Second-order electoral personalization. Intra-party preference voting in Belgium and the Netherlands

Nagtzaam, M.A.M.

Second-order electoral personalization

Intra-party preference voting in Belgium and the Netherlands

Print:
Print service Ede

Second-order electoral personalization

Intra-party preference voting in Belgium and the Netherlands

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof.mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op woensdag 9 oktober 2019
klokke 13:45 uur

door

Marijn Adrianus Marinus Nagtzaam-Mulders
Geboren te Ossendrecht in 1986

Promotoren:
Prof. dr. R.B. Andeweg
Prof. dr. J.J.M. van Holsteijn

Co-promotor:
Dr. T.P. Louwerse

Promotiecommissie:

Prof. dr. G.A. Irwin	Universiteit Leiden
Prof. dr. R.A. Koole	Universiteit Leiden
Dr. T.A. Mickler	Universiteit Leiden
Prof. dr. J-B. Pilet	Université Libre de Bruxelles
Prof. dr. G. Rahat	Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Acknowledgments

When reading some acknowledgments of (former) colleagues, as inspiration for writing my own acknowledgments, I noticed that most of them started their acknowledgments with the 'academic part', to end with the 'friends and family part'. While I recognize there is some logic to that if you are writing an acknowledgment for your dissertation, I would like to start by thanking my parents, Rini and Gerrie, for all their love and support. I am very proud knowing that my mother will sit behind me when I defend my dissertation, and I hope that my father will be in the mind of many people present that day. He will certainly be in mine.

During the five years in which I have worked on my dissertation I was supervised by Rudy Andeweg and Joop van Holsteyn, and later on also by Tom Louwerse. I am grateful for their support. They always responded quickly to questions, gave useful (and extensive!) feedback and constantly helped and pushed me to improve this dissertation. In addition I would like to thank the Institute of Political Science in Leiden. It has been, and still is, a pleasure to work there and I am thankful for the opportunities the institute gave me.

My PhD position was part of the PartiRep 2 project, a project funded by the Belgian Federal Science Office (Belspo). I am grateful for the funding I received from this project, and for the PartiRep Election Study 2014 dataset provided by this project, which I used in one part of my study. I would like to thank Patrick van Erkel for the work we did together on the experiment that is part of this dissertation. I enjoyed working together, discussing the pros and cons of each decision we had to make for the experiment. During my PhD I presented work at the Politicologenetmaal, the ECPR general conference, and the ECPR Joint Sessions, and at the first Leuven-Montréal Winter School on Elections. I thank all participants in those events for their comments.

I now go back to the 'friends and family part'. It is not possible to thank everybody in the way they deserve to be thanked. The advantage for them is that I will thank them in person. However, at least some names should definitely be mentioned here. First of all, Batsheva. I don't know if I would have been ready to start a PhD without you. You have been an immense support, which I will never forget. Of course, also Hanneke and Jasmijn deserve recognition. You motivated and helped me, and it really helps to know that you two are always there for me. Anika and Jessica: thank you for all the fun we had as colleagues and as friends and that you agreed to be my *paranimfen*.

Finally, thank you Mirjam and Sem for your love and support and for reminding me of what is most important in life.

Contents

List of figures

List of tables

1 Introduction

1.1 The personalization of politics

In a chapter entitled *The Personalization of Politics* in the Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, McAllister (2007, p. 571) starts by stating that "in a trend that has been shared by all of the liberal democracies, politics has become increasingly personalized". However, not everyone would agree with this statement. There is no consensus on the existence and the degree of the personalization of politics. As Karvonen (2010, p. 106) puts it in the reflections of his comparative study on personalization of politics: "The kind of mixed results that this study has presented easily provokes the perennial debate about whether the glass is half empty or half full. Surely, both believers and sceptics will find evidence to support their views". But apart from whether you think of the glass as half empty or half full (or possibly even completely empty or completely full), no one would deny that the personalization of politics is a topic that receives a lot of attention in the media, in politics itself as well as in the academic world.

The basic assumption of the personalization hypothesis "is the notion that individual political actors have become more prominent at the expense of parties and collective identities" (Karvonen, 2010, p. 4). Different factors have been used to explain this process of personalization in the academic literature. Broadly speaking, it is argued that two developments have contributed to the personalization of politics: the weakened relationship between voters and parties and a process of 'mediatization' (Van Aelst et al., 2012). Dalton et al. (2002) argue that because of weaker ties between voters and parties, voters have to base their voting decisions on something else. One of the factors that have become more important is the candidate, resulting in more 'candidate-centred politics'. The mediatization process can be traced back to the introduction of television and is a process in which political actors are increasingly dependent on mass media. The way the mass media report on politics has a great influence on politics itself, for example, by depicting elections as 'horse-races' and focusing on the party leaders instead of the parties themselves (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999).

Political personalization has been studied in relation to institutions (e.g. Rahat & Sheafer, 2007), the media (e.g. Langer, 2007), governments (Hazan, 1996; Maddens & Fiers, 2004; Mughan, 1993; Poguntke & Webb, 2005), and elections (Aarts et al., 2011).

When it comes to electoral personalization, the argument is that votes are increasingly being influenced by candidate evaluations and less by political parties in general. The study of electoral personalization primarily looks at the impact of party leaders' popularity on their parties' electoral fortunes (Aarts et al., 2011; McAllister, 2007; Wattenberg, 1991). For example, because of the importance of television, and the fact that mass media see political leaders as the embodiment of their parties, the influence of political leaders becomes more important. The political leader is the most important person in the

party and since he or she is so visible, he or she has a lot of influence on the party. This type of personalization has been referred to as first order personalization (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, p. 163). In addition Van Holsteyn and Andeweg distinguish 'Second Order Personalization' (2012, p. 163): "a preference for an individual candidate having to do with that person [being] embedded in a prior choice for the candidate's party". Balmas et al. (2014, p. 37) make a distinction between centralized personalization and decentralized personalization, which relates to the distinction between first- and second-order personalization. "Centralized personalization implies that power flows upwards from the group (e.g. political party, cabinet) to a single leader (e.g. party leader, prime minister, president). (…) Decentralized personalization means that power flows downwards from the group to individual politicians who are not party or executive leaders (e.g. candidates, members of parliament, ministers)". I will study second-order personalization.

1.2 Second-order electoral personalization

For the Netherlands, Van Holsteyn and Andeweg estimate that personalization embedded within a prior party choice is more widespread than leader personalization at the expense of parties. In a counterfactual thought experiment they found that roughly half of the voters are pure party voters and 9 per cent pure person voters. For the other 39 per cent "the choice of an individual politician within their party of preference clearly matters: (…) [they] indicate support for an individual politician, as long as (s)he does not leave their preferred party" (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2010, p. 633). Other studies show that in the context of a single transferable vote system, compared to the findings of Van Holsteyn and Andeweg, an even larger number of voters consider the person to be more important than the party, although overall the party is still more important for voters (Curtice & Marsh, 2008; Marsh, 2007). Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2010, p. 633) argue that "there is no reason to suspect that [their results show] a uniquely Dutch phenomenon, and to the extent that it can also be found elsewhere, personalization-within-parties considerably amends our understanding of personalization in politics".

In addition to the tension between first- and second-order electoral personalization (i.e. whether the process of personalization has an impact specifically on leaders of parties or on all candidates within a party), there is also a tension between the party and personal dimension of representation (J.M. Colomer, 2011). Results of elections, especially in proportional systems, are mostly discussed in terms of party competition. For example, in media coverage around elections constant updates on opinion polls predicting the election results for the parties are shown. The candidates who will enter parliament after the elections are of less interest.

Some studies in the 1980s already noticed this gap in the literature and paid attention to the intraparty dimension of electoral systems (Katz, 1980, 1985, 1986; Marsh, 1985). These studies focused mainly on a classification of preference voting systems and

argued for greater attention to this phenomenon. In addition, the importance of other candidates was recognized (Manin, 1997). However, three decades later progress was limited: the personal dimension is still largely 'neglected' (J.M. Colomer, 2011) and candidates still receive "much less attention" (Karvonen, 2010, p. 41).

However, comparative research on preference voting is complicated, because electoral systems are not easily compared and because the phenomenon of voting for candidates differs per electoral system. There is not even consensus in the literature on how this phenomenon – voting for an individual candidate in an electoral system where voters have the opportunity to choose between different candidates from the same list - should be called. Terms which are used are "personal voting", "person voting", "preference vote", "intraparty choice" (see Karvonen, 2004) or "intraparty preference voting" (Katz, 1986). I will use the term 'preference vote' in this study[1].

Research on preference voting is relevant for various reasons. First, in terms of the personalization debate one could argue that if politics indeed has become more personalized, it is reasonable to think this also has an effect on other candidates than party leaders. If individual persons become more important, one may expect that intra-party competition also becomes more important, because voters do not only base their vote on party ideology but also on characteristics of the candidates, i.e. *all* candidates. This is supported by findings of Karvonen (2010, p. 63), who argues that "in those countries where the possibility of choosing between individual candidates has existed for a long time, the relative importance of individual candidates seems to have increased". This trend is for example visible in the Netherlands and Belgium (see figure 1.1). In the Netherlands, voters can only vote for candidates. Therefore, only votes for candidates other than the first candidate on the list are usually considered to be preference votes. In Belgium, voters have the option to cast a list vote, and therefore all votes for candidates are considered to be preference votes. Until the 1980s the percentage of preference votes in the Netherlands often stayed below 10 per cent, whereas during the most recent elections this has fluctuated around 20 per cent, with a peak in 2002 of 27 per cent (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). After a small drop in percentage after 2002, in the most recent elections of 2017 yet again 27 per cent of the Dutch voters cast a preference vote. In Belgium, a much larger percentage of voters cast a preference vote nowadays compared to previous decades, with a peak of preference votes in 2003, when almost 70 per cent of the voters cast a preference vote (André et al., 2012). In recent elections the number of preference votes dropped slightly below 60 per cent. However, the increase in the use of preference votes did not lead to a dramatic increase of candidates being elected out of list order, but this issue will be explored later on in this study.

[1] Arguably the term intraparty preference vote would be even better; to emphasize the fact that it is an *intra*party choice. This would fit the argument that voting for a candidate within a party is a result of a sequential decision process, namely to first choose the party and then choose the candidate after the choice for a party has been made. However, for readability I use the shorter term preference vote.

Figure 1.1 Levels of preference voting in Belgium and the Netherlands



Source: Van Holsteyn & Andeweg (2012) and own calculations (the Netherlands) and Wauters & Rodenbach (2014) (Belgium).

Second, preference voting determines (or might determine) which candidates are elected. Depending on the electoral system voters have more or less influence on which candidates are elected to parliament. A recent study shows that in many countries the formal weight of preference votes has increased (Renwick & Pilet, 2016), making it easier for candidates to be elected based on their own electoral performance. Preference votes therefore have an important function in representative democracy. While political parties still perform an important role when it comes to how voters are represented in parliament, a more direct link between voters and candidates might help to improve the representativeness of democracy. Although more candidate-centred electoral systems seem to have a negative influence on voter turnout (Söderlund, 2017), research has shown that allowing voters some intraparty choice has a positive influence on voter satisfaction with democracy, since "such systems promote a greater sense of fairness about election outcomes among citizens" (Farrell & McAllister, 2006, p. 742). If a voter has the option to vote for an individual candidate he or she trusts to be a good MP, this might benefit the idea of a representative democracy. In the Netherlands the constitution states that MPs can vote '*zonder last*' (in English: 'without burden'): an MP cannot be forced (directly) by either a party or a coalition agreement to vote in a certain way. The constitution thereby states the importance of the role of an individual MP. This privilege for an MP is furthermore

guaranteed by the fact that if an MP would be removed from a parliamentary party group, the MP can keep his seat in parliament as an independent MP. Despite this constitutional strong position of MPs, parties still have a large influence on which candidates are elected. Preference votes could help voters to choose certain candidates, thereby reinforcing the representativeness of parliament.

Third, preference votes might also have other consequences for the candidate, such as a better list position at the next election if the candidate performed well in terms of preference votes (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017; Crisp et al., 2013).

1.3 Research questions and overview of the book

The main research question of this book therefore is: what are the causes and consequences of preference voting? The existing literature is partly able to answer this question, but we do not know everything there is to know about preference voting yet. This study therefore is not an exhaustive study on preference voting, but a study that tries to build on what we already know about four different aspects of preference voting. I argue that there are three aspects that have an impact on the number of preference votes which are cast: constraints (i.e. electoral rules that dictate what voters can and cannot do), the demand side (the voters who cast a preference vote) and the supply side (the candidates who receive and compete for preference votes). In addition, preference votes might also have consequences for other factors. Figure 1.2 shows the relationship between these variables. To be clear, this figure is not included here to show a comprehensive causal model, but as an illustration of how the different aspects relate to each other. What the figure shows, in terms of causality, is that in three of the following chapters, preference votes will be the dependent variable and in one chapter (about the consequences) preference votes will be considered as the independent variable. In the remainder of this section the four different aspects will be introduced shortly. Chapter two, three, four and five all deal with one of these aspects, and these chapters all have their own theoretical and methodological foundation.

In **chapter 2** the constraints will be discussed. According to Marsh (1985, p. 370) "the most obvious incentive [to cast a preference vote] is the expectation that the preference vote will affect the allocation of seats". Only open preferential list systems - where preference votes determine which candidates are elected – have an effect that is this strong. There are many differences between electoral systems that allow preference voting, which makes comparative research on preference voting extremely complex (see for example Katz, 1986; Marsh, 1985; Van Erkel, 2017, p. 5; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). What constitutes as a preference vote in one electoral system does not automatically constitute as a preference vote in another system. Electoral systems that allow preference voting share two important features. First, a voter can cast a vote for an individual candidate or several candidates and thereby influence which candidates are elected. Second, the total number of seats a party receives is based on the total number of votes for all candidates for that party

Figure 1.2 Overview of aspects discussed in the book



(Karvonen, 2011a). According to Karvonen (2011a) there are four dimensions of preferential list systems that influence preference voting. First, lists can be open or flexible. In an open list system the number of preference votes for a candidate is the only factor that determines which candidates are elected. In flexible list systems the order in which candidates are ranked on the list by their parties also influences which candidates are elected. Since preference votes have more impact in the former system, personal reputation is more important in these systems (Carey & Shugart, 1995, p. 421). Second, preference voting can be compulsory or optional. In some countries voters have the option to either cast a list vote or a preference vote. In these countries preference voting is optional: if a voter does not have a preference for a specific candidate or agrees with the order of the list determined by the party, he or she can simply cast a list vote, i.e. a vote not for a candidate but for the party. In other countries the option of the list vote is not available and therefore a voter must vote for a specific candidate. Third, a voter can have only one vote or more than one vote. According to Carey and Shugart (1995, p. 423) in systems where a voter can only cast a single vote, personal reputation is most valuable for an individual candidate[2]. The fourth dimension is whether there is a threshold for an individual candidate or not. Depending on the combination of these rules in a certain electoral system voters are

[2] Carey and Shugart (1995) also distinguish two other variables that have an influence on the value of personal reputation. These two are whether votes are pooled and district magnitude, but do not relate to Karvonen's dimensions. Personal reputation is less valuable in systems where votes are pooled, as is – by definition – the case in all preferential list systems, since in such a system the party also has an important influence on who and how many candidates get elected. The influence of district magnitude on the value of personal reputation depends on the other variables. In closed list systems the value of personal reputation declines as district magnitude increases, while in other systems the value of personal reputation increases while district magnitude increases (since there are more co-partisans to compete with).

constrained in their options to cast a preference vote. We do not know what the effects of these constrains are. For example, if a voter does not have the option to cast a list vote, and therefore has to vote for a candidate, we do not know what voters do when they do not have a candidate preference. Therefore, in the second chapter an experiment on the effects of variations in flexible list systems on preference votes will be presented. In this chapter I look at how the option to cast a list vote and the option to cast multiple preference votes influence the use of preference voting.

In **chapter 3** I look at the demand side of preference voting: the voter. In this chapter I focus on the question which voters cast a preference vote. Since studying preference voting is a relatively new field, an established set of explanations does not yet exist (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, p. 172). However, André et al. (2012, 2013) provide a very useful framework for the analysis of which voters cast a preference vote. They distinguish three models that could explain preference voting. The first model is the resource model. The underlying idea of this model is that voters who have more resources, in terms of for example education or political knowledge, are more likely to cast a preference vote. The second model is the proximity model. This model is based on the idea that voters who had (direct or indirect) contact with a candidate are more likely to cast a preference vote. Finally, the identity model assumes that voters of underrepresented groups are more likely to cast a preference vote. In the third chapter I discuss these different sets of explanations in more detail. Furthermore, I will test these explanations in a different context, namely at the national level. While the models of André et al seem very promising in helping to explain preference voting, they are mainly tested at the local level elections in Belgium. Seeing that they would also have explanatory power at the national level and in different countries would increase their value. In addition, I add one explanation for preference voting. There is a tendency in the literature on voting behaviour to primarily look at positive motivations for a vote (Catt, 1996), in other words: it is assumed that a vote is cast to support the party or candidate for which the vote was cast. In chapter 3 I show that this is not always the case. Sometimes negative motivations could also play a role in casting a preference vote. More specifically I argue that some voters cast a vote for a candidate, not as a support for that candidate but because they do not want to support another candidate.

The third and last aspect that influences preference voting is discussed in **chapter 4**: the supply side. In this chapter I focus on the question of what determines the electoral success of candidates. Different studies have paid attention to this question (see for example Karvonen, 2011b; Maddens et al., 2006, 2007, 2010; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012; Wauters et al., 2010), especially the study of Van Erkel (2017) delves into this topic in great detail. He studies different factors that influence the electoral success of candidates, ranging from individual characteristics of the candidate, media and campaign factors and factors relating to the party such as the ballot position of the candidate. My main contribution to the literature on preference voting is that I consider the role of ideological differences between candidates of the same party and analyse whether they influence the electoral

success of candidates.

These three chapters should give an answer to the first part of the main research question (what are the causes of preference voting). **Chapter 5** deals with the second part of the main research question (what are the consequences of preference voting). Within the field of preference voting this area has received the least attention. There are only a few studies which look at the impact of preference voting on the political career of candidates (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017; Crisp et al., 2013; Folke et al., 2016). These studies suggest that there is an effect of preference voting on list position for the next election or on promotions to better political functions. In chapter 5 I argue that preference votes can have an influence in three different areas. First, I will discuss the most direct effect: whether preference votes actually help candidates to become elected. The other two effects are less direct, and cover two questions. First, whether the legislative behaviour of a candidate elected through preference votes is different from a candidate who is elected solely on the basis of the strength of his or her party? And second, what are the consequences of preference votes for the political career of a candidate? These questions are important, in the first place because so far it has not been clear whether preference votes have an effect beyond the outcome of the election. Moreover, if the findings indeed show that preference votes have an effect on the political career and/or legislative behaviour of individual candidates, this would give preference voting more weight beyond 'simply' who gets elected. In addition, this would underline the relevance of research on preference voting.

The advantage of this approach is that it combines many relevant aspects of preference voting, both in terms of causes and consequences. While some studies on preference votes combined two of the aspects discussed above (e.g. Van Erkel, 2017; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012), most studies focus on only one of the aspects. Bringing together these four aspects in the **conclusion** of this dissertation will be an important contribution of this study, because it gives the opportunity to connect these aspects and therefore give a more complete overview of the phenomenon of preference voting.

One important limitation of this study has to be mentioned. While I study both voters and candidates, it was not possible to link the two directly. For the Netherlands, which is one of my cases (see section 1.4), the data needed for that purpose is not available. While data is available to study which voters cast a preference vote and official records show the number of preference votes candidates receive, there is no data that provides the information to connect them. In other words, election studies in the Netherlands do not include the question 'for which candidate did you vote?' This is a limitation, because linking the two would give additional insight in the phenomenon. However, studying the two separately also provides new and valuable insights.

1.4 Case selection

Second-order personalization will be studied in two countries: Belgium and the

Netherlands[3]. According to Andeweg and Van Holsteyn (2011, p. 23) the Netherlands is "an ideal case to study second order personalization as only votes for candidates other than the candidate leading the list (…) are regarded as preference votes". Furthermore, the electoral system of the Netherlands is a flexible list system; the order in which candidates are ranked by the political parties also has an influence on which candidates are elected. Out of all systems where preference voting is allowed, a flexible list system is therefore a least-likely case for the manifestation of second-order personalization. There are incentives for a candidate to pursue a personal reputation, but these are very low since it is normally the party that influences which candidates are elected. Findings for systems that use a flexible list system are likely to be applicable to electoral systems where the incentive for intraparty competition are stronger.

Belgium is also often seen as an ideal case to study preference voting (see for example Van Erkel, 2017). The Belgian electoral system has an important advantage compared to the Netherlands for studying second-order electoral personalization. While in the Netherlands voters can only cast a vote for a candidate, in Belgium voters also have the opportunity to cast a party vote. In a sense, this makes a candidate vote in Belgium more valuable. In the Netherlands a vote for a candidate might also be a party vote. The Netherlands and Belgium therefore provide excellent case studies. This is especially the case when both countries are studied, because when it comes to preference voting the countries differ on important aspects relating to the electoral system. At the same time both countries have very similar political systems, allowing studying some of the consequences of these different aspects of the electoral system. I will turn to these differences relating to preference voting later on, but I will first reflect on the similarities of the two countries.

Belgium and the Netherlands share a history together: the current Belgian state emerged in 1830 when it separated from the Netherlands and in 1839 the terms of agreement were accepted by the Netherlands (Deschouwer, 2009, pp. 16–19). The political systems of Belgium and the Netherlands have many similarities. Both have a multi-party system with parties from the same party families present: Christian democrats, socialists, greens, liberals and right-wing populists. In addition, Belgium also has a regionalist party family (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, pp. 56–66; Deschouwer, 2009, p. 92). These parties compete with each other in electoral systems that are based on the principle of proportional representation (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, p. 95; Deschouwer, 2009, p. 106) and that can be classified as a flexible list system. Both the Netherlands and Belgium have a bicameral system, with a lower house (in the Netherlands called the *Tweede Kamer* and in Belgium

[3] I study second-order personalization at the national level. This does not mean that second-order personalization is only relevant at the national level (André et al., 2013; Hessing, 1985). However, the dynamics of second-order personalization at the local and national level are likely to be very different. An example of this is shown by Thijssen et al. (2017), who show that some explanations for preference voting, especially related to the proximity model, have a slightly different influence on local than on national elections. Therefore, the study of second-order personalization at the local level would deserve a study on its own.

called the *Chambre des représentants* / *Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers*) that consists of 150 members. In both countries no single party comes close to an absolute majority of seats, resulting in coalition governments consisting of multiple parties, which often take office after a long formation process.

There are also important differences between Belgium and the Netherlands. The most striking difference is the fact that Belgium is a federal state. The Belgian federal state is quite a complex one, with a mix of regions and language communities. The federation is a result of compromises and is "a rather special and unusual" one (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 42 see pp. 41-72 for more about this issue). Furthermore, there are differences related to the electoral systems of both countries. In Belgium, voting is compulsory (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 110), while in the Netherlands compulsory voting was abolished in 1970 (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, p. 104). Another important difference is that in the Netherlands the country can be considered as a single electoral district for the distribution of seats. There are districts, but they perform an administrative function (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, p. 96). However, in Belgium there are 11 districts (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 107). When it comes to preference voting there are also differences between Belgium and the Netherlands. There are two important differences in this regard: the list vote and the option to cast multiple preference votes. In the Netherlands voters are obliged to vote for a single candidate, while in Belgium voters may choose between casting a list vote or one or multiple preference vote(s). In the following two sections the Belgian and Dutch electoral system will be discussed in more detail.

1.4.1 The Belgian electoral system

The electoral system of Belgium is based on proportional representation. For the elections of the 150 members of the Chamber of Representatives the country is divided into 11 districts (*kieskringen*). These districts have a district magnitude ranging from 4 to 24[4]. At the district level a 5 per cent threshold exists. Within the districts seats are distributed using the D'Hondt method (De Winter, 2005, pp. 420–421). Voting in Belgium is compulsory, although there is no strict enforcement of this rule.

Belgian voters have two options when casting a vote: they can cast a list vote or a preference vote. With a list vote a voter endorses the order in which the candidates are ranked on the party list. With a preference vote they can support one or several candidate(s) from a party. Belgian voters can cast preference votes for multiple candidates, as long as all candidates for which they cast a vote belong to the same party (De Winter, 2005, p. 421). For the distribution of seats between parties casting a list vote or a preference vote has no effect: they all count as a single vote for a party. However, the difference has an effect on how seats are allocated to candidates.

[4] In the period analysed in this dissertation (2003-2014), the number of districts remained constant. However, in 2014 the districts Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde and Leuven were abolished, and two new districts (Brussel-Hoofdstad and Vlaams-Brabant) were created.

Political parties present lists with two types of candidates: effective candidates and successor candidates. Only the effective candidates can be elected directly. The list of successor candidates is used if an elected candidate gives up his or her seat in parliament. The list with effective candidates has a maximum length of the number of candidates that can be elected in the district in which the list is presented. The list with successor candidates has a maximum length of half of the district size, with a minimum of six candidates. In addition to the length of the list, the electoral law also prescribes that each list of candidates should contain an equal number of male and female candidates (or that the maximum difference may be 1, in case of an uneven number of candidates). In addition, the first two candidates on a list may not have the same gender[5].

As an example of how seats are distributed within a party the election result of the PS in the district of Luik (Liège) (for the elections of 2014) are shown (see table 1.1). In the upper part the number of votes for the party is presented, broken down into the type of vote that was cast. In the second part the number of preference votes for all (effective) candidates are shown. The total number of votes cast for this party is 187,897 and the party won 5 seats. This means that a candidate needs 187,897 / 6 (= number of seats + 1) = 31,317 votes in order to get elected.

Half of the ballots that confirm the list order (of the effective candidates) are available to transfer to the candidates who did not reach the threshold[6]. There were 65,357 ballots with only a list vote and 9,367 ballots with only preference votes for successor candidates (i.e. by not voting for one of the effective candidates, they confirm the ranking of effective candidates): a total of 74,724 ballots. Thus, there are 37,362 votes available to transfer to effective candidates. These votes are transferred to candidates who need extra votes in order to reach the threshold, based on their list position. Since the first candidate already received enough votes, the first candidate on the list who benefits from the votes to be transferred is Julie Fernandez Fernandez. She received 15,959 preference votes; 15,358 short to reach the threshold (see column I). Thus, 15,358 votes are added to her votes, bringing her total number of votes to exactly the threshold (column II). 22,004 votes remain available (see column III) to transfer to other candidates. These votes will be transferred in the same way, until they are exhausted. The figures in column II show the number of votes for each candidate after adding the votes available for transfer. Based on these votes candidates are elected in the order of the number of preference votes (including the added list votes) they received. If two candidates have an equal number of votes, the list position is decisive[7].

[5] This rule was introduced in 2003, but only became fully effective in 2006. In 2003, as a transition rule it was stated that the first three candidates on the list should not be of the same gender.

[6] Before 2003 all votes that confirm the list order were available for distribution to the top candidates. In order to give voters more influence over which candidates are elected, this was changed in 2003 to half the votes that confirm the list order.

[7] The order in which the successor candidates are ranked is not discussed here. The method resembles the way the effective candidates are ranked, but is not explicitly discussed here because the successor candidates are not included in the analyses in this book.

Table 1.1 Example of distribution of seats within a party (Belgium)

Ballots with only a list vote	65,357	
Ballots with only preference votes for effective candidates	88,821	
Ballots with both preference votes for effective and successor candidates	24,352	
Ballots with only preference votes for successor candidates	9,367	+
Total number of votes for party	187,897	

Pos.	Candidate	Votes	I	II	III	IV
1	DEMEYER Willy	45,590	0	45,590	37,362	1
2	FERNANDEZ FERNANDEZ Julie	15,959	15,358	31,317	22,004	2
3	MATHOT Alain	20,523	10,794	31,317	11,210	3
4	FREDERIC André	11,242	11,210	22,452	0	5
5	LACROIX Christophe	15,628	0	15,628	0	
6	DUBOIS Nathalie	8,096	0	8,096	0	
7	SIMON Gil	7,546	0	7,546	0	
8	FAGNANT Carine	5,783	0	5,783	0	
9	CROCHET Pierre	5,734	0	5,734	0	
10	OMARI MWAYUMA Marie-Jeanne	5,166	0	5,166	0	
11	GOBLET Cécilia	5,747	0	5,747	0	
12	DELLEUZE Catherine	5,377	0	5,377	0	
13	JARFI Hind	5,504	0	5,504	0	
14	HAPPART Grégory	6,760	0	6,760	0	
15	DAERDEN Frédéric	30,484	0	30,484	0	4

I Number of list votes transferred to candidate in order to reach threshold.
II Number of votes after adding list votes.
III Number of list votes available to transfer to candidates lower on the list.
IV Order in which candidates are elected.

1.4.2 The Dutch electoral system

The Dutch electoral system is also based on the idea of proportional representation. In fact, the electoral system in the Netherlands can be considered as one of the most proportional electoral systems in the world.

Voters in the Netherlands can vote for a specific candidate, not for a party as such. According to Andeweg (2005, p. 494): "voters who have a preference for a party but not for any particular candidate usually cast their vote for the first candidate on the list, the so-called 'list-puller' (lijsttrekker). (…) All votes for other candidates lower on the list are known as preference votes (voorkeurstemmen), as they indicate a preference for a particular candidate over all other candidates on the list". However, as we shall see, votes for a candidate are primarily treated as votes for the party of that candidate.

The country is divided into 20 electoral districts (*kieskringen*)[8]. Political parties can present lists of candidates in each district. These lists may have a maximum of 50 candidates, or 80 if the party received more than 15 seats in the previous election[9] (Jacobs, 2018). Parties do not have to participate in each district: they can also present a list in only one or a few districts. In addition, a party can present different lists in different districts, but parties can also decide to present the same list in all districts. This has a few implications. Some parties may choose to put some 'regional' candidates on a list in a specific district. A party that participates in all districts and is able to put 30 candidates on all district lists, may for example choose to present the same top 25 candidates in all districts, but put different candidates on positions 26 to 30 in each district. This gives the party the advantage to present more candidates nationwide than the maximum would be if in all districts the exact same list would be presented, since the party can now present 25 + 5 * 20 = 125 candidates. In addition, a party may also vary the order in which they present their candidates in all districts.

Effectively, the country is treated as a single district when it comes to the distribution of seats to parties. The districts therefore primarily serve administrative purposes. To determine the number of seats for each party, first the total number of votes for all parties are counted. The total number of votes for a party are counted by adding up the votes for all candidates from a specific party. All party district lists are considered to be a single party. However, parties are allowed to combine all district lists at the national level. In that case all votes at the district level are combined into a national vote, and all district lists are considered to be a single party[10]. All parties that compete in more than one district make use of this option, since it increases the chance of winning more seats.

---

[8] Before 2010 there were 19 districts.

[9] Before the election of 2010 the maximum number of candidates on a list was 30, or twice the number of seats obtained in the previous election with a maximum of 80 candidates for parties that received more than 15 seats in the previous election (Andeweg, 2005, p. 496).

[10] Parties that present the exact same list in all districts are automatically considered to be a single national party by the electoral law.

Based on the total number of (valid) votes at the national level, the electoral quota is calculated: the number of votes cast, divided by the number of seats of the Second Chamber (150). Since the only legal threshold to enter parliament is this electoral quota, a party that receives at least 0.67 per cent (100 per cent / 150 seats) of the votes, is guaranteed a seat. If a party crossed the threshold, the party receives a seat for each time it (fully) obtained the electoral quota. In practice, this will never lead to the full allocation of all 150 seats. The seats that remain after this process are allocated according to the D'Hondt system (Andeweg, 2005, p. 948)[11].

The distribution of seats within a party is done based on the order in which candidates appear on the list[12]. Only if a candidate exceeds the individual threshold he or she is elected regardless of his or her list position. In 1998 the threshold for an individual candidate to be elected out of list order was lowered to 25 per cent of the electoral quota. Before the elections of 1998 this threshold was 50 per cent of the electoral quota (Andeweg, 2005, p. 494). In practice, this means that a candidate needs somewhere around 15,000 to 17,000 votes to be elected on the basis of preference votes.

1.4.3 Period of analysis

For the Netherlands the study covers the period between 1998 and 2017, in which a total of 7 national parliamentary elections[13] were held. For Belgium the period of analysis runs from 2003 until 2014, in which a total of 4 national elections were held[14]. The reason to choose these periods is that for both countries the electoral rules with regard to preference voting are stable for this period. As discussed in the previous sections, in the Netherlands, since 1998 the threshold for individual candidates to be elected with preference votes is 25 per cent of the threshold for parties (the individual threshold was 50 per cent before 1998) (Renwick & Pilet, 2016, p. 136). In Belgium since the elections of 2003 the weight of the list vote is reduced: only half of the list votes are assigned to the (top) candidates on the list, instead of all (Renwick & Pilet, 2016, p. 139). In both countries these changes result in a higher chance for candidates to be elected out of list order (i.e. to be elected based on their own electoral performance, instead of based on the success of the party).

---

[11] Until the elections of 2017 parties were allowed to participate in the elections as an alliance. For the distribution of seats the parties of an alliance were considered to be one party. Since the remainder seats are distributed according to the D'Hondt system, which favors larger parties, this increased the chances of an alliance for obtaining a 'remainder seat'.

[12] Formally, seats are distributed to party *district* lists. This means that a party receives a number of seats in each district and top ranked candidates in that districts are elected. If a candidate is elected in multiple districts, the candidate is elected in the district in which he or she received most votes. If in another district the candidate would also be considered elected, his or her seat would go to the next candidate on the list.

[13] Unless stated otherwise, the reader may assume that if elections are discussed in this book, election refers to the elections for the *Tweede Kamer* (with regard to the Netherlands) or the *Chambre des représentants / Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers* (with regard to Belgium).

[14] Appendix A.2 (page 156) contains some additional information about the period of analysis for both countries. The appendix shows all elections and all legislative periods that are included in the analyses in the coming chapters.

2 The constraints: the effects of a list vote and the number of votes[15] [16]

2.1 Introduction

In 2006 the *Burgerforum kiesstelsel* (Electoral System Civic Forum) was set up in the Netherlands, with the goal of advising the government on what the best electoral system would be for the Netherlands, according to the civic forum. The civic forum was composed of 143 citizens, partly chosen by lottery. After being informed about different types of electoral systems, the forum came up with two recommendations. The first one was to introduce a list vote. Voters should have the option to cast either a list vote or a vote for a candidate. In addition, the Forum recommended that preference votes should be given more influence by abolishing the threshold for individual candidates. This would have given voters more influence on which candidates would be elected. However, these proposals were rejected by the government (Fournier et al., 2011, pp. 8–9). What the effects of these proposed changes would have been is difficult to say, but it is likely that they would have had an influence on the intraparty competition.

However, it is difficult to determine the exact influence, because not much research is conducted on the effects of electoral system change on intraparty competition. While the question of how electoral rules influence electoral behaviour has been of central interest to political scientists (Blais & Carty, 1991; Clark & Golder, 2006; Cox, 1997; Duverger, 1951; Singer & Stephenson, 2009), most of these studies examine how different electoral systems influence election results in terms of vote distribution across parties. In a 1985 review of the studies on electoral systems, Lijphart (1985, p. 7) concluded that the intraparty dimension had thus far been neglected in academia. There is a change visible, however. Nowadays, not only the *inter*party dimension is studied, but the *intra*party dimension starts to receive attention as well. For example, Carey and Shugart classify different electoral formulas and explain how they might affect the vote-seeking behaviour of candidates (1995). At the same time, electoral rules also affect voters, as they constrain voters in their options, and are therefore one of the factors affecting preference votes. In this chapter the effects of these constraints are discussed.

In both Belgium and the Netherlands levels of preference voting are much higher nowadays than they were in previous decades (see also chapter 1), a trend that can also be seen elsewhere (Karvonen, 2010). But while preference voting increased, Karvonen (2010) did not find conclusive evidence for a trend towards more candidate-centred electoral systems. However, in an extensive and more recent study on electoral reforms Renwick and

[15] This chapter is based on Nagtzaam & Van Erkel (2017).

[16] The research presented in this chapter was supported by Research Foundation Flanders [Grant Number G026513N].

Pilet (2016) came to a different conclusion. They observe a trend towards more candidate-centred electoral systems, probably because they used a 'more fine-grained classification of the intra-party dimension' (Renwick & Pilet, 2016, p. 267). According to Renwick and Pilet this trend started in the 1990s. They especially observe an increased weight of preference votes in the allocation of seats within parties (2016, p. 267). Examples of electoral systems changing in a more personalized direction are Bulgaria, where a closed list system was replaced by an open list system with preference voting in 2011, and Belgium, where rules were introduced in 2002 that increased the weight given to preference votes. In the Netherlands the relative weight of preference votes was increased as well. Since the general elections of 1998 a candidate only needs 25 per cent of the threshold for parties in order to get elected out of list order, opposed to 50 per cent the candidate needed before.

In this chapter, I will not look at the influence of an electoral system as such, but I will analyse the variations of one type of electoral system: flexible list systems (Carey & Shugart, 1995). Flexible list proportional representation systems are amongst the most commonly used electoral systems in Europe. Yet, the system and its effects are understudied (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017). In flexible list systems both preference votes cast by the voters and the rank ordering of candidates by the party determine which candidates are elected. Therefore, the system should be distinguished from closed lists, where only the party rank ordering determines which candidates are elected, and from open lists, where only preference votes determine the elected candidates (Shugart, 2005).

There is considerable variation between the various countries where flexible list systems are used with regard to how open or restrictive the system is. Probably the most important distinction is whether casting a preference vote is optional or not. In some countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Latvia, Luxemburg, and Sweden, voters can choose whether they vote for a candidate or whether they cast a so called list vote, i.e. a vote for the party list as a whole. In other countries, such Estonia and the Netherlands, voters cannot cast a list vote and preference voting is therefore obligatory. Shugart (2005, p. 43) calls this latter subtype of the flexible list system a latent list: while the list itself has the most influence on how seats are distributed, the voter does not have the option to cast a vote solely for the list. A second difference relates to the number of preference votes that voters may cast (Karvonen, 2011a)[17]. In some countries voters have the option to cast multiple preference votes. In other countries voters are restricted to voting for a single candidate. The option to cast a list vote (or the constraint of not having the option to cast a list vote)

[17] A distinction can also be made on the basis of the relative weight of preference votes, i.e. how easy it is for a candidate to be elected out of list-order. Wauters et al. (2012) concluded that an increase of the relative weight of preference votes in Belgian local elections had only in some urban municipalities a minor effect. In other municipalities the reform had no effect, arguably because personalization, i.e. casting a preference vote, had reached some sort of ceiling. In these municipalities the increase of the relative weight of preference votes did not result in an increase of casting preference votes. We decided to focus only on the list vote and number of preference votes in our experiment. By including the weight of preference votes, the number of manipulations in the experiment would increase, with the risk of the experiment becoming overly complicated.

and the number of preference votes that a voter can cast are the two central themes in this chapter. The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the understanding of preferential list systems of which 'little is currently known' (Shugart, 2005, p. 43).

2.2 Studying the effects of electoral rules

Most studies on the effects of electoral systems compare election results between different systems with different electoral rules. This approach is problematic, however, because many factors might be involved that were not taken into account in the analyses. In response to this problem, a recent strand of literature has emerged that conducts experiments that study how voters react to changes in the electoral system (Blais et al., 2012; Blumenau et al., 2017; Laslier et al., 2015; Van der Straeten et al., 2013). The present study fits this trend, by conducting an experiment to investigate the impact of electoral rules on voting behaviour. The advantage of conducting experiments for such questions is that two homogenous groups in the same context can be asked how they would vote under a specific rule. When each group is asked to vote under a different rule, we can see the effects of each rule by comparing the two groups.

The experiment presented in this chapter is conducted in two countries: Belgium and the Netherlands. Conducting the same experiment in two different contexts has a great advantage. The advantage of conducting a similar experiment in two countries is that if similar results are found this strengthens the conclusions. Likewise, different results would show that the effect institutions exert on voting behaviour is likely to be influenced by the specific context. In either way, conducting an (almost) identical experiment in two countries gives us more information than conducting the experiment in only one country.

The two countries in which the experiment is conducted are very different from each other when it comes to the list vote and the number of preference votes a voter may cast. The electoral system of Belgium allows voters to cast either a list vote, or one or multiple preference votes. Belgian voters who support the party and have no preference for individual candidates or agree with the party on the order of candidates may cast a list vote. Voters who have a preference for one or more individual candidate(s) may cast multiple preference votes as long as these candidates belong to the same party (De Winter, 2005). Dutch voters are forced to vote for a single candidate (Andeweg, 2005). Therefore, it can be argued that in this experiment the Dutch case is most interesting. Dutch voters – compared to Belgian voters – are more restricted in showing their actual preference, and the experiment allows us to investigate what happens when these constraints are lifted. An extra benefit is that this gives an indication of how 'preferential' a preference vote is. Previous studies have argued that due to the nature of the Dutch system, where voters are forced to cast a single preference vote, the vote for the list-puller (i.e. the first candidate on the list) does not really reflect the preference for an individual candidate, but simply a choice for the party. Therefore, in general only votes for candidates from the second position onwards are

considered to be actual preference votes in the Netherlands (Andeweg, 2005). This distinction is quite strict and might not always reflect the exact motivations of the voters. Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2010) for example show that approximately one quarter of the voters who voted for a list-puller in the Dutch general elections of 2003 and 2006 actually stated to have a preference for that particular candidate[18]. If the candidate would have been lower on the list, or even on a different party list, these voters would have still voted for that candidate. So, for these voters their vote is seen as a 'party vote' and not as a preference vote, but this does not reflect what the voter intended. However, it seems that for a majority of voters the vote for a list-puller could be regarded as a true party vote. With an experiment it is possible to explore to what extent this is indeed the case by investigating how the introduction of a list vote affects the votes for list-pullers and for other candidates[19]. Furthermore, the experiment allows for an exploration of what happens if a voter prefers multiple candidates, but is only allowed to cast a vote for a single candidate.

The advantage of conducting an experiment in two countries is that it allows testing the hypotheses in two different contexts. Of course, it should be stressed that one still has to be careful when comparing the results of the experiments in both countries (this will be discussed in more detail below). Therefore, when discussing the results, the focus will be first and foremost on the effects within a country.

Conducting the experiment in two contexts and comparing their results, brings forth one limitation of the experimental design, namely that electoral system effects become real via a learning process. When introduced to new rules, respondents may stick to their voting habits and behaviour in the beginning, and only adopt and adapt to the new rules over time[20]. This may result in an underestimation of the treatment effects. Comparing the results of two countries that currently have opposing electoral rules regarding the number of votes and the option of a list vote, might provide an (tentative) insight into the extent of this underestimation.

2.3 Electoral rules and the influence on preference voting

Using an experiment to investigate the effects of electoral rules on the election outcome is in line with a recent trend. Blumenau et al. (2017), for example, study the differences between open and closed list electoral systems on party choice. They demonstrate that some voters

[18] In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies of 2010 and 2012 respondents were also asked for their reason to vote for the list-puller. The distribution of voters who cast a vote for the list-puller as support for the list-puller and the voters who did so as support for the party was stable. The percentages for the number of votes for list-pullers as support for the party are: 77% (2003), 77% (2006), 75% (2010) and 79% (2012) (source DPES 2002/2003, DPES 2006, DPES 2010 and DPES 2012).

[19] Throughout this dissertation 'other candidates' should be read as 'other candidates *than the list-puller*'.

[20] Next to this learning effect a change in the electoral rules might also have an effect on the behaviour of parties and candidates. They will also adapt to the new rules, which in turn might also affect the behaviour of the voters. These effects are not taken into account in this chapter.

who voted for a niche party in a closed list system, switch to a mainstream party under an open list system. More specifically, some Eurosceptic voters voted for UKIP under the closed list rules and switched their vote to a Eurosceptic candidate of the Conservative party under the open list rules. This move applies to approximately 6 per cent of the electorate. Other experiments were conducted as part of the 'making electoral democracy work' project (Blais, 2010). These experiments were conducted as quasi-experiments during real election campaigns, inviting people to vote under different electoral systems. The general conclusion of these experiments is that a substantial number of voters vote differently in different systems, showing that voters are responsive to changes in electoral rules (Blais et al., 2012; Laslier et al., 2015; Van der Straeten et al., 2013). Similar results can be expected in the experiment with regard to preference voting in the Belgium and the Netherlands. In particular, for the Dutch case, where some respondents get new opportunities to express their political preference, the expectation is that when these new rules are available, some Dutch voters will use the option to cast a list vote and others will choose to cast multiple preference votes.

2.3.1 The effect of a list vote

While it is interesting to see whether and to what extent voters actually make use of these new rules, the primary goal of this chapter is to study how these rules affect the type of preference votes that are cast. As stated earlier, in the Netherlands only votes for candidates on the second place on the list or lower are regarded as preference votes, because the choice for the first candidate is assumed to be a choice for the party (Andeweg, 2005, p. 494)[21]. Therefore, it is plausible that a substantial number of these voters would have cast a list vote if that option would have been available to them. It is less likely that voters who voted for other candidates, i.e. candidates from the second position on the party list onwards, switch to a list vote. In general these votes are considered as an expression of a real preference for an individual candidate and as a more sophisticated type of voting behaviour (Marsh, 1985): casting a vote for a specific candidate who is not the list-puller requires additional information about the candidates. The assumption is that these voters made a conscious choice for a specific candidate within a party, so there is no reason to expect that a substantial number of them would switch to a list vote if that option would be available. Overall, we can expect that in a situation where Dutch voters have the option to cast a list vote, this would reduce the number of votes cast for the list-puller, but not so much for other candidates. The latter is seen as an actual preference vote, whereas the former is often a reflection of support for the party.

Can different outcomes be expected if the situation is reversed: i.e. if the option to cast a list vote disappears in the Belgian case? Voters who usually cast such a list vote - and

[21] In the present experiment, all votes for individual candidates are considered to be preference votes, to distinguish them from list votes. Thus, in this chapter a vote for the list-puller in the Dutch context is always seen as a preference vote as well.

thereby accept the order of the list - need to change their behaviour if the option to cast a list vote disappears. It is most likely that especially the list-puller will profit from this. André et al. show that voters with less political interest and sophistication are more likely to cast list votes, because party labels 'act as brand names from which rationally ignorant and risk-averse voters can readily infer information about the issue positions and policy commitment of all candidates a party endorsed' (2012, p. 296). When these less sophisticated voters can no longer use the easy option of a list vote, they have to find an alternative solution. The most likely heuristic for these voters would be to rely on the ballot list position: they will cast a vote for the list-puller instead of another candidate. This bias toward the first option on a list can be interpreted as a *primacy effect* (see Brockington, 2003; Miller & Krosnick, 1998; Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016). Consequently, the expectation is that once voters can no longer cast a list vote, it is primarily the list-puller who profits, although in that case this vote does not reflect a real preference for the list-puller but a preference for the party. Giving voters more or less options of course has an effect on the other options. If an option is added, the other options are likely chosen less often. If an option is removed, the other options are chosen more often. However, in this study the main interest is to which options these votes go to. The expectations are summarized in the following two hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 2.1**: Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote are more likely to vote for the list-puller than voters who do have the option to cast a list vote.
>
> **Hypothesis 2.2**: Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote are *not* more likely to vote for other candidates than voters who do have the option to cast a list vote.

2.3.2 A single preference vote versus multiple preference votes

A major difference between the Belgian and Dutch system is the number of preference votes citizens can cast. It seems obvious to expect that the lower a candidate is placed on the list, the more he or she benefits if voters have the option to cast multiple preference votes. List-pullers will hardly be affected by the number of preference votes that may be cast.

In Belgium many voters combine a vote for the list-puller with a vote for another candidate, often a more local candidate (Wauters et al., 2004). If these voters would be forced to vote for only one candidate, one can expect that more voters drop the vote for the other candidate(s). First, previous studies have shown that candidates at the top of the list receive more preference votes (Marcinkiewicz, 2014; Miller & Krosnick, 1998). Given this tendency to vote for higher placed candidates, it is more likely that voters drop the preference for a lower placed candidate when they are forced to vote for a single candidate. Second, a bandwagon-effect could occur if citizens who can cast only one preference vote vote for the candidate who is expected to receive more votes. This could be because they

think that their vote is wasted if they vote for a lower placed candidate, who is not likely to get enough votes to get elected. When voters get the opportunity to cast more preference votes, this will benefit lower ranked candidates, because voters who usually vote for the list-puller may decide to also cast a vote for another candidate to whom they wish to give additional support. Of course some voters will drop the vote for the list-puller, or higher placed candidate, because they have a really strong preference for the lower placed candidate. But considering the electorate as a whole, the expectation is that lower placed candidates will have a greater disadvantage than higher placed candidates when the voters' choice is constrained to only one candidate. The general effect described above might be a position effect or a candidate quality effect. However, it is not the goal of this study to analyse what exactly drives the (possible) mechanism. The first step is finding out whether there is a clear pattern visible. If such a pattern would be visible, the next step would be to find the exact causes for this pattern.

The question is whether it is reasonable to expect something different for the group of voters who also have the option the cast a list vote than for the group of voters who do not have this option. The option to cast a list vote will lead to a lower number of preference votes, but it is not likely that a different pattern with regard to the type of preference votes that are cast can be observed for these two groups. This leads to the following hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 2.3**: Voters who can cast multiple preference votes are more likely to vote for other candidates than voters who can only cast a single preference vote.
> **Hypothesis 2.4**: Voters who can cast multiple preference votes are *not* more likely to vote for the list-puller than voters who can only cast a single preference vote.

2.4 Methods and data

2.4.1 General outline of the experiment

In order to test these hypotheses an experiment was conducted[22] simultaneously in Belgium (Flanders) and the Netherlands using a between-groups design. The disadvantage of a between-group design is that it is not possible to say how a specific voter changes his or her behaviour if other rules become available (or disappear). However, asking the same respondent to vote twice under different rules might have the disadvantage that the second vote is influenced either by the first, or that the respondent is more inclined to change his or

[22] Before conducting the experiment of which the results are presented here, a pilot study was conducted under first year bachelor students Political Science at Leiden University. This pilot study was set up in the same way as the experiment described in this section. Based on this pilot some changes were made. The most important one was that in the pilot party lists were used from the previous general election, resulting in variations in the length of lists per party. In the actual experiment fictional lists (with real candidates) were created with the same number of candidates on each list (this issue is discussed further in section 2.4.2).

her behaviour. Therefore, asking each respondent only once how they would vote under a given set of rules seems most appropriate. Thus, to say something about the effect of the electoral rules, different groups should be compared.

Since the effects of two institutional rules (stimuli) are tested, it was necessary to have four groups to which respondents are randomly assigned in each country (see table 2.1). Respondents in group 1 have the option to either cast a list vote or to cast a preference vote for a single candidate. Group 2 reflects the Belgian system: respondents can cast a list vote or cast a preference vote for one or multiple candidates, as long as these candidates belong to the same party. Respondents in group 3 can vote according to Dutch rules: they are forced to cast a vote for a single candidate. Finally, respondents in group 4 do not have the option to cast a list vote, but they can cast multiple preference votes.

Table 2.1 Experimental groups (both in Belgium and the Netherlands)

		Number of preference votes	
		One	Multiple
Option to cast a list vote	Yes	Group 1	Group 2 *(Belgian system)*
	No	Group 3 *(Dutch system)*	Group 4

As part of the data collection, two almost identical surveys to conduct the experiment were created, one for Dutch and one for Belgian respondents[23]. Both surveys were distributed by Survey Sampling International (SSI). This guaranteed that respondents in both countries received an identical survey with regard to layout, etc. SSI has its own panels from which respondents were selected. These panels consist of people who registered themselves[24]. The aim was to have 750 respondents for each country to participate in the experiment. As only voters for large and medium parties are taken into account (see below) a filter question was used to determine which respondents could participate in the experiment, by asking respondents for which party they would vote. Eventually, 785 respondents in the Netherlands and 788 in Belgium participated in the experiment.

In the context of an experiment the prerequisite of having a representative sample is less important than in a 'normal' survey, as long as respondents are randomly assigned to a

[23] The main difference between the surveys was that in the Netherlands Dutch parties and candidates were used, while in Belgium Flemish parties and candidates were used. Furthermore there was some variation in the explanation of the rules (see also appendix B.2).

[24] For more information about SSI, see: https://www.surveysampling.com.

treatment group. Nevertheless, in order to increase the external validity of the experiment the aim was to have representative samples. Therefore, representative quotas on key socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, region and educational level) were used. These quotas were applied to each characteristic individually, and not combined. For this study the quota on educational level is particularly important with regard to external validity, as previous studies show that political interest and knowledge are important predictors of casting a preference votes (André et al., 2012). Education is strongly related to political knowledge (e.g. Rasmussen, 2016) and is a good proxy.

The survey consisted of four parts. In the first part respondents were asked for which party they would vote if national elections were held that day. This question served as a filter to decide whether respondents would participate in the experiment or not: only respondents who said they would vote for a party were included. In addition, respondents for the smallest parties were excluded (see appendix B.1); it would have been too difficult to design a list of candidates for these parties that would have enough candidates that could be recognized by the voters. Second, respondents received an explanation of the electoral rules under which they could vote, based on the group to which they were randomly assigned[25] (see appendix B.2). After respondents had read these instructions, they proceeded to the third and main part of the survey: a ballot paper. The ballot paper they received depended on the group they were assigned to and their party choice (see section 2.4.2 for more information about the ballot papers). Finally, the fourth section contained some additional, more general questions.

The way the experiment is designed has a potential problem. Voters were only given limited information on how their votes influence the (hypothetical) seat distribution, while we know from the literature on strategic voting this could influence the decision voters take (Blais et al., 2012). However, the choice to give respondents no detailed information on what the rules meant and what their (potential) purpose is was deliberate. Giving more detailed information could have a negative effect, i.e. to prime voters in a particular direction and thereby artificially increase the use of specific options. Moreover, voters in a real polling booth also only receive a ballot paper; the rules are not explained to them. Consequently, it is possible that voters based their behaviour in the experiment on the knowledge of their own electoral system. Dutch voters and Belgian voters thus could have something different in mind while participating in the experiment. This is especially true for the introduction of the list vote in the Netherlands, since participants were only told that

[25] The time respondents spent on this page was registered. There was no manipulation check included in the survey, but the time respondents spent on (specific) parts of the experiment could be used to say something about whether the manipulation was understood by respondents. Appendix B.6 contains an analysis of these time data, which resulted in two important conclusions: 1) voters who used the option to cast a list vote or the option to cast multiple preference votes on average spent more time on the page with the explanations of voting rules than voters who did not use any of these additional options and 2) based on a comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands there is no reason to expect that this had a (large) influence on the experiment. The estimations of the effects reported are conservative at most.

with a list vote they 'support the party list as a whole'.

However, the lack of detailed information and subsequent bias towards information from their own political system are not too problematic. In the analysis the main focus will be on the results within both countries separately. In that part of the analysis the potential problem identified above is not a real problem, because it can be assumed that since voters are used to the same rules in real life there is no difference between the experimental groups in their average level of knowledge off the electoral system. With regard to the list vote for Dutch voters, it is not possible to know for certain what voters had in mind. In the conclusion of this chapter this aspect of the experiment design will be discussed.

In order to test the hypotheses, first four bivariate analyses will be presented. Using cross-tabulation tables the relationship between the electoral rules and voting for either the list-puller or other candidates will be investigated. In addition, two logistic regression analyses for each country are conducted with respectively voting for the list-puller and voting for other candidates as dependent variables. The dependent variables for both the bivariate and multivariate analyses are coded based on the type of vote that was cast by the respondent (see table 2.2). In the logistic regression models, several independent variables are included, first and foremost the two treatments: the option to cast a list vote and the option to cast multiple preference votes. Control variables are added for factors that the literature has identified as key predictors for preference voting; political interest, education and being a party member (André et al., 2012). One might also expect that the type of (preference) vote may be a result of the evaluation of the list-puller. Voters who give the list-puller of their party bad evaluations might be more likely to vote for other candidates, than voters who give the list-puller better evaluations. Therefore the model also controls for this evaluation. Respondents were asked their affection for both the party they voted for and its leader on an 11-point scale (feeling thermometer). Two dummy variables are included in the regression models: one where list-puller evaluations were lower than party evaluations and one where list-puller evaluations were higher than party evaluations. Thus, the reference category is voters who evaluated the party and its list-puller at the same level.

Table 2.2 Coding of dependent variables

Type of vote	**Dependent variable**	
	Voted for list-puller	**Voted for other candidate**
List vote	No (=0)	No (=0)
List-puller	Yes (=1)	No (=0)
List-puller and other candidate(s)	Yes (=1)	Yes (=1)
Other candidate(s)	No (=0)	Yes (=1)

2.4.2 Ballots and party lists

Each ballot paper included 20 candidates of the chosen party and, for the relevant experimental groups, also allowed voters to cast a list vote[26]. Lists of candidates were

[26] In appendix B.3 examples of these ballot papers are given.

designed with real politicians instead of fictional candidates. Although fictional candidates have the advantage that the researcher exerts more control over the experiment, it would nevertheless be problematic for the design of this study. Fictional candidates are not known by respondents and are probably more likely to drive respondents in the direction of casting a list vote or a vote for the first candidate, since they are unlikely to have a preference for candidates they do not know. The choice for real candidates ensures that, next to the party leader, each ballot paper presents a number of candidates who are known by respondents.

To increase comparability between Belgium and the Netherlands, and between political parties within each country, first a general draft list was designed that could be applied to each party, using criteria that were held constant across political parties and the two countries. Therefore, differences between political parties with regard to the overall quality and familiarity of the candidates on the ballot list would not be too large. For example, for all parties the sixth place was occupied by an incumbent MP. To design this draft list a standardized mixture of a few characteristics was used: incumbency, gender, ethnicity and region. Not only are these characteristics taken into account by real-life selectors (Gallagher, 1988; Put & Maddens, 2013), they are also predictors for the success of a candidate in terms of preference votes (e.g. Maddens et al., 2007; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). Subsequently, using this general draft list, a list of candidates was created for each party with actual politicians from that party. Two draft lists were designed: one for the larger (government) parties and one for the smaller parties included in the experiment. This made it possible to put a larger number of familiar candidates on the list of the larger parties. If a single list would have been made that would apply to all parties, this would restrict, for example, the number of members of parliament who could be included on the list since some smaller parties only have a few members of parliament.

The lists were different from what Belgian voters are used to, because respondents normally vote in a district in which each party presents a district-specific list. However, since the lists were standard to all Belgian respondents, irrespective of their district, the same ballot with candidates from all districts was presented. This was done to guarantee comparability of the experiments by avoiding that the lists presented in the Netherlands were "stronger" than in Belgium. The draft lists and identification of parties as large/small are given in appendix B.4. The specific lists of candidates for all parties are given in appendix B.5.

2.5 Results

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the experimental groups. Table 2.3 shows the distribution of the participants in the experiment across experimental groups and party choice for Belgium. In Belgium 1,163 respondents started the survey. Excluded from all analyses were 375 (32.2%) respondents who said they would vote for the PVDA[27] (n=46) or

[27] Appendix A.1 contains a list with the used party abbreviations and the full names of the parties.

another party (n=16), would cast a blank vote (n=59), would not vote (n=57), would not say or did not know what to vote (n=161) or did not answer all the relevant questions for the experiment (n=36).

Table 2.4 shows the distribution for the Dutch participants. In the Netherlands 1,247 respondents started the survey. From those respondents 462 (37.0%) did not participate in the experiment because they would vote for a party that was not included in the experiment (n=137), would cast a blank vote (n=15), would not vote (n=121), would not say or did not know what to vote (n=169) or did not answer all questions relevant for the experiment (n=20). These respondents are excluded from all analyses. The chi-square and p-value indicate that in both countries voters from different parties are distributed equally between the experimental groups.

Table 2.3 Participants in Belgian experiment

Group Party	1. List vote or single pref. vote	2. List vote or multiple pref. vote	3. Single pref. vote	4. Multiple pref. vote	Total
CD&V	16%	12%	17%	16%	15%
N-VA	31%	34%	33%	30%	32%
Open VLD	9%	13%	13%	11%	12%
sp.a	16%	15%	15%	18%	16%
Groen	12%	14%	8%	10%	11%
Vlaams Belang	16%	12%	13%	15%	14%
Total (N)	**192**	**203**	**195**	**198**	**788**

χ^2 (15) = 9.597, p = .844
Source: Own dataset.

Table 2.4 Participants in Dutch experiment

Group Party	1. List vote or single pref. vote	2. List vote or multiple pref. vote	3. Single pref. vote	4. Multiple pref. vote	Total
VVD	12%	11%	13%	16%	13%
PvdA	11%	17%	15%	7%	12%
PVV	24%	22%	25%	27%	25%
CDA	12%	12%	7%	11%	11%
SP	19%	14%	17%	19%	17%
D66	13%	10%	13%	9%	11%
GroenLinks	4%	7%	5%	6%	6%
ChristenUnie	6%	6%	4%	5%	5%
Total (N)	**197**	**195**	**183**	**210**	**785**

χ^2 (21) = 22.230, p = .386
Source: Own dataset.

Before comparing the experimental groups, it should be noted that respondents who voted under the system they are used to, vote very much in line with the actual electoral results. In group 2 (list vote or multiple preference vote), which represents the Belgian electoral system, 35 per cent of the Belgian respondents cast a list vote (see figure 2.1). This is not very different from actual election results, which normally fluctuate around 40 per

Figure 2.1 Types of votes cast

Since respondents in group 3 could only cast a single preference vote, this group is not shown.

Figure 2.2 Types of preference votes cast



cent. In group 3 (single preference vote) 33 per cent of the Dutch respondents cast a vote for another candidate than the list-puller (see figure 2.2); this is also in line with the real outcome, although slightly higher than in real elections, probably as a result of the way the party lists were designed. Familiar candidates tend to be overrepresented on these lists and even more concentrated at the top of the list. Thus, it is not surprising that a slightly higher amount of voters cast a vote for another candidate in the experiment than can be observed in real-life elections.

The first thing to be noticed when comparing between groups is that voters respond to new rules. In the Netherlands approximately 20 per cent of the respondents in group 1 (list vote or single preference vote) and 2 (list vote or multiple preference votes) - who in real life do not have the option of a list vote - cast a list vote. The same is true for the option to cast multiple preference votes. In the Netherlands 15 per cent of the Dutch respondents did cast a preference vote for multiple candidates. Thus, a substantial part of Dutch voters made use of the new options, showing that the electoral rules matters.

However, Dutch voters made less use of the option to cast a list vote and were more likely to stick to a single preference vote compared to Belgian voters, of whom approximately 40 per cent did cast a list vote or used the option to cast multiple preference votes. Additionally, when we look at how many preference votes were cast by the respondents in group 2 (list vote or multiple preference votes) and 4 (multiple preference votes) it is clear that, with the exception of the respondents who cast 20 preference votes (1 in the Netherlands and 4 in Belgium), the maximum number of preference votes that were cast was lower in the Netherlands as well. The maximum number of votes on one ballot in the Netherlands was five, while in Belgium this was 17. Even when this outlier is discarded, the number of preferences votes in Belgium on a single ballot is still higher than in the Netherlands: nine. This is confirmed by looking at the averages. In Belgium, respondents who cast a preference vote in groups 2 or 4 (in which casting multiple preference votes was allowed) on average voted for 2.7 candidates[28], in the Netherlands this was 1.3.

Having shown that electoral rules influence voting behaviour, it is time to turn to the hypotheses. Table 2.5 and table 2.6 show the effect the list vote has on voting for respectively the list-puller and other candidates. The expectation is that having a list vote negatively affects voting for the list-puller (H2.1), but does not affect voting for other candidates (H2.2). There is indeed a statistically significant and medium effect of the list vote on voting for the list-puller. In Belgium 64 per cent of the respondents who did not have the option to cast a list vote, voted for the list-puller. Only 40 per cent out of the respondents who had the option to cast a list vote, voted for the list-puller. In the Netherlands, 70 per cent of the voters without the option to cast a list vote and 57 per cent of the voters with the option to cast a list vote cast a vote for the list-puller.

[28] The average number of preference votes for the 2007 federal elections in Belgium (in Flanders) was 2.63 (Wauters & Weekers, 2008, p. 64), 2.75 in 2010 and 2.55 in 2014 (own calculations), indicating that the results of the experiment are similar to actual election results.

Table 2.5 Effect of list vote on votes for the list-puller

	Belgium χ^2 (1) = 45.905, $p < .001$; $\varphi = .241$			**The Netherlands** χ^2 (1) = 15.083, $p < .001$; $\varphi = .139$		
	List vote			List vote		
	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
Not voted for list-puller	36%	60%	48%	30%	43%	36%
Voted for list-puller	64%	40%	52%	70%	57%	64%
Total (N)	393	395	788	393	392	785

Source: Own dataset.

Table 2.6 Effect of list vote on votes for other candidates

	Belgium χ^2 (1) = 40.534, $p < .001$; $\varphi = .227$			**The Netherlands** χ^2 (1) = 7.506, $p = .006$; $\varphi = .098$		
	List vote			List vote		
	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
Not voted for other candidate	44%	66%	55%	64%	73%	68%
Voted for other candidate	56%	34%	45%	36%	27%	32%
Total (N)	393	395	788	393	392	785

Source: Own dataset.

Table 2.7 Effect of available number of preference votes on votes for list-puller

	Belgium χ^2 (1) = 1.788, p = .181 ; φ = .048			**The Netherlands** χ^2 (1) = 4.046, p = .044 ; φ = .072		
	Preference votes			Preference votes		
	Single	Multiple	Total	Single	Multiple	Total
Not voted for list-puller	51%	46%	48%	40%	33%	36%
Voted for list-puller	49%	54%	52%	60%	67%	64%
Total (N)	387	401	788	380	405	785

Source: Own dataset.

Table 2.8 Effect of available number of preference votes on votes for other candidates

	Belgium χ^2 (1) = 71.089, p < .001 ; φ = .300			**The Netherlands** χ^2 (1) = 0.864, p = .353 ; φ = .033		
	Preference votes			Preference votes		
	Single	Multiple	Total	Single	Multiple	Total
Not voted for other candidate	70%	40%	55%	70%	67%	68%
Voted for other candidate	30%	60%	45%	30%	33%	32%
Total (N)	387	401	788	380	405	785

Source: Own dataset.

Surprisingly, there is also a statistically significant, although somewhat smaller, effect of the list vote on voting for other candidates. In Belgium, from the group of voters without a list vote 56 per cent cast a vote for another candidate. In the group of voters who had the option to cast a list vote, this percentage was only 34. In the Netherlands, in the group of voters who had the option to cast a list vote, 27 per cent did vote for another candidate; nine percentage points below the percentage of voters who cast a vote for another candidate in the group without a list vote. These results refute the idea that *all* votes for other candidates are more sophisticated and more 'preferential' in nature than votes for the list-puller in situations where a list vote is not possible. In this study, we see that the list-puller and other candidates are almost equally affected by the introduction (or abolition) of a list vote[29].

With regard to the option to cast multiple preference votes, the expectation is that having multiple preference votes will benefit other candidates (H2.3). For Belgium the results are in line with the hypothesis, but the results for the Netherlands are not in line with the hypothesis (see table 2.8). In Belgium, there is a statistically significant effect of the option to cast multiple preference votes on voting for other candidates. In the group of respondents without the option to cast multiple preference votes, only 30 per cent cast a vote for another candidate. However, in the group with respondents who had the option to cast multiple preference votes 60 per cent of the respondents cast a vote for another candidate. In the Netherlands this effect was absent. The difference between voting for other candidates in the group without multiple preference votes and in the group with multiple preference votes was only 3 percentage points, a difference that is not statistically significant. When it comes to voting for list-pullers, the expectation is that the option of multiple preference votes has no effect on the number of votes cast for the list-puller (H2.4). In Belgium, there was no statistically significant effect of the number of preference votes available on votes for the list-puller. In the Netherlands the relationship between both variables was statistically significant. However, the effect was very small (see table 2.7)[30].

The effects of the list vote and the option to cast multiple preference votes are also tested using logistic regression models, which allow for the inclusion of additional variables that could influence whether voters cast a vote for a list-puller or another candidate. For each country one model predicting voting for the list-puller (table 2.9) and one model predicting voting for other candidates (table 2.10) will be presented. These models contain

---

[29] In table 2.6 and table 2.7, the other manipulation (i.e. the number of preference votes), is not taken into account. In appendix B.7 (page 170, table b.4 and table b.5) this distinction is taken into account. With one exception, the same conclusions can be drawn. Only for Dutch voters who had the option to vote for a single candidate, the effect of the list vote on voting for other candidates was not significant. However, the effect was in the same direction, so there is no reason to change the overall conclusion.

[30] In appendix B.7 (page 170, table b.6 and table b.7) the effects of the number of preference votes are also shown when the other manipulation (i.e. the list vote) is taken into account. The only difference is that for the Netherlands the effect of the number of votes on voting for the list-puller is not significant when we distinguish between those who had the option to cast a list vote and those who did not have the option to cast a list vote, which is in line with the hypothesis.

Table 2.9 Voting for the list-puller

	Belgium	**The Netherlands**
(Constant)	0.474	1.220***
	(0.259)	(0.317)
Option to cast a list vote	-1.184***	-0.462*
	(0.173)	(0.190)
Option to cast multiple preference votes	0.367*	0.115
	(0.170)	(0.190)
Political interest (Ref. = not interested)		
Somewhat interested	0.244	-0.046
	(0.192)	(0.237)
Highly interested	0.308	0.593
	(0.270)	(0.373)
Party member	0.286	-0.233
	(0.254)	(0.366)
Evaluation difference (Ref. = No difference)		
List-puller < party	-1.644***	-1.028***
	(0.238)	(0.237)
List-puller > party	0.790***	0.433
	(0.195)	(0.232)
Education (Ref. = low)		
Middle	0.008	-0.293
	(0.216)	(0.247)
High	-0.225	-1.133***
	(0.232)	(0.249)
-2LL	832.293	650.020
Cox and Snell's R^2	0.194	0.114
Nagelkerke R^2	0.259	0.154
N	713	530

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset.

Table 2.10 Voting for other candidates

	Belgium	**The Netherlands**
(Constant)	-0.771**	-1.182***
	(0.265)	(0.318)
Option to cast a list vote	-1.125***	-0.541**
	(0.172)	(0.190)
Option to cast multiple preference votes	1.387***	0.336
	(0.173)	(0.191)
Political interest (Ref. = not interested)		
Somewhat interested	0.362	0.304
	(0.195)	(0.240)
Highly interested	0.506	0.035
	(0.270)	(0.375)
Party member	0.334	0.336
	(0.249)	(0.360)
Evaluation difference (Ref. = No difference)		
List-puller < party	0.698**	0.890***
	(0.217)	(0.233)
List-puller > party	-0.418*	-0.295
	(0.197)	(0.232)
Education (Ref. = low)		
Middle	-0.043	0.236
	(0.219)	(0.246)
High	0.086	0.658**
	(0.229)	(0.247)
-2LL	836.876	651.344
Cox and Snell's R^2	0.182	0.077
Nagelkerke R^2	0.244	0.106
N	713	530

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset.

two variables that state whether a respondent had the option to cast a list vote and whether the respondent had the option to cast multiple preference votes. In addition, a number of control variables are included. These models confirm most findings of the bivariate analyses. With regard to the list vote the logistic regression models show the same pattern as the bivariate analyses: the option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the list-puller as well as other candidates. Some differences can be noticed when it comes to the effect of multiple preference votes on voting for the list-puller. While the bivariate analysis showed no effect of multiple preference votes on votes for the list-puller in Belgium, the logistic regression model (see table 2.9) shows that list-pullers also benefit when voters may cast multiple preference votes, contradicting hypothesis 2.4. For the Netherlands we conclude that the results confirm the hypothesis: there is no significant effect of having multiple preference votes on voting for the list-puller. The logistic regression models confirm that having the option to cast multiple preference votes benefits other candidates in Belgium, but not in the Netherlands (table 2.10). The difference between Belgium and the Netherlands persists when combining the cases in one model with an interaction term between the Netherlands and multiple list votes (see appendix B.8). So overall, the findings with regard to the effect of multiple preference votes are mixed. The nature of these differences will be discussed in the next section.

Most of the control variables that were included in the models were not significant. However, the variables with the comparison of the party and party leader evaluations are significant, both in Belgium and the Netherlands. Voters who gave the list-puller a higher (i.e. more favourable) evaluation than the party are more likely to cast a vote for the list-puller and voters who evaluated the list-puller lower than the party are more likely to cast a vote for another candidate. The evaluation of the list-puller might have something to do with the surprising findings with regard to the list vote also affecting voting for other candidates[31].

2.6 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter aimed at studying the extent to which electoral rules influence electoral behaviour with regard to preference voting. An experiment was conducted in order to answer this question. The focus of this experiment was not only on preference voting as such, but also on the distribution of preference votes across candidates.

The main finding is that electoral rules shape voting behaviour. Belgian voters were already used to the options of a list vote and multiple preference votes. Consequently, in the experimental groups for which these options were available many respondents also used them. For Dutch voters these options were new and about 20 per cent of the Dutch respondents made use of new options when they became available to them. A second important finding of this study is that the results show that - primarily for the Netherlands -

[31] The next chapter, which deals with the question which voters cast a preference vote, will discuss this issue.

the idea behind the distinction between a vote for the list-puller as a party vote and a vote for another candidate as a preference vote may be too strict and as such incorrect. The expectation was that in systems where a list vote is not possible many voters cast a vote for the first candidate because this is the most 'simple' option when one lacks information about the candidates. Thus, once an even simpler option becomes available in the form of a list vote it seems logical to expect that voters go for the list vote instead. For voters who cast a vote for another candidate no change was expected as this is considered to be a more sophisticated type of voting behaviour (Marsh, 1985), reflecting a 'real' preference. This expectation did not hold. Both the list-pullers and other candidates lose votes once the option to cast a list vote becomes available. Why voters who cast a more sophisticated vote in one situation switch to a 'simpler' type of vote in another situation is puzzling and raises the question whether a 'preference vote' for a list-puller and a preference vote for another candidate are as different from each other as is, especially in the Netherlands, often assumed. The hard distinction that is often made between a party vote and a preference vote, might be even more flawed than we already observed. It is not only the case that a 'party vote' could also be a preference vote (for the list-puller) (see Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2010), but a 'preference vote' (for another candidate) might also be a party vote. Finally, the results show that the benefits for lower ranked candidates as a result of the option to cast multiple preference votes only holds for Belgium.

As argued before, it is difficult to compare the results of the experiment of Belgium and the Netherlands, but it is nevertheless interesting to look at the similarities and differences. This could help to gain insight into avenues for further research. The third and fourth hypotheses, stating that other candidates benefit from the option of multiple preference votes and list-pullers do not, only receives support in Belgium. Additionally, while a substantial number of Dutch respondents make use of the option to cast a list vote or multiple preference votes, this percentage is by no means as high as the percentage of Belgian respondents using these options.

That observed differences are in line with research on electoral change. Moser and Scheiner (2012, p. 236) for example argue that effects of electoral system change are not always the same in all cases. They find that the political context of a country conditions the effect electoral rules have. The experience with democracy and the development of the party system especially determine how voters adapt to new electoral rules. With regard to the Dutch and Belgian case, it is only possible to speculate about the nature of these differences. Perhaps the Netherlands has stronger leaders on average, due to the single national district, giving voters less incentive to cast a list vote or to vote for candidates with a lower ballot list position. However, this is unlikely as in the experiment the Belgian lists were made as strong as the Dutch lists by including party leaders. The fact that the number of list votes is still higher for voters of the N-VA, which has a strong leader in Bart De Wever, goes against this explanation.

A more likely explanation is that differences can be attributed to voting habits.

Belgian respondents were familiar with the options to cast a list vote or multiple preference votes. For Dutch voters these rules were new, and consequently respondents may have stuck to their usual behaviour. This indicates that changes in the electoral system do not immediately result in changes of voting behaviour: voters need time to learn how to use the new rules. This interpretation corresponds with actual election results in Belgium. The option to cast multiple preference votes was introduced in 1995, but the option was hardly used in the elections of 1995 and 1999. In 2003 and 2007, however, the average number of votes per 'preference ballot'[32] increased (Wauters & Weekers, 2008). In 2010 this number increased again, before dropping slightly in 2014. In general an increasing use of multiple preference votes was visible. In addition, it seems to resemble the notion of habitual voting (Dinas, 2018): that voting in one election increases the chances of voting in the next election. Voting, according to this idea, is habit-forming. This contrasts the idea that voting is a consideration in terms of costs and benefits. If habits indeed seem to have an influence on the turnout, they might also have an influence on the act of voting itself. Casting a list vote, or a specific type of preference vote, might then also become a habit.

In this chapter the focus was solely on the voter, but if electoral rules would change, it is likely that parties and candidates would also change their behaviour. On top of that, Norris (2004) argues that electoral rules influence voters directly, but that voters are also influenced by the reaction of for example parties and candidates to those electoral rules. Parties will adapt their strategies on the basis of the electoral rules. If the ballot structure changes, parties will also change their strategies in order to achieve their goals. Within the context of this experiment it is not possible to make any statements about this issue, but is highly likely that such a mechanism would have additional influence on the effects of the introduction of new rules.

Further research, for example by studying first time voters, should shed more light on whether voting habits indeed can account for the differences. However, if this is the case it implies that the experimental method that is used to estimate effects of electoral rules, actually underestimates the effects found in this experiment.

The findings presented in this chapter have two important implications. First, the results suggest that preference votes might be less preferential with regard to a specific candidate than is often assumed. For systems without list votes it is often argued that whereas votes for list-pullers might not really be preferential, votes for other candidates are based on conscious decisions and are truly preferential. However, the findings of the analysis in this chapter cast doubt on this common assumption: both voters who cast a vote for the list-puller and voters who cast a vote for other candidates opted for a list vote when presented with this possibility.

The possibility that, for some voters, a list vote still contains a preference for a candidate cannot be fully excluded. It could be that they prefer candidates at the top of the

[32] A term used to distinguish cast ballots with preference votes from cast ballots with a list vote.

list and think that a list vote will help those candidates get elected. However, considering the effect sizes that are found it is unlikely that all voters who cast a list vote instead of a preferential vote think so strategically. Moreover, many voters may not be aware that by casting a list vote one technically supports the candidates at top positions. Particularly in the Dutch case, where voters are not used to these (new) rules and where not all implications of these rules were explained in the description, voters might not have been aware of the practicalities of the list vote. If this is true, the estimate of the percentage of voters who switch their vote might even be conservative. This could indicate that at least for a group of voters their preference vote might be less preferential than has often been assumed. What this discussion above all shows, is that further research is necessary to get a better understanding of the meaning of a preference vote and a better insight in the degree of preference in a so-called preference vote. The next chapter attempts to deal with this issue. However, further research should also focus on other cases to see if we can find similar results. First, it might be interesting to see whether there is a difference in effects between open and flexible list systems which allow voters to cast a party vote. It might be that the openness of the list is an additional constraint to casting a negatively motivated preference vote, next to the list vote. In addition, systems that combine compulsory candidate voting with a (more) open list system, such as Estonia and Finland, would be interesting cases. What would voters do in such systems if they have no, or only negative candidate preferences?

Second, even when being modest in comparing the results of the experiment in Belgium and the Netherlands, the fact remains that different results in both countries were found. These differences might be the result of voting habits. If this is true, it means that the effects that are found are an underestimation. In real life, and in particular over time, the results may be stronger.

3 The demand side: motivations for preference votes

3.1 Introduction

In the introduction of this book I argued that there are three factors that have an influence on preference voting. In this chapter I look at the second factor: the demand side. Or in other words: the voters who cast (or do not cast) a preference vote. The central question in this chapter is therefore which voters cast a preference vote.

Since preference voting in proportional representation systems is a relatively new field of study, expectations about who cast a preference vote sometimes contradict each other and no established set of explanations exists (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, p. 172). Different authors have tried to distinguish different sets of explanations. Katz (1985) argues that there are three explanations for preference voting: traditionalism, sophistication and mobilization. On the one hand preference voting might be associated with traditional culture and clientelism, causing those with a low level of political sophistication to cast preference votes. In this case preference votes are cast in exchange for rewards. On the other hand, the reverse may be true when preference votes are seen as a more sophisticated vote than the list vote. In this case voters with higher levels of political interest and knowledge would be more likely to cast a preference vote. Their goal is not an immediate reward, but to have a greater influence on policies than they would have if they would only vote for a preferred party. This would be especially useful if the party allows intra-party differences and competition. In addition to these two expectations, Katz argues that a third mechanism is also possible: different sub groups within a party try to mobilize as many voters as possible to support their group by casting a preference vote for candidates belonging to the sub group. Katz finds evidence for all three explanations in the Italian context, suggesting that different types of preference votes and voters exist.

Another set of explanations can be found in the study of André et al. (2013). They distinguish three models to explain why voters cast a preference vote: a resource model, an identity model and a proximity model[33]. Some of these models overlap with the models proposed by Katz (see table 3.1). The resource model assumes that voters are more likely to cast a preference vote if they have more resources, for example political knowledge, to come to an informed choice about voting for a specific candidate within a party. Therefore this model resembles the sophistication model from Katz. The second model that André et al. use to explain preference voting is the identity model. This model assumes that a voter is

[33] In an earlier study on preference votes from André et al., the identity model was not included: in that version an instrumental model was included as the third model. The assumption was that voters are more likely to cast a preference vote, as the chances increase that their preference vote would actually influence which candidates are elected (André et al., 2012). This model does not fit the context of this chapter; in the previous chapter institutional constraints were discussed. Although this specific constraint was not discussed (see also footnote 17 on page 16).

more likely to cast a preference vote for a candidate who shares certain social characteristics, and that the chances of casting a preference vote especially increase when the voter belongs to an underrepresented group. The final model from André et al. is the proximity model, which assumes that a voter is more likely to cast a preference vote if there is more proximity between voters and candidates. This model resembles the mobilization type of preference vote in the typology of Katz. However, there is a difference. In the typology of Katz it is a group of candidates who try to mobilize voters to cast a vote for candidates belonging to their group, which makes it a top-down model. The model of André et al. is more bottom-up: the voters are looking for candidates who share certain social characteristics.

Since the sophistication and resource model resemble each other, and the mobilization and proximity model resemble each other (see table 3.1), we can distinguish four models. In the next section I will discuss these models in further detail and I present the hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter.

Table 3.1 Overview of the models for preference voting of Katz and André et al.

		Katz		
		Traditionalism	Sophistication	Mobilization
André et al.	Resource		X	
	Identity			
	Proximity			X

X = Model of Katz and André et al. resemble each other.

3.2 Expectations[34]

3.2.1 The resource model

The resource model, which resembles Katz's sophistication explanation, builds on Marsh's (1985) idea that a preference vote should be seen as a more sophisticated type of vote. While party labels can 'act as brand names from which rationally ignorant and risk-averse voters can readily infer information about the issue positions and policy commitment of all candidates a party endorsed' (André et al., 2012, p. 296), such party labels do not help when a voter has to distinguish between candidates from the same party. Voting for a specific candidate[35] therefore requires more knowledge. In order to cast a preference vote a voter needs to have information about the candidates from which he or she can choose. This implies that the voter needs to have resources available to make the right choice. Therefore, it can be expected that voters who have higher education levels or who are more politically interested or involved are more likely to cast a preference vote. Indeed, political interest has a positive effect on the chances of casting a preference vote (André et al., 2012, 2013; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). Education has a positive effect in the Netherlands (Van

[34] In order to not end up with a long list of hypotheses, hypotheses within a certain category will be grouped. In table 3.2 (on page 88) an overview of the hypotheses is given, together with the (specific) variables which are used to test these hypotheses.

[35] Or, when voting for a candidate is mandatory: voting for another candidate than 'simply' the first one on the list.

Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012), but in Belgium higher educational levels alone seem to be insufficient to make a difference. In Belgium, specific political knowledge or interest is thus necessary (André et al., 2012, 2013).

> **Hypothesis 3.1:** If a voter has more resources available he or she is more likely to cast a preference vote than a voter with fewer resources.

3.2.2 The identity model

The identity model assumes that voters are more likely to cast a vote for candidates who belong to the same social group. In particular members of social groups that are traditionally underrepresented in parliament are more likely to cast a preference vote for a member of their own social group (André et al., 2013). Sharing a sociodemographic characteristic can serve as a heuristic for voters to cast such a preference vote for that candidate. Cutler (2002) shows that voters are more likely to cast a vote for a candidate if the sociodemographic distance[36] between the voter and candidate is smaller. Similar results are found by McDermott (2009), who shows that voters in US elections for the House of Representatives are more likely to cast a vote for candidates having the same group associations, although the effects of these group associations have become weaker over time. Second, casting a preference vote might be a strategic consideration for underrepresented groups to promote their interest and gain better descriptive representation (Mansbridge, 1999). Groups that are more likely to cast a preference vote are women, ethnic minorities and the younger and older age categories (André et al., 2013).

Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012) found that in the Netherlands women are slightly more likely to cast a preference vote (28%) than men (24%) in the parliamentary elections between 1998-2006. In studies on Belgium, the effects of gender are not significant (André et al., 2012, 2013). There are not many studies that have addressed the effect of membership of an ethnic minority group on preference voting. André et al. (2013) include a predictor 'non-European origin' in their models, but in Belgium this predictor has no significant influence on whether voters cast a preference vote or not. However, when distinguishing between different types of preference votes, having a non-European origin is significant: there is a significant and positive relationship between this group and preference voting for other candidates than the list-puller. Conclusions about the effect of age are contradictive: Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012) find a negative relationship, André et al. (2012) a positive relationship.

In addition, one might expect that voters from certain regions are more likely to cast a preference vote, because they feel underrepresented. In the Netherlands, for example, in some provinces one might be more inclined to cast a preference vote because one feels that the regional interest is not represented enough in 'The Hague'. Dutch MPs from 'peripheral'

[36] A term used by Cutler (2002: 469) to describe 'the degree of similarity between two persons - in this case, a voter and a candidate'.

provinces are more inclined to represent the interest of their own region, contact regional organizations and contact the government on regional interest than their colleagues from the Randstad[37] (Thomassen & Andeweg, 2004). This may be a reason for voters in there provinces to cast a preference vote, to increase the chances that their interests are represented[38].

> **Hypothesis 3.2:** A voter belonging to an underrepresented social group in parliament will be more likely to cast a preference vote than a voter from a social group that is overrepresented in parliament.

3.2.3 The proximity model

The proximity model assumes that a voter is more likely to cast a preference vote if the voter feels connected to the candidate. For example, party members would be more likely to cast a preference vote, because they could use a preference vote to support their preferred faction within the party (André et al., 2012). However, Marsh (1985, p. 372) argues that 'party attachment provides for more trust in a party and a greater willingness to permit [the party] to determine who is elected. On this interpretation, list voting is a sign of confidence in a party'. Still, according to André et al. (2012) party membership has a strong influence on the chances of casting a preference vote. In the Dutch case, however, Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012) found no evidence that party membership has an influence on preference voting, nor did they find an effect for party identification. This is in contrast with findings for Finland where a negative effect was found (Karvonen, 2011b).

Members of interest groups are also more likely to cast a preference vote to support those candidates who advocate their particular concerns. The study by André et al. (2012) is the only study in which this relationship between casting a preference vote and interest group membership is tested. They found that interest group membership had a positive influence on the chances of casting a preference vote.

Another explanation for preference votes has to do with the relationship between urbanisation and the use of preference votes. This is different from the regional background of voters mentioned previously. For regional background one expects that voters living at a greater distance from the political centre, from either rural or urban regions, are more likely to cast a preference vote. However, both in the centre and in the periphery one would expect that voters from rural areas are more likely to cast a preference vote, because they tend to have stronger connections with candidates from their region (André et al., 2012). In 1985 Marsh had to conclude that there was a lack of cross-national clarity with regard to the urban-rural dimension. In some countries preference voting seemed to be an urban phenomenon while in others it was rural (1985, pp. 369–370). More recent work shows no

[37] Defined as the provinces of Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Utrecht (see Thomassen & Andeweg, 2004).

[38] The relevance of regional background of voters and candidates will be discussed at length in the next chapter (see section 4.4.2).

conclusive evidence either. Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012) found no linear relationship between urbanization and casting a preference vote at national elections in The Netherlands.

The general idea behind the proximity model is that voters who feel closer to a (group of) candidate(s) are more likely to cast a preference vote.

> **Hypothesis 3.3:** Voters who feel closer to a particular (group of) candidate(s) are more likely to cast a preference vote than voters who do not feel close to a particular (group of) candidate(s).

3.2.4 Negative motivations: the effect of the first candidate on the list

So far, the explanations in the literature mainly focus on positive effects of both candidates and voters. Voters have certain resources available that enable them to make an informed decision to cast a preference vote, or voters are *attracted* by a character trait or other characteristic of the candidate they vote for. The preference vote therefore has a positive character; voters are pulled towards a candidate. However, a vote does not necessarily have to be a sign of support, although this is what is normally assumed in studies on voting behaviour (Catt, 1996). There is therefore little attention for possible negative motivations which (could) play a role in voting behaviour. There is one area in which negative motivations receive attention, namely when it comes to economic voting. The idea is that voters either reward or *punish* the government based on the economic situation (Duch & Stevenson, 2008).

In this section I consider a negative motivation for preference voting, based on an evaluation of the first candidate on the list. According to King (2002, pp. 4–6), leaders of political parties can either have a direct or an indirect effect on voters. If leaders have an indirect effect, they influence how voters evaluate the political party, which in turn influences the chances of voting for that party. A direct effect occurs when the leader evaluations directly influence the chances of voting for the party of the leader.

According to some authors, a direct effect of leaders of political parties can be observed in the Netherlands. Anker (1992, chapter 5) for example discusses push and pull effects of party leaders for the electoral fortune of their parties in the Dutch parliamentary elections of 1986 and 1989. By comparing the actual vote with the normal vote[39] he shows that when voters evaluate party leaders negatively or as unsympathetic, they are 'pushed' away from that party. In other words, out of those voters who evaluate a leader as unsympathetic, fewer voters actually cast a vote for the party of that leader than would be expected on the basis of the normal vote. On the other hand, when voters have more positive feelings towards the party leader, the reversed is visible. A larger number of voters actually vote for a party if they have high sympathy scores for the leader than would be

[39] The normal vote can be seen as a hypothetical situation in which election specific effects are filtered out. The normal vote thus represents a baseline election result.

expected on the basis of the normal vote: they are 'pulled' towards the party via the party leader. Similar results can be found in the work of Rosema (2004, 2006), who shows that voters are more likely to cast an insincere vote[40] when the leader of the voter's most positively evaluated party is negatively evaluated. In addition, if leaders of other parties than the most preferred party, are evaluated more positively compared to the leader of the most preferred party, the chance of an insincere vote increases[41].

What these studies show is that the evaluation of a party leader influences the electoral decision of a voter. Based on the work of Hirschman (1970) it is possible to see three strategies for voters who evaluate the leader of their preferred party negatively: exit, voice or loyalty. Voters could still vote for the list-puller despite the negative evaluation (stay loyal) or they could vote for another party (exit). The exit strategy fits the interparty competition. However, the last strategy (voice) may be a strategy that fits the intraparty competition. In this case a push effect for the list-puller could lead to an increase in the number of votes for other candidates. In the Netherlands, this would mean an increase in preference votes. Voters with negative feelings towards the list-puller, instead of voting for another *party*, would vote for another *candidate* within the party.

The voting behaviour for the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) in 2002 and 2003 might be an illustration of this effect. In 2002 the PvdA list was headed by Ad Melkert. Two months before the national elections local elections were held. On the election night of the local elections a debate was organized with the parties' national leaders to. Melkert - according to public opinion - acted as a 'poor loser' (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003, p. 46) after a large victory of newcomer Fortuyn in the city of Rotterdam. Melkert could not get rid of this image, remained one of the most unpopular leaders[42] and after a crushing defeat in the national elections of 2002 (the PvdA lost half of its seats) he resigned on election night (Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2004; Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). The PvdA did not only lose many seats, many voters for the party cast a preference vote: 44.1 per cent. This was much more than the overall percentage of preference votes: 27.1.

Melkert was succeeded by Wouter Bos, who won an internal leadership election. Bos was seen as a 'new, young, dynamic and 'charismatic' leader' (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2004, p. 158) and 'emerged as the new star in Dutch politics and thereafter dominated the campaign' (Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2004, p. 555). Under his leadership the party quickly recovered and, only eight months after the 2002 election when new (early) elections were

[40] Rosema defines a sincere vote as a vote for the party that is evaluated most positively by the voter (2006, p. 473). An insincere vote is a vote for another party than the one that is evaluated most positively.

[41] Van Wijnen (2000) also shows that candidate evaluations have an (increasing) impact on party voting, although his research was criticized for omitting important variables (i.e. the relationship between the evaluation of the party and the evaluation of the leader of a party) (Aarts, 2001). When party evaluations are taken into account, there is no increasing impact of evaluations of party leaders.

[42] Even before the elections, there were discussions within the party about replacing Melkert after the elections. There were even suggestions to withdraw Melkert and to put forward Wim Kok (at that time the prime minister) for another term as prime minister, in case the PvdA would win the elections (Koole, 2009).

held, the PvdA became the second largest party. In addition, only 17.1 per cent of the voters of the PvdA cast a preference vote. Whether this example is an exceptional case, or whether evaluations of the list-pullers have a more general influence on preference voting will be tested with the following hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 3.4:** If a voter, prior to the elections, gives lower evaluations to the first candidate (list-puller) on the list, he or she is more likely to cast a vote for another candidate, i.e. a preference vote.

However, this expectation suggests that a voter does not have any other options than voting for another candidate if he or she does not want to vote for the first candidate on the list. Of course, this is not the case for each electoral system. In Belgium voters have the option to cast a list vote. Thus, if a Belgian voter has a negative feeling towards the first candidate on the list, but no specific preference for another candidate on that list, the voter has another option: to cast a list vote. Therefore, I expect that in addition to hypothesis 3.4:

> **Hypothesis 3.5:** Hypothesis 3.4 only holds if the electoral system forces a voter to vote for a candidate, and not if the electoral system allows the voter to cast a list vote.

Table 3.2 Overview of expectations for the demand side

Model	Categories	H	Expectation
Resources	Education	3.1	+
	Political interest	3.1	+
	Internal efficacy	3.1	+
	Political knowledge	3.1	+
Traditionally underrepresented group	Age	3.2	+
	Women	3.2	+
	Region	3.2	+
	Non-western origin	3.2	+
Feeling closer towards a certain group of candidates	Urbanization	3.3	+
	Member political party	3.3	+
Negative motivations	Negative evaluation first candidate on the list	3.4/.3.5	+ (NL) ~ (BE)

Note: + positive effect on preference voting; ~ no effect on preference voting.

3.3 Methods and data

3.3.1 Methods and data for the Netherlands

The data for the analysis of the Dutch case come from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES)[43]. Different datasets were combined into one dataset for the analyses in this chapter. The starting point was the DPES integrated file 1970-2006 (Todosijevic et al.,

[43] For more information see: http://www.dpes.nl/.

2010), to which cases from the DPES 2010 and DPES 2012 were added[44]. In the 1970-2006 integrated file, not all variables from the original studies were included. However, some of the excluded variables were relevant for this study. Therefore, these variables were included again in the dataset for the years 1998, 2002, 2003 and 2006 for the analysis in this chapter. These variables were taken from the DPES 1998, DPES 2002/3 and DPES 2006.

With the constructed dataset two analyses were conducted. First, tot test hypothesis 3.4, I study the motivations respondents had for casting a preference vote for the election years 2002 until 2012. From the DPES of 2002 onwards respondents receive a question about their most important reason for casting a preference vote. One of the answer options is 'other reason' and if people gave that answer they were asked to describe their motivation in their own words. For these motivations two things are coded: 1) if that motivation contains a (negative) evaluation of the list-puller and 2) whether a reason is given to vote for the specific candidate he or she chose instead. Studies have shown that studying open answers might result in valuable results (see for example André et al., 2015; Van Holsteyn, 1994).

In the 1998 DPES the reason for casting a preference vote was asked in a slightly different way. In 1998 voters were asked if they voted for another candidate 1) because it was the first woman on the list, 2) the candidate was a well-known person or 3) for another reason. These reasons from the third category were coded in different categories, including categories that include a (negative) evaluation of the list-puller of the party. The results for the 1998 election will therefore be discussed separately.

Next, a logistic regression analysis was conducted. The dependent variable for this logistic regression analysis is whether a voter cast a preference vote (coded 1) or not (coded 0). Table 3.3 shows the percentage of respondents who said they cast a preference vote, compared with the actual percentage of preference votes. In general, the reported preference votes resemble the actual preference votes rather well. While there is a slight overrepresentation of voters who said they did cast a preference vote, the reported preference votes follow the trend of the actual preference votes.

A number of independent variables are included to test the hypotheses. These variables are education, political interest, whether the respondent thinks he or she is qualified for politics, political knowledge, age, gender, region, ethnicity, urbanisation and party membership (see table 3.2). Whether the respondent thinks he or she is qualified for politics is used to test the effect of internal political efficacy. In most waves of the DPES this variable is a scale made up of different questions. However, the qualified for politics question is the only question that was asked in all DPES between 1998 and 2012. In order to make the variable comparable between all studies, this is the only question used in the analysis. Furthermore, as control variables dummies are included for parties and election

[44] While in other parts of this dissertation the Dutch elections of 2017 are included in the analysis, at the time of writing this chapter the DPES 2017 was not yet available and therefore this election is not included in the analysis in this chapter.

Table 3.3 Reported and actual preference votes (the Netherlands)

Year	Reported preference votes	Actual preference votes
1998	23.5%	20.5%
2002	32.0%	27.1%
2003	25.6%	18.5%
2006	24.1%	22.8%
2010	15.9%	15.9%
2012	19.4%	19.0%
Total	23.0%	20.6%

Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 2010; DPES 2012 (reported preference votes, unweighted); own calculations based on official election results (actual preference votes)

years. For parties a dummy is included indicating whether the party is a traditional or new party; research for Belgium has shown that voters for traditional parties cast more preference votes (Wauters et al., 2016)[45] [46]. In addition the number of candidates on the list of the party of choice is included. Research has shown that an increase in the number of candidates from which a voter can choose leads to a decrease in the likelihood of casting a preference votes, arguably since the larger the choice set the harder the decision for which candidate to vote (André & Depauw, 2017)[47]. With the exception of age and the number of candidates on a list, for all these variables dummies for the different categories are included. In appendix C.2 descriptive statistics for these variables are given. This appendix also shows the different answering categories for all variables for which dummies were created and which categories were used as reference category.

To test hypothesis 3.4 measurements of the evaluation of the list-puller are included. Based on the evaluations of parties and political leaders given by the respondents two variables were created to test the effect of leadership evaluations on preference voting. The variables 'sympathy score for party' and 'sympathy score for leader' contain the evaluations of the party and of the leader from the political party for which the respondent voted respectively. In appendix C.1 an overview is given for the parties included in the analysis, and the name of the list-puller. In the DPES from 2006 and 2012 the evaluation scores were asked in the wave after the elections. To make sure that the evaluation scores are not influenced by the behaviour of the respondents we are interested in (casting a preference vote or not), these two elections are excluded from this analysis. The first variable that is included in the analysis to test the leadership evaluation hypothesis (H3.4) is the evaluation score of the list-puller of the party a respondent voted for. A second variable was created containing the difference between the evaluation score of the list-puller and of the party for

[45] PvdA, VVD, CDA, D66, SGP, GPV and RPF are considered to be traditional parties. GroenLinks, SP, ChristenUnie, LPF, PVV and Partij voor de Dieren are considered to be new parties.

[46] Other party effects will be discussed in the next chapter.

[47] André and Depauw (2017) use the number of candidates of all parties for which a voter can vote, but since the starting point of this dissertation is that a candidate choice comes after party choice, I only count the number of candidates on the list of the party for which a respondent voted.

which the respondent voted. If this variable takes a positive value this means that a respondent gives the leader of a party a better evaluation than the party itself. A negative value means that the respondent gave the list-puller a lower evaluation than the party. In the case that the respondent has evaluated the list-puller and the party the same this variable takes the value 0.

The distributions of these evaluation scores are shown in figure 3.1. The distributions of the scores for the party and list-puller are negatively skewed. This is not surprising, since the scores are for the party for which the respondent voted. Still, we see that both the evaluation score of the party and the list-puller cover the entire range (from very unsympathetic (0) to very sympathetic (10))[48]. The party for which a respondent voted on average receives an evaluation score of 7.5 (SD 1.58). The list-puller of the party for which a respondent voted receives on average an evaluation score of 7.4 (SD 1.67). While we know that the evaluation of a party and the evaluation of its leader are highly correlated (see for example Aarts, 2001), some voters gave different scores to a party and the leader. The average difference between the evaluation score of the party and the list-puller is -0.12 (SD 1.44); of the respondents 41 per cent gave the party and the list-puller of that party for which he or she voted the same score.

Figure 3.1 Distribution evaluation scores list-puller, party and difference



[48] Up to and including the 2003 study, respondents were asked to evaluate parties and leaders on a scale ranging from 0 until 100. These scores were recoded to a 0-10 scale (see for further information and coding scheme Todosijevic et al., 2010, pp. 98–112).

3.3.2 Methods and data for Belgium

For Belgium motivations for a vote for a specific candidate of respondents in the PartiRep 2014 election study will be analysed (Deschouwer et al., 2015; PARTIREP, 2014). In this study respondents were asked for which candidates they voted if they did not cast a list vote. In the Belgian federal elections of 2014, 57 per cent of the voters did cast (at least one) preference vote. In the PartiRep Election Study slightly fewer respondents said they did cast a preference vote: 50 per cent. Belgian voters may cast multiple candidate votes. If respondents did cast more than one preference vote, they were asked to motivate the vote for their most preferred candidate. Again, for these motivations two things are coded: 1) whether that motivation contains a (negative) evaluation of the candidate at the top of the list and 2) whether a reason is given for the candidate who is chosen instead. It is important to notice that in the Belgian system not all voters have the option to cast a vote for the party leader, since they can only participate in one district[49]. However, it is not necessarily the effect of the electoral leader we are interested in, but the effect of the first candidate on the list. Therefore, the motivations will be studied to see if negative evaluations are given with respect to the *first candidate* on the list of the party the respondent could vote for.

Subsequently, a logistic regression model was conducted to test which voters are more likely to cast a preference vote. Unfortunately, the PartiRep election study contains no questions about evaluations for leaders of political parties. Therefore, it is not possible to also test hypothesis 3.4 and 3.5 using a logistic regression model based on the PartiRep data[50]. However, it is possible to test the first three hypotheses.

The dependent variable refers to whether a respondent did cast a preference vote. Note that a preference vote in Belgium is different than in the Netherlands. Since voters in Belgium have the option to cast a list vote all votes on a candidate are considered as preference votes. Whether a respondent did cast one or multiple preference votes does not make a difference for our purpose. Thus, the dependent variable measures whether a respondent did cast a vote for at least one candidate.

Several independent variables are included: education, political interest, political knowledge, age, gender and party membership (see also table 3.2)[51]. In addition also for Belgium the number of candidates on the party list and whether the respondent did cast a vote for a traditional or newer party is included[52]. In appendix C.2 the answer categories for the different variables are shown; some descriptive statistics are included as well.

The absence of evaluation scores for list-pullers / political leaders in the PartiRep 2014 election study is unfortunate, but not fatal for the analysis of this chapter. The dataset

[49] In general, the party chairman is considered the electoral leader (see also Wauters et al., 2016, p. 7).

[50] In other election studies for Belgium which are known / available to me, no evaluation scores for political leaders are available either.

[51] Since I use excising election studies in this chapter for Belgium and the Netherlands, it was not possible to create two identical models for Belgium and the Netherlands. This may be considered to be a shortcoming, but it is more useful to have slightly different models than two identical models with fewer variables.

[52] Coded as traditional parties are: CD&V, open VLD, sp.a, PS, MR and cdH.

is very valuable in the sense that motivations for preference votes are well documented, which makes it possible to test the fourth and fifth hypotheses of this chapter. Moreover, based on the data collected for the experiment described in the previous chapter it is possible to conduct a logistic regression analysis which resembles the one conducted for the Netherlands. However, since this experiment was conducted only in Flanders and was not designed to be a comprehensive study on real election behaviour, we have to be careful in drawing conclusions from the analysis.

A logistic regression analysis was performed using all respondents from the first and second group of the experiment; i.e. those respondents who had the option to cast a list vote. The dependent variable for this analysis is whether a voter did cast a preference vote. The independent variables which are included are: education, political interest, whether the respondents thinks he or she is qualified for politics, age, gender, party membership, whether the respondent did cast a vote for an traditional party, the evaluation score for the list-puller and the difference between the evaluation score for the list-puller and the party.

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Preference voting in the Netherlands

In the Dutch elections held between 1998 and 2012 on average approximately 20 per cent of the voters cast a preference vote. Preference voting in the Netherlands peaked in 2002, when 27.1 per cent of the voters cast a preference vote (see also section 1.2)[53]. Table 3.4 shows the reasons respondents of the DPES gave for casting such a preference vote. The most important reason to cast a preference vote is that the candidate is a woman. For each election approximately one third of the preference votes are cast because the candidate voted for is a woman. The fact that a candidate comes from the same region is for many voters another important reason to cast a preference vote[54]. In the election study of 1998 the question consisted of fewer categories, and this may explain why in 1998 the percentage of voters who said their reason was that they knew the candidate personally was much higher. Since the question in the study of 1998 only had two predefined answers (see section 3.3.1) and 'did know the candidate personally' was one of them, the higher percentage might be explained by more methodological reasons. For a quarter of voters the qualities or the interest the candidate represented was an important reason to cast a preference vote. All these reasons suggest a 'pull' mechanism: the candidate for whom the preference vote is cast is in one way or another interesting and attractive for the voter.

It is interesting to see how these reasons for casting a preference vote relate to the

[53] In the 2017 election, which is not included in the analysis in this chapter, this 'record' was almost broken, when 27.0 per cent of the voters cast a preference vote.

[54] Whether this is true for all voters, or for a (geographically) specific part of the electorate will be discussed later in this chapter, when the results of the logistic regression analysis are presented. Moreover, the issue of regional candidates will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, see section 4.4.2.

Table 3.4 Reasons for casting a preference vote

Reason	1998[1]	2002	2003	2006	2010	2012
It is a woman	31%	33%	41%	30%	35%	37%
It is a man		3%	2%			
Someone I know personally	23%	3%	7%	4%	5%	4%
Someone who represents certain interests	6%	8%	7%	12%	5%	8%
Someone from this neighbourhood/region[2]	10%	7%	12%	9%	14%	19%
It is a good candidate	18%	25%	17%	22%	11%	8%
He/she is from an ethnic minority			1%			
Negative about first candidate	11%					
Other reason	5%	20%	15%	23%	30%	24%
Total (N)	353	476	307	519	315	270

[1] In 1998 some respondents gave multiple reasons, therefore the percentages do not add up to 100.
[2] This category combines answers with any reference to a specific area the candidate comes from. This can be the same neighbourhood, municipality, a wider region or province.
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 1998; DPES 2010; DPES 2012.

Table 3.5 Gender and casting a preference vote because the candidate is a woman

	Gender		
Reason for preference vote	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
Other reason	87.7%	60.7%	72.6%
It is a woman	12.3%	39.3%	27.4%
Total (N)	1197	1511	2708

χ^2 (1) = 245.533, p < .001; φ = .301

Table 3.6 Gender and casting a preference vote because the candidate is a man

	Gender		
Reason for preference vote	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
Other reason	98.2%	96.5%	97.2%
It is a man	1.8%	3.5%	2.8%
Total (N)	331	452	783

χ^2 (1) = 2.087, p < .149; φ = .052
Period: 2002-2003.

Table 3.7 Region and casting a preference votes because someone is from this region

	Region				
Reason for preference vote	**North**	**East**	**West**	**South**	**Total**
Other reason	82.3%	91.0%	96.6%	83.9%	90.8%
Someone from this neighbourhood	17.7%	9.0%	3.4%	16.1%	9.2%
Total (N)	361	565	1199	583	2708

χ^2 (3) = 112.513, p < .001; φ = .204

variables presented in the hypotheses in this chapter, to get an idea of how plausible the hypotheses are. Because of data limitations, it is not possible to relate all the answer options to one of the variables, but three reasons can be linked to the variables. First, it is possible to check whether there is a relationship between gender and the reason 'It is a woman' (table 3.5). Almost 40 per cent of female voters (who cast a preference vote), said they cast a preference vote for a candidate because that candidate was a woman. For male voters, this percentage was much lower (12 per cent). This relationship is statistically significant, and represents a medium effect. In table 3.6 the relationship between gender and casting a preference vote because the candidate is a man is shown. The table shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between both variables. These two findings support the idea behind hypothesis 3.2, as women are underrepresented in politics and underrepresented groups are, according to the hypothesis, more likely to cast a preference vote.

We now look at the relationship between the region and stating 'someone from this neighbourhood' as the reason for casting a preference vote (see table 3.7). We would expect that, based on the logic behind H3.3, voters from the western region are less likely to cast a preference vote based on this reason than voters from the other regions. This is indeed what the table shows, since out of the respondents from the west only 4.4 did report this reason, while in the north, west and south this reason was given by respectively 17.7, 9.0 and 16.1 per cent of the voters who cast a preference vote. This is a statistically significant, but relatively small effect.

A substantial number of respondents said they had other reasons to cast a preference vote, ranging from 5 per cent in 1998 to 30 in 2010 (see table 3.4). The reasons these voters gave were coded and analysed. For each motivation two things were coded: whether the motivation for the preference vote included a negative evaluation of the list-puller, and whether or not the voter gave a reason for voting for a specific other candidate instead.

In table 3.8 the results of the analysis of the motivations are reported, which shows that a substantial number of voters had negative reasons to cast a preference vote in each election, ranging from 4.2 per cent of the voters who cast a preference vote in 2003 to 9.4 per cent in 2010. For some voters the reason was simply that they disliked the list-puller or did not think the list-puller was a good candidate. Others said that the list-puller already received enough votes, so they voted for another candidate. The majority of these voters only gave the reason they did not vote for the list-puller. Some voters who explicitly mentioned they did not want to vote for the list-puller also gave a reason why they voted for the other candidate. However, this group was much smaller. Of those voters who did cast a preference vote motivated by negative evaluations of the list-puller, approximately one out of every five respondents gave a reason why they did cast a vote for the other candidate.

The estimate of the percentage of negative preference votes is probably conservative, for several reasons. Since not all respondents answered the open part of the question, it might be that other respondents were also motivated by negative evaluations of the list-

Table 3.8 The negative preference vote

Year	Against list-puller without motivation for other candidate	Against list-puller with motivation for other candidate	Total
2002	4.8	1.4	6.2
2003	3.9	0.3	4.2
2006	4.9	1.1	6.0
2010	6.8	2.5	9.4
2012	7.0	0.7	7.7
Total	5.3	1.3	6.6

Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 2010; DPES 2012

puller, but gave their secondary reason for voting for another candidate in the first question. This interpretation is supported by what is found for 1998. In the 1998 DPES respondents only got two options in the multiple choice question, and as a result many more respondents answered the open question. For 11 per cent of the respondents who gave a reason for casting a preference vote the evaluation of the list-puller was the reason for casting a vote for another candidate (see table 3.4). This percentage is higher than any percentage in table 3.8, and fits the suggestion that the estimates in table 3.8 are rather conservative. The conclusion is that in the Netherlands, given the obligatory candidate vote, a small part of what is called a preference vote is in fact a vote against the list-puller or motivated by a negative evaluation of the list-puller, rather than a vote in favour of the other candidate.

In table 3.9 the relationship between the evaluation of the list-puller and casting a preference vote is further explored. The table shows how respondents in the DPES evaluated the list-puller of the party they voted for on a scale ranging from 0 (very unsympathetic) to 10 (very sympathetic) and whether they cast a vote for the list-puller or a preference vote. It shows, in line with previous results, that voters who gave the list-puller lower evaluations are more likely to cast a preference vote. Out of those who give their party's list-puller an evaluation score below 7, more than 30 per cent cast a preference vote. This is much more than among voters who evaluate the list-puller with the maximum score. Within this group only 14 per cent cast a preference vote.

The same analysis was conducted per party (results not shown here). In general, these separate analyses did not show different results. For the biggest parties (CDA, VVD, PvdA and D66) the results were similar and also highly significant. However, some

Table 3.9 Evaluation score list-puller and casting a preference vote

	Evaluation score											
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
LP	56	75	70	65	62	68	68	76	80	84	86	77
PV	44	26	30	35	38	32	32	25	20	16	14	23
Total (N)	18	47	53	80	175	500	883	1707	1994	1262	511	7230

LP = Vote for list-puller; PV = Preference vote. χ^2 (10) = 168.020, $p < .001$
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 2010; DPES 2012.

differences should be noted. For some parties the effect was visible, but not significant (GroenLinks, ChristenUnie). For four parties there did not seem to be a negative correlation between the evaluation of the list-puller and whether voters cast a preference vote: PVV, LPF, SP and SGP[55]. Three of these parties are seen as populist parties (PVV, LPF and SP) (Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007), often characterized as parties with strong leaders (e.g. Taggart, 2004, p. 276), which might explain the absence of any effect in these parties.

In the remaining part of this section the results of the logistic regression models are discussed in order to see if the relationship between the evaluation of the list-puller and casting a preference vote remains intact when included in a model with other explanatory factors. Table 3.10 shows the result of the logistic regression model for the elections between 1998 and 2010[56]. Ideally, political knowledge, party membership and ethnicity would also be included in this model, but these variables are not included in all DPES. Three additional models are therefore presented in appendix C.3 which each include one additional variable: with political knowledge (Table C.3, page 178), with ethnicity (Table C.4, page 179) and with party membership (Table C.5, page 180). All tables contain one model without (model 1) and one model with (model 2) the evaluation scores of the list-puller[57]. The interpretation of effect sizes based on a logistic regression table is not always straightforward. Therefore, for each independent variable the change in the predicted probability of casting a preference vote was calculated with the effects package for R (Fox, 2003) when that independent variable would take its minimum value and its maximum value, while keeping all other variables at their mean (for interval-ratio variables) or modus (for dummy variables).

Hypothesis 3.1 states that voters who have more resources available are more likely to cast a preference vote. Variables measuring the levels of education, political interest, internal efficacy and political knowledge are therefore included, and a positive effect for all these variables is expected. This expectation is empirically supported. Voters with higher levels of education are more likely to cast a preference vote. I estimate that those with the highest level of education have approximately an 11 percentage points higher predicted probability of casting a preference vote than those with the lowest level of education. Political interest also has a significant effect in the model presented in table 3.10. For voters with the highest level of political interest the predicted probability of casting a preference vote increases with 8 percentage points, compared to those with the lowest levels of political

[55] These differences could also have a methodological reason, since there are fewer observations for these smaller parties. While 22 combinations are possible, many cells for these parties have no observations and a low expected count, which is problematic. Therefore, the analysis was also redone by making a dummy of the evaluation scores (with an evaluation score of 6 as cut-off point). This did not make a difference in the results.

[56] The elections of 2006 and 2012 are not included, see also section 3.3.1.

[57] In this section primarily the results of the models in table 3.10 will be discussed, complemented by the results of the three specific variables in the models from the appendix. The effects of the variables in the appendix also presented in table 3.10 will only be mentioned if there are notable differences between the model presented in this chapter and in the appendix. If not, the reader may assume there are no differences.

Table 3.10 Preference voting in the Netherlands

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
(Constant)	-1.742***	(0.300)	-1.304***	(0.342)
Education (Ref. = Elementary)				
(Lower) Vocational	0.220	(0.172)	0.234	(0.177)
Secondary	0.275	(0.168)	0.323	(0.172)
Middle level vocational, higher level secondary	0.571***	(0.162)	0.614***	(0.166)
Higher level vocational, University	0.650***	(0.156)	0.695***	(0.161)
Political interest (Ref. = 0 (Low))				
1	-0.081	(0.186)	-0.016	
2	0.133	(0.190)	0.195	(0.194)
3	0.287	(0.193)	0.374	(0.198)
4 (High)	0.429*	(0.205)	0.568**	(0.211)
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)				
Disagree	0.145	(0.084)	0.177*	(0.086)
Agree	0.258**	(0.097)	0.289	
Fully agree	0.598**	(0.173)	0.630***	(0.175)
Age	-0.010***	(0.002)	-0.008***	(0.002)
Woman	0.386***	(0.067)	0.378***	(0.068)
Living outside *Randstad*	0.130	(0.074)	0.139	
Urbanization (Ref. = Very strongly urban)				
Strongly urban	-0.301**	(0.105)	-0.323**	(0.107)
Mildly urban	-0.303**	(0.113)	-0.326**	(0.115)
Hardly urban	-0.318**	(0.115)	-0.344**	(0.116)
Not urban	-0.190	(0.122)	-0.213	
Candidates on list	0.010**	(0.003)	0.010***	(0.003)
Party old	0.135	(0.114)	0.070	(0.116)
Evaluation score list-puller			-0.101***	(0.023)
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score party			-0.213***	(0.027)
-2LL	5986.856		5809.554	
Cox and Snell's R2	0.049		0.079	
Nagelkerke R2	0.074		0.118	
N	5697		5697	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Election dummies are included in model, but not presented here. The elections of 2006 and 2012 are excluded from the model.
Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 1998; DPES2002/03; DPES 2010;.

interest. However, in only one of the six models in the appendix the effect is also significant. Therefore, the support for the expectation that political interest has a positive influence on preference voting in the Netherlands is not very strong. The effect for internal efficacy, i.e. whether a voter considers him- or herself qualified for politics, is approximately of the same size as the effect of education. Those who fully agree that they are qualified for politics have a 12 per cent higher predicted probability of casting a preference vote than those who fully disagree with that statement. The effect of political knowledge is smaller, but the effect is statistically significant: those with the highest level of knowledge have an increased chance of 8 percentage points to cast a preference vote compared to those with the lowest level of knowledge. These are quite large effects, given the fact that approximately 20 per cent of the Dutch voters cast a preference vote. The resource hypothesis s therefore convincingly supported by the data.

According to hypothesis 3.2 underrepresented groups are more likely to cast a preference vote. For age, we indeed find that younger voters are more likely to cast a preference vote. In addition we expect that women, voters coming from another part of the country than the *Randstad* and voters with a non-Dutch origin are more likely to cast a preference vote. The expectation from hypothesis 3.2 is supported for women. Women have a 7 per cent higher predicted probability than men to cast a preference vote. Not all expectations are supported. For those living outside the *Randstad* the chances of casting a preference votes increases with 2 percentage points. However, this finding is not statistically significant, although in most models the p-value is only slightly above the conventional .05 level[58]. In addition, voters with a non-Dutch background are not significantly more likely to cast a preference vote. For those with a non-western background the coefficient in the model is even negative, suggesting that they are less likely to cast a preference vote. Yet, this finding is only based on only one edition of the DPES, and further research on the use of preference votes by ethnic minorities is necessary. Overall the hypothesis that traditionally underrepresented groups are more likely to cast a preference vote is empirically supported.

We also expect that voters who had close 'contact' or at least are more familiar with candidates are more likely to cast a preference vote (hypothesis 3.3). Therefore, we expect that those living in rural areas are more likely to cast a preference vote because the chance that they come in contact with a candidate from their neighbourhood is higher. With regard to this impact or urbanisation we find something else than expected. It seems that voters living in the most urban and the most rural areas are more likely to cast a preference vote. Furthermore, we expect that party members have a higher chance of casting a preference vote, based on the assumption that they have more contacts within the party and are more likely to know a candidate. The probability that members of a political party cast a

[58] It should be noted that a further exploration of which voters outside the *Randstad* are more likely to cast a preference vote (results not presented here) shows that, especially those in the North and South of the country are more likely to cast a preference votes. Voters in the east of the country are not significantly more likely to cast a preference vote than those living in the *Randstad*.

preference vote increases by 6 percentage points, compared to the probability of a voter who is not a member of a party. However, we should be careful with drawing this conclusion, since the coefficient is slightly above the .05 significance level in model 1 and the significance level is just below the .05 level in model 2 (see table c.5). The evidence for hypothesis 3.3 is therefore not very strong.

The models contain two control variables, one for the number of candidates on the party list and one for separating established from newer parties. Since they are control variables we have to be cautious to causally interpret them, but the length of the list seems to have a very small positive effect on preference voting, contrary to what was expected. The expectation was that too much choice would let voters to abstain from casting a preference vote. Instead, the result seems to suggest that more choice leads to higher probabilities of casting a preference vote. However, the effect is not significant in all models and is only very small. With respect to party age, voters for traditional parties are indeed more likely to cast a preference vote (an increase of 4 per cent), but this effect is neither statistically significant nor consistent across all models.

In each table a second model is presented as well which includes the affect or evaluation score a voter gave the list-puller of the party he or she voted for, and the difference between the evaluation score of the party and the list-puller. The inclusion of the two evaluation variables results in a significant improvement of the model ($\chi^2 = 201.720$, df = 2, $p < .001$)[59]. In addition, the inclusion of the evaluation scores hardly has an effect on the other variables included in the model. In all models the two evaluation variables are highly statistically significant, and for both variables the effect is also substantial. The effect of the evaluation score of the list-puller is also presented in figure 3.2. The figure shows the effect of the evaluation score of the list-puller on the probability to cast a preference vote, when all other variables remains at their mean or (for categorical variables) at their modal value. The difference between the evaluation of the list-puller and the party is kept constant at 0 in this figure, because that is the only score on the difference variable that allows the evaluation of the list-puller variable to take all possible values between 0 and 10. This figure shows quite a substantial effect. Other things being equal, there is a clear drop in the probability of casting a preference vote of almost 25 percentage points, moving from a very negative or unsympathetic to a very positive or sympathetic evaluation of the list-puller.

In addition, the difference between the evaluation score of the list-puller and the party also has a significant and substantial effect. Using the 'divide by four rule' (see Gelman & Hill, 2007, p. 82), the maximum decline of the probability of casting a preference vote is 4.5 per cent if the difference between the two evaluation scores increases with one point on the evaluation scale (meaning that the list-puller is evaluated relatively better). The effect of the difference between the evaluation scores is plotted in figure 3.3. The effect is shown for the range from -4 (the evaluation score of the list-puller is 4 points below the evaluation

[59] The models presented in the appendix also show a significant improvement.

Figure 3.2 Effect evaluation list-puller



Note: the variable 'difference evaluation party & list-puller' was set to 0.

Figure 3.3 Effect difference between evaluation list-puller and party



score of the party) until 4 (the evaluation score of the list-puller is 4 points above the evaluation score of the party). Within this range the probability of casting a preference vote drops with approximately 25 percentage points. Given these large effects, both figures confirm that the results presented in table 3.8 indeed may be conservative. I argued that the results presented there might be conservative, because maybe not all voters who cast a preference vote for another candidate because of a negative evaluation of the list-puller actually said this was their reason for casting a preference vote, given the question that was asked. Since the differences between the percentages presented in table 3.8 and in the regression models are so large, it seems likely that the negative preference vote is more common than can be seen in table 3.8.

These two effects again show that the evaluation of the list-puller of a party impacts the probability of casting a preference vote (in line with hypothesis 3.4). This finding may not be extremely surprising, but it has important implications if a voter can only vote for a candidate, as is the case in the Netherlands. However, before discussing these and other implications, the results for Belgium will be presented.

3.4.2 Preference voting in Belgium

Of the respondents in the 2014 PartiRep election study 628 gave a motivation for their vote for a specific candidate. This was approximately one third of the respondents who participated in the study and half of the respondents who said they cast a vote in the federal elections. From these 628 respondents only 5 (0.2%) mentioned the first candidate on the list in their motivation to vote for another candidate[60]. These respondents said they would not vote for the first candidate because they did not like the first candidate on the list. Four of these respondents said they therefore randomly picked another candidate and one respondent gave an additional reason for the choice for the other candidate. Thus in Belgium the number of voters who cast a preference vote as a result of a negative evaluation of the candidate on top of the list is much lower than in the Netherlands. This does not mean that all preference votes in Belgium are pure, personalized preference votes. Table 3.11 shows what was most important for respondents when they voted: the party or the candidate. For most respondents the party is much more important than the candidates, even if he or she voted for a candidate. In the next section these results are discussed, thereby reflecting on hypothesis 3.5.

The results of the logistic regression model for Belgium, presented in table 3.12, show a different picture than the results for the Netherlands. With regard to the first hypothesis, on the basis of which we expect that higher education, better political knowledge and higher levels of political interest increase the chances of casting a preference

[60] If this percentage would have been higher, it would have been interesting to perform an additional analysis to see whether there was a difference between lists where the political leader headed the list or where other candidates headed the list. But since only 0.2 per cent of the respondents mentioned the list-puller in their motivation, it is not very interesting to make this distinction: such negative motivations clearly do not play a role in the Belgian system.

Table 3.11 Party vote versus candidate vote (Belgium)

Candidate or party?	List vote	Preference vote	Total
0 - Only candidate(s) matter(s)	1.6%	8.5%	5.0%
1	0.4%	2.2%	1.3%
2	0.7%	3.1%	1.9%
3	0.9%	4.5%	2.6%
4	0.6%	4.0%	2.3%
5	8.4%	16.6%	12.5%
6	3.8%	6.7%	5.2%
7	11.9%	12.8%	12.4%
8	23.1%	19.0%	21.1%
9	9.8%	7.7%	8.8%
10 - Only the party matters	38.7%	14.9%	26.9%
N	687	673	1360

Source: PartiRep election study 2014 (PARTIREP, 2014). The question was (translated to English): What has been the most important factor in determining your vote: the candidate(s) or the party? You can answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that only the candidate(s) was (were) important and 10 means that only the party was important.

vote, the evidence is mixed. All variables have an effect in the expected direction, but they are not all significant. Education and political interest have a small and positive, but no significant effect. Political interest is significant: for each step on the scale from 0 to 10 the chances of casting a preference vote increases with approximately one per cent.

For the second hypothesis fewer indicators are included compared to the model for the Netherlands. The PartiRep dataset did not contain information about a candidate's origin (a further discussion of this issue will follow in the final section of this chapter). While according to the model women are more likely to cast a preference vote, this effect is not only smaller than in the Netherlands but also not significant. This might have to do with the Belgian regulations for gender equality. On each list an equal number of men and women should be presented (in case of an uneven number of candidates there may be a difference of one) and the top two places of the list should be occupied by one man and one woman. Despite these rules women are still underrepresented in parliament. So based on the logic behind the identity model we would still expect that women are more likely to cast a preference vote. In contrast to the Netherlands, older people in Belgium are more likely to cast a preference vote.

The proximity model assumes that members of political parties are more likely to cast a preference vote, which is supported by the analysis. Party members are almost three times more likely to cast a preference vote than voters who are not a member of a political party.

Finally, the two control variables show the same direction as in the Netherlands. The number of candidates has a positive effect on casting a preference vote, but is not significant. In line with what was expected, voting for a traditional party strongly increases the chances of casting a preference vote.

In table 3.13 the results of the second logistic regression analysis are presented, based on data collected for the experiment in the previous chapter. What is interesting is that the

Table 3.12 Preference voting in Belgium

	Model 1	
(Constant)	-2.092***	(0.042)
Education (Ref. = Low)		
Middle	0.356	(0.233)
High	0.471	(0.244)
Political interest	0.047*	(0.024)
Political knowledge (Ref. = 0 - Low)		
1	-0.126	(0.173)
2	0.044	(0.177)
3	0.141	(0.196)
4 - High	0.125	(0.264)
Age	0.011**	(0.004)
Woman	0.200	(0.118)
Party member	1.035***	(0.235)
Candidates on list	0.012	(0.008)
Party old	0.750***	(0.119)
-2LL	1784.005	
Cox and Snell's R2	.070	
Nagelkerke R2	.093	
N	1358	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: PartiRep election study 2014 (PARTIREP, 2014)

Table 3.13 Preference voting in Belgium including evaluation scores

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
(Constant)	0.233	0.357	0.078	0.703
Education (Ref. = Low)				
Middle	-0.229	0.292	-0.230	0.295
High	-0.368	0.319	-0.330	0.321
Political interest (Ref. = Not interested)				
Somewhat interested	0.067	0.283	0.068	0.287
Highly interested	-0.254	0.392	-0.281	0.400
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)				
Disagree	0.206	0.297	0.219	0.299
Agree	0.775**	0.342	0.798**	0.345
Fully agree	0.420	0.473	0.440	0.476
Age	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000
Woman	-0.054	0.239	-0.028	0.242
Party member	-0.157	0.346	-0.148	0.356
Party old	0.287	0.241	0.284	0.243
Evaluation score list-puller			0.017	0.084
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score party			0.138	0.100
-2LL	440.050		436.014	
Cox and Snell's R2	.038		.049	
Nagelkerke R2	.051		.067	
N	338		338	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Model improvement: $\chi^2 = 4.036$, df = 2, p = .133. Source: Own dataset.

results show that the evaluation of the list-puller and the difference between the evaluation of the party and list-puller for which was voted do not have a significant influence[61]. While this test is very conservative, it is in line with the findings presented earlier in this chapter: a negative evaluation of the list-puller has less influence in a system where it is possible to cast a list vote.

3.5 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter set out with the aim of explaining which voters cast a preference vote. Table 3.14 gives an overview of the expectations and the findings for Belgium and the Netherlands presented in this chapter.

Table 3.14 Summary of findings for chapter 3

Group	Categories	H	Exp.	Bel.	Net.
Resources	Education	3.1	+	~	++
	Political interest	3.1	+	++	+
	Internal efficacy	3.1	+		++
	Political knowledge	3.1	+	~	++
Traditionally underrepresented group	Age	3.2	+	+	-
	Women	3.2	+	~	++
	Region	3.2	+		~
	Non-western country	3.2	+		~
Feeling closer towards a certain group of candidates	Urbanization	3.3	+		M
	Party member	3.3	+	++	+
Influence negative evaluation first candidate on the list	-	3.4/.3.5	+ (NL) ~ (BE)	~	++

Note: ++ strong positive effect; + positive effect; ~ no effect; - negative effect

Current literature on voting behaviour works from the assumption that voters cast a vote for a specific party or candidate because they evaluate that party or candidate positively; they are pulled towards that party or candidate. For preference voting one might therefore expect that voters with more resources are more likely to cast a preference vote, because they are better qualified to decide which candidate best fits their interest. Furthermore, voters from underrepresented groups are more likely to cast a preference vote. By casting a preference vote for a candidate with a similar background, these voters might try to improve the representation of their group in parliament. Finally, those voters who have more contact or are more familiar with candidates are also expected to be more likely

[61] In the experiment the same lists were used for all respondents. This is different from the real-life situation in Belgium, where voters can only vote for a list within a district. In the experiment all respondents therefore could vote for the electoral leader, which is not true in real elections in Belgium. Therefore, the results based on this analysis should be seen as highly tentative.

to cast a preference vote. For the Netherlands, all these expectations are empirically supported (although not all as convincingly). For Belgium the evidence is somewhat mixed. While most of the hypotheses are supported in the current literature on preference voting in Belgium on the regional or municipal level, for the federal elections of 2014 this is not the case.

Perhaps the most striking difference between the results for Belgium and the Netherlands is the role gender plays in both countries. In the Netherlands, gender is one of the stronger predictors of preference voting while in Belgium it has no effect. There seems to be one obvious explanation for this difference. In Belgium rules determine that there should be a balance between male and female voters on party lists. In the Netherlands such rules do not exist, resulting in unbalanced lists (for most parties). Although in Belgium these rules do not result in a perfectly gender balanced parliament, this might reduce the incentive for women to cast a vote for a female candidate. In the Netherlands, where most lists are dominated by male candidates, voters – and especially female voters - might have a higher incentive to cast a vote for female candidates. Of course, based on the regression models in this chapter it is not possible to say whether women actually cast a preference vote for female candidates, but other results presented in this chapter seem to suggest they do. Even so, it will be interesting to see whether this difference is reflected in the support for female candidates in Belgium and the Netherlands. This is discussed in the next chapter, which discusses the candidates.

Two findings suggest further research is needed. First, with regard to the ethnic background of voters one important remark has to be made. In this chapter I was only able, based on existing survey research, to tentatively look at the influence of a voter's ethnic background on preference voting. Therefore it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about the existence of an effect for this group of voters and to identify what the precise effect would be. The ethnic preference vote deserves more attention in electoral research. Second, the contradicting effects of age in Belgium and the Netherlands are difficult to explain. Further research should focus on this topic to conduct a more fine grained analysis of the effect age has on preference voting.

While some differences exist, the analyses for both countries show that positive factors play a role in casting a preference vote. What this chapter also shows is that negative factors play an important role as well, which is an understudied aspect of voting behaviour (Catt, 1996). I specifically explored one negative factor: the evaluation of the list-puller. While research has shown that at the interparty level leaders could have a negative effect on the number of votes their party receives, I argue and show that, especially in a context in which the list vote is absent, list-pullers can also have an impact on the number of preference votes that are cast.

In the Netherlands votes for the list-puller are often primarily seen as a party vote. Only votes for other candidates are called preference votes. The assumption is that votes for other candidates reflect a specific choice for that individual candidate. However, analysing

the motivations voters gave for casting a preference vote, we can conclude that a substantial part of voters cast a preference vote because they do not want to vote for the list-puller. These preference votes can be seen as a 'negatively motivated preference vote'[62] and are not a deliberate preference vote for the other candidate, but rather an anti-vote against the list-puller.

The extent to which the phenomenon of a negatively motivated preference vote exists is difficult to tell. By studying the motivations of Dutch voters I estimate that there is a lower limit somewhere between 6 and 10 per cent of the preference votes. But the logistic regression analyses showed that the effect of the evaluation of the list-puller is quite large, and therefore this percentage might by conservative. What is sure is that it complicates, in the Dutch case, the distinction between a party vote and a preference vote. The existing literature assumes that a vote for any other candidate than the party leader is necessarily *not* a pure party vote[63]. This is for example visible in the distinction Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2010) make when they look at what comes first in the Dutch case: the party or the person. A vote for the list-puller in their operationalization can be: 1) a vote for the party (party above person), 2) a vote purely for the person (person above party) or 3) a vote for that person, within that party. For other candidates they only distinguish between the second and third option. This implies that a vote for another candidate than the list-puller from their perspective cannot be a pure party vote in the voter's mind. The results of the experiment on voting behaviour presented in the previous chapter challenges this (one of the findings is that the option to cast a list vote equally affects voting for the list-puller and voting for other candidates) and this is again confirmed by the analyses in this chapter.

This negatively motivated preference vote is absent in a situation where a voter can cast a list vote, such as in Belgium. In Belgium the negatively motivated preference vote is near to absent. When looking at the differences with regard to the electoral systems in Belgium and the Netherlands, it seems reasonable to expect that the option to cast a list vote is the cause of this difference. For Belgium, voters who do not have a specific preference for a candidate or who have a negative feeling towards the first candidate on the list and no other preferences, there is always the option to cast a list vote. Therefore, the distinction between a list vote on the one hand and a candidate vote on the other hand in Belgium is much clearer. It also more accurately grasps what a voter intends to 'say' with his or her vote. The fact that in the Netherlands there is one single district, while in Belgium there are

[62] In an earlier publication Nagtzaam and van Erkel (2017) called these preference votes 'preference votes without preference'. While for most of these votes it seems to be true that the voter does not have a specific preference for the candidate for which the vote was cast, the term negatively motivated preference vote seems more appropriate. It more accurately grasps of the reason behind the preference vote: a negative evaluation of the first candidate on the list.

[63] A pure party vote in this sense can be seen as a vote that, despite being cast for a candidate, has little to do with that individual candidate. The voter did not have a preference for that candidate, but only wanted to vote for the party of the candidate. That the voter voted for that candidate is only an effect of the fact that Dutch voters can only vote for a candidate and does not have the option to cast a list vote.

11 districts, could also have a potential influence on this result. After all, in Belgium not all voters have the option to cast a vote for the electoral leader of the party. Since these are the most visible candidates in election campaigns, it is also more likely that a voter has a (negative) opinion about that candidate. In the Netherlands all voters have the option to cast a vote for the leader of their preferred party. Thus, the Belgian districts could also be an explanation for the difference. However, this explanation is not very strong, since the effect did not appear on those lists where the electoral leader headed the list. It also seems unlikely that the fact that voting in Belgium is compulsory could explain this difference. It would even be more likely that the phenomenon occurs in a situation where voting is compulsory, since in such situations voters do not have the option to abstain if they do not want to vote for a specific candidate. Therefore, the conclusion should be that, although other differences between Belgium and the Netherlands exist, the list vote probably has a large influence on the extent to which negatively motivated preference votes exist.

In the Netherlands the direct effect of 'negatively motivated preference votes' (i.e. whether a candidate gets elected or not) might be limited. Parties after all also have a large influence in determining which candidates are elected. However, in electoral systems that are fully open and in which voters only have the option to cast a preference vote (e.g. Finland), such effects might be stronger. In addition to for example a primacy effect (Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016), this might further influence the impact of the list-order has on the outcome of the election.

The results presented in this chapter have important implications. First, the results show that motivations for preference voting are not always (entirely) rational. This is in line with previous findings on preference voting (Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016, p. 253). This has, as Van Erkel and Thijssen argue, important implications, since political parties use the electoral performance of individual candidates to decide whether to promote them to better list positions or other political functions (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017; Crisp et al., 2013; Folke et al., 2016; see also chapter 5 of this dissertation). However, if not all preference votes are true *preference* votes, the electoral success of a candidate becomes a less precise indicator of the actual popularity of a candidate. Therefore this phenomenon might disturb the influence voters have beyond the direct effect of casting a preference vote, namely influencing the composition of the parliament.

In addition, the results show that the debate on personalization is a very complex one. The current literature distinguishes between centralized personalization and decentralized personalization (Balmas et al., 2014). In the case of centralized personalization a leader of a political party or cabinet gains more power, while in the case of decentralized personalisation individual members other than the leader gain power. These are considered as two separate types of personalization, which are "more or less opposite processes" but nevertheless "can exist simultaneously". The results in this chapter indeed show that both processes can be connected. In addition, the results relate to the concept of 'negative personalization' (Pruysers & Cross, 2016): a strategy adopted by parties to attack leaders of

other parties. While Pruysers and Cross relate this concept to the interparty competition, negative personalization might have an impact on intraparty competition as well. How all these concepts relate to each other remains open for debate. Further research on what the concept of personalization actually entails is therefore needed.

The results presented in this chapter have implications for further research on preference voting[64]. For election studies in the Netherlands it would be advisable to at least include an answering category to the question about the reason for voters to cast a preference vote which includes the evaluation of the list-puller, to get a better understanding of the precise magnitude of the negatively motivated preference vote. It would be even better to extend the questions, if included, around the counterfactual thought experiment described by Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2010) and to also leave voters the option to call a 'preference vote' a vote for the party (thus giving both voters for the list-pullers and voters for other candidates the same options to describe their vote). For Belgium it would be interesting to include questions on evaluation of list-pullers or at least political leaders, to further study whether the phenomenon of negatively motivated preference voting is truly absent in Belgium.

[64] The conclusion (Chapter 0) contains a discussion with more practical implications of these findings for the Dutch electoral system.

4 The supply side: what determines the popularity of candidates?

4.1 Introduction

If there is a demand side there should also be a supply side to meet this demand: in this case the candidates that are on the party lists and from which the voters can choose. According to Marsh (1985, p. 371) "candidates' characteristics may be particularly salient where parties are composites of clearly defined subgroups. These may be ideological, and many derive from group identity – ethnic, religious, class, locality – or may be more personal: incumbents, for instance, may be perceived as potentially more effective deputies than their challengers".

There is a huge variation in the popularity of candidates in the Netherlands and Belgium. Even between those candidates who are elected large differences exist between the numbers of preference votes they receive. In the Netherlands, in each election a few candidates receive more than 100,000 votes, but at the same time some elected candidates only receive around 200 votes. The Dutch election of 2006 was an extreme election in this respect. While Rita Verdonk (2nd position VVD) received 620,555 preference votes, Tony van Dijck (8th position PVV) received 114 votes. The electoral threshold for an individual candidate to be elected on the basis of preference votes amounted to 16,398 votes. Thus, while Verdonk reached this number almost 38 times, Tony van Dijck did not reach one per cent of the individual threshold, but both candidates were elected to parliament. A comparison between the total number of votes of each elected candidate in Belgium does not tell the entire story, because of the size of the districts. However, it shows that differences in Belgium are also large. In 2014, for example, Bart de Wever was (in absolute terms) the most popular elected candidate with 314,650 votes. Benoit Hellings received 3,725 votes and was (again in absolute terms) the least popular elected candidate. If we look at the number of votes, relative to the number of votes needed to be elected based on preference votes, Bart de Wever was still the most popular candidate. He received 8.4 times the number of votes needed to be elected directly. In relative terms, Marijke Dillen was the least popular candidate. She only received one fifth of the number of votes needed to be elected based on preference votes.

Of course, these differences might not be relevant for all candidates. After all, both countries have a flexible list-system, in which parties still have a large influence on which candidates are elected and which candidates are not. Preference votes for a candidate are thus not always relevant, since candidates can also rely on the party. This is for example visible in the fact that in the Netherlands by no means all candidates take action to receive preference votes (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, pp. 177–178). In Belgium, most candidates only campaign for their party and not for themselves either. Approximately one fifth of the candidates run a more personalized campaign, in which they try to convince

voters to vote for them specially and not only try to make sure the voter cast a vote for the party (Van Erkel et al., 2017, pp. 393–394). Still, research has shown that preference votes have consequences beyond the scope of who gets elected. Parties for example reward popular candidates with better list positions in subsequent elections or promote them to better political functions (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017; Crisp et al., 2013; Folke et al., 2016; see also chapter 5 of this dissertation). Thus, there are two reasons why it is relevant to know which candidates are successful: it influences which candidates are elected and also influences later decisions of political parties. Therefore, this chapter looks at what factors determine the electoral success of candidates.

4.2 Expectations[65]

4.2.1 Socio-demographic factors

As we saw in chapter 3, socio-demographic factors play a role when it comes to preference voting. These factors especially seem to benefit candidates from groups who are traditionally underrepresented. If citizens of these underrepresented groups vote for candidates from their own group, we would expect that women, candidates from ethnic minorities, candidates within a certain age category and candidates from specific regions are likely to receive more preference votes. However, the evidence is not conclusive.

For example, there is no consensus whether gender has influence on the number of preference votes a candidate receives. While some studies in different contexts show that no voter bias against women exists (Black & Erickson, 2003; McElroy & Marsh, 2010; Wauters et al., 2010), Erzeel and Caluwaerts (2015) show that especially voters with low levels of political interest are still only voting for male candidates. Erzeel et al. (2017) argue that a "gender-based vote from the part of female voters (i.e. women opting to vote for women) is still limited". Wauters et al. (2010) observed that in the 2003 Belgian federal elections women received fewer preference votes than men. The conclusion of their study was that "women do not obtain a lower number of preferential votes because they are women (no voter bias), but because they are less likely to occupy crucial positions on the list, wage a less expensive campaign and get less media coverage (systemic bias)" (Wauters et al., 2010, p. 483). Controlling for the systemic bias resulted in no gender effect. This corresponds with McElroy and Marsh (2010, p. 824). They argue that "the role that candidate sex plays in voting behaviour is undoubtedly complex", but that there is no evidence that women are 'discriminated' against by voters. If they receive fewer votes, other factors can explain this. In absolute terms female candidates receive fewer votes than male candidates, but other factors can explain this, for example because male candidates have better list positions. Therefore, controlled for such factors, in Belgium female candidates still receive marginally more preference votes than male candidates (see for example Maddens et al., 2010). In the Netherlands the effect is larger, although this is to a large extent caused by the first female

[65] A summary of the expectations can be found in table 4.1.

candidate on the list (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). Gender-based voting in the Netherlands therefore seems more important than it is in Belgium.

The effect of age is not linear (Maddens et al., 2007). Candidates tend to receive more preference votes when they are older, but beyond a certain age (around 60) the vote level drops to the level of the youngest candidates. In the Dutch national election of 2010, members of ethnic minorities receive on average 7,516 preference votes, compared to 2,064 preference votes for those candidates not belonging to an ethnic minority (when votes for list-pullers are not included). However, the first figure is highly influenced by the average for the highest placed candidate from an ethnic minority on the list (which is 16,280) (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). The first set of hypotheses therefore is:

> **Hypothesis 4.1**: If a candidate belongs to a traditionally underrepresented social group in parliament he or she will receive more preference votes, than a candidate who belongs to a social group that is traditionally overrepresented in parliament.
> **Hypothesis 4.2**: The effect described in hypothesis 4.1 is stronger for the first candidate of a specific group, than it is for other candidates belonging to that group.

Studies in the U.S. and United Kingdom also show that voters tend to vote for candidates who live closer to them (Arzheimer & Evans, 2012; Gimpel et al., 2008). Jankowski (2016) found that in the parliamentary elections of Hamburg candidates receive more votes in their own urban district, and that the effect is larger for the first candidate from a district on the list. Not much research has been done on the regional effect of the preference vote, but Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012) concluded that in the Dutch national elections of 2010 region did not seem to have a large influence. However, 30 years earlier Hessing (1985) concluded that most elected candidates in the Dutch elections of 1982 received relatively most votes in their own district (*kieskring*).

The findings for the Netherlands of Van Holsteyn and Andeweg and Hessing contradict each other. Of course, it could be that trends in preference voting simply changed in 30 years. However, in the previous chapter we saw that an important reason for Dutch voters to cast a preference vote is that the candidate is from the same region or that they know the candidate personally: together these two reasons were mentioned by approximately 20 per cent of the voters as their motivation for casting a preference vote (see table 3.4, page 51). Furthermore, if we look at the seven candidates who are elected out of list order in the three most recent Dutch parliamentary elections (of 2010, 2012 and 2017), we see that regional considerations seem to play an important role for most of these candidates' preference votes. Figure 4.1 shows their share of preference votes in each municipality. Five candidates received most of their preference votes in their own place of residence (indicated on the map with a red border) and the surrounding municipalities. Especially Sabine Uitslag (2010), Pieter Omtzigt (2012), Maurits von Martels (2017), and

Figure 4.1 Candidates elected out of list order and their vote share per municipality

A) Pia Dijkstra, D66 (2010)

B) Sabine Uitslag, CDA (2010)

C) Pieter Omtzigt, CDA (2012)



D) Isabelle Diks, GroenLinks (2017)



E) Maurits von Martels, CDA (2017)

F) Lilianne Ploumen, PvdA (2017)

G) Lisa Westerveld, GroenLinks (2017)



Note: These maps show the preference votes a candidate received in each municipality, as a percentage of the total number of votes for their party in that municipality. The place of residence of the candidate (indicated on the ballot) is marked by a red border.

In municipalities that are coloured grey the candidate received a lower percentage of preference votes than was necessary to be elected out of list order. In other words, if the candidate would have received the same percentage of preference votes in each municipality as in such a municipality, the candidate would not have reached the individual threshold to be elected out of list order.

Sources: Kiesraad (2017a) for 2010 and 2012 election results and Dataportaal van de Nederlandse overheid (2017) for 2017 election result; visualization borders municipality: © Kadaster and Centraal Bureau for de Statistiek (2013, 2015, 2016). For the visualization of the 2017 election the *Wijk- en buurtkaart* 2016 was used.

Lisa Westerveld (2017) received most of their preference votes in a very specific part of the country. The fact that Van Holsteyn and Andeweg did not find an effect might have a methodological reason: regional distance between voters and candidates was operationalized as an interval-ratio variable measuring the distance between the municipality of the voter and the municipality of the candidate (2012, p. 180). Based on what is visible in figure 4.1 this might not be the ideal way to operationalize the variable. It seems there is a strong effect when the distance between voter and candidate is relatively short, but the effect is not linear. After a certain distance it stops, and after that point distance plays no role anymore. In this chapter a subsection will be devoted to the regional origin of Dutch candidates to test the hypothesis that:

> **Hypothesis 4.3**: Dutch candidates receive relatively more votes in their own district (kieskring) than they receive in other districts.

4.2.2 Ballot position

One of the strongest predictors of the number of preference votes a candidate receives is the ballot position of the candidate. Evidence for the effects of ballot position are overwhelming, although much of earlier research may have been influenced by not considering other explanations or is methodologically flawed by using wrong statistical models, or even no statistical model at all (Darcy & McAllister, 1990). Recent studies, which also take other factors into consideration, come to the same conclusion however: candidates towards the top of the list receive more votes (Blom-Hansen et al., 2016; Faas & Schoen, 2006; Lutz, 2010; Miller & Krosnick, 1998; Ortega Villodres, 2003), even when lists of candidates are ordered alphabetically (Lijphart & López Pintor, 1988). Even in races with only two candidates, the ordering of the candidates matters to the advantage of the first listed candidate (Chen et al., 2014). In addition, also the list-pusher (i.e. the candidate on the last position on the list) receives more votes than candidates just above him or her on the list. However, the advantage for list-pushers is not as large as the advantage for candidates on the first positions on the list (Marcinkiewicz, 2014). Parties sometimes place well-known candidates, either from inside politics or outside politics on this last position, with the idea to attract voters. For example, in 2017 the PvdA had Jan Smeets (who is the founder of Pinkpop, a large music festival that is held every year in the Netherlands) on the last position of the list. In Belgium the last position on the list is often occupied by a politician who is active at another level and does not have the ambition to enter the Chamber of Representatives. For example in 2010 Rudy Demotte, as the Minister-President of Wallonia, was list-pusher for PS in the district of Hainaut.

An important question is whether the ballot position is a pure primacy effect, or whether candidates towards the top of the list receive more votes because they are better qualified for office. Van Erkel and Thijssen (2016) show that the success of candidates at the top of the list can partly be explained by the political experience of those candidates and the fact that they receive more media attention. However, a primacy effect works to their

advantage, both because voters have a confirmation bias towards candidates on top of the list and because of a pure primacy effect: some voters vote for the first candidate on the list, simply because the candidates is the first one on the list (Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016).

> **Hypothesis 4.4**: The more a candidate is positioned towards the top of the list, the more preference votes he or she will receive.
> **Hypothesis 4.5**: The last candidate on the list (the list-pusher) attracts more votes than might be expected based on the low list position he or she occupies.

4.2.3 Political experience

Whether voters actually prefer incumbents or whether incumbents receive more votes because of structural factors that are to their advantage is a matter of debate (see for example Brown, 2014), but there is no doubt that in many countries a positive correlation between incumbency and preference votes exists (Karvonen, 2011b; Maddens et al., 2007; Marsh, 1985; McElroy & Marsh, 2010; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). In addition, candidates with experience in other political functions performed at the local level, either directly before the election or earlier, attract more preference votes as well (Maddens et al., 2007; Tavits, 2010).

One way to explain the advantage incumbents and candidates with other political functions have with regard to the number of preference votes they receive, is the fact that they appear in the media more often. Maddens et al. (2006) and Van Aelst et al. (2006, 2008) found a positive effect of media exposure on the number of preference votes. Politicians who appear in the main news bulletin on national television more than once during the campaign receive significantly more preference votes than candidates who do not (Van Aelst et al., 2006). The effect of being mentioned in newspapers seems to be especially significant for those candidates who do not appear on television. Candidates being mentioned in newspapers receive more preference votes than those candidates who are not being mentioned in newspapers (Van Aelst et al., 2006).

> **Hypothesis 4.6**: Candidates with more political experience receive more preference votes than candidates with less political experience.

4.2.4 Ideological differences

A possible additional factor that could influence the popularity of candidates is if there are ideological differences between candidates within the same party. We know from studies on interparty competition that ideology plays a role when voters decide for which party they vote. Could there also be an effect of ideology on the intraparty competition? Political parties are often seen as unitary actors (e.g. Downs, 1957) and MPs in Belgium and the Netherlands often vote according to party lines (Van Vonno, 2016). However, there are differences in how Dutch MPs of the same party place themselves on a left-right scale, and

these differences are larger when it comes to specific issues (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011). For candidates in Flanders (Belgium) research has also shown that such differences between candidates from the same party exist (Van Erkel, 2017, p. 96). These differences are relatively small, however. This is no surprise, first of all because parties have an incentive to strive for party unity. Second, it would not make sense, especially in a multi-party system if a candidate from a left-wing party would have opinions that are extremely right. In such a situation it is more likely that the candidate would be a member of a right-wing party.

However, some variation might also have an advantage for parties, if the electoral systems allows for intraparty choice. Candidates with, relatively extreme positions within the party might attract voters from other parties. In an experiment on the effects of electoral systems Blumenau et al. (2017) for example found that, British voters under an open list system are likely to switch from niche parties to mainstream parties. Some Eurosceptic voters voted for UKIP under closed list rules and switched to a Eurosceptic candidate of the Conservative party under open list rules.

Throughout this study the assumption is that voters first choose for which party to vote. Next, they make a choice for a specific candidate. If differences between candidates of the same party exist, this might give the voter an opportunity to express a preference for a certain direction (see also Blumenau et al., 2017). According to the directional theory of issue voting (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989), voters do not vote for the party which is closest to them on the left-right scale (assuming a political space with a single dimension) but for the party which takes the most extreme position on their side of scale. This would suggest major support for extremist parties, an expectation that is not supported by empirical findings. Rabinowitz and Macdonald therefore include the 'region of acceptability' in their model. If a party would cross a certain boundary, it would be penalized by the voters. Voters thus vote for the most extreme party within the region of acceptability. In terms of the intraparty competition this region of acceptability is less important for voters: it is likely to assume that the acceptability is already regulated by the party. It is unlikely that a candidate who is unacceptable to a (large part of the) voter(s) of a party, is acceptable to the party itself. If voters want to push the party in a particular direction, the direction model would suggest that the voter votes for the candidate who takes the most extreme position in that direction within that party.

There is some evidence that candidates who deviate from their party have some electoral success. 'Rebellions' in the UK may pay off, although the effect is weak, even in favourable conditions (Vivyan & Wagner, 2012). Results are mixed, however; as another study shows that voters take deviation by MPs as a sign of integrity and trustworthiness and they therefore have stronger preference for such candidates (Campbell et al., 2016). Findings for the US also show that voters partly base their voting decision on how members of Congress vote (Ansolabehere & Jones, 2010; Carson et al., 2010).

It is not necessarily true that the effect of deviating from the party line is the same for all candidates. I expect that this effect especially applies to candidates more towards the end

of the list. They might be more inclined to deviate from the party line, in order to attract voters, since they depend more on the voter. Candidates towards the top of the list can rely more on the party to be elected and thus it is less important for them to distinguish themselves from co-partisans. At the same time, parties may also be more inclined to put candidates towards the top of the list who are more loyal to the party. Therefore, we expect that:

> **Hypothesis 4.7**: Candidates who deviate more from the party line will receive more preference votes than candidates who deviate less from the party line.
> **Hypothesis 4.8**: The more the candidate has a position towards the end on the list, the stronger the effect of deviating from the party line (hypothesis 4.7).

The only recent study that addressed the ideological positions of candidates in this context of intraparty competition found no effect of ideology on the electoral success of candidates in Belgium (Van Erkel, 2017, p. 104). Van Erkel studied the effect of ideology based on a candidate survey, in which candidates were asked their position on 30 ideological questions on six dimensions: economy, environment, Europe, migration, ethnics and federalism. While he found that variation existed on these dimensions between members of the same party, he found no effect of that variation on the preference votes candidates received.

One of the explanations Van Erkel gives for his non-finding relates to the availability of the information voters need to distinguish the ideological positions of candidates. A first problem is that this information is hard to find, and, if available at all the second problem relates to the capability of voters to process the information. While Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) at the party level is a growing and popular phenomenon (Marschall & Garzia, 2014), for candidates the use of such VAAs is (still) limited (Dumont et al., 2014). A voter therefore should actively search for information about the policy positions of a candidate if the voter wishes to cast a vote for a candidate with a similar ideological position. As will be explained below I measure ideological positions of candidates in a different way, namely based on content analysis of speeches made by MPs in plenary sessions of parliament and of written questions submitted. In line with the availability of information argument, we might expect a different effect based on both these sources. I argue that it is more likely that candidates who distinguish themselves from co-partisans in the questions they ask attract more votes. First of all, because of the function these questions have. Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) distinguish between substantial and symbolic political agendas. They argue that political agendas 'can be placed on a continuum ranging from substantial to symbolic' (2006, p. 95). Furthermore, media affects the questions that are submitted (Van Aelst & Vliegenthart, 2014). The questions MPs ask might have a more symbolic function, showing that they care about issues which are reported on in the media, while speeches made in plenary sessions might be more substantial in nature. In addition,

an MP might have more freedom while asking questions compared to when he or she is delivering a speech in parliament[66]. When delivering a speech in parliament the MP is at that time the spokesperson of the party and therefore might be more constrained by the party. Second, because of their symbolic functions it is more likely that the positions MPs take while asking questions is known to the voters. I therefore expect that:

> **Hypothesis 4.9**: Deviating from the party line has a stronger effect on preference votes when it is done through submitting questions, than it has during speeches in plenary sessions of parliament.

4.2.5 Party effects

Next to these explanations at the level of the candidate, there may be effects relating to the party. These might have an effect on the number of preference votes candidates receive, and should therefore be discussed in this chapter. A first factor that might influence the number of preference votes at the party level is whether the party is relatively new or not. Traditional parties in general have a larger pool of candidates who are familiar to the voter, they have more local politicians and (former) ministers (see Wauters et al., 2016, p. 5). Therefore, they are able to attract more preference votes, so we expect that:

> **Hypothesis 4.10**: Candidates from traditional parties are more likely to receive preference votes than candidates from newer parties.

There is a specific group of parties for which we expect that candidates receive fewer preference votes: populist parties. These parties are often characterized as parties with strong 'charismatic' leaders and often lack a differentiated internal party structure (Kitschelt, 1995; Taggart, 2004). We can therefore expect that other candidates than the party leaders from these parties receive fewer preference votes, because of both the strong appeal of the leader[67] and the fact that other candidates are relatively unknown to the voter. Since there is a weaker party structure (or no local party roots at all) for these parties, candidates have fewer options to become familiar to the voters of these parties.

> **Hypothesis 4.11**: Candidates from populist parties are less likely to receive preference votes than candidates from other parties.

Some scholars argue that ideology has an influence on preference voting. Preferential voting is "slightly more common amongst the political right" (see also Karvonen, 2011b;

[66] Although, some political parties have internal rules that state that members should ask their party for permission before submitting questions (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011, p. 659).

[67] In the Netherlands the votes for the leader are not considered to be preference votes, while in Belgium they are. The effect therefore might be stronger in the Netherlands. However, in Belgium the leader of the party can still only be elected in one district, so in other districts we would also expect that the first candidate on the list of a populist party would receive fewer votes.

Marsh, 1985, p. 369). André, Depauw and Pilet (André, Depauw, & Pilet, 2017) also found that casting a preference vote is more common in right-wing parties. According to them, the reason for this is the fact that candidates from right-wing parties tend to run more personalized campaigns than candidates from the left (André, Depauw, & Pilet, 2017). Running a personalized campaign indeed seems to have an effect on the levels of preference voting. In the Netherlands in 2006 parliamentarians were asked whether they had undertaken activities during the election campaign in 2003 to get preference votes. According to this study 40 MPs had undertaken such activities and 70 had not (the list-pullers were not included in the analysis). They received on average respectively 5,601 and 3,958 votes, suggesting that a personalized campaign does make a difference (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). Belgian research has also shown that individual campaign expenses have a robust and positive effect on preference votes (Maddens et al., 2006; Maddens & Put, 2013; Van Erkel et al., 2017).

> **Hypothesis 4.12**: Candidates from right-wing parties are more likely to receive preference votes than candidates from left-wing parties.

Finally, based on the findings in the previous chapter, we expect that in the Netherlands candidates from parties with less popular list-pullers receive more preference votes. Since in the Netherlands voters are forced to vote for a candidate, voters without a candidate preference tend to vote for the first candidate on the list. However, the previous chapter showed that for some voters without a positive candidate preference, a negative candidate preference exists: they have no strong preference for another candidate, but they do not want to vote for the list-puller. These voters switch to another candidate, for whom they have no real preference. Thus, we expect that:

> **Hypothesis 4.13**: In the Netherlands, candidates of parties with less popular list-pullers receive more preference votes than candidates of parties with more popular list-pullers.

4.3 Methods and data

To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section multilevel regression analyses were conducted. Since the used data are clustered at several levels, a single level regression model would be problematic. Not all observations are independent from each other, since they are clustered in parties, elections and (for Belgium) in districts. When a single level regression model is run with these data, it does not provide correct standard errors (Jones, 2009). A multilevel model, with random intercepts for these groups addresses this problem.

For each country four different specifications of the multilevel model will be presented in the results section. The first model is the basic model, containing only independent variables at the candidate level. In the second model independent variables at

Table 4.1 Summary of expectations for chapter 4

Group	Categories	H	Expectation
Underrepresented social groups	Women	4.1	+
	Candidates with a non-European background	4.1	+
First of a underrepresented social groups	First woman	4.2	+
	First candidate with a non-European background	4.2	+
Geographical representation	Dutch candidates in their own *kieskring*	4.3	+
List position	More towards the top	4.4	+
	Lowest position	4.5	+
Political experience	Incumbent MP	4.6	+
	Minister	4.6	+
	Junior minister	4.6	+
Deviating from party line		4.7	+
	Interaction with list position	4.8	+
	Stronger for question than for plenary sessions	4.9	+
Party effects	Traditional parties	4.10	+
	Populist parties	4.11	-
	Right-wing parties	4.12	+
	Parties with unpopular list-pullers	4.13	+

the party level are included as well. In addition, the third and fourth models contain variables that measure a candidate's deviation from the party line.

4.3.1 Candidates included in the analyses

The analysis for the Dutch case is based on the parliamentary elections between 1998 and 2017. For the most part of this period, the Netherlands was divided in 19 districts (*kieskringen*). Since 2012 the country has 20 districts[68]. These districts mainly have an administrative function, but this function is salient for the analysis in this chapter.

Political parties can present a different list of candidates in each district (see also section 1.1.1). This has two important implications when we compare the preference votes of candidates at a national level. First, not all candidates participated in all districts. Some political parties present lists that contain different candidates at the end of the list in each district. For example, a party that is allowed to have a maximum of 30 candidates on the list in each district may choose to run with the same 25 names in the same order on the first 25 positions in each district, but present a different number 26 to 30 in each district. They may want to put some regional candidates on the list in a district, or they may want to present more than 30 candidates in total. Second, a party may choose to present a list with the same

[68] The 20th district, which was created in 2012, is formed by the three municipalities in the Caribbean Netherlands.

30 candidates in each district, but vary the order in each district. Therefore, a candidate 1) does not always appear on the ballot in all districts and 2) does not always appear on the ballot on the same position in each district. To make sure the results of the regression analyses are not biased by these differences in candidates, only the candidates who participated in all districts *and* were placed on the same position on each list are included in the analysis.

If all parties would have presented identical lists in all districts in the elections between 1998 and 2017, the total number of candidates would have been 4,845. In reality, a total of 6,123 candidates participated in the elections. Of these candidates 3,725 (61 per cent) were placed on the same position and participated in all districts. In addition, the list-pullers are excluded from the analysis. This results in a total of 3,623 candidates in the analysis.

The analysis for Belgium is based on the federal elections between 2003 and 2014. Parties in Belgium present lists with effective candidates and successors. Effective candidates can be elected directly. On each list the maximum number of effective candidates equals the number of seats to be elected in a district. Successors cannot be elected directly; they replace effective candidates who do not take up their seat or leave parliament before the end of the legislative term. The list of successors has a maximum of half the number of seats available in a district. Since successors cannot be elected directly, only effective candidates will be included in the analysis. In the four elections between 2003 and 2014 in total 6,943 effective candidates participated.

4.3.2 The dependent variable

The dependent variable should be a measurement of a candidate's electoral success. Therefore, preference votes are used to determine the electoral success. There are different ways in which this measurement can be operationalized. In this chapter I use the proportion of a candidate's preference vote relative to the total votes cast for candidates within the candidate's party at the level at which the seats are distributed to parties. Thus for the Netherlands this is in relation to the total votes for the party (since voting for a candidate is mandatory) at the national level, but for Belgium this is in relation to the number of votes cast for candidates (so excluding the list votes) within a district. Another option would have been to look at the proportion of votes in relation to total number of votes cast for candidates. However, in this dissertation the main focus is on the intraparty competition, since the assumption behind second-order personalization is that a voter first decides for which party he or she will vote. Only when the party choice is made, the voter makes a specific choice for a candidate within that party. Therefore it makes sense to look to a candidate's popularity relative to the popularity of other candidates of the same party. The advantage of taking the relative number of votes, instead of the absolute number of votes, is that the relative number of votes do not depend on the size of the party or (in the Belgian case) the size of the district.

The distribution of the percentage of preference votes for each candidate is highly skewed; therefore a decimal log transformation of the percentage of preference votes is used as the dependent variable[69]. For the Netherlands this data comes from the official documents published by the *Kiesraad,* which contain the results of the election (Kiesraad, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017a). For Belgium this data comes from the official website of the Belgian government, containing the election results (Belgium.be, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014).

In the Netherlands the average candidate received 0.64 per cent preference votes, ranging from 0.002 to 43.0 per cent. Table 4.2 shows for different levels of preference votes how many candidates reached that level. The table shows how skewed the distribution is: more than 40 per cent of the candidates received less than 0.1 per cent of the votes of a party. Only 12 per cent of the candidates received more than 1 per cent of the votes of his or her party[70]. This is important to keep in mind when the results of the multilevel model are discussed.

Table 4.2 Percentage of preference votes for Dutch candidates

Percentage	**1998**	**2002**	**2003**	**2006**	**2010**	**2012**	**2017**	**Total**
0.00 up to 0.10	33.3	42.5	39.3	49.0	46.3	41.8	43.2	42.3
0.10 up to 0.25	21.1	22.5	23.7	22.2	21.9	24.9	24.8	23.1
0.25 up to 0.50	14.8	12.7	16.0	11.8	12.0	15.8	12.1	13.6
0.50 up to 1.00	11.5	9.2	9.6	6.7	7.6	9.2	8.4	8.8
1.00 up to 2.00	9.4	3.8	4.3	3.9	5.4	4.5	5.2	5.3
2.00 up to 4.00	5.3	4.1	4.1	2.3	4.7	1.8	2.2	3.4
4.00 up to 10.00	3.3	3.8	2.1	2.5	1.6	1.8	2.8	2.5
10.00 and higher	1.2	1.4	0.9	1.6	0.5	0.2	1.3	0.9
Total (N)	**487**	**369**	**438**	**433**	**643**	**619**	**634**	**3,623**

Source: own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in all districts from the same position in an election (list-pullers are excluded).

In Belgium, on average a candidate receives 5.67 per cent of the preference votes of his or her party, within a range from 0.6 to 53.2 per cent. The distribution of preference votes is extremely skewed in Belgium as well (see table 4.3). Only 2.4 per cent of the

[69] Using the decimal log has some advantages and disadvantages compared to using the natural log (see for example Gelman & Hill, 2007, pp. 60–61). I chose to use to decimal log for this dependent variable, to be consistent with the transformation I use for the dependent variable in the analyses presented in chapter 5 (on the effect of preference votes on the list position for the next election), a choice made based on the fact that it was used in previous research (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017).

[70] The fact that there seems to be a relative drop of the number of candidates with higher percentages of preference votes is mainly caused by the decline of candidates who do not participate in all districts. The absolute number of candidates who receive over 1 per cent of the vote stays roughly equal: in absolute terms the group of candidates with fewer preference votes increases. This is because the candidates who do not participate in all districts are low on the list. If fewer parties present lists in different districts with different candidates on the lower positions of the list, the number of candidates participating in all districts increases. And since the increase is caused by candidates lower at the list, who tend to receive fewer votes, the group of candidates participating in all districts and receiving few preference votes increases.

candidates received more than 25 per cent of the preference votes. The majority of candidates (70 per cent) did not receive more than 5 per cent.

Table 4.3 Percentage of preference votes for Belgian candidates

Percentage	2003	2007	2010	2014	Total
0.00 up to 2.50	34.5	27.5	31.5	22.3	29.2
2.50 up to 5.00	36.5	40.9	36.7	41.8	38.9
5.00 up to 10.00	17.1	19.6	19.3	19.1	18.8
10.00 up to 15.00	4.8	5.7	5.7	6.2	5.6
15.00 up to 25.00	4.9	4.7	5.3	5.8	5.2
25.00 and higher	2.1	1.5	1.4	4.8	2.4
Total (N)	**1880**	**1776**	**1688**	**1599**	**6943**

Source: own dataset. Included are all effective candidates.

4.3.3 Independent variables

Most of the relevant independent variables are readily available from the official election records for the Netherlands (Kiesraad, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017a) and Belgium (Belgium.be, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014). First of all, the gender of a candidate is obtained from these documents. In the Netherlands, for most candidates the gender is given on the ballot. However, not all parties publish the gender of the candidates on their list. Missing data was added as much as possible by hand coding the gender[71]. In addition, for female candidates it was coded whether they were the first woman on the list (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0).

Second, the ethnicity of a candidate was coded based on the name of a candidate. For each candidate it was coded whether they had or at least seem to have a non-European ethnicity. Coding based on the name is not be the most optimal solution, although it has been done before (e.g. Thijssen, 2013; Van Erkel, 2017, p. 49; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). For those candidates with a non-European background it was also coded whether they were the first non-European on the list (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0).

Third, the list position of a candidate was obtained from the official election records. List position is operationalized in two different ways. For the Netherlands, in the second, third and fourth model list position is included relative to the number of elected members for that party. For example, if a party wins 10 seats in an election, the candidate on position 10 has a list position of 1 in this operationalization and the candidate on position 1 has a list position of 0 in this operationalization. I set a maximum value of this variable at 1.5. So, in the previous example, the value for a candidate on position 20 as well as a candidate on position 30 would be 1.5. The advantage of this operationalization is that it is better suited to test the hypothesis that a deviation from the party line is more likely to have an influence

[71] First, by checking whether the gender of the candidate was mentioned in another election. Second, by looking at the first name of a candidate which for candidates of most parties is also given on the ballot. If the first name was not given or if it was not a typical male or female name, the gender of a candidate was coded based on an internet search. For 32 candidates none of these ways were sufficient to code the gender. Therefore, these candidates are excluded from the analysis.

on lower placed candidates. This operationalization accounts for the fact that 'lower placed' is relative to party size. For example for a medium party a candidate on the 8th position might be a lower placed candidate, but for a large party this candidate might not be considered a lower placed candidate.

In the other models, the decimal logarithm of the list position is used to test the effect of the list position of a candidate. This logarithmic transformation (at least partly) accounts for the different length of lists of parties and accounts for the non-linear effect list position has on preference voting. This operationalization is unfortunately not possible in the model with all candidates, since candidates from parties who did not win seats are also included (and therefore it is impossible to calculate the relative position towards candidates elected). For Belgium this operationalization would also not work, since within some parties in some districts only one candidate gets elected. In such a situation this operationalization would not result in a meaningful indicator of list position.

Based on the list position a dummy variable was created to indicate whether the candidate was the list-pusher (i.e. the last candidate on the list), since previous research has shown that a 'last position effect' may occur (Marcinkiewicz, 2014). In addition to an effect based on the last position, this particular candidate might also attract more votes, because parties sometimes put well know persons either from inside or outside politics on the last position on the list. These candidates, often do not have the intention to become an MP, but they want to express their support for the party by being the list-pusher (see for example Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, p. 181).

For all candidates it was determined whether they had served as a minister, junior minister or MP in the legislative period directly prior to the election. For the Netherlands, data for these variables was obtained from the website *Parlement & Politiek* (Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, 2017b, 2017a). For Belgium, information about ministers and junior ministers was obtained from the Political Data Yearbook website (Political Data Yearbook, 2017; Rihoux et al., 2013). A list with members of parliament for each period was obtained from the website of the parliament (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2017a). If a candidate performed more than one of these functions, only one was coded as such. For example, a candidate who was an MP at the beginning of the previous term but became a minister when the government was formed was coded as minister and not as MP[72]. The last independent variable at the candidate level that is included is the deviation of a candidate from the average party score; this variable is discussed in section 4.3.4.

In addition information at the level of the party was gathered. Based on the official documents with the election results the number of candidates on the list for each party was

[72] In Belgium political functions at the local level play an important role in the electoral success of candidates (see Put & Maddens, 2015 for an extensive analysis). These functions are excluded from the analysis in this chapter to keep the included political functions similar in the Dutch and Belgian models.

coded[73]. Furthermore for each party it was coded whether the party was traditional or new, whether they were in government the previous legislative period, whether they were a populist party (classification of parties as populist was done based on the work of Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007; March & Mudde, 2005; Pauwels, 2014) and what their position on the left-right scale is. The position of the party on the left-right scale was taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (see Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). This scale runs from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Finally, and only for the Netherlands, the average evaluation score for the list-puller by voters for the party was coded; the previous chapter showed that leadership evaluation has an influence on the likelihood of casting a preference vote in the Netherlands. Data for this variable was taken from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies; this evaluation score is measured on an 11-point scale (for more information about this variable, see section 3.3.1). Since it is not possible to code all these variables for all parties (for example, because no policy positions are given in the CHES for the smaller, non-elected parties), the second, third and fourth model (which include variables at the party level) are solely based on candidates coming from parties that obtained at least one seat in parliament.

4.3.4 Estimating a candidate's deviation from the party line

Measuring policy positions of individual candidates is a difficult task. One way to measure their positions is by looking at voting behaviour in parliament. However, both in Belgium and the Netherlands MPs usually vote according to party lines (Van Vonno, 2016, pp. 63–64). Thus, if we would try to measure a policy position of an individual MP, based on the voting behaviour of that MP, it is highly likely that we would find almost identical policy positions for all MPs from one party, since they all voted in a similar way. This analysis would not lead to variation in the policy positions for individual candidates belonging to the same party and therefore would not be useful for the purpose of this study.

Another option to measure policy positions is via content analysis of speeches by MPs. Thanks to advances both in the (digital) availability of parliamentary documents and computer techniques to analyse text documents, options are available that make content analysis of large volumes of parliamentary speeches possible (Slapin & Proksch, 2014). Automated content analysis allows analyzing large text files to establish policy positions of individual members of parliament. There are two main approaches: *Wordscores* (Laver et al., 2003) and *Wordfish* (Slapin & Proksch, 2008). In this study the Wordscores approach will be used.

Wordscores is an *a priori*-method in the sense that "reference" texts are used to estimate the position of "virgin" texts. Based on the reference texts the positions on a dimension are known. In essence, the word patterns of these reference texts are compared to those of the virgin texts. Based on these word patterns the virgin texts are scored (for a

[73] For the Netherlands, if a party presented lists of unequal length in different districts, the maximum number of candidates was coded.

detailed description of the method, see Laver et al., 2003).

An important decision during this process is to decide which texts should be used as reference and virgin texts. What to use as virgin texts is clear: texts produced by MPs in parliament. Studies have shown that Wordscores can be used to measure policy positions based on speeches of MPs in parliament (Bäck et al., 2010; Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009). The data for the text file for each individual MP was obtained from official websites (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2017b; Ministry of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations, 2016). For Belgium the 51st (2003-2007) 52nd (2007-2010) and 53rd (2010-2014) legislative periods are analysed. For each Belgian MP all contributions to plenary sessions and all written questions submitted to ministers are included. For the Netherlands six legislative periods between 1998 and 2017 are analysed. For these legislative periods all speeches made in plenary sessions and all submitted written questions are included[74]. For each MP two text files per legislative period were created with all contributions of that MP in a given legislative period, one that contained speeches made in plenary sessions and one that contained the questions submitted. These texts files are used to estimate the positions of MPs in a specific legislative period in two different ways. This allows checking whether the behaviour differs across the two forms of participation, as is expected in H4.3.

The choice for reference texts and how to score those texts is less clear-cut. An option would be to use party manifestos as reference texts. However, comparing manifestos with speeches in parliament complicates matters. For example, in manifestos a large range of issues are usually discussed, while speeches normally focus on a single topic. Furthermore, there is a difference between the 'language' of manifestos and speeches. Since Wordscores counts all words in a document, if the vocabulary of manifestos and speeches differ, Wordscores will not be able to estimate a policy position accurately (see Laver & Benoit, 2002 for further argumentation). It is therefore better to choose reference texts that are also produced in parliament by MPs, so the reference and virgin texts can actually be compared. One way of doing this is by using the texts of all MPs from one party and combine them into a single text, which could be used as the reference text for that party (Mickler, 2017b). This was done for this study: all text files created for the individual MPs of a party were combined into one file for each party in each legislative period, serving as reference texts. For the party (reference) texts two versions were made as well: one with contributions to plenary sessions and one with the written questions[75]. If members of parliament switched to another party (or started his or her own parliamentary group) between elections, only the contributions made as a member of the party for which the

[74] The plenary sessions for the 51st legislative period in Belgium were not analyzed, due to the format of the documents containing the proceedings for this period. It was not possible to subtract the needed information from these documents in an automated manner. The written questions for this period are included in the analysis.

[75] For the Netherlands, some co-partisans submitted questions together. These questions were included in the own document of each MP, but were only included once in the document of the party.

candidate was elected are included.

The scores given to these reference texts are the party positions on the general left-right scale according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017)[76]. This scale runs from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). The general left-right scale is chosen to score the reference texts, since these reference texts consist of texts dealing with a wide range of topics. Therefore, using the general left-right scale seems most appropriate. In Appendix D.1 the policy positions for the parties included in the analysis are given.

Based on the outcome of the Wordscores analyses the value of the (absolute) difference between a candidate's individual position and the average position of all candidates from his or her party will be calculated, serving as an indicator of a candidate's deviation from the party line. Measuring a candidate's deviation from the party line like this has one important consequence. It is only possible to do this for MPs, and not for other candidates. The models that contain the deviation from the party line are therefore restricted to candidates who also served as an MP in the previous legislative term.

Advantages of the Wordscores method are that it increases reliability compared to hand coding; it is easier and more flexible to implement; the researcher does not necessarily have to (perfectly) speak the language of the analysed texts; and the Wordscores approach produces uncertainty measures for each policy position (Klemmensen et al., 2007, p. 748). One of the disadvantages of the method is that the validity of the produced scores for the virgin texts depends on the choice of reference texts and how they are scored (Klemmensen et al., 2007, p. 748). Choosing and scoring the reference texts is therefore crucial. With regard to this study this disadvantage is slightly less important, because I am not interested in the party and candidate positions per se, but only in the differences between members of the same party.

A disadvantage of measuring a candidate's deviation from the party based on legislative behaviour is that, by definition, it is only possible to measure the deviation from incumbent candidates at the time of an election. Therefore, the number of candidates that can be included in the regression models that take into account the deviation variables (models three and four) is much lower than the actual candidates participating in the election.

The Wordscores approach delivered promising results in the field of estimating policy positions based on party manifestos. However, whether they can also be used for estimating policy positions of individual legislators is still debatably. Mickler (2017a) for example shows that there is not much overlap between policy positions of MPs estimated by Wordscores and self-placement of MPs on a left-right scale. Some additional analyses were conducted to test the validity of the policy positions estimated by the method described in this section. These are presented in appendix D.2. This appendix contains a further

[76] For more information about the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, see http://chesdata.eu/.

discussion of the decisions made for the analyses, shows the number of documents that were analysed and gives an overview of the estimated policy positions.

In addition, descriptive statistics for all variables included in the model can be found in appendix D.3 (Table D.3).

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Preference votes for Dutch candidates

In this section the results of the analysis of the Dutch case will be presented and discussed. The results of the multilevel regression models for the Netherlands are shown in table 4.4. The first model shows the result with only the predictors at the individual level included. This model is based on all candidates participating in all districts at the same position on the list in the parliamentary elections between 1998 and 2017.

Since the model presented is based on the entire population, statistical significance is less important and we should mainly look at the magnitude of the effects. Note that the dependent variable is the log(10) transformation of the percentage of preference votes of a candidate. As the scale is less intuitive, the interpretation of the regression coefficients is harder. The effect size of each variable is discussed based on the difference between the predicted outcome if that variable would take its minimum value and its maximum value, while keeping all other variables at their mean (for interval-ratio variables) or modus (for dummy variables). In addition, the predicted outcome was transformed back to its original value (the percentage of votes, instead of the logarithmic transformation), which makes it easier to gauge the effect sizes. These values were calculated using the effects package for R (Fox, 2003).

Female candidates receive more votes than male candidates, but this effect is small. Women near the top of the list receive approximately 1 per cent point more preference votes than male candidates at the same list position. Near the end of the list the effect is even smaller. For example, a woman at position 25 receives less than 0.1 percentage point more preference votes than male candidates at position 25.

What matters much more is being the first woman on the list. For example, if a woman occupies the third position on the list and is the first woman, she receives approximately 4 percentage points more preference votes than male candidates on the third position. In addition, she also receives 4 percentage points more preference votes than a female candidate on the third position on a list where she is not the first woman on the list (in other words: the first or second position on that list is also occupied by a woman). If the first woman is lower on the list, the absolute effect decreases. However, the effect remains. These effects are similar in the other models as well.

Having a non-European background does attract slightly more preference votes: depending on the list position the effect varies from 0.5 percentage point for candidates higher on the list to 0.1 percentage point for candidates lower on the list. In contrast to the

Table 4.4 Preference votes for Dutch candidates

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
(Intercept)	0.778***	1.393***	1.862***	1.678***
	(0.064)	(0.232)	(0.431)	(0.415)
Woman	0.161***	0.133***	0.099*	0.121*
	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.049)
First woman on list	0.374***	0.931***	1.068***	1.016***
	(0.046)	(0.075)	(0.125)	(0.134)
Non-European background	0.345***	0.432***	0.285*	0.364*
	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.135)	(0.149)
First non-European background	-0.113*	0.016	0.140	0.032
	(0.054)	(0.083)	(0.171)	(0.184)
List position	-1.167***	-0.627***	-0.559***	-0.581***
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.096)	(0.102)
List-pusher	0.753***	0.547***		
	(0.043)	(0.09)		
Member of parliament t-1	0.128***	0.221***		
	(0.019)	(0.028)		
Minister t-1	0.476***	0.773***		
	(0.059)	(0.077)		
Junior minister t-1	0.082	0.242**		
	(0.059)	(0.077)		
Deviation (Plenary sessions) t-1			2.774	
			(1.984)	
Deviation (Written questions) t-1				-0.285
				(0.935)
Deviation*list position			-4.408	-1.247
			(2.818)	(1.464)
Traditional party		-0.123	-0.350	-0.430
		(0.21)	(0.321)	(0.307)
Populist party		-0.247	-0.494	-0.512
		(0.217)	(0.331)	(0.316)
Left Right scale		-0.064*	-0.046	-0.045
		(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Evaluation score list-puller		-0.133***	-0.171***	-0.154***
		(0.017)	(0.041)	(0.04)
Government party t-1		0.031	0.157*	0.149*
		(0.026)	(0.061)	(0.063)
Candidates on list		-0.009***	-0.007***	-0.004
		(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
AIC	2831.2	2128.3	595.0	543.8
BIC	2911.6	2233.4	664.2	611.4
Log likelihood	-1402.6	-1045.1	-280.5	-254.9
Observations	3591	1869	433	394
Groups (Parties/Elections)	44/7	8/6	8/5	8/5
Variance: Party (intercept)	0.112	0.029	0.058	0.052
Variance: Election (intercept)	0.005	0.010	0.013	0.003

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

findings for gender, being the highest placed candidate with a non-European background does not have an additional effect. This effect is absent in the second, third and fourth model. In the first model there is a slightly negative effect. When looking at absolute numbers of preference votes and comparing the number of votes for the first candidate with a non-European background with other candidates with a non-European background, the first candidate with a non-European background on the list in the Netherlands receives more votes than other candidates with a non-European background. Since this effect does not show up in the regression models, this difference could likely be explained by the effect of the list position. The first candidate with a non-European background simply seems to receive more votes, because he or she has a better list position.

List position has a strong influence on the percentage of preference votes a candidate receives. Candidates lower on the list receive fewer preference votes. It is mainly the first few candidates who have larger shares of preference votes. It is not until we reach the bottom of the list that we see a small effect again: the list-pusher receives slightly more votes. However, this effect is not very large. A list-pusher may expect two or three times the percentage of preference votes of other candidates near the end of the list.

Political experience has a positive influence on the percentage of preference votes a candidate receives. All things equal, an incumbent candidate receives approximately two to three times as many preference votes as a candidate who was not an MP in the previous legislative period. For ministers this effect is larger. A minister who runs at the same list position as another candidate who was not a minister receives approximately four times as many preference votes. From the variables measuring political experience, having been a junior minister in the previous period has the smallest effect. For example, running for office at position 8 on the list, having experience of a junior minister only adds 0.1 percentage points to a candidates expected percentage of preference votes. These effects are robust when party variables are added to the model (model 2).

The third and fourth model include the effect deviation from the party line in the previous legislative period has on the percentage of preference votes a candidate receives[77]. It tests the hypotheses that candidates who deviate more strongly from the party line receive more preference votes in the next election and that this effect is stronger for candidates more towards the end of the list. Furthermore, the expectation was that the effects would be stronger if we look at the deviation from the party line of an MP based on the analysis of the written questions an MP submitted compared to speeches held in parliament. Most of these expectations are not met. First, while there is a positive effect of deviation from the party

[77] Some independent variables at the candidate level are excluded in the third and fourth model. This is because the group of candidates included in these two models is fairly homogeneous. Since we are interested in the effect of behaviour in parliament in the previous period, we can only include candidates who were a member of parliament in this previous period. Therefore, some of the variables included in the first and second model cannot be included in the third and fourth, because they have no (member of parliament t-1 and list-pusher) or almost no (minister and junior minster) variation.

line in plenary sessions, there is almost no effect of deviation from the party line with respect to written questions. For MPs, independent of their list position, deviating from the party line while submitting written questions actually seems to result in fewer preference votes, although the effect is only 0.1 percentage points. However, there is an effect for MPs who deviate from the party in the plenary sessions, but this effect does not apply to all MPs. Contrary to what was expected, only MPs near the top of the list can benefit from deviating from the party line. For candidates at the bottom of the list, deviation from the average party score has no effect; for candidates near the top of the list, this has an effect of 0.7 percentage points. However, this effect of 0.7 percentage points applies to the candidates who deviated most from their own party compared to those who did not deviate at all. So all in all, we have to conclude that deviating from the party line hardly has an impact on preference votes.

The model also contains some party effects. The average evaluation of the list-puller also has a negative impact on the percentage of preference votes, in line with what we found in the previous chapter. All other things being equal, a popular list-puller might result in a loss of two-thirds of a candidate's percentage of preference votes. The hypothesis that candidates from traditional parties receive more preference votes than candidates from newer parties has to be rejected: no evidence is found for this hypothesis. The magnitude in terms of percentage preference votes is almost zero, suggesting that there is no difference between levels of preference voting for candidates from traditional and newer parties. The effects for candidates from populist parties are stronger. Candidates from populist parties receive approximately only one-third of the percentage of preference votes that candidates in the same position for other parties receive, although these effects are not significant. Finally, candidates from parties more towards the right receive fewer preference votes than candidates from more left-wing parties, contrary to what was expected.

In addition, two control variables were added: list-length and government party. The length of the list has a negative impact on the percentage of preference votes a candidate receives. For a candidate near the top of the list, a longer list leads to a maximum decrease of preference votes of 0.6 percentage points. Candidates from government parties receive slightly more votes: approximately 0.2 percentage points.

4.4.2 Dutch candidates and where they receive their votes

One hypothesis for the Dutch case is not tested yet. Hypothesis 4.3 states that candidates receive a higher percentage of votes in their own district than in other districts. Since the analysis in the previous section was based on the number of votes at the national level, it was not possible to test this hypothesis. Therefore, in this section I will conduct some additional analyses to test this hypothesis.

In Dutch elections the place of residence of candidates is mentioned on the ballot. If voters wish to cast a vote for a candidate from their own region, this information is thus available. Table 4.5 is based on all candidates in the elections between 1998 and 2017 who

participated in at least two districts, including their 'home district', i.e. the district which includes their place of residence. Almost all candidates participated in their own district (97 per cent), but not all of them participated in another district as well. We are interested in how candidates perform in their own district, relative to their performance at the national level. Therefore, only candidates who participate in their 'home district' and at least one other district than their 'home district' are included in this analysis. In the period between 1998 and 2017 5,036 candidates satisfy both conditions. For each of these candidates the number of preference votes as a percentage of the total number of votes for their party in each district is calculated. Over the entire period for 81.5 per cent of the candidates this percentage was highest in their own district. For almost all candidates (98.0 per cent) the percentage of votes in their home district was above their nationwide percentage of votes. It therefore seems highly likely that the region the candidate comes from plays a role in where candidates receive their votes. At least a part of the electorate seems to look for a regional candidate to vote for. Candidates can therefore expect a considerable 'home bonus'.

Table 4.5 Electoral performance Dutch candidates in home district

Year	Candidates	Highest percentage in home district	Percentage home district above average
1998	793	81.1%	97.7%
2002	664	80.3%	97.9%
2003	591	72.8%	96.8%
2006	617	75.0%	97.1%
2010	642	85.7%	98.9%
2012	833	86.0%	99.2%
2017	896	85.8%	98.1%
Total	**5036**	**81.5%**	**98.0%**

Source: own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in at least two district, including their 'home district' (excluding list-pullers). The district of Bonaire (in 2012 and 2017) is excluded from the analysis.

Table 4.6 compares a candidate's performance in his or her own district and the performance in all other districts. For all candidates between 1998 and 2012, candidates on average received 2.2 percentage points more votes in their own district, compared to the votes in all other districts the candidate participated in. At first this might not look impressive. However, at the national level on average only 7 per cent of the candidates in the Netherlands receive 2.2 per cent or more of their party's votes. Moreover, the average candidate only receives 0.64 per cent of the votes of his or her party. The regional 'bonus' of a candidate is thus substantial for many candidates. In addition, the effect we observe for women is visible for the regional candidate as well. In a particular district, the bonus is much stronger for the first candidate on the list from that district. On average the first candidate from a specific district on the list receives approximately 4.5 per cent more preference votes than co-partisans from the same district.

There is considerable variation in the home bonus between the various districts. The effect of the home bonus varies from 6.1 in the district of Middelburg to 0.8 in the district of

Table 4.6 Average 'home bonus' per district

District	Bonus	Candidates
Middelburg	6.1	119
Maastricht	5.1	230
Leeuwarden	4.6	173
Groningen	4.3	205
Assen	4.2	124
Rotterdam	3.1	241
Lelystad	2.9	140
Nijmegen	2.4	119
Zwolle	2.4	247
Amsterdam	2.1	512
Den Helder	2.0	180
Tilburg	1.9	228
's-Hertogenbosch	1.8	278
's-Gravenhage	1.7	356
Arnhem	1.5	365
Haarlem	1.3	328
Dordrecht	1.1	286
Utrecht	1.0	471
Leiden	0.8	434
Average	**2.2**	**5036**

Source: own dataset, based on all parliamentary elections in the period 1998-2017. Based on election results without the district of Bonaire. Included are all candidates who participated in at least two district, including their 'home district' (excluding list-pullers).

Leiden. Partly, this effect is 'mechanical' in nature. If we assume that in all districts an equal proportion of voters would vote for a regional candidate, on average candidates in districts in which fewer candidates from that district are on the ballot would receive a higher percentage of votes. We indeed see a negative correlation between the number of candidates from a district and the average home bonus ($r = -0.371$, $p = <0.001$, $N=133$). This, however, does not fully explain the variation in the home bonus. The home bonus is highest in the five provinces furthest away from 'The Hague': the districts of Middelburg, Maastricht, Leeuwarden, Groningen and Assen. In the district of Maastricht almost 60 per cent of the preference votes are cast for regional candidates. In the *Randstad* only 20 per cent of the preference votes are cast for a regional candidate. The distinction between the *Randstad* and the rest of the country, which was already discussed in the previous chapter, is also visible here. Voters living outside the *Randstad* are more likely to cast a preference vote, especially those living in the north and south of the country. Based on the findings presented in this chapter, this suggests that voters outside the *Randstad* are more likely to cast a preference vote; they have a greater inclination to cast a vote for a regional candidate compared to voters living in the *Randstad*.

4.4.3 Preference votes for Belgian candidates

The regression models for Belgium are shown in table 4.7. In Belgium, the gender effects are different compared to the Netherlands. Female candidates receive slightly more preference votes than male candidates, if we look at a larger subset of candidates (in the first and

Table 4.7 Preference votes for Belgian candidates

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	1.122***	1.310***	1.399***	1.418***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.078)	(0.068)
Woman	0.031***	0.038***	-0.106*	-0.092*
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.05)	(0.038)
First woman on list	-0.011	-0.001	0.034	0.026
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.056)	(0.046)
Non-European background	0.087***	0.113***	-0.046	-0.047
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.091)	(0.076)
First non-European background	-0.066***	-0.100***		
	(0.017)	(0.025)		
List position	-0.620***	-0.620***	-0.623***	-0.560***
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.063)	(0.053)
List-pusher	0.304***	0.388***		
	(0.007)	(0.012)		
Member of parliament t-1	0.139***	0.134***		
	(0.009)	(0.01)		
Minister t-1	0.370***	0.377***		
	(0.021)	(0.022)		
Junior minister t-1	0.266***	0.276***		
	(0.045)	(0.046)		
Deviation (Plenary sessions) t-1			-0.459	
			(0.567)	
Deviation (Written questions) t-1				0.066
				(0.324)
Deviation*list position			0.891	-0.359
			(0.992)	(0.557)
Effective candidates on list		-0.015***	-0.009**	-0.011***
		(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Old party		-0.048*	0.026	0.050
		(0.019)	(0.082)	(0.063)
Government party t-1		-0.031***	-0.075	-0.101
		(0.009)	(0.075)	(0.056)
Populist party		0.014	0.016	-0.018
		(0.037)	(0.087)	(0.069)
Left Right scale		-0.003	-0.002	-0.003
		(0.004)	(0.01)	(0.009)
AIC	-6091.8	-2933.4	-54.7	-98.2
BIC	-5995.9	-2816.7	-4.1	-41.1
Log likelihood	3059.9	1485.7	43.3	65.1
Observations	6943	3430	174	262
Groups (Parties/Districts/Elections)	105/13/4	11/13/4	10/13/2	11/13/3
Variance: Party (intercept)	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001
Variance: District (intercept)	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000
Variance: Election (intercept)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset.

second model). In these models female candidates receive approximately 6 per cent more preference votes than male candidates from the same list position. For example, if a male candidate on the fifth position receives 5.4 per cent preference votes, a female candidate on the same position would receive 5.7 per cent preference votes. The percentages for male and female candidates drop more towards the end of the list, but the relative difference remains the same. In the third and fourth model, however, this effect changes, and women tend to receive 15 per cent fewer preference votes than male candidates. These two models are only based on candidates who were a member of parliament in the previous election. These candidates normally occupy positions towards the top of the list. The positive effect for woman seems to be for female candidates towards the end of the list in particular, and less for women at the top of the list. An even bigger difference with the Netherlands is the effect of being the first woman on the list. In the Netherlands this has a strong positive effect, but in Belgium this effect is much smaller. In the first two models the effect is negligible; the third and fourth model show an effect of approximately 0.7 percentage points preference votes for female candidates running at the second position on the list, compared to male candidates running at the second position on the list[78]. The fact that there is a much smaller 'first woman effect' in Belgium can be explained by a difference in gender rules between both countries. In the Netherlands there are no rules stipulating a specific distribution of female and male candidates. In Belgium these rules exist. Since 2002 the difference between the number of male and female candidates on a list may not be greater than one. Therefore, on lists with an even number of candidates there are an equal number of male and female candidates. Furthermore, the first two candidates on the list may not have the same gender[79]. This may explain the difference between vote shares for male and female candidates between Belgium and the Netherlands.

Having a non-European background leads to slightly more votes in Belgium, if we look at the first and second model. A male candidate running at the fifth position with a non-European background would receive 1.1 percentage points more preference votes than a male candidate with a European background running at the fifth position. However, the effect disappears if we look at the third and fourth model. This again suggests that candidates with a non-European background lower on the list have an advantage, but candidates at the top of the list do not have this advantage. This is also what is shown by the 'first non-European background' indicator, which shows a negative effect of approximately one percentage point.

In Belgium too, list position is a strong predictor of a candidate's share of preference votes. The model predicts that candidates towards the top of the list receive approximately

[78] If we look at the actual election results, on average the 390 women on the second position receive 8.9 per cent preference votes. The 159 male candidates on the second position receive on average 8.3 per cent preference votes. However, there is almost no difference in the average percentage of preference votes for male and female candidates on top of the list (22.0 versus 22.1 percentage).

[79] As a transition rule, in the elections of 2003 not all first three candidates were allowed to be of the same gender.

15 per cent preference votes, whereas candidates at the bottom of the list receive only 2 per cent preference votes. Next to this negative effect of position a 'last position effect' exists as well. The last candidate on the list receives two to three times the number of preference votes that other candidates towards the end of the list receive.

Three variables are included in the model to test whether political experience has an effect on the percentage of preference votes a Belgian candidate receives. Just like in the Netherlands, candidates who served as an MP, minister or junior minister in the previous legislative period may count on additional preference votes. For example an incumbent candidate running at the third position receives two percentage points more preference votes than a candidate without experience as an MP who runs at the third position. For ministers this effect is 8 percentage points and for junior ministers 5 percentage points. This last result is in contrast with the findings for the Netherlands, where a junior minister does not receive much more preference votes compared to other candidates.

Model three and four include the effect of deviating from the average party score, based respectively on speeches in plenary sessions and written questions[80]. The expectation is that in general candidates who deviate more from the party line receive more preference votes, and that this effect is stronger for candidates lower on the list. In addition, the expectation is that this effect is stronger for the indicator based on written questions. Based on the speeches MPs made in plenary sessions, for candidates towards the top of the list the effect of deviating is negative. The effect is also limited: only candidates who deviate most from the average party score receive more than 2 percentage points fewer preference votes, compared to candidates who are on the average party score. For candidates towards the end of the list the effect is positive, which is in line with the hypothesis. However, the electoral gains are limited: not more than approximately 0.5 percentage points for the candidates who deviate most. Based on the written questions MPs submitted the effect is reversed: there is a small positive effect for candidates near the top of the list, but this effect is not more than 0.7 percentage points for the candidates who deviate most. For candidates lower on the list the effect is negative, candidates who deviate most receive approximately 0.5 percentage points fewer preference votes than candidates close to the average party score. The implications of these findings will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.

Next to these indicators at the candidate level, the model includes indicators at the party level. First, the number of effective candidates on the party list has a negative effect on the percentage of preference votes a candidate receives. This is not a surprising finding: it is

[80] Some variables are excluded from the third and fourth model, because they have no variation, see also footnote 77, page 54. In addition to the variables mentioned in that footnote, the variable 'First non-European background' is excluded for Belgium as well. Because of the districts in Belgium, from each list only a few candidates are elected. Most elected candidates with a non-European background are therefore the first candidate with a non-European background on a list. This has an effect on the correlation between both background variables in the third and fourth model, since only candidates who were a member of parliament in the previous period are included. Since the correlation between both variables is extremely high in this subset of candidates, only the variable measuring a candidate's background is included in the third and fourth model.

rather logical that for lists with larger numbers of candidates, on average a candidate receives fewer preference votes in relative terms. The model predicts that candidates of parties with longer lists (24 candidates) receive on average only half of the votes of candidates who run at the same position on smaller lists (around 5 candidates). The inclusion of this variable in the second, third and fourth model is therefore also an important explanation for the difference in the variance of the intercepts for the different groups (as shown towards the bottom of table 4.7). In the first model there is some variance between the intercepts for different parties and the intercepts for different districts. The intercept (and thus the number of preference votes) is higher for smaller districts and for parties that do not present lists with the maximum number of candidates. In the second, third and fourth model the variation between these intercepts disappears to a large extent, because the variation in these models is explained by the number of effective candidates on a list.

The other party indicators have a different impact in the model for Belgium compared to the model for the Netherlands. In the Dutch model the percentages of all candidates in one party do not add up to 100 per cent, since votes for the first candidate are not considered as preference votes. Therefore, in the Dutch models these other party variables did actually say something about which parties attract more preference votes (instead of more votes for the list-puller). For Belgium this is not the case, since all votes for a candidate are seen as a preference vote. Therefore in these models these variables do not say that much about which types of parties attract preference votes. If a specific party would attract more preference votes, but these would be distributed equally amongst the candidates of that party, these effects would not be visible in the regression models[81]. An effect would only show up when comparing the second with the third and the fourth model, if the distribution of votes between candidates on top of the list and at the bottom of the list would differ much. However, this difference does not seem to exist.

In table 4.8 the variables on the party level are included in a model predicting the percentage of preference votes cast for a party, relative to the total number of votes cast for that party. The results show that traditional parties attract approximately 20 percentage points more preference votes than newer parties. For populist parties fewer preference votes are cast, but the difference is only 3.7 percentage points. Government parties receive slightly fewer preference votes than opposition parties, but this difference is very small (below 1 percentage point). Parties located more towards the right of the left-right scale receive fewer preference votes, but the difference is small. Based on the positions of the parties the difference between the most left-wing and most right-wing party would be 3.7 per cent. Finally, the effective number of candidates has a positive influence on the number of preference votes cast. For each extra candidate on the list, the party can expect half a

[81] These effects would have been visible if instead of using the votes of a candidate as a percentage of the total preference votes cast for that party, the percentage of the total votes cast for the party (thus including list votes) would have been used.

percentage point more preference votes.

Table 4.8 Percentage of preference votes within Belgian parties

	Model 1
(Intercept)	45.658***
	(5.307)
Effective candidates on list	0.402
	(0.205)
Traditional party	19.342***
	(3.500)
Government party t-1	-0.658
	(2.026)
Populist party	-3.670
	(6.220)
Left Right scale	-0.468
	(0.774)
AIC	1312.8
BIC	1345.1
Log likelihood	-646.4
Observations	186
Groups (Parties/Districts/Elections)	16/13/4
Variance: Party (intercept)	25.16
Variance: District (intercept)	20.88
Variance: Election (intercept)	19.01

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset.

4.5 Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter I study what factors affect the electoral success of candidates. An overview of the results is given in table 4.9. As expected, list position and political experience have a strong and positive influence on the electoral success of candidates, both in Belgium and the Netherlands. However, not all expectations were met and some differences exist between Belgium and the Netherlands. The effects for gender are different in the Netherlands and Belgium. In general the effects are stronger for female candidates more towards the end of the list in Belgium. In the Netherlands the first woman on the list has a larger advantage, while in Belgium there is no such advantage for the first female candidate. These differences might be explained by the fact that in Belgium rules exist that guarantee an equal number of male and female candidates on the list. In addition, the top two candidates should not be from the same gender. That female candidates towards the top of the list do not seem to benefit as much in Belgium as they do in the Netherlands might be explained by the fact that the lists in Belgium are more gender balanced: the need to vote for a woman in Belgian might actually be smaller, because there are more women towards the top of the list. The fact that female candidates lower on the list receive more votes than male candidates in Belgium might be a result of the fact that Belgian voters can cast multiple preference votes. The explanation therefore might also be that it is not so much that the first female candidate

Table 4.9 Summary of findings for chapter 4

Group	Categories	H	Exp.	Bel.	Net.
Underrepresented social groups	Women	4.1	+	++	+
	Candidates with a non-European background	4.1	+	+	+
First of a underrepresented social groups	First woman	4.2	+	~	++
	First candidate with a non-European background	4.2	+	-	~
Geographical representation	Dutch candidates in their own *kieskring*	4.3	+		++
List position	More towards the top	4.4	+	++	++
	Lowest position	4.5	+	+	+
Political experience	Incumbent MP	4.6	+	++	+
	Minister	4.6	+	++	++
	Junior minister	4.6	+	++	+
Deviating from party line	Deviating from party line	4.7	+	~	~
	Interaction with list position	4.8	+	~	-
	Stronger for question than for plenary sessions	4.9	+	~	~
Party effects	Traditional parties	4.10	+	+	~
	Populist parties	4.11	-	~	-
	Right-wing parties	4.12	+	-	-
	Parties with unpopular list-pullers	4.13	+		+

Note: ++ strong positive effect; + positive effect; ~ no effect; - negative effect

in Belgium does not benefit from being the first woman on the list, but rather that lower placed female candidates benefit as well (and therefore making the difference between the first female candidate and the lower placed candidates smaller), because voters in Belgium have multiple preference votes. It would be interesting to look at this phenomenon by looking at other electoral systems and see whether there is a relationship between the number of votes and the advantages for the first candidate of a specific (underrepresented) group.

A common assumption is that proportional representation benefits the representation of women in parliament (e.g. Norris, 2004), although this also depends on the context of the political system. However, studies focussing on the electoral success of women in list systems show mixed results. Some studies show that women receive fewer votes (Wauters et al., 2010) and some studies show no difference (Schmidt, 2003; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). However, whether women actually receive more votes is not the most relevant question, if we are interested in the representation of women in parliament. In such a case it is much more interesting to see whether the votes actually make a difference. It remains surprising that it is the first woman on the list who has such a large advantage in the Netherlands, since normally these candidates are elected anyway (see also Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). However, it seems that there is a small change in this respect. In the most recent elections four candidates were elected out of list order, three of them being a woman. It is difficult to say whether this actually has something to do with the

'vote for a woman' initiative, but at least it seems there is more awareness for the fact that if the goal is to make sure more women are elected, voting for the first woman on the list does not really help that cause.

In this chapter I also tested whether deviating from the party line has an effect on preference votes. To my knowledge, only one other study has investigated the effect ideology has on the intraparty competition in proportional representation systems. Van Erkel (2017) used a candidate survey to ask candidates about their opinion on different issues. He showed that differences between co-partisans exist, but that these differences had no effect on the electoral success of the candidates. I used quantitative text analyses to estimate policy positions of candidates and test whether candidates who deviate from their party receive more preference votes. Both in Belgium and the Netherlands there was no effect of deviating from the party line on the number of preference votes a candidate receives, neither for candidates near the top of the list nor for candidates lower on the list. For intraparty competition, it does not seem to matter whether a candidate deviates from the party line or not.

What could explain this non-finding? In Belgium, depending on the size of the district, voters can choose between 4 to 24 candidates. In the Netherlands, voters for most parties can choose between 30 candidates[82], although lists may include up to 80 candidates. It may be that for most voters in the Netherlands there are just too many candidates to be able to collect enough information about each candidate to see whether they have (slightly) different options than the party and whether this would be a reason to vote for such a candidate. Voters take ideology into consideration when distinguishing between parties, but look at other aspects when deciding which candidate within a party they prefer. It would be a difficult task for a voter to find the information necessary to make an informed choice based on the policy positions of all candidates on a party list. The question is even justified whether it is possible to obtain this information at all. While there are voting advice applications to help voters choose between parties, these tools are normally not available for all individual candidates[83]. Some parties have some information about their candidates on the website when they announce the lists for the upcoming elections, but the information is usually not very elaborate and focuses more often on the motivations of candidates to become an MP.

The electoral systems of Belgium and the Netherlands can both be classified as flexible list systems. In such systems parties still have a large influence on which candidates are elected. Therefore it might be that in flexible list systems the cost of making an informed choice about a candidate's policy position is too high, compared to the expected benefit. In systems where the expected benefit is higher, ideology at the interparty level might have a larger influence. For example in open list systems, where voters have way more influence on

[82] Some parties present shorter lists, but these are mostly new parties who do not receive enough seats to be elected.
[83] Although this is beginning to change. For example, in Belgium a VAA was launched in Flanders for the federal elections of 2014 (Van Erkel, 2017, pp. 50–51).

the actual composition of parliament, it might be worthwhile to look for a candidate who represents certain interests. In addition, such an effect might also be stronger in systems that allow for panachage voting, if candidates try to attract voters from other parties as well. Further research should therefore test the hypotheses in list systems that are more open as well.

Another important finding in this chapter is that in the Netherlands candidates tend to receive relatively more votes in the district in which they live. In the Netherlands the place of residence of a candidate is mentioned on the ballot, which makes it easy for voters to search for a candidate from their own region. This is different for Belgium, where the municipality of a candidate is not mentioned on the ballot. However, this phenomenon does not play the same role in Belgium as it plays in the Netherlands, since in Belgium voters can only vote for candidates from their own district.

Yet, it is striking that most of the factors that strongly influence the electoral success of a candidate (gender, list position, municipality in the Netherlands) are those factors that depend on or are given on the ballot. In the conclusion of this dissertation I will reflect on this issue of information availability on the ballot.

5 The consequences: what's in it for a candidate?

5.1 Introduction

In the run-up to the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2006 the VVD organized an internal election to choose a new party leader. The main contenders were Mark Rutte and Rita Verdonk. According to opinion polls Mrs Verdonk, who was the minister for immigration and integration at the time, was very popular amongst the (potential) electorate of the VVD. However, within the party, and especially the top of the party, Rutte was most popular. Rutte won the election by a small margin (51 versus 46 per cent) and became the new party leader and the list-puller for the VVD in the 2006 elections. Rita Verdonk was put on the second place on the party list (Van Holsteyn, 2007, p. 1141).

The battle seemed over, but both Verdonk and the voters decided differently. Verdonk led a personal campaign, thereby dividing the party. But her campaign, at least from a personal point of a view, was a success. Rita Verdonk received more votes than Mark Rutte. This was a first in the Netherlands for elections at the national level. Never before did a candidate lower on the list receive more votes than the list-puller.

A long internal power struggle followed. The leadership position of Rutte, who had the support of the parliamentary party group, was challenged by Verdonk. Verdonk felt backed by the massive support she had received from voters. Verdonk claimed she earned the right to become the party leader and was in constant disagreement with the rest of the party. Eventually, after yet another criticism of Verdonk of the party line, Rutte and the rest of the party felt that Verdonk could no longer be a member of the parliamentary party group and she was expelled from the parliamentary group. Dutch constitutional rules state that she could keep her seat in the Second Chamber and Verdonk became an independent MP. She started her own movement / party, and while briefly very successful in opinion polls, in the elections of 2010 she failed to reach the electoral threshold and was not elected. Mark Rutte, who remained the leader of the VVD, led his party to a victory in the elections and became prime minister.

An impressive number of preference votes do not guarantee a success in the long run, as the Verdonk story shows, but she definitely tried to play the 'mandate by preference votes' card. In this regard the story of the Christian Democratic politician Pieter Omtzigt was more successful. For the elections of 2012 he initially was not placed on the draft list of candidates of his party, after having been an MP for that party since 2003. This was not only to his own regret but also to that of his followers. When the congress had to approve the final list of candidates, after a campaign from local and prominent party members, Omtzigt was put on the 39th place. Despite now being on the list, this was still not a good perspective, since according to opinion polls his party would only receive around 12 seats (Louwerse, 2014). However, Omtzigt received 36,750 preference votes, more than enough to be elected out of list order. Five years later, when the Christian Democratic Party presented the list of

candidates for the 2017 elections, Omtzigt held the fourth position. Here, preference votes likely played a major role in his career.

While rather anecdotal, and somewhat extreme, Verdonk and Omtzigt show that preference votes may matter for a candidate's legislative behaviour and political career. In the previous three chapters I looked at factors *affecting* preference votes. This chapter will look in a more systematic manner at the *consequences* of preference votes for both the legislative behaviour and political career of a candidate. With regard to the political career of a candidate, in the context of this chapter I focus on political functions at the national level performed by a candidate after the elections.

Studies focusing on the consequences of the number of preference votes in flexible list systems are rare. A single quote from De Winter referring to the Belgian electoral system (2005, p. 423) was, for a long time, one of the few comments in the academic literature on the consequences: "Preference votes are not entirely irrelevant to a candidate's political career. Selectors do take into account a candidate's previous electoral performance."

The few studies that focus on the consequences of preference votes are related to the political career of candidates. Ackaert (1996) found that in Flanders (Belgium) political parties take the number of preference votes candidates received into account for the composition of the government and the reselection of candidates at the local level. Another study looked at the effect of preference votes on the career of ministers and junior minsters in Belgium (Weekers, 2003). The conclusion of her comprehensive study was that between 1981 and 1999 preference votes did not play a decisive role in the career of ministers. But since only ministers and junior ministers were analysed in that study, it is not possible to say how the number of preference votes for a candidate influences his or her actual chances of obtaining a government post. Karvonen (2004) also studied the effects of preference voting, but he focussed on effects of preference votes on the political system and, more specific, on the party system. Some more recent studies deal with the question of whether there is an effect of preference votes on the political career of a candidate (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017; Crisp et al., 2013; Folke et al., 2016), showing that there is an effect (these studies will be discussed in more detail below).

Thus, while we know something about the impact of the number of preference votes for a candidate, there is much we do *not* know. For countries as Belgium and the Netherlands, where only a few candidates are elected solely on the basis of preference votes (see section 5.2), this question is especially relevant both for voters and candidates. If the number of preference votes for a candidate has consequences, this could lead to an increased incentive for candidates to seek preference votes. For voters, the value of casting a preference vote could increase if they know it will have consequences. These potential consequences could also (at least partly) answer the puzzling finding why so many voters would vote for candidates who would have been elected anyway.

In terms of consequences of preference votes, at least three aspects are relevant. The first and most direct effect is whether candidates are elected based on preference votes. In

section 5.2 an overview is given of the number of candidates who receive enough votes to be elected based on preference votes, and how many of these candidates are elected out of list order. The second and third aspects are indirect consequences of preference votes. The number of preference votes may have an effect on the parliamentary behaviour of the candidates (see section 5.3). Finally, if parties value the number of preference votes a candidate receives, this potentially influences the political career of the candidate, i.e. whether candidates with more preference votes for example have a higher chance to be 'promoted' to (junior) minister or obtain a better list position in the next election (see section 5.4).

5.2 Candidates elected based on preference votes

In Belgium and the Netherlands only a small proportion of the elected candidates receive enough votes to be elected independent of their list position. At the same time, most of the candidates who are elected based on preference votes, would also have been elected based on their list position.

In Belgium, between 1919 and 1999, 30 candidates were elected out of list order: only 0.6 per cent of the total number of elected candidates in that period (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 117). But since the weight of preference votes was increased in 2003, by reducing the number of list votes that are transferred to the candidates (see section 1.4.1), the number of candidates elected out of list order increased dramatically.

First of all, in the four elections between 2003 and 2014 respectively 35, 33, 35 and 30 of the 150 elected candidates received enough votes to be elected on their own. Approximately 40 per cent of these candidates were elected out of list order. Both in 2003 and 2007 17 candidates (11.3 per cent of the elected candidates) were elected out of list order. In 2010 and 2014 respectively 12 (8.0 per cent) and 7 candidates (4.7 per cent) were elected out of list order. At first sight this seems an impressive effect. However, there is a downside. A large part of these elected candidates did not accept their seat. Out of the candidates elected out of list order six (35.2 per cent) did not enter parliament after the elections in 2003, seven (50.0 per cent) did not do so in 2007 and six (41.2 per cent) of them refused in 2010. Most of these candidates were list-pushers, and at the same time already held a position either in a regional parliament or government. The drop in elected candidates out of list order (and the fact that in 2014 all candidates who were elected out of list order accepted their seat), can likely be explained by the newly introduced rule that it was no longer allowed to be a candidate for multiple elections held at the same day if the mandates for the elected bodies are incompatible.

In the Netherlands, between 1946 and 1994, three candidates were elected out of list order: only 0.1 per cent of all candidates elected in that period. Political parties do not really encourage candidates to try to be elected out of list order: some parties even ask their candidates to state that they would not accept their seat if they would be elected out of list

order (Andeweg, 2005, p. 494; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012, p. 169).

The number of candidates elected out of order increased, after changing the formal weight of preference votes, although not as dramatically as in Belgium. Since the election of 1998 a candidate only needs 25 per cent of the electoral threshold to be elected based on preference votes (this was 50 per cent). In the seven parliamentary elections between 1998 and 2017 only 145 of the 979 elected candidates (excluding list-pullers) received enough votes to be elected on their own. However, also in the Netherlands most of these candidates would have been elected anyway. In most elections only one or two of the 150 elected candidates were elected out of order (14 candidates in a total of 7 elections). In the elections of 2017 a 'record' of four candidates were elected out of list order. An important difference with Belgium is that all these candidates accepted their seat after the elections.

5.3 Consequences for legislative behaviour

5.3.1 Expectations

Preference votes may influence the legislative behaviour of candidates. In general, according to André et al. (2014, p. 231) "[e]lectoral institutions shape the behaviour of (would-be) legislators between elections". More specifically, electoral institutions influence the "relative value to legislators (…) of personal reputations versus party reputations for advancing political careers" (Carey & Shugart, 1995). Systems that allow intra-party preference voting encourage behaviour of politicians that is focused on their personal reputations, since, in these systems legislators do not solely depend on their party in order to be re-elected, but also on the voter.

Research suggests that both the weight given to preference votes and the use of preference votes by voters influence the level of personal vote-seeking incentives (Bräuninger et al., 2012). This is where the competing principals theory comes into play (Carey, 2007). Members of parliament normally have at least one principal: the legislative party leadership. However, the institutional context might influence whether MPs also have other principals. If competing principals exist, this might reduce party unity, since voters do not only depend on the party leadership (Carey, 2007). So, if an electoral systems allows intraparty competition, party unity might be reduced because MP's try to distinguish themselves from party colleagues in order to attract voters.

MPs have two options to attract these voters: via constituency service and by voting against the party in parliament (Kam, 2009, p. 24). However, candidates in Belgium and the Netherlands partly depend on voters, but both countries should be classified as party-centered systems (Shugart, 2001). In the Netherlands and Belgium, but also in other countries, MPs to a large extent indeed vote according to party lines (see for example Van Vonno, 2016, p. 62). And that is not only a result of MPs being forced by the party leadership, but mainly because MPs simply are in agreement with the party, rely on cue-taking or voluntarily decide to vote according to party lines (Van Vonno, 2016). Yet, there

are other, to some extent more subtle, ways for an MP to distinguish him- or herself from co-partisans than voting against the party. Still, members of parliament who do not reach the individual threshold are not more active in parliament, in terms of sponsorship of amendments and motions and the submission of written question, to boost their chances of being re-elected (Louwerse & Otjes, 2016).

In this section, the starting point is that a candidate seeks re-election. The assumption is that what an MP does in parliament is driven by future elections: the behaviour is motivated by vote-seeking arguments. In terms of preference votes one might also turn the argument around. What if it is not the behaviour of a member that influences his or her preference votes at the next election, but the preference votes that influence the behaviour of an MP in the subsequent legislative term? Candidates with many preference votes could feel they were given a stronger personal mandate and therefore either perceive a responsibility (to the voter) or a right (for themselves) to act less in accordance with the party line.

One way an MP could do this, is by delivering speeches in parliament and therein deviate from the party line. According to Proksch and Slapin (2015) MPs do not use their speeches given in parliament with the goal to persuade their colleagues to change their opinion. Their main goal is to communicate with their voters and show them their policy positions. Therefore, if an MP feels he or she has a stronger personal mandate, and therefore has the opportunity to more strongly deviate from the party, speeches in parliament could be a way to show that to the voters. I will therefore test the following hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 5.1**: Candidates who receive more preference votes are more likely to deviate from the parliamentary party group line.

5.3.2 Data and methods

To test the effect of preference votes on the legislative behaviour of members of parliament in both Belgium and the Netherlands, two multilevel regression models will be conducted for each country. One model tests the effects of preference votes on the behaviour of MPs during plenary sessions and one model tests the effects of preference votes on the positions MPs take in the written questions they submit to (junior) ministers. These models contain random intercepts for parties and elections and districts (only for Belgium). The period of analysis is 1998 until 2017 for the Netherlands (6 legislative periods) and 2003 until 2014 for Belgium (3 legislative periods).

5.3.2.1 Deviating from the average party score

For the two analyses two different dependent variables will be used. One estimates the deviation of an MP from the average party score based on text analysis of speeches made during plenary sessions. The other dependent variable measures the deviation of MPs from the average party score based on text analysis of the written questions they submitted. These variables are discussed in section 4.3.3.

5.3.2.2 Independent variables

The most important independent variable should be an indicator of the number of preference votes for the members of parliament. However, it is not possible to simply use the votes a candidate received, since the size of both the party and the district (in Belgium) have an influence on the absolute number of votes. For Belgium a solution is to use the ratio of the number of received preference votes and the number of preference votes for a candidate necessary to be elected (which is calculated by dividing the number of votes of a party by the number of seats the party won in a district + 1). This last figure depends on the size of the party and (indirectly) on the size of the district. Therefore, this ratio is comparable between parties and districts. The higher the ratio the better the candidate performed. In the Netherlands the ratio between the number of votes for a candidate and the threshold for individual candidates will be used as the indicator for the number of preference votes. So, for both Belgium and the Netherlands this independent variable measures how close a candidate was to winning a seat on his or her own. A score of '1' means that the candidate received the exact number of preference votes necessary to be elected independent of his or her list position. To make sure the analysis is not influenced by only a few outliers (i.e. candidates who passed the threshold by a large margin), the maximum value this variable can take is one[84]. The data necessary for this variable were taken from official sources containing the elections results (for Belgium: Belgium.be, 2003, 2007, 2010, for the Netherlands: Kiesraad, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012).

Next to the indicator for preference votes three other variables will be included. First whether a candidate was a member of a party that was in government at that time, since governing parties are more unified than opposition parties in parliamentary systems (Carey, 2007). If agreements were made between governing parties, the pressure on individual members to stick to the party (or government) line might be larger. Second, the position on the list of a candidate (relative to the number of elected members of the party) is included as a control variable. Third, as an additional control variable incumbency is included. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in appendix E.2 (for the Netherlands in table e.3 (part I and II), on page 193 and for Belgium in table e.4 (part I and II), on page 194).

5.3.3 Results

Table 5.1 and table 5.2 show the results of the multilevel regression analyses for the effect of preference votes in the Netherlands and Belgium. The results are mixed, but in general they are not in line with the first hypothesis of this chapter. In figure 5.1 the effects the

[84] There might be a downside to this choice. If the effect would only manifest itself once the threshold is reached by a candidate, the analysis would not find any effect. Therefore the analyses presented in section 5.3.3 were also conducted for only those candidates who passed the threshold (with the preference votes variable not set at a maximum of 1). The results of these analyses did not show any different pattern than those presented in section 5.3.3 (the magnitude of the effect changed slightly, but if the effects were significant, they were in the same direction).

Table 5.1 Effect of preference votes on legislative behaviour (the Netherlands)

	Plenary sessions	**Written questions**
(Constant)	0.029***	0.059***
	(0.007)	(0.012)
Preference votes	0.006*	0.007
	(0.003)	(0.006)
List position	0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.005)
Government party	0.003	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.004)
Member of parliament t-1	-0.004*	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.004)
AIC	-4317.5	-2683.1
BIC	-4278.9	-2645.2
Log likelihood	2166.7	1349.6
Observations	923	839
Groups(Parties)	8	8
Groups(Election)	6	6
Variance: Party (intercept)	0.000	0.001
Variance: Election (intercept)	0.000	0.000

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset.

Table 5.2 Effect of preference votes on legislative behaviour (Belgium)

	Plenary sessions	**Written questions**
(Constant)	0.030**	0.080***
	(0.008)	(0.011)
Preference votes	0.025**	-0.018
	(0.009)	(0.142)
List position	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Government party	-0.009	-0.019
	(0.008)	(0.010)
Member of parliament t-1	-0.002	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.007)
AIC	-945.1	-901.1
BIC	-914.1	-867.0
Log likelihood	481.5	459.6
Observations	231	328
Groups(Parties)	11	12
Groups(Districts)	11	11
Groups(Election)	2	3
Variance: Party (intercept)	0.000	0.000
Variance: District (intercept)	0.000	0.000
Variance: Election (intercept)	0.000	0.000

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset.

Figure 5.1 Effects of preference votes on parliamentary behaviour



preference votes have in the different models are plotted. The Y-axis in these plots show the entire range of the relevant deviation variable, to help the interpretation of the coefficients presented in the tables. In both countries the model with the behaviour of MPs in plenary sessions as the dependent variable, show that the preference votes variable has a statistically significant and positive influence. However, both in the Netherlands and Belgium the effects are very limited in substantial terms. Moving from the minimum at the preference votes scale (0 per cent of the individual threshold) to the maximum (100 per cent of the individual threshold) a candidate only makes a small step on the deviation scale. In the Netherlands that step would be 0.006, while the deviation scale has a minimum score of 0.0 and a maximum of 0.19. Therefore, the maximum effect only equals 1/30 of the entire range of the deviation scale. While statistically significant, in substantial terms that effect is almost negligible. In Belgium the effect is somewhat stronger, but the maximum effect still only equals 1/7 of the entire deviation scale.

When the deviation of an MP from the average party score is measured based on his or her written question, a positive effect is only found in the Netherlands and it is very small. While moving through the entire range of the preference votes scale, an MP would only move 1/63 of the range of the deviation scale. In Belgium the effect is even negative, but also small. Moving through the entire range of the preference vote scale leads to a decrease on the dependent variable of 0.018, which is only 1/25 of the range of that scale. These effects are controlled for by list position and incumbency, which both have no major influence on deviating from the party line. In addition, the model controls for being a member of a government party. One might expect that this has a negative influence on deviating from the party line. This holds for Belgium, but not for the Netherlands. However, these effects are not statistically significant[85]. Hypothesis 5.1 therefore has to be rejected.

5.4 Consequences for the political career of a candidate

5.4.1 Expectations

For the Netherlands Andeweg and Irwin (2009, p. 93) observe a pattern in which "the possibility for a career in politics is now almost completely under the control of parties". Before the 1960s Dutch ministers were recruited from outside parliament more often and sometimes ministers without any party affiliation entered government (Secker, 1991). With the near disappearance of this type of politician, a development towards 'career politicians' has taken place, not only in the Netherlands (King, 1981). In addition, the selection of candidates is one of the most important functions of a political party (Hazan, 2014). Selectors take into account characteristics of candidates such as incumbency, gender,

[85] Additional analyses were conducted to test whether interaction effects between these control variables and preference votes exist. In none of the models the inclusion of interaction effects had a result on the conclusion presented here.

ethnicity and region (Gallagher, 1988), and the assumption is that they strive for 'ticket-balancing', i.e. a mix of candidates with different characteristics (Matthews & Valen, 1999). Of course, this task is simpler if the district magnitude and the length of the list increase (Matland & Studlar, 1996; in the context of geographical representattion, see also Put, 2016, p. 192). So, especially for the Netherlands, but also for the larger districts in Belgium there is at least the possibility of drafting balanced lists[86].

Recent studies have shown that preference votes could also influence the selection process. The study of André et al. (2017) is especially relevant, since it looks at the influence of preference votes on party nomination strategies in three countries where flexible-list systems are used. The study shows that in Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia preference votes do influence the list position of a returning candidate for the next election. Returning candidates who are ranked higher by the voters (in terms of votes) than by the party (in terms of their original list position) are moved up the list by the party in the next election[87]. Crisp et al. (2013) come to similar conclusions for Slovakia, but they included only incumbents in their analysis: once elected, those who received more preference votes are more likely to move up the list for the next election. Since this mechanism seems to work both in nationwide (single district) and district proportional representation systems, I expect the same to be true for the Netherlands.

> **Hypothesis 5.2**: Candidates who receive more preference votes have a better chance of getting a higher place on the list in the next elections.

However, I do not expect that this effect necessarily is the same for both female and male candidates. For most parties there is a difference in the distribution between female and male candidates on the list. In the Netherlands, most parties not only have more male candidates on the list, but they also have more male candidates towards the top of the list. In Belgium rules dictate that there should be an equal number of male and female candidates on the list, however, the rules further only stipulate that the first two candidates may not have the same gender[88]. As a result, despite the fact that parties have an equal number of male and female candidates on their list, there are still more male candidates towards the top of the list in Belgian parties[89]. It is not immediately clear if and how this would influence the effect of preference votes on the list position for the next election. On

[86] These balanced lists can (partly) be a deception, since arguably what matters most is which candidates have a realistic chance to be elected. The order of the list still has a large influence on which candidates are elected (see section 5.2) and selectors favour for example incumbents or ministers on more 'realistic positions' (i.e. positions more towards the top of the list) (Put & Maddens, 2012). This means that a balanced list can still lead to the group of elected candidates with highly similar characteristics.

[87] This result is based on an analysis of all parties (that won seats in the period under analysis), so it is not clear whether there is a difference between different parties.

[88] As a transition-rule, in 2003, the first election under these gender rules the first three candidates could not have the same gender.

[89] For example, in the 2014 elections, if we only look at the first 6 candidates on all lists, 46.9 per cent of the candidates were female. From the first three candidates on all lists, only 41.6 per cent was a female candidate.

the one hand, it is possible to argue that political parties still prefer (for whatever reason) to have male candidates towards the top of the list and the effect of preference votes on the list position would therefore also be stronger for male candidates. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that since political parties prefer male candidates, a good electoral performance is less important for them to gain a better list position for the next election. In that case, we could expect that the effect is stronger for female candidates, since they need something extra in order to be promoted to better list positions. The argument could also be reversed: because of overrepresentation of male candidates towards the top of the list, a better electoral performance is more important for them to distinguish themselves from their (male) co-partisans. Under that logic the effect would be stronger for male candidates and less important for female candidates because they have less (female) competition. In any way, it is difficult to theorize that the effect will be in a specific direction. Therefore the following, and rivalling, hypotheses are formulated:

> **Hypothesis 5.3**: The effect of preference votes on the list position in the next election is stronger for male candidates than for female candidates.
> **Hypothesis 5.4**: The effect of preference votes on the list position in the next election is stronger for female candidates than for male candidates.

Another aspect of the political career which is relevant in this context is the ministerial career. For many ministers the 'parliamentary pathway' to become a minister is important (De Winter, 1991). In both Belgium and the Netherlands the government is often formed by ministers and junior ministers who were elected as an MP first. In the Netherlands 69 per cent of the ministers between 1967 and 2013 had parliamentary experience (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014, p. 159) and in Belgium nearly all ministers are recruited from parliament (De Winter, 1991; Dumont et al., 2009).

From the perspective of a party, selecting popular candidates as ministers could strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the government. In the Netherlands for example a critique of the system is that voters do not have influence on the government that is formed (e.g. Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, pp. 132–134; Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, 2018). A political party could choose to partly address this critique by taking the number of preference votes into consideration when allocating government positions. Promoting popular candidates to minister or junior minister could at least give voters the feeling they have some influence on the composition of government. Research has shown that political parties indeed take preference votes into account when 'promoting' politicians. Winning more preference votes in local elections in the Swedish semi-open list system and the Brazilian open list systems, for example, increases the chances of becoming a local party leader (Folke et al., 2016). Therefore, I expect that:

> **Hypothesis 5.5**: Candidates who receive more preference votes have a higher chance of obtaining a post in the government installed after the elections (if their party participates in the governmental coalition).

Of course, it should be kept in mind that there are various constraints which influence which individuals enter government (Dowding & Dumont, 2009). A constitutional constraint is the pool from which ministers can be recruited, e.g. whether they should come from parliament or not. The 'linguistic parity' rule in Belgium, stating that there should be an equal number of Dutch-speaking and French-speaking ministers (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 140), also complicates the portfolio allocation. Constraints may also be 'political': how the different ministerial positions are filled may reflect power balances and policy interests. Furthermore, because of strategic considerations a junior minister may be linked to a minister from a different party. Therefore it is unlikely to expect a strong effect of preference votes on the appointment of ministers.

5.4.2 Data and method

5.4.2.1 Effects of preference votes on list position at the next election

The effects of preference votes on the list position of candidates in the next election in Belgium is comprehensively studied by André et al. (2017). To a large extent I will replicate their research design to test whether the same effects hold for the Netherlands. However, I add some independent variables to the model, mainly to test for a gender effect. I will therefore also replicate their analyses for Belgium.

To test the effect of preference votes (t-1) on the list position in the next election (t), a multilevel regression model was constructed with random intercepts for both Belgium and the Netherlands. For both countries random intercepts were included for the election and parties. For Belgium a third random intercept for districts was included. The dependent variable used for the analysis is the decimal logarithm of a candidate's list position at t. With this logarithmic transformation the analysis accounts for the fact that it is more difficult to gain positions for a candidate who already occupies a high list position at t-1 than it is for a candidate more towards the bottom of the list.

As André et al. (2017, p. 593) point out, an important - but not easy - decision that has to be made, is how to measure a candidate's preference vote-earning, i.e. the most important independent variable for this analysis. If I would use the absolute number of votes a candidate receives, candidates could not be compared across parties, because it may depend on the size of the party and (for Belgium) the district. The solution that André et al. propose is to compare the ranking of candidates by the party (i.e. the order in which candidates appear on the list) with the ranking of candidates by the voter (i.e. by ordering the candidates based on the votes they received). The list position and the position on the voter ranking are used to calculate the *rank difference*[90]. A positive rank difference means

[90] The rank difference is a deviant operationalization of a candidate's electoral performance compared to how it is operationalized in the rest of this study (i.e. a more absolute measurement of the number of preference votes a candidate received, either by looking at the percentage of preference votes within a party or by looking at the percentage of preference votes related to the individual threshold). This is a result of the fact that in the other parts

that a candidate performed better in terms of votes than in terms of party support: the candidate has a better voter rank than list position. The expectation is that if preference votes matter, a candidate's rank difference has a negative effect in the regression analyses. This would mean that a higher rank difference (i.e. voters rank a candidate higher than the party) leads to a position more towards the top of the list.

Figure 5.2 and figure 5.3 show the distribution of the rank difference variable for respectively the Netherlands and Belgium for all candidates at t-1. These histograms thus include both candidates who did and who did not return in the next election. Both histograms are distributed relatively normally, although they are both slightly positively skewed. The distribution of the rank difference variable for those candidates included in the analysis looks relatively similar. At least they (almost) have the same range. The rank difference variable ranges from -15 to 23 in Belgium, both for candidates participating again at t and for all candidates participating at t-1. For the Netherlands the distributions ranges from -43 to 59 (all candidates at t-1) and -43 to 45 (all returning candidates at t). There is thus considerable variation in the rank difference of the candidates included in the analysis, to test the effect of rank difference at t-1 on the list position at t. It is not the case that all candidates with a low rank difference do not even participate in the next election, which would have created a selection bias.

Figure 5.2 Distribution rank difference (the Netherlands)



Figure 5.3 Distribution rank difference (Belgium)



In addition, and in line with the study of André et al. (2017), two other independent variables will be included: 1) a candidate's list position at t-1 to account for general qualities of the candidate and 2) incumbency. Previous literature has shown that parties are more likely to put incumbent candidates on positions more towards the top of the list (Put & Maddens, 2013), so we should control for this.

Next to these independent variables used by André et al. (2017), I include some other variables. First, a variable is included that measures whether the candidate was a minister or

---

of this study we are interested in the electoral performance of a candidate relative to all other (co-partisan) candidates, but in this analysis we are mainly interested in a candidate's electoral performance in relation to co-partisan candidates close to his or her own list position.

junior minister in the previous legislative period. It is reasonable to expect that if a minister or junior minister would like to return on the party list in the next election, he or she is given a position towards the top of the list; we should control for this. Furthermore, I include gender and an interaction between gender and rank difference in the analysis, to test whether there is a gender difference in the effects of rank difference. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in appendix E.2 (for the Netherlands in table e.3 (part III) and for Belgium in table e.4 (part III)).

Data on individual election results were obtained from official documents containing the election results, both for Belgium (Belgium.be, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014) and the Netherlands (Kiesraad, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017c). From these documents all candidates, their gender, their list position and the absolute number of preference votes at the national (for the Netherlands) or district (for Belgium) level were obtained. In the Netherlands, for most candidates the candidate's gender is given on the ballot. However, not all parties have the gender on the list. Missing data was completed as much as possible by hand coding the gender[91]. Data about which candidates were also a minister or junior minister was obtained from the website *Parlement & Politiek* (Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, 2017a) for the Netherlands and the Political Data Yearbook (Political Data Yearbook, 2017; Rihoux et al., 2013) for Belgium. To determine whether a candidate was a member of parliament in the period before the election I used information given on the website of *Parlement & Politiek* (Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, 2017b) for the Netherlands and the Belgian Chamber of Representatives (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2017a) for Belgium. Based on these sources a dataset was created in which each case represents a candidate in a single election.

For the Netherlands, only candidates from parties that received at least one seat in parliament between 1998 and 2017 are included. Next, for all candidates it was determined whether they also participated (for the same party) in the next election. Only these candidates are included in the analysis. Candidates at the first position in t-1 were also excluded from the analysis.

A problem occurs due to the fact that political parties in the Netherlands may present different electoral lists in each district. These districts normally do not influence the electoral outcome (Andeweg, 2005, p. 497), but complicate the comparison between candidates. Usually a large part of the list is the same in each district, but some parties have variations at the end of the list in each district. This gives them the opportunity to present more candidates nationwide than the maximum number of candidates on one list would allow them to do and to add some regional candidates in each district. Therefore, some candidates are not on the ballot in all districts. Moreover, some candidates are on the ballot

[91] This was done by checking whether the gender of the candidate was mentioned in another election or by looking at the first name of a candidate, which is also given on the ballot for candidates of most parties. If the first name was not given or it was not a typical male or female name, the gender of a candidate was coded based on an internet search.

in all districts, but do not always have the same list position in all districts. This is problematic for the analysis. First, if candidates do not participate in an equal number of districts their votes cannot be compared. Second, if a candidate participates in all districts but at varying positions, it is not straightforward which positions at two consecutive elections should be compared. Therefore, only candidates who in two subsequent elections have the same position on the party-list in all districts are included in the analysis (to be clear: the position can be different in the first and second election)[92].

For Belgium all effective candidates from parties that won at least one seat in the elections between 2003 and 2014 are included in the analysis. For each of them it was determined whether they participated in the next election, again as an effective candidate, for the same party and in the same district. Candidates who fulfil all these criteria are included in the multilevel regression model.

5.4.2.2 Effects of preference votes on chances of becoming a (junior) minister

To test hypothesis 5.5 three multilevel logistic regression analyses will be conducted, all with a different dependent variable. The first model predicts the chances of becoming a member of government, the second one predicts the chances of becoming a minister and the third model predicts the chances of becoming a junior minister. Included in the analyses are all candidates of parties that entered government in a certain legislative period. The models will contain random intercepts for parties, elections and (for Belgium) districts.

For the Netherlands the analysis is conducted for the period 1998 until 2017; the results of six elections are included[93]. For Belgium the analysis is conducted for the period 2003 until 2017[94]. In addition to the data containing the electoral results described in the previous section, data about which candidates became a (junior) minister after the election was collected. The data required for the Netherlands was obtained from the *Parlement & Politiek website* (Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, 2017a) and for Belgium data was obtained from the Political Data Yearbook website (Political Data Yearbook, 2017; Rihoux

[92] Within a party the voter rank order is based on all candidates who participate at the same position and in all districts. So for example, if a party presents lists with 50 candidates, but varies the last 5 positions in each district, the rank order runs from 1 to 45. A candidate who does not participate in all districts, but receives more votes than candidates who participate in all districts, would thus not influence the rank order of the candidates who participate in all districts. This solution is chosen because in the example mentioned before a party would present in total 45 + (5 * 20) = 145 candidates. If the rank order was based on all these candidates a candidate included in the analysis could have a potential rank difference of -105 (if the candidate running from position 40 receives for example only a few votes and therefore ends up at the end of the rank order). This would create a problem for the distribution of the independent variable and would increase the chances of finding invalid results.

[93] While in other parts of this book the election of 2017 is also included, the election results of candidates in this election are not considered in this chapter, since at the time of writing the formation process was still underway.

[94] The Verhofdstadt III government was in office between December 2007 and March 2008 and took office after the elections of 2007. However, it was clear from the start that this was an interim government (Sinardet, 2008, p. 1029). The allocation of (junior) ministers may have followed a different process because of the interim nature of this cabinet. To ensure that this does not have an influence on the results of the analyses, this cabinet is excluded from the analyses.

et al., 2013). Based on these sources a dataset was created with all candidates of the parties that entered the government after the elections.

The dependent variable measures whether a candidate obtained a specific function in the period between two elections (i.e. depending on the model, whether the candidate became a minister, a junior minister, or both). Thus, for the analysis no distinction is made between government members who obtained their position the day the government took office, or whether they obtained their position later, for example after a reshuffle of the cabinet.

Four independent variables are included in each model. First, an indicator of the electoral performance of the candidate is included. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of preference votes of the candidate by the threshold for an individual candidate to be elected on his or her own[95]. For the Dutch candidates this is 25 per cent of the electoral threshold for a political party (i.e. 0.17 per cent of the total votes casted). For Belgian candidates this is the number of votes cast for the party of the candidate divided by the number of seats won by the party + 1. This variable is set at a maximum of 1 to prevent that the results are influenced by a few candidates who passed the threshold with a large margin.

Second, to account for general qualities of the candidate his or her list position (as a log(10) transformation) is included in the model. If we do not control for this, we may find a positive effect between preference votes and the chances of becoming a minister, while actually both are influenced by the list position of the candidate.

Third, a variable is included which measures whether the candidate performed the same function in the previous legislative period (i.e. depending on the model, whether the candidate was a minister, junior minister or both in the previous legislative period).

Fourth, an indicator with the gender of the candidate is included together with an interaction effect between the preference vote indicator and gender to test whether there is a different effect for male and female candidates. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in appendix E.2 (for the Netherlands in table e.3 (part IV) and for Belgium in table e.4 (part IV)).

5.4.3 Results

5.4.3.1 Effects of preference votes on list position in the next election

In table 5.3 the number of returning candidates in the Dutch elections are shown. In most elections around 40 per cent of the candidates who participate in an election can also be found on the ballot for the next election. Only in 2002 the percentage of returning candidates is much higher: 70 per cent. This does not come as a surprise, since the next election was held only eight months later, when the government formed after the election of

[95] See also footnote 90 (on page 112) with respect to the different operationalization for the electoral performance variable used in this study.

2002 fell after being in office for only three months. Therefore, many parties presented (almost) identical or only slightly changed lists for the 2003 election. The candidates for whom figures are presented in the table are those candidates who were on the ballot in all districts at the same position in election t-1. Whether they participated for the same party or in all districts at t is not considered here.

Table 5.3 Rank difference and returning candidates (the Netherlands)

Election	Category	N	%	Mean RD	SE	T-test
1998	Not running in 2002	146	41.8	0.49	0.89	t(334.5)=0.654
	Running in 2002	203	58.2	-0.33	0.87	
2002	Not running in 2003	102	29.8	0.22	1.27	t(167.3)=0.131
	Running in 2003	240	70.2	0.03	0.71	
2003	Not running in 2006	210	57.9	0.71	0.64	t(262.9)=1.213
	Running in 2006	153	42.1	-0.76	1.03	
2006	Not running in 2010	244	60.2	1.41	0.82	t(365.4)=2.741**
	Running in 2010	161	39.8	-1.96	0.91	
2010	Not running in 2012	265	53.8	0.46	0.79	t(490.9)=0.866
	Running in 2012	228	46.2	-0.47	0.74	
2012	Not running in 2017	336	63.2	0.30	0.66	t(446.2)=0.758
	Running in 2017	196	36.8	-0.47	0.78	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001
Source: Own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in election t in all districts and at the same position in each district, and who run for parties that won at least one seat in the elections between 1998-2017.

The table also shows a comparison between the average rank difference of those candidates not running again and those who did run again. When looking at the effect of rank difference at t-1 on the list position at t, logic dictates that only candidates who participate in two subsequent elections can be included. However, if we only look at the effect for returning candidates, a part of the effect of the electoral performance might be overlooked. The electoral performance at t-1 might also affect which candidates are given a place on the list at election t. For example, a candidate who performs very badly in electoral term at t-1 might not even be re-selected. Therefore, before considering the effect rank difference has on the list position for returning candidates, I first compare the rank difference of candidates who did not return with the rank difference of candidates who did return.

Based on the logic of hypothesis 5.2, we expect that candidates with a higher rank difference are more likely to be selected for the next election. With the exception of the 2006 election, comparisons of the rank difference between candidates running again and not running again are not significant. However, since these averages are for the entire population one might argue that statistical significance is less important. What therefore is most striking about the t-test presented in table 5.3 is the direction of the effect. Candidates running again on average have a lower rank difference than candidates who did not run again. This seems to contradict the expectation, because what this means is that candidates who performed better in terms of votes than based on party ranking are less likely to return.

If parties would benefit those candidates who perform well in elections, we would have expected that this would have been the other way around.

The comparison is not very thorough subtle, however, and it is therefore difficult to draw strong conclusions. For example, it is not considered what the reasons are for (not) running again. Some candidates might not have the ambition to run again in the next election and in these cases rank difference does not have an influence on the selection process within the party[96]. Furthermore, the results might be influenced by the differences between candidates who served as an MP in the legislative terms between the two election and those candidates who did not. Therefore table 5.3 is replicated in appendix E.1 (table e.1 on page 191), but now includes an additional distinction between incumbent and non-incumbent candidates at the time of election t[97]. This table shows that, with the exception of 2006, incumbents who return on average have higher rank differences than (incumbent) candidates who do not return. For most years the same is true for non-incumbents as well; they too are more likely to return when there rank difference is higher. These effects are not statistically significant, but nevertheless telling, since the averages are based on the entire population. The effect is not large, but there seems to be a positive effect of rank difference on the chances of reselection.

Table 5.4 shows the average rank difference for returning and not returning candidates in Belgium. In 2003, 2007 and 2010 respectively 32, 44 and 21 per cent of the effective candidates at t-1 were also on the ballot in the elections at t. Contrary to the Netherlands, in all three years the ranking difference of returning candidates is higher than it is for non-returning candidates. In two of these years the difference is also statistically significant. There is a difference between incumbents and non-incumbents, however, as can be seen in appendix E.1 (table e.2, on page 192). Incumbent candidates who return have a lower rank difference than incumbent candidates who do not return. For non-incumbent candidates this is the other way around: if they have a higher rank difference they are more likely to return on the ballot in the next election. Rank difference in Belgium thus seems to be of less importance for members of parliament than it is for candidates who were not an MP between two subsequent elections.

Table 5.5 shows the results of the multilevel regression models testing the influence of rank difference at t-1 on the list position at t for the Netherlands. In the most basic model (model 1), which only controls for the list position at t-1, the electoral performance of a candidate has no statistical significant influence on the list position in the next election. List position t-1 is highly significant and with a regression coefficient of almost one it is an important predictor of list position at t. Returning candidates normally run at a position at t

[96] This does not hold if a relatively bad electoral performance would be the reason for a candidate not to run again. But even then it is a personal decision and in this chapter we are interested in if and how the party considers electoral performance in the selection process.

[97] This does not necessarily mean that the candidate was elected at t-1. The incumbent candidate may have entered parliament at a later time, as a replacement for another MP.

Table 5.4 Rank difference and returning candidates (Belgium)

Year	Category	N	%	Mean RD	SE	T-test
2003	Not running in 2007	740	67.9	-0.36	0.20	t(774.5)=-3.671***
	Running in 2007	350	32.1	0.80	0.25	
2007	Not running in 2010	613	56.2	-0.31	0.20	t(990.0)=-2.334**
	Running in 2010	477	43.8	0.42	0.24	
2010	Not running in 2014	960	78.7	-0.09	0.16	t(459.6)=-1.455
	Running in 2014	259	21.3	0.37	0.27	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001
Source: Own dataset. Included are all effective candidates of parties that won at least one seat in the elections between 2003-2014.

similar to the one at which they ran at t-1. In the second model the influence of political functions in the previous period is shown as well. Serving as a minister, junior minister or being an incumbent leads to a position more towards the top of the list in the next election if the candidate runs again, although the effect of being a junior minister is not significant. The third model also includes the gender of a candidate, together with an interaction between gender and rank difference. Although women are placed relatively more towards the bottom of the list, for them rank difference at t-1 has a significant influence on their list position at t. Women who are ranked higher by voters than by the party at t-1 are rewarded with a list position more towards the top of the list at t. For example, all other things being equal, women around position 40 at t-1 need a rank difference of three to move up one position. This required rank difference to move up one position increases if the candidate already had a better position at t-1. Women around position 25 at t-1, for example, need a rank difference of 5 to move up one position. For women in the top 10 at t-1, a positive rank difference alone is not sufficient to gain a better list position at t. The interaction effect is also graphically shown in figure 5.4. The figure shows the effect of rank difference for men and women, when all other variables stay at their mean or mode value. What is visible is that for men rank difference does not influence the list position, but for women there is quite a substantial range of list positions at t possible based on the electoral performance at t-1[98].

The fourth model also tests whether there is an interaction between rank difference and the election of 2003. Since this election was held so closely after the previous election, and many parties presented a list similar to the list in 2002, this possibly reduces the effects that are presented in the other models. However, the interaction effect is not significant and the other effects do not change after the inclusion of the interaction effect. All models have random intercepts for each election and each party. However, they have almost no variance.

[98] The candidate selection process in the Netherlands has changed drastically at the beginning of the 21st century for some major parties. The elections of 2002 can be seen as a turning point: since then most parties give their members more influence on the selection process (Voerman, 2014). Since the first election included in the analysis is the election of 2002 (with the rank difference of 1998), the entire period of analysis is after this turning point. However, it might be that it took some time for the changes to have an effect. Therefore, the analysis was also conducted based on the elections since 2006. This had no effect on the results.

Table 5.5 Effect of preference votes on list position next election (the Netherlands)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Constant)	0.104***	0.182***	0.182***	0.182***
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Rank difference t-1	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
List position t-1	0.852***	0.826***	0.826***	0.826***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Member of parliament		-0.070***	-0.071***	-0.071***
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Minister		-0.144*	-0.143*	-0.142*
		(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Junior Minister		-0.062	-0.060	-0.054
		(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Woman			0.004	0.004
			(0.017)	(0.017)
Rank difference t-1 * woman			-0.004*	-0.004*
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Rank difference t-1 * 2003				0.001
				(0.002)
AIC	81.0	67.4	65.2	66.8
BIC	110.6	111.9	119.6	126.1
Log likelihood	-34.5	-24.7	-21.6	-21.4
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040
Groups(Parties)	11	11	11	11
Groups(Elections)	6	6	6	6
Variance: Party (intercept)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Variance: Election (intercept)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset. Included are all candidates who run at two subsequent elections (t-1 and t) for the same party and in both elections run in all districts and at the same position in each district. In addition, list-pullers at t-1 are excluded from the analysis.

Figure 5.4 Effect of rank difference t0 at list position t+1 (the Netherlands)



Table 5.6 Effect of preference votes on list position next election (Belgium)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Constant)	0.167***	0.287***	0.274***
	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Rank difference t-1	-0.013***	-0.010***	-0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
List position t-1	0.674***	0.548***	0.548***
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Member of parliament		-0.148***	-0.142***
		(0.029)	(0.029)
Minister		-0.242***	-0.235**
		(0.072)	(0.072)
Junior Minister		-0.187	0.160
		(0.120)	(0.120)
Woman			0.020
			(0.021)
Rank difference t-1 * woman			0.011*
			(0.005)
AIC	530.4	507.2	505.0
BIC	564.3	555.6	563.0
Log likelihood	-258.2	-243.6	-240.5
Observations	931	931	931
Groups(Parties)	18	18	18
Groups(Districts)	12	12	12
Groups(Elections)	3	3	3
Variance: Party (intercept)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Variance: District (intercept)	0.004	0.007	0.007
Variance: Election (intercept)	0.000	0.001	0.001

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset. Included are all effective candidates at t who also ran as an effective candidate in the same district and for the same party in the previous election (t-1).

Figure 5.5 Effect of rank difference t at list position t+1 (Belgium)



The multilevel regression models for Belgium are shown in table 5.6. The first model shows a negative and significant influence of rank difference. For Belgium candidates' rank difference thus matters if we only control for list position. Candidates who return at the next election can expect a list position similar to the list position they held in the previous election, but candidates who performed better in the previous election move up some places. As is the case in the Netherlands, the political functions performed in the legislative term between the two elections all lead to a list position more towards the top of the list in the next election. The effect for junior ministers was not significant (see model 2). Model 3 also includes the gender interaction, for which the results are graphically shown in figure 5.5. What is clear from this figure is that the effect gender has in Belgium is the opposite of the effect it has in the Netherlands. In Belgium the effect is much stronger for male candidates than it is for female candidates[99].

In both countries the electoral performance at t-1 measured as the rank difference thus has an influence on the list positions of candidates at t[100]. However, the effect is much stronger in Belgium and whereas the effect mainly applies to female candidates in the Netherlands, in Belgium it mainly applies to male candidates. In the conclusion I will reflect upon these differences.

---

[99] In addition, a model was ran with an interaction term between gender, incumbency and rank difference as well. The general conclusion presented based on the models presented in the text did not change, although the results of this three-way interaction showed that the effect for male candidates is mostly caused by candidates who were not a member of parliament before election t. For women there was no difference between incumbents and non-incumbents. The same interaction was also ran for the Dutch case, but the results did not change with the inclusion of this interaction.

[100] The length of list of candidates varies between parties and districts in Belgium, which could potentially influence the results. Therefore, another operationalization for the variables list position and rank difference was used in additional checks. In the analysis presented here absolute numbers were used for rank difference and a logarithmic transformation for list position. The length of a party list does not only have a direct influence on the variable list position, but also on the rank difference. For larger parties the (theoretical) range of rank difference is larger. Therefore the analysis was also conducted where list positions were transformed in a way that the first candidate on the list was at position 0 and the last candidate on the list at position 1. In this way for each candidate the list position was a measurement of the relative position on that list. For rank difference the same was done: the relative position on the list was compared to the relative position in the order based on the number of preference votes received. This decreased the range difference between political parties. When these variables were used, results did not change. Another option to deal with the variation in the length of party lists is to use a relative position, in which not the last candidate on the list is assigned position 1, but the last elected candidate. This however creates a different problem, since the variation between elected candidates and non-elected candidates varies considerably from party to party as well. For a party with 30 candidates and 2 elected members, the position of the number 30 on the list would be transformed to 15. For a party with 60 candidates and 30 elected members, the position of the number 60 on the list would be transformed to 2. This would not solve the problem that lists are hard to compare. Since the first solution did not have an effect on the results, and the second one has other problems, the logarithmic transformation of list position and the absolute rank difference are used, because they have the advantage of having a slightly more intuitive interpretation compared to the relative list positions described above.

5.4.3.2 Effects of preference votes on chances of becoming (junior) minister

Hypothesis 5.5 states that candidates who receive more preference votes have a higher chance of obtaining a government post if their party enters government. Table 5.7 and table 5.8 show for both the Netherlands and Belgium respectively three logistic multilevel regression models predicting the chances of a candidate to become a minister, junior minister or both in the legislative period after the elections. These models control for list position, gender and whether the candidate performed the same function in the previous legislative period. In addition an interaction effect between preference votes and gender is included.

In the Netherlands there is no significant effect of preference votes on the chances of obtaining a government post (see table 5.7). Both for male and female candidates the chances of becoming a minister or junior minister do not significantly change when the candidate receives more preference votes. For junior ministers there is even a negative effect, although in substantive terms there is no effect. List position and performing the same function in the previous period are far better predictors of the chances of obtaining a government post for Dutch candidates. Candidates more towards the top of the list have a higher probability of becoming minister or junior minister and candidates who performed the same function in the previous legislative period have a higher chance as well. The fact that candidates near the top of the list have a higher chance is not surprising: a party puts their political heavyweights near the top of the list.

In Belgium the effects are different. Preference votes have a significant influence in all three models. For incumbent ministers there is a relatively strong positive effect of preference votes on the chances of obtaining a government post, but there is a positive effect for junior ministers as well. Research in the Dutch context has shown that when ministers are appointed they have relatively more political experience, while junior ministers have relatively more technical experience (Elfferich, 2017). Such a difference could explain why the effect is stronger for ministers than it is for junior ministers. These effects remain when we control for list position (as a measure of the general qualities of the candidate[101]) and whether the candidate performed the same function in the previous legislative term (which also has a positive effect, but this effect is not as strong as it is in the Netherlands). The gender effect is different in Belgium as well. For female candidates the effect of preference votes on the chance of becoming a minister is larger than it is for male candidates. For female candidates who reach the individual threshold the chance of becoming a minister is 30 per cent, while for male candidates it is 15 per cent. For junior ministers the effect is the other way around, but the difference is smaller. Male candidates who reach the individual threshold have a 10 per cent chance of becoming a junior minister; for female candidates this chance is 5 per cent.

[101] Given the districts in Belgium, this indicator is mostly a measure of the qualities of a candidate within a district / party and only to a lesser extent a general measure of the qualities of a candidate (within a party), particularly compared to the Netherlands. However, it remains a workable proxy for the qualities of a candidate.

Table 5.7 Effects of preference votes on entering government (the Netherlands)

	Minister	**Junior minister**	**Government**
(Constant)	0.895	1.203	2.483*
	(1.024)	(1.003)	(0.999)
Preference votes	0.084	-1.146	-0.685
	(0.820)	(0.867)	(0.708)
List position	-3.693***	-3.510***	-4.770***
	(0.772)	(0.776)	(0.708)
Woman	-1.442	-1.040	-1.063
	(1.025)	(0.681)	(0.617)
Same function t-1	1.600**	2.117***	1.384***
	(0.505)	(0.454)	(0.398)
Preference votes * woman	1.254	1.257	0.829
	(1.273)	(1.031)	(0.967)
AIC	205.5	258.9	313.4
BIC	244.0	297.5	351.9
Log likelihood	-94.7	-121.5	-148.7
Observations	915	915	915
Groups(Parties)	6	6	6
Groups(Elections)	6	6	6
Variance: Party (intercept)	0.000	0.134	1.305
Variance: Election (intercept)	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in all districts, at the same position in each district and who come from the parties that entered government after the election. In addition, list-pullers at t-1 are excluded from the analysis.

Table 5.8 Effects of preference votes on entering government (Belgium)

	Minister	**Junior minister**	**Government**
(Constant)	-6.951***	-6.410***	-6.650***
	(1.252)	(1.130)	(0.965)
Preference votes	5.896***	3.996***	5.839***
	(1.287)	(1.130)	(0.984)
List position	-0.893	0.148	-0.343
	(0.610)	(0.690)	(0.480)
Woman	-0.145	0.502	0.340
	(1.449)	(1.005)	(1.012)
Same function t-1	1.566***	1.259	1.335**
	(0.433)	(0.860)	(0.426)
Preference votes * woman	0.970	-1.413	0.222
	(1.693)	(1.615)	(1.248)
AIC	252.7	208.1	327.3
BIC	301.3	256.7	375.9
Log likelihood	-117.3	-95.1	-154.6
Observations	1639	1639	1639
Groups(Districts)	13	13	13
Groups(Parties)	9	9	9
Groups(Elections)	4	4	4
Variance: District (intercept)	0.053	0.000	0.000
Variance: Party (intercept)	0.000	0.116	0.011
Variance: Election (intercept)	0.124	0.000	0.070

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset. Included are all effective candidates of parties that entered government after the election.

5.5 Discussion and conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to explore whether preference votes have an influence on the political career and parliamentary behaviour of candidates. These votes influence which candidates are elected (although as shown in section 5.2 the effects are limit both in Belgium and the Netherlands), but are there other consequences?

First, I looked at whether preference votes influence the parliamentary behaviour of elected candidates. The results suggest that preference votes do not have an influence on the ideological positions MPs in Belgium and the Netherlands take either in speeches made in parliament or in the written questions they submit to ministers. This fits the observation of Bäck and Debus (2016) for the German Bundestag that directly elected MPs did not deviate more from the party line than MPs elected on a party list. I will reflect further on this finding in the concluding chapter of this book, thereby also taking into account the causal link between preference voting and an MP's position. Based on the textual data collected for the analysis presented in this chapter, it would be possible to investigate other factors which did not receive attention in this dissertation. For example, further research could focus on whether MP's actually refer to regions in their speeches. It seems plausible to expect that in district systems MP's would refer to their own region more often. However, as we saw in chapter 4, also in the Netherlands candidates receive relatively more votes in their own district. Therefore, it might be that also in systems where the election result is determined by the national vote, candidates still refer to their own region. Further research, based on text analysis, could look to more detail at the speeches of MP's to see whether those with higher number of preference votes behave differently than those with lower number of preference votes. For example, do candidates with a strong local support refer more to their own region, or do female candidates who received a lot of votes more often refer to gender-equality? While the analysis presented in this chapter showed that preference votes do not affect whether candidates deviate more from the party line, it might be that preference votes affect candidates in a more specific way, which is not actually captured by a general ideological position.

I also looked at whether preference votes have an influence on the political career of a candidate. The influence of preference votes on the ministerial career differs in Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium an effect of preference votes on the selection of ministers was found. In the Netherlands such an effect does not exist. Since all sorts of constraints exist (Dowding & Dumont, 2009) which complicate the allocation process of ministers this might not come as a surprise. This raises the questions how the effect in Belgium can be explained. It might be that the fact that in Belgium it is unusual to recruit a (junior) mister from outside parliament (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 145), can explain the result. While in the Netherlands most ministers are also recruited from parliament, there are more ministers recruited from outside the parliament. This stronger link between parliament and recruitment in Belgium might explain a stronger effect of preference votes. If the electoral

success of candidates indeed influences the recruitment of ministers, this could strengthen the chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000).

However, a limitation to the analysis is that it might also be that there is a simpler explanation and that the effect is not so much an effect of preference votes at all. Political parties normally place their top candidates towards the top of the list, and these candidates also receive most preference votes (partly because of an pure position effect (see for example Van Erkel & Thijssen, 2016)). Since Belgium has 11 districts, there are thus more candidates with a high list position. Belgian parties, when recruiting ministers, also strive to achieve a regional balance: ministers should be recruited evenly from these districts (Deschouwer, 2009, p. 143). It is likely that parties choose their top candidates for ministerial posts. Therefore, the selected (junior) ministers may all be candidates who had a list position towards the top of the list (at least with less variation than the list positions of Dutch ministers). In this case, preference votes might show up as highly significant in the Belgian models, but these effects might in reality be of less importance.

The strongest effects of preference votes can be found on the list position for the next elections. Both in the Netherlands and in Belgium there is an effect of preference votes on the list position of a candidate for the next election. Candidates who perform better in terms of votes than in terms of the list-position assigned by the party move up the list for the next election. For Belgium André et al. (2017) already found that preference votes influenced a candidate's list position for the next election. They also found that the same effect can be found in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Thus, the effect of preference vote on list-position for the next election is demonstrated in two flexible list systems which have districts (Belgium and the Czech Republic) and two flexible list systems with a single nationwide constituency (the Netherlands and Slovakia). The same mechanism might also be present in other countries using flexible list systems. In other types of list systems it is less likely that we find this pattern. By definition, in closed list systems no such effect is possible, since voters do not have the option to cast a candidate vote. However, in open list system it is also unlikely that there will be a similar effect, since in an open system the voters directly determine the ranking of candidates. In addition, parties do not always provide a ranking themselves. For example in Finland, most parties rank candidates in alphabetical order (von Schoultz, 2017, p. 609). In such instances looking at ranking difference does not make sense. Therefore, in these systems it makes more sense to look at how the number of preference votes influence whether candidates are running again in the next election.

Turning back to the Netherlands and Belgium, an important distinction has to be made about the candidates to which the effect applies in both countries. In the Netherlands the effect only exists for female candidates. If they perform better than might be expected based on their list position, they can expect a better list position in the next election. For male candidates this effect is not present. In Belgium, it is the other way around. For male candidates there is a much stronger effect of the electoral performance on the list position for the next election than there is for female candidates.

How could these differences be explained? The fact that in the Netherlands the effect for female candidates is stronger might be a result of how male and female candidates are distributed on the list. Since in most parties more male candidates can be found near the top of the list, it might be that for women it is easier to benefit from a good electoral performance: since they are in lower positions to begin with, there is more room for improvement. This conclusion is supported by the fact that for female candidates towards the top of the list the electoral performance alone does not suffice to move up one position on the list for the next election. At the same time it might be a result of the fact that because most parties have fewer female candidates on their list, they promote women who perform well to better list positions. This could either be to reward those women for their good electoral performance or to have more influence over which candidates are elected in the next election. Having candidates who are able to be elected out of list order on lower positions, might disturb the balance between the candidates a party puts on eligible positions. Therefore, a party might choose to put these electorally successful candidates towards the top of the list. If the party still tries to keep a balanced list, it might help to end up with a balanced parliamentary group as well. The results for Belgium are more difficult to explain. Based on the gender rules, which stipulate that lists in Belgium contain an equal number of male and female candidates, one would expect the effects to be smaller, since parties have relatively limited options to change the balance between male and female candidates. However, many parties have relatively more male candidates on the first half of their list than on the lower half, which would suggest that there is still more room for female candidates to improve their position than there is for male candidates. If indeed the effect in Belgium is less strong because of the gender-quota, this would not be the first negative effect of quota's on women's success. Research has shown that quota to ensure female representation in different contexts have a negative influence on the electoral success of female candidates (Górecki & Kukołowicz, 2014; Miguel, 2008). I argued there are different mechanisms which could explain differences between male and female candidates. Based on the results it is difficult to state which explanation works best. We do know for which candidates the effect is stronger, but we do not know what drives this mechanism. Future research should focus on this mechanism.

Although it is not yet entirely clear how the mechanism exactly works, the results show that preference votes might be important for some candidates, depending on country and gender, to increase their chances of being elected, however, indirectly. If a candidate on a non-electable list position fails to cross the threshold but still performs relatively well in terms of preference votes, he or she might be moved up the list for the next election, thereby increasing his or her chances of becoming an MP after that election. These findings have important implications for the literature on candidate selection methods as well. Traditional studies on candidate selection mainly focus on individual characteristics of candidates to explain the process of candidate selection. The results in this chapter show that adding the electoral performance of re-running candidates to models which explain the process is

important, in order to get a better understanding of the selection process. But is also relates to a highly salient discussion surrounding candidate selection: the democratization of candidate selection processes (Pennings & Hazan, 2001). In times of weakening bonds between parties and voters, the democratization of candidate selection is one of the methods parties try to use to strengthen the link with their members and/or voters. Democratization of the selection process occurs when the selectorate (i.e. those who may select the candidates) becomes more inclusive (i.e. an increase in the number of individuals who have a say in the selection process) (Hazan & Rahat, 2010, p. 54). The findings in this chapter relate to this democratization process. If the selectorate indeed takes the electoral performance of candidates into account, this can also be seen as an (indirect) form of democratization since voters of the party influence the candidate selection. Therefore these findings also have implications for the literature on the democratization of parties.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Main findings of the study

The main research question of this study is what the causes and consequences of preference votes are. In order to fully understand the phenomenon of preference voting I argued that it is important to look at all factors influencing preference voting and at what the effects of preference votes are. The three factors influencing preference voting are the institutional rules, the voters casting a preference voting and the candidates receiving and sometimes actively campaigning for preference votes. I argue that these three factors together affect the preference votes in a political system. Preference votes in turn could have consequences on other factors (see figure 6.1). Table 6.1 provides an overview of the hypotheses tested in this book. In this section I will discuss the most important findings, both in terms of these individual aspects of preference voting and their relation.

Figure 6.1 The causes and consequences of preference voting



6.1.1 A negative preference vote?

The first notable finding is the fact that, contrary to what was expected, the results of the experiment presented in chapter 2 strongly suggest that the introduction of a list vote would affect list-pullers and other candidates than list-pullers in the same way. The expectation was that the introduction of a list vote would only have an effect on votes for the list-puller (H2.1), but not for the other candidates (H2.2). However, what the experiment showed was that voters casting a vote for another candidate would also switch to a list vote if that option would become available.

Table 6.1. Overview of the findings of this study

Hypothesis		BEL	NET
2.1	Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote are more likely to vote for the list-puller than voters who do have the option to cast a list vote.	+	+
2.2	Voters who do not have the option to cast a list vote are not more likely to vote for other candidates than voters who do have the option to cast a list vote.	-	-
2.3	Voters who can cast multiple preference votes are more likely to vote for other candidates than voters who can only cast a single preference vote.	+	-
2.4	Voters who can cast multiple preference votes are not more likely to vote for the list-puller than voters who can only cast a single preference vote.	-	+
3.1	If a voter has more resources available he or she is more likely to cast a preference vote than a voter with fewer resources.	M	M
3.2	A voter belonging to an underrepresented social group in parliament will be more likely to cast a preference vote than a voter from a social group that is overrepresented in parliament.	M	M
3.3	Voters who feel closer to a particular (group of) candidate(s) are more likely to cast a preference vote than voters who do not feel close to a particular (group of) candidate(s).	+	M
3.4	If a voter, prior to the elections, gives lower evaluations to the first candidate (list-puller) on the list, he or she is more likely to cast a vote for another candidate, i.e. a preference vote.	~	+
3.5	Hypothesis 3.4 holds only if the electoral system forces a voter to vote for a candidate, and not if the electoral system allows the voter to cast a list vote.	+	
4.1	If a candidate belongs to a traditionally underrepresented social group in parliament he or she will receive more preference votes, than a candidate who belongs to a social group that is traditionally overrepresented in parliament.	+	+
4.2	The effect described in hypothesis 4.1 is stronger for the first candidate of a specific group, than it is for other candidates belonging to that group.	-	M
4.3	Dutch candidates receive relatively more votes in their own district (*kieskring*) than they receive in other districts.		+
4.4	The more a candidate is positioned towards the top of the list, the more preference votes he or she will receive.	+	+
4.5	The last candidate on the list (the list-pusher) attracts more votes than might be expected based on the low list position he or she occupies.	+	+
4.6	Candidates with more political experience receive more preference votes than candidates with less political experience.	+	+
4.7	Candidates who deviate more from the party line will receive more preference votes than candidates who deviate less from the party line.	~	~
4.8	The more the candidate has a position towards the end on the list, the stronger the effect of deviating from the party line (hypothesis 4.7).	~	~
4.9	Deviating from the party line has a stronger effect on preference votes when it is done through submitting questions, than it has during speeches in plenary sessions of parliament.	~	~
4.10	Candidates from traditional parties are more likely to receive preference votes than candidates from newer parties.	+	~

Table 6.1. Overview of the findings of this study

Hypothesis		BEL	NET
4.11	Candidates from populist parties are less likely to receive preference votes than candidates from other parties.	~	~
4.12	Candidates from right-wing parties are more likely to receive preference votes than candidates from left-wing parties.	~	-
4.13	In the Netherlands, candidates of parties with less popular list-pullers receive more preference votes than candidates of parties with more popular list-pullers.		+
5.1	Candidates who receive more preference votes are more likely to deviate from the parliamentary party group line.	~	~
5.2	Candidates who receive more preference votes have a better chance of getting a higher place on the list in the next elections.	+	~
5.3	The effect of preference votes on the list position in the next election is stronger for male candidates than for female candidates.	+	-
5.4	The effect of preference votes on the list position in the next election is stronger for female candidates than for male candidates.	-	+
5.5	Candidates who receive more preference votes have a higher chance of obtaining a post in the government installed after the elections (if their party participates in the governmental coalition).	+	~

Note: + expectation met; - effect in other direction that expected; M mixed effect; ~ no effect.

This issue was further examined when looking at the motivations for voters to cast a preference vote. I explored whether there are negative reasons for casting a preference vote, which also could explain the results of the experiment. I analysed motivations of voters for casting a preference vote and looked at whether voters mentioned a negative evaluation of the list-puller as a reason to cast a preference vote. I expected that in the Netherlands, where a list vote is absent, such motivations could be found, but that for Belgium, where voters have an option to cast a list vote, such motivations would be absent (H3.4 and H3.5). The expectation was supported by the results. In the Netherlands approximately 7 per cent of voters who cast a preference vote, mentioned that they did not want to vote for the list-puller and therefore voted for another candidate. In most of these motivations, a reason for preferring the specific other candidate was missing. Thus, a substantial part of preference votes cast in the Dutch context might be seen as 'negatively motivated preference votes'. This type of preference votes was absent in Belgium, where almost none of the voters mentioned the list-puller in their motivation for their vote for another candidate. While multiple differences exist between (the electoral systems of) Belgium and the Netherlands, I argue that the most likely cause of the absence of the 'negatively motivated preference vote' in Belgium is the fact that Belgian voters have the option to cast a list vote. In the Netherlands, if a voter has no positive preference for a specific candidate, but also does not want to vote for the list-puller, he or she has no other option than to vote for another candidate. In Belgium, such a voter could cast a list vote.

6.1.2 No role for ideology

The second notable finding is that there does not seem to be a relation between preference

votes and the policy position of a candidate. Amongst other things, the relationship between the ideological position and preference votes of candidates was explored in chapter 4 and 5. In chapter 4 I looked at whether candidates who took an ideological position more towards the extremes within their party are more likely to receive preference votes. The expectation was that candidates who deviate more from the party line, especially if they are more towards the end of the list, would receive more preference votes (H4.7 and H4.8). When voters distinguish between candidates from the same party, it might be that they take the policy positions of candidates into consideration. The results show that the ideology of candidates did not matter for their electoral success. In chapter five I explored whether the effect between ideology and preference votes might be the other way around: that candidates start deviating more from the party line after they received relatively more preference votes. This relationship also does not exist. There seems to be no causal link in either direction. Since the causal link was studied in both directions, and theory suggests that the causal link is possible in both directions, the link was further explored in appendix E.3. The relationship was tested again in both directions, based on a first-event analysis. The results presented in this appendix did not lead to any revisions of conclusions of both chapters. When it comes to intraparty preference voting ideology seems to have no influence on either the voter or the candidate.

6.1.3 Limited consequences of preference votes

The third notable finding relates to the consequences of preference voting. First of all, I show that the consequences of preference voting are limited. In Belgium and the Netherlands there are not that many candidates who are elected out of list order. Most candidates do not even receive enough votes to be elected based on preference votes. Yes, in theory both systems have flexible list systems, but in practice it still are to a great extent the parties who decide which candidates become an MP after the elections.

Preference votes also do not seem to matter that much for the legislative behaviour of candidates, neither in Belgium nor in the Netherlands. In addition, in the Netherlands there also seems to be no effect of preference voting on the allocation of ministers and junior ministers. In Belgium this effect exists. However, as I argued before, the question remains how large this influence actually is. There is one area in which preference votes seem to matter: namely when it comes to candidate selection (H5.2, H5.3 and H5.4). However, the effect manifests itself in different ways in the Netherlands and Belgium. Previous research already showed that in Belgium those candidates who receive more preference votes receive a better list position in the subsequent election (André, Depauw, Shugart, et al., 2017). However, I argued that it might be important to look at the differences between male and female candidates when it comes to this effect. And if gender is taken into account, the interpretation of the findings changes. In Belgium, the effect of preference votes on the list position of a candidate in the next election only exists for male candidates. In the Netherlands, at first preference votes do not seem to have an effect on the

list position of a candidate for the next election. However, if gender is taken into account, the results show that in the Netherlands there is an effect, but contrary to Belgium, the effect applies to female candidates. This is an important contribution to the literature of candidate selection and something that should be taken into account when studying the way selectors draft the list of candidates.

6.2 Implications

One of the findings of this study is that the absence of a list vote can lead to negatively motivated preference votes. This has two important implications, one for research on preference voting and one more practical implication for the Dutch electoral system.

So far, the literature with regard to the Dutch case assumes that votes for a list-puller are predominantly a party vote or a preference vote for the list-puller. Votes for other candidates on the list are seen as a pure preference vote (see for example Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2010). The findings presented in this book challenge this distinction. They show that votes for another candidate should sometimes be considered to be more of a party vote than a preference vote for that candidate. Some voters who cast a vote for another candidate may switch to a list vote, if that option is available. For research on preference voting in general, but specifically for the Dutch case, this adds to the complexity of the phenomenon of personalization. Future research should take this into account.

Of course, it is not possible to know exactly what a voter has in mind when casting a vote. A whole set of motivations may be related to one act; i.e. indicating a preference for one specific party or candidate. However, it seems that if voters have the option to cast a list vote it contributes to a better interpretation of the motivations of voters, based on the results presented in this study.

In 2016 the *Tweede Kamer* in the Netherlands voted against a law that would have allowed an experiment for a new ballot design. However, after the elections of 2017 the *Kiesraad* (Electoral Council) again pleaded for a re-evaluation of the ballot in an evaluation of the elections, after various problems as a result of the size of the ballot occurred (Kiesraad, 2017b). In the original proposal, different options for a new design of the voting ballot were proposed. All contained a process of two steps: first choosing a party and subsequently voting for a candidate. This was not intended as an introduction of a list vote, but if a new government would indeed take a new ballot design into consideration, an electoral reform in terms of the introduction of a list vote could also be considered. After all, such a ballot implies that the party is more important than the candidate, since that would be the first step in the voting process under such a ballot design. Why not allow the voter to only cast a vote for the party then? Introducing a list vote would increase the options of Dutch voters and therefore result in election results that are more in line with the intentions of voters. At least the difference between the pure party voters and the pure candidate voters would be much clearer in such a system. Such a system was proposed once in the

Netherlands, by the Dutch Electoral System Civic Forum. However, the government did not implement the suggested changes (Fournier et al., 2011, pp. 8–9). Recently, the proposed changes by the Civic Forum have been echoed by a State Commission (Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel, 2018).

Another implication relates to the importance of preference votes. Comments with regard to preference voting in the Netherlands sometimes relate to the surprising number of preference votes for candidates who do not actually need them, since these candidates have a high enough list position to be elected based on the success of the party. In the elections between 1998 and 2017 only 17 per cent of all preference votes are cast for candidates who are not elected and this percentage is even lower when looking at candidates from parties who won seats (15 per cent). In Belgium this percentage is much higher. Non-elected candidates together receive approximately 60% of the preference votes. In addition, in the Netherlands only a few candidates are elected out of list order. Based purely on which candidates are elected, preference votes thus have a limited influence, both in Belgium and the Netherlands. It should be noticed, however, that in the Netherlands there seems to be a development in how voters deal with this issue. In the most recent parliamentary election, for example, the website www.stemopeenvrouw.nl (voteforawoman) advised voters not to vote for the first female candidate on the list, who normally is elected regardless of preference votes. Instead, the website gave some strategic options to try and get more female candidates elected. It is hard to say whether this actually had an effect, the first woman on the list still received much more votes than other women on the list. However, a record of 4 candidates got elected out of list order, three of whom are female candidates.

Apart from that, the analyses in chapter 5 show that it is not necessarily the case that all these votes for candidates who would have been elected anyway are 'wasted', since preference votes may also have other effects. For female candidates in the Netherlands in particular, a larger number of preference votes helps them to get a better list position in the next election. Still, this effect does not hold for candidates more towards the top of the list, so the influence stays limited in that respect. In Belgium a good electoral performance also helps candidates in their political career, although the effect applies to male candidates there. Preference votes thus have an influence beyond which candidates are elected or not, which is not only an important finding in itself, but also underlines the relevance of research on preference voting.

6.3 The value of preference votes

All findings and implications discussed above lead to two important questions. First, what do these findings mean for the academic literature on personalization? And second, what are the advantages of preference votes for representative democracy?

The findings presented in this study do not show overwhelming support for the personalization thesis. Yes, both in the Netherlands and Belgium the use of preference votes

has increased over the last decades, but the influence of political parties remains strong. We see that parties still control to a very large extent which candidates are elected. List position still has the largest influence on whether a candidate gets elected or not. Thus it is more important for a candidate to be popular with the selectorate of the party, than to be popular with voters. This is partly because of the electoral rules. Both in Belgium and the Netherlands the threshold for winning a seat without the support of the party are relatively high. In addition, the rules also benefit the higher placed candidates. On the other hand, this is also because of the way voters use the electoral rules. At least in theory, it is possible that more candidates are elected out of list order. However, voters tend to vote mostly for those candidates who are elected anyway. On top of that, not all of these preference votes seem to be real personal votes. Sometimes they are cast for negative reasons, especially in a system where no party vote exists. Sometimes they are cast simply for the first person on the list with a certain characteristic. For example, the first woman on the list in the Netherlands can count on a considerable number of votes. Such votes are not necessarily personal: they have more to do with a specific characteristic of that candidate, but if a different female candidate occupied that position, she would have been the one obtaining all those votes. This does not mean that such a vote is not important. It most likely shows that a part of the electorate is in favour of female representation, but it is not so much a sign of personalized politics. Both the electoral rules and the voters themselves therefore still give political parties a large influence on which candidates end up in parliament.

Increasing levels of preference votes therefore do not necessary mean that politics become more personalized. Therefore, preference votes alone should not be used as an indicator for personalization of politics. But does this mean there is actually no sign of personalized politics at all? Not entirely. Looking in more detail at preference votes can shed light on the issue. For example, some candidates receive votes because candidates know them personally, resulting in a real personal vote. And the results presented in this dissertation show that preference votes can have some indirect effects on the political career of a candidate, by giving candidates who perform well in elections better list positions in subsequent elections. Parties respond to preference votes, which leaves room for candidates to build a political career based on performing well in elections.

The advantages of preference voting for representative democracy in Belgium and the Netherlands seem limited. If we would look at the chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000), the influence of voters on this chain of delegation in terms of influencing the actual politicians who end up in parliament or government seems weak. In a representative democracy the chain of delegation is important, because, it links voters in several steps to those who govern. The first step in this chain is from voters to elected representatives. We saw that parties to a very large extent still control which candidates are elected. In addition, if we would look further at the chain of delegation, the influence becomes even weaker. In the second and third step of the chain, elected legislators are linked with the head of government and ministers. The chain of delegation could be strengthened by given

preference votes more influence in the selection of those ministers. However, I have shown that the influence of preference vote on the selection of ministers is also weak, especially in the Netherlands. Using preference votes in the selection process could indirectly give voters more influence, which would further strengthen the chain of delegation. The influence of preference votes on representative democracy in its currents form therefore seems limited.

So, these answers might be somewhat disappointing for those who think preference votes have value. Should the conclusion be that it is redundant to allow voters to cast a preference vote and that preference votes should be abolished? I do not think that this is the case. Preference votes still could be of great value, but voters should be able to make it more clear what their intentions are. Therefore, it is necessary to make changes to the electoral systems of the Netherlands and Belgium. For the Netherlands this would mean introducing a list vote. This at least would make it possible for voters who do not have a candidate preference to cast a vote that shows their true intentions. As an additional, and maybe even more important advantage, when we look at the actual preference votes it would become more clear who the popular candidates are. By definition, introducing a list vote means abolishing the obligatory candidate vote. This might seem a devaluation of the candidate vote, but I actually believe that it is the other way around. If voters have the option to not cast a candidate vote, those candidate votes that are cast are more meaningful.

To further strengthen the value of preference votes, the system could be made more open by making it easier for candidates to be elected out of list order. This also applies to Belgium. In that case, preference votes could actually have an important influence on the composition of parliament. In the current systems the effects of preference votes seem quite limited, which seems to make them somewhat redundant. If this is the case, I argue that the better way to go would be to increase the weight of preference votes, instead of abolishing them. This could also have a positive influence on representative democracy, since it allows for a more direct link between voters and MPs. In times where the relationship between voters and parties is weakening, this might be of importance for representative democracy.

6.4 Suggestions for further research

A first suggestion for further research relates to the information about candidates given to voters on the ballot. Many of the indicators that seem to have a strong effect on which candidates receive more preference votes, are related to information given on the ballot: gender (explicitly in the Netherlands, as the gender of (most) candidates is given and implicitly in Belgium, as the first name of candidates is given) and municipality (in the Netherlands). The information about the candidate that is given on the ballot thus seems to influence preference voting. Research could focus on the actual size of the effect of the information given on the ballot. This is also a more normative question, since it might influence the election result. To which extent is information given on the ballot desirable, if other potentially relevant information is left out?

A second suggestion relates to the nature of preference votes. The current literature on preference voting assumes that casting a preference vote is in general positively motivated. I argued and showed that motivations can also be negative, by focusing on one such negative motivation (a negative evaluation of the list-puller). Further research could focus more on the distinction between negative and positive motivations for casting a preference vote. In addition, further research could be conducted on the 'random' aspect of some preference votes. I showed that, in the Dutch case, some voters who do not want to vote for the list-puller voted for another candidate, without mentioning a reason for voting for the candidate who was chosen. Future research might delve into this mechanism, by studying whether the vote actually is random or that in addition to the negative motivations, positive motivations for the actual vote exist as well.

In this dissertation one chapter focuses on the voter, and one chapter focuses on the candidate. While these analyses are valuable to get a better insight in the reasons for voters who cast a preference vote and the candidates who receive preference votes, this does not explain the whole dynamic of preference voting. Therefore, another suggestion for further research would be to focus on the link between voters and candidates and how this affects preference voting. Only few studies have done this so far, mainly because it is difficult to obtain the data necessary, as detailed data about voting behaviour is necessary for such a study.

Some studies have linked voters and candidates in terms of gender based voting. However, the results of these studies are not consistent. Some studies found that voters are more likely to vote for a candidate from the same gender (Erzeel & Caluwaerts, 2015; Giger et al., 2014; Marien et al., 2017), while other studies did not (McElroy & Marsh, 2010; Wauters et al., 2010). In contrast to what literature would suggest, political sophistication has a limited influence on gender-based voting (De Leeuw, 2017). Gender-based voting thus does not seem to be simply a 'shortcut' (Cutler, 2002) for those voters with low levels of political sophistication. This strengthens the need for research that links voters and candidates, since the findings of De Leeuw suggest this type of voting is a strategy used by a broader spectrum of voters.

The only study in which multiple voter and candidate characteristics are included in an approach that links voters and candidates is conducted by Van Erkel (2017, pp. 155–180). Van Erkel included gender, age and location in his model and found a "strong effect of shared municipality, (…) a moderate effect of sex and no general effect of age" (2017, p. 177). But further studies are still necessary, not only in different contexts, but also with different candidate characteristics. One such characteristic which would be particularly interesting is ethnicity, as was mentioned in chapter 4. Results in chapter 4 showed no robust effects of whether candidates who have a non-European background receive more preference votes. Further research is necessary, which should delve deeper into this issue and also gather better information about the ethnic background of candidates. In this dissertation I coded whether candidates belong to an ethnic minority based on last names,

which is not ideal, and leaves little room for variation between members of different ethnic minorities.

Studying the link between voters and candidates more closely might give valuable insights in what voters try to accomplish by casting a preference vote. It might help to think about changes in the electoral system to facilitate that which voters actually would like to achieve with preference votes. In the current electoral systems of Belgium and the Netherlands the influence of preference votes all in all seems limited, while it could actually help to strengthen the link between voters and candidates in a representative democracy.

Bibliography

Aarts, K. (2001). The impact of leaders on electoral choice in the Netherlands revisited. *Acta Politica*, *36*(4), 380–401.

Aarts, K., Blais, A., & Schmitt, H. (Eds.). (2011). *Political Leaders and Democratic Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ackaert, J. (1996). De kiezers delen de kaarten uit, de partijen spelen ermee.... In J. Buelens & K. Deschouwer (Eds.), *De Dorpsstraat is de Wetstraat niet* (pp. 49–74). Brussel: VUBPress.

Andeweg, R. B. (2005). The Netherlands: The Sanctity of Proportionality. In M. Gallagher & P. Mitchell (Eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems* (pp. 491–510). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Andeweg, R. B., & Irwin, G. A. (2009). *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands* (third ed.). Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Andeweg, R. B., & Irwin, G. A. (2014). *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands* (fourth ed.). Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Andeweg, R. B., & Thomassen, J. (2011). Pathways to party unity: Sanctions, loyalty, homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament. *Party Politics*, *17*(5), 655–672.

Andeweg, R. B., & Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (2011). Second order personalization: preference voting in the Netherlands. *Paper Presented at the ECPR General Conference, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, 25 - 27 August*.

André, A., Baudewyns, P., Depauw, S., & de Winter, L. (2015). Het waarom van de voorkeurstem. In K. Deschouwer, P. Delwit, M. Hooghe, P. Baudewyns, & S. Walgrave (Eds.), *De kiezer ontcijferd. Over stemgedrag en stemmotivaties.* (pp. 57–75). Leuven: Lannoo Campus.

André, A., & Depauw, S. (2017). Too much choice, too little impact: a multilevel analysis of the contextual determinants of preference voting. *West European Politics*, *40*(3), 598–620.

André, A., Depauw, S., & Pilet, J.-B. (2017). The nature of preference voting: Disentangling the party and personal components of candidate choice. In K. Deschouwer (Ed.), *Mind the Gap. Political Participation and Representation in Belgium* (pp. 251–273). Colchester: ECPR Press.

André, A., Depauw, S., & Shugart, M. S. (2014). The effect of electoral institutions on legislative behaviour. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, & K. W. Strøm (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies* (pp. 231–249). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

André, A., Depauw, S., Shugart, M. S., & Chytilek, R. (2017). Party nomination strategies in flexible-list systems: Do preference votes matter? *Party Politics*, *23*(5), 589–600.

André, A., Pilet, J.-B., Depauw, S., & Van Aelst, P. (2013). De partij, de leider of een "gewone" kandidaat? Het gebruik van voorkeurstemmen bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2012. In R. Dassonneville, M. Hooghe, S. Marien, & J.-B. Pilet (Eds.), *De lokale kiezer: het kiesgedrag bij de Belgische gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van oktober 2012* (pp. 117–140). Brussel: ASP.

André, A., Wauters, B., & Pilet, J.-B. (2012). It's Not Only About Lists: Explaining Preference Voting in Belgium. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, *22*(3), 293–313.

Anker, H. (1992). *Normal vote analysis*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.

Ansolabehere, S., & Jones, P. E. (2010). Constituents' Responses to Congressional Roll-Call Voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, *54*(3), 583–597.

Arzheimer, K., & Evans, J. (2012). Geolocation and voting: Candidate–voter distance effects on party choice in the 2010 UK general election in England. *Political Geography*,

31(5), 301–310.
Bäck, H., & Debus, M. (2016). *Political Parties, Parliaments and Legislative Speechmaking*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Müller, W. C. (2010). The ideological cohesion of political parties. an evaluation of the method of deriving MPs' policy positions from parliamentary speeches. *Paper Presented at the 68th Annual MPSA Conference in Chicago, 22–25 April*.
Bakker, R., De Vries, C., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G., … Vachudova, M. A. (2015). Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999-2010. *Party Politics*, *21*(1), 143–152.
Balmas, M., Rahat, G., Sheafer, T., & Shenhav, S. R. (2014). Two routes to personalized politics. *Party Politics*, *20*(1), 37–51.
Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. (2017a). Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers - De Kamerleden. Retrieved July 7, 2017, from http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/depute&language=nl&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/depute/cvlist54.cfm
Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. (2017b). Belgische Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers - Parlementaire stukken van de Kamer. Retrieved July 5, 2017, from http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/flwb&language=nl&cfm=ListDocument.cfm
Belgium.be. (2003). Verkiezingen 2003. Retrieved October 6, 2015, from http://verkiezingen2003.belgium.be
Belgium.be. (2007). Verkiezingen 2007. Retrieved October 7, 2015, from http://verkiezingen2007.belgium.be
Belgium.be. (2010). Verkiezingen 2010. Retrieved October 13, 2015, from http://verkiezingen2010.belgium.be
Belgium.be. (2014). Verkiezingen 2014. Retrieved October 14, 2015, from http://verkiezingen2014.belgium.be/
Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2007). Compared to What? A Comment on "A Robust Transformation Procedure for Interpreting Political Text" by Martin and Vanberg. *Political Analysis*, *16*(1), 101–111.
Benoit, K., & Nulty, P. (2016). Quanteda: Quantitative Analysis of Textual Data. R package version 0.9.8.
Bernauer, J., & Bräuninger, T. (2009). Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction Membership in the 15th German Bundestag: A Computational Text Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches. *German Politics*, *18*(3), 385–402.
Black, J. H., & Erickson, L. (2003). Women candidates and voter bias: do women politicians need to be better? *Electoral Studies*, *22*(1), 81–100.
Blais, A. (2010). Making electoral democracy work. *Electoral Studies*, *29*(1), 169–170.
Blais, A., & Carty, R. K. (1991). The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor. *British Journal of Political Science*, *21*(1), 79–93.
Blais, A., Héroux-Legault, M., Stephenson, L. B., Cross, W., & Gidengil, E. (2012). Assessing the psychological and mechanical impact of electoral rules: A quasi-experiment. *Electoral Studies*, *31*(4), 829–837.
Blom-Hansen, J., Elklit, J., Serritzlew, S., & Villadsen, L. R. (2016). Ballot position and election results: Evidence from a natural experiment. *Electoral Studies*, *44*, 172–183.
Blumenau, J., Eggers, A. C., Hangartner, D., & Hix, S. (2017). Open/Closed List and Party Choice: Experimental Evidence from the UK. *British Journal of Political Science*, *47*(4), 809–827.
Bräuninger, T., Brunner, M., & Bäubler, T. (2012). Personal vote-seeking in flexible list systems: How electoral incentives shape Belgian MPs' bill initiation behaviour.

European Journal of Political Research, *51*(5), 607–645.
Brockington, D. (2003). A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect. *Political Behavior*, *25*(1), 1–27. Retrieved from ht
Brown, A. R. (2014). Voters Don't Care Much About Incumbency. *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, *1*(2), 132–143.
Campbell, R., Cowley, P., Vivyan, N., & Wagner, M. (2016). Legislator Dissent as a Valence Signal. First published online 24 June 2016. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1–24.
Carey, J. M. (2007). Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, *51*(1), 92–107.
Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, *14*(4), 417–439.
Carson, J. L., Koger, G., Lebo, M. J., & Young, E. (2010). The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress. *American Journal of Political Science*, *54*(3), 598–616.
Catt, H. (1996). *Voting Behaviour. A Radical Critique.* London and New York: Leicester University Press.
Chen, E., Simonovits, G., Krosnick, J. A., & Pasek, J. (2014). The impact of candidate name order on election outcomes in North Dakota. *Electoral Studies*, *35*, 115–122.
Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws. *Comparative Political Studies*, *39*(6), 679–708.
Colomer, J. M. (2011). Introduction: personal and party representation. In J. M. Colomer (Ed.), *Personal representation. The neglected dimension of electoral systems* (pp. 1–19). Colchester: ECPR Press.
Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crisp, B. F., Olivella, S., Malecki, M., & Sher, M. (2013). Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: Seats at the price of unity. *Electoral Studies*, *32*(4), 658–669.
Curtice, J., & Marsh, M. (2008). How did they vote? Voters' use of the STV ballot paper in the 2007 Scottish Local Elections. *Representation*, *44*(4), 285–300.
Cutler, F. (2002). The Simplest Shortcut of All: Sociodemographic Characteristics and Electoral Choice. *The Journal of Politics*, *64*(2), 466–490.
Dalton, R. J., McAllister, I., & Wattenberg, M. (2002). The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment. In R. J. Dalton & M. Wattenberg (Eds.), *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (pp. 37–63). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Darcy, R., & McAllister, I. (1990). Ballot position effects. *Electoral Studies*, *9*(1), 5–17.
Dataportaal van de Nederlandse overheid. (2017). Verkiezingsuitslag Tweede Kamer 2017.
De Leeuw, S. (2017). Het geslacht van de kandidaat als heuristisch stemmotief: Een onderzoek naar het effect van politieke sofisticatie en electorale context op gender-based stemgedrag. *Res Publica*, *60*(2), 141–170.
De Winter, L. (1991). Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet. In J. Blondel & J.-L. Thiébault (Eds.), *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe* (pp. 44–69). London: Macmillan.
De Winter, L. (2005). Belgium: Empowering Voters or Party Elites? In M. Gallagher & P. Mitchell (Eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems* (pp. 417–432). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deschouwer, K. (2009). *The Politics of Belgium. Governing a Divided Society*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Deschouwer, K., Delwit, P., Hooghe, M., Baudewyns, P., & Walgrave, S. (Eds.). (2015). *De kiezer ontcijferd. Over stemgedrag en stemmotivaties.* Leuven: Lannoo Campus.
Dinas, E. (2018). *The Acquisition of Voting Habits.* (J. Fisher, E. Fieldhouse, M. N. Franklin, R. Gibson, M. Cantijoch, & C. Wlezien, Eds.). London and New York: Routlegde.

Dowding, K., & Dumont, P. (2009). Structural and Strategic Factors Affecting the Hiring and Firing of Ministers. In K. Dowding & P. Dumont (Eds.), *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing* (pp. 1–20). London: Routledge.
Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper.
Duch, R. M., & Stevenson, R. T. (2008). *The Economic Vote. How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dumont, P., Fiers, S., & Dandoy, R. (2009). Belgium: Ups and downs of ministerial careers in a partitocratic federal state. In K. Dowding & P. Dumont (Eds.), *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing* (pp. 125–146). London: Routledge.
Dumont, P., Kies, R., & Fivaz, J. (2014). Being a VAA candidate: Why do candidates use voting advice applications and what can we learn from it. In D. Garzia & S. Marschall (Eds.), *Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates. Voting Advice Applications in a comparative perspective* (pp. 145–159). Colchester: EC.
Duverger, M. (1951). *Les partis politiques*. Paris: Armand Colin.
Elfferich, A. (2017). Politieke en technische expertise van Nederlandse ministers en staatssecretarissen van 1967 tot 2015. *Res Publica*, *59*(2), 171–191.
Erzeel, S., & Caluwaerts, D. (2015). Is It Gender, Ideology or Resources? Individual-Level Determinants of Preferential Voting for Male or Female Candidates. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, *25*(3), 265–283.
Erzeel, S., De Leeuw, S., Marien, S., & Rihoux, B. (2017). Gender-based voting. In K. Deschouwer (Ed.), *Mind the Gap. Political Participation and Representation in Belgium* (pp. 227–250). Colchester: ECPR Press.
Faas, T., & Schoen, H. (2006). The importance of being first: Effects of candidates' list positions in the 2003 Bavarian state election. *Electoral Studies*, *25*(1), 91–102.
Farrell, D. M., & McAllister, I. (2006). Voter satisfaction and electoral systems: Does preferential voting in candidate-centred systems make a difference? *European Journal of Political Research*, *45*(5), 723–749.
Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2016). The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions. *American Political Science Review*, *110*(3), 559–578.
Fournier, P., Van der Kolk, H., Carty, R. K., Blais, A., & Rose, J. (2011). *When Citizens Decide. Lessons from Citizen Assemblies on Electoral Reform*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fox, J. (2003). Effect displays in R for generalised linear models. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *8*(15), 1–27.
Gallagher. (1988). Conclusion. In M. Gallagher & M. Marsh (Eds.), *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective* (pp. 236–283). London: Sage.
Gelman, A., & Hill, J. (2007). *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Giger, N., Holli, A. M., Lefkofridi, Z., & Wass, H. (2014). The gender gap in same-gender voting: The role of context. *Electoral Studies*, *35*, 303–314.
Gimpel, J. G., Karnes, K. A., McTague, J., & Pearson-Merkowitz, S. (2008). Distance-decay in the political geography of friends-and-neighbors voting. *Political Geography*, *27*(2), 231–252.
Górecki, M. A., & Kukołowicz, P. (2014). Gender quotas, candidate background and the election of women: A paradox of gender quotas in open-list proportional representation systems. *Electoral Studies*, *36*, 65–80.
Hakhverdian, A., & Koop, C. (2007). Consensus Democracy and Support for Populist Parties in Western Europe. *Acta Politica*, *42*(4), 401–420.
Hazan, R. Y. (1996). Presidential parliamentarism: Direct popular election of the Prime Minister, Israel's new electoral and political system. *Electoral Studies*, *15*(1), 21–37.
Hazan, R. Y. (2014). Candidate selection: implications and challenges for legislative behaviour. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, & K. W. Strøm (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of*

Legislative Studies (pp. 213–230). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hazan, R. Y., & Rahat, G. (2010). *Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572540.001.0001/acprof-9780199572540
Hessing, R. C. (1985). Bij Voorkeur: Een onderzoek naar het gebruik van voorkeurstemmen. *Acta Politica*, *20*(2), 157–177.
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, voice, and loyalty : responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press.
Irwin, G. A., & Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (2004). The 2002 and 2003 Parliamentary Elections in The Netherlands. *Electoral Studies*, *23*(3), 551–557.
Jacobs, K. (2018). Electoral Systems in Context: The Netherlands. In E. S. Herron, R. J. Pekkanen, & M. S. Shugart (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems* (pp. 557–580). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jankowski, M. (2016). Voting for locals: Voters' information processing strategies in open-list PR systems. *Electoral Studies*, *43*, 72–84.
Jones, B. S. (2009). Multilevel Models. In J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, & D. Collier (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (pp. 605–623). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kadaster, & Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. (2013). Wijk- en buurtkaart 2010. Retrieved August 21, 2017, from https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/nederland-regionaal/geografische data/wijk-en-buurtkaart-2010
Kadaster, & Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. (2015). Wijk- en buurtkaart 2012. Retrieved August 21, 2017, from https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/nederland-regionaal/geografische data/wijk-en-buurtkaart-2012
Kadaster, & Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. (2016). Wijk- en buurtkaart 2016. Retrieved August 21, 2017, from https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/nederland-regionaal/geografische data/wijk-en-buurtkaart-2016
Kam, C. J. (2009). *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Karvonen, L. (2004). Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. *International Political Science Review*, *25*(2), 203–226.
Karvonen, L. (2010). *The personalisation of politics: a study of parliamentary democracies*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
Karvonen, L. (2011a). Preferential vote in party list. In J. Colomer (Ed.), *Personal representation. The neglected dimension of electoral systems* (pp. 119–134). Colchester: ECPR Press.
Karvonen, L. (2011b). Preferential Voting in Finland: How Much Do Candidates Matter, and to Whom and Why? *Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington, USA, September 1-4, 2011*.
Katz, R. S. (1980). *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Katz, R. S. (1985). Preference Voting in Italy. *Comparative Political Studies*, *18*(2), 229–249.
Katz, R. S. (1986). Intraparty Preference Voting. In B. Grofman & A. Lijphart (Eds.), *Electoral laws and their political consequences* (pp. 85–103). New York: Agathon Press Inc.
Kiesraad. (1998). *Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het opnieuw vaststellen van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer*. The Hague.
Kiesraad. (2002). *Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer*. The Hague.

Kiesraad. (2003). *Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer*. The Hague.
Kiesraad. (2006). *Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer*. The Hague.
Kiesraad. (2010). *Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer*. The Hague.
Kiesraad. (2012). *Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer*. The Hague.
Kiesraad. (2017a). Databank verkiezingsuitslagen. Retrieved August 21, 2017, from http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/
Kiesraad. (2017b). Evaluatie-advies Tweede Kamerverkiezing 15 maart. Retrieved September 25, 2017, from https://www.kiesraad.nl/adviezen-en-publicaties/adviezen/2017/06/02/evaluatieadvies-tweede-kamerverkiezing-2017
Kiesraad. (2017c). *Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau tot het vaststellen van de uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer*. The Hague.
King, A. (1981). The rise of the career politician in Britain—and its consequences. *British Journal of Political Science*, *11*(3), 249–285.
King, A. (2002). Do Leaders' Personalities Really matter? In A. King (Ed.), *Leaders' personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections* (pp. 1–43). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kitschelt, H. (1995). *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Klemmensen, R., Hobolt, S. B., & Hansen, M. E. (2007). Estimating policy positions using political texts: An evaluation of the Wordscores approach. *Electoral Studies*, *26*(4), 746–755.
Koole, R. A. (2009). *Mensenwerk; herinneringen van een partijvoorzitter, 2001-2007*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
Langer, A. I. (2007). A Historical Exploration of the Personalisation of Politics in the Print Media: The British Prime Ministers (1945-1999). *Parliamentary Affairs*, *60*(3), 371–387.
Laslier, J.-F., Blais, A., Bol, D., Golder, S. N., Harfst, P., Stephenson, L. B., & Van der Straeten, K. (2015). The EuroVotePlus experiment. *European Union Politics*, *16*(4), 601–615.
Laver, M., & Benoit, K. (2002). Locating TDs in Policy Spaces: The Computational Text Analysis of Dáil Speeches. *Irish Political Studies*, *17*(1), 59–73.
Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data. *American Political Science Review*, *97*(2), 311–331.
Lijphart, A. (1985). The field of electoral systems research: A critical survey. *Electoral Studies*, *4*(1), 3–14.
Lijphart, A., & López Pintor, R. (1988). Alphabetic bias in partisan elections: Patterns of voting for the Spanish Senate, 1982 and 1986. *Electoral Studies*, *7*(3), 225–231.
Louwerse, T. (2014). Peilingwijzer 2010-2012. Harvard Dataverse.
Louwerse, T., & Otjes, S. (2016). Personalised parliamentary behaviour without electoral incentives : the case of the Netherlands. *West European Politics*, *39*(4), 778–799.
Lowe, W. (2011). JFreq: Count words, quickly. Java software version 0.5.4. Retrieved from http://www.conjugateprior.org/software/jfreq/
Lutz, G. (2010). First come, First Served: The Effect of Ballot Position on Electoral Success in Open Ballot PR Elections. *Representation*, *46*(2), 167–181.
Maddens, B., & Fiers, S. (2004). The direct PM election and the institutional presidentialisation of parliamentary systems. *Electoral Studies*, *23*(4), 769–793.
Maddens, B., & Put, G.-J. (2013). Office effects and campaign spending in a semi-open list PR system: The Belgian/Flemish federal and regional elections 1999–2010. *Electoral*

Studies, *32*(4), 852–863.
Maddens, B., Put, G., & Vanlangenakker, I. (2010). Welke kandidaten zullen het meest voorkeurstemmen halen? Centrum voor Politicologie K.U.Leuven, Leuven. Retrieved November 11, 2015, from https://soc.kuleuven.be/web/files/5/16/2010-nota_voorkeurstemmen.pdf
Maddens, B., Wauters, B., Noppe, J., & Fiers, S. (2006). Effects of Campaign Spending in an Open List PR System: The 2003 Legislative Elections in Flanders/Belgium. *West European Politics*, *29*(1), 161–168.
Maddens, B., Weekers, K., Fiers, S., & Vanlangenakker, I. (2007). Op zoek naar een verklaring voor de persoonlijke score van de kandidaten bij lokale verkiezingen. *Res Publica*, *49*(1), 132–149.
Manin, B. (1997). *The Principles of Representative Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mansbridge, J. (1999). Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes." *The Journal of Politics*, *61*(3), 628–657.
March, L., & Mudde, C. (2005). What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation. *Comparative European Politics*, *3*(1), 23–49.
Marcinkiewicz, K. (2014). Electoral contexts that assist voter coordination: Ballot position effects in Poland. *Electoral Studies*, *33*, 322–334.
Marien, S., Schouteden, A., & Wauters, B. (2017). Voting for Women in Belgium's Flexible List System. *Politics & Gender*, *13*(2), 305–335.
Marschall, S., & Garzia, D. (2014). Voting advice applications in a comparative perspective: an introduction. In D. Garzia & S. Marschall (Eds.), *Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates. Voting Advice Applications in a comparative perspective* (pp. 1–10). Colchester: ECPR Press.
Marsh, M. (1985). The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems. *European Journal of Political Research*, *13*(4), 365–378.
Marsh, M. (2007). Candidates or Parties? Objects of Electoral Choice in Ireland. *Party Politics*, *13*(4), 500–527.
Martin, & Vanberg, G. (2008). A robust transformation procedure for interpreting political text. *Political Analysis*, *16*(1), 93–100.
Matland, R. E., & Studlar, D. T. (1996). The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway. *The Journal of Politics*, *58*(3), 707–733.
Matthews, D. R., & Valen, H. (1999). *Parliamentary Representation: The Case of the Norwegian Storting*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). "Mediatization" of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy? *Political Communication*, *16*(3), 247–261.
McAllister, I. (2007). The Personalization of Politics. In R. J. Dalton & H.-D. Klingemann (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior* (pp. 571–588). New York: Oxford University Press.
McDermott, M. L. (2009). Voting for myself: Candidate and voter group associations over time. *Electoral Studies*, *28*(4), 606–614.
McElroy, G., & Marsh, M. (2010). Candidate Gender and Voter Choice: Analysis from a Multimember Preferential Voting System. *Political Research Quarterly*, *63*(4), 822–833.
Mickler, T. A. (2017a). Inferring Ideological Positions From Speeches and Questions - An Analysis of the Tweede Kamer. *Paper Presented at the Politicologenetmaal 2017, Leiden*.
Mickler, T. A. (2017b). *Parliamentary committees in a party-centred context : structure, composition, functioning*. Leiden: Leiden University Institute of Political Science PhD Dissertation.
Miguel, L. F. (2008). Political representation and gender in Brazil: Quotas for women and

their impact. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, *27*(2), 197–214.
Miller, J. M., & Krosnick, J. A. (1998). The impact of candidate name order on election outcomes. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *62*(3), 291–330.
Ministry of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations. (2016). Officiële Bekendmakingen. Retrieved from http://www.officielebekendmakingen.nl
Moser, R. G., & Scheiner, E. (2012). *Electoral Systems and Political Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mughan, A. (1993). Party leaders and presidentialism in the 1992 election: A postwar perspective. *British Elections and Parties Yearbook*, *3*(1), 193–204.
Nagtzaam, M. A. M., & Van Erkel, P. F. A. (2017). Preference votes without preference? Institutional effects on preference voting: an experiment. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, *27*(2), 172–191.
Norris, P. (2004). *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ortega Villodres, C. (2003). Intra-party competition under preferential list systems: the case of Finland. *Representation*, *40*(1), 55–66.
Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. (2017a). Parlement & Politiek: Selectiemenu Bewindslieden. Retrieved May 10, 2017, from https://www.parlement.com/id/vg6gfs1frizd/selectiemenu_bewindspersonen
Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. (2017b). Parlement & Politiek: Selectiemenu Tweede Kamerleden. Retrieved May 10, 2017, from http://www.parlement.com/id/vg7zoaah7lqb/selectiemenu_tweede_kamerleden
Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. (2018). Parlement & Politiek: Gekozen minister-president of formateur. Retrieved July 6, 2018, from https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrsr2z0/gekozen_minister_president_of_formateur
PARTIREP. (2014). *PartiRep Election Study 2014*. Brussels: PARTIREP [dataset].
Pauwels, T. (2014). *Populism in Western Europe. Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands*. Abingdon: Routledge.
Pennings, P., & Hazan, R. Y. (2001). Democratizing Candidate Selection: Causes and Consequences. *Party Politics*, *7*(3), 267–275.
Pilet, J.-B., & Van Haute, E. (2008). The federal elections in Belgium, June 2007. *Electoral Studies*, *27*(3), 547–550.
Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (Eds.). (2005). *The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Political Data Yearbook. (2017). Political Data Yearbook - Belgium. Retrieved March 14, 2017, from http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/Chart.aspx/106/Belgium
Polk, J., Rovny, J., Bakker, R., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., … Zilovic, M. (2017). Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. *Research & Politics*, *4*(1), 1–9.
Proksch, S.-O., & Slapin, J. B. (2015). *The Politics of Parliamentary Debate. Parties, Rebels, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pruysers, S., & Cross, W. (2016). Negative personalization: party leaders and party strategy. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, *49*(3), 539–558.
Put, G.-J. (2016). Determinants of Geographical Representation on Candidate Lists in Flexible-List Systems: Lessons from the Belgian Case. *Politics*, *36*(2), 180–196.
Put, G.-J., & Maddens, B. (2012). De selectie van verkiesbare kandidaten. Een analyse van de Belgische Kamerverkiezingen 1999-2010. *Res Publica*, *54*(3), 289–308.
Put, G.-J., & Maddens, B. (2013). The Selection of Candidates for Eligible Positions on PR Lists: The Belgian/Flemish Federal Elections 1999-2010. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, *23*(1), 49–65.
Put, G.-J., & Maddens, B. (2015). The Effect of Municipality Size and Local Office on the

Electoral Success of Belgian/Flemish Election Candidates: A Multilevel Analysis. *Government and Opposition*, *50*(4), 607–628.
Rabinowitz, G., & Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A Directional Theory of Issue Voting. *The American Political Science Review*, *83*(1), 93–121.
Rahat, G., & Sheafer, T. (2007). The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003. *Political Communication*, *24*(1), 65–80.
Rasmussen, S. H. R. (2016). Education or Personality Traits and Intelligence as Determinants of Political Knowledge? *Political Studies*, *64*(4), 1036–1054.
Renwick, A., & Pilet, J.-B. (2016). *Faces of the Ballot*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rihoux, B., Dumont, P., Deruette, S., De Winter, L., & Baudewyns, P. (2013). Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook*, *52*(1), 32–34.
Rosema, M. (2004). *The sincere vote: a psychological study of voting*. Doctoral dissertation.
Rosema, M. (2006). Partisanship, candidate evaluations, and prospective voting. *Electoral Studies*, *25*(3), 467–488.
Schmidt, G. D. (2003). Unanticipated successes: Lessons from Perus experiences with gender quotas in Majoritarian closed list and open list PR systems. *Paper Presented at the International IDEA Workshop The Implementation of Quotas, Latin American Experiences; 23–24 February 2003, Lima, Peru*.
Secker, W. (1991). *Ministers in beeld. De sociale en functionele herkomst van de Nederlandse ministers, 1848-1990*. Leiden: DSWO Press.
Shugart, M. S. (2001). Electoral "efficiency" and the move to mixed-member systems. *Electoral Studies*, *20*(2), 173–193.
Shugart, M. S. (2005). Comparative Electoral Systems Research: The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead. In M. Gallagher & P. Mitchell (Eds.), *The politics of Electoral systems* (pp. 25–56). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sinardet, D. (2008). Belgian Federalism Put to the Test: The 2007 Belgian Federal Elections and their Aftermath. *West European Politics*, *31*(5), 1016–1032.
Singer, M. M., & Stephenson, L. B. (2009). The political context and Duverger's theory: Evidence at the district level. *Electoral Studies*, *28*(3), 480–491.
Slapin, J. B., & Proksch, S.-O. (2008). A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Party Positions from Texts. *American Journal of Political Science*, *52*(3), 705–722.
Slapin, J. B., & Proksch, S.-O. (2014). Words as Data: Content analysis in Legislative Studies. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, & K. W. Strøm (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies* (pp. 126–144). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Söderlund, P. (2017). Candidate-centred electoral systems and voter turnout. *West European Politics*, *40*(3), 516–533.
Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel. (2018). *Lage drempels, hoge dijken. Democratie en rechtsstaat in balans*. Amsterdam: Boom Uitgvers.
Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, *37*(3), 261–290.
Taggart, P. (2004). Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, *9*(3), 269–288.
Tavits, M. (2010). Effect of Local Ties On Electoral Success and Parliamentary Behaviour. *Party Politics*, *16*(2), 215–235.
Thijssen, P. (2013). Are parties stimulating candidate-centred voting? The case of the Belgian district council elections 2000–2006. *Acta Politica*, *48*(2), 144–166.
Thijssen, P., Wauters, B., & Van Erkel, P. F. A. (2017). Preferential voting in local versus national elections: The role of proximity revisited. In K. Deschouwer (Ed.), *Mind the Gap. Political Participation and Representation in Belgium* (pp. 275–293). Colchester: ECPR Press.
Thomassen, J., & Andeweg, R. B. (2004). Beyond collective representation: individual members of parliament and interest representation in the Netherlands. *The Journal of*

Legislative Studies, *10*(4), 47–69.
Todosijevic, B., Aarts, K., & Van Der Kaap, H. G. (2010). *Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies: Data Source Book 1971-2006*. The Hague: DANS.
Van Aelst, P., Maddens, B., & Noppe, J. (2006). Van de studio naar de Kamer? Over de relatie tussen media en voorkeurstemmen tijdens de verkiezingen van 2003. In S. Fiers & H. Reynaert (Eds.), *Wie zetelt? De gekozen politieke elite in Vlaanderen doorgelicht* (pp. 163–176). Heverlee: Lannoo.
Van Aelst, P., Maddens, B., Noppe, J., & Fiers, S. (2008). Politicians in the News: Media or Party Logic? *European Journal of Communication*, *23*(2), 193–210.
Van Aelst, P., Sheafer, T., & Stanyer, J. (2012). The personalization of mediated political communication: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. *Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism*, *13*(2), 203–220.
Van Aelst, P., & Vliegenthart, R. (2014). Studying the Tango. *Journalism Studies*, *15*(4), 392–410.
Van der Straeten, K., Laslier, J.-F., & Blais, A. (2013). Vote Au Pluriel: How People Vote When Offered to Vote Under Different Rules. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, *46*(2), 324–328.
Van Erkel, P. F. A. (2017). *Preferential votes: explaining individual electoral success in intra-party competition*. Universiteit Antwerpen: PhD Dissertation.
Van Erkel, P. F. A., & Thijssen, P. (2016). The first one wins: Distilling the primacy effect. *Electoral Studies*, *44*, 245–254.
Van Erkel, P. F. A., Thijssen, P., & Van Aelst, P. (2017). One for all or all for one: The electoral effects of personalized campaign strategies. *Acta Politica*, *52*(3), 384–405.
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (1994). *Het woord is aan de kiezer: een beschouwing over verkiezingen en stemgedrag aan de hand van open vragen*. Leiden: DSWO Press.
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (2007). The Dutch Parliamentary Elections of 2006. *West European Politics*, *30*(5), 1139–1147.
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Andeweg, R. B. (2010). Demoted leaders and exiled candidates: Disentangling party and person in the voter's mind. *Electoral Studies*, *29*(4), 628–635.
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Andeweg, R. B. (2012). Tweede Orde Personalisering: Voorkeurstemmen in Nederland. *Res Publica*, *54*(2), 163–191.
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Irwin, G. A. (2003). Never a dull moment: Pim Fortuyn and the Dutch parliamentary election of 2002. *West European Politics*, *26*(2), 41–66.
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Irwin, G. A. (2004). The Dutch Parliamentary Elections of 2003. *West European Politics*, *27*(1), 157–164.
Van Vonno, C. M. C. (2016). *Achieving Party Unity. A sequential Approach to Why Mps Act in Concert*. Leiden: Leiden University Institute of Political Science PhD Dissertation.
Van Wijnen, P. (2000). Candidates and voting behaviour. *Acta Politica*, *35*, 430–450.
Vivyan, N., & Wagner, M. (2012). Do voters reward rebellion? The electoral accountability of MPs in Britain. *European Journal of Political Research*, *51*(2), 235–264.
Voerman, G. (2014). Kandidaatstelling op landelijk niveau. In S. de Lange, M. Leyenaar, & P. de Jong (Eds.), *Politieke partijen: overbodig of nodig?* (pp. 45–62). Den Haag: Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur.
von Schoultz, Å. (2017). Electoral Systems in Context: Finland. In E. S. Herron, R. J. Pekkanen, & M. S. Shugart (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems* (pp. 601–626). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walgrave, S., & Van Aelst, P. (2006). The Contingency of the Mass Media's Political Agenda Setting Power: Toward a Preliminary Theory. *Journal of Communication*, *56*(1), 88–109.
Wattenberg, M. (1991). *The Rise of Candidate-Centred Politics: Presidential Elections of the 1980s*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Wauters, B., & Rodenbach, J. (2014). Het gebruik van de voorkeurstem bij de

parlementsverkiezingen van 25 mei 2014. *Onderzoeksnota GASPAR*. Retrieved from www.gaspar.ugent.be

Wauters, B., Thijssen, P., Van Aelst, P., & Pilet, J.-B. (2016). Centralized personalization at the expense of decentralized personalization. The decline of preferential voting in Belgium (2003–2014). *Party Politics*.

Wauters, B., Verlet, D., & Ackaert, J. (2012). Giving More Weight to Preferential Votes: Welcome or Superfluous Reform? The Case of the Local Elections in Flanders (Belgium). *Local Government Studies*, *38*(1), 91–111.

Wauters, B., & Weekers, K. (2008). Het gebruik van de voorkeurstem bij de federale parlementsverkiezingen van 10 juni 2007. *Res Publica*, *50*(2), 49–88.

Wauters, B., Weekers, K., & Maddens, B. (2010). Explaining the number of preferential votes for women in an open-list PR system : An investigation of the 2003 federal elections in Flanders (Belgium). *Acta Politica*, *45*(4), 468–490.

Wauters, B., Weekers, K., & Pilet, J.-B. (2004). Het gebruik van de voorkeurstem bij de regionale en Europese parlementsverkiezingen van 13 juni 2004. *Res Publica*, *46*(2–3), 377–411.

Weekers, K. (2003). *Electorale prestaties van regeringsleden: de betekenis van voorkeurstemmen in het carrièreverloop van Belgische ministers en staatssecretarissen (1981-1999)*. KU leven, Faculteit Sociale wetenschappen: niet gepubliceerde thesis.

Appendices

A General appendices

A.1. Used party abbreviations

Belgium

Party	Full name	English name
CD&V	Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams	Christian Democratic & Flemish
CDH	Centre Démocrate Humaniste	Humanist Democratic Centre
Ecolo	Ecolo	Ecolo
Groen[1]	Groen	Green
MR	Mouvement Réformateur	Reformist Movement
N-VA	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie	New Flemish Alliance
OpenVLD[2]	Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
PS	Parti Socialiste	Socialist Party
PVDA / PTB	Partij van de Arbeid van België / Parti du Travail de Belgique	Workers' Party of Belgium
Sp.A	Socialistische Partij Anders	Socialist Party Different
VB	Vlaams Belang	Flemish Interest

The Netherlands

Party	Full name	English name
CDA	Christen Democratisch Appèl	Christian Democratic Appeal
CU	ChristenUnie	ChristianUnion
D66	Democraten 66	Democrats 66
GL	GroenLinks	GreenLeft
GPV	Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond	Reformed Political League
LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn	List Pim Fortuyn
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid	Labour Party
PvdD	Partij voor de Dieren	Party for the Animals
PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid	Party for Freedom
RPF	Reformatorische Politieke Federatie	Reformational Political Federation
SGP	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij	Political Reformed Party
SP	Socialistische Partij	Socialist Party
VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
50Plus	50Plus	50Plus

[1] In 2003 this party was called Agalev, and between 2004 and 2011 Groen!.
[2] Before 2007 this party was called VLD.

A.2. Analysed elections, legislative periods and governments

Table A.1 Analysed elections, legislative periods, governments (Belgium)

Election	Legislative period		Government (Parties)	Date formed Date dissolved
18-05-2003	51	05-06-2003	Verhofstadt II	11-07-2003
		26-04-2007	(VLD,-MR- sp.a/SPIRIT-PS)	21-12-2007
10-06-2007	52	28-06-2007	Verhofstadt III	21-12-2007
		06-05-2010	(Open VLD-MR-CD&V-cdH-PS)	20-03-2008
			Leterme I	20-03-2008
			(CD&V-cdH-MR-Open Vld-PS)	30-12-2008
			Van Rompuy	30-12-2008
			(CD&V-cdH-MR-Open Vld-PS)	25-11-2009
			Leterme II	25-11-2009
			(CD&V-cdH-MR-Open Vld-PS)	06-12-2011
13-06-2010	53	06-07-2010	Di Rupo	06-12-2011
		24-04-2014	(PS-sp.a-MR-Open Vld-CD&V-cdH)	11-10-2014
25-05-2014	54	19-06-2014	Michel	11-10-2014
		-	(NVA-MR-CD&V-Open Vld)	-

Table A.2 Analysed elections, legislative periods, governments (the Netherlands)

Election	Legislative period	Government (Parties)	Date formed Date dissolved
06-05-1998	19-05-1998	Kok II	03-08-1998
	23-05-2002	(PvdA-VVD-D66)	22-07-2002
15-02-2002	23-05-2002	Balkenende I	22-07-2002
	29-01-2003	(CDA-LPF-VVD)	27-05-2003
22-01-2003	30-01-2003	Balkenende II	27-05-2003
	29-11-2006	(CDA-VVD-D66)	30-06-2006
		Balkenende III	07-07-2006
		(CDA-VVD)	22-02-2007
22-11-2006	30-11-2006	Balkenende IV	22-02-2007
	16-06-2010	(CDA-PvdA-CU)	14-10-2010
09-06-2010	17-06-2010	Rutte I	14-10-2010
	19-09-2012	(VVD-CDA)	05-11-2012
12-09-2012	20-09-2012	Rutte II	05-11-2012
	22-03-2017	(VVD-PvdA)	26-10-2017
15-03-2017	23-03-2017		
	-		

B Appendices for chapter 2

B.1. Respondents which were included and excluded in the experiment

Table B.1 Included and excluded respondents based on vote intention

Country	**Belgium**	**The Netherlands**
Included respondents	Who would vote: ▪ CD&V ▪ N-VA ▪ Open VLD ▪ sp.a ▪ Groen ▪ Vlaams belang	Who would vote: ▪ VVD ▪ PvdA ▪ PVV ▪ CDA ▪ SP ▪ D66 ▪ GroenLinks ▪ ChristenUnie
Excluded respondents	Who would vote: ▪ PVDA ▪ Other party ▪ Blank ▪ Who would not vote. ▪ Who didn't know what to vote or would not say what they would vote.	Who would vote: ▪ SGP ▪ 50Plus ▪ Partij voor de Dieren ▪ Other party ▪ Blank ▪ Who would not vote. ▪ Who didn't know what to vote or would not say what they would vote.

B.2. Explanations of the electoral rules (translated)

Group 1	Group 2
You would vote for [name of party]. On the next screen you will see the ballot for [name of party]. **PAY ATTENTION!** You have the option: - to vote for the party and thereby support the candidate list as a whole, by colouring the circle at the top of the list (below the party logo). OR - to vote for one of the candidates, by colouring the circle in front of that candidate. How would you vote in this case?	You would vote for [name of party]. On the next screen you will see the ballot for [name of party]. **PAY ATTENTION!**[1] You have the option: - to vote for the party and thereby support the candidate list as a whole, by colouring the circle at the top of the list (below the party logo). OR - to vote for one or multiple candidates, by colouring the circle in front of that candidate or candidates. How would you vote in this case?
Group 3	**Group 4**
You would vote for [name of party]. On the next screen you will see the ballot for [name of party]. **PAY ATTENTION!**[2] You have the option to vote for one of the candidates, by colouring the circle in front of that candidate. How would you vote in this case?	You would vote for [name of party]. On the next screen you will see the ballot for [name of party]. **PAY ATTENTION!** You have the option to vote for one or multiple candidates, by colouring the circle in front of that candidate or candidates. How would you vote in this case?

[1] Since group 2 corresponds to the electoral system of Belgium, this line was not included for Belgian respondents.
[2] Since group 3 corresponds to the electoral system of the Netherlands, this line was not included for Dutch respondents.

B.3. Examples of ballot papers

Figure B.1 Example of a ballot for group 1 and 2 (with list vote)



Figure B.2 Example of ballot for group 3 and 4 (without list vote)



B.4. Draft lists of candidates

#	Government / larger parties	Smaller parties
	Belgium: CD&V, N-VA, VLD, Sp.A Netherlands: VVD, PvdA	Belgium: Groen, VB Netherlands: CDA, D66, SP, GL, PVV, CU
1.	Current political leader / party chairman / national figure	Current political leader / party chairman / national figure
2.	(ex) minister / mayor large city / other prominent party member	Prominent member of parliament
3.	(ex) minister / mayor large city / other prominent party member	Prominent member of parliament
4.	(ex) minister / mayor large city / other prominent party member	Relatively unknown member of parliament
5.	(ex) minister / mayor large city / other prominent party member	Relatively unknown member of parliament
6.	Prominent member of parliament	Relatively unknown member of parliament, other ethnicity
7.	Prominent member of parliament	Unknown candidate, but with local experience
8.	Prominent member of parliament	Unknown candidate, but with local experience, other ethnicity
9.	Prominent member of parliament	Unknown candidate, but with local experience
10.	Mayor / other prominent party member	Unknown candidate, but with local experience
11.	Mayor / other prominent party member	Unknown candidate, but with local experience
12.	Relatively unknown member of parliament, other ethnicity	Unknown candidate, but with local experience, other ethnicity
13.	Relatively unknown member of parliament	Unknown candidate
14.	Relatively unknown member of parliament	Unknown candidate
15.	Relatively unknown member of parliament, other ethnicity	Unknown candidate, other ethnicity
16.	Relatively unknown member of parliament	Unknown candidate
17.	Unknown candidate	Unknown candidate
18.	Unknown candidate	Unknown candidate
19.	Unknown candidate	Unknown candidate
20.	Prominent party member	Prominent party member

Other priorities:

- Candidates from all different regions.
- Equal distribution between male and female candidates.

B.5. Lists of candidates

Belgium

CD&V

List position	Candidate	Gender	District
1	Kris Peeters	M	Antwerpen
2	Hilde Crevits	F	West-Vlaanderen
3	Wouter Beke	M	Limburg
4	Joke Schauvliege	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
5	Jo Vandeurzen	M	Limburg
6	Tinne Rombout	F	Antwerpen
7	Eric Van Rompuy	M	Vlaams-Brabant
8	Sonja Becq	F	Vlaams-Brabant
9	Servais Verherstraeten	M	Antwerpen
10	Nicole Van Duyse	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
11	Walter De Donder	M	Vlaams-Brabant
12	Nahima Lanjri	F	Antwerpen
13	Johan Verstreken	M	West-Vlaanderen
14	Vera Jans	F	Limburg
15	Veli Yuksel	M	Oost-Vlaanderen
16	Katrien Partyka	F	Vlaams-Brabant
17	Michel Lacroix	M	Antwerpen
18	Loes Vandromme	F	West-Vlaanderen
19	Thomas Vints	M	Limburg
20	Marianne Thyssen	F	Oost-Vlaanderen

N-VA

List position	Candidate	Gender	District
1	Bart de Wever	M	Antwerpen
2	Liesbeth Homans	F	Antwerpen
3	Geert Bourgeois	M	West-Vlaanderen
4	Nadia Sminate	F	Vlaams-Brabant
5	Ben Weyts	M	Vlaams-Brabant
6	Sarah Smeyers	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
7	Jan Peumans	M	Limburg
8	Annick De Ridder	F	Antwerpen
9	Pol Van Den Driessche	M	West-Vlaanderen
10	Veerle Baeyens	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
11	Eddy Bevers	M	Antwerpen
12	Nabilla Ait Daoud	F	Antwerpen
13	Werner Janssen	M	Limburg
14	An Capoen	F	West-Vlaanderen
15	Seva Ndibesche	M	Brussel
16	Miranda Van Eetvelde	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
17	Dirk Kesteloot	M	West-Vlaanderen
18	Karen Van Herck	F	Vlaams-Brabant
19	Kristof Joos	M	Antwerpen
20	Frieda Brepoels	F	Limburg

VLD

List position	Candidate	Gender	District
1	Maggie De Block	F	Vlaams-Brabant
2	Alexander De Croo	M	Oost-Vlaanderen
3	Gwendolyn Rutten	F	Vlaams-Brabant
4	Sven Gatz	M	Brussel
5	Annemie Turtelboom	F	Antwerpen
6	Bart Tommelein	M	West-Vlaanderen
7	Carina Van Cauter	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
8	Bart Somers	M	Antwerpen
9	Lydia Peeters	F	Limburg
10	Ward Vergote	M	West-Vlaanderen
11	Tim Vandenput	M	Vlaams-Brabant
12	Khadija Zamouri	F	Brussel
13	Gwenny de Vroe	F	Vlaams-Brabant
14	Egbert Lachaert	M	Oost-Vlaanderen
15	Meral Özcan	F	Limburg
16	Frank Wilrycx	M	Antwerpen
17	Stefanie Platteau	F	West-Vlaanderen
18	Jos Mombaers	M	Vlaams-Brabant
19	Daisy Zaenen	F	Limburg
20	Herman De Croo	M	Oost-Vlaanderen

Sp.a

List position	Candidate	Gender	District
1	John Crombez	M	West-Vlaanderen
2	Ingrid Lieten	F	Limburg
3	Bruno Tobback	M	Vlaams-Brabant
4	Freya Van den Bossche	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
5	Daniel Termont	M	Oost-Vlaanderen
6	Yasmine Kherbache	F	Antwerpen
7	Hans Bonte	M	Vlaams-Brabant
8	Inga Verhaert	F	Antwerpen
9	Bart Van Malderen	M	Oost-Vlaanderen
10	Hilde Claes	F	Limburg
11	Alain Top	M	West-Vlaanderen
12	Meryame Kitir	F	Limburg
13	Jan Bertels	M	Antwerpen
14	Karine Jiroflée	F	Vlaams-Brabant
15	Fouad Ahidar	M	Brussel
16	Tine Soens	F	West-Vlaanderen
17	Guy Van Acker	M	Oost-Vlaanderen
18	Patricia Vanluyten	F	Vlaams-Brabant
19	Daan Deckers	M	Limburg
20	Johan Vande Lannotte	M	West-Vlaanderen

Groen

List position	Candidate	Gender	District
1	Meyrem Almaci	F	Antwerpen
2	Kristof Calvo	M	Antwerpen
3	Elisabeth Meuleman	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
4	Johan Danen	M	Limburg
5	Ann Moerenhout	F	Vlaams-Brabant
6	Imade Annouri	M	Antwerpen
7	Martine de Meester	F	West-Vlaanderen
8	Hassan Amaghlaou	M	Limburg
9	Evita Willaert	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
10	David Van Moerkercke	M	West-Vlaanderen
11	Müzeyyen Çaliskan	F	Antwerpen
12	Edward Van Keer	M	Vlaams-Brabant
13	Marijke Vanlauwe	F	West-Vlaanderen
14	Ludo Vanzeer	M	Limburg
15	Sarah Wouters	F	Antwerpen
16	Irfan Izgin	M	Vlaams-Brabant
17	Nina De Wolf	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
18	Tom Daerden	M	Limburg
19	Lisa Buysse	F	Antwerpen
20	Wouter Van Besien	M	West-Vlaanderen

VB

List position	Candidate	Gender	District
1	Filip Dewinter	M	Antwerpen
2	Anke Van dermeersch	F	Antwerpen
3	Tom Van Grieken	M	Antwerpen
4	Barbara Pas	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
5	Chris Janssens	M	Limburg
6	Barbara Bonte	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
7	Jan Jans	M	Limburg
8	Mireille Buyse	F	Vlaams-Brabant
9	Alain Quataert	M	West-Vlaanderen
10	Femke Pieters	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
11	Leo Joosten	M	Limburg
12	Dominiek Sneppe	F	West-Vlaanderen
13	Johan Verwerft	M	Antwerpen
14	Anna Boey	F	Limburg
15	Jan Meulepas	M	Vlaams-Brabant
16	Katie Van der Heyden	F	Oost-Vlaanderen
17	Wim Van Outryve	M	West-Vlaanderen
18	Anja Dury	F	Vlaams-Brabant
19	Wim Van Outryve	M	West-Vlaanderen
20	Gerolf Annemans	M	Antwerpen

The Netherlands

VVD

List position	Candidate	Gender	Municipality
1	Mark Rutte	M	's-Gravenhage
2	Edith Schippers	F	Baarn
3	Stef Blok	M	's-Gravenhage
4	Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert	F	Nederhorst den Berg
5	Ard Van der Steur	M	Warmond
6	Anouchka Van Miltenburg	F	Zaltbommel
7	Halbe Zijlstra	M	Wassenaar
8	Helma Neppérus	F	Voorschoten
9	Ton Elias	M	's-Gravenhage
10	Annemarie Jorritsma-Lebbink	F	Almere
11	Hans Van der Hoeve	M	Epe
12	Malik Azmani	M	Stegeren
13	André Bosma	M	Middelburg
14	Sjoerd Potters	M	Waalwijk
15	Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius	F	Amsterdam (NH)
16	Chantal Nijkerken-de Haan	F	Schinveld
17	Tjeerd Waterlander	M	Heerenveen
18	Sabine Koebrugge	F	Groningen
19	Linn Binnert	F	Assen
20	Hans Van Baalen	M	's-Gravenhage

PvdA

List position	Candidate	Gender	Municipality
1	Diederik Samsom	M	Leiden
2	Jet Bussemaker	F	Amsterdam
3	Lodewijk Asscher	M	Amsterdam
4	Jetta Klijnsma	F	's-Gravenhage
5	Jeroen Dijsselbloem	M	Wageningen
6	Mariëtte Hamer	F	Maassluis
7	Martijn Van Dam	M	's-Gravenhage
8	Tanja Jadnanansing	F	Amsterdam
9	Ahmed Marcouch	M	Amsterdam
10	Leontien Kompier	F	Vlagtwedde
11	Hans Van der Pas	M	Rhenen
12	Keklik Demir-Yücel	F	Deventer
13	Jacques Monasch	M	Sneek
14	Manon Fokke	F	Maastricht
15	Mehmet Kavşitli	M	Middelburg
16	Attje Kuiken	F	Breda
17	Raymond Wanders	M	Emmen
18	Carine Bloemhoff	F	Groningen
19	Nelly Den Os	F	Lelystad
20	Maarten Van Rossem	M	Utrecht

PVV

List position	Candidate	Gender	Municipality
1	Geert Wilders	M	's-Gravenhage
2	Fleur Agema	F	's-Gravenhage
3	Martin Bosma	M	Amsterdam
4	Reinette Klever	F	Ermelo
5	Raymond Roon	M	Almere
6	Lilian Helder	F	Venlo
7	Léon De Jong	M	's-Gravenhage
8	Annette Raijer	F	Almere
9	Rene Eekhuis	M	Almere
10	Daniëlle De Winter	F	's-Gravenhage
11	Karen Gerbrands	F	's-Gravenhage
12	Gidi Markuszower	M	Amstelveen
13	Edgar Mulder	M	Zwolle
14	Elly Broere-Kaal	F	Soest
15	Ton Van Kesteren	M	Groningen
16	Yvonne Waterman	F	Wouwse Plantage
17	Peter Van Dijk	M	Goes
18	Jitske Eizema	F	Leeuwarden
19	Liesbeth Beving	F	Eelde
20	Ronald Sörensen	M	Rotterdam

CDA

List position	Candidate	Gender	Municipality
1	Sybrand Van Haersma Buma	M	Voorburg
2	Mona Keijzer	F	Volendam
3	Raymond Knops	M	Hegelsom
4	Agnes Mulder	F	Assen
5	Pieter Omtzigt	M	Enschede
6	Susan Faal-Takak	F	Rijssen
7	Wilma Van der Rijt-Van der Kruis	F	Heeze
8	Efstathios Andreou	M	Rotterdam
9	Sander Van Waveren	M	Utrecht
10	Ank Muller	F	Vlissingen
11	Elske Van der Mik	F	Deventer
12	Turan Yazir	M	Rotterdam
13	Zegert Vis	M	Lochem
14	Karin Dunning	F	Haren
15	Fokke Molenaar	M	Urk
16	Ananta Khemradj	F	Rotterdam
17	John Heller	M	Breda
18	Aletta Van Meer-Ruiten	F	Ermelo
19	Marike Postma	F	Menameradiel
20	Herman Wijffels	M	Maarn

SP

List position	Candidate	Gender	Municipality
1	Emile Roemer	M	Boxmeer
2	Renske Leijten	F	Haarlem
3	Ronald Raak	M	Amsterdam
4	Tjitske Siderius	F	Zwolle
5	Michiel Van Nispen	M	Breda
6	Sadet Karabulut	F	Amsterdam
7	Thijs Coppus	M	Horst aan de Maas
8	Aisha Akhiat	F	's-Gravenhage
9	Pim Siegers	M	Nieuw Pekela
10	Nicole van Gemert	F	Utrecht
11	Lies van Aelst	F	Gorinchem
12	Hasan Inekci	M	Nieuwegein
13	Frank Wulms	M	West Maas en Waal
14	Petra Meelker	F	Hoogezand-Sappemeer
15	Rinus Pankow	M	Schouwen-Duiveland
16	Roya Moayyed	F	Amsterdam
17	Barend Houtman	M	Smallingerland
18	Laura Van Os	F	Meppel
19	Hemrika Vanessa	F	Lelystad
20	Huub Oosterhuis	M	Amsterdam

D66

List position	Candidate	Gender	Municipality
1	Alexander Pechtold	M	Wageningen
2	Stientje Van Veldhoven-van der Meer	F	Rijswijk
3	Gerard Schouw	M	Dordrecht
4	Pia Dijkstra	F	Utrecht
5	Kees Verhoeven	M	Amersfoort
6	Wassila Hachchi	F	Breda
7	Michael Feelders	M	Heerhugowaard
8	Selma Bas	F	Utrecht
9	Gerbrant Fennema	M	Noordenveld
10	Hilde Tjeerdema	F	Leeuwarden
11	Martine Van Bemmel	F	Almere
12	Gökhan Çoban	M	Veenendaal
13	Danny Cevaal	M	Vlissingen
14	Annet de Rooij	F	Bergen op Zoom
15	Steven Rieder	M	Groningen
16	Yassmine El Ksaihi	F	Amsterdam
17	Bert Saarloos	M	Brunssum
18	Sacha Kuijs	F	Bloemendaal
19	Betsie Bijsterbosch	F	Almelo
20	Hans Wijers	M	Utrecht

GroenLinks

List position	Candidate	Gender	Municipality
1	Jesse Klaver	M	's-Gravenhage
2	Liesbeth Van Tongeren	F	Amsterdam
3	Rik Grashoff	M	Delft
4	Linda Voortman	F	Utrecht
5	Bas Eickhout	M	Utrecht
6	Huri Sahin	F	Zoetermeer
7	Pepijn Boekhorst	M	Nijmegen
8	Saideh Hashemi	F	Alkmaar
9	Carel Bruring	M	Goes
10	Lisa Westerveld	F	Nijmegen
11	Gea Smith	F	Assen
12	Ahmed Harika	M	Rotterdam
13	Roland van der Put	M	Almere
14	Leanne Jansen	F	Dronten
15	Rene Vink	M	Almelo
16	Hayat Barrahmun	F	Venlo
17	Jos Van Egmond	M	Smallingerland
18	Katinka Waelbers	F	Oss
19	Bea Moolenaar	F	Groningen
20	Tof Thissen	M	Roermond

ChristenUnie

List position	Candidate	Gender	Municipality
1	Arie Slob	M	Zwolle
2	Carola Schouten	F	Rotterdam
3	Joël Voordewind	M	Amsterdam
4	Carla Dik-Faber	F	Veenendaal
5	Gert-Jan Segers	M	Hoogland
6	Ixora Balootje	F	Rotterdam
7	Arne Schaddelee	M	Houten
8	Ravenna Kotadiny	F	Amsterdam
9	Jurgen Van Houdt	M	Enschede
10	Anja Haga	F	Leeuwarden
11	Harmke Vlieg-Kempe	F	Assen
12	Anil Kumar	M	's-Gravenhage
13	Arnout Van Kempen	M	Sint-Michielsgestel
14	Lenny De Wolf	F	Meppel
15	Ronald Kleiweg	M	Veendam
16	Gea Gort	F	Rotterdam
17	Maarten Van der Boon	M	Barneveld
18	Tannie Kruit-de Bruijne	F	Vlissingen
19	Marielle Woord	F	Urk
20	Andries Knevel	M	Amsterdam

B.6. About the validity of the experiment

An important issue is whether respondents understood the electoral rules under which they were asked to cast a vote. If respondents did not understand that they had different options than they are used to from real elections[102], this very likely has an impact on the validity of the experiment.

No questions were included in the survey to test whether respondents noticed, or understood the electoral rules (i.e. the experimental treatment). It is therefore difficult to say whether respondents understood the electoral rules. However, some insight could be gained by looking at the time respondents spent on the page where the electoral rules were explained. Table B.2 shows a comparison between the average time Dutch and Belgian respondents did spent on this page. It is clear that Belgian and Dutch respondents took more or less the same time to read the explanation in the first and fourth group: i.e. systems which neither are used to. It also shows that compared to the Dutch respondents, Belgians were quicker in reading the explanation for their own system (group 2). This is the other way around for group 3, which means that Dutch respondents have read the explanation of their own system faster than Belgian respondents did[103]. These results suggest that in general respondents have read the explanations accurately.

Table B.2 Time spent on page with explanations of rules (country comparison)

Group	Country	N	Mean	SE	T-test
1	Belgium	183	10.44	0.43	t(360.0)=-1.791
	The Netherlands	181	11.57	0.46	
2	Belgium	194	9.44	0.45	t(369.5)=-3.177**
	The Netherlands	185	11.61	0.51	
3	Belgium	194	7.86	0.33	t(365.6)= 3.119**
	The Netherlands	179	6.52	0.28	
4	Belgium	195	8.73	0.36	t(392.2)= 0.131
	The Netherlands	201	8.80	0.34	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001
Source: Own dataset. The average time is given in seconds. Respondents who spent more than 30 seconds on the page with the explanation of the electoral rules are excluded from this analysis (3.5 per cent of all respondents).

Table B.3 provides information about the difference between respondents who made use of the options to cast a list vote or a multiple preference vote and the respondents who did not use these options. In all comparisons the group of respondents using an additional option on average spent more time on the page with the explanation of the voting rules than the group of respondents who did not use an additional option. In the Netherlands most of these differences are statistically significant, while in Belgium they are not. This is an

[102] With the exception of Belgian respondents who were assigned to the 2nd group (list vote and multiple preference votes) and Dutch respondents who were assigned to the 3th group (single preference vote).
[103] This might also be a consequence of not including 'pay attention' in the explanation (see appendix B.2).

indication that some respondents, especially in the Netherlands, may not have been aware of the fact that they had other options because of 'speeding through the survey'. On the other hand, since Dutch respondents on average spent more time on the page with the explanation of the rules in those groups were additional rules were explained, this does not seem to be problematic in terms of the overall results of the experiment. At least this might indicate a conservative estimation for the use of the list vote and multiple preference votes in the Netherlands.

Table B.3 Time spent on page with explanations of rules (choice comparison)

Group	Category	N	Mean	SE	T-test
Belgium					
1	No listvote	108	9.94	0.57	t(163.2)=-1.406
	Listvote	75	11.16	0.66	
2	No listvote	125	8.82	0.53	t(122.4)=-1.767
	Listvote	69	10.56	0.83	
	No multiple pref. votes	132	9.33	0.56	t(123.9)=-0.360
	Multiple pref. votes	62	9.67	0.78	
4	No multiple pref. votes	87	7.68	0.49	t(191.5)=-2.732**
	Multiple pref. votes	108	9.59	0.50	
The Netherlands					
1	No listvote	146	10.98	0.50	t(49.9)=-2.568*
	Listvote	35	14.02	1.07	
2	No listvote	147	10.92	0.57	t(62.9)=-2.876**
	Listvote	38	14.27	1.01	
	No multiple pref. votes	163	11.03	0.52	t(25.1)=-2.776*
	Multiple pref. votes	22	15.90	1.68	
4	No multiple pref. votes	171	8.68	0.36	t(37.0)=-0.777
	Multiple pref. votes	30	9.50	0.99	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001
Source: Own dataset. The average times are given in seconds. Respondents who spent more than 30 seconds on the page with the explanation of the electoral rules are excluded from this analysis (3.5 per cent of the total respondents).

B.7. Additional cross tabs

Table B.4 Effect of list vote on votes for the list-puller

In combination with single preference vote (Group 1 versus 3)						
	Belgium *χ2 (1) = 25.351, p < .001; φ = .256*			**The Netherlands** *χ2 (1) = 6.537, p = .011; φ = .131*		
	List vote			List vote		
	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
Not voted for list-puller	38%	64%	51%	33%	46%	40%
Voted for list-puller	62%	36%	49%	67%	54%	60%
Total (N)	195	192	387	183	197	380
In combination with multiple preference votes (Group 2 versus 4)						
	Belgium *χ2 (1) = 20.983, p < .001; φ = .229*			**The Netherlands** *χ2 (1) = 8.119, p = .004; φ = .142*		
	List vote			List vote		
	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
Not voted for list-puller	34%	57%	46%	27%	40%	33%
Voted for list-puller	66%	43%	54%	73%	60%	67%
Total (N)	198	203	401	210	195	405

Source: Own dataset.

Table B.5 Effect of list vote on voters for other candidates

In combination with single preference vote (Group 1 versus 3)						
	Belgium *χ2 (1) = 12.756, p < .001; φ = .182*			**The Netherlands** *χ2 (1) = 1.868, p = .172; φ = .070*		
	List vote			List vote		
	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
Not voted for other candidate	62%	79%	70%	67%	73%	70%
Voted for other candidate	38%	21%	30%	33%	27%	30%
Total (N)	195	192	387	183	197	380
In combination with multiple preference votes (Group 2 versus 4)						
	Belgium *χ2 (1) = 34.822, p < .001; φ = .295*			**The Netherlands** *χ2 (1) = 5.927, p = .015; φ = .121*		
	List vote			List vote		
	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
Not voted for other candidate	26%	55%	40%	61%	73%	67%
Voted for other candidate	74%	45%	60%	39%	27%	33%
Total (N)	198	203	401	210	195	405

Source: Own dataset.

Table B.6 Effect of available number of preference votes on votes for list-puller

In combination with compulsory candidate vote (Group 3 versus 4)						
	Belgium *χ2 (1) =0.553, p =0.457; φ =* .038			**The Netherlands** *χ2 (1) =2.079, p =0.149; φ =* .073		
	Preference votes			Preference votes		
	Single	Multiple	Total	Single	Multiple	Total
Not voted for list-puller	38%	34%	36%	33%	27%	30%
Voted for list-puller	62%	66%	64%	67%	73%	70%
Total (N)	195	198	393	183	210	393
In combination with list vote (Group 1 versus 2)						
	Belgium *χ2 (1) =1.687, p =0.194; φ =* .065			**The Netherlands** *χ2 (1) =1.532, p =0.216; φ =* .063		
	Preference votes			Preference votes		
	Single	Multiple	Total	Single	Multiple	Total
Not voted for list-puller	64%	57%	60%	46%	40%	43%
Voted for list-puller	35%	43%	40%	54%	60%	57%
Total (N)	192	203	395	197	195	392

Source: Own dataset.

Table B.7 Effect of available number of preference votes on votes for other candidates

In combination with compulsory candidate vote (Group 3 versus 4)						
	Belgium *χ2 (1) = 52.582, p < 0.001; φ = .366*			**The Netherlands** *χ2 (1) = 1.163, p = 0.281; φ = .054*		
	Preference votes			Preference votes		
	Single	Multiple	Total	Single	Multiple	Total
Not voted for other candidate	62%	26%	44%	67%	61%	64%
Voted for other candidate	38%	74%	56%	33%	39%	36%
Total (N)	195	198	393	183	210	393
In combination with list vote (Group 1 versus 2)						
	Belgium *χ2 (1) = 25.377, p < 0.001; φ = .253*			**The Netherlands** *χ2 (1) = 0.004, p = 0.951; φ = .003*		
	Preference votes			Preference votes		
	Single	Multiple	Total	Single	Multiple	Total
Not voted for other candidate	79%	55%	66%	73%	73%	73%
Voted for other candidate	21%	45%	34%	27%	27%	27%
Total (N)	192	203	395	197	195	392

Source: Own dataset.

B.8. Additional logistic regression models

Table B.8 Voting for list-puller & other candidates (with country dummy)

	List-puller	**Other candidates**
(Constant)	0.586**	-1.020***
	(0.208)	(0.216)
Option to cast a list vote	-0.864***	-0.864***
	(0.126)	(0.126)
Option to cast multiple preference votes	0.333*	1.344***
	(0.164)	(0.169)
Netherlands	0.518**	0.142
	(0.183)	(0.188)
Political interest (Ref. = not interested)		
Somewhat interested	0.144	0.347*
	(0.147)	(0.150)
Highly interested	0.467*	0.328
	(0.212)	(0.215)
Party member	0.102	0.334
	(0.202)	(0.202)
Evaluation difference (Ref. = No difference)		
List-puller < party	-1.322***	0.761***
	(0.164)	(0.158)
List-puller > party	0.599***	-0.370*
	(0.147)	(0.149)
Education (Ref. = low)		
Middle	-0.136	0.093
	(0.160)	(0.161)
High	-0.664***	0.367*
	(0.167)	(0.166)
Multiple pref. votes * Netherlands	-0.248	-1.012***
	(0.253)	(0.253)
-2LL	1509.385	1497.759
Cox and Snell's R^2	0.147	0.138
Nagelkerke R^2	0.197	0.187
N	1243	1243

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own dataset.

C Appendices for chapter 3

C.1. Included parties and list-pullers the Netherlands

Party	1998	2002	2003	2010	2012
CDA	de Hoop Scheffer	Balkenende	Balkenende	Balkenende	van Haersma Buma
CD	Janmaat				
CU		Veling	Rouvoet	Rouvoet	Slob
D66	Borst-Eilers	de Graaf	de Graaf	Pechtold	Pechtold
GPV	Schutte				
GL	Rosenmöller	Rosenmöller	Halsema	Halsema	Sap
PvdD				Thieme	Thieme
LPF		Fortuijn	Herben		
PvdA	Kok	Melkert	Bos	Cohen	Samsom
PVV				Wilders	Wilders
SGP		van der Vlies	van der Vlies	van der Staaij	van der Staaij
SP	Marijnissen	Marijnissen	Marijnissen	Roemer	Roemer
VVD	Bolkestein	Dijkstal	Zalm	Rutte	Rutte

C.2. Descriptive statistics for variables entered in logistic regression models

Table C.1 Descriptive statistics chapter 3 (the Netherlands)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Preference vote	0.23	0.42		
Education				
Elementary (REF)	0.08	0.28		
(Lower) Vocational	0.15	0.36		
Secondary	0.12	0.32		
Middle level vocational. higher level secondary	0.32	0.46		
Higher level vocational. University	0.33	0.47		
Political interest				
Low (0) (REF)	0.06	0.24		
1	0.42	0.49		
2	0.25	0.43		
3	0.18	0.39		
High (4)	0.09	0.29		
Political knowledge				
Low (0) (REF)	0.41	0.49		
1	0.25	0.43		
2	0.18	0.38		
3	0.10	0.30		
High (4)	0.06	0.25		
Qualified for politics				
Fully agree	0.03	0.18		
Agree	0.22	0.42		
Disagree	0.45	0.50		
Fully disagree (REF)	0.29	0.45		
Age of respondent	47.54	16.73	16	99
Woman	0.51	0.50		
Country of origin (Ref. = Netherlands)				
Netherlands	0.88	0.33		
Western country	0.07	0.26		
Non-western country	0.05	0.22		
Living outside *Randstad*	0.57	0.50		
Urbanization				
Very strongly urban (REF)	0.16	0.36		
Strongly urban	0.26	0.44		
Mildly urban	0.21	0.41		
Hardly urban	0.22	0.42		
Not urban	0.15	0.36		
Party member	0.05	0.22		
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score party	-0.12	1.44	-9	9
Evaluation score list-puller	7.36	1.68	0	10
Number of candidates on party list	57.65	17.91	25	80
Older party	0.73	0.44		

Table C.2 Descriptive statistics chapter 3 (Belgium)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Preference vote	0.50	0.50		
Education				
Low (REF)	0.09	0.28		
Middle	0.58	0.50		
High	0.34	0.47		
Political interest	4.79	2.78	0	10
Political knowledge				
Low (0) (REF)	0.19	0.40		
1	0.30	0.47		
2	0.26	0.44		
3	0.18	0.38		
High (4)	0.07	0.25		
Age	47.97	17.32	18	84
Woman	0.50	0.50		
Member political party	0.07	0.25		
Candidates on list	25.17	7.75	10	37
Party old	0.58	0.49		

C.3. Additional logistic regression models

Table C.3 Preference voting in the Netherlands (including political knowledge)

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
(Constant)	-1.934***	(0.338)	-1.454**	(0.385)
Education (Ref. = Elementary)				
(Lower) Vocational	0.081	(0.188)	0.088	(0.193)
Secondary	0.203	(0.185)	0.252	(0.189)
Middle level vocational, higher level secondary	0.433*	(0.176)	0.460*	(0.181)
Higher level vocational, University	0.496**	(0.173)	0.505**	(0.178)
Political interest (Ref. = 0 (Low))				
1	-0.086	(0.208)	-0.006	(0.212)
2	0.105	(0.214)	0.165	(0.218)
3	0.200	(0.218)	0.277	(0.223)
4 (High)	0.298	(0.235)	0.430	(0.240)
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)				
Disagree	0.105	(0.096)	0.138	(0.097)
Agree	0.193	(0.112)	0.231*	(0.114)
Fully agree	0.496*	(0.198)	0.503**	(0.201)
Political knowledge (Ref. = 0 (Low))				
1	0.261**	(0.094)	0.312**	(0.096)
2	0.364**	(0.121)	0.425***	(0.123)
3	0.388**	(0.130)	0.427**	(0.132)
4 (High)	0.428**	(0.152)	0.516***	(0.155)
Age	-0.014***	(0.003)	-0.012***	(0.003)
Woman	0.386***	(0.076)	0.371***	(0.078)
Living outside *Randstad*	0.152	(0.082)	0.166*	(0.083)
Urbanization (Ref. = Very strongly urban)				
Strongly urban	-0.355**	(0.119)	-0.370**	(0.121)
Mildly urban	-0.298*	(0.125)	-0.327*	(0.127)
Hardly urban	-0.367**	(0.131)	-0.403**	(0.133)
Not urban	-0.237	(0.140)	-0.273	(0.143)
Candidates on list	0.020***	(0.004)	0.019***	(0.004)
Party old	-0.105	(0.142)	-0.132	(0.144)
Evaluation score list-puller			-0.100***	(0.026)
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score party			-0.194***	(0.031)
-2LL	4658.198		4537.517	
Cox and Snell's R2	0.063		0.087	
Nagelkerke R2	0.094		0.131	
N	4536		4536	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Election dummies are included in model, but not presented here. Based on the elections of 1998, 2002 and 2010.

Improvement model 2: χ^2 120.681, df = 2, p < .001.

Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 1998; DPES2002/03; DPES 2010.

Table C.4. Preference voting in the Netherlands (including country or origin)

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
(Constant)	-4.002***	(0.807)	-3.332***	(0.897)
Education (Ref. = Elementary)				
(Lower) Vocational	0.862	(0.567)	0.880	(0.570)
Secondary	0.820	(0.594)	0.811	(0.597)
Middle level vocational, higher level secondary	1.193*	(0.544)	1.200*	(0.546)
Higher level vocational, University	1.112*	(0.549)	1.110*	(0.551)
Political interest (Ref. = 0 (Low))				
1	-0.144	(0.408)	-0.043	(0.417)
2	0.077	(0.416)	0.164	(0.425)
3	0.172	(0.425)	0.281	(0.434)
4 (High)	0.506	(0.447)	0.646	(0.456)
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)				
Disagree	0.130	(0.186)	0.144	(0.188)
Agree	0.488*	(0.019)	0.519	(0.212)
Fully agree	0.775*	(0.326)	0.804*	(0.331)
Age	-0.007	(0.005)	-0.006	(0.005)
Woman	0.325*	(0.141)	0.340*	(0.143)
Living outside *Randstad*	0.164	(0.151)	0.209	(0.153)
Country of origin (Ref. = Netherlands)				
Western country	0.313	(0.246)	0.318	(0.249)
Non-western country	-0.321	(0.409)	-0.281	(0.415)
Urbanization (Ref. = Very strongly urban)				
Strongly urban	-0.212	(0.219)	-0.229	(0.222)
Mildly urban	-0.152	(0.230)	-0.196	(0.233)
Hardly urban	-0.109	(0.239)	-0.180	(0.242)
Not urban	-0.308	(0.275)	-0.327	(0.279)
Candidates on list	0.016	(0.008)	0.012	(0.008)
Party old	0.358	(0.260)	0.502	(0.266)
Evaluation score list-puller			-0.108*	(0.051)
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score party			-0.23***	(0.062)
-2LL	1433.579		1397.855	
Cox and Snell's R2	0.044		0.064	
Nagelkerke R2	0.074		0.108	
N	1665		1665	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Election dummies are included in model, but not presented here. Based on the election of 2010.

Improvement model 2: χ^2 35,724, df = 2, p < .001.

Source: DPES 2010.

Table C.5. Preference voting in the Netherlands (including member political party)

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
(Constant)	-1.955***	(0.337)	-1.481**	(0.385)
Education (Ref. = Elementary)				
(Lower) Vocational	0.114	(0.188)	0.128	(0.192)
Secondary	0.280	(0.184)	0.339	(0.188)
Middle level vocational, higher level secondary	0.500**	(0.175)	0.536**	(0.179)
Higher level vocational, University	0.606***	(0.171)	0.631***	(0.175)
Political interest (Ref. = 0 (Low))				
1	-0.046	(0.207)	0.036	(0.211)
2	0.174	(0.212)	0.243	(0.217)
3	0.303	(0.216)	0.395	(0.221)
4 (High)	0.403	(0.232)	0.546*	(0.237)
Qualified for politics (Ref. = fully disagree)				
Disagree	0.136	(0.095)	0.171	(0.097)
Agree	0.235*	(0.111)	0.275*	(0.113)
Fully agree	0.510**	(0.199)	0.517*	(0.202)
Age	-0.012***	(0.003)	-0.011***	(0.003)
Woman	0.360***	(0.076)	0.340***	(0.077)
Living outside *Randstad*	0.148	(0.082)	0.160	(0.083)
Urbanization (Ref. = Very strongly urban)				
Strongly urban	-0.356**	(0.119)	-0.370**	(0.121)
Mildly urban	-0.301*	(0.125)	-0.329**	(0.127)
Hardly urban	-0.362**	(0.130)	-0.395**	(0.132)
Not urban	-0.236	(0.140)	-0.271	(0.142)
Member political party	0.286	(0.147)	0.332*	(0.150)
Candidates on list	0.020***	(0.004)	0.019***	(0.004)
Party old	-0.097	(0.142)	-0.117	(0.143)
Evaluation score list-puller			-0.097***	(0.026)
Evaluation score list-puller - evaluation score party			-0.190***	(0.031)
-2LL	4670.474		4553.622	
Cox and Snell's R2	0.060		0.084	
Nagelkerke R2	0.090		0.126	
N	4535		4535	

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Election dummies are included in model, but not presented here. Based on the elections of 1998, 2002 and 2010.

Improvement model 2: χ^2 116.852, df = 2, p < .001.

Source: DPES 1970-2006 integrated file; DPES 1998; DPES2002/03; DPES 2010.

D Appendices for chapter 4

D.1. Assigned positions for reference texts

In the tables below the scores which are assigned to the reference texts are given. Scores are taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 1999-2014 trend file (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). For each legislative period the row labelled 'CHES' shows from which year in the survey the scores are used for the corresponding legislative period; for each legislative period the scores from the survey-year closed to start of the legislative term are used

Belgium

Party	**2003-2007**	**2007-2010**	**2010-2014**
CD&V	5.95	5.56	5.79
CDH	5.65	5.50	4.50
Ecolo	2.56	2.83	2.29
Groen	2.64	1.89	2.29
MR	6.35	6.67	7.00
N-VA	6.22	7.89	7.57
OpenVLD	6.23	6.78	6.93
PS	3.35	3.50	2.50
Sp.A	3.50	3.22	3.43
VB	9.55	9.67	9.86
CHES	*2002*	*2006*	*2010*

The Netherlands

Party	**1998-2002**	**2002-2003**	**2003-2006**	**2006-2010**	**2010-2012**	**2012-2017**
CDA	5.20	6.13	6.13	6.09	6.29	6.78
D66	4.40	4.63	4.63	4.45	5.00	5.56
GL	2.60	2.50	2.50	2.18	2.57	2.33
LPF		8.38	8.38			
PvdA	3.80	4.00	4.00	3.73	3.86	3.67
PVV				8.80	8.62	9.25
SP	1.10	1.63	1.63	1.64	1.64	1.00
VVD	6.90	7.38	7.38	7.45	7.86	7.89
CHES	*1999*	*2002*	*2002*	*2006*	*2010*	*2014*

D.2. Measuring policy positions using Wordscores

Once texts for individual members of parliament are prepared and reference texts are chosen, assigning a score to them using Wordscores is relatively easy. However, choosing the appropriate reference texts and preparing the virgin texts is not that easy. Several choices have to be made. This appendix addresses some issues of scoring texts using Wordscores. Some of the decisions which are made and discussed in section 4.3.3 are further explained in this section. In addition, some alternatives are discussed and the final choice defended.

D.2.1 Additional information about the process

The text files created for the MPs and parties were pre-processed using the computer program JFreq (Lowe, 2011). Since Wordscores counts words to estimate a position of a text, it would not make sense to include all Belgian parties in one analysis, since the country is bilingual. Therefore for Belgium two analyses are conducted: one for Flanders (Dutch speaking part of the country) and one for Wallonia (French speaking part of the country)[104]. With JFreq also a document-term matrix was created, containing for each document the frequency of all words in the entire corpus. Separate matrices were made for each legislative period in the Netherlands, the French-speaking MPs in Belgium and the Dutch-speaking MPs in Belgium. Based on the document-term matrices the policy positions of individual MPs were estimated, using the Quanteda-package in R (Benoit & Nulty, 2016).

Some MPs are excluded from the analysis. Only MPs from parties who at least received four seats in each period they were represented in parliament are included in the analysis. In the end, the goal of the analysis is not so much to say something about the *exact* ideological position of a candidate, but more about how that ideological position *deviates* from the party line. Since the deviation is measured by calculating the difference between the average party score and the MP score, parties with one candidate are automatically ruled out: there is no difference to calculate. For very small parties with only two or three MPs the difference would not be that meaningful as well. With such small parties the difference would say just as much about the MPs own position as it would say something about the position(s) of the other one or two MP(s).

This procedure leads to the inclusion of eight parties for the Netherlands. Six of them are represented in the entire period between 1998 and 2017: CDA, D66[105], GroenLinks, PvdA, SP and VVD. Two parties were represented in fewer legislative periods:

[104] In addition for each extracted paragraph of a speech it was determined whether the paragraph was primarily French or Dutch, using the *detectlanguage* function in Google spreadsheets. Most of the paragraphs were detected as either Dutch or French. For those paragraphs for which the function reported a different language, the language of the paragraph was coded manually. Paragraphs from MPs in Flanders which were primarily French, were excluded from the text file of that MP; and vice-versa. Furthermore, some paragraphs were in German; these were also excluded.

[105] Between 2006 and 2010 D66 only held 3 seats. However, the party is included since in the other legislative periods it had a substantially larger parliamentary party group.

LPF (2002-2003 and 2003-2006) and PVV (2006-2010, 2010-2012 and 2012-2017). In each legislative period these parties together held at least 138 (out of 150) seats. For Belgium 10 parties are included: CD&V, CDH, ECOLO, Groen, MR, N-VA, openVLD, PS, sp.a, VB. These parties together held at least 144 (out of 150) seats.

For Belgium, one other issue complicates the analysis. Some parties form a single parliamentary group in parliament, which might make it unclear what the party average is. For example, both green parties (Groen and ECOLO) form one parliamentary group in parliament. In the analysis these two are considered to be two different parties. This is partly a pragmatic choice: since Groen is the Flemish party and ECOLO the Walloon party, MPs of both parties speak in a different language and therefore have to be treated as two separate parties. But since they both participated in different regions of the country, and therefore one voter may only choose for candidates from ECOLO or only choose for candidates from Groen, this also makes sense on a substantial ground.

A more difficult choice is what to do with the CD&V / N-VA cartel in the 2007 elections (Pilet & Van Haute, 2008). The two parties formed an alliance before the elections and participated as one 'party'. However, the alliance did not survive the entire legislative period. In September 2008 the alliance came to an end and continued as two separate parliamentary parties. In the 52nd legislative period (after the 2007 elections) 154 plenary sessions were held. In 52 of these the alliance existed, but in a large majority of the sessions the parties both had their own parliamentary group. All members of the CD&V and N-VA cartel will therefore be treated as being a member of either the CD&V parliamentary party group or the N-VA parliamentary party group for the entire legislative period[106].

Initially, Wordscores produces raw scores for each virgin text. These raw scores tend to cluster around the mean of the scores of the reference texts. The reason for the clustering of scores is that all texts contain 'meaningless' words, which are more or less used equally (in relative terms) across all texts. These raw scores are therefore difficult to interpret, since the scale on which they are placed is no longer intuitive. For example: if the original scale on which the reference texts were scored runs from 0 to 10, the scores for the virgin texts all will be closer to around 5. Therefore, within the original scale they do not make much sense anymore. For the regression models these raw scores are used, as suggested by Benoit and laver (2007, p. 109) since they "are informative relative to each other". The advantage of using these raw scores for the regression analysis is that the results cannot be influenced by the way in which the raw scores were transformed. Transforming the raw scores has the advantage that they become intuitive again, but there are different ways in which they can be transformed and each way will result in a (slightly) different outcome.

To get some notion whether the Wordscores analysis produces valid estimates, in this section boxplots containing the results of the analysis will be presented. However, for these boxplots the interpretation of scores plays a role and for this purpose in this section

[106] In all other cases MPs are grouped in the same way as parliamentary groups were organized.

transformed scores are presented. There are different ways to transform the raw scores produced with Wordscores. One option is to use the original transformation method (Laver et al., 2003). However, Martin and Vanberg (2008) point out some difficulties with this transformation. If scores are transformed based on the original method, they depend on the combination of virgin texts and are no longer placed on the same scale as the reference texts, which complicates the interpretation of the scores. Therefore they propose another method. The scores presented below are transformed with the method proposed by Martin and Vanberg (from now on referred to as MV-method). The advantages of this method are that the transformed scores are independent of the included virgin texts and that the texts are placed on the same scale as the original scale which was used for the reference texts (Martin & Vanberg, 2008 also fur further details of the calculation of the transformed scores).

Table D.1 shows the number of plenary sessions and submitted written questions analysed in each legislative period for the Netherlands. For 1,931 plenary sessions and 38,265 written questions all contributions by MPs are extracted from these documents. Since one member in one legislative period is considered as an individual case, in total 1,106 MPs held a seat between 1998 and 2012. For 960 of them it was possible to estimate their policy position based on contributions in plenary sessions, and for 862 the position based on written questions could be estimated. Some MPs were excluded because they were a member of one of the smallest parties and some members never participated in a debate or submitted a written question: members of parliament who became a minister in the newly formed government for example. In addition some MPs were excluded because their total contribution of speeches and questions did not exceed 500 words. Since for shorter texts the uncertainty of the policy positions obtained by Wordscores increases (Laver et al., 2003, p. 315), these texts are excluded. Figure D**.1** shows the policy positions which were measured based on these texts, in the form of a boxplot per party per legislative period. For the purpose of interpretation the policy position which are shown in this figure are the transformed scores, based on the MV- method. These boxplots suggest that the way the policy positions are measured works. It shows variation within political parties of policy position from individual MPs. At the same time, individual politicians from a party seem to cluster around an expected party position.

In Belgium the policy positions for members of parliament from three legislative periods (2003-2007, 2007-2010 and 2010-2014) were measured. All contributions by MPs in 353 plenary sessions and from 53,158 written questions were extracted from the parliamentary documents to create separate documents for each MP. From 181 Dutch speaking and 133 French speaking MPs it was possible to determine a policy position based on their contributions to plenary sessions. Based on written questions, a position could be estimated for 272 Dutch speaking MPs and 189 French speaking MPs (see table d.2). Figure D.2 shows per party and per legislative term a boxplot for the policy positions of individual MPs. The transformed scores according to the MV-method based on the documents containing

Figure D.1 Policy positions of Dutch MPs per party per legislative period



Table D.1 Analysed documents to measure positions of MPs (the Netherlands)

Legislative period	MPs	Plenary sessions			Written questions		
		Analyzed[1]	MPs[2]	Words[3]	Analyzed[1]	MPs[2]	Words[3]
1998-2002	189	403	161	73055	5577	144	8864
2002-2003	173	61	136	11957	1044	90	2145
2003-2006	187	389	167	66170	7185	157	11582
2006-2010[4]	186	353	167	69469	5813	158	14803
2010-2012	176	228	158	49224	6345	149	11420
2012-2017	195	497	171	107548	12301	164	23225
Total	1106	1931	960	64800	38265	862	12920

Source: own dataset.

[1] Number of plenary sessions / written questions for the entire legislative period, from which texts from individual MPs were obtained.

[2] Number of MPs from parties included in the analysis and whose own document contained at least 500 words.

[3] Average length of the text in words (before pre-processing) for those MPs mentioned in the previous column.

[4] In this period there were 383 plenary sessions. However, from 30 of them (between April and October 2009) the minutes were only available in a format from which it was not possible to automatically extract all speakers and their speeches. Therefore these plenary sessions are excluded.

Figure D.2 Policy positions of Belgian MPs per party per legislative period



Table D.2 Analysed documents to measure positions of MPs (Belgium)

Legislative period	MPs	Plenary sessions			Written questions		
		Analyzed[1]	MPs[2]	Words[3]	Analyzed[1]	MPs[2]	Words[3]
Dutch speaking parliamentarians							
2003-2007	115	-	-	-	10555	90	19263
2007-2010	106	154	89	18330	15538	91	26776
2010-2014	102	199	92	25844	14548	91	30484
Total	323	353	181	22149	40641	272	25650
French speaking parliamentarians							
2003-2007	89	-	-	-	2341	56	7407
2007-2010	89	154	70	13980	5172	67	15074
2010-2014	90	199	63	21007	5004	66	16118
Total	258	353	133	17308	12517	189	13167

Source: own dataset.

[1] Number of plenary sessions / written questions for the entire legislative period, from which texts from individual MPs were obtained.

[2] Number of MPs from parties included in the analysis and whose own document contained at least 500 words.

[3] Average length of the text in words (before pre-processing) for those MPs mentioned in the previous column.

D.2.2 Combing speeches and questions or not?

With the texts obtained from official documents containing the speeches and written questions two things can be done: 1) combine speeches and written questions into a single virgin text, or 2) create two different virgin texts per MP, one with his or her speeches in plenary sessions and one with the written questions. I prefer the second option, both for theoretical and methodological reasons. The theoretical considerations are discussed in chapter 4. There are, however, also methodological reasons to choose for two different sets of virgin texts. Speeches and questions are two different types of texts. First of all, questions are shorter than regular contributions to the parliamentary debate. Second, questions are written while contributions to the debate in parliament are spoken. This leads to a different use of words. Since Wordscores is based on counting words, combining both would create possible problems. For example, if both texts would be combined the score of an MP might depend on the ratio questions/speeches, which would not be meaningful[107]. It is therefore from a methodological point of view, better to keep the texts separated and estimate two different scores based on the two sets of texts.

D.2.3 Preparing the virgin texts

The second decision to be made is to what extent virgin texts should be prepared and adjusted before using Wordscores to estimate the policy positions for the texts. The minimum requirements are to delete common stop words, which are useless in these texts anyway. Since we would expect that each MP would use them approximately in the same way, these stop words would receive an average score and would only pull all MPs more towards the middle of the range on which the texts are scored. In addition, words were reduced to their stems. I only excluded general stop words, so no stop words which are specific for parliament. For example, the word 'Speaker' is used many times, without having a substantive meaning. This is not problematic for the analysis. Assuming that all members approximately use these terms on a relative equal basis, the only effect it has is that scores would all move somewhat more to the centre. One thing which I tested was to see whether it made a difference to exclude words from the reference texts and virgin texts which were only used by a single MP.

Figure D.3 shows the effect of also excluding single word usage (CLEAN) compared to only removing stop words (FULL), for the legislative period 2003-2006 in the Netherlands as an example. Removing these words has only a small effect. The correlation between deviation from the average score based on the FULL-method and deviation from the average score based on the CLEAN-method is extremely high (.911, $p = < .01$). Since this does not have an effect, in the analyses presented in chapter 4 and 5 the FULL-models are used.

[107] This does not mean that I argue that the ratio on its one is not interesting. However, in the context of estimating positions with Wordscores it is not.

Figure D.3 Effect of removing individual use of words in Wordscores



D.2.4 Choosing the reference texts

Choosing the right reference texts is the next step. There are various options. First, one could use the manifesto of the party to use as a reference texts. However, this would results in a comparison of two different texts. Manifestos have a different 'language' than (spoken) speeches or (much shorter) written questions. Therefore we would compare texts which in essence already are different, which would not work. A second option is to use the text of the parliamentary party group leaders and use their texts as reference texts. The advantage would be that we would compare speeches with speeches and written questions with written questions. However, while based on face validity this provides relatively good results, at least to how the MPs of different parties are scored towards each other, this has a major setback. The number of words which can be scored is namely extremely low: leaders do not always discuss all topics (as extensively) as specialists do. To overcome these problems, as explained in the methodological section in chapter four, I combine all virgin texts of MPs in one text, which serves as the reference texts for that party.

D.2.5 Including the estimated text in the reference text or not?

There is one important and potential problematic consequence of the choice to combine the virgin texts of co-partisans into a single party reference text. For each virgin text for which a score is estimated, in one of the reference texts the same virgin text is included. rom a theoretical point of view this can be defended: the goal of the Wordscores analysis presented in this book is to measure the deviation of an MP to the *average* party score. Thus, that the MP for which the deviation is estimated also influences the average seems justified. However, the question is which effect this has in methodological terms. Do we still get valid results when this choice is made? In order to asses this I did two tests. First, I run the Wordscores without words which are only used by a single MP as already discussed. Second,

I run the Wordscores without the virgin text for which a score is estimated included in the reference text. In this procedure when we want to score 150 virgin texts, instead of using 1 set of reference texts (which is the normal procedure) we need 150 different sets of reference texts. In each set of reference texts the text of MP-x is excluded and based on that set of reference texts a score is estimated for MP-x. In the end this results in 150 scores of separate Wordscores analyses, one for MP-1, one for MP-2 etc. These 150 scores are then combined as if they came from one single Wordscores analysis. Of course, this solution is not ideal, since the reference texts are not identical for all virgin texts, but it is the best estimation of the effect of an overlap in virgin- and reference texts. Figure D.4 shows the distribution of scores for texts, with the virgin text excluded from the reference text, for the legislative period between 2003 and 2006 in the Netherlands. What it shows is that all scores assigned to MPs move towards the middle of the scale. We still see that the boxplots for the parties are roughly in the order in which we would expect them, but the overlap is relatively large. This is even more so for the analysis based on the written questions. Including the virgin texts in the reference texts thus pulls the boxplot of a party more towards the position on which we would expect that party. This could be problematic; however, I am only interested in intraparty competition. And if we would calculate the deviation based on the analysis presented in Figure D.4 and compare it with the deviation used in the analyses in chapter 4 and 5, there is a very high and statistically significant correlation (0.803, $p < 0.01$). While we should be aware of this effect, it thus seems that the results can be used for the analyses presented in this chapter. Including the virgin texts in the reference texts does not create major problems for the validity of a measurement of intraparty competition.

Figure D.4 Effect of excluding an MP's own text from the reference text



D.3. Descriptive statistics for analyses chapter 4

Table D.3 Descriptive statistics for analysis chapter 4 (the Netherlands)

Variable	N	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
Preference votes	3591	-0.82	-0.88	0.68	-2.66	1.63
Woman	3591	0.33	0.00	0.47	0.00	1.00
First woman on list	3591	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.00	1.00
Non-western background	3591	0.06	0.00	0.23	0.00	1.00
First non-western background	3591	0.02	0.00	0.13	0.00	1.00
List position (log)	3591	1.26	1.32	0.37	0.30	1.90
List position (relative to elected members)	1869	1.04	1.22	0.50	0.02	1.50
List-pusher	3591	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.00	1.00
Member of parliament t-1	3591	0.18	0.00	0.38	0.00	1.00
Minister t-1	3591	0.01	0.00	0.10	0.00	1.00
Junior minister t-1	3591	0.01	0.00	0.10	0.00	1.00
Party - Candidates	1869	58.04	57.00	17.38	20.00	80.00
Party - Evaluation list-pusher	1869	7.27	7.45	0.69	3.76	8.32
Party - Old	1869	0.73	1.00	0.45	0.00	1.00
Party - Government t-1	1869	0.49	0.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
Party - Left Right scale	1869	5.23	5.20	2.21	1.00	9.25
Party - Populist	1869	0.18	0.00	0.38	0.00	1.00
Deviation (Plenary sessions)	433	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.14
Deviation (Written questions)	394	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.44

Table D.4 Descriptive statistics for analysis chapter 4 (Belgium)

Variable	N	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
Preference votes	6943	0.60	0.54	0.34	-0.24	1.73
Woman	6943	0.49	0.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
First woman on list	6943	0.06	0.00	0.24	0.00	1.00
Non-western background	6943	0.05	0.00	0.21	0.00	1.00
First non-western background	6943	0.02	0.00	0.15	0.00	1.00
List position (log)	6943	0.81	0.90	0.38	0.00	1.38
List-pusher	6943	0.08	0.00	0.27	0.00	1.00
Member of parliament t-1	6943	0.06	0.00	0.23	0.00	1.00
Minister t-1	6943	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.00	1.00
Junior minister t-1	6943	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00
Party - Effective candidates	3430	17.64	19.00	5.48	4.00	24.00
Party - Old	3430	0.56	1.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
Party - Government t-1	3430	0.51	1.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
Party - Populist	3430	0.13	0.00	0.33	0.00	1.00
Party - Left Right scale	3430	5.32	5.56	2.40	1.89	9.86
Deviation (Plenary sessions)	174	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.18
Deviation (Written questions)	262	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.45

E Appendices for chapter 5

E.1. Rank difference for non-incumbents and incumbents

Table E.1 Rank difference for non-incumbents and incumbents (the Netherlands)

Election	Category	N	%	Mean RD	SE	T-test
Non-incumbents						
1998	Not running in 2002	86	53.8	3.20	1.11	t(155.7)=1.170
	Running in 2002	74	46.3	1.31	1.17	
2002	Not running in 2003	67	38.3	2.44	1.65	t(120.6)=-0.234
	Running in 2003	108	61.7	2.88	1.08	
2003	Not running in 2006	141	78.8	1.90	0.80	t(69.4)=2.140*
	Running in 2006	38	21.2	-1.32	1.27	
2006	Not running in 2010	185	82.6	2.52	0.88	t(73.5)=0.275
	Running in 2010	39	17.4	2.08	1.37	
2010	Not running in 2012	212	66.9	1.58	0.91	t(231.2)=-0.926
	Running in 2012	105	33.1	2.92	1.14	
2012	Not running in 2017	258	76.6	1.28	0.76	t(150.1)=-0.297
	Running in 2017	79	23.4	1.70	1.17	
Incumbents						
1998	Not running in 2002	60	31.7	-3.40	1.33	t(147.4)=-1.191
	Running in 2002	129	68.3	-1.27	1.19	
2002	Not running in 2003	35	21.0	-4.00	1.74	t(53.6)=-0.862
	Running in 2003	132	79.0	-2.31	0.90	
2003	Not running in 2006	69	37.5	-1.71	0.99	t(181.9)=-0.692
	Running in 2006	115	62.5	-0.57	1.31	
2006	Not running in 2010	59	32.6	-2.10	1.90	t(98.1)=0.521
	Running in 2010	122	67.4	-3.25	1.10	
2010	Not running in 2012	53	30.1	-3.98	1.36	t(98.1)=-0.379
	Running in 2012	123	69.9	-3.37	0.89	
2012	Not running in 2017	78	40.0	-2.94	1.31	t(159.2)=-0.607
	Running in 2017	117	60.0	-1.93	1.02	

Note: $^{*}p< .05$; $^{**}p< .01$; $^{***}p< .001$

Source: Own dataset. Included are all candidates who participated in election t in all districts from the same position, of parties who at least won a seat in the elections between 1998-2017.

Table E.2 Rank difference for non-incumbents and incumbents (Belgium)

Year	Category	N	%	Mean RD	SE	T-test
Non-incumbents						
2003	Not running in 2007	706	74.2	-0.41	0.20	t(438.8)=-3.863***
	Running in 2007	245	25.8	1.08	0.33	
2007	Not running in 2010	585	61.7	-0.39	0.20	t(679.5)=-2.417**
	Running in 2010	363	38.3	0.49	0.30	
2010	Not running in 2014	902	83.2	-0.13	0.17	t(257.2)=-1.836
	Running in 2014	182	16.8	0.64	0.38	
Incumbents						
2003	Not running in 2007	34	24.5	0.62	0.79	t(42.97)=0.574
	Running in 2007	105	75.5	0.13	0.30	
2007	Not running in 2010	28	19.7	1.29	1.06	t(32.31)=0.981
	Running in 2010	114	80.3	0.20	0.33	
2010	Not running in 2014	58	43.0	0.41	0.61	t(64.2)=1.098
	Running in 2014	77	57.0	-0.27	0.15	

Note: $^{*}p< .05$; $^{**}p< .01$; $^{***}p< .001$
Source: Own dataset. Included are all effective candidates of parties who won at least one seat in the elections between 2003-2014.

E.2. Descriptive statistics for analyses chapter 5

Table E.3 Descriptive statistics for analyse chapter 5 (the Netherlands)

Variable	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
I - Effect preference votes on legislative behaviour (plenary sessions) (N=923)					
Deviation from average party score (plenary sessions)	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.19
Preference votes (% individual threshold)	0.27	0.13	0.31	0.01	1.00
List position (relative to elected members)	0.69	0.67	0.41	0.02	4.43
Government party	0.58	1.00	0.49	0.00	1.00
MP t-1	0.47	0.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
II - Effect preference votes on legislative behaviour (written questions) (N=839)					
Deviation from average party score (written questions)	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.44
Preference votes t (% individual threshold)	0.26	0.13	0.30	0.00	1.00
List position t (relative to elected members)	0.70	0.70	0.40	0.02	4.43
Government party	0.54	1.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
MP t-1	0.47	0.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
III - Effect rank difference t-1 on list position t (N=1040)					
Position t (log)	1.12	1.18	0.41	0.00	1.88
Rank difference t-1	-1.03	-1.00	11.66	-43.00	45.00
Position t-1 (log)	1.19	1.26	0.38	0.30	1.87
MP t-1	0.61	1.00	0.49	0.00	1.00
Minister t-1	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.00	1.00
Junior minister t-1	0.02	0.00	0.15	0.00	1.00
Woman	0.33	0.00	0.47	0.00	1.00
IV - Effect preference votes on becoming (junior) minister (N=915)					
Government	0.08	0.00	0.27	0.00	1.00
Minister	0.04	0.00	0.20	0.00	1.00
Junior minister	0.04	0.00	0.21	0.00	1.00
Preference votes (% individual threshold)	0.20	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Women	0.37	0.00	0.48	0.00	1.00
Government t-1	0.06	0.00	0.24	0.00	1.00
Minister t-1	0.03	0.00	0.17	0.00	1.00
Junior minister t-1	0.03	0.00	0.18	0.00	1.00
Position t (log)	1.41	1.51	0.37	0.30	1.90

Table E.4 Descriptive statistics for analyse chapter 5 (Belgium)

Variable	Mean	Median	SD	MIN	MAX
I - Effect preference votes on legislative behaviour (plenary sessions) (N=231)					
Deviation from average party score (plenary sessions)	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.18
Preference votes t (% individual threshold)	0.56	0.52	0.25	0.10	1.00
List position t (relative to elected members)	0.62	0.50	0.92	0.00	7.67
Government party	0.63	1.00	0.48	0.00	1.00
MP t-1	0.64	1.00	0.48	0.00	1.00
II - Effect preference votes on legislative behaviour (written questions) (N=328)					
Deviation from average party score (written questions)	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.45
Preference votes t (% individual threshold)	0.56	0.51	0.26	0.10	1.00
List position t (relative to elected members)	0.69	0.50	1.06	0.00	11.50
Government party	0.60	1.00	0.49	0.00	1.00
MP t-1	0.62	1.00	0.49	0.00	1.00
III - Effect rank difference t-1 on list position t (N=931)					
Position t (log)	0.64	0.70	0.43	0.00	1.38
Rank difference t-1	0.46	0.00	4.34	-15.00	23.00
Position t-1 (log)	0.66	0.70	0.41	0.00	1.38
MP t-1	0.28	0.00	0.45	0.00	1.00
Minister t-1	0.03	0.00	0.17	0.00	1.00
Junior minister t-1	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00
Woman	0.45	0.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
IV - Effect preference votes on becoming (junior) minister (N=1639)					
Minister	0.03	0.00	0.18	0.00	1.00
Junior minister	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.00	1.00
Government	0.04	0.00	0.20	0.00	1.00
Preference votes t (% individual threshold)	0.30	0.21	0.26	0.03	1.00
Women	0.49	0.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
Minister t-1	0.03	0.00	0.16	0.00	1.00
Junior minister t-1	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00
Government t-1	0.03	0.00	0.18	0.00	1.00
Position t (log)	0.84	0.90	0.37	0.00	1.38

E.3. The causal link between preference votes & deviation from the party

In two chapters of this book I test the relationship between the number of preference votes for a candidate and the deviation from the party line by that candidate. In the fourth chapter, where I focus on what factors impact the electoral success of a candidate, I test whether deviating from the party line in a certain legislative period affects the number of preference votes a candidate receives in the subsequent elections. In chapter five I test whether the preference votes a candidate receives influence whether he or she deviates more from the party line in the legislative period which follows after the election. In both chapters I do not find a strong relationship between both variables. It seems that in either direction both variables do not influence each other.

However, if preference votes and deviation from the party line have a relationship, which works in both ways and reinforces each other, then maybe the methods used in the fourth and fifth chapter were not sufficient to pick up the effects. Therefore, I conducted some additional analyses. I test the relationship not with all possible cases in my dataset, but only around the first legislative term of a candidate to see whether the results change. By looking only at the first time an event happens the problem of the possible reinforcing relationship disappears. For example, if a candidate served as an MP in three legislative terms, instead of including three cases for that candidate, only the first legislative term would be included. Furthermore, for the Netherlands, for which I have data over a longer time period, for some candidates I show the evolution of their preference votes and behaviour in parliament to see if we can find any patterns.

Table E.5 shows the replication of the analyses from chapter 4 (see table 4.4, page 87 and table 4.7, page 92). This table only shows the relevant variables for this additional analysis; the other variables included in the analyses are not presented here. Only candidates are included who at a certain election were a member of parliament in the legislative period before the election for the first time. The results for the Netherlands are based on the elections between 2003 and 2017 and for Belgium of the 2010 and 2014 elections. The results do not change dramatically if we only look at the effect of a first legislative period for a candidate on his or her number of preference votes. The only differences are that the effect of deviation from the party line measured based on written questions has a positive influence on preference votes for candidates lower on the list. However, this difference is very small. With regard to Belgium we see in the third model that deviating from the party line has a negative influence on preference votes in the next election for all candidates. This latter finding is in contrast with the results presented in chapter 4, where the effect for candidates lower on the list was positive instead of negative. The effects for written questions are bigger. Deviating from the average party score has a substantial positive effect for those candidates lower on the list: they get a bonus of 5 percentage points preference votes. However, all in all we should conclude that the effects are limited when we only look

Table E.5 Effect of deviation on preference votes after first legislative period

	The Netherlands		Belgium	
	Model 3	**Model 4**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
(Intercept)	1.557*	1.435*	1.416***	1.431***
	(0.733)	(0.673)	(0.082)	(0.083)
List position	-0.413*	-0.536**	-0.639***	-0.886***
	(0.177)	(0.194)	(0.091)	(0.105)
Deviation (Plenary sessions) t-1	2.591		-0.342	
	(3.324)		(0.775)	
Deviation (Written questions) t-1		-4.736*		0.027
		(1.882)		(0.446)
Deviation*list position	-2.350	4.006	-3.194	1.949
	(4.361)	(2.873)	(2.041)	(1.021)
AIC	193.8	163.0	-47.2	-46.8
BIC	242.8	210.3	-9.2	-9.6
Log likelihood	-79.9	-64.5	39.6	39.4
Observations	132	119	79	76

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Other variables which were included in the origin models in chapter 4 were included, but the results for these variables did not change and are therefore not presented here. The same applies to the random intercepts for parties, elections and (for Belgium) districts.
Source: own dataset.

at the effects of deviating from the party for those candidates who were a member of parliament for the first time. The first event analysis for this part (replication of analysis chapter 4) is less convincing than it is for the next part (replication of analysis chapter 5), since by definition the election of a candidate after his or hers first legislative period is already the second election in which the candidate participates. The behaviour of the MP therefore could have been influenced by the number of preference votes he or she received in his or her first election. This problem is not applicable when replicating the analysis for chapter 5, since here we look at the relationship between the election results of a candidate's first election and the behaviour of the candidate in his or her first legislative term.

Table E.6 shows the replication of the analyses presented in chapter 5 (see table 5.1, page 107 and table 5.2, page 107), to test whether candidates who receive more preference votes, deviate more from the average party score in the legislative period after the election. For the Netherlands I include candidates from the elections between 2002 and 2012 (five elections) and for Belgium from 2007 until 2010 (two elections)[108]. I only include a candidate if he or she did not participate in the previous election. The effects of preference votes on the behaviour of an MP are visualized in figure e.1. The results based on this selection are not essentially different from the results presented in the fifth chapter. First, the effects of preference votes on the behaviour of MPs remain limited. Second, the direction of the effects is the same in almost all models. Only in the Netherlands the effect of preference

[108] I do not include the Dutch elections of 1998 and the Belgium elections of 2003, because I have no data for all candidates whether they participated in the previous election or not.

votes on the deviation from the average party score, based on written questions, changes from a positive to a negative effect. However, in both cases the effect stays very limited and therefore we can hardly say that this has a substantial influence.

Table E.6 Effect of preference votes on deviation in first legislative period

	The Netherlands		Belgium	
	Plenary sessions	**Written questions**	**Plenary sessions**	**Written questions**
(Constant)	0.030**	0.063***	0.033**	0.097***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)
Preference votes	0.010	-0.013	0.001	-0.047
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.043)
List position	0.004	0.010	0.015*	-0.008
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.011)
Government party	-0.001	-0.004	-0.018	-0.035*
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.017)
AIC	-1147.8	-681.1	-201.9	-134.6
BIC	-1122.7	-656.9	-186.6	-119.1
Log likelihood	580.9	347.5	108.9	75.3
Observations	267	235	50	51

Note: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts for parties, elections and (in the case of Belgium) districts were included, there was no variation between the intercepts for the different groups.
Source: Own dataset.

Figure E.1 Effects of preference votes on deviation in first legislative period



Figure E.2 and figure e.3 show the evolution of preference votes for candidates who were an MP for 5 or 6 legislative periods in the Netherlands between 1998 and 2017, and their deviation from the average party score. In figure e.2 the deviation is based on the text analyses of speeches in plenary sessions and in figure e.3 on the written questions MPs submitted. These figures show no clear pattern. It also does not look like different types of MPs exist. There is for example not a group of MPs who constantly deviate more from the party line if they receive more preference votes, and vice versa. There are also no MPs who constantly receive more preference votes if they deviate more from the party line in the previous legislative period. Based on the additional evidence presented in this appendix the conclusions of chapter 4 and chapter 5 still stand.

Figure E.2 Preference votes & deviation from the party (Plenary sessions)



The solid line represents the evaluation of the preference votes for a candidate, as a percentage of the individual threshold, with a maximum score of 1 (right y-axis). The dashed line represents the deviation from the average party score (left y-axis).

Figure E.3 Preference votes & deviation from the party (Written questions)



The solid line represents the evaluation of the preference votes for a candidate, as a percentage of the individual threshold, with a maximum score of 1 (right y-axis). The dashed line represents the deviation from the average party score (left y-axis).

Nederlandstalige samenvatting

Tweede Orde Personalisering: Voorkeurstemmen in België en Nederland

In de politiek gaat het tegenwoordig steeds meer om de persoon van de politicus en minder om de partij. Kiezers zouden hun stem meer laten afhangen van het karakter en uiterlijk van de leider van een politieke partij dan van de standpunten van die partij. Althans, dat is een veelgehoorde uitspraak over de politiek die, hoewel het soms lijkt alsof er in de media en de politiek zelf geen discussie meer nodig is en 'personalisering van de politiek' als een vaststaand feit wordt gezien, in de wetenschappelijke literatuur nog ter discussie staat. Sommige wetenschappers vinden bewijs voor een trend van personalisering, andere vinden dit bewijs niet. Zo blijkt uit onderzoek in Nederland bijvoorbeeld dat maar een heel klein deel van de kiezers nog steeds op de kandidaat van hun keuze zou stemmen als deze bij een andere partij op de lijst zou staan.

Toch blijkt uit onderzoek dat voor een aanzienlijk deel van het electoraat de kandidaat wel belangrijk is, maar pas nadat er een keuze is gemaakt voor de partij. Het uitgangspunt in dit proefschrift is dat personen er wel toe kunnen doen, maar dat de partij nog steeds belangrijker blijft. De keuze voor een kandidaat is bij de kiezer het resultaat van een proces van twee stappen: de kiezer kiest eerst welke partij hij of zij stemt, en maakt daarna een keuze tussen de kandidaten van die partij. De kandidaatskeuze is daarmee niet zozeer een gevolg van competitie tussen kandidaten (met name politiek leiders) van verschillende partijen, maar een gevolg van competitie tussen kandidaten binnen één partij. Er is wel sprake van personalisering, maar deze is van de tweede orde. Voor een goed begrip van personalisering is het dus niet alleen belangrijk om politieke leiders te onderzoeken, maar zullen *alle* kandidaten die deelnemen aan verkiezingen in onderzoek betrokken moeten worden.

De centrale vraag in dit proefschrift is wat de oorzaken en gevolgen van voorkeurstemmen zijn (in systemen waar het mogelijk is om niet alleen een keuze te maken tussen partijen, maar ook tussen meerdere kandidaten van één partij). Vier verschillende onderwerpen worden behandeld, die samen een antwoord op deze vraag kunnen geven: 1) de invloed van het kiesstelsel op het uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem; 2) welke kiezers voorkeurstemmen uitbrengen; 3) welke kandidaten voorkeurstemmen ontvangen; en 4) welke gevolgen voorkeurstemmen voor kandidaten hebben voor hun politieke carrière en parlementair gedrag. In bestaande onderzoeken naar voorkeurstemmen staat veelal één van deze onderdelen centraal. De toegevoegde waarde van dit proefschrift is dat het kijkt naar al deze factoren, en dat conclusies per deelonderwerp met elkaar in verband gebracht worden om zo een completer beeld te krijgen van de oorzaken en gevolgen van voorkeurstemmen.

Personalisering van de politiek wordt voor het nationale niveau onderzocht in België en Nederland, landen waar de kiezer door het uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem de mogelijkheid heeft een keuze te maken tussen kandidaten die voor dezelfde partij op de lijst staan. De competitie voor zetels in het parlement gaat in beide landen in de eerste plaats

tussen partijen: het aantal stemmen op de partij bepaalt het aantal zetels voor de partij. Vervolgens worden de zetels voor een partij verdeeld onder de kandidaten die voor de partij deelnamen aan de verkiezingen. Zowel in Nederland als België hebben de partijen *en* de kiezer invloed op welke kandidaten verkozen worden. De partij heeft invloed door het opstellen van een lijst met kandidaten, die in principe de volgorde bepaalt waarop de kandidaten verkozen worden. Met andere woorden: als een partij bij de verkiezing 5 zetels wint, zullen de 5 eerste kandidaten op de lijst de zetels innemen. Echter, ook de kiezer heeft invloed: als een kandidaat genoeg stemmen haalt, kan hij of zij de lijstvolgorde doorbreken. In Nederland moet een kandidaat bij verkiezingen voor de Tweede Kamer ten minste 25% van de kiesdeler[i] halen om op basis van voorkeurstemmen verkozen te worden. Als een kandidaat boven deze drempel komt (en de partij voldoende zetels heeft behaald), dan heeft die kandidaat, ongeacht zijn of haar positie op de lijst, recht op een plaats in het parlement. In België zijn de regels voor het verkiezen van de kandidaten iets complexer, maar het basisprincipe is daar hetzelfde.

In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift zijn de resultaten gepresenteerd van een experiment gericht op de effecten van regels met betrekking tot voorkeurstemmen, met name op die aspecten waar de kiesstelsels van Nederland en België verschillen. Geen enkel kiesstelsel is (exact) hetzelfde, en door dit onderzoek is het mogelijk om van een aantal specifieke aspecten te achterhalen wat de invloed is op het uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem.

De kiesstelsels van Nederland en België verschillen als het gaat om voorkeurstemmen op twee belangrijke punten. Ten eerste hebben Belgische kiezers de mogelijkheid om een partijstem uit te brengen, terwijl Nederlandse kiezers slechts op een kandidaat kunnen stemmen. Ten tweede kunnen Belgische kiezers, als ze ervoor kiezen op een kandidaat te stemmen, voor zoveel kandidaten stemmen als ze willen, als deze kandidaten voor dezelfde partij op de lijst staan[ii]. In Nederland stemt een kiezer op één kandidaat.

In het experiment zijn deelnemers in zowel Nederland als België gevraagd te stemmen in een willekeurig aan hun toegewezen combinatie van deze twee factoren[iii], om te onderzoeken wat het effect van deze regels is. De verwachting met betrekking tot de partijstem was dat deze optie vooral ten koste zou gaan van (stemmen voor) de lijsttrekker, en niet van andere kandidaten op de lijst. De gedachte hierachter was dat in Nederland, bij afwezigheid van de mogelijkheid om op de partij als geheel te stemmen, een stem op de

---

[i] De kiesdeler is het aantal stemmen dat een partij minimaal nodig heeft om verkozen te worden. In Nederland staat deze gelijk aan het aantal uitgebrachte (geldige) stemmen op politieke partijen gedeeld door het aantal zetels (wat neerkomt op 0,67 procent van de stemmen).

[ii] Als een kiezer op meer dan één kandidaat stemt, telt zijn of haar stem in de verdeling van de zetels onder partijen nog steeds maar als één stem mee. Het uitbrengen van een stem op meerdere kandidaten heeft wel invloed op de verdeling van de zetels onder de kandidaten.

[iii] De twee factoren zijn partijstem (die wel of niet aanwezig kan zijn) en het aantal voorkeurstemmen dat mag worden uitgebracht (één of meerdere). In totaal waren er dus vier verschillende 'kiesstelsels', waarvan iedere respondent er willekeurig 1 kreeg toegewezen.

lijsttrekker voornamelijk wordt gezien als een stem op de partij. Een stem op de lijsttrekker is volgens die gedachte dus niet altijd een persoonlijke stem, terwijl een stem op een andere kandidaat dat wel. Als dat daadwerkelijk zo is, dan zou men verwachten dat als een partijstem beschikbaar komt, er minder kiezers op de lijsttrekker zouden stemmen indien ze geen specifieke voorkeur voor een kandidaat hebben. Andersom geredeneerd: een kiezer die normaal een partijstem uitbrengt, maar dat plotseling niet meer zou kunnen, zou waarschijnlijk op de lijsttrekker stemmen, simpelweg omdat dit de eerste kandidaat op de lijst is. De kiezer hoeft dan niet de moeite te nemen om een keuze te maken tussen de kandidaten op de lijst van de partij. Het resultaat bevestigde deze verwachting niet. Uit het experiment blijkt het invoeren van een partijstem zowel ten koste gaat van stemmen voor de lijsttrekker als van stemmen voor andere kandidaten.

Het resultaat van het experiment roept de vraag op of het in Nederland veronderstelde onderscheid tussen een stem op een lijsttrekker bij wijze van partijstem en een stem op een andere kandidaat als een 'echte' voorkeurstem wel zo strikt moet zijn. Het lijkt veeleer het geval te zijn dat alle uitgebrachte stemmen zowel een stem op een specifieke kandidaat kunnen zijn als een stem die puur als doel heeft het steunen van de partij. Wat betreft de mogelijkheid om meerdere stemmen uit te brengen kwam de verwachting, althans voor België, wel uit: het zijn voornamelijk lager geplaatste kandidaten die profiteren van het feit dat een kiezer meerdere stemmen mag uitbrengen. In Nederland was dit effect niet zichtbaar: mogelijk omdat voor Nederlandse deelnemers aan het experiment deze regel nog onbekend was en daardoor minder gebruikt.

Het tweede deel van het proefschrift behandelt de vraag welke kiezers voorkeurstemmen uitbrengen. In dit deel zijn bestaande verklaringen getest, en is een nieuwe verklaring toegevoegd. De meeste literatuur over stemgedrag gaat uit van positieve redenen om een stem uit te brengen: de kiezer maakt een keuze omdat hij of zij zich, om bepaalde redenen, voelt aangetrokken tot een partij of kandidaat. Ook wat betreft het uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem spelen zulke positieve factoren een rol: kiezers die deel uitmaken van een groep die in de volksvertegenwoordiging ondervertegenwoordigd is, brengen bijvoorbeeld eerder een voorkeurstem uit. Echter, de analyse laat zien dat ook negatieve factoren een rol kunnen spelen. Kiezers kunnen ervoor kiezen een voorkeurstem uit te brengen voor een kandidaat, niet omdat ze zich voelen aangetrokken tot die kandidaat, maar omdat ze niet willen stemmen op de eerste kandidaat op de lijst. Met name voor Nederland, waar de kiezer geen partijstem kan uitbrengen, speelt dit een rol. Als een kiezer geen specifieke voorkeur heeft voor een kandidaat van zijn of haar partij, maar wel een afkeur van de eerste kandidaat op de lijst, kan dat de kiezer ertoe brengen een stem op een andere kandidaat uit te brengen. Bij bestudering van motivaties voor het uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem in Nederland bleek dat ongeveer 7 procent van de kiezers die een voorkeurstem uitbrengen dat doet, omdat ze niet op de lijsttrekker willen stemmen. Het grootste deel van deze groep heeft geen specifieke reden voor de keuze voor de andere kandidaat: die lijkt willekeurig gekozen. In België komen zulke motivaties nauwelijks voor

als kiezers wordt gevraagd te motiveren waarom ze voor een bepaalde kandidaat hebben gestemd. Een voor de hand liggende verklaring van dit verschil is de aan- of afwezigheid van de partijstem. Immers: een kiezer zonder voorkeur maar met een afkeur van de lijsttrekker kan in België een partijstem uitbrengen. Een kiezer in Nederland heeft deze mogelijkheid niet, en is 'gedwongen' op een kandidaat te stemmen. Deze bevinding kan een verklaring zijn voor de verrassende resultaten van het experiment uit het eerste deel van het proefschrift. Het zou goed kunnen dat kiezers met een afkeur van de lijsttrekker in plaats van een voorkeurstem voor een andere kandidaat een partijstem uitbrengen, als die optie beschikbaar komt.

Welke kandidaten ontvangen voorkeurstemmen? Deze vraag staat centraal in het derde deel van dit proefschrift. Het is niet alleen van belang om te weten welke kiezers een voorkeurstem uitbrengen, maar ook bij welk type kandidaat deze stemmen terecht komen. Ook hier zijn bestaande verklaringen getest en is een nieuwe verklaring toegevoegd, namelijk of het afwijken van de partijlijn invloed heeft op het aantal voorkeurstemmen dat een kandidaat krijgt.

In de competitie tussen partijen spelen standpunten een belangrijk rol; de vraag is of dat ook het geval is bij competitie tussen kandidaten van eenzelfde partij. Om dit te onderzoeken is allereerst een tekstanalyse uitgevoerd van speeches in de Tweede Kamer (in Nederland) en Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers (België) en Kamervragen. Op basis van deze analyse is de positie van Kamerleden op een links-rechts schaal vastgesteld. Vervolgens is voor elk Kamerlid de (absolute) afstand genomen tussen zijn of haar positie en de gemiddelde positie van alle kandidaten van de partij. Hoe groter dit verschil, des te meer het Kamerlid afwijkt van de partijlijn. Vervolgens is een analyse gedaan waarin de invloed van het afwijken van de partijlijn op het aantal voorkeurstemmen is getest. In deze analyse zijn ook verklaringen opgenomen die volgens de literatuur een effect hebben op het aantal voorkeurstemmen: kandidaten afkomstig van groepen die onder-gerepresenteerd zijn in het parlement, met een hoge lijstpositie en/of politieke ervaring kunnen rekenen op meer voorkeurstemmen. Het afwijken van de partijlijn levert echter geen (extra) voorkeurstemmen op[iv]. In tegenstelling tot wanneer het gaat om de partijkeuze, lijkt bij de keuze tussen kandidaten binnen een partij voor de kiezer de inhoud er niet toe te doen.

In het laatste deel van dit proefschrift is onderzocht wat de gevolgen voor kandidaten zijn van het aantal voorkeurstemmen dat ze krijgen voor zowel hun politieke carrière als hun parlementaire gedrag. Het meest directe effect van voorkeurstemmen is of ze daadwerkelijk invloed hebben op of kandidaten verkozen worden of niet. Dit effect is beperkt: weinig kandidaten worden verkozen volledig op basis van het aantal voorkeurstemmen dat ze krijgen.

Maar wellicht zijn er meer indirecte effecten van voorkeurstemmen. Specifiek is onderzocht wat de gevolgen zijn voor de kansen op het verkrijgen van een positie als

[iv] Omdat de posities van kandidaten zijn vastgesteld op basis van speeches in het parlement, is deze analyse alleen uitgevoerd onder kandidaten die in de periode voorafgaand aan de geanalyseerde verkiezing al Kamerlid waren.

minister of staatssecretaris, of meer voorkeurstemmen voor een betere lijstpositie zorgen bij volgende verkiezingen en of kandidaten die meer voorkeurstemmen krijgen in het parlement meer afwijken van de partijlijn. Dit laatste blijkt in ieder geval niet zo te zijn. Zowel in Nederland als in België is er geen effect van het aantal voorkeurstemmen op het afwijken van de partijlijn tijdens speeches of gestelde vragen in het parlement. In België hebben voorkeurstemmen wel invloed op de selectie van ministers en staatssecretarissen. In Nederland hebben voorkeurstemmen echter ook op dit proces geen invloed. De grootste effecten van voorkeurstemmen zijn te zien in de lijstpositie bij volgende verkiezingen. Evenals in eerder onderzoek blijkt dat kandidaten die relatief beter presteren dan mag worden verwacht op basis van hun lijstpositie, bij volgende verkiezingen door de partij hoger op de lijst geplaatst worden. Hierbij dient wel een kanttekening gemaakt te worden: waar dit effect in Nederland met name voor vrouwen bestaat, zijn het in België voornamelijk mannelijke kandidaten die van dit effect profiteren. Het effect voor Nederlandse vrouwen kan wellicht worden verklaard door het feit dat in Nederland bij de meeste partijen relatief meer mannen bovenaan de lijst staan. Omdat vrouwen daardoor van lagere posities moeten komen, is het voor hen relatief gezien gemakkelijk om te profiteren van een goed verkiezingsresultaat.

Op basis van deze bevindingen worden in het afsluitende hoofdstuk drie conclusies getrokken over de oorzaken en gevolgen van voorkeurstemmen. Ten eerste blijkt uit de bevindingen van zowel het eerste als tweede deel van mijn proefschrift dat een voorkeurstem niet automatisch een voorkeur voor een kandidaat betekent. Indien een kiezer verplicht is op een kandidaat te stemmen, kan een voorkeurstem ook voornamelijk een stem op de partij of zelfs een 'negatieve voorkeurstem' zijn. In dat geval stemmen kiezers op een willekeurige kandidaat, omdat ze niet willen stemmen op de eerste kandidaat van de lijst. Er is dan wel sprake van een motivatie (namelijk dat de kiezer niet op een bepaalde kandidaat wil stemmen), maar geen motivatie voor de kandidaat van keuze. In Nederland komt dit fenomeen voor, terwijl het in België afwezig is. Het is aannemelijk dat dat komt doordat in België kiezers in een dergelijke situatie gebruik kunnen maken van de partijstem. Om deze reden wordt in de conclusie gepleit voor de invoering van een partijstem in het Nederlandse kiesstelsel. Dit heeft als voordeel dat er meer transparantie ontstaat over wat de kiezer wil. Een kiezer die geen voorkeur heeft voor een specifieke kandidaat kan dan een partijstem uitbrengen, en op kandidaten uitgebrachte stemmen geven een betere indicatie van de steun van het electoraat aan die kandidaten.

Ten tweede blijkt uit het derde en vierde deel dat de rol die ideologie inneemt binnen de competitie tussen kandidaten van dezelfde partij afwezig is. Kandidaten die afwijken van de partijlijn krijgen niet meer (of minder) stemmen en kandidaten die meer voorkeurstemmen krijgen, wijken daarna niet meer dan andere kandidaten af van de partijlijn. De centrale gedachte binnen dit proefschrift is dat de persoon van een politicus pas een rol gaat spelen, nadat de partijkeuze is gemaakt. Hier spelen andere factoren een rol dan de standpunten van de kandidaten. Voor een partij lijkt het dus van belang een lijst van

kandidaten te presenteren die weliswaar een ideologie delen, maar op andere, socio-demografische factoren, van elkaar verschillen.

Tot slot hebben voorkeurstemmen beperkte consequenties. Het meest directe gevolg van het verkrijgen van voorkeurstemmen is of ze de kandidaat aan een zetel helpen. In Nederland en België is voor maar enkele kandidaten het aantal voorkeurstemmen alleen de bepalende factor om verkozen te worden. Voor veruit het overgrote deel van de kandidaten is de lijstpositie bepalend voor hun verkiezing. Wel zijn er enkele indirecte gevolgen van voorkeurstemmen. Zo heeft in België het aantal voorkeurstemmen invloed op benoemingen voor regeringsposities, en heeft zowel in Nederland als België het aantal voorkeurstemmen invloed op de lijstpositie van een kandidaat bij een volgende verkiezing. Dit versterkt het argument voor invoering van een partijstem in Nederland, zodat ook voor deze zaken voorkeurstemmen een betere weergave vormen van wat de kiezer met zijn of haar stem beoogt. In tijden waarin kritiek op het democratische systeem niet ongewoon is, zou dit kunnen bijdragen aan een versterking van de representatieve democratie.

Curriculum Vitea

Marijn Adrianus Marinus Nagtzaam (Ossendrecht, 1986) attended senior general secondary education at the Roncalli Scholengemeenschap, Bergen op Zoom, after which he obtained a Bachelor degree after studying Business economics, Finance and Accounting (2004-2008). He studied political science at Leiden University (the Netherlands), where he obtained a Bachelor degree (2008-2012) and his Master degree (2012-2014). During his time as a research master student Marijn worked as a teaching and research assistant (2012-2014). Marijn conducted his PhD research at the Institute of Political Science, first as a PhD-student (2014-2017) and later alongside an appointment as a lecturer (from 2017 onwards).