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Adding fuel to the conflict: How gas reserves complicate the Cyprus question

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The historical context

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Any analysis regarding the conflict-inducing role of natural resources would have been much simpler if the conflict was only about the exploitation of natural resources. Such a monolithically material-based type of conflict is usually concrete and clearly defined, while the objectives of the disputants are bounded by the resources at stake: what is the amount of gas reserves that each side should receive and which companies are eligible to begin drilling? In such an ‘ideally’ conflictual context, the utility of cooperative outcomes or mutual accommodation would have not been that complicated to discern (Rothman 1997, 10).

Nonetheless, the bases for the Cypriot conflict, and similar ethnic conflicts, are not only material interests. Such conflicts are deeply seated in relatively intangible psychological factors, which may extend beyond the exploitation of natural resources (Ellis 2006, 29). They touch upon the existential needs and values of the groups involved, such as security and recognition of identity. These values are under threat and competitively pursued (Rothman 1997). Ethnicity gains ground as a first order social identity. It encompasses psychological properties and discursive resources, with the potential to descend into an arms spiral or escalate into a conflict (Young 2003). Ethnic conflicts are past oriented, rooted in personal traumas and collective indignities born of the past, operating as engines of current confrontations (Rothman 2012). As Caruth (1996, 4, in Bryant 2012) postulated: ‘Trauma seems to be much more than a pathology, or the simple illness of a wounded psyche: it is always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available.’

These traumas grant primacy to the role of history in battles on the energy field or in the diplomatic terrains. Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot delegates acknowledge the necessity to shape and adopt particular historical narratives that will resonate ‘both domestically and internationally, among their constituents and in the international fora; narratives that will in turn shape the course of the conflict’ (Bryant and Papadakis 2012, 2). The disputants adopt history as a ‘battle’ to force one side to accept the other side’s version of history. This what Hatay and Papadakis call (2012, 27) the ‘fetishism of history’. It is a common predicament for societies facing an ethnic conflict to elevate history to the most important form of public discourse. History becomes ‘anthropomorphized’ and must be respected by the constituents, especially when tensions resurface (*ibid*). From a discursive perspective, the historical background can constitute ‘underlying tendencies that gather force’ (Foucault 1972, 3) and bring about a reverberation (Birgel 2018), as manifested through the recent energy tensions.

Throughout this chapter, I seek to comprehend the ways in which the parties to the conflict engage history as an actor in the struggle. That is why I lay out the historical context. Without this, I would leave the impression that the recent tensions evolved solely around the exploitation of the natural resources. Nonetheless, as explained in the Introduction, the amount of natural

resources detected *per se* (at least at the time of writing) would not entirely justify their conflict-triggering effect. There are other ‘intangible’ factors at play, which I can discern only by laying out the historical background.

For this purpose, I embrace a combination of desk and field research. As regards the first, I briefly resort to historical textbooks and extract information about the impact of Greece and Turkey on the nationalisms in the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides. As regards the perceptual links between Greece and Greek-Cypriots, I found refuge to the writings of multiple Greek and Greek-Cypriot historians, sociologists and political analysts (Alastos 1955; Alecou 2016; Attalides 1979; Bitsios 1975; Constantinou 2010; Georgiades 2017; Joseph 1997, 2009; Kitromilides 1979; Klapsis 2013; Koufoudakis 2008; Koumas 2013; Kranidiotis 1981, 1984; Loizides 2007; Papadakis 2003, 2005; Papageorgiou 2000; Stavrou 2009; Stefanidis 1999; Svolopoulos 2004; Tenekides 1964; Tenekides and Kranidiotis 1982; Spyridakis 1974; Xydis 1993). To investigate the roots and manifestations of the Turkish-Cypriot nationalism and its links to the Turkish one, I used the works of Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot historians, sociologists and political analysts (Gazioglu 1996; Goker 2012; Hanioglu 1995; Kaliber 2005; Kizilyurek 2006, 2009, 2010; Mütercimler 2003; Morag 2004; Uzer 2010; Volkan 2008; Ercan 2010), as well as the work of Greek and Greek-Cypriot Turkologists and cultural anthropologists of international background (Anagnostopoulou 2004; Bryant 2008, 2012; Ktoris 2013). Although Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots are the key protagonists of my study, they are not the only players. Through the work of other scholars (Anderson 2008, Dodd 2010, Holland 2004, Faustmann 1999; Johnson 2000, Ker-Lindsay 2005, 2007, 2009 2011; Mallinson 2011; O’Malley and Craig 1999), I examined the role of external stakeholders.

Having completed my desk research, I visited the island for the first time in November 2014 to conduct field research. I arranged open-ended interviews with a number of historians, sociologists and political analysts, who shed further light on the lessons that each side has drawn from the conflict. In Appendix 1, I provide further information regarding the interviewees and in Appendix 2 the type of questions I asked. I recorded their comments and statements and used them to complement my desk research. I incorporated some of their historical interpretations and considerable insights while narrating events. I provide their summary in the last section of this Chapter while explaining the reasons behind the intractability of the conflict¹.

After a brief overview, I trace the historical pattern of rivalry and contest between between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots from 1950 and 1960, when Cyprus became an independent state, to 1974, when Turkey militarily intervened on the island after the Greek

¹ As I will explain in Chapter 5, their answers serve a methodological purpose as well; their answers construct partially my empirical data, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses regarding the historical context of the conflict, which will be subject to further investigation.

military regime engineered a coup against the Cypriot government. From then onwards, I listed the multiple failed attempts of the UN to bring about a settlement. In the last section, I conclude with the question: which factors account for the intractable and protracted character of the Cyprus conflict? To answer this question, I use a summary of the viewpoints of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot historians and sociologists which I interviewed in 2014. The list of these people as well as the open-ended interview questions I asked them can be found in appendices 1 and 2.

3.2 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

‘I’m very sorry to tell you that despite the very strong commitment and engagement of all the delegations and different parties ... the conference on Cyprus was closed without an agreement being reached’ (Reuters 2017a). These were the concluding words of the UN secretary general, Antonio Gutierrez, on July 7, 2017, in Crans Montana. They marked the end of another unsuccessful round of talks to reunify the divided island.

Since 1974, the territory of Cyprus has been divided by a UN buffer zone. On the south, we find the Republic of Cyprus – whose authority is recognized by the entire international community for the whole island – a member of the EU and the UN, administered by the Greek-Cypriots. It is, in general, a functioning, thriving and well-governed democratic state, with one of the highest levels of GDP per capita in Europe. Greek-Cypriots, a population of 667,398 forming up to 77% of the island (Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus 2011), run an open, free-market, service-based economy and are among the most prosperous people in the Mediterranean region.

To the north of this zone, we encounter the self-declared ‘TRNC’. It constitutes a breakaway regime not recognized – along the lines of consecutive Security Council (hereinafter SC) resolutions – by any state of the international community except for Turkey. Since 1974, Turkish-Cypriots, a population of 294,606² (Hatay 2017) comprising 18% of the whole – cope with an embargo imposed on ports under their control; therefore, they rely heavily on Turkish military and economic aid. Their economy is overshadowed by the services sector, including the public sector, trade, tourism and education (CIA Factbook 2018).

Except for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, there are three officially recognized religious groups, which, in accordance with the 1960 constitution, opted to adhere to the Greek-Cypriot

² The census was conducted under UN auspices but this figure is disputed by political parties and labour unions in the North. Furthermore, it does not include the number of Turkish settlers residing on the island.

community³: Armenians⁴, Maronites⁵ and Latins.⁶ Romas belonging since 1960 to the Turkish-Cypriot community are estimated to number around 1000. Cyprus is also the home of a Jewish community with a synagogue in Larnaca (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011).⁷ Finally, on the territory of the island, there are two British sovereign bases, at Akrotiri and Dhekeleia.

3.3 THE HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

3.3.1 The birth of multi-ethnic cleavages

Situated in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea, at the juncture of Eurasia with Africa, Cyprus holds an important position in global politics. Turkey as the closest neighbour, lies at almost 40 miles north of the island, while Syria and Lebanon lie approximately 60 miles to its eastern side (CIA Factbook 2018). Other neighbouring territories involve Egypt to the south (230 miles) and Israel to the southeast (124 miles). To the west, the nearest Greek Dodecanesian island, Castellorizo, is 170 miles away, while its distance from the Greek mainland is more than 497 miles (CIA Factbook 2018). Cyprus is positioned on the sea lane of the great maritime highway which links the Mediterranean Sea via its two sea gates, the Suez and Bab al-Mandab, to the Indian Ocean (Leigh and Vucovic 2011, Davutoglu 2010). With a total area of 9,251 km and coastlines of 648 km, Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean, after Sicily and Sardinia (CIA Factbook 2018).

³ These three religious groups can each elect one delegate to the House of Representatives. These delegates are eligible to only present the group's views to any public body of the Republic of Cyprus and are not allowed to cast a vote (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011, 4)

⁴ Current estimates put the number of Armenians residing in Cyprus at 2,600 to 3,500, all of them in the southern part of the island. According to the Second Report of the Republic of Cyprus, submitted to the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), the number is set at 2,600 (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011, 14-15).

⁵ The total population of the group today is assumedly 6,000 in Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus submitted a report to the Advisory Committee of the FCNM putting the number at 4,800 (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011, 15).

⁶ In 1991, the official population amounted to 250 people, according to the Second Report submitted by the Republic of Cyprus to the FCNM (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011, 16).

⁷ Besides the groups mentioned above, a small number of Turkish Cypriots reside permanently in the South, under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the *Council of Europe* (2007), most of them 'who live in the territory under Government control find themselves isolated and marginalized politically, economically, socially and culturally'. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the 1974 invasion, '20,000 Greek-Cypriots remained in the northern part of Cyprus'(ibid). Their number has gradually declined because of 'a systematic policy of harassment, discrimination and persecution employed by the authorities' (*Council of Europe* 2007, 18; Kyriacou & Kaya 2011, 16).

Due to its special location, Cyprus has witnessed the invasion, establishment and interaction of many of the ancient civilizations of pre-history and proto-history.⁸ Populations of various cultures used to meet on Cyprus for a common purpose: to get the copper and the wood of its famous forests. Arcadians, Minoans, Achaeans, Mycenaeans and the Ptolemaic dynasty⁹ (among other tribes) settled there and contributed to the formulation of the Hellenic character of the island (Spyridakis 1974, Tenekides 1964). By 900 BC, the island was mainly Greek speaking, although Phoenician, Assyrian, Egyptian and Persian dominations might have also influenced, to a certain degree, the ethnic make-up of the population (Spyridakis 1974). Two Greek-Cypriot historians, Doros Alastos (1955) and Kleanthis Georgiades (2017) highlighted the ancient Greek origins of Cypriots, their continuity with the ancient Greek past and the inclusion of Cyprus within the Hellenic world. As I will show later, in terms of Realpolitik, the implications of this was that Cypriots should be incorporated into the modern Greek state, a claim dubbed as 'enosis'. In 58 BC, Cyprus came under Roman rule (Hatay and Papadakis 2012, 29). During the Eastern Roman Empire governance,¹⁰ the Christian Orthodox features of its spiritual and cultural identity were moulded. This explains why the Greek-Cypriots were, and are to this day, called 'Rum' by the Turks.¹¹

Between 1571 and 1878, the Ottoman Empire took over the rule over Cyprus. This played a catalytic role in forging the Turkish-Cypriot identity of a portion of its constituents. Ottoman origins of the Turkish-Cypriots have been mainly presented by Halil Fikret Alasya (1939) in his book, *Kıbrıs Tarihi ve Belli Baslı Antikitepleri* (Cyprus History and its Main Antiquities). Halil Fikret Alasya would become the advisor of the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaşh. At that time, Turkish-Cypriots enjoyed more benefits compared with the Greek-Cypriot subjects of the empire (Ktoris 2013, 40).¹² Many Greek-Cypriots and Latin constituents converted to Islam in order to avoid heavy taxation and compulsory recruitment of their children to the Ottoman

⁸ The Eteocyprians constituted the autochthonous population of the Island during the Neolithic period.

⁹ The settlement of Jews in Cyprus dates from that time and their numbers increased after the arrival of many refugees in 70 AD, following Jerusalem's destruction by Titus, the son of Emperor Vespasian (Spyridakis 1974).

¹⁰ The Church of Cyprus became one of the oldest Eastern Orthodox autocephalous churches.

¹¹ For many centuries, the Hellenic-Orthodox constituents withstood many disastrous Arab raids between the 7th and 10th centuries. Nevertheless, the advent of the Crusaders in 1192 under the leadership of King Richard the 'Lionheart' interrupted the linkages with the Roman Empire in the east. Between 1192 and 1489, Cyprus went through the Frankish Era. In 1489, Queen Caterina transferred the Kingdom of Cyprus to the Venetians, signaling the start of the Venetian Era (1489-1570).

¹² For instance, exemption from the obligation to pay the *haraç* (a land tax levied on non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire) to the Sultan (Ktoris 2013); the requirement to pay only half the amount of the taxes which Greek-Cypriots were obliged to pay; exclusiveness in their employment in public administration, the police, the army and in provincial administrative councils on the island (*Medjiliss Idare*).

army (Mirbagheri 2009). These triggered multiple uprisings on several occasions violently put down by the Ottoman Empire.

3.3.2 The colonial legacy of the British Empire

In 1878, when the Great Eastern Crisis had reached its peak and in fear of an eventual Russian expansion into its territories, the Ottoman reign over Cyprus substantially (but not legally) came to an end. Through the 1878 Cyprus convention, Sultan Abdul Hamit II ceded the island's administration to the British authorities and in exchange received formal guarantees by them to protect the integrity of the Ottoman borders from Russian expansionist aspirations. Britain would exercise *de facto* and the Ottoman Empire *de jure* sovereignty on the island. The British praised the geopolitical significance of Cyprus's location,¹³ linking its administration to the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) and the occupation of Egypt (1882) in order to protect the vital Mediterranean-Suez route.

From the first year of the British administration, various discontents, rooted in the Ottoman era, instigated 'philhellenic aspirations' in certain urban circles among Greek-Cypriots for unification of the island with Greece, commonly known as '*enosis*'. For instance, in 1878, after the Cyprus Convention, a Greek-Cypriot delegation headed by the Bishop of Kition welcomed the Governor Sir Garnet Wolseley with the following words: 'We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is nationally connected' (Sir Orr 1918, 60). As Varnavas (2013, 118) observes: 'the power of those words is obvious: from the very start of the British rule, the leader of the Cypriot Church had a Greek national identity and desired *enosis*'. According to Attalides (1979, 1), 'Greek-Cypriots seemed well prepared to raise such a demand. They had 'a well-developed system of political representation through the Church and a marked degree of national consciousness within their leading groups'.

On the contrary, Turkish-Cypriots considered the island still part of the Ottoman territory. The Turkish-Cypriot resistance against '*enosis*' was reportedly fuelled by the Greek revolt in Ottoman Crete (1866-1869). Turkish-Cypriots' collectively shared anxieties evolved allegedly around a 'Crete syndrome' (Interviewee 12). During the Ottoman Empire, Crete's continuous efforts to unify with Greece and the realization of the union in 1912-13 led to the deportation of the Cretan-Muslim population and their emigration to Turkey (Denктаş 2004). Less than a decade later, Greece's military campaign in Asia Minor intensified the fears of their potential uprooting. Turkish-Cypriot leaders invoked these memories to justify their rejection of '*enosis*' (Kizilyurek 2006).

¹³ The British prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, writing to Queen Victoria, considered the acquisition of Cyprus as the 'key of Western Asia', which would 'weld together' the Indian Empire and Great Britain while enormously increasing England's power in the Mediterranean (Stavrou 2009, 15).

At the same time, the formulation of the Turkish-Cypriot national identity was going through some *zymosis*.¹⁴ Turkish-Cypriots did not fully resume their nationalism until the 1940s. The reason for the late development of the secular-laden nationalism was that the Turkish-speaking minority in Cyprus, with few exceptions, did not immediately endear itself to secular Kemalism (Anagnostopoulou 2004). After Ottomans gradually began decreasing their involvement in Cypriot affairs, Cypriot Muslims, emerging as an economically backward, insignificant community, sought refuge with the British colonial administration (Kizilyurek 2006; Ktoris 2013; Moudouros 2013).¹⁵ Therefore, the gradual 'disintegration' of the Ottoman power on the island downgraded Turkish-Cypriots from an initially dominant ethnic group to a minority. Under these circumstances, the latter had no other choice than to rely on the colonial government for their security. The British organized and consolidated their administration on the basis of British-Muslim cooperation, while profiting by the ideological-political dispute between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (Kizilyurek 2009, 30).¹⁶

Despite the British-Muslim cooperation, the British would not hesitate to utilize the 'enosis' sentiments as a bargaining tool in order to acquire further regional assets. In November 1914, at the outbreak of the First World War and after the Ottomans aligned their forces with the Central Powers, the British proclaimed the nullity of the 1878 Treaties and the annexation of Cyprus. Greek-Cypriots thought that the momentum for 'enosis' was ripe. Britain allegedly offered Cyprus to Greece in order to lure the latter to enter the Entente camp in WWI.¹⁷ However, the then Greek government rejected this offer in order to demonstrate its initially neutral stance at that period.

¹⁴ The Muslim 'Ottoman Community' witnessed the disputes between the various ideological movements which were generally dominating the Ottoman territory (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 175); on the one hand, there were grassroots adhering to the religious Ottoman legacy and, on the other, constituents were diffusing the secular ideas of the Young Turks. Despite the fierce opposition of the Ottoman elite to these secular ideas, the proponents of secularism played an influential role in fortifying the (secular) Kemalist principles of the Turkish identity among Cypriot Muslims (Nevzat 2005).

¹⁵ The emigration of an important proportion of Turkish-Cypriots' upper class, consisting of its military and bureaucratic apparatus, after the British arrival in 1878, played a crucial role in this respect (Ktoris 2013)

¹⁶ To that effect, the Cypriot Constitution, which they introduced in 1882, established a legislative council in such a way that the number of Muslims and the appointed *ex officio* was equal to the number of Christians (Kizilyurek 2009, 30).

¹⁷ Great Britain, 'Cabinet Meeting (Financial Situation; Proposed Cession to Greece of Cyprus without Cabinet Consent; Need for Smaller War Council);' CAB 37/136/26, October 21, 1915 found in Stavrou, 2009:, 16). 'Grey's offer' has never been renewed ever since. Stavrou (ibid) argues that it was symbolic rather than substantial. The condition of Greece's becoming belligerent tangled up with the diplomatic machinations of Entente. These machinations were aimed at striking a balance among the overlapping interests and territorial aspirations of other countries, like Russia, Romania, Serbia, and Greece, while simultaneously at inducing 'Ottoman Turkey and Bulgaria to remain neutral' (ibid).

These developments did not discourage Greek-Cypriots from continuing with their struggle for 'enosis'. According to Article 20 of the Lausanne Treaty, which established the borders of modern Turkey, Turkey recognized 'the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914', giving up any of its rights on the Island. For Greek-Cypriots, this event was an opportunity to advance their claims over 'enosis'.¹⁸ The British Government, in 1925, declared Cyprus a crown colony,¹⁹ and entombed these aspirations. In 1931, the Greek-Cypriot struggle for 'enosis' intensified with a spontaneous rebellion against British rule, putting Government House on fire (Anderson 2008).²⁰ The British administration, mainly under the rule of Governor Palmer (1933-1939), responded by enacting 16 laws which suspended the colony's constitution, prohibited public gatherings, banned political parties and decreed any agitations related to 'enosis' punishable (Anderson 2008). The regulations also targeted the Church, which played a protagonist role in disseminating the 'enosis' cause, and the newly formed communist movement, which was gaining ground at that time.

The outbreak of World War II signalled the end of the Palmerstonian era and forced the key players of that period (British, nationalists, communists) to cooperate from the moment that their patrons²¹ had become allies. In 1940, British founded the Cyprus regiment, armed units comprising British officers, Greek-Cypriot (78%) and Turkish-Cypriot nationals (21%) and a few Cypriot Armenians (Dodd 2010). The British, capitalizing on the nationalistic sentiments of Greek-Cypriots, recruited them with the slogan, 'Fight for Freedom and Greece' (Stavrou 2009, 17).²² At the same time, the Turkish-Cypriots, whose younger generation had been schooled in the secular principles of Turkey's Republic, politically resumed their Kemalist-oriented nationalism through the establishment of a Turkish right wing party, KATAK.²³ The name of the organization underlined their Turkish rather than the Muslim identity.

¹⁸ They established a National Organization which included a National Assembly and a National Council to promote the union with Greece (Dodd 2010, 7).

¹⁹ The lowest rank on the colonial ladder (Spyridakis 1974)

²⁰ The impact of the 1929 economic depression provided fertile ground for an island-wide uprising, while maintaining the demand for *enosis* on top of their agenda (Dodd 2010, 7). The crisis started when a tax bill, already turned down by the Legislative Council, was nevertheless imposed by the British-appointed governor as an order of the council (Stavrou 2009, 16). As a reaction against this imposition, Greek-Cypriot representatives withdrew from the council.

²¹ Meaning a 'neutralist' Turkey, Britain, Greece and the Soviet Union

²² Many Cypriots joined the Cyprus regiment hoping that British would reward their participation with the realization of 'enosis'.

²³ Acronym for *Kıbrıs Adası, Türk Azınlık Kurumu*, which stands for the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus.

3.3.3 External and domestic developments after WWII (1945-1955)

The British undertook initiatives to contain the rising ‘*enosis*’ aspirations. In March 1947, Lord Baron Winster, the new governor on the island, announced the establishment of a Consultative Assembly, composed of delegates of the island’s major associations and interests.²⁴ The Greek-Cypriot nationalists expressed their sole commitment to the cause of ‘*enosis*’ and, therefore, boycotted the proceedings. On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriot communists, represented by AKEL (Alastos 1955),²⁵ demanded ministry assignments and much more self-rule governance (as British did with their other colonies in Malta and Ceylon). The British rejected their demands and, as a result, the proceedings of the Assembly ended; eventually the implementation of the Winster Plan was cancelled (Svolopoulos 2004, 77).

AKEL, which initially favoured a self-governance system along the lines of the British plans, suddenly switched its stance to ‘*enosis*’. It sent a proposal to the Church²⁶ asking the latter to submit a joint memorandum to the UN General Assembly, establish a common delegation to the UN and launch Pancyprian demonstrations in order to internationalize the ‘*enosis*’ cause (Alecou 2016, 127). Along these lines, AKEL organized mass rallies through which it raised a number of social demands as well. Some analysts attributed AKEL’s shift to the Soviet Union’s influence (Doddo 2010, Koumas 2013).²⁷ On November 29, 1949, AKEL’s leader, Ezekias Papaioannou, sent the Greek prime minister a letter asking him to push for the internationalization of the Cyprus issue in the UN (Vlachos 1980, 16-22, Koumas 2013, 37). The Greek government was hesitant about addressing such a request because it was afraid that London would invoke potential Soviet involvement behind AKEL’s initiatives.

On their part, as Turkish-Cypriots fortified their Kemalist-oriented nationalism as a form of counter-resistance. ‘It will not be an exaggeration to say that the political behaviour of the Turkish-Cypriots was mainly guided by the threat of ‘*enosis*’ (Kizilyurek 2006).²⁸ In November 1948, 15,000 Turkish-Cypriots gathered to condemn the agitation of the Greek-Cypriots for ‘*enosis*’ but no Greek-Cypriot newspapers reported these demonstrations: ‘At that

²⁴ According to his plan, the governor would maintain part of his legislative and executive power through the assistance of an Executive Advisory Board, consisting of three Greek-Cypriots, one Turkish-Cypriot and four British officials appointed *ex officio* (Svolopoulos 2004, 77).

²⁵ Progressive Party of Working People.

²⁶ Which had played a leading role in mobilizing the constituents for the cause of ‘*enosis*’.

²⁷ The Soviet Union allegedly promoted the ‘*enosis*’ cause in order to upset the unity of the anti-communist Western powers (Dodd 2010) and, especially, relations between Greece and Britain.

²⁸ They made energetic representations to the British government and, particularly, to Prime Minister Attlee at that time (Dodd 2010, 14).

time, Turkish-Cypriots had become invisible to such an extent that they did not evoke national hatred among Greek-Cypriots' (Interviewee 12).

As regards Greek-Cypriots, the Church,²⁹ under the aegis of Michael Mouskos, elected bishop of Kition in 1948 and archbishop (as Makarios III) in 1950, called for a plebiscite in January 15, 1950. A total of 95.7% of the Greek-Cypriot participants favoured the unification of Cyprus with Greece' (Svolopoulos 2004, 77).³⁰

This plebiscite stirred up public opinion in Turkey and anti-enosis feelings among Turkish-Cypriots. In April 1950, they sent copies of a pamphlet, 'Turks of Cyprus Protest against the Desire for Union with Greece: A Counter Appeal to the United Nations', to London, Washington and New York (Gates 2013, 876).³¹ The pamphlet stated that self-determination would threaten world security and bring about social disorder and the domination of communism. They rejected every claim on Cyprus' Greek character and requested the return of the island to Turkey (ibid.). Anti-*enosis* sentiments developed apace in Turkey (ibid.). The nationalistic newspaper at that time, *Hurriyet*, sought for Turkey's government to terminate its inaction, while throwing 'thinly veiled threats against the Greek Minority in Istanbul and its institutions' (Stefanidis 1999, 215).

Despite its initially attentive stance, Greece left a window to raise the issue at the UN in case the discussions with the British authorities would come to naught (Faustmann 1999; Johnson 2000, 114; Mallinson 2011). Facing British obduracy and under the pressure of Makarios III as well as Greek and Greek-Cypriot public opinion, the Greek government brought the issue to attention of the UN General Assembly in 1954 without achieving any significant result.³²

²⁹ Fearing that the communists would take the lead in the unification movement (Interviewee 1).

³⁰ The result of the referendum was circulated to all UN delegations. Makarios III made unremitting efforts to engage the full support of Greece. The official Greek stance, worrying about the British (and US) reaction, was rather cautious indicative. George Papandreou, vice-president of the Greek government, stated: 'Greece is breathing through two lungs; the British and the American. Therefore, due to the Cyprus question, she cannot die because of asphyxiation' (Christodoulides 2012). To this end, rather than promoting the Cyprus question unilaterally in the UN forums, Greece initially engaged in discussions with the British government (led by Churchill at that time) to reach a *modus vivendi* and avoid a head-on collision with it (Dodd 2010, 15).

³¹ In their reaction against the plebiscite, Turkish-Cypriots criticized the British response as 'far too tolerant' (Gates 2013, 877). They also sent a delegation to Turkey to express their concerns about their safety while the pro-*enosis* sentiments across the island were reaching their peak.

³² The British, having been notified earlier on the intentions and the prescheduled reactions of the Greek government and the Greek-Cypriots, invoked Article 2(7) of the UN Charter and denied the UN authority the right to 'intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'.

3.3.4 EOKA and the Turkish-Cypriot reaction

Greek-Cypriots assumed that diplomacy was not the only channel to pursue '*enosis*'. In January 1955, Archbishop Makarios authorized Georgios Grivas,³³ former colonel of the Greek army and the leader of EOKA, National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, to initiate a campaign of confrontation and sabotage against the British authorities on the island (Grivas 1961). The campaign was launched on April 1, 1955, with a series of explosions at various parts of the island against government offices, military facilities and police stations (Grob 2011, 297).

In order to effectively control the escalating situation, British policy-makers capitalized on the growing anti-*enosis* sentiments in Turkey.³⁴ As the standoff on the island intensified and with EOKA's military campaign having already broken out, British officials came up with the idea of a tripartite conference in September 1955.³⁵ Despite its expected failure, the conference remained significant, in the sense that it introduced the device of a tri-condominium over sovereignty and marked the beginning of Turkey's active involvement in the Cyprus equation for the first time since 1923, when it had waived all its rights on the island (Faustmann 1999).

In October 1955, while EOKA's guerrilla activities were continuing and British security forces were increasingly tied down in static defence duties, the British Colonial Office appointed Field Marshal Sir John Harding as the new Governor of Cyprus. He was instructed by London to employ a 'tough law-and-order policy against the insurgents',³⁶ while engaging in direct negotiations with Makarios III (Stavrou 2009, 21). A last-minute dispute between Makarios

³³ George Grivas (1897-1974) was known by his *nom de guerre* Digenis, which he adopted as EOKA's leader.

³⁴ The losses of other British territorial assets in the region along with the growing hostility in Egypt after the rise of Nasser on power led to the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. This agreement was a watershed in Britain's transition from Egypt to a Northern Tier strategy, as well as a turning point in Turkey's ascent as a regional Middle Eastern power (Hatzivassiliou 2009, 1145).

³⁵ Already in June 1955, the British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs explained the rationale behind such a venture: 'I have always been attracted by the idea of a three Power conference, simply because I believe that it would seriously embarrass the Greek government. And if such conference were held, I should not produce any British plan or proposal until a Greek-Turkish deadlock has been defined... This seems to imply that we are reconciled to handing over the island to one of them -and that is up to them to decide the future of the Island' (Mallinson 2011, 21). In July 1955, Britain's Foreign Secretary declared in front of the Cabinet: 'Throughout the negotiations, our aim would be to bring the Greeks up against the Turkish refusal to accept *enosis* and so condition them to accept a solution, which would leave sovereignty in our hands' (O' Malley and Craig 1999, 21).

³⁶ In his strategy to eliminate the guerilla fighters, he conducted small-scale operations through heavily armed undercover squads, which recruited also pro-British Turkish-Cypriots (Beckett 1988, 177, Robbins 2012)

and Harding derailed a potential agreement.³⁷ Harding ordered the archbishop's arrest and exile in Seychelles on March 9 1956, while continuing with coercive measures against Greek-Cypriot nationalists.³⁸

Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish officials were preparing their counter-attack at that time. Between 1955 and 1956, Turkish-Cypriots organized the first underground organization, Volkan (Isachenko 2012, 38-39), and set off explosions in Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot neighbourhoods in Nicosia without killing or injuring any victims. However, Volkan's insurgents intentionally blamed EOKA for these incursions in order to further exacerbate the anti-Greek-Cypriot sentiments among the Turkish-Cypriot grassroots (Isachenko 2012). At the same time, the Turkish prime minister, Adnan Menderes, assigned Professor Nihat Erim to conduct a report on the future status of the island and examine the best options for Turkey's strategy (Erim 1974). Erim concluded that Turkey's possession of the island, either in whole or in part would best serve NATO's interests (Erim 1974; Uzer 2010, 121). Therefore, partition, dubbed '*taksim*', became Turkey's predominant policy in order to negate '*enosis*'.

In November 1957, after Volkan was disbanded (having been accused of keeping close links with elements of the British administration), Rauf Denktaşh and some other Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot members, founded TMT³⁹ (Turkish Resistance Organization), a special warfare organization. Greek-Cypriot civilians were intimidated and forced to evacuate some areas under their control. EOKA and TMT intensified their armed conflict, resulting in the island's first inter-communal violence (Holland 2004, 216). 'At that moment Turkish-Cypriots become for the first time visible to the eyes of the Greek-Cypriots. They become for the first time the enemy that prevented enosis' (Interviewee 12).

3.3.5 Cyprus as an independent state and the constitutional deadlock

Diplomatic efforts between Greece, Turkey and Britain led to a conference on February 11, 1959, in Zurich (Papageorgiou 2000). The political leaders of the Greek-Cypriots⁴⁰ and the Turkish-Cypriots were not represented in that conference. Kucuk and Denktaşh, the Turkish-Cypriot

³⁷ One of the promises delivered by Sir Harding to Makarios III was a 'broad' measure of self-government. Since no common approach was attained with respect to the interpretation of 'broad measure of self-government', the talks broke down (Spyridakis 1974, 177). After American pressure on Britain's new prime minister, Anthony Eden, on April 17 1957, Makarios III was released from exile to Greece, but not to Cyprus.

³⁸ Makarios' absence from the negotiations left Grivas with greater latitude for military action and consolidated not only his military but also his political authority over EOKA (Stavrou 2009, 22).

³⁹ Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı

⁴⁰ Makarios III was not allowed to attend the conference

leaders, clarified to the Turkish foreign minister that they would condition their acceptance of the negotiated agreement on Turkey's guarantee of the settlement and an adequate Turkish military presence for the security of the Turkish-Cypriots (Mutercimler 2003, 210). Therefore, treaties of guarantee and alliances would also be included. Without their participation in the negotiations, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders were asked to give their assent to them. On February 19, 1959, these agreements were initialled in London's Lancaster House.

The Zurich-London accords consist of three main treaties: the Treaty of Establishment, of Alliance and of Guarantee. The first one includes basic articles-principles for the construction of what has been described as a functional federal state, the Republic of Cyprus (Dodd 2010, 38, Emilianides 2006, Stavrou 2009). According to Article 1, its territory would comprise the entire island of Cyprus, with the exception of two areas, the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, which would come under British sovereignty (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1960). Moreover, Cyprus would become a presidential republic, the president being a Greek-Cypriot, while the vice-president would be a Turkish-Cypriot. Both of them would hold veto rights over the cabinet's decisions concerning legislature, foreign policy and security and defence (Uzer 2010, 125).⁴¹

According to the Treaty of Alliance, the high contracting parties, Britain, Turkey and Greece, were assigned 'to co-operate for their common defense' and resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, targeted against 'the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus' (Emilianides 2006). Furthermore, the treaty provided for the establishment of a Tripartite Headquarters, whereby Greece and Turkey were called to participate with their military contingents. These would comprise 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, on the one hand, and 650 Turkish officers non-commissioned officers and men, on the other (UN 1960).

Among the most controversial treaties was the Treaty of Guarantee. It called on Cyprus to avoid participation 'in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever' (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1960), while prohibiting both '*enosis*' and '*taksim*'. Article II of that Treaty authorized Greece, Turkey and Britain to take over its security (ibid.). Paradoxically for

⁴¹ Furthermore, seven Greek-Cypriot and three Turkish-Cypriot Ministers would form the Council of Ministers (Stavrou 2009, 25). The legislative power would be vested in a House of Representatives, composed of 70% Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots. The vast majority of laws would be adopted through 'simple majority', except for basic articles, such as electoral law, municipalities, duties and taxes, which would ask for separate majorities (Markides 2001). Furthermore, it envisioned separate municipalities created in the five largest towns with Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants (ibid.). With respect to public service, it would consist of 70% Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots. Regarding the Cyprus Army, 60% would be Greek-Cypriots and 40% Turkish-Cypriots, while the security forces would be 70% Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots (ibid.).

a sovereign state, Cyprus would not be responsible for its own independence, territorial integrity and security. According to Article IV, the three guarantor powers, in the event of a breach of the agreements, would have to consult together in order to 'ensure observance of those provisions' (ibid). The most problematic aspect of this treaty lays in the following statement: 'In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty' (ibid).⁴² This eventually would become the article that Turkey invoked in order to justify its 1974 military operation.

According to Fouskas and Tackie (2009) the Cypriot constitution was drafted in such a way as to make it unworkable in case the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots did not reach an agreement. A potential constitutional deadlock and subsequent intercommunal disputes would provide fertile ground for British intervention as a guarantor power. The pursuit of strategic benefits in and around Cyprus, explains, according to Adamides (2014) why imperial Britain pitted the minority Turkish-Cypriots against the majority Greek-Cypriots. These provisions are characterized as 'neo-colonial', motivated by the logic of instrumentalism where external-international stakeholders 'pursue their interests as if the communities are not there, as if they are invisible' (Interviewee 12). As one of my interviewee explains, this invisibility triggers their anger and evokes their reaction 'against any other intervention or settlement proposal from the outside'

The newly-founded Republic of Cyprus was not the beloved child of its Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot constituents. It rather emerged as the accidental offspring of violent conflicts that unfolded in the 1950s among the Greek-Cypriots, the British (who had been ruling the island from 1878) and the Turkish-Cypriots. The multiple checks and balances, entailed within these accords, inhibited the functional operation of the constitution. The amendments submitted by President Archbishop Makarios III on November 3, 1963, encountered the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot vetoes (Markides 1977; Stavrou 2009).

This expectedly led to a constitutional deadlock accompanied by violent clashes between the two communities⁴³. These developments signposted the start of the *Enclave Period*,

⁴² In other words, that particular article would be interpreted as allowing unilateral military action on behalf of one of the three guarantor countries if deemed necessary.

⁴³ 'On December 21, 1963, a Greek-Cypriot police patrol while checking on identification documents asked a Turkish-Cypriot couple on the edge of a Turkish-Cypriot quarter in Nicosia' to stop (Hazou 2013). After an initial dispute, a hostile crowd gathered, shots were fired and two Turkish-Cypriots were killed (ibid). As the news spread, members of TMT and EOKA began firing and taking hostages (Solsten 1993). In the north of capital Nicosia, Turkish forces occupied a strong position at St. Hilarion Castle, controlling the road to Kyrenia on the northern coast, which was a principal combat area. Three days later, 31 Turkish-Cypriots and 5 Greek-Cypriots were killed (Hazou 2013). The attacks continued in other

during which the island was *de facto* partitioned into Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot areas, where each side held their own political leadership and administration. The Turkish-Cypriots, the vast majority of whom were living in enclaves, controlled 4% of the island, while the Greek-Cypriots controlled 96%. This partition was reinforced by the Turkish-Cypriots' withdrawal from the official government institutions; Greek-Cypriots, by necessity, had taken over exclusively the duties previously performed by the Turkish-Cypriots (Dodd 2010; Stavrou 2009). According to Volkan (2008), the above events, described as a 'chosen trauma', dramatically shaped the Turkish-Cypriot national narrative, compounded the 'mistrust factor' in any prospective initiative towards reunification and underpinned all their future negotiating predispositions.

3.3.6 UN intervention and the continuation of the clashes: 1964-1974

In 1964, under the threat of Turkish jet fighters flying low over Nicosia, Makarios III gave his assent to a British proposal for dispatching troops to Nicosia. The British drew a ceasefire line on a map with a green chinagraph pencil, known as the 'Green Line'. On March 8, 1964, the Security Council adopted Resolution 186 (1964) and called for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). Its central mission was to stop the fighting and facilitate power-sharing between the two communities in the newly reformed republic (Richmond and Ker-Lindsay 2001). Furthermore, the then secretary general, U Thant, called on some diplomats and prominent international figures to mediate in the conflict (ibid). Nevertheless, against the background of these initiatives, the situation did not de-escalate. In mid-1964, the battles between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot forces north of Cyprus continued⁴⁴.

In early June 1964, then US President Johnson, trying to head off further inflammation of the ongoing conflicts, averted the threat of Turkish invasion by issuing a warning to the Turkish prime minister, Ismet Inonu (New York Times 1964). This intervention was the first direct US involvement in the Cyprus conflict.⁴⁵ The Undersecretary of State at that time, George Ball,

places (Omorphita, Kumsal, Kaimakli). Turkish Cypriots who lived across the island had to concentrate in particular enclaves for their safety, retreating into exclusively Turkish urban sectors and country side, while the Greek-Cypriot forces sealed these areas off from the rest of the Island (Morag 2004, 601)

⁴⁴ Turkish-Cypriots established a bridgehead at Kokkina, providing them with arms, volunteers and other supplies from Turkey (Hazou 2013). As a reaction, the Cypriot government invited the EOKA leader, Grivas, to take over the command of the Greek troops stationed on the Island and launch attacks against the bridgehead. As retaliation, Turkey dispatched its own fighter jets to bomb Greek positions (ibid.). Moreover, Greece dispatched a brigade on the island to provide security to the Greek-Cypriots in the case of a Turkish attack.

⁴⁵ The US authorities were afraid that further escalation of the crisis would paralyze NATO's south-eastern flank and bring its two allies, Greece and Turkey, into direct conflict. Such a development would benefit the Soviet Union's influence; the latter warned that if 'a foreign armed invasion takes place against the territory of Cyprus, the Soviet Union will help Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence'

along with the former Secretary of State from the Truman administration, Dean Acheson, presented different versions of a plan that would end the deadlock. One version of the plan was provisioning the union of Cyprus with Greece in exchange for a military base in Karpas peninsula to Turkey. Turkish-Cypriot enclaves – areas where Turkish-Cypriots were in a majority – would enjoy local autonomy, including taxation, education and local security (Kanli 2016)⁴⁶. The then Greek Prime Minister reportedly clashed with Makarios who denounced the plan as favouring partition and involving Turkey in Cypriot affairs (Christodoulides 2009).

In the meantime, political developments in Greece -with the establishment of the military junta in 1967- and the continuation of Cypriot inter-communal tensions in November 1967,⁴⁷ brought the re-launched talks once again to deadlock. After Turkey's *démarche* to the Greek junta, demanding the withdrawal of Greek troops from the island, and its rejection from the Greek side, the UN secretary general called for the withdrawal of all forces in excess of their contingents.⁴⁸ According to the Greek-Cypriots, the withdrawal of the Greek forces 'had a catastrophic effect on the morale of the Greek-Cypriots, which sunk to its lowest ebb' (Dodd 2010, 90). This was a turning point for the Turkish-Cypriots as well. They acknowledged Turkey's determination to come to their rescue. Furthermore, Turkey assigned the secretary general of its Foreign Ministry, Zeki Kuneralp, and Professor Suat Bilge to help the Turkish-Cypriots draft their own constitution (Dodd 2010, 89) and pave the way for their partition.

3.3.7 Turkey's military operation in 1974

Supported by Greece and Turkey, inter-communal talks between Clerides and Denktas were re-launched between 1968 and 1971 and from 1972 to 1974. Against the background of negotiations, on August 31, 1971, Grivas, former leader of EOKA, returned secretly from Greece to Cyprus and established a secret organization (EOKA-B), whose declared aim was '*enosis*' through self-determination. The ongoing talks ended after the coup against Makarios in Cyprus on July 15, 1974. The coup was mainly engineered by the Greek military dictatorship

(*Pravda* August 16, 1964, cited in Sakkas & Zhukova 2013. It should be noted that at the end of the 1960s, Cyprus and the Soviet Union had cultivated close trade, diplomatic and cultural ties, expressed through 'unofficial exchanges, the opening of a Soviet cultural center in Nicosia and the admission of a large number of Cypriot university students to the Soviet Union' (Sakkas and Zhukova 2013, 126).

⁴⁶ There is a speculation that the US officials provisioned the ceding of the Greek Island of Kastellorizo to Turkey.

⁴⁷ With the bombing of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou from forces on both sides increasing the existing death toll.

⁴⁸ The appeal was one-sided against Greece, because the Greek forces numbered 20,000 troops, while there were a few hundred Turkish forces on Cypriot ground. Greece complied with this appeal.

of Ioannidis⁴⁹ and staged by the Cypriot National Guard in conjunction with EOKA-B, which, after the death of Grivas, viewed Makarios as a 'crypto-communist'.

On July 20, 1974, this coup attempt was followed by the Turkish military intervention, codenamed 'Attila I'. Turkish officials invoked the controversial Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee for this operation. The Security Council immediately demanded the prompt termination of 'foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus' and the 'withdrawal without delay... of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of the 1960 agreements', and the re-launch of negotiations among the guarantor powers (UN Security Council 1974).

Turkey's military incursion had a tremendous impact on Greece's domestic developments. The military junta crumbled and called for a government of national unity. The 'self-exiled' former prime minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, came back from Paris and formed a government of national unity. The three guarantor powers (UK, Greece and Turkey) met in Geneva between July 25 and 30, 1974. They issued a declaration, according to which the Turkish occupation zone should not be extended; the Turkish enclaves should be immediately evacuated by the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots, while each side should release the detained military personnel (Dodd 2010, 118). They also agreed on a second conference to be held in August 1974 with the participation of the two Cypriot communities in order to restore situation to normality. At the time the second-round talks started (August 8, 1974), Turkish forces had extended their area of control from 300 square km to 430 square km (Assmussen 2008). Turkey's Foreign Minister, Gunes, demanded the Cypriot government accept its plan for a federal state and population transfer, in order to ensure the security of 81,000 Turkish-Cypriots, who, in his view, were defenceless (Dodd 2010, 119).⁵⁰ When the Cypriot acting president, Glafcos Clerides, asked for 36 to 48 hours to consult with Athens and with the Greek-Cypriot leaders, Gunes, denied him that window; he speculated that Makarios and Greeks would abuse the time in order to start a worldwide campaign against Turkey (ibid.).

⁴⁹ Two Greek-Cypriot journalists, Venizels and Ignatiou (2002), use declassified documents from the US State Department, to question the controversial role of the former US Secretary, Henry Kissinger in letting things spiral out of control.

⁵⁰ By contrast with Gunes' allegations, the UN official participating in the discussions, Weckmann-Munoz, stated that the Turkish-Cypriots were not short of food and water and not under attack (Dodd 2010: 119). On the other hand, according to the memoirs of the Greek diplomat, Georgios Helmis (2006), the US official, Hartman, during his *talks* with the Greek Foreign Minister, Georgios Mavros (6.8.1974), displayed a 'hands off' policy and asked Greece to seriously consider Turkey's requests and the US interests ('You have no choice' was the recorded quot

After the conference broke up on August 14, 1974, Turkish forces initiated a new military operation, codenamed 'Attila II'. They occupied 36,2% of the Republic of Cyprus' territory⁵¹. Approximately 180,000 Greek-Cypriots were displaced from the North, while 65,000 Turkish-Cypriots subsequently moved north to take their place. On August 16, 1974, the UN instituted a ceasefire and created a buffer zone of 183 km from the east to the west across the entire island, covering 2,6% of its territory. The Security Council (SC) passed several resolutions calling for a ceasefire an immediate termination of the foreign military intervention and the withdrawal of all the forces, except for those whose presence was authorized by the Treaties. Moreover, the US imposed for a particular period an arms embargo on Turkey and decided not to 'deliver military equipment worth over \$200 million, including credits, commercial military sales and aircraft that had already been paid for by the Turkish government' (Karagoz 2004, 114).

Since 1974, Turkish authorities have kept around 35,000 troops on the island, and, breaching the Geneva Convention, started bringing settlers from the Turkish mainland to the island in order to bolster the 'Turkish' population of the north. The main strategy of Turkification was to convince the newcomer Turks from Turkey, 'yerlesikler' as settlers are called in Turkish, they are the owners of a Turkish place, both in the present and the future; a future detached from the past (Goker 2012, 132). According to Goker (2012, 132) all the places where these people would live were given different names from the ones they had before 1974, because they could not be part of this 'newly homogenized home, north Cyprus'. The large Turkish flags and the legendary quote of Atatürk made by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, '*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene*'⁵² on the slopes of Kyrenia mountains, work a constant reminder of 'Turkishness' of the north (ibid). Furthermore, between 1963 and 1974, around 570,000 people, from both sides lost their property. In absolute figures, the Greek-Cypriots' number is three times higher than the Turkish-Cypriots' (Dodd 2010, Ker-Lindsay 2011, Stavrou 2009). Moreover, approximately 3,500 people died during the coup and invasion. Various international and national commissions are investigating the bodies of 2,000 disappeared people.

Turkish officials called the military intervention as 'peace operation'. The liberation of Turkish-Cypriots from Greeks and Greek-Cypriots theoretically motivated this move. 'After this 1974 event, Turkish-Cypriots could trust Turkey to be always there for them. If it weren't for Turkey, nobody would take any interest in them, they would be run over (Interviewee 10). Nonetheless, besides Turkish-Cypriots' security concerns, it seems that further security considerations motivated Turkey's decision to militarily intervene. Gunes' position was quoted as follows (Kaliber 2005, 326):

⁵¹ 36,2% of the Republic of Cyprus' territory represents 35,2% of the entire Cyprus' territory. The British bases cover 2,7% of the Cyprus' territory and the buffer zone 2,6%, which represents 2,7% of the Republic of Cyprus' territory (Christodoulides 2009, 196)

⁵² Which translates to 'How happy is the one who can say 'I'm a Turk'

‘Cyprus is as precious as the right arm of a country which cares for her defence or her expansionistic aims if she harbors any. If we don’t keep this strategic importance of Cyprus, we cannot understand the peace operation of 20 July 1974 or rather it is impossible to understand the entire Cyprus crisis. Many states, to a certain extent because it suits their interest, want to see the Cyprus problem merely as our desire to protect the Turkish community on the island; whereas the actual problem is the security of 45 million Turks in the motherland together with Turks in the island and the maintenance of the balance of the Middle East’ (ibid.).

For Greek-Cypriots the same event is collectively recorded as ‘invasion’. The 1974 events, besides their obvious economic catastrophic implications, have had a tremendous impact on the collective memory of Greek-Cypriots, the same way the 1963 period shaped the Turkish-Cypriot collective memory; a psychological feeling of abasement and humiliation is deeply embedded in national consciousness of the Greek-Cypriots (Interviewee 2). The so-called *Den Xehno* [I do not forget in Greek] highlights their remembrance of Turkey’s invasion, the thousands of refugees and Turkey’s settlement policies. These developments continue to resonate strongly irrespective of the fact that more than 4 decades have passed since then (Burke 2017). The *Den Xehno* as a synecdoche warns the Greek-Cypriots that by forgetting what happened back then they will accept the *fait accompli* of the Turkish invasion and the continued occupation of the northern side. For that reason, via the collective obligations of *Den Xehno*, the ‘commemorative structures of the state draw on and collate these memories issues within official discourses’ (Burke 2017, 2), like education texts (Zembylas 2015).

3.3.8 The post-1974 developments

After the *de facto* division, a parallel administration, already run by Turkish-Cypriots in the decade 1964-1974, evolved to a ‘self-governing’ status in the north. More particularly, on 13 February 1975, the ‘Turkish Federal State of Cyprus’ declared its formation. Denktash became the leader of the self-styled ‘Turkish-Cypriot state’. Nevertheless, the breakaway regime could not survive without Turkey’s economic aid, which accounted for 80% of the community’s budget (Stavrou 2009, 43). The economic dependence spilled over into the political and administrative domains. Indicatively, from 1974 to 1983, Turkish officials directly participated in the Turkish-Cypriot cabinet (ibid.).

In 1977, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim brought the leaders of the two communities, Makarios and Denktash, on the negotiation table. In February 1977, the two reached an agreement for an independent, nonaligned, bi-communal federal republic. According to this agreement, the territory, administered by each community, would be addressed in light of economic viability, productivity and property rights (Migdalovitz 2005). Questions regarding freedom of movement and settlement, rights of ownership, and certain special matters would be open for dialogue, considering the schema of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties

This agreement would eventually become the blueprint for all future negotiations, although it did not initially provision bi-zonality, a prerequisite for the Turkish-Cypriots' approval (Dodd 2010, 136). Furthermore, the 'three freedoms' of movement, the right to own property and live anywhere, crucial aspects for the Greek-Cypriots, were not accepted outright (*ibid.*). On the other hand, the death of Makarios, along with the growing political strength of the refugees and displaced persons in Kyprianou's constituency (Makarios' successor), hardened his negotiating position (*ibid.*). Thus, no agreement was brought into fruition.

Anyhow, the UN maintained its efforts to come up with a sustainable solution. At the start of 1982, the UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, presented the two sides the 'draft framework agreement' for an independent, nonaligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal state (Ker-Lindsay 2009, 155). Kyprianou rejected the plan on several grounds. First, it did not predict the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island. Second, the politico-administrational axis around which the state would be established was reminiscent of a confederation rather than a federation. Third, there was no provision concerning the way basic freedoms (movement, settlement and property ownership) would be guaranteed (Sozen 2007)⁵³.

The chances to reach a settlement deteriorated when on November 15, 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot administration unilaterally declared its independence and gained recognition from Turkey (Hadjigregoriou 2014). Through Resolution 541 (18 November 1983), the UN SC stated that the declaration was 'legally invalid' and should be withdrawn (UN Security Council 1983). To this effect, except for Turkey, no other country has legally recognized the breakaway regime as a state entity. For a couple of years, the reunification talks were interrupted.

3.3.9 The EU-factor and the Annan Plan

From the 1990s onwards, the EU became an additional actor in the Cypriot equation. Since 1972, Cyprus and the EEC (at that time) have concluded an association agreement (Demetriou 2004, Ker-Lindsay 2007, 2009; Tocci 2004). On July 1990, the Greek-Cypriot government, with the support of Greece and Britain, applied for full membership of the EU (Ker-Lindsay 2007). This move was probably driven by the perception that the EU could offer the catalyst platform needed for the change of the status quo on the island. Greek-Cypriot officials believed that if Turkey was genuinely interested in becoming an EU member, it would make certain concessions in its Cyprus policy (Ker-Lindsay 2011). The decision to accept the application of Cyprus was taken against a backdrop of longstanding Turkish intransigence (Ker-Lindsay 2007). According to Gunther Verheugen, former European Commissioner for Enlargement, 'any attempt to prevent Cyprus from starting down the road to EU membership would have unfairly penalized the Greek-Cypriots from the behaviour of the Turkish government and

⁵³ In our interview, Nikos Rolandis, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, mentioned that he disagreed with Kyprianou's reactions and resigned.

the Turkish-Cypriot leadership' (*Turkish Daily News* 2002, found in Ker-Lindsay 2005, 2007). In general, many international observers and officials were initially casting the burden of blame for the stalemate on the Turkish-Cypriots (Ker-Lindsay 2007; Christou, 2010, 2012). For instance Lord Hannay (2005, 17-21), the British Special Representative for Cyprus, had clearly demonstrated in his book that the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaşh was the main impediment to reach a peace-agreement. According to Ker-Lindsay (2007), this view was also shared by Richard Holbrooke, the former American diplomat, who, after he terminated the Bosnian Civil War, became briefly involved with the Cypriot imbroglio.

Despite the EU involvement in the Cyprus' conundrum, the situation did not initially improve. The year between 1997 and 1998 was marked by a significant crisis which brought the disputants to the brink of an armed conflict. The decision of the Greek-Cypriots to deploy S-300 Russian missiles in the Greek-Cypriot administered territory⁵⁴ triggered a prompt reaction from Turkey's prime minister at that time, Tansu Ciler: 'If they are deployed, we will do what is needed, and if that means they need to be hit, they will be hit' (Barber 1997). After Turkey's pressure and US-led initiatives, the instalment was eventually cancelled and the crisis effectively ended in December 1998.⁵⁵

In spite of this setback, the carrot of EU membership played an important role in the re-launch of the (inconclusive) negotiation talks in December 1999. The European Council of Helsinki in December 1999 underlined 'that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union' (EU Council 1999). It stated, however, that if no settlement had been reached by the completion of accession negotiations in 2004, 'the Council's decision on accession would be made without the above being a precondition' (ibid.). In other words, regardless of a settlement, the Republic of Cyprus would become an EU member.

The rise of the AKP, which came to power with an initial pro-EU agenda in the November 2002 Turkish elections, allowed the UN to believe that it was the right moment to seek a permanent solution to Cyprus issue. On November 11, 2002, the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan, put forward a comprehensive settlement plan based on Swiss and Belgian models (Ker-Lindsay 2011; Palley 2005). Both sides expressed their disagreements against this plan in the EU Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. Cyprus signed an accession treaty to join the EU on April 16, while, at the same time, Turkish-Cypriot authorities decided to ease the restrictions on travel across the dividing line between the northern and southern parts of the island (BBC 2003).

⁵⁴ Due to Turkey's superiority in the air, Greek-Cypriots attempted to establish a credible air-defense system

⁵⁵ The government of the Republic of Cyprus decided to transfer the installment of the missiles in Crete in exchange for alternative missile systems (TOR M1 and SUZANA) from Greece (Venizelos 2019)

Annan presented his final revised plan on March 31 and requested from both sides to put it to a referendum on April 24 (Ker-Lindsay 2011). The plan provisioned the establishment of the 'United Cyprus Republic', which would exercise full sovereignty over the entire territory of the island, with the exception of the British Sovereign Base Areas. It constituted a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal republic with federal and constitutional laws (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 64-66)⁵⁶. In referenda on April 24, 76% of Greek-Cypriot voters rejected the plan, while 65% of Turkish-Cypriot voters accepted it. In a televised speech, the now deceased president of the Republic of Cyprus, at the time of the referendum, stated: 'I was given a state as a President; I will not deliver a community'. In light of the 1974 events, such a statement really touched upon very sensitive chords, people's sense of collective consciousness or subconsciousness.

Turkey had declared a positive stance towards the Annan Plan, although this stance did not reflect Erdogan's real wish according to one of my respondents (Interviewee 12): 'In order to safeguard the European perspective and use it as a bargaining chip against the Kemalist regime, Erdogan says 'yes' to the Annan plan hoping that the Greeks would say 'no'. The Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan was a relief and fantastic opportunity for Erdogan'.

Why did Greek-Cypriots reject the plan? According to Hubert Faustmann (2006), security concerns played a dominant role in the rejection of the plan. As he asserted, by security concerns Greek-Cypriots meant 'safeguards against the partition of the island, the presence of Turkish troops, demilitarisation and the right of Turkish intervention based on the Treaty of Guarantee' (Faustmann 2006). According to Greek-Cypriot academics (Emilianides 2009, Kyriakides 2009), the Plan could not provide any guarantees for these issues. An interviewee (No. 10) told me that the actual problem was the framing of the plan; there was a big gap between what was being discussed on the table and what was actually presented to the public, especially as to what the government was aiming to get in the end (Interviewee 10). The plan was presented to the people as it would be the end of the Republic of Cyprus as we know it' (ibid). Moreover, 'there was some uncertainty as to how the economy would be affected, and there were serious concerns. The plan would make them think that their property would lose a lot of value (ibid).

From the viewpoint of Brussels, the blame for the stalemate shifted from the Turkish-Cypriot side to the Greek-Cypriot (Christou 2010, 2012). Verheugen mentioned that he felt personally

⁵⁶ It predicted a single common state consisting of two component state-federal units (the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot), each holding political equality. Approximately 8% of the land would go back to the Greek-Cypriots (Lindsay 2011, 64-66). The provisions in the plan included the maintaining of the 1960s treaties and preventing the state from the possibility of unification with another country. The citizens would hold a double citizenship, one deriving from the common and the other from the component state in which someone was residing. Additionally, they would be paid in compensation for the property lost during the 1963-1974 events. The value of the compensation would be based on the market prices at the time their homes were lost and on the proper adjusted inflation rate (ibid.).

‘cheated’ by the Greek-Cypriots, who had taken him ‘for a ride’ (BBC 2004): ‘we accepted at the request of the Greek-Cypriots that the solution should not constitute a prerequisite for Cyprus’ accession... but the Cypriot government had to do everything possible to find a solution to the conflict. Mr. Papadopoulos must respect his part of the deal’ (BBC 2004). A Greek-Cypriot interviewee (No. 3) counter-argued: ‘Had the EU excluded Cyprus from the enlargement round, it would have rewarded Turkey for its behaviour and punished Cyprus for having been a victim of occupation’.

3.3.10 The post-Annan period

After the rejection of the Anan plan, the UN undertook additional initiatives to cope with the impasse. Nevertheless, it has failed so far to reach a peaceful settlement. Between 2008 and 2012, a new phase of reunification talks began (Sözen 2011; Sözen and Özersay 2007). The UN Special Envoy⁵⁷ documented a number of convergences (Sigmalive 2013) achieved between the president of the Republic of Cyprus at that time, Dimitris Christophias, and the Turkish-Cypriot presidents, Mehmet Ali Talat (till 2010) and Derviş Eroğlu (2010-2015).

At that time, Greek-Cypriots’ economy tipped into recession in 2009 because the ongoing global financial crisis and the resulting low demand hit their main pillars of their economy, tourism and construction (CIA Factbook 2018). An overextended banking sector for the standards of their real economy, accompanied by a excessive exposure to Greek debt exacerbated the contraction. After numerous downgrades of their credit rating, in May 2011, Cypriot banks for a time could not access the international capital markets. Things deteriorated in July 2011 when a large amount of military explosives self-detonated at Mari of Larnace, killing 13 people. The electricity supply was interrupted in half of the island and the expenses skyrocketed deteriorating the competitiveness the Cypriot economy even further. In July 2012, the Republic of Cyprus became the fifth eurozone member to request an economic bailout programme from the ‘troika’⁵⁸ in order to recapitalize its lenders and finance its government. The Eurozone officials forced their bank depositors to share in the cost of the country’s bailout. This triggered increasing outrage and turmoil on the island. More than 11,000 Greek-Cypriot banking depositors lost large amounts of their savings (Economist 2014). The GDP shrank by 6% in 2013 and the unemployment rate reached a 17% record (IMF, 2013). After three years of austerity policies, Cyprus returned to growth in 2015 and exited the austerity programme in 2016.

⁵⁷ A Turkish-Cypriot analyst told me: You could identify there the age-old problem: there is no agreement on what the Cyprus Problem is. It is two different things: the Greek Cypriots regard the problem as an invasion/occupation starting in 1974 and it’s all due to Turkey, while for Turkish Cypriots, the problem started long before the ‘Enosis Idea’ of the Greek Cypriots that brought all this trouble.

⁵⁸ The term refers to three institutions, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. These institutions formed a group of international lenders which provided bailouts to indebted Eurozone countries, with stringent austerity measures attached.

On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriot dependence on Turkey increased after September 2014, as the sequel of a new project's realization: a water diversion plan to supply water for drinking and irrigation from southern Turkey (the Alaköprü Dam on the Anamur-Dragon Creek) to the north of the island (Geçitköy Dam) through a 107 km pipeline under the Mediterranean Sea (Mason and Bryant 2017). Turkish officials constructed this water pipeline after decades of effort (Hurriyet Daily News 2015). Given the region's groundwater and surface shortage as the outcome of inadequate rainfall, the project is highly significant.

In February 2014, after intense haggling and negotiating dystocia, the leaders of the two communities signed a joint declaration, which functioned as the kick-starter of the talks and laid the ground upon which the respective negotiations would unfold. Nevertheless, the 2014 energy developments (analysed in Chapter 4) resulted in Anastasiades pulling out of the negotiations. The election of Mustafa Akkinci, a Turkish-Cypriot leader with a pro-solution agenda, facilitated the re-initiation of the negotiations in Geneva in 2017 and 2018, which, nonetheless, failed again to result in a settlement so far.

3.4 REASONS BEHIND THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE CONFLICT

Having presented the historical background of the conflict, I tackle a final question: which factors have inhibited the settling of the Cyprus conflict according to Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot analysts?

One view is that the conflict Cyprus has been 'consolidated in a non-violent fashion; on the one hand, this is good because we face a soft crisis which is not fierce and does not determine the life of the constituents, but, on the other, this situation has been rooted in the consciousness of the people' (Interviewee 9). Thus, the incentives to resolve the conflict are removed day by day, since it constitutes a rather 'comfortable crisis' (ibid). Under the threat of having people losing their lives day by day, there might be further incentives to immediately resolve the conflict. Another interviewee mentioned an additional reason: the absence of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (Interviewee 14), as conceptualized by Zartman (2000, 2001, 2003, 2009; Meerts 2015). The existing status quo provides a level of stability and enables guarantor powers, such as the UK, to continue to use the sovereign bases without any dispute. These are the bases for operations in Libya and Syria (ibid). The bases facilitate the British and American authorities for data collection from all around the world. This is why there is no urgency for the international community to encourage any solution (ibid).

Lack of leadership seems to be the key reason behind the stalemate according to Interviewee 11: 'The Cypriots – Greek, Turkish doesn't matter – as well as the two motherlands, are very successful in making things more complicated, instead of solving problems, simply because

we are focusing too much on the constraints instead of having a very clear focus; that we want to solve this. The absence of bold action and leadership with vision and courage is the key ingredient missing in order to advance the peace process' (Interviewee 11). This resonates with the assumptions of Adamides and Constantinou (2012), Adamides (2015), Charalampous (2015) and Kaymak (2009) presented in the theoretical chapter.

Besides the lack of leadership, other parameters may have to be factored into the equation. According to Interviewee 12, the trade-off between what the international community wants and what the constituents need provide the infrastructure to this conflict. On the one hand, communities feel underprivileged and deeply traumatized rendering the introduction of a Weberian rationalism to solve the problem ineffective (Interviewee 12). This is in line with the assumptions of Bryant (2008, 2012) and Hadjipavlou (2007), as presented in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the efforts of the UN and the EU have 'allegedly shown a pattern to just get rid of a problem, although what dominate Cypriots' perceptions are expectations of a moral, ideological and political nature, conceptualized in a metaphysical sense as justice' (Interviewee 12). The mismatch between competing Cypriot and international objectives sustains the deadlock according to this logic.

These views are not shared by all sides. Another interviewee (No. 3) mentioned that the deadlock was rooted in 'Turkey's intention to strategically control the island. Had Turkey a genuine desire to solve the conflict and respected the existence of the Republic of Cyprus, the solution of the problem would have only been a matter of time'. However, Turkey may have no incentive to demonstrate such a desire because Cyprus falls under its vital interests (Interviewee 6). The position of Turkish-Cypriots is irrelevant according to another interviewee (No. 3): 'Turkish-Cypriots are the Trojan horse of Turkey. Therefore, they have no jurisdiction to discuss the security issue of the Cyprus conflict and its international dimension' (ibid). Turkey is not simply a conqueror; it not only colonize the island, it does not recognize even the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exist by calling it a defunct republic'. That is why the philosophy of the constituent state, as stipulated in the 1977 blueprint for all settlements, cannot practically work. Interviewee 3 expressed fears that such agreements may abolish the Republic of Cyprus and pave the way for the federalization of the constituent Greek-Cypriot state with Turkey through its 'territorial extension' in Cyprus [the Turkish-Cypriots].

Turkish-Cypriots' overreliance on Turkey has severe implications for their own standing as an independent entity and does justice to the Greek-Cypriot concerns. They cannot voice their own concerns and promote their own agenda (Interviewee 10). This is manifested through their economic infrastructure, in the sense that they do nothing to reform their economy because they have not been challenged economically. The current impasse works for them. Turkey gives the money and Turkish-Cypriots dance to its tune. It has been path dependent (Interviewee 10). On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriots do not trust Greek-Cypriots any more than Turkey. They

believe that the way Greek-Cypriots envision the new state entails a risk for them in becoming second-class citizens, without any right to intervene, especially if Turkey gets disentangled after a settlement is reached (Interviewee 9).

In addition, Turkey, assumedly influenced by an Islamic agenda during the last few decades, ‘conceives not only the Turkish-Cypriot society, but Cyprus, as a geographic entity, as an Islamic space that could not be cut out from the Islamic vision, a small section of which is named Umma, which is community in Arabic’ (Interviewee 2)⁵⁹. The situation may worsen in the future because ‘Turkey has gained extensive control and influence in the occupied territories’ (Interviewee 5). If the conflict came to a head, ‘Turkey would not hesitate to pursue recognition of the occupied territories if it considered the momentum profitable for its interests’ (Interviewee 5). There may be a scenario where, if future negotiation talks fail, Turkey will point the finger at the Greek-Cypriots, holding them accountable for their intransigence and for the failure of any unification talks (Interviewee 5). Under these circumstances, Turkey would pursue the ‘recognition of the occupied territories’ by projecting its demands at the Islamic Conference (ibid). Given that Pakistan and Iran have already *de facto* recognized the occupied territories, if Turkey properly play its cards it might get recognition from up to 50 countries.

3.5 CONCLUSIONS

Following the disputants’ analysis of the Cyprus conflict, the following statements were highlighted on behalf of the Greek-Cypriots: ‘Turkey holds the key for the settlement of the conflict’ and ‘Turkish-Cypriots function as the Trojan Horse of Turkey’, while some of the constituents prefer the ‘theory of the second best’, meaning no solution instead of an insufficient solution like the 1959-1960 agreements. As regards the Turkish-Cypriots, they underline the ‘absence of a mutually hurting stalemate’ as the reason why no progress has been achieved with respect to the reunification talks. Finally, some analysts have pointed fingers at the problematic role of the UN in tackling the conflict; while the Security Council wants to ‘get rid of the conflict’, the constituents seek justice. This inconsistency of values, which highlights a trade-off between effectiveness on behalf of the great powers in ‘getting rid of the problem’ and ‘legitimacy’ on behalf of the constituents in implementing a solution that would redress the injustices of the past, explains the reasons behind the impasse. Therefore, as some Turkish-Cypriots have asserted, the future for the conflict does not look bright. These positions do not represent the views of the entire population. However, they are collectively shared among different segments of the Cypriot societies.

The positions on the historical developments, as broached in the chapter, comprise part of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses of my Q-study, which I develop in Chapter

⁵⁹ For further elaboration on the interviewee’s interpretation see Moudouros (2013)

5. While investigating the incompatible objectives of the contending parties, I draw on their collectively shared memories of each side to assess their impact on the newly emerged energy security dilemmas that I present in the following chapter. I anticipate that historical narratives may reappear in order to justify the present policy positions as regards the energy aspects. For instance, regardless of the economic benefit of a pipeline to Turkey, some Greek-Cypriots might not be open to cooperate with Turkey for the monetization of the gas reserves because they put the entire blame on Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots for the military occupation of 37% of the Cypriot territory; along the same lines, they might further adhere to the exclusion of the Turkish-Cypriots from the hydrocarbons' management. Turkish-Cypriots, who solely blame Greek-Cypriots and not Turkey (or themselves) for the embargo imposed by the international community on their ports, may justify Turkey's recent incursions on the island; in this light, these incursions, coming from the only reliable power for them, are portrayed as 'necessary' steps to safeguard their participation in the debate. On the other hand, if some Greek-Cypriots hold their Greek and Greek-Cypriot leaders partially responsible for the 1974 events,⁶⁰ they may be more open to cooperation with the latter. Similarly, if Turkish-Cypriots impute to themselves or to Turkey their current economic standing, then they may entertain the possibility of consulting with Greek-Cypriots without Turkey's active involvement.

It seems that although this conflict is frozen, all parties know that the wrong trigger-button might make the conflict to flare up again (Bryant and Papadakis, 2012). The traumas of the past point both backward and forward in time (Papadakis 2003, 2005; Scarry 1985, 121). On the one hand they perpetually visualize the hostile activities of the past performing a memorialization function (*ibid*). On the other hand, they refer forward to the future to what has not yet occurred, thus have an as-if function. The natural resources may have 'opened this window'.

In order to discuss about the conflictual dynamics of the natural resources, readers need to capture the complicated calculus that the policy formulation on hydrocarbons' management dictates. Technical and financial considerations cannot be left out of the convoluted energy planning. Therefore, in the following chapter, I set forth the details about how the world of natural gas plays out in the Eastern Mediterranean and accentuate the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot viewpoints on this topic.

⁶⁰ And not only Turkey or Turkish-Cypriots.