The people in between : education, desire, and South Koreans in contemporary China

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Chapter 3 The Internationalised Education of China and the Globalised Education of South Korea

This chapter elaborates on the socio-political circumstances and discourses regarding education that Korean migrants face in China. I generalise the situation in China as "internationalised education", encompassing: the increase in international schools; internationalised Chinese schools simultaneously incorporating and separating foreign students; and, the national desire for the internationalisation of Chinese higher education with the embedded discourse of talents as "profit". Subsequently, I shift the attention to the overseas Korean schools, representing the Korean state reaching out to overseas nationals with a discourse of globalisation. Moreover, I briefly depict the tendency of Korea's "education exodus" to the world, which I argue Korean expatriate parents and their children in China are supposed to be an integral part of. In conclusion, a discussion on the connotations of internationalisation and globalisation in the Chinese and Korean contexts will be presented. The data in this chapter was collected from a wide range of academic publications, government documents, online information, interviews and participant observation (e.g. school visits).

International Schools in China: Beijing as a Hub

The international school system was initiated in the mid-1920, primarily catering to western expatriate families who hoped to have their offspring educated in an academic or lingual education system compatible to the system existing in their countries of origin (Hayden and Thompson 2008). The earliest two international schools (in Switzerland and Japan), both established in 1924, provided an English-French bilingual curriculum (Hayden and Thompson 2008). In China, international schools did not receive official permission to operate until the "opening-up period" in the late 1970s. Prior to that, most western expatriates in China sent their young children home to boarding school, although some elected to have their younger generation educated in the local nurseries and schools (Hooper 2016, 34 and 85–86).

The first international school in China, International School of Beijing (ISB), was initiated by the United States Liaison Office in Beijing in the early 1970s (prior to the China-United States diplomatic normalisation) (ISB n.d.). The school, officially founded in 1980, was led by the US Embassy and merged the small-scale classes run by the British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand embassies (ISB n.d.). The school provided a pre-university stage of education for children of diplomats and embassy staff in Beijing, whose number had soared since the late 1970s following China establishing diplomatic relationships with several western countries. Officially registered as a "school for diplomatic children", it was eventually granted permission to accept all foreign children including those outside of the diplomatic community by the Beijing Municipal Education Bureau in 2002 (ISB n.d.).

Being another large-scale international school, the establishment of WAB (Western Academy of Beijing) in 1994 was supported by various multi-national enterprises, international organisations and individuals, including General Electric, Motorola, Royal Dutch Shell, and the World Bank in Beijing (WAB n.d.). Michael Crook is a co-founder and board member at WAB. He was born in Beijing to "foreign comrade" parents who committed to the Communist Party in the late 1930s, witnessed its victory in the Civil War, and saw the establishment of the new regime (Hooper 2016, 16–17). Following this, his parents taught English to Chinese university students in Beijing for decades, with their faith in communism barely shaken despite being imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (Hooper 2016, 37–48). Tracking back to his grandparents, Crook's grandmother founded the first missionary school in Chengdu, China, in the 1910s (Chen 2012). His family's long history of engagement with China and his parents' loyalty to the party played a crucial role in helping him receive a permit from the local education bureau to found the school in the early 1990s (Chen 2012).

In the last two decades, China has seen an increase in the number of international schools especially with the establishment of offshore campuses by mother schools located in English speaking countries. For instance, Dulwich College, a prestigious British public school founded in 1619 and based in London, established four overseas campuses in China (one in Beijing, two in Shanghai and one in Suzhou), in addition to campuses in South Korea, Singapore and Myanmar (Dulwich College n.d.). In total, Dulwich College enrols more than 7,000 students outside of Britain (Dulwich College n.d.). Regarding the higher education sector in the UK, sociologist Susan Robertson noted that British universities have been prompted by the central government to set up

branch campuses overseas since the late 1990s and she generalised the traits of this tendency as "corporatisation, competitiveness, commercialisation" (Robertson 2010). Campuses around the globe are strategically distributed in Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore and Mainland China, where western styles of education are adored by parents and students hanker for going to "brand" universities around the world (Robertson 2010). The expansion of Dulwich College in the educational market of China and other Asian countries perfectly exemplifies this trend at the pre-university level.

Despite multiple backgrounds, the majority of international schools are committed to adopting various international programmes, e.g. IB (International Baccalaureate Programme), IGCSE (International General Certificate of Secondary Education), or AP (International Advanced Placement). Designed by international education organisations, these English-language curricula comply with certain universal ideas and standards and aim to prepare students to become "internationally minded" and to obtain "global perspectives" (for instance, see ibo.org n.d.). Most international schools recruit pre-university age students, ranging from toddlers to senior high school students. The curriculum also varies according to the different academic stages. For example, BSB (the British School of Beijing) follows the English National Curriculum in their elementary and junior secondary education (year 1-9), IGCSE in year 10-11, and the IB "Diploma Programme" in the last two years of senior secondary school (year 12-13) (BSB n.d.).

Chinese nationals are forbidden to attend these schools. Chinese individuals and organisations are also prohibited from funding them (chinalaw.gov.cn 1995). [36] This constraint is exemplified under the heading found in the official Chinese document: "schools for children of persons with a foreign nationality" (*waiji renyuan zinü xuexiao*), or "foreigners' school" (*waiguoren xuexiao*) for short. However, an emerging trend throughout China, especially in a metropolis like Beijing, is numerous Chinese parents returning from overseas enrolling their children in these schools (Leung 2010). From an administrative point of view, international schools are regulated by the Ministry of Education (MOE), specifically the department of International Cooperation and Communication (*Guoji hezuo yu jiaoliu si*) in conjunction with Beijing Municipal Commission of Education (*Beijingshi jiaowei*).

[36] According to Hayden and Thompson (2008), the new phenomenon is that international schools provide an alternative for parents who are dissatisfied with the national education and desire to foster a global outlook in the child. Yet, the international schools in China retain exclusively available to non-Chinese citizens.

In 2002, the MOE set out to accredit these schools as a means to reinforce its governance on international schools in China (Yan 2007, 29). One sub-department, NCCT, took charge of the development of a series of assessment standards used to evaluate a school and to decide whether to award it an accreditation.[37] These standards broadly cover the educational objectives, curricula, organisation, to teaching staff, facilities, and student enrolment etc. Nevertheless, the emphasis on assessment tends to be on "certain standards of Chinese background" like abiding Chinese laws, respecting Chinese culture, and avoiding politically and historically sensitive issues that emerge in textbooks (e.g. Chinese territory disputes, Taiwan is an independent country) (Mo 2011). [38] In addition, schools are encouraged to adjust their curricula to the Chinese context, e.g. by dedicating a certain number of hours each week to Mandarin and Chinese culture courses.

By November 2012, in total 116 "foreigners' schools" were announced in an officially recognised school list issued by the MOE, of which twenty schools were located in Beijing (including five international kindergartens) (MOE 2012). By 2014, 11,500 students were reportedly enrolled in the international school system in Beijing.[39] In its position as the political and diplomatic centre of China, Beijing is a well-placed hub for international education. It is closely linked to the historical presence of foreign communities and is credited with the commercialisation and global expansion of education from developed English-language economies.

These socio-political circumstances in Beijing prompted Korean migrant families to seek positions for the younger generation in the track of international schools. Korean students disproportionately account for the student body in several international schools in Beijing, according to information I collected during visits to these schools. For instance, approximately 20% students in the year 11-13 in Dulwich College Beijing originate from South Korea, and 170 Korean students account for the whole student body (750 people) in YCIS, the Hong Kong international school in Beijing. I will further elaborate on Korean parents' concerns on international schools in Chapter 4.

[37] NCCT is an abbreviation of "National Centre for School Curriculum and Textbook Development Ministry of Education" (*jiaoyubu jichu jiaoyu kecheng jiaocai fazhan zhongxin*).
[38] The specific standards were provided by a staff member of NCCT in a phone interview, Dec 20th, 2015.
[39] The number was provided by Mrs Sheng Guohui, the director of Chaoyang district education commission, 19th September, 2014.

Internationalised Chinese Schools: Integration and Separation

While Chinese nationals are prohibited from attending international schools, increasing numbers of Chinese schools are opening their doors to children of foreign nationalities. A Chinese school needs to apply for and receive official approval from an educational bureau before they can legally admit students with foreign nationalities. According to the Beijing Municipal Commission of Education, only "the schools with a history of at least ten years" are eligible to apply for this qualification. Despite this, the number of schools opening to foreign students has dramatically increased in the last 30 years. In the late 1990s, there were only three schools in Beijing available to foreign children. This figure rose to 25 schools by 2003 and steadily reached 82 schools, both public and private, by 2013. [40]

Fangcaodi Primary School (*Fangcaodi xiaoxue*), a public school in Beijing founded in 1956, was the first school to recruit foreign students. The permission was initially granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1973 with the support of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai who considered the rising demand for schooling among diplomats and embassy staff (Baidu baike n.d.). The school taught the local curriculum in a separate block for foreign students and deliberately created isolation between Chinese and foreign children (Hooper 2016, 85–86). Until the early 1990s, this school remained one of the few schools accepting foreign students in Beijing, educating them in separate "international classes" (*guojiban*) (Song 2013, 34). Following this, the rigorous separation in Chinese public schools was replaced by an 'international department'(*guojibu*), which recruited, managed and specifically integrated foreign students into Chinese classes.

Visiting the international department of Wangjing Experiment School (*Wangjing shiyan xuexiao*) in Beijing, I learned of the availability of a semester-long language bridging course for newly enrolled foreign students. At the end of the course, students sit an exam and are thereby evaluated and placed in Chinese classes corresponding to their academic ages. Given the predominant numbers of Korean students, the department hired a Han Chinese full-time teacher to

[40] The figure in 2013 derives from a conference publication, "Beijingshi zhongxiaoxue waiji xuesheng jiaoyu yanjiuhui 2012 nianhui huikan" (the 2012 conference publication of Beijing Secondary and Primary School Foreign Students Education and Research Institute).

work with the part-time Korean Chinese teacher, responsible for teaching Chinese to two classes (7-14 students per class). Further, the international department plays a crucial role in reconciling problems related to student engagement with Chinese classes. This school is well known as "an internationalised school" (*guojihua xuejiao*) due to the high proportion of foreign students (over 200 students, or one-fifth of the total student body) and because of its successful model of integrating them into Chinese schooling system (Zhang 2013).

Despite this, the local education bureau does not include the academic performance of international students into the school assessment and ranking system. This exclusive evaluation system causes school leaders and teachers to place their concerns much more on Chinese students than on the foreign ones. Teachers often have lower academic requirements for foreign students compared to their Chinese classmates. This double criterion has been reinforced by the divided university admission policies imposed on Chinese students and their foreign counterpart: the admission requirements for the latter group are considered as being less challenging than the ones that the former group are confronted with. Given the segregation in polices, some schools deliberately "outsource" the recruitment and management of foreign students to foreign-run study-abroad agencies and rely on them to take responsibility for these students. The vast majority of the educational agencies are operated by Koreans, which I will elaborate on in Chapter 6.

Some Chinese public schools seek their path to internationalisation in a slightly different way. They recruit foreign students to an international department where an internationally-recognised curriculum is taught. Like international schools, some of these international departments offer IB (International Baccalaureate) program to students. Others adopt AP (Advanced Placement, a North American track) or A-level (General Certificate of Education Advanced Level, a British track) to educate enrolled foreign students. These programs, primarily at the secondary school level, are exclusively available to foreign students.

Figure 3.1 A lunch break at one bridge class at Wangjing Experiment School. The goal of the class is to assist students to pass HSK (*Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi*, Chinese Proficiency Test) level three after one semester of an intensive Chinese language course. All of the seven enrolled students (aged 7-12 years) in this class are South Korean nationals. Photograph by the author.

The first China based "IB-authorised school" (*guoji wenpin xuexiao*) was Beijing No.55 High School (founded in 1954), which received accreditation by the IBO (International Baccalaureate Organisation) in 1994 (ctiku.com/bjwsw n.d.). Like Fancaodi Primary School, this school began accepting foreign students in the mid-1970s. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Beijing municipal government designated the school as a "opening-to-the-outside-world school" (*duiwai kaifang xuexiao*), with an aim to educate students to become qualified international talents needed by the world (ctiku.com/bjwsw n.d.). At present, most reputable secondary schools in

Beijing are equipped with an international department where internationally-recognised programs are provided for foreign students.[41] However, foreigner-only international departments are still outnumbered by the proliferation of international departments that cater exclusively to Chinese students intending to study at universities abroad.

From the late 1990s onwards, non-state actors have also become involved in the trend to pursue internationalisation. Driven by reform in educational decentralisation and marketisation in the mid-1980s, the state has reshuffled its monopoly role in the educational sector and pledged to diversify educational providers (Mok 2006, 101–17). Following this trend, affluent Chinese entrepreneurs, mostly real estate and property developers, devoted their wealth to establishing private schools that offer international programs to both foreign students and Chinese nationals (R. Zhang 2014). Their major intention is to profit from the growing demand for an international education among the affluent Chinese, and possibly to ensure a place for their own descendants within this system. To distinguish them from the international schools run by foreign entities, these schools are labelled as "people-run (private) international schools" (*minban guoji xuexiao*).

The people-run international schools have a relatively high degree of autonomy regarding student admission, teacher recruitment, curriculum arrangement etc. (MOE 2013). In addition to the provision of international curriculum, most schools also include parts of the Chinese national curriculum (e.g. Chinese literature and language and/or Mathematics) in their elementary and junior secondary curriculum in order to foster bilingualism in students prior to entering international programs at the senior secondary education level. Hence, these institutions also identify themselves as "international bilingual school" (*guoji shuangyu xuexiao*), with their curriculum and pedagogy distinguishing them from the international schools.

These international bilingual schools tend to hold a more active and supportive attitude towards the school accreditation system launched by the MOE because they expect to prove their teaching quality and justify their educational ideology by receiving certificates from the Chinese educational bureau. This type of educational track, thereby, was increasing in popularity with the Korean parents in my study, due to its affordability and the bilingual programs on offer (see

[41] These schools are: High School Affiliated to Tsinghua University (*qinghua fuzhong*), The Middle School Affiliated to Renmin University (*renda fuzhong*), Beijing No.4 High School (*beijing sizhong*), to name a few.

Chapter 4). The cost of the Chinese-run international programs and schools varied from 80,000 to 200,000 yuan (10,667 to 26,667 euro) per person per academic year, notably lower than the fees for international schools in China (200,000 to 280,000 yuan, 26,667 to 37,333 euro).

By 2016, there were 321 private international schools and 218 international departments in public schools throughout China, almost half catering to students with foreign nationalities (CCG 2016). According to a survey of 309 international education institutions in China: 15% catered to foreign nationals; 33.9% catered to both Chinese nationals and foreigners; and, the rest (51.5%) were exclusively available to Chinese students (Zeng 2016). This survey outcome reveals that the stringent separation between foreign and Chinese students in schools has been gradually erased by the trend of educational marketisation and internationalisation, and yet still remains conspicuous. Furthermore, the internationalised Chinese public and private schools, in general, convey a rather ambivalent message that inclusion/exclusion, integration/separation do not stand at odds with each other but tend to coexist in this trend. This is certainly attributed to the strategic manoeuvres by the central and local governments through various means of granting permission, accreditation and evaluation in the educational domain, regardless of their claim to have withdrawn their influence from the educational market since the 1980s.

Internationalisation of Higher Education in China: Talent as a "Profit"

Compared with pre-university education, the Chinese higher education section is undergoing a remarkable process of internationalisation, initiated and mobilised by the central government. In 2010, in order to intensify the quality of talent resources in China, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party along with the State Council issued a key document: "National Education Reform and Development of Medium- and Long-term Planning program (2010-2020)" (MOE 2010a). In this document, the government pledged "to develop a collection of internationally reputable, distinctive, and high-quality higher educational institutions, to build several world-class universities, and to remarkably enhance the international competitiveness of higher education" (MOE 2010a).

To implement this national policy, the Ministry of Education subsequently announced an ambitious plan, "*liuxue zhongguo jihua*" (study in China plan), with that target of making China the main destination in Asia for international students (MOE 2010b). Specifically, the plan aims

to attract 500,000 students to all levels of educational institutions, including 150,000 foreign students to study in university degree programs, in the Mainland China by the year 2020 (MOE 2010b). As a consequence, the number of international students enrolled in Chinese universities soared from 77,715 students in 2003 to 442,773 in 2016, with the vast majority being self-funded students, and a small proportion being scholarship students sponsored by various government scholarship programs (see Figure 3.2).



Figure 3.2. The Number of International Students in Chinese Higher Education Institutions (2003-2016)

Source: Laihua liuxuesheng qingkuang tongji (The Statistics of International Students in China), Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, 2016;2015;2014;2013;2012;2011;2009;2007;2006;2004;2003.
Note: the figures involve all sorts of higher education institutions, including degree and non-degree programs, ranging from an undergraduate to a doctoral level.

This national blueprint in education reflects a significant policy shift from urging overseas Chinese students to return home, to attracting foreign students to study in China. [42] The 1990s witnessed the initiation of the policy, summarised as "support study overseas, promote return home, maintain freedom of movement" (*zhichi liuxue, guli huiguo, laiqu ziyou*), sponsored and monitored by the Chinese Scholarship Council, an administrative institution affiliated to the Ministry of Education (Pieke and Speelman 2016, 22–23). This policy is central in supporting selected Chinese students pursuing doctoral degrees abroad and in sponsoring students seeking short-term academic

[42] Like many other developing economies, China has suffered from "brain drain", losing considerable students and talent to more developed countries, regardless of the constant endeavours by the government to "bring back the best" (Zweig and Wang 2013; Zweig, Fung, and Han 2008).

exchange experiences overseas. The underlying logic being that students learn about advanced western ideas and technology before returning and contributing to the development of national economy, science and technology programs (Huang 2007, 422). This movement of students and scholars, mobilised by the government, is a crucial part in the discourse on higher education internationalisation, which entails the mixed pursuits for "westernisation, modernization or liberalisation", while retaining and reinforcing a strong sense of national identity among the people who are sent abroad (Yang 2002, 83–88).

Following the announcement of the "study in China plan", Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted "studying abroad" as a national "*shiye*" (business, career) essential to China's development, at the first "national studying-abroad work conference" (*quanguo liuxue gongzuo huiyi*) in 2014 (Xinhuanet 2014). The implication of studying abroad (*liuxue*), in this sense, is twofold: "Chinese students studying abroad" (*chuguo liuxue*); and, "foreign students studying in China" (*laihua liuxue*). According to President Xi, the national goal is to strategically plan the flow of students, to adopt international and domestic resources to cultivate more outstanding talents, and ultimately to contribute to the Chinese dream of rejuvenating the Chinese nation (Xinhuanet 2014). Soon after, Wang Huiyao, the director of CCG (Centre for China and Globalization), a leading Chinese independent think tank, responded to Xi's speech by considering attracting foreign students as a "profit" (*hongli*) benefitting China, and as a counterbalance to China's "studying abroad deficit" (Wang 2014). Moreover, he noted that foreign students can contribute to the cultural communication between China and other countries, to the development of Chinese enterprises overseas, and to enriching the potential talent pool of China (Wang 2016).

Educators and academics tend to address this policy transformation from three perspectives. Initially, some scholars consider this as a means for the Chinese state, as head player and rule-maker, to impose its "soft power" on international relationships (Kuroda 2014; Pan 2013, 2010). From the university perspective, some regard the enrolment of foreign students as a means for individual universities to seek international fame and contribute to strategies that aim to attract more foreign students to their institutions (Liu 2015; Huang 2015; Hayhoe and Liu 2010; Li and Sun 2010; Chai 2006). However, Chinese universities are criticised as treating foreign students as "a money-making opportunity" (Zweig 2002, 162). More attention has been drawn to the daily education and supervision of the influx of foreign students. Some consider this as a political mission, which will affect the diplomatic relations between China and the countries the students

come from (Liu 2006). Some are more concerned about the political "*suzhi" (*quality) of international students and have suggested teaching these students to be friendly to China, to be aware of the communist party's leadership, and to comply with Chinese laws and cultural customs etc. (Zhang, Jin, and Cao 1997; J. Wang 2000). Focusing on the academic "suzhi" of students, some tend to criticise the current educational policy as a style of "Great Leap Forward", only considering the quantity without caring about the quality in student recruitment (Tian 2017).[43]

Nevertheless, insufficient attention has been drawn to studying the experiences of international students in China and their trajectories to Chinese universities. One exception is Heidi Haugen's study on university students from several African countries (Haugen 2014). Haugen found that most students are disappointed in the quality of Chinese higher education and are motivated to be engaged in international trade between China and Africa by making use of their student status. South Korean students account for the largest group (70,540 students in 2016) of international students in Chinese higher educational institutions, making up 16% of the total student body (MOE 2017). Despite the lack of accurate numbers, South Koreans also make up a large proportion of enrolled students at the most prestigious Chinese universities in Beijing, including Tsinghua, Beijing and Renmin University. In Chapter 6, I will elaborate on the "desire" of Korean students going to Chinese universities and explore the connotation of the internationalisation of higher education in China from the perspective of foreign students.

Overseas Korean Schools in China: the Patriotic and the Pragmatic

As An Pyŏngman, the former Korean Minister of Education (2008-2010), wrote in the forward of a government document justifying the state's sponsorship for the development of an education system for Korean nationals living abroad:

> It is an age of globalisation, intellectualisation and informatisation in the 21st century… Our compatriots (*tongp'o*) are going to everywhere of the global village and setting up their homes. In order to actively respond to this change of international situation, it is a priority to develop the seven million overseas compatriots (*chaeoedongp'o*), who are precious human assets, into capable talents who are creative and hold lively

[43] The Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) was an economic and social campaign led by Chairman Mao Zedong, which aimed to transform China from an agrarian economy to a socialist society through rapid industrialisation and collectivisation. See more details https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Leap_Forward.

> cosmopolitan outlook by education…In this period, our government has been continuously supporting children of the overseas Koreans to learn not only our language and text but also our history and culture, to grow a correct perception, and to live with an identity and pride as a South Korean (An 2009).

The discourse of globalisation, in this sense, underlies the Korean state reaching out to the overseas communities regarding the education of their descendants, which I frame as the "globalised education of South Korea". Overseas Korean schools (*haeoe han'guk hákkyo*) constitute one of the three pillars of the overseas Korean education system, alongside (weekend) Korean language schools (*hankŭl hakkyo*) and South Korean education centres (*hankuk kyoyukwŏn*) (see Table 3.1). Distinct from the last two pillars, overseas Korean schools are formal full-time educational institutions, providing the Korean national curriculum to the offspring of overseas Korean nationals (*chaeoe kukmin chanyŏ*). The education covers all pre-university levels, from kindergarten to senior secondary school. By 2015, there were 32 overseas Korean schools in 15 locations around the world, including 12 based in Mainland China and Hong Kong, according to figures issued by the Korean Ministry of Education.[44]

Korean language schools, by contrast, are identified as informal schools, targeting overseas Koreans from all age groups. The school provides Korean language and history courses and only operates on weekends, between two and six hours per week. Therefore, they are also labelled as "weekend schools" (*chumal hakkyo*). This type of school has widespread locations around the world: in 2011 there were 1,868 Korean language schools in 120 countries, half of which were reportedly in the United States. The third type, Korean education centre, is usually recognised as an education and administration institution responsible for course provision and education promotion, and catering to both Korean nationals and local residents in the destination countries. A total of 39 Korean education centres in 17 countries were reported in 2015. The overseas education institutions are regulated by the Korean authority, involving the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and its affiliation, the Overseas Koreans Foundation. The Korean government sponsors them in various measures, e.g. to dispatch headmasters and teachers, to support the expenditure of operation, or to supply textbooks.

[44] Apart from this, there are four schools in Japan, two in Vietnam, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia, respectively, and one of each in a few Asian countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand), in South America (Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay), Middle East (Iran, Egypt) and Russia.

Notably, the full-time overseas Korean schools are unevenly distributed around the globe. These schools are concentrated in Asia, Middle East and South America. No such schools exist in North America, Europe and Ocean, despite the considerable numbers of Korean residents in these regions. Globally, Mainland China hosts the largest number of overseas Korean schools. By 2015, overseas Korean schools existed in the following Chinese cities: Yanji, Beijing and Shanghai (established at the end of the 1990s), Tianjin, Yantai, Dalian, Shenyang, Wuxi, and Qingdao (founded in the 2000s), Suzhou and Guangzhou (emerged in the 2010s). What is the cause of this uneven distribution?

Table 3.1. An Overview of The Overseas Korean Education Institutions

Type	Overseas Korean school	Korean Language School	Korean Education Centre
Feature	Formal school, full-time, from kindergarten to high school education	Informal school, part-time, two to six hours per week, only on weekends	Education & administration institution, part-time, two to four hours per week
Target group	Children of overseas Korean residents at pre-university ages	Korean nationals abroad (at all ages)	Korean nationals abroad (at all ages) and local residents
Distribution around the global	32 schools in 15 areas (12 schools in Mainland China and Hong Kong)	1868 schools in 120 countries (nearly half in the United States)	39 Korean education centres in 17 countries (15 schools in Japan)

Source: 2015nyŏn chaeoehan'guk'akkyo hyŏnhwang (The Present Condition of Overseas Korean Schools in 2015), Korean Ministry of Education, 2015; 2011nyŏn chaeoedongp'o kyoyukkigwan hyŏnhwang (The Present Condition of Overseas Korean Education Institutions in 2011), Overseas Koreans Foundation, 2011; Chaeoehan'guk'akkyo sŏnjinhwa pangan (Advancement Plan for Overseas Korean Schools), Korean Ministry of Education, 2010.

I met several Korean diplomats and school teachers who addressed this question from an ideological and historical viewpoint. In response to the question "Why do you think it is important to establish Korean schools in China?" Korean diplomat Mrs Jong replied:

> Unlike South Korea, China is a socialist state (*sahoejuŭi kukka*), which means there is an essential distinction in the historical view (*sagwan*) between the Korean and Chinese government. Schooling reflects such difference, so the values (taught) in Chinese schools will be essentially different from the Korean one. That is why it is important and necessary to establish Korean schools in China.

Mr Pak, a teacher in the elementary department at the Korean International School in Beijing (KISB) compared his students with those who are enrolled in Chinese schools and only study the Korean language on weekends, and declared:

> Students in our school (KISB), in general, hold a stronger historical perspective regarding Korea. They are more patriotic than their peers in Chinese schools because they follow Korean national curriculum …It is certain that they are concerned more about Korea because they are greatly influenced by Korean culture provided in our classes, such as *taekwondo* and *samul nori*. [45]

Despite this, more pragmatic concerns are also revealed. For instance, Mr Kim, another KISB teacher pointed out that the lack of demand for Korean education in the developed countries underlies the absence of Korean schools in those regions:

> In those English-speaking countries, Koreans would send their children to a local school, as the local schools offer advanced education in English. Hence, there is no demand for Korean education (in those English-speaking countries). Since (the operation of) Korean schools in one country is partly supported by tuition fees (paid by parents), and partly (sponsored) by the state, without the demand (for Korean education), Korean schools cannot run.

Notably, both patriotic and pragmatic concerns about the overseas Korean schools are manifested by the above diplomats and school teachers. As representatives of the Korean state, they anticipate the school will disseminate the national identity, historical values and culture to the overseas younger generation on the one hand; yet on the other, they also acknowledge and accept the fact that Korean migrants are inclined to seek education in the developed countries that they perceive as having a more advanced and modernised option than the national education. These two views, in a broader sense, represent the core debate between nationalists and globalists regarding the impact of globalisation on the contemporary Korean society (Yang 2009; Shin and Choi 2009). The former group tend to criticise believing that the sweeping trend of globalisation has eroded traditional values and ideology (e.g. Confucianism) and lament the loss of tradition to

[45] Taekwondo is a Korean martial art with a heavy emphasis on kicks, and Samul nori is a Korean traditional musical performance. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taekwondo, https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samul_nori.

modernisation, nationalism to globalisation. In contrast, the latter group highlight that globalisation does not necessarily weaken the Korean national identity, rather that it can act as a strong motivation to prompt economic and cultural transactions, and movement of the population between Korea and the world, severing national purposes.

This dual logic has also been demonstrated by the establishment of the first Korean school in China, KISB (Korean International School in Beijing, also *pukkyŏng han'guk kukche hakkyo*). In January 1998, a journalist Lee Kilu (1998), wrote in a Korean progressive newspaper *hankyoreh*, "there are 15,000 South Koreans residing in Beijing, but we do not even have one Korean association for all residents, neither do we have one Korean school". He noted that the absence of a Korean school resulted from a widespread interest in the international education and the generous education subsidies paid by employers to expatriates. According to him, the Korean society in Beijing was largely composed of two groups of people: embassy staff and expatriate employees dispatched by Korean conglomerates. The majority arranged for their children to study in international schools, with two-thirds of the tuition fees subsidised by their employers. "These people…actually did not even realise the necessity of a Korean school" (Lee 1998).

Nevertheless, half a year later, a brand-new full-time Korean school opened its doors in Beijing. The emergence of this school was initially driven by parents demanding a more affordable education, and who were being subjected to the plunging exchange rate (Korean won to US dollars) as an aftermath of the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) (Kihwan Kim 2006). According to journalist Huang Ŭipong (1998), Korean parents panicked when the incomes they earned in Korean won dramatically devalued, resulting in difficulties paying off the large amount of tuition and subscription fees (in dollars), regardless that they only needed to cover part of the total fees.

The Korean embassy in Beijing played a central role in reconciling the interests of multiple sides and supporting the school's establishment (Beijing Journal 1998b). The embassy staff contacted the Ministry of Education in both Korea and in China, requesting approval to establish a Korean school while seeking the cooperation of a few Korean entrepreneurs to initiate an association, a "school building promotion committee" (*hakkyo gŏllip ch'ujinwi*) (Beijing Journal 1998b). The committee was responsible for a series of specific preparations including fundraising, teacher recruitment, student admission, and textbook import. The establishment of the school was also supported by the Ministry of Education in Korea, in terms of providing an approval, financial supports and textbook supplies (Yonhapnews 1998). The Korean school eventually opened on

September 1st, 1998. A second full-time Korean school was opened in Shanghai the same year (Beijing Journal 1998a).

From the Korean side, the overseas Korean schools must comply with the "elementary and secondary education law" and are legitimated and regulated by the Ministry of Education. Accordingly, the school is expected to provide "an education connecting to the domestic education" (*ponkuk yŏnkye kyoyuk*) for children of overseas nationals who temporarily reside in a foreign country for professional reasons (K. Kim 2012, 12).[46] The Korean national curriculum is fundamentally adopted in these schools, and the teaching and administrative staff are selected from applicants of various schools throughout Korea. Despite being officially categorised as one international school in China, Korean schools exclusively open admission to children of the overseas Korean nationals (excluding Korean students sent to study in China by parents who remain in Korea) and the offspring of Korean Chinese residents.

Interestingly, individual schools are encouraged to become more "local", while simultaneously showcasing their "international" aspects. Extra hours of foreign language study are often considered as an approach to achieve this. The KISB, for instance, provides elementary pupils with seven hours of English and five hours of Chinese language lessons per week. Accordingly, the school day is extended from 8:30am to 2:50pm Monday to Friday, with certain subjects like ethics (*todŏk*), practical course (*shirhwa*), and computer skills removed from the program, and the time for subjects like physical education and arts reduced.[47] Hence, in the case of overseas Korean schools in China, being national appears to not be in opposition to being local and international. In Chapter 4, I will elaborate more on this from the perspective of migrant parents, including their motivation to choose a Korean education and their concerns about an overseas national education.

The "Education Exodus" of South Korea

In the beginning of the book "*South Korea' Education Exodus: The Life and Times of Study Abroad*", anthropologist Nancy Abelmann and her associates stated:

[46] Kim also pointed out the South Korean schools in Japan as an exception. In Japan, Korean schools are legitimated as Japanese private schools, providing Japanese national curriculum as a major and Korean curriculum as a supplement, with an aim of adapting Korean population to the Japanese environment.
[47] The above content is written based on interviews with several school teachers in KISB.

> In South Korea, it has now become commonplace for families to leave the country and to take their children abroad to study in countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, China and Singapore. ESA (Early Study Abroad) or *chogi yuhak*, which began as the movement of upper middle-class children to North America, is today the exodus of pre-college children from much of the class spectrum who move abroad for stints long and short across much of the globe…What is distinctive about the South Korean case, however, is the widespread extent of participation in this transnational strategy (Abelmann et al. 2015, 1).

In the final section of this chapter, I regard it as imperative to draw on this notion of "education exodus" to briefly depict a general tendency of Koreans leaving their home country for educational purposes. This trend is closely associated with the political, economic and social transformations in Korea from the 1990s onwards, an integral part of the globalised education of South Korea discussed in this chapter. This situation in the home country will further provide solid grounds for understanding the educational perceptions and practices of Korean migrants in China in later chapters.

Prior to the 2000s, sending children of pre-university ages to study abroad was restricted by the Korean authority as a means of "ensuring equal access to educational opportunities" (Abelmann et al. 2015, 8–9). Only a small group of privileged parents managed to send their descendants to elite colleges in the United States and other developed countries (Abelmann et al. 2015, 9). The transition from an authoritarian to a liberalised regime opened up the possibility of studying abroad for Korean students of all academic ages (at one's own expense), thus creating a boom in the outflow of Korean students (Abelmann et al. 2015, 9). By 2000, the numbers of students who studied overseas at pre-university and university (and above) level were respectively 4,397 and 3,963 (see Figure 3.3). In the next decade, the former figure mushroomed and peaked at 29,511 in 2006, gradually declining thereafter. Likewise, the number of university level Korean students studying abroad steadily increased reaching its highest point at 262,465 in 2011, which was also followed by a stable decrease.



Figure 3.3 Number of Korean Students Studying Abroad (2000-2014)

Source: Brief Statistics on Korean Education, KEDI (Korean Educational Development Institute), 2016, 2013; Kanch'urin kyoyukt'onggye (Summarised Education Statistics), KEDI (Korean Educational Development Institute), 2012, 2010; Kugoe han'gugin yuhaksaeng t'onggye (The Statistics of Korean Students Abroad), Korean Ministry of Education, 2016, 2008.
Note: Students who went abroad to accompany their parents stationed in foreign countries and those emigrated to foreign countries are excluded from the category of pre-university study-abroad.

Besides, the liberalisation of studying abroad at all ages pertains to the national demand for transformation of a heavy-industry-centred economy to a knowledge-based one (Seth 2002, 235–36). The government emphasised "research and creativity" in tandem with "international content" in the agenda for national education (Seth 2002, 233 and 236). Nevertheless, various neo-liberal reforms in the educational domain led to widespread preoccupation with the "school collapse", and people lost faith in the quality and equality of public education (Lim 2012). Consequently, two ramifications became apparent: the boom of the private education market; and, an excess in supplementary education programs arranged by parents for their children (M. Kim 2012). This, in turn, added more financial burden on parents and further widened the educational gap between children of the haves and the have-nots. In addition, parents who were unhappy with this exam-oriented domestic education, sought educational alternatives for their children, e.g. studying abroad (Abelmann, Choi, and Park 2013, 2).

The Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) also played a catalyst role in this trend. As an aftermath of this crisis, a tremendous amount of FDI (Foreigner Direct Investment) and numerous foreign businesses were abruptly introduced to the local market (Lee and Kim 2010). This shift

urged people to consider the English language as a fundamental skill needed to survive and thrive in the global competition. Parents, in particular, were persuaded to send their children, at pre-university ages, to study in the major English-language countries (Cho 2005; Yi 2002, 29–30). Aside from this, the desire to obtain a degree from a first-class university intensified due to increasing competition in the job market.[48] Universities in Korea are rigidly ranked: first, second, third, and down to fourth class (Seth 2002, 143–44). In this regard, "employers know whom (not) to hire by referring to which university applicants graduated from, and parents know whom (not) to endorse as (prospective) sons or daughters-in-law by referring to their educational or university background" (Song 2011, 44; see also Lett 1998, chapter six). As a Korean education researcher Kim Misook noted, "it is often said that there are two kinds of people in South Korea today: the graduates of first-class colleges and everyone else" (Kim 2013: 97).

Studying abroad provided the opportunity to fulfil both of the above concerns: excellent English proficiency, and, a degree from a (not just first-class) world-class university. Much scholarly attention focused on the phenomenon of "*kiroˇgi kajok"* (it literally means a wild goose family, but it is also understood as a transnational family). In a Korean transnational family, a child, often at pre-university age, is accompanied by the mother to seek local education in one of the main English-speaking countries, and the father stays behind in Korea earning a salary and supporting the expense of the child and the mother abroad (Jeong, You, and Kwon 2014; Bae 2013; Finch and Kim 2012; Lee 2010). Korean families, in general, are regarded as having an aspiration to "seek cosmopolitanism" in their children's education, given their extraordinary uncertainty about their (and their children's) future (Abelmann, Newendorp, and Lee-Chung 2014, 268–70). It is significant that most of these families keep their belief that a good education will ultimately lead to moving up the social ladder, a belief widely shared among domestic residents, transnational families and permanent residents overseas (Song 2012).

Nevertheless, a variation in socio-economic status results in divergent educational practices (Lee 2016; Kang and Abelmann 2011; Park and Abelmann 2004; Abelmann 2003, 126–31). For instance, "success" in studying abroad at a young age is less likely to be achieved by students from the rank-and-file family background than by students from the more affluent families

[48] Individuals often have various definitions on what a first-class university is. Some consider it as, at least, an "in-Seoul" university, i.e. a university that is located in the capital Seoul; some believe it to be the top ten or top twenty universities in Korea.

(Lee 2016; Kang and Abelmann 2011). Besides, the "upper- and middle-class" mothers are more likely to value their children studying English than "working-class" mothers (Park and Abelmann 2004). Korean students from lower/middle-class backgrounds tend to choose relatively affordable countries as their study abroad destinations, such as Singapore, the Philippines, India, and South Africa, rather than opting for more conventional destinations like North America, Europe, and Australia (J. Kim 2010).

Scholars also compare the Korean case with the well-documented studies on ethnic Chinese (e.g. from Hong Kong) "astronaut families" and "parachute kids" (Abelmann et al. 2015, 4–5; Waters 2015; Abelmann, Newendorp, and Lee-Chung 2014).[49] Given the political upheaval and economic instability in Hong Kong, a Hong Kong family normally seeks migration to North America: the wife and the child settle in and the husband travels back and forth to operate business. Generally, pursuing permanent residency in the host country is regarded as a priority and educating the child as an additional credit. By contrast, Korean families move due to predominantly educational reasons and are more likely to return: the wife and the child move to an English-language country where the child is expected to acquire a high level of English proficiency and/or an educational credential before returning to home.

The "education exodus" of South Korea, thereby, implies a mass departure of people for educational purposes, in tandem with, a return to their homeland equipped with foreign language skills, credentials, and overseas experiences. Despite a shared "cosmopolitan" outlook, the actual practices in education are highly divergent upon the variation in socio-economic backgrounds of different households. These findings provide significant grounds for my study on Korean migrant parents, children, their concerns about school choices, and their plans to go to universities. However, my focus in this study is placed on the education of the migrant children accompanying their parents to reside and study in China. These children are officially identified as overseas Korean nationals rather than studying abroad students, due to how their parents are identified in

[49] "Astronaut families" originally refer to fathers from Hong Kong or Southeast Asia sending their wives and children to earn rights of residence in North America, Australia or the UK, whereas they travel back and forth themselves, involved in transnational business and family caring, as a way to escape the anticipated upheavals in the domestic society, e.g. the 1997 Hong Kong Takeover. See (Ong 1999, 118–28) "Parachute kids" originally derives from the study on children from Taiwan sent to attend schools in the US, while their parents remained at home. See (Skeldon 1994, 45) Both terms, in general, denote family members residing in different countries across the world, as a family-based strategy to flexibly deal with unpleasant situations in the domestic society.

official documents.[50] While their initial departure from home was not driven by an educational reason, their future movements (to universities in China, in Korea or in a third place) entails considerable educational concerns and purposes. Further, the presence of Korean migrant children actually obscures the conceptual line between educational migration and the educational issues of migration children. In spite of being a contested part of the "education exodus" from South Korea, this specific migration group warrants greater academic attention.

Conclusion

This chapter elaborates the internationalised process of Chinese educational domain in the last decades. Educational providers have been enormously diversified: non-state and foreign actors are increasingly involved in the educational market; public schools are implanting international curriculum to meet the rising demand for an English-medium education. Despite this diversification, the central and local governments retain their authority over the educational domain through explicit and implicit manners such as policy-making, permit-granting, and certificate-accrediting. As a consequence, the stringently established segregation between foreign and Chinese students regarding schooling has been gradually eroded. Nonetheless, it creates a hyper-ambivalent scenario, in which foreign students are encouraged to be integrated into the group of Chinese students in some cases, and are enforced to be alienated from them in others.

Besides, I show that the logic of Korean state's representatives (e.g. diplomats, teachers of overseas Korean schools) in reaching out to the overseas communities is simultaneously patriotic and pragmatic. They are eager to instil national identity and historical values into the younger generation overseas on the one hand; on the other, they are generously supportive of multilingual and multicultural curriculum in the education for overseas Korean youth. This logic is difficult to understand if the trend of education exodus in South Korea is left aside. The proliferation of studying abroad at a young age reflects the profound impact of political and economic transformation on people's behaviour regarding education from the 1990s onwards. It also

[50] The number of the latter group is dismissed by the official statistics on early-study-abroad students issued by South Korean government. Despite their experience of studying abroad, they are integrated into the group of overseas Korean nationals, in the way that their parents are identified in official documents. A survey on 1,000 Korean students who have early study abroad experience shows that, 51.7 percent of whom went abroad following their parents who worked and studied overseas (Ihm and Choi 2015, 26-27).

indicates a way for Korean young people to get recharged overseas before returning to the highly competitive home country, instead of making a complete escape from the homeland.

Hence, internationalisation (in the Chinese context) and globalisation (in the Korean context) are by no means boundless and overwhelming powers prevailing national sovereignty; rather, in various ways, they can be encouraged, engineered, and appropriated by these nation-states (Shin 2006; Pieke et al. 2004).[51] In other words, the proliferation of non-state and foreign actors does not necessarily mean a retreat of state power, rather it may indicate a modified and implicit manner of governance. Introducing international curricula and attracting foreign students to Chinese schools and universities indicates a tactic approach to foster and introduce talents needed for the national development through opening up to the world. A similar tactical approach may be the conjunction of supporting overseas nationals to pursue multilingualism, with instilling national loyalties through the overseas education system. In brief, globalisation (internationalisation) and nationalism are paradoxically and profoundly entangled in the socio-political circumstances and discourses towards immigration/emigration of these two countries.

[51] Defining the term "Chinese globalisation", anthropologist Frank Pieke and his colleagues argue that the proliferation of Chinese population, institutions and culture around the globe "went hand in hand with heightened Chinese nationalism and a more assertive attitude of the Chinese state in international affairs" (Pieke et al. 2004, 20). Here, I adopt Pieke's argument to address the Chinese internationalisation shown in my study. Likewise, sociologist Gi-wook Shin have also found that Koreans' ethnic national identity, which is based on common blood and ancestry, has been virtually reinforced as a reaction to the rapid development of industrialisation and globalisation (Shin 2006, 17). From the perspective of the Korean government, he points out that globalisation in Korea refers to "policy makers' efforts to increase national competitiveness in an expanding global market", while preserving and protecting Korea's national culture and identity (Shin 2006, 211–14).