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Elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish muslims in the Netherlands

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Elite and Popular Religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands



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ÖMER FARUK GÜRLESİN

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Prof.dr. M.C.H. van Dijk-Groeneboer (Tilburg University)

Dedicated to the memory of Meerten ter Borg (1946-2017)

Transliteration Table

ء	ʾ	ض	ḍ
ا	a, ā /A	ط	ṭ
ب	b	ظ	ẓ
ت	t	ع	ʿ
ث	th	غ	gh
ج	j	ف	f
ح	ḥ	ق	q
خ	kh	ك	k
د	d	ل	l
ذ	dh	م	m
ر	r	ن	n
ز	z	ه	h
س	s	و	w/v, ū/Ū, -uww
ش	sh	ي	ī/Ī, -iyy
ص	ṣ	Short Vowels	a, e, i, ı, o, ö, u, ü

List of Tables

Table 1 - Characteristics of two-dimensional conceptualizations 81

Table 2 - Components of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity 84

Table 3 - Conceptual model of E&PR in relation with Glock's scheme 90

Table 4 - Components of elite and popular religiosity 120

Table 5 - Characteristics of elite and popular religiosity 142

Table 6 - Reliability analysis (attitude scales) 144

Table 7 - Reliability analysis - (religiosity scales) 146

Table 8 - Demographic variables 1 153

Table 9 - Demographic variables 2 156

Table 10 - Demographic variables 3 157

Table 11 – Belief in basic tenets of Islamic faith 160

Table 12 – Level of practice of the pillars of Islam 161

Table 13 - Religious experience 162

Table 14 - Religious knowledge 163

Table 15 - Consequential dimensions 164

Table 16 - Mean distributions for five aspects of general religiosity 165

Table 17 - Correlation matrix of five aspects of general religiosity 165

Table 18 - Correlation matrix 169

Table 19 - Correlation matrix (elite, popular and high Religiosity) 172

Table 20 - Average means of elite and popular religiosity 173

Table 21 - Cross tabulations 174

Table 22 - Agreement and disagreement with elite and popular religiosity scale 175

Table 23 - Education and elite/popular religiosity 176

Table 24 - Education and high religiosity 177

Table 25 - Income and elite/popular religiosity....178
Table 26 - Religiosity and generational differences....179
Table 27 - Gender and elite/popular religion....180
Table 28 - Age groups and elite/popular religiosity....181
Table 29 - Correlation matrix of age, residence duration and religiosity....182
Table 30 - Item 12 - I believe myself to be more religious than most people....183
Table 31 - Correlation matrix of factors influencing elite/popular religiosity....184
Table 32 - Average mean distributions for elite religiosity....187
Table 33- Average mean distributions for popular religiosity....188
Table 34 - t-test comparison of some socio-psychological attitudes....189
Table 35 - Correlation matrix of socio-psychological factors....192
Table 36 - Factor analysis / General religiosity scale....250
Table 37 - Factor analysis / Elite religiosity scale....252
Table 38 - Factor analysis / Popular religiosity scale....254
Table 39 - Factor analysis of scales of consequential dimensions....256
Table 40 - Adapted western-Christian measurements....276

List of Figures

Figure 1 - Exploratory mixed method design 39

Figure 2 - A conceptual model of elite and popular religiosity 41

Figure 3 - Al-Ghazālī's methodology 109

Figure 4 - Categorization of religiosity 145

Figure 5 - Highly-educated 25 to 64-year old by ethnic background 260

Figure 6 - Muslims in the Netherlands by ethnic origin (CBS) 260

Figure 7 - Population of the Netherlands from 2010 to 2015, by religion 261

Table of Contents

Transliteration Table 5

List of Tables 6

List of Figures 9

Table of Contents 11

Acknowledgements 15

Abstract 17

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Positioning Myself Within the Research 21

1.2. Islam in Europe and the Netherlands 23

1.3. Academic Research into Islam in Europe and the Netherlands 27

1.4. Elite and Popular Religiosity - Contested Concepts 31

1.5. Definition of Elite and Popular Religiosity 32

1.6. Objectives, Research Problems and Research Questions 37

1.7. Methodology of the Thesis 38

1.7.1. Conceptual Model 40

1.8. Organization of the Thesis 43

Chapter 2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Culture and the Concept of Elite and Popular 49

2.1.1. Elite and Popular Culture: Differentiations 52

2.1.2. Elite and Popular Culture in Turkish sociology 53

2.1.3. Complementarity of Elite and Popular Religiosity 56

2.2. Religion and the Concepts of Elite and Popular 58
2.2.1. Religion and Social Stratification: Weber 58
2.2.2. Religion and Religious Market 61
2.2.3. Some Characteristics of Elite and Popular Religiosity 64
2.2.4. Religious Elites and Masses 68
2.2.5. General Evaluation 69

Chapter 3. Theoretical and Socio-psychological Foundations of Elite and Popular Religiosity in Islam

3.1. Elite and Popular Religiosity in Social Scientific Study of Religion 75
3.1.1. Two - Dimensional Approaches of Religiosity 78
3.1.2. Comparative Analysis of Allport's Religious Orientation Approach and the Multi-Dimensional Approach of Glock and Stark 85
3.2. The Concepts of Elite and Popular Religiosity in Islam 91
3.2.1. Intra-Religious Pluralism: Islam or Islams? 92
3.2.2. Turkish Islam(s) 95
3.2.3. Some Critics and Their Suggestions 96
3.2.4. Intra-Dimensional Aspects of Islam in the Works of Al-Ghazālī 103
3.3. Dimensions of Religiosity in Islam 109
3.3.1. The Ideological Dimension (faith - īmān) 112
3.3.2. The Ritualistic Dimension (ʿamal) 113
3.3.3. The Intellectual Dimension (ʿilm / maʿrifah) 115
3.3.4. The Experiential Dimension (ilhām - maʿūnat) 117
3.3.5. The Consequential Dimension (natījah) 117
3.3.6. Conclusion 118

Chapter 4. Research Methodology

4.1. Introduction 124
4.2. Objectives, Research questions and Hypothesis 126
4.2.1. Objective 126
4.2.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses 126
4.3. Design and Procedure of the Research: Mixed Methods Approach 129
4.3.1. Qualitative Data Collection: Participant Observation 130
4.3.2. Quantitative Data Collection: Questionnaires 135
4.3.2.1. Paper-based Survey 135
4.3.2.2. Internet-Mediated Research (IMR) 135
4.3.2.3. Problems Encountered 137

4.4. Quantitative Research Instruments 138
4.4.1. Demographic Inquiry 138
4.4.2. General Religiosity Scale (GRS) 139
4.4.3. The Elite and Popular Religiosity Scales (E&PRS) 141
4.4.4. Scales to Measure the Consequential Dimension 143
4.4.5. General Overview 144
4.5. Reliability Analysis 146
4.6. Method of Data Analysis 147

Chapter 5. Data Analysis and Findings

5.1. A Profile of the Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Surveyed in the Netherlands 153
5.2. Findings Concerning General Religiosity 158
5.2.1. Ideological Dimension 159
5.2.2. Ritualistic Dimension 160
5.2.3. Experiential Dimension 162
5.2.4. Intellectual Dimension 162
5.2.5. Consequential Dimension 163
5.2.6. Factor Analysis 164
5.2.7. Conclusion 166
5.3. Findings Concerning Aspects of Elite and Popular Religiosity 169
5.3.1. Factor Analysis of Elite and Popular Religiosity Scale 170
5.3.2. Average Means of Elite and Popular Religiosity 173
5.3.3. Independent Variables and Elite and Popular Religiosity 176
5.3.3.1. Educational Status 176
5.3.3.2. Income 177
5.3.3.3. Generational differences 178
5.3.3.4. Gender 180
5.3.3.5. Age 180
5.3.3.6. Elite / Popular religiosity and Feeling Oneself More Religious 182
5.3.4. Factors Influencing Elite and Popular Religiosity 184
5.3.5. Socio-psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity 186

Chapter 6. Summary, Discussion and Conclusion

6.1. Summary of Research Findings 197
6.1.1. Characteristics of the Respondents and the Questionnaire 197
6.1.2. Research Questions, Hypothesis and Results 197

6.2. Discussion 202
6.2.1. Reflections on Glock's Five-dimensional Scheme 203
6.2.2. Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity. 205
6.2.3. Socio-Cultural Factors Affecting Religiosity 208
6.2.3.1. Immigration and Religiosity 209
6.2.3.2. Education and Religiosity 214
6.2.3.3. Age, Cohort and Generational Effects on Religiosity 222
6.2.3.4. Economic Status and Religiosity 226
6.2.3.5. Digital Media and Religiosity 229
6.2.3.6. Gender and Religiosity 231
6.2.4. Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity 232
6.2.4.1. Ethnocentrism and Religiosity 233
6.2.4.2. Sexism and Religiosity 236
6.2.5. Spirituality and Religiosity 237
6.3. Conclusion and Future Research 242
Appendix One (Factor Analysis) 249
Appendix Two (Additional Tables) 259
Appendix Three (Paper-Based Questionnaire) 263
Appendix Four (Web-Based Questionnaire) 273
Appendix Five (Measurements in Turkish Sociology of Religion) 275
Bibliography 283
Summary in English 337
Samenvatting 345
Curriculum Vitae 361

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to examine and understand the beliefs and practices of Dutch-Turkish Muslims from the perspective of elite and popular religiosity, exploring the characteristics of both kinds of religiosity and the various sociological consequences, thereby considering the demographic and socio-economic factors in relation to both in the context of the plural society of the Netherlands.

The design of the present study has been shaped by a 'mixed-methods' approach, in which quantitative and qualitative methods are merged into one research project. Within a four-year period (2010 - 2013), the project began with qualitative research to explore the various forms and motivations of elite and popular religiosity, so that the results of this qualitative research could inform aspects of the quantitative approach. The second method consisted of a questionnaire survey that formed the main part of the project. I developed instruments of an elite and popular religiosity scale through the operationalization of concepts I used in light of my qualitative research of elite and popular religiosity. 1165 participants took part in the survey, ranging in age between 18 - 68 years.

This theoretical and empirical study yielded the result that the forms and motivations of high religiosity vary across different groups. Based on the findings of this study, out of the total group of participants who experienced high religiosity, six out of ten participants experienced popular religiosity, while only two out of ten experienced elite religiosity. I also found that respondents who experienced popular religiosity were less open and friendly towards other religions. Moreover, men who experienced popular religiosity had reduced views on the equality and rights of women compared to men who experienced elite religiosity. It also turned out that participants who experienced popular religiosity expressed more (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and showed more conservative in-group attitudes than participants who experienced elite religiosity.

1. Introduction

In this first chapter of our study of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims, we present the fundamental outlines of our research. The first section (1.1) will discuss my positionality as a Turkish Muslim researcher in the Netherlands. The second section (1.2) will give a brief overview of the current situation of Islam in Europe and in the Netherlands. This will be followed by a survey of previous studies on Islam in Europe and in the Netherlands (1.3). In the subsequent section (1.4), we will describe why we are interested in studying the phenomenon of elite and popular religiosity. Following this, we will focus on the definition of elite and popular religiosity specifically with reference to Islam (1.5). The objectives, problems and research questions of the present study are set out in section 1.6. The methodology of our study is outlined in section 1.7. Then we shall present the conceptual model in subsection 1.7.1. The final section (1.8) will provide an overview of the remaining chapters of the study.

1.1. *Positioning Myself Within the Research*

In the present study, I follow two distinctive paths: first, analysing from my position as an insider, as a member of the group; second, analysing in light of my position as an outsider, as a sociologist of religion. This is first and foremost an empirical study of religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims that was conducted by a Turkish Muslim scholar who lives in the Netherlands. It is important, therefore, to begin this study with a discussion of my own positionality as a Muslim researcher. My background was relevant to the research methodologies and the conceptual development used in this thesis. As an insider, I had access to many private and public religious experiences such as *ṣalaḥ, ṣawm, ḥajj* etc. while these experiences took place. At the same time, I evaluate these practices in the light of a social scientific study of religion. In this section, therefore, I will discuss the experienced benefits and possible challenges that were produced by my specific background.

One of the essential instruments of the ethnographic method is participant observation. This includes gathering social data in their natural social setting, in which researchers have access to the meaning of events and social interactions as understood by the group or organization under study. Different typologies of participant observers were developed according to their role during the course of research. The basic typology formulated by Gold (1958) defined four so-called field roles: ‘the complete participant’, ‘the participant-as-observer’, ‘the observer as participant’, and ‘the complete observer’. In the ethnographic part of this study, I usually took on the role of ‘complete participant’ (in virtue of my background) and of ‘participant-as-observer’, in order to gain access to a wider group of participants in their social connections. These insider positions provided me with excellent opportunities for in-depth interaction with various sections of the Turkish community in the Netherlands, in order to understand the meaning they ascribed to culture and religion within the context of a multicultural society.

The reason for accepting an insider role was to get close to the behaviours and everyday experiences of the Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands. “Getting close”, according to Emerson (1995, pp. 1-2) requires “physical and social proximity to the daily rounds of people’s lives and activities; the field researcher must be able to take positions in the midst of the key sites and scenes of others’ lives in order to

observe and understand them" (for examples of this positionality, see: 4.3.1 Qualitative Data Collection; Participant Observation).

The particularities of my life made this process even easier. I was born in Germany in 1982. I was educated in Turkey until I was 9 years old. I first came into contact with the Turkish community in the Netherlands when the Turkish Presidium of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) sent my father and his family to the Netherlands to work there as an imam in 1992. During his period of office in the Netherlands, I attended several cultural and religious courses and public meetings with the Turkish community in Deventer. I went to the Hagenpoort, one of Deventer's primary schools. Through my studies at the Hagenpoort I built up good relations with numerous friends. Although I was a child, these early meetings provided the early experience that inspired my future research interests. After nearly three years in the Netherlands, I returned to Turkey in 1996, when my father's period of office ended.

Many issues and experiences persisted in my imagination when I returned to Turkey. I developed a greater interest in reading literature and watching broadcasts about Turkish communities, the largest ethnic group amongst Muslims in Europe. Accordingly, an intellectual enthusiasm emerged to conduct this research even before entering the field.

In August 2007 I made my second contact with the Turkish community in the Netherlands, and during my MA studies in Leiden I attended various volunteer activities. During my studies at Leiden University I built up good relations with plenty of people and Muslim foundations with various social-cultural and political backgrounds. This second round of experiences strengthened my interest in studying the Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands. When I began my PhD research in Leiden, I understood that my earlier observations and involvement in various gatherings and ceremonies were all significant sources of background information.

In addition to these advantages, researching from an insider position provided me with some further critical benefits. Because I already had a network of people who trusted me, visiting cultural establishments, religious and political institutions, weekend schools and sport clubs was easy. I attended meetings, lectures, ceremonies and various other events of these organizations to observe the processes while they were taking place. Moreover, the extensive knowledge about my own religion that I

possessed prevented me from committing basic mistakes. Perhaps the greatest advantage was the capacity for *einfühlen* (intuition or empathy), the ability of taking the native point of view: only people who have or have had religious experiences are able to understand the meaning of religious commitment (Geertz, 1999).

The insider position I took on had some disadvantages as well. Someone living within a religious tradition may not be able to maintain the necessary distance to conduct a reliable and valid analysis. This is partly due to intellectual limitations: one is so familiar with one's own tradition that it is almost impossible to analyse one's own background with a critical eye. A religious attitude can also blind a scholar to possible connections between religious expressions and their social context. A sociologist is hardly able to construct an interpretation of a 'pure' religion that exists independently of a social context. Strong loyalty to a particular religious tradition can create difficulties in producing unbiased analyses of other traditions (Furseth, Repstad, & Woodhead, 2006, pp. 206-7). To avoid these problems, I made every effort to benefit from the outsider's point of view that came from a team of supervisors with expertise in various fields, including sociology, psychology, anthropology of religion and history of religions.

Moreover, the goal of the present study is not to evaluate (either positively or negatively), but simply to describe the diversity, similarity and complexity of human religious beliefs and behaviours. Therefore, in order to overcome various difficulties that stem from the insider approach, the present study opts for a *mediating stance*. This approach attempts to remain neutral when it comes to questions of truth and value; instead, it focuses on issues of accurate description and comparison at the expense of drawing value judgments. This approach attempts to bracket out, or avoids asking, all questions about the truth of a person's claims, termed methodological agnosticism (MacCutcheon, 1999). From this point of view, when it comes to writing and analyzing the data coming from both qualitative and quantitative research, this study is a form of social scientific research that is fully in line with the methods of sociology of religion.

1.2. *Islam in Europe and the Netherlands*

Islam is the second largest and fastest-growing world religion today, with majority populations in 56 countries extending from North Africa to Southeast Asia and encompassing significant minorities in Europe and the United States (Lipka & Hackett,

2007). The Netherlands is one of the countries in which Islam is a fast-growing religion (CBS, 2009a). Although this growth is fairly recent, Muslims are no strangers to the Dutch society. The Netherlands became familiar with Muslims centuries ago in its role as a trading nation and colonial power (Rath, Meyer & Sunier, 1997). Before the Second World War, small numbers of Indonesian students visited the Netherlands, their colonial 'mother country', and in the 1950s a few Moluccans (from Indonesia) and Hindustani Surinamese (of Indian descent) decided to settle there. These communities consisted mainly of Christians and Hindus respectively, but they included small numbers of Muslims as well. The number of Muslims increased significantly after 1965 as a result of the arrival of foreign workers and their families from North Africa (Morocco) and Turkey. The estimated number of Muslims in the Netherlands in 1971 was approximately 50,000; in 1975 about 100,000; in 1995 about 626,000 (Rath, 1997, p. 389) and in 2012 about 825,000 or 4.5% of the Dutch population (CBS, 2012). In-depth interviewing in 2015 showed about 5% to be Muslim.[1]

There are many different groups of Muslims in the Netherlands, of different denominations and countries of origin. If we look at the ethnic origin[2], we see that the vast majority (two-thirds) of Muslims are of Turkish or Moroccan descent. According to the latest estimate of CBS, there are 296,000 Muslims of Moroccan descent and 285,000 Muslims of Turkish descent living in the Netherlands (CBS, 2009a), which accounts for 68% of all Muslims in the country (See Figure 5 in the appendix two for Muslims in the Netherlands by ethnic origin).

Debates on 'European Islam' figure largely in the discussion of whether Islam has already undergone a process of localization by adapting to the European context, or whether it is and will "remain an alien transplant" (Yükleyen, 2009). Cherribi (2003, p. 196) observes that "over the past three decades Islam has become increasingly

[1] Up to a few years earlier, the number of Muslims was estimated on the basis of the religious makeup of the country of origin of the parents of citizens. Following this method, the number of Muslims was overestimated. For example, in 2004, the CBS estimated the number of Muslims in the Netherlands to be 944,000 (almost 6% of the Dutch population) (CBS, 2006, 2009b). In 2010, Kettani estimated the number to be 966.000, amounting to 5.8% of the Dutch population (Kettani, 2010).

[2] Here, 'ethnic origin' means belonging to or deriving from the cultural or religious traditions of a specific country.

visible in the European public space". The appearance of Islam took the Dutch by surprise. At the height of secularization, the country was surprised to be confronted with communities in which religion is very much alive and flourishing, and is furthermore a noticeable basis for social organization (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012). Muslims currently make up about five percent of the total population[3] and Islam has become a cultural factor in Dutch society.

Despite Islam's rapid growth in Europe and the Netherlands, many in the West know little about the religion and are only familiar with the actions of a minority of radical extremists. Islam has had a significant impact on world affairs, both historically and in the current era (Cesari, 2015; Ramadan, 2009b; Shadid & Koningsveld, 2002b). Muslims understand Islam as more than a religion: it is a comprehensive way of life that includes spiritual, social, economic and political dimensions (Turner & Nasir, 2013; Turner, 2003a, 2003b). The reality of European Islam is also very diverse (Cesari, 2015). The differences are related to national, cultural, religious and linguistic elements and these elements definitely remain important (Dassetto, Ferrari, & Maréchal, 2007 p. 3; Huijnk, 2018; Yükleyen & White, 2007). Anyone working on the sociology and anthropology of Islam will be aware of this extensive diversity in Muslim beliefs and practices. The first problem is therefore one of organizing this diversity in terms of an adequate concept (Asad, 1986, p. 5). Unfortunately, this challenge has not yet been met successfully with the existing conceptualizations and the use of the twin concepts "Islam/Islamic" does not express a coherent object of meaning (Ahmed, 2016).

The Direction of Islam in Europe

For centuries, Muslim countries and Europe have engaged one another through theological dialogues, trade and diplomatic missions, and power struggles. Over the last thirty years, however, and to a large extent as a result of globalization and migration, the debate has ceased to be a debate of remote and isolated communities and has become a debate of endogenous, face-to-face cultural and religious interaction. The recurrent question nowadays is: are Islamic religious principles compatible with liberal secular European values? (Cesari, 2015, p. 1). There are several models that try

[3] See Figure 7 - Population of the Netherlands from 2010 to 2015, by religion

to answer this question and try to explain the direction of Islam in Europe by focusing on a particular aspect of Muslim immigrant life.

On the one hand, there are some studies that suggest that an inner incompatibility between Islam and the West determines the direction of their religious choices. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the train bombings in Madrid of 11 March 2004, and the London metro bombings of July 2005 have increased the tensions between European society and its Muslim minorities and lent support to the essentialist argument of an inner incompatibility between Islam and Western democratic, liberal, and secular culture. Some scholars suggested that Islam was the new 'other' of 'the West' incompatible with Western values of freedom, liberty, and democracy. Political scientist Samuel Huntington (1993) suggested that global politics would be dominated by a "clash of civilizations" in which Islam would replace Communism as the "other" of the Western world. Historian Bernard Lewis supported these predictions with historical arguments about an inner incompatibility between Islam and Western culture. According to his arguments, the textual sources and historical development of Islam are inherently hostile to democracy, freedom, liberalism and even peace. He argued that this inner structure of Islam would not change over time and was not adaptive, either in Europe or in Muslim societies (Lewis, 1990).

Other scholars, on the other hand, with representatives such as Bulliet (2004), Bassam Tibi (2001, 2014), Mohammed Arkoun (1996, 2003), Nasr Abu Zayd (2006), and Tariq Ramadan (1999, 2004, 2009, 2012) reinterpret Islam in accordance with democracy, liberty, and secularism in Europe. Bassam Tibi proposes the emergence of Euro-Islam, a form of Islam that is assimilated into the secular European public sphere (2014, 2001). This Euro-Islam would limit itself to the private sphere, be pursued as an individual form of spirituality and would assure peaceful Muslim participation in European cultural pluralism. Tibi speaks out in favour of an enlightened and open-minded Islamic identity that would be compatible with European civic culture. Bulliet argues that Islam and Christianity have the same cradle of a common civilization from which they descended "as siblings" in the sixteenth century. He emphasizes the similarities in the developments and experiences of the two civilizations (2004).

In the present study, we are planning to explore the inner differences of Dutch-Turkish religiosity in relation to social, economic, and cultural aspects. By means of

this exploration we intend to examine the possible directions Islam is taking in Europe. We seek a middle ground between two types of essentialist argumentation: one is to theorize incompatibility between Islam and European culture, and the other is to theorize compatibility between them. As many scholars who study Muslim society have noted, Islam, like any other religion, does not develop in a monolithic form, whether it is hostile to European values or assimilated, as the term 'Euro-Islam' suggests. It develops in a multiplicity of forms, such as political Islam, official Islam, popular Islam, spiritual Islam and radical fundamentalism, combining both radical and moderate religious voices. This inner-Islamic difference is important in order to understand what Muslims make of their religion in Europe, and to grasp the direction that Islam is taking on the continent. This then brings us to the argumentation suggested by Nielsen (1999, 2007), in which he points to the fact that since there is more than one way of being European, in terms of religious practice, culture, and identity, there are more ways than one for Muslims to become European.

1.3. *Academic Research into Islam in Europe and the Netherlands*

Studies on Islam in Europe address multiple subjects such as the development of mosques and Muslim associations, the struggle to establish Muslim schools in the European context (Daun & Walford, 2004; Doomernik, 1991; Wetering & Miedema, 2012), the status of religious leaders such as imams (Boender, 2007; Ghaly, 2008), the history of Islam in the West (Berger, 2014), and social responses to the establishment of Muslim institutions (Boender, 2006; Esch & Roovers, 1987; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meyer, 2001; Rath, 1996, 2005; Rath, Meyer & Sunier, 1997; Waardenburg, 1991). Others have elaborated specific social or institutional aspects of Islam in Europe, such as the problems of Muslim youth (Nilan, 2017; Vertovec & Rogers, 1999), political participation (Cesari, 2013; Klausen, 2005; Shadid & Koningsveld, 1996), legal questions and secularism (Berger, 2013; Cesari & McLoughlin, 2005; Ferrari & Bradney, 2000; Nielsen, 1979, 1987; Rohe, 2007), radicalization of Muslims (Coolsaet, 2008; Pargeter, 2008), and conversion to Islam (Köse, 1996), the complexity of the increasing presence of a multitude of Muslims (Vinding, Račius, & Thielmann, 2018). There is hardly a topic relating to Muslims or Islam that has not been researched in Europe (Cesari, 2015).

Islamic studies has also become a well-established discipline in the Netherlands (Berger, 2015). From the 1980s onwards, scholars increasingly turned their attention to the religious beliefs and practices of Muslim migrants in the Netherlands (Broex, 1982; Custers, 1985; Koningsveld & Shadid, 1992, 1997). Initially, the focus was on Islam in general (Jansen, 1987; Koningsveld, 1982) and the ways in which it was practiced by Muslims (Landman, 1992a, 1992b; Waardenburg, 1983). Some of the literature was about Islamic education and how it should be provided by schools (Ter Avest & Bakker, 2013; Esch & Roovers, 1987; Genç, Ter Avest & Miedema, 2011; Rietveld-van Wingerden et al., 2009; Ter Avest & Rietveld-Van Wingerden, 2016; Wagtendonk, 1987). Some studies focused on Islamic minority law (*fiqh al-aqalliyāt*) (De Kroon, 2016; Shadid & Koningsveld, 1996a).

After the 1990s, a tradition of anthropological and ethnographic research developed concerning Muslim experiences of religion and religious identity (Andree & Jonge, 1990; Ter Avest & Bakker, 2009; Dessing, 2001; Rath et al., 1997; Sunier, 1996; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2010; Verkuyten, Thijs, & Steven, 2012; Verkuyten & Yıldız, 2009).

In the 2000s, while the public and political debate on integration focused increasingly on Muslims, academic research rose to the challenge in order to answer basic questions such as: Who are the Muslims?, What do they want? and What is the role of Islam in their lives? This research into the praxis of Islam would soon dominate the study of Islam in the Netherlands (Berger, 2015). This resulted in studies on a diversity of issues, such as religion and culture (Buijs, 2009; Buitelaar, 2006; Huijnk, 2018; Phalet & Wall, 2004), Muslim youth (Bartels, 2000; De Koning, 2011, 2008; Heijden, 2009; Nabben, Yeşilgöz & Korf, 2006; Pels, Gruijter, Doğan & Hoek, 2006; Phalet, Lotringen & Entzinger, 2000; Roeland, Aupers, Houtman, De Koning & Noomen, 2010), everyday lived Islam (Dessing, 2013), mosque architecture (Arab, 2013; Roose, 2009), female circumcision (Bartels, 2004; Dessing, 2001; Kolfschooten, 2004; J. Smith & Longbottom, 1995), choice of marriage partners (De Koning & Bartels, 2005; Hooghiemstra, 2003; Speelman, 2001), experience of the public sphere (De Koning, 2010), headscarf issues (Hoekstra & Verkuyten, 2014; Lorasdağı, 2009a, 2009b; Moors, 2009; Motivaction, 2011), socio-psychological matters (Hoffer, 2009; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012; Speelman, 2016; Verkuyten, 2010; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012), use of multi-media (Konijn et al., 2010). After

that, many studies on radicalization and orthodox trends among young Muslims began to appear (Cherribi, 2010; De Koning, 2009, 2013; Gielen, 2008; Komen, 2014).

Challenges in Studying Islam

As is understood from this large body of research, the examination of the religiosity of Muslim individuals has gained increasing salience, and the 'native voice' has become an important topic nowadays. However, very little information has been gathered about the daily practices of Muslims in ways comparable to how information has been gathered about other religious groups. In this regard, sociology, psychology and anthropology of religion - specifically the European social sciences - still remain marginal when it comes to Muslims and production of data that can be compared to those existing for Protestants, Catholics, or Jews (Cesari, 2015, p. 3).

One of the problems here is the scant attention paid to non-Christian religious experience. In the last few decades, approaches to religious orientation employed to measure various ways of being religious have emerged strongly in Western scientific literature, focusing in particular on Christian religious experience. The divisions that have been applied in the study of religion draw on a range of terms such as 'authoritarian' and 'humanistic' religion (Fromm, 1950), 'primary religious behaviour', 'secondary religious behaviour' and 'tertiary religious behaviour'(Clark, 1958), 'committed' and 'consensual' religion (Spilka & Allen, 1967), 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967), 'mythological' and 'literal' religion (Hunt, 1972), Religion as 'ends', religion as 'means' (Batson, 1976), 'high-involvement religion' and 'low-involvement religion' (Beit-Hallahmi, 1989) and so forth. To a certain extent, these various terms and propositions used in different disciplines exhibit characteristics comparable to those of 'elite' and 'popular' religiosity, as conceptualized by scholars studying Islam.

Although the notion of elite and popular religiosity has been in circulation since the 17th century, its usage in both theoretical and practical Islamic studies was vague and ill-defined until the last few decades, when there was an increase in studies with this angle. However, field studies in this area have been few compared to theoretical studies (Çapçıoğlu, 2004, p. 210).

This religious diversity forms a challenge for Turkish research in sociology of religion of Islam. The challenge lies in the task to find the appropriate measurements

that will allow us to comprehend the different characteristics of religiosity in Turkey. The measurements which assume a monolithic and one-dimensional Turkish Islam no longer seem to be sufficient. There is a growing need to assess the varieties of religious orientations, such as intrinsic versus extrinsic, ultimate versus instrumental, personal versus institutional motivations in ritualistic dimensions; esoteric versus exoteric, differentiated versus undifferentiated knowledge in the intellectual dimension (see section 3.3).

Adaptation of Scales in Studying Islam

At the end of the 20th century, scholarly interest expanded to include living Muslim peoples as a subject of study, and studies in the field of sociology gained in importance through this time.[4] Many multidimensional religiosity scales have been proposed in recent years (see Appendix five: Measurements in Turkish Sociology and Psychology of Religion). They are either inspired by or adapted from European or American religiosity scales and have been translated into Turkish (Zuhal Ağılkaya-Şahin, 2012). The most influential approach to developing religiosity scales in Turkey is the multidimensional approach of Glock and Stark (1969). Early efforts (e.g. Yaparel's (1987) Religious Life Inventory) as well as later attempts (e.g. Ayten's (2009) Brief Islamic Religiosity Scale) referred to Glock and Stark's (1969) model and developed multidimensional religiosity scales for the study of Turkish Islamic religiosity.

Allport & Ross' concept of religiosity is another inspiration to Turkish sociology and psychology of religion research, when it comes to developing measurements of religiosity. Scales based on religious orientation (e.g., Hoge, 1972) have been identified as suitable for measurements in different religious contexts since they do not refer to a single explicit religious system (Karaca, 2001a). Kayıklık (2000) was one of the researchers who adapted the Religious Orientation Scale by Allport & Ross (1967) to Turkish culture. With minor differences, Gürses (2001) advanced an equivalent measure. According to their results, religion is an aim for the intrinsic religious person. Hökelekli (2005) defined this kind of religiosity as '*psychological needs religiosity*'

[4] Over the last two decades, the number of field studies has exceeded theoretical studies in Turkey. According to Şerif Mardin, field studies in sociology of religion that are conducted to explore the Islamic understanding of the masses supply more important and valuable data than theoretical or normative studies of the country's religious landscape (Mardin, 2012).

in relation to the functions of religion. In contrast, for the extrinsic religious person, religion is a means by which he/she intends to achieve goals such as social acceptance.

The elite and popular religiosity scale developed in this study is inspired by both the Glock and Allport scales and will be the combination of these two. In chapter 3 we will discuss this issue in depth by indicating pros and cons of these two measurements.

1.4. *Elite and Popular Religiosity - Contested Concepts*

If we look at the comprehensive academic literature on popular religiosity, the difficulty of our task is immediately apparent: scholars do not even agree on the choice of a term to refer to the phenomenon. In our view this is mainly due to the fact that they come from considerable different scientific backgrounds. Many academic disciplines, in particular since the 1970s, have contributed to the study of popular religiosity: social sciences (sociology, anthropology, psychology), religious studies (comparative, historical), theology (systematic, liturgical, practical) have approached this complex phenomenon from different viewpoints, creating the confusion mentioned above. Examples of terminological differences are diffused religion, folk religion, mass religion, common religion, popular piety, popular faith and popular Islam. We should indicate that the term 'popular religion' is preferred in Anglophone literature, while the term 'popular religiosity' is found in other language areas, such as in German (Volksfrömmigkeit or Volksreligiosität), Italian (religiosità popolare) and Spanish (religiosidad popular) (Zaccaria, 2010, p. 4). These examples make us understand Badone's (1990, p. 4) comment that "as a scholarly category popular religion is problematic". This causes frustration among scholars about a term whose meaning has become increasingly less clear over the past few decades (Carrol, 1992, p. 6), so much so that some have advocated abandoning it (Christian, 1981; Grehan, 2014). Given the complexity of the debate on popular religiosity, we definitely cannot hope to offer a comprehensive, unifying conceptual definition. Instead, in line with Berlinerblau, we suggest that the term must be used with some caution, thereby making it clear that the term cannot be regarded as unproblematic and conceptually unambiguous (Berlinerblau, 2001, p . 607).

However, this does not mean that the term is abandoned in the present study. On the contrary, we will use it, but, rather than looking for just one academically unifying, acknowledged term, we will attempt to clarify what we mean by the term 'popular'

within ‘popular religiosity’ as employed by us in our research. This means that instead of a conceptual universal definition, we will offer an operational contextual definition of both elite and popular religiosity. Namely, we will offer a list of contents, motivations and cognitive styles that, in our view, characterize popular religiosity, which differ from the contents, motivations and cognitive styles that characterize elite religiosity. These can be analytically and empirically investigated in the Dutch-Turkish Muslim community (see 3.3).

It can be said that no universally accepted definitions of Religion, Culture, and Popular Religion have been produced. Working definitions are not necessarily perfect, complete, or universally accepted, but they can provide a practical starting point for further exploration (Clark, 2012, pp. 2-3). Contextualization of our object of study will enable us to overcome the lack of consensus among scholars of popular religiosity: the attempt to offer a-historical and universal definitions of religion (Asad, 1993, p. 29). From this perspective, religion is not considered as absolute in the trans-historical and transcultural sense but is subject to historical and cultural differences. Considering Berger’s approach (2014, p. 26), when we speak of ‘Islam’, this is with the understanding that these notions and their interpretations are specific to their time and place, whether as a doctrine or a cultural system. Therefore, our approach to elite and popular religiosity in this study can be seen as the opposite of universalisation: the elite and popular religiosity that we are dealing with is neither a-historical nor universal in character, because we investigate elite and popular religiosity in Muslim society, more precisely in the Turkish Muslim society, and more specifically in the Dutch-Turkish Muslim society existing in the Netherlands.

1.5. *Definition of Elite and Popular Religiosity*

Most researchers who have written about religion in general seem to agree that there is no single religious orientation, but rather a wide range of different experiences that can be focused on religious objects (Allport, 1950; Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996; Spilka & Allen, 1967; Weber, 1963)

Many scholars who study Muslim society have also noted that Islam, like all religions, is not monolithic. Although most Muslims adhere to certain fundamental tenets, the practices, interpretations, images and realities of Islam differ across time and space (Ahmet, 2016). Max Weber indicated that investigators of human culture do

not want to discover universal rules that will help them to explain a particular culture; but rather want to understand the uniqueness and particularity of a culture (1949, p. 72).

The variety of Muslims living in Europe in terms of regional origin and ethno-national identity plays an important role in the make-up of Islamic religiosity in Europe, because the Islamic orientation in the countries of origin is still influential on Muslim immigrants, especially when it comes to Turks (Huijnk, 2018, p. 83). Olivier Roy argues that ethno-cultural differences are going to disappear as Muslims in Europe de-link culture from religion (Roy, 2004). However, he notes that, in comparison with other Muslims, Turks tend to preserve their language and ethnonational identity (Ibid, 123). Other scholars suggest that the religious and ethno-national identities of Muslims in Europe are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing (Cesari, 2004, p. 178). Observations on Turkish Muslims in the Dutch society confirm this (Yükleyen & White, 2007). The ethno-national division among Muslims justifies examining the diversity of Islam within one group, such as Pakistani, Moroccan, or Turkish Muslims, because the religious organizations of Muslims are divided along ethno-national lines.

The focus on one faith group, however, bears the risk of constructing Muslims as a coherent group while ignoring the inner-Islamic difference and the characteristics that some of them share with other individuals and groups (Spielhaus, 2011). There are various sources of religious diversity within a single ethno-national Muslim community, and Turkish society today experiences various types of religiosity as well. Data from both theoretical and practical studies confirm the existence of different religious orientations (Akşit, Şentürk, Küçükural, & Cengiz, 2012; Arslan, 2003, 2004, 2008b; Coştu, 2009; Kirman, 2005; Tanyu, 1976). Therefore, the inner-Islamic difference to which we draw attention here is of great importance in understanding and explaining this religious diversity. Taking this inner-Islamic difference into account, this study is concerned with investigating the distinctive characteristics of Islam in Turkish culture. In order to do so, we suggest two conceptions related to the Islamic tradition, namely *khawāṣṣ* (elite) and *ʿawāmm* (popular).

The notions of *khawāṣṣ* and *ʿawāmm* have deep roots, dating back to the initial period of the Muslim tradition. Before offering our contextual and operational definition, we would like to introduce some earlier approaches to these concepts. There are two general approaches that stress the differences between elite and popular

religiosity; (1) the *praxis approach*, which refers to the religious practices and beliefs of individuals (2) the *economic and social approach*, which refers to the social or economic status of a group. In this section, I will briefly review how the concepts of *khawāṣṣ* and *ʿawāmm* are evaluated by these approaches.

Ethical traditions in Islam, in particular all Sufi traditions, generally classify the whole of humanity into three ranks to point out the inner-Islamic differences and to address the different religious contents, motivations and cognitive styles that lie behind religious beliefs and practices. The ranks are: the common folk or general mankind (*ʿawāmm*); the elect or elite (*khawāṣṣ*); and the super-elect (*khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ*). The ordinary level of religious experience refers to *ʿawāmm* while elite religious experience commonly refers to *khawāṣṣ* and only rarely to *khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ*. On the one hand, the concept of *ʿawāmm* is mostly used for those who pay attention to Sharia law, the exoteric side of religion. Simultaneously, ʿawāmm refers to those who are formalistic and yet cannot grasp the inner aspect of religion, the esoteric side of religion. The concept of *khawāṣṣ*, on the other hand, is used to indicate inner aspects of religious beliefs and practices.

> The fasting of the general public (*ʿawāmm*) involves refraining from satisfying the appetite of the stomach and the appetite for sex. The fasting of the select few (*khawāṣṣ*) is to keep the ears, the eyes, the tongue, and hands, and the feet as well as the other senses free from sin (Ghazālī, 1938, book 6, trans. 1992).

This brief anecdote from Al-Ghazālī's *Revival of the Religious Sciences*, one of the Sufi classics from the 11th century, illustrates the use of *the praxis approach* in the ritualistic aspect of religion. Here, *ʿawāmm* refers to ordinary types of religious behaviour, namely popular religiosity, while *khawāṣṣ* refers to the spiritual, inner aspect of religious behaviour, namely elite religiosity.

Khawāṣṣ and *ʿawāmm* types of commitment can be exemplified in light of the other four dimensions of religiosity as listed by Glock, i.e. the ideological, intellectual, experiential and consequential dimension - in addition to the ritualistic dimension. There appear to be at least two forms of religious belief that fall within the ideological dimension. Elites (*khawāṣṣ*) tend to emphasize verification (*taḥqīq*) of beliefs, which includes doubt (*irtiyāb*) and questioning (*tafakkur*). Those who experience popular religiosity (*ʿawāmm*), on the other hand, tend to emphasize imitation (*taqlīd*) through a blind trust in tradition, which implies that family elders, the cultural environment and

society are imitated as a second-hand experience. Among the beliefs and practices discussed by Muslim ethicists and Sufis, there are verification (*taḥqīq*), doubt (*irtiyāb*), questioning (*tafakkur*), and imitation (*taqlīd*) or second-hand experience. When we look at these kinds of examples given by Muslims ethicists and Sufis, we can say that 'elite and popular religion' needs to be defined on the basis of the religious practices and beliefs of individuals - not on the basis of the non-privileged social or economic status of a group.

Nearly comparable conceptions of 'elite' and 'popular' are used by sociologists to explain the structure of Muslim society. Gellner identifies unvarying features of Muslim societies. Building on the work of Ibn Khaldūn, he suggests a dialectic between city and tribe, each with its own form of religion. According to him, the central characteristic of Islam is that it was divided internally into the high Islam of the elite and the popular ('low') Islam of the common people. High Islam, Gellner believes, is carried by urban elites who are largely recruited from the bourgeois trading classes, and it reflects the tastes and values of the urban middle class. Popular Islam, on the other hand, is usually associated with the pre-urban stages or nonurban, nonliterate/illiterate levels of society and is produced by the village, or the common people (Gellner, 1983). In the same way, in Şerif Mardin's writings on Turkish religiosity, this inner-Islamic difference, as mentioned above, is associated with central Islam (*Merkez İslamı*) and peripheral Islam (*çevre İslamı*) - generally based on the distinction according to lifestyle (urban/rural) (2006). As one can immediately understand, these sociologists have put the *economic and social approach* at the centre and have explored religiosity in the context of socio-economic conditions. Within the economic and social approach, elite and popular religiosity refers to the religious tendencies of strata characterized by a high or low degree of social and economic status. Among the groups discussed by Gellner and Mardin are the urban elite, the bourgeois trading classes, the lower middle class, the middle class, urban middle classes, labourers, peasants, central Islam and peripheral Islam… On this basis, it could be assumed that when these sociologists spoke of 'elite and popular religion', they proposed a type of religiosity associated with a given society's economically or socially privileged classes or non-privileged groups, instead of referring to the religious practices and beliefs of individuals.

When we look at studies on Turkish religiosity, it can be said that theoretical research in religious studies (theology, ethics) was indeed insufficient to determine these concepts in relation to socio-economic terms, but that at the same time practical research (sociology, anthropology) is also inadequate to explore Muslim religiosity in terms of inner-Islamic differences. The spiritual and intrinsic dimensions of religiosity were mostly ignored or studied separately by the sociologist, without taking the interrelatedness of elite and popular religiosity into account, while the relation with social and economic factors was largely neglected by the scholars of religious studies.

This is also the case for the Dutch Muslims. As Berger points out, there is very little information in the literature about socio-economic issues relating to Muslims: but more information is available on Moroccans and Turks (Berger, 2015). Religion is neither used to identify inner-Islamic pluralities nor to explain the behaviour of individuals in socio-economic terms. In order to fill this gap in the present study we plan to concentrate both on the inner-Islamic differences of religiosity and their relation with the socio-economic situation in the Netherlands. From this point of view, the approach to elite and popular religiosity that we use takes the following form:

> 'Elite religiosity' and 'popular religiosity' are constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief generally exercised by certain socio-economic strata.

This approach suggested by Jaques Berlinerblau (2001) is called the *synthesis approach* and is inspired by the works of Max Weber. This approach will be developed in more detail in chapter 2. We believe that this approach will help us to understand the inner aspects of religiosity without losing sight of the influence of social and economic factors.

Here, we briefly anticipate the way in which we interpret elite and popular religiosity, the object of our research. In the context of the present study, elite religiosity is understood to refer to the spiritual, internalized, intrinsic, and committed outlooks of Turkish religious experience that are highlighted by ethicists and Sufis, but also by sociologists and psychologists of religion, by exploring the religious cultural system that is generally produced by spiritual elites primarily for their own religious life and tradition. Popular religiosity in this context refers to the conventional, extrinsic, and consensual elements of Turkish religious experience, which are emphasized by sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists of religion by exploring

the religious cultural system generally produced by the masses for their own religious life, likely to include beliefs, practices, religious knowledge, and religious experiences of individuals. The main focus is on the characteristics of religiosity and its relation with socio-economic factors rather than on the content of particular theological beliefs. We also assume that certain objective positions within the socio-cultural field generally go hand in hand with certain forms of religiosity. Chapter 2 of this study is dedicated to understanding elite and popular religiosity in depth. In this chapter, we will elaborate on the relations between religiosity and culture. This chapter describes the theoretical perspectives of *social stratification* and *religious market* with respect to the emergence of elite and popular religiosity. Chapter 3 will further elaborate on these conceptions, particularly with a view to the Islamic context.

1.6. *Objectives, Research Problems and Research Questions*

The objective of this study is to contribute to the body of knowledge about the characteristics of religiosity of Turkish-Dutch Muslims in diaspora, in relation to socio-economic aspects of the Dutch plural society. Our research is exploratory and descriptive. It seeks to examine and understand Muslim beliefs and practices from the perspective of elite and popular religiosity, exploring the characteristics of both kinds of religiosity, considering demographic and socio-economic factors in relation to both. The aim is to discover the relationship between elite and popular religiosity and the various sociological consequences of both in the context of the plural society of the Netherlands. The choice for explorative and descriptive research is motivated by the fact that there is no strong theory formation available regarding elite and popular religiosity and its relation to socio-economic aspects, in particular regarding Muslims in a plural context.

In light of this objective, the problem under investigation is the characteristics of religiosity of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands and how this relates to their socio-economic status, which will be investigated in this study using the theoretical elaborations presented in chapter 2. In our research, we formulate hypotheses about this relation. We cautiously call them hypotheses, we might also say expectations because of the exploratory character of our study and the lack of robust theory on elite and popular religiosity and their relation with cultural and social differentiation in diaspora. Still, we draw on existing literature and preliminary observations in the field

in order to arrive at a number of hypotheses. Based on the results of the analyses of our empirical findings, we will then see whether these hypotheses can be confirmed or need to be refuted.

The main research questions have been formulated in relation to our objective and the problem we have stated above; (1) 'What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?' (2) 'What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity, respectively?' These questions will be further explored in the following chapters, and they will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.

1.7. *Methodology of the Thesis*

Sociology of religion is the study of beliefs, practices, and organizational forms of religion using the tools and methods of the discipline of sociology. This study follows a structural-functionalist approach. In this model religion has reciprocal relations with other elements of the social structure, and therefore a change in the structural elements of society will be reflected in religion and religious phenomena, or vice versa, a change in the position of religion will bring about certain changes in society. According to this approach, religion has functions in every social layer of a society and corresponds with various social functions and roles within these different layers (Cunningham, 1999, p. 42).

This objective investigation may include the use of quantitative methods such as surveys, polls, demographic and census analysis, or qualitative methods such as participant observation, interviewing, and analysis of archival, historical and documentary material, or may draw on a 'mixed-methods' approach combining both qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques. The design of the present study has been shaped by a 'mixed-methods' approach, in which quantitative and qualitative methods are merged into one research project.

Scholars have identified various possible forms of mixed-methods design and have even devised a classification based on a basic typology in the field of evaluation (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989). This classification distinguishes four types:

complementarity, development, initiation, and expansion. (1) Complementarity seeks to use the results of one method to elaborate on the results of another method; (2) development seeks to use the results of one method to help develop or inform another method; (3) initiation seeks to recast the results or procedures of one method in order to question the results of another method; (4) expansion seeks to extend the breadth or scope of an inquiry by using different methods for different research components (Greene et al., 1989, p. 259). Our method is based on the first and second types. Figure 1 illustrates the design we use in this study.

Figure 1 - *Exploratory mixed method design*



This design is typically used to develop quantitative instruments when the variables are not known, or to explore preliminary qualitative findings collected from a small group of people with a randomized sample from a larger population.

Within a four-year period (2010 - 2013), the project began with qualitative research to explore the various forms and motivations of elite and popular religiosity and the social location of these religiosities, particularly focusing on Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. One of the essential instruments we used was participant observation, which was briefly discussed already in section 1.1. As a cross-sectional study, the research design also included an extensive literature review, so that the results of the qualitative research and literature review could serve as a basis for aspects of the quantitative approach.

The second method was a questionnaire survey that formed the main part of the project, with the clear research goal to investigate Muslim beliefs and practices in the context of elite and popular religiosity. We used four different questionnaires; (1) a general religiosity scale, (2) an elite religiosity scale, (3) a popular religiosity scale and (4) measurements for the consequential dimension.

The general religiosity scale (1) was designed to obtain information under the five dimensions based on Glock and Stark (1962). This part of the questionnaire focuses

on high and low religiosity. The result of this part of the survey was used to identify respondents who experience a low level of religiosity and to remove them from the sample, because they are unable to assist us in our search for three elements of religious orientation, namely motivation, cognitive style, and content.

The use of an elite religiosity scale (2) and a popular religiosity scale (3) distinguishes the present study from most other studies. These instruments are developed through the operationalization of concepts we use in our study of elite and popular religiosity. This part of the questionnaire was designed to highlight the intra-dimensional aspects of Glock's five dimensions by considering the 'elite' and popular', 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' aspects of religiosity. This part of the study is therefore not designed to examine the difference between high and low religiosity, but rather the difference between elite and popular religiosity. Our initial method, consisting of participant observation and literature study, was generally useful to design this part of the questionnaire.

The consequential dimension (4) is considered here as the relation(s) or even possible influence(s) of being an elite or popular religious person. This part of the questionnaire will reveal the effects of elite and popular religiosity in peoples' day-to-day lives. The consequential dimension was chosen to cover a wide range of life issues, including modernity, gender issues, sectarian issues, segregation issues, in-group attitudes, social relations, and attitudes towards Christianity. These four measures were developed to obtain a quantitative picture of Muslim religiosity and its sociological manifestations. The methodology of this study will be elaborated in detail in chapter 4.

1.7.1. *Conceptual Model*

In order to achieve our goal and to face our research difficulties, this study uses the concepts that are illustrated schematically in the following figure:


Culture
High Culture
Popular Culture
Individual
Gender
Age
Marital Status
Education
Income
Religiosity
Elite
Belief
Ritual
Experience
Knowledge
Popular
Belief
Ritual
Experience
Knowledge
Social
Family, Friends
School
Religious Leaders
Mosques
Religious Foundations
TV and Internet
Socio-Psychological Attitudes
Attitudes towards other religions
Attitudes towards women
Attitudes towards race
Attitudes towards others
Attitudes towards modernity
In-group/Out-group Attitudes

This model illustrates the possible relations between the concepts used in our study. The model indicates that the notion of elite and popular religiosity is localized under the umbrella of high and popular culture. Consequently, one of the sub-questions to answer our first research question[5] is 'How can the relation between religion and culture be characterized, and how do we understand popular and elite religiosity?' A justification for the study of religion by relating it to cultural differentiation can be found in different disciplines such as sociology, psychology and anthropology of religion (Bell, 2006; Belzen, 2010; Forbes & Mahan, 2005; Foucault & Carrette, 2013; Geertz, 1971, 1973; Mirsepassi, 1992; Scupin, 1993). Our study analyses high and popular culture on this basis.

Furthermore, we try to understand the concepts of elite and popular religiosity by conducting a social scientific study of religion. The above schematization of elite and popular religiosity represents these forms of religiosity as two circles. However, the present study does not view the relation between elite and popular religiosity as static and clear-cut. We will not overlook the dialectical character of their interrelatedness. The second sub-question of this study deals with these aspects of religiosity: 'What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in the context of the Turkish - and possibly also Dutch - society and how is this related to socio-economic status? This entails exploring the relation between elite and popular religiosity in terms of beliefs, rituals, experiences and knowledge, while monitoring the effect of population characteristics. The following population characteristics will be taken into account: gender, age, educational level, income, and generational differences. These characteristics are included in our model because, according to the existing literature, they can influence the relation between elite and popular religiosity.

The lower part of the model represents socio-psychological attitudes related to elite and popular religiosity. To measure various non-religious attitudinal affects in response to the second major research question stated above, the present study makes use of several attitude scales.

[5] *RQ1*: What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?'

1.8. *Organization of the Thesis*

This concluding section of the introductory chapter provides an overview of the following chapters. The thesis is divided into six chapters.

Chapter 1 includes a general overview of the study. This part introduces the theme of the thesis, and the immediate cause that led to the research questions, and presents an overview of the chapters.

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical background of the main concepts in light of a social scientific study of religion. The notions of great and little traditions, high and popular culture are introduced and developed upon in a broader context (2.1). First, we discuss how the category of the 'popular' is approached by structuralists and culturalists (2.1.1) Second, this concept is elaborated upon in light of Turkish sociology. More specifically, this section seeks to investigate the links between culture and religiosity drawing on the works of Ziya Gökalp and Fuad Köprülü (2.1.2). After elaborating these approaches, we propose a third approach based on Gramsci's writings. In this part we highlight the importance of investigating the cultures of the elites through comparison and synthesis with the cultures of the masses. (2.1.3).

After presenting this introduction on elite and popular culture, this study will shed light on the notion of elite and popular religion and its acquired meaning and content in the social scientific study of religion (2.2). I will explain Weber's status stratification (2.2.1) and religion and rational choice theories (2.2.2) in order to explain elite and popular religion from a sociological perspective. Following this, we will discuss the earlier usage and meaning given to the terms elite and popular religiosity in different disciplines (2.2.3). This study will then propose adding a different definition of 'elite' based on a synthesis approach (2.2.4). Our operational definition will be particularly built in chapter three, however. Finally, the criticisms levelled against the concepts of elite and popular religiosity and against similar or overlapping concepts such as great and little traditions, will be considered and refuted up to some degree (2.2.5).

Chapter 3 will shed light on a somewhat narrower context and will focus on elite and popular religiosity in Islam. In part 3.1, I will indicate discussions on the conceptualization and operationalization of religiosity. Here I will elaborate on how the subdivision between 'elite' and 'popular' influences research in the social scientific

study of religion. The first section of this part mainly discusses two-dimensional religiosity scales (3.1.1). The second section of this part, I will make a comparison between the two-dimensional scale devised by Allport and Ross (1967) and the multidimensional religiosity scales conceived by Stark and Glock (1968) (3.1.2).

In part 3.2, continuing from chapter 2, I will try to evaluate elite and popular religiosity in the context of Muslim sociology. I will try to show what the concepts of great and little Islam mean, and how these terms apply to the case of Islam, by drawing on the works of Ernest Gellner and Clifford Geertz (3.2.1). I shall then focus particularly on Turkish sociology of Islam by drawing on Şerif Mardin, Ahmed Karamustafa and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (3.2.2). In section 3.2.3, I will discuss some criticisms of elite and popular religiosity and come up with some suggestions. In the next section (3.2.4) I will elaborate on the study of elite and popular religiosity in Muslim philosophy of religion, thereby referring in particular to the works of Al-Ghazālī.

The remainder of the chapter (3.3) discusses the theoretical framework of this study and develops various hypotheses that will be tested in chapter 5. I will present the possible content of the components of religious commitment under five headings: the ideological dimension (3.3.1), ritualistic dimension (3.3.2), intellectual dimension (3.3.3), experiential dimension (3.3.4) and consequential dimension (3.3.5). These parts of the study provide an operational definition of elite and popular religiosity. This section proposes an understanding of elite and popular religious forms and motivations through observation of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in context.

Chapter 4 outlines the methodology for the study (4.1). The objectives, research questions and hypotheses are discussed in more detail in part 4.2. I will then continue to discuss the research design and the working methods in section 4.3. In this section I will explain how I use a mixed-methods approach. Then, I will discuss the collection of qualitative data during my research and problems I faced during field work (4.3.1). Then, in section 4.3.2, I will indicate quantitative tools for data collection; paper-based survey and web-based survey. Further on in the chapter, I will address measuring instruments that were developed through operationalization of the concepts that I used in this study of elite and popular religiosity (4.4). Reliability analyses of the scales are rendered in section 4.5. The data analysis methods are explained in section 4.6.

Chapter 5 provides findings and data analysis, testing the hypotheses developed in chapters 2 and 3. In this chapter, I first present the demographic characteristics of the sample as drawn from the 2013 Census information (5.1). Secondly, I analyse data from the general religiosity scale (5.2).

Then I turn to the other part of the empirical question posed in this chapter: what is the social location of elite and popular religiosity? (5.3) This discussion begins with the factor analysis of the elite religiosity scale and the popular religiosity scale (5.3.1). Next, I address the average means of elite and popular religiosity (5.3.2). Subsequently, I continue to determine which population characteristics (gender, age, educational level, income etc.) have a significant correlation or association with the elite and popular religiosity scales. A series of ANOVA analyses will be applied in this section (5.3.3). Next, I present some social factors influence religious education of the respondents in relation to elite and popular religiosity (5.3.4). Then I will shed light on socio-psychological attitudes that are affected by elite and popular religiosity (5.3.5). This part of the scale constitutes our consequential aspect. The consequential aspect will reveal the effects of elite and popular religiosity in peoples' day-to-day lives.

Finally, *chapter 6* consists of three parts. We start by summarizing the main hypotheses of the thesis and the empirical results (6.1). The discussion section (6.2) is divided into five parts. First, 'Reflections on Glock's Five-dimensional Scheme' (6.2.1) discusses the validity of Glock's 5-dimensional scale in light of the findings of this study. Second, 'Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity' (6.2.2) will discuss the patterns of the relationship between elite and popular religiosity. Third, 'Social-Cultural Factors Affecting Religiosity' (6.2.3) will discuss factors that may have an impact on elite and popular religiosity. Fourthly, in section 6.2.4 'Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity', we continue to examine the processes and mechanisms by which religiosity may affect the socio-psychological attitudes of general populations. Finally, section 6.2.5 'Spirituality and Religiosity' illustrates the relevance and significance of spirituality in the sociology of elite and popular religiosity. Finally, we conclude by presenting some recommendations for future research (6.3).

2. Theoretical Background

The first part of this chapter addresses the main question in this research project: What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands? Robert Redfield (1956) argued that two levels of culture run through complex civilizations, the “great tradition of the reflective few” and the “little tradition of the unreflective many” (pp. 41-42). Elite and popular religiosity gain their place in society and its culture. In order to understand elite and popular religiosity, therefore, we first need to explore the meaning of great and little cultures, due to the close relationship between culture and religion (Clark, 2012).

2.1. *Culture and the Concept of Elite and Popular*

Many sociologists have abandoned the assumption that a single dominant culture holds society together. They assume that societies are naturally diverse and ask instead how some groups can establish their own customs and values as normal, so that those of others are viewed as subcultural deviations from the norm (Akdoğan, 2012; Keskin, 2012; Weber, 1946).

An influential model for the study of world religions was proposed by Robert Redfield. Through a series of articles written in the early 1950s and most fully in his final short book *Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Civilization* (1956), he argued that two levels of culture run through complex civilizations, the "great tradition of the reflective few" and the "little tradition of the unreflective many" (Redfield, 1956, pp. 41-42).

The great tradition, the 'orthodox' form of the cultural/religious centre, belongs to the urban elite. It is the religion of the reflective few, refined in schools and temples, and is "consciously cultivated and handed down" (Redfield, 1956, p. 70). Great traditions have also been named 'orthodoxy', 'textual traditions,' 'high traditions,' 'philosophical religions', and 'universal traditions' (Lukens-Bull, 1999, p. 4). The little tradition is the 'heterodox' form of the cultural/religious periphery. It integrates many elements of the local tradition and practice. It is the religion as it is practiced in daily life by ordinary people (in Redfield's assessment, the largely unreflective majority; 1956, pp. 41-42). The little tradition is taken for granted and is not subject to a great deal of scrutiny, refinement, or improvement (Redfield, 1956, p. 70). Little traditions are also designated by the terms 'local tradition,' 'low tradition', and 'popular religion' (Lukens-Bull, 1999, p. 4).

The great vs. little tradition dichotomy emerged in response to the challenge of understanding the social organization of tradition. Richard Antoun stated that "the social organization of tradition" is an essential process in all complex societies. It is the process by which different religious hierarchies are created between the common people and the elite, through cultural brokers who act as mediators between ordinary people and the elite (Antoun, 1989, p. 31). These hierarchies shape the form that religious practices take by imposing communicative constraints (Hefner, 1987, p. 74). In addition, it is essential to know the specific relations between adherents of great and

little traditions in each local setting. Redfield agrees that although anthropology may be largely concerned with local religious practice, it cannot disregard the interrelationship between these two aspects of tradition (1956, pp. 86-98).

Although there is some criticism on Redfield's two-dimensional conceptualization of culture[6], it cannot be underestimated as an operational tool to understand the notion of culture. His ideas have exerted influence on academics and public intellectuals for a long time. After Redfield, analogous conceptualizations have been used to define dual traditions running through any of the major civilizations, such as: 'high culture' and 'popular culture' (Gans, 1975), 'highbrow culture' and 'lowbrow culture' (Levine, 1988), 'high culture' and 'low culture' (Brottman, 2005).

Cultural and Religious Diversity in Islam

Medieval Islamic thinkers have referred to the distinction between high culture and popular culture in their writings. Bīrūnī (d. 1048), who is regarded as one of the greatest scholars of the medieval Islamic era, commented on the social differentiation of society. His study of Indian culture, which can serve as Bīrūnī's contribution to the study of religion, reached its climax in his major work *Tahqīq mā li'l-Hind min maqūla fī'l-'aql aw mardhūla* (1958), known in the West as *Alberuni's India: An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature Geography, Chronology, Astronomy, Customs, Laws and Astrology of India* (Sachau 1910). First of all, although Bīrūnī recognized that the Indian civilization was different from ancient Greek civilization, he thought that they were similar and even that they had been in agreement in the distant past. He believed that there existed a basic "original unity of higher civilization" (Rosenthal, 1976, p. 12) between them, and he opened the eyes of educated Muslims to Indian and Greek science and philosophy, so that both could be integrated into a single intellectual worldview. Bīrūnī held that both in India and in Greece there had been - and still were - philosophers who, through their power of thought, had arrived at the idea of one God, corresponding with the message that had been revealed to the prophets. This kind of universal religious thought developed by Indian and Greek philosophers was only the possession of a literate elite, the *khawāṣṣ*, anywhere. In contrast to this, the illiterate

[6]See especially Lukens-Bull, 1999.

masses, the *ʿawāmm*, both within and outside Islam, tend to give way to the innate human disposition towards idolatry (Lawrence, 1976, pp. 24-47; Watt, 2003).

It is interesting to relate the results of the more empirical approach of Bīrūnī with the view on Indian religions given a hundred years later by the theologian al-Shahrastānī. Al-Shahrastānī discusses Hinduism in his *Kitāb al-milal wa'l-niḥal* ("Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects") in the chapter on the *Ārā' al-Hind* (the Views of the Indians). In the six sections constant attention is paid to the *Sabians*, the *Barāhima*, the three groups of the *ashāb al-ruhāniyyāt* (Those in favour of spiritual beings), the *'abadat al-kawākib* (star-worshippers), the *'abadat al-asnām* (idol-worshippers), and finally the Indian philosophers (Al-Shahrastānī, 1846). While Bīrūnī divides the Hindus into the literate elite and the illiterate masses, Shahrastānī marks them according to degrees of religious worship.

The most influential exposition of the division between elite and popular can be found in the writings of Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), one of the famous Muslim philosophers who dealt with this issue in his books. He states that society is divided into a thinking and ruling elite, and the masses, whose affairs are entirely in the hands of the elite. Religious and doctrinal questions are left to the scholars, and worldly things and matters of state fall under the authority of the rulers. Ordinary people have no choice but to obey ([1945], 2005, p.24). Al-Ghazālī confined and restricted the scope of several of his books in order to reserve them for the elite (here, 'elite' refers to the philosophical and theological elites which we will later identify) and to withhold them from the masses. For example, he openly declared that books like *al-Maḍnūn bihi ʿalā ghairi ahlihi* ("The Book to Be Withheld from Those for Whom It Is Not Written") ([1891], 2005a) and *al-maḍnūn al-ṣaghīr* ("To Be Withheld") ([1891], 1996) were strictly meant for the elite only, and in his other important book entitled *Iljām al ʿawāmm ʿan ʿilm al-kalām* ("Restraining the Ordinary People from the Science of Kalām") ([1891], 1987) he warned against indulgence in the doctrinal absurdities of the common people.

The Arab historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406) is well known for his in-depth discussions of different forms of Islam, in which he refers to the social role of religion in a way that seems to foreshadow Durkheim. Ibn Khaldūn makes a distinction between Bedouin and sedentary civilizations and describes their living conditions in the second chapter of his work *Muqaddimah* ("Introduction"). His theory

of history is based on the interaction of these two opposing and complementary forces. The culture of a 'sedentary' society is peculiar to the existence of the monarchic State, which enforces its authority on a large unarmed population, collects taxes and inspires the rise of arts, thought, education and so on. Contrary to "sedentary" society, 'Bedouin' society is not familiar with the accumulation of population and wealth from which the 'sedentary' society's progress stems. (1967, pp. 92-103).

2.1.1. *Elite and Popular Culture: Differentiations*

There are two central approaches to the category of 'popular': structuralism and culturalism. Structuralism and culturalism are two distinctive theories within the discourse on popular culture that serve to theorize the complexities of popular culture's relationship with society (Storey, 2009). Structuralism[7], a concept formulated at the Frankfurt School, views popular culture as a site where veiled hegemonic ideologies are imposed from above by the multinational corporations bred by capitalism. The theory is best exemplified via a top-down model. Structuralism considers 'popular' to be identical with vulgar: popular would be the misrepresentation or distortion of an original form, a second-class product to be consumed by the masses. According to this approach, 'popular' refers to things that are admired and consumed by ordinary people (Storey, 2009, pp. 111-133).

Culturalism[8], on the other hand, rejects the consensus that popular culture is imposed from above and views it as an authentic expression of mass society. Social structures, in this view, are shaped by human agency and the collective power of 'bottom-up' movements should not be underestimated (Storey, 2009, pp. 37-58). Culturalism understands 'popular' as a natural form specific to the subordinate groups

[7] Structuralism is a method of approaching culture via a top-down mode. Its principal proponents are Ferdinand de Saussure in linguistics, Louis Althusser in Marxist theory, Michel Foucault in philosophy and history, Roland Barthes in literary and cultural studies, Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, Jacques Lacan in psychoanalysis and Pierre Macherey in literary theory.

[8] Culturalism is a way of approaching culture via a bottom-up mode. Its principal proponents are Giovanni Battista Vico in political philosophy and rhetoric, Gottfried Herder in philosophy, Richard Hoggart in sociology and literature, Raymond Williams in cultural studies, E.P. Thompson in social history, Stuart Hall in cultural studies and sociology, and Paddy Whannel in social studies and mass media in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

or classes, and therefore capable of authenticating their cultural production (Gans, 1975; Oliveira, 1994, p. 514). Culturalists claim that social meaning can be achieved on any level, especially on the lower levels of the social structure, such as the levels of the 'masses', illiterate people or ordinary people. These scholars were often uncritically romantic in their celebration of popular culture as an expression of the authentic interests and values of subordinate social groups and classes. The philosophical justification of this perspective in Western literature can be found in the writings of Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). They distinguished the notions of the "*populari*" or the "*Volk*" as the basis for an alternate and new meaning of humanism, apart from the rationalizing and civilizing processes set in motion by the European Enlightenment (Long, 1987, p. 7325). The philosophical justification for this orientation can be found in the writings of Köprülü and Gökalp in the tradition of Turkish Sociology, who proposed that it is the ordinary people (*halk*) who are the carriers of culture (Berkes, 1959, p. 30). In the following section, we will discuss these conceptions in Turkish sociology.

Although both approaches broaden the discourse on popular culture and offer very interesting perspectives, the more reasonable model, according to us, lies somewhere between the two. Storey (2003, p. 51) suggests that the work of Antonio Gramsci is instrumental in conceiving popular culture as an arena of struggle and negotiation between the interests of dominant groups and the interests of subordinate groups. As will be indicated in section 2.1.3, the Gramsci model offers the continuity of the dominant social framework, but operates through consent rather than coercion in a negotiation process between those who hold power and those who do not (Miller et al., 1998).

2.1.2. *Elite and Popular Culture in Turkish sociology*

The differentiation between elite and popular is also seen in Turkish sociology at the beginning of 20th century. M. Ziya Gökalp's sociology is predominantly based upon this distinction. Gökalp was a highly influential thinker, strongly influenced by both the French Durkheimian sociological tradition (focused on the organization and social coherence of society) and the German sociological tradition of Ferdinand Tönnies, which insisted on a difference between culture and civilization (Alexander & Smith, 2005; Parla, 1985). According to Türkdoğan, Gökalp pioneered the concept of the

'folk' in Turkish sociology: culture, for him, was created by the common folk. He distinguished this culture, so defined, from another concept, which he called *Tehzib*, meaning 'civilized' culture. This would be the cultural production by an elite (Gökalp, 1976a, 1976b, 1981, Türkdoğan, 1998, 2005).

In order to conceptualize his ideas, Gökalp primarily used the notions of culture (*hars*) and civilization (*medeniyet)* (Gökalp, 2013). He saw modernization as a basic factor for progress. However, he argued that modernization only meant that the Turks adopted the material aspects of Western European civilization, while the cultural essence of the Turks, which according to him is the dominance of *hars*, should be upheld (Berkes, 1959, p. 159). For Western European civilization to take root, he claimed, the Turks needed to establish harmony between *medeniyet* and *hars* (civilization and culture). For Gökalp, Western European material civilization and real Turkish culture were highly compatible and, if combined, could sustain progress without undermining the true Turkish ethos. Progress therefore required social and cultural transformation to revitalize the Turkish ethos, in order for civilization to take root (Davison, 1995; Kılıç, 2008).

With his search for culture in the literature of 'popular' Islam, Mehmed Fuat Köprülü followed Gökalp's lead and proposed that it is the (ordinary) people (*halk*) who are the carriers of culture. According to him, the roots of the Turkish spirit lay not in the Islamic institutions of the elite, but could be found in myth and folklore; these were the areas that had to be explored and uncovered in order for the Turks to be able to develop their Turkish cultural and religious identity further, a prerequisite for their involvement in Western civilization (Berkes, 1959, p. 30; Dressler, 2016, p. 26).

In his first footnote to the volume *Early Mystics*, Köprülü explained that he would use the Turkish term *halk* (the [ordinary] people) as corresponding to the French "*populaire*." The term would, as he emphasized, not indicate a reduction of any sort and should not be seen as referring to a particular social class (2006, p. 1).[9] Köprülü provided much historical evidence for the antagonism between elite culture and "orthodox" religion on the one hand, and rural culture related to "heterodoxy" and

[9] Nevertheless, Köprülü was criticized for not always applying the term in such allegedly objective, value-free ways, especially when he compared matters of religious orientation, social location, and political interests. We will refer to this critique in the following section (section 3.2.3).

"syncretism" on the other. In a later article on the Anatolian *aşık* tradition, he discussed the role of the Sufi orders in the foundation and development of *aşık*. Over time, the Sufi orders adapted to the social environments in which they lived. Some of these orders, in accordance with the religious policies of the government, exhibited an "orthodox" character in urban contexts, "appropriate to Sunni dogma," but in another context, for example a tribal environment, they appeared "totally heterodox, that is, removed from Islamic doctrine" (Köprülü, 1966, p. 184).

The structural link that Köprülü posits between the socioeconomic context, culture and religious preference can be associated with Ibn Khaldūn's *Muqaddima*, which Köprülü celebrated as a "philosophy of history" and "blueprint of sociology."[10] For Ibn Khaldūn, *'aṣabiyya* (group solidarity) is a source of strength and renewal, and - although not entirely absent from the town - at its strongest among the Bedouins. He also considers the Bedouins to be generally more virtuous than the city dwellers, who follow the law instead of their instinct and got spoiled as a result of their luxurious lifestyle (Khaldun, 1967, p. 122). Likewise, for Köprülü, who kept an eye on Ziya Gökalp in this matter, Turkish culture was found in its finest, pure ways among the peripheral Turkmen tribes of Anatolia (Dressler, 2013, p. 201).

On the other hand, however, Köprülü's explanation of the relationship between urban and rural life departed considerably from that of Ibn Khaldūn. In Ibn Khaldūn's text, the dichotomy of urban and rural culture was part of a larger, cyclical conception of Islamic civilization (Dressler, 2013, p. 202). In Köprülü's work, the connection between the centre and the periphery seems more static and the differences are presented as clear-cut distinctions. The other difference is the way they evaluate the relationship between centre and periphery with respect to religiosity. Although there is no fundamental value difference between urban and rural forms of socioeconomic organization and culture in Ibn Khaldūn's text, he emphasized that rural people tend to be more religious due to the hardships of life (Baali, 1988, p. 98). Ibn Khaldūn produced extensive discussions on various forms of Islam and specified the social role of religion in a way that seems to foreshadow Durkheim. What he did not do, according to Dressler (2013), is correlate inner-Islamic differences - for example between jurists

[10] Köprülü respectfully defined Ibn Khaldun as the apex of Islamic historiography and as one of the greatest philosophers of history of the classic and medieval periods (Köprülü, 1980, p. 93-94).

and muftis [persons who give a *fatwā* (opinion on a point of law), or is engaged in that profession] on the one hand, and the Sufis on the other - with distinction according to lifestyle (urban/rural). In Köprülü's work, on the other hand, the influence of Orientalist and Islamic revivalist thought can be seen, which made him portray the cultural periphery with reference to religion as impure and inferior (expressed through concepts such as "popular", "syncretic" and "heterodox" Islam) compared to the scripture- and law-based Islamic culture connected with urban contexts.[11] In conclusion, Köprülü can be seen as an initial representative of the (Khaldūnian) idea of the opposed but complementary character of urban and rural Islamic cultures in connection with the Orientalist division between 'official' / 'orthodox' / 'high' and 'unofficial' / 'heterodox' / 'popular' Islam (Dressler, 2013, p. 202).

2.1.3. *Complementarity of Elite and Popular Religiosity*

These discussions should suffice to indicate that both in Western and in Turkish thought, the concepts of 'elite' and 'popular' have been commonly applied. I have focused on two general approaches so far. On the one hand, those who support the structuralist approach juxtapose high culture with popular culture as having distinct differences that clearly stand out between the two. Most of them view popular culture as outdated and old-fashioned. According to this elitist view, educated people have superior cultural values. In this case, popular culture is disparaged as being of inferior taste and quality, and expressing the less desirable values of the uneducated majority. This definition of popular culture may be regarded as too narrow, because it excludes those members of the elite for whom popular culture is more or less experienced as a second culture. It may also be regarded as too broad; speaking of 'popular culture' as if it constitutes a uniform category. This way of defining suggests that popular culture is relatively homogeneous (Burke, 2009). It is observable that any layperson of any social status can potentially be either elite or non-elite, depending on the circumstances. Moreover, a person who is 'popular' in some contexts may be 'elite'

[11] Sharp changes can be seen in Köprülü's thoughts on this issue. Although in his earlier writings he argued that true literature should not take the vulgar tastes of the masses into consideration (Park, 1975, p. 364), after 1913, he changed his position and began to criticize elitist perspectives and to see the common people as the soul of a culture (Dressler, 2016).

in others. Worst, in this respect, is that this view defines 'the popular' only in a negative way.

On the other hand, by protesting against the increasing authority of high culture, supporters of the second approach, culturalism, see popular culture as an authentic culture, which can stand on its own feet. However, this view results in an equally essentialist view of culture: it interprets popular culture as the embodiment of a particular class (Bennett, 2006, p. 93).

What structuralism and culturalism have in common, is thus that they pretend that the cultural sphere is divided into two hermetically separate regions, each with its own, different logic. While this was clearly unsatisfactory, it was equally clear that the two traditions could not be forced into a shotgun marriage either. As Bennet concluded, "the only way out of this impasse seemed to be to shift the debate on to a new terrain, which would displace the structuralism - culturalism opposition, a project which inclined many working in the field at the time to draw increasingly on the writings of Antonio Gramsci" (Bennett, 2006, p. 94).

In his famous essay *Osservazioni sul Folclore* ("Observations on Folklore", Gramsci 1950, p. 215), Antonio Gramsci brought these approaches together by saying that "[t]he people is not a culturally homogeneous unit, but it is culturally stratified in a complex way" (trans. Burke, 2009, p. 29). Gramsci's conception of folklore corresponds in many respects to the more expansive category of popular culture (1971, 1991). He notes that while most intellectuals view folklore as 'picturesque' and old-fashioned, his own conception treats it as a living "conception of the world and life" which stands in implicit opposition to 'official' conceptions of the world. Gramsci's purpose is not simply to endorse folklore, for he acknowledges that much of the culture of subordinate people is conservative and fatalistic. Instead, he proposes that such 'fossilized' conceptions could be disaggregated from those "which are in the process of developing and which are in contradiction to or simply different from the morality of the governing strata" (Bennett, 2006). According to Gramsci, only by doing this could peasants and intellectuals be organized into part of a coalition in which communication could take place (Jones, 2006). Without this, Italy would, according to Gramsci, maintain a "great social disintegration", in which the intellectuals regard the peasants as bestial, cultureless 'machines to be bled dry', and the peasants,

overwhelmed by fear, believe that learning is a trick unique to the intellectuals (Jones, 2006, p. 37).

Based on a Gramscian approach, our construction of an elite and popular culture therefore necessitates a linked operation. This means that we can only approach the cultures of the elite in processes of comparison and synthesis with the cultures of the masses and *vice versa*. This makes it crucially important that we abandon any assumptions about the superiority of high culture and the primitivism of the masses. A cultural project, Gramsci wrote, cannot be some avant-garde movement imposed upon people. In line with Gökalp and Köprülü, Gramsci stated that a cultural project had to be rooted in the "humus of popular culture as it is, with its tastes and tendencies and with its moral and intellectual world, even if it is backward and conventional" (Bennett, 2006, p. 37; Crehan, 2009, p. 37).

These discussions on elite and popular culture form the basis for discussions on elite and popular religiosity. We think that this theoretical exploration will be helpful in exploring the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity and its socioeconomic and socio-cultural location. After this introduction to elite and popular culture, this study will therefore continue to shed light on the notion of elite and popular religion and its acquired meanings and content in the social scientific study of religion.

2.2. *Religion and the Concepts of Elite and Popular*

Here, I will shed light on Weber's status stratification and religious market theories to explain elite and popular religiosity from a sociological perspective. Following this, this study tries to understand the earlier usage and the meaning given to the terms elite and popular religiosity in different disciplines. In the next step, I will come up with preliminary definitions, which will be reviewed after the results of the statistical analysis of the hypothesis for this context have been discussed.

2.2.1. *Religion and Social Stratification: Weber*

In his inspiring studies on religion, Max Weber regularly referred to something called "popular religion".[12] In the context of social stratification, he evaluates religiosity in

[12] The terms Weber uses, *Volksreligiosität, Massenreligion,* and *Massenglauben,* are generally rendered in English as "popular religion".

two categories. He conceptualizes this distinction as "status stratification". Using the musical metaphor of the 'virtuoso', he distinguishes between the different qualifications of believers. According to Weber, human beings vary in their religious capacities and in the special personal attributes needed to achieve the highest religious goals. He introduces the term 'unmusical' in "*The Social Psychology of the World Religions*", stating that 'heroic' or 'virtuoso' religiosity stands in opposition to 'mass' religiosity (1946, p. 287).

In his writings on the sociology of religion, Weber's standard approach is to show how the substance of belief is closely associated with the class culture of believers. Peasantry, proletariat, aristocracy and bourgeoisie have different material interests and life experiences, and will therefore respond to different kinds of religious messages (Parkin, 1982, p. 52). Redfield's theory (1956) can be considered to be parallel to Weber's (1946). Weber's 'virtuoso' religiosity corresponds with the religion of the members of the 'great tradition' as portrayed by Redfield, while Weber's 'mass' religiosity points to Redfield's portrayal of the 'little' tradition in religion. In that sense, it can be argued that, with the popularization of cultural-religious elements of the great tradition, popular religiosity is the non-derivative 'mass' religiosity of the members of the little tradition.

Up to here it can be seen that there are two definitions of popular religion that contradict each other to a certain extent. 'Popular religion' *by reference to the non-privileged social or economic attributes of a group* and 'popular religion' *through its religious practice and beliefs.*

What, then, were Max Weber's criteria for defining popular religion?

In an important article, Jacques Berlinerblau suggested to accommodate the differences between these two definitions by identifying two main approaches to popular religion, based on a Weberian conception. These are (1) *the economic and social approach* and (2) *the praxis approach*.

In the economic and social approach[13], popular religion refers to the religious tendencies of strata not "characterized by a high degree of social and economic

[13] The starting point for understanding the first approach is based on Weber's section "Religion of Non-Privileged Strata" in *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.* This section contains a wealth of theoretical observations on the religious tendencies of strata not

privilege". Among the groups discussed by Weber are slaves, free day labourers, women, peasants, artisans, small traders, the proletariat, the lower middle class, and the middle class. On this basis, it could be deduced that Weber, when he spoke of 'popular religion', proposed a type of religiosity associated with a given society's economically or socially non-privileged groups, which constitute its majority (Berlinerblau, 2001).

Nevertheless, closer examination of Weber's writings on this subject shows that social and economic factors, while important, are not of primary significance when defining popular religion. In the praxis approach[14], popular religion is not defined by reference to a group's non-privileged social or economic status, but by referring to religious practice and beliefs.

Two approaches to the question 'What is popular religion?' may be identified in Weber's writings:

- 'Popular religion' is that religion, regardless of its contents, practiced by groups among the masses characterized by a non-privileged social and economic status.
- 'Popular religion' is constituted by specific types of practices and beliefs (e.g., magic, an antirational orientation, a close bond with nature, a 'this-worldly' religious attitude, increased preoccupation with salvation and saviour figures) fostered by a particular group.

"characterized by a high degree of social and economic privilege" (Weber 1978, p. 481). In the same chapter, we find references to "popular religion" (1978, pp. 488-92), "mass religion" (1978, p. 492) and "masses" (1978, pp. 487-88). Thus, it could be deduced that Weber, when he spoke of "popular religion", proposed a type of religiosity associated with the economically or socially non-privileged groups of a given society, which constitute its majority.

[14] In a different passage, however, Weber explicitly defines mass religiosity as associated with those who are "religiously unmusical" and not with "those who occupy an inferior position in the secular status order" (1958, p. 287). This use of the term contradicts many references to the religion of the masses cited above in *Economy and Society.* In one case, Weber seems to explicitly associate *Massenglauben* (mass religion) with underprivileged classes (1978, p. 492; 1978, p. 282). In other cases (cited above), practitioners of mass religion appear to engage in many of the behaviours associated with groups with a low position in the secular status order (e g., magic, inclination towards salvation religion, cults of saints and heroes). For Weber's definition of popular religious beliefs and practices, see section 2.2.3. of this study, "Some Characteristics of Elite and Popular Religiosity".

On the basis of this double and seemingly irreconcilable interpretation, Berlinerblau has built another, more reasonable, conceptualization. This will be referred to as the 'synthesis approach' and is the approach used in this study. It holds that:

"'Popular religion' is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief exercised by *generally* socially and economically non-privileged strata" (2001, p. 613, *emphasis added*).

From this point of view, the definition of elite religion takes shape as follows: 'Elite religion' is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief exercised by strata that are generally socially and economically privileged. Thus, certain objective positions within the social field generally 'go hand in hand with' certain forms of religiosity.

This assumption suggests that persons with a non-privileged social and economic status may experience elite forms of religious practice to a certain extent, while persons with a privileged social and economic status may, in turn, experience popular forms of religious practice to a certain extent. Although social and economic factors are important, they are thus not of primary significance in defining elite and popular religiosity.

In order to clarify Weber's approach of elite and popular religiosity, it is now appropriate to take a look at religious market theory.

2.2.2. *Religion and Religious Market*

Another approach that can sociologically explain cultural differences has its roots in the study of the relations between "cultural production and markets". We can better understand cultural differences by looking at the nature of these relations. Its strongest advocates, such as Rodney Stark, argue that it represents a new paradigm in the sociology of religion (Stark & McCann, 1993). It emphasises the power of the market and of competition between religious producers (Dobbelaere, 2004; Kisala, 2004; Voyé, 2004; Warner, 1993).

The main characteristics of religion in modern society, especially in the West, are individualism and the decline of the authority of traditional institutions. Modernity appears to be generally compatible with the increase of deinstitutionalised, commercialised religion (Turner, 2011). In a differentiated global religious market,

these segments of the religious market compete with each other and overlap. Under competitive conditions, the producers of religious services are forced to face the particular challenge of retaining their members and attracting new members, while at the same time responding to the needs of their clientele and offering efficient services (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; Pickel & Sammet, 2012).

The 'religious market' approach is based on rational choice theory assumptions. Rational choice theory emerged as a major item on the agenda of many social scientists in the 1990s and its proponents have formed a section within the American Sociological Association. The impact of rational choice theory on the social scientific study of religion has been enormous in the past decades (Young, 1997). According to this theory, the individual's demand for religious goods is constant. Supporters of the market approach, particularly scholars in religious studies, suggest that the conditions of the modern age do not unavoidably cause religion to weaken but may even foster it. Religious vitality seen in modern times could be the result of competition between religious producers (Roger Finke & Stark, 1988; Iannaccone, 1991; Iannaccone, Finke, & Stark, 1997).

Stark and Bainbridge (1985, 1989) describe religious goods as supernatural, general and non-verifiable compensators. By the term "compensator" Stark and Bainbridge (1985, p. 6) mean "the belief that a reward will be obtained in the distant future or in some other context which cannot be immediately verified". Rewards are "anything humans will incur costs to obtain" (1989, p. 27). Since human beings often strive for rewards they cannot directly have, they regularly settle for a substitute, a compensator. Compensators may be secular or based on supernatural expectations. The supernaturally-based compensators can be "magic" or "religion". Examples of magical compensators are promises such as getting a good grade at school, or being cured of cancer, or winning back an unfaithful lover. Examples of religious compensators are a revelation of the meaning of existence, an afterlife, illumination or the coming of the saviour at some unspecified time (1985, pp. 7-30). It is interesting to note that compensators are the core element of Stark and Bainbridge's definition of religions: religions are "systems of general compensators based on supernatural assumptions" (1989, p. 81). Religious communities can then be seen as organizations that produce two things: on the one hand, supernaturally-based compensators, and on the other, "secular" goods (rewards) such as friendship, social ties or social identities that may

be produced by any kind of social group. In a revised version of his theory, Stark drops the term “compensator”, and talks instead about “otherworldly rewards”, which are “those that will be obtained only in a non-empirical (usually posthumous) context” (Stark, 1999, p. 268). We see that Stark and Bainbridge focus on the ultimate goals that religions often propose. In his writings, Max Weber describes the same phenomenon - the “religious market” - as “salvation goals”.

Max Weber is the most important classic author for the concept of “religious goods”. The term “salvation good” is a central one in Weber’s works such as in *Economy and Society* ([1920], 1978) and *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion* ([1920b], 1988). Weber also uses the terms “salvation goals”, “salvation means” and “promises of the religions” instead of the term “salvation goods” (Stolz, 2006).

Jörg Stolz (2006) mentions four aspects of Weber’s conception of salvation goods. (1) Salvation goods are either *goals* or *means*. Weber states that religions generate salvation goals that may be reached through certain “salvation means”. Individuals can use salvation means in a rational way in order to reach future salvation goals, thus allowing for a sociological explanation. (2) Salvation goods should not be thought of as isolated objects. Rather, they suggest *a specific worldview and specific life practices of the respective religion*. With regard to the worldview, the religious symbol system determines from which sad circumstances the group is to be saved and what the state of salvation looks like. (3) Salvation goods *satisfy different psychological and social needs*. According to Max Weber, psychological needs can be either compensatory, legitimating or intellectual. The deprivation, misfortune and suffering that is felt, cause the individual to search for compensation... These psychological needs vary depending on the historical situation and the social class in which the individual finds himself. This is why distinctive social classes tend to accept and produce different kinds of religiosity. (4) Salvation goods can be this-worldly or other-worldly. Weber states that many of the salvation goods of the different religions were not, and are not, other-worldly (such as an afterlife in paradise), but this-worldly. They can be formulated positively, as the achieving of good health, long life, happiness, riches; or they can be formulated negatively as the liberation from illness and death, unhappiness, poverty, defeat in war, slavery, etc. (pp. 18-20).

By addressing these aspects of religious goods as described by Stolz (2006), I have attempted to show how Weberian and rational choice concepts of religious goods and religious markets can be integrated into a larger theoretical framework. This structure enables us to understand possible religious forms and motivations of elite and popular religious actions. In this study, we prefer to use the concept of "motivations" rather than that of "*religious goods"* to address different characteristics of religious action and to analyse elite and popular forms of religiosity. This approach is compatible with Weber's definition of a motivation as "a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question". (Weber 1966, p. 98). Thus, by treating motivations in the way Weber advocates, we should be able to come to an explanation of the actual course of behaviour, although we do not reduce motivation to merely an actor's reasons for acting, but also take the institutional, cultural and psychological aspects into account. Religious elites, according to Weber, are mostly motivated by *other-worldly* religious goods, while those who experience popular religiosity are motivated by *this-worldly* religious goods. In section 2.2.3, I will discuss how the elements of religious orientation, namely motivation, cognitive style, and content correspond to both elite and popular religiosity, drawing on the works of Weber and other religious studies scholars.

2.2.3. *Some Characteristics of Elite and Popular Religiosity*

In this section, the present study tries to understand different meanings and characteristics assigned to the terms of elite and popular religiosity in the context of different disciplines. However, our operational definition will be particularly elaborated in chapter 3.

Above we have addressed different *religious goods* that lie behind religious action according to Weber's writings. Here we will continue to shed light on these different *religious goods* by focusing on the opinions of various scholars of religion that relate to elite and popular religiosity. From now on, in order to be consistent in the use of the concept, we prefer to use the terms 'forms', 'motivations' or 'characteristics' to indicate the various *religious goods* that lie behind religious action.

The reader may have noticed that in social scientific and historical research there is little to no consensus on what 'popular religion' actually means. Terms such as 'common religion' (Towler, 1974, p. 148), 'folk religion' (Mensching, 1964, p. 254),

‘non-official religion’ (Waardenburg & Vrijhof, 1979), ‘extra-ecclesiastical religion’ (Williams, 1989, p. 5), ‘local religion’ (Maltby & Christian, 1982), and ‘popular faith’ (Brandes, 1990, p. 186), among others, have served to recast, refine, and, in some cases, outright reject the traditional typology of ‘popular religion’. Accordingly, the last quarter century of work in this area has seen an explosive increase in definitional activity, as well as a vigorous process of producing conceptual clarity.

Generally, in the scientific study of religion, the term ‘popular religion’ is used to refer to the collection of common beliefs and rites and sacred products among humans. Critical investigations of the meaning of popular culture and religion from the disciplinary orientations of the anthropology and history of religion, and the sociology of knowledge, revealed a wide variety of forms of popular religion. Long places these varied forms of popular religion in seven categories (1987, pp. 7324–7333). Of these seven definitions of popular religion, three are of great relevance to our research because of their common characteristics. These are:

1. Popular religion as the religion of the laity in a religious community in contrast to the religion of the clergy or other specialists.
2. Popular religion as the pervasive beliefs, rituals, and values of a society.
3. Popular religion as the religion of the masses in opposition to the religion of the sophisticated, discriminating and scholarly within a society.[15]

Knoblauch defines popular religion as the religious life of ordinary people who know and practice it as it is communicated and performed on a family, village, or popular level (Knoblauch, 2011). In traditional societies, folk religion is generally associated with peasant communities (Bowker, 2003), but in the modern world many of its characteristics can be found among the working class and other ordinary people

[15] The other four definitions are as follows: 4. Popular religion as identical with the organic (usually rural and peasant) form of a society. The religious and moral orders are also identical; in this sense popular religion is closely related to the meanings of primitive and folk religion. 5. Popular religion as an amalgam of esoteric beliefs and practices differing from the common or civil religion, but usually located in the lower strata of a society. 6. Popular religion as the religion of a subclass or minority group in a culture. 7. Popular religion as the creation of an ideology of religion by the elite levels of a society (Long, 1987, pp. 7324-7333).

in urban societies. In this social context it is often called popular religion (Ellwood, 2007, p. 153).

In *the Encyclopaedia of World Religions*, Ellwood describes popular religion on the basis of two fundamental characteristics. First, it is primarily 'cosmic' rather than historical in perspective, and second, it is mainly passed on orally, through the words and examples of family, community members, and spiritual leaders at the local level, whether they be imams, shamans, evangelists, priests, or others. Cosmic orientation means that those who experience popular religiosity generally have little sense of history outside of living memory, except if it is encoded in myth. A significant point of attention is how religion fits into seasonal cycles and local geography. If the practitioners of the religion are farmers, festivals of planting and harvest are important. Oral transmission means that popular religion is learned primarily through face to face encounters, from the words of people one knows locally, rather than through intense study or by learning about the way religion is known from literary sources or among elites (2007, p.154).

Weber deals with popular religion by placing it in a double category as stated above: popular religion "*by reference to the non-privileged social or economic attributes of a group"* and popular religion "*through its religious practice and beliefs"*. Berlinerblau divided Weber's definition of popular religious beliefs and practices into five categories (2001, pp. 611-612).

1. Engaging in all sorts of 'magical' practices (1958, pp. 277, 287, 288; 1968, pp. 201, 210; 1978, pp. 448, 466, 477, 482, 488, 506, 575, 609).
2. Eschewing any tendency to rationalize, putting a heavy emphasis on tradition and generally being incapable of producing rational worldviews (1978, pp. 467, 469, 512, 629).
3. Strongly motivated by the forces of nature (1958, p. 287; 1968, pp. 173, 174; 1978, pp. 401, 468, 471, 482).
4. A this-worldly orientation and interpretation of religion - illustrated by a *do ut des*[16] (1978, pp. 422, 424) or a "coercive" (1978, p. 422) and

[16] *Do ut des* refers to an ancient Latin formula used when sacrifices were made to the gods in the hope of fruitfulness and security (see Trompf, 2016).

"calculating attitude" (1978, p. 492) towards the gods, and a desire for "tangible instruments of grace" (1978, p. 559).

5. Great deal of interest in the question of salvation and heroic saviour figures (1958, p. 272; 1968, pp. 173, 201; 1978, pp. 459, 487, 488, 506, 571).

Oliviera (1994) defines popular religion through three characteristics. According to him, "popular religion" implies:

1. *Socialization of sacred "goods"* - since they are produced for self-consumption, the popular forms of religion are more accessible to the dominated classes who cannot afford their own specialists.
2. *Absence of doctrinal and theological systematization* - which is an activity of specialists - of religious beliefs and practices, which are implicitly articulated. Popular religion thus exhibits stereotyped behaviour, formalism, conventionalism and ritualism.
3. *Absence of the institutional legitimacy that only official specialists can provide* - as a product for self-consumption, popular religious forms can only claim legitimacy from tradition.

The 'popular' category, according to Oliviera, embodies different meanings. Considered from the social perspective, it opposes what belongs to the 'dominant' classes; from a cultural point of view, it is the opposite of 'erudite'; from a political point of view, it opposes 'official'(1994, p 514).

Popular religion has similarly been defined as exhibiting stereotyped behaviour, formalism, conventionalism and ritualism (La Bon, 1896, pp. 63-70; Sezen, 2004), and as keeping a distance from profound doctrinal and theological systematization (Günay, 2002; Mensching, 1976). In this context of popular religiosity, religion represents a set of resources for the achievement of particular objectives related to health, wealth and happiness. Here popular culture appears as a *bricoleur* culture (Zubaida, 1993, p. 145). What is important for the believer at any given moment is to construct remedies out of various elements that suit the task at hand. This highlights the pragmatic aspects of popular religion. Practitioners like to keep their options open. In other words, they do

not practice a religion on a daily basis but keep religious conceptions ready in case of need. Popular religion is mostly fragmentary and *ad hoc*, and is on permanent standby for any occasion when ontological security comes under threat (Ter Borg, 2004, 2008)

As seen above, the category 'popular' embodies different meanings. By means of this chapter, our study tried to emphasize these acquired meanings and characteristics of popular religiosity in the study of religion. After this brief introduction to popular religiosity, the following chapter will focus on elite and popular religiosity in Islam. The detailed comparison between elite and popular religiosity with respect to Islam is left to the subsequent chapters.

2.2.4. *Religious Elites and Masses*

Two general definitions of 'elite' have been proposed by sociologists. The first identifies an elite as a group composed of people recognized as having reached the highest level in a particular branch of activity. The second definition describes an elite as a group consisting of those who occupy the highest position in a social organization equipped with an internal authority structure (Bottomore, 1964, pp. 1-3; Giddens, 1973, pp. 119-20). When applied in the field of religions, a distinction can be made between those who are recognized as embodying the highest values of the religion and those who hold the highest positions of formal authority in religious organizations or institutions (Sharot, 2001, p. 11).

In this study, however, the term 'elite religiosity' does not necessarily refer to the religion of elites who have reached the highest values of the religion or who hold the highest positions of formal authority. The present study proposes to add a different definition of elites based on the *synthesis approach*: an elite is a group that generally exercises specific types of religious praxis and belief. This assumption suggests that persons with a non-privileged social and economic status may be viewed as elite in virtue of the forms and motivations that shape their religious practice.

In this study, 'popular religiosity' *primarily* refers to the religion of those who are religiously 'unmusical'; by this term we do not mean to refer to those who occupy an inferior position in the secular status order. In other words, in the way it is used here, 'popular religiosity' does not necessarily signify the religion of the masses. 'Popular' refers to a group that exercises specific types of religious praxis and belief. What

makes our respondents elite or mass in this study is not their position in a secular status order but rather the forms and motivations that shape their religious beliefs and practices. However, we will be monitoring the effect of population characteristics like social, economic and cultural conditions and will assume that certain positions in society have a strong effect on the ways people believe and practice.

2.2.5. *General Evaluation*

An evaluation of elite and popular religiosity necessitates some defence against criticism of these concepts and similar or overlapping concepts such as great and little traditions. One criticism of these distinctions is that they create the impression that the religions of the learned and the masses are static and unchanging, and can be divided into separate compartments in a clear-cut manner, each invulnerable to the effect of the other. The dichotomization is seen as leading to a concrete devaluation of popular religion as magic, oriented solely towards practical and materialistic ends, without any ethical, philosophical values. In contrast, the religious elite is exclusively associated with the spiritual, removed from worldly matters (Sharot, 2001, p. 13).

Based upon the Gramscian approach explained above, this research project rejects an interpretation of 'popular religion' as if it were the very antithesis of 'elite religion'. The following remark taken from J.B. Segal's article "Popular Religion in Ancient Israel" may be understood as an illustration of this pejorative approach that is rejected in this study:

> There were two levels of Israelite religion. The one... is that of established sanctuaries and of established dates, a formal religion, in short, which followed lines clearly defined and precise in detail. The other is less easy to characterize... Outside the borders of the established cult lies the shadowy region of popular superstition, of actions that arise from the vague, half-conscious feelings of fear and anticipation that have been summed up in the not ill-chosen term of 'Nature religion' (1976, p. 1).

As Sharot rightly notes, these depictions misrepresent the complexity of people's religiosity and disregard the historically dynamic and complex relations between social groups that result in religious overlap and integrations. Where one group is assumed to have an influence on another, Sharot points out, this is frequently supposed to run in a downward direction, from the learned to the unlearned. Specifically, the peasants are often regarded as taking a passive stance (2001, p. 13).

In many works, ‘popular’ and ‘elite’ spheres are imagined to be exact opposites as seen above. In recent research, however, this monolithic conception of popular and elite religion has been re-evaluated. As Ellen Badone points out, “rather than viewing elite and popular religion as monolithic entities, immutable and distinct, it is more fruitful to focus on the dialectical character of their interrelationship” (1990, p. 6).

In Conclusion

The use of the terms elite religiosity and popular religiosity in this study refers to the patterns of religious action of social actors (religious elites and laity, especially the peasant population, i.e., the ‘masses’). Popular religion is not seen as a secondary version of an elite archetype, nor is it assumed to be cut off from elite religion or to be necessarily opposed to it. Popular religiosity is understood here as referring to the conventional, extrinsic, and consensual elements emphasized by the non-elite for their own religious life. Elite religiosity is understood here as referring to the internalized, intrinsic, and committed outlooks that have been generally produced by spiritual elites primarily for their own religious life and tradition. In chapter 3, this study examines the operational definition of elite and popular religiosity in greater detail.

As Bulaç (1995) indicates, these categorisations are only valuable as long as they are used as a descriptive and analytical tool to comprehend the multidimensional structure of society. These divisions are helpful to measure to what extent elite religiosity and popular religiosity overlap, differ, and conflict. Moreover, these concepts will help us to understand, by way of empirical investigations, comparisons, and explanations, to what extent religious dimensions vary from society to society and affect the socioeconomic landscape of the community.

3. Theoretical and Socio-psychological Foundations of Elite and Popular Religiosity in Islam

In this chapter, we shall discuss the ten components (2x5) of religious commitment that were derived in relation to an elite and popular distinction on Glock's (1962) five dimensions. In the first section of this chapter (3.1), I indicate how elite and popular divisions affect research in the social scientific study of religion. Then, I will try to conceptualize ten components of religious commitment by comparing to other measurements in the field (3.1). Subsequently, I offer a comparison of Allport's religious orientation approach of religion with Glock's Multi-Dimensional Approach of religion (3.1.2). In addition, some suggestions are given regarding the scale that has been developed for this study.

The second part of this chapter is dedicated to understanding elite and popular religiosity from the point of view of Muslim religious experience. Building on the general conceptual foundations laid in chapter 2, I shall try to evaluate elite and popular religion in the context of Muslim sociology (3.2). I then outline the possible content of ten components of religiosity (3.3). This part of the study will provide us with a set of hypotheses that will be tested in chapter 5.

3.1. *Elite and Popular Religiosity in Social Scientific Study of Religion*

Islamic history has been a history of interaction
between realities and ideas.

Jørgen S. Nielsen (2008)

Too often, studies on religion have focused on intellectual history as a substitute for social history. In religious studies, theoretical and prescriptive religion has taken priority over the living content of *everyday religion* (McGuire, 2008, pp. 3-19). The field has preferred to recognise religion as internalized "faith", built upon a systematic acquaintance with sacred texts, theological doctrines, and legal debates (Grehan, 2014; Keskin, 2011; Wiktor-Mach, 2012; Ağilkaya-Şahin, 2012). It did not investigate properly whether piety and prayer have their own particular history. Metaphorically speaking, "looking upward to the sky rather than downward to earthly matters" (Berger, 2006, p. 338). As a result, the field has often lapsed into various forms of historical anachronism.

Rather than influencing daily social behaviour, religious norms and teachings continued ideals that most individuals did not fully understand. Until recent times, the vast majority of people, be they Muslim, Christian or Jewish, would not have fully recognized or understood the religious culture that is attributed to them today. However, it is not difficult to find the remnants of a mental universe that was very different from the casual assumptions that so many researchers project onto the religion of the past (Grehan, 2014).

Historians of pre-modern societies have long been aware that many elements of religious life do not seem to fit with prescribed doctrine or ritual. To address this problem, scholars have proposed theoretical conceptions such as official/unofficial religion and elite/popular religion. Initially, 'popular religion' referred mainly to religious practices that were denounced by religious authorities and other observers speaking on behalf of orthodoxy. In these cases, religion is almost automatically defined in terms of institutions (Ter Borg, 1999). Because the term 'popular religion' is therefore severely tainted by such pejorative connotations, some scholars have recommended to discard the concept altogether (Grehan, 2014). Robert Orsi (2002, p.

16) has claimed that concepts like ‘popular religion’ are deeply and directly involved in the history of Western racism and colonialism, and in three centuries of divisive, bitter, and destructive Christian conflict. McGuire (2008, p. 46) assumes that in the long term scholars will find the concept so ambiguous and unhelpful that they will abandon it. In line with this critical reassessment, the present study wants to de-centre the issue of religion from its supposed Western origins, in which true religion was regarded as set against localised religions or “mere tradition” (Picard, 2011). The latter has often been associated with superstition and backwardness - not only in Europe, but also in the cultural politics of many post-colonial Asian countries of the 20th century (Endres & Lauser, 2012, p. 2). Therefore, we search for new ways to conceptualize elite and popular religion as a cultural process that is linked to contemporary values and market and power relations.

Over the past few decades, historians and sociologists have worked hard to break free from this judgmental language. Instead of taking sides in theological disputes, they have sought inspiration in anthropological models, which were more concerned with identifying patterns of behaviour than determining the correctness of beliefs (Berlinerblau, 2001; Bilgin, 2003; Geertz, 1973). A shift from theory to practice would allow popular religion to garner more attention, instead of being referred to the margins along with “superstition” and other forms of pejoratively labelled religiosity. Such labels betray dogmatic assumptions that are not acceptable in an ideologically neutral form of religious studies (Antes, 2004, p. 63).

Since the 1990s, many sociologists who investigate religious phenomena have been turning to quantitative research methods. Examples include national surveys such as the American General Social Surveys (GSS), the National Election Studies (NES) and Eurobarometer, and global studies such as the World Values Survey (WVS) and the “Forum on Religion and Public Life” of the Pew Research Center. According to Wiktor-March, such a strategy usually does not take the influence of cultural, political, economic, and social contexts on people’s theological ideas into consideration. Nor does it usually consider the impact of such contexts on the variety of meanings that people attach to religious concepts. Consequently, the images and diagnoses of religious communities that emerge out of these studies turn out to be inconsistent or, in many cases, contradictory (2012, p. 219).

According to Yapıcı's study on fieldwork (2004, pp. 85-118), most MA and PhD students in Turkey seem to be reluctant to develop their own scales and to analyse the data generated by such newly developed scales. They often prefer to employ the already existing scales. According to Yapıcı, this methodology causes the situation that "the scales form the facts rather than the facts form the scales" (2004, p. 112).

This recent wave of research shows signs of sensitivity to methodological problems. There is a growing awareness that, in addition to progress in theoretical thinking and data analysis, more attention should be paid to the way religion is conceptualized and operationalized (Finke et al., 2010; Yapıcı, 2004).

The most important problems arise from the fact that little attention has been paid to non-Christian religious experience. Hill and Hood (1999) aggregated and analysed 126 different psychological measurements for religiosity. However, Grace (2000) noted that researchers who wanted to find measurements applicable to non-Western religions and spirituality could not find them in Hill and Hood's work. Scholars have pointed out that the content dimension of Muslim religiosity varies considerably from that of the Christian religious tradition (Krauss et al., 2005; Shamsuddin, 1992; Wiktor-Mach, 2012). According to Küçükcan (2000, p. 468)

> One should bear in mind that almost all of the theoretical frameworks were developed after studying predominantly Christian believers and manifestations of Christian religious experience. It is therefore questionable whether these methodological approaches can explain non-Christian religious experience...

Hill and Hood (1999) have echoed this sentiment by admitting that, since relevant scales for non-Christian religions are virtually non-existent, measures of 'religion' are likely to reflect Christian religious conceptions, even when they do not explicitly identify as measurements of the *Christian* religion (Heelas, 1985; Ağilkaya-Şahin, 2015). Scholars also add that the need to study other religious traditions empirically is obvious. The study of religion and spirituality needs to be informed about the content of particular faith traditions in order to develop meaningful and appropriate empirical instruments (Gorsuch, 2008; Hood, 1992; Porpora, 2006; Wiktor-Mach, 2012; Ağilkaya-Şahin, 2012). Methodological approaches for the measurement of religiosity should correlate with the theological and cultural framework to which the specific religion or religiosity belongs.

For example, Glock and Stark's model of religiosity, which has been predominantly employed in different fields - wholly or partly -, has been adapted to the Islamic religion (see Appendix five: Measurements in Turkish Sociology and Psychology of Religion). Serajzadeh (1998), in his study on Iranian Muslim youth and crime, developed an adapted measurement for religiosity based on Glock and Stark's model. The leading assumption for using the model was that "since the three monotheistic religions (namely Judaism, Christianity and Islam) seem to share similar elements in their structural tenets, some items developed by researchers for Christianity and Judaism seem to be applicable to Islam too" (Serajzadeh, pp. 138-139). For each of the five dimensions of Glock and Stark, Serajzadeh included or applied aspects of the Islamic faith. For the ideological dimension, for example, the Islamic 'articles of faith' or the 'six pillars of faith' were used. For the 'ritualistic' dimension, Serajzadeh included daily prayer *(ṣalāt)* and fasting *(ṣawm)* during the month of Ramadan - as part of the 'pillars of Islam' -, in addition to reading the Holy Book (the Qurʾān), attending public prayer (both every day of the week and during Friday prayer), participating in ceremonies held on holy days in mosques, and other rituals. While such an adaptation of Glock and Stark's model to the Islamic religious context is more comprehensive than most of the other multi-dimensional models measuring the religiosity of the Muslim population, there are important shortcomings that need to be highlighted. Before we get to that, however, we need to look at two-dimensional approaches of religiosity.

3.1.1. *Two - Dimensional Approaches of Religiosity*

Attempts to define and measure religiosity initially started with *one-dimensional* approaches such as church attendance (frequency). As a result, the scope and boundaries of religiosity were quite narrowly defined in these measurements. These surveys only embraced one set of factors. Summur's questionnaire on religiosity can be classified in this category, because he focused mainly on religious faith (Meadow & Kahoe, 1984, p. 301). Thurstone and Chave (1929) developed similar questionnaires to measure attitudes towards the church (Wulff, 1991, p. 206).

American psychologists and sociologists of religion such as Stanley Hall (1891), James Leuba (1912), Edwin Starbuck (1899) and William James (1902) initially studied religion by employing similar *one-dimensional* approaches, with a particular

focus on religious emotions (Wulff, 1991, p. 200). Subsequently, researchers such as Thouless (1985), Popleton and Pilkington (1963), and Vernon and Lindzey (1960) also investigated religiosity on a *one-dimensional scale* (Meadow & Kahoe, 1984, p. 301).

These surveys on religion have often been criticized because they tend to measure individual religiosity as a belief in the normative doctrines of particular religious traditions (Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996).

All attempts to operationalize the concept of religiosity which we have mentioned here, have in common that they each rely on a single measurement, for example combining frequency of church attendance with frequency of communion attendance, or frequency of personal prayer with the degree of involvement in the overall organizational life of the congregation. Such measurements of religiosity have revealed significant differences between people. At the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, for example, it was discovered that among white southern college students, those who attended church were somewhat more biased against blacks than those who never attended. There were, however, equally strong indications that among churchgoers, those who attended more frequently were less prejudiced than irregular churchgoers (Johnstone, 2015). The reason for such differences seems to be that religiosity is not a one-dimensional phenomenon: not everyone is religious in the same way. A person may rank high in religiosity on one dimension or measurement, but low on another - or several others. So, if a certain behaviour is correlated with a high score on one scale of religiosity, but with a low score on another, very different conclusions can be drawn about the impact of religiosity on that behaviour, depending on which measurement of religiosity is used. Assumptions about the impact of people's religiosity on their behaviour and commitment can therefore be inaccurate and misleading (Johnstone, 2015, pp. 103-104).

Prominent thinkers soon discarded the idea that it was possible to simply locate people in a single dimension, with popular sentiments on one end of the spectrum and elite views on the other end. The various ways in which people approach religion have been collectively termed "religious orientation" (Krauss & Hood, 2013, pp. 23-48). Religious orientation refers to the sub-dimensions of religion or, in other words, to the intra-dimensional aspects of religion. These proved to include many new sets of dimensions - some covering a broad range, some narrower in their focus - which began to be mentioned in the research literature under different names such as "first-hand"

and “second-hand religious life”, “authoritarian” and “humanistic religion”, “committed religion” and “consensual religion”, “intrinsic” and “extrinsic religiosity”, “mythological” and “literal religion”, “end” and “means religion”, “high-involvement” and “low-involvement religion”, “elite” and “popular religion”. Although these are by no means the same distinctions under different names, it is clear that social scientists felt the need to broaden the scope of their instruments. The following table tries to show the main characteristics of these divisions, together with their theorists.

Table 1 - *Characteristics of two-dimensional conceptualizations*

Dimensions	*Theorists*
	James (1978)
Religious geniuses	Religion exists not as a dull habit, but as an acute fever rather (p. 6).
Second-hand religious life	Believer follows the conventional observances. Such religion has been made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, determined to fixed forms by imitation and retained by habit (p. 6).
	Fromm (1950)
Humanistic religion	This type of religion is centred around man and his strength... virtue is self-realization, not obedience" (p.37).
Authoritarian religion	The main virtue of this type of religion is obedience, its cardinal sin is disobedience" (p.35).
	Allen and Spilka (1967)
Committed religion	Utilizes an abstract philosophical perspective: multiplex religious ideas are relatively clear in meaning and an open and flexible framework of commitment relates religion to daily activities" (p.205).
Consensual religion	Vague, non-differentiated, bifurcated, neutralized (p.205). A cognitively simplified and personally convenient faith.
	Allport (1967)
Intrinsic religiosity	It is mature religiousness, a longing for and a commitment to "an ideal unification of one's life" under the guidance of "a unifying conception of the nature of all existence" (p. 151).
Extrinsic religiosity	It is something people use, not something they live. It is a "dull habit" or a "tribal investment" used for "occasional ceremony, family convenience, and personal comfort" (p. 148).
	Hunt (1972)
Mythological religion	A reinterpretation of religious statements to seek their deeper symbolic meanings.
Literal religion	Taking at face value any religious statement without in any way questioning it" (p.43).
	Beit-Hallahmi (1989)
High-involvement religion	Often religion of converts, who learned it outside their family of origin and invest much more emotional energy in it" (p. 100).
Low-involvement religion	Learned within the family of origin and having little emotional significance (p. 100).

When we look at these schemes that have been proposed, we see that there is a great deal of overlap between the various proposals. They sometimes give the impression of being the same idea phrased in different words by various social scientists. In other words, scholars commonly use the term ‘religious orientation’ to describe why an individual engages in religious behaviour (motivation), how they think about religion (cognitive style), and what an individual believes (content) (Krauss & Hood, 2013, p. 24). Although these proposals have different origins, purposes and methodologies, nearly all of them try to express a common phenomenon observed in the study of religion. There is one point on which all are in agreement: even though there is a single word for ‘religion’, there might be numerous possible ways in which one can be ‘religious’ (Spilka, 1967, p. 33).

Scholars generally have not studied three elements of religious orientation in isolation from each another, namely motivation, cognitive style, and content. Their systems of religious orientation tend to reflect this omission by including combinations of these three elements. In this study we combine these three elements of religious orientation as well, in order to differentiate different ways of ‘being religious’ (see section 3.3). So, it would be appropriate to elaborate on these three elements a bit more in detail here. The study of motivation, for example, is basically the study of why behaviour occurs, and includes research into the frequency and timing of behaviour. Therefore, systems of religious orientation contain the element ‘motivation’ if they scrutinize the importance, centrality, frequency, or purpose of religious behaviour. The study of cognitive style is the study of the amount of complexity, reflectiveness and questioning that beliefs and belief systems undergo and accumulate, and includes research into the way beliefs are thought through and held. The study of content refers to the substance of beliefs which are held by the individual. The element ‘content’ is included in systems of religious orientation to the extent that they specify the types of beliefs that individuals with specific religious orientations hold (Krauss & Hood, 2013, p. 25).

Of these definitions, Allport’s extrinsic and intrinsic concept has become one of the most popular tools employed in the scientific study of religion. We can plainly see that Allport, in his turn, made use of these three elements in his studies. Allport’s most extensive discussion of the concepts ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ can be found in his

articles “The Religious Context of Prejudice” (Allport, 1966) and “Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice” (Allport & Ross, 1967).[17] Hunt and King (1971) identified 11 characteristics that they believed Allport used to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic religion. These characteristics are as follows: reflective versus uncritical, associational versus communal, universal versus parochial (closed-minded), ultimate versus instrumental, differentiated versus undifferentiated, personal versus institutional, unselfish versus selfish, relevance for all life, salient versus un-salient, humility versus dogmatism, and regular versus irregular church attendance (see Table 2).[18]

[17] The psychological tie between the intrinsic orientation and tolerance, and between the extrinsic orientation and prejudice, has been discussed in a series of papers by Allport (1959, 1963a, 1963b, 1968).

[18] However, Hunt and King (1971) only credited Allport (1950) with the first five of these distinctions, of which only one, i.e., differentiated versus undifferentiated religion, clearly corresponded to one of the six distinguishing characteristics that Allport used to differentiate mature from immature religion. (See: Krauss, & Hood, 2013).

Table 2 - *Components of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity*

	Intrinsic	*Extrinsic*
I	*Reflective vs Uncritical*	
	reflective (1950)	unreflective, uncritical (1950)
II	*Differentiated vs Undifferentiated*	
	highly differentiated (1950)	undifferentiated (1950)
III	*Personal vs Institutional*	
	interiorized (1954, 1960), vital, deeper level (1967), devout, internalized (1967)	institutional (1950, p. 54), institutionalized (1954), external (1954)
IV	*Universal vs Parochial*	
	infused with the character of ethics (1954), creed, ideals of brotherhood (1954, p. 66), conditioned to love one's neighbour (1960), compassion (1967)	exclusionist (1950, p. 59), ethnocentric, exclusive, in-group (1954), at expense of out-groups (1960), favours provincialism (1966)
V	*Unselfish vs Selfish*	
	not self-centred (1959), strives to transcend self-centred needs (1966)	self-centred (1950), self-interest (1959), self-serving, protective (1960), useful to self (1966) uses for own ends (1967)
VI	*Relevance for all of Life*	
	distilled into thought and conduct (1954), floods whole life with motivation and meaning (1959, p. 66), not limited to single segments, (1966), other needs brought into harmony with religious beliefs and prescriptions (1967), follows creed fully (1967)	single segment (1959), not integrated into their way of life (1966), favours compartmentalization (1966)
VII	*Salience*	
	faith really matters (1954), sincerely believing (1954), accepts total creed (1960), without reservations (1960), follows creed fully (1967)	full creed and teaching not adopted (1959), faith, beliefs lightly held (1967)
VIII	*Ultimate vs. Instrumental*	
	an end in itself (1954, p. 66), intrinsic (1959, pp. 60, 66, 67), intent on serving his religion (1960), a final good (1966), faith is supreme value; the master motive (1967), ultimate significance (1967)	utilitarian, means to ends (1954), extrinsic (1959, pp. 60, 66, 67), not master motive (1959), instrumental (1959, pp. 66, 67), supports and serves non-religious ends (1966), uses religion (1967), serves other than ultimate interests (1967)
IX	*Associational vs Communal*	
	associational (1966; 1967), seeking deeper values (1967), involved for religious fellowship (1967)	political and social aspects (1954), communal (1966; 1967), sociocultural, affiliates for communal identification, need to belong (1966), no true association with the religious function of the church (1966), involved for sociability and status (1967)
X	*Humility vs Dogmatism*	
	humility (1959, p. 67)	dogmatic (1959, p. 66)
XI	*Regularity of Church Attendance*	
	constant (1967)	casual and peripheral churchgoers, feel no need to attend regularly (1966)

Even this older, well-established scheme of Allport's 'intrinsic-extrinsic' distinction is being increasingly distrusted. Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) have given a variety of theoretical and methodological criticisms of intrinsic-extrinsic research.

> Theoretical problems include lack of conceptual clarity in the definitions of I and E; confusion regarding what I and E are supposed to measure (namely, intrinsic-extrinsic what?); the value-laden 'good-religion-versus-bad-religion' distinction underlying the framework; the problems inherent in defining and studying religiosity independently of belief content; and the thorny issue of how I and E are conceptually interrelated (namely, Allport's original bipolar continuum versus the modern two-factor theory). Criticisms of the measurement of I and E concern the factorial structure, reliability, and construct validity of the I and E scales, as well as the empirical relationship between the scales (Kirkpatrick and Hood, 1990, p. 442).

Despite challenges to the validity of these ideas, multi-dimensional constructions of religion are likely to remain and become more subtle and refined. This kind of terminology implies 'pure types', and although these idealized images make for interesting discussion, in real life they are vanishingly rare. Still, both as scientists and as human beings, we like the appearance of unchallengeable certainty that classifications offer us (Spilka, 1967, p. 10). So, in the coming sections, this study also provides some characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in Islam by taking advantage of the analyses offered by previous scholars in the scientific study of religion, to grasp complex and distinctive characteristics of Turkish religiosity.

3.1.2. *Comparative Analysis of Allport's Religious Orientation Approach and the Multi-Dimensional Approach of Glock and Stark*

Glock and Stark (1965, pp. 19-20) argue that in all religions of the world - despite their great variation in details - there are general areas in which religiosity manifests itself. These areas, which Glock and Stark consider to be the core dimensions of religiosity, are the 'ideological', the 'ritualistic', the 'experiential', the 'intellectual' and the 'consequential' dimensions. According to their definitions:

The 'Ideological' or religious belief dimension encompasses beliefs that are expected to be held by followers.

The 'Ritualistic' or religious practice dimension includes the specific religious practices, such as worship, prayer, participation in special sacraments, fasting, and so on, which are expected to be performed by believers.

The 'Experiential' or religious feeling dimension refers to having feelings, perceptions and sensations of established communication with a divine essence (i.e. with God), ultimate reality or transcendental authority.

The 'Intellectual' or religious knowledge dimension encompasses the basic information and knowledge about the tenets of faith and the sacred scriptures that the believers are expected to possess.

The 'Consequential' or religious effects dimension includes the effects of religious belief, practice, experience, and knowledge on the daily life of the believer (1965, pp. 20-21).

In the discussion on the multi-dimensional structure of religion, a minor shift can be observed from Glock (1962) to Stark and Glock (1968). Glock (1962) discussed the intellectual, ideological, experiential, ritualistic, and consequential dimensions as basic expressions of religion. Stark and Glock (I968) changed two aspects of this multi-dimensional structure of religion. First, they excluded the consequential dimension from their reflection on the inner structure of religiosity. Secondly, they divided the former ideological and ritualistic dimensions into several components.

In 1968, Glock specified two types of research that could be enabled by such a scheme. One type of research puts the specification of the components within each dimension in the foreground. Glock proposed a number of tentative components within the various dimensions, but emphasized that there was still a great deal of work to be done in terms of *intra-dimensional differentiation* (1965). The other type of research focuses on the matter of *inter-dimensional independence.* Glock anticipated that his multi-dimensional scheme would stimulate research into the extent to which people might be religious in some dimensions, but not in others. The idea that these various dimensions exist independently of each other led to the suggestion that individuals might score high on one dimension, but low on another one, and to the view that classes might differ in the form in which they display their religiosity. For instance, it was suggested that the working class might score high on belief but low on ritual practice, while the middle class might score high on ritual practice and low on belief. Concerning the relationships between these two types of research, they state that:

> A first and obvious requirement if religious commitment is to be comprehensively assessed, is to establish the different ways in which individuals can be religious.

> With some few exceptions, past research has curiously avoided this fundamental question. Investigators have tended to focus upon one or another of the diverse manifestations of religiosity and to ignore all others (p. 19).

Glock's exploration in collaboration with Rodney Stark progressed according to this principle. Concerning the intra-dimensional differentiation, which is highly relevant to the present study, Glock and Stark (1968) indicated that a "person will hold a certain theological outlook, that he will acknowledge the truth of the tenets of the religion. Every religion maintains some set of beliefs which adherents are expected to ratify. However, the content and scope of beliefs will vary not only between religions, but often within the same religious tradition" (p. 14). In their explorative research, for example, 'orthodoxy', 'religious particularism' and 'ethicalism' were used as indicators for measuring religious belief (pp. 57-80).

According to Glock and Stark (1968), religious practices fall into two important classes: ritual and devotion.

> Ritual refers to the set of rites, formal religious acts, and sacred practices which all religions expect their adherents to perform. In Christianity some of these formal ritual expectations are attendance at worship services, taking communion, baptism, weddings, and the like. Devotion on the other hand, is somewhat akin to, but importantly different from ritual. While the ritual aspect of commitment is highly formalized and typically public, all known religions also value personal acts of worship and contemplation which are relatively spontaneous, informal, and typically private. Devotionalism among Christians is manifested through private prayer, Bible reading, and perhaps even by impromptu hymn singing (p. 15).

In our opinion, the criteria used by Glock and Stark to describe intra-dimensional differentiation within religious practice are closely related to Allport's characterization of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' religiosity. Glock and Stark also clearly admitted that Allport's types crosscut through the criteria of religious commitment they had previously developed in their important work *American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment* (1968, p. 18). In relation to the above example about religious practice, Allport (1967, 1968) also used the private character of ritual to measure intrinsic aspects of religious practice:

- 9. It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and meditation (1968, p. 268) (intrinsic).

In order to measure extrinsic aspects of rituals, he used communal aspects of the ritual:

- 2. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to establish a person in the community (1968, p. 265) (extrinsic).

Although Glock and Stark did not directly use Allport's conceptualization of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' religiosity, they emphasised the importance of this conceptualization for exploring intra-dimensional differentiation after summarizing the general ideas of Allport's religious orientation theory. They stated that "it is very probably the case that people who adhere to a faith out of a need for psychic security will act upon their faith differently compared to people whose commitment to their faith is based on high moral purpose". They also admitted that these expectations provide a major theoretical basis for volumes two (sources of religious commitment) and three (consequences of religious commitment) of their publication *American Piety* (1968).[19]

Conversely, most other researchers who used Glock's scheme adopted a very different approach (Cardwell, 1971; Clayton, 1968; Faulkner, 1969; Lehman, 1968; Serajzadeh, 1998) (in Turkey: Altınlı, 2011; Atalay, 2005; Ayten, 2009; Kafalı, 2005; Şahin, 2001; Yapıcı, 2004; Yıldız, 2006). Contrary to what Glock advocated in his original article, the majority of these researchers assumed that it is possible to construct a single measurement for each dimension.

The following questions therefore arise: is it correct to consider these five dimensions as empirical wholes, as many researchers have assumed, or do they encompass unrelated or even negatively related phenomena, as Stark and Glock have reported? The answer to this question will in turn help us to evaluate the validity of assumptions made with regard to the relationships between the various dimensions, which were claimed in earlier studies.

[19] In this study, they addressed the question whether there are patterns in American piety. In their work, they have focused on many issues, but three fundamental questions dominated one phase of their research: 1. What is the nature of religious commitment? 2. What are the sociological and psychological sources of religious commitment? 3. What are the sociological and psychological consequences of religious commitment?

In order to make meaningful distinctions within the five dimensions, this study will initially focus on the intra-dimensional differentiation within the various dimensions of Glock's five-dimensional scale, and launch the proposal to apply the elite - popular religiosity distinction to it, in relation to Allport's (1967) distinction between 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' approaches to religion. We therefore propose to specify two components within each of these five dimensions, in order to address the different beliefs and behaviours discussed in the literature about socio-cultural stratification and religious orientation. Moreover, we exclude the consequential dimension from other dimensions of religiosity, just as Stark and Glock did, and consider it a dependent variable (1968, p. 16).

Our main suggestion, in addition to applying the elite - popular religiosity distinction to Glock's scheme, is to respectively include: Weber's (1963) distinction between 'other-worldly' and 'this-worldly' orientations, Allport's (1967) distinction between 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' approaches to religion, and Allen and Spilka's (1967) categorization of 'committed' and 'consensual' religious orientations. Although the conceptualizations suggested by Weber, Allport, and Allen and Spilka contain one or more components that differentiate each other, together they suggest two general religious orientations. One orientation emphasizes the internalized, intrinsic, and committed outlooks. This orientation reflects a personal, critical type of commitment, which is *most often* associated with elite religiosity, practiced mostly by socially and economically privileged strata, i.e., the spiritual elites *(khawāṣṣ).* The other orientation emphasizes the conventional, extrinsic, and consensual outlooks. This latter orientation reflects the social, unquestioning and community-oriented type of commitment, which is *most often* associated with popular religion, practiced by the socially and economically non-privileged strata, i.e., the masses (*ʿawāmm*).

When these elite and popular religious orientations are applied to Glock's model of religious commitment, they suggest two components within each of their five dimensions. This conceptual orientation suggests the following table:

Table 3 - *Conceptual model of E&PR in relation with Glock's scheme*

Components	*Elite Religiosity*	*Popular Religiosity*
Ideological	Elite beliefs	Popular beliefs
Ritualistic	Elite rituals	Popular rituals
Experiential	Elite experiences	Popular experiences
Intellectual	Elite knowledge	Popular knowledge

Dependent variable

Consequential	Elite consequences	Popular consequences

The proposed scale of elite and popular orientation shows that individuals can occupy three main locations based on these ten components. The group of respondents who scored high on the elite religiosity scale and low on the popular scale was defined as representing 'elite religiosity'. The group of respondents who scored high on the popular religiosity scale and low on the elite scale was defined as representing 'popular religiosity'. Finally, those who scored high on some of the components of the elite religiosity scale, and high on other components of the popular scale, or vice versa, were defined as representing 'mixed religiosity'.

Obviously, there is one final location that an individual can also occupy: this would be to score low on the elite *and* popular religiosity scale. This can be called low religiosity. These individuals are excluded from our main analysis. For this purpose, this study uses *a general religiosity scale* (GRS), which is included in the questionnaire before the elite and popular religiosity scale.

The GRS was developed using the older versions of Glock's five-dimensional religiosity scale (1962). The intra-dimensional aspects of the ideological, ritualistic,

intellectual and experiential dimensions are not considered in this initial study - this is the most common approach adopted by Turkish sociologists. The present study uses this only to measure those who are high in religiosity and low in religiosity.[20] We also use this scale to evaluate the pros and cons of this tool in relation to elite and popular religiosity. Further information about the measurement tools can be found in chapter 4.

So far in this study we have tried to point out equivalent intra-dimensionality in religion and more particularly in Islamic religion. Within Turkish Islam, the religion that is the subject of our present research, we will later have the opportunity to distinguish various intra-dimensional aspects of religious beliefs, practices, experiences, knowledge and consequences that we assume are related with social and cultural differentiation in society.

3.2. *The Concepts of Elite and Popular Religiosity in Islam*

One of the most popular and prized *ḥadīths* among Muslims is the one known as the *"Ḥadīth of Gabriel"*. Standing in front of his companions, the prophet Muḥammad was asked by the angel Gabriel about *Islām*, *īmān* ('faith') and *iḥsān* ('perfection').

The Prophet states the five pillars of Islam as an answer to what is Islam is. Then the prophet lists the six pillars of faith as an answer to what *Īmān* is. With regard to the second question, what *iḥsān* is, the prophet states, "It is to worship Allah as though you can see Him, for although you cannot see Him, He indeed, sees you". So, the Prophet does not add a new dimension but addresses intra-dimensional aspects of *Īmān* and *Islām*. In other words, these terms mean to become excellent in the pillars of faith and those of Islam (al Bukhari, book 2, *ḥadith* 43).

The term spirituality is used as an English equivalent for the Arabic term *iḥsān* (Renard, 2005, p. 226). The root of this term is *ḥ-s-n* which means beauty, to be or to become beautiful (Badawi & Haleem, 2008; Lane, 1863, vol. 2, p. 570). It is an especially important concept in Sufi thought, representing a high level of spiritual progress.

[20] For a detailed explanation of general religiosity, see section 4.4.2 'General Religiosity Scale (GRS)'.

According to an overwhelming majority of Sunni Muslim scholars, this ḥadīth presents a condensed form of Islam in general. According to us, this ḥadīth embraces both popular and elite religiosity in Islam and suggests that the concept of *iḥsān* corresponds with the concept of 'great culture' or 'great tradition' in the terminology of the social anthropology of Islam. These concepts are discussed below.

3.2.1. *Intra-Religious Pluralism: Islam or Islams?*

What the concepts of great and little traditions mean in the historical context has been discussed in chapter two. Redfield suggested that all world religions and some local religions could be separated into a 'great tradition' and 'little tradition'. From this point on, I will try to show how these terms are applicable to the case of Islam.

Every theory of 'original', 'normal' or 'essential' Islam creates a polemic against Islam as it is found in the world (Ahmed, 2016). Some scholars suggest that the term *Islam* should be replaced by *'Islams'*. The existence of this view was already noted in 1968 by W. Montgomery Watt: "Some occidental observers have gone so far as to say that there is not one Islam but many – a different religion in each country or region" (Watt, 1979, p. 153). Abdul Hamid el-Zein emphasizes the multiplicity of Islamic expressions as well – the *Islams* of the elites and non-elites, theologians and peasants, literates and illiterates – and sees them as equally valid expressions of fundamental, "unconscious" Islamic principles. Muslim fundamentalists who regard their interpretations of Islam as definitive, ironically and unintentionally provide a conceptual end product which reduces the Islamic tradition to a single, essentialist set of principles (1977, p. 174). According to Dale Eickelman, the theory of 'original' Islam also disregards the fact that most Muslims hold quite consciously that their religion possesses central, normative tenets and that these tenets are essential for an understanding of Islamic belief and practice (1982, p. 1).

Some orientalist researchers who took these criticisms into consideration, used a dual conceptualisation in their sociological and anthropological studies of Islamic societies. Let us look at some examples of how these scholars treated the multiplicity of Islamic expressions, before moving on to Turkish sociologists. Gellner (1981) was certainly the most Weberian of the sociologists and anthropologists who devoted their studies to Muslim societies. Together with Geertz, he affected, and still largely influences sociological and anthropological studies of Islam that use comparable

twofold differentiations (Marranci, 2010, p. 368). In his book *Muslim Society* (1983) and in other writings (1992; 1994), Gellner identified unvarying features of Muslim societies that make them susceptible to sociological analysis. Building on the work of Ibn Khaldūn, he suggested a dialectic between city and tribe, each with its own form of religion. According to him, the central and perhaps most significant characteristic of Islam is that it is internally divided into the high Islam of the elite and the popular (low) Islam of the people. High Islam is primarily urban, and folk Islam is primarily tribal and rural. Although the boundaries between the two are not sharp but gradual and ambiguous, they each project a distinctive tradition nevertheless.

High Islam, according to Gellner, is "carried by urban elites recruited largely from the trading bourgeois classes and reflecting the tastes and values of urban middle classes. Those values include order, rule observance, sobriety, and learning. They contain an aversion to hysteria and emotional excess, and to the excessive use of the audio-visual aids of religion. This high Islam stresses the severely monotheistic and nomocratic nature of Islam, it is mindful of the prohibition of claims to mediation between God and man, and it is generally oriented towards puritanism and scripturalism" (Gellner, 1992, p. 11).

Popular Islam, however, is in the majority of the cases associated with "the pre-urban stages or nonurban, nonliterate/illiterate levels of society and is produced by the village or the common people. If it knows literacy, it does so mainly in the use of writing for magical purposes, rather than as a tool of scholarship. It stresses magic more than learning, ecstasy more than rule-observance. Far from avoiding mediation, this form of Islam is centred on it: its most characteristic institution is the saint cult, where the saint is more often than not a living rather than dead personage" (Gellner, 1992, p. 11).

Gellner was familiar with the work of the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, but his work barely reflects this. Geertz focused on Muslim societies as well, and tried to show how Islam differs in Morocco and Indonesia (Geertz, 1971). In a study of Javanese religion, he brings out the contrast between peasant and specialist religion. He calls the peasant pattern *abangan.* The *Prijaji*, the Javanese warrior-gentry, opposes *abangan* by striving for spiritual excellence. "*Abangan* religion represents the peasant synthesis of urban imports and tribal inheritances, a syncretism of old bits and pieces from a dozen sources", "the *abangans* are Java's peasantry, the *prijajis* its elite.

Prijajis are constituted of bureaucrats, clerks and teachers of the Javanese society, who dwell in cities. As opposed to *abangan*, which is concrete, *prijaji* is mystical. *Abangan* is interested only in first-order representation, while *prijaji* deals with higher-order symbolism. *Abangan* focuses on the household, *prijaji* on the individual. *Abangan* involves a concrete polytheism, *prijaji* an abstract and speculative pantheism" (1976, pp. 228-34).

Despite the terminological differences between Gellner and Geertz, their approaches to Islam and Muslim societies are, in fact, remarkably similar. The conceptions and approach they used are broadly criticised, which will be reflected to some extent at the end of this section, in conjunction with the discussion of criticism of the approach used by the Turkish sociologist in general. Here we will discuss a number of particular criticisms of Gellner and Geertz's studies on Muslim societies. For example, Kamali (2001) strongly criticized Gellner's interpretation of Muslim society. He noticed that "[Gellner] mixes the religious notion of *umma*, which is the concept of a religious community in relation to its Messenger, namely the Prophet, with the peoples residing in different Muslim countries... This use of the notion of *umma* as a homogeneous phenomenon referring to the entire 'Muslim world' neglects the reality of different cultural and institutional arrangements in the various 'Muslim' societies. He fails to take into account in his discussion the sociocultural and even economic diversity of different Muslim countries" (p. 464). In relation to this criticism, Bruinessen and Howell (2003) noticed that "Geertz and Gellner declared Sufism moribund, but what they meant by Sufism was only its popular, rural, ecstatic and illiterate variant. They appeared unaware of the existence, all over the Muslim world, of learned urban Sufis, whose following included members of the traditional elites" (p. 8). Asad reflects the same criticism of Geertz by saying that "[his approach] ignores the varying social conditions for the production of knowledge" (Asad, 1983, p. 237).

We do not have the necessary space here to discuss the work of Gellner and Geertz in depth. We will not provide any new critique or defence of their studies. In addition to these criticisms, however, we must stress that they made an innovative and interesting sociological and anthropological attempt to explain inner-Islamic differences, and that their work had an impact on many scholars in the scientific study of religion.

3.2.2. *Turkish Islam(s)*

In the writings of Şerif Mardin, who is considered the Max Weber of Turkish sociology (Filiz & Uluç, 2006, p. 32), we find an innovative sociological attempt to explain the religious diversity observed in Turkish society. Mardin uses two concepts for this: *kitâbî İslam*, which means Islam based on a book or text, and *halk İslamı*, which refers to popular Islam (Şeker, 2007). He also uses central (*Merkez*) and periphery (*çevre*) to explain religious differentiation (1963, 1973, 1995, 2005, 2006). Mardin (1973) argues that this social dichotomy was primarily a cultural dichotomy that differentiated the elites of the "centre" from the non-elite (*teba*, subjects of the Ottoman Empire) of the "periphery". The cultural division has remained deep, despite urbanization and the fairly recent opening of Turkish society through the adoption of market-driven economic policies, which in fact meant that the country became subject to the consequences of globalizing trends. However, he also indicates that neither the centre nor the periphery has its pure and monolithic representatives.

Ali Yaşar Sarıbay called this phenomenon "elitist Islam" and "populist Islam" and traced it through Islamic history (1985, 1993, 1995). Sarıbay argued that Islamic movements rose and developed in a populist way by using democracy and the media as a tool in the Islamic world. He stated that populist Islam motivates ordinary people by referring to the imagination of a "mystical past and utopic future" (1993). Sarıbay's work is largely based on Gellner's conceptualization and describes elitist Islam as religiosity created by *ulamā,* the guardians, transmitters and interpreters of religious knowledge, of Islamic doctrine and law, living in the city. Sarıbay emphasizes that the common characteristics of these *ulamā* exhibit the values and tastes of the middle class.[21] These values are shaped by systematic methodologies, jurisprudence, moderation and the sacred text. On the other hand, populist Islam is not systematic, but very emotional. Moreover, he states, popular Islam does not pay attention to the text (*al kitāb*), and places a strong emphasis on belonging to the dervish lodge (*tekke*) and the order of the dervish (*tarika*) (Çelik, 1995, p. 11).

These religious differentiations which have been explored by Turkish sociologists and especially by Şarif Mardin, have also been the subject of harsh criticism from

[21] Here, the term 'middle class' refers to a social group consisting of well-educated people, such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers.

contemporary Islamic historians. The main point of these criticisms is Mardin's inability to elaborate the sociological aspect of religion in relation to the theoretical aspect. This inadequacy manifests itself in the analysis of the Naqshibandi order. Mehmet F. Şeker accurately states that Mardin's interpretation of the Naqshibandi order ignores the sufic/mystical elements with the effect that it is portrayed as an organized political organization. He points out that Mardin approached the history of the traditional Naqshibandi on the economic, social and political levels, as many other "orientalists" did (Şeker, 2007, p 212). If we inspect Mardin's center-periphery theoretical framework, we see that these conceptualizations do not sufficiently address the inner-Islamic plurality in a theoretical sense, and that his framework is primarily used to understand the dichotomies in Ottoman and Turkish political life. In many of his books, Mardin refers to the centre-periphery scheme for understanding Turkish elections (Sayar, 2002, p. 3).

The other prominent Turkish scholar who has investigated intra-religious diversity in Islam is Ahmet Karamustafa. He is one of the contemporary scholars who have shown alternative ways to theorize inner-Islamic difference in relation to sociological factors, doing so specifically in his work on Anatolian Islam. Unlike Şerif Mardin and Yaşar Sarıbay, Karamustafa pays considerable attention to the theoretical side of Muslim religious experience (1994, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2013). He conceptualized inner-Islamic differences without using binaries such as popular Islam - high Islam and other "pejorative devices" such as "heterodoxy". Instead, he offered terms such as "deviance", "new renunciation," and "dervish piety" (Karamustafa, 1994, 2005). According to Karamustafa, these terms do not carry the historical and normative baggage of 'elite' and 'popular'. Recently he used the term "vernacular Islam" as an indicator for local characteristics of Islamic traditions (Karamustafa, 2013).

3.2.3. *Some Critics and Their Suggestions*

In the section above, we listed scholars who suggested a plurality of conceptualizations to describe religious diversity in Turkish sociology, such as: literate and non-literate groups, elitist Islam and populist Islam, town-dwellers and village-dwellers, centre and periphery. We have pointed out, among other things, the criticism that some researchers have received on their twofold conceptualizations. In this section, we

continue to criticize these conceptualizations within a more general framework and will make a number of suggestions.

The notion of ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions and other dichotomies oversimplified the complexity of each of these traditions, and overstressed their separation. This dichotomy slips too easily into other dubious dichotomies advocated by writers in the Middle East: ‘great’ stands to ‘little’ as ‘literate elite’ stands to ‘illiterate masses’, as ‘urban’ stands to ‘rural’, ‘intellectual’ to ‘emotional’, ‘public’ to ‘private’, and so on (Eickelman, 1981; Stirrat, 1984). These connotations are misleading and often false, but have been accepted by a large majority of researchers as a master narrative and continue to influence scholarly and public discourse on the history and religion of Muslim societies. In section 2.2.3 we have given a few examples of these applications in religious studies. Here I give an example of this tendency in the historiography of Turkish Islam as set out in the influential writings of Fuat Köprülü, discussed in Markus Dressler’s recent book on Turkish Alevi Islam (2013). Dressler criticized Köprülü for his elitist, hierarchical, and modernist approach to Islam.

> Köprülü widely followed the classical approach of Islamic cultural elites as well as Western Orientalists, who tended to look down on forms of popular religious culture, measuring the latter against the standards of what they considered to be properly Islamic. For Köprülü these standards were since his earliest work defined by Sunnism. We can see that when he uses apologetic Islamic terms in his description of inner-Islamic difference: for example, when, in a discussion of the Bektashis, he refers to them as *ghulāt*, that is, “exaggerating/extreme (*ifratçı*) Shiite-bâtınî currents”; when he argues that the flexibility of the Bektashis in matters of dogma and practice made them attractive and successful “among the ignorant Muslim and Christian masses”; and when he asserts that through the continuing adaptation of elements originally not part of it, the Bektashiye became more and more syncretistic (Köprülü, 1970 [1949], p. 462); when he claims that “the Babai incident has to be seen as an important starting point for the heretical and schismatic (*rafz ve iʾtizal*) movements in opposition to the Sunni doctrine... leading to the formation of sects (*tâife*) such as Kızılbashism and Bektashism” (Köprülü, 1966 [1919], p. 178); or when he qualifies belief in metempsychosis (*tenasüh*) and the circle of reincarnations (*devir*), which could be found among certain Alevi groups, as “corrupted dogmas” (*bozuk akide*) (Köprülü, 1935, p. 31) (Dressler, 2013, p. 198).

Such a narrative normalizes certain religious formations, while refusing to ascribe originality and authenticity to those socio-religious movements that do not comply with its own theological norms. In Köprülü's case, "properly Islamic" points to mainstream Sunni Islam.

Diyanet, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, is another critical example of the growing influence of Sunni Islam and an illustration of the governance of religion by the state, which I outline in chapter 6. Ali Bardakoğlu, the president of Diyanet between 2003 and 2010, has explained the role of Diyanet as a state institution in terms of maintaining social order in Turkey by promoting a moderate Islam based on rationality and 'sound knowledge', and not on 'superstition' and 'sentimental religiosity' (Turner & Arslan, 2013b).

The (implicit) model with which Köprülü and Diyanet work can be regarded as an elitist approach that is very normative in a specific religious or political sense. This model is criticized for presenting popular religion as a deviation from a 'higher religion', a 'pure' Islam that is assumed to be represented in the actions and statements of theologians and Diyanet leaders.

A similar approach can occasionally even be found in the anthropology of Islam. John Gulick, for example, suggested the 'Five Pillars' of Islam as the foundations of great Islam (1976, p164). According to Yel, however, the Islamic great tradition consists of four elements: the Qurʾān, *Sunnah*, consensus and analogy[22] (1993, p. 107).

The problem with these proposals is that these are the sources consulted both by the elites and by the masses. Supporters of these approaches confront the Islamic great tradition with the little one as if they have clear-cut differences. This structuralist definition of the great Islam may be regarded as too narrow, because it excludes people for whom the little tradition is a second identity.[23] It may also be regarded as too broad; speaking of the 'little tradition' in the singular suggests that it is relatively homogeneous. Following Lynch (2007), we must resist the temptation to restrict

[22]These four principal proofs called *adillah Sharʾiyyah* are accepted as main sources of the Islamic law (Sharīʾah).

[23]Practitioners of elite and popular religiosity could co-exist amicably. The adherents of the popular form could even revere the elite form and recognize its authority, whilst continuing to tolerate and practice the popular variant (see also: 6.2.2. Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity).

popular culture to the environment, practices, and resources of everyday life of 'ordinary people' in a society, because we cannot decide who is 'ordinary' and who is not. We are all part of some popular culture (Lyden, 2015, p. 15). In other words, it cannot be claimed that there is a pure popular religion, characterized by the masses, which is completely independent of the great Islam, represented by the religious elite. What is neglected here is the strict interrelation that exists between great Islam and popular Islam.

Markus Dressler suggests a number of criteria that concepts for the description of inner-Islamic difference and plurality should ideally fulfil. In order to avoid theoretical and methodological pitfalls, such concepts, in his view, "should not be normative in a specific religious or political sense. They should not be intermingled in apologetic discourses and not participate in theologico-political rationalizations of power...; should not cater to a concept of religion that privileges boundaries over fluidity, and static over dynamic, as well as essentializing over historicizing perspectives; should be formulated in an inductive rather than deductive manner; should be guided by attention to the work that a particular concept is able to accomplish…" (Dressler, 2013, p. 270). As Arkoun states, most studies on these subjects are written in accordance with a vision dominated by doctrinal Islam, or since the birth of new nations, with an official, ideological standpoint. According to him, much remains to be done to establish a sociological and anthropological approach (2003, p. 344).

We are certainly not suggesting that the existing conceptualizations of Islam are completely wrong or entirely useless: on the contrary, many of these conceptualizations are partly correct in important ways. Many of these arguments contain valuable and profound insights.

However, in light of this criticism, our conception of a great and a little tradition should differ from the deductive and static approaches mentioned above. Instead, inspired by Ahmet (2016), we will argue that the historical phenomenon of Islam is a field of meaning in which truth is not formed, ordered, and lived in terms of categories constituted by mutual exclusion, but rather in terms of categories of mutual interaction (p. 116). Categorically distinguishing between elite and popular, or between great and little, seeks first of all to organize and understand phenomena in a sociological sense. From this point of view, the relationship between elite and popular religiosity can be

understood as an interaction between social groups that interpret their practices using common formulas (in this case, *Sharīʿa*).

Towards an Islamic Religious Market

The following argument by Turner makes room for an understanding of elite and popular religiosity through use of cultural differentiation (such as great, little), and by pointing to the emergence of spiritual market places.

> Popular religion is historically not just a vulgarization of the Islamic mysticism since elite mysticism and popular religion have always stood side-by-side oriented to different clientele with different social and religious interests. It is more accurate to regard popular and elite religion as a form of differentiation and specialization of religious services relevant to different lay markets than to treat 'mass religiosity' as the contaminated offspring of pure religious consciousness (1985, p. 56).

These different religious markets are for branded religious goods and services premised on the differentiation of cultural identities, based on the possession of positional goods: things whose value is wholly culturally defined by who owns them (Calhoun, Rojek, & Turner, 2005, p. 506). Islamic communities, for example, are leading competitors in an Islamic religious market in Europe. They produce, represent, and supply a variety of Islamic interpretations to both believers and non-believers. This inner diversity allows Muslims to compare and contrast these various Islamic institutions as suppliers of various interpretations, *fatwa* (legal opinions), and socio-religious services (Yükleyen & White, 2007, p. 36).

We can then open our eyes to patterns of worship and belief that can be characterized as pertaining to the elite religious market and the popular religious market, based on *the synthesis approach*. According to this approach, which is derived from Weber's writings, as we pointed out earlier in this study, 'popular religiosity' is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief exercised by strata that are *generally* socially and economically non-privileged. 'Elite religiosity', on the other hand, is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief that are proclaimed and exercised by strata that are *generally* socially and economically privileged. Based on this approach, let us formulate some more precise qualifications. When the present study uses the concept of elite religiosity, we do not necessarily mean to refer to

religious officials assigned by religious organizations such as muftis or imams, or religious leaders of communities such as dervishes, sheikhs or hodjas. Hence, elite religiosity is not a subjective notion, but an analytical category as often used by psychological and sociological observers of religion. Such a category defines elite religiosity as follows: elite religiosity differs from popular religiosity by the emphasis placed on the spiritual, internalized, intrinsic, and committed outlooks of 'ordinary' people. Consequently, when we use the term 'elite religiosity', we focus on all ordinary individuals who strongly experience the spiritual and elite forms - and motivations - of religiosity. In contrast, the term 'popular religiosity' refers to all ordinary individuals who strongly experience the popular forms - and motivations - of religiosity.

More precisely, 'elite religiosity' is understood here as referring to the internalized, intrinsic, and committed outlooks that are highlighted by sociologists and psychologists of religion in exploring the religious cultural systems that have been *generally* produced by spiritual elites - primarily for their own religious life and tradition.[24] These traditions are also proclaimed and conveyed to society by means of books, sermons, teachings, and even face-to-face relationships.[25] These are likely to include representations of beliefs, practices, religious knowledge, and religious experiences that accord with the norms of the spiritual elites. Consequently, if someone from any level of society practices this particular kind of religious beliefs and practices in their life, we call them 'spiritual elite', because they are motivated by elite forms of

[24]The great tradition is not just something that has been agreed upon by scholars, but always something that has been agreed upon by specific scholars in a specific place, and at a specific time (Eickelman, 1982; 12). Therefore, it would probably be better to speak of various great traditions than just *the* great tradition.

[25] Elite forms of religiosity do not stand isolated in society, but are rather part of an active circulation of norms that move through society-at- large. This interaction occurs "by way of active projects of circulation, such as the epitomizing of fundamental Sufi philosophical ideas in vernacular primers, as well as, and most importantly, the translation, configuration and dramatization of these ideas into poetical and narrative fiction, which served as the primary medium for their oral circulation" (see: Ahmed, 2016, p. 85). Shahrani mentions a number of examples of textual materials by which Islamic elite knowledge becomes local knowledge and is acquired by the masses: the *Dīvāns of Ḥāfiẓ*, *Saʿdī,* and love epics such as *Laylā va Majnūn* (of *Niẓāmī*), *Yūsuf va Zulaykhā* (of *Jāmī*), *Farhad va Shīrīn*, as well as books of proverbs (*ẓarb- ul- misāl*), and narrative fiction (*afsānah, ḥikāyah, qiṣṣah*) (1991, p. 167).

religiosity. Therefore, unless specified otherwise, we use the term 'elite religion or religiosity' in this study to refer to those who experience elite forms of religiosity.

In this study, 'popular religiosity' is understood to refer to the conventional, extrinsic, and consensual elements that are highlighted by sociologists and psychologists of religion in exploring the religious cultural systems that have been *generally* produced by religious non-elites - for their own religious life. These are likely to include beliefs, practices, religious knowledge and religious experiences.

Popular religiosity may be defined in two ways. First, popular religion as the interpretations and adaptations of non-elite religious groups in accordance with their local and community concerns. Second, popular religion created by the religious elite *for* religious non-elite in accordance with their local and community concerns, based upon the very same religious texts. In the first case, the masses create a culture while living their religious lives spontaneously. In the second case, however, the masses are inevitably passive. Religious elites make deliberate decisions about the religious life of the masses. This is called 'official religion' by scholars (Waardenburg, 1978). Non-elites are inevitably a passive factor in this process. They are dependent on the religious elites (here 'religious elite' refers to religious officials) for the demarcation of their religious lives (Subaşı, 1995). Accordingly, the little tradition can be understood not only as the culture most experienced by the masses, but also as the culture made available for the masses.[26]

The definition of popular religion thus includes, to a certain extent, both the meaning of the official religion made available by the religious elite for the religious non-elite, and elements that are considered to fall beyond the official religion, which are created by the religious non-elite.

[26] It has been said that "Do what the *imām* says, but do not follow his example." This sentence is usually understood to mean that "imams do not adhere to their own rulings" and refers to the misrepresentation of imams in modern Turkey. This semantic shift cannot be rejected as falling under the very popular ottoman that indicates that "the mumpsimus is by far the proper use of the word" (*galat-ı meşhur lügât-i fasihden evlâdır*). However, the original intention behind this sentence was different. The use of this sentence means that imams must give the easiest *fatwā* (legal ruling) for the solving of community concerns, but that they must follow rules that are in accordance with his own spiritual development, and therefore cannot adhere to his own fatwā. When ordinary people try to live up to what imams do, it will become difficult for them and they won't be able to keep up with what they do.

These conceptual formulations allow us to picture possible divergences between an elite Islam which is promoted by the spiritual elite; a normative (or official) Islam (*sharīʿa*) which is allowed or tolerated by the official religious elite (*Imāms, Muftīs*); and a popular Islam which includes all the religious components that are believed in by groups which can be *generally* defined as the religious masses.

These definitions require the definition of popular Islam in two forms. This typology of popular Islam is defined by its proximity to normative religion. These are the 'similar' or identical, and the contrarian types to normative religion (Arslan, 2008, p. 81). According to this definition, popular Islam is made up of beliefs and practices that are both allowed and not allowed by the religious elites. In that respect, our definition of popular religion embraces, to a certain extent, the definition of normative religion.

3.2.4. *Intra-Dimensional Aspects of Islam in the Works of Al-Ghazālī*

The works of Al-Ghazālī' provide a fertile ground for a variety of motivations, cognitive styles and contents of Islamic beliefs and practices, and also form an important example to explain intra-dimensional aspects of Islam. Furthermore, we believe that Al-Ghazālī's analysis of individual religiosity shows some striking similarities with the analysis of the psychologist Allport. We will try to illustrate these below. Al-Ghazālī is also considered to be one of the pioneers of sociology of religion in the Muslim world (Akyüz & Çapçıoğlu, 2012). As a theologian and as one of the earliest Muslim sociologists of Islam, we will examine Al-Ghazālī's work in this study because of the authority he holds in Islamic history in general, and his enormous influence on Turkish religiosity in particular.[27]

Al-Ghazālī confined and restricted the scope of several of his books in order to reserve them for the elite, and to withhold them from the masses (see Ghazālī, 1996). For example, he openly declared that books like *al-Maḍnūn bihī Alā Ghayri Ahlihī* ("The Book to Be Withheld from Those for Whom It Is Not Written") and *al-Maḍnūn al-ṣaghīr* ("To Be Withheld") were strictly meant for the elite only (see Ghazālī, 1996). And in his other important book entitled *Iljām al ʿavāmm an ʿilm al-kalām*

[27] For more information on Al-Ghazālī's influence on Turkish history and society, see: Arpaguş, (2001).

("Restraining the Ordinary People from the Science of Kalām") he warned against indulgence in the 'doctrinal absurdities' of the common people.

In *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān,* Al-Ghazālī described some of the cognitive styles of the elite (khawāṣṣ) and the masses (ʿawāmm):

> Because their intellect was confined to the study of the shapes of things and their imaginative forms, their consideration was not directed to the spirit and the real meaning of things, and they did not understand the parallelism *(muwāzana)* between the visible world and the invisible... Neither did they understand anything of the spiritual world through experience *(dhawq)* as becomes possible for the elite (*khawāṣṣ*) through understanding, nor did they believe in the unseen as becomes possible for the masses *(ʿawāmm)* through belief. In this way, their intelligence destroyed them (Ghazālī, 1352, p. 37; tr. 63).

However, the use of the term 'elite' in the studies of Al-Ghazālī' is not homogenous. While Al-Ghazālī's other books, such as *Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihyā' ʿulūm ad-dīn,* further referred to as "The Revival"*)* and *The Alchemy of Happiness (Kīmyā-yi Saʿādat)*, which are very popular in Muslim society, are addressed to ordinary people, they still employ the elite (*khawāṣṣ*) - ordinary people *(ʿawāmm)* division.[28] Different elements of religious orientation, namely motivation, cognitive style, and content pertaining to either elite religion or popular religion stand side by side, pointing to different groups of people with different social and religious interests and needs. These terms should not only be understood in a sociological sense; they do not necessarily correlate with the level of prominence that individuals or groups have in a society. It is entirely possible that a king is one of the *ʿawāmm*, and a simple shepherd is one of the *khawāṣṣ*.

The method that Al-Ghazālī followed in "The Revival" is to discuss a given matter first from the point of view of *fiqh* (islamic jurisprudence), and then from the point of view of Sufism. When, for example, he discusses prayer, Al-Ghazālī first establishes why prayer is necessary and what the necessary conditions are for the validity of prayer

[28] All Sufi traditions generally classify the whole of humanity into three ranks: the common folk or general mankind (*ʿawāmm*); the elect or elite (*khawāṣṣ*); and the super-elect (*khawāṣṣ al- khawāṣṣ*). The ordinary level of religious experience refers to the *ʿawāmm* while elite religious experience refers to the *khawāṣṣ*. For detailed information about *ʿawāmm* / *khawāṣṣ* divisions see the following articles: Uludağ (1988), *Avam*; Uludağ (2014), *Havas*; Curcānī (2014), *awāmm*; Qashani (1991), khawāṣṣ.

in terms of *fiqh*. Then he goes on to determine the inner dimensions of prayer.[29] This method is closely linked to the inner aspects of the ritualistic dimension. Al-Ghazālī's criteria to describe intra-dimensional differentiation in the ritualistic dimension are closely related to Allport's components of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' religiosity and Glock and Stark's characterization of 'ritual' and 'devotion' (1968, p. 18). For example, Allport (1967, 1968) used the private and communal character of ritual to measure different motivational aspects of religious practice. Hunt and King (1971) labelled this differentiation as 'associational vs communal'. 'Associational' refers to searching for deeper values (Allport, 1967), while communal refers to sociocultural and communal identification, the need to belong (Allport, 1966), and the need for involvement for sociability and status (Allport, 1967).

Let us inspect how Al-Ghazālī discussed rituals such as fasting (*ṣawm*) in "The Revival". In the book, he distinguished three levels: the fasting of the common people, which means that one abstains on the physical level; the fasting of the elite, which means that one abstains from sinful thoughts, speech, etc.; and the fasting of 'the elite of the elite'[30], which means that one abstains from thinking about something other than God and the Last Day (Ghazālī, 1938, *book 6*, trans. 1992). Hence, there are two (sometimes three) levels of spiritual capacity and attainment, in accordance with which

[29] There are many classical Sufi texts that follow the same line as Al-Ghazālī's book, such as: Al-Qushayrī's (1956) "Epistle on Sufism" (*al-risāla al-qushayriyya fiʿilm al-tasawwuf*); Hujwīrī's (1999 [1911]) "Revelation of the Mystery" (*kashf al-mahjūb*); Al-Shadilī's (1938) "Illumination in Islamic Mysticism" (*qawānin hikam al-Ishrāq*); Sarrāj's (1914) *Kitāb al-luma*; Suhrawardī's (2001) *Awārif-ul-maārif*; Al-Ghazālī's "Alchemy of Happiness" (*Kimiya' al-Sa'ādah*); Ibn Arabī's "Revelations of Makkah" (ʿ*al-Futuḥāt al-Makkīyah*) (Revelations of Makkah), are some examples.

[30] Al-Ghazālī sometimes used the term 'elite of the elite' (*khawāṣṣ'ul khawāṣṣ*) to refer mainly to the philosophical or theological elites and sometimes to the mystical elites. As explained in chapter 2, in this study, when we use the term 'elite', we mean the social elite, which is connected to the societal level rather than to the individual level. According to the present study, 'elite religiosity' consists of specific types of religious praxis and belief that are proclaimed and exercised by strata *generally* socially and economically privileged in society. Although in this study we do not exclude as elites those who are recognized as exemplifying the highest values of the religion, and those who occupy the highest positions of formal authority in religious organizations or institutions, we primarily conceptualize elites as those in society who adhere to specific kinds of beliefs and practices that are generally laid down by the spiritual elites. According to our definition, the elite is not necessarily the intellectual elite trained in particular disciplines, such as philosophers, theologians and mystics. This last category of elite contains only small numbers of individuals.

prayer takes on a different level or different aspects. The same twofold (sometimes threefold) principle is applied by Al-Ghazālī to all forms of ritual worship, whether it be *taḥāra* (purity) (1938, *book 3*; trans. 2017c), *ṣalāt* (prayer) (1938, *book 4*; trans. 2017b)*, zakāt* (charity) (1938, *book 5*; trans. 2017a) or *ḥajj* (pilgrimage) (1938, *book 7;* trans. 1975).

In that period, the sciences were pursued in an academic fashion that was out of touch with the needs of the ordinary people. Al-Ghazālī therefore tried to rescue the sciences from this circumstance. What he actually did in the first part of "The Revival" is to show that the prescriptions of the Sharīʿa, taken in considerable detail, can be made the foundation of a meaningful life (Watt, 1971). Therefore, Sufism is important to Al-Ghazālī as a moral force, both for producing moral character and for deepening the understanding of the Sharīʿa.[31] According to Al-Ghazālī it is sufficient for most people to follow the tradition. For those with the need and ability, properly practiced Sufism is the way. This involves an esotericism in which there is often a single doctrine for the common people, and a plurality of other teachings for the elite.[32] Here lies the key to his 'reconciliation' of Sharīʿa-mindedness and Sufism, and to his integration of other aspects of the Islamic tradition that existed in his time. Different things are suitable for different people, and if this is recognized the different currents in Islam can live in harmony.[33]

Characteristic of Al-Ghazālī's work is that he links the details of the Sharīʿa to the insights of the Sufis. In the past, much of the texture of social life was determined by

[31] As Berger points out that "Sharīa, or Islamic law, is a term that evokes strong emotions. For some scholars, it is a medieval system that imposes a harsh code of conduct, sanctioned by draconic punishments. For others, on the other hand, it is a system that encourages goodness and justice." In order to understand both the emotional value and the facts of Sharīa, Berger proposes to distinguish three meanings; Sharia as an ideology, Sharia as a legal science and Sharia in contemporary times (see Berger, 2006).

[32] It has been said that the *Qurʾān* has four features: *ʿibāra* (a literal or clear articulation of the meaning of a verse); *ishāra* (its allegorical allusion); *latāʾif* (its subtle and symbolic sides) and *ḥaqāʾiq* (its spiritual truths). Each level of meaning accordingly has its own addressees: the ordinary believers (*al-ʿawāmm*), the spiritual elite (*al-khawāṣṣ*), God's close friends (*al-awliyāʾ*), and the prophets (*al-anbiyāʾ*). See: Knysh, 2006 and Nasr, 2003.

[33] In his autobiography, *al-Munqidh min al Ḍalāl* (1980), Al-Ghazali narrates the stages of his intellectual and spiritual evolution. His goal is clearly to promote *taṣawwuf* (the inward dimension of Islam), and in fact he has been credited with making Sufism 'respectable' in the Islamic milieu of his time and beyond.

a stabilized Sharīʿa, and once political life became largely determined by an autocratic caliph and his court, ordinary people needed to have such a religious aim set out before them. Watt indicated that the failure of the official representatives of religious truth in these societies was their inability to see this, whereas the fresh insight of the Sufis provided precisely for this need (Watt, 1971, p. 164).

Another prominent feature of Al-Ghazali's thinking in this respect is the model of the complementarity between exoteric (*zāhir)* and esoteric (*bātin)* interpretations of the Qur'ān and of reality in general. These are different cognitive styles that lead to different religious orientations. They are likened to general knowledge of an object vs detailed knowledge of an object, in so far as the latter is gained through 'verification and experience' (*tahqīq wa'l-dhawq*). General knowledge can be likened to acquiring the husk of a grain (*qishr*) while detailed knowledge can be likened to acquiring the germ (*lubāb*), terms found frequently in *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān* (Whittingham, 2007, p. 59). As pointed out below, these two types of knowledge have a lot to do with the intellectual dimension of religiosity. The exoteric (*zāhir)* and esoteric (*bātin)* interpretations are also very significantly related to Allport's definition of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' religiosity, and the characteristic distinction between elite believers (*al-khawāṣṣ*) and ordinary believers (*al-ʿawāmm*).

Al-Ghazālī also speaks about two kinds of religious obligations, namely objective and subjective obligations. We believe that these concepts are also highly relevant for justification of the key concepts of intra-dimensionality, and that they are closely linked to Allport's differentiation of *'personal vs institutional'* motivations. Objective obligations are the rules laid down in relation to the needs of the people (Günay, 2002; Okumuş, 2006). Religious law (*Sharīʿa*) consist of these objective rules. In "The Revival", Al-Ghazālī defines four degrees of observance. The first degree of observance refers to objective obligations, which is "(a) simple observance of all that issues from the Islamic profession of faith, sc. abstinence from what is clearly forbidden (*ḥarām*)" (1938, *book 1*, *bab 2*; trans. 2015). These rules contain institutionalized fragments of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) that are strongly related to 'institutional' (Allport, 1950, p. 54), 'institutionalized' (Allport, 1954) or 'external' (Allport, 1954) aspects of religion.

The subsequent degrees of observance can be categorized as subjective religious obligations, or as *personal* observances in the terminology of Allport. We think that

these can be categorized under ‘elite religion’ which emphasizes ‘interiorized’ (Allport, 1954, 1960), ‘vital, deeper level’ (Allport, 1967), ‘devout’ and ‘internalized’ (Allport, 1967) aspects of religiosity. These are “(b) the scrupulosity of the *ṣāliḥūn,* abstinence from everything which is dubious; (c) that of the *muttaqūn,* sc. abstention from all that is licit in itself but which might lead to what is forbidden; and (d) that of the *ṣiddīqūn,* which is ‘turning away from everything which is other than God through fear of wasting an hour of one’s life on things which do not increase one’s nearness to God’” (1938, *book 1 , bab 2*; trans. 2015).

Criticism of Al-Ghazālī

The views of Al-Ghazālī’ were criticized by many, including Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who wrote a refutation of them called *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, “The Refutation of The Refutation” (1930). According to Ibn Rushd, the common people should rely only on the explicit, transparent teachings of the Sharīʿa and adhere strictly to the religious obligations and duties they impose, as this remains the only way for them to receive guidance. The law is twofold: exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the common people is to follow exoteric law, while the duty of learned men is to follow esoteric law; likewise the duty of the common people is to follow the meaning of the law in the literal sense, leaving aside any kind of interpretation (Arnaldez, 1971; Gharipour, 2012; Rushd, 2001).

In the *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, Ibn Rushd commented on the esoteric interpretations of Qurʾanic texts and the actions of those who reveal such interpretations to individuals who are only ready to grasp the outer meaning of the texts. “Anyone of the interpretive class who discloses such (an interpretation) to him invites him to unbelief, and he who invites to unbelief is an unbeliever”. Similarly, in the *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, Ibn Rushd accused Al-Ghazālī of revealing philosophical interpretations to those who were not equipped to handle them (Rusd & Hourani, 1961, p. 61). In his article, “Ibn Rushd, Faṣl al-Maqāl and the Theory of Double Truth”, Terkan states that one could say that Al-Ghazālī introduced a foretaste of the philosophical approach to the public, but that this does not make the work philosophical (2006, p. 111). According to us, Al-Ghazālī proposed a dynamic rather than a static religious language by thinking in terms of two different aspects (objective - subjective) and two different groups of believers, i.e., the ordinary believers (al-ʿ*awāmm*) and the spiritual elite (al-*khawāṣṣ*). Although he did not draw ordinary people into doctrinal discussions, he did not limit their interests to

the outer meaning of the Sharīʿa either. Despite differences in emphasis and presentation, both exoteric and esoteric interpretations are essential, and esoteric interpretations complement and build upon exoteric exegesis rather than replacing it (Whittingham, 2007). By using concepts such as 'the secrets of prayer', 'the secrets of *zakāt*' and 'the secrets of fasting', Al-Ghazālī indicated the inner meaning of these religious notions. But in these works, he did not discuss any philosophical and theological subtleties, because they ought to be reserved for the intellectual elites (philosophers, theologians). His methodology can be presented as follows:

Figure 3 - *Al-Ghazālī's methodology*



These conceptualizations that correspond to different motivations and cognitive styles which are used by Al-Ghazālī, are usually underestimated by Turkish sociologists and psychologists of religion. In our opinion, however, these characteristics are crucial for understanding the intra-dimensional aspects of religiosity, and consequently, for understanding the nature of religiosity in relation to social and economic factors.

3.3. *Dimensions of Religiosity in Islam*

Up to this point, we listed some characteristics of elite and popular religion. However, we must not forget that nearly all of the theoretical frameworks that have been proposed were developed with Christian believers and manifestations of Christian

religious experience in mind. The exact content and meaning of these dimensions should not be understood as a set of unchanging essences; instead, religiosity and spirituality should be discovered, described and analysed in specific contexts (Karamustafa, 2007, p. vii). Any attempt to measure such concepts requires that the concept be specified in measurable terms. Such an 'operational definition' is particularly important when applied to religiosity and spirituality, since, as we have seen in earlier sections, there are considerable differences in the way elite and popular religiosity are conceptualized. In this section of our study we will arrive at a relevant operational definition of elite and popular religiosity, by taking Muslim religious experience into account.

This study will utilize the religiosity scale developed by Glock and Stark. However, it is important to stress that Glock and Stark's scale does not wholly apply to the distinctive religious elements of the Islamic worldview. Their model does not reflect certain poles of distinctive religious elements, such as: the different categories of knowledge that comprise this religious worldview, e.g., worldly and other-worldly dimensions of knowledge; the extrinsic and intrinsic motives of Islamic religiosity; and neither does it accommodate other polarities, such as dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, differentiated versus undifferentiated. We also try to address the inability of Turkish sociologists to elaborate the sociological aspect of religion in relation to these theoretical aspects. Consequently, in order to make meaningful distinctions within the five dimensions, the present study focuses on the intra-dimensional aspects of the five dimensions and proposes to use Allport's conceptual schemes in particular, which have been used in previous studies to distinguish different motivational and cognitive elements within religious orientation. In sum, our study develops an elite and popular religiosity scale in relation to these various conceptualizations which have been proposed by psychologists and sociologists.

This conceptual orientation suggests two poles within each of the 5 components of Glock and Stark's model. These are: 5 components of elite religiosity, and 5 components of popular religiosity.

These are:

elite beliefs	popular beliefs
elite ritual	popular ritual
elite experiences	popular experiences
elite knowledge	popular knowledge
elite consequences	popular consequences

In what follows, I outline the content of these components of religious commitment as applied to the Islamic religious experience.

Field research into the Dutch-Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands provides the examples in our analysis of elite and popular religion. The emphasis here is on the motivations and cognitive styles of elite religiosity and popular religiosity. The following section presents various characteristics that, in our opinion, describe elite and popular religiosity. These characteristics are presented in the light of extensive readings of Islamic sources and observation of Muslim religious experience - in Turkey and in the Netherlands in particular, specifically in relation to Allport's two-dimensional scale.

Some Characteristics of Elite and Popular Religion in Islam

This section proposes an understanding of elite and popular religious orientation that includes diverse motivations, cognitive styles, and contents, and which is based on an examination of the Dutch-Turkish Muslim context.

The first source of inspiration for our conceptualization can therefore be found in religious behaviour 'on the ground' - that is, in the experience of ordinary people. I will make use of data resulting from field research carried out by adopting the roles of 'complete participant' and 'participant-as-observer'.

A second source of inspiration can be found in the Qur'ān and other religious texts. These include works by scholars, mystics and jurists who directly or indirectly influence Turkish Islam and function as important seeds of Turkish religiosity. I refer to these texts in order to show in what way and in what context religion has been theorized and prescribed. In other words, in terms of *religious market theory* (see

2.2.2) our focus will be on the question in which ways and in which contexts religiosity is produced and consumed. Instead of taking sides in theological disputes, I have sought inspiration in sociological models - such as Weber's interpretive sociology - to understand the meaning of religious action. We are concerned with identifying patterns of behaviour, not with determining the correctness of beliefs.

This approach makes it impossible and undesirable to comment on the validity (i.e., truth or error) of the Turkish religious experience under study. As pointed out earlier, this study accepts, on the basis of a Durkheimian approach, that religion responds to the specific social, intellectual and material conditions of a community, and that therefore no manifestation of religion should be seen as fake or false (Durkheim, 2001, p. 4).

3.3.1. *The Ideological Dimension (faith - īmān)*

Within the ideological dimension, at least two forms of religious belief seem to be manifesting. Spiritual elites (*khawāṣṣ*) tend to emphasize verification (*taḥqīq*) of beliefs, which includes doubt (*irtiyāb*) and questioning (*tafakkur*) (Kasapoğlu, 2005; Kayıklık, 2005). Cognitive needs theories explain this type of religious commitment to a large extent. The cognitive problems that can be met by religion are a pressing matter in the life of this kind of believer. Intellectual problems like 'How did the world begin?', 'What is the purpose of life?', etc., to which science or common sense does not immediately provide an obvious answer, are important to this believer (Argyle, 1975; Batson, 2004). The cognitive styles of spiritual elites include complexity, reflectiveness, and the questioning of beliefs and belief systems. Practitioners of this type of religiosity are called investigators (*muḥaqqiq*). In contrast, people who experience popular religiosity (*ʿawāmm*) tend to emphasize imitation (*taqlīd*)[34], through trust in tradition (Özervarlı, 2014). This profile is highly relevant in

[34] The validity of this type of Islamic faith has been widely discussed in Islamic theology. In general, the imitation (*taqlīd*) of someone considered to be a higher religious authority (such as a qualified scholar or *ālim*) is deemed acceptable in the area of the details of the religious law (*Sharīʿa*), e.g., such as in matters of worship and personal affairs, but not in the area of the fundamentals of 'metaphysical' belief, e.g. such as regarding the belief in the existence of God (Allah). For more information on *taqlid*, see: Calder, 2000.

connection with Allport's descriptions of reflective and uncritical religiosity (see Table 2).

Those who experience popular religiosity, experience fewer doubts than the spiritual elites, because they have no feelings of uncertainty about believing that something is true (or false), and they do not doubt themselves. They see no other option than to believe that something is true or false (Rosenthal, 2007, p. 304). They also believe 'doubt' to be wrong (Madge, Hemming & Stenson, 2014, p. 74). This type of believer, also called 'imitator' (*muqallid*) sometimes, is chiefly motivated by social learning (Yücedoğru, 2005). From this perspective, children often acquire the same beliefs as their parents, especially if they like them and continue to live at home. The same holds for attitudes towards political issues and regarding other matters. Religious attitudes and beliefs are modified by membership of educational and other social groups (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975). For the 'investigator' type, on the other hand, social learning plays an effective rather than a determining role. Thus, it can be said that elite religiosity stimulates the *reflective* and *dynamic* processes of faith development, while popular religion stimulates adherents to acquire *uncritical* and *stable* stereotypical beliefs.

3.3.2. *The Ritualistic Dimension (ʿamal)*

These popular (*ʿawāmm*) and elite (*khawāṣṣ*) types of commitment suggest a distinction between aspects of quantity and quality within the ritualistic dimension. While spiritual elites emphasize the *intrinsic* value of the ritual (i.e., its quality), such as the secrets (meanings) of prayer and secrets of fasting, popular believers emphasize the *extrinsic* value of the ritual (i.e., its quantity), which can also be seen as an expression of a calculating attitude.

Popular religious behaviour is the place where 'magic' and religion meet. For example, the ritual of reciting a certain number of prayers (*duā*) and formulas for a specific time, including verses from the Qurʾān, is considered by practitioners of religion and magic as an important resource for curing diseases (O'Connor, 2006; Kırbaşoğlu, 2002). Use of amulets (*muska*) in the belief that they possess beneficial

magical qualities[35] (Çelebi, 2014; Dessing, 2001; Hamès, 2007) and the use of prayer beads (similar to the rosary in Catholic Christianity) to count the number of repetitions of formulas to glorify God (for example, by repeating the Arabic sentence *'Subḥān Allāh'*, often translated as 'Glorious is God'), are forms of popular religious behaviour.[36]

The other aspect of the ritualistic dimension is the motivation behind the performance of rituals. Spiritual elites engage in (or refrain from) religious practices largely without direct material expectations. This is referred to in the Islamic tradition as *ʿubudiyyāt* (Bilmen, 2007; Çağrıcı, 2014; Kaşani, 2004; Pazarlı, 1980; Uludağ, 2014a). In this case, the practices are not *instrumentalized*. Such motivations can be explained by a framework of obedience and glorification (Scarlett, 2006; Scarlett & Perriello, 1991). An example of this is the following statement by Said Nursi about elite motivations behind worship. He says, "Worship is not the introduction to additional rewards, but the result of previous bounties" (2008, p. 369). Those who experience popular religiosity engage in (or refrain from) religious practices to obtain material rewards in heaven such as 'gardens', 'rivers', 'drink', 'water', 'wine', etc. This is generally referred to as *ʿibādat*, which can also be regarded as a calculating attitude (Bilmen, 2007, p. 83; Çağrıcı, 1989, p. 78; Kınalızâde, 1974, p. 8; Nesefi, 2009, p. 233). No doubt these material motivations are considered authentic and valid in most interpretations of Islam.

This profile is also highly relevant in connection with Allport's descriptions of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (see Table 2). For example, those who experience elite religiosity engage in their practices as an end in itself (Allport, 1954, p. 66) (Allport, 1959, pp. 60, 66, 67), while those who experience popular religiosity engage in their practices as a means to an end (Allport, 1954; 1959, pp. 60, 66, 67; 1966, 1967). Rational choice theories explain these popular types of religious behaviour to a large extent. This approach, proposed by Rodney Stark, assumes that people are goal-driven, and that when choosing a path to a desired goal, they weigh up the costs they

[35] During the history of Islam, amulets did not only appeal to the common people. Some religious scholars sought the help of these methods as well (see Anadol, 1991, pp. 54-81, 97-104, 116-125, 189-190).

[36] Today, the classic rosary (*tasbiha*) has been traded in for a digital type of rosary (called *zikir matik* in Turkish), which is much easier to use.

have to pay to achieve it. Such costs might include restrictions on dress, diet, ability to associate with others, etc. They will even make a rational assessment of the costs and benefits of martyrdom. With the help of a set of rational 'propositions', Stark and Bainbridge seek to explain many seemingly irrational religious beliefs and behaviours by showing their roots in cost-benefit calculations (Stark & Bainbridge, 1989).

Another aspect of the ritualistic dimension are the public and private motivations for doing rituals. Popular religiosity is more publicly motivated, deliberately occurring, formalized and socialized, while elite religiosity is more privately motivated, spontaneously occurring, and exists independently of formal institutions (Young & Koopsen, 2010, p. 91). This is also related to Allport's differentiation between associational and communal (see Table 2). For example, people who experience elite religiosity will look for the deeper values behind religious practices (cf. Allport, 1967), while people who experience popular religiosity will look for communal, sociocultural identification, based on their need to belong (cf. Allport, 1966).

In conclusion, it can be said that elite religiosity provides *intrinsic*, *ultimate* and *personal* motivations for doing rituals, while popular religiosity provides its adherents with *extrinsic*, *instrumental* and *institutional* motivations for doing rituals.

3.3.3. *The Intellectual Dimension (ʿilm / maʿrifah)*

The intellectual dimension can also be divided into two main cognitive components: esoteric religious knowledge *(bātin)* (Uludağ, 1996, 2014c) and exoteric religious knowledge *(zāhir).*[37] Spiritual elites tend to be knowledgeable both about the literal,

[37] The term 'esoteric' has a very specific meaning in the Islamic tradition. The Qurʾān, as well as other fundamental religious texts, emphasize the difference between what is 'apparent' and 'outward' (*zāhir*) and what is 'hidden' and 'inward' (*bātin*). *Zāhir* is everything that is immediately apparent in our perceptions and thoughts (an empirical phenomenon, the meaning of a text), the presence of which cannot be doubted. *Bātin* is what is not expressed outwardly (feelings for instance), what is hidden in natural phenomena, or concealed in speech. However, the 'hidden' is no less real than the 'apparent'. The very etymology of these terms is significant in this respect. *Zāhir* refers to *zahr*, the back, while *bātin* refers to *batn*, the belly. The image is clear: what immediately manifests itself in human life is actually only the backside of reality; the less interesting part of it. The 'belly' of reality, the organism that gives life to it, is hidden from perception and common sense. This opposition between apparent and hidden can be applied to the whole universe. It reflects the structure of God's manifestation in his creation: "He is the First and the Last, the Outward (*al-Zāhir*) and the Inward (*al-Bātin*)". (See: Lory,

outward (*zāhir*) and metaphorical, inward meanings (*bātin*) of sacred scriptures and the historical roots of their faith. Practitioners of popular religion, on the other hand, are more inclined to engage with the outward and formal truth (*zāhir*) of their religion (Bar-Asher, 2002; Ghazālī, 1993; Sarrāj & Nicholson, 1914, p. 14; Uludağ, 2014b). The other aspect of this dimension is the perception (*tasawwur*) on the nature of knowledge. Spiritual elites tend to build up their religious knowledge through *critical investigation*. They are never entirely sure of the accuracy of their knowledge. For them, the *questioning* and *criticising* of knowledge is something crucial.[38] According to this perception on knowledge, knowledge is a process of 'obtaining' (*d-r-k*, *ḥ-ṣ-l*), 'comprehending' (*f-h-m*), and thus of enabling individuals to *change* their thoughts in the process of time. Another perception on knowledge is 'knowledge as belief'. According to this approach, the practitioner of popular religion will hold that knowledge is believing a thing (to be) as it is, and this constitutes certainty (*tayaqqun*) as well as the removal of any doubts about the nature of the thing in question. This state of knowledge is constituted by definitive and firm (*thābit*) belief that conforms to reality (*al-muṭābiq li-l-wâqī*) (Rosenthal, 2007, pp. 63-65). An *unchanging* and *static* worldview and a total absence of the idea of development are characteristic for this popular acquisition of knowledge (Watt, 1988, pp. 3-8).[39] Moreover, people who experience popular religiosity tend to acquire their religious knowledge *orally* through their parents, family elders and especially *in a quick fashion* through the internet[40] and TV. Criticism of this kind of knowledge acquisition is unusual in this type of religiosity. This type of oral knowledge transmission shows similarities with the process through which prejudice is transferred. Preconceived views are often based on hearsay rather than on direct evidence, and are resistant to change, even in the face of new information (Çelebi, 1980 p. 74; Giddens, 2006, p. 490).

2010, p. 49) The opposition between *zāhir* and *bātin* has been masterfully explained in the works of Henry Corbin (2014), especially in *A History of Islamic Philosophy*. For a concise summary of his thoughts, see Cheetham, *The World Turned Inside Out*, chapter 4 (Cheetham, 2003).

[38] For information on attitudes towards doubt, see the following books: Rosenthal, 2007; Treiger, 2012.

[39] For Watt, these features of the Islamic worldview and the accompanying self-image form the basis of Islamic fundamentalism (see Watt, 1988).

[40] In this context, Google became the most prominent sheikh for those who experience popular religiosity, called 'Sheikh Google'.

In conclusion, it can be said that elite religiosity is constituted by *esoteric* and *differentiated* religious knowledge, while popular religiosity is constituted by *exoteric* and *undifferentiated* religious knowledge.

3.3.4. *The Experiential Dimension (ilhām - maʿūnat)*

Religious experiences at the societal level are called *maʿūnat* (Curcānī, 2014; Özervarlı, 1997; Uludağ, 2014g). In this context we mean any religious experience that an individual interprets as contact with a transcendent reality, an encounter or union with the divine. Spiritual elites *(khawāṣṣ)* and practitioners of popular religiosity *(ʿawāmm)* are likely to differ on two aspects of the experiential dimension, while both categories of believers indeed have religious experiences. One aspect of this dimension is *experiential desirability*. Practitioners of popular religiosity are more likely to see religious experiences as appropriate and necessary elements of religious commitment. Spiritual elites, on the other hand, may regard mystic or miraculous experience as superfluous (Konuk, 2012, p. 133). Sufis, for example, often teach that spiritual elites should not pursue, or even actively distrust, this gift of mystical experience, and that becoming attached to it creates a serious obstacle on the road to union with God (Gardet, 1997; Uludağ, 2014f, 2014h, 2014d).

The other aspect of this dimension concerns the *expression* of private religious experiences (such as telling someone that you had a private dream about the prophet). Those who experience popular religiosity are more inclined to report that they ever had such experiences (Uludağ, 2014g). The spiritual elite is more inclined to keep silent about this. Likewise, for the Sufis, such notions as "protection of the secret" (*ḥifẓ al-sirr*) or "hiding the real nature of the particular interior state" (*ikhfāʾ al-ḥāl*) describe practices and disciplines which are particularly valued (Amir-Moezzi & Ali, 2004).

3.3.5. *The Consequential Dimension (natījah)*

The consequential dimension is interpreted here as the effects of religious belief, practice, experience, and knowledge on the daily lives of individuals. Stark and Glock (1968) noted that the consequential dimension consists of the secular effects of the other four dimensions. It is not, therefore, a completely independent dimension. Rather, this is a dimension that is strongly dependent on the other four dimensions.

Scholars distinguish two types of consequences that religious commitment can have (Ardelt, 2003; Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Barrett, 2010; Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Nelson, 2009). In general, it has been said that, for those who experience popular religiosity, religion could have numerous positive aspects that are useful in various ways: providing security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-determination (Allport & Ross, 1967). At the same time, popular forms of religiosity have been found to be related to racial and ethnic prejudice and a host of other *socially divisive* characteristics. In contrast, elite forms of religiosity have been found to be unrelated or negatively related to intolerance and racial and ethnic prejudice, and to be positively related to a wide variety of *socially integrative* characteristics (see section 6.2.4 for the elaboration of this aspect of religiosity).

In order to measure these various non-religious characteristics, several attitude scales have been formulated in this study (see Appendix one: Table 39). These are:

(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)

(Subordinate) attitudes towards women

(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race

(Hostile) attitudes towards others

(Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism

(Conservative) in-group attitudes

3.3.6. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, some structural characteristics of a new scale of Muslim religiosity have been presented, ranging from popular religiosity on one end of the continuum to elite religiosity on the other. These two extremes reflect the classification of the sub-dimensions, which include belief (*īmān*), practice (*ʿamal*), knowledge (*ʿilm/maʿrifah*), experience (*maʿūnat/ilhām*) and consequences (*natījah*). Under these sub-dimensions, we have identified several motivational and cognitive characteristics and contents, which according to us distinguish elite religiosity from popular religiosity. These characteristics are: dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and privacy versus experiential desirability

and shareability, tolerant versus intolerant, unprejudiced versus prejudiced. Definitions and measuring instruments are not correct or incorrect, but only more or less suitable for a specific purpose (King & Hunt, 1972, p. 5). These are ideal types, that this list of dichotomies refers to (theoretical) extremes, and that this is a tool to represent the reality of people's (expression) of religiosity – which is always more diversified and complex – by locating it on an (artificial) scale.

In the next chapter, chapter 4 of this study, we will explain the general lines of our research methodology. In this chapter, we will discuss our measuring instruments in detail which merely have been introduced here. Then, in chapter 5, we will try to show to what extent the concept of elite and popular religiosity reflects the empirical sphere of religious expressions.

Table 4 indicates how these general characteristics of these two forms of religiosity - as they are listed above - can be represented. Characteristics in brackets show the relevant connection to Allport's components (see: Table 2).

Table 4 - *Components of elite and popular religiosity*

D	*Characteristics of ER*	*Sample Item*	*Characteristics of PR*	*Sample Item*
Ideological	Questioning (Reflective)	My recent religious beliefs and ideals are primarily based upon personal investigation.	Imitating (Uncritical)	A major factor in my religious development has been the importance of religion for my parents.
	Doubt	I think that there are many more things in my faith that I have not perceived yet.	Sureness, uncritical	I completely understand what it means to be a believer *(Mu'min).*
	Dynamism (Differentiated)	My religious beliefs are not the same today as they were five years ago.	Stability (Undifferentiated)	My religious beliefs are pretty much the same as they were five years ago.
Ritualistic	Material expectations are not important (Unselfish, ultimate)	My reason to pray is to be rewarded in heaven and to be saved from hell. (R)	Material expectations are central (Selfish, instrumental)	The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.
	Emphasis on the meaning of private ritual (Personal, associational)	When I pray, I mostly try to understand the meaning of chapters and prayers.	Emphasis on the impressiveness of public ritual (Institutional, communal)	When I recall my experiences with religion I most readily remember the impressive formal rites and rituals.
Experiential	Keeping Religious experience private	If I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., guidance of God or Prophet) I prefer to keep it to myself.	Tendency to share private religious experience	I think that it is important to tell about special gifts from God, i.e., peace, mercy, or prosperity, to family or friends
	Experiential desirability is not central	I feel upset if I am not receiving any special divine gifts from God in exchange for prayers. (R)	Experiential desirability is central	It is essential for religious spiritual leaders to have miracles (*Karāmats)*
Intellectual	Uncertainty about current religious knowledge	For me, doubting the validity of my current religious knowledge is an important part of what it means to be religious.	Certainty of current religious knowledge	I completely understand what Allah wants by requesting the profession from us *(Kalima-i shahādat).*
	Openness to change (Reflective)	My religious knowledge provides me with satisfying answers at this stage of my development, but I am prepared to readjust them as new information becomes available.	Closedness to change (Unreflective)	If I find answers to my religious questions through imams, I never doubt their correctness.

Note: This table is organized before the factor analysis. Some of the items were excluded after further analysis. (R) means reverse-scored

4. Research Methodology

4.1. *Introduction*

For the identification of a theoretical framework and for the analysis of the data, this study takes the general principles of a structural-functionalist approach into consideration, which is one of the dominant paradigms of social theory. As the name suggests, structural functionalists are interested in the 'functional' analysis of social structures. In other words, they are interested in analysing the consequences of certain social structures for other social structures, as well as in analysing the consequences of such structures for the wider society (Ritzer, 2007).

In this model, religion has reciprocal relations with other elements of the social structure, and therefore a change in the structural elements of society will be reflected in that society's religion and religious phenomena, or vice versa, a change in the position of religion may cause certain changes in that society. According to this approach, religion has functions in every social layer of a society and corresponds with various social functions and roles within these different layers (Cunningham, 1999, p. 42).

In addition, this study uses Weber's interpretive sociology to gain an understanding of the meaning of the religious action of Muslims in a changing context. Such an interpretation of meaning is essential for the compilation of a social phenomenology. This approach therefore prevents us from hastily making generalizations. We also fundamentally avoid commenting on the truth or falsehood of the Turkish religious experience under investigation. This is a general principle of the scientific study of religion, rooted in Durkheim's thesis that religion is likely to transform in parallel with changes in society (2001, p. 326). In various parts of his book *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim discusses that religion responds to the specific social and intellectual circumstances of a community, and makes the point that, correspondingly, no manifestation of religion should be seen as fake or false (2001, p. 4). This is important to keep in mind, as the majority of empirical social scientific research into religion is vulnerable to criticism regarding hidden normativity in the construction of measuring instruments.

In line with these general principles in the study of religion, we seek to capture the role of elite and popular religiosity in the lives of Dutch-Turkish Muslims. So, by adhering to these approaches, I will try to reconstruct Weber's conception of 'elite and popular religion' by considering Muslim religious experience.

This study is designed on the basis of deductive reasoning, which tends to move from the general to the specific. The validity of deductions depends on the validity of a premise or premises (prior statements, findings or conditions). In the theoretical chapter, we therefore began with a study of the concepts of high and popular culture in relation to the societal foundation of socio-cultural differentiation and religiosity. We then examined interpretations of elite and popular religiosity and of their general characteristics in the scientific study of religion. Finally, we discussed how these concepts can be understood in the case of Muslim societies, by considering Turkish Muslim religious experience and its foundations in authoritative theological Muslim texts.

The design of our study is characterized by a 'mixed-methods' approach, which fuses quantitative and qualitative methods into a single research project. Within a four-year period (2010 - 2013), the project started with qualitative research, so that the results of this qualitative research could inform aspects of the quantitative approach. The qualitative data collection included participant observation, informal interviews

and specially designed questionnaires. The application of the questionnaire started in November 2012 and lasted until April 2013. Although filling in the questionnaires took 5 months of research, my extensive fieldwork lasted at least 4 years.

Based on the theoretical framework and the participant observation processes, several hypotheses were developed. Factor analysis was then applied to measure whether elite and popular religiosity and their sub-components had reached statistical significance. In accordance with this, the categories of elite and popular religiosity in this study have been based not only on theoretical foundations, but also on statistical foundations. Data collected from the fieldwork were tested against the hypothesis developed in this study, and compared to the theoretical framework, in order to reach solid conclusions.

In the following part, I will present the research questions, the research design, the methodology and the data collection process.

4.2. *Objectives, Research questions and Hypothesis*

I now present the objectives of my study, my research questions and my hypothesis regarding the subject matters of this research.

4.2.1. *Objective*

To contribute to the body of knowledge about the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who live in the Dutch plural society.

4.2.2. *Research Questions and Hypotheses*

> **RQ_1**: What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?

It is necessary to explore the following sub-questions in order to be in a position to answer our main research question:

> **RQ_1a**: How can the relationship between religion and culture be characterized, and how do we understand popular and elite religiosity in our research setting? (Chapter 2, ‘Theoretical Background’)

RQ_1b: What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in the context of Turkish - and possibly also Dutch - society, and how do these characteristics relate to the socio-economic status of (Dutch-) Turkish Muslims? (Chapter 3, 'Theoretical and Socio-psychological Foundations')

The exploration of these two sub-questions is described in chapters 2 and 3. As a result of our literature review, we have added additional research questions in order to achieve an even more articulated response to our main research question.

The following sub-questions and hypothesis were explored by way of a survey, and by means of an analysis of the data collected:

RQ_1c: What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands? (Chapter 5)

RQ_1d: What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?

H_1: Elite and popular forms of religiosity are negatively correlated with each another.

RQ_1e: How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located? (Chapters 5 - 6)

H_2: Turkish Muslim minorities living in the Netherlands predominantly experience popular religiosity.

H_3: First-generation respondents experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation respondents.

H_4: High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with education. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with education.

H_5: High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with economic status. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with economic status.

In our research, we have formulated a number of expectations with regard to these research questions. Because of the exploratory nature of our research, we explicitly describe them as expectations rather than hypotheses. These are:

E_1: The experience level of popular religiosity is higher among Muslim women than among Muslim men.

E_2: Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and above) experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-35).

E_3: Respondents who identify themselves as 'more religious than most' predominantly experience popular religiosity.

E_4: Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through television programmes, experience a high level of popular religiosity.

E_5: Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through their family experience a high level of popular religiosity.

In light of our literature review, we expect a relationship between socio-psychological attitudes and religiosity, and for this reason we formulate the following secondary research question and hypotheses:

RQ_2: What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity, respectively?

H_6: Respondents motivated by elite religiosity are more open to interaction with Christians than respondents motivated by popular religiosity.

H_7: Men motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more negative attitudes towards women and more traditional ideas about gender, than men motivated by elite religiosity.

H_8: Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more prejudiced attitude towards other nations than respondents motivated by elite religiosity.

H_9: Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more hostile attitude towards others[41] than respondents motivated by elite religiosity.

H_{10}: Respondents motivated by elite religiosity feel more comfortable with modernity than respondents motivated by popular religiosity.

[41] "Others" was conceptualised as any person other than the respondent. See items 87, 88, 89 in Table 39 in the Appendices, which were designed to test this hypothesis.

H_{11}: Respondents motivated by elite religiosity exhibit less conservative in-group[42] attitudes than respondents motivated by popular religiosity.

The hypotheses and expectations listed above will be tested statistically in the next chapter. I now turn to the clarification of the design of the questionnaire.

4.3. *Design and Procedure of the Research: Mixed Methods Approach*

The mixed-methods approach has become a very popular methodological approach in a variety of disciplines and fields, particularly in the social and behavioural sciences (Teddlie, & Tashakkori (2003). A basic premise of mixed-methods approaches is that the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches can emphasise the strengths and diminish the weaknesses of these single approaches within a study (Andrew & Halcomb, 2006). A commonly used definition of the mixed-methods approach states that:

> Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis of data and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 5).

Several reasons have been adduced to support the use of a mixed-methods approach. For example, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003) claim that a mixed-methods design offers the opportunity to present a greater diversity of views. Given the complex nature of the issues explored within our cross-cultural context, a mixed-methods approach was chosen since it would allow a deeper penetration into issues when language and communication barriers might hamper the research process. As defined by Greene et al (1989), we use the rationale of complementarity for using a mixed-methods approach. This rationale allows us to explore distinct aspects of a religious phenomenon. We believe that a mixed-methods approach draws upon the strengths of quantitative approaches (i.e., large sample size, prediction, and generalizability) and qualitative approaches (i.e., description, depth, and contextual findings), while minimizing the weaknesses inherent in single-method paradigms. The data drawn from

[42] Here, 'in-group' means a group to which a person belongs, and which is felt to be an integral part of his/her personal identity.

the qualitative interviews can, we claim, elaborate, enhance, and ultimately even help explain the correlations demonstrated in the quantitative study. This means that the methods are complementary and, when mixed, produce a more comprehensive picture than one of the two methods could provide on its own.

Scholars have identified various possible forms of mixed-methods design and have even devised a classification based on a basic typology in the field of evaluation (Greene et al., 1989). In this study, we have based our method on the first and second types. (1) complementarity seeks to use the results of one method to elaborate on the results of another method; (2) development seeks to use the results of one method to help develop or inform another method.[43] This design is the *sequential exploratory design* in which the collection of qualitative data is followed by a second stage of quantitative data collection (see Figure 1). This design is typically used to develop quantitative instruments when the variables are not known (Swanson & Holton, 2005, p. 320). In the following section we will provide more detailed information on how the qualitative side of this study was informed by the development of the quantitative part.

4.3.1. *Qualitative Data Collection: Participant Observation*

The use of a mixed-methods design resulted in an approach that initially included qualitative instruments and strategies. In the introductory chapter, I discussed the insider position that I took on for this part of the research, and the possible advantages and disadvantages of this positionality. Here I will continue to outline the ways in which I collected qualitative data.

One problem that I faced during field work was the problem of hindrances to the observation of Muslim women, being a male participant observer. Other male scholars who conducted research in Muslim communities have reported similar difficulties, because the female sphere is often separated from the male sphere. This makes it difficult to participate in events for Muslim women and to gather information on the use of concepts by insiders and the meanings attributed to the practices. In order to collect the necessary data relevant to women's lives, I received the support of my wife who took on the role of a female assistant, willing to act as observer and take notes in the field. She carefully gathered observations in the field and we compared and

[43] For a brief sketch of the other two types, see section 1.7. 'Methodology of the Thesis'.

discussed our observations on a regular basis. These discussions were very useful for setting up the theoretical framework of this study, and for developing hypotheses and items during the development of the research questionnaire. Simultaneously, her work in the field provided an important contribution to the interpretation that will be presented in the discussion section, in which the research results will be evaluated.

During the research phase, we took on several volunteer tasks in various Turkish organizations and institutions, such as SEVA (Sociaal Educatief Kunst- en Volksacademie) and Diyanet. These volunteer tasks made it possible for us to collect data while we were working in the community. In general, we were expected to teach the basic values of Turkish culture, and the concepts of Islamic faith. By taking on this teaching role, we were able to meet parents and have fruitful discussions about cultural and religious issues, and their expectations of these institutions.

One of the volunteer tasks I took on in 2012 concerned Qurʾān weekend schools in *Ahi Evran*, one of the four Diyanet mosques in The Hague. The ages of the students who took part in the Qurʾān classes ranged from 13 to 18. There was no fixed time in the year to organize Qurʾān lessons, which caused the educational level of the students to vary considerably. There was no school class system and children of different ages sat together in a single room. The instruction during the lessons consisted first and foremost in the memorization of the Arabic alphabet using *elifbâ cüzü*, followed by reading qur'anic sections of *Amme cüzü*, i.e., from Surah 78 to the end of the Qurʾān. These were the popular Diyanet teaching tools. The main goal of these lessons was to teach the pupils to read the Qurʾān aloud fluently in Arabic, and to instruct them in the memorization of short sections of the Qurʾān, without pondering on the meaning of the passages (*ayah*) or sections (*surah*). Thus, the focus of attention was on the exoteric knowledge of Islam. When I questioned this method and the curriculum, wanting to concentrate more on the meaning of the verses, both the administrators and the parents of the students responded negatively. The administrators feared that the institution would lose students. And many of the parent's main expectations revolved around teaching the children to memorize the *surahs* as soon as possible, and instructing them in reading the Qurʾān fluently in Arabic. So, I didn't have much time to teach the meaning of the Qurʾān, and the intrinsic side of religious practices.

In addition, the books we read in that short period were books on ablution (i.e., books that instruct students on how to perform the requirements for prayer such as the

ghusl [the full-body ritual purification] and the *wudu* [washing parts of the body]). This literature was therefore mainly focused on the legal (*fiqh*) aspects of praying. Many of these publications were produced by the Dutch Islamic Foundation (*Islamitische Stichting Nederland*; this is the Dutch branch of Diyanet), clearly with a view to children growing up in Turkey. It was almost impossible to find a Dutch source that was more relevant to the pupils in our class and that would point them towards the spirit of Islam.

In addition to these classes, my wife and I conducted weekly conversations with members of the Turkish community. During these conversations we spoke with Dutch-Turkish Muslims about the problems of Muslim communities in the Netherlands. The most important questions during these meetings were how a Muslim community can practise its religion and culture and make a contribution to Dutch society. These conversations provided valuable insights that were used in the course of the research to improve the elite and popular religiosity scale and to analyse the Turkish Muslim society in the Netherlands.

A relevant illustration concerns the weekly meetings I had with young people (18-25 years old) at SEVA (Social-Educational Art and Folk Academy, The Hague) in 2011. These meetings lasted almost a year. The majority of these young people had no basic religious knowledge. Their expectations and most of their questions revolved around the general rules of worship. Similar attitudes were observed by my wife in the women's meetings. In the month of Ramadan, Muslim men and women aspire to read the complete Qurʾān (a practice called *hatim indirmek*). The month of Ramadan consists of 30 days and during this period a *qāri* (reader of the Quran) reads 20 pages of the Qurʾān aloud every day, with the audience following the reader. My wife guided one of these Qurʾān readings for women. At the very least, she wanted to expand on the lectures by offering an explanation of the literal meaning of the passages, whereas usually these lectures consisted only of reading the Qurʾān aloud in Arabic. The reading of the Arabic already took 45 minutes, while it took at least half an hour to sketch the literal meaning of what had been read. Although the majority of women were opposed to this novel approach, my assistant (my spouse) insisted that this teaching method be tested. After a few days, many of the women began to excuse themselves and left immediately after the Arabic reading. Those who left were mostly

older women, and usually housewives. However, many of the younger women stayed on to attend the lessons.

I had regular discussions with my wife, in her role as a female assistant, on how the women's meetings were going. When we grouped the questions asked by the men and women, we could see that they were all particularly interested in the material and extrinsic aspects of religiosity. The themes related to popular religiosity were therefore dominant, both among the men and women. These observations were incorporated in the questionnaire with the following item:

> 54. When I pray, I mostly try to understand the meaning of chapters and prayers. (In this example, 'Agree' or 'Completely agree' would represent elite religiosity).

One of the important topics that came up during the women's meetings was the sharing and expressing of religious experiences. Most women felt free to tell others about divine signs they had seen in their dreams. This was also true for the men. It was completely acceptable that someone would publicly say that he had seen the prophet Muḥammad in his dream, and that the prophet had pointed out something to him. In spiritual forms of the Islamic tradition, it has often been claimed that such religious experiences are private and should be concealed. Although some were aware of this tradition and tried to keep such religious experiences hidden, many frequently referred to their religious experiences in order to explain the reasons for their actions. Inspired by these observations, we tried to measure this aspect of religiosity by formulating items 59, 62, 63 relating to elite and popular Islamic religious experience:

> 59. If I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., guidance of God or the Prophet) I prefer to keep it to myself.
>
> 62. I think that it is important to tell about special gifts from God (i.e., peace, mercy, or prosperity) to family or friends.
>
> 63. If I feel the guidance of the Prophet in my dreams I prefer to share it with my family or friends.

One of the most significant religious experiences we had was a 3-week *ʿumrah* visit with a group of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in early 2013. This gave us the opportunity to collect information as a 'complete participant'. The *ʿumrah* visit is like a rehearsal for the *ḥajj*, one of the five pillars of Islam.[44] Many of the rituals performed during *ʿumrah*

[44] In the terminology of Islam, *ʿumrah* means a visit to the *Kaʿbah*. It differs from *hajj* in two respects. In the first place, *ḥajj* can only be performed at a fixed time, whereas *ʿumrah* may be

are exactly the same as those for the *ḥajj*. On this journey, a female research assistant accompanied the women while I accompanied the men. Because we were both competent in Islamic studies, the *ʿumrah* visitors regularly asked us questions and shared their experiences with us. During this visit we had the opportunity to observe some differences between private (individual) and communal worship. These observations were also incorporated in the questionnaire with the following items 52, 56, 58:

> 52. It is more important to me to spend periods of time in public religious ritual than in private religious thought and meditation.
>
> 56. The prayers I say when I am alone don't carry the same meaning and personal emotion as the prayers I say during services.
>
> 58. When I recall my experiences with religion I most readily remember the impressive formal rites and rituals (circumambulation of the *Kaʿbah – ṣalāt al-ʿīd*).

Furthermore, I tried to attend Friday prayers and sermons in different mosques as much as possible, observing the practices of the communities during this prayer. When I attended a public meeting, I noted how many people were present, with an estimate of age and gender distribution, etc. When listening to the *khutbah* (Friday sermon) in the mosques, I noted down which verses were referred to and which issues were addressed.

In this way, we had many opportunities to observe various forms and motives that are characteristic of elite and popular religiosity, and to establish how such religiosity relates to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands. These observations were very useful for determining the theoretical framework of this study, and for developing hypotheses such as 'Turkish Muslim minorities living in the Netherlands predominantly experience popular religiosity' and 'first-generation respondents experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation respondents'. These observations were equally useful for formulating many items included in the research questionnaire, and they simultaneously provided important contributions to the interpretation that will be presented in the discussion section.

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carried out at any time. Secondly, going to *ʿarafāt* and gathering there is omitted in the case of *ʿumrah*, while it is an essential part of *ḥajj*.

4.3.2. *Quantitative Data Collection: Questionnaires*

Data were collected in two ways: by means of a paper survey and by means of a modern web-based approach

4.3.2.1. *Paper-based Survey*

Paper-based surveys have been the traditional method of gathering responses for many decades. In recent years, this method has given way to web-based approaches. However, for people without access to information technology, paper continues to be the most feasible alternative, as paper surveys require little to no special technological skill and can be completed by hand. For this reason, we used paper-based surveys mainly to reach older respondents who had less familiarity with the Internet. 500 questionnaires were distributed, mainly at three locations (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague), of which 435 were returned. The questionnaires were distributed in various Turkish Islamic centres, mosques, Islamic schools, Islamic organizations and secular societies such as coffeehouses, sports clubs, and a number of other cultural organizations. A few were also given to friends and acquaintances. Some of the collected forms were not included in the statistical analysis because only a few questions had been answered. The quantitative analysis therefore comprises 388 questionnaires, of which 219 were filled in by male respondents and 169 by female respondents. 40 percent of the statistical data was collected through the paper-based survey, compared to 60 percent through the online survey (see Appendix three: Paper-based questionnaire).

4.3.2.2. *Internet-Mediated Research (IMR)*

Since 2011, web 2.0 systems are clearly becoming dominant. Examples include Survey Monkey, Google Docs, Survey Tool and Free Online Surveys. These are similar in that they all provide users with the ability to create, send, and analyse online survey results on-demand. These online software packages offer the possibility to quickly create a questionnaire and gather data, to present the results in a graphical format, and to easily import the data into a statistical analysis package. Moreover, researchers can create a variety of question types including multiple choice, Likert scale, short answers and open responses (Cheruvallil & Shakkour, 2015; Knezek & Christensen, 2013).

Early studies yielded promising results, indicating that the quality of IMR data was at least comparable to that of data collected offline. Such research also showed that IMR samples are in many ways more diverse than traditional offline samples (see Arnett, 2008). Other recent studies have reached parallel conclusions. For example, Hewson and Charlton (2005) managed the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control (MHLC) Scale (Wallston & Wallston, 1981), both in web-based and pen-and-paper modes; the internet data was found to be at least as good as the offline data, taking into account scale reliabilities and factor structures. Other studies have provided similar support for IMR questionnaires (e.g. Brock, Barry & Lawrence, 2012) and experiments (e.g. Linnman, Carlbring & Ahman, 2006). Only a few studies have reported a lack of equivalence (e.g. Barbeite & Weiss, 2004), and in these cases it is often uncertain whether the online or offline data is superior.

In this study, the larger part of the data (60 %) was collected using one of these modern web-based approaches, Google Docs (see Appendix four: Web-based questionnaire). The survey designed with Google Docs was embedded in an email and sent to addresses randomly collected from social networks such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter. Some websites that are mainly used by Turkish citizens embedded the survey link in their forum page at our request.[45] We also sent thousands of messages to the collected Facebook addresses on a random basis. Facebook offers the possibility to send sixty messages per day. I used my own and my wife's Facebook account for three months, so I sent about a hundred messages per day. I asked respondents to share the survey link with their environment as well.

In addition, some Facebook groups with hundreds of members shared the survey link at our request. For example, the Europe Islamic University of Applied Sciences[46] shared our survey link on the main page of their website, allowing us to reach nearly 5000 members simultaneously. At the end of that day, we received more than fifty newly filled-in questionnaires. It is also worth mentioning that the questionnaire was shared by Facebook groups with different social and cultural backgrounds.

[45]For example: http://forums.hababam.nl/showthread.php?t=156462&s=76324f76fe0cf2ad97e3ce0afd84a0fd

[46] The website of the Europe Islamic University of Applied Sciences can be found via this link: https://eiu-edu.nl/

4.3.2.3. *Problems Encountered*

One of the problems we encountered with regard to the quantitative data collection was the language of the questionnaire. Initially, the questionnaire was meant to be designed in two languages: Turkish and Dutch. The reason for this was that some second-generation Muslims understand Dutch better than Turkish. Prior to the finalization of the questionnaires, a pilot study was carried out with an early version of the questionnaire. Forty respondents participated in this pilot to determine whether the questions were well understood. Twenty-two respondents completed the questionnaire in Turkish and eighteen in Dutch. The data from the pilot study proved to be inconsistent. In other words, when translated to Dutch, it effectively became a different questionnaire which yielded very different results, thus making it inoperable. The pilot also showed that the questionnaire contained too many questions and that completing it took more time than expected. Therefore, some questions had to be replaced by more relevant ones.

After discussing this problematic issue, we decided not to use a questionnaire in two separate languages. Instead, we designed a semi-translated questionnaire to solve the problem. Turkish was chosen as the main language and Dutch was made the secondary language. In addition, during the course of the pilot study, respondents were encouraged to communicate their views on the clarity and relevance of the items. In light of conversations with respondents, some questions were modified or rephrased to give respondents a better understanding of the questions. I tried to make the Turkish wording as plain and as a clear as possible. Moreover, I added some explanations in Dutch. Some words and phrases were also translated in Dutch (in parentheses). For example:

> 7. Medeni Haliniz? (Burgerlijke staat?): Hiç evlenmemiş (nooit getrouwd), Evli (getrouwd), Boşanmış (gescheiden), Nişanlı (verloofd), Evli değilim Birlikte yaşıyorum samenwonend).[47]
>
> Regarding experiential dimension:
>
> 27. Mucizevi (*wonderbaarlijk*) olaylarla karşılaşma.[48]

In order to make the questionnaire shorter because of the time efficiency issue, I had to exclude two scales related to the consequential dimension. These scales

[47] In English: 7. Marital status? : never married, married, divorced, engaged, cohabiting.
[48] In English: 27. A miraculous (*wonderbaarlijk*) event

measured the respondent's attitudes towards Turkish people and Dutch people. As a result, the number of items was reduced from 133 to 99. Following these changes, we carried out a second pilot to evaluate the reliability of the new questionnaire. The data coming from this pilot showed that the new, semi-translated questionnaire became operable.

4.4. *Quantitative Research Instruments*

Measuring instruments were developed by operationalisation of the concepts we identified in our study of elite and popular religiosity (see previous chapters). Theoretical concepts cannot be applied directly to empirical reality and must therefore be operationalised, i.e., converted into empirical items and variables (Van der Ven, 1993, 2005). For this study, specific measuring instruments were built by considering previous studies in the field. The items were generally selected from previous studies. Compatibility with previously published scales of religious orientation was a criterion guiding item selection. Items were translated from English to Turkish and partly to Dutch. These were then checked[49] for equivalence of meaning and subsequently transformed to adapt the measuring instrument to our research context and conceptual framework.

In this section, we discuss our measuring instruments according to four groups: (1) population characteristics (1), general religiosity (2), elite and popular religiosity (3) and measurements for the consequential dimension (4). We indicate the sources of these instruments and refer to the appendices at the end of this dissertation, where these sources can be consulted in detail.

4.4.1. *Demographic Inquiry*

The first section of the questionnaire contains 12 items that relate to population characteristics: gender, age, educational level, income, residence, language and group affiliations.

[49] I am very grateful to Ahmet Kaya and Muslim Aydın (who is an official translator from Turkish to Dutch) for helping me with this conversion. Ahmet Kaya is currently a PhD Student at Radboud University Nijmegen. Muslim Aydın is currently a PhD candidate at Leiden University.

4.4.2. *General Religiosity Scale (GRS)*

The second part of the questionnaire was designed to provide information under the five dimensions of religion as conceptualized by Glock (1962). These are the ideological, ritualistic, experiential, intellectual, and consequential dimensions. These concepts are considered horizontal dimensions because they indicate inter-dimensional aspects of religiosity (Hökelekli, 2005). The scale used for this part of the questionnaire does not address the intra-dimensional aspects of the five dimensions, as is customary in most studies that have been completed on Christianity (Cardwell, 1971; Clayton, 1968; Faulkner, 1969; Lehman, 1968) and Islam (Altınlı, 2011; Atalay, 2005; Ayten, 2009; Kafalı, 2005; Köktaş, 1993; Serajzadeh, 1998; Şahin, 2001; Yapıcı, 2004; Yıldız, 2006). In other words, it does not measure the difference between elite and popular religiosity, but between high and low religiosity. This *general religiosity scale* (GRS) was developed using older versions of Glock's scale (1962). The result of this part of the survey was used, first of all, to exclude respondents who experience low level religiosity, because they are unable to assist us in our search for the forms and motives of different aspects of high religiosity. Clearly, elite and popular forms, as well as elite and popular motives, are all manifestations of a strong religious affiliation. Therefore, it is pointless for our analysis to include respondents who score low on religious affiliation. For example, with the elite and popular religiosity scale we want to measure motives that lie behind certain religious practices. If the respondents are not performing any religious rituals then it would be pointless to ask them about the motivation lying behind them. Likewise, with the elite and popular religiosity scale we want to measure certain forms of religious experience. If the respondents are not reporting any forms of religious experience in the experiential dimension, such as experiences of angels or guiding spirits for instance, then it would be meaningless to measure the form of their religious experience. Secondly, using this adapted older version of Glock and Stark's scale gives us the opportunity to evaluate whether it is a sufficient tool to understand complex characteristics of the religiosity of individuals. In this way, there are possibilities to make some comparisons between the conclusions drawn about Turkish religiosity based on the application of our newly developed elite and popular religiosity scale, and the conclusions drawn based on the continued use of the older version of Glock and Stark's scale in Turkish sociology of religion, without taking into account intra-dimensional aspects of variables.

I refer to this part of the questionnaire as the *general religiosity scale* (GRS). Sample items are:

14. 'The Oneness of God' in the ideological dimension.

19. 'Observance of the five daily prayers' in the ritualistic dimension.

25. 'Experience of angels or guiding spirits' in the experiential dimension.

33. 'Which of the following rules is not one of the pillars of faith (īmān)?' in the intellectual dimension.

38. 'Religion is something I have never personally felt compelled to consider' in the consequential dimension.

Scoring of the GRS

This scale consists of 25 items. The respondents were asked to answer on 5-point Likert scales and multiple-choice scales.

With regard to the ideological dimension, respondents were asked about their degree of faith. 1 referred to 'non-believing' and 5 referred to 'very believing'.

With regard to the ritualistic dimension, respondents were asked about the frequency of their prayers. 1 referred to 'never' and 5 referred to 'very often'.

With regard to the experiential dimension, respondents were asked about their experience level of certain religious experiences. 1 referred to 'never' and 5 referred to 'very often'.

With regard to the intellectual dimension, respondents were asked to fill in a multiple-choice scale consisting of 5 questions. Among the various options was the correct answer. 1 referred to 'incorrect answer' and 5 referred to 'correct answer' (other answers were 'not sure' and 'no idea', recoded as 1).

Finally, with regard to the consequential dimension, respondents were asked to mark the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with several statements in order to measure the degree of influence of religion on their daily lives. In these questions, 1 referred to 'minimum impact' and 5 referred to 'maximum impact'.

The method used to distinguish between participants with high and low experiences of religiosity was as follows: to divide the variable into two categories - an upper and a lower half - we used the median of its frequency distribution. The lower half represents low religiosity and the upper half represents high religiosity.

4.4.3. *The Elite and Popular Religiosity Scales (E&PRS)*

The third part of the questionnaire are the Elite and Popular Religiosity Scales (E&PRS), which were specially developed with a view to surveying Turkish Muslim communities in this study. This section sets the present study apart from most others. These scales were designed to highlight the intra-dimensional aspects of various variables: not the difference between high and low religiosity, but the difference between elite and popular religiosity. One of the reasons for using the general religiosity scale, as explained above, was to identify respondents who experience high religiosity and to eliminate respondents who experience low religiosity from our analysis. Since the Elite and Popular Religiosity Scales were designed to measure the forms and motives of religious belief, practices, experiences and knowledge, they can only be relevantly applied to respondents with high religiosity. In other words, these scales, given their characteristics, can only function if a certain degree of religiosity is experienced.

Our initial method, consisting of participant observation and literature study, was generally useful for the design of this new questionnaire, to the extent that it enabled us to obtain a quantitative picture of Muslim religiosity and its sociological manifestations. We discuss the two scales separately. In chapter 3 some explanation has already been given about the development of these elite and popular religiosity scales. The following table presents the proposed characteristics of elite and popular religiosity determined on the basis of participant observation and literature review.

Table 5 - *Characteristics of elite and popular religiosity*

Components	Characteristics of Elite (Spiritual) Religiosity	Characteristics of Popular Religiosity
Ideological	Reflective and dynamic process of faith	Uncritical and stable stereotypical beliefs
Ritualistic	Intrinsic, ultimate and personal motivations for performance of rituals	Extrinsic, instrumental and institutional characteristics of rituals
Intellectual	Esoteric and differentiated religious knowledge	Exoteric and undifferentiated religious knowledge
Experiential	Experiential inessentiality and privacy	Experiential desirability and shareability
Consequential	Tolerant and unprejudiced	Intolerant and prejudiced

Scoring of E&PRS

The Elite and Popular Religiosity Scale contains two separate scales designed to measure two distinct religious orientations: 11 items aim to measure elite religiosity, while another 11 aims to measure popular religiosity. The respondents were asked to answer on a 5-point Likert scale (5 referred to ‘strongly agree’; 1 to ‘strongly disagree’; and 3 to ‘no idea’). 3 items were worded reversely, 3 items negatively, and 16 positively. The purpose of wording items positively, negatively and reversely within the same scale is to avoid an *acquiescence, affirmation,* or *agreement bias*. These interchangeable terms refer to a respondent’s tendency to agree with items regardless of their content (DeVellis, 2016). Reversely worded items were reversely scored before the measurements on the full scale and the two subscales were computed.

Another scoring issue related to validity concerns how - and whether - individuals should be assigned religious orientation type labels, based on their elite religiosity and popular religiosity scores. In order to make meaningful distinctions, this study temporarily excluded individuals who tended towards agreement on both scales - both the elite and popular religiosity scales - and those who tended towards disagreement

on both scales. So, this study generally took those individuals into account who tended towards agreement on only one of the scales (Elite or Popular). However, the groups that showed agreement, respectively disagreement, on both scales cannot be ignored if we are to understand the complex interrelationships between elite and popular religiosity, and they will therefore be addressed in the discussion section (see 6.2.2. Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity).

4.4.4. *Scales to Measure the Consequential Dimension*

The consequential dimension is conceptualized here as the impact of religious belief, practice, experience, and knowledge on the daily lives of individuals. The consequential dimension was designed to cover a wide range of life issues, including gender issues, sectarian issues, and attitudes towards modernity and Christianity. This study benefited from previous studies developed for the surveying of Christian believers. For this research project, these previously developed scales were translated into Turkish and then adapted for Muslim religious experience. Attitudes towards other religions (i.e., Christianity) were measured by means of a set of 5 items, selected from Seyfarth et al. (1984). The instrument measuring attitudes towards women contained 4 items, selected from Postovoit (1990). Attitudes towards race were measured by means of 4 items, and were investigated using the inventory developed by Hadlock (1988), Jackson (1994) and Massey (1998). The instrument measuring attitudes towards others contained 3 items, selected from Wichern (1984). Attitudes towards modernity were measured by means of 3 items, and in-group attitudes by means of 4 items, in both cases using McCullough & Worthington (1995).

The following table presents these tools and their reliability results:

Table 6 - *Reliability analysis (attitude scales)*

Attitude Scales	*Reliability*	*Items*	*n*	*Selected from*
Attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)	α = .87	5	*893*	*Attitudes Towards Evangelism Scale* (Seyfarth et al., 1984)
Attitudes towards women	α = .71	4	*893*	*Attitudes Towards Christian Women Scale* (Postovoit, 1990)
Attitudes towards race	α = .77	4	*893*	*Religious Status Inventory* (Hadlock, 1988; Jackson, 1994; Massey, 1998)
Attitudes towards others	α = .76	3	*893*	*Spiritual Leadership Qualities Inventory* (Wichern, 1984)
Attitudes towards modernity	α = .86	3	*893*	*Religious Values Scale* (McCullough & Worthington, 1995)
In-group attitudes	α = .81	4	*561*	*Religious Values Scale* (McCullough & Worthington, 1995)

Scoring of the Consequential Dimension

These tools consist of 23 items. The respondents were asked to answer on a 5-point Likert scale (5 referred to ‘completely agree’ and 1 to ‘completely disagree’). 8 items were phased negatively and 15 were phased positively. Positively phased items were scored as 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and negatively phased items were reversely scored as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

4.4.5. *General Overview*

In summary, the E&PRS was not designed to distinguish between individuals high in religiosity and individuals low in religiosity. Our concept of elite and popular religion provides a very different construct. The elite and popular religiosity scale is primarily designed to distinguish different ways of being religious among those who, by some other criteria, may be described as religious. Or, to put it in another way, this scale is intended to distinguish between the different characteristics of those who are, in one sense or another, religious.

Based on our qualitative observation, adherents of both types of religiosity (elite and popular) show a strong religious commitment. The different types of religious

belief, rituals, experience, knowledge and consequences may occur due to the variety in socio-economic and cultural differentiation. Elite and popular religion could be seen as a form of differentiation and specialization of religious services relevant to different lay markets. However, based on our previous observations in the field, we expect to find more than two types of attitudes towards religious beliefs. In addition to distinctly elite and popular attitudes, an ambivalent attitude is obviously possible. This would mean: experiencing elite religiosity on one dimension and popular religiosity on another dimension. There could be another important aspect that needs to be further explored. This is the simultaneity of elite and popular religiosity, which means that the two types of religiosity are experienced at the same time.

All these scales therefore try to measure the following categories of religiosity:

Figure 4 - *Categorization of religiosity*



4.5. *Reliability Analysis*

The GRS, the E&PRS, and the scales for measuring the consequential dimension appear to be sufficiently reliable for research purposes.

Two-week test-retest reliabilities show that internal consistencies for the GRS are excellent (α = .96). Internal consistencies for the ERS are invariably lower, with Cronbach's alphas most typically in the middle (α = .74) Internal consistencies for the PRS are invariably higher, with Cronbach's alphas most typically in the low (α = .81) (*N* = 40).

Table 7 - *Reliability analysis - (religiosity scales)*

Religiosity Scale	*Reliability*	*Items*	*n*	*Based on*
General Religiosity Scale (GRS)	α = .94	25	1165	Glock and Stark (1969)
Elite Religiosity Scale (ERS)	α = .82	11	*893*	*Age Universal I5-E Scale* (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983); *Committed Consensual Measures* (Spilka & Allen, 1967); *Quest Scale* (Batson & Ventis, 1982); *Religious Orientation Scale* (Allport & Ross, 1967)
Popular Religiosity Scale (PRS)	α = .84	11	*893*	*Age Universal I-E Scale* (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983)*; Committed Consensual Measures* (Spilka & Allen, 1967); *Quest Scale* (Batson & Ventis, 1982)*; Religious Orientation Scale* (Allport & Ross, 1967)

Internal consistency estimates of reliability were calculated by using a sample of more than 1165 Dutch- Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. The coefficient alphas for the General Religiosity Scale (GRS) equal (α = .94) (n of items 25) (*N* = 1165). The coefficient alphas for the Elite Religiosity Scale (ERS) equal (α = .77) (n of items = 14) (*N* = 893). An item analysis indicated that three items were not performing well within the measurement (i.e., were decreasing the overall alpha coefficient). After exclusion of these three items (numbers 40, 55, and 66), Cronbach's

alpha increased to level (α = .82) (n of items = 11). The coefficient alphas for the Popular Religiosity Scale (PRS) equal (α = .79) (n of items = 14) (*N* = 893). An item analysis indicated that three items were not performing well within the measurement. After exclusion of these three items (numbers 39, 43, and 68), Cronbach's alpha increased to level (α = .84) (n of items = 11).

4.6. *Method of Data Analysis*

The data from the completed questionnaires were entered and analysed in the program SPSS 23.0 (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). A variety of statistical research techniques were utilized in the estimation of the data. The primary statistical methods were tabulation of frequencies and percentages, and computation of mean, median, standard deviation and range. The findings of the General Religiosity Scale were presented based on these basic techniques.

In addition, we performed the following types of analysis: factor analysis, an analysis of Variance = ANOVA, correlation analysis, and T tests. Factor analysis (more properly called exploratory factor analysis) is concerned with whether the covariances or correlations between a set of observed variables can be explained in terms of a smaller number of unobservable constructs, known as *latent variables* or *common factors*. 'Explanation' here means that the correlation between each pair of measured (manifest) variables arises because of their mutual association with the common factors (Çokluk, Şekercioğlu & Büyüköztürk, 2010; Landau & Everitt, 2004). Factor analysis was performed on the General Religiosity Scale (GRS), the Elite Religiosity Scale (ERS), the Popular Religiosity Scale (PRS), and the scales for the consequential dimension. We always started with a free factor solution (Eigenvalue ≥ 1.00) and moved on to a forced factor solution for statistical reasons if the interpretability of the outcome of the free factor solution required this. For admission to a factor an item had to meet the following criteria: factor loading ≥ .30; the item clearly had to belong to one factor, the criterion being a factor loading of ≥ .15 compared to its loading on other factors. The factor analyses are included in an appendix to this study, but the factor loadings between –.30 and .30 are not shown in the table (see: Appendix one: Factor Analysis). Once the number of factors had been determined, we needed to label them. The choice of label concerns the *indicator variables*; i.e., the variables within the factor that have the highest loadings. The

common features of variables loading onto that factor, which are based on the personal judgement of this study's researcher, were also taken into account. The method of identification was based on the perceived interpretability and meaningfulness of the factors. Factor analyses were used to explore the following subquestions, which are part of our first research question, '*RQ1c*: What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?' and '*RQ1d*: What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?'.

The correlations between elite and popular religiosity, '*RQ1d*: What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?', and the social location of both types of religiosity, '*RQ1e*: How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?' were investigated by calculating the Pearson's correlation coefficient and by means of variance analysis (ANOVA). These are research topics that range under our first research question. Pearson correlation is used to measure the strength of the linear relationship between two variables. The value of the correlation provides information both about the nature and the strength of the relationship. Pearson correlation ranges between -1.0 and 1.0. The closer the value of the correlation is to 1, the stronger the relationship between the two variables. A one-way ANOVA, on the other hand, is the analysis of the variance of values (of a dependent variable) by comparing them against another set of values (the independent variable). It is a test of the hypothesis that the mean of the tested variable is equal to that of the factor (Griffith, 2010, p. 234).

An independent samples t-test, also called a between-subjects t-test, is used when a researcher wants to determine if the mean value on a given target variable for one group differs from the mean value on the target variable for a different group. A significant t-test specifies that the two groups have different means. An independent samples t-test was used to test our second research question '*RQ2*: What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity, respectively?', for the comparison of some socio-psychological attitudes of respondents who experience elite and popular religiosity.

5. Data Analysis and Findings

In this chapter, I first present the demographic characteristics of the sample as drawn from the 2013 Census information, and secondly the results of an analysis of the data from the general religiosity scale. This part of the study enables us to exclude respondents with a low religious affiliation from the follow-up analysis. Thirdly, during most of my thesis, in order to answer the research questions, I focus on respondents who have strong religious affiliations in the context of elite and popular religiosity. It is here that the main research question is addressed: 'What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?' Finally, by posing the second research question 'What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively', I will present the attitudes of those motivated by elite and popular religiosity.

5.1. *A Profile of the Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Surveyed in the Netherlands*

Table 8 - *Demographic variables 1*

Variables	*n*	%
1 - *Gender*		
Male	649	55,7
Female	516	44,3
2 - *Age Group*		
Between 18 - 25	368	31,6
Between 26 - 35	355	30,4
Between 36 - 45	209	17,9
Between 46 - 55	132	11,4
56 and older	101	8,7
3 - *Marital Status*		
Single	398	34,2
Married	654	56,1
Widowed	38	3,3
Divorced	68	5,8
Living together with partner	7	0,6
4 - *Yearly Income*		
Below € 10,000	75	6,4
Between € 10,000 - €30,000	510	43,0
Between € 30,000 - € 60,000	432	37,1
Between € 60,000 - € 100,000	117	10
Above € 100,000	31	2,7
5 - *Residence*		
Amsterdam	293	25,2
Den Haag	367	31,5
Rotterdam	257	22,1
Other	248	21,3

Note: Total *n* = 1165.

Participants

This part of the study provides a comparison between the Dutch-Turkish (Muslim) sample and the 2013 Census information. Most comparisons with the Census data are taken from the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* ('Statistics Netherlands', CBS).[50]

Table 8 shows information regarding gender, age groups, marital status, yearly income and residence.

There were 649 male and 516 female participants. The participants ranged in age between 18 - 68 years. There were 368 (31,6 %) participants between 18-25 years, 354 (30,4 %) between 26-35 years, 209 (17,9 %) between 36-45 years, 133 (11,4 %) between 46-55 years, and 101 participants (8,7 %) older than 56 years. The majority of participants were married or remarried: 656 (56,3 %). 395 (33,9 %) participants were single, 39 (3,3 %) were widowed, 68 (9,2 %) were divorced, and only 7 (0,6 %) were living with a partner. The estimated annual income was fairly represented among the participants: 75 (6,4 %) had an annual income below €10.000; 510 (43,8 %) between €10.000 - €30,000; 432 (37,1 %) between €30.000 - €60.000; 117 (10,0 %) between €60.000 - €100.000; and 31 (2,7 %) had an annual income over €100.000. The largest group of participants lived in Den Haag: 367 (31,5 %). 293 (25,2 %) participants lived in Amsterdam and 257 (22,1 %) in Rotterdam. The remaining 248 (21,3 %) participants lived in other locations.

517 (44,3 %) of the participants belonged to the second generation and were over 18 years old. 648 (55,7 %) of the participants belonged to the first generation.[51]

907 (77,9 %) of the participants obtained their highest level of education in the Netherlands, while 258 (22,1 %) obtained their highest level of education in Turkey. Graduates from the Netherlands were distributed as follows: for 19 participants (1,6 %) the highest educational level was primary education, for 186 participants (16,0 %) secondary education, for 541 participants (46,4 %) undergraduate education, and 161

[50] http://www.cbs.nl

[51] To determine if a person is first or second generation, Statistics Netherlands looks whether the individual was born in the Netherlands (second generation) or abroad (first generation). For a comparison with the census data concerning generations, see the following article: FORUM, 2011. In addition, see the article: "Turkish Population by Generation", CBS, 2018.

participants (13,8 %) completed postgraduate education.[52] Graduates from Turkey were distributed as follows: for 103 participants (8,8 %) the highest educational level was primary education, for 103 participants (8,8 %) secondary education, for 51 participants (4,3 %) undergraduate education, and only 1 participant (0,09 %) completed postgraduate education.[53]

When compared to the 2013 Census data, it can be said that the sample of Dutch-Turkish citizens is in most respects very similar to the general Dutch population. There are no major differences with the demographic profiles of the sample as determined for the general population of the Netherlands on the basis of the census.[54] In summary, the participants varied in age from 18 to 68 years. The majority of the participants were married or remarried. The estimated annual income was fairly represented among the participants. There is a clear educational gap between the first and second-generation Muslims: while the first generation received little education, the second generation is gradually entering higher education.

[52]Groups distributed taking into account the following definition of the Dutch education system:
http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/methoden/toelichtingen/alfabet/l/level+of+education+1.htm
[53] Groups distributed taking into account the following diagram of the Turkish education system:
http://www.bougainville-turkey.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Turkish-Education-System-path.jpg
[54]See also the following article: Alders, 2001.

Table 9 - *Demographic variables 2*

Variables	*n*	%
6 - *When did you come to the Netherlands?*		
Second (or Third) Generation		
Born in the Netherlands	517	44,3
First Generation		
Less than 5 years ago	69	5,9
Between 6 - 10	34	2,9
Between 11 - 20	160	13,7
Between 21 - 30	176	15,1
More than 31 years ago	209	17,9
7- *In which country did you obtain your diploma?*		
The Netherlands	907	77,9
Turkey	258	22,1
Graduation in the Netherlands, What is your highest level of education?		
Primary education	19	1,6
Secondary education	186	16,0
Undergraduate	541	46,4
Postgraduate	161	13,8
Graduation in Turkey, What is your highest level of education?		
Primary education	103	8,8
Secondary education	103	8,8
Undergraduate	51	4,3
Postgraduate	1	0,09
8 - *What do you think about returning to Turkey?*		
I hope (or plan) to return soon	198	17,0
I plan/hope to return after 10 years	389	33,4
Unfortunately, I cannot return	167	14,8
I do not want to return	372	31,9
Others		3,3

Note: Total *n* = 1165.

Additional Tendencies

The eighth item of the questionnaire was the question ‘What do you think about returning to Turkey?’. Of the participants, 198 (17,0 %) answered ‘I hope (or plan) to

return soon', 389 (33,3 %) replied 'I plan/hope to return after 10 years', 167 (14,8 %) replied 'Unfortunately, I cannot return', and 372 (31,9 %) participants answered 'I do not want to return.' Finally, 3,3 % of the participants gave several other answers.

Table 10 - *Demographic variables 3*

Variables	*n*	%
9 - *Foundation of which you are an official or voluntary member. (Optional)*		
Diyanet	238	20,4
Nur Community	129	11,1
Milli Görüş Movement	115	9,9
Süleyman Efendi Community	42	3,6
None	370	31,8
Others	96	8,2
Blank	175	15,0
10 - *Annual charity to Islamic foundations.(Optional)*		
Never make a donation	202	17,3
Less than €1000	762	65,4
Between €1000 - €5000	158	13,6
Between €5000 - €10 000	22	1,9
More than €10 000	20	1,7
11 - *Commonly spoken language at home.*		
Turkish	980	84,2
Dutch	170	14,6
Kurdish	14	1,2
12 - *I consider myself to be more religious than other people*		
Right	414	35,5
Wrong	498	42,7
No Opinion	253	21,7

Note: Total $n = 1165$.

The ninth item of the questionnaire was the question 'Of which foundation are you an official or voluntary member?' Answering this question was optional. 238 (20,4 %) participants answered this question with the 'Turkish Diyanet Foundation', 129 (11,1 %) responded with the 'Nur Movement', 115 (9,9 %) with the 'Milli Görüş Movement', 42 (3,6 %) with 'the Süleymancı Community', 370 (31,8 %) replied 'none', 96 participants (8,2 %) indicated that they were part of another community or movement, and 175 (15,0 %) left this question unanswered.

A reply to the tenth item of the questionnaire was also optional. This question was intended to measure the annual charity donated to Islamic foundations. 202 (17,3) participants answered this question with 'I never make a donation', 762 participants (65,4 %) responded 'less than €1000', 158 (13,6 %) responded with 'between €1000 - €5000', 22 (1,9 %) responded with 'between €5000 - €10,000', and 20 participants (1,7 %) replied 'more than €10 000'.

The eleventh item sought to measure the language commonly spoken at home. 980 (84,2) participants noted 'Turkish', 170 (14,6 %) noted 'Dutch' while only 14 participants (1,2 %) noted 'Kurdish'.

The twelfth item of the questionnaire was 'I consider myself to be more religious than other people'. 414 (35,5 %) participants responded with 'right', 498 (42,7 %) responded with 'wrong', and 253 (21,7 %) indicated 'no opinion'.

In summary, the general characteristics of our sample consist of the following features:

Our participants varied in age from 18 to 68 years. The majority were married or remarried. The estimated annual income was fairly represented among the population sample. There is a clear educational gap between the first and second-generation Muslims: while the first generation received little education, the second generation is gradually entering higher education. Almost half of the participants were born in the Netherlands. More than half of them intend to return to Turkey sooner or later. Nearly half of them are official or voluntary members of an Islamic community. The majority of these Dutch-Turkish Muslims makes annual donations to Islamic foundations. A majority among them speaks Dutch at home.

5.2. *Findings Concerning General Religiosity*

As explained earlier in this study, an analysis of religiosity can be approached from at least two distinct angles. First, an analysis of religiosity can focus on distinguishing individuals in terms of the *intensity* or *frequency* of the beliefs, practices, experience and knowledge with which they engage in religious activities.

Secondly, an analysis of religiosity can focus on the intra-dimensional aspects, the forms of religious activities and the motivations behind their performance for the individuals who engage in them. For the time being, the analysis presented in this study

has been primarily concerned with the first perspective. In our terminology we refer to this first perspective as the study of general religiosity, taking inspiration from Glock's (1962) initial work. However, the core of this study seeks to reveal the intra-dimensional aspects of the five dimensions. In other words, the actual research objective of this study is to uncover the various forms of Muslim religious behaviour, the motivations behind their performance, and their consequences in society.

The tables in this section will provide only limited information about religiosity and will not point to different motivations, cognitive styles, and contents of religious beliefs and practices. One of our goals with the analysis we present here is to show that Glock's old scheme has only a limited capacity to measure the complex nature of religiosity, and to show how important and crucial the elite and popular conceptualization is to understand the inner aspects of religiosity.

5.2.1. *Ideological Dimension*

Traditionally, Muslims affirm several articles of faith. Among the most widely known are: there is only one God; God has sent many messengers, with Muhammad as His last Prophet; God has revealed Sacred Scriptures, including the Qurʾān; God's angels exist even if humans cannot see them; there will be a Day of Judgment, when God will determine whether individuals are sent to heaven or to hell; and God's will and knowledge are absolute, which means that humans are subject to fate or predestination.[55]

In the following table, light gray (1) refers to minimum belief and dark gray (5) to maximum belief.

[55] The lists and translations of the articles of faith vary. Most of them are derived from the "Ḥadīth of Gabriel". See for example *Sahih al-Bukhari* 2:47 and *Sahih al-Muslim* 1:1.

Table 11 – *Belief in basic tenets of Islamic faith* (*n* = 1165)



The survey, in which 1165 Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands participated, revealed the ubiquitous conviction among the participants that there is only one God and that Muhammad is His last prophet, with high percentages of Muslims who ascribe to other articles of faith, including the belief in sacred scriptures, reward and punishment, and the resurrection of the dead. In addition to the belief in the oneness of God, there are some low religious affiliations visible in the other domains. The participants were asked to indicate the intensity of their religious belief with a number ranging from 1 to 5. At least one in ten participants selected the number '1', which indicates minimum affiliation. And at least one in ten selected number '2' and '3' to describe their religious belief, which indicates low and average affiliation.

5.2.2. *Ritualistic Dimension*

Together with the core beliefs discussed above, Islam is defined by 'Five Pillars' – basic rituals that are obligatory for all the members of the Islamic community who are physically able to perform them. The Five Pillars are: the profession of faith (*shahādah*), daily prayer (*ṣalāt*), fasting during the holy month of Ramadan (*ṣawm*), annual almsgiving to help the poor or needy (*zakāt*); and performing the annual pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during one's lifetime (*ḥajj).*

Table 12 – *Level of practice of the pillars of Islam* (*n* = 1165)



Among these Five Pillars, the *Ṣalāt*, or daily prayer, is the most frequent practice by which Muslims profess their faith in one God and His prophet Muhammad. According to tradition, Muslims have to perform the prayer five times a day, typically at dawn, noon, mid- afternoon, sunset and night.

The survey finds that daily prayer is comparatively less central in the life of the majority of Dutch-Turkish Muslims. The participants who say they pray ‘always’ or ‘usually’ constitute three out of ten. Also, three out of ten say they never observe the five daily prayers.

Fasting during the month of Ramadan, which according to Islamic tradition is required of all healthy, adult Muslims, is part of an annual rite in which individuals place renewed emphasis on the teachings of the Qurʾān. The survey finds that more than half of the Muslims surveyed say that they ‘usually’ or ‘always’ observe the daytime fast during Ramadan. Three out of ten say that they fast ‘less often’ or ‘sometimes’. Less than one in ten says they never observe the daytime fast during Ramadan.

Friday Prayer is also widely observed when we exclude the female participants, as it is traditionally compulsory for men but preferable for women. In the Turkish community, women generally do not perform this prayer communally. More than two out of ten participants say they ‘always’ observe Friday prayer, while less than two out of ten say they ‘usually’ observe it.

Praying to God is thus one of the most extensively observed rituals of the respondents. Five out of ten Muslims say they ‘always’ pray to God, while more than two out of ten

participants say they ‘usually’ pray.

Annual almsgiving (*zakāt*), which by custom is supposed to equal 2.5% or more of a person’s total wealth, is widely observed. Four out of ten Muslims say they ‘always’ observe almsgiving, while two out of ten say they ‘usually’ observe it.

5.2.3. *Experiential Dimension*

The ritualistic dimension is one of the most observable dimensions of religion, while the experiential dimension is one of the least observable. This dimension encompasses all feelings, perceptions and sensations, whether they are felt by an individual or a religious group, that relate to some type of postulated communication with God or a transcendental being.

Table 13 - *Religious experience* (*n* = 1165)



In this table, 1 refers to ‘no experience’ while 5 refers to ‘a high level of experience’. Three out of ten participants say they have no experience with ‘sensing a spiritual teacher’ and ‘experiencing a miraculous event’. When we look at other variables, more than eight out of ten participants say they experience ‘angels’, ‘inner peace’, and ‘closeness to God’ to some degree.

5.2.4. *Intellectual Dimension*

The intellectual dimension refers to the expectation that Muslims will possess some knowledge about the basic tenets of their faith and its sacred scriptures.

Table 14 - *Religious knowledge* (*n* = 1165)



Initially, respondents were asked: 'Which of the following answers provide lists that correctly sort successive chapters from the Qurʾān?'. More than three out of ten respondents answered this question correctly, while nearly three out of ten gave the wrong answer. Nearly four out of ten respondents said they were 'not sure' or had 'no idea'.

The other questions for the intellectual dimension were: 'Which of the following holy days occur during Ramadan?', 'Which of the following rules is not considered one of the obligatory rules (*farẓ*) for prayer (*ṣalāh*)?', 'What is the meaning of *Maqrūh*?', and 'Which of the following rules is not one of the pillars of faith (*īmān)*?'. On average, seven out of ten respondents answered these questions correctly.

5.2.5. *Consequential Dimension*

The consequential dimension encompasses the effects of religious belief, practice, experience and knowledge on the daily life of the believer. It includes all those religious prescriptions that specify what people ought to do and the attitudes they are supposed to have as a consequence of their religion.

Table 15 - *Consequential dimensions* (*n* = 1165)



Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

34. It would not bother my conscience to use alcohol.
35. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life. (reversed)
36. A woman should be able to have an abortion for any reason.
37. Premarital sexual relations between a boy and a girl who are in love is not immoral.
38. Religion is something I have never felt personally compelled to consider.

On average, seven out of ten respondents indicated that they 'disagree' or 'totally disagree' with these statements.[56]

5.2.6. *Factor Analysis*

A principle factor analysis was performed on the data set of the general religiosity scale. An examination of the item correlations revealed the predominance of a single factor (see Appendix one: Table 36). Our findings suggest that this 5-dimensional construction may merely be the components of a single dimensional phenomenon, i.e. religiosity, and that it is possible that it does not represent a multidimensional phenomenon, i.e., it may not represent separate and distinct dimensions of Muslim

[56] Item 35 was formulated positively, contrary to the other statements. More than seven out of ten respondents indicated that they 'agree' or 'totally agree' with his statement.

religiosity. In other words, the data for Factor I suggest that the 5-dimensional scale may refer only to different aspects of a single dimension rather than to separate dimensions of religiosity.

Table 16 - *Mean distributions for five aspects of general religiosity* (*n* = 1165)



Table 16 shows the mean distributions of general religiosity for the overall sample. Based on this table, we can conclude that eight out of ten Dutch-Turkish respondents experience high religiosity while two out of ten respondents experience low religiosity.

Table 17 - *Correlation matrix of five aspects of general religiosity*

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	*Means*	*SD*	*n*
(1)	Ideological	.					4,46	,99	1165
(2)	Ritualistic	,73**	.				3,74	1,03	1165
(3)	Experiential	,67**	,55**	.			3,53	1,15	1165
(4)	Intellectual	,65**	,59**	,56**	.		4,23	1,10	1165
(5)	Consequential	,78**	,65**	,64**	,64**	.	4,41	,90	1165

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The interrelations were tested by computing correlation coefficients among the five aspects of religiosity. For all respondents, the correlation coefficients ranged from a high of .78 between the ideological and consequential aspects to a low of .55 between the experiential and ideological aspects. All the correlations were positive and statistically significant.

5.2.7. *Conclusion*

Glock indicated two types of research that could be conducted utilizing his scheme. The first type of research to which Glock referred focuses on the question of inter-dimensional independence. The second type of research focuses on the intra-dimensional aspect. The idea of the first approach is that the various dimensions could be independent of each other, making it possible for individuals to score high on one dimension but low on another, and for social classes to differ in the form in which their religiosity is displayed. For example, Glock suggested that the working class might score high on belief but low on ritual practice, while the middle class might score high on ritual practice and low on belief. Regarding the matter of inter-dimensional independence, we found that 24 items of the general religiosity scale loaded on one general dimension (see Appendix one: Table 36).

Although Glock and Stark identified these 5 dimensions as core dimensions - dimensions which are both autonomous and independent - some specific studies have reported findings on the one-dimensional structure of this scheme, in line with our results. The one-dimensional structure of Glock's scheme is not surprising in the scientific study of religion. Clayton and Gladden (1974) discussed the Glock-Stark typology in their article and reported the existence of a single general factor. They concluded that religiosity is not multidimensional. According to further analysis of the Glock-Stark typology, religiosity seems to be one-dimensional in two cases: in the case of very high religiosity and in the case of complete irreligiosity. In the first case, all dimensions exhibit high intensities or frequencies, in the second case, all dimensions show very low values and are therefore (almost) perfectly correlated (Hubert, 2015). Perhaps the one-dimensional structure of the general religiosity scale is affected by the high religiosity characteristics of our sample. We elaborate on these considerations in the next chapter.

The second type of research, the intra-dimensional aspects of Glock's five dimensions, has so far not been taken into account in our analysis of the data. Glock proposed a number of tentative components within the various dimensions, but emphasized that there was still a great deal of work to be done in the field of intra-dimensional differentiation. The following part of our work focuses on such a research objective. Until this point in the survey, the believers were asked about the frequency

and quantity (*kammiyyāt*) of their religious beliefs and practices, accumulating scores on the general religiosity scale inspired by Glock (1962). Not the difference between elite and popular religion (intra-dimensional aspects of belief, practices, experience, knowledge), but the difference between belief and non-belief clearly emerged. In the next part of the survey, the central questions become 'how?' and 'why?' participants believe and practice. This brings into view rather different forms of beliefs and practices, and the motivations lying behind them (*kayfiyyāt*).[57]

Inspired by Allport's definition of the two ideal types intrinsic/extrinsic, our definition of elite/popular shows a clear development towards viewing the phenomena as types of motive, i.e., we zoom in on the *motivations* associated with religious beliefs and practices. We use the term 'form' to refer to the *cognitive styles* of religious beliefs and practices. In this study, then, the elite/popular distinction is operationalized as a measurement of two different kinds of motivations or cognitive styles in each of the dimensions (ideological, ritualistic, experiential and intellectual) which divide each of these dimensions in two subdimensions, 'elite' and 'popular'. For instance, within the ideological dimension of religiosity, what will be measured is not the belief-content itself, but elite/popular motivations or cognitive styles shaping the belief. These two different kinds of motivations or cognitive styles measured within each of the dimensions can be called 'elite motivations and cognitive styles of religiosity' and 'popular motivations and cognitive styles of religiosity'.

The starting point of our investigation is that elite forms and motivations, and popular forms and motivations, are both manifestations of strong religious affiliation. In other words, what distinguishes elite religiosity and popular religiosity is not a *commitment* to certain beliefs and practices, but different *motivations* and *cognitive styles*, or, to use a metaphor, the distinction concerns the vehicles used instead of the cargo carried. One can, for example, start from the Islamic definition of 'Islam' as 'submission to God'. All Muslims will agree to this definition. The difference lies in defining *how* one should go about with submitting to God. From that point on, a

[57] The Arabic term *kammiyyāt* comes from the root *"kam"*, which means "how many". This question therefore emphasizes the numerable or calculable side of faith. The Arabic term *kayfiyyāt*, on the other hand, comes from the root "*kayfa"* which means "how" or "in what way". This question mainly emphasizes motivations and cognitive styles of beliefs and practices, rather than their quantity.

comparative study of the different interpretations of *how* to submit to God (that is, how to be a Muslim) is central to the research.

Therefore, from this point on, participants with low or non-existent religious affiliations will be excluded from further analysis. In the general religiosity scale, we employed a 5-point Likert scale and a multiple-choice scale. To divide the variable '*general religiosity*' into two categories - an upper and a lower half - we used the median of its frequency distribution. The lower half represents low religiosity and the upper half represents high religiosity.[58] By means of this criterion, 272 (23.3%) of the respondents were excluded, because - due to their low religious commitment - they are unable to assist us in our search for the forms and motivations of different aspects of high religiosity. Our analysis will therefore focus on the remaining 893 respondents (76.7 % of the initial sample), who have strong religious affiliations and are therefore categorized as 'experiencing high religiosity'.

[58] Scoring method: Likert scale items scored 1 to 5. Multiple-choice scale items scored from 1, signifying a "wrong answer", to 5, signifying a "right answer". Other answer options were "not sure" and "no idea", recoded as '1'.

5.3. *Findings Concerning Aspects of Elite and Popular Religiosity*

Table 18 - *Correlation matrix*

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	*Means*	*SD*	*n*
(1)	Elite belief	.								2,67	1,12	893
(2)	Elite ritual	,62**	.							2,58	,99	893
(3)	Elite experience	,23**	33**	.						2,86	,86	893
(4)	Elite knowledge	,60**	,60**	,23**	.					2,55	1,03	893
(5)	Popular belief	-,65**	-,51**	-,23**	-,47**	.				3,37	1,06	893
(6)	Popular ritual	-,36**	-,52**	-,31**	-,40**	,51**	.			3,55	1,12	893
(7)	Popular experience	-,35**	-,38**	-,54**	-,32**	,31**	,27**	.		2,87	1,09	893
(8)	Popular knowledge	-,53**	-,52**	-,25**	-,53**	,65**	,58**	,31**	.	3,42	1,02	893

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

The interrelations were tested by computing correlation coefficients between the eight components (four subcomponents of elite religiosity, and four subcomponents of popular religiosity). The correlation coefficients range from a high negative correlation (-.65) to a high positive correlation (+0.65). The subcomponents of elite religiosity are negatively correlated with the subcomponents of popular religiosity. The subcomponents of elite religiosity are positively correlated with each other, just as the subcomponents of popular religiosity are positively correlated with each other.

5.3.1. *Factor Analysis of Elite Religiosity Scale and Popular Religiosity Scale*

In this section, we try to answer the third sub-question among the research questions. The third sub-question (RQ_1c) was: 'What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?'

In chapter 3 several characteristics and motivations were presented, which range from popular religiosity on one side of the spectrum to elite religiosity on the other. These two aspects of religiosity reflect subcomponents, including belief, practice, knowledge, experience and consequences. Under these subcomponents, this study has identified several characteristics that we believe distinguish elite religiosity from popular religiosity. These characteristics were: dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and privacy versus experiential desirability and shareability.

If we look at the factor analysis of elite religiosity (see Appendix one, Table 37) and the factor analysis of popular religiosity (see Appendix one, Table 38), we can clearly see an overlap between several of the dimensions. There is an area of overlap between elite belief and elite knowledge, which together generate attitudes of criticism and openness to spiritual and intellectual change. Another area of overlap exists between popular belief and popular knowledge, which together generate a lack of criticism and resistance to spiritual and intellectual change.

After initial factor analysis, we assumed that at least one or two dimensions of elite and popular religiosity might be represented by one factor. The final factor analysis revealed that 11 items of elite religiosity loaded on two factors, as expected. The correlation between the two factors was 0.41. The pattern loadings of these two factors

are presented in Table 37 (see Appendix one). The first factor turned out to mainly represent elite belief, elite ritual and elite knowledge. In this study, all the factors listed below are labelled on the basis of the loadings of the *indicator variables*, i.e., the variables within the factor with the highest loadings, and also on the basis of the common features of variables. Based on this criterion, the first factor may be labelled '[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation'. The second factor turned out to mainly represent elite experience. This factor may be labelled 'experiential inessentiality and privacy'.

The final factor analysis revealed that 11 items of popular religiosity scale loaded on two factors as well. The correlation between the two factors was 0.34. The pattern loadings of these two factors are presented in Table 38 (see Appendix one). This table shows all the items loaded on these two factors. Factor 1 turned out to mainly represent popular belief, popular ritual and popular knowledge. This first factor may be labelled 'material expectations and [spiritual and intellectual] stability'. The second factor turned out to mainly represent popular experience. This factor may be labelled 'experiential desirability and shareability'.[59] The main reason for this structural similarity is that these groups of items were formulated by taking mutual interrelations between elite and popular religiosity into account.

Researchers may prefer to merge variables when they reveal strong correlations, in order to reduce the complexity of the representation. An indicator is available in all statistical software packages that estimates the strengths of the average correlations between two or more variables that are eligible for a merger into a single dimension. This indicator is called 'Cronbach's alpha' (Minkov, 2012, p. 139). Since the elite and popular religiosity variables reveal a strong correlation with each other (respectively $\alpha = .82$ and $\alpha = .84$, see chapter 4), we prefer to combine them in a single dimension. Combining the 2-factors structures for the elite and popular religiosity scales into a single data set can simplify the analysis. It is precisely with a view to this simplification that the two 2-factor structures for the scales were merged into a single factor per scale, factors which were then considered a single dimension for the scales in question. In other words, based on the factor analysis of elite religiosity, a single score '*elite*

[59] In these statements, we prefer to use the formulation "*may* be labelled" because of the subjective and controversial character of these labels, which are designed based on the personal judgement of the researcher.

religiosity' was constructed by combining the 2-factor structure '[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation' and 'experiential inessentiality and privacy.' Likewise, based on the factor analysis of popular religiosity, a single score '*popular religiosity*' was constructed by combining the 2-factor structure 'material expectations and [spiritual and intellectual] stability' and 'experiential desirability and shareability.' This means that the scores obtained on the two 2-factor structures will be evaluated as a total score when measuring *elite religiosity* and *popular religiosity*.

The fourth sub-question (*RQ1d*) among the research questions was: 'What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?' The present study expects to find that 'Elite and popular forms of religiosity are negatively correlated with each another' (*H1*).

We tested correlation coefficients among the three religiosities (elite, popular and high religiosity).

Table 19 - *Correlation matrix (elite, popular and high Religiosity)*

		(1)	(2)	(3)	*Means*	*SD*	*n*
(1)	High religiosity	.			4,24	,34	893
(2)	Elite religiosity	-,09**	.		2,75	,67	893
(3)	Popular religiosity	,054	-,72**	.	3,30	,81	893

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The study found a negative correlation between elite religiosity and popular religiosity (r = -.72) and also a negative correlation between high religiosity and elite religiosity (r = -.09). The study found no correlation between high religiosity and popular religiosity.

The null hypothesis[60] (there is no relationship between elite and popular religiosity) was therefore rejected.

[60] *H1* may be formulated in terms of absence of similarity or the presence of difference, and the null hypothesis may be formulated in a reversed manner, in terms of presence of similarity or the absence of difference. If there is no similarity or if there actually is a difference, the null

5.3.2. *Average Means of Elite and Popular Religiosity*

We now turn to the other part of the empirical question raised in this section: *RQ1e*: 'How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?' The first hypothesis of the present study in this context was that 'Turkish Muslim minorities living in the Netherlands predominantly experience popular religiosity' (*H2*).

Table 20 - *Average means of elite and popular religiosity* (*n* = 893)



A median split formed the low and high scores for the elite and popular religiosity groups (high level of elite religiosity ≥ 3 and high level of popular religiosity ≥ 3). According to this criterion, 611 (% 68.4) of the respondents experience popular religiosity while 269 (% 30.1) experience elite religiosity.[61]

hypothesis is rejected, and if there is similarity or there is no difference, the null hypothesis is not rejected.

[61] Table 20 includes the group of respondents who experience (low or high) elite and popular religiosity simultaneously.

Table 21 - *Cross tabulations*

		Popular religiosity				
		1<2	2<3	3<4	4<5	Total
Elite	1<2	1	5	42	68	116
religiosity	2<3	8	65	346	89	508
	3<4	83	94	56	4	237
	4<5	15	11	6	0	32
Total		107	175	450	161	893

Cross-tabulation shows that 79 (% 8,8) of the respondents experience low levels of elite *and* popular religiosity, and 66 (% 7,3) respondents experience high levels of elite *and* popular religiosity, even after exclusion of the group of respondents who experience low religiosity. This means that a significant number of the respondents subscribe to both the elite and popular religiosity items. Some of these items are positively and negatively worded versions of virtually the same item. The problem we are encountering here is essentially the same as that of the various researchers who have tried to reverse the wording of items, in order to avoid an unwanted response-set bias.

An example from the intellectual dimension of the elite and popular religiosity scales would be: 'For me, doubting the validity of my current religious knowledge is an important part of what it means to be religious' (elite religiosity). 'If I find answers to my religious questions trough imams, I never doubt their correctness' (popular religiosity). (For a comparison of the items, see the following tables in Appendix one: Table 37, Table 38)

The approach used by Peabody (1961) provides us with a model for meaningfully analyzing our data. By comparing each individual's responses to the same question, which was formulated positively in one place and reversely formulated in another, he was able to distinguish between those who were consistently pro or anti the content of authoritarian items. Table 22 above applies Peabody's paradigm to our data.

In assigning our 893 cases to these categories, we used the following criteria.

Individuals who consistently agree with elite religiosity scale items and who disagree with popular religiosity scale items, are assigned to *Elite religiosity*. Due to

the scoring method used, these individuals fall above the median scores on the elite religiosity scale.

Individuals who consistently agree with popular religiosity scale items and who disagree with elite religiosity scale items, are assigned to *Popular religiosity*. Due to the scoring method used, these individuals fall above the median scores on the popular religiosity scale.

Concerning the respondents who experience low levels of elite and popular religiosity simultaneously, we can say that definitions of elite and popular religion do not cover all aspects of high religiosity. These results mean that a high level of religiosity should be considered with a number of additional aspects. Concerning the respondents who experience elite and popular religiosity simultaneously, we can recall the interrelation existing between elite religiosity and popular religiosity. In this case, it could be said that it is perfectly possible that some respondents experience some aspects of elite and popular religiosity simultaneously. These results will be discussed in the next chapter.

Table 22 - *Agreement and disagreement with elite and popular religiosity scale* (*n* = 893)

	Agrees with elite religiosity	*Disagrees with elite religiosity*
Agrees with popular religiosity	Double agreement 66 (% 7,4)	Consistently popular religiosity 545 (% 61)
Disagrees with popular religiosity	Consistently elite religiosity 203 (% 22,7)	Double disagreement 79 (% 8,8)
	total = 269	*total = 624*

Finally, our study excludes those who display a double agreement (or double disagreement) with both scales. In view of further analysis, these cases diminish the statistical significance of our data to some degree. We temporarily halted the analysis of these groups, and continued to investigate the differences between those 748 respondents who experience a high level of elite religiosity and a high level of popular religiosity (after exclusion of 145 respondents).

In the following paragraphs and tables, we give participants who consistently experience a high level of elite religiosity the label '*elite religiosity*', and participants who consistently experience a high level of popular religiosity the label '*popular religiosity*'.

5.3.3. *Independent Variables and Elite and Popular Religiosity*

In this section, this study continues to research the following research question *RQ1e*: 'How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?'

Firstly, we will discuss the remaining three hypotheses regarding education, income and generational differences. We then discuss our expectations with regard to gender and age. A series of ANOVA results revealed that there were some significant differences regarding elite/popular religiosity in relation to demographic variables.

5.3.3.1. *Educational Status*

The first research question was: in what manner does the educational status of an individual impact on elite /popular religiosity?

Table 23 - *Education and elite/popular religiosity*

		n	*Means*	*SD*	*F*	*Sig.*
Elite religiosity	Primary education	11	3,41	,24		
	Secondary education	31	3,63	,32		
	Undergraduate	111	3,69	,33	2,83	,039*
	Postgraduate	50	3,69	,29		
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Primary education	79	3,91	,47		
	Secondary education	153	3,92	,41		
	Undergraduate	267	3,72	,40	10,83	,000*
	Postgraduate	46	3,66	,37		
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Our hypothesis was: 'High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with education. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with education' (*H4*).

A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 23) and the findings showed that there was a significant difference in the means of elite and popular religiosity based on educational status.

The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the educational level of the participants and elite and popular religiosity) was rejected.

Table 23 shows that respondents with a higher educational status experience elite religiosity more clearly than respondents with a lower educational status. A significant difference (F = 2,83, p = .039) was found between the means of these values.

This table also shows that respondents with a lower educational status experience popular religiosity more clearly than respondents with a higher educational status. A significant difference (F = 10,83, p = .000) was found between the means of these values.

Table 24 considers respondents who experience high religiosity. A one-way ANOVA was used to test whether there are differences in the means of high religiosity and the findings showed that there was a significant difference based on educational status (F = 3,78, p = .010). The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the educational level of the participants and high religiosity) was rejected. Table 24 shows that the intensity of high religiosity decreases with education.

Table 24 - *Education and high religiosity*

		n	*Means*	*SD*	*F*	*Sig.*
High religiosity	Primary education	107	4,28	,32		
	Secondary education	215	4,30	,30		
	Undergraduate	456	4,21	,37	3,78	,010*
	Postgraduate	115	4,21	,33		
	Total	893	4,24	,34		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

5.3.3.2. *Income*

The second research question was: in what manner does the income of an individual impact the score on the elite/popular religiosity scale?

Our hypothesis was: ‘High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with

economic status. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with economic status' (H_5).

Table 25 - Income and elite/popular religiosity (n = 748)

	Income	*n*	*Means*	*SD*	*F*	*Sig.*
Elite religiosity	Below €10,000	12	3,71	,38	,60	,659
	€ 10,000 - €30,000	88	3,68	,32		
	€ 30,000 - € 60,000	67	3,64	,32		
	€ 60,000 - € 100,000	30	3,64	,26		
	Above € 100,000	6	3,83	,44		
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Below €10,000	30	3,75	,45	2,49	,042*
	€ 10,000 - €30,000	232	3,76	,40		
	€ 30,000 - € 60,000	202	3,80	,41		
	€ 60,000 - € 100,000	64	3,94	,49		
	Above € 100,000	17	3,87	,51		
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 25) and the findings showed that there was no significant difference in the means of elite religion based on income. The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the income of the participants and scores on the elite religiosity scale) was maintained.

Surprisingly, however, we found that there was a significant difference in the means of popular religiosity based on income. If the respondents who earn more than 100,000 Euros are excluded, we can read this table as showing that respondents with a higher income experience popular religiosity more clearly than respondents with a lower income. A significant difference (F = 2,49, p = .042) was found between the means of these values.

According to these results, our hypothesis is rejected.

5.3.3.3. *Generational differences*

The third research question was: in what manner does the generational status of an individual impact the score on the elite/popular religiosity scale?

Our hypothesis was: 'First-generation respondents experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation respondents' (H_3).

A group t-test for differences between the first and second-generation respondents supported the hypothesis that there would be differences between the two groups.

Table 26 - Independent samples t-test – Religiosity and generational differences

	Generations	*n*	*Means*	*SD*	*F*	*Sig.*
Elite religiosity	First generation	115	3,66	,331	,12	,646
	Second generation	88	3,68	,316		,644
Popular religiosity	First generation	338	3,86	,438	4,65	,000*
	Second generation	207	3,69	,387		,000*
High religiosity	First generation	528	4,32	,311	4,21	,000*
	Second generation	365	4,13	,370		,000*
Low religiosity	First generation	120	2,16	,245	,63	,568
	Second generation	152	2,14	,236		,570
Education	First generation	648	2,51	,889	77,87	,000*
	Second generation	517	2,88	,718		,000*

* Significance is based on a 2-tailed test.
t-test statistics based on the assumption of equal variances.

The means of *elite religiosity* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. No significance was found within this group ($p > .05$).

The means of *popular religiosity* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. Significance at the .05 level was found within this group ($p < .001$).

The means of *high religiosity* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of *low religiosity* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. No significance was found within this group ($p > .05$).

The means of *education* were compared for the first and second-generation respondents. Significance at the .05 level was found within this group ($p < .001$).

Looking at the average mean values of each group, we can conclude that the first-

generation respondents were stronger in popular religiosity and stronger in high religiosity compared to the second-generation respondents.

5.3.3.4. *Gender*

The fourth research question was: in what manner does the gender of an individual impact on elite /popular religiosity?

Table 27 - *Gender and elite/popular religion*

Gender		*n*	*Means*	*SD*	*F*	*Sig.*
Elite religiosity	Male	120	3,65	,32		
	Female	83	3,68	,32	,38	,536
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Male	281	3,82	,43		
	Female	264	3,78	,41	1,10	,294
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

Our expectation was: 'The experience level of popular religiosity is higher among Muslim women than among Muslim men' (E_1)

A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 27) and the findings showed that there was no significant difference in the means of elite religiosity (F = ,38, p = .586) and popular religiosity (F = 1,10, p = .294) based on gender.

The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the gender of the participants and scores on the elite religiosity scale) was maintained.

5.3.3.5. *Age*

The fifth research question was: in what manner does the age of an individual impact on elite / popular religiosity?

Table 28 - *Age groups and elite/popular religiosity*

		n	*Means*	*SD*	*F*	*Sig.*
Elite religiosity	Between 18 - 25	64	3,69	,34	1,38	,242
	Between 26 - 35	47	3,73	,35		
	Between 36 - 45	38	3,65	,30		
	Between 46 - 55	27	3,62	,29		
	56 and older	27	3,57	,26		
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Between 18 - 25	159	3,72	,40	3,39	,003*
	Between 26 - 35	144	3,77	,43		
	Between 36 - 45	108	3,80	,40		
	Between 46 - 55	80	3,92	,44		
	56 and older	54	3,91	,43		
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Our expectation was: 'Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and above) experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-35)' (E_2).

A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 28) and the findings showed that there was no significant difference in the means of elite religiosity based on age groups. The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the age of the participants and scores on the elite religiosity scale) was maintained.

However, the findings showed that there was a difference in the means of popular religiosity based on age groups. Table 28 shows that the middle-aged (36 - 55) and older participants (56 and above) experienced popular religiosity more intensely compared to young respondents. A significant difference (F = 3,39, p = .003) was found between the means of these values. The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the age of the participants and scores on the popular religiosity scale) was rejected.

Table 29 - *Correlation matrix of age, residence duration and religiosity*

		High religiosity	Elite religiosity	Popular religiosity
Age group	Pearson correlation	,213**	-,139*	,162**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,048	,000
	n	893	203	545
Residence duration	Pearson correlation	,070	-,269**	,033
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,117	,004	,556
	n	502	111	316

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 29 shows a correlation matrix of age, residence duration and religiosity. According to this table, the older generations tend to be more religious than the younger generation (r = .21). Moreover, age group turns out to be negatively correlated with elite religiosity (r = -.13) and positively correlated with popular religiosity (r = .16).

We found a negative correlation between the residence duration of respondents who were not born in the Netherlands and elite religiosity (r = -.26). In other words, living in a non-Muslim environment does seem to weaken ties with elite religiosity.

5.3.3.6. *Elite / Popular religiosity and Feeling Oneself More Religious*

The seventh research question was: in what manner does a sense that one is more religious than most people, impact on elite /popular religiosity?

Our expectation was: ‘Respondents who identify themselves as ‘more religious than most’ predominantly experience popular religiosity’(E_3).

Table 30 - *Item 12 - I believe myself to be more religious than most people*

		n	*Means*	*SD*	*F*	*Sig.*
Elite religiosity	Right	55	3,57	,26	5,75	,005*
	Wrong	117	3,73	,33		
	No idea	31	3,60	,32		
	Total	203	3,67	,32		
Popular religiosity	Right	269	3,85	,43	4,77	,017*
	Wrong	179	3,74	,41		
	No idea	97	3,74	,40		
	Total	545	3,80	,42		

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

In elite religiosity, 27 % (55) of the respondents stated they were more religious than most, while 58 % (113) of the respondents stated they were no more religious than most. 15 % (31) stated they had no opinion.

However, in popular religiosity, 49 % (269) of the respondents stated they were more religious than most, while 33 % (179) of the respondents stated they were no more religious than most. 18 % (97) stated they had no opinion.

A one-way ANOVA with post-hoc analysis was used to test this research question (see Table 30) and the findings showed that there was a significant difference in the means of elite religiosity (F = 5,75, p = .005) and popular religiosity (F = 4,77, p = .017) based on the item ‘believing oneself to be more religious than most’. (Between two items: right and wrong). The null hypothesis (there is no relation between ‘believing oneself to be more religious than most’ and scores on the elite and popular religiosity scales) was rejected. According to these results, our expectation is confirmed.

5.3.4. *Factors Influencing Elite and Popular Religiosity*

Table 31 - Correlation matrix of factors influencing elite/popular religiosity

		Family	Friends	School	Books	R. Leaders	Mosques	R. Found.	TV	Internet
Elite religiosity	Pearson correlation	,184**	,086	,129	,266**	,141*	-,018	,041	-,221**	,038
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,009	,225	,067	,000	,045	,799	,559	,002	,591
	n	203	203	203	203	203	203	203	203	203
Popular religiosity	Pearson correlation	,074	,079	,010	-,005	,177**	,174**	,057	,187**	,104*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,085	,064	,810	,900	,000	,000	,180	,000	,015
	n	545	545	545	545	545	545	545	545	545
Education	Pearson correlation	-,001	,000	-,041	,242**	-,066*	-,094**	-,015	-,184**	-,073*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,974	1,000	,163	,000	,025	,001	,612	,000	,013
	n	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165	1165

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

This part of the study will seek to identify bivariate associations, and therefore, will utilize the Pearson correlation coefficient.

The respondents were asked how much the following items influenced their religious education: family, friends, school, books, religious leaders, mosques, religious foundations, television and the Internet.

Our expectations were:

‘Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through television programmes, experience a high level of popular religiosity’ (E_4).

‘Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through their family experience a high level of popular religiosity’ (E_5).

Since this aspect of the present study was exploratory, no hypotheses and further expectations were presented.

We found that elite religiosity is positively correlated with family (r = .18), books (r = .26), religious leaders (r = .14), while negatively correlated with television (r = -.22). We found that elite religiosity is not significantly correlated with friends, school, mosques, religious foundations and the Internet.

At the same time, we found that popular religiosity is positively correlated with religious leaders (r = .27), mosques (r = .24), television (r = .25) and the Internet (r = .15). We found that popular religiosity is not significantly correlated with family, friends, school, books and religious foundations.

We also looked at the way in which educational status itself influences religious education. We found that educational status is positively correlated with books (r = .24), while negatively correlated with religious leaders (r = -.06), mosques (r = -.09), television (r = -.18) and the Internet (r = .07).

According to these results, our first expectation was confirmed while our second expectation was rejected.

5.3.5. *Socio-psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity*

Consequential Dimension of Religiosity

We now turn to the other part of the empirical question raised in this section: RQ_2: 'What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively?'

The consequential dimension of religiosity was measured through the use of several attitude scales. The consequential dimension includes all those religious prescriptions that specify what people ought to do and the attitudes they are supposed to have as a consequence of their religion. Therefore, this dimension can also be described as an attitudinal aspect. This attitudinal aspect is interpreted here as the connection of elite and popular religiosity with people's daily lives. The scales used in previous studies that have similar characteristics of popular religiosity, have generally shown that aspects of popular religion are not only related to racial and ethnic prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 441) but to a large number of other *socially divisive* characteristics as well. On the other hand, scales used in previous studies with equivalent characteristics of elite religiosity have generally shown that aspects of elite religion are unrelated or negatively related to racial and ethnic prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 441) and also that these aspects are positively related to a variety of *socially productive* characteristics (Capucao, 2010; Hood, 1998; Nelson, 2015). In order to measure these various non-religious characteristics, several attitude scales have been developed in this study.

The attitudinal aspects were chosen to cover a wide range of life issues, including modernity, gender, sectarian issues, social relations in society, and attitudes towards Christianity (numerically the strongest religion in the Netherlands).

Accordingly, in order to measure attitudinal consequences of elite and popular religiosity, this study presents the following scales that make up the fourth part of our questionnaire. These scales are:

Attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)

Attitudes towards women

Attitudes towards race/ethnicity

Attitudes towards others

Attitudes towards modernity

In-group attitudes

These scales consist of 27 items (see Appendix one, Table 38). The respondents were asked to answer on a 5-point Likert scale (5 referred to 'completely agree' and 1 to 'completely disagree'). 11 items were structured negatively, and 16 positively. Positively phased items were scored as 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and negatively phased items were reversely scored as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. This scoring method suggests that mean scores ranging from 1 to 3 indicate a positive tendency towards the listed attitude, and that mean scores ranging from 3 to 5 indicate a negative tendency towards the listed attitude.

The following tables show the average mean distributions for elite and popular religiosity.

Table 32 - *Average mean distributions for elite religiosity*



According to table 32, 188 (% 93) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 15 (% 7) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'hostile attitudes towards other religions'*.

121 (% 98) male respondents out of 123 male participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 2 (% 2) male respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'subordinate attitudes towards women'*.

188 (% 93) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 15 (% 7) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'prejudiced attitudes towards others'*.

197 (% 97) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 6 (% 3) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'hostile attitudes towards others'*.

179 (% 88) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 24 (% 12) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'harmonious attitudes towards modernity'*.

112 (% 70) respondents out of 158 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 46 (% 30) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'conservative in-group attitudes'*.

Table 33- *Average mean distributions for popular religiosity*



According to table 33, 435 (% 80) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 110 (% 20) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'hostile attitudes towards other religions'*.

255 (% 89) male respondents out of 285 male participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 30 (% 11) male respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'subordinate attitudes towards women'*.

467 (% 86) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 78 (% 14) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'prejudiced attitudes towards others'*.

495 (% 91) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 50 (% 9) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'hostile attitudes towards others'*.

461 (% 85) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 84 (% 15) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'harmonious attitudes towards modernity'*.

216 (% 74) respondents out of 293 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 77 (% 26) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale *'conservative in-group attitudes'*.

Table 34 - *t-test comparison of some socio-psychological attitudes for elite and popular religiosity*

Subscale	Type of religiosity	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	*Sig.*
(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions	Elite religiosity	203	1,90	,730	,000*
(i.e., Christianity)	Popular religiosity	545	2,34	,895	,000*
(Subordinate) attitudes towards women	Elite religiosity	123	1,66	,595	,000*
	Popular religiosity	281	2,13	,728	,000*
(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race	Elite religiosity	203	1,82	,744	,000*
	Popular religiosity	545	2,20	,906	,000*
(Hostile) attitudes towards others	Elite religiosity	203	1,78	,652	,000*
	Popular religiosity	545	2,15	,806	,000*
(Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism	Elite religiosity	203	2,17	,965	,842
	Popular religiosity	545	2,18	1,007	,839
(Conservative) in-group attitudes	Elite religiosity	168	2,52	,970	,000*
	Popular religiosity	393	2,99	,944	,000*

* Significance is based on a 2-tailed test.
t-test statistics based on the assumption of equal variances.
(n = 748)

Socio-psychological Attitudes

The second research question was: 'What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively?'.

Our hypotheses were:

(H_6) Respondents motivated by elite religiosity are more open to interaction with Christians than respondents motivated by popular religiosity.
(H_7) Men motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more subordinate attitudes towards women and more traditional ideas about gender, than men motivated by elite religiosity.
(H_8) Respondents motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more prejudiced attitudes towards other races/ethnicities than respondents motivated by elite religiosity.
(H_9) Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more hostile attitude towards others than respondents motivated by elite religiosity.
(H_{10}) Respondents motivated by elite religiosity have a more harmonious attitude towards modernity than respondents motivated by popular religiosity.
(H_{11}) Respondents motivated by elite religiosity exhibit less conservative in-group attitudes than respondents motivated by popular religiosity.

The fourth sub-question was addressed by conducting independent t-tests on each subscale of the questionnaire, to determine whether there were differences in the means of the socio-psychological attitudes in relation to elite and popular religiosity.

The means of the '(prejudiced) attitudes towards race' subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of the '(subordinate) attitudes towards women' subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Female respondents are excluded from this scale because of the question characteristics. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of the ‘(hostile) attitudes towards other religions (i.e., Christianity)’ subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of the ‘(hostile) attitudes towards others’ subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

The means of the ‘(harmonious) attitudes towards modernism’ subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. No significance was found within this subscale ($p > .05$).

The means of the ‘(conservative) in-group attitudes’ subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ($p < .001$).

According to our scoring method, values ranging from 1 to 3 indicate a positive tendency towards listed attitudes, and values ranging from 3 to 5 indicate a negative tendency towards listed attitudes. If we look at the average mean values of each attitude scale, we can conclude that both participants who experience elite religiosity and participants who experience popular religiosity have negative attitudes towards each scale. This means that, according to the average result, the participants - regardless of their religious affiliations - are not hostile towards members of other religions; do not have subordinate attitudes towards women; are not prejudiced towards other races; are not hostile towards others; and do not have conservative in-group attitudes.

However, the differences in the mean values between the two groups are significant. We found that respondents who experienced popular religiosity were less open and friendly towards other religions. Moreover, men who experienced popular religiosity had poorer views on the equality and rights of women compared to men who experienced elite religiosity. It also turned out that participants who experienced popular religiosity expressed more (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and showed more conservative in-group attitudes than participants who experienced elite religiosity. According to these results, hypotheses 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11 are confirmed. Hypothesis 10 is rejected.

Table 35 - *Correlation matrix of socio-psychological factors*

		(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions	(Subordinate) attitudes towards women	(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race	(Hostile) attitudes towards others	(Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism	(Conservative) in-group attitudes
Elite religiosity	Pearson correlation	-,159*	-,239**	-,150*	-,214**	-,069	-,004
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,024	,008	,033	,002	,330	,962
	n	203	123	203	203	203	168
Popular religiosity	Pearson correlation	,159**	,301**	,106*	,111**	,065	,170**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,013	,009	,131	,001
	n	545	281	545	545	545	393
High religiosity	Pearson correlation	,073*	,166**	,061	,019	,042	,068
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,028	,000	,068	,572	,214	,081
	n	893	492	893	893	893	660
Education	Pearson correlation	-,121**	-,217**	-,160**	-,118**	,020	-,106**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	,000	,557	,007
	n	893	492	893	893	893	660
Age group	Pearson correlation	,036	,211**	,115**	,048	-,057	,000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,286	,000	,001	,148	,090	,992
	n	893	492	893	893	893	660

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The results of a Pearson correlation coefficient established that the correlation between the religiosity scales and the scales for socio-psychological factors, as well as the correlation between education and age group and the scales for socio-psychological factors, are all significant.

The study observes a negative correlation between the subscale '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions' and elite religiosity (r = -.159); between (subordinate) attitudes towards women and elite religiosity (r = -.239); between (prejudiced) attitudes towards race and elite religiosity (r = -.150); and between (hostile) attitudes towards others and elite religiosity (r = -.214).

The study observes a positive correlation between the subscale '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions' and popular religiosity (r = .159); between (subordinate) attitudes towards women and popular religiosity (r = .301); between (prejudiced) attitudes towards race and popular religiosity (r = .106); between (hostile) attitudes towards others and popular religiosity (r = .111); and between (conservative) in-group attitudes and popular religiosity (r = .170).

The study observes a positive correlation between the subscale '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions' and high religiosity (r = .073); and between (subordinate) attitudes towards women and high religiosity (r = .166).

The study observes a negative correlation between the subscale '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions' and education (r = -.121); between (subordinate) attitudes towards women and education (r = -.160); between (prejudiced) attitudes towards race and education (r = -.160); between (hostile) attitudes towards others and education (r = .118); and between (conservative) in-group attitudes and education (r = -.106).

The study observes a positive correlation between the subscale '(subordinate) attitudes towards women' and age group (r = .211); and between (prejudiced) attitudes towards race and age group (r = .115).

These findings show that there are important socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among the two groups. Therefore, these research findings will be elaborated in the next chapter (see 6.2.4. Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity).

6. Summary, Discussion and Conclusion

In the literature review we have argued that, although the distinction between elite and popular religiosity - as perceived in the Islamic world - seems to have had a far-reaching influence on the way Muslims act and think, psychological and sociological literature has failed to investigate this influence - neither theoretical elaboration nor empirical research of this factor has taken place. Our study was designed to fill that gap. In order to conduct research in this neglected domain, we needed to develop a scale for assessing elite and popular religiosity.

Starting from this point, the necessary steps of this study can be divided into several categories. The first step was a discussion of the general characteristics of elite and popular religiosity within Islam, together with an exploration of the differences and similarities between the two concepts. The second step was an exploration of the experience of elite and popular religiosity by considering demographic and social-cultural factors in the Netherlands. Finally, the study aimed to reveal various socio-psychological characteristics of elite and popular religiosity by surveying Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. This chapter provides a summary of the most important research findings of our study and a discussion of the social and psychological implications for Dutch-Turkish Muslims. The contribution of this study to the scientific research of religion carried out in Muslim societies is also discussed. Finally, recommendations for future research are presented.

6.1. *Summary of Research Findings*

This section presents the most important research results that contribute to answering the two research questions - with their sub-questions - that are central to this study. In addition, we will see which hypotheses found support, and which ones had to be rejected.

6.1.1. *Characteristics of the Respondents and the Questionnaire*

A survey was conducted among Turkish Muslims living in different parts of the Netherlands. There were 649 male and 516 female Turkish Muslim participants, varying in age from 18 to 68 years. The first part of the questionnaire was designed to identify the further demographic characteristics of the participants. The second part of the questionnaire was designed to obtain information about five dimensions of religion: the ideological, ritualistic, experiential, intellectual and consequential dimensions. This part of the questionnaire was not designed to discover the difference between elite and popular religiosity, but to investigate the difference between high religiosity and low religiosity, measured on a scale we called the *General Religiosity Scale* (GRS).

In the GRS, as indicated in chapters 4 and 5, we divided the variable 'general religiosity' into two categories - an upper and a lower half - by using used the median of its frequency distribution. The lower half represents low religiosity and the upper half high religiosity. On the basis of this criterion, 272 (23,3 %) of the respondents were excluded from follow-up study and we continued the analysis of the other 893 (76,7 %) respondents, who were labelled as experiencing '*high religiosity*'.

The third part of the questionnaire consisted of two scales: the *Elite Religiosity Scale* and the *Popular Religiosity Scale,* both specially developed for the surveying of Dutch-Turkish Muslim communities. This part of the questionnaire, which distinguishes the current study from previous studies in the field, was specifically designed to uncover differences between elite and popular religiosity.

6.1.2. *Research Questions, Hypothesis and Results*

The following research questions were asked in this study:

RQ1: 'What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?' In order to be in a position to answer this main research question, we explored six sub-questions. The first sub-question was *RQ1a*: 'How can the relationship between religion and culture be characterized, and how do we understand popular and elite religiosity in our research setting?' (Chapter 2, 'Theoretical Background').

In chapters 1, 2 and 3, which form the theoretical framework of this study, the relationship between elite/popular in culture and elite/popular in religion was explored; these insights were then applied to the sociological background of elite and popular religiosity and its foundations.

The literature review showed that the 'great' and 'little' traditions in Islam, which are derived from the more expansive division of 'great' and 'little' traditions in culture, have great significance for understanding the religious structure of Turkish society.

The second sub-question was *RQ1b*: 'What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in the context of Turkish - and possibly also Dutch - society, and how do these characteristics relate to the socio-economic status of (Dutch-) Turkish Muslims?'

In chapter 3, some structural characteristics of a new Muslim religiosity scale were suggested, ranging from popular religiosity on one end of the continuum to elite religiosity on the other. These two extremes reflect the classification of the sub-dimensions, which include belief (*īmān*), practice (*ʿamal*), knowledge (*ʿilm / maʿrifah*), experience (*maʿūnat / ilhām*) and consequences (*natījah*). Under these sub-dimensions, the current study identified several characteristics, which according to us distinguish elite religiosity from popular religiosity. These characteristics are: dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and privacy versus experiential desirability and shareability, tolerant versus intolerant, and unprejudiced versus prejudiced.

The exploration of these two sub-questions was described in chapters 2 and 3. As a result of our literature review, we added additional research questions in order to achieve an even more articulated response to our main research question. The ensuing sub-questions were explored by way of a survey, and by means of an analysis of the collected data. The third sub-question was *RQ1c*: 'What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?'

Factor analyses and correlation analyses performed on the Elite Religiosity Scale and the Popular Religiosity Scale, showed that participants who experience elite religiosity tend to stress doubt and dynamism within the ideological aspect of religiosity. Within the ritualistic aspect, they tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of rituals (i.e., focus on quality). Within the intellectual aspect, they underline the importance of doubt about the validity of their current religious knowledge, and the dynamism of religious learning. Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they consider miraculous religious experiences (special gifts from God in exchange for their religious effort) to be relatively unimportant: for them it is essential to keep these private.

Participants who experience popular religiosity tend to stress the sureness and the stability of their current beliefs within the ideological aspect of religiosity. Within the ritualistic aspect, they emphasize the extrinsic value of rituals (i.e., focus on quantity) and they express material expectations. Within the intellectual aspect, they tend to be sure of their current religious knowledge and place intellectual stability at the centre. Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they consider miraculous religious experiences to be an appropriate and necessary part of religious commitment, and they are eager to report such experiences to others.

The fourth sub-question was *RQ1d*: 'What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?' We hypothesized that 'Elite and popular forms of religiosity are negatively correlated with each another' (*H1*). We indeed found a negative correlation between elite religiosity and popular religiosity (r = -.72).

The fifth sub-question was *RQ1e*: 'How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?' The first hypothesis related to this sub-question was that 'Turkish Muslim minorities living in the Netherlands predominantly experience popular

religiosity' (H_2). Of the 893 (76.7%) respondents with a strong religious affiliation, 203 (22.7%) turned out to consistently experience elite religiosity, while 545 (61%) consistently experienced popular religiosity. 79 (8.8%) respondents who simultaneously experienced a low level of elite and popular religiosity and 66 (7.3%) respondents who simultaneously experienced a high level of elite and popular religiosity were excluded from further analysis. A total of 145 respondents (16.2%) were excluded after cross-tabulation analysis.

The third hypothesis related to the fifth sub-question was: 'First-generation respondents experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation respondents' (H_3). According to our findings, first-generation respondents do indeed experience popular religiosity more intensely than second-generation respondents.

The fourth hypothesis related to the fifth sub-question was: 'High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with education. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with education.' (H_4). The research results showed that there was a significant difference in the means of elite and popular religiosity based on educational status. Respondents with a higher level of education experienced a higher level of elite religiosity than respondents with a lower educational level. Similarly, respondents with a lower level of education experienced a higher level of popular religiosity than respondents with a higher educational level.

The fifth hypothesis related to the fifth sub-question was: 'High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with economic status. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with economic status.' (H_5). We found no significant difference in the means of elite religiosity based on income. However, we found a significant difference in the means of popular religiosity. Respondents with a higher income experienced a higher level of popular religiosity compared to respondents with a lower income.

In addition to these hypotheses, we formulated a number of expectations with regard to the fifth sub-question (RQ_1e). Because of the exploratory nature of our research, we explicitly described them as expectations rather than hypotheses. The first expectation was: 'The experience of popular religiosity is higher among Muslim women than among Muslim men' (E_1). We found no significant difference in the means of elite and popular religiosity based on gender. The second expectation was:

‘Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and above) experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-35)’ (E_2). The findings showed that there was a difference in the means of popular religiosity based on age. The middle-aged and older participants experienced popular religiosity more intensely than the young respondents. The third expectation was: ‘Respondents who identify themselves as ‘more religious than most’ predominantly experience popular religiosity’ (E_3). We found that - based on the item ‘believing oneself to be more religious than most’ - there was a significant difference both in the means of elite religiosity and in the means of popular religiosity. Those who identified themselves as ‘more religious than most’ predominantly experienced popular religiosity. The fourth expectation was: ‘Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through television programmes, experience a high level of popular religiosity’ (E_4). We found that popular religiosity is positively correlated with acquiring religious knowledge through television programmes. The fifth expectation was: ‘Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge through their family experience a high level of popular religiosity (E_5). We found that elite religiosity was positively correlated with family (r = .18) while popular religiosity was not significantly correlated with family. The respondents were also asked how much the following items influenced their religious education: friends, school, books, religious leaders, mosques, religious foundations and the Internet. We found that elite religiosity was positively correlated with books (r = .26) and religious leaders (r = 0.14), while negatively correlated with television (r = -.22). Elite religiosity turned out not to be significantly correlated with friends, school, mosques, religious foundations and the Internet. However, popular religiosity turned out to be positively correlated with religious leaders (r = .27), mosques (r = .24), TV (r = .25) and the Internet (r = .15), while not significantly correlated with friends, school, books and religious foundations.

In light of our literature review, we expected a relationship between socio-psychological attitudes and religiosity, and for this reason we formulated a second main research question and the following hypotheses:

RQ_2: ‘What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively?’ Our hypotheses were: ‘Respondents motivated by elite religiosity are

more open to interaction with Christians than respondents motivated by popular religiosity (H_6); 'Men motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more subordinate attitudes towards women and more traditional ideas about gender, than men motivated by elite religiosity' (H_7); 'Respondents motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more prejudiced attitudes towards other races/ethnicities than respondents motivated by elite religiosity' (H_8); 'Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more hostile attitude towards others than respondents motivated by elite religiosity' (H_9); 'Respondents motivated by elite religiosity have a more harmonious attitude towards modernity than respondents motivated by popular religiosity' (H_{10}), and 'Respondents motivated by elite religiosity exhibit less conservative in-group attitudes than respondents motivated by popular religiosity' (H_{11}).

We found that respondents who experienced popular religiosity were less open and friendly towards other religions. Moreover, men who experienced popular religiosity had poorer views on the equality and rights of women compared to men who experienced elite religiosity. It also turned out that participants who experienced popular religiosity expressed more (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and showed more conservative in-group attitudes than participants who experienced elite religiosity.

6.2. *Discussion*

This theoretical and empirical study has yielded the result that the forms and motivations of high religiosity vary across different groups. Based on the findings of this study, out of the total group of participants who experienced high religiosity, six out of ten participants experienced popular religiosity, while only two out of ten experienced elite religiosity.

Islam is not necessarily the most important factor in building the individual and social identity of Muslims. The literature and our sample suggest a number of demographic and socio-economic factors to explain why Dutch-Turkish Muslims generally experience popular religiosity. Some of these factors were briefly presented in the previous chapter, such as gender and age; educational status; household income; and social and cultural capital. There are many other factors that have not been directly addressed so far. These include the experience of immigration; structural and contextual factors such as the current economic and political crisis; government policies; and experiences with discrimination. Such factors may have an effect that

requires further investigation. In this section, therefore, we will continue to focus on the dynamic interrelation between elite and popular religiosity, and how this relates to the socio-economic situation of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. We discuss these relationships in light of our findings. We want to pay more attention to the role of these factors listed above, in order to deepen our understanding of the social, cultural and economic grounds of elite and popular religiosity.

The following discussion consists of five parts. First, 'Reflections on Glock's Five-Dimensional Scheme' (6.2.1) discusses the validity of Glock's 5-dimensional scale in the light of our findings. Second, 'Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity' (6.2.2) will discuss the patterns of the relationship between elite and popular religiosity. Third, 'Social-Cultural Factors Affecting Religiosity' (6.2.3) will discuss factors that may have an impact on elite and popular religiosity. Six factors will be discussed in this part. Fourthly, in section 6.2.4 'Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity', we continue to examine the processes and mechanisms by which religiosity may affect the socio-psychological attitudes of the research population. Finally, section 6.2.5 'Spirituality and Religiosity' illustrates the relevance and significance of spirituality in the sociology of elite and popular religiosity.

6.2.1. *Reflections on Glock's Five-dimensional Scheme*

As we outlined in chapter three, Glock indicated two types of research that could be conducted utilizing his five-dimensional scheme (see 3.1.2). The first type of research to which Glock referred focuses on the specification of components. He proposed a number of tentative components within the various dimensions, but emphasized that there was still a great deal of work to be done in the field of intra-dimensional differentiation. As we pointed out in chapter 3, Glock's exploration in collaboration with Rodney Stark progressed according to this principle, in line of work done by Weber (1963), Allport (1967) and Allen and Spilka (1967). Afterwards, in 1968, Glock and Stark identified and measured three components within the ideological dimension and two components within the ritualistic dimension. In light of this finding, they had to conclude that at least some of the five dimensions (e.g., the ideological) might encompass unrelated or even negatively related phenomena, and that the specific components of the different dimensions "are much more independent of one another than they are measures of the same thing" (p. 181). In order to make a meaningful

distinction within these dimensions, this study applied the elite/popular religiosity distinction. Our data, to some extent, are consistent with Glock and Stark's assumptions. In this study we found a negative correlation between our Elite Religiosity Scale and our Popular Religiosity Scale (r = -.72), scales that include elite and popular aspects of the ideological, ritualistic, intellectual and experiential dimensions.

The second type of research to which Glock referred focuses on the question of inter-dimensional independence. As a result of this type of research, we found that 24 items of our General Religiosity Scale loaded on a single dimension (see Appendix one: Table 36). In addition, our analysis revealed that 11 items of our Elite Religiosity Scale loaded on two factors. The first factor turned out to mainly represent elite belief (ideological dimension), elite ritual (ritualistic dimension) and elite knowledge (intellectual dimension). We labelled this factor '[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation'. The second factor turned out to mainly represent elite experience (experiential dimension). We labelled this factor 'experiential inessentiality and privacy'. In the same way, factor analysis revealed that 11 items of our Popular Religiosity Scale loaded on two factors. The first factor mainly represented popular belief (ideological dimension), popular ritual (ritualistic dimension) and popular knowledge (intellectual dimension). We labelled this factor 'material expectations and [spiritual and intellectual] stability'. The second factor primarily represented popular experience (experiential dimension). We labelled this factor 'experiential desirability and shareability'.

The data were generally in line with the study's expectations. The ideological, ritualistic and intellectual dimensions appear to represent a single dimension and seem to encompass phenomena that are analytically separable and empirically negatively related ('[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation' and 'material expectations and [spiritual and intellectual] stability'). The experiential dimension also seems to encompass phenomena that are analytically separable and empirically negatively related ('experiential inessentiality and privacy' and 'experiential desirability and shareability'). Based on these findings, it can be said that our data support the first approach, i.e., 'intra-dimensional differentiation', but not the second, i.e., the 'inter-dimensional independence' of the four dimensions. In other words, our research findings do not support the view that the five dimensions are empirical wholes.

Consequently, the findings of our research raise serious questions about the assumptions and conclusions found in many sociological studies of religion, especially serious questions about the research of scholars who focus on Turkish Muslims and generally support the view that the five dimensions are empirical wholes (Altınlı, 2011; Atalay, 2005; Ayten, 2009; Kafalı, 2005; Mehmedoğlu, 2004; Şahin, 2001; Uysal, 1995; Yaparel, 1987; Yapıcı, 2004; Yıldız, 1998, 2006). Most of these researchers have reported a positive relationship between the five dimensions, for instance. Our findings, on the other hand, suggest that the subcomponents of elite religiosity (elite belief, ritual, experience, knowledge) might be negatively correlated with the subcomponents of popular religiosity (popular belief, ritual, experience, knowledge) (see Table 17 in chapter 5, subsection 5.3). The findings of this study generally support the view that Glock's five dimensions can be regarded as heuristic and exploratory devices encompassing a variety of phenomena, which should be operationalized, conceptualized and measured before other types of analysis are attempted.

6.2.2. *Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity.*

In this study we explored 'What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity with regard to Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands' (fourth sub-question, RQ_1d). We hypothesized that 'Elite and popular forms of religiosity are negatively correlated with each other' (H_1). We indeed found a negative correlation between elite religiosity and popular religiosity (r = - .72), as expected. However, this does not mean that there is a *clear* differentiation between the two forms of religiosity, since we found that 66 (7.3%) respondents experienced aspects of both types simultaneously. Moreover, the respondents who are labelled as displaying 'elite religiosity' are not completely opposed to popular forms of religiosity, and vice versa. So there is an important aspect that needs to be stressed before the relationship between elite and popular religiosity can be discussed. This concerns the simultaneous experience of both types of religiosity that appears to be characteristic of a significant number of respondents, as described in the previous chapter. Allport, faced with comparable results in his studies, criticized the logic of these respondents and tried to resolve this puzzle by describing the endorsement of both 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic'

positions as "muddleheadedness" (Allport, 1967, p. 439).[62] Pargament et al. reacted to this blunt statement by stating that scoring high on the two orientations is not necessarily logically inconsistent, in the sense that people both "live" (intrinsic) and "use" (extrinsic) their religion (1997, pp. 65-66). This intersectionality is one of the key features of the everyday context, the meeting and interplay between social categories and identities (Andrew Kam-Tuck Yip & Nynäs, 2012, p. 8). Based on the findings of this study, we would rather speak of a contextualized domination of one type of religiosity over another type, or in Hermans' conceptualization, of the dominant position of one 'voice' over others at a given time and under specific circumstances (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). The concepts of religious 'voice' and position, and the Dialogical Self Theory (DST), can shed new light on the way in which individuals orchestrate their various voiced religious positions in so-called *I*-positions in the 'society of mind' (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). Hermans defines the dialogical self as a dynamic multiplicity of *I*-positions. The main characteristic of DST is:

> In the most succinct way, the dialogical self can be conceived of as a dynamic multiplicity of *I*-positions. In this view, the *I* emerges from its intrinsic contact with the (social) environment and is bound to particular positions in time and space. As such, the embodied I is able to move from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time. In this process of positioning, repositioning and counterpositioning, the *I* fluctuates among different and even opposed positions (both within the self and between the self and perceived or imagined others), and these positions are involved in relationships of relative dominance and social power. As part of sign-mediated social relations, positions can be voiced so that dialogical exchanges among positions can develop. The voices behave like interacting characters in a story or movie, involved in processes of question and answer, agreement and disagreement, conflicts and struggles, negotiations and integrations. Each of them has a story to tell about their own experiences from their own perspective. As different voices, these characters exchange knowledge and information about their respective me's, creating a complex, narratively structured self (Hermans, 2016, pp. 2-3).

[62] Allport defines "muddleheadedness" in the following way: "these individuals seem to opt for a superficial 'hit and run' approach. Their mental set seems to be 'all religion is good'. 'My religious beliefs are what really lies behind my whole life'—Yes!' 'Although I believe in my religion, I believe there are many other important things in life'—Yes!' 'Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life'—Yes!' 'The church is highly important as a place to cultivate good social relationships'—Yes!' There seems to be one broad category— religion is OK." (Allport, 1967, p. 439).

A strong key metaphor in DST is that of 'voice'. When people take different positions, they tell different stories about themselves originating from different so-called *I*-positions. All voices are coloured by the ideas, values, expectations and behavioural patterns of the different social and cultural groups of which an individual is a member. Other persons and cultural groups manifest themselves as voices speaking in the self (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010).

For Hermans, 'religion' seems to have two meanings: 'traditional religiosity' and 'individual spirituality'. Hermans connects the traditional religious view with the traditional model of the self, and individual spirituality with the modern and postmodern model of the self. These conceptualizations include characteristics and motivations which are similar to those included in our conceptualizations of elite and popular religiosity, such as: reflective versus uncritical, openness to change versus closedness to change, associational versus communal, universal versus parochial, differentiated versus undifferentiated, personal versus institutional, and humility versus dogmatism. According to the traditional model of the self, "the self is not an autonomous entity but rather an integral part of a sacred whole" (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 84). "The God of the traditional model is a sovereign who wishes humans to obey him, instead of getting involved in a mutual dialogue" (ibid., p. 85). Within this model "the hierarchical system suppresses individual autonomy and freedom" (ibid., p. 86), and "there is a strong belief in fate and destiny" (ibid., pp. 98-99). The modern model of the self questioned these characteristics and found its justification not in a sacred order, but in the self as a sovereign, reflexive self. In the postmodern model of the self, the sovereign self is deconstructed as a multiple, fragmented, and decentred self, under the influence of diverse and constantly changing cultural forces (Zock, 2013, p. 19).

Hermans does not see a strict distinction between these three models. He argues that a previous model of the self does not become completely obsolete in a subsequent stage, emphasizing that aspects of the traditional self are still present in the modern and postmodern self. He claims that traditional religion can easily go off the rails - reducing, contesting, and even replacing the reflexivity, autonomy, and openness that are dominant characteristics of the modern and postmodern self. Hermans draws attention to the ontological insecurity accompanying the complexity and diversity of the postmodern *condition humaine*. According to Hermans, religious fundamentalism

is an emotional and defensive coping mechanism to deal with the insecurity caused by the plurality and the fragmentation of the postmodern world. The voice of "fundamentalism" can be strong or weak depending on the context. According to Hermans, traditional religion is an important source of defensive localization (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 114).

This study acknowledges the 'muddleheadedness' of the religiosity of some participants, and suggests that DST provides an interesting theoretical framework for an explanation and further explanation of this phenomenon. Our quantitative analysis focused mainly on participants who strongly experienced either elite or popular religiosity. As explained earlier, we excluded participants who simultaneously experienced elite and popular religiosity from follow-up analysis, to enable a careful analysis of these two aspects of religiosity. We therefore preferred to analyze first those respondents for whom one of the religious voices was clearly dominant. In other words, we mainly analyzed those individuals who disagreed with or were in conflict with the other religious voice. But this does not mean that the other religious voice is completely absent and rejected in such individuals. On the contrary, certain circumstances led respondents to express themselves with certain religious voices and these expressions may change as circumstances change. If we look, for example, at the participants who simultaneously expressed elite and popular religiosity, we can say that these different religious voices can, to a certain extent, be reconciled, even if they show very different and contradictory forms and motivations - just as postmodern relativism has drawn attention to the coexistence of disparate views and interpretations, even within one and the same person (Droogers, 2012, p. 72).

In the following sections we will discuss the circumstances that can influence the nature of the interrelation between elite and popular religiosity, and which outcomes may be deduced from this.

6.2.3. *Socio-Cultural Factors Affecting Religiosity*

This section will discuss factors that may have an impact on elite and popular religiosity. Six factors will be discussed. The sub-paragraph 'Immigration and Religiosity' (6.2.3.1) discusses the impact of an immigration background on religiosity. The sub-paragraph 'Education and Religiosity' (6.2.3.2) highlights how education plays a varied and important role in different aspects of Turkish religiosity.

We also discuss the issue of imam training and Diyanet's position on the production of Islamic knowledge in regard to elite and popular religiosity. The sub-paragraph 'Age, Cohort and Generational Effects on Religiosity' (6.2.3.3) illustrates the extent to which religiosity evolves in relation to age and generation. The sub-paragraph 'Economic Status and Religiosity' (6.2.3.4) discusses the relation between a person's economic situation and his/her religious orientation. The sub-paragraph 'Digital Media and Religiosity' (6.2.3.5) considers the religious education offered by television programmes, and how such programmes affect religiosity. Finally, 'Gender and Religiosity' (6.2.3.6) discusses the extent to which gender plays a role in elite and popular religiosity.

6.2.3.1. *Immigration and Religiosity*

The urban popular culture in Europe simply drew from various traditional cultures that were brought to the city, improvised in their forms, adapted by city dwellers to their new situation. For example, the festival and trade-fair culture which had long been a part of the 'little' tradition found its way into cities (Battani, Hall, & Neitz, 2004). Most Dutch-Turkish Muslims have a migrant background, although many were born in Europe. The first concern of Muslim migrants who came to the Netherlands was finding employment. First-generation migrants generally had a low level of education, and concerns about making money clearly took precedence over their Islamic identity (Böcker, 2000, p. 156). Most so-called 'guest workers' came from the rural areas of Turkey, and were joined by their family members in the years that followed (Abadan-Unat, 1976). Islamic life in the Netherlands therefore exhibited a very rural character. At the same time, there was a steady influx of well-educated migrants, but these were fewer in number (Güngör & Küçükcan, 2006). On the basis of Norris and Inglehart (2004) and their axioms for religious adherence levels, we would assume that religiosity is influenced by the developmental level of the country of origin, whether this is primarily agricultural or industrial, or religiously pluralistic.

In sum, although Turkey is considered to be an industrialized country, the migration from Turkey to the Netherlands in the last five decades was very rural in character. It seems that this rural character of migration did not only strongly influence the economic and educational status of Turkish migrants, but also their religious experience. A recent analysis of religion in the Turkish countryside in the twenty-first century, where religiosity is stronger than in the cities, indicated that among the

members of the rural working class who were religious, religiosity was only partly based on Muslim beliefs. Mardin showed that the structure and content of religious beliefs differed from what was promulgated in the city, and were heavily based on traditional beliefs, for example concerning magic (Mardin, 1995, p. 231).

The rapid internal migration and urbanization taking place in Turkey, which began around 1950, was accompanied by cultural pressure for the large numbers of people of rural origin who moved to the city. In sociological analyses, this evolution brought the concept of centre-periphery to attention. This process was interpreted by Mardin (1995, p. 234) and Sarıbay (1985) as an invasion of the traditional urban culture by the periphery. However, according to Gellner's (1994) and Türköne's model (1993), traditional popular religiosity in the city is diluted in favour of elite Islam. According to Mardin's and Sarıbay's model, this change moves from the periphery towards the centre, while according to Gellner's and Türköne's model this change takes place from top to bottom. Mardin's and Sarıbay's model views this change as a corruption, while Gellner's and Türköne's model views it as an improvement. In this study, we object to defining social dynamics through such kind of moral evaluation. Instead, we will try to investigate how local practices and interpretations of groups refer to Islam and how they overlap, interconnect and feed into (or alter) the negotiation of Islam.

From 1960 onwards, the external migration from Turkey to Europe and the continuing urbanization process triggered certain related problems and questions. The religious expressions of Muslim guest workers in the European public sphere in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s can be described as signalling a kind of agoraphobia.[63] Muslim migrants were not often seen in the public sphere and even less heard. Gradually, during this period, the construction of mosques in the Netherlands led to a greater public visibility of Islam (Landman & Wessels, 2005). The 1990s can be characterized as the decade that encouraged Muslim migrants to discover the European society beyond the doors of their mosque, and to enter the public sphere in order to gain visibility. The growth of religious expression in the public sphere led to new

[63] Agoraphobia is an anxiety disorder characterized by fear symptoms in places or situations where the person experiences the environment as unsafe and feels trapped, helpless or embarrassed. These situations can include various kinds of open or public spaces, or simply being outdoors.

encounters for Europe's secular societies, a process that many observers described as the return or revival of religion in the public sphere (Cherribi, 2010).

This growing visibility of a Turkish-Muslim identity took place in relation to three distinct groups: the non-Muslim European majority, Muslim communities of different ethnic origins, and Turkish-Muslim communities that continued to reflect the old political and ideological divisions in Turkey. Some scholars have given voice to the view that this web of relationships enables Muslims to adopt an Islamic perspective that appreciates democratic values, recognizes the plurality of Islam in the Netherlands, and resists attempts to portray Muslims as a homogenous population (Güngör & Küçükcan, 2006).

In order to understand the nature of the relationships between these groups, we must emphasize the pillarization model (*verzuiling*) that was peculiar to the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1975; Ter Avest & Bakker, 2013; Vink, 2007). In recent decades Muslims have defended their interests on the basis of two Dutch constitutional principles. The first is the constitutional principle of the neutrality of the state towards all religious groups. The other is the pillarization system, a socio-political system of organization. This is a denominational system for organizing not only religious but also ideological communities, such as Catholics, Protestants, Socialists, and Liberals. These groups used to have separate organizations in the field of education, health, media, and politics (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1995; Sunier, 1998). In the 1970s followed an era of de-pillarization, during which the Dutch population rapidly lost interest in religion. As a result, the pillars have lost much of their salience (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014, p. 35).

In spite of this de-pillarization trend, the position of Muslims was strengthened by the emphasis placed on the equality principle in the 1983 constitutional reforms (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meyer, 2001). Nowadays, the Dutch authorities use the pillarization system to anticipate the need for religious, educational, media, and health facilities. With the ongoing discussion as the separation of state and religion grows and religion in the majority society melts away, the opportunities for Muslim organizations to be accepted as a separate pillar diminish. Nevertheless, the residual system from the pillarization period provides Muslims with a strong basis for applying for government funding to found public broadcasting organizations and educational facilities (e.g., Islamic schools and the Islamic University of Rotterdam). The

pillarization system also gives Muslims access to the state-supported national and local media (Yükleyen, 2011, p. 151; See also Akbulut, 2016; Budak, Bakker, & ter Avest, 2018).

Critics have claimed that this strategy stimulated a separatist approach and did not promote 'integration' (Landman, 2002). It was further argued that this produced a new type of structurally excluded ghettoes (Kaya, 2009, p. 167), and did little to improve the marginal situation of Dutch Muslims (Vasta, 2007).

Nevertheless, the pillarization system has had many advantages for Muslim communities. It provided them with a plural religious market for a peaceful modernization process, for instance. Pillarization has played a crucial role in the external opportunities that have shaped Muslim mobilization and the institutionalization of Islam over the past 35 years (Kaya, 2009; Maussen, 2012). The confessionally defined pillars, which nearly organized every aspect of citizen's daily lives in a religious way, helped many Dutch-Turkish Muslims to enter modernity without losing their sense of ontological security (Ter Borg, 2009).[64] However, the side effects of modernization, in particular the loss of ontological security, cannot be underestimated. The argument put forward in recent articles (Turner & Arslan, 2013; Voyé, 2004) is that, in a globalizing context, divisions between religions have increased rather than decreased and that there is a risk that multicultural societies become seriously divided. The fear and uncertainty[65] may encourage people to delegate religious power to 'specialists' or persons with a potential for charisma who

[64] Ontological security is term used by Giddens to describe the basic human need for predictability and understandability of the world: people need the social and natural worlds in which they live to show a recognizable pattern, so that they can operate in these worlds with a certain degree of confidence. The term thus refers to the search for some sort of order in an uncertain and often changing world (Giddens, 1979).

[65] Hermans and Hermans-Konopka indicate that "uncertainty can be reduced by giving the lead to one powerful position that is permitted to dominate the repertoire as a whole. When people are located in a field of divergent and contradictory positions where they have to give answers to a variety of complex situations, the transfer of responsibility to some authority, guru, strong leader, or "godfather'' may be a way to reduce the burden of uncertainty when it has reached the level of negative feelings. This reaction can be seen in cases of religious orthodoxy or political fundamentalism as they thrive on simplification. It can also be noticed in the supporters of political parties that take an extreme and radical stance on issues of immigration and want to close national boundaries for newcomers" (See: Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 45).

will seize this opportunity, and seek to increase the religious power offered to them by converting it into other types of power (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 45; Ter Borg, 2009). As Ter Borg points out, popular religion is usually fragmentary and ad hoc, and on permanent standby for any occasion when ontological security is at risk (2004, 2008). For this reason, popular religiosity can stimulate fundamentalist and ethnocentric views in a globalizing context.

On the basis of our earlier observations in the field, we can express the view that the construction of society through pillars is not beneficial for religious pluralism, coherence or cosmopolitanism in the long run. Turkish religious and political groups constitute parallel mental worlds to a certain extent, and remain relatively independent of each other. Intra-religious and cultural dialogue between these groups has little or no effect. Each group has its own religious and ideological reality, and this reality is emphasized, for example, through Friday sermons and periodical publications (such as newspapers and magazines) with particular reference to their religious and ideological basis. As one imam put it, “They don’t go to each other’s mosques. These communities and their mosques behave like churches” (Yükleyen & White, 2007, p. 30). Further observations indicate that zones of encounter are steadily diminishing. The feast of Ramadan and the feast of Sacrifice, which brought the broader community of Muslims together in the 1980s and 1990s, are now celebrated in much narrower settings. Each community prefers to celebrate its festivals with its own members: those with whom one shares a particular worldview or religious understanding. However, these special days are intended to bring the wider Muslim community together, despite differences in religious, cultural and political worldviews. On the basis of our observations, we have to conclude that the opposite is happening today: the ‘pillars’ are strongly encouraged not to mix. Group interests are prioritized and the cohesive objectives of religion are suspended. In such communitarian settings, group solidarity is maintained and strengthened by serving God, and, if necessary, by demonizing other groups (a strategy also used in the ideology wars between the traditional Dutch pillars (Ter Borg, 2009)).

The 2012 report of the Social Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP, scientific institute that conducts social scientific research and reports to the Dutch government) strongly supports these observations. Dutch-Turkish citizens score low on ‘integration’ compared to other groups. They have less contact with the Dutch majority society,

they are less proficient in the Dutch language, they lag behind on the labour market and in schools, and have a 'traditional' view on moral values (Huijnk & Dagevos, 2012). According to the SCP, this low integration score could be linked to a number of factors. One of the possible factors is the strong attachment to religious organizations within the Turkish community. A recent survey has revealed that, compared to three other groups of migrants (Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans), Dutch-Turkish citizens have strong and stable religious organizations. The dominant image that has taken root in the Dutch public debate - particularly in politics and in the media - is that the Dutch-Turkish community is less open to Dutch society as a whole and is more oriented towards Turkish society. In this context, the term 'parallel community' or 'parallel society' has often been mentioned (Speelman, 2016, p. 166).

Recently, many scholars have stressed the need for a process of de-pillarization. They see a direct relationship between the rise of popular culture and the de-pillarization of Dutch society. For the pillarized organizations, which were based on political and religious values, popular culture posed a threat because it was thought to create undisciplined and uncontrolled collectives of individuals, who would follow their own taste and emotions, which would ultimately lead to the dissolvement of the pillarized organisation's very disciplined religious/ideological basis (Moore & Nierop, 2006). The de-pillarization trend will undoubtedly also stimulate new religious transformations in Muslim communities. The question then becomes to what extent and in what way processes of individualization and de-pillarization encourage the Dutch-Turkish Muslim communities? According to some, the search for a 'pure' Islam without local communities and culture could push Muslims towards Salafism (see 6.2.3.2). Others, however, believe that new forms of spirituality might emerge within European societies, which could attract a considerable number of people (see 6.2.5). We will briefly discuss these issues in the following paragraphs.

6.2.3.2. *Education and Religiosity*

Different studies have offered different conclusions regarding the relation between religiosity and education, depending on whether religiosity is measured by religious practice (e.g., attendance at places of worship) or specific religious beliefs (e.g., belief in miracles). Substantial differences between nations have emerged. For example, some studies indicate that the intensity of belief decreases with education, while

attendance at places of worship and religious practice increases with education (Eilers, Seitz & Hirschler, 2008; Sacerdote & Glaeser, 2001). Other studies indicate that religious people have, on average, a higher level of education than people with little to no religious faith (Kavanagh, 2011; Norris & Inglehart, 2011;Smith, 1998). Yet other studies find that the positive correlation between low religious affiliation / absence of religious affiliation and education has been reversed in recent decades (Smith & Snell, 2009; Voas & McAndrew, 2014). One study concluded that in the US the majority of professors, even at 'elite' universities, are religious (Gross & Simmons, 2009).

Looking at the overall picture generated by the studies carried out in Western countries, it can be shown that a positive relationship between religiosity and education is more common (Köktaş, 1993). However, studies carried out in particular in Turkey show that a higher level of education causes a general decline in several aspects of religiosity. For example, Köse and Ayten (2009) indicate a negative relationship between education and popular religious beliefs. Günay (1999) and Köktaş (1993) indicate that as the level of education increases, the tendency to carry out daily prayers and fasting decreases. In the Netherlands, for example, more highly educated Muslims of Turkish descent practice their religion considerably less, and adhere less strictly to the rules than their less well-educated compatriots (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012).[66]

One of the important conclusions that can be drawn from the present study is the important role of education in the changes in the level of elite and popular religiosity observed among Dutch-Turkish Muslims. We found that the intensity of elite religiosity increases with education, while the intensity of popular religiosity decreases with education (see: Table 23 in chapter 5, subparagraph 5.3.3.1).

This raises questions for further analyses. Will popular religiosity decline in the coming years? Will popular religiosity still appeal to Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the future as the new generations grow up and as the average level of education among young Muslims increases? Future longitudinal studies on popular religiosity might be able to answer these questions. Researchers found that Dutch-Turkish citizens lag

[66] If we look at mosque attendance by Dutch-Turkish Muslims with higher and lower levels of education, it is striking that until 2004 the higher educated visited the mosque less often than the lower educated; however, since 2004 this difference has disappeared and the higher and lower educated visit the mosque with equal frequency (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012).

behind in education when compared to indigenous Dutch citizens (Driessen, 2012, p. 74; Hartgers, 2012, pp. 18-21; Staring, Geelhoed, Aslanoglu, Hiah & Kox, 2014). According to recent research by the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* ('Statistics Netherlands', CBS), the educational level of Dutch-Turkish citizens is the lowest among the non-native populations living in the Netherlands.[67] However, a slight increase in the education level of the Dutch-Turkish population has been noted (Driessen, 2012, p. 25; Gijberts & Iedema, 2012, pp. 90-91; Gijberts & Vervoort, 2009; Herweijer, 2009, p. 106; Herweijer, 2012, pp. 103-104; Stevens, Clycq, Timmerman & Van Houtte, 2011, p. 13). There is also an educational gap between the first and second-generation Muslims living in the Netherlands: while the first generation received little education, the second generation is gradually entering higher education (CBS, 2010; Dagevos, Gijsberts & Praag, 2003; Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009; SCP, 2011).

It therefore seems that education, one of the important socio-economic factors linked to religiosity, plays a varied and important role in different aspects of Turkish religiosity. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to generalize the results. As we will discuss below, the education provided by Dutch Muslim organizations and the religious elite, and the religious education provided by the parents, are also significant socio-economic factors in the development of Muslim religiosity, and therefore need more attention.

Education Supplied by Official Elites

There are many factors that could influence the religious characteristics of Turkish Muslim minorities in the decades to come. Insight into suppliers of Islam (the supply side) is just as important as insight into the demand side. Among these suppliers, Islamic communities have a particularly strong position in the Netherlands. They will determine the course of the interaction between elite and popular religiosity, and might push current developments into new directions.

Just like in Turkey, where the Qurʾān schools undertook pioneering work within the Muslim community, Islamic educational groups started to organize themselves in

[67] See Figure 5 in the appendix two: 'Proportion of highly-educated 25 to 64-year olds by ethnic background'.

the Netherlands in the 1970s. These included the Turkish Diyanet Foundation, the Nur movement[68], the Milli Görüş Movement, and the Süleymancı Movement (Bommel, 1992, pp. 135-137). We found no significant differences in the distribution of elite and popular religiosity linked to community involvement. We prefer to avoid generalizations with regard to these Islamic communities, as such small subsamples cannot possibly lead to valid generalizations with regard to the community as a whole. These communities deserve special attention.

However, it may be appropriate here to consider a problem that is shared by all of them. It concerns the training of imams. The relations between Islamic communities such as Milli Görüş, the Nur Movement, Süleymancı, Diyanet and others are based on competition. Although they use different strategies, they all have the priority to increase their number of followers. This has led to competition when organizational interests clash. The differences in imam training and the failure to establish a representative body for Muslims, illustrate this clash of interests (Yükleyen & White, 2007, p. 129). Dutch public debates assume that there is an inherent tension between the traditional task of an imam and his tasks in the secularized Dutch society (Boender & Kanmaz, 2002; Boender, 2007). The questions that arise relate to two central issues: the transmission of Islam to young people living in European secular societies and, at a more abstract level, the criteria that 'proper' leaders of European Muslim communities must meet. Can they act as intermediaries between European and Islamic societies? Do they have sufficient knowledge of the host country to counsel young people? To what extent do the countries of origin exert political and ideological influence on Muslims in the host countries through these key figures? How can these imams function in the host society if they do not speak Dutch? How do they interpret the norms and values of their host societies? Should they not receive their training in the host country instead of in their country of origin? (Boender, 2013; Boender & Kanmaz, 2002). These pressing questions and the changing political climate should stimulate the development of an educational programme for training imams in the Netherlands, which has gone through a very complicated process of discussion and negotiation for almost a quarter of a century (Ghaly, 2008). The issue remains highly relevant. These Islamic groups all have their own mosques and their own imams,

[68] This is not a homogeneous group. Although all members are declared followers of Said Nursi, their methodologies are quite different.

specifically chosen from individuals with the same ideological background in Turkey. Most of these imams are incompetent in many respects even they have received high education; they can recite the Qurʾān in phonetic Arabic but do not understand the language; they know little more about Islamic law than the basic elements, which they have not learned to interpret. To this day, imported imams have no experience of European urban life, they often do not speak Dutch, and are appointed only for a limited period of time.

In the 1980s, it seemed that mosque imams had much more influence in the diaspora than in their home countries, because of the different functions that the mosque fulfilled in the diaspora. However, second and third-generation migrants tend to understand the language of their country of residence better than the language of their parents or grandparents (Bruinessen, 2011). Recently, this influential role of imams has begun to fade. Young Muslims became dissatisfied with imams whose experiences lacked any connection with their own Dutch lives. Instead, they began to nurture their own Islamic self-understanding and they feel no need for religious guidance or authority. It has been observed that young Muslims prefer to develop their own individual religiosity and prefer to find their own answers, independent of mosques or religious specialists (Becker & De Hart, 2006; Borg, 2008; Sunier, 2014; WRR, 2006). The evolution was that parents stopped sending their children to Qurʾān schools, and that the position of the imam as a religious authority became threatened. It is clear that an imam with insufficient knowledge of Dutch is seriously handicapped in his communication with second and third-generation Muslims (Landman, 1999).

One of the respondents, Yunus (44), stated that:

> When I have questions in my mind, I prefer to just search for answers on Google rather than asking imams. My friends don't want to ask their imam any more questions either, because they already know that he won't have the right answer. Unfortunately, the imams come from Turkey and you cannot apply their answers here.

This is because officials have become indifferent and 'lazy' in their work and have lost their ability to be socially responsive, as was the case in the context of state-supported religious monopolies in pre-modern and early modern Europe (Stark & McCann, 1993). Turkish Muslim immigrants are faced with the challenge to reconcile

their religious identity with the Dutch culture in which they grew up.[69] Moreover, the terrorist attacks in Europe and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan Islamic fundamentalist shocked the entire nation, forcing the government to take measures against what it feared was an increasingly radical culture among Muslims. The lack of knowledge of the Dutch culture and Dutch language among imams was seen a major obstacle to Muslim integration. With respect to second-generation radicalization, Tillie (2010), Kepel (2006) and Olivier Roy (2004) indicate that many young people reject a large part of their parents' (and their imams') understanding of Islam as irrelevant local culture, and that the search for a 'pure' Islam without culture almost inevitably draws them towards Salafism.[70]

In response, the Dutch government set up pilot programmes in Islamic theology in 2005 (De Koning, 2014). In 2007, government-funded imam training initiatives,[71] arguing that "training for imams in the Netherlands may significantly contribute to the integration of young migrants in particular, and help them to defend themselves against radicalization" (Dutch Ministry of Justice, 2007). It has also been brought up that imams trained in the Netherlands would be better acquainted with the Dutch situation.[72] They could also act as a bridge between the Muslim community and Dutch

[69] Here we are mainly focusing on Turkish institutions and communities. Outside the Turkish communities, however, there are certain initiatives which are rarely consulted by members of the Turkish communities. In general, Muslims in the West to a certain extent consult a variety of religious authorities on all kinds of problems related to the application of the norms and values of their faith in the Western context. The religious authorities consulted by them are located in both the Muslim and the Western world. Moreover, councils of Islamic jurisprudence, both at the national and the international levels, are developing new interpretations of Islamic values as well, based on the modern principle of collective *ijtihâd*. For more information see: Shadid & van Koningsveld, 2002, pp. 149-170.

[70] However, Olivier Roy notes that compared to other Muslims, Turkish migrants tend to preserve their language and ethno-national identity (Roy, 2004, p. 123)

[71] Welmoet Boender discusses the immigration policy with regard to imams. In her view, fear of fundamentalism should not be the sole motivation for governmental action in this domain. Boender questions whether this interference is appropriate, given a long history of creating a negative image of Islam. According to Boender, "only if there are real extremist actions - on religious or political grounds - which disturb the public order, should the government interfere and let the public interest prevail" (see Boender, 2000, pp. 155-169).

[72] The Ministries of Internal Affairs and Education formulate this as follows: "The organisational religious and worldview levels can contribute to the views of their members on Dutch society and can strengthen their sense of responsibility towards that society. They can, together with other societal forces, prevent their members from decaying into marginality and worse [sic]; they may help their members to make the right choices concerning their

society and thus contribute to the integration of Muslim migrants (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk & Meyer, 2001). The government intended to develop a socio-cultural policy that encompassed religion and 'life principles' (Landman, 1999).

Over the past decades, the Dutch Diyanet Foundation (*Islamitische Stichting Nederland*, ISN) succeeded in becoming the largest mosque organization in the Netherlands, controlling 143 of the 220 Dutch-Turkish mosques (Sunier & Landman, 2011, 2014). However, the representatives of Turkish Islam in Europe have refrained from participating in this project as partners due to reservations about Diyanet's curriculum and the teacher's educational backgrounds. The training of imams in Europe and the recruitment of candidates among Muslims living in Europe have not been Diyanet's priorities in recent years. Instead, Diyanet draws from a vast pool of imams trained in Turkish high schools for imams (*imam hatip lisesi*), and from preachers and practitioners at their theological faculties. However, increasing criticism of this policy by European Muslims and politicians has prompted Diyanet to take up this issue and to enter into negotiations about setting up imam training facilities in Europe (Sunier & Landman, 2014). Diyanet chose to develop its own project, whereby Muslim students who graduated from the Imam Hatip School[73] in the Netherlands would move to Turkey to study at Turkish theology faculties under Turkish scholars. In this way, young Muslims who have been predominantly immersed in the Dutch language and culture, could learn the Islamic sciences directly from Muslim scholars and become the new generation of imams in Europe. Under this policy, the Imam Hatip School supported by Diyanet started to work in 2013 under the umbrella of *Ibn Ghaldoun*, an Islamic school for VMBO, HAVO and VWO students in Rotterdam (Anadolu Ajansı, 2013).

The project of the Dutch government ended due to high costs and low participation of Muslim students. Moreover, Diyanet's project was stopped by the Dutch Ministry of Education because of a scandal that broke out at the time, which resulted in the

functioning in the economic, social and cultural sense, while respecting Dutch law and Dutch social rules. Imams can make an important contribution to this." See: Nota Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en OC&W, 1998, pp. 8-9.

[73] As the name suggests, these schools were originally founded to train government-employed imams, after the abolition of *madrasas* in Turkey through the Unification of Education act.

closure of the *Ibn Ghaldoun* School (Kasteleijn, 2013).[74]

The other question is whether Diyanet really is able to train elite imams for European societies through working with Turkish theology faculties. Recent developments have aroused doubts. In 2012, the attempt of the he Council of Higher Education (CoHE)[75] to abolish the philosophy courses offered by the faculty of theology seemed to signal anti-academic sentiment in Turkey (Demircan, 2015b). In response, a considerable number of theologians stated that abolishing the philosophy courses offered by theology faculties would in the medium and long term promote Salafism in Turkey, and that this form of theological education would lead nowhere (Demir, 2015; Kara, 2013). These sharp reactions from academics led to the withdrawal of the proposal (*Today's Zaman*, 2013). However, afterwards, the Council of Higher Education unexpectedly made a number of changes to the curriculum, which led to renewed discussions. These changes in the curriculum of theology faculties prove to a certain extent that Fatih M. Şeker was right when he stated in his books *The Formation Period of Turkish Religious Thought* (2013) and *The Turkish Mindset and Philosophy of Life* (2015) that the new Salafism increasingly dominates the contemporary Turkish interpretations of Islam. Such interpretations of Islam can lead to extreme hostility towards traditional interpretative communities and towards all forms of rationalism, intellectualism and mysticism in Islam (Reddig, 2011).

Yapıcı (2002) illustrated some characteristics of dogmatic religiosity. Although the orientation of popular religion and Salafism is not identical, it can be seen that both types of religiosity share a number of similar dogmatic characteristics. Both types of religiosity emphasize a homogenized idea of Islam and textually and philologically centred interpretative orientations; they share a belief in the fixed, stable meaning of the Qurʾanic text; and they lack a thematic value- and goal-centred approach to Qurʾanic hermeneutics (Demircan, 2015a; İşcan, 2006, 2015; Lohlker, 2011; Scalett,

[74] In September 2014, it was succeeded by the Avicenna College, a new Islamic secondary school with a new board of management (De Koning, 2015).

[75] The higher education system in Turkey is supervised by the Council of Higher Education (CoHE). The CoHE is an autonomous institution which is responsible for the planning, coordination and governance of higher education system in Turkey in accordance with the Turkish Constitution and the Higher Education Laws.

2006; Yapıcı, 2002). For this reason we believe that it is not very difficult for Salafi movements to manipulate and influence those population groups that experience popular religiosity. According to recently published data collected by the Pew Research Center in 11 countries with a significant Muslim population, respondents overwhelmingly expressed negative views on ISIS. Seven out of ten respondents in Turkey had unfavourable opinions about ISIS, while one out of ten (8%) had positive opinions (Poushter, 2015). Although these numbers are encouraging, 8% of a population of 79 million in Turkey is still 6 million people, a frighteningly large number. Other reports found fewer positive opinions among Muslim respondents (Akyol, 2014; *Global Turkey Social Trends Survey*, 2016).

From this point of view, it can be said that the religiosity experienced by Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands is to some extent exposed to Salafi ideologies.

6.2.3.3. *Age, Cohort and Generational Effects on Religiosity*

Studies on the effect of age and generation on religiosity report that intense religious changes are taking place among second-generation migrants (Azak, 2008; Berger, 2015). But the direction of the change is interpreted differently by scholars. A majority of scholars indicate that the second generations who descend from North African or Turkish migrant families, consider themselves more strongly as Muslims when compared to their elders. The second generation is more religious, in the sense that it is more strict in its observance of the rules of Islam and its search for an authentic or 'pure' Islam (Roeland, Aupers, Houtman, De Koning & Noomen, 2010), i.e., an Islam based on its normative sources (Bartels, 2000; Buijs, 2009; Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006; Buitelaar, 2006; Korf & Bovenkerk, 2007). However, a different analysis shows that there is a pattern of secularization among Muslims in Europe: the longer they stay in Europe, the higher their level of education, and the more they participate in the labour market, the less concerned they become about their religion. (For the Netherlands see: Huijnk, 2018; Lans & Rooijackers, 1992; Phalet & Haker, 2004; Phalet & van Praag, 2004) (For Germany see: Şen, 2008).

Islam in the EU countries shows a range of differences which are linked to the countries of origin. The findings of our study, which largely revolve around a Dutch-Turkish sample, are to a certain extent in line with the findings referred to above, which report the secularization of the second generation (cf. Huijnk, 2018, p. 84). Our

analysis revealed a positive correlation between age and *general religiosity*, which indicates that the older respondents - who in our study are mainly first generation - are more religious than the younger respondents - who in our study are mainly second generation. Our main objective, however, is not just to measure the correlations between general religiosity and age and generation. Instead, we seek to measure the correlations related to age and generation with a focus on the intra-religious aspects of general religiosity, i.e., with a focus on elite and popular religiosity.

Our expectation was that 'Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and above) experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-35)' (*E2*). Our findings indicated that older respondents experience popular and high religiosity to a larger degree than younger respondents (see Table 28 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.3.5). In connection with this result, we also found that first-generation respondents experience popular and high religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation respondents (see Table 26 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.3.3).

If we look at the *age effect*, the religious tendencies of the respondents can be explained in a different way. Sociologists have specified how religiosity changes depending on age or life-cycle events, such as leaving the parental home or marriage. These are referred to as 'age effects' on religiosity. This approach assumes that the effects of ageing on religiosity are constant over time (Roof & Wilson, 1983). For example, young adults currently have little religious involvement, but when they are 40 and married, their involvement in a religious community will increase, and when they are 60 and face death, that involvement will increase even further. The following ideas may also be suggested in order to explain the results listed above. Young people are a less socialized group and less likely to fulfil traditional roles, which may reduce their interest in popular religiosity. On the other hand, older people invest more in traditional role patterns, attitudes and beliefs, and are less motivated to re-examine them. These beliefs could make them receptive to popular religiosity (Güngör, 2012; Hökelekli, 2006, 2009; Karaşahin, 2012).

Other questions that arise here are to what extent the power of religious heritage differs for Turks living in the Netherlands and Turks living in Turkey, and to what extent the religiosity of the parents and grandparents influences the religiosity of the second and third generation. Another theory that should be mentioned here is 'the continuity theory of ageing.' This theory states that:

> In making adaptive choices, middle-aged and older adults attempt to preserve and maintain existing psychological and social patterns by applying familiar knowledge, skills, and strategies. According to this theory, continuity in aging is seen as a dynamic and evolutionary developmental process in which individuals grow, adapt, and change; however, these changes are consistent with the person's underlying ideology and past experiences (Diggs, 2008, p. 233).

Our study is not a longitudinal study and therefore does not investigate changes in faith, belief, and behaviour over time. This study is cross-sectional because it has been performed only once and the results are limited to the time at which the study was performed. All we can say here is that our findings were counterintuitive to our expectations. Our expectations were that religious elites tend to emphasize verification of beliefs, which includes doubt and questioning, and that respondents who adhere to popular religiosity tend to emphasize imitation through the family connection. Initial analysis showed that items 39 and 68 related to the family connection did not correlate significantly with the other elite and popular religiosity scale items. Therefore, these items were excluded.[76] In addition, respondents were asked to what extent their family influenced their religious education. Contrary to our expectations (E_5), we found that elite religiosity is positively correlated with family (r = .18). We found no significant correlation between popular religiosity and family-based religious education, contrary to our qualitative findings gathered through participant observation. On the basis of these qualitative findings, we continue to believe that the religiosity of family elders is an important and influential factor in popular religiosity. We estimate that this aspect of religiosity is very sensitive and needs more attention in the area of item construction, in order to obtain reliable findings and to avoid irritation on behalf of the respondents.

To explore this issue further, we can consult a recent study on the intergenerational effects of migration published in 2015. This study compared three dimensions[77] between Turks living in Europe and Turks living in Turkey from generation to generation. It was found that first-generation migrants and non-migrants did not show

[76] The excluded items related to family connection were: Item 39 - A major factor in my religious development has been the importance of religion for my parents; Item 68 - I gained my religious knowledge mainly through my parents.

[77] The three dimensions that were measured were: *subjective religiosity* - reflects a person's judgment of his/her own piety; *individual religiosity* - comprises the practice of religious duties such as prayer or fasting which can be performed on an individual basis in private places; *communal religiosity* - public manifestations of religion, such as communal worship or Friday prayers.

a significant difference on any religiosity measures (Guveli & Ganzeboom, 2015, p. 303). This finding contradicts the assimilation hypothesis that migrants adopt the secular way of life of European countries over time. On the other hand, this finding does support the religious reliance hypothesis,[78] according to which migrants are expected to be more religious than non-migrants or as religious as non-migrants. The authors of the study concluded that grandparents and parents had a significant positive influence on each of the three measurements of religiosity (Guveli & Ganzeboom, 2015, p. 305). This also indicates that the manner in which parents and grandparents believe and practice their religion has positive effects on their children or grandchildren.[79] Empirical results of international surveys like the one conducted by Gallup (2002, 2009), confirm that Turks involve their families, especially their parents, in making important decisions. A high degree of continuity in religious ideas and practices was observed (Sunier, 1992). This may mean that the majority of young Turkish Muslims will experience a higher degree of popular religiosity as they grow older, precisely because their family elders experience popular religiosity to a high degree.

However, some aspects of cultural-religious heritage can only be retained with considerable difficulty. This applies in particular to religious practices and rituals connected with a local or regional religious infrastructure in the country of origin, such as aspects connected with the veneration of saints, the celebration of seasonal festivals, and many other aspects of popular religion (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1992). As Landman (1992, p. 52) points out: “whereas about 300 mosques have been established in the Netherlands so far, it may take quite some time before the first Sufi saint whose tomb could become the centre of religious activity will be buried in this country. Only then will popular Sufism be institutionalized in Holland.”

Relations between religious and ethnic identity, age and generation can reflect the effect of living through a particular period in history, in specific circumstances. This is called a period effect or, in sociology, a ‘cohort effect’. Cohort analysis reminds us

[78] Religious reliance theory argues that migrants retain their religious involvement, identity, and beliefs because religion is a resource in their new environment. See: (Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007).

[79] Marjo Buitelaar’s qualitative study is one of the important publications on life stories about parenting styles and the transmission of religion. See: Buitelaar, 2013.

that the cultural context shapes social expectations regarding age-related behaviour. The status of Islamic communities as diasporic settlements around the globe has been profoundly and perhaps permanently influenced by 'the global war on terror' (Es, 2012; Savage, 2004), which was spurred on by events such as 9/11[80], the bombings in London in 2005 and the more recent Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016) terrorist attacks, and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh (2004). This generates new cohorts at the local level. Xenophobia and racism do not make a subtle distinction between religious fundamentalism and moderate Islam, and therefore anyone who has a Middle Eastern appearance can become the target of public distrust or anger. For convenience's sake, people with completely different backgrounds were lumped together under the common denominator of 'Muslim culture' (Sunier, 2005). After the murder of Theo van Gogh, at least 10 Muslim schools and mosques were subjected to burning and vandalism. In 2005, a survey among 800 Dutch citizens living in four major cities revealed that a large majority saw relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in a very negative light.[81] Furthermore, numerous recent court cases against radicalized Muslim youths have kept terrorism in the media, and the majority of Dutch people claim that their sense of security has disappeared (Turner & Nasir, 2013).

In light of these findings, we express the opinion that the current European atmosphere, in which existential threats are perceived, could stimulate the growth of popular religiosity among the population, which could then acquire a fundamentalist character because of its fragmentary and pragmatist nature.

6.2.3.4. *Economic Status and Religiosity*

In this study, 'elite religion' was defined based on Weber's ideas as comprising specific forms of religious praxis and belief, which are *generally* practiced by the socially and economically privileged strata of society. In social surveys, income is one of the indicators of socio-economic status and religious beliefs. Some studies indicate that the socio-economic conditions of Muslims largely regulate the direction of their religious choices. It turns out, for example, that Muslim migrants radicalize because

[80] Landman and Wessels state that in the broader field of political debates on multiculturalism and the position of Islam in the Netherlands, a shift hast taken place since 11 September 2001. See: Landman & Wessels, 2005.

[81] For a survey that measures ethnocentric attitudes of Dutch citizens towards Muslims, see: Eisinga, Kraaykamp & Scheepers, 2012.

they are unhappy with their low economic status (Heitmeyer & Schroder, 1997). In our analysis, we found that respondents with a higher income experience popular religiosity to a greater extent than respondents with a lower income. How can this result be explained?

The 'socially and economically privileged' strata of society enjoy a kind of wealth in terms of education, art and high culture. If we look at the profile of rich and religious Turks living in the Netherlands, we see that until recently they had a low income and did not inherit any particular wealth from the previous generation. The phenomenon of rich Turks in the Netherlands is a new phenomenon which only applies to a very small number of individuals, rather than to communities.

Based on Ibn Khaldūn's and Durkheim's work as we briefly outlined in chapter 3, we think that an improvement of economic conditions would provide Dutch-Turkish Muslims with the means to develop an elite religious culture in the long run. According to Islamic jurisprudence, the foundations of a good individual and social life are organized at three levels, namely (1) necessities (*ḍarūriyyāt*), (2) comforts (*ḥājiyyāt*) and (3) refinements or luxury items (*taḥsīniyyāt*).[82] The third category includes items and activities that go beyond the category of comforts. These are items that do not primarily remove or relieve discomforts, but rather add beauty and elegance to life. These include innocent hobbies, recreation, objects of enjoyment, and ornamentations (quality furniture, paintings, flowers, jewellery, etc.) (Masud, 1995; Shāṭibī et al., 2003). An example of this in religious experience is *iḥsān*. This term means 'becoming excellent' in the pillars of faith. The term is derived from the same root as the term *taḥsīniyyāt* (i.e., refinements or luxury items) and is an especially important concept in Sufi thought, representing a high level of religiosity and spirituality. Ibn Khaldūn uses these categories in the social theory that he develops in his work *Muqaddimah*. Although Ibn Khaldūn believes that Bedouin tribes and sedentary communities are natural groups, he believes in 'movement' from necessities to luxury items, and 'movement' from primitive to civilized culture. This is based on the idea that the gathering of bare necessities in the desert precedes the luxury and comfort of the

[82] It should be noted that Islam jurisprudence does permit the consumption of 'illegal' luxuries which are prohibited.

sedentary social organization. The harshness of desert life precedes the ease of sedentary life:

> It should be known that differences of condition among people are the result of the different ways in which they make their living. Social organization enables them to cooperate toward that end and to start with the simple necessities of life, before they get to conveniences and luxuries… Sedentary people means the inhabitants of cities and countries, some of whom adopt the crafts as their way of making a living, while others adopt commerce. They earn more and live more comfortably than Bedouins, because they live on a level beyond the level of (bare) necessity, and their way of making a living corresponds to their wealth. It has thus become clear that Bedouins and sedentary people are natural groups which exist by necessity (Khaldūn & Rosenthal, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 250).

Durkheim believed in the multiplication of human needs as well. He sketches the development of new institutions for the satisfaction of those needs. The following words from Durkheim are reminiscent of Ibn Khaldūn:

> Thus, it is an historical law that mechanical solidarity, which first stands alone, or nearly so, progressively loses ground, and that organic solidarity gradually becomes preponderant. But when the mode of solidarity becomes changed, the structure of societies cannot but change (Giddens, 1990, p. 140).

Durkheim's typology of mechanical and organic solidarities is highly relevant to Ibn Khaldūn's typology. Within the mechanical solidarity that exists in the Bedouin civilization, life is very simple, and relationships between people are close and personal. The organic solidarity within sedentary civilization manifest itself in excessive division of labour, great luxury, and impersonal relationships.

We are of the opinion that the economic disadvantages of Muslim immigrant life play an important role in the types of religiosity they choose on the religious market. However, we do not consider economic factors to be the only factors that shape Muslim religiosity - this would constitute an over-deterministic view on the role of material conditions. Individuals can opt to use their income and personal wealth to support a 'great' culture and elite forms of Islam. However, if income and wealth are distributed equitably among Islamic communities and can thus penetrate education and culture, after the example of Khaldūnian and Durkheimian social theory, we can expect the long-term impact of economic progress on religiosity to become noticeable.

6.2.3.5. *Digital Media and Religiosity*

On the one hand Muslims become rooted in their local environments, yet at the same time modern mass media enable Muslims to build networks and communities across borders (Sunier, 2012). The new media play a crucial part in the production of Islamic knowledge in Europe (Bruinessen, 2011). The media professionals who broadcast Islamic *responsa* are therefore at least as important as the religious scholars who issue them (Caeiro, 2011). Mass education and the new media have contributed to the shift and disintegration of classic religious authority, while modernity has challenged the very credibility of the *ʿulamā*s discourses (Zaman, 2002, 2009). Television and the Internet have supplanted imams, whose influential role as the main source of religious knowledge for immigrants has diminished. Our analysis showed that elite religiosity was negatively correlated with television and the Internet, while popular religiosity was positively correlated with these media.

With regard to the production of religious education encapsulated in television programmes, the general level of education of the viewer is taken into account, due to concerns about audience ratings (Warren, 2006). This form of education focuses on the 'enthusiasm' that is the most powerful motivation in popular religiosity. Especially during Ramadan (the month of fasting), this religious discourse targets the masses. Therefore, the language of these programmes is necessarily superficial, following certain popular religious trends. Some television programmes target religious elites and are infused with mystical and spiritual language, which inevitably helps the re-formation of a popular Sufi culture, in accordance with the demands signalled by audience ratings. Two historical representatives of elite religiosity, *Rumi* and *Yūnus Emre*, which have exerted enormous influence on Turkish religious literature, are regularly encountered in these programmes, and are made into figures for mass consumption.

Globalization and the spread of modern mass media have seriously weakened the traditional normative religious frameworks (Mandaville, 2007). The effects of new digital media on Islamic discourse have reinforced new perceptions. The search for religious information on the Internet involves a highly subjective choice between information on popular religious culture and elite religious culture, both of which are freely available. It has been said that individual desires and wishes determine the type

of information that is accessed (Campbell, 2006; Turner & Nasir, 2013c). When someone is looking for a religious *fatwā* related to a problem, a search in 'Sheikh Google' using the right keywords will yield the expected information. Four elements, *muftī, mustaftī, iftāʿ* and *fatwā* [83], which constitute the traditional process of *fatwā*, have been discarded since the Internet became widespread. Publication "converts a form of highly personalized interpretation... into more generic messages for a mass audience... thereby shift[ing] part of the burden of interpretation to the listener/reader" (Eickelman & Anderson, 2003, p. 3). Olivier Roy (2004) has stated that increasing numbers of young Muslims are constructing their own 'cut-and-paste' version of Islam, selected from heterogeneous sources. Other researchers have pointed to the rise of a phenomenon called Muslim 'Protestantism', in which Muslim youths look for answers, usually on the Internet, while they lack basic knowledge of the theological framework of Islam (De Koning, 2008; Sunier, 2010).

This also contributes to the production of conflicting religious ideas, and creates the conditions for market differentiation. The *fatwā* wars in different media playing out between Islamic authorities effectually force the Muslim individual to make a choice and to select the most appropriate answer (Caeiro, 2011). There is one big difference here compared to the past. As Bryan Turner (2005, p. 309) pointed out, "in the past, the educated and disciplined elites determined the official or popular form of religion. Periodically, religion gets 'cleaned up' as the elites expel the magical, popular and cultic accretions." According to Ibn Khaldūn, prophets periodically enter the city to reform the House of Faith. In the modern world, however, lay people have some literacy and can access radio, television, the Internet, foreign travel and mass consumption. The globalization of popular religion makes it increasingly difficult for the elites to regulate the masses. The growth of global spiritual marketplaces means that 'religion' constantly transforms itself, becoming increasingly hybrid and reflective (Parna, 2010; Young, 2004).

[83] The *muftī*, or jurist consultant, stands between man and God, and issues opinions (*fatwā*) to a petitioner (*mustafti*), either with regard to the laws of God or the deeds of man. The task, or process, of giving a fatwa is iftāʿ.

6.2.3.6. *Gender and Religiosity*

Gender seems to play a central part in popular religions, both now and in the past. Contemporary research reveals that religion - in terms of faith and participation - plays a much greater role in the lives of women than those of men, and yet the dominant roles in religious organizations are characteristically occupied by men (Roberts & Yamane, 2012, pp. 262-291). Women struggle for recognition and representation in the official religious institutions of Islam, as is the case in Roman Catholicism, Thai Buddhism, and so on (Turner, 2013, pp. 235-40). This situation drives women to find meaning in popular themes.

One of our expectations was that 'The experience of popular religiosity is higher among Muslim women than among Muslim men' (E_1). This expectation was based on the findings of previous studies carried out in Turkey (Köse, 2015; Köse & Ayten, 2010; Saktanber, 2002; Asım Yapıcı, 2012b).

However, we found no significant differences between men and women in our sample. Lack of significance can be informative, however. Reporting non-significant results has been identified as 'the file drawer problem' in all scientific areas (Rosenthal, 1979). Scientists must be willing to report the absence of statistically significant findings if they are to advance the social sciences, in particular psychology and sociology. This lack of significant differences between men and women in our sample may be due to the different characteristics of our scale, which does not quite match the scales developed in Turkey.

In Turkey, for example, traditionally minded women regard *ziyārat* (grave visit) as a valuable means of gaining access to sacred power without male mediation (Günay, Güngör, Taştan & Sayim, 2001), yet men often deride such activities as 'superstitious'[84] (Smith, 2008). Such practices are of greater importance to women than to men, since many characteristics of female social life are strictly linked to its religious aspects, such as the visiting of graves and the veneration of saints (Köse, 2015; Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1992). As pointed out above, such aspects of religious cultural heritage, which are tightly connected with popular religiosity, are rarely transferred to the host countries. These conditions had an impact on our

[84] Such visits have also been criticized and banned by official Islam, even though they remain a tradition within Turkish popular religiosity (see: Açıkgöz, 2004; Çelik, 2004; Günay et al., 2001).

measuring tools. Grave visit, which in a sense is closely connected to the experiential and ritualistic aspect, could not be taken into account in this study. According to previous observations, this aspect of religiosity was not observable in the Dutch-Turkish community. But as Landman predicts (1992, p. 52), this aspect of popular religiosity may emerge in the Netherlands in future decades. Only then will we be able to measure this aspect of religiosity, and we assume that this side of religiosity will to some extent affect female religious life more than male religious life.[85]

6.2.4. *Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity*

Interest in studying the relationship between religiosity and health continues to grow. Although various hypotheses have been developed to explain this association, there has been a lack of research into the processes and mechanisms by which religiosity might influence the mental and physical health of populations. In particular, there was a lack of research with a specific focus on migrants. There was a lack of studies on spirituality in migrant and non-migrant populations as well (Abraido-Lanza & Viladrich, 2012, p. 1285). The present study is one of the first to pay more attention to this issue in the context of Dutch-Turkish Muslim society. The interactions between individual and broader social and cultural factors were also briefly examined.

Considering the average mean values of the attitude scales employed in this study (which measure negative attitudes towards other religions, women, other races/ethnicities, out-groups and modernity), we can conclude that both groups - participants who experience elite religiosity and participants who experience popular religiosity - express negative attitudes towards the items of the attitude scales (see Table 32 and Table 33 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.5). Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the existing data that Turkish religiosity impinges on cultural integration. These results suggest that there is no general danger of ethnocentrism and fundamentalism.

[85] However, this may not be the case in Europe for the coming years. It is not easy to make predictions or generalizations by looking at processes taking place outside Europe. The idea of European exceptionalism is increasingly accepted by scholars active in the field of sociology of religion. European patterns of religion are no longer seen as a global prototype, but constitute an unusual case in a world where vibrant religiosity is becoming the norm. Peter Berger (1992, 1999) is a notable exponent of this idea. It follows that explanations for European patterns of religion must lie in Europeanness rather than in connections between religion and modernity (Davie, 2001).

Furthermore, a Pearson correlation coefficient test found that elite religiosity was negatively correlated, and popular religiosity was positively correlated with racial prejudice, hostile attitudes towards other religions and subordinate attitudes towards women (see Table 34). These findings will be further elaborated in separate sub-paragraphs.

6.2.4.1. *Ethnocentrism and Religiosity*

One of the aims of this study was to investigate whether there are socio-psychological behaviours related to elite and popular religiosity. Scales such as '(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (i.e., Christianity)', '(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race', '(Hostile) attitudes towards others' generally focus on ethnocentrism that can be characterized as the attitude that one's own people, nation, or ethnic group is inherently superior to others (Capucao, 2010; Stuckrad, 2006, p. 1574). Since the beginning of the Second World War, social scientists have been trying to understand the relationship between religion and ethnocentrism.[86] Most of the results of these studies have shown that religion is one of the main factors contributing to ethnic prejudice (Allport & Kramer, 1946). Recent studies have also confirmed that religion is a key factor affecting ethnic or racial prejudice. They argue that the more religious an individual is, the more prejudiced he/she will likely be (Hood et al., 1996). Yet, some contradictory results have also been obtained, in which it is noted that religion has an aspect that encourages prejudice and an aspect that unmakes prejudice (Allport, 1966; Kayıklık, 2001; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Yapıcı & Kayıklık, 2005). Other studies illustrate that the different dimensions of religiosity may have very different effects on prejudice (Glock & Stark, 1965; 1968). The findings of the present study support these latter findings. These findings suggest that the real question is not whether one is a believer or not, but rather whether the kind of things a person believes in make him or her ethnocentric. In other words, it is not *that* one believes, but *what* and *how* one believes that makes a person ethnocentric.

[86] Botson summarized 47 sets of findings based on 38 studies conducted between 1940 and1990. He categorized these findings according to three manifestations: church membership or attendance, positive attitudes towards religion, and orthodoxy or conservatism. He also categorized 4 kinds of intolerance, i.e., ethnocentrism, racial prejudice, anti-Semitism and other prejudices. He discovered that 37 sets out of the 47 sets indicated the existence of a positive relationship, while the others indicated the opposite (Lawrence Binet Brown, 1985).

It has been said that every religion and every social group, to some extent, imparts conservative and ethnocentric views to its members (Dittes, 1969). On the basis of this social reality, the level of prejudice and ethnocentrism of Dutch-Turkish Muslims can in certain respects be defined as 'normal'. As Watt (1963) has shown, no one would easily become a member of a group that does not claim to represent the truth.[87] However, these socio-psychological attitudes may be influenced by a number of other factors that can produce some 'abnormal' outcomes.

According to Speelman, most Dutch-Turkish citizens are tolerant (2016). However, how religious tolerance is shaped and conceptualized depends on the historical, political and social circumstances of the specific environments in which these minorities live (Berger, 2007). During the period in which our quantitative research in the Netherlands took place (2012 - 2013) there was a relatively peaceful atmosphere, with few conflicts. But insecuritization[88] is unstable, fragile and contested. While there is resistance, change and transformation are possible. The history of Europe and the Netherlands demonstrates that many and frequent insecuritizations of identities have taken place (Canatan, 2008, 2013; Cesari, 2009; Gündüz, 2007; Seufert & Waardenburg, 1999). Insecuritization of the Dutch Muslim identity is a foreseeable possibility (Mijnhart, 2010).[89] The changing political climate following the coup of 15 July 2016 seems to have seriously affected the religious sentiments of Turkish Muslims living in the Europe. Nationalism, anti-Western resentment, and a strong attachment to Turkey's sovereignty are the main factors that unite Turkey's new political actors (Tol & Taşpınar, 2016). When linked to a social *I*-position, the religion

[87] Comenius can shed some light on this point. Just like today, Comenius was confronted with cultural and religious clashes. He was critical of religions, including Christianity. According to Comenius no one can claim to possess the whole truth, because all interpretations are the work of men (Marjoke Rietveld-van Wingerden, Ter Avest & Westerman, 2012, p. 69).

[88] The concept of 'insecuritization' suggests that 'security' should be understood as a situation where the dominant power can decide who should be protected and who should be designated as capable of being controlled, objectified or feared.

[89] Dutch tolerance would turn out to be a conditional affair once again. Although some hostile views could be heard in the late twentieth century, the new millennium put an end to the atmosphere of optimism, tolerance and permissiveness. After 9/11, Muslims soon came to serve primarily as the image of the 'Other', as the counter-image of the beloved Dutch self-image of a nation of tolerant individuals, as a representation of a past that the Dutch were now glad to have shaken off, and even as a danger that they might function as the Dutch base for a world-wide Islamic revival (Mijnhart, 2010).

of Dutch-Turkish migrants may get mixed with other collective identity elements (national, ethnic, cultural).[90]

Further analysis shows that the perception of cultural incompatibility mainly stems from the politicization of socio-economic dissatisfaction; structural conditions have provoked an existential malaise among Muslims and the Dutch. National politics and elections are dominated by emotions, lack of self-confidence, fear of the other, and by feelings of insecurity (Ramadan, 2009a). When existential insecurity erupts in public violence, ideological arguments take over from the real causes of unrest and generate 'block thinking' - the inability to enter into a reasonable dialogue to achieve fruitful integration and coexistence (Taylor, 2007). Bhatia's research (2007) showed that before 9/11 there were many upper-class, privileged Indian immigrants who believed they had achieved full 'cultural citizenship' and 'integration' in America. But a single, cataclysmic, political event like 9/11 disrupted their taken-for-granted acculturation process and migrant identity. Unexpectedly and quite dramatically, they moved from a comfortable sense of belonging to an uneasy state as an outsider, and a threatening one at that. Existential insecurity therefore gives integration issues a cultural and political overtone, translating pluralism into a *clash*.

Some articles suggest that the current terrorist threats are due to the politicization of the Islamic faith, rather than being rooted in Islamic teachings (Esposito, 1992; Yo, 2005). Today, intolerance is a common problem in Turkish society, both amongst the religious and the secular (Bilgili, 2015). On the other hand, the extreme right is gaining ground in Europe and especially in the Netherlands (BBC, 2016; Kakebeeke & Reijerman, 2015). The asylum debate has also influenced voting behaviour in the Netherlands. Geert Wilders continues to gain popularity, along with his right-wing party, the PVV (De Koning, 2016).

Norris and Inglehart claim that experiencing a high level of existential security in their formative years reduces the importance of religion in people's lives, while experiencing a high level of existential insecurity increases the subjective importance of religion (2004, p. 219). The current and future situation in Europe may stimulate the prevalence of popular religiosity. In an atmosphere where conflicts arise and

[90] Verkuyten and Yıldız (2009) described in their paper that the Sunni Muslim minority, which is the largest minority group in Europe, has a very high Muslim group identification.

existential security is threatened, popular religiosity, as noted above, can acquire a fundamentalist character, one element of which is a strong sense of belonging to a group (Johnson, 2012, p. 653).

The terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, which killed 132 people and injured hundreds of others, were the worst terrorist atrocities on the French mainland since the Second World War. Once again they brought Islamic extremism to the forefront of international relations. Many Turkish-Dutch people report experiences of discrimination and prejudice: more than 66–75% according to research (Andriessen, Fernee, & Wittebrood, 2014). According to a report of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia on Muslims in Europe, policies and public discourse on Islam and experiences of discrimination have had a negative impact on Muslim migrants' feelings of belonging to the host countries (Choudhury, 2009).

6.2.4.2. *Sexism and Religiosity*

Sexism or gender discrimination is discrimination based on a person's sex or gender. Sexism can affect any gender, but it is mostly documented as affecting women and girls (Johnson, 2000; Lorber, 2011; Masequesmay, 2015; Stevenson & Lindberg, 2010). It has been linked to stereotypes and gender roles (Matsumoto, 2001), and may include the belief that one sex or gender is intrinsically superior to the other. Studies carried out in different countries show that gender role expectations are strictly influenced by cultural factors, including religion (Burn & Busso, 2005 [in the United States]; Glick, Lameiras & Castro, 2002 [in Spain]; Taşdemir & Sakallı-Uğurlu, 2010; Yapıcı, 2012a [in Turkey]). Morgan (1987) demonstrated a direct link between religiosity and sexism. But the process by which religiosity leads to sexism is still being investigated (Seguino, 2011).

It is often said that Islamic law tends to keep women in a subordinate position compared to western law, and uses principles that are not always compatible with those that inspired western law on human rights and fundamental liberties (Foblets, 2003; Kadıoğlu, 2003). For almost all European respondents, Islamic gender relations are centred upon the subordination of women to men (FES, 2011; Verney, 2013). While most authors point out that the oppression of women is a product of societal and cultural norms rather than religion, they also recognize that political leaders have

legitimised the physical, legal, or psychological subordination of women in religious terms (Silvestri, 2008).

In the field of social psychology, research has clearly demonstrated that religiosity has both positive and negative correlations with prejudice (Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). McFarland (1989) posited that extrinsic religiosity orientation among men tends to give rise to discriminatory attitudes towards women, and that an intrinsic religiosity orientation shows a negative association with prejudice against women. [91]

Here the present study focuses on the question how religiously based differentiation affects inequality between men and women. Our hypothesis was that 'Men motivated by elite religiosity tend to have more positive attitudes towards women and more progressive ideas about gender, than men motivated by popular religiosity.'

Based on the average mean values, we can say that both groups - participants who experience elite religiosity and participants who experience popular religiosity - have no prejudiced or subordinate attitudes towards women. However, the differences in mean values between the two groups were significant. We found that men who experienced elite religiosity had stronger views on the equality and rights of women than men who experienced popular religiosity (see Table 34 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.5).

In summary, popular religiosity among men tends to give rise to discriminatory attitudes towards women, and elite religiosity among men shows negative association with prejudice against women. These findings and results support the position of social psychologists who state that religiosity can have both positive and negative correlations with prejudice against women.

6.2.5. *Spirituality and Religiosity*

Since the turn of the millennium, the use of the concept of 'spirituality' has become increasingly widespread in sociology of religion (Kieran Flanagan & Jupp, 2007; Younos, 2011). Spirituality comprises numerous sociological aspects, such as an

[91] Gordon Allport (1966) found that intrinsic religiosity (valuing religious experience for its own sake and not because of secondary rewards) was related to lower rates of racial antipathy. However, in the case of sexism, it was intrinsic religiosity that correlated highly with sex bias - attitudes that privilege men (Kahoe, 1974).

individualistic orientation, a weak organisational drive, and a holistic function, which have been pointed out by various academics (Knoblauch, 2008). Theoretically, Muslim spirituality in general and Turkish spirituality in particular are rooted in the Qurʾān, and, on the practical level, in the religious life of flourishing sects and orders (for empirical results on Turkish spirituality, see: Ayten, 2010; Altınlı-Macić & Coleman, 2015; Dastan & Buzlu, 2010; Düzgüner, 2007, 2011; Horozcu, 2010). Rose (2001) discovered that the majority of professionals claimed that religious belief did not require spirituality. Compared with adherents of other traditions, however, the religious life of the majority of Muslim respondents indicates that, in their case, spirituality cannot be experienced without religious belief. In line with Rose's general findings derived from a Muslim sample, the results of another study (Altınlı-Macić & Coleman, 2015) indicates that out of a Turkish Muslim sample (41.8%), a majority of respondents identified spirituality as a term derived from religion.

One of the aims of this study was to measure the spiritual aspect of religion by developing an elite religiosity scale. The term 'spirituality' is equivalent to the Arabic term *iḥsān* (Renard, 2005). Spirituality encompasses many forms and motivations, embodied in our study's concept of elite religiosity, including spiritual dynamism, the search for meaning and a quest to understand religiosity in all its depths (Wood, 2010). By looking at the close relationship between elite religiosity and spirituality, this study tried to assess the significance of spirituality in the sociology of Islam.

Nowadays, Muslim majority societies are seriously lacking in spirituality (Cündioğlu, 2009, 2008); Geaves, Dressler & Klinkhammer, 2009; Ramadan, 2004, 2009b, 2012). In Islamic societies there is extensive support available for conventional, scriptural religion in the realm of everyday life (Hassan, 2003). Many European Muslims struggle with finding a balance between spirituality and orthodox interpretations of Islam (Phalet, Gijsberts & Hegandoorn, 2008).

The current Islamic discourse in Turkey and the Netherlands has too often lost its substance, namely the search for meaning, an understanding of ultimate goals, and a gauging of the state of the heart. As we have shown in this study, Islam has been largely reduced to popular religiosity - to jurisprudence, rituals, and, above all, prohibitions characterized by exoteric, unreflective, and uncritical forms and motivations (see Table 38). European Muslim families experience Islam under a comprehensive set of rules, interdictions, and rulings that explain Islam in the context of a specific relation

of protection against an environment that is perceived as too permissive and even hostile (Ramadan, 1999). The findings of our study largely confirm this attitude. Within our group of participants who experienced high religiosity, only 24% experienced elite religiosity while 61% experienced popular religiosity. If we take the other participants into account - those who experienced low religiosity - this ratio drops to 19%. In other words, only two out ten participants experienced elite religiosity to some extent.

In the short term we do not foresee any growth in the spiritual side of religion because of the insecurity that will likely be felt in the near future.[92] The majority of respondents participating in Dutch surveys (FES, 2011; Smith, 2006) assert that Islam is incompatible with modern Western society. Most of the citizens polled expressed negative views on Islam and Muslims. For highly committed Dutch-Turkish Muslims it can be difficult to maintain a stable religious identity without the respect of the Dutch majority. Religious identity development depends importantly on the acceptance and recognition of others (other Muslims and society as a whole) (Phalet, Baysu & Verkuyten, 2010; Visser-Vogel, Bakker, Barnard & Kock, 2015). Moreover, social and political activism in Turkey and in Europe currently prevails over spiritual considerations; the struggle for power has largely overshadowed the search for meaning. Religious styles certainly cannot be reduced to identity politics, but identity politics do inform the kind of religiosity developed by individuals (Buitelaar, 2013, p. 271). The political and ideological thinking of an established party usually does not allow for critical thinking, as a result of which there is insufficient room for spirituality

[92] However, this insecurity felt all over the world might actually trigger spirituality in the long run. In his book on 13th century Iran, George Lane stated that the extraordinary creativity of the Mongolian period, particularly manifested in the development of Sufi thought and the creation of mystical poetry, was a response to the widespread social and political uncertainty caused by the Mongol invasions and the unprecedented prevalence of violence. These disruptions led to the collapse of many pillars of people's lives (2003, pp. 229-230).
Lewisohn concluded that "the only consolation for the ordinary man faced with such barbarity lay in the cultivation of Sufism" (1995, p. 56).
This blossoming of Sufism took place against the sombre background of a barbarian invasion - the Crusaders descending on the Islamic world from the West and the Mongols from the East - and might almost be seen as a kind of compensation for the social and political disasters of the period (see: Dāya, 1982, pp. 1-2).
Arberry suggested that it was the embracing comfort of mysticism that helped formal Islam survive this 'terrible' catastrophic period in the thirteenth century (see: 2010, p. 26).

(Cündioğlu, 2007, 2005, 2010; Kara, 2016). Predominantly, ideological organizations are somewhat hesitant and suspicious, which is an attitude that is incompatible with elite Islam or spiritual religiosity.

To a certain extent, Sufi Muslims nowadays continue to practice and expand the traditional modes of Sufi activity (Dressler, 2009). However, a large part of the sociological literature on Muslim societies has identified Sufism or the *tariqas* - which are expected to be the bearers of the spiritual side of Islam - with the illiterate and rural parts of society (Köse & Ayten, 2010; Ocak, 1996, 2003, 2010). In this perspective, the *tariqa*s represent the disappearing 'traditional' elements of the contemporary social order (Günay & Ecer, 1999; Kara, 2002). This image of *tariqa*s continues to influence scholarship and the general public opinion, both in the West and in the Muslim world (Bruinessen, 2003; Voll, 2007, p. 282). In such a conceptual framework, a renewed success of elite religiosity and an increased visibility of Sufism among the highly educated in the 'modern' sector of society - and in modern and modernizing societies - is not expected nor predicted.[93]

In the long term, however, we are assuming some development of elite religiosity. Most scholars foresee a development "from institutionalized/organized religion to individualized spirituality" (Abraido-Lanza & Viladrich, 2012; Cündioğlu, 2010; Heelas, 2008, p. 227; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 103). In one sense, secularisation has won. Organised religion has declined sharply. Yet spirituality does not seem to have undergone the same fate. It has become "the solace of soul survivors who journey outside organised religion" (Flanagan, 2007, p. 6). In *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (2005), Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel draw on survey data collected in 81 countries - which comprise 85 % of the world's population - between 1981 and 2001, to reach the following conclusion: the contemporary socio-economic developments result in an increasing interest in spirituality (p. 93). If the socio-economic developments and their relation to elite

[93] In his classic text *Sufism*, published in the mid-twentieth century, A.J. Arberry remarked that Sufi orders in many places were continuing to attract the "ignorant masses, but no man of education would care to speak in their favour" (Arberry, 1950, p. 122). Gilsenan reported some 60 orders in Egypt at the time of his field research, but he assessed that relatively few people were actually involved in them, especially compared to the pre-modern period when most men were reputedly members of such orders (Gilsenan, 1967, pp 11-18).

religiosity are taken into consideration, we may also expect that the Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands will gain in spirituality.

Moreover, the majority of Western countries have a positive understanding of multiculturalism, particularly of ethnic and religious pluralism (Canatan, 2009; Ziebertz & Kay, 2009). New forms of Islamic spirituality may appear in European societies, which could attract considerable numbers of people. Such a movement could develop guided by a modern spiritual language (Halstead, 2006) and by the re-individualization of Islamic mysticism, which is more expressed in personal thought and in the intellectual relationship between master and disciple, than in community life or the emotion felt during collective rituals (Maréchal, 2003, p. 153).

Citizens in Western Europe are more open to an elite religiosity that is closely linked to the spiritual side of Islam, than an orthodox or popular Islam, because of the historical religious and cultural heritage of the latter (Köse, 1996, 2003). Van Bruinessen (2009) recently pointed out that Sufism has regained its appeal as a spiritual doctrine and practice among many Muslims in the modern world, as an alternative to the political and puritan styles of Islam. These neo-Sufi movements and new spiritualities may stimulate elite forms of religiosity that are more tolerant and moderate, and open to dialogue with other religions.

The number of people who define themselves as “spiritual but not religious”, or as more spiritual than religious, is increasing in the United States and Western Europe. This development supports meaningful exercises within the spiritual domain (Altınlı-Macić & Coleman, 2015; Altınlı, 2011; Streib & Hood, 2008; Zinnbauer, Pargament et al., 1997). A religion without spirituality is difficult to imagine. Hanegraaff (1999, p. 151) underlined that the reverse - a spirituality without religion - is in principle quite possible. Spirituality can arise on the basis of an existing religion, but can very well do without it. The concept of ‘spirituality without religion’ is a relatively new issue in both Turkey and the Islamic world. A more collectively orientated religiosity is still present and dominant in Turkey, although recently religious individualism has emerged in Islam (De Koning, 2008; Huijnk, 2018; Noor, 2018; Wagemakers & Koning, 2015) but it is not as widespread as in the US and other Western countries (Altınlı-Macić & Coleman, 2015). New Age is a prime example of this last possibility: a complex of spiritualties that arose on the foundation of a pluralistic secular society.

For future research it is important to also focus on this side of spirituality, in order to understand different aspects of Turkish religious life.

6.3. *Conclusion and Future Research*

One of the important findings of our empirical research is that the theoretical approach that Glock's five dimensions are empirical wholes, is not sufficient to gain insight into the complex expressions of Muslim religiosity. There are various intra-dimensional aspects to these dimensions, such as the elite and popular aspects. General conclusions reached in other studies on Glock's scale, regarding a relationship between the dimensions (i.e., relationships based on a single measurement of each dimension), are in need of further exploration. The conceptualizations of elite and popular religiosity seem to have an important theoretical value for the exploration of intra-dimensional aspects of religiosity. Our theoretical and empirical study showed that forms and motivations of high religiosity, which have different aspects such as the ideological, ritualistic, experiential, and intellectual, differ among groups or individuals. We believe that more research is needed into the already proposed intra-dimensional aspects of religiosity. While much of the evidence from our study compares favourably with Stark and Glock's (1968) data, in particular with regard to various aspects of single dimensions, more research is needed before religion analysts can be confident that the relationships which have been published in the present study are more generalizable.

The elite and popular religious orientations in this study included several components that Stark and Glock did not measure (dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality versus experiential desirability). Attempts to apply other schemes to Glock's five dimensions may reveal other components. Conceptualizing and measuring these components is another fruitful direction for future research. I recommend that greater efforts be made to generate new conceptualizations and measurements of the kinds of phenomena that are encompassed by the five dimensions which Glock proposed. Based on the results of this study, I also recommend that future research based on Glock's scheme should treat the five dimensions as heuristic and exploratory devices, and not as empirical wholes.

In addition, it was very difficult to conduct a long-term sociological study of Turkish Muslims in the current context, because there are very large differences between the situation in Turkey 7 years ago and today (2018). I have to express the difficulties I encountered in linking the concluding part of this study to the introductory part written at the beginning of the project. When this project began, Turkey's trend towards democratization was relatively high and Turkey was moving closer to Europe. Turkey's membership of the European Union was discussed openly and developments seemed to run in a positive direction. Now, in 2018, it must be said that Turkey's integration into the European Union has largely failed and that Turkey is now further away from the West. Slowly but surely after 2010 and especially after the coup in 2016, Turkey has turned its face from the West to the East. It seems that this may have long-term and short-term consequences, not only in economic and political terms, but also in religious terms.

The will of the Islamic community leaders to act by leaning on the power of the government, forced them to fulfil the demands of the political centre. This tendency, driven by practical concerns, was for a long time the main driving force behind the perversion of Islamic thought and spirituality. Religious communities still seem to have failed to learn the lessons of recent events, in particular those relating to the Gülen Movement, which has long been backed by political leaders. The dramatic changes following the coup appear to have profoundly affected the religious identity of Turkish Muslims in both Turkey and Europe. Only one decade ago, concepts such as cohesion and integration had emerged to describe the relationship between Turkey and Europe. But circumstances have changed completely today. Turkishness, anti-Western resentment and a strong attachment to Turkish sovereignty have once again become strong among Turkish Muslims in Turkey and in the Netherlands. The discourse of the religious communities is inevitably influenced by these evolving political events because it is closely tied to politics. Projects such as interfaith dialogue, which refers to a cooperative, constructive, and positive interaction between adherents of different religions and/or spiritual or humanistic beliefs, give place to the voice of *Turkish civil religion* which refers to the sacralisation of the state through Islamic symbols.[94] In this context the other became *kāfir* (infidel), and Christianity became 'evil' again. Popular religiosity stimulates such negative image formation when its basic characteristics play

[94] See the following article for the extended definition of civil religiosity and its fundamentals in Dutch society (Ter Borg, 2013).

out in a context of insecurity, which we pointed out in the discussion section. Every coup did not only damage democracy, but also nourished radical Islam. The last attempt is undoubtedly an example of this. It should be an obvious insight that Islam can be understood at many different levels. However, it seems that nowadays we are largely witnessing the least developed forms of understanding, all because of the influence of the level of understanding of preachers who preach only popular and superficial aspects of religiosity. The voices of *Niyāzi-i Misrī*, *Yūnus Emre*, and *Mavlānā*, which emphasize the grace of the human being, are mainly ignored in times when the strengthening of national identities is politically necessary. The Islamic world today, and Turkey in particular, has lost its ability to say "O People", only "O Muslims" remains. The reason is that politics today puts the voices of *Molla Kāsım* and *Vāni Effendi* at its service.

In the early chapters of this study, an attempt was made to critically assess the new paradigms in sociology of religion. Rational choice theory and publications exploring postmodernity recognize the growth of a spiritual marketplace. The key question, however, is whether the emergence of such a market has stimulated elite religiosity or popular religiosity. Or whether this emergence affects the relationship between the two. We must not forget that traditional beliefs and institutions already existed in modernity. Traditional religiosity is still present in modern and postmodern times. The popular religiosity that includes many elements of traditional religiosity can easily go off the rails - reducing, contesting, and even replacing the reflexivity, autonomy, and openness that are dominant characteristics of spiritual religiosity. In line with many cultural theorists, we would like to draw attention once again to the ontological insecurity brought about by the complexities, uncertainty, and diversity of the postmodern condition. We see religious fundamentalism as an emotional and defensive coping mechanism to deal with the insecurity caused by the plurality and the fragmentation of the postmodern world. According to the findings of our study, popular religiosity could remain an important and dominant source of defensive localization within Turkish religiosity, at least in the short term, both in Turkey and in the Netherlands due to the recent developments outlined above.

Another significant issue is that in some studies on elite and popular religiosity, these two concepts are dealt with in theological and political terms. Elite religiosity has been linked to 'great' tradition, official tradition, while popular religiosity has been linked to 'superstition', unofficial religion, and other forms of pejoratively labelled

religiosity. As a consequence, popular religiosity is defined as the 'object' of all negativity in a religious sense. Today, this mistake is often made by religious officials and scholars. Elite and popular religiosity, however, arise as a result of cultural differentiation and stratification in society, as we have shown in this study, and are in fact phenomena that fall within the field of sociology of culture and religion. Future research should therefore not participate in theologico-political power rationalizations, nor participate in the essentializing of historicizing perspectives. We believe that attempts to solve the problems of religious thought without exploring the possibilities for change and transformation between elite and popular, signal the use of an incomplete and inaccurate research methodology.

This tension is mainly fuelled by the official elites (promoted by the state via Diyanet). Once the official religion is in the hands of a particular religious elite, and has been defined by this elite, it can continue to exist as an absolute religious ideal with the call 'Back to true Islam!', wholly separated from the needs and ideals of the everyday, lived religion. The mentality of (religious or political) governments and the mentality of their subjects can therefore be in conflict with each other. Diyanet defines its role as maintaining the social order in Turkey by promoting a moderate Islam based on rationality, not 'superstition'. This model has been faulted for presenting popular religious practices as a deviation from the 'official religion' or 'pure' Islam, which is supposedly represented by theologians and Diyanet leaders. These leaders clearly have a positivist ideology. If someone calls him/herself a Muslim and recognizes certain practices as Islamic, we as researchers must first accept this statement as true and then investigate how these practices differ from those of other Muslims. Moreover, it cannot be said that there is a purely popular religion practiced by the masses, which is completely independent of an 'elite Islam' supposedly represented by theologians and Diyanet leaders. Nor can it be argued that there is a purely 'official' and elite religion, which is completely independent of popular religion, as we have shown in this study. What is neglected is the intersectionality that exists between elite Islam and popular Islam.

Modernity is usually conceived as constituted by a radical shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, from community to society, from particularism to universalism. Today, many scholars observe that current Turkish interpretations of Islam actualize the new Salafism, with an emphasis on *ʿumma*. Although these interpretations, which emphasize *gemeinschaft*, community, and particularism, could be partly successful in

establishing an atmosphere of security for certain religious groups, it does not seem possible to promote peaceful coexistence in this way, in cities where pluralism is a reality. The embracing of such interpretations within an urban setting can lead to tensions between believers and secularists, and in the interreligious domain, to tensions between world religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam. It can also lead to extreme hostility towards traditional interpretative communities and towards all forms of rationalism, intellectualism and mysticism in Islam. If the new Salafism continues to dominate the current Turkish interpretations of Islam, and resists the competitive and open character of the Islamic religious market, we believe it would not be difficult for pro-violence groups to exist in such fertile ground.

Sufis attach great importance to the following *hadīth qudsī*: "I am where My servant thinks of Me. Every servant has an image and an idea of Me. Whatever picture he forms of Me, there I am."[95] We admit that it would be unwise to suggest this Sufi principle to religious officials which emphasize equal reception of manifestations of religiosity, and suggest the ultra-liberal religious market. At the very least, we can say that official religious institutions should not completely ignore this principle, which is at the heart of Islamic wisdom, and should not stigmatize divergent religious expressions of the pious as 'superstition' or '*bidʿah*'. Although struggling against "irreligion and apostasy", the Islamic religion has shown great leniency throughout its history to man's weakness in the face of harsh reality and the strictness of religious demands (Waardenburg, 1978b). Official religious institutions could apply a number of religious development methods suggested by sociology and psychology of religion, instead of waging war on all popular manifestations of religion. In this light, we recommend that the current (official) elites read the dynamic and dialogical language of Al-Ghazālī and integrate it into their thinking. We also believe that this model is a promising basis for developing religious education strategies in Europe. With further improvements, this model, which creates room for a diversity of religious interpretations and flexibility with regard to a variety of religious production demands, could also be used as a tool for primary and secondary education, both in Turkey and in the Netherlands.

[95] Also called *ḥadith ilāhī* or *rabbānī* (divine tradition). This is a set of traditions which preserves words spoken by God, as distinguished from the *hadith nabawī* (prophetical tradition), which preserves the words of the Prophet. For the whole hadith see: *Al Muslim*, book Zhikr, ḥadith 21. For an English translation, see: Arberry, 2004, p. 43.

Dawson states that for “every fresh need there is an answer of divine grace and that every historical crisis is met by a new outpouring of the spirit” (2012, p. 129). Most research in contemporary sociology of religion foresees a development “from institutionalized/organized religion to individualized spirituality”. In fact, in the Netherlands, there is an intellectual accumulation that can nourish religious cosmopolitanism. As mentioned in the introduction, many research topics in regard to Islam are currently being studied by experts in many different fields. The Leiden University Centre for the Study of Religion (LUCSoR) directs this intellectual accumulation under the supervision of Maurits S. Berger. Unfortunately, the channels for reaching the Dutch Muslim community are weak. One aspect of this problem is the reluctance of the Islamic community to take advantage of this accumulation of knowledge. Some prejudices prevent these respected Islamic data from being accessed. The rector of the Rotterdam Islamic University has said that “Muslims want to learn Islam from Muslim scholars”. Although this could be a sociological fact, this can only be explained by a lack of confidence in one’s own values. It should not be forgotten that the tradition of intellectual Islam was built by the representatives of a civilization who followed the principle: “Even if science is in China, look for it and find it”. In the 11th and 12th centuries, Muslim intellectuals had no issues whatsoever with being taught by Christian scholars. We recommend Muslim communities in the West to get rid of this idleness and to remove the dust from these treasures.

Appendix One (*Factor Analysis*)

Table 36 - *Factor analysis / General religiosity scale*

No	*Item*	*Component*	*Factor 1*
14	Oneness of God	Ideological	,487
15	Reward and punishment	Ideological	,894
16	Belief in sacred scriptures	Ideological	,920
17	Resurrection of the dead	Ideological	,789
18	Belief in Muhammad as the last prophet	Ideological	,867
19	Observance of five daily prayers	Ritualistic	,635
20	Observance of fast days during Ramadan	Ritualistic	,714
21	Observance of Friday prayer	Ritualistic	,604
22	Praying to God (*Duā*)	Ritualistic	,650
23	Observance of almsgiving (*zakāt*)	Ritualistic	,488
24	Experiencing a spiritual teacher	Experiential	,729
25	An experience of angels or guiding spirits	Experiential	,676
26	An experience of profound inner peace	Experiential	,735
27	An experience of a miraculous event	Experiential	,741
28	Feeling close to God	Experiential	,736
29	Which of the following answers provide lists that correctly sort successive chapters from the Qurʾān?	Intellectual	,068
30	Which of the following holy days occur during Ramadan?	Intellectual	,599
31	Which of the following rules is not considered one of the obligatory rules (*farẓ*) for prayer (*salāh*)?	Intellectual	,488
32	What is the meaning of *Maqrūh*?	Intellectual	,647
33	Which of the following rules is not one of the pillars of faith (*īmān*) in intellectual dimension	Intellectual	,657
34	It would not bother my conscience to use alcohol	Consequential	,865

35	I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life (reversed)	Consequential	,660
36	A woman should be able to have an abortion for any reason	Consequential	,676
37	Premarital sexual relations between a boy and a girl who are in love is not immoral	Consequential	,737
38	Religion is something I have never felt personally compelled to consider	Consequential	,723

In order to examine the factor structure of 25 items, a principal component analysis was conducted. Four factors emerged with eigenvalues >1. Most items clearly belong to one component, even if some items have component loadings between .3 and .4 on other dimensions. Item 29 loaded on the fourth factor. This item was not further included in the factor analysis due to interpretation difficulties. The other three factors accounted for 58.971 % of the total variance. But there is still a difficulty to interpret the second and third factor. We therefore preferred to use only the first factor that accounted for 47,879 of the total variance.

Table 37 - *Factor analysis / Elite religiosity scale*

No	*Item*	*Components*	*Subcomponent*	*Factor 1*	*Factor 2*
42	I think that there are many more things in my faith that I have not perceived yet.	Elite belief	Self-awareness and openness to change	,761	
45	My religious beliefs are not the same today as they were five years ago.	Elite belief	Self-awareness and openness to change	,648	
52	It is more important to me to spend periods of time in public religious rituals than in private religious thought and meditation. (R)	Elite ritual	Emphasis on the meaning of private ritual	,789	
54	When I pray, I mostly try to understand the meanings of chapters and prayers.	Elite ritual	Emphasis on the meaning of private ritual	,546	
56	The prayers I say when I am alone don't carry the same meaning and personal emotion as those said by me during services. (R)	Elite ritual	Emphasis on the meaning of private ritual	,676	
59	If I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., guidance of God or the Prophet), I prefer to keep it to myself.	Elite experience	Keeping religious experience private		,537
61	I don't desire religious experiences (special gifts from God) in exchange for prayers.	Elite experience	The centrality of experiential desirability		,573
64	I feel upset if I am not receiving any special divine gifts from God in exchange for prayers. (R)	Elite experience	The centrality of experiential desirability		,613
65	My religious knowledge provides me with satisfying answers at this stage of my development, but I am prepared to readjust it as new information becomes available.	Elite knowledge	No certainty of current religious knowledge	,747	
69	For me, doubting the validity of my current religious knowledge is an important part of what it means to be religious.	Elite knowledge	No certainty of current religious knowledge	,704	
71	There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.	Elite knowledge	No certainty of current religious knowledge	,773	

Initial analysis showed that item 55 (related to elite ritual) and item 66 (related to elite knowledge) were not significantly correlated with the total 14-item scale. Therefore, these items were not included in the factor analysis. In order to examine the factor structure of the remaining 12 items, a principal component analysis was conducted. Three factors emerged with eigenvalues >1. Item 40 loaded on a third factor. This item was not further included in the factor analysis due to interpretation difficulties. The other two factors accounted for 51.174 % of the total variance. The correlation between these two factors was .41. The pattern loadings of these two factors are presented in Table 37. As can be seen in Table 37, all items loaded on one of the two factors. Factor 1 mainly represents elite belief, elite ritual and elite knowledge. This factor may be labelled as *spiritual and intellectual dynamism*. The second factor mainly represents elite experience. This factor may be labelled as *experiential privacy and inessentiality*.

Table 38 - *Factor analysis / Popular religiosity scale*

No	*Item*	*Components*	*Subcomponents*	*Factor 1*	*Factor 2*
41	My religious beliefs are pretty much the same today as they were five years ago.	Popular Belief	Spiritual stability	,611	
44	I completely understand what it means to be a believer (*Mu'min*).	Popular Belief	Spiritual stability	,714	
53	I perform my prayers to God to gain relief and protection.	Popular ritual	Material expectations	,648	
57	The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.	Popular ritual	Material expectations	,707	
58	When I recall my experiences with religion I most readily remember the impressive formal rites and rituals. (Circumambulation of the *Kaʿbah – salat al eid*).	Popular ritual	Emphasis on the impressiveness of public ritual	,667	
60	It is essential for religious spiritual leaders to have miracles (*karamats*).	Popular experience	Giving high level of importance to miracles		,689
62	I think it is important to tell about special gifts from God (i.e., peace, mercy, or prosperity) to family or friends	Popular experience	Tendency to share private religious experience		,725
63	If I feel the guidance of the Prophet in my dreams, I prefer to share it with my family or friends.	Popular experience	Tendency to share private religious experience		,622
67	I generally search and find quick answers to my religious questions through Google.	Popular knowledge	Outwardness, intellectual stability	,663	
70	If I find answers to my religious questions through Imams, I never doubt their correctness.	Popular knowledge	Certainty of current religious knowledge	,701	
72	I completely understand what Allah wants by requesting the profession from us (*Kalima-i shahādat*).	Popular knowledge	Intellectual stability	,700	

Items 39 and 43 (related to popular belief) and item 68 (related to popular knowledge) were not significantly correlated with the total 14-item scale. Therefore, these items were not included in the factor analysis. In order to examine the factor structure of the remaining 11 items, a principal component analysis was conducted. Two factors accounted for 55.109 % of the total variance. The correlation between these two factors was .34. The pattern loadings of these two factors are presented in Table 38. As can be seen in table 38, all items loaded on one of the two factors. Factor 1 mainly represents popular belief, popular ritual and popular knowledge. This factor may be labelled as *material expectations* and *spiritual and intellectual stability*. The second factor mainly represents popular experience. This factor may be labelled as *experiential desirability and shareability*.

Table 39 - *Factor analysis of scales of consequential dimensions*

No	*Item*	*Components*	*Factor 1*	*Factor 2*	*Factor 3*	*Factor 4*
73	I cannot endure beliefs that are different than mine.	(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)	,745			
74	It bothers me when religious differences keep people from becoming friends.	(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)	,725			
75	When a person from another religion publicly shares his testimony with me, I take it as a great gift. (R)	(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)	,636			
76	My relations with Christians have always been characterized by conflict.	(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)	,720			
77	Talking to people from different religions helps me to have a *broader* view of life. (R)	(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)	,585			
78	Man's superior strength and common sense show he's more made in the image of God than women are.	(Subordinate) attitudes towards women				,613
79	If a woman is unhappy in her subordinate role, she shows her sinful nature.	(Subordinate) attitudes towards women				,655
80	In marriage, husband and wife should make the important decisions together, with both having the final word. (R)	(Subordinate) attitudes towards women				,590
81	If a husband gets angry about his home situation, it is his wife's fault because she did not prevent the problem.	(Subordinate) attitudes towards women				,619
82	I'm uneasy around people from different cultures or races.	(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race	,740			
83	People of some cultures or races are difficult to trust.	(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race	,748			
84	My racial/ethnic group is an important reflection of who I am.	(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race	,632			
95	I enjoy being around people of different cultures or races. (R)	(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race	,695			
87	I secretly feel good when I learn that someone I dislike has gotten in trouble.	(Hostile) attitudes towards others	,448			

88	I generally join in conversations in which the faults or misdeeds of others are discussed.	(Hostile) attitudes towards others	,521		
89	I continue to wish the best for someone who has hurt me. (R)	(Hostile) attitudes towards others	,493		
92	My religious beliefs cause conflicts with the modern world. (R)	(Hostile) attitudes towards others			,802
93	My religion is entirely compatible with what the modern world has to offer.	(Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism			,796
94	The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of what is right or wrong to these changes.	(Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism			,769
96	Denominational differences are not important to me. (R)	(Positive) in-group attitudes		,763	
97	I avoid doing things that members of my local religious group would disapprove of.	(Positive) in-group attitudes		,780	
98	What members of my religious group expect of me is not important. (R)	(Positive) in-group attitudes		,782	
99	The standards of my local religious group guide me in making decisions.	(Positive) in-group attitudes		,681	

Items 85 and 86 (related to '(hostile) attitudes towards others') and items 90 and 91 (related to 'attitudes towards Islam as self-discipline') were not significantly correlated with the total 27-item scale. Therefore, these items were not included in the factor analysis. In order to examine the factor structure of the remaining 23 items, a principal component analysis was conducted. Six factors emerged with eigenvalues >1. However, further analysis indicated that four factors would offer the best solution. These four factors accounted for 54.376 % of the total variance. The pattern loadings of these four factors are presented in Table 39. According to this table, Factor 1 mainly represents '(hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)', '(prejudiced) attitudes towards race' and '(hostile) attitudes towards others'. This factor may be labelled as *hostile attitudes towards others*. The second factor mainly represents *conservative in-group attitudes.* The third factor mainly represents *harmonious attitudes towards modernism*. The fourth factor mainly represents *subordinate attitudes towards women*.

Appendix Two (*Additional Tables*)



Figure 5 - *Proportion of highly-educated 25 to 64-year old by ethnic background (CBS)*



Figure 6 - *Muslims in the Netherlands by ethnic origin (CBS)*



Figure 7 - *Population of the Netherlands from 2010 to 2015, by religion (CBS, 2016)*

Appendix Three (*Paper-Based Questionnaire*)

Dindarlık üzerine sosyolojik bir araştırma
Een sociologisch onderzoek naar religiositeit

Geachte deelnemer,

Deze vragenlijst is opgesteld voor Turkse Nederlanders. Alle antwoorden zullen enkel voor wetenschappelijke doeleinden gebruikt worden. Uw gegevens zullen volledig anoniem blijven. De vragen zijn in het Turks gesteld met soms een Nederlandse vertaling. De vragenlijst zal in totaal 10-15 minuten in beslag nemen. Uw weloverwogen en gemeende antwoorden worden zeer op prijs gesteld. Alvast bedankt voor uw deelname.

Değerli Katılımcı,

Araştırma anketi Hollanda'da yaşayan Türk vatandaşlar için düzenlenmiştir. Bu anket çalışmasına vereceğiniz cevaplar tamamıyla bilimsel amaçlar için kullanılacaktır. Sorular Türkçe sorulmuştur. Bazı yerlerde Hollandaca tercüme verilmiştir. Anketin tamamlanması yaklaşık 10-15 dakikanızı alacaktır. Vereceğiniz içten ve samimi cevaplar çalışmamızı başarıya ulaştıracaktır.

Kur'an-ı Kerim de inananlara şöyle seslenir;

"*Ey iman edenler, her zaman doğruyu söyleyiniz.*" (33:70)

Katkılarınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Araştırmacı	:	Ömer Faruk Gürlesin
Kurum	:	Leiden Üniversitesi
Bölüm	:	Din Sosyolojisi
Tarih	:	Kasım 2012
İrtibat	:	gurlesin@gmail.com

1. Cinsiyetiniz ?

- o Erkek
- o Kadın

2. Doğum Yılınız ?

3. Hollanda'ya geldiğiniz yıl ?

4. Hollanda'nın neresinde yaşıyorsunuz ?

5. En son hangi ülkenin okulundan mezun (afstuderen) oldunuz ?

- o Hollanda
- o Türkiye
- o Diğer

En son Hollanda'dan mezun olduysanız aşağıyı doldurunuz.

- o Basisondervvijs / Lager beroepsonderwijs
- o Voorbereidend middelbaar
- o Beroepsonderwijs (VMBO)
- o Middelbaar voortgezet onderwijs (Mavo, MULO)
- o Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (MBO)
- o Hoger voortgezet onderwijs (Havo, VWO)
- o Hoger beroepsonderwijs (HBO)
- o Wetenschappelijk onderwijs

En son Türkiye'den mezun olduysanız lütfen aşağıyı doldurunuz.

- o İlkokul
- o Ortaokul
- o Lise
- o Üniversite

6. Ailenizin ortalama yıllık geliri ?

Wat is de gemiddelde jaarlijkse inkomen van uw gezin?

- o (onder) €10,000'nun altında
- o € 10,000 - €30,000
- o €40,000 - €60,000
- o €60,000 - €100,000
- o (boven) € 100,000'nun üzerinde

7. Medeni Haliniz ?

Burgerlijke staat ?

- o Hiç evlenmemiş (nooit getrouwd)
- o Evli (getrouwd)
- o Boşanmış (gescheiden)
- o Nişanlı (verloofd)
- o Evli Değilim, birlikte yaşıyorum (samen wonen)

8. Türkiye'ye Kesin dönüş hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz ?

Wat denkt u 0ver het wel of niet teruggaan naar Turkije?

- o Yakında dönmeyi düşünüyorum
- o 10 yıl sonra dönmeyi düşünüyorum
- o Maalesef (helaas) dönemiyorum
- o Dönmek istemiyorum
- o Diğer _____

9. Resmi olarak bağlı olduğunuz veya gönüllü olarak katkıda bulunduğunuz dini vakıf veya cemaat. (Bu soru boş bırakılabilir)

De stichting waar je officieel of als vrijwilliger lid van bent.

- o Diyanet Vakfı
- o Nur Cemaati
- o Süleyman Efendi Cemaati
- o Milli Görüş Hareketi
- o Hiçbiri
- o Diğer_____

10. İslami vakıflara yaptığınız ortalama senelik bağış.

Jaarlijkse bijdrage aan Islamitische organisaties

- o hiç bağış yapmıyorum (Ik doneer niet)
- o (onder) €1000'nun altında
- o €1000 - €5000'nun arasında
- o €5000 - €10 000'nun arasında
- o (boven) €10 000'nun üzerinde

11. Evde en çok konuşulan dil

Meest gesproken taal thuis

o Hollandaca o Türkçe o Kürtçe o Diğer: _____

12. Pek çok insandan daha çok dindar olduğumu düşünüyorum.

Ik denk religieuzer te zijn dan de meeste mensen

- o Doğru (rechts)
- o Yanlış (onjuist)
- o Fikrim Yok (ik heb geen idee)

13. Aşağıdaki maddelerin din eğitiminizde ne kadar etkili olduğunu sırasıyla belirtiniz.

Geef in volgorde aan hoe invloedrijk onderstaande opties zijn gevveest op uw religieuze scholing.

	Etkisiz	Az etkili	Normal	Etkili	Çok Fazla etkili
Aileden (Familie)					
Arkadaşlardan (Vriend(en))					
Okuldan (School)					
Kitaplardan (Boeken)					
Dini Liderlerden (Religieuze leiders)					
Camilerden (Moskees)					
Dini Vakıflardan (religieuze stichtingen)					
TV ve Radyo'dan					
İnternetten					

Aşağıdaki inanç esaslarına ne kadar inanıyorsunuz ?

1 - Minimum inanç; 5 - Maksimum inanç

	1	2	3	4	5
14. Allah'ın Birliği					
15. Cennet ve Cehennem					
16. Kutsal Kitapların Allah tarafından indirilmesi					
17. Öldükten sonra tekrar dirilme					
18. Hz Muhammed'in son peygamber olarak gönderilmesi					

Aşağıdaki İbadetleri ne kadar sıklıkla (hoe vaak) yapıyorsunuz.

	hiç yapmıyorum	çok az	bazen	Çoğu Zaman	Tamamen yapıyorum
19. Beş vakit namaz kılma					
20. Ramazan orucunu tutma					
21. Cuma namazını kılma					
22. Dua etme					
23. Zekat verme					

Dikkat: Aşağıdaki duyguları ne kadar hissettiğinizi belirtiniz.

1 - Minimum hissetme (minimaal ervaring) 5 - Maksimum hissetme (maximaal ervaring)

	1	2	3	4	5
24. Manevi bir dini liderle buluşma veya onun sesini kalben hissetme					
25. Koruyucu ve yardım edici melekleri(engelen) hissetme					
26. Derin bir gönül huzuru (gemoedsrust) hissetme					
27. Mucizevi (wonderbaarlijk) olaylarla karşılaşma					
28. Allah'a çok yakın hissetme					

29. Aşağıdaki şıkların hangisinde sure sıralaması doğru olarak verilmiştir?

- o Nasr, Tebbet, İhlas, Felak, Nas Sureleri
- o Tebbet, Nasr, İhlas, Felak, Nas Sureleri
- o İhlas, Tebbet, Felak, Nasr, Nas Sureleri
- o Felak, Nas, İhlas, Tebbet, Nasr Sureleri
- o Emin değilim (ik ben niet zeker)
- o Fikrim yok (ik heb geen idee)

30. Aşağıdaki kutsal zamanlardan hangisi Ramazan ayı içerisinde yer alır?

- o Mevlid Kandili
- o Berat Kandili
- o Aşure Günü
- o Kadir Gecesi
- o Emin değilim (ik ben niet zeker)
- o Fikrim yok (ik heb geen idee)

29. Aşağıdakilerden hangisi namazın farzlarından değildir.

- o Başlama tekbiri (Allahu Ekber)
- o Kuran okumak
- o Rükû ve secde etmek
- o Secdede 3 defa tesbih çekmek (3x Subhane Rabbiyel Ala)
- o Emin değilim
- o Fikrim yok

30. Mekruh ne demektir?

O Zorunlu O İzin verilmiş O Yasaklanmış O İyi görülmeyen O Fikrim yok

31. Aşağıdakilerden hangisi imanın şartlarından değildir.

- o Peygamberlere inanmak
- o Oruç Tutmak
- o Ahiret Gününe inanmak
- o Allaha inanmak
- o Fikrim yok

Lütfen aşağıdaki maddeler hakkındaki düşüncelerinizi belirtiniz. Geef wat je denkt over de volgende items. Katılıyorum - Ik ben het eens / Katılmıyorum - Ik ben het oneens	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Fikrim Yok	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
34. Dindar bir insanın alkol kullanmasında (içki içmesinde) bir sakınca yoktur.					
35. Dini inançlarımı ve ibadetlerimi hayatımın diğer bütün alanlarında uygulamaya gayret gösteriyorum.					
36. Kadın istediği zaman çocuk aldırma hakkını kullanabilmeli.					
37. Birbirini seven erkekle kadın arasındaki evlilik öncesi cinsel ilişki ahlaksızca bir davranış değildir.					
38. Din konusunda kendimi bir şey yapmak zorunda hissetmem.					

Lütfen aşağıdaki maddeler hakkındaki düşüncelerinizi belirtiniz.

Geef wat je denkt over de volgende items.

Katılıyorum - Ik ben het eens / Katılmıyorum - Ik ben het oneens

	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Fikrim Yok	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
39. Dini inancımın kuvvetli olmasındaki temel sebep ailemin dine verdiği önemden kaynaklanmaktadır.					
40. Şu anki dini inançlarım ve ideallerimin bir çoğu kendi çabalarıma dayanıyor.					
41. 5 sene önceki dini inancımla şimdiki dini inancım tıpatıp aynı.					
42. İnancımın içerisindeki pek çok şeyi halen anlayamadığımı düşünüyorum.					
43. Dini inançlarımı ve ideallerimi temel olarak çevremdeki insanların varlığına borçluyum.					
44. Mü'min olmanın ne demek olduğunu bütünüyle anlıyorum.					
45. Şu an sahip olduğum dini inançlar 5 sene önceki inançlarımla aynı seviyede değil.					

Not: Eğer dini inancınızı kaybedip ateist (Allah yoktur diyen) yahut agnostik (Allah'ın varlığını veya yokluğunu önemsemeyen) olsaydınız bu size neye mal olurdu (wat voor gevolg zou dat hebben?). Aşağıdaki duyguları ne kadar hissederdiniz.?

	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Fikrim Yok	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
46. Kaybolmuş ve başıboş hissederdim; hayatımın dayanak noktasını kaybetmiş hissederdim.					
47. Ailemi hayal kırıklığına uğrattığımı düşünürdüm.					
48. İnancımın devam ettirecek kadar güçlü olamadığım için kendimden utanırdım.					
49. Arkadaşlarımı hayal kırıklığına uğrattığımı düşünürdüm.					
50. Hayatımın temel amacına ihanet etmiş gibi hissederdim.					
51. Allah'ın ceza vermesinden korkardım.					

İbadetleriniz ile alakalı aşağıdaki maddeler sizin için ne kadar doğrudur.	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Fikrim Yok	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
52. Benim için topluca yapılan ibadetler yalnız başına yaptığım dualardan ve ibadetlerden daha değerlidir.					
53. Rahata ermek ve yüce Allah tarafından korunmak için ibadet ederim.					
54. Namaz kılar veya dua ederken her zaman okuduğum duaların ve ayetlerin manalarını anlamaya çalışırım.					
55. Cennet ile ödüllendirilmek veya cehennemden korunmak için ibadet ederim.					
56. Yalnız başına yaptığım dualar cemaatle yaptığım dualar kadar anlamlı ve duygusal olmuyor.					
57. ibadetin amacı mutlu ve huzurlu bir hayat yaşamaktır.					
58. Yaşadığım dini anları düşündüğümde coşkulu ve etkileyici olan cemaatle ibadetleri hatırlarım (Bayram namazı, veya hac gibi).					

Aşağıdaki maddeler ile alakalı düşüncenizi belirtiniz. Geef wat je denkt över de volgende items.	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Fikrim Yok	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
59. Peygamberimizin bana manevi olarak yardım ettiğini hissetsem bunu sır olarak saklarım.					
60. Dini liderlerin keramet (olağan üstü olaylar) göstermeleri önemlidir.					
61. İbadetler karşılığında dini ve manevi bir sevinç beklentim yoktur.					
62. Bence insanların Allah'ın vermiş olduğu özel manevi hediyeleri başkalarına anlatması gerçekten önemlidir, (gönül huzuru, bereket, bolluk gibi).					
63. Eğer peygamber efendimizin rüyada bana yol gösterdiğini ve yardım ettiğini görsem, bunu ailemle ve yakınlarımla kesinlikle paylaşırım.					
64. Eğer Allah tarafından ibadetlerim karşılığında manevi hediyeler ve ikramlar verildiğini hissetmezsem üzülürüm.					
65. Yeni dini bilgilerle karşılaşırsam şimdiki bilgilerimi değiştirmeye hazırım.					
66. Televizyon dini bilgi öğrenmemde önemli bir yere sahiptir.					
67. Genellikle aklıma takılan dini sorulara hızlıca Google'dan arattırıp cevaplar bulurum.					
68. Dini bilgilerimi çoğunlukla ailemden öğrendim.					
69. Sahip olduğum dini bilgilerin doğruluğundan şüphe etmek dindar olmanın bir gereğidir.					
70. Eğer aklıma takılan bir soruya hocalar tarafından bir cevap bulursam, bunun doğruluğundan kesinlikle şüphe etmem.					
71. Dini bilgilerime dair pek çok görüşüm sürekli değişiyor.					
72. Yüce Allah'ın kelime-i şahadet getirmemizi isteyerek bizden ne istediğini tamamen anlamaktayım.					

Aşağıdaki maddeler ile alakalı düşüncenizi belirtiniz. Geef wat je denkt over de volgende items.	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Fikrim Yok	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
73. Benim dini inançlarımdan farklı olan inançlara dayanamıyorum.					
74. Farklı dinden insanların arkadaş olabilmesi beni rahatsız eder.					
75. Başka dine mensup birisi herkesin arasında inançlarını bana anlatsa, bunu memnuniyetle karşılarım.					
76. Hristiyanlarla olan ilişkilerimde genellikle anlaşamam.					
77. Başka dine mensup insanlarla yaptığım konuşmalar geniş bir dünya görüşü kazanmama yardımcı olur.					
78. Erkeğin üstün güçleri ve sağduyusu Allah'ın onu kadından üstün yarattığının göstergesidir.					
79. Eğer kadın aile içerisinde erkekten aşağı olmaktan dolayı mutsuz ise, günahkar bir tavır sergiliyor demektir.					
80. Evlilikte kadın ve erkek önemli kararlar alınacağı zaman eşit düzeyde söz sahibi olmalıdır.					
81. Eğer erkek evde olan bitenden dolayı kızıyorsa, bu problemi önlemediği için suçlu kadındır.					
82. Başka ırktan insanların arasında rahatsız olurum.					
83. Başka ırktan insanlara güvenmek zordur.					
84. Mensubu olduğum ırk benim kim olduğumu belirleyen en önemli şeydir.					
85. Başkalarına olan yaklaşımımda herkesi Allah için sevmeyi esas alırım.					
86. Başkalarıyla olan ilişkilerimde Hz Muhammed'e olan sevgimi anlatma duygusu etkili olur.					
87. Nefret ettiğim birisinin başı derde girerse gizliden gizliye mutlu olurum.					
88. Genellikle başkalarının hatalarının ve yanlışlarının konuşulduğu konuşmalara katılırım.					
89. Birisi bana zarar verse dahi onun hakkında iyi düşünmeye devam ederim.					
90. Dinin temel görevi insanı eğitmek değil, insanlar arasında toplumsal bütünleşmeyi sağlamaktır.					
91. Din benim kendimi değil, başkalarını tanımamı kolaylaştırır.					
92. Dini inançlarım modern dünyanın istekleriyle çelişiyor (botst).					
93. Dinim modern dünyanın istekleriyle tamamen uyum içerisindedir.					
94. Dünya sürekli değişiyor. Neyin doğru neyin yanlış olduğunu yeni değişmelere göre belirlemeliyiz.					
95. Başka ırklara mensup insanlarla birlikte olmaktan mutlu olurum.					

Eğer bir dini grup veya cemaate bağlı iseniz lütfen bu tablodaki sorulara cevap veriniz.

96. Dini Cemaat farklılıklarının benim için önemi yoktur.					
97. Bağlı olduğum dini grubun üyelerinin beğenmeyeceği şeylerden uzak dururum.					
98.Bağlı olduğum dini gruptaki diğer üyelerin benden beklediklerinin çok önemi yoktur.					
99. Bağlı bulunduğum dini grubun prensipleri karar vermemde beni yönlendirir.					

Appendix Four (*Web-Based Questionnaire*)

Link:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?usp=drive_web&formkey=dHh2ekhZckpNUDFGbE5SLUgyQ2xocUE6MQ#gid=0



Dindarlık üzerine sosyolojik bir araştırma & Een sociologisch onderzoek naar religiositeit

This survey was held between November 2012 - March 2013 . You can go to the next page for all of the items.

Questionnaires completed after the date of April 1, 2013 will not be considered.

Thank you for your interest,

Best Regards.

Turkish

Bu anket çalışması Kasım 2012 - Mart 2013 tarihleri arasında düzenlenmiştir. Maddeleri tamamını görmek için bir sonraki sayfaya geçebilirsiniz.

1 Nisan 2013 tarihinden sonra doldurulan anketler dikkate alınmayacaktır.

Gösterdiğiniz ilgi için teşekkür ederim,

Saygılarımla.

Ömer Faruk Gürlesin

Leiden Üniversitesi

Din Sosyolojisi ve Psikolojisi

Nisan, 2013 - Leiden

SONRAKI

Google Formlar üzerinden asla şifre göndermeyin.

Appendix Five

(*Measurements in Turkish Sociology and Psychology of Religion*)

Table 40 - *Adapted western-Christian measurements*

Author	*Measure (total # items)*	*Factorial Structure (# items)*	*α*	*Subsequent Research*	*Adapted from…*
Özbaydar (1970)	Belief in God and Religion Measure (53)	• Belief in God (18) • Belief in religion (35)		Uyaver (2010)	Religious beliefs (Kuhlen & Arnold, 1944)
Yaparel (1987)	Religious Life Inventory (31)	• Belief: prevalent beliefs, religious particularism, ethical behaviour (4) • Rituals (10) • Emotions (7) • Intellect (10	α = .86	Köktaş (1993) Yapıcı (2004)	Multidimensions of religiosity (Glock & Stark, 1969)
Mutlu (1989)	Islamic Religiosity Scale (14)	• Belief (14)	α = .94	Kaya (1998)	Religious attitudes
Köktaş (1993)	Religious Life Inventory (81)	• Ideology: particularism, ethical behaviour (14) • Rituals: obligatory worship, voluntary worship (12) • Experience: effects of religion, closeness to Allah (4) • Intellect: basic religious knowledge (7) • Secular consequences: politics, economics, family, education, neighbourhood, science (44)		Köktaş (1993)	Multidimensions of religiosity (Glock & Stark, 1969)
Uysal (1995)	Islamic Religiosity Scale (26)	• Consequences (8) • Ideology (8) • Intellect (3) • Rituals (4) • Social functions of religious behaviour (3)	α = .97	Musa (2004) Ayten (2009a) Turan (2009) Çetin (2010)	Multidimensions of religiosity (Glock & Stark, 1962)

Kaya (1998)	Religious Attitudes Measure (31)	• Positive attitudes (17) • Negative attitudes (14)	α = .96	Apaydın (2002) Kafalı (2005)	Religious attitudes and behaviours (Özbaydar 1970)
Yıldız (1998)	Religious Life Inventory (31)	• Intellect (10) • Belief (4) • Emotions (7) • Behaviour (10)	α = .86	Yıldız (2006) Şahin (2001)) Atalay (2005) Kafalı (2005)	Multidimensions of religiosity (Glock & Stark, 1962)
Kotehne (1999)	Age Universal I-E Scale (20) Quest Scale (6)	• Intrinsic scale (9) • Extrinsic scale (11) • Quest (6)	α = .82 α = .48 α = .34	Göçen (2005)	Religious orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967) (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983)
Kayıklık (2000)	Religious Orientation Scale (23)	• Intrinsic religiosity (6) • Extrinsic religiosity (4)	α = .78		Religious orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967)
Gürses (2001)	Religiosity Scale (21)	• Intrinsic religiosity (9) • Extrinsic religiosity (12)			Religious orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967)
Karaca (2001)	Intrinsic Motivational Religiosity Scale (19)	• Intrinsic motivation (19)	α = .84	Karaca (2000) Karaca (2001b) Karaca (2006) Güler (2007)	Religious orientation (Hoge, 1972)
Karaca (2001b)	Heterodox Beliefs and Practices Scale (10)	• Heterodox practices (5) • Heterodox beliefs (5)	α = .63		Heterodox beliefs
Uysal (2001)	Religiosity Scale (34)	• Religious features and practices (15) • Social features and practices (12) • Personal ethics (5) • Negative character traits (2)	α = .93	Uysal (2006) Çapçıoğlu (2003)	
Yapıcı (2002)	Religious Dogmatism Scale (16)	• Religious dogmatism (16)	α = .91	Yapıcı (2002) Yapıcı (2004)	Dogmatism (Brunswik Frenkel, 1948; Rokeach, 1960)

Topuz (2003)	Religious Development Scale (55)	• Disbelief (11) • Deceptive religiosity (11) • Imitative religiosity (11) • Investigative religiosity (11) • Pleasurable religiosity (11 items)	α = .80	Topuz (2003)	Religiosity typologies described in Ghāzāli's works, especially in *Ihyaʾ ul ʿulum al-dīn*
Kayıklık (2003)	Religious Life Scale (36)	• Belief (12) • Worship (15) • Ethics (9	α = .95		Multidimensions of religiosity (Glock & Stark, 1962)
Yapıcı & Zengin (2003)	Religious Affection Scale (17)	• Effect of religion (17)	α = .95	Yapıcı (2006)	Multidimensions of religiosity (Glock & Stark, 1962)
Taş (2003)	Religiosity Measure (12)	• Belief (6) • Worship and social life (6)	α = .93	Kandemir (2006)	Religious attitudes
Arslan (2003)	Popular Religiosity Scale (12)	• Popular religious beliefs (12)	α = .85	Arslan (2002) Arslan (2003) Arslan (2004)	Popular religious attitudes
Onay (2004)	Religious Orientation Scale (18)	• Cognition (8) • Behaviour (6) • Emotion (4)	α = .95	Onay (2002) Onay (2004)	Religious attitudes
Mehmedoğlu (2004)	Islamic Religiosity Scale (26)	• Ideology (4) • Rituals (6) • Experience (7) • Intellect (4) • Consequences (12	α = .96		Multidimensions of religiosity (Glock & Stark, 1962; Uysal, 1995
Mehmedoğlu & Aygum (2006)	Faith Development Interview (26)	• Life review (6) • Relations (3) • Present values and commitments (8) • Religion and worldview (9		Ok (2006)	Faith development (Fowler, 1981)
Cirhinlioğlu (2006)	Religious Orientation Scale (23)	• Intrinsic religiosity (11) • Extrinsic religiosity (12)	α = .90	(Cirhinlioğlu, 2010)	Religious orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967)

Mehmedoğlu & Aygum (2006)	Faith Development Interview (26)	• Life review (6) • Relations (3) • Present values and commitments (8) • Religion and worldview (9		Ok (2006)	Faith development (Fowler, 1981)
Güler (2007a)	God Perception Scale (22)	• Loving God perception (8) • Positive God perception (4) • Distant/unconcerned God perception (4) • Scaring/punishing God perception (3) • Negative God perception (3)	α = .83	Güler (2007) Güler & Aydın (2011)	God perceptions
Güler (2007a)	Guilt Scale (20)	• Repentance (9) • Self-punishment (5) • Punishment expectation (6)	α = .90	Güler (2007b)	Feelings of guilt/sinfulness
Sezen (2008)	Religious Fundamentalism (12)	• Religious doctrines (6) • Symbolic thought (3) • Categorical thought (3)	α = .84		Religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004)
Sezen (2008)	Faith Development Scale (8)	• Religious diversity (3) • Religious autonomy (3) • Critical thought (2)	α = .71	Sezen (2008)	Faith development (Leak, Loucks & Bowlin, 1999)
Ok (2009)	Scale of Faith or Worldview Schemas (18)	• Literal faith (5) • Historical reductionism (5) • Pluralist relativism (4) • Historical hermeneutics (4)		Ok & Cirhinlioglu (2010)	Faith development (Fowler, 1981) Religious styles (Streib, 2001)
Ok (2009)	Clergy Vocational Conflict (10)	• Vocational cognitive conflict (10)	α = .76	Ok (2002) Ok (2004) Ok (2005) Ok (2009)	Religious conflict, quest, doubts
Ayten (2009b)	Brief Islamic Religiosity Scale (10)	• Religious faith and consequences (6) • Religious rituals and knowledge (4)	α = .80	Ayten (2010) Altınlı (2011)	Multidimensions of religiosity (Glock & Stark, 1969; Uysal, 1995)

Coştu (2009)	Religious Orientation Scale (37)	• Normative religious orientation (30) • Popular religious orientation (7)	α = .87		Religious attitudes
Apaydın (2010)	Munich Motivational Religiosity Inventory (26)	• Relation with God as source of strength and trust (14) • Ethical control (4) • Cooperative control (2) • Prosocial and religious intellectual responsibility (8)		Uysal, Turan & Işık (2014)	Multidimensional motivational religiosity (Zwingmann & Moosburger, 2004)
Ok (2011)	Ok-Religious Attitudes Scale (8)	• Cognition (2) • Affection (2) • Behaviour (2) • Relation, with God (2)	α = .91		Religious attitudes (Francis, Kerr, & Lewis, 2005)
Mehmedoğlu (2011)	God Image Scale (76)	• Positive God image: merciful (11), protecting (8), submitted (5), competent/ transcendent (12), friend (7), close/ immanent (7), officious/controlling (6), loving (8), not requesting (2) • Negative God image: punishing (7), testing (3)	α = .89	Mehmedoğlu (2011) Akyuz (2011)	Islamic/ Qur'anic images of God
Albayrak, Acuner, & Seyhan (2014)	Prayer Attitude Scale (34)	• Purpose (12) • Frequency (11) • Sensation and consciousness (11)	α = .96		
Uysal, Turan, & Işık, (2014)	Munich Motivational Religiosity Inventory (26)	• Relation with God as source of strength and trust (14) • Ethical control (4) • Cooperative control (2) • Prosocial and religious intellectual responsibility (8)	α = .96		Multidimensional motivational religiosity (Zwingmann & Moosburger, 2004)

Sevinç, Güven, & Yeşilyurt (2015)	Nonreligious Nonspiritual Scale (16)	•Religiosity (8) •Spirituality (8)	α = .85	Nonreligious Nonspiritual Scale - Cragun, Hammer, & Nielsen (2015)
Akın, Altundağ, & Turan (2015)	Religious Commitment Scale (10)	•Intrapersonal religious commitment (5) •Interpersonal religious commitment (5)	α = .85	Religious Commitment Scale (Worthington, Everett L. et al., 2003)
Akın & Yalnız (2015)	Short Muslim Practice and Belief Scale (9)	• Individual (4) • Social (5)		Short Muslim Practice and Belief Scale (Al-Marri, Oei & Al-Adawi, 2009)

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Summary in English

Over the past three decades, Islam has become increasingly visible in the European public sphere. Despite Islam's rapid growth in Europe and the Netherlands, many people in the West know little about this religion. The reality of European Islam is very diverse. The differences are related to national, cultural, religious and linguistic elements. In the present study, we explored the inner differences of Dutch-Turkish religiosity in relation to social, economic, and cultural aspects. By means of this exploration we examined the possible directions Islam is taking in Europe. We sought a middle ground between two types of essentialist argumentation: one is to theorize incompatibility between Islam and European culture, and the other is to theorize compatibility between them. As many scholars who study Muslim society have noted, Islam, like any other religion, does not develop in a monolithic form, whether it is hostile to European values or assimilated, as the term 'Euro-Islam' suggests. It develops in a multiplicity of forms, such as political Islam, official Islam, popular Islam, spiritual Islam and radical fundamentalism, combining both radical and moderate religious voices.

The objective of this study was to contribute to the body of knowledge about the characteristics of the religiosity of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands, in relation to their socio-economic status. Our research is exploratory and descriptive. It seeks to examine and understand Muslim beliefs and practices from the perspective of elite and popular religiosity, exploring the characteristics of both kinds of religiosity. The main research questions are (1) 'What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?' (2) 'What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity, respectively?'

Ethical traditions in Islam, in particular all Sufi traditions, generally classify the whole of humanity into three ranks. The ranks are: the common folk or general mankind (*ʿawāmm*); the elect or elite (*khawāṣṣ);* and the super-elite (*khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ*). Nearly comparable conceptions of 'elite' and 'popular' are used by sociologists to explain the structure of Muslim society. In the academic study of Islam in Turkey, the spiritual and intrinsic dimensions of religiosity were mostly ignored or studied separately by sociologists, without taking the interrelatedness of elite and popular religiosity into account, while the relation between religiosity and social and economic factors was largely neglected by the scholars of religious studies. This was also the case for the study of Dutch-Turkish Muslims. There was very little information available in the literature about socio-economic issues relating to the religiosity of Dutch-Turkish Muslims. In order to fill this gap, in the present study, we concentrated both on the inner-Islamic differences of religiosity and their relation with the socio-economic situation in the Netherlands.

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical background of the main concepts in light of a social scientific study of religion. The notions of 'great' and 'little' traditions, 'high' and 'popular' culture are introduced and developed upon in a broader context. First, we discuss how the category of the 'popular' is approached by structuralists and culturalists. These concepts are also elaborated upon in light of Turkish sociology. More specifically, we sought to investigate the links between culture and religiosity drawing on the works of Ziya Gökalp and Fuad Köprülü. The literature review shows that the 'great' and 'little' traditions in Islam, which are derived from the more expansive division between 'great' and 'little' traditions in culture, have great significance for understanding the religious structure of Turkish society.

This study sheds light on the notion of elite and popular religion and its acquired meaning and content in the social scientific study of religion. We explain Weber's status stratification and rational choice theories in order to clarify elite and popular religion from a sociological perspective. In this study it is then proposed to add a different definition of 'elite' based on a synthesis approach. It holds that: 'Popular religion' is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief exercised by generally socially and economically non-privileged strata. The definition of elite religion takes shape as follows: 'Elite religion' is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief exercised by strata that are generally socially and economically privileged. Thus, following these definitions we assumed that certain objective positions within the social field generally 'go hand in hand with' certain forms of religiosity.

This study utilizes the five-dimensional scheme of the nature of religious commitment as developed by Glock and Stark (1962). However, it is important to stress that Glock and Stark's scale does not wholly apply to the distinctive religious elements of the Islamic worldview. The present study focused on the intra-dimensional aspects of the five dimensions and proposed to use Allport's conceptual schemes. Furthermore, this study revealed that Al-Ghazālī's analysis of individual religiosity shows some striking similarities with the analysis of the psychologist Allport, and provides a fertile ground for uncovering a variety of motivations, cognitive styles and contents of Islamic beliefs and practices, and also forms an important example to explain intra-dimensional aspects of Islam.

Chapter 3 will shed light on a somewhat narrower context and will focus on elite and popular religiosity in Islam. We will make a comparison between the two-dimensional scale devised by Allport and Ross (1967) and the multidimensional religiosity scales conceived by Stark and Glock (1968). Following this, our study develops a new elite and popular religiosity scale. The conceptual orientation suggests two poles within each of the five components of Glock and Stark's model. These are: 5 components of elite religiosity, and 5 components of popular religiosity. These two extremes reflect the classification of the sub-dimensions, which include belief (*īmān*), practice (*'amal*), knowledge (*'ilm/ma'rifah*), experience (*maunat/ilhām*) and consequences (*natajah*). Under these sub-dimensions, we identified several motivational and cognitive characteristics and contents, which according to us distinguish elite religiosity from popular religiosity.

Chapter 4 outlines the methodology for the study. The design of this present study has been shaped by a 'mixed-methods' approach, in which quantitative and qualitative methods are merged into one research project. Within a four-year period (2010 - 2013), the project began

with qualitative research to explore the various forms and motivations of elite and popular religiosity and the social location of these religiosities, focusing on Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. One of the essential instruments we used was participant observation. The research design also included an extensive literature review, so that the results of the qualitative research and literature review could serve as a basis for aspects of the quantitative approach.

The second method consisted of a questionnaire survey that formed the main part of the project. We used four different scales; (1) a general religiosity scale, (2) an elite religiosity scale, (3) a popular religiosity scale and (4) measurements for the consequential dimension. The general religiosity scale (1) was designed to obtain information under the five dimensions based on Glock and Stark (1962). This part of the questionnaire focused on high and low religiosity. The results of this part of the survey were used to identify respondents who experienced a low level of religiosity and to remove them from the sample. An elite religiosity scale (2) and a popular religiosity scale (3) were designed to highlight the intra-dimensional aspects of Glock's five dimensions. The consequential dimension (4) was interpreted here as the relation(s) between, or even the possible influence(s) of being an elite or popular religious person for peoples' day-to-day lives.

Chapter 5 provides data analysis and results, and the answers to the sub-questions and, accordingly, to the main research question. The hypotheses as developed in chapters 2 and 3 are tested. This first main research question was: 'What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?' The first sub-question was: 'How can the relationship between religion and culture be characterized, and how do we understand popular and elite religiosity in our research setting?' The literature review showed that the 'great' and 'little' traditions in Islam, which are derived from the more expansive division between 'great' and 'little' traditions in culture, have great significance for understanding the religious structure of Turkish society.

The second sub-question was: 'What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in the context of Turkish – and possibly also Dutch – society?' These characteristics are: dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and privacy versus experiential desirability and shareability, tolerant versus intolerant, and unprejudiced versus prejudiced.

The third sub-question was: ‘What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’ Factor analyses and correlation analyses performed on the elite religiosity scale and the popular religiosity scale, showed that participants who experience elite religiosity tend to stress doubt and dynamism within the ideological aspect of religiosity. Within the ritualistic aspect, they tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of rituals (i.e., focus on quality). Within the intellectual aspect, they underline the importance of doubt regarding the validity of their current religious knowledge, and the dynamism of religious learning. Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they consider miraculous religious experiences (special gifts from God in exchange for their religious effort) to be relatively unimportant: for them it is essential to keep these private. Participants who experience popular religiosity tend to stress the sureness and stability of their current beliefs within the ideological aspect of religiosity. Within the ritualistic aspect, they emphasize the extrinsic value of rituals (i.e., focus on quantity) and they express material expectations. Within the intellectual aspect, they tend to be sure of their current religious knowledge and place intellectual stability at the centre. Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they consider miraculous religious experiences to be an appropriate and necessary part of religious commitment, and they are eager to report such experiences to others.

The fourth sub-question was: ‘What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?’ We indeed found a negative correlation between elite religiosity and popular religiosity ($r = -.72$).

The fifth sub-question was: ‘How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?’ Of the 893 (76.7%) respondents with a strong religious affiliation, 203 (22.7%) turned out to consistently experience elite religiosity, while 545 (61%) consistently experienced popular religiosity. First-generation respondents do experience popular religiosity more intensely than second-generation respondents. Respondents with a higher level of education experienced a higher level of elite religiosity than respondents with a lower educational level. Similarly, respondents with a lower level of education experienced a higher level of popular religiosity than respondents with a higher educational level.

In light of our literature review, we expected a relationship between socio-psychological attitudes and religiosity, and for this reason we formulated a second main research question: ‘What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively? We found that respondents

who experienced elite religiosity were more open and friendly towards other religions. Moreover, men who experienced elite religiosity had stronger views on the equality and rights of women compared to men who experienced popular religiosity. It also turned out that participants who experienced elite religiosity expressed less (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and showed less conservative in-group attitudes than participants who experienced popular religiosity.

Based on the findings of this study, out of the total group of participants who experienced high religiosity, six out of ten participants experienced popular religiosity, while only two out of ten experienced elite religiosity. The literature and our sample suggest a number of demographic and socio-economic factors to explain why Dutch-Turkish Muslims generally experience popular religiosity. Some of these factors are gender and age; educational status; household income; and social and cultural capital; the experience of immigration; structural and contextual factors such as the current economic and political crisis; government policies; and experiences with discrimination. In the discussion section, we tried to pay more attention to the role of these factors listed above, in order to deepen our understanding of the social, cultural and economic grounds of elite and popular religiosity.

The findings of this study generally support the view that Glock's five dimensions can be regarded as heuristic and exploratory devices encompassing a variety of phenomena, which should be operationalized, conceptualized and measured before other types of analysis are attempted. This study also recognizes the occurrence of respondents who simultaneously experience elite and popular religiosity, and suggests that the dialogical self theory (DST) provides an interesting theoretical framework for an explanation and further research of this phenomenon. We mainly analyzed those individuals who disagreed with, or were in conflict with the other religious voice. But this does not mean that the other religious voice is completely absent and rejected in such individuals. On the contrary, certain circumstances led respondents to express themselves with certain religious voices and these expressions may change as circumstances change. If we look, for example, at the participants who simultaneously expressed elite and popular religiosity, we can say that these different religious voices can, to a certain extent, be reconciled, even if they show very different and contradictory forms and motivations.

In line with many cultural theorists, we would like to draw attention to the ontological insecurity brought about by the complexities, uncertainty, and diversity of the postmodern condition. We see religious fundamentalism as an emotional and defensive coping mechanism

to deal with the insecurity caused by the plurality and fragmentation of the postmodern world. According to the findings of our study, popular religiosity could remain an important and dominant source of defensive localization within Turkish religiosity, at least in the short term, and this both in Turkey and in the Netherlands, due to the recent socio-political developments outlined in the discussion section of this study.

One of the aims of this study was to investigate whether there are socio-psychological behaviours related to elite and popular religiosity. Recent studies have confirmed that religion has an aspect that encourages prejudice, and an aspect that unmakes prejudice. The findings of the present study support these findings. These findings suggest that the real question is not whether one is a believer or not, but rather whether the kind of things a person believes in make him or her ethnocentric.

One of the aims of this study was to measure the spiritual aspect of religion by developing an elite religiosity scale. As we have discussed in this dissertation, Islam has been largely reduced to popular religiosity – to jurisprudence, rituals, and, above all, prohibitions characterized by exoteric, unreflective, and uncritical forms and motivations. European Muslim families experience Islam under a comprehensive set of rules, prohibitions, and rulings that explain Islam in the context of a specific relation of protection against an environment that is perceived as too permissive and even hostile. Our findings largely confirm this attitude. Within our group of participants who experienced high religiosity, only 24% experienced elite religiosity while 61% experienced popular religiosity. If we take the other participants into account – those who experienced low religiosity – this ratio drops to 19%. In other words, only two out of ten participants experienced elite religiosity to some extent. In the short term, we do not foresee any growth in the spiritual side of religion because of the insecurity that will likely be felt in the near future.

Nederlandse Samenvatting

In de afgelopen drie decennia is de Islam steeds nadrukkelijker zichtbaar geworden in de Europese publieke ruimte. Ondanks de snelle groei van de Islam in Europa en in Nederland weten mensen in het Westen weinig over deze religie. De Islam in Europa is heel divers. De verschillen zijn gerelateerd aan nationale, culturele, religieuze aspecten van de Islam en de manier waarop het verwoord is. In deze studie zijn de onderlinge verschillen onderzocht van Turks-Nederlandse religiositeit in relatie tot sociale, economische en culturele aspecten. Met dit onderzoek hebben we gekeken naar de verschillende richtingen die de Islam in Europa op gaat. We zijn op zoek naar het midden tussen twee types van essentialistische argumentatie: de ene is het uitgangspunt dat Islam en Europese cultuur niet samen gaan, en de ander zoekt naar verbinding tussen Islam en Europese cultuur. Zoals vele onderzoekers die de islamitische samenleving tot onderwerp van onderzoek hebben vastgesteld ontwikkelt de Islam zich niet als één onveranderbaar geheel, of ze nu vijandig staat tegenover de Europese samenleving of zich wil aanpassen, zoals de term Euro-Islam suggereert. De Islam ontwikkelt zich op veel verschillende manieren, zoals een politieke Islam, een officiële Islam, een volks-Islam, een spirituele Islam en radicaal fundamentalistische Islam, waarin zowel radicale als gematigde vormen van Islam verenigd zijn.

Het doel van deze studie is een bijdrage te leveren aan de 'body of knowledge' over de karakteristieke eigenschappen van religiositeit van Nederlands-Turkse moslims in Nederland, in relatie tot hun sociaal-economische status. Deze studie is beschrijvend en explorerend. Wij proberen het geloof en de praktijken van moslims te onderzoeken en te begrijpen vanuit het perspectief van elite en volks-religiositeit, waarbij we de karakteristieke eigenschappen van beide vormen in ogenschouw nemen. De belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen zijn: (1) 'Welke vormen en motivaties kenmerken elite en volks-religiositeit, wat zijn de patronen in de relatie tussen elite en volks-religiositeit, en hoe verhoudt zich dat tot de sociaal-economische status van Nederlands-Turkse moslims die in Nederland wonen?' (2) 'Wat zijn de sociaal-psychologische verschillen in houding en gedrag onder Nederlands-Turkse moslims die respectievelijk elite dan wel volks-religiositeit ervaren?'

Ethische tradities binnen de Islam, in het bijzonder alle Soefi georiënteerde tradities, onderscheiden in het algemeen de mensheid in drie categorieën. Dat zijn: het gewone volk of de mensheid in het algemeen (*ʿawāmm*); een geselecteerde groep of de elite (*khawāṣṣ);* en de super-elite (*khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ*). De begrippen 'elite' en 'volks-' zijn bijna vergelijkbaar met de begrippen die sociologen gebruiken om de structuur in de islamitische samenleving te beschrijven. In het academisch onderzoek naar de Islam in Turkije werden over het algemeen

de spirituele en intrinsieke dimensies van religiositeit genegeerd, of afzonderlijk onderzocht door sociologen, zonder rekening te houden met de onderlinge relaties van elite- en volks-religiositeit, terwijl de relatie met sociale en economische factoren grotendeels werd genegeerd door de onderzoekers op het gebied van religiestudies. Dit was ook het geval voor de Nederlands-Turkse moslims. Er was weinig informatie te vinden in de literatuur over socio-economische onderwerpen in relatie tot de religiositeit van Nederlands-Turkse moslims. Om deze leemte te vullen richten we ons in dit onderzoek op zowel de verschillen in religiositeit van moslims binnen de Islam als ook op de relatie ervan met hun socio-economische situatie in Nederland.

In hoofdstuk 2 staat de theoretische achtergrond van de belangrijkste concepten centraal in het licht van het sociaal-wetenschappelijk karakter van religie. De begrippen ‘grote’ en ‘kleine’ tradities, ‘hoge’ en ‘volks’-cultuur worden geïntroduceerd en verder ontwikkeld in breder verband. In de eerste plaats bespreken we hoe de categorie van ‘volks’- wordt benaderd door structuralisten en culturalisten. Deze concepten worden ook besproken in het licht van de Turkse sociologie. Meer in het bijzonder proberen we te kijken naar de verbanden tussen cultuur en religiositeit, gebaseerd op de werken van Ziya Gökalp en Fuad Köprülü. Het literatuuronderzoek laat zien dat ‘grote’ en ‘kleine’ tradities binnen Islam, die zijn afgeleid van het onderscheid tussen ‘grote’ en ‘kleine’ tradities in culturen, van groot belang zijn voor de betekenis van de religieuze structuur van de Turkse samenleving.

Deze studie werpt een licht op de begrippen elite- en volks-religiositeit, en de inhoud en de betekenis daarvan in het sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek van religie. We lichten Webers status-stratificatie theorie toe en de *‘rational choice’* theorieën, met het doel elite- en volks-religiositeit te kunnen benaderen vanuit sociologisch perspectief. In dit onderzoek stellen we dan een andere definitie van ‘elite’ voor, gebaseerd op een synthetiserende benadering. We stellen dat: ‘volks-religie’ bestaat uit specifieke manieren van geloof en religieuze praktijken, zoals die uitgeoefend worden door in het algemeen mensen uit de lagere sociaal-economische bevolkingsgroepen in de samenleving. De definitie van elite-religiositeit is dan als volgt: ‘elite-religiositeit’ is samengesteld uit specifieke manieren van geloof en religieuze praktijken zoals die worden uitgeoefend door in het algemeen mensen uit de sociaal-economisch bevoorrechte groepen in de samenleving’. Deze definities volgend nemen wij aan dat bepaalde objectieve posities in de samenleving hand in hand gaan met bepaalde vormen van religiositeit.

We gebruiken in dit onderzoek een vijf-dimensionaal schema wat betreft de aard van de manier waarop mensen betrokken zijn op het religieuze, zoals ontwikkeld door Glock en Stark

(1962). Echter, het is belangrijk te benadrukken dat de schaal van Glock en Stark niet helemaal van toepassing is op de verschillende te onderscheiden religieuze aspecten van de Islamitische wereldbeschouwing. In ons onderzoek richten we ons op de te onderscheiden aspecten binnen (intra-) de vijf dimensies zoals die zijn voorgesteld binnen Allport's conceptuele schema's. Verder ontdekten we in ons onderzoek dat de analyse van Al-Ghazālī van individuele religiositeit opvallende overeenkomsten vertoont met de analyse van de psycholoog Allport, en dat biedt vruchtbare grond voor een variatie aan motivaties, cognitieve stijlen en inhouden van islamitische manieren van geloven en praktijken, en gaf ook een belangrijk voorbeeld waarmee de verschillen binnen de Islam van de onderscheiden dimensies beschreven kunnen worden.

In hoofdstuk 3 is ingezoomd op de context van elite- en volks-religiositeit in Islam. We vergelijken de twee-dimensionale schaal zoals ontwikkeld door Allport en Ross (1967) met de multi-dimensionale schalen van religiositeit zoals samengesteld door Stark en Glock (1968). Daarop voortbouwend ontwikkelen wij in dit onderzoek een nieuwe schaal voor elite- en volks-religiositeit. Het conceptuele onderzoek beschrijft twee polen binnen elk van de vijf componenten van het model van Glock en Stark, te weten 5 componenten van elite-religiositeit en 5 componenten van volks-religiositeit. Deze twee extremen weerspiegelen de classificatie in sub-dimensies, waarin opgenomen geloof (*īmān*), praktijk *(ʿamal),* kennis (*ʿilm / maʿrifah*), ervaring (*maʿūnat / ilhām*) and gevolgen (*natījah*). Op grond van deze sub-dimensies hebben we verscheidene motivaties, cognitieve kenmerken en inhouden gerangschikt, die volgens ons het onderscheid bepalen tussen elite- en volks-religiositeit.

Het vierde hoofdstuk bevat de methodologie van ons onderzoek. Het onderzoeksdesign van het huidige onderzoek volgt de *'mixed-methods'* benadering, waarin kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden samen komen in één onderzoekproject. In een periode van vier jaar (2010 - 2013) is het project gestart met een kwalitatief deel om de verschillende vormen en motivaties van elite- en volks-religiositeit te beschrijven, en het voorkomen ervan in het sociale domein van deze vormen van religiositeit, daarbij gefocust op Nederlands-Turkse moslims die in Nederland leven. We maakten gebruik van participerende observatie, als belangrijkste instrument in het kwalitatieve deel van ons onderzoek. Het research design omvatte ook een uitvoerig literatuur onderzoek, zodat de resultaten van zowel het kwalitatieve onderzoek als van het literatuur onderzoek als basis konden dienen voor het kwantitatieve deel van het onderzoek.

Een tweede belangrijk instrument, in het tweede deel van het onderzoek (het kwantitatieve deel), was een vragenlijst. Deze vragenlijst is de kern van ons onderzoeksdesign. We hebben

vier verschillende schalen gebruikt: (1) een schaal voor algemene religiositeit, (2) een schaal voor elite-religiositeit, (3) een schaal voor volks-religiositeit en (4) een maat met betrekking tot de gevolgen van religiositeit. De schaal voor algemene religiositeit (1) werd ontwikkeld om informatie te krijgen met betrekking tot de vijf dimensies gebaseerd op Glock en Stark (1962). Dit deel van het onderzoek richtte zich op het verkrijgen van informatie over 'hoge' en 'lage' religiositeit. De resultaten daarvan zijn gebruikt om respondenten te identificeren die een laag niveau van religiositeit ervaren; zij zijn vervolgens uitgesloten van het verdere onderzoek. De schalen voor elite-religiositeit (2) en voor volks religiositeit (3) zijn ontwikkeld om verschillen te kunnen signaleren zoals die voorkomen binnen de vijf dimensies van Glock. We verwachten dat de maat met betrekking tot de gevolgen van religiositeit (4) de relatie of zelfs de mogelijke invloed die er is van elite- of volks-religieus personen op het leven van alledag zichtbaar maakt.

In hoofdstuk 5 worden de data gepresenteerd, de data analyse en de resultaten daarvan, en de antwoorden op de sub-vragen en daaruit voortvloeiend de antwoorden op de hoofdvragen. De hypotheses, zoals deze ontwikkeld waren in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 worden in dit vijfde hoofdstuk getest. De eerste hoofdvraag luidde: 'Welke vormen en motivaties kenmerken elite- en volks-religiositeit, wat zijn de patronen in de relatie tussen elite- en volks-religiositeit, en hoe verhoudt zich dat tot de sociaal-economische status van Nederlands-Turkse moslims die in Nederland wonen?' Het literatuur onderzoek heeft laten zien dat 'grote' en 'kleine' tradities in Islam, die zijn afgeleid van de onderverdeling in 'grote' en 'kleine' tradities in culturen, van grote betekenis zijn voor het begrijpen van de religieuze structuur van de Turkse samenleving.

De tweede sub-vraag was als volgt geformuleerd: 'Wat zijn de sociaal-psychologische verschillen in houding en gedrag onder Nederlands-Turkse moslims die respectievelijk elite- dan wel volks-religiositeit ervaren?' De resultaten van de data-analyse geven aan dat de kenmerken van respectievelijk elite dan wel volks-religiositeit zijn: dynamisch versus stabiel, kritisch versus onkritisch, zonder of met materiële verwachtingen (van gelovig zijn/geloofspraktijken) onderscheid makend versus een globaal perspectief; (individuele) religieuze ervaring belangrijk versus onbelangrijk, tolerant versus intolerant, en bevooroordeeld versus onbevooroordeeld.

De derde sub-vraag was: 'Wat zijn de kenmerken van elite- en volks-religiositeit van Nederlands-Turkse moslims die in Nederland wonen?' Factor analyses en correlatie analyses die zijn uitgevoerd met de schaal voor elite-religiositeit en de schaal voor volks-religiositeit laten zien dat respondenten die elite-religiositeit ervaren tot twijfel en dynamisch geloven neigen in hun religiositeit. Wat betreft het rituele aspect neigen zij tot een nadruk op de

intrinsieke waarde van een ritueel (bijv. een focus op de kwaliteit van het ritueel). Wat betreft het intellectuele aspect onderschrijven zij het belang van twijfel wat betreft de geldigheid van actuele religieuze kennis, en staan zij een dynamische benadering van religieus leren voor. Wat betreft het ervarings-aspect van religiositeit beschouwen deze respondenten wonderen (speciale gaven van God in ruil voor hun religieuze inspanningen) als relatief onbelangrijk; voor deze groep respondenten is het belangrijk dit soort ervaringen voor zich te houden. Respondenten die volks-religiositeit ervaren neigen er toe de zekerheden van het geloof te benadrukken. Wat betreft rituelen is voor hen de extrinsieke waarde ervan belangrijk (bijv. een focus op hoe vaak ze de rituelen – moeten - doen) en voor hen zijn materiële beloningen voor religieuze inspanningen belangrijk. Wat betreft het intellectuele aspect benadrukt deze groep dat zij zeker zijn van hun huidige geloofs-kennis; voor hen staat intellectuele stabiliteit centraal. Wat betreft de ervarings-dimensie beschouwen deze respondenten in ons onderzoek religieuze ervaringen als gewenst, passend en behorend tot een noodzakelijk deel van hun geloof; zij gaan er prat op hun religieuze ervaringen met anderen te delen.

De vierde sub-vraag luidde: ‘Welke patronen kunnen we onderscheiden in de relatie tussen elite- en volks-religiositeit?’ Uit de resultaten van de analyse van onze data blijkt dat er een negatieve relatie bestaat tussen elite- en volks-religiositeit ($r = -.72$).

De vijfde sub-vraag luidde: ‘Hoe zijn elite- en volks-religiositeit herkenbaar in de onderzoeksgroep van Nederlands-Turkse moslims en wat is de relatie met hun sociaal-economische situatie? Van de 893 (76.7%) respondenten met een sterke religieuze betrokkenheid, bleken 203 (22.7%) consistent een manier van elite-religiositeit te ervaren, terwijl 545 (61%) consistent een manier van volks-religiositeit bleken te ervaren. Eerste-generatie respondenten ervaren volks-religiositeit vaker dan tweede-generatie respondenten. Respondenten met een hogere opleiding ervaren vaker een hoger niveau van elite-religiositeit dan respondenten met een lager opleidingsniveau. Evenzo ervaren respondenten met een lager opleidingsniveau een hoger niveau van volks-religiositeit dan respondenten met een hogere opleiding.

Op basis van ons literatuur onderzoek verwachtten we een relatie tussen sociaal-psychologische houdingen en religiositeit. Dat was de reden voor onze tweede onderzoekvraag: ‘Wat zijn de sociaal-psychologische verschillen in gedrag en houdingen onder Nederlands-Turkse moslims die elite- dan wel volks-religiositeit ervaren?’ De resultaten van de data-analyse laten zien dat respondenten die elite-religiositeit ervaren opener zijn en vriendelijker naar mensen met een andere geloofsovertuiging. Daarbij hebben mannen die elite-religiositeit

ervaren sterkere meningen over de gelijk(waardig)heid en de rechten van vrouwen in vergelijking met mannen die volks-religiositeit ervaren. Het bleek ook dat respondenten die elite-religiositeit ervaren minder vooroordelen hadden (wat betreft ras, etniciteit) en minder conservatieve in-groep houdingen aangaven, dan respondenten die volks-religiositeit ervaren.

Gebaseerd op de resultaten van ons onderzoek blijkt dat van de totale groep respondenten die hoge religiositeit ervaren, zes van de tien volks-religiositeit ervaren, terwijl slechts twee van de tien elite-religiositeit ervaren. Op basis van de literatuur en uit de resultaten van dit onderzoek komen een aantal demografische en sociaal-economische factoren naar voren die begrijpelijk maken waarom Nederlands-Turkse moslims over het algemeen volks-religiositeit ervaren. Enkele van de factoren zijn gender en leeftijd, opleidingsniveau, inkomen per huishouden, sociaal en cultureel kapitaal, de migratiegeschiedenis, structurele en contextuele factoren zoals de huidige economische crisis, overheidsbeleid, en de ervaring met discriminatie. In de discussie zullen we proberen meer aandacht te besteden aan de rol van de hierboven genoemde factoren, om ons begrip te verdiepen met betrekking tot de sociale, culturele en economische achtergrond van elite- en volks-religiositeit

De resultaten van dit onderzoek ondersteunen de gedachte dat de vijf dimensies van Glock gezien kunnen worden als heuristisch en exploratief instrument dat een hoeveelheid van verschijnselen omvat, die nader geoperationaliseerd, geconceptualiseerd en vervolgens gemeten kunnen worden, voordat andere analyse methoden ingezet worden. De resultaten van dit onderzoek erkennen ook het feit dat respondenten tegelijkertijd elite- en volks-religiositeit blijken te kunnen ervaren, en suggereert dat de dialogical self theory (DST) een interessant theoretisch kader biedt om deze ogenschijnlijke tegenstrijdigheid te verklaren en nader te onderzoeken. We hebben voornamelijk de data geanalyseerd van personen waarvan de scores een tegenstrijdigheid in religiositeit aangaven. Maar dat betekent niet dat de ‘andere’ religiositeit volledig afwezig was of afgewezen werd door deze respondenten. In tegendeel, in bepaalde omstandigheden kwamen deze respondenten tot een bepaalde religiositeit, maar dat zou kunnen veranderen onder veranderende omstandigheden. Als we bijvoorbeeld kijken naar die respondenten die tegelijkertijd elite- en volks-religiositeit aangaven, dan kunnen we stellen dat deze verschillende religieuze ‘stemmen’ tot op zekere hoogte met elkaar verenigd kunnen worden ook al maken zij zich kenbaar in heel verschillende en soms tegenstrijdige vormen en motivaties.

Evenals veel theoretici op het gebied van cultuur willen wij de aandacht vestigen op de ontologische onzekerheden die teweeg worden gebracht door de complexiteit, onzekerheden en

diversiteit in de postmoderne samenleving. Wij beschouwen het religieus fundamentalisme als een emotioneel en defensief copings-mechanisme om te kunnen omgaan met de onzekerheid die veroorzaakt wordt door pluraliteit en fragmentatie waardoor de postmoderne wereld gekenmerkt wordt. Op grond van de bevindingen in ons onderzoek zou volks-religiositeit een belangrijke en dominante bron kunnen worden van een defensieve positionering in Turkse religiositeit, tenminste op de korte termijn, zowel in Turkije als in Nederland, als gevolg van recente socio-politieke ontwikkelingen zoals die beschreven zijn in het discussie hoofdstuk van ons onderzoek.

Een van de doelen van onze studie was te onderzoeken welke relatie er is tussen socio-psychologische gedragingen aan de ene kant, en elite- en volks-religiositeit aan de andere kant. Recent onderzoek heeft bevestigd dat religie zowel de ontwikkeling van vooroordelen kan stimuleren, als ze teniet doen. Ons onderzoek bevestigt dat. Onze bevindingen doen veronderstellen dat de vraag waarom het gaat niet is of men gelooft of niet, maar eerder of de manier waarop men gelooft van iemand al dan niet een etnocentrische persoon maakt.

Een ander doel van ons onderzoek was om het spirituele aspect van religiositeit zichtbaar te maken, door een schaal te ontwikkelen voor elite-religiositeit. Zoals we met ons onderzoek hebben laten zien, lijkt de Islam gereduceerd te zijn tot volks-religiositeit, tot jurisprudentie, tot verplichting van rituelen en bovenal tot verboden die gekenmerkt worden door niet-bereflecteerde en onkritische vormen en motivaties. Europese moslim families ervaren de Islam als een omvattende set van waarden en normen, verboden en regels die de Islam doen verstaan als beschermend tegen de omgeving die moreel gezien veel te toelatend is en zelfs vijandig. Dat wordt door ons onderzoek bevestigd. Van onze groep respondenten met hoge religiositeit gaf slechts 24% aan elite-religiositeit te ervaren, terwijl 61% aangaf volks-religiositeit te ervaren. Als we de overige respondenten meerekenen – degenen die lage religiositeit aangaven te ervaren – dan zakt het percentage zelfs naar 19% voor elite-religiositeit. Met andere woorden, slechts twee van de tien respondenten heeft aangegeven tot op zekere hoogte elite-religiositeit te ervaren. Op de korte termijn voorzien wij geen groei op het gebied van de spirituele dimensie van religie, wat nauw gerelateerd is aan de onzekerheid die blijvend zal worden ervaren in de nabije toekomst.

Index

A

abangan, *87*
age effect, *212*
age-related behaviour, 214
agoraphobia, 199
alevi Islam, 91, 279
American Sociological Association, *58*
Anatolia, 51
antagonism, 50
anthropological studies, 86
anthropology of Islam, *22*, *86*, *92*
apologetic discourses, 93
aristocracy, *55*
articles of faith, *72*, *149*, *150*
aṣabiyya (group solidarity), 51
associational versus communal, *77*, *196*
authentic culture, 53
autonomy, 196, 233, 261
avant-garde movement, 54

B

bātin, 101, 109
bedouin, 47, 216, 217
Bīrūnī, 46, 47, 265
bourgeoisie, *55*
bricoleur culture, *63*

C

calculating attitude, 63, 107, 108
celebration of seasonal festivals, 214
centre and periphery, 51, 90
church attendance, *72*, *73*, *77*
clash of civilizations, *23*
clash of interests, 206
coexistence of disparate views, 197
cognitive needs theories, 106
cognitive styles, *29*, *31*, *97*, *98*, *101*, *103*, *105*, *106*, *149*, *157*, *319*
cohesive objectives of religion, 202
cohort effect, 214
comforts (*ḥājiyyāt*), 216
commercialised religion, *57*
common people, 32, 45, 47, 52, 87, 98, 99, 100, 102, 108
common religion, *28*, *60*
compensator, *58*
competition between religious producers, *57*, *58*
complexity, 20, 28, 65, 76, 91, 106, 161, 196
consensual religion, *73*
consequential dimension, *31*, *36*, *37*, *41*, *80*, *83*, *111*, *130*, *132*, *135*, *138*, *139*, *153*, *176*, *320*, *328*
context of insecurity, 232
cosmopolitanism, 202, 235
cost-benefit calculations, 109
critical versus uncritical, 104, 112, 160, 187, 231
cultural citizenship, 223
cultural dichotomy, *89*
cultural division, *89*
cultural identities, 94
culturalism, 48, 53

D

democracy, *23*, *89*, *232*, *311*
de-pillarization, 200, 203
deprivation, *59*
dervish piety, 90
descriptive research, 34
dialectic between city and tribe, 32, 87
Dialogical Self Theory, 195, 287
differentiated, 27, 57, 77, 89, 104, 111, 112, 160, 187, 196, 231
differentiated versus undifferentiated, *27*, *77*, *104*, *112*, *160*, *187*, *196*, *231*
diffused religion, *28*

Diyanet, 19, 92, 123, 124, 147, 197, 205, 206, 209, 233, 273, 275, 278, 288, 301, 311, 312
doctrinal Islam, 93
dogmatic religiosity, 210
doubt, 31, 106, 107, 108, 110, 164, 188, 213, 241, 300
dual conceptualisation, 86
Durkheim, Emile, 47, 51, 106, 117, 216, 217, 265, 279, 284
Durkheimian approach, 106
Durkheimian sociological tradition, 49
Dutch society, *21*, *22*, *30*, *124*, *203*, *206*, *208*
dynamic multiplicity of *I*-positions, 195
dynamism versus stability, 104, 112, 160, 187, 231

E

economic and social approach, *30*, *32*, *55*
einfühlen (intuition or empathy), 20
elite forms of religiosity, 96, 112, 230
elite mysticism, 94
empirical findings, 34
esoteric, 27, 31, 61, 101, 102, 109, 111
esotericism, 100
ethnic origin, *7*, *21*
ethnic prejudice, 112, 176, 222
ethnocentrism, 221, 222
ethnographic research, *25*
ethnonational identity, *30*
Euro-Islam, *23*, *24*, *306*, *318*
European Islam, *21*, *22*, *270*, *275*
European public space, *22*
everyday lived Islam, *25*
everyday religion, *69*, *285*
existential (in)security, 223, 224
exoteric, 27, 31, 101, 102, 103, 109, 111, 123, 227
experiential desirability, 111, 112, 160, 161, 162, 187, 193, 231, 239, 242
exploratory character, 34
extrinsic, *5*, *26*, *27*, *33*, *37*, *66*, *73*, *76*, *77*, *79*, *81*, *82*, *83*, *96*, *99*, *101*, *104*, *107*, *108*, *109*, *125*, *157*, *188*, *194*, *225*, *292*

F

fasting of the elite, 99
fatwā wars, 219
file drawer problem, 220, 304
first-generation, 119, 169, 189, 198
folk, 28, 31, 50, 60, 61, 87, 98, 275, 309
folk religion, *28*, *60*, *61*
folklore, 50, 53
foreign workers, *21*
formalism, *63*
Frankfurt School, 48
free day labourers, *56*
Friday prayer, *72*, *151*, *237*

G

Geertz, Clifford, 20, 39, 41, 70, 86, 87, 88, 267, 268, 282
Gellner, Ernest, *32*, *41*, *86*, *87*, *88*, *89*, *199*, *282*, *311*
German sociological tradition, 49
Ghazālī, 7, 31, 41, 47, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 110, 235, 283, 314, 315
global politics, *23*
globalization, *22*, *219*
globalization of popular religion, 219
globalizing trends, *89*
glorification, 108
Gökalp, Ziya, 40, 49, 50, 51, 54, 271, 278, 284, 285, 292, 301, 310
Gramsci, Antonio, 40, 49, 53, 54, 270, 277, 285, 289
Gramscian approach, 54, 65
great tradition, 44, 45, 55, 86, 92, 95
group interests, 202
group solidarity, 51, 202
growth of global spiritual marketplaces, 219

guest workers, 198, 199

H

halk, *49*, *50*, *89*
halk İslamı, *89*
hars, *50*
Hermans, Hubert, 195, 196, 201, 229, 287
heterodoxy, 45, 50, 51, 52, 90
high culture, 46, 52, 53, 54, 215, 282
high Islam, *32*, *87*, *90*
historical anachronism, *69*
humanistic religion, *73*
humility versus dogmatism, *77*, *196*
Huntington, Samuel, *23*, *289*

I

Ibn Khaldūn, *32*, *47*, *51*, *87*, *216*, *217*, *219*, *269*
identity politics, 228
iḥsān, *85*, *86*, *216*, *226*
imam training, 197, 206, 208, 209
imitation (*taqlīd*), 31, 106
imitator' (*muqallid*), 107
immigrant, *23*, *217*, *269*
immigration, 191, 197, 201, 208
impersonal relationships, 217
individual spirituality, 196
individualism, *57*, *230*
individualization, 203, 229
informal interviews, 117
inner incompatibility, *23*
inner structure of religiosity, *80*
inner-Islamic difference, *24*, *30*, 31, *32*, 51, 88, *90*, *91*, *93*, *319*
insider, 18, 19, 20, 122, 282, 296
institutionalization of Islam, 201, 295
integration, *25*, *100*, *201*, *202*, *208*, *221*, *223*, *231*, *232*
inter-dimensional independence, *80*, *156*, *193*
interpretive sociology, 106, 117
intra-dimensional differentiation, *80*, *81*, *82*, *83*, *99*, *156*, *192*, *193*
intrinsic, *5*, *26*, *27*, *33*, *37*, *66*, *73*, *76*, *77*, *79*, *81*, *82*, *83*, *95*, *99*, *101*, *104*, *107*, *108*, *109*, *123*, *157*, *188*, *194*, *195*, *225*, *288*, *318*
investigator (*muḥaqqiq*), 106, 107
irrational religious beliefs, 109
Islam and the West, *23*
Islam in Europe, *17*, *23*, *24*
Islamic education, *25*, *310*
Islamic identity, *23*, *198*
Islamic mysticism, 229, 265

J

Javanese religion, 87
Judaism, *72*, *234*

K

Karamustafa, Ahmed, *41*, *90*, *104*, *290*, *291*
Kınalızâde, Ali Effendi, 108, 292
kitâbî İslam, *89*
knowledge as belief, 110
Koningsveld, Pieter van, *22*, *24*, *200*, *208*, *214*, *220*, *271*, *272*, *282*, *293*, *295*, *306*, *308*, *314*
Köprülü, Mehmed Fuad, 40, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 91, 92, 279, 293, 294

L

Lewis, Bernard, *23*, *262*, *281*, *295*
literal religion, *73*
little tradition, 44, 45, 55, 86, 92, 93, 96
local religion, *61*
localization, *21*, *197*, *233*, *323*
low-involvement religion, *26*, *73*
luxury items (*taḥsīniyyāt*), 216

M

magic, *56*, *58*, *65*, *87*, *107*, *199*
mainstream Sunni Islam, 92

Mardin, Şerif, *27*, *32*, *41*, *89*, *90*, *198*, *199*, *297*, *305*
market differentiation, 219
market-driven economic policies, *89*
mass religion, *28*, *56*
material expectations, 108, 112, 160, 161, 162, 187, 188, 193, 231, 242
measurement of religiosity, *71*, *73*
mechanical solidarity, 217
medeniyet, *50*
mediating stance, *20*
methodological agnosticism, *20*, *302*
migration, *22*, *198*, *199*, *213*, *286*
misfortune, *59*
mixed-methods, 35, 41, 117, 121, 122
moderate Islam, 92, 215, 233
modern web-based approach, 127
modernity, *57*, *234*, *272*, *297*, *302*, *314*, *317*
monolithic form, *24*, *318*
muddleheadedness, 195, 197
multiculturalism, 214, 229, 309, 313
multidimensional approach, *27*
multi-dimensional approach, *68*, *79*
multi-dimensional structure, *80*
multiplication of human needs, 217
multiplicity of Islamic expressions, 86
Muqaddimah, 47, 216, 289, 292
Muslim Protestantism, 219
Muslim migrants, *24*, *198*, *199*, *208*, *215*, *224*
Muslim minorities, *23*, *119*, *126*, *163*, *188*, *205*
Muslim mobilization, 201
Muslim society, *24*, *29*, *32*, *88*, *98*, *124*, *221*, *282*, *318*
Muslim sociology, *41*, *68*
myth, 50, 62, 313

N

native voice, *26*
necessities (*ḍarūriyyāt*), 216
need to belong, 99, 109
negotiation of Islam, 199
New Age, 230, 287, 303
new renunciation, 90
new Salafism, 210, 234
nomocratic nature of Islam, 87

O

obedience, 108
official Islam, *24*, *220*, *318*
official religion, 61, 96, 233
old-fashioned, 52, 53
ontological insecurity, 196, 233, 323
ontological security, 64, 201
openness, 160, 196, 233, 239
operational contextual definition, *28*
operational definition, *30*, *40*, *41*, *60*, *66*, *104*
operational tool, 46
ordinary people, 45, 48, 49, 61, 89, 93, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 105
organic solidarity, 217
organized religion, 229, 235
orthodox interpretations of Islam, 227
otherworldly rewards, *59*
outsider, 18, 20, 224, 282, 296

P

paper survey, 127
paper-based questionnaire, 127
participant observation, 18, 35, 36, 37, 117, 118, 133, 213, 320
patterns of behaviour, *70*, *106*
patterns of worship, 94
peasant communities, *61*
peasants, 32, 53, 56, 65, 86
period effect, 214
personal versus institutional, *27*, *77*, *196*
pillarization, 200, 201, 203, 313
pillars of faith, *72*, *85*, *132*, *153*, *216*, *237*
pluralism, *23*, *202*, *224*, *229*, *234*
political activism, 228
political Islam, *24*, *318*

popular culture, 39, 40, 46, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 61, 63, 93, 117, 198, 203, 270, 281
popular faith, *28*, *61*, *269*
popular forms of religiosity, 60, 112, 119, 162, 188, 194
popular Islam, *24*, *28*, *89*, *90*, *93*, *97*, *229*, *234*, *318*
positionality, 17, 18, 19, 122
postmodern relativism, 197
postmodernity, 232
praxis approach, *30*, *31*, *55*, *56*
praxis of Islam, *25*
prescriptive religion, *69*
Prijaji, *87*
private sphere, *23*
production of Islamic knowledge, 197, 217
proletariat, *55*, *56*
promises of the religions, *59*
protection of the secret, 111
psychological and social needs, *59*
psychology of religion, *27*, *71*, *257*, *266*, *269*, *270*, *272*, *280*, *288*, *294*, *295*, *300*, *308*, *312*
public distrust, 215
public sphere, *23*, *25*, *199*
public visibility of Islam, 199
pure types, *79*
pure Islam, 92, 203, 208, 211, 233, 278
puritanism, 87

Q

qualitative methods, 35, 117
quantitative methods, 35

R

racial prejudice, 221, 222
racism, 69, 215, 286
radical extremists, *22*
radical fundamentalism, *24*, *318*
radical Islam, 232
radicalization, *24*, *25*, *208*
rational choice theory, 58, 108, 232
Redfield, Robert, 44, 45, 46, 55, 86, 303
reflective versus uncritical, *77*, *196*
reflexivity, 76, 106, 196, 233
religion and culture, *25*, *39*, *119*, *124*, *187*
religion in modern society, *57*
religiosity scales, *5*, *27*, *41*, *42*, *133*, *134*, *161*, *164*, *173*, *183*
religious diversity, *30*
religious fundamentalism, 196, 215, 233, 323
religious goods, *58*, *59*, *60*, *94*
religious identity, *25*, *50*, *207*, *228*, *232*
religious market, *34*, *54*, *57*, *58*, *59*, *94*, *105*, *201*, *217*, *234*
religious market theory, 57, 105
religious orientation, *26*, *27*, *29*, *36*, *50*, *60*, *68*, *73*, *76*, *82*, *83*, *98*, *104*, *105*, *130*, *134*, *198*, *262*, *292*
religious symbol system, *59*
religious vitality, *58*
religious voices, *24*, *197*, *318*
ritualism, *63*
Rumi, 218, 267
rural Islamic cultures, 52
Rushd, Ibn, 102, 268, 282, 289, 304, 310

S

sacralisation of the state, 232
sacred products, *61*
Said Nursi, 108, 205, 270
saint cult, 87
salafism, 203, 208, 210, 234, 289, 303
salient versus un-salient, *77*
salvation goals, *59*
salvation means, *59*
Sarıbay, Ali Yaşar, 41, 89, 90, 199, 265
scriptural religion, 227
scripturalism, 87
search for meaning, 227, 228
second-hand religious life, *73*
secrets of fasting, 103, 107
secular culture, *23*

secular society, 230
secularism, *23*, *24*, *311*
sedentary, 47, 216, 217
sense of ontological security, 201
sense of security, 215
sentimental religiosity, 92
separation of state and religion, 200
separatist approach, 201
sexism, 224, 289, 297, 308, 309
Shahrastānī, ʿAbd al-Karīm, 47, 265
sharīʿa-mindedness, 100
sociability, 99, 112
social behaviour, *69*
social class, *50*, *59*
social dichotomy, *89*
social disintegration, 53
social functions, 35, 116
social identities, *58*
social learning, 107
social phenomenology, 117
social sciences, *26*, *28*, *220*
social scientific study of religion, 18, 39, 40, 41, 54, 58, 68
social stratification, *34*, *54*
social structure, 35, 49, 116
social ties, *58*
socially divisive characteristics, 112, 176
socially integrative characteristics, 112
society of mind, 195
sociocultural identification, 109
sociology of religion, *20*, *26*, *27*, *55*, *57*, *97*, *132*, *220*, *226*, *232*, *235*, *315*
specialization of religious services, 94, 137
spiritual elites, 33, 66, 83, 95, 99, 106, 107, 111
spiritual Islam, *24*, *318*
spiritual marketplace, 232
spirituality, *23*, *42*, *71*, *85*, *104*, *192*, *196*, *216*, *221*, *226*, *227*, *228*, *229*, *230*, *231*, *235*, *277*, *287*, *288*
spirituality in the sociology of Islam, 227
spirituality without religion, 230
Stark, Rodney, *27*, *36*, *41*, *57*, *58*, *71*, *79*, *80*, *81*, *82*, *83*, *99*, *104*, *108*, *111*, *131*, *156*, *192*, *207*, *222*, *230*, *231*, *258*, *259*, *260*, *261*, *281*, *284*, *289*, *307*, *308*, *319*, *320*, *327*, *328*
statistical analysis, 54, 127
status stratification, 40, 54, 55
stereotyped behaviour, *63*
structural-functionalist approach, 35, 116
structuralism, 48, 53
structuralist approach, 52
structurally excluded ghettoes, 201
struggle for power, 228
subjective religious obligations, 101
suffering, *59*
sufi orders, 51, 229, 295
sufism, *88*, *98*, *99*, *100*, *214*, *227*, *228*, *229*, *267*, *272*, *277*, *286*, *291*, *299*, *302*, *303*, *311*, *314*
supernatural, *58*
superstition, *65*, *70*, *92*, *233*, *235*
syncretism, 51, 87
synthesis approach, *33*, *40*, *57*, *64*, *94*

T

Tehzib, *50*
the assimilation hypothesis, 213
the continuity theory of ageing, 212
the global war on terror, 214
the middle class, *32*, *56*, *80*, *89*, *156*
the modern model of the self, 196
the Netherlands, *21*, *265*, *269*, *270*, *273*, *295*, *306*, *307*, *309*
the postmodern model of the self, 196
the religious reliance hypothesis, 213
the study of Islam, *25*
theologico-political rationalizations, 93
Tönnies, Ferdinand, 49
traditional model of the self, 196
traditional religiosity, 196, 232
Türkdoğan, Orhan, 49, 310
Turkish civil religion, 232

Turkish communities in Europe, 19
Turkish community, 18, 19, 124, 151, 203, 220
Turkish culture, 27, 30, 50, 51, 123
Turkish interpretations of Islam, 210, 234
Turkish Islam, *26*, *85*, *89*, *91*, *105*, *209*, *306*, *309*
Turkish religious experience, 33, 106, 117
Turkish society, *30*, *89*, *187*, *203*, *224*, *290*, *312*
Turkish sociology, *27*, *40*, *41*, *49*, *89*, *90*, *132*
Turkish spirit, 50
Turkish spirituality, 226

U

ulamā, *89*
ultimate goals, *59*, *227*
ultimate versus instrumental, *27*, *77*
umma, 88
uncertainty, 107, 201, 227, 233, 323
undifferentiated, 111
universal definition, *28*
universal versus parochial, *77*, *196*
unselfish versus selfish, *77*
urban societies, *62*
urbanization, *89*, *199*

V

van Gogh, Theo, 215, 223
vandalism, 215
veneration of saints, 214, 220
verification, 31, 101, 106, 213
vernacular Islam, 90
vibrant religiosity, 220
virtuoso, *55*, *311*
vulgarization of the Islamic mysticism, 94

W

Waardenburg, Jacques, *24*, *25*, *61*, *96*, *223*, *235*, *279*, *292*, *306*, *314*
Watt, Montgomery, 47, 86, 100, 101, 110, 222, 314
Weber, Max, *29*, *33*, *40*, *45*, *54*, *55*, *56*, *57*, *59*, *60*, *62*, *83*, *89*, *94*, *106*, *117*, *192*, *215*, *271*, *315*
working class, *61*, *80*, *156*, *198*

X

Xenophobia, 215, 224

Y

Yūnus Emre, 218, 232

Z

zāhir, 101, 109
ziyārat (grave visit), 220

Curriculum Vitae

Ömer Faruk Gürlesin was born in August 1982 in Grevenbroich, Germany. He was educated in Turkey until he was 9 years old. He first came into contact with the Turkish community in the Netherlands when the Turkish Presidium of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) sent his father and his family to the Netherlands in 1992, to work there as an imam. During his father's period of office in the Netherlands, he attended several cultural and religious courses and public meetings with the Turkish community in Deventer. He went to the Hagenpoort, one of Deventer's primary schools. After spending nearly three years in the Netherlands, he returned to Turkey in 1996, when his father's period of office ended. After his arrival in Turkey, he enrolled in the Manisa Imam-Hatip School. After completing his education at the Imam-Hatip school in 2002, he enrolled at the Marmara University in Istanbul. In 2006 he graduated from this university with a bachelor's degree in Philosophy and Theology. Three years later, he obtained his MA degree in Sociology and Psychology of Religion at Leiden University in 2009. In 2010 he started his PhD studies at the Leiden Institute for Religious Studies (currently the Leiden University Centre for the Study of Religion) and worked on the socio-cultural aspects of Turkish Islam in the Netherlands. Gürlesin is currently living in The Hague, and completing his PhD degree.