Elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish muslims in the Netherlands
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3. Theoretical and Socio-psychological Foundations of Elite and Popular Religiosity in Islam

In this chapter, we shall discuss the ten components (2x5) of religious commitment that were derived in relation to an elite and popular distinction on Glock's (1962) five dimensions. In the first section of this chapter (3.1), I indicate how elite and popular divisions affect research in the social scientific study of religion. Then, I will try to conceptualize ten components of religious commitment by comparing to other measurements in the field (3.1). Subsequently, I offer a comparison of Allport's religious orientation approach of religion with Glock's Multi-Dimensional Approach of religion (3.1.2). In addition, some suggestions are given regarding the scale that has been developed for this study.

The second part of this chapter is dedicated to understanding elite and popular religiosity from the point of view of Muslim religious experience. Building on the general conceptual foundations laid in chapter 2, I shall try to evaluate elite and popular religion in the context of Muslim sociology (3.2). I then outline the possible content of ten components of religiosity (3.3). This part of the study will provide us with a set of hypotheses that will be tested in chapter 5.

3.1. *Elite and Popular Religiosity in Social Scientific Study of Religion*

Islamic history has been a history of interaction
between realities and ideas.

Jørgen S. Nielsen (2008)

Too often, studies on religion have focused on intellectual history as a substitute for social history. In religious studies, theoretical and prescriptive religion has taken priority over the living content of *everyday religion* (McGuire, 2008, pp. 3-19). The field has preferred to recognise religion as internalized "faith", built upon a systematic acquaintance with sacred texts, theological doctrines, and legal debates (Grehan, 2014; Keskin, 2011; Wiktor-Mach, 2012; Ağilkaya-Şahin, 2012). It did not investigate properly whether piety and prayer have their own particular history. Metaphorically speaking, "looking upward to the sky rather than downward to earthly matters" (Berger, 2006, p. 338). As a result, the field has often lapsed into various forms of historical anachronism.

Rather than influencing daily social behaviour, religious norms and teachings continued ideals that most individuals did not fully understand. Until recent times, the vast majority of people, be they Muslim, Christian or Jewish, would not have fully recognized or understood the religious culture that is attributed to them today. However, it is not difficult to find the remnants of a mental universe that was very different from the casual assumptions that so many researchers project onto the religion of the past (Grehan, 2014).

Historians of pre-modern societies have long been aware that many elements of religious life do not seem to fit with prescribed doctrine or ritual. To address this problem, scholars have proposed theoretical conceptions such as official/unofficial religion and elite/popular religion. Initially, 'popular religion' referred mainly to religious practices that were denounced by religious authorities and other observers speaking on behalf of orthodoxy. In these cases, religion is almost automatically defined in terms of institutions (Ter Borg, 1999). Because the term 'popular religion' is therefore severely tainted by such pejorative connotations, some scholars have recommended to discard the concept altogether (Grehan, 2014). Robert Orsi (2002, p.

16) has claimed that concepts like 'popular religion' are deeply and directly involved in the history of Western racism and colonialism, and in three centuries of divisive, bitter, and destructive Christian conflict. McGuire (2008, p. 46) assumes that in the long term scholars will find the concept so ambiguous and unhelpful that they will abandon it. In line with this critical reassessment, the present study wants to de-centre the issue of religion from its supposed Western origins, in which true religion was regarded as set against localised religions or "mere tradition" (Picard, 2011). The latter has often been associated with superstition and backwardness - not only in Europe, but also in the cultural politics of many post-colonial Asian countries of the 20th century (Endres & Lauser, 2012, p. 2). Therefore, we search for new ways to conceptualize elite and popular religion as a cultural process that is linked to contemporary values and market and power relations.

Over the past few decades, historians and sociologists have worked hard to break free from this judgmental language. Instead of taking sides in theological disputes, they have sought inspiration in anthropological models, which were more concerned with identifying patterns of behaviour than determining the correctness of beliefs (Berlinerblau, 2001; Bilgin, 2003; Geertz, 1973). A shift from theory to practice would allow popular religion to garner more attention, instead of being referred to the margins along with "superstition" and other forms of pejoratively labelled religiosity. Such labels betray dogmatic assumptions that are not acceptable in an ideologically neutral form of religious studies (Antes, 2004, p. 63).

Since the 1990s, many sociologists who investigate religious phenomena have been turning to quantitative research methods. Examples include national surveys such as the American General Social Surveys (GSS), the National Election Studies (NES) and Eurobarometer, and global studies such as the World Values Survey (WVS) and the "Forum on Religion and Public Life" of the Pew Research Center. According to Wiktor-March, such a strategy usually does not take the influence of cultural, political, economic, and social contexts on people's theological ideas into consideration. Nor does it usually consider the impact of such contexts on the variety of meanings that people attach to religious concepts. Consequently, the images and diagnoses of religious communities that emerge out of these studies turn out to be inconsistent or, in many cases, contradictory (2012, p. 219).

According to Yapıcı's study on fieldwork (2004, pp. 85-118), most MA and PhD students in Turkey seem to be reluctant to develop their own scales and to analyse the data generated by such newly developed scales. They often prefer to employ the already existing scales. According to Yapıcı, this methodology causes the situation that "the scales form the facts rather than the facts form the scales" (2004, p. 112).

This recent wave of research shows signs of sensitivity to methodological problems. There is a growing awareness that, in addition to progress in theoretical thinking and data analysis, more attention should be paid to the way religion is conceptualized and operationalized (Finke et al., 2010; Yapıcı, 2004).

The most important problems arise from the fact that little attention has been paid to non-Christian religious experience. Hill and Hood (1999) aggregated and analysed 126 different psychological measurements for religiosity. However, Grace (2000) noted that researchers who wanted to find measurements applicable to non-Western religions and spirituality could not find them in Hill and Hood's work. Scholars have pointed out that the content dimension of Muslim religiosity varies considerably from that of the Christian religious tradition (Krauss et al., 2005; Shamsuddin, 1992; Wiktor-Mach, 2012). According to Küçükcan (2000, p. 468)

> One should bear in mind that almost all of the theoretical frameworks were developed after studying predominantly Christian believers and manifestations of Christian religious experience. It is therefore questionable whether these methodological approaches can explain non-Christian religious experience...

Hill and Hood (1999) have echoed this sentiment by admitting that, since relevant scales for non-Christian religions are virtually non-existent, measures of 'religion' are likely to reflect Christian religious conceptions, even when they do not explicitly identify as measurements of the *Christian* religion (Heelas, 1985; Ağilkaya-Şahin, 2015). Scholars also add that the need to study other religious traditions empirically is obvious. The study of religion and spirituality needs to be informed about the content of particular faith traditions in order to develop meaningful and appropriate empirical instruments (Gorsuch, 2008; Hood, 1992; Porpora, 2006; Wiktor-Mach, 2012; Ağilkaya-Şahin, 2012). Methodological approaches for the measurement of religiosity should correlate with the theological and cultural framework to which the specific religion or religiosity belongs.

For example, Glock and Stark's model of religiosity, which has been predominantly employed in different fields - wholly or partly -, has been adapted to the Islamic religion (see Appendix five: Measurements in Turkish Sociology and Psychology of Religion). Serajzadeh (1998), in his study on Iranian Muslim youth and crime, developed an adapted measurement for religiosity based on Glock and Stark's model. The leading assumption for using the model was that "since the three monotheistic religions (namely Judaism, Christianity and Islam) seem to share similar elements in their structural tenets, some items developed by researchers for Christianity and Judaism seem to be applicable to Islam too" (Serajzadeh, pp. 138-139). For each of the five dimensions of Glock and Stark, Serajzadeh included or applied aspects of the Islamic faith. For the ideological dimension, for example, the Islamic 'articles of faith' or the 'six pillars of faith' were used. For the 'ritualistic' dimension, Serajzadeh included daily prayer *(ṣalāt)* and fasting *(ṣawm)* during the month of Ramadan - as part of the 'pillars of Islam' -, in addition to reading the Holy Book (the Qurʾān), attending public prayer (both every day of the week and during Friday prayer), participating in ceremonies held on holy days in mosques, and other rituals. While such an adaptation of Glock and Stark's model to the Islamic religious context is more comprehensive than most of the other multi-dimensional models measuring the religiosity of the Muslim population, there are important shortcomings that need to be highlighted. Before we get to that, however, we need to look at two-dimensional approaches of religiosity.

3.1.1. *Two - Dimensional Approaches of Religiosity*

Attempts to define and measure religiosity initially started with *one-dimensional* approaches such as church attendance (frequency). As a result, the scope and boundaries of religiosity were quite narrowly defined in these measurements. These surveys only embraced one set of factors. Summur's questionnaire on religiosity can be classified in this category, because he focused mainly on religious faith (Meadow & Kahoe, 1984, p. 301). Thurstone and Chave (1929) developed similar questionnaires to measure attitudes towards the church (Wulff, 1991, p. 206).

American psychologists and sociologists of religion such as Stanley Hall (1891), James Leuba (1912), Edwin Starbuck (1899) and William James (1902) initially studied religion by employing similar *one-dimensional* approaches, with a particular

focus on religious emotions (Wulff, 1991, p. 200). Subsequently, researchers such as Thouless (1985), Popleton and Pilkington (1963), and Vernon and Lindzey (1960) also investigated religiosity on a *one-dimensional scale* (Meadow & Kahoe, 1984, p. 301).

These surveys on religion have often been criticized because they tend to measure individual religiosity as a belief in the normative doctrines of particular religious traditions (Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996).

All attempts to operationalize the concept of religiosity which we have mentioned here, have in common that they each rely on a single measurement, for example combining frequency of church attendance with frequency of communion attendance, or frequency of personal prayer with the degree of involvement in the overall organizational life of the congregation. Such measurements of religiosity have revealed significant differences between people. At the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, for example, it was discovered that among white southern college students, those who attended church were somewhat more biased against blacks than those who never attended. There were, however, equally strong indications that among churchgoers, those who attended more frequently were less prejudiced than irregular churchgoers (Johnstone, 2015). The reason for such differences seems to be that religiosity is not a one-dimensional phenomenon: not everyone is religious in the same way. A person may rank high in religiosity on one dimension or measurement, but low on another - or several others. So, if a certain behaviour is correlated with a high score on one scale of religiosity, but with a low score on another, very different conclusions can be drawn about the impact of religiosity on that behaviour, depending on which measurement of religiosity is used. Assumptions about the impact of people's religiosity on their behaviour and commitment can therefore be inaccurate and misleading (Johnstone, 2015, pp. 103-104).

Prominent thinkers soon discarded the idea that it was possible to simply locate people in a single dimension, with popular sentiments on one end of the spectrum and elite views on the other end. The various ways in which people approach religion have been collectively termed "religious orientation" (Krauss & Hood, 2013, pp. 23-48). Religious orientation refers to the sub-dimensions of religion or, in other words, to the intra-dimensional aspects of religion. These proved to include many new sets of dimensions - some covering a broad range, some narrower in their focus - which began to be mentioned in the research literature under different names such as "first-hand"

and "second-hand religious life", "authoritarian" and "humanistic religion", "committed religion" and "consensual religion", "intrinsic" and "extrinsic religiosity", "mythological" and "literal religion", "end" and "means religion", "high-involvement" and "low-involvement religion", "elite" and "popular religion". Although these are by no means the same distinctions under different names, it is clear that social scientists felt the need to broaden the scope of their instruments. The following table tries to show the main characteristics of these divisions, together with their theorists.

Table 1 - *Characteristics of two-dimensional conceptualizations*

Dimensions	Theorists
James (1978)	
Religious geniuses	Religion exists not as a dull habit, but as an acute fever rather (p. 6).
Second-hand religious life	Believer follows the conventional observances. Such religion has been made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, determined to fixed forms by imitation and retained by habit (p. 6).
Fromm (1950)	
Humanistic religion	This type of religion is centred around man and his strength... virtue is self-realization, not obedience" (p.37).
Authoritarian religion	The main virtue of this type of religion is obedience, its cardinal sin is disobedience" (p.35).
Allen and Spilka (1967)	
Committed religion	Utilizes an abstract philosophical perspective: multiplex religious ideas are relatively clear in meaning and an open and flexible framework of commitment relates religion to daily activities" (p.205).
Consensual religion	Vague, non-differentiated, bifurcated, neutralized (p.205). A cognitively simplified and personally convenient faith.
Allport (1967)	
Intrinsic religiosity	It is mature religiousness, a longing for and a commitment to "an ideal unification of one's life" under the guidance of "a unifying conception of the nature of all existence" (p. 151).
Extrinsic religiosity	It is something people use, not something they live. It is a "dull habit" or a "tribal investment" used for "occasional ceremony, family convenience, and personal comfort" (p. 148).
Hunt (1972)	
Mythological religion	A reinterpretation of religious statements to seek their deeper symbolic meanings.
Literal religion	Taking at face value any religious statement without in any way questioning it" (p.43).
Beit-Hallahmi (1989)	
High-involvement religion	Often religion of converts, who learned it outside their family of origin and invest much more emotional energy in it" (p. 100).
Low-involvement religion	Learned within the family of origin and having little emotional significance (p. 100).

When we look at these schemes that have been proposed, we see that there is a great deal of overlap between the various proposals. They sometimes give the impression of being the same idea phrased in different words by various social scientists. In other words, scholars commonly use the term 'religious orientation' to describe why an individual engages in religious behaviour (motivation), how they think about religion (cognitive style), and what an individual believes (content) (Krauss & Hood, 2013, p. 24). Although these proposals have different origins, purposes and methodologies, nearly all of them try to express a common phenomenon observed in the study of religion. There is one point on which all are in agreement: even though there is a single word for 'religion', there might be numerous possible ways in which one can be 'religious' (Spilka, 1967, p. 33).

Scholars generally have not studied three elements of religious orientation in isolation from each another, namely motivation, cognitive style, and content. Their systems of religious orientation tend to reflect this omission by including combinations of these three elements. In this study we combine these three elements of religious orientation as well, in order to differentiate different ways of 'being religious' (see section 3.3). So, it would be appropriate to elaborate on these three elements a bit more in detail here. The study of motivation, for example, is basically the study of why behaviour occurs, and includes research into the frequency and timing of behaviour. Therefore, systems of religious orientation contain the element 'motivation' if they scrutinize the importance, centrality, frequency, or purpose of religious behaviour. The study of cognitive style is the study of the amount of complexity, reflectiveness and questioning that beliefs and belief systems undergo and accumulate, and includes research into the way beliefs are thought through and held. The study of content refers to the substance of beliefs which are held by the individual. The element 'content' is included in systems of religious orientation to the extent that they specify the types of beliefs that individuals with specific religious orientations hold (Krauss & Hood, 2013, p. 25).

Of these definitions, Allport's extrinsic and intrinsic concept has become one of the most popular tools employed in the scientific study of religion. We can plainly see that Allport, in his turn, made use of these three elements in his studies. Allport's most extensive discussion of the concepts 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' can be found in his

articles "The Religious Context of Prejudice" (Allport, 1966) and "Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice" (Allport & Ross, 1967).[17] Hunt and King (1971) identified 11 characteristics that they believed Allport used to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic religion. These characteristics are as follows: reflective versus uncritical, associational versus communal, universal versus parochial (closed-minded), ultimate versus instrumental, differentiated versus undifferentiated, personal versus institutional, unselfish versus selfish, relevance for all life, salient versus un-salient, humility versus dogmatism, and regular versus irregular church attendance (see Table 2).[18]

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[17] The psychological tie between the intrinsic orientation and tolerance, and between the extrinsic orientation and prejudice, has been discussed in a series of papers by Allport (1959, 1963a, 1963b, 1968).

[18] However, Hunt and King (1971) only credited Allport (1950) with the first five of these distinctions, of which only one, i.e., differentiated versus undifferentiated religion, clearly corresponded to one of the six distinguishing characteristics that Allport used to differentiate mature from immature religion. (See: Krauss, & Hood, 2013).

Table 2 - *Components of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity*

	Intrinsic	Extrinsic
I	*Reflective vs Uncritical*	
	reflective (1950)	unreflective, uncritical (1950)
II	*Differentiated vs Undifferentiated*	
	highly differentiated (1950)	undifferentiated (1950)
III	*Personal vs Institutional*	
	interiorized (1954, 1960), vital, deeper level (1967), devout, internalized (1967)	institutional (1950, p. 54), institutionalized (1954), external (1954)
IV	*Universal vs Parochial*	
	infused with the character of ethics (1954), creed, ideals of brotherhood (1954, p. 66), conditioned to love one's neighbour (1960), compassion (1967)	exclusionist (1950, p. 59), ethnocentric, exclusive, in-group (1954), at expense of out-groups (1960), favours provincialism (1966)
V	*Unselfish vs Selfish*	
	not self-centred (1959), strives to transcend self-centred needs (1966)	self-centred (1950), self-interest (1959), self-serving, protective (1960), useful to self (1966) uses for own ends (1967)
VI	*Relevance for all of Life*	
	distilled into thought and conduct (1954), floods whole life with motivation and meaning (1959, p. 66), not limited to single segments, (1966), other needs brought into harmony with religious beliefs and prescriptions (1967), follows creed fully (1967)	single segment (1959), not integrated into their way of life (1966), favours compartmentalization (1966)
VII	*Salience*	
	faith really matters (1954), sincerely believing (1954), accepts total creed (1960), without reservations (1960), follows creed fully (1967)	full creed and teaching not adopted (1959), faith, beliefs lightly held (1967)
VIII	*Ultimate vs. Instrumental*	
	an end in itself (1954, p. 66), intrinsic (1959, pp. 60, 66, 67), intent on serving his religion (1960), a final good (1966), faith is supreme value; the master motive (1967), ultimate significance (1967)	utilitarian, means to ends (1954), extrinsic (1959, pp. 60, 66, 67), not master motive (1959), instrumental (1959, pp. 66, 67), supports and serves non-religious ends (1966), uses religion (1967), serves other than ultimate interests (1967)
IX	*Associational vs Communal*	
	associational (1966; 1967), seeking deeper values (1967), involved for religious fellowship (1967)	political and social aspects (1954), communal (1966; 1967), sociocultural, affiliates for communal identification, need to belong (1966), no true association with the religious function of the church (1966), involved for sociability and status (1967)
X	*Humility vs Dogmatism*	
	humility (1959, p. 67)	dogmatic (1959, p. 66)
XI	*Regularity of Church Attendance*	
	constant (1967)	casual and peripheral churchgoers, feel no need to attend regularly (1966)

Even this older, well-established scheme of Allport's 'intrinsic-extrinsic' distinction is being increasingly distrusted. Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) have given a variety of theoretical and methodological criticisms of intrinsic-extrinsic research.

> Theoretical problems include lack of conceptual clarity in the definitions of I and E; confusion regarding what I and E are supposed to measure (namely, intrinsic-extrinsic what?); the value-laden 'good-religion-versus-bad-religion' distinction underlying the framework; the problems inherent in defining and studying religiosity independently of belief content; and the thorny issue of how I and E are conceptually interrelated (namely, Allport's original bipolar continuum versus the modern two-factor theory). Criticisms of the measurement of I and E concern the factorial structure, reliability, and construct validity of the I and E scales, as well as the empirical relationship between the scales (Kirkpatrick and Hood, 1990, p. 442).

Despite challenges to the validity of these ideas, multi-dimensional constructions of religion are likely to remain and become more subtle and refined. This kind of terminology implies 'pure types', and although these idealized images make for interesting discussion, in real life they are vanishingly rare. Still, both as scientists and as human beings, we like the appearance of unchallengeable certainty that classifications offer us (Spilka, 1967, p. 10). So, in the coming sections, this study also provides some characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in Islam by taking advantage of the analyses offered by previous scholars in the scientific study of religion, to grasp complex and distinctive characteristics of Turkish religiosity.

3.1.2. *Comparative Analysis of Allport's Religious Orientation Approach and the Multi-Dimensional Approach of Glock and Stark*

Glock and Stark (1965, pp. 19-20) argue that in all religions of the world - despite their great variation in details - there are general areas in which religiosity manifests itself. These areas, which Glock and Stark consider to be the core dimensions of religiosity, are the 'ideological', the 'ritualistic', the 'experiential', the 'intellectual' and the 'consequential' dimensions. According to their definitions:

The 'Ideological' or religious belief dimension encompasses beliefs that are expected to be held by followers.

The 'Ritualistic' or religious practice dimension includes the specific religious practices, such as worship, prayer, participation in special sacraments, fasting, and so on, which are expected to be performed by believers.

The 'Experiential' or religious feeling dimension refers to having feelings, perceptions and sensations of established communication with a divine essence (i.e. with God), ultimate reality or transcendental authority.

The 'Intellectual' or religious knowledge dimension encompasses the basic information and knowledge about the tenets of faith and the sacred scriptures that the believers are expected to possess.

The 'Consequential' or religious effects dimension includes the effects of religious belief, practice, experience, and knowledge on the daily life of the believer (1965, pp. 20-21).

In the discussion on the multi-dimensional structure of religion, a minor shift can be observed from Glock (1962) to Stark and Glock (1968). Glock (1962) discussed the intellectual, ideological, experiential, ritualistic, and consequential dimensions as basic expressions of religion. Stark and Glock (I968) changed two aspects of this multi-dimensional structure of religion. First, they excluded the consequential dimension from their reflection on the inner structure of religiosity. Secondly, they divided the former ideological and ritualistic dimensions into several components.

In 1968, Glock specified two types of research that could be enabled by such a scheme. One type of research puts the specification of the components within each dimension in the foreground. Glock proposed a number of tentative components within the various dimensions, but emphasized that there was still a great deal of work to be done in terms of *intra-dimensional differentiation* (1965). The other type of research focuses on the matter of *inter-dimensional independence.* Glock anticipated that his multi-dimensional scheme would stimulate research into the extent to which people might be religious in some dimensions, but not in others. The idea that these various dimensions exist independently of each other led to the suggestion that individuals might score high on one dimension, but low on another one, and to the view that classes might differ in the form in which they display their religiosity. For instance, it was suggested that the working class might score high on belief but low on ritual practice, while the middle class might score high on ritual practice and low on belief. Concerning the relationships between these two types of research, they state that:

> A first and obvious requirement if religious commitment is to be comprehensively assessed, is to establish the different ways in which individuals can be religious.

With some few exceptions, past research has curiously avoided this fundamental question. Investigators have tended to focus upon one or another of the diverse manifestations of religiosity and to ignore all others (p. 19).

Glock's exploration in collaboration with Rodney Stark progressed according to this principle. Concerning the intra-dimensional differentiation, which is highly relevant to the present study, Glock and Stark (1968) indicated that a "person will hold a certain theological outlook, that he will acknowledge the truth of the tenets of the religion. Every religion maintains some set of beliefs which adherents are expected to ratify. However, the content and scope of beliefs will vary not only between religions, but often within the same religious tradition" (p. 14). In their explorative research, for example, 'orthodoxy', 'religious particularism' and 'ethicalism' were used as indicators for measuring religious belief (pp. 57-80).

According to Glock and Stark (1968), religious practices fall into two important classes: ritual and devotion.

> Ritual refers to the set of rites, formal religious acts, and sacred practices which all religions expect their adherents to perform. In Christianity some of these formal ritual expectations are attendance at worship services, taking communion, baptism, weddings, and the like. Devotion on the other hand, is somewhat akin to, but importantly different from ritual. While the ritual aspect of commitment is highly formalized and typically public, all known religions also value personal acts of worship and contemplation which are relatively spontaneous, informal, and typically private. Devotionalism among Christians is manifested through private prayer, Bible reading, and perhaps even by impromptu hymn singing (p. 15).

In our opinion, the criteria used by Glock and Stark to describe intra-dimensional differentiation within religious practice are closely related to Allport's characterization of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' religiosity. Glock and Stark also clearly admitted that Allport's types crosscut through the criteria of religious commitment they had previously developed in their important work *American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment* (1968, p. 18). In relation to the above example about religious practice, Allport (1967, 1968) also used the private character of ritual to measure intrinsic aspects of religious practice:

- 9. It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and meditation (1968, p. 268) (intrinsic).

In order to measure extrinsic aspects of rituals, he used communal aspects of the ritual:

- 2. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to establish a person in the community (1968, p. 265) (extrinsic).

Although Glock and Stark did not directly use Allport's conceptualization of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' religiosity, they emphasised the importance of this conceptualization for exploring intra-dimensional differentiation after summarizing the general ideas of Allport's religious orientation theory. They stated that "it is very probably the case that people who adhere to a faith out of a need for psychic security will act upon their faith differently compared to people whose commitment to their faith is based on high moral purpose". They also admitted that these expectations provide a major theoretical basis for volumes two (sources of religious commitment) and three (consequences of religious commitment) of their publication *American Piety* (1968).[19]

Conversely, most other researchers who used Glock's scheme adopted a very different approach (Cardwell, 1971; Clayton, 1968; Faulkner, 1969; Lehman, 1968; Serajzadeh, 1998) (in Turkey: Altınlı, 2011; Atalay, 2005; Ayten, 2009; Kafalı, 2005; Şahin, 2001; Yapıcı, 2004; Yıldız, 2006). Contrary to what Glock advocated in his original article, the majority of these researchers assumed that it is possible to construct a single measurement for each dimension.

The following questions therefore arise: is it correct to consider these five dimensions as empirical wholes, as many researchers have assumed, or do they encompass unrelated or even negatively related phenomena, as Stark and Glock have reported? The answer to this question will in turn help us to evaluate the validity of assumptions made with regard to the relationships between the various dimensions, which were claimed in earlier studies.

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[19] In this study, they addressed the question whether there are patterns in American piety. In their work, they have focused on many issues, but three fundamental questions dominated one phase of their research: 1. What is the nature of religious commitment? 2. What are the sociological and psychological sources of religious commitment? 3. What are the sociological and psychological consequences of religious commitment?

In order to make meaningful distinctions within the five dimensions, this study will initially focus on the intra-dimensional differentiation within the various dimensions of Glock's five-dimensional scale, and launch the proposal to apply the elite - popular religiosity distinction to it, in relation to Allport's (1967) distinction between 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' approaches to religion. We therefore propose to specify two components within each of these five dimensions, in order to address the different beliefs and behaviours discussed in the literature about socio-cultural stratification and religious orientation. Moreover, we exclude the consequential dimension from other dimensions of religiosity, just as Stark and Glock did, and consider it a dependent variable (1968, p. 16).

Our main suggestion, in addition to applying the elite - popular religiosity distinction to Glock's scheme, is to respectively include: Weber's (1963) distinction between 'other-worldly' and 'this-worldly' orientations, Allport's (1967) distinction between 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' approaches to religion, and Allen and Spilka's (1967) categorization of 'committed' and 'consensual' religious orientations. Although the conceptualizations suggested by Weber, Allport, and Allen and Spilka contain one or more components that differentiate each other, together they suggest two general religious orientations. One orientation emphasizes the internalized, intrinsic, and committed outlooks. This orientation reflects a personal, critical type of commitment, which is *most often* associated with elite religiosity, practiced mostly by socially and economically privileged strata, i.e., the spiritual elites *(khawāṣṣ)*. The other orientation emphasizes the conventional, extrinsic, and consensual outlooks. This latter orientation reflects the social, unquestioning and community-oriented type of commitment, which is *most often* associated with popular religion, practiced by the socially and economically non-privileged strata, i.e., the masses (ʿawāmm).

When these elite and popular religious orientations are applied to Glock's model of religious commitment, they suggest two components within each of their five dimensions. This conceptual orientation suggests the following table:

Table 3 - *Conceptual model of E&PR in relation with*
Glock's scheme

Components	Elite Religiosity	Popular Religiosity
Ideological	Elite beliefs	Popular beliefs
Ritualistic	Elite rituals	Popular rituals
Experiential	Elite experiences	Popular experiences
Intellectual	Elite knowledge	Popular knowledge

Dependent variable

Consequential	Elite consequences	Popular consequences

The proposed scale of elite and popular orientation shows that individuals can occupy three main locations based on these ten components. The group of respondents who scored high on the elite religiosity scale and low on the popular scale was defined as representing 'elite religiosity'. The group of respondents who scored high on the popular religiosity scale and low on the elite scale was defined as representing 'popular religiosity'. Finally, those who scored high on some of the components of the elite religiosity scale, and high on other components of the popular scale, or vice versa, were defined as representing 'mixed religiosity'.

Obviously, there is one final location that an individual can also occupy: this would be to score low on the elite *and* popular religiosity scale. This can be called low religiosity. These individuals are excluded from our main analysis. For this purpose, this study uses *a general religiosity scale* (GRS), which is included in the questionnaire before the elite and popular religiosity scale.

The GRS was developed using the older versions of Glock's five-dimensional religiosity scale (1962). The intra-dimensional aspects of the ideological, ritualistic,

intellectual and experiential dimensions are not considered in this initial study - this is the most common approach adopted by Turkish sociologists. The present study uses this only to measure those who are high in religiosity and low in religiosity.[20] We also use this scale to evaluate the pros and cons of this tool in relation to elite and popular religiosity. Further information about the measurement tools can be found in chapter 4.

So far in this study we have tried to point out equivalent intra-dimensionality in religion and more particularly in Islamic religion. Within Turkish Islam, the religion that is the subject of our present research, we will later have the opportunity to distinguish various intra-dimensional aspects of religious beliefs, practices, experiences, knowledge and consequences that we assume are related with social and cultural differentiation in society.

3.2. *The Concepts of Elite and Popular Religiosity in Islam*

One of the most popular and prized *ḥadīths* among Muslims is the one known as the *"Ḥadīth of Gabriel"*. Standing in front of his companions, the prophet Muḥammad was asked by the angel Gabriel about *Islām*, *īmān* ('faith') and *iḥsān* ('perfection').

The Prophet states the five pillars of Islam as an answer to what is Islam is. Then the prophet lists the six pillars of faith as an answer to what *Īmān* is. With regard to the second question, what *iḥsān* is, the prophet states, "It is to worship Allah as though you can see Him, for although you cannot see Him, He indeed, sees you". So, the Prophet does not add a new dimension but addresses intra-dimensional aspects of *Īmān* and *Islām*. In other words, these terms mean to become excellent in the pillars of faith and those of Islam (al Bukhari, book 2, *ḥadith* 43).

The term spirituality is used as an English equivalent for the Arabic term *iḥsān* (Renard, 2005, p. 226). The root of this term is *ḥ-s-n* which means beauty, to be or to become beautiful (Badawi & Haleem, 2008; Lane, 1863, vol. 2, p. 570). It is an especially important concept in Sufi thought, representing a high level of spiritual progress.

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[20] For a detailed explanation of general religiosity, see section 4.4.2 'General Religiosity Scale (GRS)'.

According to an overwhelming majority of Sunni Muslim scholars, this ḥadīth presents a condensed form of Islam in general. According to us, this ḥadīth embraces both popular and elite religiosity in Islam and suggests that the concept of *iḥsān* corresponds with the concept of 'great culture' or 'great tradition' in the terminology of the social anthropology of Islam. These concepts are discussed below.

3.2.1. *Intra-Religious Pluralism: Islam or Islams?*

What the concepts of great and little traditions mean in the historical context has been discussed in chapter two. Redfield suggested that all world religions and some local religions could be separated into a 'great tradition' and 'little tradition'. From this point on, I will try to show how these terms are applicable to the case of Islam.

Every theory of 'original', 'normal' or 'essential' Islam creates a polemic against Islam as it is found in the world (Ahmed, 2016). Some scholars suggest that the term *Islam* should be replaced by *'Islams'*. The existence of this view was already noted in 1968 by W. Montgomery Watt: "Some occidental observers have gone so far as to say that there is not one Islam but many – a different religion in each country or region" (Watt, 1979, p. 153). Abdul Hamid el-Zein emphasizes the multiplicity of Islamic expressions as well – the *Islams* of the elites and non-elites, theologians and peasants, literates and illiterates – and sees them as equally valid expressions of fundamental, "unconscious" Islamic principles. Muslim fundamentalists who regard their interpretations of Islam as definitive, ironically and unintentionally provide a conceptual end product which reduces the Islamic tradition to a single, essentialist set of principles (1977, p. 174). According to Dale Eickelman, the theory of 'original' Islam also disregards the fact that most Muslims hold quite consciously that their religion possesses central, normative tenets and that these tenets are essential for an understanding of Islamic belief and practice (1982, p. 1).

Some orientalist researchers who took these criticisms into consideration, used a dual conceptualisation in their sociological and anthropological studies of Islamic societies. Let us look at some examples of how these scholars treated the multiplicity of Islamic expressions, before moving on to Turkish sociologists. Gellner (1981) was certainly the most Weberian of the sociologists and anthropologists who devoted their studies to Muslim societies. Together with Geertz, he affected, and still largely influences sociological and anthropological studies of Islam that use comparable

twofold differentiations (Marranci, 2010, p. 368). In his book *Muslim Society* (1983) and in other writings (1992; 1994), Gellner identified unvarying features of Muslim societies that make them susceptible to sociological analysis. Building on the work of Ibn Khaldūn, he suggested a dialectic between city and tribe, each with its own form of religion. According to him, the central and perhaps most significant characteristic of Islam is that it is internally divided into the high Islam of the elite and the popular (low) Islam of the people. High Islam is primarily urban, and folk Islam is primarily tribal and rural. Although the boundaries between the two are not sharp but gradual and ambiguous, they each project a distinctive tradition nevertheless.

High Islam, according to Gellner, is "carried by urban elites recruited largely from the trading bourgeois classes and reflecting the tastes and values of urban middle classes. Those values include order, rule observance, sobriety, and learning. They contain an aversion to hysteria and emotional excess, and to the excessive use of the audio-visual aids of religion. This high Islam stresses the severely monotheistic and nomocratic nature of Islam, it is mindful of the prohibition of claims to mediation between God and man, and it is generally oriented towards puritanism and scripturalism" (Gellner, 1992, p. 11).

Popular Islam, however, is in the majority of the cases associated with "the pre-urban stages or nonurban, nonliterate/illiterate levels of society and is produced by the village or the common people. If it knows literacy, it does so mainly in the use of writing for magical purposes, rather than as a tool of scholarship. It stresses magic more than learning, ecstasy more than rule-observance. Far from avoiding mediation, this form of Islam is centred on it: its most characteristic institution is the saint cult, where the saint is more often than not a living rather than dead personage" (Gellner, 1992, p. 11).

Gellner was familiar with the work of the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, but his work barely reflects this. Geertz focused on Muslim societies as well, and tried to show how Islam differs in Morocco and Indonesia (Geertz, 1971). In a study of Javanese religion, he brings out the contrast between peasant and specialist religion. He calls the peasant pattern *abangan.* The *Prijaji,* the Javanese warrior-gentry, opposes *abangan* by striving for spiritual excellence. "*Abangan* religion represents the peasant synthesis of urban imports and tribal inheritances, a syncretism of old bits and pieces from a dozen sources", "the *abangans* are Java's peasantry, the *prijajis* its elite.

Prijajis are constituted of bureaucrats, clerks and teachers of the Javanese society, who dwell in cities. As opposed to *abangan,* which is concrete, *prijaji* is mystical. *Abangan* is interested only in first-order representation, while *prijaji* deals with higher-order symbolism. *Abangan* focuses on the household, *prijaji* on the individual. *Abangan* involves a concrete polytheism, *prijaji* an abstract and speculative pantheism" (1976, pp. 228-34).

Despite the terminological differences between Gellner and Geertz, their approaches to Islam and Muslim societies are, in fact, remarkably similar. The conceptions and approach they used are broadly criticised, which will be reflected to some extent at the end of this section, in conjunction with the discussion of criticism of the approach used by the Turkish sociologist in general. Here we will discuss a number of particular criticisms of Gellner and Geertz's studies on Muslim societies. For example, Kamali (2001) strongly criticized Gellner's interpretation of Muslim society. He noticed that "[Gellner] mixes the religious notion of *umma*, which is the concept of a religious community in relation to its Messenger, namely the Prophet, with the peoples residing in different Muslim countries... This use of the notion of *umma* as a homogeneous phenomenon referring to the entire 'Muslim world' neglects the reality of different cultural and institutional arrangements in the various 'Muslim' societies. He fails to take into account in his discussion the sociocultural and even economic diversity of different Muslim countries" (p. 464). In relation to this criticism, Bruinessen and Howell (2003) noticed that "Geertz and Gellner declared Sufism moribund, but what they meant by Sufism was only its popular, rural, ecstatic and illiterate variant. They appeared unaware of the existence, all over the Muslim world, of learned urban Sufis, whose following included members of the traditional elites" (p. 8). Asad reflects the same criticism of Geertz by saying that "[his approach] ignores the varying social conditions for the production of knowledge" (Asad, 1983, p. 237).

We do not have the necessary space here to discuss the work of Gellner and Geertz in depth. We will not provide any new critique or defence of their studies. In addition to these criticisms, however, we must stress that they made an innovative and interesting sociological and anthropological attempt to explain inner-Islamic differences, and that their work had an impact on many scholars in the scientific study of religion.

3.2.2. *Turkish Islam(s)*

In the writings of Şerif Mardin, who is considered the Max Weber of Turkish sociology (Filiz & Uluç, 2006, p. 32), we find an innovative sociological attempt to explain the religious diversity observed in Turkish society. Mardin uses two concepts for this: *kitâbî İslam*, which means Islam based on a book or text, and *halk İslamı*, which refers to popular Islam (Şeker, 2007). He also uses central (*Merkez*) and periphery (*çevre*) to explain religious differentiation (1963, 1973, 1995, 2005, 2006). Mardin (1973) argues that this social dichotomy was primarily a cultural dichotomy that differentiated the elites of the "centre" from the non-elite (*teba*, subjects of the Ottoman Empire) of the "periphery". The cultural division has remained deep, despite urbanization and the fairly recent opening of Turkish society through the adoption of market-driven economic policies, which in fact meant that the country became subject to the consequences of globalizing trends. However, he also indicates that neither the centre nor the periphery has its pure and monolithic representatives.

Ali Yaşar Sarıbay called this phenomenon "elitist Islam" and "populist Islam" and traced it through Islamic history (1985, 1993, 1995). Sarıbay argued that Islamic movements rose and developed in a populist way by using democracy and the media as a tool in the Islamic world. He stated that populist Islam motivates ordinary people by referring to the imagination of a "mystical past and utopic future" (1993). Sarıbay's work is largely based on Gellner's conceptualization and describes elitist Islam as religiosity created by *ulamā,* the guardians, transmitters and interpreters of religious knowledge, of Islamic doctrine and law, living in the city. Sarıbay emphasizes that the common characteristics of these *ulamā* exhibit the values and tastes of the middle class.[21] These values are shaped by systematic methodologies, jurisprudence, moderation and the sacred text. On the other hand, populist Islam is not systematic, but very emotional. Moreover, he states, popular Islam does not pay attention to the text (*al kitāb*), and places a strong emphasis on belonging to the dervish lodge (*tekke*) and the order of the dervish (*tarika*) (Çelik, 1995, p. 11).

These religious differentiations which have been explored by Turkish sociologists and especially by Şarif Mardin, have also been the subject of harsh criticism from

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[21] Here, the term 'middle class' refers to a social group consisting of well-educated people, such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers.

contemporary Islamic historians. The main point of these criticisms is Mardin's inability to elaborate the sociological aspect of religion in relation to the theoretical aspect. This inadequacy manifests itself in the analysis of the Naqshibandi order. Mehmet F. Şeker accurately states that Mardin's interpretation of the Naqshibandi order ignores the sufic/mystical elements with the effect that it is portrayed as an organized political organization. He points out that Mardin approached the history of the traditional Naqshibandi on the economic, social and political levels, as many other "orientalists" did (Şeker, 2007, p 212). If we inspect Mardin's center-periphery theoretical framework, we see that these conceptualizations do not sufficiently address the inner-Islamic plurality in a theoretical sense, and that his framework is primarily used to understand the dichotomies in Ottoman and Turkish political life. In many of his books, Mardin refers to the centre-periphery scheme for understanding Turkish elections (Sayar, 2002, p. 3).

The other prominent Turkish scholar who has investigated intra-religious diversity in Islam is Ahmet Karamustafa. He is one of the contemporary scholars who have shown alternative ways to theorize inner-Islamic difference in relation to sociological factors, doing so specifically in his work on Anatolian Islam. Unlike Şerif Mardin and Yaşar Sarıbay, Karamustafa pays considerable attention to the theoretical side of Muslim religious experience (1994, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2013). He conceptualized inner-Islamic differences without using binaries such as popular Islam - high Islam and other "pejorative devices" such as "heterodoxy". Instead, he offered terms such as "deviance", "new renunciation," and "dervish piety" (Karamustafa, 1994, 2005). According to Karamustafa, these terms do not carry the historical and normative baggage of 'elite' and 'popular'. Recently he used the term "vernacular Islam" as an indicator for local characteristics of Islamic traditions (Karamustafa, 2013).

3.2.3. *Some Critics and Their Suggestions*

In the section above, we listed scholars who suggested a plurality of conceptualizations to describe religious diversity in Turkish sociology, such as: literate and non-literate groups, elitist Islam and populist Islam, town-dwellers and village-dwellers, centre and periphery. We have pointed out, among other things, the criticism that some researchers have received on their twofold conceptualizations. In this section, we

continue to criticize these conceptualizations within a more general framework and will make a number of suggestions.

The notion of 'great' and 'little' traditions and other dichotomies oversimplified the complexity of each of these traditions, and overstressed their separation. This dichotomy slips too easily into other dubious dichotomies advocated by writers in the Middle East: 'great' stands to 'little' as 'literate elite' stands to 'illiterate masses', as 'urban' stands to 'rural', 'intellectual' to 'emotional', 'public' to 'private', and so on (Eickelman, 1981; Stirrat, 1984). These connotations are misleading and often false, but have been accepted by a large majority of researchers as a master narrative and continue to influence scholarly and public discourse on the history and religion of Muslim societies. In section 2.2.3 we have given a few examples of these applications in religious studies. Here I give an example of this tendency in the historiography of Turkish Islam as set out in the influential writings of Fuat Köprülü, discussed in Markus Dressler's recent book on Turkish Alevi Islam (2013). Dressler criticized Köprülü for his elitist, hierarchical, and modernist approach to Islam.

> Köprülü widely followed the classical approach of Islamic cultural elites as well as Western Orientalists, who tended to look down on forms of popular religious culture, measuring the latter against the standards of what they considered to be properly Islamic. For Köprülü these standards were since his earliest work defined by Sunnism. We can see that when he uses apologetic Islamic terms in his description of inner-Islamic difference: for example, when, in a discussion of the Bektashis, he refers to them as *ghulāt*, that is, "exaggerating/extreme (*ifratçı*) Shiite-bâtınî currents"; when he argues that the flexibility of the Bektashis in matters of dogma and practice made them attractive and successful "among the ignorant Muslim and Christian masses"; and when he asserts that through the continuing adaptation of elements originally not part of it, the Bektashiye became more and more syncretistic (Köprülü, 1970 [1949], p. 462); when he claims that "the Babai incident has to be seen as an important starting point for the heretical and schismatic (*rafz ve i'tizal*) movements in opposition to the Sunni doctrine... leading to the formation of sects (*tâife*) such as Kızılbashism and Bektashism" (Köprülü, 1966 [1919], p. 178); or when he qualifies belief in metempsychosis (*tenasüh*) and the circle of reincarnations (*devir*), which could be found among certain Alevi groups, as "corrupted dogmas" (*bozuk akide*) (Köprülü, 1935, p. 31) (Dressler, 2013, p. 198).

Such a narrative normalizes certain religious formations, while refusing to ascribe originality and authenticity to those socio-religious movements that do not comply with its own theological norms. In Köprülü's case, "properly Islamic" points to mainstream Sunni Islam.

Diyanet, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, is another critical example of the growing influence of Sunni Islam and an illustration of the governance of religion by the state, which I outline in chapter 6. Ali Bardakoğlu, the president of Diyanet between 2003 and 2010, has explained the role of Diyanet as a state institution in terms of maintaining social order in Turkey by promoting a moderate Islam based on rationality and 'sound knowledge', and not on 'superstition' and 'sentimental religiosity' (Turner & Arslan, 2013b).

The (implicit) model with which Köprülü and Diyanet work can be regarded as an elitist approach that is very normative in a specific religious or political sense. This model is criticized for presenting popular religion as a deviation from a 'higher religion', a 'pure' Islam that is assumed to be represented in the actions and statements of theologians and Diyanet leaders.

A similar approach can occasionally even be found in the anthropology of Islam. John Gulick, for example, suggested the 'Five Pillars' of Islam as the foundations of great Islam (1976, p164). According to Yel, however, the Islamic great tradition consists of four elements: the Qurʾān, *Sunnah*, consensus and analogy[22] (1993, p. 107).

The problem with these proposals is that these are the sources consulted both by the elites and by the masses. Supporters of these approaches confront the Islamic great tradition with the little one as if they have clear-cut differences. This structuralist definition of the great Islam may be regarded as too narrow, because it excludes people for whom the little tradition is a second identity.[23] It may also be regarded as too broad; speaking of the 'little tradition' in the singular suggests that it is relatively homogeneous. Following Lynch (2007), we must resist the temptation to restrict

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[22]These four principal proofs called *adillah Sharʾiyyah* are accepted as main sources of the Islamic law (Sharīʾah).

[23]Practitioners of elite and popular religiosity could co-exist amicably. The adherents of the popular form could even revere the elite form and recognize its authority, whilst continuing to tolerate and practice the popular variant (see also: 6.2.2. Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity).

popular culture to the environment, practices, and resources of everyday life of 'ordinary people' in a society, because we cannot decide who is 'ordinary' and who is not. We are all part of some popular culture (Lyden, 2015, p. 15). In other words, it cannot be claimed that there is a pure popular religion, characterized by the masses, which is completely independent of the great Islam, represented by the religious elite. What is neglected here is the strict interrelation that exists between great Islam and popular Islam.

Markus Dressler suggests a number of criteria that concepts for the description of inner-Islamic difference and plurality should ideally fulfil. In order to avoid theoretical and methodological pitfalls, such concepts, in his view, "should not be normative in a specific religious or political sense. They should not be intermingled in apologetic discourses and not participate in theologico-political rationalizations of power...; should not cater to a concept of religion that privileges boundaries over fluidity, and static over dynamic, as well as essentializing over historicizing perspectives; should be formulated in an inductive rather than deductive manner; should be guided by attention to the work that a particular concept is able to accomplish…" (Dressler, 2013, p. 270). As Arkoun states, most studies on these subjects are written in accordance with a vision dominated by doctrinal Islam, or since the birth of new nations, with an official, ideological standpoint. According to him, much remains to be done to establish a sociological and anthropological approach (2003, p. 344).

We are certainly not suggesting that the existing conceptualizations of Islam are completely wrong or entirely useless: on the contrary, many of these conceptualizations are partly correct in important ways. Many of these arguments contain valuable and profound insights.

However, in light of this criticism, our conception of a great and a little tradition should differ from the deductive and static approaches mentioned above. Instead, inspired by Ahmet (2016), we will argue that the historical phenomenon of Islam is a field of meaning in which truth is not formed, ordered, and lived in terms of categories constituted by mutual exclusion, but rather in terms of categories of mutual interaction (p. 116). Categorically distinguishing between elite and popular, or between great and little, seeks first of all to organize and understand phenomena in a sociological sense. From this point of view, the relationship between elite and popular religiosity can be

understood as an interaction between social groups that interpret their practices using common formulas (in this case, *Sharīʿa*).

Towards an Islamic Religious Market

The following argument by Turner makes room for an understanding of elite and popular religiosity through use of cultural differentiation (such as great, little), and by pointing to the emergence of spiritual market places.

> Popular religion is historically not just a vulgarization of the Islamic mysticism since elite mysticism and popular religion have always stood side-by-side oriented to different clientele with different social and religious interests. It is more accurate to regard popular and elite religion as a form of differentiation and specialization of religious services relevant to different lay markets than to treat 'mass religiosity' as the contaminated offspring of pure religious consciousness (1985, p. 56).

These different religious markets are for branded religious goods and services premised on the differentiation of cultural identities, based on the possession of positional goods: things whose value is wholly culturally defined by who owns them (Calhoun, Rojek, & Turner, 2005, p. 506). Islamic communities, for example, are leading competitors in an Islamic religious market in Europe. They produce, represent, and supply a variety of Islamic interpretations to both believers and non-believers. This inner diversity allows Muslims to compare and contrast these various Islamic institutions as suppliers of various interpretations, *fatwa* (legal opinions), and socio-religious services (Yükleyen & White, 2007, p. 36).

We can then open our eyes to patterns of worship and belief that can be characterized as pertaining to the elite religious market and the popular religious market, based on *the synthesis approach*. According to this approach, which is derived from Weber's writings, as we pointed out earlier in this study, 'popular religiosity' is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief exercised by strata that are *generally* socially and economically non-privileged. 'Elite religiosity', on the other hand, is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief that are proclaimed and exercised by strata that are *generally* socially and economically privileged. Based on this approach, let us formulate some more precise qualifications. When the present study uses the concept of elite religiosity, we do not necessarily mean to refer to

religious officials assigned by religious organizations such as muftis or imams, or religious leaders of communities such as dervishes, sheikhs or hodjas. Hence, elite religiosity is not a subjective notion, but an analytical category as often used by psychological and sociological observers of religion. Such a category defines elite religiosity as follows: elite religiosity differs from popular religiosity by the emphasis placed on the spiritual, internalized, intrinsic, and committed outlooks of 'ordinary' people. Consequently, when we use the term 'elite religiosity', we focus on all ordinary individuals who strongly experience the spiritual and elite forms - and motivations - of religiosity. In contrast, the term 'popular religiosity' refers to all ordinary individuals who strongly experience the popular forms - and motivations - of religiosity.

More precisely, 'elite religiosity' is understood here as referring to the internalized, intrinsic, and committed outlooks that are highlighted by sociologists and psychologists of religion in exploring the religious cultural systems that have been *generally* produced by spiritual elites - primarily for their own religious life and tradition.[24] These traditions are also proclaimed and conveyed to society by means of books, sermons, teachings, and even face-to-face relationships.[25] These are likely to include representations of beliefs, practices, religious knowledge, and religious experiences that accord with the norms of the spiritual elites. Consequently, if someone from any level of society practices this particular kind of religious beliefs and practices in their life, we call them 'spiritual elite', because they are motivated by elite forms of

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[24]The great tradition is not just something that has been agreed upon by scholars, but always something that has been agreed upon by specific scholars in a specific place, and at a specific time (Eickelman, 1982; 12). Therefore, it would probably be better to speak of various great traditions than just *the* great tradition.

[25] Elite forms of religiosity do not stand isolated in society, but are rather part of an active circulation of norms that move through society-at- large. This interaction occurs "by way of active projects of circulation, such as the epitomizing of fundamental Sufi philosophical ideas in vernacular primers, as well as, and most importantly, the translation, configuration and dramatization of these ideas into poetical and narrative fiction, which served as the primary medium for their oral circulation" (see: Ahmed, 2016, p. 85). Shahrani mentions a number of examples of textual materials by which Islamic elite knowledge becomes local knowledge and is acquired by the masses: the *Dīvāns of Ḥāfiẓ, Saʿdī,* and love epics such as *Laylā va Majnūn* (of *Niẓāmī*), *Yūsuf va Zulaykhā* (of *Jāmī*), *Farhad va Shīrīn*, as well as books of proverbs (*ẓarb- ul- misāl*), and narrative fiction (*afsānah, ḥikāyah, qiṣṣah*) (1991, p. 167).

religiosity. Therefore, unless specified otherwise, we use the term 'elite religion or religiosity' in this study to refer to those who experience elite forms of religiosity.

In this study, 'popular religiosity' is understood to refer to the conventional, extrinsic, and consensual elements that are highlighted by sociologists and psychologists of religion in exploring the religious cultural systems that have been *generally* produced by religious non-elites - for their own religious life. These are likely to include beliefs, practices, religious knowledge and religious experiences.

Popular religiosity may be defined in two ways. First, popular religion as the interpretations and adaptations of non-elite religious groups in accordance with their local and community concerns. Second, popular religion created by the religious elite *for* religious non-elite in accordance with their local and community concerns, based upon the very same religious texts. In the first case, the masses create a culture while living their religious lives spontaneously. In the second case, however, the masses are inevitably passive. Religious elites make deliberate decisions about the religious life of the masses. This is called 'official religion' by scholars (Waardenburg, 1978). Non-elites are inevitably a passive factor in this process. They are dependent on the religious elites (here 'religious elite' refers to religious officials) for the demarcation of their religious lives (Subaşı, 1995). Accordingly, the little tradition can be understood not only as the culture most experienced by the masses, but also as the culture made available for the masses.[26]

The definition of popular religion thus includes, to a certain extent, both the meaning of the official religion made available by the religious elite for the religious non-elite, and elements that are considered to fall beyond the official religion, which are created by the religious non-elite.

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[26] It has been said that "Do what the *imām* says, but do not follow his example." This sentence is usually understood to mean that "imams do not adhere to their own rulings" and refers to the misrepresentation of imams in modern Turkey. This semantic shift cannot be rejected as falling under the very popular ottoman that indicates that "the mumpsimus is by far the proper use of the word" (*galat-ı meşhur lügât-i fasihden evlâdır*). However, the original intention behind this sentence was different. The use of this sentence means that imams must give the easiest *fatwā* (legal ruling) for the solving of community concerns, but that they must follow rules that are in accordance with his own spiritual development, and therefore cannot adhere to his own fatwā. When ordinary people try to live up to what imams do, it will become difficult for them and they won't be able to keep up with what they do.

These conceptual formulations allow us to picture possible divergences between an elite Islam which is promoted by the spiritual elite; a normative (or official) Islam (*sharīʿa*) which is allowed or tolerated by the official religious elite (*Imāms, Muftīs*); and a popular Islam which includes all the religious components that are believed in by groups which can be *generally* defined as the religious masses.

These definitions require the definition of popular Islam in two forms. This typology of popular Islam is defined by its proximity to normative religion. These are the 'similar' or identical, and the contrarian types to normative religion (Arslan, 2008, p. 81). According to this definition, popular Islam is made up of beliefs and practices that are both allowed and not allowed by the religious elites. In that respect, our definition of popular religion embraces, to a certain extent, the definition of normative religion.

3.2.4. *Intra-Dimensional Aspects of Islam in the Works of Al-Ghazālī*

The works of Al-Ghazālī' provide a fertile ground for a variety of motivations, cognitive styles and contents of Islamic beliefs and practices, and also form an important example to explain intra-dimensional aspects of Islam. Furthermore, we believe that Al-Ghazālī's analysis of individual religiosity shows some striking similarities with the analysis of the psychologist Allport. We will try to illustrate these below. Al-Ghazālī is also considered to be one of the pioneers of sociology of religion in the Muslim world (Akyüz & Çapçıoğlu, 2012). As a theologian and as one of the earliest Muslim sociologists of Islam, we will examine Al-Ghazālī's work in this study because of the authority he holds in Islamic history in general, and his enormous influence on Turkish religiosity in particular.[27]

Al-Ghazālī confined and restricted the scope of several of his books in order to reserve them for the elite, and to withhold them from the masses (see Ghazālī, 1996). For example, he openly declared that books like *al-Maḍnūn bihī Alā Ghayri Ahlihī* ("The Book to Be Withheld from Those for Whom It Is Not Written") and *al-Maḍnūn al-ṣaghīr* ("To Be Withheld") were strictly meant for the elite only (see Ghazālī, 1996). And in his other important book entitled *Iljām al ʿavāmm an ʿilm al-kalām*

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[27] For more information on Al-Ghazālī's influence on Turkish history and society, see: Arpaguş, (2001).

("Restraining the Ordinary People from the Science of Kalām") he warned against indulgence in the 'doctrinal absurdities' of the common people.

In *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān,* Al-Ghazālī described some of the cognitive styles of the elite (khawāṣṣ) and the masses (ʿawāmm):

> Because their intellect was confined to the study of the shapes of things and their imaginative forms, their consideration was not directed to the spirit and the real meaning of things, and they did not understand the parallelism *(muwāzana)* between the visible world and the invisible... Neither did they understand anything of the spiritual world through experience *(dhawq)* as becomes possible for the elite *(khawāṣṣ)* through understanding, nor did they believe in the unseen as becomes possible for the masses *(ʿawāmm)* through belief. In this way, their intelligence destroyed them (Ghazālī, 1352, p. 37; tr. 63).

However, the use of the term 'elite' in the studies of Al-Ghazālī' is not homogenous. While Al-Ghazālī's other books, such as *Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn,* further referred to as "The Revival"*)* and *The Alchemy of Happiness (Kīmyā-yi Saʿādat)*, which are very popular in Muslim society, are addressed to ordinary people, they still employ the elite (khawāṣṣ) - ordinary people (ʿawāmm) division.[28] Different elements of religious orientation, namely motivation, cognitive style, and content pertaining to either elite religion or popular religion stand side by side, pointing to different groups of people with different social and religious interests and needs. These terms should not only be understood in a sociological sense; they do not necessarily correlate with the level of prominence that individuals or groups have in a society. It is entirely possible that a king is one of the ʿawāmm, and a simple shepherd is one of the khawāṣṣ.

The method that Al-Ghazālī followed in "The Revival" is to discuss a given matter first from the point of view of *fiqh* (islamic jurisprudence), and then from the point of view of Sufism. When, for example, he discusses prayer, Al-Ghazālī first establishes why prayer is necessary and what the necessary conditions are for the validity of prayer

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[28] All Sufi traditions generally classify the whole of humanity into three ranks: the common folk or general mankind (ʿawāmm); the elect or elite (khawāṣṣ); and the super-elect (khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ). The ordinary level of religious experience refers to the ʿawāmm while elite religious experience refers to the khawāṣṣ. For detailed information about ʿawāmm / khawāṣṣ divisions see the following articles: Uludağ (1988), *Avam*; Uludağ (2014), *Havas*; Curcānī (2014), *awāmm*; Qashani (1991), khawāṣṣ.

in terms of *fiqh*. Then he goes on to determine the inner dimensions of prayer.[29] This method is closely linked to the inner aspects of the ritualistic dimension. Al-Ghazālī's criteria to describe intra-dimensional differentiation in the ritualistic dimension are closely related to Allport's components of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' religiosity and Glock and Stark's characterization of 'ritual' and 'devotion' (1968, p. 18). For example, Allport (1967, 1968) used the private and communal character of ritual to measure different motivational aspects of religious practice. Hunt and King (1971) labelled this differentiation as 'associational vs communal'. 'Associational' refers to searching for deeper values (Allport, 1967), while communal refers to sociocultural and communal identification, the need to belong (Allport, 1966), and the need for involvement for sociability and status (Allport, 1967).

Let us inspect how Al-Ghazālī discussed rituals such as fasting (*ṣawm*) in "The Revival". In the book, he distinguished three levels: the fasting of the common people, which means that one abstains on the physical level; the fasting of the elite, which means that one abstains from sinful thoughts, speech, etc.; and the fasting of 'the elite of the elite'[30], which means that one abstains from thinking about something other than God and the Last Day (Ghazālī, 1938, *book 6*, trans. 1992). Hence, there are two (sometimes three) levels of spiritual capacity and attainment, in accordance with which

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[29] There are many classical Sufi texts that follow the same line as Al-Ghazālī's book, such as: Al-Qushayrī's (1956) "Epistle on Sufism" (*al-risāla al-qushayriyya fī ʿilm al-tasawwuf*); Hujwīrī's (1999 [1911]) "Revelation of the Mystery" (*kashf al-mahjūb*); Al-Shadilī's (1938) "Illumination in Islamic Mysticism" (*qawānin hikam al-Ishrāq*); Sarrāj's (1914) *Kitāb al-luma*; Suhrawardī's (2001) *Awārif-ul-maārif*; Al-Ghazālī's "Alchemy of Happiness" (*Kimiya' al-Sa'ādah*); Ibn Arabī's "Revelations of Makkah" (*ʿal-Futuḥāt al-Makkīyah*) (Revelations of Makkah), are some examples.

[30] Al-Ghazālī sometimes used the term 'elite of the elite' (*khawāṣṣ 'ul khawāṣṣ*) to refer mainly to the philosophical or theological elites and sometimes to the mystical elites. As explained in chapter 2, in this study, when we use the term 'elite', we mean the social elite, which is connected to the societal level rather than to the individual level. According to the present study, 'elite religiosity' consists of specific types of religious praxis and belief that are proclaimed and exercised by strata *generally* socially and economically privileged in society. Although in this study we do not exclude as elites those who are recognized as exemplifying the highest values of the religion, and those who occupy the highest positions of formal authority in religious organizations or institutions, we primarily conceptualize elites as those in society who adhere to specific kinds of beliefs and practices that are generally laid down by the spiritual elites. According to our definition, the elite is not necessarily the intellectual elite trained in particular disciplines, such as philosophers, theologians and mystics. This last category of elite contains only small numbers of individuals.

prayer takes on a different level or different aspects. The same twofold (sometimes threefold) principle is applied by Al-Ghazālī to all forms of ritual worship, whether it be *ṭahāra* (purity) (1938, *book 3*; trans. 2017c), *ṣalāt* (prayer) (1938, *book 4*; trans. 2017b)*, zakāt* (charity) (1938, *book 5*; trans. 2017a) or *ḥajj* (pilgrimage) (1938, *book 7;* trans. 1975).

In that period, the sciences were pursued in an academic fashion that was out of touch with the needs of the ordinary people. Al-Ghazālī therefore tried to rescue the sciences from this circumstance. What he actually did in the first part of "The Revival" is to show that the prescriptions of the Sharīʿa, taken in considerable detail, can be made the foundation of a meaningful life (Watt, 1971). Therefore, Sufism is important to Al-Ghazālī as a moral force, both for producing moral character and for deepening the understanding of the Sharīʿa.[31] According to Al-Ghazālī it is sufficient for most people to follow the tradition. For those with the need and ability, properly practiced Sufism is the way. This involves an esotericism in which there is often a single doctrine for the common people, and a plurality of other teachings for the elite.[32] Here lies the key to his 'reconciliation' of Sharīʿa-mindedness and Sufism, and to his integration of other aspects of the Islamic tradition that existed in his time. Different things are suitable for different people, and if this is recognized the different currents in Islam can live in harmony.[33]

Characteristic of Al-Ghazālī's work is that he links the details of the Sharīʿa to the insights of the Sufis. In the past, much of the texture of social life was determined by

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[31] As Berger points out that "Sharīa, or Islamic law, is a term that evokes strong emotions. For some scholars, it is a medieval system that imposes a harsh code of conduct, sanctioned by draconic punishments. For others, on the other hand, it is a system that encourages goodness and justice." In order to understand both the emotional value and the facts of Sharīa, Berger proposes to distinguish three meanings; Sharia as an ideology, Sharia as a legal science and Sharia in contemporary times (see Berger, 2006).

[32] It has been said that the *Qurʾān* has four features: *ʿibāra* (a literal or clear articulation of the meaning of a verse); *ishāra* (its allegorical allusion); *laṭāʾif* (its subtle and symbolic sides) and *ḥaqāʾiq* (its spiritual truths). Each level of meaning accordingly has its own addressees: the ordinary believers (*al-ʿawāmm*), the spiritual elite (*al-khawāṣṣ*), God's close friends (*al-awliyāʾ*), and the prophets (*al-anbiyāʾ*). See: Knysh, 2006 and Nasr, 2003.

[33] In his autobiography, *al-Munqidh min al Ḍalāl* (1980), Al-Ghazali narrates the stages of his intellectual and spiritual evolution. His goal is clearly to promote *taṣawwuf* (the inward dimension of Islam), and in fact he has been credited with making Sufism 'respectable' in the Islamic milieu of his time and beyond.

a stabilized Sharīʿa, and once political life became largely determined by an autocratic caliph and his court, ordinary people needed to have such a religious aim set out before them. Watt indicated that the failure of the official representatives of religious truth in these societies was their inability to see this, whereas the fresh insight of the Sufis provided precisely for this need (Watt, 1971, p. 164).

Another prominent feature of Al-Ghazali's thinking in this respect is the model of the complementarity between exoteric (*zāhir)* and esoteric (*bātin)* interpretations of the Qur'ān and of reality in general. These are different cognitive styles that lead to different religious orientations. They are likened to general knowledge of an object vs detailed knowledge of an object, in so far as the latter is gained through 'verification and experience' (*tahqīq wa'l-dhawq*). General knowledge can be likened to acquiring the husk of a grain (*qishr*) while detailed knowledge can be likened to acquiring the germ (*lubāb*), terms found frequently in *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān* (Whittingham, 2007, p. 59). As pointed out below, these two types of knowledge have a lot to do with the intellectual dimension of religiosity. The exoteric (*zāhir)* and esoteric (*bātin)* interpretations are also very significantly related to Allport's definition of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' religiosity, and the characteristic distinction between elite believers (*al-khawāṣṣ*) and ordinary believers (*al-ʿawāmm*).

Al-Ghazālī also speaks about two kinds of religious obligations, namely objective and subjective obligations. We believe that these concepts are also highly relevant for justification of the key concepts of intra-dimensionality, and that they are closely linked to Allport's differentiation of *'personal vs institutional'* motivations. Objective obligations are the rules laid down in relation to the needs of the people (Günay, 2002; Okumuş, 2006). Religious law (*Sharīʿa*) consist of these objective rules. In "The Revival", Al-Ghazālī defines four degrees of observance. The first degree of observance refers to objective obligations, which is "(a) simple observance of all that issues from the Islamic profession of faith, sc. abstinence from what is clearly forbidden (*ḥarām*)" (1938, *book 1*, *bab 2*; trans. 2015). These rules contain institutionalized fragments of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) that are strongly related to 'institutional' (Allport, 1950, p. 54), 'institutionalized' (Allport, 1954) or 'external' (Allport, 1954) aspects of religion.

The subsequent degrees of observance can be categorized as subjective religious obligations, or as *personal* observances in the terminology of Allport. We think that

these can be categorized under 'elite religion' which emphasizes 'interiorized' (Allport, 1954, 1960), 'vital, deeper level' (Allport, 1967), 'devout' and 'internalized' (Allport, 1967) aspects of religiosity. These are "(b) the scrupulosity of the *ṣāliḥūn,* abstinence from everything which is dubious; (c) that of the *muttaqūn,* sc. abstention from all that is licit in itself but which might lead to what is forbidden; and (d) that of the *ṣiddīqūn,* which is 'turning away from everything which is other than God through fear of wasting an hour of one's life on things which do not increase one's nearness to God'" (1938, *book 1 , bab 2*; trans. 2015).

Criticism of Al-Ghazālī

The views of Al-Ghazālī' were criticized by many, including Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who wrote a refutation of them called *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, "The Refutation of The Refutation" (1930). According to Ibn Rushd, the common people should rely only on the explicit, transparent teachings of the Sharīʿa and adhere strictly to the religious obligations and duties they impose, as this remains the only way for them to receive guidance. The law is twofold: exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the common people is to follow exoteric law, while the duty of learned men is to follow esoteric law; likewise the duty of the common people is to follow the meaning of the law in the literal sense, leaving aside any kind of interpretation (Arnaldez, 1971; Gharipour, 2012; Rushd, 2001).

In the *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, Ibn Rushd commented on the esoteric interpretations of Qurʾanic texts and the actions of those who reveal such interpretations to individuals who are only ready to grasp the outer meaning of the texts. "Anyone of the interpretive class who discloses such (an interpretation) to him invites him to unbelief, and he who invites to unbelief is an unbeliever". Similarly, in the *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, Ibn Rushd accused Al-Ghazālī of revealing philosophical interpretations to those who were not equipped to handle them (Rusd & Hourani, 1961, p. 61). In his article, "Ibn Rushd, Faṣl al-Maqāl and the Theory of Double Truth", Terkan states that one could say that Al-Ghazālī introduced a foretaste of the philosophical approach to the public, but that this does not make the work philosophical (2006, p. 111). According to us, Al-Ghazālī proposed a dynamic rather than a static religious language by thinking in terms of two different aspects (objective - subjective) and two different groups of believers, i.e., the ordinary believers (al-ʿawāmm) and the spiritual elite (al-khawāṣṣ). Although he did not draw ordinary people into doctrinal discussions, he did not limit their interests to

the outer meaning of the Sharīʿa either. Despite differences in emphasis and presentation, both exoteric and esoteric interpretations are essential, and esoteric interpretations complement and build upon exoteric exegesis rather than replacing it (Whittingham, 2007). By using concepts such as 'the secrets of prayer', 'the secrets of *zakāt*' and 'the secrets of fasting', Al-Ghazālī indicated the inner meaning of these religious notions. But in these works, he did not discuss any philosophical and theological subtleties, because they ought to be reserved for the intellectual elites (philosophers, theologians). His methodology can be presented as follows:

Figure 3 - *Al-Ghazālī's methodology*

Haqiqah (Inner Truth that can only be grasped by philosophical or theological elites)

The Inner Religion
Elite Religion

The Outer Religion
Popular Religion

These conceptualizations that correspond to different motivations and cognitive styles which are used by Al-Ghazālī, are usually underestimated by Turkish sociologists and psychologists of religion. In our opinion, however, these characteristics are crucial for understanding the intra-dimensional aspects of religiosity, and consequently, for understanding the nature of religiosity in relation to social and economic factors.

3.3. *Dimensions of Religiosity in Islam*

Up to this point, we listed some characteristics of elite and popular religion. However, we must not forget that nearly all of the theoretical frameworks that have been proposed were developed with Christian believers and manifestations of Christian

religious experience in mind. The exact content and meaning of these dimensions should not be understood as a set of unchanging essences; instead, religiosity and spirituality should be discovered, described and analysed in specific contexts (Karamustafa, 2007, p. vii). Any attempt to measure such concepts requires that the concept be specified in measurable terms. Such an 'operational definition' is particularly important when applied to religiosity and spirituality, since, as we have seen in earlier sections, there are considerable differences in the way elite and popular religiosity are conceptualized. In this section of our study we will arrive at a relevant operational definition of elite and popular religiosity, by taking Muslim religious experience into account.

This study will utilize the religiosity scale developed by Glock and Stark. However, it is important to stress that Glock and Stark's scale does not wholly apply to the distinctive religious elements of the Islamic worldview. Their model does not reflect certain poles of distinctive religious elements, such as: the different categories of knowledge that comprise this religious worldview, e.g., worldly and other-worldly dimensions of knowledge; the extrinsic and intrinsic motives of Islamic religiosity; and neither does it accommodate other polarities, such as dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, differentiated versus undifferentiated. We also try to address the inability of Turkish sociologists to elaborate the sociological aspect of religion in relation to these theoretical aspects. Consequently, in order to make meaningful distinctions within the five dimensions, the present study focuses on the intra-dimensional aspects of the five dimensions and proposes to use Allport's conceptual schemes in particular, which have been used in previous studies to distinguish different motivational and cognitive elements within religious orientation. In sum, our study develops an elite and popular religiosity scale in relation to these various conceptualizations which have been proposed by psychologists and sociologists.

This conceptual orientation suggests two poles within each of the 5 components of Glock and Stark's model. These are: 5 components of elite religiosity, and 5 components of popular religiosity.

These are:

elite beliefs	popular beliefs
elite ritual	popular ritual
elite experiences	popular experiences
elite knowledge	popular knowledge
elite consequences	popular consequences

In what follows, I outline the content of these components of religious commitment as applied to the Islamic religious experience.

Field research into the Dutch-Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands provides the examples in our analysis of elite and popular religion. The emphasis here is on the motivations and cognitive styles of elite religiosity and popular religiosity. The following section presents various characteristics that, in our opinion, describe elite and popular religiosity. These characteristics are presented in the light of extensive readings of Islamic sources and observation of Muslim religious experience - in Turkey and in the Netherlands in particular, specifically in relation to Allport's two-dimensional scale.

Some Characteristics of Elite and Popular Religion in Islam

This section proposes an understanding of elite and popular religious orientation that includes diverse motivations, cognitive styles, and contents, and which is based on an examination of the Dutch-Turkish Muslim context.

The first source of inspiration for our conceptualization can therefore be found in religious behaviour 'on the ground' - that is, in the experience of ordinary people. I will make use of data resulting from field research carried out by adopting the roles of 'complete participant' and 'participant-as-observer'.

A second source of inspiration can be found in the Qur'ān and other religious texts. These include works by scholars, mystics and jurists who directly or indirectly influence Turkish Islam and function as important seeds of Turkish religiosity. I refer to these texts in order to show in what way and in what context religion has been theorized and prescribed. In other words, in terms of *religious market theory* (see

2.2.2) our focus will be on the question in which ways and in which contexts religiosity is produced and consumed. Instead of taking sides in theological disputes, I have sought inspiration in sociological models - such as Weber's interpretive sociology - to understand the meaning of religious action. We are concerned with identifying patterns of behaviour, not with determining the correctness of beliefs.

This approach makes it impossible and undesirable to comment on the validity (i.e., truth or error) of the Turkish religious experience under study. As pointed out earlier, this study accepts, on the basis of a Durkheimian approach, that religion responds to the specific social, intellectual and material conditions of a community, and that therefore no manifestation of religion should be seen as fake or false (Durkheim, 2001, p. 4).

3.3.1. *The Ideological Dimension (faith - īmān)*

Within the ideological dimension, at least two forms of religious belief seem to be manifesting. Spiritual elites (*khawāṣṣ*) tend to emphasize verification (*taḥqīq*) of beliefs, which includes doubt (*irtiyāb*) and questioning (*tafakkur*) (Kasapoğlu, 2005; Kayıklık, 2005). Cognitive needs theories explain this type of religious commitment to a large extent. The cognitive problems that can be met by religion are a pressing matter in the life of this kind of believer. Intellectual problems like 'How did the world begin?', 'What is the purpose of life?', etc., to which science or common sense does not immediately provide an obvious answer, are important to this believer (Argyle, 1975; Batson, 2004). The cognitive styles of spiritual elites include complexity, reflectiveness, and the questioning of beliefs and belief systems. Practitioners of this type of religiosity are called investigators (*muḥaqqiq*). In contrast, people who experience popular religiosity (*ʿawāmm*) tend to emphasize imitation (*taqlīd*)[34], through trust in tradition (Özervarlı, 2014). This profile is highly relevant in

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[34] The validity of this type of Islamic faith has been widely discussed in Islamic theology. In general, the imitation (*taqlīd*) of someone considered to be a higher religious authority (such as a qualified scholar or *ālim*) is deemed acceptable in the area of the details of the religious law (*Sharīʿa*), e.g., such as in matters of worship and personal affairs, but not in the area of the fundamentals of 'metaphysical' belief, e.g. such as regarding the belief in the existence of God (Allah). For more information on *taqlid*, see: Calder, 2000.

connection with Allport's descriptions of reflective and uncritical religiosity (see Table 2).

Those who experience popular religiosity, experience fewer doubts than the spiritual elites, because they have no feelings of uncertainty about believing that something is true (or false), and they do not doubt themselves. They see no other option than to believe that something is true or false (Rosenthal, 2007, p. 304). They also believe 'doubt' to be wrong (Madge, Hemming & Stenson, 2014, p. 74). This type of believer, also called 'imitator' (*muqallid*) sometimes, is chiefly motivated by social learning (Yücedoğru, 2005). From this perspective, children often acquire the same beliefs as their parents, especially if they like them and continue to live at home. The same holds for attitudes towards political issues and regarding other matters. Religious attitudes and beliefs are modified by membership of educational and other social groups (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975). For the 'investigator' type, on the other hand, social learning plays an effective rather than a determining role. Thus, it can be said that elite religiosity stimulates the *reflective* and *dynamic* processes of faith development, while popular religion stimulates adherents to acquire *uncritical* and *stable* stereotypical beliefs.

3.3.2. *The Ritualistic Dimension (ʿamal)*

These popular (ʿ*awāmm*) and elite (*khawāṣṣ*) types of commitment suggest a distinction between aspects of quantity and quality within the ritualistic dimension. While spiritual elites emphasize the *intrinsic* value of the ritual (i.e., its quality), such as the secrets (meanings) of prayer and secrets of fasting, popular believers emphasize the *extrinsic* value of the ritual (i.e., its quantity), which can also be seen as an expression of a calculating attitude.

Popular religious behaviour is the place where 'magic' and religion meet. For example, the ritual of reciting a certain number of prayers (*duā*) and formulas for a specific time, including verses from the Qurʾān, is considered by practitioners of religion and magic as an important resource for curing diseases (O'Connor, 2006; Kırbaşoğlu, 2002). Use of amulets (*muska*) in the belief that they possess beneficial

magical qualities[35] (Çelebi, 2014; Dessing, 2001; Hamès, 2007) and the use of prayer beads (similar to the rosary in Catholic Christianity) to count the number of repetitions of formulas to glorify God (for example, by repeating the Arabic sentence *'Subḥān Allāh'*, often translated as 'Glorious is God'), are forms of popular religious behaviour.[36]

The other aspect of the ritualistic dimension is the motivation behind the performance of rituals. Spiritual elites engage in (or refrain from) religious practices largely without direct material expectations. This is referred to in the Islamic tradition as *'ubudiyyāt* (Bilmen, 2007; Çağrıcı, 2014; Kaşani, 2004; Pazarlı, 1980; Uludağ, 2014a). In this case, the practices are not *instrumentalized*. Such motivations can be explained by a framework of obedience and glorification (Scarlett, 2006; Scarlett & Perriello, 1991). An example of this is the following statement by Said Nursi about elite motivations behind worship. He says, "Worship is not the introduction to additional rewards, but the result of previous bounties" (2008, p. 369). Those who experience popular religiosity engage in (or refrain from) religious practices to obtain material rewards in heaven such as 'gardens', 'rivers', 'drink', 'water', 'wine', etc. This is generally referred to as *'ibādat*, which can also be regarded as a calculating attitude (Bilmen, 2007, p. 83; Çağrıcı, 1989, p. 78; Kınalızâde, 1974, p. 8; Nesefi, 2009, p. 233). No doubt these material motivations are considered authentic and valid in most interpretations of Islam.

This profile is also highly relevant in connection with Allport's descriptions of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (see Table 2). For example, those who experience elite religiosity engage in their practices as an end in itself (Allport, 1954, p. 66) (Allport, 1959, pp. 60, 66, 67), while those who experience popular religiosity engage in their practices as a means to an end (Allport, 1954; 1959, pp. 60, 66, 67; 1966, 1967). Rational choice theories explain these popular types of religious behaviour to a large extent. This approach, proposed by Rodney Stark, assumes that people are goal-driven, and that when choosing a path to a desired goal, they weigh up the costs they

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[35] During the history of Islam, amulets did not only appeal to the common people. Some religious scholars sought the help of these methods as well (see Anadol, 1991, pp. 54-81, 97-104, 116-125, 189-190).

[36] Today, the classic rosary (*tasbiha*) has been traded in for a digital type of rosary (called *zikir matik* in Turkish), which is much easier to use.

have to pay to achieve it. Such costs might include restrictions on dress, diet, ability to associate with others, etc. They will even make a rational assessment of the costs and benefits of martyrdom. With the help of a set of rational 'propositions', Stark and Bainbridge seek to explain many seemingly irrational religious beliefs and behaviours by showing their roots in cost-benefit calculations (Stark & Bainbridge, 1989).

Another aspect of the ritualistic dimension are the public and private motivations for doing rituals. Popular religiosity is more publicly motivated, deliberately occurring, formalized and socialized, while elite religiosity is more privately motivated, spontaneously occurring, and exists independently of formal institutions (Young & Koopsen, 2010, p. 91). This is also related to Allport's differentiation between associational and communal (see Table 2). For example, people who experience elite religiosity will look for the deeper values behind religious practices (cf. Allport, 1967), while people who experience popular religiosity will look for communal, sociocultural identification, based on their need to belong (cf. Allport, 1966).

In conclusion, it can be said that elite religiosity provides *intrinsic*, *ultimate* and *personal* motivations for doing rituals, while popular religiosity provides its adherents with *extrinsic*, *instrumental* and *institutional* motivations for doing rituals.

3.3.3. *The Intellectual Dimension (ʿilm / maʿrifah)*

The intellectual dimension can also be divided into two main cognitive components: esoteric religious knowledge *(bātin)* (Uludağ, 1996, 2014c) and exoteric religious knowledge *(zāhir)*.[37] Spiritual elites tend to be knowledgeable both about the literal,

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[37] The term 'esoteric' has a very specific meaning in the Islamic tradition. The Qurʾān, as well as other fundamental religious texts, emphasize the difference between what is 'apparent' and 'outward' (*zāhir*) and what is 'hidden' and 'inward' (*bātin*). *Zāhir* is everything that is immediately apparent in our perceptions and thoughts (an empirical phenomenon, the meaning of a text), the presence of which cannot be doubted. *Bātin* is what is not expressed outwardly (feelings for instance), what is hidden in natural phenomena, or concealed in speech. However, the 'hidden' is no less real than the 'apparent'. The very etymology of these terms is significant in this respect. *Zāhir* refers to *zahr,* the back, while *bātin* refers to *batn*, the belly. The image is clear: what immediately manifests itself in human life is actually only the backside of reality; the less interesting part of it. The 'belly' of reality, the organism that gives life to it, is hidden from perception and common sense. This opposition between apparent and hidden can be applied to the whole universe. It reflects the structure of God's manifestation in his creation: "He is the First and the Last, the Outward (*al-Zāhir*) and the Inward (*al-Bātin*)". (See: Lory,

outward (*zāhir*) and metaphorical, inward meanings (*bātin*) of sacred scriptures and the historical roots of their faith. Practitioners of popular religion, on the other hand, are more inclined to engage with the outward and formal truth (*zāhir*) of their religion (Bar-Asher, 2002; Ghazālī, 1993; Sarrāj & Nicholson, 1914, p. 14; Uludağ, 2014b). The other aspect of this dimension is the perception (*tasawwur*) on the nature of knowledge. Spiritual elites tend to build up their religious knowledge through *critical investigation*. They are never entirely sure of the accuracy of their knowledge. For them, the *questioning* and *criticising* of knowledge is something crucial.[38] According to this perception on knowledge, knowledge is a process of 'obtaining' (*d-r-k*, *ḥ-ṣ-l*), 'comprehending' (*f-h-m*), and thus of enabling individuals to *change* their thoughts in the process of time. Another perception on knowledge is 'knowledge as belief'. According to this approach, the practitioner of popular religion will hold that knowledge is believing a thing (to be) as it is, and this constitutes certainty (*tayaqqun*) as well as the removal of any doubts about the nature of the thing in question. This state of knowledge is constituted by definitive and firm (*thābit*) belief that conforms to reality (*al-muṭābiq li-l-wâqī*) (Rosenthal, 2007, pp. 63-65). An *unchanging* and *static* worldview and a total absence of the idea of development are characteristic for this popular acquisition of knowledge (Watt, 1988, pp. 3-8).[39] Moreover, people who experience popular religiosity tend to acquire their religious knowledge *orally* through their parents, family elders and especially *in a quick fashion* through the internet[40] and TV. Criticism of this kind of knowledge acquisition is unusual in this type of religiosity. This type of oral knowledge transmission shows similarities with the process through which prejudice is transferred. Preconceived views are often based on hearsay rather than on direct evidence, and are resistant to change, even in the face of new information (Çelebi, 1980 p. 74; Giddens, 2006, p. 490).

2010, p. 49) The opposition between *zāhir* and *bātin* has been masterfully explained in the works of Henry Corbin (2014), especially in *A History of Islamic Philosophy*. For a concise summary of his thoughts, see Cheetham, *The World Turned Inside Out*, chapter 4 (Cheetham, 2003).

[38] For information on attitudes towards doubt, see the following books: Rosenthal, 2007; Treiger, 2012.

[39] For Watt, these features of the Islamic worldview and the accompanying self-image form the basis of Islamic fundamentalism (see Watt, 1988).

[40] In this context, Google became the most prominent sheikh for those who experience popular religiosity, called 'Sheikh Google'.

In conclusion, it can be said that elite religiosity is constituted by *esoteric* and *differentiated* religious knowledge, while popular religiosity is constituted by *exoteric* and *undifferentiated* religious knowledge.

3.3.4. *The Experiential Dimension (ilhām - maʿūnat)*

Religious experiences at the societal level are called *maʿūnat* (Curcānī, 2014; Özervarlı, 1997; Uludağ, 2014g). In this context we mean any religious experience that an individual interprets as contact with a transcendent reality, an encounter or union with the divine. Spiritual elites *(khawāṣṣ)* and practitioners of popular religiosity *(ʿawāmm)* are likely to differ on two aspects of the experiential dimension, while both categories of believers indeed have religious experiences. One aspect of this dimension is *experiential desirability.* Practitioners of popular religiosity are more likely to see religious experiences as appropriate and necessary elements of religious commitment. Spiritual elites, on the other hand, may regard mystic or miraculous experience as superfluous (Konuk, 2012, p. 133). Sufis, for example, often teach that spiritual elites should not pursue, or even actively distrust, this gift of mystical experience, and that becoming attached to it creates a serious obstacle on the road to union with God (Gardet, 1997; Uludağ, 2014f, 2014h, 2014d).

The other aspect of this dimension concerns the *expression* of private religious experiences (such as telling someone that you had a private dream about the prophet). Those who experience popular religiosity are more inclined to report that they ever had such experiences (Uludağ, 2014g). The spiritual elite is more inclined to keep silent about this. Likewise, for the Sufis, such notions as "protection of the secret" (*ḥifẓ al-sirr*) or "hiding the real nature of the particular interior state" (*ikhfāʾ al-ḥāl*) describe practices and disciplines which are particularly valued (Amir-Moezzi & Ali, 2004).

3.3.5. *The Consequential Dimension (natījah)*

The consequential dimension is interpreted here as the effects of religious belief, practice, experience, and knowledge on the daily lives of individuals. Stark and Glock (1968) noted that the consequential dimension consists of the secular effects of the other four dimensions. It is not, therefore, a completely independent dimension. Rather, this is a dimension that is strongly dependent on the other four dimensions.

Scholars distinguish two types of consequences that religious commitment can have (Ardelt, 2003; Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Barrett, 2010; Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Nelson, 2009). In general, it has been said that, for those who experience popular religiosity, religion could have numerous positive aspects that are useful in various ways: providing security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-determination (Allport & Ross, 1967). At the same time, popular forms of religiosity have been found to be related to racial and ethnic prejudice and a host of other *socially divisive* characteristics. In contrast, elite forms of religiosity have been found to be unrelated or negatively related to intolerance and racial and ethnic prejudice, and to be positively related to a wide variety of *socially integrative* characteristics (see section 6.2.4 for the elaboration of this aspect of religiosity).

In order to measure these various non-religious characteristics, several attitude scales have been formulated in this study (see Appendix one: Table 39). These are:

> (Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)
>
> (Subordinate) attitudes towards women
>
> (Prejudiced) attitudes towards race
>
> (Hostile) attitudes towards others
>
> (Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism
>
> (Conservative) in-group attitudes

3.3.6. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, some structural characteristics of a new scale of Muslim religiosity have been presented, ranging from popular religiosity on one end of the continuum to elite religiosity on the other. These two extremes reflect the classification of the sub-dimensions, which include belief (*īmān*), practice *(ʿamal)*, knowledge (*ʿilm/maʿrifah*), experience (*maʿūnat/ilhām*) and consequences (*natījah*). Under these sub-dimensions, we have identified several motivational and cognitive characteristics and contents, which according to us distinguish elite religiosity from popular religiosity. These characteristics are: dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and privacy versus experiential desirability

and shareability, tolerant versus intolerant, unprejudiced versus prejudiced. Definitions and measuring instruments are not correct or incorrect, but only more or less suitable for a specific purpose (King & Hunt, 1972, p. 5). These are ideal types, that this list of dichotomies refers to (theoretical) extremes, and that this is a tool to represent the reality of people's (expression) of religiosity – which is always more diversified and complex – by locating it on an (artificial) scale.

In the next chapter, chapter 4 of this study, we will explain the general lines of our research methodology. In this chapter, we will discuss our measuring instruments in detail which merely have been introduced here. Then, in chapter 5, we will try to show to what extent the concept of elite and popular religiosity reflects the empirical sphere of religious expressions.

Table 4 indicates how these general characteristics of these two forms of religiosity - as they are listed above - can be represented. Characteristics in brackets show the relevant connection to Allport's components (see: Table 2).

Table 4 - *Components of elite and popular religiosity*

D	Characteristics of ER	Sample Item	Characteristics of PR	Sample Item
Ideological	Questioning (Reflective)	My recent religious beliefs and ideals are primarily based upon personal investigation.	Imitating (Uncritical)	A major factor in my religious development has been the importance of religion for my parents.
	Doubt	I think that there are many more things in my faith that I have not perceived yet.	Sureness, uncritical	I completely understand what it means to be a believer *(Mu'min)*.
	Dynamism (Differentiated)	My religious beliefs are not the same today as they were five years ago.	Stability (Undifferentiated)	My religious beliefs are pretty much the same as they were five years ago.
Ritualistic	Material expectations are not important (Unselfish, ultimate)	My reason to pray is to be rewarded in heaven and to be saved from hell. (R)	Material expectations are central (Selfish, instrumental)	The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.
	Emphasis on the meaning of private ritual (Personal, associational)	When I pray, I mostly try to understand the meaning of chapters and prayers.	Emphasis on the impressiveness of public ritual (Institutional, communal)	When I recall my experiences with religion I most readily remember the impressive formal rites and rituals.
Experiential	Keeping Religious experience private	If I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., guidance of God or Prophet) I prefer to keep it to myself.	Tendency to share private religious experience	I think that it is important to tell about special gifts from God, i.e., peace, mercy, or prosperity, to family or friends
	Experiential desirability is not central	I feel upset if I am not receiving any special divine gifts from God in exchange for prayers. (R)	Experiential desirability is central	It is essential for religious spiritual leaders to have miracles *(Karāmats)*
Intellectual	Uncertainty about current religious knowledge	For me, doubting the validity of my current religious knowledge is an important part of what it means to be religious.	Certainty of current religious knowledge	I completely understand what Allah wants by requesting the profession from us *(Kalima-i shahādat).*
	Openness to change (Reflective)	My religious knowledge provides me with satisfying answers at this stage of my development, but I am prepared to readjust them as new information becomes available.	Closedness to change (Unreflective)	If I find answers to my religious questions through imams, I never doubt their correctness.

Note: This table is organized before the factor analysis. Some of the items were excluded after further analysis. (R) means reverse-scored