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Benchmarking Crimes: An Emerging Threat in Systems Security

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Abstract—Properly benchmarking a system is a difficult and intricate task. Unfortunately, even a seemingly innocuous benchmarking mistake can compromise the guarantees provided by a given systems security defense and also put its reproducibility and comparability at risk. This threat is particularly insidious as it is generally not a result of malice and can easily go undetected by both authors and reviewers. Moreover, as modern defenses often trade off security for performance in an attempt to find an ideal design point in the performance-security space, the damage caused by benchmarking mistakes is increasingly worrisome.

To analyze the magnitude of the phenomenon, we identify a set of 22 “benchmarking crimes” that threaten the validity of systems security evaluations and perform a survey of 50 defense papers published in top venues. To ensure the validity of our results, we perform the complete survey twice, with two independent readers. We find only a very small number of disagreements between readers, showing that our assessment of benchmarking crimes is highly reproducible.

We show that benchmarking crimes are widespread even in papers published at tier-1 venues. We find that tier-1 papers commit an average of five benchmarking crimes and we find only a single paper in our sample that committed no benchmarking crimes. Moreover, we find that the scale of the problem is constant over time, suggesting that the community is not yet addressing it despite the problem being now more relevant than ever. This threatens the scientific process, which relies on reproducibility and comparability to ensure that published research advances the state of the art. We hope to raise awareness of these issues and provide recommendations to improve benchmarking quality and safeguard the scientific process in our community.

I. INTRODUCTION

Benchmarking is essential in systems security—to compare different solutions and reproduce prior results. At every program committee meeting for every top venue in our field, heated discussions revolve around the question whether the performance numbers reported in papers X and Y are reliable and how they relate to each other. Making the wrong call is bad, as nobody wants to accept or reject papers for the wrong reasons. And after we accept a paper, we want to be able to reproduce and compare the results in a meaningful way. Faults in benchmarking are popularly referred to as *benchmarking crimes* [1], even if authors generally do not commit them intentionally¹.

Bluntly speaking, benchmarking crimes threaten the validity of the research results in publications. The obvious question then is: how safe are we as a community from this threat? And if we are not safe, how serious is this threat, and how can we mitigate it? Phrased differently, we want to know how well the systems security research community detects anomalies in benchmarking in evaluation sections of papers published in tier-1 venues, what the consequences are of false negatives, and how to fix these “vulnerabilities”.

In the community, there is wide agreement that performance benchmarks are important to advance the field [2]. In systems, it is clear that all security mechanisms incur some performance overhead [3]. The aim is to keep the overhead as low as possible, while raising the bar for attackers as high as possible. Given an unlimited performance budget, techniques to build secure systems under common threat models are already well-established—memory safety being a typical example [4], [5]. As a result, modern systems security research focuses on practical defenses (such as control-flow integrity [6] or randomization [7]), that trade off some security to achieve realistic performance guarantees.

Given these constraints, performance benchmarking is increasingly important in systems security. Proper benchmarks allow us to compare different solutions and reproduce research results. Improper benchmarking, on the other hand, may set unrealistic standards and hamper progress in the area.

In this paper, we take a closer look at benchmarking crimes in systems security. While it would be good to also benchmark the security of a solution, doing so in an unbiased way is much harder [8] and this paper primarily focuses on performance benchmarking of defenses (expanding on other dimensions when appropriate). After discussing the objectives of performance benchmarking in general, we carefully explore all the pitfalls that authors may encounter when assessing the performance of their research artefact. For each of these benchmarking crimes, we explain the negative impact they may have on the validity or usefulness of the evaluation.

Finally, we assess the state of benchmarking in systems security. We selected systems defense papers from USENIX Security, the leading conference in systems security, but also from the other tier-1 computer security venues where systems

¹*Crime* here has no “criminal” connotations, but is intended as a hyperbolic term following the original terminology introduced by Heiser [1].

security defenses are routinely published (Security & Privacy, CCS, and NDSS). We fincombed some 50 papers and analyzed how they fared with respect to the benchmarking crimes. For this purpose, we selected *all* defense papers with benchmarking results published in 2010 and 2015. As nearly all papers in our data set have at least some benchmarking issue (and many have several) and we found no clear difference between the more recent and the older papers, we conclude that improper benchmarking is a serious threat with little improvement in recent years. Moreover, our analysis shows that more and more papers are affected over time, confirming the increasing relevance of benchmarking crimes in our community.

It is explicitly not our intention to point fingers. As mentioned, all of the papers that we investigated exhibited some flaws and we freely admit that some of our own past papers are no exception. The point that we want to make is that the problem is not with individual papers, but with the field. While we acknowledge that following all the guidelines is difficult and sometimes impossible under time pressure, we found that for many common and serious crimes the extra effort is very low and our goal is to formulate specific guidelines moving forward for the systems security community. Moreover, by having concrete guidelines for benchmarking, it is possible to build automatic tools that set up and run benchmarks in such a way as to avoid benchmarking crimes. We believe this is a promising area for future work.

We also refrain from speculating about the cause of the crimes we encountered. Informal discussions at PC meetings frequently blame the pressure to publish in good venues that lead authors to cut corners. The reasoning is as follows. All defense solutions in systems security represent a tradeoff between security and performance. As a result, researchers frantically try to minimize the performance overhead, while not compromising the security—sometimes doing whatever it takes to stay under (fairly arbitrary) thresholds. For example: “The instrumentation overhead should be under 5%” [9]. We do not deny such pressure exists, but we have found no evidence of deliberate cheating. We believe that most, if not all, benchmarking crimes we found are unintentional and just denote insufficient attention devoted to performance benchmarking in our community. As mentioned earlier, many prevalent benchmarking crimes we found can, in fact, be prevented altogether with little effort and simple benchmarking practices. Our goal is to raise awareness of this increasingly important issue and foster high-quality benchmarking to improve reproducibility and comparability of research in our community.

Contributions

This paper makes the following contributions:

- We raise awareness of a number of common pitfalls that affect the validity of benchmarking results in systems security. We report on 22 benchmarking crimes which are commonly found in systems research papers.
- We present a survey of defense research papers in top security venues in recent years to demonstrate the impact

of these benchmarking crimes in the systems security community.

- We propose best practices to reduce the impact of improper benchmarking practices and improve the scientific process in our community.

II. BENCHMARKING CRIMES

Almost every paper in computer systems requires an evaluation that determines whether and how well the presented system achieves its goals. One important purpose of the evaluation is to compare against other work: it should show that the system improves the state of the art in some way and allow possible later papers to show that they improve this system. To allow for comparison, an evaluation must meet a number of requirements. First of all, it should be complete in the sense that it verifies all claimed contributions of the system and shows the extent of any negative impact the system may have. All the presented results must be relevant in the sense that they actually tell the reader something meaningful about the system. Another important characteristic is soundness, the requirement that all numbers measure what is intended with reasonable accuracy and repeatability. Finally, a general principle of science, requires papers to be reproducible. That is, the information provided in the paper should be sufficient to allow others to build the system and perform its evaluation in the same way as the original. A good paper should meet all these requirements, but unfortunately experience shows that this is often hard to come by in practice. Indeed, we found that most papers commit a number of *benchmarking crimes* that violate these properties.

In this section, we describe the benchmarking crimes we identified and explain their importance. Our list is based in large part on a reference web page by Heiser [1], but we alter and add a number of benchmarking crimes and also perform a systematic and large-scale survey of systems defense papers at top conferences (see Section IV) to determine whether these benchmarking crimes are common in published papers in systems security. We will show that the applicability of these crimes is not limited to the operating systems community, but also extends to other subfields of computer systems, in particular systems security. This is particularly important because, as we shall see, Heiser’s original web page [1] published in 2010 had insufficient impact in the systems security community. Benchmarking crimes are still widespread and their relevance has, in fact, grown over time.

We placed the 22 benchmarking crimes we identified in groups and assigned codes (a letter for the group plus a number for the specific crime) to simplify later references to them. We summarize the identified benchmarking crimes and their impact in Table I. While many crimes impact multiple requirements, we merely show the *most* affected ones. We describe the groups and the individual benchmarking crimes in the following subsections and later elaborate on their impact in Section IV.

TABLE I

BENCHMARKING CRIMES AND THEIR IMPACT; ●=HIGH-IMPACT CRIME, ○=OTHER CRIME (INDICATING ONLY THE *most* AFFECTED REQUIREMENTS).

		Completeness	Relevancy	Soundness	Reproducibility
A1	Not evaluating potential performance degradation	●			
A2	Benchmark subsetting without proper justification	○	○		
A3	Selective data set hiding deficiencies	○			
B1	Microbenchmarks representing overall performance		○		
B2	Throughput degraded by $x\%$ \Rightarrow overhead is $x\%$			●	
B3	Creative overhead accounting			○	
B4	No indication of significance of data	○			
B5	Incorrect averaging across benchmark scores			○	
C1	Benchmarking of simplified simulated system			●	
C2	Inappropriate and misleading benchmarks		●		
C3	Same dataset for calibration and validation		○		
D1	No proper baseline		●		
D2	Only evaluate against yourself		○		
D3	Unfair benchmarking of competitors		●		
E1	Not all contributions evaluated	●			
E2	Only measure runtime overhead	○			
E3	False positives/negatives not tested	○			
E4	Elements of solution not tested incrementally	○			
F1	Missing platform specification				○
F2	Missing software versions				○
F3	Subbenchmarks not listed	●			
F4	Relative numbers only	○			

A. Selective benchmarking

There is no single number that can fully express how well a system performs. Performance overhead is multidimensional as different operations are affected in different ways. For example, a system that performs CFI [6] instruments indirect branches but leaves other operations alone. Therefore, it is likely to incur substantial overhead for programs and workloads that perform many function calls, especially if they are indirect (e.g., common C++ programs), but it will incur minimal overhead if the program spends most of its time in a loop that calls no functions. This has several implications for benchmarking, and when a paper does not consider these implications it might result in a performance evaluation becoming anywhere from slightly inaccurate to completely meaningless.

The first implication is that we should always make sure we include benchmarks that perform all the kinds of work where one might reasonably expect an impact on performance. If a system improves one kind of workload compared to the state of the art but slows down another, it is important to show this to uncover tradeoffs and allow readers to decide whether this solution is actually faster overall. If a paper does not include such benchmarks, it commits benchmarking crime *A1: not evaluating potential performance degradation*. A typical example would be a system that instruments some system calls in the kernel (potentially slowing them down) but runs only workloads that primarily perform user mode computations. In this case, the benchmarking results would be meaningless and would not allow the reader to determine whether the system is practical or how it compares to related work. This crime results in a lack of completeness.

Another implication is that, whenever a paper summarizes performance as a single number, it must take care to ensure

this number is representative of real-world workloads. A number of benchmarking suites, such as SPEC CPU2006 [10], have been created for this purpose. Different subbenchmarks stress different types of operations and therefore result in different overhead numbers. Any paper which arbitrarily selects a subset of benchmarks and presents it as a single overall performance overhead number as if it is still representative commits benchmarking crime *A2: benchmark subsetting without proper justification*. If the missing subbenchmarks happen to be those that incur most overhead, the overall performance number will be meaningless because important components are missing (lack of completeness) and misleads the reader into thinking the system performs better than it actually does (lack of relevance). A typical example would be a system that instruments memory management operations (potentially slowing them down) and omits the memory-intensive *perlbench* from SPEC CPU2006 [10]. This problem is not limited to performance benchmarks; a subset arbitrarily selected from a large set of tests is unlikely to be representative of the full set regardless of whether they benchmark performance or, for example, vulnerabilities that the system attempts to mitigate.

Finally, benchmark configurations are often flexible and allow performance to be measured in different settings. A typical example would be the number of concurrent connections for a server program. Since this configuration parameter is likely to affect overhead, it is important to measure a range of concurrency settings. Papers that fail to test performance over an appropriate range of settings are guilty of benchmarking crime *A3: selective data set hiding deficiencies*. For example, if throughput seems to scale linearly with the number of concurrent connections, it suggests that the range of this variable is too restricted because the system cannot keep

this up forever. Like the other two crimes in this group, it has the potential to result in numbers that do not accurately reflect the practical performance impact of the system (lack of completeness).

B. Improper handling of benchmark results

Our second group of benchmarking crimes deals with the question whether papers interpret benchmarking results in appropriate ways. Even when running the right benchmarks, the presentation of their results can be misleading if they are processed in incorrect ways. This group contains five benchmarking crimes related to incorrect handling of benchmark results.

Microbenchmarks measure the performance of a specific aspect of the system. While such benchmarks have value to determine whether a system succeeds to speed up these particular operations, as well as for drilling down on performance issues, they are not an indication of how fast the system would run in practice. For this purpose, more realistic macrobenchmarks are needed. Misrepresenting the results of microbenchmarks is classified as *B1: microbenchmarks representing overall performance* and threatens relevance because the presented results are misleading.

Benchmarks usually run either a fixed workload to measure its runtime or repeat operations for a fixed amount of time to measure throughput. One common mistake is for papers to consider the increase in runtime or decrease in throughput to be the overhead. However, for many workloads the CPU is idle some of the time, for example waiting I/O. If the CPU is working while it would otherwise have been waiting, this masks some of the overhead because it reduces the CPU time potentially available for other jobs. A typical example would be a lightly loaded server program (e.g., at 10% CPU) that reports no throughput degradation when heavily instrumented, given that the spare CPU cycles can be spent on running instrumentation code (at the expense of extra CPU load). Papers that ignore this effect are guilty of *B2: throughput degraded by $x\% \Rightarrow$ overhead is $x\%$* . One possible way to avoid this crime is to ensure the CPU is fully loaded by running a sufficient number of concurrent jobs. Alternatively, the change in CPU load must be taken into account, e.g. by quoting the cost of processing a certain amount of data. When a paper commits this crime, it threatens the soundness of the results and almost certainly results in the presented overhead being lower than the actual overhead.

Another crime in this group is *B3: creative overhead accounting*. We use this to refer to any kind of incorrect computations with overhead numbers. Examples include the use of percentage points to present a difference in overhead, such as the case where the difference between 10% overhead and 20% overhead is presented as 10% more overhead, while it is actually 100% more (i.e., $2x$). Another example would be computing slowdown incorrectly, for example presenting a runtime that changes from 5s to 20s as a 75% slowdown ($1 - \frac{5}{20}$) rather than a 300% slowdown ($\frac{20}{5} - 1$). In all such

cases, this crime results in presenting numbers that are incorrect and therefore unsound.

When measuring runtimes or throughput numbers, there is always random variation due to measurement error. If these measurement errors are large, it typically means that there is a problem with the experimental setup and the numbers measured should be taken with a grain of salt. For this reason, we consider the lack of some indication of variance, such as a standard deviation or significance test to be benchmarking crime *B4: No indication of significance of data*. We classify this as a lack of completeness because without knowing the amount of variation one cannot tell what the measured results really mean.

Papers that use benchmarking suites generally present a single overall overhead figure representing average overhead. Some authors use the arithmetic mean to summarize such numbers. However, this is inappropriate because the arithmetic mean over a number of ratios depends on which setup is chosen as a baseline [11] and is therefore not a reliable metric. Only the geometric mean is appropriate to average overhead ratios. Papers that use the arithmetic mean (or other averaging strategies such as using the median) are guilty of benchmarking crime *B5: incorrect averaging across benchmark scores*. This benchmarking crime threatens soundness because it results in reporting incorrect overall overhead numbers.

C. Using the wrong benchmarks

The next group of benchmarking crimes is about using the wrong benchmarks. It consists of three benchmarking crimes. *C1: benchmarking of simplified simulated system* refers to cases where the benchmarks are not run on a real system but rather an emulated version, for example through virtualization. While it is sometimes necessary to emulate a system if it is not available otherwise, it is best avoided because the characteristics of the emulated system are generally not identical to those of the real system. This results in unsound measurements that do not reflect the intended system. The second is *C2: inappropriate and misleading benchmarks*, which refers to the use of benchmarks that are not suitable to measure the expected overheads. For example, it would be inappropriate to use a workload that mostly performs user-space computations if overhead is expected only on system calls in the kernel. Presenting the results from inappropriate benchmarks misleads the reader and therefore violates the property of relevance. Finally, papers commit *C3: same dataset for calibration and validation* when they benchmark their system using the same data set that they used to train it or, more generally, if there is any overlap between the training and test sets. A typical example would be profile-guide approaches which optimize for a specific workload and then use (parts of) that same workload to demonstrate the performance of the technique. The results from this approach lack relevance because they mislead the reader into believing the system performs better than it actually would in realistic scenarios.

D. Improper comparison of benchmarking results

Raw measurements like runtime or throughput numbers are rarely meaningful in isolation. Instead, they get meaning by comparing them to a baseline to determine how much overhead the system incurs and/or to competing systems to determine whether the system can improve their performance. We separated this issue into three different benchmarking crimes. *D1: no proper baseline* refers to computing overhead compared to an unsuitable baseline. In systems defenses, the proper baseline is usually the original system using default settings with no defenses enabled. If the baseline is modified, for example by adding part of the requirements for the system being evaluated (such as specific compiler flags or virtualization), this misleads the reader by hiding some of the overhead in the baseline and therefore violates the relevance requirement. *D2: only evaluate against yourself* refers to cases where papers compare their new system to their own earlier work rather than the state of the art. If better solutions are available, they should be included in the comparison so as to not mislead the reader. In this case, the comparison is not relevant. Finally, *D3: unfair benchmarking of competitors* refers to papers that do compare against competitors but do so in an unfair way. For example, they might use a configuration that is not optimal. Again, this misleads the reader into thinking the presented system is better than it actually is and violates relevance.

E. Benchmarking omissions

This group covers a number of necessary measurements for evaluations that are not yet covered by the other benchmarking crimes.

E1: not all contributions evaluated refers to cases where a paper claims to achieve a certain goal, but does not empirically determine whether this goal has been reached. It is critical that papers verify claims for the progress of science, since incorrect claims may prevent later work that does make the contributions from being published. This crime violates completeness.

When evaluating their performance, many papers measure runtime overhead. However, there are often other types of overhead that are also relevant for performance. A typical example would be memory overhead. Memory is a limited resource, so applications using lots of memory can slow down other processes running on the same system. Since most defenses need to use memory for bookkeeping, it is important to measure memory consumption. A paper commits benchmarking crime *E2: only measure runtime overhead* and its evaluation is incomplete whenever it does not measure important performance characteristics.

Many systems defenses monitor behavior to determine whether it is benign or could be malicious, which is usually impossible to do with certainty. Unless it is obvious that the system can never get it wrong (e.g., security enforcement based on conservative program analysis), the evaluation needs to quantify such failures; omission of this assessment results in benchmarking crime *E3: false positives/negatives not tested*. Without knowing how accurate the system is, it is impossible

to tell how valuable it would be in practice and the paper is incomplete.

Many systems consist of multiple components or steps that can to some extent be used independently. For example, an instrumentation-based system might use static analysis to eliminate irrelevant instrumentation points and improve performance. Such optimizations are optional as they do not affect functionality and can greatly increase complexity, so it is best to only include them if they result in substantial performance gains. Papers that do not measure the impact of such optional components individually commit benchmarking crime *E4: elements of solution not tested incrementally* and its evaluation lacks completeness. This is of particular importance if the optional components are a major part of the paper's contributions. If the system is faster than the state of the art merely due to a faster implementation rather than the newly designed optimizations, its novelty is questionable.

F. Missing information

The final group contains benchmarking crimes where important information has been left out of a paper. A paper commits *F1: missing platform specification* if it lacks a description of the hardware setup used to perform the experiments. To be able to reproduce the results, it is always important to know what type of CPU was used and how much memory was available. The cache architecture may be important to understand some performance effects. Depending on the type of system being evaluated, other characteristics such as hard drives and networking setup may also be essential for reproducibility. The second crime in this group, *F2: missing software versions*, is similar but refers to the software. It is almost always important to specify the type and version of operating system used, while other information such as hypervisors or compiler versions is also commonly needed. Like the previous crime, such omissions lead to a lack of reproducibility. Next *F3: subbenchmarks not listed* applies to papers that run a benchmarking suite but do not present the results of the individual subbenchmarks, just the overall number. This threatens completeness as the results on subbenchmarks often carry important information about the strong and the weak points of the system. Moreover, it is important to know whether the overhead is consistent across different applications or highly application-specific. Finally, papers commit *F4: relative numbers only* if they present only ratios of overheads (example: system X has half the overhead of system Y) without presenting the overhead itself (example: system X incurs 10% overhead). This is a bad crime as the most important result is withheld and the reader cannot perform a sanity check of whether the results seem reasonable, threatening the evaluation's completeness. A weaker version of this practice—presenting overheads compared to a baseline without presenting absolute runtimes or throughput numbers—is also undesirable. The absolute numbers are valuable for the reader to perform a sanity check (is the system configured in a reasonable way?) and because a slow baseline often means overhead will be less visible. The practice of omitting absolute numbers is not

harmful enough to consider it a benchmarking crime, but we do strongly encourage authors to include absolute numbers in addition to overheads.

III. METHODOLOGY

To determine the prevalence of the benchmarking crimes discussed in Section II and get a better idea of how papers commit these crimes in practice, we performed a survey of 50 papers published at top systems security venues. Table II presents an overview of all the papers selected for our analysis, sorted by year and title.

Given our focus on systems security, our methodology is based on the approaches used in prior large-scale surveys of papers in the area of computer systems [12], [13], [14], [15]. In this section, we discuss how we performed the survey. First we consider how to determine whether a given paper has committed a given crime, next we discuss how we selected top venues to survey papers from, and finally we present the sample of papers that we selected and the rationale behind this selection.

A. Classification methodology

Based on the criteria discussed in Section II, two persons independently categorized each paper for each crime as correct, flawed, underspecified, or not applicable. In most cases, both readers came to the same conclusions, showing that our methodology is highly reproducible. For papers where there were some disagreements, the readers discussed their assessments to converge on a final classification. This was the case for 8 out of 50 papers (16%). In only two cases did the discussion lead to the addition of a benchmarking crime that was initially missed by one of the readers. Only one of these cases concerned a high-impact benchmarking crime. The remaining disagreements concerned the precise extent of crimes identified by both readers, rather than crimes completely missed by one of the readers.

We use only information from the papers themselves and did not contact the authors for explanation. Effectively, we impose on ourselves the same constraints reviewers face when deciding whether to accept or reject a paper in a double-blind submission system. In cases where the papers themselves were excessively unclear about the procedures that led to the presented results, we classified that paper/crime pair as underspecified. This hampers reproducibility, which is a problem in itself. We discuss this as a separate verdict in Section IV. Not applicable refers to cases where a paper could not possibly have committed the crime, such as invalid comparisons in a paper that does not perform any comparisons.

While we make an effort to anonymize our survey and prevent naming and shaming of the papers in our sample, we do believe it is important to allow reproduction of this study. For this reason, we include a full overview of all evaluated papers, as well as our detailed reasoning behind the classification of all borderline cases (without identifying the papers themselves), in Appendix A.

B. Selected venues

We focused our analysis on the traditional “top 4” venues in systems security: USENIX Security, Security & Privacy, CCS, and NDSS. While there are many other lower-tier venues publishing relevant systems security research, the “top 4” venues are the most influential and de-facto set the standard for benchmarking practices in the community. For our purposes, we selected all the relevant papers from these venues in 2010 and 2015. The 2015 sample is useful to study recent trends. The 2010 sample, in turn, allows us to examine the evolution of benchmarking crimes over time and the impact of Heiser’s original benchmarking crimes web page [1] in the systems security community five years after its publication.

C. Selected papers

From the listed conferences, we selected systems defense papers given the increasingly strong focus on practical defense solutions in the community. When evaluating these solutions, it is crucial to follow adequate benchmarking practices to demonstrate that the proposed design point in the performance-security space actually improves the state of the art.

Among many security defense papers, it is important to clearly delimit which papers are included and which are not to ensure reproducibility. We want to select a group of papers for which runtime performance is of particular importance and which are reasonably comparable among each other. For this reason, we specifically focus on systems intended to defend software against attacks at runtime in production settings. For example we include sandboxing approaches, which can be used in production to limit the damage an attacker can do, but exclude taint tracking, which, in modern practical defenses, is primarily used only for offline analysis. Moreover, we only consider systems that should be expected to have a potential runtime performance impact. We consider approaches that modify existing software rather than building completely new software, which allows overhead to be computed relative to the original software baseline.

As expected, the defense papers selected according to our criteria have a relevant presence in all the “top 4” venues. The steep increase of papers in 2015 (34 vs. 16 in 2010) stands out, confirming that the number of practical defense papers and thus the relevance of benchmarking crimes in our community is on the rise.

IV. SURVEY RESULTS

For each selected paper listed in Table II and each benchmarking crime described in Section II, we have determined whether the paper commits that particular benchmarking crime. Table III provides the number of papers committing each crime split by year of publication. In this table, we consider only whether the paper commits the crime at least once (i.e., papers that commit the same benchmarking crime multiple times are counted once). In some cases, we were unable to determine whether the methodology in the paper is sound because important elements of the experiments or their analysis were not specified with a sufficient level of detail. We have classified these

TABLE II
PAPERS SELECTED FOR INCLUSION IN OUR ANALYSIS, SORTED BY YEAR AND TITLE.

venue	year	authors	title
USENIX Sec	2010	Sehr et al.	Adapting Software Fault Isolation to Contemporary CPU [...]
USENIX Sec	2010	Ter Louw et al.	AdJail: Practical Enforcement of Confidentiality and Integrity [...]
CCS	2010	Lu et al.	BLADE: An Attack-Agnostic Approach for Preventing [...]
USENIX Sec	2010	Watson et al.	Capsicum: Practical Capabilities for UNIX
USENIX Sec	2010	Akritidis	Cling: A Memory Allocator to Mitigate Dangling Pointers
S&P	2010	Meyerovich et al.	ConScript: Specifying and Enforcing Fine-Grained Security [...]
CCS	2010	Novark et al.	DieHarder: Securing the Heap
S&P	2010	Wang	HyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to Provide Lifetime [...]
CCS	2010	Azab et al.	HyperSentry: Enabling Stealthy In-context Measurement of [...]
NDSS	2010	Seo et al.	InvisiType: Object-Oriented Security Policies
USENIX Sec	2010	Kim et al.	Making Linux Protection Mechanisms Egalitarian with UserFS
S&P	2010	Devriese et al.	Non-Interference Through Secure Multi-Execution
CCS	2010	Askarov et al.	Predictive Black-box Mitigation of Timing Channels
NDSS	2010	Barth et al.	Protecting Browsers from Extension Vulnerabilities
CCS	2010	Cappos et al.	Retaining Sandbox Containment Despite Bugs in Privileged [...]
USENIX Sec	2010	Djeric et al.	Securing Script-Based Extensibility in Web Browsers
CCS	2015	Lu et al.	ASLR-Guard: Stopping Address Space Leakage for Code Reuse [...]
USENIX Sec	2015	Backes et al.	Boxify: Full-fledged App Sandboxing for Stock Android
CCS	2015	Mashtizadeh et al.	CCFI: Cryptographically Enforced Control Flow Integrity
USENIX Sec	2015	Araujo et al.	Compiler-instrumented, Dynamic Secret-Redaction of Legacy [...]
NDSS	2015	Song et al.	Exploiting and Protecting Dynamic Code Generation
CCS	2015	Muthukumaran et al.	FlowWatcher: Defending against Data Disclosure [...]
NDSS	2015	Younan	FreeSentry: protecting against use-after-free [...]
CCS	2015	Tang et al.	Heisenbyte: Thwarting Memory Disclosure Attacks using [...]
S&P	2015	Wagner et al.	High System-Code Security with Low Overhead
NDSS	2015	Davi et al.	Isomeron: Code Randomization Resilient to (Just-In-Time) [...]
CCS	2015	Chudnov et al.	Inlined Information Flow Monitoring for JavaScript
CCS	2015	Crane et al.	It's a TRaP: Table Randomization and Protection against [...]
S&P	2015	Zhang et al.	Leave Me Alone: App-level Protection Against Runtime [...]
USENIX Sec	2015	Feng et al.	LinkDroid: Reducing Unregulated Aggregation of App Usage [...]
NDSS	2015	Mohan er al.	Opaque Control-Flow Integrity
CCS	2015	Niu et al.	Per-Input Control-Flow Integrity
CCS	2015	Van der Veen et al.	Practical Context-Sensitive CFI
NDSS	2015	Lee et al.	Preventing Use-after-free with Dangling Pointers Nullification
S&P	2015	Guan et al.	Protecting Private Keys against Memory Disclosure Attacks [...]
USENIX Sec	2015	Rane et al.	Raccoon: Closing Digital Side-Channels through Obfuscated [...]
S&P	2015	Stephen et al.	Readactor: Practical Code Randomization Resilient to Memory [...]
NDSS	2015	Jang et al.	SeCRet: Secure Channel between Rich Execution Environment [...]
NDSS	2015	Chen et al.	StackArmor: Comprehensive Protection From Stack-based [...]
CCS	2015	Soni et al.	The SICILIAN Defense: Signature-based Whitelisting of Web [...]
NDSS	2015	Crane et al.	Thwarting Cache Side-Channel Attacks Through Dynamic [...]
CCS	2015	Liu et al.	Thwarting Memory Disclosure with Efficient [...]
CCS	2015	Bigelow et al.	Timely Rerandomization for Mitigating Memory Disclosures
USENIX Sec	2015	Lee et al.	Type Casting Verification: Stopping an Emerging Attack Vector
CCS	2015	Xu et al.	UCognito: Private Browsing without Tears
S&P	2015	Schuster et al.	VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud using SGX
NDSS	2015	Prakash et al.	vfGuard: Strict Protection for Virtual Function Calls in COTS [...]
NDSS	2015	Zhang et al.	VTint: Protecting Virtual Function Tables' Integrity
NDSS	2015	Demetriou et al.	What's in Your Dongle and Bank Account? Mandatory and [...]
USENIX Sec	2015	Weissbacher et al.	ZigZag: Automatically Hardening Web Applications Against [...]

paper/crime pairs as underspecified. It is important to note that underspecification is problematic even if the underlying methodology is sound as it hampers reproducibility and makes it harder for later competitors to perform a fair comparison with prior work.

Our results show that benchmarking crimes are a major problem in both years we investigate. Over all pairs of a paper and an applicable crime, the crime either applies or the paper is underspecified with regard to the crime in 77 out of the 255 cases (30%) for 2010 and in 179 out of the 596 cases (30%) for 2015. However, not all crimes are equally common. The lack of indication of significance of data and benchmark subsetting without proper justification are by far the most widespread,

respectively affecting 80% and 69% of the applicable papers we surveyed. None of the other crimes affect a majority of the papers, but four additional ones affect 40% or more of the papers to which they apply. This shows that several types of benchmarking crimes are widespread even in peer-reviewed papers at top venues.

There is no clear difference visible between the more recent and the older papers, confirming that improper benchmarking is a longstanding problem and that the original web page on benchmarking crimes published in 2010 [1] did not have a sufficient impact in the systems security community. The fraction of paper/crime pairs that applies or is underspecified is almost identical between the years (30% in 2010, 30% in

TABLE III
BENCHMARKING CRIMES SURVEY OVERVIEW.

	2010				2015			
	appl.	flawed	undersp.		appl.	flawed	undersp.	
A1 Not evaluating potential perf. degradation	16	8 (50%)	0	(0%)	34	8 (24%)	1	(3%)
A2 Benchmark subsetting w/o proper justification	9	4 (44%)	0	(0%)	33	24 (73%)	1	(3%)
A3 Selective data set hiding deficiencies	16	1 (6%)	1	(6%)	32	6 (19%)	0	(0%)
B1 Microbenchmarks representing overall perf.	14	5 (36%)	0	(0%)	10	1 (10%)	0	(0%)
B2 Throughput degrading by x% ⇒ overhead is x%	13	6 (46%)	2	(15%)	30	10 (33%)	0	(0%)
B3 Creative overhead accounting	16	1 (6%)	1	(6%)	34	8 (24%)	1	(3%)
B4 No indication of significance of data	16	13 (81%)	0	(0%)	34	25 (74%)	2	(6%)
B5 Incorrect averaging across benchmark scores	5	0 (0%)	2	(40%)	24	12 (50%)	0	(0%)
C1 Benchmarking of simplified simulated system	16	2 (13%)	0	(0%)	34	3 (9%)	0	(0%)
C2 Inappropriate and misleading benchmarks	16	0 (0%)	1	(6%)	34	8 (24%)	1	(3%)
C3 Same dataset for calibration and validation	0	0	0		5	1 (20%)	3	(60%)
D1 No proper baseline	16	3 (19%)	0	(0%)	34	9 (26%)	5	(15%)
D2 Only evaluate against yourself	2	0 (0%)	0	(0%)	13	2 (15%)	0	(0%)
D3 Unfair benchmarking of competitors	2	0 (0%)	1	(50%)	13	4 (31%)	1	(8%)
E1 Not all contributions evaluated	16	6 (38%)	0	(0%)	34	0 (0%)	0	(0%)
E2 Only measure runtime overhead	16	6 (38%)	0	(0%)	34	17 (50%)	0	(0%)
E3 False positives/negatives not tested	5	3 (60%)	0	(0%)	14	3 (21%)	0	(0%)
E4 Elements of solution not tested incrementally	5	0 (0%)	0	(0%)	20	4 (20%)	0	(0%)
F1 Missing platform specification	16	4 (25%)	0	(0%)	34	7 (21%)	0	(0%)
F2 Missing software versions	16	5 (31%)	0	(0%)	34	7 (21%)	0	(0%)
F3 Subbenchmarks not listed	8	2 (25%)	0	(0%)	30	5 (17%)	0	(0%)
F4 Relative numbers only	16	0 (0%)	0	(0%)	32	0 (0%)	0	(0%)
Total	255	69 (27%)	8	(3%)	596	162 (27%)	15	(3%)

2015).

For most individual benchmarking crimes we cannot apply the χ^2 -test directly because the expected values in some cells are below 5 [16]. This is mostly due to the fact that there were relatively few suitable papers published in 2010. In the cases where the χ^2 -test does (almost) apply, the differences between the years are always insignificant. This is the case for benchmarking crimes A1, B2, and E2 (see Table III for the numbering). In the other cases, we apply Yates' correction for continuity [16] and find significant differences only for benchmarking crime E1 ($p = 0.001$). The number of papers in which not all contributions are evaluated (crime E1) has gone down significantly over our period of five years, which suggests that either authors or reviewers have been more careful to require a complete evaluation. Overall, however, our conclusion must be that differences over time are minor and, in almost all cases, statistically insignificant for our sample.

Based on our findings in the survey, we classified some benchmarking crimes as *high-impact* to indicate that they are almost always a major threat to the usefulness of the evaluation and, with it, the scientific value of the paper. Table I presents our classification. We discuss the concrete impact for each individual crime in Section V. A typical example of a high-impact crime is not evaluating all contributions, as unverified claims cannot be considered true contributions. A typical example of a crime that is not high-impact is using the arithmetic mean to average overhead numbers; while the impact is severe in specific cases, there are also papers where the difference is small and therefore does not undermine the value of the paper. While we recognize any such classification is necessarily subjective, we did make an effort to reflect our observations from the survey. We do believe that any high-

impact crime we listed should be a reason for reviewers to demand the paper to be revised, while for the other crimes this depends on the context. Overall, high-impact crimes are somewhat less common than other crimes. In our sample we found 86 high-impact crimes out of 346 applicable crime/paper pairs (25%) and 167 other crimes out of 505 applicable pairs (33%). A χ^2 test shows this difference to be significant with $p < 0.0005$.

Figure 1 shows a histogram of the number of benchmarking crimes (including underspecification) per paper. It is notable that from our sample of 50 papers, we found only a single paper without any benchmarking crimes. Crimes are fairly evenly spread between papers, with many papers being very close to the average number of benchmarking crimes per paper (5.0 for all crimes, 1.7 for high-impact crimes). As such, the results would seem to suggest that the problem of benchmarking crimes is not an issue of a few authors and reviewers being particularly careless (or malicious), but rather a community-wide lack of awareness of or attention to these problems. This is further corroborated by the fact that many prevalent benchmarking crimes require very little effort to fix, as detailed later.

For completeness and to improve transparency, we have included a detailed discussion and justification of the way we classified the papers in Appendix A.

V. IMPACT

In this section, we consider the impact of the various benchmarking crimes based on our findings from the survey we conducted.

A. Selective benchmarking

a) *A1 - Not evaluating potential performance degradation:*
We found two major groups of papers that commit this crime:




Fig. 1. Histogram of number of crimes per paper

those where overhead figures are missing entirely and those that do not reflect all potential slowdown. In both cases, this crime makes it difficult (if not impossible) to assess the practicality of the presented solution and improvements over the state of the art. Moreover, papers that present inappropriate performance measurements may even hamper scientific progress because they prevent competing systems that perform poorly on these inappropriate measures or not as efficiently on appropriate measures from being published. Even worse, they may encourage more benchmarking crimes in future systems, as authors struggle to beat overly optimistic performance figures. As such, we consider this crime high-impact.

b) A2 - Benchmark subsetting without proper justification: We found that many papers that use standardized benchmarking suites leave out some subbenchmarks. Based on the particular benchmarks that are often left out, it is very likely that this will result in an underestimate of performance in practice (see Appendix A for details). We conclude that leaving out subbenchmarks can have a major impact on the soundness of measurements as well as the comparability between competing systems and therefore requires a proper and explicit justification. Moreover, if different papers use subsets, the overall slowdown is no longer suitable for comparing performance. Fortunately, many of these problems can be solved simply by explicitly acknowledging that a paper uses a subset of the available subbenchmarks and detailing the reasoning behind this choice. Despite the possibly large impact we do not consider this crime to be high-impact as there are also cases where the particular subbenchmarks left out do not seem to introduce a bias.

c) A3 - Selective data set hiding deficiencies: We found two types of occurrences of this benchmarking crime, with different impacts. Papers with important missing variables make it hard to estimate how the solution would behave in practical situations and may hide limitations of the solution’s performance. Papers which use variables with a restricted range might result in incorrect extrapolation and again hide limitations.

B. Improper handling of benchmark results

a) B1 - Microbenchmarks representing overall performance: This crime came in two flavors in our survey: papers which leave out macrobenchmarks altogether and one paper that includes both but bases performance claims on microbenchmarks. In both cases this is inappropriate as microbenchmarks are a poor indicator for real-world performance, resulting in misleading claims. In the former case it is impossible to determine how strong this impact is, but in the latter case the paper suggested a runtime performance that is not realistic in practice.

b) B2 - Throughput degraded by $x\%$ \Rightarrow overhead is $x\%$: Based on our survey, we believe that all instances of this benchmarking crime are likely to result in an underestimate of performance overhead, although without the necessary data it is impossible to determine by how much. Because this crime is likely to affect the soundness of performance measurements in all cases, we consider it to be a high-impact benchmarking crime.

c) B3 - Creative overhead accounting: It is hard to make a general statement about the impact of creative overhead accounting as this benchmarking crime is committed in many different ways. In some papers this leads to unsound results, some of which systematic underestimations of overhead, while in other cases the conclusions are misleading. See Appendix A for details about the specific issues we found.

d) B4 - No indication of significance of data: Some indication of variation is important because it is an indication of how reliable the numbers are and whether, given the measurement inaccuracy, the measured differences are actually meaningful. However, we expect the overall impact of this crime to be relatively mild for papers where researchers set up their experiments correctly.

e) B5 - Incorrect averaging across benchmark scores: To determine the impact of incorrect averaging, we computed the geometric mean based on tables or graphs presenting the subbenchmark results for papers that should have used it. Because there is some inaccuracy in deriving numbers from the graphs, we compared the geometric mean with the arithmetic mean derived from the same numbers rather than the arithmetic mean presented in the paper. We were able to do this for eight papers. For four out of the eight papers, the difference between the means is less than 1% and as such the impact of using the incorrect mean is negligible. For the other four papers, the arithmetic mean is higher than the geometric mean, so they overestimate overall overhead. In the worst case we found, the arithmetic mean is more than twice the geometric mean, while the remainder overestimates overhead by 2% to 16%. The relative difference between the means is largest in cases where the overhead is large.

C. Using the wrong benchmarks

a) C1 - Benchmarking of simplified simulated system: For all papers that committed this benchmarking crime, benchmarking a simplified system threatens the accuracy of the reported numbers and makes it harder to compare against

competing systems that were evaluated under more realistic conditions. Given that this issue always yields potentially unsound results, we classified it as high-impact.

b) *C2 - Inappropriate and misleading benchmarks:* In all cases we found, the use of inappropriate and misleading benchmarks is likely to have a major impact on the validity of the results. This crime always results in either an underestimate of overhead or an overestimate of effectiveness in the papers in our survey. For this reason, we consider this a high-impact crime.

c) *C3: same dataset for calibration and validation:* While we believe this is a very serious crime that can have a major impact, we have found too few papers that it applies to in our sample to meaningfully judge its impact in practice. However, we believe that as profile-guiding and machine learning become more popular, this may become a major issue if authors and reviewers do not pay sufficient attention to it.

D. Improper comparison of benchmarking results

a) *D1 - No proper baseline:* With regard to the impact, we can distinguish two different cases for this crime: papers that have an incorrect baseline and papers that do not present one at all. In our sample, the former group is always likely to either underestimate overhead or overestimate effectiveness. This threatens both the soundness and comparability of the results. Absolute performance numbers with no baseline to compare against cannot be compared between systems and therefore provide little meaningful information. Since we found that the lack of a proper baseline was a serious problem in all cases, we consider this crime high-impact.

b) *D2 - Only evaluate against yourself:* The impact for this crime in practice is hard to assess because it would require gathering the state of the art at the time the paper was submitted for publication and ensuring their performance numbers are actually comparable. This process would be highly error-prone except when done by an expert on the type of system the paper is about.

c) *D3 - Unfair benchmarking of competitors:* In all cases of this benchmarking crime that we found, the reader is misled into believing the presented system performs better compared to the state of the art than it actually does. As such, we consider this crime to be high-impact.

E. Benchmarking omissions

a) *E1 - Not all contributions evaluated:* The impact of not evaluating claimed contributions is that the design may not actually work as advertised and future solutions that do achieve such goals may have a much harder time getting published, holding back research progress. Given that this risk is present in all cases we found, this crime is labeled as high-impact.

b) *E2 - Only measure runtime overhead:* Papers which do not measure important sources of overhead other than runtime are incomplete. However, the impact of this incompleteness differs from case to case. If, for example, memory overhead can theoretically be assumed to be minor and similar to prior work, the impact is limited. If, on the other hand, there is

reason to believe the paper incurs significant memory overhead yet does not measure it, this could be a problem for later papers that improve on this overhead.

c) *E3 - False positives/negatives not tested:* The lack of testing for false positives or negatives is potentially a major issue because if the number of these is substantial it could greatly affect the practicality or effectiveness of the approach. Without this information, it may be impossible for a reader to properly assess how valuable the contributions of the paper are. That said, in practice the impact depends on the type of system presented. In some cases false positives may crash the system while in others they merely result in performance degradation.

d) *E4 - Elements of solution not tested incrementally:* If elements of the presented system are not tested incrementally, it is unclear whether all parts of the approach are indeed necessary to implement a system that is as effective and efficient and therefore it is also unclear whether all the components are actually contributions.

F. Missing information

a) *F1 - Missing platform specification:* In all cases, this benchmarking crime makes reproducing the exact results based on the contents of the paper impossible and it may make the results less comparable. However, it does not affect the validity of the results.

b) *F2 - Missing software versions:* This benchmarking crime hampers reproducibility for all papers that commit it, as the software about which information is missing should be expected to have an impact on performance.

c) *F3 - Subbenchmarks not listed:* The impact of this benchmarking crime is somewhat hard to estimate. Although the lack of important information always affects completeness of the paper, it may even result in measurements that are unsound and misleading. This is the case, for example, if the omission obscures the fact that the results are greatly affected by outliers or that only a subset of the benchmarking suite is run. The latter also makes the results incomparable. While it is impossible to tell whether this is the case due to the missing information, our results for crime A2 suggest the practice of unjustified subsetting is widespread. Because of the wide range of possible consequences of this crime it seems likely there is some relevant impact for almost every paper that commits this crime and, as such, we consider it high-impact.

d) *F4 - Relative overheads only:* We have not found this crime in its worst form, so we cannot determine the practical impact. As for leaving out an absolute baseline, we have found one case of D1 (no proper baseline) where the presented absolute baseline was clearly inconsistent with the reference baseline for the benchmark. This means the measurement was performed incorrectly, something that would not have been clear without the absolute baseline. As such we believe that the mild version of this crime does impact some cases.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

While our analysis shows that benchmarking crimes are very common and potentially have a major impact on the quality of

published research in systems security, it also reveals that the quality of published research could be greatly improved with little effort by paying extra attention to the most important crimes.

The primary focus should be on preventing common high-impact benchmarking crimes. The most common high-impact benchmarking crimes are A1 (not evaluating potential performance degradation), B2 (throughput degraded by $x\% \Rightarrow$ overhead is $x\%$), and D1 (no proper baseline). We believe authors should consider these crimes early on in the research process to ensure they set up the right benchmarks.

To address A1, authors should consider which performance dimensions the solution could possibly affect (for example, CPU, concurrency, memory, IO, system calls, ...) and include at least one appropriate benchmark for each dimension. Authors can address B2 by ensuring the system is always fully loaded while benchmarking. Typically, this is simply a matter of setting up a sufficient number of concurrent operations on workloads that would otherwise be bound by IO latencies. If this is not feasible, an alternative is to present the CPU load on both the baseline and the experimental setup in the paper. Benchmarking crime D1 can be addressed by considering the way the system protected by the provided solution would be used in a setting where the presented solution is not available. Often, this means avoiding any non-default compiler flags or emulation techniques that would slow down the baseline. Moreover, authors should always specify what the baseline is.

A number of common benchmarking crimes is not necessarily high-impact, but very easy to address and we believe every author should go through the list to avoid them. In particular, crimes B4 (no indication of significance of data), B5 (incorrect averaging across benchmark scores), F2 (missing software versions), and F1 (missing platform specification) can be addressed by simply adding readily available data to the paper. Yet, each of these crimes is committed by more than 10 papers in the sample. Although F4 (relative overheads only) is not committed by the papers in our survey in the worst form, many papers can still be improved by adding an absolute baseline. Addressing each of these issues should take almost no time (and space), yet it would greatly improve many of the papers in our survey.

One more benchmarking crime is neither high-impact nor trivial to address, but it is so common that we feel it deserves more attention since it does have a major overall impact on the quality of research in our field. A2 (benchmark subsetting without proper justification) does not always have a large impact, but it may result in overly optimistic (or completely incorrect) overall overheads. Authors should run all subbenchmarks that can reasonably be run and be explicit about reasons for omitting the others. Moreover, they should not present the overall result as if it is a complete result that can be compared with other papers using the same benchmarks.

While we hope authors avoid all the benchmarking crimes discussed in this paper, we believe that following the recommendations here would at least be a first step to greatly improve the research quality in systems security with relatively little

effort. Had all the authors followed these simple rules, it would almost triple the number of papers without any high-impact crimes committed or underspecified (from 8 to 22 papers), greatly increase the number of papers that commit no crimes at all (from 1 to 9 papers), and reduce the average number of crimes per paper by almost two thirds (4.6 to 1.7 for all crimes, 1.5 to 0.6 for high-profile crimes).

VII. LIMITATIONS

Although we have performed this survey as carefully as possible, there are a number of limitations on its applicability that are hard to avoid.

First, we do not claim that either our list of benchmarking crimes or our dimensions of evaluation quality are complete. Similarly, we do not seek comparison with other systems fields, as the distribution of crimes is inherently field-specific. There are many more benchmarking crimes possible in the broader computer systems field. The ones we examined are merely some of the most important issues that stand out for being common problems in systems security papers, especially defenses.

Second, in some cases, whether a particular benchmarking crime has been committed or even whether a benchmarking crime applies to a paper is subjective. Other people could reach somewhat different conclusions, although we did make an effort to be lenient in borderline cases so as to be conservative in our analysis. We also discussed borderline cases among ourselves and always consulted an independent reader as necessary. Whenever possible, we explicitly discuss these cases in Section IV. We also cannot rule out that, despite the care we put into our analysis, there can be mistakes or oversights. Hopefully, this only concerns a small fraction of the paper/crime pairs.

A third limitation is the fact that we cannot be transparent about which papers commit which crimes. While this would be better for reproducibility and allowing others to verify our work, we believe that naming and shaming would be counterproductive as in our opinion the problem is not with individuals but rather the community as a whole. Moreover, we believe it would not be appropriate to create what amounts to a ranking of individuals or institutions given that not all crimes are equally severe and the lack of the specific crimes we consider does not imply that there are no other flaws in the paper. In avoiding this, we follow common practice in papers that perform similar surveys [12], [13], [14], [15]. To compensate, we added a detailed discussion in Appendix A that should allow others to perform the survey themselves according to the same criteria.

Fourth, popular research topics have changed over time, which makes a direct comparison between percentages in 2010 and 2015 hard. Different types of papers are subject to different types of benchmarking crimes. All we can and did do is show that benchmarking crimes were a problem at both points in time.

Fifth, for studies such as the one presented in this paper a larger sample size is always desirable. Since we surveyed all eligible papers in all tier-1 security venues for 2010 and

2015, the most logical way to increase the sample size would be to consider more years. However, given that we found minimal differences between the two years currently surveyed, we believe that a larger sample over recent years would not yield significantly different results.

Finally, published papers are not necessarily a representative sample of all papers, especially at the top conferences. One would hope the review process weeds out the papers which commit the worst benchmarking crimes, but one cannot rule out that benchmarking crimes make acceptance more likely if they are not too obvious and appear to improve the presented results. Either possibility creates a bias when applying our survey results to papers submitted for review.

VIII. RELATED WORK

a) Benchmarking in systems security: While there have been several surveys to determine whether computer science papers perform measurements in appropriate ways [17], [13], [18], [19], [14], [20], [15], [12], to the best of our knowledge none of them is specific to benchmarking in systems security. The most closely related work is Heiser’s original web page about benchmarking crimes [1], which serves as an inspiration for this paper and forms the basis for our benchmarking requirements. Compared to Heiser’s web page, we propose an extended classification and present a systematic analysis to show that benchmarking crimes are indeed an increasingly relevant problem in peer-reviewed defense papers accepted at top systems security venues. We also formulate concrete recommendations for authors in the security community.

b) Surveys considering evaluation quality: We will now consider a number of papers that have performed surveys to determine how well papers in various fields evaluate their work. Kuz et al. [18] survey the use of benchmarking for multi-core systems to propose a better approach, but only include six papers in their survey. Skadron et al. [20] survey a number of papers in computer architecture to determine their topics and performance evaluation techniques adopted. They provide an overview and discussion of the various techniques, of which benchmarking is done, but do not go in depth about incorrect benchmarking practices. Kurkowski et al. [13] survey papers using simulation techniques for mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET) and identify common pitfalls. Krishnamurty and Willinger [21] discuss a list of common pitfalls in networking measurements using illustrative examples of flaws, but do not perform a systematic survey. Mogul [19] surveys papers to determine what types of benchmarks are commonly used in operating systems papers. However, it considers only whether those benchmarks themselves are realistic, not whether they are used appropriately. Traeger and Zadok [14] survey the use of benchmarks in file systems and storage research. However, they limit themselves to setting up the benchmarks and do not consider whether the results are handled appropriately. Mytkowicz [15] presents a survey to determine whether measurement error is considered correctly in computer systems experiments and provides suggestions on how to improve this. Aviv and Haerberlen [17] survey botnet research, but focus

on correctness evaluations rather than performance. Collberg et al. [22] survey a number of computer systems papers to examine their repeatability, but focus on being able to locate, build, and run the systems prototypes. No attempt is made to reproduce the experimental results detailed in the paper or generally assess the quality of their benchmarking results. Rossow et al. [12] study the methodological rigor and prudence in papers using malware execution. While their approach to identifying flaws and surveying is similar to ours, the pitfalls they identify are quite different because they focus on malware analysis rather than on performance. While these papers have used a survey of published papers in ways similar to ours, none of them are in the field of systems security and none considers all the benchmarking flaws we do.

c) Benchmarking advice: Some other papers also provide benchmarking advice but do so without a systematic survey, instead using examples, and their own tests to verify the identified pitfalls result in questionable results. Schwarzkopf et al. [23] identify benchmarking problems in cloud research this way and Seltzer et al. [24] discuss problems with using standardized benchmarks in file systems research. While these studies demonstrate important benchmarking problems, the lack of a survey means they cannot determine the impact these potential problems have on the research literature in practice.

IX. CONCLUSION

As a security community, we struggle to preserve the integrity of everyday systems from increasingly dangerous security threats. Regrettably, much less attention has been devoted to preserve the integrity of systems security research results themselves from accidental “threats”. Benchmarking crimes, in particular, have been largely neglected in systems security research, as its core focus has been traditionally on security rather than performance. As the focus of the community is increasingly shifting to devising practical, low-overhead defenses, however, benchmarking crimes have grown extremely relevant and are now the elephant in the room.

In this paper, we assessed the magnitude of the problem by surveying 50 defense papers in top systems security venues. Our results show that benchmarking crimes are widespread and, while their prevalence has not changed over time, their impact is increasingly worrisome. Faults in benchmarking can hamper comparability and reproducibility at best, or “poison” an entire research area in the worst case. Encouragingly, we found that many common benchmarking crimes can be easily prevented and we formulated concrete recommendations for authors. We hope our research will raise awareness of this threat and encourage adequate benchmarking practices to improve the quality of the scientific process in our community.

APPENDIX

In this appendix we discuss the conclusions from our survey for the individual benchmarking crimes introduced in Section II. In each subsection, we elaborate on one group of benchmarking crimes. Where appropriate we use examples from the papers we surveyed, but to keep the discussion anonymous with

regard to the papers in our sample, we either abstract away or change some of the details. We also consider what impact the benchmarking crimes we found are likely to have on the results.

A. *Selective benchmarking*

Benchmarking crimes related to selective benchmarking are very common. 40 out of the 50 papers in our sample (80%) commit at least one of the three crimes in this group and one additional paper does not provide enough information to determine whether this element is performed correctly. This is largely due to the most common benchmarking crime in this group, selecting a subset of a benchmarking suite without proper justification (A2).

A1 - Not evaluating potential performance degradation: Not evaluating potential performance degradation is a relatively common benchmarking crime, affecting 16 out of the 50 papers (32%) it applies to, and being underspecified in one more case. There are two main manifestations of this crime. The most obvious case are those papers which provide no meaningful measurement of runtime performance for some or all of the systems presented. We found this to be the case for seven papers in our sample. A more subtle case are those papers that do present runtime performance numbers, but where the benchmarks used to measure those numbers are inappropriate for the presented system, not reflecting an important element of its potential performance impact. This occurs for eight papers in our sample. Examples include not using a memory-intensive benchmark for systems likely to affect memory accesses, using a single-threaded workload for systems that benefit from additional cores, using benchmarks that do not stress instrumented calls, or omitting start-up/warm-up periods that might be affected by the system. While these papers do present runtime performance numbers, they are not meaningful for comparisons to similar systems.

A2 - Benchmark subsetting without proper justification: This is the most common benchmarking crime in this group, affecting 28 out of the 42 papers (67%) it applies to and is underspecified in one more case. The most common benchmarking setup in our sample is the use of the SPEC CPU [10] benchmarks, which is the case for 18 out of 50 papers (36%). These CPU-intensive benchmarks are appropriate to test single-threaded performance of systems that insert instrumentation which requires the CPU and the memory to do more work to run the program.

However, many papers using SPEC CPU benchmarks only run a subset of the benchmarks. The papers from our sample show that overhead often differs greatly between the programs that make up the SPEC CPU benchmarking suites, with the percentage overhead often showing at least an order of magnitude difference between the best and the worst case. In particular, `perlbench`, `xalancbmk`, and `povray` often stand out for large overhead numbers. If any of these benchmarks is omitted, it can have a large impact on the overall overhead computed for SPEC. However, there is a substantial difference between the different systems in which benchmarks stress them

most, so even if other benchmarks are left out, there can be a large and unpredictable impact on the overall result.

We find that leaving out SPEC subbenchmarks for legitimate reasons is common and we have been lenient in these cases even though any overall score from an incomplete benchmarking suite is somewhat misleading. All papers in our sample that use SPEC leave out the benchmarks written in the Fortran language, instead using only the C and/or C++ ones. We consider this to be justified because the prototypes built to test the designs in these papers only support C and/or C++. Moreover, it does not affect comparability because this practice is widespread in the systems security literature. Another justified case of subsetting is the use of only C++ benchmarks for systems that do not apply to programs that are purely written in C. Given that these systems would not be applied to C programs in practice, their overhead on C has little meaning for their practicality. In three cases, a subset of the benchmarks was omitted because the system was based on a framework which does not support them. We consider this acceptable if it is clearly indicated because it is hard to avoid incompatibilities in third-party software. Another case is the use of a subset in a detailed evaluation after presenting overall numbers for the full set. It is sensible to limit such an in-depth investigation to the most interesting cases, generally those with most overhead, and it provides more insight in which cases are hard for the system to deal with without affecting comparability. We have not marked any of the cases described in this paragraph as a benchmarking crime because they are properly justified.

Although there can be legitimate reasons to select a subset of benchmarks, we also found a large number of papers that did not properly justify their subbenchmark selection. Four papers leave out a number of SPEC subbenchmarks seemingly arbitrarily without even mentioning explicitly that they were left out. This is a serious omission because these papers present an overall overhead number that does not actually represent the entire benchmarking suite, misleading readers into believing that this number is directly comparable with those measured for other solutions. While these subbenchmarks may have been left out for legitimate reasons—for example they might not contain the type of memory safety bugs that the system defends against—it is crucial to explain why these particular benchmarks cannot be run with the system. This not only justifies the lack of comparable numbers, but also indicates the effectiveness or the limits of the solution and helps competitors compare their solutions on these issues as well.

A second problem we found is leaving out the floating point benchmarks of SPEC CPU without justification, which is a problem in four of the papers in the sample. While this is not a random subset of SPEC CPU, it is problematic because there are relatively many C++ benchmarks in the floating point benchmarks. C++ programs tend to allocate relatively many small heap objects, which stresses allocator instrumentation, and contain relatively many virtual function calls, which stresses indirect branch instrumentation. This means that for certain classes of defenses, leaving out the floating-point programs is likely to result in underestimating

performance overhead.

Another problem we found in two papers that use SPEC is mixing subbenchmarks from two different versions, namely SPEC CPU2000 and CPU2006. While these benchmarking suites have some programs in common, they use different workloads and their results are therefore not interchangeable. The benchmarking suites are designed to be used as a balanced whole and mixing versions results in unpredictable deviations in the overall results, making those numbers incomparable.

One final problem that we found among the papers using SPEC CPU is the use of an incorrect justification for leaving out subbenchmarks. In particular, we found claims that some of the subbenchmarks do not perform some instrumented operations while in reality they do. Those subbenchmarks have thus been omitted in error, although the impact here is less prominent than cases where benchmarks have been omitted arbitrarily since at least the incompleteness of the benchmarking suite is clearly acknowledged. Overall, we found a substantial number of cases where papers using SPEC CPU improperly select a subset of the benchmarks and it seems plausible that this has a substantial impact on the comparability of the results.

Not all papers use SPEC CPU to evaluate performance, although some do use other standard benchmarking suites that test specific types of systems, for example to evaluate the performance of operating systems [25], [26] or browsers [27], [28]. We found four such papers that use a subset of benchmarks without justification. The impact in these cases is similar to those where we found a subset of SPEC CPU is used. In one additional case, a paper modified subbenchmarks without stating why this was necessary. Like subsetting through selection, this practice has a strong impact on comparability.

Papers that do not use a standard benchmarking suite generally use a selection of supported programs and workloads for them to measure performance. This is in itself acceptable as there is not always a suitable benchmarking suite available. A common example is the use of ApacheBench [29] to measure the performance of instrumented server programs. However, even in these cases, it is important to justify selection and avoid misrepresentation of the results. We found five papers that presented a number of supported programs, but then selected an unjustified subset of these programs for benchmarking. This is problematic in cases where competing solutions do include them, leaving the reader wondering which solution would be faster, had the evaluation been more complete.

Another issue, which we found in one paper, is computing an overall overhead figure over a number of self-selected programs. While this may be useful to informally summarize overhead trends, it cannot be used as a reference performance figure because such a figure strongly depends on the selection of the programs. Instead, it would be more appropriate to provide a range of overheads or always mention each program individually.

Finally, when defending against vulnerabilities, it is important to ensure that the defense can prevent attacks in practice. For this reason, many papers use vulnerabilities registered in the CVE database [30]. While this is an excellent way to assess the

effectiveness of defenses, authors generally select only a small number of CVEs to evaluate their solution with. While this is understandable given the often heroic effort, it is important to ensure that these CVE entries are representative. We found five papers that lack a systematic selection of vulnerabilities. This means there is a risk of a biased selection, masking limitations in the effectiveness of the solution being evaluated.

A3 - Selective data set hiding deficiencies: Problems with selective data sets are not as common as the other benchmarking crimes in this group, with a total of 7 out of 48 applicable papers (15%) either committing the crime or being underspecified. We found four papers where the impact of an important variable is not considered in workload selection. An example is not considering different levels of concurrency when concurrency is expected to influence performance. There are two papers in our sample where graphs suggest that performance might reach a threshold but the range of the x -axis is too limited to see it.

B. Improper handling of benchmark results

Improper handling of benchmark results is another very common group of benchmarking crimes. 44 out of the 50 papers in our sample (88%) commit at least one of the five crimes in this group and two additional papers do not provide enough information. However, it should be noted that this is mostly due to lack of indication of significance (B4) being very common in our sample.

B1 - Microbenchmarks representing overall performance: Compared to the other benchmarking crimes, B1 stands out for being applicable to relatively few papers because many papers do not present any microbenchmarks at all. It is noteworthy that the use of microbenchmarks was much more common in 2010 (14 out of 16 papers, 88%) than in 2015 (10 out of 34 papers, 29%). Overall, this crime is committed in 6 out of 24 papers (25%) and was more common in 2010 even relative to the larger number of applicable cases. In five cases, papers only present microbenchmarks and base their performance claims on these microbenchmarks. While there is one more paper that presents only microbenchmarks, we have not labelled it as a crime since it only affects rare operations that cannot realistically affect performance overhead on macrobenchmarks; we consider it appropriate in cases where microbenchmarks can reveal overhead that macrobenchmarks would not. Finally, one paper presents both microbenchmarks and macrobenchmarks but bases its performance claims on the microbenchmarks even though the macrobenchmarks show substantially more overhead.

B2 - Throughput degraded by $x\%$ \Rightarrow overhead is $x\%$: For most papers in our sample, this crime comes down to not ensuring that the benchmark fully loads the CPU(s). This crime applies to 43 out of 50 papers (86%), with the remainder not providing benchmarking results that are intended to measure overhead. Out of these 43 papers, 16 commit the crime (37%) and 2 are underspecified (5%). Most papers avoid this crime by either using a benchmarking suite known to be CPU-bound or by ensuring that a manually constructed benchmark fully

loads the CPU, for example by running multiple concurrent threads until all cores are fully loaded. Fifteen papers commit this crime by using a benchmark that is not clearly CPU-bound without taking precautions to ensure the CPU is fully loaded, while one other paper computes overhead from latency rather than from throughput. In both cases, there is a substantial risk that the actual overhead is underestimated because the overhead computation does not consider the extra CPU load introduced by the protection mechanism being evaluated.

B3 - Creative overhead accounting: This crime is committed in 9 out of 50 papers (18%) and it is impossible to determine whether creative overhead accounting has been used in 2 more papers (4%). While this type of benchmarking crime is relatively uncommon, it is very diverse. The most common variety is to use magic numbers that are not supported by experiments in overhead computations. In these cases, the results cannot be considered methodologically sound. Another case of creative overhead accounting is not considering some required instrumentations in the overhead numbers, for example if the approach relies on the use of non-default compiler passes. This results in an underestimation of the overhead that a user would experience in practice. Another instance we found is to use percentage points to compare overhead. For example, if solution A incurs 10% overhead and solution B incurs 20% overhead then B has 100% more overhead than A, not 10%. This misleads the reader into thinking that the differences are smaller than they really are. One final issue we found is to mark overhead as negligible because it is small compared to the standard deviation. While this logic holds if the standard deviation is reasonable, a large standard deviation is more likely to mean that the experiment is set up incorrectly and the results are unreliable. The proper reaction would be to improve the experiment to reduce measurement error or, if this is not feasible, provide a confidence interval on the overhead. There is one more common issue with overhead computation, namely computing an overall overhead when a number of subbenchmarks have substantial negative overhead. We did not mark it as a crime as it can be a legitimate effect of random measurement errors, but we do want to raise the issue that it is important to explain why overhead is negative for systems that should only decrease performance. Large negative overheads can be an indication that the experiment is set up incorrectly and authors should make an attempt to set up the experiment in such a way as to reduce measurement errors. Mytkowicz et al. [15] provide guidelines on how to achieve this. If negative overhead is simply ignored, it may result in inaccurate performance numbers which are unsuitable for comparison with competing solutions. In summary, creative overhead accounting is a broad group of benchmarking crimes which can often result in misleading and inaccurate results.

B4 - No indication of significance of data: The lack of an indication of significance is a very widespread problem, occurring in 38 out of 50 papers (76%). Two more papers contain qualitative significance statements without putting a concrete upper bound on observed variations. We expect papers that perform measurements that are subject to random

fluctuations, such as runtimes or throughput numbers, to perform multiple runs to reduce standard errors and to allow the standard deviation to be measured. Papers should present the standard deviation or level of significance for such numbers. We also accepted a general statement that ensures that variation is at a very low level, such as “all standard deviations are below 1%”.

B5 - Incorrect averaging across benchmark scores: We found that 12 out of 29 papers (41%) incorrectly use the arithmetic mean to average overhead numbers. For two more papers, there was not enough information to decide whether the overall score was computed correctly. This crime only applies to 29 out of the 50 papers (58%) because the remainder either does not present overhead numbers or does not compute an overall score. One additional paper used the arithmetic mean to average absolute overhead numbers, which is acceptable and we did not count this as a crime. Another paper presents overhead as a range, which is also acceptable to obtain an overall indication of overhead.

C. Using the wrong benchmarks

Using the wrong benchmarks is a relatively rare group of benchmarking crimes, with 14 out of the 50 papers in our sample (28%) committing at least one of the three crimes in this group and 5 additional papers (10%) not providing enough information. However, the crimes in this group can have a major impact on the validity of the benchmarking results.

C1 - Benchmarking of simplified simulated system: We found 5 out of 50 papers (10%) benchmarking a simplified simulated system. We did not count this as a crime in cases where the use of a simplified system was explicitly acknowledged and there was no practical way to avoid or compensate for it, for example because the system relies on hardware that is not yet available. In two of the papers that commit this crime we found that performance was measured in a virtualized environment without need. Virtualization does not incur a uniform slowdown, but instead slows down operations that require an exit to the hypervisor much more than unprivileged operations. As a consequence, numbers measured in a virtual machine cannot be meaningfully translated to numbers that would be measured on the bare metal. Three other papers omitted some operations that would need to be performed if the system were used in practice. Two of these cases were unjustified, while the third had a good reason but did not consider the impact on performance.

C2 - Inappropriate and misleading benchmarks: The use of inappropriate and misleading benchmarks is moderately common, with 8 out of 50 applicable papers (16%) committing the crime and 2 more being underspecified. Although all the instances we found are in papers published in 2015, the χ^2 -test reveals that this can reasonably be the case due to mere chance ($p = 0.198$). Papers that make this mistake commonly also have a problem with not evaluating potential performance degradation (benchmarking crime A1) because inappropriate benchmarks often do not reveal important cases where the system incurs overhead. The difference between the two is

that A1 applies if an important type of benchmark is missing even if the included benchmarks are appropriate, while A3 can apply even if some of the other benchmarks cover the relevant performance dimensions.

A typical example in the papers we surveyed includes the use of IO-bound workloads in systems that introduce extra CPU load. This results in benchmark results that suggest unrealistically low overhead. This poses a major problem for later work, which is now expected to compare its performance against the overly optimistic numbers measured before. Another situation is the case where single-threaded single-process benchmarks are used to test systems where concurrency is important, for example because they affect multiple cores. Like in the previous case, the benchmark ignores an important part of the overhead.

One final problem is the use of performance benchmarks in cases where high coverage is important, for example to detect false positives. Since performance benchmarks are typically repetitive and do not test error paths, they will not reach high coverage, revealing fewer false positives.

C3 - Same dataset for calibration and validation: Unfortunately, this crime applies only to very few papers in our sample (5 out of 50, 10%). Out of these five, one papers commits the crime and three are underspecified.

D. Improper comparison of benchmarking results

16 out of the 50 papers in our sample (32%) commit at least one of the three crimes that have to do with improper comparison of benchmarking results. In addition, 6 more papers are underspecified with regards to the criteria in this group.

D1 - No proper baseline: This benchmarking crime stands out for having most papers by far that are underspecified. There were 5 cases out of 50 (10%) where it was neither clear from the text of the paper nor implicit from the context what baseline was used. This is an important problem, not only because it means a reader cannot verify whether the baseline is reasonable but also because it hampers reproducibility. While the correct baseline should often be obvious, it is always good to be explicit about it.

The benchmarking crime of not using a proper baseline was committed in 12 out of 50 papers (24%). Five papers did not use a baseline at all, presenting only raw numbers that do not give a good indication of overhead. Another five papers used a nonstandard configuration for the baseline, such as running on top of an instrumentation framework or using nonstandard compiler options. In four of these papers, this likely means that performance overhead is underestimated, while in a fifth the baseline was easier to attack than a standard system would be.

One more paper used a simplification for the experimental system without applying the same treatment to the baseline. A more appropriate approach would be to measure both and use whichever approach is faster as the baseline. Finally, we found a paper where a memory baseline is off by more than an order of magnitude from the published reference baseline for the same benchmark. This strongly suggests that it has

been measured incorrectly and such a difference requires an explanation in the paper.

D2 - Only evaluate against yourself: The benchmarking crime of only evaluating against oneself applies to relatively few papers, 15 out of 50 (30%), because we only considered those papers that actually perform a comparison. Out of those 15 papers, 2 (13%) compare only against their own work while there would have been appropriate alternatives.

D3 - Unfair benchmarking of competitors: Like the previous benchmarking crime, this one only applies to the 15 out of 50 papers (30%) that actually perform a comparison. The crime is committed in 4 out of 15 papers (27%) and unclear due to underspecification in 2 more papers. In two papers, we found competing solutions were presented as having much higher overhead than in their original paper with no explanation. Another paper selected an unoptimized number for comparison, while an optimized version was also presented in the original paper. In the fourth case, the configuration does not seem appropriate.

E. Benchmarking omissions

We found that 30 out of 50 papers (60%) omit some important benchmarking configurations, committing one or more of the four benchmarking crimes in this group.

E1 - Not all contributions evaluated: We found that 6 out of 50 papers do not evaluate all claimed contributions. In particular, four papers do not test their effectiveness in securing programs while two others do not evaluate the performance on some relevant applications.

E2 - Only measure runtime overhead: While most papers evaluate runtime overhead, this is often not the only relevant performance characteristic. We found that 23 out of 50 papers (46%) omitted other relevant dimensions of performance. For almost all of these papers, memory overhead is missing while it is reasonable to believe the presented system might incur some memory overhead. Given that memory usage can often be traded off against runtime performance and that memory is a limited resource that must be shared between applications running on a system, performance measurements are not complete without measuring memory overhead. This means that, for example, a paper that achieves similar runtime performance but greatly reduces memory overhead compared to the state of the art is worth publishing. If prior work lacks an evaluation of memory overhead, it becomes harder to improve on it. Other missing measurements include the amount of extra network and/or disk IO, increased binary size after instrumentation, and the time taken to instrument the protected program. Like for memory, we have only counted cases where these performance dimensions were not presented if there is a reasonable expectation that there may be significant overhead.

E3 - False positives/negatives not tested: For this benchmarking crime, we only considered papers where false positives or negatives would be a potential problem. Out of the 19 papers where this was the case, 6 papers (32%) ignore the possibility of false positives or negatives.

E4 - Elements of solution not tested incrementally: This benchmarking crime only applies to the 25 out of 50 papers (50%) that actually consist of multiple components that could potentially be measured independently or incrementally. From these papers, 4 (16%) do not provide measurements for individual components.

F. Missing information

20 out of 50 papers (40%) commit at least one of the four benchmarking crimes in this group, leaving out some information that is important for completeness, reproduction and/or sanity checking.

F1 - Missing platform specification: 11 out of 50 papers (22%) do not provide a full specification of the hardware used to run the benchmarks. Out of these, five do not give any information, five more do not provide information about the networking setup and the final one provides some information about the networking setup but it is incomplete.

F2 - Missing software versions: This benchmarking crime is committed by 12 out of 50 papers (24%). In six cases the paper does not specify the operating system used, two papers do specify the operating system but not its version number, one paper does not specify which hypervisor is used, and three papers do not specify any information at all about the software used to evaluate their systems.

F3 - Subbenchmarks not listed: This benchmarking crime is applicable to the 38 out of 50 papers (76%) which use subbenchmarks and, out of these, 7 (18%) commit the crime. While a seventh also does not list subbenchmark results explicitly, the number of applications it was tested with is so large that presenting all of them would be unpractical. Moreover, it does provide extensive statistics about the subbenchmarks, which compensates for the missing information. Therefore, we decided not to count it as having committed this benchmarking crime. Still, it would have been even better if this paper had discussed the methodology used to select the benchmarks that were used. The other papers do not provide additional information that can compensate for this lack of completeness.

F4 - Relative numbers only: This benchmarking crime is applicable to 48 out of 50 papers (96%), but none of these papers commit the crime in its worst form. We found that 24 out of 48 applicable papers in our sample (50%) included only overheads.

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