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Nationalism between Regionalism and Transnational
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<center>Chapter Eleven</center>

<center>**The Spatial Turn and the History of Nationalism: Nationalism between Regionalism and Transnational Approaches**</center>

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Introduction

Most historians today agree that nations are constructed and their borders largely arbitrary. So, why should we study nationalism by limiting ourselves to the boundaries of existing nation-states or nationalist movements? In fact, since the 1990s historians have been analysing the interaction between local, regional and national identities, mostly by concentrating on the territorial identification processes in a specific city or region. Other scholars examined trans-border influences on the nation-building process by focusing on the role of emigrants, borders, transfers or the impact of foreign scholars and tourists. As a consequence, nationalism is now being studied at various geographical levels besides the traditional emphasis on the nation itself: the local, the regional, the transnational and the global (which will be the topic of chapter twelve). This chapter aims to provide an overview of the impact of the 'spatial turn' on the history of nationalism.

Globalisation and the spatial turn

The spatial turn in the humanities and social sciences can be understood as a reaction to the globalisation that rapidly gained momentum after 1989. During the Cold War, the division of the world in the capitalist West, the communist Eastern Bloc and the Third World was taken for granted and there seemed to be no signs of imminent change. The basic units of the three blocks were independent nation-states. Ethnic strife and secessionist movements still existed, but apart from a few unsatisfied regions in the West – such as Quebec or the Basque Country – this was largely limited to the new nation-states in Africa and Asia.

This stable worldview was shattered by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. It seemed as if the lid of the pressure cooker had been removed as ethnic rivalries boiled over in various parts of the world. In the Eastern Bloc, the Soviet-Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, which for decades had given the impression of being successful nation-states, fell apart within a few years. At the same time, regionalist and separatist movements became more active within the West. Existing regionalist (or nationalist) parties scored electoral victories and were joined by new ones, such as the Lega Nord in Italy. In the Third World, separatist movements saw new opportunities and Eritrea, East Timor and South-Sudan gained independence. The borders of existing nation-states were no longer inviolable.

The nation-state was also undermined by the increasing globalisation of the economy. Neo-liberal reforms, which from the late 1980s were adopted by most democracies, opened up protected markets and led to increased international competition, large-scale privatizations, the curtailing of the welfare state, the liberalization of financial markets and large scale relocations of industries. Moreover, international corporations and banks seemed to have more power than many nation-states, particularly the smaller ones. Other factors that undermined the central role of nation-states were the rapid increase of travel and migration, the invention of the internet and the growing importance of international organisations such as the European Union. At the same time, global shifts of (economic) power became obvious. In the 1990s, the Soviet Union disappeared as a superpower, while the spectacular economic growth of China began to undermine the dominance of the West.

Many people, at least initially, viewed the growing interconnectedness of the world and the end of the strict divide between East and West with optimism and this was reflected in the

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popularity of ideas about the 'global village' (McLuhan), the 'death of distance' (Cairncross) or even the 'end of history' (Fukuyama). Others however doubted whether globalisation and the communications revolution would result in a more homogenous and uniform world. In any case, these developments shattered the self-evident nature of nation-states as the primary independent actors on the global stage.

A growing number of scholars now became aware that in a world in flux it is not logical anymore to use the nation-state as an abstract and fixed geographical container and continue to use it unreflexively as the main unit of analysis in the humanities and social sciences. As a consequence, in the 1990s a reaction began to develop, which is part of a broader 'spatial turn'. The roots for this new critical understanding of space can be found in France, where in the 1970s the Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre and the Jesuit Michel de Certeau began to oppose the strong focus on language and discourse by poststructuralists, such as Michel Foucault.

Lefebvre was an unorthodox Marxist, with a strong interest in the impact of capitalism on everyday life, who as a professor of sociology at the University of Nanterre would be a direct source of inspiration for the May 1968 student revolt. In 1974, Lefebvre published *The Production of Space*, in which he criticized poststructuralism for only exploring abstract mental spaces, while ignoring the social spaces where language and discourse had practical effects. He also deplored the disciplinary division between architects, urbanists and regional planners, which each study and act upon a specific spatial domain. Moreover by working within the constraints of capitalist society, they serve the interests of the dominant classes. Lefebvre argued that the interaction between physical, mental and social spaces should be studied together by examining the production of space. Scholars should not focus on the location of things in space and try to come to a rational use of space devising models and typologies, but study the genesis of actual spaces, thus historicizing space. By uncovering the homogenizing forces of capitalism, Lefebvre hoped to stimulate acts of social resistance in which inhabitants, users and artists would struggle to re-appropriate and diversify spaces in everyday life.[1]

Michel de Certeau came from a very different tradition. He was a sociologist from a Catholic background, but was also fascinated by the psychoanalysis of Freud and Lacan. Like Lefebvre, he criticized post-structuralism for favouring discourse over daily life and social practices. Whereas Michel Foucault had focused on the mechanisms of power and discipline,[2] Certeau turned his attention to the way individuals respond to them. Thus, in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, which was first published in 1980, he argued that people are not spineless victims of oppression or passive consumers, but can in their daily activities subvert, manipulate or evade the mechanisms of discipline, as does anyone who makes a ramble in a city. Walkers accept the lay-out and concrete forms of the city, but take their own route, while making detours and finding shortcuts that were not foreseen by the planners. Thus, every inhabitant or visitor experiences the space of the city in his or her own way. Certeau distinguished between the long-term 'strategies' of institutions, governments, enterprises and other powerful bodies to influence the behaviour of the population and the 'tactics' used by individuals in all kinds of everyday practices, such as dwelling, shopping, walking and talking, to manipulate events and seize the opportunities thus created.[3] In his analysis of society Certeau accordingly prioritized individual agency and concrete places over long-term developments and the structural limitations of discourse, which had been the focus of Foucault. In the 1990s these ideas of both Lefebvre and Certeau were taken over and adapted by geographers like Edward Soja – who

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[1] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford, 1991).
[2] See chapter by Elgenius.
[3] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley, 1984) pp. xi-xxiv.

introduced the term 'spatial turn' – David Harvey and Doreen Massey, while scholars from other disciplines did the same.[4]

In fact, the spatial turn entails four related ideas which are relevant for historians. The first is that space is not an empty, abstract entity, but that it is understood and used differently in different periods and by different people. Thus, place is not a neutral, empty space, but socially constructed, or produced over time as Lefebvre would argue. A second, related idea is that space is made, reproduced and transformed in daily life. What is of interest in both cases is not geometrical space, like the coordinates of a specific location on the globe, but the way spaces are perceived and lived. A third idea, which is somewhat more controversial, is that spaces also have their own materiality that can enable or delimit certain uses. Rohkrämer and Schulz argue that it matters if someone lives in or experiences an Alpine landscape, an open plain or a forest. Others even plead for a 'moderate geographical materialism'.[5] In line with Massey, I would add a fourth idea that place should not be seen as something static and closed in itself but as a meeting place of movements, communications and networks of social relations.[6]

The first idea of space as a social construct is already part of mainstream nationalism studies since the breakthrough of the modernist and constructivist approaches,[7] although this is now also applied to other territorial units, while the second idea that space is transformed in daily life permeates almost all contributions discussed in this chapter. Most authors conduct a detailed case-study in which they implicitly agree with Certeau by not presenting their objects of analysis as passive victims of a nation-building process that was imposed on them from above, but by focusing on the agency they had and on the 'tactics' people used to adapt the national policies and projects to their own needs. The third idea of a geographical materialism is not very popular among historians dealing with territorial identity construction. Although recently Andreas Wimmer has argued that geographical conditions influences state-building processes that in the long term had an impact on the feasibility of well-functioning nation-states. Thus, the presence of high mountains or inhospitable deserts make it more difficult for peasants to avoid taxation and thus favours the construction of centralized states, while rugged terrain can be an obstacle for efficient communications needed for state-building.[8] The fourth idea, however, that nation-states (or regions) should not be studied as self-contained entities seems to have been widely accepted by almost all authors analysed here.

The spatial turn has been a source of inspiration for many different disciplines and the study of a broad range of topics, but it also had a direct impact on the study of nationalism and national identity construction by a number of social scientists. Highly innovative in this sense is the geographer Anssi Paasi, who in his *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness* (1996) combined a long-term analysis of the production of the space of the Finnish nation-state with a more concrete focus on current-day social practices and individual 'life-histories'. According to him it is crucial to distinguish between the historical construction of a nation or a region – by drawing boundaries and providing it with symbols and institutions – and the way the inhabitants identify with it through their concrete experiences. In order to study this

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[4] Barney Warf and Santa Arias (eds.), *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (London & New York, 2009); Jörg Döring and Tristan Thielmann (eds.), *Spatial Turn. Das Raumparadigma in den Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften* (Bielefeld, 2008).
[5] See: Thomas Rohkrämer and Felix Robin Schulz, 'Space, Place and Identities' *History Compass* 7 (2009) pp. 1338-49; Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, 'Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization' *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010) pp. 149-70. Leif Jerram, 'Space: A Useless Category for Historical Analysis?' *History and Theory* 52 (2013) pp. 400-19.
[6] Doreen Massey, *Space, Place and Gender* (Minneapolis 1994), pp. 146-57.
[7] See chapters by Breuilly and Wicke.
[8] Andreas Wimmer, *Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart* (Princeton 2018), pp. 171-208.

territorialisation of space he focuses on the Finnish perceptions of and experiences with the Russian border and first examines the institutionalization of Finnish territory and its boundaries in official discourse, but also in such heterogeneous sources as periodicals, textbooks, religious hymns and photographs. In addition, he explores how the boundaries were reproduced and transformed in people's everyday life in the border community of Värtsilä. This industrial town was divided between the Soviet-Union and Finland after the latter's defeat in 1944 and Finland subsequently had to resettle about 420,000 citizens who left the territories that were ceded to the victor. Through several fieldtrips and dozens of interviews he found that the younger generations, who had no personal memories of the lost homelands, quickly adapted to the new situation and as a consequence developed different 'territorial identities' than the older inhabitants.[9]

In his *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life* (2002), the sociologist Tim Edensor focuses on the reproduction of national identities in current-day social spaces. In this stimulating book, he argues that national identity is not something fixed; it is represented and performed in all kinds of practices, which are all related to each other. Thus national identity can be reproduced at iconic sites such as the Taj Mahal or the Sydney Opera House, but also at home and in quotidian spaces such as a prairie farm or a red telephone box. The same way, the nation can be performed at several levels; by participating in national holidays, by cheering the national team at the Olympic Games, but also by Turkish wrestling, having a Guinness beer at an Irish pub or enjoying a Finnish sauna. The nation is also represented in film, on websites and in other media. The same is true with objects, which often are associated with nations, from masterpieces of art to cars and sausages. Thus, if we want to know how national identities are constructed and reconstructed on a daily basis we also have to pay attention to popular culture, mundane spaces and all kinds of banal practices.[10]

Social scientists usually focus on recent periods while conducting surveys and interviews to examine actual life-histories, which is much more difficult for the distant past. As a result, when studying the way people (re-) construct their sense of the nation most historians concentrate on small communities and the role of all kinds of associations – which have produced enough primary source material – rather than on the quotidian experiences of individuals. Strikingly, until very recently they did not include direct references to the spatial turn. Most scholars asserted that they merely applied Anderson's concept of 'imagined community' or Hobsbawm's 'invention of tradition' to a case-study in order to empirically assess how the nation-building process functioned in a specific region or border community. Thus, their approach can be defined as constructivist and they generally also accepted the view that nationalism was essentially a modern phenomenon. Nonetheless, most of them did not see modernization as an automatic or teleological process. They also moved away from the post-structuralist emphasis on discourse and narrative and preferred to examine the role of agency, social practices and everyday life. The influence of the spatial turn, however, is most obvious in their unease about nationalism and nation-building as being processes that operated in the supposedly uniform and homogenous space of the nation-state.

Unlike most of the other chapters in this volume, which focus on a relatively limited number of path-breaking studies, in my field there are almost no classic interpretations with a global impact. Particularly in the studies that explore the interaction between local, regional and national identities there are even various disconnected historiographical traditions. As a result, I will discuss a relatively large number of case studies, beginning with those that focus on the countryside, then regional and local case studies, and finally those that deal with transnational influences.

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[9] Anssi Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border* (Chichester, 1996).

[10] Tim Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life* (Oxford, 2002).

Agency in the countryside

Inspired by modernization theories, an older generation of scholars, such as Eugen Weber, had presented nation-building as a process of assimilation imposed from above.[11] However, from the late 1980s this view has been criticized in a growing number of regional case studies that showed that the inhabitants of rural areas did not undergo this process passively and, as a consequence, that national integration and homogenization was not an almost automatic process. By awarding agency to the rural population, scholars in fact argued that the nation-building process did not operate in the homogenous space of the existing nation-state, but that the nation was made, reproduced and transformed at a local level as well. Thus, in 1993, Caroline Ford examined how Brittany became more integrated into France during the period 1890-1926. In her *Creating the Nation in Provincial France* she made clear that this happened largely as a local response to some of the more controversial policies of the left-wing governments of the Third Republic. New social-catholic parties and associations mobilized broad layers of the population in opposition to the anticlerical measures from Paris and by doing so integrated the region more thoroughly within the national political domain.[12] In a case study on the department of the Loire that appeared two years later, James Lehning equally asserted that peasants actively interacted with the state in matters concerning education, religion and politics. Inspired by anthropological approaches, he argued that during the nineteenth century the inhabitants of the countryside slowly became members of the French nation through a process of negotiation and adaptation.[13] By focusing on the response of local actors, both authors argued that the nation-building process did not have the same outcome everywhere.

Elsewhere, authors also began to pay attention to the agency of the rural population, some of whom even anticipated the studies by Ford and Lehning on France. Thus, Prasenjit Duara argued that the difficult transition to a modern nation-state in China could best be explained by zooming in on the local level. He does so by a detailed examination of the nation- and state-building process in six villages in Northern China between 1900 and 1942. Pressured both by nationalists at home and by imperialist encroachment from abroad, the national authorities attempted to strengthen their grip on the countryside. The taxes that had to fund the new agencies of the modernizing state, such as Western style education, a modern bureaucracy and up-to-date armed forces, had to be collected by the traditional local elites. Through their networks, informal relations and shared norms and beliefs they continued to control village life. However, this 'cultural nexus of power' broke down because the high demands that were placed on local society were not compensated by new, well-functioning state services.[14]

Florencia Mallon was clearly influenced by post-colonial studies and instead of looking at the role of local elites she focused on the agency of the rural 'subaltern classes'.[15] In her *Peasant and Nation* she ambitiously compared the nation-building process in two Mexican with two Peruvian rural areas. In the exceptional circumstances of national crisis and foreign invasion – the French intervention in Mexico in 1861 and the Chilean occupation of Peru between 1881 and 1884 – the rural population actively participated in the national struggle and in three of the regions under scrutiny they even developed their own form of peasant

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[11] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, 1976); see also the chapter by Breuilly.

[12] Caroline Ford, *Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany* (New Haven, 1993).

[13] James R. Lehning, *Peasant and French: Cultural Contact in Rural France during the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1995).

[14] Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (Stanford, 1988).

[15] See chapter by Seth.

nationalism by embracing the idea of citizenship and legal equality. However, the effects of this rural activism were quite different in the two countries. In Mexico, the memories of this 'alternative national-democratic' project were revived under Porfirio Díaz and during the Mexican Revolution, while in Peru the irregular peasant forces were repressed by the national authorities and in the 1890s the suffrage was restricted, converting the indigenous population of the countryside effectively into second-rate citizens.[16]

Although Keely Stauter-Halsted also focused on the role of peasants in *The Nation in the Village*, like most other scholars writing on the nation-building process in East-Central Europe, she did not concentrate much on modern citizenship, but on inter-ethnic rivalry. The emancipation of the serfs in 1848 profoundly transformed social relations in the Galician countryside. The dependency of the peasants on their former lords diminished substantially and they now had to deal directly with Austrian officials. Nonetheless, changes did not happen overnight and it took decades before a modern, rural public sphere was in place. Education, military service, emigration, electoral campaigns, new associations and the rural press all played a role in bringing the peasants into contact with a wider world. However, this modernization process also meant that peasants were mobilized along national lines, while relations between the Poles, Jews, Germans and Ruthenians became tenser. However, as the author argues, the 'discovery' of the Polish nation by the peasants also implied the adaptation of the national idea to a broader public. Thus more attention was given to the needs of the poorer members of the national community living outside of the major cities, while including rural folk culture into a new and broader conception of the Polish nation.[17]

Regional and local identities
While these authors uncovered the role of peasants in the nation-building process, others focused on the interaction between local, regional and national identity formation. Scholars applying modernist or constructivist approaches had until the 1980s been concerned exclusively with nations, while implicitly assuming that separate regional economies, politics and cultures would slowly be absorbed by more encompassing nation-states. However, authors who applied a constructivist approach to smaller territorial entities found that regional identities did not disappear but were in fact strengthened by the rise of nationalism.

Surprisingly, several different historiographical traditions can be discerned. Authors dealing with the rather stable Western-European nation-states concentrated primarily on the role of regional identities in the nation-building process. In areas where state borders had been more fluid, such as Eastern Europe and large parts of Asia and Africa, scholars generally concentrated on the interaction and conflicts between different ethnic groups. In the Americas, where the nation-state generally was not contested, most attention was paid to racial discrimination and the formal or informal exclusion from citizenship of large parts of the population. Most of these studies deal with the period between 1870 and 1945 when nationalism became a mass-movement, although there are also scholars who concentrate on earlier periods[18] or on the more recent decades.[19]

Ground-breaking for Western-Europe was Celia Applegate's *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (1990). Instead of choosing one of the 'unhappy regions' or 'stateless nations', which in the neo-Marxist centre-periphery theory were interpreted as being

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[16] Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley, 1995).
[17] Keely Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland 1848-1918* (Ithaca, 2001).
[18] For instance: Katherine B. Aaslestad, *Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture and German Nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era* (Leiden, 2005).
[19] Rogers Brubaker, Margit Feinschmidt, Jon Fox and Liana Grancea, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton, 2006).

subordinate to the centre, she examined the construction of regional identity in the Palatinate, a rather nondescript region which in 1815 was added to the Kingdom of Bavaria and which, like the rest of Bavaria, became part of the new German Empire in 1871. In her monograph Applegate showed how regionalist sentiment did not disappear with German unification; on the contrary the identity of the region was more closely defined in the subsequent decades. Regionalist associations rapidly grew in number and membership. They were not part of a backward-looking movement, but constituted a modern and largely urban phenomenon. By encouraging the participation of wide strata of the population in collecting and preserving the regional heritage, they had clear egalitarian and democratic implications. They often even embraced the heritage of local minorities, such as the Jews. Love of the local *Heimat* was closely intertwined with loyalty to the German fatherland. What is more, the connection to the large and rather abstract nation was stimulated by strengthening the attachment to the more concrete heritage of regional folk custom, song, dance, dress and nature.[20]

Anne-Marie Thiesse, who a year later published her study on French regionalist literature, had a very different starting point, but her conclusions were similar to those of Applegate. Thiesse applied Bourdieu's theories about the literary field to regionalist literature by not focusing primarily on the aesthetic or ideological motives of the authors, but on their competition for scarce resources. She thus asserted that towards the end of the nineteenth century there was a broad 'réveil des provinces' that was caused by the broadening and democratization of the public sphere. Profiling oneself as a regional author came to be seen as a profitable strategy. However, she not only analysed the structural causes behind the rise of a new literary genre, she also discussed how the lost war against Prussia in 1870 and the concerns about the levelling effects of modernization led to growing calls for political decentralisation and a new interest in regional folklore, local history and vernacular traditions. Like in Germany, the new and rather diverse regionalist associations were instrumental in constructing new regional identities in all parts of France, thus not only in the unhappy or underprivileged regions.[21]

Both books provided the inspiration for a wave of case studies which focused on the regionalist movements and associations that were instrumental in constructing and disseminating a new awareness of the various regional identities. But even within Western Europe there were two largely separate historiographical traditions. Although in her first book on regionalism, Thiesse still very much underlined its cultural aspects, in *Ils apprenaient la France* (1997), she showed how, in reaction to the defeat of 1870, the Third Republic began to actively promote the exaltation of the regions in French primary education. In history and geography lessons France was explicitly presented as a union of diverse regions which all contributed in their own way to the greatness of the nation. The pupils studied their 'petit patrie' in order to better understand and love the 'grande Patrie'.[22] Likewise, most studies on French regionalism concentrate on the political integration of the regions in the nation and this also happened in neighbouring countries like Spain, Italy and Belgium.[23] Studies on Germany in turn focused on all kinds of associations and had a strong cultural focus. A cultural

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[20] Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, 1990). See also: Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill, 1997).

[21] Anne-Marie Thiesse, *Écrire la France. Le Mouvement littéraire régionaliste de la langue française entre la Belle Époque et la Libération* (Paris, 1991).

[22] Anne-Marie Thiesse, *Ils apprenaient la France. L'exaltation des régions dans le discours patriotique* (Paris, 1997).

[23] Xosé-Manoel Núñez, 'The Region as Essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840-1936)' *European History Quarterly* (2001), pp. 483-518; Stefano Cavazza, *Piccole Patrie. Feste popolari tra regione e nazione durante il fascismo* (Bologna, 1997); Maarten Van Ginderachter, *Le chant du coq. Nation et nationalisme en Wallonie depuis 1880* (Ghent, 2005).

interpretation of regionalism also seems to prevail in England, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands.[24]

Local and regional studies dealing with nation formation in East-Central Europe have made clear that the break-up of the so-called 'multi-ethnic' empires was not an automatic consequence of the modernization process. Interestingly, in a local case study of the impact of nationalism on the Bohemian city of Budweis/Budějovice between 1848 and 1948, Jeremy King also has a keen eye for those who were 'nationally uncommitted' and those who felt loyal to the Habsburg state. He argues against taking pre-existing ethnic identities for granted, as most scholars did, even if they embraced the constructivist view on national identity formation. Thus, in the early nineteenth century it was extremely difficult to distinguish between German and Czech Bohemians, since in both languages there was only one term to refer to them: *Böhme* and *Čech*. Many inhabitants of the town and the surrounding countryside were bilingual and many others were able to make themselves understood. Nonetheless, towards the end of the nineteenth century, inhabitants were increasingly forced to identify with one nationality, as associations, political parties and schools were organized along national lines. Geopolitical shifts, however, determined the fate of the town's inhabitants, as in 1918 they became citizens of a new, independent Czechoslovak Republic. Twenty years later Nazi Germany took over and the implementation of its racial policies indirectly resulted in the expulsion of all ethnic Germans after the end of the Second World War. However, part of the bilingual population switched sides and nationality; sometimes more than once, according to what was opportune.[25]

Other historians, such as Pieter Judson, James Bjork and Tara Zahra, also paid attention to those who – particularly in those parts of East-Central Europe where ethnic and religious cleavages did not overlap – had difficulties in defining themselves in ethnic terms or who were not enthusiastic nationalists, while coining the concept of 'national indifference' to cover this phenomenon. The emphasis of scholars on nationalist discourse, while ignoring myriad indifferent practices has led to an overvaluation of the strength of nationalism, at least until the First World War. Zahra even argues that the radicalization of the various nationalist movements in Austria-Hungary was largely caused by their relative failure in mobilizing the population.[26]

Most regional case-studies on Asia and Africa, like their counterparts in East-Central Europe, also focus on inter-ethnic strife. This can be illustrated with the case of India. In a monograph on the politics of nationality in Assam, which appeared in 1999, Sanjib Baruah argues that the rise of both the anti-colonial nationalism of the Indian National Congress and an Assamese 'imagined community' were the result of the modernization process during the colonial era. The expansion of the tea plantations caused the integration of the region within the capitalist market economy, while profoundly affecting the social structure of the population. Both an Assamese 'subnationalism' and a pan-Indian nationalism coexisted peacefully side by side until in the 1980s the United Liberation Front of Assam tried to 'restore' the region's 'lost independence'. This in turn triggered a reaction by some of the region's ethnic minorities, who now also demanded a separate state. In general, however, most inhabitants cherished their regional or ethnic 'subnationalism' while recognizing the existing framework

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[24] Robert Colls and Bill Lancaster (eds.), *Geordies: Roots of Regionalism* (Newcastle, 1992); Goffe Jensma, *Het rode tasje van Salverda. Burgerlijk bewustzijn en Friese identiteit in de negentiende eeuw* (Leeuwarden, 1998). F. Persson, *Skåne, den farliga halvön. Historia, identitet och ideologi, 1865-2000* (Lund, 2008).

[25] Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, 2002).

[26] Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontier of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, MA 2006); James E. Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor, 2008); Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands 1900-1948* (Ithaca, 2008); Tara Zahra, 'Imagined Non-Communities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis' *Slavic Review* (2010) pp. 93-119.

of the Indian nation-state.[27] Other scholars have studied the construction of other regional or subnational identities within India with a more cultural approach, focusing for instance on language, historical memory or religion, while largely confirming Baruah's view that these territorial identities were the product of modernization and developed alongside Indian nationalism.[28]

In the United States, the South is generally seen as a region with an outspoken identity, which was cultivated particularly after its failed attempt to secede from the Union during the American Civil War. As a result the field of Southern Studies is flourishing. The main topic here is the region's traditionalism (or economic backwardness) and the continuing presence of all forms of racial discrimination. Recently, more cultural approaches have also been applied, but apart from the issue of citizenship, the link with nationalism or nation-building is not explicitly made.[29]

Since in the rest of the Americas the nation or nation-state is generally not contested, while discrimination of indigenous groups, descendants of African slaves, and other people of colour is still very much an issue, regional case studies mainly focus on the relations between the different ethnic communities. Nancy Appelbaum's *Muddied Waters*, for instance, examines the construction of local and regional identities in Riosucio, a town in Colombia's western Coffee Region. The town was founded in 1819 by a 'black' and 'Indian' community, but during the nineteenth century 'white' migrants from the neighbouring department of Antioquia arrived in the region to domesticate an 'empty' wilderness in order to cultivate coffee. They quickly took over power at the municipal and provincial level and they generally presented the region's identity as modern and 'white'. The author, however, makes clear that this was neither a peaceful colonization of virgin lands by hard-working migrants, nor an 'invasion' of outsiders, since the already existing indigenous and black communities actively participated in the process of regional identity formation.[30]

However, there were also other ways of studying the construction of territorial identities in the Americas. In 2003, Robert Dorman published his *Revolt of the Provinces*. Similar to Thiesse, he analyses the rise of regionalist literature in the United States within a broad cultural context. He clearly shows that regionalism was not something that was confined to the South but that intellectuals, writers, folklorists, sociologists and architects all over the country were interested in rural traditions, the tribal cultures of Native Americans and the folklore of new immigrants. Dorman presents regionalism primarily as a reaction against the levelling impact of modernization and the destructive force of unbridled capitalism. Nevertheless, he also underlines that not all activists were nostalgic traditionalists; many of them collaborated actively in Roosevelt's New Deal and attempted to reform capitalism while taking into account regional differences.[31]

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[27] Sanjib Baruah, *India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality* (Philadelphia, 1999).

[28] Sumathi Ramaswamy, *Passions of the Tongue: Language Devotion in Tamil India, 1891-1970* (Berkeley, 1997); Yasmin Saikia, *Fragmented Memories: Struggling to be Tai-Ahom in India* (Durham, 2004); Prachi Deshpande, *Creative Pasts: Historical Memory and Identity in Western India, 1700-1960* (New York, 2007); Chitralekha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir* (London, 2004).

[29] See for instance Martyn Bone, Brian Ward and William A. Link (eds.), *Creating and Consuming the American South* (Gainesville, 2015). For the West see: David M. Wrobel, *Promised Lands: Promotion, Memory, and the Creation of the American West* (Lawrence, 2002). See for a similar study on the Brazilian South: Ruben Oliven, *Tradition Matters: Modern Gaucho Identity in Brazil* (translated from Portuguese; New York, 1996).

[30] Nancy P. Appelbaum, *Muddied Waters: Race, Region, and Local History in Colombia, 1846-1948* (Durham, 2003).

[31] Robert L. Dorman, *Revolt of the Provinces: The Regionalist Movement in America, 1920-1945* (Chapel Hill, 1993).

Scholars have also paid much attention to the construction of spatial identities of smaller regions and cities within the United States. Again the link with the nation-building process, which is so prominent in European case studies, is not explicitly addressed. In her *Inventing New England*, published in 1995, Dana Brown privileged economic actors and commercial motives over the initiatives and ideas of politicians and intellectuals, thus dealing with themes that would be highlighted by Edensor as well. She clearly showed how the growth of the tourism business during the nineteenth century transformed the image of New England as a highly industrialized region ridden with class conflict into a charming tourist destination, with beautiful fishing villages, rustic cottages and a peaceful countryside, thus profoundly affecting the region's identity.[32] In a similar way, Chris Magoc makes clear how Yellowstone, the world's first national park, became an iconic landscape through the efforts of railway companies, businessmen and local authorities. As a kind of illustration of the frontier myth, and against the backdrop of rather exceptional scenery, wild bison and Native Americans were converted into picturesque tourist objects.[33]

Also dealing with economic motives is Kolleen Guy's monograph *When Champagne became French*. In it she tells the sparkling story of the international success of champagne and its association with both the region and the nation. Around 1900 various groups of wine growers and the large trading houses violently clashed, particularly over the use of grapes and wine from outside the Champagne region. This was opposed by the farmers with the argument that true champagne could only be made with locally grown grapes. As a consequence, they obtained protective measures which after the First World War were extended as the *appelation d'origine contrôlée* to other regional agricultural specialties as well (primarily cheese and wine). This way champagne became closely connected to both the soil and identity of the region, while at the same time it was marketed as a quintessential French beverage.[34]

In the end, we can conclude that there are many similarities between the construction of regional or subnational identities and their relationship with the larger nation-building process in the various parts of the Americas, Europe and Asia. First of all, the rise of nationalism did not weaken existing regional identities; on the contrary, these were strengthened and more closely defined towards the end of the nineteenth century. Everywhere the interest in local history, vernacular traditions, folklore and the cultural and natural heritage of the region grew rapidly. It seemed that in most cases local and regional elites tried to advance the nation-building process by broadening and democratizing the national identity that had to be adopted by including the vernacular culture of the rural population within the national patrimony. Sometimes political considerations had the upper hand; in other cases cultural or even commercial motives seemed to have been more relevant. Nevertheless, almost all existing studies are still firmly embedded within a specific national context and historiographic tradition.

Unfortunately, apart from Mallon's book on Mexican and Peruvian peasant nationalism and a few edited volumes on regionalism in Europe, there are almost no comparative studies.[35] One of the few exceptions is *The Culture of Regionalism* in which Eric Storm compares regionalist painting, neo-vernacular architecture and regionalist exhibits in France, Germany

[32] Dona Brown, *Inventing New England: Regional Tourism in the Nineteenth Century* (Washington, 1995).

[33] Chris J. Magoc, *Yellowstone: The Creation and Selling of an American Landscape, 1870-1903* (Albuquerque, 1999). See also Chris Wilson, *The Myth of Santa Fe: Creating a Modern Regional Tradition* (Alburquerque, 1997); Angela M. Blake, *How New York became American: 1890-1924* (Baltimore, 2006).

[34] Kolleen M. Guy, *When Champagne became French: Wine and the Making of a National Identity* (Baltimore, 2003).

[35] Almost all chapters still deal with one national or regional case: Laurence Cole (ed.), *Different Paths to the Nation: Regional and National Identities in Central Europe and Italy, 1830-70* (Basingstoke, 2007); Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm (eds.), *Region and State in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism* (Basingstoke, 2012).

and Spain. In his monograph, he contradicts some of the findings of most existing case studies by arguing that the new interest in regional identities was not so much a 'revolt' or 'awakening' of the provinces, which can be explained from the particular national context, but an innovative cultural trend that arose almost simultaneously in different parts of Europe towards the end of the nineteenth century. Regionalist activists decisively broke with the conventional historicist and academic culture of the nineteenth century – which took the nation as its main frame of reference. As a result, the 'culture of regionalism' became its most important alternative during the first decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, he claims that the construction of regional identities and the integration of the regional cultural heritage within the patrimony of the nation was not primarily the work of local and regional elites, on the contrary many of its early promotors belonged to the highly cosmopolitan national artistic and intellectual elites. This novel interest in the 'authentic' vernacular culture of the countryside could therefore be interpreted as a new transnational phase in the nation-building process.[36]

Next to this comparative interpretation of regionalism as a cultural trend, there is another highly comparative research tradition that focuses more on institutional factors and that is largely dominated by social scientists. Their investigations deal with the 'Europe of the regions', that is to say the effects of the regional policies that were introduced by the European Economic Community in 1973 with the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund in order to reduce regional disparities in income and wealth. As a consequence, this approach privileges governance and economics over culture, while institutions receive more attention than actors from civil society. Michael Keating is probably the most important expert on this topic and in *The New Regionalism in Western Europe* he shows how from the 1970s onwards the need to attract investors and markets caused increased inter-regional competition, which led to active policies of 'region branding'. At the same time, the growing role of the European Union restructured the relations between the European Commission, the member states and the various sub-state regions. Regional councils administered the subsidies that were obtained from Brussels. This 'rescaling' implied that nation-states ceded power in some fields to the European Union, while devolving other responsibilities to regional or municipal bodies. Nevertheless, this was not a one-way process and in many instances national governments reasserted their position. Region branding, the empowerment of the region by the European Union and the growing assertiveness of some regions on the international stage can strengthen regional identities or reinforce a process of 'region-building', and in some cases even have a debilitating effect on existing nation-states.[37] Other authors have also stressed the role of globalization in stimulating a somewhat defensive and more cultural laden 'new regionalism', both in Europe as elsewhere.[38]

Transnational approaches
Possibly even more directly related to the new phase of globalization since 1989 is the rapidly growing interest in global flows and movements of goods, ideas and persons in earlier periods of time, which is now generally known as transnational history.[39] Many scholars are starting to

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[36] Eric Storm, *The Culture of Regionalism: Art, Architecture and International Exhibitions in France, Germany and Spain, 1890-1930* (Manchester, 2010); Xosé M. Núñez Seixas and Eric Storm (eds.), *Regionalism and Modern Europe: Identity Construction and Movements from 1890 to the Present Day* (London, 2019).
[37] Michael Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change* (Cheltenham, 1998); Michael Keating, *Rescaling the European State: The Making of Territory and the Rise of the Meso* (Oxford, 2013).
[38] Anssi Paasi, 'The Resurgence of the "Region" and "Regional Identity": Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Observations on Regional Dynamics in Europe' *Review of International Studies* (2009) pp. 121-46; Tim Oakes, 'China's Provincial Identities: Reviving Regionalism and Reinventing "Chineseness"' *Journal of Asian Studies* (2000) pp. 667-92.
[39] See Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History* (Basingstoke, 2013).

realize that trans-border movements had an impact on the rise and development of nationalism, the nation-building process and the construction of national identities around the globe. In fact, the new emphasis on transnational flows even entails a fundamental critique of the older, almost exclusive focus on the nation-state. Thus, in 2002 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller launched an attack on what they labelled 'methodological nationalism'. Although, they principally dissected the role of methodological nationalism in the social sciences and its impact on migration studies, their critique also applies to the discipline of history and the field of nationalism studies. They distinguish three forms of methodological nationalism. First of all classical social theory downplays the role of nationalism while considering it to be backward, but at the same time accepts a world divided into nation-states as a given. Secondly, sociologists equate society with national society and thus take nation-states as the 'naturally given entities of study'. Thirdly, in the social sciences the analytical focus is reduced to the boundaries of the nation-state and everything that extends 'over its borders was cut off analytically'. The consequence of this use of the nation-state as a container in which developments should be analysed was that trans-border migration was seen as an anomaly that – contrary to migration flows within the nation-state – should be controlled and monitored. Moreover, foreign migrants were presented as problematic. They either were 'uprooted' and implicitly supposed to return home, or should be naturalized and assimilate into the homogeneous national culture that presumably already existed within the host country.[40]

The awareness that transnational influences had been ignored has led scholars dealing with nationalism to direct their attention beyond the existing borders. This can be done by concentrating on the role of migrants, but has expressed itself in other ways as well. Some historians focus on the role of borderlands, others look at transfers and transnational networks, while another group deals with foreign influences on the nation-building process. In all cases, scholars examine how local, regional and transnational actors actively construct and reconstruct territorial identities in everyday life. It is noteworthy that within these four transnational approaches the differences between the various geographical historiographical traditions are much less prominent.

In a lecture in 1992 Benedict Anderson already paid attention to the impact of nationalism on migrants. He argued that because the nation-state model became the norm during the twentieth-century the identity of immigrants had the tendency to become 'ethnicized'. Anderson also coined the term 'long-distance nationalism' to describe the strong attachment emigrants and many of their descendants feel towards their home country. This has become easier thanks to modern communication technology. Sometimes this led to active political involvement and even support for violent nationalist movements, such as the Tamil Tigers and the Irish Revolutionary Army. In this way citizenship and national feelings became disconnected and some migrants participated in the politics of a country in which they did not live, pay taxes or vote.[41] In 2001, in a more extensive case-study Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Fouron demonstrated how Haitian migrants in the United States created 'transnational social fields'. Instead of being uprooted or assimilating in the host country, they remained in contact with those who stayed behind to improve the situation of their 'fatherland'.[42]

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[40] Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, 'Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences' *Global Networks* (2002) pp. 301-34; Daniel Chernillo, 'The Critique of Methodological Nationalism: Theory and History' *Thesis Eleven* 106:1 (2011), pp. 98-117.

[41] Benedict Anderson, *Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics* (Wertheim Lecture; Amsterdam, 1992), p. 11.

[42] Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Eugene Fouron, *Georges Woke up Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home* (Durham, 2001). See for a similar in-depth study of Slovene and Croat migrant communities in Australia Zlatko Skrbis, *Long-Distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and Identities* (Aldershot, 1999).

While most studies on long-distance nationalism discuss very recent developments, Sebastian Conrad focuses on the decades around 1900. Moreover, in his book he primarily examines the impact of transnational migration flows on the development of nationalism within the motherland itself, in this case the German Empire. With the growing number of German emigrants, especially to the United States, people began to worry about the diminishing strength of the German nation. Emigrants were renamed 'diaspora Germans' and attempts were made to redirect migration flows towards the German colonies. Relations with emigrant groups were intensified and German settlers abroad were even presented as a 'rejuvenation' of the 'race'. Preoccupations, on the other hand, with growing numbers of Polish and Jewish newcomers, together with anxieties over miscegenation in the German colonies, led to a gradual 'racialization' of foreign immigrants. These transnational influences and worries had practical consequences, such as stricter border controls, and in 1913, a new citizenship law stipulated that Germans would not lose their citizenship after leaving the country and could even transfer it to their descendants.[43]

Borders also received more scholarly attention and a very early example is Peter Sahlins' *Boundaries*, a compelling examination of the social construction of a national border in the Pyrenees after half of the Spanish county of Cerdanya was annexed by France in 1659. He analysed how the identity of the rural communities developed over the following centuries, while showing that even before the boundaries became more territorialized and rigid during the French Revolution, the inhabitants of the county already used 'the language and rhetoric of nationality' to protect their interests. They requested specific benefits and privileges that were due to them as Frenchmen or Spaniards, while continuing to use the local Catalan dialect in daily life. Local identities therefore continued to exist alongside a more modern national identity. Only during the late nineteenth and twentieth century did differences between the two parts of the valley become more prominent as the modernizing French state offered its citizens more advantages, opportunities and material rewards than its Spanish counterpart. This could possibly explain why all things Catalan merely have a folkloric status on the French side of the border, whereas on the Spanish side Catalan nationalism made significant inroads.[44]

A similar study is Paul Nugent's analysis of the construction of the border between Ghana and Togo during the twentieth century. Although the border was imposed from above, the colonial authorities did take existing realities in this part of West Africa into account. Moreover, the local population took the border as a 'theatre of opportunities' for smuggling and cross-border trade, but also used it as a protection against persecution by fleeing to the other side. Western-educated elites among the Ewe – the most important ethnic group on both sides of the border – began to advocate the creation of their own nation-state. However, the large majority of the population was not interested in this theoretical construct; most local inhabitants preferred the concrete benefits that could be gained from the existing borders, while directing their demands increasingly to the central governments of the new nation-states of Ghana and Togo. Here, like in the Cerdenya valley, the local population actively contributed to the strengthening of the new nation-states.[45]

Some recent studies pay more attention to cross-border flows. In her monograph on northern Bohemia (Sudetenland) and southern Saxony, Caitlin Murdock begins in 1871, when the border between these two regions became the separation line between two large Central European Empires. For the moment, the dividing effect of the state-building processes was offset by improved communications. Different price levels provided strong incentives to cross the border for work or shopping, while mutual relations were also stimulated by tourism,

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[43] Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (translated from German; Cambridge, 2010).
[44] Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, 1989).
[45] Paul Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists, and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier* (Oxford, 2002).

entertainment – beer was cheaper in Bohemia – and marriages. Until 1914, nation-building on both sides of the border was not so much stimulated by the state as by nationalist organizations and movements. German-speaking workers from Bohemia were not considered foreigners in Saxony's civil society. However, Czech and German nationalist groups in Bohemia began to resent migration to Saxony since it weakened their cause within Austria. The First World War, the intensification of state- and nation-building and the economic upheavals during the Interwar period drove Saxony and Bohemia apart. The border was better guarded; those without citizenship were now considered foreigners and economic relations were disrupted.[46] Thus, borders were not only imposed from above, but also took shape on a daily basis by the actions, ideas and imaginations of thousands of ordinary people.

Another transnational approach is developed by historians who recognize that nationalist movements were influenced by foreign ideas, that many nationalist intellectuals conducted their activities in exile and that many nationalist pamphlets and magazines were published abroad. The most ambitious attempt to literally map the intellectual networks of nationalist activists, their international contacts and the transfer of ideas from one movement to another is undertaken by Joep Leerssen, who advocates a comparative approach to nineteenth-century cultural nationalism in Europe. During the Romantic era, intellectuals began to canonize vernacular cultures by salvaging, producing and propagating all kinds of 'national' cultural manifestations. In 2015, he launched a digital database with over 1200 articles – written by hundreds of scholars – about themes and persons, while showing the links between them on a map of Europe. It also provides access to visual, textual and audio documentation. This *Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism* demonstrates the large number of transnational connections between different cultural fields, genres and media.[47]

Somewhat similar is Prasenjit Duara's attempt to study the nation formation in China from the 'outside-in', which means that he puts much emphasis on entangled histories, international transfers, comparisons and transnational influences in order to understand the Chinese case as part of broader global and East-Asian developments. He particularly emphasizes the rise of nationalism in Japan, China, Korea, Manchukuo and Taiwan as an entangled history. This obviously had to do with the Japanese occupation of the other areas, but intellectual trends such as the production of national histories or the adoption of racialist conceptions also developed along common lines. In his book, he also explores the role of the Chinese diaspora and its connections with the 'homeland'.[48]

Surprisingly, all studies discussed until now, whether they focus on peasants, regional activists, migrants or transfer, only award agency to members of the proper nation. This is quite obvious in the case of nationalist movements. However, it is much less logical when analysing the construction of national identities and this brings us to the fourth transnational approach. Influenced by Edward Said's *Orientalism*, many scholars have analysed how collective identities in the non-Western world were imposed or largely shaped from outside. A highly nuanced application of Said's views on a national case is given by Donald Reid in his book on the role of Egypt's rich ancient past in the construction of the country's national identity during the long nineteenth century. Egyptian archaeology was dominated by Western scholars and they also largely determined the way that Egypt's pharaonic, Greco-Roman, Islamic and Coptic

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[46] Caitlin E. Murdock, *Changing Places: Society, Culture and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870-1946* (Ann Arbor, 2010). See also Omar Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington, 2013).
[47] Joep Leerssen, 'Nationalism and the Cultivation of Culture' *Nations and Nationalism* 12:4 (2006) pp. 559-78; Joep Leerssen (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism* (Amsterdam, 2018); http://romanticnationalism.net.
[48] Prasenjit Duara, *The Global and Regional in China's Nation-Formation* (London, 2008). See also Mark Frost, '"Wider Opportunities": Religious Revival, Nationalist Awakening and the Global Dimensions in Colombo, 1870-1920' *Modern Asian Studies* 36:4 (2002) pp. 937-67.

heritage was represented in scientific texts and popular guidebooks, at sites, in museums and at world fairs. Nonetheless, Reid also shows how Egyptian scholars, politicians and intellectuals became involved in this process, producing their own histories of ancient Egypt in Arabic, founding a national school of Egyptology, and embracing the pharaonic past as part of their national heritage. They were not the passive victims of Western science and imperialist powers, but had an active role in the construction of an Egyptian national identity.[49]

The impact of foreign tourism has also been a topic of research. Anthropologists in particular have examined how local communities interacted with outsiders to reshape their own collective self-image. A fascinating example is provided by Michel Picard's exploration of how the people of Bali became 'Balinized' through the interaction with colonial authorities, Western travellers, the Indonesian state and foreign tourism. First of all, colonial officials considered Bali a 'living museum' of the original Hindu-Javanese civilization of the Dutch East Indies. Foreign visitors created the image of a peaceful paradise and more or less invented Balinese arts and crafts by separating diverse traditions from their original ritual and religious context and packaging them for Western consumption. In the 1960s the independent Indonesian state began to present Bali as one of the highlights of the country's rich cultural and natural treasures in order to attract foreign tourists. In this way, the Balinese were required to be worthy representatives of their supposedly 'authentic' culture. The island's collective identity was thus shaped by the interaction of the local population with the processes of colonization, nation-building and 'touristification'.[50]

Largely ignored, however, is the notion that foreigners also had a substantial impact on the construction of national identities within the Western world. Some recent studies have made this clear for the case of Spain. Foreign scholars, for instance, were the first to historicize the story of Spanish art, thereby contributing in a decisive way to the definition of the country's artistic canon. And during the nineteenth and twentieth century foreign travellers and tourists also played a crucial role in integrating the monuments of Al-Andalus, flamenco music and the figure of Don Juan – each of which initially was seen with suspicion by most domestic elites – into the Spanish national imagination.[51]

Conclusion

The disintegration of the nation as the self-evident unit of analysis in the study of nationalism has had important consequences. First of all, the modernist view of nation-building as a process that was imposed from above has been undermined by a large number of local and regional case studies that show that regional authorities, local elites and even peasants had an active role and could in many instances bend it to their needs. Moreover, existing collective and territorial identities were not absorbed by the more modern identification with the nation, but were transformed and in many cases even strengthened in the process. From the late nineteenth century the vernacular heritage of the countryside became an integral part of both better defined regional identities and of the more encompassing patrimony of the nation. Globalisation, tourism and devolution ensured that regions and their territorial identities continue to be a factor at the (inter)national stage.

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[49] Donald Malcolm Reid, *Whose Pharaos? Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I* (Berkeley, 2002).

[50] Michel Picard, *Bali: Cultural Tourism and Touristic Culture* (translated from French; Singapore, 1996).

[51] Eric Storm, 'Nationalism Studies between Methodological Nationalism and Orientalism: An Alternative Approach Illustrated with the Case of El Greco, Toledo, Spain' *Nations and Nationalism* 21:4 (2015) pp. 786-804; Xavier Andreu, *El descubrimiento de España. Mito romántico e identidad nacional* (Barcelona, 2016); Eric Storm, 'Making Spain more Spanish: The Impact of Tourism on Spanish National Identity', in Javier Moreno Luzón and Xosé M. Núñez (eds.), *Metaphors of Spain: Representations of Spanish National Identity in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 2017), pp. 239-60.

The growing attention for transnational flows and movements in turn have made clear that the rise of national movements, the nation-building process and the construction of national identities should not be studied in isolation. Borders were not just fixed demarcation lines between two nation-states, but were reproduced and transformed by geopolitical developments, governmental decisions, but also on a daily basis by the ideas, practices and trans-border movements of the people on the ground. On top of that, it has become evident that migrants and exiles, transferred ideas and even foreign scholars and tourists had an impact on nation formation and nation-building processes.

Although many of the main concepts of the spatial turn, such as the idea that spaces are social constructs, the focus on agency, tactics and everyday life and the questioning of the nation-state as a neutral, inert box in which developments can objectively be analysed, have become mainstream among historians and social scientists, the nation-state remains the main unit of analysis in the humanities and social sciences. Statistical data, archival material and surveys are still collected and classified per country, which as a consequence also functions as the basic unit for comparisons. In public opinion the world is still divided into discrete and bounded nation-states, which each have their own identity and are supposed to command their own destiny. Even recent historical overviews that are used for our undergraduate courses continue to focus on the individual trajectories of the various nation-states and routinely speak of nations when modern nation-states did not yet exist. So a lot of work still needs to be done.

At the same time, the focus on the production of spaces by different social groups and communities over time seems to have its limitations as well. It has resulted in a fast-growing number of historical studies that tend to emphasise the specific circumstances and unique outcomes of each case, thus resulting in a very fragmented overall picture. Moreover many scholars still do not escape the trap of 'methodological nationalism'; most studies discussed in the first half of this chapter, for instance, were firmly embedded in national historiographical debates and focused almost exclusively on national actors and national turning points, while using national concepts and national primary sources. This makes it even more difficult to arrive at a global overview. Comparative studies could probably make clear that there are many similarities as well in the way nations were constructed, in the way local and regional identities interacted with the nation-building process and in the impact of transnational actors.

Further Reading
Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, 1990).
Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (Stanford, 1988).
Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Eugene Fouron, *Georges Woke up Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home* (Durham, 2001).
Michael Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change* (Cheltenham, 1998).
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Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley, 1995).
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