The soldier as a sage: Qi Jiguang (1528-1588) and the neo-confucianization of the military in sixteenth-century China

Noordam, B.

Chapter 9 – Military Knowledge Circulation and the *Xinxue*-Statecraft Network

This chapter will explore the location of Qi's military writings within the established tradition of Chinese military thought and assess their indebtedness to the commander's access to circulating military knowledge within the network of Neo-Confucian civil and military officials. In the first chapter, we have seen that statecraft as a genre had, like military writings, led a semi-independent life often associated with different ideological positions and leanings until the late Tang and early Song dynasties. My hypothesis is that statecraft became more and more a corollary of Confucianism, as the latter gained status as the state orthodoxy through its promotion as the sole avenue into state service via the examination system. The rise of Neo-Confucianism during the Southern Song seems to have brought a distinct Neo-Confucian statecraft to the fore, with a strong component of local voluntarism. In this chapter I will briefly trace the development of Neo-Confucian statecraft during the Ming dynasty before arguing that the military activities on the south-eastern coast during the mid-sixteenth century featured a strong input of *xinxue*-scholars. I will thereupon argue that the associated military and statecraft writings, the line between which would become blurred, have to be considered part of Neo-Confucian statecraft as well. By way of establishing the background of this argument, I will posit that the artificial Han-era category of *bingjia*, or *School of the Strategists*, should be disregarded as it obscures the social and intellectual cross-fertilization between military and Neo-Confucian thinkers and their thought. It is my contention that the formation of Qi Jiguang's military writings should be understood specifically within the context of Wang Yangming-influenced Neo-Confucian statecraft, a notion which I will fully explore in chapter ten. But first, we must establish to what kind of military writings dating from previous dynasties and epochs in Chinese history turned, before we can assess the impact of both *xinxue* moral philosophy in general and the pragmatic solutions applied by Wang Yangming on Qi Jiguang's military ideas.

Military Writings as a Problematic Category

As we have seen in the first chapter, the first known examples of Chinese military thought arose during the later Zhou dynasty, with the most important examples emerging during, perhaps

understandably, the Warring States Period. These included the vaunted *Art of War* by Sun Wu and the *Wuzi* 吳子 by Wu Qi 吳起, often considered the two foundational texts in the tradition of Chinese military writing. As noted in the first chapter, these two works and other texts were then during the Han dynasty categorized as belonging to a distinct category of *bingjia*, suggesting a structural and ideational coherence within the diverse literature which in reality probably amounted to no more than a mutual engagement with military matters. But textual production certainly did not stop with the end of the Warring States and the beginning of the unified imperial era in Chinese history. From a survey of the monumental *Siku quanshu* compilation, it becomes clear that over the span of Chinese history until the moment of the *Siku quanshu*'s commission, at least 1,340 distinct works of military thought existed at one time or another.[594] However, until now no attempt has been made to analyse this amorphous group of texts and divide them in "lineages" of ideas and genres. Some of them were small treatises on wall defence, some concerned divinatory practices and some were huge all-encompassing encyclopaedia of military science. We however know very little about the socio-cultural background of the authors, the connections with Confucian, Daoist or Buddhist thought and their published numbers and circulation in knowledge networks.

In the second chapter I have described the formation of the three great manuals of the Tang-Song transition and the formation of the canon of the *Seven Military Classics*. Fortunately, these ten works are a bit better known, and it can be assumed that these texts had the deepest impact on central policy formulation, as all these were attempts at reorganizing and systematizing military knowledge by the state. At the same time as these works were being created, a slow bifurcation took place between a largely illiterate professional military class and a literate scholastic community devoted to state service increasingly selected through an examination system. A problem presents itself for the researcher: since most military men could not read the important works on their own profession, we know very little of the praxis in reality. Presumably a lot of knowledge on military strategy, martial arts and tactics circulated orally within the military ranks and also in civilian society. As Benjamin Israel observed, a lot of martial knowledge must have circulated in society, because else Wang Yangming would not have been able to recruit so many skilled men within civilian society.[595] Other scholars like Peter Lorge also assume that at least

[594] Chen-Ya Tien, *Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1992), 21-22.
[595] Israel, "On the Margins of the Grand Unity," 60-61.

since the Warring States Period, all sorts of military knowledge probably circulated outside of the purview of the state, [596] even though there were attempts to keep it secret from the civil population by the state at times. Even if these texts were read, they were thus often not mentioned openly in other writings.[597]

From this short overview, we can already draw the conclusion that military knowledge could circulate in different forms, both oral and written, and that these forms were tied to different socio-cultural contexts of circulation. Furthermore, military thought did not constitute a consistent monolithic ideological program as seen in the first chapter, as the category to which it assigned by Han scholars was an artificial *post-facto* reconstruction and reorganization of the intellectual world existing in the centuries before them. Therefore, the tendency to treat military knowledge as a separate category has had the unfortunately result, in my view, to obscure the entanglements between it and other scholarly intellectual pursuits. In addition, the scholars concerning themselves with, for example, Neo-Confucian intellectual pursuits and those engaged with military thought probably both came from the same literate social environment, making intellectual entanglements more likely. Below, I will explore this link by considering the development of military thought in relation to the burgeoning field of Neo-Confucian statecraft.

(Military) Statecraft and Its Development in the Neo-Confucian Context

Wang Yangming's philosophical reorientation of Neo-Confucianism stressed social activism, especially through his doctrine of the unity of (moral) knowledge and (moral) action. This orientation towards social activism was further exemplified by the great significance Wang and his followers attached to one particular member of the *Four Books* and the *Five Classics*; namely the *Great Learning*, or *Daxue* 大學. This part of the *Four Books* canon, thought to be based on Confucius' own teachings by succeeding generations of Confucian literati, makes the connection between moral self-cultivation and the ultimate task or even duty of ordering society.[598] In the second chapter we have seen that the initial Neo-Confucian movement as it appeared in the southern Song dynasty was characterized by social activism as well. There was a turn away from

[596] Lorge, *Chinese Martial Arts*, 55-56.
[597] Joseph Needham et al, *Science and Civilization in China, Volume 5: Chemistry and Chemical Technology. Part VI: Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 88-89.
[598] Hauf, "The Jiangyou Group," 221-222.

a Confucian identity which associated itself with military and martial abilities and values, accompanied by a turn towards local voluntarism. As military activities during the Song dynasty tended to be a more state-centralized affair than during the middle and late Ming dynasty and were perceived as tasks for the central government (coupled with a tendency to disdain martial activities), the Neo-Confucian movement largely turned its back to the centre and concerned itself with the local as a way to ensure and perpetuate the elite status of its adherents in local society. This was inherent in the message of the movement itself, which disavowed status as an official as a requirement for local leadership. Instead it was those who had learned the true way, i.e. those with moral qualifications, who had the right to claim this leadership.

Furthermore, with the institution of the examination system, hereditary status and the automatically guaranteed succession of power through the generations of a family was largely abolished and, as Bol contends, families therefore had to strengthen their local power base.[599] Therefore the Neo-Confucian program fitted this new social reality so well and the local voluntarism should be seen as a means of seizing this local leadership status. This local voluntarism could take the form of "statecraft", or *jingshi*, something Kandice Hauf takes to literally mean "to regulate the world",[600] although in the context of Southern Song Neo-Confucianism "*state*craft" should probably be considered a misnomer for the local voluntarist contents of its ideas. This had already for a long time within Confucianism been the corollary of the ideology, an expression of the this-worldliness of its message in opposition to the otherworldliness of Daoism and Buddhism. Neo-Confucianism continued this tradition of statecraft, which during the Song could take the form of communal projects like building academies, establishing famine-relief granaries and creating and maintaining diverse infrastructure. Military matters were not entirely neglected, as we have seen in the case of Lu Jiuyuan and Lu Jiuling in the second chapter. However, it was a domain of activity frowned upon. Furthermore, even Lu Jiuling did not want to leave matters of military defence to people such as knight-errants, instead the literati should involve themselves with it. This implied dichotomy in the identities between literati and knight-errant seems to have been more marginal during the mid-sixteenth century. Wang Yangming followers like Xu Wei, Qi Jiguang, Tang Shunzhi, and Wang Ji sought to embody both identities. Neo-Confucianism was a "small government"-ideology and therefore much emphasis was put on local leadership and local

[599] Bol, "The "Localist Turn"," 4-5.
[600] Hauf, "The Jiangyou Group," 221.

solutions. These solutions, as articulated by Zhu Xi amongst others, also included community covenants obliging its participants to mutual moral monitoring and rectification.[601] The Wang Yangming movement would be paired with a renewed surge of statecraft activities, both within and outside of the official governing institutions. Several of Wang Yangming's first generation followers, whom we have already encountered, dabbled in statecraft. Luo Hongxian was concerned with reforming the tax system of his native county when he was retired from government service; Zou Shouyi, Nie Bao and Luo Hongxian were concerned with setting up community covenants, *xiangyue*, in various counties in their native region, which was Ji'an 吉安 prefecture in Jiangxi province.[602]

In contrast to modern scholarship on the late Ming dynasty, the history of statecraft during the early Ming has received relatively scant attention. An important reason for this is perhaps the relatively lower production of statecraft writings and their survival until the present day in comparison with the wide circulation and survival of texts from the late Ming owing to the printing boom of the sixteenth century. An exception to this state of affairs are Hung-lam Chu's research of the fifteenth century statecraft work *Daxue yanyi bu* 大學衍義補 (*Supplement to the Meaning of the Great Learning*) by Qiu Jun丘濬 (1420-1495). From its title it can be seen that it was "marketed" as an addition to Chen Dexiu's 陳德修 (1178-1255) treatise (*Daxue yanyi* 大學衍義) from the Southern Song-era, but Hung points out that the contents are very different. Where Chen Dexiu focuses on the moral rectification of the ruler and as such signified a return of Neo-Confucian statecraft concerns back to political centre, Qiu Jun compiles practical solutions to myriad aspects of governance. His work received imperial sponsorship and Qiu Jun wrote it in such a way that it addressed the emperor himself as the audience.[603] Furthermore, the topics were arranged in such a way that they reflected the spheres of activity of the Six Ministries.[604] The *Daxue yanyi bu* drew from an eclectic range of written sources. In Hung-lam Chu's words:

---

[601] Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer, "Introduction," in *Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China*, edited by Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993), 22-27.
[602] Gerritsen, *Ji'an Literati*, 161.
[603] Hung-lam Chu, "Ch'iu Chün (1421-1495) and the `Ta-hsüeh yen-i pu': Statecraft Thought in Fifteenth-Century China," (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1984), 2-3, 60.
[604] Chu, "Ch'iu Chün," 61-62.

> "They include the standard Confucian Classics; writing by ancient philosophers of both Confucian and non-Confucian schools; exegesis and elaboration on both classic and philosophical writings; histories ancient and contemporary, standard and chronological in style, political and institutional in nature; comments on historical events by writers contemporary with as well as after the events; memorials addressing concrete problems; administrative handbooks, including gazetteers; military handbooks; and others as well."[605]

Chu notes that Qiu Jun showed a preference for adherents of the Neo-Confucian movement, but that he did not shy away from appreciating the ideas of even their ideological opponents, like Wang Anshi, who advocated a big-government approach.[606] This particular example of Neo-Confucian-influenced central statecraft would retain enormous influence in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, setting a standard for statecraft compilations later in the dynasty. It demonstrated that non-Neo-Confucian thought could remain alive within its statecraft tradition, and that military theory could be part of this tradition as well.

In the mid-sixteenth century, the new tradition of compiling large statecraft treatises would be continued by three new publications. In short succession, these were carried out by Huang Xun 黃訓 (dates unknown), Zhang Han 張瀚 (1511-1593) and Ruan E, and Wan Biao.[607] *Xinxue*-adherents were thus involved in two of the three statecraft compilations, indicating the vitality of this concern within the new direction of Neo-Confucianism. Military concerns took up considerable space in these treatises. The statecraft tradition was thus very much alive within the *xinxue*-movement, and it concerned itself with military affairs as well. The latter was not altogether surprising considering earlier developments within the statecraft tradition, however it seems that the content of *xinxue*-ideology itself emancipated certain strands of military thought from non-*xinxue* Confucian critiques. This could already be detected when considering Qi Jiguang's attitude to the *Seven Military Classics* as seen in chapter seven. This same attitude towards the *Seven Military Classics*, especially that towards the problematic contents (from a Confucian point of view) of *Sunzi* and *Wuzi*, could also be gleaned from the views of others in the *xinxue*-tradition.

[605] Idem, 65.
[606] Idem, 66.
[607] William Stewart Atwell, "Ch'en Tzu-lung (1608-1647): A Scholar-Official of the Late Ming Dynasty" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1974), 82.

I will now turn to the development of statecraft within the *xinxue*-network Qi Jiguang was a part of, and especially highlight the important role military knowledge would come to play in it by the mid-sixteenth century.

Converging *Xinxue*-Networks and (Military) Statecraft during the Wokou-Crisis

Wang Ji once described his master and drew a link between his interest in the military classics and statecraft activities: "He actively engaged with Sun [Wu] and Wu [Qi], and although his aspiration lay in statecraft, his talents were also those which he indulged in" 馳騁於孫吳，雖其志在經世，亦才有所縱也.[608] In this sentence Wang Ji makes clear that military activities could be viewed as belonging to the domain of statecraft within Wang Yangming's movement, but also he saw it as giving expression to one's naturally endowed talents. As we have seen, these talents (*cai*) depended on one's quality of *qi*. Wang Ji seems to evaluate *qi*-endowed military talents as a positive phenomenon and its subordination to statecraft activities as an aside.

In her monograph on literati activism during the late Ming dynasty, historian Joanna Handlin Smith expressed her puzzlement at the relatively widespread phenomenon of literati engaging in military affairs.[609] This engagement, which was reflected in a writing and publication boom of assorted new military writings and commentaries on older classics, on the one hand can simply be construed to reflect the new vigour of the printing press from the sixteenth century onwards.[610] Earlier literati interest in this direction might have been obscured by the scarce possibilities of publication and transmission during earlier phases of the dynasty. Furthermore, in my tentative reading of Wang Ji's description of Wang Yangming's life, the latter's engagement with military classics like *Sunzi's Art of War* could simply be seen as an extension of his statecraft aspirations. As such, military activities could be legitimated within (Neo-)Confucianism as simply a part of the moral obligation to order society. A third reason I would like to posit is the increasing necessity of military writings to aid literati and civil bureaucrats in their bureaucratic and sub-bureaucratic government of realm. We have seen in the third chapter that the decreasing ability of

[608] Wang Ji 王畿, *Wang Ji ji* 王畿集 (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe, 2007), 33.
[609] Joanna F. Handlin, *Action in Late Ming Thought: The Reorientation of Lü K'un and Other Scholar-Officials* (Berkeley, California: California University Press, 1983), 209-210.
[610] Joseph P. McDermott, *A Social History of the Chinese Book: Books and Literati Culure in Late Imperial China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 46.

the hereditary military to ensure military security against internal rebellions and external enemies meant a corresponding increase in the importance of mercenaries, rural militias and aboriginal troops which supplemented and often even replaced them. These non-hereditary troops were usually under the authority and command of civil bureaucrats and not the hereditary military officials. This change was both because of internal structural reasons pertaining to the military system established at the beginning of the dynasty, and external factors.

Within the Neo-Confucian movement, and certainly within its *xinxue*-branch, knowledge circulated about the more practical affairs of managing society. Significant here is also the cooperation between *xinxue* adherents in and out of office: when an in-office official set up a *xiangyue* community covenant in his county where he served as a magistrate, he asked Nie Bao to write a preface emphasizing the importance of the participation of the local elites in upholding it.[611] This was of course a concern for a bureaucracy that had a fleeting individual presence by design. Magistrates, for example, would only serve three years in a single position in order to prevent the development of local ties and interests. This kind of cooperation also extended to sharing knowledge pertaining to military campaigns and frontier control. Qian Dehong, when he was no longer in any official function, transmitted knowledge about raising militia to Qi Jiguang. Can we trace a broader process of (military) knowledge circulation as a part of statecraft within the sixteenth-century *xinxue*-movement?

Recently, Kai Filipiak has noted that the south-eastern campaigns against the *Wokou* stimulated a boom in cartographical and military works of the frontier area. He notes that many of the authors shared an interest in martial arts and he speculates that they may have taken Wang Yangming as an exemplar. Included in this group are the hereditary military officers Qi Jiguang, Yu Dayou, and Liu Xian 劉顯 (? -1581) and the literati and civil bureaucrats Zheng Ruoceng, Tan Lun and Tang Shunzhi. With the exception of Liu Xian, who left no writings to explore, I have been able to identify Qi, Zheng, Tan, Tang (and perhaps Yu as well) as adherents of a form of *xinxue* Neo-Confucianism. And they were all part of an anti-Wokou operation which was already led by Yangming-followers Hu Zongxian, Ruan E and Hu Song. Filipiak characterizes this group of six as a network. What I will argue below is that this network extended much further and that it

[611] Hauf, "The Jiangyou Group," 272.

was in fact a *xinxue*-network comprising followers of Chen Xiangzhang, Zhan Ruoshui and Wang Yangming, and that it included many first-generation followers of these men.

Within this combined *wen* and *wu* pool of talent, knowledge thus circulated and was compiled and written down. Much of this activity seems to have taken place within the ranks of those associated with either Wang Yangming, or his friend Zhan Ruoshui's teachings. The affinity between activism, martial identities and *xinxue* which I explored in the previous three chapters was on full display during the sustained campaign to pacify the south-eastern maritime frontier. The ideology brought together military hereditary men, civil bureaucrats and literati with diverse interests and talents outside of government service.

A significant amount of knowledge circulated and transmitted within *xinxue*-circles had a bearing on military matters, which had already started with Wang Yangming, himself. In the course of the practical application of his skills and knowledge during multiple military crisis in the south of the empire, he also generated new military knowledge and sought the application of new military technologies. In a recent monograph, Tonio Andrade elucidated the process of knowledge circulation which accompanied the introduction of European firearms in the campaign against the Prince of Ning. Wang gained access to knowledge about Portuguese guns from befriended civil officials who also had a history of leading military campaigns against armed uprisings in the empire's southern inland areas. One of these, Tang Long 唐龍（1477-1546) used these Portuguese guns in battles against bandits in both north and south China, and another official called Lin Jun 林俊 (1452-1527) fought bandits in Jiangxi province using these weapons and cast them for Wang Yangming once he heard of the Prince of Ning's uprising. Zou Shouyi later commemorated this process of transfer in a poem. Of this phenomenon, Andrade concludes that "[…] elite officials, being at the center of wide nets of patronage and friendship, helped spread information about Portuguese cannons widely." I have not been able to ascertain what Wang's contemporaries like Lin Jun and Tang Long thought of his philosophy. However, concerning the diffusion and innovation related to cannon, Andrade notes the roles played by his followers, including the later efforts at gun founding by Weng Wanda, whom we will meet below, and the descriptions by Qi Jiguang and Zheng Ruoceng.[612] I posit that the development of personal ties between *xinxue*-adherrents, in addition to their attitudes towards military affairs and martial identities, could only

[612] Tonio Andrade, *The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016), 138-142.

have facilitated the process of military technology and knowledge circulation. I will now elucidate this connection between *xinxue*-networks and military knowledge circulation in the case of the anti-Wokou campaign.

An examination of the ties between the first-generation followers of Wang Yangming and the people involved with the maritime frontier campaign of the 1550s and 1560s reveals more than only Qian Dehong passing along his military knowledge. Wan Biao, a hereditary military officer whom we already encountered in the sixth chapter, was literate and had passed the military examinations. He was known to be in contact with Wang Ji, Luo Hongxian, Qian Dehong and Tang Shunzhi and was thus probably in a good position to pass on his military knowledge to prominent people involved in *xinxue* circles. The knowledge he obtained and wrote down pertained to more than mere military affairs. One of his longer-term responsibilities was overseeing part of the tribute grain shipment from the south to the capital, and in this capacity, he proposed improvements to the administration of the system as well as the conservation of rivers. In military terms, he was drawn in the Wokou upheavals and contributed personal funds towards establishing his military units which also included Buddhist monks from the famed Shaolin monastery, well known for its martial arts traditions. His knowledge of the causes of-, and solutions to the *Wokou* problem he wrote down in a treatise named *Hai kou yi* 海寇議, or *Treatise on the Ocean Bandits.* This treatise was probably consulted by none other than Hu Zongxian.[613] Zou Shouyi had helped Wang Yangming in the suppression of the rebellion by the Prince of Ning,[614] and Hu Zongxian also asked Zou Shouyi to join his private staff as an advisor, no doubt owing to his experience as a participant in Wang Yangming's pacification campaigns. Tang Shunzhi widened his scope of interest to include geometry, astronomy, weaponry, military strategy and mathematics. His military ideas crystalized in a big military manual entitled *Wu bian* 武編, or *Military Writings*. He served in the Ministry of War and was detached to aid Hu Zongxian in his campaigns against the Wokou, which he was known to supervise from the front on horseback and clad in armour.[615] Luo Hongxian had skills as a cartographer and taught Zheng Ruoceng, who would use his abilities to chart the maritime frontier regions. He declined Hu Zongxian's offer to join the campaign in person,

[613] Lienche Tu Fang, "WAN Piao," in in *Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644*, *Part 2*, edited by L.C. Goodrich and Chao-ying Fang (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 1337-1339.
[614] Julia Ching, "TSOU Shou-i," in *Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644*, *Part 2*, edited by L.C. Goodrich and Chao-ying Fang (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 1310.
[615] Huang, "T'ANG Shun-chih," 1253-1255.

but it is significant that these contacts existed. Nor did this knowledge sharing network on the basis of *xinxue*-ties restrict itself to the south and the endemic upheavals in that macro area of the empire. An official serving at the northern frontier, Weng Wanda, who also advocated European firearms as a solution for the empire's military problems, had become acquainted with Wang Yangming and his philosophy as well.[616] Mao Kun was also acquainted with Zhejiang's Wang Zongmu 王宗沐 (1523-1591) and his writings, which included the military title *Bing shi* 兵事 (*Military Affairs*). I was unable to trace this title, but Ray Huang notes in his short biography of Wang Zongmu that he indeed wrote about military frontier affairs. Furthermore, Wang Zongmu was a follower of Wang Yangming's philosophy and a prolific author on many different statecraft topics, including the northern frontier dealt with in the (41) *San zhen lu* 三鎮錄 (*Records of the Three Garrison Posts*).[617]

Arguably, the pinnacle achievement of the *xinxue*-circulation of knowledge was the huge cartographical survey and technical summary of the anti-Wokou campaign compiled by Zheng Ruoceng, whom we met in chapter six. It details policy proposals, strategies, and background information concerning the Wokou, and it was sponsored by Hu Zongxian. These proposals did not only cover purely military matters, but also campaign finances.[618] It was not the work of one man. The *Chou hai tu bian* lists 79 names of contributors to the end result. A list of consulted literature is also provided. This includes all the official dynastic histories compiled until that time, institutional histories and encyclopaedias from the Tang empire onwards, gazetteers and cartographical surveys from the Song and especially the Ming of the areas affected by Wokou raids (including many written by members of the 79 contributors), and miscellaneous texts like military manuals.[619] There are, however, two features which betray the *Chou hai tu bian* in my view as a fruit of predominantly *xinxue* labour: the pride of place accorded Wang Yangming's campaigns, especially the one against the Prince of Ning, and the membership of the 79.

The lessons learned by Wang Yangming in the earlier sixteenth century during his management of several military campaigns would still retain their relevance in the eyes of the leadership of the anti-piracy effort decades later. Significantly, Wang Yangming himself is quoted

[616] Ma, "Weng Wanda shengping yu sixiang (1498-1552)," 45-55.
[617] Ray Huang, "WANG Tsung-mu," in *Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644*, *Part 2*, edited by L.C. Goodrich and Chao-ying Fang (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 1440-1441.
[618] Lim, *Lineage Society on the Southeastern Coast*, 77, 102.
[619] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾, *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 972-985.

around fifteen times on various issues, again showing the continued importance of his ideas for the officials and literati leading the anti-piracy campaign of the 1550s and 1560s, almost three decades after he had passed away. In addition, his colleague and contemporary Hu Shining 胡世寧 (1469-1530) provided an equal number of quotes to the contents of the *Chou hai tu bian*. Together with Wang, he had been the principal architect of the downfall of the Prince of Ning and the failure of his rebellion, one of the military campaigns against a would-be usurper belonging to the imperial family Wang had participated in.[620] Apparently, Hu and Wang discussed the latter's practice of lecturing about learning (*jiangxue* 講學), as shown by the following passage preserved in Wang's collected writings:

> Shouren [Wang Yangming] once said Hu Shining valued lecturing about learning [*jiangxue*] little, and Shining said: "I hate that you only value lecturing about studying [*jiangxue*] a lot."
> 守仁嘗謂胡世寧少講學，世寧曰 ： "某恨公多講學耳。"[621]

Not everyone Wang cooperated with thus held his emphasis on lecturing about his philosophy and its resulting praxis in high regard, yet Hu Shining had played an important part in Wang's successful campaign and presumably by virtue of this association was referenced in the *Chou hai tu bian*. He was mostly cited concerning his ideas about recruiting local stalwarts to keep them away from a bandit's existence.[622] This work of statecraft in any case served to highlight Wang's practical statesmanship accomplishments and not his philosophy, which was still controversial in the political centre around the time of the *Chou hai tu bian*'s publication, a point that I raised in chapter seven.

Among the contemporary importance of Wang's ideas was their usefulness combatting the continuing lax discipline of the armies of the Ming empire. Wang's contributions were to be taken as guidelines for the present day: "This means that rewards and punishments are important affairs of the military; they have to be implemented according to the precedents that were recorded/此言

---

620 Andrea S. Goldman, *Opera and the City: The Politics of Culture in Beijing, 1770-1900* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 311.
621 Wang Shouren 王守仁, *Wang Yangming quanji* 王陽明全集, *Volume 1* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992), 1543.
622 See for example: Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾. *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 672.

賞罰爲兵家之要務，當照律例所載而行."[623] A Fujian magistrate furthermore argued for the timelessness of Wang's ideas: "Like in recent years Mister Wang Yangming's memorial explaining rewards and punishments, though already past events, still one should not forget their previous merit and therefore they can always clearly advise on the punishments/若近歲王陽明公申明賞罰疏，雖已事之後，猶不忘前功，斯可以永昭勸懲者也."[624] Wang's advice on unravelling bands of pirates by positive incentives also made it to the pages of the *Chou hai tu bian*:

> The Minister of War Wang Shouren [Wang Yangming] said: "Distribute the announcement that it will not be inquired about whether they were forced to follow [the bandits]. Even those thieves that have once received title and rank, the ones who are able to escape and return [to our side] all avoid decapitation. The bandit followers who surrender are given rewards. [It] causes inside and outside residents as well as the local leaders, etc, in all directions to propagate [it], dissolving and breaking up the gangs.
> 兵部尚書王守仁云：「出給告示，凡脅從皆不問。雖嘗受賊官爵，能逃歸者皆免處斬。賊徒歸降者給賞。使内外居民及鄉導人等四路傳播，以解散其黨。」[625]

This was the first phase of Wang Yangming's campaign strategy, enticing the bandit group to break up, leaving only a core group of bandits against which military action could be undertaken. It served to contain violence, by ensuring local officials would not use excessive violence to gain big tallies of dead "bandits" to claim rewards of merit.[626]

In a further section, Wang laments the lacklustre implementation of the practice of offering amnesty to the bandits by officials. According to him, the main problem was constituted by the fact that officials were indifferent whether former bandits remained reformed after amnesty had been given and were deaf to the complaints of the local common people when they aired their grievances about it. This lead to a loss of confidence in the ability of the officialdom to provide good governance and also contributed to the swelling of the ranks of the bandits. The added danger was also that reformed bandits who were faking their return to virtue and who were acting as local militia became a fifth column filled with informers working for the bandits still in open revolt and

[623] Wang Shouren 王守仁, *Wang Yangming quanji* 王陽明全集, *Volume 1* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992), 1543.
[624] Idem, 755.
[625] Idem, 782.
[626] Israel, "On the Margins of the Grand Unity", 72.

who were prone to desert again to the other side in the case of setbacks.[627] The problem here was the reverse one of officials using excessive violence. These instances were a result of officials lacking sufficient military strength to enforce peace by military means, leading to an excessive offering of rewards. Wang thus recognized the need for additional control measures, one of which was a disciplined army.[628]

The *baojia* 保甲 system was cited in the *Chou hai tu bian* as well.[629] There was, however, awareness that the *baojia*-system had its limits, also among followers of Wang Yangming's learning himself. The following quote from the *Chou hai tu bian* attests to this, and also shows that Wang's military exploits remained a popular topic for those discussing military affairs well into the 1550s and 1560s:

> Training village militia
> Supreme Commander Hu Zongxian said: "Recently the ones idly talking about military affairs speak of Mister Yangming's *baojia* method, [but] hardly realize this method stops at providing security to newly incorporated people and provides defence against the petty thievery of bandits. From ancient times to now, I have not heard that this system defends the outside borders.
> 練鄉兵
> 總督尚書胡宗憲云：近日虛談兵事者，動以陽明先生保甲之法爲言，殊不知此法止爲安新附之民，禦鼠竊之盜耳。自古及今，未聞以此制禦外裔也。[630]

Considering the attainment of good generals in the field, a magistrate of Fujian province lamented the situation that caused a bifurcation between physical martial skillsets and theoretical military knowledge, caused by the inability of the military examination system to produce enough officers with strategic and tactical knowledge *and* practical experience. Therefore, it often depended on civil bureaucrats to handle these more theoretical dimensions of warfare. These civil bureaucrats would then have to select talented men outside of the regular officialdom to assist them, particularly men well-versed in the various skillsets. According to this magistrate, these skills included astrology, geography, but also military strategy and martial arts. "On the same day when Mr. Wang Yangming at home grasped military [matters], on each occasion he was able to recruit

[627] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾. *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 786.
[628] Israel, "On the Margins of the Grand Unity", 58-60.
[629] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾. *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 831.
[630] Idem, 705.

talent by implication of this idea 此王陽明先生於居家握兵之日，每能延攬以寓此意," concluded the magistrate.[631]

A *shengyuan* 生員 local licentiate (i.e. someone who has passed the lowest level of the civil service examinations) brought up Wang's campaign examples when discussing the benefits of recruiting a private advisory staff among the talented non-officials of provinces and sub-provincial administrative units. During the discussion, it was mentioned that these private staff members could include local village leaders and people who had passed different levels of the examination system. These would have to be selected on the basis of their character; abstruse, impractical and presumptuous personalities were to be of little use. The *shengyuan* added:

> From the moment Mr. Wang Yangming entered officialdom to the point when he wielded military power, he used his followers and students and advisors of the office. Later on, when he came across the disturbance of the traitorous [Prince of] Ning, [people] like Long Guang and Huang Shou all, whether as secret agents, hidden spies, or top-secret messengers, usually performed it as trusted subordinates and thereupon were able to succeed so far as to be conferred honours.
> 陽明王先生自入仕以至秉鉞，動隨生徒，顧問幄帷。後遇逆濠之變，若龍光、黃受諸人， 或 爲 間諜，或潛伺察，或通機密，皆以平日腹心爲之，遂能成功，至於封拜. [632]

On the basis of this quotation it is thus possible to posit that Hu Zongxian's private staff (*mufu*) took its direct inspiration from Wang Yangming's practice earlier in the century.

Logistics and financing was another of Wang's policies given a place within the *Chou hai tu bian*. Throughout the empire state granaries had been erected since the time of the founding emperor, in order to collect tax in kind. They were administered by local officials who oversaw the collection of the tax.[633] By Wang Yangming's time, these granaries apparently still existed and he expected them to furnish him with the resources necessary to wage his campaigns. *Chou hai tu bian* records Wang devising policies to utilize them and force cooperation by the local officials managing them.[634]

---

[631] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾. *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 682-683.
[632] Idem, 741.
[633] Charles O. Hucker, "Ming Government," in *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 8: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 2*, edited by Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 91.
[634] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾. *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 716-717.

In this example, Wang Yangming's concern with not disrupting local society as a consequence of military deployments can be clearly seen. He was adamant that the armies would be rationed and paid for by funds allotted by the state, and in order to prevent different layers of government blocking access to these funds (probably by siphoning off by local officials for their own gain) he advised monitoring the provisions and funding that came in by his subordinates. In no way were the commoners supposed to be burdened by the costs of compensating for corruption. In an adjoining section, Wang Yangming stipulates the amount of provisions the different units of soldiers were supposed to receive and he exhorted that since these provisions were not inexhaustible, the soldiers were not to indulge in extravagance and lazy behavior. This advice was once again taken as a model for the campaigns of the 1550s and 1560s.

Another aspect of the campaign which displayed the influence of Wang Yangming's advise as reflected in the *Chou hai tu bian* concerned the rewards and punishments for the soldiers. Wang Yangming noted that violations would occur if the law was not implemented and enforced. The necessity of implementation of the law was in his mind linked to the personality and career background of the military officers. He distinguished between two kinds of officers: the first kind was honest and their martial courage had been justifiably written down in the records. These people, Wang Yangming noted, did not come from influential families and had not risen through the ranks through social connections. Moreover, they could be entrusted with authority. The second group was different, and presumably embodied the opposite personality traits and career background. This group was liable for committing acts of molestation during marches, made use of powerful connections in order to claim meritorious service for themselves and falsely claim rewards based on no exertion at all. Wang's recipe for this second group was harsh and simple: defeat in battle, for example, meant losing your head. For Wang, the basis of defeating the enemy and encouraging the troops lay with the implementation of these kinds of laws.[635] The reason Wang Yangming emphasized punishing the officers hinged on his belief that displaying lenience towards them would lead to the rank-and-file's disobedience.

A second exhortation he made concerning rewards and punishments was the need for different layers of the military hierarchy to implement them and enforce them on their subordinates. Wang noted that many officers did not dare punish their men for cowardice, laxness and disobedience during combat. His solution was to punish the officers who were unwilling to enforce

[635] Idem, 744.

the regulations in front of the army. This would have to be done by the layer of the hierarchy directly above the one being punished. A similar use of public spectacle as a tool of deterrence was advised in the case of the disposal of enemy combatants captured in battle. They were to be executed in sight of the local population in order to coerce their brethren to lay down arms. A final point made by Wang Yangming was his stress on the immediate imposition of punishments and rewards. A reward that was not awarded immediately after the meritorious action it was allocated for would not be experienced as a reward by the soldiers. Similarly, if one waited too long after a transgression with its punishment, it would not be considered a punishment anymore by the one who was receiving it. The immediacy of implementation of rewards and punishments was valued as beneficial advice for the conduct of the anti-*wokou* campaign by the *Chou hai tu bian*.[636]

The segment of Wang Yangming's views on reward and punishment closed with a detailed list of the rewards and punishments given to the soldiers in different situations and contexts on the battlefield. By way of conclusion Wang added that his general idea was that the soldiers would have to come to fear him more than the enemy, and this could presumably only be achieved by draconian punishments (many offenses had lethal legal consequences) combined with the lure of attractive rewards.[637]

Compiled under sponsorship of Hu Zongxian and published by Hu Song, I would argue that the *Chou hai tu bian*, based on the numerous references to Wang Yangming and Hu Shining highlighted in this chapter, referenced the campaigns of Wang as a kind of blueprint for the campaign of the mid-sixteenth century, probably for reasons of ideological affinity. No other military campaign waged during the Ming period prior to the mid-sixteenth century received any attention in the *Chou hai tu bian*. Many names associated with the *xinxue* network, whom we have already met in chapters six and seven, show up in its pages, recorded giving advice and opinions about different aspects of the south-eastern frontier pacification campaign. These were mostly southern literati devising solutions to a southern military problem in the sixteenth century. From Shaoxing 紹興 prefecture in Zhejiang province hailed, in addition to Qian Dehong, Wang Ji and Xu Wei, a province which also was the home to Mao Kun and Wan Biao. Jiangxi-literati, as already noted, also constituted an important group, which included Luo Hongxian, Zou Shouyi, Tan Lun, and Luo Rufang. The Southern Metropolitan Province Nan Zhili yielded Tang Shunzhi, Zhao Dahe,

[636] Idem, 745.
[637] Idem, 746.

Hu Zongxian, Wang Daokun, Zheng Ruoceng, Ruan E, and Hu Song. Fujian supplied Yu Dayou, which makes Shandong's Qi Jiguang seem relative isolated cases by contrast.[638]

The intensity of statecraft activity in *xinxue* circles should not surprise us, since for Wang Yangming one should proceed from self-cultivation to social activism.[639] Statecraft should therefore be seen as a natural element of the concerns of those who took Wang Yangming and Zhan Ruoshui, and Chen Xianzhang's teachings seriously. The intimate relation between the philosophy of Wang Yangming and statecraft related activities is further evidenced by the publishing activities the pair of Hu Zongxian and Hu Song further embarked on. Around the same time they brought out the *Chou hai tu bian*, they were also involved with the publication of a new edition of Wang Yangming's writings (1557) and his chronological biography (1563).[640] Although this is hard to prove, it is hard not to suspect that the prominent group of *xinxue* adherents involved in the anti-Wokou campaign tried to gain favor for their ideology by showcasing the practical statecraft results of its activist consequences in such a prestigious book project as was the *Chou hai tu bian*. This same tactic would be used later in the 1560s and 1570s when Wang's followers tried to get official state recognition for their master as a true Confucian by getting him officially inducted in the Confucian temple. In Hung Lam-chu's words: "Wang's supporters […] concentrated on what was irrefutable: his accomplishments in state commissions, a manifestation of credible teaching through verifiable deeds."[641] That the prestige attached to the book like the *Chou hai tu bian* could be very substantial was proven by the attempt of Hu Zongxian's descendants to retroactively claim his authorship for the work and purge any reference to Zheng Ruoceng's role in its compilation.[642]

In addition to its contents, the *Chou hai tu bian* also provides a list of names of 79 scholars, civil bureaucrats and military officers which contributed towards its creation. Prominently placed at the beginning are first generation Wang Yangming disciples as Luo Hongxian (whose

[638] This survey was aided immeasurably by Harvard University's *China Biographical Database Project* (CBDB), http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cbdb/home. Consulted on 16-02-2017.
[639] Hauf, "The Jiangyou Group," 46.
[640] Cai Shumin 蔡淑閔, "Yangming xuepai zhi jianli yu fazhan" 陽明學派之建立與發展, in *Zhongguo wenxue zhi xueli yu yingyong – Ming Qing yuyan yu wenxue guoji xueshu yantaohui*, edited by Department of Applied Chinese, Ming Chuan University (Taipei: Department of Applied Chinese, Ming Chuan University, 2011), 267-270.
[641] Hung-lam Chu, "The Debate over Recognition of Wang Yang-ming," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*. 48.1 (1988): 69.
[642] Huang, "CHENG Jo-tseng," 207.

cartographic work formed the basis of all maps in the *Chou hai tu bian*),[643] Wang Ji, and Zou Shouyi. They are listed along with Hu Zongxian, Hu Song, Tang Shunzhi, and members of Hu Zongxian's private staff Mao Kun and Xu Wei. The more radical left-wing follower of Wang Yangming, Luo Rufang, is also mentioned.[644] Earlier we have also seen that Qian Dehong and Wan Biao contributed their knowledge to the anti-Wokou campaign, although they apparently were not involved directly in the creation of the *Chou hai tu bian*. It is clear, therefore, that some of the most important Wang Yangming disciples - representing the Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Taizhou traditions outlined in chapter six - and later followers were drawn into the orbit of Hu Zongxian's military campaign along the southeastern maritime frontier and engaged in statecraft activities. Filipiak was thus correct in positing a network, but I contend that this network was merely the tip of the iceberg and reached back to the most prominent early followers of the three *xinxue*-philosophers. Fully 21 of the 79 contributors I could positively identify as either Zhan Ruoshui's or Wang Yangming's followers (or heavily influenced by their ideas), including many prominent members. The remainder might also be related to these groups, but I could not find any evidence for or against. Only one contributor, Yang Bo (see chapter six), can be definitely identified as not belonging to a *xinxue*-current. I have provided a full list of the 21 in the appendix.

I posit that Qi Jiguang's military manuals should be seen as part and product of this productive south-eastern *xinxue*-statecraft tradition of the first half of the sixteenth century. The existence of the *Chou hai tu bian* and the knowledge of which militarily engaged literati-*cum*-officials were closely associated with Qi Jiguang during the 1550s and 1560s in the south allows to me to tentatively reconstruct the formation of *xinxue* military statecraft and its impact on Ming military knowledge production in general. To achieve this, I will analyse the sources of written military knowledge that this group consulted and what prominence their own military writings would achieve in terms of circulation and influence on later thought. I will start with the access to past military knowledge first.

Access to the Past in the Present ca. 1550: Military Knowledge and Its Circulation

[643] Idem, 206.
[644] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾, *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 983-985.

The question of which past sources of (military) knowledge were available to literati-*cum*-officials at any time during, for example, the Ming dynasty has never been attempted. This is unfortunate, for such a survey could answer many pertinent questions. Amongst them, the oft-posited but rarely researched cultural continuity of Chinese civilization, the relative importance of different written works in different periods and places, and the degrees of access to (military knowledge) in different socio-political networks. Especially the latter problematic concerns me here in particular, because it the answer would tentatively show what kind of prior written military knowledge was available to Qi Jiguang. This would also enable us to see his own original contributions in a much clearer light.

An indication of the sometimes-problematic knowledge circulation during the late Ming is given by the example of the compilation of its largest statecraft collection, the seventeenth-century *Huang Ming jingshi wen bian* mentioned in chapter five. According to its chief compilator Chen Zilong, the Ming empire lacked government policies which collected the writings of important officials after their deaths, nor did it dispatch agents to buy and collect relevant books. Chen also bemoaned a relative dearth of wealthy families who compiled the writings of important family members. What was crucial for Chen Zilong's success in his compilation endeavours? William Atwell argues that it was his connections within a network of like-minded literati, the seventeenth-century Donglin 東林 association and friends in general.[645] According to John Dardess, the Donglin association was a group of Confucian literati who strove for empire wide ethical revitalization in the early seventeenth century, and it also constituted a political faction in Beijing. The latter tried to put followers in key government positions in order to improve the moral fibre of imperial governance.[646] For Qi Jiguang in the mid-sixteenth century the same conditions, characterized by his membership of an idealistic empire wide group of Neo-Confucian literati, must have applied. In the case of military writings, access must have been even more precarious in light of the government policies limiting their circulation. As such it is legitimate to look at a wider group of like-minded literati and officials around Qi Jiguang and make an inventory of their access to military writings. What, then, can we know about Qi Jiguang's access to these texts?

[645] Atwell, "Ch'en Tzu-lung," 85-86.
[646] John W. Dardess, *Blood and History in China: The Donglin Faction and Its Repression, 1620-1627* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 1.

This is a question I will answer by looking at the writings of a number of literati and officials who had strong military interests and wrote military treatises themselves.

My argument in this section will proceed from the assumption that the group of scholars, scholar-officials and military men involved with the piracy suppression campaign and associated with Hu Zongxian formed a relatively homogeneous ideological group extending across social and official hierarchical layers. From this proceeds my assumption that it is possible to treat the *Chou hai tu bian* as a relatively comprehensive snapshot of the written knowledge available to and circulating within this group. Third, by combining the insights of military knowledge circulation gleaned from this work with the range of works known to be available to some of the group members heavily involved in military affairs, an even more detailed picture can emerge of the state of military knowledge circulation in the mid-sixteenth century. My approach to this is a minimalist one: only when a (military) text is mentioned or quoted in the literary collections of the sample group investigated in the context of military discussions, do I assume that this text was possibly part of the knowledge circulation process. Finally, the sources mentioned in the *Chou hai tu bian* will be included in the survey as well. I will first briefly elaborate on the sample group of authors I have selected for the survey and my reasons for doing so. Second, I will give an overview of the kinds of sources of military thought I have found, and categorize them by genre and antiquity.

The authors whose writings I have sampled to come to an understanding of which sources they used to in their production of new military knowledge are as follows: Qi Jiguang, Yu Dayou, Tang Shunzhi, Tan Lun, Wang Daokun, Qian Dehong, Hu Zongxian, Xu Wei, and Mao Kun.[647] In addition, I have investigated Zheng Ruoceng's *Chou hai tu bian* as representative of the military knowledge circulation of the entire anti-Wokou effort under Hu Zongxian. All the authors were both involved in the military campaigns of 1550s and 1560s and were known to have made a considerable contribution to the production of new military knowledge. Although Qian Dehong and Wang Daokun did not contribute to the *Chou hai tu bian*, they can be assumed to have had an impact on Qi Jiguang's developing military thought and for this reason they have been included in this survey. I have checked the extant literary collections and military writings of these men and compiled the titles of works and traced back the quotations of other works they used in the context of discussions about military affairs.

[647] See Appendix B for a fuller consideration of my applied methodology.

The first group of sources, perhaps not surprisingly, consists of the *Seven Military Classics*,[648] which include the *Sunzi bingfa*[649], *Wuzi*[650], *Weiliaozi*[651], *Sima fa*[652], and the *Liu tao*, probably dating from the Warring States. In addition, it includes *Huangshi gong san lüe* 黃石公三略 (*Three Strategies of Huang Shigong*)[653] and *Tang Taizong Li Wei gong wendui* 唐太宗李衛公問對 (*Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Duke Li Wei*), the former probably dating to the Western Han and the latter to the tenth or eleventh century.[654] These treatises contain advice on a wide range of topics, including strategies, tactics, organizational principles, recruitment, equipment, discipline and disciplinary measures. Most members of the group refer to all seven, or at least one of the classics.

The second group consists of a number of sources that have often been utilized as military treatises, dating from a period up to and including the Yuan dynasty, but were not part of the military canon. The *Huangshi gong su shu* 黃石公素書 (*Pure Book of Huang Shigong*)[655], a military treatise that was probably written by Zhang Shangying 張商英 (1043-1121) during the Northern Song.[656] The *Guigu zi* 鬼谷子 (*Master of the Ghost Valley*), a purportedly Warring States-era treatise on the art of persuasion – but probably dating from the late fourth century -, which is sometimes regarded as a military work.[657] The *Wo qi jing* 握奇經 (*Classic of Grasping the Unconventional*)[658], a treatise mainly dealing with army formations and their movements during battle. It contains parts purportedly dating back to the Zhou and the Han, but it only first

[648] Bian, *Hu Zongxian chuan*, 13-14; Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Zhizhitang ji* 止止堂集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 272.
[649] Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1211; Wang Daokun 汪道昆, *Taihan ji* 太函集, *volume 2* (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 2004), 1235; Yu Dayou 俞大猷. *Zhengqitang quanji* 正氣堂全集 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 576; Xu Wei 徐渭, *Xu Wei ji* 徐渭集, *volume 3* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1999), 897.
[650] Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1231; Xu Wei 徐渭, *Xu Wei ji* 徐渭集, *volume 2* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1999), 508.
[651] Yu Dayou 俞大猷. *Zhengqitang quanji* 正氣堂全集 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 75.
[652] Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1301.
[653] Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1211.
[654] Sawyer and Sawyer, *The Seven Military Classics*, 283-284, 313.
[655] Yu Dayou 俞大猷. *Zhengqitang quanji* 正氣堂全集 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 239.
[656] Xu Baolin 许保林, *Zhongguo bingshu tonglan* 中国兵书通览 (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990), 142-143.
[657] Michael Robert Broschat, "`Guiguzi': A Textual Study and Translation" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1985), 5, 26; Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Lianbing shi ji* 練兵實紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 202; Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1223.
[658] Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1261; Yu Dayou 俞大猷. *Zhengqitang quanji* 正氣堂全集 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 623.

showed up in Song-era catalogues.[659] A work dating to the Southern Song, entitled *Chaoye qian yan* 朝野僉言 (*All Kinds of Talk from Court and Commonality*)[660], which was a part of a bigger treatise on city defence, the *Shoucheng lu* 守城錄 (*Record of City Defense*).[661] The treatise named the *Bei zheng lu* 北征录 (*Record of the Northern Campaign*), an early thirteenth-century work on military frontier affairs, which was rediscovered in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century after having been lost for a while. This work is divided in two smaller treatises, which are now published together as *Cuiwei nan zheng lu, bei zheng lu he ji* 翠微南征录北征录合集 (Combined Collection of Cui Wei's Record of the Southern Campaign and Record of the Northern Campaign)[662].[663] The *Bai jiang zhuan* 百將傳, or *Biographies of One Hundred Generals.*[664] This latter work consists of the biographies of generals serving from the eleventh century BCE to the ninth CE and was composed during the Northern Song dynasty by a scholar named Zhang Yu 張預 (dates unknown).[665] As can be surmised, some of these were tied to a specific historical and military context, like the *Cuiwei nan zheng lu, bei zheng lu he ji*. The dispersion of these texts among the group is much more limited, with Tang Shunzhi taking the lead in the utilization of these texts.

The third group is formed by the three most important military treatises to appear in the Tang and early Song dynasties, the *Tai bai yin jing* (*Secret Classic of Venus*)[666], the *Hu qian jing* (*Classic of the Tiger Seal*)[667], and the *Wujing zongyao* (*Essentials for the Military Classics*)[668]. Like the first group of the *Seven Military Classics*, this group of texts was relatively well-dispersed

---

659 Xu, *Zhongguo bingshu tonglan*, 207-209.
660 Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1378.
661 Idem, 253-255.
662 Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1211.
663 Hua Yue 華岳, *Cuiwei nan zheng lu, bei zheng lu he ji* 翠微南征录北征录合集 (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 2014), 1-5.
664 Bian, *Hu Zongxian chuan*, 13-14; Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 344.
665 Xu, *Zhongguo bingshu tonglan*, 332.
666 Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1277; Yu Dayou 俞大猷. *Zhengqitang quanji* 正氣堂全集 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 718.
667 Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1301.
668 Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 73; Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1261; Yu Dayou 俞大猷, *Zhengqitang quanji* 正氣堂全集 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 570; Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾, *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 975.

among the group. In many ways, these were encyclopaedic elaborations of the classics, which included large sections on military rituals. In the words of Marcia Butler: "In contrast to the conceptual, rather abstract prescriptions of the older treatises, these manuals contain detail on all aspects of warfare as the middle imperial Chinese understood it. The manuals document in detail, and, in some cases, for the first time in Chinese history, the content of certain rituals and the procedure for their performance." [669]

The fourth group consists of state-sanctioned and privately compiled histories, encyclopaedias, compendia, and law codes. These contain information on a variety of subjects, and cannot be considered purely military works. They date from the Tang, Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties. Two administrative histories compiled during the Tang and the Yuan dynasties respectively, were the *Du zhi tongdian* 杜氏通典 (*Mister Du's Comprehensive Statutes)*[670] and *Wenxian tongkao* 文献通考 (*Comprehensive Investigation of Literary Sources*)[671]. These works gave an overview of the administrative history of the Chinese empires up until their compilation date and also included information on military organization and regulations. From the Tang dynasty the *Du zhi tongdian* also included the now-lost *Li Jing bingfa* 李靖兵法 (*Li Jing's Art of War*)[672], ascribed to a famous early Tang general who lived from 571 to 649, and the also lost *Jiao she jing* 教射經 (*Classic of Teaching Archery*)[673] by Wang Ju 王璩 (a contemporary of empress Wu Zetian 武則天, 625-705).[674] The *Du zhi tongdian* and *Du zhi tongdian* were wider in scope than the official standard histories (*shi* 史) of the succeeding dynasties, which were also examined according to the *Chou hai tu bian*.[675] A further source containing important military information was the *Daxue yanyi bu*[676], the great statecraft work of the fifteenth century written by Qiu Jun. The Southern Song administrative compilation *Shantang xiansheng qunshu kao suo* 山堂先生群

[669] Butler, "Reflections of a Military Medium,"
[670] Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1301; Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾, *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 975.
[671] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾, *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 975.
[672] Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1215.
[673] Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1332.
[674] Graff, *Medieval Chinese Warfare*, 192-195; Sawyer and Sawyer, *The Seven Military Classics*, 313-320; Stephen Selby, *Chinese Archery* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), 196-197.
[675] Wilkinson, *Chinese History*, 524-526.
[676] Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾, *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 875.

書考索 (*Mister Shantang's Deep Investigation of All Kinds of Books*)[677], which is only partly extant at present.[678] The *Da Ming Huidian* 大明會典 (*Collection of Laws and Institutions of the Great Ming*)[679], a descriptive work of Ming laws and institutions (including the military), which was compiled at the beginning of the sixteenth century.[680] The *Da Ming Lü* 大明律 (*Laws of the Great Ming*), which was the dynasty's law code compiled at the end of the fourteenth century, which included rules and regulations for military personnel as well.[681]

The fifth group concerns a contemporary body of writings which together constitute evidence of "horizontal" knowledge circulations between contemporaries, covering both northern and south-eastern military topics. Not all the authors could be identified by me as members of my posited *xinxue*-network, but they did contribute to the military statecraft circulation by means of their writings. This category also contains a number of titles which do not correspond to existing works anymore, but they will be displayed in the table. The *Jiubian tu* 九邊圖 (*Charts of the Nine Borders*)[682], which might be the same as the *Jiubian tu lun* 九邊圖論 (*Discussion and Charts Pertaining to the Nine Borders*)[683] (1538) by Xu Lun 許論 (1487-1559), who also collaborated in the compilation of the *Chou hai tu bian.*[684] Another important work in this group is Wei Huan's 魏煥 (dates unknown) work on the northern frontier, *Huang Ming jiubian kao* 皇明九邊考 (*Investigation of the Imperial Ming's Nine Borders*) (1541).[685] The third was the the *Jiubian tushuo* 九邊圖說 (*Illustrated Handbook of the Nine Borders*) [686], which had been compiled by the

[677] Mao Kun compares Tang Shunzhi's literary achievements in a positive way with this important statecraft encyclopaedia, indicating Mao familiarity with it. See: Mao Kun 茅坤, *Mao Kun ji* 茅坤集, *volume 2* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 2012), 486.
[678] Wen Zhiba 温志拔, "`Qunshu kao suo' de `kao suo zhi gong' jiqi xueshu shi yiyi" 《群书考索》的 "考索之功" 及其学术史意义, *Huzhou shifanxue yuanxuebao* 湖州师范学院学报 38.3 (2016): 52.
[679] Wang Daokun 汪道昆, *Taihan ji* 太函集, *volume 2* (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 2004), 834; Zheng Ruoceng 鄭若曾, *Chou hai tu bian* 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 974.
[680] Timothy Brook, "Communications and Commerce," in *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 8: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 2*, edited by Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 652; Wilkinson, *Chinese History*, 884.
[681] Idem, 546.
[682] Yu Dayou 俞大猷. *Zhengqitang quanji* 正氣堂全集 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007), 555.
[683] Wang Daokun 汪道昆, *Taihan ji* 太函集, *volume 2* (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 2004), 732.
[684] Kai Filipiak, "Zum Aufschwung der nördlichen Grenzhistoriographie in der Ming-Zeit," in *China und die Wahrnehmung der Welt*, edited by Antje Richter and Helmolt Vittinghoff (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007), 115.
[685] Filipiak, "Zum Aufschwung der Nördlichen Grenzhistoriographie," 114-115.
[686] Wang Daokun 汪道昆, *Taihan ji* 太函集, *volume 3* (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 2004), 1865.

Ministry of War itself around 1569.[687] The inclusion of the cartographic and ethnographic works on the northern frontier should not surprise us, since many members of the group had served or would serve in the theatre during their careers.

The sixth group was also contemporary body of work created by Yu Dayou prior to his involvement in the anti-Wokou campaigns. Yu Dayou's *Jian jing* 劍經 (*Sword Classic*), a short manual on staff fighting techniques. It was named after the sword, and not the staff, because the technique described therein was apparently known as the *Jingchu changjian* 荊楚長劍, or "Jingchu long sword"-technique. Historian Meir Shahar speculates that this manual circulated independently before 1562, when it found its way into the *Ji xiao xin shu*.[688] Furthermore, his publications with Zhao Benxue 趙本學 (1478-1544), a civilian scholar of military affairs, reveal his activities writing commentaries on-, and supplements to the *Art of War* and the *Wujing zongyao*.[689] The, latter, the so-called *Xu wujing zongyao* 續武經總要 (*Supplement to the Comprehensive Essentials of the Military Classics*) was a treatise on military formations and movements which had been authored by Yu Dayou and Zhao Benxue and marketed as an addition to the famous Song military manual.[690]

Four decidedly non-military works turn up in Qi Jiguang's *Ji xiao xin shu*, in the context of archery and other training activities. These were the writings of Confucius, Mencius, the Warring States period Confucian Xun Kuang's 荀況 (310-235 BCE) *Xunzi* 荀子 and the *Lienü zhuan* 烈女傳 (*Commentary on Virtuous Women*),[691] by the Western Han dynasty scholar Liu Xiang 劉向 (79-8 BCE). This was a collection of moralistic biographies of virtuous women.[692] These sources provide both examples for practical instruction and moral exhortation. Tang Shunzhi paraphrases the *Classic of Changes*.[693]

---

[687] Zhao Xianhai 赵现海, "Mingdai Jia-Long nianjian Changcheng tuji xuan hui kao" 明代嘉隆年间长城图籍撰绘考, *Neimenggu shifan daxue xue bao* 内蒙古师范大学学报 39.4 (2010): 34

[688] Meir Shahar, "Ming-Period Evidence of Shaolin Martial Practice." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 61.2 (2001): 374-375.

[689] Xu, *Zhongguo bingshu zhijian lu*, 136-139.

[690] Xu, *Zhongguo bingshu tonglan*, 209-212, 399-402.

[691] Qi Jiguang 戚繼光, *Ji xiao xin shu: shisi juan ben* 紀效新書: 十四卷本 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 67, 216.

[692] Bret Hinsch, "The Textual History of Liu Xiang's Lienüzhuan," *Monumenta Serica* 52.1 (2004): 95.

[693] Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, *Wu bian* 武編 (CSCS), 1300.

Last, but not least, was Wang Yangming's commentary on the *Seven Military Classics*, called the *Xinjuan biaoti wujing qishu* 新镌标题武经七书, or *Newly Published and Captioned Seven Military Classics*[694].

What can be concluded from this survey of the sources of military knowledge available to a number of figures involved in the *xinxue*-network? First of all, despite the hundreds of military treatises known to have been composed before and during the sixteenth century, only a comparatively small number seems to have circulated through this group. The *Seven Military Classics* were an important foundation of military thought, and the three Tang-Song manuals were also an important reference. A scholar like Tang Shunzhi referred to a broader range of treatises, but even the sources available to him did not exceed far beyond the number of ten. Second, specialist military treatises were but one category of sources consulted. The field of military knowledge spanned different genres, including official surveys of statutes and institutions, large compendia and statecraft writings. Third, there was horizontal sharing of knowledge, but only knowledge produced by members within the network. The large production of new military texts during the Jiajing to early-mid Wanli eras is otherwise not reflected by the sources these men consulted. Fourth, the only exception to the third conclusion is the new departure in northern frontier historiography, to which a number of persons investigated above seem to have had access to. This last phenomenon can be explained by reference to the fact that many of the military and civil officials involved in the anti-Wokou campaign were later transferred to the northern frontier to continue their careers there, including Qi Jiguang himself. Finally, many of the contemporary texts circulating in this group were the result of private scholarship initiatives, and not state sponsorship. This was noticeable, for example, in the northern frontier historiography in which all but one treatise was the result of private initiative. This one exception was the *Jiubian tushuo*.[695]

To return to the concerns raised at the beginning of this chapter, it seems clear that it is severely limiting to consider military thought as a separate category divorced from other literati concerns. Instead, a strong connection existed between military concerns and the statecraft writings of the *xinxue*-network, and Qi Jiguang's writings can best be seen as a product of this same connection. They were not written in isolation. I cannot but conclude on this survey that Qi had access to only a relatively narrow base of older written military knowledge on which he could

[694] Bian, *Hu Zongxian chuan*, 13-14.
[695] Zhao, "Mingdai Jia-Long nianjian Changcheng tuji xuan hui kao," 26.

base his own ideas. Departures from this older knowledge therefore shall be assumed to have been his original contribution, or of those in his social *Umfeld* (social surroundings). Furthermore, the survey of literati writings reveals that a multiplicity of genres could serve as a source for military thought, further diminishing the *bingjia*-category as a helpful analytical tool.

Despite an explosion of the number of published military works during the late Ming, we should thus be careful to overstate their reach, impact, and importance. This holds even more true considering the fact that many of the written collections analysed can be assumed to have belonged to the highest socio-political level of the literate elite. If their access to the written Chinese cultural tradition was still relatively limited, how much more would this have held for the levels below them? However, I will argue below that the military writings the *xinxue*-group produced were at the forefront of the sixteenth-century spike in military knowledge production and dissemination, a process we will now turn to.

The Importance of *Xinxue* Military Writings in Sixteenth-Century Military Knowledge Production

A further indication of the importance of the role of *xinxue*-literati participation in military affairs was the contribution they made to the spectacular growth of written military knowledge during the sixteenth century. In order to gauge their importance, I will use a bibliographical compilation of all extant Chinese military treatises in the world. Chinese scholar Xu Baolin has compiled a bibliography of the military titles across Chinese history surviving until this very day in different locations, and those titles which are known to have existed at some point in time. He notes that 777 treatises have survived from the Ming dynasty, but a personal recounting of his list reveals 781 titles.[696] Xu Baolin has included the names of the authors, the titles of the works, and – where available – the year of publication. A survey has led me to divide them in different classifications as shown in table 2.

Table 1: Categorizing Ming military texts

Category	*Number*
Commentaries/new editions of the *Seven Military Classics*	156

[696] Xu, *Zhongguo bingshu zhijian lu*, 132-254.

Commentaries/new editions of *Mr. Zuo's Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals*	8
Commentaries/new editions of other works dating to the Zhou dynasty	3
Commentaries/new editions of works dating after the Han up to-, and including the Song dynasty	40
Commentaries on the *Histories*	8
Commentaries/new editions of Zhuge Liang 诸葛亮 (181-234) and works ascribed to him	5
Commentaries (and new editions of them) on various generals	17
Commentaries/new editions of various pre-Ming texts combined	7
Commentaries/new editions of various texts combined, including the Ming	27
Subtotal 1	*271*
New works pre-Jiajing (1368-1521)	14
-Variants	23
New works Jiajing, Longqing, and early-to-mid Wanli (1521-1610)	96
-Variants	159
New works late Wanli to the end of the dynasty (1610-1644)	79
-Variants	86
Unknown (including variants, reprints, and commentaries)	53
Subtotal 2	*510*
Total	***781***

On the basis of the titles some tentative conclusions can be drawn. Similar as pertaining to the surviving military writings dating from the Song dynasty, a great number of titles are commentaries on-, or variant titles of the *Seven Military Classics*.[697] An impressive 34.7 % of the surviving texts are new editions of-, and commentaries on military treatises produced prior to the Ming. Of these 57.56 % are solely related to the *Seven Military Classics.* 242 of the surviving Ming texts can be considered new works, with the remaining 268 appearing to be variants of them.

[697] For statistics related to the Song dynasty, see: Hilde De Weerdt, *Information, Territory, and Networks: The Crisis and Maintenance of Empire in Song China* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), 168-169.

A caveat is that original military thought might be found in commentaries on the classics, and that "new titles" might actually contain nothing but quotes and paraphrases from older military works. Research of the scope necessary to address this problem is nevertheless logistically impossible within the constraints of modern academia.

Based on my survey, it is also possible to discern distinct peaks in the production of "new titles". The periodization of text production during the Ming can be parcelled up in three rough slices. From the beginning of the dynasty until the start of the Jiajing period (roughly 150 years) there seems to be relatively little innovation. Then, with the troubles with the Mongols and the upheavals in the south and southeast of the empire causing a troublesome sixteenth century, text production increases leading to a veritable "military treatise explosion" lasting until the beginning of the seventeenth century. Then a second, slightly smaller, explosion occurs in the final decades of the dynasty, presumably related to the growing Manchu threat and concurrent peasant rebellions. This broad panoply of texts has not been systematically studied, so even tentative conclusions are perilous at best. I will endeavour a tentative conclusion regarding the circulation of *xinxue*-military thought. The question of circulation is also hard to assess accurately, but it is telling that Qi Jiguang's works have the highest number of surviving variants of any original text in the corresponding "New works Jiajing, Longqing, and early-to-mid Wanli (1521-1610)"-category. A caveat I have to mention in this context is that some of these variants were reprints dating to the later Qing and Republican periods, thus any conclusions drawn about circulation transcend the Ming period alone. Furthermore, intentional acts of book destruction, as committed by the ruling Manchus during the Qing dynasty for example, could have unduly distorted the record. More than 50 works of Qi Jiguang - carrying titles and variant titles of his known manuals - in the "variants"-section seem to be versions of his two manuals, the *Ji xiao xin shu* and the *Lianbing shi ji*, accounting for a full third of all surviving variants of all "new titles" dating from the sixteenth century. Other works produced by the network had less impressive circulation, judging by the surviving numbers, but still impressive considering that most of the new treatises produced in the same period have only survived in single or double copies. Tang Shunzhi's *Wu bian*, for example, has nine surviving variants. The nearest competitors in the category "New works Jiajing, Longqing, and early-to-mid Wanli (1521-1610)" are Zhao Shizhen's 趙士楨 (1553-1611) *Shenqi pu* 神器譜 (*Manual of Divine Weapons*) with three variants, He Liangchen's *Zhen ji* 陣紀 (*Record of Battle Arrays*) with four variants, *Dengtan bijiu* 登壇必究 (*Necessary Research for Mounting the*

Platform) by Wang Minghe 王鳴鶴 (dates unknown) with five variants, and the *Caolu jinglüe* 草廬經略 (*Classical strategies from the Thatched Hut*) by an unknown author with six variants surviving. The authors of all four are quite obscure and it is impossible to discover social links between them and the network Qi Jiguang belonged to.[698] Nevertheless, the first and the latter two treatises show strong influences of Qi Jiguang's ideas,[699] and all four postdate Qi's manuals with the possible exception of the *Zhen ji*.[700] The *Zhen ji* quotes Qi Jiguang and Yu Dayou.[701] Another important new work, which featured the input of many members of the *xinxue* knowledge circulation network, was of course the *Chou hai tu bian*. Above I elaborated on its importance as the main statecraft achievement of this network and its *xinxue* and Wang Yangming connections in particular. Four variants of this work are recorded by Xu Baolin in his overview.[702]

Qi Jiguang's works were thus part of a proliferation of military texts during the Jiajing-period's Wokou-crisis, many of the most prominent of which were produced by men who were in some way related to his network. Judging by the numbers that survived, Qi Jiguang's works were by far the most influential of any of his sixteenth- and seventeenth-century colleague-authors. The *xinxue*-network as a whole made an impressive contribution to new military knowledge production during the sixteenth-century peak. Furthermore, this contribution was isolated and uninfluenced by all the other "new titles" appearing in the same period, but based on a relatively narrow range of older texts and (as can be assumed) practical experience. Qi Jiguang, Yu Dayou, Hu Zongxian, Tang Shunzhi, and Zheng Ruoceng all wrote their ideas amidst a large ongoing military campaign. Unlike many of their contemporaries, this clears them of charges of armchair generalship. Moreover, their works survived in the highest numbers, and the manuals that did not demonstrably belong to this network, but survived in high numbers as well, all showcase strong influences from,

---

[698] He Liangchen 何良臣 (fl. 1565), the sixteenth-century author of the *Zhen ji*, which is a close analogue to Qi Jiguang's manuals in style and content. About the author little is known, unfortunately. He appears to have been a talented poet in his locale, before he threw away his writing brush and embarked on a military career, which included fighting against Wokou in the southeast.[698] He does not seem to have been part of Qi Jiguang's social *Umfeld*, however, as references to him and his work cannot be found in the writings of the larger network Qi was a part of. The *Zhen ji* itself appeared around 1565 and contains references to a number of other military treatises. The author hailed from Shaoxing prefecture in Zhejiang province, similar to Wang Yangming and his first followers. See: He Liangchen 何良臣, *Zhen ji* 陣紀 (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1984), 1-4.

[699] Filipiak, *Krieg, Staat, und Militär*, 265; Xu, *Zhongguo bingshu tonglan*, 160; Zurndorfer, "Wanli China versus Hideyoshi's Japan," 208.

[700] Shahar, "Ming-Period Evidence," 410.

[701] He Liangchen 何良臣, *Zhen ji* 陣紀 (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1984), 24, 100-101， 107。

[702] Xu, *Zhongguo bingshu zhijian lu*, 132-254.

fore mostly, Qi Jiguang's thought. Did it, however, matter to the contents of these works that their author was part of a larger network of civil bureaucrats, military officers, and literati that were to a greater or lesser extent affiliated with a movement unleashed by Wang Yangming? In the next chapter I will explore the influence of specifically *xinxue*-ideas and praxis on the military thought birthed by Qi Jiguang. I will argue that Qi's main contribution was elaborating on the organization and disciplinary framework of Wang Yangming's military ideas, and translating Wang's philosophy to the context of a military manual. In the guise of Qi Jiguang's manuals, Neo-Confucianism would enter the genre of the military manual.