Universiteit Leiden
The Netherlands

Adding fuel to the conflict: How gas reserves complicate the Cyprus question

Karakasis, V.P.

Citation
Karakasis, V. P. (2020, October 15). *Adding fuel to the conflict: How gas reserves complicate the Cyprus question*. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/137884

Version:	Publisher's Version
License:	Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden
Downloaded from:	https://hdl.handle.net/1887/137884

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page

Universiteit Leiden

Leiden University Repository

The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/137884 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

Author: Karakasis, V.P.
Title: Adding fuel to the conflict : how gas reserves complicate the Cyprus question
Issue Date: 2020-10-15

Appendices

APPENDIX 1: RECRUITMENT OF INTERVIEWEES

With respect to the Republic of Cyprus, one of the key figures I interviewed is Nikos Rolandis, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1983) and Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (1998-2003) in the coalition-government formed up by the late President Clerides. During his incumbency in the latter Ministry (which included the portfolio of Energy), N. Rolandis had been the pioneer in setting the offshore oil and gas reserves of Cyprus in the political agenda. In Cairo, on February 17, 2003, he signed an Agreement delineating the Exclusive Economic Zones of Cyprus and Egypt -the first delimitation agreement signed in the Eastern Mediterranean. His insights into the domestic and external challenges he met while bringing this problem up, the main lessons he drew out from his experience along with his predictions on the future monetization of the gas reserves, are the main stimulants that prompted the interview with him. I approached, among others, Dr. Charles Ellinas, Greek-Cypriot in origin, CEO of Cyprus-based energy consultancy e-CNHC at the time of our interview. He has served as a CEO for the Cypriot National Hydrocarbon Company (KRETYK) and has over thirty-five years of experience in the oil and gas sector. His business-oriented approach has been considered more than useful in putting forward the economic challenges and prospects that the monetization of gas reserves might encounter in the future. I also discussed this topic with Dr. Tsakiris, who is Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Energy Policy at the University of Nicosia's Business School and the director of the Energy & Geopolitics Program at Greece's seminal Foreign Policy think-tank ELIAMEP. His deep knowledge on the energy field would provide me insights on which monetization options would be the most feasible ones for the Greek-Cypriots.

I also talked to Pr. Theophanous, currently Director of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, who had also served as Economic Advisor to Georgios Vasiliou, former President of the Republic of Cyprus (September 1990-February 1993). A set of questions related to the political economy of the Cyprus conflict as well as the limitations in establishing a federated state was addressed to him. I engaged in an interesting discussion with Dr. Constantinos Adamides, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Nicosia, who serves too as a member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus. The questions he was called to address concentrated on his research expertise in securitization, energy security and energy geopolitics. I also interviewed Dr. Moudouros, member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus and adviser to the former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias (2008-2013) on Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot issues. His deep knowledge of the developments in the Turkish-Cypriot side and his understanding of the geopolitical 'viewpoints' explaining the Turkish behaviour around the Island, offered significant insights into our concourse. Similar questions were posed to Dr. Tziarras, whose expertise and research interests lie in Turkish politics and foreign policy. I also interviewed, the Greek-Cypriot Associate Professor on History, Michael N. Michael in order to identify the roots of the Greek-Cypriot nationalism.

Furthermore, I contacted Dr. Tzimitras in the UN Buffer Zone, the Greek Director of Peace Research Institute Olso (PRIO) Cyprus Centre. Before joining PRIO, Dr. Tzimitras held a post at Istanbul Bilgi University, where he was both the director of the International Relations master's programme and the Director of the Turkish-Greek studies division. Having conducted a detailed report on the hydrocarbons' issue[1] and organized several international conferences on this topic, he was considered the person that could enlighten us on the legal dimensions of the question at stake and on the conflictual milieu within which the energy debate unfolds. Table 11.1 lists the people we interviewed for this purpose.

From the Turkish-Cypriot side, I had an interesting conversation with Pr. Kızılyürek, former advisor to President Nicos Anastasiades on Turkish affairs in the Geostrategic Advisory Council, and former Dean of the Faculty of Humanities in the University of Cyprus. He currently serves as a member of the European Parliament. His insights into the amalgam of sociological and psychological factors that sustain the intransigent position of the conflicting sides shed light on the intractable nature of this conflict. I also interviewed the former Turkish-Cypriot negotiator and founder of 'The People's Party' in the northern side, Pr. Kudret Özersay, in order to understand the challenges he experienced during the negotiations, and to better comprehend whether and how the energy developments got intertwined with the reunification talks in 2011 and 2014. Dr. Kahveci -with her expertise in energy politics- spelled out the main economic concerns of the Turkish-Cypriots over the future monetization of the gas reserves as well as the prospects of the water pipeline -between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side- as a negotiation tool in the future of the reunification talks. Dr. Ayla Gürel, Senior Research Consultant of PRIO, whose research concerned the issue of hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation offshore Cyprus, delineated the stakes both sides are met with in the hydrocarbons' issue. I also talked to Pr. Ahmet Sözen -Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU) - former member of the Turkish-Cypriot team in the UN-led peace negotiations, who set forth the limitations that the conflict resolution approaches deal with when it comes to their application on the Cyprus conflict. With respect to the Turkish-Cypriot side, the persons we contacted are listed in Table 1.2.

[1] Gürel Ayrel, Mullen Fionna, Tzimitras Harry (2013), 'The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios', in *PRIO Cyprus Center Report*

Table 1.1. Interviewees in the Republic of Cyprus (in chronological order)

Name of the interviewee	Professional Expertise	Date of interview	Code for the interviewee
Dr. Michalis N. Michael	Associate Professor of History at the University of Cyprus	8.11.2014	Interviewee 1
Dr. Nikos Moudouros	Member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus and adviser to the former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias (2008-2013) on Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot issues	18.11.2014	Interviewee 2
Pr. Andreas Theophanous	Director of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs and Ex Economic Advisor to former President of the Republic of Cyprus (September 1990-February 1993), Georgios Vasiliou	19.11.2014	Interviewee 3
Dr. Constantinos Adamides	Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Nicosia, member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus	30.11.2015	Interviewee 4
Dr. Zenon Tziarras	Associate Lecturer at UCLAN with expertise in Turkish politics and foreign policy	3.12.2015	Interviewee 5
Dr. Charles Ellinas	CEO of Cyprus-based energy consultancy e-CNHC and former CEO for the Cypriot National Hydrocarbon Company (KRETYK)	4.12.2015	Interviewee 6
Dr. Thodoros Tsakiris	Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Energy Policy at the University of Nicosia's Business School, Research Associate of ESCP's London-based Research Center for Energy Management, director of the Energy & Geopolitics Program at Greece's seminal Foreign Policy think-tank ELIAMEP	10.11.2015	Interviewee 7
Nikos Rolandis	- Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1983) and Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism in the coalition-government formed up by the late President Clerides	11.12.2015	Interviewee 8
Dr. Harry Tzimitras	Director of PRIO (Peace Research Institute of Oslo)	21.12.2015	Interviewee 9

Table 1.2. Turkish-Cypriot Interviewees (in chronological order)

Name of the interviewee	Professional Affiliation-Expertise	Date of interview	Code name for the interviewee
Dr. Ayla Gürel	Senior Research Consultant of PRIO	11.11.2014	Interviewee 10
Pr. Ahmet Sözen	Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU)- former member of the Turkish-Cypriot team in the UN-led peace negotiations	17.11.2014	Interviewee 11
Pr. Niyazi Kızılyürek	Member of the European Parliament (2019-2024)- first Turkish-Cypriot to ever achieve this/advisor to the Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades on Turkish affairs in the Geostrategic Advisory Council, and Dean of the Faculty of Humanities in the University of Cyprus	20.11.2014	Interviewee 12
Dr. Hayriye Kahveci	Analyst in energy politics	1.12.2015	Interviewee 13
Pr. Kudret Özersay	Former Turkish-Cypriot negotiator and founder of 'The People's Party'	18.12.2015	Interviewee 14

APPENDIX 2: TYPE OF QUESTIONS IN OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEWS

Type of open-ended interview questions for the field research in 2014	Type of open-ended interview questions for the field research in 2015
The historical component of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses	The energy component of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses
What are the main impediments in reaching a settlement and looking at the win-win side in exploiting these gas reserves	What is the importance of the gas reserves for you
What difficulties emerged from the protracted conflict	What geopolitical and/or economic factors have to be examined
Which factors make the conflict sustain	What kind of lessons can you draw from international experience and how do they apply in the realities of the Eastern Mediterranean
How does the one side view the other	Which alternatives exist for the Greek-Cypriots to export their gas reserves

APPENDIX 3: BIDDERS FOR THE 2ND ROUND

Company/Consortium	Country of Origin
Petra Petroleum Inc	Canada
ATP East Med No 2 / Naphtha Israel Petroleum / DOR Chemicals / Modiin Energy	USA/Israel/Israel/Israel
Total	France
Total / Novatek / GazpromBank	France/Russia/Russia
Premier Oil/Vitol	UK/UK
Premier Oil / Vitol / Petronas	UK/UK/Malaysia
Edison / Delek Drilling / Avner Oil / Enel / Woodside	Italy/Israel/Israel/Italy/Australia
Eni/Kogas	Italy/South Korea
AGR Energy / CO Cyprus Opportunity Energy	Norway/Israel
Oak Delta NG Exploration	USA/Israel
Capricorn Oil / Marathon Oil / Orange Nassau Energie / CC Energie	UK/USA/Netherlands/Lebanon
Winevia Holdings	Cyprus
RX-Drill Energy Cyprus	Cyprus
PT Energy Mega Persada & Frastico Holdings	Indonesia/Canada/Cyprus
Emmannuelle Geoglobal Rosario	Israel

Source: (Poten & Partners 2012)

APPENDIX 4: BIDDERS FOR THE 3RD ROUND

Block	Company or Consortium	Operator
6	ENI Cyprus Limited/Total E&P Cyprus B.V	ENI Cyprus Limited
8	Capricorn Oil (Cairn Energy from the UK) /Delek Drilling / Avner Oil Exploration	Capricorn Oil
	ENI Cyprus Limited	ENI Cyprus Limited
10	ENI Cyprus Limited/Total E&P Cyprus B.V	ENI Cyprus Limited
	ExxonMobil Exploration and Production Cyprus (Offshore) Limited /Qatar Petroleum International Upstream O.P.C	ExxonMobil
	Statoil Upsilon Netherlands B.V.	Statoil Upsilon Netherlands B.V.

Source: (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry 2016)

APPENDIX 5: THE DISPUTE OVER THE AEGEAN

Turkey's position is that UNCLOS Articles 3 (on the breadth of territorial sea), 33 (on the contiguous zone) and 121 (on the international jurisprudence on islands) imperil Turkey's interests in the Aegean. In the early 1970s, the discovery of oil off the Greek island Thasos set off the tension between Greece and Turkey over continental shelf rights in the Aegean. According to the Greek side's official stance, the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean is the only dispute dividing the two sides. Furthermore, it considers it to be of a purely legal nature and therefore only amenable to a judicial solution (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017a, Tzimitras 2012, Syrigos 2014). From Turkey's standpoint, the dispute in Aegean should be treated as a set of four separate (and interrelated sometimes) issues: (1) the delimitation of the maritime boundaries and continental shelf including claims over the sovereignty of small islets and rocks; (2) the breadth of territorial waters; (3) control of the airspace beyond the territorial waters and (4) Greece's militarization of its Eastern Aegean islands (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017; Karakasis, 2019).

With respect to (2), at this moment, Greece's territorial sea is at 6nm. Under the current status, Greece controls 43.5% of the Aegean, while Turkey's territorial sea covers 7.5% of the area (the remaining 49% is high seas). Nevertheless, the Greece's position is that customary international law, as codified in Article 3 of UNCLOS, grants it the right to extend its territorial sea to 12nm (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017a). Although Turkey has exercised this right in Black Sea[2] and the EM, in the Aegean it keeps a territorial sea of 6nm. During the negotiation stage of the UNCLOS, Turkey had made proposals (that failed to be adopted) obligating the coastal states surrounding enclosed or semi-enclosed seas (like the Aegean which is regarded in the Turkish view as a *sui generis* case) to define the breadth of their territorial seas by agreement (Bahçeli 1990, 142). After its failure to get her proposals across, Turkey has projected itself as a persistent objector to the extension of territorial sea in the Aegean considering the convention as *res inter alios acta,* i.e. a treaty that can only be binding to the signing parties but not to others.

Turkey went a step further. After Greece ratified the UNCLOS (Law 2321/1995), Turkey's Grand Assembly issued a resolution on June 8, 1995, which authorized the Turkish government to undertake all necessary measures, including military steps, deemed necessary to defend Turkey's vital interests (Republic of Turkey Grand Assembly 1995). Had Greece made use of its rights granted by the UNCLOS to extend its territorial sea to 12nm, she would acquire 71.5% of the area while the same proportion for Turkey would be 8.8%, with the proportion of the high seas shrinking to a 19.7% (Başeren 2010), as shown in Figure 5.1. In that case, Turkish ships

[2] Being party to bilateral agreements for delimitation with Bulgaria, Georgia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

should (particularly military vessels) transit Greek territorial waters when sailing between Turkey's Aegean ports and the Mediterranean Sea (Gurel, Mullen and Tzimitras 2013). Were Greece to claim its Exclusive Economic Zone from the baselines of its mainland and island territories (drawing on UNCLOS Article 121, par. 3) the maritime territory to delimit with Turkey is also depicted in Figure A5.1 (ibid).



Figure A5.1. Map of the Aegean, with approximate extent of territorial waters if extended from 6nm (left pic) to 12nm (right pic). Source: [Image]. (n.d.). *Aegean from 6 to 12 nautical miles.* Retrieved at 7.6.2017 from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aegean_12_nm.svg

&

APPENDIX 6: THE LEVIATHAN-CEYHAN PIPELINE

Such a deal would be significant for Turkey. Located between Europe -the world's second largest natural gas consumer after the US- and major natural gas reserves in Central Asia, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey sees itself as a transit state (Karakasis, 2016). To this effect, several gas pipeline projects are moving forward to help transport Caspian gas to Europe through Turkey, which in the long run will enable Turkey to address its dependence on imported oil and gas (Winrow 2016, Tekin and Williams 2011). Turkey aspires to play the same role in the Eastern Mediterranean. It entertains the possibility of exporting Israeli gas from the Leviathan field to Europe. In March 2014, two Turkish companies, Zorlu Group and Turcas Holding, participated in a tender for the possible laying of a 7-10 bcm/y capacity pipeline across the EM connecting Leviathan to the Turkish mainland (Amiram 2014).

Besides seeing itself as a transit state for the transportation of gas, there are further material stimulants prompting Turkey's involvement in such a deal. For several decades the Turkish economy was characterized by a guided industrialization based on import substituting protectionism (Karakasis, 2016). A decision by the Council of Ministers on January 24, 1980, to remove many of the foreign currency controls that came under the banner of 'Regulations to Protect the Value of the Turkish Lira' contributed to a fundamental transformation of the Turkish economy (Turan 2015). This decision aimed at changing the country's economic strategy from import substitution industrialization to export-led growth and embedding the national economy in the global market system (ibid). This resulted in a rapid growth of the Turkish economy and consequently in the increase of Turkey's energy needs. The main energy fuel source it uses in order to cover its electricity, consumption, industry and transportation needs is natural gas, representing 35% of the country's energy mix (BP 2015). Turkey's 'rush to gas' occurred in the past decade, as the country's demand tripled from 15b cubic metres (bcm) annually in 2000 to 47.6 bcm in 2013, registering the greatest increase in the world demand after China (ibid).

Nevertheless, what makes things problematic from an energy security standpoint is Turkey's asymmetric reliance on a single supplier, Russia (Tuncalp 2015). Figure A6.1 demonstrates this uneven distribution. Russia's multifaceted involvement in Turkey's neighbourhood over the past seven years[3] has stressed the critical need for Turkey to diversify its energy suppliers and supply routes (Karakasis, 2016).

We shall conclude, though, that such a project (the Turkish-Israeli pipeline) presents important economic complications due to the low gas prices on a global scale. These economic hardships

[3] I.e. the invasion of Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 2015 incident when Turkish authorities shut down a Russian helicopter in the Syrian-Turkish border.

are not even the most significant ones for the realization of the project. This pipeline would cross the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone in order to avoid the turbulent Syrian waters. Given, however, that Turkey persists in not recognizing the Republic of Cyprus as a state entity under its current status[4] the examination of additional projects is more than imperative.



Figure A6.1. Energy suppliers Turkey. Source: (EIA 2013a).

[4] Since Turkish Cypriots are not part of the administration of the Republic of Cyprus.

APPENDIX 7A: Q-SAMPLE FOR GREEK-CYPRIOT P-SET

1	The maritime disputes around Cyprus are linked to the Aegean Sea.	5	The energy developments have been hijacked by the domestic politics.
2	Energy in our case is deeply securitized in a political level: screw the economics.	6	I do not believe in the philosophy of the constituent state and I do not think that it can practically work, as long as the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state will be under the control of Turkey.
3	Cyprus conflict is a dormant, 'comfortable crisis'. If we had to face a reality of people's losing their lives day by day, then we would have extra incentives to immediately resolve the conflict.	7	Instead of taking steps to tackle the crisis, Christofias launched the energy debate.
4	The challenge of a pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey would be that if the single market we have is Turkey, then Turkey may dictate the prices.	8	The water project is almost like taking the pipeline and hitting the Greek-Cypriots.
9	All countries in our region, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt approached the whole debate purely from a political point of view having priority over the business logic.	13	The Turkish-Cypriots believe that the way Greek-Cypriots envisage to shape the new state entails for them the risk of vigorously becoming second-class citizens.
10	Exporting the current Cypriot gas reserves to Turkey establishes the conditions of a unilateral dependency on Turkey.	14	Wherever grievances exist, the past never becomes a past.
11	How can you talk about energy cooperation with your enemy when the latter does not recognize you as a state entity?	15	There is a danger to have a pipeline transiting the 'TRNC'.
12	Through the potential utilization of natural gas, Greek-Cypriots thought they had gained a negotiation tool in their confrontation vis-à-vis Turkey.	16	People are cautious after the Annan enthusiasm. It is good that the leaders are drinking coffee and zivania, but what is really happening is not convincing.
17	Americans want to clear the Cyprus question out of their way in order to normalize their relations with Turkey, while Syria is in between.	21	The rationale driving the cooperation with Israel is the lack of Cypriots' experience in securing its natural resources through coast-guard, navy and air force.
18	Under the current prices Greek-Cypriots cannot take any advantage of the gas reserves especially because they lie offshore, in 'ultra-deep' waters.	22	Without a meeting with the Turkish-Cypriots –not Turkey- to discuss on the energy issue, the Greek-Cypriots will find themselves under the 'Damoclean sword' of Turkey.
19	There is a succession principle in the delimitation agreement signed between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. All agreements of the predecessor states continue.	23	Greek-Cypriots fear that Turkish-Cypriots will be potentially treated as the 'Trojan horse' of Turkey.
20	The energy triangles are based on a consolidated perception: the 'enemy of my enemy is my friend'.	24	Gas is an important issue but **not** the main factor that prompts the negotiations. Negotiations are driven by geopolitics.

Appendix 7A. (continued)

25	The construction of a pipeline to Greece is not feasible due to the depth of the waters and the lack of Israel's interest in investing in such a pipeline.	29	In Cyprus, the companies face a jumble of bureaucratic procedures in order to safeguard a corporate licence; the oil companies need 16 distinct licensing rounds for technical reasons. Why should they get further involved?
26	If Greek-Cypriots exhaust all possibilities with no results, then they have to do all necessary to facilitate the best possible cooperation with Turkey.	30	The hyperbolic opinion 'from now on, we are friends and partners with Israel' corresponds to Mediatic needs of the Greek-Cypriots' mentality that an external player is going to 'save us'.
27	If this negotiation process fails, we head for a potential division, permanent and legitimate.	31	The pipeline prospects will not be a trigger for peace. The presence of pipelines is just a reflection of peace or stability, not the other way round.
28	In **economic terms**, I cannot rule out that the best option is to export gas through Turkey. In **political terms** -with the current gas reserves detected-I would consider the export to Turkey a wrong choice, even after a settlement.	32	There may be companies (ENI and TOTAL) that would not hesitate to confront Turkey. If they want to make the decision to go, they will go because they think that Cyprus' entitlement in this region is very strong.
33	In Cyprus, we do not find cases where cooperation extends beyond the micro-level: they were few and did not have any spill-over effect, with a more sustainable character.	37	If the issue reaches the bi-communal level and every community has the right to exercise its veto, no company in the world would invest millions, if it had to face any form of obstructiveness
34	If Greek-Cypriots hurry up, they might sell some gas to Egypt for 2 to 4 years, until they discover more gas and earn some money in order to invest into another option.	38	If I cannot safeguard something that betters the *status quo*, then I handle things as they are, 'the theory of the second best'.
35	In the case of political-military conflicts energy, as such, has not been, so far, a factor conducive to their resolution but evolved as an essential chapter of the pre-existing conflict.	39	The most important stake in the energy debate is the guarantee of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and its rights. Therefore, the Greek-Cypriots should be the ones making the decisions.
36	The trilateral agreements between Cyprus-Egypt-Greece and Cyprus-Israel-Greece are oriented towards the right direction.	40	Greek-Cypriots can keep on at the drilling activities, but under the supervision of an international authority, within which a Turkish-Cypriot representative could also participate. This proposal includes a disclaimer; whatever agreed upon is not a precedent for other issues.
41	The way the profits will be distributed among the two communities is something to be seen. Greek Cypriots are ready in case of an external pressure to find an economic formula, but not a political one.	45	Akkinci wants to reach a settlement, he is a reasonable man. We should not forget, however, that he is a Turkish-Cypriot and has to address the interests of his constituency.

&

Appendix 7A. (continued)

42	If it weren't for Turkey, nobody would take any interest in the Turkish-Cypriots.	46	If a solution is to be found, the options for the utilization of the reserves will be expanded.
43	Russia has been conspicuously absent from the whole energy debate. If Israel approaches Turkey, then Russia will get involved.	47	After the establishment of an escrow account, for every 100 dollars that the Greek-Cypriots would earn out of the utilization of the hydrocarbons, a proportion could be directed to the Turkish-Cypriots. We can apply this proposal even without a settlement
44	If we trust Turkey to build a federated state (which means that the Turkish-Cypriots are reliable in their commitments), why shall we not trust Turkey for the construction of a pipeline?	48	Greek-Cypriots do not want an agreement abolishing the Republic of Cyprus and paving the way for the federalization of a constituent state with the 'territorial extension' of Turkey

APPENDIX 7B: Q-SAMPLE FOR TURKISH-CYPRIOT P-SET

1	The gas reserves were something that would not make Turkey and Greece step back.	5	Özersay played an important role in the crisis with the seismic survey in 2011.
2	If you talk about energy, it is always the realist school that comes at play. It is the state's safety at stake.	6	Turkish-Cypriots had become invisible in the eyes of the Greek-Cypriots to such a degree that they did not evoke even national hatred.
3	The incentives to resolve the conflict drop day by day, since it constitutes a manageable-dormant crisis.	7	Christofias' government initiated the whole energy endeavour in order to restore his shaken image after the Mari events in 2011 and distract the attention from the economic reforms needed.
4	I can understand why Greek-Cypriots do not make use of the Turkish export option. Despite the economic benefits, you cannot assign a price to the political risk.	8	Bringing water from Turkey to Cyprus as an option might be adopted as a negotiation tool vis-à-vis a common gas exploitation in the foreseeable future.
9	Greek-Cypriots failed to do something creative and substantive about the resolution of the problem and preferred to divert the public opinion towards something which is abstract, like the monetization of the gas reserves.	13	Turkey has always this heavy, oppressing presence. There is too much dependence on Turkey which is not a liberal country, and all the things that come with that create certain awareness.
10	Exporting the current Cypriot gas reserves to Turkey establishes the conditions of a unilateral dependency from Turkey.	14	Cyprus is a space wherein resentment exists; a space in which people, communities and citizens feel underprivileged and deeply traumatized.
11	In the case of energy, had international community sent the message to the Greek Cypriots: 'you know what, you can proceed on this matter, but you would need the consent of the Turkish Cypriots', then you would have better chances to resolve the conflict.	15	There might be options that a potential pipeline starting from Israel might not go through the Republic of Cyprus' controlled territory but through Karpaz.
12	The Greek Cypriots have a lot of problems with Turkey blaming everything on it. They like to think that Turkish-Cypriots are the good elements and Turkey is the bad element.	16	Turkish diplomats are making plans on the construction of the gas pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey without consulting the Turkish-Cypriots.
17	The existing status quo offers itself a level of stability and enables countries like the UK to continue to use the sovereign bases, without any dispute.	21	It is not easy to bring all actors involved given the continuous struggle in the region in the same way the Black Sea countries in 1972 came together and made an agreement in a Cold War environment.
18	The Security Council says that the Turkish Cypriots have political rights and Greek Cypriots have legal rights. It had not been taking one side or another. It mainly wanted to keep a kind of balance	22	The Greek Cypriots are pushed into a situation where they say 'For once, we are strong against Turkey so we're going to make the best of this, bring Turkey to its knees. This gives them all this false hope.

Appendix 7B. (continued)

19	All agreements of the predecessor states continue to apply after a potential reunification.	23	Even being considered the good element by Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots' overreliance on Turkey is problematic, because they can be the fifth column.
20	The cooperation between Cyprus, Greece and Israel has been perceived as a sign that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'.	24	The US in the background have played a very big role in bridging the gap between the two sides.
25	Turkey is getting angrier and angrier if it remains left out from the energy developments.	29	The format in accordance with which the two leaders as well as a handful of other men and a couple of women in the negotiation team who meet in the UN buffer zone are totally cut off from the rest of the society, does not seem the best way to go.
26	The presumption that Turkish-Cypriots will prevent decisions from being taken, if they participate in a decision-making body on energy issues underlines another missing element in the Cyprus conflict: the federal culture.	30	The Church had lost a lot financially due to the banking crisis. That's why Archbishop was initially convinced by some actors that following a non-solution or anti-solution stance or anti-federation stance is not the way to go.
27	Another deadlock will not take anything out of the tensions and I am afraid that Cyprus will surely go through another war.	31	The Cypriots – Greek, Turkish doesn't matter –are very successful in making things more complicated, instead of solving problems, simply because we are focusing too much on the constraints instead of having a very clear focus; that's we want to solve.
28	In order to safeguard the European perspective and utilize it against the Kemalist structure, Erdogan says 'yes' to the Annan plan hoping that the Greeks would say 'no'. The Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan was a relief and fantastic opportunity for Erdogan.	32	Erdogan talks about the Cyprus conflict by synthesizing the two discourses that every Turkish nationalist embraces in his rhetoric over Cyprus: geopolitical significance and the Turkish nationalist narrative.
33	Turkish-Cypriots do not want to change their economy because they do not really care. A state was established without oil but with aid. That has been a mistake of the Turkish policy-making.	37	Turkish-Cypriots are after decision-making. What they actually want is to have a say in the decision-making: 'let's do the explorations jointly.'
34	Due to the gas that will be transported from Azerbaijan, Europeans need Turkey and that is why they are going to re-open the energy chapter.	38	For the Greek-Cypriots, the explorations constitute a sovereignty issue. They are the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus now and the world knows that.
35	A settlement is not going to happen just from one day to the other. It's not going to be peace and reconciliation once we get an agreement and we will actually be able to implement it.	39	You could identify there the age-old problem: there is no agreement on what the Cyprus Problem is. It is two different things: When the Greek- Cypriots talk about reunifying the island they mean one thing while Turkish-Cypriots mean something else.

Appendix 7B. (continued)

36	Turkey is an important country in the region and obviously it will demand certain priorities as to its presence and geopolitical interests.	40	All these discussions about bringing the hydrocarbon issue do not have to be on the settlement negotiations. There could be perhaps a parallel process that would not prejudice any precedents.
41	The hydrocarbons' issue should be put on the negotiation table, but the way it's framed by the Greek-Cypriot side makes it impossible.	45	The Greek-Cypriots shall not make the energy issue the existential question for the Republic of Cyprus, as if its existence depends on talking about hydrocarbons with Turkish-Cypriots or not.
42	Even if the Turkish-Cypriots had natural gas reserves, they would have to bring the international development in, mainly companies to take it out. Then, they would have to engage with capitalism; unfortunately, that is life.	46	Cypriots should establish a fund: not like a bank, but investment bank. They could have a peace fund for reconstruction after peace. This fund should be used to introduce new things in the island (fixing traffic)
43	Turkey should do something on non-Russian gas resources.	47	The electricity cable linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece makes a crazy business. If you look at the feasibility plan, which is part of EU's common interest projects, only Cyprus and Israel are included.
44	In case Turkey and Israel normalize their bilateral relations, Greek-Cypriots have to decide what kind of policy they should follow.	48	Turkish-Cypriots also had this ambivalent attitude towards Turkey, in a sense that Turkish-Cypriots trust it to be there always for them.

APPENDIX 8A: Q-SAMPLE IN THE ORIGINAL GREEK LANGUAGE

1	Οι ναυτικές διαμάχες γύρω από την Κύπρο σχετίζονται και με το Αιγαίο.	5	Οι ενεργειακές εξελίξεις είναι έρμαιο μικροπολιτικών σκοπιμοτήτων.
2	Ξέχνα τα οικονομικά: η ενέργεια στην δική μας περίπτωση είναι καθαρά θέμα ασφάλειας.	6	Δεν πιστεύω στη φιλοσοφία του συνιστώντος κρατιδίου και δεν θεωρώ ότι μπορεί πρακτικά να λειτουργήσει όσο αυτό θα υπόκειται στον έλεγχο της Τουρκίας.
3	Η Κυπριακή σύγκρουση είναι μια υπνώττουσα, «βολική κρίση». Αν είχαμε να αντιμετωπίσουμε μια πραγματικότητα στην οποία οι άνθρωποι θα έχαναν τη ζωή τους της μέρα με τη μέρα, τότε θα είχαμε επιπρόσθετα κίνητρα για τη λύση της.	7	Αντί μέτρων προς διαχείριση της οικονομικής κρίσης, ο Χριστόφιας εκκίνησε την ενεργειακή κρίση.
4	Η πρόκληση για έναν αγωγό από το Λεβιάθαν στη Τουρκία θα ήταν το ότι η Τουρκία θα υπαγόρευε τις τιμές, σε περίπτωση που θα αποτελούσε τη μόνη αγορά για μας.	8	Ο υδάτινος αγωγός ήταν κακή εξέλιξη: σα να αρπάζεις ένα σωλήνα και να βαράς τους Ελληνοκύπριους.
9	Κύπρος, Ισραήλ και Αίγυπτος προσέγγισαν το όλο «ντιμπέιτ' από καθαρά πολιτικό πρίσμα, δίνοντάς του προτεραιότητα έναντι της επιχειρηματικής λογικής.	13	Με τον τρόπο που οι Ελληνοκύπριοι οραματίζονται να «στήσουν» το νέο κράτος, οι Τουρκοκύπριοι θεωρούν ότι διατρέχουν τον σοβαρό κίνδυνο να καταστούν πολίτες β' διαλογής.
10	Τυχόν εξαγωγή των υπαρχόντων Κυπριακών κοιτασμάτων στη Τουρκία θα δημιουργούσε συνθήκες μονομερούς εξάρτησης.	14	Όπου υφίσταται πνεύμα αδικίας, το παρελθόν δεν γίνεται παρελθόν.
11	Πως μπορείς να συνομιλείς για ενεργειακή συνεργασία με τον εχθρό σου, όταν ο τελευταίος δεν σου αναγνωρίζει καν την κρατική υπόσταση;	15	Υπάρχει κίνδυνος ο αγωγός προς Τουρκία να διέρχεται μόνο από τα κατεχόμενα.
12	Μέσω της πιθανής χρήσης του φ.α, οι Ελληνοκύπριοι νόμιζαν ότι είχαν διασφαλίσει ένα διαπραγματευτικό εργαλείο στην αντιπαράθεσή τους με τη Τουρκία.	16	Μετά τον ενθουσιασμό της περιόδου Αννάν οι άνθρωποι είναι επιφυλακτικοί. Δεν είναι κακό που οι ηγέτες πίνουν καφέ και ζιβανία, όμως, αυτό που συμβαίνει στην πραγματικότητα δεν μας πείθει.
17	Ενόσω εκκρεμεί το Συριακό, οι Αμερικανοί θέλουν να «απαλλαγούν' από το Κυπριακό για να διευκολυνθούν οι σχέσεις τους με τη Τουρκία.	21	Η λογική της συνεργασίας μας με το Ισραήλ υπαγορεύεται από την έλλειψη εμπειρίας μας στη διαφύλαξη των φυσικών πόρων μέσω λιμενικού, ναυτικού και πολεμικής αεροπορίας.
18	Ένα σημαντικό εμπόδιο εν σχέσει με τους υδρογονάνθρακές μας είναι ότι με τις τρέχουσες τιμές δεν μπορούμε να τους εκμεταλλευτούμε, πόσω μάλλον όταν αυτοί κείνται σε πολύ βαθιά ύδατα.	22	Αν δεν γίνει συνάντηση με τους Τουρκοκυπρίους -όχι τη Τουρκία- προκειμένου να συζητήσουμε το ενεργειακό, θα βρεθούμε υπό την «δαμόκλειον σπάθην» της Τουρκίας.

Appendix 8A. (continued)

19	Υφίσταται αρχή διαδοχής στη συμφωνία οριοθέτησης μεταξύ Τουρκοκυπρίων και Τουρκίας. Ως εκ τούτου όλες οι συμφωνίες που έχουν προηγηθεί συνεχίζουν να ισχύουν.	23	Οι Ελληνοκύπριοι έντονα φοβούνται μήπως οι Τουρκοκύπριοι καταστούν ο «δούρειος ίππος' της Τουρκίας.
20	Τα «ενεργειακά τρίγωνα' βασίζονται σε μια εδραιωμένη αντίληψη: «ο εχθρός του εχθρού μου είναι φίλος μου».	24	Παρότι το «αέριο» είναι σημαντικό ζήτημα, δεν αποτελεί τον κύριο μοχλό που κινεί τις διαπραγματεύσεις. Αυτές υπαγορεύονται από γεωπολιτικά συμφέροντα.
25	Η κατασκευή αγωγού προς Ελλάδα δεν είναι μια εφικτή εναλλακτική λόγω κυρίως του βάθους των υδάτων και της έλλειψης Ισραηλινού ενδιαφέροντος να επενδύσει σε ένα τέτοιο αγωγό.	29	Στην Κύπρο οι εταιρείες συναντούν ένα κυκεώνα διαδικασιών για μια εταιρική αδειοδότηση. Στην περίπτωση δε των πετρελαϊκών χρειάζονται 16 διαφορετικοί κύκλοι αδειοδοτήσεων ένεκα τεχνικών λόγων. Γιατί να ασχοληθούν οι εταιρείες αυτές περαιτέρω;
26	Αν οι Ελληνοκύπριοι εξαντλήσουν όλες τις πιθανές επιλογές χωρίς αποτέλεσμα, τότε πρέπει να κάνουν κάθε τι που να διευκολύνει τη καλύτερη δυνατή συνεργασία με Τουρκία.	30	Ο υπερτονισμός, τουλάχιστον επικοινωνιακά, της φιλίας με το Ισραήλ, τελεί σε συνάρτηση με τη νοοτροπία του μέσου Κύπριου που, στα δύσκολα, προσπαθεί να πιαστεί από κάποιον εξωτερικό παίχτη «ο οποίος θα μας σώσει».
27	Αν αυτή η διαδικασία διαπραγματεύσεων αποτύχει, οδηγούμεθα σε μια πιθανή διχοτόμηση, μόνιμη και νόμιμη.	31	Οι πετρελαϊκές δεν επενδύουν τα δισεκατομμύριά τους για την επίτευξη ειρήνης. Η παρουσία των αγωγών αντανακλά απλώς τις υφιστάμενες συνθήκες ειρήνης και σταθερότητας. Δεν ισχύει το αντίστροφο.
28	Με οικονομικούς όρους, η εξαγωγή φ.α μέσω Τουρκίας δεν αποκλείεται να ήταν η καλύτερη λύση. Πολιτικά, όμως κρίνοντας, με τα διαθέσιμα πάντα κοιτάσματα, θα τη θεωρούσα λανθασμένη ακόμα και αν ήθελε επιλυθεί το Κυπριακό.	32	Υπάρχουν εταιρείες (ENI, TOTAL) που δεν θα δίσταζαν να τα βάλουν με τη Τουρκία. Εφόσον αποφασίσουν να προχωρήσουν τις έρευνες/γεωτρήσεις θα το κάνουν γιατί πιστεύουν ότι η Κυπριακή δικαιοδοσία στη συγκεκριμένη περιοχή είναι πολύ ισχυρή.
33	Στην Κύπρο δεν βρίσκουμε περιπτώσεις συνεργασίας πέραν τομέων «χαμηλής πολιτικής»: ήταν λιγοστές και δεν είχαν οιαδήποτε σημαντική επίπτωση σε τομείς «υψηλής πολιτικής».	37	Καμία εταιρεία στον κόσμο δεν θα διακινδύνευε επένδυση δισεκατομμυρίων μπροστά στο ενδεχόμενο κωλυσιεργίας που θα προέκυπτε αν το θέμα έφτανε σε δικοινοτικό επίπεδο, λόγω πιθανού βέτο εκατέρας πλευράς.
34	Εφόσον βιαστούμε, ενδεχομένως για πολιτικούς λόγους, μπορεί να πουλήσουμε (αέριο) στην Αίγυπτο για 2-4 χρόνια - μέχρις ότου δε βρούμε κι άλλο αέριο- να εξοικονομήσουμε πόρους και να επενδύσουμε σε εναλλακτική λύση.	38	Αν δεν μπορώ να διασφαλίσω κάτι που να βελτιώνει το status quo, τότε διαχειρίζομαι την κατάσταση ως έχει.

&

Appendix 8A. (continued)

35	Σε περιπτώσεις πολιτικών-στρατιωτικών συγκρούσεων, η ενέργεια ποτέ δεν συνέβαλε, έως τώρα, στην επίλυσή τους. Αντιθέτως, ανελισσόταν ως ένα σημαντικό κεφάλαιο για τις συγκρούσεις αυτές.	39	Το σημαντικότερο διακύβευμα στη συζήτηση περί ενέργειας είναι η διασφάλιση της κυριαρχίας και των δικαιωμάτων της ΚΔ. Για αυτό οι Ελληνοκύπριοι είναι αυτοί που πρέπει να λαμβάνουν τις αποφάσεις.
36	Οι τριμερείς συμφωνίες μεταξύ Κύπρου-Αιγύπτου-Ελλάδος και Κύπρου-Ισραήλ-Ελλάδος είναι προς τη σωστή κατεύθυνση.	40	Θα κάναμε εμείς τη δουλειά αλλά υπό επιτήρηση. Θα μπορούσαν να ήσαν διεθνείς επιτηρητές ή κάποιος Τουρκοκύπριος. Από την αρχή θα υπήρχε ένα disclaimer: αυτά που συμφωνούμε επί του θέματος αυτού δεν δημιουργούν προηγούμενο για άλλες διευθετήσεις στο Κυπριακό.
41	Το πως θα διανεμηθούν τα κέρδη ανάμεσα στις δυο κοινότητες θα φανεί στο μέλλον. Σε περίπτωση εξωτερικής πίεσης, οι Ελληνοκύπριοι είναι έτοιμοι να βρουν μια οικονομική αλλά όχι πολιτική φόρμουλα.	45	Ο Ακιντζί θέλει να βρεθεί λύση, είναι ένας λογικός άνθρωπος. Μη ξεχνάμε όμως, ότι είναι Τουρκοκύπριος και πρέπει να εξυπηρετήσει τα συμφέροντα των ψηφοφόρων του.
42	Αν δεν υπήρχε η Τουρκία, κανένας δεν θα ενδιαφερόταν για τους Τουρκοκύπριους.	46	Εφόσον βρεθεί λύση, οι δυνατές επιλογές για τη χρήση των υδρογονανθράκων θα αυξηθούν.
43	Η Ρωσία είναι καταφανώς απούσα από τις εδώ ενεργειακές εξελίξεις. Τώρα που βλέπουν ότι το Ισραήλ επαναπροσεγγίζει τη Τουρκία, οι Ρώσοι θα θέλουν να εμπλακούν.	47	Μετά τη δημιουργία ενός ειδικού λογαριασμού, για κάθε 100 δολάρια που θα εξοικονομούν οι Ελληνοκύπριοι από τη χρήση των υδρογονανθράκων, ένα μέρος μπορεί να κατευθύνεται στους Τουρκοκύπριους. Δυνάμεθα να εφαρμόσουμε την πρόταση αυτή ακόμα και χωρίς διευθέτηση του Κυπριακού.
44	Αν εμπιστευόμασταν τη Τουρκία (που είναι το μείζον) για τη σύσταση ενός ομοσπονδιακού κράτους -άρα οι Τουρκοκύπριοι θα αποδεικνύονταν φερέγγυοι-γιατί να μην την εμπιστευθούμε στο θέμα του αγωγού;	48	Δεν θα ήθελα μια συμφωνία με την οποία να καταλύεται η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία και ένα συνιστών ελληνοκυπριακό κρατίδιο να ομοσπονδοποιείται με τη Τουρκία, μέσω της προέκτασής της αυτής στην Κύπρο.

APPENDIX 8B: Q-SAMPLE IN THE ORIGINAL TURKISH LANGUAGE

1	Gaz rezervleri, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın geri adım atmayacağı bir konudur.	5	2011'deki sismik araştırmayla Özersay krizde önemli bir rol oynamıştır.
2	Konu enerji olduğunda devreye realist ekol girer. Söz konusu olan devletin güvenliğidir.	6	Kıbrıslı Türkler, Kıbrıslı Rumların gözünde o derece görünmez hale gelmiştir ki ulusal nefret bile uyandırmamışlardır.
3	Anlaşmazlık, yönetilebilir-etkisiz bir kriz olduğu için çözüm çalışmalarını teşvik edecek noktalar günden güne azalmaktadır.	7	Christofias hükümeti bütün enerji girişimini 2011 yılındaki Mari olaylarının ardından zayıflayan imajını sağlamlaştırmak ve dikkati gerekli iktisadi reformlardan uzaklaştırmak için başlatmıştır.
4	Kıbrıslı Rumların neden Türkiye üzerinden ihraç seçeneğini kullanmadıklarını anlayabiliyorum. İktisadi faydalarına rağmen siyasi riske bir bedel biçilemez.	8	Görünür gelecekte Türkiye'den Kıbrıs'a su götürmek ortak gaz çıkarma çalışmalarına karşı bir müzakere aracı olarak kullanılabilir.
9	Kıbrıslı Rumlar soruna yaratıcı ve kapsamlı bir çözüm geliştirmeyi başaramamış ve bunun yerine kamuoyunu gaz rezervlerini para kaynağı hâline getirmek gibi soyut bir konuya yönlendirmişlerdir.	13	Türkiye'nin ağır, baskıcı varlığı her zaman mevcut olmuştur. Liberal bir ülke olmayan Türkiye'ye bağımlılık çok yüksektir ve bunun sonucu belirli bir farkındalık doğmaktadır.
10	Kıbrıs'taki mevcut gaz rezervlerinin Türkiye'ye ihraç edilmesi Türkiye'ye tek taraflı bağımlılık yaratır.	14	Kıbrıs kırgınlıkların olduğu; insanların, toplulukların ve vatandaşların kendilerini yoksun hissettikleri ve derin travmalar yaşadıkları bir yerdir.
11	Enerji konusunda eğer uluslararası toplum Kıbrıslı Rumlara 'devam edebilirsiniz ama Kıbrıslı Türklerin onayını almanız lazım,' mesajını vermiş olsaydı anlaşmazlığı çözme şansınız daha yüksek olurdu.	15	İsrail'den başlayacak bir boru hattının Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nden değil, Karpaz üzerinden geçme seçeneği gündeme gelebilir.
12	Kıbrıslı Rumlar pek çok sorun için Türkiye'yi suçlar. Kıbrıslı Türklerin iyi, Türkiye'nin kötü bileşen olduğunu düşünürler.	16	Türk diplomatlar Kıbrıslı Türklere danışmadan Leviathan'dan Türkiye'ye gaz boru hattı inşası planları yapmaktadır.
17	Mevcut durum bir derece istikrar vadetmekte ve Birleşik Krallık gibi ülkelerin egemenlik bölgelerini herhangi bir anlaşmazlık olmaksızın kullanmaya devam etmelerini sağlamaktadır.	21	Bölgede devam eden mücadele düşünüldüğünde ilgili tüm aktörleri 1972 yılında Soğuk Savaş ortamına rağmen bir araya gelip anlaşan Karadeniz ülkeleri gibi aynı masaya oturtmak kolay değildir.
18	Güvenlik Konseyi Kıbrıslı Türklerin siyasi hakları olduğunu ve Kıbrıslı Rumların yasal hakları olduğunu söylemektedir. Konsey herhangi bir taraftan yana olmamıştır. Daha çok bir tür dengeyi sağlamaya çalışmıştır.	22	Kıbrıslı Rumlar, 'İlk defa Türkiye'ye karşı güçlü durumdayız ve bunu en iyi şekilde değerlendirip Türkiye'ye diz çöktüreceğiz,' deme konumuna itilmiştir. Bu durum boş beklentilere girmelerine neden olmaktadır.
19	Muhtemel bir birleşmenin ardından selef devletlerin imzaladıkları bütün anlaşmalar geçerliliklerini koruyacaktır.	23	Kıbrıslı Rumlar tarafından iyi bileşen olarak görülseler bile Kıbrıslı Türklerin Türkiye'ye aşırı bağımlılığı sorun yaratabilir, çünkü beşinci kol faaliyetinde bulunabilirler.

&

Appendix 8B. (continued)

20	Kıbrıs, Yunanistan ve İsrail arasındaki işbirliği 'düşmanımın düşmanı benim dostumdur,' denildiğinin işareti olarak algılanmıştır.	24	Arka planda A.B.D., iki taraf arasında köprü kurulmasında çok önemli bir rol oynamıştır.
25	Türkiye enerji konusundaki gelişmelerin dışında bırakıldıkça öfkelenmektedir.	29	İki liderin ve müzakere takımındaki birkaç erkek ve kadının BM tampon bölgesinde bir araya gelme şeklinin toplumun geri kalanından tamamen uzakta tutulması, olumlu bir davranış olmamıştır.
26	Kıbrıslı Türklerin enerji konularında karar veren bir organda yer almaları durumda kararların alınmasına engel olacakları varsayımı Kıbrıs çatışmasındaki başka bir eksik bileşeni işaret etmektedir: federal kültür.	30	Bankacılık krizi nedeniyle Kilise maddi olarak büyük kayıplar yaşamıştır. Bu nedenle bazı aktörler başlangıçta Başpiskopos'u çözümsüzlük veya çözüm karşıtlığı ya da federasyon karşıtlığı yaklaşımı benimsemenin doğru olmadığına ikna etmiştir.
27	Yeni bir çıkmaz, gerilimi azaltmayacak ve korkarım Kıbrıs'ı kesinlikle yeni bir savaşa sürükleyecektir.	31	Kıbrıslılar – Rum veya Türk fark etmez – sorunları çözmek yerine her şeyi daha karmaşık hale getirmekte çok başarılıdır. Bunun nedeni odak noktamızı korumak yerine sıkıntıların üstünde çok fazla durmamızdır. İşte çözmek istediğimiz tam da budur.
28	Avrupa perspektifini korumak ve Kemalist yapıya karşı kullanmak için Erdoğan, Annan planına 'evet' derken Rumların 'hayır' diyeceğini ummuştur. Kıbrıslı Rumların Annan planını reddetmesi Erdoğan'ı rahatlatmış ve ona muazzam bir fırsat sunmuştur.	32	Erdoğan Kıbrıs sorunundan bahsederken bütün Türk milliyetçilerinin Kıbrıs konusunda benimsediği iki söylemi birleştirmektedir: jeopolitik önem ve milliyetçi Türk anlatısı.
33	Kıbrıslı Türkler ekonomilerini değiştirmek istememektedir çünkü umurlarında değildir. Devletleri petrolle değil, yardımla kurulmuştur. Bu, Türk siyasetinin bir hatası olmuştur.	37	Kıbrıslı Türkler karar verme mekanizmalarında yer almak istemektedir. Asıl istedikleri karar verme kuvvetine sahip olmaktır: 'Hadi aramaları birlikte yapalım.'
34	Azerbaycan'dan nakledilecek gaz nedeniyle Avrupalıların Türkiye'ye ihtiyacı vardır ve bu nedenle enerji faslı yeniden açılacaktır.	38	Kıbrıslı Rumlar için aramalar bir egemenlik meselesidir. Bu bölgeler Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin egemenlik alanıdır ve bunu bütün dünya bilmektedir.
35	Anlaşma bir günden diğerine gerçekleşmeyecektir. Bir anlaşmaya vardığımız zaman huzur ve uzlaşı kendiliğinden kurulmayacak, bunu uygulamamız gerekecektir.	39	Burada çok eski bir sorun olduğu anlaşılmaktadır: Kıbrıs sorununun ne olduğu konusunda bir anlaşma yoktur. Burada iki farklı konu vardır: Kıbrıslı Rumlar adanın birleşmesi açısında bir şeyden bahsederken Kıbrıslı Türkler bambaşka bir şeyden bahsetmektedir.
36	Türkiye, bölgede önemli bir devlettir ve mevcudiyeti ve jeopolitik çıkarları doğrultusunda bazı ayrıcalıklar talep edeceği aşikârdır.	40	Hidrokarbon konusunu gündeme getirmek konusundaki bütün tartışmaların anlaşma müzakerelerinde olmasına gerek yoktur. Emsalleri dikkate almayan paralel bir süreç başlatılabilir.

Appendix 8B. (continued)

41	Hidrokarbonlar konusu masaya getirilmelidir, ancak Kıbrıslı Rumların çizdiği çerçevede bunu yapmak imkansızdır.	45	Kıbrıslı Rumlar enerji konusunu Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin beka sorunu hâline getirmeyecek, varlığı Kıbrıslı Türklerle hidrokarbon konusunu konuşmaya dayanıyormuş gibi davranmayacaktır.
42	Kıbrıslı Türklerin doğal gaz rezervleri olsa bile, çıkarmak için uluslararası gelişmeleri, yani şirketleri içeri almaları gerekecektir. O zaman kapitalizmle uğraşmak zorunda kalacaklardır. Maalesef, hayat böyle bir şeydir.	46	Kıbrıslılar bir fon kurmalıdır: bankadan çok yatırım bankası gibi bir oluşum. Barışın tesisinin ardından yeniden yapılanma için bir barış fonu olabilir. Bu fon adaya yenilikler getirmek için kullanılmalıdır (trafik sorununu çözmek)
43	Türkiye, Rusya dışındaki gaz kaynakları konusunda bir adım atmalıdır.	47	İsrail, Kıbrıs ve Yunanistan'ı bağlayan elektrik hattı çılgınlıktır. AB'nin ortak çıkar projelerinden biri olan fizibilite planına bakarsanız, yalnızca Kıbrıs ve İsrail'in dahil olduğu görülür.
44	Türkiye ve İsrail arasındaki ikili ilişkiler normalleşirse, Kıbrıslı Rumlar nasıl bir siyaset izleyeceklerine karar vermelidir.	48	Kıbrıslı Türkler, Türkiye'ye karşı birbiriyle çelişen bir yaklaşım benimsemekte, bir anlamda Türkiye'nin hep yanlarında olacağına güvenmektedir.

APPENDIX 9A: GREEK-CYPRIOT P-SET (JULY 2017)

	Professional Affiliation	Q-sort coding	Year of birth
1	Civil Servant	CS1	1982
2	Journalist	Jour1	1967
3	Policy-Maker	PM1	1958
4	NGO representative	NGO1	1962
5	Journalist	Jour2	1966
6	NGO representative	NGO2	1988
7	Journalist	Jour3	1982
8	Energy Affiliate	EA1	1984
9	NGO representative	NGO3	1993
10	NGO representative	NGO4	1984
11	NGO reprsentative	NGO5	1984
12	Energy Affiliate 2	EA2	1981
13	Policy-Maker 2	PM2	1949
14	Policy-Maker 3	PM3	1951
15	Energy Affiliate 3	EA3	1953
16	Policy-Maker 4	PM4	1963
17	Policy-Maker 5	PM5	1960
18	NGO reprsentative	NGO6	1984
19	NGO reprsentative	NGO7	1961
20	CS 2	CS2	1982
21	Journalist 4	Jour4	1988
22	NGO representative	NGO8	1975
23	Journalist 5	Jour5	1985

APPENDIX 9B: TURKISH-CYPRIOT P-SET (JANUARY 2018)

	Affiliation	Q-sort	Year of birth
1	Policy-Maker	PM1	1987
2	Policy-Maker	PM2	1991
3	Energy Affiliate	EA1	1987
4	Energy Affiliate	EA2	1992
5	Researcher	R1	1962
6	Journalist	J1	1991
7	Journalist	J2	1979
8	NGO representative	NGO1	1979
9	NGO representative	NGO2	1981
10	NGO representative	NGO3	1991
11	Energy Affiliate	EA3	1989
12	Researcher	R2	1991
13	Energy Affiliate	EA4	1987
14	Policy-maker	PM3	1981
15	NGO representative	NGO4	1996
16	Researcher	R3	1978
17	Researcher	R4	1986
18	Researcher	R5	1976
19	Policy-Maker	PM4	1981
20	Journalist 3	J3	1982
21	Policy-Maker	PM5	1954

APPENDIX 10A: FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE GREEK-CYPRIOT P-SET

	Q-Sort Coding Name	1	2	3
1	CS1	0,65	0,05	0,13
2	Jour1	-0,13	0,65	-0,37
3	PM1	0,89	0,06	0,25
4	NGO1	0,29	0,14	0,06
5	Jour2	0,19	0,58	0,03
6	NGO2	0,24	-0,02	0,47
7	Jour3	-0,05	0,57	0,08
8	EA1	0,36	0,11	0,34
9	NGO3	0,20	0,15	0,50
10	NGO4	0,08	-0,07	0,60
11	NGO5	0,02	0,51	0,20
12	EA2	0,25	-0,14	0,22
13	PM2	0,60	0,00	0,02
14	PM3	0,39	0,09	-0,18
15	EA3	0,28	0,04	0,03
16	PM4	0,57	0,17	0,02
17	PM5	0,50	-0,08	0,35
18	NGO6	-0,12	-0,10	0,49
19	NGO7	0,08	0,14	0,62
20	CS 2	0,78	-0,09	0,25
21	Jour4	0,20	0,62	-0,26
22	NGO8	0,26	0,27	0,29
23	Jour5	0,45	-0,08	0,34
	% Variance	**16%**	**9%**	**10%**

APPENDIX 10B: FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT P-SET

	Q-Sort Coding Name	1	2
1	PM 1	0,54	0,55
2	PM 2	0,47	0,45
3	EA1	0,52	0,41
4	EA2	0,77	-0,06
5	R1	0,46	-0,38
6	J1	0,06	-0,38
7	J2	0,71	0,22
8	NGO1	0,32	-0,20
9	NGO2	-0,17	0,61
10	NGO3	0,39	-0,16
11	EA3	0,34	0,23
12	NGO4	0,15	0,26
13	EA4	0,34	0,23
14	R2	0,51	0,32
15	NGO5	0,75	-0,34
16	R3	0,53	-0,20
17	R4	0,41	-0,36
18	R5	0,62	-0,05
19	PM3	0,36	0,00
20	J3	0,13	0,36
21	PM4	0,69	-0,07
	% Variance	**23**	**11**

APPENDIX 11A: FACTOR ARRAYS FOR THE GREEK-CYPRIOT P-SET

No.		Factor Arrays					
		Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3	
		Q-Sort Value	Z-score	Q-Sort Value	Z-score	Q-Sort Value	Z-score
1	The maritime disputes around Cyprus are linked to the Aegean Sea.	2	1,22	0	-0,34	-2	-0,65
2	Energy in our case is deeply securitized in a political level: screw the economics.	-1	-0,44	-3	-1,76	2	0,41
3	Cyprus conflict is a dormant, 'comfortable crisis'. If we had to face a reality of people's losing their lives day by day, then we would have extra incentives to immediately resolve the conflict.	1	0,62	1	0,84	4	2,32
4	The challenge of a pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey would be that if the single market we have is Turkey, then Turkey may dictate the prices.	0	-0,05	-1	-0,45	-3	-1,12
5	The energy developments have been hijacked by the domestic politics.	0	0,07	-1	-0,47	0	0
6	I do not believe in the philosophy of the constituent state and I do not think that it can practically work, as long as the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state will be under the control of Turkey.	-1	-0,49	-3	-1,15	0	-0,15
7	Instead of taking steps to tackle the crisis, Christofias launched the energy debate.	-3	-1,37	-2	-0,94	2	0,47
8	The water project is almost like taking the pipeline and hitting the Greek-Cypriots.	-3	-1,46	0	0,01	2	1,03
9	All countries in our region, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt approached the whole debate purely from a political point of view having priority over the business logic.	0	-0,07	3	1,39	0	-0,35
10	Exporting the current Cypriot gas reserves to Turkey establishes the conditions of a unilateral dependency from Turkey.	2	0,98	-2	-1,19	-1	-0,58
11	How can you talk about energy cooperation with your enemy when the latter does not recognize you as a state entity?	4	1,53	0	-0,05	3	1,93
12	Through the potential utilization of natural gas, Greek-Cypriots thought they had gained a negotiation tool in their confrontation vis-à-vis Turkey.	2	0,84	3	1,46	0	-0,42
13	The Turkish-Cypriots believe that the way Greek-Cypriots envisage shaping the new state entails a risk that they become second-class citizens.	1	0,41	4	1,6	0	-0,09
14	Wherever grievances exist, the past never becomes a past.	0	0,25	2	1,11	3	1,94
15	There is a danger to have a pipeline transiting the "TRNC".	-3	-1,34	0	-0,13	-3	-1,24
16	People are cautious after the Annan enthusiasm. It is good that the leaders are drinking coffee and zivania, but what is really happening is not convincing.	1	0,74	2	0,99	1	0,54
17	Americans want to clear the Cyprus question out of their way in order to normalize their relations with Turkey, while Syria is in between.	0	-0,09	-2	-0,79	-1	-0,57
18	Under the current prices Greek-Cypriots cannot take any advantage of the gas reserves especially because they lie offshore, in 'ultra-deep' waters.	-1	-0,33	3	1,55	-2	-0,77
19	There is a succession principle in the delimitation agreement signed between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. All agreements of the predecessor states continue.	-3	-1,78	-1	-0,8	0	-0,18

20	The energy triangles are based on a consolidated perception: the "enemy of my enemy is my friend".	0	-0,23	0	-0,33	-3	-1,04
21	The rationale driving the cooperation with Israel is the lack of Cypriots' experience in securing its natural resources through coast-guard, navy and air force.	-1	-0,3	-1	-0,34	0	-0,47
22	Without a meeting with the Turkish-Cypriots –not Turkey- to discuss on the energy issue, the Greek-Cypriots will find themselves under the 'Damoclean sword' of Turkey.	-2	-0,84	0	-0,1	-2	-0,74
23	Greek-Cypriots fear that Turkish-Cypriots will be potentially treated as the 'Trojan horse' of Turkey.	3	1,48	1	0,74	3	2,14
24	Gas is an important issue but **not** the main factor that prompts the negotiations. Negotiations are driven by geopolitics.	3	1,48	1	0,57	2	0,97
25	The construction of a pipeline to Greece is not feasible due to the depth of the waters and the lack of Israel's interest in investing in such a pipeline.	0	-0,28	3	1,5	0	0,2
26	If Greek Cypriots exhaust all possibilities with no results, then they have to do all necessary to facilitate the best possible cooperation with Turkey.	-2	-1,22	1	0,29	1	0,78
27	If this negotiation process fails, we head for a potential division, permanent and legitimate.	-1	-0,33	2	1,16	-3	-1,18
28	In **economic terms**, I cannot rule out that the best option is to export gas through Turkey. In **political terms** -with the current gas reserves detected-I would consider the export to Turkey a wrong choice, even after a settlement.	1	0,48	-3	-1,35	2	0,97
29	In Cyprus, the companies face a jumble of bureaucratic procedures in order to safeguard a corporate licence; the oil companies need 16 distinct licensing rounds for technical reasons. Why should they get further involved?	-2	-1,14	0	-0,18	-1	-0,68
30	The hyperbolic opinion 'from now on, we are friends and partners with Israel' corresponds to Mediatic needs of the Greek-Cypriots' mentality that an external player is going to 'save us'.	1	0,4	1	0,89	1	0,29
31	The pipeline prospects will not be a trigger for peace. The presence of pipelines is just a reflection of peace or stability, not the other way round.	3	1,47	-1	-0,42	3	1,74
32	There may be companies (ENI and TOTAL) that would not hesitate to confront Turkey. If they want to make the decision to go, they will go because they think that Cyprus' entitlement in this region is very strong.	3	1,46	-1	-0,58	-1	-0,46
33	In Cyprus, we do not find cases where cooperation extends beyond the micro-level: they were few and did not have any spill-over effect, with a more sustainable character..	0	0,17	0	0,03	0	-0,47
34	If Greek-Cypriots hurry up, they might sell some gas to Egypt for 2 to 4 years, until they discover more gas and thereby earn some money in order to invest into another option.	1	0,49	-2	-0,71	-1	-0,63
35	In the case of political-military conflicts energy, as such, has not been, so far, a factor conducive to their resolution but evolved as an essential chapter of the pre-existing conflict.	0	0,22	2	0,86	2	1,09
36	The trilateral agreements between Cyprus-Egypt-Greece and Cyprus-Israel-Greece are oriented towards the right direction.	3	1,54	1	0,57	0	-0,27
37	If the issue reaches the bi-communal level and every community has the right to exercise its veto, no company in the world would invest millions, if it had to face any form of obstructiveness	-1	-0,52	0	-0,07	3	1,18

&

38	If I cannot safeguard something that betters the *status quo* , then I handle things as they are, 'the theory of the second best'.	-2	-1,04	-4	-2,01	1	0,67
39	The most important stake in the energy debate is the guarantee of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and its rights. Therefore, the Greek-Cypriots should be the ones making the decisions.	2	1,4	-2	-1,19	1	0,02
40	Greek-Cypriots can keep at the drilling activities, but under the supervision of an international authority, within which a Turkish-Cypriot representative could also participate. This proposal includes a disclaimer; whatever agreed upon is not a precedent for other issues.	-4	-2,01	2	1,32	-1	-0,79
41	The way the profits will be distributed among the two communities is something to be seen. Greek Cypriots are ready in case of an external pressure to find an economic formula, but not a political one.	-3	-1,98	0	-0,16	-4	-2,82
42	If it weren't for Turkey, nobody would take any interest in the Turkish-Cypriots.	-2	-0,9	-2	-0,9	-2	-1,1
43	Russia has been conspicuously absent from the whole energy debate. If Israel approaches Turkey, then Russia will get involved.	-1	-0,35	-3	-1,19	1	0,31
44	If we trust Turkey to build a federated state (which means that the Turkish-Cypriots are reliable in their commitments), why shall we not trust Turkey for the construction of a pipeline?	1	0,59	2	1,46	-1	-0,63
45	Akkinci wants to reach a settlement, he is a reasonable man. We should not forget, however, that he is a Turkish Cypriot and has to address the interests of his constituency.	2	0,92	-1	-0,36	-2	-0,9
46	If a solution is to be found, the options for the utilization of the reserves will be expanded.	0	0,21	3	1,45	-3	-2,15
47	After the establishment of an escrow account, for every 100 dollars that the Greek-Cypriots would earn out of the utilization of the hydrocarbons, a proportion could be directed to the Turkish-Cypriots. We can apply this proposal even without a settlement	-2	-0,98	1	0,67	-2	-0,98
48	Greek-Cypriots do not want an agreement abolishing the Republic of Cyprus and paving the way for the federalization of a constituent state with the 'territorial extension' of Turkey	2	0,79	-3	-1,71	1	0,87

APPENDIX 11B: FACTOR ARRAYS FOR THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT P-SET

		Q-Sort Value	Z-score	Q-Sort Value	Z-score
1	The gas reserves were something that would not make Turkey and Greece step back.	-1	-0,74	0	0,2
2	If you talk about energy, it is always the realist school that comes at play. It is the state's safety at stake.	1	0,51	1	0,45
3	The incentives to resolve the conflict drop day by day, since it constitutes a manageable-dormant crisis.	3	1,39	0	-0,2
4	I can understand why Greek-Cypriots do not make use of the Turkish export option. Despite the economic benefits, you cannot assign a price to the political risk.	-3	-1,17	3	1,74
5	Özersay played an important role in the crisis with the seismic survey in 2011.	-1	-0,66	4	2,59
6	Turkish-Cypriots had become invisible in the eyes of the Greek-Cypriots to such a degree that they did not evoke even national hatred.	0	-0,02	2	0,89
7	Christofias' government initiated the whole energy endeavour in order to restore his shaken image after the Mari events in 2011 and distract the attention from the economic reforms needed.	-3	-1,44	3	1,54
8	Bringing water from Turkey to Cyprus as an option might be adopted as a negotiation tool vis-à-vis a common gas exploitation in the foreseeable future.	0	-0,31	2	0,74
9	Greek-Cypriots failed to do something creative and substantive about the resolution of the problem and preferred to divert the public opinion towards something which is abstract, like the monetization of the gas reserves.	-1	-0,53	3	1,54
10	The prestige loss that the Greek Cypriots had suffered after the Annan Plan was an extra incentive for them to initiate the energy endeavor.	-2	-0,87	3	1,54
11	In the case of energy, the international community had no leverage to change the attitude of Greek-Cypriots.	-2	-0,94	2	1,29
12	The Greek Cypriots have a lot of problems with Turkey blaming everything on Turkey. They like to think that Turkish Cypriots are the good elements and Turkey is the bad element.	2	0,97	2	1,29
13	Turkey has always this heavy, oppressing presence. There is too much dependence on Turkey which is not a liberal country, and all the things that come with that create certain awareness.	3	1,7	2	1,29

&

14	Cyprus is a space wherein resentment exists; a space in which people, communities and citizens feel underprivileged and deeply traumatized.	2	0,99	1	0,49
15	There might be options that a potential pipeline starting from Israel might not go through the Republic of Cyprus but through Karpaz.	-1	-0,41	1	0,49
16	Turkish diplomats are making plans on the construction of the gas pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey without consulting the Turkish-Cypriots.	0	0,21	0	-0,16
17	The existing status quo embraces itself a level of stability and enables countries like the UK to continue to use the sovereign bases, without any dispute.	-3	-1,55	0	0,25
18	The Security Council says that the Turkish Cypriots have political rights and Greek Cypriots have legal rights. It had not been taking one side or another. It mainly wanted to keep a kind of balance.	2	1,06	1	0,45
19	All agreements of the predecessor states continue to apply after a potential reunification.	-1	-0,67	0	0,25
20	The cooperation between Cyprus, Greece and Israel has been perceived as a sign that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'	0	--0,04	2	0,6
21	It is not easy to bring all actors involved given the continuous struggle in the region in the same way the Black Sea countries in 1972 came together and made an agreement in a Cold War environment.	0	0,02	0	0
22	The Greek Cypriots are pushed into a situation where they say "For once, we are strong against Turkey so we're going to make the best of this, bring Turkey to its knees. This gives them all this false hope.	0	0,28	0	-0,2
23	Even being considered the good element by Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots' overreliance on Turkey is problematic, because they can be the fifth column.	1	0,77	0	0
24	The US in the background have played a very big role in bridging the gap between the two sides.	2	1,02	-1	-0,8
25	Turkey is getting angrier and angrier if it remains left out from the energy developments.	1	0,47	1	0,4
26	The presumption that Turkish-Cypriots will prevent decisions from being taken, if they participate in a decision-making body on energy issues underlines another missing element in the Cyprus conflict: the federal culture.	3	1,49	0	0
27	Another deadlock will not take anything out of the tensions and I am afraid that Cyprus will surely go through another war.	-4	-2	2	0,85

28	In order to safeguard the European perspective and utilize it against the Kemalist structure, Erdogan says "yes" to the Annan plan hoping that the Greeks would say "no". The Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan was a relief and fantastic opportunity for Erdogan.	-2	-1,02	-1	-0,4
29	The format in accordance with which the two leaders as well as a handful other men and couple of women in the negotiation team who meet in the UN buffer zone are totally cut off from the rest of the society, does not seem the best way to go.	0	-0,2	1	0,45
30	The Church had lost a lot financially due to the banking crisis. That's why Archbishop was initially convinced by some actors that following a non-solution or anti-solution stance or anti-federation stance is not the way to go.	-1	-0,57	-1	-0,25
31	The Cypriots – Greek, Turkish doesn't matter –are very successful in making things more complicated, instead of solving problems, simply because we are focusing too much on the constraints instead of having a very clear focus; that we want to solve this.	3	0,83	-1	-1,05
32	Erdogan talks about the Cyprus conflict by synthesizing the two discourses that every Turkish nationalist embraces in his rhetoric over Cyprus: geopolitical significance and the Turkish nationalist narrative.	-3	-1,51	-1	-0,85
33	Turkish-Cypriots do not want to change their economy because they do not really care. A state was established without oil but with aid. That has been a mistake of the Turkish policy-making.	-2	-0,85	-2	-1,09
34	Due to the gas that will be transported from Azerbaijan, Europeans need Turkey and that is why they are going to re-open immediately the energy chapter.	-2	-0,96	-2	-1,14
35	A settlement is not going to happen just from one day to the other. It's not going to be peace and reconciliation once we get an agreement and we will actually be able to implement it.	2	0,88	-1	-0,29
36	Turkey is an important country in the region and obviously it will demand certain priorities as to its presence and geopolitical interests.	0	-0,31	-1	-0,25
37	Turkish-Cypriots are after decision-making. What they actually want is to have a say in the decision-making: 'let's do the explorations jointly.'	4	1,96	-1	-0,45

&

38	For the Greek Cypriots, the explorations constitute a sovereignty issue. They are the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus now and the world knows that.	0	-0,28	-2	-1,05
39	You could identify there the age-old problem: there is no agreement on what the Cyprus Problem is. It is two different things: When the Greek- Cypriots talk about reunifying the island they mean one thing while Turkish-Cypriots mean something else.	-3	-1,96	-3	-1,29
40	All these discussions about bringing the hydrocarbon issue do not have to be on the settlement negotiations. There could be perhaps a parallel process that would not prejudice any precedents.	0	0,23	-1	-0,74
41	The hydrocarbons' issue should be put on the negotiation table, but the way it's framed by the Greek-Cypriot side makes it impossible.	1	0,54	-2	-1,18
42	Even if the Turkish-Cypriots had natural gas reserves, they would have to bring the international development in, mainly companies to take it out. Then, they would have to engage with capitalism; unfortunately, that is life.	1	0,72	-3	-1,29
43	Turkey should do something on non-Russian gas resources.	-2	-0,83	-2	-1,09
44	In case Turkey and Israel normalize their bilateral relations, Greek-Cypriots have to decide what kind of policy they should follow.	1	0,84	-3	-1,49
45	The Greek-Cypriots shall not make the energy issue into the existential question for the Republic of Cyprus, as if its existence depends on talking about hydrocarbons with Turkish-Cypriots or not.	2	1,03	0	0,16
46	Cypriots should establish a fund: not like a bank, but investment bank. They could have a peace fund for reconstruction after peace. This fund should be used to introduce new things in the island (fixing traffic)	3	1,21	-3	-1,34
47	The electricity cable linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece makes a crazy business.	-1	-0,5	-3	-1,34
48	Turkish Cypriots also had this ambivalent attitude towards Turkey, in a sense that Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey to be there always for them.	3	1,23	-4	-1,54