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## Religious Persecution and Transnational Compassion in the Dutch Vernacular Press 1655-1745

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# Introduction

We are [...] in a world in which power figures and reconfigures; in which human artifice must struggle with human necessities; in which notions of justice, freedom, compassion, and autonomy, authority, legitimacy, security, and force animate, constrain and enable human beings in each and every arena within which they engage with one another.

- Jean Bethke Elshtain (1995)<sup>1</sup>

At the turn of the eighteenth century Amsterdam was a gateway to the world in more than one sense. Not only did the city have one of Europe's biggest ports from which ships sailed to all corners of the known world, it was also home to about 150 printers and booksellers, who produced and sold all sorts of literature covering what was going on beyond the borders of the Dutch Republic.<sup>2</sup> One of these printers was Johannes Douci, whose shop was well situated on a junction of the busy Singel, not far from Dam Square, the city's beating heart. Customers browsing the shop's stock in 1714 were likely to stumble upon a small book called *Verhaal der tormenten die men de gereformeerde, welke op de galeyen van Vrankryk zyn, heeft doen ondergaan* (*Story of the torments inflicted upon the Reformed on the galleys of France*), written by the Frenchman Jean-François Bion [Fig. 1]. In case the title did not immediately attract potential readers, the cover further explained why they should buy the work: it had been translated from French into Dutch for the 'common good, but especially for those who take the oppression of Zion to heart'.<sup>3</sup>

In *Verhaal der tormenten*, Bion, a former priest from the village of Urcy near Dijon, shared with the world his experiences aboard *La Superbe*, a royal galley from Marseille, on which he had been chaplain since 1703.<sup>4</sup> Yet most of the *forçats*, the galley slaves who formed the majority

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<sup>1</sup> J. Bethke Elshtain, 'International politics and political theory', in K. Booth and S. Smith (eds.), *International relations theory today* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> J. Gruys and C. de Wolf, *Thesaurus 1473–1800. Nederlandse boekdrukkers en boekverkoopers* (Utrecht, 1989); Gruys and De Wolf count 146 active printers in the year 1700.

<sup>3</sup> 'Tot algemeene nuttigheyt, maer insonderheyt voor die geene die Sions verdruckinge ter herte gaet'; J.-F. Bion, *Verhaal der tormenten die men de gereformeerde, welke op de gallyen van Vrankryk zyn, heeft doen ondergaan* (Amsterdam, 1714), p. 1; all translations of primary and secondary literature in this work are the author's.

<sup>4</sup> For more biographical information on Bion see P. Conlon, *Jean-François Bion et sa relation des tourments soufferts par les forçats protestants* (Geneva, 1966), pp. 13–56.

of the ship's crew, were not fellow Catholics. Over half of them were Huguenots from the Cévennes, a mountainous region in south-eastern France that was plagued by a destructive religious civil war against the Crown.<sup>5</sup> The other galley slaves included Turks, deserters, highwaymen, and peasant smugglers. Bion describes the horrendous circumstances on board, where the slaves were reduced to a life of beatings, rotting food, and physical labor so arduous that it quickly ruined their health. One Sunday, after the chaplain had sung Mass, the *comitre*—commander of the slave crew—ordered that the Huguenots were to receive a foot whipping, as punishment for refusing to kneel to the Holy Sacrament. Struck by guilt and pity, Bion realized that the men endured their fate solely for having chosen to obey God rather than men. In a dramatic reversal of roles, the priest converted to the Reformed religion and fled to Geneva.<sup>6</sup>

The refugee's account of the enslavement of Huguenot rebels, engulfed in a religious war against their sovereign Louis XIV, reminds us that sixty years after the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), Europe had not shaken off the specter of religious violence. It used to be a common trope among historians that the Peace of Westphalia (1648) marked the final end of Europe's wars of religion, which had plagued large parts of the continent for four generations. Today, the idea remains widespread among political scientists. Eric Hanson, for one, contended in his 2006 book *Religion and politics in the international system today* that 'the West chose secularism in response to religious war within the society', but that 'Islam did not have a Thirty Years War'.<sup>7</sup> In 2013, Monica Soft similarly argued in the *Oxford handbook of religion and violence* that 'because Islam had no 'Thirty Years' War, the Islamic world did not inherit the West's now instinctive rejection of the idea that violence in the name of religion enhance's one's religious credibility'.<sup>8</sup> The fate of the Cévennes Huguenots exemplifies, however, that the secularization of politics that such researchers believe to have come in Westphalia's wake

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<sup>5</sup> The War of the Camisards (1702–05) is extensively discussed in Chapter 4.

<sup>6</sup> Conlon, *Jean-François Bion*, p. 26; Bion does not describe his flight to Geneva.

<sup>7</sup> E. Hanson, *Religion and politics in the international system today* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 107; citation taken from W. Palaver, H. Rudolph, and D. Regensburger, 'Introduction', in W. Palaver, H. Rudolph, and D. Regensburger (eds.), *The European wars of religion. An interdisciplinary reassessment of sources, interpretations, and myths* (Abingdon, NY, 2016), p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> M. Toft, 'Religion and political violence', in M. Juergensmeyer, M. Kitts, and M. Jerryson (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of religion and violence* (New York, 2013), p. 340; citation taken from Palaver, Rudolph, and Regensburger, 'Introduction', pp. 1–2.

was a rocky road at best; between ca. 1650 and 1750 Europe continued to witness a considerable number of religious uprisings and devastating persecutions of confessional minorities at the hands of their sovereigns.

There was, moreover, a genuine interest in information about religious persecutions among different strata of early modern society, and writers and publishers were keen to meet this, even if rulers, by contrast, often tried to manage or contain information about the religious conflicts within their realms.<sup>9</sup> Despite their attempts to monopolize public political communication through censorship, monarchs had few means to stop the *foreign* press from covering their persecutory measures. In the wealthy and urbanized but politically decentralized Dutch Republic especially, printers found a relatively comfortable climate in which to produce foreign news and public opinion for both domestic and foreign audiences. By the mid-seventeenth century, the United Provinces had achieved a steady reputation as one of the dominant hubs of the European news market. Throughout the continent political writers knew of it as a literary safe haven, a ‘Mecca of authors’.<sup>10</sup> In 1722 Voltaire, for one, praised Amsterdam to his mistress as ‘storehouse of the universe’.<sup>11</sup>

Bion, too, initially published his work outside France. Living in exile in England, the convert first had his work printed in London in 1708. As a pamphleteer he must have hoped that it would not take long before his account of the *forçats* would also pour from the presses in one of the Dutch merchant cities across the North Sea. And indeed, *Verhaal der tormenten* was an international success. After the first edition in French it was soon translated into English, Dutch, and German;<sup>12</sup> and seven years after the first Dutch edition Douci still saw enough potential in the story to publish it again.<sup>13</sup> In the century after the Peace of Westphalia,

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<sup>9</sup> For a comparative analysis of governmental censorship practices see M. Griesse, ‘Frühneuzeitliche Revolten als Kommunikationsereignisse. Die Krise des 17. Jahrhunderts als Produkt der Medienrevolution’ (unpublished Habilitationsschrift, 2015).

<sup>10</sup> J. Marshall, *John Locke, toleration and early Enlightenment culture* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 157.

<sup>11</sup> Letter from Voltaire to Madame la Présidente de Bernières, 7 October 1722, in J.–J. Tourneisen (ed.), *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire*, vol. 7 (Basel, 1788), p. 20; a long-overdue comprehensive study of the Dutch Republic’s booktrade was published in 2019 by Andrew Pettegree and Arthur der Weduwen. Unfortunately, their findings came too late to be incorporated in this study: A. Pettegree and A. der Weduwen, *The bookshop of the world. Making and trading books in the Dutch Golden Age* (New Haven, CT, and London, 2019).

<sup>12</sup> For a list of all editions see Conlon, *Jean-François Bion*, pp. 57–66.

<sup>13</sup> J.–F. Bion, *Verhaal der tormenten die men de gereformeerde, welke op de galejen van Vrankryk zyn, heeft doen ondergaan* (Amsterdam, 1721).

numerous newspapers, pamphlets, and periodicals originating in the Dutch Republic continued to confront news consumers throughout Europe with the persecution of religious minorities. Together with their counterparts in other printing hubs, such as London, Hamburg, and Berlin, Dutch printers repeatedly turned the plight of foreign communities into international causes célèbres. Yet to inform and affect their audiences, early modern opinion makers had to answer a fundamental question which we still grapple with in our own times: *Why should we care about distant suffering?*

*Verhaal der tormenten* demonstrates that even individual authors developed different answers to that question. On the one hand, Bion tells a typical story about persecution and religious truth. The convert's account of spiritual steadfastness in a life of hopeless suffering, and his religious enlightenment that was its consequence, must have struck a sensitive chord among a Reformed readership. People who lived close enough to Europe's theological front lines had been confronted with similar stories for almost two hundred years. Narratives about religious minorities who suffered at the hands of their sovereign had been part and parcel of the propaganda wars surrounding the Protestant Reformations as well as the Catholic Counter-Reformation. For all the deep religious divisions, apologists on all sides of the confessional divide agreed that God's Church was a persecuted church. *Verhaal der tormenten* shows that this genre had not lost currency by the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, Bion also used a much more secular language of compassion. In the preface, he warns his readers that he will not only discuss the fate of the Reformed but pay attention to the other *forçats* as well.<sup>14</sup> He elaborates on poor peasants on the galley who had resorted to smuggling salt to feed their families.<sup>15</sup> Readers learned about deserters who, while guilty of an inexcusable crime, could not but incite pity as 'young men, who have been raised tenderly in the arms of their parents, [who] live [...] a life a hundred times more cruel than death'.<sup>16</sup> Bion also gives ample attention to the Turks whom he describes as men who, like all enslaved people, continued to long for their freedom. The author even praises them for taking good care of one another and for the faithfulness they showed toward their religion, even

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<sup>14</sup> Bion, *Verhaal der tormenten*, p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24.

<sup>16</sup> 'Jonge menschen die tederlyk opgevoet zynde in d'armen hunner Ouders [die] een leeven [...] lyden, hondertmaal wreder als de doot'; *ibid.*, p. 24.

refusing to relieve their pain with wine.<sup>17</sup> In other words, Catholic peasants and Muslim Turks also invoked pity, despite their utter religious otherness. They are portrayed as fellow human beings, with human desires for freedom, affection, and companionship, and therefore worthy of the reader's sympathy. Bion, hence, used two languages of compassion, encouraging his readers to identify with the *forçats* in different ways.

What was Bion trying to tell his audience and how should we locate his double appeal to religious and human empathy in history? Recent studies on the deep history of human rights have greatly enhanced our understanding of 'common humanity' as a political norm. In her path-breaking 2008 study *Inventing human rights*, Lynn Hunt traced its genealogy to the mid-eighteenth-century proliferation of the novel. Hunt has contended that by reading about the inner lives of characters who were often very different from themselves, people learned to identify and sympathize with others across sex, class, confession, and other social boundaries. The printed encouragement of psychological identification with unfamiliar individuals thus laid 'the foundations for a new social and political order', one that saw 'ordinary secular life as the foundation of morality'.<sup>18</sup>

Was Bion simply ahead of his time, as one of history's many mavericks who formulated revolutionary ideas before they reached wider acceptance? Not necessarily: In Hunt's wake historians have started to trace the normative history of common humanity further back in time. Recent studies have shown that already in the sixteenth century different developments turned the question of mankind's unity into a pressing political concern: Mihai Grigore has demonstrated that from the sixteenth century onwards humanist scholars began to assign intrinsic political and ethical value to humanity; human qualities of solidarity, organization, and political life did not depend on being Christian but came to be regarded as natural traits common to all.<sup>19</sup> John Headley and Mariano Delgado have shown that encounters between Europeans and indigenous Americans shaped the concept of have shown that already in the sixteenth century different developments turned the question of mankind's unity into a

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 19–20.

<sup>18</sup> L. Hunt, *Inventing human rights. A history* (New York, 2008), pp. 38, 57.

<sup>19</sup> M.–D. Grigore, 'Humanism and humanitas. The transition from the humanitas christiana to humanitas politica in the political writings of Erasmus', in F. Klose and M. Thulin (eds.), *Humanity. A history of European concepts in practice from the sixteenth century to the present* (Göttingen, 2016), pp. 73–90.

pressing political concern: Mihai Grigore has demonstrated that from the sixteenth century century onwards humanist scholars began to assign intrinsic political and ethical value to humanity; human qualities of solidarity, organization, and political life did not depend on being Christian but came to be regarded as natural traits common to all.<sup>20</sup>

**Verhaal der Tormenten**  
 Die men de  
**GEREFORMEERDE,**  
 Welke op de  
**GALLYEN van VRANKRYK**

zyn, heeft doen ondergaan,

Beschreven in 't Frans,

Door **J E A N B I O N,**

Gewesene Priester tot Urfy, naderhand Aelmoe-  
 fenier op de Gally genaamt de Hoogmoet.

Welk in duyts is overgeset tot algemeene  
 nuttigheit, maer insonderheit voor die geene  
 die Sions verdruckinge ter herte gaet en daar  
 aan mede deel nemen,

Waar by nogh gevoegt zyn eenige brieven van en  
 aan de verdruckte broeders op de Gallyen.



Tot **A M S T E R D A M,**

By **J O H A N N E S D O U C I,** Boekverkoper,  
 op de Singel, by de Gasthuys Moolen-steeg. 1714.

1. J. Bion, *Verhaal der tormenten die men de gereformeerde, welke op de gallyen van Vrankryk zyn, heeft doen ondergaan* (Amsterdam, 1714). Resource: Special Collections, University of Amsterdam.

<sup>20</sup> M.-D. Grigore, 'Humanism and humanitas. The transition from the humanitas christiana to humanitas politica in the political writings of Erasmus', in F. Klose and M. Thulin (eds.), *Humanity. A history of European concepts in practice from the sixteenth century to the present* (Göttingen, 2016), pp. 73–90.

John Headley and Mariano Delgado have shown that encounters between Europeans and indigenous Americans shaped the concept of common humanity as a political argument.<sup>21</sup> A case in point is Bartolomé de las Casas, who around 1550 rejected the cruel treatment and subjugation of the native population of America, arguing that ‘all people in the world are humans’.<sup>22</sup> Headley has also insisted that the Protestant Reformation was pivotal for the development of humanity as a political norm. After the shattering of the *corpus Christianum* in the Reformation and the destructive religious wars that came in its wake, political theorists began to look beyond religion as a basis of community, and some—the most well known being Hugo Grotius—found this basis in natural human sociability.<sup>23</sup>

What these different historiographical narratives share is that they all—to varying degrees of explicitness—contrast the development of ‘common humanity’ with a moral political order based on religion. Human rights historiography either describes how the concept took form through a gradual disentangling from religion, or it approaches it as an explicit *alternative* to religious norms.<sup>24</sup> In other words, the rise of humanity as a foundation of morality is approached in terms of political secularization. By political secularization I mean, to paraphrase John Somerville, the separation of political language ‘from religious associations or ecclesiastical direction’.<sup>25</sup>

To be sure, students of early modern political secularization usually approach the concept not in terms of a decline in religious belief—as Max Weber still did in his seminal secularization theory—but as a differentiation of political and religious norms.<sup>26</sup> Besides common humanity, there are several other normative principles that are associated with

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<sup>21</sup> J. Headley, *The Europeanization of the world* (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, 2008), esp. pp. 63–148; M. Delgado, “‘All people have reason and free will’”. The controversy over the nature of the Indians in the sixteenth century’, in Klose and Thulin (eds.), *Humanity*, pp. 91–106; see also A. Pagden, *The fall of natural man. The American Indian and the origins of comparative ethnology* (Cambridge, 1982), esp. pp. 119–145; see also P. Stamatov, *The origins of global humanitarianism* (Cambridge, 2013).

<sup>22</sup> Quotation taken from Delgado, “‘All people have reason’”, p. 93.

<sup>23</sup> Headley, *Europeanization of the world*, pp. 75–79; C. McKeogh, ‘Grotius and the civilian’, in E. Charters, E. Rosenhaft, and H. Smith (eds.), *Civilians and war in Europe, 1618–1815* (Liverpool, 2012), pp. 37–38.

<sup>24</sup> The political theorist Carl Schmitt famously argued that ‘all the quintessential concepts of the theory of the modern state are secularized theological concepts’; quotation taken from P. Ifergan, ‘Cutting to the chase. Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on political theology and secularization’, *New German Critique* 111 (2010), 150.

<sup>25</sup> C. Somerville, *The secularization of early modern England. From religious culture to religious faith* (New York and Oxford, 1992), p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> See J. Eastwood and N. Prevelakis, ‘Nationalism, religion, and secularization. An opportune moment for research’, *Review of Religious Research* 52–1 (2010), pp. 90–111.

political secularization. As will be discussed in more detail below, we can distinguish four secular normative principles in early modern historiography: (1) sovereignty, (2) rule of law, and (3) reason, and (4) humanity. And as in human rights historiography, there is a tendency to argue that modern secular languages replaced a premodern religious language.

As *longue durée* observations, these secularization theses have significant analytical value. Indeed, few historians would deny that between 1650 and 1750 European societies developed new political norms that were (largely) separate from the religious sphere. However, we should be careful not to assume that the rise of new political languages led to the disappearance of ‘old’ ones. Bion’s pamphlet suggests that opinion makers were comfortable in using a mixture of both religious and secular languages. This study hypothesizes that the four different normative principles briefly outlined above—and discussed at length below—all constitute valid analyses of the main ideological languages of Europe’s political landscape. But if we want to understand when and why people living in early modern times actually referred to such principles, we need to study how they related to each other. For this, religious conflicts provide excellent test cases.

Nevertheless, scholarly attention to early modern news media concerned with religious persecution is remarkably scarce. One reason for this may be that because historians argued that large-scale religious violence had ended by 1648, they have treated instances of persecution after this date as historical anomalies, irrelevant disturbances within the larger narrative of political modernization. Whether contemporaries indeed considered them as anomalies, however, is a question that still awaits an answer. Several historians have studied the political communication surrounding individual episodes of religious persecution after Westphalia, but they have not looked beyond their cases in search of a bigger picture.<sup>27</sup>

For this reason, there are two important strands of historiography that largely fail to communicate. On the one hand, we find the grand narratives of secularization and modernization, which pay little attention to the persistence of religious persecution. On the other hand, there are much more nuanced case studies of political communication, but within short time frames. Some of these works do position themselves in relation to these grand

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<sup>27</sup> Most of these works will be referred to throughout the chapters of this book.

narratives.<sup>28</sup> Microhistories like Benjamin Kaplan's *Cunegonde's kidnapping*, in which he meticulously describes a local religious conflict in 1762, are useful reminders that the broad strokes of secularization and modernization often fail to describe the complexity on the ground. At the same time, case studies usually fail to account for change beyond an inductive demonstration of persistence.

This study tries to combine these two approaches. It analyses international printed engagement with persecuted minorities in Europe between ca. 1650 and 1750, by investigating and comparing a range of case studies. Rather than establish when exactly 'common humanity' and other secular arguments began to emerge in history—or to prove that they did not—it examines how opinion makers used religious and secular normative principles to make sense of specific topical events. By comparing the public communication and evaluation of different events, this study charts and explains the shifts in the use of normative principles underpinning Europe's domestic and international order over the course of a century.

I will investigate how different forms of printed news media, mainly pamphlets, newspapers, and periodicals, brought distant suffering close. This study scrutinizes these media on three different levels. It asks, first, which normative principles were used to communicate religious persecution in a period that is often approached in terms of secularization. Second, it identifies which stakeholders were engaged in the international production of topical persecution literature and examines who they believed to be their audience; one might expect that preachers, for instance, would usually give religious meaning to news about the persecution of brethren in the faith whereas political officeholders might be more inclined to provide a secular evaluation. Whether this was actually the case, however, is a question that begs to be answered. Finally, tying in with the nascent historiography of early modern 'public diplomacy', this study explores the role which topical persecution literature hoped to play in domestic and international politics.

To understand how, when, and why people turned to the printing press to inform the world about the fate of persecuted people, this study will focus on works published in the United Provinces, which by the seventeenth century had become Europe's most versatile and

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<sup>28</sup> A recent example is Benjamin Kaplan's fascinating work on a border region in the Dutch Republic, B. Kaplan, *Cunegonde's kidnapping. A story of religious conflict in the age of Enlightenment* (New Haven and London 2014).

prolific hub of the printed word. Dutch printers were avid producers of printed opinion about religious violence, matched, perhaps, only by the English—who would merit a study of their own. If an early modern opinion maker wanted to advocate his or her cause in front of a large European audience, the Dutch press was often the preferred choice. Not only did the Dutch have an impressive market share in the international production of printed opinion, they were also an eager audience, for reasons that will be explained in detail below. If the opinion maker in question first turned elsewhere, as Bion did, there was still a good chance that, before long, Dutch or French editions would be produced in the United Provinces. In short, bringing distant suffering close often meant bringing it to the Dutch Republic.

### *The Imperative to Justify*

While making occasional references to canonical philosophers for context, comparison, or clarification—and of course whenever they are referred to in the sources—this study deals with political argumentation rather than theory, and with ephemeral texts rather than full-blown works of philosophy and high scholarship. Since the 1970s, a ‘linguistic turn’ in historical studies broke open the study of political language to include more lowbrow texts to understand the political concepts underpinning societies.<sup>29</sup> In the last decades, historians have increasingly come to argue that the everyday, local event-oriented communication of *Herrschaft* (rule) by political agents and commentators played a decisive role in the negotiation and conceptualization of political order. As Luise Schorn-Schütte suggests, if one studies conceptual change over a longer period of time, political languages become ‘just as tangible in local conflicts as in theoretical treatises and the texts that instituted legal norms.’<sup>30</sup>

Investigating how opinion makers made sense of acute political crises for their audiences, this study engages with a small area in the vast realm of early modern political

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<sup>29</sup> See P. Burke, ‘Cultural history and its neighbours’, *Culture & History* 1–1 (2012), <http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2012.006>

<sup>30</sup> ‘Die damit behauptete Existenz einer “politischen Sprache” der Zeitgenossen erschließt sich dem Historiker in der Untersuchung des Wandels von Begriffen, der in den Konflikten vor Ort ebenso gut greifbar ist wie in den theoretischen Abhandlungen oder auch in Texten, die Rechtsnormen setzten;’ L. Schorn-Schütte, *Gottes Wort und Menschenherrschaft. Politisch-Theologische Sprachen im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit* (Munich, 2015), p. 14.

communication. Yet—as will become clear—it was a particularly versatile area. Decisions to punish dissenting religious groups were among the most controversial and consequential policies of early modern states. They gave rise to dynamic political communication that invoked many, if not all, of Europe’s main normative political principles, except, perhaps, the relation between gender and political power. The predicament of religious minorities thus provided unmatched occasions for opinion makers to discuss fundamental questions about humans and their attitude toward fellow men, about rulers’ bonds with their subjects, as well as about the relations between different rulers. In other words, religious persecutions acutely laid bare questions about how society is best and most justly ordered and maintained.

Like all evaluations of political decision-making, the public communication of decisions to penalize a religious minority largely revolved around either justifying or rejecting a certain policy—opposite sides of the same coin. As Malte Griesse has argued, the identification of ‘common evils’ is closely interwoven with the articulation of the ‘common good’.<sup>31</sup> Notions of the common good had been part and parcel of the political vocabulary since ancient times, when Aristotle made it the central standard for political justice and the purpose of the city-state.<sup>32</sup> In the early modern period it usually pertained to communal welfare or the shared benefit of people in a given society—increasingly applied to the state—and was measured in terms of concrete issues, such as military defense, peace, and maintaining political independence.<sup>33</sup> As such, it was generally formulated in opposition to private, factional, or individual rulers’ interests. Throughout much of early modern history, the common good continued to be regarded as the highest attainable end of a government’s policy by a wide range of political philosophers, including Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, as well as many lower profile thinkers.<sup>34</sup> Consequently, it was with reference to the common good that different forms of political order were evaluated and legitimated, including ruler-centered theories of

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<sup>31</sup> Griesse, *Frühneuzeitliche Revolten als Kommunikationsereignisse*.

<sup>32</sup> For an elaborate discussion of Aristotle’s conception of the common good, see M. Hoipkemier, ‘Justice, not happiness. Aristotle on the common good’, *Polity* 50–4 (2018), pp. 547–574.

<sup>33</sup> See H. Münkler and H. Bluhm, ‘Einleitung. Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn als politisch–soziale Leitbegriffe’, in H. Münkler and H. Bluhm (eds.), *Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn. Historische Semantiken politischer Leitbegriffe* (Berlin, 2001), esp. pp. 17–22. For the rudimental stable definition of ‘common good’ as shared benefit see G. Burgess and M. Knights, ‘Commonwealth. The social, cultural, and conceptual contexts of an early modern keyword’, *The Historical Journal* 54–3 (2011), 662; alternative terms for the ‘common good’ include ‘common interest’, ‘public good’, ‘public welfare’, and ‘public felicity’.

<sup>34</sup> B. Diggs, ‘The common good as a reason for political action’, *Ethics* 83–4 (1973), p. 283.

absolutism.<sup>35</sup> At the same time, as a moral guideline for good policy, references to the ‘common good’ served as a check to arbitrary government.

As we will see, episodes of religious persecution were also implicitly and explicitly evaluated by opinion makers with recourse to the ‘common good’. Building upon the ‘justification theory’ developed within French pragmatic sociology, I approach normative principles as moral maxims, or guides to action that are used to attain or maintain a just order in society. In their seminal work *On justification*, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot provide a systematic analysis of how individuals and groups try to resolve conflict through communication. In their definition, this excludes conflict resolution through bargaining and violence. Boltanski and Thévenot take as their point of departure the premise that human behavior is coordinated and constrained by the imperative to justify one’s actions. In a conflict situation, individuals and groups structurally try to reach agreement by reference to a higher unifying principle. These unifying principles, in turn, appeal to an ideal political order, ‘[which] gives direction to the ordinary sense of what is just’.<sup>36</sup> An action is thus evaluated as ‘worthy’ on the basis of the extent to which it serves the ‘common good’. In order not to confuse contemporary references to the ‘common good’ with the developed methodological categorizations here, I will stick to the term normative principle.

This dissertation does not deal primarily with the justification of action by the actors themselves, that is, those who ordered or devised the persecution of religious minorities. Yet it has a similar dynamic: opinion makers who wrote about persecution built upon the premise that political behavior must stand the public test of justification. Rulers, as will be explored in Chapter 1, often did not agree with the public stage on which this justification test was played out. Yet every public criticism of the public stage simultaneously served as its confirmation.

The analysis in this study will show that the public evaluation of religious persecution revolved around five normative principles. The first normative principle is (1) ‘religion’. The

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<sup>35</sup> See P. Wilson, *Absolutism in Central Europe* (Abington, 2000), esp. p. 50; in England, by contrast, the term ‘commonwealth’ developed into an ideological opposite of absolutism; C. Cuttica and G. Burgess, ‘Introduction. Monarchism and absolutism in early modern Europe’, in C. Cuttica and G. Burgess (eds.), *Monarchism and absolutism in early modern Europe* (London and New York, 2012), p. 16; G. Burgess, ‘Tyrants, absolutist kings, arbitrary rulers and the commonwealth of England. Some reflections on seventeenth-century English political vocabulary’, in Cuttica and Burgess (eds.), *Monarchism and absolutism*, pp. 147–158.

<sup>36</sup> L. Boltanski and L. Thévenot, *On justification. Economics of worth* (Princeton, NJ, 2006), p. 74.

other four are what students of early modern political secularization have identified as its secular justificatory counterparts: (2) ‘sovereignty’, (3) ‘rule of law’, (4) ‘reason’, and (5) ‘humanity’. In the following I will explain what I mean by each of them.

Normative principles	
I Religious	II Secular
(1) religion	(2) sovereignty (3) rule of law (4) reason (5) humanity

#### *Normative Principle I: Religion*

Religion is the first of the five normative principles, as it is the only one that historiography has not approached in terms of secularization. As noted above, in the last decades, several studies have been devoted to showing how, after the Peace of Westphalia, religion remained a source of political conflict in Europe. Benjamin Kaplan, for one, concluded his seminal synthesis of early modern religious conflict and toleration noting that by the early eighteenth century ‘the age of religious wars had not yet ended’.<sup>37</sup>

A first strand of scholarly criticism of the idea of a secularized political landscape after Westphalia comes from historians and political scientists who point to continuing practices of religious intolerance in domestic politics.<sup>38</sup> Seventeenth-century efforts to centralize state power more firmly around the monarch—often conceptualized by historians under the term absolutism—did not straightforwardly neutralize religious conflict into a matter of opinion, as Reinhart Koselleck once suggested.<sup>39</sup> They also gave rise to new tensions between rulers and

<sup>37</sup> B. Kaplan, *Divided by faith. Religious conflict and the practice of toleration in early modern Europe* (Cambridge and London, 2007), p. 343.

<sup>38</sup> For an overview of religious conflict after 1648 see *ibid.*, pp. 336–343.

<sup>39</sup> R. Koselleck, *Critique and crisis. Enlightenment and the pathogenesis of modern society* (Cambridge, 1988).

religiously deviant subjects. Absolutist political thought, which flourished in the seventeenth century, was largely developed to provide rulers with a straightforward justification to claim uncompromised religious sovereignty.<sup>40</sup> As the political scientist Daniel Nexon put it, Westphalia ‘did not amount to a secularization of politics, but to a domestication of religious conflict’.<sup>41</sup> The main difference with some of their pre-Westphalian counterparts was that most of these religious conflicts remained domestic, or at least did not evolve into full-fledged international wars of religion. Now that rulers had come to realize that fighting wars over religion only wreaked havoc, states could enforce religious uniformity without the fear of being threatened by external forces.<sup>42</sup>

A second, related strand of criticism derives from constructivist students of political discourse against realist international relations (IR) scholarship. Realist scholars single out ‘objective’ national or state interest—secular by definition—as the sole force behind foreign policy. Writing in the wake of the linguistic turn, constructivists have duly pointed out that this approach is essentialist. Arguing that foreign policy is culturally constructed, they have drawn attention to identity as a constitutive force behind political behavior.<sup>43</sup> They thus tie in with the historiography of political communication, which recognizes that politics is, as Rudolf Schlögl points out, ‘always connected with processes of identity formation’.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> W. te Brake, *Shaping history. Ordinary people in European politics, 1500–1700* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1998), p. 115; D. Grim, *Sovereignty. The origin and future of a political and legal concept* (New York, 2015), pp. 20–21. Heinz Schilling regards confessionalization as the first phase of early modern absolutism, as rulers began to socially discipline their subjects into following a specific creed. Only in the second phase, which, according to Schilling, lasted from the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War up until the early eighteenth century, were religion and politics gradually uncoupled, with the rise of irenicism and Pietism. See H. Schilling, ‘Die Konfessionalisierung im Reich. Religiöser und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Deutschland zwischen 1555 und 1620’, *Historische Zeitschrift* 247–1 (1988), pp. 28–30; for an insightful historiographical overview of confessionalization and state building see Ute Lotz–Heumann, ‘The concept of “confessionalization”. A historiographical paradigm in dispute’, *Memoria y civilización* 4 (2001), pp. 93–114.

<sup>41</sup> D. Nexon, *The struggle for power in early modern Europe. Religious conflict, dynastic empires, and international change* (Princeton, NJ, 2009), p. 281; see also D. Nexon, ‘Religion, European identity, and political contention in historical perspective’, in T. Byrnes and P. Katzenstein (eds.), *Religion in an expanding Europe* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 278.

<sup>42</sup> R. Bonney, *The Thirty Years’ War* (Oxford, 2002), p. 531.

<sup>43</sup> For a more detailed analysis of constructivist historiography of early modern international politics see D. Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713* (London, 2016).

<sup>44</sup> R. Schlögl, ‘Vergesellschaftung unter Anwesenden. Zur kommunikativen Form des Politischen in der vormodernen Stadt’, in R. Schlögl (ed.), *Interaktion und Herrschaft. Die Politik der frühneuzeitlichen Stadt* (Konstanz, 2004), p. 22.

Confronted with the disastrous sectarian violence of the Yugoslav Wars and the September 11 attacks, religion—a central marker of identity—was rehabilitated as crucial for understanding present and past international politics. In this light, recent Anglo-American and Dutch historiographies have revived the concept of ‘Protestant Internationalism’ to identify a transnational sense of religious community guiding early modern international relations.<sup>45</sup> Studying the mutual constitution of foreign policy and vernacular press in England Tony Claydon has contended that a master narrative of confessional strife between Protestantism and Catholicism continued to shape the boundaries of debate on foreign politics until deep into the eighteenth century.<sup>46</sup> Andrew Thompson similarly argues that Britain’s increased involvement in continental politics and diplomacy in the first half of the eighteenth century was dictated by the desire to defend the ‘Protestant interest’.<sup>47</sup> David Onnekink, Donald Haks, and Jill Stern have shown confessional rhetoric to have been equally persistent in shaping international political discourse in the Dutch Republic, especially in the public negotiation of its struggles with Louis XIV’s France.<sup>48</sup>

It is important to keep in mind that hermeneutical attempts to understand or rationalize individual, group, or state behavior in bygone eras always carries the risk of misinterpretation.<sup>49</sup> To avoid this, Konrad Repgen has given a radically limited definition of religious war. Arguing

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<sup>45</sup> Others have rephrased the term more restrictively as ‘Calvinist internationalism’. See, for instance, M. Prestwich (ed.), *International Calvinism 1541–1715* (Oxford, 1987); D. Trim, ‘Calvinist internationalism and the English officer corps, 1562–1642’, *History Compass* 4–6 (2006), pp. 1024–1048; T. Claydon, *Europe and the making of England, 1660–1750* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 58–61.

<sup>46</sup> Claydon, *Europe and the making of England*.

<sup>47</sup> A.C. Thompson, *Britain, Hanover and the Protestant interest, 1688–1756* (Woodbridge, 2006); see also A.C. Thompson, ‘The Protestant interest and the history of humanitarian intervention, c. 1685–c. 1756’, in B. Simms and D. Trim (eds.), *Humanitarian intervention. A history* (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 67–88; A.C. Thompson, ‘After Westphalia. Remodelling a religious foreign policy’, in D. Onnekink (ed.), *War and religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713* (Farnham, 2009), pp. 47–68; these are examples pertaining to England. For studies of religiously inspired foreign policy in other countries see, for instance, P. Sonnino, ‘*Plus royaliste que le pape*. Louis XIV’s religious policy and his *Guerre de Hollande*’, in Onnekink (ed.), *War and religion after Westphalia*, pp. 17–24; C. Storrs, ‘The role of religion in Spanish foreign policy in the reign of Carlos II (1665–1700)’, in Onnekink (ed.), *War and religion after Westphalia*, pp. 25–46.

<sup>48</sup> D. Haks, ‘The States General on religion and war. Manifestos, policy documents and prayer days in the Dutch Republic, 1672–1713’, in Onnekink (ed.), *War and religion after Westphalia*, pp. 155–176; D. Haks, *Vaderland en vrede 1672–1713. Publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in oorlog* (Hilversum, 2013), pp. 86–114; Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War*; J. Stern, *Orangism in the Dutch Republic in word and image, 1650–75* (Manchester and New York, 2010).

<sup>49</sup> For an extensive discussion of this problem see G. Murdock, P. Roberts, and A. Spicer (eds.), *Religion and violence in early modern France. The work of Natalie Zemon Davis, Past & Present Supplement 7* (Oxford, 2013).

that inner motives to violence are bound to remain invisible to the historian's eyes, he insisted that one should only regard a war as religious when at least one of the opposing parties explicitly legitimizes it as such.<sup>50</sup> Such an approach is obviously too restrictive to understand the complex nature of religious conflict. The present study, however, does not aim to tackle this question, nor does it seek to answer why religious persecutions took place in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. Instead, it examines how contemporaries referred to religion in general, and their confession more specifically, to justify or condemn political behavior. Therefore, it largely follows Repgen in merely discussing explicit references. However, it is important to do so without shying away from identifying patterns, or contextualizing them within argumentative frameworks not made explicit by the opinion maker in question.

### *Normative Principle II: Sovereignty*

The year 1648 is often identified as a key moment for the concept of sovereignty and the emergence of a 'sovereign-territorial state system'.<sup>51</sup> It is in relation to this narrative that the Peace of Westphalia still serves as reference for political legitimation today. In 1998 nineteen heads of state gathered in Munster to celebrate the 350th anniversary of the signing of the peace treaties.<sup>52</sup> Two decades later, the idea of an eroding 'Westphalian system' is being used as a rallying point for a wide strand of politicians and opinion makers expressing their concerns about modern transnational developments, including globalization, immigration, or the legislative powers of the European Union.

Especially in IR scholarship and within German political historiography, the idea that the Peace of Westphalia was either the cradle or the fulfillment of a modern international order based on normatively equal sovereign states which recognized one another's territorial integrity remains widespread.<sup>53</sup> Volker Gerhardt and Daniel Philpott have pointed out that the 1648

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<sup>50</sup> K. Repgen, 'What is a religious war?', in E.I. Kouri and T. Scott (eds.), *Politics and society in Reformation Europe. Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton on his sixty-fifth birthday* (Hong Kong, 1987), pp. 313–318.

<sup>51</sup> For the term 'sovereign-territorial state system' see Nexon, *Struggle for power*, p. 265.

<sup>52</sup> For the festivities surrounding the 350th anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia see J. Arndt, 'Ein europäisches Jubiläum. 350 Jahre Westfälischer Friede', *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte* 1 (2000), pp. 133–158.

<sup>53</sup> For a recent defence of the 'Westphalian hypothesis' see D. Philpott, 'The religious roots of modern international relations', *World Politics* 52–2 (2000), pp. 206–245; D. Philpott, *Revolutions in sovereignty. How ideas*

peace treaties finally rejected the universalistic claims of pope and emperor. Henceforth, states could declare universal peace among themselves as independent territorial-political entities.<sup>54</sup> Heinhart Steiger has argued that as such the Peace of Westphalia was the endpoint of a *longue durée* political development which started in the fourteenth century, in which domestic and external sovereignty—independent from any transnational power—became the carrying principle of a horizontally conceptualized European order.<sup>55</sup> In this perspective, 1648 was the moment in which Europe disentangled its endlessly fine weave of contested jurisdictions and replaced this with a clear distinction between domestic and international politics.

In the last decades, revisionists have criticized the ‘Westphalian hypothesis’, both for assigning too much conceptual significance to the 1648 treaties and for (implicitly) exaggerating their practical consequences. Andreas Osiander, for example, has stressed that nowhere in the treaties of Munster and Osnabruck is state sovereignty discussed as a principle. Instead, Westphalia institutionalized *Landeshoheit* as a basis for government. Although *Landeshoheit* is close to the concept of sovereignty, it was specifically defined as more limited, so as to fit within the transnational structure of the Holy Roman Empire. Osiander argues that by translating *Landeshoheit* into sovereignty, proponents of the Westphalian hypothesis erroneously assign universal—or at least European—significance to what was first of all a specific legal framework devised for the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>56</sup> Stephen Krasner and Stéphane Beaulac have argued that the political principle that states enjoy full external sovereignty was only developed in the eighteenth century by Emer de Vattel in his 1758 *The law of nations*.<sup>57</sup>

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*shaped modern international relations* (Princeton, NJ, 2001), pp. 82–89; the ‘Westphalian hypothesis’ also remains current among most contributors to the collective volume published at the 350th anniversary of the peace by Klaus Bußmann and Heinz Schilling; K. Bußmann and H. Schilling (eds.), *1648. Krieg und Frieden in Europa*, 2 vols. (Münster, 1998).

<sup>54</sup> V. Gerhardt, ‘Zur historischen Bedeutung des Westfälischen Friedens. Zwölf Thesen’, in Bußmann and Schilling (eds.), *1648*, vol. 1., pp. 486–487; Philpott, *Revolutions in sovereignty*, pp. 82–83.

<sup>55</sup> H. Steiger, ‘Konkreter Friede und allgemeine Ordnung. Zur rechtlichen Bedeutung der Verträge vom 24. Oktober 1648’, in Bußmann and Schilling (eds.), *1648*, vol. 1., pp. 486–487; Philpott, *Revolutions in sovereignty*, pp. 437–446.

<sup>56</sup> A. Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian myth’, *International Organization* 55–2 (2001), p. 267.

<sup>57</sup> S. Krasner, ‘Rethinking the sovereign state model’, *Review of International Studies* 27 (2001), p. 17; S. Beaulac, *The power of language in the making of international law. The word sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the myth of Westphalia* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2004), pp. 127–183.

Pointing to the friction between theory and practice, other historians have also pointed out that even if the Peace of Westphalia had been designed to give rise to a European order based on mutually recognized sovereignty, it was ultimately a failure. After all, expansionist war—that is, the violation of another state’s sovereignty—remained ubiquitous throughout the centuries that followed.<sup>58</sup> This does not, of course, force us to discard sovereignty as a normative principle. Political scientist Stephen Krasner is right to argue that sovereignty will always be limited or contested by other norms:

The sovereign state model has always been a cognitive script; its basic rules are widely understood but also frequently violated. Normative structures have been decoupled from actual behavior either because actors embrace inconsistent norms such as human rights and non-intervention.<sup>59</sup>

More recently, Benjamin de Carvalho and Andrea Paras have argued that in England, the political norm of sovereignty developed in relation to policies of intervention. Both sovereignty and intervention revolved around questions of identity and the boundaries of moral responsibility, making them mutually constitutive.<sup>60</sup> This account of the justification of interventionist policy ties in with older intellectual historiography on the relation between sovereignty and intervention in the works of Jean Bodin, the father of absolutist thought.<sup>61</sup>

The aim of this dissertation is not to confirm or disprove the ‘Westphalian hypothesis’ on the rise of sovereignty. The mid-seventeenth century is primarily chosen as a point of

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<sup>58</sup> Benno Teschke, for instance, argues that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries international politics remained dominated by dynastic aspirations, based on a competitive logic of geopolitical property accumulation; B. Teschke, ‘Theorizing the Westphalian system of states. International relations from absolutism to capitalism’, *European Journal of International Relations* 8–1 (2002), pp. 5–48; see also Nexon, *Struggle for power*, p. 281; Heinz Duchhardt has similarly argued that Louis XIV’s expansionism had already destroyed Westphalia’s political order; H. Duchhardt, ‘Westfälischer Friede und internationales System im Ancien Régime’, *Historische Zeitschrift* 249–3 (1989), pp. 529–543.

<sup>59</sup> Krasner also contends that ‘logics of consequences driven by power and interest [can] trump logics of appropriateness dictated by norms and principles’. This dissertation does not follow Krasner’s distinction between norm and principle on the one hand, and power and interest on the other. Power and interest are culturally contingent, not objective, fixed, and impregnable blueprints for political behavior. Claims to maintaining sovereignty (or any of the other normative principles) can thus also be a form of power. As Rodney Hall has argued, moral authority gives power to political actors. Krasner, ‘Rethinking the sovereign state model’, p. 17; R. Hall, ‘Moral authority as a power resource’, *International Organization* 51–4 (1997), pp. 591–592.

<sup>60</sup> B. de Carvalho and A. Paras, ‘Sovereignty and solidarity. Moral obligation, confessional England, and the Huguenots’, *International History Review* 37–1 (2014), pp. 1–21.

<sup>61</sup> For an overview see A. Heraclides and A. Dially, *Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century. Setting the precedent* (Manchester, 2015), pp. 19–20.

departure to study public perceptions of religious conflict after the great wars of religion. As this study will argue, however, conceptualizations of sovereignty played a central role in the public evaluation of religious persecution. As we have seen, Nexon argued that a shared norm of state sovereignty could justify international religious peace as well as the (violent) domestic enforcement of religious uniformity. This dissertation will investigate whether contemporary political commentators were aware of these contradictory qualities of sovereignty, and if so, how they negotiated them with recourse to religious persecution. This study ties in with de Carvalho and Paras' approach to sovereignty as a contingent discursive construct, but investigates when it was actually used to justify intervention or non-intervention.

### *Normative Principle III: The Rule of Law*

The wars of religion have often been identified as a watershed that led to the emancipation of law from religious foundations and legitimations.<sup>62</sup> Within German historiography, political secularization has closely been associated with processes of 'juridification' (*Verrechtlichung*).<sup>63</sup> Traditionally focusing on the Holy Roman Empire, scholars have argued that the wars of religion were paradigmatic moments in the development of the early modern legal landscape. To ban religious violence, political elites renegotiated the role of religion as a basis for law and developed a confessionally neutral legal framework. This allowed religious conflict to be settled in court with recourse to public law rather than with swords on the battlefield.

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<sup>62</sup> M. Stolleis, 'The legitimation of law through God, tradition, will, nature and constitution', in L. Daston and M. Stolleis (eds.), *Nature, law and natural law in early modern Europe. Jurisprudence, theology, moral and natural philosophy* (Farnham, 2008), pp. 49, 52.

<sup>63</sup> See M. Heckel, 'Reichsrecht und "Zweite Reformation". Theologisch-juristische Probleme der reformierten Konfessionalisierung', in H. Schilling (ed.), *Die reformierte Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland. Das Problem der 'Zweiten Reformation'. Wissenschaftliches Symposium des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte* (Gütersloh, 1985), pp. 113–115. Processes of 'Verrechtlichung' have not only been examined in relation to religious conflict. Winfried Schulze, who coined the term, conceptualized it as a consequence of peasant revolts; W. Schulze, "'Geben Aufruhr und Aufstand Anlaß zu neuen heilsamen Gesetzen". Beobachtungen über die Wirkungen bäuerlichen Widerstands in der Frühen Neuzeit', in W. Schulze (ed.), *Aufstände, Revolten, Prozesse. Beiträge zu bäuerlichen Widerstandsbewegungen im frühneuzeitlichen Europa* (Gerlingen, 1983), pp. 261–285; see also A. De Benedictis and K. Härter (eds.), *Revolten und politische Verbrechen zwischen dem 12. Und 19. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2013).

The first concrete results of such negotiations were the various religious peace treaties which provided specific answers to the problem of religious difference within the state.<sup>64</sup> These treaties were devised as positive laws, meant to bring an end to a specific conflict. They were not ideological celebrations of toleration but pragmatic compromises granted—often grudgingly—to religious dissenters until the ideal of religious unity could once again be achieved. Accordingly, most edicts of tolerance were issued as unilateral royal grants, allowing minorities to exercise their faith within certain limits as long as they did not question their ruler’s authority.<sup>65</sup>

Religious peace treaties nevertheless turned confessional deviants into legal entities.<sup>66</sup> David Saunders has argued that despite their non-ideological origins, these peace treaties imposed and legitimated a ‘secular “rule of law” in spheres of life previously governed by religion’.<sup>67</sup> As a consequence, theological truth gradually disappeared as a constituent of peace treaties. Within this process, the Peace of Westphalia takes up a somewhat paradoxical position. It may have elevated sovereignty and normative state parity, but it also set a precedent for establishing positivist international laws which served to bind the behavior of sovereign states.<sup>68</sup>

Legal scholar Brian Tamanaha aptly defines the ‘rule of law’ as ‘that government officials and citizens are bound by and abide the law’.<sup>69</sup> In first stance, the normative principle of ‘rule of law’ thus refers to an ideal society that is justly ordered by the particular laws that exist there. But early modern opinion makers did not evaluate persecutions solely on the basis of the positive laws of the polities in which these took place. One of the main strands of early

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<sup>64</sup> The Peace of Augsburg’s (1555) famous principle of ‘*cuius regio, eius religio*’ assured religious unity by decreeing that the religion of a prince was *ipso facto* the religion of the state, avoiding religious violence with the connected *ius emigrandi*. The Edict of Cavour (1561), in turn, gave a territorial concession to a religious minority, allowing them to live and practice their religion within the boundaries of a restricted area.

<sup>65</sup> R. Forst, *Toleranz im Konflikt. Geschichte, Gehalt und Gegenwart in eines umstritten Begriffs* (Berlin, 2003), p. 42.

<sup>66</sup> J.–F. Missfelder, ‘Verrechtlichung, Verräumlichung, Souveränität. Zur politischen Kultur der Pazifikation in den französischen Religionskriegen (1562–1629)’, in D. Hückler, Y. Kleinmann, and M. Thomsen (eds.), *Reden und Schweigen über religiöse Differenz. Tolerieren in epochen–übergreifender Perspektive* (Göttingen, 2013), pp. 139–140.

<sup>67</sup> D. Saunders, ‘Juridifications and religion in early modern Europe. The challenge of a contextual history of law’, *Law and Critique* 15–2 (2004), p. 99.

<sup>68</sup> For an overview of the relation between peace treaties and international law see R. Lesaffer, ‘Peace treaties and the formation of international law’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of the history of international law* (Oxford, 2012), esp. pp. 72–89.

<sup>69</sup> B. Tamanaha, ‘The history and elements of the rule of law’, *Singapore Journal of Legal Studies* 232 (2012), p. 233.

modern political philosophy concerned the law of nature. Being a wide intellectual movement, natural law thinking defies an easy definition, but as Anthony Pagden aptly summarizes, it typically establishes ‘rationally conceived, and thus universally acceptable, first principles’.<sup>70</sup>

Natural law thinking can also be approached in terms of juridification and secularization. Beginning in the seventeenth century, political philosophers began to develop secular concepts of natural law and—its counterpart for the international stage—the law of nations (*ius gentium*). Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94) and other philosophers built upon the legal settlements that ended the wars of religion and universalized them, giving the secular state and religious coexistence theoretical and ideological currency. Becoming increasingly popular in the 1680s and finding its political zenith in the eighteenth century, natural law aimed to set the boundaries for man to live in society with other men, without being concerned with his salvation after death.<sup>71</sup>

Both on the domestic and on the international level, positivist and natural law could stand in an uneasy relationship to the idea of absolute sovereignty. Ideally, the absolutist ruler was an ultimate lawmaker, a speaking law (*lex loquens*), which to some absolutist thinkers implied that he was not bound by existing legislation (*legibus solutus*).<sup>72</sup> Bodin granted that princes were subject to natural law, but they were—together with God—also the only ones authorized to interpret and enforce it.<sup>73</sup> In other words, he argued that sovereignty was not restricted by natural law, as no one could use it as a normative principle against him. Other theorists, most notably Grotius, argued that sovereignty came with obligations to natural law, whose source lies in universal human nature and can be identified through ‘right reason’ (*recta ratio*).<sup>74</sup> The problem remained, of course, that on the international scene there was no higher

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<sup>70</sup> A. Pagden, ‘Introduction’, in A. Pagden (ed.), *The languages of political theory in early–modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 4.

<sup>71</sup> Saunders, ‘Juridifications and religion’, pp. 101–102.

<sup>72</sup> C. Cuttica, ‘An absolutist trio in the early 1630s. Sir Robert Filmer, Jean–Louis Guez de Balzac, Cardin le Bret and their models of monarchical power’, in Cuttica and Burgess (eds.), *Monarchism and absolutism*, p. 133; this was, however, not commonly accepted. Jean Bodin believed that the sovereign was bound by divine law, natural law, the law of nations, and the laws of reason; R. Jennings, ‘Sovereignty and international law’, in G. Kreijen, M. Brus, J. Duursma, E. De Vos, and J. Dugard (eds.), *State, sovereignty, and international governance* (Oxford, 2012), p. 28.

<sup>73</sup> E. Andrew, ‘Jean Bodin on sovereignty’, *Republics of Letters* 2–2 (2011), p. 78.

<sup>74</sup> B. Straumann, ‘Early modern sovereignty and its limits’, *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 12–2 (2015), pp. 427–428.

authority to which this obligation could be entrusted; between states, at least according to Hobbes, the state of nature still held sway.<sup>75</sup>

This dissertation is not primarily occupied with political theory. But the question of how to maintain political order and justice on a continent scarred by confessional warfare was not only tackled by great thinkers such as Hobbes, Grotius, and Pufendorf. The normative principle of ‘rule of law’ thus pertains to all public evaluations of religious persecution that had recourse to existing positive laws and universalized conceptions of natural law.

#### *Normative Principle IV: Reason*

The human capacity to reason was not only key in conceptions of natural law. In the course of the early modern period, many European thinkers would come to elevate reason as the principal tool by which humans could make sense of and order the political world in which they lived. Indeed, the Enlightenment’s triumph of reason after an age of religious warfare is one of the central leitmotifs of Europe’s turn toward modernity. Nevertheless, few terms within conceptual history remain as elusive as reason. For instance, in Brunner, Conze, and Koselleck’s magnum opus *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, an article dedicated to reason is conspicuous by its absence.

The genealogy of reason as a guide to political behavior precedes the Enlightenment and can be traced back at least to sixteenth-century conceptions of reason of state. Maurizio Viroli has argued that reason of state refers to the ‘capacity to calculate the appropriate means of preserving the state’.<sup>76</sup> Whether that state is legitimate or behaves legitimately is of no concern.<sup>77</sup> Francesco Guicciardini, who provided the earliest known example of the term, identified reason of state as the exigencies for the maintenance of the state, as opposed to the political virtues of morality, religion, and legality.<sup>78</sup> Closely tied to the idea reason of state was

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<sup>75</sup> See P. Schröder, ‘Natural law, sovereignty, and international law. A comparative perspective’, in I. Hunter and D. Saunders (eds.), *Natural law and civil sovereignty. Moral right and state authority in early modern political thought* (London, 2002), pp. 204–218.

<sup>76</sup> M. Viroli, *From politics to reason of state. The acquisition and transformation of the language of politics* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 4.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>78</sup> H. Höpfl, ‘Orthodoxy and reason of state’, *History of Political Thought* 23–2 (2002), pp. 214–215.

the concept of political prudence, the art of governing through the use of practical reason, which required, in the words of Jon Snyder, ‘relativism and flexibility in the application of moral and ethical principles’.<sup>79</sup>

One could argue that, as such, reason of state and political prudence were contrary to prevailing normative principles. Reason of state would always remain controversial as a political maxim. Yet as Lisa Kattenberg has recently demonstrated, practitioners would often try to reconcile reason of state and morality by pointing to necessity. As Justus Lipsius—whose works were highly influential—stated, extraordinary circumstances allowed for the suspension of moral or religious laws in favor of reason of state as long as it was for the sake of the common good.<sup>80</sup> The end justified the means.

The interventionist maxim of mercantilism, the period’s dominant economic ideology, was firmly connected with reason of state thinking.<sup>81</sup> The same goes for the free trade-oriented political philosophy of ‘commercial reason of state’, which developed in opposition to mercantilism in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic.<sup>82</sup> Both economic maxims were structured around the premise that the preservation of the polity depended first and foremost on its mercantile well-being. As Chapter 3 will show, commerce and reason were therefore often part of the same argument. Economic argumentation against religious persecution will therefore be categorized within the normative principle of reason.

Enlightenment theorists tried to reunite reason with justice politically and democratize its foundations. In England, Thomas Hobbes devised a theory of politics based on ‘right reason’ (*recta ratio*)—in contrast to religion or the persuasion-centered discipline of humanist rhetoric.<sup>83</sup> According to Hobbes, the most important constituent of the scientific theory of

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<sup>79</sup> J. Snyder, *Dissimulation and the culture of secrecy in early modern Europe* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 2012), p. 8.

<sup>80</sup> L. Kattenberg, *The power of necessity. Reason of state in the Spanish monarchy, ca. 1590–1650* (unpublished PhD thesis, Amsterdam, 2018).

<sup>81</sup> For a recent analysis of mercantilism and reason of state see P.R. Rössner, ‘New inroads into well-known territory? On the virtues of re-discovering pre-classical political economy’, in P.R. Rössner (ed.), *Economic growth and the origins of modern political economy. Economic reasons of state, 1500–2000* (Abingdon 2016), pp. 3–25.

<sup>82</sup> The term ‘commercial reason of state’ has recently been coined by Jan Hartman and Arthur Weststeijn: J. Hartman and A. Weststeijn, ‘An empire of trade. Commercial reason of state in seventeenth-century Holland’, in S. Reindert and P. Røge (eds.), *The political economy of empire in the early modern world* (Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 11–31.

<sup>83</sup> Q. Skinner, *Reason and rhetoric in the philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 294–299.

politics is the virtue of justice, which is recognizable within the laws of nature, and thus discernible through reason.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, social contract theory—which became a hallmark of Enlightenment political thought—redefined political authority as stemming from a rational agreement among individuals for the mutual advancement of their own interests.

At the same time, political philosophers tried to explain how the disastrous intolerance that had culminated in the wars of religion had also sprung from the human mind, despite its capacity to reason. Some thinkers pointed to a friction between reason and human nature, and insisted on the importance of education.<sup>85</sup> Others, such as Pierre Bayle, were more skeptical and argued that reason ultimately had to bow to custom and education, the very forces that led persecutors to sincerely believe that their acts of intolerance were just. Bayle contended that, ultimately, the reasoning mind gets stuck in contradictions. Reason was therefore like a ‘runner who does not know when the race is over’.<sup>86</sup> Some forty years later—around the end of this book’s chronological scope—David Hume would argue that reason is merely a ‘slave of the passions’.<sup>87</sup>

Reason-of-state theorists and the skeptics Bayle and Hume thus all suggested in different ways that as a political maxim reason offered little guidance as to where a ‘rational’ policy would or ought to lead. Confronted with the utter destruction brought about by World War II and the Holocaust, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer famously radicalized this idea of the blindness of reason. Equating knowledge with power, they argued that the Enlightenment had given rise to man’s rational sovereignty, but had failed to provide the necessary reflection of what this new human mastery over the world could entail.<sup>88</sup>

The aim of a majority of Enlightenment thinkers was thus to restructure society based on principles developed by the clear-thinking mind, independent of dogmatic tradition, superstition, and unquestioned authority. This took many forms. Harro Höpfl provides an apt summary of the manifold (implicit) definitions of reason by early modern theorists. He claims

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 309.

<sup>85</sup> L. Daston and M. Stolleis, ‘Introduction. Nature, law and natural law in early modern Europe’, in Daston and Stolleis (eds.), *Nature, law and natural law*, pp. 9–10.

<sup>86</sup> D. Erdozain, *The soul of doubt. The religious roots of unbelief from Luther to Marx* (Oxford, 2015), p. 124.

<sup>87</sup> S. Buckle, ‘Hume on the passions’, *Philosophy* 87–340 (2012), p. 198.

<sup>88</sup> M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical fragments* (Stanford, CA, 2002).

that reason-of-state theorists—and I argue that this can be extended to other political philosophers—thought of reason as including

the activities of reasoning, deliberation, discussion, argument, reflection [...]; the product of such deliberation or discourse; the intellectual faculty that allows these activities or that generates understanding, insight or knowledge; a ground or justification or motive for an action; the inner logic, rationale or nature of something; or a method or way of doing something; reason might even (by metonymy) mean justice.<sup>89</sup>

The normative principle of ‘reason’ thus encompasses any justification or rejection of religious persecution on the basis of whether the rational mind allows or dictates it as a form of policy.

#### *Normative Principle V: Humanity*

The final normative principle pertains to an ideal polity based on the sense or sentiment of shared humanity. Within the theoretical framework of Boltanski and Thévenot, the principle of common humanity is a prerequisite for all normative orders.<sup>90</sup> They argue that agreement can only be established among people if they recognize a fundamental parity between fellow human beings. Of course, all societies are ordered around different forms of inequality among people. These inequalities, however, are always in need of justification. They need to be based on the acceptance that, as human beings, humans recognize and treat each other as suchs.<sup>91</sup>

To some extent, early modern European societies indeed used fundamental human parity as a basis of moral order. Christian theology preached egalitarianism in access to the world to come, but, of course, it depended on one’s religious beliefs. Calvinist theology is illustrative of this complex relationship between Christian doctrine and shared humanity; on the one hand, double predestination makes a clear-cut distinction between the elect and the non-elect—the worthy and the unworthy—were it not for the fact that all men are

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<sup>89</sup> Höpfl, ‘Orthodoxy and reason of state’, pp. 217–218.

<sup>90</sup> Boltanski and Thévenot, *On justification*, p. 38; Boltanski and Thévenot use the term ‘order of justification’.

<sup>91</sup> Hunt, *Inventing human rights*, pp. 38–39.

fundamentally unworthy. On the other hand, the elect group cuts right through most social inequalities and remains difficult, if not impossible, to identify.<sup>92</sup>

Life in early modern Europe was, however, structured around countless forms of inequality and hierarchy, most of which were justified as divinely ordained. Confession was one of the few markers of division that was recognized as a social group which people could join or leave—one that had serious consequences in virtually every early modern society. But Reformed Protestants did not even consider religious belief to be a matter of human choice; it was fixed by God. This study builds on Francisco Bethencourt's observation that to understand the history of human rights, one has to pay attention to the ways in which humanity has been perceived as divided and segmented throughout history. Bethencourt identifies several historical 'divisions of humankind', one of which was the distinction made in ancient Greece between barbarians and the civilized. Bethencourt points out that in Christian Europe, this division was equated with heathens and Christians.<sup>93</sup> Studying early modern society, it therefore makes sense to turn Boltanski and Thévenot's argument on its head; in early modern Europe, human distinctions rather than human parity could be considered as the first foundation of moral order. From this premise, we can investigate when the idea of shared humanity was used as a political argument to cut through prevailing social divisions.

As Miia Halme-Tuomisaari and Pamela Slotte remind us, one should be careful not fall into the teleological trap of approaching all utterances of natural law, benevolence, or compassion as precursors of modern human rights.<sup>94</sup> Above, we have already touched upon the historiography of human rights. A closer look allows us to identify some of the main characteristics of humanity as a normative order. Students of early Spanish imperialism have shown that encounters with the New World led some European thinkers to conceptualize that all human beings were in fact human beings, with (1) the same natural rights and (2) the same

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<sup>92</sup> For a study of social stratification and the development of Reformed Protestantism see M. Zafirovski, 'Society and "heaven and hell": The interplay between social structure and theological tradition during early Calvinism', *Politics, Religion, and Ideology* 18–3 (2017), pp. 282–308.

<sup>93</sup> F. Bethencourt, 'Humankind. From division to recomposition', in Klose and Thulin (eds.), *Humanity*, pp. 29–50.

<sup>94</sup> M. Halme–Tuomisaari and P. Slotte, 'Revisiting the origins of human rights. Introduction', in M. Halme–Tuomisaari and P. Slotte (eds.), *Revisiting the origins of human rights* (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 1–36.

natural traits—reason.<sup>95</sup> Such criticism also gave rise to the idea of (3) inhumane behavior, that is, acts of cruelty that conveyed the perpetrator’s barbarity, or even lesser humanity.<sup>96</sup> In the seventeenth century, political philosophers developed the idea of (4) sociability as a natural human trait.<sup>97</sup> As we have seen, Lynn Hunt contended that people became sensitized to the inner world of those very different from them around the mid-eighteenth century. This revolution of empathy subsequently found theoretical expression within political philosophy; according to Hunt, Enlightenment thinkers came to regard (5) empathy as central to human nature—even preceding reason—and, consequently, as the central source of morality and community.<sup>98</sup>

Since the late 2000s, this alternative narrative of the Enlightenment has been gaining ground. Michael Frazer, for one, has argued that the Enlightenment was an intellectual revolution characterized by two currents. Alongside the celebration of rationalism, there was also a sentimentalist revolution, which focused on ‘reflectively refined feelings shared among individuals via the all-important faculty of sympathy’.<sup>99</sup> Frazer has shown that from the beginning of the eighteenth century Enlightenment thinkers hotly debated whether normative political standards should be deduced from reasoning or from reflection on one’s sentiments. While insisting that this debate was fundamentally transnational, Frazer has contended that a soft geographical boundary of this debate can be identified between ‘sentimentalist’ Britain and ‘rationalist’ Germany and France.<sup>100</sup> One aim of this study is to investigate how this opposition was negotiated in Dutch pamphlet literature, which stood at the intersection of these cultures.

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<sup>95</sup> A. Pagden, ‘Introduction’, in N. Griffin (ed.), *A short account of the destruction of the Indies* (London, 1992), pp. xiii–xli.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. xxxix–xl; for the use of a similar argument in seventeenth-century antislavery discourses see T. Weller, ‘Humanitarianism before humanitarianism? Spanish discourses on slavery from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century’, in Klose and Thulin (eds.), *Humanity*, pp. 151–168.

<sup>97</sup> McKeogh, ‘Grotius and the civilian’, p. 39.

<sup>98</sup> Contemporaries used the term sympathy to refer to what in today’s vocabulary is closer to empathy; *ibid.*, pp. 64–69.

<sup>99</sup> M. Frazier, *The Enlightenment of sympathy. Justice and the moral sentiments in the eighteenth century and today* (Oxford, 2010), p. 4; Ronald Crane has similarly argued that around 1750—under the influence of the Latitudinarians—sentimentalism, expressed through sympathetic compassion, came to be held in high esteem, in a way people would have frowned upon one hundred years before; R. Crane, ‘Suggestions toward a genealogy of the “man of feeling”’, *Journal of English Literary History* 1–3 (1934), pp. 205–230.

<sup>100</sup> Frazier, *The Enlightenment of sympathy*, pp. 4–5.

This study aims to integrate these different strands of human rights historiography and the varying conceptualizations of humanity they describe. It will investigate how, when, and why opinion makers between roughly 1650 and 1750 evaluated topical persecutions in reference to humanity and human nature, describing people as (1) having natural rights, (2) being rational, (3) being non-cruel, (4) being sociable, and/or (5) being empathetic—as well as potentially different characteristics. In doing so, it examines the development of humanitarian argumentation outside the parameters set by Hunt and Frazer.

### *Opinion Makers and Public Spheres*

The five normative principles outlined above form the analytical ground of this study. In order to establish how they were used to make sense of topical religious persecutions in printed news media, it will be examined who applied them, when and where they were applied, and how they were used in relation to each other. Dealing with early modern sources always carries the problem of definition. The terms historians use for certain documents today are often different from the ones used by early modern people. This creates the risk that we lump together media that they considered as essentially different, or that we make unhelpful distinctions between media that they regarded as belonging to the same category. ‘Pamphlet’, for instance, was not a term used by contemporary Dutch people. Yet I agree with Femke Deen, David Onnekink, and Michel Reiners that it remains a useful term to refer to topical publications that were meant ‘to criticize, support, or in general polarise people and groups’.<sup>101</sup>

Although their inclusive definition would allow it, I do not see newspapers and periodicals as pamphlets; the fact that they were published at regular intervals made them essentially different forms of communication.<sup>102</sup> Together, I refer to my main sources as printed news media. The majority of Dutch pamphlets of which we still have copies can be found through the *Short-Title Catalogue, Netherlands* (STCN)—the largest digital database of Dutch publications before 1800—and are digitized in *Dutch Pamphlets Online* (TEMPO), which

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<sup>101</sup> F. Deen, D. Onnekink, and M. Reinders, ‘Pamphlets and politics. Introduction’, in F. Deen, D. Onnekink, and M. Reinders (eds.), *Pamphlets and politics in the Dutch Republic* (Leiden 2012), pp. 11–12.

<sup>102</sup> See M. van Groesen, ‘(No) news from the western front. The weekly press of the Low Countries and the making of Atlantic news’, *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 44–3 (2013), pp. 739–760.

contains all titles of the Royal Library and the main Dutch university libraries.<sup>103</sup> For newspapers, I have used the digital platform Delpher as a starting point, combined with trips to Dutch archives and university libraries.<sup>104</sup> I have consulted the *Encyclopedie Nederlandse Tijdschriften* (ENT) to find Dutch periodicals, and *Le Gazetier Universel* (GU) for French titles published in the United Provinces.<sup>105</sup>

It is impossible to analyze all printed news media tackling the episodes of religious persecution discussed in this study, first of all, because not all works have withstood the ravages of time. There is a dark number of pamphlets of which we no longer have any copies.<sup>106</sup> Second, I have not been able to visit every archive to look for incidental new sources. However, I have systematically examined everything that could be found through STCN, ENT, and GU. Following leads found through these digital tools, I have searched for specific sources in university libraries and Dutch archives. As a result, this study surveys a coherent sample of about two hundred pamphlets, newspapers, and periodicals in five languages, all of them published between 1655 and 1746.<sup>107</sup>

Dealing with printed news media, this dissertation covers a considerable area of public communication. Yet it is important to keep in mind that such media were not the only carriers of political debate. Recent studies have made us aware of the wide variety of media through which *Herrschaft* and politics were publicly communicated in early modern society. Donald Haks has shown that in the Dutch Republic not only pamphlets and newspapers, but also, among others, sermons, songs, petitions, and calls for public prayer were important carriers of public debate.<sup>108</sup> Moreover, then as now, there was a continuous interplay between printed and

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<sup>103</sup> Short Title Catalogue Netherlands, <http://picarta.nl/DB=3.11/>; Dutch Pamphlets Online, <https://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/dutch-pamphlets-online>; all pamphlets in TEMPO have a searchable “pflt number”, which is included in the footnotes and the bibliography.

<sup>104</sup> Admittedly, this does not offer an exhaustive overview of the communication of religious persecution in newspapers. Many Dutch newspapers from the seventeenth century are now lost or scattered throughout different archives and libraries in Europe. Newspapers from the eighteenth century are better preserved. As we will see, however, newspapers were not the main printed media used to opionate about religious persecution. I have therefore decided to study a limited number of newspapers per case. For a comprehensive overview of seventeenth-century Dutch language newspapers and their current locations see A. der Weduwen, *Dutch and Flemish newspapers of the seventeenth century, 1618–1700* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2017).

<sup>105</sup> Encyclopedie Nederlandse Tijdschriften, <https://ent1815.nl/>; Le Gazetier Universel, <http://gazetier-universel.gazettes18e.fr/>.

<sup>106</sup> See Pettegree and der Weduwen, *Bookshop of the world*, pp. 13–17.

<sup>107</sup> See Bibliography.

<sup>108</sup> Haks, *Vaderland en vrede*.

oral communication of news and opinion. People discussed what they read in marketplaces, taverns, and churches, and conversely—as we will see—publicists often regarded rumors and the word on the street as valuable news items. Furthermore, handwritten pamphlets and newsletters long existed side-by-side to printed media, often reaching large audiences through public recitation.<sup>109</sup>

In recent years, several studies have taken up an integrated approach, exploring the interaction between these written, oral, and performative forms of public political communication within the boundaries of a civic community.<sup>110</sup> In doing so, they have offered valuable insights into the immensely difficult question of news reception. When taking an international approach, however, such an integrated approach becomes unwieldy. Moreover, as Rudolf Schlögl has rightly pointed out, including ever more sources as constituents of the public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*) carries the risk of blurring the concept's historiographical focus.<sup>111</sup> Rather than presenting an exhaustive account of 'Dutch' public debate on religious persecution, this dissertation thus focuses on the production of printed public opinion, taking into account its international dimensions.

This brings us to a second limitation: the focus lies on works produced by printing presses in the United Provinces—which also inescapably causes a gravitation toward Holland, the most prosperous province with the biggest printing industry. Yet the authors of the pamphlets, periodicals, and newspaper articles were by no means all Dutchmen, let alone Hollanders. The works under investigation were authored by a diverse group of people from different parts of Europe, including journalists, printmakers, preachers, and political officeholders from the Holy Roman Empire, France, Savoy, England, and other places. By the seventeenth century, this eclectic group of opinion makers had elevated printed works to be the dominant media of long-distance public debate about political events.<sup>112</sup> After having been

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<sup>109</sup> F. Deen, *Publiek debat en propaganda in Amsterdam tijdens de Nederlandse Opstand. Amsterdam 'Moorddam' (1566–1578)* (Amsterdam, 2015); M. Keblusek, *Boeken in de hofstad. Haagse boekcultuur in de Gouden Eeuw* (Hilversum, 1997), pp. 310–311; H. Love, *Scribal publication in seventeenth-century England* (Oxford, 1993).

<sup>110</sup> D. Bellingradt, 'Organizing public opinion in a resonating box. The Gülich rebellion in early modern Cologne, 1680–1686', *Urban History* 39–4 (2012), pp. 553–570; Deen, *Publiek debat en propaganda*.

<sup>111</sup> R. Schlögl, 'Politik beobachten. Öffentlichkeit und Medien in der Frühen Neuzeit', *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 35–4 (2008), p. 583.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 611–612.

published in The Hague, Utrecht, or Amsterdam, printed news media often traveled abroad again.

For many years, early modernists have paid little attention to the international dynamics of the production of public opinion, and even today the majority of works on public debate in the Dutch Republic deal with their domestic dimensions.<sup>113</sup> To a considerable extent, this is a consequence of the Habermasian paradigm from which the study of early modern publicity developed. Jürgen Habermas famously conceived the public sphere to have emerged within the boundaries of the eighteenth-century nation state.<sup>114</sup> In his wake, Benedict Anderson confirmed this close relation between the public sphere and the nation state in his study on the development of nationalism—which depends on an imagined community.<sup>115</sup>

In the last decades, two important historiographical developments have begun to break open this national paradigm, or at least offer the methodological tools to do so. First, there is a nascent historiography on the international production and dissemination of news in early modern Europe.<sup>116</sup> Historians now recognize that a transnational sense of contemporaneity played a pivotal role in structuring the political thought and behavior of both the public and politician.<sup>117</sup> Second, early modernists have begun to distinguish a multitude of public spheres (*Teilöffentlichkeiten*)—in opposition to Habermas’ monolithic national frame—ordered around different institutional, discursive, or geographical boundaries. Several studies have thus identified, among others, a reformatory public sphere, a Puritan public sphere, and an Anglo-Scoto-Dutch public sphere which transcended national borders.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> M. Reinders, *Gedrukte chaos. Populisme en moord in het Rampjaar 1672* (Amsterdam, 2010); R. Harms, *Pamfletten en publieke opinie. Massamedia in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam, 2011); C. Harline, *Pamphlets, printing, and political culture in the early Dutch Republic* (Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster, 1987); for an insightful historiographical discussion of the Dutch historiography, see D. van Netten, ‘Propaganda, publics, and pamphlets in the Dutch Golden Age – what else is new?’, *Jaarboek voor Nederlandse Boekgeschiedenis* 22 (2015), pp. 209–221.

<sup>114</sup> J. Habermas, *The structural transformation of the public sphere. An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society* (Cambridge, 1992); for a critical evaluation of ‘implicitly national public sphere theory’, see N. Fraser, ‘Transnationalizing the public sphere’, in M. Pensky (ed.), *Globalizing critical theory* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 37–47.

<sup>115</sup> B. Anderson, *Imagined communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (New York, 2006).

<sup>116</sup> R. Harms, R. Raymond, and J. Salman (eds.), *Not dead things. The dissemination in popular print in England, Wales, Italy, and the Low Counties* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2013); J. Raymond and N. Moxham (eds.), *News networks in early modern Europe* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2016).

<sup>117</sup> B. Dooley, *The dissemination of news and the emergence of contemporaneity in early modern Europe* (Farnham, 2010); J. Raymond and N. Moxham (eds.), *News networks in early modern Europe* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2016); A. Pettegree, *The invention of news. How the world came to know about itself* (New Haven, CT, 2014).

<sup>118</sup> R. Wohlfeil, ‘Reformatorsche Öffentlichkeit’, in J. Metzler (ed.), *Literatur und Laienbildung im Spätmittelalter und in der Reformationszeit* (Wolfenbüttel, 1981), pp. 41–52; M. Nieden, ‘Die Wittenberger Reformation als

One important consequence of this dual project of fragmenting public spheres and the widening of their geographical scope is that it allows historians to move beyond the opposition between the representative public sphere (*repräsentative Öffentlichkeit*) and the civil public sphere (*bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit*).<sup>119</sup> According to Habermas, premodern societies were home to a representative public sphere, in which the authorities publicly represented their rule before the people.<sup>120</sup> The civil public sphere, on the other hand, consists of a culture of rational debate about political authority, which is fundamentally independent from it.<sup>121</sup> It has now become clear that these two oppositional models do not hold. Cross-border publicity severely hampered governments' efforts at monopolizing political communication. Authorities have often tried to establish control over news and opinion, but usually failed because they could not control the foreign press. On the other hand, government officials frequently produced textual interventions into foreign and domestic public discussions, blurring the line between official publicity and public debate.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, we have now moved beyond Habermas' idea that the public sphere was necessarily constituted by 'rational debate'.<sup>123</sup> Indeed, as we have seen above, this dissertation will argue that the appeal to 'reason' was just one among five main argumentative strategies in public political debate.

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Medienereignis', *Europäische Geschichte Online* (2012), <http://ieg-ego.eu/de/threads/europaeische-medien/europaeische-medienereignisse/marcel-nieden-die-wittenberger-reformation-als-medienereignis>; P. Roberts, 'Habermas, "Philosophes", and Puritans. Rationality and exclusion in the dialectical public sphere', *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 26–1 (1996), pp. 47–68; H. Helmers, *The Royalist republic. Literature, politics, and religion in the Anglo-Dutch public sphere, 1639–1660* (Cambridge, 2015). For Prussia, Esther-Beate Körber has differentiated between the public spheres of power, of education, and of information. These existed simultaneously, and whereas some of them remained local, others transcended national borders; E.-B. Körber, *Öffentlichkeiten der frühen Neuzeit. Teilnehmer, Formen, Institutionen und Entscheidungen öffentlicher Kommunikation im Herzogtum Preußen von 1525 bis 1618* (Berlin, 1998).

<sup>119</sup> H. Jürgens and T. Weller, 'Einleitung', in H. Jürgens and T. Weller (eds.), *Streitkultur und Öffentlichkeit im konfessionellen Zeitalter* (Göttingen, 2013), p. 18.

<sup>120</sup> S. Rau and G. Schwerhoff, 'Öffentliche Räume in der Frühen Neuzeit. Überlegungen zu Leitbegriffen und Themen eines Forschungsfeldes', in S. Rau and G. Schwerhoff (eds.), *Zwischen Gotteshaus und Taverne. Öffentliche Räume in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* (Cologne, 2004), p. 14.

<sup>121</sup> Habermas, *Structural transformation*.

<sup>122</sup> See J. Peacey, *Politicians and pamphleteers. Propaganda during the English Civil War and the Interregnum* (Farnham, 2004); H. Helmers, 'Public diplomacy in early modern Europe', *Media History* 22–3/4 (2016), pp. 402–403.

<sup>123</sup> G. Hauser, *Vernacular voices. The rhetoric of publics and public spheres* (Columbia, SC, 1999), pp. 53–55.

*Identifying with Foreign Suffering*

Dutch printers owed much of their success to the fact that the public sphere transcended borders, that both governments and citizens—and everyone inbetween—sought access to it, and that they did not limit themselves to ‘rational debate’. But although the press in the United Provinces was an international playground, it also remained distinctly Dutch in many ways. After all, the Dutch were ardent consumers of printed opinion. Fueled by high levels of literacy and urbanization, Dutch society was characterized by a pronounced discussion culture. In the words of Willem Frijhoff, there was a

cultural practice of intellectual participation in the problems, the debates, and the social and political development of the commonwealth, and secondly a mental habit of feeling involved in the community act, repeated over and over again, of defining the common good as a shared commodity for the benefit of all.<sup>124</sup>

The United Provinces’ devolved political structure lay at the foundation of the prevalent sense of political involvement among citizens. The Republic was a union of seven sovereign provinces, the most prosperous, populous, and influential of which—chief among them Holland—were politically dominated by a considerable number of proud and largely autonomous cities. Urban elites thus dominated both the provincial states and the States General,—the union’s assembly consisting of provincial deputies—which was responsible mainly for foreign affairs, conducting war, and making peace. Through a weekly rotation, the individual provinces alternately presided over the assembly, and could, as such, dominate the agenda for a week.<sup>125</sup> However, the Grand Pensionary, the leader of Holland’s delegates, served as the *de facto* head of government.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> W. Frijhoff, ‘Calvinism, literacy, and reading culture in the early modern Northern Netherlands. Towards a reassessment’, *Archiv für Reformationgeschichte* 95 (2004), p. 255.

<sup>125</sup> J. Koopmans, ‘De vergadering van de Staten-Generaal in de Republiek voor 1795 en de publiciteit’, *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 120–3 (2005), pp. 388–389.

<sup>126</sup> See J. Grever, ‘The structure of decision-making in the States-General of the Dutch Republic, 1660-1668’, *Parliaments, Estates, and Representation* 2–2 (1982), pp. 125–153.

Local, provincial, and national politics thus stood in a close relationship.<sup>127</sup> As we will see in Chapter 3, cities like Amsterdam could effectively veto a given foreign policy in the interest of its merchant citizens. The civic ruling class, collectively known as the regents, was largely closed, as it perpetuated itself through cooptation. Yet Dutch citizens lived in relative proximity to their regents, due to the networks provided by civic institutions such as the militias, the guilds, and the Church.<sup>128</sup> Moreover, the city authorities were dependent on citizens in the maintenance of public order.<sup>129</sup> While not officially part of the political process, there was a rich culture of petitioning and lobbying different levels of government.<sup>130</sup>

The stadtholderate added further complexity to the Republic's political system. Officially, the individual provinces appointed the stadtholder as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. Both the provinces and the States General thus remained his official superiors. In practice, however, the princes of Orange had turned the stadtholderate of most provinces into a semi-hereditary office.<sup>131</sup> Based on their prestige as sovereigns of a principality, the Princes of Orange exerted great informal power and repeatedly tried to expand their influence on politics through their patronage networks. This, in turn, often gave rise to opposition. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, factional strife between Orangists and their Statist adversaries over civic, provincial, and national power recurrently dominated Dutch politics.<sup>132</sup>

This fractured political landscape provided a rich feeding ground for printed debate, all the more because it (inadvertently) helped create a unique degree of press freedom—at least

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<sup>127</sup> A good summary of the Republic's political organization is provided by D. Onnekink, 'The body politic', in H. Helmers and G. Janssen (eds.), *The Cambridge companion to the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge, 2018), pp. 107–123.

<sup>128</sup> For Dutch civic culture see M. Prak, 'Urbanization', in Helmers and Janssen (eds.), *Cambridge companion*, pp. 15–31.

<sup>129</sup> For the (political) role of militias in Holland see P. Knevel, *Burgers in het geweer. De schutterijen in Holland, 1500–1700* (Hilversum, 1994); for a comparative analysis of the role of militias in early modern Europe see M. Prak, 'Citizens, soldiers and civic militias in late medieval and early modern Europe', *Past & Present* 228–1 (2015), pp. 93–123.

<sup>130</sup> M. Reinders, "'The citizens come from all cities with petitions". Printed petitions and civic propaganda in the seventeenth century', in Deen, Onnekink, and Reinders (eds.), *Pamphlets and politics*, pp. 97–118; J. van den Tol, *Lobbying in company. Mechanisms of political decision-making and economic interests in the history of Dutch Brazil, 1621–56* (Unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden, 2018).

<sup>131</sup> Only Friesland and sometimes Groningen had stadtholders from different house. See G. Janssen, *Princely power in the Dutch Republic. Patronage and William Frederick of Nassau (1613–64)* (Manchester, 2008).

<sup>132</sup> See J. Stern, *Orangism in the Dutch Republic in word and image, 1650–75* (Manchester and New York, 2010).

until the Glorious Revolution loosened state censorship in England.<sup>133</sup> The States General, the provincial states, and civic governments all recurrently issued placards forbidding the publication of defamatory works.<sup>134</sup> Due to the patchwork of judicial authorities, however, it was relatively easy to evade censorship, especially since local enforcement was often lax. Moreover, there were no laws requiring texts to be read by the authorities before publication.<sup>135</sup>

Interestingly, the Republic's lenience probably points more to the effectiveness of censorship, than to it being a dead letter. As Simon Groenveld reminds us, not many authors and printers would unnecessarily endanger themselves and their businesses by publishing libel. To a considerable extent, the press was therefore regulated by self-censorship.<sup>136</sup> In times of political stability, it was unusual and rather frowned upon to criticize the authorities in print.<sup>137</sup> Only when political power became contested, most notably during the recurring struggles between Statist and Orangist regent factions—one of which will be examined in Chapter 3—did pamphleteers begin to besmear each other's political elites in public.<sup>138</sup> The prevalent historiographical focus on the printed polemic surrounding the Republic's domestic political crises is therefore understandable, but also sketches a somewhat unrepresentative picture of the role of public opinion in everyday politics.

It appears that the Dutch authorities were even less concerned by printed opinion about foreign governments. Both the States of Holland and the States General recurrently issued placards against insulting neighboring and friendly heads of state—a similar law is still in force in the Netherlands today.<sup>139</sup> At times, foreign ambassadors appealed to these placards, but the

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<sup>133</sup> R. Robertson, *Censorship and conflict in England. The subtle art of division* (University Park, PA, 2009) pp. 197–208.

<sup>134</sup> E. van Gelder, *Getemperde vrijheid. Een verhandeling over de verhouding van kerk en staat in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden en de vrijheid van meningsuiting in zake godsdienst, drukpers en onderwijs, gedurende de 17<sup>e</sup> eeuw* (Groningen, 1972), pp. 154–161.

<sup>135</sup> Harline, *Pamphlets, printing*, p. 128–129; relatively few works were banned after publication. See I. Weekhout, *Boekencensuur in de noordelijke Nederlanden. De vrijheid van de drukpers in de zeventiende eeuw* (The Hague, 1998).

<sup>136</sup> S. Groenveld, 'The Mecca of authors? States assemblies and censorship in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic', in A. Duke and C. Tamse (eds.), *Too mighty to be free. Censorship and the press in Britain and the Netherlands* (Zutphen, 1987), p. 80.

<sup>137</sup> H. Helmers, 'Popular participation and public debate', in Helmers and Janssen (eds.), *Cambridge companion*, pp. 136–137.

<sup>138</sup> The most notable example of this has been well-studied by Reinders, *Gedrukte chaos*; for an extensive study of Orangist printed opinion see Stern, *Orangism in the Dutch Republic*.

<sup>139</sup> See 'Voorstel van wet van het lid Verhoeven tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht en het Wetboek van Strafrecht BES teneinde enkele bijzondere bepalingen inzake belediging van staatshoofden en andere publieke personen en instellingen te doen vervallen', Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Kamerstuk kst–

Dutch authorities only tried to enforce censorship about foreign issues—usually to little avail—if they believed it could harm diplomatic relations or incite foreign retaliation.<sup>140</sup> It is quite possible that pamphleteers practiced a similar restraint when it came to friendly powers, which will be addressed in Chapter 3. Most of the persecutions discussed in this study, however, were not enacted by allies of the Dutch Republic.

The internationalization of the historiography of the public sphere does not mean that historians now deny the importance of national boundaries in printed political debate. On the contrary, it has given rise to new questions as to how people negotiated their religious, civic, or national identity in relation to the world beyond their states' borders. Recently, Helmer Helmers has examined how Dutch, English, and Scottish pamphleteers expanded public debate about the English Civil War to the United Provinces and hotly contested its religious and national identity. Helmers has compellingly shown how international pamphleteering could lead to unexpected political allegiances. After the execution of Charles I, opinion makers in the Dutch Republic—‘ostensibly the logical continental ally of the new, equally Protestant English Republic’—almost univocally supported the Stuart monarchy against Cromwell's Reformed republic.<sup>141</sup>

This dissertation hypothesizes that topical religious persecutions provided crucial opportunities for opinion makers to negotiate the Dutch Republic's religious and political identity. Within Europe's master narratives of confessional strife, the persecution of religious minorities played a central role.<sup>142</sup> The sixteenth-century martyr books by Jean Crespin, John Foxe, and Adriaan van Haemstede provided a literary canon for a transnational Reformed cultural memory—as did Catholic and Lutheran martyr books for their own respective flocks.<sup>143</sup> Beyond the realm of cultural memory, a transnational sentiment of religious belonging was also shaped by the harsh realities of forced migration, which religious

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34456–B, 5 July 2018, Eerste Kamer der Staten–Generaal, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34456-B.html>

<sup>140</sup> For an elaborate discussion see J. Koopmans, *Early modern media and the news in Europe. Perspectives from the Dutch angle* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2018), pp. 282–302.

<sup>141</sup> Helmers, *Royalist republic*, p. 8.

<sup>142</sup> See, for instance, Claydon, *Europe and the making of England*, pp. 58–61.

<sup>143</sup> B. Gregory, *Salvation at stake. Christian martyrdom in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1999).

intolerance continued to bring in its wake.<sup>144</sup> Heavy persecution in different parts of Europe throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had created a Reformed diaspora in safe havens, such as London, Amsterdam, and Geneva, which were well connected with other parts of the Calvinist world.<sup>145</sup> As Carolyn Chappell Lougee, Johannes Müller, and David van der Linden have shown, subsequent generations of exiles cultivated their history of persecution as a central part of their religious and civic identity.<sup>146</sup> Such pride found confirmation in Scripture; the New Testament repeatedly reminded the followers of Christ that the true Church was a persecuted church. The cherished memory of persecution recurrently inspired people to action. Ole Peter Grell has masterfully demonstrated that in the first half of the seventeenth century notable merchant families with an exile history used their extensive European networks within the Reformed diaspora to start fundraisers for persecuted brethren in the faith in places like the Palatinate and Ireland and put their fates on local political agendas.<sup>147</sup>

But not everyone could easily trace a personal genealogy of past persecution. The Dutch Reformed were (un)fortunate enough to be members of a Church that was supported rather than oppressed by the state in which they lived. Yet that did not stop them from cherishing the memory of a troublesome past. As Judith Pollmann, Erika Kuijpers, and others have shown, the hardships of the Inquisition and the Dutch Revolt were deeply engrained in the United Provinces' cultural memory.<sup>148</sup> Individuals, groups, and communities shaped and negotiated their identity by invoking the memories of their relation with the Revolt and past

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<sup>144</sup> For a recent overview see N. Terpstra, *Religious refugees in the early modern world. An alternative history of the Reformation* (Cambridge, 2015).

<sup>145</sup> Heiko Oberman calls the Calvinist Reformation a 'Reformation of Refugees'; H.A. Oberman, 'Europa afflicta. The Reformation of the refugees', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 83 (1992), pp. 91–111; for exile identities see Johannes Müller, *Exile memories and the Dutch Revolt. The narrated diaspora, 1550–1750* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2016).

<sup>146</sup> Müller, *Exile memories*; D. van der Linden, *Experiencing exile. Huguenot refugees in the Dutch Republic, 1680–1700* (Farnham, 2015). For the Dutch Revolt and Catholic experiences of exile see G. Janssen, *The Dutch Revolt and Catholic exile in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2014).

<sup>147</sup> O. Grell, *Brethren in Christ. A Calvinist network in Reformation Europe* (Cambridge, 2012).

<sup>148</sup> E. Kuijpers, J. Pollmann, J. Müller, and J. van der Steen (eds.), *Memory before modernity. Practices of memory in early modern Europe* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2013); J. Pollmann, *Memory in early modern Europe, 1500–1800* (Oxford, 2017); J. van der Steen, *Memory wars in the Low Countries, 1566–1700* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2015); M. Eekhout, 'Material memories of the Dutch Revolt. The urban memory landscape in the Low Countries, 1566–1700' (unpublished PhD thesis, 2014); G. Janssen, 'The republic of the refugees. Early modern migrations and the Dutch experience', *The Historical Journal* 60–1 (2017), pp. 233–252.

suffering that had led to the formation of their state.<sup>149</sup> This past was by no means conceived of exclusively in religious terms. On the contrary, throughout the seventeenth century it remained hotly debated whether the Dutch Revolt had been a war of religion between the true faith and the Antichrist or a war for ‘liberty’ that transcended confessional divides. Both interpretations, however, were sympathetic to a civic identity based on reverence for the forefathers who had suffered and fought against a persecuting enemy.<sup>150</sup>

Tensions between political and religious identity also permeated discussions about Golden Age politics. The Dutch Republic offered limited religious tolerance to its subjects, granting freedom of conscience, which they regarded as a foundational principle of the state, but not freedom of worship. For most of the seventeenth century, the religious pluriformity of Dutch society was tolerated but not celebrated.<sup>151</sup> The Calvinist Church was hegemonic whereas Catholicism—professed by almost half of the Republic’s population—was officially forbidden. After 1618 Catholics were excluded from public office.<sup>152</sup> Jonathan Israel aptly summarizes that the United Provinces’ religious culture was ultimately marked by ‘ambivalent semi-tolerance [...] [and] seethed with tension’.<sup>153</sup> The Dutch realized that their multiconfessional society contrasted sharply with the ideal of confessional unity that many

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<sup>149</sup> J. Pollmann, ‘Met grootvaders bloed bezegeld. Over religie en herinneringscultuur in de zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlanden’, *De Zeventiende Eeuw* 29–2 (2013), pp. 154–175.

<sup>150</sup> See also S. Schama, *The embarrassment of riches. An interpretation of Dutch culture in the Golden Age* (London, 1987), pp. 51–125.

<sup>151</sup> B. Kaplan, ‘“Dutch” religious toleration. Celebration and revision’, in R. Po–Chia Hsia and H. van Nierop (eds.), *Calvinism and religious toleration in the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 8–26; C. Berkvens–Stevelinck, J. Israel, and G. Posthumus Meyjes (eds.), *The emergence of tolerance in the Dutch Republic* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 1997); M. Gijswijt–Hofstra (ed.), *Een schijn van verdraagzaamheid. Afwijking en tolerantie in Nederland van de zestiende eeuw tot beden* (Hilversum, 1989); for a European perspective of tolerance see Kaplan, *Divided by faith*.

<sup>152</sup> For the relation between Calvinists and Catholics in Holland see C. Kooi, *Calvinists and Catholics during Holland’s Golden Age. Heretics and idolaters* (Cambridge, 2012); for Catholicism in the Dutch Republic see C.H. Parker, *Faith on the margins. Catholics and Catholicism in the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge, 2008); P. Polman, *Katholieke Nederland in de achttiende eeuw*, 3 vols (Hilversum, 1968); L.J. Rogier, *Geschiedenis van het katholicisme in Noord–Nederland in de zestiende en zeventiende eeuw*, 3 vols. (Amsterdam, 1947). The recognition of Catholics as a religious community in the second half of the seventeenth century led to new ambiguities. On the one hand, they were now allowed to organize themselves. On the other hand, they were subjected to new forms of institutionalized discrimination; G. Yasuhira, ‘Confessional coexistence and perceptions of the “public”. Catholics’ agency in negotiations on poverty and charity in Utrecht, 1620s–1670s’, *BMGN—Low Countries Historical Review* 132–4 (2017), pp. 3–24; J. Spaans, ‘Katholieken onder curatele. Katholieke armenzorg als ingang voor overheidsbemoedienis in Haarlem in de achttiende eeuw’, *Trajecta* 3 (1994), pp. 110–130.

<sup>153</sup> J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness, and fall, 1477–1806* (Oxford, 1995), p. 372.

other European states cherished. For some, it remained a subject of embarrassment and self-criticism. By around 1648, however, others began to take pride in their tolerance.<sup>154</sup>

Past persecution and subsequent tolerance were thus part of what Simon Schama has identified as ‘patriotic scripture’, the stories which some Dutchmen and women told themselves and others to construct their national identity.<sup>155</sup> As Jasper van der Steen and Donald Haks have recently shown, patriotic stories about the Revolt could become powerful political tools. Government authorities and other political interest groups frequently deployed the cultural memories of persecution to legitimate or criticize both domestic and foreign policy.<sup>156</sup> Moreover, as we have discussed above, international confessional solidarity played a considerable role in (the evaluation of) foreign politics.

Although research suggests that the memories of the Revolt to a considerable extent shaped Dutch perspectives on the world across their borders, we know strikingly little about how the Dutch perceived the persistence of religious intolerance in other parts of Europe.<sup>157</sup> Indeed, it is well known that many Dutch cities opened their parts to tens of thousands of Huguenot refugees in the 1680s, hoping for an influx of skilled labor and capital.<sup>158</sup> Yet what the Dutch knew about the reasons that caused these men and women to flee, or the fate of those who were left behind, remains unclear. More importantly, whether opinion makers mainly identified with persecuted Protestants on the basis of shared confession—following the logic of a ‘Protestant internationalism’—is a question that remains to be answered. To understand this, we need to distinguish between the different stakeholders at play. In many cases, it is impossible to retrieve the exact identity of pamphleteers, because they often hid behind anonymity. Still, as we will see, the vantage points from which anonymous authors wrote often gives a clear indication of their background. Dutch authors usually had other reasons for discussing instances of religious repression abroad than persecuted minorities who turned to the Dutch printing presses to make their plight known.

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<sup>154</sup> Kaplan, “‘Dutch’ religious toleration’, p. 9.

<sup>155</sup> Schama, *Embarrassment of riches*, pp. 51–125.

<sup>156</sup> Van der Steen, *Memory wars in the Low Countries*; Haks, *Vaderland en Vrede*.

<sup>157</sup> See Benjamin Schmidt’s excellent study on Dutch perceptions of the New World: B. Schmidt, *Innocence abroad. The Dutch imagination and the New World, 1570–1670* (Cambridge, 2001).

<sup>158</sup> Van der Linden, *Experiencing exile*.

For the latter group, the Dutch Republic was also an important place for public appeal. In a recent article, Helmer Helmers adopted the term ‘public diplomacy’ from political scientists as a heuristic tool to understand how ambassadors managed international relations and influence foreign policy by employing the press to communicate with foreign audiences—rather than through the secret peer-to-peer contact on which the historiography of diplomacy has traditionally focused.<sup>159</sup> Tying in with recent efforts to include non-state actors—such as merchants, cities and religious orders—in the history of early modern diplomacy, Helmers suggests that news media might even replace ambassadors, especially for actors lacking official diplomatic representation.<sup>160</sup> Writing from the perspective of today’s world, the political scientist Teresa La Porte contends that one can duly speak of public diplomacy whenever ‘non-state actors have a basic organization, clear objectives, stable representation and coordinated activity’.<sup>161</sup> This study will investigate whether persecuted minorities fell within this category and partook in the world of European diplomacy through publicity. It builds on the hypothesis that if they did, the Dutch Republic, with its myriad of printing presses and political office holders, must have been a logical place to do so.

This dissertation is divided into six chapters, taking up four episodes of religious persecution in different parts of Europe between 1655 and 1725—the conclusion will briefly discuss a fifth episode that occurred in 1745. Chapter 1 will examine the publicity campaign that the Waldensians in Piedmont initiated after experiencing a massacre committed by the army of their sovereign Charles Emmanuel II, Duke of Savoy, in 1655. By seeking international attention, the Waldensians assumed political agency and engaged in public diplomacy. By exploring the channels of communication between exiled ministers in the Alps and the Dutch printing presses, the first chapter explores the role of publicizing as an act of political agency in relation to other forms of international political communication. Chapter 2 stays with the Waldensians, providing an analysis of the pamphlets that helped turn a local crackdown into

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<sup>159</sup> H. Helmers, ‘Public diplomacy in early modern Europe. Towards a new history of news’, *Media History* 22–3/4 (2016), pp. 401–420.

<sup>160</sup> See M. Ebben and L. Sicking, ‘Nieuwe diplomatieke geschiedenis van de premoderne tijd. Een inleiding’, *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 127–4 (2014), pp. 541–552.

<sup>161</sup> T. La Porte, ‘The impact of ‘intermestic’ non–state actors on the conceptual framework of public diplomacy’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7 (2012), pp. 449–450.

an international cause célèbre. It will examine how the Piedmont Easter, as the massacre came to be called, was evaluated in reference to the normative principles which have been outlined above. This chapter investigates why Waldensian pamphleteers tried to frame their persecution as a humanitarian disaster rather than a confessional conflict and how the massacre was subsequently reframed and appropriated by Dutch pamphleteers for a Dutch audience.

Chapters 3 and 4 tackle the publicity surrounding the persecution of the Huguenots in the years preceding and following the prohibition of Protestantism in France with Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In contrast to the events in Piedmont in 1655 discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, there was limited public attention for the persecution of the early 1680s. We will see that publicity strongly depended on whether the persecuted themselves regarded publicity desirable, to attain their political ends. Only at a later stage, when domestic and international political circumstances changed, did Huguenot authors and foreign governments begin to take up their pens and polemicize against the persecutory measures of Louis XIV. It will be demonstrated that polemic about the persecutions remained asymmetrical, with foreign observers and refugees attacking what could be regarded as the representative *Öffentlichkeit* of the French court. Finally, Chapter 4 will also explore how the Revocation revived old questions about Europe's confessional divides.

The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes ultimately paved the way to France's last war of religion. The relation between international publicity and political action during the War of the Camisards will be explored in Chapter 5. It will demonstrate that pamphlets not only reflected on events, but were meant to incite people to action. One conclusion will be that it was not only diplomats who engaged in 'public diplomacy'. It was also practiced by various other actors who assumed an unauthorized voice within IR.

Sometimes, relatively small events turned into huge media sensations. Chapter 6 will analyze why this was the case with the Royal Prussian city of Toruń, where in 1724 eleven citizens were executed for their alleged involvement in an anti-Jesuit riot. In order to gain a better understanding of the links between 'Dutch' and 'international' or 'European' public opinion, publicity for the Tumult of Toruń in England and the Holy Roman Empire, alongside the Dutch Republic, will be brought into focus. This chapter will shed light on how Toruń became a case from which Europe's religio-political issues were negotiated as a whole.

The conclusion of this book will begin with an analysis of two counter cases which came before and after the main cases discussed in Chapters 1 to 6. Between 1648 and 1657 tens of thousands of Jews perished in Ukraine, where they were actively persecuted during the Cossack Khmelnytsky Uprising. In 1745, about one hundred years later, Maria Theresia expelled all Jews from Bohemia. Reflecting upon the limited response of the Dutch press to these cases, we will come to see that, then as now, inclusive political vocabulary does not guarantee attention for all kinds of human suffering.

It is important to keep in mind that the cases that this study comprises were by no means the only religious persecutions that were publicized in Protestant Europe: The Waldensians were not only persecuted in 1655, but also in the 1660s, the 1680s, and the 1730s;<sup>162</sup> The persecution of Hungarian Calvinist ministers by the Habsburgs in the 1670s received considerable public attention and ultimately led to a Dutch intervention and the celebrated liberation of 26 Calvinist galley slaves by admiral Michiel de Ruyter.<sup>163</sup> In 1731, the expulsion of 20,000 Protestants from Salzburg led to an impressive outpouring of pamphlets, most of which originated in Prussia—whereas there were surprisingly few Dutch news media commenting on the matter.<sup>164</sup> Many more persecutions of varying degrees and scope could be named, the printed echoes of which all merit investigation. After all, this study will show that the complex interplay between the agency of the persecuted, the appropriation of the news by opinion makers, and the international (religio)political circumstances guaranteed that different persecutions were always discussed through very different patterns of argumentation. However, I have prioritized the thorough investigation of a limited number of cases, spread out over a relatively long timeframe, over an exhaustive account of all instances of persecution and their printed echo in the Dutch Republic. The snapshots 1655, 1680-88, 1702-05, 1725, and 1745 largely cover the persecutions with which the Dutch were most concerned and have good intervals to track potential changes in political argumentation.

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<sup>162</sup> G. Audisio, *The Waldensian dissent. Persecution and survival, c. 1170–c. 1570* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 207–214.

<sup>163</sup> For a good overview of the international reactions to this episode see G. Murdock, 'Responses to Habsburg persecution of Protestants in seventeenth-century Hungary', *Austrian History Yearbook* 40 (2009), pp. 37–52.

<sup>164</sup> See G. Turner, *Die Heimat nehmen wir mit. Ein Beitrag zur Auswanderung Salzburger Protestanten im Jahr 1732, ihrer Ansiedlung in Ostpreußen und der Vertreibung in 1944/45* (Berlin, 2008); C. Lindenmeyer and G. Florey, *Geschichte der Salzburger Protestanten und ihrer Emigration 1731/21* (Graz, 1977).