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Elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish muslims in the Netherlands

Gürlesin, O.F.

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Author: Gürlesin, O.F.

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5. Data Analysis and Findings

In this chapter, I first present the demographic characteristics of the sample as drawn from the 2013 Census information, and secondly the results of an analysis of the data from the general religiosity scale. This part of the study enables us to exclude respondents with a low religious affiliation from the follow-up analysis. Thirdly, during most of my thesis, in order to answer the research questions, I focus on respondents who have strong religious affiliations in the context of elite and popular religiosity. It is here that the main research question is addressed: ‘What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’ Finally, by posing the second research question ‘What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively’, I will present the attitudes of those motivated by elite and popular religiosity.

5.1. *A Profile of the Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Surveyed in the Netherlands*

Table 8 - *Demographic variables 1*

<i>Variables</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
<i>1 - Gender</i>		
Male	649	55,7
Female	516	44,3
<i>2 - Age Group</i>		
Between 18 - 25	368	31,6
Between 26 - 35	355	30,4
Between 36 - 45	209	17,9
Between 46 - 55	132	11,4
56 and older	101	8,7
<i>3 - Marital Status</i>		
Single	398	34,2
Married	654	56,1
Widowed	38	3,3
Divorced	68	5,8
Living together with partner	7	0,6
<i>4 - Yearly Income</i>		
Below €10,000	75	6,4
Between €10,000 - €30,000	510	43,0
Between €30,000 - €60,000	432	37,1
Between €60,000 - €100,000	117	10
Above €100,000	31	2,7
<i>5 - Residence</i>		
Amsterdam	293	25,2
Den Haag	367	31,5
Rotterdam	257	22,1
Other	248	21,3

Note: Total *n* = 1165.

Participants

This part of the study provides a comparison between the Dutch-Turkish (Muslim) sample and the 2013 Census information. Most comparisons with the Census data are taken from the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* ('Statistics Netherlands', CBS).⁵⁰

Table 8 shows information regarding gender, age groups, marital status, yearly income and residence.

There were 649 male and 516 female participants. The participants ranged in age between 18 - 68 years. There were 368 (31,6 %) participants between 18-25 years, 354 (30,4 %) between 26-35 years, 209 (17,9 %) between 36-45 years, 133 (11,4 %) between 46-55 years, and 101 participants (8,7 %) older than 56 years. The majority of participants were married or remarried: 656 (56,3 %). 395 (33,9 %) participants were single, 39 (3,3 %) were widowed, 68 (9,2 %) were divorced, and only 7 (0,6 %) were living with a partner. The estimated annual income was fairly represented among the participants: 75 (6,4 %) had an annual income below €10.000; 510 (43,8 %) between €10.000 - €30.000; 432 (37,1 %) between €30.000 - €60.000; 117 (10,0 %) between €60.000 - €100.000; and 31 (2,7 %) had an annual income over €100.000. The largest group of participants lived in Den Haag: 367 (31,5 %). 293 (25,2 %) participants lived in Amsterdam and 257 (22,1 %) in Rotterdam. The remaining 248 (21,3 %) participants lived in other locations.

517 (44,3 %) of the participants belonged to the second generation and were over 18 years old. 648 (55,7 %) of the participants belonged to the first generation.⁵¹

907 (77,9 %) of the participants obtained their highest level of education in the Netherlands, while 258 (22,1 %) obtained their highest level of education in Turkey. Graduates from the Netherlands were distributed as follows: for 19 participants (1,6 %) the highest educational level was primary education, for 186 participants (16,0 %) secondary education, for 541 participants (46,4 %) undergraduate education, and 161

⁵⁰ <http://www.cbs.nl>

⁵¹ To determine if a person is first or second generation, Statistics Netherlands looks whether the individual was born in the Netherlands (second generation) or abroad (first generation). For a comparison with the census data concerning generations, see the following article: FORUM, 2011. In addition, see the article: "Turkish Population by Generation", CBS, 2018.

participants (13,8 %) completed postgraduate education.⁵² Graduates from Turkey were distributed as follows: for 103 participants (8,8 %) the highest educational level was primary education, for 103 participants (8,8 %) secondary education, for 51 participants (4,3 %) undergraduate education, and only 1 participant (0,09 %) completed postgraduate education.⁵³

When compared to the 2013 Census data, it can be said that the sample of Dutch-Turkish citizens is in most respects very similar to the general Dutch population. There are no major differences with the demographic profiles of the sample as determined for the general population of the Netherlands on the basis of the census.⁵⁴ In summary, the participants varied in age from 18 to 68 years. The majority of the participants were married or remarried. The estimated annual income was fairly represented among the participants. There is a clear educational gap between the first and second-generation Muslims: while the first generation received little education, the second generation is gradually entering higher education.

⁵²Groups distributed taking into account the following definition of the Dutch education system:

<http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/methoden/toelichtingen/alfabet/1/level-of-education+1.htm>

⁵³ Groups distributed taking into account the following diagram of the Turkish education system:

<http://www.bougainville-turkey.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Turkish-Education-System-path.jpg>

⁵⁴See also the following article: Alders, 2001.

Table 9 - Demographic variables 2

<i>Variables</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
<i>6 - When did you come to the Netherlands?</i>		
<i>Second (or Third) Generation</i>		
Born in the Netherlands	517	44,3
<i>First Generation</i>		
Less than 5 years ago	69	5,9
Between 6 - 10	34	2,9
Between 11 - 20	160	13,7
Between 21 - 30	176	15,1
More than 31 years ago	209	17,9
<i>7- In which country did you obtain your diploma?</i>		
The Netherlands	907	77,9
Turkey	258	22,1
<i>Graduation in the Netherlands, What is your highest level of education?</i>		
Primary education	19	1,6
Secondary education	186	16,0
Undergraduate	541	46,4
Postgraduate	161	13,8
<i>Graduation in Turkey, What is your highest level of education?</i>		
Primary education	103	8,8
Secondary education	103	8,8
Undergraduate	51	4,3
Postgraduate	1	0,09
<i>8 - What do you think about returning to Turkey?</i>		
I hope (or plan) to return soon	198	17,0
I plan/hope to return after 10 years	389	33,4
Unfortunately, I cannot return	167	14,8
I do not want to return	372	31,9
Others		3,3

Note: Total $n = 1165$.

Additional Tendencies

The eighth item of the questionnaire was the question ‘What do you think about returning to Turkey?’. Of the participants, 198 (17,0 %) answered ‘I hope (or plan) to

return soon’, 389 (33,3 %) replied ‘I plan/hope to return after 10 years’, 167 (14,8 %) replied ‘Unfortunately, I cannot return’, and 372 (31,9 %) participants answered ‘I do not want to return.’ Finally, 3,3 % of the participants gave several other answers.

Table 10 - *Demographic variables 3*

<i>Variables</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
<i>9 - Foundation of which you are an official or voluntary member. (Optional)</i>		
Diyanet	238	20,4
Nur Community	129	11,1
Milli Görüş Movement	115	9,9
Süleyman Efendi Community	42	3,6
None	370	31,8
Others	96	8,2
Blank	175	15,0
<i>10 - Annual charity to Islamic foundations.(Optional)</i>		
Never make a donation	202	17,3
Less than €1000	762	65,4
Between €1000 - €5000	158	13,6
Between €5000 - €10 000	22	1,9
More than €10 000	20	1,7
<i>11 - Commonly spoken language at home.</i>		
Turkish	980	84,2
Dutch	170	14,6
Kurdish	14	1,2
<i>12 - I consider myself to be more religious than other people</i>		
Right	414	35,5
Wrong	498	42,7
No Opinion	253	21,7

Note: Total *n* = 1165.

The ninth item of the questionnaire was the question ‘Of which foundation are you an official or voluntary member?’ Answering this question was optional. 238 (20,4 %) participants answered this question with the ‘Turkish Diyanet Foundation’, 129 (11,1 %) responded with the ‘Nur Movement’, 115 (9,9 %) with the ‘Milli Görüş Movement’, 42 (3,6 %) with ‘the Süleymançı Community’, 370 (31,8 %) replied ‘none’, 96 participants (8,2 %) indicated that they were part of another community or movement, and 175 (15,0 %) left this question unanswered.

A reply to the tenth item of the questionnaire was also optional. This question was intended to measure the annual charity donated to Islamic foundations. 202 (17,3) participants answered this question with 'I never make a donation', 762 participants (65,4 %) responded 'less than €1000', 158 (13,6 %) responded with 'between €1000 - €5000', 22 (1,9 %) responded with 'between €5000 - €10,000', and 20 participants (1,7 %) replied 'more than €10 000'.

The eleventh item sought to measure the language commonly spoken at home. 980 (84,2) participants noted 'Turkish', 170 (14,6 %) noted 'Dutch' while only 14 participants (1,2 %) noted 'Kurdish'.

The twelfth item of the questionnaire was 'I consider myself to be more religious than other people'. 414 (35,5 %) participants responded with 'right', 498 (42,7 %) responded with 'wrong', and 253 (21,7 %) indicated 'no opinion'.

In summary, the general characteristics of our sample consist of the following features:

Our participants varied in age from 18 to 68 years. The majority were married or remarried. The estimated annual income was fairly represented among the population sample. There is a clear educational gap between the first and second-generation Muslims: while the first generation received little education, the second generation is gradually entering higher education. Almost half of the participants were born in the Netherlands. More than half of them intend to return to Turkey sooner or later. Nearly half of them are official or voluntary members of an Islamic community. The majority of these Dutch-Turkish Muslims makes annual donations to Islamic foundations. A majority among them speaks Dutch at home.

5.2. Findings Concerning General Religiosity

As explained earlier in this study, an analysis of religiosity can be approached from at least two distinct angles. First, an analysis of religiosity can focus on distinguishing individuals in terms of the *intensity* or *frequency* of the beliefs, practices, experience and knowledge with which they engage in religious activities.

Secondly, an analysis of religiosity can focus on the intra-dimensional aspects, the forms of religious activities and the motivations behind their performance for the individuals who engage in them. For the time being, the analysis presented in this study

has been primarily concerned with the first perspective. In our terminology we refer to this first perspective as the study of general religiosity, taking inspiration from Glock's (1962) initial work. However, the core of this study seeks to reveal the intra-dimensional aspects of the five dimensions. In other words, the actual research objective of this study is to uncover the various forms of Muslim religious behaviour, the motivations behind their performance, and their consequences in society.

The tables in this section will provide only limited information about religiosity and will not point to different motivations, cognitive styles, and contents of religious beliefs and practices. One of our goals with the analysis we present here is to show that Glock's old scheme has only a limited capacity to measure the complex nature of religiosity, and to show how important and crucial the elite and popular conceptualization is to understand the inner aspects of religiosity.


5.2.1. *Ideological Dimension*

Traditionally, Muslims affirm several articles of faith. Among the most widely known are: there is only one God; God has sent many messengers, with Muhammad as His last Prophet; God has revealed Sacred Scriptures, including the Qur'ān; God's angels exist even if humans cannot see them; there will be a Day of Judgment, when God will determine whether individuals are sent to heaven or to hell; and God's will and knowledge are absolute, which means that humans are subject to fate or predestination.⁵⁵

In the following table, light gray (1) refers to minimum belief and dark gray (5) to maximum belief.

⁵⁵ The lists and translations of the articles of faith vary. Most of them are derived from the "Ḥadīth of Gabriel". See for example *Sahih al-Bukhari* 2:47 and *Sahih al-Muslim* 1:1.

Table 11 – *Belief in basic tenets of Islamic faith* (n = 1165)




The survey, in which 1165 Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands participated, revealed the ubiquitous conviction among the participants that there is only one God and that Muhammad is His last prophet, with high percentages of Muslims who ascribe to other articles of faith, including the belief in sacred scriptures, reward and punishment, and the resurrection of the dead. In addition to the belief in the oneness of God, there are some low religious affiliations visible in the other domains. The participants were asked to indicate the intensity of their religious belief with a number ranging from 1 to 5. At least one in ten participants selected the number ‘1’, which indicates minimum affiliation. And at least one in ten selected number ‘2’ and ‘3’ to describe their religious belief, which indicates low and average affiliation.

5.2.2. *Ritualistic Dimension*

Together with the core beliefs discussed above, Islam is defined by ‘Five Pillars’ – basic rituals that are obligatory for all the members of the Islamic community who are physically able to perform them. The Five Pillars are: the profession of faith (*shahādah*), daily prayer (*ṣalāt*), fasting during the holy month of Ramadan (*ṣawm*), annual almsgiving to help the poor or needy (*zakāt*); and performing the annual pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during one’s lifetime (*ḥajj*).

Table 12 – *Level of practice of the pillars of Islam* (n = 1165)



Among these Five Pillars, the *Ṣalāt*, or daily prayer, is the most frequent practice by which Muslims profess their faith in one God and His prophet Muhammad. According to tradition, Muslims have to perform the prayer five times a day, typically at dawn, noon, mid- afternoon, sunset and night.

The survey finds that daily prayer is comparatively less central in the life of the majority of Dutch-Turkish Muslims. The participants who say they pray ‘always’ or ‘usually’ constitute three out of ten. Also, three out of ten say they never observe the five daily prayers.

Fasting during the month of Ramadan, which according to Islamic tradition is required of all healthy, adult Muslims, is part of an annual rite in which individuals place renewed emphasis on the teachings of the Qur’ān. The survey finds that more than half of the Muslims surveyed say that they ‘usually’ or ‘always’ observe the daytime fast during Ramadan. Three out of ten say that they fast ‘less often’ or ‘sometimes’. Less than one in ten says they never observe the daytime fast during Ramadan.

Friday Prayer is also widely observed when we exclude the female participants, as it is traditionally compulsory for men but preferable for women. In the Turkish community, women generally do not perform this prayer communally. More than two out of ten participants say they ‘always’ observe Friday prayer, while less than two out of ten say they ‘usually’ observe it.

Praying to God is thus one of the most extensively observed rituals of the respondents. Five out of ten Muslims say they ‘always’ pray to God, while more than two out of ten


participants say they ‘usually’ pray.

Annual almsgiving (*zakāt*), which by custom is supposed to equal 2.5% or more of a person’s total wealth, is widely observed. Four out of ten Muslims say they ‘always’ observe almsgiving, while two out of ten say they ‘usually’ observe it.

5.2.3. *Experiential Dimension*

The ritualistic dimension is one of the most observable dimensions of religion, while the experiential dimension is one of the least observable. This dimension encompasses all feelings, perceptions and sensations, whether they are felt by an individual or a religious group, that relate to some type of postulated communication with God or a transcendental being.

Table 13 - *Religious experience (n = 1165)*




In this table, 1 refers to ‘no experience’ while 5 refers to ‘a high level of experience’. Three out of ten participants say they have no experience with ‘sensing a spiritual teacher’ and ‘experiencing a miraculous event’. When we look at other variables, more than eight out of ten participants say they experience ‘angels’, ‘inner peace’, and ‘closeness to God’ to some degree.

5.2.4. *Intellectual Dimension*

The intellectual dimension refers to the expectation that Muslims will possess some knowledge about the basic tenets of their faith and its sacred scriptures.

Table 14 - *Religious knowledge* (n = 1165)




Initially, respondents were asked: ‘Which of the following answers provide lists that correctly sort successive chapters from the Qur’ān?’. More than three out of ten respondents answered this question correctly, while nearly three out of ten gave the wrong answer. Nearly four out of ten respondents said they were ‘not sure’ or had ‘no idea’.

The other questions for the intellectual dimension were: ‘Which of the following holy days occur during Ramadan?’, ‘Which of the following rules is not considered one of the obligatory rules (*farz*) for prayer (*ṣalāh*)?’, ‘What is the meaning of *Maqrūh*?’, and ‘Which of the following rules is not one of the pillars of faith (*īmān*)?’. On average, seven out of ten respondents answered these questions correctly.

5.2.5. *Consequential Dimension*

The consequential dimension encompasses the effects of religious belief, practice, experience and knowledge on the daily life of the believer. It includes all those religious prescriptions that specify what people ought to do and the attitudes they are supposed to have as a consequence of their religion.

Table 15 - *Consequential dimensions* (n = 1165)



Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

- 34. It would not bother my conscience to use alcohol.
- 35. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.
(reversed)
- 36. A woman should be able to have an abortion for any reason.
- 37. Premarital sexual relations between a boy and a girl who are in love is not immoral.
- 38. Religion is something I have never felt personally compelled to consider.

On average, seven out of ten respondents indicated that they ‘disagree’ or ‘totally disagree’ with these statements.⁵⁶

5.2.6. *Factor Analysis*

A principle factor analysis was performed on the data set of the general religiosity scale. An examination of the item correlations revealed the predominance of a single factor (see Appendix one: Table 36). Our findings suggest that this 5-dimensional construction may merely be the components of a single dimensional phenomenon, i.e. religiosity, and that it is possible that it does not represent a multidimensional phenomenon, i.e., it may not represent separate and distinct dimensions of Muslim

⁵⁶ Item 35 was formulated positively, contrary to the other statements. More than seven out of ten respondents indicated that they ‘agree’ or ‘totally agree’ with his statement.

religiosity. In other words, the data for Factor I suggest that the 5-dimensional scale may refer only to different aspects of a single dimension rather than to separate dimensions of religiosity.

Table 16 - Mean distributions for five aspects of general religiosity (n = 1165)




Table 16 shows the mean distributions of general religiosity for the overall sample. Based on this table, we can conclude that eight out of ten Dutch-Turkish respondents experience high religiosity while two out of ten respondents experience low religiosity.

Table 17 - Correlation matrix of five aspects of general religiosity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Means	SD	n
(1) Ideological	.					4,46	,99	1165
(2) Ritualistic	,73**	.				3,74	1,03	1165
(3) Experiential	,67**	,55**	.			3,53	1,15	1165
(4) Intellectual	,65**	,59**	,56**	.		4,23	1,10	1165
(5) Consequential	,78**	,65**	,64**	,64**	.	4,41	,90	1165

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The interrelations were tested by computing correlation coefficients among the five aspects of religiosity. For all respondents, the correlation coefficients ranged from a high of .78 between the ideological and consequential aspects to a low of .55 between the experiential and ideological aspects. All the correlations were positive and statistically significant.

5.2.7. *Conclusion*

Glock indicated two types of research that could be conducted utilizing his scheme. The first type of research to which Glock referred focuses on the question of inter-dimensional independence. The second type of research focuses on the intra-dimensional aspect. The idea of the first approach is that the various dimensions could be independent of each other, making it possible for individuals to score high on one dimension but low on another, and for social classes to differ in the form in which their religiosity is displayed. For example, Glock suggested that the working class might score high on belief but low on ritual practice, while the middle class might score high on ritual practice and low on belief. Regarding the matter of inter-dimensional independence, we found that 24 items of the general religiosity scale loaded on one general dimension (see Appendix one: Table 36).

Although Glock and Stark identified these 5 dimensions as core dimensions - dimensions which are both autonomous and independent - some specific studies have reported findings on the one-dimensional structure of this scheme, in line with our results. The one-dimensional structure of Glock's scheme is not surprising in the scientific study of religion. Clayton and Gladden (1974) discussed the Glock-Stark typology in their article and reported the existence of a single general factor. They concluded that religiosity is not multidimensional. According to further analysis of the Glock-Stark typology, religiosity seems to be one-dimensional in two cases: in the case of very high religiosity and in the case of complete irreligiosity. In the first case, all dimensions exhibit high intensities or frequencies, in the second case, all dimensions show very low values and are therefore (almost) perfectly correlated (Hubert, 2015). Perhaps the one-dimensional structure of the general religiosity scale is affected by the high religiosity characteristics of our sample. We elaborate on these considerations in the next chapter.

The second type of research, the intra-dimensional aspects of Glock's five dimensions, has so far not been taken into account in our analysis of the data. Glock proposed a number of tentative components within the various dimensions, but emphasized that there was still a great deal of work to be done in the field of intra-dimensional differentiation. The following part of our work focuses on such a research objective. Until this point in the survey, the believers were asked about the frequency

and quantity (*kammiyyāt*) of their religious beliefs and practices, accumulating scores on the general religiosity scale inspired by Glock (1962). Not the difference between elite and popular religion (intra-dimensional aspects of belief, practices, experience, knowledge), but the difference between belief and non-belief clearly emerged. In the next part of the survey, the central questions become ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ participants believe and practice. This brings into view rather different forms of beliefs and practices, and the motivations lying behind them (*kayfiyyāt*).⁵⁷

Inspired by Allport’s definition of the two ideal types intrinsic/extrinsic, our definition of elite/popular shows a clear development towards viewing the phenomena as types of motive, i.e., we zoom in on the *motivations* associated with religious beliefs and practices. We use the term ‘form’ to refer to the *cognitive styles* of religious beliefs and practices. In this study, then, the elite/popular distinction is operationalized as a measurement of two different kinds of motivations or cognitive styles in each of the dimensions (ideological, ritualistic, experiential and intellectual) which divide each of these dimensions in two subdimensions, ‘elite’ and ‘popular’. For instance, within the ideological dimension of religiosity, what will be measured is not the belief-content itself, but elite/popular motivations or cognitive styles shaping the belief. These two different kinds of motivations or cognitive styles measured within each of the dimensions can be called ‘elite motivations and cognitive styles of religiosity’ and ‘popular motivations and cognitive styles of religiosity’.

The starting point of our investigation is that elite forms and motivations, and popular forms and motivations, are both manifestations of strong religious affiliation. In other words, what distinguishes elite religiosity and popular religiosity is not a *commitment* to certain beliefs and practices, but different *motivations* and *cognitive styles*, or, to use a metaphor, the distinction concerns the vehicles used instead of the cargo carried. One can, for example, start from the Islamic definition of ‘Islam’ as ‘submission to God’. All Muslims will agree to this definition. The difference lies in defining *how* one should go about with submitting to God. From that point on, a

⁵⁷ The Arabic term *kammiyyāt* comes from the root “*kam*”, which means “how many”. This question therefore emphasizes the numerable or calculable side of faith. The Arabic term *kayfiyyāt*, on the other hand, comes from the root “*kayfa*” which means “how” or “in what way”. This question mainly emphasizes motivations and cognitive styles of beliefs and practices, rather than their quantity.

comparative study of the different interpretations of *how* to submit to God (that is, how to be a Muslim) is central to the research.

Therefore, from this point on, participants with low or non-existent religious affiliations will be excluded from further analysis. In the general religiosity scale, we employed a 5-point Likert scale and a multiple-choice scale. To divide the variable '*general religiosity*' into two categories - an upper and a lower half - we used the median of its frequency distribution. The lower half represents low religiosity and the upper half represents high religiosity.⁵⁸ By means of this criterion, 272 (23.3%) of the respondents were excluded, because - due to their low religious commitment - they are unable to assist us in our search for the forms and motivations of different aspects of high religiosity. Our analysis will therefore focus on the remaining 893 respondents (76.7 % of the initial sample), who have strong religious affiliations and are therefore categorized as 'experiencing high religiosity'.

⁵⁸ Scoring method: Likert scale items scored 1 to 5. Multiple-choice scale items scored from 1, signifying a "wrong answer", to 5, signifying a "right answer". Other answer options were "not sure" and "no idea", recoded as '1'.

5.3. Findings Concerning Aspects of Elite and Popular Religiosity

Table 18 - Correlation matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	Means	SD	n
(1) Elite belief	.								2,67	1,12	893
(2) Elite ritual	,62**	.							2,58	,99	893
(3) Elite experience	,23**	33**	.						2,86	,86	893
(4) Elite knowledge	,60**	,60**	,23**	.					2,55	1,03	893
(5) Popular belief	-,65**	-,51**	-,23**	-,47**	.				3,37	1,06	893
(6) Popular ritual	-,36**	-,52**	-,31**	-,40**	,51**	.			3,55	1,12	893
(7) Popular experience	-,35**	-,38**	-,54**	-,32**	,31**	,27**	.		2,87	1,09	893
(8) Popular knowledge	-,53**	-,52**	-,25**	-,53**	,65**	,58**	,31**	.	3,42	1,02	893

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

The interrelations were tested by computing correlation coefficients between the eight components (four subcomponents of elite religiosity, and four subcomponents of popular religiosity). The correlation coefficients range from a high negative correlation (-.65) to a high positive correlation (+0.65). The subcomponents of elite religiosity are negatively correlated with the subcomponents of popular religiosity. The subcomponents of elite religiosity are positively correlated with each other, just as the subcomponents of popular religiosity are positively correlated with each other.

5.3.1. *Factor Analysis of Elite Religiosity Scale and Popular Religiosity Scale*

In this section, we try to answer the third sub-question among the research questions. The third sub-question (*RQ1c*) was: ‘What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’

In chapter 3 several characteristics and motivations were presented, which range from popular religiosity on one side of the spectrum to elite religiosity on the other. These two aspects of religiosity reflect subcomponents, including belief, practice, knowledge, experience and consequences. Under these subcomponents, this study has identified several characteristics that we believe distinguish elite religiosity from popular religiosity. These characteristics were: dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and privacy versus experiential desirability and shareability.

If we look at the factor analysis of elite religiosity (see Appendix one, Table 37) and the factor analysis of popular religiosity (see Appendix one, Table 38), we can clearly see an overlap between several of the dimensions. There is an area of overlap between elite belief and elite knowledge, which together generate attitudes of criticism and openness to spiritual and intellectual change. Another area of overlap exists between popular belief and popular knowledge, which together generate a lack of criticism and resistance to spiritual and intellectual change.

After initial factor analysis, we assumed that at least one or two dimensions of elite and popular religiosity might be represented by one factor. The final factor analysis revealed that 11 items of elite religiosity loaded on two factors, as expected. The correlation between the two factors was 0.41. The pattern loadings of these two factors

are presented in Table 37 (see Appendix one). The first factor turned out to mainly represent elite belief, elite ritual and elite knowledge. In this study, all the factors listed below are labelled on the basis of the loadings of the *indicator variables*, i.e., the variables within the factor with the highest loadings, and also on the basis of the common features of variables. Based on this criterion, the first factor may be labelled '[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation'. The second factor turned out to mainly represent elite experience. This factor may be labelled 'experiential inessentiality and privacy'.

The final factor analysis revealed that 11 items of popular religiosity scale loaded on two factors as well. The correlation between the two factors was 0.34. The pattern loadings of these two factors are presented in Table 38 (see Appendix one). This table shows all the items loaded on these two factors. Factor 1 turned out to mainly represent popular belief, popular ritual and popular knowledge. This first factor may be labelled 'material expectations and [spiritual and intellectual] stability'. The second factor turned out to mainly represent popular experience. This factor may be labelled 'experiential desirability and shareability'.⁵⁹ The main reason for this structural similarity is that these groups of items were formulated by taking mutual interrelations between elite and popular religiosity into account.

Researchers may prefer to merge variables when they reveal strong correlations, in order to reduce the complexity of the representation. An indicator is available in all statistical software packages that estimates the strengths of the average correlations between two or more variables that are eligible for a merger into a single dimension. This indicator is called 'Cronbach's alpha' (Minkov, 2012, p. 139). Since the elite and popular religiosity variables reveal a strong correlation with each other (respectively $\alpha = .82$ and $\alpha = .84$, see chapter 4), we prefer to combine them in a single dimension. Combining the 2-factors structures for the elite and popular religiosity scales into a single data set can simplify the analysis. It is precisely with a view to this simplification that the two 2-factor structures for the scales were merged into a single factor per scale, factors which were then considered a single dimension for the scales in question. In other words, based on the factor analysis of elite religiosity, a single score '*elite*

⁵⁹ In these statements, we prefer to use the formulation "may be labelled" because of the subjective and controversial character of these labels, which are designed based on the personal judgement of the researcher.

religiosity’ was constructed by combining the 2-factor structure ‘[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation’ and ‘experiential inessentiality and privacy.’ Likewise, based on the factor analysis of popular religiosity, a single score ‘*popular religiosity*’ was constructed by combining the 2-factor structure ‘material expectations and [spiritual and intellectual] stability’ and ‘experiential desirability and shareability.’ This means that the scores obtained on the two 2-factor structures will be evaluated as a total score when measuring *elite religiosity* and *popular religiosity*.

The fourth sub-question (*RQ1d*) among the research questions was: ‘What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?’ The present study expects to find that ‘Elite and popular forms of religiosity are negatively correlated with each another’ (*H1*).

We tested correlation coefficients among the three religiosities (elite, popular and high religiosity).

Table 19 - *Correlation matrix (elite, popular and high Religiosity)*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	Means	SD	n
(1) High religiosity	.			4,24	,34	893
(2) Elite religiosity	-,09**	.		2,75	,67	893
(3) Popular religiosity	,054	-,72**	.	3,30	,81	893

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The study found a negative correlation between elite religiosity and popular religiosity ($r = -.72$) and also a negative correlation between high religiosity and elite religiosity ($r = -.09$). The study found no correlation between high religiosity and popular religiosity.


The null hypothesis⁶⁰ (there is no relationship between elite and popular religiosity) was therefore rejected.

⁶⁰ *H1* may be formulated in terms of absence of similarity or the presence of difference, and the null hypothesis may be formulated in a reversed manner, in terms of presence of similarity or the absence of difference. If there is no similarity or if there actually is a difference, the null

5.3.2. Average Means of Elite and Popular Religiosity

We now turn to the other part of the empirical question raised in this section: *RQ1e*: ‘How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?’ The first hypothesis of the present study in this context was that ‘Turkish Muslim minorities living in the Netherlands predominantly experience popular religiosity’ (*H2*).

Table 20 - Average means of elite and popular religiosity (*n* = 893)



A median split formed the low and high scores for the elite and popular religiosity groups (high level of elite religiosity ≥ 3 and high level of popular religiosity ≥ 3). According to this criterion, 611 (% 68.4) of the respondents experience popular religiosity while 269 (% 30.1) experience elite religiosity.⁶¹

hypothesis is rejected, and if there is similarity or there is no difference, the null hypothesis is not rejected.

⁶¹ Table 20 includes the group of respondents who experience (low or high) elite and popular religiosity simultaneously.

Table 21 - *Cross tabulations*

		Popular religiosity				
		1<2	2<3	3<4	4<5	Total
Elite religiosity	1<2	1	5	42	68	116
	2<3	8	65	346	89	508
	3<4	83	94	56	4	237
	4<5	15	11	6	0	32
Total		107	175	450	161	893

Cross-tabulation shows that 79 (% 8,8) of the respondents experience low levels of elite *and* popular religiosity, and 66 (% 7,3) respondents experience high levels of elite *and* popular religiosity, even after exclusion of the group of respondents who experience low religiosity. This means that a significant number of the respondents subscribe to both the elite and popular religiosity items. Some of these items are positively and negatively worded versions of virtually the same item. The problem we are encountering here is essentially the same as that of the various researchers who have tried to reverse the wording of items, in order to avoid an unwanted response-set bias.

An example from the intellectual dimension of the elite and popular religiosity scales would be: 'For me, doubting the validity of my current religious knowledge is an important part of what it means to be religious' (elite religiosity). 'If I find answers to my religious questions through imams, I never doubt their correctness' (popular religiosity). (For a comparison of the items, see the following tables in Appendix one: Table 37, Table 38)

The approach used by Peabody (1961) provides us with a model for meaningfully analyzing our data. By comparing each individual's responses to the same question, which was formulated positively in one place and reversely formulated in another, he was able to distinguish between those who were consistently pro or anti the content of authoritarian items. Table 22 above applies Peabody's paradigm to our data.

In assigning our 893 cases to these categories, we used the following criteria.

Individuals who consistently agree with elite religiosity scale items and who disagree with popular religiosity scale items, are assigned to *Elite religiosity*. Due to

the scoring method used, these individuals fall above the median scores on the elite religiosity scale.

Individuals who consistently agree with popular religiosity scale items and who disagree with elite religiosity scale items, are assigned to *Popular religiosity*. Due to the scoring method used, these individuals fall above the median scores on the popular religiosity scale.

Concerning the respondents who experience low levels of elite and popular religiosity simultaneously, we can say that definitions of elite and popular religion do not cover all aspects of high religiosity. These results mean that a high level of religiosity should be considered with a number of additional aspects. Concerning the respondents who experience elite and popular religiosity simultaneously, we can recall the interrelation existing between elite religiosity and popular religiosity. In this case, it could be said that it is perfectly possible that some respondents experience some aspects of elite and popular religiosity simultaneously. These results will be discussed in the next chapter.

Table 22 - *Agreement and disagreement with elite and popular religiosity scale (n = 893)*

	<i>Agrees with elite religiosity</i>	<i>Disagrees with elite religiosity</i>
<i>Agrees with popular religiosity</i>	Double agreement 66 (% 7,4)	Consistently popular religiosity 545 (% 61)
<i>Disagrees with popular religiosity</i>	Consistently elite religiosity 203 (% 22,7)	Double disagreement 79 (% 8,8)
	<i>total = 269</i>	<i>total = 624</i>

Finally, our study excludes those who display a double agreement (or double disagreement) with both scales. In view of further analysis, these cases diminish the statistical significance of our data to some degree. We temporarily halted the analysis of these groups, and continued to investigate the differences between those 748 respondents who experience a high level of elite religiosity and a high level of popular religiosity (after exclusion of 145 respondents).

In the following paragraphs and tables, we give participants who consistently experience a high level of elite religiosity the label ‘*elite religiosity*’, and participants who consistently experience a high level of popular religiosity the label ‘*popular religiosity*’.

5.3.3. *Independent Variables and Elite and Popular Religiosity*

In this section, this study continues to research the following research question *RQ1e*: ‘How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?’

Firstly, we will discuss the remaining three hypotheses regarding education, income and generational differences. We then discuss our expectations with regard to gender and age. A series of ANOVA results revealed that there were some significant differences regarding elite/popular religiosity in relation to demographic variables.

5.3.3.1. *Educational Status*

The first research question was: in what manner does the educational status of an individual impact on elite /popular religiosity?

Table 23 - *Education and elite/popular religiosity*

		<i>n</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Elite religiosity	Primary education	11	3,41	,24	2,83	,039*
	Secondary education	31	3,63	,32		
	Undergraduate	111	3,69	,33		
	Postgraduate	50	3,69	,29		
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Primary education	79	3,91	,47	10,83	,000*
	Secondary education	153	3,92	,41		
	Undergraduate	267	3,72	,40		
	Postgraduate	46	3,66	,37		
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Our hypothesis was: ‘High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with education. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with education’ (*H4*).

A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 23) and the findings showed that there was a significant difference in the means of elite and popular religiosity based on educational status.

The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the educational level of the participants and elite and popular religiosity) was rejected.

Table 23 shows that respondents with a higher educational status experience elite religiosity more clearly than respondents with a lower educational status. A significant difference ($F = 2,83, p = .039$) was found between the means of these values.

This table also shows that respondents with a lower educational status experience popular religiosity more clearly than respondents with a higher educational status. A significant difference ($F = 10,83, p = .000$) was found between the means of these values.

Table 24 considers respondents who experience high religiosity. A one-way ANOVA was used to test whether there are differences in the means of high religiosity and the findings showed that there was a significant difference based on educational status ($F = 3,78, p = .010$). The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the educational level of the participants and high religiosity) was rejected. Table 24 shows that the intensity of high religiosity decreases with education.

Table 24 - *Education and high religiosity*

		<i>n</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
High religiosity	Primary education	107	4,28	,32	3,78	,010*
	Secondary education	215	4,30	,30		
	Undergraduate	456	4,21	,37		
	Postgraduate	115	4,21	,33		
	Total	893	4,24	,34		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

5.3.3.2. *Income*

The second research question was: in what manner does the income of an individual impact the score on the elite/popular religiosity scale?

Our hypothesis was: 'High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with

economic status. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with economic status' (H_5).

Table 25 - Income and elite/popular religiosity (n = 748)

	<i>Income</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Elite religiosity	Below €10,000	12	3,71	,38	,60	,659
	€10,000 - €30,000	88	3,68	,32		
	€30,000 - €60,000	67	3,64	,32		
	€60,000 - €100,000	30	3,64	,26		
	Above €100,000	6	3,83	,44		
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Below €10,000	30	3,75	,45	2,49	,042*
	€10,000 - €30,000	232	3,76	,40		
	€30,000 - €60,000	202	3,80	,41		
	€60,000 - €100,000	64	3,94	,49		
	Above €100,000	17	3,87	,51		
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 25) and the findings showed that there was no significant difference in the means of elite religion based on income. The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the income of the participants and scores on the elite religiosity scale) was maintained.

Surprisingly, however, we found that there was a significant difference in the means of popular religiosity based on income. If the respondents who earn more than 100,000 Euros are excluded, we can read this table as showing that respondents with a higher income experience popular religiosity more clearly than respondents with a lower income. A significant difference ($F = 2,49, p = .042$) was found between the means of these values.

According to these results, our hypothesis is rejected.

5.3.3.3. *Generational differences*

The third research question was: in what manner does the generational status of an individual impact the score on the elite/popular religiosity scale?

Our hypothesis was: ‘First-generation respondents experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation respondents’ (H_3).

A group t-test for differences between the first and second-generation respondents supported the hypothesis that there would be differences between the two groups.

Table 26 - Independent samples t-test – Religiosity and generational differences

	<i>Generations</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Elite religiosity	First generation	115	3,66	,331	,12	,646
	Second generation	88	3,68	,316		
Popular religiosity	First generation	338	3,86	,438	4,65	,000*
	Second generation	207	3,69	,387		
High religiosity	First generation	528	4,32	,311	4,21	,000*
	Second generation	365	4,13	,370		
Low religiosity	First generation	120	2,16	,245	,63	,568
	Second generation	152	2,14	,236		
Education	First generation	648	2,51	,889	77,87	,000*
	Second generation	517	2,88	,718		

* Significance is based on a 2-tailed test.

t-test statistics based on the assumption of equal variances.

The means of *elite religiosity* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. No significance was found within this group ($p > .05$).

The means of *popular religiosity* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. Significance at the .05 level was found within this group ($p < .001$).

The means of *high religiosity* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of *low religiosity* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. No significance was found within this group ($p > .05$).

The means of *education* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. Significance at the .05 level was found within this group ($p < .001$).

Looking at the average mean values of each group, we can conclude that the first-

generation respondents were stronger in popular religiosity and stronger in high religiosity compared to the second-generation respondents.

5.3.3.4. Gender

The fourth research question was: in what manner does the gender of an individual impact on elite /popular religiosity?

Table 27 - Gender and elite/popular religion

Gender		<i>n</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Elite religiosity	Male	120	3,65	,32	,38	,536
	Female	83	3,68	,32		
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Male	281	3,82	,43	1,10	,294
	Female	264	3,78	,41		
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

Our expectation was: ‘The experience level of popular religiosity is higher among Muslim women than among Muslim men’ (E_1)

A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 27) and the findings showed that there was no significant difference in the means of elite religiosity ($F = ,38, p = .586$) and popular religiosity ($F = 1,10, p = .294$) based on gender.

The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the gender of the participants and scores on the elite religiosity scale) was maintained.

5.3.3.5. Age

The fifth research question was: in what manner does the age of an individual impact on elite / popular religiosity?

Table 28 - Age groups and elite/popular religiosity

		<i>n</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Elite religiosity	Between 18 - 25	64	3,69	,34	1,38	,242
	Between 26 - 35	47	3,73	,35		
	Between 36 - 45	38	3,65	,30		
	Between 46 - 55	27	3,62	,29		
	56 and older	27	3,57	,26		
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Between 18 - 25	159	3,72	,40	3,39	,003*
	Between 26 - 35	144	3,77	,43		
	Between 36 - 45	108	3,80	,40		
	Between 46 - 55	80	3,92	,44		
	56 and older	54	3,91	,43		
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Our expectation was: ‘Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and above) experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-35)’ (E_2).

A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 28) and the findings showed that there was no significant difference in the means of elite religiosity based on age groups. The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the age of the participants and scores on the elite religiosity scale) was maintained.

However, the findings showed that there was a difference in the means of popular religiosity based on age groups. Table 28 shows that the middle-aged (36 - 55) and older participants (56 and above) experienced popular religiosity more intensely compared to young respondents. A significant difference ($F = 3,39$, $p = .003$) was found between the means of these values. The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the age of the participants and scores on the popular religiosity scale) was rejected.

Table 29 - Correlation matrix of age, residence duration and religiosity

		High religiosity	Elite religiosity	Popular religiosity
Age group	Pearson correlation	,213**	-,139*	,162**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,048	,000
	<i>n</i>	893	203	545
Residence duration	Pearson correlation	,070	-,269**	,033
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,117	,004	,556
	<i>n</i>	502	111	316

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 29 shows a correlation matrix of age, residence duration and religiosity. According to this table, the older generations tend to be more religious than the younger generation ($r = .21$). Moreover, age group turns out to be negatively correlated with elite religiosity ($r = -.13$) and positively correlated with popular religiosity ($r = .16$).

We found a negative correlation between the residence duration of respondents who were not born in the Netherlands and elite religiosity ($r = -.26$). In other words, living in a non-Muslim environment does seem to weaken ties with elite religiosity.

5.3.3.6. *Elite / Popular religiosity and Feeling Oneself More Religious*

The seventh research question was: in what manner does a sense that one is more religious than most people, impact on elite /popular religiosity?

Our expectation was: ‘Respondents who identify themselves as ‘more religious than most’ predominantly experience popular religiosity’ (E_3).

Table 30 - Item 12 - *I believe myself to be more religious than most people*

		<i>n</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Elite religiosity	Right	55	3,57	,26	5,75	,005*
	Wrong	117	3,73	,33		
	No idea	31	3,60	,32		
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Right	269	3,85	,43	4,77	,017*
	Wrong	179	3,74	,41		
	No idea	97	3,74	,40		
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

In elite religiosity, 27 % (55) of the respondents stated they were more religious than most, while 58 % (113) of the respondents stated they were no more religious than most. 15 % (31) stated they had no opinion.

However, in popular religiosity, 49 % (269) of the respondents stated they were more religious than most, while 33 % (179) of the respondents stated they were no more religious than most. 18 % (97) stated they had no opinion.

A one-way ANOVA with post-hoc analysis was used to test this research question (see Table 30) and the findings showed that there was a significant difference in the means of elite religiosity ($F = 5,75, p = .005$) and popular religiosity ($F = 4,77, p = .017$) based on the item 'believing oneself to be more religious than most'. (Between two items: right and wrong). The null hypothesis (there is no relation between 'believing oneself to be more religious than most' and scores on the elite and popular religiosity scales) was rejected. According to these results, our expectation is confirmed.

5.3.4. Factors Influencing Elite and Popular Religiosity

Table 31 - Correlation matrix of factors influencing elite/popular religiosity

		Family	Friends	School	Books	R. Leaders	Mosques	R. Found.	TV	Internet
Elite religiosity	Pearson correlation	,184**	,086	,129	,266**	,141*	-,018	,041	-,221**	,038
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,009	,225	,067	,000	,045	,799	,559	,002	,591
	<i>n</i>	203	203	203	203	203	203	203	203	203
Popular religiosity	Pearson correlation	,074	,079	,010	-,005	,177**	,174**	,057	,187**	,104*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,085	,064	,810	,900	,000	,000	,180	,000	,015
	<i>n</i>	545	545	545	545	545	545	545	545	545
Education	Pearson correlation	-,001	,000	-,041	,242**	-,066*	-,094**	-,015	-,184**	-,073*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,974	1,000	,163	,000	,025	,001	,612	,000	,013
	<i>n</i>	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

This part of the study will seek to identify bivariate associations, and therefore, will utilize the Pearson correlation coefficient.

The respondents were asked how much the following items influenced their religious education: family, friends, school, books, religious leaders, mosques, religious foundations, television and the Internet.

Our expectations were:

'Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through television programmes, experience a high level of popular religiosity' (E_4).

'Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through their family experience a high level of popular religiosity' (E_5).

Since this aspect of the present study was exploratory, no hypotheses and further expectations were presented.

We found that elite religiosity is positively correlated with family ($r = .18$), books ($r = .26$), religious leaders ($r = .14$), while negatively correlated with television ($r = -.22$). We found that elite religiosity is not significantly correlated with friends, school, mosques, religious foundations and the Internet.

At the same time, we found that popular religiosity is positively correlated with religious leaders ($r = .27$), mosques ($r = .24$), television ($r = .25$) and the Internet ($r = .15$). We found that popular religiosity is not significantly correlated with family, friends, school, books and religious foundations.

We also looked at the way in which educational status itself influences religious education. We found that educational status is positively correlated with books ($r = .24$), while negatively correlated with religious leaders ($r = -.06$), mosques ($r = -.09$), television ($r = -.18$) and the Internet ($r = .07$).

According to these results, our first expectation was confirmed while our second expectation was rejected.

5.3.5. *Socio-psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity*

Consequential Dimension of Religiosity

We now turn to the other part of the empirical question raised in this section: *RQ2*: ‘What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively?’

The consequential dimension of religiosity was measured through the use of several attitude scales. The consequential dimension includes all those religious prescriptions that specify what people ought to do and the attitudes they are supposed to have as a consequence of their religion. Therefore, this dimension can also be described as an attitudinal aspect. This attitudinal aspect is interpreted here as the connection of elite and popular religiosity with people’s daily lives. The scales used in previous studies that have similar characteristics of popular religiosity, have generally shown that aspects of popular religion are not only related to racial and ethnic prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 441) but to a large number of other *socially divisive* characteristics as well. On the other hand, scales used in previous studies with equivalent characteristics of elite religiosity have generally shown that aspects of elite religion are unrelated or negatively related to racial and ethnic prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 441) and also that these aspects are positively related to a variety of *socially productive* characteristics (Capucao, 2010; Hood, 1998; Nelson, 2015). In order to measure these various non-religious characteristics, several attitude scales have been developed in this study.

The attitudinal aspects were chosen to cover a wide range of life issues, including modernity, gender, sectarian issues, social relations in society, and attitudes towards Christianity (numerically the strongest religion in the Netherlands).

Accordingly, in order to measure attitudinal consequences of elite and popular religiosity, this study presents the following scales that make up the fourth part of our questionnaire. These scales are:

Attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)

Attitudes towards women

Attitudes towards race/ethnicity

Attitudes towards others


Attitudes towards modernity

In-group attitudes

These scales consist of 27 items (see Appendix one, Table 38). The respondents were asked to answer on a 5-point Likert scale (5 referred to ‘completely agree’ and 1 to ‘completely disagree’). 11 items were structured negatively, and 16 positively. Positively phased items were scored as 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and negatively phased items were reversely scored as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. This scoring method suggests that mean scores ranging from 1 to 3 indicate a positive tendency towards the listed attitude, and that mean scores ranging from 3 to 5 indicate a negative tendency towards the listed attitude.

The following tables show the average mean distributions for elite and popular religiosity.

Table 32 - Average mean distributions for elite religiosity



According to table 32, 188 (% 93) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 15 (% 7) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘*hostile attitudes towards other religions*’.

121 (% 98) male respondents out of 123 male participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 2 (% 2) male respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘*subordinate attitudes towards women*’.


188 (% 93) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 15 (% 7) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘*prejudiced attitudes towards others*’.

197 (% 97) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 6 (% 3) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘*hostile attitudes towards others*’.

179 (% 88) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 24 (% 12) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale '*harmonious attitudes towards modernity*'.

112 (% 70) respondents out of 158 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 46 (% 30) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale '*conservative in-group attitudes*'.

Table 33- Average mean distributions for popular religiosity



According to table 33, 435 (% 80) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 110 (% 20) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale '*hostile attitudes towards other religions*'.

255 (% 89) male respondents out of 285 male participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 30 (% 11) male respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale '*subordinate attitudes towards women*'.

467 (% 86) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 78 (% 14) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale '*prejudiced attitudes towards others*'.

495 (% 91) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 50 (% 9) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale '*hostile attitudes towards others*'.

461 (% 85) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 84 (% 15) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale '*harmonious attitudes towards modernity*'.

216 (% 74) respondents out of 293 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 77 (% 26) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale '*conservative in-group attitudes*'.

Table 34 - *t*-test comparison of some socio-psychological attitudes for elite and popular religiosity

Subscale	Type of religiosity	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Sig.
(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (i.e., Christianity)	Elite religiosity	203	1,90	,730	,000*
	Popular religiosity	545	2,34	,895	,000*
(Subordinate) attitudes towards women	Elite religiosity	123	1,66	,595	,000*
	Popular religiosity	281	2,13	,728	,000*
(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race	Elite religiosity	203	1,82	,744	,000*
	Popular religiosity	545	2,20	,906	,000*
(Hostile) attitudes towards others	Elite religiosity	203	1,78	,652	,000*
	Popular religiosity	545	2,15	,806	,000*
(Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism	Elite religiosity	203	2,17	,965	,842
	Popular religiosity	545	2,18	1,007	,839
(Conservative) in-group attitudes	Elite religiosity	168	2,52	,970	,000*
	Popular religiosity	393	2,99	,944	,000*

* Significance is based on a 2-tailed test.
t-test statistics based on the assumption of equal variances.
 (*n* = 748)

Socio-psychological Attitudes

The second research question was: ‘What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively?’.

Our hypotheses were:

(*H*₆) Respondents motivated by elite religiosity are more open to interaction with Christians than respondents motivated by popular religiosity.

(*H*₇) Men motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more subordinate attitudes towards women and more traditional ideas about gender, than men motivated by elite religiosity.

(*H*₈) Respondents motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more prejudiced attitudes towards other races/ethnicities than respondents motivated by elite religiosity.

(*H*₉) Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more hostile attitude towards others than respondents motivated by elite religiosity.

(*H*₁₀) Respondents motivated by elite religiosity have a more harmonious attitude towards modernity than respondents motivated by popular religiosity.

(*H*₁₁) Respondents motivated by elite religiosity exhibit less conservative in-group attitudes than respondents motivated by popular religiosity.

The fourth sub-question was addressed by conducting independent t-tests on each subscale of the questionnaire, to determine whether there were differences in the means of the socio-psychological attitudes in relation to elite and popular religiosity.

The means of the ‘(prejudiced) attitudes towards race’ subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of the ‘(subordinate) attitudes towards women’ subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Female respondents are excluded from this scale because of the question characteristics. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of the '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions (i.e., Christianity)' subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of the '(hostile) attitudes towards others' subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of the '(harmonious) attitudes towards modernism' subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. No significance was found within this subscale ($p > .05$).

The means of the '(conservative) in-group attitudes' subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

According to our scoring method, values ranging from 1 to 3 indicate a positive tendency towards listed attitudes, and values ranging from 3 to 5 indicate a negative tendency towards listed attitudes. If we look at the average mean values of each attitude scale, we can conclude that both participants who experience elite religiosity and participants who experience popular religiosity have negative attitudes towards each scale. This means that, according to the average result, the participants - regardless of their religious affiliations - are not hostile towards members of other religions; do not have subordinate attitudes towards women; are not prejudiced towards other races; are not hostile towards others; and do not have conservative in-group attitudes.

However, the differences in the mean values between the two groups are significant. We found that respondents who experienced popular religiosity were less open and friendly towards other religions. Moreover, men who experienced popular religiosity had poorer views on the equality and rights of women compared to men who experienced elite religiosity. It also turned out that participants who experienced popular religiosity expressed more (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and showed more conservative in-group attitudes than participants who experienced elite religiosity. According to these results, hypotheses 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11 are confirmed. Hypothesis 10 is rejected.

Table 35 - Correlation matrix of socio-psychological factors

		(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions	(Subordinate) attitudes towards women	(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race	(Hostile) attitudes towards others	(Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism	(Conservative) in-group attitudes
Elite religiosity	Pearson correlation	-,159*	-,239**	-,150*	-,214**	-,069	-,004
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,024	,008	,033	,002	,330	,962
	<i>n</i>	203	123	203	203	203	168
Popular religiosity	Pearson correlation	,159**	,301**	,106*	,111**	,065	,170**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,013	,009	,131	,001
	<i>n</i>	545	281	545	545	545	393
High religiosity	Pearson correlation	,073*	,166**	,061	,019	,042	,068
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,028	,000	,068	,572	,214	,081
	<i>n</i>	893	492	893	893	893	660
Education	Pearson correlation	-,121**	-,217**	-,160**	-,118**	,020	-,106**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	,000	,557	,007
	<i>n</i>	893	492	893	893	893	660
Age group	Pearson correlation	,036	,211**	,115**	,048	-,057	,000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,286	,000	,001	,148	,090	,992
	<i>n</i>	893	492	893	893	893	660

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The results of a Pearson correlation coefficient established that the correlation between the religiosity scales and the scales for socio-psychological factors, as well as the correlation between education and age group and the scales for socio-psychological factors, are all significant.

The study observes a negative correlation between the subscale '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions' and elite religiosity ($r = -.159$); between (subordinate) attitudes towards women and elite religiosity ($r = -.239$); between (prejudiced) attitudes towards race and elite religiosity ($r = -.150$); and between (hostile) attitudes towards others and elite religiosity ($r = -.214$).

The study observes a positive correlation between the subscale '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions' and popular religiosity ($r = .159$); between (subordinate) attitudes towards women and popular religiosity ($r = .301$); between (prejudiced) attitudes towards race and popular religiosity ($r = .106$); between (hostile) attitudes towards others and popular religiosity ($r = .111$); and between (conservative) in-group attitudes and popular religiosity ($r = .170$).

The study observes a positive correlation between the subscale '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions' and high religiosity ($r = .073$); and between (subordinate) attitudes towards women and high religiosity ($r = .166$).

The study observes a negative correlation between the subscale '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions' and education ($r = -.121$); between (subordinate) attitudes towards women and education ($r = -.160$); between (prejudiced) attitudes towards race and education ($r = -.160$); between (hostile) attitudes towards others and education ($r = .118$); and between (conservative) in-group attitudes and education ($r = -.106$).

The study observes a positive correlation between the subscale '(subordinate) attitudes towards women' and age group ($r = .211$); and between (prejudiced) attitudes towards race and age group ($r = .115$).

These findings show that there are important socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among the two groups. Therefore, these research findings will be elaborated in the next chapter (see 6.2.4. Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity).