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An Innovation Agenda for UN 75: The Albright-Gambari Commission and the Road to 2020

Ponzio, R.; Larik, J.; Petcu, C.; Durch, W.; Kiel, R.; Ledesma, L.

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An Innovation Agenda for UN 75

THE ALBRIGHT-GAMBARI COMMISSION REPORT
AND THE ROAD TO 2020



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STIMSON

1211 Connecticut Avenue NW, 8th Floor

Washington, DC 20036

Tel: 202.223.5956 | Fax: 202.238.9604

www.stimson.org

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ABOUT STIMSON

The Stimson Center is a nonpartisan policy research center working to protect people, preserve the planet, and promote security & prosperity. Stimson's award-winning research serves as a roadmap to address borderless threats through concerted action. Our formula is simple: we gather the brightest people to think beyond soundbites, create solutions, and make those solutions reality. We follow the credo of one of history's leading statesmen, Henry L. Stimson, in taking "pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives." We are practical in our approach and independent in our analysis. Our innovative ideas change the world.

Stimson's Just Security 2020 Program supports efforts to build more capable global governance institutions to better cope with existing and new global challenges, in the face of growing mass violence in fragile states, the threat of runaway climate change, and fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber-attacks. Effective problem solving requires both global collaboration and attention to serious deficits of justice as well as security, to create what we call "just security." The program gives particular attention to initiating and influencing preparations for a Leaders Summit, in September 2020 in New York, on United Nations renewal and innovation.

Visit our new knowledge Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Reform:

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FOREWORD

When the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance launched its June 2015 report, *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*—in The Hague, New York, Abuja, and over thirty other locations worldwide—both the headlines and trendlines had begun to foreshadow the return of a virulent form of nationalism fueled by surging migration, perceived and real economic inequality, and the emergence of leaders who dehumanize others and seek to divide rather than unite. In the months that followed, the international community did rally around one of the defining issues of our time, but the Paris agreement on climate change was non-binding. Moreover, policy pledges made since have fallen short of global climate needs.

Regrettably, the violent conflicts and environmental crises we documented in our report have only grown more acute with each passing year. The global economy remains vulnerable to another financial crisis. The international institutions built since 1945 to help nations manage and resolve their problems peacefully—and together—are being weakened to a degree not seen since their founding. Yet dealing with global issues calls for policies and actions beyond the writ or capabilities of any one state.

Building on two decades of thinking and practice to promote human security, the Commission used the lens of security and justice, or “Just Security,” to inform its search for solutions to governance challenges at multiple levels of human experience that would enable humanity not only to survive but to thrive in peace with dignity. As we wrote in our Foreword to *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*, global institutions such as the United Nations have a critical role to play in promoting just security. An important anniversary is looming next year that could galvanize further action towards this goal.

The recommendations of the Commission are intended, in this seventieth anniversary year of the United Nations, to encourage a broad-based global policy dialogue and an institutional reform agenda aimed at 2020, the seventy-fifth anniversary commemoration of the founding of the United Nations. We invite potential partners from around the world—in governments, civil society organizations, the private sector, media, and international organizations—to help build and sustain a coalition for progressive global change, in pursuit of a vision of justice and security for all.

Leaders from all countries have a responsibility to ensure that the United Nations and other global institutions continue to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts, safeguard human rights, and give even the most vulnerable people a reason to hope. Having defended our nations’ foreign policies as their representatives in New York and having shaped them at the top of our respective foreign ministries, we know from experience the tenacity and skill required to move multilateral negotiations from zero-sum opening bids to positive-sum outcomes that strike a balance between local, national, and global interests.

We wish to express our appreciation to the Stimson Center’s Just Security 2020 Program for its continued commitment to advancing the Commission’s ideas in this new report, *An Innovation Agenda for UN 75: The Albright-Gambari Commission Report and the Road to 2020*. We continue to believe—and we all must work relentlessly to ensure—that global institutions such as the United Nations remain central to achieving a more just and secure world.

Madeleine K. Albright and Ibrahim A. Gambari

Former Co-Chairs, Commission on Global
Security, Justice & Governance

REPORT TEAM & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Report Team

Richard Ponzio (Program Director), Joris Larik (Senior Researcher), Cristina Petcu (Research Associate), Robert Kiel (Research Assistant), William Durch (Senior Adviser), Lita Ledesma (Designer), and Research Team: Charles Cox, Rachel Dame, Sachal Jacob, Samuel Korolnik, Joshua Maziak-Amey, and Tyler Sadek.

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Related Publications

Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance, The Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance (2015):

<http://www.platformglobalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/publications-resources/report/>

Background Papers for *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*:

<http://www.platformglobalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/publications-resources/publications/>

Just Security in an Undergoverned World (OUP 2018): <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/just-security-in-an-undergoverned-world-9780198805373?cc=us&lang=en&>

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEOI	Automatic Exchange of Information
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CAN	Climate Action Network
CDR	Carbon Dioxide Removal
CICC	Coalition for the International Criminal Court
CIVCAP	(UN) Civilian Capacity Initiative
CO ₂	Carbon dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DESA	(UN) Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DOCO	(UN) Development Operations Coordination Office
DPA	(UN) Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	(UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO	(UN) Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	(UN) Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DSG	(UN) Deputy Secretary-General
DTO	Designated Terrorist Organizations
ECOSOC	(UN) Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EU	European Union
FATCA	Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FSB	Financial Stability Board
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
G20	Group of 20
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCA	Global Center on Adaptation
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFCE	Global Forum on Cyber Expertise
GGGI	Global Green Growth Initiative
GHG	Greenhouse gas
HDR	Human Development Report
HLPF	High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
HRC	(UN) Human Rights Council

IANA	Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICAO	(UN) International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IET	International Emissions Trading
IFF	Illicit Financial Flows
IGN	Intergovernmental Negotiations
ILO	(UN) International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	(UN) International Maritime Organization
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organization
IOM	(UN) International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IS	Islamic State (Daesh)
ITU	(UN) International Telecommunication Union
LDC	Least Developed Country
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	(UN) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
P5	Permanent Five (members of the UN Security Council)
PBC	(UN) Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	(UN) Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	(UN) United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
PGA	President of the UN General Assembly
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SGF	Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping
SPC	Standing Police Capacity
SRM	Solar Radiation Management

U.S.	United States
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDG	UN Development Group
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNGGE	UN Group of Governmental Experts
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPA	UN Parliamentary Assembly
UNPN	UN Parliamentary Network
UNPOL	UN Police
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSCRUN	Security Council Resolution
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations
WCGI	World Conference on Global Institutions
WFP	(UN) World Food Programme
WMO	(UN) World Meteorological Organization
WPS	Women Peace and Security
WTO	World Trade Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

“TWENTY GLOBAL IDEAS FOR 2020”

With the proliferation of advanced military and information technologies, growing ease of movement, increasing climate instability, and the rise of violent extremism, conflict and state fragility have increased since reaching a twenty-year low in 2010. In 2017, the latest year with complete data, nearly ninety-two thousand individuals lost their lives in various forms of violent conflict.

Countries also face many cross-border economic threats and challenges—including weaknesses in cyberspace infrastructure, loss of tax revenues to illicit financial flows, illegal exploitation of natural resources, and other corrupt practices—that inhibit the growth of economies and the ability of governments to enhance economic resilience, especially in the Global South. Even more alarming, if humankind cannot find its way to limit average global warming to less than 1.5°C (looming as soon as 2030), further severe climatic changes are anticipated, including intensified biodiversity loss, storm surges, drought, desertification, and sea level rise of up to one meter by 2100.

In the face of these global challenges, “we the peoples” are currently a house divided. In addition to “the West versus the rest” or “Global North versus Global South,” there are numerous divisions and discrepancies within and across societies along racial, gender, socioeconomic, and other lines. And as the discourse of recent years has shown, perceived injustices are at least as divisive as measurable discrepancies. The feeling of not benefitting (enough) from globalization is coupled with a desire to redefine national identities as incompatible with global citizenship and attempts to close states off from the outside world by putting up walls and fences, denouncing international agreements, and leaving common institutions.

The roots of current discontents with global governance lie in the actual and perceived lack of justice and human security for many individuals in a globalized world. The current crisis of global governance undermines international support mechanisms intended to build resilience, reduce

corruption, combat extremism, and ensure regional stability in global trouble spots.

Therefore, global action by governments, international organizations, and global civil society—underpinned by a new global ethic—to reverse these dangerous trends has become the moral and practical imperative of the present era. Since the launch, in 2015, of the Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*, a concerted effort has been made to promote urgently needed global governance innovations, looking toward and continuing through the United Nations’ seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020.

After much hard work by many parties, in June 2019 the UN General Assembly (A/RES/73/299) set into motion multilateral *and multi-stakeholder* negotiations on a “concise, substantive, forward-looking and unifying declaration that captures Member States’ collective commitment to multilateralism and to the United Nations and their shared vision for a common future” for consideration at a Heads of State Summit that is to gather in New York in September 2020, just one month before the seventy-fifth anniversary of the UN’s founding (“UN 75”). Detailed in this study, we offer an updated **Twenty Global Ideas for 2020**, based on the Albright-Gambari Commission’s original analysis, broader reform recommendations, and worldwide consultations, as a contribution to this important conversation over the next fifteen months, in the following four thematic areas:

Conflict and State Fragility: Advancing the Prevention and Rebuilding Agenda

1. Continue to operationalize and prioritize conflict prevention
2. Continue to strengthen the role of women in peace processes
3. Establish standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployable needs for civilian specialist skills

4. Establish a sizable standing and reserve capacity to support rapid and sustainable deployment of police to UN peace operations and to meet requests from UN Member States for police/justice development support
5. Augment current disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programming with greater emphasis on countering (preventing the rise of) violent extremism (CVE) and reducing recidivism among former foreign terrorist fighters and affiliates
13. Promote the Automatic Exchange of Information standard and transparency of registries of beneficial ownership information to combat illicit financial flows in global commerce and deter cross-border tax evasion
14. Strengthen the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative with more stringent reporting requirements (and appropriate confidentiality and security measures) to address issues of transfer pricing, illicit financial flows, and environmental and social dislocation costs associated with natural resource exploitation

Climate Governance: Innovating the Paris Agreement and Expanding Green Tech

6. Facilitate and strengthen linkages between the UNFCCC and other international regimes and organizations and civil society actors dealing with climate change
7. Define one or more global climate adaptation goals and gauge their achievement in terms of measurable improvements in local human security; finance support for adaptation from revenues formerly directed to fossil fuel subsidies
8. Establish a Green Technology Licensing Facility within the Green Climate Fund
9. Vigorously pursue emissions reductions in “short-lived climate pollutants” like methane as an “early win” while CO₂ reduction strategies and technologies mature
10. Establish a multilateral mechanism to govern climate engineering research and experimentation, especially solar radiation management

Hyperconnected Global Economy: Averting Shocks and Promoting Inclusive Growth

11. Create a G20+ to enhance coordination with the UN system, Bretton Woods institutions, and related bodies, and give it a small secretariat
12. Strengthen cybersecurity through international cybercrime centers, international cybercrime experts rosters, and a heightened focus on improving essential end-user cyber hygiene

Global Institutions and Civil Society: Harnessing State and Non-State Actor Ideas, Networks & Capabilities

15. Create a strong UN Peacebuilding Council to replace the current Peacebuilding Commission and entrust it with a conflict prevention mandate
16. Make the UN Security Council more effective by expanding its membership, updating its working methods, and giving greater voice to non-state actors in its deliberations
17. Create a UN Parliamentary Network as a new advisory body of people’s representatives to the UN General Assembly
18. Establish a UN Global Partnership to give a greater voice to under-represented policy issues through new social compacts and a new hub and online platform, whereby the entire UN system can tap into the expertise of civil society and the business community
19. Strengthen and more fully use the International Court of Justice to advance and safeguard international law by expanding its jurisdiction and making use of its authoritative advisory opinions in innovative ways
20. Strengthen working ties between the International Criminal Court, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Security Council

Prior United Nations anniversaries have been occasions for reflecting on the organization’s achievements; taking stock of its progress in meeting key



**THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN A SUCCESSFUL
AND UNSUCCESSFUL
COMMISSION IS THAT A
SUCCESSFUL COMMISSION'S
WORK REALLY BEGINS,
RATHER THAN ENDS, WITH
THE RELEASE OF ITS REPORT**

— Columbia University Professor Michael Doyle at the Columbia World Leaders Forum on the Albright-Gambari Commission Report, September 28, 2015

challenges and looming threats; renewing commitment to multilateral cooperation; and, in some rare cases, revitalizing and strengthening our global governance architecture. The June 2019 UN General Assembly “modalities resolution” for the UN 75 Leaders Summit in New York recognizes “the need to promote and strengthen multilateralism and ... that the seventy-fifth anniversary ... is an opportunity to reaffirm its [Member States’] collective commitment to multilateralism and to the United Nations.” It will, however, require the active and skillful engagement of global civil society, in partnership with like-minded countries, to advance more ambitious ideas to revitalize and strengthen the system in the remaining months until September 2020.

Learning from past global systemic change efforts, driven collectively by civil society groups and like-minded countries such as those supporting creation of the International Criminal Court and improving transparency and participation in the selection of the UN Secretary-General, new “smart coalitions” are encouraged to maximize the 2020 Leaders Summit. In particular, they should:

- a. Build strong working relationships with the President of the UN General Assembly, the UN

75 political declaration co-facilitators, and the Secretary-General’s UN 75 Special Adviser.

- b. Reframe issues and employ positive, forward-looking narratives when engaging potential spoilers (such as exclusive nationalists), in order to find common ground in addressing specific global policy challenges.
- c. Treat the 2020 Summit as both a “landing pad” for a few timely innovations and a “launch pad” for other, more ambitious reforms that may require additional time to mature.
- d. Ensure that the 2020 Summit’s political declaration empowers more rule-makers and penalizes rule-breakers through increased institutional legitimacy, burden-sharing, effectiveness, and accountability.

In seeking to forge a mutually supportive system of equitable governance and sustainable peace globally through the intersection of security and justice on the eve of the UN’s seventy-fifth anniversary, the Albright-Gambari Commission’s innovative “just security” framework offers a unique prism for understanding and responding to some of the most pressing global concerns of our time. Just security can inform a practical program that innovates our global institutions, laws, policy tools, and relationships. Powerful states and other increasingly influential global actors have a special responsibility to work toward a shared analysis of global problems and to seize opportunities to remedy them. Only when women and men from diverse places and backgrounds *rally around a shared, inherent need for security and justice—always felt locally but created at many levels*—can these powerful actors be nudged toward what is needed, as well as what is right.

INTRODUCTION

“We must ensure that we rise to the serious challenges we face, and to the opportunities presented by the 75th anniversary. ... This is a critical moment—for the United Nations and for the world. We sometimes speak of this moment as a ‘crossroads’—where things could go either way. But it feels more and more like a tipping point—as though we are on the brink of irreparable damage to our rules-based international system. ... I invite you to see this process as a full overhaul of our multilateral engine.” —H.E. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, *President of the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly and former Foreign Minister of Ecuador*¹

“The Secretary-General’s vision for the commemoration is focused on the UN’s achievements but, above all, on the future of the world when the UN is 100, in 2045. Youth across the world will be at the center of this reflection in a meaningful way. The impacts of climate change, technological disruption, demographic change and migratory trends will be addressed through a global discussion with youth on the future they want and the role of the UN in getting there.” —H.E. Fabrizio Hochschild, *Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on the Preparations for the Commemoration of the United Nations’ 75th Anniversary*²

With fifteen months until the United Nations Leaders Summit in New York that is timed to coincide with the seventy-fifth anniversary commemoration of the world body (“UN 75”), now is the time for a forward-looking and meaningful conversation about ways to further innovate, renew, and reform our system of global governance. In the face of rising exclusionary, populist forces, growing mass violence in fragile states, fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks, cyber-attacks, and the rapidly growing threat of runaway climate change, the world needs a new kind of leadership and vision, combined with new tools, networks, and institutions.

In June 2015, the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance—co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State and Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright and former Nigerian Foreign Minister and UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari (see Appendix I)—offered in its pathbreaking report, *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*, a vision for just security, to ensure that neither justice nor security imperatives are neglected by critical international policy debates in the run-up to UN 75. It further presented a bold, yet practical action plan for innovating global governance, and ways to mobilize diverse actors to advance reform, to better

respond to twenty-first-century threats, challenges, and opportunities.

In this follow-on report, the Stimson Center’s Just Security 2020 program seeks to equip policy-makers, activists, the media, and experts with updated analysis and a prioritized set of proposals from the Commission’s broader recommendations. The global governance renewal and reform ideas advanced in the sections that follow represent an ambitious, yet realistic innovation agenda that can set the United Nations and other global institutions on a more secure and capable footing to address the urgent issues on that agenda. In doing so, our system of global governance will be able to better support all nations and peoples in facing new challenges, threats, and opportunities in this emerging multipolar era.

Global Policy Dialogues to Drive a Multi-Actor Theory of Change

This report is designed, in part, to inform and complement the consensus-based “Action Plans” from a series of Global Policy Dialogues that are focused, respectively, on Preventive Action, Sustaining Peace, and Global Governance (December 2018 in Doha); on Global Security, Justice, and Economic Institutions (June 2019 in Washington, D.C.); and

on Climate Governance: Innovating the Paris Agreement & Beyond (October 2019 in Seoul). The series of meetings seek to:

- Establish broad areas of consensus on priority innovations vis-à-vis specific global governance policy and institutional reform challenges related to the main pillars of the United Nations (peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights), using the Albright-Gambari Commission's recommendations as points of departure;
- Provide fresh ideas and perspectives, as well as help to build greater global support for ongoing official UN 75 preparations toward strengthening the United Nations system, including the Secretary-General's three reform tracks: peace and security, development, and management; and
- Engage a broad network of organizations and individuals committed to growing a coalition of states and non-state actors interested in achieving critical global and regional governance reforms for UN 75 (while setting the stage for even more ambitious reforms post-2020).

Together, the three-part series aims to advance a global consensus around several of the best recommendations for improving international responses to deadly conflict and weak states, the challenges inherent in the hyperconnected global economy, and the risk of runaway climate change. A new knowledge-based ***Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Reform*** (<http://www.platformglobalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/>) will communicate activities to advance such innovative reform ideas in the run-up to the September 2020 UN Leaders Summit.

The “theory of change” driving Global Policy Dialogues is rooted in the conviction that greater results can be achieved when (1) individual states and non-state actors recognize that their priority issues or institutional reforms can benefit from a globally systemic, coalition-supported effort; (2) greater opportunities arise for “deal-making” and exploiting linkages between innovative proposals across distinct sectors and institutional settings; and (3)

momentum for reform is generated and sustained by early wins on easier issues that lay the groundwork for progress on harder questions.

Balanced attention toward gaining the confidence of powerful “insiders,” including the UN Secretary-General, and influential “outsiders” from civil society, the media, and the business community, will be a hallmark of new knowledge and advocacy networks utilizing the new online Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Reform and the closely related, civil society-led Together First campaign and UN 2020 Initiative. Each is critical to leveraging institutions and individuals with the ability to affect positive changes in global governance.


When a large coalition of civil society organizations teams up with like-minded states to bring about progressive reforms in our global governance system, they create “smart coalitions for change.”³ From the Coalition for the International Criminal Court and International Campaign to Ban Landmines that began in the 1990s to more recent examples, such as the 1 for 7 Billion campaign and the broad-based effort to achieve the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, they have combined top-down and bottom-up approaches in many shapes and sizes to achieve varying degrees of success over the years (as detailed in the “Roadmap” section of this report).

On the Road to 2020 (UN 75), a new generation of smart coalitions is poised to advocate for many of the legal, institutional, and policy innovations advanced in this report in the critical—and overlapping (see Figure 1)—issue areas of conflict, climate, economy, and institutions. In doing so, they are helping to reinvent and reimagine global governance.

Proponents of global governance transformation must quickly move beyond the false dichotomy and narrative that there is a battle today between slow, bureaucratic, and cumbersome “legacy governance,” epitomized by the 193-member United Nations, and more agile, manageable, and effective “multi-stakeholder” and “mini-lateral” initiatives like the Group of 20 (G20) industrial countries or the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Rather, the way forward in countering today’s “crisis of multilateralism” and grappling with current and future challenges and opportunities is to use the reputations and reach of the legacy institutions, overhauled and

FIGURE 1

International Law, Institutions, and Impactful Ideas for Smart Coalitions



SOURCE: Adapted from Durch, Larik, and Ponzio, *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*, Ch. 19. Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.

modernized, in collaboration with emerging stakeholder coalitions to more nimbly and effectively harness the capabilities, constituents, networks, and ideas of both.

The United Nations at Fifty and Sixty: A Tale of Two (Distinctly Different) Outcomes

Anniversaries of the United Nations offer moments for reflection on past achievements, stocktaking of progress in meeting current challenges and looming

threats, renewal of commitments to principles of multilateral cooperation, and sometimes opportunities to revitalize and strengthen our global governance architecture. On the UN's fiftieth anniversary, the General Assembly's unanimous Declaration embodied the first three of these objectives but not the fourth. Despite the chance for a "rebirth of the United Nations" afforded by the end of the Cold War a few years prior, and the publication of several substantial reports on the need for restructuring by the Commission on Global Governance, the Yale-Ford Foundation Independent Working Group on

the Future of the United Nations, UNDP's Human Development Report Office, and other notable institutions, Member States in 1995 gave merely rhetorical support to the need to “strengthen,” “resource,” and “reform” the UN system, and only in the resolution's concluding section.⁴

Nearly a decade later, learning from this missed opportunity and looking toward “UN 60,” then Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, whose seminal report, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*, informed a broader set of reform proposals from the Secretary-General which, in turn, informed the relatively more forward-leaning UNGA resolution, the 2005 World Summit Outcome. Among the more notable ideas adopted by governments were the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (representing, in part, Security Council reform by another name), the upgrade of the frail and divisive Human Rights Commission into a Council empowered with new tools such as the Universal Periodic Review, and endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, introduced in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.⁵

Looking toward UN 75, and despite the troubling rise of exclusionary nationalism, the international community should draw encouragement from the announcement in April 2019 by German Foreign Minister H.E. Heiko Maas and French Foreign Minister H.E. Jean-Yves Le Drian that a new Alliance for Multilateralism will gather at the ministerial level, this September, at the start of the seventy-fourth UN General Assembly to show that states that “support multilateralism and support the United Nations remain the majority in the world.”⁶ Canada, Mexico, and Japan subsequently agreed to join the Alliance, and India, Indonesia, and Australia are expected to follow soon.

Three other reasons to believe that the more ambitious “UN 60 model” is realizable for UN 75 are:

- **FIRST**, the current President of the General Assembly, H.E. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, has voiced the need for a substantive conversation on UN system strengthening in the run-up to the Leaders Summit in September 2020, and it is expected that the

next President of the General Assembly, H.E. Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, will do so as well.

- **SECOND**, Secretary-General António Guterres has appointed at the rank of Under-Secretary-General a senior member of his inner circle, H.E. Fabrizio Hochschild, to support him in coordinating UN 75 preparations.
- **THIRD**, learning from the past, two new non-governmental-led initiatives, UN 2020 and Together First, have begun to mobilize global civil society through public and expert consultations, research, and direct advocacy and educational outreach to constructively engage governments in charting a progressive renewal and innovation agenda next year.

As the lengthy follow-through to the 2005 Summit demonstrated (for example, its recommended upgrade of the Human Rights Commission into a stronger Council took another six months), the political declaration agreed to in September 2020 can serve as a “launch pad” for new, ambitious reforms that may require additional time to mature.

Albright-Gambari Commission: Progress and Unfinished Business

In its 2015 report, *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*, the Albright-Gambari Commission offered some eighty-five pragmatic proposals for reforms using new tools and networks to build better global institutions, and a new global ethic to focus policy-makers, opinion leaders, and global civil society on the need for more dynamic and creative solutions to looming global challenges (see Appendix II). That focus used the lens of security and justice—specifically their interplay, or “just security”—and emphasized finding solutions to governance challenges at multiple levels of human experience (see Figure 2). The approach of the Albright-Gambari Commission also informs the analysis and prioritized recommendations of this report. Since the launch of the Commission's report, a concerted effort has been made to promote these and related global governance innovations through more than fifty events worldwide, looking toward and continuing through the UN's seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020.


A number of the Commission's recommendations have been picked up or are becoming accepted practice by governments or international organizations (see Box 1). In the run-up to the 2020 Leaders Summit, it is hoped that several more of its global governance reform proposals gain further traction.

This report's twenty recommendations—selected from the broader set of Albright-Gambari Commission proposals—reflect a careful reading of the current global political climate and a diagnosis of why some past UN milestone anniversaries advanced a significant change agenda while others fell flat. Important variables such as near-term impact, efficiency gains, and the likelihood of garnering requisite political, technical, and financial support were taken into account in that selection.

Stimson's Just Security 2020 program continues to advocate for a “hybrid approach to global governance reform,” as presented in the Commission's 2015 report, which acknowledges that different kinds of multilateral reform negotiations will require different negotiating forums and will proceed at different speeds. Thus a hybrid approach might look toward the 2020 Leaders Summit as an opportunity to upgrade underpowered institutions like the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which now advises both the Security Council and General Assembly but could do much more, even as more singularly focused reform efforts like the Intergovernmental Negotiations framework on the makeup of the UN Security Council continue in parallel.⁷

FIGURE 2

Intersections of Security and Justice with Multilevel Governance



SOURCE: Durch, Larik, and Ponzio, *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*, Ch. 2. Reproduced with permission of Oxford University Press.

BOX 1

2015 Albright-Gambari Commission Proposals that Have Largely Been Adopted

Conflict and Fragility

- ▶ Specify the responsibilities and objectives of R2P Mission Participants (rec. 4.3.3.1)
- ▶ Focus G20 support on the New Deal for engagement in fragile states (rec. 4.3.5.1)

Climate Governance

- ▶ Establish an International Carbon Monitoring Entity (rec. 5.3.1.3)
- ▶ Establish a Global Climate Research Registry and Climate Action Clearinghouse (rec. 5.3.1.4)
- ▶ Engage the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and UNEP Environment Assembly on climate issues (rec. 5.3.1.6)
- ▶ “Green” the G20 (rec. 5.3.2.3)

The Hyperconnected Global Economy

- ▶ Address Illicit Financial Flows in the Post-2015 Development Agenda (rec. 6.3.2.4)
- ▶ Make EITI+ complementary to the Post-2015 SDGs (rec. 6.3.3.2)

Global Institutions and Civil Society

- ▶ Focus ECOSOC on delivering the Post-2015 Development Agenda (rec. 7.3.3.7)
- ▶ Improve the selection procedure for the next Secretary-General (rec. 7.3.6.1)

Transitional Strategy for Reform

- ▶ Build Smart Coalitions to Mobilize Support and Sustain Reforms (rec. 9.0)

SOURCES: UN Secretary-General, Responsibility to protect; UNSCR 2205 and 2428; G20, “G20 Leaders’ Summit Agreed in Antalya.”; Climate Transparency, *Brown to Green: The G20 Transition to a Low Carbon Economy*; UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development; UNEP Environment Assembly; UN, “Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform.” ECOSOC, “Promoting sustainable development”; IISD, “A Brief Analysis of the Katowice Climate Change Conference”; UN 2020, “Preparing the UN 2020 Summit”; and Together First, “A global system that works for all.”

Structure of this Report

The following sections situate the just security conceptual framework within the context of the present global battle against populist, exclusionary nationalist, and anti-multilateralist forces, and update the Commission’s rationales and underlying analysis for twenty of its recommendations judged to be especially topical and urgent now. These recommendations are grouped within four thematic categories: conflict and state fragility, climate governance, the hyperconnected global economy, and global institutions and civil society.

The report concludes by presenting a roadmap for maximizing the utility of the UN 75 (2020) Leaders Summit for strengthening and restructuring global

institutions to meet rising need. To do so, multilateral diplomacy must begin to move from a competitive zero-sum or lowest common denominator framework toward more collaborative negotiations, where a better balance is struck between local, national, regional, and global interests. Many of the arguments laid out in this report can be employed to persuade powerful stakeholders to get on board, whether because continued global collective inaction is shown to increase the spread of “public bads,” or because civic pressure on politicians triggers more enlightened global leadership that seeks to create more just and secure living conditions for all citizens, not only to survive but to thrive in our increasingly interconnected world.

JUST SECURITY, EXCLUSIONARY NATIONALISM, AND RECLAIMING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, in 2020, will be an opportunity for looking back as well as forward for global governance. It should be a retrospective not only of the past years of crisis and backlash, but of the entire history of the organization and rules-based multilateralism, both in terms of setbacks and achievements. Equally important, it will be an opportunity to look to the future and focus on concrete improvements for the near term, as well as how to pave the way for more profound change to ensure humankind's ability to tackle global challenges and stem global systemic risks.

For the time being, “we the peoples” resemble a house divided. In addition to “the West versus the rest” or “Global North versus Global South,” there are divisions and discrepancies within and across societies along racial, gender, socioeconomic, and other lines. And as the discourse of recent years has shown, perceived injustices are at least as divisive as measurable discrepancies. Thus, while global poverty has been dramatically reduced over the past decades, with living standards being raised in general, there

are many who feel left behind by globalization—not necessarily because their situation worsened but because their real wages are stagnating—even as many people in emerging economies and especially the wealthiest percentiles of the global population benefitted greatly from global economic growth over the past decades, as illustrated by Branko Milanovic’s now famous “elephant graph.”⁸

This feeling of not (sufficiently) benefitting from globalization can be linked to a low sense of identification with—and even animosity towards—the institutions associated with it, including the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, international financial institutions, or regional organizations such as the European Union. Such feelings rationalize renunciations of rules-based governance by the present U.S. administration—among other more recently elected governments including Brazil and Italy—and go hand in hand with a backlash against civil society around the world.⁹ The United States, then as now the most powerful country in the world, played an essential role in creating the very systems

BOX 2

Overview of Recent U.S. Policies Regarding Global Governance Norms and Institutions

► **January 2017:** U.S. abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership

► **Aug. 2017:** U.S. notification of intent to withdraw from Paris Climate Agreement

► **October 2017:** U.S. notification to withdraw from UNESCO

► **December 2017:** U.S. ends participation in UN Global Compact on Migration

► **May 2018:** U.S. withdraws from Iran Nuclear Deal

► **June 2018:** U.S. withdraws from UN Human Rights Council

► **Oct. 2018:** U.S. withdraws from Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes

► **September 2018:** U.S. adopts visa bans against ICC personnel

► **November 2018:** U.S. discontinues implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)

► **April 2019:** U.S. “unsigns” UN Arms Trade Treaty

it is currently undermining (see Box 2). Other examples of the current backlash include Brexit, through which the UK is trying to disentangle its relationship with its closest partners in Europe, in part because EU membership made parts of the population “feel” less sovereign,¹⁰ and the Philippines’ and Burundi’s withdrawal from the ICC, ostensibly because that court is a tool of Western imperialism. This sense of ill-treatment is coupled with a desire to redefine national identities as incompatible with global citizenship, and attempts to close states off from the outside world by putting up walls and fences, denouncing international agreements, and leaving common institutions. However, these are symptoms, not the roots, of the current crisis.

Theories and concepts that reach into the state and take the individual’s situation into account are not new, though now they may be needed more than ever. The roots of current discontents with global governance lie in the actual and perceived lack of justice and “human security”¹¹ for many individuals in a globalized world. An essential element for addressing this challenge is improving the balance, in global governance institutions and policies, between security and justice imperatives. This includes, firstly, reframing issues and questions with the concept of *just security*. This concept was coined in the 2015 Albright-Gambari Report as an approach “to refashion global institutions and their policy instruments to strike a more effective balance between security and justice that does not privilege one major concept over the other,” but which instead builds “a mutually supportive system of accountable, fair, and effective governance and sustainable peace globally.”¹² Subsequently, practical solutions with a balance of the two principles in mind need to be formulated and implemented (as elaborated in the following sections).

At the macro level, many injustices, real or perceived—and between or within states—are sources of increasing insecurity in the world. For instance, excluding women from fully contributing to conflict resolution and peacebuilding hampers building resilient societies that are less likely to relapse into conflict. At the same time, failures to address conflicts ranging from civil wars to interstate tensions heighten perceptions of unfair treatment, caused in part by prior failure to treat from the outset the

BOX 3

France and Germany to Launch a New “Alliance for Multilateralism”

“The multilateral order is experiencing its perhaps gravest crisis since its emergence after the Second World War. Unfortunately, it can no longer be taken for granted that an international rules-based system is seen by all as the best guarantor of our security and prosperity.

The rivalry among major powers and growing nationalism have resulted in an increasingly fragmented world order—in political, economic and social terms.

To counter this trend, like-minded states must make common cause and double their efforts to promote multilateralism. ... We firmly believe that a new commitment to multilateralism, an alliance for multilateralism, is more necessary than ever if we are to stabilize the rules-based world order, to uphold its principles and to adapt it to new challenges where necessary. We therefore want to establish a global network of like-minded states which are convinced that pursuing legitimate, national interests and protecting the collective property of humankind are fully compatible, not mutually exclusive.

The current multilateral system is undoubtedly imperfect. It is not always able to find the right answers to the countless challenges we face. Those like us who support multilateralism must therefore seek to make it more efficient, representative and agile in future. The global political and economic order must be more inclusive and effective in order to deliver tangible successes for people around the world.”

— Joint article by German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, “Who, if not us?” (February 2019).

BOX 4

Focusing Leaders on Realizing a More Secure and Just World

“When the next elections come along, and politicians want you to vote for them, ask these politicians four questions:

- 1 If you are elected, what actions will you take to lessen the risks of nuclear war?
- 2 What action will you take to lessen the risks of climate change?
- 3 What actions will you take to regulate disruptive technologies such as AI and bioengineering?
- 4 And finally, how do you see the world of 2040? What is your worst-case scenario, and what is your vision for the best-case scenario?

If some politicians don’t understand these questions or if they constantly talk about the past without being able to formulate a meaningful vision for the future, don’t vote for them.”

— Yuval Noah Harari,
“Moving Beyond Nationalism.”



sources of the conflict. For example, as the Syrian conflict has dragged on, refugee flows to Europe and elsewhere have fueled narratives of communities being overwhelmed by foreigners, which have, in turn, been used to fuel nativist politics at the national level. To break these vicious cycles, reforms have to put justice and security considerations into a mutually reinforcing relationship. Together, they should contribute to transcending discourses about exclusionary nationalism and cosmopolitan elitism and foster a sense of destiny and community across people and nations grounded in necessity and pragmatism.

This is not impossible. Movements and coalitions across the globe have sprung up for this very mission. This includes the nascent *Alliance for Multilateralism* of liberal democracies, to be formally launched by France and Germany in September 2019 at the UN General Assembly (see Box 3), and the Together First campaign, “a movement of global citizens, coordinated by a network of over 100 experts, practitioners, civil society activists and business leaders from all regions of the world.”¹³

It will be crucial to their success to avoid raising unrealistic expectations and develop a sustained momentum for their cause. At the same time, at the national level, discourses need to move beyond (manufactured) dichotomies of cosmopolitan elites beholden to liberal internationalism and those claiming to uniquely represent the will of the people. Instead, it is time to focus on what national leaders can deliver to foster both security and justice in a globalized world and in the face of global threats (see Box 4).

UN 75 should be used to foster greater comprehension between the various groups in the world, each with their own narratives of injustice and each with their own sense of insecurity. In order to move forward, the world needs to come together first.

CONFLICT AND STATE FRAGILITY: ADVANCING THE PREVENTION AND REBUILDING AGENDA

Global Challenge Update

Conflict and state fragility have long been threats to the international order, but conflicts today are most commonly found within states, involving numerous and non-easily identifiable actors who hold a stake in such conflicts for non-typical and often diverse motives. With the proliferation of advanced military and information technologies, growing ease of movement, increasing climate instability, and the rise of violent extremism (the Islamic State in particular), conflict and state fragility have been on the rise after reaching a twenty-year low in 2010.¹⁴ Despite a decrease in global battle deaths in 2017 driven by the conflict in Syria, nearly ninety-two thousand individuals still lost their lives in various forms of violent conflict.¹⁵ The Syrian conflict alone has killed more than 500 thousand people, displaced more than 11 million others and is estimated to have caused more than U.S. \$388 billion dollars in economic damage.¹⁶ Violent conflict is the main driver of humanitarian needs, with projections showing that, in 2019 alone, nearly 132 million people will require humanitarian assistance.¹⁷ Violent conflict also has a detrimental impact on the global economy, with the Global Peace Index estimating that, in 2017, violent conflict cost the global economy nearly U.S. \$1.2 trillion in purchasing power.¹⁸

UN peacekeeping operations intended to contain or to prevent the recurrence of recent armed conflict cost around U.S. \$6–7 billion a year for today's twelve field missions.¹⁹ In addition to the human and economic cost, the impact of conflict and violence is also reflected by the record 68 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, of which 10 million are stateless people deprived of basic rights such as education, employment, healthcare, and freedom of movement (see Box 5).²⁰

Current Global and Regional Responses

To combat the rise in violent conflict, the international community has begun refocusing its efforts on preventive action as a set of tools to minimize threats to international order while using fewer resources. The UN-World Bank *Pathways for Peace* report argues, for example, that better preventive action would save the world an average of U.S. \$5 billion to U.S. \$70 billion per year.²¹

Since the start of his term, in January 2017, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has undertaken a series of institutional reforms, including a focus on the UN's peace and security pillar. The newly established Department of Political and

BOX 5

The Challenge of Fragility, Conflict, and Violence

- ▶ Two billion people live in countries where development outcomes are affected by fragility, conflict, and violence.
- ▶ By 2030, at least half of the world's poor people will be living in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

- ▶ Conflicts drive 80 percent of all humanitarian needs.
- ▶ Forced displacement is a development world crisis: 95 percent of refugees and internally displaced people live in developing countries, originating from

the same ten conflicts since 1991, consistently hosted by about fifteen countries—also overwhelmingly in the developing world.

SOURCE: World Bank. "Fragility, Conflict, and Violence."

Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA, combining the former Department of Political Affairs and the Peacebuilding Support Office) and Department of Peace Operations (DPO, the former Department of Peacekeeping Operations) now share a unified political-operational structure to address fragmentation between these two major departments and to ensure greater coordination with the UN's development and human rights pillars.

These measures are accompanied by a gender parity strategy and management and development reforms that advance many of the recommendations of three major 2015 UN reports: the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the [UN] Peacebuilding Architecture, and the Global Study on the Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000).²² And shortly after taking office, Secretary-General Guterres announced that, “The overarching goals of the reform and restructuring of the peace and security pillar are to prioritize prevention and sustaining peace.”²³ With the Secretary-General's focus on prevention, even UN peacekeeping has begun to devote new resources and staff attention to this critical area in its operations.²⁴ One other innovation was the establishment of a High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation. Composed of eighteen current and former global leaders (including former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo and former Kyrgyz president Roza Otunbayeva), senior officials, and experts, the advisory board provides him with advice on mediation initiatives and backs specific mediation efforts around the world.²⁵ It builds on the important work of the more than decade-old Mediation Support Unit and Standby Team in what is now DPPA. Guterres has also continued his predecessor's Human Rights Upfront Initiative and greater focus on conflict forecasting capabilities (for example, periodic “horizon scanning”), all aimed at strengthening the link between early-warning and early-action.²⁶

Why the Status Quo Remains Insufficient

The United Nations' current toolkit for conflict prevention and response has proved effective at times, but many challenges remain to address modern

conflicts, including in Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, Libya, Mali, or any of the several instances of ethno-religious conflict elsewhere over who “belongs” in the state, as in Myanmar. Prevention's main problem in gaining traction as an international norm is the requirement that countries turn attention and resources to contexts where widespread violence and instability have not yet broken out.²⁷ Present prevention efforts are also modest in scale relative to need, insufficient to address the complex, asymmetric nature of contemporary conflicts. Thus the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs regularly warns that Yemen faces one of the worst humanitarian crises, with 80 percent of its 30 million people in need of aid and protection.²⁸ But the international community's ability to deal with, let alone prevent, such crises has only weakened in recent years, due in part to an upsurge in extremist, populist, and nationalist sentiments coalescing into movements that not only incite social divisions, but challenge democracy and destabilize a system of global governance that is critically underpinned by values of multilateral cooperation.

Priority Recommendations for 2020

This section introduces the first five of twenty thematic recommendations, in four key areas of global governance, numbered consecutively through the report.

1. *Continue to operationalize and prioritize conflict prevention*

Presaging the new Secretary-General's prevention initiatives, the Albright-Gambari Commission recommended improving conflict analysis and crisis warning through high-level discussions to work out the signs and factors associated with mass atrocity events, and to designate responsibility—possibly within DPPA—for analysis and warning to enable quicker decision-making. The Commission further called for a “Focus on the Responsibility to Prevent” by having all major UN agencies and programs develop a plan of action to review the relevance of their work to the Responsibility to Protect principle, and a unified UN perspective on the challenge of preventing and addressing atrocities.

In an effort to further operationalize and prioritize conflict prevention, the Commission's thinking should be joined with more recent recommendations of the Secretary-General to enhance the UN's system-wide integrated analysis and planning capacity, and its capacity for early action that builds upon the Human Rights Up Front initiative and works in concert with other international partners.²⁹ Reaching a high-level agreement on the warning signs of mass atrocities may prove politically challenging, but there is a growing body of serious work to draw upon, including from the UN Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, the African Union's Continental Early Warning System, and a growing number of NGOs.³⁰


Despite some progress, too few resources are being brought to bear in timely fashion in service of prevention. While having all major UN agencies and programs develop their "Responsibility to Prevent" action plans will entail little or no additional cost, other helpful initiatives, such as a New Civilian Response Capability, do have an associated price tag and, hence, may elicit donor pushback. Of greater concern is how major powers on the Security Council, in conflicts such as Syria and Yemen in recent years, have blocked efforts to address mass atrocities (discussed further under global institutions, below).

2. Continue to strengthen the role of women in peace processes

The inclusion of women in peace processes has been a priority for the United Nations since the passage of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Despite 1325 and subsequent UNSC resolutions for inclusion of women in peace processes, female representation in international peace processes continues to be minimal (see Figure 3). According to UN Women, in 2018, of the seventy-seven national action plans on WPS adopted to date by countries and territories, only eighteen were accompanied by a budget.³¹ Twenty years since the WPS resolution was adopted, women continue to be excluded from formal peace negotiations and peacebuilding planning processes. From 2005 to 2014, only two of the twenty-three rounds of peace talks between the Afghan Government and the

FIGURE 3

Women's Roles in Major Peace Processes, 1990–2019



SOURCE: Data from UN Women and the Council on Foreign Relations.

BOX 6

Gaps in Implementing UNSC Resolution 1325

As the Women, Peace, and Security Resolution marks its twentieth anniversary in 2020, the Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, stressed six gap areas that need urgent attention before 2020:

1. protecting women human rights defenders and civil society;
2. expanding financing for the women, peace, and security agenda;

3. increasing the number of women in uniform;
4. promoting women's economic recovery in post-conflict contexts;
5. standardizing gender-responsive conflict analysis and planning; and
6. promoting gender inclusive peace processes and negotiations.

SOURCE: UN Women, "The Road to 2020."

Taliban involved women in a formal capacity, and just five percent of the negotiators were women in the most recent, February 2019 talks.³²

The Albright-Gambari Commission's recommendation was designed to spur action on the integration of women not only in international peace processes but also in domestic decision-making fora, arguing that states can learn from sharing their 1325 national action plans. Going further, several major gaps in the WPS agenda have been identified that require urgent attention (see Box 6).

There are already several UN-based initiatives that can be leveraged to further support this recommendation, including the UN-Wide Gender Parity Strategy and the Elsie Initiative of the Canadian government, which seeks state-level collective action to achieve greater gender parity in peace operations.³³ High-level meetings such as the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerials, in London, Vancouver, and most recently in New York, continue to show the resolve of individual states to further the goals of gender parity in peacekeeping (a policy on which the UN Department of Peace Operations has recently issued for uniformed personnel).³⁴ At the 2017 ministerial in Vancouver, for example, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Bangladesh pledged to lead a new international, military-led gender champion network.³⁵

3. Establish standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployable needs for civilian specialist skills

Following a request from the Security Council in May 2008 and the subsequent Secretary-General's Report on "Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict," the UN's civilian capacity (CIVCAP) initiative commenced in 2009. In January 2014, a follow-on Report of the Secretary-General on "Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict" recommended disbanding the stand-alone CIVCAP team later that year, while mainstreaming its work across the UN system in three distinct areas: (a) improvement of support to institution-building grounded in national ownership; (b) broadening and deepening the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding; and (c) enhancing regional, South-South, and triangular cooperation.³⁶ The conclusion of CIVCAP also resulted in the winding down of the "CAPMATCH" online civilian capacity sourcing platform, which had faced difficulties in the areas of labor-intensive outreach and often-times cumbersome procedures for placing qualified individuals from developing countries in peace operation and peacebuilding settings.³⁷

Building on key elements of this earlier effort, the Albright-Gambari Commission proposed a "New UN Civilian Response Capability" with a quickly deployable cadre of 500 international



**THE NEW UN CIVILIAN
RESPONSE CAPABILITY
WIELDS THE POTENTIAL
TO REDUCE THE OUTBREAK
AND RECURRENCE
OF VIOLENT CONFLICT**

staff, possessing technical and managerial skills most needed in today's peace operations and including a specialized track of fifty senior mediators and Special Envoys/Representatives of the Secretary-General. This standing group would be complemented by a 2,000-strong standby component of highly skilled and periodically trained international civil servants drawn voluntarily from across the UN system, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and beyond the UN system to tap further specialized skill sets (including gender empowerment advisers, municipal-level administrators, engineers, and cyber-security specialists).

The New UN Civilian Response Capability reinforces António Guterres' strong push in support of conflict prevention (*see the first recommendation in this section on conflict and fragility*), combining a new quickly deployable standing capacity with wider reserve capabilities to support the Secretary-General's new "surge in diplomacy for peace." This recommendation can also build upon and derive lessons from, for example, the African Union's efforts to develop civilian capabilities for its missions in Darfur and Somalia, which recognized that their expertise was essential to addressing "root causes" of these conflicts such as scarce-resource governance, and the European Union's "Civilian Headline Goals," which seek to build civil and administrative processes on top of military and policing ones, as called for in the EU's Lisbon Treaty that entered into force on December 1, 2009.³⁸

Though some donor countries may balk at the price tag associated with a 500-strong standing capability when not deployed and budgeted against a field mission or other operational cost center (on the order of U.S. \$50 million per year, assuming a sustainable field deployment rate of 50 percent),³⁹ funding for the 2,000-strong reserve component would come from existing budgets across the UN system, except for some additional training for operating in non-permissive environments. Filling a relative dearth of civilian leadership and expertise, particularly in critical mediation skills, the New UN Civilian Response Capability wields the potential to reduce the outbreak and recurrence of violent conflict, thereby mitigating the need for far more costly interventions involving, for example, foreign military powers.

4. Establish a sizable standing and reserve capacity to support rapid and sustainable deployment of police to UN peace operations and to meet requests from UN Member States for police/justice development support

UN Police play an essential role in peacekeeping missions around the world but few countries maintain police capacity intended for international operations as police are in continual demand domestically in all countries. The United Nations has been called on to deploy at least 10 thousand police in its peace operations each year since 2008, and 5 to 9 thousand in the seven years preceding. UN policing has not had a lean year since 1998.⁴⁰ Because UN police tend to return home after not more than a year in the field, the UN has to recruit continually in all ranks and specialties to keep its missions working. The need to staff new missions in time-critical environments led to the establishment of a small Standing Police Capacity (SPC) within the UN Police Division. Initially operational in 2007, the SPC has been staffed by no more than forty-one persons since.⁴¹ Previous Stimson analyses concluded that the SPC was far too small to support mission setup; it has been used largely for technical support of ongoing operations. In 2015, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (the UN's de facto Inspector General), concluded that "the vision behind [SPC's] creation... has never been fully realized" and that restrictions on its deployments (three to six months) and reliance for funding on



BUSINESS AS USUAL HAS BECOME AN INCREASINGLY UNSUSTAINABLE APPROACH TO ENABLING THE POLICE DIVISION TO FULFIL THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF EXPERTISE AND BACKSTOPPING CAPACITIES REQUIRED TO ADVANCE POLICING PRIORITIES

the field missions that seek its support had led to it being “chronically underutilized.”⁴² It has also tended to be seen within the Police Division as a competitor for resources rather than a tool to use in mission support. Prior to 2014, UN Police lacked integrated guidance for developing new mission police components and carrying out their police capacity-building mandates. That has since changed with the development of the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping (SGF), which will figure prominently in all future UN police work. And the 2018 Secretary-General’s report on UN policing concluded that “business as usual has become an increasingly unsustainable approach to enabling the Police Division to fulfil the broad spectrum of expertise and backstopping capacities required to advance policing priorities.”⁴³

Continuing high demand for UN police peacekeeping, the high standards established by the SGF, and growing demand for UN police development support outside of post-conflict settings all argue for a professional, available, and full-time UN police response capacity. A 2010 Stimson study argued for a standing “rule of law capacity” that was about two-thirds police specialists and one-third other rule of law specialists. They would spend about half of their time in field missions or giving requested

support to UN Member States’ police services. The other half of their time would be taken up with individual training and learning, providing training for new UNPOL headed to missions, assessing and planning for next mission assignments, and resting a bit. Rapid response teams within the arrangement would enable new missions’ police components to be set up as quickly as military components, especially if the bulk of deployed UN police could be drawn from a pre-trained and pre-cleared reserve system.⁴⁴ To reduce potential friction between the standing capacity and headquarters personnel, it may be advisable to make DPO’s entire Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions—the parent organization of the Police Division and of DPO’s judicial, corrections, and security sector reform elements—periodically deployable, and to give the “standing” team a share of headquarters responsibility.⁴⁵

Per capita headquarters and field costs of UN peace operations have remained steady since the 2010 Stimson study costed its proposed standing rule of law capacity at roughly U.S. \$50 million to establish and U.S. \$70 million per year to sustain, half of which was to be built into the budgets of UN peacekeeping and other missions that anticipated a need for police support.⁴⁶

It must be stressed that this proposal is intended to supplant the current system by which UN Police are recruited, trained, deployed, and evaluated for UN peacekeeping and other UN police support tasks. The failure to better utilize SPC has been one of strategy and vision, not of concept. Promisingly, DPO has been working with the UN Development Program and other UN elements in the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice, and Corrections, which acts as a multi-agency coordination unit intended to reduce institutional competition and promote cooperation in rebuilding local rule of law in post-conflict and other settings.

We think that UN Member States would reap direct benefit from this proposed new UN capacity, not just in peacekeeping settings, although its role in new operations could be critical, but in providing police and other rule of law institutional development support to any country requesting it, with assurance that the response would be prompt, professional, consistent, well-trained, and well-supported.

5. Augment current disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programming with greater emphasis on countering (preventing the rise of) violent extremism (CVE) and reducing recidivism among former foreign terrorist fighters and affiliates

Generally used as a peacebuilding tool, DDR⁴⁷ has been continuously adapted to address the changing nature of conflicts and increasingly conducted in contexts with ongoing violence where mercenaries, foreign fighters, and terrorists are present.⁴⁸ In the past decade, DDR has been extensively operationalized in CVE settings, where no comprehensive peace agreement or inclusive political process are in place, transnational criminal organizations are present, and various armed groups, including Designated Terrorist Organizations (DTOs) and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), are perpetrating violence against the state, civilians, or other militant groups. Given the gap between prohibitive laws criminalizing engagement with “terrorists” and the imperative to provide “off-ramping” support measures for defecting fighters and affiliates that mitigate the risk associated with recidivism, a new set of preconditions must accompany the harmonization of international humanitarian, human rights, counterterrorism, and domestic civil laws for effective DDR. Further, in the absence of a peace agreement, stakeholders working on DDR should include persons with legal expertise—lawyers, as part of integrated DDR teams.⁴⁹

In particular, three legal obstacles need to be overcome in order to enhance DDR as a tool to prevent/counter violent extremism and mitigate the risk of recidivism.

First, despite the UN permitting “developing and implementing prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters” through UNSCR 2178 (2014)⁵⁰ and stressing the importance to provide reintegration and rehabilitation assistance to children (without mentioning women) associated with foreign terrorist fighters through resolution 2396 (2017),⁵¹ several legal frameworks prohibit engagement, provision of support, or services to individuals—“terrorists”—associated with VEOs and DTOs. The U.S. counterterrorism law, for example, strictly prohibits assistance and material support for DTOs

and VEOs. These prohibitive frameworks hinder the international community’s capacity to conduct DDR for defectors who seek to disengage, and presents challenges for DDR practitioners, who lack any guidance as to how violent extremist offenders should be managed.⁵²

Second, returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) remains a significant challenge for UN Member States. While their numbers are substantial—ISIS and Al-Qaeda claim thirty thousand foreign fighters in more than one hundred countries⁵³—international consensus is lacking on legal frameworks for dealing with disengaged FTFs. Determining which state is responsible for extradition and where FTFs are to be reintegrated is difficult, leaving jurisdiction for DDR of such fighters ambiguous.⁵⁴

Third, asserting the danger that FTFs pose to national security, governments have taken internal measures to “nullify passports, prohibit travel, and denationalize individuals” associated with DTOs and VEOs, creating statelessness, a violation of international law.⁵⁵ This is leading to a new phenomenon in DDR, the advent of the Stateless Fighter. With no current legal framework to address, and prevent “statelessness,” this dynamic can expect to continue.⁵⁶

The UN has led in setting international guidelines and practices such as the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006), UNSCR 2178



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PEACEBUILDING**

(2014), and the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which calls on states to enable "disengagement, rehabilitation and counselling programmes for persons engaged in violent extremism."⁵⁷ Bringing these guidelines fully to life calls for a coalition of entities such as the World Bank, UNICEF, and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, which consists of thirty-eight UN offices and organizations. It is essential that the incoherence among international humanitarian, human rights, counterterrorism laws, and DDR be resolved so that the imperative to disengage fighters from DTOs and VEOs and reintegrate them can finally be met.

Proposals Beyond 2020

Consider transformational justice as a postwar alternative that addresses not just the results but also the roots of violence

A core element of the Albright-Gambari Commission's Report, the conceptual framework of just security, underscores that, despite being considered "competing goods," justice and security are mutually reinforcing: "security creates the conditions needed for justice to take hold, while justice provides the essential means to address and redress the conditions that generated conflict."⁵⁸ In this same spirit, the growing post-war field of *transitional justice* should not be limited to simply trials, reparations, or truth-telling to respond to grave human rights abuses. Rather, achieving "just security" requires a shift to *transformational justice*, from legal to socio-economic and political justice, and from a state and

institutions focus to one heeding the needs of the community and society at large. Transformational justice aims to tackle the root causes of conflict, which are often linked to economic, social, civil, political, and cultural rights violations. The shift from transitional to transformational justice represents a necessary but arduous and likely time-consuming journey. UN 75 provides an opportunity to, at the very least, begin this important conversation toward building more durable and just peace in countries recovering from years of violence and turmoil.

Combat corruption to support effective rule of law

In post-conflict transitions, states usually suffer from weak judicial institutions and legal frameworks that lack rigorous enforcement. If not addressed forcefully and comprehensively, especially with ample external funds flowing into a country or region, corruption can quickly upend a peace process, even creating conditions for backsliding toward violence. Efforts to address corruption in post-conflict settings are generally siloed and fragmented among different peacebuilding actors seeking to build effective rule of law. But combating corruption requires well-defined and broad-based anti-corruption strategies and independent public institutions, whose primary mandate is to prevent, investigate, and punish acts of corruption. For instance, the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras and the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, established by the Organization of the American States and the United Nations, respectively, are notable for their success in investigating, prosecuting, and convicting high-level government officials. For building both the rule of law and government legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, reducing corruption in a systematic, root-and-branch manner is essential to effective peacebuilding. A recommitment to the United Nations Convention against Corruption at the 2020 (UN 75) Summit would be a welcomed development, with increased political support and technical and financial resources to follow.

CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: INNOVATING THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND EXPANDING GREEN TECH

Global Challenge Update

Over the last two centuries, global mean sea-level temperature has increased roughly one-degree centigrade (1°C). About half of that increase has occurred in the last thirty years. According to the best scientific evidence assembled by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), at present rates of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, warming will continue at roughly 0.2°C per decade and much faster in the Arctic, where winter temperatures critical to forming and maintaining the ice pack have already risen 3°C. If humankind cannot find a way to limit average global warming to less than 1.5°C (looming as soon as 2030; see Figure 4), further severe consequences are anticipated, including sea level rise of up to one meter by 2100.⁵⁹


The oceans absorb about 30 percent of emitted carbon dioxide, making them more acidic, and seriously damaging or destroying aquatic food webs and fisheries. We are also seeing unprecedented heat waves, precipitation, storm damage, drought, and desertification

as a result of climate change, and the damage is accelerating. The recent Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services also found that around one million animal and plant species are at risk of extinction, with climate change representing one important contributing factor.⁶⁰ As stated in the *Fourth U.S. Climate assessment*, “Earth’s climate is now changing faster than at any point in the history of modern civilization, primarily as a result of human activities.”⁶¹

Climate change is disrupting human security and national stability around the globe. The long-running conflict in Afghanistan takes place against the background of one of the most severe droughts in its history that has forced farmers to migrate into cities, straining local resources.⁶² While Central American gangs have received the bulk of the attention as a cause for increased migration to the United States, many rural families are forced to migrate due to drought, which has destroyed agricultural productivity.⁶³ In the Nigerian Sahel, desertification has parched traditional pastoral lands, forcing herders to

FIGURE 4

IPCC Projections for Global Warming



SOURCE: IPCC, *Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C*, Chapter 1 - Technical Annex 1.A, Fig 12.

BOX 7

The Katowice Climate Package

► **On mitigation:** further guidance in relation to nationally determined contributions (NDCs), common time frames, and modalities, work programme, and functions under the Paris Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;

► **On adaptation:** further guidance on adaptation communication;

► **On finance:** identification of the information to be provided

by parties in accordance with Agreement Article 9.5 (ex ante finance transparency), matters relating to the Adaptation Fund, and setting a new collective quantified goal on finance;

► **On technology:** scope of and modalities for the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism, and the technology framework

► **For the transparency framework:** modalities, procedures, and guidelines for action and support;

The global stocktake (Paris progress report due in 2023); and

► **For implementation and compliance:** modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee to facilitate both.

SOURCE: IISD, “A Brief Analysis of the Katowice Climate Change Conference.”

encroach increasingly on farmlands, while population pressure pushes farmers into remaining pastoral lands. Endemic violence in 2018 displaced upwards of 300 thousand people.⁶⁴ That same year, California suffered two of its deadliest wildfires, linked to a prolonged drought.⁶⁵ Ninety percent of Lake Chad, bordering four states in north-central Africa, has disappeared, depleting local fisheries.⁶⁶ The war in Syria also has roots in a climate-change-implicated drought that forced people into cities, contributing to a war that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, facilitated the rise of ISIS, and nearly destabilized Iraq.⁶⁷

Negotiations on how to cope with climate change have been ongoing since 1992 under the auspices of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The IPCC is its scientific assessment arm and annual “Conferences of the Parties” (COPs) are the principal negotiating venues. *Mitigating* potential damage from climate change was a dominant consideration for much of the UNFCCC’s existence but the slippage of time and growing evidence of adverse climate-related impacts around the world have focused increased attention on *adaptation and resilience* to climate change as well.

Current Global and Regional Responses

In December 2015, 195 states signed the Paris Climate Agreement at COP 21. Signatories pledged to make voluntary carbon emission reductions with a goal of holding global temperature increases to no more than 2°C.⁶⁸ Since the agreement took effect, in November 2016, negotiations have focused on rules for implementation.⁶⁹ In 2018, COP 24 finalized the Katowice Climate Package (or “Rulebook”), a 236-page set of guidelines for states to achieve the Paris Agreement goal of limiting temperature increases to well below 2°C and helping countries adapt and prepare.⁷⁰ Among the provisions, participating states agreed to report their climate impact, and the UN will produce a five-year update on progress towards carbon reduction and report on climate financing (“the Stocktake”; see Box 7).⁷¹

Reflecting the UN’s growing sense of urgency about climate change, in September 2019 the Secretary-General will convene a second “Climate Action Summit” (the first was in 2014) in New York with the announced intent to “rapidly accelerate

action to implement the Paris Agreement” in six “action portfolios” and three “key areas” (see Box 8).⁷²

In addition to the Paris Agreement and September Climate Action Summit, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 72/277 in May 2018, which mandated a review of current global environmental laws and updates. The most recent meeting took place in Nairobi, Kenya, where over one hundred states came together to discuss gaps in environmental laws, including those related to climate. Many concerns were raised, including intellectual property rights relating to the transfer of technology, the lack of laws concerning international trade, and other gaps.⁷³

Climate adaptation and resilience have come to the fore since COP 21. The Paris Agreement

instituted a five-year technical examination process on adaptation seeking ways to strengthen and understand adaptation.⁷⁴ In early 2019 the World Bank took the lead in financing adaptation by increasing funds for low and middle-income states to U.S. \$50 billion from 2021 to 2025,⁷⁵ providing institutional support for states to centralize adaptation in policy, investment, and implementation. The independent Global Commission on Adaptation (GCA), launched in June 2018 and led by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation co-chair Bill Gates, and World Bank CEO Kristalina Georgieva,⁷⁶ will submit a report to the UN Climate Action Summit and initiate a year of action in October 2019 to push policy makers on the issue. COP 25, to be held in

BOX 8

UN Climate Action Summit 2019

ACTION PRIORITIES

Finance: mobilizing public and private sources of finance to drive decarbonization of all priority sectors and advance resilience;

Energy Transition: accelerating the shift away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy, as well as making significant gains in energy efficiency;

Industry Transition: transforming industries such as Oil and Gas, Steel, Cement, Chemicals and Information Technology;

Nature-Based Solutions: Reducing emissions, increasing sink capacity and enhancing resilience within and across forestry, agriculture, oceans and food systems [“AFOLU” – agriculture, forestry, oceans, and land use]], including through biodiversity conservation, leveraging supply chains and technology;

Cities and Local Action: Advancing mitigation and resilience at urban and local levels, with a focus on new commitments on low-emission buildings, mass transport and urban infrastructure, and resilience for the urban poor;

Resilience and Adaptation: advancing global efforts to address and manage the impacts and risks of climate change, particularly in those communities and nations most vulnerable.

OTHER KEY AREAS

Mitigation Strategy: to generate momentum for ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and long-term strategies to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Youth Engagement and Public Mobilization: To mobilize people worldwide to take action on climate change and ensure that young people are integrated and represented across all aspects of the Summit, including the six transformational areas.

Social and Political Drivers: to advance commitments in areas that affect people’s well-being, such as reducing air pollution, generating decent jobs, strengthening climate adaptation strategies, and protecting workers and vulnerable groups.

SOURCE: UN, “Climate Action Summit 2019.”

BOX 9

Country Spotlight: Bangladesh

Bangladesh is one of the countries considered most vulnerable to the devastating effects of climate change, with its dense population (about 1,116 people per square

kilometer), 20 percent of land less than one meter above sea level, and location in a region prone to severe cyclones. The majority of the population works in agriculture, and climate change is increasing soil salinization, threatening to destroy local food production and force more people into the already-crowded cities.

In response, Bangladesh has invested billions of dollars in tackling climate change; it has become internationally recognized for its innovative techniques to adapt, build resilience, and prepare its population. These include building over 200 cyclone shelters for its residents on vulnerable islands and developing new technologies to prevent the salinization of its agriculture. Additionally, the government has taken steps to educate its people on ways to conduct more climate-friendly farming in different environments. One government program, in partnership with UNDP and other NGOs, is empowering women and girls to take action on climate change. The Bangladesh Climate Trust Fund, the first trust fund to finance climate resilience projects in a least developed country, supports this and other innovative initiatives.

SOURCES: World Population Review, "Bangladesh Population 2019." World Bank, "Bangladesh." UNDP, "Bangladesh Climate."

Santiago, Chile, shortly after the Climate Action Summit, will make adaptation a central component of its action program.

Why the Status Quo Remains Insufficient

Many organizations, agencies, and scientists believe that the Paris Agreement does not go far enough to keep climate change below the 1.5°C target, even if states adhered to the goals of the agreement. A significant vulnerability is that all of the Paris Agreement targets, the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), are voluntary and subject to unilateral change. In 2017, the United States—the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world—announced that it would step out of the deal, effective November 2020. Brazil's president Jair Bolsonaro has threatened to leave as well, endangering the Amazon River Basin, which is a central filter of carbon dioxide.⁷⁷

Despite the clear and present climate risks, the world's most-capable states have failed to act aggressively enough. Among the G20, not one NDC is set to meet 2030 targets established in the Paris Agreement.⁷⁸ In 2017, fifteen of its members saw their energy-related carbon emissions increase, sending a powerful message of inaction around the world. Moreover, while the Paris Agreement established a broad global adaptation goal, and COP 24 at Katowice advanced "communications" and funding for adaptation, no standards to measure achievement were agreed upon. Commitments to the financial vehicles intended to help developing countries and vulnerable populations develop greater climate change resilience have fallen far short of the Paris goal of U.S. \$100 billion per year by 2020. At COP 24, delegates agreed to consider raising that amount in deliberations starting November 2020.⁷⁹ Meanwhile, climate-induced challenges to the most vulnerable, low-lying countries continue to intensify (see Box 9).

Priority Recommendations for 2020

6. Facilitate and strengthen linkages between the UNFCCC and other international regimes and organizations and civil society actors dealing with climate change

While the UNFCCC is considered the primary body in the UN to combat climate change, there are many

other agencies taking action, from the International Civil Aviation Authority and the International Maritime Organization to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).⁸⁰ In addition, international clubs such as the G20 have implemented climate initiatives, and many cities are even charting their own path. To streamline the process, the Albright-Gambari Commission recommended that the international community strengthen linkages between the UNFCCC and other regional and global institutions. Formal memoranda can accomplish this, allowing the UNFCCC Secretariat to assume a more significant coordinating role in climate initiatives and improving information sharing.

The UNFCCC process has created several means for non-state actors to contribute to concerted “climate action.” COP 20 in Lima (2014) created the “Nazca Portal,” incorporated into the Paris Agreement “as the official portal to showcase the contributions of the so-called ‘non-Party stakeholders,’” in climate change.⁸¹ COP 22 added the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action “to strengthen collaboration between Parties and non-Party stakeholders to allow greater mitigation and adaptation action.”⁸² COP 24 saw unofficial side events from non-state actors pushing to have a more formal role in climate negotiations, and the UNFCCC has a process for non-state actors to gain observer status and monitor negotiations, but the primary way for non-state actors to exert influence is still to pressure their respective national governments to take certain negotiating positions, including by serving on government delegations to the COP.⁸³

A critical path to facilitate these linkages will be to use the upcoming COP 25 where states will report on their progress towards fulfillment of their commitments to the Paris Agreement and very likely highlight challenges to accomplishing the goals they have set. Additionally, the Global Pact for the Environment has formed an ad hoc committee to examine gaps in international law, which as progress continues will provide a forum to facilitate linkages with the UNFCCC. The upcoming UN Climate Action meeting in September 2019 will provide a forum for action on these concerns, and the UN 2020 Leaders Summit should aim to give focus to the efforts by mandating measurable adaptation goals within NDCs.

7. Define one or more global climate adaptation goals and gauge their achievement in terms of measurable improvements in local human security; finance support for adaptation from revenues formerly directed to fossil fuel subsidies

Adaptation can take many forms, from building flood control infrastructure to planning when to plant crops, and involves multiple levels of governance, from local to global. Individual states and localities should be responsible for developing “climate-resilient development pathways” (CRDPs) that best meet their needs. But adaptation might be faster, deeper, and more cost-effective if lessons and experience—including approaches to governing and managing adaptation—from many places experiencing similar climate-related vulnerabilities and economic circumstances were more readily shareable. Effective sharing and learning are hampered at present because, in the words of the IPCC’s 2019 Special Report, “approaches, reporting procedures, reference points, and data sources to assess progress on implementation across and within nations are still largely underdeveloped.”⁸⁴ Development of “indicators and standardized approaches to evaluate and compare adaptation over time and across regions, countries, and sectors would enhance comparability and learning.”⁸⁵ However, as also noted by the IPCC,

A number of constraints continue to hamper progress on adaptation [measurement and evaluation], including ... an absence of comprehensive and systematically collected data on adaptation to support ... assessment and comparison, a lack of agreement on indicators to measure, and challenges of attributing altered vulnerability to adaptation actions.⁸⁶

The Special Report stressed the importance of “independent private and public reporting and statistical institutions” to monitor and evaluate climate adaptation efforts and underlined that the “creation and enhancement of these institutions would be an important contribution to an effective transition to a low-emission world.”⁸⁷

Although adaptation is already a component of the UN’s “Climate Action” Sustainable Development Goal, and the World Bank is making



A GREEN TECHNOLOGY LICENSING FACILITY WOULD FACILITATE GREEN TECHNOLOGY ACCESS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

notable strides with developing states, the centrality of adaptation in coping with climate change and the urgency of the need, worldwide, requires much greater attention to what works well where and how, shared as soon and as broadly as possible. Both the UN 75 Leaders Summit (September 2020) and COP 26 (November 2020), building on what will then be known from such sources as the Global Commission on Adaptation's first full "year of action," should aim to give focus to these efforts and stress the importance of *measurable adaptation goals* in NDCs and *means to better evaluate and share* successes (and failures) of adaptation across a wide range of stakeholders.

Globally, countries spent roughly U.S. \$310 billion in 2016 on fossil fuel subsidies, over 80 percent of it to support fossil fuel consumption.⁸⁸ To fund both transformational adaptation and the means to monitor and evaluate what does and does not work, governments should *redirect revenues currently spent on fossil fuel subsidies to support climate adaptation programming*, both domestically and, in line with Paris and subsequent arrangements, in developing countries with the most immediately vulnerable populations.

8. Establish a Green Technology Licensing Facility within the Green Climate Fund

Currently, there are active programs to foster the transfer of technology and adaptation to the

Global South, but there are still myriad licensing and intellectual property laws that can hinder the process. The Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), a joint effort of UNEP and the UN Industrial Development Organization, together with a large number of collaborating partners, offers technical assistance, access to knowledge, and co-operation "among climate technology stakeholders," primarily on behalf of developing countries around the world.⁸⁹ The UNFCCC's Green Climate Fund is partnering with CTCN to support about U.S. \$5 billion in green development projects.⁹⁰ However, despite the advances in funding and technical assistance, there are still financial barriers to licensing green technology applications.

To ensure the expansion of green technology into the Global South, the Albright-Gambari Commission recommended establishing a Green Technology Licensing Facility within the Green Climate Fund. It would facilitate green technology access in the Global South by lowering barriers arising from different intellectual property rights and trade laws and requirements.⁹¹ The facility would encourage licensing and transfer of technology to developing countries while protecting intellectual property rights to incentivize the development of green technology as well as availability in developing countries. The facility could also work with technology firms to promote the transfer of technology to the Global South.⁹²

The best path forward for the Green Technology Licensing Facility may be to lean on the commitments in the Katowice rulebook to provide green technology to the Global South. Additionally, at COP 25 in December 2019, states will present their first progress reports on NDCs to implement the Paris Agreement. As states show progress in some areas but have problems with technology implementation, a proposal that would ease bureaucratic and intellectual property barriers would be appealing.

9. Vigorously pursue emissions reductions in "short-lived climate pollutants" like methane as an "early win" while CO₂ reduction strategies and technologies mature

Methane, the principal component of "natural gas," is widely used in heating, cooking, electricity generation, and increasingly, as a less polluting alternative

to diesel fuel in urban transit and other transport applications. U.S. production has grown 55 percent since 2006 as hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) techniques have made “unconventional gas” more accessible, making the United States a net exporter of natural gas since 2017.⁹³ Burning natural gas instead of coal to generate electricity or diesel to power buses is a relative gain for the environment (especially for breathing), but 2–3 percent of methane production and distribution is now estimated to be lost to the atmosphere every year.⁹⁴ That is a serious and growing problem.

Methane has a “radiative forcing” (warming) effect in the atmosphere that is, pound for pound, up to two *orders of magnitude* greater than CO₂ in the short term with a global warming potential (as of 2012) equivalent to 40 percent of global CO₂ emissions.⁹⁵ However, because methane has an “atmospheric lifetime” of about a decade, cutting emissions to zero would wash out its warming effects in about ten years. Cutting net CO₂ emissions to zero would halt *further* warming but not make the world cooler because CO₂ stays around for a very long time. Any gains from reducing “short-lived climate pollutants” like methane would be lost in a decade or so if CO₂ emissions continued. So in order to stabilize warming *and roll it back*, it is crucial to haul back steeply on both methane and CO₂.

Fortunately, reducing methane emissions is doable at a reasonable cost—indeed, with substantial *cost recovery*, since not-lost gas is marketable—and doable with available technology.⁹⁶ And if initiated promptly and broadly, it would start to produce measurable results as the globe approaches the timeframe in which global temperatures are anticipated to “overshoot” 1.5°C.

What now seems most lacking on the methane emissions reduction front is the political imperative. A March 2016 U.S.-Canada joint statement pledged to reduce methane emissions in the oil and gas production sector to 40–45 percent below 2012 levels by 2025.⁹⁷ Obama-era draft regulations to implement that vision were blocked by the Trump administration.⁹⁸ The emerging UN pact for the environment may be another avenue of approach to achieve methane and other short-lived pollutant reductions.

10. Establish a multilateral mechanism to govern climate engineering research and experimentation, especially solar radiation management

As climate change intensifies, there will be a stronger push to use active technological measures to reverse its effects, often referred to as “climate engineering” or “geoengineering,” but at present it is a very controversial proposition. The IPCC’s 2019 Special Report does not use “geoengineering,” referring instead just to carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM). And in March 2019, the fourth UN Environment Assembly rejected a resolution that would have commissioned the UNEP to assess the current state of knowledge on geoengineering.⁹⁹ CDR encompasses engineering pathways aiming to “reduce [CO₂] concentrations already in the atmosphere.” SRM involves “remedial measures” intended “to temporarily reduce or offset warming.”¹⁰⁰ Both categories are umbrellas for multiple activities.¹⁰¹

SRM is primarily associated with “stratospheric aerosol injection” (seeding the earth’s upper atmosphere with cooling aerosols like sulfur dioxide, a familiar component of urban smog).¹⁰² Aerosol injection would need to be actively and uniformly sustained for decades, could have uneven regional impacts,¹⁰³ and whenever its mission is deemed fulfilled, would need to be reduced gradually to avoid “termination shock,” or rapid reversion to warmer temperatures as injection ends.¹⁰⁴

Regarding management and governance of SRM, the IPCC notes that,

There is robust evidence but medium agreement for unilateral action potentially becoming a serious SRM governance issue An equitable institutional or governance arrangement around SRM would have to reflect views of different countries and be multilateral because of the risk of termination, and risks that implementation or unilateral action by one country or organization will produce negative precipitation or extreme weather effects across borders. Some have suggested that the governance of research and field experimentation can help clarify uncertainties surrounding deployment of SRM¹⁰⁵

The Albright-Gambari Commission recommended the creation of an international board, most likely within the ambit of the UNFCCC, to monitor the development, advise on the wisdom, and manage the testing and application of these technologies, particularly those involving atmospheric solar radiation management and other large-scale albedo management techniques. The board should be staffed by top experts capable of evaluating research for efficacy, ethical, and safety considerations along with considering the potential for irreversible unintended consequences. Any field experimentation involving atmospheric SRM beyond a certain small scale will inevitably involve testing on human subjects. UN Member States should treat the board's decisions on such testing as binding, although the gravity of the issues involved would also argue for paths to appeal those decisions.

With growing concern over the worsening effects of climate change, the impetus to find ways to reverse these effects will only grow. While primary attention for the upcoming COP 25 is on states showing their progress on implementing pledges for the Paris Agreement, the COPs have always been forums for new proposals. Current talks on the Global Pact for the Environment and the upcoming Climate Summit at the United Nations in September offer other paths to address this gap in international climate governance.

Proposals Beyond 2020

Negotiate carbon subsidy reduction targets, aiming at zero fossil fuel subsidies by 2025

Carbon-emitting fossil fuels continue to be subsidized across the world. Despite pledges to phase out fossil-fuel subsidies from the G20 and all UN Member States through the Sustainable Development Goals, total worldwide subsidies have only increased, with 2017 outpacing 2016 by U.S. \$30 billion (including increased subsidy programs in some of the most prosperous economies).¹⁰⁶ Subsidy reduction steps have been difficult, in part because of the power and profit of the fossil fuel industry; another factor is the burden placed on states facing energy insecurity. According to the International Monetary Fund, more efficient fossil fuel pricing can significantly lower global carbon emissions (by upwards of 28 percent), reduce fossil fuel air pollution by close to

50 percent, and even increase government revenue by close to 4 percent of GDP.¹⁰⁷ A goal of phasing-out all fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 would be desirable—perhaps making use of World Trade Organization environmental exceptions on tariffs (GATT Article XX) for the purpose of taxing carbon on trade.

The International Court of Justice Should Provide Advisory Opinions on Climate Change

The Albright-Gambari Commission also encouraged the General Assembly and other authorized bodies to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligation of states to pursue climate action, thereby reshaping the role of international law in curbing emissions. Such an approach could build on the precedents set in pronouncing authoritative interpretations of international law in cases concerning genocide (1951, 2007, and 2015) and the legality of nuclear weapons (1996). The ICJ is well suited, for instance, to provide an advisory opinion in relation to the existential threat that small island states face due to climate change. In 2016, this idea was given renewed impetus through a proclamation of support by the World Conservation Congress of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. Moreover, it can build on practice from regional human rights courts, in particular the Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the environment and human rights of February 2018. Rather than substituting for further negotiations (e.g., toward strengthening the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change), an ICJ advisory opinion could play a constructive role in complementing negotiations by allowing all states the chance to be heard at a relatively high level of generality (leaving the specifics to be worked out through negotiations).¹⁰⁸

HYPERCONNECTED GLOBAL ECONOMY: AVERTING SHOCKS AND PROMOTING INCLUSIVE GROWTH

Global Challenge Update

Today's global economy is increasingly hyper-connected, driving prosperity and development. However, the resulting high degree of interdependence is not matched by an adequate global regulatory and institutional framework. Significant challenges remain in terms of both economic security and justice. Countries face many cross-border economic threats and challenges—including weaknesses in cyberspace infrastructure, the loss of tax revenues to illicit financial flows (IFFs), illegal exploitation of natural resources, and other corrupt practices of multinational conglomerates that inhibit the growth of economies and the ability of governments to enhance their countries' economic resilience, especially in Global South countries with limited capacities to respond to these threats. Meanwhile, income and wealth inequality have increased substantially in many quarters of the globe in recent years, concentrating sharply at the top.¹⁰⁹ There is, not surprisingly, a spreading sense of resentment against economic globalization among those who, in contrast to its greatest beneficiaries, see themselves as “left behind by globalization and automation,”¹¹⁰ particularly in industrialized countries.

Global governance can be a powerful tool for addressing these issues, but it often comes up short in protecting consumers, employees, and smaller entrepreneurs. Consider cybersecurity, which lacks international coordination despite a wealth of expertise and technical resources in the international community and the rising cost of cyberattacks and cybercrime for leading economies. Expanding internet access not only adds several hundred million new users every year,¹¹¹ but increases the number of potential victims of cybercrime in the global economy.

Although global governance practice is starting to emerge around tax evasion and natural resource exploitation, corruption and illicit financial flows remain rampant, resulting in enormous financial losses especially for developing countries (see Figure 5), which need tax revenue to increase their societies' and institutions' resilience, reduce inequalities, and

address global challenges such as climate change. According to Global Financial Integrity, between 2006 and 2015, IFFs accounted for over twenty percent of the value of developing countries' trade.¹¹² Moreover, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) utilize differences in tax rules among countries to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations. This practice, which is not technically illegal, is known as “base erosion and profit shifting.”¹¹³ Scholarly research estimates that roughly U.S. \$500 billion in annual tax revenues are lost due to profit shifting by MNCs.¹¹⁴


Resource-rich developing countries remain deprived of possibilities to invest in their societies because extractive industries can impose unfavorable contractual terms, accepted by governments to the detriment of their populations. For instance, according to the Africa Progress Panel, the Democratic Republic of Congo reportedly lost at least U.S. \$1.36 billion in revenues between 2010 and 2012 “from the underpricing of mining assets that were sold to off-shore companies.”¹¹⁵ Such unequal relationships, in turn, increase environmental and societal pressures on already fragile host countries.

Current Global and Regional Responses

In response to past shocks and crises, specific steps were taken to better equip global governance mechanisms to deal with them in the future. At the highest political level, following the global financial crisis of 2008–09, the G20 upgraded its main gathering to include Heads of State, preceded by meetings of finance and foreign ministers. In 2009, the G20 vowed to become the “premier forum” overseeing international economic and financial cooperation and thereafter established the Financial Stability Board (FSB) following the crisis in 2008–2009.¹¹⁶ The FSB comprises representatives from the central banks of member countries and aims to promote coordination and implement reform of international financial regulation and

FIGURE 5

**Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries, 2004-2013,
in billions of U.S. dollars (nominal)**



SOURCE: Kar and Spanjer, *Illicit Financial Flows*.

supervision. Reforms in 2012 made it a legal entity (an association) under Swiss law.¹¹⁷

In the domain of cyber governance, a range of organizations and initiatives work towards a more secure internet. These include the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), formed by countries, international organizations, and private companies that came together in 2015 to share know-how and best practices on countering cybercrime. It has since grown to include thirty-eight countries, including the United States, several intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, INTERPOL, and the World Bank, and large private companies such as AT&T, Microsoft, and IBM.¹¹⁸ Its work has helped build a healthy foundation for global governance in cybersecurity, including its campaign to raise cybersecurity awareness and a project to assess and develop cybersecurity capabilities.¹¹⁹

In addition, the UN is pursuing international cooperation through its Group of Governmental

Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE). This group examines potential cooperative measures avoiding inter-state tensions in cyberspace, leading to two UN General Assembly resolutions in December 2018 welcoming the development of a “set of international rules, norms, and principles of responsible behavior of States” in cyberspace.¹²⁰

Global governance has also made progress in the areas of IFFs and resource exploitation. This process progress started with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and has expanded from there.¹²¹ More recent initiatives include the implementation of the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) standard and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The AEOI, a largely OECD-driven standard, aims to make the automatic exchange of tax information between countries an international norm to prevent tax evasion and recover lost

revenue, has received commitments to implement from 153 countries as of November 2018, including China, Germany, and the United Kingdom.¹²²

The EITI is a multi-stakeholder initiative that works by requiring member countries to report revenue from extractive industries and how that revenue is taxed by the government and entered into the economy. Fifty-two member countries subscribe to its principles (see Box 10) and to implementing the reporting standards and regulations that create transparency around the flow of money and capital through resource extraction companies and their host governments. Civil society organizations, international organizations, and companies also lend support and financial contributions to EITI. The more than fifty supporting companies include BP, Chevron, and Shell.¹²³

BOX 10

Select EITI Principles

1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative economic and social impacts.

...

4. We recognize that a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development.

...

10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use.

SOURCE: EITI, "The EITI Principles."

Why the Status Quo Remains Insufficient

The G20 still falls short in global financial and economic governance and remains formally disconnected from other important international institutions. In an environment in which the "specific benefits [of trade], such as more jobs, higher wages or lower prices" are widely questioned,¹²⁴ the international sphere has become a more disordered environment, where isolationist and protectionist attitudes have risen to prominence, leading to, among other surprises, Brexit and the 2016 U.S. election results. Hence, it is essential to build international cooperation on the many issues stalking the global economy and to seek greater coordination between the G20 and the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as the World Trade Organization. Nor should we ignore important but often-overlooked organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), which sets international minimum labor standards and has been operating a "tripartite" multi-stakeholder governance model in which employers, workers, and states are represented since 1919.

While Brexit tests the limits of multilateral diplomacy, the Trump administration has used tariffs as a tool of coercion, even going so far as to engage in a trade war with China. These events have dampened the growth outlook of the global economy.¹²⁵ In the face of this reality, the international community needs to utilize multilateral coordination to both prevent and respond to economic shocks and work towards greater economic equity.

Challenges for internet security and governance include access, affordability, and quality of internet services, restrictions on the freedom of expression online, protecting private data, and deepening cybersecurity. The latter has become an increasingly high-profile issue, given Russian interference in the U.S. elections and targeted cyberattacks against large companies like Yahoo.¹²⁶ Many Global South countries, in particular, still lack vital infrastructure and security for/against cyber threats. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) concludes that progress in developing that infrastructure in the Global South has stalled, particularly in Africa, where the majority of states lack essential



TO BETTER COORDINATE WITH DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, THE G20 WILL REQUIRE MORE INSTITUTIONAL PRESENCE, AS CURRENTLY, IT HAS NO COLLECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY AND NO FAMILIAR FACE TO THE WORLD—NOT EVEN A PERMANENT WEBSITE

capacities for effective cybersecurity.¹²⁷ Attacks on the region's financial services industry are intense and increasing, with ransomware alone costing regional economies U.S. \$4 billion in 2016.¹²⁸

While 153 countries committed to implementing the AEOI standard, the United States is not one of them. The U.S. maintains its own system under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and a network of bilateral agreements. This hampers promotion of AEOI as a global standard. Moreover, as demonstrated in recent years by the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers scandals, shell companies continue to play a crucial role in facilitating tax evasion and avoidance. According to a 2017 study by Damgaard and Elkjaer,

a stunning U.S. \$12 trillion—almost 40 percent of all foreign direct investment positions globally—is completely artificial: it consists of financial investment passing through empty corporate shells with no real activity. These investments in empty corporate shells almost always pass through well-known tax havens.¹²⁹

The implementation of the EITI standard faces significant obstacles as well. Although its overall membership has increased, the United States left the initiative in November 2017.¹³⁰ Other large industrialized economies such as France and Japan have not signed up. Neither has China. Moreover, close to half of its members have yet to have their progress assessed or have made inadequate progress toward implementation.¹³¹ While the EITI has helped many countries develop legal frameworks and consistent reporting requirements around extractive industries,¹³² further reporting requirements are necessary to combat issues related to IFFs and the environmental costs of these industries. The EITI has begun to implement initiatives to increase transparency for extractive industries, such as the EU's country-by-country reporting standard.¹³³ Despite some success, the EITI has failed to produce the social outcomes predicted by increased transparency, to address the impact of fossil fuel extraction on climate change, and has still a lot of unrealized potential to prevent the continued diversion of revenues from natural resource exploitation from developmental purposes.

Priority Recommendations for 2020

11. Create a G20+ to enhance coordination with the UN system, Bretton Woods institutions, and related bodies, and give it a small secretariat

Economic shocks to the global economy are a constant concern of the international community. Stronger global governance is needed to both prevent and respond to them. The G20 in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008–09 demonstrated the potential of multilateral economic coordination by convening at the Heads of State level and creating the Financial Stability Board to coordinate the efforts of central banks in some of the larger national economies.¹³⁴

G20 Member States' economies generate about 74 percent of global GDP and support roughly two-thirds of the world's population.¹³⁵ However, the G20 does not give representation to 174 other countries, many in the Global South, which also have vested interests in sustaining inclusive economic growth while maintaining economic stability, reducing

global inequality, and addressing the economic, social, and political threats posed by climate change.

For the G20 to truly become the “premier forum” of global economic and financial governance, it needs an upgrade to what the Albright-Gambari Commission termed a “G20+.”¹³⁶ This would entail assembling the G20 at the Heads of State level every two years at UN Headquarters, timed to coincide with the start of the UN General Assembly in the third week of September in New York. While the main policy focus of the G20+ should remain priority setting on critical issues for the world economy, including in the area of crisis response, it should establish formal links with intergovernmental organizations for implementation and follow-through.

To better coordinate with different international economic institutions, the G20 will also require more institutional presence, as currently, it has no collective institutional memory and no familiar face to the world—not even a permanent website. Its web presence passes to each successive host of the next G20 summit, revealing a Sisyphean model that inhibits the accumulation of working knowledge and consensus.

The Albright-Gambari Commission proposed the establishment of a modest secretariat to promote better-integrated economic, social, and environmental approaches to international problems by G20 governments, international organizations (global, like the UN; regional, like the AU; and sub-regional, like ASEAN), civil society organizations, and the business community. This secretariat could take many forms, including a virtual secretariat (electronically joined up but physically distributed) or an “IPCC model” of experts to inform decision-making. Although costs can be a concern for this endeavor, these estimates pale in comparison to the projected economic gains from enhanced coordination and preventing future crises and shocks in the global economy.

Besides expected support for the G20+ among the 174 UN Member States not represented on the current G20, enthusiastic members of the new Alliance for Multilateralism that are concurrently G20 members—including Germany, France, Mexico, Japan, and Canada—should be looked to for leadership on this initiative, just as Canada’s Finance Minister and later Prime Minister Paul Martin long

advocated the need to upgrade the G20 to the level of Heads of State.

12. Strengthen cybersecurity through international cybercrime centers, international cybercrime experts rosters, and a heightened focus on improving essential end-user cyber hygiene

The Albright-Gambari Report recommended several steps to take in the cybersecurity domain. Progress has been made on some of them, in particularly as regards to “a global harmonization of cybersecurity frameworks and standards, under the aegis of the UN” in the form of principles on responsible state behavior and capacity building in Member States thanks to the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise.¹³⁷

Going forward, a standby roster of cybercrime experts should be created to assist countries in the Global South develop critical cybersecurity capabilities, working from a global network of cybercrime centers that could draw on the experience and best practices of Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre. Such a network of independent experts could help stem the rising tide of cybercrime. Regional centers, moreover, would allow countries with limited budgets and capabilities to share resources and technology, and to exchange information. The centers and their personnel could



A STANDBY ROSTER OF CYBERCRIME EXPERTS SHOULD BE CREATED TO ASSIST COUNTRIES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH DEVELOP CRITICAL CYBERSECURITY CAPABILITIES, WORKING FROM A GLOBAL NETWORK OF CYBERCRIME CENTERS



UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AEOI STANDARD IS URGENTLY NEEDED, AS IS, ULTIMATELY, A GLOBAL REGISTRY THAT CONNECTS DIFFERENT NATIONAL AND REGIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT IFFS

promote good fundamental practices and personal due diligence in cybersecurity among millions of new internet users each year. A global campaign promoting such “cyber hygiene” would help new “netizens” protect themselves, their data, and their assets from falling victim to cybercrime.¹³⁸ The benefits of prevention would easily outweigh the limited costs of such a campaign.

13. Promote the Automatic Exchange of Information standard and transparency of registries of beneficial ownership information to combat illicit financial flows in global commerce and deter cross-border tax evasion

Illicit financial flows are an affliction on the global economy as individuals and corporations deprive countries of tax revenues through deceptive practices and the manipulation of tax codes. Operationalizing the Automatic Exchange of Information standard by the OECD in 2018 was a crucial step in combatting IFFs. Although further implementation may require more funding—especially in fragile countries with the greatest need to mobilize public resources—such expense should be more than made up through redeemed tax revenues. Alongside transparent corporate registries, the AEOI standard should be promoted further to prohibit the usage of shell companies that aid in tax evasion.

The Albright-Gambari Commission recommendation called on more countries to adopt and implement the AEOI standard, especially among the eighty-eight jurisdictions that have in place both the multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and the CRS Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement.¹³⁹ With the U.S. unwilling to join AEOI, the global AEOI regime and the U.S. approach through FACTA should be aligned as much as possible to maximize gains and minimize the costs affected by duplication of efforts. Moreover, new technologies, such as blockchain, should be employed to help fight IFFs and tax evasion.¹⁴⁰ The OECD should compile best practices which would then be disseminated by other international bodies, including the United Nations, World Bank, and regional organizations, with the scope to help countries improve their implementation of the AEOI standard.

More work is also needed around corporate ownership, including the disclosure of beneficial ownership information in a public registry in order to fight the use of anonymous “shell companies” for tax evasion and other nefarious purposes. In recent years, a new global standard has begun to take form, including in the U.K. and Ukraine, where governments publish beneficial ownership information for companies based in their countries.¹⁴¹ The EU is also expanding the transparency of beneficial ownership information in its member nations to better identify and deter money laundering through shell corporations,¹⁴² in particular through its Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which introduces a central “Ultimate Beneficial Owner” registry.

While these initiatives are critical to countering IFFs, the lack of global governance and cooperation concerning corporate registries remains. Furthermore, weak laws in the U.S. around the transparency of beneficial ownership complicate matters, as “the U.S. incorporates more companies each year than any other country but no U.S. state requires the collection of beneficial ownership information.”¹⁴³ Weak laws, both in the United States and other countries, enable shell companies to continue laundering money that makes its way to criminal organizations, such as terrorist groups, drug cartels, and autocratic governments. To counter this trend,

universal implementation of the AEOI standard is urgently needed as is, ultimately, a global registry that connects different national and regional efforts to combat IFFs.

14. Strengthen the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative with more stringent reporting requirements (and appropriate confidentiality and security measures) to address issues of transfer pricing, illicit financial flows, and environmental and social dislocation costs associated with natural resource exploitation

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative was realized, in 2003, with the goal of creating industry transparency, leading to repatriated tax revenue and, eventually, greater economic and social development due to increased public sector funding in countries holding extractable natural resources. While EITI has helped many countries develop legal frameworks and consistent reporting requirements around extractive industries, further reporting requirements are necessary to combat issues related to IFFs and the environmental costs of these industries. Germany, which joined in 2016, is one of a handful of advanced economies currently participating in the EITI.

As proposed by the Albright-Gambari Commission, the EITI needs to be upgraded (to “EITI+”) to reach its full potential.¹⁴⁴ This upgrade concerns both the scope and modus operandi of the EITI. Regarding scope, recognizing that the extractive industries are global businesses with global ramifications, a drive to commit more developed economies to join the EITI is imperative. In addition, the EITI framework needs more stringent reporting requirements, accompanied by appropriate information confidentiality and security measures, which would address sensitive issues related to transfer pricing and IFFs, as well as the widely documented environmental and social dislocation costs associated with natural resource exploitation. In addition, since the EITI principles do not address the impact of fossil fuel extraction on climate change and given what is known about the risk this poses for humanity’s wellbeing, upgraded EITI principles should also include benchmarks and guidelines for decision making processes about whether or not to extract.¹⁴⁵ New technologies such as blockchain have the potential of enhancing such transparency throughout global supply chains

and, therefore, increase the possibilities for more stringent monitoring.

Proposals Beyond 2020

Promote universal, affordable, and secure internet access

Looking beyond the 2020 milestone, the struggle for a more secure, just, and more equitable global economy continues. An integral part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is achieving “[u]niversal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020.”¹⁴⁶ This goal will not be met by a long shot. While half the world population is now using the internet, sub-Saharan connectivity averages only twenty percent and just ten percent among the least developed countries—most beset by violent conflict. A “dramatic slowdown in global growth of internet access” has been reported.¹⁴⁷ Lack of access denies women and the rural poor, in particular, benefits from internet-related education, business, and other opportunities. To prevent consolidation of a two-class global society of haves and have-nots with regard to internet



TO PREVENT CONSOLIDATION OF A TWO-CLASS GLOBAL SOCIETY OF HAVES AND HAVE-NOTS WITH REGARD TO INTERNET ACCESS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS CONCERTED EFFORTS TO MAKE THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL ON UNIVERSAL, AFFORDABLE (AND SAFE) ONLINE ACCESS A REALITY

access, the international community needs concerted efforts to make the Sustainable Development Goal on universal, affordable (and safe) online access a reality.

Establish a system-wide UN Sustainable Development Network

In 2015, the Albright-Gambari Commission proposed the establishment of a UN-coordinated Sustainable Human Development Network that would implement key recommendations from the reports of the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, the Future United

Nations Development System project, and the UN's earlier Delivering as One coherence agenda.¹⁴⁸ Its aim is to bring together all UN programs, funds, and agencies, as well as the World Bank, IMF, and regional development banks into greater collaboration to maximize impact, improve the use of technical and financial resources, and better streamline reporting and broader administrative requirements in all UN Member States. Building directly on more recent efforts to forge greater coherence and a more streamlined United Nations development system through the UN's Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review,¹⁴⁹ the eventual creation of such a network remains imperative.

GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY: HARNESSING STATE AND NON-STATE ACTOR IDEAS, NETWORKS & CAPABILITIES

Global Challenge Update

We have already noted the upsurges in conflict, displacement, exclusivist nationalism, and economic inequality that threaten regional and global well-being, undermine civic space, and strain the abilities of present global governance institutions to respond. The current crisis of global governance undermines international support mechanisms to build resilience, reduce corruption, combat extremism, and ensure regional stability in global trouble spots.

U.S. withdrawal from key international institutions and normative frameworks that it traditionally has championed has left leadership vacuums in many international agreements and regimes. Meanwhile, Europe's attention is to a large degree absorbed by the intricate mechanics and acrimonious debates around the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, and the rising populist response to immigration and refugees from surrounding regions. These distract from the global agenda set out in policy declarations of both the EU and UK.¹⁵⁰ To the world, Brexit, the refugee crises, and the earlier Eurozone crisis have raised serious questions regarding regional integration projects elsewhere. This includes ASEAN,¹⁵¹ but also the African Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council, and sows doubt about their potential to resolve intramural disputes or contribute effectively to meeting global challenges.

Under-performing global institutions face worrying regional trends, for example, in the eroding ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle disputes: The blocking of new appointments to the Appellate Body by the U.S. potentially renders judicial recourse ineffective as a form of peaceful dispute resolution.¹⁵² For instance, by the time Qatar's complaints against Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE reach the appeals stage, the WTO's Appellate Body may have lost its quorum, rendering it inoperative.¹⁵³

The lack of leadership in global governance and disregard for global norms and institutions continue

to deprive some countries of tools for peaceful dispute resolution, and they embolden others to violate core international norms and assert their interests unilaterally. As noted by the 2015 report of the Albright-Gambari Commission, the "grim news is that too few resources are being brought to bear in timely fashion in service of prevention, or that action may be politically blocked under current interpretations of powers like the [UN Security Council] veto, as the war in Syria has illustrated."¹⁵⁴ This holds, unfortunately, even more true today. Effective responses are needed for the conflicts and crises at hand, for those that may escalate soon, and for those where warning signs are starting to appear.

Current Global and Regional Responses

At the start of his tenure as UN Secretary-General, in January 2017, António Guterres initiated three tracks of internal changes: in the peace and security sector, the development system, and management. On September 18, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump presided over a high-level meeting on United Nations reform on the sidelines of the annual General Assembly session in New York, at which 128 countries endorsed a ten-point political declaration in support of the Secretary-General's reform effort.¹⁵⁵

Britain and France—both permanent, veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council—alongside the "G4" countries of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, continued to call for the Council's expansion through the UN's long-running Intergovernmental Negotiations process. Support for modifying the use of veto power to prevent mass atrocities has also increased in recent years, beginning with a proposal that France brought forward and Mexico supported on restraint in the use of the veto in cases involving mass atrocities.¹⁵⁶ By late 2015, 105 UN Member States had endorsed a "code of conduct" pledging that, when serving on the Security Council, they would "not vote against

a credible draft resolution before the Security Council on timely and decisive action to end the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or to prevent such crimes.”¹⁵⁷

In recent years, developing countries have become increasingly vocal in advocating for UN General Assembly enhancement, including on matters of peace and security.¹⁵⁸ Their collective efforts have succeeded in streamlining the UNGA agenda, as well as strengthening the President of the UNGA and standing committees by agreeing to elect the President, the Vice Presidents, and the main committee chairs at least

three months in advance of the start of every session. With the support of the civil society-led 1 for 7 Billion campaign, the General Assembly also managed, in 2015–16, to spearhead several improvements in the selection process for the Secretary-General (see Box 11).

Calls to reform some of the UN’s principal organs have intensified in recent years, demanding better reflection of present-day realities. But without consensus among the great powers and the broader UN membership, it will be difficult, though not impossible, to achieve near-term breakthroughs. At the same time, these same UN organs are reaching out to growing

BOX 11

The 1 for 7 Billion Campaign: Partnering with the UNGA for Greater Transparency in Global Governance

The 1 for 7 Billion campaign underscores the importance of civil society working with like-minded states, with social media savvy, and with relentless follow-through to achieve global governance change. Central to the campaign’s objectives was giving the UN General Assembly a say in the selection of the next Secretary General. Historically, the five permanent members of the Security Council (the “P5”) preferred to drive the selection process via backroom deals.

With more than 750 non-governmental organization (NGO) members and an estimated reach of over 170 million people, the 1 for 7 Billion campaign—whose informal steering committee consisted of Avaaz, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office, United Nations

Association-UK, and the World Federalist Movement—succeeded through intensive lobbying to have the General Assembly pass, on September 11, 2015, its landmark Resolution 69/321, which created greater transparency in the Secretary-General’s selection, including “informal dialogues” with candidates, under the auspices of the President of the UNGA; broad selection criteria; making publicly available mission statements and curriculum vitae for each candidate; and inviting UN Member States to present women as candidates.

While not all of 1 for 7 Billion’s recommendations were met, such as limiting the term of the Secretary-General to a single, non-renewable period of seven years, the campaign’s notable achievements have

emboldened civil society groups in pursuing other, previously unimaginable, advances in global governance. And though the P5 still exercised the most influence overall in the selection process, Secretary-General António Guterres may not have been recommended to the General Assembly following six rounds of UNSC voting had it not been for the novel and far more transparent process (including a dialogue with UNGA members and other public events) advocated by 1 for 7 Billion with the support of large numbers of UN Member States—that played to his strengths as a highly experienced and politically astute leader.

SOURCES: 1 for 7 Billion; United Nations General Assembly Resolution 69/321; Terlingen, “A Better Process, a Stronger UN Secretary-General.”

numbers of regional organizations, sub-regional organizations, and non-state actors to promote new kinds of partnership in fulfillment of their broad mandates.

Why the Status Quo Remains Insufficient

The Secretary-General's three tracks of internal reforms aim to show that the United Nations is capable of change and is achieving value for money. They center on breaking down silos among Secretariat departments (such as between Peacekeeping and Political Affairs) and modernizing personnel policies to suit an institution that is primarily an operational agency and not a conference servicing one. However, they are not the kinds of structural, intergovernmental reforms necessary to advance more ambitious collective security and justice goals in global governance.

Meanwhile, although the current Intergovernmental Negotiation on Security Council Reform has been instrumental in continuing reform discussions, it has largely been paralyzed by procedural issues. The UN Security Council's current composition and working methods both reflect and help to fuel mistrust, because they have locked in the global power arrangements from the early post-World War II period—making the United Nations especially susceptible to geopolitical rivalries and the recent surge in anti-globalist sentiments.¹⁵⁹

Moreover, while the periodic reform proposals of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the General Assembly are important to progressive reformers and may well improve the UN General Assembly's work, a lack of consensus on the best way to implement them continues to impede progress. Failure to dramatically improve the functioning of the UN's main deliberative forum risks a further slide toward its irrelevance vis-à-vis other formal and informal intergovernmental bodies and powerful global non-state actors and multi-stakeholder arrangements.

Priority Recommendations for 2020

15. Create a strong UN Peacebuilding Council to replace the current Peacebuilding Commission and entrust it with a conflict prevention mandate

Similar to the 2005–06 transformation of the UN Human Rights Commission into an empowered

Human Rights Council, it is time for the UN Peacebuilding Commission—currently a joint “advisory subsidiary body” to the Security Council and General Assembly—to be upgraded into a Peacebuilding Council with enhanced powers and responsibilities. A new Peacebuilding Council should be mandated to lead on policy development, coordination, resource mobilization, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding efforts in areas not directly addressed by the UN Security Council. Without amending the UN Charter, the new Peacebuilding Council could be established as a full subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly, like the Human Rights Council, or as a full subsidiary body of the Security Council, like UN peacekeeping operations and political missions, or both. Another option—with appropriate Charter amendment—is to supplant the long-dormant Trusteeship Council as a principal organ of the United Nations. (The Trusteeship Council's operations were suspended on November 1, 1994, one month after the independence of Palau, the last remaining UN trust territory.) A Peacebuilding Council, as a new principal organ of the United Nations, would focus on countries and regions in non- (and especially “post-”) peacekeeping environments, monitoring as well as marshalling collective action to avert the outbreak or recurrence of deadly conflict and tracking closely the UN's system-wide efforts at sustaining peace.

As presently structured, the Peacebuilding Commission has made some important strides, including through innovating various engagements with countries emerging from conflict and a flexible and streamlined integrated peacebuilding strategy instrument that aims to better help host countries address and resolve deadly conflict. However, it continues to fall short of delivery in its core mandated areas, and its tenure has coincided with a tripling of major violent conflicts.¹⁶⁰ Two central questions are: *should real authority be invested in this body, and what is an acceptable division of responsibility with the Security Council?*

In light of the difficulties in achieving a more representative Security Council, an empowered Peacebuilding Council would allow more capable UN Member States to contribute directly to the UN's primary purpose of maintaining international peace



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and security. It should be entrusted with a conflict prevention mandate operationalized through a new “Peacebuilding Audit” tool, modeled on the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) instrument for tracking the human rights situation of all UN Member States. As with the UPR, all countries would participate periodically in such audits of early warning indicators, supported in some cases by the rigorous work of UN special rapporteurs. This would be consistent with current efforts to track the ten targets and associated indicators of all countries’ progress toward meeting their commitments to Sustainable Development Goal 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions).

Incorporating several recommendations from the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, the 2016 UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council’s resolutions on the Peacebuilding Architecture, the 2018 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, and subsequent UN High-Level Meeting on that subject, the proposed transformation of the Peacebuilding Commission into a Peacebuilding Council could garner support in the run-up to the September 2020 Leaders Summit. Supportive venues could include ongoing discussions in the Peacebuilding Commission’s Organizational Committee, and

supportive countries and organizations including current and recent Commission chairs and vice-chairs (Colombia, Romania, Egypt, Germany, and the Republic of Korea), the Executive-Office of the Secretary-General, the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and the larger non-governmental peacebuilding community. The new Peacebuilding Council will absorb all costs associated with the current Peacebuilding Commission and Trusteeship Council.

16. Make the UN Security Council more effective by expanding its membership, updating its working methods, and giving greater voice to non-state actors in its deliberations

In 1945, the fifty-one original members of the United Nations established the UN Security Council as an eleven-member body with a voting majority of seven and five veto-wielding permanent members. They regarded membership and the veto as temporary measures until the so called “enemy states” (Germany and Japan) were demilitarized and accepted as peace-loving UN members. Accordingly, the founders planned for a review conference to be held in a decade—in 1955—to review the Charter, reconstitute the Security Council, and abolish the veto.¹⁶¹ However, such a review conference was soon forgotten because of the Cold War. Despite the fact that both West and East Germany and Japan were admitted into UN membership, the obsolete “enemy states” clauses have remained in the Charter.

In the wake of decolonization, the United Nations grew to 117 members by 1965 and the UN Charter was amended to expand the UN Security Council to fifteen members and its voting majority to nine.¹⁶² The number and powers of its permanent, veto-wielding members did not change. UN membership has expanded to 193 countries, but the size of the Security Council has not changed in the intervening fifty-four years. Further expansion of the Security Council is considered by many UN observers to be the “Holy Grail” of unfinished global governance reform, central to both the UN Security Council’s credibility and effectiveness. With China being antagonistic toward a new permanent seat for Japan, and similarly Pakistan toward India, Italy toward Germany, and Argentina and Mexico toward Brazil—and further lack of consensus within

Africa—serious attention has begun to turn to variations of compromise proposals, as put forward in recent years by the “Uniting for Consensus” and other groups, that may be acceptable to the G4 and other powerful nations.¹⁶³

In this spirit, the Albright-Gambari Commission proposed, in 2015, expanding the Council’s membership, “in line with present-day realities,” and amending UN Charter Article 23 to allow non-permanent members to be re-elected to consecutive terms. In addition, it called for UN Security Council Members to defend their No Votes publicly when there are reasonable grounds to believe that mass atrocities may occur because of the Council’s inaction. Finally, the Commission recommended instituting a formal consultative mechanism for periodic dialogues—building on the successful, albeit informal Arria Formula—between the UNSC and representatives of civil society, the business community, and municipalities.¹⁶⁴

The announcement by Germany and France of their intent to co-sponsor a new Alliance for Multilateralism at the United Nations, and the support expected by Japan, Canada, India, Australia and others at the formal launch of the Alliance in September 2019 in New York reflects the understanding of a growing number of countries that a simple re-commitment to a rules-based international order is insufficient to push back against rising isolationism, protectionism, nationalism and populism. Only meaningful change, however incremental in the short-term, can make our global institutions fully representative and responsive to current challenges.

The UN 75 Leaders Summit, in September 2020 in New York, can give new impetus to the ongoing Intergovernmental Negotiations on UN Security Council reform, especially with regular encouragement from the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to have positive news to report. While those negotiations should continue, linking them to the wider forum could imbue them with a greater sense of urgency and political momentum, increase international pro-active engagement, and facilitate the trade-offs and deal making—as part of a broader package of reforms—so essential to effective multilateral diplomacy.

A breakthrough, however modest and transitional, could be achieved leading up to the Summit, especially if the great powers begin to view greater global security burden-sharing and improved Council working methods and participation as consistent with their national interests and values. Over the medium-to-long term and with the emergence of different political conditions (including support from regional bodies, such as the AU and EU), more ambitious reform proposals could be entertained, such as Vesselin Popovski’s “8+8+8” model for UNSC composition, engineered to satisfy all countries and regions—as presented in the 2018 companion volume to the Albright-Gambari Commission, *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*.¹⁶⁵

17. Create a UN Parliamentary Network as a new advisory body of people’s representatives to the UN General Assembly

In a resolution adopted on July 5, 2018, the European Parliament called on the EU’s governments to advocate “the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly” and to support a “UN 2020 summit” that will consider “comprehensive reform measures for a renewal and strengthening of the United Nations.”¹⁶⁶ This follows from a similar resolution, on May 12, 2016, by the Pan-African Parliament in support of a UN Parliamentary Assembly to “strengthen the participation and representation of the world’s citizens in the UN.”¹⁶⁷

As a near-term step toward developing a more authoritative UN Parliamentary Assembly with political standing alongside the UN General Assembly, the Albright-Gambari Commission called for a United Nations Parliamentary *Network* to be established as a subsidiary advisory body to the UN General Assembly under UN Charter Article 22. Meeting initially every September to feed ideas into the start of the new General Assembly session, the UNPN would bring together parliamentarians from national legislatures and members of regional parliaments, creating a new platform for input and accountability claims by citizens and civil society groups on matters of UN governance.

It is not a radical idea, being similar in initial composition to the Parliamentary Network of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and

the Parliamentary Conference on the World Trade Organization, meaning that individual parliamentarians could opt to join on their own initiative.¹⁶⁸ Associated costs should not be an inhibiting factor if the UN Parliamentary Network was to meet in person, at least initially, only in September, at the opening of the General Assembly, with subsequent dialogues possibly taking place online. Members of a UN Parliamentary Network would focus, in large part, on the sorts of global issues treated by the General Assembly and other UN institutions. This would make the Network an important complement to the existing dialogue and efforts of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which has focused on common domestic challenges among members, and some trans-national issues.

In addition to strong global civil society support for the more ambitious UN Parliamentary Assembly idea—including through a decade-old global campaign that benefited, last October, from an endorsement by the World Federation of United Nations Associations—support among parliamentarians is also widespread.¹⁶⁹ More than 1,500 current and former members of parliament have endorsed the UNPA concept, and in November 2018, a new parliamentary group (with five co-presidents from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe) was created to build the political momentum and pressure needed to engender the UNPA's realization. Bringing, at the very least, the UN Parliamentary Network proposal into a wider conversation on UN system renewal in the run-up to the 2020 Summit could further accelerate support for this complementary effort to the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and civil society organizations to develop a transnational democratic culture.

18. Establish a UN Global Partnership to give a greater voice to under-represented policy issues through new social compacts and a new hub and online platform, whereby the entire UN system can tap into the expertise of civil society and the business community

From the passage of the Mine Ban Treaty and creation of an International Criminal Court in the 1990s to the more recent adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Climate Agreement, and measures to improve

transparency in the selection of the UN Secretary-General, global civil society has played a central role in bringing about global governance innovation and renewal. Yet, a recent report by CIVICUS details the devastating effects of attacks on civil society in recent years, with, by their estimates, some 111 countries having “closed, repressed, or obstructed space” in which civil society can operate.¹⁷⁰ Additionally, civil society groups feel increasingly unwelcome at the UN due to Member States co-opting institutional levers to ensure their exclusion.¹⁷¹ Bilateral aid in support of civil society also appears to be on the decline.¹⁷² Without an expression of deep concern and action by the UN Secretariat, General Assembly, and Security Council, civil society's space in UN policy-making and implementation remains highly vulnerable.

Responding to the piecemeal and still somewhat *ad hoc* way the UN engages civil society and the business community, the Albright-Gambari Commission proposed a UN Global Partnership that would offer a more prominent level of institutional representation and an online hub through which these private (non-governmental) actors can more effectively shape global decision-making, and through which various UN bodies can tap into the expertise and networks of these resourceful sectors. Meetings of the Partnership's steering committee could take place three times per year between the UN Secretary-General, the World Bank President, the head of a new civil society-led Committee on Civil Society-UN Relations (which would be selected by global civil society and periodically rotate),¹⁷³ and the vice chair of the UN Global Compact Board of Directors. This apex body would oversee civil society and business community accreditation to the United Nations (including in engaging under-represented voices)¹⁷⁴ and identify opportunities, trouble shoot, and seek to safeguard and codify further the principles for improved interactions between the UN, civil society, and businesses.

If rolled out in 2020, the proposal is likely to remain largely cost-neutral, by absorbing the costs currently associated with the annual United Nations Civil Society Conference of the recently re-branded Department of Global Communications, the convening of NGO caucus meetings in connection with

UN policy fora, and ongoing digital consultations, building on the far-reaching and cost-effective internet-based discussions for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.¹⁷⁵

19. Strengthen and more fully use the International Court of Justice to advance and safeguard international law by expanding its jurisdiction and making use of its authoritative advisory opinions in innovative ways

In 2017, then-president of the ICJ, Judge Ronny Abraham, underscored to the United Nations Sixth Committee (Legal) that states' trust in the ICJ was essential to its vitality and longevity.¹⁷⁶ Regrettably, only seventy-three states (38 percent of the UN's membership) have accepted the mandatory jurisdiction of the "world court."¹⁷⁷ Among the veto-wielding permanent five members of the Security Council, only the United Kingdom has declared acceptance of the ICJ's general compulsory jurisdiction. However, while a range of influential states have at times ignored the rulings of the court,¹⁷⁸ the ICJ maintains a robust yearly docket of cases despite challenges, with states from every region of the world now seeking recourse to the ICJ to resolve disputes.

To further increase the use of the court as a primary mechanism for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, while safeguarding its independence, the Albright-Gambari Commission called for: (i) the UN to review the reasons states refrain from issuing declarations in support of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, and to work toward expanding the number of declarations to cover more than half the UN membership 2020; (ii) expansion of the ICJ's advisory jurisdiction, to address today's most pressing issues; and (iii) amendment of the ICJ's statute (Article 13) to limit justices' tenure to one nine-year term.

Although the ICJ's advisory opinions would continue to be non-binding (yet authoritative), expanding access to include requests for such opinions from, for example, the UN Secretary-General/Secretariat and other international courts and tribunals would increase their use, helping to minimize conflicting interpretations of international law and to foster its progressive development.¹⁷⁹ If these distinct international actors are not granted the right to request such advisory opinions

directly (which would require amendment of the UN Charter), then a clear and expedited enabling procedure to submit their requests through existing channels, such as the Security Council or General Assembly, should be established.

The budget implications of both increased ICJ advisory opinions and overall caseload are expected to be negligible. In addition to large countries such as Germany, Japan, India, and the United Kingdom, countries that have recently accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, including Bulgaria, Côte d'Ivoire, and Pakistan, are well-positioned to apply peer pressure on their neighbors and close allies to follow their positive example for the seventy-fifth anniversary, in 2020, of the UN Charter and the Statute of the ICJ.

These steps to strengthen the ICJ should be considered as interim measures, pending a more thorough expert review to suggest deeper reforms to the court. An independent international expert group should be convened to make more substantial reform recommendations to modernize the court, and to make it equal to its task as genuine enforcer of international law.

20. Strengthen working ties between the International Criminal Court, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Security Council

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has experienced a backlash from select Western and non-Western countries since its establishment. After the United States played an instrumental role in drafting the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC, the U.S. Congress passed legislation undermining the court, such as the 2002 American Service-Members' Protection Act, the Bush administration concluded Bilateral Immunity Agreements with countries to prevent the transfer of American citizens to the ICC, and most recently the Trump administration threatened sanctions against the court.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, alleging that the ICC is a Western-centric organization primarily focused on prosecutions in Sub-Saharan Africa,¹⁸¹ four countries (Burundi, the Gambia, the Philippines, and South Africa) have given notice since 2016 of their intent to withdraw from it (although the Gambia and South Africa rescinded their withdrawal notifications in 2017). The universality of the ICC's mission has also been

questioned due to an underrepresentation of Asian countries among state parties to the Rome Statute (see Figure 6). Faced with these challenges, the ICC remains constrained in its ability to serve as an effective tool to adjudicate—and ultimately to deter—mass atrocities, and to uphold the international rule of law. With the United States’ decision, in June 2018, to withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), this body’s credibility and ability to operate effectively has also come under further strain.


The ICC, HRC, and the UN Security Council should strengthen their working ties, as absent such reforms, the ICC’s and HRC’s authority, capabilities, and overall relevance are severely challenged. For this reason, the Albright-Gambari Commission

proposed, for example: (i) adopting a protocol or outlining factors that could guide the UN Security Council when it deliberates on the referral of a situation to the ICC; (ii) having the UNSC support ICC action against perpetrators, including enforcing ICC arrest warrants, through sanctions (such as freezing assets); and (iii) encouraging a regular, scheduled human rights dialogue between the UN Security Council, HRC, and ICC, drawing on system-wide conflict analysis, early warning, early actions in response to large-scale human rights abuses, and improving cooperation between New York and Geneva-based institutions.

The current president of the ICC, Chile Eboe-Osuji, has expressed the need for urgent support from states, international and regional organizations,

FIGURE 6

Status of ratifications and signatures of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court



SOURCE: ICC. Note: The U.S. signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but “unsigned” it two years later.

and civil society.¹⁸² While Member States marked the ICC Rome Statute's 20th anniversary in 2018, no concrete reforms emerged from the commemoration. Despite this lack of progress, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries have continually advocated for increased use of the ICC, including to seek the ICC's opinion on the immunity of Heads of State to the court's prosecution.¹⁸³ As with the ICJ, an international group of independent experts should be convened to recommend an ICC reform package to strengthen the court in a range of respects, as has recently been suggested.¹⁸⁴

Although the United Nations' human rights bodies continue to lack resources, adequate commitment by Member States to the human rights treaties they have joined, and enhanced coordination among themselves the bodies and with relevant UN organs, including the Security Council, initial disappointment with the HRC's inaction in its early years (2006–09) has given way to renewed optimism. This is thanks, in part, to its public statements regarding the Arab Spring, notable fact-finding missions to Libya, Syria, and Côte d'Ivoire, and a strong resolution in 2014 on the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities. The ongoing proliferation of special procedures, usually exercised by independent mandate-holders, is also widely seen as a positive catalyst for change. Such successes lay the groundwork for the consideration of further reform of the HRC, to make it a yet more independent and effective body.

In addition, the international community should consider prioritizing corruption as a fundamental governance issue linked to systemic human rights violations, to be more effectively addressed through, for example, the establishment of a new international anti-corruption court, following the model of the ICC.¹⁸⁵

Proposals Beyond 2020

Increase UN effectiveness through a second deputy secretary-general to oversee and coordinate the organization's far-flung humanitarian and development activities

A new (second) UN Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) for Economic, Social, and Environmental

affairs would provide much-needed leadership to managing the proposed G20+-UN-Global Economic Governance Liaison Group and coordinating Secretary-General António Guterres' current round of UN development system reforms. This deputy would seek, in particular, to maximize impact, leverage new technologies, improve communication of the UN's many under-appreciated achievements, and streamline reporting in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and broader UN socioeconomic and ecological goals. In many ways, the current DSG, Amina Mohammed is, unlike her predecessors, also performing this development and humanitarian-system-focused role and a separately mandated counterpart would allow increased attention to leadership on critical political and security matters. The Secretary-General should delegate substantial line management authority to the two DSGs in their respective substantive areas, including authority to negotiate harmonization of personnel and financial rules necessary to facilitate a regular exchange of staff among UN Secretariat elements and other agencies, funds, and programs, at both headquarters and field levels.

Promote regional courts to protect international human rights and to address particular issues, such as transnational or environmental crimes

Another proposal strongly advocated by the Albright-Gambari Commission, which given the resurgence of authoritarian and populist forces in many parts of the world may require a time-frame post-2020 (UN 75), is the need for regional organizations to further bolster international human rights protection through regional measures, in particular, strong regional courts. Current examples would include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. The UN should encourage the establishment of regional charter and adjudication mechanisms in every part of the world, covering at least the core of universally recognized human rights. Moreover, the possibilities for establishing regional tribunals should be explored with a view to addressing particular issues, such as transnational or environmental crimes (for example, related to failures to mitigate against extreme and highly damaging forms of climate change).

A ROADMAP FOR MAXIMIZING RESULTS AT THE UN 75 (2020) LEADERS SUMMIT

Prior UN anniversaries have been occasions for reflecting on the organization's achievements; taking stock of its progress in meeting key challenges and looming threats; renewing commitment to multilateral cooperation; and, in some rare cases, revitalizing and strengthening our global governance architecture. The UNGA "modalities resolution" for the UN 75 Leaders Summit in New York (see Box 12) recognizes "the need to promote and strengthen multilateralism and ... that the seventy-fifth anniversary ... is an opportunity to reaffirm its [Member States'] collective

commitment to multilateralism and to the United Nations," and this is encouraging. It will, however, require the active and skillful engagement of global civil society (like the UN 2020 Initiative and the Together First campaign), in partnership with like-minded countries (including those affiliated with the emerging Alliance for Multilateralism), as to whether revitalization and strengthening goals—which have traditionally been more ambitious and, hence, difficult to achieve politically—are advanced in the remaining months until September 2020.

BOX 12

Opening Rounds of Diplomacy for the UN 75 Leaders Summit

Following an initial failed attempt in mid-2018, to include language on a 2020 Leaders Summit on UN strengthening in the annual resolution of the General Assembly's Ad-hoc Working Group on Revitalization, H.E. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, President of the UN General Assembly and former Foreign and Defense Minister of Ecuador appointed, in February 2019, the Permanent Representatives of Singapore (H.E. Ambassador Burhan Gafoor) and Iceland (H.E. Ambassador Bergdis Ellertsdóttir) to shepherd through the UNGA a resolution on the theme, date, and modalities commemorating the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

Finalized in June 2019, the General Assembly's "modalities resolution" (A/RES/73/299) proclaimed the theme "The Future We Want, the UN We Need: Reaffirming Our Collective Commitment



to Multilateralism" for UN 75 commemorations worldwide involving governments and civil society throughout 2020, including on June 26 (UN Charter Day) and October 24 (United Nations

Day). Most importantly, it calls for "a concise, substantive, forward-looking and unifying declaration that captures Member States' collective commitment to multilateralism and to the United Nations and their shared vision for a common future ..." With inter-governmental negotiations on this political declaration to be concluded no later than June 2020 with the support of two—yet to be appointed by the President of the seventy-fourth session of the General Assembly—co-facilitators, this diplomatic instrument is expected to represent the main outcome of a Heads of State and Government gathering, on September 21, 2020, at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

TABLE 1

Lessons from Civil Society-led Coalitions that Partnered with Like-minded States

MAJOR LESSON LEARNED (key attributes of progress & limits)	CIVIL SOCIETY-LED COALITION EXAMPLES
<i>Capture the Zeitgeist</i>	- Coalition for the International Criminal Court - NETmundial (Internet Governance) Initiative - International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (and earlier International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty)
<i>Reframe the narrative</i>	- Jubilee 2000 Debt Relief Campaign - International Campaign to Ban Landmines - Coalition for the International Criminal Court
<i>Be in it for the long haul</i>	- Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly - Support for Women Peace and Security: UNSCR 1325 - NGO Working Group on the Security Council (improving UNSC representation)
<i>You don't always need to reinvent the wheel</i>	- Support for Youth Peace and Security: UNSCR 2250 - Support for the Paris Climate Change Agreement - Support for the Programme of Action on Small Arms and its International Tracing Instrument
<i>Focus on a single issue</i>	- Jubilee 2000 Debt Relief Campaign - International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons - Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly
<i>Understand and address obstacles to tackling the root causes of a global policy challenge</i>	- Support for the Programme of Action on small arms and its International Tracing Instrument - Support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative - Support for the UN Human Rights Commission's upgrade into a more empowered Council
<i>Make change without great power support</i>	- 1 for 7 Billion Campaign (with the exception of notable UK support) - International Campaign to Ban Landmines - NGO Working Group on the Security Council (support for the ACT Code of Conduct and earlier French-Mexico initiative to curb veto use to avert mass atrocities)
<i>Understand the importance of international institutional legitimacy</i>	- International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (and earlier International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) - Support for Youth Peace and Security: UNSCR 2250 - International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
<i>If you build it ... they still need an incentive to come</i>	- Support for the UN Human Rights Commission's upgrade into a more empowered Council - Support for the Kyoto Protocol (climate change) - Support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
<i>Combine bottom-up and top-down (hybrid governance)</i>	- 1 for 7 Billion Campaign - Support for Women Peace and Security: UNSCR 1325 - Support for the Paris Climate Change Agreement

SOURCE: Kiel, Robert, Samuel Koralnik, and Joshua Maziak-Amey, "Lessons from 17 Smart Coalitions since the End of the Cold War," Stimson Center Just Security 2020 Program (forthcoming occasional paper).

Smart Coalitions: Major Lessons for Progressive Global Governance Reform

Making progress on strengthening our global system requires sustained partnerships between states, civil society, and other stakeholders. Common characteristics of successful initiatives include the emergence of coalitions both between states, and between states and civil society to champion reforms, carefully navigating multilateral negotiations. Campaigners also mobilized to exert public pressure and increase the political will for change, effective resource mobilization, and tools to measure progress and respond to setbacks. There are helpful lessons from successful and (equally important) not-so-successful coalitions of like-minded states and non-state actors (see Table 1). They can be drawn upon to marshal, monitor, and sustain support for other global governance reform proposals, including those introduced through the Albright-Gambari Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance and related initiatives.

Although each coalition of civil society organizations and like-minded states necessarily adapts to the specific conditions and requirements of the global policy issue(s) they are working together to address, three elements are typically vital to achieving progress:¹⁸⁶

First, it is important that the main players, ideally both state and non-state representatives (including women and youth), begin a sustained policy dialogue as early as possible in the formation of a smart coalition. When treated with mutual respect through iterative dialogues, these actors build trust in one another, forming the basis for future consensus-building, while appreciating differing interests.

Second, bottlenecks can be avoided by changing narratives and reframing issues, as did several of the coalitions in Table 1. The framework of just security introduced by the Albright-Gambari Commission offers the possibility of reframing the narrative to change the narrow perspectives that have led to a logjam in negotiations (for example, viewing climate change as a security challenge, as well as an issue of justice, can lend greater urgency and bring new voices to the conversation to mitigate and adapt to its effects).

Third and finally, although global governance reform takes time, the articulation and mobilization of political support within a smart coalition for clear, near-term interim milestones can generate a snowball effect toward the realization of broader and more ambitious global systemic change objectives. If politics is the art of the possible, then having the courage to talk about eventual historical destinations is how we expand the boundaries of political possibility.

Adopting these and other key lessons from earlier efforts will enable even relatively small numbers of civil society groups to more capably engage with governments and senior international organization officials sympathetic to their perspectives on how to renew and innovate global governance. With sufficient critical mass, they will then be poised to rally global public opinion—including through robust social media campaigns, crowdfunding, and targeted outreach to the media, religious authorities, business leaders, regional and sub-regional organizations, and local community leaders—around the joint promotion of a progressive vision for global change underpinned by concrete reform proposals.

A “3+2 Strategy” for Global Governance Renewal and Innovation

A “3 + 2” Strategy—involving three critical sets of actors and two major reform vehicles for channeling actors’ ideas and political support toward achievable, yet transformative goals—can maximize results for the UN 75 Leaders Summit, setting the stage for even more ambitious goals post-2020.

The *first* set of actors, **UN Member States**, remains the bedrock of the international system, despite the diffusion of power from states in recent decades to sub-national and non-state entities. Since many of the envisaged reform ideas affect intergovernmental bodies and key facets of state sovereignty, states’ buy-in, or at least their agreement not to block progress, is fundamental to achieving global systemic reform.

Indeed, having “champion countries” is essential to success. Here, the Alliance for Multilateralism, announced in April by the Foreign Ministers of Germany and France, appears promising, provided it engages a large number of influential developed and developing countries. The Alliance’s first objective will be to show

that countries that support multilateralism and support the United Nations remain the majority in the world, and its second objective will be to establish a network of countries ready to support multilateralism and cooperation, including new joint efforts on inequality, climate change and the consequences of new technology, several of which are expected to be announced during the annual High-Level Segment of the UN General Assembly in late September in New York.¹⁸⁷

Beyond UN Member States, the *second* set of actors, **global civil society**, encompasses non-governmental organizations, social and religious movements, community-based groups, the business community, scholars, and journalists. As detailed in Table 1, substantive change in global governance rarely occurs without the active engagement of a diverse range of non-state actors.

Two relatively new civil society-led networks that have begun to impact UN 75 preparations are the UN 2020 Initiative and the Together First campaign, both supported by the Stimson Center's Just Security 2020 Program. Conceived in March 2016, UN 2020's partner organizations have worked to bring about a summit-level meeting on global governance renewal and strengthening to coincide with the world body's seventy-fifth-anniversary commemoration.¹⁸⁸ Together First—initiated at the Paris Peace Forum on November 11, 2018 (Armistice Day)—brings together partner organizations and individuals to promote a multi-stakeholder agenda for dealing with the greatest global risks that humanity faces, from climate change to weapons of mass destruction.¹⁸⁹ It is teaming up closely with UN 2020 to ensure that the UN 75 Leaders Summit serves as a starting point for a broader, longer-term conversation on global governance transformation.

The *third and final* set of actors is **international civil servants**, including especially the leadership of the **UN Secretary-General**. He wields many tools and may choose among many potential courses of action to exert influence. When acting with courage, creativity, and political acumen, Secretaries-General become protagonists for global governance reform, alongside governments and non-governmental actors. Secretary-General António Guterres' current three tracks of internal UN system reforms (see Appendix III), coupled

with his appointment of the seasoned veteran Fabrizio Hochschild as Under-Secretary-General overseeing the Secretariat's UN 75 preparations, signal a heightened level of commitment and ability to lead UN renewal efforts.


Channeling the ideas and the political support of these three sets of actors toward achievable, yet transformative goals is the objective of the two proposed vehicles for reform. The *first vehicle*, what the Albright-Gambari Commission called "**Reform through Parallel Tracks**," acknowledges that different kinds of multilateral reform ideas will require different kinds of negotiating forums and will proceed at different speeds, although many can still benefit from the occasional top-level nudge. For example, as noted in this report's introduction and again in the discussion of global institutions, the now decade-old Intergovernmental Negotiations framework on Security Council reform should continue to operate on a separate, parallel track so as to not upset deliberations toward the UN 75 Summit, but the latter might still be leveraged to achieve at least interim breakthroughs. Similarly, while the main venue for multilateral and multi-stakeholder negotiations on climate governance innovation is the Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the September 2020 Leaders' Summit could usefully endorse important innovations in that area, as COP 26 will gather only two months later.

Reform through Parallel Tracks facilitates the sequencing of reform priorities based on criteria such as urgency, political feasibility, and cost, without getting bogged down in a potentially over-ambitious reform agenda. At the same time, focusing only on a specific range of issues may limit opportunities to exploit linkages between issues and actors across what needs to be a better integrated system of governance, given both the tensions and potential complementarities between, for example, peace, development, human rights, and the environment. Moreover, narrowly defined reform agendas reduce chances for "give-and-take" among negotiators and can be more easily controlled by one or two powerful opponents.

A *second reform vehicle*, as advocated originally by the Albright-Gambari Commission, is to organize in the run-up to the United Nations' seventy-fifth anniversary a series of formal intergovernmental,

FIGURE 7

Roadmap to 2020



* Only select activities listed

yet at the same time multi-stakeholder, meetings leading to the convening, in September 2020, of a **Heads of State and Government Summit**-level gathering, ideally, as part of the traditional UN Summit planned to mark significant anniversaries. These discussions would be complemented by more informal and forward-leaning “ideas generating” consultations worldwide at the global, regional, national, and community levels (including on June 26, Charter Day, and October 24, United Nations Day), organized by governments, civil society groups, the UN, and other interested partners (see Figure 7: Roadmap to 2020). Under the banner of “The Future

We Want, the UN We Need: Reaffirming Our Collective Commitment to Multilateralism,” this is what the recently finalized UN General Assembly modalities resolution has, in effect, achieved.

Given the continued central significance of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the 2020 Summit is expected to take note of progress toward meeting the Sustainable Development Goals since their inception in 2015. It can also take a step back and contemplate the international system and its institutions as a whole and adopt system-wide reforms that seek greater coherence, reduced waste and duplication of effort, and mutually reinforcing linkages

between several, interdependent issue areas, including global governance for improved implementation of the SDGs. Moreover, the 2020 Summit could mobilize a broad coalition of civil society groups with quite different issue advocacy agendas to come together behind a focused call to have the high-level gathering invest in meaningful changes across the entire United Nations and broader system of global governance.

Neither of these two strategies stands to take root without the collective, full, and sustained engagement of the major constellation of global actors outlined earlier, namely UN Member States, international civil servants, and global civil society, or what the scholars Thomas Weiss, Tatianna Carayannis, and Richard Jolly have aptly called “The Third United Nations.”⁹⁰ When their respective strengths and passion are leveraged effectively together in a true spirit of partnership, progressive and durable global change can be achieved.

Fortunately, the international community does not need to choose between them to achieve meaningful and lasting global governance reforms that safeguard and promote global security and justice alike. Rather, the Albright-Gambari Commission recommended a hybrid approach that plays to the strengths of each sector, and institution-specific approaches, on the one hand, and a more comprehensive UN Summit approach, on the other, while exploiting the advantages of both.

Practical Guidance for UN 2020, Together First, and the Alliance for Multilateralism on the Road to the UN 75 (2020) Leaders Summit


This report has offered twenty global governance reform ideas for 2020. Giving special attention to the two civil society-driven coalitions, the UN 2020 Initiative, and the Together First campaign, and the government-led Alliance for Multilateralism, we offer here one further set of practical guidance for non-governmental actors and states committed to ensuring that UN 75 is more than a birthday celebration or simple stocktaking exercise. We build on the twelve suggestions from Jody Williams, Nobel Peace Laureate and founding coordinator (1992–98) of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines

BOX 13

Jody Williams’ Top Twelve Recommendations for Effective Civil Society Movements

1. Know how to organize
2. Maintain a flexible structure
3. Need for leadership and committed workers
4. Always have an action plan, deadline, outcome-oriented meetings
5. Communication, communication & more communication
6. Follow-up & follow through
7. Provide expertise & documentation
8. Articulate goals & messages clearly and simply
9. Focus on the human cost
10. Use as many forums as possible to promote the message
11. Be inclusive, be diverse, yet speak with one voice
12. Recognize that international context & timing do matter

SOURCE: Williams and Goose, “Citizen Diplomacy.”



(Box 13), with the following eight proposals specific to influencing the September 2020 Leaders Summit:

Build strong working relationships with the President of the UN General Assembly, the UN 75 political declaration co-facilitators, the Secretary-General's UN 75 Special Adviser, foundations, and at least five diverse "champion countries/regions": For civil society and like-minded governments to maximize their combined impact on the UN 75 (2020) Leaders Summit, they must demonstrate the value they can add and the ways in which their goals and principles align with established UN practices. Opportunities for political and financial support from partner governments and the technical and financial support of both grant-making and operational foundations should be explored.

Ensure that global governance reform innovations are carefully researched and vetted: While civil society groups and partner governments should encourage a range of ideas on the future of global governance, the best ideas for consideration should be rooted in rigorous study, analysis, expert peer review, publicly defensible consultations, and evaluated on their feasibility and impact. Specific interim and longer-term reform objectives should also be carefully measured through a combination of qualitative and quantitative monitoring tools and multiple independent sources of data and analysis. Online tools, including the knowledge-based Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Reform (visit: <http://www.platformglobalsecurity-justicegovernance.org/>), should be utilized to promote pioneering research and the outcomes of UN 75 consultations worldwide.

Treat the UN 75 Summit as both a "landing pad" for a few timely innovations and "launch pad" for other, more ambitious reforms that may require additional time to mature: As noted in this report's introduction, the political declaration to be agreed to, in September 2020, can serve as a launch pad for ideas that may take many more months (possibly a few years) to be realized fully. At the same time, achieving a few "easy wins" by September of next year (e.g., the establishment of a United Nations Global Partnership or new civilian response capability to support fragile and conflict-affected states) can position the UN 75 Summit next year, in 2020, as more of a landing pad to generate momentum and help

to garner political support for a few big bold ideas, such as a United Nations Parliamentary Network or empowered Peacebuilding Council.

Organize panel discussions and broad-based consultations on UN system renewal and innovation and the central role of Global Civil Society in the Future United Nations: Since October 2018, the UN 2020 Initiative and Together First—and their lead affiliates—have convened panels and consultations at a steady clip in Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and North and South America. To magnify their overall influence and impact on the UN 75 political declaration negotiations, they should accelerate their outreach and multi-stakeholder dialogues game plan—both online and in person—over the next twelve months (before the expected finalization of the declaration in June 2020).

Reframe issues and employ positive, forward-looking narratives when engaging potential spoilers (e.g., exclusionary nationalists), in order to find common ground in addressing specific global policy challenges: there is value in having conversations with others who do not necessarily share our point of view, while never compromising your values or principles as a campaign. Instead of referring to climate change and the need for new regulations, for example, stress to potential spoilers the need for conservation and protecting citizens, and find messengers (e.g., religious leaders and radio talk show hosts) who may hold sway over those harboring "anti-multilateralist/international cooperation" views. New terms and concepts that offer new insights/fresh perspectives can also help to avoid bottlenecks and circumvent protracted differences due, in part, to perceived threats to the power, status, and interests of influential groups.

Convene an NGO Forum (probably in New York) at least three months prior to finalizing the UN 75 Summit political declaration: In August 2018, 1,100 organizations participated in the annual United Nations Department of Public Information (now Department of Global Communications) United Nations Civil Society Conference in New York, which endorsed a call for advancing "people-centered multilateralism" and "developing proposals to revitalize the United Nations on the occasion of its seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020."⁹¹ Building on momentum generated at the next UN Civil Society

Conference this August in Salt Lake City, plans should be undertaken in earnest to convene a large NGO Forum, no later than April 2020 (probably in New York to have direct access to UN Mission representatives), to exert maximum influence via a collective global civil society statement with specific proposals for enhancing the UN 75 political declaration.

Utilize June 26, Charter Day, in San Francisco and October 24, United Nations Day, to focus global attention on the UN's achievements and ways to build on success: While revitalizing and strengthening (and eventually transforming) our institutions of global governance is the ultimate goal to which progressive elements in civil society and like-minded states should remain committed, this same community should not underestimate the importance of leveraging UN Charter and United Nations Days to both educate and elevate the international standing of the world's most universal institution dedicated to peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights.

Ensure that the 2020 Summit's political declaration empowers more rule-makers and penalizes rule-breakers through increased institutional legitimacy, burden-sharing, effectiveness, and accountability: For too many decades, the post-Second World War global institutions (including the UN, international financial institutions, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) were dominated by a few major western countries. Earlier generation rule-makers should, in close partnership with global civil society, recognize the benefits of expanding the pie of decision-makers (increased institutional legitimacy, burden-sharing, effectiveness, and accountability), and expend their political capital on building credible global institutions that can dissuade and, when necessary, sanction rule-breakers.

Getting-from-Here-to-There in 2020 ... then 2025, 2045, and Beyond

A powerful, ethical vision for a more just and peaceful world can only be as successful as the transitional strategy with which it is paired. Besides harnessing the ideas, networks, and resources of myriad transnational and increasingly global actors, garnering political support and seeing through to fulfillment a robust vision of just security requires a new kind of

diplomacy—and indeed, a new kind of *leadership*—at the United Nations and other global institutions. Maximizing desirable impact of the UN 75 (2020) Leaders Summit will depend on leaders who are ready and willing to adopt a far-sighted strategy that gives equal weight to and pursues both global security and justice goals simultaneously when working to overcome obstacles and seize new opportunities for the benefit of all people. Unfinished business from 2020 can quickly become the business of UN 80 (2025).

In seeking to manage many of today's transnational crises, leaders lack the institutions, tools, and networks for effective global collective action.¹⁹² A world still organized primarily around the notion of the Westphalian nation-state—whether the passive “night watchman state,” the oppressive authoritarian state, or even the self-contented mid-twentieth-century welfare state—is undergoverned and ill-equipped to deliver essential global public goods to the great majority of its people and forces an ever-growing number of vulnerable people to leave their communities and countries of origin.

One hundred years ago, when the “war to end all wars” drew to a close, the leaders of nations inaugurated the first universal attempt at international organization across all continents, the League of Nations, whose Covenant was finalized, on June 28, 1919, with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. This noble, yet short-lived endeavor was shattered by the cataclysmic horrors of the Second World War. The United Nations was built upon the ruins of that war. Fast approaching its seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020, having weathered both the Cold War and countless global shocks along the way, this second-generation world organization faces new challenges to keep pace with twenty-first-century trends and struggles.

To set the United Nations on a viable course toward its 2045 centenary and beyond, it must be transformed by harnessing and uniting the ideas, legitimacy, and capabilities of not only Member States, but of the many new actors in global governance that should not be denied a seat at the table. This is both the moral and practical imperative of our time. It is essential to meeting the needs and aspirations of all nations and peoples, on whose behalf this unprecedented experiment in building global peace with justice must succeed.

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APPENDIX I

Former Members of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance (2014-2016)

Co-Chairs

Madeleine Albright (former U.S. Secretary of State and Ambassador to the United Nations)

Ibrahim Gambari (former Foreign Minister of Nigeria and UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs)

Commissioners

Haifa Fahoum Al Kaylani (Founding Chair of the Arab International Women's Forum)

Celso Amorim (former Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Relations of Brazil)

Lloyd Axworthy (former Foreign Minister of Canada)

Igor Ivanov (former Foreign Minister of Russia)

Yoriko Kawaguchi (former Foreign and Environment Minister of Japan)

Jane Holl Lute (former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and Assistant Secretary-General for the UN Department of Field Support)

Asha-Rose Migiro (Minister of Justice and Constitution Affairs of Tanzania and former Foreign Minister and UN Deputy Secretary-General)

José Antonio Ocampo (former Minister of Finance of Colombia and UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs)

Shyam Saran (former Foreign Secretary and Chief Climate Change Negotiator of India)

Michael Schaefer (BMW Foundation Chairman and former German Ambassador to China)

Jozias van Aartsen (former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands and Mayor of The Hague)

Erna Witoelar (founder of the Indonesian Environmental Forum and former Minister of Human Settlements and Regional Development of Indonesia)

Wu Jianmin (Executive Vice Chairman of the China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy and former Ambassador of China to the UN and France)

Ex Officio Members

Ellen Laipson (President, The Stimson Center)

Abiodun Williams (President, The Hague Institute for Global Justice)

APPENDIX II

Albright-Gambari Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance Summary of Recommendations

Part 4: Coping with State Fragility and Violent Conflict

- 4.3.1.1 Strengthen the role of women in peace processes
- 4.3.1.2 Learn and share lessons from implementing National Action Plans under SCR 1325
- 4.3.2.1 Improve conflict analysis and crisis warning
- 4.3.2.2 Focus on the Responsibility to Prevent
- 4.3.3.1 Specify the responsibilities and objectives of R2P mission participants
- 4.3.3.2 Emphasize the principle of “no net harm” in R2P planning and deployments
- 4.3.3.3 Embed standards-monitoring and human rights teams in R2P-associated events
- 4.3.4.1 Make designated Member State military units available for UN or regional peace operations on short notice
- 4.3.4.2 Enhance UN ability to rapidly deploy military planning and support teams to new and existing UN missions
- 4.3.4.3 Make designated Member State formed police units available for UN deployment on short notice
- 4.3.4.4 Establish a sizable standing and reserve capacity to support rapid and sustainable deployment of police to UN peace operations
- 4.3.4.5 Establish standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployment needs for civilian specialist skills
- 4.3.5.1 Focus G20 support on the New Deal for engagement in fragile states
- 4.3.5.2 Combat corruption to support effective rule of law
- 4.3.5.3 Augment current disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programming with greater emphasis on countering (preventing the rise of) violent extremism
- 4.3.5.4 Consider hybrid models of justice when transitioning to a modern state court system
- 4.3.5.5 Consider transformational justice as a postwar alternative that addresses not just the results but also the roots of violence

Part 5: Climate and People: Global Systems, Local Livelihoods

- 5.3.1.1 Facilitate and strengthen linkages between the UNFCCC and other international regimes and organizations dealing with climate change
- 5.3.1.2 Give subnational and nonstate actors the opportunity to endorse climate rules more stringent than the UNFCCC process creates
- 5.3.1.3 Establish an International Carbon Monitoring entity and regulatory framework
- 5.3.1.4 Establish a Global Climate Research Registry and Climate Action Clearinghouse
- 5.3.1.5 Establish a Climate Engineering Advisory Board and Experiments Registry
- 5.3.1.6 Engage the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and UNEP Environment Assembly on climate issues
- 5.3.2.1 Make global and regional trade more climate-sensitive
- 5.3.2.2 Seek advisory opinions from the ICJ in climate change disputes
- 5.3.2.3 “Green” the G20

- 5.3.3.1 Define one or more global climate adaptation goals and gauge their achievement in terms of measurable improvements in local human security
- 5.3.2.2 Structure climate finance to increase net support to climate adaptation
- 5.3.4.1 Negotiate carbon subsidy reduction targets
- 5.3.4.2 Reduce emissions of short-lived climate pollutants
- 5.3.4.3 Institutionalize financial climate risk reporting
- 5.3.4.4 Establish a Green Technology Licensing Facility

Part 6: Governing the Hyperconnected Global Economy

- 6.3.1.1 Create a G20+ to enhance coordination with the UN, Bretton Woods institutions, and related bodies
- 6.3.1.2 Strengthen the IMF
- 6.3.1.3 Bolster the FSB
- 6.3.1.4 Ensure labor rights and global economic governance for inclusive growth
- 6.3.1.5 Establish a system-wide UN Sustainable Human Development Network
- 6.3.2.1 Promote the AEOI standard and transparency of corporate registries
- 6.3.2.2 Assess the effects of anti-money laundering policies on crime and terrorist groups
- 6.3.2.3 Use human rights norms and policy tools to curb illicit financial flows
- 6.3.2.4 Address IFFs in the Post-2015 Development Agenda
- 6.3.3.1 Establish clear guidelines for reporting and sanctioning violations of EITI+ principles
- 6.3.3.2 Make EITI+ complementary to the post-2015 SDGs
- 6.3.4.1 Expand norms and the rule of law in the digital marketplace
- 6.3.4.2 Combat cybercrime through international cybercrime centers and an international cybercrime experts roster
- 6.3.4.3 Promote fundamental good practice in cybersecurity globally
- 6.3.4.4 Promote universal access and the protection of rights and freedom in the digital marketplace

Part 7: Reform of Major Global Institutions

- 7.3.1.1 Streamline the UNGA agenda and strengthen its president and committees
- 7.3.1.2 Create a Shadow Council in the General Assembly for Security Council oversight
- 7.3.1.3 Revisit the Uniting for Peace resolution
- 7.3.1.4 Lead the Post-2015 Development Agenda
- 7.3.1.5 Establish a UN Parliamentary Network
- 7.3.2.1 Expand the membership and allow immediate reelection of nonpermanent members
- 7.3.2.2 Improve the working methods
- 7.3.2.3 Hold regular, structured consultations with civil society and business
- 7.3.3.1 Facilitate multi-stakeholder, cross-disciplinary dialogue, and policy solutions
- 7.3.3.2 Promote inclusive economic reform
- 7.3.3.3 Enable global economic crisis response
- 7.3.3.4 Convene the G20+ every two years at the UN

- 73.3.5 Establish a global economic cooperation liaison mechanism
- 73.3.6 Create a (virtual) G20+ secretariat composed mainly of seconded personnel from major global and regional economic bodies
- 73.3.7 Focus ECOSOC on delivering the Post-2015 Development Agenda
- 73.3.8 Facilitate development cooperation and humanitarian action through ECOSOC
- 73.4.1 Strengthen and make full use of the ICJ
- 73.4.2 Enhance working relations between the UNSC and ICC
- 73.4.3 Streamline the global human rights architecture
- 73.5.1 Create a stronger Peacebuilding Council to replace the Peacebuilding Commission
- 73.5.2 Entrust the new Peacebuilding Council with a conflict-prevention mandate
- 73.5.3 Improve integrated peacebuilding strategies and monitoring
- 73.6.1 Improve the selection procedure for the next Secretary-General
- 73.6.2 Empower the Secretary-General with more discretion to manage the Secretariat
- 73.6.3 Further advance the Delivering as One UN Coherence Agenda through a second deputy secretary-general and additional incentives

Part 8: Engaging Critical Regional, Local, Civil Society, and Business Actors in Global Governance

- 8.3.1.1 Develop new social compacts to support multi-stakeholder solutions to critical governance problems
- 8.3.1.2 Establish a repository for new social compacts
- 8.3.2.1 Establish a UN Global Partnership
- 8.3.2.2 Strengthen civil society and business engagement
- 8.3.2.3 Encourage greater UN policy and programmatic attention on major civil society and private-sector priorities
- 8.3.2.4 Further codify of principles for UN, civil society, and business interactions and corporate social responsibility in global governance
- 8.3.3.1 Promote regional courts to protect international human rights and to address particular issues
- 8.3.3.2 Explore ways to grant regional courts the right to request ICJ advisory opinions
- 8.3.2.3 Update the Cold War–based UN regional groups and strengthen the role of regional organizations
- 8.3.4.1 Create an official dialogue and institutional links between international, national, and local institutions
- 8.3.4.2 Bolster local capabilities to fulfill their expanded governance role

Part 9: A Transitional Strategy for Reform: “Getting from Here to There”

- 9. Build Smart Coalitions to Mobilize Support and Sustain Reforms
- Part 10: Multilateral Negotiations, Sequencing of Reforms, and Resource Mobilization
- 10.1 Reform Through Parallel Tracks (RPT)
- 10.2 Convene a World Conference on Global Institutions (WCGI)
- Part 11: Progress Measurement and Setback Responses
- 11.1 Establish a Mechanism for Monitoring and Coordinating Reform

APPENDIX III

The Secretary-General's Proposals to Reform the United Nations

Reform of the United Nations Development System

- 1st Report of the Secretary-General: Repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda: ensuring a better future for all: [A/72/124 - E/2018/3](#)
- 2nd Report of the Secretary-General: Repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda: our promise for dignity, prosperity and peace on a healthy planet: [A/72/684-E/2018/7](#)
- [Remarks of the Secretary-General on Repositioning of the UN Development System, in the Context of the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational Activities for Development](#)
- Explanatory Notes
- [A new generation of UN Country Teams](#)
- [The reinvigorated Resident Coordinator system](#)
- [Enhanced Resident Coordinator offices](#)
- [Common business services and back-office functions and enhanced UN-DOCO](#)
- [UN inter-agency Pooled Funds](#)
- [A reinvigorated ECOSOC Operational Activities Segment](#)
- [A Joint Board of NYC-based funds and programmes](#)
- [Revised draft: General Assembly resolution on the repositioning of the UN development system, in the context of the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review](#)

Reform of the Management of the United Nations

- Report of the Secretary-General: Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: ensuring a better future for all [A/72/492](#) & improving and streamlining the programme planning and budgeting process [A/72/492/Add.1](#)
- [Remarks of the Secretary-General](#) introducing his management reform proposals to the General Assembly Fifth Committee
- General Assembly resolution [72/266](#) 'Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations'
- Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 [A/72/7/Add.24](#)
- Proposed revisions to the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (article VII and annex) [A/72/73/Rev.1](#)
- Limited budgetary discretion [A/72/497](#)
- Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations [A/72/682](#)

Reform of the United Nations Peace and Security Pillar

- Report of the Secretary-General: Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar [A/72/525](#)
- General Assembly resolution [72/199](#) Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar ▪ Report of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding and sustaining peace [A/72/707-S/2018/43](#)
- [Remarks of the Secretary-General](#) to the General Assembly introducing his report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

Other United Nations Reform Strands

- United Nations System-wide Strategy on Gender Parity
- Secretary-General's Bulletin: Protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct and for cooperating with duly authorized audits or investigations ST/SGB/2017/2
- Report of the Secretary-General: Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse : a new approach A/71/818 + Corr.1 + Add.1
- Report of the Secretary-General: Capability of the United Nations system to assist Member States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy A/71/858

An Innovation Agenda for UN 75


THE ALBRIGHT-GAMبارI COMMISSION REPORT AND THE ROAD TO 2020

“Without bold, effective, and inclusive global governance that also safeguards fundamental human rights, the hard-fought gains of earlier generations may be lost and the extraordinary potential of future generations jeopardized.”

— Foreword to *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance* (2015)

“The international institutions built since 1945 to help nations manage and resolve their problems peacefully—and together—are being weakened to a degree not seen since their founding. Yet dealing with global issues calls for policies and actions beyond the writ or capabilities of any one state.”

— Foreword to *An Innovation Agenda for UN 75* (2019), Madeleine K. Albright and Ibrahim A. Gambari



To do a better job of preventing armed conflict and helping its victims, avoiding runaway climate change, averting cross-border economic shocks, and harnessing the ideas, networks, and capabilities of governments, civil society, and the private sector, the world needs a new kind of leadership and vision, combined with new norms, tools, and institutions. This innovative update to the 2015 report of the Albright-Gambari Commission and its companion volume, *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*, offers twenty global ideas for the United Nations’ seventy-fifth anniversary and Leaders Summit, in 2020, with the goal of renewing and invigorating our system of global governance to better meet twenty-first-century threats, challenges, and opportunities. It presents a bold, yet practical “Roadmap to 2020” designed to mobilize a wide range of actors and constituencies and to produce results at the intersection of global security and justice—preventing violent extremism, mitigating and adapting to climate change, governing our hyperconnected global economy, and safeguarding human rights—to make the world a little more just and secure.