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Monitoring migrations: the Habsburg-Ottoman border in the eighteenth century

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CHAPTER 3: ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY

The Habsburg-Ottoman border was about 1,800 km long. It passed through populated and unpopulated areas, through cultivated lands, meadows, pastures, tick forests, over mountaintops, and followed small and big rivers. The border sanitary administration, counting altogether several hundreds of officials, supervised only official border crossings, not the sections in between, which were tens of kilometers long. Hundreds of migrants could pass through the sections unnoticed by sanitary officials, avoiding cleaning procedures, quarantine and the associated costs. A single unsupervised plague-infested traveler, slipping through outside official crossings, could possibly cause a major plague epidemic in Habsburg lands. To prevent this, as well as smuggling and clandestine immigration and emigration, supervision of the whole Habsburg-Ottoman border was necessary, year round, day and night, with thousands of guards.

Organizing effective border controls remains a major challenge even in modern states with their large and well-organized bureaucracies. One of the explanations for a relatively late introduction of border controls in many states after the First World War was that pre-industrial states did not possess sufficient administrative capacities to implement them.²⁷⁸ In early modern times, creating and maintaining permanent border controls would be a very ambitious project for small and more organized city-states. It would be much more challenging for territorial monarchies, like the Habsburg Monarchy, with their complex structure and decision-making, modest central administration, and restricted finances. Yet, the Habsburg Monarchy

²⁷⁸ Torpey, "Coming and Going."

introduced a border-control system already in the 1720s and maintained it for the next 130 years. How did it manage to organize effective border controls? To answer that, I explore four main elements contributing to the efficient border controls: the roles of the military, of migrants, of the Ottoman border authorities and of the local Habsburg border population.

Early modern states were able to organize larger statewide systematic operations, requiring significant resources and labor. The Ottoman Empire compiled comprehensive provincial registers of incomes for centuries. The Habsburg Monarchy and France relied on local elites. Both the central government and provincial ones benefited from this relationship. In the Habsburg Monarchy, provincial estates and local nobles used local knowledge and patronage networks to project central power on the local level. They extracted in an efficient and politically viable way taxes for the central state, and provisions and recruits for the standing army. In exchange, they were also legitimized by the relationship, being recognized as the legitimate political representatives of the local population.²⁷⁹ The Habsburg Monarchy successfully engaged in expensive, complex multiyear undertakings that engaged substantial manpower, such as the population census of its Austrian and Bohemian provinces in 1770-1771 and detailed mapping of its possessions, from the Austrian Netherlands to Italy and Transylvania (1763-1787).²⁸⁰ In both undertakings the Habsburg military, the largest work force readily available to the central government, played a major role. There was, therefore, a capacity, available to use. However, it came at a high cost. Maintaining standing armies was the biggest expense item of early modern states.

²⁷⁹ Godsey, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power*, 17-18, 23-29, 154, 158-73, 184-87, 325-35.

²⁸⁰ Vann, "Mapping under the Austrian Habsburgs;" Tantner, *Ordnung der Häuser*. Stephan Steiner, *Rückkehr unerwünscht. Deportationen in der Habsburgermonarchie der Frühen Neuzeit und ihr europäischer Kontext* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2014), 118-19.

Having them engaged in multiyear operations on terrain for surveys and censuses further increased costs. In the case of border controls, the expenses were particularly critical because, unlike censuses and surveys, one-off undertakings, border checks had to permanently engage and support thousands of troops year round.

Even sufficient administrative capacity and constant supervision of the whole border would not guarantee effective controls. The most affected individuals and groups had to at least partially accept the controls. Twentieth-century totalitarian regimes, with considerable bureaucratic resources and enforcement capabilities, were well aware that they, in addition to control measures, also needed to win a necessary level of public cooperation and support.²⁸¹ On the Habsburg-Ottoman border, there were three important stakeholders involved, whose concerns and interests had to be addressed to enforce the mobility-control regime successfully. First, the migrants, the group most directly affected, had to accept border-control regulations and procedures as indispensable, reasonable, and in line with contemporary international practices. Second, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg partner on the other side of the boundary, had to agree with additional restrictions on free movement of people and goods, directly affecting the Ottoman economy and state finances. Third, the limitations on free traffic in the border area that the control system necessitated, significantly influenced the life of local Habsburg populations, putting their social and economic relations with their Ottoman neighbors under close state supervision and control. The Habsburg Monarchy had to make the migration controls both administratively feasible and acceptable to all interested and affected parties.

In this chapter, I first examine the role of the Habsburg military and the Habsburg Military Border. The pacification of Habsburg-Ottoman relations and subsequent

²⁸¹ “‘Information Is the Alpha and Omega;’” Groebner, *Der Schein der Person*.

reorganization of the Military Border, particularly its eastward expansion, were closely connected to the development of effective border controls. Migration control, not military defense, became the most important peacetime duty of the Military Border. I further study how the Habsburg Monarchy ensured the support of the stakeholders involved: the migrants, the border population and the Ottoman border authorities. More detailed descriptions of the extent of the engagement of the border military, of military units specialized in guarding difficult border terrain and river boundaries, as well as of the organization of border no-contact markets, can be found in the appendix of this book.

Administrative Capacity: Military; “The most important duty of border troops in peacetime was guarding the cordon”²⁸²

Besides quarantine stations, the other essential element of the border mobility controls was the system of guard posts and supervision regulations and practices designed to prevent illegal border crossing outside official quarantine stations. Even before border sanitary administration was integrated into the Military Border in 1776,²⁸³ the army had been for decades responsible for staffing the sanitary cordon. Habsburg soldiers guarded the boundary, redirecting the traffic to official border crossings. They also served as guards in quarantine stations. The local commanders were responsible for issuing passports to migrants who passed quarantine. They maintained everyday

²⁸² “Der wichtigste Dienst der Gränztruppen, zur Zeit des Friedens bestehet in der Bewachung des Cordons.“ Spiridion Jowitsch, *Ethnographisches Gemählde der slawonischen Militärgränze oder ausführliche Darstellung der Lage, Beschaffenheit und politischen Verfassung des Landes, dann der Lebensart, Sitten, Gebräuche, der geistigen Bildung und des Charakters seiner Bewohner* (Vienna, 1835) 48.

²⁸³ Until 1776, the border sanitary administration was independent from the Habsburg army. After 1776, it was subjected to the War Council (Hofkriegsrat) and integrated into the military.

communication with the Ottoman side, filed reports from the boundary and organized their own sanitary-intelligence networks. At the beginning, several parallel security arrangements existed, some not involving military.

When the first permanent *Pestkordon* was created in the 1720s and the 1730s, it could rely only partially on the Military Border for support. The sanitary cordon was directly adjacent to two old Military Border westernmost districts in the area between the Adriatic Sea and the Sava River, the Karlovac (Karlstadt) Generalate (or Generalcy, also known as the Croatian Border), and the Banal (or Petrinja) Border.²⁸⁴ A larger part of the border was without direct military support.²⁸⁵ The situation changed after Habsburg territorial losses in 1739. The Slavonian Military Border became aligned with the new boundary. The province of Banat, directly ruled from Vienna, staffed the cordon with its provincial militia. Further to the east, Transylvania continued not to have the Military Border. All three arrangements, the first involving the Military Border, the second in Banat, and the third in Transylvania, kept the costs low. The efficiency, on the other hand, varied. A comparison between Transylvania

²⁸⁴The two borders were the last remains (together with the Old Slavonian Border or the Varaždin Generalate) of an old defensive military frontier against the Ottomans that spread between the Adriatic Sea and Upper Hungary (now Slovakia) from the sixteenth century. While a larger section in Hungary was dissolved after 1699, because the frontier moved hundreds of kilometers to the south, the Military Borders in Croatia, where the Habsburgs were less successful in territorial expansion, survived. The Croatian and Banal military borders increased their territory and population in the war of 1683-1699. Ivić, *Migracije Srba u Hrvatsku*, 5-6, 13-14; Pedani, *Dalla frontiera al confine*, 15-16; Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 84, 86-92, 240-42; Kaser, "Siedler an der habsburgischen Militärgrenze," 985-87; Ágoston, "Defending and Administering the Frontier," 221; Varga, "Croatia and Slavonia," 269-70.

²⁸⁵ During the 1720s and the 1730s, there was a progressively increasing spatial divergence as we go eastwards, between the Military Border, which continued to follow the 1699-delimitation, from the post-1718 Habsburg-Ottoman boundary. A narrow strip of land, the *Uskokan* district in northern Bosnia, separated the Slavonian Military Border from the boundary. The distance progressively increased in Habsburg Serbia and Lesser Wallachia to hundreds of kilometers between the Tisza-Máros Military Border and the actual boundary.

and western border provinces showed that the military made a decisive difference between more and less efficient border controls.

On the sections with the Military Border, border militia guarded the cordon for free, as a part of their service. In Banat, provincial militia (Landmiliz) performed this task in a similar manner. Without such troops at hand, Transylvania relied on a mix of military and civilian guards. While the standing army provided guards on major roads and in border quarantine stations, armed peasants, *Plajase* (plăieși), paid by the *Dreissigstamt*, guarded large sections of the Carpathian ranges in between, particularly the byroads and paths leading over the Carpathian Mountains to Wallachia and Moldavia.²⁸⁶ The system, however, was not very efficient. Dr. Grosse, the principal Transylvanian contagion physician, who inspected the guards in 1752, criticized the ill-defined responsibilities of the military, provincial authorities and the *Hofkammer* (das Militare, das Provinciale und das Camerale). He observed that *Plăieși* were inferior to the military, poorly trained and lacking discipline. He concluded that the whole system of guards and quarantine stations in Transylvania was effective only in the case of the migrants unfamiliar with the area and the numerous minor mountain byroads. For locals from both sides of the border, according to Dr. Grosse, Transylvania was in practice an almost open and unprotected country.²⁸⁷ The attempts to introduce better training and control failed to improve the situation. In 1760, for example, the Court Sanitary Deputation was still trying unsuccessfully to improve *Plăieși* service by introducing military discipline and rules.

²⁸⁶ Project über das Personale deren Contumaz Beambten in Siebenbürgen, 16 March 1740, 1740-1, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1. Jesner, "Habsburgische Grenzraumpolitik," 32.

²⁸⁷ Anmerkungen über den von H. Dr. Grosse als in dem Fürstentum Siebenbürgen angestellten ersten Contagions-Physico... eingeschickten Vorschlag wie die Siebenbürgische Gräntzen gegen der Moldau und Wallachey... känn besser zu verwaren wären, 1755 8, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1.

It ordered that accurate lists be made of civil guards and that they be trained in shooting. It organized elaborate regular unannounced inspections and controls. To address permissiveness toward locals and familiarization, guards were never to be assigned to their home district and they were to be changed every two weeks.²⁸⁸ These recommendations were not sufficiently enforced, and guarding service continued to be inadequate. A couple of years later the system was abolished altogether, *plăieși* were dissolved, and replaced by the newly organized Transylvanian Military Border.

While the Transylvanian border continued to be plagued by problems during the 1740s and the 1750s, the central and western sections of the border went through reforms. The existing military border districts were reorganized from 1737 through the 1740s and early 1750s (Croatian Border in 1746, Banal and Slavonian Borders by the 1750s). The troops were divided into territorial battalions and regiments, like the regular army, with draconian discipline and yearly drills. This enabled the Monarchy to use successfully border troops outside the Habsburg-Ottoman border, in other European theaters of war. A better organization was also reflected in border guarding service, improving border supervision and contributing to a decline in banditry.²⁸⁹ The reforms further increased, at the expense of Transylvania, the contrast in migration-

²⁸⁸ Instruction welche sowohl von den angestellten Granitz Wächern oder Plajaschen, und deren Vorgesetzten Inspectoren, als auch von denen Landes- Inwohnern, in Betreff deren hinkünftig zu versicherenden Playen, Reith- und Fuß-Weegen, über die Landes-Gräntzen, zu beobachten ist, 1760 Januar 18, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1.

²⁸⁹ A use of some border troops in the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1735) inspired reforms. Border troops proved essential in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and valuable in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). At that moment, with about 40,000 soldiers, they made up about a quarter of the Habsburg army, although only a third could march out of the Military Border at a time. Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia*, 21-38, 40-45; Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat*, 131-39; Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 83-92, 227-30, 240-43, 319-24; William O'Reilly, "Border, Buffer and Bulwark. The Historiography of the Military Frontier, 1521-1881," in *Frontiers and the Writing of History*, 231, 233, 238, 242. For drop in banditry, see Chapter 1.

control efficiency that already existed between it and the western portions of the *Pestkordon*. As a result, the Military border was expanded to the east, to cover the whole length of the Habsburg-Ottoman border, to Banat in 1764-1765, and to Transylvania in 1762-1766.²⁹⁰ One reason for the expansion was to increase further a relatively cheap source of troops to use elsewhere.²⁹¹ The other was to resolve deficiencies of the sanitary cordon in Transylvania.²⁹² In 1763-1764 a special battalion of military boatmen (*Tschaikistenbataillon*) was established to patrol the border rivers of Danube and Sava.²⁹³ This suggests that control of cross-border mobility was, as a factor in the extension of the Military Border, not less important than the increase in the number of recruits. Thus, by the late 1760s, along the whole length of the *Pestkordon* there was a uniformly organized Military border to support it. The Military Border continued to perform this duty until its abolition in 1851-1881.²⁹⁴ Through this institution, the Habsburg central government was able to directly regulate and control cross-border migrations.

²⁹⁰ Jordan, *Die kaiserliche Wirtschaftspolitik im Banat*, 83-98; Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 318-24; O'Reilly, "Border, Buffer and Bulwark," 231, 233.

²⁹¹ Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat*, 512-520.

²⁹² As suggested by Lesky. Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia*, 46-49.

²⁹³ More about *Tschaikisten* in Chapter 3 and the Appendix 3.2.

²⁹⁴ Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia*, 180-92; Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat*, 490-501.

Table 3.1. The Military Border after its extension to Banat and Transylvania in the 1760s²⁹⁵

Central Court institution	Provincial commands	Border regiments
The Court War Council	Karlovac Generalate	Lika Otočac Ogulin Slunj
	Banal Border	Glina Petrinja
	Slavonian Border	Gradiška Brod Petrovaradin <i>Tschaikisten</i> battalion
	Banat Border	German Illyrian
	Transylvanian Border	1. Wallachian 2. Szekler 1. Szekler 2. Wallachian

The Military border provided a large and well-organized body of men. Its eastward extension increased the number of available soldiers in the late 1760s and in the 1770s to 65,000-70,000.²⁹⁶ Some of them were engaged in *Pestkordon* duties, either by

²⁹⁵ Based on Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*. The Varaždin Generalate (Old Slavonian Border) was exempted from sanitary cordon duties. Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze*, vol. 2, no. 2: 360.

²⁹⁶ Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 324.

guarding the border or by waiting to relieve serving guards, who usually changed each week. According to an estimate from 1823, the Military Border had to provide at least 4,179 guards in healthy times, 6,798 when plague was present in distant Ottoman provinces (or when there was political disorder in Ottoman border provinces), and 10,066 when a plague epidemic reached the border.²⁹⁷ The actual number of people involved in guarding the border and unavailable for use elsewhere triples when we count in the military units returning from duty and those getting ready to relieve the present guards.²⁹⁸ The maintenance costs for such a sizeable work force, as well as control infrastructure, were substantial. Border officers' salaries and allowances had to be paid, while command centers, watch houses, patrol paths and barriers had to be built and maintained. The costs were lowered in several ways. The biggest savings resulted from the fact that border soldiers did not need to be paid for their service on the sanitary cordon. They had to provide their service for free in exchange for the right to cultivate land plots assigned to their families. In 1786, the border soldiers in Slavonia had to serve on the cordon at least two months during healthy years and more during suspicious and pestilent times. As with their other provincial services (guarding the provincial and regimental commands, escorting arrestees, guarding convicts who pulled barges upstream), they had to provide it without pay, covering all their costs by themselves. The border soldiers received remunerations only when used on campaigns outside the Military Border. In addition, the border soldiers also had to

²⁹⁷ There were different dynamics involved in the increase of guards on various sections of the border. On the Transylvanian Military Border, fewer guards were engaged during winter, because snow blocked some of passes and byways in the Carpathians. Jesner, "Habsburgische Grenzraumpolitik," 49. See the Appendix 3.1 for more information about border guards.

²⁹⁸ SHK, 8 October 1743, 1743 October 4, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 1. In 1766, 3,534 soldiers were allocated to the Karlovac Generalate cordon in pestilent times. The advice of the Sanitäts- [Hof-] Deputation, 21 May 1766, 1766 Junius 1, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2. This number could include the replacements, which would staff the cordon after a week.

pay taxes, which financed the operation of the border administration, including officers' salaries. They were also obliged to provide *Robaten* (corvée), for the erection of watch houses, officers' accommodation, border paths and other necessary border infrastructure. Due to these measures, the cost of maintenance of border troops, even when used in military campaigns elsewhere in Europe was just a quarter of the costs of the regular army.²⁹⁹ At the border, border troops not only provided necessary labor for the operation of border controls, but also managed to finance most of its costs.³⁰⁰ While classifying the border soldiers as state serfs would be an exaggeration, in the eighteenth century they were very far from free peasant soldiers.³⁰¹

The flipside of this was the militarization of society along the Military Border. For example, the commanding general in Osijek (later in Petrovaradin) was the head not only of the military, but also of all the administration of the border area, including judiciary, and military townships, whose inhabitants were engaged in trade and provided no military service. Retired officers usually led military townships. With no free cities and no noble manors, the Slavonian Military Border was not politically

²⁹⁹ Engel, "Beschreibung des Königreichs Slawonien," vol. 2: 317-18, 333-34, 711, 713-15, 732, 1013-14; Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat*, 354-65.

³⁰⁰ There were some additional costs, particularly during pestilent regimes. In 1762, border soldiers had to be subsidized with a cordon allowance of two Kreuzer. Bartenstein to Maria Theresia, Vienna, 14 September 1762, 26 October 1762, 16 November 1762, 17 and 31 October 1762, 1762 September 13; 1762-October-23; 1762 December 3; 1762 December 17, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1. If all guards would receive this allowance for a full year during pestilent regime, the total costs would run up to over 120,000 guildens. When introduced in the thirteenth century, Kreuzer was silver coin. From 1760, it was made of copper. Its standard value was four pfennigs; 60 Kreuzer made one gulden, also known as florin (fl.) or as forint in Hungary. Thus 1 Gulden = 60 Kreuzer = 240 Pfennigs. *Österreichische Geldgeschichte. Vom Mittelalter bis zum Euro* (Vienna: Österreichische Nationalbank, s.d.), 24-25, 46-49,

https://www.oenb.at/docroot/flipbooks/oesterreichische_geldgeschichte/flipviewerxpress.html (Accessed 11 January 2016). Similar situation existed on the Transylvanian Military Border. Jesner, "Habsburgische Grenzraumpolitik," 40, 43, 60-61.

³⁰¹ As described by Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat*.

represented in Hungarian diets. Although formally subjected to the *locum tenens* of Hungary, the Slavonian commanding general, for example, received orders from the War Council in Vienna.³⁰² The central government was more present and influential than elsewhere in the monarchy.³⁰³ This militarization lowered costs and increased the efficiency of the Military border. It also lowered the freedom of the population, imposing hereditary military profession on male inhabitants. Although military border men were often designated as “free peasants,” their contemporaries were critical of this. As Engel noted in 1786, “if the freedom is taken in its natural meaning...the border men are very far from it,” since they are not allowed to decide the non-military career for themselves or for their children.³⁰⁴

“Uninterrupted System of Sentinels”³⁰⁵

Watch houses (Tschartaken, Cserdaken, Wachthütten, Wachthäuser, Thürme) existed along the borderline before the sanitary cordon was organized. They were built along the Slavonian border with Ottoman Bosnia soon after 1699. At that time, when it was still not clear whether the pacification of the Habsburg-Ottoman border would be permanent, they served as observation points, to alert the Habsburg defense of possible Ottoman attacks. At the time when the sanitary cordon was established in the

³⁰² Taube, *Historische und geographische Beschreibung*, vol. 2: 75, 84-85; vol. 3: 86-87; Engel, “Beschreibung des Königreichs Slawonien,” vol. 2: 759-60, 762, 764-66; Jowitsch, *Ethnographisches Gemählde*, 42-46.

³⁰³ Military Border was surveyed earlier than other provinces in Hungary. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 324-26.


³⁰⁴ “Wenn übrigens die natürliche Freyheit nach ihrer eigentlichen Bedeutung genommen wird, so ist der Gränzer sowohl in Rücksicht seiner eigenen Person, als auch seiner Kinder die ihre Bestimmung zum Militär stand haben, mithin da er mit denenselben nicht nach Willkuhr disponiren darf, wert davon entfernet.” Engel, “Beschreibung des Königreichs Slawonien,” vol. 2: 542-43.

³⁰⁵ “ununterbrochene System von Wachen.” Jowitsch, *Ethnographisches Gemählde*, 48.

1720s, the Habsburg authorities realized that peacetime cross-border raids were a thing of the past. Watchtowers focused, therefore, not on Ottoman military, but on migrants. Partly built of stones, partly of wood, they were placed as to make the two neighboring watchtowers, left and right, visible, as well as the boundary sections in between. The distances varied, depending on the terrain. In the hilly and wooded terrain of Croatia (Karlovac Generalate and Banal Border) they could be placed much closer than in the flatlands of Slavonia, Srem or Banat, for example, where in 1765, it was ordered that they should be about fifteenth minutes' walk from one another. In Slavonia, the watchtowers along the Sava River were made of wood, placed on wooden poles, a couple of meters above ground, so that the observation area could be larger, and to keep guards dry during seasons, such as spring, when water levels were high. The size depended on the post's importance. A typical watchtower had a main room, surrounded by a roofed terrace with a chest-high fence, so the soldiers were protected during observations. Guards climbed into watchtowers using ladders, pulled up in the case of danger, with embrasures (Schießlöcher) in the floor for defense. In times of danger, additional middle posts (Zwischenposten) were added between regular posts. From watchtowers, border guards went on patrols, inspecting the eventual signs of illegal entrances. They reported to border officers, placed in smaller fortifications. In Slavonia, cavalry also performed patrol duties. A cordon road (Cordonstrasse) going along the borderline connected watchtowers. At night, gun shots (Signalschüsse) were used to alert surrounding stations in case of intrusion. The guards submitted regular reports to officers, usually to "most humbly report that there was nothing to report."³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ "Gehorsamst melden, daß sie nichts zu melden haben." In the nineteenth century, there was an alarm system along the whole border. Main posts had alarm poles (Alarmstangen), a plate placed between two wooden poles and mallets to hit it, so that the sound could be heard at the next station. A

Figure 3.1. Watch Tower near Pančevo (late eighteenth/early nineteenth c.)³⁰⁷



bunch of straw soaked in tar on a high pole, fired when needed, served as a night alarm. Through the alarm system, a signal traveled from Dalmatia to Serbia in an hour or an hour and a half. There were many false alarms. Taube, *Historische und geographische Beschreibung*, vol. 3: 115-16; Engel, "Beschreibung des Königreichs Slawonien," vol. 2: 711, 713-15; Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze*, vol. 2, no. 1: 366, 369; vol. 2, no. 2: 354-56; Jowitsch, *Ethnographisches Gemählde*, 48-53; E. I. von Tkalac, *Jugenderinnerungen aus Kroatien (1749-1823. 1824-1843)* (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1894), 134-36; Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 240-42.

³⁰⁷ Source: Entwurf eines Cordons Wachthauses bequem für 20 Mann bestehende ...auf unter Oficirs Posten Homolizer Dunavaez, IAB-1184-IG, 1/8. I would to thank to the Historical Archive of Belgrade for providing me with an electronic copy of this document.

In addition to watchtowers, in the Karlovac Generalate and on the Banal Border, where despite a denser network of watchtowers, the terrain was still difficult to observe, special mobile patrol units were organized to surveil hilly and mountainous areas, *Seressaner* or “cordon’s police” (Cordons-Polizei). They were specialized in fighting robbery, smuggling, and desertion. On the Sava and Danube rivers, from Jasenovac in Slavonia to Banatska Palanka in Banat, the river battalion of *Tschaikisten*, organized in 1763-1764, patrolled. They used small galleys, called *Tschaiken* or *Sayken*, with rowing banks and sails that could move quickly upstream and downstream. *Tschaiken* could carry from 100 to 1,000 people and two to four cannons. The *Tschaikisten* came from the *Tschaikisten* Battalion district of the Military Border, in Bačka, between the Tisza and the Danube. They patrolled from spring to autumn along border rivers.³⁰⁸

In addition to the fight against epidemics, the cordon and the Military Border were used as a tool for population management and economic policy.³⁰⁹ By controlling migrants, the cordon did not only check for epidemics. It performed other secondary duties, like the fight against banditry, regularly mentioned in the cordon’s descriptions written by contemporaries. The hierarchy of other tasks changed, reflecting population policy priorities. In the eighteenth century, when the Habsburg Monarchy was working on increasing its population, the focus was on preventing unauthorized travels to the Ottoman Empire, particularly emigration, flight of criminals and desertion. In the 1820s, preventing emigration and desertion were still mentioned among the cordon’s goals, but also the immigration of undesirables. In

³⁰⁸ See the Appendix 3.2. for more about *Seressaner* and *Tschaikisten*.

³⁰⁹ Military defense against Ottomans nominally remained one of the main duties of the sanitary cordon. There was no Ottoman military threat during peacetime in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the eighteenth century in nine out of ten years there was peace between Vienna in Istanbul. There were no military conflicts between two empires in the nineteenth century.

1835, emigration was not perceived as a major problem. Instead, the focus was on preventing the immigration of “good for nothings” and smuggling. Writing about the sanitary cordon as it existed in the 1830s and the 1840s, when he visited it as a boy, Imbro Tkalac cynically noted that its role “is certainly not the defense against Turkish raids of the Austrian territory, but principally the suppression of smuggling of tobacco, salt, coffee and sugar from the Ottoman to the Habsburg territory, because [Ottoman price of] these products was only half [of the Austrian price].”³¹⁰

Guarding the cordon became the principal peacetime duty of the Military Border. The number of service days, particularly in pestilent years, suggests that it was the predominant and heavy duty on many border sections. In 1823, border soldiers spent on average fifty-two days on sanitary-cordon duties in healthy years, a third of their 150 days of yearly service (forty-eight days were spent in exercises and maneuvers and forty-two days on duties within the regiment). The service on the cordon could double during pestilent and suspicious health regimes.³¹¹ In addition, there were

³¹⁰ “Die eigentliche Bestimmung dieser Gränzsoldaten ist, fowohl in Friedens- als Kriegszeiten die Gränzen zu decken und dieselben Tag und Nacht zu bewachen; folglich zu verhüten, daß die Osmanen keinen Unfug auf österreichischem Grund und Boden treiben, daß keine türkische Räuber hereinsbrechen, daß sich niemand ohne Haltung der Quarantaine durchschleiche, daß keiner ohne Paß in die Turkey gehe, daß die Ausreisser, Uebelthäter und andere, die über die Gränze ins türkische Gebieth flüchten wollen.” “...um zu verhüten, daß keine Soldaten von den deutschen und hungarischen Regimentern ausreissen; daß sich niemand aus der Turkey ohne Haltung der Quarantäne durchschleiche; daß die Türken nicht herüber kommen und Unheil anrichten mögen.” Taube, *Historische und geographische Beschreibung*, Vol. 3: 81, 115-16; Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze*, vol. 2, no. 2: 354-56. The purpose of the cordon, according to Jowitsch was to prevent Ottoman attacks, spread of plague epidemics, smuggling, desertion and the “Einwanderung von schlechten und unnützen Gesindel.“ Jowitsch, *Ethnographisches Gemählde*, 48. “An der österreichisch-türkischen Grenze war stets ein Militärcordon aufgestellt, der allerdings nicht mehr zur Abwehr türkischer Einbrüche auf österreichisches Gebiet, sondern hauptsächlich zur Verhinderung des Schmuggels von Tabak, Salz, Kaffee und Zucker aus türkischem auf österreichisches Gebiet diente, weil diese Artikel dort nur halb so viel kosteten als hier.” Tkalac, *Jugenderinnerungen*, 134-35.

³¹¹ Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze*, vol. 2, no. 2: 362-63.

significant local and regional differences that could increase the burden further. First, travel times varied. Soldiers changed each week, and each served in healthy years at least four times. Some soldiers needed days to reach designated cordon posts. The soldiers from distant villages on the Karlovac Generalate in Croatia, for example, needed four days to reach their designated cordon posts. Total service and travel time during pestilent years would double.³¹² Further, the burden was unevenly distributed between border sections and border regiments. The soldiers in the relatively populous Lika and Ogulin regiments, and two Banal regiments were responsible for smaller border sections, sending fewer than 200 people at once to the cordon, compared to the regiments in Slavonia or parts of Transylvania, that needed to provide more than 400 to staff their respective sections.³¹³ This imbalance would further increase in pestilent years. In 1817, a *Grenzer* from the Gradiška Regiment in Slavonia spent on average 262 days in service, 168 on the cordon, leaving him with little time to cultivate his plot, his main source of income and sustenance.³¹⁴ Tkalac, who in 1834 visited his older brother, who served on the cordon as an officer, called the cordon service “an extremely heavy burden” (eine überaus harte Fronde). Spending days isolated, often in harsh weather and in the wilderness (Einöde), was difficult both physically and mentally. Officers struggled with boredom and loneliness. Tkalac’s brother, quartered in a single room with one bed, one table, and one chair, with the next post at shooting distance and the actual boundary only fifty steps away, fought against boredom and loneliness by bringing several novels by Walter Scott to his duty station.³¹⁵ The

³¹² Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze*, vol. 2, no. 2, 356-57; Tkalac, *Jugenderinnerungen*, 134-51. For Transylvania, see Jesner, “Habsburgische Grenzraumpolitik,” 99.

³¹³ Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze*, vol. 2, no. 2, 357-58.

³¹⁴ Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat*, 478-81, 490-501.

³¹⁵ Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze*, vol. 1: 214; vol. 2, no. 2, 356-57; Tkalac, *Jugenderinnerungen*, 134-51. See also Lesky, “Die österreichische Pestfront,” 88-90; Rothenberg,

cordon duty remained very unpopular among both officers and common soldiers until the Military Border was dissolved.

Stakeholders: Local population

The operation of the cordon was based on laws criminalizing the crossing of the border outside quarantine stations. A very strict regulation was complemented by a juridical system with martial courts and harsh punishments, all intended to serve as a deterrent. On its face, the system was very severe.³¹⁶ The patent published by Empress Maria Theresa on 25 August 1766, translated into all commonly spoken (in allen in dem Lande gewöhnlichen Sprachen) languages in the Austrian and Hungarian lands, including the border areas around the *Pestkordon*, emphasized that the quarantine stations were the only allowed entrance points both in healthy and in pestilent times. Only roads leading to quarantine stations were marked, while the other roads and paths in the border area were to be hidden and forbidden to use. If an attempted illegal crossing by these side roads was noticed, migrants would be warned to return to the main road or risk being shot, their corpses burned, and their animals and goods confiscated. The death sentence was prescribed for those who committed certain sanitary transgressions: transgressors coming from pestilent provinces and detected only after they had already entered; those traveling with false travel documents (*Attestata, Pässe Federn, Prattica*); migrants who reported a false place of origin to

“The Austrian Sanitary Cordon:” 18; Ilić, “Der Sanitätskordon,” 344-48; Panzac, *Quarantaines et lazarets*, 68; Panzac, “Politique sanitaire:” 94-95; O’Reilly, “Border, Buffer and Bulwark,” 238-39.

³¹⁶ In 1739 and 1740 Emperor Charles VI issued a patent that threatened anyone illegally crossing the provisional *Pestkordon* between Lower Austria and Hungary with a death sentence. Festsetzung der Todesstrafe für diejenigen, die unerlaubt den um Niederösterreich gelegten Kordon gegen die Pest überschreiten, 16 January 1740, FHKA SUS Patente 74.2.

avoid a long quarantine; the local subjects who helped them. Local inhabitants as well as tavern and innkeepers who did not report illegal immigrants or strangers with improper travel documents to authorities were to be subjected to the punishment of two years of trench digging (Schanz Strafe).³¹⁷ In applying sanitary law targeting transgressions, however, the local and provincial authorities were careful not to alienate locals, trying to coopt them instead in border-control enforcement.

Local Habsburg subjects were the weakest link of border controls. The locals knew the terrain, were familiar with border guards and patrols, and had friends on the other side of the border. For them, it was not too difficult to cross the border unnoticed or help others avoid controls. Vuck Jankovics, an inhabitant of Zemun, in the summer of 1762 left his wife Milicza and their children and crossed secretly with his lover, Stoja Jovanova, to the Ottoman Empire. Vuck and Stoja met near the gates, sneaked together to the river shore where a prearranged Ottoman boat waited for them. They crossed the border unnoticed. At the repeated request of the abandoned wife Milicza, Marin Vojkovics, a friend from Zemun went on several occasions secretly to Belgrade to beg Vuck to return to his family. Marin crossed through fields and swamps, and Ottoman subjects, who transported firewood to Zemun, transported him

³¹⁷ Erneuerung der Kontumaz-Ordnung, 25 August 1766, FHKA SUS Patente 159.31. The severity of the legislation was amended formally in 1769, by clarifying that in healthy times sanitary offenders were not sent to martial courts, but subjected to the regular criminal procedure instead. In 1805 the death sentence was abolished for the locals who helped transgressors. To the Slav. SK; to the Transylv. SK, the SK in the Generalate of Karlovac; also to TLA; to Commercial- Intendenza in Triest; also to HKR; to Obriste Justitz Stelle; to the Ministerial Banco Deputation; to the Commerciens Rath; to the Hungarian and Transylvanian Chancelleries. Vienna, 9 February 1769, Freih[err] von Koller. The original in the Austrian and Bohemian Court Chancellery; Nota to the HKR; to the Obriste Justiz Stelle; to the Ministerial Banco- Deputation; to the Commerciens Rath; Inclyta to the Hungarian Chancellery; to the Transylvanian Chancellery, Vienna, 9 February 1769, 1769 Februarius 3, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2. Military defense against Ottomans nominally remained one of the main duties of the sanitary cordon. There was no Ottoman military threat during peacetime in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze*, vol. 2, no. 2: 449.

to Belgrade and back secretly. Both Vuck and Marin moved across the border secretly with ease. The affair was discovered only in December 1763, when Vuck, after “spells that... [Stoja] threw on him were broken” decided to return to his family. His return to Zemun was immediately noticed. Marin received fifty lashes. Vuck was arrested.³¹⁸ The sources do not explain what happened to him later. Based on the outcomes of similar court cases, he was probably sentenced to several months or a couple of years of hard labor. Local inhabitants often played a crucial role in organizing illegal crossings for non-locals, even without Ottoman participation. In 1769, a Zemun fisherman Janko Stanojevics Kuriak was arrested for secretly transporting people over the border during the night while pretending to fish.³¹⁹ The local population was trying to avoid complicated procedures regulating travel to the Ottoman Empire and back.

It was essential for authorities to dissuade the border population from such actions. One manner was a closer regulation of border life. Concentrated villages, with houses in a line, progressively replaced dispersed houses to increase public security, but also so that neighbors could keep a watchful eye on each other and alert authorities if necessary.³²⁰ For example, they were obliged to report to authorities if their neighbors prepared to emigrate from the Military Border.³²¹ The active role of

³¹⁸ IAB, ZM, 1764-1-98, 1764-1-72, in Ilić, *Beograd i Srbija*, 187-99.

³¹⁹ IAB, ZM, 1769-2-89, in Ilić, *Beograd i Srbija*, 266-72. Six people from Otočac regiment in the Karlovac Generalate were arrested in 1764 for helping an immigrant Ive Marinich to illegally cross the cordon from Ottoman Bosnia. Vienna, 5 August 1764, to the Interim commander of the Karlovac Generalate, 1764 Augustus 5; 1764 Augustus 10; Vienna, 13 November 1764, to Interim commander of the Karlovac Generalate, 1764 November 4, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

³²⁰ “Die öffentliche Sicherheit... hergestellt worden ist, bloß in der Zusammenziehung der Dorfschaften an die Landstraße, in der Regulierung der Häuser nach immer guten Ordnung, damit jeder Einwohner auf das Betragen seines Nachbars Acht haben konnte.” Engel, “Beschreibung des Königreichs Slawonien,” vol. 1: 190.

³²¹ Engel, “Beschreibung des Königreichs Slawonien,” vol. 1: 274.

local population is further stressed in ordinances targeting strangers. In 1761, the commander of Zemun, Colonel Schulze, ordered town inhabitants to discreetly report to the town magistrate the arrival of all strangers (particularly Ottoman Muslims), their “Tauf- und Zunamen” and the reason for their arrival.³²² Non-natives who did not engage local help ran into many more difficulties and were often caught, as was the case with deserters. The crossing of the borderline was just the first step. The migrant needed some support after crossing and guides to take him away from the border. The border population was made up of small communities, where everyone knew each other and a stranger stood out.

For locals, short stays and quick returns decreased the possibility of detection. That is why Marin’s secret trip from Zemun to Belgrade went unnoticed. The return of his friend Vuck, absent for a year and a half, could not be kept secret. The local population could be very alert and supportive of public policies. In 1778, Zemun inhabitant Syma Lukics reported that one local boatman negotiated with “Turks.”³²³ Although the content of the boatman’s conversation remained unknown to him, he was aware that the authorities did not approve of unsupervised communication with the people living on the other side of the border.

Mutual control was the most efficient enforcement method. Denunciations were an essential tool in the control of the local population. People were encouraged to report not only strangers, but also suspicious behavior by their neighbors. The informants were protected and rewarded for their role, for example by receiving a

³²² Obrister Schulze to the Zemun Magistrate, Zemun, 9 September 1761, IAB, ZM, 1761-1-3, in Ilić, *Beograd i Srbija*, 144. Thirteen years later, the Zemun military command reminded the Zemun Magistrate that the inhabitants were obliged to report all strangers accommodated in town inns and in private houses. Nobody was allowed to approach border rivers before noon and during the night. IAB, ZM, 1774-2-27, in Ilić, *Beograd i Srbija*, 388-91.

³²³ IAB, ZM, 1778-1-112, in Ilić, *Beograd i Srbija*, 462-64.

third of the value of smuggled goods.³²⁴ Local peasants were rewarded if they caught escaped convicts sentenced to hard labor in the border area.³²⁵ This loyalty of the local population to the system was probably the most important element in its functioning. The many instances when locals reported each other suggest that this internal social control gave the migration-control regime most of its strength.

A different approach existed in Lika in Croatia: attempting to win over the support of local population. The border regime there was more lax before the 1760s, as an additional support to the delicate local economy. One of the original parts of the Military Border, created in the sixteenth century, the Karlovac Generalate, of which Lika was the southernmost region, more than doubled its territory as well as its population during the war of 1683-1699. It received many waves of settlers from the Ottoman Empire before 1699. The number of its inhabitants swelled so much that this westernmost section of the Military Border could provide the Habsburg military with 18,000 soldiers, a quarter of all border troops, 4,000 more than the much bigger Transylvanian Border.³²⁶ The disadvantage was that local agriculture could not feed so many people. Transportation costs made importing food from the Hungarian Plain to compensate for shortages prohibitively expensive. The most convenient and least expensive way to import food was from nearby Ottoman western Bosnia. The Habsburg Monarchy allowed custom-free import of goods from Bosnia for personal use. In exchange for food, the Habsburg subjects supplied Bosnians with salt from the Adriatic salt works, which they could buy from military warehouses in Senj and

³²⁴ Auswanderungspatent, Vienna, 10 August 1784, in *Handbuch aller unter der Regierung des Kaisers Joseph des II für die K. K. Erbländer ergangener Verordnungen und Gesetze in einer Systematischen Verbindung* 6, no. 2 (1786): 279-307, here 290.

³²⁵ Steiner, *Rückkehr unerwünscht*, 26.

³²⁶ Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 321-24.

Karlobag at a discount.³²⁷ Why did not only Ottoman peasants, but also Venetian subjects from Dalmatia continue to arrive in this overcrowded and occasionally hunger-stricken province? If they were coming from even worse conditions in the Balkans, would not they be better off settling in western Bosnia, which produced at least some agricultural surpluses? While it is not possible to answer these questions with more certainty, it appears that Lika was an initial reception area for immigrants. From there, migrants were often re-settled into more prosperous provinces, such as Slavonia or Banat.³²⁸ The immigrants possibly chose to cross the boundary here because it was easier to leave the Ottoman Empire unnoticed. The border area here was scarcely populated, wild and forested. The borders on the Sava and Danube were better monitored, and Ottoman border authorities could prevent the emigration of their subjects more easily.

To further help the local population, the sanitary regime here was for a long time more relaxed. The Sanitary Court Deputation ordered the organization of two quarantine stations, Slunj and Rudanovac, in 1753, more than a decade later than elsewhere.³²⁹ This part of the border continued to operate differently until the 1760s. In April 1758, the quarantine time for migrants coming to this section of the border

³²⁷ In 1820, the ratio of exchange was one measure of salt for three measures of grain. Hietzinger, *Statistik der Militärgränze*, vol. 2, no. 1: 312. Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat*, 501-505.

³²⁸ See Chapter 4.

³²⁹ Previously there were only temporary cordons, drawn during suspicious and pestilent times. In October 1742, the Sanitary Court Commission ordered the drawing and staffing of the cordon against Bosnia because of a plague epidemic there. Rescript to the Innerösterreichische Krieg Stelle, 24. oktober 1742, 1742 October 6, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 1. The work on the quarantine facilities continued into 1755. SHD to Slav. SK, 14 May 1753, 1753 Majus 1; Vienna, 4 August 1753, Nota to the HKR, 1753 Augustus 2; Vienna, 17 December 1753, Nota to Hofkammer, 1753 December 7; Vienna, 9 April 1754, to Scherzer; and Nota to Hofkammer, 1754 Aprilis 6; Vienna, 26 April 1755, to the Count Petazzi, 1755 Aprilis 8; Vienna, 2 June 1755, to the Count Petazzi. 1755 Junius 3, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2.

was decreased to fourteen days, below the official minimum (twenty-one days).³³⁰ In 1754 and in 1760, the quarantine was cancelled altogether for border soldiers who went to Bosnia to buy food for their families.³³¹ The local character of trade with no major trade routes passing through meant that the danger that merchants could bring some epidemic from faraway places was smaller. In addition, most of the imported merchandise here consisted of cereals, other kinds of food and live animals, all exempted from quarantine.

A lenient approach and a more flexible mobility regime worked well until the 1760s, when it was temporarily called into question. After the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), there was an intensification of efforts to standardize and rationalize Habsburg administration.³³² The Sanitary Court Deputation set out to codify sanitary administration and to make quarantine facilities and procedures more uniform. The special arrangement in the Karlovac Generalate was perceived as a potentially dangerous anomaly. The local lax approach appeared to leave the province, the greatest source of soldiers, too exposed to plague epidemics in Bosnia, at the very moment when the losses in the Seven Years' War created manpower shortages.³³³ When, during the summer of 1763, a plague epidemic spread through Bosnia, the Sanitary Court Deputation ordered a complete halt in the trade with the Ottomans. Severe hunger spread through Lika.³³⁴ The commanding general in Karlovac, Baron

³³⁰ SHD to the commanding general in the Karlovac Generalate, 1758 Aprilis 13, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

³³¹ SHD to the Command of the Karlovac Generalate, Vienna, 5 April 1760, 1760 Aprilis 2, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

³³² Behrisch, *Die Berechnung der Glückseligkeit*, 56-74.

³³³ Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia*, 40-45.

³³⁴ Maria Theresia to Generalate of Karlovac, Vienna, 15 September 1763, 1763 Augustus 8; Maria Theresia to the Interims-Commando in dem Carlstädter Generalat, Vienna, 1 October 1763; Nota to

Beck, explained to the Sanitary Deputation that even in good years it was necessary to import grain to feed the two Lika regiments (Lika and Otočac districts). It was impossible to get food under isolation. Military grain reserves were not sufficient, and importing grain from Karlovac on packhorses was unfeasible because in the dead of winter the horses would consume the most if not all the grain they were carrying. The only way would be to open the Lika border with Bosnia and to allow the border inhabitants access to the salt warehouses on the coast, so that they could exchange salt for grain in a transaction that was economically feasible.³³⁵

After the closure of 1763 and the three consecutive bad harvests that followed,³³⁶ the Karlovac Generalate could count on only a third of its soldiers, with the others unfit for service. The Karlovac leadership requested a permanent border arrangement that would keep the border with Bosnia always open for the import of food. The Deputation suggested organizing weekly border markets (*Rastelle* oder *Wochen-Märckte*), where the sale and barter (*Stichhandel*) of grain, other foodstuffs, salt and live animals with the Ottomans (*Türcken*) would always be possible, under strict sanitary precautions.³³⁷ In 1768, the Sanitary Court Deputation approved the organization of *Rastelle* in the Karlovac Generalate.³³⁸ The exchange of goods was limited to foodstuffs (*gemeinen Lebensmitteln*) to which pestilent miasma did not stick. The exchange was organized in such a manner that there was no direct contact

HKR, Vienna, 2 October 1763; Nota [of HKR to SHD], Vienna, 17 November 1763, 1763-October-2, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2. More about the Lika hunger of 1763 in Chapter 2.

³³⁵ Baron de Beck to Maria Theresa, Karlovac, 17 Decembar 1763, 1763-December 11, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2.

³³⁶ Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia*, 40-45.

³³⁷ Report of the Sanitäts- [Hof-] Deputation, 21 May 1766, 1766 Junius 1, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2. It is not clear what this name *Rastel* means. Perhaps from Italian. *Rastello*, *Rastrello*? – rake, German *das Rastel* – wicker(work), wire net.

³³⁸ In Rudanovac, there was also one of the two quarantine stations of the Karlovac Generalate.

between the Habsburg and Ottoman sides.³³⁹ The *Rastelle* itself was an elongated triangle with an open base on the boundary and a five-foot-tall fence on the longer sides. Regular *Pestkordon* fencing connected on the left and right sides of the triangle, with military watches, to make sure that Ottoman merchants would enter only through the base into the enclosure. The tip of the triangle on the opposite side was cut out with a smaller fence, closer to the base. Under supervision of a military officer in a guardroom, goods were exchanged without contact (see figure 3.2.). Livestock³⁴⁰ was considered clean after swimming through a nearby river or through a specially dug ditch filled with water. Ottomans bought Habsburg goods through barter or by showing money and then dropping it in warm vinegar.³⁴¹

Through the organization of border markets, the border-control regime attempted to reconcile the economic interests of local Habsburg border inhabitants with proper sanitary precautions, discouraging smuggling. The other main source of clandestine border crossings, secret travels by the locals was subsequently addressed as well. They were attempting to avoid the significant burden that quarantine procedures placed on necessary business and family short-distance trips to the other side of the boundary. In the 1830s, the travelers from the Habsburg side of the border were allowed to travel to the Ottoman Empire without need to be subjected to quarantine if they returned on the same day and if they were accompanied throughout the whole trip by a customs official. The customs official would guarantee that there had been


³³⁹ SHD to the Sanitary Commission in Karlovac, Vienna, 28 June 1768; the protocol of the SHD, Vienna, 28 October 1769; Vortrag der ... Sanitäts Hof-Deputation betreffend ... die Rastelle in Croatien 18 November 1769, 1769 October 16, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2.

³⁴⁰ “Zugviehe, als Pferd- Rind- dann dem zum Unterhalte ebenfalls höchst nöthigen Borstenviehe. ”

³⁴¹ Generalsanitätsnormativum, 2 January 1770, *Sammlung aller k. k. Verordnungen und Gesetze vom Jahre 1740. bis 1780.*, Vol. 6: 33-112. More on Rastelle in the Appendix 3.3. See also the description of border markets in Slavonia from 1835, where they were called Skellatage (Skella – ferry), operating on the Habsburg side of border rivers, in Jowitsch, *Ethnographisches Gemählde*, 48-53.

no physical contact with the people on the Ottoman side.³⁴² These were additional measures to ensure the loyalty and cooperation of the Habsburg border population in enforcing the migration-control regime on the border.

Figure 3.2. Mali Maljevac Rastel (founded after 1791)³⁴³



³⁴² Jowitsch, *Ethnographisches Gemählde*, 48-55.

³⁴³ Adapted from Panzac, *Quarantaines en lazarets*, 71-72.

Stakeholders: Migrants

In addition to the local population, the border administration also addressed the concerns and complaints of the group most affected by border controls, the migrants travelling from the Ottoman Empire to the Habsburg Monarchy. It reviewed and sometimes revised border regulations and procedures, so that the system would be as acceptable as possible to the majority of migrants. Through intelligence collection, migrants were also passively and occasionally actively involved in control (See Chapter 2). There was an effort to make border regulations and procedures more comprehensible, by translating them into the most common languages the migrants used. In 1753, at the request of the Sanitary Court Deputation, the interpreter Galinovich translated the *Reinigungs-Ordnung* into Greek, to make its provisions clear to the large portion of Ottoman merchants who used that language. The following year the Austrian Livestock Ordinance (*Vieh-Ordnung*) was translated into Serbian and Romanian (in die Raizisch- und Wallachische Sprach) to help the merchants from Bosnia, Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia,³⁴⁴ heavily involved in livestock trade, to better understand Habsburg sanitary and cleaning procedures.

The Habsburg authorities also responded to migrants' specific complaints. In the winter of 1742/1743, the Habsburg Sanitary Court Commission, upon learning about a plague epidemic around Belgrade, closed the whole border west of Mehadia,

³⁴⁴ Sanitary authorities were responsible for fighting animal as well as human epidemics. They collected information about animal diseases in the Ottoman Empire and adjusted border measures and animal traffic accordingly. SHD to TLA, Vienna, 20 August 1753, 1753 Augustus 10; SHD to TLA, Vienna, 2 November 1754, 1754 November 1, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2. In August and Septebmer 1758 a cattle epidemic was reported in first in Wallachia, then in Serbia and Moldavia. The cattle trade was stopped with Wallachia and Moldavia. Vienna, 12 August 1758, 1758 August 6; Vienna, 9 September 1758, to TLA, 1758 September 1; to Transylv. SK, Vienna, 30 September 1758, 1758 September 6, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

declaring all contiguous Ottoman provinces pestilent, irrespective of the individual places from where the migrants were coming. In January 1743, Ottoman merchants unsuccessfully protested.³⁴⁵ Other complaints were easier to respond to satisfactory. In July 1750, the Ottoman merchants in Mehadia complained to the Sanitary Court Commission in Vienna that their already washed wool was rewashed in Mehadia, for which they were charged, while this extra step did not exist in Zemun and in Pančevo. The Commission ordered a stop to the additional washing in Mehadia and demanded that all border quarantines adopt the uniform procedures.³⁴⁶

³⁴⁵ SHK, 29 January 1743, 1743 Januarius 2; SHK, 31 July 1743, 1743 Julius 1; SHK, 8 August 1743, 1743 Augustus 1, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 1; SHD to TLA, Vienna, 10 July 1754, 1754 Julius 3; SHD to TLA, Vienna, 30 July 1754, 1754-Julius-10; SHD to TLA, to Slav. SK, and to the Hof- und Staatskanzlei, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2; Vienna, 28 March 1758, to the Commercial Intendenza in Trieste, to Slav. SK, Transylv. SK, to TLA, to the General Command in Karlovac, 1758 Martius 6; the Count Perlas, TLA, to SHD, Temesvár, 17 March 1758, 1758 Aprilis 4; to TLA, Vienna, 29 April 1758 and 17 May 1758, 1758 Aprilis 16, 1758 Majus 3; to Transylv. SK, Vienna, 17 May 1758, 1758 Majus 4; Vienna, 17 June 1758, 1758 Junius 8; Slav. SK, Osijek, 3 September 1758, 1758 September 10; to Slav. SK, Vienna, 25 November 1758, 1758 November 5; to TLA, Vienna, 9 December 1758, 1758 December 2; Vienna, 3 March 1759, to TLA, 1759 Martius 1; Vienna, 28 June 1759, to Transylv. SK, 1759 Junius 5; Vienna, 28 June 1759, to Slav. SK, 1759 Junius 8; Vienna, 22 August 1759, to Transylv. SK, 1759 Augustus 10; Vienna, 27 August 1759, 1759 Augustus 11; Vienna, 27 August 1759, to Slav. SK, 1759 Augustus 12; Vienna, 10 September 1759, to TLA, 1759 September 4; Vienna, 19 September 1759, to Slav. SK, 1759 September 12; Vienna, 22 September 1759, to TLA, to Transylv. SK, to Slav. SK, to the Hof- und Staatskanzlei, 1759 Septembris 18; Vienna, 4 October 1759, to TLA, 1759 October 2; Vienna, 16 October 1759, to Slav. SK, 1759 October 8; Vienna, 24 October 1759, to Slav. SK, to the Count Mercy, to the Hof- und Staatskanzlei, to HKR, 1759 October 15; Vienna, 29 October 1759, to TLA, 1759 October 19; Vienna, 17 November 1759, to the Karlovac Generalate Command, 1759 November 3; Vienna, 29 November 1759, to the Count Mercy, the president of the Slav. SK, 1759 November 16, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

³⁴⁶ A decree from 3 July 1750, to the Mehadia quarantine director Mathias Perner, 1750 Julius 3; A decree from 12 September 1750 to the Zemun quarantine director Stadler, 1750 September 1; A decree from 12 September 1750 to the Mehadia quarantine director Perner, 1750 September 2, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 1.

The representatives of affected migrants were sometimes involved in the review process. In discussions over quarantine cleaning taxes in the 1740s, the Sanitary Court Commission prioritized migrants' complaints over the financial interests of quarantine stations. According to the eighteenth-century understanding of plague, pestilent miasma easily attached itself to some goods, such as raw cotton and wool, textiles, clothes, skins and furs. They were not only quarantined, but also subjected to additional cleaning. The merchants had to pay a "cleaning tax" (Reinigungs Tax) for airing, fumigation and washing. For quarantine stations, this was the principal source of income used to cover operational costs. Ottoman merchants, however, perceived these charges as too high to justify the costs of cleaning and as a kind of hidden taxation, forbidden by Habsburg-Ottoman treaties. In addition, there was a lack of uniformity. Many goods that passed through quarantine stations in the 1740s, 1750s or 1760s were not mentioned in the original and still valid Quarantine and Cleaning Ordinance from 1731.³⁴⁷ Quarantine directors had to estimate how to clean them and how much to charge for it. As a result, cleaning taxes for the same goods differed from station to station and from director to director, adding to the perception that they were arbitrary.

On 31 October 1742, the War Council forwarded a complaint by Ottoman merchants in Transylvania against high and arbitrary cleaning taxes, particularly on finished goods. The Sanitary Court Commission responded by asking provinces to conduct a comprehensive review of cleaning procedures and tariffs. In Banat, the provincial commander, Baron Engelshofen, entrusted this task to a senior tax inspector Leopold Philipp Lagler, already familiar with goods passing through the quarantine stations of Pančevo and Mehadia. Lagler worked with the Mehadia

³⁴⁷ Contumaz und respective Reinigungs Ordnung, 3 October 1731, FHKA SUS Patente 63.7.

quarantine director, Mathias Perner on a new proposal. Together they first extracted the list of goods passing through Mehadia and Pančevo in the year 1741, from the Senior Customs Office in Banat (Mauth Ober Ambt). Lagler admitted that the cleaning taxes appeared arbitrary. While some taxes were high because cleaning implied intensive labor, others were elevated because the goods in question were valuable and the merchants were prepared to pay more. Lagler and Perner consulted unnamed Ottoman merchants in Mehadia to produce a revised list of new cleaning taxes. Finally, after returning to Temesvár, Lagler convened a local “Greek judge” (der hiesige Griechische Richter) Marco Nico, and three Ottoman Greek merchants, Thoma Georgy, Attanasko Dimiter and Pavle Sivko. They went together through the new proposal. Three Ottoman merchants and the “Greek judge” composed and signed a note that they found the new proposal reasonable and acceptable. Based on the conversations with the merchants, in his conclusions Lagler emphasized that cleaning taxes should be uniform in all quarantine stations along the border with the Ottoman Empire.³⁴⁸ Ottoman migrants thus participated in the formulation of new cleaning tariffs, contributing to the making of mobility-control regulations.

The migrants participated in cross-border mobility control by, upon arriving at the station, extensively describing during the initial interview the health situation in the areas they had passed through. Sometimes they participated more directly, for example, the Greek merchants from the Ottoman town of Grocka, who co-financed

³⁴⁸ Lagler offered to travel to Pančevo to do additional investigation if it was necessary. From Lagler’s report, the commander of Banat, Baron Engelshofen concluded that cleaning tax incomes varied from year to year. *Reinigungs Tax- Aufsatz*, Leop. Phillip Lagler and Mathias Perner, Mehadia, 17 November 1742; Leopold Philipp Lagler and Mathias Perner to TLA, 26 November 1742; Notandum, Temesvár, 26 November 1742; Leopold Phillip Lagler to TLA, Temesvár, 27 November 1742; Baron Engelshofen to SHK, Temesvár, 28 November 1742, 1742 November 3, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1.

the trip of the Habsburg sanitary spy Dimo (Dima) Sifkovith to Macedonia in 1755 (see Chapter 2). They attempted successfully to show to the Pančevo quarantine director that the rumors about the plague were false and that additional quarantine measures were unjustified.³⁴⁹ But they were also thus voluntary participants in the Habsburg intelligence network. The migrants were not just controlled, but a part of the control system.

Stakeholders: Ottoman Government Agents

The third stakeholder was the Ottoman Empire, particularly the Ottoman border authorities. The existence of border controls not only affected Ottoman migrants, it also could affect the Ottoman state more directly, for example Ottoman central finances. Occasional closures of some quarantine stations during plague epidemics diverted trade. The incomes from the border customs stations would dry up, affecting provincial and state finances. As explained by Abdi Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Belgrade, in his 1762 protest to the Habsburg authorities, the closure of the border meant that the incomes of the Belgrade customs station, allocated to the imperial library in Istanbul, could not be collected. Not only nearby Belgrade, but also the far away Ottoman capital could thus feel the changes in the border regime. In addition, Abdi Pasha emphasized, the Habsburg decision to close Pančevo and Zemun, while keeping Mehadia open, led to a redirection of trade and accompanying provincial fiscal incomes from Belgrade to the neighboring Ottoman governor in Vidin.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁹ Sanitäts-Diarium von der Contumaz Station Banzova, 11 November 1755, pro Mense November 1755; 27 Dezember 1755, pro Mense Dezember 1755; 5 January, 10 January 1756, pro Mense Januar 1756; 3 February 1756, pro Mense Febr. 1756, FHKA NHK Banat A 123.

³⁵⁰ The Letter of Abdi Pasha, the Ottoman Governor of Belgrade, 1762, HHStA StAbt Türkei III 4-2. Pashas of Belgrade and Bosnia expressed similar complaints a year before by the pashas of Belgrade

Ottoman dignitaries also sometimes found border procedures insulting. At the beginning of 1761, the governor of Vidin protested because Habsburg Banat authorities refused to admit his messenger to proceed to Temesvár directly without quarantine. The Ottoman side interpreted the treatment of the courier as humiliating, and as an insult to the Pasha of Vidin. The Sanitary Court Deputation approved the cautious reaction of the Habsburg border officials, the Cavalry Colonel (Obrist Wachtmeister) Sturm, the interpreter Janisch and the district controller (Districts-Gegenschreiber) Roderich, but warned the provincial administration not to engage in an extensive discussion that would further escalate the dispute. It disapproved the draft of a letter from the Banat General Command to the commander of Vidin and five Aghas, in which they tried to explain and justify the decision to refuse entry to the messenger. The Sanitary Court Deputation emphasized that “It would be very dangerous to become involved in extensive correspondence with the Ottomans, because [they] send such letters to the Porte and, as experience shows, they ruminate on every word, and they are used to interpret [it] as a confession [that their complaint was justified].” It advised both the Banat General Command and border officials to reduce tensions by sending short, formal and almost identical letters instead. The letters should contain the following text: “We want nothing more than to faithfully and with no harm [to either side] follow the peace treaties on the one hand and to encourage trade between two empires to the advantage of both sides on the other. The affliction called plague could be unfortunately very harmful for commerce. [Its

and Bosnia. SHK/D to TLA, Vienna, 27 March 1761; 1761 Martius 5, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1; Vienna, 17 November 1759, to TLA, 1759 November 2, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

eventual spread] would not only lead to the [international] isolation of [...] the Monarchy [...] Ottoman commerce would suffer terribly too.”³⁵¹

Through continuous communication, the Habsburg border authorities aimed to keep Ottoman border governors well informed. There was an everyday correspondence with local notables (Begis) in Serbia, Bosnia, and Ottoman Croatia, and with Pashas in Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia and Dalmatia, oral and written. Upon assuming his post, the commanding general of Slavonia, for example, sent formal letters to the Pashas of Bosnia and Belgrade announcing that he would protect peace, friendship and existing border agreements. The commanding generals had official sworn interpreters (ein ordentlicher in Eid und Pflicht stehender Orientalische Dolmetsch) for Turkish, while regiment scribes on the border had to learn to speak fluent Turkish and to write it in an understandable way. The commander of Zemun also had one “exposed” interpreter, quartered in the quarantine station, prepared to go several times per day to Ottoman Belgrade if necessary.³⁵² The two sides were also economically interdependent. For example, the Ottoman garrison in Belgrade was fed with Habsburg imported cereals (wheat). The inhabitants of Habsburg Zemun imported firewood from the Ottomans throughout the eighteenth century.³⁵³ Most of

³⁵¹ “Da wäre allerdings gefährlich, sich mit denen Türcken in weitläuffigen Schrifftwechsel einzulassen, weil den Briefen an die Pforte geschicket zu werden pflegen, und die Erfahrung giebet, daß sie jedem Wort nachzutrübten, und sogleich etwas pro Confesso anzunehmen gewohnt seynd.” SHD to TLA, Vienna, 27 March 1761, 1761 Martius 5, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1.

³⁵² The SHD Rescript, Vienna, 25 January 1770; Erleuterung [by the Slav. SK] auf das [...] Rescript; A protocol of the Slav. SK, from 20 February 1770, 1770 Martius 9, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2; Taube, *Historische und geographische Beschreibung*, vol. 3, 85; Engel, “Beschreibung des Königreichs Slawonien,” vol. 2: 759-60, 762, 764-66.

³⁵³ Protocoll, Zemun, 31 October 1755, IAB, ZM, 1755-1-38, 1755-1-39, 1755-1-40; Protocoll, Zemun, 31 October 1756, IAB, ZM, 1756-1-29, 1756-1-30, 1756-1, 31; Protocoll, Zemun, 31 October 1757, IAB, ZM, 1757-1-12; Protocoll, Zemun, 31 October 1758, IAB, ZM, 1758-1-12; IAB, ZM, 1759-1-17;

the communication concerned day-to-day business, resolving individual requests and problems, such as unpaid debts, minor and major offences. Communications also concerned the border regime. Habsburg border generals officially notified adjacent Ottoman border Pashas whenever the quarantine time was raised or decreased, or whenever quarantine stations were closed, so that they could inform Ottoman merchants. On 3 December 1762, for example, the Sanitary Court Deputation informed the Ottoman Pasha of Belgrade that the border would be closed. An apology followed for passing along this information on such a short notice.³⁵⁴ Sometimes, a correspondence could escalate into a dispute, with Habsburg central bodies intervening and advocating a friendlier approach, as in 1762, in a disagreement about pulling barges upstream on border rivers.

The border rivers, Una, Sava and Danube, served not only as natural frontiers but also as major traffic arteries, supplying Ottoman garrisons in Serbia and Bosnia with food and other provisions. Article 7 of the Belgrade Peace Treaty from 1739 partially exempted river traffic from exclusive territorial separation. Animals or people were entitled to use a more convenient side of the river for pulling barges upstream.³⁵⁵ On the Habsburg side, the military escorted Ottoman barges from a distance to prevent eventual contacts with domestic subjects. In the late summer of 1762, during a plague epidemic, a letter from the Ottoman Pasha of Belgrade was received by Count Mercy, the commander of Slavonia. In it, the Pasha not only formally asked to use the

Protocolmässige Berechnung, Zemun, 22 December 1769, IAB, ZM, 1770-1-7; Protocolmässige Berechnung, Zemun, 31 October 1770, IAB, ZM, 1770-1-1; Zemun, 21 November 1773, 24 November 1773, IAB, ZM, 1773-1-12, 1773-1-11; Journal über Einkauf und Verkauf des Bau und Brennholzes pro anno militari 1785, Zemun, 22 October 1785, IAB, ZM, 1785, in Ilić, *Beograd i Srbija*, 45-47, 58-61, 80-81, 133-35, 138-39, 279, 287-91, 375-78, 603-13.

³⁵⁴ Bartenstein to Maria Theresa, Vienna, 16 November 1762, 3 December 1762, 1762 December 3, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1.

³⁵⁵ "Belgrade Peace Treaty 1739," article 7.

Habsburg side of border rivers to tow barges, but also to fill some of these barges with Habsburg wheat. Mercy drafted a negative response, forwarding it to Vienna for approval. The Sanitary Court Deputation commented that it “is... the greatest luck that this draft has not been sent” (ist ... das größte Glück, daß dieses Schreiben nicht aberlassen worden) because pulling barges upstream was always allowed. In addition, it was wise to allow the Ottomans to import cereals from the Monarchy in a safe manner (without contact), to strengthen good neighborly relations between the two empires.³⁵⁶

The most disputed issue between border authorities was how to reconcile quarantine times above the international standard of forty to forty-two days and quarantine closures in particular with the free commerce and free travel guaranteed to the subjects of both sides by Habsburg-Ottoman treaties. In 1761, Ottoman border pashas complained about the lack of uniformity, the concurrent existence of different sanitary regimes. With a plague in Moldavia, the quarantine stations between Moldavia and Transylvania were closed, those between Wallachia and Transylvania remained open with quarantine time of forty-two days, while the stations further west introduced the suspicious regime of twenty-eight days. The Court Sanitary Deputation and the Banat Provincial Administration responded that the system had to be flexible because the circumstances varied at the different sections of the border, and three different regimes could be introduced on different sections of the border. Vienna instructed the Banat Provincial Administration to stress that the sanitary regime was in the best interest of commerce because an eventual outbreak of plague in the

³⁵⁶ The protocol of the SHD, Vienna, 12 September 1762; Nota to the Secret Court and State Chancellery, 1762 September 13, Vienna, 14 September 1762, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitaetshofkommission Akten 1.

Habsburg Monarchy would bring trade to a complete halt, with losses to subjects and state incomes on both sides.³⁵⁷

The Ottoman side perceived in particular months-long closures of quarantines for all incoming individuals as being contrary to the principle of free travel, guaranteed by mutual treaties, involving occasionally the Ottoman court in the discussions.³⁵⁸

Habsburg attempts to address these complaints by devising new solutions demonstrated the bilateral nature of the border regime, with Ottomans sometimes decisively influencing new border control arrangements. The arrangement that was favored by the Court Sanitary Commission/Deputation from the 1740s to the 1760s, which kept quarantine stations open in pestilent times was the introduction of a pre-quarantine facility (Prob-Contumaz, Vorcontumaz, lazaretto sporco). When the plague spread in the Ottoman provinces across the border, the incoming migrants would first undergo quarantine in a pre-quarantine facility, and then, if they showed no signs of contagious diseases, were accepted into the main quarantine station to undergo regular quarantine. In the 1740s, this was a provisional arrangement, introduced temporarily during major plague epidemics. In 1743, such facilities were

³⁵⁷ SHD to TLA, Vienna, 27 March 1761; 1761 Martius 5, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1; Vienna, 17 November 1759, to TLA, 1759 November 2, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

³⁵⁸ SHK, 30 September 1740, 1740 September 5; SHK, 10 October 1740, 1740 October 3, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 1. Vienna, 10 July 1756, to TLA, to Slav. SK, 1756 Julius 8; Vienna, 14 July 1756, to Slav. SK, to TLA, 1756 Julius 12; Vienna, 16 July 1756, to Slav. SK., Nota to the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei, 1756 Julius 16; Osijek, 19 July 1756, from Slav. SK, 1756 Julius 32; Osijek, 28 July 1756, from Slav. SK, 1756 Augustus 3; Vienna, 20 July 1756, to TLA, 1756 Julius 23; Vienna, 31 July 1756, to Slav. SK; Rescription to the Count Petazzi, 1756 Julius 31; Vienna, 7 August 1756, to the Count Petazzi, also to HKR, 1756 Augustus 2; Osijek, 30 July 1756, from Slav. SK, 1756 September 10, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2.

organized near the quarantine stations of Zemun and Brod, to allow commerce to continue in pestilent times.³⁵⁹

The Habsburgs opened a permanent pre-quarantine facility about a decade later in Banat, in Jupalnic, south of the Mehadia station. It was operating already in September 1753.³⁶⁰ In July 1754, arriving migrants had to spend fourteen days in *Vor-Contumaz* in Jupalnic followed by the full forty-two-day quarantine in Mehadia. More importantly, the arrangement allowed the continual imports of goods perceived to be miasma carrying, such as wool and cotton, important raw materials for the Habsburg textile industry, even during plague epidemics. In ordinary quarantines, the goods considered to be potential carriers of miasmas were not accepted in the pestilent regime. The system was formalized in April 1757 with Jupalnic as the pre-quarantine location and Mehadia as the main quarantine station. The Ottoman side, interested in keeping the border open for commerce, accepted the new arrangement. As the only station with a pre-quarantine facility, Jupalnic attracted trade from nearby provinces.³⁶¹

The protests from the Pasha of Belgrade, where the incomes from transit commerce diminished because of the diversion of trade through Jupalnic, ensued during each plague epidemic and the closures of the two quarantine stations nearest to

³⁵⁹ SHK, 31 July 1743, 1743 Julius 1; SHK, 8 August 1743, 1743 Augustus 1; SHK, 6 September 1743, 1743 September 2; SHK, 8 November 1743, 1743 November 1; SHK, 20 February 1744, 1744 Februarius 1, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 1.

³⁶⁰ The Mehadia quarantine director, Mathias Perner and the surgeon Niclas Schmalz, received that year an extra 100 guldens to cover their travel costs to and from Schuppanecker Contumaz Haan, which was then the name for this facility. 1753 September 10, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2.

³⁶¹ 1754 Julius 10; SHD to TLA, 1757 Aprilis 8; Vienna, 27 August 1757, to TLA; Nota to HKR; Decree to k. k. Geheime Directorial Haupt-Hof-Tax-Amt, 1757 Augustus 10; Vienna, 10 September 1757, to TLA; Nota to k. k. Commerzien Directorium, 1757 September 4, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2. 1759 August 10, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1.

Belgrade, Zemun and Pančevo. The Sanitary Court Deputation repeatedly discussed Ottoman objections, concluding that the only possible solution would be to open a permanent pre-quarantine facility near Belgrade, similar to the one in Jupalnic. Even though such a facility would be potentially useful for Ottoman commerce and fiscal incomes, the Ottoman provincial authorities, and the inhabitants of Belgrade in particular, remained staunchly opposed to the project during the 1750s, because it implied the erection of solid structures near the Belgrade fortress.³⁶² In 1756, to demonstrate flexibility and that there was no real threat for the Ottoman side, the Sanitary Court Deputation asked the Banat Provincial Administration to suggest an alternative location in Banat, further from the Belgrade fortress.³⁶³ The Court Sanitary Deputation and the Slavonian Sanitary Commission even proposed, to insure that there was no security threat to the Belgrade fortress, placing the pre-quarantine facility on Ottoman territory, for example on the Ada Ciganlija (Zigeuner Insul) on the River Sava. But instead of breaking the deadlock, the persistent attempts to open the pre-quarantine facility made the Ottoman side even more distrustful. The inhabitants of Belgrade complained to the sultan. The Ottoman Porte formally protested to the Habsburg envoy against the plan to introduce a pre-quarantine facility. At the advice of the Court- and State Chancellery, responsible for foreign relations, the Court Sanitary Deputation dropped the proposal and continued with the status quo.³⁶⁴

³⁶² 1754 Junius 5, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2.

³⁶³ SHD to k. k. Hofkammer, Vienna, 10 January 1756, 1756 Januarius 5; Vienna, 7 September 1756, to TLA, 1756 September 32, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2.

³⁶⁴ Vienna, 12 February 1757, to Slav. SK, 1757 Februarius 9; to TLA; to Slav. SK, 1757 Aprilis 8; Vienna, 8 July 1757, to Slav. SK, also Nota to the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei; also Note to Commerciens Directorium, 1757 Julius 1, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2. Ada Ciganlija (Gypsy island) was placed on Sava, several kilometers upstream from Belgrade.

The debate was re-ignited in 1761. A new epidemic resulted in a new closure and new Ottoman complaints. The Sanitary Court Deputation specified a possible location for a pre-quarantine facility, Dobraer/Toplaer Graben, between Belgrade and Pančevo, close to the River Danube.³⁶⁵ The new facility would serve both Belgrade and Pančevo quarantine stations, keeping them open for all types of goods during plague epidemics. The Court and State Chancellery supported the proposed location and ordered Schwachheim, the Habsburg internuncio at the Ottoman court, to lobby for the new pre-quarantine facility. Before he could raise the issue, the Porte summoned him to answer to the complaints of the inhabitants of Ottoman Belgrade. His argument that similar facilities in Jupalnic (Schuppanegg) had been established with the support of the Ottoman commanders of Vidin and Orșova and the Prince of Wallachia, and that the arrangement proved to be beneficial for all sides involved, had no effect. He stressed in vain that the Jupalnic pre-quarantine facility was also near an Ottoman fortress, Ada Kaleh, and that it was not perceived as a problem there. The works on the pre-quarantine facility had to be stopped until the Ottomans agreed to it.³⁶⁶

The Ottoman reluctance to compromise over Belgrade reflected the city's status as a key border fortress, more significant than Ada Kaleh near Jupalnic. The Ottoman side worried that the new facility would be too close to the borderline, with quarantine palisades and trenches that could easily be used as fortifications. The inhabitants of Belgrade pointed out that additional fortifications on the border would run against Habsburg-Ottoman treaties, deducing that the whole pre-quarantine project was

³⁶⁵ The probable place of Dobraer Graben:

<http://mapire.eu/en/map/collection/secondsurvey/?zoom=15&lat=44.84301&lon=20.64726>

³⁶⁶ Bartenstein to Maria Theresia, Vienna, 22 March 1761, 27 March 1761; Nota, Vienna, 22 March 1761; SHD to SK in Slavonia, to SK in Transylvania, 27 March 1761; SHD to TLA, Vienna, 27 March 1761, 1761 Martius 5, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1.

therefore illegal as well.³⁶⁷ In the border area the Ottoman side was not willing to be treated as a passive observer. They understood that any changes to the arrangement needed their approval.

With a plague epidemic in 1762 in Vidin and on the Lower Danube, then in Serbia, discussions about new pre-quarantine facility near Belgrade continued nevertheless. The State and Court Chancellery instructed the new Habsburg envoy at the Ottoman court, Baron Penckler, to talk with the commander of Belgrade on his way and then to the Reis Effendi and the Grand Vizier in the Ottoman capital about the need to open a pre-quarantine facility near Belgrade. He was to argue that it would be harmful for both sides to stop wool trade from Macedonia because of the plague. To neutralize Ottoman security objections, the Slavonian Sanitary Commission devised a new arrangement in March 1762. The existing Zemun quarantine station would be converted into a pre-quarantine facility. The main quarantine station would be moved to the village of Banovci, further inside the Monarchy, using military barracks already available there to keep the costs low. Because there would be no new constructions in the immediate border area, Ottoman consent was not necessary. In May 1762, the Court Sanitary Deputation instructed the Slavonian Sanitary Commission to make plans and calculations. In July, the Deputation decided to ignore the continuing Ottoman dissatisfaction in Belgrade. In December 1762, the Slavonian Sanitary Commission reported that the adaptation of the Zemun station was completed and that the Banovci station would be able to host 276 migrants.³⁶⁸ In April

³⁶⁷ Osijek, April 1761, Mercy, 1761 Majus 1; Vienna, 31 December 1761, to Slav. SK, to the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei, 1761 December 6; Vienna, 11 February 1762, to Slav. SK, to the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei, to HKR, 1762 Februarius 1; Vienna, 28 February 1762, to the Count Mercy, 1762 Februarius 10; KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

³⁶⁸ The Count Mercy to HKR, Osijek, 31 January 1762; Report, 18 January 1762; Bartenstein to Maria Theresia, Vienna, 10 February 1762, 1762-Februar-1; The protocoll of the SHD from 16 May 1762;

1763, the Ottoman side, represented by the commander of Belgrade, formally agreed to the new system. In August 1763, the first quarantine lists from Banovci were registered in Vienna.³⁶⁹

Bartenstein to Maria Theresia, Vienna, 24 May 1762, 1762-May-5; Barteinstein to Maria Theresia, 14 August 1762; Nota to the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei, Vienna, 14 September 1762, 1762 September 13; Protocoll of the SHD from 8 September 1762; Bartenstein to Maria Theresia, 8 September 1762 and on 10 September 1762, 1762 September 19; Bartenstein to Maria Theresia, Vienna, 16 November 1762, 1762 December 3, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1; Vienna, 12 March 1762, to the Slav. SK, 1762 Martius 4; Vienna, 30 March 1762, to the HKR, 1762 Martius 12; Vienna, 25 May 1762, to the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei, Nota to HKR, 1762 Majus 5; Vienna, 25 June 1762, to the Slav. SK, 1762 Junius 7; Vienna, 30 June 1762, to TLA, to the Count Mercy, to the Hofkammer, 1762 Junius 17; Vienna, 24 July 1762, to TLA, 1762 Julius 5; Vienna, 24 July 1762, to the count Mercy, 1762 Julius 6; Vienna, 28 July 1762, to the the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei, 1762 Julius 9; Vienna, 10 September 1762, to Slav. SK, 1762 September 5; from the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei, Nota from 24 August 1762, 1762 September 10; Vienna, 14 September 1762, Nota to the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei, from Slav. SK, 1762 September 13; Vienna, 28 September 1762, to Slav. SK, 1762 September 19; From the Hofkammer, s. d., 1762 October 4; Vienna, 14 October 1762, Slav. SK, 1762 October 14; Vienna, 4 November 1762, to Slav. SK, 1762 November 7; Vienna, 22 December 1762, to Slav. SK, 1762 December 25; KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

³⁶⁹ With this addition, there were four pairs of stations in the 1760s on the Ottoman-Habsburg border with a pre-quarantine facility and a major quarantine station: Turnu Roșu and Timiș toward Wallachia, Mehadia/Jupalnic toward Serbia and Vidin and Banovci/Zemun toward Serbia. The discussions to introduce the same system in the Croatian Military Border, between Ottoman Bihać and the Adriatic Habsburg port of Karlobag did not come to realization. Vienna, 14 March 1763, to the Count Mercy, 1763 Martius 12; Vienna, 19 April 1763, to the Hof- und Staats Kanzlei, 1763 Aprilis 12; Vienna, 3 January 1764, to the Count Mercy, 1764 Januar 1; Vienna, 3 March 1764, to the Count Mercy, 1764 Martius 11, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3; Bartenstein to Maria Theresia, Vienna, 16 November 1762, 1762 December 3, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 1. To the Count Mercy, Vienna, 3 May 1763, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2. The new arrangement lasted only several years. Soon after the General Sanitary Normative became a law on 2 January 1770, the Court Sanitary Deputation ordered on 25 January the abolition of the unnecessary pre-quarantine/quarantine system. The concept of pre-quarantines/quarantines, where the length of stay could be as much as 84 days, was considered excessive. The General Sanitary Normative defined the maximum quarantine times at forty-two days for stations. As closer to the border, safer and more convenient to migrants, the Banovci station was abolished, and Zemun became again the main station. The SHDeputation Rescript, Vienna, 25 January 1770; Erleuterung [by the Slav. SK] auf das [...] Rescript; Nota of the Count Moritz Lacy, Vienna, 13 March 1770, 1770 Martius 9, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2. This was followed by a major review of sanitary facilities, and

Ottoman protests delayed for years the renewal of Zemun palisades, including the section that separated the quarantine station from the town. When in spring 1753 new logs began to arrive to Zemun to replace the old ones, the Ottoman governor of Belgrade, informed in advance, not only lodged a complaint, but also asked the Ottoman court to intervene. The inhabitants of Belgrade were so upset about the new Zemun palisades that they crossed into the Habsburg territory and approached the existing Zemun palisades, shouting insults aimed at the commander of the town. Reis Effendi summoned the Habsburg envoy Baron Penkler and promised that the transgressors would be punished, but insisted that the works on the renewal of the palisades had to be stopped.³⁷⁰ The buildings were in the border area and thus it was necessary to acquire Ottoman approval for any changes that could affect defenses. Ten years later, the central government in Vienna dismissed the suggestion to build a circular wall around Zemun as too provocative.³⁷¹ The palisades were renewed only in 1769, while the Ottomans were too occupied with the unsuccessful war against Russia

quarantine stations in particular. The emphasis was moved from inflating the quarantine period to improving sanitary procedures and separation. A protocol of the Slav. SK, from 20 February 1770, [Osijek]; The rescript of the SHD, Vienna, 25 January 1770, 1770 Martius 9, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2.

³⁷⁰ 27 January 1753, 1753-Januaris-6; Slav. SK to SHD, Osijek, 27 April 1753, 1753 Majus 8; SHD to Slav. SK, 14 May 1753, 1753 Majus 1; SHD to the Hof- und Staats- Kanzlei, Vienna, 23 December 1753, 1753 December 14; SHD to Slavonian SK, Vienna, 3 February 1754, 1754-Februarius-4, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 2; The 1753/54 transgression incident was mentioned in an imperial firman issued in 1764. *Übersezung eines große Sultanischen Fermans so in den ersten Tügen des Monats Rebuil Ewwel A(nno) Hegira 1178, das ist um den 8 September 1764 an den Pascha zu Belgrad, wie auch an den daselbigen Richter und Janitscharen Aga ergangen ist*, fol. 190-91, FHKA NHK Kommerz U Akten 1523. Published also in Slavko Gavrilović, "Prevodi turskih fermana za regulisanje odnosa sa Austrijom u drugoj polovini XVIII i početkom XIX veka", *Mešovita grada* 19 (1989): 51-72.

³⁷¹ SHD to Slav. SK, Vienna, 8 July 1764, 1764-Julius-1, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Bücher 3.

to lodge a complaint, and too eager to maintain friendly relations with Vienna to re-ignite the dispute. The renewal of Zemun palisades progressed smoothly.³⁷²

The Ottomans were the other actor, invisible at first glance, but nevertheless indispensable. Their complaints that the closure of quarantine stations during plague epidemics violated the peace-treaty provisions were taken seriously. The Sanitary Court Deputation and local military commanders made an effort to find an accommodation that would at the same time keep the basic principles of the sanitary protection and border control intact, and keep the migrations and commerce flowing. The Ottomans effectively delayed the introduction of the Belgrade pre-quarantine facility for a decade or more by withdrawing their agreement to changes in the border regime. The introduction of the pre-quarantine/quarantine system in 1762-1763, on the other hand, showed the limitations of Ottoman influence. In the border area their agreement was necessary. The village of Banovci, located about twenty kilometers from the boundary line, was considered to be at a sufficient distance to give the Ottomans no say.

It was possible to organize complex and comprehensive border-mobility regimes long before the industrial bureaucratic states developed modern police apparatus, identification and record techniques. There were other ways to make up for the shortage of an adequate centrally controlled civil administration. In German lands, tasks were performed by the coopted provincial and local elites, while state projects were delegated to corporations. As demonstrated in the example of Lower Austria, there was sufficient administrative capacity on the local and provincial levels, on

³⁷² [Protocoll of SHD], Vienna, 2 August 1769; Vortrag of the Hofkammer, Vienna, 11 August 1769; Nota of the HKR to the Hofkammer, 19 December 1769, Vienna; Moritz Count Lacy [HKR] to the SHD, Vienna, 19 December 1769; [SHD] to the Slavonian SK, Vienna, 2 January 1770. Also to HKR, 1770 Januarius 2, KA ZSt MilKom Sanitätshofkommission Akten 2

which the central government in Vienna could rely throughout the early modern period. Local nobles and estates successfully performed taxation and other administrative duties; they helped in conducting censuses and creating cadasters.³⁷³ On the Habsburg-Ottoman border, the Habsburg military took over a large portion of the control duties. Troops from the western sections of the Military Border played a major role in border controls in first decades of the existence of the sanitary cordon. They were more effective than provincial militias, and particularly than the civil guards in Transylvania. This effectiveness increased after the 1740s, when the Military Border was reformed and stricter discipline and uniform drill were introduced. Migration control was one of the reasons (if not the principal) for the extension of the Military Border to Banat and Transylvania in the early 1760s. Guarding the border became one of the border soldiers' main services performed in exchange for cultivation of the state-owned land plots. Border soldiers thus resolved the problem of administrative capacity, by providing a permanent and affordable source of labor.

To be sufficiently efficient, however, the border system had to be accepted by the parties most affected by its existence. I identify three major stakeholders: the Habsburg border population, migrants and Ottoman border authorities. The existence of border controls affected them in myriad ways. The Habsburg Monarchy had to address their concerns and to ensure their cooperation. The economic and social life of the local Habsburg population was seriously impacted by the existence of compulsory border controls. The Habsburg Monarchy attempted to ensure the cooperation of locals with a series of negative and positive incentives. It criminalized

³⁷³ Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State*, 165-66, 174; Godsey, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power*, 23-29, 116-21, 291-335.

clandestine border movements and encouraged internal social control. Neighbors were officially responsible for supervising each other, as well as strangers, and for alerting local authorities if necessary. The individuals who cooperated with authorities received rewards, such as a part of value of confiscated smuggled goods. As for positive incentives, single-day accompanied trips were introduced for individuals who wanted to visit Ottoman border settlements without having to submit to expensive quarantine on their return. Poor border areas, like the Karlovac Generalate, enjoyed economic privileges, shorter quarantine times and partial exemption from customs and salt taxes. In addition, the Sanitary Court Deputation approved the organization of many border markets along the border between quarantine stations. These markets, where the goods perceived as non-miasma-carrying could be exchanged without contact, improved the local economy.

Border military troops and local inhabitants provided an essential ingredient to centrally planned projects, serving as local agents with local knowledge. Their knowledge of local roads, capacities, practices and customs proved crucial given the lack of such information on the central level. Vienna was dependent on locals also in central Habsburg lands, even around the Habsburg capital. An attempt to organize the billeting and provision of the army in Lower Austria after 1748 through centrally appointed circle (Kreis) officials, without the involvement of local nobles and estates, failed. The estates needed to step in to assist. When the provincial administration of Lower Austria was reorganized in 1764, circle offices were filled with local nobles and partially subjected to the Lower Austrian estates, underlining the indispensable services that only locals could provide.³⁷⁴ In the border area, local inhabitants and border military troops played this essential role. There is significant overlap between

³⁷⁴ Godsey, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power*, 206-210, 248-67, 273-83.

these two groups. Unlike the regular Habsburg standing army, most border soldiers, with the exception of the Generalate of Varaždin, which was in the interior, were at the same time local inhabitants. They were familiar with the terrain and with the population where they served. The use of local knowledge and local forces made centrally designed policies of border pacification and migration control more efficient.

Migrants were also stakeholders in the migration control regime. By addressing their complaints, the Habsburg authorities aimed to demonstrate that sanitary regulations and procedures were clear and reasonable; that migrants' concerns were taken into account and dealt with in a fair manner; that procedural and financial burdens were kept at a necessary minimum. Migrants' representatives were sometimes consulted during revisions and reviews of the regulations.

In an apparently unilateral border mobility-control regime, where migration was systematically controlled in one direction, but not in the other, the other participant, the Ottoman side, was nevertheless always present. It made its importance felt, for example, during the negotiations over a possible Belgrade pre-quarantine facility. The Ottomans had seemingly a passive, but nevertheless an essential role. Without their cooperation, it was very difficult to enforce controls or to decrease smuggling, clandestine entrances and banditry. Without Ottoman approval, it was often not possible to introduce any changes in the immediate border areas. It suggests that border mobility-control regimes could efficiently function only through bilateral consent.

The Habsburg Monarchy was able to control the migrations between two empires systemically and reasonably efficiently. This was a powerful tool that could be used not only to subject migrants to obligatory quarantines, but also to encourage or to discourage the entrance of certain individuals and groups, in line with the Monarchy's

population policies. The Habsburg Monarchy, like other European states, exempted higher estates from controls, while attempting to curb the mobility of poor migrants or non-tolerated religious minorities. The following chapter will explore whether the controls on the Habsburg-Ottoman border were universal or selective, targeting all incoming migrants or exempting some individuals and groups from controls.