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Elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish muslims in the Netherlands

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STELLINGEN

Elite and Popular Religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands

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ÖMER FARUK GÜRLESİN

1. The ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions in Islam, which are derived from the more expansive division between ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions in culture, are of great significance for understanding the religious structure of Turkish society.
2. The popular religiosity that includes many elements of traditional religiosity can easily go off the rails – reducing, contesting, and even replacing the reflexivity, autonomy, and openness that are dominant characteristics of elite (spiritual) religiosity.
3. Glock’s five dimensions can be regarded as heuristic and exploratory devices encompassing a variety of phenomena, which need to be operationalized, conceptualized and measured before other types of analysis are attempted.
4. The real question is not whether one is a believer or not, but rather whether the kind of things a person believes in make him or her ethnocentric. In other words, it is not that one believes, but what and how one believes that makes a person ethnocentric.
5. The religiosity experienced by Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands is to some extent vulnerable to radicalized ideologies.
6. The current European atmosphere, in which existential threats are perceived, might facilitate the growth of popular religiosity among the population, which could then acquire a fundamentalist character due to this religiosity’s fragmentary and pragmatist nature.
7. The Islamic world today, and the Turkish people in particular, have lost their ability to say “O People.” Instead, only “O Muslims” remains.
8. If the new Salafism continues to dominate the current Turkish interpretations of Islam, and resists the competitive and open character of the Islamic religious market, we believe that it would not be difficult for pro-violence groups to flourish in such fertile ground.
9. The economic disadvantages of Muslim immigrant life play an important role in the types of religiosity Muslim immigrants choose on the religious market.
10. The respondents expressed themselves with certain religious voices, but these expressions can be expected to change as circumstances change.
11. In the short term, we do not foresee any growth in the spiritual side of religion because of the insecurity that will likely be felt in the near future. In the long term, due to the economic improvement experienced by migrants in Europe, we assume development of elite religiosity to take place among Islamic migrants in Europe.