

Sonic peripheries : middling with/in the event

Klusmeyer, P.

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Author: Klusmeyer, P.

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Part Four

HOW NATURE DOES

A LURE FOR FEELING

Beauty is therefore an event, a process, rather than a condition or a state. The flower is not beautiful in itself; rather, beauty *happens* when I *encounter* the flower. Beauty is fleeting, and it is always imbued with otherness. For although the feeling of beauty is "subjective," I cannot experience it at will. I can only find beauty when the object solicits me, or arouses my sense of beauty, in a certain way. Also, beauty does not survive the moment of the encounter in which it is created. It cannot be recovered once it is gone. It can only be born afresh in another event, another encounter. (Shaviro 2009, pp. 4–5; italics in original)

When I laid down the last card, I can now safely say that I was struck by something. "Wow! Beautiful!" – one description in response to *How is Nature*; not an expression I used but heard others say as they encountered the work for the first time (see Fig. 5 and Experiment 2). To use the word 'strike' to give account of the experience is deliberate though, and its meaning twofold. First – and here lies the primary significance – it alludes to a 'forcible contact' that exceeds my intention, likes or dislikes. It is a feeling or pulse of emotion which

^{17.}

¹ Doruff, S. 2016. Email correspondence with the author, 8 September.

underlies all sense and sensibility, and is forceful in such a manner that it "changes whatever it encounters" (Shaviro 2009, p. 63). The encounter opens to an outside, a contingent event that inheres in the limits of apperception. The effect it inspires is not an inevitable consequence of the happenings; it's not something I already know, nor seek to discover. It simply *is* – *ising* at the horizon of tacit knowing. Thus struck again, taken with the formal aspect of the audiovisual piece – an artwork of fifty-one 4 x 2 1/4 inches cards and fourteen field recordings – possibly enchanting the ear and eye with the topographies of ragged edges and chalky surface texture it assumes.

18.1

. . .

Let us backtrack for a moment and consider the three W's of *How is Nature* – why, what, where. To discuss the purpose of the artistic project in the context of this research is a simple matter. Indeed, rather than examine the purpose of its making, I should like to refer to John Cage (1961) who once inquired into the purpose of writing music. Of course, his reply took the form of a paradox:

a purposeful purposelessness or a purposeless play. This play, however, is an affirmation of life — not an attempt to bring order out of chaos nor to suggest improvements in creation, but simply a way of waking up to the very life we're living, which is so excellent once one gets one's mind and one's desires out of its way and lets it act of its own accord. (ibid. p. 12) ²

I use the same quote in Part One since I find it crucial and, indeed, helpful in claiming that Cage enacted a radical empiricism (akin to Whitehead's process philosophy). More on this in the chapter Aesthetic Encounter of Part Two.

Cage's philosophical impulse was to leave out one's volition and let life run its course (in the creation of art). A 'purposeful purposelessness' is posited on the idea that Life – here *Nature* in the broadest sense – is constituted by an anonymous flux of matter and energy from which novelty and *creativeness* arises. This stance reflects an onto-epistemological belief not bound to hermeneutical modes of interpretation. Consider it a materialist view wedded to Whitehead's organic realism that seeks to bypass the position wherein nature is bifurcated, "namely into the nature apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the cause of awareness" (Whitehead 1920, p. 31).

The antirealism inherent in the well established assumption that mind and matter are distinct substances — that is, that nature is divided in two systems of reality: one that is real or 'objectifyable' to the sciences, and one that is real to us, the human subject who perceives and 'dreams' — is erroneous to Whitehead (ibid., p. 30). Or as he puts it: "'We may not pick and choose' [...;] we must develop an account of the world in which 'the red glow of the sunset' and 'the molecules and electric waves' of sunlight refracting into the earth's atmosphere have the same ontological status" (ibid., p. 29 as quoted in Shaviro 2014, p. 2). Which is also to say that Cage's notion of artistic creation is premised on the conviction that he is *partaking in a whole* — "humanity and nature, not separate, are in this world together" (Cage 1961, p. 8). The reason of writing music, then, lies in matter, in nature itself to which he belongs. "Not an attempt to understand something that is being said [....] Just an attention to the activity of sounds;" he lets sounds be themselves "rather than vehicles for man-made theories or expressions of human sentiments" (ibid., p. 10).

Whitehead opposes the antirealist presupposition that "perception is only the representation of an object, or in general terms, of an external world" and "replaces it with the notion that perception is part of the object or of the world. He names this reformulated notion *prehension*" (Sjöstedt-H 2016, n.p.; italics in original). Here subject and object are no longer conceived in epistemological

terms, "with the subject the knower and the object the known thing/world. Rather, the 'occasion as subject has a 'concern' for the object. And the 'concern' at once places the object as a component in the experience of the subject" (Whitehead 1933/1967, p. 176 as quoted in Goodman 2010, p. 92).3 Whitehead takes up concern from the Quaker's use of the word, namely as "divested of any suggestion of knowledge," which makes it apt to express the fundamental structure of experience (Whitehead 1933/1967, p. 176). Concernedness denotes the "affective tone" that is intrinsic to the "subject-object relation" (ibid. pp. 175, 176). "No prehension, even of bare sensa, can be divested of its affective tone, that is to say, of its character as a 'concern' [...] Concernedness is of the essence of perception" (ibid., p. 180). Finally, the activity of prehension is filled with feelings, meaning any "occasion of experience," also referred to as "actual entity" or "actual occasion," involves what Whitehead calls "subjective form" (ibid., pp. 176, 177, 192). "The subjective form of an experience is the dynamic form of how the potentials for change initially found in the bare-active midst come to play out in its occasion" (Massumi 2011, p. 15). In other words, "this is how, the manner in which," events in nature-matter come to pass; "[a]nd this manner makes all the difference" (Shaviro 2014, p. 38; italics in original).4

To clarify this point we consider a sonic example: tap a drum, its membrane begins to vibrate, sound waves propagate change the ear hearing it, the ossicles of the middle ear, the cochlear of the inner ear to the brain; and so part of

Whitehead further explains: "Thus subject and object are relative terms. An occasion is a subject in respect to its special activity concerning an object; and anything is an object in respect to its provocation of some special activity within a subject. Such a mode of activity is termed a 'prehension'" (1933/1967, p. 176). Whitehead, A.N. 1933/1967. Adventures of Ideas. New York: The Free Press.

^{4 &}quot;[A] prehension involves three factors. There is the occasion of experience within which the prehension is a detail of activity; there is the datum whose relevance provokes the origination of this prehension; this datum is the prehended object; there is the subjective form, which is the affective tone determining the effectiveness of that prehension in that occasion of experience. How the experience constitutes itself depends on its complex of subjective forms" (Whitehead 1933/1967, pp. 176-177; emphasis added).

the drum – its potential/material constitution – becomes part of us (say, any entity, human or not, can be affected by the encounter). Although that the causal chain seems clear - i.e., drum, vibration, ear/organ transduces signal to brain, etc. – it remains open how something comes to matter. "An occasion may be caused by what precedes it, but, as Stengers puts it [in reference to Whitehead's 'causal efficacy'], 'no cause, even God as a cause, has the power to define how it will cause. Nothing has the power to determine how it will matter for others'" (2009, p. 40 as quoted in Shaviro 2014, p. 38). Let me quickly add that our example appears to privilege the human listener as recipient of the something'shappening. So it does, but the listener is neither the passive receiver nor the constituent force in the occasions of experience. Rather, the issue at stake is the question of how nature does, and how we - not apart but a part of nature carefully move in the midst, "in the mess of relations not yet organized in terms such as 'subject' and 'object'" (Manning 2015b, p. 55). To say it another way, and eventually return to the 'why' of this project: to think/view the sonic through a Whitehead-Jamesian lens, we need to "perceive reality as it really is" (Sjöstedt-H 2016, n.p.); that is to say, "take everything as it comes. You cannot pick and choose according to a priori principles or pre-given evaluative criteria" (Massumi 2011, p. 85). It places you and me "in a more nuanced relationship to knowledge," as Manning affirms; "[a]n occasion of experience [...] produces the means by which it will eventually define itself as this or that" (Manning 2015b, pp. 55–56). In the case of the drum, the sounds drifting outwards may be soft or loud – depending on the condition/situation wherein the action takes place, the vibrations might be reflected by walls, surfaces, or dampened by bodies, objects – then, anything and -body becomes (is, ising) part of a worlding. What it means (the 'this' or 'that') is less the issue, but what it does – how it does is at issue here.

Aside from this basic example, my interest in the making/proposition of How is Nature lies precisely in the complexities that arise in the encounter with vibrational force, that is to say, in prehension. Namely, in the performative

encounter with vibrant ecology occurs what Cage – after Zen Buddhist scholar D.T. Suzuki – refers to as "unimpededness and interpenetration;" he describes his understanding of these concepts as such:

this unimpededness is seeing that in all of space each thing and each human being is at the center and furthermore that each one being at the center is the most honored one of all. Interpenetration means that each of these most honored ones of all is moving out in all directions penetrating and being penetrated by every other one and no matter what the time or what the space. [... I]n fact each and every thing in all of the time and space is related to each and every other thing in all of time and space. (Cage 1961, pp. 46–47)

This view depicts a distinct balance between the singularity of things and happenings (their unimpededness) on the one hand and their simultaneous inter-/intra-activity (their interpenetration) on the other. For Cage, this conception of reality is entirely non-dualistic, "since the complete interrelation of all things cannot allow for any divisions or distinctions" (Pritchett 1993, p. 75). Similar holds true for the dual-aspect ontology of Whitehead who insists that actual entities (things) and actual occasions (happenings) constitute the universe. "These two modes of being are different, yet they can be identified with one another, in much the same way that 'matter has been identified with energy' in modern physics" (Whitehead 1938/1968, p. 137 as quoted in Shaviro 2014, p. 35).

Although Whitehead's atomism differs in nuance to Deleuze's notion of process and becoming, both philosophers insist on relations as underlying cosmic factuality. Deleuze sees no actual thing, say, "an actual entity volcano, a real force to be reckoned with" – instead, he has eyes only for "its violent, upsurging

⁵ This phrase stems from Graham Harman's *Guerilla Metaphysics*, which Shaviro draws on to elaborate on the distinct differences between Whitehead's (atomist-based) process ontology and Harman's

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action," that is to say, "its force to be reckoned with" (ibid., pp. 33, 34; emphasis added). According to Shaviro (drawing on Robinson [2007]), the differences between Deleuze and Whitehead "are matters of 'balance' or emphasis, rather than fundamental incompatibilities" (2009, p. 18).6 The former believes in a 'continuity of becoming', whereas the latter subscribes to a 'becoming of continuity'; what the two positions share is, in effect, the philosophers' common quest in "how to resolve the conflicting claims of unity and multiplicity, or how to achieve what Deleuze-Guattari call 'the magic formula we all seek - PLURALISM = MONISM" (1980/1998, p. 20 as quoted in ibid.). My adventure is another, but it clearly links to their concern of becoming, change and ultimately invention. How is Nature deals with the problem of translation and mannerism in the context of artistic making (poiesis) and doing (praxis). The project follows the transversal movement of Sonic Peripheries based on the incentive presented at the outset of this venture. To reiterate: the motive and curiosity that drives this research done in and through art practice turns to occasions where sound is prehended (and conceived) both as audible and inaudible occurrence – as either vibration, music, fabulation, concept, or as 'wholly other'. Call it incentive or lure of the middle – the problematic locus where the sonic is neither this nor that – that gives impetus to listen intently, yet to assume nothing. This research is committed to attending to the ever all-embracing activity, it is committed to the moment of awareness that takes precedence over questions of signification; as such, it is convinced that sound is always-already a matter of experience. Here we arrive at the 'what' of this art research offshoot; though let me first conclude the why section with some observations that are relevant in the overall discussion.

object-oriented ontology. See Harman, G., 2005. *Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things*. Chicago: Open Court, p. 82.

Steven Shaviro elaborates on this point in Without Criteria, p. 19n2. See Shaviro, S. 2009. Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics. Cambridge: The MIT Press.



Figure 1

Terra incognita: vegetatio, 'the power of growth' (or untamed cultured nature).

Photo taken on the grounds of Catwalk Institute, Catskill NY.

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Take a moment to look at Figure 1. What do you see? Captured aliveness? Or rather a kind of stilled energy that quivers still – yet not still, not quiet. What do you hear? A buzzing of sorts? A rustling in the thickets of vegetation seen ahead, imagined below and somewhere above one's point of view? A kind of noise we might expect to hear when we see the display of shrubs, trees, sticks and stones, foliage, and dirt. Nature ... a wildness?, or one's dream thereof; Henry David Thoreau conjures 'wildness' in the writings he does on, or rather through nature (not about nature). Jane Bennett in Thoreau's Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild (2002) explains that in her study on the naturalist, artist-poet, and philos-

opher, she "capitalize[s] Nature when it refers to the magical reality of Thoreau's making, to the outdoor life he inflects as Nature" (p. xxxii). It is in this sense that Nature with a capital N will be considered here. As part of an idea that starts with what is known as American Transcendentalism, a philosophico-literary movement of the early to mid-nineteenth century, but diverges from it — namely, I endeavor to suggest, in the direction of a materialist meaning of worlding as opposed to an anthropocentric reading of the world.

The notion of 'materialist meaning' I draw from Massumi who in A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia describes meaning as a "network of enveloped material processes" (1992, p. 10). He considers meaning as process; "an encounter between forces, or lines of force (which themselves are complexes of other lines), an event, dynamic rather than static and in a constant process of becoming [...;] the expression of one force on another" (O'Sullivan 2006, p. 21; emphasis added). For Bennett, "Thoreau is a sculptor: his materials are flesh, bones, twigs, rocks, feathers, memories, and dreams; his tools – themselves finely wrought – are words, sentences, acute observations, imagination, hiking shoes, and canoes; his product is Nature and the sojourning individual" (2002, p. xxx).8 Her point being that it is "sometimes difficult – amid the dust and discarded or partially formed chunks – to figure out just what it is that is being made in

⁷ I wish to note here that I neither consider myself an expert on Henry David Thoreau nor on American Transcendentalism. My main sources with regard to the former goes back to Bennett's studies on the philosopher as well as several texts by Thoreau himself. My interest in Thoreau comes, on the one hand, from Cage and his conceptual involvement with him and, on the other hand, my art-philosophical interest in the type of thinking that Thoreau projects, also, or especially concerning sound and sonic observations he expresses in his writings, e.g., in *Walden*.

⁸ Jane Bennett describes Thoreau as a *sojourner* and explains: "Sojourners are in search of a home but also value the sense of estrangement that propels them. Sojourning is not as purposive as journeying but not as aimless as sauntering. Although the self Thoreau seeks to fashion also engages in the last two, it is the first that best names the fragile balance between comfort and estrangement, between the universe and the Wild, that marks Thoreau's ideal" (2002, p. xxvii). See Bennett, J. 2002. *Thoreau's Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Thoreau's texts. Because sculptor and sculpture often coincide, it is hard to distinguish between raw material and emerging work of art;" and mine being, drawing on Bennett's analogy that the artist 'enacts' and transforms the lines of forces into what I termed elsewhere 'fugacious expression' — which is something of a matter-meaning that comes into articulation as artifact/thing of material-discursive complexion (ibid.). Meaning, as such, steps aside from the logic of logocentricism and assumes the wisdom of the Event inherent in naturing nature (Lat. natura naturans). Matter in its broadest sense (solid, liquid, gaseous, and intangible, that is, incorporeal) comes to matter as mattering event. Here 'meaning' can be understood as a 'cut' or 'point of suspension' — to name "the 'pinning down' of a dynamic process, a kind of map, or diagram, of a procedure" (O'Sullivan 2006, pp. 21–22). This proposition will be further explored in the context of the ideation and making of *How is Nature*. However, firstly let us continue our perceptual reading of Figure 1.

It seems nearly quotidian — the photograph, that is. But I think it really is not, especially on second sight. Not to say that it shows signs of any particular artistic merit; nah, it's a snapshot of a temporary mise-en-scène that unfolded in front of me the day I scouted — or should I say, 'sojourned' — the area. Snap! Maybe I was fidgety when pressing the camera button, alas, causing the image to appear out of focus in parts. Then again, I wonder — some elements in the image are entirely in focus, nearly jutting out from the picture plane to meet the eye halfway. There is a sense of dynamism that subsists in the tonal values, eventually concrescing into shapes; see the lopsided trunk of a fallen tree near the center of the image: Dark, stark black-rhizomatic-lines amid moving grass and skittish light-bright leaves. The longer I look the less I conceive of an image that depicts a definite landscape — that is, the wooded environs nearby my cabin. I sense untamed cultured nature, perceive the power of growth and decay; 'I' lose myself — "surrendering of one's self to that which lies beyond oneself" (O'Sullivan 2001, p. 118). The image opens to a facsimile of terra incognita, bound to earth but not

limited to sameness.⁹ The work in process began here. (And you may ask yourself, what does this have to do with sound? Just wait.)

The 'why' of *How is Nature* connects to the 'where', and we will come to the 'what' of the project shortly.

The where provides a straightforward response; but perhaps not quite so unambiguous when considering what Whitehead calls "the fallacy of simple location" (1929/1978, p. 137). The fallacy lies in the belief that 'discrete matter' is locatable – namely, "in a definite finite region of space, and throughout a definite finite duration of time" (Whitehead 1925/1967, p. 58). For the philosopher of process, this is a misconstrue of reality that entirely "ignores the way that feeling is relational and always in transition" (Shaviro 2009, p. 60). Well, pardon the odd aside – not too odd we shall see – we turn to the less unusual.

The where and when comes to this: In the summer 2016, I spent four weeks at Catwalk Artist Residency, Catskill, NY. Located in the Hudson Valley, near Catskill Mountains, the residency is flanked by the river Hudson and overlooks the sublime landscape so often depicted by the Hudson River School of painting – in fact, to one side of the Catwalk grounds, the view opens to *Olana*, the former estate of the painter Frederick Edwin Church (1829–1900). It comes as no surprise that resident artists are invited to work on projects focused on aspects of landscape.¹⁰

⁹ To quote Brent Adkins (2015) concerning the problem of the *new* and Deleuze and Guattari's postulated monism of univocity (as discussed in *A Thousand Plateaus*, namely in the first plateau on the rhizome): "The monism arrived at here, though, is not an Eleatic stasis in which movement is an illusion. It is the monism of the continuity thesis, the monism of univocity. *The claim is not that ontology is a monotonous sameness, but that everything exists in the exactly the same way.* There is no dualism of form and content that must then be related by analogy. There is no transcendence, only immanence. All the assemblages are arrayed on the same plane. The formula (pluralism = monism) is magic precisely because it allows for the creation of the new" (n.p.; emphasis added). See Adkins, B. 2015. *Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus: A Critical Introduction and Guide*. [eBook] Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

¹⁰ And to me, it comes as no surprise that I shall at once think of Thoreau in the context of New England. Though, strictly speaking, New Englanders moved into Upstate New York after having settled first in

My proposal for the art residency outlined the motive for experimentation on site – taking into consideration, that is to say, expanding on the research proposition of Sonic Peripheries, which advocates a thinking-sound that, akin to Cage and other art-philosophers, seeks to explore 'theory-practice entanglements' - in other words, to conjoin philosophy and art practice in order to elaborate a genuine manner of working with sonic matter. "This kind of mannerism," I explained - the listening-in and -through sonic materiality, "is premised on questions this research pursues;" put here in very basic terms: it wants to find out "what happens when sound happens as an aesthetic force" in a sonic artwork context. Basic, albeit not simple. In the chapters preceding this one, facets of the earlier case studies and the research at large were discussed. Suffice to say now that the findings from the cases, the continuous evolve- and involvement with this (ad)venture led to what I refer to at present as 'perceptual mannerism' namely, a mode of invention that is an expression of thinking sonically qua writing and experimentation. Experimentation in the sense that I intent to push the limits of what sound can do – or put this way, how it comes into articulation through other media, other than itself (see esp. Part Three: Experiment 1).

This brings me to the what of *How is Nature*. The plan was, and still is to date, to work on a piece that combines writing with visual, i.e., diagrammatic approaches in correlation with field recording practice by which to problematize the notion of Nature. The term nature, especially with a capital N, holds all sorts of romantic ideas and lures – here I think of Thoreau and his musings:

Nature makes no noise. The howling storm, the rustling leaf, the pattering rain are no disturbances, there is an essential and unexplored harmony in them. [... N]ow I see the beauty and full

the six states of the northeastern United States: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Thoreau's seminal book *Walden* was inspired by his experience of living for some years amid woodland near Walden pond, an area located close to Concord, Massachusetts.

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meaning of that word 'sound'. Nature always possesses a certain sonorousness, as in the hum of insects, the booming of ice [...] which indicates her sound state. (*Journal 1*, pp. 12, 226–227) ¹¹

That said though: this project subscribes to a realism, say, a new materialism, which deviates from any form of romanticism (e.g., Emerson's American Transcendentalism). And precisely because of the pursuit of the *real* – not the ideal – it seems only apt to be embedded in an environment, such as the Catskills (to me, then, a quasi *Walden*) to cultivate contemplation, listening, making; to engage in the sonic ecology of the grounds. Also, in short, to encounter 'nature' in a bucolic rather than urban environs. I was interested in the site-specificity and the soundscape inscribed in this particular setting and envisaged to set out on numerous tasks/experiments that investigate the way sonic matter comes into expression, hence experience. What I hoped for was to encounter the 'great outdoors'; to explore an outside, something external to us that exceeds immediate apprehension – however, which can be intuited/imagined, sensuously/nonsensuously thought-felt by way of artistic-speculative manners of translation and transformation.

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¹¹ Bernd Herzogenrath in 'The 'Weather of Music'' (2009, pp. 217–218; italics in original) suggests that "Thoreau is exploring the audible world like a sound-archaeologist, carefully distinguishing 'sound' from 'music' [....] What Thoreau is pointing at is the fact that nature *itself* produces what one might call 'ambient sounds';" and continues that Thoreau's sensitivity for environmental sounds "heralds an avant-garde aesthetics in music," wielding influence on composers such as Charles Ives, Cage and John Luther Adams, among others. See Herzogenrath, B., 2009. The 'Weather of Music': Sounding Nature in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries. In B. Herzogenrath ed. *Deleuze|Guattari & Ecology*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 216–232.

¹² "American Transcendentalism is inextricably intertwined with the names Ralph Waldo Emerson and Thoreau. While Emerson's metaphysical and idealistic (in the sense of a Hegelian Idealism) brand of Transcendentalism made him the philosophical spokesman of the movement, his disciple Thoreau followed a much more materialist and 'physical' philosophy, without, however, completely casting off the Emersonian Metaphysics" (Herzogenrath 2009, p. 218).

Indeed, what I did encounter was a plethora of impressions; factual and imagined (on 'factual-fictional energies', see pp. 53–64), naturally present and others produced as artifice of nature in Nature.

Contrary to the saying, what you see is what you get, I propose, what you see is *not* what you get. More to the point: What you believe you see is an approximation of what you think-feel as you get to see *and* hear it (see Fig. 2). Consider this; and take a look (again) at Figure 1 followed by Figures 3, 4 (you may also follow the audio icon on p. 197 and listen) — then proceed from here.

The process started on a hunch; it's always a hunch. Though I did know that I wanted to work with visuals and field recording. I also knew that I wanted to further explore the relation of site to sound in connection with notions of surface-depth, concrete-abstract, sense-nonsense – something that was brought about in the collaborative effort with Academy Records, which I then continued to develop in the work on the chapter Experimenting: Sound/Non-Sound. And not to forget, another thing I knew: there was still a conceptual itch that needed scratching. (Does one ever forget an itch?; more on it below). In hindsight, the joy of this creative research lay in letting myself run wild – speculative-pragmatically, playful-fervently go beside one's self to anticipate that which lies beyond oneself. A purposeful purposelessness reenacted.



Figure 2

Looking at, out or about the window? (Cf. Kim-Cohen 2009, p. xvii). View out the studio skylight watching and listening to the rain.

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Invention lies in the encounter between forces, when lines of forces coalesce (Massumi 1992, 2002; Deleuze 1969/1990; Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1998), or put this way, when sets of potentials synergetically click together (Simondon 2009; Whitehead 1933/1967); that is,

For Whitehead, each taking-form involves 'the swing over from reenaction to anticipation' due to an 'intervening touch of mentality'. He speaks of the reenaction in terms very similar [to Gilbert] Simondon, as an 'energizing' of a given set of conditions inherited from the past. The swing-over to anticipation introduces novelty into the world. A taking-form 'arises as an effect facing its past', no sooner to turn away from its past to become 'a cause facing its future': a future cause. The snapping-to exemplified in the taking-effect of the operational solidarity (the 'subjective form' in Whitehead's vocabulary) of this new existence is the 'touch of mentality'. Whitehead also talks about this in terms of the passing of a quantum threshold consisting in the becoming of a qualitatively new existence. (Adventures of Ideas, pp. 192–194 as quoted in Massumi et al. 2009, pp. 41–42)

In the anticipation of a futurity subsists the moment of invention; the doing, 'the decision' – the cut-off point – where the occasioning goes either this or that way. It does *click*; *bang*!, energetically leaps from now to now and here to here-now. The quantum thing follows its own reason. There is no trajectory to speak of, no change, yet everything changes; *puff*. WOW. Surprise!, a pragmatic magics taking effect, the quantum threshold's been passed. Barad (2007) discusses quantum leaps as follows:

Quantum leaps aren't jumps (large or small) through space and time. An electron that 'leaps' from one orbital to another does not travel along some continuous trajectory from here-now to therethen. [...] What makes a quantum leap unlike any other is that there is no determinate answer to the question of where and when they happen. The point is that it is the intra-play of continuity and discontinuity, determinacy and indeterminacy, possibility and impossibility that constitutes the differential spacetimematterings of the world. (p. 182)

How does this fall into the creation of How is Nature? I will try to clarify this point, although the feeling of change, the pragmatic-magics that happen in artistic practice, is nearly impossible to relate. It is a matter of feeling, of firsthand experience; however, that which gets produced, namely the artwork itself bears the trace of this magical touch ... in fact, it will yield its own. "Art is simple but complex in this sense. [...I]t works on itself ... follows lines of enquiry, repeats certain moments, accelerates some motifs ... slows others down ... In so doing, art itself constitutes a world - its own world" - and so creates the conditions by which it may be 'read' and 'understood' (O'Sullivan 2014, n.p.; italics in original). Art's power lies in the differential spacetimematterings it constitutes; the alinear spatiotemporal formations that gestate in miraculous no-time – in this case, the types of soundspace that might leap into (and out) of existence; a worlding of its own. While on the subject, for Simondon, the philosopher of techno-aesthetics, "all transition, all change, all becoming, is quantum" (Massumi et al. 2009, p. 41). The quantum trick, say, is an invocation of something unforeheard and seen; and, until here-now, of occurrences unknown.¹³

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¹³ Let me briefly muse on Whitehead's take on the occasioning of taking-form, which, introduced above by Massumi, says, I repeat, "A taking-form 'arises as an effect facing its past', no sooner to turn away from its past to become 'a cause facing its future': a future cause" (Whitehead 1933/1967, p. 194 as quoted in Massumi et al. 2009, p. 41). This notion reminds me of Pauline Oliveros's site-specific

Bennett's Thoreau is a sculptor. I wonder if she'd agree on my being a 'carto-mytho-grapher'; a Pynchonesque character, if you like — an idiosyncrasy assumed for this offshoot case; producing maps, projecting lines of flight by which to trace unknown knowns, truly seeking for unknown unknowns. The carto-mytho-grapher's materials are leaves, flowers, graphite, paper, feathers, atmosphere, and sounds; her tools: field recorder, camera, intuition, imagination, hiking boots, and bug spray; her product – How is Nature – takes the form of an audiovisual assemblage, a kind of map, or diagram of points of suspension, "the 'pinning down' of a dynamic process" (O'Sullivan 2006, pp. 21-22). Sher Doruff in 'Artistic Res/Arch: The Propositional Experience of Mattering' writes, "it is the surprise encounter with unknown unknowns (what we don't know we don't know) that is the hinge of the potentiality, of the indeterminate contingencies of artistic research practice" (2010, p. 7; italics in original). The inventive search for the unexpected depends on the carto-mytho-grapher's intuit grip for the not yet – namely for "'a lure for feeling' that seduces an entity into its process of becoming, or that draws it into difference" (Whitehead 1929/1978 as guoted in

improvisational explorations of extreme acoustic spaces. Deep Listening (1988) was one such release by the composer/ musician - and other performers - recorded at the Fort Worden Cistern in Port Townsend, WA, on which she comments with regard to the forty-five second reverberation: "The sound is so well mirrored, so to speak, that it's hard to tell direct sound from the reflective sound. It puts you in the deep listening space. You're hearing the past, of the sound you made; you're continuing it, possibly, so you're right in the present, and you're anticipating the future, which is coming at you from the past. [...] So it puts you into the simultaneity of time, which is quite wonderful, but it's challenging to maintain it and stay concentrated. [...] The space itself becomes a very active partner in the creation" (as quoted in Ocean of Sound, pp. 248-249; emphasis added). In my view, Oliveros's account beautifully describes a taking-form of soundspace that comes into gestalt as sonic reflection of dis/similar temporalities - mirroring flows of presents, pasts, and futures' past. Soundspace, here, performs intricately folded, ever-specious present; and in reverberation, the processual situatedness energizes the in/determinate futurity's passage. This so-called propagation effect lets us discern the build-up of energy, a vibratory force that increases and endures, invigorating (causing) a mesh of enveloped material processes to resonate in quasi-unison. On Oliveros's practice of 'deep listening', see Toop, D. 1995. Ocean of Sound: Aether Talk, Ambient Sound and Imaginary Worlds. London: Serpent's Tail, pp. 242-250.

Shaviro 2009, p. 135). Which means, going back to the opening quote in this chapter, that, for example, the beauty of a flower presents a lure; it allures, or in Whiteheadian parlance, it presents a "proposition" which reveals a potentiality (1929/1978, pp. 186, 196–197).

That is to say, propositions are neither actual nor fictive; they are 'the tales that might be told about particular actualities', from a given perspective that enter into the construction [...] of that very perspective. As such, propositions are possible routes of actualization, vectors of nondeterministic change. [...] 'A proposition is an element in the objective lure proposed for feeling, and when admitted into feeling it constitutes what is felt' (ibid., pp. 256, 187 as quoted in Shaviro 2009, p. 3; italics in original).

Paraphrasing Shaviro (ibid.): the flower, stick and stone, foliage, or sound is not beautiful in itself; though, importantly, something happens to us when encountering the flower, stick and stone, foliage, or sound and we think-feel it to be beautiful. In aesthetic judgment, the carto-mytho-grapher tends to the lay of the land, surveying Nature — the harmonies (and disharmonies), rhythms, pulses, and affective tonalities inherent in its resonant spacetimemattering. The attitude taken on is not one of an adjudicator nor legislator; the carto-mytho-grapher, instead, becomes aesthetic contemplator, tunes into disinterested reverie, thus taking account of the semblance of rhythms and patterns immanent to a resonance of spaciousness 'in the act'; especially directing one's ear at the semblances specific to the experience of sonic artifacts is of interest — along with the manner in which sonic matter comes into expression.

Why the concern for beauty? Because beauty functions as a *proposition* and operates as a *lure for feeling*. It speaks of affect and singularity. It is an aesthetic experience where the surprise encounter effectuates the manner in which

novelty arises "from an act of positive decision" (Shaviro 2014, p. 39); 'surprise', however, here understood to designate an asubjective sensation contrary to an emotive attunement. Beauty to Whitehead is "a matter of differences that are conciliated, adapted to one another, and 'interwoven in patterned contrasts' in order to make for 'intense experience'" (1933/1967, pp. 252, 263 as quoted in ibid., p. 42). And beauty to the carto-mytho-grapher submits no definition; without question, she is taken by the sprawl of nature's doing - in the sense of being led by intuition to discover an unruliness that underlies the joy she felt when watching the poplar's sway and listening to the magicicadas' frenzy. 14 She recalls that after heavy rains the pensive force of beauty started to emerge; the repulsive smells, signs of rot and decay filled the air; and insects ... biting little beasts so unpleasant to the senses. Still - an experience of a life - beautiful on its own terms. As Thoreau said above, "the rustling leaf, the pattering rain are no disturbances, there is an essential and unexplored harmony in them" (Journal 1, p. 12); his notion of Nature "speaks to the idea that there always remains a surplus that escapes our categories and organizational practices, even as it is generated by them" (Bennett 2002, p. xxvii). For the carto-mytho-grapher, the wildness of Nature naturing is that which disturbs, confounds, and inspires the perceptual mannerism put to practice in the mapping and fabulation of How is Nature. 15 Lastly, Shaviro in The Universe of Things advocates that "beauty is

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¹⁴ For the curious, see Coin, G. 2016. Billions of 17-year cicadas to emerge in Eastern US, but in only one spot in NY. *Syracuse.com*. [Online] Available at: http://www.syracuse.com/weather/index. ssf/2016/04/billions_of_cicadas_to_emerge_in_northeast_but_only_in_one_spot_in_ny.html [Accessed: 26 May 2018].

¹⁵ Ronald Bogue's gloss on Deleuzian fabulation is quite instructive and helpful in placing what I mean by fabulation when employing the term. He writes: "In *What Is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari reiterate the notion that 'all fabulation is the fabrication of giants' (D & G 1994: 171), but they also extend the concept of fabulation by tying it to the fundamental aim of the arts – that of capturing the affects and percepts of sensation. Percepts are like landscapes in which the human being as subject no longer exists and yet remains diffused throughout the landscape; affects are intensities that traverse individuals and go beyond ordinary emotions and sensations. Percepts and affects exceed lived experience and our recollections of that experience. Thus, art's domain is 'not memory but

appropriate to a world of relations, in which entities continually affect and touch and interpenetrate one another;" and concludes his aesthetic considerations by posing questions relevant to this research:

I wonder, however, whether today, in the twenty-first century, we might be at the beginning of a major aesthetic revaluation. [...] Our predominant aesthetic procedures involve sampling, synthesizing, remixing, and cutting and pasting. In such a world, the aesthetic problem we face is Whitehead's [...;] it is a question of beauty and patterned contrasts [....] How can recycling issue into creativity and familiarity be transformed into novelty? Through what process of selection and decision is it possible to make something new out of the massive accumulation of already-existing materials? (2014, pp. 42, 43–44)

I am not here to answer his questions, I am here to chart possible vectors of indeterminate transformation, in/along which the carto-mytho-grapher is one 'conceptual persona' — a sojourner (*Verweilende*) and go-betweener, among others: "Fictive or real, animate or inanimate, our intercessors must be created. They come in series" (Deleuze 1995, p. 125 as quoted in Manning & Massumi 2014, p. 64); at Catwalk, this includes the ubiquitous hum of ACs, the intermittent train and whistle sounds ever so materializing out of nowhere; the chipmunks' curious staccato; the sonorous touch of humid air, wind, and raindrops

fabulation' (D & G 1994: 168). 'Creative fabulation has nothing to do with memory [...] In fact, the artist, including the novelist, goes beyond the perceptual states and the affective transitions of the lived. The artist is a seer, a becomer' (D & G 1994: 171). Fabulation, then, is one with the general artistic project of capturing percepts and affects via a general 'becoming'" (Bogue, p. 100). See Bogue, R. 2010. Fabulation. In A. Parr ed. *The Deleuze Dictionary Revised Edition*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 99–100.

on the canopy.¹⁶ What to do in the encounter with a strange place that captivates, stirs and concerns you? You go explore. Which brings us now to the prefigured conceptual itch (yes, not forgotten).

Conceptual itch?! The neologism doesn't mean much other than to imply that something is persistent enough to cause attention, even annoy at times. It demands attentiveness. Here it comes in the form of a problem in the Deleuzian sense, that is, as "something which forces thought and provokes responses or creative 'solutions'" (Schrimshaw 2012, n.p.). You might also read it as a query concerning the ontological status of sound to image (what you hear in relation to what you see) — if indeed, 'ontological' and 'status' are the words to be used here?; bearing in mind that ontology is the study of being. At this stage of our journey (the thesis) it should be evident that the sonic is neither-this-nor-that; not a thing as in tree, camera, hiking boots, or ... biting little beasts. And yet still sound is material which entails objective potential. That is to say, its ontogenetic force sets drums into vibration and brings walls tumbling down. Perhaps though there is an ontic difference to be considered in the sound-image constellation – alone the notion of image deserves further thought – but surely, the issue would go beyond the scope of this chapter. Rather, let us zoom in on an image, namely the picturesque landscape, the site-specifics of the environs present at Catwalk/Catskill Mountains. I will go into the details of the problem (conceptual itch) as it presented itself to me shortly.

As suggested in the part Introduction, the sonic occupies a space that sits between oppositions. Neither this nor that - a double negation that produces a

¹⁶ "The difference between conceptual personae and aesthetic figures consists first of all in this: the former are the powers of concepts, and the latter are the powers of affects and percepts. The former take effect on a plane of immanence that is an image of Thought-Being (noumenon), and the latter take effect on a plane of composition as image of a Universe (phenomenon). The great aesthetic figures of thought and the novel but also of painting, sculpture, and music produce affects that surpass ordinary affections and perceptions, just as concepts go beyond everyday opinions" (Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, p. 65). See Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. 1991/1994. What Is Philosophy? New York: Columbia University.


Part Four – How Nature Does

condition for paradoxical affirmation, which gives way to productive, aesthetic encounters; hence our interest in sound's occasioning as aesthetic force that brings to pass the unexpected. "The most we can say is that when forces appear as forces of the earth or of chaos, they are not grasped directly as forces but as reflected in relations between matter and form," say Deleuze and Guattari; and surmise that "it is more a question of thresholds of perception, or thresholds of discernibility belonging to given assemblages" (1980/1998, pp. 346-347; emphasis added). Forces can only truly be perceived by intuiting them; "that is, by grasping them without reference to a conceptual understanding of existence" (Stagoll 2010, p. 112). For them, music – for me, sonic art in general – does not reproduce the sonorous but renders forces sonorous, in other words, harnessing forces of the cosmos, universe, earth's Nature. Oscillating between matter and form (matter as it comes to matter); intuited/imagined as intensive force and sensuously/non-sensuously thought-felt as aesthetic figure through blocs of sensation. The images for us to consider next are Figures 3, 4 and audio example 20 as instances of the 'problem' - tingling conceptually and, to some degree, objectively – provoking the senses, exciting protean lines of thought.

As previously mentioned, I sought to explore the site-specific attributes of Catwalk grounds. Part of the investigation meant to do field recordings on site over the course of days in order to capture various acoustic atmospheres of the environs. This included an excursion to Catskill Mountains, hiking the Escarpment Trail via Mary's Glen, North Point, Sunset and Artist's Rock.¹⁷ (Fig. 4 shows audio equipment set in front of the waterfall at Mary's Glen.) Aside from sound

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¹⁷ This hiking trail is favored by the painters of the Hudson River School. Especially the outlook south along the eastern Catskill escarpment from the platform known as Sunset Rock gave inspiration to painters such as Thomas Cole (founder of the School) and his work titled *Catskill Mountain House: Four Elements*. Oil on canvas, 1843–44. See HRSAT: Sunset Rock n.d. *Hudson River School, Art Trail*. [Online] http://www.hudsonriverschool.org/trails/1/sites/7 [Accessed: 26 May 2018].





Figures 3 (top), 4

recordings, I took photographs of the landscape/s, especially close-ups of plant life and other natural occurrences, e.g., bodies of water – cascades and rain. Furthermore, I experimented with the so-called frottage technique (this drawing method was developed by the Surrealist artist Max Ernst who placed a sheet of paper on a surface to then rub over it with a soft pencil to capture its texture). I gathered materials – such as leaves, feathers, rocks, etc. – to trace the surface condition of the respective objects. What was I looking for? Or rather, what did I listen in and through? I was neither looking for nor listening to anything specific other than wanting to let intuition guide the way toward that which lies between matter and form. To think-feel my way along the perceptual path of what is seen and heard when middling with/in the event. I took delight in the allure of the acoustic and visual scenery on site – absolutely contrary to what I had expected. Though if asked what it was I did exactly anticipate, I should draw a blank; perhaps the notion of a virgin land and/or romantic ideas of a wilderness infused my thinking? – certainly, none of which was true. But no less, what I discovered were sites of in-betweenness as lures of patterned contrast intra-/intertwined with what's seen and heard conjured up by means of artistic practice and production.

On this view, I might argue that the itch has been scratched or the puzzle pieces have been put in place. Indeed the problematic I puzzled over, namely how to deal with/comprehend/judge the modal difference of experiences of what I see and I hear at a given moment was beside the point. That is to say, through the making of *How is Nature*, I grasped once more that artistic work does not afford a solution to a number of questions. Rather, art affords propositions as amalgamation of potentialities and actualities that gives way to "aesthetic delight" (Whitehead 1929/1978, p. 185). Here I follow Doruff's (2010) definition on artistic research. She writes that "framing is art's method of establishing a territory, of demarcating a fragment of chaos as sensation," putting forth that "[t]he emphasis here is on the experience of making as encounter. This is a kind of radical empiricism extolled by William James [... and Massumi's speculative

pragmatism, which] tends towards the experience of relational processes, every bit as real as its products;" and continues that creative research practice also always involves a *deframing* activity in order to "resonate with its milieu, its Umwelt, its ethico-aesthetic political situatedness, its participatory audience, to insure that its framed territory is a 'space contained or bounded but nonetheless always open to the chaos from which it draws its force'" (Grosz 2008, p. 20 as quoted in ibid., p. 8; italics in original). In conclusion, Doruff sums up her perceptive exposition on art as research with the statement:

Artistic research practice proposes to frame what is given in experience as a port of entry. It fields an opening as a creative affordance, composing a fragment of chaos to a scratch-like stuttering rhythm that in turn overflows its boundaries as a mattering, as a matter of concern. (2010, p. 11)

In this case, the emphasis lies on the space between, the experience of real-yet-abstract relations expressed as a result of 'scratch-like stutterings', the patterned contrasts intra-/intertwined with the affective tones and rhythms established by a plethora of impressions ... hear, see, taste, touch, smell ... think ... to and fro ... AND AND so forth ... frame one moment, deframe another. What remains and is given expression to is the middling between one 'thing' (e.g., feeling, thought, texture, sonorous quality) and some other. The incongruences that enliven our newly lived experiences through art (and artistic re/search) are matters of concern and facts. Massumi brings this to a point: "Art is about constructing artifacts – crafted facts of experience. The fact of the matter is that experiential potentials are brought to evolutionary expression" (2011, p. 57; italics in original). He then asks, "How can a framed picture presenting a fragment of a scene hold a wholeness of potential in it?;" and submits, "[b]y including what doesn't actually appear, but that is necessarily involved in the thinking-feeling of what does. A semblance is a form of inclusion of what exceeds the artifact's

actuality" (ibid., p. 58; see e.g. Fig. 3). The term semblance, as it is used here, refers to the rhythms and patterns immanent to a resonance of spaciousness in-act. In short, the residual thinking-feeling of sonic matter as it comes to matter. Semblances, thus, not only refer to instances specific to visual art or ocular phenomena but to sonic occasionings as well. It is worth quoting Massumi at length here to further elucidate this abstract force of life-likeness with an account of what Roland Barthes (1980/1981) terms 'punctum':

The punctum for Barthes is an affective force that makes the photo breathe with a feeling of life, a life, in all the singularity of its having had no choice but to follow the generic life path toward death in its own unique and unreproducible way. It's not about the content of the life per se or about psychological associations that a memento of it might arouse in the observer, it's not really even about grief. It's about the affective commotion of a direct, immediate, uncanny thinking-feeling of the dynamic quality of a life no more. (Massumi 2011, p. 57)

As an aside, Massumi in the above refers to *Camera Lucida*, Barthes study on photography. There Barthes describes the case of Lewis Powell who in 1865 was condemned to death for trying to assassinate the US Secretary of State W.H. Seward. Relevant to our purposes, I recommend that you take a look at Alexander Gardner's portrait of the conspirator. The uncanniness issuing forth from the photograph escapes any words, which – basically – encapsulates the affect-event of punctum – and sonic semblance at stake here.

¹⁸ See Rancière, J. 2011. *The Emancipated Spectator*. London: Verso, pp. 112–114. To view the photograph of Lewis Payne (aka Powell) visit Lewis Powell (conspirator). 2018. Wikipedia. [Online] Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lewis_Powell_(conspirator)&oldid=842812983 [Accessed: 26 May 2018].

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Echoing the above, I want to ask now: How can a field recording presenting a sequence of a sounding scene transmit a wholeness of potential in it? In a similar vein to Massumi, I propose that the affective quality of a recording we prehend as unfamiliar in the familiar is precisely that which draws us into the singularity of that scene. This in my view has little to do with the idea of documentary - as it was understood by the pioneers of the Acoustic Ecology movement.¹⁹ As I have argued elsewhere, field recording is site-nonspecific; 20 meaning, there is a nominal relation to place – a vibrational trace displaced and articulated apart from its place of origin - even then when the listener desires to envisage a mimetic real of site. Consider here audio example 18 on p. 175. I suggest that you concentrate on the first three tracks of the playlist (alternatively you could scan the respective QR codes as seen on pp. 215-228 and listen to the recordings via mobile device, as in phone or tablet PC).21 I refrain from 'reading' the field recordings; instead, I encourage to "a finding oneself in the unknown, an immersion in its specificity, a negotiation with its newness;" other than triggering the intellect which "render[s] the unknown known or knowable," intuition takes us into the heart of a unique event, enabling "the generation of a new series of impulses which may help modify our relations to the world" (Grosz 2004, p. 240). What we find is the affective clamor of Nature turn sonorous, a resonant spaciousness that is present in duration, a felt presence that enacts time. Not a time but temporalities in the making.

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¹⁹ 'Documentary' here to mean the practice of location recording and environmental advocacy, endorsed by R. Murray Schafer and the *World Soundscape Project* – today known as the *World Forum for Acoustic Ecology*.

²⁰ Klusmeyer, P. 2011. *Sonic Objecthood, Vibrational Force*. Unpublished essay.

²¹ The so-called Quick Response code or QR code is a type of matrix barcode that is a machine-readable optical label that contains information about the item to which it is attached; here it leads to an online audio archive.

Especially when listening to the third track, it seems as if we encountered an enclosed, yet distant space; large, undefined and somewhat emptied but none the less brimming with energy (take an empty bottle and blow across the top notice the resonance). We prehend a fluid, drone-like quality, a sonorous ambience caused by an uncongealed fusion of myriads of entwined frequencies that marks the start of the soundscape, i.e., track titled Untitled 3. It gives way to a vastness that is not necessarily recognizable as something we might know. However, the exercise is not to rehearse who-knows-what (though notice how prompt identification of what is being heard sets in) - rather, I want us to pay attention to how time 'feels', or more to the point, how temporalities come in and out of earshot; one temporality in the making overlapping another, as it were. Chronological time – parceled out into discrete intervals such as seconds, minutes, hours that can be quantified and measured – is thus suspended. We become attuned to flows, perhaps akin to a heterogeneous, qualitative, dis/continuous and to some degree interpenetrating movement of times: Temporal fabrics never inert but shifting heavy with mass like a wet ball of wool or light as the strand of silk floating across space. What we hear are sounds unknown yet known. Known unknowns arise from a scene that is enframed qua slice of time: beginning at zero moving onward to forty-seven seconds of recorded material. Even though the time frame is set, the temporalities disclosed in the field recording enact processually.

Special note should be made that R. Murray Schafer – composer, theorist, environmentalist – coined the term 'soundscape' as part of his advocacy for the study of acoustic environments in the 1970s onwards, inclusive of a prescription for a new kind of listening. Suffice it to say in regard to his programme that Schafer calls attention to the features of the soundscape, which he identified as "keynote sounds," "signals," and "soundmarks" (Schafer 1977/1994). Still relevant, the categories can be helpful in the general analysis of location recordings as they provide a vocabulary for the description of sonic events. For example, in

Untitled 3, we perceive an ambience, that is to say, we tune into the keynote sound, representing the 'acoustic backdrop' of the locale, "created by its geography and climate: water, wind, forests, plains, birds, insects and animals" (ibid., pp. 9–10). The 'dronesque ambience' of the soundscape sets the mood; presenting a slow-moving, luscious cluster of tones – microtones, overtones, combination tones – the result of the general environs and atmospheric pressure waves. By around twelve seconds into the recording – enticed by the flow, we indulge in its enigmatic undercurrent. What follows then is not a sudden interruption of that flow, but it appears that tonal figures 'lift off' and turn into signals and soundmarks – to use Schafer's terms. For instance, I discern the noise of far-off, rhythmic traffic and the cicadas' ocean-like swell. "Signals are foreground sounds and they are listened to consciously," writes Schafer in The Tuning of the World (1977/1994, p. 10). Similar to the notion of landmark, he considers soundmarks to be an essential part of a community's acoustic life (which deserves protection, according to Schafer and the Acoustic Ecology's socio-political agenda). With regard to Catwalk, I should think that the approaching and receding train and whistle sounds - mainly heard but rarely seen since the train tracks are mostly hidden from view – qualify as the regional soundmark.

Although of merit, a sonic typology is not of concern to this art project. This endeavor aspires to resonate with the Umwelt as it relates to the senses: sight, smell, hearing, taste, touch and what ising between (not 'is beyond'). The adventure lies with thinking-feeling sound as an aesthetic experience; to expand the limits of the sonic arts through the intervention and entanglement of other materials, other media, other concepts. The central theme of *How is Nature* pertains to the sites of in-betweenness and cares for the 'pinning down' of what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as "fuzzy aggregates" that are constituted by "vague and material essences" (1980/1998, p. 407; italics in original). This means we attend to the matter-movement, "the flow of matter in continuous variation, conveying singularities and traits of expression" (ibid., p. 406). Like the artisan in

A Thousand Plateaus "who is determined in such a way as to follow a flow of matter, a machinic phylum" — we, you/me now the carto-mytho-grapher determinedly follow a sonic phylum that fleetingly articulates into various intensities and affects: "[an] operative and expressive flow [which] is as much artificial as natural: it is like the unity of human beings and Nature" (ibid., pp. 409, 406; italics in original).²² Of interest to this project is to connect this fuzziness with 'resonant immediations' (see Fig. 1, pp. 88, 89ff) which occasion in aesthetic encounters: one, in the manner of art experimentation that produces artifacts and, two, in the encounter with those artifacts (artwork) that provoke untimely/ unthought experiences.²³ In what follows, we turn to the latter: meet the vagabond abstractions head-on in order to negotiate the how events come into matter-meaning. Here the question of time (kairos) takes primacy.

I have difficulty to think time, but I certainly can experience some sense of passage when listening to sounds. Sound happens in 'duration', or rather lifts off that 'groundless ground of being'. The term *duration* is Henri Bergson's and is used by both Whitehead and Deleuze. It stands for "the lived movement of temporality [...,] the creative dynamism and indivisible movement of 'the time of life'" (Robinson 2009, p. 224).²⁴ Therefore, duration is the underlying means for

²² "We will call an *assemblage* every constellation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow [here, the sonic phylum] – selected, organized, stratified – in such a way as to converge (consistency) artificially and naturally; an assemblage in that sense, is a veritable invention" (Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1998, p. 406; italics in original). Deleuze G. & Guattari F. 1980/1998. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

²³ "To follow the flow of matter is to itinerate, to ambulate. *It is intuition in action*" (Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1998, p. 409; emphasis added). The fifty-one cards (works on paper) might assume the function of a map, enabling 'intuition in action' along the lines of flight, thus following the clairaudient/voyant directives ('the topographies of ragged edges and chalky surface texture') to access what I call elsewhere 'intuit-immediacy' – the quasi-presence of a sonorous event in its be/coming-into fugacious expression.

²⁴ Elizabeth Grosz (2005, p. 4) similar to Keith Robinson's gloss describes the Bergsonian 'duration' as follows: "Duration is the 'field' in which difference lives and plays itself out. Duration is that which

sounds to actualize in the form of soundspace; or to put it another way, through sonic individuation temporalities provisionally take shape. I further suggest that the process works reciprocally where the type of soundspace defines how temporalities unfold. As aforementioned, quantum leaps take precedence in microscopic processes and constitute the differential spacetimematterings. The 'quantum trick' — as it were — is an invocation of something unforeheard and seen and hitherto of occurrences unknown. Hence, the cunning next act will be to articulate the inarticulable as well as to summon images for the imageless. (And why not let art work its magic? Trace the spectral occurrences! Probe into the sounds, the cards, the lines, the maps — the diagrammatics of *How is Nature*.)

Considering audio examples 18 (note: entire playlist) – the field recordings introduced earlier – I seek to describe sui generis temporal formations that yield soundspace and a perch for sonic objecthood. Here, I want to contemplate the relation of the singularity of a recorded scene-site-situation and conclude this chapter on the *marking* of temporalities in the ap/prehension of soundspace (or soundscape) in the making.

To proceed from here, I shall call on the term kairos and undertake a short excursus into its meaning.²⁵ The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines

undoes as well as what makes: to the extent that duration entails an open future, it involves the fracturing and opening up of the past and the present to what is virtual in them, to what in them differs from the actual, to what in them can bring forth the new." See Grosz, E. 2005. Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecoming. *Parallax*, 11(2), 4–13.

²⁵ What follows in this excursus is my attempt to delineate a partial view of the meaning of *kairos* in order to then conceptualize a kairotic instant in relation to aesthetic encounters and the singularity of the 'more-than'. As Thomas Rickert notes: "the meaning of the Greek word *kairos* is itself murky because of its many and varied usages (Rickert 2013, p. 75). He further mentions Eric C. White (author of *Kaironomia*) who considers kairos to "[stand] for precisely the irrational novelty of the moment that escapes formalization" (White 1987, p. 20); and quotes William H. Race (Classics scholar) who considers the term "elusive" (as quoted in Rickert 2013, p. 75). In my search for the meaning of the term, I have come across several publications, which have helped in developing my understanding of its historical and contemporary sense – that is, mainly in the context of English rhetoric but also, and importantly, artistic practices. Here are my main sources in random order:

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the word as "the propitious moment for the performance of an action or the coming into being of a new state" and also "fullness of time" — etymologically speaking, and as the OED has it, the Ancient Greek $\kappa\alpha\iota\rho\dot{o}\varsigma$ (kairos) alludes to the "right or proper time." ²⁶ Besides affording temporal connotations, the term suggests a movement or marks a force as Deborah Hawhee puts forward in 'Kairotic Encounters' (2002). She draws on the mythical figure Kairos in order to

Cassin, B. et al. eds. 2014. Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon. [eBook] Princeton: Princeton University Press. (See especially entries on Moment/Momentum/Instant and, in contrast, Aiôn); Rickert, T. 2013. Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; White, E.C. 1987. Kaironomia: On the Will-to-Invent. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Hawhee, D. 2002. Kairotic Encounters. In J. Atwill & J.M. Lauer eds. Perspectives on Rhetorical Intentention. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, pp. 16-35; Muckelbauer, J. 2009. The Future of Invention: Rhetoric, Postmodernism, and the Problem of Change. Albany: SUNY Press; Cocker, E. 2015. Kairos Time: The Performativity of Timing and Timeliness ... or; Between Biding One's Time and Knowing When to Act. In 1st PARSE Biennial Research Conference on TIME, Faculty of Fine, Applied and Performing Arts, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. NTU IRep. [Online] Available at: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/27462/ [Accessed: 27 May 2018]. O'Sullivan, S. 2006. Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation. New York: Palgrave; O'Sullivan, S. 2012. On the Production of Subjectivity: Five Diagrams of the Finite-Infinite Relation. New York: Palgrave. Negri, A. 2003. Time for Revolution. New York: Continuum. The following references relate to the viable/ possible similarities between kairos and 'the Untimley' (and Aion): Deleuze, G. 1969/1990. The Logic of Sense. London: The Athlone Press; Deleuze G. & Guattari F. 1980/1998. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Grosz, E. 2004. The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely. Durham: Duke University Press; Nietzsche, F. 2007. On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. In D. Breazeale ed. Nietzsche: Untimely Meditations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-123; Leston, R. 2013. Unhinged: Kairos and the Invention of the Untimely. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 21(1), 29-50; Boque, R. 2010. The Concept of Fabulation. In Deleuzian Fabulation and the Scars of History. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 14-48; Deleuze, G. 1968/1994 Difference and Repetition. New York: Columbia University Press. In the latter Deleuze writes: "[...] we must condense all the singularities, precipitate all the circumstances, points of fusion, congelation or condensation in a sublime occasion, Kairos, which makes the solution explode like something abrupt, brutal and revolutionary" (Deleuze 1968/1994, p. 190).

²⁶ Deborah Hahwee remarks that "kairos does not have a direct English equivalent. Most frequently translated as 'exact or critical time, season, opportunity', kairos marks the quality of time rather than time's quantity" (2002, p. 18).

conceptualize what she calls "invention-in-the-middle," a rhetorical stance, which is a "kairotic movement" understood as "simultaneous extending outward and folding back," occurring in the realm of the middle from where a provisional subject and object emerges (Hawhee 2002, p. 19). Briefly, in terms of the mythfigure: the god Kairos "epitomizes decision- and incision-making in that he is usually depicted bearing scales and razor blades, tools for measuring and cutting as well as for being measured and cut" (ibid., p. 25). Central to this image is the (rhetoric) performance of steadi- and readiness: "Kairos must remain in the middle, ever ready for a moment of intervention," therefore prepared to intervene (mark) 'in the nick of time' and invent (make) 'at the spur of the moment' (ibid.). In that sense, kairos "mediates – or goes 'between' – the outside of the self, i.e., the nodes where 'self' encounters the world, and the discourse or the 'other' that the self encounters" (ibid.). Hawhee's notion of invention-in-the middle invokes the Deleuzian 'au milieu' (in the middle): "Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but [...] a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, [...] a stream without beginning or end that [...] picks up speed in the middle" (A Thousand Plateaus, p. 25; italics in original). Kairos, a rhizomatic movement? Her linking kairos to a material force - a matter-movement speeding up or slowing down, alwaysalready in-between - produces an emergent becoming that lies beyond the control of self, and advocates a kairotic encounter that exceeds the orginary spatiotemporal usage of the term. (Hence the myth-god of Opportunity turns actionfigure of The Wild – in no time.)

The issue here is that I seek to give articulation to the temporal point at the edge of the in/finite (see Part One: Aesthetic Encounter, pp. 66–68). The difficulty, however, is, and has been throughout, that an 'elusive *momentum*' appears hard to catch and evades quick — or any — formalization. In the chapter Research Into Sonic Art Practices of Part Two, the focus lay on Hannah Klatt's query of following the lines — 'What are these lines?' — which in return bore so-

called fugacious expression. Now we are led by another quest, namely by the quixotic task of *pinning down* the quantum leaps of invention. And this is why we look to the kairotic instant as that which "does not name a time as such, but rather an orientation and attitude, perhaps best characterized as a certain restlessness and opening out to the 'to-come'" (O'Sullivan 2012, p. 119).²⁷ Here following Simon O'Sullivan's lead (pace Antonio Negri), I too wonder whether *kairos* is "a passage into the virtual" (ibid., p. 120). Because it is at the time or rather locus of incipience — what Massumi calls the 'seeping edge' — when "that which is immanent to experience (affect) becomes conceptualised within experience (specifically with language)" (O'Sullivan 2006, p. 191; see Massumi 2002, pp. 23–45). This then brings me back to the above concern: to explore the connection between the singularity of a recorded scene (field recording) and the marking and the *marking* of temporalities.

It is of import at this point to recall that my interest links to Massumi's concept of semblance, i.e., his discussion of art's means to construct artifacts — "crafted facts of experience" (Massumi 2011, p. 57; italics in original). Earlier in this chapter, we briefly looked to Massumi's example of a framed picture which holds a wholeness of potential in it by involving an affective quality necessary for the 'arcane' experience (or punctum) to seep up. It is again the more-than to which we come; that is to say, to relate the notion of kairotic instant to the singularity of the more-than in aesthetic encounters. How is Nature operates precisely "at that 'seeping edge' between the existing states of affairs and a world 'yet-to-come'. [... T]his is not to position art as transcendent, for as we have seen the ontological coordinates of the actual and the virtual operate 'within' immanence (within this world)" (O'Sullivan 2006, p. 105) What arises (actualizes) from the infinite (virtual) affords a sense of significance, i.e., a qualitative difference that is hard to pin down but is nevertheless felt as affirmative attunement in

²⁷ This will be of interest to us shortly, namely that O'Sullivan (2012) suggests that "this time – of the event – is not dissimilar to Deleuze's own ideas of the 'untimely'" (p. 199). See also footnote 31.

the occasioning of a situatedness. Which is then to say that the sonorous-vibrant quality of a recording, namely that which we intuit as the unfamiliar in the familiar, is that which draws us into the singularity of a sonic occurrence as it concurrently extends outward and folds back in the blink of an eye/ear. It lies, paradoxically, with/in the blink of an eye and ear - in the 'quantum interstice' of what's seen and heard, in the 'no-where' and 'now-here' of vision and audition that we can anticipate the event's more-than to emerge in thought-micro-perceptions, resonant at the fringes of cognition.²⁸ How is Nature presents us with a case to study those vaporlike occurrences that impinge on the body, jutting out from the works on paper like an affect-projectile that "rises from a scene, shoots out of it" - "pricks" and "bruises" the beholder of the cards in conjunction with the soundscapes: image and sound (not one or the other) as crafted facts of experience. (Note that the just mentioned quotations stem from Barthes [1980/ 1981, pp. 26, 27] who comments on the nature of punctum concerning photographic images. Regardless, his observations are relevant to our case since the force discussed subsists in the qualitative dimension perceived as strangely painfully or sublimely – anew, though, coming from what is always-already there. Call it rejig at first sight; or punctum; or semblance [Langer 1953; Massumi 2011] and beauty [Shaviro 2009] – what these concepts have in common is the impact that is thought felt in aesthetic encounters.) Next, to conclude this discussion on

²⁸ The next passage from Deleuze (1968/2001) elucidates the notion of the 'no-where' and 'now-here': "Following Nietzsche we discover, as more profound than time and eternity, the untimely: philosophy is neither a philosophy of history, nor a philosophy of the eternal, but untimely, always and only untimely – that is to say, 'acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come'. Following Samuel Butler, we discover *Erewhon*, signifying at once the originary 'nowhere' and the displaced, disguised, modified and always re-created 'here-and-now'. Neither empirical particularities nor abstract universals: a Cogito for a dissolved self. We believe in a world in which individuations are impersonal, and singularities are pre-individual: the splendour of the pronoun 'one' – whence the science-fiction aspect, which necessarily derives from this *Erewhon*" (p. xxi). See Deleuze, G. 1968/2001. *Difference and Repetition*. New York: Continuum.

the nascent concept of kairotic instant as critical orientation facing the 'to-come', we will turn to Thoreau one more time.

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Feb. 2. [1841] Tuesday. It is easy to repeat, but hard to originate. Nature is readily made to repeat herself in a thousand forms, and in the daguerreotype her own light is amanuensis, and the picture too has more than a surface significance, — a depth equal to the prospect, — so that the microscope may be applied to the one as the spy-glass to the other. Thus we may easily multiply the forms of the outward; but to give the within outwardness, that is not easy.

That an impression may be taken, perfect stillness, though but for an instant, is necessary. There is something analogous in the birth of all rhymes.

Our sympathy is a gift whose value we can never know, nor when we impart it. The instant of communion is when, for the least point of time, we cease to oscillate, and coincide in rest by as fine a point as a star pierces the firmament. (Thoreau 1906, p. 189; italics in original)

Not a daguerreotype but an audiovisual piece of fifty-one 4 x 2 1/4 inches cards and fourteen field recordings that reflects Nature as nature diffracts itself onto the paper-graphite-material and into the encoded audio signals (see Postscript chapter on daguerreotypes and future fabulation). As we scrutinize each card and listen – both at once – we look at and hear towards Nature's fictioning: "Nature writes," Barad infers; it "scribbles, experiments, calculates, thinks, breathes and laughs" (2010, p. 268n11). And it inscribes its meaning as mattering: "a process of coming-to-meaning across the human/nonhuman, organic/inorganic divide"

(Sheldon 2016, n.p.). The carto-mytho-grapher picks up the spy-glass — just in time — to listen, see, and ruminate *kairos* ... "becoming everybody/everything [...] eliminate everything that exceeds the moment, but put in everything that it includes — and the moment is not the instantaneous, it is the haecceity ['thisness'] into which one slips" (Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1998, pp. 279—280; italics in original). MATTER COMES TO MATTER COMES TO MATTER: "[B]ecomings cut across distinctions between the mental and the material, the human and the nonhuman, culture and nature. Indeed, becomings are evident throughout nature" (Bogue 2010, p. 21). Incorporeals are produced by the material inter/intra-action of bodies or entities. They are the sonic and ocular effects that 'rise from a scene' — 'prick' and entrain the listener-beholder-sojourner in the instant of *kairos* ('for the least point of time, we cease to oscillate, and coincide in rest by as fine a point as a star pierces the firmament'). ²⁹ (See also Part Three: Experiment 1.)

²⁹ "Deleuze claims that while states of affairs have the temporality of the living present, the incorporeal events of sense are infinitives (to shine, to be the sun) that constitute pure becomings with the temporality of aion - a form of time independent of matter that always eludes the present" (Lorraine 2010, p. 130). The concept of kairos and the kairotic instant as it is developed here displays certain affinities to the Deleuzian aion while differing in nuance, namely that kairos does not name a time as such, but rather an orientation 'to-and-fro', a kairotic movement dependent on iterative re/configurations of matter as generative production of new paradigms of subjectivity: "subjectivity is not something that subsists: it is - on the contrary - produced by kairos [....] Subjectivity is not before but after kairos" (Negri as quoted in O'Sullivan 2012, p. 121). Mind that 'dependent' on matter should not read as if kairos were congruent with 'chronos', where "the present is in some manner corporeal" (Logic of Sense, p. 162). Indeed, as O'Sullivan (2012) suggests: kairos could be conceived as a passage into the virtual, which, to me, aligns with the idea of quantum leaps. The kairotic instant - not only understood as 'the propitious moment for the performance of an action or the coming into being of a new state' but as a creative leap that 'passes' in the nonmathematizable instant. An action perhaps just as "queer" as Barad (2007), Barad et al. (2012) consider the occasioning of quantum leaps; 'the moment is not the instantaneous, it is the haecceity' - an individuation takes place via thisness. And here/there the kairotic momentum 'steps in' (the action-figure Kairos) opening out the 'to-come', affording innovation qua intervention. See Lorraine, T. 2010. Incorporeal. In A. Parr ed. The Deleuze Dictionary Revised Edition. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 130-131; O'Sullivan, S. 2012. On the Production of Subjectivity: Five Diagrams of the Finite-Infinite Relation. New York:

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Similar to a daguerreotype, the assemblage of cards and sounds invoke a spectral quality, "sucking away the time frame" (Palmer 2016).³⁰ Perhaps no longer a temporality but a kind of a atmosphere that beguiles and affects, and which undoes any notion of a here-now to there-then. *Time's sucked away* – hence negated when understood to mean that past, present, and future are of the same temporality wherein the present originates time (De Beistegui 2012, p. 70). On this view, time is the Untimely, "neither temporal nor eternal," that is to say, "acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come" (Deleuze 1968/2001, p. xxi).³¹ I suggest that *the benefit of a time to-come* inheres in *kairos* as the atmosphered (*attitudinal*) creative leap that comes from nowhere and goes nowhere. For example, when listening to tracks eight through eleven (i.e., Untitled 8–11) we are lured by a multiverse of sounds coupled with the impressions (on our retina) of graphite-tracings-and-dust covering the plane of cards: ScreeEEEEchh KaBOOM! In aesthetic experience, we inevitably take quantum leaps. (We come face to face with

Palgrave Macmillan; Barad, K. 2007. *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning*. Durham: Duke University Press; Barad, K. et al. 2012. Intra-active entanglements – An interview with Karen Barad. *Kvinder, Køn & Forskning*, NR. 1-2, 10–23.

³⁰ During a studio visit, Purcell Palmer proprietor of Catwalk grounds and director of Catwalk Institute, commented on the work, comparing the effect it has to that of a daguerreotype, saying: "the time frame gets sucked away." This remark might be owed in part to the chalky (spectral) surface texture of the works on paper, but then her spontaneous response came about as she listened to the field recordings as she viewed the set of cards (as seen in Fig. 5) – therefore stands in relation to the soundscapes.

³¹ In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze discusses Nietzsche's conception of 'the Untimely', which is of interest to us: "the Untimely, which is another name for haecceity, becoming, the innocence of becoming (in other words, forgetting as opposed to memory, geography as opposed to history, the map as opposed to the tracing, the rhizome as opposed to arborescence). 'The unhistorical is like an atmosphere within which alone life can germinate and with the destruction of which it must vanish. [...]' Creations are like mutant abstract lines that have detached themselves from the task of representing a world, precisely because they assemble a new type of reality that history can only recontain or relocate in punctual systems" (Nietzsche as quoted in 1980/1998, p. 296).

Kairos, now god of The Wild, whoOSH points to the field of an in/determinate future and past.) A pragmatic magics' taken effect! Just-now!; we encountered the vagabond abstractions, the incorporeal effects, say, "sound effects" in the event's own worlding (Logic of Sense, pp. 7, 70). The allure lies within the quantum interstice – the resonant immediations – since it emphasizes "the non-linearity of the time of the event [...] time's affective force, in the event. This affective force is laden with both pastness and futurity, but in a way that is singularly active in the now of experience" (Brunner 2013, p. 136).

Time is a matter of an inexhaustible dynamism of the folding and unfolding (enfolding) of mattering (Barad 2007). Neither a past nor a future, "but 'past' and 'future' are iteratively reconfigured and enfolded through the world's ongoing intra-activity. There is no inherently determinate relationship between past, present, and future" (Barad as quoted in Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2012, p. 66). There lies art's power: in the affective nowness (the singularity); in the differential spacetimematterings it constitutes, that is, the alinear spatiotemporal formations that gestate in miraculous 'no-time' – in our case, the types of soundspace that guiver at the edge of experience. In the anticipation of a futurity to re/configure subsists the moment of invention; the doing, the cut-off point – the ma(r)king of temporalities (and spatialities). What we will find is the affective clamor of Nature turn sonorous, a resonant spaciousness felt in its presencing, enacting time. Thus not a time 'as such' but temporalities in the making, marking sonic occurrence from the flux of haecceities: a gush of wind, the rushing water; "perfect stillness, though but for an instant, is necessary. There is something analogous in the birth of all rhymes" (Thoreau 1906, p. 189).



Figure 5
Snapshot of *How is Nature* – work in progress; cards laid out on the grand piano in the Catwalk studio.

EXPERIMENT 2

An Event.
Image, Sound, Writing.
Works in progress (process).







