

The other jihad: Enver Pasha, Bolsheviks, and politics of anticolonial Muslim nationalism during the Baku Congress 1920

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'May the holy war of the peoples of the East and of the toilers of the entire world against imperialist Britain burn with unquenchable fire!'¹ With these words, the Communist International (Comintern) appealed to the anti-imperialist sentiments of Muslim delegates attending the First Congress of the Peoples of East in Baku (in short Baku Congress) in September 1920. Like many lost and forgotten moments and movements during the aftermath of the First World War, the Baku Congress and the ideological climate of anticolonial Muslim nationalism were long dismissed by teleological narratives as marginal and obscure. Even an eyewitness has prominently concluded: 'I cannot take this Baku Conference very seriously. It was an excursion, a pageant, a Beano. As a meeting of Asiatic proletarians it was preposterous.'² Several scholars underlined the importance of the Baku Congress in demonstrating the complex

1 John Riddell (ed), *To See the Dawn: Baku 1920 – First Congress of the Peoples of the East* (Pathfinder, New York: 1993) p 263.

2 Herbert G. Wells, *Russia in the Shadows* (George H. Doran Company, New York: 1921) p 99.

intentions and actions of the Bolsheviks regarding national and colonial questions during the eventful years of the Russian Civil War.³

This chapter places the Baku Congress within the global moment of the aftermath of the First World War. This global moment is generally depicted as conditioned by Lenin's declaration on the rights of nations and President Wilson's fourteen point programme which opened up framing strategies for national self-determination.⁴ Although the declarations by Lenin and Wilson are important in framing the national struggles of this era, this approach might reproduce a certain West vs. East conflict before the actual Cold War.⁵ We

3 The most influential work on Baku Congress is still Stephen White, 'Communism and the East: The Baku Congress, 1920', in *Slavic Review* 33, No 3 (1974). See also: Cosroe Chaqueri, 'The Baku Congress', *Central Asian Survey* 2, No 2 (1983); Edith Ybert-Chabrier, *Le premier congrès des peuples de l'Orient (Bakou, 1-8 Septembre 1920)* (EHESS, Paris: 1984); Edith Ybert-Chabrier, 'Les délégués au Premier Congrès des Peuples d'Orient, Bakou (1er-8 Septembre 1920)', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 26, No 1 (1985); Nermin Menemencioğlu, 'Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku, September 1920', in *XI. Türk Tarih Kongresi: Ankara, 5-9 Eylül 1990. Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler*, Vol 6 of 6 Vols. (Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara: 1994) pp 2223-33; Solmaz Rustamova-Towhidi, 'The First Congress of the Peoples of the East: Aims, Tasks, Results', in Mikhail Narinsky and Jürgen Rojahn (eds), *Centre and Periphery: The History of the Comintern in the Light of New Documents* (International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam: 1996) pp 74-80; Pezhmann Dailami, 'The First Congress of Peoples of the East and the Iranian Soviet Republic of Gilan, 1920-21', in Stephanie Cronin (ed) *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left* (Routledge Curzon, London: 2004) pp 85-117. For a Soviet account see: G. Z. Sorkin, *Pervyi s'ezd Narodov Vostoka* (Nauka, Moscow: 1961).

4 Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, 'Introduction: Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s', in Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (eds), *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s - 1930s* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2007) pp 1-25, 15-16.

5 Erez Manela rightly notes the fallacies of a Wilson vs. Lenin approach, but rather to underline Wilson's superior impact in the colonial debates of early post-war years: 'It may be tempting, for example, to construe the ideological essence of 1919 as a clash between Wilsonian and communist internationalism; "Wilson vs. Lenin" is the influential phrase that Arno Mayer coined some decades ago. But while the Wilson versus Lenin framework is helpful, as Mayer used it, for understanding the struggle over the European Left at the time, it cannot be extended to the colonial world in 1919. Socialist ideas were influential among some colonial intellectuals at the time, and the Russian Bolsheviks also used the language of self-determination, but until late 1919 Wilson's words carried far greater weight in the colonial world than Lenin's.' Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2009) pp

need to see this global moment also within the context of the peak of colonial penetration of the Muslim world as manifested in the Sykes-Picot agreement, Balfour, and Sèvres documents and in the numerous local declarations and claims made against these colonial and imperial machinations by local Muslim insurgents.

Within this global moment of the aftermath of the First World War, a global movement of anticolonial Muslim nationalism emerged. Different movements -without being united under one umbrella or led by a 'hidden hand' – were entangled with each other in a complex network of interrelations and shared the same 'Young Turk zeitgeist' of Muslim nationalism, political culture of partisanship, and anticolonial mobilisation.⁶ Even though diplomatic history of the peace talks in Paris and London has brought light on imperialist and colonialist schemes, one needs to regard only the emergence of several new Muslim states and republics in the aftermath of the First World War, to appreciate the many (and mostly failed) bottom-up struggles of Muslim insurgents.⁷ Beyond national and diplomatic narratives, transnational approaches are necessary in understanding the contentious interaction of local non-state actors in shaping the modern Middle East.⁸ This transnational movement of anticolonial Muslim nationalism was ideologically framed by growing ideas of Muslim nationalism, people's sovereignty, and political anti-Westernism. In the Middle East, this moment was long built up in cultural memories during the era of the Great Game and the Eastern Question and found its emotional tipping point with

6–7. See also: Arno Joseph Mayer, *Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (The World Publishing Company, Cleveland: 1969).

6 Alp Yenen, 'The "Young Turk Zeitgeist" among the Middle Eastern Uprisings in the Aftermath of World War I', in M. Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad (eds), *War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State* (University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City: forthcoming in 2015).

7 For a great overview of Muslim-national attempts of state-formation after the Russian Revolution and the end of the First World War see: Stefan Reichmuth, 'Der Erste Weltkrieg und die muslimischen Republiken der Nachkriegszeit', in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 40 (2014).

8 Alp Yenen, 'Approaching Transnational Political History: The Role of Non-State Actors in Post-Ottoman State-Formation' in Steffi Marung and Matthias Middell (eds), *Transnational Actors – Crossing Borders: Transnational History Studies* (Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig: 2015) pp 261–70. See also: Michael Provence, 'Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East', in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, No 2 (2011).

the colonial partition of the Muslim world after the First World War. Different revolts, rebellions, revolutions, wars of independence in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Anatolia, Iran, Afghanistan, and India between 1918 and 1922 were all framed within the same discursive template of anticolonial Muslim nationalism regardless of their different local cleavages and complex diversities. As the Comintern called for holy war in Baku 1920, spirits of jihad were already bedeviling the colonial powers.

In this chapter, I will showcase one of the most symbolic events trying to embark this transnational movement of Muslim anticolonialism, namely the Bolshevik call for jihad during the Baku Congress in 1920. Two of the major political actors who tried to steal the show from each other at this eventful congress were Enver Pasha and the Bolsheviks. Their story tells the greater story of anticolonial Muslim nationalism during this 'jihad' of 1920.

The chapter will, first, illustrate the approach of Comintern and Soviet Russia towards the Baku Congress. Second, it will dwell on the Bolshevik call for jihad and discuss their problematic approach to Islam in mobilising Muslim anticolonialism. Third, it will contextualise the Baku Congress from the British perspective, which delivered fancy conspiracy theories in trying to make sense out of the anticolonial uprisings in the Middle East. Lastly, it will discuss the role of Enver Pasha in Baku and argue that his struggle needs to be read within movement of anticolonial Muslim nationalism. Louise Bryant, who witnessed the revolutionary days in Soviet Russia, evaluates the contention between Enver Pasha and Zinoviev, the chairman of the Comintern, at the Baku Congress as follows:

The Communists understood perfectly well that Enver Pasha was not at the Oriental Conference as a sudden and sincere convert to Internationalism, and he knew that they knew. Both Zinoviev and Enver were actors taking the lead rôles in a significant historical pageant. The results are really all that matter, since the motives will soon be forgotten.⁹

The First (and last) Congress of the Peoples of the East was held in Baku, from 1 to 8 September 1920. It was the first and most famous result of Comintern's new Eastern policy. During the Second Congress of the Third (Communist) International in the early summer of 1920, Lenin presented his preliminary

⁹ Louise Bryant, *Mirrors of Moscow*, Reprint (Hyperion Press, Westport, Conn.: 1973) pp 157–58.

draft of his 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions'.¹⁰ Lenin was thereby in favour of supporting revolutionary movements in the colonial world regardless of their stance towards communist ideals.¹¹ In article six of the theses on the national and colonial questions, adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern, this idea was manifested as follows:

Consequently, we cannot limit ourselves at this time merely to recognizing or proclaiming the friendship of the toilers of various nations. Rather we must pursue a policy of implementing the closest possible alliance of all national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia. The forms of this alliance will be determined by the level of development of the Communist movement within the proletariat of each country or of the revolutionary liberation movement in the backward countries and among the backward nationalities.¹²

The idea was to organise a conference for this new Eastern policy following the conference model of the Communist International.¹³ The Baku Conference was subordinated to the Comintern and it was, according to Zinoviev, even

10 For the final draft of these theses see: Vladimir I. Lenin, 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions: Adopted by the Second Congress of the Communist International (July 28, 1920)', in John Riddell (ed), *To See the Dawn: Baku 1920 – First Congress of the Peoples of the East* (Pathfinder, New York: 1993) pp 300–307; John Riddell (ed), *Workers of the World and Oppressed Peoples, Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress of the Communist International, 1920, 2 Vols.*, The Communist International in Lenin's Time 1 (Pathfinder Press, New York: 1991) pp 283–90.

11 Rudolf Schlesinger, *Die Kolonialfrage in der Kommunistischen Internationale* (Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main: 1970) p 32; White, 'Communism and the East', p 495. The main objection to Lenin's proposal came from M. N. Roy, the Indian communist revolutionary. Due to Roy's objection, Lenin changed the term 'bourgeois-democratic' to 'national-revolutionary' in order to distinguish between different national struggles. Manabendra Nath Roy, *Memoirs* (Allied Publishers, Bombay: 1964) p 392. See also: Dailami, 'The First Congress of Peoples of the East and the Iranian Soviet Republic of Gilan, 1920–21', p 103; White, 'Communism and the East', p 497; Schlesinger, *Die Kolonialfrage in der Kommunistischen Internationale*, p 45.

12 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, p 302

13 Ahmed Zeki Velidi Togan, *Memoirs: National Existence and Cultural Struggles of Turkistan and other Muslim Eastern Turks*, (transl.) H. B. Paksoy (CreateSpace, North Charleston: 2012) p 263. See also: Bülent Gökay, *A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918 – 1923* (Tauris Academic Studies, London: 1997) p 99.

the 'complement, the second part, the second half' of the Second Comintern Congress.¹⁴ Later M. N. Pavlovich announced the general euphoria in the Comintern as follows: 'All Communists – Russian, French, Italian, and so on – have now become Asians and are resolved to help every revolutionary movement in the East and in Africa.'¹⁵

As one eyewitness concluded, the Bolshevik motivation behind the Baku Congress was presumably not much more 'than a vague idea of hitting back at the British Government through Mesopotamia and India, because it has been hitting them through Kolchak, Deniken, Wrangel, and the Poles'.¹⁶ The Comintern's world revolution plans were usually exposed to dominance of Soviet state interests.¹⁷ Trotsky wrote at the eve of the Baku Congress in a letter to Chicherin that 'a potential Soviet revolution in the East is now advantageous for us chiefly as a major item of diplomatic barter with England'.¹⁸ The strategic momentum should not dismiss the Baku Congress to a mere instrument of Soviet foreign affairs.¹⁹ For many Bolsheviks the world revolution was more than a lip service, although they were rather unsure how to deal with it.

Around 2,000 attendees were present at the Baku Congress.²⁰ The majority of the delegates were Russian Muslims from Caucasus and Central Asia and Asian political émigrés living in Soviet Russia.²¹ The major part of the delegates were, nonetheless, not members of a communist party, and were in many cases even members of a petty-bourgeois movement.²² The contradiction of Soviet

14 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, p 71.

15 M. N. Pavlovich's speech at the Baku Congress, 5th session, 5 September 1920, in *ibid.*, pp 164–65.

16 Wells, *Russia in the Shadows*, pp 97–98.

17 Ben Fowkes and Bülent Gökay, 'Unholy Alliance: Muslims and Communists: An Introduction', in *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25, No 1 (2009) p 9. See also: Rustamova-Towhidi, 'The First Congress of the Peoples of the East', p 74.

18 L. Trotsky, letter to Chicherin, 4 June 1920, in Jan M. Meijer (ed), *The Trotsky papers, 1917–1922*, Vol 2 of 2 Vols (Mouton, The Hague: 1971) p 209. See also White, 'Communism and the East', p 503.

19 White, 'Communism and the East', p 493.

20 For the statistics see Sorkin, *Pervyi s'ezd Narodov Vostoka*, pp 21–22; White, 'Communism and the East', p 499; Chaqueri, 'The Baku Congress', p 92.

21 White, 'Communism and the East', pp 506–7. See also the critical remarks about the election of the delegates in: Chaqueri, 'The Baku Congress', p 93.

22 Schlesinger, *Die Kolonialfrage in der Kommunistischen Internationale*, p 49; White, 'Communism and the East', p 507.

support for nationalist forces in Turkey, Iran, India, and China remained a disputed issue within the Comintern and needed to be justified again and again. In his opening speech of the Baku Congress, Zinoviev argued once again:

And so I say that we patiently support groups that are not yet with us and even against us on some questions. For example, in Turkey, comrades, you know that the Soviet government supports Kemal. We do not forget for one moment that the movement headed by Kemal is not a Communist movement. [...] It is not out of some mercenary calculation that we support national movements like those in Turkey, Persia, India, and China. Rather we support them because a conscious worker will tell himself that the Turks who today do not yet understand where all their interests lie will understand this tomorrow. We must support this Turk and help him, and wait for a real people's revolution to arise in Turkey, when veneration for sultans and other obsolete notions will vanish from his mind.²³

Nevertheless, the Baku Congress was convened with typical Soviet-style parades and Internationalist ceremonies. For instance, one of the major topics was, why the Third (Communist) International was superior to the Second (Socialist) International. This was an unnecessary concern in Baku, since the major part of the participants were non-party delegates. To entertain the delegates the anthem 'International' was playing repeatedly by an orchestra during ovations. On 3 September 1920, there were no sessions out of respect to Friday prayers, but a military parade of the Red Army took place. Also a huge statue of Karl Marx was unveiled by Comintern leaders in the city centre with a great ceremony.²⁴ One of the propaganda highlights was a public trial, at which effigies of Lloyd George, Alexandre Millerand, and Woodrow Wilson were show-trialed and set on fire.²⁵ At the end of the

23 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, pp 82, 84.

24 White, 'Communism and the East', pp 500–501. There is a photograph of this event in Riddell, *To See the Dawn*.

25 Secret Political Report, 25 October 1920, The National Archives, London, Foreign Office correspondence and files (hereafter FO), FO 371/5178/E13412, quoted in White, 'Communism and the East', p 501. The Constantinople correspondent of *The Times* describes the same incident remarkably similarly to British intelligence report. *The Times*, 'Communist Congress at Baku: Its "Asiatic" Policy', 1 October 1920. This event is confirmed also by eye-witness accounts: Wells, *Russia in the Shadows*, pp 96–97.

congress sessions, there was a ceremony for 26 Baku commissars, killed by the British.²⁶

Despite all the sincere efforts for world revolution, there was also a certain Orientalism in Comintern's approach to the 'backward nationalities' at the Baku Congress. John Reed, who made his last journey to the Baku Congress before his sudden death, was strongly disappointed by Zinoviev's and Radek's insincerity and cynical rhetoric.²⁷ But tropes of Orientalism were even stronger on the part of the critics of the Baku Congress. Despite his alleged insincerity, as Zinoviev was defending the Baku Congress to his European comrades, he made painstaking efforts to counter Rudolf Hilferding's Orientalist criticism of "mullahs of Chiva", whom the demagogues, the Bolsheviks, were trying to draw into the Communist international.²⁸ British Intelligence ridiculed the competence of the delegates as well: 'The majority of the delegates seem to have been illiterate and to have taken far more interest in each other's weapons and in selling the produce, which they had brought with them from their native countries, than in the proceedings of the Conference.'²⁹ Also Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir) who was a delegate in Baku recalls as a later leftist-Kemalist dismissively that:

the first sessions of the congress passed by with parades, screams, roars and cheers. The swords were drawn out without ceasing. Besides these, a few program meetings took place, but since it was necessary to listen to the speeches there, rather than drawing out the sword and yelling, these didn't get the attention of the honorable delegates.³⁰

The Times mocked the Bolshevik approach and the mentality of the Oriental delegates: 'In view of the fact that the Soviet gave free meals to the delegates at the expense of the Baku population, the following Russian *mot*

26 Alfred Rosmer, *Moscou sous Lénine* (Maspéro, Paris: 1970) pp 145–46.

27 Warren Lerner, *Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist* (Stanford University Press, Stanford: 1970) p 104.

28 Ben Lewis and Lars T. Lih, *Martov and Zinoviev: Head to Head in Halle* (November Publications, London: 2011) pp 69, 88, 136–140.

29 Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports (Constantinople Branch), 30 September 1920, FO 371/5171 E13451/262/44, quoted in Richard H. Ullman, *The Anglo-Soviet Accord, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921*, Vol 3 of 3 Vols (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ: 1972) p 319.

30 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 7th Ed. (Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul: 1979) p 189.

seems to be a good summing-up of this sorry farce: – “The Eastern Communists Congress has simply shown that Orientals like pilaff [a rice meal] and that our Communists have not understood the Moslem mentality”.³¹

The very highlight of Baku Congress was not very much communist or internationalist. Zinoviev finished his long speech at the first session of the congress with the following appeal to Eastern delegates:

Comrades! Brothers! The time has come when you can set about organizing a true people's holy war against the robbers and oppressors. The Communist International turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them “Brothers, we summon you to a holy war, above all against British Imperialism!” (Loud applause. Prolonged shouts of “Hurrah!” Members of the congress stand up, brandishing their weapons. The speaker is unable to continue for some time. All the delegates stand up and applaud. Shouts: “We swear it!”)³²

Also in the Manifesto of Peoples of the East, which was accepted by the Baku Congress, ‘holy war’ was one of the signal words, which was frequently repeated. Why would the Bolsheviks call for holy war? According to general assumptions, the notorious First World War jihad of 1914 was nothing but hot air as a general revolution did not take place in the Muslim lands of Ottoman Empire's enemies. However, the picture differs severely when one looks past 1918. In the aftermath of the First World War, there were Muslim uprisings everywhere from North Africa over Middle East and Central Asia to South Asia. One could argue that the jihad of 1914 only catalysed in 1919 reaching its peak in the summer of 1920. In these anticolonial Muslim-nationalist struggles, jihad was not only in the eye of the colonialist beholder, but also on the lips – and probably in the hearts and minds – of those who rallied against colonial rule. Thus, Zinoviev did not need to seek far in looking for ways to mobilise anticolonial Muslim nationalism. But ever since the overtly vocal role the Germans played in the jihad of 1914, ‘infidel’ calls for jihad were broadly suspicious, especially by atheist Bolsheviks.

The Bolshevik approach that ‘religion is the opium of the people’ bedeviled the jihad of Baku 1920 from the beginning on. It is remarkable that ‘Islam’ was never directly mentioned by name in this Bolshevik call for holy war. Even

31 *The Times*, ‘Pilaff and Palaver: Communist Farce at Baku’, 6 October 1920.

32 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, p 88.

within the whole of the conference proceedings Islam is mentioned only on few occasions.³³ Nevertheless, while Zinoviev's call for a holy war was translated into Turkish, Azeri, and Persian, it was probably translated as *jihād*. Even a direct translation as *ḥarb-i mukaddes*,³⁴ which one can find in some documents, does refer only to the concept of jihad.³⁵

At the Baku Congress, some speakers were going long distances in emphasising that 'the Muslim religion is rooted in principles of religious communism'.³⁶ The Bolshevik delegates were stressing the revolutionary potential of the East for the struggle against imperialism to disappointed delegates coming from Soviet Central Asia where Russian colonialist overtones were still very much present.³⁷ Whereas Islam was barely mentioned by name, there was a repeating and derogative discourse about Pan-Islamism. Zinoviev, for instance, said that 'Pan-Islamism, Musavatism, all these trends are not ours. We have a different policy.'³⁸ Already in Lenin's theses, the article 11, c) made a similar objection regarding Pan-Islamism:

It is necessary to struggle against the pan-Islamic and pan-Asian movements and similar currents that try to link the liberation struggle against European and American imperialism with strengthening the power of Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobles, large landowners, clergy, and so forth.³⁹

33 Ibid., pp 95, 159.

34 Report on Baku Congress, 24 September 1920, General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate Archives, Ankara (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüd Daire Başkanlığı Arşivi, hereafter ATASE), ATASE, İSH-11, sıra no. 3115, kutu no. 717, gömlek no. 83.

35 Even before the proclamation of jihad and Ottoman entry to the First World War, Enver Pasha was convinced, for instance, that the coming war with England 'would be a holy war [*böyle bir harb mukaddes olacağına*]' and 'it will definitely be pertinent to rally the Muslim population [...] in [neighbouring] Iran under Russian and English rule to revolution.' Enver to Cavid, 24/25 Temmuz 330 [7/8 August 1914], ATASE, BDH, klasör 68, yeni dosya 337, fihrist 1 and 1-1, quoted in Mustafa Aksakal, "'Holy War Made in Germany"? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad', *War in History* 18, No 2 (2011) p 196.

36 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, p 209. See also: Fowkes and Gökay, 'Unholy Alliance: Muslims and Communists', p 11.

37 Hélène Carrère d'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, *Marxism and Asia: An Introduction with Readings* (Lane, London: 1969) pp 33-34.

38 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, p 84.

39 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, p 305.

This was not a single remark. The attitude towards Pan-Islam was clear and harsh, but not necessarily smart.⁴⁰ On the one hand, some true communists were displeased, since 'there was hardly anything Socialistic about Zinoviev's appeal for a "holy war."' ⁴¹ On the other hand, for Muslim delegates, this was contradictory. British Intelligence was proudly reporting that 'the Congress has been a failure. From the point of view of those Muslims, who sincerely expected to further the cause of Islam, it is certainly a failure.'⁴² Later it was confirmed by Muslim communists that by rejecting Pan-Islam, the Comintern terribly damaged its relation to Muslim masses.⁴³

Also other sources reveal the existence of a certain Muslim spirit during the days of Baku Congress which needs to be appreciated. In Aydemir's account, there is a certain cynicism towards his own romanticism in his young days. These romantic sentiments need further attention, because it delivers a certain insight to Baku Congress through the eyes of a passionate Muslim delegate. Aydemir strongly emphasises the general euphoria and solidarity among the Muslims, who were fraternising with each other, even though they could not speak or understand each other's language. Everywhere, everybody was celebrating the so-called 'awakening of the East': the end of the long-lasting oppression of Asia. It was felt like a 'judgement day' as Aydemir remembers. The sleeping nations of the East were now waking up from their centuries old sleep of death to finally overthrow their oppressors and besiegers.⁴⁴ The official maxim was that '[a] new world [was] awakening to the life and struggle: the world of the oppressed nationalities.'⁴⁵ Naciye Hanım, a young lady delegate from Turkey, was saying that 'in order to see the dawn one has to pass through the dark night.'⁴⁶ This idea of the 'awakening of the East' was probably at least since the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 slowly but surely spreading among the intellectuals of the East.⁴⁷ This trope of the 'awakening

40 Fowkes and Gökay, 'Unholy Alliance: Muslims and Communists', p 11.

41 Bryant, *Mirrors of Moscow*, p 158.

42 Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports (Constantinople Branch), 30 September 1920, FO 371/5171 E13451/262/44, quoted in Ullman, *The Anglo-Soviet Accord*, p 319.

43 Carrère d'Encausse and Schram, *Marxism and Asia*, pp 188–189.

44 Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, p 187.

45 'A New World: Declaration Delivered at the Baku Congress by the Baku City Executive Committee, Communist Party of Azerbaijan', in John Riddell (ed), *To See the Dawn: Baku 1920 – First Congress of the Peoples of the East* (Pathfinder, New York: 1993) pp 308–11, 308.

46 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, pp 234.

47 For the effect of the victory of 1905 in the Islamic world see: Cemil Aydın, *The Politics*

of the East' was simultaneously supported by the imagination and anxiety of European Orientalists.

In British intelligence and news coverage, the Baku Congress was interpreted in common tropes of conspiracy theories. For instance, in an article about the Baku Congress, *The Times* reporter was illustrating the Comintern leaders as criminal Jewish conspirators: 'Apfelbaum [Zinoviev] is a Jew, like his associate Bela Kun, or Cohen, from Budapest, who was also at Baku; and of all the strange things which have happened in the last few years, none has been stranger than this spectacle of two Jews, one of them a convicted pickpocket, summoning the world of Islam to a new Jihad.'⁴⁸ From the beginning on, the Russian Revolution was seen as a Jewish conspiracy, thus also Zinoviev's call for jihad.⁴⁹ The British Baku delegate Wells confirms that this tradition of conspiracy theories in the British press: 'According to the crazier section of the British Press they [the Bolsheviks] are the agents of a mysterious racial plot, a secret society in which Jews, Jesuits, Freemasons, and Germans are all jumbled together in the maddest fashion.' Further, he explains that in England there is 'a peculiar style of thinking, so impervious to any general ideas that it must needs fall back upon the notion of a conspiracy to explain the simplest reactions of the human mind.'⁵⁰ David Fromkin describes these British conspiracy theories within the broader context of Middle Eastern uprisings:

When the uprisings in the Middle East after the war occurred, it was natural for British officials to explain that they formed part of a sinister design woven by the long-time conspirators. Bolshevism and international finance, pan-Arabs and pan-Turks, Islam and Russia were pictured by British Intelligence as agents of international Jewry and Prussian Germany, the managing partners of the great conspiracy.⁵¹

of *Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (Columbia University Press, New York, NY: 2007); Renée Worringer, *Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2014).

48 *The Times*, 'The Red Flag in the East', 23 September 1920.

49 On the British perception of the Russian Revolution as a Jewish conspiracy see: Sharman Kadish, *Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community, Britain and the Russian Revolution* (Cass, London: 1992) pp 10–55.

50 Wells, *Russia in the Shadows*, p 79.

51 David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, 20th anniversary ed. (Henry Holt & Co., New York, NY: 2009) p 466.

At the end of the war in November 1918, Sir Eyre Crowe from the Foreign Office was suspecting that 'the heart and soul of all revolutionary and terrorist movements have invariably been the Jews, the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress' (in short CUP).⁵² Other senior officials claimed even that 'there is or ever has been any dividing line between the CUP and bolshevism. The force behind all these movements is the same.'⁵³ There was a 'far more dangerous party, that of Enver & Talaat & the CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik combination' which was said to be occupied 'with the Pan-Islamic offensive of Bolshevism throughout the East, primarily directed against Great Britain'.⁵⁴ Even in the lack of facts and proofs, the paranoid style was delivering creative visions:

I do not think we can say Bolshevism does not exist because we can certify that no *Bolshevist organization* exists [emphasis in original]. We are looking for something far more elusive and intangible than that, viz: tendencies and sympathies on the part of the Turks or any of the peoples of Turkey, which foreshadows a fusion with Bolshevism or may end directly or indirectly, morally or materially, in aiding the Bolshevik cause to our detriment ... There have in fact been a number of incidents relevant to the subject, which, with the concomitant evil of Pan-Islamism, seem to fill the near horizon day by day with greater power of disturbing the British world.⁵⁵

52 Eyre Crowe, Minute to Foreign Office, 18 November 1918, F0.371.4369.513, quoted in John Fisher, 'British Responses to Mahdist and Other Unrest in North and West Africa, 1919–1930', in *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 52, No 3 (2006) p 348; John Ferris, 'The British Empire vs. The Hidden Hand: British Intelligence and Strategy and 'The CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik combination', 1918–1924', in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (eds) *The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856–1956: Essays in Honour of David French* (Ashgate, Farnham: 2010) pp 325–45, 337.

53 George Kidston from Foreign Office, quoted in Priya Satia, *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York: 2008) p 224.

54 D. G. Osbourne, Minute, 23 September 1920, F0.371.4946.E11702, quoted in Ferris, 'The British Empire vs. The Hidden Hand', p 342.

55 SIS chief in Constantinople, Political Report, 5 May 5, 1920, F0.371.5178.E.4689, quoted in John Ferris, "'The Internationalism of Islam': The British Perception of a Muslim Menace, 1840–1951", in *Intelligence and National Security* 24, No 1 (2009) p 65.

Paranoid thinking or not, the events of the aftermath of the First World War caused a shift in the strategic perception of British officials. Suddenly, it was the 'Russian menace in the East', which threatened the British Empire "incomparably greater than anything else".⁵⁶ Priya Satia writes in her brilliant study of cultural foundations of British colonialism in the Middle East: 'Bolshevism and Islam were both giant secret societies in the British official mind, their members following party decrees and clerical fatwas, respectively.'⁵⁷

Accordingly, the British high officials were highly concerned about the Baku Congress. British occupation forces in Turkey and Persia did everything to prevent the arrival of delegates to Baku – as in the case of some unfortunate Persian delegates even by using deadly force.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, British newspapers were reporting about the anti-British propaganda, which the Baku Congress set out.⁵⁹ According to *The Times* '[t]he real danger in Middle Asia, as elsewhere' was not the Red Army nor "Enver's stage army", but rather the "Bolshevist propaganda."⁶⁰ As Ullman summarises, among the British officials the term of 'propaganda' became by then 'the shorthand term which increasingly came to stand for the whole complex of Soviet revolutionary activities against British interests, especially in Asia.'⁶¹

In echoing many concerned voices in the British officialdom, *The Times* was propagandising that 'Bolshevism and Islam can no more mix than oil and water; but Enver is no Moslem.'⁶² Enver Pasha, on the other side, saw this quite differently. Before he went to the 'Islam conference' as he referred to the Baku Congress, he wrote to Cemal Pasha:

Here [in Moscow] I got in touch with all the Muslim delegations. Either they be communist or not, they all support from their heart a military enterprise for the Muslims. From the mufti of Kazan to Sultan Galiev.

56 Lord Curzon, quoted in Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, p 461.

57 Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, p 211.

58 White, 'Communism and the East', pp 501–2.

59 'At this gathering it is proposed that, among other things, lectures should be given and pamphlets issued on the question of freeing India from "British tyranny".' *The Times*, "Oriental Congress" at Baku: Bolsheviks Pulling the Strings', 8 September 1920.

60 *The Times*, 'The Red Flag in the East', 23 September 1920.

61 Ullman, *The Anglo-Soviet Accord*, p 318.

62 *The Times*, 'The Red Flag in the East', 23 September 1920.

Accordingly, I am sure that great services will be done for the Islamic world when the general spirit is as such.⁶³

Kazım Karabekir, one of the leaders of the Turkish national struggle, wrote to Enver Pasha after learning that the latter will go to the Baku Congress: 'It is a very important matter that you will be present at the Baku Conference where the fate of the Islamic world and all nations of the East will certainly be discussed [...].' Kazım Karabekir referred to general Muslim solidarity and that 'delegations coming to Ankara from India, Syria and Iraq declared that they all recognize the Anatolian government and that they are ready to make any sacrifice and will not abstain from any expenditure to save Turkey, but need our help and trained personnel to build up an organization.'⁶⁴

Enver Pasha travelled from Moscow to the Baku Congress in the same train as Zinoviev and other Comintern leaders, but rather as a special guest, not a delegate.⁶⁵ But Zinoviev seemed to have open misgivings towards Enver's presence at the conference.⁶⁶ The Bolsheviks had every reason to fear that Enver could cast a shadow on the Comintern leaders in Baku. For instance, as Enver Pasha entered the congress hall during Zinoviev's opening speech. His sudden appearance caused a great curiosity and excitement among the Muslim delegates during the session.⁶⁷ Enver was not necessarily hiding his self-promoting schemes either. During the military parade on 3 September, Enver Pasha galloped on a near-by hill and saluted the crowds on his reared horse, which strongly displeased the Comintern leaders.⁶⁸

At the end, Enver was not even allowed to read his own declaration. His

63 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Afghanistan), 25 August 1920 in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (eds) *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihî Mektuplar* 40–41 (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002) pp 41.

64 Kazım Karabekir, letter to Enver Pasha, 7 September 1920, ATASE, İSH-10, sıra no. 4345, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 50. For the same letter see also Archive of the Turkish Historical Society, Ankara (Türk Tarih Kurumu Arşivi, hereafter TTK), TTK, EP, 1–70.

65 Enver Pasha, letter (Baku) to Cemal Pasha (Afghanistan), [around 8 September 1920], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, p 42; Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, p 194.

66 Chaqueri, 'The Baku Congress', p 94.

67 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Enver Paşa: Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya*, Vol 3 of 3 Vols. (Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul: 1972) p 543; Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, p 190; Kurt Okay, *Enver Pascha, der große Freund Deutschlands* (Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin: 1935) pp 311–12.

68 Rosmer, *Moscou sous Lénine*, p 147.

anti-imperialist declaration was read out on the fourth session (4 September 1920). Strangely enough, Enver Pasha claimed to represent the Union of the Revolutionary Organizations of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Arabia and India.⁶⁹ Masayuki Yamauchi carefully compared Enver Pasha's hand-written declaration in Ottoman-Turkish with the Russian stenographic record. He found out that expressions, like 'Allah's rule', 'Islam warriors', 'sacredness of the people' and 'victory by the grace of Allah' are changed in favour of Bolshevik terminology in the Russian text.⁷⁰

The following harsh resolution, which was adopted in reaction to his declaration, demonstrate the Comintern's disillusionment about exploiting Enver Pasha for the mobilisation of anticolonial Muslim nationalism, but also how much defamation Enver Pasha's name would bring along in European minds due to his association with warmongering, self-enrichment, and Armenian massacres. Later during the Labour Conference in Halle, Zinoviev had to explain the presence of Enver Pasha at the Baku Conference against his European comrades:

I have to say that comrade Crispian really has taken in with this Enver Pasha business. Such outrageous flimflam has been written on the question of nationalities. But it is not only in Germany that people are talking of this 'spectre Enver', but in Switzerland too. I just received a letter from the Swiss comrade Rose Bloch, in which she asks: 'Well comrade, tell me, is Enver really your ally? Tell me, is the terrible Enver Pasha your

69 According to Yamauchi, this Union, which Enver was claiming to represent, 'was obviously invented for the purpose at Baku and for his own depiction of his ties with various Muslim leaders of local movements, mainly in Arabic-speaking areas, with whom he had conversations in Berlin.' Especially, it was Emir Shakib Arslan and his friends, with whom Enver Pasha was indeed in contact in Berlin. Masayuki Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922* (Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokio: 1991) p 32.

70 Ibid., p 33. For the Russian original see: *Pervyy s'ezd narodov vostoka: Baku 1–8 sent. 1920g.* (Communist International Publishing House, Petrograd: 1920) pp 108–12; Türkaya Ataöv, '1–7 Eylül 1920 Doğu Halkları Birinci Kongresinde (Bakü) Enver Paşa'nın Konuşma Metni ve Bununla İlgili Kongre Kararı', in *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 29, No 1 (1974) pp 46–47. For the English translation of the Russian text: Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, pp 138–42. For the transcription of the original Ottoman-Turkish manuscript see: Enver Pasha, Original Text of the Speech Delivered at the Baku Congress, [ca. August – September 1920], TTK, EP, 1–77, in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, pp 318–21.

ally?’ And I have a pamphlet from Frankfurt, signed by Gütler and Kohl, which cries that Enver Pasha, the executioner of the Armenian people, is admitted into the Third International, but Ledebour the old revolutionary fighter is refused admittance.

Allow me to tell you how things really stand [Heckles. Unrest] Enver Pasha was present at the Baku congress, he was not a delegate. He requested that we give him the opportunity to issue a statement. [...] So, we did not allow him to speak, indeed this was at my instigation as president of the congress. Then he asked us to read out a statement. We agreed to do that. [...]

So that is what the Enver Pasha story looks like. [Unrest] Enver Pasha was not a delegate, and there was even a resolution against him. Of course, Enver Pasha was the leading butcher of the Armenians, and we also told him that to his face.⁷¹

Although the European public was more or less suspicious about Enver, what all accounts agree on is that Enver Pasha indeed had a great reputation among the Muslim delegates and caused great excitement during the Baku Congress. Aydemir says for instance that ‘his fame was in the Muslim Orient like a fairy tale or a legend. According to the belief of these peoples, he was not of humankind from this earth. Everywhere, where he appeared, the sky had to open up, the ground had to split up, and great and magnificent things had to occur. He was over everything and over everyone.’⁷² A British Intelligence report confirms that he ‘exercised great influence over the Moslem delegates from the various districts of Central Asia’, and he was ‘looked upon by them as heroic figure and the representative of Moslem hostility to the Western powers and particularly England.’ Furthermore, many senior Muslim representatives ‘insisted on rendering Oriental obeisance to Enver Pasha when presented to him’.⁷³ Even Zinoviev himself remarked later in Halle that

71 Grigory Zinoviev, *Die Weltrevolution und die III. Kommunistische Internationale: Rede auf dem Parteitag der USPD in Halle am 14. Oktober 1920* (Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, Hamburg: 1920), quoted here from the English translation in Lewis and Lih, *Martov and Zinoviev*, pp 135–36.

72 Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, pp 190–91.

73 Report of British High Commissioner (Constantinople) about the Baku Congress, 5 November 1920, FO 371/5439/N2539, quoted in White, ‘Communism and the East’, p 509.

In Baku, the influence of Enver over a large part of the Muslim population is so great that people on the streets kiss his hands and feet. Of course, this is regrettable. I will not hide that. But I do not want to hear that the whole Muslim population is totally different compared to us. This is what we must understand. We must be able to respond to and remove such local difficulties which the working class in the Orient always comes across.⁷⁴

Enver definitely enjoyed the respect and love of the Muslim delegates and was fully aware that this was disturbing the Bolsheviks. In a letter Enver Pasha wrote to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Enver emphasised the 'revival of Islam' and the lack of understanding on part of the Bolsheviks that there is a Muslim 'force' at stake which is beyond the grasp of communism:

Nevertheless, at the [Baku] congress I talked to many Muslim delegates, either they be communists or not, from "Turkestan", Afghanistan, Kirgizstan, Dagestan, and Caucasus and Chechenia. They have demonstrated by their spirit and acclamations that they are allied to Turkey and possess an indescribable degree of attachment to the Turks with strong ties. As far as I understood, as a result of a general revival of Islam, they came to the conclusion that any war taking place against Turkey will bring a greater degree of attention to them. Some of these ovations out of this position made the communists concerned. For some reason, I think that the Russian communist executive committee which considers Turkey as aspiring to communist rule, did neither understand that this Muslim union is a force nor that this force cannot be obtained by communism.⁷⁵

Although in the literature there is strong tendency to associate Enver Pasha with Pan-Turkism from his Caucasus campaign in the First World War to his post-war exile adventures leading to his death in Central Asia in 1922, his private correspondence and public statements feature rather stronger sentiments for the cause of Islam and Muslims in a global anticolonial struggle. In a private letter, after returning from the Baku Congress, he wrote: 'Let's see,

74 Zinoviev, *Die Weltrevolution und die III. Kommunistische Internationale*, quoted from the English translation in Lewis and Lih, *Martov and Zinoviev*, p 140.

75 Enver Pasha, letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, late September 1920, ATASE, İSH-10, sıra no. 5774, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 51.

what Allah will bring upon us. Is there hope for the future? The World War did not end yet. No matter what happens, I am sure it will end with the redemption of Islam.⁷⁶ In an internal note on the results of the Baku Congress, Enver Pasha made clear: 'Since we have the opinion that in the Islamic world only by operating as Muslims we can mobilize them against our enemies and only then they can move towards progress, no other ways of operation need to be considered.'⁷⁷ One year later, at the third conference of the Communist International, Enver Pasha – still a 'special guest' of the Comintern – opened and finished his speech with references to the global struggle of Muslims:

It is now almost a year since the Baku Congress of the Eastern Nations. With great pleasure, we observe the struggle towards freedom of a people of five hundred millions of Muslims making the four-fifth of the people from the Atlantic Ocean over Nord Africa reaching into the Great Chinese Ocean who are thirsty for freedom.

Those independence struggles in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Albania, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and India which has joined the Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies and the results achieved so far are rapidly encouraging our hopes. [...]

Like we said last year, the war between the imperialists which started in 1914 still continues. These monsters whose rapacity cannot be satisfied will long quarrel over the body of oppressed nations they knocked down.

Let us continue to prepare for the world revolution so that when the time is ripe let us all free ourselves by working together as hand in glove. Time is working for our benefit. Let us not sleep, but move with courage. Definitely, the last triumph will be ours. Because we are the oppressed, we are the rightful.⁷⁸

Zinoviev had declared in his opening speech of the Baku Congress that '[t]he enormous significance of the revolution that is beginning in the East does

76 Enver Pasha, letter to Kazım (Özalp), 23 September 1920, ATASE, İSH-10, sıra no. 5826, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 57.

77 Enver Pasha, Remarks on the Baku Congress and the Domestic Situations of Russia, [September or October 1920], TTK, EP, 7–6, in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, pp 321–22.

78 Enver Pasha's speech at the Third Conference of the Communist International, 2 June -12 July 1921, Moscow, published in *Liwa-el-Islam* 1, No 11–12 (1921), pp 113, 118–120.

not consist in requesting the British imperialist gentlemen to take their feet off the table, only to then permit the Turkish rich to stretch their feet comfortably on the table.⁷⁹ Soon Zinoviev would discover that even as a fallen hero and fugitive war-criminal, Enver Pasha was still too strong to be left alone in Baku.⁸⁰ At the end of the Baku Congress, as Zinoviev returned to Moscow, he took Enver Pasha with him in the armoured train of the Communist International.⁸¹ As disappointed as Zinoviev might possibly have been, Enver Pasha wrote to Kazım Karabekir: 'I arrived to Moscow from Baku. Anyway, I am greatly satisfied with the result of the conference.'⁸²

The Comintern leaders practically did not really know how to deal with the situation in Baku: an uneducated crowd largely uninterested about class-struggle and Internationalist ceremonies, a dangerous but alluring rise of anti-colonial Muslim nationalism, and the celebration of dubious men like Enver. Although the Baku Congress was directed against the rest of the world as an asset to Soviet foreign policy, the large participation of Russian Muslim delegates and the impact of Enver Pasha on Russian Muslims coupled the Baku Congress unintendedly with the Soviet internal affairs in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the Baku Congress, one of its most prominent delegates, the leader of the nonparty fraction Narbutabekov from Tashkent, for instance, harshly criticised 'the local authorities, whose policy is alienating the working masses from the Soviet government.' He called upon the communist leaders to pull back their 'colonizers who are now working behind the mask of communism!' He even did not hesitate to say that only when 'that is done, I am sure, not a single Muslim will venture to raise his hand against Soviet power.'⁸³ But the Soviets soon began an anti-Islamic campaign in Central Asia.⁸⁴ The representative of the Ankara Government İbrahim Tali was also fully aware of

79 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, p 74.

80 Yamauchi argues that Enver Pasha was in touch with leading Muslim delegates, and the Bolshevik feared a possible coup d'état against themselves. Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, pp 33–34.

81 Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, p 194; *The Times*, 'Pilaff and Palaver'.

82 Enver Pasha, letter to Kazım Karabekir, October 1920, ATASE, ATAŞB, sıra no. 4262, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 13.

83 Riddell, *To See the Dawn*, pp 116–23. Okay especially emphasises Narbutabekov's speech. Okay, *Enver Pascha, der große Freund Deutschlands*, pp 317–20.

84 For more details on the anti-Islamic campaign in Soviet Central Asia see: Shoshana Keller, *To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against Islam in Central Asia, 1917 – 1941* (Praeger, Westport: 2001).

the inconsistencies in the Bolshevik schemes in his report on the Baku congress: 'My mind doesn't grasp the Bolsheviks' depiction and perspective of a world federation. What I heard from Khiva and Turkestan and what I saw in Azerbaijan has opened my eyes to this mentality.'⁸⁵

At the end, in May 1922 as the jihad cries were slowly fading away and the Muslim world was getting finally parcelled by the British, French, and Soviet colonisers and only few successful local struggles in Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan could stand their ground, one British observer rightly concluded that

the fundamental cause of unrest in Eastern Countries is an intense nationalism, which may be briefly described as the attempt on the various Eastern peoples to emancipate themselves from any form of control by Europeans. Consequently it is not surprising to find an anti-European fanaticism prevalent throughout the East. [...] Pan-Islamic intrigue is more apparent in local fanaticism than in any world-wide combination [...] [but it] does provide an added and dangerous element in Eastern unrest [...].⁸⁶

85 İbrahim Tali, report on the Baku Congress, 1 October, 1920, ATASE, İSH-10, sıra no. 5822, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 53.

86 Inter-Departmental Committee on Eastern Unrest, Interim report, 24 May 1922, FO.371.7790, quoted in Ferris, 'The British Empire vs. The Hidden Hand', pp 343–44.