Elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish muslims in the Netherlands

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6. Summary, Discussion and Conclusion

In the literature review we have argued that, although the distinction between elite and popular religiosity - as perceived in the Islamic world - seems to have had a far-reaching influence on the way Muslims act and think, psychological and sociological literature has failed to investigate this influence - neither theoretical elaboration nor empirical research of this factor has taken place. Our study was designed to fill that gap. In order to conduct research in this neglected domain, we needed to develop a scale for assessing elite and popular religiosity.

Starting from this point, the necessary steps of this study can be divided into several categories. The first step was a discussion of the general characteristics of elite and popular religiosity within Islam, together with an exploration of the differences and similarities between the two concepts. The second step was an exploration of the experience of elite and popular religiosity by considering demographic and social-cultural factors in the Netherlands. Finally, the study aimed to reveal various socio-psychological characteristics of elite and popular religiosity by surveying Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. This chapter provides a summary of the most important research findings of our study and a discussion of the social and psychological implications for Dutch-Turkish Muslims. The contribution of this study to the scientific research of religion carried out in Muslim societies is also discussed. Finally, recommendations for future research are presented.

6.1. *Summary of Research Findings*

This section presents the most important research results that contribute to answering the two research questions - with their sub-questions - that are central to this study. In addition, we will see which hypotheses found support, and which ones had to be rejected.

6.1.1. *Characteristics of the Respondents and the Questionnaire*

A survey was conducted among Turkish Muslims living in different parts of the Netherlands. There were 649 male and 516 female Turkish Muslim participants, varying in age from 18 to 68 years. The first part of the questionnaire was designed to identify the further demographic characteristics of the participants. The second part of the questionnaire was designed to obtain information about five dimensions of religion: the ideological, ritualistic, experiential, intellectual and consequential dimensions. This part of the questionnaire was not designed to discover the difference between elite and popular religiosity, but to investigate the difference between high religiosity and low religiosity, measured on a scale we called the *General Religiosity Scale* (GRS).

In the GRS, as indicated in chapters 4 and 5, we divided the variable 'general religiosity' into two categories - an upper and a lower half - by using used the median of its frequency distribution. The lower half represents low religiosity and the upper half high religiosity. On the basis of this criterion, 272 (23,3 %) of the respondents were excluded from follow-up study and we continued the analysis of the other 893 (76,7 %) respondents, who were labelled as experiencing '*high religiosity*'.

The third part of the questionnaire consisted of two scales: the *Elite Religiosity Scale* and the *Popular Religiosity Scale*, both specially developed for the surveying of Dutch-Turkish Muslim communities. This part of the questionnaire, which distinguishes the current study from previous studies in the field, was specifically designed to uncover differences between elite and popular religiosity.

6.1.2. *Research Questions, Hypothesis and Results*

The following research questions were asked in this study:

RQ₁: 'What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?' In order to be in a position to answer this main research question, we explored six sub-questions. The first sub-question was *RQ₁a*: 'How can the relationship between religion and culture be characterized, and how do we understand popular and elite religiosity in our research setting?' (Chapter 2, 'Theoretical Background').

In chapters 1, 2 and 3, which form the theoretical framework of this study, the relationship between elite/popular in culture and elite/popular in religion was explored; these insights were then applied to the sociological background of elite and popular religiosity and its foundations.

The literature review showed that the 'great' and 'little' traditions in Islam, which are derived from the more expansive division of 'great' and 'little' traditions in culture, have great significance for understanding the religious structure of Turkish society.

The second sub-question was *RQ₁b*: 'What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in the context of Turkish - and possibly also Dutch - society, and how do these characteristics relate to the socio-economic status of (Dutch-) Turkish Muslims?'

In chapter 3, some structural characteristics of a new Muslim religiosity scale were suggested, ranging from popular religiosity on one end of the continuum to elite religiosity on the other. These two extremes reflect the classification of the sub-dimensions, which include belief (*īmān*), practice (*ʿamal*), knowledge (*ʿilm / maʿrifah*), experience (*maʿūnat / ilhām*) and consequences (*natījah*). Under these sub-dimensions, the current study identified several characteristics, which according to us distinguish elite religiosity from popular religiosity. These characteristics are: dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and privacy versus experiential desirability and shareability, tolerant versus intolerant, and unprejudiced versus prejudiced.

The exploration of these two sub-questions was described in chapters 2 and 3. As a result of our literature review, we added additional research questions in order to achieve an even more articulated response to our main research question. The ensuing sub-questions were explored by way of a survey, and by means of an analysis of the collected data. The third sub-question was RQ_1c: 'What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?'

Factor analyses and correlation analyses performed on the Elite Religiosity Scale and the Popular Religiosity Scale, showed that participants who experience elite religiosity tend to stress doubt and dynamism within the ideological aspect of religiosity. Within the ritualistic aspect, they tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of rituals (i.e., focus on quality). Within the intellectual aspect, they underline the importance of doubt about the validity of their current religious knowledge, and the dynamism of religious learning. Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they consider miraculous religious experiences (special gifts from God in exchange for their religious effort) to be relatively unimportant: for them it is essential to keep these private.

Participants who experience popular religiosity tend to stress the sureness and the stability of their current beliefs within the ideological aspect of religiosity. Within the ritualistic aspect, they emphasize the extrinsic value of rituals (i.e., focus on quantity) and they express material expectations. Within the intellectual aspect, they tend to be sure of their current religious knowledge and place intellectual stability at the centre. Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they consider miraculous religious experiences to be an appropriate and necessary part of religious commitment, and they are eager to report such experiences to others.

The fourth sub-question was RQ_1d: 'What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?' We hypothesized that 'Elite and popular forms of religiosity are negatively correlated with each another' (H_1). We indeed found a negative correlation between elite religiosity and popular religiosity ($r = -.72$).

The fifth sub-question was RQ_1e: 'How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?' The first hypothesis related to this sub-question was that 'Turkish Muslim minorities living in the Netherlands predominantly experience popular

religiosity' (*H₂*). Of the 893 (76.7%) respondents with a strong religious affiliation, 203 (22.7%) turned out to consistently experience elite religiosity, while 545 (61%) consistently experienced popular religiosity. 79 (8.8%) respondents who simultaneously experienced a low level of elite and popular religiosity and 66 (7.3%) respondents who simultaneously experienced a high level of elite and popular religiosity were excluded from further analysis. A total of 145 respondents (16.2%) were excluded after cross-tabulation analysis.

The third hypothesis related to the fifth sub-question was: 'First-generation respondents experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation respondents' (*H₃*). According to our findings, first-generation respondents do indeed experience popular religiosity more intensely than second-generation respondents.

The fourth hypothesis related to the fifth sub-question was: 'High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with education. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with education.' (*H₄*). The research results showed that there was a significant difference in the means of elite and popular religiosity based on educational status. Respondents with a higher level of education experienced a higher level of elite religiosity than respondents with a lower educational level. Similarly, respondents with a lower level of education experienced a higher level of popular religiosity than respondents with a higher educational level.

The fifth hypothesis related to the fifth sub-question was: 'High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with economic status. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with economic status.' (*H₅*). We found no significant difference in the means of elite religiosity based on income. However, we found a significant difference in the means of popular religiosity. Respondents with a higher income experienced a higher level of popular religiosity compared to respondents with a lower income.

In addition to these hypotheses, we formulated a number of expectations with regard to the fifth sub-question (*RQ₁e*). Because of the exploratory nature of our research, we explicitly described them as expectations rather than hypotheses. The first expectation was: 'The experience of popular religiosity is higher among Muslim women than among Muslim men' (*E₁*). We found no significant difference in the means of elite and popular religiosity based on gender. The second expectation was:

'Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and above) experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-35)' (E_2). The findings showed that there was a difference in the means of popular religiosity based on age. The middle-aged and older participants experienced popular religiosity more intensely than the young respondents. The third expectation was: 'Respondents who identify themselves as 'more religious than most' predominantly experience popular religiosity' (E_3). We found that - based on the item 'believing oneself to be more religious than most' - there was a significant difference both in the means of elite religiosity and in the means of popular religiosity. Those who identified themselves as 'more religious than most' predominantly experienced popular religiosity. The fourth expectation was: 'Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through television programmes, experience a high level of popular religiosity' (E_4). We found that popular religiosity is positively correlated with acquiring religious knowledge through television programmes. The fifth expectation was: 'Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through their family experience a high level of popular religiosity (E_5). We found that elite religiosity was positively correlated with family ($r = .18$) while popular religiosity was not significantly correlated with family. The respondents were also asked how much the following items influenced their religious education: friends, school, books, religious leaders, mosques, religious foundations and the Internet. We found that elite religiosity was positively correlated with books ($r = .26$) and religious leaders ($r = 0.14$), while negatively correlated with television ($r = -.22$). Elite religiosity turned out not to be significantly correlated with friends, school, mosques, religious foundations and the Internet. However, popular religiosity turned out to be positively correlated with religious leaders ($r = .27$), mosques ($r = .24$), TV ($r = .25$) and the Internet ($r = .15$), while not significantly correlated with friends, school, books and religious foundations.

In light of our literature review, we expected a relationship between socio-psychological attitudes and religiosity, and for this reason we formulated a second main research question and the following hypotheses:

RQ2: 'What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively?' Our hypotheses were: 'Respondents motivated by elite religiosity are

more open to interaction with Christians than respondents motivated by popular religiosity (H_6); 'Men motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more subordinate attitudes towards women and more traditional ideas about gender, than men motivated by elite religiosity' (H_7); 'Respondents motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more prejudiced attitudes towards other races/ethnicities than respondents motivated by elite religiosity' (H_8); 'Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more hostile attitude towards others than respondents motivated by elite religiosity' (H_9); 'Respondents motivated by elite religiosity have a more harmonious attitude towards modernity than respondents motivated by popular religiosity' (H_{10}), and 'Respondents motivated by elite religiosity exhibit less conservative in-group attitudes than respondents motivated by popular religiosity' (H_{11}).

We found that respondents who experienced popular religiosity were less open and friendly towards other religions. Moreover, men who experienced popular religiosity had poorer views on the equality and rights of women compared to men who experienced elite religiosity. It also turned out that participants who experienced popular religiosity expressed more (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and showed more conservative in-group attitudes than participants who experienced elite religiosity.

6.2. *Discussion*

This theoretical and empirical study has yielded the result that the forms and motivations of high religiosity vary across different groups. Based on the findings of this study, out of the total group of participants who experienced high religiosity, six out of ten participants experienced popular religiosity, while only two out of ten experienced elite religiosity.

Islam is not necessarily the most important factor in building the individual and social identity of Muslims. The literature and our sample suggest a number of demographic and socio-economic factors to explain why Dutch-Turkish Muslims generally experience popular religiosity. Some of these factors were briefly presented in the previous chapter, such as gender and age; educational status; household income; and social and cultural capital. There are many other factors that have not been directly addressed so far. These include the experience of immigration; structural and contextual factors such as the current economic and political crisis; government policies; and experiences with discrimination. Such factors may have an effect that

requires further investigation. In this section, therefore, we will continue to focus on the dynamic interrelation between elite and popular religiosity, and how this relates to the socio-economic situation of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. We discuss these relationships in light of our findings. We want to pay more attention to the role of these factors listed above, in order to deepen our understanding of the social, cultural and economic grounds of elite and popular religiosity.

The following discussion consists of five parts. First, 'Reflections on Glock's Five-Dimensional Scheme' (6.2.1) discusses the validity of Glock's 5-dimensional scale in the light of our findings. Second, 'Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity' (6.2.2) will discuss the patterns of the relationship between elite and popular religiosity. Third, 'Social-Cultural Factors Affecting Religiosity' (6.2.3) will discuss factors that may have an impact on elite and popular religiosity. Six factors will be discussed in this part. Fourthly, in section 6.2.4 'Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity', we continue to examine the processes and mechanisms by which religiosity may affect the socio-psychological attitudes of the research population. Finally, section 6.2.5 'Spirituality and Religiosity' illustrates the relevance and significance of spirituality in the sociology of elite and popular religiosity.

6.2.1. *Reflections on Glock's Five-dimensional Scheme*

As we outlined in chapter three, Glock indicated two types of research that could be conducted utilizing his five-dimensional scheme (see 3.1.2). The first type of research to which Glock referred focuses on the specification of components. He proposed a number of tentative components within the various dimensions, but emphasized that there was still a great deal of work to be done in the field of intra-dimensional differentiation. As we pointed out in chapter 3, Glock's exploration in collaboration with Rodney Stark progressed according to this principle, in line of work done by Weber (1963), Allport (1967) and Allen and Spilka (1967). Afterwards, in 1968, Glock and Stark identified and measured three components within the ideological dimension and two components within the ritualistic dimension. In light of this finding, they had to conclude that at least some of the five dimensions (e.g., the ideological) might encompass unrelated or even negatively related phenomena, and that the specific components of the different dimensions "are much more independent of one another than they are measures of the same thing" (p. 181). In order to make a meaningful

distinction within these dimensions, this study applied the elite/popular religiosity distinction. Our data, to some extent, are consistent with Glock and Stark's assumptions. In this study we found a negative correlation between our Elite Religiosity Scale and our Popular Religiosity Scale ($r = -.72$), scales that include elite and popular aspects of the ideological, ritualistic, intellectual and experiential dimensions.

The second type of research to which Glock referred focuses on the question of inter-dimensional independence. As a result of this type of research, we found that 24 items of our General Religiosity Scale loaded on a single dimension (see Appendix one: Table 36). In addition, our analysis revealed that 11 items of our Elite Religiosity Scale loaded on two factors. The first factor turned out to mainly represent elite belief (ideological dimension), elite ritual (ritualistic dimension) and elite knowledge (intellectual dimension). We labelled this factor '[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation'. The second factor turned out to mainly represent elite experience (experiential dimension). We labelled this factor 'experiential inessentiality and privacy'. In the same way, factor analysis revealed that 11 items of our Popular Religiosity Scale loaded on two factors. The first factor mainly represented popular belief (ideological dimension), popular ritual (ritualistic dimension) and popular knowledge (intellectual dimension). We labelled this factor 'material expectations and [spiritual and intellectual] stability'. The second factor primarily represented popular experience (experiential dimension). We labelled this factor 'experiential desirability and shareability'.

The data were generally in line with the study's expectations. The ideological, ritualistic and intellectual dimensions appear to represent a single dimension and seem to encompass phenomena that are analytically separable and empirically negatively related ('[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation' and 'material expectations and [spiritual and intellectual] stability'). The experiential dimension also seems to encompass phenomena that are analytically separable and empirically negatively related ('experiential inessentiality and privacy' and 'experiential desirability and shareability'). Based on these findings, it can be said that our data support the first approach, i.e., 'intra-dimensional differentiation', but not the second, i.e., the 'inter-dimensional independence' of the four dimensions. In other words, our research findings do not support the view that the five dimensions are empirical wholes.

Consequently, the findings of our research raise serious questions about the assumptions and conclusions found in many sociological studies of religion, especially serious questions about the research of scholars who focus on Turkish Muslims and generally support the view that the five dimensions are empirical wholes (Altınlı, 2011; Atalay, 2005; Ayten, 2009; Kafalı, 2005; Mehmedoğlu, 2004; Şahin, 2001; Uysal, 1995; Yaparel, 1987; Yapıcı, 2004; Yıldız, 1998, 2006). Most of these researchers have reported a positive relationship between the five dimensions, for instance. Our findings, on the other hand, suggest that the subcomponents of elite religiosity (elite belief, ritual, experience, knowledge) might be negatively correlated with the subcomponents of popular religiosity (popular belief, ritual, experience, knowledge) (see Table 17 in chapter 5, subsection 5.3). The findings of this study generally support the view that Glock's five dimensions can be regarded as heuristic and exploratory devices encompassing a variety of phenomena, which should be operationalized, conceptualized and measured before other types of analysis are attempted.

6.2.2. *Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity.*

In this study we explored 'What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity with regard to Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands' (fourth sub-question, *RQ₁d*). We hypothesized that 'Elite and popular forms of religiosity are negatively correlated with each other' (*H₁*). We indeed found a negative correlation between elite religiosity and popular religiosity ($r = -.72$), as expected. However, this does not mean that there is a *clear* differentiation between the two forms of religiosity, since we found that 66 (7.3%) respondents experienced aspects of both types simultaneously. Moreover, the respondents who are labelled as displaying 'elite religiosity' are not completely opposed to popular forms of religiosity, and vice versa. So there is an important aspect that needs to be stressed before the relationship between elite and popular religiosity can be discussed. This concerns the simultaneous experience of both types of religiosity that appears to be characteristic of a significant number of respondents, as described in the previous chapter. Allport, faced with comparable results in his studies, criticized the logic of these respondents and tried to resolve this puzzle by describing the endorsement of both 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic'

positions as "muddleheadedness" (Allport, 1967, p. 439).[62] Pargament et al. reacted to this blunt statement by stating that scoring high on the two orientations is not necessarily logically inconsistent, in the sense that people both "live" (intrinsic) and "use" (extrinsic) their religion (1997, pp. 65-66). This intersectionality is one of the key features of the everyday context, the meeting and interplay between social categories and identities (Andrew Kam-Tuck Yip & Nynäs, 2012, p. 8). Based on the findings of this study, we would rather speak of a contextualized domination of one type of religiosity over another type, or in Hermans' conceptualization, of the dominant position of one 'voice' over others at a given time and under specific circumstances (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). The concepts of religious 'voice' and position, and the Dialogical Self Theory (DST), can shed new light on the way in which individuals orchestrate their various voiced religious positions in so-called *I*-positions in the 'society of mind' (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). Hermans defines the dialogical self as a dynamic multiplicity of *I*-positions. The main characteristic of DST is:

> In the most succinct way, the dialogical self can be conceived of as a dynamic multiplicity of *I*-positions. In this view, the *I* emerges from its intrinsic contact with the (social) environment and is bound to particular positions in time and space. As such, the embodied I is able to move from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time. In this process of positioning, repositioning and counterpositioning, the *I* fluctuates among different and even opposed positions (both within the self and between the self and perceived or imagined others), and these positions are involved in relationships of relative dominance and social power. As part of sign-mediated social relations, positions can be voiced so that dialogical exchanges among positions can develop. The voices behave like interacting characters in a story or movie, involved in processes of question and answer, agreement and disagreement, conflicts and struggles, negotiations and integrations. Each of them has a story to tell about their own experiences from their own perspective. As different voices, these characters exchange knowledge and information about their respective me's, creating a complex, narratively structured self (Hermans, 2016, pp. 2-3).

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[62] Allport defines "muddleheadedness" in the following way: "these individuals seem to opt for a superficial 'hit and run' approach. Their mental set seems to be 'all religion is good'. 'My religious beliefs are what really lies behind my whole life'—Yes!' 'Although I believe in my religion, I believe there are many other important things in life'—Yes!' 'Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life'—Yes!' 'The church is highly important as a place to cultivate good social relationships'—Yes!' There seems to be one broad category— religion is OK." (Allport, 1967, p. 439).

A strong key metaphor in DST is that of 'voice'. When people take different positions, they tell different stories about themselves originating from different so-called *I*-positions. All voices are coloured by the ideas, values, expectations and behavioural patterns of the different social and cultural groups of which an individual is a member. Other persons and cultural groups manifest themselves as voices speaking in the self (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010).

For Hermans, 'religion' seems to have two meanings: 'traditional religiosity' and 'individual spirituality'. Hermans connects the traditional religious view with the traditional model of the self, and individual spirituality with the modern and postmodern model of the self. These conceptualizations include characteristics and motivations which are similar to those included in our conceptualizations of elite and popular religiosity, such as: reflective versus uncritical, openness to change versus closedness to change, associational versus communal, universal versus parochial, differentiated versus undifferentiated, personal versus institutional, and humility versus dogmatism. According to the traditional model of the self, "the self is not an autonomous entity but rather an integral part of a sacred whole" (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 84). "The God of the traditional model is a sovereign who wishes humans to obey him, instead of getting involved in a mutual dialogue" (ibid., p. 85). Within this model "the hierarchical system suppresses individual autonomy and freedom" (ibid., p. 86), and "there is a strong belief in fate and destiny" (ibid., pp. 98-99). The modern model of the self questioned these characteristics and found its justification not in a sacred order, but in the self as a sovereign, reflexive self. In the postmodern model of the self, the sovereign self is deconstructed as a multiple, fragmented, and decentred self, under the influence of diverse and constantly changing cultural forces (Zock, 2013, p. 19).

Hermans does not see a strict distinction between these three models. He argues that a previous model of the self does not become completely obsolete in a subsequent stage, emphasizing that aspects of the traditional self are still present in the modern and postmodern self. He claims that traditional religion can easily go off the rails - reducing, contesting, and even replacing the reflexivity, autonomy, and openness that are dominant characteristics of the modern and postmodern self. Hermans draws attention to the ontological insecurity accompanying the complexity and diversity of the postmodern *condition humaine*. According to Hermans, religious fundamentalism

is an emotional and defensive coping mechanism to deal with the insecurity caused by the plurality and the fragmentation of the postmodern world. The voice of "fundamentalism" can be strong or weak depending on the context. According to Hermans, traditional religion is an important source of defensive localization (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 114).

This study acknowledges the 'muddleheadedness' of the religiosity of some participants, and suggests that DST provides an interesting theoretical framework for an explanation and further explanation of this phenomenon. Our quantitative analysis focused mainly on participants who strongly experienced either elite or popular religiosity. As explained earlier, we excluded participants who simultaneously experienced elite and popular religiosity from follow-up analysis, to enable a careful analysis of these two aspects of religiosity. We therefore preferred to analyze first those respondents for whom one of the religious voices was clearly dominant. In other words, we mainly analyzed those individuals who disagreed with or were in conflict with the other religious voice. But this does not mean that the other religious voice is completely absent and rejected in such individuals. On the contrary, certain circumstances led respondents to express themselves with certain religious voices and these expressions may change as circumstances change. If we look, for example, at the participants who simultaneously expressed elite and popular religiosity, we can say that these different religious voices can, to a certain extent, be reconciled, even if they show very different and contradictory forms and motivations - just as postmodern relativism has drawn attention to the coexistence of disparate views and interpretations, even within one and the same person (Droogers, 2012, p. 72).

In the following sections we will discuss the circumstances that can influence the nature of the interrelation between elite and popular religiosity, and which outcomes may be deduced from this.

6.2.3. *Socio-Cultural Factors Affecting Religiosity*

This section will discuss factors that may have an impact on elite and popular religiosity. Six factors will be discussed. The sub-paragraph 'Immigration and Religiosity' (6.2.3.1) discusses the impact of an immigration background on religiosity. The sub-paragraph 'Education and Religiosity' (6.2.3.2) highlights how education plays a varied and important role in different aspects of Turkish religiosity.

We also discuss the issue of imam training and Diyanet's position on the production of Islamic knowledge in regard to elite and popular religiosity. The sub-paragraph 'Age, Cohort and Generational Effects on Religiosity' (6.2.3.3) illustrates the extent to which religiosity evolves in relation to age and generation. The sub-paragraph 'Economic Status and Religiosity' (6.2.3.4) discusses the relation between a person's economic situation and his/her religious orientation. The sub-paragraph 'Digital Media and Religiosity' (6.2.3.5) considers the religious education offered by television programmes, and how such programmes affect religiosity. Finally, 'Gender and Religiosity' (6.2.3.6) discusses the extent to which gender plays a role in elite and popular religiosity.

6.2.3.1. *Immigration and Religiosity*

The urban popular culture in Europe simply drew from various traditional cultures that were brought to the city, improvised in their forms, adapted by city dwellers to their new situation. For example, the festival and trade-fair culture which had long been a part of the 'little' tradition found its way into cities (Battani, Hall, & Neitz, 2004). Most Dutch-Turkish Muslims have a migrant background, although many were born in Europe. The first concern of Muslim migrants who came to the Netherlands was finding employment. First-generation migrants generally had a low level of education, and concerns about making money clearly took precedence over their Islamic identity (Böcker, 2000, p. 156). Most so-called 'guest workers' came from the rural areas of Turkey, and were joined by their family members in the years that followed (Abadan-Unat, 1976). Islamic life in the Netherlands therefore exhibited a very rural character. At the same time, there was a steady influx of well-educated migrants, but these were fewer in number (Güngör & Küçükcan, 2006). On the basis of Norris and Inglehart (2004) and their axioms for religious adherence levels, we would assume that religiosity is influenced by the developmental level of the country of origin, whether this is primarily agricultural or industrial, or religiously pluralistic.

In sum, although Turkey is considered to be an industrialized country, the migration from Turkey to the Netherlands in the last five decades was very rural in character. It seems that this rural character of migration did not only strongly influence the economic and educational status of Turkish migrants, but also their religious experience. A recent analysis of religion in the Turkish countryside in the twenty-first century, where religiosity is stronger than in the cities, indicated that among the

members of the rural working class who were religious, religiosity was only partly based on Muslim beliefs. Mardin showed that the structure and content of religious beliefs differed from what was promulgated in the city, and were heavily based on traditional beliefs, for example concerning magic (Mardin, 1995, p. 231).

The rapid internal migration and urbanization taking place in Turkey, which began around 1950, was accompanied by cultural pressure for the large numbers of people of rural origin who moved to the city. In sociological analyses, this evolution brought the concept of centre-periphery to attention. This process was interpreted by Mardin (1995, p. 234) and Sarıbay (1985) as an invasion of the traditional urban culture by the periphery. However, according to Gellner's (1994) and Türköne's model (1993), traditional popular religiosity in the city is diluted in favour of elite Islam. According to Mardin's and Sarıbay's model, this change moves from the periphery towards the centre, while according to Gellner's and Türköne's model this change takes place from top to bottom. Mardin's and Sarıbay's model views this change as a corruption, while Gellner's and Türköne's model views it as an improvement. In this study, we object to defining social dynamics through such kind of moral evaluation. Instead, we will try to investigate how local practices and interpretations of groups refer to Islam and how they overlap, interconnect and feed into (or alter) the negotiation of Islam.

From 1960 onwards, the external migration from Turkey to Europe and the continuing urbanization process triggered certain related problems and questions. The religious expressions of Muslim guest workers in the European public sphere in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s can be described as signalling a kind of agoraphobia.[63] Muslim migrants were not often seen in the public sphere and even less heard. Gradually, during this period, the construction of mosques in the Netherlands led to a greater public visibility of Islam (Landman & Wessels, 2005). The 1990s can be characterized as the decade that encouraged Muslim migrants to discover the European society beyond the doors of their mosque, and to enter the public sphere in order to gain visibility. The growth of religious expression in the public sphere led to new

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[63] Agoraphobia is an anxiety disorder characterized by fear symptoms in places or situations where the person experiences the environment as unsafe and feels trapped, helpless or embarrassed. These situations can include various kinds of open or public spaces, or simply being outdoors.

encounters for Europe's secular societies, a process that many observers described as the return or revival of religion in the public sphere (Cherribi, 2010).

This growing visibility of a Turkish-Muslim identity took place in relation to three distinct groups: the non-Muslim European majority, Muslim communities of different ethnic origins, and Turkish-Muslim communities that continued to reflect the old political and ideological divisions in Turkey. Some scholars have given voice to the view that this web of relationships enables Muslims to adopt an Islamic perspective that appreciates democratic values, recognizes the plurality of Islam in the Netherlands, and resists attempts to portray Muslims as a homogenous population (Güngör & Küçükcan, 2006).

In order to understand the nature of the relationships between these groups, we must emphasize the pillarization model (*verzuiling*) that was peculiar to the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1975; Ter Avest & Bakker, 2013; Vink, 2007). In recent decades Muslims have defended their interests on the basis of two Dutch constitutional principles. The first is the constitutional principle of the neutrality of the state towards all religious groups. The other is the pillarization system, a socio-political system of organization. This is a denominational system for organizing not only religious but also ideological communities, such as Catholics, Protestants, Socialists, and Liberals. These groups used to have separate organizations in the field of education, health, media, and politics (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1995; Sunier, 1998). In the 1970s followed an era of de-pillarization, during which the Dutch population rapidly lost interest in religion. As a result, the pillars have lost much of their salience (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014, p. 35).

In spite of this de-pillarization trend, the position of Muslims was strengthened by the emphasis placed on the equality principle in the 1983 constitutional reforms (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meyer, 2001). Nowadays, the Dutch authorities use the pillarization system to anticipate the need for religious, educational, media, and health facilities. With the ongoing discussion as the separation of state and religion grows and religion in the majority society melts away, the opportunities for Muslim organizations to be accepted as a separate pillar diminish. Nevertheless, the residual system from the pillarization period provides Muslims with a strong basis for applying for government funding to found public broadcasting organizations and educational facilities (e.g., Islamic schools and the Islamic University of Rotterdam). The

pillarization system also gives Muslims access to the state-supported national and local media (Yükleyen, 2011, p. 151; See also Akbulut, 2016; Budak, Bakker, & ter Avest, 2018).

Critics have claimed that this strategy stimulated a separatist approach and did not promote 'integration' (Landman, 2002). It was further argued that this produced a new type of structurally excluded ghettoes (Kaya, 2009, p. 167), and did little to improve the marginal situation of Dutch Muslims (Vasta, 2007).

Nevertheless, the pillarization system has had many advantages for Muslim communities. It provided them with a plural religious market for a peaceful modernization process, for instance. Pillarization has played a crucial role in the external opportunities that have shaped Muslim mobilization and the institutionalization of Islam over the past 35 years (Kaya, 2009; Maussen, 2012). The confessionally defined pillars, which nearly organized every aspect of citizen's daily lives in a religious way, helped many Dutch-Turkish Muslims to enter modernity without losing their sense of ontological security (Ter Borg, 2009).[64] However, the side effects of modernization, in particular the loss of ontological security, cannot be underestimated. The argument put forward in recent articles (Turner & Arslan, 2013; Voyé, 2004) is that, in a globalizing context, divisions between religions have increased rather than decreased and that there is a risk that multicultural societies become seriously divided. The fear and uncertainty[65] may encourage people to delegate religious power to 'specialists' or persons with a potential for charisma who

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[64] Ontological security is term used by Giddens to describe the basic human need for predictability and understandability of the world: people need the social and natural worlds in which they live to show a recognizable pattern, so that they can operate in these worlds with a certain degree of confidence. The term thus refers to the search for some sort of order in an uncertain and often changing world (Giddens, 1979).

[65] Hermans and Hermans-Konopka indicate that "uncertainty can be reduced by giving the lead to one powerful position that is permitted to dominate the repertoire as a whole. When people are located in a field of divergent and contradictory positions where they have to give answers to a variety of complex situations, the transfer of responsibility to some authority, guru, strong leader, or "godfather'' may be a way to reduce the burden of uncertainty when it has reached the level of negative feelings. This reaction can be seen in cases of religious orthodoxy or political fundamentalism as they thrive on simplification. It can also be noticed in the supporters of political parties that take an extreme and radical stance on issues of immigration and want to close national boundaries for newcomers" (See: Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 45).

will seize this opportunity, and seek to increase the religious power offered to them by converting it into other types of power (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 45; Ter Borg, 2009). As Ter Borg points out, popular religion is usually fragmentary and ad hoc, and on permanent standby for any occasion when ontological security is at risk (2004, 2008). For this reason, popular religiosity can stimulate fundamentalist and ethnocentric views in a globalizing context.

On the basis of our earlier observations in the field, we can express the view that the construction of society through pillars is not beneficial for religious pluralism, coherence or cosmopolitanism in the long run. Turkish religious and political groups constitute parallel mental worlds to a certain extent, and remain relatively independent of each other. Intra-religious and cultural dialogue between these groups has little or no effect. Each group has its own religious and ideological reality, and this reality is emphasized, for example, through Friday sermons and periodical publications (such as newspapers and magazines) with particular reference to their religious and ideological basis. As one imam put it, "They don't go to each other's mosques. These communities and their mosques behave like churches" (Yükleyen & White, 2007, p. 30). Further observations indicate that zones of encounter are steadily diminishing. The feast of Ramadan and the feast of Sacrifice, which brought the broader community of Muslims together in the 1980s and 1990s, are now celebrated in much narrower settings. Each community prefers to celebrate its festivals with its own members: those with whom one shares a particular worldview or religious understanding. However, these special days are intended to bring the wider Muslim community together, despite differences in religious, cultural and political worldviews. On the basis of our observations, we have to conclude that the opposite is happening today: the 'pillars' are strongly encouraged not to mix. Group interests are prioritized and the cohesive objectives of religion are suspended. In such communitarian settings, group solidarity is maintained and strengthened by serving God, and, if necessary, by demonizing other groups (a strategy also used in the ideology wars between the traditional Dutch pillars (Ter Borg, 2009)).

The 2012 report of the Social Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP, scientific institute that conducts social scientific research and reports to the Dutch government) strongly supports these observations. Dutch-Turkish citizens score low on 'integration' compared to other groups. They have less contact with the Dutch majority society,

they are less proficient in the Dutch language, they lag behind on the labour market and in schools, and have a 'traditional' view on moral values (Huijnk & Dagevos, 2012). According to the SCP, this low integration score could be linked to a number of factors. One of the possible factors is the strong attachment to religious organizations within the Turkish community. A recent survey has revealed that, compared to three other groups of migrants (Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans), Dutch-Turkish citizens have strong and stable religious organizations. The dominant image that has taken root in the Dutch public debate - particularly in politics and in the media - is that the Dutch-Turkish community is less open to Dutch society as a whole and is more oriented towards Turkish society. In this context, the term 'parallel community' or 'parallel society' has often been mentioned (Speelman, 2016, p. 166).

Recently, many scholars have stressed the need for a process of de-pillarization. They see a direct relationship between the rise of popular culture and the de-pillarization of Dutch society. For the pillarized organizations, which were based on political and religious values, popular culture posed a threat because it was thought to create undisciplined and uncontrolled collectives of individuals, who would follow their own taste and emotions, which would ultimately lead to the dissolvement of the pillarized organisation's very disciplined religious/ideological basis (Moore & Nierop, 2006). The de-pillarization trend will undoubtedly also stimulate new religious transformations in Muslim communities. The question then becomes to what extent and in what way processes of individualization and de-pillarization encourage the Dutch-Turkish Muslim communities? According to some, the search for a 'pure' Islam without local communities and culture could push Muslims towards Salafism (see 6.2.3.2). Others, however, believe that new forms of spirituality might emerge within European societies, which could attract a considerable number of people (see 6.2.5). We will briefly discuss these issues in the following paragraphs.

6.2.3.2. *Education and Religiosity*

Different studies have offered different conclusions regarding the relation between religiosity and education, depending on whether religiosity is measured by religious practice (e.g., attendance at places of worship) or specific religious beliefs (e.g., belief in miracles). Substantial differences between nations have emerged. For example, some studies indicate that the intensity of belief decreases with education, while

attendance at places of worship and religious practice increases with education (Eilers, Seitz & Hirschler, 2008; Sacerdote & Glaeser, 2001). Other studies indicate that religious people have, on average, a higher level of education than people with little to no religious faith (Kavanagh, 2011; Norris & Inglehart, 2011; Smith, 1998). Yet other studies find that the positive correlation between low religious affiliation / absence of religious affiliation and education has been reversed in recent decades (Smith & Snell, 2009; Voas & McAndrew, 2014). One study concluded that in the US the majority of professors, even at 'elite' universities, are religious (Gross & Simmons, 2009).

Looking at the overall picture generated by the studies carried out in Western countries, it can be shown that a positive relationship between religiosity and education is more common (Köktaş, 1993). However, studies carried out in particular in Turkey show that a higher level of education causes a general decline in several aspects of religiosity. For example, Köse and Ayten (2009) indicate a negative relationship between education and popular religious beliefs. Günay (1999) and Köktaş (1993) indicate that as the level of education increases, the tendency to carry out daily prayers and fasting decreases. In the Netherlands, for example, more highly educated Muslims of Turkish descent practice their religion considerably less, and adhere less strictly to the rules than their less well-educated compatriots (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012).[66]

One of the important conclusions that can be drawn from the present study is the important role of education in the changes in the level of elite and popular religiosity observed among Dutch-Turkish Muslims. We found that the intensity of elite religiosity increases with education, while the intensity of popular religiosity decreases with education (see: Table 23 in chapter 5, subparagraph 5.3.3.1).

This raises questions for further analyses. Will popular religiosity decline in the coming years? Will popular religiosity still appeal to Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the future as the new generations grow up and as the average level of education among young Muslims increases? Future longitudinal studies on popular religiosity might be able to answer these questions. Researchers found that Dutch-Turkish citizens lag

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[66] If we look at mosque attendance by Dutch-Turkish Muslims with higher and lower levels of education, it is striking that until 2004 the higher educated visited the mosque less often than the lower educated; however, since 2004 this difference has disappeared and the higher and lower educated visit the mosque with equal frequency (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012).

behind in education when compared to indigenous Dutch citizens (Driessen, 2012, p. 74; Hartgers, 2012, pp. 18-21; Staring, Geelhoed, Aslanoglu, Hiah & Kox, 2014). According to recent research by the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* ('Statistics Netherlands', CBS), the educational level of Dutch-Turkish citizens is the lowest among the non-native populations living in the Netherlands.[67] However, a slight increase in the education level of the Dutch-Turkish population has been noted (Driessen, 2012, p. 25; Gijberts & Iedema, 2012, pp. 90-91; Gijberts & Vervoort, 2009; Herweijer, 2009, p. 106; Herweijer, 2012, pp. 103-104; Stevens, Clycq, Timmerman & Van Houtte, 2011, p. 13). There is also an educational gap between the first and second-generation Muslims living in the Netherlands: while the first generation received little education, the second generation is gradually entering higher education (CBS, 2010; Dagevos, Gijsberts & Praag, 2003; Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009; SCP, 2011).

It therefore seems that education, one of the important socio-economic factors linked to religiosity, plays a varied and important role in different aspects of Turkish religiosity. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to generalize the results. As we will discuss below, the education provided by Dutch Muslim organizations and the religious elite, and the religious education provided by the parents, are also significant socio-economic factors in the development of Muslim religiosity, and therefore need more attention.

Education Supplied by Official Elites

There are many factors that could influence the religious characteristics of Turkish Muslim minorities in the decades to come. Insight into suppliers of Islam (the supply side) is just as important as insight into the demand side. Among these suppliers, Islamic communities have a particularly strong position in the Netherlands. They will determine the course of the interaction between elite and popular religiosity, and might push current developments into new directions.

Just like in Turkey, where the Qurʾān schools undertook pioneering work within the Muslim community, Islamic educational groups started to organize themselves in

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[67] See Figure 5 in the appendix two: 'Proportion of highly-educated 25 to 64-year olds by ethnic background'.

the Netherlands in the 1970s. These included the Turkish Diyanet Foundation, the Nur movement[68], the Milli Görüş Movement, and the Süleymancı Movement (Bommel, 1992, pp. 135-137). We found no significant differences in the distribution of elite and popular religiosity linked to community involvement. We prefer to avoid generalizations with regard to these Islamic communities, as such small subsamples cannot possibly lead to valid generalizations with regard to the community as a whole. These communities deserve special attention.

However, it may be appropriate here to consider a problem that is shared by all of them. It concerns the training of imams. The relations between Islamic communities such as Milli Görüş, the Nur Movement, Süleymancı, Diyanet and others are based on competition. Although they use different strategies, they all have the priority to increase their number of followers. This has led to competition when organizational interests clash. The differences in imam training and the failure to establish a representative body for Muslims, illustrate this clash of interests (Yükleyen & White, 2007, p. 129). Dutch public debates assume that there is an inherent tension between the traditional task of an imam and his tasks in the secularized Dutch society (Boender & Kanmaz, 2002; Boender, 2007). The questions that arise relate to two central issues: the transmission of Islam to young people living in European secular societies and, at a more abstract level, the criteria that 'proper' leaders of European Muslim communities must meet. Can they act as intermediaries between European and Islamic societies? Do they have sufficient knowledge of the host country to counsel young people? To what extent do the countries of origin exert political and ideological influence on Muslims in the host countries through these key figures? How can these imams function in the host society if they do not speak Dutch? How do they interpret the norms and values of their host societies? Should they not receive their training in the host country instead of in their country of origin? (Boender, 2013; Boender & Kanmaz, 2002). These pressing questions and the changing political climate should stimulate the development of an educational programme for training imams in the Netherlands, which has gone through a very complicated process of discussion and negotiation for almost a quarter of a century (Ghaly, 2008). The issue remains highly relevant. These Islamic groups all have their own mosques and their own imams,

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[68] This is not a homogeneous group. Although all members are declared followers of Said Nursi, their methodologies are quite different.

specifically chosen from individuals with the same ideological background in Turkey. Most of these imams are incompetent in many respects even they have received high education; they can recite the Qurʾān in phonetic Arabic but do not understand the language; they know little more about Islamic law than the basic elements, which they have not learned to interpret. To this day, imported imams have no experience of European urban life, they often do not speak Dutch, and are appointed only for a limited period of time.

In the 1980s, it seemed that mosque imams had much more influence in the diaspora than in their home countries, because of the different functions that the mosque fulfilled in the diaspora. However, second and third-generation migrants tend to understand the language of their country of residence better than the language of their parents or grandparents (Bruinessen, 2011). Recently, this influential role of imams has begun to fade. Young Muslims became dissatisfied with imams whose experiences lacked any connection with their own Dutch lives. Instead, they began to nurture their own Islamic self-understanding and they feel no need for religious guidance or authority. It has been observed that young Muslims prefer to develop their own individual religiosity and prefer to find their own answers, independent of mosques or religious specialists (Becker & De Hart, 2006; Borg, 2008; Sunier, 2014; WRR, 2006). The evolution was that parents stopped sending their children to Qurʾān schools, and that the position of the imam as a religious authority became threatened. It is clear that an imam with insufficient knowledge of Dutch is seriously handicapped in his communication with second and third-generation Muslims (Landman, 1999).

One of the respondents, Yunus (44), stated that:

> When I have questions in my mind, I prefer to just search for answers on Google rather than asking imams. My friends don't want to ask their imam any more questions either, because they already know that he won't have the right answer. Unfortunately, the imams come from Turkey and you cannot apply their answers here.

This is because officials have become indifferent and 'lazy' in their work and have lost their ability to be socially responsive, as was the case in the context of state-supported religious monopolies in pre-modern and early modern Europe (Stark & McCann, 1993). Turkish Muslim immigrants are faced with the challenge to reconcile

their religious identity with the Dutch culture in which they grew up.[69] Moreover, the terrorist attacks in Europe and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan Islamic fundamentalist shocked the entire nation, forcing the government to take measures against what it feared was an increasingly radical culture among Muslims. The lack of knowledge of the Dutch culture and Dutch language among imams was seen a major obstacle to Muslim integration. With respect to second-generation radicalization, Tillie (2010), Kepel (2006) and Olivier Roy (2004) indicate that many young people reject a large part of their parents' (and their imams') understanding of Islam as irrelevant local culture, and that the search for a 'pure' Islam without culture almost inevitably draws them towards Salafism.[70]

In response, the Dutch government set up pilot programmes in Islamic theology in 2005 (De Koning, 2014). In 2007, government-funded imam training initiatives,[71] arguing that "training for imams in the Netherlands may significantly contribute to the integration of young migrants in particular, and help them to defend themselves against radicalization" (Dutch Ministry of Justice, 2007). It has also been brought up that imams trained in the Netherlands would be better acquainted with the Dutch situation.[72] They could also act as a bridge between the Muslim community and Dutch

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[69] Here we are mainly focusing on Turkish institutions and communities. Outside the Turkish communities, however, there are certain initiatives which are rarely consulted by members of the Turkish communities. In general, Muslims in the West to a certain extent consult a variety of religious authorities on all kinds of problems related to the application of the norms and values of their faith in the Western context. The religious authorities consulted by them are located in both the Muslim and the Western world. Moreover, councils of Islamic jurisprudence, both at the national and the international levels, are developing new interpretations of Islamic values as well, based on the modern principle of collective *ijtihâd*. For more information see: Shadid & van Koningsveld, 2002, pp. 149-170.

[70] However, Olivier Roy notes that compared to other Muslims, Turkish migrants tend to preserve their language and ethno-national identity (Roy, 2004, p. 123)

[71] Welmoet Boender discusses the immigration policy with regard to imams. In her view, fear of fundamentalism should not be the sole motivation for governmental action in this domain. Boender questions whether this interference is appropriate, given a long history of creating a negative image of Islam. According to Boender, "only if there are real extremist actions - on religious or political grounds - which disturb the public order, should the government interfere and let the public interest prevail" (see Boender, 2000, pp. 155-169).

[72] The Ministries of Internal Affairs and Education formulate this as follows: "The organisational religious and worldview levels can contribute to the views of their members on Dutch society and can strengthen their sense of responsibility towards that society. They can, together with other societal forces, prevent their members from decaying into marginality and worse [sic]; they may help their members to make the right choices concerning their

society and thus contribute to the integration of Muslim migrants (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk & Meyer, 2001). The government intended to develop a socio-cultural policy that encompassed religion and 'life principles' (Landman, 1999).

Over the past decades, the Dutch Diyanet Foundation (*Islamitische Stichting Nederland*, ISN) succeeded in becoming the largest mosque organization in the Netherlands, controlling 143 of the 220 Dutch-Turkish mosques (Sunier & Landman, 2011, 2014). However, the representatives of Turkish Islam in Europe have refrained from participating in this project as partners due to reservations about Diyanet's curriculum and the teacher's educational backgrounds. The training of imams in Europe and the recruitment of candidates among Muslims living in Europe have not been Diyanet's priorities in recent years. Instead, Diyanet draws from a vast pool of imams trained in Turkish high schools for imams (*imam hatip lisesi*), and from preachers and practitioners at their theological faculties. However, increasing criticism of this policy by European Muslims and politicians has prompted Diyanet to take up this issue and to enter into negotiations about setting up imam training facilities in Europe (Sunier & Landman, 2014). Diyanet chose to develop its own project, whereby Muslim students who graduated from the Imam Hatip School[73] in the Netherlands would move to Turkey to study at Turkish theology faculties under Turkish scholars. In this way, young Muslims who have been predominantly immersed in the Dutch language and culture, could learn the Islamic sciences directly from Muslim scholars and become the new generation of imams in Europe. Under this policy, the Imam Hatip School supported by Diyanet started to work in 2013 under the umbrella of *Ibn Ghaldoun*, an Islamic school for VMBO, HAVO and VWO students in Rotterdam (Anadolu Ajansı, 2013).

The project of the Dutch government ended due to high costs and low participation of Muslim students. Moreover, Diyanet's project was stopped by the Dutch Ministry of Education because of a scandal that broke out at the time, which resulted in the

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functioning in the economic, social and cultural sense, while respecting Dutch law and Dutch social rules. Imams can make an important contribution to this." See: Nota Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en OC&W, 1998, pp. 8-9.

[73] As the name suggests, these schools were originally founded to train government-employed imams, after the abolition of *madrasas* in Turkey through the Unification of Education act.

closure of the *Ibn Ghaldoun* School (Kasteleijn, 2013).[74]

The other question is whether Diyanet really is able to train elite imams for European societies through working with Turkish theology faculties. Recent developments have aroused doubts. In 2012, the attempt of the he Council of Higher Education (CoHE)[75] to abolish the philosophy courses offered by the faculty of theology seemed to signal anti-academic sentiment in Turkey (Demircan, 2015b). In response, a considerable number of theologians stated that abolishing the philosophy courses offered by theology faculties would in the medium and long term promote Salafism in Turkey, and that this form of theological education would lead nowhere (Demir, 2015; Kara, 2013). These sharp reactions from academics led to the withdrawal of the proposal (*Today's Zaman*, 2013). However, afterwards, the Council of Higher Education unexpectedly made a number of changes to the curriculum, which led to renewed discussions. These changes in the curriculum of theology faculties prove to a certain extent that Fatih M. Şeker was right when he stated in his books *The Formation Period of Turkish Religious Thought* (2013) and *The Turkish Mindset and Philosophy of Life* (2015) that the new Salafism increasingly dominates the contemporary Turkish interpretations of Islam. Such interpretations of Islam can lead to extreme hostility towards traditional interpretative communities and towards all forms of rationalism, intellectualism and mysticism in Islam (Reddig, 2011).

Yapıcı (2002) illustrated some characteristics of dogmatic religiosity. Although the orientation of popular religion and Salafism is not identical, it can be seen that both types of religiosity share a number of similar dogmatic characteristics. Both types of religiosity emphasize a homogenized idea of Islam and textually and philologically centred interpretative orientations; they share a belief in the fixed, stable meaning of the Qurʾanic text; and they lack a thematic value- and goal-centred approach to Qurʾanic hermeneutics (Demircan, 2015a; İşcan, 2006, 2015; Lohlker, 2011; Scalett,

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[74] In September 2014, it was succeeded by the Avicenna College, a new Islamic secondary school with a new board of management (De Koning, 2015).

[75] The higher education system in Turkey is supervised by the Council of Higher Education (CoHE). The CoHE is an autonomous institution which is responsible for the planning, coordination and governance of higher education system in Turkey in accordance with the Turkish Constitution and the Higher Education Laws.

2006; Yapıcı, 2002). For this reason we believe that it is not very difficult for Salafi movements to manipulate and influence those population groups that experience popular religiosity. According to recently published data collected by the Pew Research Center in 11 countries with a significant Muslim population, respondents overwhelmingly expressed negative views on ISIS. Seven out of ten respondents in Turkey had unfavourable opinions about ISIS, while one out of ten (8%) had positive opinions (Poushter, 2015). Although these numbers are encouraging, 8% of a population of 79 million in Turkey is still 6 million people, a frighteningly large number. Other reports found fewer positive opinions among Muslim respondents (Akyol, 2014; *Global Turkey Social Trends Survey*, 2016).

From this point of view, it can be said that the religiosity experienced by Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands is to some extent exposed to Salafi ideologies.

6.2.3.3. *Age, Cohort and Generational Effects on Religiosity*

Studies on the effect of age and generation on religiosity report that intense religious changes are taking place among second-generation migrants (Azak, 2008; Berger, 2015). But the direction of the change is interpreted differently by scholars. A majority of scholars indicate that the second generations who descend from North African or Turkish migrant families, consider themselves more strongly as Muslims when compared to their elders. The second generation is more religious, in the sense that it is more strict in its observance of the rules of Islam and its search for an authentic or 'pure' Islam (Roeland, Aupers, Houtman, De Koning & Noomen, 2010), i.e., an Islam based on its normative sources (Bartels, 2000; Buijs, 2009; Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006; Buitelaar, 2006; Korf & Bovenkerk, 2007). However, a different analysis shows that there is a pattern of secularization among Muslims in Europe: the longer they stay in Europe, the higher their level of education, and the more they participate in the labour market, the less concerned they become about their religion. (For the Netherlands see: Huijnk, 2018; Lans & Rooijackers, 1992; Phalet & Haker, 2004; Phalet & van Praag, 2004) (For Germany see: Şen, 2008).

Islam in the EU countries shows a range of differences which are linked to the countries of origin. The findings of our study, which largely revolve around a Dutch-Turkish sample, are to a certain extent in line with the findings referred to above, which report the secularization of the second generation (cf. Huijnk, 2018, p. 84). Our

analysis revealed a positive correlation between age and *general religiosity*, which indicates that the older respondents - who in our study are mainly first generation - are more religious than the younger respondents - who in our study are mainly second generation. Our main objective, however, is not just to measure the correlations between general religiosity and age and generation. Instead, we seek to measure the correlations related to age and generation with a focus on the intra-religious aspects of general religiosity, i.e., with a focus on elite and popular religiosity.

Our expectation was that 'Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and above) experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-35)' (*E2*). Our findings indicated that older respondents experience popular and high religiosity to a larger degree than younger respondents (see Table 28 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.3.5). In connection with this result, we also found that first-generation respondents experience popular and high religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation respondents (see Table 26 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.3.3).

If we look at the *age effect*, the religious tendencies of the respondents can be explained in a different way. Sociologists have specified how religiosity changes depending on age or life-cycle events, such as leaving the parental home or marriage. These are referred to as 'age effects' on religiosity. This approach assumes that the effects of ageing on religiosity are constant over time (Roof & Wilson, 1983). For example, young adults currently have little religious involvement, but when they are 40 and married, their involvement in a religious community will increase, and when they are 60 and face death, that involvement will increase even further. The following ideas may also be suggested in order to explain the results listed above. Young people are a less socialized group and less likely to fulfil traditional roles, which may reduce their interest in popular religiosity. On the other hand, older people invest more in traditional role patterns, attitudes and beliefs, and are less motivated to re-examine them. These beliefs could make them receptive to popular religiosity (Güngör, 2012; Hökelekli, 2006, 2009; Karaşahin, 2012).

Other questions that arise here are to what extent the power of religious heritage differs for Turks living in the Netherlands and Turks living in Turkey, and to what extent the religiosity of the parents and grandparents influences the religiosity of the second and third generation. Another theory that should be mentioned here is 'the continuity theory of ageing.' This theory states that:

In making adaptive choices, middle-aged and older adults attempt to preserve and maintain existing psychological and social patterns by applying familiar knowledge, skills, and strategies. According to this theory, continuity in aging is seen as a dynamic and evolutionary developmental process in which individuals grow, adapt, and change; however, these changes are consistent with the person's underlying ideology and past experiences (Diggs, 2008, p. 233).

Our study is not a longitudinal study and therefore does not investigate changes in faith, belief, and behaviour over time. This study is cross-sectional because it has been performed only once and the results are limited to the time at which the study was performed. All we can say here is that our findings were counterintuitive to our expectations. Our expectations were that religious elites tend to emphasize verification of beliefs, which includes doubt and questioning, and that respondents who adhere to popular religiosity tend to emphasize imitation through the family connection. Initial analysis showed that items 39 and 68 related to the family connection did not correlate significantly with the other elite and popular religiosity scale items. Therefore, these items were excluded.[76] In addition, respondents were asked to what extent their family influenced their religious education. Contrary to our expectations (E_5), we found that elite religiosity is positively correlated with family ($r = .18$). We found no significant correlation between popular religiosity and family-based religious education, contrary to our qualitative findings gathered through participant observation. On the basis of these qualitative findings, we continue to believe that the religiosity of family elders is an important and influential factor in popular religiosity. We estimate that this aspect of religiosity is very sensitive and needs more attention in the area of item construction, in order to obtain reliable findings and to avoid irritation on behalf of the respondents.

To explore this issue further, we can consult a recent study on the intergenerational effects of migration published in 2015. This study compared three dimensions[77] between Turks living in Europe and Turks living in Turkey from generation to generation. It was found that first-generation migrants and non-migrants did not show

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[76] The excluded items related to family connection were: Item 39 - A major factor in my religious development has been the importance of religion for my parents; Item 68 - I gained my religious knowledge mainly through my parents.

[77] The three dimensions that were measured were: *subjective religiosity* - reflects a person's judgment of his/her own piety; *individual religiosity* - comprises the practice of religious duties such as prayer or fasting which can be performed on an individual basis in private places; *communal religiosity* - public manifestations of religion, such as communal worship or Friday prayers.

a significant difference on any religiosity measures (Guveli & Ganzeboom, 2015, p. 303). This finding contradicts the assimilation hypothesis that migrants adopt the secular way of life of European countries over time. On the other hand, this finding does support the religious reliance hypothesis,[78] according to which migrants are expected to be more religious than non-migrants or as religious as non-migrants. The authors of the study concluded that grandparents and parents had a significant positive influence on each of the three measurements of religiosity (Guveli & Ganzeboom, 2015, p. 305). This also indicates that the manner in which parents and grandparents believe and practice their religion has positive effects on their children or grandchildren.[79] Empirical results of international surveys like the one conducted by Gallup (2002, 2009), confirm that Turks involve their families, especially their parents, in making important decisions. A high degree of continuity in religious ideas and practices was observed (Sunier, 1992). This may mean that the majority of young Turkish Muslims will experience a higher degree of popular religiosity as they grow older, precisely because their family elders experience popular religiosity to a high degree.

However, some aspects of cultural-religious heritage can only be retained with considerable difficulty. This applies in particular to religious practices and rituals connected with a local or regional religious infrastructure in the country of origin, such as aspects connected with the veneration of saints, the celebration of seasonal festivals, and many other aspects of popular religion (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1992). As Landman (1992, p. 52) points out: "whereas about 300 mosques have been established in the Netherlands so far, it may take quite some time before the first Sufi saint whose tomb could become the centre of religious activity will be buried in this country. Only then will popular Sufism be institutionalized in Holland."

Relations between religious and ethnic identity, age and generation can reflect the effect of living through a particular period in history, in specific circumstances. This is called a period effect or, in sociology, a 'cohort effect'. Cohort analysis reminds us

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[78] Religious reliance theory argues that migrants retain their religious involvement, identity, and beliefs because religion is a resource in their new environment. See: (Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007).

[79] Marjo Buitelaar's qualitative study is one of the important publications on life stories about parenting styles and the transmission of religion. See: Buitelaar, 2013.

that the cultural context shapes social expectations regarding age-related behaviour. The status of Islamic communities as diasporic settlements around the globe has been profoundly and perhaps permanently influenced by 'the global war on terror' (Es, 2012; Savage, 2004), which was spurred on by events such as 9/11[80], the bombings in London in 2005 and the more recent Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016) terrorist attacks, and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh (2004). This generates new cohorts at the local level. Xenophobia and racism do not make a subtle distinction between religious fundamentalism and moderate Islam, and therefore anyone who has a Middle Eastern appearance can become the target of public distrust or anger. For convenience's sake, people with completely different backgrounds were lumped together under the common denominator of 'Muslim culture' (Sunier, 2005). After the murder of Theo van Gogh, at least 10 Muslim schools and mosques were subjected to burning and vandalism. In 2005, a survey among 800 Dutch citizens living in four major cities revealed that a large majority saw relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in a very negative light.[81] Furthermore, numerous recent court cases against radicalized Muslim youths have kept terrorism in the media, and the majority of Dutch people claim that their sense of security has disappeared (Turner & Nasir, 2013).

In light of these findings, we express the opinion that the current European atmosphere, in which existential threats are perceived, could stimulate the growth of popular religiosity among the population, which could then acquire a fundamentalist character because of its fragmentary and pragmatist nature.

6.2.3.4. *Economic Status and Religiosity*

In this study, 'elite religion' was defined based on Weber's ideas as comprising specific forms of religious praxis and belief, which are *generally* practiced by the socially and economically privileged strata of society. In social surveys, income is one of the indicators of socio-economic status and religious beliefs. Some studies indicate that the socio-economic conditions of Muslims largely regulate the direction of their religious choices. It turns out, for example, that Muslim migrants radicalize because

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[80] Landman and Wessels state that in the broader field of political debates on multiculturalism and the position of Islam in the Netherlands, a shift hast taken place since 11 September 2001. See: Landman & Wessels, 2005.

[81] For a survey that measures ethnocentric attitudes of Dutch citizens towards Muslims, see: Eisinga, Kraaykamp & Scheepers, 2012.

they are unhappy with their low economic status (Heitmeyer & Schroder, 1997). In our analysis, we found that respondents with a higher income experience popular religiosity to a greater extent than respondents with a lower income. How can this result be explained?

The 'socially and economically privileged' strata of society enjoy a kind of wealth in terms of education, art and high culture. If we look at the profile of rich and religious Turks living in the Netherlands, we see that until recently they had a low income and did not inherit any particular wealth from the previous generation. The phenomenon of rich Turks in the Netherlands is a new phenomenon which only applies to a very small number of individuals, rather than to communities.

Based on Ibn Khaldūn's and Durkheim's work as we briefly outlined in chapter 3, we think that an improvement of economic conditions would provide Dutch-Turkish Muslims with the means to develop an elite religious culture in the long run. According to Islamic jurisprudence, the foundations of a good individual and social life are organized at three levels, namely (1) necessities (ḍarūriyyāt), (2) comforts (ḥājiyyāt) and (3) refinements or luxury items (taḥsīniyyāt).[82] The third category includes items and activities that go beyond the category of comforts. These are items that do not primarily remove or relieve discomforts, but rather add beauty and elegance to life. These include innocent hobbies, recreation, objects of enjoyment, and ornamentations (quality furniture, paintings, flowers, jewellery, etc.) (Masud, 1995; Shāṭibī et al., 2003). An example of this in religious experience is iḥsān. This term means 'becoming excellent' in the pillars of faith. The term is derived from the same root as the term taḥsīniyyāt (i.e., refinements or luxury items) and is an especially important concept in Sufi thought, representing a high level of religiosity and spirituality. Ibn Khaldūn uses these categories in the social theory that he develops in his work Muqaddimah. Although Ibn Khaldūn believes that Bedouin tribes and sedentary communities are natural groups, he believes in 'movement' from necessities to luxury items, and 'movement' from primitive to civilized culture. This is based on the idea that the gathering of bare necessities in the desert precedes the luxury and comfort of the

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[82] It should be noted that Islam jurisprudence does permit the consumption of 'illegal' luxuries which are prohibited.

sedentary social organization. The harshness of desert life precedes the ease of sedentary life:

> It should be known that differences of condition among people are the result of the different ways in which they make their living. Social organization enables them to cooperate toward that end and to start with the simple necessities of life, before they get to conveniences and luxuries… Sedentary people means the inhabitants of cities and countries, some of whom adopt the crafts as their way of making a living, while others adopt commerce. They earn more and live more comfortably than Bedouins, because they live on a level beyond the level of (bare) necessity, and their way of making a living corresponds to their wealth. It has thus become clear that Bedouins and sedentary people are natural groups which exist by necessity (Khaldūn & Rosenthal, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 250).

Durkheim believed in the multiplication of human needs as well. He sketches the development of new institutions for the satisfaction of those needs. The following words from Durkheim are reminiscent of Ibn Khaldūn:

> Thus, it is an historical law that mechanical solidarity, which first stands alone, or nearly so, progressively loses ground, and that organic solidarity gradually becomes preponderant. But when the mode of solidarity becomes changed, the structure of societies cannot but change (Giddens, 1990, p. 140).

Durkheim's typology of mechanical and organic solidarities is highly relevant to Ibn Khaldūn's typology. Within the mechanical solidarity that exists in the Bedouin civilization, life is very simple, and relationships between people are close and personal. The organic solidarity within sedentary civilization manifest itself in excessive division of labour, great luxury, and impersonal relationships.

We are of the opinion that the economic disadvantages of Muslim immigrant life play an important role in the types of religiosity they choose on the religious market. However, we do not consider economic factors to be the only factors that shape Muslim religiosity - this would constitute an over-deterministic view on the role of material conditions. Individuals can opt to use their income and personal wealth to support a 'great' culture and elite forms of Islam. However, if income and wealth are distributed equitably among Islamic communities and can thus penetrate education and culture, after the example of Khaldūnian and Durkheimian social theory, we can expect the long-term impact of economic progress on religiosity to become noticeable.

6.2.3.5. *Digital Media and Religiosity*

On the one hand Muslims become rooted in their local environments, yet at the same time modern mass media enable Muslims to build networks and communities across borders (Sunier, 2012). The new media play a crucial part in the production of Islamic knowledge in Europe (Bruinessen, 2011). The media professionals who broadcast Islamic *responsa* are therefore at least as important as the religious scholars who issue them (Caeiro, 2011). Mass education and the new media have contributed to the shift and disintegration of classic religious authority, while modernity has challenged the very credibility of the ʿulamās discourses (Zaman, 2002, 2009). Television and the Internet have supplanted imams, whose influential role as the main source of religious knowledge for immigrants has diminished. Our analysis showed that elite religiosity was negatively correlated with television and the Internet, while popular religiosity was positively correlated with these media.

With regard to the production of religious education encapsulated in television programmes, the general level of education of the viewer is taken into account, due to concerns about audience ratings (Warren, 2006). This form of education focuses on the 'enthusiasm' that is the most powerful motivation in popular religiosity. Especially during Ramadan (the month of fasting), this religious discourse targets the masses. Therefore, the language of these programmes is necessarily superficial, following certain popular religious trends. Some television programmes target religious elites and are infused with mystical and spiritual language, which inevitably helps the re-formation of a popular Sufi culture, in accordance with the demands signalled by audience ratings. Two historical representatives of elite religiosity, *Rumi* and *Yūnus Emre*, which have exerted enormous influence on Turkish religious literature, are regularly encountered in these programmes, and are made into figures for mass consumption.

Globalization and the spread of modern mass media have seriously weakened the traditional normative religious frameworks (Mandaville, 2007). The effects of new digital media on Islamic discourse have reinforced new perceptions. The search for religious information on the Internet involves a highly subjective choice between information on popular religious culture and elite religious culture, both of which are freely available. It has been said that individual desires and wishes determine the type

of information that is accessed (Campbell, 2006; Turner & Nasir, 2013c). When someone is looking for a religious *fatwā* related to a problem, a search in 'Sheikh Google' using the right keywords will yield the expected information. Four elements, *muftī, mustaftī, iftā'* and *fatwā* [83], which constitute the traditional process of *fatwā*, have been discarded since the Internet became widespread. Publication "converts a form of highly personalized interpretation... into more generic messages for a mass audience... thereby shift[ing] part of the burden of interpretation to the listener/reader" (Eickelman & Anderson, 2003, p. 3). Olivier Roy (2004) has stated that increasing numbers of young Muslims are constructing their own 'cut-and-paste' version of Islam, selected from heterogeneous sources. Other researchers have pointed to the rise of a phenomenon called Muslim 'Protestantism', in which Muslim youths look for answers, usually on the Internet, while they lack basic knowledge of the theological framework of Islam (De Koning, 2008; Sunier, 2010).

This also contributes to the production of conflicting religious ideas, and creates the conditions for market differentiation. The *fatwā* wars in different media playing out between Islamic authorities effectually force the Muslim individual to make a choice and to select the most appropriate answer (Caeiro, 2011). There is one big difference here compared to the past. As Bryan Turner (2005, p. 309) pointed out, "in the past, the educated and disciplined elites determined the official or popular form of religion. Periodically, religion gets 'cleaned up' as the elites expel the magical, popular and cultic accretions." According to Ibn Khaldūn, prophets periodically enter the city to reform the House of Faith. In the modern world, however, lay people have some literacy and can access radio, television, the Internet, foreign travel and mass consumption. The globalization of popular religion makes it increasingly difficult for the elites to regulate the masses. The growth of global spiritual marketplaces means that 'religion' constantly transforms itself, becoming increasingly hybrid and reflective (Parna, 2010; Young, 2004).

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[83] The *muftī*, or jurist consultant, stands between man and God, and issues opinions (*fatwā*) to a petitioner (*mustafti*), either with regard to the laws of God or the deeds of man. The task, or process, of giving a fatwa is iftā'.

6.2.3.6. *Gender and Religiosity*

Gender seems to play a central part in popular religions, both now and in the past. Contemporary research reveals that religion - in terms of faith and participation - plays a much greater role in the lives of women than those of men, and yet the dominant roles in religious organizations are characteristically occupied by men (Roberts & Yamane, 2012, pp. 262-291). Women struggle for recognition and representation in the official religious institutions of Islam, as is the case in Roman Catholicism, Thai Buddhism, and so on (Turner, 2013, pp. 235-40). This situation drives women to find meaning in popular themes.

One of our expectations was that 'The experience of popular religiosity is higher among Muslim women than among Muslim men' (E_1). This expectation was based on the findings of previous studies carried out in Turkey (Köse, 2015; Köse & Ayten, 2010; Saktanber, 2002; Asım Yapıcı, 2012b).

However, we found no significant differences between men and women in our sample. Lack of significance can be informative, however. Reporting non-significant results has been identified as 'the file drawer problem' in all scientific areas (Rosenthal, 1979). Scientists must be willing to report the absence of statistically significant findings if they are to advance the social sciences, in particular psychology and sociology. This lack of significant differences between men and women in our sample may be due to the different characteristics of our scale, which does not quite match the scales developed in Turkey.

In Turkey, for example, traditionally minded women regard *ziyārat* (grave visit) as a valuable means of gaining access to sacred power without male mediation (Günay, Güngör, Taştan & Sayim, 2001), yet men often deride such activities as 'superstitious'[84] (Smith, 2008). Such practices are of greater importance to women than to men, since many characteristics of female social life are strictly linked to its religious aspects, such as the visiting of graves and the veneration of saints (Köse, 2015; Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1992). As pointed out above, such aspects of religious cultural heritage, which are tightly connected with popular religiosity, are rarely transferred to the host countries. These conditions had an impact on our

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[84] Such visits have also been criticized and banned by official Islam, even though they remain a tradition within Turkish popular religiosity (see: Açıkgöz, 2004; Çelik, 2004; Günay et al., 2001).

measuring tools. Grave visit, which in a sense is closely connected to the experiential and ritualistic aspect, could not be taken into account in this study. According to previous observations, this aspect of religiosity was not observable in the Dutch-Turkish community. But as Landman predicts (1992, p. 52), this aspect of popular religiosity may emerge in the Netherlands in future decades. Only then will we be able to measure this aspect of religiosity, and we assume that this side of religiosity will to some extent affect female religious life more than male religious life.[85]

6.2.4. *Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity*

Interest in studying the relationship between religiosity and health continues to grow. Although various hypotheses have been developed to explain this association, there has been a lack of research into the processes and mechanisms by which religiosity might influence the mental and physical health of populations. In particular, there was a lack of research with a specific focus on migrants. There was a lack of studies on spirituality in migrant and non-migrant populations as well (Abraido-Lanza & Viladrich, 2012, p. 1285). The present study is one of the first to pay more attention to this issue in the context of Dutch-Turkish Muslim society. The interactions between individual and broader social and cultural factors were also briefly examined.

Considering the average mean values of the attitude scales employed in this study (which measure negative attitudes towards other religions, women, other races/ethnicities, out-groups and modernity), we can conclude that both groups - participants who experience elite religiosity and participants who experience popular religiosity - express negative attitudes towards the items of the attitude scales (see Table 32 and Table 33 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.5). Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the existing data that Turkish religiosity impinges on cultural integration. These results suggest that there is no general danger of ethnocentrism and fundamentalism.

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[85] However, this may not be the case in Europe for the coming years. It is not easy to make predictions or generalizations by looking at processes taking place outside Europe. The idea of European exceptionalism is increasingly accepted by scholars active in the field of sociology of religion. European patterns of religion are no longer seen as a global prototype, but constitute an unusual case in a world where vibrant religiosity is becoming the norm. Peter Berger (1992, 1999) is a notable exponent of this idea. It follows that explanations for European patterns of religion must lie in Europeanness rather than in connections between religion and modernity (Davie, 2001).

Furthermore, a Pearson correlation coefficient test found that elite religiosity was negatively correlated, and popular religiosity was positively correlated with racial prejudice, hostile attitudes towards other religions and subordinate attitudes towards women (see Table 34). These findings will be further elaborated in separate sub-paragraphs.

6.2.4.1. *Ethnocentrism and Religiosity*

One of the aims of this study was to investigate whether there are socio-psychological behaviours related to elite and popular religiosity. Scales such as '(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (i.e., Christianity)', '(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race', '(Hostile) attitudes towards others' generally focus on ethnocentrism that can be characterized as the attitude that one's own people, nation, or ethnic group is inherently superior to others (Capucao, 2010; Stuckrad, 2006, p. 1574). Since the beginning of the Second World War, social scientists have been trying to understand the relationship between religion and ethnocentrism.[86] Most of the results of these studies have shown that religion is one of the main factors contributing to ethnic prejudice (Allport & Kramer, 1946). Recent studies have also confirmed that religion is a key factor affecting ethnic or racial prejudice. They argue that the more religious an individual is, the more prejudiced he/she will likely be (Hood et al., 1996). Yet, some contradictory results have also been obtained, in which it is noted that religion has an aspect that encourages prejudice and an aspect that unmakes prejudice (Allport, 1966; Kayıklık, 2001; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Yapıcı & Kayıklık, 2005). Other studies illustrate that the different dimensions of religiosity may have very different effects on prejudice (Glock & Stark, 1965; 1968). The findings of the present study support these latter findings. These findings suggest that the real question is not whether one is a believer or not, but rather whether the kind of things a person believes in make him or her ethnocentric. In other words, it is not *that* one believes, but *what* and *how* one believes that makes a person ethnocentric.

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[86] Botson summarized 47 sets of findings based on 38 studies conducted between 1940 and1990. He categorized these findings according to three manifestations: church membership or attendance, positive attitudes towards religion, and orthodoxy or conservatism. He also categorized 4 kinds of intolerance, i.e., ethnocentrism, racial prejudice, anti-Semitism and other prejudices. He discovered that 37 sets out of the 47 sets indicated the existence of a positive relationship, while the others indicated the opposite (Lawrence Binet Brown, 1985).

It has been said that every religion and every social group, to some extent, imparts conservative and ethnocentric views to its members (Dittes, 1969). On the basis of this social reality, the level of prejudice and ethnocentrism of Dutch-Turkish Muslims can in certain respects be defined as 'normal'. As Watt (1963) has shown, no one would easily become a member of a group that does not claim to represent the truth.[87] However, these socio-psychological attitudes may be influenced by a number of other factors that can produce some 'abnormal' outcomes.

According to Speelman, most Dutch-Turkish citizens are tolerant (2016). However, how religious tolerance is shaped and conceptualized depends on the historical, political and social circumstances of the specific environments in which these minorities live (Berger, 2007). During the period in which our quantitative research in the Netherlands took place (2012 - 2013) there was a relatively peaceful atmosphere, with few conflicts. But insecuritization[88] is unstable, fragile and contested. While there is resistance, change and transformation are possible. The history of Europe and the Netherlands demonstrates that many and frequent insecuritizations of identities have taken place (Canatan, 2008, 2013; Cesari, 2009; Gündüz, 2007; Seufert & Waardenburg, 1999). Insecuritization of the Dutch Muslim identity is a foreseeable possibility (Mijnhart, 2010).[89] The changing political climate following the coup of 15 July 2016 seems to have seriously affected the religious sentiments of Turkish Muslims living in the Europe. Nationalism, anti-Western resentment, and a strong attachment to Turkey's sovereignty are the main factors that unite Turkey's new political actors (Tol & Taşpınar, 2016). When linked to a social *I*-position, the religion

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[87] Comenius can shed some light on this point. Just like today, Comenius was confronted with cultural and religious clashes. He was critical of religions, including Christianity. According to Comenius no one can claim to possess the whole truth, because all interpretations are the work of men (Marjoke Rietveld-van Wingerden, Ter Avest & Westerman, 2012, p. 69).

[88] The concept of 'insecuritization' suggests that 'security' should be understood as a situation where the dominant power can decide who should be protected and who should be designated as capable of being controlled, objectified or feared.

[89] Dutch tolerance would turn out to be a conditional affair once again. Although some hostile views could be heard in the late twentieth century, the new millennium put an end to the atmosphere of optimism, tolerance and permissiveness. After 9/11, Muslims soon came to serve primarily as the image of the 'Other', as the counter-image of the beloved Dutch self-image of a nation of tolerant individuals, as a representation of a past that the Dutch were now glad to have shaken off, and even as a danger that they might function as the Dutch base for a world-wide Islamic revival (Mijnhart, 2010).

of Dutch-Turkish migrants may get mixed with other collective identity elements (national, ethnic, cultural).[90]

Further analysis shows that the perception of cultural incompatibility mainly stems from the politicization of socio-economic dissatisfaction; structural conditions have provoked an existential malaise among Muslims and the Dutch. National politics and elections are dominated by emotions, lack of self-confidence, fear of the other, and by feelings of insecurity (Ramadan, 2009a). When existential insecurity erupts in public violence, ideological arguments take over from the real causes of unrest and generate 'block thinking' - the inability to enter into a reasonable dialogue to achieve fruitful integration and coexistence (Taylor, 2007). Bhatia's research (2007) showed that before 9/11 there were many upper-class, privileged Indian immigrants who believed they had achieved full 'cultural citizenship' and 'integration' in America. But a single, cataclysmic, political event like 9/11 disrupted their taken-for-granted acculturation process and migrant identity. Unexpectedly and quite dramatically, they moved from a comfortable sense of belonging to an uneasy state as an outsider, and a threatening one at that. Existential insecurity therefore gives integration issues a cultural and political overtone, translating pluralism into a *clash*.

Some articles suggest that the current terrorist threats are due to the politicization of the Islamic faith, rather than being rooted in Islamic teachings (Esposito, 1992; Yo, 2005). Today, intolerance is a common problem in Turkish society, both amongst the religious and the secular (Bilgili, 2015). On the other hand, the extreme right is gaining ground in Europe and especially in the Netherlands (BBC, 2016; Kakebeeke & Reijerman, 2015). The asylum debate has also influenced voting behaviour in the Netherlands. Geert Wilders continues to gain popularity, along with his right-wing party, the PVV (De Koning, 2016).

Norris and Inglehart claim that experiencing a high level of existential security in their formative years reduces the importance of religion in people's lives, while experiencing a high level of existential insecurity increases the subjective importance of religion (2004, p. 219). The current and future situation in Europe may stimulate the prevalence of popular religiosity. In an atmosphere where conflicts arise and

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[90] Verkuyten and Yıldız (2009) described in their paper that the Sunni Muslim minority, which is the largest minority group in Europe, has a very high Muslim group identification.

existential security is threatened, popular religiosity, as noted above, can acquire a fundamentalist character, one element of which is a strong sense of belonging to a group (Johnson, 2012, p. 653).

The terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, which killed 132 people and injured hundreds of others, were the worst terrorist atrocities on the French mainland since the Second World War. Once again they brought Islamic extremism to the forefront of international relations. Many Turkish-Dutch people report experiences of discrimination and prejudice: more than 66–75% according to research (Andriessen, Fernee, & Wittebrood, 2014). According to a report of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia on Muslims in Europe, policies and public discourse on Islam and experiences of discrimination have had a negative impact on Muslim migrants' feelings of belonging to the host countries (Choudhury, 2009).

6.2.4.2. *Sexism and Religiosity*

Sexism or gender discrimination is discrimination based on a person's sex or gender. Sexism can affect any gender, but it is mostly documented as affecting women and girls (Johnson, 2000; Lorber, 2011; Masequesmay, 2015; Stevenson & Lindberg, 2010). It has been linked to stereotypes and gender roles (Matsumoto, 2001), and may include the belief that one sex or gender is intrinsically superior to the other. Studies carried out in different countries show that gender role expectations are strictly influenced by cultural factors, including religion (Burn & Busso, 2005 [in the United States]; Glick, Lameiras & Castro, 2002 [in Spain]; Taşdemir & Sakallı-Uğurlu, 2010; Yapıcı, 2012a [in Turkey]). Morgan (1987) demonstrated a direct link between religiosity and sexism. But the process by which religiosity leads to sexism is still being investigated (Seguino, 2011).

It is often said that Islamic law tends to keep women in a subordinate position compared to western law, and uses principles that are not always compatible with those that inspired western law on human rights and fundamental liberties (Foblets, 2003; Kadıoğlu, 2003). For almost all European respondents, Islamic gender relations are centred upon the subordination of women to men (FES, 2011; Verney, 2013). While most authors point out that the oppression of women is a product of societal and cultural norms rather than religion, they also recognize that political leaders have

legitimised the physical, legal, or psychological subordination of women in religious terms (Silvestri, 2008).

In the field of social psychology, research has clearly demonstrated that religiosity has both positive and negative correlations with prejudice (Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). McFarland (1989) posited that extrinsic religiosity orientation among men tends to give rise to discriminatory attitudes towards women, and that an intrinsic religiosity orientation shows a negative association with prejudice against women. [91]

Here the present study focuses on the question how religiously based differentiation affects inequality between men and women. Our hypothesis was that 'Men motivated by elite religiosity tend to have more positive attitudes towards women and more progressive ideas about gender, than men motivated by popular religiosity.'

Based on the average mean values, we can say that both groups - participants who experience elite religiosity and participants who experience popular religiosity - have no prejudiced or subordinate attitudes towards women. However, the differences in mean values between the two groups were significant. We found that men who experienced elite religiosity had stronger views on the equality and rights of women than men who experienced popular religiosity (see Table 34 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.5).

In summary, popular religiosity among men tends to give rise to discriminatory attitudes towards women, and elite religiosity among men shows negative association with prejudice against women. These findings and results support the position of social psychologists who state that religiosity can have both positive and negative correlations with prejudice against women.

6.2.5. *Spirituality and Religiosity*

Since the turn of the millennium, the use of the concept of 'spirituality' has become increasingly widespread in sociology of religion (Kieran Flanagan & Jupp, 2007; Younos, 2011). Spirituality comprises numerous sociological aspects, such as an

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[91] Gordon Allport (1966) found that intrinsic religiosity (valuing religious experience for its own sake and not because of secondary rewards) was related to lower rates of racial antipathy. However, in the case of sexism, it was intrinsic religiosity that correlated highly with sex bias - attitudes that privilege men (Kahoe, 1974).

individualistic orientation, a weak organisational drive, and a holistic function, which have been pointed out by various academics (Knoblauch, 2008). Theoretically, Muslim spirituality in general and Turkish spirituality in particular are rooted in the Qurʾān, and, on the practical level, in the religious life of flourishing sects and orders (for empirical results on Turkish spirituality, see: Ayten, 2010; Altınlı-Macić & Coleman, 2015; Dastan & Buzlu, 2010; Düzgüner, 2007, 2011; Horozcu, 2010). Rose (2001) discovered that the majority of professionals claimed that religious belief did not require spirituality. Compared with adherents of other traditions, however, the religious life of the majority of Muslim respondents indicates that, in their case, spirituality cannot be experienced without religious belief. In line with Rose's general findings derived from a Muslim sample, the results of another study (Altınlı-Macić & Coleman, 2015) indicates that out of a Turkish Muslim sample (41.8%), a majority of respondents identified spirituality as a term derived from religion.

One of the aims of this study was to measure the spiritual aspect of religion by developing an elite religiosity scale. The term 'spirituality' is equivalent to the Arabic term *iḥsān* (Renard, 2005). Spirituality encompasses many forms and motivations, embodied in our study's concept of elite religiosity, including spiritual dynamism, the search for meaning and a quest to understand religiosity in all its depths (Wood, 2010). By looking at the close relationship between elite religiosity and spirituality, this study tried to assess the significance of spirituality in the sociology of Islam.

Nowadays, Muslim majority societies are seriously lacking in spirituality (Cündioğlu, 2009, 2008); Geaves, Dressler & Klinkhammer, 2009; Ramadan, 2004, 2009b, 2012). In Islamic societies there is extensive support available for conventional, scriptural religion in the realm of everyday life (Hassan, 2003). Many European Muslims struggle with finding a balance between spirituality and orthodox interpretations of Islam (Phalet, Gijsberts & Hegandoorn, 2008).

The current Islamic discourse in Turkey and the Netherlands has too often lost its substance, namely the search for meaning, an understanding of ultimate goals, and a gauging of the state of the heart. As we have shown in this study, Islam has been largely reduced to popular religiosity - to jurisprudence, rituals, and, above all, prohibitions characterized by exoteric, unreflective, and uncritical forms and motivations (see Table 38). European Muslim families experience Islam under a comprehensive set of rules, interdictions, and rulings that explain Islam in the context of a specific relation

of protection against an environment that is perceived as too permissive and even hostile (Ramadan, 1999). The findings of our study largely confirm this attitude. Within our group of participants who experienced high religiosity, only 24% experienced elite religiosity while 61% experienced popular religiosity. If we take the other participants into account - those who experienced low religiosity - this ratio drops to 19%. In other words, only two out ten participants experienced elite religiosity to some extent.

In the short term we do not foresee any growth in the spiritual side of religion because of the insecurity that will likely be felt in the near future.[92] The majority of respondents participating in Dutch surveys (FES, 2011; Smith, 2006) assert that Islam is incompatible with modern Western society. Most of the citizens polled expressed negative views on Islam and Muslims. For highly committed Dutch-Turkish Muslims it can be difficult to maintain a stable religious identity without the respect of the Dutch majority. Religious identity development depends importantly on the acceptance and recognition of others (other Muslims and society as a whole) (Phalet, Baysu & Verkuyten, 2010; Visser-Vogel, Bakker, Barnard & Kock, 2015). Moreover, social and political activism in Turkey and in Europe currently prevails over spiritual considerations; the struggle for power has largely overshadowed the search for meaning. Religious styles certainly cannot be reduced to identity politics, but identity politics do inform the kind of religiosity developed by individuals (Buitelaar, 2013, p. 271). The political and ideological thinking of an established party usually does not allow for critical thinking, as a result of which there is insufficient room for spirituality

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[92] However, this insecurity felt all over the world might actually trigger spirituality in the long run. In his book on 13th century Iran, George Lane stated that the extraordinary creativity of the Mongolian period, particularly manifested in the development of Sufi thought and the creation of mystical poetry, was a response to the widespread social and political uncertainty caused by the Mongol invasions and the unprecedented prevalence of violence. These disruptions led to the collapse of many pillars of people's lives (2003, pp. 229-230).
Lewisohn concluded that "the only consolation for the ordinary man faced with such barbarity lay in the cultivation of Sufism" (1995, p. 56).
This blossoming of Sufism took place against the sombre background of a barbarian invasion - the Crusaders descending on the Islamic world from the West and the Mongols from the East - and might almost be seen as a kind of compensation for the social and political disasters of the period (see: Dāya, 1982, pp. 1-2).
Arberry suggested that it was the embracing comfort of mysticism that helped formal Islam survive this 'terrible' catastrophic period in the thirteenth century (see: 2010, p. 26).

(Cündioğlu, 2007, 2005, 2010; Kara, 2016). Predominantly, ideological organizations are somewhat hesitant and suspicious, which is an attitude that is incompatible with elite Islam or spiritual religiosity.

To a certain extent, Sufi Muslims nowadays continue to practice and expand the traditional modes of Sufi activity (Dressler, 2009). However, a large part of the sociological literature on Muslim societies has identified Sufism or the *tariqas* - which are expected to be the bearers of the spiritual side of Islam - with the illiterate and rural parts of society (Köse & Ayten, 2010; Ocak, 1996, 2003, 2010). In this perspective, the *tariqa*s represent the disappearing 'traditional' elements of the contemporary social order (Günay & Ecer, 1999; Kara, 2002). This image of *tariqa*s continues to influence scholarship and the general public opinion, both in the West and in the Muslim world (Bruinessen, 2003; Voll, 2007, p. 282). In such a conceptual framework, a renewed success of elite religiosity and an increased visibility of Sufism among the highly educated in the 'modern' sector of society - and in modern and modernizing societies - is not expected nor predicted.[93]

In the long term, however, we are assuming some development of elite religiosity. Most scholars foresee a development "from institutionalized/organized religion to individualized spirituality" (Abraido-Lanza & Viladrich, 2012; Cündioğlu, 2010; Heelas, 2008, p. 227; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 103). In one sense, secularisation has won. Organised religion has declined sharply. Yet spirituality does not seem to have undergone the same fate. It has become "the solace of soul survivors who journey outside organised religion" (Flanagan, 2007, p. 6). In *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (2005), Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel draw on survey data collected in 81 countries - which comprise 85 % of the world's population - between 1981 and 2001, to reach the following conclusion: the contemporary socio-economic developments result in an increasing interest in spirituality (p. 93). If the socio-economic developments and their relation to elite

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[93] In his classic text *Sufism*, published in the mid-twentieth century, A.J. Arberry remarked that Sufi orders in many places were continuing to attract the "ignorant masses, but no man of education would care to speak in their favour" (Arberry, 1950, p. 122). Gilsenan reported some 60 orders in Egypt at the time of his field research, but he assessed that relatively few people were actually involved in them, especially compared to the pre-modern period when most men were reputedly members of such orders (Gilsenan, 1967, pp 11-18).

religiosity are taken into consideration, we may also expect that the Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands will gain in spirituality.

Moreover, the majority of Western countries have a positive understanding of multiculturalism, particularly of ethnic and religious pluralism (Canatan, 2009; Ziebertz & Kay, 2009). New forms of Islamic spirituality may appear in European societies, which could attract considerable numbers of people. Such a movement could develop guided by a modern spiritual language (Halstead, 2006) and by the re-individualization of Islamic mysticism, which is more expressed in personal thought and in the intellectual relationship between master and disciple, than in community life or the emotion felt during collective rituals (Maréchal, 2003, p. 153).

Citizens in Western Europe are more open to an elite religiosity that is closely linked to the spiritual side of Islam, than an orthodox or popular Islam, because of the historical religious and cultural heritage of the latter (Köse, 1996, 2003). Van Bruinessen (2009) recently pointed out that Sufism has regained its appeal as a spiritual doctrine and practice among many Muslims in the modern world, as an alternative to the political and puritan styles of Islam. These neo-Sufi movements and new spiritualities may stimulate elite forms of religiosity that are more tolerant and moderate, and open to dialogue with other religions.

The number of people who define themselves as "spiritual but not religious", or as more spiritual than religious, is increasing in the United States and Western Europe. This development supports meaningful exercises within the spiritual domain (Altınlı-Macić & Coleman, 2015; Altınlı, 2011; Streib & Hood, 2008; Zinnbauer, Pargament et al., 1997). A religion without spirituality is difficult to imagine. Hanegraaff (1999, p. 151) underlined that the reverse - a spirituality without religion - is in principle quite possible. Spirituality can arise on the basis of an existing religion, but can very well do without it. The concept of 'spirituality without religion' is a relatively new issue in both Turkey and the Islamic world. A more collectively orientated religiosity is still present and dominant in Turkey, although recently religious individualism has emerged in Islam (De Koning, 2008; Huijnk, 2018; Noor, 2018; Wagemakers & Koning, 2015) but it is not as widespread as in the US and other Western countries (Altınlı-Macić & Coleman, 2015). New Age is a prime example of this last possibility: a complex of spiritualties that arose on the foundation of a pluralistic secular society.

For future research it is important to also focus on this side of spirituality, in order to understand different aspects of Turkish religious life.

6.3. *Conclusion and Future Research*

One of the important findings of our empirical research is that the theoretical approach that Glock's five dimensions are empirical wholes, is not sufficient to gain insight into the complex expressions of Muslim religiosity. There are various intra-dimensional aspects to these dimensions, such as the elite and popular aspects. General conclusions reached in other studies on Glock's scale, regarding a relationship between the dimensions (i.e., relationships based on a single measurement of each dimension), are in need of further exploration. The conceptualizations of elite and popular religiosity seem to have an important theoretical value for the exploration of intra-dimensional aspects of religiosity. Our theoretical and empirical study showed that forms and motivations of high religiosity, which have different aspects such as the ideological, ritualistic, experiential, and intellectual, differ among groups or individuals. We believe that more research is needed into the already proposed intra-dimensional aspects of religiosity. While much of the evidence from our study compares favourably with Stark and Glock's (1968) data, in particular with regard to various aspects of single dimensions, more research is needed before religion analysts can be confident that the relationships which have been published in the present study are more generalizable.

The elite and popular religious orientations in this study included several components that Stark and Glock did not measure (dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality versus experiential desirability). Attempts to apply other schemes to Glock's five dimensions may reveal other components. Conceptualizing and measuring these components is another fruitful direction for future research. I recommend that greater efforts be made to generate new conceptualizations and measurements of the kinds of phenomena that are encompassed by the five dimensions which Glock proposed. Based on the results of this study, I also recommend that future research based on Glock's scheme should treat the five dimensions as heuristic and exploratory devices, and not as empirical wholes.

In addition, it was very difficult to conduct a long-term sociological study of Turkish Muslims in the current context, because there are very large differences between the situation in Turkey 7 years ago and today (2018). I have to express the difficulties I encountered in linking the concluding part of this study to the introductory part written at the beginning of the project. When this project began, Turkey's trend towards democratization was relatively high and Turkey was moving closer to Europe. Turkey's membership of the European Union was discussed openly and developments seemed to run in a positive direction. Now, in 2018, it must be said that Turkey's integration into the European Union has largely failed and that Turkey is now further away from the West. Slowly but surely after 2010 and especially after the coup in 2016, Turkey has turned its face from the West to the East. It seems that this may have long-term and short-term consequences, not only in economic and political terms, but also in religious terms.

The will of the Islamic community leaders to act by leaning on the power of the government, forced them to fulfil the demands of the political centre. This tendency, driven by practical concerns, was for a long time the main driving force behind the perversion of Islamic thought and spirituality. Religious communities still seem to have failed to learn the lessons of recent events, in particular those relating to the Gülen Movement, which has long been backed by political leaders. The dramatic changes following the coup appear to have profoundly affected the religious identity of Turkish Muslims in both Turkey and Europe. Only one decade ago, concepts such as cohesion and integration had emerged to describe the relationship between Turkey and Europe. But circumstances have changed completely today. Turkishness, anti-Western resentment and a strong attachment to Turkish sovereignty have once again become strong among Turkish Muslims in Turkey and in the Netherlands. The discourse of the religious communities is inevitably influenced by these evolving political events because it is closely tied to politics. Projects such as interfaith dialogue, which refers to a cooperative, constructive, and positive interaction between adherents of different religions and/or spiritual or humanistic beliefs, give place to the voice of *Turkish civil religion* which refers to the sacralisation of the state through Islamic symbols.[94] In this context the other became *kāfir* (infidel), and Christianity became 'evil' again. Popular religiosity stimulates such negative image formation when its basic characteristics play

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[94] See the following article for the extended definition of civil religiosity and its fundamentals in Dutch society (Ter Borg, 2013).

out in a context of insecurity, which we pointed out in the discussion section. Every coup did not only damage democracy, but also nourished radical Islam. The last attempt is undoubtedly an example of this. It should be an obvious insight that Islam can be understood at many different levels. However, it seems that nowadays we are largely witnessing the least developed forms of understanding, all because of the influence of the level of understanding of preachers who preach only popular and superficial aspects of religiosity. The voices of *Niyāzi-i Misrī*, *Yūnus Emre*, and *Mavlānā*, which emphasize the grace of the human being, are mainly ignored in times when the strengthening of national identities is politically necessary. The Islamic world today, and Turkey in particular, has lost its ability to say "O People", only "O Muslims" remains. The reason is that politics today puts the voices of *Molla Kāsım* and *Vāni Effendi* at its service.

In the early chapters of this study, an attempt was made to critically assess the new paradigms in sociology of religion. Rational choice theory and publications exploring postmodernity recognize the growth of a spiritual marketplace. The key question, however, is whether the emergence of such a market has stimulated elite religiosity or popular religiosity. Or whether this emergence affects the relationship between the two. We must not forget that traditional beliefs and institutions already existed in modernity. Traditional religiosity is still present in modern and postmodern times. The popular religiosity that includes many elements of traditional religiosity can easily go off the rails - reducing, contesting, and even replacing the reflexivity, autonomy, and openness that are dominant characteristics of spiritual religiosity. In line with many cultural theorists, we would like to draw attention once again to the ontological insecurity brought about by the complexities, uncertainty, and diversity of the postmodern condition. We see religious fundamentalism as an emotional and defensive coping mechanism to deal with the insecurity caused by the plurality and the fragmentation of the postmodern world. According to the findings of our study, popular religiosity could remain an important and dominant source of defensive localization within Turkish religiosity, at least in the short term, both in Turkey and in the Netherlands due to the recent developments outlined above.

Another significant issue is that in some studies on elite and popular religiosity, these two concepts are dealt with in theological and political terms. Elite religiosity has been linked to 'great' tradition, official tradition, while popular religiosity has been linked to 'superstition', unofficial religion, and other forms of pejoratively labelled

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religiosity. As a consequence, popular religiosity is defined as the 'object' of all negativity in a religious sense. Today, this mistake is often made by religious officials and scholars. Elite and popular religiosity, however, arise as a result of cultural differentiation and stratification in society, as we have shown in this study, and are in fact phenomena that fall within the field of sociology of culture and religion. Future research should therefore not participate in theologico-political power rationalizations, nor participate in the essentializing of historicizing perspectives. We believe that attempts to solve the problems of religious thought without exploring the possibilities for change and transformation between elite and popular, signal the use of an incomplete and inaccurate research methodology.

This tension is mainly fuelled by the official elites (promoted by the state via Diyanet). Once the official religion is in the hands of a particular religious elite, and has been defined by this elite, it can continue to exist as an absolute religious ideal with the call 'Back to true Islam!', wholly separated from the needs and ideals of the everyday, lived religion. The mentality of (religious or political) governments and the mentality of their subjects can therefore be in conflict with each other. Diyanet defines its role as maintaining the social order in Turkey by promoting a moderate Islam based on rationality, not 'superstition'. This model has been faulted for presenting popular religious practices as a deviation from the 'official religion' or 'pure' Islam, which is supposedly represented by theologians and Diyanet leaders. These leaders clearly have a positivist ideology. If someone calls him/herself a Muslim and recognizes certain practices as Islamic, we as researchers must first accept this statement as true and then investigate how these practices differ from those of other Muslims. Moreover, it cannot be said that there is a purely popular religion practiced by the masses, which is completely independent of an 'elite Islam' supposedly represented by theologians and Diyanet leaders. Nor can it be argued that there is a purely 'official' and elite religion, which is completely independent of popular religion, as we have shown in this study. What is neglected is the intersectionality that exists between elite Islam and popular Islam.

Modernity is usually conceived as constituted by a radical shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, from community to society, from particularism to universalism. Today, many scholars observe that current Turkish interpretations of Islam actualize the new Salafism, with an emphasis on ʿ*umma*. Although these interpretations, which emphasize *gemeinschaft*, community, and particularism, could be partly successful in

establishing an atmosphere of security for certain religious groups, it does not seem possible to promote peaceful coexistence in this way, in cities where pluralism is a reality. The embracing of such interpretations within an urban setting can lead to tensions between believers and secularists, and in the interreligious domain, to tensions between world religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam. It can also lead to extreme hostility towards traditional interpretative communities and towards all forms of rationalism, intellectualism and mysticism in Islam. If the new Salafism continues to dominate the current Turkish interpretations of Islam, and resists the competitive and open character of the Islamic religious market, we believe it would not be difficult for pro-violence groups to exist in such fertile ground.

Sufis attach great importance to the following *hadīth qudsī*: "I am where My servant thinks of Me. Every servant has an image and an idea of Me. Whatever picture he forms of Me, there I am."[95] We admit that it would be unwise to suggest this Sufi principle to religious officials which emphasize equal reception of manifestations of religiosity, and suggest the ultra-liberal religious market. At the very least, we can say that official religious institutions should not completely ignore this principle, which is at the heart of Islamic wisdom, and should not stigmatize divergent religious expressions of the pious as 'superstition' or '*bidʿah*'. Although struggling against "irreligion and apostasy", the Islamic religion has shown great leniency throughout its history to man's weakness in the face of harsh reality and the strictness of religious demands (Waardenburg, 1978b). Official religious institutions could apply a number of religious development methods suggested by sociology and psychology of religion, instead of waging war on all popular manifestations of religion. In this light, we recommend that the current (official) elites read the dynamic and dialogical language of Al-Ghazālī and integrate it into their thinking. We also believe that this model is a promising basis for developing religious education strategies in Europe. With further improvements, this model, which creates room for a diversity of religious interpretations and flexibility with regard to a variety of religious production demands, could also be used as a tool for primary and secondary education, both in Turkey and in the Netherlands.

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[95] Also called *ḥadith ilāhī* or *rabbānī* (divine tradition). This is a set of traditions which preserves words spoken by God, as distinguished from the *hadith nabawī* (prophetical tradition), which preserves the words of the Prophet. For the whole hadith see: *Al Muslim*, book Zhikr, ḥadith 21. For an English translation, see: Arberry, 2004, p. 43.

Dawson states that for "every fresh need there is an answer of divine grace and that every historical crisis is met by a new outpouring of the spirit" (2012, p. 129). Most research in contemporary sociology of religion foresees a development "from institutionalized/organized religion to individualized spirituality". In fact, in the Netherlands, there is an intellectual accumulation that can nourish religious cosmopolitanism. As mentioned in the introduction, many research topics in regard to Islam are currently being studied by experts in many different fields. The Leiden University Centre for the Study of Religion (LUCSoR) directs this intellectual accumulation under the supervision of Maurits S. Berger. Unfortunately, the channels for reaching the Dutch Muslim community are weak. One aspect of this problem is the reluctance of the Islamic community to take advantage of this accumulation of knowledge. Some prejudices prevent these respected Islamic data from being accessed. The rector of the Rotterdam Islamic University has said that "Muslims want to learn Islam from Muslim scholars". Although this could be a sociological fact, this can only be explained by a lack of confidence in one's own values. It should not be forgotten that the tradition of intellectual Islam was built by the representatives of a civilization who followed the principle: "Even if science is in China, look for it and find it". In the 11th and 12th centuries, Muslim intellectuals had no issues whatsoever with being taught by Christian scholars. We recommend Muslim communities in the West to get rid of this idleness and to remove the dust from these treasures.