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Managing informal interaction: stancetaking and alignment in Dutch and Indonesian

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Managing informal interaction

Stancetaking and alignment in Dutch and Indonesian

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

People talk. A lot. The first reason springing to mind what all this talk is good for, is to share information. A message that one person has in mind is encoded in language and sent to another person to unpack and interpret.[1] That message might carry a question or an answer, an anecdote or a compliment, a "hi" or a "bye". These simple examples already show there is a wide variety of types of messages that can be sent - and hence actions that can be performed. While the sharing of information is indeed an important function of language, it is thus by no means the only one. People use language to coordinate activities (Clark, 1996) and manage their interpersonal relations (see e.g. Spencer-Oatey 2005; 2011) Some of these are more strongly involved with actual informing, in the sense that they provide knowledge that the other participant was looking for that was not previously available (e.g. in giving an answer to a question). However, some seem less concerned with providing new knowledge and more with the interpersonal relation between the participants (e.g. giving a compliment or greeting someone).

A considerable portion of talk-in-interaction does not have an immediately recognizable goal or intention related to transfer of (new) information. For example, during the openings of conversations participants routinely work

[1] This representation is reminiscent of a linear model of communication (e.g. the Shannon-Weaver model, cf. Weaver, 1949; Shannon and Weaver, 1964) and is a gross oversimplification of language processing since both the production and comprehension of communication are much more complex. For the purposes of this thesis, however, this rough sketch of communication as a pipe model suffices. This is not the place to go in to the particulars of language processing or models of communication. For an exploration of a specialized language processing model used in dialogue (as opposed to isolated text) see e.g. Garrod and Anderson (1987); Pickering and Garrod (2004); Garrod and Pickering (2004).

through a greeting sequence, which possibly has them ask about the well-being of all family members, without their health actually being the topic of talk. Or consider the obligatory small talk at the hairdresser's; or the exchange of pleasantries with friends of friends at a birthday party. This type of talk in interaction may seem insignificant (or even annoying), it plays an important role in establishing and maintaining social relations between people. Such supposedly aimless talk is in fact a core aspect of interaction. It is what is called the "phatic function" of language (Malinowski, 1923; Jakobson, 1960; Senft, 2009).

An example of talk-in-interaction that seems to be entirely concentrated on creating and/or sustaining a feeling of communion is found in example (1) below (reproduced from Jakobson, 1960:355-356). The exchange between Ella and James lasts seven turns and includes nine separated utterances. Yet, the only piece of information shared in this conversation seems to be "Here we are".

(1) *Phatic interaction*

James	Well!
Ella	Well!
James	Well, here we are
Ella	Here we are, aren't we?
James	I should say we were
	Eeyop! Here we are
Ella	Well!
James	Well!
	Well.

In this short excerpt James and Ella mention no less than four times they are at a particular location (figuratively speaking or not). The first statement of this fact by James is already a bit superfluous given both of them *know* they are there; it is the next three lines of talk that really do not fill any informational need. They simply present a repetition of what was already established. These "informationally empty" reproductions of initiating acts or statements are a surprisingly common aspect of language use (cf. section 3.3.1 and chapter 6). It is this type of interactional behavior that I am interested in: the non-conventionalized but also seemingly non-informative use of language that is regularly found in informal interaction.[2]

Such seemingly redundant contributions[3] do provide valuable insights per-

[2]Non-informative might sound a bit strong, what I mean is that most, if not all, of the information that is shared in the presented contributions (in the above example the statement "Here we are") is already known to either participant. There is no immediate need to present that information. Note that this is not to suggest they are void of meaning, these utterances are highly relevant in the negotiation of interpersonal alignment. See section 2.1 for a more elaborate discussion.

[3]Throughout this thesis, the term contribution is used as a general term taken to refer to any interactional act that presents some intentional and meaningful act in an effort to expand

taining to participants' interpersonal attitude and stance. Reproducing an earlier contribution, as in example (1), establishes a strong connection between the participants. The repetition ties the two participants to the same piece of information, marking a shared, joint, position on the matter. The both of them individually take the same stance on the topic of talk, while establishing interpersonal alignment between them. Alignment here refers to the mutual relation between stances and stancetakers (Du Bois, 2007:144; cf. chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis). Even if the actual propositional content of the repeated utterance is not very insightful, it thus presents useful and new information about the ongoing interaction and the participants' place in it.[4]

Assuming language is first and foremost a dyadic structure - a means to express and share our thoughts with *others* (Dor et al., 2014:2-3) - ensuring the social relationships are strong eases the amount of work participants need to put into coordinating their interactions. The need to establish or be updated on each other's position is thus likely a continuous priority in interaction. To what extent such efforts are encoded in expressions is presumably guided by cultural norms (cf. section 2.6). The question, then, is how speakers of different linguistic backgrounds enact this function of language in their everyday interactions. Suppose the management of interpersonal relationships is indeed the central use of language, is the way in which we establish and sustain relationships universally stable or are there culture specific patterns of use? Taking the Netherlands and Indonesia as case in point, this thesis will explore the patterns of (verbalized) interpersonal alignment as negotiated by speakers of the respective national languages.

If we are to believe the Internet (which is a risky endeavor), speakers of Indonesian and Dutch prefer very different communication styles. Giving advice about how to conduct business in these regions, and how to adapt to the new environment as an expat, numerous websites report the Dutch to be direct, focused on clarity, and concerned with openness, whereas the Indonesian are described as indirect, concerned with face, and focused on harmony.[5] Following

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and extend the ongoing interaction. This includes full turns or utterances, expressions that are cut short, minimal elements of feedback, etc. The terms "expression" and "utterance" are used as general descriptors to refer to "something someone said". They are not intended to carry particular theoretical connotations, but are used as stylistic variants throughout this thesis.

[4]Reproducing a prior turn is not the only means by which interpersonal alignment can be established. Part II of this thesis will explore three main ways in which participants negotiate alignment: through expressions of support (chapter 5), reproduction of meaning and form (chapter 6), and collaborative construction of meaning (chapter 7).

[5]See e.g. https://www.communicaid.com, http://www.expat.or.id, http://www.expatica.com, http://www.kwintessential.co.uk. These characterizations are of course highly simplified and they are usually not substantiated with academic research. Nevertheless, they are insightful sources of information; not because of their accurate description of Dutch or Indonesian society, but because they provide us with the dominant representation of these societies. Representations that are further shared, and thus reinforced, among people interested in interaction with people from these societies. These general perceptions and assessments thus reflect folk beliefs held about these societies.

these descriptions, the preferred Indonesian and Dutch ways of communicating are near-opposite; a familiar (maybe even expected) outcome considering the often proclaimed contrast between The East and The West. As representatives of the East and the West, respectively (cf. sections 1.4 and 2.6), these countries are excellent candidates to investigate the particularities and universalities of managing interpersonal relationships in informal interaction.

1.1 Informal interaction

Phatic communication is aimed at the establishment and maintaining of a constructive relationship between interlocutors. This is often associated with ceremonial or ritual utterances at the margins of interaction, such as greeting and leave-taking routines. However, the exchange in example (1) already proved phatic exchanges not to be limited to the margins of conversation. A further example of "uninformative" talk for the sake of talk is found in small talk:

> "[...] talk which is aimless, prefatory, obvious, uninteresting, sometimes suspect and even irrelevant, but part of the process of fulfilling our intrinsically human needs for social cohesiveness and mutual recognition". (Coupland, 2000:3)

Small talk has a clear social function. It is not necessarily concerned with transactional or instrumental goals, but does have an effect on meeting such goals. The relationship or rapport established through small talk influences further (work-related) interaction. While small talk surely occurs at the margins of conversation, for example in greeting exchanges, it is just as much found in service encounters, as part of buying or selling activities, or even as the central purpose of interaction, as a recreational activity (Coupland, 2000:10).

Still, equating phatic communication to small talk unjustly separates the phatic or social function of language from other functions of communication and from other sites of interaction. Many interactional moves can be read to do several things at once (Sidnell and Enfield, 2014), which is why labeling them as having just one function or performing one action is not representative of the dynamism of interaction. The data discussed in this thesis are thus not limited to small talk nor to the margins of conversation, but instead reflect the body of informal, spontaneous, conversation.

Taking dyadic informal talk as the central form of language in interaction (see e.g. Enfield, 2013; Goody, 1995a; Levinson, 2006b), informal conversation is considered to be the basic form of talk-in-interaction (see e.g. Heritage, 2008:304-305). The idea of "conversation" being casual, informal, or unmarked is often found in both lay and scholarly work (Gaudio, 2003:663). As noted by Cameron (2001:10) the word informal is most naturally applied to interaction as being "characterized by informality, spontaneity and egalitarian relationships between the participants". Taking everyday talk to be the basic form of interaction is further supported by the fact that analyses of institutional

talk inevitably discuss a specific institutional context and its parameters of interaction in terms of them deviating from everyday practice. The underlying everyday practice thus serves as holding the basic set of interactional possibilities, which are restricted or extended in particular institutionalized settings (Goodwin and Heritage, 1990:289; Coupland, 2000:4) . This suggests unmarked, informal, spontaneous, conversation might be an activity type in its own right.

Any event in which the primary participants share the same goal and are familiar with relevant (social) constraints could form an activity type. The most important aspect of an activity type, apart from a shared goal of interaction, is that the participants have a strong sense of what contributions are and are not allowable (Levinson, 1992:69). For some activity types, the goal and boundaries of the activity are very clear; during a job interview, for example, all participants have a clear idea of the purpose of the interaction, their respective roles, and the type of contributions that are expected (not) to be offered. In an informal conversation this might not be as clear-cut, but there are, nonetheless, particular characteristics associated with this specific type of talk-in-interaction.

The goal of informal conversation could be described as (i) sharing information, thoughts, and ideas and (ii) eliciting sympathy or understanding for each other's position or perspective on a certain matter. Throughout the interaction, participants aim for a pleasant, smooth interactional exchange, meaning they orient towards moving the conversation forward (Sacks, 1987; Kotthoff, 1993; Stivers and Robinson, 2006) and are oriented towards consensus. In "neutral" interaction, agreement to a prior turn is preferred (e.g. Pomerantz, 1984). While this may intuitively seem applicable to all types of interaction, what is considered a preferred response depends on the initiated action. For example, in a compliment situation it is preferred to not agree with the compliment, but instead downplay or dismiss the flattering (Pomerantz, 1978). Similarly, following accusations denials are preferred (Atkinson and Drew, 1979), and in disputes participants orient towards disagreements as preferred responsive contributions (Kotthoff, 1993).

The different patterns of preferred responsive actions further suggest that the unmarked, informal type of conversation is indeed a recognizable activity type to participants. They not only know they are engaged in informal interaction, they also know how to behave *as being engaged* in informal interaction.[6] In other words, participants have certain expectations based on the particular activity they are involved in. This includes knowledge of what is noticeably and relevantly absent from a particular interactional situation.

[6]This same line of reasoning is presented by Coupland (2000:6), arguing small talk is recognizable as an activity in itself, and in contrast with (institutionalized) work-related activities. Although small talk is a very specific form of informal interaction, people are aware of it being a separate type of interactional undertaking and can shift into and out of it. This suggests the absence of defined norms does not prevent participants from collectively knowing when they are and are not "doing small talk", i.e. when they are and are not involved in a type of informal interaction.

Furthermore, Sacks (1995:II:216-218) suggests people actively *do* being ordinary. They do things in a usual way, have usual thoughts and interests, and have a usual way of reporting about them. The way in which people do being ordinary could be the central way in which our world is organized Sacks (1995:II:221). This presupposes people have a shared sense of what ordinary or usual activity looks like, otherwise they would not be able to recognize others' behavior as ordinary nor would they be able to constitute themselves as ordinary. Similar to small talk, presenting oneself (and the interaction) as ordinary is a specific type of informal activity.

Interactants are thus able to differentiate between informal, ordinary, phatic interactions and more institutionalized forms of interactions based on recognizable patterns of behavior that are associated with one, but not the other, activity. Considering relationships are built and maintained using language, these patterned behaviors affect the mutual and ongoing relationship between the participants involved. It is through language that they show interest in each other's well-being, share insights in each other's lives, and support each other's opinions and beliefs. It is through language that they establish interpersonal alignment; that they negotiate a shared position regarding the topic of talk. Studying these relationships in interaction - as the center of social organization - will deepen our understanding of pragmatics (Enfield, 2009).

1.2 Spontaneous responsive action

As one of the core objectives of informal interaction, mutual understanding and appreciation of a particular object of talk takes an important place in this thesis. In order for *mutual* understanding or appreciation to be constructed, one of the participants first has to propose or introduce a topic of talk and present a particular position on that topic. This initiating act projects the opportunity (and responsibility) for a responsive act to be performed[7]. The ways in which participants generally react to such acts tells us something about what they feel is the appropriate next move. This is of course strongly dependent on what conversation-initiating act is presented by the first speaker.

Initiating acts can strongly demand a response, but do not always present a claim to someone else's reaction. For example, following a question, there is a strong sense of obligation to present an answer (especially if the questions was directed at a specific person), but following a general observation there is no clear obligation to react.[8] Related to phatic communication and informal interaction, the supposed norms of interest are to be found in responsive actions

[7]See Thompson et al. (2015) for an analysis of responsive actions more generally; see e.g. Schegloff (2007) on sequence organization.

[8]This relates to turn-taking and sequence organization. The basic unit of conversation is an adjacency pair: two turns that are adjacent to each other. The two turns are necessarily presented by different participants and are connected through a relation of conditional relevance. This means the first pair part limits the number of second pair parts that count as a relevant response. To each first pair part (the initiating turn), there are a number of "type-connected" second pair parts. The interlocutor that is about to perform the second

as well. Arguably, all responsive actions contribute to building and maintaining a particular social relation, however, not all responsive actions are equally suitable to study the patterns of interpersonal relationship management.

In the context of this research, the *spontaneous* display of understanding or appreciation are of particular interest, since those contributions show affiliation with both the object of talk and the interlocutor, without there being a pressing need to provide said contribution. These contributions do not generally carry new propositional content, instead they present the indexical position of the second speaker with respect to the first speaker and the topic of talk. They focus on the participants' interpersonal alignment and could indeed be described as uninformative, non-referential, or even redundant.

All interactional moves supporting that relationship can be said to have a phatic function (which is not to say it is their *only* function!). The association of informal interaction with interpersonal consensus or smooth progression of the interaction is where the phatic function of language becomes especially relevant. Through negotiation, collaboration, and ultimately mutual agreement participants attempt to reach a shared understanding and appreciation of the matter at hand. Presenting agreement or support for a particular interactional move reinforces the interpersonal bond: the two participants involved share the same perspective regarding the object of talk. In other words, they have established convergent interpersonal alignment (cf. Du Bois, 2007, 2014; Stivers, 2008; section 3.2).

This thesis aims to shed light on the way in which participants use spontaneous interactional contributions to establish interpersonal alignment. That is, contributions that do not present required uptake of a project, but rather demonstrate personal investment in the ongoing interaction.[9] They hence an interactional environment in which the rules pertaining to required next actions are more flexible. Still, if the management of interpersonal relationships in informal conversation is indeed normatively guided, we would assume there to be expectations and obligations in terms of spontaneous response behavior - however contradictory that may sound.

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pair part, then, selects a second pair part that is relevant to the type that was projected in the first pair part (Sacks, 1987 [1973], 55-56). These alternatives are, however, by no means equivalent. For most types of first pair parts there are several second pair parts to choose from, one of which is the preferred one.

[9]Display of affiliation or interpersonal alignment between participants is of course not limited to spontaneous contributions. Accepting an extended invitations surely influences the interpersonal relationship in a positive manner - as do other project completions. There is, however, a strong incentive to present a response to an invitation, since not doing so would be interpreted as noticeably and relevantly absent (Schegloff, 2007:21). Following an assertion, or (the beginning of) a telling, the matching responsive action that would complete the initiated project is not as clearly defined. The *need* or obligation to present a specific type of response is less strict compared to, for example, a joint action like a question-answer pair, where two different participants have to present particular parts of the act for it to be completed. The organization of interaction based on adjacency pairs dictates that a relevant second pair part is presented (by the addressee). If the invited party does not present an answer, the absence of a response will be interpreted *as a response*.

1.3 Normal behavior - a shared concern

In order to adequately interpret and respond to a particular act, interactants have to be able to recognize what it is another person is doing. What is considered an adequate interpretation and response is - all going well - mutually understood by the parties involved. Their shared common ground (Clark, 1996) allows them to think about the other's access to information and hence expect (or even predict) certain outcomes of their communicative exchange. Goffman (1956) already explained social interaction to be normatively enforced. People follow particular "rules of conduct" that they are socialized into and that are consequently associated with a certain group of language users. These rules guide their actions, because "it is suitable or just" (Goffman, 1956:473) to behave in that specific way. Such normative patters thus create obligations and expectations on the part of all interactants involved: obligations to follow certain patterns of self-conduct, and the expectation others will behave a certain way as well. This results in an ongoing effort of coordination between interlocutors directed at their mutual understanding of their interactional moves (cf. Clark, 1996 and chapter 2).

One such expectation concerns the continuation of interaction. Once a conversation has started, the participants involved are expected to stay involved and keep the conversation going, thus properly fulfilling the role of interactant. As Goffman (1957:48) explains, "the individual must not only maintain proper involvement himself but also act so as to ensure that others will maintain theirs". This interactional order is a strong tool or system preserving both the active involvement and interpersonal and relational balance. The suggestion that continuing an ongoing interaction is the default is further supported by conversation analytic studies describing the systematic closing of both a current topic and a conversation overall (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). The fact that interactants negotiate the closing of an activity shows that their reciprocal responsibility for their involvement in interaction is firmly entrenched in their sense of how a "normal" interaction unfolds. Instead of simply leaving the site of interaction, abruptly ending the activity, it is important to maintain their interpersonal relation across and past the current encounter.

Societal or cultural norms play a role in what counts as appropriate behavior. Much like phatic communication, normativity is often connected to politeness. The idea that politeness has to do with the observation of certain norms is prevalent in both lay and scholarly discussions of the phenomenon. The traditional social-norm view explicitly focused on norms as the source of politeness (Fraser, 1990). More recently, polite and "normal" behavior have been explicitly separated (e.g. Watts, 2003; Locher and Watts, 2005; Terkourafi, 2005; Long, 2016) because language users do not necessarily consider to act in line with what is expected a display of politeness. Politeness, then, is not equated with norms of interpersonal interaction, but is understood as existing in contrast with the general, expected, patterns of interaction. It is the deviation of those

norms that (potentially) leads to (an evaluation of) politeness.[10]

Generally, scientific theories of politeness include norms in one way or another in their conceptualization of politeness (Eelen, 2001:127). A problem with the notion of norms in politeness research is that what is meant by "norms" is not clear. The term seems to be used to cover a range of different phenomena among which appropriateness, sharedness, normality, and expectation (Eelen, 2001:128-140). Eelen (2001) warns researchers to not fall victim to the norms that are being studied: judging what is and is not polite based on norms, however they are defined, is the participants' privilege. It is the researcher's task to study the norms, not use them (Eelen, 2001:186). His conclusion is an important incentive to pursue this study:

> "The only way in which normativity can be adequately tackled without reverting to prescriptivist accounts is by making it the object of research". (Eelen, 2001:187)

Rather than *deciding* what norms are (presumably) being used in interaction, projecting an outsider understanding onto the communicative situation, we need to *discern* what normative structures are apparently observed by the participants involved in interaction. Throughout this thesis, norms are considered to be reflected in "normal" (expected, just, unmarked, appropriate) behavior. Recurring patterns of interactional and linguistic choices suggest participants orient towards a particular code of conduct or social norm. The norms that apparently guide these behaviors can be reconstructed trough the study of regularities in the negotiation of social relationships in informal interaction. The general assumption in determining such norms is that patterns that occur more frequently are unmarked and can thus be said to represent the normal use of language.[11]

[10]The main argument for defining politeness as the unmarked situation is based in the assumption that interlocutors prefer to interact under conditions that are least costly. Constantly assuming all interlocutors are hostile, have a face-threatening intention, and are not to be trusted is an extremely costly exercise in alertness and second-guessing. The frequent, unchallenged, mode of interaction is therefore constructed as the polite way of interacting (Terkourafi, 2005:248). Terkourafi thus takes a bottom-up approach to politeness, seeking empirical regularities based on qualitative and quantitative analysis. A similar approach is presented in Usami's (2006) discourse politeness, who combines qualitative and quantitative methods as well. This understanding of politeness corresponds to Watts' (2003) notion of politic behavior: appropriate behavior relative to the situation (Terkourafi, 2003:253). Following these understandings, what I have called "normal" behavior would in fact be "polite" behavior. An important difference between the frame-based approach and the perspective taken in this thesis is the centrality of social frames. While Terkourafi (2005) describes how the social aspects of a given situation, and the participants in it, inform linguistic choices, the focus in this thesis is on observable linguistic behavior in reaction to others, irrespective of their social background. In short, this research is interactional in nature, not sociolinguistic.

[11]See e.g. Terkourafi (2001, 2005) and Usami (2006) for a similar position.

1.4 Interactional universals, cultural particulars

Studies in conversation analysis have uncovered several organizational structures to guide talk-in-interaction. The basic findings are usually centered on four general concepts: the rules of turn-taking, the organization of talk in adjacency pairs, preference organization, and the organization of repair (see e.g. Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; Liddicoat, 2007; Schegloff, 2007; Sidnell, 2010 for a general introduction). The organization of both turn-taking (Stivers et al., 2009), and repair (Dingemanse et al., 2014) have proven to show cross-linguistic similarities. That is, the general structures of organization are universally stable, but the specific way in which they are enacted and implemented in interaction are not.[12]

The universally stable organizational structures of interaction suggest there is a particularly strong norm of interaction all people orient towards, irrespective of their linguistic background. It allows people to infer meaning from interactional acts, guides interpretation and understanding, and thus facilitates successful communication. This possibly suggests humans to have a separate layer of interactional knowledge, independent from language (Levinson, 1995). A specific set of abilities designed for human interaction: a "human interaction engine" (Levinson, 2006b, cf. section 2.4).

The cultural differences found in the operationalization of these basic organizational structures emphasize the importance of shared knowledge and common ground. While all human beings evidently have general knowledge about how to take turn or signal the need for repair, it is only for a limited set of communities that they have specific knowledge about how to actually successfully and appropriately accomplish these things. These relevant rules of conduct, and the inferences associated with particular behavior, are not only influenced by the activity type, but are culturally informed as well (Levinson, 1992:97).

One of the more persistent beliefs about cultural differences (and possible difficulties) is the existence of an East-West divide (e.g. found in (work following) Hofstede, 1980; Hall, 1959, 1976).[13] The cultural differences between Eastern and Western countries are perceived to be so extensive that misunderstanding is likely to occur. This perception might, in part, be due to the problematic application of western biased theories of language and communication to languages spoken in (East) Asia.[14] When it comes to interactional

[12]There is a growing interest in universals of interaction, including efforts related to the project on a Typology of Interaction, headed by Stephen C. Levinson at the Max Planck Institute in Nijmegen, the Netherlands (see e.g. Stivers et al., 2009; Dingemanse et al., 2014), and in work on interactional linguistics (see e.g. Selting and Couper-Kuhlen, 2001; Couper-Kuhlen and Ford, 2004; Thompson et al., 2015; Couper-Kuhlen and Selting, 2018).

[13]See Leech (2007) for an account of linguistic politeness explicitly negating such a divide. An explicit argument in favor of a culture-general, approach to politeness is presented by Long (2016).

[14]Most notably in research concerned with politeness and intercultural communication, the past decades have witnessed a call for alternative models and approaches rooted in Asian

behavior these regions are reported to prefer different styles of conversation. Conversational style is here used as a cover term for all patterns of language use that collectively make up the appropriate, or just, way of behaving in interaction (Tannen, 2005, cf. section 3.4). It is what "feels normal" to people.[15] These normative patterns often go by unnoticed, precisely because they are what speakers feel goes without saying; it is what they have always done and what they expect others to do as well.

Most work reporting an opposition between Western and Eastern ways of communicating focus on the Anglophone world and East Asia.[16] These regions are taken as strong examples of individualist and collectivist societies, respectively (e.g. Triandis, 1995; Oyserman et al., 2002). The main difference between these two characteristics is the way in which individuals see themselves, and consequently what motivates them to (not) do certain things. Individualism can be described as a social pattern in which an individual is viewed as independent from others and hence primarily motivated by his own personal wants, obligations, and goals. Collectivism, on the other hand, refers to a social pattern in which an individual is viewed as part of a collective and is primarily motivated by obligations or norms imposed by that collective (Triandis, 1995:2). This difference in self-perception and source of motivation inevitably leads to a difference in self-conduct. Especially in terms of appropriate behavior Markus and Kitayama (1991:240) note the importance of taking into account the cultural construction of the relationship between self and others.[17]

Patterns of interpersonal alignment are presumably influenced by the general idea of what constitutes a relationship and what it takes to sustain that relationship. Following the explanation above, a more individualistic perspective would assume participants to feel detached from each other, which could result in more explicit efforts of communicating closeness or similarity. In other words, it could motivate attempts to explicitly verbalize interpersonal alignment. Taking the collectivist perspective, this explicit verbalization could be deemed superfluous. Given that self and others are considered part of the same collective, it would be needless to explicitly point out the mutual relationship. This would predict the Dutch, an individual society, to make a clear effort to

conceptualization of interaction. On politeness phenomena see e.g. Matsumoto (1988), Gu (1990); on intercultural communication see Kim (2002; 2009), Miike (2007; 2015; 2014) and Wei (2016); on the conception of self, see Markus and Kitayama (1991; 2010; 2003), cf. section 2.6.

[15]It is emphatically not meant to be understood in terms of stylistics, but simply as a general understanding of "a way or mode of doing something" (Hymes, 1989:434). See e.g. Coupland (2007) and Tannen (2005) for a book-length exploration of style and variation from a more sociolinguisitc perspective.

[16]Often represented by the US and Japan, see e.g. Markus and Kitayama (1991), Kitayama et al. (1997), Kitayama et al. (2000); or even more narrowly on European Americans and Asian Americans, e.g. Markus and Kitayama (2003), Cohen and Hoshino-Browne (2005); see Triandis and Suh (2002) for an overview of cultural influences on personality construction.

[17]Markus and Kitayama (1991; 2003; 2010) do not use the term "appropriate" necessarily. They focus on independent and interdependent construction of self and the associated notions of independent and interdependent agency. These issues are further explored in section 2.6.

establish and communicate interpersonal alignment, whereas for the Indonesian speakers, as representatives of a collectivist society, the relationship is implied and not in need of explicit construction.

Indonesia and the Netherlands

Referring back to the earlier mentioned expat websites, social harmony was often suggested as being one of the central aspects of Indonesian culture. This trait is indeed reported by Geertz (1960, 1984) to be an important cultural value in Java and Bali. Note that these claims are specifically about Java and Bali. Indonesia is of course a highly diverse nation, encompassing thousands of islands, over 700 indigenous languages (Simons and Fennig, 2018) and with a population of more than 237 million in 2010.[18] The 2010 census reports roughly 198 million people to have command of Indonesian, although the level of proficiency is not specified. Most people speak other languages as well and might prefer those language for interaction with the home community (Sneddon, 2003b:6)[19] The aspects of culture mentioned here all supposedly connect with Indonesian, the national language, in general. Considering the language is spoken by the majority of the population and forms the language variety that is especially relevant in intercultural settings, the general advice found about "Indonesian culture" likely refers to the language usages norms associated with Indonesian.[20]

Contrary to the hypothesis presented above - that a collectivist outlook would not need to mark their interpersonal relationship in interaction - Wouk (2001:189-190) argues (the appearance of) solidarity to be central in Indonesian language use. This has resulted in a conversational style that overtly marks the existing solidarity between interlocutors.[21] The characterization of Indonesians as indirect communicators is confirmed by both Hassall (1999:598-599)[22] and Aziz (2003:182), the latter describing indirectness as being "part of the social norm".[23]

[18]These are the most recent census data, see http://sp2010.bps.go.id/

[19]See e.g. Sneddon (2003a); Errington (1984, 1998) on diglossia in Indonesia.

[20]It is misleading, though, to consider it a second language, as it holds an important position in society, even if it is not learned in a home or family environment (Errington, 2006:180). This leads Errington (2006:181) to refer to Indonesian as an "un-native" language, in his words, "to foreground its qualitatively different place in Indonesian political culture and as a marker of identity".

[21]Her work concentrated on the use of two specific discourse markers in Indonesian: *ya* (Wouk, 2001) and *kan* (Wouk, 1998). She concludes both of these markers are reflective of the Indonesian cultural value to emphasize solidarity between interlocutors. In her words "the important thing is not the sincerity of the claim, nor the reality of solidarity, but the successful creation of an appearance of such" (Wouk, 2001:190).

[22]Although his empirical work on request formation does not reflect this characterization. Indonesian students were in fact found to mostly use query preparatory requests, whereas a stronger preference for hints would be expected if indirectness indeed was favored (cf. Hassall, 1999, 2003).

[23]To satisfactorily analyze politeness related behavior in Indonesian Aziz (2003:182ff) proposes a Principle of Mutual Consideration (orig. *Prinsip Saling Tenggang Rasa*), which

The opposite seems to be the case for speakers of Dutch,[24] who, allegedly, prefer a direct, open, and clear way of communicating. These characterizations all fit the overall description of the Netherlands as an individualistic country.[25] Somewhat surprisingly, little work has been found to take the Dutch culture as the object of research (cf. Van Ginkel, 1990, 1991, 1992). Studies that do address cultural aspects of Dutch language use mention Hofstede's (1980) power dimension as one of the more challenging factors in intercultural communication (e.g. Gerritsen, 2001; Van der Wijst, 2000). The egalitarian approach of interaction and the ideal to have everyone heard and on board before a decision is made (reflective of Hofstede's femininity dimension) proves to be a complex combination to outsiders. In French-Dutch business negotiations, the difference in directness was reported to cause communicative friction (Ulijn and Gorter 1989 in Van der Wijst 1995, 478).[26]

Both lay and scholarly discussions of Dutch and Indonesian language use repeatedly mention concepts as harmony and (in)directness to be relevant factors in intercultural communication involving speakers of one of these languages. The (limited number of) available academic studies mostly focus on second language learners or business negotiations. This is in itself not surprising, given the immediate relevance of having knowledge about the cultural patterns of linguistic behavior in these contexts. Still, assuming informal interaction to be the default interactive situation, it is remarkable how little information is found about general patterns of interaction in informal encounters. Knowing how speakers use the language in their everyday conversations, would presumably assist in dealing with more specific contexts as well. Especially when it comes to the management of mutual understanding, both in terms of informational and relational needs, the "normal" behavior as displayed in spontaneous interaction can be a valuable source of insight.

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explicitly includes a mutual understanding of the hearer's and speaker's face wants to ensure the preservation of social harmony.

[24]Speakers of Dutch will be understood to refer to speakers of the language variety as spoken in the Netherlands. The Dutch variety spoken in Belgium, Flemish Dutch, is not considered here.

[25]A conceptualization shown to be reflected in the way Dutch speakers talk about - and hence construct - themselves. Pouliasi and Verkuyten (2012) found Dutch speakers to primarily present information related to themselves and friends and family from their own perspective, e.g. "my son, my mother", representing the relationship between the participants talked about in terms of individual entities engaged in a dyad. They also more frequently referred to their "communal self", which is the personal involvement in particular communities, compared to Greek participants (who were shown to orient towards a more collectivist conceptualization).

[26]Van der Wijst (1995) concludes the difference in politeness or indirectness in power relations are not that great. It seems the degree of conventionality of particular request forms in French and Dutch differs, causing a divergent perception of politeness when a request is expressed using a form that is conventional (and polite) to the Dutch, but unconventional (and impolite) the French. Van der Wijst thus emphasizes the familiarity with (the use of) a language to be perhaps more important than cultural factors. See also Van der Wijst (2000). Stalpers (2005) also concentrates on French-Dutch business negotiations, but does not say anything about possible cultural influences.

1.5 This thesis

The general (folk) perception of the Dutch and Indonesian preferred conversational styles is very different: direct vs. indirect, clear vs. vague, and focused on independence vs. solidarity. A particularly important aspect of interaction that could potentially prevent misunderstandings and misinterpretations in intercultural communication is a shared understanding of the interpersonal relationship. A conversation is often full of seemingly redundant, uninformative contributions that support, repeat, paraphrase, or co-construct a particular message presented by some other participant. These contributions may not be very relevant in terms of offering new knowledge, they are crucial sources of information when it comes to the interpersonal positioning of the interlocutors. They are phatic contributions: instead of carrying a transactional or informational function, they fullfill a primarily social function.

In order to further our understanding of phatic communication in interpersonal relationship management, this thesis investigates how participants use spontaneous responsive actions (Thompson et al., 2015) to convey their personal, and as a result interpersonal, position on a certain matter. The analysis of naturally occurring interactions, will aid in uncovering patterns of language use in Dutch and Indonesian related to the management of interpersonal relationships. The guiding research question is formulated as follows:

- How do speakers of Dutch and Indonesian manage their interpersonal alignment in informal interaction?

All analyses are data-driven. That is, the empirical data - the informal interactions - are the main source of information when it comes to recognizing patterns, distinguishing categories, and contrasting results. The research is both qualitative and quantitative, in that micro-level descriptions and explanations of specific linguistic behavior related to interpersonal alignment are combined with macro-level patterns of regularity. This study is therefore an example of sensible quantification: it is not so much concerned with the (possible) occurrence of a particular form and its related normative rules, but with the relative preference to use a certain form over others. Even if a certain way of communicating is available to people, it does not mean they will use it regularly. The current research aims to find what linguistic forms *are* regularly used (and why); the specific workings of the individual forms that interactants have at their disposal is - for the purpose of this study - of secondary concern.

The overall goal of the research is to gain insight in how participants use phatic contributions in spontaneous informal interaction to establish interpersonal alignment. This insight will help increase our understanding of the ways in which these speakers normally (and possibly normatively) explicate their mutual relationship. Which, in turn, will contribute to a deeper understanding of intercultural communication and the connection between the organization of language, culture, and interaction.

Knowledge about patterns of alignment behavior both benefits language teachers and learners in intercultural communication. It allows participants to accurately interpret others' communicative moves and display communicative behavior in line with the relevant expectations. Being able to think like a member of the community - or at least recognize how members of a particular community think - eases communication and will likely increase mutual understanding and appreciation. The degree to which participants perceived there to be common ground, in terms of shared knowledge and expectations, affects both the successful transfer of information and the creation of a successful relationship.[27]

Ultimately, the research question presented above touches on a broader discussion of universal and culture specific patterns of language use. The contrastive nature of this study invites exploration of this overarching theme: to what extent is phatic communication a universal endeavor and how do specific languages differentiate in the decisions that are made in an effort to establish and maintain interpersonal bonds? This study concentrates on two languages only, meaning the analysis presented here can only serve as first steps towards answering the question of universality. Nonetheless, the insights gained through contrastive study of language usage provide empirical support that is indispensible in reaching final conclusions in this debate.

Structure of the thesis

As has hopefully become apparent from this introduction, I will not use a single theoretical framework to answer my research question. Inevitably, it takes some additional work on the author and reader's part to connect the relevant concepts. To that end, the thesis is divided into two parts. Part I includes the theoretical and methodological considerations guiding this research (chapters 2-4), Part II presents the discussion of the interactional data (chapters 5-8). Each of the parts will start with a brief introduction of the central themes that are discussed in the chapters. This will clarify how they are related and why they are of relevance to the research. The separate chapters will of course address these issues as well, but for a quick overview the reader is referred to the introductory text at the beginning of the relevant part. Whereas the main discussion of theory is found in Part I, the data-driven analysis in Part II includes theoretical explanations as well to allow for separate reading of Part I and Part II. The individual analyses are thus made accessible in their own right, albeit at the cost of concepts being discussed at several points in the text.

[27] The highly problematic word "successful" is here meant to reflect the favorable or desired outcome (following the Merriam Webster dictionary). Successful transfer of information thus refers to the situation in which an intended message indeed reaches the intended target. Describing the successful creation of relationships is somewhat more challenging, but would refer to all those situations in which participants were attempting to establish a particular type of relationship (be it one of like or dislike) and indeed reached the point where either party was felt to have understood and accepted the existence of that relationship.

Chapter 2 considers human interaction in general, with a focus on the social use of language; the self-less sharing of information, feelings, and knowledge believed to be unique to humans. The principles of cooperation and coordination guiding interaction are explored and the collaborative nature of human beings is discussed. These patterns might suggest the existence of interactional universals, or even a human interaction engine, warranting the question what role culture plays and how politeness might be involved.

Chapter 3 concentrates on stancetaking and alignment. This chapter moves on from a general examination of stance in interaction to the particular explanation of stance as conceptualized in a triangle, connecting the first speaker, the second speaker, and the object of talk. This will be the leading conceptualization throughout the thesis. The chapter subsequently discusses ways in which interactants establish alignment, which form the theoretical grounding of the interactional patterns studied in the data analysis. The data used for this research were taken from a reality TV show, Big Brother, to have access to both auditory and visual communication. The selection and processing of the data is described in detail in **chapter 4**, as are the connected benefits and challenges of using these data. This chapter also includes an explanation of the coding protocol that was used to analyze the transcripts.

The first chapter of part II, **chapter 5**, discusses how participants show involvement in Dutch and Indonesian through minimal and extensive expressions of support. This includes back-channeling, agreements, and the explicit marking of interpersonal alignment by means of such phrases as "I think / like X too". This is perhaps the most straightforward form of establishing (and communicating) a shared understanding and common ground. Another means of expressing similarity between two participants is presented in **chapter 6**. By reproducing (part of) a prior utterance participants are shown to establish interpersonal alignment. Considering the information of a particular message is already available (the previous person presented that piece of information after all), the main function of such reproductions is social in nature.

Chapter 7 focuses on the collaborative construction of meaning, referring to co-completions and extensions of presented thoughts. The ability to complete someone else's expression or build on an idea presented by another speaker shows the similarity between the participants involved. This does not necessarily mean they feel the same way about a particular topic, but it does demonstrate their likeness in terms of processing and coordinating their thoughts.

The results are brought together in **chapter 8** and connected to the theoretical concepts introduced in part I. It is shown that the expression and establishment of alignment differs across the two languages, both in frequency and in preferred form. This is suggested to be an effect of culture, and, more specifically, to be related to the different conceptualizations of self and other; a crucial aspect of interpersonal alignment. This final chapter will also address the challenges of the research design and the opportunities it presents for further research.

Part I

Theory and method

> "Depending on their research questions, scholars can creatively combine methodological tools and (interdisciplinary) theoretical insights in pursing their specific research endeavors and build on each other's findings, no matter whether they define their research goal as understanding a particular practice with all its facets or exploring personal, cultural, situational and contextual norms and ideologies that shape interaction more globally". (Locher 2015:8)

Introduction - Theory and method

These next chapters give an overview of the relevant theoretical notions and selected method. As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis does not reflect a single theoretical approach or theory. Rather, a number of relevant concepts is combined to form an appropriate theoretical foundation to describe and analyze the Dutch and Indonesian informal interactions. The first two chapters in this part are dedicated to the theoretical foundation of the analyses presented in part II. The third chapter included here describes the corpus that was set up for this thesis and explains the methodology.

The aim of this thesis is to uncover patterns of language use concerned with establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships. More specifically, I am interested in the way in which participants use spontaneous reactions to construct and express interpersonal alignment. The *phatic function* of language is hence positioned at the core of interactional organization. Interpersonal alignment could be described as a type of negotiation that is focused on relationships and stances. This understanding is grounded in some of the notions that are central to human communication: *coordination*, *common ground*, *joint action*, and *uptake* all of which are addressed in **chapter 2**. These notions pertaining to the organization of interaction are based in a more anthropological or psychological tradition.

Considering the current research is contrastive in nature, the possible influence of cultural preferences has to be addressed as well. Section 2.6 explores the relevance of such notions as collectivism and individualism, the concept of self and the nature of agency often used in cross-cultural (psychological) research. This discussion follows a brief overview of research produced in the field of *politeness*. Again, this is not the immediate focus of this thesis, but politeness is the field that is traditionally associated with the managing of interpersonal relations.

The way in which particular forms or structures contribute to the organization of interaction is the central objective of *conversation analysis*. In general, the aim of conversation analytic work is to closely describe the workings of a specific practice. This means that a selected way of "doing something with language" is studied in natural interaction, taking into account the immediate environment and the unfolding of the interaction following that act. It is thus

emphatically not about the linguistic form in isolation, but about how the linguistic form is interpreted in actual conversation. This is nicely captured by the question "Why that now?" attributed to Schegloff and Sacks (1973). Central aspects in CA work are the organization of turn-taking and sequentiality in interaction. Conversation analysis is not addressed separately in this thesis, but relevant insights are included in **chapter 2**, most notably in section 2.3.

One theoretical concept that is of specific importance to this thesis has already been mentioned: alignment. In short, this refers to the connection between two stances taken by two participants in interaction (e.g. Du Bois, 2007, 2014). Taking the same or a similar stance establishes positive alignment, thus creating a strong sense of similarity between participants; presenting diverging stance results in negative alignment and a feeling of separateness. The focus being on phatic communication,positive alignment is mostly of relevance here. The theoretical notions of *stance* and *alignment* are discussed in **chapter 3**. This chapter also explains how the terms are used in this thesis and what they do (not) include. Finally, the chapter will describe some of the more apparent ways in which alignment is in fact established.

This thesis will pursue and *interactional linguistic* agenda, combining conversation analytic and linguistic anthropological insights. As Couper-Kuhlen and Selting (2018:11-16) explain, interactional linguistics aims at describing linguistic structures and their use to accomplish tasks in social interaction and is interested in cross-linguistic comparison to determine how these interactional patterns influence language structures and use in interaction, and how language impinges on the organization of social interaction. The general aim, then, is not to describe a particular practice at micro-level, but to draw general conclusions about how language is organized and practiced in interaction. The approach - both of interactional linguistics and of this thesis - is strictly *empirical*. The analysis is based on empirical data from natural interaction and uses a context-sensitive approach, meaning the interpretation given to a certain practice needs to be reflected in the actual data. Similarly, the categories that are distinguished are grounded in the data following a general *inductive* approach.

Chapter 4 introduces the *corpus* and *coding* protocol. Since there was no readily available Dutch or Indonesian spoken corpus available, a corpus of informal conversations was collected. The material was taken from reality TV show Big Brother. The challenges and opportunities that come with using televised material are explored. All material was transcribed and coded by the author, which also has its benefits and downsides. Using some type of model of classification is the only way to both qualitatively and quantitatively analyze the data - and thus the only way to uncover patterns or regularities. However, to ensure the analyst's coding indeed is reliable and representative, what is coded must be unequivocally and indisputably recognizable as an instance of a particular code. To that end, the coding protocol is discussed in the methods chapter as well (and included in the Appendix).

CHAPTER 2

Sharing and collaborating

The social use of language is thought to be both the most primitive and most essential type of language use (Malinowski, 1923:328). Primitive in the sense that one of the primary reasons for language to have evolved might have been to ease maintaining social relationships: as a substitute for one-to-one grooming as groups grew bigger (Dunbar, 1992, 1996, 2016)[1]. An argument that supports the idea of phatic language use as a primitive function of language is that it is the first function of language that children acquire: before they are able to verbally exchange information, they are already trying to establish contact (Jakobson, 1960:356).

The socially oriented function of language, also called the phatic function, is generally said to be found in the margins of interaction (Malinowski, 1923; Jakobson, 1960; Laver, 1975), but this might be too narrow a view. Jakobson (1960) explicitly associates an absence of "informative communication" with the phatic function of language. This is not to say, however, that interactional activity that *is* focused on conveying information is not concerned with managing interpersonal relations (Goody, 1995b:4). All actions taken in social interaction carry consequences to the relationship between interactants (Enfield, 2006:412). As Enfield (2006:422) notes, (not) sharing information is essentially social. The social or interpersonal function of language seems to always play a role in interaction (more on this in section 3.1).

Managing interpersonal relationships could indeed be the single most central use of language (Goody, 1995b:4;, see also Dunbar, 1996). Considering humans

[1]Dunbar (e.g. 2016) argues language evolved as the last stage of simpler vocalizations like laughter and singing. He disagrees with the view upheld by Tomasello (e.g. 2008) that language evolved from a gestural form of communication

have the species-unique ability to share intentionality and think about what others think or know (Tomasello, 2008:85ff), the possibility that interactants would try to *actively* maintain commonality or even communality during the entire flow of their interaction is not at all improbable (cf. Clark, 1996:92ff; see also section 2.2).[2]

In managing interaction, people build on what came before and anticipate what will come next. To be able to do so, they have to keep track of what they know and believe about the situation at hand; their common ground has to stay updated (Clark, 1996; Enfield, 2006). In a joint effort, they coordinate their interactional moves to reflect their shared understanding and interpersonal positioning. These moves include phatic communicative efforts to signal their interpersonal alignment and mutual involvement in the interaction. An especially interesting aspect of phatic communication is the underlying sense or want of sharing. Participants want others to know something thinking it might help *them* instead of benefit the speaker. This selfless motive of communication is thought to be unique to the human species and is in large part due to our ability to think about others' states of mind and knowledge.

One way in which people coordinate their interaction is by giving hints about what their next move will be, where they want to take the interaction. This allows co-participants to anticipate that move or even prevent it from happening. Prefacing a particular interactional move can help increase the chance of eliciting a preferred response. The study of organizational structures in interaction and the way language is used in them is the primary objective of conversation analysis. Of course, different languages show differences in language use, but the general patterns of coordination are the same cross-linguistically. These abilities to coordinate interpretation and understanding are not dependent on language, they allow language to work.

In this chapter this social side of language use is discussed that at first may seems marginal, but is in fact central to human communication (cf. section 2.1). Section 2.2 explains that using communication to selflessly share knowledge, feelings and information is thought to be unique to humans. The ways in which people coordinate their actions and beliefs and collaborate in interaction is subsequently explored in section 2.3. Underlying, interaction is driven by a special skill set that is universally shared by people. This skill set is what Levinson (2006b) calls the interaction engine, which will be explained in section 2.4. Finally, section 2.6 discusses the influence of cultural preferences on these universal interactional patterns.

[2]The idea of using language in service of managing interpersonal relationships is found in many approaches to politeness, most notably the ones that view politeness as rapport management (e.g. Spencer-Oatey, 2005); see also section 2.5.

2.1 Phatic communication

The first mention of talk for the sake of talk as a special function of language seems to be Malinowski's study of the people and language of the Trobriand Islands (1923). He studied their "primitive" ways of using language and noticed that a lot of their communicative interaction did not seem to have a clear goal-oriented purpose, but rather was focused on the relationship between the interactants (1923:316). He coined this use of language phatic communion: "a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words" (1923:315). The main function or goal of this type of language use is breaking the silence, forming bonds, enjoying each other's company. Language, then, is not so much used to transfer thoughts, but serves to socially bind the speaker and hearer together (1923:315). Following Malinowski (1923), Jakobson similarly recognizes a function of language focused on the social side of interaction, which he denotes as "set for contact" (Jakobson, 1960:355). Again, this function primarily serves "to establish, prolong, or to discontinue communication" (Jakobson, 1960:355).[3] The phatic function is thus separated from the informational or referential function as Senft (2009) explains:

> "[...] phatic communion is characterized by not conveying meaning, by not importing information; thus, phatic utterances are described as procedures without propositional contents".
>
> (Senft, 2009:228)

While utterances that serve a phatic function are not focused on conveying informational content, it is not to say they do not convey meaning. This type of language use is not primarily to do with transferring thoughts or information, but with sharing an environment and maintaining a relationship in (and beyond) that particular situation. This is why Laver (1975) describes phatic communication to be an indexical function of language:

> "[...] the prime function of phatic communion is the communication of indexical facts about the speakers' identities, attributes, and attitudes, and [...] these indexical facts constrain the nature of the particular interaction". (Laver, 1975:217)

The elements used in phatic communication are not referential in nature. Instead, they connect the speaker to his immediate environment - including his fellow interactants and their interactional contributions. The choices made by the speaker are of indexical significance, since they say something about the speaker's stance or relation to the larger interaction. The phatic (and deictic) elements that are used in communication present a claim about the speaker's solidarity with his interlocutor(s) and the relative social status of participants. Laver's analysis of language use in the interactional margins (openings and

[3] His main focus is on the poetic function of language, which will prove to be relevant in the discussion of alignment and repetition (see 3.1 and 3.3.1).

closings of interaction) showed that all elements used in phatic communion indeed had deictic reference: they related back to something in the immediate environment, the speaker, or the addressee (1975:222-223).

Laver (1975:217) describes the fundamental social function of phatic communion as "the detailed management of interpersonal relationships during the psychologically crucial margins of interaction". Malinowski, too, concentrated mostly on such exchanges as "How do you do" or "Nice day today" in the opening phase of an interaction. He refers to these as "mere phrase[s] of politeness" (1923:313), suggesting that the phatic use of language is - to lay people (i.e. regular users of a particular language variety) - considered to belong to the politeness spectrum.[4] Normative phatic structures are most clearly found in acts that overtly address the interpersonal relation, including compliments, apologies, and greetings (Goffman, 1956:477). This does not mean, however, that phatic language does not follow normative patterns in other interactional environments.

As discussed above, Malinowski defined phatic communion as a tie of union between people that is created by talk or language (1923:315). So far, the term phatic communion has roughly been related with the social side of language, a pragmatic or even polite aspect of language use. It is, in that sense, similar to what Goffman (1956:476) calls ceremonial rules: "conventionalized means of communication by which the individual expresses his character or conveys his appreciation of the other participants in the situation".[5] More broadly, this function of language is referred to as phatic communication (Senft, 2009:227)[6] and involves language use informing the interpersonal relationship.

In this thesis, the more general use of phatic communication is used. Although the term is rather old and no longer regularly found in scholarly work, it is a useful concept for the purposes of this thesis. Phatic communication will be understood to refer to all contributions that (i) communicate affiliation and establish positive interpersonal alignment in informal interaction and (ii) that are not strictly necessary in terms of informational content. All such acts that are designated as phatic contributions are spontaneous reactions that pri-

[4]The association of language use for social purposes with politeness is not uncommon. A full and uniform grasp of what politeness entails is, however, not that easy to establish and is certainly not something scholars of politeness agree on. See section 2.5 for a more elaborate discussion of politeness.

[5]Goffman concentrated on two components of ceremonial activity, deference and demeanor. The first refers to the expression of appreciation for another participant, the latter concerns the way in which a participant expresses his personal qualities of character.

[6]Phatic communion and phatic communication are not necessarily the same. Simplistically put, communication entails transferring or conveying a particular (intended) message from one party to another. Communion, on the other hand, is thought to be used by Malinowksi with its religious connotation (Ehlich, 1993:317, quoted in Senft, 2009:227), which suggests a stronger bond or unity compared to one established in communication. Although it is good to keep in mind that communion and communication are not always interchangeable, the similarities outweigh the differences. Both phatic communion and phatic communication are used to refer to utterances that are used to build rapport, utterances that serve primarily social functions.

marily serve the construction or maintenance of a shared position between the participants involved.

2.2 What makes us human

From an evolutionary point of view, Tomasello (2008:84-87) describes three general motives for interaction: requesting, informing and sharing. Requesting and informing are both imperative motives that mostly serve the benefit of the speaker. With requests, the speaker wants the hearer to do something, with informatives the speaker wants the hearer to know something (so that they can subsequently do something with that knowledge that will benefit the speaker). Sharing on the other hand, does not seem to be informed by this kind of goal or intention. The speaker does not want the hearer to do anything, but simply shares a feeling, attitude or information for the sake of sharing. The ultimate goal or reason behind this motive of communication is to expand the common ground with others (Tomasello, 2008:86). Sharing thus reflects a social or phatic motive. Of these three general motives of communication, sharing is the one that is unique to the human species.

What is said to distinguish the human mind from other species is our ability to think recursively about our own and other's thinking (cf.Corbalis, 2011). Related to language and interaction, Tomasello (2008:94-95) argues that what makes our (verbal) interaction work is the fact that the creation of common ground, the Gricean communicative intention, and the motivational structure of human communication are all recursive. Cooperation can only be successful, after all, if everyone assumes that everyone assumes (etc.) the same norms of cooperation (Tomasello, 2008:95).[7] Common ground, cooperation, and coordination are essential aspects of our universal system of human interaction (cf. section 2.4).

2.2.1 Common ground

In section 2.1, the phatic function of language was explained to serve the arrangement of social roles and relationships. The possibility that was put forward that people continuously update this social arrangement in interaction is supported by the importance of common ground in communication. Clark (1996:93) defines common ground as "the sum of [the] mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and supposition". Common ground, or intersubjective context (Tomasello, 2008:74),[8] thus refers to the knowledge participants see as

[7]Clark (1996:95) argues against this recursive representation of common ground (CG-iterated in his terms) because it would call for an "infinitely large mental capacity".

[8]The term "intersubjectivity" is not further discussed in this thesis, but is simply understood to refer to the fact that all interaction assumes mutual involvement in the form of shared attention and coordination (cf. Goffman, 1957). This is neatly captured by the very general definition provided by Sidnell (2014:366): "The human form of intersubjectivity, then, centrally involves joint attention and shared intentionality thus allowing two or

relevant to the ongoing interaction. Crucially, it is not one participant's individual belief that something is relevant, but their belief that the other sees it as relevant as well and that they both mutually know that they know this. As neatly summarized by Tomasello (2008):

> "The critical point about common ground is that it takes people beyond their own egocentric perspective of things".
>
> (Tomasello, 2008:76)

The beliefs about what an interlocutor might know or notice assumes a starting point or baseline that both participants share and use to build their common ground. People base their beliefs of common ground on the situation they find themselves in (the location, activity, surroundings, etc.) and on information about the participants that is presented in interaction; information that is accessible to both of them. These bases are believed to be shared (Clark, 1996:94). There is no certainty in them actually having the same awareness or knowledge, they can only index what they believe is in their common ground (Clark, 1996:96).[9]

There are roughly two types of shared bases: knowledge about general cultural communities, which leads to communal common ground and knowledge about personal experience, leading to personal common ground (Clark, 1996:100). Communal common ground encompasses the characteristics (or ideas) people attribute to being part of a particular cultural group and the knowledge or expertise that comes with that membership. Examples of cultural communities that may serve as a base for communal common ground are having a shared nationality, education, or religion or living in the same area or being of similar age (Clark, 1996:100). Personal common ground refers to shared personal experiences and activities, like previous conversations or the immediate surroundings (Clark, 1996:112ff).

In conversation, people keep track of their common ground as it develops over the course of their interaction. They subsequently use the knowledge they believe is shared to design their utterance, make inferences, and arrive at interpretations (Enfield, 2006:405).[10] For example, when you learn your co-participant is an avid football fan - as are you - you will assume that certain

more individuals to focus on the same object while simultaneously attending to the attention of the other". Especially the latter part of the definition has a central place in this thesis. Participants not only jointly focus on a certain object, they coordinate or negotiate their stance towards that object, and thus to each other. Stancetaking is thus a central aspect of intersubjectivity. This will be further discussed in chapter 3). Intersubjectivity is also found in cognitive (linguistic) approaches to language and interaction, which are not included in the current study (for a cognitive approach, see e.g. Verhagen, 2007; Zlatev et al., 2009.

[9] In this thesis I will follow Clark's (1996) definition of common ground, specifically his understanding of Common Ground as being built from a shared basis (CG-shared). The other two representations he lists, CG-reflexive and CG-iterated, are not discussed here. See Clark (1996:95-100) for a full discussion of the differences between these three representations of common ground. See Tomasello (2008:78-79) for an alternative, but similar, typology of common ground.

[10] To what extent people consciously or explicitly update their common ground is a point

knowledge about the upcoming game, important players or competitions is shared between the two of you and thus does not need introduction or explaining. Aside from shared knowledge and experience that is stored in the (personal) common ground, cultural norms and practices are also part of speakers' (communal) common ground. Participants will use both these sources of assumed shared knowledge to ascribe intentions to interactional moves. This allows them to interpret the goal of an utterance even if the intention is not literally encoded in the message (Levinson, 1995:240).

The most economical way in terms of processing, is to assume the correct interpretation of a particular interactional move is the most likely interpretation. What this most likely interpretation is has to be shared among participants: they have to agree in advance (although not explicitly) that a certain move normally carries a particular intention (Levinson, 1995:241). This default ascription of intention is presumed by the both of them to apply to both of them. A speaker thus recognizes the utterance will likely be interpreted to carry a particular intention and knows to actively make an effort to redirect their partner's interpretation if the utterance was meant to convey something else.

Common ground and overt communication are thought to be complementary: the more knowledge is shared between interactants, the less needs to be overtly expressed (Tomasello, 2008:79). Because common ground allows for inferences about intentions and interpretation, a bigger common ground makes it easier to attribute intentions without needing an explicit message doing so (Enfield, 2006:401-402). Yet, even though a particular piece of information is readily available to both participants, this does not keep people from relaying that piece of information. People oftentimes do state the obvious or repeat what was already said - even if it was just uttered one or a couple of turns before. Establishing or coordinating shared (referential) knowledge or understanding is not necessary at that point, suggesting the purpose of such contributions must lie elsewhere. Participants will always assume such redundant utterances *do* carry meaning and purpose; otherwise, they would not have been uttered. It is the interlocutor's job to determine what that purpose is.

2.2.2 Cooperation

Interactants are generally considered rational individuals that normally try to communicate as efficiently as possible. A seemingly inefficient or redundant utterance must contribute something to the ongoing interaction and there must be a reason for the speaker to use that particular form. Cooperative interaction is marked by the idea that people want to understand each other and will

of ongoing debate. Clark (1996:153) argues people have to coordinate closely to establish a piece of information as common and thus add it to their common ground. For the opposite perspective see e.g. Pickering and Garrod (2004, 2006) and Wachsmuth, de Ruiter, Jaecks, and Kopp (2013), who argue that mental representations are automatically updated and - due to similar input from the environment - aligned accordingly. The importance of updating common ground in relation to alignment will be explored in chapter 3.

work together to make that happen. The speaker wants the hearer to understand what the speaker wants or knows and the hearer wants to understand what the speaker (wants the hearer to understand what the speaker) wants or knows. They jointly make an effort to reach this shared goal. As Levinson (1995:253) stresses "it is [our] cooperative intersubjective background that makes language interpretation possible". Apart from the actual interactional behavior (the utterance), they will make use of their common ground, and the associated defaults of intention ascription, to come to an interpretation of a particular act. Guiding this effort of reaching a shared understanding - that is ascribing the intention the speaker indeed aimed to communicate - is Grice's (1975) cooperative principle:[11]

> "Make your conversational contribution as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of talk exchange in which you are engaged". (Grice, 1975:45)

He assumes participants will normally follow this general rule of thumb and its associated maxims that guide rational language use.[12] It allows participants to make assumptions about each other's behavior and interpret a particular interactional move as intended. If the maxims are or appear to be violated, the speaker must have intended to include an implicit message for the hearer to infer: a conversational implicature. Note that this is in line with the default presumption of intention; both speakers will assume a particular interpretation to arise from a certain expression, unless it is made clear something else is going on.

Cooperation more generally thus refers to the effort participants make to calibrate their mutual understanding in interaction. This includes their beliefs about what is and is not shared between them and how to resolve possible discrepancies in their knowledge or expectations. Ultimately, intention ascription is the central aim of their cooperative work. Both speakers benefit from a shared understanding of a particular act, since it will most likely lead to a smooth continuation of their interaction (cf. 1.1).

[11] This description of rational, efficient, and cooperative interaction has been deemed too narrowly focused on the Anglo-Saxon world, most notably by Clyne (1994) who reformulated the cooperative principle and its maxims to include reference to cultural appropriateness. The original cooperative principle likely was indeed formulated with English in mind. Still, it does leave room to include other cultural or communal norms that influence interaction. Specifically the phrase *as is required* allows for a shift in interpretation regarding what is at that stage of conversation appropriate or expected and to best design the utterance. Although Clyne is right to draw attention to the existing cultural differences in what is considered "required", I would argue it is more fruitful to incorporate that insight in the standing definition.

[12] The Cooperative Principle (CP) is accompanied by four conversational maxims (Grice, 1975:45-46): (i) the maxim of quality - try to make your contribution one that is true, (ii) the maxim of quantity - make your contribution as informative as required, (iii) the maxim of relation - make your contribution one that is relevant, and (iv) the maxim of manner - make your contribution one that is clear. These maxims are all aimed at capturing rational language use and guiding interpretation. They are not rules, speakers may not follow them, but Grice assumes that the CP and the maxims are in principal observed by speakers.

Clark (1996:3) similarly explains the importance of cooperation in interaction and language use as a joint action. To successfully communicate a message and reach understanding participants have to coordinate their behavior. People coordinate their individual efforts when they have common interests or goals that are dependent on coordination to be met (Clark, 1996:62). Language use - and especially its interpretation - is undeniably dependent on such collaborative behavior. Importantly, it is not the sum of the individual activities the speaker and hearer perform that make language use a joint action. This coordination of both content and processes makes it a joint action (Clark, 1996:59). In other words, language is a joint action because participants have a shared orientation towards mutual cooperation and coordination throughout the interaction - as visible in the interconnectedness of participants' interactional moves.

2.2.3 Coordination

Social roles are typically dyadic: parent-child, boss-employee, student-professor. Consequently, social interaction is mapped accordingly. Knowing who carries which role in a particular social encounter helps interactants predict the behavior of their interlocutors thus facilitating their interaction (Goody, 1995b:14). Usually, participants start their actual interaction with a greeting, for example "Hi", followed by (in English) a "how-are-you sequence" (Schegloff, 2007:23), before introducing the reason for their initiation of contact.

Most work on the structural organization of social negotiation has focused on such transitional phases of interaction. It is in these phases that the boundaries between interaction and non-interaction are crossed, which makes them excellent candidates to suspect behavior that is focused on managing interpersonal relationships. A substantial part of the exchanges in these phases are conventionalized, they are what Coulmas (1981) calls conversational routines. It is not just the phrases that are used, like "Good morning" or "How are you today", that are conventionalized, the entire sequence of acts that opens up or closes down a conversation is highly predictable.

When transitioning into interaction one party first has to get another to direct their attention toward them, this is what Schegloff (1968:1080) calls the summons-answer sequence.[13] In this part of the interaction, participants coordinate their availability and roles: who is the (overall) speaker, the one with the question/request/story and who acts primarily as hearer (Schegloff, 1968:1093). This establishment of role structure is an important function of phatic communication (Laver, 1975:219).

These transitional phases of interaction are important in terms of establishing and disengaging from a joint activity. As explained above, people do not simply start or end a conversation by themselves, they have to coordinate with

[13]Schegloff (1968) mostly discusses telephone conversations, but explicitly notes that the initiating act and a (positive) response by two different parties are necessary and present in the first phase of all kinds of talk.

their interlocutor and jointly decide and establish the changed state of our activity. Joint activities, like having a conversation, are built from joint actions, such as utterances and their uptake or understanding (Clark, 2006:129). To bring these actions, and ultimately the joint activity, to a good end, participants have to establish joint commitment. A joint commitment is the combination of the individual commitments of the interlocutors to a particular joint action (Clark, 2006:130).

Each pair of acts forms a joint action and negotiates or confirms the commitment either participant has to both the singular action and the joint activity as a whole. When a first speaker initiates contact by saying something like "Good morning"this suggests the willingness to interact with the other. If the second speaker responds with a "Good morning to you too" they both commit themselves to that willingness to interact. At this point both parties have committed themselves to participating in interaction and have thus established joint commitment. People negotiate joint commitment in projective pairs: an initiating act or proposal and its uptake (Clark, 2006:132).[14] They jointly brought the projective pair (greeting1-greeting2) to a successful end; the joint action is complete and the first step in their joint activity of having a conversation is taken. Of course there is a possibility the interaction does not extend past the exchange of greetings. This does not change the fact that the two participants both - and jointly - committed to the cause of successfully completing the proposed pair. Whether or not they continue their conversation, a joint commitment was reached. Given that this first exchange of utterances resulted in a joint commitment, participants will more easily assume or try to reach similar results in the future. Their joint commitment to enter interaction compels them to build on that commitment and reach similar results in future exchanges.

As Schegloff and Sacks (1973) first showed, the final part of a conversation is structurally organized into particular acts that are completed in a particular order as well. Commonly, the end of the conversation is marked by a closing initiation (indicating the topic has concluded and it is time to move on to ending the conversation), a terminal exchange (whereby the participants agree on closing the conversation), and a proper closing (to mark the end, a phrase like "Goodbye"). Additional components that can be found in the closing section include arranging the next point of contact, summarizing the main points of conversation, or reaffirming an appointment or arrangement that has been dis-

[14]This use of projective pairs closely resembles the idea of adjacency pairs as the basic unit in conversation as operated in conversation analysis: two turns that are adjacent to each other. The first pair part consists of the speaker doing some type of act: greeting, questioning, offering, requesting, etc. To each first pair part (the initiating turn) there are a number of "type-connected" second pair parts. The interlocutor that is about to perform the second pair part, then, selects a second pair part that is relevant to the type that was projected in the first pair part (Sacks, 1987[1973]:55-56; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). The difference is that Schegloff and Sacks focus on talk-in-interaction, whereas Clark (1996) intends his notion of projective pairs to be applicable to all kinds of coordinating (and joint) actions, both communicative and non-communicative.

cussed (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973:317). All these elements are potentially, if not explicitly, targeting the relationship between the interlocutors: they help establish that this instance of contact is positively evaluated and the participants will continue their relation later - or at least are open to that possibility. This closing sequence is indeed restricted to the margin of interaction: the transition from interaction to non-interaction or the ending of "a state of talk" (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973:324).

The process of ending a conversation shows how uncommon it is for participants to take unilateral decisions once they are involved in a joint activity (cf. Goffman, 1957). Breaking their commitment, extricating one from the joint activity, is difficult precisely because there have been so many separate commitments over the course of the activity that it is against expectation to suddenly stop with the joint activity and switch back to singular decision making. The commitment they have established between the two of them affects their interpersonal relationship. To continue on the right foot, they have to ensure their relation is still strong even following the conclusion of their current interaction.

When participants do end up having a longer conversation, they will build one joint action - pair of utterances - on top of the other. Each completed pair negotiates and preferably leads to joint commitment. Over the course of their conversation the participants stack one joint commitment on top of the other, while persisting to be committed to each and every one of them (Clark, 2006:138-139). They thus continuously reinforce their joint commitment to the overall joint activity. These continuous reinforcements do not all take place in the margins of interactions. On the contrary, each time a projected pair is completed, the participants are said to have consolidated their joint commitment.

When an initiating act (e.g. a request) strongly compels another participant to respond with a particular type of act (e.g. an acceptance), the relevance between the two acts and the participants' commitment to the combined act is clear. However, not all first acts are as commanding when it comes to the presentation of uptake. A reaction to a telling of someone's personal experience, for example, may be expected, but they are hardly required for the act of storytelling to be completed.[15] These contributions do establish ongoing joint commitment to the conversation. Such display of involvement is presumably more or less appreciated (and expected) depending on the cultural norms that

[15]Heritage (2011:160) notes that speakers have a moral obligation to respond to such tellings, more specifically to support the stance taken by the first speaker: "[...] when persons report first-hand experiences of any great intensity (involving, for example, pleasure, pain, joy or sorrow), they obligate others to join with them in their evaluation, to affirm the nature of the experience and its meaning, and to affiliate with the stance of the experiencer toward them. These obligations are moral obligations that, if fulfilled, will create moments of empathic communion". However, he does not explain how it is these experiencers oblige the other participant(s) to affirm their affiliation, or when an experience qualifies to hold "great intensity". His discussion of the resources that people have at their disposal to affiliate with the stance presented by the first speaker (i.e. the experiencer), will prove useful in the discussion of stancetaking and alignment in chapter 3.

participants orient towards.

Phatic efforts of communication seem to serve two broad tasks (1) establishing and consolidating interpersonal relationships and (2) crossing the boundaries between interaction and non-interaction (Laver, 1975:232). While the second major function is clearly most easily recognized in the literal margins of interaction, consolidating an interpersonal relationship is not necessarily restricted to the opening or closing of a conversation. Behavior that is aimed at strengthening or enhancing rapport might be even more likely to turn up when the interaction is well on its way in order to update the common ground and reinforcing participants' joint commitment to the conversation and each other. The question then is what phatic language use would look like outside of the margins of interaction.

2.3 Collaboration and anticipation

Language is not something designed for the individual, but rather for the interpersonal.[16] As Dor, Knight, and Lewis (2014:2-3) state, "it's a system for publicly expressing our thoughts to help others imaginatively reconstruct them". This ties back to the idea that using language is a collaborative effort. The most natural use of language is found in spoken informal conversation (Enfield, 2013:11; Levinson, 2006b:61; Goody, 1995b:12). In this type of interaction, the level of institutionalization is very limited and people are thus mostly reliant on their instinctive interactional skills. Part of that instinct is to use their knowledge of common ground and their beliefs about how interaction typically unfolds to reach a shared interpretation and understanding. As noted in the previous section, participants are invested in their joint commitment to the interaction. Their mutual affiliation to the topic of talk and their resulting (positive) interpersonal alignment is not only a marginal concern, but in fact an ongoing matter of attention.

Interactional moves hardly ever appear in a vacuum, there usually is a context in which they occur. An utterance is tightly linked to the situation in which it is uttered, in the sense that the speaker decides in that moment, in that situation, that some thought or action has to be expressed or performed at that point in the interaction. As discussed in 2.2, people assume and negotiate their common ground. At any given point in interaction they have a sense of what they all know. Even intuitively, it would make little sense to assume people would ignore what has been said before and block the knowledge they already have on a particular story or topic. Indeed, in most interactions, the

[16]Earlier studies of linguistic structure focused on the organization of linguistic elements in the larger structure of a sentence (e.g. Chomsky, 1957). This so-called Chomskyan view upholds that language is an innate ability of the human species. Language is encoded in our genes and should therefore be studied in isolation, language itself the research object, if we want to understand how this process or ability works. The central question in this line of work is not so much what we do with language, but *how* we are able to use language; how the system works.

shared knowledge that is available is used and addressed to anticipate the next course of action.[17] The current speaker designs his utterance in such a way that the targeted hearer most likely will arrive at the intended interpretation. This audience design is informed by the cooperative struggle interactants find themselves in to maintain common referential understanding. To establish mutual understanding, they calibrate their common ground and mutual relation at every step of their interaction (Enfield, 2006:411).

Interlocutors thus closely monitor the unfolding of talk in interaction, among other things to decide when they can take over the turn at talk. Participants recognize when a turn constructional unit is almost completed, at which point they can potentially take over the turn. A turn constructional unit is understood as an intonationally, syntactically, and pragmatically completed unit. This could be a sentence, a clause, or a phrase of any length that is recognizable as having completed a relevant act at that point (Sacks et al., 1974:720-723; Schegloff, 2007:3-4). Participants do not await the current speaker to finish to then only start after a pause (ensuring the speaker was in fact done talking), they use their knowledge of the intonation, grammar, and relevance of the act in context to predict the projected completion. They anticipate the moment they can take turn, thus limiting the overlap and silence in between turns to a minimum.[18] Turn-taking thus requires collaboration and anticipation on all participants' parts. The current speaker knows the other participants will recognize a turn constructional unit to be almost completed and thus anticipates passing on the turn or make an effort to keep the floor. Next speakers anticipate the projected completion and recognize efforts to postpone such moments. This all contributes to the experience of a smooth interaction.

One interactional environment that sees explicit calibration of their mutual position is in the use of prefaces to the main interactional act. Such prefaces increase the likelihood of a preferred outcome and thus preemptively assure the participants that they both know what to expect. Instead of immediately extending an invitation or making a request, participants are shown to start with a preliminary act (Schegloff, 1980) to probe the other's interest or availability to accept the main act. In this way, speakers coordinate their current positions before deciding to perform the main act. This is closely connected to the preference for a proposed project (the invitation or request) to be met with an affirmative response as we will see in the remainder of this section.

Prefacing interactional moves

Acts or moves performed in interaction are often foreshadowed by some other type of interaction unit (Schegloff, 1980; Streeck, 1995). For example, a motion

[17] See e.g. Goody (1995b) on anticipatory interactive planning and Schegloff (2007) on the sequential organization of interaction.

[18] This has universally proven to be the optimal configuration of turns to interlocutors. See e.g. Sacks et al. (1974) for a detailed account of the organization of turn-taking and Stivers et al. (2009) for a cross-linguistic comparison of the organizational structures of turn-taking.

or change in posture often indicates something is coming up. A social act (or main speech act) in interaction is mostly not singular, but marks the end point of a trajectory that started with the first indication that the speaker is going to (start to) make a move (Streeck, 1995:106). Schegloff (1980) introduced the term "action projection" to refer to this phenomenon. Preliminary moves do not announce which act will be performed, but project possible courses of action giving the interlocutor some idea as to what will come next. One interactional practice that is used to help hearers anticipate future actions is that of prefaces.

While gestures or postural shifts are useful cues to anticipate a change in the interaction, verbal moves are often prefaced by other verbal moves as well. The common practice (at least in English) to preface a question with "Can I ask you something?"[19] or "Are you hungry?" are a case in point. The expression is itself a question, but does not hold the information the speaker is presumably after. It is unlikely the end goal of these questions actually is to find out whether or not the co-participant is open to answering a question or is feeling hungry. Instead, the answers to these question are an incentive to (not) further pursue the main act of asking someone to join for dinner. These preliminary questions thus prepare the other participant for the upcoming act and increase the likelihood of the first speaker receiving an adequate or preferred answer.

As such, prefacing interactional units play a key role in the negotiation and collaboration that is needed to successfully (and jointly!) solve a communication problem. In short "[they] are at the very heart of social collaboration in talk and interaction" (Streeck, 1995:87). Note that the scholars cited here all imply that people *actively* make an effort to maintain the level of social solidarity. They may not explicitly negotiate social roles or attitudes (as with greeting or leave-taking), but people do tend to the established roles and attitudes. The constant update of common ground, keeping track of what is and is not shared and trying to anticipate or hint at what is coming ensures the best possible outcome - both on an informational and relational level. Essential to this way of interacting is the cooperative nature of the human species.

Preference

Preliminaries not only present possible outcomes to the hearer, they increase the likelihood of the actual request or invitation being met with a preferred response. Generally speaking, a preferred move is the type of response that is in congruence with the projected reality (Schegloff, 1988, 2007). For example, when the first speaker requests the hearer to do the dishes this is an attempt to get the other participant to do something. The first speaker's projected or desired reality is that the hearer cleans the dirty dishes. The request is successful when the other participant indeed takes up the requested task. This would be

[19]This would in fact be called a pre-preliminary act, because it only forewarns a certain act being performed but does not allude to the content of the ensuing question. See Schegloff (1980, 2007) for a full discussion of both preliminary and pre-preliminary acts.

the preferred response. In this action-based sense of preference, the completion of the action is preferred, the decline or rejection of an action is dispreferred.

Preferred responses are usually performed immediately, structurally simple, and convey the message clearly and unambiguously. Dispreferred responses, on the other hand, are often prefaced, delayed and weakened (Pomerantz, 1984:65). Levinson (1983:307) relates this notion of preference to the linguistic concept of markedness: preferred responses are unmarked, simple forms; dispreferred responses are marked by structural complexity.[20] Speakers design their utterance to be met with a preferred response. That is, they anticipate the likelihood of the proposed project actually being met with approval or acceptance and formulate their utterance accordingly. Compare examples (1) and (2).

(1) *Preference*
Anna Are you joining us for dinner tonight?
Esther (a) Of course!
(b) Well, actually, it's kind of busy at work at the moment, I'm not sure what time I will be able to leave...

(2) *Preference*
Anna You're not joining us for dinner tonight?
Esther (a) No, I can't.
(b) Well, actually, I have tonight off; I'd love to join you.

In both (1) and (2) the projected outcome is for Esther to join Anna and her co-workers for dinner. From an action-based perspective, the preferred response would thus be an acceptance of the invitation to come along (1a and 2b). From a design-based perspective, on the other hand, the preferred response is the one in line with the anticipated outcome (1a and 2a). This latter perspective is less concerned with the successful completion of a proposed project, but rather concentrates on the congruence between the anticipated and actual response in terms of design. The focus is on the structural markers, not so much on the content of the utterances or turns. Preference in this sense is not so much related to the personal liking or the participants' psychological states. It is concerned with certain observable regularities in the conversation that are in line with the projected completion (a preferred) or counter to the expected completion (a dispreferred). The asymmetry in preference for both a certain *type* of response and the *design* of that response underlines the bias for cooperation (Levinson, 2006b:48).

Being able to recognize (and anticipate) actions and respond to them in a preferred manner (both action-based and design-based) is an important aspect of constituting a smooth, natural conversation. On the one hand, this means

[20]Participants may construct their turn to look like a dispreferred response by implementing hedges, delays or reluctance markers, while their turn is in fact preferred based on the content. Or, the other way around, one could very quickly and very directly utter a dispreferred response, making it look like a preferred one in the sense that there are no dispreference markers. As Schegloff puts it (1988), they present the response "as a preferred" or "as a dispreferred", rather than "doing the preferred or dispreferred response".

participants are able to correctly ascribe a particular intention to an act and act accordingly. In other words, they recognize a particular utterance carries an invitation and they know the preferred outcome is for them to accept that invitation. On the other hand, it means participants recognize the projected outcome that is captured in the initiating act and know part of their expected behavior is to respond in line with that projection. Furthermore, they know how to manipulate their response in such a way that it converges or diverges from the first act and what affect that will have on the further development of the conversation. All these steps taken by the responding party are known to the initiating party as well, and are presumably used to both their advantage.

This coordination of interpretation and subsequent actions is a strong indication of a joint commitment to the ongoing interaction. It also suggests participants are indeed using their common ground (including prior contact) to predict as best they can how the other will respond. In formulating an initiating act, the speaker has to think *as* the other participant, anticipating the likely outcome based on the (contextual) information available about that participant. Both the speaker's stance towards the object (the proposed act) and the presumed stance taken by the hearer have to be taken into account to make an accurate assessment of their joint position. Before actually proposing the act, the speaker predicts both their presumed positions to increase the likelihood of success. The connection between preference and social solidarity is explained by Heritage (1984):

> "[...] preferred format actions are normally affiliative in character while dispreferred format actions are disaffiliative. Similarly, while preferred format accounts are generally supportive of social solidarity, dispreferred format actions are destructive of it".
>
> (Heritage, 1984:269)

Responses that are in line with the expected outcome will strengthen the social bond between interlocutors. This is related to their (assumed) interpersonal positioning, which is indeed proven by the correct prediction and subsequent completion of a particular act. They are thus shown to be similar, to share a strong common ground. Dispreferred response, on the other hand, will lead to a feeling of separation, since the continuation of the interaction will not develop as imagined. Of course mutual (dis)affiliation does not depend on a single turn exchange, but the notion of preference is thus associated with how speakers manage their mutual relations and how intersubjective understanding is achieved (Boyle, 2000:548).

The discussion about preference and prefaces above mostly dealt with directives and their projected responses. This is indeed where such practices are often found. As explained in sections 1.1 and 2.1, these responses are not analyzed further in this thesis. While they evidently contribute to interpersonal affiliation and alignment, they are also required contributions in terms of project completion. Their primary goal (or function if you will) is to complete

the project that was set up by the first speaker. This is mostly done in a way to ensure positive social relations, but it is not what they are primarily concerned with. They first and foremost present the information that was targeted by the first speaker (e.g. an answer, acceptance of an invitation, rejection of a request). As such, they are not considered phatic contributions for the purposes of this thesis, even if they do carry a phatic function.

2.4 Universals of interaction

As discussed in paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.3 the negotiation and establishment of common ground and joint goals and commitment are central to successful interaction. The ability to cooperate, coordinate and collaborate with others is believed to be specific to humans.[21] Crucially, these skills do not depend on language, but are (normally) available to all socialized people (see e.g. Levinson, 1995, 2006a,b; Schegloff, 2006; Sidnell, 2007, 2014; Sidnell and Enfield, 2012; Enfield and Sidnell, 2014). All people know, almost instinctively, how to interact with others. They have the ability to think about others' knowledge and situations and are thus able to predict and anticipate certain behavior. This allows them to coordinate their communicative efforts in order to construct and maintain interaction. It also allows them to constitute and prolong a social relationship.

Even if these abilities are not based in language, the use of these skills is evident in structures of language use. Traditionally, the structural organization of interaction is the site of conversation analytic research. As Drew (1990:31) points out, conversation analysis is concerned with "identifying the transindividual, transcontextual, generic properties, patterns and devices associated with how speakers design their contributions". These patterns are normative in character and help speakers achieve mutual understanding and coherence in interaction (Drew, 1990:29-31). They are "conventional reference points" that speakers use to interpret and understand one another's behavior (Bilmes, 1988:162).

The organizational structures that have thus far received most attention include turn-taking, sequentiality and repair organization (Schegloff, 2006:71ff).[22] Earlier findings on interactional organization were mostly based on English data. More recently, the cross-cultural validity of these organizational structures has been established (Sidnell, 2009). Universals of interaction have so far been found in the use and organization of repair (Dingemanse et al., 2014),

[21] Note that Suchak et al. (2016) disagree with this statement. They observed how chimpanzees solved problems that required a joint effort, proving they are able to collaborate as well. They conclude that "the roots of human cooperation are shared with other primates" (2016:21025). See also Bullinger et al. (2011), Melis et al. (2016), and Schmelz and Call (2015).

[22] For the original work on turn-taking see e.g. Sacks et al. (1974); Schegloff (2000), on sequentiality e.g. Schegloff (1968); Schegloff and Sacks (1973); Schegloff (2007), on repair e.g. Schegloff et al. (1977).

turn-taking (Stivers and Robinson, 2006), and pointing (Sidnell and Enfield, 2017).

Interactional organization

It is not uncommon for one communicative act to be conveyed by different types of signals, for example gestures accompanying speech (Levinson, 2006a:88). Universally, people are able to simultaneously produce and recognize different types of signals belonging to the same message (Deppermann, 2013).[23] This suggests there is indeed a special human cognition for interaction that guides our interactional behavior and understanding.[24] Other interactional patterns that might prove to be universal include (i) a preference for progressivity in interaction, (ii) recipient design, (iii) minimization, for example in turn-taking, but also in using reference terms when the referent is known to either party, and (iv) "nextness", referring to the default assumption that some act relates to the one just prior to it (Schegloff, 2006).

Taking turn-taking as an example, all languages share a preference for the transition from one speaker to the next to be as smooth as possible. The silence between turns is to be minimized and overlap is to be avoided (Stivers et al., 2009:10589). Furthermore, responses that present an answer are produced faster than non-answers and confirming answers faster than disconfirming ones (Stivers et al., 2009:10588). The pattern that preferred actions are performed without delay (see section 2.3) is indeed confirmed cross-linguistically. Although the general turn-taking system is found to be universal, there is some cultural variability in what constitutes the "ideal" middle ground between minimization of overlap and silence. Stivers et al. (2009:10590) suggest this is related to the specific conversational rhythm each language is used to.

By themselves, such universal patterns of interactional organization cannot explain why people interact the way they do. These structures only work if interlocutors assume them to be in effect. Therefore, while they form a great reference point to make inferences about someone's behavior, those inferences have to be based on some other interactional ability. Levinson (1995) argues for a separate interactional intelligence and even an interactional bias in human thinking:

> "Language didn't make interactional intelligence possible, it is interactional intelligence that made language possible as a means of communication". (Levinson, 1995:232)

This interactional intelligence allows people to infer meaning and intention, to cooperate and coordinate with each other in interaction. The universal - because species specific - ability to think recursively about other's knowledge and

[23] See the papers in the 2013 special issue of Journal of Pragmatics on multimodality and conversation analysis (vol. 46) for language specific descriptions.

[24] See e.g. the chapters in Enfield and Levinson (2006a) for discussions of different perspectives on the relationship between interaction and cognition.

intentions combined with the observational patterns of interaction mentioned above suggests there is a set of abilities specifically designed for human interaction (Enfield and Sidnell, 2014:93; Goffman, 1983:5). Levinson (2006b:54) proposes "a human interaction engine" to explain the structure of everyday human interaction. In this view, the interactional patterns of turn-taking, sequencing and repair are but one ingredient to successful human interaction.

Human interaction engine

People have a set of heuristics[25] to guide their reasoning process in interaction: based on the type of utterance they encounter they look for the stereotypical interpretation (assuming Gricean intention and the cooperation principle), unless it is somehow marked in the utterance they should take a different approach (Levinson, 1995:233-234). Another set of heuristics is based on sequential expectations that responses are normally tied to what came before (Levinson, 1995:234). Given that people look for relations between turns, it is possible to convey a lot of information with a very limited utterance. To explain how they are able to infer so much from so little explicit input we need a set of core abilities that guide our behavior in interaction. Together these abilities form the human interaction engine.

Central to thinking for communication is the search for mutual salience (Levinson, 1995:246). People coordinate their efforts to find the most likely interpretation of some interactional move. The interpretation that is accessible and likely to either participant, i.e. has features to it that are salient to both participants, makes for a good candidate. This ability to recognize mutual salience at any point in interaction, based in our beliefs about our common ground, is crucial to make interaction work (Levinson, 2006a:51, 54). It allows for coordination without participants having to explicitly communicate they both are in fact aware of some particular piece of knowledge or element in their surroundings.

Related to this reflexive thinking is a second essential ingredient for successful interaction: intention attribution and recovery (Levinson, 2006b:48-49). The ability to infer meaning and goals from observed behavior plays an important role in communication. The assumption that others will try to attribute some intention to a particular behavior and that we are usually able to so, allows for indirect (or less) direct messages. The attribution of intention assumes people have Gricean intentions and are able to recognize them in others (Levinson, 2006b:49-50); the third central element of an interaction engine. People *want* their intention to be recognized, they want others to interpret their behavior or act and infer meaning from it.

These three abilities - recognizing mutual salience, intention attribution and

[25]Enfield (2013) aptly explains what is meant by heuristics: "rational principles of interpretation that may be generically applied in attributing meaning to tokens of communicative behavior. More generally, a heuristic is an interpretive strategy that applies an easy rule of thumb in order to simplify what might otherwise be a complex decision-making process".

recovery, and Gricean intentions - depend on the presumption that people cooperate (Levinson, 2006b:50, 54). It is only possible to infer meaning, recognize intention or determine mutual salience if the other person is assumed to reason and act similar to you. All participants expect some general rules of interaction to be observed, and all participants are expected to observe those rules. Patterns in the way they structure their contributions to interaction present evidence that these elements of reflexivity are indeed in effect. The final ingredient of an interaction engine is thus a set of practices that are observable in interaction (Levinson, 2006b:54). This includes the universal patterns of interaction, such as the turn-taking system, but also the more language specific communicative routines like greeting and leave-taking (Levinson, 2006a:87).

The abilities or skills to participate in interaction are the basis of all human interaction. But by no means do they suggest cultural uniformity, rather they are "the building blocks for cultural diversity in social interaction" (Levinson, 2006b:62). Considering all acts and their (mutual) understanding form a joint action and thus negotiate joint commitment, Clark (2006:126) suggests that the guiding force behind these general principles of human interaction are joint commitments. It was explained in section 2.2.3 that the joint commitment to a single act projects an expectation of such commitment to future acts, thus creating a buildup of joint commitments. The relationship that is constructed through this collection of acts is (or becomes) a concern it itself. People do not unilaterally leave interactional situations, nor do they suddenly change the direction of the talk. They know they have to *jointly* commit to a certain act and are thus committed to keep the other person involved just as much as they are (compare Goffman's normativity of involvement as discussed in chapter 1). They thus have to actively pay attention to their mutual and joint commitment in interaction, managing their interpersonal relationship.

2.5 Interpersonal relations - a matter of politeness?

Knowing how to appropriately participate in interaction is traditionally associated with the study of politeness. Even though this thesis is not primarily focused on politeness, there is no denying that the type of work interactants do to keep their interaction going smoothly is a principle subject in politeness research. This section will give a brief, albeit necessarily incomplete, overview of insights gained from the ongoing investigation of politeness as relevant to the current study. Assuming a pleasant, smooth, conversation, participants will try to find a balance between being informative and avoid threatening, insulting or offending their conversational partner(s). This balance and specifically the effort people put into their use of language to reach such balance is roughly what is studied in politeness research (see e.g. Watts et al., 2005b; Kádár and Haugh, 2013; Culpeper et al., 2017 for a general overview and introduction of the field.)

A recurring challenge with politeness (and researching it) is that it is difficult to find a clear definition of the phenomenon at hand. Most lay people have a sense of whether a particular utterance is polite or not; they are able to give a description of what they understand politeness to mean. Interestingly, though, instead of providing an actual definition of the target concept, such descriptions are often phrased negatively, listing what behavior or linguistic structure is considered *not* to be polite. Moreover, people usually do not simply identify certain linguistic expression as polite, they assess the behavior in context as being polite; there is thus a sense of evaluation involved in what is understood to be politeness.

Not only lay people have difficulties defining what politeness encompasses. Researchers working in the field of linguistic politeness do not agree on what politeness is either (Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003:146).[26] As Fraser (1990) notes:

> "[...] it might seem obvious that politeness is simply a well understood concept that pervades interaction, and that the task of those interested has been relatively straightforward. Not so. While the existence of politeness or the lack thereof is not in question, a common understanding of the concept and how to account for it is certainly problematic". (Fraser, 1990:220)

Even for scholars whose work focuses on the phenomenon called politeness, it appears difficult to define what it is exactly they are researching.[27] From the proposed definitions and approaches to politeness out there, two main characteristics of politeness can be derived i) politeness is concerned with the "something extra" people put into their speech and ii) politeness does not belong to a person or an utterance, but is established in interaction. Not the language (or linguistic item) itself determines whether an utterance is polite, the interlocutors do. As Ehlich (2005:78) points out, we should "recognize polite activity as social activity". Still, the question remains when a particular social activity is to be recognized as a *polite* activity.

[26] There are some key characteristics, however, that are often associated (or even equated) with politeness, including deference (e.g. Fraser and Nolen, 1981), indirectness (Blum-Kulka, 1987, 1989; House and Kasper, 1981), language use as ritual and routine (e.g. Ferguson, 1976, 1981; Coulmas, 1979, 1981), adhering to the established social norm (e.g. Fraser, 1990; Fraser and Nolen, 1981), consideration for the other (e.g. Brown and Levinson, 1987; Arndt and Janney, 1984), establishing and preserving social harmony between interlocutors in interaction (e.g. Leech, 1983, 2007; Hill et al., 1986; Haverkate, 1988a,b; see also the articles in Spencer-Oatey, 2008a). Politeness has also more broadly been described in terms of interpersonal and relational activity (e.g. Locher and Watts, 2005; Janney and Arndt, 2005; Arundale, 2006), as an attitudinal view (e.g. Culpeper, 2012; Haugh, 2007a), as a conversational implicature (e.g. Haugh, 2007b, 2014; Terkourafi, 2005, 2011), or as behavior in excess of what is to be expected given the situation (e.g. Watts, 1989, 2003, 2005; Watts et al., 2005b).

[27] An impression further evidenced by the many publications addressing this issue (e.g. Meier, 1995; Kasper, 1990, 2005; Eelen, 2001; Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003; Held, 2005; Bousfield and Grainger, 2010; Sifianou, 2011).

Two waves of politeness research

The most widely known theory of politeness is that proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987). They approach politeness in terms of strategic orientation to participants' face: the public self-image every speaker wants for himself (Brown and Levinson, 1987:57).[28] At the heart of the theory is the Gricean presumption that conversationalists have a working assumption of the rational and efficient nature of talk. Against this assumption, polite ways of talking turn up as deviations, requiring rational explanations on the part of the hearer. The reason for the speaker's (seemingly) irrational and inefficient behavior is taken to be grounded in considerations of politeness.[29] As of yet, Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness remains influential and as Leech (2014:28) states: "it is probably still true to say that up to the present time no one as produced a better one".[30]

While earlier approaches to politeness were heavily based in pragmatics and focused on the linguistic realization of politeness (Lakoff, 1973; Leech, 1983; Brown and Levinson, 1987), recent work on politeness emphasizes a stronger focus on the interactional and emergent character of politeness (Culpeper, 2012:415).[31] This postmodern or discursive turn emphasizes the relational work

[28] A number of scholars have challenged their conceptualization of face as consisting of positive and negative face wants. For example, Mao (1994), Matsumoto (1988), Ide (1989), Gu (1990), and Nwoye (1992) argue that in, respectively, Japanese, Chinese and Igbo, collective identity and one's position within a social hierarchy is more important to preserve and protect than one's individual wants. Moreover, the interpretation of face as something belonging to the individual, was criticized (e.g. De Kadt, 1998; Ogiermann, 2006) for being too rigid and not in line with Goffman's (1976) original description of face as an emergent, interactional construct. In the immediate years after the publication, a number of scholars have tried to apply Brown and Levinson's politeness theory to data from different languages, not all without problems (see e.g. Longcope (1995) on Japanese, Terkourafi (2004) on Greek, and Huls (2001) on Dutch).

[29] Many of the points raised in critique of Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness are entirely reasonable, but some seem unaware they were already identified by Brown and Levinson themselves. They argue in their introduction to the revised text (1987) that it *is* possible to integrate different kinds of linguistic details regarding social structure and message construction, since "essentially the framework of politeness is a framework of social interaction". They do recognize, however, that models that underlie Gricean pragmatics, speech act theory and Goffman's account of interaction order are not well equipped to take on the emergent character of politeness. Most notably the focus on isolated utterances - the prevalent method of analysis in speech act theory - is not able to satisfactorily explain language in interaction.

[30] This is not for lack of trying, as politeness has become a central interest of study for many scholars. Some have exposed flaws in the traditional theories (e.g. Eelen, 2001), others have designed an alternative model of politeness (most notably Leech, 1983, 2014; Terkourafi, 2001, 2005; Usami, 2006; Watts, 2003; Long, 2016), or filled a theoretical gap (e.g. Culpeper, 2011; Bousfield, 2008 with respect to impoliteness), and yet still others theorized about politeness and its challenges in pursuit of developing the field in general (e.g. Mills, 2003; Haugh, 2007b,a; Locher, 2015).

[31] The second wave of thinking about politeness was initiated by Eelen's (2001) *A Critique of Politeness Theories*. He did not present a new theory or approach, but explained what the first-wave approaches to politeness were lacking: attention for the participants' perspective. He follows Watts, Ide and Ehlich (2005[1992]) in arguing that politeness research should not

interactants employ in interaction to reach an understanding of the norms of interaction that are relevant then-and-there (Locher, 2006:262). This includes, for example, studies concerned with rapport management and sociality rights and obligations (e.g. Spencer-Oatey, 2005, 2007) that focus on the ongoing balancing act interactants are involved in to maintain their (positive) relationship.[32]

A key position held by discursive studies of politeness is that even the definition of politeness itself is subject to debate (Culpeper, 2012:409). Evaluations of particular utterances against the background of individuals' expectations in the particular context of interaction allow individuals to decide on their appropriateness or politeness (Locher and Watts, 2005:29).[33] These approaches assume there to be a constant, ongoing discursive "struggle" over what constitutes appropriate behavior and what is considered polite (Locher and Watts, 2005:29). This discursive and evaluative understanding is a central claim in postmodern approaches (Locher, 2004, 2006; Mills, 2003), and at the same time its biggest challenge.

Challenges in politeness research

The perspective that politeness is a social practice found in interaction is not contested here. However, locating and analyzing instances of that practice is a complicated endeavor when you cannot (but have to) define what you are looking for. Interactants themselves are able to determine what behavior is expected (unmarked, normal, appropriate) and what behavior may be open to an interpretation of politeness, based on their individual and shared past experiences. It is part of their common ground. However, there are no objective criteria to decide what is and is not appropriate or expected - let alone what is polite. As (Kádár and Haugh, 2013:2) explain, a consequence of this strong focus on participants as the source of understanding politeness, is that "politeness research has been left in somewhat of a theoretical limbo".

Since evaluations are by default personal, politeness is crucially dependent on the understanding of the participants involved in interaction. This understanding might differ between participants; they might not agree on what is or is not polite.[34] The problem hence remains how to talk about or analyze

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focus on linguistic forms and strategies but instead on the evaluation of politeness by the participants involved in the interaction.

[32]The traditional social-norm view and the conversational-contract view similarly draw attention to the expectations, rights and obligations that participants have in interaction (e.g. Fraser and Nolen, 1981; Fraser, 1990). There is a critical difference, however, with the social-norm view. The traditional social-norm view puts forward a prescriptivist agenda, whereas the postmodern and neo-gricean views explicitly assume a descriptive position (see Eelen, 2001; Kádár and Haugh, 2013).

[33]Compare Bourdieu's notion of habitus, defined as "the product of a particular class of objective regularities" (1990:56).

[34]An additional challenge scholars of politeness are confronted with is that the understanding of both appropriate and polite behavior held by participants is normally inaccessible. Interactants do not exchange "politeness beliefs" prior to engaging in interaction; their personal

politeness. Indeed, Mills (2011) argues that the systematic description of linguistic politeness is not a pre-evident objective, and Watts, Ide, and Ehlich (2005a) raises the question whether a theory of politeness is even possible. To counter this problematic status of politeness, it is increasingly viewed as part of a broader interpersonal orientation, moving away from the individual perspective. Politeness might in fact be so difficult to describe (and understand), precisely because the term is used to address different social phenomena and to answer different kinds of research questions (Locher, 2015).

Although the management of interpersonal relationships certainly fits the general description of politeness, this thesis is not written from a politeness perspective. Some of the observations presented in this thesis would probably have been included in a politeness-driven research (e.g. forms of redress, solidarity markers), but others would likely have been omitted (e.g. co-completion of utterances, repetition, paraphrase). A bottom up approach was used to uncover how speakers of Dutch and Indonesian, respectively, (prefer to) construct and maintain their mutual relationship. This allows for an open approach of the linguistic forms and social negotiation that takes place, without the added complexity of whether a particular choice would be considered appropriate or polite (and what either of those mean).

2.6 Effect of culture

As we saw above (in section 2.4), some organizational structures are universally found in interaction. Whereas the "default" patterns might hold cross-culturally, the specific execution is likely affected by cultural habits or beliefs. Referring back to the turn-taking system, the allocation of turns is not always a matter of choice. In court, for example, there are strict rules about who is allowed to speak at which point during the hearing. In this case, it is the "court culture", the institutionalized rules of court, which determines what is and is not allowed. The default organization of interaction is hence both flexible and robust: it allows changes in different social settings and activities while keeping the overall system intact (Schegloff, 2006:70). Similarly, in some cultures there might be norms about who has to extend the first greeting, or can produce initiating acts, thus changing the basic pattern.

Each communicative interaction involves interplay of knowledge and skills that operate at three different levels: the individual, interactional and sociocultural level (Levinson, 2006a:91). The first refers to the cognitive abilities humans possess that allows us to interact, the second refers to the observable patterns and structures in interaction, and the third refers to the cultural organization of society and the constraints that are placed on language use. Although they are interconnected, the organization of actual patterns of verbal

sense of what is (not) deemed suitable behavior remains implicit. Furthermore, speakers typically do not overtly communicate their appreciation of others' fitting behavior. Only when someone displays (extremely) inappropriate behavior will speakers likely comment on their infringement of an apparent norm (Kasper 1990:193; Watts 2003:8).

interaction at the micro-level is separated from the macro level organization of culture and social institutions (Levinson, 2005). The micro-level patterns of use can reflect certain societal or cultural norms or preferences that are (apparently) upheld by interactants, just as much as the cultural level is influenced by such language usage patterns at the interactional level. In short, to get a full picture of interactional practices within a particular group and social setting both are important to take into account.

In section 2.2.1 it was explained that people try to establish common ground. Part of that common ground are the beliefs they have (or maybe even share) about how one should behave in interaction - not so much related to the cognitive abilities, but to the cultural peculiarities of each group of people and their expectations in interaction. How loud are you supposed to talk? What routines or rituals have to be performed before or during conversation? The cultural level of interaction is thus actively made part of the decision made at the interactional level, that is in the actual interaction itself.

Like language, culture is essentially a social endeavor (Silverstein, 2004:621). It is not something practiced by the individual; cultural beliefs, norms, ideas and habits are shared between people. This sharedness both establishes similarity within a particular social group as separates it from other groups. Cultural backgrounds shape the way people live their lives, what they think is normal and what conventions they abide to. Whereas specific interactional roles and acts are said to be negotiated locally (Schegloff, 2006), culture is felt to be relatively stable (Zegarac, 2008:49). For the purposes of this thesis, Spencer-Oatey (2008b) proposes a useful definition of culture:

> "Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioral conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that influences (but do not determine) each member's behavior and his/her interpretations of the "meaning" of other people's behavior".
>
> (Spencer-Oatey, 2008:3)

Understanding culture as a fuzzy set of basic assumptions shared by a particular social group allows for some members of the group to be more influenced by or attached to those values than others while still sharing the same culture. Culture is manifested in regularities of belief, behavior and attitudes found in the majority of the members of the social group.[35]

An important difference between culture and the universal cognitive abilities people use in interaction (establish common ground, attribute intention and coordinate understanding, the human interaction engine) is that culture is learned. Like the interdependence between the different elements of the interaction engine, the various aspects of culture are interrelated. One aspect of

[35] All kinds of groups of people that share and display a particular set of values can be said to represent a certain culture. The term thus refers not just to national cultures, but also to so-called sub-cultures. Gender groups, generational groups, ethnic groups, professional groups etc. could all qualify as different cultural groups provided they meet the above requirements.

culture is interlinked with all other cultural beliefs (Hall, 1976:16). Culture is partially unconscious, and in its hidden form influences our way of thinking (Hall, 1976:3). As entrenched as it is in our daily lives, it is sometimes difficult to see where the influence of our culture(s) ends. Or what we qualify as being cultural. Hall (1976:12, 42ff) explains that a large part of culture is often described as "mere convention". The irony is that conventions *are* cultural entities.

All behaviors, and patterns of behavior, are learned, but because they become a habit so quickly and everyone around us acts the same way, these behavioral or interactional patterns "sink below the surface of the mind" (Hall, 1976:42). We are no longer aware we once learned them even though they are still in effect and guide our everyday interaction. The things we learn in childhood - the things that are "normal" to us - function below our level of awareness. We treat them as if they are innate, while it is in fact learned behavior (Hall, 1976:43). This is in line with Levinson (2006b) who suggests the cognitive capabilities are innate, but the detailing of the execution is reliant on situation specific - and thus culture specific - circumstances. Integrating cultural specific norms in interaction is essentially adapting the general interaction structure to fit a specialized purpose. The universals of interactional structure simply provide the default framework (Levinson, 2006b:62), cultural or societal norms and expectations provide the specifics.

Some cultural influences are more visible than others are, and some interactional patterns are more likely to be attributed to culture than others are. Whereas name taboos, social hierarchies or institutional rules may be unfamiliar, they are easily recognized and one can thus (theoretically) adapt their language use and behavior accordingly. Each of these examples is readily accepted to be a norm within that culture. However, not all cultural interactional habits are that straightforward or readily apparent to the outsider. The effect "hidden" cultural norms can have on the interactional organization is probably most strongly observed in the difference in usage and preference for direct and indirect communication. This is often associated with high and low context cultures and collectivist and individualist societies. These distinctions that are examined in more detail in the following sections.

High and low context cultures

The biggest differences in what counts as "normal", culturally speaking, are often felt to arise between so-called Eastern and Western cultures. These supposed differences between the East and the West have inspired a lot of research, especially in the area of intercultural (business) communication (e.g. Ferraro, 1997; Ismail, 2007; Ismail et al., 2009; Grainger et al., 2010; Nakane, 2006, 2007; Chen et al., 2011). This may seem to suggest there is indeed an irreconcilable gap between these two "cultural regions", but there is no proof to corroborate this. Moreover, it would go against the human cognition for interaction discussed in section 2.4. Of course cultural norms influence expectations about

how interaction unfolds, but as long as the underlying cognitive abilities are the same, the cultural specifics can be learned.

One level at which the divergence between cultures is often described is the level of involvement between members of the cultural group. Most Western cultures are said to be "highly individualized, somewhat alienated, fragmented cultures [...] in which there is relatively little involvement with people" (Hall, 1976:39). These are what Hall (1976) calls low-context cultures, typical examples being Germany, Switzerland and to a lesser extent the United States. On the other end of the scale are high-context cultures: cultures that show high levels of engagement among people and where information is widely shared; in short, cultures where people are "deeply involved with each other" (Hall, 1976:39). Cultures might have a general preference for one or the other way of organizing their social life, this is not to say they are exclusively high-context or low-context (Hall, 1976:91).

The general preferences ascribed to members of high-context and low-context cultures are presumably also applicable to their preferred style of communication. When establishing common ground, the level of context that is assumed to be shared (and relevantly known to be shared) might cause troubles in intercultural communication if participants have different expectations as to what is and is not shared between them. Interaction between a participant who is used to a higher degree of involvement and one that prefers a lower level of involvement possibly leads to conflicting wants and needs. High-context communication reportedly relies heavily on information that is "in the physical context or internalized in the person" (Hall, 1976:91). The actual verbal message is less informative in the sense that it carries little of the information that the speaker wants the hearer to understand. In low-context communication, it is the other way around: the bulk of the information is in the explicitly coded message (Hall, 1976:91). What the speaker wants the other to know is communicated verbally.

It was suggested earlier (in section 2.2.1) that common ground and overt verbal messages were complementary. When participants believed to have a strong common ground, there was less of a need to overtly encode the full extent of their message. Successful high-context communication indeed presupposes a larger or stronger common ground: with only minimal information in the verbal exchange, a complete message is transmitted. Low-context communication is more easily accessible to outsiders since the entire message is verbalized. The risk of low-context communication is that people might tell others things they already know. While this may not sound too bad, they are wasting time and might even insult their interlocutor because they (seem to) assume they do not know certain things by explicitly sharing them. Conversely, in high-context communication there is the risk of sharing too little information leading to long exchanges of repair and explanation.

There is thus a fine balance between telling people things and letting them infer the message. In maintaining that balance, a correct assessment of involvement and common ground is crucial. In low-context cultures, a low degree of

involvement is assumed, leading (or requiring) speakers to make their entire message available in language. The efficient way of communicating, then, is to make your intentions as optimally accessible to your co-interactants. On the other hand, if you have put time and effort in sustaining your social bond, you may not need all that information. In a high-context culture people assume high interpersonal involvement, making speakers rely much more on their (known to be) shared context. The efficient way of communicating is, then, to give only the essential information that is necessary for others to infer the intended message. What is considered essential or optimal - in either of these cultural types - is thus directly related to the level of involvement between interlocutors.

Collectivism and individualism

The degree of involvement with others is often associated with having a collectivist or individualist world-view. These two notions are contrasted based on the core assumption of an individual being independent from others, or mutually bound in groups (Oyserman et al., 2002:4-5). The collectivism-individualism dichotomy is mostly used to describe national cultures, following Hofstede's (1980) influential work on national differences in the workplace. This difference is not meant to suggest an absolute opposition between a focus on personal, individual freedom in individualist societies and a focus on being part of community in collectivist society. Rather, one or the other view is salient in interaction (e.g. Schwartz, 1990; Triandis, 1995). Important to note is that the characterization of a particular cultural group does not mean *all* members of that group necessarily follow a certain behavioral pattern. Needless to say, there are individualists in collectivist societies and collectivists in individualist societies (e.g. Markus and Kitayama, 1991:30). However, the overall trend in collectivist societies is to orient towards and reason from the perspective of the in-group, perceiving closeness between its members, whereas individualist cultures are more likely to perceive, and construct, separateness between social actors (Triandis, 1995:5).

A crucial element in determining the involvement between participants and their closeness or separateness is their construction of self and other. This is not necessarily something people are consciously aware of, but their understanding of themselves in relation to others is implicitly present in patterns of behavior (Kitayama and Uchida, 2005:141; Triandis, 1989). Markus and Kitayama (1991:225) emphasize that the Western notion of self as detached from context is not an adequate description for many cultures of the world. Or as Geertz' (1984) fittingly describes it:

> "The Western conception of the person as bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe - a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background - is, however

> incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures". (Geertz, 1984:126)

However self-evident it might seem to many Westerners, their sense of self as an unbounded, unique, center of action and awareness is not shared by everyone. People are in fact observed to conduct themselves with a stronger focus on their own, personal and individual goals and desires, or to take into account the motivations and wants of the group they feel related to. The first is (amongst other terms) referred to as an idiocentric, independent sense of self, the second is usually described as an allocentric, interdependent or relational sense of self (e.g. Triandis, 1989, 1995; Markus and Kitayama, 1991, 2003, 2010; Kitayama and Uchida, 2005). These understandings overlap with the notions of collectivism and individualism described above. A collectivist perspective relates to a relational or interdependent construction of self; an individualist perspective is connected with an independent understanding of self. These terms are, however, not interchangeable, they normally apply to different levels of interaction. The terms collectivism and individualism are generally used to describe societies or even nations in their entirety, whereas the construction of self is relevant to the personal behavior displayed by participants.

An independent view of self emphasizes autonomy and independence (Markus and Kitayama, 1991:226). From this perspective, people are described to feel good about themselves when they conduct themselves as independent entities: being unique, asserting individual ideas, expressing opinions, goals, desires, etc. (Markus and Kitayama, 1991:242). An interdependent view foregrounds the connectedness between self and others instead of their separateness (Markus and Kitayama, 1991:227). Instead of being motivated by the own individual desires, an interdependent construction of self receives fulfillment from tasks that are associated with the relation of interdependence to others: fitting in, maintaining harmony, promoting others' goals, engaging in appropriate action, etc. (Markus and Kitayama, 1991:242).[36]

These different perceptions of self presumably affect the norms of interactional behavior participants (subconsciously) follow. Participants who see themselves (and others!) as separate, autonomous entities are thought to make more of an effort to assert their own, personal, view on a particular matter. That is what reaffirms their status as individual, autonomous entities, after all. People that attune more to others, whom they feel they are connected with,

[36] One area that is suggested to reflect a stronger concern for self or other is the expression of emotions. Markus and Kitayama (1991:235-239; see also Kitayama et al., 2000) connect an independent understanding of self to emotions focused on ego, such as anger, pride, frustration, reflecting the individual's personal needs or desires, as the primary referent of the emotion. They predict such emotions to be more frequently expressed by people with independent selves. An interdependent understanding of self, on the other hand, is more closely connected to other-focused emotions, such as sympathy, shame, feelings of communion, reflecting the feelings of another person - or the relationship between persons - to be of central concern. This might be but one explanation for the cultural importance of shame in the Malay-speaking world (Lindquist, 2004; Fuller Collins and Bahar, 2000), and the reported, albeit dated, self-assured, moralizing Dutch cultural trait (Van Ginkel, 1990, 1991, 1992).

will likely pay closer attention to their desires, feelings, and views. The relation between the members of the in-group is a core consideration in their individual behavior, since it is this relation that contributes to their sense of self. The expected (or maybe even required) behavior in communities that are accustomed to these different concepts of self and others will thus likely differ as well. Behaving like an able, agentive member of the community is dependent on having necessary knowledge about the code of conduct, which in turn is (at least partly) informed by the cultural construction of self and other.

Understanding agency as the capacity to purposefully and reflectively act upon the world, both individual and relational driven decision can be considered agentive moves (Markus and Kitayama, 2003:17-18). Asserting one's own ideas or acting upon one's own desires can just as much be a purposeful and reflective act as maintaining one's position in a relational web. This leads Markus and Kitayama (2003) to propose two models of agency: a disjoint and a conjoint model. Disjoint agency refers to a focus on personal feelings, uniqueness, autonomy, and individuality. In a conjoint model of agency, the focus is on the reciprocal, interdependent, relation between self and others in a particular context. It is, then, not so much one's own interests, goals, or preferences that are centralized, but maintaining one's status or position and respecting social bonds. What is considered agentive behavior depends on whether the community favors an *in*dependent or *inter*dependent conception of self. That is, whether individuals are reliant mostly on themselves or are collectively responsible for each other.[37]

The conception of self and the associated expression of agency are one aspect of (hidden) culture that might affect how speakers show active involvement and manage interpersonal alignment. Following the general descriptions of the Dutch and Indonesian national cultures, certain tentative predictions can be made about the preferred style of communication in these countries. The Indonesian culture is generally considered collectivist, which would suggest speakers of Indonesian - or more accurately people enacting the Indonesian culture - to have a mostly interdependent or allocentric sense of self. This, in turn, would mean they view themselves and others as interrelated, as being part of a community, leading to a more conjoint form of agency. The corresponding behavior would presumably match what is called a high-context style of

[37] As Markus and Kitayama (1991:228) point out, an interdependent self is no less agentive than an independent self. An interdependent (or relational) construction of self does not imply people are not able to function on their own, or do not consider themselves responsible or in charge of their own actions. They are just not as concerned with asserting their own thoughts, ideas, or desires as people with an independent sense of self. To maintain the interpersonal relation one is part of - and that is an important aspect of the sense of self - in fact requires a high degree of agency: one needs to purposefully and reflectively act to not disturb that harmony. Not letting one's own, personal, desires, emotions, or opinions interfere with the relationship requires a lot of self-control. It may not be the understanding of "agency" that is usually encountered, it is just as much purposeful behavior as attempting to control the outside world by asserting your personal feelings about that world; see also Kitayama and Uchida (2005).

communication. The Netherlands, on the other hand, is usually classified as an individualist society, which suggests its members to have an independent or idiocentric sense of self and mostly show disjoint agency. Following the presumed separation from others, the sharing of personal thoughts and desires would require a full, verbal, expression; corresponding to a low-context communicative style. As mentioned above, these are most likely conceptions that people are not actively aware of in interaction. It is simply how they "normally" behave.[38]

2.7 Conclusion

It was explained in this chapter that interaction, or even human life in general, is normally social (Goffman, 1983:2). Our whole life is centered around relationships and the management of our place in the social network(s) we are part of. Our thinking is thus predisposed to think in terms of social interaction and relationships Enfield (2013). If the establishment and maintenance of social relations is indeed the central task of language in human communication (Goody, 1995b:4), then surely a large part of communicative activity has to be dedicated to the management of interpersonal relationships - and be recognizable as such. This phatic function of language is most easily recognized in the more routinized parts of interaction, such as greeting and leave-taking, but is in fact strongly interlinked with informational or referential language use (Enfield, 2006).

The knowledge people have about each other and their respective roles or social statuses in a particular interaction is part of their common ground. This knowledge (and the associated beliefs) is negotiated at the start of interaction and remains relevant throughout the ongoing interaction (cf. 2.2.3). Participants are jointly committed to the interaction and each other. Should there be an individual change in attitude or belief in one of the participants which could influence their cooperation, they would presumably signal this to their partner to update the common ground and increase the possibility of successfully coordinating mutual understanding (cf. Clark (1996:98ff) on the relation between coordination and common ground). Keeping the common ground updated is ultimately as much a joint action as using language is.

Assuming all human beings share cognitive abilities to attribute intention, anticipate and coordinate understanding, why would we need to mark the development of our social connection. Is that not part of our common ground? Suppose the affiliation between interactants is indeed presumed to be known to both participants and thus part of the shared base their common ground is built on, then it would be redundant to overtly mark that relationship is

[38]Keep in mind these should all be regarded as general tendencies. It is not at all suggested that *all* people who consider themselves part of a particular community *always* and *automatically* share the same view of self and agency, nor do they hold particular views at all times and in all settings. These generalizations overlook contextual particularities, but they do so on purpose. Taking a bird's eye view is the only way to hope to find larger patterns of culturally induced behavior and uncover normal and normative practices.

still intact and on track. This line of thinking fits the description of a high-context culture: a great deal of knowledge and understanding can be inferred from the common ground, making explicit reference to that shared knowledge unnecessary. It also suggest participants would need to pay close and ongoing attention to the relevant interpersonal relationships (and knowledge thereof), which would better suit an interdependent view of self. The "absence" of linguistic communication could be an indication of conjoint agency; prioritizing the existing harmony over individual opinions or needs.

On the other hand, keeping the common ground updated is an important step towards achieving mutual understanding, which in turn strengthens the relationship and makes communication as efficient as it can be. Showing your interlocutor that you share his point of view or are keeping up with his train of thought are helpful cues to establish you are on the same page. It reinforces the joint commitment and involvement in interaction. This is especially relevant case in communication between participants with an independent view of self. They would consider themselves separate from others, thus creating a greater need to construct - and sustain - ad hoc bonds based in mutual autonomy. A disjoint agency, asserting personal feelings and desires, and a low-context communication style would correspond to this conceptualization.

Marking the existing bond of solidarity between interactional partners - however minimally - reaffirms their interpersonal relationship. In what way this reaffirmation is marked, crucially depends on the (cultural) preferences upheld by members of a particular community. This study aims to explore culture or language specific preferences when it comes to managing social relationships and positioning of self and other. One area of interaction likely prone to different styles of communication is the spontaneous construction of interpersonal alignment. Taking stance and reacting to others' stancetaking allows participants to make the connection between themselves, the interlocutors and the topic of talk available to others. The experienced degree of sharedness might influence to what extent participants feel it is desired (and required) to explicate that connection. The affiliative nature of stance and its relation to alignment and phatic communication is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

Stancetaking and alignment

From the previous chapters it might seem that the language use in interaction is entirely focused on keeping others close, maintaining and tightening bonds and jointly reaching understanding. This is, however, a particularly one-sided (if not fantastical) representation of how language is used in daily life. The cooperative nature of humans does not negate the fact that people can and do disagree with one another. Establishing boundaries and social differences with interactional partners is an important part of organizing social relations as well (Enfield, 2013:7). If we fully want to understand how people use their language to manage relationships, we need to combine studies of both cooperative and competitive interactions. Yet here, the focus is on cooperation rather than competition. As explained earlier, the general structure of organizing talk in interaction has received a lot of attention, but the knowledge about specific language usage patterns is still limited (cf. Heritage, 1995).

This study aims to deepen the understanding of how people manage their interpersonal relationships during informal interactions. To that end, I will focus exclusively on how they establish and maintain constructive, positive relationships, as the preferred state that people generally orient towards. A central aspect of interpersonal relationship building is stancetaking. Presenting an evaluation or assessment of a performed act is what is often referred to as stancetaking. How stancetaking is organized and how it influences interaction is explored in section 3.1. Importantly, taking stance toward something implies taking stance toward someone (Du Bois, 2007:144; 149).

When taking position regarding some object participants align themselves with the position presented by the previous speaker. The stancetaking act itself may primarily communicate the subjective position of a particular participant

regarding a particular object of talk, as a consequence it also communicates how similar or different the co-participants are in their evaluation of that object. This can be visualized as a stance triangle, which is further discussed in section 3.2. Essentially, individual stancetaking results in interpersonal alignment, thus informing participants about their mutual relationship, and in turn helping them (better) anticipate and coordinate their behaviors. Section 3.3 explores how people establish interpersonal alignment in interaction. This section will introduce some main forms of language use that are observed to be associated with efforts of alignment and interpersonal relationship management. These general resources (support, reproduction, collaboration) are the leading themes in the analysis presented in chapters 5 to 7.

The previous chapter explained that although people universally share certain cognitive abilities to participate in interaction, cultural norms decide the community specific style of interaction. The management of interpersonal relations was argued to be one of the - if not the - central function of language use in interaction. In what way and to what extent people make their positioning and hence alignment explicitly available to one another is most likely influenced by cultural customs as well. The specific executions and preferences involved in "doing" alignment result in a particular conversational style. This point is further elaborated upon in section 3.4.

3.1 Taking stance

The general understanding of stance often involves the expression of personal attitudes, feelings, or judgments about a particular topic of talk (Biber and Finegan, 1989; Englebretson, 2007). As Kockelman (2004:144) concludes, "scholars often use the term stance marker to refer to any linguistic form that seems to imply an evaluation" (cf. Kockelman, 2004 for a review of the different uses of the term stance in the academic literature). There thus does not seem to be agreement on how stance is to be defined. Englebretson (2007:6) describes the study of stancetaking to involve several general themes:

- stance is physical, active, personal belief, social morality
- stance is public, perceivable, and interpretable
- stance is interactional
- stance is indexical
- stance is consequential

All these aspects of stancetaking have been discussed in some way or another in the previous chapter. Personal attitudes and knowledge are commonly shared in conversation. By sharing them, the speaker makes them accessible to others and at the same time indexes the position he or she has taken on the matter. Establishing and maintaining social relations is an interactional, negotiable, process. The distribution of social relations subsequently affects the possible and plausible interpretation of interactional moves. Keeping updated on what

people know or believe to be the case about something or someone thus is a vital part of interaction.

Du Bois (2007:144) argues there are three general functions of stance: evaluation, positioning, and alignment.[1] The latter function will be elaborated on in section 3.2. Stancetaking is not limited to approval, it more generally has to do with the position one takes in relation to an act (and its speaker by extension). This may involve their personal liking (often called affective stance) or their knowledge (epistemic stance). In taking stance, participants may "join" someone else's position (using *"yes"* for example) or explicitly express it is *their* subjective position (e.g. *"I know"*) on a scale of affection or knowledge (cf. Du Bois, 2007:143, 152ff). Even if they are emphatically taking subjective stance, their relative position is still perceivable and interpretable to others and thus indexes and affects to ongoing interaction.

Participants orient their stance toward a particular "object of stance" found in the utterance or act they respond to. In taking stance, they make relevant the relation between themselves (the stance subject) and the act or referent (the stance object) the speaker is orienting to (Du Bois, 2007:154). Stancetakers thus combine an object-focused act, evaluating it, and a subject-centered act, positioning themselves in relation to that object (Du Bois, 2007:158).

So far, stancetaking is presented as an individual or subjective affair. However, in interaction people are shown to orient towards the same object or act. Stancetaking is thus not only a subjective matter; it often is an intersubjective affair. Indeed, as Schegloff (1992:1299) explains, participants "do" intersubjectivity as "co-shaping an appreciated grasp of the world". Researching stance (and alignment) hence entails the study of form-meaning relations, figuring out "how stance is located in form" (Englebretson, 2007:17).

Considering participants share and build common ground and cooperate in reaching understanding, it would only make sense that they would try to jointly establish and maintain a topic of interest. Several interlocutors can - and often do - present their stance about the same thing. Because interaction is incremental (Schegloff, 1996; Kärkkäinen, 2003), they must take notice and acknowledge the stances provided before their own. Imagine Sophie, Jasper and Astrid are discussing the new Star Wars movie over dinner. Sophie is eagerly awaiting her chance to go see the movie and, knowing her friends have already been to the theater, she wants to know what they thought about it. Following her questions, both her friends want to express their disappointment. Jasper is the first to respond, meaning Astrid cannot subsequently construct her response as if she is the first to do so.

A hypothetical exchange of turns as in (1) would presumably yield at least a raised eyebrow. Astrid's exact copy of Jasper's answer is not something we normally encounter and, unless meant as a joke, a response like this would probably have others believe she is not a very competent communicator (which

[1] Compare Englebretson (2007:17) who subdivides stance into three aspects as well: evaluation ("assessment"), affect ("personal feelings"), and epistemicity ("commitment").

is not to say people do not recycle turns, but more on that in 3.3).

(1) *Star Wars 1*

Sophie	So how did you like the movie?
	Would you recommend it?
Jasper	I thought it was a waste of time, honestly
Astrid	I thought it was a waste of time, honestly

In (1) Jasper evaluates the object of stance - the movie - and reveals his subjective position to it (indicated by "I thought"). By the time Astrid presents her evaluation, she cannot ignore Jasper's response to Sophie's question. Moreover, one of the aims of her stancetaking should be aligning herself with Jasper's stance; that is, finding a way to connect her subjective judgment of the movie to that of Jasper. Astrid thus has to take into account and acknowledge the stance Jasper took before her; she has to index her stancetaking as coming second to Jasper's. In a scenario like this, Jasper is said to be the stance lead and Astrid the stance follow (Du Bois, 2007:161). This acknowledgment, and hence intersubjective indexing, can be expressed in numerous ways:

(2) *Star Wars 2*

Sophie	So how did you like the movie?
	Would you recommend it?
Jasper	I thought it was a waste of time, honestly
Astrid	(a) Yeah, I thought so too
	(b) A total waste of time
	(c) And money!
	(d) I didn't like it either

In this example, option (a) presents a positive stance towards the prior speaker's positioning, joining Jasper in his evaluation, and at the same time a negative stance towards the movie. There is still overlap between Jasper's and Astrid's responses, but here she acknowledges she is the second one to present this stance (most explicitly by adding "too"). A good amount of overlap is found in (b) as well, in which Astrid reiterates the movie was "a waste of time", but adds an intensifier ("total"), reinforcing - and thereby acknowledging - what Jasper said. In (c) it is not so much the words itself that are adopted by Astrid, but the construction Jasper used. She inserts a different noun that neatly fits Jasper's earlier turn: the movie was a waste of time/money. Again, this time by using "and", she explicitly ties her response back to Jasper's making the relation between their two stances relevant. Lastly, (d) does not make use of the words or construction Jasper chose, but does acknowledge there was a prior turn that presented a stance to the same object that is now being evaluated (marked by "either"). The evaluation itself is phrased differently ("didn't like"), but the two stances are overtly connected, thus aligning the perspectives taken by the two participants.

3.2 The stance triangle

Recall that stance involves three general functions: evaluation, positioning, and aligning. These three functions typically come together in one single act of stancetaking. When speakers take stance, they simultaneously evaluate an object, position a subject (usually themselves), and align with other subjects. These three seemingly separated elements are mutually connected: focusing on one affects the others. This interconnectedness is nicely represented in a stance triangle, as shown in figure 3.1 below. The triangle features three key elements: Subject 1, Subject 2, and an Object.

Subject 1, the first speaker, evaluates the object of stance and thereby positions himself regarding that object, and at the same time aligns himself with Subject 2. Even if Subject 2 has not said anything yet, one could argue that Subject 1 has indexed his position with respect to Subject 2. Subject 2 now has access to and knowledge of the position taken by Subject 1, and has to consider this when producing a next turn. There is thus already interpersonal positioning taking place with respect to Subject 2 as well, without this person actually having said something. When Subject 2 subsequently evaluates that same object, he or she takes position as well and in doing so aligns his or her stance with the position taken by Subject 1.




Figure 3.1: Stance triangle (reproduced from Du Bois, 2007:163)

The idea behind the triangular form is that if one of the three acts (represented by the vectors) is not overtly expressed, the other two will allow participants to make inferences about the "missing" stances. Referring back to example (2), the alignment between Astrid and Jasper was overtly expressed in (a), (b), and (d). The response in (c) already took a little more effort, because the others had to recognize how Astrid's assessment fit the construction Jasper used. Now

suppose the exchange looked like this:

(3) *Star Wars 3*

Sophie	So how did you like the movie?
	Would you recommend it?
Jasper	I thought it was a waste of time, honestly
Astrid	I totally zoned out
Sophie	So I guess I'll skip it then

Jasper's answer is still the same, but whereas Astrid still does evaluate and take position, she does not overtly relate her stancetaking to that of Jasper. The alignment between the two stances has to be inferred. Because the participants have access to the (subjective) evaluations and positions of Jasper and Astrid, and they are aware that there normally is a relation between the individual stances, they will attempt to (re)construct this connection. In example (3) both Jasper and Astrid express their dislike of the movie, so even though it is not made explicit, their stances are convergent.

Stivers (2008:35) refers to this type of support display of stances as affiliation. Alignment, to her, is related to those interactional moves that extent support the activity itself. For example by producing continuers like "mm-hm", "okay" or "yeah" participants can align themselves with that ongoing activity and reality without commenting on the content of the story. Alignment and affiliation are both important in calibrating the relation and balance in interaction (Stivers, 2008:36). The analysis presented in this thesis focuses on the cooperation and management of interpersonal relationships in interaction, and is as such concerned with what is described here as affiliation. However, while the content of a conversation and participants' stances toward that content are considered most relevant, backchannels do show active involvement in interaction and, as such, can play a central role in participants' sense of mutual affiliation as well. For my purposes, affiliation and alignment are therefore not separated.[2]

Following Du Bois, alignment is defined as "the act of calibrating the relationship between two stances, and by implication between two stancetakers" (Du Bois, 2007:144).[3] This calibration is normally scalar, people often do not

[2]Not because there is no difference between the two, but because the difference (content vs structural focus) is not of immediate relevance to the present research. In the design of this study, alignment and affiliation almost always converge: both pertain to the mutual commitment to continue their interaction on the set course. Alignment need of course not be affiliative: two speakers can present opposite stances related to the same object of talk. In such a case, their individual positionings emphasize their distance or even dissociation from one another. For the purposes of this research, however, such negative alignment is not further considered. Consequentely there is no need to distinguish (positive) affiliative alignment and affiliation.

[3]Pickering and Garrod (2004, 2006) suggest alignment is indeed the fundamental aspect of successful communication. However, they connect alignment to sharing a representation at some level: "specifically, alignment occurs at a particular level when interlocutors have the same representation at that level" (Pickering and Garrod, 2004:171).

agree or disagree completely on a particular matter. Their alignment may be relatively positive or negative or something in between (Du Bois, 2007:162).

In sum, at each step in their joint interactional trajectory participants coordinate and calibrate their shared knowledge and goals. They update their common ground and reaffirm their mutual relation (Enfield, 2006:405).[4] As long as they share the same evaluation or similar stance, they are mostly showing positive alignment, when a disagreement arises their alignment will be on the negative end of the scale.

There is no way of telling whether people actively tried to establish or increase positive alignment between them. Yet, in stretches of talk, all kinds of unnecessary or redundant contributions are presented - at least on a referential level that is. Such contributions may not carry new (propositional) information concerning the main theme or object of talk, they do offer (new) insights on the participants' affiliation both regarding the object of concern and each other's position on that topic. As such, these contributions are central to keeping the interaction flow and establishing alignment, and thus managing the interpersonal relation. These types of turns are a form of phatic communication that occurs not at the margins of interaction, but right at the center.

3.3 Doing alignment

Threaded through interaction is the effort of aligning with co-interactants: indexing and re-indexing ones position on a particular matter to increase mutual understanding. Showing active involvement, by producing a highly and recognizably similar utterance to what was uttered earlier, indexes the position of the speaker relative to the object of talk and the other participant(s). This affiliation between utterances does not only connect one turn to the next, it connects one stance to the next. Alignment is not only central to negotiating the relationship between interactants, it consequently affects their common

[4]The cognitive approach taken by Pickering and Garrod (2004, 2006) and Wachsmuth et al. (2013) fundamentally disagrees with the idea of updating common ground. Their reasoning is that keeping track of both your own and someone else's knowledge about the situation you are in (your situation model) is far too costly. Participants simply assume that what is in their representation of the situation is found in the situation model of the other as well (Pickering and Garrod, 2006:211). They propose that alignment is not a result of common ground or inference. Instead, "the fundamental mechanism that leads to alignment of situation models is automatic" (Pickering and Garrod, 2004:178). Considering both participants find themselves in the same interactional situation, and thus add similar information to their situation model, they can access the same information, but, crucially, in their own (individual) representation of the situation. Interestingly, Clark (1996) does assume a basic shared starting point of common ground: the situation you are in and the information you have on prior encounters (see section 2.2.1). Furthermore, participants do not *know* they have common ground, the best they can do is assume what is accessible to them is accessible to their partner as well. There hence is an assumption on both participants' parts that they perceive and remember the same (salient) things and that they both update their individual knowledge in the same way. This, to me, seems very close to the situation model and its automatic update advocated by Pickering and Garrod.

ground and supports mutual engagement and understanding: participants want to ensure they know where the other stands in relation to a particular topic or act, and by extension to them. This allows them to anticipate and coordinate their joint next actions.

Each pair of utterances shows efforts of calibration, of alignment: first speakers take position on a particular matter and fellow participants orient towards that effort when presenting their own stance. First turns normally initiate some kind of action trajectory, which second turns respond to. Each response decides on the successful completion of a joint action (see section 2.2.3) and thus each second turn presents a chance to take the same position as the first speaker or diverge from their point of view. The second speaker has two general options: to respond in "a compliant or aligning way or in misaligning or noncompliant way" (Schegloff, 2006:74-75). As explained in section 2.3, people prefer the interaction to unfold as projected in the initiating act. There is, hence, a preference for positive alignment between interactants and, as evidenced by preliminaries or set-up expressions (Enfield, 2006:406, cf. section 2.3) people actively try to minimize the chance of being confronted with a negative response. It is agreement, positive alignment and joint commitment that people generally seek.

This overall orientation toward positive alignment does not mean people have to explicitly say "my position is completely in line with yours" to show that there is positive alignment. Reproducing what was said before, collaborating on the completion of a turn or a simple "me too" or "same here" suffices to inform some a co-participant of your shared (or a similar) stance. Similarly, negative alignment can be explained extensively or can be established with a mere negation. Moreover, alignment does not need to be explicit, a speaker can present a stance that their co-participant has to relate to an earlier stancetaking themselves, inferring the alignment between the two utterances (Du Bois, 2007, cf. 3.2).

In the following sections, some of the resources that people have at their disposal to take stance and align themselves to others will be presented. There are of course infinite ways of establishing alignment, what the selected forms share is a distinct focus on the relative positioning of participants. They all show there is a strong sense of involvement - a focus on the connection between what one participant says and what came before - whether the utterance serves to concur or contest what was said earlier (Du Bois, 2014:360;363).[5] With the interpersonal relationship or involvement taking pole position, referential or informational content may move to the background.

[5]This is different from adjacency pairs or projective pairs as presented earlier. This sense of involvement (or engagement in terms of Du Bois, 2014) is not necessarily only associated with the previous turn - i.e. the first pair part - but to all that came before, and is thus similar to making explicit reference to the coherence between turns. Importantly, this engagement is not only found in utterances produced by different speakers. A single speaker can relate their next utterance to the previous one as well, thus engaging with prior words and structures (Du Bois, 2014:372).

The (sub)classes discussed below play an important role in the coordination of knowledge and understanding and hence in managing the common ground; they are all attempts to (re)phrase or connect to the other's idea, to show understanding, and position oneself accordingly. Following this effort, participants have (explicit) access to the status of their interpersonal alignment, thus demonstrating the collaborative nature of interaction.

3.3.1 Positive and negative alignment

Establishing alignment can be done explicitly and absolute by saying "yes, I agree completely" or "no, I disagree completely"; clearly relating the expression and associated position to what came before. Here, the alignment is near perfect: the second speaker indicates their stance to be effectively the same or the absolute opposite of that presented by the first speaker. However, as explained in section 3.2, alignment is thought to be scalar, meaning the independent positions are often not identical, but rather relatively closer to the same side of the scale or towards opposite ends.

Positive alignment is established when one speaker takes a particular position regarding the object of talk and the second speaker takes a similar position. This is what Clark (2006:134) calls their "joint position". His idea is that speech acts are not completed by just one speaker - the initiating party - but by the combination of the initiating and responding party. Take, for example, a suggestion. The proposition presented by the first speaker is not only reflective of his or her own position, but also reflects the position of the second speaker once they have accepted the suggestion. In example (4) Stef and Jack have a meeting at nine o'clock with a real estate agent and are discussing what time they have to leave to be on time.

(4) *Taking the train*

1	Stef	If we have to be there by nine,
2		we'd better take the 8.15 train.
3		It's about a 15 minute walk I guess.
4	Jack	Okay, 8.15 it is.

Stef suggests they take the train that leaves at 8.15 because they have to walk for a bit before they are at the arranged meeting place. Jack agrees with her plan, taking the same position she presented in line 2. They both individually present the same subjective position on the matter (taking the 8.15 train), but Jack's stancetaking is informed by what Stef has done earlier. He not only takes a subjective stance but relates his stance to Stef's, establishing the relation between their two stances. In accepting her suggestion, he thus positively aligns himself to her stance, establishing their joint position.

In most languages, the simplest way to show agreement is by means of an affirmative particle. On the opposite end, disagreement can be expressed by means of a disaffirmative particle. The challenge with describing the use of particles like "yes" and "no" is that their distribution is much more complex

than just an affirmative or disaffirmative answer to a polar question (see e.g. Sorjonen (1997) on the distribution of (dis)affirmative particles in Finnish). A simple (dis)affirmative marker can indeed convey affiliation and construct positive alignment, but it could just as well indicate someone is simply listening without taking stance whatsoever.[6] Oftentimes the use of a particle is combined with a more explicit form of stancetaking. These more explicit strategies will be discussed below.

Divergence of stances is what I will refer to as establishing negative alignment. Negative alignment arises when one speaker takes a certain stance regarding an object of talk and the second speaker takes an opposing stance. By not joining the first speaker in his positioning, the second speaker not only rejects the proposition presented by the first speaker, but expresses (or even emphasizes) the dissimilarity between to two of them. The most recognizable cases of negative alignment involve blatant disagreement or rejection. In the following example, an assessment made by one participant is rejected by the other participant. Ruben and Hugo discuss Hugo's career in the hotel and restaurant business. At some point Ruben states that he would not like working with all those annoying people. Hugo does not agree with this assertion, he actually likes bonding with his guests. The relevant exchange is presented in example (5):

(5) *Hospitality (day 1)*[7]

1	Ruben	all kinds of annoying people who all (.)
2		ju[st strangely wander eh
3	Hugo	[no you build a relationship with them,
4		that's really nice.

Hugo dismisses the perception Ruben has of the hospitality industry. He interrupts Ruben and he, indeed, starts his objection with a plain disagreement marker "no". Following the negation, he does offer a reason for his divergent

[6] These back-channels or continuers are what Stivers (2008) refers to as alignment, in contrast to affiliation. While the latter would include taking stance, alignment, to her, only includes structural markers indicating all parties are (still) in agreement about the ongoing organization of the interaction. I am, however, not so much interested in the progress of the structure of interaction, but rather in the management of the content and the related interpersonal positions. Here, alignment is mostly used to refer to stancetaking, i.e. interpersonal alignment, not organizational alignment (cf. section 5.1 for a discussion of backchannels in relation to the managing interpersonal relations). This means the cases that *do* involve stancetaking and hence alignment are the central target of study. More specifically still, it is those instances in which conveying the position of the speaker is (one of) the main contributions to the interaction that are of primary interest.

[7] All examples that include a reference to a certain day (e.g. here "day 1") are taken from the Dutch collection of Big Brother transcripts. The excerpts are loosely translated to English, without the Dutch original present, to increase readability. The point here is not to present a thorough analysis of the Dutch material, but to illustrate the different resources interactants - generally speaking - have at their disposal. Part II will discuss the patterns of use of these different forms in the Dutch and Indonesian data. There, the examples will of course include the original text (as well as a translation).

stancetaking as well. In Hugo's opinion, the people you encounter in the hospitality industry are not annoying; you build relationships with them which is something enjoyable.[8] The dismissal thus establishes negative alignment between the two men. Here, the rejection was opened with a negation marker "no".[9] This does, however, by no means imply that to reject someone's position an explicit negation is required.

Crucially, alignment does not have to be absolute. Participants can take position towards the same end of the scale but not at the same point their interlocutor placed himself. This is seen in example (6) where David and Susan share the same sentiment, but not the same position. Susan states she is convinced three other housemates concocted some sort of plan to collectively nominate David and Lotte for eviction. Whereas David has the same feeling, he is not entirely certain about the nomination being a set-up. He thus adopts her belief, but not to the full extent.

(6) *Hundred percent (day 33)*

1	Susan	but I know for sure-
2		one thing I'm absolutely convinced about,
3		(.) I just talked to Bram about it,
4		I'm convinced the three of them discussed this.
5		I'm a hundred percent sure of it.
6	David	yeah? I'm ninety percent sure.

Susan's states she is "a hundred percent" certain of the other contestants having discussed the nomination process beforehand (line 5). Her strong suspicion of foul play is mitigated somewhat by David, who asserts to be "ninety percent" convinced of them talking it through. Thinking of alignment as a scale, David is taking position on the same side of the scale as Susan, but not at the same point. His positioning still results in mostly positive alignment (on the general theme) but shows some slight divergence as well (on the details).

On the negative end of the alignment-scale, one can cast doubt upon someone's stancetaking without completely disagreeing with it either as in example (7). Just prior to this fragment Thomas and Ruben started talking about their female housemates when Thomas, in line 27, states one of them made him think of Pippi Longstocking.

[8] A relevant factor that allows for Hugo's bluntness might be that Hugo is the one who has greater access and rights over the knowledge regarding the hospitality industry. After all, he is involved in it and Ruben is not. See Stivers, Mondada, and Steensig (2011) for detailed studies of epistemics and morality in interaction.

[9] Although dispreferred responses are said to usually be more complex structurally and less clear-cut (cf. section 2.3), this kind of explicit disagreement is not at all uncommon in the Dutch data. This might suggest the Dutch, like speakers of Spanish, might not perceive disagreements necessarily as dispreferred (López Sako, 2008). However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss rejections in detail.

(7) *Pippi (day 5)*

26	Thomas	when she came outside this afternoon
27		she reminded me of Pippi Longstocking
28	Ruben	yes, but that's her style,
29		yeah, I- [you know I just accept people
30	Thomas	[just like Pippi Longstocking
31	Ruben	the way [they are
32	Thomas	[yeah me too
33	Ruben	yeah I don't know

Ruben objects saying it is just her style (line 28) and that he accepts her as she is (line 29-31). He seems to imply Thomas does not accept her, leading Thomas to assert that he *does* in line 352. His statement does not convince Ruben, as evidenced by the latter's expression of doubt in line 33. While Ruben does not openly accuse Thomas of judging their housemate for the way she dresses, he is not prepared to accept Thomas' positive alignment with him either. The intersubjective positioning between the two of them is ambiguous here, there is no straightforward agreement or disagreement.

The combination of positive and negative alignment is not uncommon. Indeed, repetition can be used as a strategy of rapport (Tannen, 2007:84) before disagreeing with someone: the social relation is first reaffirmed by showing or ratifying listenership through repetition, after which some form of disagreement is more easily accepted. Combining positive alignment through repetition with an overall negative stance can be used as a face-saving strategy (Tannen, 2007:84). Most of the rejections found in the data start with a negation marker or turn-initial repetition as an effective way to introduce a negative stancetaking (Schegloff, 1997:532-533). Dispreferred moves in general are commonly prefaced by a repetition of the problematic part that the second speaker is rejecting or correcting (Schegloff, 1997:531).

Some of the more frequent resources used by participants to establish positive alignment are discussed below. As already apparent from the last example, a responsive act may combine several forms. The different classes presented below are separated for ease of understanding, but in actual interaction they do of course co-occur. Oftentimes positive alignment is established through a combination of repetition and explicit agreement (using "yes" or "me too" and reproducing the previous utterance). Similarly, the combination of co-construction or shadowing of a turn and the subsequent ratification by the initial speaker also affirms the joint position, that is, positive alignment, of the participants.

3.3.2 Explicit alignment

One of the most straightforward phrases people can use to position themselves right along their interlocutor is "me too" or "me either" type of responses. The strongest message conveyed by such a phrase is that there is in fact positive alignment; that the both of them are of the same opinion about something.

Parallel to explicit positive alignment phrases like "me too", there are of course ways of explicitly communicating you do *not* share the stance taken by a conversational partner. The focus being on positive alignment, those cases are not addressed separately. In the example below, Laura aligns her position explicitly with Kirk's point of view:

(8) *Meatballs - me too*

Kirk	I don't like meatballs
Laura	(a) I don't like meatballs either
	(b) I don't like them either
	(c) Me neither

As discussed in section 3.2, a second speaker can overtly mark their contribution as a stance follow to someone else' stance lead. Laura overtly acknowledges her utterance is indeed a partial reproduction of Kirk's idea about meatballs. She indicates her position is a stance follow to Kirk's stance lead by adding "either". There is thus explicit engagement with the prior structure and active alignment of stances. In (c) the alignment is the only explicitly communicated message, in (a) on the other hand, Kirk's entire turn is repeated followed by the alignment marker. She thereby maximizes the likeness between their turns. Even if Laura responds with (c), there still is a level of repetition present: she may not reproduce the words; she does recycle the proposition by connecting herself to it. She decides to what extent she reproduces the prior utterance or which elements she selects (Du Bois, 2014:379).[10] The stronger the similarities across utterances, the stronger she commits herself to the proposition and thus their shared position.

What distinguishes this alignment strategy from the other classes is that the speaker unequivocally relates his or her own position to that of the object of talk and therefore to the other speaker. The subjective alignment is thus explicit, as in (8). The interlocutor does not have to infer the position that is taken or the effect this stancetaking has on their interpersonal alignment, they are handed to him. The next example emphasizes the usefulness of such explicit construction of alignment, with four people taking two positions (in pairs). Right before the exchanges in example (9) takes place one of the contestants has announced she will withdraw from the competition.

(9) *Inkling (day 9/10)*

73	Hugo	well, I didn't expect this to happen
74	Ruben	no I didn't expect this either
75	Roos	I did have a feeling it might
76	Hanna	yeah, me too

Hugo and Ruben share the same position: they did not expect someone to leave the competition willingly at this point (lines 73-74). Their alignment is positive and explicitly marked by the full repetition and the addition of "either"

[10] This is similar to the category of resonance that Du Bois (2014) refers to as selection.

showing Ruben is the stance follow to Hugo's stance lead. Roos and Hanna, on the other hand, share the opposite view: they did have an inkling this might happen. Roos' stance diverges from Hugo and Ruben's resulting in negative alignment. She explicitly refers to her subjective position in relation to Hugo and Ruben's subjective first positioning, making the interpersonal alignment between them and her easy to recognize. Finally, Hanna explicitly connects her position on the matter to Roos' stance. In this example, the explicit positioning of second parties is combined with the (partial) repetition of prior utterances. Repeating someone else's words to communicate your own position facilitates the recognizability of alignment, while maintaining the autonomy of each of the stances, as we will see in section 3.3.3. Due to the similarity between the two individual expressions, the relation between them is easy to identify - whether that relation is one of sameness or opposition. As a result, the interpersonal relation between the speakers of those utterances is easily recognized as well.

3.3.3 Repetition

One particularly interesting form of language use that can both introduce positive and negative alignment with another participant is reduplication of a prior utterance (usually the utterance immediately preceding the current one (Schegloff, 1997:503, 525). Repetition seems to be an automatic and spontaneous process, not something people stop to think about (Tannen, 2005:100).However, Du Bois (2014:379) argues the opposite: he discusses several strategies people use to establish alignment, including repetition, arguing these are in fact a strategic use of language. Participants deliberately choose to select a particular form to control the level of engagement with the prior utterance, thus not suggesting a reflex, but rather a purposeful decision.

Parallelism was famously analyzed by Jakobson (1960:368-369), who described it as a "fundamental problem of poetry": consecutive lines in a poem are often found to be parallel, emphasizing the likeness or unlikeness between the two juxtaposed units (1960:369). Such parallels appear in everyday conversation as well. Utterances are constructed using the same internal structure, increasing the perception of affinities between the utterances (Du Bois, 2014:370).

Reproduction of a prior utterance is not only used in explicit constructions of alignment. Repetition can in fact be used to perform a variety of functions. Repair structures (Schegloff, 1997) and epistemic claims (Stivers, 2005) are but two environments in which repeats are often found. Tannen (2007:68-78) presents a thorough description of repetitions in interaction and distinguishes at least nine different purposes repetition can serve, some of which coincide with the relevant types discussed in this section.[11] Related to the different functions

[11]The term "relevant" here refers to the types of spontaneous, phatic, responses that were distinguished through the bottom-up analysis of the interactional data. This includes all and only those cases that are presented spontaneously and are targeting positive alignment. That is, those contributions that could be called "phatic" (cf. section 2.1); that are informationally

of repetition, it is important to realize participants can repeat their own words or the words of others (Tannen, 2007:63). Considering the focus of this thesis is on interpersonal alignment, cross-speaker repetitions are most interesting. People do repeat their own words, to emphasize a point or to correct a mistake for example, but these self-repetitions are not relevant to the present analysis. After all, they do not aim to position one speaker in relation to another, but rather concern the subjective, one-sided, positioning of a single interactant.

Speakers are observed to use words that were previously produced by others and make them their own. By integrating others' words in their contributions, participants make the conversation into a unified whole (Tannen, 2007:67). Repetition ranges from full reduplications or "perfect copies", to repetitions that are slightly altered, to repetitions of the format of a previous utterance, to reproductions of content but not form (Tannen, 2007:63; Couper-Kuhlen, 1996:368; Stivers, 2005). Following Schegloff (1997:525) the term "repetition" is reserved for those cases involving observable repetition of words from some preceding turn. Repetition of meaning but not form is discussed under "paraphrase" in the next paragraph.

Listenership

Full repetition of (part of) a prior utterance is the most straightforward type of repetition. At the same time, it is the most confusing type from the perspective of interactional relevance, since the information is already available. Consider example (10). By recycling the phrasing of the prior utterance, the second speaker takes the same position as his conversational partner. He could have just agreed, seconding the proposition presented by his interlocutor.

(10) *It's not fair (day 29)*

45	Susan	no it's not fair
46	Bram	it's not fair
47	Roos	no, it's not fair

Susan presents her stance on the matter of nominating fellow contestants. In her view, it is unfair to nominate someone you believe to be safe from eviction based on the assumption that the audience will not vote for that person to leave the house. Bram holds the same opinion, as evident from his utterance in line 46. He thus establishes a joint position for him and Susan. His repetition allows him to make the same point independent from Susan. This might seem insignificant, but by uttering the proposition himself, there is a sense of autonomy that would not be available to him if he would have just attached himself to Susan's proposition (e.g. by agreeing with her). Bram now shows he has as much access to the presented information as the first speaker and can thus claim epistemic independence (e.g. Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Heritage, 2012; Heritage and

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or referentially redundant. It is for this reason that e.g. repair structures and conversational routines are excluded from the discussion, as are disaffiliative and initiating acts.

Raymond, 2012; Stivers et al., 2011).[12] Even if he actually did not think about this matter before Susan brought it up, the suggestion of shared knowledge or experience alone builds rapport and thus strengthens the interpersonal bond in that interaction. Repetition can hence be used to allude to shared knowledge and epistemic independence without it actually being present. After both Susan and Bram have stated the situation is not fair, Roos presents the same stance. She too fully repeats the expression initially presented by Susan, claiming greater independence over her positioning than she would have by simply agreeing to it. The difference between Bram's repetition is that she marks her contribution as being a stance follow to Susan's stance lead. By including an affirmative marker ("no"), she openly acknowledges she is not the first to take this position.

This type of full repetition usually immediately follows the original utterance, showing familiarity and involvement with the interaction and reflects what Tannen (2007:68) calls participatory listenership, which is probably the most basic form of repetition. The hearer shows they are listening and understand what is being said by repeating the speaker's words. By echoing someone else's utterance, participants can show involvement and acceptance of the message and thus establish shared expertise on the matter (Tannen, 2007:68; see also Schegloff (1997:527) on registering receipt). The use of full and partial repeats is further discussed in section 6.1. In short, the difference between full and partial repeats relates to the extent of overlap between the first and second speaker's presentation of the expression. Full repeats are perfect copies of the original; no material is added or eliminated. Partial repeats are an integral copy of part of the original utterance, meaning some other part of the previous rendering is not reproduced.

Shadowing

In example (10), the repetition of the initial utterance "it's not fair" was produced only after the previous instance was completed. Each of the participants awaited their turn and only then reduplicated the prior turn. It is not uncommon however, to have a second speaker reproduce the first speaker's utterance while the initial turn is still ongoing, as in example (11) below. Lieke and Iris are both nominated for eviction. The nomination process is anonymous, but Lieke pretends to be mad about the situation and fake-demands to know who nominated her:

[12]Stivers, Mondada, and Steensig (2011) argue that we can only understand how people manage (dis)agreement and (dis)affiliation through a better understanding of epistemic stance. I will treat stance as a general way of positioning oneself, including epistemic and affiliational stance. Separating these two functions is not necessary for the purpose of this study. In fact, managing relationships is not only related to access to knowledge, but to attitudes and emotions as well.

(11) *I don't want to know (day 53)*

20	Lieke	I WANT TO KNOW WHO NOMINATED ME, NOW!
21	Iris	hahah (.) no:: I do[n't need to know]
22	Lieke	[no I don't need to know]
23	Iris	no:
24	Hugo	I don't mind telling you

In response to Lieke's demand, Iris says she does not need to know who nominated her. This position is quickly adopted by Lieke, who starts talking along with Iris' turn, repeating the entire utterance with only a small delay. This shadowing (Tannen, 2007:69) is a relatively effortless strategy to show involvement with the other participants (Tannen, 2007:93). Its use to construct affiliation and construct positive alignment as found in the Dutch and Indonesian data is discussed in section 7.1.3.

Ratification

A slightly different form of repetition is found when people collaboratively construct an utterance or story. In these cases, one speaker offers the next piece of information to a story told by a different speaker as a show of understanding or involvement (Lerner, 1996; Lerner and Takagi, 1999). The main speaker may hesitate or pause before finishing the current utterance, but even without such encouragement participants are found to suggest a (to them) likely completion to someone else's turn. If that piece of information is correct or indeed relevant, the main speaker may explicitly connect it to his initial utterance. By repeating the suggested information, the storyteller ratifies it (Tannen, 2007:70-71) and includes it in his story. In example (12) Bram has the floor but pauses mid-sentence in line 8, following which his turn is completed by Hugo (cf. section 7.1.4).

(12) *Solidarity (day 5)*

7	Bram	and yet, when all the guys are together
8		there is some kind of (.)
9	Hugo	solidarity
10	David	yeah with the women too
11	Bram	solidarity

Hugo proposes the term Bram is looking for is "solidarity", which is ratified by Bram in line 11 when he repeats it and thus includes it in his story as his own. The co-construction of turns at talk, as shown by Hugo in this case, is another way to establish positive alignment. This is further elaborated on below in section 3.3.5.

Answers to questions

A third context in which full repetition is often found is in answers to polar questions (see e.g. Raymond (2003); Heritage and Raymond (2005); Stivers

(2005)). By repeating the question, the respondent "confirms" the proposition, rather than "affirming" it (Heritage and Raymond, 2012:192) as in example (13):

(13) *Ready (day 36)*

2	Kevin	are you ready?
3	Lotte	I'm ready

In response to Kevin's question, Lotte could have just said "yes". However, she chose otherwise. She must have had a reason to put in the effort of reproducing Kevin's question as an answer. Increasing the engagement between the two utterances seems a possible explanation (Du Bois, 2014:379).[13] By echoing the question in line 2 as an answer, Lotte ratifies the proposition and claims greater epistemic rights over her current state of being ready compared to when she would have just said "yes". She accepts Kevin's proposed position and makes it her own, thus establishing positive alignment between them.

Repetition in repair structures

Lastly, repetition is regularly observed in repair structures (Schegloff, 1997; Stivers, 2005). Repair initiations, for example, can be formulated by rephrasing the unclear statement as a question or check of understanding (Schegloff, 1997:526) as in (14):

(14) *Funny or not (day 29)*

23	David	I believe it would be funny
24	Hanna	it's amusing right?
25	Lotte	you believe it would be funny?
26	David	just for fun, sure why not.

In this example, David and Hanna propose the idea that David and Lotte pretend-marry, because it would make for good television. Lotte does not initially agree to this idea. In line 23, David asserts he believes it is funny to go on with the plan (and Hanna concurs in line 24). Lotte reproduces his assertion as a question - probably out of disbelief that he would say such a thing. While this is a case of repetition, although with variation (Tannen, 2007:63), it does not present positive alignment on Lotte's part. At least at this point in the conversation, she is not prepared to join David and Hanna in their assessment of the situation. This example shows that repetition can be and is used to show and establish negative alignment as well. Instead of positioning herself alongside the same end of the scale as David and Hanna, Lotte questions their stance. As a result, it could be argued she tentatively takes the opposing stance, with an invitation for them to change her mind ("I believe it is not funny, but convince

[13] Crucially, Du Bois excludes "mere echoes and slavish repetition" and argues that only the more extensive repetitions are strategic. What he calls reproduction is thus an *active* effort to create similarity. This effort must be recognizable as a direct attempt to engage with the prior occurrence of this same word or structure (Du Bois, 2014:378).

me to believe otherwise"). Taking this opposite stance, she stresses the difference between them and her, thus creating a situation of negative interpersonal alignment.

Another form of repetition that is found in repair structures is self-repetition of the problematic utterance (Schegloff, 1997:507). When a speaker is alerted that something is unclear by a general repair initiation they will often repeat the initial turn to solve the problem, as in example (15) in which Susan's attempt to complete her part of a group assignment fails before she started:

(15) *Self-repair (day 29)*

39	Susan	I hadn't even started yet
40	Roos	darn it
41	Lotte	HUh?
42	Susan	I hadn't even started yet.

Susan complains to the other contestants that she did not get a fair chance to compete because she was called back before she could start her part of the assignment. While Roos does not necessarily respond to the complaint, Lotte is open to discussing it. The problem is she did not hear or understand what Susan said. In response to Lotte's repair initiation in line 41 ("Huh?"), Susan reproduces her initial utterance. Because this is neither a spontaneous repetition, nor a reproduction of someone else's turn and position, cases like these are not further analyzed in detail.[14]

All of the cases discussed above show full, complete, repetition of the prior utterance. However, there are plenty of examples in which the repetition is only partial, meaning a second speaker presents a perfect copy of some part of the previous utterance. Such partial repetitions are not discussed as a separate form of repetition, because they can all be placed in the subclasses presented above. Full and partial repeats are collectively referred to as "bare repetitions", owing to the fact that the second utterance includes the same choice of words as (part of) the previous utterance.[15] Recall that reproduction in interaction can be thought of as a scale ranging from full repetition (reproducing meaning

[14]Other forms of repetition that are excluded are self-repetitions as a result of the initial utterance not being (entirely) audible to the interlocutors and repetition as part of a conversational routine, as in "Good night" - "Good night". For a similar reason, repair initiations are excluded from further analysis as well. As explained in sections 1.1 and 2.1, the analyses presented in this thesis are exclusively concerned with spontaneous, phatic, contributions. The emphasis is thus on responsive actions that establish positive alignment without disrupting the flow of information (the reason repair initiations are excluded). The interactional relevance of rejection, disagreement, and repair structures is fully recognized, but does not fit the scope of this research.

[15]This is not to suggest the two contributions are deemed exactly the same, their interactional meaning is of course different, simply because of the fact that one is presented after the other and by another participant. For example, the added claim of epistemic rights or access and the establishment of alignment are associated with the string of words uttered by the second speaker, but were not associated with that same string of words when uttered by the first speaker. "Bare" repetition is meant to capture the one-to-one match concerning the words used by two speakers, not to the associated interpretation of those words.

and form) to paraphrase (reproducing meaning but not form). One type of repetition with variation merits special attention as it combines aspects of both: repetition of the format of an earlier utterance, but substituting a crucial element with some other lexical item.

Substitution

Participants sometimes reproduce the structure of a prior utterance but partially change the content. Similar to the "me too" and "me neither" examples discussed in section 5.4, one can only partially reproduce the prior utterance and still convey the same message. A very dressed down version of partial repetition would be to recycle the grammatical structure of a previous utterance, but change the content. In doing so, the contribution is connected to the prior utterance by means of the structural recognizability, even though the message may not (at all) be related. This re-using of the grammatical structure is explained as creating a rhythm (Tannen, 2007) or enhancing engagement (Du Bois, 2014), but it does not necessarily involve interpersonal alignment, because the object of talk may be entirely disconnected from the earlier utterance (compare "She wears glasses" and "He wears a hat"; both present a simple sentence involving a 3rd person subject wearing something. These two utterances could be meant to contrast her and his outfit, but it could also be two descriptions of a person's appearance, unrelated to stancetaking and the speakers' interpersonal alignment.). A partial repetition strategy that *does* create alignment is what I will call "substitution". The class of substitution includes those cases in which a central part of the first utterance is replaced by a similar, often related, word in the following turn.[16]

An example of how substitution is used to create interpersonal alignment is givne in (16). Hugo and Hanna react to Bram's earlier suggestion a good session of cursing and calling each other names might release some tension held by the group (lines 40 and 43):

(16) *Name-calling (day 4)*

40	Hugo	you do that when we're gone.
41	Bram	hahahha
42	Hugo	hahahah
43	Hanna	you do that when you're home.

Hugo counters Bram better holds the urge to call people names until the others are not around. In line 43, Hanna reproduces the first part of Hugo's utterance but replaces "when we're gone" with "when you're home". The message is essentially the same: both Hugo and Hanna are not keen on his proposal and suggest he only then starts his name-calling session when they are not present.

[16]Variations in the intensity of an assessment or evaluation are not included here. For example, "That cake is delicious" vs. "That cake is absolutely delicious" are not considered to substitute a vital part of the construction. They will be analyzed as cases of full repetition modified by an upgrade (or downgrade).

Hanna repeats the entire structure and most of the content of Hugo's utterance, but paraphrases a salient part of it, making it (at least partly) her own.

As discussed earlier, repeating someone else's utterance can increase the epistemic access you claim over that information. By repeating an utterance but essentially paraphrasing the key component by selecting a synonym, the respondent emphasizes his own position on the matter, while at the same time aligning himself with the initial speaker. The proposition remains intact but is enforced or mitigated by changing the salient parts. Substitution can also be used to present subsequent propositions as alternatives (Du Bois, 2014:381). Because of the overlap in structure, the emphasis can be placed on the contrast between two elements as David does in line 6 in example (17):

(17) *Hundred percent (day 33)*

1	Susan	but I know for sure-
2		one thing I'm absolutely convinced about,
3		(.) I just talked to Bram about it
4		I'm convinced the three of them discussed this
5		I'm a hundred percent sure of it
6	David	yeah? I'm ninety percent sure

He echoes Susan's assertion she is "hundred percent sure of it", but substitutes a crucial element to downgrade the level of certainty to express he is "ninety percent sure of it". The similarity between their two contributions certainly creates high involvement and positions them near to each other on a stancetaking scale. Yet, the (slight) dissimilarity between them is emphasized because of the structural similarity. Substitution can thus be used to emphasize convergence, by paraphrasing part of the utterance, or divergence, by replacing one phrase with a phrase unrelated in meaning to the original, presenting an alternative proposition. In (6) there was only minor divergence, but a similar strategy could be used to emphasize opposing positions on a particular matter (cf. Du Bois (2014:381) on contrast).[17]

3.3.4 Paraphrase

Paraphrase can be thought of as repetition of the idea without reproducing the utterance used by the prior speaker. It involves approximate equivalence of meaning (Bhagat and Hovy, 2013) presented in different words. [18] Whereas

[17]The substitution of elements for emphasizing the contrast between two participants is not further considered here, the simple reason being it is not within the scope of the current study of positive alignment and the use of phatic contributions.

[18]Paraphrase can be defined as strict as involving all synonymy (Bhagat and Hovy, 2013; Vila et al., 2014) that is however not the type of paraphrase meant here. The classes presented in this chapter all relate to phatic communion and alignment. They all show interpersonal positioning and involvement of participants. The type of paraphrase included here thus needs to meet that criterion: it has to be used to establish or display the alignment between the subjects and object of a specific interaction. For a typology of paraphrase, see Vila, Martí, and Rodríguez (2011).

repetition can be objectively recognized, paraphrase is much more of a sliding scale of interpretation. Participants have to interpret both utterances and decide whether the level of similarity between them is high enough to be considered paraphrases. Because of this subjectivity paraphrase is not included in the class of repetition. Still, the sense of repetition that is present in paraphrasing is what makes it a useful strategy to show involvement as seen in example (18):

(18) *Surprise (day 12)*

2	Thomas	well David you did not see that coming huh?
3	David	no-no not at all
4	Hanna	surprise right?

The group of contestants decided to throw David a surprise birthday party and he just found out about the party. While he is taking all of it in Thomas concludes David had not suspected something like this to happen, which David confirms in line 3. Following this exchange, Hanna comes to the same conclusion Thomas presented: David did not see it coming; it was a surprise. She paraphrases "not see that coming" as "[that was a] surprise". Because she constructs her turn as a question, the similarity with Thomas' utterance is even more apparent.[19] By using a paraphrase to ask the same question that has already been answered, she seems to claim the right to know (Stivers et al., 2011) and positions herself alongside Thomas. Not as a stance follow, but as an autonomous position that is positively aligned to his.

Establishing a connection between two participants using paraphrase is even more recognizable in example (19), where Iris confirms Lieke's evaluation of a bottle of perfume she had bought that carried her name.

(19) *Perfume (day 49)*

14	Lieke	everyone said like it smells kinda nice.
15	Iris	it doesn't smell bad at all.
16	Lieke	no.

Prior to this exchange, Lieke has told the story about how she was on holiday and came across a brand of perfume by the same name as her and decided to buy a bottle. In line 14 she explains that her friends said "it smells kinda nice", almost justifying why she bought it. Iris is quick to confirm this assessment, stating "it does not smell bad at all" (line 15). Both Lieke and Iris thus present the same (extended) position on the fragrance, and while both of them use the main verb "smell" the actual assessment is paraphrased from the original "kinda nice" to "not bad at all". There is no explicit stance follow marker present (something like, "yes", "right", "either"), Iris actually phrases her reaction as if she could have been the first to make this remark. The strong overlap in the propositional content of the two messages is what gives away the connection,

[19] She is not trying to surprise David at this point by yelling "SURPRISE". She wants validation for the successful surprise; for the fact that they pulled it off to organize a party without him expecting anything.

more so than similarities in chosen form. A detailed analysis of paraphrases in relation to alignment is given in section 6.2.

3.3.5 Co-construction

In (12) we already saw an example of collaboration on turn-completion, repeated here for convenience as (20). In this conversation, Bram has the floor and produces a longer turn but stops right before the end, seemingly not being able to find the right word.

(20) *Solidarity (day 5)*

6	Bram	and yet when all the guys are together
7		there is some kind of (.)
8	Hugo	solidarity
9	David	yeah with the women too
10	Bram	solidarity

Even though Bram's utterance is not completed and there is thus no transitional relevant point to change turns (Sacks et al., 1974), Hugo presents a candidate completion for Bram's utterance. In this case it can be argued that Bram was seeking help: by pausing in the midst of his utterance he opens up the possibility to let someone else complete the turn.[20] In line 11 he accepts Hugo's suggestion by repeating it, thus incorporating it in his original utterance and ratifying Hugo's interpretation of Bram's initial thought (Tannen, 2007:70-71).[21]

Their collaborative effort to produce this single turn speaks to their willingness to cooperate as well as their (especially Hugo's) ability to think for the other person. This co-construction thus evidences a strong common ground, which is further reinforced by the correct insertion of a missing element (and the subsequent ratification). Hugo's anticipation of what characterization would be fitting in this context reflects his position on the object ("a group of guys"). Considering it is originally Bram's assertion, this completion projects the position Bram supposedly represents, which is indeed confirmed by Bram, thus establishing their joint position on male solidarity.

However, collaborative completions are not always encouraged, as shown in examples (21) and (22). Roos and Hugo are in the kitchen trying to make a salad dressing. They do not have a mixer or blender at their disposal so they have to whisk the ingredients together by hand. Roos suggests their best option is to work together: one of them can hold the bowl while the other slowly pours the oil into the mixture.

[20] Lerner and Takagi (1999) refer to this phenomenon as co-participant completion; Lerner (1996) calls it anticipatory completion,

[21] Such successful co-constructions of a single turn are often ratified by a repetition or affirmative marker produced by the initial speaker. However, when the candidate completion is flawed the initial speaker will likely replace the suggested completion to convey the intended interpretation, cf. section 7.1.4.

(21) *Drip (day 9/10)*

14	Roos	isn't it an idea to have one person
15		hold it [slightly tilted and then do]
16	Hugo	[yes and the other lets it]
17		ve::ry carefully, really drip. drip. drip.

She has not yet finished her turn, when Hugo steps in (line 15) and completes it for her, overlapping the end of her original turn. Similarly, in (22), Hanna quickly steps in to finish Ruben's thought about talking to a psychologist.

(22) *Talk (day 14)*

38	Ruben	yes, I didn't really have an emotional talk or anything,
39		but-
40	Hanna	but it is just nice to talk to someone

As with projected pairs, the turn-so-far projects likely formats for completion (Lerner, 1991:455ff). The "one person does X" construction Roos uses in (21) is recognized by Hugo as likely being followed by "the other person does Y". Instead of waiting for Roos to come to the second part, he produces it for her. Usually these collaborations involve what Lerner refers to as compound turn-constructional units in which the hearer not only anticipates the completion of the entire turn, but also recognizes where the final component might begin (Lerner, 1991:453). The earlier components project the format of that final component, allowing the hearer to complete the turn instead of the speaker (Lerner, 1991:454). This anticipatory completion need not take place, but because of the recognizability of the different parts of the larger turn and the predictability of the construction yet to come the co-participants have the opportunity to take over and produce the last component. It thus allows them to project a joint position, suggesting positive alignment of their individual stances (cf. section 7.1).

3.4 Conversational style

In section 2.6, it was argued that even though all human beings share a set of cognitive skills to manage interaction, the day-to-day use of those skills is influenced by cultural norms. The "normal" way to talk and interact is shaped by culture as well (Enfield and Levinson, 2006b:1). However, we should be wary of overestimating the similarities or differences between cultural preferences of interactional patterns. As (López Sako, 2008:320) shows in his cross-cultural study of disagreements, languages might share one aspect of use, but diverge on another. As will become apparent in chapters 5 to 7, a similar result is found in this study. Some general patterns or phatic language use in spontaneous responsive actions are strongly similar across the two languages, whereas other uses are clearly more preferred by one or the other group of speakers. This collection of preferences within a particular community is an informative source

of how people normally manage an informal, friendly, interaction. It reflects their conversational style (Hymes, 1989).

In interaction people use words, organize topics and turns in a way they consider "normal". And they expect others will do the same (Tannen, 2007:254). They are, as such, oriented towards a particular style of engaging in interaction. It was previously established that what is normal is often overlooked as being part of culture (see section2.6). Many people are not aware they have a conversational style, because everyone around them talks in the same way. They have all been socialized in the same social or cultural group so the style is part of their common ground. Only when they encounter someone that uses a different style it occurs to them their normal might not be everyone's normal (Tannen, 1987:264). What conversational style is preferred differs per social or cultural community. The lack of awareness about conversational styles makes it especially hard to adapt your style to someone else's style.

The importance of style of conversation is not to be underestimated. As Tannen (1987:251) explains: "Style is not something extra or frivolous, added on like frosting on a cake. It is the stuff of which the cake is made". To interpret someone's words correctly, others need to be able to recognize what someone is trying to do. The way some message is phrased and uttered presents clues as to how it is meant (Tannen, 2005:4); provided that you are familiar with that style of course. Recognizing one aspect of interactional organization as shared could result in the (faulty) assumption other aspects are shared as well. Some more subtle differences in conversational style are not that easily perceived, leading people to assume they do in fact use the same interactional resources in the same way and are thus able to correctly interpret others' behaviors based on their own expectations of how interaction normally unfolds.

A detailed study of the patterns of phatic communion can provide a general idea of the conversational style that is adopted by speakers of a particular language (in a particular group). Assuming participants are cooperative and normally try to coordinate their actions to the best of their abilities, the default orientation should be towards positive alignment and communality (this is supported by the preference for continuity in talk and the completion of joint actions (as explained in section 2.3). One strategy to keep the conversation going and establish (or at least suggest) mutual understanding is repetition of ideas and sentences. This type of strategy fits a conversational style of high-involvement in which it is valued to continuously show rapport and engagement (Tannen, 2007:85).

Related to high- and low-context communication, the level of overt commitment and alignment could be hypothesizes to coincide with the verbal explicitness of communicative messages. If a large part of some informational message is communicated verbally as in the low-context communication style, then the same would be expected for the indexation of interpersonal relationships. Low-context cultures would, consequently, be expected to value explicit reference to involvement. The construction of positive alignment would be more overtly expressed, emphasizing the mutual similarity and sharedness. Their conversa-

tional style would be one of high-involvement. Conversely, in high-context communication both the informational and relational coordination would largely by left to inference based on the assumed common ground. The mutual relationship is known to all participants, meaning they do not have to explicitly communicate their shared position or involvement in interaction (and their relationship) that frequently. The sharedness is implied, not in need of explication. High-context communication would thus be associated with a more low-involvement conversational style (cf. section 2.6).

3.5 Conclusion

Language is used to inform others about things we know or want. It is also, or maybe even primarily, used to share our attitude or stance toward someone or something. At some level, this is as much informing others as is telling them something about the world around us - the classical referential informing. Laver (1975) argued the phatic function of language is indexical: a speaker positions himself in relation to the hearer, the utterance, and the situation. By indicating that one shares or opposes another's point of view, the social relation is indexed and updated. This positioning can be alongside a conversational partner (positive alignment) or in opposition of the stance they took (negative alignment). These different positions regarding the object of interaction (the utterance or act) and the participants form a stance triangle (Du Bois, 2007; cf. section 3.2) that people use to keep track of their attitudes and beliefs.

The preferred direction of talk in informal interaction is to move forward and orient towards agreement (Stivers and Robinson, 2006). That is, participants anticipate and coordinate their contributions to increase the likelihood of reaching mutual understanding and appreciation. In terms of stancetaking and alignment, the construction of a joint position is preferred over opposing, disconnected stances. People are thus generally assuming - and actively pursuing - positive alignment. Their calibration of stances is visible in the way they design their responsive actions. Over the course of this chapter, three main types of contributions have been discussed that primarily address the interpersonal stance, attempting to establish alignment.

The most visible way of constructing alignment is by means of an explicit expression that communicates the similarity between two participants (e.g. "I believe so too"). The stance taken by the first speaker is openly taken to represent the second speaker's position as well. These forms clearly mark one of the participants as a stance lead (the first speaker) and the other participant as a stance follow (the second speaker). In other cases, this successive stancetaking is not as clearly to recognize. Reproducing an earlier utterance does communicate the second speaker takes the same (or a similar) stance as the original speaker, but allows for more autonomy. The second speaker can claim independent access to a certain position by not explicitly attaching the two turns (and stances), but presenting the message as if it was something already on their

mind even before the other person made the statement. Finally, collaboratively constructing a single utterance establishes a joint position as well, if that the candidate completion offered by a second speaker indeed fits the first speaker's original utterance. In such co-participant completions, the first speaker starts a turn, which is then completed by another speaker. The anticipation of the full message, as expressed in the suggested completion, projects a possible shared position, which is to be confirmed by the original speaker. These three general types of contributions that primarily target the interpersonal relationship form the foundation of the analyses presented in part II.

The way in which interactants orient towards the use of one or the other type of contributions, indicates how they normally prefer and expect alignment to be addressed in informal interaction. This collection of preferences associated with building and maintaining the interpersonal relationship can be said to reflect people's conversational style: the way they normally do things. This is not to say they are aware of their preferences. Given that people are mostly confronted with people that are used to doing things the same way, it escapes their attention that it actually is a *particular* way and that others may have different preferences.

A distinction was made between high-involvement and low-involvement styles. The first reflects a preference for explicit and frequent expression of interpersonal similarity and connectedness, whereas the second is less concerned with overt and frequent marking of interpersonal involvement. These preferences - and thus the resulting conversational style - may be related to a high-context or low-context culture. A high-involvement style seemingly matches communication in low-context cultures; a low-involvement style seems to correspond with high-context cultures.

In sum, taking a stance, positioning yourself in relation to the things and people around you is an important aspect of phatic communion and central to successful communication. How the three general classes of explicit alignment, reproduction and collaboration are used in interaction and the role they play in establishing alignment is further examined in part II using data from Dutch and Indonesian informal conversation. This will ultimately lead to a discussion of their respective conversational styles in chapter 8. First, the methods of data analysis are explained in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

Data and methods

As explained in chapter 3, interpersonal alignment is a sliding scale between a positive and negative end. The workings of negative alignment, found in disagreements or rejections, have been described thoroughly (see e.g. conversational analytic work on dispreferred actions and repair Sidnell and Barnes, 2013). General patterns of language use related to positive alignment are less well established. There are many studies on agreement and confirmation, but mostly in relation to particular directive actions (e.g. Sidnell and Enfield, 2012; Schegloff, 1996) or as part of a general description of agreement markers (see e.g. Kärkkäinen, 2003). Pomerantz (1984) describes how (second) assessments are used to express both disagreement and agreement, but is an exception in the field.

While these studies on specific interactional environments or linguistic elements are invaluable to our understanding of interaction, we have to keep in mind they are smaller pieces of a bigger picture. That bigger picture is the ultimate goal of interactional research and this thesis is an attempt to get closer to it. My main interest lies in how speakers show their involvement in the ongoing interaction. More specifically, how people make their position known to others and thus establish alignment between active participants - in this case in Dutch and Indonesian. Due to the focus on positive alignment, this thesis still only touches upon a fraction of general interaction. However, it is an important fraction, for if we understand how people belonging to different groups are used to or prefer to express involvement, we are closer to understand the interplay between basic human interactional structures (or the interaction engine, see section 2.4) and culture. After all, the want to cooperate, work together and establish a positive interpersonal relation is said to be the driving force of inter-

action. Sticking with the engine metaphor first presented in 2.4: knowing what motor is used helps us understand how the car works. In other words, when we have a clear picture of what conversational style the speakers of these language use to express involvement we not only deepen our knowledge of the preferences of language use in two speech communities, but in human interaction in general.

The similarities and differences in style between the two groups can tell us more about which aspects of language use might be universal and which aspects are culturally informed. Furthermore, understanding the particulars of informal, friendly, language use in either language, can help explain challenges in intercultural interactions. To uncover a conversational style, a lot of data are needed. This chapter explains what interactional data were used and how they were prepared for analysis. The first section emphasizes the importance of longer stretches of interaction in this type of research (see 4.1). Subsequently the challenges of working with a corpus of spoken language are briefly touched upon (see section 4.2). Section 4.3 introduces real-life soap Big Brother as the source material and elaborates on how the TV show is set up, what the participants are like, and what the advantages and limitations are of working with this material. The final section of this chapter explains how the source material was adapted for analysis (4.4) by transcribing and coding a selection of televised episodes, and highlights the main challenges and limitations of manually transcribing and coding data.

4.1 Building conversations, building relations

As argued in 2.2, individual knowledge and attitudes are constantly updated; and as a result of this update, so is the common ground. This shared knowledge subsequently leads to certain expectations about the ongoing interaction and informs decisions about the further course of interaction. Preliminary moves (discussed earlier in section 2.3) are a perfect illustration of how interaction builds. Suppose two people, Dave and Vicky, meet in the foyer of their office building. Dave really likes Vicky and wants to ask her out. A question like "Are you doing anything later tonight?" can be understood as just a question about her plans later that night, but using her intention-attribution skills, Vicky will likely already move on to a possible next move: Dave could be planning on extending an invitation to join him in some activity. If she is not available or does not feel like hanging out with Dave tonight, she can make the question into the main act by formulating a response that cuts off that route of conversation. His (potential) next move of inviting can be prevented. The subsequent course of action depends on what the hearer decides to do with the preliminary move. If Vicky responds with "I'm having dinner with my parents" or even "I have a date", the invitation-to-be will likely not be extended and the both of them can pretend there was no intention of asking her out on a date to begin with.

Given that interaction builds on what came before, and interlocutors care-

fully monitor what others do in interaction, it is important not to just look at individual turns, or isolated responses, but to analyze language use as it happens. After all, interlocutors have access to much more information than a single utterance or turn. If we want to truly understand how language, and specifically the *use* of language, works we need to study multi-unit sequences as they occur in conversation, and focus on how interactants manage social relations within that stretch of talk in interaction (Enfield and Sidnell, 2014:93). To that end, Enfield (2013) advocates what he calls an enchronic analysis of language:

> "An enchronic perspective on human communication focuses on sequences of interlocking or interdependent communicative moves that are taken to be co-relevant, and causally-conditionally related". (Enfield 2013a:29)

This causally-conditionally relevance is strongly emphasized in conversation analytic approaches as well. As discussed in sections 2.3 and 3.3, initiating and responsive turns form projective pairs that are jointly established. The sequential nature of talk in interaction is central to investigating how speakers show involvement and establish interpersonal alignment. Furthermore, focusing on a larger stretch of unfolding conversation (as opposed to isolated examples) is the only way that allows for analysts to try and interpret what is said in the (near) the participants themselves did. To learn more about the preferences of constructing an informal conversation, as much of the interaction under consideration has to be taken into account as possible. However, every interactional study is concerned more with one aspect than others. Thus, decisions have to be made about what (not) to include and why. The following sections outline how this was approached in the current study.

4.2 Qualitative and quantitative analysis

Finding patterns of language use and do justice to the complexity and dynamics of interactions requires an extensive collection of longer stretches of interaction. The analysis presented in this thesis is grounded in empirical data. Based on a context-sensitive single case analysis, recurring observations led to the formation of three general types of contributions that are regularly found in spontaneous responsive actions targeting the interpersonal positioning of interlocutors (cf. 3.3, and chapters 5-7). All contributions that fit one of these three main types were subsequently reviewed to determine whether relevant subtypes could be distinguished. This bottom up approach has the advantage of not imposing a particular function or understanding to a certain interactional behavior, while at the same time allowing for generalizations. It thus combines qualitative and quantitative analysis to come to a full understanding of the (relative) regularity of a certain linguistic practice.

This is reminiscent of the inductive approach used in conversation analysis (Heritage, 1995:399): a general search for cases that (seemingly) reflect the practice under investigation, to subsequently come to conclusions about the more general pattern of use based on qualitative case-by-case analysis. This first search includes all possibly relevant instances, following which the collection is studied for patterns. This will reveal clear examples, marginal cases and even deviant cases, clarifying the boundaries of one or another function or use of the phenomenon. An important difference, however, is that this study employed coding as a central step in the analysis. Systematically organizing the data allows for a subsequent thorough analysis of the material, but also provides the possibility to present actual numbers and find relevant correlations. Coding can improve an interactional analysis, as long as it is done sensibly (Stivers, 2015).

Where this mixed methods approach is aimed at finding patterns of use, strict conversation analytic studies do not normally use a quantitative approach.[1] Schegloff (1993:103) indeed argues that formulating a defensible notion of nominator, denominator and domain is not possible in many areas, thus complicating quantitative analysis. Heritage (1995:406) similarly concludes "statistical treatments of evidence for conversational procedures have yet to prove to be central or significant for analysis". Essentially, the problem is that to quantify the occurrence of a particular practice it needs to be clear what is counted (and why) and it needs to be clear what does and does not count as a relevant instance (and why). More challenging still, is that the fact that something *can* occur at a certain point in interaction - that it is a relevant and appropriate act at that point - does not mean it necessarily *does*. The potentiality of a particular practice is likely higher than the actual number of realizations. How often something could have, but did not, occur is difficult to assess, since there is no (linguistic) form available.

Distilling linguistic patterns from a large pool of data is the central effort of corpus linguistics. Corpus-linguistics can be an end in itself, but is increasingly used as a means to an end in other disciplines of linguistics (McCarthy and O'Keeffe, 2010:7). In most corpus linguistic studies, the search for a particular lexical item leads to certain conclusions about its distribution, use or change. With pragmatic phenomena, such as politeness patterns, stancetaking and phatic language use, it is difficult to enter a search item and retrieve frequency and distributional information automatically, since there often is no specific form associated with the phenomenon of interest (Ruhlemann and Aijmer, 2015:10). This lack of clear form-function mapping also means automatic tagging or annotation often is impossible. Still, using quantitative methods is relevant to discourse analysis, although it can never be a fully quantitative analysis (Hunston, 2007:28). The numbers that are included in a quantitative overview are normally derived from a case-by-case examination; they are a product of qualitative analysis. Furthermore, quantitative patterns of use play

[1] Recently a special issue on the use of conversation analysis in experimental (often quantitative) studies was published in Research on Language and Social Interaction (2017, 50(1)). See Kendrick (2017) for an introduction.

a role in identifying more or other elements of interest (Hunston, 2007). The relevance of quantitative information thus primarily lies in the relative frequency of particular form or function within the larger set of forms and function that target the same phenomenon.

This is why the analyses presented in the following chapters will not speak to the overall frequency of occurrence compared to the associated potentiality. All quantitative statements concern the number of instances of a particular subtype relative to the full set of observed occurrences of *that type*. For example, the study of explicit expressions of alignment demonstrated several forms to be used, most notably expressions similar to "me too" or "that is why I said". In the collection of explicit alignment efforts in Dutch showed most are of the first type, in the Indonesian data the second type is more frequently observed. Similarly, out of all phatic contributions that actually were produced, a difference in distribution of the main types (support, reproduction, collaboration) is observed between the two data sets. Note that this statement addresses the relative distribution *within* this larger class, not the relative frequency of phatic contributions (or one of the subsets) in interaction *overall*. These relevant frequencies do contribute to the general impression of speakers orienting towards a certain conversational style. Furthermore, the quantification of phrases such as "usually" or "typically" adds transparency to the analysis.

In recent years, corpus linguistics has become increasingly used to help solve pragmatic, sociolinguistic, and discourse analytical questions. Although the use of corpora to investigate language use has proven to be very fruitful (McCarthy and O'Keeffe, 2010:11), it presents a number of challenges as well. Corpora are generally not designed with the study of pragmatics in mind and there are relatively few spoken corpora (McCarthy and O'Keeffe, 2010:10). For both Indonesian and Dutch no spoken corpus was available that included longer stretches of naturally occurring talk. Even if such a corpus had been available, the comparability of the data would be questionable at best. To ensure the comparability of corpora, a new corpus was constructed for this thesis. Constructing a corpus that includes pragmatic annotation inevitably means manually assigning tags or codes to every relevant item in the data set - a time-consuming job.

The advantage of an annotated corpus is that it allows for systematic analysis of certain aspects of the different classes or categories that are distinguished. For example, one such aspect could be the frequency of an affirmative particle being added to a full repetition or paraphrase of an earlier utterance. The subsets that are formed by the corpus linguistic analysis of the coded reactions are then qualitatively scrutinized in a case-by-case manner adding a layer of pragmatic analysis. This combination of pragmatic and corpus linguistic methods is what Ruhlemann and Aijmer (2015) call corpus-pragmatics. Corpus-pragmatics has proven to be a useful method in research on topics related to this thesis, including work on stancetaking in academic writing (Gray and Biber, 2015), back-channels (Peters and Wong, 2015), and co-construction (Clancy and McCarthy, 2015). To conclude, the integration of quantitative cor-

pus linguistic methods with qualitative pragmatic methods, as advocated by corpus-pragmatics, can uncover patterns that would be overlooked by either method on its own.

4.3 The data - Big Brother recorded them

If we truly want to understand how people use their language in everyday life, we need to actually observe them using it. As Pulaczewska (2013) shows, elicited data can be problematic because the data might not represent actual spoken language use, but rather represent what participants think is "correct". A prerequisite for potentially uncovering patterns - and cross-linguistic differences - in language use is thus having a huge database of naturally occurring spoken interactions. However, gathering enough examples is not an easy task. Following people around, recording all their (linguistic) actions, would yield a great amount of useful data, but is both highly impractical and very invasive.

Luckily, the great minds of television have designed a show that does just that: Big Brother.[2] In this reality TV show, a group of people moved into a house where their every move was recorded. Even though the data have been obtained from an abnormal environment, they are a good source of normal language use. This practice has been put to the test in recent years, and a number of local versions of Big Brother have been used as a source of data to analyze language usage patterns, including Sinkeviciute (2014) on Australian English mock impoliteness, Sinkeviciute (2015) on impoliteness in the UK, Pulaczewska (2010, 2013) on Polish, German and English requests, Flöck (2016) on requests in British and American English, and Syahwinda and Kusasi (2012) on politeness in Indonesian.

4.3.1 Big Brother the TV show

Modeled after George Orwell's dystopian book *1984*, the television show Big Brother revolves around the idea of people living in a world without privacy. A number of contestants, referred to as housemates, is brought into a house that will be their home for up to the next hundred days. They are not allowed to have any contact with the outside world; no telephone, no internet, no television, no radio, not even a newspaper. Everything they say and do is recorded with both visible and hidden cameras. In the first ever broadcast season of Big Brother, 24 cameras (of which 2 infrared cameras) and 63 microphones were used to document the life of the housemates. To record personal interactions, every housemate had to wear a personal microphone as well (Hille et al., 2000:160).

[2]This project would not have been possible without the permission from Endemol Nederland B.V. (EndemolShine Nederland since 2015) to use their archive of Big Brother material. The use of material was restricted to members of the research project and was limited to reviewing and transcribing the data; distribution or reproduction of audio and/or visual material is not allowed. Therefore, no images or other media files can be made available related to this thesis.

Although the creators of the show prefer to describe it as a real-life soap (Roscoe, 2001:480), Big Brother is essentially a game show with a money prize to be won after a hundred or so days. Every two weeks all contestants have to (anonymously) nominate two of their peers for eviction.[3] It is, however, not the contestants themselves that decide who leaves the house, but the viewers at home. Via televoting the audience decides which of the nominees is evicted the week following nomination. The last resident to remain in the house is the winner. Apart from the weekly nominations, the contestants have to complete a challenge each week in return for extra household money or other advantages (e.g. a good meal, a letter from home, immunity from eviction).

The first ever season of Big Brother was broadcast in the Netherlands in 1999. Soon after that, the immensely popular TV program spread across the globe and local versions have now been broadcast in over 45 countries. The concept of the show has remained largely the same, although some changes were made most notably to the number of contestants. Because of the consistency in design, the show lends itself very well for comparative study. Considering this thesis aims to analyze and contrast the norms of conversational conduct in Dutch and Indonesian, comparability of the source material is essential.

The Dutch data cover the first 60 days of the contestants living together, the Indonesian data range from the first to the 34th day of habitation. Transcripts were made from a selection of the television broadcasts of both the first season of the Dutch version (aired in 1999) and the Indonesian edition (aired in 2011) of Big Brother to compile a large enough corpus to study the management of interpersonal interaction. Both data sets consist of approximately ten hours of transcribed interaction.[4] The excerpts that were selected include different types of interactions:

- spontaneous interactions between contestants (e.g. sitting in the living room)
- "guided" interactions between contestants (e.g. weekly tasks)
- interactions between the contestants and Big Brother

Not all of these interactions are equally relevant to the current study. Given that this thesis is concerned with interpersonal relationship management in informal interaction, the spontaneous interactions between housemates are most relevant. These are all conversations amongst contestants that are not in any way encouraged or influenced by the producers of the TV show. They are truly informal and spontaneous.

Guided interactions refer to those interactions that are instigated by Big Brother, like the weekly task they have to complete or the grocery list they have to make. It is important to note that Big Brother does not influence the interaction *itself*. Participants are completely free in what they do or say, how they behave, whether they cooperate or take part in the activity or not, etc. The

[3] At least in the first edition (1999) the nomination was biweekly.
[4] For the included excerpts and episodes, see Appendix A.1.

Corpus details	**Dutch**	**Indonesian**
minutes	598	729
episodes	41	28
scenes	696	964
contributions (all)	11897 (100%)	8064 (100%)
contributions (internal)	11713 (98.45%)	7416 (93.20%)
words (all)	96841 (100%)	60869 (100%)
words (internal)	88868 (91.77%)	47992 (78.84%)

Table 4.1: Corpus breakdown This table presents the relevant numbers pertaining to the size of the corpus. The total number of contributions and words, represented by (all) in the table, includes all utterances presented by the contestants. Contributions by hosts, guests, voice over, or the production team are excluded from the corpus. Since the focus of this thesis is on interpersonal alignment en informal interaction, a distinction was made between interaction oriented towards an "internal" or "external" interlocutor. All of the contestants themselves are considered internal interlocutors, making all their interpersonal interaction part of the relevant data collection. They partake in actual face-to-face informal conversation. On these grounds, contributions targeting a member of the Big Brother production team or a friend or relative back home were excluded. These participants are either not present (e.g. family members) and thus do not actively take part in any form of interaction, or the interaction is not deemed informal or equal due to a clear power structure between Big Brother representatives and the contestants. Furthermore, these representatives are normally invisible to the contestants, which significantly influences the communicative behavior as well.

term guided merely reflects the fact that the suggestion of doing that particular activity at that moment did not come from one of the contestants, but from an external party. Both the spontaneous and guided interactions are useful in describing the conversational habits of the people involved, since both situations involve multi-party interactions where in principle anything and everything is possible.

Finally, interactions between housemates and Big Brother are excluded from analysis. On several occasions, contestants interact with a representative from the tv show. These representatives are only "present" in interaction behind a camera (in the diary room) or via intercom. This "Big Brother" character is never seen, only heard. Big Brother may address the housemates as a group, in which case the voice is heard in the entire house, or housemates may enter the so-called "diary room" to talk to Big Brother in private. Housemates are usually invited to come into the diary room by intercom; they cannot initiate contact themselves. In the diary room, the contestants reveal their two nominees of choice, talk to a psychologist or doctor if needed, receive secret missions or tasks from Big Brother, or simply share their thoughts on something that happened in the house. These interactions are not really multi-party, since contestants are in the room by themselves, talking to a camera. They do talk to someone, but this person is not actually present, they only hear their voice.

The power relation between the contestants and representatives from the TV show and the lack of actual contact between the two groups disqualifies their

interaction as a type of informal conversation. The contestants are dependent on the producers, cannot normally initiate talk with them, and are not able to see them. The relationship between contestants amongst themselves and between the contestants and Big Brother is entirely different. Whereas contestants are mostly equals, their relation to Big Brother is hierarchical (Pulaczewska, 2010). They do not know who they are talking to, they reside in the house because Big Brother lets them, and it is Big Brother, not them, who can decide to make changes to their living situation. The numbers presented in table 4.1 therefore distinguishes between turns directed at "internal" and "external" interlocutors. The contestants are the internal co-participants, all people they talk to who do not reside in the house are external participants. This latter group includes representatives of the show, but also family members or friends that are addressed through the camera.

4.3.2 Advantages and limitations

Big Brother has been described as a human zoo, in which "the housemates are displayed in a simulated natural environment" (Roscoe, 2001:478). Just like in an actual zoo, the general behavior of its residents is not impeded, only the area they can move around in. Also similar to a zoo, visitors (the audience) feel they have the right to watch the residents' every move and formulate all sorts of opinions and judgments about them as well. It is this confinement of the residents and the privilege of unlimited access to their behavior that makes this human zoo a perfect source for language use research.

As a result of being completely isolated from the outside world, the Big Brother residents dependent on each other for distraction and interaction. They do not have too much to do (aside from the weekly tasks that earn them money to order groceries), meaning one of their main activities is to hang around and talk. These interactions are the kind of spoken data that are not easily obtained: long, spontaneous, multi-party, naturally occurring stretches of talk between people that have no shared history. Although this is enough reason in itself to use these and not other data, pre-recorded data do present some challenges of their own. The main advantages and disadvantages of the data are discussed below.

The first advantage is the fact that the participants have no prior history. They have to resort to their basic knowledge and expectation of how to talk to others, since they do not have any information about how their co-habitants might react. Secondly, a lot of different types of interactions are observable - the housemates gossip, discuss more and less serious matters, complain, tell stories, coordinate activities, argue, and so on. A third advantage is that the number of people that are involved allows for different pairings of participants. The way they talk can thus potentially be cross-referenced with their interactional partner to see whether they adapt their uses of language.

One objection to using a televised show as source material might be that the participants' behavior is unnatural or that the interactions are scripted.

However, even though the contestants indeed *know* they are observed, their behavior is reflective of human beings trying to show their best self. These interactions are thus taken to represent the conversational style they would use in similar situations where they would have to interact with newly acquainted people in a sympathetic manner.[5] Therefore, I do not consider this a real limitation to the data, at least not in the context of the current study.

There is a serious limitation, though, that influences the availability and accessibility of interactional material. To find patterns in language use that together form a style, longer stretches of spontaneous talk are crucial. A challenge in using a television program for research purposes is that you do not have any control over what is and is not available. The producers of the show might make decisions that make a lot of sense from a production perspective, but can be destructive of interesting conversational data. To give some examples, some interactions are cut short, others "begin" in the middle of a conversation, and sometimes the conversation is overpowered by music or surrounding noises. Still, while the limitation is real, the bits and pieces that are available leave plenty of useful interactional data to work with.

4.3.3 Participants

Although the contestants are aware they are being recorded, they do not know what material is included in the daily broadcast or how the recordings are edited. The housemates in the 1999 season in the Netherlands did not even know millions of viewers tuned in each night to watch them live their lives. This group of people is especially interesting to the study of interactional norms, because they are essentially strangers that have to learn to live together. They have not met before entering the Big Brother house and thus have no previously established social relations to fall back to. They have to rely on how interaction is "normally" structured to get to know one another and establish a mutual relationship.

They might present themselves as (slightly) better or more sympathetic versions of themselves to ensure the television audience's sympathy as well, but as (Pulaczewska, 2013:661) rightly points out "such conscious face- building is constantly present in our everyday lives, too, and does not disqualify the data as a very special sort". The fact that they cannot escape the cameras and do not know what will and will not be on air further complicates the idea that the participants would behave unnaturally to impress the audience. Keeping up appearances all day, everyday for up to a hundred days is a steep challenge. Still, both contestants and producers confirm the normalcy of the interactions.

After leaving the Big Brother house, one of the contestants stated in an

[5]Of course nothing is truly similar to living in the Big Brother house. However, as Pulaczewska (2012:21) states, there are situations that resemble certain aspects of this situation like holiday camps, student housing, or shared apartments. All these situations involve a number of people, who are not at first acquainted, residing in a shared space and having to interact with each other to make it work.

interview they "just tried to be themselves" (Van de Pol, 2000). Moreover, as De Kloet and Chow (2000:125) assert, Big Brother is focused on producing and capturing authenticity. The goal was never to bring people spectacular television, instead the show wanted to show them how fascinating the banality of everyday life can be (Van Ginneken, 2000:114; Roscoe, 2001:479). At least in the early edition of the show, the aim was to cast ordinary people, rather than selecting eccentric or provoking characters to entertain the audience. One of the people involved in casting the Dutch housemates recalls they were looking for candidates to fulfill particular family roles - the dad, mom, and the rebellious son. They expected the dynamics between such characters to make for interesting television (Staat, 2000:89). The fact that the housemates were not actors but regular people who "wrote their own script" (Roscoe, 2001:480) allowed viewers to identify with them - quite possibly explaining the huge success of the show.

The premiere 1999 edition of Big Brother, broadcast in the Netherlands, originally included nine people; four women and five men.[6] Three of them voluntarily left the house prematurely and were replaced by others. Twelve people have thus at one point lived in the Big Brother house, but never more than nine at the same time. These twelve people represent a variety of occupations: police officer, salesperson, teacher, student, singer, bartender, homemaker, entrepreneur, probation officer. Table 4.2 below provides an overview of the age profile of this group of twelve housemates.[7]

Dutch	*count*	*mean age*	*median age*	*youngest*	*oldest*
women	7	26.7	26	20	39
men	5	32	25	22	44
total	12	28.9	26	20	44

Table 4.2: Age profile Dutch participants. This table shows the number and age profile of male and female participants residing in the Big Brother house. A total of 12 residents have stayed at the Dutch Big Brother house, albeit not all at the same time. The mean age of the contestants is close to 29 year, with youngest being a woman of 22 and the oldest a man of 44. (The mean age of the original nine contestants was slightly higher, 30 years, due to two of the replacement contestants being younger than the contestants that had left the house.)

[6] From almost 3000 applications a selection of a few hundred people was made, who were invited for a screen test. All prospective candidates had to agree to a psychological evaluation, a medical screening and a background check to ensure they were mentally and physically fit to stay in the house for up to 107 days (Hille et al., 2000:5).

[7] The age profile of the original nine contestants moving into the Dutch Big Brother house is as follows:

Dutch	*count*	*mean age*	*median age*	*youngest*	*oldest*
women	4	27.5	23	20	39
men	5	32	25	22	44
total	9	30	26	20	44

The first (and thus far only) edition of Big Brother Indonesia was broadcast in the spring of 2011 and it saw 15 people enter the Big Brother house. In this edition the group of housemates consisted of eight men and seven women who had spent their days before the show as a model, homemaker, student, artist, doctor, entrepreneur, umbrella girl, working in administration, human resources, at a radio station, or freelancing.

Indonesian	*count*	*mean age*	*median age*	*youngest*	*oldest*
women	7	27.9	25	20	43
men	8	24.8	23.5	21	30
total	15	26.2	24	20	43

Table 4.3: Age profile Indonesian participants. This table shows the number and age profile of male and female participants residing in the Indonesian Big Brother house. In total there were fifteen residents staying in the house, all of whom moved in at the very first day. There were no replacements. The mean age is somewhat lower than the Dutch contestants are: just over 26 years old. The youngest contestant is a woman of 20, the oldest a women of 43. The biggest difference with the Dutch contestants, in terms of age distribution, is the younger age of the men (a mean age of 32 in the Dutch, compared to 24.8 in the Indonesian competition).

The main difference between these two groups is the number of participants living in the Big Brother house. Since this thesis focuses on comparing how people in these two languages normally indicate involvement and establish alignment, it is important to start the analysis at a similar point for both groups. To establish what is "normal", ideally the participants should not have any common ground other than their physical environment - at least as far as they know. Lacking prior information about other people's knowledge, habits or expectations means people have to fall back on general principles of interaction; their baseline of interactive conduct. Therefore, I decided to focus on all interactions right from the start of the show, even if that meant the number of participants was different. Using the earlier interactions rules out the possibility that differences in patterns of use are a result of one group being unacquainted to each other (the Dutch speakers), whereas the other group has already spent seven weeks living together (the nine Indonesian contestants that are left after seven weeks). In those seven weeks, the Indonesian group could have developed routines of co-habitation not yet available to the Dutch group that had only just met for the first time.

4.4 From broadcast to data - constructing the corpus

The analyses in this thesis are based on roughly ten hours of video material of both the Dutch and the Indonesian first edition of Big Brother; the total set of data thus encompasses twenty hours of recorded natural interaction. These hours mostly consist of multi-party interactions, although some scenes involve visits to the diary room to talk to a member of the production team

(as explained in section 4.3.1). The data were selected based on the presence of accessible linguistic interaction. To give an example, when the housemates were seen working on a project without any talk involved (or inaudible due to music) that part of the episode was excluded. All selected material was subsequently manually transcribed and coded. This resulted in a corpus of informal conversation reaching almost 97.000 words in Dutch and 61.000 words in Indonesian. The corpus includes pragmatic annotation of all responsive contributions. Not all responsive actions are of course produced spontaneously (e.g. answers to questions), nor are all of them primarily targeting the interpersonal relation. This section will first address the transcription process, followed by an explanation of the coding protocol and a breakdown of the corpus and finally some challenges to the research procedure.

4.4.1 Transcripts

The selected episodes were fully transcribed and/or checked by both a native speaker of the relevant language and myself. A transcript was produced for all spoken material.[8] Every (transcribed) scene also includes information about who are involved or present and where the interaction takes place. I use the term "scene" to describe a demarcated stretch of interaction in the material. A scene might be cut off due to the production team deciding to jump to a different location or activity in the house, or can end naturally when the participants move on to do something else. If there was even the slightest suspicion of a scene being edited by the show's producers, this is indicated in the transcript. Each scene normally takes place in one location with a fixed group of people and covers a specific topic of talk. All changes in location and involved participants are mentioned in the transcript, change of topic is of course visible in the talk itself. The transcript thus represents what is called an open transcript, as it includes "every feature of talk and interaction as it unfolds" (Jenks, 2011:12) without a predetermined hypothesis or research goal.

As Tannen (2005:14) emphasizes, ideally both the verbal and non-verbal behavior is analyzed. Although the used source material includes audio and video, the editing process aimed at making good television, not good research data. The transcripts represent all verbal and where relevant (and visible!) non-verbal behavior of the involved participants. Non-verbal behavior is considered relevant when it (i) clearly presents a reaction or response to something another participant said and (ii) it is noticeably interpreted as a meaningful contribution by that other participant. The third position (the turn following a projective pair) gives a good sense of how the nonverbal act was interpreted by

[8]Many thanks to Tanja Sloos (research intern) and Eri Y Sidharta (research assistant) for their assistance with the transcripts. The financial means for the latter's involvement was generously provided by LUCL. I would also like to thank the students of *Tekst- en gespreksanalyse* 2014-2015 for their willingness to act as co-coders. See Appendix A.2 for the transcription conventions, which are (loosely) based on Jefferson (2004). Appendix A.3 and A.4 present a longer stretch of transcribed conversation from respectively the Dutch and Indonesian material.

the first speaker. For example, nodding or frowning might lead the first speaker to continue or rephrase their turn to clarify what they meant. In doing so, they ratify the non-verbal act as a meaningful contribution. The turn following a projective pair thus holds information about how the participants themselves interpreted the behavior of their interlocutor.

4.4.2 Coding the data

To create some order in the chaos of hours of interaction, the relevant interactional exchanges have to be separated from the irrelevant. Using codes to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant cases and to assign the relevant cases to particular subsets makes the pool of analyzable data manageable. As Basit (2003:152) fittingly describes, coding allows you to "communicate and connect with the data to facilitate the comprehension of emerging phenomena and to generate theory grounded in the data". Coding provides additional information to the transcript and can therefore be seen as a further "development of the transcription stage" (Adolphs and Carter, 2014:15). Whereas the transcript reflects the actual behavior in interaction, the codes reflect a higher level of abstraction of that behavior. By linking symbolic categories to certain contributions, qualitative records of events become quantifiable (see Bird and Liberman (2001) for an effort to design a unified frame for all types of linguistic coding and annotation).

Since the topic of this thesis is interpersonal involvement and positive alignment, the analysis, and therefore the coding, is focused on responsive actions. Whenever a participant has taken a stance regarding a particular object, other participants have the opportunity to join that first speaker in their position - positively aligning to them - or to present a different position - negatively aligning to them. The stancetaking of every party other than the first stancetaker is coded to investigate how speakers of Dutch and Indonesian preferably inform their conversational partner(s) about their subjective stance and consequent interpersonal alignment. To this end, all responsive contributions that present some form of positioning were coded, both the responses that establish positive and negative alignment.[9] This resulted in a total of 4915 coded contributions in the Dutch corpus and 2667 coded contribution in the Indonesian corpus.

The coding was done by me as a bottom-up identification process: I read through all transcripts while watching the videos and provided a code when appropriate. To present evidence based on corpus data, a reliable method is needed to describe and analyze the patterns that are discovered (Tognini Bonelli, 2010:18). In an attempt to devise a set of codes that were most relevant to my research goals I followed the three rules of thumb in coding data presented by Lampert and Ervin-Tripp (1993:179-181): (i) the categories that

[9]Coding negative alignment as well is useful, even if it is not included in the analysis, because it provides an overall idea of how common certain linguistic structures are and how often and explicit speakers make their stance follow available to others. The negative alignment instances will not be discussed further in this thesis.

are distinguished should match the research goals of the current research (and not include "left over" codes from a borrowed coding scheme that are in fact irrelevant), (ii) it should be clear what each category represents and how it is different from other categories (categories are preferably mutually exclusive), and (iii) the chosen categories should be exhaustive, that is for all cases that are found a classification has to be provided.

The codes I used reflect prominent topics in research on affiliation and alignment and, more importantly, were observably different in the data. They represent the main resources speakers use to establish alignment with another party. The main codes attributed to positive alignment cases distinguish repetition (RPT), co-construction (COCON), paraphrase (PAR), agreement (AGREE) and reactions that include some reference to a shared evaluation (ME TOO).[10] Apart from these main codes, all annotated cases provide information on three other aspects of the reaction, each of which is explained below. For the sake of transparency, the full breakdown of the corpus is given here, starting from the full collection of coded contributions, resp. 4915 cases in the Dutch corpus and 2667 cases in the Indonesian corpus.

Note that these numbers pertain to all contributions that follow some earlier utterance. This still includes reactions to participants not residing in the house (e.g. Big Brother representatives, family at home, the audience) and reactions to an earlier utterance produced by the same speaker (e.g. self-repair or reproduction of an utterance for emphasis). These reactions are excluded from the analysis, because they do not primarily target the interpersonal relationship between co-participants. However, they were coded to gain insight in the relative frequency of contributions constructing positive interpersonal alignment. The text below will use the starting data set to present some general trends that appear from this broader overview, and will explain how and why certain contributions were excluded from further analysis. The final number of contributions that *do* form the basis of the analyses presented in part II comes down to 3218 cases in Dutch and 1287 in Indonesian.

Responsive actions

All contributions that are discussed in this thesis are reactions to some other participant.[11] Furthermore, they are all produced spontaneously and do not carry (too) much new propositional content. They are, in terms of transfer of

[10] Appendix A.5 presents all codes used to organize the data; an example of coded data is given in Appendix A.6.

[11] Some are responsive actions as well. Following (Thompson et al., 2015:3) the term *response* is understood to refer to contributions that present a proper closing of a projective project. That is, turns that are presented in the responsive slot, complete a proposed project, and are interpreted as such. Reactions refer to turns that react to something presented by another speaker, but are not a proper responsive action, in that they do not present uptake of the initiated or projected project. Both responses and reactions can contribute to establishing interpersonal alignment, although reactions - with their lack of clear propositional content or projected pair completion - are the primary suspects to perform a mostly phatic role.

information, redundant or irrelevant. However, they are highly valuable when it comes to the coordination of interpersonal understanding and stance. They represent a form of phatic communication at the heart of human interaction.

A distinction was made between content and feedback contributions. Content contributions are described as expressions that can stand on their own; they carry their own propositional content (e.g. "That is a beautiful cake"). Feedback contributions, on the other hand, cannot stand on their own, but are strongly linked to the turn they are presenting a reaction to ("Indeed", "Okay"). Compare Roos's contributions in example (1):

(1) *Reaction or response?*

Hanna	but I thought she was joking, so I ju[st kept going.
Roos	(a) [hm
	(b) YEah
	(c) sure, I would've done the same thing
	(d) hungry?

Hanna reports on her experience in an earlier situation, which invites a response insofar as a telling is normally aimed at enlisting sympathy or affinity. The utterances in (a) and (b) are of the FEEDBACK type, the utterances in (c) and (d) reflect a CONTENT contributions. Note that the category of FEEDBACK is not restricted to the class of backchannels or continuers; a single affirmative marker that presents a full response ("Are you still at work?" - "Yes") is just as much a feedback contribution as a simple "hm-hm". The point is that both in (a) and (b) the utterance does not mean anything without the previous utterance. To some extent, this applies to (some) content contributions as well. In (c), the "same thing" that is being referred to is impossible to understand without access to the prior exchange. Yet, the utterance in (c) is much more insightful when it comes to the positioning of the second speaker; whatever the "thing" is that is referred to, both speakers are now connected to the same position regarding that thing. At least their mutual similarity or shared understanding of the situation is clearly visible in the utterance. In that sense, the utterance communicates its own message, independent from the earlier utterance.

Out of all reactive contributions, a good subset consists of feedback reactions: in the Dutch data, 51.66% (or 2539 out of 4915) presented a feedback reaction, compared to 38.13% (or 1017 out of 2667) in the Indonesian data. The difference in frequency and type of reaction is already a first sign that these two groups may have different expectations in interaction when it comes to the behavior of fellow participants.[12]

[12]The relative preference for feedback over content contributions further increases in Dutch in the subset of contributions directed at another contestant (i.e. excluding reactions to self or to some person not residing in the house). This collection of 4279 cases represents actual interpersonal interaction and is as such more representative than the full collection of contributions. Out of all other-directed contributions in Dutch, 2505 presented feedback (58.5%) against 1174 content contributions (41.46%). Conversely, in the Indonesian data the relative preference of for content over feedback increases when only considering contributions




Figure 4.1: Feedback vs. content contributions. These figures present the relative share of feedback and content type reactions found in the corpus. The Dutch data shows a relatively higher number of feedback contributions (51.66% or 2539/4915) compared to content contributions (48.34% or 2376/4915), although they are very close together. The Indonesian data present a rather different picture: the relative share of feedback contributions (38.13% or 1017/2667) is much smaller than the share of content contributions (61.87% or 1650/2667).

Contributions that are coded as feedback may be performed in the responsive slot - after a transition relevant point - or mid-utterance (as in (a) above), indicating the person is listening. Moreover, owing to their limited propositional content, they can easily be non-verbal in nature. Content contributions may occur mid-utterance as well, for example, when a second speaker believes he or she is able to finish someone else's turn. Even though such a parallel contribution is not quite a response - since the utterance is presented ahead of the first speaker finishing the original his utterance and as such does not present a completion to the projected pair - it is a relevant propositional contribution in terms of constructing alignment. These mid-utterance contributions show involvement and the (at least one-sided) belief that the interlocutors share a common understanding. As such, they are relevant to the management of their interpersonal relationship.

Aside from FEEDBACK and CONTENT, a number of other codes were used to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant contributions. Each of those codes was designed to filter out data that did not target phatic communication and interpersonal alignment. The first distinction made is that between a reaction to some other participant's turn versus an earlier turn produced by the current speaker. After all, with only one speaker involved, there cannot be *interpersonal* alignment. The second distinction relates to the spontaneity of the contributions, since spontaneous informal reactions were explained to be the primary locus of interpersonal relationship management. Thirdly, contributions that are mostly concerned with the transfer of (factual) information were separated from phatic contributions. These three distinctions, and the consequences for the data collection, are each further discussed below.

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directed at a fellow contestant. The Indonesian corpus includes 1893 other-directed reactions of which 839 present feedback (44.32%) and 1054 (55.68%) present a content contribution.

1. Self or other

Most of the lexical or grammatical forms that are used to establish or express alignment are used in other environments as well. One of the contexts I decided to exclude from this study is repetitions or corrections of self. Investigating interpersonal alignment inevitably focuses on multiple parties, making reactions to utterances that were produced earlier by the same speaker irrelevant to the current study. Recall that it was for this same reason that reactions directed at participants not residing in the Big Brother house were excluded from further analysis. Thus, only coded contributions that react to some other speaker residing in the house are relevant for the purpose of this study: those turns form the subset of interpersonal spontaneous interaction in which alignment and stancetaking is presumably found.




Figure 4.2: Reactions to self vs. other. The majority of reactions is, unsurprisingly, directed at some other participant. However, the size of this majority share differs markedly between the two collections. In The Dutch data 4279 contributions were directed at a fellow contestant (out of 4915, 87.10%); in the Indonesian data the peer-oriented reactions make up for 1893 cases (out of 2667, 70.98%). The share of contributions targeting an earlier utterance produced by the same speaker (e.g. cases of self-repair, emphasis, non-responsiveness) reaches 12.07% in Dutch (593/4915) and 21.11% in the Indonesian data (563/2667). In the Indonesian corpus almost 8% of reactions were directed at some participants external to the circle of contestants (i.e. a Big Brother representative, the audience, or someone back home), whereas this hardly occurred in the Dutch data (0.87%). This is likely an effect of the higher number of diary room visits edited into the Indonesian episodes.

Figure 4.2 shows that out of all reactive moves, the majority was indeed directed at a fellow contestant in both the Indonesian and Dutch data. This separation of self and other directed contributions results in 4279 contributions (out of 4915, equaling 87.10%) directed at a fellow contestant in the Dutch data, and 1893 relevant contributions in the Indonesian data (out of a total of 2667 contributions, or 70.98%) These numbers include all responsive moves targeting one of the other participants, irrespective of the function or goal of that move.

Turns that are produced by a second speaker in reaction to some other speaker were coded with OTHER. All structures that would be considered a reaction had someone *else* produced them, were coded as if that were the case - even if they were produced by the same speaker. This includes repair structures,

emphatic reproduction of a particular point, a second attempt to gain someone's attention, confirming one's own stance, etc. Whenever a speaker "reacted" to their own expression, the code SELF was added. The codes referring to both self and other reactions combined give us a sense of the general frequency of use of certain structures, whereas the reactions to self can easily be excluded from further in-depth analyses. To be able to shed light on how participants prefer to show their active involvement in Indonesian and Dutch informal interaction, a further distinction needs to be made between invited and uninvited responsive actions.

2. Invited or uninvited

Initiating actions can simply present information that the other participants can do with what they will or they can explicitly target a response from another party (Kotthoff, 1993:194). Prime examples of invited reactions are answers to questions (Heritage and Raymond, 2012:1). Whereas these invited reactions are not immediately relevant to this study, they seem to represent an environment in which many of the linguistic structures are found that are used for purposes of alignment as well.

Similar to the distinction between self and other, it was indicated for each case whether the reaction or response was invited or uninvited. Reactions that establish alignment are mostly uninvited: participants spontaneously decide to reproduce, paraphrase or confirm what was just said, thus communicating similarity between themselves and another person. In both data collections, most coded contributions were not encouraged, but were presented spontaneously by another participant.




Figure 4.3: Invited vs. uninvited contributions. These figures show the large majority of cases to be presented spontaneously. In 86.31% of Dutch reactions (4242/4915) and 80.61% of Indonesian reactions (2150/2667) was it the second speaker that decided to say something in return, without being invited or encouraged to do so. Invited responses refer to those cases where the first speaker (explicitly) requests a response, the easiest example being a question that invites an answer.

Candidate solutions for word searches, as in "that museum in eh" followed by a silence, are considered to be invited as well since the first speaker opens up the floor to suggestions. All reactions that were in some way targeted or

invited by the first speaker were coded as INVITED; all cases in which the second speaker spontaneously decided to contribute something were marked UNINVITED. Open questions were excluded altogether, because the response they target is normally new information. Phatic communication and alignment is associated with speakers reacting to or (re)sharing knowledge that is already available in their common ground. The transfer (or request) of new information is thus not considered here.[13] This is in fact the final and most important distinction that was made: that between informative and phatic or affiliative contributions.

3. Informative or affiliative

The relevant data set was restricted to affiliative moves only, by excluding all "informational" contributions. Many responsive actions did not primarily target interpersonal alignment, but rather presented requested new information or redirected the conversation to some other topic of talk (e.g. answers to open questions). Such interactional moves were excluded from the analysis, precisely because they are more concerned with the exchange of news or information than with establishing and maintaining the interpersonal relationship. Only contributions that presented an immediate reaction to a stance or position taken by the first speaker are included in the analysis.




Figure 4.4: Phatic vs. functional contributions. The majority of spontaneous reactions can be classified as phatic communication. Out of all other-directed contributions, 75.20% resp. 68.09% in Dutch and Indonesian, are primarily socially relevant. This means that these contributions are not structurally necessary, i.e. they do not present an anticipated second pair part. Also, they do not obstruct or divert the course of action (in the form of repair or rejection) in any way. All contributions included in the raised pie part are primarily focused on continuing the ongoing interaction, constructing, and maintaining the interpersonal relationship. This results in 3218 phatic contributions in the Dutch corpus and 1287 in the Indonesian corpus.

Out of all other-directed contributions, most cases are in fact primarily relevant from a social perspective. In both data sets, the majority of reactions are

[13] An exception to this rule are confirmation questions, which are primarily concerned with the establishment of similarity and sharedness and therefore included in the analysis (cf. section 5.3).

affiliative in nature, although the share of phatic contributions is somewhat bigger in the Dutch corpus (75.20% or 3218/4279) compared to the Indonesian corpus (68.09% or 1287/1893). The numbers presented in the raised part of the pie chart represent the core data set that was used in this study. It includes all responsive actions that targeted some fellow participant *and* were deemed redundant in terms of informational value. The analysis presented in this thesis is thus based on 3218 instances of Dutch and 1287 instances of Indonesian phatic communication.

Actions - one or many?

An important point to keep in mind is that many actions in fact do several things at once. For example, a single turn does not just show confirmation, but also lays claim to the source or right of knowledge, or does not just show understanding, but autonomous (or even superior) access to information. The codes that were assigned to the relevant turns do not imply that all there is to that turn is what the code represents; they merely indicate to which broad categories of observable phenomena the turn belongs. For example, the code representing repetition of lexical items (RPT) only tells us that what the speaker says is a reiteration of an earlier turn. What the second speaker does or means with his repetition of the first turn is not yet determined.[14] Whether they confirm, disconfirm, question, mock or do something else entirely is not yet established when giving a code. The codes refer to observable structures of alignment, not to intended or interpreted actions, let alone claims of epistemic access or autonomy. The quantitative analysis thus informs the subsequent qualitative analysis, by drawing attention to certain cases that might have otherwise passed by unnoticed (Hunston, 2007).

4.4.3 Challenges

Including pragmatic annotation or assigning codes to language use is a tricky endeavor. The main challenge to the coder(s) is to limit confusion between the different coding options and to ensure for all cases that deserve a code one is available. Ideally, manual coding of language use is done ny a number of people in parallel to show people other than the develope can indeed apply the coding distinctions (Carletta et al., 1996:24). Lampert and Ervin-Tripp (1993:196ff) report that coding agreement varies greatly depending on topic of research and even from one team to the next. To produce similar codings of the same text, individuals are preferably trained together to make sure they have the same understanding of the process. Still, the percentage of agreement may be too low to be considered reliable, even with experienced coders (Spooren and Degand,

[14]The coding guide in Appendix A.5 shows codes for some subclasses. Whereas the main classes largely refer to categories of form or content, these subclasses are related to the main action performed by the speaker's contribution, it is thus a more functional indication. A particular turn was only assigned a subcode if there was a clearly recognizable action involved (e.g. a repair initiation, the completion of a routine, answering an open question).

2010:248). Remarkably, the best reliability scores are reported for individuals who have a close personal relationship. In other words, it seems that for co-annotators to produce similar results, understanding the coding system is not enough. They need to understand how the designer of the codes thinks and apply the codes as if they were the designer.[15]

If inter-annotator indeed correlates with how well the individuals involved know each other and to what extent they share a way of thinking, the question is how reliable the scores of inter-annotator reliability (and therefore objectivity of coding) in fact is. After all, if the second coder knows how to think *like* the first coder and applies that criterion when going through the material, is it really a measure of objectivity? At that point, the second coder is not necessarily trying to assign codes according to their own judgment, but rather trying to apply the codes as they think the first coder would do it. In other words, the effort shows an attempt to match someone else's subjective view and as a result does not say much about the objectivity of the coding design.

In the end it is mostly discussion and negotiation that is invaluable to fine-tuning the coding system (Lampert and Ervin-Tripp, 1993:200; called "double coding" by Spooren and Degand (2010:253). The coding system designed for this thesis is indeed the result of a number of rounds of parallel coding. In the first round I instructed a group of 8 undergraduate students to code a sample of conversation in groups of three. They first had to code their text individually and subsequently discuss the cases they disagreed on to see whether they could establish consensus amongst themselves on which code was most fitting. In the end, this test-run highlighted the most problematic codes and allowed me to adjust the codes where necessary. The revised version of the coding system was tested by a research intern and myself and led to further tweaking and modification. The result is the coding scheme that is used in this thesis (cf. Appendix A.5).

Unfortunately, I was not in the position to have other people go through all the data and apply codes. All coding is therefore subjective, although the categories the codes refer to are mostly structural and can as such be objectively recognized. An advantage to the disadvantage of not being able to reach inter-rater reliability is in fact this subjectivity. The individual strategies that one coder will develop to apply the codes will at least be applied systematically to all data (Spooren and Degand, 2010:254). Even if the coder is biased towards a particular interpretation, at least that bias is consistently present, thus not obscuring the overall comparison. To give a concrete example, suppose I assigned the code "paraphrase" to cases that someone else would not

[15]Core and Allen (1997) report an inter-annotator agreement for their annotation scheme DAMSL (Dialog Act Markup in Several Layers), that is close to - but still below - the limit for drawing scientifically reliable results. They scored around κ 0.6, whereas κ 0.8 is considered to be reliable. Scores above κ 0.67 are useful to draw tentative conclusions. Even though they themselves are optimistic on the successful implementation of their annotation scheme, the fact that inter-annotator agreement seems unreachable - even when a group of people actively work together to create an objective coding scheme - shows the complexity of pragmatic annotation.

categorize as such, at least the category of paraphrase is overrepresented across the board. This single-coder perspective thus has the up-sight that the data is coded consistently.

Because all coding is solely my own, I was rather conservative in assigning codes. Cases I had to think too hard about to "make them" belong to a certain category are not included. Cases in which I was unsure whom the speaker reacted to are not included. If I had any doubts at all whether they were in fact an example of alignment were not included. Surely, I unfairly excluded some cases by being maybe too cautious. Still I decided to focus on the most recognizable ways of establishing alignment, assuming that if a reaction was recognizable as such to me, it must have been recognizable to the participants that were actually part of the interaction as well. The problematic or marginal cases may show some pattern, and may even include the more interesting or creative language usage, but being the marginal cases they do not represent the preferred way of showing alignment.

Kádár and Haugh (2013:64) argue that a normative frame of reference is a key dimension of interpersonal evaluation. This adheres to the idea that people belonging to the same group would be likely - expected - to evaluate a particular behavior or relation in the same way. Whereas normativity is usually located at the societal or cultural level, it can be found on a smaller scale as well. All social units have their own shared norms (Kádár and Haugh, 2013:64). Indeed, the collective of people occupying a Big Brother house is a close-knit group that inevitably will share norms of interaction. It has to be kept in mind that the circumstances in which these people live is rather unnatural, possibly influencing their interactional behavior. Maybe not in the sense that they are trying to present a better version of themselves, but perhaps their ways of doing things is deviant from how they would conduct themselves in a less restricted environment. Indeed, as Goebel (2008, 2016) argues, the television environment could inspire performative behavior on the participants' part, indexing (and forefronting) a particular identity.

Non-verbal communication

As noted in section 4.3.2, a genuine challenge to including the nonverbal behavior in the transcript and coding is the fact that the material was edited for broadcast. It is not uncommon for only one participant to be visible at a time, obscuring a lot of valuable information; someone may be nodding or shaking their head off-screen, meaning a case of positive alignment would go unnoticed. Whenever non-verbal behavior was accessible and considered to constitute a reaction (by me, but more importantly by the participant(s)) it was coded in the same way as the linguistic contributions. The coded non-verbal material is presumably incomplete and may present an unreliable result. The analysis will thus be largely restricted to the linguistic means that participants use to establish alignment.

4.5 Conclusion

Real-life soap Big Brother provides valuable interactional data: access to both audio and video recordings of naturally occurring longer stretches of informal interaction. One of the biggest challenges, however, is that the material was prepared for television, not for analysis. Some (parts) of the interactions that were broadcast are unusable because of editorial decisions to cut off the interaction, to play music that overpowers the talking voices, or to focus the cameras on someone or some action that is not immediately involved in the ongoing conversation. Still, even with these challenges and limitations, the advantage of being able to follow the natural interactional behavior of a group of strangers in a variety of situations makes the material worthwhile.

Roughly ten hours of video material was transcribed for both Dutch and Indonesian, resulting in a corpus of twenty hours of informal interaction. The transcripts were subsequently subjected to a round of coding, to categorize the data and uncover first patterns of use. All responsive actions were coded. The relevant set of data was restricted to spontaneous contributions that were directed at a fellow contestant and had a primarily affiliative function. This last point, admittedly, is difficult to determine. The decision to include some contribution as an example of phatic communication is thus associated with the other two aspects. In short, for a contribution to be included in the final data set, it had to meet four conditions: (i) the contributions had to be produced spontaneously, (ii) it had to have a clear connection to the prior turn, (iii) it had to be directed at another contestant, and (iv) it had to present a positively aligning second stance.

All data was first studied line by line to assign codes to those responsive actions that established alignment or showed structural choices often used in establishing alignment. This first "horizontal reading" of the corpus allowed for the subsequent analysis of the subset of pragmatic phenomena of interest (Ruhlemann and Aijmer, 2015:3). Through the assignment of codes, the data could be categorized in basic subsets of linguistic resources people use in relation to their interpersonal positioning. These subsets were then used to conduct a more detailed analysis, to unveil patterns of language use or occurrence of certain lexical items within or across these subsets. The patterns resulting from this analysis were subjected to a qualitative analysis.

The next three chapters each discuss one main set of resources to construct and communicate sharedness. Each of these categories was designed to reflect a major group of phenomena used to establish interpersonal alignment, although they are by no means found exclusively in this particular environment. The individual instances included in this study are often not required and they present little new information about the actual topic of talk. Instead, the personal experience and interpersonal alignment is addressed. The first chapter explores the use of agreement markers, support, and explicit expressions of alignment. The second chapter focuses on reproduction meaning and form, and the third chapter addresses co-construction of utterances and thoughts.

Part II

Data analysis

> "[...] any social encounter, including any of those in which talk is engaged, has as its logically first and interactionally ongoing highest priority to position the participants in the social encounter in relationship to each other. Whatever else we do in speaking to each other, we make claims about ourselves as a person, we make claims about the person of our listeners, we claim how those persons are related to each other at the outset of the encounter, we project an ongoing monitoring of those multiple relationships, and as we close the encounter we make claims about what sort of relationship we expect will hold upon resuming our contacts in future social encounters". (Scollon 1998:33)

Introduction - Data Analysis

This second part explores the use of backchannels, agreement, repetition, paraphrase, and co-constructions in spontaneous interaction in Dutch and Indonesian. These different reaction types play an important part in the construction of interpersonal understanding. Producing these utterances might not be required from an informational or structural perspective - in the sense that they are not an anticipated second pair part, nor do they obstruct or divert the ongoing course of action in the form of repair or rejection - they demonstrate involvement with the other participant(s) and are therefore valuable contributions from a relational perspective. They help establish and maintain the interpersonal relationship.[16] As such, all of these contributions can be qualified as phatic communication: they are focused on continuing the ongoing interaction, while establishing mutual understanding and appreciation.

Included in the current study are reaction types ranging from minimal responses (such as "hm-hm" or "right") to full expressions of agreement ("You are absolutely right, I agree that's the best option"), and from complete repetitions of a prior turn to collaboratively constructing a single utterance or thought. Each of these categories represents a means of expressing understanding and support. The different ways of showing active involvement can be grouped together in three general types: (i) support, (ii) reproduction, and (iii) collaboration. Figure 4.5 shows the relative frequency of these three general types of phatic communication.

In both languages, extending support is the single biggest category (68.05% or 2190/3218 in Dutch; 49.11% or 632/1287 in Indonesian), but the relative size differs by 19 percent point. Whereas the support category encompasses a good two-third of all Dutch social contributions, this same category forms just short

[16] Note that the data discussed in this part only includes contributions that are in fact produced in reaction to some other interactional move (see chapter 4). Turns that introduce a new topic or direction of talk are not considered in this study, because they are primarily informational, not phatic, in nature.




Figure 4.5: Phatic communication. These figures show the overall relative frequency of each of the three main classes of spontaneous responsive contributions that were distinguished: support, reproduction, and collaboration. In both the Dutch and Indonesian data collect, support is the biggest category; 68.05% of Dutch phatic contributions present a backchannel, agreement, or explicit form of alignment, compared to 49.11% of Indonesian contributions. The class of collaboration was smallest in both data set (resp. 15.41% of Dutch and 14.92 of Indonesian contributions). The biggest difference is found in the relative frequency of reproductions: whereas the Dutch data only shows 16.53% of phatic contributions to involve reproduction, this number rises to 35.98% in the Indonesian data.

of half of the social contributions in Indonesian. This first category includes the type of contributions that express agreement and involvement: continuation, affirmation, and agreement markers and "me too"-like utterances. The importance of showing support in interaction and the preferred way to do so is the topic of **chapter 5**. The second category includes reproduction of meaning (and form) by a second speaker by means of repetition and paraphrase of the original message. Although this is the second largest category in both Indonesian and Dutch, the relative share markedly differs. Whereas 35.89% or (463/1287) of Indonesian social contributions involves reproduction of meaning and potentially form, the Dutch data only shows 16.53% (or 532/3218) of contributions to include repetition or paraphrase to express the same message. The use of repetition and paraphrase is discussed in **chapter 6**. Lastly, the third category includes all those cases in which participants collaboratively construct meaning. This might be in the form of actual collaborative construction of a single utterance, or by means of extending the presented idea into new, related, territory. This final category is similar in size across the two data sets (respectively 15.41% or 496/3218 in Dutch and 14.92% or 192/1287 in Indonesian). This does not mean, however, that the way this type of contribution is utilized is necessarily similar across the two languages. The different forms of collaboration are explored in **chapter 7**.

The descriptions and analyses presented in this part of the thesis are illustrated with examples taken from the Dutch and Indonesian data collection. Fragments and excerpts have been selected based on clarity and ease of understanding in hopes of indeed supporting the given explanation. Sometimes the most insightful example was found in the Indonesian data; sometimes it was taken from the Dutch collection. To avoid needless complication of the

argument and cluttering of the text not every phenomenon is illustrated with both an Indonesian *and* a Dutch example. The best examples were selected, while maintaining an overall balance of Dutch and Indonesian cases across the chapters. The fact that an example from one of the data collections is used does not imply there are no (suitable) examples to be found in the other collection. It only means the selected example was believed to be one of the more transparent or interesting cases that would optimally support the readability and comprehensibility of the analysis. In a similar effort to increase readability of the main text it was decided to include non-essential information about the quantitative comparison of the different phenomena in the captions of relevant figures and tables. Information presented in a figure or table that is essential to the analysis is given in the main text as well as in the captions. Still, the captions mostly provide additional, more in-depth information about the particular phenomenon. While this results in (much) longer captions, it ensures all information is made available to the reader.

Each of the chapters that discuss a particular category of phatic contributions is structured in roughly the same way. The point of departure is the general function of the relevant category of contributions, which is discussed in the introduction of the chapter. Usually the category that is described includes several (related) types of contributions; these are addressed separately in the main sections of each chapter (e.g. section 5.2, 5.3, etc.). In order to systematically describe and analyze these specific types of phatic contributions, subclasses were distinguished based on patterns or characteristics of form observed within the relevant set. The resulting subclasses are described in the subsections associated with the relevant main section (e.g. subsections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, etc.). Some overarching considerations regarding the different subclasses are presented in the last subsection of the relevant main section (e.g. subsection 5.2.4). This could, for example, involve a discussion of context factors associated with or influencing a certain form of expression, the implications connected to the different subclasses, or the (optional) addition of a certain element to emphasize a particular aspect of the communicative message. An overall summary and conclusion to each chapter is presented in the corresponding final section (e.g. section 5.5).[17]

[17]In chapter 7, the separation between form and function is somewhat complicated. A distinction was made between two main forms of collaborative construction of meaning: completion and extension. However, the fact that something is a completion (section 7.1) or an extension (section 7.2) is not something that is necessarily associated with a particular formal characteristic. It is - at least to some extent - a matter of interpretation whether a fellow participant co-constructs a single unique message with his conversational partner or builds on a prior contribution extending the message past the original. One aspect that does separate the two types on a formal basis is the fact that completion occurs prior to the original speaker finishing the turn, whereas extensions typically occur following the original speaker having completed the turn (the full extent of the message has to be communicated for another participant to be able to build on it after all).

CHAPTER 5

Lending support - from minimal responses to explicit alignment

Whenever someone presents information on a particular matter, they take position regarding that object of interaction (see chapter 3). This positioning is primarily their individual stance towards the thing or topic of talk. However, it also presents the opportunity for the conversational partners to show where they stand on this matter: they can align themselves positively or negatively with this first speaker by presenting a similar or opposing stance, respectively. Establishing positive alignment between interlocutors is generally what people are trying to accomplish in conversation (compare preferred vs dispreferred responses, cf. section 2.3). Through positive alignment, participants show involvement with both the topic and the prior speaker: they are interested enough in the topic to have a say on it and they are interested enough in the speaker to establish a connection between them. The most recognizable way of marking interpersonal alignment is by means of agreement or affirmation. These markers at the very least signal support for the ongoing interaction, but often extend to the communicative content of the prior utterance.

Once a participant decides they share the position presented by the first speaker and wants to show this agreement, they can explicitly establish a relation between their utterance and what was said before. In marking that they are not the first to take that stance, they present themselves as stance follow. The question is if and how people mark that the position they take was already presented by someone else. Do they acknowledge the original stancetaker? Do they adapt their expression to show they are stance followers? And how common is explicitly establishing your position compared to someone else's to begin with?




Figure 5.1: Phatic communication - focus on support. The three classes of phatic communication were already presented in figure 4.5 above. The left-hand sphere in each of the graphs is a reproduction of that figure. The raised part represents those contributions that lend support to the prior speaker: 68.05% (or 2190/3218) of Dutch contributions, 49.11% (or 632/1287) of Indonesian contributions. On the right-hand side, the subclasses of support are given: backchannels, agreement, and explicit expressions of alignment. Most contributions of support fall into the class of backchannels, also referred to as continuers. This particular subclass takes up 71.32% of Dutch supportive contributions (1560/2190) and 68.04% (430/632) of Indonesian supportive contributions. Note, though, that the overall share of backhannels is 15 percent point higher in Dutch compared to Indonesian (resp. 48.54% and 33.41%). The other forms to convey support of another participant's position is by expressing agreement (resp. 13.98% and 12.43% in Dutch and Indonesian) and explicitly establishing alignment by expressing similarity between the two participants involved (resp. 5.53% and 3.26%).

This chapter will concentrate on three ways of constructing positive alignment between participants.

The use of affirmative particles is an easy and frequently adopted practice to show agreement (e.g. Sacks, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984; Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Stivers, 2005) and as such construct a shared position and establish positive alignment. First, however, the use of affirmative particles in non-agreement contexts is explored (section 5.1. In the second section (5.2), the preferences in spontaneously expressing agreement are addressed. The focus will mainly be on the difference between the use of simple agreements (single interjections) and more elaborate expressions of agreement. Not all agreements are solely driven by the second speaker's want to show they share the other speaker's point of view. Participants may also ask for or invite agreement, which is discussed in the third section (5.3). The fourth section examines a strategy that even more explicitly and unequivocally constructs positive alignment by referring to the "sharedness" of both speakers' positions (5.4). This may be done by drawing attention to the fact that the second speaker believes something *as well*, or by emphasizing the second speaker had said the same thing just prior to this occurrence.

5.1 Backchannels

Most of the supportive reactions found in the corpus are what are called "backchannels" (coined by Yngve, 1970:568). They acknowledge that the previous speaker said something, but they do not explicitly convey the second

speaker's stance on what was said.[1] Typically, backchannels are expressions such as "hm-hm", "yes", or "right" uttered by one participant in support of the ongoing story telling of another person. For example, Roos' contribution in line 112 in (1) represents what is normally considered a backchannel. Lotte is explaining how she feels about having to leave the competition, while Roos indicates she is listening, without agreeing or objecting to Lotte's story.

Apart from the minimality of the reaction presented to convey her active involvement, the placement of Roos' contribution further suggests it is indeed not an attempt to take turn. Such contributions are not normally considered turns at talk, because the participant offering the backchannel does not attempt to take the lead in the interaction. Indeed Roos' contribution is not presented at a transition relevant point, but instead is a form of unproblematic overlap (Sacks et al., 1974). She is not trying to take over as the main speaker, nor is she interpreted to do so; Lotte simply continues her story and turn at talk.

(1) *Backchannel - "home"* (BB-NL, 35-16)[2]

109	Lotte	*=ik ben gewoon ook echt heel blij*
		=I'm just also really very happy
110		*dat ik nou weer naar huis kan.*
		that I now can go home again.
111		*hee[l ↑stom*
		rea[lly ↑stupid
112	Roos	*[hm-hm*
		[hm-hm
113	Lotte	*tuurlijk was ik liever hier gebleven*
		of course I would have rather stayed here
114		*dat is gewoon lo↑gisch.*
		that is just lo↑gical.
115		*maar ehm, als ik weet wat er buiten*
		but ehm, when I know what is outside
116		*allemaal weer op me staat te wachten,*
		all again waiting for me,
117		*en ja (.) dan ben ik ook weer gewoon echt gelukkig=*
		and yes (.) then I am also again just really happy=
118		*=en dat meen ik ↑echt (.) ja.*
		and ↑really do mean that (.) yes.

[1] For a recent overview of different functional types of verbal and non-verbal backchannels, see (Knight, 2011:83ff).

[2] All examples in this chapter are taken from natural interactions between the Dutch or Indonesian participants of TV reality show Big Brother. The original transcript is given, with a translation in English. The translation is kept as close to the original as possible, even though that might mean the translation is an unnatural (or even ungrammatical) form of English. The practices used in Indonesian and Dutch do not always have a ready equivalent in English. Therefore, I have opted to give a less elegant translation that approaches the original practice or formulation. If the translation would strive for pragmatic equivalence, straying from the Dutch or Indonesian original, this might result in a mismatch between the description and analysis of the example - for the English readers - and the actual interaction.

These expressions of support target the structure of the ongoing interaction, but do not necessarily address the content of the expressions. In contrast to agreements, in which affirmative markers *are* used to support the content of the presented message (cf. section 5.2).




Figure 5.2: Communicating support. These diagrams represent the share of spontaneous positive support in the collection of phatic contributions. In the Dutch corpus, contributions that provided spontaneous support form 62.52% (or 2012/3218) of all phatic contributions: 48.54% are backchannels (n=1562) and 13.98% are spontaneous agreements (n=450). The share of support in the Indonesian collection of phatic contributions is notably lower at 45.84% (or 590/1287): 33.41% backchannels (n=430) and 12.43% spontaneous agreements (n=160).

Backchannels are an example of positive support, because they indicate to the main speaker they can carry on with the interaction. The participant extending the backchannels conveys they are still content with their role in the ongoing interaction and they have no trouble following the main storyteller (Stivers, 2008). A stronger form of extending support is a spontaneous demonstration of agreement, by means of which the responding party not only provides feedback on the organizational aspects of the interaction, but approves of the content as well. Backchannels and agreement do share an important aspect: they provide the current speaker with information on the level of active participation of the other interactants. Which is why the two categories are collectively presented here as positive spontaneous support.

Gathering all occurrences of spontaneous support in the corpus (both in the form of backchannels and agreements), a notable difference appears between the two languages as shown in figure 5.2. Well over half of all phatic contributions in the Dutch data are an example of a contribution providing unsolicited positive support (62.52%) compared to less than half in the Indonesian data (45.84%). This difference of 17 percent point is largely caused by the higher relative number of backchannels in Dutch, given that the share of (unequivocal) expressions of agreement in the two collections is of a comparable size (13.98% in Dutch, 12.43% in Indonesian).

Concentrating on the overwhelming presence of backchannels in especially the Dutch collection, these distributions suggest that giving feedback, showing you are involved in interaction and paying attention to the other speakers'

contributions, is more important in Dutch spontaneous interaction than it is in Indonesian. This is suggested by the fact that nearly one in two reactions in the Dutch data proved to be a backchannel (48.54% or 1562/3218), whereas the chance to come across a backchannel is reduced to one in three in Indonesian (33.41% or 430/1287).

The structural alignment (cf. Stivers, 2008) established by backchannels does not necessarily reflect a participant's stance on the topic of talk, but does provide feedback and encouragement to the main speaker to carry on. The decision not to interrupt or take over but instead give the other person room to elaborate on *their* position, signals support of the overall organization of the interaction at that point. The party presenting the backchannels actively takes on the role of listener, approving of the other person taking on the speaker role. The apparent need or want to verbally communicate being supportive of the ongoing interaction is evidently more strongly associated with the Dutch participants.

Both types of support are found in example (2). This fragment is taken from a conversation between Hanna and Roos about one of the other contestants (Eva) who had just voluntarily left the house. In line 9 Hanna starts describing how she experienced the events of that afternoon: she felt Eva looked physically ill, probably due to homesickness. Roos does not interrupt nor respond to Hanna's description until line 18 when she presents her perspective on the matter: being pretty is not enough.[3] She concludes that Eva mostly lacked charisma, which is confirmed by Hanna in line 22 (*ja dat is wel zo* "yes that is so"). In this short stretch of talk, Roos and Hanna present a number of backchannels (lines 10, 13, 15, 17, 20) and one clear agreement (Hanna in line 22).[4]

Deciding whether an affirmation particle is intended as a reaction to the structure of the ongoing interaction (a backchannel) or actually presents support (an agreement) is a complex endeavor - both for participants and the researcher (Allwood et al., 2007). The boundary between the two categories is not always clear-cut and the interpretation can sometimes only be constructed retrospectively (Mazeland, 1990:260).

[3]This seems unrelated to Hanna's explanation, but Eva's physical appearance had been the topic of talk before and had left them with the conclusion that Eva was selected by the production team because of her looks.

[4]The use of affirmative particles as agreement markers (e.g. in response to questions) and backchannels are mostly relevant to this thesis and will thus be foregrounded. The discussion presented here is not an attempt to explain or even describe all variations of *ja*, *yeah*, *jah*, *ya*, *iya*, etc. and will not at all do justice to the intricate differences between them, let alone in and across contexts. What I am interested in here is the way in which they collectively establish involvement between interactants and how (un)common they are in spontaneous interaction in Dutch and Indonesian. There are of course numerous meanings and functions to these particles as established in the literature. For an in-depth analysis of affirmative and negative particles, see Kärkkäinen, 2003. An overview of particles in Dutch is given in e.g. Van der Wouden and Caspers (2010). Two recent MA-theses were dedicated to affirmative and negative particles in respectively Dutch (Hoek, 2013) and Indonesian (Nasir, 2017).

(2) *Positive feedback - "sick"* (BB-NL, 11-09)

9	Hanna	*maar ze zag er vanmiddag gewoon helemaal ziek uit.*
		but this afternoon she just looked completely sick
10	Roos	°*ja*°
		°yes°
11	Hanna	*toen kwam ze uit haar bed en toen dacht ik*
		then she came out of bed and I thought
12		*nou het is net alsof ze gewoon helemaal* ↑ziek is,
		well it is just as if she is completely ↑sick,
13	Roos	*ja*
		yes
14	Hanna	*nou dat was ze denk ik ook,*
		and well I think she was,
15	Roos	*hm-hm*
		hm-hm
16	Hanna	*gewoon inderdaad heim*↑*wee*
		indeed just homesick↑ness
17	Roos	°*mja*°
		°yeah°
18		*kijk je kunt KNAP zijn,*
		look you can be PRETTY,
19		*maar je moet ook uitstrAling hebben*
		but you have to have charismA as well
20	Hanna	*ja*
		ja
21	Roos	°*heel af en toe heeft ze die maar*°
		°it is very seldom she has that°
22	Hanna	*ja dat is wel zo.*
		yes that is so.

Arguably, the contributions made in lines 17 and 20 in (2) above could be open for interpretation to be more than a minimal response to the ongoing interaction. They might be (intended and/or interpreted as) agreements instead of backchannels. However, because they are not uttered as strongly recognizable as a form of agreement as some other examples (e.g. line 22 above) or even softer spoken than usual, such ambiguous cases are for the purpose of this study classified as backchannels. Considering them backchannels avoids overestimating the frequency of spontaneous agreement, while maintaining an overall sense of active - that is, vocalized - involvement.[5]

[5]The explicit emphasis is on verbal expressions of involvement. This is not at all to diminish the role non-verbal communication cues play in interaction; however, the data did unfortunately not allow systematic analysis of non-verbal behavior. The fact that the material was edited for broadcast presents a clear disadvantage at this point. The people in front of the camera are not always the ones talking or even participating in the audible interaction and even when the visuals are in congruence with the audible interaction, not all participants involved are visible at all times. The access to non-verbal communication is thus limited and prevents systematic description, let alone reliable analysis. Therefore, the analysis is limited to all and only those contributions that are perceptible, in this case audible, to the researcher.

Overall, these data indicate there appears to be less need or desire for backchannels in the Indonesian interactions. Reactions are more likely to be related to the message carried by what was said than solely to that fact *that* something was said.[6] In the Dutch corpus backchannels form the single largest category of reaction type by a landslide, followed by agreement as we saw in figure 5.2. This suggests that active and involved participation in interaction is associated with providing feedback and support. The presence of spontaneous positive feedback is notably lower in the Indonesian data. This seems to point towards a preference for more informative reactions. In other words, a preference for contributions that relate to the message, not to the interactional move, contributions that carry more propositional content than expressed by the average minimal response. This preference is further explored in chapter 6. As discussed above, backchannels are mostly associated with the acceptance of a particular role in an ongoing interaction. Some of the expressions used to signal such acceptance could also be used to support the message presented in a previous utterance. The next section addresses the use of affirmative particles to convey agreement with the content of an earlier message.

5.2 Spontaneous agreement

When agreeing with someone, the speaker can limit the utterance to a single affirmative particle ("yes"), or include a more elaborate phrase expressing the same thing ("I completely agree").[7] Both simple and complex agreements convey a single message when it comes to alignment: the speaker shares and adopts the position presented by the interlocutor, thus establishing positive alignment between the two of them. The general outcome may be the same - two people agreeing - the force carried by the agreement is not.

Analyzing the way speakers communicate support for someone else's position provides a first insight in how speakers normally prefer to construct positive interpersonal alignment. A preference for (less) explicit or (less) unequivocal expressions of agreement presumably finds its parallel in a preference for stronger or lesser commitment expressed through other means, including paraphrases,

Consequently, there is a real possibility many more instances of feedback and agreement were extended, albeit non-verbally, that are not taken into account. To avoid drawing conclusions about non-verbal behavior based on a data set that is quite probably incomplete and not representative, I decided to exclude it from the analysis. Whenever non-verbal behavior was visible, to both the viewer and the participants involved, it was taken into account to interpret the meaning of a particular expression (cf. section 4.4.1).

[6]This is also visible in the lower percentage of feedback type turns overall in Indonesian compared to the Dutch data. Whereas the majority of responsive actions in Dutch consists of feedback contributions (58.54%), the Indonesian corpus shows the almost opposite distribution, with most contributions (55.68%) consisting of utterances that present (new) content instead of only minimal feedback markers. See section 4.4.2 for more details.

[7]There are of course numerous other ways of showing support for a presented idea, including repetition, paraphrase, and co-construction. These options will be addressed in chapters 6 and 7. For now, however, the discussion is limited to those cases in which the second speaker does not present any other message than to lend their support to what was just said.




Figure 5.3: Spontaneous agreements. This figure shows the share of simple agreements (the raised green and blue parts) and complex or elaborate expressions of agreement (the lighter colored parts). **Simple agreements.** The share of simple agreements in the Dutch data collection is 62.44% (or 281/450), compared to 77.85% (or 123/158) of all spontaneous agreements in the Indonesian collection. This includes three types of simple agreements: minimal agreement ("yes"), minimal agreement in combination with another affirmative particle ("yes indeed"), and agreement by means of an affirmative particle only ("indeed"). In both data sets, the minimal option is observed most (133/450, or 29.50% of Dutch agreements; 52/158, or 32.91% of Indonesian agreements). Followed by the combination of minimal response and another particle (respectively 100/450, or 22.22%, and 42/158, or 29.75% in the Dutch and Indonesian collection), and finally agreement by another particle in isolation (10.67% of Dutch agreements, or 48/450; 15.19% of Indonesian agreements, or 24/158) **Elaborate agreements.** The lowered parts of the figures represent the more elaborate expressions of agreement. Out of all 450 Dutch agreements, 169 cases involved a more explicit description stating there was agreement between the two participants. This equals 37.65%. The Indonesian collection of agreement shows only 35 out of the total 158 to include an elaborate statement of agreement, equaling 22.15%. In both languages, most of the extensive agreements included a minimal particle (26.67%, or 120/450, of all agreements in Dutch; 15.19%, or 24/158, of all agreements in Indonesian.) Finally, the occurrence of elaborate expressions of agreement *without* an affirmation particle was rather low. A total of 49 instances were found in the Dutch collection (10.89% of the total 450 cases); the Indonesian data set only included 11 cases (6.96% of the total 158 instances.)

repetitions, and collaborations. Such a discernible pattern of preference would present opportunities to improve intercultural understanding.

In both the Dutch and Indonesian data, the majority of spontaneous agreements are expressed by means of a relatively simple expression involving solely interjections. The choice for a minimal affirmative particle (such as "yes"), another single token of affirmation ("indeed"), or a combination of the two ("yes indeed") adds up to 62.44% of Dutch instances of spontaneous agreement (281 out of 450) compared to 77.85% of Indonesian agreements (123 out of 158). The easiest way to show agreement thus proves to be the preferred choice to speakers in both languages. However, there is a notable difference in the size of the majority share: whereas over three quarter of the Indonesian spontaneous agreements were presented by means of particles only, this strategy is employed in under two thirds of Dutch spontaneous agreements. Meaning the relative frequency of more elaborate agreements is much higher in the Dutch corpus (37.56%) than it is in the Indonesian (22.15%). These two types of agreements are discussed in some more detail below.

5.2.1 Interjections of agreement

The simplest form of spontaneous support is the use of an affirmative particle, as in example (3) in which Hugo and Ruben talk about the stubbornness of one of the other contestants. This exchange forms the conclusion of a longer conversation between Roos, Hugo, and Ruben about the inability of their former housemate Lotte to look past her own perspectives and opinions.

(3) *Simple agreement - "yogurt"* (BB-NL, 33-08)[8]

24	Hugo	*ik zeg- dan kom ik jou even,*
		I say- then I just come you,
25		*he dan doe ik jouw uitspraak even,*
		huh then I just borrow your expression
26		*jij vindt dat het vla is, ik vind dat het yoghurt is*
		you think it is custard, I think it is yogurt
27	Ruben	↑*JAH*
		↑YEAH

In this final part of the exchange, Hugo illustrates Lotte's hardheadedness with a difference of opinion (custard vs. yogurt) that would typically result in discussion with their former housemate. This characterization is accepted by Ruben in line 27 (↑*JAH*). The interjection is uttered relatively louder and with a rising intonation, indicating this is not only a sign of listenership, but indeed an attempt to extend his support to the proposition. Their sharedness is further reinforced by Hugo's original adoption of something Ruben said earlier: he explicitly mentions adopting Ruben's expression to present his subjective position. Ruben thus seems to confirm Hugo's description of Lotte having somewhat of an inflexible personality, although there is no overt sign that is indeed what he meant to convey.

A simple agreement does not really tell the first speaker much more than that *something* they said is endorsed by another person. Given that there is only a simple "yes-like" affirmation presented in reaction to the message, the first speaker would not necessarily know what part of the message is supported or agreed with (or upon) nor to what extent. For example, in both (4) and (5) below, the person offering the affirmation particle might support the full extent of the utterance they react to or only a certain part of it. Indra, in example (4) line 18, may support the statement that people who are familiar with a certain place must feel the need to learn about other places as well. On the other hand, maybe he subscribes the former part of Tessa's utterance, reinforcing the idea of having met many people who feel this way. Or maybe both.

[8]The utterance in line 24 (*dan kom ik jou even*, "then I just come you") does not make any more sense in Dutch than it does in the English translation. A more comprehensible version of this message is presented in the subsequent line: "then I just borrow your expression". This second attempt suggests that Hugo himself at that point realized his first utterance was somewhat unconventional. Ultimately, what Hugo is trying to convey is that he takes an expression previously used by Ruben (in another conversation about the same topic) to make his point about Lotte's current behavior.

(4) *Simple agreement - "travel"* (BB-IND 1-4-5)

16	Tessa	*=>atau ya aku udah ketemu banyak orang<*
		=>or yes I already met many people<
		yang pingin keluar Indonesia.
		who want to go outside of Indonesia.
17		*orang yang (.) kenal A pasti mau kenal Z juga.*
		people who (.) know A surely want to know Z as well.
18	Indra	*↑ya.*
		↑yes.

Similarly, in example (5) line 17, Maya's affirmation of Nazam's contribution could pertain to the number, the act of entering the numbers, where to enter them, or all of the above.

(5) *Simple agreement - "number"* (BB-IND 2-5-4)

15	Nazam	*sebutin nomornya masukin sini=*
		mention the number enter here=
16	Lena	*masu[kin aja:*
		ente[r ju:st
17	Maya	*[iya*
		[yes

Furthermore, what is not included in these short agreements is to what extent someone supports the earlier utterance. Whether the person is in full support of the entire message or is only indicates hesitant agreement with some part of the expression remains unclear. Even though the force or degree of agreement may not always be clear, it often does not need to be either. A general sign of approval may be sufficiently informative; knowing that someone can relate to your position at least to some extent might be all that is needed. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that there usually is no request for clarification or elaboration following simple agreements. The conversation continues with the main speaker having the reassurance they are not alone in their understanding of the topic at talk.

Of course affirmative markers like "yes" are not the only way to express agreement. Using other particles or interjections, on their own or in combination with an affirmative particle, is another frequently employed strategy. The difference between minimal agreement and (combined) particle agreement is found in the wiggle room left to deny you intended to communicate agreement in the first place. Whereas minimal responses, such as "yes" or "hm", function both as backchannels and agreements, other affirmative particles lack this functional ambiguity.

In example (6) Nazam fully agrees with Wayan's assessment in line 27: just because they are in the disadvantaged group, this does not mean they have to lose the game they are playing. Nazam's reaction in line 28 combines an affirmative particle *ya* ("yes") with *betul* (lit. "true, right, correct"). Using this combination results in a clearly recognizable agreement. The possible ambiguity

of a single affirmation particle is canceled by the reinforcing meaning carried by the second element. With *betul*, Nazam signals he had reached the same conclusion as Wayan, and as such takes the same stance independently.[9]

(6) *Simple agreement - "win or lose"* (BB-IND, 25-05)

26	Wayan	*=oke, setuju.*
		=okay, that's it.
27		*jadi jangan sampai udah miskin, kalah.*
		just because we are the poor [group],
		doesn't mean we have to lose
28	Nazam	*ya betul*
		yes indeed

This type of reaction can therefore unequivocally be interpreted as an agreement. Compare the two reactions in example (7), lines 33 and 34. Earlier on in the conversation it was suggested that Lotte and David (who are couple) should get married in the Big Brother house - they have only known each other for a couple of weeks, so it is by no means a serious proposal. Hanna's daughter came up with the idea in a letter to her mother. Lotte is not as enthusiastic as the other housemates are, but ultimately gives in on condition that the "wedding" is dedicated to Hanna's daughter (line 32).

(7) *Simple agreement - "daughter"* (BB-NL, 29-14)

32	Lotte	*=Hanna maar dan dragen we het op aan jouw dochtertje*
		Hanna but then we dedicate it to your daughter
33	Roos	[*ja*
		[yes
34	Hanna	↑*ja:: tuur* [*lijk*
		↑ye::s of [course
35	Lotte	[*speciaal voor haar ja=*
		[especially for her yes=

Both Roos and Hanna were in favor of the plan right from the start. In response to Lotte's agreement to play along, they each present an affirmative marker; however, the degree of recognizability of their contributions *as an agreement* differs. Roos' reaction in line 33 (*ja*, "yes") is definitely a sign of support, but whether or not it is actually an agreement remains somewhat ambiguous. The response Hanna presents is unquestionably an agreement. The affirmative particle is emphatically stretched and presented with a raised intonation, already indicating it is not "just" a sign of listenership. The addition of "of course" (*tuurlijk*) clearly presents it as an acceptance of Lotte's condition. Moreover, she assesses the dedication as something obvious, as something known to everyone, as part of their common ground. Hanna thus completes the project started by Lotte, meanwhile (re)affirming their common ground and presenting a joint position on the matter.

[9]See Sidnell and Enfield (2012) for a similar description of an affirmative particle in Lao.

Agreement markers such as "exactly", "indeed", or "precisely" are thus much more explicit. There really is only one interpretation; they convey this speaker to be in full accord with the prior message. Thus, the force or certainty with which the second speaker takes position relative to the object of talk and the prior speaker is much higher, expressing greater independent agentivity on the speaker's part. In example (7), the added marker "of course" did not only communicate agreement, but prior knowledge or acceptance of the topic that was in need of support. This more forceful agreement hence constructed mutual alignment, while communicating independent access to the shared position. The emphasis on (greater) independent or subjective stancetaking is yet more visible in full expressions of agreement.

5.2.2 Full expressions of agreement

Other than using an interjection for affirmation, the agreeing party might choose to convey their positive stance regarding a proposition even more explicitly. Such an explicit expression of agreement might include an affirmative marker, but more importantly explicitly references the speaker's conviction about the subject at hand. The overall numbers on this specific type of agreement are rather low, especially in the Indonesian corpus (a total of 35 occurrences). This is reflected in the small share of agreements that fall in this category to begin with: in the Indonesian data, 77.85% of agreements involved an affirmation expressed by particles only (either in isolation or combined), which leaves 22.15% of full expression agreements. In Dutch, on the other hand, the share of full expression agreements is decidedly bigger: 37.65% of spontaneous agreements are of the more elaborate type (resulting in 169 occurrences).

An elaborate expression of support is much more informative regarding the relative position taken by the second speaker compared to the first speaker's stance. Whereas simple expressions of agreement may be somewhat vague or ambiguous in their intention (not to mention the fact that they share their form with backchannels), the message is made unequivocally clear in elaborate expression of agreement. Even though there still may be some uncertainty as to the extent of that agreement (pertaining to the entire message or only part of it), there is no mistaking the function of the contribution. The second speaker explicitly communicates to be in agreement with their conversational partner. Such overt adoption of someone else's position is illustrate by David's turn in line 68 (and 69) in example (8).

(8) *Elaborate agreement - "worst nightmare"* (BB-NL 60-5)

58	David	*wat is het ergste wat je kan overkomen?*
		what is the worst that could happen to you?
59		(0.8)
60	Bram	*nou gewoon dat eh (.) m'n dochtertje en m'n vriendin*
		well just that eh (.) my daughter and girlfriend
61		*zo* (0.4) *zo beschadigd zijn d-door bepaalde mensen,*
		so (0.4) are so damaged by c-certain people,
62		*dat m'n relatie zeg maar in principe*
		that my relationship let's say in effect
63		*naar de klote kan gaan*
		could go to hell
64	David	°*oke*°
		°okay°
65	Bram	*he*↑ *dat is- dat is het ergste scenario*
		huh↑ that is- that is the worst scenario
66		*wat ik me kan indenken.*
		that I can imagine.
67		(1.2)
68	David	*ben ik helemaal met je eens.*
		I completely agree with you.
69		*dat is inderdaad hetgeen waar ik denk*
		that is indeed the thing that I believe
70		*iedereen wel het meest bang voor is*
		everyone is afraid of the most
71	Bram	*ja.*
		yes.

David asked Bram what would be the worst thing that could happen to him while taking part in the competition. Bram's answer (losing his daughter and girlfriend) clearly resonates with David. He first literally states "I completely agree with you" (*ben ik helemaal met je eens*, line 68), followed by an additional elaboration on his agreement. Not only does he agree, he feels everyone shares that same fear of being left with a broken household because of their participation in the show. His intention is clear: the scenario sketched by Bram is his worst-case scenario as well. Bram's stance lead is thus presented with a stance follow by David. He accepts Bram's position as his own, establishing strong positive alignment between them.

Explicitly stating you completely agree with some other person (as in example (8)) is not the only way to unambiguously communicate agreement. Another option that is regularly found in the corpus is to confirm that some observation or assessment made by another participant is indeed the case. The matter of discussion is no longer subject of individual opinion, but rather promoted to "the truth". In doing so, the second speaker creates a strong connection between him and the previous speaker: he not only takes the same position as his fellow interactant, but believes that particular position to be the only possible position to take. The next excerpt, example (9), shows part of a discussion

in the Dutch Big Brother house about their most recent assignment: putting together a circus show. An example of a full expression of agreement referring to the previous message as being true is found in line 54.

(9) *Elaborate agreement - "try (and fail)"* (BB-NL, 58-03)

49	Bram	*ik vind sowieso* [*proberen* [*gewoon*
		I feel you have [to at least [just try
50	Hugo	[*heb je het* [*gedaan*
		[you did it
51	Hanna	[*hebben ze tenminste*
		[at least they have
52		*wat te lachen thuis*
		something to laugh about at home
53	Bram	*precies*
		exactly
54	Ruben	°*dat is waar*°
		°that is true°
55	Hanna	hahahah

One of the circus acts involves jumping around on a pogo-stick for 30 seconds, something Ruben has not quite mastered after almost a week of practice. He contemplates withdrawing from the challenge altogether, taking their loss and moving on to the next week. Bram and Hugo object to this defeatist attitude and argue they (Ruben included) should at least try. While they call upon his (lack of) dedication and commitment, Hanna presents a different argument to continue working on the circus: the viewers at home will have a good laugh seeing them struggle. This view is corroborated by Bram in line 53 with a single particle agreement (*precies*, "exactly") and is subsequently confirmed by Ruben with a full expression of agreement (*dat is waar*, "that's true").[10]

Even though such full expressions of agreement are used on a smaller scale in both languages, they form an interesting counterpart to the simple agreements. Referring back to the difference between backchannels and agreements - reacting to the existence or content of the prior speaker's utterance - this class of full expressions is a next step toward a still more informative, unambiguous, contribution. Moreover, since elaborate agreements are much more specific and put greater responsibility on the speaker, they can be considered stronger attempts at alignment with the conversational partner. This section explores if there is a particular pattern of use associated with this type of agreement.

In example (9) above, Ruben did not use an affirmative particle in his expression of agreement. However, such a combination is not uncommon at all. Most elaborate expressions of agreement in fact do include an affirmative particle: 120 out of 169 Dutch instances (or 71%), compared to 24 out

[10]Theoretically, Ruben's response might not be a confirmation of Hanna's perspective but of the argument extended by Bram and Hugo. Based on the visual and auditory information available in the original material, this reading could be eliminated. Ruben definitely responds to and expresses support for Hanna's view.

of 35 Indonesian cases (or 68%). The next example shows a full expression of agreement following an affirmative particle. During this interaction, again, the Dutch participants discuss an assignment they were given. They have to embroider the Big Brother logo within a week's time and everyone has to spend the same length of time doing so. Hanna summarizes the instructions in line 20 and presents a consequence or challenge of the equal time-share: not everyone works at the same speed.

(10) *Elaborate agreement - "time and speed"* (BB-NL, 46-18)

20	Hanna	*iedereen moet even veel tijd,*
		everyone has to spend an equal amount of time,
21		*maar de een is sneller dan de ander.*
		but one is faster than the other.
22	Bram	*ja natuurlijk*
		yes of course
23	David	*ja dat is zeker waar*
		yes that is certainly true
24	Bram	*ja*
		yes
25	Hanna	*oke.*
		oke.

The objection raised by Hanna is promptly confirmed by Bram in line 22 and subsequently by David in line 23. Whereas Bram uses a simple agreement (interjections only), David opts for a full expression of agreement *dat is zeker waar*, ("that's certainly true"). In contrast to example (9) above, he begins his expression with an affirmative marker *ja* ("yes"). A possible explanation for choosing a more extensive form of agreement in (10) might be that David is the second person to extend his support and therefore has to express a stronger agreement than was presented by the first reaction (in this case Bram's "yes of course"). A similar pattern was seen in example (9) after all: first a simple than a complex agreement.

There was, however, no correlation found between full expressions of agreement and such "serial agreements". The data showed most of these agreements to immediately follow the initial speaker (143/169 or 84.6% in Dutch, 31/35 or 88.6% in Indonesian), instead of another agreeing party. Using a full expression of agreement does suggest stronger commitment or conviction of the presented information, but the decision to use this form seems unrelated to the position or location of the agreement.[11] What does seem to play a role, at least in the

[11]Even though these full expressions of agreement mostly occur in first response position, there still might be a pattern of intensification across contributions whenever more than one participant decides to express their agreement. This is supported by an older study conducted by Verplanck (1955). He conducted an experiment in which two people were having an ordinary conversation, with one being the "reinforcer" and the other the main speaker. The main speaker was unaware of this set-up. The confederate was instructed to either reinforce the statements of opinion presented by the main speaker, using agreements or paraphrases, or not respond to the opinion, causing the topic to go extinct. This study showed that speakers

Dutch data, is the ability to elevate the presented knowledge from personal to factual using this form of agreement. The next section will explore how more elaborate expressions of agreement are used to upgrade the original statement from an individual opinion to an intersubjective truth. The final subsection will reflect on the consequences of using a simple or an elaborate agreement utterance, from the perspective of agentivity and accountability.

5.2.3 Opinion and truth - subjective and objective perspectives

An explicit reference to truth is found in 52 of the 169 full expressions of agreement in Dutch and was already visible in both examples discussed above: "that is true" in example (9) and "yes, that is certainly true" in example (10). Qualifying the utterance performed by the first speaker as something true (i.e. universally known or accepted) instead of just this person's opinion or position reinforces the presented stance. The agreeing party joins in not only with their own personal weight, but also with the weight of the truth behind them.

A similar form of presenting a certain stance as the logical position is by means of amplifying the message: acknowledging the first speaker is correct by presenting further evidence or expressing a high level of certainty in the form of intensifiers (e.g. "indeed very much so", "that is indeed the case"). There is no literal reference to the message being true per se, hence the added weight is limited to the second speaker feeling the same way. Still, the elevation from subjective to objective knowledge is a central feature. Other ways to promote a taken position from an individual to a collective understanding is by accepting the target utterance as the only sensible conclusion (e.g. *daarom* in Dutch or *gitu* in Indonesian, roughly translatable as "thus that"), or at least a possibility ("could be"), or by positively assessing the presented message ("good idea"). All these formulations share the fact that the agreement is presented as something factual, not personal.[12]

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increased or decreased the rate and frequency of statements of opinion depending on the (lack of) reinforcing behavior in their conversational partner. It might be that reinforcing behavior not only influences the initial stancetaker, but inspires other participants to be more vocal about their positions as well. It would be interesting to take a closer look at serialized agreement in larger groups of interactants to see if there is a preferred order in the use of different formulations at different positions in the series. A preliminary search suggests that, indeed, when a full expression of agreement is a follow-up to someone else's display of support, it will mostly be of the stronger type: qualifying the target utterance as non-subjective truth (see section 5.2.3). A targeted corpus of serialized agreements would be needed to decidedly answer this question. Due to constraints of time and scope, this possible correlation was not further investigated as part of the current research.

[12] Betz (2015) observed the use of lexical and phrasal confirmation tokens to be connected to stance negotiation in German interaction. The lexical form *stimmt* ("right","indeed") and the phrasal form *das stimmt* ("that's right") both index independent access, but whereas the latter openly connects the confirmation to the prior utterance (by means of the deictic element *das*), the former suggests a stronger reliance on (implicit) prior knowledge. These two forms are highly similar to the Dutch *klopt* and *dat klopt*. The examples included as "objective agreements" in this section are mostly of the phrasal type: they include some reference to the previous statement and confirm it is indeed correct. What are called "subjective agreements"

Language	**Dutch**		**Indonesian**	
	n	%	n	%
objective agreement	112	66.27	19	54.29
subjective agreement	57	33.73	16	45.71
total	169	100	35	100

Table 5.1: Objective and subjective agreement. This table shows the number and percentage of elaborate expressions of agreement that qualify as objective and subjective agreements, respectively. ***Objective agreements.*** The Dutch collection shows a clear preference for objective formulations: 112 out of 169 elaborate agreements involve an objective agreement. This means the second speaker literally claims the target utterance to be true, reinforces said message by means of intensification or definitive agreement ("very much so", "it is indeed the case"), presents it as the only sensible conclusion ('thus that') or at least a likely possibility ("could be"), or grants the idea a positive assessment ("good idea"). The main feature is the focus on the target message presenting the rightful position to be taken, not just from the personal perspective of the agreeing party, but as a generally accepted fact. The number of elaborate agreements found in the Indonesian corpus is too low to draw definitive conclusions, but out of the 35 instances found, 19 presented a form of objective agreement. Most of these involved reinforcement of the target utterance by corroborating the presented message (12 out of 19 cases). ***Subjective agreements.*** The other option is to emphatically include a (inter)personal perspective in the elaborate agreement. In these expressions, the subjective aspect position associated with the agreement is foregrounded. This includes expressions explicitly stating personal agreement ("I agree"), understanding ("I understand"), or acceptance ("I see") and expressions asserting individual prior access to the information presented by the other speaker ("I know"). Subjective agreements form the minority class in both the Dutch collection of elaborate agreements (57/169 or 33.73%) and the Indonesian collection (16/35 or 45.71%).

The total share of such "objective" agreements is 66.3% (or 112/169) of all Dutch elaborate agreements (see table 5.1). There is a clear tendency to use these full expression of agreement to not just personally agree, but rather qualify the presented information as something bigger than one person's stance. This same tendency seems apparent in the Indonesian collection of elaborate agreements, although the total number is too low to draw definitive conclusions about the subtypes of spontaneous agreements. A total of 35 elaborate agreements were found in the Indonesian data, 19 of which present an objective agreement (54.29%). Whereas explicit reference to the presented message being true was the most observed form of objective agreement in the Dutch collection, the Indonesian speakers mostly opt for agreement by independent corroboration. In 12 of the 19 objective agreements does the second speaker corroborate the target utterance by presenting the same position or intensifying said position. Corroboration is thus a form of both acknowledging and strengthening the position presented by the first speaker, without going as far as explicitly claiming the position to be held true.

(see below) are stronger claims for independent epistemic access based on prior knowledge. Still, in these data, these more independent confirmations seem to mostly be connected to the earlier statement as well, using such phrases as "I know that".

An example of the second speaker presenting their own reason or conviction to take the same position as the first stancetaker is found in example (11). Tessa calls out for Nazam's help, because she is having trouble with the water pump for the pond in the backyard. Just prior to this exchange, Nazam complained it is Kamil's job to manage the pump, but that Kamil has been largely absent lately - neglecting his responsibilities as team captain. In line 11, Nazam asserts he already predicted the pump would break (because of bad maintenance on Kamil's part). Tessa corroborates this view by stating the pump indeed has its problems: *"iya emang rusak"*. She combines an affirmative particle (*iya* "yes") and an adverb (*emang* "indeed") with the central element from Nazam's utterance: *rusak* "broken". In using this full expression, Tessa not only confirms Nazam's position, but takes that same position on her own accord. She is not simply adopting his stance, she is making it hers as well.

(11) *Objective agreement - "broken"* (BB-IND, 10-2-5)

11	Nazam	*aku udah bilang bakalan rusak begitu*
		I already said it will break down like this
12	Tessa	*iya emang ru↑sak.*
		yes it is indeed broken / will indeed break down.
13	Nazam	*ya tapi kan dia yang bongkar,*
		yes but he is the one who broke it,
14		*dia yang salah, gitu.*
		he is wrong, like that.

Opposite these objective agreements is a set of "subjective" full expressions of agreement. These all include some personal commitment to the act proposed or information shared by the first speaker. This can be in the form of explicit personal positioning like "I completely agree, I believe X is the case", or by means of (prior) understanding ("I understand", "I know"), or by accepting the presented idea ("I see") or taking up the suggested activity ('I will'). Contrary to the objective formulations of agreements, these all emphatically include reference to the personal perspective taken by the agreeing party. It is not a general observation, but a personal connection with the previous speaker that is fore-fronted.

An emphasis on such personal, subjective, positioning is found in examples (12) and (13) below. These exchanges are taken from two separate conversations between Lotte and Susan about their annoyance with the behavior of some of the other contestants. In (12) it is Lotte who presents the first position ("if it was about someone else, I would be just as upset") and Susan who expresses her full understanding of that stance. In reaction to Lotte's statement, Susan first presents a general agreement marker "no" - although not the most obvious of choices, it is indeed meant as an agreement marker. Following a short pause, she emphatically reproduces the agreement particle followed by a full expression literally stating she understands exactly what Lotte is saying.

(12) *Subjective agreement - "understand"* (BB-NL, 23-24-14)

16	Lotte	*als het over iemand anders zou gaan,*
		if it was about someone else,
17		*zou ik er net zo boos over zijn ↑hoor.*
		I would be just as upset ↑you know.
18	Susan	*↓nee (.) ↑nee::, ik begrijp precies wat je bedoelt=*
		↓no (.) ↑no::, I understand exactly what you mean=

Susan thus communicates her support for Lotte's take on the situation by emphasizing her subjective relation to the statement. She does not necessarily say anything about what she *herself* thinks of the situation, only that she accepts Lotte's perspective.

In (13) it is the other way around: Susan presents a first statement, which is subsequently accepted by Lotte. This reaction almost seems to ratify the validity of Susan making that claim. The fact that Lotte expresses her understanding of Susan's unhappiness with the situation reinforces Susan's position. Lotte recognizes why Susan takes that position, thus suggesting it is an acceptable position to take. She could quite possibly be meaning to take that stance herself, but that is not apparent from her utterance. She only expresses understanding for Susan's behavior, but does not connect her own faith to her co-participant's.

(13) *Subjective agreement - "understand"* (BB-NL, 23-24-23)

1	Susan	*ik vind het niet leuk hoor wat ze doen=*
		I find it not fun what they are doing=
2	Lotte	*=NEE dat snap ik*
		=NO I understand
3		°*dat heb ik ook net gezegd.*°
		°that I have also just said.°

In both examples (12) and (13), the emphasis is on the individual subjective position of a particular second speaker in relation to another participant. The position taken by the first speaker is confirmed to be a joint position by the second speaker. Presenting an overt expression of understanding confirms they had a similar experience and assessment of the situation, thus reinforcing their social bond. Indeed this interpersonal sharedness is emphatically put forward by means of the personal pronoun and reference to the level of understanding of the object or situation of concern.

In subjective agreements, it is the first speaker that offered certain information, which is subsequently adopted (maybe even "learned") by the second speaker. Their two stances are very clearly and visibly linked, by means of the second speaker explicitly stating "I" combined with some reference to (understanding of) the first assertion. This includes cases that communicate prior and independent access to the knowledge ("I know"). These cases emphatically communicate the message not to be new. The second speaker confirms

the information, not because it was now presented to them, but based on existing beliefs. Subjective full expressions of agreement are overall less commonly found than objective expressions of agreement.

Objective agreements, on the other hand do not overtly connect the second speaker to the first act by means of a reference to their own personal position or knowledge. The contribution can be combined with an affirmative particle or deictic element, marking the reaction indeed as a reaction, but do not necessarily include a clear reference to the two utterances being connected (other than addressing the same topic). In the data, it seems most of such objective agreements do in fact refer to the previous utterance, confirming the statement and acknowledging the other participant's position. This is mostly done by means of affirmative markers and deictic elements, or elements as *ook* ("too"), *zo* ("so") in Dutch and *aja* ("just") in Indonesian. In these objective agreements, the interpersonal aspect of their mutual positioning is less obvious. Presenting the information as factual, seconding the statement made by some other person by confirming its accuracy on independent grounds, perhaps allows for a stronger sense of autonomy. This option is clearly preferred by the Dutch speakers, fitting the earlier observation that they were more likely to use an elaborate expression of agreement in the first place. (The Indonesian data include too few instances to draw definitive conclusions, but based on the available examples the objective form is preferred by these speakers as well).

5.2.4 Agentivity and accountability

Albeit not as forceful as claiming something to be true, an elaborate expression of agreement is stronger than a simple agreement particle. The latter allows the second speaker to latch onto or accept the stance taken by the first speaker, but exempts them from actually presenting it as their own. Some level of uncertainty remains with simple agreements: does the agreeing party accept the stance as their own *or* do they simply accept the fact that the first speaker takes that stance without himself or herself taking position? Or both? This ambiguity is absent with full expression of agreement. In these more extensive utterances the second speaker takes some accountability for the position as well, instead of leaving all responsibility with the initiating party.

With an elaborate agreement, the speaker does not affirm but *asserts* the propositional content of the utterance, thus displaying greater agency over the taken stance (Enfield and Sidnell, 2015:141).[13] The interpretation of the elaborate confirmation is not dependent on the prior utterance, but can stand on its own (in contrast to simple affirmation by interjection). Asserting the proposition was indeed correct, taking the associated stance on their own individual

[13]Recall that the notion of agentivity is usually understood as the disjointed model of agency: "bounded, person-centered, and located within the individual" (Markus and Kitayama, 2003:43). Throughout this chapter, the term agentivity, and its associated forms, indeed refer to this independent, individual understanding. See section 2.6 for a discussion of other definitions of agency.

grounds is supposedly more important to the Dutch speakers (who were found to use an elaborate agreement in 37.56% of all spontaneous agreements) than to the Indonesian speakers (22.14%). The fact that the subclass of full expressions of agreement is rather small in the Indonesian corpus is an interesting observation in itself, especially considering the overall share of spontaneous agreements is not that different from the Dutch data (12.43% of Indonesian and 13.98%, of Dutch supportive moves was an agreement; see fig. 5.2). This seems to suggest less of a need to be this specific in the analyzed Indonesian interactions.

All spontaneous expressions of agreement follow an opinion, fact, or suggestion extended by another party. This is not surprising, given that these activities are strong examples of the first speaker taking a stance on a certain matter. In doing so the possibility opens up for other participants to decide on their own position and hence their alignment with the first speaker. In agreements, there is thus no claim about prior knowledge or positioning regarding the topic of discussion: they are intrinsically second acts (Stivers, 2005:133). Whether or not alignment is established mostly depends on the listening party: they decide to react or keep to themselves.[14]

A notable exception to the listener having this freedom to agree or not agree is found in the context of polar questions. Following a statement, other participants are indeed free to either react or keep silent; to actively establish alignment or not. Following a polar question, however, this freedom is heavily reduced. The question projects an obligation to respond. The person asking the question is actively urging another person to explicate his position on the matter at hand. Although not necessarily only concerned with establishing alignment, polar questions are a relevant set of initiating acts that *do* present insight on relative participant positioning. The response patterns found in this context of invited agreement provide insights in the overall preferences when it comes to constructing interpersonal alignment.

5.3 Invited agreement

It was discussed above that, like backchannels, support in the form of agreement can be extended spontaneously: an uninvited display of endorsement by the listening party. Unlike backchannels, however, agreement may also be invited. The first speaker can simply ask if some other participant shares the presented

[14]Since the focus of this research is on cases in which alignment *did* take place, information on how common it is to (not) act upon a chance to align is unfortunately not available. Because of the decision to concentrate on instances that showed alignment, it is unknown in how many cases there was a *possibility* to establish alignment. Consequently, the relative frequency of exploiting or passing the chance to do so is unknown. To be able to say something about the number of cases of alignment that could have but did not happen - i.e. the full potential of alignment cases - we would need to collect all initiating turns, both those that did and did not receive a reaction. Furthermore, to interpret the (lack of) response adequately, we would need to include the further development of the interaction, including agreements resulting from the first agreement.

position on a particular matter.[15] Given people prefer an answer in line with their projected answer (in terms of both the overall project an the design of the turn), participants will make an effort to anticipate the probable reaction of their conversational partner (cf. section 2.3). Polar questions thus involve stancetaking by the person asking the question: in order for the question to steer the responding party towards "yes" or "no", the chosen form necessarily has to decide on one or the other being more likely, thus giving away the (presumed) position taken by the person asking the question. The design of polar questions thus reflects a stance that is assigned to the responding party, and possibly in line with the position taken by the asking party as well. To give a simple example, the initiating act in example (14) presents a yes/no question, seeking confirmation or denial from the responding party.

(14) *Polar question - "sports"*

```
1  Robin  Do you like playing football as well?
2  Chris  (a) Yes, of course!
2         (b) Well, no, not really actually.
```

Robin's question is phrased in such a way that "yes" is the more fitting response. She thus presents the (preliminary) position, or maybe rather presumption, that Chris does like playing football. Although there still is a rather large degree of uncertainty to Robin's knowledge - and she does need Chris' response to relieve that uncertainty - there is a preference for one answer over the other. Only one of the possible two answers is in line with her projected perspective on the matter of him playing football.

The fact that Robin indeed takes position by asking a question becomes even more apparent in examples like (15). In this case, she claims to have specific knowledge on Chris' habits, taking the position that connects Chris to enjoying a game of football. She explicitly seeks confirmation for this position from her conversational partner. The degree of certainty displayed by her question is much higher compared to example (14).

(15) *Polar question - "sports"*

```
1  Robin  You like playing football, right?
2  Chris  (a) Yes, of course!
2         (b) Well, no, not really actually.
```

[15] Open questions are not discussed further in this thesis, because there is no stance taken in their formulation and hence the responsive action does not present a stance follow (establishing alignment), but rather presents a first stance. They are primarily concerned with gaining information not previously accessible to the person asking the question, nor without the assistance of another party. In a sense, they are preparatory queries in order for the asking party to take stance. They do not themselves include the speaker taking a position, but rather compel someone else to present new knowledge and/or a first stance. Whereas an open question is neutral concerning the outcome of the responsive action, at least in its phrasing, polar questions are biased, anticipating a particular response. In terms of stancetaking, polar questions present a first stance, whereas open questions invite a first stance.

The question really only pertains to him confirming her claim to be correct. This exchange is much more strongly targeting their interpersonal alignment than the exchange in example (15). She is convinced to have access to certain knowledge and invites him to affirm that conviction. In both the Dutch and Indonesian data, a little over half of all agreements were produced without encouragement by the first speaker (58.44% and 53.87% respectively). This means a good amount of agreements was in fact presented in response to a question. The different expressions used in such spontaneous displays of affirmation were discussed above. This section, discusses affirmations in response to polar questions to see whether there is an overall trend to be found in the agreement behavior of these speakers.

5.3.1 Interjection answers - type-conformity

A polar question orients toward a certain answer and as such (implicitly) conveys the position the asking party is orienting towards. This is also the position they hope the responding party might take, thus joining them and establishing positive alignment. Polar questions are a particularly restrictive initiating action, in that the responses that are made relevant are limited to two options: presenting an affirmative or a negative answer. Raymond (2003:945) found most answers to such acts to be type-conforming. This means the answers matched the format proposed by the initiating act: they were formulated as a "yes" or "no"-like response.[16] An example of a type-conforming response is found in (16). Ruben asks a simple yes or no question (line 42) and receives a straightforward "yes" in return.

(16) *Invited agreement - "dorm"* (BB-NL, 48-2)

42	Ruben	*jij woont in een studentenhuis?*
		you live in a dorm?
43	Lieke	↑*ja*
		↑yes

While Ruben is asking for information that he does not have individual nor prior access to - Lieke's living situation - he still takes a stance regarding the topic of talk. He decides on the likelihood of a certain outcome, based on the knowledge he does have. His chosen phrasing orients towards an affirmative

[16]In contrast to Raymond, who includes all yes/no-interrogatives (2003:939), the discussion presented here is limited to acts seeking new information. That is, questions that are in need of some other participant confirming or denying the content because the person asking the question does not have (full) access to the target knowledge. This includes requests as they satisfy the same conditions of the first speaker not having the answer and being dependent on the second speaker to offer the solution. Interrogative forms that elicit support, such as tag-questions or rhetorical questions, are for the same reason excluded from the relevant data set. They do not so much aim to gain new insights, but instead seek additional support for what the speaker already believes to hold true. These "invitations for confirmation" are addressed separately in section (21).

response, implying he suspects her to live in a dorm (a plausible assumption given the fact that she is a student). Conversely, would he have asked "you don't live in a dorm?", a negative response ,"no", would have been in line with his expectation. This same pattern is found in example (17);, Bram's question (line 43) already reflects his suspected outcome of the response.

(17) *Invited agreement - "having fun"* (BB-NL, 46-7)

43	Bram	*vind je het een beetje leuk?*
		do you find it somewhat fun?
44	Ruben	*jA*
		jA

In example (17), the question is not in search of personal information, but invites an assessment of the ongoing activity (a game of table tennis). Rather than presenting an open-ended question ("how do you like the game?"), Bram orients towards a positive evaluation by incorporating the position "you are having fun" into his question. He explicitly seeks Ruben's stance on the matter but already provides his own expected outcome. The implied first stance reflects Bram's impression of the situation, still, it is Ruben holding the cards; he is the only one who knows whether he is enjoying the game or not. In that sense, Bram is indeed targeting new knowledge: he does not *know* Ruben's position on the matter; he is dependent on Ruben's response to be certain his projected position was accurate.

Both these examples include a first speaker seeking insights available to another participant but not himself. The interrogative reveals his assumed outcome of this quest for knowledge, differentiating it from an open question. This presumed outcome quite possibly reflects his own position with respect to the object of talk, but mostly it reflects the position assumed to be held by the responding party. The question thus presents the first speaker's estimation of the second speaker's position. The responding party has the knowledge sought after by the person asking the question, hence they are to confirm or deny the predicted outcome. Ultimately, these questions are searches for new information: knowledge the asking party does not have access to and cannot obtain without the assistance of the responding participant. These polar questions are thus requests for information (as opposed to requests for confirmation of a known position). This applies to more prototypical requests for action as well, since they too target assistance (in this case uptake to perform the action) from another party and are formulated to present an expected outcome.

Example (18) demonstrates the same pattern of type-conformity as the two exchanges discussed above. Lotte and Susan are in the bathroom, when Lotte asks Susan to help her block the camera's view from her stepping on the scale. Lotte's turn in line 3 is a clear example of a polar question as there are only two options: Susan does or does not comply with the request. Susan confirms she is willing to lend a hand (line 4) and does so with a response that neatly fits the projected answer-format. She uses a combination of affirmative interjections (*ja tuurlijk*, "yes of course") to answer Lotte's question.

(18) *Invited agreement - "bathrobe"* (BB-NL, 29-7)

1	Lotte	*Susan?*
		Susan?
2	Susan	*ja?*
		yes?
3	Lotte	*kan jij zo direct heel even een badjas voor me houden?*
		could you hold up a bathrobe in front of me shortly?
4	Susan	*ja tuurlijk*
		yes of course
5	Lotte	*dan kan de camera me niet zien*
		then the camera can't see me
6	Susan	*ja*
		yes

With this type-conforming answer, she both accepts the setup of the question itself and the requested action - shielding Lotte from the camera. This type of interjection responses form the type-conforming, unmarked option, as Enfield and Sidnell (2015:136) explain:

> "[...] unelaborated interjection responses treat confirmation as a simple matter, are indexically dependent on the question to which they respond, accept the terms of the question as unproblematic and maximize sequence progressivity". (2015:136)

Using interjections to answer a polar question is one of the available options; the other universally found type of response to these questions is (partial) repetition (Enfield and Sidnell, 2015:134). Using a repetition in response to a polar question means the responding party produces a non-type-conforming answer. This is an indication of the speaker claiming independent access the information. They do not simply affirm what the other speaker said, but rather confirm it at their own terms (Heritage and Raymond, 2012:185). As such, a non-type confirming answer can be used to overtly signal problems with the content or design of the question (Raymond, 2003:947-949).

It is important to note these two options index different levels of agency. Whereas interjections express overall agreement with the conversational partner, they do not present new insights - neither about the topic at hand, nor about the responding party's stance toward that topic. The speaker simply confirms what was suggested in the question. With the decision to formulate an answer that carries propositional content in and of itself, the speaker commits to that content and takes on a more assertive, more agentive role. The same pattern was observed with the simple and full expressions of agreement above: a stronger agreement meant greater agentivity and therefore accountability.

5.3.2 Repetition answers - standing your ground

As explained in the previous section, repetition can be used as a means to get out from under the restrictive terms of a polar question and take back some

control (cf. Stivers and Hayashi, 2010). This is what happens in the exchange between Roos and David in example (19), taken from a longer discussion about the possibility of getting a cat to scare off mice living around the house. Earlier in the conversation, Roos had introduced the idea to get a cat. The exchange below reflects the point where she attempts to (re)affirm David objects to that idea.

The question-answer pairs in both lines 18-19 and 20-21 demonstrate repetition as an invited response. Roos is the strongest proponent of getting a cat and thus far, all other housemates were in favor of her idea. David is the first - and only - one to object. Roos first tries to verify her interpretation of his earlier turn (not in transcript) and finally offers the candidate conclusion "so you are against a cat?" in line 18, emphasizing the element of opposition.

(19) *Invited agreement - "getting a cat"* (BB-NL, 37/38-24)

18	Roos	*jij bent tegen een ↑kat?*
		you're against a ↑cat?
19	David	*ik ben absoluut tegen een kat, ja.*
		I'm absolutely against a cat, yes.
20	Roos	*kan je er niet tegen?*
		can you not cope with it? [i.e. allergies]
21	David	*ik kan best tegen katten, maar ik eh-*
		I can cope with cats just fine, but I eh-
22		*>tenminste ik kan er best teg-*
		>I mean I can cope with it just fi-
23		*ik wil gewoon geen kat (hier) hebben<=*
		I just don't want a cat (here)=
24		*=dat vind ik helemaal ↑ni:ks*
		=I don't like that at ↑a:ll
25	Ruben	*↓nee*
		↓no

Her reading is confirmed by David repeating the proposition in line 19.[17] The fact that he includes an agreement particle (*ja* in final position, is a clear sign that he is not agreeing with her, but rather confirming the proposition. By positioning the element of agreement at the end of his turn, he "separates the action of agreeing from the action of confirming" (Heritage and Raymond, 2005:24). He in effect dismisses the question and presents his individual and independent stance on cats. This position is not something that occurred to him because of the question being asked, it was a previously held conviction - or at least so he lets her believe.

Now that she knows they are in opposite camps, she wants to know why. Her question in line 20 proposes a possible explanation: he might be allergic to

[17]This is strongly similar to what Schegloff (1996) called "confirming allusions". The combination of a candidate interpretation and ratifying repetition is not necessarily related to question environments, though. It does show strong involvement and signifies an attempt at collaboration; as such, it is a more fitting topic to address in more detail in the next chapter.

cats. He negatively answers this question by reusing her words ("kan je er *niet* tegen" is reformulated to "ik kan er *best* tegen") and then further elaborates on his objection to getting a cat. By using her original phrase, he denies the question-answer format and opens up the possibility to elaborate. In this case, the repetition serves as a way to allow sequence expansion and re-direct the focus to David's perspective (Heritage and Raymond, 2012:188;190ff). Whereas Roos had been the main actor in this negotiation up until the point of his objection, he takes control from line 19 onward.

The difference between these two "proposal - repetition" pairs is the access to relevant knowledge. Roos' first question was based on prior information presented by David about his feelings toward cats; all she did was explicating what was already there (although implied). Her second question, on the other hand, is not based on an earlier exchange of information between the two of them. Instead, she makes an educated guess about allergies based on the common knowledge that some people are allergic to cats - suggesting it is a (if not the only) valid reason to raise objection to her plan. Whereas the first question tried to confirm her interpretation, the second question actually makes an inquiry about knowledge unavailable to her. As such, her contribution in line 20 is an example of a prototypical question: she does not have the necessary information on the matter, she wants that information, and she believes David to be able to give her that.[18]

Both interjections and repetition are found in the corpus as reactions to polar questions, albeit at different frequencies. The use of repetition in response to a yes/no question is slightly more common in the Indonesian collection compared to the Dutch data (see table 5.2). In reaction to a request for information, the preferred answer involves a type-confirming response. In other words, when someone asks a question to gain new insights and is dependent on another participant to offer those insights, the preferred response conforms to the yes/no set-up and involves a "yes"-like answer. This pattern is found across the two data sets. In Dutch, the preference for type-confirming answers is even stronger when it comes to requests for confirmation. On the contrary, the Indonesian speakers (who made less use of confirmation requests overall) mostly used repetition to in response to such requests.

5.3.3 Responding to questions

The previous sections outlined two major forms of responding to a polar question: using an affirmative marker or repeating (part of) the question. As noted above, an overall preference was found for answers to be type-conforming, that

[18]The data was coded based on the criterion of a next action being invited or uninvited combined with a stance taken by the first speaker. As a result, open-ended questions (content questions) are excluded, because the question does not carry an assumption or position taken by the first speaker regarding the object of talk. All and only utterances that sought information, confirmation or agreement about a specific matter introduced by the questioning party are included in the subset of polar questions, including tag-questions (cf. Englert, 2010).

is, to follow the yes/no pattern. This seems, at least to some extent, to be influenced by the type of question in response to which the answer is presented. Two specific question environments and the associated response behavior will be discussed here: requests for information and requests for confirmation.

While a more elaborate explanation is given below, the main difference between these two types of requests is the degree to which the response is expected to present knowledge or insights not previously available to the participant posing the question. In formulating the question, the first participant may opt to leave it to their conversational partner to provide the targeted knowledge or instead they may present a specific piece of knowledge for the other to confirm. Compare examples (20) and (21):

(20) *Request for information*

```
1  Astrid  Are you going to the lecture tonight?
2  Nicole  Yes, I am.
```

(21) *Request for confirmation*

```
1  Astrid  You are going to the lecture tonight, right?
2  Nicole  Yes, I am.
```

In both examples, Astrid wants to know if Nicole is going to a certain lecture later that night. The question presented in (20) does not assume prior knowledge about Nicole's plans; it is up to Nicole to give her that insight. The question is a request for information, knowledge for Nicole to share with Astrid. In (21), on the other hand, Astrid formulates her question as a statement followed by a tag. Here, she does claim prior knowledge - she *knows* Nicole is going to the lecture, and is not so much in search of new insights, but rather seeks confirmation of her existing knowledge. These questions are answered affirmatively, in line with the projected response, but that need of course not be the case.

The two data sets are actually very close together when it comes to the distribution of positive and negative answers. The Dutch participants received a negative answer in 23.28% of all polar questions (122/524), the Indonesian participants in 24.72% (68/275) of occurrences. [19]. This means that in both collections a good three quarter of cases was met with an affirmative response (76.72% or 402/524 in Dutch; 75.27% or 207/275 in Indonesian). Similarly, both languages show a majority of questions targeting new information instead

[19]For the sake of completeness this table includes the number of negative answers as well, even though these are not further discussed in this thesis. The relative share of questions receiving a negative answer is highly similar (23.28% and 24.72% overall for Dutch and Indonesian, respectively. The bracketed numbers in table 5.2 reflect the relative share of the reaction type in the subset of questions for information (for rejections that results in 34.96% of Dutch information requests and 32.84% of Indonesian information requests.) It is interesting to note these negative answers included relatively more repetitions in Indonesian than in Dutch. This seems to be in line with the higher relative occurrence of repetitions in response to questions and in responsive actions overall (cf. chapter 6)

of confirmation: 66.60% (349/524) of polar questions in Dutch and 74.18% (204/275) in Indonesian.

Collection	**Dutch**		**Indonesian**	
	n	%	*n*	%
Q for information	**349**	**66.60**	**204**	**74.18**
rejection	122	23.28 (34.96)	68	24.72 (32.84)
interjection	185	35.31 (53.01)	100	36.36 (49.02)
repetition	42	8.02 (12.03)	36	13.09 (17.65)
Q for confirmation	**175**	**33.40**	**71**	**25.82**
interjection	135	25.76 (77.14)	28	10.18 (39.44)
repetition	40	7.63 (22.86)	43	15.64 (60.56)
total	524	100	275	100

Table 5.2: Polar questions. This table presents the frequency of use of interjections and repetition in response to a polar question. The bracketed numbers represent the relative frequency of a reaction type within the subset of questions for information/confirmation; the unbracketed numbers represent the overall relative frequency of that reaction type in the full collection of polar questions. ***Request for information.*** The top half of the table is concerned with responses to requests for information: knowledge the asking party does not have access to without assistance from the responding party. In both collections, most polar questions indeed involved requests for information, although the relative frequency is somewhat higher in Indonesian (66.60% or 349/524 in Dutch; 74.18 or 204/275 in Indonesian). The distribution of reaction types observed in response to these questions is highly comparable. Roughly a third of requests for information received a negative answer (34.96% or 122/349 in Dutch; 32.84% or 68/204 in Indonesian); around half of the requests received an affirmative answer by means of interjections (53.01% or 185/349 in Dutch; 49.02% or 100/204 in Indonesian); and finally, a minority of responses repeated part of the question by means of an answer (12.02% or 42/349 in Dutch; 17.65% 36/204 in Indonesian). ***Request for confirmation.*** The bottom half of the table presents the (relative) frequency of occurrence on requests for confirmation and their response. The first thing to note is the higher relative frequency of requests for confirmation in Dutch overall (33.40% or 174/524) compared to the Indonesian collection (25.82% or 71/275). More interesting, though, is the dramatic difference in frequency of the two response types. Whereas the high majority of Dutch confirmation requests are met with an interjection (77.14% or 135/175); this reaction type is the minority choice in the Indonesian collection (39.44% or 28/71).

Englert (2010:2679) reports the majority of questions in a corpus of 321 instances of Dutch questions to be requests for confirmation, followed by requests for information at quite some distance. In the current corpus, however, most questions were requests for information (see table 5.2). Concentrating on the subset of polar questions that received a positive response, the same pattern is found: most questions that were answered affirmatively presented a request

for information (65.70% or 136 out of 207 affirmatively answered questions in Indonesian; 56.47%, or 227 out of 402, in Dutch).[20] In this subset we might have expected to find a higher percentage of request for confirmation (as Englert (2010) did), and indeed the share of confirmation questions is relatively higher. Within this subset, a good third of cases is a request for confirmation, whereas it was a small quarter in the complete set of polar questions (i.e. including those that received a negative answer). The numbers are still not as high as Englert (2010) reports. This may be a result of the exclusion of open-ended questions from the current study, although one would expect the open questions to increase the number of requests for information not confirmation.

Request for information

Recall that requests for information involved queries for knowledge or insights unavailable to the person asking the question. The question may orient towards a certain outcome, but the speaker is dependent on another participant to confirm his assumption or expectation is indeed on point. These are therefore referred to as "requests for information", the questioning party is requesting new or additional information on a certain topic after all. Consequently, he or she does not so much present their own individual stance on the matter - they do not have the necessary knowledge or information to lay claim to a particular position - but instead the question reflects the position they estimate the other party to take, inviting them to confirm the estimate to be accurate. The examples discussed thus far all involved requests for information.

In both sets of data, the majority of polar questions seeking new information was answered affirmatively (65.04% in Dutch; 66.67% in Indonesian, see figure 5.4). The majority of affirmative answers were presented using interjections, a small number involved repetition of (elements from) the question. Concentrating only on the affirmative answers (227 in Dutch, 136 in Indonesian), 73.53% (or 100/136) of cases in Indonesian and 81.50% (or 185/227) in Dutch[21] were presented using interjections (e.g. *"ya"*, *"betul"*, *"klopt"*; in short all affirma-

[20] These numbers are based on the information in 5.2. The total number of polar questions in Indonesians is 275, of which 207 are answered affirmatively (deducting the negative answers (n=68) from the overall number). The questions for information that resulted in a positive answer combines to 136 (100 involving interjections, 36 involving repetitions). The total share of requests for information within the subset of affirmatively answered questions thus is 136 (total of affirmatively answered requests for information) divided by 207 (the total number of affirmatively answered questions). This results in a relative frequency of occurrence of 65.70%. The same reasoning holds for the Dutch percentage presented in the text.

[21] A slightly stronger preference for type-conforming answers (88%) in Dutch is reported by Englert (2010:2683). However, in her study, this number included content questions (i.e. open questions), and confirmation questions as well, which makes it difficult to compare the numbers. Unfortunately, she does not explain whether there is a correlation between type-conformity and question-type. In my data, this definitely seems to be the case, as requests for confirmation are much more restrictive and "directive" and will likely yield the preferred, type-conforming, response. Given that this type of questions is included in Englert's (2010) overall results, that might be an explanation for the higher percentage compared to that found in this study.




Figure 5.4: Requests for information. Both the Indonesian and Dutch data show most questions seeking new information receive a positive answer, respectively 66.67% (or 136/204) and 65.04% (or 227/349). Most responsive actions present an answer by means of interjections: resp. in 53.01% (or 185/349) and 49.02% (or 100/204) of occurrences in Dutch and Indonesian. The relative share of repetitions in affirmative answer is somewhat higher in Indonesian compared to Dutch: 17.65% (or 36/204) and 12.03% (or 42/349), respectively. A third of requests for information were met with a rejection (122/349 or 34.96% in Dutch; 68/204 or 33.33% in Indonesian).

tive particles). In the Indonesian data 26.47% (or 36/136) involved repetition of elements from the question, compared to 18.50% (or 42/227) in Dutch (see fig. 5.5).

Although these numbers point toward only a slight difference in response behavior (roughly 75-25 in Indonesian, 80-20 in Dutch in terms of using an interjection or repetition in response to a question), the Dutch seem to have a stronger preference for the interjection form over repetition than suggested by this overall classification. This is evidenced by the fact that even if repetition is used as an affirmative answer, in a third of cases found in the Dutch data an agreement marker is included (see figure 5.5).




Figure 5.5: Requests for information - affirmative answers. The Indonesian and Dutch data show affirmative answers in response to a polar question to be mostly expressed by interjections. However, the size of the majority differs. In Indonesian just under three quarter of the answers is formed with an interjection (73.53%), 26.47% consists of a repetition. The Dutch data show an even stronger preference for interjections (81.50% to 18.50%). If repetition is used as an answer, the Dutch speakers added an agreement marker at the beginning of their turn in 35.71% of the cases (or 15/42). This combination was found in 25% of the Indonesian answers (9/36).

The use of repetition was suggested to be a means of taking control, breaking free from the format of the polar question. The higher number of repetitions in Indonesian would thus suggest a greater assertiveness or agency on the part of the Indonesian speakers compared to the Dutch speakers. Englert (2010:3683) notes that the unusually low frequency of repetition in answers found in Dutch - compared to other languages - could indicate the speakers do not normally use repetition to express their discontent with the term of the question, but instead might rely on other practices. This suggests the explanation given above related to repetition and greater epistemic rights and agentivity may in fact not be the whole story.

The higher frequency of interjections found in repetition answers in the Dutch data could indicate these repetitions are not actually the answer, or at least not responding to the format of the question. The yes-like opening in these combined answers accepts the question and its restraints (Heritage and Raymond, 2005:23-24); the repetition is simply an elaboration of agreement, not an attempt to diverge. In 85.29%, or 29 out of 34 Dutch answers that involved repetition and an agreement marker, the agreement came first. Admittedly, these numbers are low but they are nevertheless an indication that type-conformity is indeed preferred, even when repetition is used.

Request for confirmation

The previous paragraphs discussed questions that target information not previously available to the asking party. The answers were observed to be strongly similar across the two data sets: both the Dutch and Indonesian speakers mostly used interjection. A somewhat different pattern is observed in response to what are called "requests for confirmation": the asking party believes to have the necessary information or understanding to take stance on a certain matter and is inviting another party to confirm that position. These requests are thus not really targeting new or additional knowledge on the topic of talk, but seek support for a stance already taken (and presented in the question). The fact that it is formulated as a question, not a statement, indicates the speaker does hold some uncertainty over his presented stance. But whereas requests for information did not see the first speaker present their own position, because certain knowledge or insight was lacking, these questions do prominently represent the first speaker's position. The preferred way of responding to such requests for confirmation turned out to be remarkably different in the two languages. The Dutch clearly prefer interjections as a response to confirming questions, whereas the Indonesians used repetition more frequently.

As discussed above, the majority of all positively answered questions presented a request for information (65.70% in Indonesian and 56.47% in Dutch). The remaining questions (respectively, 34.30% and 43.53%) presented a request to give confirmation on something. The majority of these requests were answered with an interjection in the Dutch data (77.14% or 135/175). In Indonesian, on the other hand, the participants mostly opted for a repetition of




Figure 5.6: Polar questions - affirmative responses. These figures present the relative occurrence of repetition and interjections in response to requests for information (gray pieces) and confirmation (colored pieces). The overall share of requests for confirmation is 175 out of 402 in Dutch (or 43.53%) and 71 out of 207 in Indonesian (or 34.30%). ***Interjections.*** The single biggest class of reaction types in both data sets is that of interjections in response to a request for information: 46.02% (or 185/402) in Dutch, 48.31% (or 100/207) in Indonesian. In the Dutch data, a close second in terms of relative frequency of occurrence is the use of interjections in response to requests for confirmation, at 33.58% of affirmatively answered polar questions (or 135/402). This is by no means equaled in the Indonesian collection, where interjections are only found to be used in response to requests for confirmation in 13.53% of polar questions (or 28/207 occurrences). ***Repetitions.*** Repetition, on the other hand, is found twice as frequent in the Indonesian data: in 43 of the 207 polar questions included in this set, equaling 20.77%. The Dutch number of repetitions in response to confirmation request is only slightly lower (n=40), but the relative number of this class does not pass 10% (9.95% to be exact, or 40/402). Similarly, the share of repetitions in response to requests for information is considerably bigger in Indonesian (17.39%) than in Dutch (10.45%).

the proposed information (in 60.56% of occurrences, or 43/71). This opposition between the two sets of data is seen in figure 5.6. Out of all positive answers in Dutch, 9.95% (or 40/402) involved the use of repetition in response to a request for confirmation. The relative share of this specific question-answer pair is twice as big in the Indonesian data: 20.77% or 43 out of 207 positively answered polar questions.

Most requests for confirmation are answered positively and do not see further elaboration or explanation. The questioners defer to the responding party when it comes to having greater rights or access to the relevant knowledge, which is confirmed in the repetition. This is a typical use of tag-questions: downgrading the access or rights to evaluate the matter of discussion (Heritage and Raymond, 2005:25). Such downgrading is what Kamil seems to be doing in example (22), mitigating his claim about the action to be taken by adding *ya* as a tag-question to his interpretation of events. Immediately prior to the exchange between Indra and Kamil, Indra was called to the storage room by Big Brother. In the storage room, a bag with several fresh water fish was waiting for him. He was instructed to take the fish and put them in the backyard pond; they are now the proud owners of several pets. Indra was the only person in the storage room and thus the only person that has access to all aspects of information (the instruction and the fish) needed to proceed.

(22) *Invitation for confirmation - "fish"* (BB-IND, 2-1-13)

1	Kamil	*ditambahin ikannya, ya?*
		add the fish,yes?
2	Indra	*iya ditambahin ikan*
		yes add the fish

Kamil is outside when Indra takes the bag with fish out of the storage room and into the backyard. Upon seeing Indra carrying a bag of fish, he deduces the next turn of action is putting the fish in the pond. Kamil does not *know* this with certainty; he did not receive the instructions nor the fish after all, which is reflected in his utterance. He presents his interpretation - the likely next step considering the circumstances - as a statement followed by a tag-question. In doing so, he signals to Indra that he is the one with prior or even superior access and rights to the assertion, not Kamil. Indra accepts this assessment of the situation by first responding with an affirmative interjection (*iya*) and subsequently repeating the description of the task at hand: putting the fish in the pond.

Comparing this example to the example in (19) above, the order of the interjection and repetition elements suggests full agreement without an attempt to reclaim or reassert epistemic rights to the information. The interesting thing is that the hesitance in Kamil's utterance is an open invitation (if not recognition) for Indra to take the lead. Yet, Indra agrees seemingly without presenting his independent stance - at least that is how his response is to be interpreted following the analysis presented in Raymond (2003). In fact, Indra is now the stance follow to Kamil's stance lead, whereas the opposite would have been expected given the level of information available to either participant. In these cases, where one participant seeks confirmation on a certain matter, simple answers (i.e. interjections) are presumed to accept the terms of the question whereas repetition claims a more assertive role (Enfield and Sidnell, 2015:142).

So what is Indra doing, agreeing or asserting? The difficulty with either reading is that they seem equally plausible: it may be that Indra's utterance is fully and only an agreement or that Indra agrees with the question-answer format and subsequently asserts his independent access to the matter of discussion. Given that the interjection satisfactorily answers the question (both the terms and content of the question), the repetition is redundant - at least when it comes to answering the question. The meaning of this added repetition must likely be sought in the interpersonal domain, making the explanation related to assertiveness the more appropriate one. This is further supported by the shared knowledge the participants have about who had access to what information at the point of interaction. They both know Indra is the only one who has full access, and they both know the both of them know this. There is thus no need to assume or pretend otherwise, other than for reasons of relationship management.

The majority of invitations for confirmation consist of one speaker expressing a candidate assessment or understanding accompanied by a tag-question

(*he* or *toch* in Dutch (cf. Enfield et al., 2012), *ya* or *kan* in Indonesian (cf. Wouk, 1998, 2001). As such, they present a claim for which confirmation is sought, similar to what we saw in example (22) above. The same construction, but with different tags, is found in fragment (23) in which Tessa and Eko work on an arts and craft project together.

The housemates have been divided in three groups that each have to put on a performance of their choosing. The group performances are judged by three "actual" artists that enter the house just for this occasion. Eko and Tessa are in a group with Rendra and Nur, and the four of them prepare a pantomime. The excerpt is taken from a scene that sees Eko and Tessa working on a piece of scenery to be used in the performance (Rendra and Nur are not present). While Tessa and Eko are working on the scenery for a pantomime performance to be staged later, Eko checks with Tessa if she wants to add eyes to the cardboard. His turn in line 3 is not a question for new (unknown) information that only Tessa has access to, as in examples (16) and (19), he presents the inquiry as a ready-made decision that she only needs to confirm. He thus implicitly presents his position on the matter of including eyes - he is in favor of it - and asks Tessa to do the same thing. She confirms his assertion with an emphatic *iya* (line 4). The subsequent exchange follows the same pattern: Eko presents an assertion pertaining to their joint activity and Tessa confirms. In response to both claims, Tessa presents an interjection.

(23) *Invitation for confirmation - "eyes"* (BB-IND, 19-2-7)

3	Eko	*pasti mau bikin mata nih?*
		surely want to make eyes now?
4	Tessa	*iya*
		yes
5	Eko	*mata Big Brother kan?*
		Big Brother's eyes right?
6	Tessa	*hm-↑hm*
		hm-↑hm

As was explained above, this is not the preferred type of answer in Indonesian. In the majority of cases, repetition was used, either in isolation (52.11%) or in combination with an interjection (60.56%), as shown in figure 5.7 below. In contrast, the Dutch used repetition in only 22.86% of the contributions responding to a confirm question - they strongly preferred interjections. Most requests for confirmation include the use of a tag-question or otherwise place the primary rights to assess with the responding participant, making it somewhat surprising that the Dutch show a strong preference for interjections in response to invitations to confirm; seemingly not claiming independent epistemic access.

A confirming answer involving both an interjection and repetition was already shown in (22). The following exchange between Wulan and Maya includes an example (24) of repetition in isolation (line 8 and 9). The contestants are playing a game to get to know one another. One element in the game is to draw a question card and answer it. Wulan picks a card and reads the question (line




Figure 5.7: Requests for confirmation. In the subset of questions that request confirmation (as opposed to (new) information), there is an interesting difference to be observed in the preferred answer type: the Indonesian data mostly shows repetitions in isolation (52.11%) or combined with an interjection (60.56%), whereas the Dutch data clearly show a preference for interjections in isolation (77.14%, climbing to 85.71% when combined interjection-repetition cases are included).

7), and immediately realizes this question was just answered by the previous contestant. The cards are identical. She checks with the other housemates (line 8, "it's the same, right?"), by presenting her own conviction and adding *ya* to transform it into an invitation to confirm. Maya is the one to confirm, repeating *"sama"* to indicate Wulan was indeed correct in her assertion.

(24) *Invitation for confirmation - "question card"* (BB-IND, 1-4-8)

7	Wulan	*''siapakah orang yang terpenting dalam hidup kamu?*
		''who is most important person in your life?
8		*kenapa?''*
		why?''
9		*kok sama ya?*
		huh same right?
10	Maya	*sama.*
		same.
11	Adam	*ya udah berarti rejeki kamu*
		right that means you're lucky (i.e. easy question)
12	Wulan	*mamalah pasti*
		for sure my mum.

In this example, repetition of the central element makes up the full expression; there is no agreement or affirmation marker, only the repetition. According to Enfield and Sidnell (2015) there is a clear pattern of distribution between interjection and repetition confirmations (at least in English). Repetition is associated with the "attempt to reassert agency or priority" (2015:134). Related to this example, it means Maya shows (asserts) her independent and prior access to the information presented by Wulan. In other words, there is no dependent relation between the propositional content carried by the question and the answer (Enfield and Sidnell, 2015:141). Had Maya replied with an interjection answer, she would have still given the confirmation Wulan was looking for. The

implication, though, would have been that Maya did not have independent access to that information - or at least she did not feel the need to reveal she had reached the same conclusion on her own.

The Dutch preference for interjections in response to confirmation requests can largely be attributed to a phenomenon found almost exclusively in the Dutch data. Out of the 175 questions in the Dutch data that targeted confirmation, 45 cases (or 25.71%) are of a special type: a "minimal confirmation". This type was found in only three instances in the Indonesian corpus. These exchanges consist of an adjacency pair of affirmative particles.

In fragment (25) below, Hanna explains how Eva's behavior - one of the contestants that had just left the house - reminded her of her younger self. The housemates have been talking about Eva for a while already, more specifically, about how the problems she encountered during her stay at the house might be related to her young age. Transitioning into a new topic, Hanna states that Eva reminded her of herself (line 57). This statement is not immediately accepted, but rather questioned by Ruben (line 59): he explicitly asks her to confirm her earlier statement ("are you serious?"), which Hanna does with a simple interjection answer. This phenomenon is scarcely found in the Indonesian data, but is responsible for 10% of Dutch requests to confirm. The examples even stronger associated with Dutch interaction, however, are found in lines 73-74 and 77-78.

The first minimal confirmation is initiated by Ruben, who asks Hanna to reinforce one of her earlier statements (line 71 "very recognizable"). His request for confirmation is a simple question, "yes?", met by an equally simple answer, "yes".[22] Immediately following this exchange, Bram presents a follow-up question to Hanna "how do you recognize [yourself] in her" (line 75). After Hanna produces a first response, Bram asks her to confirm her own turn in line 77 (*"ja?"*), which she does before elaborating on her earlier answer as to the similarities she noticed between her (younger) self and Eva.

Within a stretch of roughly twenty contributions, three requests for confirmation or reinforcement are made. This is not unusual in a group interaction. Dutch speakers often explicitly ask for confirmation, much more so than the Indonesian speakers do. This is a sign of explicit coordination or negotiation of alignment. It is somewhat similar to the discussion of tag-questions as a means to establish, defer, and claim epistemic access (cf. Heritage and Raymond, 2012). The important difference is that there is no assessment. The first speaker, in this case Hanna, was making a claim about herself; a claim subsequently targeted as being in need of reaffirmation by both Ruben and Bram.

[22]Technically these pairs could be considered repetition, but in this study, it was decided to separate feedback elements (like affirmative particles) from lexical items carrying propositional content and reserve the qualification of repetition for content elements only. The distinction that is made in this chapter between interjections and repetitions and the numbers that follow from that distinction are all based on this criterion of a word (not) carrying propositional content on its own.

(25) *Invitation for confirmation - "recognition"* (BB-NL, 11-1)

57	Hanna	*nee maar ik vind haar heel erg zo* [*als ik vroeger was.*
		no but I find her to be a lot [like how I used to be.
58	Lotte	[*ja ze is gewoon zo*
		[yes she is just so
59	Ruben	↑*meen je dat?*are
		you serious?*JA*
60	Hanna	YES
		ik ook=
61	Lotte	me too=
		=ja ik he [*rken*
62	Roos	=yes I re[cognize
63	Lotte	[*ik o*↑*ok*↓
		[me t↑oo↓
64	Roos	*>nou ja daar hebben we* [*het toch ook*
		>well that is something [we have also *al*
65		[*over gehad Hanna?<*
		alr[eady talked about Hanna<?
66	Lotte	[*ik herken mezelf daar ook in*
		[I recognize myself in that too
67	Hanna	[*dat ze- daar hebben we het over gehad*
		[that she - that is something we talked about ↑*ja.*
68	Lotte	yes.
		ja
69	Hanna	yes
70	Roos	*>*↑*ja<*
		>↑yes
71	Hanna	*heel her* [*kenbaar*
		very rec[ognizable
72	Lotte	[*absoluut.*
		[absolutely.
73	Ruben	*ja?*
		yes?
74	Hanna	↑*>ja<*
		>↑ja<
75	Bram	*maar ze- h-h-h-hoe herken je haar als?*
		but she- h-h-how do you recognize her as?
76	Hanna	*dat=eh ik-ik-ik zag heel veel van mezelf in haar,*
		that=eh I-I-I saw a lot of myself in her,
77	Bram	*ja?*
		yes?
78	Hanna	*jA, zo heel duidelijk je mening hebben=*
		yES, like having a very clear opinion=

Hanna logically has the superior right and access to information about her own experience. These requests for confirmation could be intended as requests to elaborate, but it is not how Hanna interprets them. She simply answers and

leaves it at that. (Her elaboration in line 78 is actually a continuation of the turn she started in 76, but was interrupted by Bram's attempt at confirmation.).

This example does not only include minimal confirmation and an explicit request for reinforcement, it includes a request for confirmation with a repetition answer as well (lines 64-67). In fact, a lot of effort is put in the coordination of alignment. This is not only visible in the question-answer pairs and the spontaneous agreements (*"ja"* line 70; "absolutely", line 72), but also - and perhaps mostly so - in the explicit demonstration of alignment by expressing similarity in experience or understanding. Both Lotte and Roos declare they know what Hanna is talking about, by associating themselves with her position. In lines 61-63 Roos and Lotte each assert their likeness with Hanna through a "me too"-like utterance.[23] The use and effect of this form of alignment is further explored in the next section.

5.4 Explicit establishment of shared positions

Backchannels were mentioned as a means of communicating support that related primarily to the ongoing interaction, whereas agreements actually grounded to participants to some propositional act presented in the interaction. This section discusses the third form of support that was observed: explicitly establishing a shared position. While the use of agreements was shown to establish positive interpersonal alignment between participants, the degree to which a reaction is recognizable as an agreement and what part of the original proposition is indeed accepted or supported depends on the chosen form of agreement. A single affirmative particle is less easily interpreted than a full expression of agreement. While (full) expressions of agreement show unequivocal support and can be a useful and important tool in negotiating relationships, they also imply an inequality between participants. The independent access a second speaker might have to relevant knowledge is not usually addressed. The agreement thus conveys a shared stance, but leaves at bay whether this position was reached independently or following the conversational partner.

Consequently, the original speaker carries the burden of responsibility on their own; they took stance, they are accountable. The fact that someone else endorses the stancetaking does not take away from the original speaker being the one to present the assertion or evaluation in the first place. The agreeing party may not have claimed the rights of access to the information needed or presented by the first speaker, this also frees him from obligations associated with that knowledge.[24] The third and final form of supportive moves that is

[23] Coincidentally the hash tag #metoo went viral on social media while finishing this thesis. This hash tag was used by victims of sexual harassment or abuse to share their experiences, letting others know they were not alone. The movement attracted worldwide attention in a short time. Although completely unrelated to this research, the global attention and support gathered by this phrase is an interesting example of how strong the feeling of support and interpersonal understanding (or even bonding) associated with these words actually is.

[24] Even with "objective" agreements, the second speaker could - when called upon - still




Figure 5.8: Explicit alignment. These figures represent the same information as the smaller circle in figure 5.1: the distribution of subclasses of support. The focus here is on expressions explicitly negotiating alignment (the highlighted parts). In both languages, this is the smallest subtype of lending support. The share of explicit alignment expressions reaches 8.13% (or 178/2190) in the Dutch and 6.65% (or 42/632) in the Indonesian collection of support expressions.

addressed in this chapter does explicitly connect both participants individually to a particular position. They thus do not only share stance, they share responsibility as well.

This explicit connection is established by participants overtly stating they are in fact like some other person; that they actually do hold the same position. For example, following a first assertion in which someone asserts they like something, the next speaker can take that same position by means of stating "me too" or "same here" (or something similar). These contributions communicate the position presented by the first speaker in fact represents the position (already) held by the second speaker. Compared to the ambiguity of scope presented by agreements, these expressions leave no doubt about the relative positioning.

Figure 5.8 shows the share of such explicit expressions of alignment to form the minority of support expressions: 8.13% of the Dutch supportive moves and 6.65% of Indonesian support contributions involves the second speaker explicitly connecting their position to that of the prior speaker. Aside from sharing a particular stance, they now share responsibility for that stance. In explicitly aligning their positions, the second speaker shows willingness to take the (rights and) obligations that come with that position as well.

These contributions target convergence and help construct, or rather, highlight certain aspects of the speakers' common ground. In both the Dutch and Indonesian corpus, the overall frequency of occurrence of this type of contribution is very low (5.53% or 178/3218 resp. 3.26% or 42/1287). However, this is an interesting form of relationship management even if there are not enough items to generalize. The fact that the relative share of this response type is

shield themselves from responsibility by stating the argument made by the first speaker was compelling and held true, irrespective of it actually being true, and *that* was what they were responding to.

almost twice as big (although still small) in the Dutch data alone is a useful observation. This is a first indication that the need for or want to explicitly and openly manage the alignment between participants might not be equal across languages. The analysis presented here is thus primarily qualitative in nature, although some preliminary conclusions can be drawn about apparent preferences regarding the form of these contributions.

Expressions that explicitly address the interpersonal alignment between participation are observed to roughly fall into two categories. First, they can be limited to a bare form of explicit alignment: the "me too"-like expressions referred to above. These types of utterances are used to adopt what was said before as the point of view of the second speaker, serving as the foundation of *their* stancetaking. Others, however, are of a more elaborate type, including some modification of the utterance in an effort to mitigate, personalize, or disconnect the message from the prior turn. The two main associated with explicit constitution of alignment (bare and elaborate expressions) are discussed in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. The overall preferences and consequences of those preferences to the management of informal interaction are examined in section 5.4.3.

5.4.1 Bare constitution of alignment

It might not always be appropriate or desirable to leave the responsibility for an utterance with one speaker. We already saw that using repetition in answers to polar questions could indicate individual and prior access to information. As such, these repetitions claimed greater rights and obligations over the subject at hand. This is not the only way to present stronger agency in reaction to someone taking a stance. The type of expressions Lotte and Roos used in example (25) are another way to establish positive alignment and assert individuality at the same time. Similarly, the ongoing conversation in (26) sees Hugo explicitly joining positions with Ruben.

This single turn exchange is taken from a rather lengthy group discussion about Sesame Street characters Ernie and Bert. The housemates have been reminiscing about these two characters for a while when Ruben redirects the focus to a different character from the show: Super Grover (i.e. Grover as a superhero). He declares he liked Super Grover (line 59); an evaluation that is emphatically backed by Hugo. Hugo uses a simple expression to establish positive alignment between the two of them. The only thing Hugo explicitly communicates is that he, like Ruben, likes Super Grover. The "too" (line 60) presents this contribution as a stance follow; acknowledging Hugo is not the first to take this position on Super Grover. He does not add anything to the propositional content, he simply refers back to what Ruben said and presents it as his own position as well.[25]

[25]Hugo in fact leaves out the central piece of information (the object they are talking about). He does not explicitly mention what it is he likes as well. The only likely interpretation is that he refers back to the object introduced by Ruben. Presumably, when asked to formulate

(26) *Bare positive alignment - "Super Grover"* (BB-NL, 20-1)[26]

59	Ruben	*ik vond Super Grover ook altijd wel leuk*
		I always liked Super Grover as well
60	Hugo	*ja ik ook*
		yes me too

The difference with agreement is that Hugo does not latch on to Ruben's stance; piggybacking for as long as he deems necessary whilst being able to retract or redirect his stance at all times. Instead, he joins Ruben in that position on his own accord.

This same form of explicit alignment is found in Indonesian, although not as frequently (see fig. 5.9 and discussion below). One example that parallels the act of sequence in example (26) is found in (27). This exchange is taken from a rather long group discussion about how the contestants should run the household. Several people have argued they should make a schedule and assign tasks, because not everyone is as tidy or prone to clean up after themselves. They feel it is not fair if housekeeping would simply end up being done by those caring the most; everyone should chip in.

(27) *Explicit positive alignment - "fed-up"* (BB-IND, 7-3-1)[27]

115	Nazam	*trus biar gampang jadi diri sendiri.*
		then let's keep it easy just be yourself
116		*guwa males <debat> daripada [panjang* ((walks away))
		I'm tired of <debating> for [this long ((walks away))
117	Yuni	[*ya betul, guwa juga gitu*
		[yes indeed, me too so
118	Wayan	*nggak bang, duduk dulu bang,*
		no brother, just sit down brother,
119		*belum beres bang.*
		not done yet brother.

a full sentence, he would use Ruben's entire expression and include the stance follow and affirmative markers to distinguish his utterance from the original. (Although in this particular case that would lead to an odd couple of utterances, because of the "ook" already present in Ruben's original utterance.)

[26]The *ook* ("too, as well") in line 59 does not reflect an attempt at alignment, but rather introduces a new, although related, topic of talk. The *ook* is used to contrast Super Grover with another Sesame Street character mentioned earlier by another participant (Count Von Count). Although it clearly signals an addition of sorts, it is not so much Ruben's stance that is "added" to the position taken by the previous speaker, but rather the extension of the context to include the Super Grover character as relevant to the discussion. In short, in this particular line *ook* refers to the addition of a topic of talk, not the speaker's position on the existing topic or his attempt to establish alignment. The message is that "aside from Count Von Count, I liked **Super Grover** as well", instead of "like you, **I** liked Super Grover as well". (The latter paraphrase *is* applicable to the utterance in line 60 in the same example, as explained in the text.)

[27]The Indonesian vocative *abang* is not easily translated. It literally means brother or older brother and it is used to address men who are older than the speaker is or men holding certain occupations.

The fragment starts at the point that Nazam has had enough of the ongoing discussion about the schedule and assignment of house chores. His solution is easy: everyone just decides for themselves (line 15). He announces he is fed-up with the debate (line 116), gets up off the couch and starts walking to the yard. Yuni shares his frustration, as she states in line 117. She first agrees to his solution (*iya betul* "yes right") and then explicitly relates her position on the matter to Nazam's: "I feel so too" (lit. "me too as that").

This form of establishing alignment is more informative than the use of (full) expressions of agreement we saw above (section 5.2), at least pertaining to the relevant social relations. Whereas there is still some ambiguity or wiggle room with interjections of agreement for the second speaker to hide behind, these explicit expressions of alignment are less open to debate. These utterances all involve some sort of reference to the second speaker's individual or personal situation. An important difference between agreements and these literal alignments is that the second speaker takes responsibility for the taken stance. It is no longer the first speaker taking position with endorsement from another participant (as with agreements); they are now both as individuals connected to and accountable for the taken stance.

Another option in Indonesian, unavailable to Dutch, is the use of *sama* to take the same position as some other participant. Using this form in isolation allows the speaker to express they share the position taken by another party, without reference to themselves as one of parties involved. In example (28), Maya uses this form to indicate she shares Dian's fondness of the bedside chandelier.

(28) *Explicit positive alignment - "sound"* (BB-IND, 2-1-6)[28]

4	Dian	*aduh aku seneng denger bunyi ini* ((touches chandelier))
		hah I happy hearing this sound
5	Maya	*sama*
		same

Dian is playing with the glass pendants hanging from the lamp on her nightstand, which makes a tinkling sound. She expresses her appreciation of the sound (line 4); an assessment Maya seconds in line 5. Maya's utterance clearly shows she is the second person to take this position, considering the deictic nature of "same". To be able to interpret Maya's utterance, notice of Dian's earlier utterance (and behavior) is required. Even though Maya does not include a personal pronoun, she nevertheless presents a stronger commitment to the assessment than had she used an affirmative marker. As explained above,

[28] As explained earlier, the translations provided in the examples are not necessarily grammatical English sentences. This is one such example where the original is difficult to translate into English without completely changing the grammatical structure. What Dian expresses is that hearing this sound makes her feel happy, comfortable, content. The pragmatic equivalent would be something like "hearing this sounds makes me feel happy", but to preserve the original structure as much as possible the ungrammatical translation is given in the example.

an affirmative marker does not necessarily mean the speaker can be held accountable for the proposition to which they lend their support. There is still a possibility for the speaker to argue the affirmation was in fact intended as support for the *other* person taking that stance or making that assessment, without committing to that position themselves. This does not apply to (28), however. Maya's turn places her right alongside Dian: both are committed to the full expression (liking the tinkling sound), both are accountable. Yet while the second speaker may have explicitly connected their positions, the first speaker remains the first to have taken that stance. Their joint position makes them jointly accountable; however, the second speaker is still mostly a stance follow to the first speaker's stance lead. A way to escape this (inter)dependence is to truly make the proposition your own.

5.4.2 Elaborate constitution of alignment

As discussed above, the way in which speakers explicitly negotiated alignment takes different forms, ranging from an utterance communicating only "me too" (or rather, the equivalent thereof in the relevant languages) to a combination of such an expression with an elaboration, to an utterance emphasizing not sharedness but autonomy. Examples (26)-(28) already showed the bare form of explicit alignment. Most cases, however, involve some sort of elaboration allowing them to make a more forceful or assertive claim over the proposition (and position!) carried by the utterance, as in example (29).

(29) *Explicit positive alignment - "arrhythmia"* (BB-NL, 2-3-2)

31	David	*>we zijn ook nog getest op hartritmestoornissen=*
		>we were also tested for cardiac arrhythmia=
32		*=maar volgens mij heeft iedereen ze<*
		=but I believe everyone suffers from it<
33		*op dit mom[ent hoor*
		at this po[int
34	Thomas	*[ja volgens mij ook*
		[yes I believe so too

David describes the act of nominating as something he believes has caused everyone to suffer from arrhythmia (lines 31-32). The interesting thing here is that Thomas repeats the construction David used, *volgens mij* (lit. "according to me"), in his expression of explicit alignment (line 34). It is therefore not entirely clear whether he agrees with and takes over David's perspective or rather asserts his own claim. What *is* clear, is that Thomas feels the need to acknowledge David's assessment of the situation and attach his stance to David's, as evidenced by his use of *ook* ("too") and the affirmative marker *ja* ('yes'). The full expression does suggest he is not only following David's assessment of the situation, but had thought about it himself and takes this opportunity to join David's in the assertion of that thought.

An unmistakable example of explicit alignment with a claim of prior knowledge is found in example (30), in which David and Hanna complain about the lack of hot water in the shower. At the breakfast table, a couple of housemates are expressing their discontent with getting up early (they are practicing for the circus mentioned earlier in example (9)). David took a cold shower, because of Big Brother not taking the trouble to turn on the hot water (lines 40 and 42). In line 41-43 Hanna reports on her thought process when she tested the water: she should not have bothered getting out of bed. This assessment is reinforced by David, who asserts he thought the same thing (line 44, *nee dat dacht ik ook*, "no I thought so too"). His use of the past tense communicates he did not reach this conclusion because of her description, but rather had already reached that conclusion on his own when *he* tested the water.

(30) *Explicit positive alignment - "cold shower"* (BB-NL, 55-1)

40	David	*ze kunnen niet eens het warme water voor me aanzetten.*
		they can't even turn on the hot water for me.
41	Hanna	*ik had zoiets van nou* (.)
		I thought like well (.)
42	David	*ja dan maar koud=*
		yes cold it is then
43	Hanna	*=daar had ik ook niet voor er uit hoeven komen.*
		=that I not needed to get out [of bed] for.
44	David	*nee dat dacht ik↑ook*
		no I thought so ↑too
45		*van jezus ben ik daar nou voor m'n bed uitgekomen?*
		like jesus is that what I came out of bed for?
46	Hanna	*ja.*
		yes.

The explanation following his explicit expression of alignment (which is in fact a paraphrase of Hanna's turn in 43), further proves he claims prior epistemic access to the experience and information or insights connected to it. Compared to Thomas in the previous example, David clearly makes an effort to emphasize his autonomy in the matter. Hanna may have had this thought, it occurred to him as well (and at an earlier point in time). David thus takes the same position she did - while claiming greater rights to that position - establishing commonality while retaining individuality.

This seeming opposition is found in other examples as well. In example (31), Iris is not so much reinforcing as mitigating the stance presented by her conversational partner. As the two newcomers in the house - they moved in after two "original" contestants left voluntarily after six weeks of residence - Lieke and Iris privately talk about their first impressions. In this fragment, Lieke asserts she is very relaxed (line 18), likes the people (line 19), and does not feel like she is locked up (line 23-24). It is this last comment that prompts Iris to explicitly assert her position relative to Lieke's position.

In the first part of the interaction, Iris fully agrees with what Lieke says

(lines 22-23), endorsing or reinforcing her assessment of the situation. She then changes her response type to explicitly establishing alignment between the two of them in line 25, following the comment about feeling locked up. This explicit alignment is individualized or adapted to Iris' personal belief, amending the experience Lieke presented before to fit her own situation. Lieke asserts she does not "*at all*" feel locked up (line 23-24), which Iris mitigates to *not really* feeling locked up (line 25). In doing so, she takes individual responsibility to the stance that there is no feeling of being locked up. She does not take over or latch onto Lieke's assertion, but truly makes it her own while still acknowledging she is a stance follow to Lieke.

(31) *Explicit positive alignment - "locked up"* (BB-NL, 49-23)

18	Lieke	*ik vi- vind het allemaal heel relaxed en eh*
		I fi- find everything very relaxed and ehm
19		*zijn onwijs leuke lui, ge[zel↑lig*
		are very nice people, soc[ia↑ble
20	Iris	[*ja, absouluut*
		[yes, absolutely
21		*zeker weten.*
		for sure.
22	Lieke	*maar het is gewoon zo anders*
		but it's just so different
23		*en het- ik heb helemaal geen gevoel van opsluiting,*
		and it- I don't have a feeling of confinement at
24		all, *dat heb ik helemaal niet*
		I don't have that at all.
25	Iris	*>nee, dat heb ik ook niet echt<*
		>no, I don't really have that either<
26	Lieke	((nods))

These three examples of explicit alignment all involve reference to personal experience or belief. At the same time, they showed different degrees of overlap and autonomy in the position taken by the participant presenting a stance follow (Thomas, David, and Iris respectively). Compared to the simple or bare examples of this response type in (26)-(28), the connection that is established between the first and second speaker's position is more explicit and specific. Inserting a verb that explicates the mental state of the second speaker (not relying on "me too" alone) makes the construction of alignment more specific and as a result stronger: it is more difficult to deny the shared position. Conversely, it opens up the possibility to nuance the similarity or overlap between the two positions. Whereas a simple "me too" leads to the speaker taking the same position as the prior speaker, adding an extra element allows for reinforcement or mitigation - creating convergence and divergence at the same time. The relative frequency of the different subtypes found in utterances explicit expressions of alignment are reviewed in the next section. This will give a sense of the possible preferences concerned with managing informal interaction as reflected in the choices made by these participants.

5.4.3 (Dis)connecting stances - lead or follow

The previous sections already introduced two main forms of explicit expressions of alignment: bare expressions of alignment and elaborate expressions of alignment. A further breakdown of the patterns of use can provide insight in the guiding principles that participants orient towards during informal interaction. A preference for one or another utterance design might in fact reflect a (hidden) norm of interaction. A bigger collection of such patterns of normal language use constitutes the conversational style adopted by the speakers, that is, their normal way of doing something in interaction (here: managing their interpersonal alignment).

Table 5.3 shows that almost half (45.14% or 79/175) of the cases involving explicit alignment in the Dutch data convey nothing other than the two speakers taking similar stances. These utterances can be modified with mitigators (mostly particles) or a reference to a particular mental state (20% are bare alignment cases, 25.14% include a mental reference). In the Indonesian data, the combination of simple expressions of explicit alignment and those including reference to a mental state results in a collection of nine occurrences (out of 40 cases total, or 22.50%). Conversely, in the Indonesian data 42.50% of cases involve some sort of shift in perspective (mostly in terms of "that is what I just said") whereas this grouped category only takes up 19.43% in the Dutch data.

This opposition in choice of formulation seems to indicate a stronger need or want to emphasize interpersonal similarity in Dutch compared to Indonesian. The bare forms explicitly communicate the second speaker has the same interpretation/idea the first speaker presented; the connection between the two utterances and the associated stances is foregrounded. The Indonesian seeming preference for expressions emphasizing earlier access (and utterance) of the stance currently taken suggests it is not so much the interpersonal positioning that is put in the spotlight, but instead the individual access to that stance. In stating that the position had already been presented earlier (or was at least in the making), the second speaker implies similarity but does not explicitly connect the two stances. Essentially, it is an attempt to (re)claim position as first stancetaker. The interpersonal relation is thus left unsaid, even though the fact that both speakers had the same idea at some point - and more importantly feel the need to share this information - does place them right alongside each other. There is just no explicit connection between the two of them; a connection that is arguably the main goal of expressions that include "me too"-like phrases.

An example of an utterance stating an idea had been presented earlier by another person is found in (32). Just prior to this exchange, the housemates were sitting in the living room. Yuni was preparing to give Indra a shoulder massage, when he rather suddenly got up and rushed to the bedroom. He turned out to have a rather severe reaction to the massage oil she had used earlier. Several people present a solution to Indra's severe reaction to massage oil: ice. First Maya checks in on him, trying to figure out what is wrong. It

Collection	Dutch		Indonesian	
	n	%	*n*	%
bare "me too"	35	**20.00**	5	12.50
+ mental state	44	**25.14**	4	10.00
+ reproduction	41	23.43	9	22.50
+ addition	21	12.00	5	12.50
perspective change	34	19.43	17	**42.50**
total	175	100	40	100

Table 5.3: Explicit expressions of alignment. Five types of formulation are observed to be used in explicitly constructing positive alignment. Four of them include explicit reference to the second speaker sharing the presented stance ("me too"), one refers to the second speaker having presented or thought of that position before. ***Bare "me too".*** The simplest form includes only a "me too"-like expression. This is found in 20% (or 35/175) of Dutch cases, compared to 11.90% (or 5/40). Somewhat more explicit, resulting in a stronger or more autonomous commitment, are the reactions that involve explicit alignment through reference to the object of talk (in the form of repetition or paraphrase). ***Bare + mental verb.*** 23.43% of Dutch occurrences (41/175) involve some reference to the personal belief or knowledge of the speaker ("I believe", "according to me"). The number of instances found to include such a form in the Indonesian data was limited to four examples (10% or 4/40), but with the overall numbers being so low it is difficult to say much about this particular form. ***Bare + reproduction.*** The tactic to add new information that presents a reason or account for the alignment (as we saw with David's explanation in (30)) emphasizes the autonomous stance even more. This is found in 23.43% of Dutch cases (41/175) and 12.50% (or 5/40) of Indonesian cases. ***Bare + addition.*** In 12% of Dutch and 12.5% of Indonesian explicit expressions of alignment, the second speaker adds their own example, argument, or experience to take distance from being a stance follow. ***Perspective change.*** Finally, a little under a fifth of the Dutch occurrences (19.43%, or 34/175) is made up of turns that do not necessarily use a phrase like "me too", but instead present a connection between the two participants based on "similar thinking". This similarity can be expressed in roughly two different ways: the second speaker explicitly mentions having said or thought the same thing earlier (or they were planning to say the same thing right when the other speaker did), or they explicitly show understanding by (hypothetically) placing themselves in their co-participant's shoes. This form is most frequently found in the Indonesian collection: 42.50% of explicit alignment expressions refer to someone having said or thought the same thing independent from the current speaker.

is at that point she suggests using ice (not in transcript). After a while, the other housemates come to check on Indra as well and in line 6 of this fragment Nazam urges someone (nobody in particular) to get ice water to give to Indra. Maya silently agrees (line 7) but at this point does not make a stronger effort to negotiate her position related to Nazam's. Lena is more assertive and suggests ice cubes (*es batu*, line 8) instead of water.

When Yuni starts a long apology (line 9), Maya decides to assert she had already suggested using ice earlier (line 10). In doing so, she takes the same stance Nazam presented (and Lena joined in on to some extent), but reclaims it as being her original position.

(32) *Explicit positive alignment - "ice"* (BB-IND, 2-2-3)

6	Nazam	*kasih air es aja, kasih air es*
		just give ice water, give ice water
7	Maya	°*ya*°
		°yes°
8	Lena	*es batu*
		ice cube
9	Yuni	*sori, sori b*[*ang*
		sorry, sorry [brother
10	Maya	[*aku bilang juga pake es karena-*
		[I said also use ice because-
11	Yuni	*ya udah es bang* (0.6) *sori, bang*
		yes ready ice brother (0.6) sorry, brother
12	Indra	*ya ya*
		yes yes

The point here is that the connection between Nazam's and Maya's utterances is not simply one of stance lead and stance follow - or at least that is not the connection Maya accepts. In terms of dialogic development her contribution indeed follows Nazam's assertion and she acknowledges their order of presenting the idea ("ya"in line 7 and "juga" in line 10 both marking the sequentiality). However, she also makes an effort to explicate she is not only *following* his suggestion, but rather affirming it. She came up with this same solution on her own and at an earlier point in time (before Nazam presented his utterance). Thus, she can and wants to also ("juga") take responsibility for taking this stance.

The Indonesian data show a stronger preference for this less explicit "second stancetaking". Claiming you had a similar thought does not necessarily include explicit reference to the speaker that first presented that thought. Moreover, the fact that you assert your right to that utterance or thought, does not in itself connect the two speakers. While the explicit expressions of alignment are strongly committed to emphasize the bond between the participants, these expressions of similar thinking rather emphasize the individuality without necessarily connecting the two individually established positions.

Overall, comparing the frequency of occurrence of explicit alignment to expressions of similar thinking, the Indonesian data show some form of explicit alignment in just over half of the occurrences (57.50% or 23 out of 40). That means the other 17 cases express similarity without explicitly referring to the resulting alignment. The Dutch data show an even stronger preference for overtly connecting stances, with 80.57% (or 141/175) of cases having some kind of explicit alignment marker (see fig. 5.9).

Both these general types unambiguously establish positive alignment between two speakers. An important difference is the emphasis that is placed on the similarity and relationship between the responding party and to the earlier speaker. The "simple" expressions of alignment position the speaker as stance follow to the prior speaker. These utterances do not only convey agreement




Figure 5.9: Expressions of alignment. The preference for a formulation emphasizing sharedness or autonomy is clearly visible in these graphs (the information presented here is the same as in table 5.3). The Dutch speakers show a strong preference for a formulation that literally includes "me too" (80.57% or 141/175 cases), emphasizing similarity between speakers and explicitly expressing the second speaker joins the first in their evaluation of the matter at hand. In the Indonesian data this use of an utterance literally expressing the speaker is a stance follow forms the biggest category as well, although the difference with the more autonomous expressions is not as sharp as in Dutch (resp. 57.50% (or 23/40) and 42.50% (or 17/40)

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and support for a particular stance, they openly acknowledge that the other party originally took that position. This does not mean the second speaker is simply joining their conversational partner in their conviction or evaluation - it is not *just* an agreement. The second speaker actually takes that same position independently, while acknowledging they are not alone (nor the first) in doing so. The connection between the two utterances - and thus speakers - is foregrounded in these explicit expression of alignment.

Cases that communicate similar thinking, are less overtly concerned with the interpersonal and interdependent relation between positions, but are instead more focused on the individual experience of the second speaker. There is of course still a strong connection to the interpersonal relation; however, the individual's role in the situation is of primary importance. It is the second speaker who reclaims territory, expresses understanding and empathy, or extends sympathy. The expression involved in such negotiation of alignment might be formulated to construct a bond between participants, the message they convey is highly individualistic: "you think or know X, so do I". Emphasizing similarity between the two speakers - in conviction, experience, and attitude - can reinforce their relationship and mutual understanding. At the same time, the second speaker establishes their likeness at another level: the power position. They are equals in interaction. Both have equal rights to take position and *state* their position and both take equal responsibility for that position. An explicit reference to what the second speaker knows or feels compared to the original message is a display of high assertiveness: they may not be the first to raise a certain point, but that does not make their contribution redundant or less valuable. The value is not in the referential meaning, but in the relational meaning.

The inclusion of an explicit stance follow (like "yes"), follows the pattern found in the preference of explicit expressions of alignment: it is less frequent in Indonesian than in Dutch. Overall, a stance follow marker is given in 35% of all relevant cases in Indonesian. Furthermore, contributions including literal "me too" - that were less preferred to begin with - are mostly not accompanied by a stance follow (only in 17%, or 4/19) in Indonesian, whereas the Dutch data showed a relatively high preference for using a stance follow with literal me too: 61.7% of these cases is combined with a stance follow (or 87/141). Furthermore, the Indonesian preference to focus on the similarity in individual thought processes - at least in the utterance - is not shared by the Dutch. The Indonesian data show that in most "same position" cases the reaction is combined with a stance follow (58.82%, 10/17). This pattern is somewhat different from that found in the Dutch data: 41.18% of the Dutch cases emphasizing similar thinking are accompanied by a stance marker. It appears that the general preference for either the explicit expression of alignment or the assertion of similar thinking coincides with the response type used in combination with an affirmative marker. A bigger corpus of explicit alignment responses is needed to be able to (dis)prove there is indeed a correlation there.

To conclude, literal expressions of alignment are (much) less frequently found in the Indonesian data than in the Dutch data. This might be a coincidence, considering the low number of occurrences. Still, within the bigger picture of providing positive feedback and openly negotiating interpersonal relationships and alignment, this does fit a pattern found in the lower frequency of use of backchannels and expressions of agreement. Similarly, the Dutch preference for explicit alignment corresponds to the overwhelming use of backchannels and relatively high number of requests for confirmation. The Dutch seem to place a strong emphasis on overt, recognizable, alignment. Acknowledging the first speaker's contribution and explicitly establishing the connection between positions taken by different participants is a valued aspect of interaction. In other words, recognizing and negotiating stance and alignment is something to actively engage in.

5.5 Conclusion

Once they are part of some interactional activity, people expect to stay involved in that interaction and expect the same of others. They will thus employ means to make sure their joint commitment is upheld. This chapter has reviewed three forms participant were observed to use in their support of others' interactional moves: backchannels, agreements, and explicit expressions of alignment. Each of these three forms presents a means of expressing support for the ongoing interaction and/or the position or stance taken by another participant. These supportive moves address the position held by participants concerning the ongoing interaction, including the topic of talk, and the other interactants. They thus connect (and commit) participants to the ongoing ac-

tivity. Whereas backchannels are mostly associated with structural alignment, agreement markers and explicit expressions of alignment are important means of establishing positive interpersonal alignment between participants.

The use of backchannels as a marker of active involvement was briefly discussed in section 5.1. Although these elements only indicate the main speaker may continue their story, they do signal that the person presenting a backchannel is still supportive of both the ongoing organization of the talk (the respective roles of the participants) and the talk itself. The latter referring to that fact that the hearer displays active involvement in the interaction: even if another speaker has the floor, the hearer makes an effort to communicate they are still jointly pursuing the successful continuation and completion of the activity. As such, their frequency of use is a first indication of the assumed and expected level of active involvement amongst participants.

The same linguistic forms that are used to show involvement ("yes", "okay", "hm") are used to communicate agreement with some proposition. This presents the challenge of distinguishing "mere" continuers from "actual" agreements - to participants and analyst alike. Those cases that cast any doubt as to their status as backchannel or agreement were classified as the first to avoid an overestimation of active efforts of alignment. Agreements refer to those contributions that not so much signal a current speaker may continue, but communicate support of the content of their turn - and their associated stance. Agreement markers thus differ from backchannels in that they *are* a means of establishing interpersonal alignment: the participant uttering the agreement adopts the position that was put forward by a fellow interactant, thus establishing positive alignment between them.

An agreement can consist of a single affirmative particle ("yes", "indeed"), but can include a full expression of agreement as well ("I completely agree with you"). These options are all equally suitable, but they are not equally informative. That is, whereas all options are a perfectly acceptable way of communicating support or agreement, not all of them explicate what it is they support. Contributions consisting of affirmative particles only are dependent on the prior utterance for their interpretation, whereas full expressions of agreement carry their own propositional content. A full expression of agreement unequivocally conveys someone to support or endorse some statement; speakers cannot deny they have taken a certain position.

The connection between two participants is foregrounded in explicit expressions of alignment. Whereas backchannels and agreements are mostly concerned with the organization of talk and the content of some proposition, explicit expressions of alignment ("me too", "that's what I said") draw an immediate link between the prior utterance and both participants. The second speaker not only expresses their support for an earlier utterance, but also communicates their personal position on the matter in fact to be represented by that earlier utterance. The second speaker thus takes the first speaker's stance to be his own; it really is their joint position. These expressions range from bare forms, which only communicate the second speaker believes or experienced

something "too", to complex utterances including a stance follow marker, and a modification to assert the second participant's individual knowledge or rights to that joint position.

These three different reaction types communicate different levels of independent access of information and hence signify weaker or stronger commitment to a particular matter. A backchannel indicates involvement, communicating commitment to the interaction as whole, but does not influence stancetaking or alignment. Using an expression or particle of agreement to show support allows a participant to take a similar position as the original stancetaker, without taking on any of the associated responsibilities. Still, it allows the speaker some wiggle room, if need be the interpretation may be redirected: a seeming agreement might actually be meant as an encouragement (or so it can be argued) or as an acknowledgment of the fact that it was a sound argument for that position (but not necessarily reflecting *their* position). In short, using an affirmative particle opens up the possibility to insist the utterance was not intended as a commitment on the second speaker's part, but merely as a sign of support to continue. A more explicit expression communicating alignment binds the speaker to the utterance *and* position. Not only the original speaker, but the responding party as well can now be held accountable for the presented stance.

The Dutch and Indonesian data indicate these speakers hold different preferences when it comes to lending support in interaction. The Dutch speakers show an inclination to clearly take stance and negotiate alignment, much more so than was observed in the Indonesian data. The overall frequency of backchannels, the preference for explicit stance follows, and the use of minimal confirmations are all examples of active attempts to provide clarity on each person's position relative to the ongoing interaction and their conversational partner(s). In doing so, all participants know at any point in the conversation who has access to certain information and on what grounds - autonomous or as stance follow. Consequently, the allocation of rights and obligations that come with this access to knowledge is actively made part of the common ground. The interpersonal relationship is based on equal footing: equal access to information and openness about that access.

The more frequent occurrence of (stronger) agreements or confirmations in the Dutch data indeed indicates a higher need or expectation for all participants to overtly commit to the ongoing interaction and position themselves with respect to the matter at hand. This seems to correlate with a greater need to be able to hold people accountable for their contributions. Overt alignment between participants leads to a shared responsibility for the taken position. This is especially evident with explicit expressions of support where both speakers independently commit to the same position. The preference for clarity and unambiguity seems to guide the Dutch speakers in their interaction. There is an apparent need to know what others know, feel, and think about what was just said. This knowledge is not something private or individual, but actually negotiated out in the open: it is an integral part of the interaction. In other

words, to the Dutch speakers openness about interpersonal alignment is crucial.

The Indonesian speakers proved to be less preoccupied with the explicit negotiation of alignment. This is first observed in the relatively low frequency of backchannels found in the data. Even though backchannels do form the single biggest category of reactions, their number is less overwhelming than in the Dutch data. Whereas the relative frequency of both agreements and explicit expressions of alignment was very similar in both data sets, the specific choices made in utterance design were not. For example, the preferred form of expressing explicit alignment was by means of utterances reflecting some other person had just made the same point instead of overtly marking the connection between to utterances and their associated position.

Their interactions were leaner and cleaner; much less "cluttered" with contributions lending support or negotiating interpersonal alignment. The absence of minimal confirmation questions ("yes?", "yes.") is one example of redundant exchange that was not found in the Indonesian data. This is not to say the Indonesian speakers do not care as much about their interpersonal relationships as the Dutch. It does suggest there is a difference in the way these groups establish and maintain relevant relationships in informal interaction. The very first overview of the distribution of support, reproduction, and collaboration as the three main categories of phatic communication already showed that the category of support was relatively smaller in Indonesian compared to the Dutch data (resp. 49.11% and 68.05%).

One of the things that stood out in the data was the relative frequency of use of repetition in response to requests for confirmation. Interestingly, this use of repetition in response to polar questions does not seem to function as a means to necessarily assert prior or superior access to information (cf. Enfield and Sidnell, 2015). In fact, a good number of examples were observed that see the responding party use repetition in reaction to an assessment made by a speaker who clearly has the greater epistemic right. A repetition answer might then not indicate reassertion or reclaim of prior access to information, but in fact reinforce the claim advanced by the first speaker. The use and interpretation of repetition as a reinforcement of stance is further explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

Reproduction of meaning

The previous chapter revealed a preference for both more frequent and more explicit feedback in Dutch interaction, suggesting a greater need to negotiate stances openly. Apart from affirmation using interjections or full expressions of agreement, the use of repetition was briefly explored. A common denominator in these repetitions was their invited nature: another participant produced a turn that warranted a second pair part. Even though the choice to (partially) repeat that utterance lies with the responding party, there is the overt expectation some response will be produced. But what if participants repeat a prior utterance without being asked for a contribution? There is no immediate need for that information to be disclosed, it is already available. To some extent, the same holds for paraphrases: the propositional content was presented earlier and yet the second speaker shares the same knowledge, albeit formulated differently.

This chapter explores the general class of reproduction in more detail. Whereas repetition presents a mirror image of the original message in both form and content (to different degrees as we will see), paraphrases are more creative: the (relevant aspect of the) message is preserved, but the form is changed. In using a new form to express the same message, the speaker shows autonomous access to that information. Successfully paraphrasing a prior utterance requires a thorough understanding of what the previous speaker meant to convey and as such shows high involvement with the ongoing interaction and specifically the topic of talk.

Considering the striking difference in relative frequency of use (10.01% of Dutch compared to 28.44% of Indonesians phatic contributions), the first section is dedicated to the use of spontaneous repetition in interaction (see 6.1).




Figure 6.1: Phatic communication - focus on reproductions. The three classes of phatic communication were already presented in figure 4.5. The left-hand sphere in each of the graphs is a reproduction of that figure. On the right-hand side, the subclasses of meaning reproduction are given: repetition and paraphrase. The overall relative share of reproduction is much bigger in the Indonesian data, than in the Dutch. Whereas 35.98% (or 463/1287) of phatic communication involves reproduction in the Indonesian corpus, this type of phatic communication is found in only 16.53% (or 532/3218) of the Dutch corpus. This difference is mostly a result of the much higher relative frequency of use of repetitions in Indonesian (28.44% overall, n=366) compared to the Dutch data (10.1% overall, n=324).

First, the general function of reproduction of prior utterances is described (section 6.1), followed by a discussion of the two most frequent forms: bare repetitions involving a full or partial repeat of the previous utterance (sections 6.1.1 and repetitions that include some form of modification or adaptation to suit the needs of the second speaker 6.1.2. This first section closes with a paragraph addressing the sliding scale between adapted repetition and paraphrase, the latter being the focus of the second section (6.2).

6.1 Reproducing form, meaning, and stance

The repetitions discussed thus far were produced in response to a question (5.3), but the use of repetition of a prior utterance is of course not limited to question-answer pairs. In fact, most repetitions are not at all invited by another speaker, but are presented spontaneously. Given that the propositional content is already out in the open (the first speaker made sure of that), there is no need for a second, let alone third, speaker to share that same piece of information. Although these contributions may be redundant at an informational level; at a relational level, they provide valuable knowledge about the participants' interpersonal alignment. Consider the exchange in example (1). This brief excerpt shows quite some repetition among three participants involved in a discussion about what to buy for an upcoming party.

This fragment is taken from a conversation between four female contestants in the Indonesian Big Brother house (one of whom coincidentally is not featured in this stretch of talk). The production team asked Maya to throw Eko a surprise birthday party, and she has just told the others about the plan. In line 18, Lena starts listing things to buy for the party: cake, candles, matches. The full list is reiterated by Maya (line 19) and the first item is repeated by Dian (line 20), who subsequently suggests another item to add to the list: masks (*topeng*,

line 22). The same word is then repeated no less than eight times, before Dian specifies what type of masks she was thinking of: the ones that only cover your eyes. Both Lena (line 23)[1] and Maya (line 24) repeat the single element *topeng*, as does Dian (line 25). The word is then repeated three more times by Lena (line 26).

(1) *Spontaneous repetition - "masks"* (BB-IND, 4-2-4)

18	Lena	*<kue, lilin, korek>=*
		<cake, candles, matches>=
19	Maya	*=>k[ue, lilin, korek<,*
		=>c[ake, candles, matches<,
20	Dian	[°*kue*°
		[°cake°
21	Lena	*ter[us*
		the[n
22	Dian	[*tope:*[*:ng*
		[ma:sk[s
23	Lena	[*topeng*
		[masks
24	Maya	*to[peng*
		mas[ks
25	Dian	[*tope*[*:ng*
		[ma:s[ks
26	Lena	[*topeng, topeng, topeng=*
		[masks, masks, masks=
27		*=>pokoknya topeng aja [ya,< top↑eng*
		>in any case masks rig[ht, mas↑ks
28	Dian	[*topeng mata gitu=*
		[those eye masks= [=Columbina]

The contributions presented in lines 23-26 could have easily been left out of the conversation, at least from an efficiency point of view. No new information is shared whatsoever; none of the turns presents a question, answer, or attempt at repair, they truly are reproductions of the original "masks" first produced by Dian. So what do these turns do? Since the contestants are making a shopping list, it might be that they are each repeating the item to themselves to add it to their mental note of that list; to help them remember it. On the other hand, it might be that they agree with Dian that they should add masks to the list. Still another possibility is that the reiterations are a way to take some

[1]This type of repetition is called shadowing, since the second speaker closely follows the first speaker, reproducing the original utterance while it is still being formulated. This particular type of repetition is discussed in the section about collaboration (section 7.1), because even though it is definitely a case of (full) repetition. The second speaker had to have anticipated what was about to be said in order to be able to follow so closely. Furthermore, the second speaker is less easily identified as being the stance follow (as compared to consecutive repetition). Both speakers present the same message at the same time, after all. This is thus a different form of repetition than first listening and only after the utterance is completed repeating what was just said.

time to think.; repetition as a stalling technique. Even knowing the context, interpreting the role of these repetitions remains challenging. One exception to this ambiguity is Lena's turn in line 26. She clearly does communicate support for the proposal. First she reiterates 'masks' three times, but then concludes that no matter what, they have to get masks (line 27), thus approving of the suggestion first proposed by Dian in line 22. Still, this interpretation is mostly reached because of the second half of her turn, not because of the repetition.

Repetition is of course not only used for phatic purposes. Chapter 5 already discussed the use of repetition in response to questions. Another common context to find repetitions is when used to redirect the conversation. Repetition can be used in rejections to negate the propositional content and possibly present additional information to support the second speaker digressing from the chosen path. Even if the divergence is established by the negative mirror image of the original utterance, with no new piece of information other than the negation, it introduces a new direction of thought - and possibly of the ongoing talk as well.

Similarly, repair initiations are not advancing the ongoing interaction, but rather keep the conversation from going forward. They usually involve a request for more information on the topic of talk in order for the participant to formulate an appropriate response. With these repair-initiating turns the speaker signals there is a problem and asks for clarification. The requested repair is necessary for the interaction to (successfully) proceed. The opportunity or possibility to establish alignment is thus postponed a well. The practical function these turns fulfill disqualifies them as phatic communication: there is a need for them in the ongoing interaction; they are not "merely" socially relevant, but structurally as well. Considering (positive) alignment and phatic communication are the central topic of the current study, repair work and rejection are disregarded from further analysis. This chapter deals with only those repetitions that aim at establishing positive alignment with the other speaker. To qualify as such a form of repetition, the contribution should:

(i) be a reaction to some other speaker;
(ii) not be invited or elicited;
(iii) reproduce an earlier message in both form and meaning.

Using repetition to emphasize similarity between participants can take a number of different forms, ranging from full duplication to partial repetition with added paraphrasing. This chapter focuses on those instances of repetition that truly follow an original message without changing its contents. For these "simple" repetitions to occur, the original utterance has to be completed, before the second speaker decides to reproduce it (otherwise it is not a reaction, thus not meeting the first criterion). Ratification of a candidate completion and (almost) simultaneous production of the same utterance are not included here. Both forms are more of a collaborative effort to produce a single meaning, rather than an existing message being reduplicated. As such, they will be dis-

cussed in the chapter on collaboration (cf. section 7.1.4).[2] Similarly, repetition combined with new elements in the form of paraphrase or substitution of terms involves a (slight) shift in meaning and thus a deeper level of understanding on the second speaker's part. Even though there is repetition involved, these cases are therefore discussed in the section that deals with paraphrase (section 6.2).

The single biggest subtype of repetition in both Dutch and Indonesian is what might be called "full repeats": a complete reproduction of a prior utterance without any changes as in (2):

(2) *Full repetition - "psychologist"* (BB-NL 14-4)

6	Hanna	*maar (.) je moet even naar de psycholoog gaa:n,*
		but (.) you must just go: to the psychologist,
7	Ruben	*je moet even naar de psycholoog gaan,*
		you must just go to the psychologist,

The relative frequency of this form of repetition, however, markedly differs across the two data sets: 33.33% (or 78/234) of Dutch cases compared to 43.64% (or 120/275) of Indonesian cases involves full reproduction of a prior turn.

All identical repetitions, be it partial or full, can be combined into a collective class of what might be called "bare repetitions": presenting sometimes less, but never more information than the original. These repetitions are used for approval, processing and encouragement. However, in the majority of cases the specific meaning or function of the reproduction is difficult to determine. They are always an indication of active engagement, even though they do not necessarily give away any information about the second speaker's stance. What they do is acknowledge the first speaker took a stance and seemingly approve of that act - and perhaps the associated position. Nevertheless, without an explicit acknowledgment it is not certain the approval indeed extends to the content or is limited to the act of speaking.

The most recognizable way of approving of a taken stance is to include an affirmative particle. Contrary to bare repetitions, repetitions with agreement markers, or other forms of modification, do provide insight in the interpersonal alignment between the participants. The fact that this is the biggest form of repetition use in the Dutch data does not come as a surprise, considering the observed preference for overt agreement (and alignment) in chapter 5. Evidently, that same preference for clarity and individuality is found in their use

[2]Shadowing - presenting the same utterance simultaneous to the first speaker, but with a slight delay - is excluded here because of the lack of sequentiality between the first and second iteration. Ratification does follow someone else's turn and does establish positive alignment. However, there is an important difference between repetition for ratification and "simple" repetitions: whereas the latter involves an original stancetaker (the first speaker) and a stance follow (the second speaker), in the context of ratification the original stancetaker *is* the person producing the repetition. The remainder of this section focuses on those repetitions that are strongly similar to the original contribution - both in form and content - but do reflect two individual positions. Removing repetition for ratification purposes as well as shadowing from the collection brings the number of relevant repetitions in the data down to 234 instances in Dutch and 275 in Indonesian.




Figure 6.2: Spontaneous repetition. These figures present the different ways in which repetition is used in responsive acts. Recall that this set only pertains to what were called simple repetitions; that is, reproductions of a prior utterance for purposes of convergence. Thus excluding repair initiatives and simultaneous talk. In both data sets "full repetition" is one of the more frequent types, but the relative size is somewhat bigger in Indonesian (43.64% or 120/275) than in Dutch (33.33% or 78/234). Moreover, in Dutch this is not actually the single most frequent type of reactions that involve repetition of a prior turn: a slightly higher frequency is found for repetition combined with affirmative markers. This class of "stance negotiation" equals 34.62% (or 81/234) of all spontaneous (and simple!) repetitions in Dutch, compared to 17.82% (or 49/275) in Indonesian. This reflects the earlier observed preference for a more explicitly communicated and constructed interpersonal alignment in the Dutch data. The use of partial repetition is also relatively more common in the Indonesian data compared to Dutch (respectively 2.91% or 74/275, and 19.66% or 46/234). Partial repetition involves full reproduction of part of a prior utterance, again with no addition of new elements. The remaining 11% of repetitions are classified as including a small change (e.g. "not one" to "none").

of repetition (see fig. 6.2). The preference for close similarity in repetition in Indonesian versus individuality in Dutch become clearly visible when combining similar categories. The different types of spontaneous repetition may be combined into three classes: i) bare repetition, referring to full and partial repetition; ii) repetition with stance negotiation, involving repetition with agreement or modification; and iii) repetition with small changes, involving minor differences in form (e.g. "not one'" / "none").

In Indonesian, 70.55% (or 194/275) of repetitions is a form of bare repetition (i.e. full or partial, without any change or addition), compared to 52.99% (or 124/234) in Dutch. In both languages, the majority of repetitions concerned with social relationships thus does not include an individualistic touch but rather follows the first speaker seamlessly. However, there is a considerable difference in the size of this majority share in the two data sets. Considering the share of repetitions with small changes is similar across the languages, both fall within 11%, the difference is found in the share of repetitions used to actively negotiate interpersonal stance and alignment: 34.62% (or 82/234) of repetitions in Dutch involves an affirmative marker or modifier to explicitly position the second speaker relative to the first speaker. Compared to the Indonesian data, this is twice as frequent (17.82% in Indonesian or 49/275 cases). Incidentally, this coincides with the observation that the Dutch prefer their contributions to

be specific and explicit in their message (chapter 5).

These two main forms of repetition are discussed in more detail in the remainder of this section. The first subsection is dedicated to repetitions without any addition or change, the bare repetitions. The second subsection discusses repetitions that involve modification, in the form of agreement, reinforcement, or hedging, without changing the core message. Finally, the third subsection analyzes a sequence of repetitions of different types produced in a single stretch of talk.

6.1.1 Bare repetition - never more, sometimes less

The class of bare repetitions includes both full and partial reproductions of an earlier utterance. These two subclasses share the lack of newly added material: they are either a perfect copy of the original utterance (full repetition) or a reproduction of part of that utterance (partial repetition). The reproduced utterance can hold the same propositional content as the original, sometimes less, but never more. (Notwithstanding non-verbal cues of communication such as laughter, changed intonation patterns, etc.). These two forms of bare repetition are separately addressed in this section.

Full repetition

One of the more recognizable forms of repetition is the full reproduction of an earlier utterance. Such full repeats were found to make up 43.64% of Indonesian spontaneous repetitions and 33.33% of Dutch cases. Several functional uses can be distinguished, the first of which is to linger on the meaning (or form) of someone else's utterance (cf. section 3.3.3; Tannen, 2007). Often, these cases are accompanied by laughter, as in examples (3) and (4). Even without knowing what it is the participants are referring to, or in what context these things were said, it is clear the second speaker finds the original statement (resp. line 3 and line 18) in some way amusing and wants to express their appreciation.

These two repetitions are preceded by laughter, already indicating enjoyment. The repetition itself is a carbon copy of the original: no elements are added, no elements are left out. This use of repetition is found in only a handful of cases in the Indonesian data (11 of 120 full repetitions), and although it is more commonly found in the Dutch data, still, the absolute number of occurrences is rather low (15 of 78 full repetitions). Nevertheless it is a clear way of using repetition to show appreciation of an in some way unexpected utterance as presented by a fellow interactant.

(3) *Full repetition - savoring* (BB-IND 5-2-14)

3	Tessa	°*dikasih sejam lagi*° *((joking))*
		°given another hour°
4	Nur	*#HAHaaha*
		dikasih sejam lagi
		given another hour

(4) *Full repetition - savoring* (BB-NL 22-24)

18	Bram	*volle vaten klinken het hardst, of niet?*
		full barrels sound the loudest, or not?
19	Hugo	*#haha volle vaten klinken het hardst#*
		#haha full barrels sound the loudest#
20	Bram	*#hahahaha#*

A similar function of repetition is showing listenership. By repeating the words just uttered, the hearer can signal they are processing the newly acquired information. These forms of repetition - listenership and savoring - are not so much about taking stance regarding the presented information, but rather about appreciating that information. Even though the repeating party does not take position in relation to the object of talk, the repetition does establish positive alignment between the two participants. The second speaker shows approval or digestion of the original utterance, thus valuing the contribution made by the first speaker.

Yet another use of full repetitions that appears less concerned with stance-taking is repetition for encouragement. Even though the speaker does not take position, the fact that there is an apparent need to reproduce the prior message does show active engagement: the second speaker wants to attract someone else's attention to some specific object or activity. This is in fact a function that is found quite often in the Indonesian data (in 24 of 120 cases), but hardly in the Dutch data (4/78). This is largely explained by the number of repetitions involved in attempting to get someone's attention. In these cases, the initial speaker presents a request for attention, as in example (5), or information, as in example (6), which is subsequently reproduced by another speaker.

(5) *Full repetition - encouragement* (BB-IND 18-1-2)

5	Maya	*mas brO::?*
		[calling for Rendra]
6	Lena	*mas bro?*
		[calling for Rendra]

(6) *Full repetition - encouragement* (BB-IND 1-4-3)

8	Yuni	*e:h ada yang mau nanya?*
		e:h is there anyone who wants to ask a question?
9	Indra	*ada yang mau nanya?*
		is there anyone who wants to ask a question?
10	Adam	*ada yang mau nanya::*
		is there anyone who wants to ask a questio:n?

In (5) Maya tries to attract Rendra's attention, who stumbled into the living room and lies himself down on the couch without saying anything. Her concern is shared by Lena, who reiterates her request for him to respond. Similarly, in example (6), Adam has finished introducing himself on the first day, and is ready to sit back down when Yuni proposes someone might have a question (line 8). Her suggestion is subsequently repeated by both Indra and Adam, who both use the same utterance. In this case, the repetition seems to coincide with the rather fixed roles each of them plays in this interaction. The contestants are getting to know each other by playing the game "Who am I". At this particular moment, it is Adam's turn. While Yuni is certainly allowed to say something, she has no active part in the game at this point - she is part of the audience along with the other contestants. Indra, on the other hand, does have an official task: he is the appointed game master.

There are thus two people with a stronger right to ask this question in their respective game-related roles: Adam as the current player, and Indra as the manager of the activity. Whether they indeed attempt to exercise this right is not unambiguously clear. However, considering there is no need for the question to be asked again - it was audible to all those present - it is the most likely explanation. Still, an element of uncertainty about what a speaker intended to communicate with a repetition remains. This lack of clarity or transparency of meaning is nicely illustrated by the final turn in example (7), which is both redundant and ambiguous in its intentions.

(7) *Full repetition - redundant* (BB-IND 13-3-13)

9	Eko	*ini siapa nih?*
		Who's plate is this?
10	Maya	*si* [*apa aja*
		wh [omever
11	Yuni	[*siapa aja*
		[whomever
12	Lena	<*siapa aja::*>
		<whomeve::r>

Eko asks a question about which plate of food is for which person (line 9). Both Maya and Yuni answer, more or less simultaneously (line 10-11). After they finished their turns, Lena slowly and emphatically repeats the same information: anyone can take the plate (line 12). Considering his question being answered, Lena not being in a power position (as in the previous example), and not presenting any additional information, it is difficult to formulate a definitive interpretation of this contribution. Although its semantic meaning is clear, the reason for repeating the already available information is not. It could be that she is annoyed by Eko asking the question, because she feels it is evident all plates are the same and everyone can just pick one. On the other hand, it might be that she wants to be on par with Maya and Yuni and show that she too knew the answer. On the other hand, maybe there is no real purpose to the repetition and she just mimics what was said before, irrespective of who said

it and what the message entails, simply to entertain (herself or others).

Still other possibilities exist, and for each of them an argument can likely be made. Speculating about what in fact is Lena's intent, is not very helpful though, since it will not lead to a definitive decision on one or the other explanation. There are simply too many options, and too little evidence for one to be more probable than another. This is in fact not uncommon: in most cases of full repetition the reason for reproducing the utterance is not immediately clear. Without a relevant interpretation presented in a subsequent turn it is impossible to determine what the intended meaning is - or at least what the co-present participants believe it to be. A similar challenge is posed by repeats that are only partially connected to the original utterance - in form that is.

Partial repetition

Not all repetitions are a full copy of the original. In fact, most repetitions are not. Instead, they divert somewhat from the original, either by reflecting only part of the message and form, or by adding some lexical item that was not available in the original utterance. Usually, repetitions that divert from the original expression do not only see some change in form, but in meaning as well. This will be further discussed below in section 6.1.2. An exception to this rule is partial repetition: the perfect reproduction of part of the prior utterance. The part that is repeated retains both its original form and meaning.

In the Indonesian subset of spontaneous repetitions, partial repetition forms the second biggest subtype at 26.91% (or 74/275). (Note that the difference between the first type (full repetitions) and this second subtype is as high as 16 percent point.) In the Dutch selection of repetitions, this particular subcategory takes third place at 19.66% (or 46/234), cf. figure 6.2. The overall relative occurrence of partial repeats found in these two data sets is thus comparable (roughly 1/5 in Dutch; 1/4 in Indonesian). The functional use of such repeats is similar to that of full repetition: mostly to communicate listenership or appreciation.

The following example, (8), includes a participant repeating part of the earlier expression, showing active listenership. In this case, it involves learning a new phrase to describe the act of eating (or more precisely feeding). Hugo made pancakes for lunch and seeks out Hanna and David in the bedroom to offer them the leftover pancakes. David happily accepts the food, but since he is lying down on the bed, not having utensils nor a table, eating is a little difficult. Hugo offers a solution: rolling the pancake.[3] In line 49, Hugo proposes to roll the pancake and put the roll in David's mouth - which he refers to as his "drawer" (*la*). Hanna starts laughing and repeats the part of the utterance she finds funny (line 53, "right in your drawer"). She then goes on to explain she had never heard that expression before, thus presenting evidence she indeed

[3]He made Dutch pancakes, which are much thinner than American pancakes; they are more resembling of crepes and as such easily rolled.

used the repetition as a way of savoring or absorbing the phrase she was up until that point unfamiliar with.[4]

(8) *Partial repetition - "pancakes"* (BB-NL 15-1)

49	Hugo	*ik zal 'm wel oprollen*
		I'll roll it [=pancake]
50		*schuif ik 'm zo in je la:*
		slide it right in your dra:wer
51	Hanna	*#hahaha#*
52	David	*a::::h ((opens mouth))*
53	Hanna	*#zo in je la#*
		#right in your dra:wer#
54		*#god# die heb ik ook nog nooit gehoord*
		#god# I've never heard that one before either

These partial repetitions are heavily parasitic on the prior turn: their interpretation is dependent on it after all, as an essential aspect of the message is only available in the original utterance (Stivers, 2005:144). With full repeats, however, this is not the case, since they present the core claim themselves. Presenting that same claim regardless of it already being out there, may suggest the second speaker competes with the first speaker of primary rights of epistemic access (as in example (6) above, cf. Stivers, 2005)[5]. Although this certainly seems a relevant and plausible explanation for presenting a bare repetition, most of the examples observed in this data collection did not unequivocally follow this pattern.

Considering the high similarity between partial and full repetition, the same functions and challenges can be identified. While the above example includes a clue as to what role the repetition has in interaction, by means of added laughter, this is generally not the case. Presenting a copy of part of a prior utterance might communicate agreement, excitement, surprise, contemplation, or something else entirely. And these are only the positive emotions; including options that establish negative alignment would make the list even longer. The interpretation thus largely comes to down to intonation and/or facial expression. Facial expressions are unfortunately not always available in these data, and even having access to the original intonation it is still difficult to decide the speaker's communicative intention. This does not mean all repetitions are

[4]Had she wanted to repeat the entire utterance, she would have had to adapt the deictic elements to reflect Hugo being the agent. This would have resulted in a repetition with adaptation.

[5]Stivers (2005) discusses modified repeats in response to (mostly) downgraded first statements. For example, in the sequence of utterances "the children are lovely" and "they ARE lovely" the second utterance is what she refers to as a full repeat. Following the distinction made in this chapter, this same utterance would qualify as a partial repetition: only part of the original utterance is reproduced. Her point really pertains to the emphatic confirmation of the prior statement or claim in order to assert independent and primary access. The examples of full and partial repetition I found mostly do not seem to emphasize a particular aspect of the utterance to claim independent epistemic rights or access, but instead reproduce the entire utterance to (seemingly) communicate listenership or understanding.

as difficult to interpret. There are several ways of explicitly establishing a relationship between a stancetaker and stance follow using repetition. In these data, such stance negotiation by means of repetition took the form of adding an element of agreement, mitigation, or adaptation of the original.

6.1.2 Repetition with modification - negotiating position

Most repetitions were found to include only elements that were present in the original utterance (52% in Dutch, 70% in Indonesian, cf. section 6.1.1). The other cases of repetition involved some form of modification, mostly by means of an added agreement marker. This class of repetitions is referred to as "stance negotiations" in figure 6.3. Adding an agreement marker, usually at the beginning or end of the utterance, allows the second speaker to connect the two utterances explicitly. This combination of reproduction and agreement thus negotiates position: the agreement suggests a stance follow; the repeat suggests autonomous access and thus a stance lead. Similarly, including an intensifier or hedge communicates a clear individual stance on the matter presented by the utterance, again negotiating knowledge and stance. An example of a repetition including an affirmative marker is given in (9).

This exchange takes place when Dian is sick and Lena acts as caretaker. About half of the Indonesian contestants have not been feeling well, Dian being one of them. She is in bed, while Lena takes care of her. She states her hand is swollen (line 7), which is confirmed by Lena with a combined agreement and repetition turn. She begins her turn with an affirmative marker, accepting the statement by Dian as a relevant contribution. This does not necessarily mean she agrees with its content, although it could, it does mean she acknowledges the statement being made. The repetition following her *iya* ("yes"), resolves the ambiguity: this is meant as an agreement. Lena's utterance presents the same fact (it is swollen) and does so in a way that Lena is equally accountable for its content as Dian, who originally presented the information.

(9) *Repetition + stance negotiation - "swollen hands"* (BB-IND 25-1-11)

7	Dian	*<ah ini bengkak>*
		<ah this is swollen>
8	Lena	*iya, nih bengkak.*
		yes, this is swollen.

By adding the repetition, Lena communicates her independent access to the information. This is clearly the case, since both she and Dian can actually see Dian's hand at the time of interaction. In this short exchange, Dian and Lena establish that the both of them know the same thing about the topic of talk. Given that there is no further change brought to the original expression, there is not really much of negotiation of stance: Lena simply takes Dian's stance, she does assert independent access to it, but does not claim greater access or rights to the position.




Figure 6.3: Spontaneous repetition. [This is a reproduction of figure 6.2 above.] In both data sets the combined class of bare repetitions (which includes full and partial repetitions), represents the majority share of all repetitions. The remaining cases involve some form of addition compared to the original utterance. The first type of addition that was observed is the inclusion of an affirmative marker or modifier for purposes of hedging or reinforcement. This type of repeats is referred to as involving "stance negotiation". This class of "stance negotiation" equals 34.62% (or 81/234) of all spontaneous repetitions in Dutch, compared to 17.82% (or 49/275) in Indonesian. The second form of adaptation is what is called "small change", which refers to cases in which the overall meaning and form are preserved, but some minor change is observed in the specific phrasing, e.g. "none/not one". This class is only marginally found in both the Dutch and Indonesian collection (resp. 12.39% and 11.64%).

These repetitions with agreement can, however, carry a stronger claim of autonomy. Example (10) takes place immediately following Bram's plea to not nominate people (him in particular) based on supposed, but unconfirmed, popularity with the audience. Being dependent on the viewers' votes while not having access to them, a tactical move like this - voting for the popular person, betting on them not being evicted - might backfire. He concludes that it is not fair to put him in that position (line 48).

(10) *Repetition + stance negotiation - "unfair"* (BB-NL 29-13)

48	Bram	*is niet eerlijk*
		is not fair
49	Roos	*>nee het is ook niet eerlijk<*
		no it is indeed not fair<

Roos was one of the contestants contemplating using this strategy, but now agrees with him that it is unfair. She uses both a confirmation marker (in this case *nee*, "no") and a repetition of his utterance "it's unfair", further reinforced with a particle *ook*, literally meaning "too". This is essentially a special type of full expression of agreement (see section 5.2.2): Roos explicitly states what she believes to be the case, using his expression to take position, thus emphasizing both their similarity and autonomy. Note that she formulates her agreement as a fact, not an opinion. Recall that in the Dutch data, the majority of full expressions of agreement were formulated as presenting an objective truth, elevating a singular opinion to a known fact. One of the challenges with repetitions that do not add elements (the full and partial repetitions discussed

above), is that the intended message can be somewhat unclear. The one thing it undoubtedly shows is active participation, but the meaning of the contribution to the interaction may be difficult to determine. With this type of reactions, combining confirmation and repetition, a layer of ambiguity is shed.

The objective approach with added reinforcement in (10) is found more often in the Dutch data set. In example (11), David uses his turn to not only confirm Hanna's assessment, but to claim prior and independent access of information as well. In doing so, he shows a much stronger commitment to the statement, than an isolated repetition would have burdened him with. Parallel to (10), he combines a confirmation particle (*ja*, "yes") with a full repetition and an intensifier (*echt*, "real").

(11) *Repetition + stance negotiation - "a lot of work"* (BB-NL 46-18)

73	Hanna	*dit is heel veel werk he*
		this is a lot of work huh
74	David	*ja dit is echt heel veel werk*
		yes this really is a lot of work

In presenting his second assessment as a stronger version of Hanna's first assessment, he claims independent access to that information (Pomerantz, 1984). Irrespective of her stating the assignment is a lot of work, he came to the same conclusion. At least that is what he communicates. He can thus rightfully assess the situation at hand, perhaps even more so than Hanna can (hence the intensified version). As the second speaker, he thus takes agency and commits himself to that amended proposition establishing positive alignment between them. However, he does not "take over" Hanna's position, but rather makes known they are close together, albeit both at their own merit.

Out of the 275 Indonesian repetitions discussed in this section, only 11 involve some form of modification related to the communicative content. Along with eight other occurrences, the example below involves mitigation; that is, the force of the original utterance is reduced. In this case, the advice given to Tessa to try the middle door, is softened by including *aja* ("just"), making the effort or imposition seem smaller.

(12) *Repetition + stance negotiation - "doors"* (BB-IND 1-1-1)

27	Indra	*>pintu teng [ah< Tes↑sa*
		the middle [door Tes↑sa
28	Lena	[°*bisa:*°
		[°possible:°
29	Maya	*TESsa, pintu tengah aja*
		TESsa, just the middle door
30	Eko	*pintu ten↑gah*
		the middle do↑or

Tessa is trying to get through the door with her suitcase. She is struggling to fit the suitcase through the door, when Indra, who is still inside with the

other contestants, suggests she might want to try the middle door - which is slightly wider than the side doors. This advice is endorsed by Maya (line 29) and Eko (line 30). Maya is the first to reproduce Indra's expression. She reuses all his words and adds *aja* ("just") to mitigate the message. Eko on the other hand, does not adapt the message about the doorway, at least not verbally. The utterance is produced with a rather unusual intonation, though, ending on a high note. This rising intonation emphasizes his message, communicating both his own certainty in the matter and his individual claim to that knowledge. In a way, he thus is indeed reinforcing Indra's original contribution (just as David did in (11)).

An interesting (tentative) difference between Dutch and Indonesian modification seems to be the direction the adjustment takes. In Dutch, the majority of cases (15/23) are modified to intensify the message; in the Indonesian data intensification is found in only 2 cases. Most of the Indonesian instances of modification that were found included a form of mitigation (9/11) instead. Admittedly, the number of examples is too low to argue anything definitive about the behavior of Dutch and Indonesian speakers, but it is nevertheless interesting to see that there seems to be a pattern here. Especially considering the occurrences found in Indonesian are nowhere near as clear or explicitly recognizable as intensification as the Dutch examples.

A particularly interesting environment in which modified repetition occurs is in reaction to a statement made by another speaker who clearly and objectively has more knowledge about a specific topic. Yet confirmation is offered by (and sometimes sought from) another participant by means of repeating the same utterance. Especially, when the original contribution pertains to the first speaker's personal position on a certain matter, the presented repetition can hardly be interpreted as a claim of autonomous or prior knowledge. It seems that in such cases, repetition is used as a tactic of reinforcement rather than (re)claiming autonomous access of information.

This is what happens in example (13) when Nur endorses Yuni in trying to get a message across to Tessa by repeating that same message.[6] Nur and Yuni formed a team in a game of "match-the-sock". Yuni had to describe socks pinned to a board for Nur to find in a basket full of socks. Per the rules of the game, the description was limited to three words. Tessa, as the team captain, is the referee in this game and insists Yuni used four words and did not mention a color: reasons to disqualify her. Yuni and Nur have given an extensive summary of what happened from their point of view in the turns leading up to this excerpt. One of the things they and Tessa disagree on is the

[6]An element further complicating the game is the fact that the contestants had been divided in two groups at the time of this assignment: a "rich" group that was allowed to reside in the house, and a "poor" group that had to live at a campsite behind the house. Each group had their own supplies and food, and thus needed their own money. Something the "poor" group desperately needed. The results of the two-person teams were combined to decide which of the two groups would be the winner. Tessa is the team captain at this time and as such not part of either group.

colors Yuni supposedly mentioned during the game. According to Yuni, she described the sock as being pink and green.

(13) *Repetition + stance negotiation - "colorful socks"* (BB-IND, 14-4-5)

41	Yuni	*aku bilang <colorful> kare*[*na aku-*
		I said <colorful> because [I-
42	Nur	[*kek*
43		*colorful, y*[*a Yuni bilang °colorful°*
		colorful, ye[s Yuni said °colorful°
44	Tessa	[*itu yang aku dengar,*
		[that's what I heard,
45		*sumpah aku nggak dengar pink, ijo.*
		I swear I didn't hear pink, green.

In line 41, Yuni states she said "colorful", a statement subsequently repeated by Nur. Nur claiming autonomous access or a greater right to knowledge about what Yuni said is a bit of stretch. Rather, what she does is independently taking the same position Yuni did: she too remembers (i.e. knows) that Yuni used the word colorful. She thus reinforces the stance taken by Yuni as opposed to Tessa's: it is no longer one against one, but now two against one. Even though she does not explicitly use a confirmation particle or explicit reference to stress that they agree, it is what she communicates.

A similar use of repetition is found in line 2, example (14). Susan has been annoyed by Hanna's behavior for a while and finally has had enough (as she proclaims in line 1) as she makes her way to leave the room. Susan obviously knows best how she feels, and yet Lotte echoes her message: she believes Susan feels how she says she feels. Again, this repetition is primarily oriented towards supporting the claim made earlier.

(14) *Repetition + stance negotiation - "enough"* (BB-NL 23-24-22)

1	Susan	*nou ik eh >vind het echt niet leuk meer nou hoor<*
		well I eh >really don't like it anymore<
2	Lotte	*ik geloof dat Susan ECHt niet leuk vindt hoor*
		I believe Susan REAlly doesn't like it
3	Susan	*nee*
		no

In using the same words, a second voice is given to the same message. Susan and Lotte - and Yuni and Nur in the previous example - share a single perspective or experience. Susan may have been the first to take that stance, Lotte is both in complete support of her doing so and positions herself right alongside Susan. In examples (13) and (14), the similarity between the participants regarding the topic of talk is emphasized by means of repeating the original message, without explicitly expressing support. This use of repetition puts additional weight behind the original message, thus reinforcing that original message and its associated stance, and establishing a strong positive alignment between

the two speakers. Although there is no explicit connection between the two; compare the discussion on construction of alignment through explicit "me too"-like phrases and reference to having said something earlier (cf. section 5.4.3)). Most examples that were discussed involved a single repeat of some original message. However, negotiating stance by means of repetition is just as much found to be a group activity.

6.1.3 Repeated positions - to each their own

In response to questions, repetition was said to indicate a claim of greater epistemic access or rights (section 5.3). While those contributions were produced upon request, reproducing the same utterance in an effort to present it as your own original idea is found in spontaneous reactions as well. The next example shows several participants reproducing the same utterance, with varying degrees of similarity, without an immediate need to do so. Example (1) above, saw multiple rounds of repetition as well when the Indonesian housemates discussed Eko's upcoming birthday party. Whereas the women planning the party had a grocery list to keep track of and were brainstorming about what items to add, the Dutch housemates in (15) are simply chatting about whether or not Eva's boyfriend was faithful during her stay in the Big Brother house. There is thus even less of a practical need to keep stating the same thing. But, there does not have to be: each of the expressions benefits the coordination of their interpersonal alignment.

(15) *Multiple repetitions - "hope"* (BB-NL 9-10-21)

18	David	*ja: °dat we[et je niet°*
		ye::ah °you[don't know that°
19	Roos	[*het is te hopen*
		[it is to be hoped
20	all	*#hahaha#*
21	Lotte	*#het i[s te hopen ja haha#*
		#it i[s to be hoped yes haha#
22	Ruben	[*dat hoop ik wel*
		[I do hope so
23	Hanna	*hoop ik. ↑hoop ik.*
		I hope. I ↑hope.
24	Lotte	*#haha jawe::l#*
		#haha ye::s#
25	Hugo	*dat is maar de vraag natuurlijk*
		that is but the question of course

David is the first to suggest you never know what might have happened during her absence. Roos (line 19) immediately follows with a wishful statement: hopefully he did stay faithful. (Note that she does not personalize the message, it is not necessarily *her* hope something did or did not happen, it is simply a general wish.) An important difference between these reiterations of "I hope" and the examples of repetition for reinforcement purposes given above is that the

focal point shifts. The reinforcing use of repetition saw one perspective (resp. Yuni's and Susan's in the Indonesian and Dutch example) being endorsed and reinforced by another speaker as still *their* perspective, this example sees each of the participants laying claim to the same (or a similar) position as their own.

Given that Roos' turn overlaps with David's, she is not following him in his assessment of the situation. Rather, she pre-emptively finishes his thought, incited by the stretched "ye::ah", which already suggests he has his doubts. Either or both their turns induce all-round laughter. Although her realization is somewhat different from what he had planned, both convey uncertainty. It is Roos' more positive perspective of hope that is repeated in full by Lotte (line 21). Finishing her turn with an affirmative marker, Lotte acknowledges Roos as stance lead in taking that position regarding the issue at hand. Hers is thus an overt stance follow, representing a position she herself fully upholds.

At the same time as Lotte, Ruben (line 22) produces a replication of Roos' statement as well. He, however, does explicitly commit himself to the message, changing the perspective of the utterance slightly: *he* does hope the boyfriend behaved. Ruben's turn is presented as if he is the first to take that position. There is no recognition of Roos being stance lead whatsoever. The recycling of "hope" is what ties the two turns together. Ruben's formulation suggests his opinion or view is not impeded or influenced by what Roos said, but came about independently. Arguably, it is not so much Roos' turn that he responds to, but David's initial remark:

(16) *Parallel contributions - "hope" (BB-NL 9-10-21)*

18	David		*dat*	*weet*	*je*	*niet*
		(lit.)	that	know	you	not
22	Ruben		*dat*	*hoop*	*ik*	*wel*
		(lit.)	that	hope	I	too

The two expressions are neatly parallel. The negative outlook presented by David, emphasizing the not-knowing, is countered with a more positive perspective in Ruben's contribution. Both men use an anaphoric utterance, but Ruben changes the main verb from "know" to "hope", and turns the negation into an affirmation. Hanna subsequently reproduces the central part of Ruben's utterance (*hoop ik*, 'I hope') twice (line 23). Her copy of his words reinforces the feeling of hope, but at the same time shift the agency of that hope to her, not him. She too presents her position as being independent from others. Still, the reiteration of "hope" generates a strong resonance throughout this exchange, to use DuBois' (2007) term, and establishes positive alignment between the participants involved.

Similar to the series of turns about masks in the aforementioned Indonesian example, this is a sequence of turns expressing the same feeling. Unlike that example, the reproductions of the original come in a variety of forms, ranging from full repetition (Lotte, line 21), to partial repetition (Hanna, line 23), to adapted repetition (Ruben, line 22). Furthermore, it is not only the form that

is reiterated by several participants. David, Roos (and followers), and Hugo all present a similar idea: there is no certainty in knowing what Eva's boyfriend did in her absence. While Roos attempted to finish David's ongoing utterance with not much more to go on than an extended affirmative particle, Hugo, on the other hand, has already witnessed five people sharing their thoughts on the matter of faithfulness before presenting his view.

Following the exchange of repetitions, Lotte makes an end to the uncertainty by assuring the others with a stretched *jawe::l* (emphatic "yes") that there is no need to doubt the boyfriend's behavior (line 24). Hugo immediately questions this certainty, returning to David's initial position: they do not know for sure. Instead of reproducing David's earlier expression ("you don't know that"), Hugo uses a paraphrase to convey the same message ("that is the question"). There is no overlap in form between the two utterances, but there is overlap in meaning. In formulating his contribution this way, he establishes positive alignment between himself and David - they both take the same position - while maintaining his autonomy. This particular paraphrase is disconnected from the utterance it relates to, at least in form. None of the elements used in David's turn are re-used by Hugo. It is not uncommon to see a combination of repetition and paraphrase in one turn. Deciding at what point an expression is in fact a paraphrase is, however, not an easy task. What is understood to be a paraphrase and what role they play in interpersonal alignment and involvement in interaction will be addressed in the next section.

6.2 Reproducing meaning and stance

The challenge of formulating a definition for paraphrasing became apparent in chapter 3. Paraphrases range from close similarity in form and meaning, to similarity by association only. The former involves partial repetition combined with replacement of form: some elements of the initial expression are preserved, while others are phrased differently. The latter concerns cases that do not overlap in form, and only partially in meaning: (part of) the message presented by the former speaker is carried by the paraphrase alongside new information, leaving it to the hearer to work out the connection to the initial expression. This form of meaning extension and collaboration is discussed in section 7.1 below. In between these extremes are a host of possible paraphrases, varying in level of similarity in meaning and form. This section first describes three different forms of paraphrase and their their role in interaction. The last section assesses the supposed level of autonomy asserted by paraphrases by examining the degree to which the first stancetaker is recognized as such.

It is impossible to relate paraphrase to a certain stable and recognizable form or construction, bringing the decision about a particular expression being a paraphrase or not, down to the meaning of that expression. A strong similarity in meaning between two utterances has to be apparent for the second expression to qualify as a paraphrase of the first. However, even this crite-




Figure 6.4: Phatic communication - focus on paraphrases. The use of paraphrase in phatic contributions is relatively low in both languages: 6.46% (or 208/3218) in Dutch compared to 7.54% (or 97/1287) in Indonesian. Crucially, only those paraphrases are included here that do not extend past the meaning of the original contribution. Paraphrases that do involve meaning extension are included in the subclass "extension" and are discussed in chapter 7.

rion of similarity to an earlier expression leaves room for debate: what level of similarity or overlap is needed? Does the paraphrase have to be intended and acknowledged as such by its speaker? This section concentrates on paraphrases that (aim to) convey the same message as presented earlier by another participant. These types of paraphrases are especially relevant, because they are strictly speaking redundant when it comes to the exchange of information - the core message is already available. They are phatic in nature: contributing to the social organization of interaction. Out of all phatic contributions, in both languages around 7% of cases involved paraphrase (see fig. 6.4).

Compared to fully repeating an earlier expression, paraphrase is a more individualized, assertive way to construct common ground. The message may be familiar, the utterance does not have to be. Being able to come up with another formulation requires full understanding of the original meaning and a successful attempt thus provides the second speaker with the opportunity to display having that knowledge. By paraphrasing what was said before, a speaker can present the same information, take the same stance as the previous speaker, and still claim the overall "right" to that position as if they were the first to present it. Paraphrasing is thus an effective way to establish alignment whilst preserving autonomy.

Paraphrases scale from close similarity to the original utterance in meaning and form to associated similarity only. As explained above, these latter cases present more of an elaboration than a rephrasing of the original message and they will be discussed in the next section. Considering only paraphrases that do convey the same (or rather a highly similar) message, three different types can be distinguished. The first type involves partial repetition and partial replacement of an earlier utterance. Meaning some part is kept - usually the overall structure - and some other part is phrased differently while the overall message is preserved. Such cases will here be referred to as "partial paraphrases". The majority of paraphrases indeed showed a combination of old and new elements (50.24% in Dutch, 60.64% in Indonesian (cf. section 6.2.1).

Opposite this type is what will be referred to as "full paraphrase": expressions that cover the same information, but use completely different words compared to the original utterance (cf. section 6.2.2). This form of paraphrase is much more autonomous and assertive than the first type. The (second) speaker evidently is able to present the message in his or her own words, showing independent access to the necessary information. In the Dutch data, this form of paraphrase is found (much) more frequently compared to the Indonesian data. This seems to be in line with the finding that Dutch speakers preferred more elaborate agreements and expressions of alignment (chapter 5) and modified repeats (section 6.1).

The third type of paraphrase involves the use of a single synonym to (re)capture the core message of the earlier utterance (section 6.2.3). While presenting a synonym does involve a new form to convey the same message, there is not much creativity involved. Furthermore, the contribution is unable to stand on its own. Given that it is a single worded rephrasing of part of a prior message, that prior message needs to be accessible in order to construct a meaningful interpretation. Partial and full paraphrases generally convey the entire thought or message and as such can stand on their own. They are not dependent on the first formulation. This last type is thus somewhat different from the other two in that there is stronger reliance on the original utterance.

6.2.1 Partial paraphrase - something old, something new

The majority of paraphrases in both the Dutch and Indonesian data were found to be connected to an earlier message in meaning as well as form. These "partial paraphrases" involve a combination of repetition and rephrasing of a prior utterance. As shown in figure 6.5, half of the Dutch paraphrases (50.24% or 103/205 cases) and 60.6% (or 57/94) of Indonesian paraphrases involves some combination of old and new elements to construct a similar meaning as the one already presented by another participant.

Examples of such partial paraphrases are found in (17) to (19) below. The first exchange addresses the organization of the women's bedroom and takes place on the first day of residence in the Big Brother house. The women all share a bedroom together and they have just finished unpacking their suitcases. Assessing the result of her/their effort, Roos (line 5) describes the room as being *aardig netjes* ("pretty neat").

(17) *Partial paraphrase - "neat"* (BB-NL 1-5)

5	Roos	*aardig netjes.*
		pretty neat
6	Lotte	*redelijk netjes*
		pretty [lit. reasonably] neat)

Lotte produces a strongly similar utterance (line 6), using the same overall construction and head noun, but substituting the adverb "aardig" with the




Figure 6.5: Partial paraphrases. Most paraphrases in the data involve a combination of old and new elements: 50.24% (or 103/205) of Dutch and 60.64% (or 57/94) of Indonesian cases falls in the class of "partial paraphrase". An interesting difference is observed in the frequency of full paraphrases. Whereas 18.09% (17/94) of Indonesian paraphrases consists of an entirely new form, the relative number climbs to 38.54% (or 79/205) in Dutch. Conversely, the class of "synonyms" is twice as big in Indonesian at 21.28% (or 20/94) compared to the Dutch 11.22% (or 23/205). The overall share of paraphrases that present a reformulation of the original message in the subset of phatic communication is similar across the two languages (resp. 205/3218 or 6.37% in Dutch, 94/1893 or 7.30% in Indonesian). These numbers do not include the meaning-extending paraphrases discussed in the next section - although the numbers remain comparable when those cases are added (285/3218 or 8.86% in Dutch, 120/1287 or 9.32% in Indonesian).

near-equivalent "redelijk", thus seconding Roos' initial assessment. She does not upgrade or downgrade the force of her assessment compared to the original (cf. Pomerantz, 1984), but rather expresses the same force using a different form. This contribution clearly relates back to Roos' utterance, but at the same time presents Lotte's independent evaluation and position on the matter. The utterance can stand on its own. In other words, it could just as well have been the first comment that was made about the room.

The same pattern is found in example (18): both Lena and Dian describe the same thing, but in different words. Earlier the same day, Nazam had prepared a gift (a piece of painted cardboard) for Lena. He had asked Tessa to bring the gift to Lena. In this excerpt, Dian and Lena are in the kitchen preparing dinner. When Tessa walks by, Lena asks her to please extend her gratitude to Nazam.[7] Dian immediately understands what the gratitude is for (line 2, "becoming postman now right"), but Tessa does not. Following her question, both Lena and Dian reply *jadi pak pos*, "for the postman". There seems to be a misunderstanding related to their use of *pak pos*, given that Tessa softly repeats the words and both Dian and Lena offer an alternative in lines 8 and 9. These two utterances are of central interest here: they involve a partial paraphrase.

[7]Or at least that is how Tessa interprets it, as evidenced by line 11 in the example. From the lines in between it seems Lena in fact wants to thank *her* for acting as messenger, delivering the present to Lena. Per this week's assignment, they are prevented from having contact, since Lena is in the "rich" group residing in the house and Nazam is in the "poor" group living outside. As team captain, Tessa is the only one who can talk to members of both groups.

(18) *Partial paraphrase - "message"* (BB-IND 14-2-13)

1	Lena	*nanti- nanti tolong bilangin <terima kasih>*
		then- then please say <thank you>
2	Dian	*oh jadi [pak pos sekarang ya?*
		oh becoming [postman now right?
3	Tessa	*[karena apa?*
		[because of what?
4	Lena	*jadi pak pos kan?*
		becoming postman right?
5	Dian	*jadi pak pos*
		becoming postman
6	Tessa	°*pak pos*°
		°post package°
		[...]
8	Lena	*ngirim surat*
		sending a letter
9	Dian	*ngirim ba[ra:::ng, gitu ya*
		sending go[o:::ds, that's it yes
10	Tessa	*[o:::h iya.*
		[o:::h yes.
11	Lena	*maksud a[ku nanti bilangin terima <ka↑sih>*
		I meant [then say thank <↑you>
12	Dian	*[kalo kapten itu jadi*
		[as the captain so
13	Lena	*aku tadi udah °ngomong dia terima kasih ya*°
		I already °told him thank you yes°

As a first alternative to *pak pos*, Lena rephrases her earlier answer as "sending a letter" (line 8). Dian subsequently presents a similar version: "sending goods". Her partial repeat recycles the first part of Lena's original utterance ("sending"), but replaces the object from "letter" to "goods" (line 9). Her utterance is further reinforced by an affirmative marker. She is not taking over Lena's idea or position; she had reached this conclusion herself. The fact that Dian had immediately recognized the goal of Lena's first statement about presenting her gratitude, as evidenced by line 2, also suggests she indeed came up with this interpretation of the situation herself, and is not simply following Lena's lead. Again, this utterance could have stood on its own; it does not *depend* on the original. Yet, it is strongly similar, emphasizing the similarity (in thinking) between the two women. They collaboratively attempt to relieve Tessa's apparent confusion.

Lastly, example (19) is a fragment of a conversation between Bram and Susan in which they discuss aging, likely because Bram is celebrating his birthday the next day. He mentions how Mick Jagger had always seemed old to him - being somewhat 30 years older than Bram - but now that he reached the age Mick Jagger had when he became a fan, he does not feel old at all. Prior to the excerpt presented here, Susan offers another artist that fits the description of agelessness, or at the very least of behaving unlike his actual age: Herman

Brood. In doing so, she already shows she understands his perspective; she is able to construct a similar one after all. In the exchange given below, she characterizes Herman Brood as being "crazy as a door" (line 54), a fixed saying comparable to the English expression "mad as a hatter".

(19) *Partial paraphrase - "crazy"* (BB-NL 22-3)

54	Susan	*ja:: die is ook gek als een deur*
		ye:::s he is also crazy as a door
55	Bram	#hahaha#
56	Susan	#<haha>#
57	Bram	*zo leip als een deur*
		as mad as a door
58	Susan	*die is echt gek.*
		he is really crazy.

Bram only minimally changes her expression, replacing the unmarked *gek*, "crazy", with the more colloquial form *leip*. While this form conveys roughly the same, particularly within the boundaries of this saying, its use is more restricted both in terms of linguistic and sociocultural context. This paraphrase - or repetition with replacement - follows a round of laughter reminiscent of the use of repetition to savor the moment (see section 6.1.1). Quite possibly that is what Bram is conveying: his enjoyment over the description chosen by Susan. In changing the expression even this slightly, he does exert more independence over its contents than a full repetition would have. In doing so, he seems to reinforce both Susan's characterization and his appreciation of it.

In terms of stancetaking and alignment, these partial paraphrases see two participants present the same message, thus taking the same position. Whereas repetitions were sometimes unclear as to their specific function, and consequently their interpersonal positioning, these paraphrases all assert an individual (but shared) position. In making the utterance their own, the second speakers take control over the position and their ability (and willingness) to be associated with it. They do not only recognize the stance taken by another speaker (agreement), or appreciate it (full repetition), they actually *take* that position on their own. This is, of course, an oversimplification of the different forms and functions that have been discussed up until this point. Repetition and expressions of agreement are indeed used to assert individual rights and access to a particular point. However, generally speaking, repetition and agreement are more likely to be used as a stance follow to someone else's stance lead, because of the dependency on the first utterance to interpret the second. Paraphrases are more independent from the original utterance; they are (or at least can be) understood without reference to some other turn.

In (19) the (near) synonym is embedded in a full sentence, but a similar use of synonyms is found in isolation. Those isolated synonyms are a special form of paraphrase: there indeed is overlap in meaning, but not in form. However, since these paraphrases only target a single lexical item they are much more dependent on the previous utterance than a full paraphrase. Section 6.2.2 de-




Figure 6.6: Full paraphrases. Whereas 18.09% (17/94) of Indonesian paraphrases consists of an entirely new form, the relative number climbs to 38.54% (or 79/205) in Dutch. The overall share of same-meaning paraphrases in the subset of phatic communication is similar across the two languages (resp. 205/3218 or 6.37% in Dutch, 94/1893 or 7.30% in Indonesian). Most paraphrases in the data involve a combination of old and new elements: 50.24% (or 103/205) of Dutch and 60.64% (or 57/94) of Indonesian cases falls in the class of "partial paraphrase". (Reproduction of figure 6.5, with an emphasis on full paraphrase).

scribes the use of full paraphrases across the two data sets. That is, paraphrases that actually present the same proposition as some earlier expression, but using all different words. This will provide the foundation for an exploration of synonyms, presented in section 6.2.3.

6.2.2 Full paraphrase - out with the old, in with the new

Recall that in the majority of cases in which paraphrase was found it was combined with the reproduction of part of the original expression (60.64% in Indonesian, 50.24% in Dutch). Still, with a change of form, comes a shift in meaning: the partial paraphrases include some new original element (in form) that suggests the second speaker indeed knows what they are talking about. They are not only able to follow or support the first speaker in their position, they are able to adapt the message and take position on their own accord.

Figure 6.6 shows 38.54% of the Dutch paraphrases (79 out of 205) not to involve reproduction of an original element. Compared to the 18.09% (or 17/94) found in the Indonesian collection of paraphrases, the share of full paraphrases is 20 percent point higher in Dutch. This difference in relative frequency suggests a stronger want or need for the Dutch participants to assert their knowledge or stance independently. This is in line with the earlier observations about the tendency for them to use more explicit forms of alignment, to combine repetition with modification, and the overall observance of a higher occurrence of backchannels and agreement markers in the Dutch data. Again, overtly communicating a personal stance, and with that establishing interpersonal alignment, turns out to be an aspect of interaction that is highly valued by the Dutch speakers.

A contribution is considered a full paraphrase if two (close to) consecutive turns express the same idea, but with no overlap in form. Furthermore, the

message has to be carried in full by both the original utterance and the paraphrase. In contrast to partial paraphrases and synonyms, these paraphrases are not dependent on the first utterance for their interpretation. They can stand on their own and as such express the independent thoughts of the person producing the paraphrase. Full paraphrases are thus excellent candidates to present the same or a similar position on a certain matter, without having to defer to an earlier speaker.

In example (20) below, the paraphrasing party (Lotte, line 132), indeed shows no deference to Ruben's earlier turn. With the first eviction round coming up, the participants discuss the probability of someone wanting to leave the house voluntarily. Just prior to this fragment, most participants suggested this to be a possible course of events. Ruben (line 131) counters this idea: they could be wrong.

(20) *Full paraphrase - "mistaken"* (BB-NL 4-10)

131	Ruben	*maar ik denk ik denk dat je wel heel erg*
		but I think I think that you surely very much
132		*er op mis kan e:h,*
		at can miss e:h,
133	Lotte	*je kan je er ook heel erg in vergisse* [*n denk ik*
		you can also very much be mistaken I [think
134	Hanna	[*ja*
		[yes

Immediately following his turn, Lotte presents her thoughts on the matter: they could be very much mistaken. Her utterance is designed as a first comment on the topic. There is no indication whatsoever that Ruben already said something along the same lines. There is no overt acknowledgment of his contribution or the similarity between their turns. In doing so, she claims to have reached this insight independently from him and is autonomous in her stancetaking - even though the two of them take the same stance: the others may be too soon to judge.

This same type of full paraphrase is found in suggestions and encouragements. When multiple parties make the same observation and want to direct another person to do something in a certain manner, full paraphrases can function as a way of offering the same advice already given by another speaker. This is what happens in example (21). Eko and Kamil both urge Wulan to stick to the rules of the game they are playing: they cannot touch the floor, they can only step on carpet tiles they have to take with them. Wulan and Yuni are called to the Big Brother room and in her excitement, Wulan seemingly forgets about the carpet tiles. Eko is the first to remind her to use the tiles (line 2), followed by Kamil (line 3). Here too, Kamil changes the phrase completely without overtly marking his suggestion not being the first to convey this information. He changes the main verb *pakai* "use" into *ambil* "take" and refers to the carpet tile with the proximal demonstrative *ini* 'this' instead of *itu* "that".

(21) *Full paraphrase - "carpet"* (BB-IND 23-4-4)

```
2  Eko     hEy ingat pakai ituan
           hEy remember use that
3  Kamil   ambil, ambil in[i
           take, take thi[s
4  Eko                    [makai itu[an
                          [use    th[at
5  Wayan                             [>pakai itu, pakai itu<
                                     [>use that, use that<
```

The act Kamil performs is indeed the same as the one Eko presented. He is not trying to hand her a carpet tile or draw her attention to *this* specific tile, he is simply reminding her to use the tiles. Note that Eko's reproduction of his own original reminder is subsequently, and emphatically, repeated by Wayan (line 5) as well. Whereas Wayan takes over Eko's original utterance, Kamil adopts a different form, asserting a stronger independent claim to the contribution's content and value.

Most full paraphrases follow the same recipe: the original utterance is "ignored" and the message is presented as if not already available. The paraphrase is an original, new, form, to share old information. The expression chosen by the second speaker is thus mostly an ad hoc, creative, reformulation of the initial contribution. A notable exception to this is the use of fixed expressions. An example of a paraphrase in the form of a fixed saying is given in (22).

Eva has just announced she is leaving the house and motivates her choice by explaining she could have stayed another month or so, but it would have made her feel miserable and stressed out about what was going on at home. Bram concludes that if you are (emotionally) having a hard time in the house, you should do what is best for you (not in the transcript). Participating in the program is not worth feeling miserable (line 143). This stance is reiterated by Hugo, who uses the expression "there is more between heaven and earth" to convey the same thing.

Considering the rather lengthy explanation Bram provides about what he would do if he were to be in Eva's shoes (lines 135-138 and 140), Hugo's succinct paraphrase is a welcome clarification. His attempt to capture the main point is ratified by Bram in line 145. Here too, Hugo's paraphrase is not explicitly marked as a stance follow to Bram's stance lead. In fact, all but one of the examples of paraphrase presented in this section, do not include a linguistic element that explicitly ties the two utterances together. The similarity in meaning is left for the hearer to interpret, just like the interactional value of the contribution in general. This reflects the overall lack of explicit markers in the majority of paraphrases found in the data.

(22) *Full paraphrase - "heaven"* (BB-NL 9-10-10)

135	Bram	*denk ook hoor als ik hoor dat mijn eh vriendin*
		think too if I hear that my eh girlfriend
136		*eh zich KUt voelt >en-me en-me<*
		eh she feels BAd >and-my and-my<
137		*and me dochtertje heb het heel moeilijk he?*
		and my daughter has it really difficult huh?
138		*dan zeg ik *fwiet* tabee ↑jongens*
		then I say *fwiet* goodbye ↑guys
139	Roos	*tuurlijk (.) ja=*
		of course (.) yes=
140	Bram	*=de mo[ord.*
		=the mu[rder ((some sort of expression))
141	David	*[tuur[lijk wel ja hoor*
		[of co[urse yes sure
142	Roos	*[dat kan ik me ↓voorstellen.*
		[that I can ↓imagine.
143	Bram	*dat is het allemaal niet waard.*
		that is all not worth it
144	Hugo	*>er is meer tussen hemel en aarde<*
		>there is more between heaven and earth<
145	Bram	*ja*
		yes

A second presentation of the same information might seem redundant, but the fact that this second person thought of or understood the same thing - and wants to share it with others - is highly relevant in terms of the interpersonal relationship. Asserting your claim over a particular piece of knowledge informs other participants of your position on a certain matter, establishing interpersonal alignment. Moreover, showing independent (or superior) epistemic access helps to (re)distribute epistemic rights and obligations over the collectively available knowledge. This is not so say all paraphrases are detached from the initial expression. A good subset does indicate the contribution represents a stance follow to someone else' earlier turn, this will be explored further in section 6.2.4. First, a special type of single item full paraphrases is discussed: synonyms.

6.2.3 Synonyms - something borrowed, something new

The previous sections distinguished partial paraphrases from full paraphrases: whereas there is a clear, visible, connection between the original and the paraphrase in partial paraphrases, this overt link is lost in full paraphrases (although the connection can of course be made explicit, more on that in 6.2.4). When synonyms are used on their own, such a connection is absent as well. The use of synonyms is a special form of paraphrase in that it is almost a combination of partial repeat (cf. 6.1.1 and a full paraphrase (cf. 6.2.2).

The similarity to partial repeats rests on the fact that in synonyms, a single lexical item is reproduced, instead of the entire message, but the message carried by that single item is presented with a fully different form, hence the similarity to full paraphrases. This type of paraphrase is found in 21.28% (or 20/94) of cases in the Indonesian data, compared to only 11.22% of Dutch paraphrases (or 23/205). The absolute number of instances is very close, the overall share further apart, with the Indonesian share of synonyms being almost twice the size of that in Dutch. Granted, the numbers are too low to make generalizations about the use of synonyms in either language, but some initial, tentative, observations can be made.

Unlike partial paraphrases, these paraphrases are not formally connected to the previous speaker. There is no reproduction of part of the original utterance; these cases all involve an isolated synonym. The link between the two utterances exists solely on the level of meaning or interpretation. Two particular uses of synonyms stand out in both data sets: translation and simplification. Examples (23) to (26) illustrate translation being used to paraphrase or replace the core element of a prior message; examples (27) to (29) present cases in which the single worded paraphrase nicely captures the gist of a lengthier prior description, simplifying the central message.

Synonym - translation

Paraphrases were said to not only convey the message captured by the chosen linguistic forms, but also the (claim for) autonomous access of the paraphrasing party to that knowledge. Whereas translation necessarily involves a new form, the overlap in meaning is so strong these translated synonyms by translation are in some way closer to repetitions than paraphrases. While the second speaker utters a different form than the first speaker - disqualifying it as a repetition - there is not much authenticity or autonomy gained. The second speaker simply reproduces the same meaning and often even a strongly resembling word, only in a different language. Not much effort is put into making the utterance their own, it is simply a restatement of what was already said, but, again, using a different tongue.

In these data, the translations are usually from Indonesian or Dutch to English. There is no practical reason or need to use English: there are no native speakers of English residing in the house and everyone has access to the official language of the respective country they are in.[8] The choice for English has been observed in the Javanese context as a means of creating distance when negatively assessing others' attributes or behavior (Bowe et al., 2014:41). Using another language is then motivated by a certain unease of presenting

[8]This thesis is not concerned with code-switching, but the amount of English in the Indonesian corpus stood out. Mostly the English seems to be inserted randomly in initiating turns, both directed at Big Brother and fellow contestants. Of course, nothing in interaction is truly random. It would be interesting to see if there is a patterned use to the insertion of English and, if it indeed would turn out to be an act of voicing, what character aspects are channeled through this language.

a particular message in the everyday tongue. In general, this is a convincing explanation of the occurrence of English, especially in relation to sensitive or delicate subjects. In the examples discussed here, however, it seems rather unlikely that the second speakers indeed attempt to create distance between themselves and the message they (re)produce. The information that is shared by the first speaker - and therefore its subsequent translation by the second speaker - is simply too mundane or ordinary to prompt a linguistic barrier in the form of a "neutral" language.

Most of the translated synonyms are not necessarily representing a stance or position taken by the second speaker; rather they seem to express an appreciation or valuation of the first speaker's position. Parallel to bare repetitions showing appreciation, savoring what was said, or digesting the presented message all seem likely motivations to opt for an isolated translation. This is what happens in examples (23), (24), and (25). In each of these fragments, the second speaker does not explicitly align themselves to the object of talk. However, by reproducing the core aspect of the earlier message they do establish positive alignment between the two speakers (cf. section 6.1.1). Another commonality between these examples is the fact that the turn in which the synonym is presented does not itself receive a reaction; the conversation continues as if the translation was not offered.

The first example that involves translation takes place in the women's bedroom and was first introduced in chapter 5 as example (28) in the context of explicit alignment. The continuation of that exchange includes an interesting form of synonym by translation. The larger stretch of talk is presented here as example (23). The latter part of the scene is relevant here.

(23) *Synonym - "ice"* (BB-IND, 2-1-6)

4	Dian	*aduh aku seneng denger bunyi ini* ((touches chandelier))
		hah I happy hearing this sound
5	Maya	*sama*
		same
6	Yuni	*mami jualan es*
		mommy ice cream vendor
7	Dian	*#enggak#*
		#no#
8	Lena	*ice crea::m*
		ice crea::m

The sound Dian makes by running her hand through the glass pendants of the lamp apparently makes Yuni think of ice cream vendors, given that she refers to Dian - affectionately called *mami* (lit. "mommy") - as a representative of that profession. Lena adopts the image and reproduces the central element of Yuni's description, "ice cream", but in English instead of Indonesian (line 8). The lengthening of the utterance ("crea::m") and the redundancy of it on an informational level, suggest she expresses her appreciation of the presented characterization. In changing the formulation, even if slightly, she could be

said to reinforce the message. However, it might just as well be a way of "simply" savoring the image of Dian as an ice cream vendor. This example nicely shows the functional ambiguity or vagueness of using translations as synonyms or paraphrases. Like certain bare repetitions, the pragmatic purpose of this contribution is difficult to determine.

This use of English is found in the Dutch data as well. In examples (24) and (25), the original descriptor (respectively "irritated" and "messenger") is translated to English by a fellow participant. In both cases the translated synonym does not elicit a response, instead the conversation continues based on the prior, original, turn.

(24) *Synonym - "irritated"* (BB-NL 60-2)

70	David	*geïrriteer*[*d*
		irritate[d
71	Hanna	[*irritated*
		[irritated
72		(0.7)
73	David	*boos ben ik niet zo gauw*
		I'm not so quickly angry

Hanna's contribution in (24) is not very informative. Comparable to Lena's turn in the previous example, it could be interpreted to do several things: express understanding of the concept or situation, offer support for the interpretation, even express similarity between them based on the idea that she reaches the same conclusion independent from him finishing his sentence. Or all of the above.

(25) *Synonym - "messenger"* (BB-NL 46-2)

30	Hanna	*moest toch de boodschapper zijn?*
		had to be the messenger right?
31	Hugo	*de messenger*
		the messenger
32	Hanna	°*ja:*°
		°ye:s°

The same can be said for and Hugo's paraphrase ("messenger") in (25). He is not producing an answer to Hanna's question, he is simply reproducing the core element of her utterance in English (the question was directed at David specifically). Whether Hugo's contribution is meant to convey support, agreement, understanding, or a claim of epistemic access is unclear. What these synonyms do establish, though, is active listenership. The party producing the translation is actively engaged in the ongoing conversation, as evidenced by their ability (and willingness) to offer a related contribution.

The final example of synonym by translation does appear to present a separate stancetaking by both speakers. This is likely caused by the nature of the utterance. Unlike the previous examples, this pair of turns does not present

a descriptive but rather an expressive act. The final two utterances of Nazam and Tessa's interaction with Big Brother in the diary room are reproduced in example (26). They were given instructions on the latest group assignment and are now asked to leave the room. Nazam (line 19) expresses his gratitude for the clarification offered during the conversation, an act that is endorsed by Tessa (line 20). The interesting thing is that Nazam first uses a simple, English, "thank you", followed by a more elaborate utterance in Indonesian from Tessa.

(26) *Synonym - "thank you"* (BB-IND 8-2-4)

19	Nazam	*thank you*
		thank you
20	Tessa	*aduh, makasih Big Brother*
		ah, thank you Big Brother
		((Tessa and Nazam leave the diary room))

Tessa chooses a shortened Indonesian form and includes the addressee, "Big Brother". It is not uncommon to hear the Indonesian contestants thank Big Brother before leaving the diary room. Instead of using a leave taking interjection to mark the end of the interaction, they often choose a form that literally expresses gratitude. In this case, it may seem the thanking is (part of) a conversational routine as well, but the fact that they asked for clarification and their needs were met suggests an actual thank you would be in place. In this particular example, both Nazam and Tessa presumably do want to extent their gratitude. Because she uses a different form than Nazam's initial expression and extends it past the original meaning, it could be argued Tessa takes initiative to show that she, individually and independently from Nazam, intended to express her gratefulness.

Synonym - simplification

A more practical form of synonym use is found in the context of a longer explanation or description. In the examples presented below, (27), (28), and (29), the story told by one participant is neatly captured in a single term or phrase by another person. The synonym thus present a conclusion or simplified form of the information presented in the original (longer) turn. In example (27) the Indonesian contestants are playing "Who am I", a game given to them on their first day of residence to help getting to know each other. Adam picks a card that reads "what dreams have you not realized yet?". He is in medical school and reveals his dream to be running his own hospital at some point, moreover, a hospital that is named after him. His rather elaborate explanation is succinctly paraphrased by Nazam: "hospital Adam" in line 32.

(27) *Synonym - "hospital"* (BB-IND 1-4-3)

27	Adam	*okay, it's okay,*
		okay, it's okay,
28		*sampai sekarang mimpi yang belum saya wujudkan itu,*
		at this point the dream I have not yet realized,
29		*saya <penGEN> banget tuh punya rumah sakit sendiri,*
		I really <wANt> to have my own hospital,
30		*dan (.) pakai nama saya sendiri sih.*
		and (.) with my own name.
31		*saya pengen banget itu dan saya-*
		I really want that and I-
32	Nazam	*Adam Hospital*
		Adam Hospital
33	all	((applause))

Note the lack of further comment or response to the offered paraphrase. Similar to the synonyms by translation, these synonyms that are offered as conclusions or summaries do not trigger a response. In this case, the other participants focus their attention on Adam, not Nazam. Often, the original speaker (here Adam) does not acknowledge nor respond to such a synonym either. This is not surprising, considering the second speaker reiterates to them what they have just said themselves; it is a simplified version of their original message.

Compared to the synonyms by translation, these examples demonstrate more creativity and independent understanding on the second speaker's part. Whereas the translations were both in form and meaning close to the original, without a clear benefit, these efforts to explain or simplify what some other participant said shows a strong sense of understanding. The second speaker attempts to improve the communicative exchange by offering an alternative formulation that is arguably more accessible or precise. Still, there is no explicit connection between the position taken by the first and second speaker. The synonym clearly displays understanding on the second speaker's part, but it is not unequivocally clear if he or she supports the message. Again, these synonyms mostly show active listenership and involvement.

An exception to the supposed lack of acknowledgment is found in example (28) where Nazam accepts the term Wulan presents as a synonym into his own more elaborate next utterance.

(28) *Synonym - "sexy"* (BB-IND 12-1-10)

111	Lena	*terus badan kamu juga bagus,*
		next your body is also nice,
112	Wulan	°*seksi*°
		°sexy°
113	Nazam	°*seksi, kamu mau nggak jadi pacar aku?*°
		°sexy, do you want to be my boyfriend or not? °

Lena, Wulan, Nazam, Rendra and (unwillingly) Kamil are playing a game. Nazam is feeding the others things to say, all related to relationships and love.

In this particular case, Lena is directed to ask Kamil to be her boyfriend. She starts with a compliment: "his body looks good" (line 111), which is rephrased, by Wulan as "sexy". Contrary to the earlier examples, here Nazam builds his next utterance on the offered synony;. Wulan's paraphrase results in him taking over her form of choice, establishing positive alignment between the two of them.

The final example of synonymy, in (29), is close to a correction: Thomas' rather vague and clumsy description of the location of a tattoo is brought down to a single word by Eva. She does not even await the completion of his turn; his pause (and Lotte's interruption) leads her to offer a candidate location at the same time he finishes his sentence (line 16). This form of synonymy is akin to collaborative meaning-making in the sense that she attempts to finish his sentence. An important difference with most collaborative efforts is that the falling intonation and the conclusive *"ja"* at the end of Eva's turn communicate not a candidate completion, but rather decidedly presents this as a (superior) alternative to his formulation. Thomas does nothing to indicate he accepts, or has even heard, her suggestion. He simply goes on with his story about the girl with the tattoo.

(29) *Synonym - "tattoo"* (BB-NL 1-2)

12	Thomas	*ik ken een meisje, die heb ook zoiets,*
		I know a girl, that also has something like that,
13		*die heb het alleen net*
		she only has it just
14		*boven haar eh* [(.) [*achterste*
		above her eh [(.) [behind
15	Lotte	[*ook ↑hier?*
		[also ↑here?
16	Eva	[*stUITje, ja.*
		[tAILbone, yes.
17	Thomas	*en dan zo groot*
		and then this big

Concentrating solely on their form, these synonyms are all examples of full paraphrases: overlap in meaning without overlap in form. However minimal, they are a paraphrase. Yet, their role in interaction is closer to that of (bare) repetitions than most paraphrases. The strong similarity between the two classes is found in the fact that both repetitions and isolated synonyms (mostly) do not form independent utterances: they need the original message of which they are a paraphrase or repeat in order to be interpreted. On their own, both bare repetitions and bare synonyms are just random words. Furthermore, they seem to have the same function, that of active listenership. This separates synonyms from other full paraphrases, which are not normally dependent on the linguistic context of the original to elicit a meaningful interpretation. Notwithstanding the relevance of the sequential placement, the propositional content of both an original and a paraphrase can in principle be interpreted in isolation.

6.2.4 Recognizing the original stancetaker

Accepting another person as the original source of information is mostly marked by the addition of an affirmative marker, as in example (29). The choice for a paraphrase - and not a repetition or simple agreement - still indicates a strong claim to autonomous access to that information. The greater assertiveness and autonomy, signified by the ability to use a different form, is likely the reason behind this choice. The combination of an affirmative marker and a paraphrase allows the speaker to confirm the initial description, assessment, or explanation as an accurate belief *and* as their own belief. In other words, the second speaker not only recognizes the position taken by the first speaker as a point of significance, but independently adopts that position as well.

The first two examples, (30) and (31), show a combination of a turn-initial agreement marker, followed by a paraphrase of the initial message. In (30) Lotte is having trouble with her toga party costume: she does not understand how to turn the bed sheet into a toga. Susan offers an explanation, which is confirmed by David (line 2), the in-house toga expert. Given that he is the only one who has attended a toga party before, he is the only one who can rightfully lay any claim to prior knowledge or understanding. And this he does. He not only confirms Susan's explanation with the affirmative marker *ja*, "yes", but subsequently presents his own version of her explanation. Yet, his instruction is hardly more insightful than Susan's. The "over your shoulder" part is preserved in his explanation, but how the piece of fabric should be positioned exactly remains unclear and is not further clarified either - at least not by him.

(30) *Full paraphrase - "toga"* (BB-NL 23-24-3)

1	Susan	*schuin over je schouder*
		diagonally over your shoulder
2	David	*ja over >een schouder heen moet 'ie heen<*
		yes over >one shoulder over must it over<

David mostly confirms Susan's understanding of the workings of a toga (made from a bed sheet). His paraphrase does establish him having independent and prior access to this knowledge. A stronger sense of both similarity and autonomy is found in (31), with Lotte and Hugo imitating Eva moaning about the lack of entertainment in the house. The both of them communicate the same thing, voicing Eva: the others were up to no fun. They have known Eva for an equal amount of time (since they moved in to the Big Brother house) and have witnessed the same behavior from her. They both know the other has access to that information; she is part of their common ground.

(31) *Full paraphrase - "fun"* (BB-NL 23-24-3)

1	Lotte	*ja en ze waren helemaal niet in voor gekkigheid*
		yes and they were not at all in to silliness
2	Hugo	*nee ze [wouden niet geen lol maken,*
		no they [did not want to make no fun
3	Roos	[#HAhAhahah#

This example shows a first description - or rather imitation - presented by Lotte (line 1) of what Eva used to complain about, followed by another attempt to characterize that behavior - and imitate it - by Hugo. In terms of informational value, his contribution is redundant. Lotte already brought the behavior to everyone's attention, so he does not need to do the same. In their round of gossiping, however, his paraphrase makes sense. They are exchanging judgments about an absent party. Showing he has an opinion, and one that aligns with the others', benefits their mutual bond. Using a paraphrase and not just an agreement marker intensifies the value of his act. He not only follows Lotte in her evaluation of Eva, he had the same experience, as evidenced by his ability to put it to words.[9]

The final example is constructed the other way around: the paraphrase is offered first, followed by an affirmative marker. Again, Eva is the topic of conversation. Roos and Hanna discuss whether they had foreseen Eva would leave the house. In line 4, Roos asserts she had already thought Eva was not one to stay till the end, a feeling shared by Hanna (line 5). Hanna first offers a paraphrase of Roos' assessment: Eva was not going to make it. Starting with a paraphrase, she asserts individual and prior insight about the situation, indicating she indeed had thought of this herself separate from Roos now saying it.

(32) *Full paraphrase - "pull through"* (BB-NL 11-4)

4	Roos	*die gaat het niet trekken.*
		that one is not going to pull it
		[''she won't last'']
5	Hanna	*die- die redt dat niet (.) nee*
		that- that one does not save that (.) no
		[''she does not make it (.) no'']
6		(1.8)

Following a brief pause Hanna emphasizes the taken position with *nee*, "no". It is unclear whether the affirmation is focused on her own or Roos' utterance or both. What it does establish is a concrete link between the two, precisely because of this ambiguity. Both women have taken the same position independently, a position that is reaffirmed to exist by Hanna's final "no".

In the majority of cases, there is no overt acknowledgment of the earlier contribution: 70.73% of Dutch paraphrases and 84.04% of Indonesian paraphrases does not include a stance follow marker (see fig. 6.7). Although the absolute numbers are too low to draw definitive conclusions, the Dutch collection of paraphrases does suggest a correlation between the addition of an affirmative marker and the degree to which the paraphrase diverges from the original. The less similarity there is in form between the first and second utterance, the more likely it is to find an explicit indication of the paraphrase being a stance follow.

[9] Of course he does not need to have *actually* had this experience. Using a paraphrase to establish the effect of shared experience and interpersonal likeness is enough to successfully communicate (and as a result constitute) the bond he forges between them.




Figure 6.7: Paraphrase and stance follow markers. These charts show most paraphrases are not combined with a stance follow marker: they are presented as original or first turns. The overall share of stance follows is almost twice as big in the Dutch data (29.3% vs 16% in Indonesian). The majority of stance follows is found in full paraphrases in Dutch: there seems to be a correlation between the level of formal similarity and the need to produce a stance follow. In full paraphrase over 40% of cases is combined with an affirmative marker, compared to 8% of synonyms and 24% of partial paraphrases. This pattern is not found in the Indonesian data, where 10% of synonyms is accompanied by a stance follow marker and 17% of both partial and full paraphrases. Again, the numbers are low (especially in Indonesian), so there is no conclusive evidence to support or counter this observation yet.

Taking into account that the Dutch data show an overall stronger focus on overt support, agreement and alignment, the hypothesis that full paraphrases favor the addition of an affirmative marker is not that improbable. Full paraphrases are arguably less recognizable as an attempt at establishing interpersonal alignment, because of the lack of observational similarity. The message that is conveyed may show overlap in meaning with another turn, the addition of an affirmative marker draws attention to the interconnectedness of the presented information and by extension to the interconnectedness of the participants involved.

The emphasis on sharedness and mutual understanding is nicely illustrated in example (33). This excerpt represents the final part of a discussion about the newly received groceries. Not at all to the housemates' liking, they were given black pudding. After having confirmed that none of them is happy with this choice, Hanna offers what would have been a more suitable choice: ground beef (lines 30-33). Lotte, David, and Susan support this suggestion consecutively, each using a different reaction type.

(33) *Paraphrase - "black pudding"* (BB-NL 23-24-9)

30	Hanna	*>ja maar ik bedoel*
		yes but I mean
31		*waarom geven ze niet gewoon rundergehakt?*
		why don't they just give ground beef?
32	David	*jah, of gewoon eh*
		yeah, or just eh-
33	Hanna	*ik bedoel daar kun je tenmiste wat=*
		I mean that at least you can something
34		*=heleboel dingen mee doen*
		do a lot of things with
35	Lotte	*ja*
		yes
36	David	*stoofvlees*
		[beef] stew
37	Susan	*ja, kan je van alles mee doen=*
		yes, you can do all kinds of things with [it]=
38		*=van alles mee maken*
		make all kinds of things.

This example shows different people aligning to the position taken by Hanna in line 31. David agrees (*jah*) and starts an expression offering an alternative to ground beef, which he only finishes (in line 36). In the meantime, Hanna elaborates on her original suggestion and Lotte provides her support for that suggestion and its associated explanation in the form a simple agreement marker *ja*, "yes". The contribution that is most relevant for the current discussion, however, is Susan's utterance in line 37. The first thing she does is present a particle of agreement: "yes". In terms of positively aligning with Hanna, this would have sufficed. Yet Susan proceeds to reproduce Hanna's message. The interesting thing is that she first presents a partial paraphrase of Hanna's original explanation changing only the modifier *heleboel* to *van alles*, followed by a partial rephrasing of her initial paraphrase replacing *doen* ("do") with [maken] ("make"). Schematically this can be represented as:

(34) *parallels in paraphrase, BB-NL 23-24-9*

33	Hanna	*daar*	*kun*	*je*	*tenminste*	*heleboel*	*dingen*	*mee*	*doen*
	(lit.)	there	can	you	at least	a lot	things	with	do
37	Susan	ja	*kan*	*je*		*van alles*		*mee*	*doen*
	(lit.)	yes	can	you		all kinds of things		with	do
38						*van alles*		*mee*	*maken*
	(lit.)					all kinds of things		with	make

Hanna and Susan's utterances are strongly similar, in both form and meaning. The main point they both make is that ground beef is a versatile ingredient (or minced meat more generally speaking). The fact that Susan recycles the construction originally used by Hanna (twice), establishes a clear connection between them as stance lead and stance follow. Susan builds on Hanna's turn, fine-tuning it to refer to the making of a dish instead of "doing" in general. This

effort of further clarifying or specifying what it is Hanna presumably wanted to convey shows a strong collaborative effort on Susan's part.

Still another form of meaning collaboration in this short exchange is David's alternative suggestion in line 35. Whereas Susan's contribution goes towards making the existing description more precise, David demonstrates his approval and understanding of Hanna's stance by offering another versatile protein: *stoofvlees* "meat to cook stew with"). In doing so, he establishes positive alignment between himself and Hanna. They are completely on the same page: he is able to relate a new object of talk to their shared position on (un)suitable meats. This example thus includes support, reproduction, and extension of meaning. As such, it nicely illustrates the way these different forms and functions are combined in actual interaction. Simply taking in a presented message, not doing anything with it is unusual. At least in these Dutch data, the participants (have to) reveal their relative positioning regarding both the object of talk and, more importantly, their fellow interactant.

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how two forms of reproduction are used to establish and negotiate interpersonal positioning: repetition and paraphrase. Whereas both involve the reproduction of meaning (the propositional content) as presented by a previous utterance, they differ in their (re)use of linguistic forms. All reproductions discussed in this chapter were strictly speaking redundant. The original speaker performs some act, asserting a certain position on something, which is subsequently reproduced by another participant (this thus excludes repair structures). There is no *need* for this second act to be presented; the information is already available to those present. Presenting that same message may not seem very useful or insightful, it communicates involvement on the second speaker's part. Thus, through such phatic reproductions, a relationship between participants can be created or maintained. The two main forms of reproduction that were distinguished are repetition and paraphrase.

Repetition is meant to refer to those second utterances that reproduce (part of) the same utterance as a performed by a prior speaker, without adding new elements. That is, the addition of an agreement marker or intensifier is allowed, but changing a noun or verb changes the status of the utterance to a paraphrase. Most repetitions involved no change in phrasing whatsoever; that is, no new material was added. These so-called "bare" repetitions either reproduce the earlier message in full, copying the entire original utterance, or they reproduce some part of the earlier utterance with some other part(s) being omitted. These full and partial repetitions are easily recognizable as having a connection to some other utterance, but they are less easily interpreted in terms of their aim or goal. A solution to this functional ambiguity is the addition of an affirmative marker or modifier: including an element that explicitly relates the second utterance to the first (by means of agreement, upgrading, or downgrading)

clearly positions the two speakers relative to each other. The relatively small change made to the original utterance reflects the ability of the second speaker to assess the situation independently, finding ground to agree, upgrade, or downgrade the message. These repetitions are thus not only a reproduction of existing material, they are actively negotiating stance.

The term paraphrase is used to describe cases in which a second speaker communicates the same message as a fellow interactant, but with a significant change to the earlier utterance. The changes made in the second utterance range from substituting a single content word to completely rephrasing the message. The first subtype is referred to as partial paraphrases, some part of the original utterance is retained, but some other parts are replaced by a similar word. These paraphrases are still visibly connected to the earlier utterance; a considerable similarity in form reveals the two to be related. Full paraphrases, on the other, do not contain such shared elements. The overall message may be (largely) the same, but the contribution is completely disconnected from the earlier utterance in terms of form. These full paraphrases are in a sense a "second original"; they could have been the first display of that knowledge. The fact that some other person in fact presented the information first is not necessarily (visibly) acknowledged. Both full and partial paraphrases could occur in isolation; the interpretation of these utterances is not dependent on information presented by the original utterance. The final subtype of paraphrase that was observed, however, does need the earlier expression to reach a meaningful understanding. The single replacements found in partial paraphrases are also used in isolation. These synonyms are dependent on the original utterance for their context of interpretation. Most of the isolated synonyms that were observed in the corpus were a one-word translation or simplification of the original expression.

Especially full and partial repetitions present a challenge in terms of their functional contribution. They all show involvement in interaction and (re)affirm joint commitment to the activity, but there is no overt sign of the second speaker taking the same position or supporting the assertion. Mostly, their function can be described as conveying listenership or appreciation. Repeating the same utterance, then, is a way of savoring the expression. This is not to say full repetitions cannot be used to take stance or establish alignment. In the Indonesian data, these repetitions were found to be used to seemingly encourage or reinforce or certain act. This would suggest the second speaker does in fact take that same stance. However, there is no visible sign or marker that indeed can be connected to this interpretation. Agreement markers or modifiers that are sometimes added to a repeat are that evidence needed to interpret the functional value. These repetitions were explained to negotiate stance. The addition of an intensifier or agreement marker suggests the second speaker individually has some opinion or knowledge about the ongoing matter. They do not only reproduce an utterance someone else has presented, they actively make it *theirs*. The added marker allows the speaker to present the associated stance as his or her own, thus taking a more assertive approach to the interaction. The fact that the two utterances, and thus stances, are almost

identical establishes a strong and overt bond between the participants. They both now know they share a perspective on something; they have taken a joint position.

Compared to repetitions, paraphrases assert a greater independence from the first speaker *and* more clearly contribute to their interpersonal positioning. The ability to replace some or all of the words suggests understanding of the message - and likely the adoption of the associated stance. Using a paraphrase indicates that the speaker has independent access to some piece of information. By presenting the paraphrase, the speaker communicates his or her individual stance on the object of talk. Considering a paraphrase necessarily follows some other utterance that presented the same message (and stance), this second positioning establishes interpersonal alignment. The more "original" the paraphrase is, that is, the less elements are retained from the first utterance, the more independence is asserted by the second speaker. Changing the entire utterance to convey the same message suggests the second speaker to (be able to) have come up with that message themselves. The connection between the two utterances, and stances, relies on the interpretation of the participants, since there is no longer any visible connection present. Suppose the second speaker would want to acknowledge they are a stance follow to someone else's stance lead, they would have to include some marker to that end in their paraphrase. An initial analysis indicated the more divergent the paraphrase is from the original, the more likely it is combined with an affirmative marker to recognize the speaker is indeed the second person to present that information. The use of synonyms falls somewhere in between a repetition and a paraphrase: they are dependent on the original utterance for their interpretation, but they do show the speaker is able to produce the message in other words.

Whereas repetition is not a very frequently adopted choice in the Dutch data, using repetition is not at all uncommon in the Indonesian corpus, both relative and in absolute number (28% of all phatic contributions, compared to 10.07% in Dutch, cf. figure 6.1). Within the subset of reproductions, the relative share of repetitions is (much) higher in Indonesian as well (79.01% or 366/463, compared to 60.9%, or 324/532 in Dutch). Further comparing the specific form of repetitions revealed a difference between the Indonesian and Dutch speakers in terms of their preferred choice of type of repetition. Over 70 percent of repetitions found in the Indonesian data were a full or partial reproduction of a prior utterance, compared to 53 percent in the Dutch data. The variation in these numbers is (almost perfectly) explained by the more frequent inclusion of an agreement marker of modifier in Dutch, thus establishing an over link between the two utterances and speakers. The combination of an agreement marker and a repetition shows independent access and assessment of a particular act as well as acknowledgment of the other participant being the first to present the information. Instead of only presenting agreement with the other participant, the speaker makes an effort to make that position their own. This orientation towards making a mark, demonstrating individual knowledge, and taking position is also found in the Dutch use of paraphrase.

The majority of paraphrases were partial in both data sets, reaching 50 percent in the Dutch and 60 percent in the Indonesian collection of paraphrases. These reproductions are more assertive than repetitions in that they assert independent understanding and positioning. Still, they are recognizably a follow-up to some other utterance. Roughly 40 percent of the Dutch paraphrases involved a complete rephrasing of the original utterance. The relative frequency of full paraphrases in Indonesian was half that size at close to 20 percent. The decision to use a full paraphrase not only displays the speaker's capability to make a certain point, it also suggests the speaker had thought of this before and wants to present the message (and stance) on their own accord. Disconnecting the utterance from the earlier contributions may not overtly construct a shared position, the independence that is gained by reformulating the message means the speaker holds a stronger claim over the asserted stance. Both participants have thus independently reached the same position, which in effect does construct a joint position and reinforces their bond. Finally, the absolute number of synonyms was too low to draw definitive conclusions, but it is noteworthy that the Indonesian corpus included relatively more synonyms. These were explained to be closer to repetitions because of their dependency on the original utterance.

Based on the analysis of reproductions, the active negotiation of stance is supposedly more of a concern in Dutch. This is further suggested by the overall greater presence of repetitions in Indonesian. Again, this difference is explained by the greater relative number of contributions extending support for an earlier utterance. Similar to the results presented in chapter 5, the choice for greater autonomy, independence, and consequently, greater accountability, seems mostly favored by the Dutch speakers, whereas the Indonesian contributions stay closer to the original, seemingly not as focused on making their mark in the conversation. This pattern further substantiates an overall supposed preference for explicit and specific negotiation of interpersonal relations among the Dutch speakers. The fact that the Indonesian speakers favor a more ambiguous form of repetition and paraphrase suggests this preference for clarity is not shared across the two groups.

CHAPTER 7

Collaborative construction of meaning

The previous chapter showed how people use repetition and paraphrase to establish positive alignment between themselves and their conversational partner(s). With each of the reaction types discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the speaker mostly had or needed little room to diverge from the message originally presented by the other party. Some minor changes or explanation may be included by the second speaker, but the proposition, and stance, primarily remained associated with the first speaker, the stance lead. Although sometimes not overtly marked, there is a clear division between the first and second participant to (verbally) present a particular stance.

The line between these two roles is not always clear-cut, as was briefly introduced in section 6.2.2. The second speaker might not overtly acknowledge the repetitive nature of his contribution, in effect claiming the position as their own original point of view. If they do accept being stance follow, for instance by presenting an affirmative marker, the decision to communicate the same message using a paraphrase similarly signifies the claim of independent knowledge and the potential of being the stance lead. Rather than adopting someone else's stance, as with explicit agreement, paraphrasing displays a more collaborative effort to construct meaning and stance: it is not just the first speaker who presents a meaningful message and connected position, the second speaker does so as well.

Alongside support (cf. chapter 5) and reproduction (cf. chapter 6), collaboration of meaning is the third main form of phatic communication that can be distinguished. This reaction type is found in roughly one-sixth or 15% of the phatic contributions (see fig. 7.1) and includes all efforts to finish some other participant's utterance or thought, as well as attempts to extend the presented




Figure 7.1: Phatic communication - focus on collaboration. The three main forms of phatic communication, support, reproduction, and collaboration of meaning are represented in the left hand sphere (this is the same figure as 4.5). The category of collaboration can be further broken down into two subclasses: completion and extension. The relative share of the overall class of collaboration and the distribution of the subclasses is surprisingly similar across the Dutch and Indonesian data. Roughly 15% all reactions that were qualified to be mostly phatic in nature is a form of collaboration (15.41% or 496/3218 of Dutch cases; 14.92% or 192/1287 of Indonesian cases). In the Dutch data, 8.14% (262/3218) of all phatic contributions involves meaning extension and 7.27% (234/3218) represents an attempted completion. This equates to 52.82% (or 262/496) of collaborative efforts being classified as extensions and 47.18% (234/496) as completions. Similarly, in the Indonesian data 8.31% (or 107/1287) of all phatic contributions is an extension, and 6.60% (or 85/1287) involves attempted completion. Converted to the subset of collaborative contributions, the share of meaning extensions equals 55.73% (or 107/192), whereas completions make up 44.27% (or 85/192).

message into new territory. The first is throughout the chapter referred to as "completion", the latter as "extension".

In both Indonesian and Dutch, just under half of the collaborations are attempts at completing another speaker's contribution, whereas the other half extend the message past the initial (completed) turn (see figure 7.1 above). This chapter will give a detailed account of the use of completion and extension in relation to stancetaking and alignment. The first section (7.1) addresses attempts at finishing others' turns, collaboratively completing a single interactional contribution. It is shown in subsection 7.1.3 that these completions are often not encouraged by the main speaker, but instead spontaneously offered by a fellow participant. Some of the cues or markers that seem to be interpreted as an invitation or encouragement of sorts to step in, are also examined in this subsection. Following a collaborative effort to end a particular contribution, the main speaker may or may not validate the role the interlocutor played in the process. Possible reactions to an attempted co-completion were observed to range from the first speaker accepting the inserted element, to acknowledging the completion, to ignoring the attempt altogether. These different forms of ratification, or lack thereof, are explored in subsection 7.1.4. Finally, section 7.1.5 will discuss a lengthier excerpt in which multiple participants work together on one idea. The second section (7.2) is dedicated to collaboration above utterance level: extensions of a presented idea, in the form of a conclusion, specification, or statement that reaches past the original message.

7.1 Completion

It is not uncommon for interlocutors to anticipate what someone else is about to say and present that same information prior to the other person completing the utterance. While finishing someone else's sentences can be annoying, it demonstrates high involvement on the part of the second speaker. Completion here refers to those cases where one participant started an utterance, which is then finished by another participant. This does not necessarily mean the first speaker did *not* finish the utterance; people are shown to step in spontaneously and complete an utterance in parallel to the original speaker (cf. 7.1.3). The completion of an ongoing turn, sometimes called a co-construction (Lerner, 1991), is presumably the most clear-cut way of collaboration in interaction: the second speaker not only takes responsibility for the idea, but for part of the expression as well. The result still mostly reflects the first speaker's position on the presented matter - it was his idea to make the statement to begin with - but the second speaker has a significant part in it.

A candidate completion is solely based on the second speaker's interpretation of the situation. The utterance this speaker reacts to has not been finished yet, after all. However, the utterance presented thus far leads the interlocutor to expect or anticipate a particular outcome. This expected element is then offered as a candidate completion to the utterance before the original speaker has the chance to do so. An example is given in (1). Suppose two colleagues, Sarah and Lesley, are having lunch in the office pantry. Sarah wants to wash her hands before having lunch, so she walks up to the sink, stops, takes a disgruntled look at it, and starts the utterance in line 1.

(1) *Utterance completion*

```
1  Sarah   I hate it when people put their dirty dishes in eh
2  Lesley  the sink
```

Given that Lesley is in the same space as her, and hence has access to both the environment (the sink, the dishes) and Sarah's facial expression, she has a good chance of "guessing" what Sarah is about to say. The hesitance ("eh") at the end of Sarah's contribution encourages her to offer the missing piece ("the sink"). The fact that Sarah is clearly looking for a word that describes some sort of container for dishes (suggested by "put in") and the fact that she is in front of a sink leave very little doubt: she is talking about the sink.

Not all co-constructions are an attempt at utterance completion only, the candidate completion can go beyond the insertion of a single required element. In such cases, the second speaker (co-)produces the assumed message that was started by the first participant. These completions complete the original utterance, but more so, they complete the projected thought. Mostly this occurs when a speaker produces a contribution that consists of different parts but only produces the first part himself, leaving it to another speaker to fill in the second part. For example, sentences of the type "if ... then" which are cut off

after "then": a consequence is suggested but not explicated. It is up to the interlocutors to fill in the blanks. Compare example (2) below:

(2) *Thought completion*

1	Sarah	I really hate it when people
2	Lesley	put their dirty dishes in the sink (I know)

Again, Sarah has started her utterance, but this time only actually produces the main clause of an "I hate it when X"-type utterance, leaving the object of her strong dislike unsaid. Considering Lesley's presence, and the fact that they are no strangers to one another, she still has a good chance of correctly finishing the message. Lesley's completion describes the full source of Sarah's annoyance. It may be that Lesley knows this is one of Sarah's pet peeves, but it might also be that she shares her irritation. This reading of a shared positioning would be confirmed by an added "I know" to line 2 in (2), which is not at all an unimaginable expansion of her utterance.

This is in fact what happens in example (3). Ruben and Eva (both in their twenties) talk about what they would normally do at that day and time had they not been in the Big Brother house: go to a bar. In line 41, Eva states she does not go out to meet new people. A position not only acknowledged (line 42), but explicitly affirmed and adopted by Ruben (line 43). The two of them are in perfect agreement up to this point. Their shared perspective is further developed in lines 44-47 when she sets up a contrast between herself (line 41) and "a lot of people" (line 44), but does not explicate what it is those people do.

(3) *Thought completion and affirmation* (BB-NL 4-11)

41	Eva	*ik ga echt niet op stap om mensen te leren kennen.*
		I really don't go out to get to know people
42	Ruben	*nee (.) nee-nee*
		no (.) no-no
43		[*nee: dat doe ik ook niet.*
		[no: that I don't do either.
44	Eva	[*je hebt heel veel mensen die die- die*
		[you have a lot of people that that- that
45	Ruben	*om die reden uitgaan ja.*
		go out for that reason yes.
46	Eva	*ja*
		yes
47	Ruben	*ja:a inderdaad*
		ye:s indeed

In line 45 Ruben finishes Eva's prior utterance ("[people] that go out for that reason") concluding with *ja* ("yes"), presenting both a candidate completion and his own acceptance of that completion. With this turn final affirmation, he demonstrates his confidence about the offered completion being correct. More

importantly, he affirms the position presented by his words, but as part of *her* sentence, is indeed in line with his own personal perspective. In a sense, he single-handedly establishes alignment between the two of them, by first finishing her turn (ascribing her a certain position) and then agreeing with that turn as a whole (connecting his position to hers). This example shows that interlocutors not only think ahead to the point where they might be able to complete another person's utterance or thought, but already react to or interact with that supposed completion. In this particular instance, Ruben was correct in his prediction of how her turn would develop, as evidenced by Eva's affirmation in line 46. She accepts his completion, and with that her ascribed position and the resulting interpersonal alignment.

Whereas utterance completion mostly involves a single (grammatically) missing element, there are more than one likely completions involved in co-constructed thoughts. The second speaker made a conscious decision that option X was more fitting than option Y based on not so much the immediate linguistic context, but on his individual prior experiences and convictions and the shared common ground between him and his interlocutor. This is not to say both speakers necessarily share prior experiences or convictions, just that individual experiences (that may or may not be shared with the other person) and common ground (that is necessarily believed to be shared) inform his choice.[1]

These two general forms of co-construction represent different levels of involvement and accountability. In utterance completion, the sole responsibility may be left with the first speaker, relieving the co-constructing party of all burdens that may come with taking responsibility for the overall message. When it comes to the co-construction of thoughts this is not really an option: the range of likely possibilities or completions is much larger, thus making the co-constructing speaker accountable for the choice of one completion over the other. Apparently, to the speaker, it made most sense to select that particular completion, i.e. to fill in that explanation, conclusion, or example. In doing so, the completing party is giving something away about their own stance in the matter. The suggested piece of information is likely representative of his or her own perspective or position.

Figure 7.1 above already showed just under half of all collaborative efforts can be classified as a form of completion. Further breaking down this class results in the distribution presented in figure 7.2. Although the number of instances is rather low (especially in Indonesian), an interesting opposition becomes apparent. The Indonesian data (n=82) show a large majority of co-constructing efforts to be a form of utterance completion (70.73% or 58/82

[1]Note that thought completion necessarily involves utterance completion and vice versa. Their separation into two distinct classes is artificial, but it is an inevitable step in attempting to find patterns in participants' collaborative behavior. The point in separating them is that the two types of completion operate at a different level in terms of "filling in the blanks". Utterance completions require minimal effort, since the options are strongly limited due to the grammatical structure of the ongoing utterance. Thought completions, on the other hand, require maximum effort on the second speaker's part, since the options are near infinite (although they are of course brought back in number by their common ground).




Figure 7.2: Collaboration - completion. In both sets of data roughly 15% of phatic contributions involved some sort of collaboration, a little under half of which was a form of completion (see figure 7.1). This figure shows that although the overall relative numbers are similar across the data sets, the relative frequencies of the two types of completion are almost opposite. In both collections, a slight majority of collaborative efforts is a form of extension (52.48% or 254/484 in Dutch; 55.68% or 103/185 in Indonesian). The parts that represent completion are mostly of interest at this point. The overall share of completions is, again, comparable: in Dutch 47.52% (or 230/484) of collaboration is a form of completion, in Indonesian this share is 44.32% (or 82/185). However, the majority of completions in the Dutch data are an attempt to finish someone else's thought (29.75% overall, equaling 144/484, or 62.61% of Dutch completions, equaling 144 out of 230), whereas the majority of completions in Indonesian are attempts to finish another person's sentence (31.35%, overall, equaling 58/185, or 70.73% of completions, equaling 58 out of 82).

cases). In each of these cases the main speaker is assisted in some way to end the utterance in a grammatical fashion. Conversely, in Dutch the majority of co-constructions is an attempt to finish someone else's thought (62.61% or 144/230 cases), involving a more agentive decision on the second speaker's part. These two main forms of completion are discussed in the sections below: co-construction of a single utterance is discussed in section 7.1.1; section 7.1.2 addresses the co-construction of thoughts.

7.1.1 Co-constructing utterances

As explained above, co-construction of utterances involves collaboration at utterance level. The main speaker is yet to complete their turn constructional unit when another participant comes in and finishes it for them. Often the collaboration involves a "one-option" addition to complete the utterance, as in example (4). Note that this is not to suggest the second speaker actually knows with certainty how the utterance is to be completed, but rather that the set of probable options is reduced to a (very) small few, making one completion much more likely than other options. Furthermore, the attempted completion normally "fits" the grammatical construction set up by the first speaker. These two characteristics set utterance collaborations apart from attempted co-constructions of thoughts (see section 7.1.2). The relative frequency of occurrence of thought completions was much higher in the Indonesian subset of collaborative efforts compared to the Dutch data. In fact, they are almost a per-




Figure 7.3: Utterance and thought completion. This figure shows that although the overall relative occurrence of completion is similar across the Dutch and Indonesian data sets, the relative frequency of the two types of completion are almost opposite. Most of the completions observed in the Dutch data are an attempt to finish someone else's thought (62.61%, or 144 out of 230), with the co-constructions of utterance only forming little over one-third of the completions (37.39%, or 86/230). The majority of completions in Indonesian, on the other hand, are attempts to finish another person's utterance (70.73%, or 58 out of 82), with the completion of thoughts forming less than one-third of the efforts (29.27%, or 24/82).

fect opposite. Of all completion efforts found in the Indonesian data, roughly 70% was an attempt to co-construct a single utterance (here understood as a single turn-constructional unit). In the Dutch data, on the other hand, the share of utterance completions was only 37% (see figure 7.3).

A clear example of collaboration involving the addition of a missing element is seen in the following situation. Kamil is acting as team captain and is laying out his ground rules. One of the things that had been an issue before is the allocation of chores, which was solved by implementing a rotational schedule.

(4) *Utterance completion - "chores"* (BB-IND 6-4-6)

40	Kamil	*kebersihan nggak masalah lah ya,*
		cleanliness is not a problem yes,
41		*udah ada apa namanya? e:H*
		already there is whatchamacallit? e:H
42	Nazam	*organis* [*asi*
		organiz[ation
43	Kamil	[*ya eh piket-piketnya gitu.*
		[yes eh shifts like that.
44	Kamil	(0.3) *itu aja sih #hehe#*
		(0.3) that is all #hehe#

In line 40, Kamil asserts there is no problem regarding housekeeping, but his argument for this claim is incomplete. He starts by saying "there already is a" but cannot seem to find the word he is looking for (evidenced by *apa namanya,* "whatchamacallit", and a lengthy "e:h", line 41). Nazam steps in (line 42) by offering a candidate solution fitting both the relevant situational and grammatical context: [there already is a] "organization". Even though the completion

was apparently not what Kamil had in mind - he completes his utterance with "shift" instead - the effort itself is an indication of collaborative behavior. The offered suggestion and the intended form are (near) synonyms in this particular context. This example shows that the characterization of such cases as "one-option" completions indeed is to be taken figuratively: the point is there is a limited set of words that fit the immediate context.

In most examples of utterance completions, the initial utterance includes a fixed expression or clear semantic opposition that allows the second speaker to finish the utterance correctly. Indeed, in examples (5)-(7), the direction taken by the first speaker is easily recognized and pursued by another participant.

(5) *Utterance completion - "rest"* (BB-IND 6-4-6)

40	Nazam	*ya udah, berarti mereka sama-=*
		yes already, means they [are] with-=
41	Indra	*=sisanya*
		=the rest

In the above example, Indra, as team captain, has been dividing the housemates into groups of five for the upcoming team challenge. There are only 14 people in the house, which means after the first two groups have been formed, the logical conclusion is the remaining contestants form the final group. This conclusion is prepared by Nazam and finalized by Indra in the lines presented here. Given that all of the contestants are present and thus have access to the same knowledge regarding the group formation process, the chance of successful collaboration is rather high.

A shared background is what helps Lena finish Tessa's utterance in the following example as well. They are gossiping about Adam, one of their fellow contestants who has been complaining about the situation of them being divided in a poor and a rich group. More specifically, he expressed his disapproval of the pretentious or arrogant demeanor he recognized in one of the other "poor" contestants, Lena. Tessa mimics his earlier assertion that he knows who the actual rich and poor people in the house are.

(6) *Utterance completion - "poor"* (BB-IND 15-2-3)

14	Tessa	*''aku yang tahu siapa yang kaya*
		''I am the one who knows who are the rich
15		*dan siapa yang mi[skin disini''*
		and who are the p[oor here''
16	Lena	[*yang miskin*
		[the poor
17		*iya*
		yes

Lena correctly inserts "the poor" in parallel to Tessa's utterance (line 16). She did not hear Adam utter the phrase, and yet manages to complete it. The semantic opposition between "rich" and "poor" in itself is probably enough to

guess the utterance "who are the rich and who are the" would be completed by "poor". The only other immediately plausible option (in English) would likely be "famous", because of the familiar collocation "rich and famous". However, given the context of them being divided into two groups - one poor, one rich - there really is not much of a choice.

An even more straightforward example of a collocation assisting in the correct prediction of the completed utterance is found in (7). Hugo is reading out the instructions for a team challenge: a circuit of exercises, meaning each participant is assigned one exercise that they have to perform as long as they can, before the next person is allowed to start.

(7) *Utterance completion - "other"* (BB-NL 25-24)

1	Hugo	*tussen de ene activiteit en de* (0.6)
		between the one activity and the (0.6)
2	Lotte	*<andere?>*
		<other?>
3	Hugo	*de volgende mogen niet meer dan 5 seconden verlopen.*
		the next no more than 5 seconds may pass.

Hugo pauses mid-sentence (line 1), leading Lotte to fill in the gap. The phrase "the one and the other" (*de ene en de andere*) is a common collocation in Dutch (as in English). Lotte's suggestion to add "other" is thus not surprising, although it turns out not to be a match to Hugo's intended text.

Co-constructions are of course not restricted to collocational environments. The next example is not a conventionalized or frequently found combination at all. The exchange in example (8) concerns nominations to evict; not something that is likely to be brought up in everyday conversations. Yet, the utterance produced thus far and the shared common ground between the participants allows for only one interpretation.

(8) *Utterance completion - "support"* (BB-NL 37-38-10)

4	Bram	*van ja. ↑stel (.) je moet hier iemand nomineren,*
		like yes. ↑suppose (.) you have to nominate someone here,
5		*hoe ga je dan te=*
		how are you then going to=
6	Roos	*=onderbouwen.*
		=substantiate.
7	Bram	*=onderbouwen gewoon.*
		=just substantiate.

One of the criteria for a co-construction to be classified as a turn completion was for it to result into one whole sentence with the original utterance. Note that in Dutch the two contributions in line 4-5 and 6 do not smoothly form a single utterance. Still, this case represents an attempt at turn completions. Roos states a single word that cannot stand on its own and really does not make much sense without Bram's utterance. As such, the contribution is indeed to

be interpreted as a collaborative effort to present a single utterance. The fact that the combined utterance lacks grammaticality could be due to mishearing on Roos' part ("*hoe ga je dat dan*" instead of the uttered "*hoe ga je dan te*") or simply a lack of fluency in sentence formation, which is not uncommon to spoken interaction.

Incomplete sentences are relatively easy to finish because of the limited set of available options. The original utterance is almost complete, only missing the final piece. The second speaker attempts to provide that missing element; in other words, he or she tries to find that one word (or short phrase) that their conversational partner was looking for. Considering the message was already almost completely available, the likelihood of the conversational partner coming up with the correct term is rather high. Moreover, their common ground, both in terms of their shared physical environment and their preexisting relationship, further reduces the probable outcomes of the utterance.

The immediate linguistic context and the shared knowledge between the two participants combined make for a solid base of information to attempt a co-construction. The attempted completion is thus a reflection of the second speaker's interpretation of the uttered elements in context. Sharing that interpretation with the other participants - by attempting to finish the utterance - offers a (preliminary) understanding and possibly position on the subject of talk. Given that the second speaker is able to (and does) fill in the blanks, the two speakers collaboratively construct meaning and present a particular stance. Still, that stance is primarily connected with the first speaker. The second speaker can easily deny their association with that position; they were only trying to help. This flexibility to adopt or negate a certain stance essentially frees the second speaker from responsibility for that stance. In collaborative completions of thoughts, discussed in section 7.1.2, this freedom disappears.

7.1.2 Co-constructing thoughts

The previous section explained how collaborative constructions of a single turn-constructional unit usually involve the insertion of a single element. This significantly decreases the number of likely candidates to complete the utterance. It also means that the bulk of the message was already presented by the first speaker, leaving the co-constructing party free of responsibility for the overall stance. They are of course responsible for selecting a particular element to complete the utterance, but that does not necessarily mean they agree with that message. They may be, in fact, of an entirely different opinion.

Sometimes not only the final element is missing, but an entire subordinate clause is absent (as in (2) and (3) above). Even if there is much less clarity as to what piece needs to be added, participants happily provide possible completions based on the partial expression. To successfully co-construct the thought that was started by their conversational partner they not only have to make a lexical and grammatical decision, they actually have to anticipate where the first speaker was going with the contribution. They (have to) at-

tempt to think *like* the other person to complete their original thought. Recall that this category was found much more frequently in the Dutch data than in the Indonesian data (cf. figure 7.2). In fact, the number of thought completions compared to turn completions is almost opposite in terms of relative frequency (cf. figure 7.3 above). Whereas most co-constructions in Indonesian were found to be attempted turn completions (70.73 percent), the majority of Dutch co-constructions aim to complete another participant's thought (62.61 percent).

These co-constructions of a single thought reflect more initiative on the part of the co-constructing participant. Consequently, they are more accountable for the position that is projected by their candidate completion. After all, the first speaker has presented a main clause or the beginning of a thought, but a good deal of information is not yet out in the open. The candidate completion that is offered thus in large part reflects the interpretation or assessment of the overall situation held by the co-constructing party. This also means the risk of getting it wrong is somewhat higher: the immediate linguistic context is limited, so there are several possible completions. The possibility of offering a candidate completion with a reasonable chance of hitting the mark presupposes a strong common ground.

For a collaborative effort to qualify as an attempted co-construction of thought the two speakers crucially have to collaborate on a single message. In the original or base utterance, the speaker has signaled a subordinate clause or second part of the thought is still to come, but they have not yet (fully) produced that part. A fellow participant offers that second part ahead of the original speaker, attempting to complete the message. This form of co-construction shows a (presumed) shared understanding and conceptualization of the object or topic at hand between the two participants.

The existence of a shared experience as relevant to the current context is explicitly referred to by Nazam in example (9), line 89. He prefaces his appeal to "be yourself" with a question directed at Wayan to recall their many talks about this topic. Even though he has at that point not yet introduced said topic, Wayan is indeed able to finish what Nazam started.

(9) *Thought completion - "yourself"* (BB-IND 7-3-1)

89	Nazam	*kita sering ngomong ya Wayan ya?*
		we often discussed it right Wayan?
90		*tolong disini jadi orang yang* (.)
		please here be the person who (.)
91	Wayan	°*jadi di*[*ri sendiri*°
		be yours[elf
92	Nazam	[*jadilah diri sendiri.*
		[just be yourself.

The main clause produced by Nazam in line 90 allows for numerous completions. Yet, Wayan produces the one Nazam was targeting. Nazam requests the others to "please be the person who" followed by a pause. Wayan inserts the

missing relative clause, "be yourself" (line 91), only a little quicker than Nazam himself does. Nazam's suggestion that Wayan has special access to what is to come ("we've discussed this, right Wayan?", line 89) already allows Wayan to limit the probable completions of Nazam's thought upon hearing the main clause, thus increasing the likelihood of him correctly predicting the final outcome (cf. section 3.3.5; Lerner, 1991). Wayan's ability to complete Nazam's sentence is hence strongly connected to their earlier interactions. The fact that they have talked about other people's behavior before is now made relevant, confirming their common ground and emphasizing their shared understanding and position on the matter.

Overtly referring to existing or presupposed common ground is of course not necessary. In the following example, Maya and Lena talk about Yuni, whom they both feel is somewhat odd. The thing that especially bothers them is Yuni's focus on the men in the house, seemingly rejecting the women. That they have a common understanding of and stance toward the situation - and hence towards Yuni - is demonstrated by Lena's attempted co-construction in line 15. She offers her interpretation of what Maya is trying to convey drawing from their common ground, which includes their shared antipathy of their fellow contestant.

The exchange is part of a larger conversation in which Maya declares that while she was in jail, Yuni came around several times to visit the men's jail but never came to visit her. Maya's utterance "not that I wanted to be visited or anything, just-" (org. *bukkannya aku pingin ditengok apa gimana, cuma-*) in line 14 could be followed by all kinds of remarks. In this case, there is no prior discussion that holds the answer (as in (9) above).

(10) *Thought completion - ' jail"* (BB-IND 20-2-7)

13	Maya	*bukannya aku pingin ditengok apa gimana,*
		not that I wanted to be visited or anything,
14		*cuma gin*[*i-*
		just lik[e
15	Lena	[*''eh? lagi apa'' gitu udah*
		[''hey? what's up'' like that already

Following Maya's comment, Lena adds that it would be nice to be noticed. With her (successful) completion, Lena shows she understands both what Maya was going to say (on an utterance level) and what Maya tries to convey, how she feels (on an experience level). Lena correctly completing Maya's thought demonstrates her ability to put herself in Maya's shoes. Her suggested completion also reflects her personal evaluation of the situation - being in jail, not being visited, seeing others being visited repeatedly - as it still is *her* interpretation or perception of the (imagined) situation. Her contribution thus represents both her own stance and Maya's, or at least that is what she attempts to accomplish.

In example (11) below, Lotte smoothly offers a continuation of Roos' turn in line 15. Prior to this exchange, they have spoken at length about Lotte's tendency to unleash her personal frustration or negativity into the group in

a somewhat harsh manner and Roos' corresponding dislike. Resulting in the shared conclusion that Lotte does not always mean to be rude or blunt, but at times simply does not really know how to express her feelings. The fragment below follows Roos recounting Lotte's behavior earlier that day to illustrate the fact that her image of Lotte is not all negative: she rubbed Roos' back to comfort her, reflecting a side of Lotte's character that Roos highly appreciates. This example relates to her utterance in line 15, "those are things that to me", that is finished by Lotte in line 16.

(11) *Utterance completion - "important"* (BB-NL 35-3)

15	Roos	*dat zijn dingen die voor mij*
		those are things that to me
16	Lotte	*heel belangrijk zijn*
		are very important
17	Roos	*dan denk ik* (.) ↑*HE?*
		then I think (.) ↑HUh?

Given that the two of them discussed Lotte's behavior, and the effect it has on others - in particular on Roos who considers herself a more rational, contemplative person - the probable outcomes of the sentence started in line 15 are limited.[2] In light of their shared common ground, the suggested completion seems accurate (or at least plausible). However, there is no explicit reaction to confirm this was in fact what Roos was getting at. She does not ratify nor correct Lotte's contribution; she does not even seem to acknowledge Lotte said anything at all. Then again, the fact that Roos continues with "that makes me think" (lit. "then I think", line 17) suggests she *did* accept Lotte's insertion. She now uses the full collaboratively constructed contribution presented in lines 15-16 as a base to advance her argument.

Finishing another person's thought is more assertive compared to completing an utterance: the expression started by the original speaker was not complete yet, but another participant already believes he or she is able to infer where the utterance is going and "reacts" ahead of time by completing the corresponding thought. Thought completion suggests a greater epistemic claim: the second speaker feels they are both able to *recognize* some other speaker's

[2]Even though this example involves an incomplete utterance or turn constructional unit (TCU), as do all examples discussed in this section, there is a clear difference with the cases that were presented as "co-constructions of utterances" above. The main clause "those are things that to me" does signal something else is still to come, but it does not in itself give away much about what that something is; there is no clear "answer" in terms of grammatically or pragmatically completing this TCU. Lotte's "[things that to me] are very important" fits perfectly, but so would "[things that to me] are horrendous", "[things that to me] are right at the end of what is acceptable", "[things that to me] are irrelevant", or any other evaluative clause, whether positive, negative or neutral in tone. Admittedly, there is a fine line between utterance and thought completion, because both are collaborative efforts to produce a single contribution. All attempted co-constructions of thought are necessarily also collaborative expressions, since completions by definition require the first speaker to have produced only a partial TCU. The crucial difference is the level of completion achieved by the first speaker and the corresponding range of possible insertions.

thought before it is presented and to *produce* that thought in place of that other speaker. The suggested completion does represent the second speaker's interpretation, and presumably evaluation, on the matter under discussion. He or she thus communicates their own individual position or stance as well as (presumably) the other speaker's position. In the belief to produce both their own and the first speaker's understanding in one utterance, they establish positive alignment.

Thinking ahead, assuming to know the other speaker and context well enough to take over and finish his thought does not always end in success. There is an inherent risk in thinking for another person: that you are in fact *not* thinking along the same lines. Indeed, example (12) is a perfect case of misjudgment and misguided confidence on David's part (line 7).

(12) *Utterance completion - "friend"* (BB-NL 37-38-13)

1	Lotte	*kan er zo om lachen,*
		[I] can laugh so hard over it,
2		*ik heb (.) over na zitten denken,*
		I have (.) been thinking about it,
3		*waarom (.) waarom ik e:hm-*
		why (.) why I e:hm-
4		*Roos niet als al- als iemand zie=*
		don't see Roos as a- as someone=
5		*=>ik heb helemaal geen hekel aan ↑haar<*
		=>I do not at all dislike ↑her<
6		*terwij[l- terwijl het eigenlijk wel*
		whil[e- while it does actually
7	David	[*nee maar waarom het nooit je vriend zou worden.*
		[no but why she would never become your friend.
8	Lotte	*nou ↑nooit mijn vriendin zou worden,*
		well ↑never become my friend,
9		*nee zo klinkt-*
		no that sounds-
10		*>ze zou nooit m'n vriendin worden*
		>she would never become my friend
11		*gewoon om hoe ze ↓is<*
		just because of how she ↓is<

Lotte and David are both nominated for eviction. Almost all other contestants named them as nominees. In this excerpt, Lotte presents her thoughts on Roos, one of the other contestants. In lines 3-4 she begins to explaing how she views Roos ("why I ehm don't see Roos as someone"), but instead of finishing her thought she interjects that she does not hate Roos (line 5), seemingly contradicting her unspoken thought. This idea of "not disliking Roos" combined with the incomplete statement about Roos, brings David to attempt to fill in the blanks (line 7). Erroneously so, as it turns out.

David suggests Lotte was going to say that she "did not see Roos as someone who would ever become her friend" or something along those lines. He displays

his understanding of Lotte's stance regarding Roos: he is able to finish her thoughts after all. Furthermore, he shows his appreciation of that stance at the beginning of his contribution: the utterance opening "no but". He starts by recognizing the position presented in line 5 (Lotte does not dislike Roos) as valid and subsequently attempts to nuance it somewhat. A nuance he assumes to be warranted and shared - why else offer the suggested completion - but that is instead dismissed. That is, he is correct in suggesting Lotte en Roos would never become friends (line 9), but he was incorrect in thinking that was the point Lotte was going to make. The message Lotte actually wanted to convey had little to do with (not) being friends: she feels sorry for Roos (same episode, different excerpt).

It was already mentioned above that the contribution interjected by another participant reflects his own personal attitude or stance. Here, David supposedly would not be friends with Roos if he were in the situation Lotte is in. He thus simultaneously expresses his position on the (hypothetical) matter of befriending Roos and his perception of what Lotte's position on that same matter is or ought to be. The completion he offers thus reflects at least his view of what he *believes* to be their shared position. The second speaker hence takes more responsibility compared to utterance completion, in which case the overall message was produced by the first speaker and only the final step was taken by the second speaker (by producing the missing element). In this case, although there are numerous plausible continuations, the second participant believes he is able to single out the one completion appropriate or relevant to this occasion.

Collaborative completion of a single thought essentially combines both speakers' attitudes or perspectives - or at least successful completions do. As such, these co-constructions (implicitly) attempt to establish positive alignment between the first and second speaker. It was explained above that utterance completions are more strongly connected to the spoken information shared by the first speaker - that is, the utterance presented up until that point and the associated restrictions on possible insertions - whereas attempted completions of thoughts are more reliant on the existing common ground between participants. Finishing someone else's thought demands greater interpretative effort on the second speaker's part based on current and prior contextual aspects. Consequently, finishing the thoughts or ideas started by a fellow participant puts a strong emphasis on the interpersonal relation between the two of them: the fact that the second person can think *like* the first person reinforces their bond.

The fact that participants recognize when there is a chance (or perhaps even necessity) to co-construct a particular utterance shows they are indeed highly involved in the activity; keeping track of the ongoing interaction and being able to step in at relevant points. The next section explores to what extent utterance and thought completions are a solution to a problem or a highlighting of anticipation skills (section 7.1.3). The presence of some form of encouragement marker indicates the completion is (at least partially) initiated

by the original speaker. A spontaneous effort to co-construct, on the other hand, shows strong initiative on the seconds speaker's part. The first speaker's reaction to such an (un)expected collaboration effort reflects their appreciation of the decision to attempt a co-construction and negotiates first stance as will be shown in section 7.1.4.

7.1.3 Invitation or intrusion?

An attempted co-construction of a particular contribution may be initiated by the collaborating participant(s) or can be encouraged by the original speaker. In the latter case, the main speaker may (inadvertently) indicate he or she is having difficulty completing his message. Such encouragement could take the form of a pause, a hesitation marker ("ehm"), expression of uncertainty ("whatchamacallit"), or stuttering. The presence of any of these forms does not necessarily indicate the speaker is in need of assistance, but they can be interpreted as such.[3] This section will review examples of such encouraged and spontaneous attempted completions to decide whether these efforts are indeed mostly invited or felt to be an intrusion. First, those co-constructions that can be thought of as being encouraged by the original speaker are discussed, followed by spontaneous efforts of co-construction.

Encouraged completion

As mentioned above, encouragements are markers that might be interpreted by interlocutors as signals for assistance. These cues all signal (and cause) delay, and include elements as "eh(m)", pauses, lengthening of words, disfluencies, and uncertainty markers such as "what" or "whatchamacallit"-type phrases.[4]

[3]The discussion presented in this section is by no means to suggest all occurrences of hesitation or uncertainty are included, or that they are always met by an attempted co-construction. The current collection of data only represents those cases in which at least two participants collaborate to complete a single contribution. The qualitative analysis presented here thus only comprises the (lack of) markers of potential encouragement in this subset of collaborative contributions. Therefore, no general conclusions can be drawn about the overall use of hesitation markers of pauses in interaction.

[4]Such markers of hesitation, especially "eh(m)" have also been proposed to signal an attempt to hold the floor (see e.g. Maclay and Osgood, 1959). Following Clark and Fox Tree (2002), I consider "eh(m)" to function as an interjection that can carry multiple implicatures, one of which is to signal trouble (Clark and Fox Tree, 2002:88ff). The discussion is limited here to that interpretation: communicating (unintentionally) the need for assistance. Other possible interpretations are not addressed here. This is not because I believe these markers solely to signal trouble, but because in the examples collected here they *are* used in that particular role: there is another participant that interprets them as such. It is not my interpretation or conviction that they *should* be interpreted as trouble signaling devices. However, the fact that someone took it upon themselves to take the floor and insert the element that coincidentally fits the utterance initiated by someone else suggests it is not coincidental. Instead, the co-occurrence of hesitation markers and co-constructions suggests that the occurrence of the hesitation marker was indeed interpreted by the co-constructing participant as a signal to step in. Of course, this study only includes those hesitation markers that were in fact met by a collaborative effort made by another party. It thus shows a strong

In short, the data discussed here include cases that involve some sort of pause or hesitance leading to another speaker finishing the turn *instead of* or *ahead of* the original speaker.

As shown in table 7.1, roughly half of all attempted completions was in some way felt to be encouraged (52.61% in Dutch; 46.34% in Indonesian). The great majority of these efforts was produced following the original speaker, that is, the two turns were produced consecutively. This is what would be expected, given that the first speaker did not in fact complete their utterance, but instead produced some form of hesitation. This hesitation does not (yet) create a transition relevant place (the turn constructional unit is still incomplete), but can be interpreted by another participant as a signal for assistance to finish the turn. An example of such "encouraged" completion is found in line 12 in (13) below, where Eko, as the main speaker, is assisted by Adam. Eko is talking about his current employment and marital status (lines 10-11) when he pauses mid-sentence: he is "not yet (.)". This pause is interpreted as troublesome by Adam, who offers a candidate completion: *menikah*, "married" (line 12).

(13) *Encouragement - "married"* (BB-IND 1-4)

10	Eko	*pekerjaan finance admin,*
		job finance admin
11		*status belum* (.)
		status not yet (.)
12	Adam	*meni* [*kah*
		marr[ied
13	Eko	[*married* (.) *nggak.*
		[married (.) no.

Closely following Adam's collaborative effort, Eko finishes his own sentence. Even though Eko knows better than anyone whether he is married, he allows Adam to take the lead. As explained above, his shadowing of Adam is a sign of involvement; they are on the same page. At the same time, although implicitly,by closely following Adam's insertion, he approves of his suggestion. In this particular case, the attempted completion is also openly acknowledged; Eko adds a "no", confirming Adam's candidate completion. Such an acknowledgment is not at all mandatory; in fact, most collaborative efforts do not elicit a response from the original speaker (further discussed in subsection 7.1.4).

Pauses are not only found to encourage utterance collaboration, but co-construction of thoughts as well. Recall that in such collaborations the main speaker presents a main clause that projects a complement clause. The complement clause, however, is not produced. Instead, the speaker remains silent, leading the other participant to fill in the gap. In example (14), the topic of talk is the unpleasant feeling of being nominated. David is nominated for the first time during his stay in the Big Brother house, but as he announces in

bias towards the signal hypothesis. Because of the simple reason that hesitation was not the focus of this thesis, the collected data is not suited to comment on the overall function of hesitation markers.

Completions	Dutch		Indonesian	
	n	%	*n*	%
encouraged	**121**	**52.61**	**38**	**46.34**
parallel	23	10.00 (19.01)	7	8.54 (18.42)
consecutive	98	42.61 (81.09)	31	37.82 (81.58)
spontaneous	**109**	**47.39**	**44**	**53.66**
parallel	48	20.87 (44.04)	25	30.49 (56.82)
consecutive	61	26.52 (55.96)	19	23.17 (43.18)
total	230	100	82	100

Table 7.1: Initiating completions. This table displays the number of encouraged and spontaneously attempted co-constructions. Furthermore, it distinguishes between that co-construction being offered simultaneous to the main speaker ("parallel") or following the main speaker ("consecutive"). ***Encouraged completions.*** Just over half of the completions offered in Dutch were produced in reaction to some form of encouragement (52.61% or 121/230), compared to just under half of the occurrences in Indonesian (46.35% or 38/82). Unsurprisingly, the great majority of these cases is produced following the main speaker. In both languages roughly 80% of encouraged completions is a consecutive utterance, 20% is uttered in parallel to the main speaker. Each of these cases in the latter category involve the main speaker taking op his turn again right at the same time the co-constructing party offered the candidate completion. It is thus not so much the second speaker "interrupting" the main speaker, but an accidental form of overlap resulting from one participant feeling their assistance is needed and the first participant denying that need. ***Spontaneous completions.*** A little under half of all completions was offered spontaneously in Dutch (47.39% or 109/230), compared to a little more than half in Indonesian (53.66% or 44/82). The relative frequency of these completions being presented in parallel or consecutive to the first speaker is close to 50-50 as well, with the same opposition of Dutch and Indonesian having a slight preference for one or the other option. Out of the spontaneously offered completions in Dutch, 44.04% (or 48/109) were presented in parallel compared to 56.96% following the main speaker (61/109). In Indonesian, 56.82% (25/44) of spontaneous completions were offered in parallel, compared to 41.18% that were presented consecutively (19/44).

line 26 he "secretly assumes" something. Again, what he expects or assumes to happen is not verbalized; at least not by him. Bram steps in (line 27), finishing the thought David started: he (David) assumes he (David) is staying. His candidate completion is subsequently ratified by David.

(14) *Encouragement - "stay"* (BB-NL 36-1)

26	David	*maar weet je, ik ga er stiekem vanuit* (0.4)
		but you know, I secretly assume (0.4)
27	Bram	*dat je misschien mag blijven=*
		that you maybe are allowed to stay=
28	David	*=dat ik ge↑woon ↓blijf*
		=that I ↑just ↓stay

In example (15) below, the final "eh" in line 50 similarly results in collaborative completion by two fellow participants. Hanna is apprehensive about two new contestants being brought into the house shortly. They have been in a similar

situation before, when Susan moved in after 5 weeks. Susan - unlike the original contestants - had seen the success of the show and had had the opportunity of watching her soon to be housemates for several weeks before actually meeting them.

(15) *Encouragement - "information"* (BB-NL 46-4)

47	Hanna	*het is alleen af en toe gewoon heel, ja,*
		it's just sometimes like very, yes,
48		*gewoon* (.) *het is net als met Susan*
		just (.) it's just like with Susan
49		*dat vond ik best heel eng* (.) *toen die binnen* °*kwam*°
		I found it pretty very scary (.) when she °came° in
50		(0.3) *met dat hele eh stortvloed van eh*
		(0.3) with that eh flood of eh
51	Hugo	°*in*[*formatie*°
		°in[formation°
52	Ruben	[*informatie*
		[information
53	David	*jA*
		yES
54	Hanna	*van dingen en-*
		of things and-

Hanna ends her account of Susan moving in with a hesitation marker (line 49-50): *dat vond ik best wel heel eng (.) toen die binnen kwam. met dat hele eh stortvloed van eh* ("I found that pretty scary (.) when she came in. with that eh flood of eh"). Both Hugo en Ruben offer a candidate completion (line 51-52): "information". Hanna does not do anything with Hugo's nor Ruben's attempted completions, she simply continues her own utterance paying no attention whatsoever to their contribution (nor to David's agreement (line 53) for that matter). The fact that the helping hand turned out not to be needed - Hanna completed the turn herself and made a different choice finishing her sentence with "things" (line 54) - does not invalidate the attempt, nor its collaborative nature.

An encouragement cue found regularly in Indonesian is an explicit marker or phrase of hesitation. These are arguably the closest to actual encouragement. Pauses and other forms of delay through linguistic disfluencies are potentially recognized as a call for assistance, but need not be interpreted as such. It is mostly up to the other participant(s) to react or wait for the original speaker to resume his turn. When it comes to phrases like "what", "whatchamacallit", or "howdyesay" there is less room to wait. These are more pronounced hesitation markers and as such presumably more likely to compel others to lend a hand.[5]

[5]This truly is a mere presumption. The research focused on how phatic communication is organized in Indonesian and Dutch informal interaction, not to what extent hesitation led to another speaker providing assistance. No overall search for "eh" was performed in the corpus, or for any of the other cues. It is therefore unknown how often a turn-final

The fact that this leads to an attempted co-construction is in itself not surprising, since there usually is a single and recognizable referent the speaker is trying to find. An example of successfully eliciting help is found in (16). Tessa is named this week's captain. She had the feeling that Reza and Eko were not too happy when the announcement was made. Her impression was that they looked at her disapprovingly. In line 14, she tries to bring into words what she felt their facial expression meant.

(16) *Encouragement - "dislike"* (BB-IND 12-1-4)

14	Tessa	*ya maksudnya perasaan, apa=*
		yes meaning a feeling, what=
15	Nur	*=tidak suka?*
		=don't like?
16	Tessa	*iya, tidak suka, tidak senang.*
		yes, don't like, not happy

She already phrases her explanation somewhat hesitantly: "yes I mean a feeling, what=". The final element *apa* is a question word, generally translatable to "what". Nur immediately reacts, seamlessly continuing Tessa's utterance. She presents her completion as a question, indicating she did in fact interpret Tessa's hesitation as a request for assistance. Nur's contribution in line 15 is the uptake of that request. She does not try to take over the expression or message; she simply suggests a likely completion for Tessa to be able to finish her utterance - which she indeed does.

A more confident or definitive completion is presented by Hanna in line 82. The housemates have just learned that two new contestants will enter the house and that they are allowed to ask them about the current situation outside of the Big Brother compound. David announces there is something he absolutely does not want to hear about (line 77-78). He does not, however, explain what that something is. Ruben (line 81) asks for clarification ("what don't you want to know?"), which David fails to provide. Instead, he presents a rhetorical question *ja, hoe zal ik dat formuleren?*, which loosely translates as "right, how shall I put it?" (line 82), further delaying the apparently sensitive issue. Hanna is the one

"eh" occurred in general and how often it resulted in an attempted co-construction. The numbers given here only represent the information about co-constructions that actually were performed. There is no information on the total of potential co-constructing locations and the number that were in fact not realized (cf. sections 4.1 and 4.4.2; Schegloff, 1993). The analysis is in a sense performed backwards because of the main objective of this research: the first step was to observe the occurrence of co-construction, to only then look for what might have led another participant to offer the candidate completion. The number of observed co-constructions is too low to draw any definitive conclusions. Considering the absolute number of occurrences is limited (especially for Indonesian), these data at best *suggest* a *possible* correlation between particular cues and co-construction. More targeted analysis is needed to collect all hesitation markers, including those that did not lead to collaborative efforts to complete the contribution, in order to decide on the functionality and prevalence of a particular encouragement cue. These and other questions arise and deserve attention, but do not fit the scope of this thesis.

to answer both questions: David does not want any information about Lotte (his former in-house girlfriend).

(17) *Utterance completion - "news"* (BB-NL 48-1)

77	David	*ik kan wel meteen iets zeggen*
		I can immediately say something
78		*wat ik absoluut niet wil weten,*
		what I absolutely do not want to know,
		[...]
81	Ruben	*ja? nou wat wil jij niet weten?*
		yes? well what don't you want to know?
82	David	*E:Hm* (.) *ja hoe zal ik dat formuleren?=*
		E:hm (.) yes how will I formulate it?=
83	Hanna	*=jij wil niks over Lotte weten*
		=you don't want to know anything about Lotte
84	David	*juist.*
		correct.

Even more so than in (16), there is an overt and explicit marker of hesitation ("E:hm" followed by a (not so) rhetorical question). Yet, Hanna does not present her completion as a potential candidate awaiting approval (as Nur did), but seems rather confident about her contribution. This example shows she believes she has correctly inferred what David is going to say and ascribes him that position (and given his response, she was right).

An important difference between these two examples is that Nur was attempting to offer the final piece of an ongoing utterance, whereas Hanna is presenting a full thought. A tentative first analysis of the types of encouragement included in the first turn suggests a difference between the two data sets (although the number of cases available are does not allow for a full or definitive analysis). In Dutch, the use of utterance final "eh" is the cue that mostly results in an attempted completion, whereas in Indonesian encouraged completions mostly follow an explicit indication of uncertainty in the form of "whatchamacallit"-type phrases or a pause. Furthermore, comparing Dutch utterance and thought completions suggests utterance completions to be more strongly associated with "ehm" than thought completions. Especially considering the higher number of thought completions in Dutch (both relative and absolute) this is a strong indication that using "eh" is indeed a cue for others to attempt co-construction.[6]

Spontaneous completion

In roughly half of all observed cases, no encouragement was present: 47.39% of Dutch and 53.66% of Indonesian co-constructions were initiated by the second speaker (see table 7.1 above). A relevant aspect of these spontaneous collaborations is the timing of the suggested completion. Whereas encouraged

[6]Again, keep in mind there is no information on the "collaboration potential", the data only include the actual realizations of collaboration.

co-constructions normally succeed the main speaker, spontaneous completions may be presented either following the original speaker or simultaneous to the original utterance, a so-called "parallel completion".[7] A simple example of simultaneous utterance completion was given in (6) above, where Lena added "the poor" in parallel to Tessa's utterance "I understand who the rich are and who the poor are". The exchange is reproduced here as (18) for convenience.

(18) *Parallel completion - "poor"* (BB-IND 15-2-3)

14	Tessa	*''aku yang tahu siapa yang kaya*
		I am the one who knows who are the rich
15		*dan siapa yang mi[skin disini''*
		and who are the p[oor here
16	Lena	*[yang miskin*
		[the poor
17		*iya*
		yes

There is no sign Tessa would not be able to complete the utterance or is hesitant about her words whatsoever. Lena's contribution is neither encouraged, nor necessary, but does show strong and active engagement. Being able to finish Tessa's utterance displays her understanding and involvement - both pertaining to the relevant utterance and situation. By finishing the utterance, she effectively lays claim to the anecdote, even though she played no immediate part in it (granted, the complaint was *about* her, but it was not uttered in her presence). Her contribution is not of much informational relevance. After all Tessa proved to be fully capable of finishing her own sentence. The point of co-construction here is in the social or interpersonal relevance it holds. In displaying her understanding of what is to come - whether based on conventional(ized) phrases, immediate context, or prior experience - Lena establishes and reinforces common ground between them. The both of them can (and do) reach the same conclusion.

Similar examples can be found in (19) and (20). Even without any contextual information, it is evident that Reza in (19) and Iris in (20) insert their interpretation of what their conversational partner is going to say at roughly

[7] There are some examples of encouraged collaborations that do involve simultaneous talk (23 in Dutch, 7 in Indonesian). In each of these cases, the main speaker shows some form of hesitation, upon which another participant presents a candidate completion. Coincidentally, the main speaker continues his utterance again at the same time the second speaker starts talking; they thus simultaneously work on the same utterance. These examples are classified according to the cue they display, because the effort made by the second speaker is indeed encouraged by said cue. The second speaker interprets the hesitance as an invitation to assist, even if his effort turns out to be unnecessary. Overlap in turn completion is in fact not uncommon, albeit it is mostly observed with a small delay on the first speaker's part, therefore not qualifying as simultaneous or parallel talk (but see section 7.1.4 on the continuation of the interaction following an attempted co-construction). What is classified here as a parallel co-construction, is never encouraged: all original turns that include some sort of call for assistance are categorized per that encouragement cue.

the same time as it is actually presented by the original speaker (note that Iris steps in with the second part of a compound noun).

(19) *Parallel completion - "sleeping bag"* (BB-IND 12-5-3)

12	Rendra	*lho, kamu biar di atas*	[*aja sama yang lain,*
		oh, you put it on top	[just with the others,
13	Reza		[*saja yang ama lain*
			[just with the others

(20) *Parallel completion - "forefront"* (BB-NL 51-8)

119	Ruben	*ik ben nooit zo'n type geweest die eh*	
		I've never been the type that eh	
120		*die °per se op de voorgron*	[*d ofzo°*
		that °per se at the forefro	[nt or something°
121	Iris		[*grond moest treden*
			[front needed to step
122		(.) *jah.*	
		(.) yeah.	

These parallel completions, again, are an indication of the active engagement of the collaborating participants. Since the two completions are presented simultaneously, the "hearer", or second speaker, does not have much time to process what is said and think about the next step. The ability to catch on so quickly, producing the message instead of processing it shows they can in fact think like the speaker. They do not need to listen first, and then follow. They have the same thoughts, and hence reach the same conclusions. In other words, these parallel completions demonstrate their interpersonal connectedness and joint commitment to the interaction. A special type of parallel production is discussed below.

Shadowing

Some parallel utterances are not produced simultaneously with the main speaker, but with a small delay. This is what is referred to as shadowing: reproducing what the former speaker said in close following to the original, almost as if the two speakers are presenting the information together (c.f section 3.3.3). The first speaker thus present his message in its entirety all by himself. At some point in that utterance, however, another participant takes up that same utterance and echoes it. The delay may be so small the second speaker barely has time to process the original, thus having to rely on his own interpretative strength, or could grow to a couple of words. The first more closely resembles a co-construction; the second is somewhat more similar to a repeat.

The fact that a fellow participant is able to (re)produce an utterance so quickly does suggest they are thinking ahead of or at least in line with the other participant. Similar to parallel (attempted) co-constructions, shadowing demonstrates involvement. The ability to follow another speaker this closely,

echoing their words, establishes a close connection between the two messages and as a result between the two participants. Examples (21) and (22) nicely illustrate two speakers reaching the same conclusion about the topic at hand, one just ahead of the other. The first exchange discusses the raisin bread Roos baked, the second example concerns a plastic bag the housemates received from Big Brother.

(21) *Shadowing - "cinnamon"* (BB-NL 20-15)

7	Ruben	*een smaakje is te overheersend*
		one flavor is too overpowering
		[...]
11	Hugo	*dat is de ka*[*neel.*
		that is the c[innamon.
12	Hanna	[*dat is waarschijnlijk de kaneel.*
		[that is probably the cinnamon.

(22) *Shadowing - "check up"* (BB-IND 2-1-10)

41	Indra	*itu medical che*[*ck up ya*
		it's a medical [check up yes
42	Lena	[*medical check up*
		[medical check up

The total number of examples that involve a second speaker closely shadowing another participant comes down to 44 in the Dutch corpus and 53 in the Indonesian data. These numbers are not that far apart, and indeed represent a similar share of the observed repetitions in the respective languages (13.58% in Dutch, and 14.48% in Indonesian), but recall that the relative share of repetitions overall - the general class this type of contribution was included in - is much smaller in Dutch. Only 10.07% of Dutch phatic contributions were classified as a form of repetition, compared to 28.44% of Indonesian phatic contributions. Indeed out of all phatic contributions observed in the Dutch data 44 (or 1.37% of a total 3218) involves shadowing. In the Indonesian data, 53 cases of phatic contributions involved shadowing (or 4.12% of a total 1287). Even though the numbers are low, it is noteworthy that the relative share of this type of contribution is three times as big in the Indonesian data set.

A small majority of spontaneous completions in Indonesian were produced in parallel to the original speaker finishing the utterance: 25 of the 44 spontaneous Indonesian completions (equaling 57 percent). The other 19 cases seamlessly followed the other speaker (equaling 43 percent; cf. table 7.1). The Dutch completions show the opposite: 44 percent of a total 109 spontaneous completions (48 cases) were produced in parallel to the first speaker, whereas 56 percent (61 cases) were produced consecutively.

The following examples, (23) and (24), include such smooth transitions from one speaker to the next, jointly constructing a single message. The first speaker has produced the main clause; the second speaker submits the relevant second

part. There is no overlap between the two speakers this time. The completion effort is neatly attached to the first part of the utterance. At the same time, the original speaker leaves the floor to his conversational partner (which is not to say the completion is ratified) and only takes up his turn again at a later point.

(23) *Consecutive completion - "audience"* (BB-NL 54-3)

117	Bram	*één troost* (0.4) *het publiek gaat uitmaken*
		one consolidation (0.4) the audience will decide
118	Lieke	*wie* (.) *het wordt=*
		who (.) it will be=
119	Iris	↓↓*wie van de twee*↓↓
		↓↓which of the two↓↓

(24) *Consecutive completion - "energy"* (BB-NL 16-17-2)

45	Bram	*als je gaat sporten dan krij-*
		when you go do sports then ge-
46		*wordt er een eh een STOF ontwikkeld in je lichaam,*
		there is a eh a ELEMENT developed in your body,
47	Hugo	*ja d-dat je meer energie krijgt*
		yes t-that you get more energy

These consecutive completions ultimately achieve the same goal as parallel completions: the second speaker demonstrates they are on the same page as the first speaker. The completion shows they are like-minded and (can) take a joint position. The difference is that there is no overlap in utterance production, which allows for adoption of the candidate completion by the original speaker. Still, allowing another participant to insert (their anticipated understanding of) part of the message does not necessarily mean the effort is appreciated or even recognized. In addition, given that thought completions normally represent a second part to a whole, the risk of not predicting the completion accurately is higher. It might be that the original speaker had something else in mind and now needs to address the wrongful assumption of similarity between them. Whether an attempted completion is felt to be an invitation or intrusion is visible in the turn following the co-construction. The first speaker can communicate their acceptance or rejection of the candidate completion, or can simply continue. The different forms of ratification (or lack thereof) are discussed in the following section.

7.1.4 Ratification

Ratification refers to any sign of recognition that another participant contributed something that might have been helpful to complete an utterance or thought. This recognition can, for example, be established by affirmation ("yes", "right"), accepting the inserted element(s) as correct. Another common form of ratification is repetition or paraphrase of the inserted part. By




Figure 7.4: Reaction to candidate completions. These figures show the reactions presented by the main speaker, who was confronted with another participant's candidate completion of his original utterance or thought. In this figure, utterance and thought completions are combined in order to capture the overall pattern of ratification. The different types of reactions were collected in three umbrella classes: (i) the main speaker overtly recognizes the attempt, (ii) the main speaker ignores the attempt, and (iii) the interaction takes another direction, meaning some other participant takes the floor or the exchange ends. In the Indonesian data, most completions did not receive overt recognition: 54 out of 82 attempted completions (or 65.86%) were not ratified. Conversely, 34.15% (or 28/82) were ratified. Although the relative share is a little lower in Dutch, still the majority of co-constructions were not granted recognition. Out of 230 co-constructions, 133 were not ratified (57.83%); meaning 42.17% (or 97/230) were ratified.

repeating the suggested form (both in form and meaning or meaning only), the main speaker incorporates the suggestion into his own utterance. Again, this suggests the candidate completion was in fact in line with the original idea.

To what extent the offered completion is indeed in accordance with the original idea is not always explicitly debated. In fact, the majority of collaborations are not openly ratified (see figure 7.4). In both the Indonesian and Dutch data, most attempted co-constructions did not receive overt recognition (65.86% or 54/82 in Indonesian, 57.38% or 133/230 in Dutch). Either the suggestions were either ignored, the main speaker continuing on course, or the interaction ended or was taken in a different direction by another participant.[8]

To start with the least collaborative outcome, the attempted completion may

[8]Note that these numbers concern the full collection of completions: including all utterance and thought completions, both spontaneous and encouraged. The analysis does not distinguish between the different subsets, because there is not enough data of each of the sets to draw informed conclusions. A first analysis based on the limited cases suggests co-constructional attempts that followed a (possible) encouragement cue to be somewhat more welcomed than spontaneous collaborative efforts. There was some sign that assistance was needed, after all. In the Dutch data, completions that followed some encouragement marker were ratified in 41% of utterance completions (against 27% of spontaneous efforts) and 58% of thought completions (opposite 32% in response to spontaneous attempts). In the Indonesian data, 48% utterance completions that followed an encouragement marker were ratified (against 26% of spontaneous cases); there was no increase in ratifications observed with encouraged thought completions (27% compared to 23% of spontaneous efforts. Another observation that stands out is that in the Indonesian data most thought completions lead to redirection (or ending) of the conversation. For Dutch, the reactions to utterance and thought completions were almost identical, thus closely resembling the distribution in figure 7.4.)

lead to the original speaker losing their turn entirely. In 25.22% of the co-constructions observed in the Dutch data and 34.15% of the Indonesian completions, the original speaker did not retake the floor. There was no acknowledgment of the suggested completion, nor a continuation of the original turn or story. This could lead to (or be due to) the second speaker taking over as interactional lead as in example (25). In reaction to Lieke's hesitance about seeing the doctor over a hand burn, Hugo states that they (the contestants) are on their own. Or rather he initiates that statement (line 83), but does not finish it. His utterance "*je bent hier elkaar op jezelf eh-*" is completed by Lieke (line 84), who then immediately elaborates on why she felt the need to bring up the subject in the first place.

Lieke burnt her hand when she took the kettle of the stove while it was still hot. Hanna provided first aid, meaning she put some sort of ointment on it and dressed the wound with gauze dressings. Still, Lieke is a bit uncertain about her injury and talks it over with Hugo. Hugo does not get a chance to ratify Lieke's candidate completion or continue his argument. There simply is no time to respond with Lieke rushing to take the floor. Whether or not her interpretation was accurate remains unanswered. The fact that she continues does suggest she is rather confident about her effort to finish his turn. Assuming his utterance to have been completed she establishes a transition relevant place (TRP), allowing her to assign herself the next turn. The same development is observed in the data with a third party stepping in at the TRP, often (re)directing the interaction into new territory.

(25) *Ratification - "doctor"* (BB-NL 53-3)

83	Hugo	*je bent hier elkaar op jezelf eh-*
		you are here on each other yourself eh-
84	Lieke	*aangewezen=*
		dependent=
85		*=ja niet dat IK geen vertrouwen heb in Hanna ofzo*
		yes not that I don't trust Hanna or anything
86		*>geloof ik allemaal wel<*
		>I do believe it all<
87		*maar toch even dat er even iem- bij eh*
		but still that just som- with eh
88	Hugo	*ja↓ zeg je gewoon tegen Hanna zo van eh*
		yes↓ just tell Hanna like eh
89		*Hanna ik-ik wil toch dat eh*
		Hanna I- I still want eh
90		*dat er even een dokter naar komt kijken*
		a doctor to take a look at it

With the original turn completed and out of the way, other participants seize the opportunity to influence the course of conversation. Such redirection does imply that at least the "new" speaker considers the completion adequate. They are ready to move on to something else. The other two possible scenarios involve the first speaker ratifying or ignoring the attempted co-construction. In

both scenarios, the second speaker takes turn again following the completion. This could mean the original turn is finished as it was started, that is, as the first speaker had designed the turn. In that case, the candidate completion (or collaborative effort for that matter) is not openly acknowledged. The speaker either integrates the effort into the original, suggesting it was a valid attempt, or finishes the original turn as if the completion has never taken place. The silent adoption seems to be a type of covert or implicit ratification. Another option is to openly recognize and acknowledge the effort, meaning the speaker explicitly confirms at least that the attempt that was made. These covert and overt ratifications are discussed separately below.

Covert ratification?

In roughly one third of all co-contributions, the main speaker continues as if nothing happened. That is, the original speaker finishes his own utterance irrespective of the other participant's effort to do so. One form of ignoring the collaborative effort is to continue the turn following the suggested completion. In this case, there does seem to be acceptance or integration of the candidate completion, but only implicitly. The fact that the main speaker *can* continue a coherent story following the candidate completion of another participant suggests the insertion actually fits that story as set up by the original speaker. This was already seen in (11) above and is observed in (26) below as well.

(26) *Ratification - "circus"* (BB-NL 56-3)

9	Ruben	*nou (.) het klinkt misschien stom,*
		well (.) it may sound stupid,
10		*>maar ik bedoel< als je al weet van tevoren*
		>but I mean< if you already know beforehand
11		*dat het gewoon*
		that it just
12	David	*dan ki[jk je er ook-*
		then y[ou don't dread it either-
13	Ruben	*[alvast*
		[already
14	David	*=kijk je er ook niet meer zo onwijs tegen op.*
		then you don't dread it as much anymore either.
15		(0.3)
16	Ruben	*ja het is↓vervelend,*
		yes it is↓bothersome,
17		*maar net als met dat fietsen daar heb ik nog ff=*
		but just like with the cycling then I have for a bit=
18		*=>weet je< (.) dan ga je er nog even tegenaan,*
		=>you know< (.) then you still go for it,
19		*net als met dat koorddansen, maar↑dit e::h*
		just like with the tightrope walking, but↑this e::h

In this excerpt, Ruben is talking about this week's challenge to put on a circus

act. All contestants have to complete a number of acts to pass the challenge, which Ruben believes to be impossible. He introduces the sentiment that if you already know you will fail (line 10) you do not care as much about failing anymore (line 12 and 14). The second part of this thought is presented by David, instead of Ruben himself. Following a pause, Ruben continues his explanation (line 16ff) without commenting on David's completion, suggesting the insertion was indeed (similar to) what he had in mind.

In this type of exchange, the main speaker implicitly or silently adopts the other participant's position. David primarily presents his own feeling about the circus-situation: when you know you will fail you do not dread it as much. He puts his position out there, in a sense hijacking Ruben's turn. It could well have been that Ruben wanted to say something else completely (e.g. "when you know you will fail, why even try"). Yet, by continuing his explanation without paying explicit attention to David's contribution, he indicates the insertion is in line with his own position.

Connecting this back to interpersonal alignment, the introduction in lines 9-10 was enough for David to feel he could identify what Ruben was planning on saying. Ruben did not yet put his stance towards the circus challenge out there; he only made a remark announcing he was going to do so. David's completion is both an attempt at completing Ruben's contribution and a representation of his own personal stance at the same time. He takes position (I (David) do not dread the challenge) and assigns Ruben a position (I (Ruben) do not dread the challenge), thus aligning himself to Ruben's (still covert) position. Ruben's subsequent decision to continue is an implicit acceptation of his ascribed stance. The continuation indicates the both of them are indeed on the same page; the collaborative effort was a success.

On the other hand, the main speaker may present a "redundant" completion in spite of the utterance already being completed by the other participant. This includes both parallel completions (discussed above in 7.1.3) in which the main speaker continues his utterance while another participant tries to do the same, and subsequent productions as in (27). In the latter case, there is a (slight) delay in the first speaker's continuation of his turn resulting in possible overlap between the collaborating party and the original speaker (visible in lines 41-42 below). That is, another participant has already risen to the occasion of completing the utterance, when the original speaker takes up his own turn again.

Kamil is the main speaker in the exchange in (27) about the cleaning schedule - also discussed earlier as (4). Following what could be interpreted as a form of encouragement (*"whatchamacallit"*, line 41), Nazam offers a candidate completion. This form fits perfectly, and yet Kamil does not accept or integrate it into his own turn (as Ruben did above) but presents his own completion instead (line 43). Kamil arguably does react to Nazam's suggestion (*ya*, line 43), although this particle could simply signal the continuation of his own turn as well. Given the fact that he starts his utterance while Nazam is still talking, the latter explanation seems to hold more merit. Irrespective of the specific

function of "yes" at the beginning, the utterance presents a full completion of the original turn started in line 40.

(27) *Ratification - "chores"* (BB-IND 23-4-2)

40	Kamil	*kebersihan nggak masalah lah ya,*
		cleanliness is not a problem yes,
41		*udah ada apa namanya?* e:H
		already there is whatchamacallit? e:H
42	Nazam	*organis* [*asi*
		organiz [ation
43	Kamil	[*ya eh piket-piketnya gitu.*
		[yes eh shifts like that.
44		(0.3) *itu aja sih #hehe#*
		(0.3) that is all #hehe#

The effort made by Nazam to lend a helping hand is not given much attention. By diverting from Nazam's candidate completion, Kamil can be said to implicitly deny having alluded to that completion (Schegloff, 1996:192). He thus takes (and keeps) full responsibility for his utterance and for his independent claim to the stance presented by the utterance.

While the two contributions in example (27) show overlap, Bram's completion in (28) below is produced only after Ruben attempted to finish his utterance for him. Again, Ruben's suggestion is appropriate, seamlessly fitting the expression Bram set up, but not recognized (lines 23-24).

(28) *Ratification - "clueless"* (BB-NL 49-6)

19	Bram	*wat ik me ook af vraag is hoe het publiek*
		what I also wonder is how the audience
20		(.) *hierop reageert*
		(.) reacts to this
21		*dat er eh* (.) *zeg maar op de helft van de tijd eh*
		that there eh (.) let's say half way through eh
22		*mensen in het huis komen, die snappen er ook-*
		people enter the house, they also understand it-
23	Ruben	*helemaal niks van.*
		not at all whatsoever.
24	Bram	*ge- geen hout meer van.*
		no- nothing at all.

Bram wonders what the audience might think about new contestants being brought into the house mid-competition (lines 19-20). He imagines they would not understand at all what was going on anymore: "they also understand it" (line 22), when Ruben takes over and finishes what he started (line 23). The two of them produce a full and acceptable sentence *"die snappen er ook helemaal niks van"* (comparable to "they don't understand it anymore either"). Yet, Bram continues in line 24, completing his own utterance as *die snappen er ook geen hout meer van.* This results in a message strongly similar to Ruben's

effort, which evidently was on the right track. Even more than in (27), Bram's completion in line 24 did not need to be delivered; it is redundant. A complete version of the message was already out there, collaboratively constructed with Ruben. Moreover, the suggested outcome was fully completed before Bram took turn again. He could have easily heard, understood *and* accepted Ruben's interpretation, but he did not. He does not correct Ruben either, he simply ignores the attempt altogether.

In such instances of redundant completion, the main speaker demonstrates a strong sense of ownership over the utterance: they are adamant to finish what they started. While the suggested completion is a clear example of attempting to establish interpersonal alignment (parallel to the example discussed in (26)), the original speaker does not explicitly condone the effort. Both completions present the same message, meaning the two of them take the same position regarding the topic of talk. This thus does result in positive alignment between the two participants, only at a slightly later point in the exchange compared to overt ratification of the suggested completion.

The crucial difference between actually ratifying the effort and presenting the "intended" completion - apart from the phrasing obviously - is the main speaker's role as stance follow or stance lead respectively. By finishing their own turn as intended, they ensure their position as stance lead: they had already thought of the outcome of their utterance before the other participant pitched in. Completing their own original turn allows them to lay claim to the epistemic access to this position independent from the other party and regardless of what the candidate completion said. This emphasis on having an independent position and access to that position is absent in reactions that include an overt acknowledgment of the attempt. These overt ratifications rather focus on their interpersonal similarity, their *joint* position instead of their separate but similar positions.

Overt ratification

Contrary to the above examples, the original speaker can overtly acknowledge the attempt made by another participant. This does happen in 42.17% (or 97/230) of Dutch and 34.15% (or 28/82) of Indonesian attempted co-constructions (cf. fig. 7.4). In each of these cases, the main speaker accepts another participant's candidate completion as a relevant addition to the original utterance. To a certain extent this is what Nazam does in (29), line 31. Nazam finishes his own utterance with *rasional* "rational" (line 30), but at the same time Kamil offers *blak-blakan* "frank" (line 31) as a candidate completion.

In his subsequent response, Nazam first presents an affirmation marker *ya*, "yes", followed by a summary or conclusion of the preceding lines. He combines the two forms in a single closing statement, *secara blak-blakan dan rasional* line 32, (re)affirming the men have the same interpretation of the situation and are perfectly in sync when it comes to how they prefer to communicate: rational and frank. He does take over Kamil's suggestion, accepting it as appropriate or

fitting, but not at the expense of his own completion. Similar to example (28) above, Nazam demonstrates he took stance on his own accord by repeating his original completion. The difference here is that he does not ignore the effort made by his conversational partner, but rather openly integrates it into his final version of the message.

(29) *Ratification - "rational"* (BB-IND 26-4-5)

28	Nazam	*>guwa kepancing sama< ini Kamil, sorry ini yah.*
		>I caught by< this Kamil, sorry for this yeah.
29		*tapi kita ngomong sekarang*
		but we now speak
30		*secara rasio[nal.*
		like ratio[nal.
31	Kamil	*[blak-blakan aja*
		[just frankly
32	Nazam	*ya, secara blak-blakan dan rasional ya.*
		yes, frankly and rationally right.

In the example above, acknowledgment and ratification was communicated by integrating the suggested element into the core message. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, agreement and repetition can both be used to establish positive alignment. The latter form was said to be more ambiguous and more independent, since the interpretation of the repetition is often left to the other participant. Agreement, on the other hand, was said to communicate unequivocally that two participants share the same interpretation and associated stance. When it comes to co-constructions, confirmation markers are an effective way to ratify a candidate completion as well.

The exchange in (30) nicely illustrates this use of a confirmation marker to accept a co-constructional effort. Hanna is the initial speaker, explaining that there were only five contestants left last week (line 94-95), which made it "very difficult to (0.4) ehm" (orig. *was het heel moeilijk om (0.4) ehm*). Encouraged by the TCU final delay - in the form of a pause and "ehm" - Bram offers "let that go" (orig. *dat los te laten*) as a candidate completion (line 97).

(30) *Ratification - "let go"* (BB-NL 54-3)

94	Hanna	*omdat we vorige week natuurlijk*
		because we were last week of course
95		*met z'n vijven opeens waren,*
		with the five of us suddenly,
96		(0.4) *was het heel moeilijk om* (0.4) *ehm*
		(0.4) it was very difficult to (0.4) ehm
97	Bram	*>dat los te laten<*
		>let that go<
98	Hanna	↓ja:
		↓ye:s
99	Bram	*ja*
		yes

This completion is wholeheartedly accepted with an emphatic *↓ja:* (line 98). Hanna does not integrate his effort into her original utterance by means of repetition as in (4) above, she simply confirms Bram to be correct in his suggested continuation. His assessment of the situation and corresponding interpretation of her sentiment was accurate. Co-constructions that are confirmed by the original speaker are the most clear-cut examples of collaboration: two participants each presenting part of a single message and agreeing on the combined result.

A specific form of response that deserves separate attention is the ratification of a candidate completion via repetition. In this particular context repetition is not used to take over or appreciate the position already taken by the main speaker (as discussed in chapter 6), but rather to affirm a candidate interpretation of the (incomplete) first speaker's utterance offered by another participant. This fellow interactant attempts to finish the thought or utterance started by the first speaker, thus formulating the stance associated with that utterance and that speaker. In a sense, he or she provides the stance lead "in name of" the original speaker, which may or may not be representative of the second speaker's own position on the matter. The original speaker uses repetition to confirm the interpretation was indeed accurate (or not), adopting the ascribed position.

A clear instance of ratification by full repetition is found in (31). This exchange takes place shortly after Lieke entered the Big Brother house. She is still unpacking her suitcase in the bedroom, when David and Hugo join her. One of the items she brought is a bag of liquorice (line 6). She starts to describe what to do with the liquorice but does not finish "they can be placed in the ehm" (line 7), ending her turn constructial unit with "ehm". David provides a candidate completion in line 9: "in the liquorice jar".

(31) *Ratification - "liquorice"* (BB-NL 48-3)

6	Lieke	[...] *hier nog meer drop,*
		[...] here still more liquorice,
7		*dus dat kan in de ehm*
		so that can in the ehm
8	Hugo	*wow, hey*
		wow, hey
9	David	*in de dropjespot*
		liquorice jar
10	Lieke	*in de dropjespot*
		liquorice jar

David's suggestion is fully repeated by Lieke (line 10). By including the suggested completion in her own original utterance, she ratifies his attempt. She accepts his completion and with it his interpretation of her idea. As Schegloff (1996:181) explains, this confirms her alluding towards that particular completion. By repeating the explication offered by David, she not only accepts that particular insertion as appropriate, she also accepts her hinting at that particular interpretation. In a sense, she takes responsibility for him offering

that completion: her utterance led him there after all.

Ratification by repetition does not always mean the original speaker produces a full copy of the suggested completion. As we already saw in (29), the suggestion may be integrated in a more extensive expression. The examples below show another regularly observed variety of ratification by repetition: upgrading or downgrading the candidate completion. This form of modification in repetition was already described in section 6.1.2. The use of modifiers with spontaneous repetition (not in relation to candidate completions) was reported to be more frequently found in the Dutch data, where the modification usually involved an affirmative marker or intensification of the statement made.

In (32) Hanna has just talked to the in-house psychologist and reports on her visit to Hugo and Ruben in the garden. Struggling with the addition of two new contestants, she begins to explain what the psychologist said to her: *je begint eigenlijk die hele zeven weken die je nu hebt gehad*, ("actually you start those whole seven week that you have completed", line 17-18), but she does not finish the utterance. The conclusion is presented by Hugo instead: *begin je opnieuw*, ("you start again", line 19).

(32) *Ratification - "start again"* (BB-NL 49-12)

16	Hanna	*JA EN HET is gewoon alles is ontwricht,*
		YES AND IT is just everything is disrupted,
17		*hij zegt en je begint EIgenlijk die hele zeven weken*
		he says and you ACTually start that whole seven weeks
18		*die je nu hebt gehad,*
		that you have completed,
19	Hugo	*begin je opnieuw*
		you start over
20	Hanna	*die beginnen gewoon weer helemaal opieuw.*
		those just completely start over again.

Hanna reproduces his conclusion (line 20), but by adding *gewoon* ("just"), *weer* ("again"), and *helemaal* ("completely") intensifies its weight. The core structure of the completion is the same (as visualized in (33)), but the modifications added by Hanna emphasize her unique perspective and independent access to that perspective. This allows her to confirm his interpretation and them being on the same page, while setting her completion, and hence stance, apart from Hugo's.

(33) *Ratification and intensification - "start again" (BB-NL 49-12)*

19	Hugo		*begin*	*je*				*opnieuw*
	(lit.)		begin	you				over
20	Hanna	*die*	*beginnen*		*gewoon*	*weer*	*helemaal*	*opnieuw*
	(lit.)	those	start		just	again	completely	over

Here repetition is not so much used by a fellow participant to reproduce the stance taken by the first speaker and original stancetaker (as with regular repetition, cf. 6.1), but as a means for the original speaker to accept the suggested

completion as representative of their as of yet unspoken stance. The candidate completion offered by the second speaker is supposed to complete the original utterance and hence "belongs" to the original speaker. Even if the suggested completion reflects the interpretation - and possibly position - of the second speaker, their aim is to present the main speaker's perspective. The second speaker may be the one verbalizing the stance lead, but is not to be held accountable; it is not primarily their stance after all.

In both the Indonesian and Dutch data, most co-constructional efforts were observed not to be met by an overt expression of acknowledgment. That is, 42% of Dutch attempted completions were openly ratified, by means of an affirmation marker of repeat. The remaining 58% was either ignored (32%) or the initial speaker did not take turn again altogether (25%). Even if the majority is not overtly ratified, a collection of what was called "covert" ratification is included in the class of ignored attempts. These collaborative efforts were seamlessly integrated in the original turn, suggesting the accuracy of its contents. The actual number of successful collaborations (in the sense that the second speaker correctly predicted the completion) is thus supposedly higher. A very balanced distribution was found in Indonesian, where 34% of all completion efforts was ratified (a little less than in Dutch), 31% was ignored, and 34% did not see the original speaker take turn again.

Although the turn immediately following an attempted completion surely informs participants (and the analyst) about the place this contribution holds in the overall interaction, it is not an entirely truthful representation of human interaction. It presupposes that there is only one speaker who *can* ratify an attempted completion, and that there is only one speaker who does. In actuality, people do not necessarily react themselves. It is not improbable that someone else presents a reaction to the completion that in fact reflects the first speaker's take on it reducing the necessity to present their reaction. Again, this suggests there may be a form of silent acceptation that is not currently represented in the discussion of ratification efforts. Especially when there are more than two participants present, they work together as a group.

7.1.5 A group effort

Most examples discussed in this section involved only two active participants: a first speaker that initiated a turn and a second speaker that offered an attempted completion to that turn. While all examples are taken from naturally produced conversations, they are of course selected to clarify the point of discussion. To avoid painting too oversimplified a picture of collaboration and completion in interaction, the example in (34) includes no less than four collaborating interactants alongside two other actively engaged participants. [9] They are discussing the improbability of Bram being nominated for eviction.

[9]The latter demonstrated their involvement through laughter, but did not make a linguistic contribution (at least not in this excerpt).

(34) *Collaboration - "guitar"* (BB-NL 4-10)

177	Hanna	*en jij hebt die gitaa:r dus die willen we=*
		and you have the guit:ar so that we want
178	Thomas	*=ja die willen we=*
		=yes that we want=
179	Lotte	*#hahahah#*
180	Hanna	*=willen we n[og niet kwijt hoor*
		we want not [to lose yet
181	Thomas	*[niet kwijt*
		[not to lose
182	Lotte	*#hahahah#*
183	Ruben	*zodra wij allemaal kunnen*
		as soon as we are all able
184		*gitaar spele[n dan mag je e:H*
		to play gui[tar then you may e:H
185	Hanna	*[zodra die cd-[speler er is*
		[as soon as that cd-[player is here
186	Bram	*[#jahaha#*
187	Lotte	*[#hhahaha#*
188	David	*ja inderdaad, dan ho[udt het op hoor*
		yes indeed, then it [stops
189	Hanna	*[exit Bram*
		[exit Bram

Following an exchange of why he should not worry, Hanna is the first to introduce his guitar as an argument (line 177). Because the guitar is the only musical entertainment they have - they do not have access to a radio, tv or the Internet - it is disadvantageous to all of them to evict him for the guitar will leave with him. Her turn is not completed yet when Thomas takes over and reproduces the first part of her (unfinished) concluding argument: *die willen we=* ("that we want="). He acknowledges he is stance follow to her stance lead (utterance opening "yes"). When Hanna takes up her turn again (line 180), he has found her rhythm and co-presents the concluding remark: *willen we niet kwijt* ("we don't want to lose"). Thomas does not simply repeat what Hanna said, but collaboratively completes her message. His early reproduction of the incomplete turn constructional unit suggests he had an idea of where the utterance was going. The ability to manage to speak in parallel to her original turn shows he shares her position on the matter.

The collaborative effort does not end there. Especially the second part of the exchange, from line 183 onward, is constructed collaboratively. The argument put forward by Hanna and Thomas is further expanded by Ruben (line 183), then Hanna again (line 185), and finally brought to a conclusion by first David (line 188) and again Hanna (line 189). The solution to the "problem" of not being able to evict Bram because of his guitar is offered by Ruben: they have to learn how to play themselves (line 183-184). Using the same grammatical construction Ruben presented, Hanna suggests a different solution; they could get a CD player. In other words, both of them individually suggest they

need not be dependent on Bram anymore for musical entertainment. The parallel production and similar messages indicate they are like minds, establishing positive alignment between them.

Neither of them explicates what the consequence would be of learning to play or getting a CD player. Yet, David agrees with it (line 188) anyway, demonstrating his understanding of the two solutions and their subsequent result. He affirms the position hinted at by Ruben and Hanna, accepting it as his own. Hence, he overtly establishes alignment between the three of them: he assumes them to represent the same stance and associates himself with that position as well. Moreover, he presents the consequence related to their suggested solutions: the end of Bram's residence in the house (line 188). A conclusion seconded by Hanna (line 189): *exit Bram*.

The recurring contributions made by Hanna may seem to suggest she actually produces a single turn or discourse unit interrupted by others (as represented in (35)), but that is too simple a reading. All her contributions learns combined indeed form a coherent whole that *could* represent a single turn. However, that would ignore the fact that her utterance in line 185 closely resembles (and follows) Ruben's ongoing contribution (line 183), and that the final conclusion is only produced *after* David has confirmed their shared reasoning (line 188).

(35) *Collaboration - "guitar", Hanna only* (BB-NL 4-10)

177	Hanna	*en jij hebt die gitaa:r dus die willen we=*
		and you have the guit:ar so that we want
		[...]
180		*=willen we nog niet kwijt hoor*
		we want not to lose yet
		[...]
185		*zodra die cd-speler er is*
		as soon as that cd-player is here
		[...]
189		*exit Bram*
		exit Bram

Hanna's combined utterances do reflect the outline of her (or better yet *their*) reasoning: (i) point out a fact ("you have the guitar"), (ii) assess that fact ("we don't want to lose it"), (iii) offer a hypothetical solution ("learning to play / getting a cd-player"), (iv) and the corresponding result ("exit Bram"). At each of these steps, two participants are involved in producing its corresponding utterance, one of them being Hanna. This is schematically presented in (36).

(36) *Collaboration - "guitar"* (BB-NL 4-10)

(i)	fact	''Bram has the guitar''	Hanna + Thomas
(ii)	evaluation	''we want the guitar''	Hanna + Thomas
(iii)	solution	''learn to play / cd-player''	Ruben + Hanna
(iv)	result	''Bram is evicted''	David + Hanna

While the first two steps of the argument are initiated by Hanna, and reproduced or co-produced by Thomas, the subsequent development of the reasoning is no longer led by Hanna, but by Ruben and David, respectively. Hanna becomes stance follow to their contributions. Those contributions do tie back in to her original argument, clearly building on what she started in line 17. What this example nicely illustrates is the combination of completion and extension in a collaborative effort to construct a meaningful whole. Thomas' parallel production of Hanna's original turn qualifies as a completion, because he attempts to finish an incomplete turn started by another participants. The subsequent development of the argument by Ruben takes the original idea a step further.[10] Hanna adapts his idea, extending it past the guitar into the more general territory of music. Neither of them completes their utterance, leading David to offer a candidate completion. In summary, this exchange includes examples of both completion, in lines 181 and 187, and extension in line 184. This latter type of collaborative meaning construction is discussed in the next section.

7.2 Extension

The previous section discussed how participants work together to construct a single message or thought. That utterance or thought remained mostly associated with the person that started the utterance. It was in line of their utterance, after all, that the completion was suggested. The candidate completion reflects the position the second speaker anticipates the first speaker to take (and in turn does reveal at least what this speaker thinks). As discussed in section 7.1.5, not all collaborative efforts target a single message. Participants actively coordinate their understanding and stance by building off each other's contributions. This collaborative meaning extension is addressed here.

This second form of collaboration involves extension of the message or idea presented by a previous speaker. This communicative behavior is similar to full paraphrase, with the important difference that the second utterance builds on the first. The original message or idea is not reproduced in different words, but rather is taken to the next level. For example in (37), Lotte and David are discussing the fact that they are used to spend most their evenings in bars, which is a total opposite from their new normal of turning in early in the Big Brother house. The idea of a "lesser night" is introduced by Lotte in line 17 and further extended by David in lines 20 and 22 to refer to particular weeknights.

[10]Note that this particular turn and examples like it were not coded, because they are not reactive but proactive contributions. Codes were only assigned to sequence responsive actions: contributions produced in reaction to a prior utterance, presenting a complementary part to it. Initiating turns (or first pair parts) like the one referred to here are thus not included in the quantitative analysis (cf. chapter 4). That does of course not mean initiating efforts are not relevant to phatic communication. Ruben's turn does not exist in a vacuum; it builds on the stance taken by Hanna/Thomas. However, complementary parts are more easily recognized as phatic efforts and attempts to establish alignment, given that the initiating party presents a particular stance the other participant(s) have to deal with somehow.

(37) *Extension - "lesser night"* (BB-NL 11-3)

17	Lotte	*zelfs op een mindere avond,*
		even on a lesser night,
18		*dat je eigenlijk zoiets hebt om- twee uur al*
		that you actually feel like at- two o'clock already
19		*van na:H nee vanavond ga ik vroeg naar ↓huis,*
		like na:H no tonight I will go ↓home early
20	David	*ja, woensdag ofzo.*
		yes, wednesday or something.
21	Lotte	*pff (.) wordt het nog vijf ↑uur*
		pff (.) still it turns five ↑o'clock
22	David	*of maandag.*
		or monday.

A partial paraphrase of "even on a lesser night" would be something like "even on boring nights", a full paraphrase could be "indeed when it's a boring evening". David does something else, instead of reproducing her message; he explicates what would qualify as a "lesser night": Wednesday or Monday. The point is that his contribution is not so much an attempt to convey the same proposition - the general idea of "an evening that is not as popular when it comes to going out" - but rather specify the information provided in the earlier utterance.

Returning to the overall numbers of collaborations, roughly half of all occurrences was said to involve extension of the message past the original. This is visualized in figure 7.5, comparing the two forms of completion discussed above with extension. In both data collections, a slight majority of collaborative efforts sees a second participant taking the utterance presented by an earlier speaker and extending it past the original message (52.48% or 254/484 in Dutch; 55.68% or 103/185 in Indonesian). In other words, most collaborative efforts actually involve extension, not completion. This section will examine some of the ways in which such extensions are used in conversation.

The challenge posed in by both completions and extensions is that there is no clear form or construction associated with the phenomenon. There thus is no readily available aspect or element to look for. Again, the recognition and classification rests entirely on interpretation (of the analyst and participants alike). The discussion presented above thus does not first discuss form characteristics followed by an examination of the different functions fulfilled by those forms, as in chapters 5 and 6. Instead, form and function are conflated. The "form" is the recognizable similarity to some earlier utterance, the relation between base and extended meaning so to speak. The function is inevitably closely connected to this form: the relation between original and extension surely affects the interpretation of the contributions. Conversely, the interpretation of the contribution in the larger context makes it recognizable as a form of extension.




Figure 7.5: Extension. This is the same figure as 7.2, but instead of concentrating on completion, the focus is now on extensions. ***Left*** A little more than half of all collaborations qualify as an extension of an earlier message. Out of a total of 484 collaborations observed in the Dutch data, 254 involved the extension of the message past the original contribution; equaling 52.48% of all collaborative efforts. The other 47.52% was made up of completing someone else's thoughts (29.75% or 144/484) or finishing an incomplete turn (17.77% or 86/484). ***Right*** The Indonesian data present a similar picture when it comes to the extension-completion ratio: 55.68% or 103 cases out of a total 185 collaborations qualify as extensions. The other half of collaborative efforts involved an attempt to complete another participant's utterance (31.35% or 85/185) or offer the second half of an incomplete thought (17.97% or 24/185). Compared to the Dutch data, the relative number of turn and thought completions in Indonesian is almost reversed.

Recall that the key aspect differentiating completions from extension is the (un)finished status of the original message. With completions, the first speaker produces an incomplete turn constructional unit that is complemented by another speaker (utterance completions), or alludes to the production of a continuation but fails to do so before someone else offers the second part (thought completion). With extensions, on the other hand, the first speaker does finish their utterance (and hence thought). The turn is grammatically, prosodically, and pragmatically complete, opening up a transition relevant place (TRP) for another speaker to take turn. The new speaker uses this turn to establish a connection with the prior speaker: taking the message presented by that speaker one step further.

The new contribution does react to a prior one - as do most contributions in interaction of course - but it is not an attempt to co-construct that utterance. Yet, these contributions are included in the set of collaborative actions because they involve the (attempted) co-construction of a position or stance. Similar to paraphrases and repetitions, extensions can be used to indicate proximity or overlap between your position on a certain matter and that of a fellow interactant. The close relation between the two contributions demonstrates the second speaker is thinking along the same lines as their conversational partner. He or she is not just reiterating the prior message, but extending it past the original. This presupposes a strong common ground and a shared perspective regarding the topic of talk. Only when the second speaker concurs with the position presented by the other person, does it make sense to use it as the

starting point or foundation for their own contribution.

7.2.1 Specification

Typically, extension is done by explicating or specifying what was said, as in (37), or by introducing a new perspective or element that is related to the original idea but necessarily different at the same time. The latter would, for instance, occur when the follow-up contribution would change the perspective or offer another example of what was introduced by an earlier speaker. Take the example that was discussed about lesser nights of the week. Suppose that line 22, "Monday", was not presented by David, but instead was offered by Bram, as in (38). Bram's turn would be a case of extension in its own right: the propositions are not the same (Wednesday is not equal to Monday), but they are both candidates to qualify as "a lesser night".

(38) *Extension - "lesser night"* (BB-NL 11-3)

20	David	*ja, woensdag ofzo.*
		yes, wednesday or something.
21	Lotte	*pff (.) wordt het nog vijf ↑uur*
		pff (.) still it turns five ↑o'clock
22	Bram	*of maandag.*
		or monday.

These cases of extension show a strong conviction on the second speaker's part that he or she understands what the other was saying: they can relate and have their own example, interpretation, or experience to prove it. The exchange in (39) nicely illustrates how the more general comment made by Lena (line 27) is further specified by Dian (lines 28-32). Her clarification is not a paraphrase of Lena's turn, because she presents new (more specific) information about the topic. Dian does not reproduce the existing proposition; she provides further insight on it.

(39) *Extension - "make up"* (BB-IND 13-2-2)

27	Lena	*yang lucu lagi dia bilang katanya nggak pernah make up.*
		the weird thing is she said to never [wear] make up.
28	Dian	*<iya>*
		<yes>
29		°*tapi disini kok pakai eye liner, pakai-*° (.)
		°but here yet uses eye liner, uses-° (.)
30		°*terus dia itu kan kayak pakai bedak ya,*°
		°and she's the one like uses powder yes,
31	Maya	*((nods))*
32	Dian	°*ternyata pakai foundation-nya*°
		°obviously uses foundation°
33	Lena	*punya siapa?*
		belonging [to] whom?

Whereas Lena only mentioned "[Yuni] never wears make up", Dian presents a list of make-up items that she did see Yuni use. She uses the general comment to present her own (superior, because more insightful) perspective. She thus proves to have independent access to the same knowledge Lena used to make her statement. This allows her to "agree" with Lena without losing autonomy and without explicitly committing to such agreement. She recognizes Lena's position, because it is very similar to her own. They thus collaboratively paint a fuller picture of the situation at hand: Yuni not telling the truth about not wearing several items of make up.

7.2.2 List making

In a slightly different context, offering specific item that belong on a list is another way of meaning collaboration. This type of extension occurs when one person is making a list or sums things up, and the other jumps in to add an item of their own to the list. In this case, the collaborative effort does not necessarily display understanding through paraphrase or addition, but rather indicates involvement in terms of thinking alongside each other. This particular form of collaboration is - unsurprisingly - mostly observed when the participants are making grocery lists. A representative example is found in (40). The contestants have a limited amount of time before they need to hand in their week's shopping list. Lena summarizes what the others told her they did or did not want (lines 3-5). Bringing the things that do need to be purchased down to vegetables (*sayur*) and fruits (*buah*) when Adam adds another item: eggs (*telur*, line 6).

(40) *Extension - "eggs"* (BB-IND 3-3-2)

3	Lena	*kalian emang nggak mau daging,* you indeed don't want meat,
4		*kalian juga nggak mau ikan* you also don't want fish
5		*kalian kalo maunya sayur, buah,* you do want vegetables, fruit,
6	Adam	*dan telur* and eggs

Contrary to the conditions described above, this exchange does not meet the requirement of the first turn being completed before another party steps in. Yet this type of collaboration is included here, because Adam is not so much trying to insert an element or piece of information alluded to by the first speaker, but rather uses her utterance as a springboard to add information of his own. In other words, he does not attempt to put himself in Lena's position, finishing her utterance and constructing her stance *for* her, as was the case with completions. Instead, he presents additional information that advances the goal (the list) in his favor. Their combined effort does not primarily represent her stance toward the situation, but both their perspectives in equal measure.

A similar case was seen in thinking about the birthday party items. In example (1) in chapter 6, the first mention of "masks" led to a host of repetitions. This first instance of "mask" was offered as an addition to a list. Maya is the one in charge of the list. Thus far, she has put cakes, candles, and matches (line 19) on it, when Dian and Lena introduce masks as another item to be included.

(41) *Extension - "mask"* (BB-IND 4-2-4)

19	Maya	*=>k*[*ue, lilin, korek<,*
		=>c[ake, candles, matches<,
20	Dian	[°*kue*°
		[°cake°
21	Lena	*ter*[*us*
		the[n
22	Dian	[*tope:*[*ng*
		[ma:sk[s
23	Lena	[*topeng*
		[masks

Judging by Maya's intonation pattern, she is aware other items are to be added to the list. Whether it is her doing or others' is irrelevant, as long as new items are introduced. One could even argue such enumeration functions as an encouragement: her intonation signals to others the list is incomplete, inviting them to offer their insights.[11] Regardless of her turn intentionally encouraging the others to participate, they do suggest an additional item. Lena announces further expansion (*trus*, "furthermore", line 21), whilst Dian immediately makes a suggestion: "masks" (line 22). An idea supported by Lena, as evidenced by her repetition (line 23).

In both (40) and (41), the participants show or make use of their collective knowledge and insight. Just like cases that involved extension for specification purposes, the second speaker builds on information presented up until that point and stretches it into new territory to (better) represent his or her own perspective or idea. In doing so, the two separate positions are brought together. The second speaker thus establishes positive alignment by implicitly accepting the available information and corresponding position as adequate.

7.2.3 Shifting focus

Presenting an alternative focus suggests the second speaker moves away from the original message (and stance), creating divergence. There indeed are examples in which the speaker diverges from what was said before, establishing negative alignment, but those cases are not included here. A shift in focus that

[11] To decidedly claim her intonation pattern indeed invites others to make suggestions, a more elaborate and controlled set of examples is needed than is currently available. Intonation contours were not separately studied for this project. When relevant to the ongoing interaction the supposed meaning and interpretation of intonational information was (re)constructed based on the behavior displayed by fellow participants.

is relevant to positive alignment is similar to explicit alignment using "me too" like phrases (cf. section 5.4). By (re)appropriating a statement, opinion, or experience, another participant can emphasize the similarities between him or her and the initial speaker. Similar to "me too", this form establishes perfect alignment between the two interactants: they have the same experience or opinion, the same perspective and outlook, the same stance.

In example (42), Roos discloses she had her first long term boyfriend at age sixteen (line 61). The point of her sharing this information was to emphasize how her young age had influenced the (ultimately unsuccessful) relationship. Her rhetorical question (*wat wil je*, "what do you expect") presents her prior comment about her age as the obvious source of trouble. Lotte agrees with Roos (line 63) and proceeds to offer some insight on her own situation: she was nineteen when she had her first long-term relationship. She thus redirects the focus to herself, away from Roos' story, but in doing so communicates their interpersonal similarity. Roos accepts Lotte's contribution (*ja:h*, line 65), ending the exchange.

(42) *Substitution - "sixteen"* (BB-NL 9-10-8)

61	Roos	*ik was zestien* (.)
		I was sixteen (.)
62		*wat wil je*
		what do you want
63	Lotte	*ja*
		yes
64		*ik was negentien*
		I was nineteen
65	Roos	*ja:h*
		yea:h

Having had the same experience and sharing that information increases and emphasizes their common ground, making further elaboration on the topic much easier to the point that it becomes unnecessary. Even though Lotte seems to diverge from the original message, her contribution is in fact an attempt to consolidate that message. As such, it is a collaborative effort to establish mutual understanding of a particular piece of information.

Other examples of a changed focus show a more overt collaborative effort. This is the case when the alternative that is offered is an attempt to present a similar idea to what was said before, without there being overlap in meaning between the first and second expression. This is what happens in lines 19 and 21 in example (43), where Hugo adapts David's first suggestion for Ruben to "go sit on the couch" (line 17) to involve other activities.

(43) *Substitution - "go away"* (BB-NL 8-5)

17	David	*ga effe op de bank zitten joh,*
		just go sit on the couch huh,
18		*daar zit je wat beter*
		there you sit somewhat better
19	Hugo	*ga effe buiten spelen ga eh-*
		just go play outside go eh-
20	David	*ga ef [fe lekker buiten*
		just [go nice outside
21	Hugo	[*ga ff Bram vermoeien*
		[just go annoy Bram
22	David	*#ga ff buiten spelen man#*
		#just go play outside man#

Similar to example (34), it can be argued that all of these alternatives have a similar goal ("go away") and yet they are not paraphrases. Paraphrases necessarily express the same or at a least strongly similar propositions, which is not the case in these lines. Sitting on the couch, going outside, and annoying Bram are not the same activity, they are not even related, what they share is that they involve activities away from the current interaction. The overall goal of "getting Ruben to go away" is collaboratively solved by Hugo and David – or at least an attempt is made.

7.2.4 Achieving a goal

A slightly different use of extension is found in (44). The general aspects of extension apply here as well, the main speaker is done talking - his utterance is complete - by the time the other participant steps in (Rendra, line 38).

(44) *Substitution - "strong"* (BB-IND 12-5-5)

36	Wayan	*pokoknya jangan sampai udah miskin kalah.*
		in any case not because already poor [we will] lose.
37		*kita harus menang.*
		we must win.
38	Rendra	*kita mentalnya harus kuat*
		our mentality must be strong

Rendra's contribution is not a paraphrase, nor a completion. It does connect to what Wayan said earlier; Rendra provides a consequence (or prerequisite) that relates to Wayan's overall goal. In order for them to win, they must stay strong. Both Wayan and Rendra's contributions connect to a winner's mentality: they have to put their best effort in it to win it. With his turn, Rendra supports Wayan's statement and goal, and more importantly, offers a resolution how to achieve that goal. He does not explicitly agree with Wayan, but his suggestion can only be interpreted in line with the earlier aim. His call upon the others to stay strong does not make any sense if not in order to reach Wayan's goal to win the challenge, thus implying he does share Wayan's position. A further

indication that he does indeed positively align himself to Wayan is his recycling of the former's grammatical structure.

While these different usages of extension are observed in the corpus, they are too close together to fully separate them and give a more detailed analysis of their form and frequency. Specifications of an earlier turn often involve an example, but this is not exclusive to specifications. Redirecting the focus onto something or someone else or offering a solution or prerequisite to achieve a certain goal can be done by offering an example as well. Reusing a grammatical construction is likewise found across the board. The particular function or role a particular extension plays in interaction may not be unequivocally clear; it does not need to be. What all these contributions have in common is the effort to build on an earlier turn. They signal understanding of not only the utterance, but also of the relevant context, reasoning, and goals. The second speaker offers their support by showing they are able to take position *as if* they were the other speaker and proceed from there. These extensions are all unmistakable attempts to establish an interpersonal connection.

7.3 Conclusion

Two forms of collaborative behavior were analyzed in relation to interpersonal alignment: completion and extension. The crucial difference between these two forms of collaboration is the level at which it occurs. Completion involves collaboration at the utterance level related to a single message or turn initiated by another speaker. Two parties co-construct a single contribution. There is a functional use to the collaboration: a missing element is added or inserted. Usually this message or utterance is incomplete when the second speaker pitches in. The two participants thus collaboratively construct a single utterance or thought. In principal, the overall message represents the perspective of the first speaker, since the other participant is attempting to finish that person's utterance.

The second speaker thus tries to think as if in the main speaker's shoes. Still, the candidate completion offered by the second speaker to a certain extent reflects his or her personal position on the matter. The suggested insertion is based on their interpretation of the utterance and context after all; it is their projection of the most likely continuation. This could be a deliberate set-up by the first speaker: rhetorical questions, hesitations markers or pauses may lead another participant to take it upon themselves to step in and finish what was started. The assistance offered does not need to be encouraged though, the attempted co-construction may just as well be the sole initiative of the second speaker. Furthermore, the candidate completion may be offered simultaneous to the original speaker finishing his sentence, resulting in parallel speech.

Extensions, on the other hand, usually follow a completed utterance or idea; they build on or draw from the available information to create a fuller interpretation. As such, they are never invited or encouraged: there simply is

no necessity to finish anything by adding a missing word or clause, because the original contribution was already completed by the original speaker. It is always the second speaker who unilaterally decides to share their insight or understanding of what was just said. A possible exception to this rule is adding items to a list that is being constructed by the first participant. In that particular context, the initial turn is not yet finished when another participant decides to offer an additional item. Considering the second speaker is not attempting to present the other person's perspective, but rather serves their own purpose, this type of collaboration better fits the definition of extension than completion.

Being able to co-construct utterances and ideas presupposes a strong common ground. Completing or extending a contribution started by another participant shows confidence in understanding. Only when you think you know what someone is talking about does the possibility arise of stepping in and taking over - especially if you try to think like them. Co-construction is thus an effective way of an establishing interpersonal connection. The fact that both participants think alike, working with the same source material in terms of linguistic and situational context, affirms their common ground. Given the fact that no contribution is ever entirely neutral, the second speaker's collaboration attempt does provide (implicit) information about his or her personal stance, establishing interpersonal alignment between the two participants.

In both the Indonesian and Dutch collection, a slight majority of occurrences involved extension of the meaning past the original message (resp. 55.68% and 52.48%). An interesting opposition was observed, however, in the subset of completions. Roughly half of the completions were offered spontaneously, the other half were said to be encouraged - or at least interpreted as such by the participant presenting the completion. Encouragements include such elements as "ehm", "whatchamacallit", pauses, and hesitant pronunciation of the final word. Each of these might be interpreted as a cue for someone else to assist in completing the utterance. Comparing all occurrences including such an encouragement, it was observed that the Dutch clearly associated "ehm" with a need to get involved. Another relatively frequent utterance final element that led to collaboration was a pause, although this was mostly restricted to thought completions. This same association of pauses and collaborations is found in the Indonesian collection. However, the link between "ehm" and attempted completions was not nearly as strong as in Dutch. In fact, most collaborations that were in some way encouraged included a "whatchamacallit"-type element, usually *apa*, "what".

Furthermore, whereas most completions in Dutch can be described as collaborations of thoughts, that is attempts to produce the second part of an utterance (usually a subordinated clause), the majority of Indonesian candidate completions were turn completions, that is attempts to insert the missing (single) element to construct a coherent sentence. This missing element is needed to construct a grammatically and pragmatically complete utterance, thus the ability to do so presupposes the speaker is paying attention. Usually there is

only one option (or at least a very limited set of options) that effectively finishes the contribution. The insertion of this element thus does demonstrate involvement, but does not necessarily present much information about the interpersonal alignment. The completing party produces the final element "in name of" the main speaker, he or she is not accountable for the stance taken; they merely verbalize what they think the other person was heading towards.

Thought completions, on the other hand, do (re)present the collaborating participant's own stance. Given that there is less of a one-option solution to the problem of the incomplete utterance, the second speaker himself decides what continuation is most likely. This is to some extent suggested by the first part of the contribution, but is largely based on his interpretation of the overall context. That is, the immediate linguistic context, but also the existing or supposed common ground between the participants. The Dutch are gravitating towards this more assertive, more expressive role when it comes to establishing alignment. Completing another participant's thought shows high involvement in terms of the speaker being able to (or at least *believing* to be able to), think like the other person and hence being able to produce their stance. They do not await the first speaker to (almost) finish their utterance or indicate there is a problem; rather they offer their interpretation of what that speaker is going to say before that person actually gets to chance to do it. This demonstrates an effort to construct positive alignment between the speakers, because their common ground is called upon and explicated through the suggested completion.

A similar pattern was observed in the previous chapters, where the Dutch speakers were shown to feel a stronger need to negotiate their interpersonal alignment explicitly and were found to present more feedback, both in terms of backchannels and agreement (see chapter 5). Moreover, in those cases where a repetition of a prior turn was used, an agreement marker or modifier was often included to indicate the contribution was indeed meant to be connected to the earlier utterance and stance. This same focus on asserting individual position *and* establishing interpersonal alignment was observed in their greater use of full paraphrases. Conversely, the Indonesian speakers were more likely to reproduce some earlier turn, either partially or in full, and were less often observed to use a full paraphrase. The apparent need to continuously assert individual stance and (re)affirm joint positions was much smaller.

Overall, the analysis of these three types of phatic contributions seems to indicate a preference for overt and specific stance negotiation in Dutch. Affirming and reaffirming who takes what position at which point in time is a central aspect of their interaction. The Indonesian did not display such a preference. Instead, they were observed to use more repetition and partial paraphrases and seemed less concerned with overt and continuous negotiation of their interpersonal positioning. The absence of overt connections between contributions conveying the same (or a similar) message indicates a stronger reliance on inference and assumption; on their established (communal) common ground. Some consequences of these observations will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 8

Discussion and conclusion

People coordinate their needs, expectations, and obligations with language. They share their knowledge, feelings, experiences, and goals. Some aspects of interaction seem more relevant, more purposeful, than others do. Giving someone directions, teaching someone how to grow corn, explaining the inner workings of the human body all sound like language put to good use. Debating who (should have) won Eurovision, discussing last week's weather, or reminiscing about the time WiFi had not yet taken over our lives possibly less so. These latter three activities may not see language change the world; they do change people's interpersonal relationship. Sharing thoughts about seemingly useless or inane topic may lead to sharing positions on that topic. It may result in a common perspective on the world, and lead to a deeper understanding and appreciation of each other. Knowing how others think and act makes it easier to anticipate and respond to their actions. Using language to establish and maintain a bond, to reaffirm common ground and reinforce continuous joint commitment is indeed a central aspect interaction.

This thesis aimed to uncover how the (re)construction of interpersonal alignment plays a role in informal interaction. A comparison was made between Dutch and Indonesian conversation to establish to what extent the workings of phatic communication - the language use targeting social bonds - are cross-linguistically stable and to what extent they are language specific. As representatives of respectively "the West" and "the East", these languages (and their speakers) supposedly would be very different indeed. Public knowledge (i.e. folk belief) holds the Dutch to be a direct, open people focused on clarity, whereas the average Indonesian is friendly, indirect, and has a great concern for face and harmony. These two characterizations seem irreconcilable. Yet, only when

we *actually* know how they normally behave can we say something about the inner workings of their interactional preferences and the possible challenges to intercultural communication.

Given the contrastive nature of this study, there is no escaping at least some degree of a binary opposition in the presentation of the results. The discussion below is by no means intended to suggest that Dutch and Indonesian are polar opposites in terms of interactional language usage. However, the comparison of two objects of study (here speakers of two languages) inevitably leads to conclusions being framed in terms of one object *as compared to* the other. Here too, the analyses and ensuing generalizations are necessarily centered on one or the other language in order for the similarities and differences between the two to become visible. At any point where it is argued either Dutch or Indonesian is more inclined to show a particular language usage pattern, keep in mind that this is no absolute qualification of that language, but a relative one comparing the analysis to but one other set of data. Introducing a third or fourth language to the research might lead to a different sense of dichotomy, for example one where Dutch and Indonesian pair together in contrast to one of the others. Yet in the current study, Indonesian and Dutch are the only two languages under scrutiny and therefore they are the two "opposites" being compared.

Studying how people normally behave in interaction presupposes two things: (i) there are "normal" people available for observation, and (ii) it is possible to observe "normal" behavior in interaction (as opposed to "special" behavior). The (subconscious) default set of expectations and behaviors people rely on in interaction with others is what was understood to be their sense of normal. People do not normally *know* they are used to doing things a certain way in interaction; that they have what is referred to as a conversational style. Moreover, they do not normally need to think about it; everyone around them is like them and likely uses that same style. Only when someone behaves in a way that is at odds with the apparent (hidden) rules of conduct is it that they notice something is wrong. Still, chances are they *do* notice this other person to behave in a certain way, but still *do not* recognize that means they have a particular (and maybe peculiar) way of conducting themselves. Studying a group of strangers allows for the targeted examination of what (those) people apparently consider normal behavior; what basic norms they observe. The choices they make and the behaviors they display are reflective of what they believe is right; what they believe is the normal and normative way of conducting yourself in interpersonal interaction.

As explained in section 4.4.3, all social units have shared norms; dyads just as much as large communities are shown to orient towards shared rules of interaction. These norms are part of their common ground and will be reinforced repeatedly when all those present silently adopt them. The basic norms of interaction pertaining to the management of interpersonal relationships are the main topic of this research. This social aspect of interaction, the way in which the social relations are emphasized and organized is what is referred to as phatic communication. Traditionally phatic communication is associated

with mostly routine or ceremonial behavior at the literal margins of interaction: greetings and leave-taking. However, managing social relationships is not only found in the margins of conversation, it was shown to be at the heart of human interaction.

The main question addressed in this thesis was "How do speakers of Dutch and Indonesian manage their interpersonal alignment in informal interaction?". Crucially, the scope was limited to *positive* interpersonal alignment. Enfield (2013) is of course right in arguing both cooperative and competitive interaction are important to study if we want to arrive at a full understanding of relationship management. Both are equally real to human interaction; both are equally relevant. Yet, people were explained to aim for a smooth interactional exchange; to be focused on soliciting sympathy and mutual understanding; to (re)affirm joint commitment and involvement (section 1.1). It is this predisposition towards a constructive relationship, joint positions, and thus positive alignment, which is taken to be the neutral form of informal interaction. And as such, it is taken to be the relevant object of study when it comes to the management of interpersonal interaction.

The research question presented above thus specifically targeted positive alignment as one of the core activities of informal interaction. Furthermore, it is in the negotiation or establishment of positive alignment (that is the similarity between participants in their individual stance towards some object) that phatic contributions are expected to be found. To uncover how speakers of Dutch and Indonesian manage interpersonal alignment, three forms of phatic communication were studied: lending support by means of backchannels, agreement, and explicit expressions of alignment (chapter 5), reproduction of meaning and form (chapter 6), and collaborative construction of meaning (chapter 7).

8.1 Coordinating common ground

All interactants presumably share a human interaction engine (Levinson, 2006b): they have general knowledge (or instincts) about interpersonal interaction (cf. section 2.4); they are able to coordinate, anticipate, and infer meaning and, most importantly, will indeed attempt to do so. People essentially take a cooperative approach to interaction: they want to understand others and they want others to understand them. In order for others to recognize this effort, they have to make their basic set of assumptions about interaction available to others. This mutual coordination of expectations and knowledge is visible in patterns of their language use. People thus make a joint effort to update their common ground and reaffirm their joint commitment to the ongoing activity (Clark, 1996, 2006). Some of the ways in which they manage this mutual involvement is what was studied in this thesis.

Through an examination of three seemingly redundant types of communicative contributions, it was shown that speakers of Dutch and Indonesian

indeed use the same building blocks to organize interaction. They coordinate and attribute meaning (e.g. as visible in collaborative efforts and paraphrases) and they update each other on their independent and joint positions in relation to the matter at hand (e.g. by means of agreement, repeats, or explicit expressions of alignment). That they use the same interactional resources to establish mutual understanding suggests there indeed is a universal human interaction engine. The observed differences in their actual use of these resources, suggests there are language (or culture) specific preferences to operationalize these skills. The two sets of data reflected a somewhat stronger emphasis on negotiating in Dutch interpersonal alignment efforts, both in terms of frequency of occurrence and in terms of lexical choices that were made.

The three main types of phatic contributions that were analyzed in this thesis are briefly reviewed below. The first suspect to establish interpersonal alignment and communicate involvement is to affirm someone else's position or understanding by means of agreement or expressions that explicitly convey similarity between two participants. These efforts to lend support for another person's stance were discussed in chapter 5 and form the single biggest type of phatic contributions found in both sets of data. Secondly, the use of repetition and paraphrase is indeed not necessary in terms of advancing shared knowledge: the information was already presented by some first speaker, and is subsequently reproduced by some other participant. Again, the value may not be in the presentation of propositional content, but rather in the connection that it establishes between the two participants and the object of talk. Thirdly, collaborative efforts to construct meaning display the ability to anticipate the completion of an ongoing utterance and to build on what came before. What was started by one participant is completed or extended by another, thus emphasizing their like-mindedness. These reaction types might seem redundant in terms of informational value; they are vital components in organizing social relationships. Their first and foremost aim is to communicate interpersonal stance, not to share (new) information.

The overall distribution of these types within the larger collection of phatic contributions follows the same pattern in the Dutch and Indonesian data: the majority of the contributions are a marker of support, followed by reproductions of meaning or form, and finally collaborative efforts of meaning making. This does not mean, however, that the relative frequency is similarly distributed. Whereas expressions of support accounted for 68 percent of Dutch phatic contributions, the share of such contributions was 49 percent in the Indonesian data. This difference of 19 percent point is explained by the relative frequency of occurrence of reproductions: whereas the Dutch data show 16 percent to involve a repetition or paraphrase of an earlier utterance, this class represents 36 percent of the Indonesian phatic contributions; 20 percent point higher. Finally, collaboration is found in roughly 15 percent of phatic contributions across both data sets. The results from contextual analysis of these three main types of phatic contributions are outlined below.

Lending support

Most phatic contributions were observed to extend support for some first speaker's interactional move (68 percent in Dutch, 49 percent in Indonesian). These reactions at the very least signal to the first speaker that their message is acknowledged, but can be as forceful as explicitly establishing interpersonal alignment by means of overt reference to their mutual and joint position. To separate the different forms and functions of support, three subtypes were distinguished: (i) backchannels, (ii) agreement, and (iii) expressions of alignment (cf. chapter 5).

In both data collections, a similar distribution was observed in the subset of supportive contributions. Roughly 70 percent of supportive moves was classified as a backchannel, the other 30 percent dedicated to agreements and expressions of alignment. Recall, though, that the relative frequency of support in general was much higher in Dutch than in Indonesian, a difference of 19 percent. Indeed, the relative share of backchannels in the overall collection of phatic contributions shows this particular form of support indeed to account for much of that difference (48 percent of all Dutch efforts was a form of backchanneling, compared to 33 percent of Indonesian phatic contributions; a difference of 15 percent point). The high frequency of backchanneling (especially in Dutch) points towards a preference to show involvement with the interaction and others by means of verbal signaling. Although a backchannel does not necessarily communicate acceptance, it does show active listenership and thus commitment to the joint activity.

In their use of agreements, the speakers of Dutch and Indonesian were mostly observed to orient towards different formulation types. Although the relative frequency of occurrence is similar, the Indonesian speakers were shown to have stronger preference for a minimal form of agreement (78 percent): a single affirmative marker or particle ("yes", "indeed"), or a combination of particles ("yes indeed"). While the majority of agreements took this form in Dutch as well (62 percent), a considerable portion of agreements was more extensive in nature. These phrasal agreements arguably take a stronger stand, reinforcing the statement made by the first speaker. They are more assertive in terms of wanting to convey your own stance on the matter. Most of these cases referred to something being objectively the case ("that is true"), emphasizing the confidence of the speaker over the stated information being correct.

A further observation of interest was the use of requests for confirmation: exchanges that attempted to confirm information that was shared just prior to the exchange. The Indonesian speakers were observed to use both interjection and repetition answer in response to such requests ("Done? Done."), whereas the Dutch had a clear preference for interjection answers - a pattern observed in other questions as well. An especially interesting type of request for confirmation found in Dutch was the minimal confirmation exchange that involves nothing other than affirmation markers ("Yes? Yes."). This type was scarcely found in the Indonesian data (two times to be exact).

A more forceful means to establish alignment is to explicitly communicate similarity between two stances. This was done in roughly two ways: (i) by stating that you, similar to the other participant, experienced, thought, or desired something or (ii) by stating that you had said or thought the same thing as the current participant at an earlier point in time. The preference for one or the other type was observed to be almost opposite, although it must be noted that the Indonesian numbers are too low to draw definitive conclusions. The Dutch clearly oriented towards the first form. A bare form explicating their interpersonal relationships was found to be most popular ("same here", 45 percent). Overall, the great majority of cases (81 percent) involved reference to the earlier utterance and the position held by the current speaker. In the (limited) Indonesian data, this preference was not as strong (58 percent). The choice for the second option - changing the perspective to an earlier moment when you did or said something - was more frequently observed (42 percent) compared to the Dutch data (19 percent).

Overall the language use patterns related to lending support suggested that the Dutch both felt more need to verbalize their involvement (per the overwhelming use of backchannels), as well as make more of an effort to connect individual stances. Both in their use of agreements and expressions of alignment, they were more often observed to use a form that explicitly connected the two speakers and tied them to a joint position. The Indonesian speakers seemed less predisposed with explicitly connecting stances. In fact, the tentative observation that they preferred expressions of alignment that involved a change of perspective rather than an explicit verbalized connection between two speakers was an example of alignment through inference being the preferred orientation. Similarly, the use of repetition in response to questions and the strong preference for minimal agreements suggests the individual and interpersonal positioning not to take as much as a central place in their verbal contributions.

Reproduction of meaning and form

The second main type of phatic contribution that was examined involved reproduction of meaning and possibly form. These contributions are the clearest example of phatic communication: they are not at all contributing to the existing (factual) knowledge. After all, the information as carried by the expression was already made available by the previous speaker. Yet, another participant feels the need to repeat that same utterance or present the same idea in (partially) different words. These reproductions are indeed redundant when it comes to their informational or referential value; however, they are an important means of establishing interpersonal relations. Making the same statement or observation allows the second speaker to take that position as well, either following the first speaker or on their own accord. The similarity between participants in terms of their joint position is thus emphasized. Two different subtypes were distinguished: (i) repetition; reproductions of meaning *and form*, and (ii)

paraphrase; reproductions of meaning but *not form*.

As explained earlier, the number of reproductions was much higher in the Indonesian collection of phatic contributions compared to the Dutch collection. The relative share of this subtype reached 36 percent in Indonesian, which is 20 percent point higher than the share of reproductions in Dutch (16 percent). Among these reproductions, a further difference was observed in the relative frequency of use of repetitions and paraphrases. Whereas the majority of reproductions took the form of repetition in both data sets, the number was somewhat lower in Dutch (60 percent) than in Indonesian (79 percent). This difference corresponds to the relative number of repetitions in the overall corpus (10 percent of all Dutch phatic contributions, 28 percent of all Indonesian phatic contributions). Moreover, this is the one class where the Indonesian cases outnumber the Dutch in both relative and absolute number (366 against 324 cases). This high relative frequency of repetitions means the share of paraphrases is much smaller in Indonesian (21 percent) compared to Dutch (40 percent). A more detailed discussion of each of these types is found in chapter 6. The overall results are discussed below.

Reproductions were not only much more frequent in Indonesian; they tended to be closer to the original as well. The majority of reproductions involved full or partial repetition of the original utterance (a combined 70 percent, resp. 43 and 27). It was argued that although repeats are thought to exert greater epistemic access and rights, this is not in fact always easily determined. Especially bare repetitions - as full and partial repeats without further markings were called - allow a great number of interpretations. It might be that the second speaker is showing listenership, it might be a way of savoring an expression. However, it might also be that the second speaker indeed claims individual access to the knowledge conveyed by the utterance. Or maybe the repetition was a way of confirming or even reinforcing the original statement.

The resulting functional ambiguity may seem problematic, but is likely not experienced as such by the interactants for the simple fact that these repetitions do not result in communicative breakdown, initiations of repair or requests for clarification. Furthermore, their prevalence in interaction itself suggests this form plays a central aspect in the organization of interaction. Figuring out what these different types of repetition do exactly might seem an obvious direction of follow-up research. However, maybe this is not the right question to address. Maybe it is not about what these contributions do *exactly*, maybe it is indeed about what their *approximate* place in interaction is.

These bare repetitions represent the majority of repeats in Dutch as well (53 percent), but a class of repetitions that involved stance negotiation was a good second (35 percent, compared to 17 percent in Indonesian). These modified repeats involve the addition of an affirmative marker or an upgrade or downgrade of the original. These added elements allow the second speaker to really "make the utterance their own". These efforts create a stronger link between the second speaker and the utterance and position they present, and, as a result, create a stronger visible link between the first and second speaker's

positions. These little elements thus overtly negotiate their stance and alignment.

The use of paraphrases was explained to be somewhat more assertive than repetition (recall that the relative share of paraphrases within Dutch the collection of reproduction was twice the size of Indonesian paraphrases (resp. 40 and 20 percent). It allows the second speaker to display their understanding of the topic - they are able to rephrase the message after all - as well as present something as if it they are the first to make that point and take that position. Whereas repeats (especially partial repeats) are dependent on the original utterance for their interpretation, paraphrases can mostly stand on their own. In paraphrases, the full message that was presented by the original utterance is taken by the second speaker and reproduced using (partially) different words. The majority of paraphrases was found to be a partial paraphrase: some part of the original utterance was copied; some other part was replaced. These partial paraphrases thus clearly connect the two utterances and speakers, (implicitly) establishing positive alignment between them. Given that there is visible overlap between the two utterances, normally, the second speaker is recognized to be the second person to make that observation or perform that act.

Completely rephrasing the original message, on the other hand, clearly claims independent understanding and positioning. Whereas partial paraphrases are still recognizably connected to an earlier utterance, full paraphrases show no overlap in form. The reproduction is almost a "second original": if the first utterance had not been produced, this could have easily been the first time this statement was made. Such full paraphrases are relatively more often used by the Dutch speakers (38 percent, against 18 percent in Indonesian). The similarity between the two utterances, and hence associated stances, is entirely inferred based on their meaning. Should the second speaker want to communicate the contribution to be connected to an earlier utterance, they would need to include an additional marker to express such a connection.

The analysis of spontaneous reproduction of an earlier message has shown that the use of repetition in Indonesian is not only frequent, it is also mostly minimally divergent from the original. The preferred form of reproduction was found to be a full or partial repeat without any changes. Similarly, in paraphrases the adoption of some part of the original utterance was more preferred than a full paraphrase. Although the function of full repetitions may not always be clear, their presence itself shows involvement with the interaction and fellow participants. The Dutch speakers were shown to mostly use such bare repetitions as well, but were also observed to include an overt marker of stance negotiation twice as frequently as the Indonesian speakers. The want or need to overtly connect their stances and assert relative positions was observed in their use of repetitions and paraphrases as well. This is in line with the patterns found in the analysis of support contributions. A more overt marking of involvement and interpersonal relationship by means of actively negotiating stance and asserting individual positions seems the preferred way of managing informal interaction for the Dutch, but not Indonesian, participants.

Collaborative construction of meaning

The final subtype of phatic contributions that was addressed involved collaborative construction of meaning. In both data sets, this type accounted for roughly 15 percent of the phatic contributions. Instead of an actual reaction, producing a second position to another speaker's first position, collaborative construction refers to the efforts people make to jointly present a single message or further the understanding of a particular message by means of extending past it. Each of the cases included in this class sees one participant presenting an utterance (finished or not) that is subsequently used as a foundation for some other participant to build on. The ability to anticipate what is coming, where someone is going with an idea, shows great anticipation skills and involvement. Two types of collaborative efforts were distinguished: (i) completion, and (ii) extension (cf. chapter 7).

Both completions and extensions represent an effective means to establish an interpersonal connection. They highlight the second speaker's ability to think ahead, to think *like* the other participant. Only when they hold strong enough a belief of mutual understanding and anticipation will the second speaker likely attempt to co-construct or extend an existing message. The Indonesian and Dutch data sets show a similar distribution of completions and extension: a little over half of the collaborative efforts demonstrate extensions, the other half are an example of a collaborative completion. These extensions involve a second speaker building on the utterance presented by a prior speaker, extending its meaning pas the original. Although it is difficult to assign functions (let alone forms) to these efforts systematically, what all of them share is that they signal understanding of the earlier utterance in context: they are able to add to the utterance (and thus context) in a meaningful way.

The other type of collaborative construction of meaning is more easily described in terms of form and function. A distinction was made between attempted completions of single utterances and attempted completions of thoughts. Collaborative constructions of utterances were more frequent in Indonesian (70 percent) compared to collaborative constructions of thoughts (30 percent); in Dutch it was the other way around (37 percent utterance completions, 63 percent thought completions). The main difference between these two is the necessity of completing something, that is, whether or not the original utterance had already been completed or not. Co-construction of utterances involves attempts to finish an incomplete utterance, by suggesting or inserting the final element. Co-construction of thoughts, on the other hand, involves attempts to present the second part to a complex sentence. These co-constructions of thought thus require more of an anticipation effort and reliance on shared common ground, since there is less linguistic material available to limit the number of likely completions.

In co-constructions of a single utterance, still mostly the original speaker is responsible for the overall message and associated stance; the second speaker only inserted a required grammatical element. In co-constructions of thought,

however, both participants carry this responsibility. Considering the second participant presents *their* anticipated outcome of the reasoning started by the other person, the suggested completion reflects *their* stance as much as the projected stance of the first speaker. The second speaker thus not only presents their own personal interpretation of the situation, but their interpretation of the interpretation likely to be produced by the other participant. An attempt to co-construct thoughts thus suggests a strong (presumed) common ground. The speakers are thought to be alike, at least the co-constructing party believes to be able to think for the other person.

The overall findings from the analysis of collaborative construction of meaning showed the Indonesian speakers to be more focused on presenting completions to (problematic) unfinished utterances, whereas the Dutch took more liberty in their completions, mostly presenting other's thoughts in their place. The ability to successfully complete someone else' utterance or thought shows strong involvement and similarity between the participants. These efforts of completion and extension do not so much overtly negotiate stance and alignment; rather, independent access to a position alluded to by another speaker allows participants to build on (incomplete) utterances. The candidate completion or extension presented by a second speaker reflects their interpretation and the assumed joint position associated with that interpretation. The original speaker is the only one who knows whether they were in fact correct in their assumption, but mostly does not overtly ratify or correct the effort.

8.2 Norms of interpersonal alignment

The analysis outlined above witnessed some recurring themes: showing involvement, explicitly negotiating stance, asserting individual access to knowledge, and the coordination and collaboration of meaning making. The ways in which these themes related to different forms of phatic contributions, and the orientation towards these themes was shown to be different across the Dutch and Indonesian data. Even if the overall relative distribution was at times almost identical. This indeed suggests a language specific way of addressing the management of interpersonal alignment. Assuming these people to be a representative body of speakers and their behavior as new acquaintances to be sufficiently normal, the recurrent patterns observed in this thesis are argued to present the baseline norm of interaction these people turn towards in the absence of norms that are more specific or shared (confirmed) knowledge.

Generally speaking, the Dutch participants were observed to use more backchannels and more often include a reference to their individual position and their interpersonal alignment. They were overall more concerned with the continuous management of their mutual and shared position. This is evidenced by their use of minimal requests for confirmation, the abundant use of backchannels, the addition of affirmative markers to repetitions, and their more explicit expressions of agreement and alignment. The negotiation as to who is stance

follow and who is stance lead at a certain point in interaction seems a core activity in informal interaction. The upkeep of common ground is actively tended to in the exchange of who knows what and what that means for their interpersonal relationship. The emphasis on sharing independent but similar experiences further substantiates the overall image of the Dutch speakers as precise and devoted managers of interpersonal stance and alignment.

The Dutch speakers, thus, can be argued to orient towards a conversational style that foregrounds personal and interpersonal positioning; an extrovert style of communication. Their normal includes showing active involvement and making clear what they think or know about some topic of talk and how that affects their interpersonal relation. Their management of interpersonal relationships is preferably done out in the open. This is what is sometimes described as a low-context way of communicating: everything relevant to the ongoing communication situation is overtly communicated (cf. section 2.6). The importance of fully verbalizing an intended message is for example reflected in the explicit reference to earlier utterances (by means of affirmative markers, deictic elements, and conjunctions): a full repetition may be functionally ambiguous, an ambiguity that is relieved by adding an element to communicate the relation to the earlier utterance. Similarly, simply presenting an affirmative marker ("yes") is less clear than explicitly stating what that reaction is meant to convey in a full expression of agreement ("I agree"). Note that this all (exclusively) applies to spontaneous reactions: contributions that did not need to be presented in terms of being the projected pair in order to complete a presented act. These are all phatic contributions because they primarily target the interpersonal relationship.

Overall, the Indonesian speakers seemed less predisposed towards overtly and continuously (re)affirming their interpersonal stance and alignment. Their greater preference for bare repetitions, minimal agreements, and partial paraphrases indicates that the relationship between participants is not necessarily negotiated through explicit positioning and alignment. The frequent use of contributions that are less overtly concerned with connecting one to the other utterance suggests the message is not in need of overt communication. Arguably, the use of minimal agreements and repetition *is* in fact a way of showing high involvement and joint commitment to the interaction and thus reinforces the positive interpersonal relationship. The "absence" of explicit markers is not indicative of a lesser interest in each other or the interaction; it is simply not the normal way to construct such relations. Instead, the established common ground seems to take a more central position in their management of interpersonal relationships. This would be consistent with a high-context way of communication: everything that is available to everyone is not in need of explication (cf. 2.6).

The Indonesian speakers might be described as being inclined to use a more introspective conversational style. They are less concerned with actively and overtly negotiating who takes what position towards which object at what time. This does not mean they are not committed or outspoken; the characterization

of having an introspective style is meant to reflect a more inward orientation when it comes to managing interpersonal relationships. The shared common ground provides the necessary information about personal stances and relationships; unless something changes it is not expected people openly manage their standing relationship through spontaneous reinforcements. Mutual attention to some act or object can be established by a simple repetition, for example, thus showing that both speakers turn their attention to something at the same time. What that simultaneity means for their interpersonal relationship or stance order remains implicit. It might be that nonverbal communication plays a greater role in this style, including facial expression, pointing, and gaze (cf. Goodwin, 1981). Unfortunately, the unavailability of much of the nonverbal behavior did not allow systematic analysis. Further study would have to confirm to what extent non-verbal behavior indeed plays a (key) role in managing interpersonal alignment.

Knowing that speakers of Dutch and Indonesian orient towards different forms of phatic communication - and presumably have a different understanding of what is meant by their use - follow-up research can target individual aspects of their interpersonal alignment in intercultural interaction. For example, one aspect of particular interest to intercultural interaction would be the use of explicit agreements and expressions of alignment. The analysis in chapter 5 suggests speakers of Dutch and Indonesian to orient towards almost opposite ends of the scale: personalized and highly specific forms of agreement and alignment are very common in Dutch, simpler agreements and alignment expressions focusing on the utterance instead of the position associated with it was more often found in Indonesian. It would be interesting to see how these differences affect intercultural interaction. Such research should preferably include a greater pool of representatives of either language as well as full access to all behavioral acts, both audible and visual, to allow the study of both nonverbal communication and verbalized efforts of alignment.

8.3 Cultural influences

A potential explanation for some of the observed differences might be found in cultural psychology. How people conceptualize self and other presumably influences their ideas and expectations about interpersonal alignment (cf. section 2.6). Stancetaking and alignment as discussed in this thesis - and most of the literature - reflects a particularly independent sense of self: (i) each participant separately takes stance toward some object, (ii) these individual stances are mutually recognized, (iii) resulting in interpersonal alignment. This very simple sketch of what was introduced as the stance triangle in section 3.2, does not do justice to the existing body of research on stance, but it hopefully shows how the concept might be somewhat problematic if the conceptualization of self and other is indeed not an independent one. Particularly the aspect of alignment presupposes (in terms of the stance triangle) that indeed two positions

are available: subject 1 and subject 2. But what if the position taken by subject 1 automatically *is* the position taken by subject 2? Not because they agreed on that position or the both of them expressed their independent (but similar) positions, but because their sense of self is primarily relational?

Overtly marking or negotiating stance and alignment fits the idea of an autonomous self, focusing on the differences and similarities between independent entities. Each of those independent selves has to communicate what they as individuals think, what their stance on something is. If someone else has taken a first stance, it follows that other participants would want to do the same. They have to keep up; they have to update their shared common ground. Similarity between stances is thus overtly coordinated: all separate stances are available and their mutual relationship is clear. Who is stance lead, who is stance follow, and who might challenge one or the other position is all expressed in linguistic forms. In light of an autonomous construction of self, this makes sense. It is important to reinforce individuality and one way of doing so in informal interaction is to negotiate positions with others. The individual positions thus indeed lead to interpersonal alignment and an interpersonal relationship.

Such overt marking of the individual stance and resulting interpersonal alignment is, supposedly, of lesser importance or immediate relevance when your sense of self is relational to begin with. When your idea of self includes your relation to others - and thus their relevant perspectives - it is indeed very much important to *know* who knows or thinks what, but not necessary to *explicate* each individual's position. Considering all participants will apply the same logic, the need to communicate some person's stance or two people's similarity in stance overtly is almost absent. Everyone keeps close track of the people they consider relevant others, people that are part of the in-group, and is thus very much aware of their position on some act or object. Their interpersonal relation is an aspect of their construction of self (cf. Markus and Kitayama, 1991). It could even be argued, that overtly marking an independent stance or attempting to explicate interpersonal alignment would be counter-productive. In an attempt to communicate similarity or sharedness, the participant in fact demonstrates not being part of the in-group. If he or she feels the need to overtly construct a mutual relationship, then clearly he or she does not belong to the in-group. After all, all those relevantly included are part of the constructed self and other, making explicit alignment superfluous.

As far as I could find it has never been shown that Dutch speakers have an independent sense of self and Indonesian speakers have an interdependent sense of self. However, the overall results presented in this thesis would be remarkably well explained by such a conception. Take for example the collaborative efforts to complete a single contribution. Two general types of completions were distinguished: utterance completion and thought completion. The relative number of these two types was almost opposite in the Dutch and Indonesian data. Whereas 70 percent of Dutch completions involved an attempt to finish someone else's thought, 70 percent of Indonesian completions were an effort to finish another participant's utterance.

This does nicely fit the assumption that independent selves are more concerned with self-enhancement and self-affirmation, with the Dutch mostly asserting their own interpretation of what they believe the first speaker was probably going for with their contribution. Producing the second part to a thought presumes a strong common ground, but arguably a strong ego as well. The fact that the second speaker believes they know how the thought will develop, and feels the need to share that knowledge with others, does point towards a strong concern for self-enhancement and affirmation. Conversely, the 70 percent of Indonesian utterance completion could reflect a stronger focus on the other's needs: the completion is not so much presented for betterment of the second speaker (the one offering the completion), but to meet the goals or needs of the original speaker (the one who started the utterance). This is associated with an interdependent sense of self. Reaching your own goals, desires, or needs is in part realized by helping others reach theirs (Markus and Kitayama, 1991:229).

The conceptualizations of self and other, and consequently of agentivity and alignment, offer an interesting possible explanation of the differences in conversational style observed in the Indonesian and Dutch data. More research is needed, however, before we can definitively connect this conceptualization to the patterns observed in the data. For one, it is unclear if and to what extent these groups fit the characterization of individualist/collectivist or independent/interdependent self. Secondly, once it has been established how these groups are positioned on the independent-interdependent scale, the way this position affects their interactional and linguistic behavior needs to be investigated. The topics addressed in this thesis would presumably be good candidates to adopt as target interactional practices in a follow-up study to address the construction of self and other. Especially explicit alignment and collaboration would be interesting practices to include, since they are recognizably concerned with the self-other relationship. A more experimental study would allow for manipulation of the interactional situation to elicit or encourage certain behaviors. That, in turn, would allow for an analysis of all potential and realized instances in order to compare participants' behaviors across the two languages and across contexts.

It was argued at several points in this thesis that an expression emphasizing the speaker's independent position or access to knowledge was a more agentive or assertive move (e.g. section 5.3.1, 5.2.4). This use of of the term agentivity reflects a bias towards it being associated with asserting individuality. A broader definition of agentivity as being able to act purposefully and reflectively (cf. section 2.6; Markus and Kitayama, 2003:17-18) might in fact be more appropriate. While it seems intuitively appealing to explain some of the observed differences in the data from an essential predisposition toward individuality - both in the Dutch speakers and in the scientific literature - it is for now mostly a starting hypothesis. Future research would need to address the question of what constitutes agentivity as purposeful action in interaction (specifically related to the difference between conjoint and disjoint agentivity, cf. section 2.6).

8.4 Methodological considerations

The analysis presented in this thesis aimed to find general patterns of language use, of managing interpersonal alignment more specifically, in Dutch and Indonesian informal interaction. To that end, natural informal conversations were transcribed, coded, and analyzed. The source material, however, does represent a somewhat unnatural situation: a group of strangers living in a house completely isolated from the outside world. Big Brother. The choice to use a reality tv show was not taken lightly. Chapter 4 discussed the advantages and challenges and argued that although there certainly are challenges to the data (e.g. not being able to see all participants, having to deal with cut-offs due to broadcast related decisions), ultimately, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

The material

The biggest advantage of the material is the fact that people who have not yet established a relationship. The moment they started the competition, they were strangers to each other. They thus had to rely on their basic set of assumptions and expectations about how to interact with others. Their behavior is as close to the default way of interaction as it gets. Considering the aim of this study was to uncover patterns of interaction that reflect how people normally (and normatively) manage their informal conversation, this "neutral" setting in terms of participant relations was the perfect research environment. Indeed, the producers described the show as an effort to show the audience how fascinating everyday, mundane life actually is.

There undeniably is a chance that the group of people that was studied is not entirely representative of the larger body of people thought to share a similar cultural background. Not because they were on a television show, but simply because they are just one small group of people taken to be reflective of an entire language community. Their "normal" may be deviant from others; their preferred conversational style may be different from the mainstream language user (whoever that may be). Ultimately, the generalizations made in this thesis are limited to the community of language users as portrayed in these seasons of TV-show Big Brother. Wherever I have used "the Dutch" or "the Indonesians", the terms actually refer to *these* speakers of Dutch or Indonesian.

The patterns presented in this thesis may not have been confirmed for a larger pool of speakers yet, they are a valuable starting point for further analysis. The observation that at least *these* Dutch people prefer to negotiate their mutual stance openly and explicitly and *these* Indonesian speakers were found to be less preoccupied with stance negotiation is a first indication there actually might be some truth in a supposed divide. Not because people from these linguistic backgrounds are all that different, but because the (culture) specific operationalization of their preferred way of interacting is not identical. Their (hidden) cultural norms inform their conversational style and thus affect their ideas about expectations and obligations held by participants in interaction.

The method

A further methodological point to address is the combination of coding and contextual analysis. To be able to find patterns of use, a substantial number of occurrences is needed. This larger collection of data allows the analyst to confirm that some practice is not only found locally, but in fact is a recurring element in interaction. The upside of having lots of data and examples is met by the downside of having to bring order to the data to handle all information accurately. That is where coding (or annotating) the corpus becomes a valuable step of analysis (cf. section 4.4.2).

Because the focus was on interpersonal alignment, only reactions were included in the corpus; a first turn or utterance presents a first stance, meaning it is only when a reaction is produced (and thus a second stance) that there is *inter*personal alignment to be studied. All reactions were assigned a code (cf. Appendix A.5) that included information on the main type of contributions, whether it was a reaction to self or other, whether the contribution was spontaneous or encouraged, and whether it carried its own propositional content or not. The combination of these factors allows for cross-referencing between them, as well as for exclusion of particular occurrences. For the purpose of this thesis, only those contributions were subsequently included in the qualitative analysis that (i) presented a reaction to some other speaker and (ii) did not stall or redirect the conversation (meaning questions, repairs, and topic changes were excluded).

The coding represents a subjective, contextual process, meaning the analyst was the only one assigning codes based on reviewing the behavior in context. The absence of other coders means there was no inter-rater-reliability to be calculated to establish the objective (or at least intersubjective) value of the codes. However, as argued in section 4.4.2, even if more coders are involved their inter-rater score seems to rest largely on the ability of the other coders to think and code *as* the main researcher. Having multiple coders work on the same data is undeniably useful to allow discussion about problematic cases; several people see more than one, making the group effort a superior research approach. Within the scope of this research it was simply not possible to have others code the data. The resulting coded corpus might indeed reflect subjective handling of the data; this is actually not disadvantageous to the analysis. Potential biases for or against a certain interpretation are consistently applied to all data, thus resulting in a balanced annotation. A single coder approach is thus deemed a useful step of analysis to adopt in research of informal interaction.

The combination of a corpus study and a contextual analysis allowed for both quantitative insights, in terms of absolute and relative number of occurrences, and qualitative descriptions of (sub)types of the phenomena of study. The fact that only *actual* occurrences of a particular phenomenon were studied, and not *potential* occurrences of that phenomenon means all numbers and analyses relate only to the observed cases in point. Without access to the full set of occurrences (both realized and potential cases), it does not make much

sense to speculate about how often something could have but did not occur. Due to this lack of control over the material and resulting data, it was decided not to apply complex statistical methods. The observed differences in the actual pool of data are often clear enough not to need a p-value for confirmation, but, more importantly, the usefulness of the inclusion of statistical calculations - other than percentages - in these analyses is questionable for the simple reason that it would often be unclear what is calculated and why. A proper statistical analysis would need more transparent and controlled data.

8.5 Conclusion

What this thesis ultimately has shown is that taking a macro-perspective of interaction unveils patterns of language use that will further our understanding of cross-cultural similarities and differences. Notwithstanding the relevance and importance of micro-analyses of the observed phenomena, the combined results indicate what conversational style is generally adopted and preferred by speakers of Dutch or Indonesian in informal interaction. Each of the phenomena addressed in the analyses in chapters 5-7 offered insights in how participants operationalized a particular phenomenon in their interaction. It is the collection of observations taken together, however, that brings the results to life.

While it is in itself an interesting finding that the Indonesian speakers used more repetitions in spontaneous reactions, in light of the other findings that they use (much) less expressions of support, are more likely to attempt completion of someone else's utterance than thought, and are not big fans of explicit expressions of alignment such as "me too", their use of repetitions seems to suggest more than just a preference for reusing linguistic material. The combined results in fact suggest speakers of Indonesian to be less concerned with individual stancetaking and interpersonal alignment. In their language use, at least. The fact that, based on their verbal expressions, they seem less preoccupied with their own personal position in relation to others and the object of talk, does not necessarily mean they actually *are* less interested in it. It means that their mutual relationship is not negotiated or maintained primarily by making explicit reference to it.

Similarly, in Dutch it is the cumulative evidence that suggests these speakers prefer an explicit negotiation of stance as a central activity in their interactions. It is the abundance of backchannels and spontaneous agreements, the use of paraphrases and explicit expressions of alignment, the greater likelihood of attempting to finish another speaker's thought that collectively point towards a greater concern for overt alignment. This is further suggested by the frequent addition of elements explicitly connecting two utterances and stance. Both (verbally) communicating the individual position and establishing the joint position seems a central concern in informal interaction.

The advantage of having performed this study is that a sort of "interactional baseline" is established for these speakers. Considering these people had had

no prior contact and thus had no shared personal common ground to work with, they had to rely on their communal common ground: the cultural or community wide collection of shared knowledge, including norms of interaction. Their preferences in interaction, as revealed in the observed patterns of behavior discussed above, are thus reflective of the basic interactional norms people use to interact with strangers. As such, they presumably represent the default way of conducting yourself in interaction; in these communities that is.

While this thesis has discussed communicative behavior amongst these separate groups, it would be interesting to see how they adapt their conversational preference to each other in an intercultural communication situation. The different patterns observed in in-group interaction might be a challenge to intergroup interaction. In intercultural interaction, people will presumably adapt their behavior to the other in an effort to optimize mutual understanding. One way of ensuring mutual understanding is to update and coordinate common ground, something the Dutch were shown to do often and explicitly, but which did not seem to be as big of a concern in the Indonesian interaction. This could potentially cause troubles, for example if the Dutch speaker were to mistakenly take the (perceived) lack of uptake or response as a meaningful response. To confirm this hypothesis, this study (or parts of it) would have to be reduplicated with intercultural informal interactional material. Analyses of intercultural interactions could subsequently be compared to the current results to see how - if at all - participants change their behavior and to what extent their use of phatic communication is indeed (mis)understood. Such detailed and targeted studies will deepen our understanding of language usage norms in general, as well as serve a practical purpose.

With the world getting smaller as a result of ongoing globalization, people encounter others from all kinds of backgrounds. Being aware that you employ a particular conversational style - and that others may not be used to doing things the same way as you - is a helpful first step to increase communicative success. Moreover, learning about the conversational style that is preferred by the other person allows you to better understand, anticipate and react to their behavior. Establishing such baseline norms of using phatic contributions to negotiate your interpersonal alignment and relationship is thus not only of interest to researchers, but perhaps more so to language teachers and learners. Ultimately, as Hofstede (1980:8) noted almost 40 years ago: "a better understanding of cultural differences is one of the main contributions the social sciences can make to practical policy makers in governments, organizations and institutions - and to ordinary citizens." This statement is just as much true for linguistics.

In conclusion, this contrastive study of Dutch and Indonesian informal interaction has explored differences and similarities related to three types of phatic communication - support, reproduction, and collaboration. The uncovered patterns represent only three pieces of the bigger picture of participants' "normal" way of doing things. They are important pieces, however. Pieces that point towards the inner workings of a core aspect of human interaction: managing interpersonal relations.

Appendices

The analysis presented in this thesis was based on naturally occurring informal interactions. Since neither an extensive corpus of informal spoken Dutch nor spoken Indonesian was available at the time of research, a new corpus was constructed based on episodes from reality the TV show Big Brother. The appendices included here present additional information or explanation related to (mostly) methodological concerns. Each of the appendices is briefly described below.

- **Appendix A.1** presents an overview of the episodes included in the corpus, as well as the duration of each of the episodes and the number of words per episode. The duration in minutes refers to all interaction involving contestants, whether it includes (audible) talk or not. The TV show host introducing the episode is not included in the duration. Talk directed at members of the production team or others not residing in the Big Brother house was also excluded.
- **Appendix A.2** explains the transcription conventions used in transcribing the audio-visual material.
- **Appendix A.3** is a longer stretch of transcribed Dutch data, to give a general impression of the type of interactional material that was used.
- **Appendix A.4** is a longer stretch of transcribed Indonesian data, to give a general impression of the type of interactional material that was used.
- **Appendix A.5** holds the coding protocol that was used to systematically analyze the data.
- **Appendix A.6** provides an example of coded data. The example shows part of the same transcript shown in appendix A3, with added codes to give some idea of what the coded data set looks like.

The full transcripts and coded corpus are not made freely available in light of ongoing research. For the sake of transparency, all files holding transcripts and analyses are accessible for reviewing purposes. To gain access to these materials, please contact the author.

A.1 List of episodes

Dutch episode selection

episode	*duration (minutes)*	*words (count)*
1	25	2893
2 and 3, pt 1	17	1847
2 and 3, pt 2	52	1438
4	15	2399
5	10	1709
6	2	468
7	15	766
8	4	305
9 and 10	22	4006
11	9	2197
12	17	2181
14	9	1415
15	15	2426
16 and 17	9	1264
18	4	790
19	7	1335
20	7	870
21	3	403
22	19	2715
23 and 24	14	1954
25	17	2630
29	17	2923
33	23	5282
35	18	2522
36	12	1968
37 and 38	18	3468
41	17	2843
42	16	2240
46	21	3586
48	14	2847
49	23	4157
50	9	1782
51	18	2931
52	11	1907
53	9	1523
54	12	2512
55	14	2674
56	9	1524
57	10	1703
58	11	1747
59	4	408
60	20	2310
42 days	598 minutes	88868 words

Indonesian episode selection

episode	*duration (minutes)*	*words (count)*
1	45	3357
2	39	3379
3	41	3762
4	39	2345
5	38	2692
6	33	1934
7	31	1907
8	44	2520
9	37	2280
10	24	1054
11	26	1984
12	27	2392
13	30	1704
14	32	2162
15	25	2174
17	6	512
18	25	951
19	14	1450
20	18	781
21	7	284
22	32	2130
23	36	2005
24	10	462
25	23	878
26	12	1406
29	17	529
30	18	958
27 days	729 minutes	47992 words

These tables give an overview of the episodes that were included in the corpus. The **episode** refers to the episode in terms of broadcast sequence, this does not necessarily correspond to the number of days the contestants reside in the Big Brother house. The **duration** refers to the selection of material that actually shows the contestants in the house. This does sometimes include inter-actions in the diary room (which are excluded from the analysis) and activities without (audible) talk. The number of **words** reflects all talk among the contestants. Talk directed at the producers or audience is excluded from the analysis (and word count).

A.2 Transcription conventions

For the purpose of this research, spoken text was transcribed as per the standard variety of the language. Cases of strongly conventionalized colloquial language use or abbreviations are represented in their usual sub-standard form. The transcription conventions used in this thesis mostly follow Jefferson (2004).

Punctuation markers

word,	=	rising intonation
word.	=	falling intonation
word?	=	question intonation
wo:rd	=	lengthening of the sound preceding the colon

Other markers

[[word]]	=	meta-comment about the material or transcript
((word))	=	comment about ongoing conversation/interaction
(word)	=	unclear what was said
woor-	=	word cut off (by S1 or S2)
<u>wo</u>rd	=	emphasis placed on the underlined (part of) word
wo[rd	=	overlap between turns at the point indicated by the
[word		square brackets
word=	=	next turn immediately follows current turn without a
=word		pause in between the two turns
↑word	=	(part of) word uttered at a relatively higher pitch
↑↑word↑↑	=	entire stretch uttered at a relatively much higher pitch
↓word	=	(part of) word uttered at a relatively lower pitch
↓↓word↓↓	=	entire stretch uttered at a relatively much higher pitch
<word>	=	word(s) uttered relatively slower
>word<	=	word(s) uttered relatively faster
WOrd	=	(part of) word(s) uttered relatively louder
°word°	=	(part of) word(s) uttered relatively softer
#word#	=	(part of) word(s) uttered while laughing
$word$	=	(part of) word(s) uttered while crying
(.)	=	pause shorter than 0.2 seconds
(0.4)	=	pause in milliseconds

A.3 Example Dutch transcript - Big Brother day 22

[[opening scene - David walks around; women in the women's bedroom]]

22_1	1	VO	met zijn ziel onder zijn arm wacht hij
22_1	2		de confrontatie met Lotte af
22_1	3		[[muziek - bewoners staan op uit bed]]
22_1	4	Susan	goede↑morge:n,
22_1	5	Roos	morgen
22_1	6		heb je lekker geslaapt?
22_1	7	Lotte	he?
22_1	8		(7.5)
22_1	9	Susan	heb je het niet koud zo?
22_1	10	Lotte	nee, ik heb net een koude douche gehad=
22_1	11	Susan	=oh ja, natuurlijk
22_1	12	Lotte	#hahah#
22_1	13	Susan	#hah#
22_1	14	Lotte	het is wa:rm
22_1	15	Susan	wat een ↑vrAA:g
22_1	16	Lotte	toch is dat wel lekker hoor

[[edited - same scene]]

22_2	1	Lotte	ik heb je twee keer gehoord.
22_2	2	Susan	echt?
22_2	3	Lotte	↑ja
22_2	4	Susan	↓nee
22_2	5	Lotte	jA:, echt
22_2	6	Susan	nee ik heb maar een keer, één keer staat [me maar ↑bIJ
22_2	7	Lotte	[ik heb-
22_2	8		ik heb ook maar een keer uitgeweest volgens mij
22_2	9	Hugo	iemand sla:apwan[delt dan
22_2	10	Susan	[was aan het slaapwandelen misschien
22_2	11	Lotte	hoi ((tegen David die binnenkomt))
22_2	12	David	°hai°
22_2	13	Susan	was misschien aan het slaapwandelen.
22_2	14	Roos	ik heb het [niet gehoord.
22_2	15	Susan	[heb je-

22_2	16		heb je me twee keer gehoord?
22_2	17	Lotte	°volgens mij wel,
22_2	18		maar ik weet het niet zeker nou hoor°
22_2	19		misschien was het iemand anders
22_2	20		(0.4)
22_2	21		goeie↑m[orgen
22_2	22	David	[>↑hai<
22_2	23	Hanna	goeiemorgen.
22_2	24	David	zo is Ruben nou weer eh aan het slapen?
22_2	25	Hanna	he? nee hoor, die is al[lang wakker
22_2	26	David	[oh daar is 'ie, kijk ↑nou:
22_2	27		(3.1)
22_2	28	Ruben	goeiemorgen allemaal
22_2	29	Roos	goeiemorgen

[[new scene - Bram and Susan at the dining table]]

22_3	1	Susan	wat heb jij gedaan toen je 40 werd?
22_3	2		dat is ook best wel bijzonder.
22_3	3	Bram	toen heeft mijn vriendin het eh gedaan bij mij
22_3	4	Susan	↑ja
22_3	5	Bram	gisteren verteld tegen de jongens,
22_3	6		want eh >ik had net gewerkt in de wielercampagne< (.)'s nachts
22_3	7		(.) en ik lig te pitten en zegt ze 'kom eh (.)
22_3	8		eh we gaan een stukkie fie- >boodschappen doen<=
22_3	9		=we gaan fietsen
22_3	10		°ik weet niet meer° ik had een paar uurtjes maar geslapen denk ik
22_3	11		(denk) ja, zal maar mee gaan weetjewel
22_3	12		hh ik rij mee en eh (.) we hadden een paar boodschappen gedaan,
22_3	13		en toen reden we 'oh kom we gaan een bakje koffie drinken
22_3	14		in (boek op schurendacht, het ginneken) hhh
22_3	15		ik kom daar binnen, en ik zie een paar vrienden van me ↑staan
22_3	16	Susan	((knikt))
22_3	17	Bram	ik zeg 'hey hoe is het jongen, wat doen jullie hier he?'
22_3	18		helemaal niks in de gaten
22_3	19	Susan	((schudt hoofd))
22_3	20	Bram	en ik zie daar steeds m'n broers en eh m'n moeder
22_3	21		en heel het zooitje, huppakee:

22_3	22		had ze al mijn vrienden en kennissen uitgenodigd,
22_3	23		en waren allemaal in dat cafe daar.
22_3	24	Susan	a:h wat leuk
22_3	25	Bram	kreeg allemaal kadootjes,
22_3	26		kreeg nog een grote foto (1.8) met alles erop en eraan
22_3	27	Susan	oh leuk
22_3	28		(1.3)
22_3	29	Bram	goh, ben ik weer jarig zeg hey
22_3	30	Susan	<morgen ben je jarig>.
22_3	31		(3.4)
22_3	32	Bram	vroeger toen ik 20 was en eh iemand zei 'ja ik ben 45'
22_3	33		dat vond ik- nou die is al best wel oud weetjewel
22_3	34	Susan	↑↑jA:
22_3	35	Bram	en dan ben je het zelf,
22_3	36	Susan	>valt het best wel mee<=
22_3	37		=ik denk ook dat het aan jezelf ligt
22_3	38	Bram	het ligt helemaal aan jezelf.
22_3	39		want als ik ⌈nou Mi-
22_3	40	Susan	⌈aan je vitaliteit enzo
22_3	41		ja:: absoluut
22_3	42	Bram	als ik nou Mick Jagger zie,
22_3	43		die is ook al 55,
22_3	44		die loopt ook nog als een halve gek rond.
22_3	45	Susan	ja.
22_3	46		(.) Herman Brood ↑dan
22_3	47		(0.6)
22_3	48	Bram	ja die is ook ↑50
22_3	49	Susan	↓↓halve gare↓↓
22_3	50	Bram	#hja#
22_3	51		(.) en di⌈e
22_3	52	Susan	⌈#hA:#
22_3	53	Bram	dat is ook een rare
22_3	54	Susan	ja:: die is ook gek als een deur
22_3	55	Bram	#hahaha#
22_3	56	Susan	#<haha>#
22_3	57	Bram	zo leip als een deur
22_3	58	Susan	die is echt gek
22_3	59		(4.1) ja, leuk.

[[new scene - housemates decorate the wall]]

22_4	1	Lotte	volgens mij heb ik hier een dikkere KOP, of niet?
22_4	2	Susan	kijken?
22_4	3	Lotte	of zie ik dat verkeerd=
22_4	4	Susan	=ja heb je >heel duidelijk<
22_4	5	Lotte	ja he?
22_4	6	Susan	bollere wangen.
22_4	7		>HEB je daar nou een wenkbrauw< of een-eh
22_4	8	Lotte	((knikt))
22_4	9	Susan	ja?
22_4	10		>waarom heb je die nu niet meer in?<
22_4	11	Lotte	°is nog niet zo lang geleden hoor°
22_4	12		die eh (.) die ZAT niet lekker als ik sliep,
22_4	13		als ik er op <had gelegen> 's ochtends,=
22_4	14	Susan	=ja ik heb dat hier ((wijst op oor))
22_4	15	Lotte	hart[stikke last van.
22_4	16	Susan	[ik heb het met de:ze
22_4	17	Lotte	↑ja.
22_4	18	Susan	ik heb het met deze ↑ook

[[new scene - Ruben and Roos in the backyard]]

22_5	1	Ruben	ja ik denk dat wij mekaar
22_5	2		best nog wel eens een keertje zullen zien,
22_5	3	Roos	oh, da[t denk ik ook
22_5	4	Ruben	[en met Hanna ook.
22_5	5	Roos	met Hanna al helemaal ja,
22_5	6		met jullie twee heb gewoon een hele hoop op=maar,
22_5	7		(.) wij liggen denk ik eh met mekaar heel erg op een ↑lijn.
22_5	8	Ruben	ja.
22_5	9		(1.6)
22_5	10	Roos	dat merk je al heel veel zonder woorden,
22_5	11	Ruben	maar [je-
22_5	12	Roos	[dat er al wordt ge[sproken
22_5	13	Ruben	[ja:h (.)
22_5	14		maar j-je kan eh (.)

22_5	15		je kan hier altijd alles eh °alles zeggen inderdaad°.
22_5	16	Roos	ja
22_5	17		(2.4)

[[new scene - Susan joins Ruben and Roos in the backyard]]

22_6	1	Susan	hebben jullie nog een leuke foto die jullie hierin willen hebben?
22_6	2	Roos	nee
22_6	3	Susan	>we zijn foto's aan het neerzetten<=
22_6	4		=nee?
22_6	5		(0.7)
22_6	6	Ruben	hm:::
22_6	7	Susan	°nee°?

[[new scene - Ruben and Roos in the backyard]]

22_7	1	Roos	ik heb heel erg moeten knokken in mijn leven,
22_7	2		(1.3)
22_7	3		°ik heb echt moeten knokken eh Ruben°
22_7	4		(1.2) ((Hanna komt naar buiten))
22_7	5	Roos	hallo:
22_7	6		ik eh (.) ik kom niet uit een gezin waarin gestudeerd werd,
22_7	7	Ruben	nee. ja he?
22_7	8	Roos	°en eh°
22_7	9	Hanna	zitten jullie prive? zitten jul[lie-
22_7	10	Roos	[nee hoor, kom er maar lekker bij.
22_7	11	Hanna	>ik was e[ven bij de psycholoog aan ( )
22_7	12	Roos	[eh-
22_7	13	Ruben	ja? en?
22_7	14	Hanna	zomaar eventjes gezellig [kletsen
22_7	15	Roos	[lekker is dat he?ja
22_7	16	Hanna	ja
22_7	17	Roos	maar het was dus van twaalf tot twee,
22_7	18	Hanna	↓oh —
22_7	19	Roos	niet van elf tot één
22_7	20	Hanna	°oh°
22_7	21	Roos	(0.5)
22_7	22		

22_7	23	Hanna	het is nu iets van half twee
22_7	24	Roos	ja.
22_7	25	Ruben	mja
22_7	26	Roos	het wa- (.) [het was
22_7	27	Ruben	[de kan-=
22_7	28		=oh sorry. ja?
22_7	29	Roos	ik was net een verhaal aan het vertellen
22_7	30	Hanna	>goed ik haal even m'n jas<
22_7	31	Roos	ja.
22_7	32		(2.7) ((Hanna loopt naar binnen))
22_7	33		en het was niet makkelijk bij mij thuis
22_7	34		in verband met mijn broer.
22_7	35	Ruben	↓nee
22_7	36	Roos	dus ik heb best wel eh (.)
22_7	37	Hanna	dag, Hugo.
22_7	38	Roos	°dat is denk ik de reden dat ik heel erg op mezelf ben°
22_7	39		m'n ouders zijn ook heel trots op me.
22_7	40		he, want Roos deed het zo ↑lekker,
22_7	41		ja tuurlijk deed Roos het lekker (.) logisch.
22_7	42		(2.5)

[[edited? - same scene]]

22_8	1	Hanna	ik heb lekker heel lang gedoucht,
22_8	2		met één- met zo'n klein beetje water.
22_8	3	Roos	was er nog heet water d[an?
22_8	4	Hanna	[NEE: >heb ik gekookt<
22_8	5	Roos	ik ga wel naar binnen,
22_8	6		want ik krijg het nu wel koud.
22_8	7	Ruben	ik ga ff het straatje ff spuiten
22_8	8		het zit onder de (.) stront hierzo.
22_8	9	Hanna	nee je zei-
22_8	10		>ik zag zo die boom< zo [poink vallen net
22_8	11	Ruben	[ja
22_8	12		ja?
22_8	13	Roos	ja?
22_8	14	Hanna	JAHA:
22_8	15	Roos	oh geweldig.

A.4 Example Indonesian transcript - Big Brother day 21

[[new scene - narration Indra Herlambang]]
[[new scene - "rich" housemates move into the house]]

15_1_1	1	Nazam	teman-teman, sependeritaan, seperjuangan,
15_1_1	2		kita belum cium rumah lho
15_1_1	3	Wayan	ya tuhan, KITA JADI ORANG ↑KAYA #hahahah#
15_1_1	4	VO	setelah kemenangan si miskin atas si kaya dalam permainan
15_1_1	5		'matching the socks' kemarin, akhirnya terjadi pertukaran
15_1_1	6		tempat antara si kaya dan si miskin.
15_1_1	7		akan tetapi konflik yang terjadi rupanya
15_1_1	8		bukan antara si kaya dan si miskin,
15_1_1	9		melainkan antara Yuni dan Lena yang masih satu tim.

[[new scene - housemates at the camp site]]

15_1_2	1	Maya	bang bang ini tarik-
15_1_2	2	Lena	<serem> aku malahan ketutupan itu [kamu?
15_1_2	3	Kamil	[ya kan
15_1_2	4	Yuni	°hm-↑hm°
15_1_2	5	Kamil	terbuka, terbuka gini sama aja
15_1_2	6	Lena	ya u[dah
15_1_2	7	Maya	[aku bu-
15_1_2	8		>ya udah<
15_1_2	9	Lena	aku satu disitu aja lah Kamil.
15_1_2	10	Kamil	°huh?°
15_1_2	11	Lena	aku disini aja.
15_1_2	12		jadi yang ini aja bawa kesana, aku disitu
15_1_2	13	Maya	hm-hm=
15_1_2	14	Kamil	=ya udah ya, ka[n-
15_1_2	15	Maya	[(me↑kum)
15_1_2	16	Kamil	buka aja, buka, ((to Maya who want to leave the backyard))
15_1_2	17	Adam	buka baru panggil kapten dulu?
15_1_2	18	Maya	kapten? mau pipis boleh?
15_1_2	19	Tessa	↑yuk

15_1_2	20	Kamil	hm? mak Yuni?
15_1_2	21	Lena	cuci kaki dulu sih deh
15_1_2	22	Maya	°duh ya ampun°

[[edited - same scene]]

15_1_3	1	Eko	gini doang, boleh.
15_1_3	2		ngikat kemana gitu
15_1_3	3	Kamil	mau tidur di luar
15_1_3	4	Eko	hah?
15_1_3	5	Kamil	berdua
15_1_3	6	Eko	#hehe#
15_1_3	7	Adam	ya udahlah orang itu mau:, jang-
15_1_3	8		kita nggak usah cari ribut,
15_1_3	9		kalau mereka mau disitu, ya udah disitu.
15_1_3	10		(0.6)
15_1_3	11	Kamil	yang ditakutin sama BigBro, dia kabur [lagi
15_1_3	12	Eko	[#hahahah#
15_1_3	13		#ditakutin sama BigBro kabur heheh#
15_1_3	14	Yuni	iya, kalau mau berenam itu: disatuin kan?
15_1_3	15		(1.1)
15_1_3	16	Kamil	susah nanti (.) lu kan kayak nggak tahu Lena aja.
15_1_3	17		orangnya kayak gimana kan kalau dipindahin si-
15_1_3	18		ini kan dia yang mau disini.

[[new scene - flashback to Lena selecting her 'bed']]

15_1_4	1	Lena	aku satu disitu ajalah, Kamil?
15_1_4	2	Kamil	°huh?
15_1_4	3	Lena	aku disini aja?
15_1_4	4		jadi yang ini aja bawa kesana,
15_1_4	5		aku disini aja.

[[edited - back to housemates at the camp site]]

15_1_5	1	Yuni	ya u[dahlah

15_1_5	2	Adam	[iya:
15_1_5	3	Yuni	makanya guwa bilang kan,
15_1_5	4	Kamil	bilang[in aja?
15_1_5	5	Yuni	[sekarang gini aja, ikutin [aja.
15_1_5	6	Adam	[iya,
15_1_5	7		aku tahu apa yang diomongin si Wayan tentang kau, aku tahu.
15_1_5	8		(0.7) kayak yang dia benci banget sama siapa kan?!
15_1_5	9		sama si: (.) si Nur kan?
15_1_5	10	Eko	↑hm↓
15_1_5	11	Adam	dia benci banget sama si Nur, tapi semenjak dia satu kelompok
15_1_5	12		dia mencari kesalahan orang lain
15_1_5	13		dan Nur itu dibanggakan sama dia.

[[flashback to housemates in the backyard ((=ep 13, part 3))]]

15_1_6	1	Wayan	itu mah jangan dulu=
15_1_6	2		=kita kan masing-masing rokok udah punya.
15_1_6	3	Nur	yah
15_1_6	4	Wayan	jadi jangan dibelanjain dulu.
15_1_6	5	Wulan	gi[tu-
15_1_6	6	Nur	[nggak mau sekalian aja?=
15_1_6	7		=takutnya lama lagi datengnya ini,
15_1_6	8		jadi kan cuman dibelanja[in ( )
15_1_6	9	Wayan	[kan kita masing-masing sama saat lagi
15_1_6	10	Nur	iya, maksudnya ini digunakannya nanti untuk-
15_1_6	11	Rendra	ini ada apa aja selain rokok?
15_1_6	12	Wayan	udah disini aja list rokok sama-

[[end of flashback]]

15_1_7	1	Adam	guwe tahu sifat dia itu seperti apa.
15_1_7	2		(.) cuma aku bingung-
15_1_7	3	Eko	makanya lu jangan suka ngomong-ngomong begitu,
15_1_7	4		di belaka:ng
15_1_7	5	Yuni	siapa? guwa ngg[ak ngom[ong-ngomong
15_1_7	6	Adam	[ti-

15_1_7	7	Eko	[kali aja dia denger.
15_1_7	8		itu, Adam, guwa nggak ngomong-ngomong sama lu,
15_1_7	9		(.) guwe ngomong sama Adam
15_1_7	10	Yuni	dan guwa tadi-
15_1_7	11	Eko	dan mereka denger tadi kali kayaknya ya.
15_1_7	12		makanya mereka ngejudge lo langsung.
15_1_7	13	Yuni	dan [guwa tadi itu perasaan guwa di kamar
15_1_7	14	Eko	[°↓↓yes toh↓↓°
15_1_7	15	Yuni	(.) langsung ke kamar deh.
15_1_7	16	Eko	ya makanya kan tadi guwa bilang ke Yuni pas guwa masuk kan?
15_1_7	17		Yuni banyak <omong>
15_1_7	18		makanya karena guwa tahu, pasti dia sensi sama lu,
15_1_7	19		(.) pas masuk kan, pas baru masuk kan
15_1_7	20		guwa langsung bilang kan?
15_1_7	21	Yuni	aku sebenarnya udah bilang ke si: (.) bang Adam,
15_1_7	22		nggak usah dibahas kan, bang.
15_1_7	23		(2.1)
15_1_7	24		<ya udah ↑lah> (.) toh juga keluar dari sini,
15_1_7	25		dia bu[kan saudara guwe.
15_1_7	26	Kamil	[ada masih (bahan), benar nggak? ((looks in the pan))
15_1_7	27	Yuni	tipenyaan memang nada guwa agak-agak keras.
15_1_7	28	Eko	ya iyalah

[[flashback to Lena etc. in the women's bedroom (=episode 14, part 5)]

15_1_8	1	Lena	saya nggak mau,
15_1_8	2		karena kamu menuduh saya untuk ngomong sama Wayan.
15_1_8	3	Yuni	ini ya,
15_1_8	4	Lena	dia bi[lang, katanya kamu ngomong nggak empati kan
15_1_8	5	Yuni	[maksudnya
15_1_8	6	Lena	tadi Yuni sama Adam kamu nggak empati sama kita.
15_1_8	7		ya dan di[a bilang sama aku nggak mungkin kalau ada kelompok ini
15_1_8	8	Yuni	[nggak bisa dia bilang, awal aku ( )
15_1_8	9		nggak bilang [sama (.) kamu tentang aku nggak ada.
15_1_8	10	Dian	[<jangan ikut, Nazam, Nazam>
15_1_8	11	Lena	saya ngadu sama kamu?

15_1_8 12 Wayan enggak.
15_1_8 13 Lena kamu (.) tidak empati kenapa kamu [menuduh saya tidak empati-
15_1_8 14 Wayan [kan jelasin kayak tidak-
15_1_8 15 tidak bo[leh aku berkomunikasi
15_1_8 16 Yuni [<kan aku tanya Lena,>
15_1_8 17 kam[u ngerti nggak
15_1_8 18 Lena [>tapi tindakan kamu itu menuduh s[aya<=
15_1_8 19 Yuni [( )
15_1_8 20 Lena =saya bisa tahu
15_1_8 21 Yuni eh, guwe tadi nanya kan ke elo
15_1_8 22 Dian Lena, Lena, Le:na
15_1_8 23 Yuni gimana sih lo?
15_1_8 24 Nazam nggak gini-gini ya, ini kesalahan

[[edited - same scene, ep14-5]]

15_1_9 1 Lena nggak mungkin ada seseorang yang ngo[mong sama Wayan,
15_1_9 2 Nazam [Lena
15_1_9 3 eh orang kita [nggak ada yang ngomong sama Wayan
15_1_9 4 Nazam [Lena
15_1_9 5 kalau sampai Wayan bisa ngomong,
15_1_9 6 Yuni, Adam kamu yang nggak [empati
15_1_9 7 Yuni [ya udah Lena
15_1_9 8 guwa bilang sekarang guwa minta maaf kalau guwa salah ngomong.
15_1_9 9 intinya itu aja ya, kalau (.) °loh° (.)
15_1_9 10 ya<u>e</u>lah lu itu anak ke<u>cil</u>, tapi lo ngomongnya kayak gitu.
15_1_9 11 Lena Eh?
15_1_9 12 Yuni guwa-
15_1_9 13 Lena NO, guwa nggak ngeras[a lu juga dewasa deh=
15_1_9 14 Dian [>udah-udah-udah-udah-udah<
15_1_9 15 Lena =lo juga nggak bisa seenaknya sama guwe.

[[end of flashback]]

15_1_10 1 Adam masa kita dengar sendiri di kuping kita katanya orang itu
15_1_10 2 menyesal milih kami jadi kelompoknya.

15_1_10	3		kan kurang ajar gitu ngomong(nya).
15_1_10	4	Eko	siapa yang ngomong?
15_1_10	5	Adam	orang itu ngomong di kamar kita denger,
15_1_10	6		katanya nyesel milih kelompok kami berdua=
15_1_10	7		=aku sama si Yuni jadi kelomp[ok (.) orang itu
15_1_10	8	Yuni	[enggak, nyesel milih bang Eko,
15_1_10	9		gara-gara disuruh bang Kamil °katanya°
15_1_10	10		(1.6)
15_1_10	11	Eko	nyesel milih siapa?
15_1_10	12	Yuni	bang Eko
15_1_10	13	Eko	kenapa memangnya?
15_1_10	14	Kamil	ah↑
15_1_10	15	Yuni	iya, harusnya kan bang Nazam-

[[new scene - flashback to housemates in the livingroom]]

15_1_11	1		((Dian and Rendra pick their team mates))
15_1_11	2	Dian	Kamil.
15_1_11	3		(0.8)
15_1_11	4	Wayan	you know Ka[mil
15_1_11	5	Tessa	[bebas aja tante,
15_1_11	6	Lena	<bebas pil[ih>,
15_1_11	7	Dian	[°bebas°
15_1_11	8	Tessa	bebas pilih tante Di[an
15_1_11	9	Rendra	[>bebas pilih<
15_1_11	10	Dian	huh?=
15_1_11	11	Tessa	=nggak usah ikutin ini,
15_1_11	12		bebas pilih aja.
15_1_11	13	Rendra	Nazam, sini.
15_1_11	14	Dian	kesana ya, Kamil lho
15_1_11	15	Tessa?	#kemarin#

[[new scene - flashback to Dian and Lena in the women's bedroom]]

15_1_12	1	Dian	°mestinya yang disana itu ya, Kamil Adam wu::h.°
15_1_12	2	Lena	pas ((part of previous scene; greeting Adam))

15_1_12	3	Dian	ketemu Nazam, Rendra disitu, cocok itu.
15_1_12	4		kalau Rendra sih bisa gitu-gitu.
15_1_12	5		yang- yang nggak bisa itu ya °mereka ini°. ((=Kamil, Adam)).
15_1_12	6		justru yang harusnya nggak bisa itu disitu.

[[edited - back to housemates in the living room picking team mates]]

15_1_13	1	Rendra	Reza
15_1_13	2	Dian	#Yuni#

[[edited - back to housemates at the camp site]]

15_1_14	1	Kamil	udahla:h
15_1_14	2	Adam	makanya guwa bilang y[a maaf
15_1_14	3	Yuni	[suDA:H
15_1_14	4		>udah- udah- udah- dah< udah, udah, c'mon
15_1_14	5	Eko	come on men
15_1_14	6	Yuni	ini ayo kita cuci piring ini bang
15_1_14	7	Eko	lu juga cuci kaki?
15_1_14	8	Kamil	tahu (mena)
15_1_14	9	Yuni	udah lah, yang udah udah ((singing))
15_1_14	10	Kamil	tujuh nggak, karena enam s[aja
15_1_14	11	Maya	[ada yang mau?
15_1_14	12	Eko	a[da ( )
15_1_14	13	Yuni	[KaMIL?

A.5 Coding protocol

This coding guide describes the different types of codes and what they mean. For each relevant case, up to six codes can be provided. Four of those codes are mandatory, two optional. These six different types of codes are represented in the left hand column; each of them represents a particular piece of information about the evaluated reaction.

AL_pos / AL_neg	Enter the line number the coded turn responds to; if the alignment is positive enter the number in column AL_pos, if the alignment is negative in column AL_neg.
main	backchannel (=[EMPTY]), agreement (=AGREE), ME TOO*, co-construction (=COCON), paraphrase (=PAR), repeat (= RPT), rejection (=REJ), correction (=CORR)
secondary (optional)	Second main code if relevant (e.g. RPT-REJ, RPT-CORR)**
invited / uninvited	Indicate whether the response is invited or uninvited, i.e. whether the first speaker explicitly asked for a response (=INVITED RESPONSE) or whether the second speaker decided on their own to contribute something to the conversation (=UNINVITED RESPONSE). [I'm interested in the latter]
feedback / content	Indicate whether the reaction is a full turn, contributing to the content of the conversation, or a backchannel/FEEDBACK expression. All contributions that include more than a mere "yes/no/hm-hm" (i.e. that carry propositional content) are counted as CONTENT-turns. Both types of contributions are interesting: the expressions of feedback show the level of involvement with the interaction in itself and the speakers (affiliation, interest to interact with the others etc.), the content-turns show the alignment of S2 with the other speakers and topic of talk.***
self/other	Mostly relevant with RPT and CORR. Indicate whether the speaker repeats/corrects their own previous turn (=SELF) or someone else's turn (=OTHER). [The repetitions of self are not relevant, since you cannot align with/to yourself, but coding is needed to exclude such cases from analysis]

Subclasses (optional)	**SUBCLASS TO RPT**	
	▪ LIST	PARTICIPATORY LISTENERSHIP - S2 repeats turn S1 to show understanding
	▪ SHADOW	SHADOWING - S2 closely (re)produces utterance S1 with minimal delay
	▪ RAT	RATIFICATION - typically by S1 to indicate COCON by S2 was (in)correct
	▪ ANS	ANSWER – S2 reproduces interrogative utterance S1 declaratively
	▪ SUB	SUBSTITUTION - S2 repeats utterance S1, changing central term
	▪ REP_Q	REPAIR QUESTION - S2 repeats turn S1 to indicate turn S1 is not clear
	▪ REP_A	REPAIR ANSWER - S1 repeats earlier turn S1 after repair initiation S2
	▪ EMPH	EMPHASIS - S1 repeats prior utterance S1 for emphatic reasons
	▪ INAUD	INAUDIBLE - S1 repeats prior utterance S1 because s/he was not heard
	▪ ROUT	ROUTINE - S2 repeats words S1 as part of a conversational routine
	SUBCLASS TO REJ	
	▪ OPP	OPPOSITION - S2 stresses opposite stance to a negative first position of S1
	▪ ARG	ARGUMENT - S2 provides a reason for disagreeing with S1
	▪ N_ANS	NEGATIVE ANSWER – S2 negatively answer a question presented by S1

Comments

*ME TOO is also ME NEITHER and NOT ME. All cases in which a second speaker explicitly expresses they share the position or stance taken by the first speaker (me too) or explicitly distances themselves from that position (not me) belong in this category. What these cases share is that the second speaker not only explicitly presents his own stance, but in doing so assigns or reveals the first speaker's positioning. Cases that are positively aligning are given a code ME TOO in the main category (and possible RPT as secondary if

the previous turn is reproduced as well), negatively aligning cases are assigned the code REJ as main category, with ME TOO as a secondary code. (Inc. "that's what I mean", "I can imagine")

**Whenever a reaction involves repetition, enter RPT as main category. If the overall expression is negatively aligning to the prior speaker, add REJ as secondary code. This ensures all cases of repetition are grouped together as one subset and allows for systematic analysis of that subset of all repetition/rejection cases.

***All turns that involve full confirmation or disconfirmation without further explanation or information are coded as FEEDBACK. This includes cases like "exactly", "that's right", "absolute nonsense", etc. as well. Whenever a feedback turn is intended and interpreted as a full response, a code AGREE or REJ will be added in the main category. Whenever a feedback turn is used as a backchannel of sorts no main category code is supplied represented by the category code [EMPTY].

Practical note
If a particular point/message takes more than one line or turn to be presented, enter codes at the last relevant line and refer to the line the entire message is a response to. The program will automatically go to the indicated line and copy all of the conversation from that point up until the turn following the coded turn to a separate file. This way the entire message is copied, even if the message was interrupted by some other speaker. For example:

1. A I believe it is going to rain later.
2. B No, I just looked it up,
3. C Sure looks like it
4. B there won't be any rain tonight
5. D do we go by train or car?

In this case B's turn is spread across line 2 and 4. The combination of 2 and 4 is a reaction to A's turn in line 1. While B's disagreement starts in line 2, it is only completed in line 4. In this case, the codes would be entered at line 4 and refer back to line 1 as the target of response. The entire sequence (lines 1-5) will then be included as context to this rejection. (Note that in this example line 3 would be coded as well as a separate instance of reactive contribution, in this case also in reaction to line 1).

A.6 Example coded data - Excerpt Dutch transcript day 22

				alignment	main code	subcode	invited / uninvited	content / feedback	self / other
22_3	29	Bram	goh, ben ik weer jarig zeg hey						
22_3	30	Susan	<morgen ben je jarig>.	p27	RPT		uninv	content	other
22_3	31		(3.4)						
22_3	32	Bram	vroeger toen ik 20 was en eh iemand zei 'ja ik ben 45'						
22_3	33		dat vond ik- nou die is al best wel oud weetjewel						
22_3	34	Susan	↑↑jA:	p30			uninv	FB	other
22_3	35	Bram	en dan ben je het zelf,						
22_3	36	Susan	>valt het best wel mee<=	p33	COCON		uninv	content	other
22_3	37		=ik denk ook dat het aan jezelf ligt						
22_3	38	Bram	het ligt helemaal aan jezelf.	p37	RPT		uninv	content	other
22_3	39		want als ik [nou Mi-						
22_3	40	Susan	[aan je vitaliteit enzo						
22_3	41		ja:: absoluut	p40	AGREE		uninv	FB	self
22_3	42	Bram	als ik nou Mick Jagger zie,	p37	RPT	INAUD	uninv	content	self
22_3	43		die is ook al 55,						
22_3	44		die loopt ook nog als een halve gek rond.						
22_3	45	Susan	ja.	p44			uninv	FB	other
22_3	46		(.) Herman Brood ↑dan	p42	PAR		uninv	content	other
22_3	47		(0.6)						
22_3	48	Bram	ja die is ook ↑50						
22_3	49	Susan	↓↓halve gare↓↓						
22_3	50	Bram	#hja#						
22_3	51		(.) en di[e						
22_3	52	Susan	[#hA:#						
22_3	53	Bram	dat is ook een rare	p49	PAR		uninv	content	other
22_3	54	Susan	ja:: die is ook gek als een deur	p53	PAR		uninv	content	other
22_3	55	Bram	#hahaha#						
22_3	56	Susan	#<haha>#						
22_3	57	Bram	zo leip als een deur	p54	PAR		uninv	content	other
22_3	58	Susan	die is echt gek	p54	RPT	EMPH	uninv	content	self
22_3	59		(4.1)						
22_3	60	Susan	ja, leuk.						

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Samenvatting

Veel van wat mensen zeggen tijdens een informeel gesprek draagt niet zozeer bij aan de inhoud van het gesprek, maar is erop gericht de onderlinge relatie tussen de gesprekspartners te onderhouden. De bijdrage die iemand doet, bevat in dat geval geen of weinig nieuwe informatie in termen van propositionele inhoud; er is bijvoorbeeld enkel sprake van een korte instemming ("ja") of een herhaling van wat een ander eerder heeft gezegd. Hoewel het gespreksonderwerp nauwelijks verder uitgediept wordt, zijn dergelijke bijdragen van groot belang in de onderhandeling rond onderlinge kennis, ervaring en begrip. Dergelijke uitwisselingen die primair gericht zijn op de sociale relatie worden gevat onder de noemer fatische communicatie.

Dit onderzoek concentreert zich op verschillende vormen van fatische communicatie zoals die voorkomen in informele interactie: (i) instemming en ondersteuning, (ii) herhaling en parafrase en (iii) gezamenlijke betekenisvorming. Daarbij wordt bekeken in hoeverre (de keuze voor) het gebruik van bepaalde typen fatische zetten taalgebonden is door Nederlandse en Indonesische data te vergelijken. Het contrasteren van deze twee talen heeft meerdere voordelen: ten eerste biedt het de mogelijkheid een gedetailleerde analyse van een fenomeen te presenteren met voldoende variëteit aan data-input; ten tweede worden overeenkomsten en verschillen zichtbaar die kunnen leiden tot inzicht in welke patronen taalspecifiek zijn en welke patronen universeel (lijken te) zijn; tenslotte richt de vergelijking zich op de (on)waarheden van het heersende beeld van een tegenstelling tussen Westerse en Oosterse culturele patronen en gerelateerde interculturele communicatieve uitdagingen.

Het onderzoek richt zich uitsluitend en nadrukkelijk op informele interactie als de meest basale, ongecontroleerde vorm van gespreksvoering. De normen die gespreksdeelnemers in dit activiteitstype volgen kunnen beschouwd worden als de standaard die ze aanhouden voor onderling contact met onbekenden en/of in onbekende situaties. De gebruikspatronen van fatische communicatievormen in deze interactionele omgeving weerspiegelen dan ook wat men als "normaal" sociaal gedrag ziet. Zonder specifieke contextueel bepaalde richtlijnen zijn dit

de patronen waar men op terugvalt. Juist taalgebruik in deze context biedt daarom belangrijke inzichten in algemene principes van menselijke interactie.

Als onderzoeksmateriaal is gekozen voor enkel niet-gestuurde, informele gesprekken tussen (aanvankelijk) onbekenden. Het materiaal is afkomstig *reality* televisieserie Big Brother. De deelnemers aan het televisieprogramma kenden elkaar voorafgaand aan hun deelname niet en hebben elk dezelfde status binnen de show. Er is dus sprake van een volledige neutrale omgeving voor wat betreft gedrags- en taalgebruiksnormen. In deze omgeving valt daarom te verwachten dat deelnemers zich richten tot hun basale interactionele normen. Hun communicatieve bijdragen kunnen derhalve beschouwd worden als representatief voor "typisch" Nederlands respectievelijk Indonesisch sociaal gedrag: in overeenstemming met hoe de gemiddelde spreker vindt dat men zich hoort te gedragen in bijzijn van anderen. Zowel van de Nederlandse als Indonesische variant van Big Brother is het eerste seizoen bestudeerd, om zoveel als mogelijk de natuurlijkheid van het vertoonde gedrag te waarborgen. Toch moet bij deze opzet worden aangetekend dat er een mogelijkheid bestaat dat deelnemers zich (on)bewust anders hebben voorgedaan dan zij doorgaans doen in contact met (on)bekenden.

Om tot conclusies over zowel specifieke fatische communicatievormen als algemenere gebruikspatronen te komen gaat deze studie uit van een interactioneel-linguïstische benadering. De analyses zijn allen empirisch van aard en maken gebruik van inzichten uit de conversatieanalyse en linguïstische antropologie. Onderlinge relatievorming is zoals gezegd het centrale thema van deze dissertatie en wordt voornamelijk bestudeerd vanuit het perspectief van persoonlijke stellingname (stancetaking) en interpersoonlijke positionering (alignment). In dat kader worden ook relevante inzichten uit de dialogische syntaxis toegevoegd. Er is hier niet gekozen voor een beleefdheidstheoretische benadering, alhoewel er overlap bestaat met de theoretische uitgangspunten van deze studie in de aandacht voor bestudering van interpersoonlijke relaties. Belangrijke concepten vanuit die hoek worden daarom wel behandeld. Tenslotte worden cultureel-psychologische thema's als individualisme, collectivisme, zelf en ander betrokken bij de contrastieve analyse. Een uitgebreide bespreking van het theoretisch kader waarbinnen deze studie past is te vinden in hoofdstuk 2.

Telkens wanneer iemand een bijdrage doet aan een gesprek valt die op te vatten als een stellingname door de spreker. Dit komt het meest duidelijk naar voren in verklaringen van (gebrek aan) waardering of enthousiasme. Dergelijke oordelen communiceren expliciet wat de positie van de spreker is ten opzichte van het gesprekonderwerp. Een volgende spreker die iets te zeggen heeft over datzelfde onderwerp zal met een communicatieve bijdrage niet alleen de individuele positie kenbaar maken, maar ook een verband leggen tussen de vorige en zichzelf. De relatie die gelegd wordt tussen de stellingnamen van de twee deelnemers vormt de kern van dit onderzoek. In het bijzonder gaat het daarbij om het bewerkstelligen en onderhouden van een positieve onderlinge relatie: de situatie waarin beide partijen eenzelfde positie innemen ten aanzien van het onderwerp van gesprek.

In het tweede deel van het proefschrift worden achtereenvolgens drie typen fatische communicatievormen besproken die worden ingezet in een streven naar een positieve onderlinge positionering. Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op de wijze waarop gespreksdeelnemers hun steun uitspreken voor andermans communicatieve bijdrage en stellingname. Het gaat daarbij met name om het gebruik van backchannels (bv. "hm-hm", "oke"), instemmingen (bv. "ja", "inderdaad" in het Neder-lands, "ya", "betul" in het Indonesisch) en expliciete uitingen van gelijksoortigheid tussen deelnemers en beurten (bv. "ik ook").

Naast steunbetuigingen worden ook reproducties van eerdere beurten veelvuldig ingezet met het oog op de onderlinge relatie. Door een eerdere uiting (en daarmee stellingname) te herhalen wordt immers een band gesmeed tussen de twee sprekers als resultaat van hun gedeelde positie ten aanzien van het gespreksonderwerp. In hoofdstuk 6 wordt uiteengezet hoe volledige herhaling, gedeeltelijke herhaling en parafrase van een voorgaande interactionele bijdrage gebruikt worden om positieve interpersoonlijke positionering te bereiken.

De derde vorm van fatische communicatie die in het kader van dit onderzoek bestudeerd is, wordt in hoofdstuk 7 besproken: gezamenlijke betekenisvorming. Hoewel betekenisgeving aan een uiting altijd meer dan één participant vereist (minstens een spreker en hoorder), gaat het in dit hoofdstuk om gevallen waarbij meerdere gespreksdeelnemers gezamenlijk een enkele boodschap presenteren. Het presenteren van een boodschap gebeurt hier dus daadwerkelijk door beide partijen, in tegenstelling tot de prototypische situatie waarin de ene spreker een uiting doet en een ander die poogt te interpreteren. Het afronden van andermans gespreksbijdrage gebeurt op verschillende niveaus, van het aanvullen van een enkel woord tot het toevoegen van een complementzin of zelfs een uitbreiding van de originele boodschap. Ook de mate waarin een dergelijke poging tot samenwerking geaccepteerd wordt verschilt behoorlijk, want hoewel de originele spreker de aanvulling kan overnemen wordt er vaak genoeg simpelweg aan voorbij gegaan.

Elk van bovengenoemde fatische middelen wordt zowel in de Indonesische als Nederlandse data gevonden. Dit suggereert dat er inderdaad in beide talen een basale gespreksnorm aangehouden wordt die participanten ingeeft hun actieve betrokkenheid bij een gesprek en de overige deelnemers te laten blijken. Het is klaarblijkelijk gewenst meer dan eens te kennen te geven dat er nog altijd sprake is van een positieve onderlinge relatie. De frequentie waarin bepaalde vormen voorkomen verschilt echter. Waar de hoeveelheid herhalingen bijvoorbeeld groter is in het Indonesisch (zowel in relatieve als absolute zin), vertonen de Nederlandse sprekers een voorkeur voor expliciete uitingen gericht op het kenbaar maken van een gedeelde positionering door middel van uitdrukkingen zoals "ik ook".

Over het algemeen genomen lijkt de norm dat sprekers een directe relatie tussen elkaar leggen sterker aanwezig onder de Nederlandse sprekers. De onderhandeling over individuele stellingname en interpersoonlijk positionering speelt zich daarmee sterker af op de voorgrond van de interactie. Dit uit zich in het openlijk benoemen of verbinden van de individuele bijdragen door middel van

vormen als “ook”, “ja” en “dat is waar”, ook wanneer er sprake is van een herhaling of aanvulling. Dergelijke elementen zijn afhankelijk van de voorgaande beurt om tot een betekenisvolle interpretatie te kunnen komen, dus door dit soort anaforische uitingen wordt er openlijk een noodzakelijke relatie tot (een uiting van) een andere spreker gelegd. Deze observatie betekent geenszins dat de Indonesische sprekers zich minder zouden bekommeren om het onderhouden van een interpersoonlijk relatie, het suggereert alleen dat dit onderhoud op een andere manier tot uiting gebracht wordt. Zo wijst het veelvuldig gebruik van herhalingen erop dat het toevoegen van een expliciet verbindend element niet nodig is om een verband te leggen. De gelijkenis tussen uitingen en bijbehorende stellingnamen is voldoende duidelijk om een positieve interpersoonlijke positionering te bewerkstelligen en die kenbaar te maken aan de betrokken partijen. De taalspecifieke voorkeuren resulteren in een conversationele stijl die, in dit geval, (het taalgebruik van) de Nederlanders dan wel Indonesiërs kenmerkt.

De resultaten van deze exploratieve, contrastieve, studie lijken erop te wijzen dat het belang van fatische communicatie en interpersoonlijke positionering universeel belangrijk gevonden worden, maar dat de keuze voor de talige middelen die daarbij worden ingezet taalspecifiek is. Dit suggereert dat mensen, ongeacht die taal ze spreken, bepaalde interactionele patronen volgen (een *human interaction engine*). Aangezien dit onderzoek alleen op deze twee talen betrekking had is het van belang meer talen te bestuderen om claims met betrekking tot universaliteit verder te onderbouwen. Waar het aankomt op stellingname en onderlinge positionering bieden de verschillen en overeenkomsten in conversatiestijl mogelijkheden tot het verder ontwikkelen van (training in) interculturele communicatie. Weten wat de basale aannames rond “normaal” sociaal gedrag in informele interactie zijn en weten hoe talige middelen daar bij voorkeur (niet) voor gebruikt worden, vergroot de kans op succesvolle communicatie aanzienlijk.

Curriculum Vitae

Maaike van Naerssen was born on 17 December 1985 in Leiden, the Netherlands. She enrolled in the BA program Languages and Cultures of Indonesia at Leiden University in 2004, graduating in 2008. That same year she was admitted to the Research Master program of linguistics, obtaining her Mphil degree (with distinction) in 2011. She started her PhD research in 2011 at the Leiden University Centre for Linguistics (LUCL) as a PhD student/lecturer, which resulted in this dissertation. Since her appointment as a lecturer in 2011 she has taught courses about pragmatics, language in interaction, discourse and conversation analysis, and intercultural communication within the BA programs of Linguistics, Dutch language and culture, and International Studies. She currently works as a lecturer at Leiden University.