839] In other words, governments that refused to respect the normative orders of justice, reason, and humanity—which every Christian should respect—were a threat to the entire social order, regardless of territorial borders, and thus required an international political response. The normative principle of sovereignty was thereby overruled. This confessionally neutral approach shows that although the author's intended readership was primarily Protestant, he took into account the larger European picture; the interconfessional alliance waging war against France and Catholic princes would not be eager to support an anti-Catholic revolt. In fact, Jurieu had stressed something similar when he wrote to Heinsius that

> the interest which the powers of Europe of another religion have in this affair is so palpable, and you will have understood it so well, that it would be a waste of time to present it to you.[840]

To emphasize that the conflict was not of a confessional nature, the author of the manifesto made the unfounded claim that Catholic Cévenols supported the Camisard cause and had joined forces with their Protestant neighbors to resist the heavy taxes levied by the Sun King.[841] In reality, the War of the Camisards entailed particularly brutal interconfessional violence.[842] Right from the start, targeted attacks on their villages prompted local Catholics to organize their own militias. Around the time of the publication of the *Raisons véritables*, several independent Catholic militias, styling themselves the 'White Camisards'—a contrast to the black smocks worn by their enemies—'Cadets of the Cross', or 'Florentines', had begun to

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[839] '[…] tous rois, princes, & seigneurs, etats, & peuples, & en general tous hommes Chrêtiens nos voisins & compatriottes, de nous aider à repousser une si injuste Domination à laquelle toute l'Europe soit soumise, si on n'arrêtoit pas sa violence & sa barbarité '; ibid., p. 533.

[840] 'L'interest que les puissances de l'europe d'une autre religion ont dans cette affaire est si sensible et vous l'avez si bien compris que ce seroit perdre temps que de vous le representer'; Pierre Jurieu to Anthonie Heinsius, 20 November 1703, transcription in Knetsch, *Pierre Jurieu*, p. 446.

[841] Anonymous, *Manifeste des habitants*, pp. 531–532.

[842] See C. Bernat, 'La Guerre des Cévennes. Un Conflit Trilatéral?', *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 148–3 (2002), pp. 461–507.

carry out raids of their own. Until 1705, Camisards and Cadets of the Cross would continue to pillage and massacre each other's communities, quite independently from the war fought with the Crown.[843]

Nonetheless, the author of the pamphlet may have treasured real hope that his work would actually inspire Catholic Frenchmen to take up arms against their king—another decisive reason to defend the revolt in confessionally neutral terms. For over a decade, the London-based émigré Armand de Bourbon (1655–1732), Marquis of Miremont, had tried to make foreign powers aware of the 'universal discontent' over taxation experienced by Occitan subjects of both faiths.[844] Miremont had worked hard to convince the Protestant courts that they should support the Camisards.[845] It is therefore not implausible that Miremont was also the author or patron of the pamphlet. As soon as they began to consider an intervention, London and The Hague accepted him as the man to lead the armed invasion in the Languedoc. From London, the marquis actively tried to deconfessionalize the conflict. In the summer of 1703, Miremont's secretary David Flotard managed to enter the Cévennes with letters of credence, disguised as a merchant, and meet with the Camisards' main prophet-commanders, Jean Cavalier and Roland Laporte. Apart from his letters of credence from both Queen Anne and the States General, Flotard also carried a letter from Miremont bidding the Camisards to act prudently and refrain from setting churches on fire and killing priests.[846] The war had to conform to the public image that the exiled advocates of the Camisard cause had created to spur the governments joined in the Grand Alliance to act.

Selling Intervention

Calls for restraint to avert the harmful image of a fanatical war of religion did not solve the second problem about the War of the Camisards; there was no denying that they were in open

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[843] Ibid., pp. 465–474.
[844] E. Le Roy Ladurie, *The peasants of Languedoc* (Urbana and Chicago, IL, 1974), p. 273.
[845] Laborie, 'Huguenot propaganda', p. 653.
[846] H. Dubled, 'Les protestants français et l'étranger dans le Midi de 1685 à 1710. Pour répondre à une vieille accusation', *Annales du Midi. Revue archéologique, historique et philologique de la France méridionale* (1990), p. 444; Monahan, *Let God arise*, p. 161.

war with their monarch. The normative principle of sovereignty remained a major issue for advocates of intervention. In fact, the question of sovereignty had already been used in a pamphlet addressed to the Camisards, which urged them to lay down their weapons. Written in the genre of the pastoral letters, the anonymous *Lettre de M. **. Pr. Fr. Aux religionnaires révoltez des Cevennes* purported to speak with the voice of an exiled minister. The alleged pastor approached the Camisards as fellow members of the true religion, but subsequently asked them a critical question:

> Does the spirit of God inspire such cruelty? Does the true religion carry its followers to inhumane actions?'[847]

Side by side with the reprimands based on confessional truth, the author engaged with the normative principles of sovereignty and rule of law, reminding the insurgents that nobody had 'given them the right of the sword':[848]

> Roman law condemns as criminals of lèse-majesté, those who take up arms, recruit soldiers, and spill the blood of their fellow citizens, without the commandment of the prince.[849]

In short, the Camisards violated Roman law, divine law, and the law of nations, on which 'the security of civil society and the peace of mankind depends'.[850] Although the pamphlet had probably been produced by the French authorities, it made an argument to which many governments—always watchful for the threat of rebellion in their own territories—were susceptible. Although the idea of supporting a fifth column in France had found its ways into Europe's inner political and diplomatic circles by the spring of 1703, not everybody was convinced by the justification laid out in the *Manifesto of the inhabitants of the Cévennes*. In England the idea of aiding rebels against their legitimate monarch sparked controversy. Several

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847 'L'esprit de Dieu inspire–t–il la cruauté? & vraïe religion porte–t–elle ses sectateurs à des actions inhumaines?'; Anonymous, *Lettre de M. **. Pr. Fr. Aux religionnaires révoltez des Cevennes* (s.l. 1704), p. 2

848 '[…] vous à donné le droit du glaive'; Anonymous, *Lettre de M. ***., p. 4.

849 Les lois Romaines condamnent comme criminels de leze–majesté ceux qui prennent les armes, levent des soldats, & répandent le sang de leurs concitoïens, sans le commandement du prince'; ibid., p. 4.

850 '[…] depend la sûreté de la societé civile, & le repos du genre humain'; ibid., p. 5.

members of the queen's Privy Council regarded it as unethical and believed that support for the Camisards would provide fuel for those who disputed the legitimacy of Anne's rule.[851]

At the request of Miremont, Abel Boyer (1667–1729) intervened in this debate by writing another defense of the Camisard cause.[852] Boyer was a native of the Upper Languedoc who had studied theology at the Academy of Puylaurens. When the academy was shut down in 1685, he fled to the Dutch Republic. Recommended by Pierre Bayle to Gilbert Burnet, bishop of Salisbury and advisor to William III, Boyer moved to England in 1689, where he quickly made a career as a contemporary historian and tutor to the Duke of Gloucester at the English court.[853] Miremont's secretary David Flotard, who had come back from the Cévennes with reports about the Camisards, provided Boyer with material. This included the exact location where the invasion should take place on the coast of the Languedoc. Boyer refrained from including that last detail in the pamphlet, to prevent the French from fortifying it.[854] The exile theologian finished *The lawfulness, glory and advantage of giving immediate and effectual relief to the Protestants in the Cevennes* on 11 April 1703. That same month it was published in three editions by John Nutt (1665–1716), a trade publisher near Stationers' Hall, in London.[855] Shortly afterwards, the original was followed by a French translation published by London-based exile printer Paul Vaillant and a Dutch translation by François van der Plaats in Amsterdam.[856] Aiming to neutralize the Privy Council's reservations, the *Lawfulness, glory and advantage* provided a twenty-seven-page justification for military intervention.

This was a sensitive question. Governments often supported foreign insurgents, but they usually did so in secret, avoiding the pitfalls of a public apology. As discussed in Chapter

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851 Monahan, *Let God arise*, pp. 160–161.
852 Laborie, 'Huguenot propaganda', p. 643.
853 G. Gibbs, 'The contribution of Abel Boyer to contemporary history in England in the early eighteenth century', in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse (eds.), *Clio's mirror. Historiography in Britain and the Netherlands* (Zutphen, 1985), pp. 87–108; G. Gibbs, 'Boyer, Abel (1167?–1729), lexicographer and journalist', in L. Goldman (ed.), *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (2008), https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/3122.
854 Papers of Charles Spencer, 3d Early of Sunderland, The Blenheim Papers, Additional Manuscripts, inv. nr. 61648, folios 98–99, British Library; I want to thank Lionel Laborie for kindly sharing this source with me.
855 J. Gordan, 'John Nutt. Trade publisher and printer "in the Savoy"', *The Library* 15–3 (2014), pp. 243–260.
856 [A. Boyer], *La necessité de donner un prompt & puissant secours aux Protestans des Cevennes, ou l'on fait voir la justice, la gloire & l'avantage de cette entreprise, & les moyens d'y reussir* (London, 1703); [A. Boyer], *Korte en klaare aanwysing van de noodzaakelyke middelen omme de Protestanten in de Sevennes spoedig te konnen helpen, en haar te ontlasten van de verdrukking die dezelve onder de tegenwoordige Regering des Fransen Konings moeten ondergaan. Nevens een korte beschryving van het zelve Landschap, en den tegenwoordigen staat* (Amsterdam, 1703).

1, most political philosophers provided subjects with only a very limited legal framework to defend themselves against kings who raised their swords against them. Revolts were thus hard to justify. Justifying a foreign intervention was easier.[857] As discussed, Grotius had argued that rulers had a duty to intervene against the oppression of foreign subjects, especially if they were persecuted for their religion.[858] Boyer indeed based his justification on Grotius but consequently failed to justify the fact that the Camisards had themselves taken up arms. Boyer quoted the legal philosopher, arguing that 'subjects are not bound to obey the magistrate, when he decrees any thing contrary either to the law of nature or of God'.[859] Yet he added that 'it is not lawful for subjects to take up arms'.[860] In the end, he relied on Grotius' assertion 'that others may […] take up arms for them'.[861]

In his effort to translate the fate of the Camisards to his English readership and divert attention from the issue of rebellion, Boyer departed from the confessionally neutral justification employed by the *Manifesto* and returned to the normative principle of confessional truth. He argued that all Protestants should support the Camisards, as they were fighting the very same battle the English had against the 'popish pretender' James II in 1688. Moreover, the author did not shy away from claiming that 'God Almighty had vouchsafed to illuminate this people with the truth of the Gospel.'[862] As for the question of intervention, Boyer harked back to the wars of religion and reminded his readers that Elizabeth I devoted much of her reign to aiding Protestants in France and the Netherlands. James I, on the other hand, would forever carry the stain of having allowed the Protestant religion to be rooted out of Bohemia and the Palatinate, a reference to the early stages of the Thirty Years' War.[863] In other words,

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[857] Only in the second half of the eighteenth century would the idea that states could do whatever they wanted within their borders and that foreign states should in no way intervene or judge their policy develop; Krasner, 'Rethinking the sovereign state model', pp. 20.

[858] Vincent, 'Grotius, human rights, and intervention'; Pufendorf held a similar view, albeit from a more confessionally partisan position. Initially a firm opponent of foreign intervention, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) made him reconsider and favor a more interventionist policy for the survival of Protestantism; R. Tuck, *The rights of war and peace. Political thought and the international order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 158–163.

[859] [A. Boyer], *The lawfulness, glory, and advantage, of giving immediate and effectual relief to the Protestants in the Cevennes* (London, 1703), p. 6.

[860] Ibid., p. 7.

[861] Ibid.

[862] Ibid., p. 16.

[863] Ibid., p. 8.

history showed that the principle of sovereignty should not overrule a ruler's responsibilities to the survival of the true faith. Where the author of the manifesto had explicitly stated that the Camisards did not fight a war of religion, Boyer saw the need to introduce militant Protestant ideas and appeals to religious truth.[864] Confessional memory and superiority was invoked to overshadow the normative principle of sovereignty.

To Hearten and Inspire

The *Lawfulness, glory and advantage* offers insight in the complex and contested role of public opinion in political discourse at the turn of the eighteenth century. The pamphlet intervened in an ongoing debate in the highest circles of government. Miremont had access to these circles, but used publicity to pressure them. The work communicated with different publics, thereby creating a written—if not physical—link between them: as stated in the preface, the *Lawfulness, glory and advantage* was dedicated to Queen Anne and her Privy Council, praising them with references to providence and glory.[865] Furthermore, Boyer appeals to the English people, reminding them of their religious and patriotic duty to show solidarity with the Camisards.[866]

At the close of his argument, Boyer referred to the strategy of publicity itself; after pleading for a military invasion by the English fleet to support the Cévenols, he predicted that cautious people would warn about the dangers of making interventionist plans public. The author responded to this reservation by arguing that the Camisards would receive new 'spirit and vigour' upon finding out that foreign powers were willing to help them.[867] Indeed, he believed that his pamphlet—or information about it—would find its way across the French borders and encourage Protestants in the provinces around the Cévennes to also rise up and 'shake off their yoke'.[868]

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[864] Another anonymous pamphlet presents an extensive analogy with English support for the Duke of Rohan: Anonymous, *L'Europe esclave si les Cevenois ne sont promtement secourus* (Liège, 1704).
[865] Ibid., pp. 3–4.
[866] Ibid., p. 5.
[867] Ibid., p. 24.
[868] Ibid., p. 12.

Yet the author had taken a risk. On 25 April Boyer had to appear before Daniel Finch, Lord President of the Privy Council. Finch was unhappy about the passage on page 5, where Boyer argued that the 'true Englishman […] would cheerfully contribute toward the support of the Cevenois'. People in London's coffeehouses, the Lord President reminded the pamphleteer, talked about the Camisards as rebels against their lawful prince. Inciting them to support rebels was a grave matter. Finch reprimanded the Huguenot for having stirred up public opinion rather than having gone to the government first, and reminded him that he would have been broken on the wheel had he published the pamphlet in France.[869] This does not mean that the Lord President was against intervention. Finch had been in contact with Miremont about the possibilities of a military intervention since February, and by mid-April—around the same time that the pamphlet must actually have been published—Van Vrijbergen could report to Heinsius that Anne was planning to send weapons, money, and marines to the Mediterranean.[870] But the English court did not like to be told in front of the people what policy to pursue. Moreover, the council clearly favored the strategic merits of an unexpected strike over boosting the Camisards' moral with publicity. Boyer had to defend himself by emphasizing that he had not revealed the location of the invasion.[871]

Dutch advocates of the Camisard cause were similarly vexed by the two dilemmas discussed above: secrecy versus publicity, on the one hand, and confessional solidarity versus confessional neutrality, on the other. The engagement of Jacob Surendonck (1647–1729) is a case in point. Surendonck held a powerful position in the United Provinces' political center, formally as Land's Advocate of the States of Holland, and informally as a friend and adviser of Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius (1641–1720).[872] Like many of his contemporaries, Surendonck's perspective on European politics was marked by the fear of French universal monarchy and the belief that the Protestant religion was beleaguered. As such, he devoted

[869] British Library, Additional Manuscripts, 61648, folios 98–99; I want to express my gratitude to Lionel Laborie for kindly sharing this source with me.
[870] Letter from Marinus van Vrijbergen to Anthonie Heinsius, 17 April 1703, in A. Veenendaal (ed.), *De Briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius, 1702–1720*, vol. 2 (The Hague, 1976), p. 162.
[871] British Library, Additional Manuscripts, 61648, folios 98–99.
[872] M. Claessens, 'Inventaris van het archief van Jacob Surendonck' (1991), p. 8, Nationaal Archief, The Hague.

much of his career to advising on military endeavors against Louis XIV—he also tried and failed to become secretary of war after the death of William III.[873]

Ever since the Nine Years' War Surendonck had incessantly tried to convince the stadtholder-king, his wife Mary Stuart, and Heinsius of the merits of a military invasion from the sea, believing that the Sun King would quickly be defeated if he were forced to fight on his own soil.[874] During the War of the Camisards he insisted that a publicity campaign in France was the key to a successful invasion. In a letter from June 1704 to Grand Pensionary Heinsius, pensionary of Amsterdam Willem Buys, and pensionary of Gouda Bruno van der Dussen, Surendonck stressed that shortly before the invasion two 'eloquent and moving' pamphlets should be disseminated widely throughout France, 'one in the name of the repressed French nation in general and the other in the name of the Protestants'.[875]

The Land's Advocate also had his eye on international public opinion when he tried to raise charity for the Camisards in the Dutch Republic. In the beginning of May 1703 Surendonck sent requests to several administrative bodies, including the Council of Amsterdam and one of the city's burgomasters, to organize collections for the Huguenots in the Cévennes.[876] Believing that secret efforts to aid the Camisards were insufficient, he argued that a Dutch charity campaign would send an important public message abroad: open support would provide an example to the English—he surely knew about the Privy Council's doubt—bolster the insurgents in the Cévennes, and inspire other Protestants in France to rise up against Louis XIV.[877]

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[873] Missive van Jacob Surendonck aan Anthonie Heinsius met 'Consideratien' memorie houdende een voorstel om een secretaris van oorlog te benoemen, 21 August 1702, Familiearchief Surendonck 3.20.57, inv. nr. 94, Nationaal Archief, The Hague.

[874] See all letters in Familiearchief Surendonck, section b.2 'Vlootexpedities', Nationaal Archief, The Hague.

[875] Missiven van Jacob Surendonck aan Anthonie Heinsius, van Willem Buijs, pensionaris van Amsterdam, Bruno van der Dussen, pensionaris van Gouda, en [N.N.] Haack, 30 June 1704, Familiearchief Surendonck 3.20.57, inv. nr. 235; see also Missive van Jacob Surendonck aan Anthonie Heinsius, waarin hij voorstelt via Vlaanderen en Artois met ondersteuning van de vloot een inval in Frankrijk te doen, 11 July 1708, Familiearchief Surendonck 3.20.57, inv. nr. 138; and Missive van Jacob Surendonck aan Isaac van Hoornbeek, pensionaris van Rotterdam, betreffende het zenden van een expeditie naar Languedoc en Dauphine, 1 April 1705, Familiearchief Surendonck 3.20.57, inv. nr. 238. Nationaal Archief, The Hague.

[876] Missiven van Jacob Surendonck aan het stadsbestuur en aan Johannes Hudde, burgemeester van Amsterdam, betreffende een collecte voor de Camisards in de Chevennes, 5 May 1703, Familiearchief Surendonck 3.20.57, inv. nr. 221, Nationaal Archief, The Hague.

[877] Ibid.

Surendonck's archive contains several versions of a seven-page manuscript, the *Nadere remarques op de te doene assistentie en collecte in de seven provincien voor onse geloofsgenoten in de Sevennes*, in which he provided an elaborate justification for such support.[878] It discussed why the Camisards had the right to resist, why the laws of war allowed the United Provinces to support a rebellion, and why it was a Christian duty to do so. We do not know whether the *Nadere remarques* was supposed to remain a manuscript for limited circulation or whether it was meant for publication to accompany the proposed collections. In any case, both the military expedition and the fundraising ultimately failed. England and the United Provinces disagreed over the distribution of resources. Only two ships set sail to the Occitan coast, where they were immediately fired at by the French army. Forewarned by the circulation of pamphlets, royal troops had been expecting the enemy since March.[879] Afterwards, things kept spiraling downwards. In July 1704 the Swiss declared to the French ambassador that they would not let any of their subjects assist the Camisards as mercenaries, much to the irritation of extraordinary ambassador to the Savoyard court, Richard Hill. The ambassador complained to Secretary of State Charles Hedge that

> at the same time these filthy long beards do not hinder the French King from employing his Swiss for the destruction of the Cevennois.[880]

Disillusioned about the efforts to properly steer events in the Cévennes, he concluded in the same letter that 'there is a great difference between the zeal of a Camisard in the coffee-houses of London, and on the frontiers of Languedoc'.[881]

Dutch fundraising was also a disappointment. Like their English colleagues the Dutch authorities remained cautious with regards to public support. Rather than starting a new charity campaign, the States General used funds raised for the Huguenots in 1699, which did little to

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[878] J. Surendonck, 'Nadere Remarques', 1703, Familiearchief Surendonck 3.20.57, inv. nr. 222, Nationaal Archief, The Hague.
[879] Laborie, 'Huguenot propaganda', p. 644.
[880] Letter from Richard Hill to Charles Hedges, 15 July 1704, in Blackley (ed.), *Diplomatic correspondence*, vol. 2, p. 386.
[881] Letter from Hill to Hedges, 15 July 1704, in ibid., p. 386.

support the revolt.[882] On the contrary: in January 1705 Richard Hill wrote the Lord Treasurer stating that the States General had sent eight thousand guilders to Geneva for the Camisards, but that it was used for the sustenance of those who crossed the border:

> I fear we are doing the Mareschal de Villar's business, and disarming his enemies. I am sure we do not do our own; for one Camisard in the Cevennes is worth a 100 of them out of France.[883]

After all the money was spent in 1705, the States General finally asked the individual provinces to raise a total of a hundred thousand guilders for the relief of the Camisards. However, they did so secretly, with an explicit request for the matter to be dealt with discretely.[884]

The Periodical Press

The exile advocates of intervention played a significant role in shaping the Camisards' public image of in the Dutch Republic. Yet they were not the only actors producing printed opinion about what was happening in the Cévennes. Above we have seen that journalists struggled to find reliable information about the revolt, but it did not keep them from publishing about it. In fact, Miremont's advice to the Camisards not to burn churches and kill priests may very well have been caused by what he read about the revolt in periodicals. The very first report about the situation in the Cévennes in the Amsterdam almanac *Europische Mercurius*—dated January 1703—shows that journalists received conflicting reports. On the one hand, the almanac stated that the revolt was waged by people of both confessions over taxation.[885] On the other hand,

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[882] Resolutien Staten Generaal de finantien rakende, 1704, Archief van mr. C. de Jonge van Ellemeet, 1570–1798 1.10.50, inv. nr. 51, Nationaal Archief, The Hague; I am indebted to Erica Boersma for bringing this source to my attention.

[883] Letter from Richard Hill to Sidney Godolphin, 30 January 1705, in Blackley (ed.), *Diplomatic correspondence*, vol. 2, pp. 490–491.

[884] Resolutie van de Staten–Generaal inzake een omslag over de provincies tot het bijeenbrengen van f. 100.000 ten behoeve van de Camisards, 26 February 1705, Familiearchief Surendonck 3.20.57, inv. nr. 223, Nationaal Archief, The Hague.

[885] *Europische mercurius, behelzende al het voornaamste 't geen, zo omtrent de zaaken van staat als oorlog, in alle de koningryken en landen van Europa, en deels ook zelfs in verscheidenen gewesten van d'andere deelen der weereld, is voorgevallen*, vol. 14, pt. 1. A. van Damme (ed.), (Leiden, Amsterdam, 1703), p. 46; for an introduction to the *Europische Mercurius* see J. Koopmans, 'De presentatie van het nieuws in de *Europische Mercurius* (1690–1756)', *Mededelingen van de Stichting Jacob Campo Weyerman* 23 (2000), pp. 117–129.

it reported that the Camisards had set a church on fire and had killed at least fifty priests, concluding that 'it is impossible to express what evils they commit every day'.[886] One month later, the *Europische Mercurius* summarized it as follows:

> People spoke very differently about these persons, because some presented them as rascals and villains, who did nothing but pillage, kill, destroy, and burn; who violated daughters and wives; and finally, who passed through no place without leaving marks of their cruelty and godlessness. Others, on the contrary, assured that they were good people, who fought the war with all the restraint that one can have; who, admittedly, pillaged the Roman churches and set them on fire; and gave no quarter to priests, because they regarded them as their main enemy, but who, apart from that, caused no disturbances, who did no harm to those who did not present themselves in arms to fight them.[887]


ROTTERDAMSCHE
Wekelijkſe Markdaagſche
BOERE
KOURIER.
Verhalende loſſe gerugten, loo-
pende tydingen, en waie ge-
ſchiedeniſſen.
Voorgevallen in verſcheide Geweſten des Werelds.
Te ROTTERDAM,
Gedrukt by PIETER DE VRIES, Boekdrukker wo-
nende in de Valkeſteeg, by de nieuwe
Kerk, 1703.

10. G. Spaan, *Rotterdamsche wekelijkse markdaagsche boere kourier* (Rotterdam, 1703). Resource: University Library Ghent.

886 'T is niet uit de drukken, wat kwaad zy dagelyks aanrechten'; Ibid., p. 47.

887 'Men sprak zeer verscheidentlyk van deze Lieden: want d'eenen stelden hen ten toon als Schelmen en Booswichten, die niet en deeden dan plonderen, doodslaan, verwoesten, en branden; die de Dochters en Vrouwen schoffeerden; en eindelyk, die nergens door trokken zonder 'er merktekenen van hunne wreedheid en godloosheid te laaten. Anderen in tegendeel, verzekerden, dat het braave Lieden waren, die den Oorlog voerden met alle d'ingetoogenheid, welke men daar in kan onderhouden; die, in waarheid, de Roomsche Kerken plonderden, en in den brand staaken; en die geen quartier aan de Priesters gaven, vermits zy hen aanmerkten als hunne Hoofdvyanden: maar die, behalven dat, geene ongeregeldheden aanrechtten; die geen kwaad en deeden aan de geenen, welke zich niet in de wapenen vertoonden om het aan te tasten'; Ibid., 137.

In March, after the manifesto has been published, which the author believed to have been written by the insurgents themselves, the *Europische Mercurius* argued that the latter characterization was true.[888] It also maintained that the revolt was not only about religion, and that many Catholics had joined the cause against heavy taxation.[889] Another periodical that extensively discussed the revolt was the *Rotterdamsche wekelijkse markdaagsche boere courier* (*Rotterdam weekly market days farmer courier*), which was published in Overschie, nearby Rotterdam [Fig. 10].[890] The *Boere Kourier* was a remarkable piece of journalism. It was the creation of a baker named Gerrit van Spaan (1651-1711) for 'curious peasants', who lived too far from Rotterdam to have daily access to the newspapers, but went to the city's market every week.[891] Reflective of Van Spaan's and his reader's modest background, the *Boere Kourier*'s reports about the Camisards are blunt, not very scrupulous, but nevertheless strikingly reflective of contemporary discussions surrounding confessional difference, such as the question of conversion and religious tolerance, which was discussed in April 1703:

> With great torments they make Reformed the papists who fall in the hands of the Camisards, only to show that one can get people where one wants them through torture, tormenting, drawing, and hurting without pause, thereby showing the fundamental reason, why it does not please God that one person torments the other worse than the devil. They also shove them letters under the nose from Pope Innocent XI and Queen Christina of Sweden, written to Louis [XIV] and argue that conversion with dragoons is not the right way, that one should win over people with goodness and sweetness. […] In the big province of Languedoc, Dauphiné, and the principality of Orange, they also start preaching. They strike through the neck with a cold blade the papists who try to prevent it, or they hang them while warm.[892]

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888 Ibid., p. 189.

889 Ibid., pp. 251–252.

890 P.A. de Boer, 'Een bakker en zijn nieuwsblad. Gerrit van Spaans Boere Kourier', *Rotterdams Jaarboekje* 6 (1988) pp. 193–215; R. van Vliet, 'Rotterdamsche wekelijkse markdaagsche boere kourier', in R. van Vliet (ed.), *Encyclopedie Nederlandstalige Tijdschriften. Nederlandse periodieken tot aanvang Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (tot 1815)*, https://www.ent1815.nl/r/rotterdamsche–wekelijkse–markdaagsche–boere–kourier–1703–1704/

891 'Nieusgierige Huislieden'; quotation taken from De Boer, 'Een bakker en zijn nieuwsblad', p. 202.

892 'De papen die in de handen van de Kamizards vallen, doen ze met groote tormenten Gereformeerd werden; alleenlijk om te toonen, dat men door folteren, tormenteren, rekken, en pijnigen zonder ophouden, de menschen kan brengen waar toe dat men wil, hier by tonen ze met fondamentale redenen, dat het Gode niet behaagd, dat den eenen mensch den anderen slimmer als de Duivel plaagd. Ook leggen ze hun Brieven van Paus Innocent XI […] en die van Koningin Kristina van Zweden, voor de neus, welaan Louwijs [XIV] geschreven, en betuigen, dat het bekeeren door Dragonders de rechte slag niet en is, dat men de menschen met goedheit en zoetheit most winnen […] In de groote provintie van Languedok, Dauphiné, en in 't Prinsdom van Oranje, beginnen ze mede te […] prediken, de Papen die 't wille beletten, slaan ze met een koud lemmer door den nek, of knoopen ze zo maar warm op'; G. van Spaans, *Rotterdamsche wekelijkse markdaagsche boere kourier*, 10 April 1703.

Two weeks later, the *Boere Kourier* reported that this report turned out to be false; it had been spread to make the Camisards hated, even though there were many Catholics among them.[893] In other issues Van Spaan alternated reports of Camisards burning churches and harassing priests as well as 'dumb fools who dearly love the killing of heretics' with reports that Catholics, enraged by the destruction caused by royal troops, had joined the Camisards, 'like they had joined the Beggars in Holland in former times'.[894] Interestingly, Van Spaan too invoked the normative language of humanity, arguing that the Camisards were treated so 'inhumanely' that even Catholics abhorred it.[895]

Conclusion

During World War II a song was sung among the Maquis, a guerilla band of resistance fighters in the French countryside:

> The fierce children of the Cévennes,
> Recusants and Maquisards
> Show that they have in their veins,
> The pure blood of the Camisards.[896]

Through the Maquis' singing, the lasting memory of the War of the Camisards echoed in the mountains of the Cévennes. Their struggle was 'premediated' by a war fought 250 years earlier.[897] Yet the Camisards did not provide a source of inspiration in the face of occupation for their descendants alone. In 1940, J. Marmelstein (1901–1956) published an article about the War of the Camisards in the Dutch Reformed journal *Stemmen des Tijds* (*Voices of the times*), which he concluded with considerable praise for the warrior-prophets:

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[893] Ibid., 24 April 1703.
[894] '[…] dome bittere quasten, die veel van 't ketterdooden houden'; '[…] gelijk ze we leer in Holland ook met de Geuzen aanspande'; ibid., 30 October 1703.
[895] 'onmenschelyke'; ibid., 1 May 1703.
[896] 'Les fiers enfants des Cévennes, Réfractaires et Maquisards, montrent qu'ils ont dans les veines, le sang pur des Camisards'; quotation from Joutard, *Légende des Camisards*, p. 269.
[897] For the concept of 'premediation' see Chapter 2.

> All in all, we have to conclude that the prophecy of the Camisards was an awakening, which was willed by God and driven by God, in which He gave to the simple and illiterate the task, in a deadly age of immense oppression and devoid of shepherds, to save His hitherto so flourishing congregation from a radical demise.[898]

It appears that Marmelstein at some point joined the Dutch Resistance against German occupation. Among his effects, which were auctioned off in 2011, were the resistance book *Rape of the Netherlands*, written by the exiled Dutch minister of foreign affairs—published in London in 1940—and the handwritten letters of the executed Christian resistance leader Johan Schimmel.[899] It is quite possible that Marmelstein found inspiration in the Camisards in his defiance of the occupier, compared himself to them, and believed that God similarly steered the awakening of the Dutch resistance against the Nazi occupier.

The pamphleteers who had first tried to incite the Dutch and the English about the Camisard cause for diplomatic purposes had been divided by the role that should be assigned to God in the course of events. When Jurieu publicized what was happening in the Cévennes in the 1680s, he had set himself the task to convince Protestants that God was steering events for the sake of the true religion. In other words, he once again approached the event from the normative principle of confessional truth. However, to counter the skepticism among contemporaries towards journalism and revealed truth, he based his theological claims on a confessionally neutral analysis of how the truth about a remote event could be established through reason.

In their advocacy for the Camisard cause in the early 1700s, pamphleteers were walking a tightrope in two respects. First of all, they had to downplay the normative principle of confessional truth—which was paramount in the self-styling of the insurgents—in order to keep the basis of support as broad as possible. However, they appear not to have been very concerned about skeptics like Bayle and the anonymous exile who attacked Jurieu's reports as a mix of wishful thinking and zeal. Whatever they may have thought about the War of the

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[898] 'Alles saamgenomen menen wij te moeten concluderen dat het profetisme van de Camisards een van God gewild en door God bestuurd réveil is geweest, waarbij Hij aan eenvoudigen en ongeletterden de taak heeft toebedeeld om, in een doodlijk tijdsgewricht van mateloze verdrukking en volslagen herderloosheid, Zijn eertijds zo bloeiende Gemeente an een radicale ondergang te redden'; quotation by Knetsch, *Pierre Jurieu*, p. 370.
[898] Description of 'Convoluut met nalatenschap dr. J.W. Marmelstein (1882–1956)', Zwiggelaar Auctions, auctioned on 28 March 2011, https://www.zwiggelaarauctions.nl/index.php?p=a&select=8,70,3955.
[899] Ibid.

Camisards, these *moderns*, as Jurieu called them, appear not have felt the urge to counter the support for the revolt in print. More decisive was that exile advocates of the Camisards had to reckon with audiences across the confessional divide, because England and the Dutch Republic had Catholic allies and because they believed that they might also incite French Catholics to rise up against Louis XIV. At the same time, calls to confessional truth and solidarity were deemed useful to trump concerns about supporting insurgents, which followed from the normative principle of sovereignty. As such, the advocates of the Camisard cause faced the same dilemma as the Waldensians had in 1655.[900] In their efforts to legitimize an intervention in the Cévennes, pamphleteers thus had to steer a middle course between supranational Protestant identification with the insurgents and appeals to supraconfessional solidarity through the normative principles of rule of law, reason, and humanity.

Secondly, the authorities considering an intervention, were served best by secrecy, for military reasons and to avert public judgment about their course of action. Publicity could thus cause irritation among the very governments which advocates were hoping to mobilize. In earlier chapters, we have seen that the generating of publicity for persecution depended on the willingness of the persecuted to make their cause known abroad and the extent to which the secular authorities on site were well-disposed toward printed advocacy. This chapter has shown that during the War of the Camisards, publicity was largely generated by an intermediary group, most notably—albeit not exclusively—Huguenot exiles, which operated at a level between these two decisive actors. They worked in the vicinity of the authorities in question, and used the printing press to extend their political agency and manage the news to influence foreign policy. To an extent, their engagement in public diplomacy was both a sign of political power and of weakness. On the one hand, they managed to raise awareness for the Camisard cause. On the other hand, they resorted to the press because they apparently failed to steer foreign politics more directly.

Directed at multiple audiences, pamphlets were devised as multidirectional means of communication between the insurgents and the people that were supposed to support them. They purported to speak with the voice of the insurgents to make Dutch and English audiences

[900] Indeed, this was years before Spinoza had even written the works that Hazard believed to be the cradle of the crisis of the European mind.

rally behind their cause. At the same time, they served to make (potential) insurgents aware of the fact that there was foreign interest in their struggle. These were attempts to establish a form of (imagined) contact between foreign insurgent and political elite, which decisively went beyond one-directional propaganda. In many ways, the War of the Camisards had become a propaganda war. It was, however, not fought out between the French Crown and the Camisards or their allies, but by those who believed that the press could change the course of events.