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Economic Effects of Social Protection

Cammeraat, E.

Citation

Cammeraat, E. (2019, October 1). *Economic Effects of Social Protection*. *Meijers-reeks*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/78947>

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Author: Cammeraat, E.

Title: Economic Effects of Social Protection

Issue Date: 2019-10-01

Economic Effects of Social Protection

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PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof.mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op dinsdag 1 oktober 2019
klokke 16:15 uur

door

Emile Cammeraat

geboren te Ede

in 1990

Promotores: prof.dr. K.P. Goudswaard
 prof.dr. P.W.C. Koning
Co-promotor: dr. E.L.W. Jongen
Promotiecommissie: prof. dr. ir. J.C. van Ours (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
 dr. W. Adema (OECD)
 prof.dr. W.J.M. Voermans
 prof.dr. M.G. Knoef

Lay-out: AlphaZet prepress, Bodegraven
Printwerk: Ipskamp Printing

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Preface

When I started writing this dissertation almost four years ago, I did not expect that the time would go so fast. Have I been in a kind of trance imposed by a high degree of concentration, the regularity of the days and the structured approach of science? The time might have gone, which also becomes clear when I notice a changed hairline in the mirror, but my mind is peaceful and I am proud of the result.

This dissertation would not have existed without the support of many people. First of all, I am grateful for all the support I have received from my supervisors Kees Goudswaard, Pierre Koning and Egbert Jongen. Kees, I have benefited greatly from the confidence that you have always expressed in me and for helping me to keep on-track and on-schedule. Pierre and Egbert, I am very happy to have had you as co-authors of two chapters, the meetings with the three of us were often the highlight of the week. I would not have been the researcher I am now without your training. Additionally, I would like to thank the CPB and the OECD for giving me the chance to conduct research at these organizations. I would also like to thank the members of the committee for reading and assessing my thesis. Jan van Ours, Willem Adema, Marike Knoef and Wim Voermans, it is an honor to have you in my PhD committee.

I am also very grateful for the friendship and support that I have received from my colleagues. Almost all of you have read parts of my research and provided feedback after one of the seminars I gave or during the lunch breaks. In particular, I would like to thank Lieke for her support during the first years and the “office banter” group for having a lot of fun together over the last year. Also, a special thanks goes out to my office

mates and to Koen, Peter, Ben, Olaf and Annemarie for advice on research, writing, teaching, career steps and much more.

As important as all professional contributions is the support of my family. Mama, I would like to thank you for your love and your support, I cannot be more fortunate with a mum like you! Papa, with your creativity, you are one of the greatest sources of inspiration for me. Pascal and Sven, I am very happy to have you as my brothers, it is wonderful that you are always interested in my work. Finn, Alain, Oma, thank you for being there for me.

I would also like to mention how much I owe to my friends. The salsa classes I took with Maarten were very important in order to empty my head from the thoughts of work. Dion, Willem, Aslihan and Yos, the deep intellectual conversations with you were invaluable to me and helped me to gain insights in many more fields than economics alone. My old friends from "The Groep", I already look forward to living together with you in the nursing home at the West-Kruiskade sixty years from now. My friends from the "Discussion group", I hope that we will continue to have nice conversations together our entire lives. Unfortunately, there is no space to thank all my friends and family members who have supported me directly or indirectly during my PhD, but still, thank you very much!

This leaves me with thanking Jasmijn. You always support me emotionally as well as intellectually. I am grateful that you always encourage and support me in my choices. The best part of the last years was being with you.

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