Musika: The becoming of an artistic musical metaphysics

Withers, S.

CHAPTER 4

The Musical and Its Entities

Music-like, people-unlike

The term Musinculus introduced in the previous chapter is, obviously, analogous to the term homunculus: as the musinculus refers to the music-like quality of music, the homunculus denotes the human-like qualities of man. Just like the fact that I appear human – through my human-like features, my particular matter organization, form and shape, the external and internal characteristics of being human – does not begin to cover my humanity, the fact that music appears as organized sound and has characteristics we are used to recognize as 'music' does not really reveal what is the essentially musical in music. As my humanity is not necessarily contained within my body, the musicality of music is not necessarily in its sonic corpora and assemblages, so to speak. The Musical with its specific forms and facets is the focus of this chapter.

The perceived analogy between music works and persons is not an original insight. It emerges from a diverse contingent of musicking voices trying to make sense of that, which acts on the other side of the 'inter' of our inter-actions with music. What or who is the player opposite us? For one, it could be the composer who creates the work to express her thoughts and innermost dreams, emotions, desires: the so-called 'Great man'. A problematic idea. As psychologist Anthony Storr reminds us, while some aspects of composer's personality inevitably manifest in her music, "the object of listening is to get to know the music, not to get to know the composer" (1993: 121). Another strategy for finding that something in music that interacts with us, is to look for it in the communicative act. Musicologist Richard Taruskin is one of the outspoken proponents of the hypothesis that the agent of musical meaning is the audience. Naturally, this stance, too, has its pitfalls, like the sparsity of historical sources or the lack of a robust methodology. Consider the point made by Carl Dahlhaus, one of the major figures in 20th century musicology:

> Insisting that music ultimately resides in the 'communicative process' and not in the 'dead letter' will carry little or no weight when confronted with the disappointing discovery that the stereotyped evidence which historians of reception are forced to

> resort to from want of documents can hardly vie with the subtleties attainable by structural analysis of music (1967, transl. 1983: 39).

This somewhat annoying, seemingly logistical problem of the locus of meaning and, relatedly, of the nature of the musical agent who produces it while interacting with us, becomes even more subtle when psychologized. Musicologist Pieter van der Toorn, in defense of the construct 'music itself' widely criticized by Richard Taruskin in particular and more generally, by the proponents of the anti-formalist and postmodern turn in musicology, admits that his instinct is "to trust music first and foremost," and not its socio-political interpretations.

> I suspect that for many listeners an individual work and their experience of that work can indeed be individual, something for which there is no substitute and which is beyond their capacity to comprehend fully. In this respect, of course, musical works are not unlike individual human personalities, while the difficulties encountered in the study of music and its single instances are not unlike those encountered in the study of psychology and its single manifestations (Toorn 1995: 3, emphasis mine).

Are these musical personalities naïve make-believe 'characters' the unprofessional listener invents to compensate her lack of a formal instrumental and theoretical training? In his essay "Theorists and 'The Music Itself'" (1996) Scott Burnham argues that, in fact, it is the very training that encourages musicians to treat music as "something like a language with its own claims: an 'as if' notion of autonomy is an indispensable corollary to the act of learning to use this language." Language, we know, evolves consciousness. The specific consciousness constructed by musical language is endowed with the power of transformation. András Schiff, one of the masters of piano language, elaborates on the conditions that convert the decorative into the existential, the rather machinic row of trills in Beethoven op. 111 into a transcendental revelation, a "miserable piano" into the "voice of the human spirit" (in Morris 2019). Music language's agency at times even surpasses the strictly musical realm and venture into the physical to meddle with our perceptions: pianist Caroline Oltmanns, for example, shares that she sees other pianists not as gendered creatures but as "pianistic entities" – "They weren't so much men, they were pianists; the gender issue was in the background" (Oltmanns 2017). As Deleuze and Guattari stress, being a man *or* a woman no longer exists in music (2013: 354). And where the flesh and blood of physical reality become musical, the musical itself acquires some features we are used to associate with 'real' people. In pianist Yuja Wang's words, "There are pieces I want to know, but it's like [with] people:

once you know them (you) like that, maybe not. Maybe not friends. And there are pieces you don't know, and it's mysterious. The more you know, the more you want to know. And you want others to know; you want to share" (Wang 2015).

Pianistic entities vs people-like music. Although the becoming-music of people and the becoming-human of music seemingly move from the opposite ends on a continuum, they do crossover, meeting in an abstruse likeness. This was the conclusion of the now famous study psychologists Watt and Ash conveyed in 1998, when they tried to determine the character of the meaning allegedly emerging from a piece of music. Particularly, they were interested in discovering the level of agreement among the population (180 people) in differentiating traits of music based on gender (male/female), age (old/young), and emotion (sad/happy). The experiment resulted in a hypothesis, best known for its catchy phrase, "Music creates a virtual person" (Watt and Ash 1998: 18). Watt and Ash concluded that "there is some direct relation between the reaction to music and the reaction to a person. The action of music is to mimic a person:"

> Our hypothesis is that music has disclosure meaning. The person doing the disclosure, however, need not be physically present, nor even identified or identifiable. In this sense that person is virtual (Ibid.: emphasis mine).

Disclosure meaning, in contrast to attention- and knowledge meaning, is defined as "the domain (…) restricted to aspects of a person, or the relation between people that are of significance in determining the nature of the relationship. (…) Meaning lies not so much in the meaning of words, but rather in the social circumstance of their utterance and the manner of their delivery" (Ibid.: 7). According to the research, music is perceived as if it were a person making a disclosure. That is, a person with attributes, like male/female or old/young. However, the process of associating musical traits with personal features is not straightforward. When most people in the study, for example, describe particular feature of music as femaleness, that does not mean that music communicates femaleness, but rather that what music communicates could be better described as female than male. This is an important distinction, for, as Watt and Ash stress, "whatever has been received (from music) may not be expressible in language at all" (Ibid.: 16).

Watt and Ash's virtual person opens our thinking about music(al meaning) up to new possibilities. Quite literally, it proposes that through or perhaps in the work of music, a virtual person – other than the composer or the performer – is making a personal disclosure to the listener. The possible mechanisms and the cognitive background behind the hows and

whys of the phenomenon I already outlined as an argument presented in Mark Changizi's *Harnessed* (2011) in the previous Chapter 3. Music mimics natural movement, Changizi states. The natural movement of pumas, monkeys and snakes, winds, birds and waters, we may ask? Yes, that, but mostly of people, music is made of people (Ibid.). As creatures caught in a human frame of reference, we instinctually discern the intelligence and sophistication we feel in music as human traits. And indeed, there are people-like characteristics of music. Not only in terms of 'personality' but also of action, perception, even morality. But the unproblematic relatedness of a music work to people's *Umwelt* is undermined by the very phrase, people-like: there is something in music that is people-like, and it is that same thing that is people-unlike. I feel it is precisely that which fascinates and creates most trouble: what is the interval between the people-like and the people-unlike, what is the musical in music?

Composer Igor Stravinsky was emphatic on the point that music does not and cannot express anything like feeling, attitude, mood or representation of nature.[104] All allusions to a connection between human's *Umwelt* and music are merely an illusion:

> *Expression* has never been an inherent property of music (…) It is simply an additional attribute which, by tacit and inveterate agreement, we have lent it, thrust upon it, as a label, a convention – in short, an aspect which, unconsciously or by force of habit, we have come to confuse with its essential being (Stravinsky 1998: 53, emphasis his).

Thirty years after this declaration (in his *Autobiography* from 1936), Stravinsky still stands strong behind his word: "There is no correlations between composer's feelings and his notations," he stresses; "music is supra-real and super-personal. Music expresses itself" (1962, in Stravinsky 1981: 101). And elsewhere yet, Stravinsky informs that his music is best

104 Here Stravinsky echoes the well-established in musical aesthetics view earlier proposed by Eduard Hanslick in *On the Musically Beautiful* in 1854: it asserts that any alleged meaning in music is solely in terms of its materials: the form, melody, harmony, polyphony etc. However, in his musical criticism Hanslick happened to spill well beyond the rigid lines drown by himself in the sand, remarking on features of music like "floral fragrances," "strong ethical character," "manly and noble seriousness," etc. See more in Robert W. Hall 1967.

Van der Meer points out that the aversion to a liaison like music and emotion might be due to the fear of emotion in 19th century: "For Hanslick to think that something as lofty as music could have anything to do with something as base as emotion was ghastly" (personal communication 2019). Stravinsky too, seems vehement not to let music be handled and assaulted by human emotions, rather he suggests that music itself has its own rules of expression.

understood by children and animals (1961, in *Observer*), referring to the deliberate lack of surface emotion and *poesie*, of people-like quality in his music. Commenting on the reception of Stravinsky's melodrama *Persephone* (1934), Tamara Levitz notes, "By not expressing emotions or content, this music allows the things themselves to speak 'the real,' or 'just as it is' which Jankélévitch (…) later analyzed (…) as intuition, pure perception" (2012: 612).

At the same time period when Stravinsky coins the strange term 'music itself,' but with a different language and from a different vantage point, composer Benjamin Britten – Stravinsky's nemesis in some regard – also meditates on what if anything music expresses and how it does so. He defines it as something emerging from the scientific side of music,[105] but which transcends it: it cannot be analyzed because "is not in it, but of it:"

> "It is the quality which cannot be acquired simply by the exercise of a technique or a system: it is something to do with personality, with gift, with spirit. I quite simply call it – magic. Indeed, this magic can be said to consist of just the music which is not in the score" (Aspen award speech 1964, in Britten 2015: 12).

A spirit-personality free of the material side? Here, Britten evokes the sensual, often carnal individualistic spirit of music itself, of that which moves music in the face of the unquestionable fact that its tones actually don't move:[106] the musical spirit that emerges out of the physical substrate and sound articulation, and that transcends it.

> Let's imagine that spirit is a pattern of being. Patterns can be transmitted across multiple substrates. Vinyl, air, vibrations in your ear – it's all translation of what you might describe as a spirit. It is that pattern that's independent of its material substrate (Peterson, 2017 III).

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[105] "The scientific side of music" is Britten's own expression.

[106] "Actually, they stand still! In the Marseillaise, for example, we hear the first tone E--it does not move; then comes A, another static tone; this one is repeated; then comes B; and soon. No tone, as long as it sounds, moves from its place. What has happened to the motion? . . . Motion is the process that conveys the thing from here to there, in a continuous and never suspended traversal of the interval. If it stops anywhere, the motion is instantly abolished. But in a melody we have nothing but this, nothing but stops, a stringing together of static tones, and, between tone and tone, no connection, no transition, no filling up of intervals, nothing. It is the exact opposite of motion." (Zuckerkandl, *The Paradox of Tonal Motion* 1969: 83).

The pattern of being Jordan Peterson defines above, is what we could frame as the consciousness of music. Consider the following correlation: is not what self-consciousness is to man similar to what the musical is to music?

$$\frac{(\boldsymbol{self})\boldsymbol{consciousness}}{\boldsymbol{man}} \approx \frac{\boldsymbol{musical}(\boldsymbol{ity})}{\boldsymbol{music}}$$

This consciousness of music, the musical, is most people-unlike. Although it emerges from the people-like, "scientific side of music," from scores and instruments, venues and bodies, from music semiology and gesture – from everything that we as humans can put a finger on and identify, of the music-like in music we, admittedly, don't know very much. And sometimes it feels like we don't want to know. To paraphrase religious studies professor Jeffrey Kripal, "It is as if we can study everything about religion, except what makes it fiercely religious" (2014: xiv) – in music(ology) too, the attention to the fiercely musical in music becomes dangerously démodé as more and more efforts are poured into researching the cognitive effects of music, the context, music's role of a social power dynamics litmus, its 'communicative process' and acceptance history, its materiality and 'carnality' as well as those of its instruments and bodies, its sounds . . . and ultimately – our ideas' utter relativity.

Of course, there have been attempts to pinpoint the ineffable in music. Musicologist Eric Clarke, for example, discusses many important questions regarding the way we hear music in *Ways of Listening* (2005: 89), among which is this: "Who or what is moving, with what style of movement, to what purpose (if any) and in what virtual space?" In an essay cleverly titled "Something in the Way She Moves" (2003), Johnson and Larson, too, tackle the issue with what is it, which moves in music. Both Clarke's and Johnson & Larson's conclusions leave matters undetermined, or in the elegant wording of Alan Moore, "admit ambiguity over 'what' is moving in music" (2012: 247). Where Clarke appreciates movement as a "straightforwardly perceptual phenomenon" dynamically arising from the engagement of the listener with the musical material and its environment, he deems it neither real not metaphorical, but fictional – in the same way that the scene portrayed in a picture may be fictional (Clarke 2005: 89). In a similar vein, Johnson & Larson propose that the sense of movement arises from the listener in her dual role – as an observer of the happening in music and as an active participant. They admit, though, that our way to conceptualize musical movement grows on the shoulders of our metaphorical reserve, and stress on the following:

> Music is meaningful in specific ways that some language cannot be, but it shares in the general embodiment of meaning that *underlies* all forms of symbolic expression, including gesture, body language, ritual, spoken words, visual communication, and so on (Johnson and Larson 2003: 19, emphasis mine).

The idea of meaning underlying all forms of symbolic expression is important for it traces the distinction between the people-like, as all articulations and manifestations of meaning, e.g. in language, and the unnamed virtual potential of the people-unlike that hums in the beyond-human realm, e.g. the musical, which emerges from the meaning interwoven into the fabric of reality. The French philosopher Michel Serres has made several important contributions on this topic. In his book from 2011 *Musique*, he notes that language, "the sound of societies," is so strong in meanings that it prevents people of hearing the sounds of the world and of the living. "The meaning [as signification] hides what precedes it (…) This is why language will never understand Music" (2011:18). In an earlier opus, *The Five Senses* from 1985, Serres defines the phenomenon of music as that, "which comes from all the Muses" as the condition for existence of all the arts. Opening a crack between Music-as-condition and music-as-art, he writes:"Elle-même retombe dans les notes, le calcul plat, sans elle-même" (in Goehr 2017: 145) or "She herself[107] relapses into notes, a flat calculation, without herself." In Serres then, like in Britten, the musical in music is beyond the notes and composer's 'calculations' – it is that, which gives identity to poetry, architecture, dance: the same spirit, the same pattern becoming through different mediums. The musical, thus understood, is not only something particular belonging to Musika, the country of music, but also to consciousness coming into forms through each and every and all media. It is in the sound of the world and the sound of the living before it is confined and disciplined by language. Curiously, the English translation of Serre's phrase offers a further insight on its meaning, for it is not literal but hermeneutical translation. It reads, "Eloquence deprived of rhythm and the modulations of singing evocation collapses into gibberish and boredom" (Ibid.). Tuning into that eloquence that is not at all people-like, that is above articulations of bodies, arts, language, notes, rhythm, scores, calculations and social symbolization, but that compels them to movement, is where we hear the musical. For the inexperienced it may indeed sound like gibberish and boredom, but for those who work with it, it is an incantation. Thus, in the words commonly attributed to Nietzsche, Those who were seen dancing were thought to be insane by those who could not hear the music.

[107] In French "Music" is feminine, "la musique."

The art of music we make in our own image: it is the Musinculus, a sonic animated organization with emergent properties. But that which releases meaning into the world through sound comes from the sonic realm of consciousness which I name Musica1, in the guise of a virtual person with whom we share the tacit, implicit and immune to misunderstandings disclosure meaning – an overtone of the rich and sonorous meaning of reality.

A model for proper being

The last paragraph is hardly striking when consider the fact that for Campbell, and for other proponents of the so-called Simulation theory, the virtual is the fundamental nature of reality: a virtual information content expressed in digital data sets, subsets, super- and hyper- sets. In the next subchapter I return to Campbell's big TOE to consider, based on TOE's framework, the question of musical entities as 'virtual persons'. In the following pages, I turn up the volume on the nature of the virtual person with its peculiarities, charms and controversies. One way to approach this 'person' is through our old friend, the "cursed question of musical meaning;" another one is through the music work.

Michel Serres', Benjamin Britten's, and Igor Stravinsky's definition of the Musical discussed above widely differ in pathos and ethos; yet, upon close listening they resonate. What does it mean that music expresses itself (Stravinsky)? What does it mean that the magic of music is not in the score (Britten)? What, finally, does it mean that music is beyond rhythms and notes (Serres)? The perceived gap between the two realities of the music project, i.e. the music and the musical, is palpable, they are juxtaposed like matter and spirit. If Music is that which does the talking, the Musical is that which all talking is about, the agent who exerts power over us through its medium: the scientifically refined, people-like avatar-musinculus. This tension and distinction between two musical entities is problematic, it performs a sensual dissonance that somehow has to be solved with sense. It not only admits the existence of something else, something beyond the actual, physical, material, instrumental and scientific realms, but it claims that this other ineffable side is what is the most important in music.

Different thinkers use different approaches to solve the dissonance, to bridge the gap. Michel Serres, we shall recall, regards the musical in music – that "which comes from all the Muses" – as the condition for existence of all the arts; he deems the moving spirit of the arts Musical. This introduces a serious asymmetry in the power relations between the music and the Musical in favor of the latter. Philosopher Lydia Goehr takes a stand on the opposite end of

the argument. In her text "Art constantly aspires to the condition of music" (2017), she dissects the eponymous construct of Walter Patter's ("All arts constantly aspire to the condition of music"), contending that instead of taking this statement as a confirmation of music's special status among the arts (e.g. as Herder and Schopenhauer propagated), we should pay more attention to the context of Patter's phrase, which opposes the condition of music to the art of music. The condition of music – the perfect unity of form and content – is the music that comes from all the muses, in fact, it is their mother, Mousikē. Music-as-art, on the other hand (or the scientific side of music, as Britten put it), is a subject to this condition, like all the other arts – deconstructs Goehr. Differentiating between music as condition (that which comes from all he muses) and music as one of the arts, she 'solves' the problem of music's 'magic' (which Britten opposes to music's 'scientificity') treating it as a little more than a misunderstanding over something poetic but nonexistent. Similarly, Daniel Dennett 'solves' the problem of qualia and hence the 'hard problem of consciousness' by announcing the notion of qualia incoherent and consequently denying the existence of qualia phenomenon altogether (Dennett 1992). Music is good enough as an art, Goehr concludes, we don't need to mystify it and burden it with fairy tales, magic and outworldly aura.

'There is nothing special about music' has been Goehr's ritornello for years, the philosopher has made many efforts to dismantling the mystic of music. The gist of her stance is this: the problem of meaning in music, especially in Absolute music,[108] is imposed and artificially construed: had we not deliberately taken the meaning out of music on the first place (by divorcing it from its lyrics and from dramatic action and context), we would not have had such trouble finding it (Goehr 2015). Here again, I am reminded of Jeffrey Kripal's remark, that we study everything about religion except for what makes it fiercely religious:

> And then we are told that there is nothing essentially or truly religious about religion, which of course is true if we have just erased all of the weird stuff with our methods and philosophical assumptions. If we have taken everything off the table that can challenge our own reigning materialisms, relativisms and constructivisms, then everything will look like more evidence for materialism, relativism and constructivism (Kripal 2014: xiv).

[108] The idea of Absolute music was developed around the end of 18th century by German Romantic poets and writers – it is the 'pure' music, unpolluted by a title or a program, unblemished by crude representations. The symphony, the instrumental concerto or the string quartet are among the best carriers of Absolute music.

Is not this state-of-affair in religious studies commensurate with certain angles in musical scholarship? Goehr's assumption is that there is no meaning in music outside of the meaning supplemented by lyrics, texts, dramatic action or suggestive dance – in short that all musical meaning is contextually contingent. Indeed, this stance supplements much of contemporary postmodern aesthetics whose credo is summed up in the phrase, "Music, like God, is as good as we are" (Currie 2009) – a catchy distillation of the conviction that any meaning we find in music is meaning we put in there. A plausible hypothesis, indeed. I offer another view on the two-partied problem of music posed so far as art/condition, scientific/magic, musinculus/music or music/musical. It passes through the idea of the music work.

As evident in Chapter 1, the field of music ontology has its issues. What kind of thing is the music work? How can we fathom and define some-thing in which content and form are so perfectly integrated that they merit the term condition, as in Patter's phrase? With regards to the problem of content and form, the condition of painting, for example, is comparable to the condition of a lenticular postcard in which one can either see the smiley girl or the winking one, never both. Thus, in painting one can examine either the image or the picture, the representation or the canvas and the paint strokes, never both simultaneously (Belting 2005: 304-305). In music, by contrast, content and form are creating each other in a metalinguistic paradimensional manner (discussed in Chapter 2) and one is left to wonder which is first, or as Humpty Dumpty insightfully put it, which is to be the master.[109] Iain McGilchrist comments on Patter's mysterious phrase in relation to his own research of the Master (the right hemisphere) and his Emissary (the left one).

> [Music's] indivisible nature, the necessity to experience the whole at any one time, though it is never enfolding in time, a thing that is ever changing, never static or fixed, constantly evolving, with the subtle pulse of a living thing (…) the fact that its communication is by its nature implicit, profoundly emotive, working through our embodied nature – everything about music makes it the 'language' of the right hemisphere. If it is true, as Walter Pater famously said (…) that all art aspires to the condition of music, all art aspires to reside in the world that is delivered to us by the right hemisphere (McGilchrist 2009: 73).

[109] "When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.' 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master — that's all" (in Driem 2007).

As an Implicate Order, music integrates its dualities into its 'indivisible nature,' smithing and smoothing its binarisms into a fluent 'condition'. By our left-brain conscious Self, this mysterious (right-brain) unity of being in music is usually approached as a puzzle to be solved, analyzed, deconstructed, dissected. Patter and McGilchrist suggest another possible attitude towards the problem – not as something to understand, but as an example one aspires to. "We don't understand the world very well," notes the Jordan Peterson, we "don't understand how the world would be mastered if it was mastered completely" (Peterson 2017 III). Similarly, he continues, we don't know what kind of being it would be, him or her, who can bring themselves completely into alignment, who can become perfectly integrated (Ibid.). Significantly, Peterson's closest intimation as to what this might look like is the music work (in the referenced interview he gives the example of the symphony), which he defines as a "model for proper being," understood as "placing of all levels of reality in a harmonious relationship with one another – meaning emerges out of that naturally" (Peterson 2018 at 10:33).

This 'model for proper being' is the potential, steeping in scores and performances – anywhere and anytime the problem of form and content is attended to musically. Upon the proper articulation of this model hangs the whole project of music. A successful articulation is a doorway to those musical experiences that become our life events: they become part of who we are by showing us who and how we could be, are not, or should not be. These experiences are palpable not only because they are embodied as sensations in our bodies: they are felt by the function of [audience + performers] as a physical articulation of something – spirit? image? story? event? dream? happening? memory? action? – profuse with meaning. This meaning is paralinguistic, it is deeper than language: it emerges from underneath it, from beyond the 'scientific,' beyond the perceptual data as the first surface layer of reality – we know that this is so because despite the commonality of such musical experiences it is very difficult to embed them in words, to grasp them in coherent thoughts.

Difficult, but not impossible. A taste for what that is like, for example, we find in the forty seconds long silence after the last tone of Mozart's *Requiem*, at the last performance of Claudio Abbado in Lucerne in 2012, a few months before Maestro's death (Abbado 2012)[110]. The last sound of *quia pius es* has gone, the *Requiem* has concluded, the concert ends. But something is to stay well after the last sounds.

[110]"Claudio Abbado, moved after Mozart Requiem in Lucerne – 40 seconds silence." MediciTV 2012 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLP6kqcmPRI

> Suddenly everything is one, for a moment everything stands still. The music itself, the communication process, the way the audience breathes with music – all that comes together. There is a moment when that really happens and it fills the whole hall. It's not just a void or a vacuum. It's a genuine culmination in which everyone there has a part in. It's like a different dimension, a heightened sense of time. Then you can let go, you don't have to try and extend it artificially from the rostrum. Something happens that all of us are involved in for a few moments. It's a very special moment. The end of a piece of music is frequently fading, dying away. The total effect of all the sound that has been in the hall for hours, it ebbs away… and you can feel it, it's real. You don't have to ask what it is, it's just there. (long pause) I don't know what that is. (Bruno Ganz in *Claudio Abbado: Hearing the Silence* 2003 at 31:32)

Whatever 'that' is, to doubt its realness is akin to doubt one's own I-ness – despite the strong evidence that I am an assemblage of various parts, habits, and intensities, and despite the philosophical and biological arguments that favor a process of a continuous *becoming* as opposed to the existence of a stable identity of self, there is a felt integrity and coherence to my being, an I-ness to my consciousness that I cannot sincerely deny without compromising my sanity. Similarly, the musical phenomenon referred to by Bruno Ganz, is felt as something rather than another or many-things, something that is, however ineffable, real. The French philosopher Julien Benda captures this condition in his observation that music gives us the idea of "immaterial existence" presenting "the condition of being a being without being an object" (in Chou 1998: 310). One could even argue that the less objectual something is perceived as, the more real it is: as Worringer viewed it, the way out (of the carnal, material, human, and mortal) is through the pure line; the path to the absolute, which is the source of all reality and life, wonders through the lands of the abstract.

At times this immaterial abstract being that emerges in the musical experience is so visceral, that it requires special metaphors to address its breathing presence. The Chinese composer Chou Wen-Chung, while commenting on the discrepancy between the scientific and the magical, the art and the condition in music, finds chemical imagery for discriminating nuances in our vis-à-vis with the abstract:

> As the material evaporates – that is to say, as the auditory sensation fades away in the listener's ear – a crystallization of perception emerges: a transitory condensation of a transitory experience. Therefore, in discussing the catalyst [the technique], the

> material that is immaterial [e.g. the sound palette], it will serve us well not to lose sight of the immaterial that is material, the condensation itself (Ibid.: 309-310).

This palpable experiential condensation as the material ineffability of music, as the Musical in music, I recognize as a particular articulation of consciousness. As a model for proper being, this conscious musical articulation merits the term Musical entity.

Musical entities

"An entity is a well-defined, self-contained (bounded) interactive system. It can be an atom, molecule, rock, technology, computer, worm, monkey, human, organization, city, nation, planet, or an aware individual nonphysical consciousness" (Campbell 2007: 191). According to this definition of Campbell's, the work of music does indeed meet the requirements to be considered an entity. Here, it is useful to recall Campbell's organization of Nonphysical/Physical Matter Reality (NPMR/PMR) and especially the relationship between the Individuated Unit of Consciousness (IUOC) and the Free Will Awareness Unit (FWAU). The former was described as our digital mind, and the latter – as one of its manifestations. The FWAU is the sentient 'I' who is typing the words and who is limited by the constrains in this PMR. The IUOC I am an incarnation of, is the mother (or the father?) of all past and future FWAUs, a nonphysical aware consciousness entity. Despite the differences in rank, scale and ability, and despite the fact that one appears to be physical, both entities are virtual, organized consciousness content – a content (IUOC) that has chosen to manifest in PMR in my particular form (FWAU).[111]

The musical entity whose presence Claudio Abbado is experiencing (Abbado 2012) is, I propose, an Individuated Unit Of Consciousness that, propped by the culture of the musical assemblage of the performance, has manifested through its Free Will Awareness Unit. At this point we shouldn't hesitate to call it such, for the entity does foster a free, however limited, will. In the digital reality we occupy its basic decision space would be, to appear or not to appear. Indeed, to be or not to be. Imagine a situation, in which we are an audience to a performance where all that is manifested is performer's good will and efforts – sounds upon sounds and so many notes stomping on the canvas of auditory space failing to result in coherence, with nothing happening, with no awareness arising to be. Who is to receive the blame, in this case – the performer and her shortage of summoning power, or the musical

[111] The power dynamics between IUOF and FWAU is in a way comparable to the relation between the 'I' and the 'Me' discussed in the Interlude "On Practice."

entity's bad moods that evening? Of course, it is all too easy to blame it on the musician, for we have heard this music work in other performances where we did experience the magic – if one is able to kiss the beauty awake from her sleep once, shouldn't anyone, always? Indeed, nowadays we expect a sublime experience from our performers by default. Yet it does so happen that we listen to an impeccable pianist, with an excellent technique and developed consciousness, and yet she leaves us … as we are. In such rare cases, mightn't we consider the possibility that the music work's Free Will Awareness Unit has enacted its free will of choice to half- or partly be that evening, or even not to-be, and it has, therefore, called it a day?[112]

But 'musical entity' is neither unproblematic nor univocal term. Although I generally use it in its meaning of a complex musical being-in-becoming one can get obsessed with or even possessed by, it may also mean an independent musical idea, e.g. melody, ornament, waltz, symphony. According to ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl (*Thought on Improvisation* 1974) each culture has its own notion and definition of that which constitutes a musical entity. Below I regard some of these notions.

Tone

Let us assume that in Musika reality frame there are nebulae of organized, or organized to some degree, content. To the extent this content can be conceptualized as tone, we can already talk about a well-defined, bounded, and indeed interactive musical entity (as per Campbell's definition, see above). The idea of the tone as an entity could be traced back to Confucian times: the text *Yueh Chi* (*circa* 500 BC) describes music as an instrument for inducing order and as a tool for the inward transformation of the person, for her internal harmonious alignment (Taylor & Choi 2005: 734). The composer Chou Wen-Chung suggests that in *Yueh Chi* musical tones are considered musical entities and quotes the following passage: "One must investigate sound to know tones, investigate tones to know music … without the knowledge of sound… one cannot speak of music" (in Chou 1970). "It is therefore believed," continues Chou, "that single tones, rendered meaningful by their acoustic attributes, are musical entities by themselves as well as musical events within the context of the composition" (Ibid.). In this discrete approach even the slightest deviation from the single tone, which might be deemed 'ornamental,' is not to be understood as an

[112] The dynamic interaction and causal relationship between the performer/performance and the manifestation of the musical entity might be an unusual line of reasoning for those raised in the conceptual tradition of European music. There are other traditions, like the Indian culture of *rāga* – that offer a wider, more nuanced and open-minded space for musical discussion. We shall come to it briefly.

embellishment but is itself considered and treated as an independent idea. Additionally, the deviation might affect and modify the relationships of the tone contextually, and thus meaningfully change the global design.

Rāga

This view of Chinese philosophy, which sees tones as musical entities and celebrates the unique micro-dimension of the tone deviation within its tonal ecology, is reified, amplified and refined in the aesthetics of the Indian rāga. It teaches that any musical entity, like the tone, is to be understood in the global context of the rāga. It is the complex subliminal play of its 'parts' that, in a sense, make rāga such an intricate idea, at once "singular, multiple, essential and collective" (Meer 2008: 28). *Śrutis*, for example, are defined by Van der Meer as "the minute difference in intonation" (1980: 10); in his book *Hindustani Music in the 20th Century* (1980), Van der Meer explains that they are to be understood as a "tonal [re-]configuration rather than a deviation from a pre-defined pitch ratio" (Ibid.). In this sense the microtonal *śrutis* are dynamic force and full-blooded agents as they, together with the melodic contour and the scale, contribute to the "totality of rāga's sound" (Ibid. 11). On the other hand, even mere ornamentations like the *gamakas* – slides, waves, oscillations, repetitions etc. – are used not only to connect the different pitches, but to animate the 'space' between the tones, to place them, so to speak into a context. *Gamakas* are not assigned arbitrarily, but according to the character of the rāga – they perform their role of 'connectors' or 'blood suppliers' through subtle inflections in pitch, timbre and loudness. *Gamakas* and *śrutis* are only two of the many entities that partake in the creation of the atmosphere of the rāga.[113] Conceived in this manner, rāga becomes a super-entity made up of multiple, relatively autonomous musical entities. Like the machina of the human body made of multiple, heterogeneous, relatively autonomous evolving homunculi? A dangerous thought. The idea somewhat resonates with Daniel Dennett and Susan Blackmore's memetic (machinic) substitution of the notion of a unitary conscious self:

> [The selfplex is] the most insidious and pervasive memeplex of all (…) The selfplex permeates all our experience and all our thinking so that we are unable to see it clearly for what it is – a bunch of memes (Blackmore 2000: 231).

[113] The (fundamental musical) "atmosphere of the rāga" is an expression of Van der Meer (1980: 3).

In this way, conceptually, we can relate the idea of rāga to the idea of self-consciousness.[114]

"Technically, rāga is a musical entity in which the intonation of notes, as well as their relative duration and order, are defined," writes Van der Meer (1980: 3). But this is only a technical aspect; in addition, rāga has an ideational one, an abstract image, "on which one can concentrate and from which inspiration can be derived" (Ibid.). When the technical and ideational aspects are aligned in performance, the measurable, 'scientific' foundation of the rāga is subsumed in the 'magic' presence through which the entity manifests itself.

"These rāgas live and breathe in a way, they have characters and moods that are meant to be evoked by playing" explains sitar player Anoushka Shankar, admitting that it is difficult to put in words all that rāga is (2013). Indeed, there are many attempts to frame the term as idea, concept or mood. Elaborating on the problem of rāga, namely, what is rāga, Van der Meer proposes that one way to understand it is to liken it to a biological species,

> in which every performance is comparable to an individual creature and every formula to a constituent part, a cell or an organ. The rāga rules that we know are nothing but a description of the outer appearance, similar to the description of plants in a flora. The 'DNA structure' of a rāga is something else altogether. What comes closest to defining this 'DNA structure' is the view commonly held by many musicians in India that a rāga is a coherent musical entity, a supernatural power, a deity that one can meditate upon or surrender to (Meer 2008: 29).

Bruno Nettl, too, comments on the paraphysical reality of the rāga. The performer of the *a priori* improvisational rāga (or the Iranian *dastgah* or the Arabic *maqam*), "is giving a rendition of something that already exists, be it a song or a theoretical musical entity. And its basic 'table of contents' is set," remarks Nettl (1974: 8). If we adopt his observations for our purposes, it appears plausible to suggest that each version of rāga Yaman is a Free Will Awareness Unit that varies in grade, scale, and quality, but the rāga itself is an Individuated Unit of Consciousness – a music entity that may or may not emerge in performance.

> We often speak about the face of a rāga. We know and recognize faces immediately (in the Bergsonian sense), not by analyzing the shapes, colors, etc. of the face. When I

[114] "I think tones, tonemes, scales, modes, ornaments are memes, whereas rāgas and [musical] works are memeplexes. I also think entities are memeplexes, whereas tones etc. are subliminal entities or particles…" (Wim van der Meer, personal communication).

> see someone I know, I will say: "Hi Mira." I do not have a list of determinations. That's how rāga works also… if we know it (Van der Meer, personal correspondence 2018).

Does not this act of 'recognition' apply to composed music works and even, in many cases, to compositional music worlds as well? We recognize Chopin, Shostakovich, Wagner – if we know them.

Now that we have considered a few of the phenomena we can regard as musical entities and have agreed that the scope is vast – from the subtle minute explorations of the Tone within its environments, hesitations and becomings to the idea of a unitary musical selfplex of an entity. Next, we shall inquire how and why these entities, as Individuated Units of Consciousness, emerge from Musika to invest in a becoming in Physical Matter Reality.

Musikling. Becoming-music

In Musika tones, tonemes, intervals and chords, organized in rhythm and pattern ensembles, form musical gestures. These are in a way compatible with Campbell's Thoughts, defined as "chunk(s) of fixed or variable content with certain attributes, characteristics and abilities that can be stored, transmitted or used as an operator" (Campbell 2007: 297). The more wide-spread or repetition-prone these musical gesture-thoughts are, the more opaque they become, i.e. from something like a pattern through habit they become something almost like an object.[115] One example of such a robust musical gesture-thought or meme is the interval minor third – the sol-mi chant is fundamental in children's developmental musical psychology, on it are based unidentifiable number of children's songs and lullabies. We could think of these musical 'objects' as packets of meaning with bounded extent, which is not unlike a body (Campbell makes this argument for the existence of thoughts in Nonphysical Matter Reality, see p. 332). These 'bodies' are interacting with other musical 'bodies' and thus they complexify and evolve to where eventually they may be considered an Individuated Unit of Consciousness – a Being in Musika reality frame. Or perhaps not 'being' but something more like an individuated multiplicity or what Deleuze describes as haecceity – "a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance:"

[115] In *The Presence of the Past* (1995) Rupert Sheldrake proposes that things become what they are through habits, while collective memory influences their behavior and form through a morphic resonance. Campbell discusses a similar mechanism on page 474.

> A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected (Deleuze and Guattari 2013: 304).

The musical haecceities as organization of consciousness in Musika Reality Frame are different from us as organization of consciousness, or rather, from the way language has taught us to think of ourselves. We feel the likeness between our two species but are fascinated by the difference. Even when dealing with musical pieces in Physical Reality Frame, we are often perplexed and sometimes frustrated by their slippery nature, by their qualities we simply have no language to express or concepts to fathom coherently. "If you honestly ask yourself what the music piece you play is about," musicologist James Currie writes, "you get an almost orgiastic mental response:"

> (A) lewdly fecund flowering of completely contradictory narratives; magnificently profligate palettes of emotional colors; gestural imaginings dancing with religious epiphanies; jokes in the midst of tragedies, tears dripping down into wide-mouthed smiles (Currie 2010).

Indeed. The music pieces that we cannot pin down even here, in our lawful reality frame, are likely much vaguer in Musika. For convenience and consistency's sake, let us call these multiplicities/haecceities/objects/bodies/entities/beings dwelling in Musika Reality Frame (MRF), Musiklings. Each one of these Musiklings have particular characteristics and flair, they crystalize consciousness information energy in a particular sound body of meaning. The 'denser' the energy or the potential of the Musikling, the greater chance it has to be picked up by a sentient being in Physical Reality Frame (PMR) or other reality frames that work with sound as medium. Campbell describes this state as follows:

> More nonphysical "m" requires, or stores, more nonphysical "E" (as in $E = mc^2$) and requires more Force (focused mental energy with intent) to modify its present state relative to its extant dimensional container (as in $F = ma$) (p. 474).

The F in the second equation (Newton's Second Law) in our case would be the mental energy of the composer. He dives in the Implicate Order, 'tunes in' Musika's bandwidth, and with the force of her intent – or through the Order of movement of attention of Bohm's I discuss in Chapter 1 – is able to modify the inertia or the persistence of a particular potential/energy

in MRF by abstracting, filtering and constraining the latter to the rule set of our dimension. Because in our PMR the 'dimensional container' is spacetime, the informational profile of the Musikling must be filtered – in a sense destroyed – and re-assembled, embodied by particles and waves and calculated as a function of time. The Musikling is reconfigured as a Musinculus with the potential to advance in hierarchy as a Music work and – maybe – to connect and convene with his Individuated Unit of Consciousness (IUOF) through the Musical assemblage of performance. Eventually, the Musinculus, in all its Physical reality evolutions, (hopefully) assists the Musikling in MRF by (hopefully) reducing its entropy and improving the quality of its consciousness. This feedback is the actual goal of the strange intradimensional transformation. The goal is the same for the carbon-based units of consciousness, us humans. Every new experience of my Free Will Awareness Unit – being a mother, or cooking my first Christmas dinner, or writing this book, or communing with Sibelius' *Valse Triste* – has augmented my local and by extension enriched my core consciousness, the IUOC.

(Is the targeted but not necessarily always achieved reduction of entropy worth all the turmoil and suffering one experiences in Physical reality frame? Likely yes, why otherwise we would have chosen to do this? Nobody said learning is easy. Ultimately, we shall wait and see.)

Is the necessary transformation – destruction/ reorganization – of the Musikling conceptualized in MRF's Metaphysics as death? Possibly so. In such a filtered transformation, the modification of the original and its harsh constraining and coding are inevitable compromises both parties need to live with. For the musical IUOC, this is a chance to accumulate experience as a bounded and much more functional, left-brain oriented Free Will Awareness Unit whose learning contributes to reducing IUOC's – and by extend Musika's – entropy.

In other words, the great task before the musical Free Will Awareness Unit is to experience the process of *Being* – the condition the musical entity is wrestling with here, on Earth. As humans suffer under the weight of the human condition, the musical beings must endure the 'musical condition' – as difficult, uncertain, complex, and fleeting, as the human one is.

Special role in these becomings have the Composer and the Performer. For the Composer, the process of filtering and ineffable translation from MRF to PRF could be life-defining, haunting, and addictive, but also laborious and frustrating, marked by bouts of elation

followed by disheartened low states. But at least, once it is done, it's mostly done. The Performer's drama is similarly intense, often amplified. Let us begin with the Composer.

Composer: medium, translator, improviser

> [The composer is] not so much conscious of his ideas as possessed by them. Very often he is unaware of his exact processes of thought till he is through with them. Extremely often the completed work is incomprehensible to him immediately after it is finished (Roger Sessions 2016: 26).

This disclosure belongs to the composer Roger Sessions. In his essay "The Composer and his Message" from 1939 he shares his conviction that music penetrates beyond the conscious specificity of the emotion, to go yet deeper within to the level of some vague and ambiguous gestures, "to the energies that animate our psychic life, and out of these creates a pattern which has an existence, laws and human significance on their own" (Ibid.:19). This animation, Sessions speculates, energizes the emotions and makes them vital to us – which is the essence of musical expressivity.

Igor Stravinsky, to recall, believed that music expresses nothing but itself; typically, he describes the position of the artist as one of a "pig snouting truffles." He was of the conviction that the "composer writes notes" while "music expresses itself," and was disgusted by the crude idea that music may elucidate his innermost feelings. Indeed, the idea of music being a tool for self-expression, or expression of composer's personality or emotions, is not what makes music interesting, believes philosopher Karl Popper, who finds expressivist theories particularly 'empty;' In his *Intellectual Autobiography* he writes: "For everything that a man or an animal can do is (…) an expression of an internal state, of emotions, and of personality. (…) This is not a characteristic of art" (Popper 1982: 62). This understanding of the composer as an intuitive, instinctual 'medium' of music's is, in fact, a plausible description of the artistic situation in terms of the aforementioned 'intradimensional translation'. Popper continues,

> (T)he really interesting function of the composer's emotions is not that they are to be expressed, but that they may be used to test the success or the fittingness or the impact of the work: the composer may use himself as a kind of test body, and he may modify and rewrite his composition (…) when he is dissatisfied by his own reaction to it; or he may even discard it altogether (Popper 1982: 67 emphasis mine).

Drawing a line between Composer and Work as between two entities, Popper suggests that the main aim of the true artist is the perfection of his work: attempts at being original, novel, different, or expressive of own emotions are not only empty, but they interfere with the integrity of the work:

> In a great work of art the artist does not try to impose his little personal ambitions on the work but uses them to serve his work. In this way he may grow, as a person, through interaction with what he does. By a kind of feedback he may gain in craftsmanship and other powers that make an artist (Popper 1982: 52).

The feedback mechanism is, therefore, not only physical, going from composer's own to work's reality, but is also metaphysical, running in the opposite direction – from the work to its 'creator'. Naturally, the question is, how the composer can receive any instructions for personal growth from the work that he himself creates according to his own wishes? "I write only what the music wanted to say," shares Leo Ornstein, one of the longest-living composers (died at the age of 107): "Every composer is a medium of something that he doesn't really know (...) Some make more modifications than others" (Ornstein 1984: 130-131) . . ..

But 'being a medium' does not mean that the music the composer 'hears in his head' and 'pours down on paper' is complete and perfect, and the process – effortless. This myth, however seductive, does not stand up to scrutiny and remains just that, a myth. Chopin, for example, was a "pig snouting truffles," too, like Stravinsky; like Bach, he, too, was thought to be "taking musical dictation from the Lord" (Marschall 2011), but here the rather inert metaphor of Musical God's amanuensis is enriched and extended by a strong creative self-awareness. As early as 20-years-old Chopin has already discovered the delightful and dangerous escapist potential of art, when in a true Byronian spirit he declares, "I shall create a world for myself" (letter to Elsner from December 14th, 1831 in Tad Szulc 1999: 62). A personal world of music, that is. And here we could raise the stakes with the following idea: in his explorations in Musika reality frame Chopin has discovered not simply a few dozens of IUOCs ready to becoming-music, but a whole race of them. Throughout his oeuvre the composer articulates and experiments with organizing the suggestive 'content' of these Musiklings, their relationships and ecologies, and this is what we hear when we listen to Chopin: a world designed by him but inspired by and built with Musika's bricks, in accordance with Musika's modes, climates and geographies. The Chopin style. The brand *CHOPIN*.

In her *Autobiography* from 1854, George Sand remembers the compositional process in Chopin as "spontaneous," and the creation coming to him "suddenly, complete, sublime, or it sang in his head during a walk, and he would hasten to hear it again by, tossing it off on his instrument." We've heard the same story in relation to other Great Composers. The subsequent description, however, reveals rather curious aspects of the relationship between the composer and his creation:

> But then would begin the most heartbreaking labor I have ever witnessed. It was a series of efforts, indecision, and impatience to recapture certain details of the theme he had heard: what had come to him all of a piece [as a right hemisphere action], he now over-analyzed in his desire to write it down [left hemisphere's narrowing the potential to an actuality], and his regret at not finding it again "neat," as he said, would throw him into a kind of despair. He would shut himself up in his room for days at a time, weeping, pacing, breaking his pens, repeating and changing a single measure a hundred times, writing it and effacing it with equal frequency, and beginning again the next day with a meticulous and desperate perseverance. He would spend six weeks on one page, only to end up writing it just as he had traced it in his first outpouring. (Sand 1991: 1109, insertions mine).

Does this memoir account for the difficulties of embodying a musical potential from Musika reality frame into our 3D spacetime physical reality? The composer, as a translator, can capture only so much of the musicality he is channeling. Through his own, he in-forms the Musical in a body, which in the best-case scenario – from the Individuated Unit Of Consciousness' perspective – would be cartoonish, and in the opposite case – ill suited, or simply wrong. Thus, Chopin's anxiety. And thus, a possible explanation of why some scores, however 'normal' and even 'perfect' from PMR point of view, contain impossible, unsatisfactory or unconvincing solutions (see Chopin's discussion in the next chapter). Can't we apply here Glen Gould's logic when, pestered by the apologists of the 'correct' line in performance (notably the historically informed performance police), he dared asking, "What if the composer, as historian, is faulty?" (Gould 1999). Can't we ask in turn, "What if the composer, as translator, is faulty?"

In addition to medium or translator, it is also appropriate to think of the composer as improviser who "performs a version of something [that already exists], not improvising upon

something," as ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl stipulates[116] (1974: 8). For a long time, improvisation has been treated as composition's Other (Cook 2004). In his text "Thoughts on Improvisation" Nettl offers an alternative to the classic and particularly problematic in musicology juxtaposition composition-improvisation – instead of opposing them as two hierarchically related processes,[117] Nettl proposes to see them as parts of the same idea. Different cultures draw different lines between composition and improvisation that might appear at different ends on a continuum, he observes (Ibid.: 7). Even within the European art music, Nettl distinguishes between 'slow' and 'fast' compositions, giving as examples the pensive and difficult creative process of Beethoven's vs. the ease and fluid lightness characterizing much of Schubert's oeuvre (Nettl 1974: 11). The fluid idea of a continuum vs. hierarchy as organizing principle, perhaps unsurprisingly, finds an avid support among jazz researchers. For example, Florida Atlantic University's professors Gould and Keaten maintain that "jazz and classical performers alike interpret their pieces and improvise, doing so;" they argue, echoing Nettl, that "jazz and classical performances differ more in degree than in kind" (2000: 143). Furthermore, the insistence on rigid demarcation lines between composition and improvisation, has transitioned from a theoretical stance to a "dangerous, insensitive, reactionary idea:" it betrays an ideological agenda and/or "unintended racialism" (Cook 2004: 10), or at the very least, an "insufficiently critical awareness of the differences between theory and practice" (Ibid.: 24), musicologist Nicholas Cook argues. Nowadays, it is perfectly plausible to ascertain that a string quartet or a symphony is interpreted in preparation and improvised in performance entity. The composer is an improvisor just like the performer, but out of different need, through different means, and to different effect. In a sense, the musical project as a whole is hangs on our species flexibility, our ability to adapt and improvise. To paraphrase the popular saying, it is improvisations, all the way down.[118]

In summation, here is the gist of composer's task. Through intent/attention, practice, and chance, she tunes in to the Implicate Order of the Musikling and filters a selection of its information down to a subset, according to composer's intuition and understanding (conditioned by pre-compositional virtual musical structure of relationships exemplified by the Ursatz, see Chapter 2), ability, and the available material reserve. The composer walks

[116] Or, in the words of Charlie Mingus: "You can't improvise on nothin', man… you gotta improvise on somethin'" (Kernfeld 1995: 11).

[117] I.e. the hierarchical organization of the composition vs. the heterarchical organization of the improvisation (Cook 2004: 19).

[118] Originally, "It's turtles, all the way down." A version of the anecdote is recounted by Steven Hawking at the opening of *Brief History of Time* (1988).

the edge between the yin and the yang, the receptive and the procreative modes of conduct. On one hand, she is an improviser who selects elements from the substrata: tones, intervals, chords, motifs, parts of melodies, rhythmic codes and riffs, harmonic language, instruments etc. – anything that is already articulated, that she has heard before, has borrowed from others, has invented previously, etc., and organizes them in a 'new' work. But this does not make the composer a clever engineer of memes, an intelligent designer as Daniel Dennett will have us know (Dennett 2017). For, on the other hand, she combines and transforms all bits and patterns – stretches them, pinches them, pulls, compresses, multiplies, teases and tickles them backwards and upside-down – and then mobilizes the content of her personal and private musical archive with the possibilities of the topological Ursatz in order to come as closely as possible to an approximation of what she has 'perceived' with her consciousness – the spirit, the 'message' of the Musikling.

The Score

The composer creates the score. The score is at the base of the art music tradition (and of the tradition of musicology as discipline, too, argues Cook [2004]), it is habitually taken as the one element in the musical assemblage that is solid and tangible. And yet, it too is a matter of diverse interpretations. Is the score a static ocularcentric object (Cook 2004) that patiently waits for a performer to open, read, understand and unleash all the secrets that are composed, inlaid, encoded into it? If that was so, then why we would ever go, each subsequent time, to hear once again a well-known piece – everyone would have played the same, the way it is in the score! Glenn Gould, suspicious of the competence of the composer as historian, treated scores rather slovenly at times: not like a template to be filled with the right colors, but rather like a Biblical allegory with great hidden potential to be excavated through interpretation, like a book waiting to be written.[119] An opposite approach is that of Nelson Goodman, a philosopher and music aestheticist, who made a case for music as a *notational system* and argued that the identity of the music work is to be found precisely in the score, as the sole concrete reference available of the music work: "Where the works are transitory, as in singing or reciting, or require many persons for their production… a notation may be devised in order to transcend the limitations of time and the individual" (Goodman 1976: 121). In this way, Goodman identifies the music (work) with the score. For another music thinker, the philosopher Kendall Walton, the music work is reduced to hierarchically organized sound patterns and the instrumentation prescribed, "*minus*

[119] Jeremy Denk in "Bach's Music – Bach Then and Right Now" (2012) defines the score as "at once a book and a book waiting to be written."

whatever advice for good performance it contains" (2015: 234) – a significant subtraction. Walton considers scores as patterns that layout the rules for correct performance, the instruction concerning interpretation are 'ornamentation' on the face of the stable core template that is the score.

. . . I see the score as the interface between the composer and the performer. The score as interface is, indeed, the body of the music work. In it, the composer has specified genetic information and has engineered the DNA of the work, while the performer as an epigenetic agent decides which genes to be switched on or off and therefore which characteristics the work will demonstrate and embody. The performance plays the role of the environment – the third powerful factor of the evolution/becoming of the complex compound entity that is the music work – no environment, no life.

In other words, where the Composer is the architect, the Performer is the interior designer; where the former is the prophet of Musika, the latter is its priest. The Composer prescribes the sound palette, the form, function, materials, rhythmic relationships and relational patterns – everything that can be specified in concrete notational symbols and that provides the foundations, the outlook and the basic ethos of a possible house. These instructions are necessarily detailed in the score. In order for this house to become a home, however, a new agent is needed, the Performer, who is to deconstruct and reconstruct the score-house, to inspirit and design it as a unique abode with spaces for rest and rumble, with singular carpeting and lighting solutions . . ..

As life is impossible without its double, so this deconstructing and decoding (and consecutive reconstructing and recoding) of the score is very much like a second death for the musical entity. First it dies in order to crossover from MRF to PRF, and the result of the spacetime reconstruction is reflected in the score – in Composer's Own image. Then, the Performer as a Hero proceeds to taking apart and dismembering the score in order to assemble and resurrect a real living entity, to bring it to consciousness again – in Performer's own image.

In this way, the performer is the secondary creator of the music entity.

Performer: zealot, oracle, exegetist

But let us go behind this last statement.

So far, I have proposed that the composer connects through intent (after Campbell) or through the Order of attention (after Bohm) to the Implicate Order of a musical IUOC, a

Musikling, whose perceived meaning as organized Musika content she captures and codes into sounds and symbols, into the Score.[120] A score of any kind is a general diagram with basic instructions of what patterns of sounds are to be produced so the Musinculus be informed and, ideally, how to per-form the Musinculus so the particular IUOC to be emulated. These instructions are to be further deconstructed, filtered and then translated – improvised! – through the bodymind of the Performer. This feat requires a lot of skill, talent, attention, devotion, and is predestined to failure. The Performer, in a sense, is someone who just got to be comfortable with failing. For recreating what Composer has put in the score is not unlike attempting to recreate an old recipe written with obsolete units of measurements and with some ingredients that need substitution and others missing, with a method that calls for a meticulous manual labor made redundant today by technologies like mixers, blenders and freezers, and that calls for unreasonably particular purpose-made vessels – no matter how hard one tries, the 'original' taste simply cannot be recreated.[121]

. . . Before the Performer (interpreter/improviser) stands an almost unsurmountable and nothing short of heroic task – to connect the dots mapped in the score, to open an unknown abyss, to imagine a strange monster, to bring it to life, to stand up straight before it, to endure its breath, and then, barely comprehending its utter alterity, to publicly make love with it with such conviction, so the vibration pierces through dimensional walls and calls the IUOC. As love is like death, the reward for lovemaking with a dragon must be the same as the one for dragonslaying: when the Hero slays the Dragon he receives Dragon's power.

In their devotion to the Score, Performers come in all shape and color; the range is wide – from Zealots through Oracles to Exegetical Commentators. The first group treats the Score as a Gospel. Sviatoslav Richter, for example, insists that

> The interpreter is really an executant, carrying out the composer's intentions to the letter. He doesn't add anything that isn't already in the work. (...) He shouldn't dominate the music, but should dissolve into it (...) from the beginning I was always certain that, for each work, it was in this way, and no other, that it had to be played. Why? It's very simple: because I looked closely at the score. That's all that's required to reflect what it contains (Monsaingeon 2002:153).

[120] A scaled-down version of this process is performed by the Ethnomusicologist who codes live traditional music, to be perceived by a foreign temperament and unsophisticated ear, onto the staffs of Western notation system.

[121] In a similar vein, Michael Pollan makes an excellent case for bread (2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ide8N14CevI

Pianist András Schiff, too, seems to share this view: apropos the big leap the left hand is supposed to take at the beginning of Beethoven's Hammerklavier Sonata op.109, he comments, "Well, yes, it's really dangerous at that speed, but that's how it's supposed to be. You know, I would rather cut my hand off than divide that leap between the two hands, the way some pianists do" (Hewett 2008). On the other end of the continuum are artists like Glenn Gould or Ivo Pogorelich, for whom the Score is more like a hieroglyph to be interpreted, a vehicle of ideas, a subject of exegesis. A third kind of psychology is demonstrated by those I named 'Oracles'. By this term I mean to stress the mediumistic nature of the performer artist, discussed previously; it is exemplified in the statement of Japanese composer Kawabata Makoto, who says:

> Music, for me, is neither something I create, nor a form of self-expression. All kinds of sounds exist everywhere around us, and my performances solely consist of picking up these sounds, like a radio-tuner, and playing them so that people can hear them. However, maybe because my reception is somewhat off, I am unable to perfectly reproduce these sounds. That is why I spend my days rehearsing (Makoto 2000).

Ultimately, the debate pro or con interpretation seems to be missing the point, given that interpretation lays deeply in our deals with reality – our very *Umwelt* is an interpretation. Here I side with literary critic and polymath George Steiner, who writes that the performer "invests his whole being in the process of interpretation. His readings, his enactments of chosen meanings and values (…) are commitment at risk, a response which is, at the root sense, responsible" (1991: 8). As a musical entity, the Performer is the priest of Musika, engaged daily in an unimaginable set of bizarre rituals that help maintaining the connection to the other side, feeding the conviction that she can do it again, nourishing the courage to actually do it. Can she do it, again? The great performers are neither ordinary people, nor their lives are ordinary lives, for they are wrestling with some most unordinary matters.[122] Glamorous surfaces, unimaginable chasms. To take Sviatoslav Richter, again. For a few years in his later life, he was suffering from a disconnect between the hemispheres, revealed into a separation of right- and left-hand music's hearing; this resulted in playing in two different keys. For a career performer, this must have been devastating. The pianist also suffered from frequent obsessions, once fell victim of a melody he could not trace down that drove him "nearly mad," other time he became possessed by an aggressive chord based on a diminished

[122] "You cannot play this volcanic repertoire and live like a petit bourgeois. We don't belong with nappies in our hand. We do what we have to do. Anything else is a lie" exclaims one of the characters in Conrad Williams' *The Concert Pianist* from 2006, p. 220.

seventh that followed him everywhere and would not resolve. On a more manic note, Richter is famous for his lobster episode – in 1974, when suffering from a deep depression, he started carrying a pink plastic lobster everywhere and most notably, on stage, and fell in despair if the lobster was not there for his performance. These and other anecdotes are recalled by Errol Morris in an uncommonly perceptive article in *New York Times* from 2019, titled "The Pianist and The Lobster." Morris dives into the depths of Performer's psyche to surface with more than a few insights. "Being able to do something means thinking, believing that you are able to do it. It's not enough to have the skill to play the piano. Something *more* is needed" (Morris 2019). This chilling proposition is followed, somewhat unsurprisingly, by the question, "What if every performer needs a lobster?"

What a good question this is, I thought when I read it. As a performer, I know too well the sickly misery of stage fever. Once, I must have been 13 or 14 years old, I was waiting for my turn to play a piano piece in the theater hall of my hometown; I do not remember the occasion, but it was a mixed concert with a number of performers and artists participating. Backstage, I was quietly steeping in dread, as usual. Then, shortly before my turn was up, for the first and the last time in my life, I was able to spellbind myself, to come up with a personal something that performed a magic trick on me. It was like I was graced by the presence of a Thought-being. Its power was such that the disgusting anxiety in my stomach was suppressed and almost dissipated, and I was able to do the deed in a bizarre, supernatural calm. Ever since I have been trying to recreate the spell, to no avail. Either I do not remember the thought precisely, or I put the words incorrectly, or I do that part well but something else, something of demonic nature, is missing. It happened like this: Vacantly scanning the rows of people sitting in the hall through a small gap between the curtains, I was trying to convince myself that all those people did not care about me, personally, and about my playing, they just came for a concert. "Just if I am able to play it now, any which way, all this will be over" … but of course I knew too well that everyone was here, secretly, for me and they will count every tone and gasp at every mistake, and it is all life or death, a triumph or defamation. Then, a Thought came: "Nothing now depends on you" or "Now, it is not up to you anymore." Whatever the thought was, it allowed me to relax and isolate the 'myself' who was wriggling in agony from the 'I' of my 'performing bodymind' who has practiced this piece for months (It was *Love Dream* by Liszt). I 'just played' the piece, as if dreaming, and then went home . . ..

The something, the 'more than this,' the ineffable, the demonic – that which has nothing to do with notes and keys or muscles or practice – is it really the 'I' the one who is in charge on

stage? If this was the case, wouldn't we always be able to recreate our greatest successes, or at least best stage dispositions, to just go out there and play what we have practiced, without the torment?[123] Put in perspective, Richter could be considered even lucky that he has been able to formalize the something as a pink plastic lobster. Certainly, he is not alone. Before performance, pianist Jeremy Denk tries to eat spaghetti and meatballs and gets upset if he cannot find them; he always travels with a special coffee equipment and everyday drinks the equivalent of 50 coffee beans – the amount Beethoven is said to have crunched everyday (Morris 2019). And, yes, Denk has a little demon doll, which he brings to recording and editing sessions, "to just somehow make it easier" (Ibid.). Pianist Gregory Sokolov is said to be taking apart each piano before concert and to be taking notes about its mechanics (Church 2008). In order to get on stage, Vladimir Sofronitsky, another genius pianist of the recent past, had to imagine that he is under twelve layers of armor (Itin 2019). Glenn Gould was soaking his hands and wrists up to the elbows in nearly boiling water (Clarkson 2010). Arthur Rubinstein was (said to) not being able to perform if his wife was in the audience (Ibid.) . . .. Pianist Zsolt Bognar sums it well: "For me, (stage) can be (a place of) joy, but it is often arrived at through a very convoluted process of suffering" (Itin 2019).

The becoming of each and every entity is composed and conditioned by uncertainties and conjectures. Along the joys, elations and opportunities, there are disadvantages, lack and pain – for the Musical and the Physical alike. When giving voice to the Music work, the musical entity we call 'Performer' suspends her identity and lends the work her self-conscious 'I'. Thus, the Music work is performed, literally, by and from a deeper source of consciousness.

Musical assemblage

Finally, we arrive at one of the most important concepts, central for understanding Musical entities in general and more specifically, the Music work:[124] the Musical assemblage. It is the

[123] The conscious vs. the nonconscious, the 'I' vs. the 'Me" – I discuss the dynamics in the Intermission *On Practice*.

[124] Here in most cases in this thesis I use the term 'music work' in a more general sense, as a metastable meme with some endurance, and not necessarily in the specific sense of Lydia Goehr's, for example, as the conceived and perceived as autonomous, imperishable musical masterpiece a.k.a. 'work-concept' – notion, which according to Goehr acquired momentum at the turn of 19th century, notably in Germany, and whose rise and rein throughout and beyond the era of the Romanticism is

cradle, the territory, the medium of the Music work. Nicholas Cook defines the music work as a bundle or collocation of "attributes that may be variously selected, combined, and incorporated within any given actualization of the music's meaning" (2007: 232). And also, as "unstable aggregates of potential signification" (Ibid.). Researcher, composer and performer Paolo de Assis defines the music work as a metastable construction. In the music ontology I develop, the Music work is a nonlinear, nonlocal, compound, heterogeneous entity that could be regarded both as an entity, e.g. the Free Will Awareness Unit that emerges in performance, and as a Musical assemblage that is the performance itself. As we already looked into some of the major musical entities, let us now briefly consider the Musical assemblage.

The Musical assemblage is a kind of musical entity itself and, simultaneously, the modus operandi, the procedure, the technology, or even the method through which a musical entity becomes – the epitome of the so-called 'musical condition'. The Musical assemblage, after Deleuze, is a dynamic come-together of human and non-human becomings, of material and non-material components, of discursive and non-discursive elements, or *concreta* and *abstracta*. The Musical assemblage functions as an organizer of a virtual musical consciousness potential, achieved through arrangement and amalgamation of various sentient consciousness (material- and immaterial-) becomings. It rises through the collaborative experiences and practices of the following components:

physicality of the perceived sounds,

Composer's legacy (where such is available),

Performer's consciousness,

Trace (scores and score-like texts, like the 12-bar blues chord progression, for example),

'Listener(s)' (where there is a distinction between performer and listener),

material reserve (instruments, the acoustics of the auditory space, technological means etc.),

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accompanied by other similarly dubious constructs, e.g. "the Great man," the "absolute music." See more in *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* (Oxford 1992).

> immaterial reserve (sketches, drafts, editions through time, performing styles, listening expectations, criticality),
>
> and various extra-musical expressions and non-musical considerations (the dress of the performer, her age, the aesthetics of the space, e.g. geometry and design of the stage, the quantity and quality of the audience, i.e. the number of listeners, their level of participation, attention, listening culture as attitude/appreciation etc., how un/usual is the venue for the style/genre of the piece, in what historical moment the performance takes place, the level of exposure of the audience to the piece performed etc.).

All these components of the assemblage coalesce in the action of the Performance. One of the most important capacities of the musical assemblage in action is that it sounds out what the score does not account for – "the normally silent back channels of social interaction" (Cook 2004) – which it transforms into something directly perceivable. It is through the 'back channels' that the disclosure meaning of Watt and Ash's 'virtual person' runs. As Nicholas Cook writes,[125]:

> [t]he 'story-line' corresponds to the repertory item being performed, while the act of performance corresponds to the back channels, generating meanings that run in parallel with, contextualize, modify, qualify, or perhaps contradict those inherent in or associated with the composition (Cook 2004).

When all of the elements of the assemblage harmonize, when the becomings of all the components align in the spacetime of the performance, the result of their alignment is a crystallization – "a transitory condensation of transitory experience" (Chou 1998: 309-310). But the result, although aimed at, is not a given, there are stages, scope and sequence, what-ifs and a bit of demonology. Let us see.

The Performance as a physical actualization of the Music work is the first articulation of the musical assemblage. During its course a second, more refined, more subtle articulation of the assemblage may or may not emerge – one that is local and happens only here and now. Its event depends on the quality of tuning and alignment between the plane of the audience, itself an assemblage of collective consciousness, and the plane of the musical assemblage

[125] The 'back channels' vs. 'the main line' or 'story line' tracks are the two attentional tracks social psychologist Ervin Goffmann discusses in his 'face-to-face social interaction model, which Matthew Battlefield applies to jazz and Nicholas Cook, in turn, to performance.

described above. On this second, contingent articulation of the assemblage depends whether the entity of the Musical Individuated Unit of Consciousness manifests or not.

The Performance has three scenarios (or shall we say, three evolutions):

Scenario I (default): The two planes – performance and audience – come close together; they touch politely and lightly engage in a small talk. For a variety of reasons, the sounding Music work remains at a Musinculus level. Result: the right notes at the right time, familiar tune, appropriate culminations, satisfied anticipations, pleasantness, enculturation, applause, bow, flowers, ice cream, home, TV, bed.

Scenario II (experience): The two planes are overimposing, somewhat, and comingling, somewhat. The components of the Music work interact with the audience's awareness, attention and intent through an Implicate Order, and as a result a musical Free Will Awareness Unit (FWAU) is co-created, imagined, encountered. The FWAU is as particular and unique as each Performance and Audience is, yet the perceived difference between different FWAUs is more a matter of nuance (or quantity) than quality. Beethoven's 5th is here, it is being played at this very moment, it is being listened at this very moment, it has willed itself into the Hall, imposing itself upon you. The becoming of the musical Free Will Awareness Unit is loud and clear, as anyone can hear. Result: thoughts, memories, ideas, plans and wonder, wine and tapas, deep talks, "I can change all this!", home, another day.

Scenario III (borderline): The two planes – the Performance assemblage and the Audience assemblage – merge. Their respective elements are precariously and finely tuned and can now harmonize with the elements of the other assemblage in the shared spacetime. One collective consciousness merges with another, enfolded into an Implicate Order. A second articulation of the musical assemblage is taking place, during which the Free Unit of Consciousness is embodied, made palpable, visceral, in a way – visible. The speeds and affects of the Musical assemblage align with the speeds and affects of the people in the Hall. The Musical's intensities are met and matched by the Physical's intensities. There might be other, necessary for the effect, variables, too. Deleuze reminds us that in demonology the diabolical act is conditioned and dependent on the importance of "rain, hail, wind, pestilential air, on air polluted by noxious particles" (Deleuze and Guattari 2013: 304) – which collectively secure favorable conditions for the cursed act. Perhaps there is some demonology at work in this ultimate Musical assemblage scenario, too. However it is, it all happens on the interface between the first and the second articulation of the assemblage – when all conditions and factors, objects, rituals and agents necessarily involved in the event

merge with a unified, pliable, mesmerized audience in the right spacetime moment. At that rare moment of cosmic constellation something special occurs. A Musical being is present. Technical and ideational aspects align. The entity of the *rāga* is manifested – you can see her movements in your mind's eye. The merge spells the difference between a 'good,' 'fine!' and 'cathartic' musical experience.

(It is important to open a caveat here and underline an often-downplayed aspect of the musical performance – that for hundreds of millennia of human (pre)history it was simultaneously the call, the reason and the motivation for communities' assemblies. The ultimate social activity and the prime means for social cohesion, music was the essential way of binding people and helping them share their humanity. Then, we all were (more or less) equal, active musickers with no perceived hierarchization and demarcation between composer, performer and audience. Today, psychologist Oliver Sacks reminds us, this primal role of music is mostly lost. Today we have to go to church, concert or a music festival to reexperience "the collective excitement and bonding of music:"

> In such a situation music is a communal experience, and there seems to be [...] an actual binding or "marriage" of nervous systems, a "neurogamy"[126] (to use a word the early mesmerists favored). The binding is accomplished by rhythm ... [which] turns listeners into participants, makes listening active and motoric and synchronizes brains and minds (and, since emotion is always intertwined with music, the "hearts") of all who participate (Sacks 2007: 244-245).

Should we fancy to investigate the usage of the suggestive term neurogamy – here referred to as binding of nervous systems – we will quickly trace it to elaborations as "glimpse into [soul's] secret workshop," and even as "a spiritual reproduction through spiritual mating" (Bell 2005: 180). Is not this that happens in the performance of music when the musical Free will awareness unit graces – or not – the musickers with its presence? The attention and the intentions of all present musickers bind – or tune in – or align to where, as Peterson says, all levels of reality are placed in a harmonious relationship with the logic of the sounds already incepted as musical cathedral. The resulting plentitude of patterns is staggering, and even though their explicit 'meaning' cannot be easily abstracted, it cannot be denied either.)

[126] On neurogamy or the fundamental 19th century idea of animal magnetism see Matthew Bell's *The German Tradition of Psychology in Literature and Thought, 1700 – 1840* (2005), pp. 167-208.

In such rare and extraordinary moment of relentless beauty you could feel awe, you could be overwhelmed by emotions, you could be transported somewhere, floating in a moment of transcendence. *Lux aeterna, Domine, quia pius es*,[127] invokes Claudio Abbado's *Requiem* at the end of conductor's last performance (Abbado 2012). But the entity that has been evoked and manifested may not necessarily be godly and not even goodly. Amidst your unforgettable, cathartic musical transfixion you could also experience guilt, shame, lust, confusion, and heartache; you may feel like the *homo reus*[128] from Lacrimosa who has risen from the dead to be judged by the entity – God or demon. Music has power, and power has no morality. The flammable unpredictability of its communion with our consciousness is what makes music so exciting.

Because this third evolution of the Musical assemblage is most interesting to me, I explore it in some detail in the last block of text of this book, called InterZone. There, I recognize it a as the Body without Organs.

The Body without Organs is as close as we will ever get to an Individuated Unit of Musical Consciousness.

127 The end of the Requiem, (Eternal light, God) because Thou are merciful.

128 The guilty man.

IV INTERSECTION

The Musikon

The Musikling, the Musical Free Will Awareness Unit, the Musinculus, the Individuated unit of consciousness, the Music work. . .. Truthfully, the amount of neologisms and concepts introduced is ample and colorful, but is it justified? Do we need all these music creatures and why? At this point these would be some fair questions. Here is my answer. I invite you to conceptualize with me the musical entity as a Pokémon-like phenomenon. Pokémon is a Japanese media franchise started in 1996 as a video game and proliferated into card games, manga series, anime- and live action film series, books, to become the highest-grossing media franchise of all times. It fosters a hyperlinked, rich, interactive, involved mythology whose main characters are these magical creatures, called Pokémons. The word stands for "Pocket Monster." There are a few aspects of the Pokémon that are of interest here. One of them is the fact that the Pokémons are in a tight interdependent relationship with humans, called Pokémon Trainers – the latter needs to catch a wild Pokémon and train it for a combat with others. The idea is not particularly politically correct,[129] but is weirdly reminiscent of the way we still treat music and music works: on the one side of the portal roam these magical creatures, these strange monsters, and on the other – we humans. Our relationship? We humans made them, we humans own them, we humans train them. "Gotta Catch 'Em All![130]"

The more interesting aspect of the Pokémon, however, is that the creature is able to undergo metamorphosis and to transform into a similar but stronger species of Pokémon: the process, called 'evolution,' occurs spontaneously under differing circumstances. Some species of Pokémon may undergo a maximum of two evolutionary transformations, while others only one, and yet others may not evolve at all. It is only the Pokémon called Eevie that has achieved eight evolutions. Similarly, the Musical entity as a complex polysemic virtual phenomenon, or a cluster of related phenomena, manifests different characteristics at different circumstances, or upon different considerations, to different effect. The dimension the music entities inhabit is a hyperlinked, rich, interactive, involved dimension, like

[129] The franchise has drawn a lot of controversy and criticism, receiving a plethora of blames, from gambling, occultism, anti-Semitism, and violence promotion to animal cruelty. The list is not exhaustive.

[130] The English slogan for the franchise.

Pokémon universe. Some of the numerous species and evolutions of musical entities I have already named. Those, in no particular order, are Musical assemblage, Musical Free Will Awareness Unit, Musical Individuated Unit of Consciousness, Musinculus, the Music work, Musikling, the Composer, the Performer, Musika, Rāga, Tone. Depending on the occasion, I use different term, referring to the different qualities and attributes or functions of the phenomenon. When, for example, I want to underline its aliveness I may use the term 'Musical Entity;' when I want to stress its mechanical, physical, contrived and art-ificial aspect – 'Musinculus;' 'Musikling' signifies the status of an agent inhabiting particular ecology, a reality frame like 'Musika;' the 'Music work' brings forth the solid core that endures through all the transformations – the initial diagram, the blueprint. . . and so on. In order to highlight the common point, the likeness, the similarity between all these musical creatures, in order to consolidate them and to points at their common denominator, hereby I introduce one more neologism, the last one – the Musikon. The Musikon is a general ontological category, an umbrella term denoting the connections and relations between musical entities, on the one hand, and the singularity and fine distinctions between these entities – on the other.