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Chapter 1

“Our Mission as Women:” Technology, Policy, and Women’s Rights in the 1933 Tokyo Garbage Campaign

Fishbone: Anyway, those humans, they are incredibly stupid.

Cabbage Leaf: They really are. I shouldn’t even be here yet. I could have been used in soup, or pickled. I am still completely edible...

Fishbone: Me too. There are a lot of nutritious ingredients inside me. Blithely throwing me out without absorbing them really is a regrettable loss to the state.

Kaneko Shigeri, “Oharu-san no yume” (Miss Oharu’s Dream), 1933

This chapter examines the case of the “garbage campaign” (*gomi undō*) carried out in 1933 by the Tokyo Women’s League to Purify City Politics (Tōkyō Fujin Shisei Jōka Renmei), a coalition of women’s groups spearheaded by the League for Women’s Suffrage (Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei), in cooperation with the Tokyo municipal sanitation department. The campaign was a response to the “smoke problem” (*baien mondai*) affecting Fukagawa Ward and surrounding areas, which was caused by two new waste incineration plants. The case of the 1933 garbage campaign, at the intersection of technological progress, public health policy, and feminist activism, is an illuminating example of the struggles and compromises that defined the debates over the role of women in the Japanese nation-state. Before analyzing the cooperation between the city of Tokyo and activist women in the 1933 garbage campaign, the first section of this chapter will provide background information on how waste incineration came to be the preferred method of waste management in early twentieth century Japan.

The Beginning of Modern Japanese Waste Management and the Rise of Incineration

The history of modern waste management in Japan is in many ways a history of the development of garbage incineration. Incineration became popular as a waste management technology in Japan in the

late nineteenth century, around the same time as in European nations and the United States. Although initially hailed as a panacea for the garbage woes of modern cities, the limitations and downsides to incineration soon became apparent, and its popularity had declined in most countries by the 1920s – except in Japan, where incinerator construction was booming. By 1933, 113 cities (93% of larger cities in Japan at the time) had at least one incineration plant (Mizoiri 2009, 4). Significantly, incineration remains the dominant method of waste treatment in Japan today.

Incineration as a method of waste disposal was first introduced at the municipal level in Nottingham, England in 1874. The improved incinerator designed by Alfred Fryer in Manchester two years later set the standard for the incineration facilities (known as “destructors” in Britain) that quickly proliferated across Europe and America. The first garbage incinerator in the United States was built in 1885 on Governor’s Island, New York (Melosi 2005). At the time, engineers and urban planners considered incineration to be the most sanitary and effective method of waste disposal: “Burning waste at high temperatures seemed to be the perfect disposal method – no stench-ridden dumps, no pollution of streams and other watercourses, no unsanitary landfills. One doctor called cremation of garbage ‘a great sanitary device’” (Melosi 2005, 39). Despite high praise from experts, incineration quickly fell out of favor in the United States for a variety of reasons including its high cost, excessive smoke generation, and the greater availability of land for dumping (Melosi 2005, 40). One reason cited at the time for the failure of incinerators to run as efficiently as those in Europe was the higher water content of American waste, a problem that also later arose in Japan but was addressed very differently. Incineration in the United States was largely abandoned by the first decade of the twentieth century: “Of the 180 furnaces erected between 1885 and 1908, 102 were abandoned or dismantled by 1909” (Melosi 2005, 40).

The decline of incineration in Britain followed soon after. Scarcity of food and other resources during the First World War (1914-1919) prompted a shift in the discourses surrounding waste management from a focus on public health (from which standpoint incineration was considered the most sanitary method) to a focus on conserving and reusing “waste” materials: “There was a renewed enthusiasm for recycling in the latter stages of the First World War, for example, when ‘salvage’ reemerged as an alternative to incineration. Its advocates argued that burning was a scandalous waste of raw materials needed for the war effort” (Cooper 2010, 1034). Concerns about resource recovery, as well as high costs and other factors, resulted in the end of incineration as the dominant method of waste management in Britain.

These developments in Europe and the United States had a significant impact on waste management policy in Japan. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Japan was undergoing rapid, state-directed industrialization. Leaders of the new imperial government during the Meiji Period (1868-1912) were well aware of the importance of industrial capitalism in a world dominated by industrialized

colonial European powers, and made promoting industry and developing an industrial economy a priority among their state-building policies, as revealed by the prominence of the Meiji slogan “rich nation, strong army” (*fukoku kyōhei*) (Gordon 2009). In order to quickly match Europe’s level of technology and infrastructure, the Japanese government sent students on study tours in Europe and the United States to learn about “all manner of institutions and practices, from schools to factories to parliaments” (Gordon 2009, 73). Foreign knowledge was also put to use in rapidly developing industrial enterprises: “At great expense in the 1870s, the new government engaged several thousand ‘hired foreigners’ (*oyatoi gaijin*) from over twenty nations... [who] offered important advice in a wide range of economic and social endeavors” (Gordon 2009, 71).

Although waste disposal was not a major priority for Meiji leaders, urban waste management systems also underwent modernization and industrialization toward the end of the Meiji period. Traditional methods of waste management, including open dumping, land filling, ocean dumping, and use of waste as fertilizer or animal feed, continued largely unchanged through the first few decades of Meiji, as national leaders and city planners focused on more pressing issues, like building railroads and modernizing water distribution systems (Mizoiri 1988). Rag pickers or scrap dealers (called *hiroiya*, *kuzuya*, or *bataya*), who had collected scrap and other reusable materials from urban households since the Edo period (1603-1868), took on a larger role during Meiji, and in some cities formed private companies or were organized into official associations (Mizoiri 1988, 17). However, rapid industrialization and urbanization resulted in a burgeoning amount of urban waste, which in many cities began to overwhelm traditional channels of waste disposal. As was the case in coastal cities around the world, dumping of waste in the ocean was a popular form of waste disposal in Japan, and the increasing pollution of bays and waterways prompted many cities to look to new, technological solutions for the garbage problem. But the most direct impetus for the modernization of the waste management system mandated by the first national waste law in 1900, as well as for the designation of incineration as the preferred method of waste treatment, was the spread of infectious disease.

The first national law regulating waste management in Japan was the Waste Cleansing Law (*Obutsu sōji hō*), promulgated in 1900. It was passed as one of a series of measures designed to prevent the spread of disease, cholera in particular. Cholera first entered Japan in 1858, carried by a Dutch ship sailing from Java, and spread throughout the country. Outbreaks occurred sporadically throughout the Meiji period. Two major outbreaks in 1879 and 1886 resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000 people (Mizoiri 1988, 24). Early efforts to regulate urban waste at the local level were often designed as protective measures against epidemics, and waste management was primarily discussed in terms of hygiene and public health.

In 1883, the Greater Japan Private Hygiene Association (Dai Nihon Shiritsu Eiseikai) was established for the purpose of spreading information about hygiene to the general public (Mizoiri 1988, 26). This group played a large role in raising awareness about waste during the Meiji and Taishō periods. A report issued in 1888 by the association's vice-chairman, leading Meiji physician and statesman Nagayo Sensai, entitled "The hygienic conditions in the homeland during the previous year" (Zen'nendochū naikoku eiseijō no keikyō) stated that the following three measures should be considered the foundation of cholera prevention: 1) drainage of sewage (*osui sotsū*), 2) the removal of filth (*shinyō haijo*; "filth" here refers to human waste or night soil), and 3) the cleansing of garbage (*jinkai sōji*) (Mizoiri 1988, 27). These principles soon became the basis for national policies on urban sanitation and disease prevention.

At the time the Waste Cleansing Law was passed, it was widely viewed as a common-sense measure to prevent the spread of infectious disease. This law followed the 1897 Infectious Disease Prevention Law (Densenbyō yobō hō), the 1899 Water Supply Law (Suidō hō), and the 1899 Harbor Quarantine Law (Kaisō ken'eki hō), and was promulgated concurrently with the Drainage System Law (Gesuidō hō) in 1900 (Yamamoto 2003). These laws were passed quickly and were in many ways emergency measures; although the necessity of such laws had been discussed and the specifics debated for years, draft bills were drawn up and voted on with the utmost haste in response to an outbreak of plague, known in Japan as "the pest" (*pesuto*), in the western area of Japan beginning in the fall of 1899.

A summary of the draft bill of the Waste Cleansing Law described its purpose in terms of urban hygiene as the basis for disease prevention: "Water supply [...], sewerage, and waste cleansing are the three great requirements that should serve as the foundation for hygiene in the cities" (quoted in Mizoiri 1988, 33). A Diet member advocating for the bill in the lower house made the following plea:

This draft law is legislation of the utmost urgency. At present the "pest" is spreading in certain areas, and in addition to the Water Supply Law which was enacted previously, I [must] by all means press [upon you] the necessity of enacting the Drainage System Law and the Waste Control Law. (quoted in Mizoiri 1988, 30-31)

The bill was approved without modification in the House of Representatives, and with minor revisions in the House of Peers. It passed on March 6, 1900 as Law No. 31, and took effect on April 1 of the same year. Implementation regulations for the law were approved on March 8.

The Waste Cleansing Law revolutionized urban waste management in Japan, and many of its stipulations have had a lasting effect. First, the law placed the ultimate responsibility for waste collection and disposal on municipalities, shifting the burden of removing household waste from citizens to local

governments. If a household placed their waste in an appropriate container (made of metal or wood, with a lid, that would not leak garbage), they could be assured that the city, or a company or individual subcontracted by the city, would collect it. The law also established a system of sanitary inspectors (*sōji kanshi riin*) who were to oversee and regulate sanitation work (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 45).

The component of the Waste Cleansing Law that has had perhaps the greatest influence on waste management in Japan was Article 5 of the law's implementation regulations, which recommended (but did not require) that waste be disposed of through incineration: "Waste should, to the extent possible, be incinerated" (*jinkai wa narubeku kore o shōkyakusubeshi*; quoted in Mizoiri 2009, 4). At the time, incineration was considered the most sanitary method of waste disposal. The personal items of disease victims were burned as a matter of course after disease outbreaks, and the large-scale incineration of all urban waste seemed rational, efficient, and beneficial for public health. The public health and sanitation experts who helped to draft this and other disease-prevention laws at the time considered incineration to be an obvious and desirable solution to urban waste problems: "In the end, the only method of waste treatment that fulfilled the conditions of being sanitary, large-scale, and convenient was the incineration method" (Mizoiri 1988, 84).

On 19 March 1933, a communication from the Hygiene Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs entitled "Points of caution regarding the implementation of the Waste Cleansing Law" (*Obutsu sōji ho shikō ni kansuru chūi no ken*) was issued to prefectural leaders; the document requested prefectural authorities to provide guidance to municipalities in establishing incineration facilities (Mizoiri 1988, 32). At the time, only a few Japanese cities had garbage incinerators, but the promulgation of the Waste Cleansing Law sparked a boom in construction of incineration facilities, as well as in scientific studies of incineration and other waste disposal methods (Mizoiri 1988, 84).

The first waste incineration facility in Japan was built in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, in 1897, three years before the Waste Cleansing Law was passed. It is unclear why this mid-sized town (Tsuruga, designated a city [*shi*] in the present day, was at that time only a town [*chō*]) decided to invest in a new form of waste management technology even before incineration was recommended by the government. Mizoiri (1988, 40) speculates that foreign influence may have played a role in Tsuruga becoming the first Japanese city to adopt incineration – the city was made a designated trading port in 1896 and had significant trading contacts with the Russian city of Vladivostok – but notes that as other cities with more extensive foreign ties did not build incinerators, this explanation is somewhat lacking.

Perhaps as a result of Tsuruga's initiative, early adoption of incinerators was concentrated mainly in the Hokuriku region (now part of the Chūbu region) in the northeastern part of Japan's main island. A survey of the waste management methods of 52 cities and 28 towns carried out by the *Journal of the Greater Japan Private Hygiene Association* (*Dai Nihon shiritsu eiseikai zasshi*) at the end of 1900

revealed that 13 cities and 5 towns had incineration facilities. These municipalities, including Fukui, Toyama, Kanazawa (which reported possessing four incineration facilities), and four towns in Saga Prefecture, tended to be concentrated in the Hokuriku area, although incinerators were also present in other cities across the country (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 57). Although Japan's leading cities were not among these earliest adopters, within a few years Osaka would emerge as the national leader in research and development on waste incineration.

At the turn of the century, the city of Osaka produced 300 tons of garbage a day (Mizoiri 1988, 42). The majority of waste that could not be used as fertilizer was disposed of in the open sea. Although waste was generally not dumped directly in the harbor, due to wind conditions and other factors Osaka Bay was periodically inundated with garbage to the extent that it impeded harbor traffic. This situation made the development of new waste management facilities a priority, and in 1900, following the Waste Cleansing Law, the city established an "experimental incineration furnace" (*shikenteki shōkyakuro*) (Mizoiri 1988, 42). The first full-size incineration facility in Osaka was completed in 1903, and a second followed in 1907; by this time, the majority of the city's waste was incinerated (Mizoiri 1988, 62). Researchers in the city continued to conduct experiments in order to refine incineration technology. Two new incinerators were built in 1916, and in 1919 these facilities were used to conduct experiments on electricity generation and dry distillation (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 58). Improved designs based on the findings of the Osaka research became the basis for new incineration facilities across the country. One of the engineers who worked on the Osaka experiments, Iwahashi Motosuke, later moved to Tokyo and designed the Fukagawa Waste Disposal Plant (Fukagawa Jinkai Shori Kōjō), completed in 1929 (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 58). The construction of an incineration facility in this area, which had long been used for waste dumping and land filling, exacerbated the pollution problems that resulted in the 1933 garbage campaign.

Waste Management in Tokyo: Incineration and Inequality

In the first decade of the twentieth century, garbage in Tokyo was collected from the waste containers of households, shops, and public spaces, and carried to one of 36 waste collection stations in the city. There it was divided into three categories: materials for fertilizer (*hiryō akuta*), valuable material (*yūkabutsu*), and discards (*suteakuta*). Fertilizer was transported to nearby Chiba Prefecture, where it was sold to farmers. Valuable materials were typically gathered by workers (contractors before 1908, and directly employed by the city thereafter) and sold; wooden materials could be sold as fuel to factories or bath houses, while metal and cloth were sold to scrap dealers (*toriatsukai gyōsha*) (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 48).

The majority of the remaining discards were taken to a dump site in the Hirahisa area of Fukagawa Ward, which was established in 1901. Before 1908, there were problems with contractors simply dumping the waste into the bay instead of taking it to the designated dumping area, but this issue was largely resolved (and the conditions of Tokyo waterways improved) when the city began direct management of waste disposal (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 51). The site was also periodically used for open-air garbage incineration (*roten shōkyaku*), generally as an emergency measure during epidemics¹² (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 52). In 1910 the city established a more permanent open-air incineration site at Etchūjima-cho, also in Fukagawa Ward. The smoke and pests generated by open-air garbage burning caused frequent complaints from residents. In 1921, an organization called the League for the Realization of the Abolition of Garbage Incineration Grounds (Jinkai Shōkyakujō Teppai Kisei Dōmei) attracted more than 30,000 members (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 454).

During this time Tokyo's population, and with it the volume of garbage, was growing rapidly. Following the Waste Cleansing Law of 1900, the city of Tokyo made plans to construct modern incineration facilities in order to manage the large volume of waste more hygienically, but due to difficulties with siting, opposition from residents, budget constraints, and other problems, these plans repeatedly failed to materialize. From 1903 to 1914, nine different candidate sites for the construction of a waste incinerator were proposed, but each was ultimately rejected (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 52).

The first incinerator in Tokyo prefecture was the Ōsaki Waste Incineration Site (Ōsaki Jinkai Shōkyakujō), built in 1924 in Ōsaki-chō (in the northern part of present-day Shinagawa Ward). Its construction followed the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, which resulted in more than 100,000 deaths and destroyed most of the city. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, waste was dumped in the street or disposed of in waterways, and disease caused by unsanitary conditions claimed yet more victims. Normal waste collection services did not resume for months. During this time central municipal administration of sanitation and other services was impossible, and these duties were taken up by local governments and residential associations (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000). Many of Tokyo's neighborhood associations were established in the aftermath of the earthquake (Hastings 1995). The construction of the incinerator in Ōsaki-chō was a reflection of the need for localized waste management, especially in non-coastal areas of Tokyo. Several other wards and neighborhoods in the northern and

¹² Emergency burning of waste was necessitated not as a routine hygienic measure to kill any germs that might be lurking the city's garbage, but rather because during epidemics in Tokyo, farmers in Chiba refused to accept any waste fertilizer from the city. As a result garbage accumulated rapidly and open-air burning was used as a quick and large-scale disposal method (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 52).

western parts of Tokyo¹³ followed suit in the next few years. These facilities were managed locally, rather than by the city of Tokyo, until the administrative restructuring of 1932 (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000).

Though municipal and national authorities regarded incinerators as necessary and beneficial, local residents often did not agree, and plans for incinerator construction were frequently met with angry protests. One prominent dispute over the construction of an incineration facility, foreshadowing the later conflict over the incinerators in Fukagawa, occurred between Shibuya-chō and Meguro-chō in the mid-1920s. Mizoiri (2012, 125) describes this dispute as one of Tokyo's earliest "garbage wars" (*gomi sensō*). In 1924, Shibuya-chō began planning to build a waste incinerator. Initially a site was found within Shibuya and the land purchased, but after vigorous protest from residents, the site was abandoned and planners instead chose a suitable location in neighboring Meguro-chō, purchased the land, and began construction of the facility. Meguro residents protested, but as the facility had already received a permit from the metropolitan police department, construction continued. The facility was completed in November 1925 and began running initial tests. When these resulted in clouds of black smoke and complaints of bad smells from hundreds of residents, the facility's permit – which stipulated that the incinerator produce no smoke and no smells, conditions essentially impossible for incineration technology at the time – was suspended until improvements could be made and further experiments were run (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 69).

When word spread in April 1926 that the metropolitan police department was considering revoking the incineration facility's license altogether, the assemblies of Shibuya and Meguro began lobbying Diet members of opposing political parties to encourage the police to favor their side of the dispute, bringing the conflict to national attention and worsening relations between residents of the two areas. On 4 August 1926, residents from both areas had gathered at the facility to observe an incineration test, which was scheduled to end at 7:00 p.m. When the fires were still lit after the scheduled ending time, over one hundred Meguro residents began protesting. The group clashed with police, and three Meguro residents were arrested but quickly released. Tensions were high, but negotiations between Shibuya and Meguro resulted in a reluctant compromise in December 1926. Under this agreement, Shibuya would pay 15,000 yen each year to Meguro, Meguro's garbage would be accepted at the incinerator without a fee, and Meguro institutions would be allowed to draw on Shibuya's water supply for free. The incinerator was in operation for less than five years before it was closed in 1932 (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 70).

Disputes and siting protests like those that occurred in the Shibuya-Meguro "garbage war" delayed efforts by the city of Tokyo to build a much-needed large-scale incineration facility for several

¹³ Garbage from northern and western areas of Tokyo was typically transported to southeastern areas adjacent to the sea to be burned and used as landfill along the coast. After the earthquake disrupted these transportation routes, towns and wards to the northeast faced with necessity of disposing of their own waste became the first to adopt incineration facilities (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 68).

years. Eventually, however, through the influence of Iwahashi Motosuke, a leading incineration researcher from Osaka who became a Tokyo city engineer in 1926, plans to build a high-temperature waste incineration facility in Fukagawa were approved in 1927. The No. 1 Fukagawa Waste Disposal Plant (Fukagawa Jinkai Shori Kōjō Daiichi Kōjō) – the first incinerator to be built and managed by the city of Tokyo, and intended to serve a large proportion of the city rather than a single town or ward – began operations in 1929 (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 73).

The new facility in Fukagawa, a high-temperature incineration plant based on the latest technology, could handle an impressive 131.25 tons of waste each day. In contrast, the incinerator with the largest capacity in Tokyo previously could handle only 37,500 kilograms of waste per day (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 68). The new facility was also designed so that valuable waste (things which could be resold) would be separated from the rest before incineration. However, even the large capacity of the new facility was not enough to handle all of Tokyo's waste, which by 1930 amounted to about 310,000 tons a year. The waste that could not be managed in the facility was dealt with in existing traditional open air waste burning grounds, which were considered unsanitary and less than optimal by waste management experts and city engineers.

These issues coincided with national-level changes to waste management policy. In 1930, the Waste Cleansing Law was amended “in order to resolve the improvement of facilities relating to waste disposal” (*obutsu shori ni kansuru shisetsu no jūjitsu o kisengatame*; quoted in Mizoiri 2009, 1). The revised regulations changed the wording of the clause regarding the specified waste disposal method: the word *narubeku*, “to the extent possible,” was eliminated, so that the regulations stated simply, “Waste should be incinerated” (*jinkai wa kore o shōkyakusubeshi*) (Mizoiri 2009, 4). This change meant that incineration was essentially a requirement for municipalities, like Tokyo, that had the means to build incineration facilities.

Given these policy changes and the overloaded state of the existing Fukagawa incinerator, the city of Tokyo quickly decided to build additional facilities, and in June 1930 it was determined that two more incinerators would be built near the first. They were to be in the same style but incorporating the latest technological improvements (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 73). The Fukagawa Second and Third Waste Disposal Plants began operation in March 1933.

The new facilities at Fukagawa almost immediately created problems with large amounts of smoke and flies. Protests from residents forced the city to try to resolve the problem, which also attracted the attention of a rather unexpected group: women suffragists. The next section will briefly explain the League for Women's Suffrage and the related Tokyo Women's League to Purify City Politics before moving on to a discussion of the intersection of these groups with the waste management system in the 1933 women's garbage movement.

The League for Women's Suffrage and the 1933 Tokyo Garbage Campaign

In 1933, the League for Women's Suffrage initiated a far-reaching campaign to combat the city's garbage problem caused by the newly constructed waste incinerators in Fukagawa. The League organized a lecture series about household waste separation, distributed thousands of fliers, assisted in the city's contest for a "cleaning slogan," and even produced a movie about the garbage problem at the behest of city authorities. This section will analyze the cooperation between the women's group and city authorities in the 1933 Tokyo garbage campaign, with a focus on the League's initiation of the campaign as a political strategy to advance the rights of women. It will first present background information about the League for Women's Suffrage and the Tokyo Women's League to Purify City Politics before describing and analyzing the Fukagawa smoke crisis and the women's garbage campaign itself.

The League for Women's Suffrage was founded in 1924 as the League for the Attainment of Women's Political Rights (Fujin Sanseiken Kakutoku Kisei Dōmeikai) by Ichikawa Fusae, one of Japan's most prominent feminist leaders both before and after the war, and Kubushiro Ochimi, who at the time was the president of the Japan Women's Suffrage Association. The new group, like many Tokyo institutions, was created in the wake of the devastation of the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake: "Ichikawa and Kubushiro mobilized the spirit of cooperation engendered among women involved in the earthquake relief work to launch an independent suffrage group" (Molony 2011, 12). The group's name was shortened to the League for Women's Suffrage (Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei) in 1925¹⁴ (Tamanoi 2009).

The League published a monthly magazine called *Fusen* (Women's Suffrage) from 1927 to 1935 (from 1936 to 1941, the publication continued as *Josei Tenbō* [Women's Outlook]), which featured articles about topics of interest, notices about and reports on the group's activities, entertainment pieces such as poems, stories, and plays, and other types of writing as well as advertisements. The group organized an annual National Women's Suffrage Convention beginning in 1930, and advocated relentlessly for women's right to participate in civic life. Two draft bills to grant women limited rights to vote at the municipal level, introduced in May 1930 and February 1931, both failed to pass the House of Peers; these setbacks, as well as the changes in the political atmosphere following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, seem to have caused Ichikawa and the League to set their sights somewhat lower: "While full citizenship and the vote were the ideal, civic engagement even without the vote was a step in the right direction" (Molony 2011, 15).

¹⁴ Molony (2011, 12) explains the reason for the name change as follows: "After the passage of 'universal' suffrage in February 1925, when long-standing tax qualifications for men's suffrage were finally eliminated, the League shortened its name to the Women's Suffrage League (Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei, hereafter WSL) to draw attention to the hypocrisy of 'universal' suffrage (*fusen*) without women's suffrage (also pronounced *fusen*, although written with different characters)."

In the early 1930s, the League for Women's Suffrage focused most of its efforts on issues clearly related to the "women's sphere" such as motherhood protection, and on municipal issues. The League was one of twenty groups that joined together to create the Motherhood Protection League (Bosei Hogo Renmei) in 1934, which advocated for state recognition of the importance of motherhood and financial assistance for all mothers. The group was instrumental in the successful passing of the Mother-Child Protection Law in 1937 (Molony 2011, 23-24).

One of the League's major concerns during this period was corruption in Tokyo city politics. The group closely followed elections for the Tokyo City Assembly, formally endorsing eight candidates in the 1929 elections, and issuing condemnations of candidates in the 1933 election who were suspected of bribery. In March 1933, in response to a series of high-profile bribery and corruption scandals involving Tokyo City Assembly members, the League for Women's Suffrage joined together with five other women's groups to form the Tokyo Women's League to Purify City Politics (Tōkyō Fujin Shisei Jōka Renmei), which engaged in public advocacy against bribery and corrupt politicians before the March 1933 elections (Mizoiri 2010). The suffragist women's involvement in the 1933 garbage campaign was under the auspices of this latter group; following Tamanoi (2009), I will refer to both the League for Women's Suffrage and the Tokyo Women's League to Purify City Politics as "the League" unless a distinction is necessary.

"A Hell of Smoke:" The Fukagawa Garbage Crisis

The Fukagawa Second and Third Waste Incineration Plants began operation in March 1933. The two facilities combined contained eight cranes, which could each pick up 1.5 tons of waste, and five smokestacks, and began burning 750 tons of waste per day. The plants emitted a huge amount of foul-smelling smoke and attracted flies in large numbers, making life miserable for local residents and business impossible for local shops and establishments. Citizen anger at the facilities grew, and residents quickly started a protest movement. At a Tokyo City Assembly meeting, a representative of Fukagawa harshly criticized the city government: "Why must only the citizens of Fukagawa take in all of the garbage from the 15 wards, suffering in a hell of smoke?" (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 86). On May 4, 1933, the Tokyo edition of the *Asahi Shinbun*, a popular national newspaper, reported on the facilities with the headline "Like a hell of smoke – All of Fukagawa cries out" (*Asahi Shinbun*, May 4, 1933). On May 22, 1933, an assembly of ward residents approved a resolution entitled "Abolish the Murderous Incinerator" (Satsujinteki shōkyakujō teppai), and presented this to the mayor of Tokyo the following day (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 86). In response, the city took measures such as limiting the plant's hours of operation and stopping the practice of open-air burning in the facility's dumping ground. In June

1933 the city established a committee to investigate how to improve waste management techniques, and in September created an emergency investigative council for waste management facilities.

The problem quickly drew the attention of the Tokyo Women's League to Purify City Politics. On 12 May 1933, fifteen members of the group went on a study tour of the controversial facility. The visit was reported in the *Asahi Shinbun*, which noted that the two main causes of the smoke problem were the extremely large volume of garbage being collected and incinerated, and the high water content of the garbage. The newspaper concluded that the ultimate lesson of the visit was "to remove water from tea leaves before throwing them away" (*Asahi Shinbun*, May 13, 1933). Three of the League members who visited wrote about their experience in the June issue of *Fusen*; their article emphasized the importance of separating kitchen waste and other waste for effective waste management (*Fusen* 7-6 1933).

The visit to the waste incineration facility made a deep impression on the League. On June 14, they held a meeting to discuss how to solve the garbage problem; they decided to hold a lecture series about the importance of waste separation "to promote awareness among housewives" (*Fusen* 7-7 1933a, 14). Two days later, Kaneko and another League member visited the office of the head of the Tokyo Sanitation Department and "conveyed thoughts from the woman's perspective," asking for the department's financial support and official sanction (*Fusen* 7-7 1933a, 14). On June 23, they received word that the department had agreed to finance and support their lecture series.

The lecture series was to be accompanied by an educational stage play, "Miss Oharu's Dream" (Oharu-san no yume), written by Kaneko Shigeri and published in *Fusen* in July 1933, which would increase its ability to attract spectators. The purpose of the play was to emphasize the importance of proper garbage separation to the middle class housewives of Tokyo, enlightening viewers in the "new areas for separated disposal of kitchen waste (*chūkai*) and mixed waste (*zakkai*) which will begin this year" about correct separation methods (*Fusen* 7-7 1933a, 14). This was a reflection of recent changes in Tokyo's waste collection policies.

In addition to mandating incineration for municipal waste, the 1930 revision of the Waste Cleansing Law provided that, in cases where local authorities deemed it necessary, garbage should be separated into two containers, one for kitchen waste (*chūkai*) and one for mixed waste (*zakkai*), for separate collection. This provision was meant to ensure that incinerators could run more productively: the consensus among experts at the time was that many of the problems incineration facilities were facing – large quantities of smoke, excessive unburned residue, swarming flies, unpleasant smells – were caused by high water content in food waste. By separating out kitchen waste, which was instead to be diverted to fertilizer and pig feed, the remaining mixed waste (which included paper, rags, earthenware, etc.) could be incinerated more efficiently (Mizoiri 2009, 1).

The city of Tokyo began implementing separate collection of kitchen waste and other waste in central areas of the city comprising 70,000 households in June 1931. In July 1933 the area for separated collection was expanded to 100,000 households, or about 40% of the old area of the city (that is, excluding the wards that were added in the administrative restructuring of 1932) (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 82). This expansion of the area for separated collection was part of the city's response to the smoke problem, and the focus of Kaneko's educational play "Miss Oharu's Dream." Separated collection was expanded to include all of the old city beginning in 1934.

The two reasons that officials gave for the smoke problem during the League members' visit to the Fukagawa facility, excessive overall waste volume and high water content, are also clearly reflected in "Miss Oharu's Dream:" viewers were exhorted to use and reuse such items as cabbage leaves and empty bottles instead of throwing them away, and also to carefully separate the garbage so as not to inconvenience the garbage man and the furnace operator. This is no coincidence – Kaneko Shigeri, the author of the play, was one of League members who went on the study tour of the incineration facility. Interestingly, however, the smoke problem – the impetus for both the League's visit to the waste facility and the city's decision to begin implementing separated collection – is not mentioned in the play at all (Kaneko 1933; Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 86). As Tamanoi points out, the League undertook these garbage-related activities "primarily in order to become enlightened women who were conscious of national hygiene" and to increase their status in public life with the goal of gaining women's suffrage, not primarily to help the people of Fukagawa (Tamanoi 2009, 827).

"Miss Oharu's Dream"

In order to understand the League's garbage campaign, it is useful to closely examine the play "Miss Oharu's Dream," which was the entertainment that drew large crowds to the campaign's lectures about municipal waste management in Tokyo in the summer of 1933. The play was written by Kaneko Shigeri, a prominent and creative suffragist who also wrote other plays that were published in *Fusen*, on her own initiative.¹⁵ The themes of the play reinforce the campaign's messages about household waste separation as a civic duty and a necessary step in proper waste management.

The play centers on the Yamanaka household, where Miss Oharu is employed as a maid. In the opening scene, two neighborhood housewives (A and B) happen upon one another in front of the Yamanaka house. They discuss convenient ways to get rid of household garbage. Housewife B explains that she is going to throw away a watermelon rind into the ditch, which is a good method because the

¹⁵ For an insightful analysis of the themes of purity (*jōka*) employed in "Miss Oharu's Dream" and another of Kaneko's plays, "Women's Suffrage is the Key," see Tamanoi 2009.

ditch is on a hill so the garbage rolls down instead of accumulating and making a stink. Housewife A is saying that she will try that method from now on when Miss Oharu enters with a wrapped object, which she places in the trash can. Housewife B asks why Miss Oharu always wraps kitchen waste in newspaper before throwing it away. Oharu explains that Mrs. Yamanaka has asked her to do this, because it absorbs the water of the kitchen waste, making the trash can cleaner and easier for the garbage man to deal with, and also that absorbing the water makes the waste easier to burn later. Housewives A and B agree that this method seems like a lot of trouble. Their conversation establishes that the two housewives are more concerned with convenience than doing things properly, in contrast to Mrs. Yamanaka. Next, a Neighborhood Association Member (*chōkai no hito*) enters holding a bucket. Passing the housewives a flier, she explains that the bucket is a special container for the collection of kitchen waste, because soon the city will start collecting kitchen waste and regular waste separately.

Neighborhood association member: ...Soon garbage will be separated into kitchen garbage [*daidokoro no gomi*] and regular garbage [*futsū no gomi*], so we're asking everyone to please buy these kitchen waste containers. (Kaneko 1933a, 16)

She goes on to explain that if the housewives buy this bucket from the neighborhood association for 25 sen, someone from the ward office will come to collect the kitchen waste every day. Demurring, the two housewives leave, and Mrs. Yamanaka emerges. Taking a flier from the neighborhood association member, she promptly places an order for one of the new kitchen waste buckets. She then turns to Miss Oharu, giving her a list of instructions for properly sorting the garbage, "because if you recklessly throw things out, it makes trouble for the garbage man, and also makes it hard to burn later." Miss Oharu explains about the neighbors' method of throwing garbage down the slope; Mrs. Yamanaka gently admonishes her, explaining that throwing garbage down the ditch creates problems for people in other areas. Even if the new waste bucket costs money, she points out, in fact the new method will save money for everyone in the long run. The scene ends with Mrs. Yamanaka condescendingly telling Miss Oharu that she'll understand one day when she's married and has a household of her own. In this scene, the audience, who were generally middle-class housewives like many of the League members themselves, are invited to identify with the enlightened Mrs. Yamanaka, and to imagine themselves helpfully educating the less informed, like Miss Oharu and the other housewives.

The next act is the titular "Miss Oharu's Dream." The scene begins in darkness, with whispering voices: "It hurts," "I'm cold." The setting is the inside of a garbage can. As the lights come on, the characters, all different types of garbage, begin talking. They are commiserating with one another about their poor treatment by humans. There are two major themes running through their complaints. The first is

wastefulness (*mudadzukai*), which is explicitly derided as “a loss to the state” (*kokka no sonshitsu*). Characters representing kitchen waste lament being thrown away without having been used to their fullest potential, and other types of trash complain about not being reused:

Fishbone: Anyway, those humans, they are incredibly stupid.

Cabbage Leaf: They really are. I shouldn’t even be here yet. I could have been used in soup, or pickled. I am still completely edible...

Fishbone: Me too. There are a lot of nutritious ingredients inside me. Blithely throwing me out without absorbing them really is a regrettable loss to the state. (Kaneko 1933a, 18)

In this play, perhaps reflecting the increasingly nationalist political discourse of the 1930s, limiting waste and preserving resources were framed as actions to be taken in order to support the state. The fact that “Mis Oharu’s Dream” was performed with the backing and financial support of the Tokyo city government may also have influenced the way Kaneko chose to frame the garbage problem in her script.

The second theme of the play is the importance of safe and efficient waste management. A rock which has ended up in the trash explains the importance of respecting the feelings of the garbage collector and helping to make his work more effective through proper separation. In this small way, the play suggests, even housewives can play an important role in keeping the city clean:

Rock: I am Rock. This is my friend, Dirt. Please listen, everyone. This is not a place for us. When we came here with you, there were probably some of you who didn’t want us close to you. We are also heavier for the garbage man. But the worst is when the furnace operator says, thanks to you all my work never becomes more efficient; hearing this from such a nice furnace operator makes me want to crawl in a hole. But everyone, I didn’t come here because I wanted to.

Dirt: That’s right. It was humans who put us here. (Kaneko 1933a, 19)

When Miss Oharu awakens, she has finally realized the importance of dealing with the garbage properly. She tells Mrs. Yamanaka about her dream, and pledges to explain the importance of proper waste management to the neighbor housewives:

Miss Oharu: From now on I’ll manage the garbage perfectly, and tell the ladies of the neighborhood that if you don’t, the garbage will laugh at you. (Kaneko 1933a, 19)

“Miss Oharu’s Dream” is highly instructive regarding the concerns of city officials and middle-class housewives about household waste management in 1930s Tokyo. However, the play neglects to mention the cause of the 1933 garbage problem and the impetus for the League’s garbage campaign: the Fukagawa smoke crisis.

“Miss Oharu’s Dream” and its accompanying lecture were performed six times in the summer of 1933, and by all accounts were a great success. The events were well attended, with over one thousand spectators at the first showing; the chief of the Tokyo Sanitation Department came to see the sixth (Mizoiri 2010, 155). One woman who attended the first event wrote an article describing her experience which was published in the August 1933 edition of *Fusen*. She praised the show for both its educational and entertaining qualities, noting that its lessons would be readily understood by everyone:

...The town’s theater critic declares this play, a product of everyone’s combined efforts, to be a great success. The reason is its new and uncommon subject: the people of this town were saying that garbage, of all things, would certainly fail as a theatrical subject; garbage itself is so commonplace in daily life, and such a trivial topic is surprising. Everyone was thinking “Oh dear!” This impression was regarded as novel. People are of course surprised by big topics, but on the other hand they can also be surprised by small things which they wouldn’t otherwise notice. [Now,] every time they take the garbage to the trash can, the concrete lessons of this play will be recalled splendidly to even the simplest of minds. (Ikuta 1933)

Following the success of “Miss Oharu’s Dream,” the League, together with the city sanitation department, continued their efforts to combat Tokyo’s garbage problem. The group distributed 20,000 educational fliers, and a member of the League served as a judge for the city’s “cleaning slogan contest” (*seisō hyōgo boshū*) (*Fusen* 7-7 1933a, 14). In October 1933, at the request and with the financial support of the Tokyo city authorities, the League created an educational film about garbage entitled *Many a Little* (*Chiri mo tsumoreba*).¹⁶ The film was produced in order to raise awareness in preparation for the upcoming “expansion of separated collection of kitchen waste and other waste to the entire city” (Mizoiri 2010, 155). Ichikawa Fusae, Kaneko Shigeri, and other members of the League appeared in the movie, and Kaneko assisted in the production (Kaneko 1933b).

In 1934, Kaneko took this movie, as well as “Miss Oharu’s Dream,” on the road in a “cleaning pilgrimage” (*seisō angya*). She visited eight cities (Ashiya, Nada, Kobe, Kyôto, Kure, Hiroshima, Osaka,

¹⁶ Tamanoi (2009, 825) explains this title as follows: “This movie title is taken from a popular Japanese adage, *Chiri mo tsumoreba yama to naru*, which can also be translated as ‘many a little makes a mickle.’ In this context, ‘a little’ refers to ‘a little heap of trash.’”

and Kanazawa), where she showed the movie *Many a Little*, gave a lecture about proper waste practices, and ended the presentation with a production of “Miss Oharu’s Dream” (Kaneko 1934). These events were also highly successful: “In all of these cities, each performance attracted more than a thousand people, most of whom were women and children” (Tamanoi 2009, 825).

The League’s efforts to raise awareness about garbage certainly gained attention; as an anonymous editor wrote in *Fusen* in July 1933, soon after the movement began, “The League’s activities regarding garbage have at last succeeded magnificently in arousing the concern of the city” (*Fusen* 7-7 1933b, 44). The city authorities evidently concurred. *A Hundred Year History of Waste Management in Tokyo* (Tōkyōto seisō jigyō hyakunenshi), an expansive history compiled by the Tokyo Sanitation Bureau and published in 2000, states conclusively that through the cooperative garbage campaign activities of the city and the League, “a clear change could be seen in citizens’ awareness of the garbage problem” (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 87). Interestingly, the *History* also concludes that “Through these measures, the [Fukagawa smoke problem] conflict headed toward resolution,” but provides no further information about the residents of Fukagawa (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau, 87).

“Our Mission as Women:” The Garbage Campaign as a Step Toward Civil Rights

In May 1933, the garbage problem became a major crisis for the city of Tokyo. Petitions, protests, and demonstrations by Fukagawa residents against the waste facilities were frequently, and rather sympathetically, covered by newspapers. Fukagawa was a relatively socioeconomically disadvantaged area of the city, which had in fact long been associated with garbage – along the waterfront, the land of Fukagawa itself was “made of trash and dirt,” composed of landfill deposited over centuries (Tamanoi 2009, 806). The demands of the Fukagawa residents – to shut down the incinerators or move them somewhere else – pitted them against the city authorities who managed the waste facilities, and more indirectly against the residents of other areas of Tokyo who, by having their waste taken away and dealt with somewhere else, benefitted from the Fukagawa residents’ suffering.

Ichikawa, Kaneko, and the other members of the League for Women’s Suffrage were well aware of this conflict, and took steps to become more informed when they visited the waste facility. Of course, during the tour of the facility they heard only the side of the government officials and sanitation workers, and there is no evidence to suggest that any of the members sought out the leaders of the Fukagawa protest movement to hear their view before devising the garbage campaign. Why did the League choose to side with city authorities, rather than the indignant protesters?

This decision can be seen as a part of a “strategy of civic engagement as the basis for improving the lot of women” which Ichikawa and other feminists pursued after the failure of two limited women’s

suffrage bills and the rightward turn in national politics following the 1931 Manchurian Incident (Molony 2011, 15). Several articles written by Ichikawa, Kaneko, and others in *Fusen* about the garbage campaign connect the campaign with the League's ultimate goal of attaining civil rights for women.

For some of the women in the League, particularly Kaneko Shigeri, who spearheaded the garbage campaign activities, the garbage problem was indeed a pressing concern, and she and other members were clearly passionate about finding a solution. But when writing in *Fusen* about the garbage problem, and her efforts to combat it, Kaneko often linked these activities with attaining women's rights. In the following passage, part of an article in *Fusen* detailing her involvement in making the movie *Many a Little*, Kaneko describes her motivation to help the city and connects it to the organization's goal of improving women's status in public life:

"I'm so glad the movie about garbage came out." We, the members of the Women's League to Purify City Politics, feel this from the bottom of our hearts. Moreover, not limiting ourselves to garbage, we wish to do anything we can to help the city. As for whether we will be given something soon, well, let's leave that to the gods. In any case, this [movie] was excellent subject material for the resolution of this year's Women's Suffrage Convention, "Even while lacking civil rights, let the power of women be reflected in city governance." (Kaneko 1933b, 21)

In the closing paragraph of an article describing her "cleaning pilgrimage," Kaneko writes: "I will contentedly tie my fate to garbage. It is by this [garbage] that Japan moves, that women move. Though we don't have the vote, let's put the power of women into local government..." (Kaneko 1934, 30). Here, Kaneko acknowledges that she has been the leader of the League's garbage campaign and that she has embraced it as a worthy goal, and in the next sentence reminds readers that these activities are a step toward the larger goal of civic engagement and civil rights.

For members of the League who were less actively involved in the garbage movement than Kaneko, the group's cooperation with the city on the issue was primarily and explicitly a tool in their struggle for the vote. In the July 1933 issue of *Fusen*, the same issue in which the garbage campaign was announced and "Miss Oharu's Dream" was published, Ichikawa wrote an article laying out why cooperation with the city government on the garbage campaign and perhaps other issues was an important step toward achieving the vote. The article is a fascinating insight into Ichikawa's thinking, and is worth quoting at length:

It goes without saying that, as long as we are not given civil rights [*kōminken*], in the eyes of the law we are not citizens [*shimin*]. We therefore bear no responsibility or obligation with regard to the regular workings of municipal government, or indeed the current garbage crisis.

However, by progressively taking on more responsibility, we will demonstrate the importance of the cooperation of women both in municipal governance and in general society, and additionally raise awareness among the female population of the connection between municipal governance and home life.

[...] This is not merely a matter of cleaning garbage and filth. A thorough cleaning of the entire municipal government is necessary. And the work of this great cleaning must be our mission as women. But when considering this, we must feel keenly the necessity of the most effective tool for this great cleaning – civil rights. (Ichikawa 1933, 4-5)

From this article, as well as other writings by Ichikawa and other authors that appeared in *Fusen* during the garbage campaign and afterward, it is clear that the League's cooperation with the city on the garbage campaign was a conscious political strategy. An anonymous editorial published in *Fusen* in September 1933 echoed Ichikawa's sentiments in its praise for the success of the garbage campaign:

This type of gradual progression of the cooperation between the city and women's groups helps to hasten the day when women will lawfully take part in local government, and I am delighted by how influential it has been. I will never stop hoping that these kinds of activities will occur, to a greater or lesser extent, in local governments all across the country. (*Fusen* 7-9 1933, 24)

Looking at the sequence of events – the Fukagawa smoke problem became a major issue, League members went on a study tour of the Fukagawa waste facilities, the League decided to hold a lecture series and asked for the support of the city government – it seems likely that League members including Kaneko and Ichikawa saw in the garbage problem an opportunity to promote their objectives and took the initiative to make their group a key player in the city's response to the crisis. The garbage crisis was perfectly suited to the League's goals – a municipal governance problem related intimately to daily life and women's traditional tasks. And given the strategy the League embraced of working with the government to gain more visibility and responsibility, it is not surprising that their movement did not align itself with the beleaguered residents of Fukagawa. Taking the side of Fukagawa citizens demanding that the incineration plants be shut down or moved elsewhere would have put them at odds with the city government, and Ichikawa's writings make it clear that she thought working with the government would be a more effective strategy for advancing women's rights. In "Miss Oharu's Dream," the talking garbage

characters exhibit concern primarily for the state and the waste facility employees; the residents of Fukagawa, the actual victims of the garbage crisis, are mentioned nowhere at all.

When the garbage campaign began, the League noted in *Fusen* that this kind of cooperation between the city and women's groups was the first of its kind. In her July 1933 article about women's cooperation with local government, Ichikawa wrote: "However in Tokyo the city authorities received the proposal from the women's side with joy, and this cooperative state, unprecedented in the relations between city government and women, itself can already be considered a victory" (Ichikawa 1933, 5). And in August 1933, a report in *Fusen* on the status of the garbage campaign noted: "In cooperation with the city of Tokyo, we have worked strenuously on the garbage problem. This is the first instance of such cooperative work between the city and women's groups" (*Fusen* 7-8 1933, 13).

Such cooperation may have been a first for this particular women's group, but in fact, as Garon (1997) has demonstrated, cooperation between local government and women's groups became something of an established pattern in the 1920s and 30s: "During the 1920s and early 1930s, prefectural officials cooperated with local women and federation leaders to knit the local associations into prefectural confederations of women's associations. In the process, officials strengthened the federation's mass base and tacitly recognized the legitimacy of the suffrage movement. In exchange, activist women routinely lent their organizational support to the state's campaigns for daily life improvement, moral education, and 'diligence and thrift.' To many women's leaders, the road to power and influence lay in assuming public roles, often in alliance with the state" (Garon 1997, 133-134).

Although Garon does not discuss the Tokyo garbage campaign, his characterization of cooperation between the state and women's groups applies fairly well. For Ichikawa and other League members, the opportunity to publicly cooperate with city authorities was indeed "the road to power and influence." However, the garbage campaign was not a case of the League "len[ding] their organizational support to the state's campaigns;" rather, the garbage campaign was in the first place devised entirely by the League, which then asked the city for financial support. Garon's concept of "social management," implying as the term does the state's primacy in interactions with social groups, overlooks the autonomy and initiative the League took in identifying a political opportunity and leveraging it to their advantage. The official *Hundred Year History of Waste Management in Tokyo* also erases the League's role as the architects of the garbage campaign:

Along with expanding the area for separated collection, the city, together with Ichikawa Fusae's "Tokyo Women's League to Purify City Politics" and others, organized a movement to reduce waste and encourage proper sorting, and devised a fundamental solution to the problem. (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 86)

Perhaps unsurprisingly, in the city's version of events, the city becomes the central player, while the Women's League "and others" are reduced to supporting roles.

Although the women of the League were primarily responsible for the creation and success of the garbage campaign, the city was happy to cooperate – as Ichikawa noted, in the quoted passage above, city officials were overjoyed to receive such a proposal. At the time of the Fukagawa smoke crisis, the city's waste management system was already overburdened. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the city planned and constructed several new incinerators and other waste facilities, but still could not keep up with Tokyo's burgeoning volume of garbage. In fact, originally three additional incinerators were to be built at Fukagawa, but one was scrapped because the rights to the land could not be procured (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 73). By 1937, the city was operating nine incineration facilities in addition to the three at Fukagawa, but the processing capacity of all twelve facilities was still only one-third of Tokyo's total waste output (Tokyo Sanitation Bureau 2000, 86).

Given this situation, the city was undoubtedly grateful for any help it could get. The League's proposal to hold a lecture series educating citizens on proper waste management must have been a relief to the beleaguered sanitation department: the campaign, and "Miss Oharu's Dream," framed the waste problem as an issue of citizens' (mainly women's) ignorance of and lack of concern for properly managing household waste, rather than as a failure of municipal waste management systems. It is therefore unsurprising that the city approved funding and support for the League's garbage campaign activities within a week of hearing the proposal. Both the city government and the League received tangible benefits from their cooperative arrangement.

The Legacy of the Garbage Campaign

Cooperation between the city and the League for Women's Suffrage in garbage-related activities continued well into the 1930s. The League and the Tokyo city sanitation department also developed a close relationship; according to Tamanoi, during the garbage campaign "Members of the League often visited the office of the Tokyo sanitation department (in uptown Tokyo) with flowers" (Tamanoi 2009, 827). Following her successful "cleaning pilgrimage" in 1934, Kaneko was appointed to an unsalaried commissioned position in the sanitation department in 1935. The appointment notice read "commissioned for the work of popularizing the ideology of cleanliness" (Mizoiri 2010, 156). Although this position was unpaid, it was significant as a visible indication of the city's acceptance of women as public persons with a role to play in municipal governance (even if an unrecompensed role in a limited sphere).

League members continued undertaking activities related to public sanitation and garbage reduction even as the country descended into war. In 1938, the Japan Federation of Women's Groups (Nihon Fujin Dantai Renmei) held the Unused Item Exchange Sale (Fuyōhin Kōkan Sokubaikai) in Tokyo. The League for Women's Suffrage participated in the event as a member of the Federation; Ichikawa served as manager of the head office, and Kaneko as assistant director of the administrative department. The *Asahi Shinbun*, under the headline "The wave of the waste regeneration age," reported that the first day of the three day event attracted about 5000 people (Mizoiri 2010, 156). The Tokyo garbage campaign as a distinct effort to improve the city's sanitation fizzled out during the war years, as nationwide the call for thrift, reuse, and salvaging only increased, while incineration briefly fell out of favor as the preferred waste management method. Cooperation between women's groups and the government continued through the war, and expanded into areas beyond garbage. In 1942, Kaneko took on a prominent position in the Greater Japan Women's Association, while Ichikawa was on the board of directors of the Greater Japan Patriotic Press Association (a role for which she was later purged by the occupying Allied powers). The role of women in Japan's wartime waste movements will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

The Fukagawa smoke problem arose as a consequence of waste management policy promoting incineration as the best means of waste control. In the United States and elsewhere, when incineration facilities had similar problems, they were generally abandoned in favor of other means of waste management. But in Japan, the problem was framed not as being caused by the incinerators, but primarily by the garbage itself, and by extension the people throwing it out. The solution, therefore, was to fix the garbage so that the incinerators could work as intended, by diverting kitchen waste with its high water content toward other disposal methods and making sure that inappropriate materials were not put out with the remaining waste to be incinerated. Pre-treatment separation was already being carried out by waste workers in Tokyo, but was insufficient to prevent the Fukagawa smoke problem, so the city turned to source separation – which had already been endorsed as policy in the 1930 revisions of the Waste Cleansing Law – as a major part of the solution.

Source separation of necessity requires the active participation, or unpaid labor, of the majority of residents to be effective. The 1933 women's garbage campaign played a significant role in popularizing the idea that garbage separation is rightfully the civic and moral duty of citizens, especially housewives, in Tokyo and several other cities. Emphasis on waste work as the duty of citizens continued during the war years, though the focus shifted from separation for efficient incineration to reuse and recycling materials for the war effort. The "enlightened housewives" doing their part to relieve the city's garbage crisis idealized by "Miss Oharu's Dream" and the garbage campaign were replaced, during the war, with the ideal of "women of the home front" reducing and reusing waste in service to the nation. The next

chapter will discuss how these women, like the League members discussed in this chapter, exercised their autonomy while participating in wartime waste campaigns.