The soldier as a sage: Qi Jiguang (1528-1588) and the neo-confucianization of the military in sixteenth-century China

Noordam, B.

Chapter 10 – Neo-Confucianism Enters the Military Manual: Consolidation & Innovation

In this final chapter, I will zoom in on the contents of the military manuals themselves, and the ways they benefitted from both Wang Yangming's military praxis and the content of his philosophy itself. In the previous chapter, I have probed the question of the availability of previous Chinese military knowledge to Qi Jiguang and the civil and military officials in his social *Umfeld*, which was a crucial precondition to be able to assess the significance of Wang Yangming-derived ideas within Qi Jiguang's developing method. After a brief consideration of the military manuals themselves, I will give a detailed treatment of two major ways in which Qi Jiguang innovated on Wang Yangming's ideas. The first one concerns the praxis of the interrelated activities of recruitment, organization, and disciplining. The second one concerns the ideational adaptation of Wang's philosophical ideas into the concrete contents of a military manual.

The Manuals

Perhaps Qi Jiguang's most famous heritage is constituted by his two military trainings manuals, repectively the *Ji xiao xin shu* 紀效新書 (*New Book on Discipline and efficacy*) and the *Lianbing shi ji* 練兵實紀 (*Practical Record of Training Troops*). In the last chapter I have argued for regarding Qi's manuals as part of a *xinxue* statecraft tradition arising from the necessity of a military solution to the Wokou crisis at the south-eastern maritime frontier. The question I must now turn to relates to the extent to which it is possible to trace Wang Yangming's influence within the contents of these manuals. First of all, I will argue that the main features of Wang Yangming's military thought are reflected and consolidated in the content of Qi Jiguang's manuals. Wang never wrote a military manual consolidating his thought in a coherent whole, but I posit that one can view Qi's manuals, especially the *Ji xiao xin shu* which reflects southern conditions, as the closest possible equivalent.

If we consider Wang's military ideas in relation to the *Seven Military Classics*, it becomes clear that the former are a detailed interpretation and translation of the ideas of the military canon to the specific circumstances of the early sixteenth century disturbances in the southern provinces

of the empire. Specifically, how does one recruit, train and keep together an army of rural mercenaries in the absence of a regular professional government military? This was a situation that both Wang (and later Qi Jiguang) faced and when they turned to the military classics for help, and they extracted largely the same lessons from their tersely formulated contents. Wang Yangming thus had to tap into new reservoirs of *wu*-manpower as a result of the demilitarization of the southern interior. In addition, his military solutions were integrated with a number of civil solutions. Qi Jiguang faced the same situation. In the last chapter we have seen what kind of older military knowledge he had access to, and it all pertained to different political and institutional conditions. The *Seven Military Classics*, the eclectic mix of military treatises Tang Shunzhi consulted, the three great Tang-Song manuals, and the sultry administrative encyclopaedias-cum-institutional histories-cum-law codes mostly reflected the organizational contexts of highly centralized polities. Even the material closest in time to Qi, the Ming statutes, reflected the normative institutional situation of the early Ming, when the hereditary military was still functional.

There was thus a real practical reason for Qi to turn to Wang's ideas: they were born in roughly the same conditions Qi faced in the mid-sixteenth century. And as we have seen in chapter seven that in conjunction with Qian Dehong bringing Qi Jiguang to the attention of Hu Zongxian, Qian also wrote *Discussion about assembling and training village militia* and was implied to have advocated it. Considering Qi's later reliance on (and advocating of) raising local village militias in lieu of relying on mercenary and aboriginal troops brought in from more distant places, it would not be farfetched to assume Qi's initial cognition of the potential of this part of the military labour market dates from this fateful course of events early in his career. Qian Dehong, in the event, was known to have been an historian of Wang's military exploits. He, for example, wrote a history of Wang's campaign against the Prince of Ning.[703]

The specific tactical nature of the threat Qi faced did seem to have been a bit different from that of Wang's situation. In fact, through the scattered hints in Wang's writings we can only get a limited view of the concrete tactics he used, and which weapons were utilized by his soldiers. The most detailed instruction that was included in Wang's collected writings dates back to his first campaign and shows that he intended to divide up his force in a conventional main force of 800 men, and an unorthodox mobile force of 400. The members of the main force are described as

[703] Israel, "On the Margins of the Grand Unity," 198.

dashou 打手 ("fighting hands"), which probably means anyone with martial skills. The unorthodox group was supposed to include a *dui* 隊 (25 men) of archers, eight musketeers, and twenty local guides - presumably to aid in ambushes and tactical manoeuvres in an unknown terrain. The rest of the instruction details the amount of gunpowder needed and the numbers, shapes and colours of different command flags and recognitions signs.[704] Another instruction to authorities in Jiangxi in the aftermath of the Prince of Ning-rebellion advises the formation of units with spears, bows and arrows, muskets, and swords.[705]

In the case of Qi Jiguang more detailed information is available about the enemy tactics and weapons he faced, and the counter measures he devised. Whereas many of the Wokou were Chinese in origin, they seem to have benefitted from Japanese weapons and tactics. They were predominantly organized in small infantry units characterized by close teamwork. Individual fighters used large twin swords, bows and arrows, and javelins which were thrown with great skill. The Wokou thus had an advantage in the range of their weapons, training, and the cohesion of their units. In response Qi divided built his units of squads of twelve men, which consisted of two groups of five soldiers, a commanding officer, and a logistical soldier. These squads were also to utilize teamwork: a screen of four men - two with shields and swords flanked by two with bamboo trees with upper branches still attached – were to provoke the enemy units into attacking, and provided a safe retreat for four spearmen. These were to provide the main striking force against the Wokou. These four, in turn, were back up by trident-carrying soldiers.[706] Some of the men in these squads were also carrying muskets, who, in defensive actions or ambushes, could be brought together in lines or deeper multi-layered formations.[707] They were to give salvo fire on command, and could provide continuous salvo fire when deployed in layers, as recently argued by Tonio Andrade.[708]

A variant of this basic organizational and tactical system would later be "exported" to the north as Qi Jiguang was reassigned to this frontier after 1567. The units would no longer be

[704] Wang Shouren 王守仁, *Wang Yangming quanji* 王陽明全集, *volume 1* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992), 550.
[705] Wang Shouren 王守仁, *Wang Yangming quanji* 王陽明全集, *volume 2* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992), 1151.
[706] Huang, *1587*, 165-168.
[707] Ch'i, Chi-kuang*, Praxis der chinesischen Kriegführung*, translated by Kai Werhahn-Mees (München: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1980), 32-33, 50.
[708] Tonio Andrade, "The Arquebus Volley Technique in China, c. 1560: Evidence from the Writings of Qi Jiguang," *Journal of Chinese Military History* 4 (2015): 115-141.

restricted to infantry, but also included battle wagons and cavalry. Nevertheless, these would also be crewed and mounted, respectively, by the same squads of twelve. What did change, however, was the importance of firearms. If we look at the pages of the *Lianbing shi ji*, we see that Qi intended to arm all his squads with muskets and fire arrows, in addition to the spears, tridents, and swords they were already equipped with. The battlewagons were equipped with two light canons, and served by the crew of a squad of twelve. A battalion of the battlewagons could connect and form enclosed *ad hoc* fortresses, which sheltered the infantry and cavalry. After advance warning posts had alerted the defending units about the routes a Mongol incursion would take, these combined-arms battalions would be dispatched to block them. By means of salvo fire coordinated by audio signals, the Mongol formations were meant to be put in disarray, after which the infantry and cavalry would launch storm attacks using roughly the same cold steel weapons, tactics, and formations employed against the Wokou.[709]

The manuals in which these organizational and tactical details are narrated were published in 1562, 1571, and 1584. The 1584 publication concerns a reorganized version of the *Ji xiao xin shu* in fourteen chapters instead of eighteen, which reflected the organizational structure of the *Lianbing shi ji* to a greater degree.[710] The original *Ji xiao xin shu* was organized in chapters thusly:

(1) Recruiting and organizing the squads
(2) Crucial and clear orders to exercise against the enemy
(3) Collective punishments and military law applying before entering combat
(4) Crucial prohibitions for the soldiers
(5) Orders and prohibitions for the instructors in the art of war
(6) Rewards and punishments for comparing martial skills
(7) Orders and prohibitions for battalions on the march and camping in the field
(8) Training the battalion formations with flags and drums
(9) The battalion on the march
(10) The theory of long-range hand-held weapons for brief usages
(11) Comprehensive theory of rattan shields
(12) The theory of short-range hand-held weapons for long usages
(13) Methods of archery

[709] Huang, *1587*, 174-181; Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Lianbing shi ji* 練兵實紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 11-41.
[710] Fan, *Qi Jiguang pingzhuan*, 329-348.

(14) The essentials of the classic of boxing
(15) Illustrated explanation of arranging walls and all apparatuses
(16) Illustrated explanation of flags and drums
(17) Defending
(18) Organizing naval forces[711]

The first nine chapters are detailed descriptions of rewards and punishments, disciplinary and moral admonitions, organizational matters, explanations of orders and their signalling by means of flags and musical instruments, and tactical dispositions. These are elucidated for both units encamped or on the move. The latter nine chapters are illustrated guides on different practical aspects of martial arts, illustrations of weapons and other equipment, and detailed chapters on city wall defence, defence, and naval warfare.

The *Lianbing shiji* was organized in a slightly different way and this organization was partly reapplied to the organization of the 1584-version of the *Ji xiao xin shu*:

(1) Recruiting and organizing the squads (for battlewagons, cavalry, and infantry)
(2) Training courage (rewards and punishments, prohibitions)
(3) Training eyes and ears (i.e. responding to orders delivered via flags and musical instruments)
(4) Training hands and feet (training in the handling of weapons)
(5) Training battalion formations, part 1
(6) Training battalion formations, part 2
(7) Training battalion formations, part 3
(8) Training battalion formations, part 4
(9) Training officers[712]

More space was given to the tactical formations, presumably because they were more complex in the context of the northern frontier and its use of the combined-arms of cavalry, infantry, and battle wagon. Moreover, all the weapons training was compiled in one chapter, as were the items instructing the soldiers in the different orders, rewards and punishments.

Finally, the organization of the newer version of the *Ji xiao xin shu*:

(1) Recruiting and organizing the squads
(2) Training eyes and ears (i.e. responding to orders delivered via flags and musical instruments)

[711] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu* 紀效新書 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1996), 9-10.
[712] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Lianbing shi ji* 練兵實紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 1-14.

(3) Training hands and feet, part 1 (training in the handling of weapons)
(4) Training hands and feet, part 2 (training in the handling of weapons)
(5) Training hands and feet, part 3 (training in the handling of weapons)
(6) Comparing martial skills
(7) Battalion formations
(8) Battalions on the move
(9) Battalions camping
(10) Practical combat
(11) Courage (rewards and punishments, prohibitions)
(12) Naval forces
(13) Defence
(14) Training officers[713]

In comparison to the earlier edition of the *Ji xiao xin shu*, this version omitted the chapters on unarmed fighting techniques and archery. Peter Lorge posits that these omissions were the result of Qi Jiguang's ongoing experiences as a trainer and commander. The introduction of more effective firearms, like muskets, meant that the character of combat changed so much that skills in unarmed combat were increasingly useless for soldiers to have. Similarly, the greater destructive power of the musket made the bow obsolete and training in archery superfluous.[714] Other items, not present in the earlier editions of the *Ji xiao xin shu*, but present in the *Lianbing shi ji*, were added though. As I will show later on in this chapter, the *Lianbing shi ji* showcased a number of innovations in the area of mental disciplining, which were clearly indebted to Wang Yangming's *xinxue*. These innovations would find their way back into the new version of the *Ji xiao xin shu* later on. The biggest impact of *xinxue* can be seen on the chapters about courage and training officers. These three manuals did not just reflect separate northern and southern conditions of warfare but were also clearly interlinked and can be taken as successive stages in Qi Jiguang's thought about military praxis.

Within these pages of regulations and disciplinary measures one can find many of the concerns already expressed by Wang Yangming. Concerning training, Qi Jiguang disavowed

[713] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 1-7.
[714] Peter Lorge, "The Martial Arts in Qi Jiguang's Military Training," in *The Maritime Defence of China: Ming General Qi Jiguang and Beyond*, edited by Y.H. Teddy Sim (Singapore: Springer, 2017), 59-63, 66-69.

"flowery" martial arts techniques that were meant for show purposes. Instead, he emphasized practical moves with concrete results.[715] One great contribution of Qi Jiguang's manuals is their attempt to bridge the gap between praxis and written knowledge. His manuals record many martial arts in detail for the first time, and some chapters show that he had help from (civilian) martial art instructors to help him understand the techniques.[716] Another source of information was Tang Shunzhi, who provided him with spear fighting techniques.[717] This shows that *xinxue* literati could be involved with martial arts as well. The distinction between the armed outlaw bands feted in, for example, the *Shui hu zhuan* and the refined law-abiding civil literati elite was blurring. Another concern shared by Wang and Qi was the well-being of the civil population, which needed to be protected against predatory soldiers. Qi was of the opinion that such soldiers had forfeited their lives and were thus to be subjected to execution to act as a deterrent against harming the population by his army.[718] A last shared concern with Wang was the importance Qi attached to the training of a new generation of literate, but also morally virtuous military commanders, which, as we have seen in chapter five, was already expressed by Wang Yangming.[719] Qi Jiguang would take this idea and elaborate it as a fully realized blueprint as a supplementary chapter to the early editions of his *Lianbing shi ji*, named the *Chu lian tonglun* 儲煉通論*, Well-rounded Argument about Rearing and Training*.[720] In it, he argued for rearing a literate group of officers through a military analogue to the civil examination system, which would include the Confucian classics as part of the curriculum. Such a system more or less already existed in the military examinations (*wuke* 武科), which had been instituted already during the Song dynasty and later reinstituted in 1478, but it was an optional career choice for military officers.[721] The innovative aspect of Qi Jiguang's proposal was making passing these military examinations an obligatory career step for all officers, which would have led to a professionalization of the corps. It would also have meant exposure to the

[715] Lorge, *Chinese Martial Arts*, 177.
[716] Clifford Michael Gyves, "An English Translation of General Qi Jiguang's `Quanjing Jieyao Pian' (Chapter on the Fist Canon and the Essentials of Nimbleness) from the `Jixiao Xinshu' (New Treatise on Disciplined Service)" (MA thesis, University of Arizona, 1993), 23, 35.
[717] Filipiak, "The Effects of Civil Officials Handling Military Affairs," 10.
[718] Ch'i, *Praxis der chinesischen Kriegführung*, 73.
[719] Wang Shouren 王守仁, *Wang Yangming quanji* 王陽明全集, *Volume 1* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992), 286, 452, 460.
[720] Fan, *Qi Jiguang pingzhuan*, 339.
[721] Hucker, " Governmental Organization," 19-20.

Neo-Confucian canon and thus a potential mass-acculturation of the military officers to the ideology of the civil elites.

In almost every way, therefore, Qi's manuals were an elaboration of Wang's military principles as highlighted in chapter five. Now I will turn to the first of Qi's innovations: organization.

"Binding the Squads" and Collective Responsibility

For both Wang and Qi, the division of men in units and the binding of the squads was entangled with the process of recruitment and selection. The consolidation of the newly formed units and the commander's control over them was achieved in Wang's scheme by giving a practical elaboration of *Weiliaozi*'s advice in the shape of using shared tallies and cards. Afterwards the recruits would be divided in the unit structure that was outlined above, with the smallest unit – the squad – consisting of 25 men. Then the procedure was for the commander to select from amongst each squad the most talented one to serve as the leader. From amongst this group of squad leaders would then be chosen the most talented people for the next level in the unit and command hierarchy. Each of these command levels had the authority to punish the level right below them. The two crucial ideas connected to the concept of binding the squads in the *Weiliaozi* are first the use of tallies to identify units and their achievements and losses with, and second the collective responsibility forced upon the units by means of a punishment and reward scheme. The *Weiliaozi* is the only military classic to advocate this concept. Perhaps Wang intended to put up a system of collective responsibility. He is, however, not explicit about its function in this direction.

The system Wang set up made it possible to have access to the identities of the enlisted men on multiple levels of command hierarchy. If the squad leader, for example, was corrupt and allowed fake or enemy soldiers to infiltrate his squad, the platoon leader above him presumably had the right to penalize them for exactly this reason. This right to punish is mentioned directly in the same context as the tally-system by Wang, which points to this intended function. Of course, the overall commander-in-chief had access to the complete troop registry and could presumably intervene as the ultimate authority, in case this system of checks and balances failed on the lower levels of the hierarchy. The explicit instruction for the men to become familiar with each other should be seen as an extra pillar of this system. Presumably this was meant to encourage a kind of

mutual responsibility amongst the rank-and-file, who were parceled up in groups of five. Although it is not mentioned specifically in Wang Yangming's writings, the squad leader could hold track of the personnel in each of the five five-man groups under his command, and presumably hold these individual groups responsible for the actual identities of the men comprising their ranks.

Qi implemented a similar system, which operated in a similar way: the soldiers were organized in a squad of ten with an officer and logistical soldier added. A card (*pai*) would be created which recorded the names and distinctive features of all the men, and at certain intervals these men would be compared with the information about them available on the cards.[722] Qi is explicit about what should be recorded on these cards: unit designation with all the names of the fellow-soldiers in the unit, age and description of the person, immutable physical characteristics, size and power, and hometown.[723]

This method, which he probably adopted from Wang Yangming, was connected to an elaborate system of collective responsibility buttressed by collective rewards and punishments outside of the sphere of corruption and infiltration prevention and training regimes. In this sense Qi far surpassed Wang's use of the system and he followed the *Weiliaozi* more closely. Unlike Wang, Qi Jiguang himself alluded to the influence of the *Weiliaozi* by using its unique phrase "binding the squads" (*shu wu* 束伍) in his own manuals. As a result, Qi would create the most comprehensive system of collective responsibility in Chinese military history up to that point. One of the most important techniques for ensuring unit cohesion was the application of often harsh "guilt by association" (*lianzuo* 連坐) punishments to battlefield transgressions, but also to violations of the regulations in non-combat situations (outside of training). I would argue that this was the most essential innovation of Qi's military method and it would buttress the successes of his troops, instilling discipline and creating group spirit. It was an innovation that, I contend, very likely sprang out of the direction which Wang's ideas had already ventured into and I posit that the sheer magnitude of its implication in Qi's military manuals represented a new departure in Chinese military thought.

The idea of collective punishment in the military domain was not an entirely new one. I understand collective punishment here as the kind of retribution which was not only exacted on the offender himself, but also on nominally innocent people by virtue of their relationship (kinship

[722] Ch'i, *Praxis der chinesischen Kriegsführung*, 22-31.
[723] Idem, 28.

or otherwise) with said offender. As seen above, the *Weiliaozi* had already articulated its principles, although it was the only military classic to do so. My survey of the military classics, the three Tang-Song manuals and the regulations laid down by the Hongwu and Yongle emperors reveals the existence of two kinds of collective punishment. The first kind entailed the extension of the punishment of the offender to his family. The second kind entailed the extension of the punishment of the offender to the military sub-collectivity he was a part of. Above we have already seen that the *Weiliaozi* utilized both kinds of punishment in combination. In general, it can be said that these kinds of collective punishments were only applied in an extremely rare number of cases, often only in the context of concrete combat performance, before the publication of Qi's manuals. This does not preclude the earlier systematization and proliferation of military collective punishments in Chinese history, as many military writings have been lost over the centuries. During the late Song and especially during the late Ming, there were booms in military (statecraft) theorization, a systematic study of even the surviving examples would go far beyond the scope of this study. However, the canonized nature of the military classics, as well as the state-sponsored compilation of the three Tang-Song treatises and the official status of the Hongwu and Yongle regulations accords them a special authority within the body of military writings. In addition, and as pointed out in Hilde de Weerdt's recent monograph on Song statecraft writings, the majority of the military thought formulated during the Song consisted of either commentaries on the military classics or private ventures by literati and non-literati alike, often operating outside of the official purview of the court.[724] The same can probably be said of the many writings recorded as dating from the late Ming dynasty, although unfortunately research into this problematic is lacking. These Song and Ming works on the one hand reflected elite pre-occupation with military affairs of the dynasties, but on the other hand the concrete influence of these writings on actual praxis is hard to detect owing to the often non-official and private nature of their scholarship. For example, even such monumental works as the *Chou hai tu bian* and Tang Shunzhi's *Wu bian* originated as private initiatives, how much more so would this have been the case for the myriad lesser-known military treatises that appeared during the late Ming? In other words, the writers were often probably not in a position to implement their ideas.

In the case of Qi Jiguang's ideas, it can be assumed that the gap between theory and praxis was small. He had an army at his disposal, and was sponsored later in his career by a powerful

[724] De Weerdt, *Information, Territory, and Networks*, 429-437.

benefactor at the court, Zhang Juzheng (see chapter three), who used him to implement army reforms.[725] Furthermore, by regarding Wang Yangming and his followers as a semi-coherent group in which statecraft (and thus military) knowledge circulated and considering the *Chou hai tu bian* as the most comprehensive statement of their military statecraft tendencies, I tentatively posited the military writings which influenced them and, by extension, Qi Jiguang, in the previous chapter. I enlarged the scope of the survey by including the private writings on the military by his military and civil official colleagues. None of these writings I identified as possible sources for Qi's military ideas have the same elaboration of a collective punishment system in terms of complexity.

Although the idea of collective punishment in the context of the army has a long pedigree as can be surmised from the existence of the *Weiliaozi*, evidence of its application and the extent thereof is scant. It is known that a late Tang general, Zhu Wen 朱溫 or Zhu Quanzhong 朱全忠 (852-912), instituted a form of collective punishment and applied them to the troops under his command. He was originally a warlord in the chaotic late Tang period, but later he defected to the empire and was rewarded with an important post in the administrative structure. However, he later deposed and killed the Tang ruling family and started the first (short lived) post-Tang dynasty, the Later Liang or *Hou Liang* 後梁.[726] As far as we know he was the first general in Chinese history to make collective punishments the basis of his disciplinary regime in practice. This he termed "pulling out the squad and beheading them", or *ba dui zhan* 拔隊斬. The *Supplementary History of the Five Dynasties* (to which the Later Liang belonged), written during the Song dynasty, records the following about Zhu Wen's methods:

> Taizu's [Zhu Wen's posthumous name] usage of the army was [based on] severe laws. Following every battle, squads with leaders who had died or with ones who did not return with the others; all would be beheaded. This was called "pulling out the squad and beheading them" following this battle.
> 太祖之用兵也法令嚴峻．每戰逐隊主帥或有歿而不返者其餘皆斬之．謂之拔隊斬自是戰.[727]

[725] Zurndorfer, "Wanli China versus Hideyoshi's Japan," 208.
[726] Graff, *Medieval Chinese Warfare*, 244.
[727] Tao Yue 陶岳, *Wudai shi bu* 五代史補 (SKQS), 1.

Further information about Zhu's methods is scant, but this description indicates that he held entire squads responsible for the survival of its leaders and the membership of its ranks. We thus know the principle was practiced at the end of the Tang dynasty by at least one general. Other evidence seems to suggest that Zhu was quite unique in this regard. In addition to the author of the *Supplementary History of the Five Dynasties* remarking on the severity of his laws, the three large encyclopedic manuals dating from the Tang and Song dynasties do not elaborate much on systematic collective punishments. Most of the punishments they prescribe are supposed to be meted out to the individual offenders. A few collective punishments are prescribed, but they certainly form no integrated method. For example, the *Wujing zongyao*, a manual we can be reasonably sure to have circulated amongst the *xinxue* statecraft network, states the following:

> When following an attack, a unit is endangered and the platoon in front, to the rear as well as to the left and the right serving as support do not support with the result that [the endangered unit] is captured, all the units are beheaded. Also behead still attending entourage.
> 一、逐隊部被攻危急，前後及左右隊部當救不救，因致陷者，全隊部皆斬。亦斬，但 隨從坐起.[728]

> Losing the flags, drums and the insignia of the high official, the whole platoon is beheaded. Or those which are captured by the enemy, behead their whole platoon as well.
> 一、失旗鼓旌節者，全隊斬。或為賊所取者，亦全隊斬。[729]

The other military treatises, compendia, statutes, and statecraft writings I enumerated in the previous paragraph yield similar prescriptions. In contrast with Zhu Wen's policies, these instructions seem to be less about keeping the squads together in terms of manpower and instilling collective responsibility for the leader's life, than about preserving certain items and ensuring support for neighbouring units. The intended effect might have been the same nevertheless, namely instilling a sense of collective responsibility during battle. The authors of the *Wujing zongyao* prescribed using collective punishments in order to promote intra-unit cohesion during battle, however, we do not know to what extent these few prescriptions were really conformed to in the praxis of the Song military. One other kind of collective punishment had a jurisdiction which

[728] Zeng Gongliang 曾公亮 and Ding Du 丁度, *Wujing zongyao* 武經總要 (CSCS), 413.
[729] Ibidem.

extended beyond the sphere of military enlistment and could be applied to family members of individual soldiers:

> If soldiers have private interactions with bandits, or talk about written documents and memorials, behead them and extinguish their families.
> 一、吏卒與賊私交通，或言語書疏者，斬沒其家。[730]

During the Southern Song, an official named Li Gang 李綱 (1083-1140) proposed a new set of military regulations to bolster the strength of the army, which included collective punishments. This set has not survived to the present day, however, and Li Gang was also not able to put his ideas in practice.[731]

Wang Yangming himself seems to have closely followed the *Wujing zongyao*, but he refrained from applying the punishment prescribing the annihilation of the families of offenders. In one of his collected decrees he prescribes the following collective punishments for his troops:

> Always when facing battle opposing an enemy and one platoon is defeated, both squads are all beheaded. If adjacent platoons do not come to their aid, the adjacent platoons are all beheaded.
> 凡臨陣對敵, 一隊失, 全五皆斬。鄰隊不救, 鄰隊皆斬.[732]

Wang Yangming thus does not significantly develop the system of collective punishments any further than already established theory (and perhaps practice) dating back to the Tang and Song dynasties. I argue that Qi Jiguang makes his most profound contribution in this area by extending collective punishments to a great many spheres of his soldier's enlisted life. The term he uses for this, "guilt by association" (*lianzuo*), appears both in the *Ji xiao xin shu* as well as the *Lianbing shi ji* around forty and thirty times respectively. For an example of its application outside of the battlefield, I have selected the following quote of camp regulations applying to the army when on the march:

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[730] Idem, 414.
[731] Ji, *Zhongguo junshi zhidu*, 154.
[732] Wang Shouren 王守仁, *Wang Yangming quanji* 王陽明全集, *Volume 1* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992), 551.

> Foremost give primacy to solemn silence, always when in normal times there are ones who make noise, with a bundle lash them forty times and [the ones] suffering guilt by association.
> 第一肅靜為主，凡有平時喧嚷者，捆打四十，連坐。[733]

Similar collective punishments where handed out for a great variety of offenses, including the loss or negligence of equipment, the failure to nourish the horses well enough, rowdy behavior outside of the battlefield and disturbance of the civilian population. Punishments could vary from lashings to beheading for more severe offenses, with the latter usually applying to misconduct during battle. In some instances, the officers commanding the offenders were held responsible as well, all the way up to the highest level, which meant that it was a system of horizontal and vertical collective responsibility as well. A good example comes from the fourteen-chapter version of the *Ji xiao xin shu* and was applied to punish soldiers and officers responsible for the incorrect discharge of muskets. Qi Jiguang describes a situation in which the musketeers are firing their weapons in different ranks at the enemy:

> Every time you see a smoke ring going up, then these are ones who fire up in the air; if one lowers the hands and fires, on the ground there is blown up dust. All of these are removed and heavily punished, beheaded facing the battle array and squad leaders suffer guilt by association. If all squads have this, the banner leader suffers guilt by association; if all banners have this, the platoon leader suffers guilt by association up to and including the battalion commander.
> 凡望烟圈向上，即是向天放者;若低手向下，地下擊起塵土者， 是俱拿出重治，臨陣斬首，隊長連坐。隊隊有之，旗總連 坐。旗旗有之，哨官連坐，至把而止。[734]

In this way, Qi Jiguang had designed a very elaborate system of mutual responsibility, buttressed by collective punishments (and rewards as well), which was definitively a new departure in Chinese military thought in terms of complexity. Qi was certainly not the first military commander to make use of collective punishments, but his methods made use of this principle of disciplining to an extent not seen in the military writings that can be assumed to have been accessible to him. This system, combined with the praxis of every layer in the command hierarchy selecting their own subordinates, meant that Qi was consciously trying to maximize the cohesion and esprit de

[733] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu* 紀效新書 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1996), 72.
[734] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書：十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 150.

corps of his troops. An extra layer of cohesion might have been enabled by the small recruitment pool Qi Jiguang used at first. As we have seen, Wang Daokun was heavily influenced by Wang Yangming's philosophy and it is therefore possible he was knowledgeable about his military ideas as well. If Wang Daokun had instituted the tally system and the system of rewards and punishments and identification connected with it, it is not unlikely Qi Jiguang would have a solid basis to further develop his own ideas by using a force as template which had already been "bound" according to Wang Yangming's prescriptions.

Another reason Qi Jiguang might have come to rely on collective punishments and collective responsibility in his military thought was perhaps owing to the influence of the *baojia* system that had been re-advocated by Wang Yangming, as described in the previous chapter. *Lianzuo* as a concept and praxis had been associated with this system and the precise use of this terminology in the context of Qi's military writings could point to influence from this direction. It is not unthinkable that such praxis as applied to villagers would find its way to the militias recruited from amongst them and commanded by Qi Jiguang among others during the 1550s and 1560s. From there these ideas could then be applied to the non-militia troops guarding the northern frontier as per the prescriptions in the *Lianbing shi ji*. In the previous chapter we have already seen that Wang Yangming's *baojia*-system was already recommended in the *Chou hai tu bian* as measure that could fruitfully be implemented during the Wokou crisis. Evidence of a link between *baojia* collective punishment practices and its eventual incorporation into Qi's military doctrines can also be found in the same statecraft treatise. Tan Lun, who Qi Jiguang claimed was the origin of his ideas on militia training therein advocates forming militia within the *baojia*-system: "For the benefit of today's plans, we might as well commend this discussion timely for the training of militia, set up using the method of *baojia*/爲今之計，莫若稱此議練鄉兵之時，立爲保甲之法. "[735] Slightly later in the same discussion he mentions *lianzuo* as a method to collectively punish families who had committed crimes while they were part of a *baojia*-mutual surveillance organization.[736] Another discursive link between Qi Jiguang's military doctrines and the *baojia*-system is his reference to the tokens binding his units together as *pai* 牌, a similar term used to refer to the tokens the civilian mutual surveillance organizations received in order to facilitate their

[735] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾, *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 831.
[736] Idem, 832.

operation. This also aided in the application of *lianzuo*, because these *pai* and the enforced mutual cognizance of the soldiers it enforced made it impossible for them to shift blame on to others.[737]

The inspiration for Qi's elaborate system of collective punishments and collective responsibility therefore, I argue, has to be sought with the *xinxue*-network and its knowledge circulation. Although Wang Anshi intended his *baojia*-system to have a militia component as well,[738] no detailed scheme of punishments has survived to indicate the role *lianzuo* would have played in these military organizations. Neither did it circulate within the pool of written knowledge of the *xinxue*-network which I have uncovered earlier in this chapter. If we accept Wang Ji's testimony that Qi received Qian Dehong's ideas on militia organization – probably derived from Wang Yangming -, then the system outlined in the manuals was probably a further development of ideas found in the *Weiliaozi*. If we, however, accept Qi's own testimony that Tan Lun was the origin of these ideas, then a connection with Wang Yangming's *baojia*-system seems probable, also taking into account the discursive similarities between methods advocated in the manuals and as part of the *baojia*-system. Moreover, the two origins do not exclude one another and could have cross-fertilized before becoming part of Qi Jiguang's organizational doctrines. More importantly, both ultimately lead back to Wang Yangming and his theory and practice in the beginning of the sixteenth century.

How was Qi Jiguang able to implement such a draconian system? The answer, I think, can be found in the practical context of Qi's recruitment activities. From his own description in the *Ji xiao xin shu* it becomes clear that each rank was allowed to select the men serving immediately under them. If we couple that with what we know of Qi's original recruitment base, it becomes clear that many of the squads were probably pre-existing units consisting of friends, acquaintances and family already. These pre-existing social bonds gave these soldiers a real stake in preventing collective punishments to befall their entire units on their behalf. Like Wang Yangming, Qi Jiguang also recruited outside of the official military household system and his *Ji xiao xin shu* reflects his narrower access to the population of one county. The *Ji xiao xin shu* purports to be a factual and practical account of his experiences recruiting, training and leading men from Yiwu

[737] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 4.
[738] Deng Guangming 邓广铭, "Wang Anshi dui Bei Song bingzhi de gaige cuoshi jiqi shexiang" 王安石对北宋兵制的改革措施及其设想, in *Songshi yanjiu lunwenji* 宋史研究论文集, edited by Cheng Yingliu 程应镠 and Deng Guangming 邓广铭 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1982), 311.

義烏 county in Zhejiang province. His first group of recruits originated from an already functioning Yiwu militia unit, hence the men were probably already largely acquainted with each other, were used to fighting together and many might already have been friends or even related by blood. Many groups in Yiwu county were organized in clans, extended lineages, and fought side-by-side with fellow clan members.[739] Research by Thomas Nimick, furthermore, has shown that this militia unit was originally trained and led by Wang Daokun, whom we have already met in the fifth chapter.[740] He once served as Yiwu's magistrate and would later meet Qi Jiguang and become fast friends with him when he was appointed as Qi Jiguang's surveilling military censor during the latter's activities in Fujian province. Furthermore, it seems Zhao Dahe, another friend and civil bureaucrat colleague of Qi, had led this militia in the past as part of his official duties of magistrate of the county. It thus seems likely that Qi was able to get access to this labour pool through his personal connections within the civil bureaucracy, ultimately gaining him the permission to recruit there from Hu Zongxian in 1559.[741] Qi probably chose this county, not only because he could benefit from personal connections, but also because the men there had already been trained and were experienced in combat. The fact that these military activities had taken place under purview of Wang and Zhao, two civil bureaucrats influenced by Wang Yangming's ideas, could mean that the militia had already been influenced by Wang's praxis as detailed in chapter five. If this was indeed the case, then Qi Jiguang was in a very real sense building on the foundation Wang had laid.

Lianzuo was also an essential tool to condition the heart-minds of the soldiers with. Qi Jiguang explains the connection between the two in both the *Lianbing shi ji* and the newer version of the *Ji xiao xin shu*. Qi starts by quoting a desideratum related to the steadfastness of the troops, that had been used to describe the well-disciplined army of Southern Song general Yue Fei: "Shaking a mountain is easy, [but] shaking Yue's army is difficult/撼山易，撼岳家軍難."[742] Proceeding from this, Qi explained the reasons why Yue Fei's army was so unshakeable: the mass of soldiers was of a singular heart-mind, and therefore they were able to exert their strength

[739] Thomas G. Nimick, "Ch'i Chi-kuang and I-wu County," *Ming Studies* 1995.1 (1995): 19.
[740] Nimick, "Ch'i Chi-kuang," 21.
[741] Idem, 20.
[742] Edward Harold Kaplan, "Yueh Fei and the Founding of the Southern Song (Volumes I and II)" (PhD diss., University of Iowa, 1970), 232-236; Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 221.

together. Qi compares this state to a file of men carrying a heavy tree trunk together on their shoulders: although the trunk is much heavier than a single man, when many men work together with singular purpose the trunk can be lifted and moved. In terms of an army, this could be achieved, amongst other measures, by *lianzuo*:

> The present-day method of rewards and punishments [associated with] drilling, commands, the system of control, regulations, and guilt by association [*lianzuo*]; all are like carrying a length of wood or stones on the shoulders.
> 如今操練的賞罰號令節制規矩連坐之法，都是抬木石的繩扛一樣。[743]

It is unclear whether Yue Fei himself used collective punishments. Although his army was known for its exceptional discipline, no detailed set of instructions has survived from which we can deduce the methods of rewards and punishments. The best contemporary document we have of Yue Fei is a heavily romanticized novel written by his grandson half century later.[744] While these sources allow us to gain a basic overview of Yue Fei's military ideas, the presence and extent of collective punishments cannot be ascertained.[745] Yue Fei might have been an important reference for Qi Jiguang for another reason. By Ming times he had become a popular subject of vernacular novels and plays. He had become a positive exemplar for military men to aspire to:

> The vernacular literature played up his moral integrity, simple life, self-denial of personal wealth, discipline of his troops in the same manner, and concern for the welfare of the common people. These were exactly what the masses found to be lacking among many Ming generals and soldier.[746]

In the popular Ming imagination, then, Yue Fei had come to embody many of the values that Qi Jiguang cherished in accordance with his Neo-Confucian beliefs. The concern for the common people and the inculcation of this in his own troops also resonated with Qi's own aims. But the conditioning of his soldier's heart-minds did not stop with *lianzuo*. In both the *Lianbing shi ji* and

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[743] Idem, 222.
[744] John E. Wills, Jr., *Mountain of Fame: Portraits in Chinese History* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 170-171; Yue Ke 岳珂, *Eguo Jintuo zubian* 鄂國金佗稡編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989); Yue Ke 岳珂, *Eguo Jintuo xubian* 鄂國金佗續編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989).
[745] See for a modern overview: Gong Yanming 龔延明, "Ping Yue Fei de junshi sixiang" 评岳飞的军事思想, *Zhejiang daxue xuebao* 浙江大学学报 30.3 (2000): 33-40.
[746] Liu, "Yueh Fei," 296.

the newer version of the *Ji xiao xin shu* it is possible to discover the integration of *xinxue* Neo-Confucian philosophy in the military manuals.

Neo-Confucianism Enters the Military Manual

In chapter nine we have already seen that Neo-Confucian moral imperatives entered the statecraft genre, aimed at the person of the emperor himself. In the first chapter the overview of the genesis of military thought in the Chinese textual tradition touched upon the entanglements of Confucianism and other philosophical traditions with military thinking. In the case of Qi Jiguang's manuals, I will argue below, we can detect a penetration of Neo-Confucian ethical thought into the military ideas of the military commander.

In the past paragraphs, I have argued that Qi Jiguang's *Ji xiao xin shu* as it first appeared in its eighteen-chapter format in the 1560s was actually the embodiment of Wang Yangming's recommendations as laid out in his various writings which were probably transmitted by Qian Dehong. Qi developed the mutual responsibility system, derived from the *Weiliaozi* and/or the *baojia*-system, too a much greater extent and also followed other departures from established military thought which were recommended by Wang. Another one was for example Wang's emphasis on selecting soldiers according to the weapons they were supposed to wield. This might sound like common sense to a modern observer, but previous Chinese selection practices as written down in military manuals either stressed selecting soldiers for different tasks according to very general and undefined moral characteristics like "courage", "righteousness" or "loyalty", or made use of very complicated physiognomic characteristics. The former was prevalent in the military classics, the Tang era manual *Tai bei yin jing* contains examples of the latter.[747] In written discourse thus, Qi Jiguang's (and by extension Wang Yangming's) ideas were a significant departure from earlier texts. Qi's selection practices did contain some references to physiognomic practices, but these were only used to determine a recruit's vitality. Other selection was done on the basis of mental and physical characteristics. For example, the soldiers wielding the rattan shields had to be lithe - quick on their feet -, but also crafty, presumably because they were tasked with drawing the enemy out of their defensive formations.[748] But Qi's manuals represent a last

[747] Li Quan 李筌, *Tai bai yin jing* 太白陰經 (CSCS), 141-143.
[748] Huang, *1587*, 169.

very significant departure from earlier theory that I would like to highlight in this chapter: the infiltration of Neo-Confucian values in general, and *xinxue* ideas in particular into the military manuals of Qi. This was not yet apparent with the eighteen-chapter version of the *Ji xiao xin shu* published around 1560-1561, but the *Lianbing shi ji* of 1571 and the revised fourteen-chapter version of the *Ji xiao xin shu* both contain the same chapter on training officers *Lian jiang* 練將. Qi Jiguang relies on ideas derived from Yangming Neo-Confucianism to shape and discipline the mentalities of the officers in his army. On a more fundamental level, I will argue that Qi's manuals advocate a certain approach relying on theories about the heart-mind and applying them to training the soldiers, and especially the officers. I will turn to this phenomenon first, before analysing some of the discursive Neo-Confucian tactics Qi uses to finetune the moral compass of the officers in his *Lian jiang*-chapters.

In previous military thought, especially that expounded in the influential *Seven Military Classics*, the psychology of soldiers and officers was often discussed in terms of *qi* 氣, a term which throughout Chinese history acquired many different meanings. In general, *qi* seems to have been regarded as the "psycho-physical foundation or energy of life". Courage was therefore also a manifestation of *qi*. Furthermore, this *qi* of courage had to be regulated by moral concerns in order not to cause chaos. Ralph Sawyer, for example, quotes Confucius himself advocating the tempering of courage with righteousness, lest society would fall victim to chaos. Sawyer further remarks that in later military theorizing as contained in treatises like the Song-era *Wujing zongyao* and Ming-era *Caolu jinglüe* did not progress beyond this conceptualization.[749] Nor was this view at odds with later Song-era Neo-Confucianism. In the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian dualistic view of the universe, *qi* was the matter in which all phenomena manifested themselves according to the *li*, or principles. In this conceptualization, even the mind itself was manifested as *qi*, and it would seem that the psychological states of soldiers were seen as manifestations of different kinds of *qi*. Yu Dayou, a hereditary military officer, demonstrates this Neo-Confucian thought:

> Well now, *qi*, is thus equally produced from heaven and earth, yet they are divided by *yin* and *yang*. Like this, if on earth also only righteous *qi* is nourished and vigorous *qi* is not given free rein to, then why also the endless wearisome and aggrieved chatter of the *junzi* of the Way? However, people born from heaven cannot

[749] Fan, *Qi Jiguang pingzhuan*, 204-205; Ralph D. Sawyer, "Martial Qi in China: Courage and Spirit in Thought and Military Practice," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 11.1-2 (2008-2009): 2-3, 15.

all be virtuous. That which we call righteous *qi* unfortunately is maintained by the *junzi*; the common people get rid of it. That which we call vigorous *qi* is certainly that which is very slight in *junzi*.
夫其氣也，均天地之所生也，而有陰陽之分。如此，苟使天下亦惟以正氣爲養，而血氣不以逞焉，亦何勞憂道君子之喋喋哉？但天生人，不能皆賢。其所謂正氣者，不幸而君子存之，庶民去之。其所謂血氣者，固君子之所甚薄。[750]

The problem, in military terms, was thus to generate this righteous *qi* within the heart-minds of the officers and men, and combine it with the vigour already present in them. Therefore, the righteous *qi* of the *junzi* had to be nourished outside of this social group and combine with the vigorous *qi* of the military. Yu Dayou only pointed towards the problem in his writings, but Qi Jiguang formulated a solution by way of Wang Yangming's *xinxue*. Within *xinxue* the mind became central within Neo-Confucianism as the sole repository of principle. Within Qi's thought a new departure is detectable in his conceptualization of training courage, the primacy of which he places with "training the mind" 練心 *lian xin*. Interestingly, this discussion is lacking in the eighteen-chapter version of the *Ji xiao xin shu*, but is present in the *Lianbing shi ji* and the later reworked fourteen-chapter *Ji xiao xin shu*. The following quote on courage, or "gut *qi*" 膽氣 *dan qi*, exemplifies his ideas on the matter:

Explaining courage. Well now, people have their body, but first have their heart-mind. *Qi* is emitted outside and its root lies in the mind. Therefore, those who send outward their whole heart-mind create genuine *qi*; the ones investigating [external] things and emitting it create false *qi*. If you train the heart-mind, then the *qi* will become robust. Mengzi said: "We, virtuous, raise our flood-like *qi* and cultivate the heart-mind." He also said: "If the will is primary, then the *qi* is moved, if the *qi* is primary, then the will is moved. Today when the men tumble and run, this is [because of] *qi* and it moves contrary to the heart-mind." This is the inner *qi* of the heart-mind and the *qi* outside the heart-mind. Therefore, if the ones emitting the whole heart-mind create genuine *qi*, then the emitted *qi* will create true courage.
膽氣解. 夫人有此身，先有此心。氣發于外，根之于心。 故出諸心者，爲真氣;格于物而發者，爲客氣。練心則 氣自壯。孟子曰："我善養吾浩然之氣，養心也。"又 曰："志一則動氣，氣一則動志。今夫蹶者、趨者，是 氣也，而反動其心。"是心者内氣也，氣者外心也。故出諸心者爲真氣，則出于氣者爲真勇矣。[751]

[750] Yu Dayou 俞大猷, *Zhengqitang quanji* 正氣堂全集 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 67.
[751] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 201.

For Qi Jiguang, then, true courage could only be attained when one projected one's mind entirely outward. If one merely investigated courage as an external phenomenon, then it could only lead to the creation of false, or non-genuine *qi*. The heart-mind had to be in control and stimulate the *qi*, not the other way around, because only in this way was true courage attained. I argue that in this discussion of the origin of courage we can see the underlying debate between the Cheng-Zhu and *xinxue* search for principles: whether these should be sought in the heart-mind alone, or in their independent external existence from the self. For the false search for courage in external phenomena, Qi uses the term *gewu*, by which he implicitly criticizes the related Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian doctrine. This would explain the new focus on training the mind, instead of training *qi*, which had been the main current of military thought before the mid-sixteenth century. This current had not changed under influence of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, presumably because this orthodoxy also held the mind to be manifested by *qi*, and not the sole source of principles. Qi Jiguang did not develop his ideas in isolation. Earlier both Tan Lun and Xu Wei discussed training-, or "governing the mind" *zhi xin* 治心 as the approach to create a courageous and steadfast army.[752] Tan Lun's ideas on the matter are preserved within the *Chou hai tu bian*:

> Maritime circuit vice-censor Tan Lun said: "During today's battles the soldiers flee once they see the enemy and often they abandon their commanding officer and pay no attention to him, it seems indeed that the officers do not know the military arts and the soldiers are not regularly trained. Well now, officers have an unsteady heart-mind, the soldiers have unsteady hands and feet. If the hands and feet are in good health, then if you want to hold, you hold; if you want to run, then you run. Everything goes your way. If you cause the hands and feet to be atrophied and paralyzed, then how will they act in response even if the heart-mind desires to act? Therefore, select officers and train soldiers, you cannot lack either of them.
>
> He also said: "In general, discussing training soldiers is indeed not only training the skills and engaging in the methods for advancing and retreating. The essence and greatest importance lies with training the heart-mind, and its method and greatest quality lies in controlling the sections, and the sections are like the sections of a bamboo shoot. Step by step control them and then the men's heart-minds are uniform. Advancing will not be the result of good fortune, retreating will be without speed and hurry, and they will be constantly established in an unassailable position.

[752] It seems that Tang Shunzhi also incorporated some Neo-Confucian ideas about moral self-cultivation in his *Wu bian*. In a section on observing the qualities of the soldiers, he recommends the following:
"Calm their heart-minds, polish their will, and wait until that fondness for evil which their frame of mind harbours has been expelled successfully; selfish desire will thereby be attacked" 澄其心，淨其志，伺人之心情有所愛惡去就，欲從而攻之. See: Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1223.

海道副使譚綸云：“今之戰，卒望敵而走，往往棄主將不顧，蓋由將不知兵與兵不素練耳。夫將猶之心也，士卒猶之手足也。手足無恙，則欲持而持，欲行而行，無不如意。使手足而痿痹也，則心雖欲爲，其能以相應乎？故選將、練兵，缺一而不可.”

又云：“凡言練兵者，非但練其藝與坐作進退之法耳。其要莫先於練心，其法莫善於節制，節者如竹節之節，節節而制之，即人心齊一，進非倖成，退無速奔，而常立於不敗之地矣.”[753]

Tan Lun advocated training the mind as a solution to the problem of incompetent leadership and undisciplined soldiers. According to his ideas, training the heart-mind was the first step towards creating a steadfast mass of soldiers. In Xu Wei's theorizing a similar tendency can be seen to regard the mind as primary over *qi*. He explained the relationship between the two by using the analogy of water and waves:

> The heart-mind is water and *qi* are waves, arousal and resolve is the wind. Arousal and resolve then become tremor and quick vigour, the most extreme consequence of the wind is being defeated by it and this is weakness. Therefore, if you desire to stop the waves, make tranquil the water [i.e. the heart-mind] and you might as well be like getting rid of the wind [i.e. desires like arousal and resolve]; if you desire to reject the arousal of the *qi* rather than the courage and resolve of the heart-mind, you might as well facilitate it by governing it [the heart-mind].
>
> 心水也，氣波也，鼓且決者， 其風也，鼓且決而至震蕩且奮迅者，風之極也，而敗焉者，其溺也。故欲止其波，澄其水，莫若去其風； 欲斥其氣之鼓，與其心之敢決，莫若易之以治。[754]

But how did this mental training regime function in practice? Tan Lun's words give us a hint: it would be inculcated by the very act of controlling the section. Since Tan's ideas on this matter were one of the origins of Qi's theory of training village militia (indeed, Tan goes on to elaborate a system of divisions of the army in the *Chou hai tu bian* similar to Qi Jiguang's system), it can be assumed Qi held a comparable view since he dwells upon the system of controlling the sections at length in his manuals. Then the whole system of controlling the sections, including the whole regime of collective responsibility and collective punishments it was based on, was meant to train the heart-minds of the soldiers. It certainly must have instilled a sense of belonging to a greater

[753] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾, *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 700.
[754] Xu Wei 徐渭, *Xu Wei ji* 徐渭集, *Volume 3* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1999), 891.

whole in the individual soldier, and enforced a collective military ethic of self-surveillance and surveillance of the team members.

A few Chinese scholars have noticed the particular Wang Yangming-derived philosophical ideas in Qi Jiguang's manuals, but none have tied this phenomenon to the larger social context Qi operated in, or even asked the question why Wang's ideas in particular were adapted to the military context instead of Cheng-Zhu orthodox Neo-Confucianism. Furthermore, the question how *xinxue* should be operationalized in the daily praxis of the military has been left unexplored.[755] According to Qi Jiguang, training the heart-mind and its *qi* should be achieved by a combination of training (presumably on the drilling ground), moral exhortation and encouragement, and good treatment of the soldiers by their officers. The latter came down to setting a good example and sharing in the life and hardships of the soldiers themselves. Moral exhortations were spread throughout the military manuals, and included instructions for situations outside of training and combat.[756] For one did not train *xin* and *qi* merely on the drilling ground, but in one's every act in daily life. However, these elements still had to be supported by a system of rewards and punishments, of which *lianzuo* was an important component, as we have seen. These rewards and punishments had to be absolutely impartial; intimacy or blood-ties with the commander should not be reasons to escape disciplining. Punishments also provided another avenue for moral exhortation and encouragement. In some cases of lighter offenses, soldiers could escape corporeal punishment if they were able to recite certain lemmas of Qi Jiguang's manuals, or at least verbally reproduce their broad meaning. Qi thus intended that his troops would know parts of his manual by heart. This suggests that he counted on literacy on the part of the soldiers, a quality that Ming soldiers and even officers were notorious for lacking. From the prefaces of the *Lianbing shi ji* and the newer version of the *Ji xiao xin shu* it becomes clear how he meant to achieve this. To take one example, all soldiers were expected to be thoroughly acquainted with the chapter titled *Training eyes and ears*, on responding correctly to command signals. Every banner

[755] Guo Yujiang 郭玉江 and Zhang Jianfeng 张建丰, "Lun Yangming xinxue dui Qi Jiguang wuxue lilun de yingxiang" 论阳明心学对戚继光武学理论的影响, *Lantai shijie* 兰台世界 28.15 (2013): 58-59; Wang Lihua 王丽华, "Qingxing de Fojiao xuanyangzhe – Qi Jiguang" 清醒的佛教宣扬者———戚继光, *Huabei zhiye jishu xueyuan xuebao* 淮北职业技术学院学报 15.2 (2016): 98-100; Zhang Changnian 张长念, "Qi Jiguang wuxue sixiang de "Ru dao" yu "Shi xin"" 戚继光武学思想的 "儒道" 与 "释心", *Shoudu tiyu xueyuan xuebao* 首都体育学院学报 27.6 (2015): 512-515.

[756] For example, if soldiers came into a dispute with civilians, the soldiers were always to be punished first, whether they were the aggrieved party or the perpetrators. See: Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 237.

(*qi* 旗) unit, which was comprised of four squads and 48 soldiers and officers in total, was expected to contain at least one literate member who was supposed to read out the chapter aloud for the other to be able to memorize it. Hence, in case of a transgression, soldiers could reduce the number of times they were hit by a cane if they were able to recite from memory a number of sections of the chapter. They did not have to deliver a word-for-word exact replication of the contents, as long as they were able to convey the cardinal principles (*dayi* 大義). In this manner Qi Jiguang circumvented the problem of literacy, whilst at the same time encouraging his men to learn his military method, including its moral exhortations, by heart.[757] With the above narrated measures Qi Jiguang intended to operationalize *xinxue* in the context of daily practice.

The officers were subjected to an even more overt form of *xinxue* moral inculcation. By the 1570s, when Qi composed his *Lian bing shi ji*, he explicitly wrote down his instructions for the moral reformation of the officers in his *Lian jiang*-chapter, which was added word-for-word to his revised *Ji xiao xin shu* of 1584. It was supposed be distributed to the higher-lever officers in his armies.[758] This provided the desired military ethic with a rich flavour of Neo-Confucian morality with elements of *xinxue*-thought. An officer had to start his moral reformation, or rectification, by rectifying 正 zheng his "intentions", or "techniques of the heart-mind" 心術 *xinshu*.[759] This seems a variation on the *Daxue's* precept for the fourth step in learning, "rectifying the mind", *zheng xin* 正心. This included cultivating a stoic detachment from emotions. For Wang Yangming, however, the mind did not have to be rectified, but rather its intentions, and this was the first step in his schemata for self-cultivation, as we have seen in chapter four. In Qi Jiguang's *Lian jiang* it also appears as the first step:

> Lemma 1. Rectifying intentions.
>
> The officer has a foundation; this is the intention. The people's various kinds are different. That which is similarly bestowed, is the heart-mind. […] Well now, the officers, conforming to the kindness of the ruler above them, agreeing to interact with colleagues on their own level, and being served by the multitudes of

[757] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 10-12, 210-215; Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Lianbing shi ji* 練兵實紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 7-10; 216-221.
[758] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 11.
[759] According to Zhang Dainian it means "methods of thinking" or the "attitude of the inner mind". See: Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, 442. Perhaps Qi chose this expression instead of the more regular *zhengxin* 正心 to avoid association with the Wang Yangming-school. The *Lianbing shi ji* was published during the height of Zhang Juzheng's repression of the movement.

> the rank-and-file below; how can they best be able to deal with flattery, fawning, wealth, and solicited favours? Only by having rectified their intentions, being just and honourable, by implementing matters sincerely with a sincere heart-mind and with pure faithfulness and pure filial piety. Contemplating and bearing in mind constantly to be faithful to the ruler, to be respectful to friends, to hold dear the army, to hate the enemy, to strengthen the soldiers, to face up to difficulties and go forth and do all we can.
>
> 第一．正心術
>
> 將有本，心術是也。人之為類，萬有不同。所同賦者，此心也。[…] 夫為將者上副君父之恩，中契僚寀之交，下服三軍之眾，豈奉承阿諛、財帛惠徠而盡能之乎？惟有正此心術，光明正大，以實心行實事，純忠純孝，思思念念在於忠君、敬友、愛軍、惡敵、強兵，任難上做去，盡其在我.[760]

People are different, but they share one thing: the heart-mind. According to Qi service in the military proceeded first from rectifying the intentions which proceed from the heart-mind. Only then was one able to serve to the best of one's ability. He goes continues his plead showcasing other traces of *xinxue* in his ideas:

> For example, a man who did not rectify his intentions, on ordinary days he occupies an officers position and drags out an ignoble life seeking personal gain, taking refuge in deceitful actions, refusing to engage in sincere matters, being disloyal to ruler and father; but in the stillness of night the good conscience [*liangxin*] emerges he ponders, contemplates and he is terrified, he only fears his crimes being revealed.
>
> 譬如心術不正之人，平日居將位偷生謀利，避難巧為，不干實事，不忠君父，清夜良心發見，思慮驚恐，只怕犯出。[761]

Qi assures the reader that these consequences of a life ill-lived are not as relevant to consider as living a morally upright life right now. Why? By relying on the Mencian paradigm that man is innately good, and Wang Yangming's extension of this paradigm with his own ideas on the innate knowledge of the good - good consciousness *liangzhi* 良知 - or its more colloquial cognate *liangxin* 良心.[762] In essence, the good consciousness functions as a kind of moral self-surveillance. *Liangxin* will make your life on earth nightmarish if you behave in immoral ways.

A further sign of the influence of *xinxue* can be found, I argue, in the syncretic tendencies towards religion found in Qi's manual, tendencies that were also inherent in Wang's own thought

[760] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Lianbing shi ji* 練兵實紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 155-157.
[761] Idem, 157.
[762] Yu-Yin Cheng, "The Taizhou School (*Taizhou Xuepai* 泰州學派) and the Popularization of *Liangzhi* 良知 (Innate Knowledge)," *Ming Studies* 60 (2009): 47.

as seen in chapter four. Historians Ray Huang and Herbert Franke[763] have claimed that Qi Jiguang relied on a mix of different ideas from different religions to morally persuade his men into a disciplined mindset. I would, however, argue that amongst these religions, Neo-Confucian concepts take centre stage in this scheme of persuasion.[764] Qi does invoke Buddhist concepts of retribution, hell, and transmigration of the soul, but he asserts that these are manifestations of the heart-mind as well:

> How can rewards for good deeds, retribution, hell, and reincarnation be real?! Reincarnation is also in our heart-mind, hell is also in our heart-mind.
> 善報惡報地獄輪迴豈真有哉！輪迴亦在我心上，地獄亦在我心上。[765]

Wang Lihua has argued on the basis of this that Qi Jiguang did not truly believe in Buddhism, but merely used it to stimulate his soldiers.[766] However, I disagree with this assessment. As we have seen in chapter four, Wang Yangming's Neo-Confucian had certain syncretic tendencies. Wang himself certainly did not believe Buddhism and Daoism were completely false, instead they had an incomplete grasp of principle. There was therefore no reason why Qi Jiguang should not have added principles like reincarnation and hell to his method of moral cultivation, as long as they were useful. I also hold that we should not read the above passage as indicating that Qi Jiguang thought reincarnation and hell were illusions residing in our heart-mind. Instead, I would argue that, as the heart-mind is the repository of all *li*, the *li* of reincarnation and hell are naturally among them as well and thus really existing. Not taking in account the syncretic tendencies of Wang Yangming's *xinxue* have thus led to incorrect assessments of the place and importance of religious ideas in Qi Jiguang's military manuals. In addition, Qi Jiguang befriended Lin Zhao'en 林兆恩 (1517-1598) in Fujian, and discussed philosophy with him. Lin was the founder of a new religion which combined Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism in one. In this, he was probably heavily influenced by Wang Yangming's ideas. Lin's grandfather had actually worked with Wang during the suppression of a Yao rebellion in Guangxi, and also shared philosophical conversation with

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[763] Franke, *Studien und Texte*, 73; Huang, *1587*, 186-187.
[764] Felix Siegmund, based on his reading of Qi Jiguang's commentary on the *Seven Military Classics*, also disagrees with Ray Huang that Qi was interested in cosmology. See: Felix Siegmund, "Qi Jiguang's 戚繼光 *Wujing qishu zhaiti* 武經七書摘題: A Few Notes on a Synopsis of the Military Classics." *Ming Qing Yanjiu* 19 (2015): 35-36.
[765] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Lianbing shi ji* 練兵實紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 157.
[766] Wang, "Qingxing de Fojiao xuanyangzhe," 98-100.

him. This influence then carried over in the education of Lin Zhao'en himself. According to Lin, all three religions ultimately sprang from the same source, and this is the heart-mind itself.[767] It is therefore more fruitful to see Qi Jiguang's seemingly indiscriminate invocation of the creeds of different religions and philosophical systems as part of this syncretic tendency inherent in *xinxue*.[768] As we have seen in chapters seven and eight, this syncretism also affected identities. The Neo-Confucian sage, the Strategists' sagacious military commander, and the knight-errant could all be exemplars combined in one person.

This reliance on Neo-Confucian *xinxue* doctrine was further supplemented by inculcating a very stoic view on life and death:

> The third. Illuminating death and life.
>
> The life of men, amidst the universe and the unseen world they suddenly have their body; its life and death, once gone it will not return. This matter of life and death, one can say it is big. Therefore, every kind of vigorous *qi*, there is not one which doesn't love life and fear death. Yet, death and life are predestined, [they are] not arbitrary within in the midst of extreme misery and fighting. […] Moreover, look at the high ranking military officers, did they not from a young age, as low officials, go into battle and kill bandits, rising rank by rank to earn [the rank of] high-officer? Surely if battle is able to excessively kill people, nowadays there would also be no men successful in obtaining high ranks and still be alive. Furthermore, there are brave soldiers who have experienced battles and have scars all over their bodies, shoulders and faces, and have yet enjoyed an advanced age. Therefore, as the saying goes: "Men are suffering insects, our destiny depends on Heaven." Furthermore, when you are led to an appropriate death, a temple has been built to offer sacrifices to ancestors and you enjoy animals killed as a sacrifice for you [as the deceased ancestor] for all generations, this is living on after death. The locality's young men and women publicly praise you and if one day they hand it down from one to another, this is one day of being alive in the world.
>
> 第三．明死生
>
> 人之生也，於大塊冥冥之中忽有此身；其死生，一去不復再返。是生死之事，可謂大矣。故凡血氣之類，莫不愛生畏死。但死生有數，不專在水火兵戈之中。[…] 且看那個將領不是自少年為下官

[767] Kenneth Dean, *Lord of the Three in One: The Spread of a Cult in Southeast China* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 71, 107; He Shan-meng 何善蒙, "Lin Zhao'en "San Jiao heyi" de zongjiao sixiang qian xi" 林兆恩 "三教合一 " 的宗教思想淺析, *Feng Jia renwen shehui xuebao* 逢甲人文社會學報 12 (2006): 212.

[768] For more on the syncretism of Lin Zhao'en, see: Judith A. Berling, *The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). For more on the connection between Lin Zhao'en and Wang Yangming's philosophy and followers, see: Cheng Chih-ming 鄭志明, "Lin Zhao'en yu wan Ming Wangxue" 林兆恩與晚明王學, in *Wan Ming sichao yu shehui biandong* 晚明思潮與社會變動, edited by Danjiang daxue zhongwenxi 淡江大學中文系 (Taipei: Honghua wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1987), 89-140.

> 上陣殺賊，一級一級掙到大將？果是陣上能死人，如今也無人等得到大將還活在世。又有勇士屢經戰陣刀痕遍體披面，尚且享有高年。故諺云：“人是苦蟲，我命在天。”況使死得當，立廟祭祀血食百世，是死後還活，地方士女口碑一日相傳，是一日活在世間。[769]

As Kandice Hauf pointed out, it is difficult to decide if Confucianism is also a religion or only a this-worldly socio-political program. There are certainly theistic aspects to how Confucians defined Heaven, *tian* 天 across the centuries. At first it seems to have been an anthropomorphic god-like being, but later on it became a more impersonal force of nature which governed the universe. Later on, the idea was articulated that, just as Heaven bestowed its favour and a moral mandate on the ruling house, it also did this on individuals. 命 *ming* thus became the "fate" of the individual, determined by Heaven. In this conceptualization, since Heaven determined your life, death, wealth and status, it became futile to concern yourself with these things. Only the pursuit of a moral life should be of concern, everything else flowed from that. This is also how Wang Yangming considered the relationship between Heaven, fate and the individual's life on earth.[770] This fatalistic way of considering life on Earth can be discerned in Qi's exhortations in the quote above. Furthermore, another incentive to choose the moral high ground and do one's duty was having one's name remembered for generations after your own life. Again, this points to a (Neo-)Confucian exhortation as being the leading inspiration for the moral disciplining of the officers. As Kandice Hauf states, within Confucianism there was no real conception of an afterlife, reincarnation or hell. All what mattered was an idea of "social immortality". This was of course expressed in the ancestor worship and the need for this to be carried on through the generations. It was the duty of the living to preserve the memories of the dead. In return, merit accumulated by ancestors good have an impact of the life of their descendants. In that sense, you were expected to live a morally upright life in order to safeguard the future prosperity of the family. Finally, this social immortality could best be achieved by having such great achievements, that society itself would keep remembering you.[771] It could be said that Qi Jiguang succeeded admirably in this aim. Ray Huang and Herbert Franke's views on the role of multiple Chinese religions in Qi Jiguang's

[769] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Lianbing shi ji* 練兵實紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 159-163.
[770] Hauf, "The Jiangyou Group," 288-289.
[771] Idem, 291-292.

works are therefore incorrect. Qi Jiguang clearly built his argument of moral persuasion on a Neo-Confucian basis.

From South to North, from State to State, from Dynasty to Dynasty

I consider Qi Jiguang's manuals a detailed elaboration of Wang Yangming's ideas, both in praxis and in philosophy. The *Seven Military Classics* themselves considered a wide range of topics, including grand strategy from the state level, tactics in the field, recruitment, organization and disciplinary techniques. Yet these matters were often described (or rather: prescribed) in a very general and succinct way, without getting into details overmuch. This might also explain the reason why these seven works were selected as the military canon in the first place: the knowledge contained within this repository was of mostly timeless value and of nearly universal applicability. This also means that by relying on these texts, we do not get a very detailed look into the day-to-day practicalities that went into raising and running an army. For example, whilst all the classics advocate good training as well as punishment and reward schemes for disciplinary purposes, none actually offers detailed training schemes for different weapon systems or an elaborated system of rules and regulations. For those officers who passed the military examinations from the Song onwards (and scholar-officials and literati interested in military affairs) this meant that either they had to improvise based on the prescriptions of the classics, or there was a current of oral knowledge pertaining to these matters which they could conform their practices to. Concerning the regulations, we know that the Ming founder put down instructions in writing, including military law, and his son the Yongle emperor promulgated his own set of military regulations in 1414.[772] It has, however, not been researched to what extent these instructions were disseminated amongst the military and the ones supervising them, nor is it therefore known how well officials conformed to these rules during the Ming dynasty. It is possible that some degree of conformity was upheld across the lifespan of the empire, but the sheer diversity of institutional branches encroaching on the military sphere (eunuchs, censors and other civil bureaucrats) could well have further increased the variation of practices across the military establishment rather than keep it uniform. Qi Jiguang's

[772] Ji Deyuan 季德源, *Zhongguo junshi zhidu: junshi fazhi juan* 中国军事制度：军事法制卷 (Dengzhou: Daxing chubanhe, 1997), 214; John D. Langlois, Jr., "Ming Law," in *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 8: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 2*, edited by Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 174.

own writings indicate that practices differed even along the same frontier area. In 1567 Qi wrote a memorial about the situation on the northern frontier and made the following observations:

> This boundary and this border area are no less than Qin and Yue [two polities dating from the Warring States era who had no dealings with each other], the verbal commands are not unified and the signal beacons are not connected. Although there is a declaration of support, rarely can there be relief.
> 彼界此疆，不啻秦越，號令不一，烽堠不 通，雖有聲援，鮮克有濟.[773]

It appears that the defenses along the always critical northern frontier were quite disorganized and disconnected. It appears that Qi Jiguang's two manuals were an attempt to reorganize, rationalize and standardize the military establishment, both in the north and in the south of the empire. In another memorial from 1572, when he had already been stationed at the northern frontier for a while, he further stressed the need for a clear training regime:

> I humbly [want to] shed light on the aspect of training: the arts are easy to familiarize with, but hard to refine. The people's heart-minds are transformed with difficulty, but easily confused. Nowadays the techniques of the art of training do not need more than an odd number of years to bring results, why wait several years to achieve results?
> 竊照教練之方，技藝易熟而難精，人心難轉而易惑。 今練習技藝之術，不過歲餘收效，何待數年有成？[774]

Qi Jiguang was thus deeply concerned with the lack of standardization of different aspects of the military across the empire, and, for example, wished to reform the training methods. I argue that his manuals were an attempt to collect, explain and organize into a coherent whole a range of tried and proven training methods, disciplinary regimes, systems of commands and battlefield tactics and disseminate them across the empire by means of the format of the printed manual. These manuals were meant to be a mutually-supporting body of military science, although Qi Jiguang admitted that some ideas were underdeveloped and he seemed wary its future understanding would be hampered:

[773] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Qi Shaobao zouyi* 戚少保奏議 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 87.
[774] Idem, 152.

> Amongst all the above clauses there are many who have incomplete ideas, which do not go beyond the mutually supporting explanations of *Ji xiao xin shu*, *Lianbing shi ji*, and *Chu lian tong lun*, and this seems like attaching importance to redundancy. However, briefly stated, I fear that there are no students who develop it and come up with new ideas and therefore there will be ones who attach importance to the words and not to the ideas, and there will be ones who will attach importance to the ideas and not to the words. The students can only choose this themselves.
> 以上每一款內，多有不盡之意，不出乎《紀效新書》、《練兵實紀》、《儲練通論》、互相發明，似為重贅。但略言之，恐無以發揚學者生意，故重其言而不重其意者有之，重其意而不重其言者有之，學者惟自擇之。[775]

These manuals were in themselves an admission that studying the military classics was not sufficient. A combination of military technological change, a growing number of inner and outer threats to the empire partly caused by demographic changes and economic vicissitudes and the greater availability of commercial printing had made these manuals both possible and necessary. They translated the universal principles of the *Seven Military Classics* into clear concrete practices written down in a more colloquial and understandable style. In the previous chapter we have already seen that the manuals were an influence on manuals that were written later during the Ming dynasty. However, none appear to have had the same dissemination and application in both time and space as Qi Jiguang's brainchildren. The succeeding Qing dynasty faced internal rebellions in the nineteenth century amidst a failure of its own traditional military institutions. Once again, Qi Jiguang's manuals were applied to raise and train new armies of peasant militia to bolster the strength of the empire.[776] Qi's methods would also spread beyond the borders of the Ming empire. After the devastating war with the Japanese at the end of the sixteenth century, the Koreans became interested in the drill and musket tactics advocated by Qi in his manuals. Eventually, the manuals themselves would be translated and adapted to Korean circumstances.[777] Thus, the beleaguered Korean king whom we met in the introduction would in the end be vindicated, when his successors adopted military manuals advocating the unification of the Way of *wen* and *wu* in the shape of Qi

[775] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Lianbing shi ji* 練兵實紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 192.
[776] Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies*, 124-126; Y.H. Teddy Sim and Sandy J.C. Liu, "Zeng Guofan's Application of Qi Jiguang's Doctrines in Crushing the Taiping Uprising," in *The Maritime Defence of China: Ming General Qi Jiguang and Beyond*, edited by Y.H. Teddy Sim (Singapore: Springer, 2017), 93-103.
[777] Hyeok Hweon Kang, "Big Heads and Buddhist Demons: The Korean Musketry Revolution and the Northern Expeditions of 1654 and 1658," *Journal of Chinese Military History* 2 (2013): 141.

Jiguang's manuals, the military embodiments of a philosophical reorientation that was fathered by Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming.