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Religious Persecution and Transnational Compassion in the Dutch Vernacular Press 1655-1745

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Chapter 3

Confronting Louis XIV? Publicity for the Huguenots before the Revocation (1681-84)

The Prince of Orange: 'I play with hearts, even though I only have ace, yet I would risk it all if I would be allowed to.'

Anonymous, *Het Princelyk Spel van l'Ombre* (1684)⁴²⁰

'For a hobby-horse, a child will be made to say, he hath a mind to go to mass.'

Pierre Jurieu, *The last efforts of afflicted innocence* (1681)⁴²¹

Louis XIV has gone down in history as an intolerant king who tried to eradicate the Reformed religion from his realm. By imposing religious uniformity onto his subjects, he caused, if not the biggest, certainly the most famous religious exodus in early modern Europe.⁴²² Yet the Sun King had not always had the reputation of being intolerant. When Louis became king as a four-year-old in 1643 the court had been on unprecedentedly friendly terms with the realm's Protestant minority.⁴²³ After the Fronde, a bitter civil war that had plagued the realm between 1648 and 1653, chief minister Cardinal Mazarin made the young king publicly express his gratitude to his Huguenot subjects for their enduring loyalty.⁴²⁴ In this light, the request of the Commonwealth of England and the Dutch Republic to the French king—a seemingly moderate Catholic monarch of a biconfessional state who hoped for an alliance with

⁴²⁰ 'De Prins van Orangien. Ik speel met harten, en schoon ik maer een aes heb, so sou ik egter wel alles durven wagen indien 't my toegelaten wiert'; Anonymous, *Het Princelyk Spel van l'Ombre* (s.l. 1684), pflit 11944, p. 7.

⁴²¹ [P. Jurieu], *The last efforts of afflicted innocence, being an account of the persecution of the Protestants of France, and a vindication of the Reformed religion from the aspersions of disloyalty and rebellion, charg'd on it by the Papists* (London, 1982), p. 60.

⁴²² See E. Birnstiel and C. Bernat (eds.), *La diaspora des Huguenots. Les réfugiés protestants de France et leur dispersion dans le monde (XVIe–XVIIIe siècles)* (Paris, 2001).

⁴²³ G. Treasure, *The Huguenots* (New Haven, CT, and London, 2013), p. 279.

⁴²⁴ J. Wolf, *Louis XIV. A profile* (London, 1972), p. 176.

England—to mediate between the court of Savoy and the Waldensians had not been an unlikely one.⁴²⁵ Indeed, the king had already ordered his governor in the Dauphiné, which bordered Piedmont, to protect all Waldensian refugees and provide them with food and shelter.⁴²⁶

Shortly after the massacre in Piedmont had taken place, Willem Boreel, the Dutch ambassador to the court of Louis XIV, whom we have met in Chapter 1, wrote a letter to Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt, in which he explained the stance of the young king toward the persecuted Waldensians:

I have been informed on good authority that the Court of France completely disapproves of the massacre committed in the valleys of Piedmont [...] The King even wrote a letter to the Madame Royale [Christine of France] and to the Duke of Savoy to engage them for restoring the Waldensians in their old homes.⁴²⁷

As we have seen in Chapter 1, Boreel remained wary that the ‘bigoted and impetuous’ French would once again lapse into a new era of confessional conflict. Yet he had probably never expected that their king would come to make it his personal project to eradicate the Reformed religion from his realm, culminating into an outright prohibition of its exercise. Nevertheless, in the years before his death in Paris in 1668, Boreel would witness the Huguenots face new restrictions on the rights, among others, to gather, to communicate between congregations, and to contract mixed marriages.⁴²⁸

In the early 1680s a stricter interpretation of the Edict of Nantes (1598) was reinforced, with the actual stripping away of rights and privileges and active persecutions. Between May and November 1681, the Huguenots of Poitou were the first to be subjected to a *dragonnade*, in which billeted soldiers were ordered to harass their hosts into conversion.⁴²⁹ In the following

⁴²⁵ See Chapters 1 and 2.

⁴²⁶ Letter from Willem Boreel to Johan de Witt, 10 June 1655, in *Lettres et negociations*, vol. 1, pp. 328–329; for France’s policy toward the Waldensians see Laurenti, *Confini della comunità*, pp. 204–206.

⁴²⁷ ‘Je suis informé de bonne part que la cour de France dès-aprouve entierement le Massacre commis depuis eu dans les vallées du Piemont [...] & même que le roi a écrit à Madame Royale [Christine de France] & à Mr. le Duc de Savoye pour les engager à rétablir les Vaudois dans leurs anciennes demeures’; letter from Willem Boreel to Johan de Witt, 11 June 1655, in *Lettres et negociations*, vol. 1, p. 328.

⁴²⁸ D. Garrioch, *The Huguenots of Paris and the coming of religious freedom* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 25–26.

⁴²⁹ L. Bernard, ‘Foucault, Louvois, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes’, *Church History* 25–1 (1956), p. 33; the term *dragonnade* was coined by Pierre Jurieu; L. Panhuysen, *Oranje tegen de Zonnekoning. De strijd van Williem III en Lodewijk XIV om Europa* (Amsterdam and Antwerpen, 2016), p. 285.

years, Huguenots in different parts of the realm would suffer a similar fate. As circumstances became increasingly dire in France, neighboring states began to welcome the first waves of exiles in the years before the actual revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.

Historians have long recognized the cultural impact of Huguenot refugees on their host societies.⁴³⁰ Shifting focus to the experience of exile, Carolyn Chappell Lougee and David van der Linden have recently offered important new insight into how refugees (re)negotiated and nurtured their (religious) identity by sharing their memory of persecution and flight. Indeed, Van der Linden remarks that if in the late seventeenth century you were looking for enthralling adventure stories you would be best to go to a Huguenot exile.⁴³¹ This raises the question whether many people were looking for such a story, and whether or how refugees were willing to share them. In fact, there is reason to believe that the communication between the newcomers and their hosts was rather minimal.

The *Hollandse Mercurius* again offers an interesting first glimpse. One can imagine that many of the refugees arriving in the United Provinces must have been curious about how their recent predicament had been covered in the foreign press. To get a more or less coherent view of news about the persecutions in the preceding year, Abraham Casteleyn's popular almanac would have been an obvious work to turn to. An added advantage was that the *Mercurius*—the same periodical that had once so extensively and empathically elaborated on the fate of the Waldensians, had been pirated since 1672 by the brothers Boom—and was now also available in French.⁴³² Yet buyers of the 1681 edition—the year of the first *dragonnades*—could read little about the persecutions in France: Casteleyn describes how in the midst of a conflict between Rome and Paris, the French clergy had begun a campaign to convert the realm's Protestants to the Catholic religion; the author dryly remarks that a new law which allowed seven-year-olds to convert might 'be judged as violent by some';⁴³³ he overestimated that up to 100,000 people

⁴³⁰ See Chapter 4.

⁴³¹ Van der Linden, *Experiencing exile*, p. 163.

⁴³² Abraham Casteleyn had taken over the almanac after the death of his brother in 1677; Verhoeven and Van der Veen, *Hollandse Mercurius*, p. 69; H. Bots and J. Sgard, 'Le Mercure Hollandais (1672–1684)', in *Dictionnaire des journaux 1600–1789* (2015), <http://dictionnaire-journaux.gazettes18e.fr/journal/0944-le-mercure-hollandais>; Verhoeven and Van der Veen, *Hollandse Mercurius*, p. 60.

⁴³³ '[...] die sommige voor geweldtdaedige souden konnen oordeelen'; A. Casteleyn, *Hollandse Mercurius, Verhalende de voornaemste saken van staet en andere voorvallen, die in en omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden en elders in Europa in het Jaer 1681 zijn geschiet* (Haarlem, 1682), p. 146.

had fled the country to prevent their children from being taken away. He also provided transcriptions of official announcements made by Charles II of England and the Duke of Ormond, viceroy of Ireland, inviting all refugees to settle in their lands.⁴³⁴

Only in the 1683 edition does the *Hollandse Mercurius* first elaborate on the violence committed against the Huguenots. It recounts how the king's placards were executed with rigor and that any preacher who had taken care of Catholics who had converted to the Reformed religion was himself forced to convert to Catholicism. The churches in which conversions had taken place were razed and guarded by soldiers to prevent the Reformed from gathering at the ruins. Those who still preached there would be executed for sedition.⁴³⁵ In the 1684 edition, Casteleyn sketches a bleak picture:

From France, where the light of the Reformation once broke through so clearly, one hear[s] nothing but the thick, dark mist of oppression, forged by the Roman clergy, church after church is closed and reduced to rubble upon the least pretense, preachers are trampled upon and chased away, the Reformed thwarted from leaving the country and forced, with or without their minds, to become members of the Roman Church: And this so far that the small remnant of this religion, if God does not hinder it, will soon be fully annihilated.⁴³⁶

The *Hollandse Mercurius*' description is as ominous as it is opaque. Readers learned few details about the actual violence suffered. They would search in vain for a more elaborate discussion on Louis' restrictive policies, the respective responsibility of court and clergy, or the response of the Huguenots. Indeed, the two sentences quoted above are the only ones devoted to the

⁴³⁴ Ibid., pp. 148–153. The Irish government had been sending agents to France since the 1660s to persuade Huguenots to settle on the island and increase the number of Protestants; S. Lachenicht, 'Differing perceptions of the refuge? Huguenots in Ireland and Great Britain and their attitudes towards the governments' religious policy (1660–1710)', in A. Dunan–Page (ed.), *The religious culture of the Huguenots, 1660–1750* (Aldershot, 2006), p. 43.

⁴³⁵ A. Casteleyn, *Hollandse Mercurius, Verbalende de Voornaemste Saken van Staet en andere Voorvallen, die in en omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden en elders in Europa in het Jaer 1683 zyn geschie* (Haarlem, 1684), pp. 193–194.

⁴³⁶ 'Uyt Vranckrijck / daer eertijts het Licht van de Reformatie soo helder doorgebroocken is geweest / vernam men niet / als dicke duystere Nevelen van Verdruckingen / door de Roomsse Geestelijckheyt gesmeest / Kerck op Kerck / op de minste blick van schijn–reden / gesloten / en tot Puynhopen gemaectt / Predicanten geschopt en verjaegt / de Gereformeerde het vertrecken buzten 's Lants verhindert / en gedwongen / 't zy met of tegen haer gemoet / Medeleden van Roomsse Kerck te werden: en dat soo ver / dat het kleyn overschot van die Religie / soo 't God niet verhindert / in 't kort / t'eenemaeel verdelgt sal werden'; A. Casteleyn, *Hollandse Mercurius, Verbalende de Voornaemste Saken van Staet en andere Voorvallen, die in en omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden en elders in Europa in het Jaer 1684 zyn geschie* (Haarlem, 1685), pp. 276–277.

fate of the Reformed in 1684, the year in which a wave of *dragonnades*, beginning in Béarn, washed over the realm, heralding the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in October 1685.⁴³⁷

In Chapters 1 and 2 we have seen that the Dutch learned about the persecutions in Piedmont because the persecuted in question strategically raised public awareness for their cause. The relative silence of the *Hollandse Mercurius*—and, as we will see, the Dutch press in general—would thus suggest that the persecuted Huguenots did not voice their concerns abroad, perhaps because they believed this to be politically imprudent. In a pioneering study on Dutch publicity for the Huguenots, Hans Bots has indeed suggested that the Dutch press paid little attention to the predicament of the Huguenots because of a conscious strategy of restraint. He provides evidence that before the Revocation the persecuted tried to curb the foreign printed attention for the persecutions, fearing that it could hurt their cause.⁴³⁸ Supposedly, this strategy was rather successful; Bots claims that before 1685 there were no pamphlets coming off the Dutch presses discussing the fate of the Reformed in France.⁴³⁹ This supports the observation made in Chapter 1, that international publicity for religious persecution rested on the initiative of the persecuted themselves to raise international awareness for their cause. In Chapter 2, however, we have seen that persecution literature did not entirely depend on the input of the persecuted themselves. In 1655 Dutch pamphleteers eagerly appropriated the news of and reframed it for political purposes.

If we briefly move our focus to Restoration England in the early 1680s, we can, in fact, observe the same dynamic. Anne-Dunan Page has shown that already in 1681 the Huguenot persecutions gave rise to fierce polemic. Refugees and news about the persecutions crossed the Channel at a moment of particular religious and political unrest. The Popish Plot had given rise to anti-Catholic hysteria. Whigs and Tories were at each other's throats over the impending succession of a Catholic to the throne, and tensions with the English Dissenters—Protestants who refused to conform to the Anglican Church—had flared up. News about the persecutions and the influx of refugees was therefore largely hijacked by domestic polemic: Charles II

⁴³⁷ R. McCullough, *Coercion, conversion and countersubversion in Louis XIV's France* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2007), p. 141.

⁴³⁸ H. Bots, 'L'écho de la Révocation dans les Provinces-Unies à travers les gazettes et les pamphlets', in R. Zuber and L. Theis (eds.), *La Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes et le protestantisme français en 1685* (Paris, 1986), pp. 287–288.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

welcomed the Huguenots to present himself as a good Protestant monarch; Tories used the willingness of refugees to become Anglicans to accuse the Dissenters; Whigs elaborated on the gruesome fate of the Huguenots to foment public opinion against Catholics and prove that preventing James II from ever taking the throne was a matter of life and death; other anonymous—perhaps Tory—voices tried to uncover the persecutions as a scam and accused the refugees of being crypto-Catholics or Dissenters who would ruin the kingdom’s peace. Very few pamphlets actually spoke or purported to speak with the voice of the persecuted themselves.⁴⁴⁰ This indicates that, at least in England, the appropriation of news for domestic discourse did not entirely depend on the initiative of the persecuted.

Were Huguenot reservations strong enough to keep the Dutch press from publicizing about their predicament? Did the Dutch have little to argue about in the 1680s? Or did the situation of the Huguenots in France not lend itself to domestic polemics? As we will see, the political landscape in the 1680s was, in fact, decisively more divided than in had been in 1655. Since the Disaster Year of 1672 and the rise of William III as stadtholder, the Dutch political landscape had become starkly divided between Statists—the heirs of De Witt’s ‘True Freedom’ regime—and Orangists, who were traditionally associated with Reformed orthodoxy.⁴⁴¹ This chapter aims to uncover when, how, and why news about foreign persecution was appropriated for domestic political purposes.

We will, first, explore how news about the Huguenots led to conflicting responses between different church and secular authorities in the United Provinces and investigate the role publicity played within the negotiation of this conflict. Secondly, switching focus to the public polemic surrounding the Dutch Republic’s main political conflict at the time, we will see that—contrary to Bots’ observation—the fate of the Huguenots was, in fact, publicly discussed, contested, and appropriated for political capital; this chapter will investigate how Huguenot news was used in the propaganda war about a proposed military intervention in the Southern Netherlands during the War of the Reunions (1683–84), which, as Donald Haks has recently pointed out, has so far escaped historical scrutiny, but has not himself paid further

⁴⁴⁰ A. Dunan–Page, ‘La dragonnade du Poitou et l’exil des huguenots dans la littérature de controverse anglaise’, *Moreana, Association Amici Thomae Mori* 171–2 (2007), pp. 86–121.

⁴⁴¹ For earlier political conflicts between Statists and Orangists and the public opinions they produced see Reinders, *Gedrukte chaos*; J. Stern, *Orangism in the Dutch Republic in word and image, 1650–1675* (Manchester, 2010).

attention to.⁴⁴² Finally, a comparison will be made between Dutch polemic and arguably the two most influential Huguenot works of public opinion before the Revocation, Pierre Jurieu's *Politique du clergé* (*Politics of the clergy*) and *Derniers efforts* (*Last efforts*), which were also published in the United Provinces.

The Divided Provinces

Renewed persecution of the Huguenots began during peacetime. With the 1678–79 Treaties of Nijmegen, France had brought eight years of warfare with the Dutch Republic, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire to a successful conclusion.⁴⁴³ Louis XIV could now shift his attention inward and use the remainder of his largely disbanded army to missionize his own subjects.⁴⁴⁴ An extra advantage of the peace was that the former Dutch enemy, still licking its wounds, was hesitant to intercede in France's domestic policy and risk renewed hostilities.

The Peace of Nijmegen had left the Dutch political landscape deeply divided. At one end of the spectrum there was a pro-French bloc, which—to Stadtholder William III's dismay—had managed to independently reach peace with France in 1678, dissolving the anti-French alliance with, among others, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire.⁴⁴⁵ The core of this loose faction, which had inherited many of the mercantil sentiments of the De Witt era, was Amsterdam, supported by Leiden and several other cities in Holland.⁴⁴⁶ They found allies in the States of Friesland and Groningen, whose autonomy was enhanced by having their own stadtholder, Henry Casimir II, Prince of Nassau-Dietz (1664–96), who was not on friendly terms with his cousin William III, stadtholder of the five United Provinces.⁴⁴⁷ Similar factions

⁴⁴² Haks, *Vaderland en vrede*, pp. 194–195.

⁴⁴³ C. Nolan, *Wars of the age of Louis XIV, 1650–1715. An encyclopedia of global warfare and civilization* (Westport, CT, and London, 2008), pp. 128–129.

⁴⁴⁴ W. Troost, *William III, the stadholder–king. A political biography* (Farnham, 2005), p. 153.

⁴⁴⁵ S. Groenveld, 'William III as stadholder. Prince or minister?', in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III. The impact of the king–stadholder in international context* (Abingdon, 2007), p. 29; E. Edwards, 'Amsterdam and the ambassadors of Louis XIV 1674–85', in T. Claydon and Ch-É. Levillain (eds.), *Louis XIV outside in. Images of the Sun King beyond France, 1661–1715* (Farnham, 2015), p. 197; W. Troost, *Stadbouder–koning Willem III* (Hilversum, 2001), pp. 146–147.

⁴⁴⁶ Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 825–826.

⁴⁴⁷ J. van Sypesteyn, *Geschiedkundige bijdragen. Derde aflevering. Eenige gebeurtenissen gedurende het leven van Prins Hendrik Casimir II van Nassau, (1664–1696)* (The Hague, 1865), pp. 9–19.

existed in the States of Utrecht, Zeeland, and Overijssel.⁴⁴⁸ Still recuperating from the severe economic blow caused by the last war, they hoped to establish, if not an alliance, at least a lasting peace with France.

On the opposite end stood Stadtholder William III and his allies—prime among them Grand Pensionary Gaspar Fagel (1634–88). Being first and foremost a military leader, the stadtholder's power had dwindled since the Peace of Nijmegen. The costly war had taken a heavy toll on the prince's reputation among Dutch citizens, who had come to the sobering realization that their Republic's economy was in decline.⁴⁴⁹ Many of the civic and provincial officeholders from within his clientele were disliked, a feeling which was worsened by the widespread corruption among their ranks.⁴⁵⁰

Between these opposite ends lay numerous cities—and hence provinces—with fluctuating allegiances. Despite these deep divisions, which also cut sharp lines between the States of Holland and the States General, the dominant sentiment tended toward keeping cordial relations with the French. In the years following the Peace of Nijmegen the prince thus used what was left of his political capital to sway civic and provincial authorities to his side and establish a defensive alliance with England against the presumed expansionism of his lifelong adversary Louis XIV. When news about the persecution of the Huguenots began to reach the Dutch Republic, calls for religious solidarity soon began to conflict with the prevailing sentiment of war-weariness, giving rise to new frictions between provincial church authorities and the individual provinces.

Between 1679 and 1685 different church consistories repeatedly urged the secular authorities to respond to the predicament of their French brethren in the faith. Yet they found themselves fighting an uphill battle against arguments of political prudence. Frisian church leaders were the first to discuss the persecution of the Huguenots during a 1679 provincial synod. Church delegates of Dokkum voiced the recurrent argument that given the situation in France and England, where the Popish Plot had caused great public disquiet, existing placards

⁴⁴⁸ Groenveld, 'William III as stadholder', p. 30.

⁴⁴⁹ S. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966), p. 178.

⁴⁵⁰ Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 826–827.

against Dutch Catholics should be executed with renewed rigor.⁴⁵¹ The synod agreed to bring the request to the States of Friesland, but decided—probably taking into account the States’ sympathy toward France—that it would be wise if the oppression of the Huguenot churches were not mentioned.⁴⁵² Advocacy for religious issues was fine, but it should not spill over into international politics.

At the Walloon Synod in Breda and the Synod of Utrecht—both held in 1680—plans to set up provincial funds for incoming French refugees also faltered over the hesitance of the secular authorities; the President of the States of Utrecht, Everhard van Weede van Dijkveld, declared himself sympathetic to the idea, but ultimately decided against it, arguing that the States General would fear Louis XIV’s reaction.⁴⁵³ Instead, he suggested that individual magistrates were at liberty to set up secret funds, provided that they refrained from any publicity.⁴⁵⁴ These examples demonstrate that not only the Huguenots, but also the Dutch authorities discouraged publicity about the the persecutions in France. One year later, in 1681 States authorities first began to pursue an integration policy, offering tax exemptions and citizenship to Huguenots who would settle in their provinces. Civic governments quickly followed, competing for refugees by promising their own advantageous conditions for settlement.⁴⁵⁵ These invitations were media events only in so far as that they were advertised in Francophone newspapers which they knew were illegally read in France.⁴⁵⁶

In the meantime, the fate of the Huguenots was widely discussed through another public medium: the pulpit. Every Sunday, ministers throughout the United Provinces were

⁴⁵¹ Similar arguments are made in response to the persecution of the Waldensians in 1655, the persecution of the Huguenots after 1685, and the Tumult of Toruń. See chapters 2, 4, and 6. It is unlikely that this appeal was influenced by William III, who had always been a supporter of religious toleration, Catholics included; T. Claydon, ‘Protestantism, universal monarchy and Christendom in William’s war propaganda, 1689–1697’, in Mijers and Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III*, p. 127.

⁴⁵² F. Knetsch, ‘Les églises réformées des Pays-Bas et la Revocation’, in M. Peronnet (ed.), *Tricentenaire de la Revocation de l’Edit de Nantes. La Revocation et l’exterieur du royaume. Actes du IV^{ème} Colloque Jean Boisset* (Montpellier, 1985), p. 178.

⁴⁵³ Van Weede van Dijkveld had been one of the negotiators of the Peace of Nijmegen; O. van Nimwegen, *The Dutch army and the military revolutions, 1588–1688* (Woodbridge, 2010), pp. 508–510; Knetsch, ‘Églises Réformées’, pp. 181–182.

⁴⁵⁴ Knetsch, ‘Églises réformées’, p. 182.

⁴⁵⁵ W. Frijhoff, ‘Uncertain brotherhood. The Huguenots in the Dutch Republic’, in B. Van Ruymbeke and R. Sparks (eds.), *Memory and identity. The Huguenots in France and the Atlantic diaspora* (Columbia, SC, 2008), pp. 143–146.

⁴⁵⁶ See Van der Linden, *Experiencing exile*, p. 47.

preaching against France to their congregations, many of them undoubtedly encouraged by the prince's favorites. In 1680, the States of Zeeland felt compelled to publish a missive directed at their four provincial *classes*, the regional church assemblies which were largely responsible for the everyday administration of the Reformed Church in the Dutch Republic.⁴⁵⁷ The missive forbade ministers to preach in favor of an alliance with either France or England by referring to the 1672 massacres at Bodegraven and Zwammerdam—which had been canonized as low points of French cruelty by Romeyn de Hooghe, Govard Bidloo, and other masters of affective print.⁴⁵⁸

With regard to the printing presses, the church authorities appear to have been compliant, and did not try to stir up public opinion against the will of the secular authorities through print; no evidence has been found of any pamphlets calling for fundraisers or restrictions on the liberties of Catholics in the first half of the 1680s. Indeed, it would not have been a logical first move; not only did the ministers depend on the authorities' good will to reach any of their objectives, they also received their salaries from the secular authorities. Moreover, many considered preaching from the pulpit an effective way to shape public opinion. As the fiercely Orangist clergyman Jacobus Stermont had tellingly argued in a pamphlet in 1650—a year also marked by heavy factional strife—that 'one should know that one preaching from the pulpit could do more harm than a hundred pamphlets'.⁴⁵⁹ It is very well possible that sermons—which, as oral communication, are unretrievable—were more powerful than pamphlets in shaping Dutch (Reformed) public opinion, but they were also more contained in time and place than pamphlets, and therefore less politically sensitive on an international level.

⁴⁵⁷ G. Groenhuis, *De predikanten. De sociale positie van de gereformeerde predikanten in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden voor ± 1700* (Groningen, 1977), pp. 22–23.

⁴⁵⁸ Anonymous, *Missive van de heeren Staten van Zeelandt, gesonden aan het Classis van Zeeland* (Zierikzee, 1680); R. de Hooghe and G. Bidloo, *De France wreetheyt, tot Bodegrave en Swammerdam* (Amsterdam?, 1673), <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.358818>; see Haks, *Vaderland en vrede*, pp. 21–57.

⁴⁵⁹ '[...] ende met moet wel weten dat een predikatie van den predik-stoel, meer quaets kan doen dan hondert blauwe boeckjes'; Anonymous [Jacobus Stermont], *Lauveren—krans gevlochten voor syn hoocheyt Wilhelm, de beer Prince van Oranjen, &c. over sijne eeuwig roembaere handelinghe, gepleegt tot ruste deser vereenigde lantschappen, in 't jaer 1650. In 'tsamen—spraecke, tusschen een Amsterdammer/ ende Leyenaer / om—verre werpende de gronden vande Hollantsen praeter, ontstelden Amsterdammer ende diergelycke* (s.l., 1650), pfl. 6851; for more information on Stermont see P.C. Molhuysen and P.J. Blok (eds.), *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*, vol. 10 (Leiden, 1937), pp. 973–975.

Some prominent advocates of an anti-French policy were also cautious in their response to the persecution of the Huguenots and therefore favored the use of sermons to shape public opinion. Grand Pensionary Fagel's posture is a case in point. In 1682 and 1683 the Grand Pensionary took the exact opposite stance to the States of Zeeland. According to Claudes de Mesmes, Count of Avaux, the French ambassador to The Hague, Fagel instructed all preachers in Holland to elaborate in their sermons on the persecutions of the Huguenots in France, compare it to the 1672 invasion, and insist that everything should be done to prevent it from happening again.⁴⁶⁰ One year later, in late 1684 the synod of the francophone Walloon Churches—consisting of descendants of the Walloon Reformed who had fled the Southern Netherlands in the late sixteenth century—sent a delegation to the Grand Pensionary with a request to have the States General intercede with the French government in favor of the Huguenots and to establish funds for exiled pastors.⁴⁶¹ This time, Fagel replied that news of foreign relief initiatives could prove dangerous for the remaining Huguenots in France.⁴⁶² Furthermore, he believed that an intervention would in no way help the persecuted, since the United Provinces lacked authority and prestige and did not have a good relationship with Louis XIV. He argued that an intervention would make more sense if other princes took the initiative and a concerted effort was organized.⁴⁶³ In other words, Fagel wanted all talk and no action, but why?

It is unclear whether Fagel truly had the interests of the remaining Huguenots at heart, or mainly tried to gather public support before confronting France—which would explain his sympathy for sermons but hesitation to intervene. Considering how people justify their actions to themselves, it was probably a little of both. Ultimately, he gave the Walloons his permission to advocate their cause with the States of Holland, probably to use the fate of the Huguenots as ammunition in the debate with the province's pro-French cities.⁴⁶⁴ With Fagel's blessing the consistories' deputies drew up a 'vigorous and moving' request, providing a detailed description

⁴⁶⁰ Claude de Mesmes, Count of Avaux, in L. Durand and N.-J. Pissot (eds.), *Négociations de Monsieur le Comte d'Avaux en Hollande, depuis 1685, jusqu'en 1688*, vol 1 (Paris, 1752), pp. 263–264; for the Walloon Churches see Frijhoff, 'Uncertain brotherhood', pp. 128–171.

⁴⁶¹ Knetsch, 'Eglises réformées', p. 185.

⁴⁶² Ibid., p. 184.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

of the persecution, the *dragonnades*, and a list of sixteen Huguenot pastors who had been condemned to death. It invoked Bern—which had set up a fund of 100,000 for the aid of exiled pastors—as a good example. To their disappointment, the States of Holland, who found the request an embarrassment, did nothing.⁴⁶⁵

In October 1685, weeks before the Revocation, and with a steady stream of refugees already arriving in the Dutch Republic, the States of Zeeland proposed the States General look for a way to ‘move the heart of his royal majesty of France’ and asked to declare a day of public prayer.⁴⁶⁶ On 12 October the States of Holland agreed with the latter proposal, but seconded Fagel’s judgment that an intercession would be harmful.⁴⁶⁷ Ten days later the Reformed religion was prohibited in France, and the States General had done nothing to prevent it.

To some extent, the religious and the secular authorities’ (both pro- and anti-French) caution toward publicity reflected official policy. In 1651 the States General had for the first time issued a placard prohibiting publications which insulted foreign princes. This ordinance was occasionally renewed and it was not a dead letter.⁴⁶⁸ In 1679 Ambassador Avaux had issued a complaint about the *Gazette d’Amsterdam*, which had published extracts of an anti-Gallican pamphlet that was forbidden in France. In response, the States of Holland forbade the production of all newspapers in French.⁴⁶⁹ Similar prohibitions were issued by several urban authorities in the following years, yet several French newspapers continued to be published more or less secretly. Unfortunately, few clandestine newspapers from this period have survived.⁴⁷⁰ In 1681 the predominantly statist States of Holland published yet another placard—and renewed it in 1684—forbidding any publications about foreign rulers without revealing the true name of the publisher.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 186.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 187.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Weekhout, *Boekencensuur in de Noordelijke Nederlanden*, p. 51.

⁴⁶⁹ P. Rétat, *La Gazette d’Amsterdam. Miroir de l’Europe au XVIII^e siècle* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 19–20.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

⁴⁷¹ S. van Beaumont, *Placaet van de Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt, verbiendende het drucken van eenigerhande schandaleuse of fameuse libellen, t zy met of sonder naem van den Drucker, &c. In date den achtentwintighsten November 1681*, in C. Cau (ed.), *Groot Placaet–Boeck Vervattende de Placaten, Ordonantien ende Edicten van de Hoogh Mogende Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden ende van de Ed. Groot Mog. Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt, mitsgaders van de Ed. Mog. Heeren Staten van Zeelandt*, vol. 3 (The Hague, 1683), p. 1415.

It is hard to measure the success of these censorship policies. As Hans Bots already observed, newspapers were rather reserved in their reports about the persecutions in France. Some gazetteers expressed the same concerns as Fagel that detailed coverage would only have negative consequences for the Huguenots.⁴⁷² Jean Alexandre de la Font's (?–1685) *Nouvelles extraordinaires de divers endroits*, a French-language newspaper printed in—predominantly statist—Leiden, shared this dilemma with the reader;⁴⁷³ De la Font argued that whereas all sensible Protestants in France pointed to the dangers of exaggerating the persecutions, those already living in exile in the United Provinces thought differently. The gazetteer concluded that it was best to think of the public good and listen to those on the ground.⁴⁷⁴ One can only guess at the extent to which gazetteers were persuaded by the Huguenots in France or by the Statist authorities in the Netherlands. In all likelihood, it was a combination of the two. If the authorities were willing to turn a blind eye to an officially forbidden publication, there was no need to push one's luck. In doing so, most of the surviving newspapers showed restraint in covering the *dragonnades*, but covered most of the 'drier facts', the razing of churches, the first uprising in the Cévennes, and the arrests of prominent Huguenot noblemen.

In Orangist cities such as Haarlem, newspapers appear to have been somewhat less restrained in communicating the persecutions, having little reason to fear censorship for taking a critical stance toward France.⁴⁷⁵ The *Opregte Haarlemsche Courant* also printed rumors, providing insight into the hopes and fears of the Reformed in France. In January 1680 it reported that people were talking in Paris about the imminent shutdown of the Huguenot Academy of Puylaurens.⁴⁷⁶ At the end of 1681, the same newspaper reported from Paris that

⁴⁷² Bots, 'Écho de la Révocation', pp. 286–288.

⁴⁷³ Pierre Bayle would come to praise this newspaper as having set the enduring good reputation of French newspapers from the Dutch Republic; Rétat, *Gazette d'Amsterdam*, pp. 31–42; J. Sgard, 'Jean de la Font (?–1685)', in A.-M. Mercier-Faivre and D. Reynaud (eds.), *Dictionnaire des Journalistes (1600–1789)* (2005), <http://dictionnaire-journalistes.gazettes18e.fr/journaliste/442-jean-de-la-font>.

⁴⁷⁴ Bots, 'Écho de la Révocation', p. 280.

⁴⁷⁵ For Haarlems factional leaning see E.C. Edwards, 'Amsterdam and William III. The role of influence, interest and patronage on policy-making in the Dutch Republic, 1672–1684' (unpublished PhD thesis, University College London, 1998), p. 127.

⁴⁷⁶ M. Enschedé, 'Extraits de la Gazette de Haarlem. Sur les persécutions dirigées contre les protestants Français de 1679 a 1685, part 1', *Bulletin Historique et Littéraire (Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français)* 28–9 (1879), p. 405.

‘it is said that the king will go to Parliament to [...] annul the Edict of Nantes’.⁴⁷⁷ Moreover, the *Opregte Haarlemsche Courant* sometimes interspersed factual information with more judgmental observations. It presents a message from Paris dated 14 May 1683 arguing that ‘the persecutions against the reformed in the realm increase every day’ and laments that ‘between Bordeaux and Argentan, there are not more than two temples left for which they have not yet found a valid pretext for demolition’.⁴⁷⁸

(In)convenient News

For William III and his supporters, the news about France’s religious policies was quite convenient. The persecutions served as proof that France was a morally perverse state and the stadtholder did not shy away from using this to his political advantage. In April 1680, the stadtholder’s cousin and his Zeeland deputy Willem Adriaan van Nassau, Lord of Odijk, had the honor of serving as the weekly president of the States General.⁴⁷⁹ He took the opportunity to present the delegates with a royal placard from 20 February 1680, which prohibited the delivery of children by Huguenot midwives, and used it to accuse pro-French delegates:⁴⁸⁰

Behold, gentlemen, how the King of France treats those of our religion. He wants to abolish it, and while the King of England puts himself in danger to maintain it, there are people here who want us to unite with France.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁷ ‘On dit que le roi se rendra au parlement [...] pour abroger l’Édit de Nantes’; M. Enschedé, ‘Extraits de la Gazette de Haarlem. Sur les persécutions dirigées contre les protestants Français de 1679 à 1685, part 2’, *Bulletin Historique et Littéraire (Société de l’Histoire du Protestantisme Français)* 28–12 (1879), p. 541.

⁴⁷⁸ ‘La persecution contre les réformés augmente journellement en ce royaume’; ‘Entre Bordeaux et Argentan, il ne reste plus que deux temples pour la demolition desquels on n’a pas encore pu trouver un prétexte valable’; Enschedé, ‘Extraits de la Gazette, part 1’, pp. 407–408.

⁴⁷⁹ See Introduction.

⁴⁸⁰ Avaux, *Négociations de Monsieur le Comte d’Avaux*, vol 1, pp. 94–95; C. Martin, *Les compagnies de la propagation de la foi (1632–1685)*. Paris, Grenoble, Aix, Lyon, Montpellier. *Etude d’un réseau d’associations fondé en France au temps de Louis XIII pour lutter contre l’hérésie des origines à la Révocation de l’Édit de Nantes* (Geneva, 2000), p. 474; G. Robert, ‘La Révocation de l’Édit de Nantes et la dispersion des professionnels de santé hors de France’, *Histoire des sciences médicales* 39–4 (2005), p. 415.

⁴⁸¹ ‘[...] Voilà, messieurs, de quelle maniere le roi de France traite ceux de notre religion: il la veut abolir; & lorsque le roi d’Angleterre se met en danger pour la maintenir, il y a ici des gens qui veulent que nous nous unissions à la France’; Avaux, *Négociations de Monsieur le Comte d’Avaux*, vol 1, p. 95; It is important to note that Avaux started writing his memorials after 1684; Edwards, ‘Amsterdam and the ambassadors’, p. 201.

Yet William III too had to be careful. As prince and stadtholder he had great prestige and power. Moreover, in 1674–5 he had negotiated the right to annually appoint the urban magistrates of Utrecht, and approve the appointment of new regents in Overijssel and Gelderland. This drastically extended his patronage network in different corners of the political landscape, including the States General.⁴⁸² But despite all this, the stadtholdership remained an office in service of the provincial states. As stadtholder, he was the commander-in-chief of the army, but the individual provincial assemblies and the States General remained his official superiors.⁴⁸³

The prince's political power was thus informal and depended on persuading state assemblies of his cause rather than overpowering them. Neither party would be served in letting the conflict escalate. As Elizabeth Edwards observes, the Prince of Orange and his opponents knew that they ultimately had to accommodate and compromise over their conflicting interests.⁴⁸⁴ In that respect, unleashing a full-blown propaganda war defaming Louis XIV, and thus flew in the face of the censorship policies of the States General and the States of Holland, would probably do more harm than good. Moreover, as we have just seen, it appears that William III did not feel ready to confront Louis XIV with defamatory printed propaganda quite yet.

Copies of official documents and royal placards—such as the one against midwives—offered a useful alternative. Several Dutch translations of official documents were published, usually by printers who chose to hide behind anonymity. One was a Huguenot request from 1680, offered to the king, imploring him to reverse his anti-Huguenot policies.⁴⁸⁵ Similarly, a translated request from August 1681 by delegates from Poitou to French king was probably the first published testimony from which the Dutch learnt about the *dragonnades*.⁴⁸⁶ Two months before, on 17 June 1681, Louis XIV's declaration that allowed all children of the age

⁴⁸² See Groenveld, 'William III as stadholder', pp. 17–38; D.J. Roorda, 'William III and the Utrecht "Government–Regulation". Background, events, and problems', *The Low Countries History Yearbook* 12 (1979), pp. 85–109.


⁴⁸³ Groenveld, 'William III as stadholder', p. 18.

⁴⁸⁴ Edwards, 'Amsterdam and the ambassadors', p. 194.

⁴⁸⁵ Anonymous, *Request aen den koningh, by die van de gereformeerde religie in Vranckryck* (s.l., 1680).

⁴⁸⁶ Anonymous, *Coppye van 't request gepresenteert aen den koning, door de gedeputeerde van de gereformeerde kerken van de provincie van Poitou, in de meant augusto, 1681, waer inne in 't kort te sien is een waer en oprecht verbael der ongehoorde overlasten en geweldnarigen, diemen tegens haer in 't wreck stelt, om haer daer door te dvingen van Godt dienst te veranderen* (s.l. 1681).

of seven to convert was also translated and printed in the United Provinces [Fig. 5].⁴⁸⁷ In all likelihood, such publications were commissioned by stakeholders from within the prince's circle in order to influence public opinion, and, in doing so, local and provincial authorities. William III used the French occupation of the Occitan city of Orange in August, over which he ruled as prince, in a similar way. Two weeks after the occupation, deputies of the stadtholder sent a number of testimonies to the States General, drawn up by members of the principality's representative assembly, assembedescribing how the dragoons plundered, harassed, and raped.⁴⁸⁸ The message they were supposed to convey was made explicit:



5. *Declaratie des koninghs, concernerende sijne onderdanen van de gereformeerde religie* (s.l. 1681). Resource: University Library Ghent.

⁴⁸⁷ Anonymous, *Declaratie des koninghs, concernerende sijne onderdanen van de gereformeerde religie. Gegeven tot Versailles den 17. Juny 1681 en geregistreert in 't parlement den 8 July aenvolgende* (s.l., 1681); see also Anonymous, *Arrest van den Raedt van Staten des Konings, medebrengende vernietinge en suppressie van de academie van de gereformeerde religie tot Sedan, gegeven tot Versailles, den 9 dag van July, 1681* (s.l., 1681); see also Anonymous, *Declaratie van den koning van Vranckrijck, inboudende dat alle mahometaense afgodendienaren die sullen willen christenen worden, geen andere religie sullen mogen aennemem, als de rooms-catholijcke* (Amsterdam, 1683).

⁴⁸⁸ Anonymous, *Verbalen van 't gepasseerde in de stadt ende het prinsdom van Orange* (The Hague, 1682), pp. 7–8, 20.

May all this [...] become known, so that you High Mightiness take into consideration the manifest wrong inflicted upon his Highness, in breach of the most recent peace treaties, as well as because of the misery and utter ruin which has been inflicted upon the poor inhabitants of his Highness' city and principality.⁴⁸⁹

It is unclear whether the deputies themselves published the testimonies and the exordium, or whether it was done by someone sympathetic to the prince's cause from within the States General. Yet the fact that it was printed by the States General's publisher (*landsdrukker*) Jacobus Scheltus is a testimony of the lack of control Statist factions had over the assembly's official output. Some publications also came from Statist cities. In 1682, Amsterdam printer Gerardus Borstius published a letter in French and Dutch by an anonymous Huguenot from Montpellier to an equally anonymous friend, about the prohibition of the exercise of the Reformed religion and the razing of Reformed churches.⁴⁹⁰

As evidence of France's policy of persecution, royal declarations and victim accounts spoke loud and clear—and could not be regarded as libelous. Nonetheless, they could be profoundly irritating to those hoping for the continuation of good relations with France. Ambassador Avaux worriedly noted that the child-conversion placard had caused a considerable number of delegates to change their views, among them Willem van Haren, representative of the States of Friesland. Now convinced that Louis XIV was aiming for the extirpation of the Reformed religion in France, Van Haren began to urge delegates States of Friesland and Groningen to support the stadtholder and his policy of rapprochement to England.⁴⁹¹ The French ambassador personally tried persuade Van Haren to change his mind, but failed to convince the delegate that Louis XIV had done nothing against the Edict of Nantes and otherwise had every right to do as he pleased within his own realm.⁴⁹²

Public pressure appears to have been a significant factor in the stance of officeholders toward France; extraordinary ambassador to England, Diederik van Leyden van Leeuwen, visited Avaux in The Hague to report to him that since the placard of 17 June all members of

⁴⁸⁹ 'Mog. al 't selve [...] bekent te maecken, ten eynde U Hoogh Moh. in consideratie nemende het manifest ongelijck, dat syne Hoogheyt in desen, directelijck tegens de jongst-geslotene tractaten van vrede, wert aengedaen, mitsgaders de miserie en uytterste ruïne die de arme ingezetenen van syne Hoogheys stadt en prinsdom wordt toegebracht'; *ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴⁹⁰ Anonymous, *Lettre écrite d'un protestant demeurant a Montpellier* (Amsterdam, 1682).

⁴⁹¹ Avaux, *Négociations de Monsieur le Comte d'Avaux*, vol 1, pp. 151–152; Baxter, *William III*, p. 179.

⁴⁹² Avaux, *Négociations de Monsieur le Comte d'Avaux*, vol 1, p. 153.

the States General had become convinced that Louis XIV planned to destroy the Reformed religion in France. Moreover, this belief was so strong among the people that ‘those who were part of the government in any way [...] would not be safe if they would talk about an alliance with France’.⁴⁹³ According to Van Leeuwen, nobody dared to block the prince forming an alliance with England any longer ‘out of fear of being torn apart by the people’, an ominous reference to the lynching of William III’s adversaries Johan and Cornelis de Witt in 1672.⁴⁹⁴ Avaux concludes that for those who remained unsympathetic to the stadtholder’s plans ‘the matters of religion had made it impossible for them to express their feelings’.⁴⁹⁵

The War of the Reunions

William III’s opposition was not as muzzled by the persecutions as the French ambassador would have it in his memoir—which was written partly as an apology for his failure to hold the prince at bay.⁴⁹⁶ But the realities of Louis XIV’s religious policy did become increasingly embarrassing for those who wished to see a rapprochement with France. In Chapter 2, we have seen how ‘atrocious claims’ created an asymmetry in public debate; one party accuses the other of an act of inhumane violence, to which the other party responds by arguing that such an event has not taken place. Whether or not the specific act of violence—such as infanticide—was legitimate or illegitimate was not up for debate. That infanticide, rape, or torturing someone until conversion were atrocious acts rests on implicit agreement by both parties. This agreement over what constituted atrocity structured the royal communication of the persecutions; even if Louis XIV regarded the *dragonnades* as effective measures, he would never publicly celebrate them. Instead, the Crown argued in 1685 that the Protestant religion had simply died out in France without the use of violence.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹³ ‘[...] que ceux qui avoient quelque part au gouvernement, [...] ne seroient pas en sûreté, s’il vous parler d’une alliance avec la France’; *ibid.*, p. 158.

⁴⁹⁴ ‘[...] de peur d’être déchiré par le peuple’; Avaux, *Négociations de Monsieur le Comte d’Avaux*, vol 1, pp. 163–164.

⁴⁹⁵ ‘[...] les affaires de la religion les ayant mis hors d’état de pouvoir dire leurs sentimens’; *ibid.*, p. 200.

⁴⁹⁶ Edwards, ‘Amsterdam and the ambassadors’.

⁴⁹⁷ See Chapter 4.

In the Dutch Republic the persecution of the Huguenots created a similar dynamic of communication; although Amsterdam was ‘pro-French’, it was hard to find an Amsterdammer who would openly argue that the persecutions in France were justified. Indeed, in 1681 the city showed its hospitality for the persecuted by building one thousand houses for incoming refugees, while, according to Avaux, songs lamenting the fate of the Huguenots were sung in the streets.⁴⁹⁸ Continued sympathy toward France thus depended on dissociating international relations from the fate of the Huguenots.

In 1683 this problem became pressing, as developments in international politics caused the tug-of-war between Orangist and Statist factions to accelerate dramatically. Early that year, the Sun King had begun to muster an army on his northern border to seize strategic cities and lands in the Southern Netherlands, which sparked the War of Reunions (1683–84) with Spain.⁴⁹⁹ The Spanish Crown requested the United Provinces send troops southwards. An initial 8000 were dispatched, but the stadtholder was thwarted when he asked for another 16,000 troops to be put under his command in the Southern Netherlands. Although the majority of the States of Holland took the prince’s side, Amsterdam, Delft, and Leiden—still backed by Henry Casimir in Friesland—vetoed the plan; financial measures required a unanimous vote.⁵⁰⁰ Tensions rose so high in the United Provinces that one observer spoke of ‘Hook and Cod times’, referring to the civil wars that had plagued the County of Holland in the fifteenth century.⁵⁰¹

When William III personally traveled to Amsterdam to make its ruling elite reconsider, he not only found the *vroedschap* unwavering, but also the ordinary people. The prince had had the bad luck that during his visit, the States’ fleet had hit bad weather near Texel on its way back from a military mission in Sweden and had lost ten ships. Not wanting to hear the insults and accusations of the sailors and the widows and daughters of the drowned men William did not leave his residence.⁵⁰² Still, his visit caused a wave of ‘insolent and desperately seditious

⁴⁹⁸ Avaux, *Négociations de Monsieur le Comte d’Avaux*, vol 1, p. 154.

⁴⁹⁹ J. Lynn, *The French wars 1667–1714. The Sun King at war* (Wellingborough, 2002), p. 48.

⁵⁰⁰ Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 830–831.

⁵⁰¹ ‘Houkse ofte Cabeljaawse tijden’; A. Olofsz (ed.), *Vita politica. Het burgerlyk leven, beschreven door Simon Stevin, in sijn leven raad, ende ingenieur sijner princelicke excellentie Maurits Grave van Nassau, &c. stadhouder van Holland. Seer nodig om in alle Houkse ofte Cabeljaawse tijden: ende bysonderlik gedurende onse verschillen in Holland, geleesen te warden* (Amsterdam, 1684).

⁵⁰² Avaux, *Négociations de Monsieur le Comte d’Avaux*, vol. 2, pp. 1–4.

discourses upon the Dam, the Exchange, and other public places'.⁵⁰³ According to Joseph Bampfield, a former military adviser to William of Orange turned informant of the English government in Friesland, these works had scared members of the city council who had otherwise been sympathetic to the prince's designs.⁵⁰⁴ Having been 'bitterly and scandalously reproached by the common people', the aggrieved prince ultimately stormed out of the city with empty hands and an empty stomach—having stood up the *vroedschap* with whom he was supposed to have lunch.⁵⁰⁵

These 'seditious discourses' in Amsterdam were not an isolated local phenomenon. Whether the Dutch Republic should get involved in the War of the Reunions had become the subject of an intensive pamphlet war. Over a hundred printed works were produced, polemicizing about the imminent war with France and the need to send troops to the front.⁵⁰⁶ A considerable chunk were missives, resolutions, and accounts, which had been drawn up by delegates and ambassadors during the course of their negotiations. The rest included arguments written by 'real patriots', regents ranting under the cover of pseudonyms, and fictitious discourses set on towing barges (*trekschuiten*) between traveling merchants, soldiers, Frenchmen, or citizens from The Hague, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam.

The pamphlet war of 1683 and 1684 was one peak in a long-term polemic between Statists and Orangist about what policy should be pursued regarding France during Dutch Forty Years' War (1672–1713).⁵⁰⁷ In a seminal study on the political languages that steered almost half a century of Franco-Dutch conflict, David Onnekink demonstrates that both parties fired at each other from within their own discourses. Throughout the period, Statists followed a discourse of what Arthur Weststeijn has identified as 'commercial republicanism'. Arguments against intervention reflected the political philosophy of the brothers De la Court

⁵⁰³ Citation from Israel; *ibid.*, p. 832.

⁵⁰⁴ A. Marshall, 'Bampfield, Joseph (1622–1685)', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (2008), <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/1259>; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 832.

⁵⁰⁵ Le Clercq, *Negotiatiën van den heer*, vol. 2, p. 11; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 832.

⁵⁰⁶ An insightful—albeit not exhaustive—overview is provided by P.A. Tiele (ed.), *Bibliotheek van Nederlandsche pamfletten. Eerste afdeeling. Verzameling van Frederik Muller te Amsterdam. Naar tijdsorde gerangschikt en beschreven*, vol. 3 (Amsterdam, 1861), pp. 151–173.

⁵⁰⁷ This term was recently coined by David Onnekink to refer to the long period of conflict between the United Provinces and France, which included the Franco–Dutch War (1672–1678), the Nine Years' War (1688–1697), and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714); Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War*.

from the First Stadtholderless Period (1650-72), which, as we have briefly discussed in Chapter 2, combined ‘the principles of reason of state and the republican language of liberty.’⁵⁰⁸ The ethical dimension of such reason of state discourse was restricted to the state’s existential need for self-preservation, which it will strive for at all costs.⁵⁰⁹ Proponents of commercial republicanism firmly believed in provincial sovereignty as the guiding principle of domestic politics, which they combined with a secular and realistic outlook on foreign politics; in the eyes of Amsterdam’s leaders ‘the international arena [was] devoid of morality.’⁵¹⁰ Statists thus formulated their policies within the normative principle of reason.

Onnekink argues that Orangists, on their part, consistently argued that Louis XIV was striving for universal monarchy, but also intermittently employed ‘Protestant discourse’—thus belonging to what this study categorizes as the normative principle of religion. Onnekink identifies ‘Protestant discourse’ as a spatial identity construction, in which a ‘confessional geography’ was sketched, dividing Europe into a Protestant, ‘true-reformed’ space, and a Catholic ‘tyrannical space’.⁵¹¹ It revolved around beliefs of being adherents of the true religion, carrying divine responsibility, and sketching Europe’s map along confessional lines, and had a specific vocabulary with key words, such as ‘popery’, ‘Antichrist’, ‘providence’, ‘sins’, and ‘true religion’.⁵¹²

Onnekink observes that whereas universal monarchy discourse was ‘surprisingly secular’ in 1672, during the heat of the Franco-Dutch War religious argumentation became dominant in 1688, at the beginning of the Nine Years’ War.⁵¹³ He leaves open what caused this shift toward Protestant discourse. He notes that one could argue that the Dutch had become more concerned about their confession because of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Yet he counters the argument that context helps shape discourse by arguing that ‘context is not an objective entity which can be studied separately from discourse’.⁵¹⁴ Quoting constructivist IR theorist Lene Hansen, Onnekink insists that ‘discourse is the only valid “interpretative optic”

⁵⁰⁸ Weststeijn, *Commercial republicanism*, p. 347.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.

⁵¹⁰ Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War*, 28.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.* p. 129.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

of that context.⁵¹⁵ After all, the policies against the Huguenots were equally discursive acts, themselves ‘an interpretative optic of religious divisions in France.’⁵¹⁶

It is a correct observation that the opposition between context and discourse is theoretically untenable. Yet I want to argue that methodologically it remains justifiable and indeed necessary, to argue that discourse could be overtaken by events. The fact that these events were themselves discursively constituted and communicated did not mean that the shaping of such discourses was a factual free-for-all. Indeed, the pamphlet war of 1683 and 1684—which lies within the timeframe of the observed shift—and the role of news about the Huguenot persecutions can offer insight in this shift toward ‘Protestant discourse’, and in the use of the normative principle of religion.

Earlier in this chapter, we have already seen that Orangists used printed ‘evidence’ about the persecutions to give a confessional spin to the discussions about international relations, and to dare Statist officeholders to publicly justify their friendship with France. In 1683 and 1684 this dynamic intensified as the opposing parties began to actively accuse each another of putting the state in danger and fiercely debated the nature of the conflict with France: Pamphlets discussed which alliances were necessary to win an open confrontation; whether France had a long history of expansionism or had merely been a one-off enemy of the Dutch; and whether the sending of troops would make war more or less likely. But besides topical details, Statist apologists—in accordance with Onnekink’s observation—indeed always returned to the ‘commercial republican’ argument that a war would be detrimental to the city’s economic welfare, built upon the pillars which had been defined by De la Court as ‘fishery, commerce, and shipping’.⁵¹⁷ The anonymously published *Bericht van een liefhebber der waarheit aan sijn vriend, over de tegenwoordige toestant van saken* (*Notice of a lover of the truth to his friend about the hovering differences about the current state of affairs*) provides a good example of the legacy of the True Freedom:

Nothing else has motivated [our the stance against recruitment] than that which should be the supreme law of all good regents, the welfare of the people, and the preservation of means which can serve to their subsistence, and in our lands predominantly consist

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Citation from Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War*, p. 28.

of commerce, navigation, [and] fishery [...], all of which [...] will inevitably be blocked with the beginning of a war and be transferred to the nations which would not partake in that war.⁵¹⁸

In line with their secular appeals to the normative principle of reason, the Statist pamphlets were devoid of religious argumentation; within this line of reasoning, the fate of the Huguenots did not demand a foreign political response. Interestingly, Orangist polemic was also built mainly on reason of state argumentation. Orangists used Louis XIV's religious intolerance as a nightmarish vision of what would befall the Dutch Republic if France were not kept at bay. In other words, they tried to show that the normative principles of reason and religion were co-dependent. A case in point is Fagel's three-hour speech to the *vroedschap* during William III's visit to Amsterdam, which was published with the prince's signature:

God the Lord Almighty [has] naturally instilled in everyone, [...] [the instinct] to do everything that is necessary for their protection and defense, [...] also when they are confronted with a Creature that very much exceeds them in power. This natural instinct has developed into a necessity and obligation with respect to human beings, and in particular those to whom God [...] has ordered the supervision and care of other people, and that this obligation becomes all the more great and strong, when this defense has to be employed to avert that the subjects and inhabitants of a country will be deprived of the exercise of their religion, and their liberty and freedom.⁵¹⁹

Fagel concedes that the Dutch Republic cannot sustain itself without 'commerce, fishery, and manufacture', but he insists that these pillars will fall without the free exercise of religion:⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁸ 'Niets isser dat [tot onze positie tegen rekrutering] heeft aangedrongen, als het geen by alle goede regenten de opperste wet moet zijn, het welvaaren van het volck, ende de behoudnisse van de middelen welke tot haare subsistentie konden dienen, en in dese landen insonderheyt bestaande in coophandel, scheepvaart, [en] visscheryen, [...] alle welke middelen by het onstaan van een oorlogh onfeylbaarelijck sullen werden verspert, en overgebraght in handen van sodanige natien, die in dien oorlogh niet en soude participeren'; Anonymous, *Bericht van een liefhebber der waarheit aan sijn vriend, over de tegenwoordige toestant van saken* (1684), p. 15.

⁵¹⁹ 'Door Godt den Heer Almachtigh [is] aan alle [...] van de nature is ingegeven, [het instinct] te doen alle wat tot haar bescherminge ende defensie is gerequiereert, [...] oock in die gelegentheyt wanneer sy te doen hebben met een sodanigh ander Schepsel dat haer in over macht seer verre excedeert, dat natuurlijk instinct is overgegaen in een noodtsakelykheyt en obligatie ten reguarde van de menschen, ende sonderlingh van die aen welke Godt [...] heeft bevolen het opsicht ende de sorge over andere Menschen, ended at die obligatie soo veel te grooter en te stercker werd, soo wanneer die defensie moet warden geadhibeert, om voor te komen, dat de Onderdanen ende Ingesetene van een Landt niet mogen warden ontset van de oeffeninge van hare Religie, ende van hare liberteyt ende vryheydt'; C. Fagel, *Ed. propositie, gedaan door den heer raat pensionaris Fagel, aan de edele groot achtbare heeren burger-meesteren en vroedschap der stadt Amsterdam, nevens het antwoort van haer edele groot achtbare en 't gene verders is gepasseert* (s.l., 1684), pfl. 11952.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

Not a single person in this country [...] will want to remain [here], if he were to lose the aforementioned free exercise of his Religion and the freedom that all enjoy here.⁵²¹

The argument that the Dutch Republic's welfare depended on it being a safe haven for religious exiles was not new, nor was it particularly Orangist. Both the De la Court brothers and the influential Orangist contemporary historian and political thinker Pieter Valckenier agreed that the pull factor of religious toleration had brought Holland—‘an inn for all sorts of refugees’—its remarkable power and prosperity.⁵²²

In the 1680s it made little sense for Statists to dust off this argument to plead for a policy of neutrality. It was different for Orangists. The Huguenots never became a main theme on the Orangist side and there certainly were no claims that the Dutch had a moral imperative to intervene for their relief—like the ones that we have discussed in Chapter 2 and will discuss again in Chapter 5. Indeed, it would have been hard to argue that an army in the Southern Netherlands would turn the tide for the Huguenots in France. However, news about the persecutions in France had given Orangists the opportunity to combine the commercial argument for religious toleration with their warnings about universal monarchy. In 1672, French troops may have re-Catholicized the monumental Dom Church in Utrecht and given Catholics full civic rights, but they had left the Reformed in peace.⁵²³ A decade later, the treatment of the Huguenots supported the idea that a new invasion would bring a different religious policy in its wake.⁵²⁴ Using this argument, a ‘modest citizen’ wins a discussion about

⁵²¹ ‘[...] niet een enigh mensch sich hier in het landt [...] sullende willen onthouden, indien hy ontset was van de voorschreve vrye exercitie van syn religie, ende van de vryheydt die yder hier geniet’; *ibid.*

⁵²² ‘Een herberg van alderhande vluchtelingen’; P. Valckenier, *T ververd Europa ofte politijcke en historische beschryvinge der waare fundamente en oorsaken van de oorlogen en revolutien in Europa, voornamentlijk in en omtrent de Nederlanden zedert den jaare 1664 gecanseert door de gepretendeerde universele monarchie der Franschen* (Amsterdam, 1675), p. 7; Weststeijn, *Commercial republicanism*, pp. 327–328.

⁵²³ A. van Wicquefort, *Journael ofte dagelijcksch verhael van de handel der Franschen in de steden van Uytrecht en Woeder, sedert hun koomst daer binnen, tot aan hun vertrek* (Amsterdam, 1674), pp. 40–41; T. van Domselaer, *Het ontroerde Nederlandt, door de wapenen des konings van Vrankryk* (Amsterdam, 1674), p. 297.

⁵²⁴ Orangist pamphlets also mention the 1672 invasion of France. One Orangist pamphlet, the *Onnut discours*, explicitly referred to the *dragonnades* as a precursor to what would befall the United Provinces if troops were not sent to the Southern Netherlands. It argues that Amsterdam, which had not been occupied in 1672, would regret its greed when they discovered how costly and cruel a French occupation would be; Anonymous, *Onnut discours, over de Antwoort op een missive geschreven by een regent, &c.* (1684), pfl. 12136, p. 6. Similar arguments can be found in Anonymous, *Samenspraak tusschen een militair, coopman, en burger. Gebouden in een trek-schuyt, tusschen Delft en Rotterdam* (1684), p. 7.

the sending of troops in the *Samenspraek tusschen een militair, coopman, en burger in een trekschuyt* (*Conversation between a soldier, merchant, and citizen on a horse-drawn boat*):

I do not trust France, and [I] hear so much about how he [Louis XIV] treats his own people who are of the [Reformed] religion. How then will he treat us? For my part, I am willing to sacrifice everything to keep him out.⁵²⁵

Other Orangist pamphlets were more religiously militant and positioned themselves against the normative principle of reason. The *Nader bericht van een liefhebber der waarheit aan zijn vriend over de tegenwoordige toestand van Saken* (*Further account from a lover of the truth to his friend about the current state of affairs*), which went through at least three editions, for instance, tries to counter commercial republican discourse with arguments of religious truth:

They say [...] that it is impossible to resist the Frenchman with 16000 men without an alliance (with Germany). In addition they go on about the size of the costs. [...] I believe that if one [...] would really take to heart the state of the country and God's Church and encourage each other (as our forefathers did) through a laudable sigh for their well-being, one would not speak such a language, but use the means that God still gives [...] and use them in expectation of his aid. [...] The love of the common good, and religion in particular, appears to have been banished from the hearts of many. If this would not be the case, it would be incomprehensible that so many lend their ear to France [...], seeing [...] how he treats those that are under his power.⁵²⁶

Most Statist pamphlets did not use religious argumentation. However, there are some telling exceptions, such as the *Antwoort op het soo genoemde onnutte discours, over de antwoorde op een missive geschreven by een regent* (*Response to the so-called useless discourse about the answers to a missive written by a*

⁵²⁵ 'Ick vertrouw Vrankrijck niet, en [ick] hoor soo veel, hoe dat hy [Lodewijk XIV] sijn eygen volck in sijn rijk die van de [protestantse] religie zijn, tracteert, hoe sou hy ons dan niet wel handelen, ick voor mijn, ick wil hem der noch met goet en bloed helpen uythouden?'; *ibid.*

⁵²⁶ 'Men segt [...] dat het onmogelijk is, met dese 16000 Man sonder alliantie (met Duytsland) den Fransman te resisteren, daer by weet men dan nog breet uyt te meten de hoe grootheyt van de onkoste. [...] 'K meen als men [...] den staat van 't lant en Gods kerk ter dege op het herte drukte en uyt een loffelijke sugt tot desselfs wel wesen (gelijk onse voor ouders deden) malkanderen courageerden, men sou sulke tael niet voeren, maer die middelen die God nog geeft [...] in verwagting van zijn hulp gebruyken [...]. Maer wat sal men hier veel meer van seggen, de liefde tot 't gemeene wel wesen, en bysonder tot de Gods-dienst, schijnt nu uyt het herte van vele gebannen te zijn; want indien dat soo niet en was, soo was 't onbegrijpelijk, datmen noch soo veel 't oor zou leenen aen Vrankrijk, [...] daer men [...] sijn handelinge siet met die, die onder zijn gewelt zijn?'; Anonymous, *Nader bericht van een liefhebber der waerheyd aen sijn vrind, nopende de swevende verschillen over de wervingh* (s.l. 1684), pfl 12129; see also Anonymous, *Nader bericht van een liefhebber der waarheit aan sijn vrind. Nopende de swevende verschille over wervingh* (s.l. 1684), pfl 12128; and Anonymous, *Nader bericht van een lief-bebber der waerheyd aen syn vriendt, nopende de swevende verschillen over de werving* (s.l. 1684), pfl 12129a.

regent). The author primarily makes the exact opposite claim from the one made by the *Nader bericht van een liefhebber der waarheit*, arguing that

Nowadays [it is] the maxim of many people [...] to name religion [...] in all matters to their interest, and [to] frequently enact the biggest filth under the appearance of devotion [...]. It is [...] ridiculous to believe, let alone say, that religion is in peril, if the whole country is not put in danger by recruiting 16,000 men.⁵²⁷

Another Statist pamphlet actually mentioned the fate of the Huguenots in an effort to put their persecution into perspective, arguing implicitly against the consequences their fate might have for the Dutch Republic's relations with France. The author does so, on the one hand, by pointing to the religious persecutions of the Republic's main ally against France, and, on the other, by trying to dissociate Louis XIV from the persecutions in his realm. In other words, religion does not work as a normative principle in international relations, which should be guided by reason (of state):

I am not unhappy to confess that the persecutions of our brethren in the faith in France has cooled our affection for that king here [...] But what shall one say? The spirit of persecution which reigns there, reigns even stronger in other parts of the so-called Christian world [...] Italy and Spain, where the inquisition rules, that hellish monster, can testify of this spirit: And those who draw any comparison between these lands and France will have to confess that the differences in spirit are almost infinite: I do not say this in the least to approve the spirit of persecution, because I abhor them all, but to make this nation understand that a country where the Reformed religion can still be taught openly, should not be compared with those lands where it would be a capital crime to profess in caverns and caves a faith other than the one that dominates [...]. [This] should in no way be used to reproach or incite the least hate against the powers that rule there and who have to suffer the yoke of church tyranny as much as the community. This evil spirit has founded a throne which time and superstition have established too firmly [...]. A prince would [not] be capable of casting down such a centuries old seat.⁵²⁸

⁵²⁷ '[Het sijn] tegenwoordigh de maximen [...] van veele menschen, in alle saken van haer intrest, religie [...] te melden, ende onder schijn van devotie dickemaels de grootste vuyligheyt te plegen [...]. Het is [...] belacchelijck te dencken, men laet staen te seggen, dat het met de religie gevaerlijck soude staen, als door het werven van sestien duysent man het geheele landt niet in perijckel wiert gestalt'; Anonymous, *Antwoort op het onnutte discours, over de antwoorde op de missive geschreven by een regent* (Rotterdam, 1684), pfl 12138.

⁵²⁸ 'Ik belyde niet ongaarne, dat de vervolginge van onze religionsgenooten in Vrankrijk de genegentheit voor dien koningh alhier niet weinigh heeft verkoelt [...]. Maar wat zal men zeggen? De geest van persecutie [...] die aldaar regeert, regeert noch veel strengere in andere deelen van de zoo genaamde christen wereldt [...]. Italie en Spanje daar d'Inquisitie heerscht, dat helse monsterdier [...], konnen van dien geest getuigen: en die geen, die eenige vergelijkinge konnen maken, tusschen die landen en Vrankrijk, zullen moeten bekennen, dat het verschil tusschen de een en den anderen geest byna oneindigh is: 't geen ik niet en zegge om den geest van de

Ultimately, public opinion against the stadtholder proved too strong. William III had failed to sway the chief cities of Holland and Zeeland, where too many people in the streets and taverns distrusted him, to his cause. As Joseph Bampfield, a former officer of William III, wrote to a friend in April 1684, William had ‘no friend but the miserable Spaniards’.⁵²⁹ While it is impossible to measure the relative success of different forms of argumentation, pointing to the fate of the Huguenots had clearly failed to turn the tide.

The pamphlet war of 1683 and 1684 nevertheless appears to have been a significant moment in the rise of religious rhetoric concerning international politics between 1672 and 1688. Orangist opinion makers used news about the persecution of the Huguenots to bridge different conceptions of reason of state: (Statist) ‘commercial republicanism’ and (Orangist) ‘universal monarchy’. The persecutions provided a concrete image of what the Sun King’s expansionism would mean for the United Provinces. In other words, news about the Huguenots was used to show that the normative principles of religion and reason (of state) were, in fact, commensurable and be pursued simultaneously.

More importantly, the Statist-Orangist polemic of 1683–84 shows that we should formulate a clearer definition of what precisely is meant by religion as a normative principle—or ‘Protestant discourse’. Indeed, understanding the shifts and turns in political argumentation begins with distinguishing the different forms it could take. As we have seen, Onnekink argues that Protestant discourse pertains to ideas of religious truth and providence. But the 1683–84 pamphlet war also shows different approaches to Europe’s confessional geography. Some of the pamphlets did indeed refer to providence and made religious truth claims. Yet many publications in which a confessional geography of Europe was sketched remained

minste vervolginge te billyken, want ik doem ze alle; maar om onze natie te doen begrijpen, dat een landt, daar de hervormde godsdienst [...], noch in het openbaar geleert en gepredikt wordt [...], ten aanzien van de vervolgingen niet vergeleken magh worden by die landen, daar het een capitale misdaadt zoude zijn in hollen en spelonken belydenisse te doen van een anderen godsdienst, als die aldaer domineert [...]. ’T geen echter tot geen verwijt of verwekking van de minsten haat moet strekken tegens de magten, die aldaar regeren, en die onder het juk der kerkelijke tyrannie zoo wel als de gemeente moeten zuchten. Die boozen geest heeft zich in alle die landen een troon gesticht, die door de tijdt en bygelovigheit al te zeer gevestigd is [...]. Een prins [zoude niet] bequaam [...] zijn, om een zetel van zoo veel eeuwen teffens om verre te werpen;’ Anonymous, *Antwoordt van een republiquain op het lasterschrift van den nieuwen Vargas, schuilende onder den naam van Philaethes en van een regent van Hollandt* (Amsterdam, 1684), pfl 12142, p. 31.

⁵²⁹ Quotation taken from Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 833–834.

fundamentally neutral about which religion was the true one; they approached the confessional divides as a fact and regarded their religion as under threat, but they did not really use anti-Catholic or pro-Protestant language. This was in line with the stadtholder's policy of staying on good terms with Catholics, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4. We have seen a similar dynamic in Chapter 2, as several opinion makers negotiated when the persecution of a religious minority actually constituted religious persecution; in other words, the confessional divide stood at the center of debate, but it did not necessarily revolve around religious truth or error.

In short, we should split the normative principle of religion in two and distinguish between what we can call the normative principles of confessional truth and confessional solidarity. The normative principle of confessional truth indeed revolves around (doctrinal) religious truth claims—and is thus by all standards non-secular. The normative principle of confessional solidarity, by contrast, perceives the political landscape through the lens of confessional division and conflict. Confession remains the main marker of identity—providing an imagined community to speak in Benedict Anderson's terms—but it is devoid of dogmatic truth claims or religious triumphalism. It can therefore be regarded as secular.

To make a distinction between the normative principles of confessional truth and confessional solidarity may seem like splitting hairs—especially since the opinion makers appealing to the latter probably nonetheless believed that their confession was the true religion. Yet the differentiation is pivotal if we want to understand the changing dynamics of confessional conflict in European history—or the complex role of religion in the post-Cold War conflicts that put religion back on the political scientist's and historian's agenda in the first place.⁵³⁰ Indeed, not making this distinction implies that we should, for instance, regard the twenty-first-century political scientist Samuel Huntington as a religious thinker, because his view on world politics is based on a cultural-confessional geography, even though his theory is fundamentally secular.⁵³¹ How and when opinion makers used the normative principles of

⁵³⁰ For recent discussions about the role of religion as a marker of community see C. Mitchell, 'Behind the ethnic marker. Religion and social identification in Northern Ireland', *Sociology of Religion* 66–1 (2005), pp. 3–21; D. Little, 'Religion, nationalism, and intolerance', in T.D. Sisk (ed.), *Between terror and tolerance. Religious leaders, conflict, and peace-making* (Washington, D.C., 2011) pp. 9–28.

⁵³¹ S. Huntington, 'The clash of civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72–3 (1993), pp. 22–49.

confessional truth or confessional solidarity will be analyzed in more detail in chapters 4 and 6. But first, we should discuss an author who actively advocated against the reification of confessional conflict—at least in the years before the Revocation.

The Persecuted Voice

Orangist propagandists used the fate of the Huguenots as proof that an army should be sent to the Southern Netherlands. One may wonder, however, how interesting this debate was for the actual Huguenots who arrived in the Dutch Republic at this time. Many of the men and women who found refuge in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, or The Hague after having suffered a *dragonnade* in Poitou or Bearn were probably unaware of—and indifferent to—whether they had arrived in an Orangist or a Statist city. Dutch pamphleteers, in turn, appeared to take little interest in the exiles' experiences, but drew attention to their fate to make a political statement.

This was not due to a lack of stories; a considerable number of persecuted Huguenots wrote about their experiences in journals, but they were apparently not very keen on publishing them.⁵³² We can explain this through a combination of factors, not the least of which was the hope that one day, Louis XIV or his successor would reverse his policy and let the exiles return home. Causing international unrest and giving rise to religious antagonism by publicizing one's predicament would not help that wish to come true. The most notable exception to this silence before the Revocation was accordingly a work that appeared to seek rapprochement and establish, quite literally, an interconfessional dialogue.

On 23 September 1680, Pierre Jurieu, professor of theology at the Academy of Sedan, entrusted a manuscript to his friend Jean Rou, who was going to Liège, en route to going into exile in the Dutch Republic.⁵³³ Three months later, Jurieu's work was published as *La politique*

⁵³² For an analysis of Huguenot persecution journals see Van der Linden, *Experiencing exile*, pp. 163–176; R. Whelan, 'Writing the self. Huguenot autobiography and the process of assimilation', in: R. Vigne and C. Littleton (eds.), *From strangers to citizens. The integration of immigrant communities in Britain, Ireland and Colonial America, 1550–1750* (Brighton, Portland 2001), pp. 80–121; D. Watts, 'Testimonies of persecution. Four Huguenot refugees and their memoirs', in: J. Fox, M. Waddicor, and D. Watts (Eds.), *Studies in eighteenth-century French literature. Presented to Robert Niklaus* (Exeter, 1975), pp. 319–222

⁵³³ F. Knetsch, *Pierre Jurieu. Theoloog en politikus der Refuge* (Kampen, 1967), p. 111.

du clergé en France (*The politics of the clergy in France*) by Pierre Marteau from Cologne.⁵³⁴ Of course, well-informed contemporaries knew that Pierre Marteau from Cologne was not a real person. It was a fake publishing house, widely used to notify readers that the book before them was politically sensitive.⁵³⁵ In reality, the *Politique du clergé* had been published by Abraham Arondeus in The Hague. Jurieu's authorship was not an open secret, although there were rumors he was the author.⁵³⁶ Jansenist apostolic vicar and archbishop of Utrecht, Johannes van Neercassel (1625–86),—a well-connected man who kept a close correspondence with leading French publicists Antoine Arnauld and Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet—for one, believed that the Huguenot divine and opinion maker Jean Claude was the author of the work.⁵³⁷

The *politique du clergé* was probably the first work produced by the Dutch presses to provide a detailed account and judgment of the renewed persecution of the Huguenots under Louis XIV, and, as such, it became a success. Rou would later recall in a memoir that the 'energetic' work caused 'great sensation'.⁵³⁸ Pierre Bayle confirms that the work became a success in his *Dictionnaire*, even though he judged it to have 'little strength of reasoning'.⁵³⁹ Within two years, three editions had appeared in French.⁵⁴⁰ By March 1681 the work had been translated into English and published in London for R. Bentley and M. Magnes, who dedicated it to the king and the Oxford Parliament.⁵⁴¹ Around the same time, Utrecht's university printer (*academiedrukker*) François Halma (1653–1722)—who would become an important publisher for first-generation refugees—published a Dutch translation, which was soon followed by second and third editions.⁵⁴²

⁵³⁴ Anonymous [P. Jurieu], *La politique du clergé de France ou entretiens curieux de deux catholiques romains, l'un Parisien, l'autre provincial, sur les moyens dont on se sert aujourd'hui, pour détruire la religion Protestante dans ce royaume* (The Hague, 1681).

⁵³⁵ See L. Janmart de Brouillant, *Histoire de Pierre du Marteau imprimeur à Cologne (17–18. siècles)* (Paris, 1888).

⁵³⁶ S. d'Arnay (ed.), *Oeuvres de messire Antoine Arnauld, docteur de la maison et société de Sorbonne*, vol. 11 (Paris, 1777). p. lviii.

⁵³⁷ Ibid.; Jean Claude will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

⁵³⁸ F. Waddington (ed.), *Mémoires inédits et opuscules de Jean Rou, avocat au parlement de Paris (1659); secrétaire interprète de Hollande depuis l'année 1689 (1638–1711)*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1857), p. 164.

⁵³⁹ '[...] peu de solidité de raisonnement'; P. Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1820), p. 408.

⁵⁴⁰ For an overview of all editions and translations of the *Politique du clergé* see É. Kappler, *Bibliographie critique de l'oeuvre imprimée de Pierre Jurieu (1637–1713)* (Paris, 2002), pp. 213–235.

⁵⁴¹ Anonymous [P. Jurieu], *The policy of the clergy of France, to destroy the Protestants of that kingdom, wherein is set down the ways and means that have been made use of for these twenty years last past, to root out the Protestant religion, in a dialogue between two papists* (London, 1681); Marshall, *John Locke*, p. 32.

⁵⁴² Anonymous [P. Jurieu], *De Staat-Kunde van de Geestelykheyt van Vrankryk ofte Naeukeurige Samen-sprekingen van twee Roomsche-Katholijken, de eene Parijziaan, en den anderen een Landzmaat, over de middelen van welke men sig bedendaags*

In July 1681, about a year after the manuscript had been completed, the Academy of Sedan was suppressed. Pierre Jurieu followed Rou to The Hague, before taking permanent residence in Rotterdam as a professor at the newly founded *École Illustre*.⁵⁴³ In his new home, the theologian wrote a sequel to the *Politique du clergé*, entitled *Les derniers efforts de l'innocence affligée* (*The last efforts of afflicted innocence*), which also met with success. Halma also translated this work into Dutch as *De uysterste verweering der verdrukte onnozelbeyd*.⁵⁴⁴ With the two polemics, Jurieu began to build his reputation as the chief publicist of the French Refuge, or the 'Goliath of the Protestants' as his adversaries came to refer to him.⁵⁴⁵

The *Politique du clergé* is structured as a dialogue. It presents two Catholic friends who run into each other in Paris after many years. One of the two lives in Paris, while the other resides in the countryside. They present ideal types of the political thought world of generic Catholic Frenchmen. The interlocutors are wealthy, well-educated, and cordial men, who treasure civil conversation. Although one of them maintains friendships with the Huguenot nobility, they are not noblemen, nor is it indicated that they hold political office.⁵⁴⁶ The friends agree that religious uniformity in France is desirable and, by discussing how it can best be attained, they sketch a picture of the realm's and Europe's religio-political landscape. The Parisian does not know any Protestants personally but believes them to be fundamentally dangerous and curiously asks the provincial's opinion on the Huguenots and the measures directed against them. The provincial, a somewhat naive but benign man, is well disposed toward the Huguenots, knowing them as honest Frenchmen.⁵⁴⁷ Yet by the force of prejudice over experience, the provincial soon follows his friend's lead: the Parisian advises him to break

dient, om de Gereformeerde Godsdienst uzf te roejen in dat Koninkrijk, trans. F. Halma (Utrecht, 1681); P. Witsen Geysbeek, 'François Halma', in P. Witsen Geysbeek (ed.), *Biographisch anthologisch en critisch woordenboek der Nederduitsche dichters*, vol. 3 (Amsterdam, 1822), pp. 50–57; J. van Eijnatten, 'The Huguenot clerisy in the United Provinces. Aspects of Huguenot influence on Dutch intellectual life after the Revocation', in S. Pott, M. Mulsow, and L. Danneberg (eds.), *The Berlin Refuge 1680–1780* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2003), p. 226; Kappler, *Bibliographie critique*, pp. 228–229.

⁵⁴³ Knetsch, *Pierre Jurieu*, pp. 122–123.

⁵⁴⁴ Anonymous [P. Jurieu], *De uysterste verweering der verdrukte onnozelbeyd ofte 't vervolg der staat-kunde van de geestelijckbeyd van Vrankryk* (Utrecht, 1682); Kappler, *Bibliographie critique*, p. 231.

⁵⁴⁵ See, for instance, S. d'Arnay (ed.), *Oeuvres de messier Antoine Arnauld, docteur de la Maison et société de Sorbonne, tome trente-deuxieme, contenant les nombres XXIV, XXV & CCVL de la troisieme partie de la cinquieme classe* (Paris, 1780), p. 504.

⁵⁴⁶ The Parisian is called 'monsieur', not 'gentilhomme'. In the English version this is translated as 'gentleman'; P. Jurieu, *Les derniers efforts de l'innocence affligée* (The Hague 1682), p. 9; Jurieu, *Last efforts*, p. 7.

⁵⁴⁷ Jurieu, *Politique du clergé*, pp. 7–8.

off his friendships with the Reformed, who will soon experience the downfall of their religion.⁵⁴⁸

In the *Derniers efforts* the same men are joined by two Huguenots, one a nobleman, the other a lawyer. In the course of their conversation, the policy of persecution is deconstructed. As to the cause behind the persecution, the two Catholics agree that Louis XIV strives for the conversion of the Huguenots as a good Catholic, but above all, because, as a king, he is in constant search of glory and reverence.⁵⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the author follows a traditional strategy of shifting blame away from the ruler. Left by himself, Louis XIV would patiently convert the Huguenots through soft means rather than through ‘steel, fire, and banishment’, but a small faction misinforms him and pushes him in this direction.⁵⁵⁰

Like the Waldensian pamphlets, the *Politique du clergé* dwells extensively on the normative principle of rule of law, elaborating on legal nature of the Edict of Nantes, the peace treaty that settled the position of the Huguenots and their relationship with their ruler. By stressing the normative principle of the treaty Jurieu shows that he is not necessarily in favor of religious toleration. Indeed, he parries the critique that Catholics have no rights in England by pointing out that there has never been a royal promise anchored in law to tolerate them.⁵⁵¹ He thus approached religious tolerance from a legal perspective, not from the normative principles of confessional truth or solidarity. Jurieu shows how many of the measures against the Huguenots, did not follow the Edict of Nantes, as the court professed, but in fact violated it:

The edicts of pacification [the Edict of Nantes] have the exact shape which perpetual laws are supposed to have. They have been confirmed by the parlements. They have been confirmed by a hundred declarations [...], and by a thousand royal oaths. Finally, they have been posed as irrevocable laws and as the foundations of the state’s peace.⁵⁵²

Yet despite this emphasis on irrevocability, Jurieu gives a somewhat evasive answer as to whether the monarch is bound to uphold the treaty’s statutes and what happens should he fail

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 8–9.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 11–12.

⁵⁵⁰ ‘[...] le fer, le feu & le bannissement’; *ibid.*, p. 12.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., p. 126.

⁵⁵² ‘Les edits de pacification sont dans toutes les formes où doivent estre des loix perpetuelles, ils sont verifiez par les Parlemens, ils sont confirmez par cent declarations [...], & par mille paroles Royales: enfin ils ont esté posez pour estre des loix irrevocables, & comme des fondemens de la paix de l’etat;’ *ibid.* pp. 126–127.

to do so. The Parisian gentleman argues that kings ‘continuously break peace and solemnly pledged peace treaties, because the public interest demands it’;⁵⁵³ after all, the ‘common good is the sovereign law’.⁵⁵⁴ The author counters this argument by stating that such annulments should always be done openly, with an official accusation against the other party. As long as the king does not revoke the Edict of Nantes, he remains bound to uphold its principles in ‘good faith’, a term which the discussants use extensively.

In other words, there is a strong moral imperative for the king to engage with his subjects openly and not breach the contracts he has made with them, at least not covertly. Yet beyond a moral imperative, the legal consequences of not upholding the Edict of Nantes in ‘good faith’ remain undiscussed. In later works, Jurieu would do just that. By revoking the Edict of Nantes, he would come to argue, Louis XIV had broken his bond with his Huguenot subjects, which meant that the latter could lawfully resist him and, more importantly, that they had the right to offer their loyalty to a different ruler, more specifically the person of William III.⁵⁵⁵ In the *Politique du clergé* and the *Derniers efforts*, however, no such rights of resistance or annulment of loyalty are offered.

To sum up, Jurieu assigns a central role to the rule of law as the basis of just political procedure. As such, the *Politique du clergé* and the *Derniers efforts* present evidence for Michael Breen’s assertion that even at the height of absolute monarchy—from the late seventeenth century—‘law provided the principal linguistic, cultural, and procedural framework through which individuals and corporations articulated, contested, and resolved disputes over the allocation of resources, status, authority, and power’.⁵⁵⁶ At the same time, the law had lost its teeth, because there is no repercussion for the ruler who refuses to maintain the law.

Jurieu was not the only seventeenth-century philosopher in whose political theories such a friction between rule of law and absolute domestic sovereignty can be found; Hobbes—whose work Jurieu knew well, expressed a similar tension by advocating a society ordered

⁵⁵³ ‘Tous les jours on rompt des paix & des traitez qui on esté solemnellement jurez, parce que l’interest public le demande’; *ibid.*, pp. 127–128.


⁵⁵⁴ ‘[...] le bien public est la souveraine loi’; *ibid.*, p. 127

⁵⁵⁵ J. Israel, ‘General introduction’, in J. Israel (ed.), *The Anglo–Dutch moment. Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 34–35.

⁵⁵⁶ M. Breen, ‘Patronage, politics, and the “rule of law” in early modern France’, *Journal of the Western Society for French History* 33 (2005), p. 96.

around civil laws, which the sovereign had the duty to publicly promulgate.⁵⁵⁷ But because that very same sovereign had an absolute prerogative, he was not himself subjected to the laws through which he spoke.⁵⁵⁸

However, Jurieu primarily rejects the persecution of the Huguenots not because it is unlawful, but because it is unreasonable—the normative language of reason takes precedence over rule of law. In this regard, Jurieu’s work supports Arlette Jouanna’s observation that the development of absolutism as a political discourse constituted a move away from legal conceptions of political order toward new ideals centered around a ruler’s power to advance the glory of the state and the welfare of its subjects.⁵⁵⁹



6. Pierre Jurieu (1637-1713). Resource: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

⁵⁵⁷ H. Kretzer, *Calvinismus und französische Monarchie im 17. Jahrhundert. Die politische Lehre der Akademien Sedan und Saumur, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Pierre du Moulin, Moyse Amyraut und Pierre Jurieu* (Berlin, 1975), p. 369.

⁵⁵⁸ T. Poole, *Reason of state. Law, prerogative and empire* (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 37–56.

⁵⁵⁹ A. Jouanna, ‘Die Debatte über die absolute Gewalt im Frankreich der Religionskriege’, in R. Asch and H. Duchhardt (eds.), *Der Absolutismus—ein Mythos? Strukturwandel monarchischer Herrschaft* (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 1996), pp. 57–78, esp. p. 76.

Reason of State and the Psychology of Conversion

In order to show the imprudence of the Crown's policy of harassing the Huguenots into conversion, Jurieu developed an elaborate theory of human behavior and the workings of the human mind, which is descriptive rather than proscriptive. Indeed, a considerable part of both the *Politique du clergé* and the *Derniers efforts* are devoted to what can be termed a psychology of religion and conversion. The state's policy of conversion is ineffective and detrimental to the state because it fails to reckon with universal properties of the human soul.

The Parisian begins this sketch by arguing that 'that fear and hope are the two great machines through which one moves the souls'.⁵⁶⁰ To persuade the Huguenots to convert, one should therefore pursue a policy of punishment and rewards. His friend from the countryside agrees that this is a good method, since most people follow a certain religion out of habit rather than conviction:

How many people are of one religion by chance rather than choice, who have no commitment to the religion of their fathers; who stay in it because they were born in it [...]? Having neither piety nor devotion, they care little about what religion they belong to. How many Catholics do you believe we have that are not of the religion of God, but of that of their king, and who would immediately convert, if they were in a state in which we would only give them offices under this condition?⁵⁶¹

Given the superficiality of people's religious convictions, the two judge it to be an effective policy to allow girls to convert at the age of twelve and boys at the age of fourteen, luring them toward the Catholic religion in their search for independence:

You know that at this age the yoke feels heavy to children, because this is the age in which they have to choose a profession, one obliges them to work and one wants them to start moving away from the libertinism of childhood. They do not yet have any love for religion and often they have very little knowledge about it. The yoke of obedience

⁵⁶⁰ '[...] la crainte & l'esperance sont les deux grandes machines par lesquelles on remuë les ames'; Jurieu, *Politique du clergé*, p. 31.

⁵⁶¹ 'Combien y a-t-il de gens qui sont d'une religion par hazard plutôt que par choix; qui n'ont aucune attache à la religion de leurs peres; qui y demeurent par ce qu'ils y sont nez [...]? N'ayant ny pieté, ni devotion, il leur importe peu de quelle religion ils soient. Combien croyez-vous que nous ayons de Catholiques qui ne sont pas de la religion de dieu, mais de celle du roy, & qui changeroient incontinent s'ils étoient dans un estat où l'on ne voulût leur donner les charges qu'a cette condition là?'; *ibid.*, pp. 31–32.

and chastisement is heavy for them, so they only look for a way to relieve themselves of it.⁵⁶²

The Huguenots who eventually join the discussion turn this argument of superficial religiosity around. Indeed, girls who have ‘lost [their] honor’ will look for it again in the strongest party, and ‘want to cover all of their infamy with the veil of conversion’ and punished children will avenge their parents by changing religion.⁵⁶³ But only those whose religion was not upright in the first place will be lost as a result of such pull factors, thereby leading to nothing but a purification of the Reformed party. Those who remain will not succumb to promises and threats.⁵⁶⁴ On the contrary, ‘the human mind stiffens against such force’.⁵⁶⁵ The Huguenot nobleman estimates that not more than one in four converts will truly embrace their new religion:

They have changed out of interest, out of feebleness, out of fear, out of love, or out of some other passion that has caught them by surprise. When the passion has slackened, reason returns, these people are ashamed of their conversion, their conscience reawakens.⁵⁶⁶

The Catholics and the Huguenots also discuss a law which allows judges and other officials to visit people on their deathbeds and encourage them to convert:

With this fine reasoning, they tore the husband from the bed of his wife, the woman out of the arms of her husband, the children from a dying father, the father from his children. When they have no more witnesses, they promise, they menace, they intimidate [...]. One awry word said without intention, pushed by a hot fever [...] which disturbs the judgment, is enough for the parish priest to make him cry out loud, *monsieur; or madame wants to die Catholic* [...]. Our enemies have thus invented a new kind of cruelty, which was unheard of even in the ages of persecutors and martyrs of the Christian religion. If, in those times, one had to live with the religion of the emperors, at least one

⁵⁶² ‘Vous sçavez que c’est dans cet âge que le joug paroît pesant aux enfans : parce que c’est l’âge dans lequel il faut qu’ils fassent choix d’une profession, on les oblige à travailler, & l’on veut qu’ils commencement à revenir du libertinage de l’enfance. Ils n’ont encore aucun amour pour la religion, & souvent ils en ont tres peu de connoissance, le joug de l’obeissance & celuy des châtimens leur estant dur, ils ne cherchent qu’un moyen de le secoürir’; *ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵⁶³ ‘[...] perdu son honneur’; ‘[...] [...] veut covrir toute son infamie du voile de la conversion’; *ibid.*, p. 143.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁵⁶⁵ ‘L’esprit humain se roidit contre ses fortes d’oppositions’; *ibid.*, p. 150.

⁵⁶⁶ ‘Ils ont changé par interest, par legereté, par crainte, par amour, ou par quelque autre passion qui les a surpris. Quand la passion s’est rallentie, la raison revient, [et] ces gens ont honte de leur changement, leur conscience se réveille’; *ibid.*, pp. 158–159.

was allowed to die in the religion of God. Can anything in the world be more cruel? A poor sick person is struggling with death, he needs all his strength to fight it, and all the calmness of his mind to oppose the fears that appear before the last moment of his life [...]. He consoles himself by giving the last sighs in the arms of his wife and children [...]. He has no more strength than to die and has to do something he could hardly do if he had all the strength of his health [...]. He must respond to them, weigh their words, he must avoid the pitfalls laid before him through ambiguous interrogation. He must sustain the shock of threats and the weight of authority.⁵⁶⁷

It is important to note that Jurieu does not in any way frame this story with confessional truth claims, nor does he make martyrs out of the people who suffer this fate. The interlocutors analyze the impact of state policy on the human mind, not on the Protestant mind. This is made explicit when the discussants refer to the Roman emperors who persecuted the early Christians. The Parisian protests against the comparison, arguing that ‘it is a crime to persecute the true religion, but it is a work of great merit to extirpate heresy’.⁵⁶⁸ The Huguenot gentleman responds that ‘there is not a single person [...] who is not convinced of being of the right religion’.⁵⁶⁹ Moreover, he reminds the Catholics that they are investigating the policy ‘according to the rules of politics’ rather than religious truth.⁵⁷⁰

In this discussion about the natural response of human beings to persecution, the author unproblematically refers to non-Christian victims of state terror. Jurieu cites at length from the *De Rebus Emmanuelis* by the humanist bishop Jerónimo Osório (1506–1580) on the

⁵⁶⁷ ‘Avec ce beau raisonnement [...] on arrache le mary du lit de sa femme, la femme des bras de son mary, les enfans d’auprès d’un pere mourant, un pere d’auprès de ses enfans. Quand on n’a plus de témoins, on promet, on menace, on intimide [...]. Un mot de travers dit sans intention, poussé par une fièvre chaude, & qui trouble le jugement, suffit à monsieur le Curé pour le faire crier à haute voix, *monsieur, ou madame veut mourir Catholique* [...]. Nos ennemis ont inventé cela une nouvelle espece de cruauté qui a esté inouïe, même dans les siecles des persecuteurs & des martyrs de la religion chrétienne. S’il falloit vivre en ce temps-là de la religion des empereurs, au moins estoit-il permis de mourir de la religion de Dieu. Peut-on rien au monde concevoir de plus cruel? Un pauvre malade est aux prises avec la mort, il a besoin de toutes ces forces pour la combattre, & de toute la tranquillité de son esprit pour l’opposer aux terreurs qui marchent devant ce dernier moment de la vie [...]. Il se console en rendant les derniers soupirs entre les bras de sa femme & des enfans [...] Là-dessus on voit entrer un magistrat suivi de tout le clergé d’une paroisse [...]. Il n’avoit plus de force que pour mourir, & il faut qu’il fasse ce qu’à peine pourroit il faire s’il avoit toutes les forces de sa santé [...]. Il faut qu’il réponde, qu’il étudie ses paroles : il faut qu’il évite les pieges qu’on luy tend par des interrogations ambiguës : il faut qu’il soustienne le choc des menaces & le poids de l’autorité’; *ibid.*, pp. 60–63

⁵⁶⁸ ‘C’est un crime de persecuter la veritable religion, mais c’est un œuvre de grand merite d’extirper l’heresie’; Jurieu, *Politique du clergé*, p. 178.

⁵⁶⁹ ‘Il n’y a point d’homme [...] qui ne soit persuadé qu’il est dans la bonne religion’; *ibid.*, p. 179.

⁵⁷⁰ ‘[...] selon les regles de la politique’; *ibid.*

reign of Manuel I of Portugal, who took away the children of Jews and Muslims to raise them as Christians:⁵⁷¹

This could not be done without causing terrible agitations in the minds. It was a frightful spectacle to see children torn away from their mother's breast, and wrenched from the arms of the fathers [...]. They maltreated the fathers and the mothers, and beat them with clubs to make them let go. From all sides the air resounded with horrible cries, and the women shouted cries and wailings that pierced the sky. Many among the miserable fathers were so touched by the atrocity of this deed, that they threw their children in wells and many others passed to the degree of desperation and fury that they killed themselves'.⁵⁷²

Indeed, within this framework, suicide is not portrayed as a mortal sin, but as something that people can be naturally driven to. The Huguenot nobleman brings the news of two girls who, having converted under pressure in Montpellier, regretted this so much that they killed themselves, an act that he judges to be 'the natural consequences of the declarations they procure against us'.⁵⁷³ Even murdering one's children is portrayed as natural if people are driven to extremities:

We can be silent where nature speaks. It is the greatest of all cruelties to bereave a father and a mother of their children. It is a wrench which pain cannot be expressed. In one word, it is a treatment unheard of in the century of tortures and massacres. You will see things that will surprise and horrify you. Motherly tenderness, religious sentiments, and anger mixed together are a compound capable of producing terrible deeds. And I fear you will see examples of fury similar to that of the Jews, who, seeing that they wanted to take away their children to baptize them, took them and hurled themselves to death with them [...]. It is a new kind of torture, which will devastate France more than the massacres of the last century have done. Where is the African and cannibal heart which is able to sustain the view of these mothers, who are bathed in tears, who will also in their blood, will tear out their hair, [...] [and] cry after those who take away their children'.⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁷¹ J. Osório, *De Rebus Emmanuelis Regis Lusitaniae Inulctissimi Virtute et Auspicio, annis sex, ac viginti, domi forisque gestis, libri duodecim* (Cologne, 1581).

⁵⁷² 'Ce qui ne se pût faire sans causer de terribles agitations dans les esprits. Ce fut un spectacle affreux de voir tirer les enfans du sein de leurs meres, & de les voir arracher des bras des peres [...]. On maltraitoit les peres & les meres, & on les frappoit à coups de bâton pour leur faire lâcher prise. De tous côtez l'air retentissoit de cris effroyables, & les femmes pousoient des clameurs & des plaintes qui perçoient jusqu'au ciel. Plusieurs d'entre ces miserables peres furent si touchez de l'atrocité de cette action, qu'ils jetterent leurs enfans dans des puits : & beaucoup d'autres passerent jusqu'à ce degré de desespoir & de fureur, que de se donner la mort à eux-mêmes'; Jurieu, *Derniers efforts*, pp. 87–88.

⁵⁷³ '[...] les suites naturelles des declarations que l'on obtient contre nous'; *ibid.*, pp. 66–67.

⁵⁷⁴ '[...] l'on se peut taire où la nature parle [...]. C'est la plus grande de toutes les cruautés que de ravir à un père & à une mere leurs enfans : c'est un déchirement dont la douleur ne se peut exprimer. En un mot c'est un

Jurieu's strategy of approaching persecution from the perspective of human nature finally allows him to return to the question of resistance from a different angle. By forcing people to extremes, the court's policy of persecution is bound to backfire and could well usher in a new period of civil warfare in France. However, rather than to approach resistance as a right of the people if they are attacked by their sovereign, Jurieu reevaluates it as an unavoidable consequence of pushing people to extremities. Instead of justifying resistance from a legal point of view—the normative language of rule of law—he portrays it as a human trait—the normative language of humanity—, explicitly differentiating it from a right. He argues that people will inevitably begin to resist the authorities, while explicitly distinguishing it from their right to do so:

When a state conceals in its entrails two million malcontents [...] it is in danger of feeling terrible movements. [...] What persuades me that these movements would not be favorable to the Reformed is that God has never blessed such designs, to defend a religion with arms, to rise up against one's prince, and to make war under the pretext of piety. Because the furies of civil war are absolutely incompatible with charity. [...] These impatient who take up arms act against the principles of religion, and against those of their religion in particular, I avow. [...] They would be massacred by the people and the arms of their sovereign. The king would certainly master them, but he would have the pain of seeing his country bathed in the blood of his subjects.⁵⁷⁵

Despite their contemporary success, historians have paid limited attention to the *Politique du clergé* and the *Derniers efforts*. Most students of the political culture of the Huguenot diaspora

traitement dont on ne s'estoit pas avisé dans le siecle des supplices & des massacres. [...]. Verrez-vous des choses là-dessus qui vous surprendront, & qui vous seront horreur. La tendresse maternelle, les sentiments de religion, & la colere mêlées ensemble sont un composé capable de produire des actions terribles. Et je crains que vous ne voyez des exemples de fureur semblables à celuy de ces Juïves, qui voyant qu'on leur vouloit ravir leurs enfans pour les baptiser, les prenoient & se precipitoient avec eux [...]. C'est un genre de supplice tout nouveau, qui desertera plus la France que n'ont fait tous les massacres du siecle passé [...]. Où est le cœur Africain & cannibale qui pourra soutenir la vûe de ces meres, qui baignées de larmes, se baigneront encore de leur sang, s'arracheront les cheveux, [...] [et] crieront après ceux qui leur enleveront leurs enfans'; *ibid.*, pp. 79–80.

⁵⁷⁵ Quand un etat cache dans ses entrailles deux millions de mécontents [...], il est en peril de sentir de terribles mouvemens. [...] Ce qui me persuade que ces mouvemens ne seroient point favorables aux reformez, c'est que Dieu ne benit jamais ce dessein, de défendre une religion par les armes, de se soulever contre son prince, & de faire la guerre sous un pretexte de pieté : car les fureurs de la guerre civile sont absolument incompatibles avec la charité. Ces emportez & ces impatiens en prenant les armes agiroient contre les principes de la religion, & contre ceux de leur religion en particulier, je l'avoüe, ils ne reüssiroient pas, ils se seroient massacres par les peuples & par les armes de leur souverain. Ils seroient occasion de faire perir avec eux des millions d'innocens, comme il est arrivé autrefois. Le roy seroit assurément le maître ; mais il auroit la douleur de voir son país baigné du sang de ses sujets'; *ibid.*, pp. 33–34.

have focused on the period after the Edict of Fontainebleau. This makes sense if we look at the quantity of works produced before and after October 1685; as we will see in Chapter 4, the Revocation was met with a flood of publications by Huguenot and non-Huguenot thinkers who tried to make sense of the enormous disruption caused by the prohibition of the Reformed religion. By comparison, the few pamphlets published in the first half of the 1680s tend to pale into insignificance.

Quantity apart, intellectual historians have argued that the Revocation caused a shift in Huguenot political theory from uncompromising absolutism to social contract theory. Between the last Huguenot uprising—which was famously crushed by Cardinal Richelieu in the siege of La Rochelle—in 1628 and the renewed persecution of the 1680s, Huguenot subjects had come to argue that the monarch was the sole protector of their religious privileges and the only rampart against their domestic enemies—most notably the French clergy.⁵⁷⁶ Huguenot political theory was correspondingly dominated by a staunch defense of divine right absolutism; absolute loyalty to the monarch's will served to transcend the confessional divide.⁵⁷⁷ When Louis XIV simply denied the existence of Reformed subjects in October 1685, this position became extremely difficult to maintain, leading to a shift from absolutism back to the sort of contract theory that the Reformed had developed during the wars of religion. Myriam Yardeni summarizes that

after the failure of the sentimental and quasi-mystical arguments of fidelity, [...] rationalism gained the upper hand, and, with it, there came a scarcely disguised return to monarchomach theories. The Edict of Nantes was for Protestant polemicists no longer a privilege conceded by the king. One pamphlet explained that it was 'a treaty given the form of a law', and that it was 'only necessary to read the preamble to this Edict to be convinced that it is in effect a treaty that Henri IV made with our fathers'.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁶ T. Hochstrasser, 'The claims of conscience. Natural law theory, obligation, and resistance in the Huguenot diaspora', in J. Laursen (ed.), *New essays on the political thought of the Huguenots of the Refuge* (Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1995), pp. 17–18; M. Yardeni, 'French Calvinist political thought, 1543–1715', in Prestwich (ed.), *International Calvinism*, pp. 328–329; E. Labrousse, 'The political ideas of the Huguenot diaspora (Bayle and Jurieu)', in R. Golden (ed.), *Church, state, and society under the Bourbon kings of France* (Lawrence, KS, 1982), pp. 222–223; G. Dodge, *The political theory of the Huguenots of the dispersion* (New York, 1947), pp. 5–7.

⁵⁷⁷ Hochstrasser, 'Claims of conscience', pp. 18–19.

⁵⁷⁸ Yardeni, 'French Calvinist political thought', p. 331.

In terms of the theoretical framework adopted in this study, we might say that Yardeni notices a shift in Huguenot argument from the normative principle of sovereignty to the normative principles of reason and rule of law.

In the historiography of this shift in political languages, Jurieu has usually been portrayed as a central representative of post-Revocation contract theory. From 1686, he combined this with a stance against religious tolerance and bold prophesying, as will be scrutinized in Chapters 4 and 5. Indeed, the theologian would famously defend popular sovereignty against his colleague and former friend Pierre Bayle, who remained a steadfast supporter of uncompromising absolutism and religious tolerance. Their polemic on this matter has often been regarded as the main political debate of the Huguenot Refuge.⁵⁷⁹ Those who have studied Jurieu's pre-Revocation works have mainly done so in search early signs of his later political theory.⁵⁸⁰ Most notably, Jurieu's twentieth-century biographer Frederick Knetsch has contended that one can already recognize anti-absolutist principles in the *Politique du clergé* and the *Derniers efforts*. This supports his conclusion that the pastor's political philosophy did not fundamentally change after his flight from France.⁵⁸¹

It is quite possible that around the time of his flight to the Dutch Republic Jurieu already came to think of political society as based on an initial contract between people and ruler. However, what makes the *Politique du clergé* and the *Derniers efforts* so interesting is that, in these, Jurieu failed or refused to offer a social contract theory against absolutism. Instead, we have seen that the author carefully navigated between the normative principles of sovereignty—in the form of uncompromising absolutism—and rule of law—which served as a legal foothold for the position of the Reformed, without regarding them as opposites. Jurieu did so by judging the French court's policy on the basis of another normative principle: reason. Whether a certain policy was reasonable, in turn, depended on whether it took the universal properties of humanity into account. In other words, the sovereign enjoyed absolute sovereignty, but reason dictated that he would follow the rule of law and not push his subjects to such psychological extremes that they would naturally, though unjustly, revolt. By describing the psychology of

⁵⁷⁹ Hochstrasser, 'Claims of conscience', pp. 22–23.

⁵⁸⁰ See also M. van der Lugt, *Bayle, Jurieu, and the Dictionnaire historique et critique* (Oxford, 2016); J. Howells, *Pierre Jurieu. Antinomian radical* (Durham, 1983).

⁵⁸¹ Knetsch, *Pierre Jurieu*, appendix.

forced conversion, he shifted the conversation from what subjects were allowed to do (nothing) to what human being would inevitably do (turn to violence).

Conclusion

Two factors severely hampered the development of publicity for the Huguenots in the early 1680s. First, the victims were still pleading with Louis XIV to revert his policies. Their strategy to redeem their sovereign's grace was based almost entirely on an argument of absolute loyalty. An international publicity campaign to put external pressure on the Sun King would not support this argument. As we have discussed in Chapter 1, to seek attention through print media was considered less problematic than to seek direct contact with foreign governments. Yet it was not considered to be entirely unproblematic either. As long as there was no full communication breakdown with the monarch, it was not a self-evident political strategy to involve foreign authorities through publicity. Jurieu's turn to the printing press was an exception, but his argumentation was in service of the same project, to be tolerated again. Constructing a religious narrative about one's predicament would not serve this purpose; the people that had to be convinced were Catholics, not Protestants. Jurieu thus gave an intricate explanation of why France's Huguenot subjects should be tolerated, with recourse to a complex argument about how the normative orders of sovereignty, rule of law, reason, and humanity depended on each other—not as an ideal, but in reality.

Second, the Dutch authorities were opposed to the production of printed opinion about the persecution. The United Provinces' political landscape was divided and relations with France were fickle and contested. But initially none of the contesting political parties was ready for an open confrontation with Louis XIV, which could be triggered through the production of anti-French printed news media. Orangists first had to persuade the other domestic factions of their case against France. Sermons, a medium through which one could target more specific audiences, were a safer way to do so than defamatory pamphlets. Printed copies of the Sun King's anti-Huguenot decrees—and other forms of 'objective' printed evidence, served as a

safe alternative; they did not argue against anything, but nevertheless imprinted the issue of the Huguenot persecution in the reader's mind.

Helmer Helmers has recently demonstrated that there was a tight Anglo-Dutch discursive sphere during the English Civil War. Chapters 4 and 5 will show that much of the public opinion produced after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes also constituted an international public sphere. The events of the early 1680s show us, however, that these discursive spheres did not always cross borders. The appropriation of fate of the Huguenots to discuss domestic politics in England were useful neither to Statists nor Orangists. We have thus found little evidence that the English press influenced the Dutch. In other words, the Anglo-Dutch sphere, once established, was not an ever-present factor.

When news about the Huguenots did begin to play a modest role in the pamphlet war of 1683-84, it was within the boundaries of the Dutch public sphere. The persecution was used to argue that in the face of French expansionism, the normative orders of religion and reason (of state) were inseparable and could only be pursued simultaneously, against the Statist party which viewed relations with France only through latter normative principle. Again, we see that Dutch pamphleteers appropriated the news to bring a confessional argument to a domestic dispute. Whereas the persecuted Huguenots deconfessionalized their predicament, Dutch Orangists reconfessionalized it. Confessional argumentation did not, however, necessarily revolve around religious truth claims, as has been made clear by distinguishing between the normative languages of confessional truth and confessional solidarity. In fact, we will see that one of main points of discussion in printed media responding to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, was whether Europe's religious polarization could be understood by looking up to the heavens, or whether more worldly problems lay at its cause.

