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Analogy, technical reason, and living beings: the role of analogy in representing Kant's concept of naturzweck

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Citation
Terra Polanco, M. C. (2019, May 16). *Analogy, technical reason, and living beings: the role of analogy in representing Kant's concept of naturzweck*. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/73420

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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

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Title: Analogy, technical reason, and living beings: the role of analogy in representing Kant's concept of naturzweck
Issue Date: 2019-05-16

Chapter 3: Kant's Critical Concept of Analogy

As mentioned at the end of chapter 2, Kant's "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment", and more specifically, Kant's concept of natural end (*Naturzweck*), can only be fully understood by means of the analogies—and disanalogies—invoked by Kant throughout the second part of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Before interpreting and systematizing the role of analogical reflection for the formation of the concept of *Naturzweck*, it is indispensable to determine, in the first place, what Kant understands by analogy, and what kind of analogies he distinguishes; and, in the second place, what kind of conception of analogy operates within the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment". Analogy is indeed a technical term within Kantian philosophy and, as such, it has its special functions and peculiarities, as well as its own distinctions and different uses. For that reason, this chapter is devoted to distinguishing the different types of analogy that we can find in Kant's critical writings and especially in the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment".

Even though "Kant is merely following a tradition that viewed analogy as a valid (though limited) means of inquiry and discovery"[89], there is no doubt that Kantian theory of analogy provided an interesting and novel account, at least regarding the Analogies of Experience and symbolic representation. That is to say, he is more or less following the tradition when he bases the philosophical analogy on the mathematical analogy of proportion, or when he groups analogy as a form of inferior inference of the reflective power of judgment[90]. But he is also elaborating a new way of thinking analogy when he

[89] "Kant on Analogy" (Callanan 2008, 749). In this paper, Callanan states (with good reasons) that this tradition has its root in Aristotelian logic, and that Early Modern philosophers and scientists explicitly related analogy to induction, that is, as a way to move from the particular to the universal. As Callanan explains: "Induction and analogy had been traditionally pained within Aristotelian logic and Bacon is the first to recover the notion within the 'new' science. In book II of the *Novum Organum* he states: 'Substitution by analogy is certainly useful but less sure, and therefore must be used with some discretion. It occurs when a non-sensible thing is brought before the senses, not by sensible activity on the part of the insensible substance itself, but by observation of a related sensible body'" (2008, 749). Newton and Locke also recover analogy as a form to improve and extend our knowledge, but they both state that analogy must be used with caution and discretion. The works of Mary Hesse (1966) and Daniel Whistler (2013) are also very enlightening for the accounting of analogy in both Modern philosophy and science.

[90] One can even state that Kant is ambivalent regarding analogy (at least in its logical use), since he understands analogy as a form of inferior reasoning of the reflective power of judgment, but, at the same time, he highlights its relevance for extending our empirical cognition. As Nassar clearly says: "After all, Kant was not entirely critical of analogy, and often emphasized its significance. Not only in his precritical *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755), but also throughout his lectures on logic (1770-1800) and the three *Critiques*, Kant uses analogy and describes it as a necessary for the 'expansion' of cognition. Thus, although Kant expressed caution toward analogy, he was also aware of its usefulness,

introduces symbolic representation as a form of analogical procedure, by which we can indirectly present the supersensible ideas of reason. Symbolic representation (or symbolic analogy) is, perhaps, the major contribution of Kant's theory of analogy as a form of indirect presentation (*Darstellung*)[91]. Accordingly, this chapter will mainly be a systematization of Kant's Critical different conceptions of analogy, in order to clarify what kind of analogical procedure is at stake throughout the Teleological Judgment. To carry this out, this chapter is divided into five sections.

The first section (3.1) consists in a brief account of the first distinction to bear in mind when studying Kant's conception of analogy, namely, that between mathematical and philosophical analogy. This distinction is crucial, because even though philosophical analogies are based on the mathematical analogy of proportion, Kant emphasizes that philosophical analogy represents something completely different from mathematical analogy (KrV, A179/B222). Moreover, Analogies of Experience as well as symbolic representation are derived from philosophical analogies. Therefore, the distinction between mathematical and philosophical analogies is ineludible as a first stage of Kant's theory of analogy.

The second section (3.2) explores one of the most relevant aspects of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, namely: Analogies of Experience. This section, therefore, is a brief account and description of those three analogies of experience. Analogies of Experience, as a type of philosophical analogy, are crucial for the Kantian system, inasmuch as they provide a necessary unity of our perceptions in time, something indispensable for enabling possible experience. The analogies of experience, however, represent only a part—although extremely relevant—of Kant's conception of philosophical analogy; the other two philosophical analogies are analogy as a mode of inference of the reflective power of judgment and symbolic analogy. Accordingly, section

indeed of its necessity. As he puts it in the 'Hechsel Logic', without analogy, 'what are we do?'" (2015, 242). A recent account of the role of analogy for natural science can be found in van den Berg (2017). Van den Berg states that Kant has a critical view of the use of analogy for science and biology, a view that was justified for a long-standing modern tradition critical of the role of analogy in science: "Kant stemmed from a tradition that did not assign analogical arguments an important justificatory role in natural science. According to this tradition, analogy should be used sparingly in science and is subordinated to proper scientific explanations conceptualized as deductive (syllogistic) demonstrations from fundamental principles" (2).

[91] One may say that Analogies of Experience are the main philosophical contribution of Kant regarding analogy. But whereas Analogies of experience are crucial for the Kantian Critical system inasmuch as they constitute experience itself (KrV, B219), symbolic analogy is relevant for bringing to presentation (at least indirectly) what lies beyond experience, i.e. ideas of reason.

three of this chapter (3.3) deals with analogy as a mode of inferior reasoning (or inference), which, together with induction, pertains to the reflective power of judgment. In his lectures on logic, Kant states that analogy is a mode of inference that proceeds from the particular to universal in order to expand our empirical cognition. In this sense, analogy is a very useful tool for extending our cognition by experience, but Kant warns us that we must use analogical inference with caution and care (Logik, AA IX, 133). On the other hand, the fourth section (3.4) is devoted to symbolic representation, a type of analogical procedure that Kant introduces in §59 ("Beauty as a symbol of morality") of the Aesthetic Judgment in the third *Critique*. As mentioned above, symbolic representation is, maybe, the most interesting Kantian contribution regarding analogy. This section will describe and analyze the role of the symbol for presenting in an indirect manner what lies beyond any intuition, namely, the ideas of reason. Finally, the fifth section (3.5) of this chapter is about the type of analogy that is at stake in the Teleological Judgment. That is to say, this last section will mainly be an answer to the question: What kind of analogical thought is operating when Kant invokes a "remote analogy" in order to illuminate the concept of natural end? Is it a symbolic analogy, just as it is described in §59 of the Aesthetic Judgment? At the end of this chapter, we would be able to better understand not only Kant's conception of analogy and its different features, but most importantly, the type of analogical reflection that Kant uses throughout the Teleological Judgment.

3.1. - Mathematical analogy and philosophical analogy

Even though analogy is present throughout Kantian writings, his conception of analogy has a richer development starting from his critical period, especially in his lectures on logic (1770s-80s), the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Prolegomena* and the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. In these writings, Kant develops his technical conception of analogy by means of a capital distinction, namely, Analogies of Experience and symbolic representation (or symbolic analogy[92]). The most general definition of analogy that we can find in Kant's critical works is present in the *Prolegomena*, where Kant defines

[92] The name "symbolic analogy" is not specifically used by Kant for referring to symbolic representation, but I will use the expression because it condenses in a very clear way one of the types of reasoning that the reflective faculty of judgment has. Moreover, it is used by some commentators, such as Pringe (2007, 2014), and Di Sanza (2010).

analogy as "a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things" (*Prol*. AA IV, 357-8). This definition of analogy rests, in turn, on a previous differentiation of two forms of analogy, which correspond to mathematical and philosophical analogies. Both types of analogy offer different forms of identity between a relation of four members, where three of them are already given and the fourth is missing or unknown. The difference between these two forms of identity is crucial for Kant, because "[i]n philosophy analogies signify something very different from what they represent in mathematics" (KrV, A179/B222). This difference consists in two aspects: i) mathematical analogies have a quantitative relation of identity, whereas philosophical analogies have a qualitative relation of identity; and ii) the mathematical analogies are constitutive, whereas philosophical analogies are always regulative. Let us see in what this twofold difference consists, which is the starting point for understanding Kant's conception of philosophical analogy.

Mathematical analogies "are formulas that assert the identity of two relations of magnitude, and are always constitutive, so that if three members of the proportion are given the fourth is also thereby given, i.e., can be constructed" (A179/B222). This definition of mathematical analogy correspond to the mathematical relation of proportion, e.g., a:b::b:x, in which we must *construct* the fourth unknown member, that is, "x". In this operation, the unknown member "x" is, according to Kant, *constituted a priori* by construction. Moreover, the relation in mathematical analogy is quantitative, which means that the different members of the analogy are to some extent homogeneous to each other and the relation can be thus constructed (and constituted[93]) *a priori*.

Philosophical analogy, however, has a qualitative nature, that is, a relation between elements that are heterogeneous to each other. As Kant puts it: "[philosophical] analogy is not the identity of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations, where from three given members I can cognize and give a priori only the relation to a fourth member but not this fourth member itself" (A179-80/B222). That is to say, philosophical analogy

[93] Callanan explains why some principles of the understanding are actually constitutive unlike regulative principles: "Constitutive principles of the understanding are therefore those rules of combination of the manifold by composition (composition), in that they are based on the basic uniformity and homogeneity of all appearances in their characteristics (of extensive and intensive magnitude). One reason why they can be called 'constitutive' is that, as will be seen, they are the fundamental rules of the *construction* of the possibility of appearances; that is, when appearances are considered at their most basic level of uniformity" (2008, 758). Even though this explanation is referred to constitutive principles of the understanding, we can apply it to mathematical analogies inasmuch as they construct a *constitutive* relation of things.

does not construct *a priori* the unknown member of the relation, but rather it provides "a rule for seeking it [the unknown member] in experience and a mark for discovering it there" (A179-80/B222).

In short, whereas mathematical analogies have a *constitutive* role that determines the unknown member, philosophical analogies have a *regulative* role for unifying the manifold and to discover (or to infer) the missing member in experience. As Dalia Nassar suggests: "in philosophy, analogy is useful for discovering the fourth [unknown] element, while in mathematics analogy can construct it. The philosophical use of analogy thus specifically pertains to the empirical work of investigating, rather than deriving from *a priori* principles" (2015, 244). This empirical work of inferring or discovering the unknown element is crucial for understanding the Kantian conception of philosophical analogy in both its versions: analogies of experience and symbolic representation (or symbolic analogy).

3.2. - Philosophical Analogies of Experience

Kant's conception of analogy contains not only the distinction between mathematical and philosophical analogies (that is, the distinction between quantitative and qualitative relations, respectively), but also a crucial distinction within philosophical analogy itself, namely, analogies of experience and symbolic analogy. We can find in both forms of philosophical analogies the distinctive contribution of the Kantian theory of analogy. The main difference between both types of philosophical analogies is quite relevant though, and it lies in asking whether the fourth member of the relation can be considered an object of possible experience[94] or not. The analogies of experience can be grouped as a relation of identity in which the fourth unknown member is an object of possible experience (i.e., it can be intuited); a symbolic analogy, however, represents a relation in that the fourth member lies beyond possible experience.

Kant's treatment of analogies of experience is specially carried out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the section called, precisely, "Analogies of Experience". For Kant, an

[94] As Pringe clearly points out: "If the fourth term of the proportion can be intuited, then the analogy will be an analogy of experience. If, on the contrary, the fourth term cannot be intuited, the analogy will be symbolic" (2007, 13).

analogy of experience is "only a rule in accordance with which unity of experience is to arise from perceptions […], and as a principle it will not be valid of the objects (of the appearances) constitutively but merely regulatively" (A180/B222-23)[95]. Even though these analogies operate as a regulative principle, they are absolutely necessary for constituting possible experience, since they give a necessary unity (or connection) to our perceptions in time. According to Kant, "[e]xperience is an empirical cognition, i.e., a cognition that determines an object through perceptions" (B218). Nevertheless, our perceptions "come together only contingently", therefore we cannot extract from them an evidence of their necessary connection, "since apprehension is only a juxtaposition of the manifold of empirical intuition" (B219). Accordingly, we must seek an *a priori* and objective principle that serves as a necessary rule for unifying and connecting this manifold of perceptions in time, since otherwise we would be incapable of enabling experience itself[96].

There are three *modi* of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity), and the three analogies of experience will adopt one of these three *modi* respectively; thus, they will enable possible experience by connecting perceptions in time under necessary rules of the understanding. As Kant puts it:

> Hence three rules of all temporal relations of appearances [persistence, succession, and simultaneity], in accordance with which the existence of each can be determined with regard to the unity of all time, precede all experience and first make it possible (A177/ B219).

These three analogies of experience, as mentioned above, make experience itself possible, because they provide a necessary connection of appearances "in accord with an analogy with the logical and general unity of concepts" (B224). Analogies of experience, therefore, operate by means of an analogy with the concepts of the understanding (categories) and the way in which they unify (synthetize, categorize) the manifold of our intuitions (phenomena) in the process of schematization. The three analogies of experience are: persistence of substance, succession (temporal sequence) according to the

[95] Or as Kant introduces the function of these analogies at the beginning of this section: "Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" (B218).
[96] "[T]he determination of the existence of objects in time can only come about through their combination in time in general, hence only through *a priori* connecting concepts. Now since these always carry necessity along with them, experience is thus possible only through a representation of the necessary connection of the perceptions" (B219).

law of causality, and simultaneity according to the law of community. Let us examine briefly each of them.

The principle of the first analogy (persistence of the substance) is the following: "In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature" (B224). Kant starts his argumentation by stating that all "appearances are in time", and only by means of it we can represent both simultaneity and succession; that is to say, only by means of time can we represent all changes in appearances (B224-25). Time, on the other hand, endures and does not change, but we cannot perceive it by itself. Accordingly, Kant explains, "it is in the objects of perception, i.e., the appearances, that the substratum must be encountered that represents time in general and in which all change or simultaneity can be perceived in apprehension through the relation of the appearances to it" (B225). In other words, we must be able to find the substratum which represents time as *something permanent* that grounds the change amongst our perceptions, and the "substratum of everything real" is substance (B225), that is, something that endures and persists. Kant highlights that only in what persists (i.e., in a substance) are temporal relations possible, since "[s]ubstances (in appearance) are the substrata of all time-determinations" (B231). The first analogy of experience, therefore, is crucial for enabling possible experience, because it grounds persistence as a necessary condition to determine appearances "as things or objects" (B232), that is to say, as substances in which each change and temporal relation may be perceived.

The second analogy of experience is, without a doubt, the most commented of the analogies of experience and the one that has given rise to innumerable debates and discussions[97]. It is also the largest in length and the most important for Kant, since it establishes the law of natural causation. As mentioned above, our perceptions ("the apprehension of the manifold of appearance") are always successive, so Kant raises the

[97] In light of the purpose and scope of this dissertation, I cannot examine the development and details of this relevant discussion, but some thorough commentaries can be found here: Guyer (1987), Friedman (1992), Melnick (1973), Buchdahl (1992), Lewis White Beck (1973, 1978, 1981), Allison (1983), Watkins (2005), Nagel (1983), Thöle (1998), amongst others. Neither can I introduce one of the most relevant debates regarding the Second Analogy, namely: the so-called debate of the weak and strong reading of this analogy. According to the former reading, the Second Analogy only establishes that in an event there must be a preceding condition (a cause), that is to say, to every event there must be some cause that produces and antecedes the aforementioned event. Lewis White Beck and Allison follow this line of interpretation. The strong reading, on the other hand, goes a step further in stating that the Second Analogy not only establishes that every event has a cause, but, in addition to this, that the same types of effects have been produced by the same type of causes. Friedman and Guyer support this latter reading. Though I cannot dig into this debate, I agree with the weak reading of the Second Analogy, since it has stronger textual support.

question whether we can represent an objective temporal sequence, that is to say, whether our perceptions can be connected and ordered by the law of causality (i.e., by a necessary and objective rule of the understanding). Kant formulates the principle of the second analogy as follows: "All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (B232). The principle of natural causality establishes that "[e]very apprehension of an occurrence is therefore a perception that follows another one" (B237). So, if I perceive "an appearance that contains a happening, I call the preceding state of perception A and the following one B, then B can only follow A in apprehension, but the perception A cannot follow but only precede B" (B 237). Temporal sequence must follow, therefore, a necessary order in the succession of perceptions, in which the cause must necessarily precede the perception of the effect, just as the effect necessarily follows the cause[98].

The principle of causality, just as it is described in the second analogy, not only provides an order to the sequence of our representations, but also it assigns an objective significance to them. The causal principle of the understanding supplies a necessary order to the combination of our representations and thus makes possible the constitution of an object of experience. As Kant explains:

> Thus the relation of appearances (as possible perceptions) in accordance with which the existence of that which succeeds (what happens) is determined in time necessarily and in accordance with a rule by something that precedes it, consequently the relation of cause to effect, is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments with regard to the series of perceptions, thus of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience. Hence the principle of the causal relation in the sequence of appearances is valid for all objects of experience (under the conditions of succession), since it is itself the ground of the possibility of such an experience (B 247).

The law of causality is, according to Kant, the condition of experience, since the relation of cause to effect is the principle that provides objective validity to our empirical representations in time. Natural causation is the principle that can constitute an object for our experience and, hence, the rule that enables experience itself.

[98] "This rule for determining something with respect to its temporal sequence, however, is that in what precedes, the condition is to be encountered under which the occurrence (i.e., necessarily) follows" (B246).

The third analogy of experience is the principle of simultaneity in accordance with the law of community or interaction. This principle states that "[a]ll substances, insofar as they are simultaneous, stand in thoroughgoing community (i.e., interaction with one another)" (B256). Kant defines simultaneity as "the existence of the manifold at the same time": things can be represented as simultaneous in the extent that the perception of one can follow the perception of the other and vice versa (B257). Nevertheless, perceptions themselves are juxtaposed, and time itself cannot be perceived, hence we cannot "derive from the fact things are positioned at the same time that their perceptions can follow each other reciprocally" (B257). Accordingly, a concept of the understanding is required in order to represent simultaneity as objective[99], and such a concept is the law of community or interaction amongst substances in space (or amongst appearances in space). Without this principle "every perception […] is broken off from the others, and the chain of empirical representations, i.e., experience, would have to start entirely over with every new object" (B260-61). In other words, without the principle of community, the empirical relation of simultaneity could not be achieved in experience.

These three analogies of experience, as mentioned above, enable *a priori* the unity of experience and its objects[100]. That is to say, these analogies make possible experience itself by *a priori* connecting the existence of the appearances in time, according to the three *modi* of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). Moreover, these three analogies *exhibit* the unity of nature, if we understand by nature, as Kant does, "the combination of appearances as regards their existence, in accordance with necessary rules, i.e., in accordance with laws" (B263). When these laws are *a priori*, then they make possible nature (and experience) itself; empirical laws, by contrast, can only be found in experience. Even though these three analogies of experience are merely regulative principles, experience itself could not be enabled without them, since they establish the *a priori* connection of appearances in time. However, the analogies of experience represent only a part of Kant's conception of philosophical analogy. The other part, i.e. symbolic representation, consists in a relation of identity in which the fourth unknown member,

[99] "Consequently, a concept of the understanding of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of these things simultaneously existing externally to each other is required in order to say that the reciprocal sequence of perceptions is grounded in the object, and thereby to represent the simultaneity as objective" (B257).

[100] "Thus together they [the three analogies of experience] say: All appearances lie in one nature, and must lie therein, since without this a priori unity no unity of experience, thus also no determination of the objects in it, would be possible" (B263).

unlike analogies of experience, is beyond possible experience. But before thematizing symbolic analogy, it is important to explain another form of philosophical analogy, which is neither an analogy of experience (that is, an indispensable principle for enabling possible experience), nor a symbolic representation properly speaking. This type of philosophical analogy is analogical inference, which is essential for extending our cognition by experience.

3.3. - Analogical inference, or analogy as a mode of inference of the reflective power of judgment

In his "Lectures on Logic"[101], especially in the "Jäsche Logic" and the "Hechsel Logic", Kant introduces the function of inference (*Schlüss*) in general. He defines inference as a "function of thought whereby one judgment is derived from another. An inference is thus in general the derivation of one judgment from the other" (Logik, AA IX, 114). As we have seen in Chapter 1, Kant distinguishes two kinds of judgments: determining judgments (which proceed from the universal to the particular) and reflective judgments (which proceed from the particular to the universal). The reflective power of judgment has only subjective validity, since the universal that is inferred from the particular "is only empirical universality –a mere analogue of the logical" (IX, 132). Empirical universality is contrasted with rational universality, which is a strict universality in the sense that what can be attributed to the "concept universally actually does belong to all the things without exception" (IX, 109). This is not the case in empirical universality, which is a kind of broad and uncertain universality (that is, a "mere analogue" of rational universality). The inferences of the reflective power of judgment "are certain modes of inference for coming from particular concepts to universal ones" (IX, 132), and these modes of inference are induction and analogy. Both modes of inferences proceed, therefore, from the particular to the universal, and this universal is found not *a priori*, but rather empirically, that is, from experience (IX, 132).

[101] What is known as the "Lectures on Logic" (or "Logic") is a compilation of the lectures given by Kant about logic, but this compilation was not written by Kant himself, but by his student Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche. For an interesting account of the genesis and development of this work, see Terry Boswell, "On the textual Authenticity of Kant's Logic", in *History and Philosophy of Logic* 9, 1988, 193-203.

Even though both forms of inferences proceed empirically from the particular to the universal, they exhibit some differences. While induction "infers […] from many to all things of a kind"[102], analogy infers "from many determinations and properties, in which things of one kind agree, to the remaining ones, insofar as they belong to the same principle"[103] (IX, 132). Kant adds that induction proceeds in accordance with the principle of *universalization*, whereas analogy with the principle of *specification*. As Kant says: "Induction extends the empirically given from the particular to the universal in regard to many objects, while analogy extends the given properties of one thing to several [other properties] of the very same thing" (IX, 133, note). Moreover, these inferences are, as Kant says, only "logical presumptions". This latter point is relevant to highlight: considering that these modes of inferences are made empirically, the validity of this kind of judgments is not objective in the extent that they do not "yield necessity" as an inference of reason does. That is to say, these inferences are prone to fail. As Callanan clearly points out: "[b]oth induction and analogy, then, are forms of reflective judgment that allow us to draw only general and thus fallible judgments" (2008, 751).

With respect to analogy, Kant emphasizes that "identity of the ground (par ratio) is not required" (IX, 133). With analogy, we only need an identity in the *relation* of the properties of the objects that obtains in the analogy. To use a Kantian example, we can infer by analogy that the inhabitants of the moon are *rational* beings, but not *human* beings. That is to say, if the properties of the moon we have discovered so far are the same as some properties of the earth, we can infer by analogy that the remaining properties of the moon are similar to the earth[104].

Analogical inferences, therefore, are "useful and indispensable for the sake of the extending of our cognition by experience" (IX, 133). Nevertheless, by the very fact that they only provide "empirical certainty, we must use them with caution and care" (133), since they might mislead us. Despite that, one might even say that, ultimately, Kant is here more concerned with underscoring the usefulness and necessity of analogical

[102] Or as Kant puts it in his "Hechsel logic": "We infer per *inductionem* when we take it as a basis that what belongs to many things of the genus belongs to the remaining things of that genus" (IX, 109).
[103] As Kant also adds in the "Hechsel logic": "I infer according to analogy thus: when two or more things from a genus agree with one another in as many marks as we have been able to discover, I infer that they will also agree with one another in the remaining marks that I have not been able to discover" (IX, 109).
[104] "The moon has mountains and valleys, day and night, our earth has day and night and so forth; since the moon has much similarity with our earth, I will attribute to it many of the properties of the earth" (IX, 110).

inferences for expanding our empirical cognition than merely offering a warning us to be cautious when using them.[105]

3.4. - Symbolic representation or symbolic analogy

In symbolic analogy we find what is perhaps Kant's main contribution regarding analogy as a form of indirect presentation (and as a form of philosophical analogy). Symbolism, as a form of analogy, is thematized by Kant mostly in §59 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, whose title is "Beauty as a Symbol of Morality". Some years after the publication of the third *Critique*, Kant addresses again the topic of symbolic representation in his *On the Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff*. In both writings, however, Kant uses the expression "symbolic representation" or "symbol" as a presentation (*Darstellung*) by analogy. Or as he defines it in *On the Progress of Metaphysics*: "The symbol of an idea is a presentation [*Darstellung*] of the object by analogy" (AA XX, 279). In this light, symbolic representation is the analogical procedure by means of which we can access what lies beyond possible experience (i.e., ideas of reason). And this procedure is carried out by the power of judgment and it can be seen as *analogous* with schematization.

While introducing symbolic representation, Kant faces the problem that ideas of reason cannot be exhibited by any possible intuition (i.e., ideas cannot be schematized), so we must seek another kind of presentation, and this other kind of presentation is the symbol. As Kant explains it:

> To demonstrate the reality of our concepts, intuitions are always required. If they are empirical concepts, then the latter are called *examples*. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, then the latter are called *schemata*. But if one demands that the objective reality of the concepts of reason, i.e., of the ideas, be demonstrated, and moreover for the sake of theoretical cognition of them, then one desires something impossible, since no intuition adequate to them can be given at all (V, 351).

[105] "Induction and analogy are inseparable from our cognitions, and yet errors for the most part arise from them. We are always acquainted only with something in things, and we infer that here it will be as nice as it is in other things. Since we cannot do without a crutch for the human understanding, we must pay heed to whether a mistaken inference is made here" (IX, 110)

Intuitions are called *examples* when they demonstrate the objective reality of our empirical concepts; in the case of categories (i.e., pure concepts of the understanding), intuitions are denominated *schemata*; in the case of our ideas of reason, however, no intuition can be given in order to represent them, so we cannot demonstrate the objective reality of the concepts of reason. Nevertheless, we can *indirectly* make present the *relation* that these ideas have by means of symbolic analogy. Since symbolic representation has an analogous procedure to that of schematism, let us first examine the differences between the processes of schematization and symbolization.

Kant states that in order to make something sensible (*Versinnlichung*) we need the process of *hypotyposis*, and this process can be carried out in a twofold manner: either by schematizing the concept, that is to say, "where to a concept grasped by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given *a priori*"[106]; or by symbolizing the concepts of reason, that is, where to an idea of reason, "to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment proceeds in a way merely analogous to that which it observes in schematization" (V, 351)[107]. In this latter process,

[106] Schematization is the process that makes possible the application of the pure concepts of the understanding (categories) to appearances. In the "Analytic of the Principles" of the first *Critique*, Kant says that the process of subsumption presupposes a level of homogeneity between the object subsumed and the concept. Nevertheless, "pure concepts of the understanding, in comparison with empirical (indeed in general sensible) intuitions, are entirely unhomogeneous, and can never be encountered in any intuition. Now, how is the subsumption of latter under the former, thus the application of the category to appearances possible, since no one would say that the category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the senses and is contained in the appearance?" (KrV, B 176-77). This subsumption is carried out by the process of schematization. As Angelica Nuzzo clearly describes: "Schematism is the procedure followed by the imagination under the rule of understanding in order to produce knowledge. The schema solves a problem of determination. It is the means through which the category is applied to appearances. The schema bridges the heterogeneity of sensible intuition and concept" (2005, 321). Now, how is schematization carried out?: "pure concepts a priori, in addition to the function of the understanding in the category, must also contain a priori formal conditions of sensibility (namely of the inner sense) that contain the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. We will call this formal and pure condition of the sensibility, to which the use of the concept of the understanding is restricted, the schema of this concept of the understanding, and we will call the procedure of the understanding with these schemata the schematism of the pure understanding" (B 179). Nassar explains the process of schematization as follows: "While the categories and intuitions are indeed heterogeneous with regard to content, they are homogeneous with regard to form. They share the form of time. Intuitions are implicitly temporal, and it is their temporality that makes them commensurable with the categories. The schemata make this implicit temporal form explicit, and thus enable the subsumption of an intuition under a concept. In this way, the schemata bring categories to presentation in intuition" (2016, 63).

[107] In *On the Progress of Metaphysics*, Kant states: "[T]o represent a pure concept of the understanding as thinkable in an object of possible experience is to confer objective reality upon it, and in general to present it. Where we are unable to achieve this, the concept is empty, i.e., it suffices for no knowledge. If objective reality is accorded to the concept directly (*directe*) through the intuition that corresponds to it, i.e., if the concept is immediately presented, this act is called schematism; but if it cannot be presented immediately, but only in its consequences (*indirecte*), it may be called the symbolization of the concept. The first occurs with concepts of the sensible, the second is an expedient for concepts of the super-sensible which are

the power of judgment proceeds only by applying the mere rule of the procedure of schematizing, that is, it proceeds only by the "form of reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the concept" (351). As Nassar clearly puts it: "Ideas for which there is no adequate intuition can be brought to presentation in a manner analogous to (but different from) the work of schematizing" (2016, 63). In the case of schematization, we have direct (i.e., intuited) presentations of the concept, whereas in symbolization we merely have an indirect presentation of the corresponding ideas of reason, since these ideas cannot be given in intuition. Kant adds that the former carries this process out demonstratively, whereas the latter do this by means of an analogy[108].

The procedure of symbolic analogy is carried out in a double fashion: first, it applies the concept of the object of a sensible intuition, in order to apply, then, "the mere rule of reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol" (352). In the procedure of symbolization, we have, therefore, a first moment of schematization by means of a direct intuitive representation; and then we have a second moment when the process of symbolization is performed, i.e., when an indirect presentation of the ideas of reason is produced. It is only by means of symbolization that we can *indirectly* exhibit in intuition what lies beyond possible experience, that is, that we can *indirectly* present to intuition the concepts of reason.

Let us examine a Kantian example in order to clarify the procedure of symbolization. Kant takes the example of a constitutional monarchy contrasted with an absolute monarchy: the former is represented by an organized body, whereas the absolute monarchy is represented by a mere machine, such as a handmill. In both cases, Kant tells us, we have a symbolic or indirect similarity between the relation of these two objects whose concepts radically differ to each other, but whose *rule for reflecting* on them is quite similar. As Kant explains: "[f]or between a despotic state and a handmill there is, of course, no similarity, but there is one between the rule for reflecting on both and their

therefore not truly presented, and can be given in no possible experience, though they still necessarily appertain to a cognition, even if it were possible merely as a practical one" (XX, 279-80).

[108] Dalia Nassar straightforwardly explains the notion of symbolic analogy, which she calls "analogical reflection": "In the third *Critique*, Kant notes that there are ideas for which 'absolutely no intuitions can be given that would be adequate to them' (AA 5: 251). That is to say, there are ideas which cannot be schematized –ideas that are thought outside of temporal conditions. For this reason, he goes on, these ideas can only be brought to presentation 'in a way merely analogous to the procedure [judgment] followed in schematizing'. In other words, in a manner analogous to but different from the work of schematizing, ideas for which there is no adequate intuition can be brought to presentation. Analogical reflection, then, is a 'carrying over' of a rule of reflecting on one object to reflecting on a second object, which is itself not presented in intuition" (2015, 249-50).

causality" (V, 352).[109] That is to say, between a machine and a despotic monarchy (as well as between an animate body and a constitutional monarchy) we do not have any direct similarity, since the objects are of entirely different kinds. Nevertheless, we can represent a sort of similarity between both objects, at least with regard to the consequences that can be ascribed to them. In the case of the despotic monarchy, the whole state is governed by an absolute will that prescribes from outside the law, whereas in a machine we have a rational designer that commands from outside the ends this machine must carry out (accordingly, the element that is similar in both concepts is an external law or end). In the case of the constitutional monarchy, on the other hand, the state is governed by internal popular laws, whereas in an animate body there is an internal purposiveness that makes possible the self-organization of the aforementioned body (the common trait in both concepts is, therefore, an internal law or end).

This Kantian example illuminates, thus, the very procedure of symbolization, where the similarity of the elements of the analogy is only possible by means of an indirect presentation, i.e. a symbol, which represents the similarity in the relation of the symbolized object (i.e., the ideas of reason or the supersensible) with the object given in intuition. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant not only offers a clear and general definition of analogy, but also he describes it in almost the same terms as symbolic representation. He calls this mode of analogy "symbolic anthropomorphism", which refers to the similarity

[109] Then Kant adds: "Our language is full of such indirect presentations, in accordance with an analogy, where the expression does not contain the actual schema for the concept but only a symbol for reflection. Examples are the words ground (support, basis), depend (be held from above), from which flow (instead of follow), substance (as Locke expresses it: the bearer of accidents), and innumerable other nonschematic but symbolic hypotyposes and expressions for concepts not by means of a direct intuition, but only in accordance with an analogy with it, i.e., the transportation of the reflection on one object of intuition to another, quite different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond" (V, 352-53). Or as he puts it in the *Prolegomena*: "Such is an analogy between the legal relation of human actions and the mechanical relation of
moving forces: I can never do anything to another without giving him a right to do the same to me under the same conditions; just as a body cannot act on another body with its motive force without thereby causing the other body to react just as much on it. Right and motive force are here completely dissimilar things, but in their relation there is nonetheless complete similarity. By means of such an analogy I can therefore provide a concept of a relation to things that are absolutely unknown to me. E.g., the promotion of the happiness of the children = a is to the love of the parents = b as the welfare of humankind = c is to the unknown in God = x, which we call love: not as if this unknown had the least similarity with any human inclination, but because we can posit the relation between God's love and the world to be similar to that which things in the world have to one another" (Prolegomena, AA IV, 358). Nuzzo clarifies better this symbolic procedure by means of the Kantian example of the constitutional monarchy and the animate body: "What is similar in this case is not directly the animate body and the constitutional monarchy, but indirectly the relation between whole-parts in the symbol, the intuition that would immediately correspond to the concept of animate body takes the place of the intuition that we lack in the case of the concept of constitutional monarchy" (2005, 322).

in the *relation* of the objects, but not in the similarity of the objects themselves. Kant offers an example:

> If I say that we are compelled to look upon the world as if it were the work of a supreme understanding and will, I actually say nothing more than: in the way that a watch, a ship, and a regiment are related to an artisan, a builder, and a commander, the sensible world (or everything that makes up the basis of this sum total of appearances) is related to the unknown—which I do not thereby cognize according to what it is in itself, but only according to what it is for me, that is, with respect to the world of which I am a part (IV, 357).

Symbolic anthropomorphism allows us to judge the relation that the world may have with respect to the Supreme Being that lies beyond all the possible knowledge that experience can supply. That is to say, in the same way that an artisan is related to her artifact, we can attribute that the Supreme Being is related to the world in a way analogous to the objects known by us (i.e., the artisan and her artifact). Thus, symbolic anthropomorphism posits a "perfect similarity [*Ähnlichkeit*] between two *relations* of things in wholly dissimilar things [as dissimilar as can be the sensible objects with respect to the supersensible ones]" (IV, 357). This procedure described in the *Prolegomena* is quite the same as the symbolic representation (or symbolic analogy) of the third *Critique*: by the symbol we can indirectly exhibit (or present) in intuition what lies beyond possible experience, that is, we can indirectly present the supersensible concepts of reason, such as God.

Symbolic representation, as a peculiar procedure of the power of judgment, makes it possible to present indirectly in intuition an idea of reason which otherwise could not be presented, since this sort of concept cannot be intuited. The point that I would like to emphasize here is that symbolic representation (or symbolic analogy) is a typical procedure of reflection, that is to say, of the reflective power of judgment (in its aesthetic as well as teleological use). In other words, symbolic analogy is the typical procedure of the reflective power of judgment, and the third *Critique* itself is full of symbolic analogies. In this light, we can raise the question whether or not the analogies invoked in the Teleological Judgments are of the same kind of symbolic representation.

3.5. - Analogy as the very procedure of reflection

Analogy is present from the beginning of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, since the very principle of the purposiveness of nature (*Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur*) is thought by means of an analogy with purposiveness in its practical sphere[110]. In fact, the prevalence of "as if" (*als ob*) language in the third *Critique* is noteworthy in this regard, given that this kind of language is eminently analogical.[111]Both the principle of purposiveness and analogy share the privilege (or the condemnation) of being considered as a heuristic-regulative tool for orienting us in the act of thinking and researching. Reflective judgment, as the type of judgment that has an *a priori* principle and thus justifies a "critique", follows the logic of analogy to the extent that it is a subjective-regulative procedure that proceeds from the given particular to the unknown universal. Therefore, it is possible to trace out a type of convergence between the concepts of reflective judgment and analogy, in the sense that reflective judgment operates analogically. As Angelica Nuzzo points out in her outstanding *Kant and the Unity of Reason*: "Kant recognizes that analogy is the way in which the faculty of judgment is at work in the most different spheres" (2005, 323)[112]. Accordingly, it can be said that the

[110] "The purposiveness of nature is thus a special a priori concept that has its origin strictly in the reflective power of judgment. For we cannot ascribe to the products of nature anything like a relation of nature in them to ends, but can only use this concept in order to reflect on the connection of appearances in nature that are given in accordance with empirical laws. This concept is also entirely distinct from that of practical purposiveness (of human art as well as of morals), although it is certainly conceived of in terms of an analogy with that" (KU, AA V, 181).

[111] An excellent and classical work on the as-if formula in philosophy can be found in Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As if': A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind* (1968). In this work, Vaihinger analyses the fictional character of the Kantian formula "as if" as a mere "heuristic fiction". The as-if language represents mere fictions, since they "are rational concepts without objectivity, mere thought-entities that simply serve to guide our reason in certain respects" (1968, 283). Vaihinger recognizes that "fictions or, at least, many of them, are based on analogy. This view plays, as we shall see, a great part in Kant"; and, in fact, he contributes to giving a place to the as-if formula as a relevant—although sometimes overlooked—aspect of Kant's critical philosophy. Most of his Kantian analyses are focused on the problem of the regulative ideas, such as God, the immortality of the soul, and freedom, and the role they play in our moral actions. However, he barely analyses the as-if formula in the KU, let alone the role this formula plays in the Teleological Judgment or in the concept of *Naturzweck*. This is a pity, since in the third *Critique* this formula is used extensively by Kant, since it shows how our reflective judgment conceives nature as if it were commensurable with our cognitive faculties. Furthermore, the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment" is full of this formula, since the very way we make sense of organisms is by means of an analogy with our technical reason, as if organisms possess self-organization or self-determination. A more detailed examination of the as-if formula in the Teleological Judgment (especially in the Analytic of the Teleological Judgment) would have improved further the outstanding interpretation of Vaihinger.

[112] In fact, Nuzzo is more emphatic later when she states that the logic of the reflective judgment *is* the analogical logic: "Kant suggests that the logic of the reflective faculty of judgment is the logic of analogy. Analogy designates the heuristic procedure followed by reflection. It provides a method for searching for what can be neither constructed a priori nor known a posteriori, Analogy is the as-if procedure whereby judgment explains the way in which judgment itself works" (2005, 319). Even though Nuzzo stresses the

very procedure of reflection (or of the reflective judgment) is analogy, but then a question emerges: What kind of analogy is precisely at work in the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment"?

In §90 ("On the kind of affirmation involved in a moral proof of the existence of God") of the Teleological Judgment, Kant takes up analogy as a type of inference of the reflective power of judgment when he says: "One can, of course, think of one of two dissimilar things, even on the very point of their dissimilarity, by means of an analogy with the other; but from that respect in which they are dissimilar we cannot draw an inference by means of the analogy" (V, 464). Then, in a footnote that follows the latter quotation, Kant defines analogy in a very similar way as in the *Prolegomena*, but now emphasizing the similarity in the relation of cause and effects:

> An analogy (in a qualitative sense) is the identity of the relation between grounds and consequences (causes and effects), insofar as that identity obtains in spite of the specific difference between the things or those of their properties that contain in themselves the ground for similar consequences (i.e., their difference outside of this relation) (V, 464).

This quotation shows that this kind of analogy is produced while attributing an identity (*Identität*) to the relation of cause and effect, but not between the properties of these dissimilar things. Accordingly, we have now a new specification of analogical inference in this passage of the KU, which stresses a relation of identity between grounds and consequences. The examples that Kant offers in order to illuminate this kind of analogical inference are, in turn, very similar to those offered in symbolic representation and symbolic anthropomorphism. For instance:

> Thus, in analogy with the law of the equality of effect and counter-effect in the mutual attraction and repulsion of bodies, I can also conceive of the community of the members of a commonwealth in accordance with rules of justice, but I cannot transfer the specific determinations of the former (the material attraction and repulsion) to the latter and attribute them to the citizens in order to conceive of a system which is called a state. Likewise, we can very well conceive of the causality of the original being with regard to the things in the world, in analogy with an intelligence as the ground of the forms of certain products that we call artworks, as natural ends […]; but from the fact that among

role of analogical procedure in the KU, she does not develop further the role of the analogy with our causality in accordance with ends in the Teleological Judgment, which is key for understanding and representing the very concept of *Naturzweck* (as I will emphasize in Chapter 5).

> beings in the world the cause of an effect that is judged as artistic has to be attributed to intelligence we can by no means infer by an analogy that the very same causality that we perceive in humans must also pertain to the being who is entirely distinct from nature in regard to nature itself (V, 464-65).[113]

That is to say, what is homologized in these analogies is the relation between certain grounds with their corresponding effects or consequences, but not the similarity between the objects themselves or between their properties, because in the latter lies the very heterogeneity of these objects. Therefore, we can conceive the causality of God with respect to the things in the world (i.e., natural ends) in analogy with the causality of an artisan with regard to her artifact; however, we cannot determine by analogy that the type of causality that the artisan has is of the same kind as that of God.

At this point of the analysis, it is possible to determine the type of analogy that is operating throughout the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment". As just mentioned above, Kant gives in §90 a definition of analogy that is very close to symbolic representation and to analogical inference as a logic procedure of the reflective power of judgment (with the specification of emphasizing the identity in the relation between grounds and effects). This passage of §90 is key for understanding the type of analogy that operates in the Teleological Judgment. I suggest that the type of analogy that works in teleological judgments is, precisely, a conjunction of those two forms of analogies, namely, symbolic representation and analogical inference (especially in the relation of grounds and consequences). In the "Jäsche Logik", Kant states that the inferences of the reflective power of judgment (induction and analogy) only have subjective validity, since the universal toward which these forms of inference can aspire is only an "empirical universality" (Logik, AA IX, 132). For this reason, these inferences do not determine the

[113] Or as he also puts it in the already quoted footnote: "Thus, in comparing the artistic actions of animals with those of human beings, we conceive of the ground of the former, which we do not know, through the ground of similar effects in humans (reason), which we do know, and thus as an analogue of reason, and by that we also mean to indicate that the ground of the artistic capacity in animals, designated as instinct, is in fact specifically different from reason, but yet has a similar relation to the effect (comparing, say, construction by beavers with that by humans). – Yet from the fact that the human being uses reason in order to build, I cannot infer that the beaver must have the same sort of thing and call this an inference by means of the analogy. Yet from the comparison of the similar mode of operation in the animals (the ground for which we cannot immediately perceive) to that of humans (of which we are immediately aware) we can quite properly infer in accordance with the analogy that the animals also act in accordance with representations (and are not, as Descartes would have it, machines), and that in spite of their specific difference, they are still of the same genus as human beings (as living beings)" (V, 464n).

object itself, but rather they only indicate the mode in which we must reflect on the aforementioned object.

So far, analogical inference seems to qualify as the type of analogical reflection that is at stake in the Teleological Judgment, but: does the concept of *Naturzweck* extend our empirical cognition of nature[114]? The Kantian answer to this question is, without a doubt, negative. But even though the concept of *Naturzweck* does not extend our empirical cognition of nature, one of the main claims of this concept is visible in the sphere of empirical investigation as a "heuristic tool": *Naturzweck* serves, and Kant is very emphatic in this regard, as a guideline (*Leitfaden*) for our investigation of nature (KU, AA V, 375, 76). However, one point is still missing: What is the role that symbolic representation play in Teleological Judgment?

An insightful interpretation of this point is made by Angela Breitenbach in her paper "Biological Purposiveness and Analogical Reflection". In fact, she states that analogical inference plays a *partial* role in the Teleological Judgment, insofar as they only provide a heuristic-methodological device for our empirical research into nature. But another type of analogical reflection is indispensable for indirectly presenting the "objective purposiveness in biological objects": "It is thus crucial that, in the CPJ, Kant presents a different characterization of the role of analogies as providing not [just] a heuristic tool for empirical investigation, but [also] an indirect, symbolic representation of concepts that cannot be represented directly" (2014a, 140-41, my adds). As Breitenbach suggests, since the concept of an objective purposiveness in nature cannot be directly presented, we need a symbolic representation in order to bring it to presentation and to make "the representation of something as a living being possible" (142)[115]. Therefore, Breitenbach maintains that the analogical character of teleological judgment has two functions: analogical inference "as heuristic tool for the study of nature", and "symbolic representations that constitute a reflective representation of parts of nature as natural ends" (146).

[114] One of the main functions of analogical inference is extending our empirical cognition of nature (Logik, AA IX, 133).

[115] Nassar, following the line of Breitenbach, explains this process of symbolization as follows: "In other words, ideas for which there is no adequate intuition can be brought to presentation in a manner analogous to (but different from) the work of schematizing. This is exactly what takes place in the case of a symbol. It involves analogical reflection to 'carry over' a rule of reflecting on one object to reflecting on a second object, which is itself not presented in intuition. The organism is, according to Kant, one such object" (2016, 63).

I follow the line of Breitenbach in trying to unify these two functions of analogical reflection in the Teleological Judgment: as a heuristic device for investigating nature, and as a symbolic representation for indirectly exhibit the concept of *Naturzweck*. However, I do not ascribe a merely heuristic role to analogical inference, since the procedure it carries out also contributes to conceive the concept of *Naturzweck*. By means of an analogical inference (particularly, in the relation of identity between grounds and consequences) we can make sense of the seemingly purposive self-organization of this concept. Accordingly, I argue that in the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment" we have symbolic representation that operates in conjunction with analogical inference (which is one of the peculiar inferences of the reflective power of judgment). This operation consist in i) indirectly presenting the concept of *Naturzweck* in intuition (the process of symbolic representation), and in ii) elucidating and making sense of the purposive self-organization of *Naturzweck* (by applying an analogical inference, which establishes a relation of identity between grounds and consequences). Once elucidated the concept of *Naturzweck*, we can use it as a heuristic tool for guiding our investigation of nature's organization.

In conclusion, it can be inferred that the typical logic or procedure of reflection (or of the reflective power of judgment) is not only induction but also analogy[116], since the *a priori* principle of the reflective judgment is the purposiveness of nature (*Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur*), which is a regulative-heuristic tool for guiding our investigation of nature and its empirical-particular laws. I have stated that analogical reflection in the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment" is based on two main analogical resources: a specification of analogical inference (i.e., an identity in the relation of grounds and consequences), and symbolic representation. The synthesis of both forms of analogy operates by indirectly exhibiting the concept of *Naturzweck* and making sense of it, in order to guide our empirical investigation of nature when the principle of mechanism seems to be insufficient for accounting for the organized products of nature. Having said that, it is possible to analyze the analogies—and disanalogies—invoked by Kant throughout the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment", and

[116] Rudolf Makkreel also states something similar in his *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), where he emphasizes the relevance of both induction and analogy as forms of reflective power of judgment's inferences, and this relevance is worth stressing not only in the context of the *Logik*, but also in the third *Critique*.

the role they play in understanding and making sense of the reflective-analogical concept of *Naturzweck*.