



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Adding fuel to the conflict: How gas reserves complicate the Cyprus question

Karakasis, V.P.

Citation

Karakasis, V. P. (2020, October 15). *Adding fuel to the conflict: How gas reserves complicate the Cyprus question*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/137884>

Version: Publisher's Version

License: [Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/137884>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page



Universiteit Leiden



The handle <http://hdl.handle.net/1887/137884> holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

Author: Karakasis, V.P.

Title: Adding fuel to the conflict : how gas reserves complicate the Cyprus question

Issue Date: 2020-10-15

ADDING FUEL TO THE CONFLICT

How gas reserves complicate
the Cyprus question

Vasileios P. Karakasis

ADDING FUEL TO THE CONFLICT:
HOW GAS RESERVES COMPLICATE
THE CYPRUS QUESTION

Vasileios P. Karakasis

ISBN: 978-94-93197-14-5

Cover, layout & printing: Off Page, Amsterdam

ADDING FUEL TO THE CONFLICT: HOW GAS RESERVES COMPLICATE THE CYPRUS QUESTION

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof.mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op donderdag 15 oktober klokke 10.00 uur

door

Vasileios P. Karakasis
Geboren te Athene, Griekenland
1984

PROMOTOR

Prof.dr. B. Steunenberg (University of Leiden)

CO-PROMOTOR

Prof.dr.ir. J.J.C. Voorhoeve (University of Leiden)

DOCTORATE COMMITTEE

Prof. dr. A.Kutsal Yesilkagit (University of Leiden)

Prof. dr. Rob de Wijk (University of Leiden)

Prof. dr. James Ker-Lindsay (London School of Economics)

Prof. dr. Rebecca Bryant (University of Utrecht)

Dr. A.K.O. Ahmadov (University of Leiden)

Dr. Honorata Mazepus (University of Leiden)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms	12
Abstract	15
Chapter 1	Setting the stage 17
1.1	Natural gas as the new chapter of the Cypriot saga 19
1.2	Gas in global politics and its complications 21
1.3	The energy outlook in the Eastern Mediterranean 23
1.4	Research question and focus 25
1.5	Conceptual framework and methodological design 26
1.5.2	Structure-based explanations: neorealism and geopolitics 26
1.5.3	Agency-based explanations: the greed-grievance dichotomy 28
1.5.4	Epistemological challenges in adopting one theory over the other 29
1.5.5	Need for a discursive framework of analysis 30
1.5.6	Research design: the synergy between discourses & Q-method 32
1.6	Historical and energy context 32
1.7	The societal relevance of the subject for EU officials 34
1.8	Overview of the chapters 37
Chapter 2	A discursive framework of conflict analysis 39
2.1	Introduction 41
2.2	Structure-based perspectives: neorealism & geopolitics 42
2.2.2	Applicability of geopolitical perspectives 46
2.3	An agency-based approach: between greed and grievance 48
2.3.1	Greed 49
2.3.2	Grievance 53
2.4	The role of discourses as conceptual framework 56
2.5	Theoretical expectations based on single perspectives 58
2.6	Theoretical expectations based on mixed perspectives 59
2.6.1	The interplay between geopolitics and grievance 59
2.6.2	The interplay between greed and geopolitics 60
2.6.3	The interplay between greed and grievance 62
2.7	Conclusions 63
Chapter 3	The historical context 65
3.1	Introduction 67
3.2	A brief overview of the current state of affairs 69
3.3	The history of the Cyprus conflict 70
3.3.1	The birth of multi-ethnic cleavages 70
3.3.2	The colonial legacy of the British Empire 72
3.3.3	External and domestic developments after WWII (1945-1955) 75

3.3.4 EOKA and the Turkish-Cypriot reaction	77
3.3.5 Cyprus as an independent state and the constitutional deadlock	78
3.3.6 UN intervention and the continuation of the clashes: 1964-1974	81
3.3.7 Turkey's military operation in 1974	82
3.3.8 The post-1974 developments	85
3.3.9 The EU-factor and the Annan Plan	86
3.3.10 The post-Annan period	89
3.4 Reasons behind the intractability of the conflict	90
3.5 Conclusions	92
Chapter 4 The energy context	95
4.1 Introduction: the energy context	97
4.2 The geological context of the Eastern Mediterranean	97
4.2.1 Egypt: the key player in the region	98
4.2.2 Israel: from a traditional importer to a potential exporter	99
4.2.3 The Republic of Cyprus	102
4.3 International Law of the Sea and delimitation agreements	107
4.3.1 Basic Provisions of UNCLOS	108
4.3.2 Delimitation agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean	109
4.3.3 Economic and geopolitical context	119
4.4 Critical reflections, concerns and priorities	130
4.4.1 Critical reflection on the energy debate	130
4.4.2 Greek-Cypriot concerns and priorities	131
4.4.3 Turkish-Cypriot concerns and priorities	133
4.5 Conclusions	134
Chapter 5 Q-methodology	137
5.1 Introduction	139
5.2 The utility of Q-methodology	139
5.3 The steps of Q-methodology	141
5.3.1 The concourses: answers to the open-interview questions	141
5.3.2 The Q-samples: the linguistic use of 'political discourse analysis'	143
5.3.3 Explaining the sampling of the P-Sets and the Q-sort procedure	144
5.4 Q-centroid analysis	149
5.4.1 Factor loadings	150
5.4.2 Factor arrays	151
5.5 Conclusions	152
Chapter 6 Analysis of the discourses	155
6.1 Introduction	157
6.2 Greek-Cypriot discourses	157
6.2.1 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing'	157
6.2.2 'Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms'	163
6.2.3 'Resentment matters'	168

6.3 The Turkish-Cypriot discourses	170
6.3.1 'Gas stimulating political equality'	170
6.3.2 'Micro-politics'	175
6.4 Conclusions	177
Chapter 7 Theoretical Reflections on the findings	183
7.1 Introduction	185
7.2 Discourses with a single perspective	185
7.2.1 Geopolitics	185
7.2.2 Greed	186
7.2.3 Grievance	186
7.3 Discourses with 'mixed perspectives'	187
7.3.1 Geopolitics-Grievance	187
7.3.2 Greed- Geopolitics	188
7.3.3 Greed-Grievance	188
7.4 Presentation of the results	189
7.5 Conclusions: Theoretical reflections	191
Chapter 8 Conclusions	195
8.1 Introduction	197
8.2 Implications of the discourses	197
8.3 Academic contribution and limitations	202
Epilogue	209
1. Policy recommendations for the EU	211
1.1 A relation-centred approach to the conflict	211
1.2 Changing the dominant logic of the 'informal debate'	214
2. Personal remarks and future scenarios	218
Appendices	223
Appendix 1: Recruitment of interviewees	225
Appendix 2: Type of questions in open-ended interviews	229
Appendix 3: Bidders for the 2 nd round	230
Appendix 4: Bidders for the 3rd round	231
Appendix 5: The Dispute over the Aegean	232
Appendix 6: The Leviathan-Ceyhan pipeline	234
Appendix 7a: Q-Sample for Greek-Cypriot P-Set	236
Appendix 7b: Q-Sample for Turkish-Cypriot P-Set	239
Appendix 8a: Q-sample in the original Greek language	242
Appendix 8b: Q-sample in the original Turkish language	245
Appendix 9a: Greek-Cypriot P-Set (July 2017)	248
Appendix 9b: Turkish-Cypriot P-Set (January 2018)	249
Appendix 10a: Factor loadings for the Greek-Cypriot P-Set	250
Appendix 10b: Factor loadings for the Turkish-Cypriot P-Set	251

Appendix 11a: Factor Arrays for the Greek-Cypriot P-Set	252
Appendix 11b: Factor Arrays for the Turkish-Cypriot P-Set	255
Bibliography	261
Primary Sources	261
Academic sources	276
Acknowledgements	307
Dutch Summary	309
CV Vasileios P. Karakasis	311

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Eastern Mediterranean Basins.	23
Figure 1.2. Gas corridors across the EU.	35
Figure 4.1. The Levant Basin.	101
Figure 4.2. 13 Exploration blocks of the Republic of Cyprus.	102
Figure 4.3. Successful bidders for the second licensing round.	105
Figure 4.4. Jurisdiction zones according to UNCLOS.	108
Figure 4.5. Delimitation agreement of the Republic of Cyprus and Egypt.	110
Figure 4.6. Turkey's continental shelf claims.	111
Figure 4.7. Greece's viewpoint on the delimitation of its EEZ.	113
Figure 4.8. Agreement between Lebanon & Cyprus.	115
Figure 4.9. Coordinates for the EEZ between Cyprus & Israel.	115
Figure 4.10. The maritime disputed area between Israel and Lebanon.	117
Figure 4.11. Delimitation of continental shelf between Turkey and the 'TRNC'.	118
Figure 4.12. Trade relations between Turkey and Israel.	122
Figure 4.13. Proposed pipeline between Israel and Turkey.	123
Figure 5.1. Board distribution template.	148
Figure A5.1. Map of the Aegean.	233
Figure A6.1. Energy suppliers Turkey.	235

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1. Two sets of theoretical expectations	58
Table 4.1. Main recent gas discoveries in offshore EM	107
Table 4.2. Monetization projects for Eastern Mediterranean Gas	119
Table 5.1. The stages for this study's Q-research design	139
Table 5.2. A sample of the heuristic device for reducing concourse	145
Table 6.1. Greek-Cypriot Discourse 1	158
Table 6.2. Greek-Cypriot Discourse 2	164
Table 6.3. Greek-Cypriot Discourse 3	168
Table 6.4. Turkish-Cypriot Discourse 1	171
Table 6.5. Turkish-Cypriot Discourse 2	175
Table 6.6. Key points of the discourses	179
Table 7.4.1a. Single perspectives motivating discourses	189
Table 7.4.1b. Mixed perspectives motivating discourses	190
Table 7.4.2. The 3Gs in a single and in a mixed form	190
Table 1.1. Interviewees in the Republic of Cyprus (in chronological order)	227
Table 1.2. Turkish-Cypriot Interviewees (in chronological order)	228

ACRONYMS

AKEL	Progressive Party of Working People
AKP	Justice and Development Party
BCM	Billion Cubic Meters (of natural gas)
BG	British Gas Group
BKP	United Cyprus Party
BP	British Petroleum
CNG	Compressed Natural Gas
CTP	Republican Turkish Party
DEH	Public Power Corporation (of Hellenic Republic)
DEPA	Public Gas Company (of Hellenic Republic)
DIKO	Democratic Party
DISY	Democratic Rally
EastMed	Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA	Energy Information on Administration
ENI	Ente Nazionale Idrocarbur
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
FCNM	Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
FLNG	Floating Liquefied Natural Gas
FM	Foreign Minister
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HP	People's Party

HVDC	High Voltage Direct Current
IEC	Israel's Electricity Corporation
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOC	International Oil and Gas Company
KATAK	Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus
KOGAS	Korea Gas Corporation
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MCF	Million Cubic Feet
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
mW	milliwatt
NAVTEX	Navigational Telex
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
nm	Nautical miles
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCI	Projects of Common Interest
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRIO	Peace Research Institute of Oslo
RoC	Republic of Cyprus
SUMED	Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline
SC	Security Council
TCF	Trillion Cubic Feet

TDP	Communal Democracy Party
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization
TPAO	Turkish Petroleum Corporation
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USGS	United States Geological Survey

ABSTRACT

In this research I assess the impact of the recently discovered gas reserves south off Cyprus on the escalation of the Cyprus conflict. I examine the ideational dynamics underpinning the conflict-inducing role of natural resources. Theoretically motivated by the discursive shift in conflict studies, I prioritise the collectively shared meanings of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot opinion-leaders on the gas reserves and how these justify their conflictual strategies. To uncover these discourses, I apply Q-methodology, a research design tailor-made to 'measure' human subjectivity. I distinguish five distinct discourses. With respect to the Greek-Cypriot side, I identify (a) 'gas boosting our geopolitical standing', which highlights the sovereignty attributes of the natural resources, (b) 'pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms', which acknowledges the opportunistic motives behind the 'geopolitical overtones' of the Greek-Cypriot side and (c) 'resentment matters', which emphasizes the Greek-Cypriot grievances. As regards the Turkish-Cypriot side, I came across two different discourses: (e) 'gas stimulating political equality', where Turkish-Cypriots stress their grievances over their lack of international status and the opportunities that arise from the gas reserves discovery to reverse their international isolation and (f) 'micro-politics', which highlights the political opportunism of particular policymakers who capitalize on the tensions in order to serve their political careers in the face of domestic turbulence. These discourses provide a holistic framework regarding the discursive factors underpinning the conflict-inducing role of natural resources within the protracted Cyprus conflict.

1

Setting the stage

1.1 NATURAL GAS AS THE NEW CHAPTER OF THE CYPRIOT SAGA

In February 2018, the Italian state owned energy company, ENI, found an allegedly important amount of gas reserves in a well within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus. After this discovery, the company headed towards a different destination close to that area in order to launch drilling in another well. On its journey, it encountered a number of Turkish warships, which, following a navigational warning issued by Turkey's authorities, harassed the drilling rig and threatened to sink it. ENI's vessel manoeuvred to avoid the collision and sailed for a different destination in another country.

While commenting on this incident, the Italian Foreign Ministry announced that it was not related to the bilateral relations between Italy and Turkey. It should be rather viewed in light of the 'relations and economic balances between the Republic of Cyprus and the island's northern part' (ANSA 2018). Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a press release casting the blame for this standoff on the Greek-Cypriots (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). After the collapse of the 2017 Crans Montana reunification talks between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey accused Greek-Cypriots of promoting their energy plans 'as though they were the sole owner of the Island', instead of 'expending their efforts towards a just and lasting comprehensive settlement in Cyprus' (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). The collapse of the reunification talks in Crans Montana signalled the dramatic termination of a two-year UN brokered peace process. It was considered as the best opportunity to terminate the division of the island (Reuters 2017a).

This was not the first time that such incidents had transpired around Cyprus. In 2011, 2014 and in the summer of 2017, Turkey promulgated similar navigational warnings and dispatched seismic vessels to areas encroaching on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey justified its activities on Turkish-Cypriots' exclusion from the energy initiatives that the 'Greek-Cypriot administered' Republic of Cyprus had been undertaking. These activities, based on the accusations of Turkish-Cypriot leaders, affected the continuation of the reunification talks between the two communities. In February 2014, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and Greek-Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, had signed a joint declaration with Derviş Eroğlu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader at that time. The document would allegedly work as a kick-starter of the stalled reunification talks at that time. A couple of months later, the Greek-Cypriot leadership announced drilling in one of the wells within its Exclusive Economic Zone causing the reaction of the Turkish-Cypriot leader. In response to this announcement, Turkey issued a navigational warning (NAVTEX) and reserved a large area within an overlapping region for seismic surveys performed by the Turkish vessel *Barbaros* (European Parliament 2017). The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades,

invoking Turkey's 'provocations in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone', withdrew from the negotiation talks with Derviş Eroğlu.

The discovery of the gas reserves has become a new chapter of the convoluted Cyprus conflict and a new issue of contention between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. Since 1974, the territory of the Republic of Cyprus has been divided by a UN buffer zone. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Nicosia remains the last divided capital in the world. A green line separates the self-styled 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC) in the north (37% of the territory) from the remaining territory of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus in the Greek-Cypriot administered southern part, excluding the UK sovereign bases in Akrotiri and Dhekelia. From 1960s onwards and after its declaration of independence, the island of Cyprus is not simply a battleground between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. It is also the arena for the conflicting interests of its guarantor powers – Turkey, Greece and the UK – as well as a prospective area for great powers antagonism (USA and Soviet Union/Russia). In 1974, in the aftermath of a coup attempt engineered by the Greek dictatorship against the Cypriot President at that time, Turkey invaded the island and occupied 37% of its territory. Afterwards, Turkey embarked upon settlement policies by bringing Turkish inhabitants from Anatolia to the northern part of Cyprus in order to enhance its 'Turkish' character. Although no organized armed violence has occurred between the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots since 1974, a number of issues has been inhibiting a comprehensive settlement between them: disagreement about the exact form of a future governance system, territorial adjustments, a thorny issue about the missing persons, the dispute about the compensation for the properties lost in 1974, and disagreements about the presence of Turkish troops on the island as well as Turkey's intervention rights. The recent gas discoveries, however, have exacerbated the pre-existing predicament between the two sides.

The challenge of this exploratory study is to construct a discursive line of enquiry to define how and why the natural resources have become embroiled in the Cyprus conflict. Such enterprise does not take place in a theoretical vacuum. I first examine the plethora of explanations investigating the relationship between natural resources and conflict. Academic scholars (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Humphreys, 2005; Le Billon 2009; Ross, 2006) have popularized the interplay between natural resources and conflicts through the concept of 'resource war' or 'resource curse'. The term was mediatized in the late 1970s as a metaphor to describe the (renewed) tensions between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union over the 'control of fuel and minerals in disputed 'peripheries', such as the Middle East and Southern Africa (Le Billon, 2009, 211). It refers to conflicts over the 'possession of critical materials', such as extractive resources (e.g. hydrocarbons, minerals, timber and gemstones), land and water. In my single case study, the 'critical material' under examination is the recently discovered gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean.

1.2 GAS IN GLOBAL POLITICS AND ITS COMPLICATIONS

1

As a fossil fuel, natural gas ‘contains a mix of hydrocarbon gases, mainly methane, along with varying amounts of ethane, propane and butane’ (Mokhatab et al 2015, 1). It is detected in underground rocks called reservoirs and can be produced either on its own or alongside oil production; the latter is referred to as ‘associated gas’. In the past, ‘associated gas was commonly flared or burned as a waste product but in most places today it is captured and used’ (NaturalGas.Org, 2013). Once extracted, ‘natural gas is sent through small pipelines (gathering lines) to processing plants, which separate the various hydrocarbons and fluids from the pure natural gas to produce what is known as pipeline-quality dry natural gas prior to transportation’ (ibid). In general, natural gas is measured in cubic metres or feet and British Thermal Units.¹

Regarding its availability and based on calculations by BP (2017), at the end of 2016, world proven natural gas reserves stood at 186.6 trillion cubic metres (tcm), sufficient to meet more than 50 years of global production (at current levels). The majority of the gas reserves have been discovered in the Middle East (42.5%), Europe and Eurasia (30.4%) as well as Asia Pacific (9.4%), with the US, Russia and Iran holding the largest proven reserves (BP 2015).²

Despite its reportedly prominent role in global energy markets, gas cannot be regarded a ‘fully’ globalized commodity in its own right, especially compared to oil (Barnes, et al. 2006). The oil market is effectively global because it is easily transportable from one part of the world to another (primarily shipped via oil tankers); therefore, it is, in reality, impossible to segment the oil market.³ On the other hand, it is difficult to ascertain whether the global gas market will come to fruition and when (Grigas 2017, 23). It is difficult to transport, in the sense that a network must be delivered and import-facilities are required. The transportation of gas needs either an import pipeline or a liquefaction/regasification plant (LNG⁴).

¹ Natural gas has been often portrayed as the fuel of the future. Its consumption at a global level has tripled over the last 3 decades, and demand could grow by another 50% over the next twenty years. Based on the most recent projections of IEA (2017), after oil (31%) and coal (29%), natural gas supplies 22% of the energy consumed worldwide and is used in nearly a quarter of electricity generation. It is a versatile fuel, while its growth is partially ‘linked to its environmental benefits relative to other fossil fuels, particularly in terms of air quality as well as greenhouse gas emissions’ (ibid). According to the Norwegian DNV GL, an internationally accredited classification society, ‘natural gas will keep playing a key role alongside renewables in helping to meet future energy requirements’ (DNV.GL, 2017; Ellinas, 2017b).

² The shale gas revolution transformed the US natural gas market, in the sense that initially perennial shortages gave way to substantial surpluses.

³ Meaning to apply different prices to different customers or prevent oil from flowing to a specific customer or from a specific producer

⁴ According to Yergin (2012, 335), the rise of natural gas as a new supply ‘coincided with a rapid buildup of LNG’. For instance in 2010, ‘Qatar celebrated reaching 77 mn tons of LNG capacity – 28% of the world

The political ramifications emanating from these features – pipelines and LNG projects – cannot go unnoticed. It takes about 10 to 15 years for these investments to pay off. Both options rely on a system of logistics and transportation which is much less flexible than the system for oil (Barnes et al 2006, 6). Pipeline and LNG infrastructures bear an extremely high cost to be built; they necessitate long-time horizons in tandem with predictable -political and economic- context for investors to commit their capital and knowledge (Barnes, et al. 2006). This means that ‘investors are keen to ensure that involved companies and states will uphold contracts for the life of a project’ (Shaffer 2013, 114). Consequently, they require from both host and transit state governments to support international supply projects through intergovernmental arrangements (Shaffer 2013, 114). Moreover, since natural gas supply needs building permanent infrastructure in fixed locations, such as ‘electric power plants, refineries, offshore platforms, terminals, ports, pipelines, high-voltage transmission lines, distribution wires, gas storage fields, storage tanks substations’ (Yergin 2012, 282), states are called to approve the installations and routes and to provide security for the infrastructure and facilities (Shaffer 2013, 116). The segmented nature of the gas market allows the possibility of punishing or rewarding specific participants, either suppliers or customers.

These properties render natural gas an inherently geopolitical commodity.⁵ Infrastructure projects link states and mirror the geopolitical relations among them (Shaffer 2012). States, in choosing routes to export their goods and import their energy supplies, naturally consider the political ramifications of the various route options (Shaffer 2012). Consequently, political instability along the selected routes renders gas energy supplies more vulnerable to political disruption than oil and coal. So how have these aspects played out in the Eastern Mediterranean?

total. Australia is emerging a new LNG powerhouse, number two only to Qatar, and is well positioned to supply Asia and to continue to expand’ (ibid).

⁵ Based on Yergin’s (2012, 335) assumptions, ‘the energy trade becomes global and crosses more maritime and land borders, the security of supply chain also becomes an urgent question. Critical choke points along sea routes pose various vulnerabilities for the transport of LNG, such as accidents, terrorist attacks and military conflicts’. Chokepoints refer to ‘narrow channels along widely used global sea routes, which are critical to global energy security’ (EIA 2013b). The inability of gas to transit a major chokepoint, even on a temporary basis, may create substantial supply delays and result in higher shipping costs; this may further instigate higher world energy prices. The most famous choke point is the Strait of Hormuz, an energy pathway in the Middle East, situated between Iran and Oman, with a shipping lane of two miles. It constitutes a strategically important strait or narrow strip of water which linking the Persian Gulf (where more than quarter of oil production and substantial LNG can be found) with the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, while separating it from the Indian Ocean (Yergin 2012, 283). Another choke point is the Malacca Strait, a narrow route between Malaysia and the Indonesia island of Sumatra; it ‘funnels in from the Indian Ocean, curves up around Singapore and widens out in the open waters of the South China Sea’ (Yergin 2012, 283).

1.3 THE ENERGY OUTLOOK IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

The Eastern Mediterranean is situated at the crossroads of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. It is located at ‘the apex of two important geostrategic triangles: one formed in the north and north-east with the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and the other formed in the south and south-east with the Middle East and the Persian Gulf’ (Stergiou et al. 2017, 8). The countries in the region are Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. As shown in Figure 1.1, the Eastern Mediterranean consists of eight basins (the Cyprus basin, Eratosthenes High, the Latakia Basin, the Levant Basin, the Judea Basin, the Nile Delta Basin, Western Arabian Province and Zagros Province). The majority of the historical hydrocarbon production takes place in the Nile Delta Basin, the Western Arabian Province and the Zagros Province (EIA 2013a).

During the 20th century, the history of the Eastern Mediterranean was inextricably associated with the great powers’ struggle to gain control over its lucrative oil fields. At the dawn of the 21st century, technological advances, boosted mainly by skyrocketing international oil




Figure 1.1. Eastern Mediterranean Basins. Source: EIA (2013a), *Eastern Mediterranean Region*. Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration, Retrieved at 14.1.2017 from http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Eastern_Mediterranean/images/basin_map.png

prices at that time, triggered new exploration initiatives.⁶ Such technological innovations influenced the energy developments around Cyprus as well. In March 2010, the US Geological Survey estimated that there was a mean of 122 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas in the seabed of Levant Basin Province, located along and off the coast of Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Gaza Strip, extending westward into Cypriot waters (US Geological Survey 2010). Most of these countries, especially Egypt and Israel, have been vying to position their resources on the European and Asian gas market. The Republic of Cyprus is no exception.

It first proclaimed an Exclusive Economic Zone and signed delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon⁷ and Israel in order to mark off the outer limits of the exploration area, which it then parcelled out into 13 blocks (Ker-Lindsay 2011). Each of these blocks was granted to gas companies for seismic surveys and drilling after the initiation of international tenders. For the first tender in 2007, no large international companies expressed any particular interest; the uncertainty about the quantities of the hydrocarbons along with the political and legal complications in the region forced the companies to search for other opportunities around the globe (Gürel et al. 2013). In October 2008, the Republic of Cyprus awarded only one licence to the small-sized Noble Energy, which had already been operating offshore Israel. After multiple seismic surveys by Noble, the first exploratory drilling took place in 2011, indicating a natural gas deposit in deep waters (*ibid.*). Despite its small magnitude, this discovery sparked significant interest in a second offshore licensing round in 2012, during which 15 bidders participated, including bigger international oil companies and gas traders. The Italian ENI, the French Total and the Korean Kogas were accredited with the exploration rights for six more blocks (Ellinas et al. 2016). In December 2016, a third licensing round transpired and a consortium formed by the American giant Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum won the bid to start drilling in an additional block (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry 2016)

Besides the launch of licensing rounds and the invitation of international companies, Cyprus carved out strategic collaborations with Israel, Greece and Egypt. These nascent partnerships incorporated agreements of a military and economic nature. All these regional actors deliberated about various projects which would transport gas either to the European or to the Asian gas market: (a) the construction of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility, (b) a pipeline linking Israel, the Cyprus, Greece and Italy, (c) a pipeline between Egypt and the Cyprus, (d) a pipeline linking Israel, Cyprus and Turkey, (e) a Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facility or a Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) facility (Ellinas, Roberts and Tzimitras, 2016; Giamourides

⁶ The rapid progress in micro-processing 'rendered the analysis of vastly more data possible and enabled geophysicists to improve their interpretation of underground structures and, consequently, exploration success' (Yergin 2012, 40).


⁷ Not ratified by the Lebanese parliament yet.

2013; Gürel, Mullen and Tzimitras, 2013; Gürel and Le Cornu, 2014; Tagliapetra, 2013; Tsakiris 2014).

These Greek-Cypriot energy plans triggered Turkey's and Turkish-Cypriots' reactions. According to the former Turkish-Cypriot leader, Derviş Eroğlu, 'Greek Cypriot side's decision to go ahead and start drilling, in a daring and challenging fashion against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot people, was a clear indication that it had no desire to reach a solution to the Cyprus problem' (Today's Zaman 2011c). Turkish-Cypriots signed delimitation agreements with Turkey and enabled the latter to dispatch seismic vessels several times, escorted by frigates, in areas encroaching on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots disagreed with the breadth of the delimitation of exclusive economic zones signed by the Republic of Cyprus with Israel and Egypt. Furthermore, Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots accused Greek-Cypriots of not involving them in the hydrocarbons' management and of acting 'as though they were the sole owners of the Island' (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION AND FOCUS

Gas reserves have eventually become an additional chapter of the Cyprus conflict. The research challenge is to explore why and how is this case by putting the viewpoints of the contending parties, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, at the forefront of my analysis. Through the single-case study of Cyprus, I propose the following research question for my single case exploratory study: What is the impact of the gas discoveries on the escalation of the Cyprus conflict? By closely scrutinising Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot discourses my study investigates the links between gas reserves and the escalation of the Cyprus conflict. The period I am focusing on is between 2011 and 2018. 2011 was deliberately chosen as the departing point because it coincides with the first announcement (by Noble Energy) of the existence of natural resources in the seabed of the Republic of Cyprus. I selected 2018 as the final point because of the final incidents that occurred in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus between the drilling company operating there (ENI) and Turkish warships. These incidents occurred a couple of months after the collapse of the 2017 reunification talks in Crans Montana and increased the intensity of the conflict (as above mentioned). I define them as the escalation of the conflict in my research.



Due to the broad scope of the research question, I divide it into the following sub-questions:

- Sub-question 1: How do existing theories examine the conflict-inducing role of natural resources?
- Sub-question 2: What is the historical and energy context concerning the recent Cyprus gas dispute?
- Sub-question 3: What are the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot discourses on this topic and how do they differ?

Addressing this set of sub-questions paves the way for the structure of this chapter.

1.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN

1.5.1 The research puzzle: conflict because of scarcity or choice?

Any attempt to theorize about the conflict-inducing role of natural resources raises the following question: is the escalation of the conflict the purposeful outcome of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot choices or the by-product of an ‘anarchic’ environment that compels them to fight over these resources in order to survive? Such a question mirrors the classic agent-structure dilemma that has animated scientific inquiry across international relations and conflict studies (Wendt 1987). At the core of this dilemma is a continuous debate over the primacy of agency or structure in shaping the behaviour of the contending parties. Agency treats ethnic groups as purposeful actors, who act independently and make their own choices. Therefore, the conflict over natural resources is the purposeful outcome of their own choices. On the other hand, structure pinpoints the recurrent patterned arrangements in the system within which the actors have to operate (Wendt 1987); this system, dominated by a scarcity of resources and security, constrains their choices. Fighting over these resources is the essential means to safeguard their survival in that system.

Prioritizing the primacy of agency over structure or vice versa incurs serious epistemological considerations as regards the theoretical approach to my study. If I underscore the primacy of structure as my key explanatory factor, I necessarily resort to pure systemic theories of international relations that investigate the impact of the ‘anarchic system’ on the eruption of resource-related conflicts. If I stress the role of agency as the key explanatory factor, I must adopt the literature on the political economy of natural resources.

1.5.2 Structure-based explanations: neorealism and geopolitics

By granting primacy to the explanatory role of structure, neoclassical realism can offer an adequate theoretical toolkit. Neorealism pinpoints the break-up of the international system into competing blocks, which engage in rivalry over the control of natural resources (Casier 2011;

Ciuta 2010; Correlje & van der Line 2006; Fearon 1995; Mearsheimer 1994, 2001; Waltz 1979, 1986; Winrow 2016). Neorealists or structural realists paint a grim picture of an anarchical international system defined in terms of states and their responses to international distributions of power (Mearsheimer 1994, 2001). To safeguard their security and, ultimately, survival, states are 'destined' either "to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency' on others' (Waltz 1986, 103). Natural resources treated as a key strategic good become a source of internal strength, essential for the dictates of an anarchic international system and as a concomitant source of external dependency – and, thus, vulnerability – for those who do not have access to it (Casier 2011, 494). A generalized quasi-Darwinian logic emphasizes the 'survival' strategies of the contending parties and the role of natural resources as 'energy weapons' in this respect. By survival, neorealist scholars mean preserving the sovereignty of the states.

In light of this approach, geopolitics becomes the key explanatory factor in the genesis and escalation of resource-related conflicts. Geopolitics puts its emphasis on the geographic understanding of power relations between the key disputants (as well as other regional and global stakeholders). Geopolitical perspectives have the state at the centre of analysis and claim that the absence of an overarching authority, which would adjust states' incompatible objectives, compels them to enhance their security for their own survival. By granting primacy to the role of structure in resource-induced conflicts, geopolitical scholars treat gas reserves as a power resource, tailor made for the advancement of contending states' survival in the 'anarchic' system. The stake here, as iterated, is to protect their sovereignty.

Such 'systemic' approach has inspired a number of scholars to study the conflictual strategies of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus as the inevitable outcome of an anarchic environment. These scholars have underlined the emergence of the Eastern Mediterranean as a (sub)regional security complex characterized by a pre-existing imbalance of power full of uncertainty and security threats for the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey (Adamides and Christou 2013, İşeri and Bartan 2019, Koktsidis; Kouskouvelis 2015, Paraschos 2013; Sitalides 2014; Stergiou 2016, 2017, Stivachtis 2019, Tuncalp 2015, Turan 2015, Tziampiris 2019, Tziarras 2016, 2018, Winrow 2016).

Despite its useful insights, geopolitical approaches cope with some shortcomings as well. They use states as a key unit of analysis. In this respect, the "TRNC", which is not recognized as a state entity, should have theoretically fallen out of the scope of such studies. Moreover, such structural approaches, with a few exceptions in the case of Cyprus (Christou and Adamides 2013; Tziarras 2016, 2018), pinpoint the almost 'automatic' impact of the anarchic environment on the responses of the contending parties. Such theorists dismiss 'domestic' calculations aimed at 'deciphering' this anarchic environment before policy responses are made to it. These calculations can function as transmission belts, which filter systemic pressures and convert them into actual policy responses (Juneau 2015, 4).

1.5.3 Agency-based explanations: the greed-grievance dichotomy

There is another school of thought that prioritizes the role of agency over structure. Inspired by rational choice theorists and rooted in the fields of development studies and social psychology, the political economy of natural resources attributes the eruption or escalation of resource-related conflicts to the rational calculations that the contending parties make. It is not the structure of the 'anarchic system' that compels the disputants to fight about the possession of the natural resources, but greed and grievances. These theorists do not use states as the key units of analysis, but ethnic groups within ethnically divided states.

Theorists advocating grievance-based explanations have underscored the centrality of pre-existing 'perceived injustices' for understanding the outbreak of conflicts over natural resources. Prominent scholars in conflict studies, such as Edward Azar (1985, 1986, 1990) and Ted Gurr have underscored the explanatory power of relative deprivation in the eruption of conflicts. In the case of Cyprus, cultural anthropologists and political scientists (Birgel 2018; Bryant 2001, 2008, 2012; Hadjipavlou 2007; Hatay and Papadakis 2012; Yakinthou 2009; Yilmaz 2010) have highlighted the role of grievances at the grassroots level in consolidating the current impasse. However, with a few exceptions (Birgel 2018), the linkages between grievances and the escalation of the Cyprus conflict in the energy setting have been underexplored.

While granting primacy to the role of agency, during the last two decades, a burgeoning quantitative empirical literature has emphasised the dominant impact of 'greed' in conflict outbreaks (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Soysa 2000; Ross 2006). Through inferential statistics, they have identified a strong correlation between the economic opportunities which natural resources offer to key actors in a conflict and the escalation of the conflicts *per se*. Based on these calculations, key actors prefer to keep fighting rather than reaching a settlement. The problem with such studies is that the statistical relation between greed and escalation of conflicts does not necessarily imply a substantive significance in the sense that correlations derived from cross-country data do not adequately capture the procedural causal links essential to gaining a sound understanding of conflict incidents, especially when examining a single case study (Ahmadov 2014). One of the few exceptions is Humphreys' (2005) work. He lays out some qualitative causal mechanisms, according to which political parties and leaders prefer the continuation of a conflict because of their inability to make credible commitments in honouring a peace settlement or because they may be engaged in activities which they would be unable to carry out if a settlement were reached.

Bringing these assumptions to the case of Cyprus, I did not find any literature examining the linkages between political opportunism and the recent escalation of the Cyprus conflict. I encountered, however, a literature focusing on the role of problematic political leadership in the perpetuation of the conflict (Adamides 2015; Charalambous 2015; Christophorou 2015; Heraclides 2011; Kaymak 2009, 2012). These authors imply that political leaders from both

sides seem incapable of or reluctant to adopt bold and far-reaching decisions to extricate themselves from a costly antagonism and reach a political settlement. Demonstrating a pro-solution attitude at all costs would come at a high political price, such as non re-election. Similar to the case of grievances, what the literature misses is potential causal links between the potential expediciencies of the political elites and the recent escalation of the Cyprus conflict. In this research, I wish to explore the extent to which such links exist.

1.5.4 Epistemological challenges in adopting one theory over the other

The insights offered by structural and agency-related perspectives are useful for understanding how natural resources may influence the escalation of conflicts and helping me address sub-question 1. Nonetheless, for the study of each perspective a researcher needs to resort to a different academic discipline, such as international relations, conflict studies, sociology, and different theories, such as neorealism or the political economy of natural resources. The choice of academic discipline and theory is not the only challenge for such an enterprise. These two academic disciplines span different 'levels of analysis'. The level of analysis notifies the researcher where to locate the causes of a state's or a national group's behaviour by categorising contrasting explanations on the basis of the units in which the entity under examination is conceptualised (Ramsbotham et al 2011).

The founding father of structural realism (neorealism), Kenneth Waltz (1959) first developed a three-level schema to theorize states' behaviour. The first level focuses on the conception of human nature and the role of leaders. The second level elaborates on the nature of the state. Finally, the third and most crucial level, according to him, illuminates the nature of the international system. International relations scholars recommend that analysts should stick to a single level of analysis. Indicatively a major international relations' scholar, Singer (1961, 77), clearly stipulates that different levels of analysis are mutually exclusive, asserting that 'one could not add these two types of statements [systemic and domestic causes] together to achieve a cumulative growth of empirical generalizations'.

What will happen if I follow one level of analysis over the other? If I embrace a structure-based logic, the 'third-level' of analysis will gain ground. I will have to solely concentrate on the imperatives of the 'anarchic system' in the Eastern Mediterranean to explain the behaviour of states, such as the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, while downplaying the role of Northern Cyprus (which is not recognized as a state entity). If I focus on the second-domestic-level explanation, I will have to resort to grievance theorists to identify the relative deprivation of individual nation-states or communities as the main 'trigger' of a resource-related conflict. Finally, if I look for first-individual level explanations, as proposed by 'greed' theorists, I will have to investigate the personal or psychological characteristics of individual statesmen.

1.5.5 Need for a discursive framework of analysis

The problem with such a form of level-based theorization is that only a limited set of real-world cases lend themselves to this sort of analysis (Moravcsik 1993). Imre Lakatos's work on the philosophy of science has been widely employed as a heuristic model for social scientific theory building. The tendency for such theories to employ an increasing number of ad hoc variables on a single level of analysis is one of the hallmarks of a 'degenerating' research programme that is ripe for revision (Lakatos 1974). That is why empirical studies formulated at a single level of analysis, be they international or domestic, are increasingly being supplanted by efforts to integrate the two levels. To this end, I need to extend my analysis beyond this level-based model and create a single, unified, holistic theory, rather than a theory which identifies only one aspect of the resource-related conflict.

My departing point is that questions of material agency and structure, regarding natural resources and the *a priori* dualisms crystallised between natural resources and conflict, are not intrinsic, self-evident and universal givens (Birgel 2018, 56). Instead, I consider perceptions of agency and structure as contingent, precarious and processual achievements, linked to the context under investigation (Law 1999; Birgel 2018, 71), and to a context often suffused with relations of power and politics from the start (Braun 2006).

Theoretically inspired by a number of scholars who used discursive frameworks to analyse conflicts (Alkopher 2005; Campbell, 1993; Jabri 1996; Jackson 2002, 2007, 2009; Suurmond 2005, Weldes 1999), I resort to discourses as my theoretical framework of analysis. Discourses embody a shared set of capabilities, enabling the 'assemblage of words, phrases and sentences into meaningful texts intelligible to the readers' (Dryzek 1988, 710). They spell out how the most intense historical experiences as perceived and articulated by Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots influence the formulation of their conflictual strategies. The value of such an approach is that it offers important clues as to why the conflict escalated at a particular juncture and necessitates a coincidence of enabling structures and purposeful actors to spark a conflict.

By doing so, I am not questioning the validity of the key premises from the geopolitical and greed-grievances theories. I use them as theoretical preconceptions because their key assumptions are readily discernible in any conflict: insecurity, competition, fear, hatred, mistrust and power struggle. The real challenge does not lie in uncovering them but in letting the agents construct a powerful complex that makes the escalation of the conflict 'possible by rendering it conceivable, legitimate and reasonable' (Jackson 2009, 180). Through discourses, I expect to unravel the contextual *modus operandi* of geopolitics, greed and grievance in real-world politics. I use discourses to fathom the constituents' articulated fears or *hypophysis*,⁸

⁸ This term, whose literal meaning is 'looking underneath the surface', is borrowed from Thucydides and captures the politics of fear (Taras 2015)

the distrust, emotions and rational evaluations of their international environment (Dryzek and Berejikian 1993; Dryzek and Holmes 2002); with the aid of such model, I can observe the extent to which my findings fit into or re-evaluate the above-mentioned analytical categories. I should stress, though, that while the discursive approach may be replicable to other conflict studies, my findings-discourses are not because difference contextual factors for each conflict-case-study come into play. Nonetheless, the discursive shift and approach to other conflicts is recommended.

I raise two types of expectations with respect to the discourses. First, given the prominence of the agency and structure-based frameworks in the literature and that they appeal to basic arguments related to resource-related conflicts, I expect that each of the three analytical categories can be traced back to at least one of the discourses about the energy aspects of the Cyprus conflict. In other words, I expect that some discourses will centre on the basic logic of one of the geopolitics, greed or grievance. My second set of expectations focuses on the possible interaction between these analytical categories. I expect that discourses exist in which the logic of at least two frameworks play a role. These can be, in principle, combinations of geopolitics-grievance, greed-geopolitics and greed grievance some of my discourses. Indicatively, I expect to uncover a reservoir of past lessons and scripts (grievance) informing the current strategic understanding of the stakeholders in the conflict (geopolitics). I also expect discourses showing the interplay between 'political opportunism' (greed) and feelings of resentment inherited from the past (grievance). In such an opportunity-rich environment of rivalry and during periods of domestic turmoil, I expect that political elites will have intentionally invoked 'geopolitics' and attribute 'security' overtones to the natural resources in order to divert popular attention from questions of accountability regarding the turmoil. The presentation of the contrasting discourses will help me address sub-question 3.

How can discourses enrich our understanding of the conflict-inducing role of natural resources in the Cypriot context? The scholarship I presented above has shown how greed and grievance have consolidated the impasse in the Cypriot negotiations. The interplay between greed and grievance has never been examined in exploring the energy tensions. This is one of the gaps that my research seeks to fill. Moreover, as shown above, the geopolitical literature on the recent tensions is vast. However, most of these studies, with a few exceptions (Christou & Adamides 2013; Tziarras 2016, 2018; Tziarras and Moudouros 2016), have maintained the purity of the international level of analysis and have downplayed the role of domestic and ideational factors, including greed and grievance; these factors could work as transmission belts that account for the responses of the contending parties to the external imperatives of the 'anarchic system' in the Eastern Mediterranean. Scholars have not considered how 'greed' and grievance' may have functioned as 'filters' of the 'stimuli' from the 'anarchic environment' before being converted into 'conflictual strategies'. This is the contribution that my study intends to make in the conflict-inducing role of natural resources.

1.5.6 Research design: the synergy between discourses & Q-method

This holistic-discursive framework is not the only contribution that my study intends to make in the rich literature of the Cyprus conflict and the ethnic conflict over natural resources in general. The point of my research remains to endogenize agency by letting the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots articulate the stakes behind the hydrocarbons' management and its association with the conflict. To tackle such a challenge, I apply Q-methodology, which offers a set of systematic procedures that not only incorporates the participants' perspectives but 'also places them at the centre of analysis' (Durning and Brown 2006, 537). Some scholars consider the best developed paradigm in measuring human subjectivity (Dryzek and Berejikian 1993; Dryzek and Holmes 2002; Steunenberget al 2011; Uluğ and Cohrs, 2017) and without insisting on the 'more objective' status of my own construction of reality. This is the first time that Q-methodology has been employed for the study of any aspect of the Cyprus conflict.

The theoretical basis upon which Q-methodology has been established relies on the axiom that I acknowledge and present the opinion leaders' concerns without prejudging or discrediting them. By opinion-leaders I identify these people who are considered as influential members in the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot populations, who turn to them for advice and opinions. These include elites like policy-makers and chief executives in the state-apparatus as well as NGO representatives. Due to their involvement in international diplomatic fora as well as their continuous deliberation with their domestic constituents, these people have a good understanding of what happens in Cyprus' external and internal environment.

Discourse analysis and Q-methodology can be conjoined, inasmuch as both seek to model structures embedded in the articulations of the research participants. The Q-method, discourses alike, is rooted in the 'universe of verbalisations' about the topic under investigation: the concourse. The concourse consists here of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot expressed views in the historical and energy contexts of the Cyprus conflict. Based on my field research, that I will explain later, I collect a specific number of statements from open-ended interviews with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot business and geopolitical analysts, historians, and former policy-makers. The selected 'population of these statements' constitutes the concourse of verbalizations regarding the articulated Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot socially shared concerns over the topic under investigation. I build-up the concourse through answers from open-ended interviews while laying out the historical and the energy context of the conflict.

1.6 HISTORICAL AND ENERGY CONTEXT

After collecting notes from historical textbooks, most of which provide the historical background, addressed in depth in Chapter 3, I visited the island for the first time in November 2014 in order to conduct field research. The field research, in general, includes bricolage, which

associates what I had been studying so far with the geographical context under examination (Neuman 2014, 437).

The investigation of the historical scope warranted short-term, face-to-face interactions with former accredited negotiators, historians, policy advisors and sociologists in the form of open-ended interviews. After looking into the historical literature, I examined the experts' concerns and historical interpretations, while further developing questions in relation to them. Qualitative interviewing projects, in general, provide an in-depth exploration of what the selected interviewees hold as substantial experience, often leading to important insights (Charmaz 2001). Their transcribed views on the situation being studied form the empirical data of this research, which is the historical part of the concourse.

After completing the first field research and transcription of the interviews, I began formulating the second part of my concourse, comprising the energy views of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot opinion leaders. I initially studied reports illuminating the available export options on the basis of international experience of natural gas, its availability in the Eastern Mediterranean and estimations as regards its future utility (De Micco 2014, EIA 2013b, Ellinas, Roberts and Tzimitras 2016, European Parliament 2017, Giamourides 2013, Gürel, Mullen and Tzimitras 2013). I also examined through desk research the perceived risks and dangers attached to the implementation of every decision (ICG 2013; Giamourides 2013; Gürel et al. 2013; Khadduri 2012; Tagliapetra 2013, Tsafos and Giamourides 2015, Tsakiris 2014), the priorities which the political leaders had set before engaging in the formulation of their strategy and, most importantly, the geopolitical (Christou & Adamides 2013; Tsakiris, 2014) and economic (Giamourides 2013, Tsafos and Giamourides 2015, Paraschos 2013) factors under examination.

In November 2015, I started the second round of my field research in Cyprus. I met former policymakers, chief negotiators and energy analysts from both sides and asked them about the significance of the discovered gas reserves for the economies of the relevant communities, the problems with existing infrastructure, the impediments which companies faced in the exploitation and monetization of the gas reserves and, under the price regime (low at that time), which options were optimal for the monetization of the gas reserves. I also approached former policymakers to ask them about their rationale in delimiting the zones of exploitation, as well as Turkish-Cypriot analysts and former chief negotiators, to question their potentially 'triggering role' in Turkey's 'gunboat diplomacy'. The presentation of the historical and energy context addresses sub-question 2

The collection of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot views formulates the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses of my study. As I explain in Chapter 5, this material was reduced to a manageable volume of statements and was subject to further inspection in order to produce the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot 'elite discourses'. These discourses address sub-question 3.

1.7 THE SOCIETAL RELEVANCE OF THE SUBJECT FOR EU OFFICIALS

Before concluding the introduction, some questions are still pending. What is the societal relevance of the topic? Why should the EU officials shed light on how Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, with the involvement of Greece and Turkey, deliberate about the natural gas reserves? Why is it important for EU policymakers and analysts to investigate the conflict-inducing role of the gas reserves? There are two reasons for EU policymakers to focus on these developments.

The first obvious reason is that Cyprus has been a member of the EU since 2004. Although the EU recognizes the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over the entire territory, the acquisition of 37% of the territory, where the Turkish-Cypriots live, is suspended. The EU has embarked upon efforts (Green Line Regulation, Direct Trade Regulation) to fix this anomaly in order to bring Turkish-Cypriots closer to EU values and norms. Therefore, the EU officials have an interest in taking a close look at these developments. They have to observe the processes and the ideational dynamics through which the disputants formulate their incompatible objectives, in the positions articulated by the assigned leaders. Thus, I penetrate the official nuances and display the logic underpinning them.

The interests for the EU around these developments in Cyprus loom larger than the island's territory. They touch upon the 'diversification strategy' that the EU adopted in the aftermath of multiple energy crises with its main gas supplier, Russia. The EU has set out newly designed initiatives, called projects of common interest (PCI).⁹ They represent major infrastructure facilities which connect energy networks across Europe. Herewith, I present the big picture for the EU's gas supply infrastructure, which involves around four gas corridors, varying in terms of maturity, challenges and future possibilities (European Parliament 2009). [Figure 1.2](#) illustrates these corridors.

- a. The main North-Eastern Corridor from Russia: Russia constitutes the main external source of gas supply. In 2015 29.4% of the EU's overall NG imports came from Russia (Eurostat 2017). From northern Russian sources, two pipelines, the Northern Lights and the Druzhba Gas, largely supply the EU-28 northern via Poland) and south-eastern region via Slovakia (Eurostat, 2017).
- b. The North-Western Corridor from Norway: Norway exports cover approximately 25.9% of EU-28 consumption needs (Eurostat 2017). From sources in the North Sea, several pipelines are linked to the EU territory. More particularly, the Langeled, Cats, Seal,

⁹In November 2017, the Commission published a list of 173 projects (European Commission 2017).

Map 2: Existing main import corridors and future strengthening projects




Figure 1.2. Gas corridors across the EU. Source: European Parliament (2009, November 13). *Existing main import corridors and future strengthening projects [Map]*. Retrieved at 18.1.2018 from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2009/416239/IPOL-ITRE_NT\(2009\)416239_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2009/416239/IPOL-ITRE_NT(2009)416239_EN.pdf)

Sage and Pulsmar pipelines connect with the UK¹⁰ for consumption of gas in the UK or for transit. Pipelines Europipe I/II, Norpipe and Zeepipe are directly connected with EU's import points in Emden and Zeebrügge (European Parliament 2009, European Parliament 2017).

- c. The South-Western Corridor from Algeria: Algeria's exports cover approximately 8.8% of EU-28 consumption needs (Eurostat 2017). The gas to Europe is supplied through the GPDF (Maghreb-Europe) pipeline, via Morocco to Spain and through the Trans-Mediterranean pipeline to Italy (European Parliament 2009)
- d. The South-Eastern Corridor from Caucasus/Central Asia/Eastern Mediterranean): This specific import route is under construction and is flagged as a major priority for the EU in terms of supply security, on the grounds that the region supposedly holds great potential with respect to natural gas resources. The route involves infrastructure projects designed natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe (European Parliament 2017).

¹⁰ Since February 1, 2020 the UK has been effectively withdrawn from the EU.

Therefore, the recent discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean could partially contribute to the realization of the South-Eastern Corridor and the fulfilment of the EU's diversification strategy from Russia. However, the Cyprus conflict (among many other problems and conflicts that the region suffers) may become the 'stumbling' block for the realization of its energy plans.

Energy is not the only stimulant prompting the EU's interest in the region and in the conflict in general. Since 1995, the EU has formulated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona process), whose objective is to dismantle the tariffs and quantitative barriers between EU and non-EU countries in the Mediterranean (without any significant results, though). In 2004, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to 'foster stability, security and prosperity in the countries located in the EU's eastern and southern neighbourhoods' (European Parliament 2017). ENP was portrayed as a framework 'to govern the EU's relations with 16 of the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbours in order to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration' (European External Action Service 2016b). Nevertheless, the Arab uprisings impeded its smooth operation. One of the policy initiatives under the ENP was the Union for the Mediterranean (European External Action Service 2016a). The latter includes key projects such as 'the establishment of maritime and land highways that connect ports and improve rail connections so as to facilitate the movement of people and goods' and the development of alternative energy sources in the region' (ibid).

The land and sea space covering the Levant, the Aegean, Egypt and onward to Libya is considered 'a zone of intriguing, worrisome and dangerous events in the modern world' (Stergiou 2017, 7). It includes an ongoing war in Syria, the rise of ISIS, a continuously increasing refugee crisis, illegal trafficking, the traditionally strained Greek-Turkish relations and Cyprus as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts (Sitalides 2014). All these threats and risks may acquire a more significant maritime dimension, exposing global trade to real danger. The Eastern Mediterranean encompasses a trade hub that gives significance to the Suez Canal, an artificial sea-level waterway in Egypt, which links the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea through the 'Isthmus of Suez and provides watercraft with a shorter journey between the North Atlantic and northern Indian Oceans through the Mediterranean and Red seas' (Filis 2017). New shipping lanes have doubled the daily capacity and shortened the passage time (ibid.). Any dangers across these sea lanes of this region may put global trade in jeopardy. The maritime environment has been a challenge for terrorists who are used to on shore operations. This explains why maritime security in the Mediterranean provides opportunities for multilateral security cooperation between NATO and the EU.¹¹ It also explains why containing the escalation

¹¹ This cooperation has partially been developed through NATO's Operation Active Endeavour (2016), which was launched immediately after the 9/11 attacks, and in light of the recent refugee crisis.

of the conflict becomes imperative. To this effect, comprehending the causal links between the discovery of natural resources and the escalation of the conflict is essential.

1.8 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

I based the structure of this introductory chapter on of the sub-questions of sub-section 1.4. The first sub-question is about the literature review on the conflict-inducing role of natural resources. I examine this subject in Chapter 2, wherein I underscore the importance of a discursive framework of conflict analysis as the proper conceptual method for my study. In Chapters 3 and 4, I formulate the historical and energy contexts that address sub-question 2. In Chapter 5, I present my methodological section by laying out the steps that Q-method requires in order to ‘transform’ the collected answers from the interviews (the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses) into discourses, which, in turn will formulate the interpretative framework of conflict analysis. In Chapter 6, I discuss the generated discourses in detail, addressing, thus, sub-question 3. In Chapter 7, I examine the extent to which the three analytical categories (geopolitics, greed and grievance) motivate them and analyze their implications. In Chapter 8 I lay out the academic contribution and the limitations of my study.



A discursive framework of conflict analysis

2.1 INTRODUCTION

2

Which factors account for the conflict-inducing role of natural resources? The theories derived from the agency-structure dilemma could potentially offer tentative answers to this question and be tested in the Cypriot context: scarcity of resources and security from a structuralist perspective; fear, hatred and political expediencies from an agency perspective. These factors are readily discernible in any conflict. While I acknowledge their validity, I do not deem their explanatory power as intrinsic, self-evident and universally given (Birgel 2018, 56). Instead, I consider them as precarious and processual theoretical preconceptions, contingent on the discourses under investigation. My departing point is that what renders gas reserves as contentious is the particular intense relationship that both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots feel toward them. In its fullest form, this intensification yields an absolute divide between friend and enemy in relation to any given issue (Schmitt 1932; Williams 2003, 516). This line of thinking resonates with Schmitt's (1932) 'specificity of politics'. What Schmitt underscores as 'the political' cannot be inferred from the specific substantive content of any issue at stake, like the natural resources, but in a particular way of relating to them (Williams 2003, 516; Schmitt 1932).

To this effect, I prioritize how the 'conflictual strategies' of the contending parties are constructed and reproduced in their actions. My objective through this single case study is to understand and interpret the recent Cypriot imbroglio as an end in itself and not the development of broader theoretical generalizations that may be tested for other resource-related conflicts. This is why I employ a 'discursive way' in conflict research as my conceptual framework (Alkopher 2005; Campbell 1993; Jabri 1996; Jackson 2002, 2007, 2009; Weldes 1999). In these studies, the analytical attention shifts from the object of research – natural resources, for instance – to the discursive construction or (even) exaggeration of a pervading sense of threat as well as the manipulation of grievance and a sense of victimhood. Conflict discourses are 'large-scale power-knowledge regimes akin to Foucault's discourses of medicine, education, or humanism, and achieve hegemony at particular historical junctures' (Jackson 2002, 63), such as the recent energy tensions in Cyprus. Via discourses, I scrutinize how ideational factors underpin the recent tensions: how do the agents decipher their 'anarchic' environment, how do historical experiences factor into the recent developments and how does the perception of the 'other' influence each side's strategies? By doing so, I can explain why the escalation of the conflict was inevitable, rendering it 'conceivable, legitimate and reasonable' (Jackson 2009, 180).

Through the discursive framework, I let my findings-discourses 'speak for themselves', so that the interpretation emerges in a 'bottom-up' fashion (Levy 2009, 73). Agent-based and structural premises, manifested through neorealist and political economy perspectives, can be used as implicit theoretical preconceptions for my single case study. Nonetheless, these are expectedly implicit and not explicit, as Jack Levy (2009) recommends for single-case conflict studies.

In this chapter, I first present these theoretical preconceptions. Motivated by the agency-structure dilemma, I use the dichotomy of Le Billon (2009) and present two broad types of theoretical perspectives, each of them corresponding to the primacy of structure or agency as the key explanatory factor in resource-related conflicts. The first type, the geopolitical or neo-realist perspectives, adopts a structural approach and explains how the anarchic system urges states to launch conflicts over the possession of or access to natural resources. Scarcity of security and resources compels the contending parties to launch a conflict to safeguard their sovereignty. The second one, the 'political economy perspectives', grants primacy to the role of agents and builds on the dichotomy of 'greed-grievance' in the eruption/escalation of conflicts. I examine the extent to which and how these perspectives can be implicitly applied in the case of Cyprus or other resource-related conflicts. After I do this, I set forth the discursive framework and speculate about the extent to which these theoretical conceptions can be found in these discourses.

2.2 STRUCTURE-BASED PERSPECTIVES: NEOREALISM & GEOPOLITICS

2.2.1 General background

In the 1960s and 1970s, neorealists developed advanced theories to enrich our understanding of the conflictual behavior of states. According to their founding father, Kenneth Waltz (1979), the structure of the international system largely accounts for their behaviour. Neorealists treat the international system in which states play the leading role as a brutal arena, where states seek for 'windows of opportunity' to exploit each other and are not eager to show trust to each other (Mearsheimer 1994, 2001). The system is labelled 'anarchic', in the sense that it consists of independent political units (the states), which have no effective authority above them to adjust their competing interests (Mearsheimer 2001). In such an anarchic system, the most basic motive driving their behaviour is survival, meaning the protection of their sovereignty. Survival is the ultimate motive that drives their behaviour. In order to survive, they have to maximize their power. Power includes material capabilities, such as military equipment and natural resources.

There are two key features underpinning the international system: anarchy and the distribution of capabilities. Anarchy does not refer to chaos or disorder. 'It simply means that there is no centralized authority, no night watchman or ultimate arbiter, which stands above states and protects them (Mearsheimer 2001, 81). Through the distribution of capabilities, neorealists estimate a finite amount of power and power-producing potential in the system, spread over any given number of state-actors (Mearsheimer 2001). In order to further illustrate how neorealism accounts for the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties, I focus on three different concepts which animate this school: hegemonic stability and decline, maximization of

power and relative gains. After I elaborate on these concepts, I explain how the key premises of neorealism are utilized in geopolitics.

Hegemonic stability or power transition theory

Robert Gilpin (1981) sheds light on the ‘anarchic structure’ of the international system and the distribution of power among its member-states. He stresses that under particular conditions, such a system can be stable or unstable. By a stable system, he means one in which economic, (geo)political or technological changes do not jeopardize the vital interests of the dominant states (Gilpin 1988). In this context, the stability of such a system is marked by an unequivocal hierarchy of power and an unchallenged dominant or ‘hegemonic’ power. This ‘hegemonic power’ has the ability to ‘single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements of international political and economic relations’ (Goldstein 2005, 83). For instance, during the Cold War period, the United States and the Soviet Union could deploy their preponderance of power through military coercion or diplomacy in order to safeguard their interests. Hegemonic periods, although less dynamic, provide stability to the international system (Gilpin 1988). A strict hegemonic order governs the political relations between states and does not leave any room for them to manoeuvre outside the boundaries defined by the hegemon.

Correspondingly, an unstable system emerges when economic, (geo)political and technological changes erode the international hierarchy and undermine the position of the hegemonic state. The alteration in relative capability between the dominant state and its principal challenger in tandem with the dissatisfaction on the part of the challenging power may lead to a questioning of the ‘hegemonic stability’ and eventually lead to power transition (Snidal 1985; Organski 1958). Under these circumstances, adverse events and changes precipitate a power vacuum. The outcome of such a situation unleashes a new international ‘anarchic’ structure and provides formerly ‘peripheral’ or ‘marginal’ countries with an increased freedom of movement, allowing them to maximize their power.

Numerous scholars, such as Sitalides (2014), Tziampiris (2019), Stivachtis (2019) and Tziarras (2016, 2018), have mentioned that a form of hegemonic stability was governing the Eastern Mediterranean as long as the US, the dominant superpower in the aftermath of the Cold War, held vested interests in the region. After the US attempted to disentangle itself from the Middle East by withdrawing its troops from Iraq, a power vacuum emerged and the competing actors in the region, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, sought to do everything necessary to fill this vacuum. Through strategic partnerships or unilateral actions, these actors had to maximize their power to safeguard their ‘survival’ in the ‘anarchic system’. The maximization of power, besides military capabilities, included the utilization of and/or the access to the recently discovered gas reserves.

How much power is needed: the great divide

The central question that divides neorealists is how much power a state should pursue for the sake of its survival in this 'anarchic system.' The various answers to this question led to Jack Snyder (1991, 11-12) drawing a distinction line between defensive and offensive (neo) realism. Defensive realists, represented by Kenneth Waltz (1979) and van Evera (1999), assert that it is unwise for states to strive for the maximization of their share of world power because the system will punish them if they struggle to gain too much power. Defensive realists believe that the offence-defence balance tends to work in favour of a defensive capability over an offensive one (van Evera 1999, Waltz 1979). The rise of balancing coalitions will deter a state from pursuing an aggressive expansion of its power. Motivated by Herz (1951) and Jervis (1978), Stephen Van Evera (1999, 42-43) posited that 'a chief source of insecurity in Europe since medieval times has been [the] false belief that security was scarce'. He assumes that 'states are seldom as insecure as they think they are ... [the] exaggeration of insecurity, and the bellicose conduct it fosters, are prime causes of national insecurity and war' (ibid).

The second school of thought, known as offensive neorealism and advanced by Mearsheimer, adopts a contrasting viewpoint. Offensive realists argue that the scarcity of security in the anarchic international system is not an exaggeration, as van Evera (1999) stipulates. States live in uncertainty as they can never be certain about their neighbours' intentions; they should assume that these intentions are malign or can become aggressive. As a result, states are driven by the system to maximize their power as much as possible. For some of them which have the proper capabilities, achieving regional hegemony is the best way to guarantee survival (Mearsheimer 2001). Mearsheimer (2001, 35) states: 'Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive'. In light of this approach, states should not be considered reckless expansionists but 'opportunistic aggressors,' seeking to 'increase their power at acceptable cost and risk' (Walt 2002, 207). Offensive realists would expect Turkey to expand its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean by seeking regional hegemony, while the influence of the formerly dominant power in the region, the US, would decrease. In contrast, other countries, such as Egypt, Greece, Israel and the Republic of Cyprus, due to the power asymmetry, would fail to dominate the region. That is why they have to, at least, maximize their power and improve their 'relative position' in the system (Schweller 1994; Tziarras 2016) in order to check Turkey's increasing influence. This happens because this group of states could never be certain of the intentions of others (such as Turkey).

Relative gains

To pursue 'regional hegemony' and to 'maximize power,' states have to possess or control the largest proportion of available material sources in their immediate environment, including military, economic and natural resources. Successful conquest of or access to these natural resources increases the state's relative position in the 'anarchic system' and enhances its efforts

for ‘regional hegemony’. Candidate ‘regional hegemons’ hammer out strategies to control lines of communication and transportation routes in their neighbourhood in order to reduce the risk of being cut off from the vital commodities or export markets. This, in turn, leads to the reaction of the neighbouring states.

A state’s drive to maximize its own security by pursuing regional hegemony will inevitably create anxiety among its neighbours. If the relative power of countries such as the Republic of Cyprus or Israel is lower than the powerful neighbour’s (for example, Turkey), these countries may team up to contain the latter’s influence. These countries are aware that they cannot pursue regional hegemony solely by maximizing their own power. The states’ major motive in any interaction with ‘competing states’ is not to only achieve the highest possible individual payoff through conquest and access to resources (absolute gains) but to prevent others from surging ahead in their relative capabilities (relative gains).

As Grieco et al. (1993) explain, although states are interested in increasing their power and influence through cooperation with others (absolute gains), they can also be concerned about how much power and influence they might achieve in any cooperative endeavour (relative gains). From the neo-realist point of view, when countries encounter the possibility of cooperation for mutual gain, the feeling of insecurity might urge them to question how the gains will be divided. As the prominent neorealist scholar, Kenneth Waltz, (1979, 105) asserts, ‘even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities’. The economic gains arising from energy cooperation can be ultimately transformed into security gains. States gaining disproportionately while dealing with other states may achieve a superiority that will jeopardize the very security of their cooperative partners (Powell 1991).

From neorealism to geopolitical perspectives

Theoretically motivated by this neorealist reasoning, geopolitical perspectives have frequently associated the term ‘resource wars’ with interstate disputes over the control of ‘strategic resources’ (Le Billon 2004, 2009, 2014) whose possession would maximize their relative position in the ‘anarchic system’. Equating trade with trade and power has diachronically inspired Western geopolitical reasoning about the use of natural resources. Strategic thinking about natural resources in the course of the Cold War concentrated on issues of vulnerability coming from resource-supply dependence and the potential for international conflicts generated by antagonism over access to and control of key resources (Russett 1981; Le Billon 2014). The calculations of decision-makers at that time were fixated on questions of ‘energy security’, looking at reserves through a security approach and forging alliances with producing countries (Le Billon 2001, 2009). In the 1970s, energy security concerns reached their peak for the majority of Western countries, when they strived to manage the economically disastrous repercussions of the 1973 oil crisis and the 1979 Iranian revolution (Yergin 2012). In

the aftermath of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet empire, which left the pipelines between Russia and Western Europe without a concrete system of governance, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, aggravated these concerns.

The term 'geopolitics', coined in 1899 by Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922), Swedish parliamentarian and political scientist, underlines the role of territory and resources in shaping the condition and the destiny of states (Tundander 2001). The founding father of geopolitics, Sir Halford John Mackinder, in his famous article, *Geographical Pivot of History* (1904), underscored its role in global politics. He stressed their importance on the grounds that for the first time analysts and practitioners can perceive something "of the real proportions of features and events on the stage of the whole world" and search for a formula which can articulate certain aspects "at any rate of geographical causation in universe history".

As a field, geopolitics investigates the impact of geography on international politics, including conflicts. It constitutes a method of analysis which explains countries' conflicting behaviour primarily in terms of geographical variables, such as physical location, size, climate and natural resources (Ortmann and Whittaker 2013).

Geopolitics therefore highlight the break-up of the international system into competing blocks, which engage in rivalry over the control of energy resources (Correlje and van der Linde 2006; Winrow 2016). Geopolitical thinkers share in common a view of an anarchical international system defined in terms of states and states' responses to international distributions of power. To safeguard their security, and ultimately survival, states are 'destined' either 'to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency' on others (Waltz 1986, 103). Natural resources, framed in this respect as a key strategic good, are seen both as a source of internal strength, essential for the dictates of an anarchic international system, and as a concomitant source of external dependency –thus, vulnerability- for those that do not have access to it (Casier 2011, 494).

2.2.2 Applicability of geopolitical perspectives

Geopolitics has been used as a theoretical and methodological tool to explain the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, among other conflicts of course. Control of the oil and gas pipelines running from the Caspian Basin is one of the primary factors accounting for the eruption and prolongation of the conflict (Companjen 2010). The government in Baku, due to the possession of oil reserves, considered its region geopolitically more important to the Soviet Union than Armenia. This feature, along with its loyalty to Moscow, led the Azerbaijani government to expect Soviet leaders to prevent any revisions of the status quo, meaning the loss of sovereign control of Nagorno-Karabakh (Melander 2001).

Nonetheless, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the US, taking advantage of Russia's weak financial position and subsequently the power vacuum that emerged, helped

American and other Western oil companies gain concessions in the Caspian Basin. Azerbaijan, militarily and economically weak at that time, projected US interests in the Caucasus by offering its main valuable asset, the oilfields, in exchange for mainly political support in its controversy with Armenia. On the other hand, Russia viewing the region in terms of its former position as imperial and Soviet-era overlord, supported Armenia militarily, although it was selling weapons to Azerbaijan as well. During the USSR era, many generals of Armenian origin did their military service in the Soviet army. Yet, it is noteworthy that the military infrastructure of Azerbaijan, in terms of logistics, depended on Moscow's equipment and other kinds of assistance.

Geopolitical approaches have inspired a number of scholars to study the conflictual strategies of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus as the inevitable outcome of an anarchic environment. For instance, Grigoriadis (2014) tested how the above-mentioned relative gains theory can explain the negative development in the Cyprus and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. By putting forward this concept, he justified why and how building trust in a region affected by prolonged conflicts among neighbouring states is notoriously difficult. Other scholars have elaborated on the rise of the Eastern Mediterranean as a (sub)regional security complex. The region is allegedly 'stigmatized' by a preexisting imbalance of power full of uncertainty and security threats for the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (Adamides and Christou 2013; Aydin and Dizdaroğlu 2018; Bilgin 2015; Ifestos and Platias 1992; Ifestos 2013; Kahveci-Özgür 2017; Karbuz 2018; Kentas 2013; Koktsidis 2014; Kontos and Bitsis 2018; Kouskouvelis 2015; Mazis 2008; Paraschos 2013; Proedrou 2014; Sitolides 2014; Stergiou 2016, 2017; Stivachtis 2019, Tsakiris 2014, 2017; Tuncalp, 2015; Turan 2015; Tziampiris 2019, Tziarras 2016, 2018; Winrow 2016).

Kouskouvelis (2013, 2015) explains how natural resources may also be used by a small state, such as Cyprus, as a bargaining tool or relative capability to gain advantage in its confrontation with bigger powers such as Turkey. Inspired by Fox (1959), he underlines how the demands of great powers over small states frequently centre on concessions for the exploitation of natural resources or control over strategic passageways. From this viewpoint, since such demands never cease, small states such as Cyprus, according to Kouskouvelis (2015) can utilise their goods and services in order to buy consent, gain advantages or build alliances. In this respect, Cyprus, as a small country with limited resources, can respond to the dictates of the anarchic environment by joining in partnerships with Egypt and Israel, with which it shares common maritime borders, in order to contain the unfavourable arms race with Turkey.

Such a school of thought offers useful insights but copes with some shortcomings as well. It uses states as a key unit of analysis. In this respect Turkish-Cypriots, who are not recognized as a state entity, fall out of the scope of such studies. Moreover, the problem with geopolitical perspectives is that, due to their dogmatic and structural nature, they underplay the historical and perceptual factors forming part of the intractable nature of conflicts. Sticking to their

deductive and structuralist logic while simultaneously neglecting the historical patterns of amity and enmity among disputants results in researchers ignoring a great deal of the role which historical experiences play in the formulation of leaders' strategic rationality in conflicts. Moreover, such structural approaches, with some few exceptions (Christou and Adamides 2013; Tziarras, 2016, 2018; Tziarras and Moudouros 2016) pinpoint an almost 'automatic' impact of the anarchic environment on the responses of the contending parties. They dismiss their 'domestic' calculations and their efforts to 'decipher' this anarchic environment. These calculations can function as transmission belts which filter systemic pressures and convert them into actual policy responses (Juneau 2015, 4). As I explain later, through the use of the discursive framework, my research contributes to this direction.

2.3 AN AGENCY-BASED APPROACH: BETWEEN GREED AND GRIEVANCE

An agency-based model can also provide a framework to explain strategic decision-making in conflicts over natural resources. One theory highlighting the role of agency is the rational-choice model. Rooted in economics, it conceives the decisions of the key stakeholders as means-ends calculations. Schelling's *Strategy of Conflict* (1960) puts forward the principles of contemporary strategic theory. According to Schelling, strategy theory analyses and explains the maze of national actions and reactions as more or less advantageous moves in a game of interdependent conflict (Allison & Zelikow 1999). Decision-makers select from a variety of options, expecting that their choice will deliver their goals better than the alternatives. This reasoning is portrayed as a cost-benefit analysis: decision-makers are anticipated to select the choice which has the greater net benefits (benefits-costs) above those of other alternatives (Allison 1971, Allison and Zelikow 1999, Frynas et al. 2017). The buzzword for this concept is 'rationality', defined by Allison (1971, 71) as a 'consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints'.

In this rationality I include the role of emotions. Emotions should be also considered as part of the agents' 'rational choice approach' in conflicts. Some rational-choice theorists may consider rational thinking as a 'cold,' and deliberative process; in contrast they deem emotions as 'hot process,' full of biases that trigger irrational choice behaviour (Shafir et al. 1993; Fisher 1994, 150; Jervis 1976). Nonetheless, more recently, scholars began to argue that considering emotions as the source of irrational behaviour is inaccurate (Erişen 2013, 117). The scholarship revised the 'utilitarian reasoning' as being by default superior to emotions (Erişen 2013, 118) through a series of experiments and replicated findings (Elster 1999). Now, the current literature pinpoints the interaction of cognition and emotion as equal forces shaping agents' behaviour (Erişen 2013, 117). While examining the behaviour of contending parties in a conflict, the contribution of emotion, as a by-product of grievances (which I will explain

later) cannot be left out of the scope of my research when it comes to the study of the agents' 'rational behaviour' in a conflict.

According to the rational choice paradigm, the eruption or prolongation of a conflict is a result of choice. Individuals act on the basis of rational future expectations (Muth 1961, Fischer 1980). Therefore, scholars hypothesize that the decision-makers of the contending parties conduct a cost-benefit analysis before dragging ethnic groups into conflicts for the possession and exploitation of natural resources. The same arguments apply in regions holding the promise of the future extraction of natural resources. Frynas et al. (2017) support such hypotheses even for countries which have not necessarily experienced genuine resource windfalls, such as Cyprus. The exact amount of gas reserves in the seabed of the Republic of Cyprus is not known. Despite the lack of accurate information, disputants have been dragged into the dispute.

Amidst an alarming trend in the increase of intra-state rivalries, especially after the termination of the Cold War period, researchers from different disciplines, such as economics and development studies, inspired by the rational-choice model, have shifted their focus from the abovementioned 'structural' geopolitics to agency-based theories and models (Khan 2016). As I will explain later in detail, among various agency-based models, the 'greed-grievance' theories gained prominence in the literature. This literature is divided into two camps. One camp comprises proponents of the economic logic advocating that opportunities of economic profit (greed) motivate the onset, escalation and prolongation of conflicts. The other camp, involving scholars from the disciplines of political science, political psychology and sociology, stresses the role of political and social discontent (grievance) as the prime motivator of civil war.

2.3.1 Greed

2.3.1.1 *General background*

Greed theory, prominently advanced by the pioneering quantitative research of Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2004), postulates that 'economic motivations and opportunities are more highly correlated with the onset of conflict than ethnic, socio-economic, or political grievances' (Ballentine and Sherman 2003, 4). Using data from 45 civil wars, including the Nagorno-Karabakh, the Aceh and the Sudan conflicts¹, Collier and Hoeffler found a positive correlation between the exports of primary commodities, low education levels, the number of young men in society along with other greed-proxies and the frequency of civil war outbreak. Some of these greed-proxies included a low per capita income, a large diaspora, a low growth rate, a dispersed population and a higher population in total (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001, 2004). To operationalise grievance, they used social factionalisation, ethnic dominance, geographic

¹ Which I discuss later as additional examples of resource-related conflicts.

dispersion, income and land inequality (ibid). They concluded that an economic calculus of the costs and opportunities for the control of primary commodity exports constitutes the main systematic initial impetus to rebellion, with an additional effect arising from fear to be dominated by an ethnic majority (Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2001, 2004). Ross (2006) developed additional measures and new tests to enhance these linkages. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also conducted econometric studies to show how greed outweighs grievances in the eruption of conflicts.

In stark differentiation with the quantitative literature, Humphreys (2005) conducted a qualitative analysis to assess the impact of 'greed' on the escalation of conflicts. In this work, he defined greed as political opportunism in conflict settings. This definition drew my attention as the most relevant one in the case of Cyprus, rather than the economic opportunities presented by the quantitative scholars. In Cyprus, no rebels exist in order to measure the economic gains deriving from the prolongation of conflicts. Nonetheless, I can hypothesise, based on this definition, that 'spoilers of the peace process' on both sides gain political benefits, such as popularity, through the continuation of the conflict.

Among the various causal mechanisms which Humphreys (2005) adopts in order to forge linkages between 'political opportunism' and escalation of conflicts, he emphasises two, the 'domestic conflict premium mechanism' and the 'pork mechanism'. According to the first one, groups within the contending parties, which provide either economic or political benefits during a conflict, may prefer the continuation of the conflict and therefore act as spoilers of the peace process. The real puzzle here is: what prevents disputants from concluding a peaceful settlement which leaves everyone better off? An answer to this question is the ability of key agents – whether leaders or chief negotiators – to make credible commitments in honouring the agreements as the conflict continues. There may be constituents who do well out of the continuation of a conflict because they may be engaged in activities which they would not be able to carry out if a settlement were reached.

The 'pork mechanism' focuses on the relation between resources and peace negotiations. The theoretical argument goes as follows: if the resource exploitation is contingent on reaching a settlement, then the presence of natural resource endowments should make negotiations more likely to succeed. However, if resource exploitation does not depend on peace, the contending parties can keep on the pre-existing 'conflictual tracks'. In the absence of a settlement, one party can continue with the exploration activities without granting any management rights to the other. Exclusion from the co-management of natural resources would give the other contending party the pretext to harden their stance in the peace negotiations.

Pork barrel policy incentives can also work the other way round, even if an agreement is reached. In the context of distributive politics, if any coalition achieves an agreement, new coalitions may rise with a common agenda to overturn the agreement (Humphreys 2005).

Such a perspective marks the futile character of negotiations, in the sense that negotiators and the chief leaders of the contending parties cannot proceed with credible commitments for a settlement; the presence of natural resources which offer transferable rents renders negotiations more difficult by granting the opposition incentives to renegotiate subsequently (Humpreys 2005). The logic of the 'pork mechanism' resonates with Putnam's (1988) two-level game. At the domestic level of a community, domestic groups pursue their interests by putting pressure on leaders to employ favourable policies and politicians seek power by establishing coalitions among those groups. At the international level or at the peace-negotiation table in my case, the same leaders attempt to maximise their own ability to satisfy the domestic pressures while diminishing the adverse consequences of the commitments they have to undertake at the negotiation table (Putnam 1988, 433). The complexity of this two-level game lies in the fact that that moves potentially considered 'rational' for a player at the negotiation table (reaching a settlement) might be impolitic or unpopular for that same player at the other (domestic) board. Therefore, the players, for the sake of their own political survival, may prefer to toughen their stance on the negotiation table and consequently jeopardise the possibilities of a settlement.

2.3.1.2 Applicability of greed theory

While testing the explanatory power of greed theory in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Morelli and Rohner (2015) posit that as long as oil within a country is unevenly distributed among groups, it can determine ethnic war. Azerbaijan is considered a petro-state, holding a vast amount of oil and gas reserves in its soil. Taking this element into consideration, scholars dealing with 'resource curse theory', such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Morelli and Rohner (2015), have identified a link between the discovery of natural resources and the eruption or escalation of conflicts.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) have classified the (second) Sudanese war (1983-2005) as a resource-induced conflict. During the peace negotiations between the North and the South, the distribution of wealth from oil was the main bone of contention between the contending parties. During the second civil war, oil resources had reportedly become a critical battleground between the rebellious freedom movement, the SPLA, and the Sudanese government. 'Oil has raised the stakes of the war and given both sides an increased commitment to the battlefield' (ICG 2002, 100). According to the SPLA manifesto in 1983, the efforts to redraw the borders and the decision to construct an oil refinery at Bentiu motivated the SPLA's struggle against Khartoum (Johnson 2003, 80; Tang et. al 2017). Oil exploitation, falling under the responsibility of the federal and not the regional government, provided significant revenues to the government in the North. These revenues proved instrumental for the North purchasing extensive military equipment with a view to counterattacking the SPLM insurgents (Cascão 2017). A booming oil economy was serving the interests of the elites in north Sudan, regardless of the fact that more than two-thirds of the oil fields were located in the South (Cascão 2017). On the other hand, the rebels designated the oil fields as targets of military attacks, seriously disrupting

oil production as well as the revenues of the companies and the government in Khartoum (Goldsmith et al. 2002).

Based on the literature, greed could apply in the Aceh conflict. Aceh is located in the northern tip of Sumatra and has witnessed a continuous conflict between the central Indonesian government and the rebel group, GAM, from 1983 to 2005. The narrative that the central government of Indonesia had sucked Aceh's natural wealth away puts the conflict in the 'greed-based' category. This is partially confirmed by the words of one of the young leaders in a massive 1999 campaign favouring the independence referendum: 'You can imagine: of the trillions of rupiah produced by Aceh's wealth each year, Aceh only received less than one percent' (*Kompas*, December 2, 1999, cited in Aspinall 2007, 955). Had Aceh gained its wished-for independence, the constituents would have been in a better economic position. Thus, greed as a material motivation triggered the rebellion.

In the case of Cyprus, there are no rebels to consider in order to assess the impact of their greedy behaviour on the escalation of the conflict. I rather foresee the 'implicit' application of Humphreys' (2005) assumptions, although his work has not been cited in the Cypriot literature. This probably happened because no literature, to my knowledge at least, has examined the impact of political opportunism on the recent tensions. I find, however, a literature focusing on the role of problematic political leadership in the perpetuation of the conflict. According to Heraclides (2011), Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders do not have the political will to adopt bold and far-reaching decisions to extricate themselves from a costly conflict and reach a political settlement. In his view, most political parties, regardless of their political colour and ethnicity have embraced intransigent positions in order to avoid sacrificing their political survival for the sake of a settlement. Adamides and Constantinou (2012), Adamides (2015), Charalambous (2015) and Christophorou (2009), Kaymak (2009) and Richmond (1999) pinpoint this routine-like, risk-averse attitude of political parties and leaders. Charalambous (2015) attributes such behaviour to the unwillingness of the political parties across the island to uproot themselves from the domestic surroundings and the historical experiences of their constituents. Given the existing grievances on the island and bearing the political cost in mind, political parties in Cyprus do not demonstrate a bold pro-solution stance that would downplay the objections of their constituents. Such a move would come at a high political price (no re-election). What the literature misses is the potential causal links between the calculations of the political elites and the recent escalation of the Cyprus conflict. This is one of the gaps that I seek to fill through the use of a discursive framework.

The limitations to the explanatory power of greed theory cannot go unnoticed. The greed thesis has reportedly attracted scholars because of its statistical analysis and social science methodology in which it was steeped. This enterprise has oversimplified the complexity of conflicts faced by the policymakers in conflict environments (Berdal 2005; Ballentine &

Sherman 2003; Luengo-Cabrera 2012). This aphorism captures, to a great extent, the grievance theorists' criticisms of the greed-hypotheses. Advocates of grievance theory question whether all factors conducive to conflict are measurable. They also question whether an actor's behaviour and ultimate decision concerning strategic behaviour in a conflict can be the product of economically rational calculations (Bensted 2011, Sambanis 2004), disregarding other socio-political and historical factors which might be in play. In their view, the latter have oversimplified the complexity of the factors which contribute to the onset of conflict. Berdal (2005, 690) states that the economic literature displays 'a static, culturally blind and profoundly ahistorical picture of civil wars', which takes the analysis of the precipitating factors of civil wars out of the historical and social context they should be embedded in. That explains why I distinguish Humphreys' (2005) approach from the other greed-theorists.

2.3.2 Grievance

2.3.2.1 *General background*

Grievance theorists pinpoint the centrality of relative deprivation and 'justice-seeking' to understanding the outbreak of conflicts over natural resources. Gurr (1970) defines relative deprivation as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve and what they get in reality. Grievance is, hence, interpreted as 'justice-seeking', whereby every endeavour to redress the perceived injustices stimulates collective political violence. This sense of 'deprivation' functions as the 'wheel' which makes the competing parties objectify the conflict in terms of interests, stakes and goals. This is especially pertinent to ethnic conflicts, wherein competing territorial claims give birth to antagonizing interests over natural resources that 'objectively separate the parties' (Agnew 1988, 50).

Resource-related conflicts should be understood in line with the complicated systems of interaction between identity groups which have evolved over time and the degree to which the conflicts themselves have 'become part of the adversaries' identities' (Mayer 2000, 13). This sort of historical interaction affects their 'values, communication style, emotional reactions, and the structure in which they operate' (Mayer 2000, 13). As the conflict becomes the main concern of each disputant's 'thoughts, feelings, and actions', even aspects irrelevant to the genesis of the conflict, such as natural resources, become portrayed in such a way that intensifies or prolongs the conflicts (Vallacher et al. 2010). Thus, the conflict functions as a 'gravity-well' into which the surrounding mental, behavioural, and socio-structural landscape begins to slide' (ibid., 262).

In the series of studies which the late Edward Azar, the pioneer of conflict scholarship, published from the early 1970s until 1991,² the motivating factor in protracted conflicts is the struggle by

² He died in 1991.

communal groups for 'security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation' (Azar 1990, 93; Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 112). These needs are ontological and 'non-negotiable', and correspond to Shue's (1980) three basic rights of 'security, subsistence and freedom'. Azar concentrated on identity groups, however defined. He noted: 'the most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflict situations is the identity -racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and others' (Azar 1986, 31). Theorists supporting grievance-based explanations underscore the centrality of identity and group formation for understanding the outbreak of conflicts (Murshed and Tadjoeeddin 2009). Additionally, Azar noted that it is the relationship between identity groups and official states which lies at the core of the conflict or, as he put it, 'the disarticulation between state and society as whole' (Lewin 1948, Kelly 1955, Deutsch 1973, Tajfel 1978). How can we explain this 'disarticulation between state and society as a whole'? Azar forged linkages between this disarticulation and a colonial legacy which artificially imposed European and Soviet ideas of territorial statehood onto 'a multitude of communal groups' based on the principle of 'divide and rule' (Azar 1986, 33; Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 101). As the outcome of that principle, in many postcolonial or post-Soviet multi-communal societies, the state machinery becomes 'dominated by a single communal group unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society', which 'strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflicts' according to Azar (1986, 33).

This is why the grievance literature prioritises 'relative deprivation' (Murshed and Tadjoeeddin 2009, 16) as the main motivating factor behind the eruption or escalation of conflicts as regards natural resources. Basedau and Pierskalla (2014, 4) argue that 'political exclusion of local, proximate ethnic groups is likely to amplify the conflict-increasing effects of oil and gas, due to the added ability to overcome collective action and coordination problems'. Therefore, relative deprivation may trigger social activity if people acknowledge that a higher standard of living exists and that they will have the opportunity or ability to achieve it. For instance, Turkish-Cypriots, as a non-recognized state-entity, believe that through international recognition, they may achieve a better standard of living. This international recognition may be achieved if their participation in an official committee on hydrocarbons management is guaranteed. The lack of recognition captures, to a certain extent, this sense of 'relative deprivation'.

2.3.2.2 Applicability of grievance theory

Tang et al. (2017) advocate the superiority of grievance-based explanations for the onset of conflicts over natural resources and, therefore, strongly criticise Morreli and Rohner's (2015) metric analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Instead, they argue that oil was not associated with the onset of the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. They concluded that Armenians in the region began the fight not because of oil but for their independence and their (re-)unification with Armenia. To this end, nationalism construction during the dying days of the Soviet Union was the main factor motivating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and not greed over the exploitation of Karabakh's rich oil reserves (Tang et. al 2017).

In a similar vein, the same authors asserted that the deep pre-existing ethnic grievance in Sudan was more critical for the flaring up of the conflict than oil, although oil looting provided revenues for the rebels in the South. They set forth Garang's³ thesis in 1985 (Tang, et al. 2017, 377 citing Johnson 2003, 71) to underplay the greed hypothesis explanations regarding the war in Sudan:

The central problems in the Sudanese war are the dominance of One Nationality; the Sectarian and Religious Bigotry that dominated the Sudanese political science since independence; and the unequal development in the country.... Unless the Nationality Question is solved correctly, the Religious Bigotry is destroyed and a balanced development for all the regions of the Sudan is struck, war is the only invited option in the South.

With respect to the Aceh conflict, Aspinall (2007, 952) argued that it was not greed that motivated the GAM to attack foreign oil companies. Instead, 'the legacy of earlier conflicts came to be embodied in a set of institutions and discourses that ultimately provide to be conducive to conflict' (ibid.). In his view, 'grievance and hatred, instilled over long periods and in earlier episodes of conflict, played a more crucial role in escalating the conflict than the greedy behaviour of the rebels. (Aspinall 2007, 957).

The grievance theory concentrates on the 'identities' of the contending parties in the Cypriot conflict setting. Cigdem Sirin (2012) investigates the 'negative' role of ethnic identities on negotiation decision-making in the case of Cyprus. Based on her thorough quantitative research, Hadjipavlou (2007, 363) stipulates that 'psychological fears, pain, and mistrust still remain great in the experiences of each other'. This, among other causes, accounts for the intractability of the conflict. According to Heraclides (2011), the denial of the 'other' lies at the heart of the conflict. Bryant (2012, 347) posited that the two sides suffer from 'a wound that is a witness, and one that speaks from the depths of the unknowable'. She also mentions how this wound is reproduced by the two sides: 'both the temporality of the wound and the sense of a threatening other are most perceptible in representations of suffering bodies, or of the land as a body in pain' (ibid). In other research, she drew on women's writings to demonstrate how nostalgia creates the 'emotional ground that makes politics possible, that makes return realizable, and that makes the future homeland into something for which one would fight' (Bryant 2008, 418). John Burke (2019, 174) explained how the disputants use museums and schoolbooks as powerful symbols to 'frame crimes perpetrated against individuals, families and their wider communities' and reproduce the trauma associated 'with its violation, to underpin their stories'. However, how grievances and traumas are reproduced within the energy issue in Cyprus has been underexplored. This is an additional contribution that the discursive framework intends to make in the literature of the Cyprus conflict.

³ The leader of SPLA/M.

2.4 THE ROLE OF DISCOURSES AS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

As I mentioned above, I do not question whether geopolitics, greed and grievance may exist. Conflicts may be motivated by opportunism, questions of identity and power. As Zartman (2011, 298) aptly puts it, to 'deny any of these is simply blind and hence uninteresting'. My point is that they cannot be fully investigated in some objective realm; it is in the mind or, rather, the interacting minds of the disputant opinion-leaders in particular times and places where they have to be examined. My concluding point is that what makes gas reserves a bone of contention is not solely their material utility but the particular intense relationship that both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots feel toward it. Such intensification yields an absolute divide between friend and enemy in relation to this issue (Schmitt 1932; Williams 2003, 516). This line of thinking resonates with Schmitt's (1932) 'specificity of politics'. Therefore, a conflict-inducing role of the natural resources cannot be inferred from the specific substantive content of the natural resources *per se*, but in a particular way of relating to them (Williams 2003, 516; Schmitt 1932).

Therefore, in my research I look for the meanings that the constituents ascribe to notions such as relative deprivation, survival and political opportunism. I place my research effort in the discursive shift that other scholars such as Alkopher (2005), Campbell, (1993) Jabri (1996), Jackson (2002, 2007, 2009), Suurmond (2005), Weldes (1999) have made in the study of their own conflict case studies. The discursive activity is multidisciplinary and can include perspectives from international relations, social psychology and political economy of natural resources. Discourses can involve judgements and arguments which account for the escalation of a conflict but do not have to necessarily fit into any of the three categories. These perspectives, judgments and arguments are used as theoretical preconceptions that can render the assigned meanings intelligible and 'rationalized' for readers not familiar with the setting of the Cyprus conflict.

Motivated by this discursive approach, Jackson (2002) focused on the Yugoslavian wars and highlighted the importance of discourses in demonstrating the role of human agency in the eruption of conflicts. He showed how 'conflict entrepreneurs' 'construct' war as well as anti-war discourses. Jabri (1996) adopted a discursive framework to show how the cultural-political notions of just war and militarist values reproduce war as a social continuity (see also Jackson 2009, 181-182). She posited that the dominant presence of such notions offers a potent discursive resource for the elites to mobilize the masses and wage wars against others (Jabri 1996). Alkhoper (2005) alleged that the discourses of 'just war' render the social practices of the Crusades more 'logical' and 'intelligible'.

The objective of the current exploratory study is to examine the extent to which the stakeholders in a conflict use some of the theoretical preconceptions (geopolitics, greed and grievance)

presented above in order make their own 'conflictual' strategies more intelligible. I use discourses to lay out the collectively shared understandings of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot opinion-leaders vis-à-vis the conflict, their contending strategies and the importance they attribute to the gas reserves. My logic is that the conflict-inducing role of the gas reserves cannot be treated as independent of the beliefs that Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots articulate regarding energy's future role in and around the island. They cannot be treated independently of the particular intense relationship of enmity that both sides have experienced.

The articulation of the disputants' logic through their own words is on the spotlight of my discursive framework. According to Aristotle, 'spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words' (Klinck 1992, 51). Habermas (1981) identified *telos* (Greek for purpose or goal) in the use of language. Extrapolating on this idea, philosophers of the 20th and 21st centuries have placed rationality in everybody's communicative competence (Suurmond 2005). Discourses provide a form of practical argument (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 2), which, in this case, put forward collectively shared ideas for and against a particular course of action. They reflect a broader matrix of social practices which give meaning to the way people understand themselves and their behaviour (George, 1994, 4). They single out communication practices which systematically edify and structure our knowledge of reality. They put forward the terms of intelligibility, 'whereby a particular reality can be known and acted upon' (Doty 1996, 6).

I use them here as a conceptual framework which incorporates a shared set of capabilities, enabling the 'assemblage of words, phrases and sentences into meaningful texts intelligible to the readers' (Dryzek 1988, 710). They spell out how the most intense historical experiences as perceived and articulated by Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have influenced the formulation of their strategy today. They may explain how they 'decipher' their anarchic environment and whether the natural resources are their means for their 'survival' in this anarchic environment. They may also consider that the natural resources are useless at the time being and that the people who attribute 'survival' or 'security' aspects to them have a vested interest in the continuation of the conflict. In this study, I expect that discourses will be motivated by arguments which are similar to the main approaches outlined before. These are the geopolitics, greed and grievance logics, which are part of the main theoretical approaches developed in the literature. The interesting question is whether in these discourses, participants use one of these perspectives or combine several so as to motivate their views and judgments on the linkages between natural resources and the conflict.

A first step is to assume that the logics of these theoretical approaches provide some understanding of the world and could be part of a discourse. If these approaches – geopolitics, greed and grievance – are as dominant as their proponents proclaim, one would expect at least traces of these perspectives in the discourses on the Cyprus conflict. Such traces would make the discourses more intelligible. This is the basis of the first set of hypotheses in this study.

Of course, it is possible that some perspective may not be included. In that case, at least from the perspective of participants, the basic logic of this perspective is not helpful in understanding the Cypriot context.

I have already illustrated my intention to create a framework that goes beyond the agency-structure dilemma. Such an effort would include discourses that encompass traces from at least two perspectives (geopolitics-greed or geopolitics-grievance). Geopolitics grants primacy to the role of structure while greed-grievance explanations focus on the role of agency. That is why, I consider the interaction between different perspectives a necessary task via discourses. While a theoretical perspective should consist of some coherent theoretical logic, a discourse may be a coherent set of judgments and outlooks (Dryzek 1988, 710). In other words, it is possible to mix several elements of the perspectives distinguished above into one discourse. In my work, I explore this possibility of allowing different combinations of perspectives to work together into the same discourse. In other words, within the Cyprus conflict, there may exist ‘mixed’ discourses which describe the conflict in terms of combinations of different theoretical perspectives. These can be the interplay between (a) geopolitics and grievance, (b) greed and geopolitics or (c) greed and grievance. In the following pages, I further elaborate on these expectations and explain how discourses based on these different perspectives may appear.

2.5 THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS BASED ON SINGLE PERSPECTIVES

I focus first on discourses based on a single perspective. These discourses follow the logic of the theoretical frameworks discussed in this chapter. According to geopolitical perspectives, the disputants treat the system within which they operate as an ‘anarchic’ brutal arena, where they search for a window to exploit each other. The basic driver of their behaviour is not greed but survival in a system where both resources and security are scarce. Possession of or access to natural resources maximises their relative power, which eventually safeguards their survival. Based on this logic, I raise the following expectation for both sides:

1A: *The survival in the ‘anarchic system’ motivates the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of natural resources.*

Table 2.1. Two sets of theoretical expectations

Discourses based on a ‘single perspective’	Discourses based on ‘mixed’ perspectives
1. Geopolitics	4. Geopolitics-Grievance
2. Greed	5. Geopolitics-Greed
3. Grievance	6. Greed-Grievance

Inspired by Humphreys' (2005) approach, which defines greed as 'political opportunism', I claim that there are groups within the contending parties which reap political benefits during the conflict. From a cost-benefit analysis, if these groups can form strong coalitions among their constituents, they prefer the continuation of the conflict and act as spoilers of the peace process rather than letting their domestic opponents reaching a settlement. If resource exploitation does not depend on a successful conclusion of the peace process, then the contending parties have no incentive to strike a deal; rather, they prefer to prolong the conflict. Bearing this in mind, I raise the following expectation:

1B: *'Political opportunism' motivates the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of the natural resources.*

Finally, according to grievance theory, 'relative deprivation' is the main factor motivating the eruption or escalation of resource-related conflict. The possession of or access to the natural resources is propelled by the disputants' desire to redress the injustices of the past. According to 'grievance', I formulate two expectations:

1C: *The traumas of the past motivate the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of the natural resources.*

2.6 THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS BASED ON MIXED PERSPECTIVES

While dealing with such a convoluted topic, I also expect that my discourses may involve more premises coming from at least two out of the three perspectives. As I mentioned above, discourses comprise a coherent set of capabilities, judgments and outlooks (Dryzek 1988, 710) about a particular topic. In this case, the Cypriot discourses could potentially forge linkages between relative deprivation (grievance) and the 'decoding' of anarchic environment (geopolitics). They may include some perceptions of how political opportunists (greed) exploit the sense of resentment among constituents (grievance) in order to maintain their popularity, which they gained through their 'aggressive' stance towards the conflict and through its prolongation. Discourses could expectedly describe the strategies of political opportunists, who, during periods of domestic turmoil, invoke external security threats (geopolitics) to increase short-run popular support and deflect the public's attention from the domestic turmoil.

2.6.1 The interplay between geopolitics and grievance

Mainstream geopolitical and neo-realist perspectives, as shown above, are centred on the geography of politics, where long lists of material capabilities, including natural resources, usually lay out the structural background against which key agents have to make their 'optimal' decisions (Guzzini 2012). Questions of history start becoming salient in explaining states'

behaviour. Along the lines traced by a discursive and post-structuralist turn, a new branch of geopolitics, known as 'critical geopolitics', has reversed the interest in the *geography of politics* to the *politics of geography*. 'Critical geopolitics' has established itself as a new strand, prominently represented in major political geographic journals such as *Political Geography* and *Geopolitics* (Agnew 2003; Dodds 2005; Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992).

Through critical geopolitics, I examine the interplay between geopolitics and grievance. According to critical geopolitics, the value of natural resources is not naturally given. Instead, the role of natural resources is driven by the understandings which stakeholders, including opinion leaders, have about them. Whatever their actual importance, it is their place in their discursive representations which most strongly conditions their actual value (Herod, Ó Tuathail and Roberts 1997; Toal and Agnew 2005; Campbell 1993). This understanding can be provided by the main lessons these stakeholders have drawn from the crises and conflicts of the past. Most importantly, these understandings can be rooted in the grievances that opinion leaders and their constituents have inherited from the past. The primary mover behind resource-related conflicts is no longer the 'natural data of geography' but the claims made by nations in light of their 'historical rights' or simply their desire to preserve their historically charged security-sovereignty or 'environment' (Lacoste 1976). These interpretations are informed by the legacies of a turbulent past and constitute socially shared discourses. The mainstream geopolitical perspectives, trapped in structural thinking, undermine the role of grievances in formulating these strategic objectives. In contrast, through critical geopolitics, discourses showcase the interplay between geopolitics and grievance.

Based on an interaction between geopolitics and grievance, I expect the following discourse:

2A. The traumas of the past in tandem with the survival in the 'anarchic system' motivate the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of the natural resources.

2.6.2 The interplay between greed and geopolitics

Leaders of unit states, encountering economic crises or other challenges, may discursively invoke 'geopolitics' or 'security' as a form of conflict involvement in order to alarm the public and divert its attention from internal problems (Mitchell and Prins 2004; Foster and Keller 2014; Mintz and DeRouen 2010; Levy 1989; Miller 1995). Such a discourse involves an interplay between political opportunism (greed) and geopolitics. Political opportunism is defined here as the politics of accountability, with the inclusion of blame games during a domestic turmoil. Key stakeholders, whose institutional position during the domestic turmoil is at stake, invoke a threat against 'state's survival' in order to divert the public's attention and deflect blame from the domestic turmoil as much as possible. The objective of this external discursive construction of threat is to weaken the linkages between the domestic turmoil and their potential responsibilities. Such an initiative may also generate a 'rally around the flag effect' at home,

regardless of whether the effect of this discursive construction is short lived (DeRouen 1995; Mitchell and Prins 2004; James and Oneal 1991).

The discursive construction of threats raises the concept of ‘securitization’, a term coined and developed by the Copenhagen School of International Relations. Securitization offers a constructivist perspective on how ‘security problems emerge and dissolve’ (Balzaq 2005). It is a discursive process, which requires ‘negotiation’ between the key stakeholders (or securitising actors) and a significant audience (their constituents), thus making it a social and intersubjective process (Buzan, 2009; Buzan et al. 1998; Vuori 2008; Williams 2003). Threat discourses do not float freely in a vaguely defined ‘anarchic’⁴ environment. They unfold in what the Copenhagen School calls a regional security complex (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan, 2009). Regional security complex constitutes ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitization are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’ (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 26). From this standpoint, geographic proximity or adjacency ‘is potent for security because many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones’ (ibid.). In such an antagonistic environment, natural resources gain prominence because they alter the balance of capabilities among the interdependent parts of the security complex and, consequently, impact the distribution of power within it (Ciuta 2010, 130). This is clearly articulated in the approaches of Kouskouvelis (2015), Stivachtis (2019), Tziampiris (2019), Tziarras (2016, 2018) and Tziarras and Moudouros (2016) as regards the ‘anarchic environment’ of the Eastern Mediterranean.

In their insightful work, Christou and Adamides (2013, 517) laid out how the exploitation of the recently detected gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean rendered natural resources an ‘intervening variable of securitization in political and military sectors’. They pinpointed the threat to sovereignty and the threat of not being able to exploit natural resources by being subsumed into the military sector (ibid). Theoretically motivated by their approach, I speculate that the securitization of natural resources may take place during a period of domestic turmoil and carries with it the risk of an escalation of conflicts (Mitchell and Prins 2004, Morgan and Bickers 1992). The politics of accountability during a domestic turmoil and the effort to deflect blame from their responsibilities result in key stakeholders ‘securitizing’ natural resources. By securitising I mean that the stakeholders assign ‘sovereign attributes’ to these natural resources. The logic flowing from this analysis leads to an additional expectation:

2B. The low popularity of the leaders during domestic turmoil in tandem with the need for survival in an anarchic system motivates the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of the natural resources.

⁴ As dictated by the mainstream geopolitical and neo-realist perspectives.

2.6.3 The interplay between greed and grievance

The advocates of 'greed' hypotheses have underscored how leaders invoke 'grievances' in order to mobilise constituents against their opponents. While the prospects of economic benefits compel them to invoke grievances, I focus on 'political opportunism', as stipulated by Humphreys (2005). In my discursive framework, I supplement these theoretical linkages between 'political opportunism' and 'grievances' by investigating the literature of diversionary theory or the scapegoat hypothesis. Leaders facing declining levels of support prefer to carry out policies which boost their popularity, even if these policies can be considered risky and erroneous. This captures the idea of 'diversionary theory'. McLaughlin and Prins (2004) maintain that such behaviour finds a breeding ground in environments surrounded by historical grievances.

Within an environment stigmatised by grievances, constituents in a wide range of circumstances tend to support assertive national policies which appear to enhance the power and prestige of their constituent state. The traumas of the past and the 'fight for justice' legitimise this type of initiative. In an opportunity-rich environment of rivalry, decision-makers find a pretext for embarking upon risky policies as a means of increasing or retaining their domestic support, especially during periods of economic turmoil or crisis: some opinion leaders allege that political elites intentionally initiate a dispute over natural resources in order to divert popular attention from internal social, economic and political problems (Levy 1988, 666), and such a discourse is expected in this case. This reasoning, in my interpretation, captures the essence of diversionary theory or the scapegoat hypothesis.

The logic underpinning the diversionary theory emanates from the sociological literature of 'in-groups and out-groups' (Coser 1956) and Schmitt's (1932) distinction line between 'friends' and 'enemies' to any issue of contention. Facing a threat from an external source ('enemy'), members of a group ('friends') are inclined to become more cohesive and supportive of their leader. These tendencies find fertile ground in rivalry contexts, where grievances lead to distrust, the most important cognitive precursor of a hard-line orientation of political leaders (Mitchell and Prins 2004). Distrust magnifies threat discourses and encourages reliance upon aggressive policy instruments to deal with these threats (Stuart and Starr 1982; Tucker 1965; Mitchell and Prins 2004). It constitutes the general belief that the other's actions, especially their underlying motives, are insincere and should be regarded with suspicion. Therefore, the role of historical grievances cannot be neglected when assessing such decision-making of state leaders. The perceptions and decisions of political elites mirror, to an important extent, the pre-existing enmity, mutual suspicion and competitiveness of relations between the contending parties (Mitchell and Prins 2004; Stuart and Starr 1982). Because of the deep mistrust and animosity among rival states produced by the grievances, political elites could take advantage of the 'external affairs' to satisfy their own political opportunism, broadly defined as 'greed' here. Based on an interaction between greed and grievance, I expect the following discourses:

2C. *The low popularity of the leaders during domestic turmoil in tandem with the traumas of the past motivate the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of the natural resources.*

2.7 CONCLUSIONS

2

The objective of this study is to explore the impact that gas reserves have had on the escalation of the Cyprus conflict. While the theories outlined above could provide tentative answers, I believe that, without being evidenced by the constituents' discourses, they are too simple to capture the complexity of a conflict. In all conflicts, researchers have to investigate a number of issues: the incompatible positions of disputants over territory, the scarce resources, physical security, but also how the various parties perceive history and each other, the injustices inflicted on each other, the suffering, the mutual distrust and the fears. My starting point is that what renders natural resources contentious is the historically charged relationship that both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots feel towards it. Discourses are instrumental to articulating these complicated aspects.

Due to the dynamic nature of energy in a conflict environment, where everything is constantly in flux, I shed light on the collectively shared and incompatible preferences, and the fears and calculations which Cypriot opinion leaders enmesh in these very gas reserves, attempting to make them intelligible (Jervis 2017, 2). When these preferences, fears and calculations manifest themselves, I expect to trace elements of the three theoretical categories back to my analysis. This has motivated me to develop several expectations about how discourses can reflect some of the theoretical perspectives as well as some combinations of them. The theoretical preconceptions from the agency-structure dilemma were helpful in this respect.

Based on these expectations, I now further explore the historical and energy context around Cyprus. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, context is 'the parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage and can throw light on its meaning'. These contexts add specificity to the competing discourses on the gas reserves and direct the readers' attention to their very formation. By presenting these contexts, I seek to avoid, to a certain extent, unwanted interpretation because they provide the details which surround the recent developments: the economic, social and (geo)political conditions which existed before the recent tensions. Moreover, I uncover the representations which former policymakers, historians, sociologists, energy analysts and investigative journalists use in order to describe the situation at hand. As I explain in the methodological chapter (five) these features are necessary for the development of the discursive framework of my study.

3

The historical context

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Any analysis regarding the conflict-inducing role of natural resources would have been much simpler if the conflict was only about the exploitation of natural resources. Such a monolithically material-based type of conflict is usually concrete and clearly defined, while the objectives of the disputants are bounded by the resources at stake: what is the amount of gas reserves that each side should receive and which companies are eligible to begin drilling? In such an ‘ideally’ conflictual context, the utility of cooperative outcomes or mutual accommodation would have not been that complicated to discern (Rothman 1997, 10).

Nonetheless, the bases for the Cypriot conflict, and similar ethnic conflicts, are not only material interests. Such conflicts are deeply seated in relatively intangible psychological factors, which may extend beyond the exploitation of natural resources (Ellis 2006, 29). They touch upon the existential needs and values of the groups involved, such as security and recognition of identity. These values are under threat and competitively pursued (Rothman 1997). Ethnicity gains ground as a first order social identity. It encompasses psychological properties and discursive resources, with the potential to descend into an arms spiral or escalate into a conflict (Young 2003). Ethnic conflicts are past oriented, rooted in personal traumas and collective indignities born of the past, operating as engines of current confrontations (Rothman 2012). As Caruth (1996, 4, in Bryant 2012) postulated: ‘Trauma seems to be much more than a pathology, or the simple illness of a wounded psyche: it is always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available.’

These traumas grant primacy to the role of history in battles on the energy field or in the diplomatic terrains. Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot delegates acknowledge the necessity to shape and adopt particular historical narratives that will resonate ‘both domestically and internationally, among their constituents and in the international fora; narratives that will in turn shape the course of the conflict’ (Bryant and Papadakis 2012, 2). The disputants adopt history as a ‘battle’ to force one side to accept the other side’s version of history. This what Hatay and Papadakis call (2012, 27) the ‘fetishism of history’. It is a common predicament for societies facing an ethnic conflict to elevate history to the most important form of public discourse. History becomes ‘anthropomorphized’ and must be respected by the constituents, especially when tensions resurface (*ibid*). From a discursive perspective, the historical background can constitute ‘underlying tendencies that gather force’ (Foucault 1972, 3) and bring about a reverberation (Birgel 2018), as manifested through the recent energy tensions.

Throughout this chapter, I seek to comprehend the ways in which the parties to the conflict engage history as an actor in the struggle. That is why I lay out the historical context. Without this, I would leave the impression that the recent tensions evolved solely around the exploitation of the natural resources. Nonetheless, as explained in the Introduction, the amount of natural

resources detected *per se* (at least at the time of writing) would not entirely justify their conflict-triggering effect. There are other ‘intangible’ factors at play, which I can discern only by laying out the historical background.

For this purpose, I embrace a combination of desk and field research. As regards the first, I briefly resort to historical textbooks and extract information about the impact of Greece and Turkey on the nationalisms in the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides. As regards the perceptual links between Greece and Greek-Cypriots, I found refuge to the writings of multiple Greek and Greek-Cypriot historians, sociologists and political analysts (Alastos 1955; Alecou 2016; Attalides 1979; Bitsios 1975; Constantinou 2010; Georgiades 2017; Joseph 1997, 2009; Kitromilides 1979; Klapsis 2013; Koufoudakis 2008; Koumas 2013; Kranidiotis 1981, 1984; Loizides 2007; Papadakis 2003, 2005; Papageorgiou 2000; Stavrou 2009; Stefanidis 1999; Svolopoulos 2004; Tenekides 1964; Tenekides and Kranidiotis 1982; Spyridakis 1974; Xydis 1993). To investigate the roots and manifestations of the Turkish-Cypriot nationalism and its links to the Turkish one, I used the works of Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot historians, sociologists and political analysts (Gazioglu 1996; Goker 2012; Hanioglu 1995; Kaliber 2005; Kizilyurek 2006, 2009, 2010; Mütercimler 2003; Morag 2004; Uzer 2010; Volkan 2008; Ercan 2010), as well as the work of Greek and Greek-Cypriot Turkologists and cultural anthropologists of international background (Anagnostopoulou 2004; Bryant 2008, 2012; Ktoris 2013). Although Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots are the key protagonists of my study, they are not the only players. Through the work of other scholars (Anderson 2008, Dodd 2010, Holland 2004, Faustmann 1999; Johnson 2000, Ker-Lindsay 2005, 2007, 2009 2011; Mallinson 2011; O’Malley and Craig 1999), I examined the role of external stakeholders.

Having completed my desk research, I visited the island for the first time in November 2014 to conduct field research. I arranged open-ended interviews with a number of historians, sociologists and political analysts, who shed further light on the lessons that each side has drawn from the conflict. In Appendix 1, I provide further information regarding the interviewees and in Appendix 2 the type of questions I asked. I recorded their comments and statements and used them to complement my desk research. I incorporated some of their historical interpretations and considerable insights while narrating events. I provide their summary in the last section of this Chapter while explaining the reasons behind the intractability of the conflict¹.

After a brief overview, I trace the historical pattern of rivalry and contest between between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots from 1950 and 1960, when Cyprus became an independent state, to 1974, when Turkey militarily intervened on the island after the Greek

¹ As I will explain in Chapter 5, their answers serve a methodological purpose as well; their answers construct partially my empirical data, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses regarding the historical context of the conflict, which will be subject to further investigation.

military regime engineered a coup against the Cypriot government. From then onwards, I listed the multiple failed attempts of the UN to bring about a settlement. In the last section, I conclude with the question: which factors account for the intractable and protracted character of the Cyprus conflict? To answer this question, I use a summary of the viewpoints of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot historians and sociologists which I interviewed in 2014. The list of these people as well as the open-ended interview questions I asked them can be found in appendices 1 and 2.

3.2 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

‘I’m very sorry to tell you that despite the very strong commitment and engagement of all the delegations and different parties ... the conference on Cyprus was closed without an agreement being reached’ (Reuters 2017a). These were the concluding words of the UN secretary general, Antonio Gutierrez, on July 7, 2017, in Crans Montana. They marked the end of another unsuccessful round of talks to reunify the divided island.

Since 1974, the territory of Cyprus has been divided by a UN buffer zone. On the south, we find the Republic of Cyprus – whose authority is recognized by the entire international community for the whole island – a member of the EU and the UN, administered by the Greek-Cypriots. It is, in general, a functioning, thriving and well-governed democratic state, with one of the highest levels of GDP per capita in Europe. Greek-Cypriots, a population of 667,398 forming up to 77% of the island (Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus 2011), run an open, free-market, service-based economy and are among the most prosperous people in the Mediterranean region.

To the north of this zone, we encounter the self-declared ‘TRNC’. It constitutes a breakaway regime not recognized – along the lines of consecutive Security Council (hereinafter SC) resolutions – by any state of the international community except for Turkey. Since 1974, Turkish-Cypriots, a population of 294,606² (Hatay 2017) comprising 18% of the whole – cope with an embargo imposed on ports under their control; therefore, they rely heavily on Turkish military and economic aid. Their economy is overshadowed by the services sector, including the public sector, trade, tourism and education (CIA Factbook 2018).

Except for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, there are three officially recognized religious groups, which, in accordance with the 1960 constitution, opted to adhere to the Greek-Cypriot

² The census was conducted under UN auspices but this figure is disputed by political parties and labour unions in the North. Furthermore, it does not include the number of Turkish settlers residing on the island.

community³: Armenians⁴, Maronites⁵ and Latins.⁶ Romas belonging since 1960 to the Turkish-Cypriot community are estimated to number around 1000. Cyprus is also the home of a Jewish community with a synagogue in Larnaca (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011).⁷ Finally, on the territory of the island, there are two British sovereign bases, at Akrotiri and Dhekeleia.

3.3 THE HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

3.3.1 The birth of multi-ethnic cleavages

Situated in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea, at the juncture of Eurasia with Africa, Cyprus holds an important position in global politics. Turkey as the closest neighbour, lies at almost 40 miles north of the island, while Syria and Lebanon lie approximately 60 miles to its eastern side (CIA Factbook 2018). Other neighbouring territories involve Egypt to the south (230 miles) and Israel to the southeast (124 miles). To the west, the nearest Greek Dodecanesian island, Castellorizo, is 170 miles away, while its distance from the Greek mainland is more than 497 miles (CIA Factbook 2018). Cyprus is positioned on the sea lane of the great maritime highway which links the Mediterranean Sea via its two sea gates, the Suez and Bab al-Mandab, to the Indian Ocean (Leigh and Vucovic 2011, Davutoglu 2010). With a total area of 9,251 km and coastlines of 648 km, Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean, after Sicily and Sardinia (CIA Factbook 2018).

³ These three religious groups can each elect one delegate to the House of Representatives. These delegates are eligible to only present the group's views to any public body of the Republic of Cyprus and are not allowed to cast a vote (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011, 4)

⁴ Current estimates put the number of Armenians residing in Cyprus at 2,600 to 3,500, all of them in the southern part of the island. According to the Second Report of the Republic of Cyprus, submitted to the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), the number is set at 2,600 (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011, 14-15).

⁵ The total population of the group today is assumedly 6,000 in Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus submitted a report to the Advisory Committee of the FCNM putting the number at 4,800 (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011, 15).

⁶ In 1991, the official population amounted to 250 people, according to the Second Report submitted by the Republic of Cyprus to the FCNM (Kyriakou and Kaya 2011, 16).

⁷ Besides the groups mentioned above, a small number of Turkish Cypriots reside permanently in the South, under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the *Council of Europe* (2007), most of them 'who live in the territory under Government control find themselves isolated and marginalized politically, economically, socially and culturally'. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the 1974 invasion, '20,000 Greek-Cypriots remained in the northern part of Cyprus'(ibid). Their number has gradually declined because of 'a systematic policy of harassment, discrimination and persecution employed by the authorities' (*Council of Europe* 2007, 18; Kyriacou & Kaya 2011, 16).

Due to its special location, Cyprus has witnessed the invasion, establishment and interaction of many of the ancient civilizations of pre-history and proto-history.⁸ Populations of various cultures used to meet on Cyprus for a common purpose: to get the copper and the wood of its famous forests. Arcadians, Minoans, Achaeans, Mycenaeans and the Ptolemaic dynasty⁹ (among other tribes) settled there and contributed to the formulation of the Hellenic character of the island (Spyridakis 1974, Tenekides 1964). By 900 BC, the island was mainly Greek speaking, although Phoenician, Assyrian, Egyptian and Persian dominations might have also influenced, to a certain degree, the ethnic make-up of the population (Spyridakis 1974). Two Greek-Cypriot historians, Doros Alastos (1955) and Kleanthis Georgiades (2017) highlighted the ancient Greek origins of Cypriots, their continuity with the ancient Greek past and the inclusion of Cyprus within the Hellenic world. As I will show later, in terms of Realpolitik, the implications of this was that Cypriots should be incorporated into the modern Greek state, a claim dubbed as ‘enosis’. In 58 BC, Cyprus came under Roman rule (Hatay and Papadakis 2012, 29). During the Eastern Roman Empire governance,¹⁰ the Christian Orthodox features of its spiritual and cultural identity were moulded. This explains why the Greek-Cypriots were, and are to this day, called ‘Rum’ by the Turks.¹¹

Between 1571 and 1878, the Ottoman Empire took over the rule over Cyprus. This played a catalytic role in forging the Turkish-Cypriot identity of a portion of its constituents. Ottoman origins of the Turkish-Cypriots have been mainly presented by Halil Fikret Alasya (1939) in his book, *Kıbrıs Tarihi ve Belli Baslı Antikitepleri* (Cyprus History and its Main Antiquities). Halil Fikret Alasya would become the advisor of the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaşh. At that time, Turkish-Cypriots enjoyed more benefits compared with the Greek-Cypriot subjects of the empire (Ktoris 2013, 40).¹² Many Greek-Cypriots and Latin constituents converted to Islam in order to avoid heavy taxation and compulsory recruitment of their children to the Ottoman

⁸ The Eteocyprians constituted the autochthonous population of the Island during the Neolithic period.

⁹ The settlement of Jews in Cyprus dates from that time and their numbers increased after the arrival of many refugees in 70 AD, following Jerusalem’s destruction by Titus, the son of Emperor Vespasian (Spyridakis 1974).

¹⁰ The Church of Cyprus became one of the oldest Eastern Orthodox autocephalous churches.

¹¹ For many centuries, the Hellenic-Orthodox constituents withstood many disastrous Arab raids between the 7th and 10th centuries. Nevertheless, the advent of the Crusaders in 1192 under the leadership of King Richard the ‘Lionheart’ interrupted the linkages with the Roman Empire in the east. Between 1192 and 1489, Cyprus went through the Frankish Era. In 1489, Queen Caterina transferred the Kingdom of Cyprus to the Venetians, signaling the start of the Venetian Era (1489-1570).

¹² For instance, exemption from the obligation to pay the *haraç* (a land tax levied on non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire) to the Sultan (Ktoris 2013); the requirement to pay only half the amount of the taxes which Greek-Cypriots were obliged to pay; exclusiveness in their employment in public administration, the police, the army and in provincial administrative councils on the island (*Medjiliss Idare*).

army (Mirbagheri 2009). These triggered multiple uprisings on several occasions violently put down by the Ottoman Empire.

3.3.2 The colonial legacy of the British Empire

In 1878, when the Great Eastern Crisis had reached its peak and in fear of an eventual Russian expansion into its territories, the Ottoman reign over Cyprus substantially (but not legally) came to an end. Through the 1878 Cyprus convention, Sultan Abdul Hamit II ceded the island's administration to the British authorities and in exchange received formal guarantees by them to protect the integrity of the Ottoman borders from Russian expansionist aspirations. Britain would exercise *de facto* and the Ottoman Empire *de jure* sovereignty on the island. The British praised the geopolitical significance of Cyprus's location,¹³ linking its administration to the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) and the occupation of Egypt (1882) in order to protect the vital Mediterranean-Suez route.

From the first year of the British administration, various discontents, rooted in the Ottoman era, instigated 'philhellenic aspirations' in certain urban circles among Greek-Cypriots for unification of the island with Greece, commonly known as '*enosis*'. For instance, in 1878, after the Cyprus Convention, a Greek-Cypriot delegation headed by the Bishop of Kition welcomed the Governor Sir Garnet Wolseley with the following words: 'We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is nationally connected' (Sir Orr 1918, 60). As Varnavas (2013, 118) observes: 'the power of those words is obvious: from the very start of the British rule, the leader of the Cypriot Church had a Greek national identity and desired *enosis*'. According to Attalides (1979, 1), 'Greek-Cypriots seemed well prepared to raise such a demand. They had 'a well-developed system of political representation through the Church and a marked degree of national consciousness within their leading groups'.

On the contrary, Turkish-Cypriots considered the island still part of the Ottoman territory. The Turkish-Cypriot resistance against '*enosis*' was reportedly fuelled by the Greek revolt in Ottoman Crete (1866-1869). Turkish-Cypriots' collectively shared anxieties evolved allegedly around a 'Crete syndrome' (Interviewee 12). During the Ottoman Empire, Crete's continuous efforts to unify with Greece and the realization of the union in 1912-13 led to the deportation of the Cretan-Muslim population and their emigration to Turkey (Denктаş 2004). Less than a decade later, Greece's military campaign in Asia Minor intensified the fears of their potential uprooting. Turkish-Cypriot leaders invoked these memories to justify their rejection of '*enosis*' (Kizilyurek 2006).

¹³ The British prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, writing to Queen Victoria, considered the acquisition of Cyprus as the 'key of Western Asia', which would 'weld together' the Indian Empire and Great Britain while enormously increasing England's power in the Mediterranean (Stavrou 2009, 15).

At the same time, the formulation of the Turkish-Cypriot national identity was going through some *zymosis*.¹⁴ Turkish-Cypriots did not fully resume their nationalism until the 1940s. The reason for the late development of the secular-laden nationalism was that the Turkish-speaking minority in Cyprus, with few exceptions, did not immediately endear itself to secular Kemalism (Anagnostopoulou 2004). After Ottomans gradually began decreasing their involvement in Cypriot affairs, Cypriot Muslims, emerging as an economically backward, insignificant community, sought refuge with the British colonial administration (Kizilyurek 2006; Ktoris 2013; Moudouros 2013).¹⁵ Therefore, the gradual 'disintegration' of the Ottoman power on the island downgraded Turkish-Cypriots from an initially dominant ethnic group to a minority. Under these circumstances, the latter had no other choice than to rely on the colonial government for their security. The British organized and consolidated their administration on the basis of British-Muslim cooperation, while profiting by the ideological-political dispute between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (Kizilyurek 2009, 30).¹⁶

Despite the British-Muslim cooperation, the British would not hesitate to utilize the '*enosis*' sentiments as a bargaining tool in order to acquire further regional assets. In November 1914, at the outbreak of the First World War and after the Ottomans aligned their forces with the Central Powers, the British proclaimed the nullity of the 1878 Treaties and the annexation of Cyprus. Greek-Cypriots thought that the momentum for '*enosis*' was ripe. Britain allegedly offered Cyprus to Greece in order to lure the latter to enter the Entente camp in WWI.¹⁷ However, the then Greek government rejected this offer in order to demonstrate its initially neutral stance at that period.

¹⁴ The Muslim 'Ottoman Community' witnessed the disputes between the various ideological movements which were generally dominating the Ottoman territory (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 175); on the one hand, there were grassroots adhering to the religious Ottoman legacy and, on the other, constituents were diffusing the secular ideas of the Young Turks. Despite the fierce opposition of the Ottoman elite to these secular ideas, the proponents of secularism played an influential role in fortifying the (secular) Kemalist principles of the Turkish identity among Cypriot Muslims (Nevzat 2005).

¹⁵ The emigration of an important proportion of Turkish-Cypriots' upper class, consisting of its military and bureaucratic apparatus, after the British arrival in 1878, played a crucial role in this respect (Ktoris 2013)

¹⁶ To that effect, the Cypriot Constitution, which they introduced in 1882, established a legislative council in such a way that the number of Muslims and the appointed *ex officio* was equal to the number of Christians (Kizilyurek 2009, 30).

¹⁷ Great Britain, 'Cabinet Meeting (Financial Situation; Proposed Cession to Greece of Cyprus without Cabinet Consent; Need for Smaller War Council);' CAB 37/136/26, October 21, 1915 found in Stavrou, 2009:, 16). 'Grey's offer' has never been renewed ever since. Stavrou (ibid) argues that it was symbolic rather than substantial. The condition of Greece's becoming belligerent tangled up with the diplomatic machinations of Entente. These machinations were aimed at striking a balance among the overlapping interests and territorial aspirations of other countries, like Russia, Romania, Serbia, and Greece, while simultaneously at inducing 'Ottoman Turkey and Bulgaria to remain neutral' (ibid).

These developments did not discourage Greek-Cypriots from continuing with their struggle for 'enosis'. According to Article 20 of the Lausanne Treaty, which established the borders of modern Turkey, Turkey recognized 'the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914', giving up any of its rights on the Island. For Greek-Cypriots, this event was an opportunity to advance their claims over 'enosis'.¹⁸ The British Government, in 1925, declared Cyprus a crown colony,¹⁹ and entombed these aspirations. In 1931, the Greek-Cypriot struggle for 'enosis' intensified with a spontaneous rebellion against British rule, putting Government House on fire (Anderson 2008).²⁰ The British administration, mainly under the rule of Governor Palmer (1933-1939), responded by enacting 16 laws which suspended the colony's constitution, prohibited public gatherings, banned political parties and decreed any agitations related to 'enosis' punishable (Anderson 2008). The regulations also targeted the Church, which played a protagonist role in disseminating the 'enosis' cause, and the newly formed communist movement, which was gaining ground at that time.

The outbreak of World War II signalled the end of the Palmerstonian era and forced the key players of that period (British, nationalists, communists) to cooperate from the moment that their patrons²¹ had become allies. In 1940, British founded the Cyprus regiment, armed units comprising British officers, Greek-Cypriot (78%) and Turkish-Cypriot nationals (21%) and a few Cypriot Armenians (Dodd 2010). The British, capitalizing on the nationalistic sentiments of Greek-Cypriots, recruited them with the slogan, 'Fight for Freedom and Greece' (Stavrou 2009, 17).²² At the same time, the Turkish-Cypriots, whose younger generation had been schooled in the secular principles of Turkey's Republic, politically resumed their Kemalist-oriented nationalism through the establishment of a Turkish right wing party, KATAK.²³ The name of the organization underlined their Turkish rather than the Muslim identity.

¹⁸ They established a National Organization which included a National Assembly and a National Council to promote the union with Greece (Dodd 2010, 7).

¹⁹ The lowest rank on the colonial ladder (Spyridakis 1974)

²⁰ The impact of the 1929 economic depression provided fertile ground for an island-wide uprising, while maintaining the demand for *enosis* on top of their agenda (Dodd 2010, 7). The crisis started when a tax bill, already turned down by the Legislative Council, was nevertheless imposed by the British-appointed governor as an order of the council (Stavrou 2009, 16). As a reaction against this imposition, Greek-Cypriot representatives withdrew from the council.

²¹ Meaning a 'neutralist' Turkey, Britain, Greece and the Soviet Union

²² Many Cypriots joined the Cyprus regiment hoping that British would reward their participation with the realization of 'enosis'.

²³ Acronym for *Kıbrıs Adası, Türk Azınlık Kurumu*, which stands for the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus.

3.3.3 External and domestic developments after WWII (1945-1955)

The British undertook initiatives to contain the rising ‘*enosis*’ aspirations. In March 1947, Lord Baron Winster, the new governor on the island, announced the establishment of a Consultative Assembly, composed of delegates of the island’s major associations and interests.²⁴ The Greek-Cypriot nationalists expressed their sole commitment to the cause of ‘*enosis*’ and, therefore, boycotted the proceedings. On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriot communists, represented by AKEL (Alastos 1955),²⁵ demanded ministry assignments and much more self-rule governance (as British did with their other colonies in Malta and Ceylon). The British rejected their demands and, as a result, the proceedings of the Assembly ended; eventually the implementation of the Winster Plan was cancelled (Svolopoulos 2004, 77).

AKEL, which initially favoured a self-governance system along the lines of the British plans, suddenly switched its stance to ‘*enosis*’. It sent a proposal to the Church²⁶ asking the latter to submit a joint memorandum to the UN General Assembly, establish a common delegation to the UN and launch Pancyprian demonstrations in order to internationalize the ‘*enosis*’ cause (Alecou 2016, 127). Along these lines, AKEL organized mass rallies through which it raised a number of social demands as well. Some analysts attributed AKEL’s shift to the Soviet Union’s influence (Doddo 2010, Koumas 2013).²⁷ On November 29, 1949, AKEL’s leader, Ezekias Papaioannou, sent the Greek prime minister a letter asking him to push for the internationalization of the Cyprus issue in the UN (Vlachos 1980, 16-22, Koumas 2013, 37). The Greek government was hesitant about addressing such a request because it was afraid that London would invoke potential Soviet involvement behind AKEL’s initiatives.

On their part, as Turkish-Cypriots fortified their Kemalist-oriented nationalism as a form of counter-resistance. ‘It will not be an exaggeration to say that the political behaviour of the Turkish-Cypriots was mainly guided by the threat of ‘*enosis*’ (Kizilyurek 2006).²⁸ In November 1948, 15,000 Turkish-Cypriots gathered to condemn the agitation of the Greek-Cypriots for ‘*enosis*’ but no Greek-Cypriot newspapers reported these demonstrations: ‘At that

²⁴ According to his plan, the governor would maintain part of his legislative and executive power through the assistance of an Executive Advisory Board, consisting of three Greek-Cypriots, one Turkish-Cypriot and four British officials appointed *ex officio* (Svolopoulos 2004, 77).

²⁵ Progressive Party of Working People.

²⁶ Which had played a leading role in mobilizing the constituents for the cause of ‘*enosis*’.

²⁷ The Soviet Union allegedly promoted the ‘*enosis*’ cause in order to upset the unity of the anti-communist Western powers (Dodd 2010) and, especially, relations between Greece and Britain.

²⁸ They made energetic representations to the British government and, particularly, to Prime Minister Attlee at that time (Dodd 2010, 14).

time, Turkish-Cypriots had become invisible to such an extent that they did not evoke national hatred among Greek-Cypriots' (Interviewee 12).

As regards Greek-Cypriots, the Church,²⁹ under the aegis of Michael Mouskos, elected bishop of Kition in 1948 and archbishop (as Makarios III) in 1950, called for a plebiscite in January 15, 1950. A total of 95.7% of the Greek-Cypriot participants favoured the unification of Cyprus with Greece' (Svolopoulos 2004, 77).³⁰

This plebiscite stirred up public opinion in Turkey and anti-enosis feelings among Turkish-Cypriots. In April 1950, they sent copies of a pamphlet, 'Turks of Cyprus Protest against the Desire for Union with Greece: A Counter Appeal to the United Nations', to London, Washington and New York (Gates 2013, 876).³¹ The pamphlet stated that self-determination would threaten world security and bring about social disorder and the domination of communism. They rejected every claim on Cyprus' Greek character and requested the return of the island to Turkey (ibid.). Anti-*enosis* sentiments developed apace in Turkey (ibid.). The nationalistic newspaper at that time, *Hurriyet*, sought for Turkey's government to terminate its inaction, while throwing 'thinly veiled threats against the Greek Minority in Istanbul and its institutions' (Stefanidis 1999, 215).

Despite its initially attentive stance, Greece left a window to raise the issue at the UN in case the discussions with the British authorities would come to naught (Faustmann 1999; Johnson 2000, 114; Mallinson 2011). Facing British obduracy and under the pressure of Makarios III as well as Greek and Greek-Cypriot public opinion, the Greek government brought the issue to attention of the UN General Assembly in 1954 without achieving any significant result.³²

²⁹ Fearing that the communists would take the lead in the unification movement (Interviewee 1).

³⁰ The result of the referendum was circulated to all UN delegations. Makarios III made unremitting efforts to engage the full support of Greece. The official Greek stance, worrying about the British (and US) reaction, was rather cautious indicative. George Papandreou, vice-president of the Greek government, stated: 'Greece is breathing through two lungs; the British and the American. Therefore, due to the Cyprus question, she cannot die because of asphyxiation' (Christodoulides 2012). To this end, rather than promoting the Cyprus question unilaterally in the UN forums, Greece initially engaged in discussions with the British government (led by Churchill at that time) to reach a *modus vivendi* and avoid a head-on collision with it (Dodd 2010, 15).

³¹ In their reaction against the plebiscite, Turkish-Cypriots criticized the British response as 'far too tolerant' (Gates 2013, 877). They also sent a delegation to Turkey to express their concerns about their safety while the pro-*enosis* sentiments across the island were reaching their peak.

³² The British, having been notified earlier on the intentions and the prescheduled reactions of the Greek government and the Greek-Cypriots, invoked Article 2(7) of the UN Charter and denied the UN authority the right to 'intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'.

3.3.4 EOKA and the Turkish-Cypriot reaction

Greek-Cypriots assumed that diplomacy was not the only channel to pursue '*enosis*'. In January 1955, Archbishop Makarios authorized Georgios Grivas,³³ former colonel of the Greek army and the leader of EOKA, National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, to initiate a campaign of confrontation and sabotage against the British authorities on the island (Grivas 1961). The campaign was launched on April 1, 1955, with a series of explosions at various parts of the island against government offices, military facilities and police stations (Grob 2011, 297).

In order to effectively control the escalating situation, British policy-makers capitalized on the growing anti-*enosis* sentiments in Turkey.³⁴ As the standoff on the island intensified and with EOKA's military campaign having already broken out, British officials came up with the idea of a tripartite conference in September 1955.³⁵ Despite its expected failure, the conference remained significant, in the sense that it introduced the device of a tri-condominium over sovereignty and marked the beginning of Turkey's active involvement in the Cyprus equation for the first time since 1923, when it had waived all its rights on the island (Faustmann 1999).

In October 1955, while EOKA's guerrilla activities were continuing and British security forces were increasingly tied down in static defence duties, the British Colonial Office appointed Field Marshal Sir John Harding as the new Governor of Cyprus. He was instructed by London to employ a 'tough law-and-order policy against the insurgents',³⁶ while engaging in direct negotiations with Makarios III (Stavrou 2009, 21). A last-minute dispute between Makarios

³³ George Grivas (1897-1974) was known by his *nom de guerre* Digenis, which he adopted as EOKA's leader.

³⁴ The losses of other British territorial assets in the region along with the growing hostility in Egypt after the rise of Nasser on power led to the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. This agreement was a watershed in Britain's transition from Egypt to a Northern Tier strategy, as well as a turning point in Turkey's ascent as a regional Middle Eastern power (Hatzivassiliou 2009, 1145).

³⁵ Already in June 1955, the British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs explained the rationale behind such a venture: 'I have always been attracted by the idea of a three Power conference, simply because I believe that it would seriously embarrass the Greek government. And if such conference were held, I should not produce any British plan or proposal until a Greek-Turkish deadlock has been defined... This seems to imply that we are reconciled to handing over the island to one of them -and that is up to them to decide the future of the Island' (Mallinson 2011, 21). In July 1955, Britain's Foreign Secretary declared in front of the Cabinet: 'Throughout the negotiations, our aim would be to bring the Greeks up against the Turkish refusal to accept *enosis* and so condition them to accept a solution, which would leave sovereignty in our hands' (O' Malley and Craig 1999, 21).

³⁶ In his strategy to eliminate the guerilla fighters, he conducted small-scale operations through heavily armed undercover squads, which recruited also pro-British Turkish-Cypriots (Beckett 1988, 177, Robbins 2012)

and Harding derailed a potential agreement.³⁷ Harding ordered the archbishop's arrest and exile in Seychelles on March 9 1956, while continuing with coercive measures against Greek-Cypriot nationalists.³⁸

Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish officials were preparing their counter-attack at that time. Between 1955 and 1956, Turkish-Cypriots organized the first underground organization, Volkan (Isachenko 2012, 38-39), and set off explosions in Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot neighbourhoods in Nicosia without killing or injuring any victims. However, Volkan's insurgents intentionally blamed EOKA for these incursions in order to further exacerbate the anti-Greek-Cypriot sentiments among the Turkish-Cypriot grassroots (Isachenko 2012). At the same time, the Turkish prime minister, Adnan Menderes, assigned Professor Nihat Erim to conduct a report on the future status of the island and examine the best options for Turkey's strategy (Erim 1974). Erim concluded that Turkey's possession of the island, either in whole or in part would best serve NATO's interests (Erim 1974; Uzer 2010, 121). Therefore, partition, dubbed '*taksim*', became Turkey's predominant policy in order to negate '*enosis*'.

In November 1957, after Volkan was disbanded (having been accused of keeping close links with elements of the British administration), Rauf Denktaşh and some other Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot members, founded TMT³⁹ (Turkish Resistance Organization), a special warfare organization. Greek-Cypriot civilians were intimidated and forced to evacuate some areas under their control. EOKA and TMT intensified their armed conflict, resulting in the island's first inter-communal violence (Holland 2004, 216). 'At that moment Turkish-Cypriots become for the first time visible to the eyes of the Greek-Cypriots. They become for the first time the enemy that prevented enosis' (Interviewee 12).

3.3.5 Cyprus as an independent state and the constitutional deadlock

Diplomatic efforts between Greece, Turkey and Britain led to a conference on February 11, 1959, in Zurich (Papageorgiou 2000). The political leaders of the Greek-Cypriots⁴⁰ and the Turkish-Cypriots were not represented in that conference. Kucuk and Denktaşh, the Turkish-Cypriot

³⁷ One of the promises delivered by Sir Harding to Makarios III was a 'broad' measure of self-government. Since no common approach was attained with respect to the interpretation of 'broad measure of self-government', the talks broke down (Spyridakis 1974, 177). After American pressure on Britain's new prime minister, Anthony Eden, on April 17 1957, Makarios III was released from exile to Greece, but not to Cyprus.

³⁸ Makarios' absence from the negotiations left Grivas with greater latitude for military action and consolidated not only his military but also his political authority over EOKA (Stavrou 2009, 22).

³⁹ Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı

⁴⁰ Makarios III was not allowed to attend the conference

leaders, clarified to the Turkish foreign minister that they would condition their acceptance of the negotiated agreement on Turkey's guarantee of the settlement and an adequate Turkish military presence for the security of the Turkish-Cypriots (Mutercimler 2003, 210). Therefore, treaties of guarantee and alliances would also be included. Without their participation in the negotiations, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders were asked to give their assent to them. On February 19, 1959, these agreements were initialled in London's Lancaster House.

The Zurich-London accords consist of three main treaties: the Treaty of Establishment, of Alliance and of Guarantee. The first one includes basic articles-principles for the construction of what has been described as a functional federal state, the Republic of Cyprus (Dodd 2010, 38, Emilianides 2006, Stavrou 2009). According to Article 1, its territory would comprise the entire island of Cyprus, with the exception of two areas, the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, which would come under British sovereignty (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1960). Moreover, Cyprus would become a presidential republic, the president being a Greek-Cypriot, while the vice-president would be a Turkish-Cypriot. Both of them would hold veto rights over the cabinet's decisions concerning legislature, foreign policy and security and defence (Uzer 2010, 125).⁴¹

According to the Treaty of Alliance, the high contracting parties, Britain, Turkey and Greece, were assigned 'to co-operate for their common defense' and resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, targeted against 'the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus' (Emilianides 2006). Furthermore, the treaty provided for the establishment of a Tripartite Headquarters, whereby Greece and Turkey were called to participate with their military contingents. These would comprise 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, on the one hand, and 650 Turkish officers non-commissioned officers and men, on the other (UN 1960).

Among the most controversial treaties was the Treaty of Guarantee. It called on Cyprus to avoid participation 'in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever' (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1960), while prohibiting both '*enosis*' and '*taksim*'. Article II of that Treaty authorized Greece, Turkey and Britain to take over its security (ibid.). Paradoxically for

⁴¹ Furthermore, seven Greek-Cypriot and three Turkish-Cypriot Ministers would form the Council of Ministers (Stavrou 2009, 25). The legislative power would be vested in a House of Representatives, composed of 70% Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots. The vast majority of laws would be adopted through 'simple majority', except for basic articles, such as electoral law, municipalities, duties and taxes, which would ask for separate majorities (Markides 2001). Furthermore, it envisioned separate municipalities created in the five largest towns with Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants (ibid.). With respect to public service, it would consist of 70% Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots. Regarding the Cyprus Army, 60% would be Greek-Cypriots and 40% Turkish-Cypriots, while the security forces would be 70% Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots (ibid.).

a sovereign state, Cyprus would not be responsible for its own independence, territorial integrity and security. According to Article IV, the three guarantor powers, in the event of a breach of the agreements, would have to consult together in order to 'ensure observance of those provisions' (ibid). The most problematic aspect of this treaty lays in the following statement: 'In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty' (ibid).⁴² This eventually would become the article that Turkey invoked in order to justify its 1974 military operation.

According to Fouskas and Tackie (2009) the Cypriot constitution was drafted in such a way as to make it unworkable in case the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots did not reach an agreement. A potential constitutional deadlock and subsequent intercommunal disputes would provide fertile ground for British intervention as a guarantor power. The pursuit of strategic benefits in and around Cyprus, explains, according to Adamides (2014) why imperial Britain pitted the minority Turkish-Cypriots against the majority Greek-Cypriots. These provisions are characterized as 'neo-colonial', motivated by the logic of instrumentalism where external-international stakeholders 'pursue their interests as if the communities are not there, as if they are invisible' (Interviewee 12). As one of my interviewee explains, this invisibility triggers their anger and evokes their reaction 'against any other intervention or settlement proposal from the outside'

The newly-founded Republic of Cyprus was not the beloved child of its Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot constituents. It rather emerged as the accidental offspring of violent conflicts that unfolded in the 1950s among the Greek-Cypriots, the British (who had been ruling the island from 1878) and the Turkish-Cypriots. The multiple checks and balances, entailed within these accords, inhibited the functional operation of the constitution. The amendments submitted by President Archbishop Makarios III on November 3, 1963, encountered the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot vetoes (Markides 1977; Stavrou 2009).

This expectedly led to a constitutional deadlock accompanied by violent clashes between the two communities⁴³. These developments signposted the start of the *Enclave Period*,

⁴² In other words, that particular article would be interpreted as allowing unilateral military action on behalf of one of the three guarantor countries if deemed necessary.

⁴³ 'On December 21, 1963, a Greek-Cypriot police patrol while checking on identification documents asked a Turkish-Cypriot couple on the edge of a Turkish-Cypriot quarter in Nicosia' to stop (Hazou 2013). After an initial dispute, a hostile crowd gathered, shots were fired and two Turkish-Cypriots were killed (ibid). As the news spread, members of TMT and EOKA began firing and taking hostages (Solsten 1993). In the north of capital Nicosia, Turkish forces occupied a strong position at St. Hilarion Castle, controlling the road to Kyrenia on the northern coast, which was a principal combat area. Three days later, 31 Turkish-Cypriots and 5 Greek-Cypriots were killed (Hazou 2013). The attacks continued in other

during which the island was *de facto* partitioned into Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot areas, where each side held their own political leadership and administration. The Turkish-Cypriots, the vast majority of whom were living in enclaves, controlled 4% of the island, while the Greek-Cypriots controlled 96%. This partition was reinforced by the Turkish-Cypriots' withdrawal from the official government institutions; Greek-Cypriots, by necessity, had taken over exclusively the duties previously performed by the Turkish-Cypriots (Dodd 2010; Stavrou 2009). According to Volkan (2008), the above events, described as a 'chosen trauma', dramatically shaped the Turkish-Cypriot national narrative, compounded the 'mistrust factor' in any prospective initiative towards reunification and underpinned all their future negotiating predispositions.

3.3.6 UN intervention and the continuation of the clashes: 1964-1974

In 1964, under the threat of Turkish jet fighters flying low over Nicosia, Makarios III gave his assent to a British proposal for dispatching troops to Nicosia. The British drew a ceasefire line on a map with a green chinagraph pencil, known as the 'Green Line'. On March 8, 1964, the Security Council adopted Resolution 186 (1964) and called for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). Its central mission was to stop the fighting and facilitate power-sharing between the two communities in the newly reformed republic (Richmond and Ker-Lindsay 2001). Furthermore, the then secretary general, U Thant, called on some diplomats and prominent international figures to mediate in the conflict (ibid). Nevertheless, against the background of these initiatives, the situation did not de-escalate. In mid-1964, the battles between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot forces north of Cyprus continued⁴⁴.

In early June 1964, then US President Johnson, trying to head off further inflammation of the ongoing conflicts, averted the threat of Turkish invasion by issuing a warning to the Turkish prime minister, Ismet Inonu (New York Times 1964). This intervention was the first direct US involvement in the Cyprus conflict.⁴⁵ The Undersecretary of State at that time, George Ball,

places (Omorphita, Kumsal, Kaimakli). Turkish Cypriots who lived across the island had to concentrate in particular enclaves for their safety, retreating into exclusively Turkish urban sectors and country side, while the Greek-Cypriot forces sealed these areas off from the rest of the Island (Morag 2004, 601)

⁴⁴ Turkish-Cypriots established a bridgehead at Kokkina, providing them with arms, volunteers and other supplies from Turkey (Hazou 2013). As a reaction, the Cypriot government invited the EOKA leader, Grivas, to take over the command of the Greek troops stationed on the Island and launch attacks against the bridgehead. As retaliation, Turkey dispatched its own fighter jets to bomb Greek positions (ibid.). Moreover, Greece dispatched a brigade on the island to provide security to the Greek-Cypriots in the case of a Turkish attack.

⁴⁵ The US authorities were afraid that further escalation of the crisis would paralyze NATO's south-eastern flank and bring its two allies, Greece and Turkey, into direct conflict. Such a development would benefit the Soviet Union's influence; the latter warned that if 'a foreign armed invasion takes place against the territory of Cyprus, the Soviet Union will help Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence'

along with the former Secretary of State from the Truman administration, Dean Acheson, presented different versions of a plan that would end the deadlock. One version of the plan was provisioning the union of Cyprus with Greece in exchange for a military base in Karpas peninsula to Turkey. Turkish-Cypriot enclaves – areas where Turkish-Cypriots were in a majority – would enjoy local autonomy, including taxation, education and local security (Kanli 2016)⁴⁶. The then Greek Prime Minister reportedly clashed with Makarios who denounced the plan as favouring partition and involving Turkey in Cypriot affairs (Christodoulides 2009).

In the meantime, political developments in Greece -with the establishment of the military junta in 1967- and the continuation of Cypriot inter-communal tensions in November 1967,⁴⁷ brought the re-launched talks once again to deadlock. After Turkey's *démarche* to the Greek junta, demanding the withdrawal of Greek troops from the island, and its rejection from the Greek side, the UN secretary general called for the withdrawal of all forces in excess of their contingents.⁴⁸ According to the Greek-Cypriots, the withdrawal of the Greek forces 'had a catastrophic effect on the morale of the Greek-Cypriots, which sunk to its lowest ebb' (Dodd 2010, 90). This was a turning point for the Turkish-Cypriots as well. They acknowledged Turkey's determination to come to their rescue. Furthermore, Turkey assigned the secretary general of its Foreign Ministry, Zeki Kuneralp, and Professor Suat Bilge to help the Turkish-Cypriots draft their own constitution (Dodd 2010, 89) and pave the way for their partition.

3.3.7 Turkey's military operation in 1974

Supported by Greece and Turkey, inter-communal talks between Clerides and Denktas were re-launched between 1968 and 1971 and from 1972 to 1974. Against the background of negotiations, on August 31, 1971, Grivas, former leader of EOKA, returned secretly from Greece to Cyprus and established a secret organization (EOKA-B), whose declared aim was '*enosis*' through self-determination. The ongoing talks ended after the coup against Makarios in Cyprus on July 15, 1974. The coup was mainly engineered by the Greek military dictatorship

(*Pravda* August 16, 1964, cited in Sakkas & Zhukova 2013. It should be noted that at the end of the 1960s, Cyprus and the Soviet Union had cultivated close trade, diplomatic and cultural ties, expressed through 'unofficial exchanges, the opening of a Soviet cultural center in Nicosia and the admission of a large number of Cypriot university students to the Soviet Union' (Sakkas and Zhukova 2013, 126).

⁴⁶ There is a speculation that the US officials provisioned the ceding of the Greek Island of Kastellorizo to Turkey.

⁴⁷ With the bombing of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou from forces on both sides increasing the existing death toll.

⁴⁸ The appeal was one-sided against Greece, because the Greek forces numbered 20,000 troops, while there were a few hundred Turkish forces on Cypriot ground. Greece complied with this appeal.

of Ioannidis⁴⁹ and staged by the Cypriot National Guard in conjunction with EOKA-B, which, after the death of Grivas, viewed Makarios as a 'crypto-communist'.

On July 20, 1974, this coup attempt was followed by the Turkish military intervention, codenamed 'Attila I'. Turkish officials invoked the controversial Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee for this operation. The Security Council immediately demanded the prompt termination of 'foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus' and the 'withdrawal without delay... of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of the 1960 agreements', and the re-launch of negotiations among the guarantor powers (UN Security Council 1974).

Turkey's military incursion had a tremendous impact on Greece's domestic developments. The military junta crumbled and called for a government of national unity. The 'self-exiled' former prime minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, came back from Paris and formed a government of national unity. The three guarantor powers (UK, Greece and Turkey) met in Geneva between July 25 and 30, 1974. They issued a declaration, according to which the Turkish occupation zone should not be extended; the Turkish enclaves should be immediately evacuated by the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots, while each side should release the detained military personnel (Dodd 2010, 118). They also agreed on a second conference to be held in August 1974 with the participation of the two Cypriot communities in order to restore situation to normality. At the time the second-round talks started (August 8, 1974), Turkish forces had extended their area of control from 300 square km to 430 square km (Assmussen 2008). Turkey's Foreign Minister, Gunes, demanded the Cypriot government accept its plan for a federal state and population transfer, in order to ensure the security of 81,000 Turkish-Cypriots, who, in his view, were defenceless (Dodd 2010, 119).⁵⁰ When the Cypriot acting president, Glafcos Clerides, asked for 36 to 48 hours to consult with Athens and with the Greek-Cypriot leaders, Gunes, denied him that window; he speculated that Makarios and Greeks would abuse the time in order to start a worldwide campaign against Turkey (ibid.).

⁴⁹ Two Greek-Cypriot journalists, Venizels and Ignatiou (2002), use declassified documents from the US State Department, to question the controversial role of the former US Secretary, Henry Kissinger in letting things spiral out of control.

⁵⁰ By contrast with Gunes' allegations, the UN official participating in the discussions, Weckmann-Munoz, stated that the Turkish-Cypriots were not short of food and water and not under attack (Dodd 2010: 119). On the other hand, according to the memoirs of the Greek diplomat, Georgios Helmis (2006), the US official, Hartman, during his *talks* with the Greek Foreign Minister, Georgios Mavros (6.8.1974), displayed a 'hands off' policy and asked Greece to seriously consider Turkey's requests and the US interests ('You have no choice' was the recorded quot

After the conference broke up on August 14, 1974, Turkish forces initiated a new military operation, codenamed 'Attila II'. They occupied 36,2% of the Republic of Cyprus' territory⁵¹. Approximately 180,000 Greek-Cypriots were displaced from the North, while 65,000 Turkish-Cypriots subsequently moved north to take their place. On August 16, 1974, the UN instituted a ceasefire and created a buffer zone of 183 km from the east to the west across the entire island, covering 2,6% of its territory. The Security Council (SC) passed several resolutions calling for a ceasefire an immediate termination of the foreign military intervention and the withdrawal of all the forces, except for those whose presence was authorized by the Treaties. Moreover, the US imposed for a particular period an arms embargo on Turkey and decided not to 'deliver military equipment worth over \$200 million, including credits, commercial military sales and aircraft that had already been paid for by the Turkish government' (Karagoz 2004, 114).

Since 1974, Turkish authorities have kept around 35,000 troops on the island, and, breaching the Geneva Convention, started bringing settlers from the Turkish mainland to the island in order to bolster the 'Turkish' population of the north. The main strategy of Turkification was to convince the newcomer Turks from Turkey, 'yerlesikler' as settlers are called in Turkish, they are the owners of a Turkish place, both in the present and the future; a future detached from the past (Goker 2012, 132). According to Goker (2012, 132) all the places where these people would live were given different names from the ones they had before 1974, because they could not be part of this 'newly homogenized home, north Cyprus'. The large Turkish flags and the legendary quote of Atatürk made by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, '*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene*'⁵² on the slopes of Kyrenia mountains, work a constant reminder of 'Turkishness' of the north (ibid). Furthermore, between 1963 and 1974, around 570,000 people, from both sides lost their property. In absolute figures, the Greek-Cypriots' number is three times higher than the Turkish-Cypriots' (Dodd 2010, Ker-Lindsay 2011, Stavrou 2009). Moreover, approximately 3,500 people died during the coup and invasion. Various international and national commissions are investigating the bodies of 2,000 disappeared people.

Turkish officials called the military intervention as 'peace operation'. The liberation of Turkish-Cypriots from Greeks and Greek-Cypriots theoretically motivated this move. 'After this 1974 event, Turkish-Cypriots could trust Turkey to be always there for them. If it weren't for Turkey, nobody would take any interest in them, they would be run over (Interviewee 10). Nonetheless, besides Turkish-Cypriots' security concerns, it seems that further security considerations motivated Turkey's decision to militarily intervene. Gunes' position was quoted as follows (Kaliber 2005, 326):

⁵¹ 36,2% of the Republic of Cyprus' territory represents 35,2% of the entire Cyprus' territory. The British bases cover 2,7% of the Cyprus' territory and the buffer zone 2,6%, which represents 2,7% of the Republic of Cyprus' territory (Christodoulides 2009, 196)

⁵² Which translates to 'How happy is the one who can say 'I'm a Turk'

‘Cyprus is as precious as the right arm of a country which cares for her defence or her expansionistic aims if she harbors any. If we don’t keep this strategic importance of Cyprus, we cannot understand the peace operation of 20 July 1974 or rather it is impossible to understand the entire Cyprus crisis. Many states, to a certain extent because it suits their interest, want to see the Cyprus problem merely as our desire to protect the Turkish community on the island; whereas the actual problem is the security of 45 million Turks in the motherland together with Turks in the island and the maintenance of the balance of the Middle East’ (ibid.).

For Greek-Cypriots the same event is collectively recorded as ‘invasion’. The 1974 events, besides their obvious economic catastrophic implications, have had a tremendous impact on the collective memory of Greek-Cypriots, the same way the 1963 period shaped the Turkish-Cypriot collective memory; a psychological feeling of abasement and humiliation is deeply embedded in national consciousness of the Greek-Cypriots (Interviewee 2). The so-called *Den Xehno* [I do not forget in Greek] highlights their remembrance of Turkey’s invasion, the thousands of refugees and Turkey’s settlement policies. These developments continue to resonate strongly irrespective of the fact that more than 4 decades have passed since then (Burke 2017). The *Den Xehno* as a synecdoche warns the Greek-Cypriots that by forgetting what happened back then they will accept the *fait accompli* of the Turkish invasion and the continued occupation of the northern side. For that reason, via the collective obligations of *Den Xehno*, the ‘commemorative structures of the state draw on and collate these memories issues within official discourses’ (Burke 2017, 2), like education texts (Zembylas 2015).

3.3.8 The post-1974 developments

After the *de facto* division, a parallel administration, already run by Turkish-Cypriots in the decade 1964-1974, evolved to a ‘self-governing’ status in the north. More particularly, on 13 February 1975, the ‘Turkish Federal State of Cyprus’ declared its formation. Denktash became the leader of the self-styled ‘Turkish-Cypriot state’. Nevertheless, the breakaway regime could not survive without Turkey’s economic aid, which accounted for 80% of the community’s budget (Stavrou 2009, 43). The economic dependence spilled over into the political and administrative domains. Indicatively, from 1974 to 1983, Turkish officials directly participated in the Turkish-Cypriot cabinet (ibid.).

In 1977, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim brought the leaders of the two communities, Makarios and Denktash, on the negotiation table. In February 1977, the two reached an agreement for an independent, nonaligned, bi-communal federal republic. According to this agreement, the territory, administered by each community, would be addressed in light of economic viability, productivity and property rights (Migdalovitz 2005). Questions regarding freedom of movement and settlement, rights of ownership, and certain special matters would be open for dialogue, considering the schema of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties

This agreement would eventually become the blueprint for all future negotiations, although it did not initially provision bi-zonality, a prerequisite for the Turkish-Cypriots' approval (Dodd 2010, 136). Furthermore, the 'three freedoms' of movement, the right to own property and live anywhere, crucial aspects for the Greek-Cypriots, were not accepted outright (ibid). On the other hand, the death of Makarios, along with the growing political strength of the refugees and displaced persons in Kyprianou's constituency (Makarios' successor), hardened his negotiating position (ibid). Thus, no agreement was brought into fruition.

Anyhow, the UN maintained its efforts to come up with a sustainable solution. At the start of 1982, the UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, presented the two sides the 'draft framework agreement' for an independent, nonaligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal state (Ker-Lindsay 2009, 155). Kyprianou rejected the plan on several grounds. First, it did not predict the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island. Second, the politico-administrational axis around which the state would be established was reminiscent of a confederation rather than a federation. Third, there was no provision concerning the way basic freedoms (movement, settlement and property ownership) would be guaranteed (Sozen 2007)⁵³.

The chances to reach a settlement deteriorated when on November 15, 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot administration unilaterally declared its independence and gained recognition from Turkey (Hadjigregoriou 2014). Through Resolution 541 (18 November 1983), the UN SC stated that the declaration was 'legally invalid' and should be withdrawn (UN Security Council 1983). To this effect, except for Turkey, no other country has legally recognized the breakaway regime as a state entity. For a couple of years, the reunification talks were interrupted.

3.3.9 The EU-factor and the Annan Plan

From the 1990s onwards, the EU became an additional actor in the Cypriot equation. Since 1972, Cyprus and the EEC (at that time) have concluded an association agreement (Demetriou 2004, Ker-Lindsay 2007, 2009; Tocci 2004). On July 1990, the Greek-Cypriot government, with the support of Greece and Britain, applied for full membership of the EU (Ker-Lindsay 2007). This move was probably driven by the perception that the EU could offer the catalyst platform needed for the change of the status quo on the island. Greek-Cypriot officials believed that if Turkey was genuinely interested in becoming an EU member, it would make certain concessions in its Cyprus policy (Ker-Lindsay 2011). The decision to accept the application of Cyprus was taken against a backdrop of longstanding Turkish intransigence (Ker-Lindsay 2007). According to Gunther Verheugen, former European Commissioner for Enlargement, 'any attempt to prevent Cyprus from starting down the road to EU membership would have unfairly penalized the Greek-Cypriots from the behaviour of the Turkish government and

⁵³ In our interview, Nikos Rolandis, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, mentioned that he disagreed with Kyprianou's reactions and resigned.

the Turkish-Cypriot leadership' (*Turkish Daily News* 2002, found in Ker-Lindsay 2005, 2007). In general, many international observers and officials were initially casting the burden of blame for the stalemate on the Turkish-Cypriots (Ker-Lindsay 2007; Christou, 2010, 2012). For instance Lord Hannay (2005, 17-21), the British Special Representative for Cyprus, had clearly demonstrated in his book that the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaşh was the main impediment to reach a peace-agreement. According to Ker-Lindsay (2007), this view was also shared by Richard Holbrooke, the former American diplomat, who, after he terminated the Bosnian Civil War, became briefly involved with the Cypriot imbroglio.

Despite the EU involvement in the Cyprus' conundrum, the situation did not initially improve. The year between 1997 and 1998 was marked by a significant crisis which brought the disputants to the brink of an armed conflict. The decision of the Greek-Cypriots to deploy S-300 Russian missiles in the Greek-Cypriot administered territory⁵⁴ triggered a prompt reaction from Turkey's prime minister at that time, Tansu Ciler: 'If they are deployed, we will do what is needed, and if that means they need to be hit, they will be hit' (Barber 1997). After Turkey's pressure and US-led initiatives, the instalment was eventually cancelled and the crisis effectively ended in December 1998.⁵⁵

In spite of this setback, the carrot of EU membership played an important role in the re-launch of the (inconclusive) negotiation talks in December 1999. The European Council of Helsinki in December 1999 underlined 'that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union' (EU Council 1999). It stated, however, that if no settlement had been reached by the completion of accession negotiations in 2004, 'the Council's decision on accession would be made without the above being a precondition' (ibid.). In other words, regardless of a settlement, the Republic of Cyprus would become an EU member.

The rise of the AKP, which came to power with an initial pro-EU agenda in the November 2002 Turkish elections, allowed the UN to believe that it was the right moment to seek a permanent solution to Cyprus issue. On November 11, 2002, the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan, put forward a comprehensive settlement plan based on Swiss and Belgian models (Ker-Lindsay 2011; Palley 2005). Both sides expressed their disagreements against this plan in the EU Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. Cyprus signed an accession treaty to join the EU on April 16, while, at the same time, Turkish-Cypriot authorities decided to ease the restrictions on travel across the dividing line between the northern and southern parts of the island (BBC 2003).

⁵⁴ Due to Turkey's superiority in the air, Greek-Cypriots attempted to establish a credible air-defense system

⁵⁵ The government of the Republic of Cyprus decided to transfer the installment of the missiles in Crete in exchange for alternative missile systems (TOR M1 and SUZANA) from Greece (Venizelos 2019)

Annan presented his final revised plan on March 31 and requested from both sides to put it to a referendum on April 24 (Ker-Lindsay 2011). The plan provisioned the establishment of the 'United Cyprus Republic', which would exercise full sovereignty over the entire territory of the island, with the exception of the British Sovereign Base Areas. It constituted a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal republic with federal and constitutional laws (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 64-66)⁵⁶. In referenda on April 24, 76% of Greek-Cypriot voters rejected the plan, while 65% of Turkish-Cypriot voters accepted it. In a televised speech, the now deceased president of the Republic of Cyprus, at the time of the referendum, stated: 'I was given a state as a President; I will not deliver a community'. In light of the 1974 events, such a statement really touched upon very sensitive chords, people's sense of collective consciousness or subconsciousness.

Turkey had declared a positive stance towards the Annan Plan, although this stance did not reflect Erdogan's real wish according to one of my respondents (Interviewee 12): 'In order to safeguard the European perspective and use it as a bargaining chip against the Kemalist regime, Erdogan says 'yes' to the Annan plan hoping that the Greeks would say 'no'. The Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan was a relief and fantastic opportunity for Erdogan'.

Why did Greek-Cypriots reject the plan? According to Hubert Faustmann (2006), security concerns played a dominant role in the rejection of the plan. As he asserted, by security concerns Greek-Cypriots meant 'safeguards against the partition of the island, the presence of Turkish troops, demilitarisation and the right of Turkish intervention based on the Treaty of Guarantee' (Faustmann 2006). According to Greek-Cypriot academics (Emilianides 2009, Kyriakides 2009), the Plan could not provide any guarantees for these issues. An interviewee (No. 10) told me that the actual problem was the framing of the plan; there was a big gap between what was being discussed on the table and what was actually presented to the public, especially as to what the government was aiming to get in the end (Interviewee 10). The plan was presented to the people as it would be the end of the Republic of Cyprus as we know it' (ibid). Moreover, 'there was some uncertainty as to how the economy would be affected, and there were serious concerns. The plan would make them think that their property would lose a lot of value (ibid).

From the viewpoint of Brussels, the blame for the stalemate shifted from the Turkish-Cypriot side to the Greek-Cypriot (Christou 2010, 2012). Verheugen mentioned that he felt personally

⁵⁶ It predicted a single common state consisting of two component state-federal units (the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot), each holding political equality. Approximately 8% of the land would go back to the Greek-Cypriots (Lindsay 2011, 64-66). The provisions in the plan included the maintaining of the 1960s treaties and preventing the state from the possibility of unification with another country. The citizens would hold a double citizenship, one deriving from the common and the other from the component state in which someone was residing. Additionally, they would be paid in compensation for the property lost during the 1963-1974 events. The value of the compensation would be based on the market prices at the time their homes were lost and on the proper adjusted inflation rate (ibid.).

‘cheated’ by the Greek-Cypriots, who had taken him ‘for a ride’ (BBC 2004): ‘we accepted at the request of the Greek-Cypriots that the solution should not constitute a prerequisite for Cyprus’ accession... but the Cypriot government had to do everything possible to find a solution to the conflict. Mr. Papadopoulos must respect his part of the deal’ (BBC 2004). A Greek-Cypriot interviewee (No. 3) counter-argued: ‘Had the EU excluded Cyprus from the enlargement round, it would have rewarded Turkey for its behaviour and punished Cyprus for having been a victim of occupation’.

3.3.10 The post-Annan period

After the rejection of the Anan plan, the UN undertook additional initiatives to cope with the impasse. Nevertheless, it has failed so far to reach a peaceful settlement. Between 2008 and 2012, a new phase of reunification talks began (Sözen 2011; Sözen and Özersay 2007). The UN Special Envoy⁵⁷ documented a number of convergences (Sigmalive 2013) achieved between the president of the Republic of Cyprus at that time, Dimitris Christophias, and the Turkish-Cypriot presidents, Mehmet Ali Talat (till 2010) and Derviş Eroğlu (2010-2015).

At that time, Greek-Cypriots’ economy tipped into recession in 2009 because the ongoing global financial crisis and the resulting low demand hit their main pillars of their economy, tourism and construction (CIA Factbook 2018). An overextended banking sector for the standards of their real economy, accompanied by a excessive exposure to Greek debt exacerbated the contraction. After numerous downgrades of their credit rating, in May 2011, Cypriot banks for a time could not access the international capital markets. Things deteriorated in July 2011 when a large amount of military explosives self-detonated at Mari of Larnace, killing 13 people. The electricity supply was interrupted in half of the island and the expenses skyrocketed deteriorating the competitiveness the Cypriot economy even further. In July 2012, the Republic of Cyprus became the fifth eurozone member to request an economic bailout programme from the ‘troika’⁵⁸ in order to recapitalize its lenders and finance its government. The Eurozone officials forced their bank depositors to share in the cost of the country’s bailout. This triggered increasing outrage and turmoil on the island. More than 11,000 Greek-Cypriot banking depositors lost large amounts of their savings (Economist 2014). The GDP shrank by 6% in 2013 and the unemployment rate reached a 17% record (IMF, 2013). After three years of austerity policies, Cyprus returned to growth in 2015 and exited the austerity programme in 2016.

⁵⁷ A Turkish-Cypriot analyst told me: You could identify there the age-old problem: there is no agreement on what the Cyprus Problem is. It is two different things: the Greek Cypriots regard the problem as an invasion/occupation starting in 1974 and it’s all due to Turkey, while for Turkish Cypriots, the problem started long before the ‘Enosis Idea’ of the Greek Cypriots that brought all this trouble.

⁵⁸ The term refers to three institutions, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. These institutions formed a group of international lenders which provided bailouts to indebted Eurozone countries, with stringent austerity measures attached.

On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriot dependence on Turkey increased after September 2014, as the sequel of a new project's realization: a water diversion plan to supply water for drinking and irrigation from southern Turkey (the Alaköprü Dam on the Anamur-Dragon Creek) to the north of the island (Geçitköy Dam) through a 107 km pipeline under the Mediterranean Sea (Mason and Bryant 2017). Turkish officials constructed this water pipeline after decades of effort (Hurriyet Daily News 2015). Given the region's groundwater and surface shortage as the outcome of inadequate rainfall, the project is highly significant.

In February 2014, after intense haggling and negotiating dystocia, the leaders of the two communities signed a joint declaration, which functioned as the kick-starter of the talks and laid the ground upon which the respective negotiations would unfold. Nevertheless, the 2014 energy developments (analysed in Chapter 4) resulted in Anastasiades pulling out of the negotiations. The election of Mustafa Akkinci, a Turkish-Cypriot leader with a pro-solution agenda, facilitated the re-initiation of the negotiations in Geneva in 2017 and 2018, which, nonetheless, failed again to result in a settlement so far.

3.4 REASONS BEHIND THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE CONFLICT

Having presented the historical background of the conflict, I tackle a final question: which factors have inhibited the settling of the Cyprus conflict according to Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot analysts?

One view is that the conflict Cyprus has been 'consolidated in a non-violent fashion; on the one hand, this is good because we face a soft crisis which is not fierce and does not determine the life of the constituents, but, on the other, this situation has been rooted in the consciousness of the people' (Interviewee 9). Thus, the incentives to resolve the conflict are removed day by day, since it constitutes a rather 'comfortable crisis' (ibid). Under the threat of having people losing their lives day by day, there might be further incentives to immediately resolve the conflict. Another interviewee mentioned an additional reason: the absence of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (Interviewee 14), as conceptualized by Zartman (2000, 2001, 2003, 2009; Meerts 2015). The existing status quo provides a level of stability and enables guarantor powers, such as the UK, to continue to use the sovereign bases without any dispute. These are the bases for operations in Libya and Syria (ibid). The bases facilitate the British and American authorities for data collection from all around the world. This is why there is no urgency for the international community to encourage any solution (ibid).

Lack of leadership seems to be the key reason behind the stalemate according to Interviewee 11: 'The Cypriots – Greek, Turkish doesn't matter – as well as the two motherlands, are very successful in making things more complicated, instead of solving problems, simply because

we are focusing too much on the constraints instead of having a very clear focus; that we want to solve this. The absence of bold action and leadership with vision and courage is the key ingredient missing in order to advance the peace process' (Interviewee 11). This resonates with the assumptions of Adamides and Constantinou (2012), Adamides (2015), Charalampous (2015) and Kaymak (2009) presented in the theoretical chapter.

Besides the lack of leadership, other parameters may have to be factored into the equation. According to Interviewee 12, the trade-off between what the international community wants and what the constituents need provide the infrastructure to this conflict. On the one hand, communities feel underprivileged and deeply traumatized rendering the introduction of a Weberian rationalism to solve the problem ineffective (Interviewee 12). This is in line with the assumptions of Bryant (2008, 2012) and Hadjipavlou (2007), as presented in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the efforts of the UN and the EU have 'allegedly shown a pattern to just get rid of a problem, although what dominate Cypriots' perceptions are expectations of a moral, ideological and political nature, conceptualized in a metaphysical sense as justice' (Interviewee 12). The mismatch between competing Cypriot and international objectives sustains the deadlock according to this logic.

These views are not shared by all sides. Another interviewee (No. 3) mentioned that the deadlock was rooted in 'Turkey's intention to strategically control the island. Had Turkey a genuine desire to solve the conflict and respected the existence of the Republic of Cyprus, the solution of the problem would have only been a matter of time'. However, Turkey may have no incentive to demonstrate such a desire because Cyprus falls under its vital interests (Interviewee 6). The position of Turkish-Cypriots is irrelevant according to another interviewee (No. 3): 'Turkish-Cypriots are the Trojan horse of Turkey. Therefore, they have no jurisdiction to discuss the security issue of the Cyprus conflict and its international dimension' (ibid). Turkey is not simply a conqueror; it not only colonize the island, it does not recognize even the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exist by calling it a defunct republic'. That is why the philosophy of the constituent state, as stipulated in the 1977 blueprint for all settlements, cannot practically work. Interviewee 3 expressed fears that such agreements may abolish the Republic of Cyprus and pave the way for the federalization of the constituent Greek-Cypriot state with Turkey through its 'territorial extension' in Cyprus [the Turkish-Cypriots].

Turkish-Cypriots' overreliance on Turkey has severe implications for their own standing as an independent entity and does justice to the Greek-Cypriot concerns. They cannot voice their own concerns and promote their own agenda (Interviewee 10). This is manifested through their economic infrastructure, in the sense that they do nothing to reform their economy because they have not been challenged economically. The current impasse works for them. Turkey gives the money and Turkish-Cypriots dance to its tune. It has been path dependent (Interviewee 10). On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriots do not trust Greek-Cypriots any more than Turkey. They

believe that the way Greek-Cypriots envision the new state entails a risk for them in becoming second-class citizens, without any right to intervene, especially if Turkey gets disentangled after a settlement is reached (Interviewee 9).

In addition, Turkey, assumedly influenced by an Islamic agenda during the last few decades, ‘conceives not only the Turkish-Cypriot society, but Cyprus, as a geographic entity, as an Islamic space that could not be cut out from the Islamic vision, a small section of which is named Umma, which is community in Arabic’ (Interviewee 2)⁵⁹. The situation may worsen in the future because ‘Turkey has gained extensive control and influence in the occupied territories’ (Interviewee 5). If the conflict came to a head, ‘Turkey would not hesitate to pursue recognition of the occupied territories if it considered the momentum profitable for its interests’ (Interviewee 5). There may be a scenario where, if future negotiation talks fail, Turkey will point the finger at the Greek-Cypriots, holding them accountable for their intransigence and for the failure of any unification talks (Interviewee 5). Under these circumstances, Turkey would pursue the ‘recognition of the occupied territories’ by projecting its demands at the Islamic Conference (ibid). Given that Pakistan and Iran have already *de facto* recognized the occupied territories, if Turkey properly play its cards it might get recognition from up to 50 countries.

3.5 CONCLUSIONS

Following the disputants’ analysis of the Cyprus conflict, the following statements were highlighted on behalf of the Greek-Cypriots: ‘Turkey holds the key for the settlement of the conflict’ and ‘Turkish-Cypriots function as the Trojan Horse of Turkey’, while some of the constituents prefer the ‘theory of the second best’, meaning no solution instead of an insufficient solution like the 1959-1960 agreements. As regards the Turkish-Cypriots, they underline the ‘absence of a mutually hurting stalemate’ as the reason why no progress has been achieved with respect to the reunification talks. Finally, some analysts have pointed fingers at the problematic role of the UN in tackling the conflict; while the Security Council wants to ‘get rid of the conflict’, the constituents seek justice. This inconsistency of values, which highlights a trade-off between effectiveness on behalf of the great powers in ‘getting rid of the problem’ and ‘legitimacy’ on behalf of the constituents in implementing a solution that would redress the injustices of the past, explains the reasons behind the impasse. Therefore, as some Turkish-Cypriots have asserted, the future for the conflict does not look bright. These positions do not represent the views of the entire population. However, they are collectively shared among different segments of the Cypriot societies.

The positions on the historical developments, as broached in the chapter, comprise part of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses of my Q-study, which I develop in Chapter

⁵⁹ For further elaboration on the interviewee’s interpretation see Moudouros (2013)

5. While investigating the incompatible objectives of the contending parties, I draw on their collectively shared memories of each side to assess their impact on the newly emerged energy security dilemmas that I present in the following chapter. I anticipate that historical narratives may reappear in order to justify the present policy positions as regards the energy aspects. For instance, regardless of the economic benefit of a pipeline to Turkey, some Greek-Cypriots might not be open to cooperate with Turkey for the monetization of the gas reserves because they put the entire blame on Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots for the military occupation of 37% of the Cypriot territory; along the same lines, they might further adhere to the exclusion of the Turkish-Cypriots from the hydrocarbons' management. Turkish-Cypriots, who solely blame Greek-Cypriots and not Turkey (or themselves) for the embargo imposed by the international community on their ports, may justify Turkey's recent incursions on the island; in this light, these incursions, coming from the only reliable power for them, are portrayed as 'necessary' steps to safeguard their participation in the debate. On the other hand, if some Greek-Cypriots hold their Greek and Greek-Cypriot leaders partially responsible for the 1974 events,⁶⁰ they may be more open to cooperation with the latter. Similarly, if Turkish-Cypriots impute to themselves or to Turkey their current economic standing, then they may entertain the possibility of consulting with Greek-Cypriots without Turkey's active involvement.

It seems that although this conflict is frozen, all parties know that the wrong trigger-button might make the conflict to flare up again (Bryant and Papadakis, 2012). The traumas of the past point both backward and forward in time (Papadakis 2003, 2005; Scarry 1985, 121). On the one hand they perpetually visualize the hostile activities of the past performing a memorialization function (*ibid*). On the other hand, they refer forward to the future to what has not yet occurred, thus have an as-if function. The natural resources may have 'opened this window'.

In order to discuss about the conflictual dynamics of the natural resources, readers need to capture the complicated calculus that the policy formulation on hydrocarbons' management dictates. Technical and financial considerations cannot be left out of the convoluted energy planning. Therefore, in the following chapter, I set forth the details about how the world of natural gas plays out in the Eastern Mediterranean and accentuate the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot viewpoints on this topic.

⁶⁰ And not only Turkey or Turkish-Cypriots.

4

The energy context

4.1 INTRODUCTION: THE ENERGY CONTEXT

To uncover the incompatible discourses between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, I have to first present the regional energy context within which they unfold. This is what Chapter 4 is about. I start with a description of the geological realities in the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, more particularly, Egypt, Israel and Cyprus. I rely on desk and field research. I investigate multiple policy reports published by the EIA, PRIO Cyprus Center, the Mediterranean Series in the German Marshall Fund, the International Crisis group and the European Parliament (De Micco 2014; EIA 2013b; Ellinas, Roberts and Tzimitras 2016; European Parliament 2017; Giamourides 2013, Gürel, Mullen and Tzimitras 2013). Through additional policy reports, I examine the perceived risks and dangers attached to the implementation of every decision (Gürel, Mullen and Tzimitras 2013, İşeri and Andrikopoulos 2013; ICG 2013, Giamourides 2013, Khadduri 2012 Tagliapetra 2013, Tsafos and Giamourides 2015, Tsakiris 2014). With the help of academic articles (Karyotis 2011; Tzimitras 2012) as well as legal documents (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, law bulletins from the UN, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and previous decisions made by the International Court of Justice as regards disputes of a similar nature), I elaborate on the legal context within which the actors involved signed their delimitation agreements and moved on with their exploration initiatives.

After keeping notes from this desk research, in November 2015, I perform the second round of my field research in Cyprus. I meet former policymakers and chief negotiators and energy analysts on both sides and ask them about the significance of the discovered gas reserves for the economies of the communities, as well as the problems with the current infrastructure, the impediments that the companies involved faced in the exploitation of gas reserves and the optimal options for the monetization of the gas reserves. Finally, I summarize the stakes that Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots attach to the natural resources based on my open-ended interviews with them. Appendix 1 lists the people whom I interviewed in 2015, as well as my logic in their recruitment (including their code-name). Appendix 2 puts forward the type of questions I asked them.

4.2 THE GEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

The territories that the region consists of are Egypt, Israel, the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. While delving into the geological context, I pay attention to the first three countries mentioned here, since they have noted a significant progress with their energy programmes.

4.2.1 Egypt: the key player in the region

The protagonist on the Eastern Mediterranean energy scene is Egypt. Located in north-east corner of Africa, Egypt lies at the heart of the Arab world and is a non-member state in the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC). The operation of the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) Pipeline render its role in the international energy markets vital. The Suez Canal is an important transit route for oil and LNG shipments travelling northbound from the Persian Gulf to Europe and to North America as well as for shipments travelling southbound from North Africa to Asia (EIA 2017c). The SUMED Pipeline constitutes the only alternative route near the Suez Canal for the transportation of crude oil from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea when ships are in no position to navigate through the Suez Canal (SUMED 2017).¹

Egypt is the third largest gas producer in Africa after Algeria and Nigeria. For many decades, oil was the only target of all its exploration activities. That changed with the first commercial gas discovery in 1975. Larger volumes of gas reserves were detected in the 1980s and 1990s² in the Gulf of Suez, the Western-Eastern Desert and the Sinai Peninsula. The companies involved wanted to produce it, arguing with the Egyptian government about licences to export it. In 1995, the Egyptian government eventually enabled the companies to actively drill for gas in order to meet domestic demand (Hydrocarbons-Technology 2017). The domestic demand for gas was satisfied in 1999 after the discoveries in the west of Ashkelon. Egypt scaled up their exploitation after 2000 until 2011, when its gas production tripled, paving the way for considerable gas exports. The first major discovery occurred in 2003, when Shell discovered 1.5 tcm of natural gas in the North East Mediterranean (NEMED) block of Egypt, besides its extensive reserves that are monetized onshore (Independent Online 2003).

Egypt's infrastructure involves additional LNG complexes and pipelines. One of them is the Damietta LNG complex, located 60 km west of Port Said, and the other is the Idku LNG complex, located 50 km east of Alexandria (LNG World Shipping 2018). Furthermore, the gas companies constructed the Arab Gas Pipeline (known as the Trans-Mashreq Gas Pipeline), an infrastructure of 1,200 km connecting Egypt with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to Turkey, with a capacity of 10 bcm/year (ibid). Finally, the El Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline, operating since 2008, transports Egyptian gas to Israel (European Parliament 2017). In 2010, the pipeline supplied approximately half of the gas consumed in Israel (European Parliament 2017).

¹ It was installed in 1974 following an agreement between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and UAE to provide a fast route for Persian Gulf oil from Suez to the Mediterranean, following the extended closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967 (*New York Times* 1973). It is 320 km long, linking Ain Sukhna terminal on the Gulf of Suez with the terminal at Sidi Kerir and its capacity is 2.5 million barrels per day (SUMED 2017).

² Approximately 1.8 trillion cubic meters according to BP (Statistical Review of World Energy 2017).

The supplies were interrupted by the so-called Arab Spring, after the political turmoil stopped the inflow of necessary upstream investments (Bahgat 2012). Gas supplies to Israel were unilaterally halted by Egypt in 2012, as Israel had allegedly breached its obligations and had stopped payments a few months earlier. Since then, the pipeline has sat idle (*ibid.*). The country has had to import more liquid fuels. Additionally, decades of energy subsidies accompanied by population growth with ever-increasing demands resulted in financial exposure and Egyptian General Petroleum Company struggling to meet its payment obligations to foreign energy operators (Ellinas et al. 2016; Tsafos and Giamourides, 2015). These factors caused energy shortages and created the need to import expensive LNG to guarantee electricity supplies.

A recent development could reverse this trend and put Egypt back in the exporting driver seat. In August 2015, the Italian company ENI (an active tenant in Egypt since 1954) announced a giant discovery of the Zohr gas field. The field covers an area of 3,765 square km and is situated in water depths of 1,450 m (Africa Oil and Gas Journal 2013). According to an ENI press release (2015), ‘the discovery could hold a potential of 30 trillion cubic feet of lean gas in place (5.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent in place) covering an area of about 100 square km. Zohr – the largest gas discovery ever made in Egypt and in the Mediterranean Sea³ – could become one of the world’s largest natural gas finds.’ According to one of my interviewees who is an expert in the energy world, this discovery is a ‘game changer’ because Egypt may become energy sufficient and might have excess gas for export (Interviewee 6). According to estimations, Egyptians will use the Zohr gas for internal consumption and the other gas near the shores for LNG (*ibid.*).

4.2.2 Israel: from a traditional importer to a potential exporter

Another exploration area, crucial for my study, is the Levant Basin. Located along and off the coasts of Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Gaza Strip and extending westward into Cypriot waters, the basin comprises a total sea and land area of 32,000 square miles, most of which is offshore (Delek-Group 2010). Until the 1990s, much of the hydrocarbons there had gone undiscovered because the resources lie in very deep waters (known in the industry as ‘ultra-deepwater’), with depths exceeding two kilometres in certain locations (Gürel et al. 2013, 4). These features rendered the exploration in the area a technically difficult, risky and expensive enterprise. However, at the dawn of the 21st century, technological progress triggered by high international oil prices set new exploration initiatives in motion.

For the best part of its history since 1948, Israel had been an energy-poor state, relying, almost entirely, on imported fossil fuels to meet its energy needs (Shaffer 2011, 5380). Despite consecutive initiatives and very attractive commercial conditions that Israel’s governments have

³ At the time of writing this research at least.

traditionally been offering to prospective explorers, these efforts have proved fruitless. Many important oil and gas companies hesitated to manifest their interest to explore reserves in Israel (Interviewee 9). While the location of the resources in ‘ultra-deep’ waters could rationalize this hesitation, an important factor, allegedly pushing the companies away, was the implication of the Arab-Israeli tensions. More specifically, any international company potentially going for exploration in Israel, runs the risk of being precluded from lucrative projects in Arab oil-producing states, which formally could boycott companies, ships and equipment operating in Israel (*ibid*).

A joint venture between the Israeli Delek Energy⁴ and Noble Energy⁵ made the first, initially small, discovery offshore Israel in the Levant Basin, particularly in the Noah offshore field in June 1999 and in the Mari-B field in February 2000 (Delek-Group 2010). In January 2009, the offshore Tamar natural gas field was discovered near the city of Haifa. This field reportedly contains approximately 280 bcm of natural gas (Shaffer 2011). The Tamar field was quickly developed and became operational during that period, ‘supplying Israel with 7.5 bcm/year of gas already in 2014’ (European Parliament 2017). This development was quite significant for the Israeli economy because it enabled it to overcome the gas shortages triggered by the above mentioned post-2011 halt of Egyptian gas deliveries. Furthermore, in 2014, the Tamar consortium (synthesized by Delek Drilling and Noble Energy) struck Israel’s gas export deal with Jordan’s Arab Potash Corporation and Jordan’s Bromine Company to import 2 bcm of NG for 15 years (Jordan News Agency 2014).

The gas developments offshore Israel did not end with Tamar’s field. Based on a geology assessment methodology, the US Geological Survey (2010), published a report in March 2010 estimating that there was a mean of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and a mean of 122 tcf of recoverable gas in the Levant Basin Province (see [Figure 4.1](#)).⁶ From a global perspective, the Levant Basin’s gas resources are – in quantitative terms – significant but not dominating. As mentioned in the introduction, Russia, for instance, maintains the world’s largest natural gas reserves, accounting for about 25% of global gas reserves (Paraschos 2013). By Mediterranean standards, the Levant Basin’s offshore natural gas reserves are sizeable, but not as big as the gas resources held by other Mediterranean producers, such as Algeria (Paraschos 2013).

⁴ Founded in 1951 as Israel’s first government-owned gas retailer

⁵ An American petroleum and natural gas exploration and production company headquartered in Houston, Texas

⁶ In the oil and gas industry, such reports are merely indicative and do not reliably represent the expected volumes. To estimate with greater accuracy the extent of oil and gas volumes in the region more exploration efforts are deemed necessary (Shaffer, 2012).



Figure 4.1. The Levant Basin. Source: United States Geological Survey. (2010, March 5). *Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean* [Photograph]. Retrieved at 5.6.2015 from <https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf>

In October 2010, the projections of the US Geological Survey were partially confirmed by the next major find (620 bcm) of a giant field in the Leviathan Block (47 kilometres southwest of the Tamar gas field), discovered by a consortium comprising Noble Energy, Delek Drilling, Avner Oil and Ratio Oil (Gürel et al. 2013). Until August 2015 and before the discovery of the Zohr Field, it was the biggest discovery in the Eastern Mediterranean. Leviathan's shareholders entered into negotiations with the Jordanian National Electric Company in 2014 and, after surmounting certain obstacles in September 2016, agreed to supply a gross quantity of approximately 1.6 tcf of gas from the Leviathan field over a 15-year term (*Financial Times* 2016).

Brought to market, these gas reserves were destined to satisfy a large portion of Israel's domestic energy consumption for a number of decades and project it into a leading gas developer in the Levant Basin. Nevertheless, in the gas business, availability of gas reserves does not automatically lead to deliverability because several thorny issues may hamper or delay their exploitation and monetization. While in Egypt, the main problem was the domestic turbulence in the country after 2011, in Israel, certain regulatory issues initially hampered the whole procedure (Interviewee 9).

4.2.3 The Republic of Cyprus

Having proclaimed its Exclusive Economic Zone and signed delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010), the Republic of Cyprus demarcated the outer limits of a 51 km² exploration area and carved it into 13 blocks (see Figure 4.2).

As I was notified, some Greek-Cypriot officials already knew about the existence of natural gas reserves in the seabed of the Republic of Cyprus: “On August 4, 1980, Ambrose -the delegate of Standard Oil of Indiana and ARAMCO- paid a visit in my office and mentioned that the two companies he was representing, expressed their interest to drill in the seabed south of Cyprus” (Interviewee 8). He stressed that according to their surveys and estimates there are some quantities of natural gas and oil. He also mentioned that Greek-Cypriots were informed by sources of their Embassy’s Public Relations office in Washington that Ambrose had already approached the Turkish Embassy on the same issue in order to scan the Turkish reactions towards the initiation of drilling in the Greek-Cypriot seabed (Interviewee 8): “according to what we heard, Turkish authorities warned that if Greek-Cypriots launch drilling, then Turks will repeat what they did in 1974” (ibid).

More than two decades later, in 2006, Norway’s Petroleum Geo-Services ASA launched the hydrocarbon assessment programme, providing ‘high-resolution, subsalt deep imaging and




Figure 4.2. 13 Exploration blocks of the Republic of Cyprus. Source: Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry . (2016). Granted Licences. Retrieved at December 12, 2017 from http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/page16_en/page16_en?OpenDocument

ties to key wells in Shell's North-East Mediterranean deepwater block off Egypt' (*Oil and Gas Journal* 2007). The seismic report, along with regional geological background, formed the basis of a geological interpretation carried out in 2006 by France's private petroleum consulting firm Beicip-Franlab (*Oil and Gas Journal* 2007).

4.2.3.1 Republic of Cyprus' first licensing round

In February 2007, drawing on the available seismic data, Cyprus launched its first international tender for three-year oil and gas exploration licences. On May 4, 2007, through a notice published in the (*Official Journal of the European Union* 2007), it announced the inauguration of the first Licensing Round Offshore Cyprus, offering 11 of the 13 blocks (Blocks 3 and 13 were excluded because they were undergoing a 3D seismic survey). Greek-Cypriots received three bids from two different parties in the inaugural licensing round, one of which was Noble Energy, already operating in Israel and lodging a bid for Block 12.⁷ The muted interest can be attributed to the 'speculative nature of making investments at this early stage in the development of Cyprus's exploration industry, since data collection was ongoing and three-dimensional surveys were expected to be made available for the second phase of licensing' (IHS Markit, 2007).

As a result of the first licensing round, on October 24, 2008, a Hydrocarbon Exploration Licence for the exploration Block 12 was granted to Noble Energy. The geological structure of the Aphrodite field lies on the maritime border with Israel. That explains, among other reasons, why, on December 17, 2010, Cyprus signed a delimitation agreement with Israel (UN 2011). Noble Energy commenced its seismic surveys across the Island in 2011, despite Turkey's allegations that some of these areas fell under its jurisdiction. After continuous seismic surveys, in December 2011, Noble Energy's investors announced: 'results from drilling, formation logs and initial evaluation work indicate an estimated gross resource range of 5 to 8 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), with a gross mean of 7 Tcf' (Noble Energy 2011).

While the continuation of the drilling was necessary, Noble Energy had already come up with an economic proposal on the monetization of the discovered gas reserves. However, this proposal was rejected on political grounds, according to one of my interviewees. Noble proposed the construction of a cable that would gratuitously provide the whole island of Cyprus with electricity for 120 years. The significance of such project would be unquestionable in the sense that Cypriots pay the most expensive bill for electricity in Europe (Interviewee 9). This suggestion, though, could not 'sell' politically, unlike the prospect of an LNG⁷ that would render Cyprus an energy hub in the region (*ibid*).

⁷ The other was a consortium of Norwegian, U.K. and U.A.E. companies, which lodged two bids for two other separate blocks (IHS Markit 2007).

4.2.3.2 Republic of Cyprus' second licensing round

The confirmation of the gas potential in the Republic of Cyprus stimulated a growing interest from the gas industry in the region and prompted its authorities to set up a second licensing round on February 11, 2012 (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism 2012). In contrast with the first round, this licensing round witnessed the participation of nearly 30 firms (see Appendix 3).⁸ Some of them were chasing contracts in more than one block. Blocks 9 and 2 were the most popular because many bidders were expecting that the same gas structure in Block 12 would extend into these two permits. Blocks 1, 4 and 13 failed to attract bids (Poten & Partners 2012).

The bids were evaluated by a government advisory committee. In the first quarter of 2013, licences were awarded for five offshore blocks out of the twelve (of which nine received bids). More specifically, and as shown in Figure 4.3, in January 24, 2013, the authorities granted the consortium of ENI (Cyprus Limited) and KOGAS (Cyprus Limited) three exploration licences for Blocks 2, 3 and 9. In February 6, 2013, they granted Total E&P Cyprus BV two exploration licences for Blocks 10 and 11 (Paraschos 2013).

In their detailed report for PRIO, Gürel et al. (2013, 4-5) mark two important points. The first is that the list of successful bidders did not include five blocks (1,4,5,7, and 13) which, as Turkey claims, partly fall within its continental shelf, although bids were reportedly also received for two of these blocks (5 and 7). The second one claims that the selected companies 'were very large oil and gas companies from countries with significant military strength' (ibid). According to rumours, national security was prioritized over the business logic in the selection criteria and there were suggestions that the then minister exercised his right to choose other companies than those proposed by the advisory committee (Drousiotis 2012). This allegation was made with regard to Block 9, widely considered the most promising of the 12 offered in Cyprus's 2012 bidding round.⁹ In October 2012, according to the revelations of the Greek-Cypriot journalist, Drousiotis (2012), the block was initially awarded to the French-Russian consortium Total, Russia's Novatek and Gazprombank (the investment arm of Russian state gas giant, Gazprom), although it ranked fourth in the first ranking of preferences.

This move was seemingly destined to enlist two diplomatic heavyweights – Russia and France – on the side of Nicosia in the face of Turkish diplomatic threats against companies signing Cypriot exploration deals (MEES 2013). This assumption was confirmed through

⁸ Some of them lodged the bids on their own but most banded together in consortia for the country's 12 remaining blocks (Poten & Partners 2012). This list included Total of France, ENI of Italy, Gazprombank of Russia, Petronas of Malaysia and KOGAS of South Korea (Poten & Partners 2012).

⁹ It attracted bids from six companies and consortia.




Figure 4.3. Successful bidders for the second licensing round. Source: Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry . (2016). *Granted Licences*. Retrieved at December 12, 2017, from http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/page16_en/page16_en?OpenDocument

a personal statement of one policy-maker of the Republic of Cyprus¹⁰ delivered during our interview:

‘While designing our energy policy, national security was placed high on the agenda. We planned to grant one block to each member of the Security Council that would demonstrate some interest in these blocks ... I do not know what went wrong. Various interpretations saw daylight. Russians cast the blame on us, while our side claims that the offer was not good. Even if that were the case, this assumption contradicts our plans to secure our defense. If we, as a country, wanted British, French, Americans, Russians and Chinese to invest their interests in our area, we were urged to downplay the economic aspect. Let’s face it, if these were blocks granted to five permanent members of the Security Council, how could Turkey confront them and fulfil its threats against such powers?’

The expectations of the exploration potential in the granted blocks did not match the actual findings of the companies’ drilling in the Cypriot waters. The two wells drilled by ENI in Block 9¹¹ failed to reveal exploitable quantities of hydrocarbons. This result led to a re-evaluation of the company’s geological research model and its withdrawal from Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic

¹⁰ Anonymous interviewee in 2017

¹¹ Onasagoras (completed in December 2014) and Amathusa (March 2015).

Zone for an initially unspecified time (Tsakiris 2015, 2016). Furthermore, Total did not find evidence for the existence of natural gas in blocks 10 and 11, a development that spread rumours about its potential withdrawal from the region (New Europe 2015). It should be noted, though, that these setbacks constitute the norm of the upstream industry,¹² where the global success rate for exploratory wells is between 20% and 30%, even in relatively mature areas (Tsakiris 2015, 2016). In the case of Cyprus, after three exploratory wells were drilled between 2011 and 2015, the success rate was 33% (Tsakiris 2016, 25-26).

On November 23, 2015, following seven months of deliberations, Noble Energy announced a 'farm-out agreement for a portion of its interest in Block 12 offshore Cyprus with BG International' (Noble Energy 2015). BG would acquire a 35% interest in Block 12 for a total cash consideration of \$165 million. The problem in the Eastern Mediterranean is that the hydrocarbons to be detected are not to an exceptional degree and this causes economic difficulties for companies like Noble, who run for a fire escape (Interviewee 6). As I found out, Noble had always plans to sell their share in Aphrodite from 2012 and to retain about 20% of this particular gas field (ibid). Since they needed the cash, they were forced to sell, even at a really low price. More particularly, they sold 47% of their interests in the Tanin and Karish fields offshore Israel, 35% of Aphrodite, and the amount of cash they got was really important to cure their economic wounds (ibid). Given the low prices they were selling, BG snapped it up.

4.2.3.3 Republic of Cyprus' third licensing round

The discovery of the Zohr field off the coast of Egypt in August 2015 triggered the interest of the gas companies in the Eastern Mediterranean and, by extension, offshore the Republic of Cyprus. On March 24, 2016, the Cypriot government announced the beginning of the third round of licensing for offshore exploration – blocks 6, 8 and 10 in the Exclusive Economic Zone (Republic of Cyprus Press Information Office 2016). After a couple of months, the Minister of Energy announced the list of bidders for these three blocks. Appendix 4 shows a list of the bidders along with the blocks they applied for.

In December 2016, the Council of Ministers, upon the recommendation of the Minister of Energy and the preparatory report of the Technical Advisory Committee on Hydrocarbons Exploration, chose the bidders for negotiations over the terms and conditions attached to the production sharing contract (PSC). For Block 6, it picked the consortium of ENI and Total; for Block 8, ENI was selected and for Block 10, the consortium of ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum was chosen (Offshore Energy Today 2016b).

¹² By upstream industry, I mean industrial firms which process the basic or raw material into an intermediary product, which is converted into finished product by the downstream industries. For more information, go to: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/upstream-industries.html>

Table 4.1 summarizes the recent gas discoveries offshore the Eastern Mediterranean, providing the names of the gas fields, the gross mean resources and the year of discovery. While presenting the existing geological realities¹³ of the region, we should always keep in mind that the gas sector, due to the continuous development of technological equipment and revision of geological models, is susceptible to continual change.

4.3 INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AND DELIMITATION AGREEMENTS

4

A substantial amount of reserves across the globe lie in areas of contested exclusive economic zones, where, in many cases, neighbouring countries have not yet established mutually agreed maritime borderlines. For instance, a number of maritime disputes have repeatedly occurred in the East and South China Seas, regions rich in hydrocarbons and natural gas, through which trillions of dollars of global trade flow. Six countries – China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei – have overlapping claims to that area. China claims the largest portion of territory by far (more than 90%) – an area defined by the ‘nine-dash line’ stretching hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan (Council on Foreign Relations 2017). In a similar fashion, the Eastern Mediterranean region has competing claims involving a variety of states and issues, which, extending its geographical space, reaches the Aegean Sea. It includes disputes such as the ones between Israel and Lebanon and between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey.

In order to keep a tight grip on these developments, I first pinpoint the basic provisions of the international law of the sea as codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN 1982). I shed light on those provisions which directly concern the exploitation status in the Eastern Mediterranean, paying particular attention to the sovereign rights that the states may exercise in their exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.

Table 4.1. Main recent gas discoveries in offshore EM

Gas Field	Gross mean resources (bcm)	Discovery
Tamar-Israel	280	2009
Leviathan-Israel	620	2010
Aphrodite-Republic of Cyprus	140	2011
Zohr-Egypt	850	2015

Source: Ellinas et al. (2016); European Parliament (2017)

¹³ At the time of writing, the description focused on the geological parameters as formulated up to December 2017.

4.3.1 Basic Provisions of UNCLOS

UNCLOS initially divides marine space into two categories: one within the limits of national jurisdiction and the other to comprise the oceans and seas lying beyond the sphere of sovereign control. The section deliberately focuses on the first part because exploring the provisions beyond an exclusive economic zone goes beyond the scope of the research. UNCLOS divides the marine space, which falls under national jurisdiction, into several zones (Figure 4.4): the boundary between internal waters and territorial sea, the territorial sea up to 12 nm from the baseline, the contiguous zone (up to an additional 12 nm, the continental shelf (up to 200 nm or 350 nm under certain conditions) and the exclusive economic zone (up to 200 nm). The most relevant for my subject is the exclusive economic zone and, to a lesser extent, the continental shelf (UN 1982).

By contrast with the territorial waters, in the context of which the UNCLOS assigns full sovereignty to the coastal state, when it comes to the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, the coastal state enjoys certain exclusive sovereign rights (but not full sovereignty, as displayed in the territorial waters' regime). Part V of UNCLOS (Articles 55-75) pertains to the exclusive economic zone regime. Article 56, in fact, spells out the sovereign rights the coastal states are entitled to exercise: (a) 'exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds'; (b) 'the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations




Figure 4.4. Jurisdiction zones according to UNCLOS. Source: Geoscience Australia. (n.d.). *The Law of the Sea*. Retrieved at October 15, 2015, from http://www.ga.gov.au/webtemp/image_cache/GA13555.gif

and structures'; (c) 'marine scientific research' and (d) 'the protection and preservation of the marine environment' (UN 1982).

As regards the delimitation of exclusive economic zones between states with opposite or adjacent coasts (as in the case of the Eastern Mediterranean), Article 74 asks them to seek agreement in order to achieve an equitable solution. Different interpretations arise on this term. Although the countries could have adopted an equidistant line, in the majority of disputes, they have not made use of this solution (UN 1982); thus, so far, this solution has become part of customary international law, which is essential for the maritime delimitation process. Another interpretation for 'equitable solution' is a reference¹⁴ inspired by the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the well-known 1969 *North Sea Continental Shelf Cases*.¹⁵ The court put forward three factors which had to be taken into consideration when pursuing an agreement on the basis of equitable principles (ICJ 1969): (a) the general configuration of the coasts, which involves the presence of any special or unusual features, (b) the physical and geological structure, and the natural resources of the continental shelf areas involved, (c) proportionality between the extent of the continental shelf of the coastal state and the length of its sea frontage.

4.3.2 Delimitation agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean

In 2004, after the ratification of UNCLOS in 1988, the Republic of Cyprus passed a law to provide for the proclamation of exclusive economic zones. In conformity with the UNCLOS provisions, the breadth of this zone extends to 200 nm, measured from the baselines of the respective territorial seas. Cyprus delimited its Exclusive Economic Zone in the south-western, southern and south-eastern directions through distinct bilateral agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). These agreements include more or less identical provisions, in the sense that all of the boundaries are specified according to the median line principle (Gürel et al. 2013, 14).

4.3.2.1 Agreement with Egypt and Turkey's reactions

Republic of Cyprus signed an agreement on February 17, 2003, for the delimitation of its Exclusive Economic Zone with Egypt (Karyotis 2011, 47). It also signed a confidentiality agreement in May 2006 and exchanged seismic data on the region (Gürel et al. 2013, 16). Article 1 (par. a) of the 2003 Agreement stipulates that the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone is 'effected by the median line of which every point is equidistant from the nearest point of the baseline of the two Parties' (UN 2004). The same article (par. e) includes a clause stating the geographical coordinates used for the demarcation 'could be reviewed and/or extended

¹⁴ Invariably adopted in maritime delimitation questions.

¹⁵ Between Germany and Denmark, as well as between Germany and the Netherlands.

as necessary in the light of future delimitation of the exclusive economic zone with other concerned neighboring States' and in accordance 'with an agreement to be reached by them' (ibid.). As shown in Figure 4.5, the boundary line measures about 144 nm and is composed of eight geographical coordinates (ibid.).

Turkey recorded its objections to this agreement in the annex of an Information Note submitted to the UN secretary general on March 2, 2004 (UN 2004b). Its position is that the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone or 'of the continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially in areas falling beyond the western part of the longitude 32°16'18' also pertains to Turkey's existing *ipso facto* and *ab initio* legal and sovereign rights, emanating from the established principles of equity' and shall be effected by agreement between the related states based on the equity principle (ibid.). In a *note verbale* dated October 4, 2005, Turkey based its reaction against this agreement on the grounds that it constitutes 'a coastal state in the region to be affected' by such agreements and, inevitably, has the 'right to raise here objections as a concerned party in the context of the intended delimitation' (UN 2006, 34). Figure 4.6 shows Turkey's continental shelf claims on the area delimited between the Republic of Cyprus and Egypt.

From the Greek-Cypriot point of view, as communicated in a *note verbale* on December 28, 2004 (UN 2004c), Turkey had tacitly acknowledged the entitlement of Cyprus 'to legitimate claims of maritime zones by failing to raise any objections when the Cyprus submitted in 1974 its continental shelf law and in 1993 a set of coordinates with its baselines' (Gürel et al 2013, 28). Furthermore, Turkey's claim that delimitation in the western part of the longitude 32°16'18"E should be made by agreement was dismissed on the grounds that such an assertion would be




Figure 4.5. Delimitation agreement of the Republic of Cyprus and Egypt. Source: UN. (2003). *Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 52* New York, UN




Figure 4.6. Turkey's continental shelf claims. Source: (ICG 2013, 20)

'tantamount to accepting that islands and even more so a sovereign Island state [Cyprus in that particular case] is deprived of any maritime zones' (UN, 2004); this would contravene customary international law, articles 56, 77, 121 of the UNCLOS and the rulings of the ICJ.

4.3.2.2 The role of Kastellorizo

The agreement between Cyprus and Egypt seems to bring another conflict into the equation. Article 3 of this agreement states: 'If either of the two parties is engaged in negotiations aimed at the delimitation of its exclusive economic zone with another State, that party, before reaching a final agreement with the other State, shall notify and consult the other party, if such delimitation is in connection with coordinates' (UN 2003). The last sentence warranted further clarification about which other states could be included. To this effect, one of my interviewees who served as former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus and signed this agreement told me that Greece asked the Republic of Cyprus to drag the western triple point around 10 kilometres into the East in order to prevent Turkey from raising any question about Kastellorizo' (Interviewee 8).

Kastellorizo is part of the Dodecanese group of Greek islands called Megisti, which includes the offshore islands of Ro and Strongyli, along with other smaller islets, located at the south easternmost edge of Greek dominion.¹⁶

¹⁶ More particularly, Kastellorizo (*Municipality of Megisti*) lies 72 miles east of the nearest Greek island, Rhodes, 328 nautical miles from the Greek mainland (port of Piraeus) and 2 km from the Turkish Anatolian coastal town, Kas. Kastellorizo's total surface is 9 km², with a coastline of 19 km, while it has

Greece, being part of UNCLOS and controlling the Megisti islands, is able to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles (nm) in length. Together with the Greek-Cypriot zone, this would leave Turkey with 'a narrow Exclusive Economic Zone, hardly extending out from its long coastline' (ICG 2013, 23). In a note addressed to the UN dated of February 24, 2005, Greece declared its position in relation to the maritime delimitation in the area of the agreement between Egypt and Cyprus, disputed by Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots, that is, west of longitude 32°16'18"E (UN 2004c). This delimitation, from Greece's point of view, should take place in accordance with the rules of international law on the basis of the principle of equidistance/median line, as confirmed by long-standing state practice (Figure 4.7).

In that case, according to Turkey's position, its maritime zones would be entirely cut off from those of Egypt, while Greece and Egypt would have opposite coasts; the potential boundary would be determined somewhere between the line connecting the coasts of some Greek islands¹⁷ and the northern shores of Egypt (Başeren 2010). Had the Greek claims come to fruition, Turkey 'would have lost 71,000 of its 145,000 km² of the continental shelf, with 3,000 km² being for the Greek-Cypriots' benefit, and would have had to be content with only 41,000 km² in the Eastern Mediterranean' (Başeren 2010).¹⁸

Turkey maintains that the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones in the region should follow the principle of natural prolongation. This means that it should not award any zone effect to the islands of the Eastern Aegean, especially the Dodecanesian island of Kastellorizo (Siousouras & Chrysochou, 2014). Turkey bases its claims on the ICJ's 1985 ruling between Malta and Libya and the ICJ's judgment (ICJ 1985) on the maritime delimitation between Romania and Ukraine on February 3, 2009 (ICJ 2009).¹⁹ Turkey did not solely resort to legal argument but went a step further. In September 2011, it issued a NAVTEX to carry out exploration around that area. It dispatched the Norwegian seismic vessel, *Bergen Surveyor*, accompanied by other vessels in an area, which, 'according to the relevant provisions of

a population of 450. Between 1522 and 1912, it was part of the Ottoman Empire's territory until the island's seizure by Italy in the aftermath of the First Balkan War (1912-13). After WWII, according to Article 14 of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, the sovereignty of the Dodecanese islands (including Megisti and several nearby islets) was ceded to Greece.

¹⁷ Crete (Kriti/Girit), Kassos (Kasos/Kassot), Karpathos (Karpathos/Kerpe), Rhodes (Rodos) and Megisti (Kastellorizo/Meis).

¹⁸ According to the projections of Pr. Başeren, in the Turkish Marine Research Association (TÜDAV.ORG.TR).

¹⁹ The first ruling adjusted the median line 18 nm northward to provide Libya with a larger continental shelf. It found that 'the difference in their coastal lengths, with a one-to-eight proportion was 'so great as to justify the adjustment of the median line' (ICJ 1985). In the Ukraine-Romania case, the ICJ considered that the Serpents' island should have 'no effect on the delimitation other than that stemming from the role of the 12-nautical-mile arc of its territorial sea and, therefore, be any factor justifying the adjustment of the provisional equidistance line' (ICJ 2009).



Figure 4.7. Greece's viewpoint on the delimitation of its EEZ. Source: Pike, J. (2017). GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information. Retrieved at December 18, 2017, from <https://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/map-med-eez-2012.jpg>|||Eastern%20Med%20EEZ

international law, overlaps the Greek continental shelf south of Kastellorizo' (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). The Greek Embassy in Ankara made a representation to Turkey's Foreign Ministry and put forward a request that Turkey abstain from 'any exploration activity that infringes Greek sovereign rights in the area' (ibid.).

The above concerns laid out by Turkey over the Eastern Mediterranean are linked to Turkey's claims over the Aegean,²⁰ which is the (ostensible) root cause of Turkey's not having signed or ratified the UNCLOS, in spite of its participation in the negotiations. When the Republic of Cyprus signed the agreement with Egypt, it may have woken up a sleeping giant. The stake was not only in the Eastern Mediterranean but also in the Aegean Sea; it was something that would not make Turkey step back. Even Greece would not step back' (Interviewee 13).

4.3.2.3 *The ambiguous agreement with Lebanon*

Lebanon and the Republic of Cyprus started negotiations in 2002 and in 2007 signed an agreement on the delimitation of their Exclusive Economic Zones (Stocker 2012). The Cypriot parliament ratified the agreement in 2009, while the Lebanese parliament did not. The lack of ratification was attributed to various reasons. The most likely one may have been political pressure from Turkey, which had expressed its discontent with any Greek-Cypriot agreement with other countries that allegedly neglected the interests of the Turkish-Cypriots' (Republic of

²⁰ Detailed in Appendix 5.

Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). Moreover, Lebanon was in a negotiation process with Turkey on a free trade agreement which was signed at the end of November 2010 (Meier 2013).

The 2007 agreement embodies certain particularities which may also account for why the Lebanese parliament has not ratified the agreement yet.²¹ In a similar fashion to the agreement between Egypt and Cyprus, Article 1(a) of the Lebanon-Cyprus agreement states that the limitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between both states is effected by the ‘median line of which every point along the length of it is equidistant from the nearest point on the baselines of the two parties’. The boundary line extends for about 84.5 nm (Scovazzi 2012, 7) and, as [Figure 4.8](#) shows, it connects six equidistant points from north to south. Point 1 marks the southern extent between Lebanon and Cyprus and Point 6 marks the northern extent between them.

Nevertheless, in accordance with Article 1(e), these two points of the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone have been left for further negotiations with neighbouring countries, namely Israel²² and Syria. On May 21, 2009, the Council of Ministers (Decision No. 51) provided a new delineation with a list of geographical coordinates submitted to the UNSG in July 2010 (Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN 2010). On October 20, 2010, Lebanon deposited the southern part of the western median line of its Exclusive Economic Zone, that is, the point bordering Cyprus, in addition to the southern coordinates that it had deposited earlier and that border Palestine (*ibid.*).

4.3.2.4 Agreement with Israel and the Lebanese-Israeli dispute

On December, 17 2010, Israel²³ signed an agreement with the Republic of Cyprus in Nicosia delimiting their exclusive economic zones. The agreement entered into force on February 25, 2011. Similarly to the previous agreements (with Egypt and Lebanon), Article 1(a) projects the ‘median line’ as the optimal solution to delimit their exclusive economic zones. Furthermore, Article 1(b) posits that this median line consists of 12 geographical coordinates defining the edges of the Exclusive Economic Zone (*UN Israel* 23.3.2017). [Figure 4.9](#) sets forth these 12 geographical coordinates which delimit the exclusive economic zones between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus.

The problem, based on the attached list of these coordinates, is that the first boundary marker was surprisingly placed at the same coordinates of the conflictual Point 1 defined by the above-

²¹ At least at the time of writing.

²² It should be stressed, that in line with Lebanese law and practice, the term ‘Israel’ refers territorially to ‘Occupied Palestine’ and politically to the ‘Zionist Entity’.

²³ Not a contributing part to the UNCLOS.



4

Figure 4.8. Agreement between Lebanon & Cyprus. Source: UNDP. (2014, December). *The maritime boundaries and natural resources of the Republic of Lebanon*. New York, USA, p. 33



Figure 4.9. Coordinates for the EEZ between Cyprus & Israel. Source: Google Map

mentioned Greek-Cypriot agreement with Lebanon. Lebanon submitted notes to the UNSG in October 2010 (before the Greek-Cypriots' agreement with Israel) which displayed the charts and lists of the geographical coordinates for the delimitation of their Exclusive Economic Zone with the Palestinian Authority (the only authority they recognize) and the Republic of Cyprus. On July 12, 2011, Israel, in its turn, deposited a unilateral claim over the northern limit of its maritime space with the UN. The unilateral claim line defines what would 'be the maritime boundary with neighbouring Lebanon' (Permanent Mission of Israel to the UN 2011). Although the declaration does not specify the methodology for drawing the border-line, the provided turning points create a line that largely follows the northern limit of an existing 'security zone'

claimed by Israel close offshore, before following the northern limit of Israel's gas licence blocks extending out to the tri-point with Cyprus (Gürel et al 2013). These claims stirred up a reaction from Lebanon.

In 2011, Lebanon's Foreign Minister, Adnan Mansour, sent a letter to the former secretary general, Ban-Ki Moon, and declared (*Haaretz* 2011): 'The maritime maps that Israel presented to the UN are a blatant violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and its economic zone.' He explained that the coordinates Israel set forth cut a triangular area 'of 860 square kilometres of Lebanon's economic zone and regional waters' (*ibid.*). He concluded that this development 'jeopardizes international peace and security' (*ibid.*). [Figure 4.10](#) shows the disputed area.

Formally at war for years and without any diplomatic relations, Israel and Lebanon have never reached an agreement on a delimitation of their maritime boundaries. The only reference point they may hold as their borderline is the Blue Line since 2000 (although neither side has recognized the other as a state entity).

4.3.2.5 Delimitation Agreement between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey

In 2002, Turkish-Cypriots passed what they called the 'Territorial Sea Law No. 42/2002', arranging the breadth of their territorial sea to 12 nm (Gürel et al. 2013, 24). In 2005, they passed the 'Maritime Jurisdiction Areas Law', No. 63/2005, which provides for the proclamation of the Exclusive Economic Zone up to 200 nm as well as for its delimitation by agreement with neighbouring coastal states (in spite of the fact that except for Turkey none of these states has recognized them as a state entity). For Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots, this came into force with a retroactive effect on March 21, 2003, 'except for articles 15 to 17, which impose sanctions for the violation of the maritime rights and came into force on the day of the promulgation' (Yuksel and Ercan 2017, 287).

When Greek-Cypriots initiated their exploration activities, the Turkish-Cypriots made a call on them to postpone them. One of my interviewees (No. 13) informed me that the former Turkish-Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, had submitted letters to the UNSC in 2006, 2007 and 2008.²⁴ In 2011, the then chief negotiator, Kudret Özersay, considered Greek-Cypriot drilling an attempt of the Greek-Cypriot side to allegedly increase tension in a period of intensified negotiations for the reunification of the island (Gundem Kibris 2011). Greek-Cypriots were accused of 'abusing the negotiation process' in order to proceed on the issue of natural resources with the companies (Interviewee 14). 'In case you show a good environment in Cyprus negotiations, there is no need to suspend these processes. We can give further licences. This is what Greek-Cypriots were doing' (*ibid.*).

²⁴ These letters were not published in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers although they were received by the UN officials (*ibid.*).



Figure 4.10. The maritime disputed area between Israel and Lebanon. Source: InfoPro Online Service. (2017, March 22). Israel to annex disputed gas-filled maritime area. Retrieved at December 14, 2017, from <http://www.businessnews.com.lb/cms/Story/StoryDetails/5964/Israel-to-annex-disputed-gas-filled-maritime-area>

Özersay alleged, inter alia (Gundem Kibris 2011):

‘Similar steps drag the Cyprus problem into the Middle East problem which is complex in any case and could harm the safety of life and property of many people... Therefore, the Turkish-Cypriot side is bent on responding with counter measures (ibid.).

What kind of measures did he actually mean? On September 21, 2011, the Turkish-Cypriots signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement with Turkey, which has a boundary consisting of 27 coordinates (see Figure 4.11). This boundary does not constitute the median/equidistance line, but a line ‘determined on the basis of international law and equitable principles’²⁵ (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011a). This agreement would be legally binding for Cyprus after a settlement is reached, since there is a succession principle and ‘all agreements of the predecessor states remain in place’ (Interviewee 13).

Along these lines, Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot officials parcelled out eight blocks calling for Turkish Petroleum (TPAO²⁶) to initiate seismic surveys (between September 27 and November 1, 2011). Some of these blocks (F, G) encroach on blocks lying in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone.²⁷ TPAO dispatched a seismic vessel, *Piri Reis*, to carry out exploration on behalf of the breakaway regime in the occupied area of Cyprus, near parcel 12 where Noble, on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus, was conducting its own drilling. This development was justified

²⁵ Without elaborating on what this actually means.

²⁶ Acronym standing for ‘Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı’.

²⁷ Blocks 1,2,3,8,9,12 and 13.

as a reaction to the commencement of exploratory drilling authorized by Cyprus in its own Exclusive Economic Zone without consulting them. In his first statement after the signing of the agreement, the then prime minister of Turkey said: ‘We made clear to the international community that neither Turkey nor the Turkish-Cypriots can remain indifferent to this situation, which constitutes a clear and concrete violation of the rights and the interests of the Turkish-Cypriots; and that in the event that the Greek-Cypriots go ahead with the drilling, we would take a series of concrete steps with the TRNC in order to protect the legitimate rights of the Turkish-Cypriots’ (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011b)

According to sources quoted by Anadolu Agency, on September 25, 2011, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Derviş Eroğlu, during a private meeting with the UN Secretary General (Today’s Zaman 2011c), handed over a four-item proposal to manage the tensions that arose after the signing of the agreement with Turkey. The first item recommended the suspension of the ‘natural gas exploration simultaneously until a comprehensive solution is found to the Cyprus problem’ (ibid). In case the activities did not cease, Eroğlu, as a second item, set forth the establishment of an ad hoc committee, composed of an equal number of Turkish and Greek-Cypriot representatives. This committee would be assigned to make decisions and submit written approvals for research or extraction licences. According to the third item, the income ensued from the drilling could be transferred to a fund operating under the auspices of the UN. Finally, in line with the suggestions of the fourth item, this income could be allocated later to both sides, with a clause prohibiting both from using the income for purchasing arms (ibid.).

Pr. Özersay, who had claimed the origin of this idea, explained to me his rationale:




Figure 4.11. Delimitation of continental shelf between Turkey and the ‘TRNC’. Source: (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011a)

‘I had a kind of a vision. I was really serious and sincere when I encouraged and convinced Mr. Eroğlu to make a proposal about the use of these resources together even before a comprehensive settlement with the aim of un-melting it in the negotiation process. The only way for the lay person to see the benefits of a settlement is to bring some of them now in their pocket in a concrete way. So, in my view there is a fear of the Turkish-Cypriots being dependent more and more on outside sources, meaning Turkey, particularly in the field of energy’ (Interviewee 14).

4.3.3 Economic and geopolitical context

After the discovery of the gas reserves and the delimitation of their economic zones that would provide the legal framework for the drillings, the policymakers of the involved countries examined various options for the monetization. Table 4.3.3 lays out the projects that involve the Republic of Cyprus. The construction of (a) LNG plant offshore the Cyprus, (b) the installment of the East-Med pipeline which links Israel, Cyprus, Greece and, via the latter, Italy, (c) a pipeline between Israel, Cyprus and Turkey and (e) a pipeline from Cyprus to Egypt are among these projects.

These projects crystallize a sequence of continuous negotiations among the countries involved. These negotiations unfolded against a pre-existing economic background circumscribing their relations. I focus on the economic and political background of the relationships of the countries involved. I start with the relationships between Israel and Turkey, which have come under severe strain at the dawn of the new decade, especially after the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. I move on to examine the relationships among the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Israel as well as among the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Egypt.

4.3.3.1 *From Leviathan to Turkey*

Israel became the first mover in the economic and geopolitical game as regards the monetization of its reserves in terms of new export routes and infrastructure projects (Shaffer 2011). If Israel

Table 4.2. Monetization projects for Eastern Mediterranean Gas

Projects	States Involved	Gas Capacity	Estimated Cost (USD billion)	Estimated Year of Operation
LNG Plant	Cyprus and Israel	7-14 bcm/year	10-15	2020
East-Med Pipeline	Israel-Cyprus-Greece	30-40 bcm/year	17-20	After 2020
EuroAsia Interconnector Electric Cable	Israel-Cyprus-Greece	2000 MW	3.24	2019
Pipeline	Israel-Cyprus-Turkey	5-11 bcm/year	5-10	2023-2025
EuroAfrica Interconnector Cable	Egypt-Cyprus-Greece	2000 MW	3.74	Unknown
Pipeline	Cyprus-Egypt	700 mcf/day	Unknown	Unknown

Author's Compilation from Prontera & Ruszel (2017, 147); De Micco (2014)

wanted to transport its gas to the European gas market, Turkey had to be considered as one of the transit options through the construction of a pipeline crossing its territory. What are the actual possibilities for the realization of such a project?

After the AKP took over Turkey's governance, the traditionally stable bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel gradually deteriorated²⁸. They hit a low in May 2010, when Israeli commandos killed nine Turkish activists on board the ship *Mavi Marmara*.²⁹ In the immediate aftermath of the 2010 incident, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv and suspended military cooperation between the two countries. Turkish officials conditioned the restoration of the bilateral ties on three prerequisites: a clear apology to Turkey, compensation to the victims' families and relaxation of the Gaza blockade (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2013).

How can we explain the problematic relations between Israel and Turkey during the AKP's era? One of the interviewees told me that the 'withdrawal of the American troops, the weakening of Iraq and the rise of Shia governments changed the balance of power in the region and influenced -to a great extent- Turkish foreign policy' (Interviewee 5). Disrupting the ties with Israel would make no sense since Turkey could strike a delicate balance in the Arab-Israeli conflict without devaluating the military ties with Israel (*ibid*). It seems though that the ideology of Turkey's leadership may have shaped Turkey's policy vis-à-vis Israel (*ibid*).

On March 23, 2013, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan announced that he had finally received an apology from Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu for the deaths of the Turkish activists in 2010. As he alleged, this apology – brokered by US President Barack Obama – met Turkey's

²⁸ One of the tests they weathered was in February 2006, when, after an offer by the then Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the exiled supreme leader of Hamas, Khalid Mishaal, had a meeting with Turkish diplomats (*al Jazeera* 2006). On December 27, 2008, after a six-month ceasefire, Israel launched an offensive in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, with dozens of air -raids killing more than 1,000 Palestinians (*Guardian* 2008). According to Inbar (Inbar 2001), the fact that Israel did not inform Turkey about its impending attack on Gaza came as a great disappointment to the AKP government, which had viewed itself as an honest broker in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In January 2009, in one of the panels during the annual Davos World Economic Forum, the then Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan criticized, in front of the audience, Israeli president Shimon Peres for the Gaza offensive and stormed out of the forum. In September 2009, Israel rejected Ahmet Davutoglu's request to enter the Gaza Strip through Israel, 'where he planned to meet Hamas officials before crossing back into the Jewish state' (*ibid.*). Davutoglu had to call off the planned trip to Israel (Keinon 2009). Moreover, in October 2009, Turkey excluded Israel from a multinational air force exercise – codenamed Anatolian Eagle – which takes place on an annual basis.

²⁹ This ship was part of a six-boat aid flotilla, organized under the auspices of the International Gaza Movement and a Turkish group called the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Aid (IHH), aimed at breaching the blockade of Gaza imposed by the Israeli authorities. Ehud Barak, Israel's then defence minister, accused IHH of being a dangerous Islamic organization with terrorist links, 'although no evidence was provided to back this claim' (Tavernise and Bronner 2010).

conditions and proved its regional clout (Reuters 2013)³⁰. On June 26, 2016, the two countries reached an agreement to normalize their ties (Lewis and Pamuk 2016). Despite the severe political tensions between the two countries, there has been a booming trade between them; this development has continued up to today (see [Figure 4.12](#)).

Moreover, the two sides launched a discussion on an energy deal between them, with special reference made to the construction of a pipeline transporting hydrocarbons from Leviathan's gas fields (Israel) to Ceyhan (in Turkey). On the sidelines of a nuclear security summit in Washington in March 2014, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan allegedly held a private meeting with Israel's Minister of National Infrastructure, Energy and Water Resources, Yuval Steinitz, for 20 to 30 minutes (Baker 2016). That moment signalled the highest-level contact between Israel and Turkey since their diplomatic relations broke down in 2010. After the two sides renewed their ties (June 2016), the energy discussions intensified. In October 2017, the adviser of Yuval Steinitz, Dr. Cohen, said: 'discussions between Turkey and Israel were currently on the price and the route of the proposed natural gas pipeline between the two countries' (Sengul and Tiryakioğlu 2017), as shown in [Figure 4.13](#). The negotiations involved private Turkish and Israeli companies as well as government officials. The significance of such a pipeline for Turkey is explained in Appendix 6.

While interviewing energy analysts from both sides, I encountered, as expected, competing arguments about the construction of such a pipeline. One of them suggested that Greek-Cypriots should 'keep the Turkish option open if they want their gas to journey to Europe. Exporting to Turkey is a possibility and the economic argument has not been properly investigated' (Interviewee 6). The challenge would be that only if the single market were Turkey, a scenario that would enable Turkey to dictate the prices (Interviewee 6). This view is not shared among all Greek-Cypriots. Another Greek-Cypriot interviewee counterargued that 'Turkey is a difficult country at the level of cooperation and to the extent that other export options exist, the Turkish option should be left aside.' Since Turkey questions the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus, it would be unwise for the Greek-Cypriots to place them on the driver seat (Interviewee 4). The company that seeks to invest in you, due to the high risk, will ask you the double and triple price to invest' (ibid).

Moreover, the same interviewee ruled out the scenario that such project would work as a peace-pipeline. Such term exists nowhere in the world (Interviewee 4). Instead 'energy might further fuel the tensions and create a problem in parallel' (ibid). That is why the most important stake is the guarantee of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and of its rights. These should not be compromised by any means (ibid).

³⁰ Although Israel has not agreed to lift the Gaza blockade, one of Ankara's pending two conditions for the restoration of bilateral relations.




Figure 4.12. Trade relations between Turkey and Israel. Source: (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).

A Turkish-Cypriot interviewee counter-argued that the construction of a pipeline from Israel to Turkey is worth it (Interviewee 13). Turkish companies have launched lobbying to construct it, considering the option that the pipeline might not go from the Republic of Cyprus but from Karpaz (ibid).³¹ Turkish diplomats are hammering out their plans on the pipelines without consulting the Turkish-Cypriots (ibid). A Greek-Cypriot interviewee does not believe that Israel will ‘go behind Greek-Cypriots’ backs to move on with such a project (Interviewee 4). The Israelis recognize that such a pipeline crosses our red lines and, therefore, respect our concerns’ (ibid).

4.3.3.2 *The Trilateral partnership and Turkey’s reaction*

On December 5, 2017, three EU members – Greece, Cyprus and Italy – along with Israel signed a memorandum of understanding for the construction of the world’s longest underwater natural gas pipeline (Reuters 2017b). The project, listed as Project of Common Interest, provides for the construction of the largest undersea pipeline in the world, a 1,300 km offshore pipeline and a 600 km onshore pipeline (*IGI-Poseidon*). As Figure 4.13 shows, it is destined to channel offshore reserves (between 8-14 bcm/y) from the Levantine Basin (which includes Cyprus and Israel) to Greece and from there to Italy. More particularly, it consists of the following sections (ibid.): (a) a 200 km offshore pipeline stretching from the Levant Basin sources to Cyprus; (b) 700 km offshore pipeline linking Cyprus to Crete in Greece; (c) 400 km offshore pipeline from Crete to the Greek mainland (Megalopoli in Peloponnese); (d) 600 km onshore pipeline crossing Peloponnese, West Greece, and reaching the metering station within the municipality of Otranto in Italy (DEPA 2018).³²

³¹ Which lies in the occupied territories in the north of the island.

³² Since July 2014, this section was developed by the IGI Poseidon SA, a Greek company equally owned by Greek DEPA SA and the Italian Edison International Holding.




Figure 4.13. Proposed pipeline between Israel and Turkey. Source: Stratfor. (2014, April 2). [A Potential Turkey-Israel Pipeline Project]. Retrieved at 21.11.2015 from <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/potential-turkey-israel-pipeline-project>

One of my interviewees does not believe that the construction of a pipeline to Greece is a feasible option due to the depth of the water and surface on the sea (Interviewee 8). The challenge for Israel, is to meet great demands of its domestic market, while selling gas to other neighbouring markets, like Jordan and Egypt (ibid). That explains why Israelis may not invest in such option sincerely (ibid). An important obstacle concerning the Greek-Cypriot gas reserves is that under the current prices, it is difficult to take any advantage. The whole endeavour is much more expensive for the Republic of Cyprus, especially because 'these reserves lie offshore, in 'ultra-deep' waters. You need to install drilling platforms, to extract the reserves and transport them; therefore, the cost gets bigger and bigger'.

In order to comprehend how the three countries, in particular, Israel and Cyprus, concluded this agreement, I search for the background of their bilateral relations over the last few decades.

Due to its geographical proximity, Israel viewed Cyprus – an initial transit point for many Jewish Holocaust survivors in the 1940s – as an integral part of its 'periphery doctrine' (Guzansky 2014), a strategy going back to the first years of its existence, and designed to counter-balance pan-Arabism and overcome its isolation from the Arab states (Stergiou 2016). Despite reaction from within Egypt, the two countries, in January 1961, formalized their diplomatic relations with the establishment of an Israeli embassy in Nicosia. However, the participation of Greek-Cypriots in the Non-Aligned Movement – with their Arab friendly stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the close ties it developed with Soviet Union – impeded their further

development³³ (Stergiou 2016, 378). Greek-Cypriots seeking the support of the numerous Arab states, especially after 1974 in their confrontation in the UN with Turkey, explains their stance. They feared that Israel's full recognition, without a simultaneous recognition of Palestine, would bring about a risky precedent for the recognition of the breakaway regime in the north of the island (ibid). The two countries upgraded their bilateral relations in 1993 after the signing of the Oslo agreement, which paved the way for mutual Israel-PLO recognition (State of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993). On February 23, 1994, Cyprus installed its embassy in Tel Aviv. However, Israel's close military ties with Turkey had initially inhibited the further improvement of relations with the Republic of Cyprus.

Coinciding with the gradual deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations, a 'wind of change' spanned the traditionally distant relations between Greece and Israel,³⁴ as well as between Israel and Cyprus. The discovery of gas reserves offshore of Cyprus and Israel became the 'critical junctures' in this breakthrough. As stated above, in December 2010, the two sides signed an agreement to delimit their exclusive economic zones. On August 24, 2011, the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erato Kozakou-Markoullis, visited Israel to discuss strengthening the energy cooperation between the two countries and to formulate a common strategy to deal with the anticipated Turkey's reactions against Greek-Cypriot drilling (Newsit.gr 2011).

The predictions about Turkey's reactions proved accurate. *Hurriyet Daily News* (2011a) quoted Turkey's former foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu saying: 'The Eastern Mediterranean will no longer be a place where Israeli naval forces can freely exercise their 'bullying' practices against civilian vessels'. He warned that Turkey 'would take every precaution it deems necessary for the safety of maritime navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean' (ibid). Turkey's EU Minister, Egemen Bagis, asked the Greek-Cypriots to stop 'acting as the Trojan Horse of Israel' (*Daily Sabah* 2011). He also warned (*Today's Zaman* 2011a): 'This is what we have the navy for. We have trained our marines for this; we have equipped the navy for this'. In a similar tone, Turkey's Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, in reference to Greek-Cypriots' intention to launch drilling, stressed 'no one should attempt to test either the Turkish government or the country's past' (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2011b). The Greek vice-president, Theodoros Pangalos, asked in

³³ Stergiou (2016, 378) invokes the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Folder FA 2/176: Report on the Consultative Meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo in 1976 and FA 50: Report on the Consultative Meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade 8-11 July 1969.

³⁴ Since 2008, Greece and Israel have decided to put the 1994 Defense Agreement into practice. Between May and June 2008, the Israeli Air Forces (IAF), with the collaboration of the Hellenic Air Forces (HAF), carried out a major military exercise in the Greek national airspace – codenamed *Glorious Spartan* – of an attack against Iran's uranium plant, probably at Natanz (Israel National News 2008, Tziampiris 2015). In May 2010, a similar military air force exercise – codenamed *Minoas* – (involving aerial battles, long-range missions and mid-air refueling) was planned at a Greek air base in Souda Bay on the island of Crete (Pfeffer 2010).

parliament about the potential escalation of the crisis in the EM, stated: ‘an attack against Cyprus means an attack against Greece’ (Naftemporiki 2011). At that moment, Turkey was signing a delimitation agreement on the continental shelf with the Turkish-Cypriots and authorized TPAO to conduct surveys in that area, which encroaches on the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus. TPAO dispatched the seismic vessel, *Piri Reis*, to explore potential gas reserves. After signing the agreement, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called the joint Cyprus-Israel drive to explore gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean ‘madness’ and a blow to negotiations to reunite Cyprus (Today’s Zaman 2011b). One of my Turkish-Cypriot interviewees told me that Özersay played an important role in the crisis. He allegedly ‘dragged the issue to a reciprocity question.’ (Interviewee 13)

Taking Turkey’s threats into consideration, in October 2011, Cyprus agreed to do joint exercises with Israel. Although Cyprus has no air force, it possesses a modern military airport base in Paphos (‘Andreas Papandreou’) as part of a common defence doctrine with Greece. Israelis planned exercises in Cyprus’s airspace, involving air refuelling and aircraft interceptions (ibid.). These agreements were put into practice after 2014, when Cyprus and Israel embarked upon joint air force exercises codenamed Onisilos-Gideon (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Defense 2014).

Back in 2012, addressing *The Economist Energy Summit*, the Israeli Minister of Energy and Water Resources, Uzi Landau, underlined the significance of Greece, Cyprus and Israel ‘axis’ – as he called it – in Tel Aviv’s ‘geostrategic thinking’ and ‘as an anchor of stability’ in a ‘Middle East, that is now caught in a tremendous earthquake, stretching from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf and beyond’ (Melacopides, 2016, 139; Tsakiris, 2014). At the same time, between March 26 and April 2012, Israel, US and Greece conducted a joint naval exercise, codenamed *Noble Dina*, which involved ‘exercises of repelling enemy attacks against offshore natural gas and oil rigs, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and prohibition of military aircraft operations’ (Turkish Navy 2012).

4.3.3.3 Joint Israel-Cyprus LNG plant on the southern coast of Cyprus

In November 2012, Israeli, Greek and Cypriot ministers signed an agreement to set up joint Greece-Cyprus-Israel working groups which would evaluate the feasibility and promotion of some major energy initiatives (besides the East Med) enabling gas exports from Israel and Cyprus to Greece (Tagliapietra 2013).

One example was the possibility of an LNG plant at Vassilikos port in Cyprus and the EuroAsia Interconnector. This project would involve the transportation of Israeli and Cypriot gas to a liquefaction plant at the port of Vassilikos at Larnaca District in Cyprus, and from there, exporting it by ship to Greece for regasification (Tagliapietra 2013). Given the proximity of the Leviathan’s field to the Aphrodite field, this option was considered as the ‘only realistic and

viable way to deliver Israeli and Cypriot natural gas to the EU' (Tagliapietra 2013). Furthermore, as an option, it reflected an attractive market segment for gas sellers, since 'global demand for LNG has been growing three times faster than for gas as a whole' (Giamourides 2013, 21). Due its inherent flexibility, LNG would have been 'well-positioned to capture new gas market opportunities' besides Europe (ibid.). Since the Asian gas market has been growing faster than the EU market, the LNG might have entailed better prospects in the longer term than pipeline gas (Gurel, Mullen and Tzimitras 2013, 79). Furthermore, from the moment the production took place at a single site, it would be less vulnerable to terrorist attacks (as opposed to the Egypt-Israel gas pipeline, which was repeatedly targeted in the aftermath of the Arab uprising in Egypt). Finally, an additional advantage would be the much smaller volume it would contain, facilitating large quantities to be exported at any single time and eventually reducing the transportation costs.

Gürel et al. (2013, 79-82) list a number of challenges that such an enterprise might involve. The very large running and investment cost might reduce the revenue that could be generated. The cost of exploration and development wells (which, as explained at the start of this chapter, lie in 'ultra-deep' waters), the number of years needed to build up the plant (according to the current projections six to seven years after a final decision to initiate its construction) and the amount of gas reserves essential for its construction (around seven tcf for a single train-plant of five million tonnes per annum) might render this endeavour a risky business. Finally, the low LNG prices at the moment further question its future competitiveness in the global market (Interviewee 6).

In June 2013, Cyprus signed a memorandum of understanding about the potential construction of such a facility with Noble Energy International Ltd, Delek Drilling Limited Partnership and Avner Oil Exploration Limited Partnership³⁵ (LNG World News 2013). The MoU does not entail a binding character but rather paves the way for a series of negotiations 'that will specify the technical and commercial basis on which an onshore LNG plant will be built at Vassilikos' (ibid.).

4.3.3.4 The construction of the EuroAsia Interconnector

The EuroAsia interconnector is an underwater cable, approximately 1,518 km long, linking the electrical grids of Israel (Hadera), Cyprus (Kofinou) and Greece (via Korakia in Crete) through submarine DC cables and HVDC onshore stations in each country with a capacity of 2000 mw (Tsakiris 2014). Its estimated cost is approximately €2.65 billion (ibid.). Making use of the gas reserves detected in Leviathan and Aphrodite (with the utilization of additional renewable sources), the central objective of this project is to set out a reliable alternative

³⁵ The companies which were granted a production sharing contract for Block 12 in 2008.

corridor for transferring electricity to Europe, terminate the energy isolation of Cyprus³⁶ and Crete (ibid.), and ‘offer Israel an additional “fail safe switch” in the event of a flow disruption in Tamar or Leviathan’ (Tsakiris, 2014, 9). It is promoted by a trilateral consortium composed of Greece’s DEH (Public Power Corporation), Israel’s Electricity Corporation (IEC) and DEH-Quantum Energy Ltd³⁷ (Tsakiris 2014, 8). According to the current projections, this venture’s costs will be recouped in four years and should earn €17.5 billion throughout the life of the cable.³⁸ After a year of negotiations, on August 8, 2013, the three countries, represented by their ministers of energy, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) declaring their intention to implement the EuroAsia Interconnector (Globes Online 2013). This memorandum covered cooperation on desalination of water resources as well (ibid.).³⁹

4.3.3.5 *The trilateral summits*

Between 2013 and 2016, the three countries were deepening their cooperation. They reached an agreement to ‘further promote trilateral political consultations and expand dialogue to all levels, with a view to contributing to the consolidation of regional peace, stability, security and prosperity’ (State of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The ambassadors of the three countries expressed their concerns ‘for illegal actions and provocations in the sea waters of the Eastern Mediterranean in violation of international law’ (ibid.). The recipient of the message was clear: Turkey. After Cyprus announced drilling in Block 9, on October 3, 2014, Turkey issued a navigational warning (NAVTEX), ‘designating’ from 20 October to 30 December, 2014, a large area within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus as reserved for seismic surveys to be conducted by the Turkish vessel *Barbaros* (European Parliament 2017). This development allegedly triggered the Cypriot president to pull out of the negotiation talks with the Turkish-Cypriot leader at that time. The second trilateral political consultations with the participation of the countries’ ambassadors took place in Jerusalem on January 16, 2015, expanding their agenda on other areas, such as ‘search and rescue, civil protection, economic cooperation, shipping, health and medicine, education, agriculture and fisheries, conflict resolution, people-to-people contacts and culture’ (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).

From 2016 until 2017, three trilateral summits were held. In January 2016, the first trilateral summit took place in Nicosia. In a joint statement, they emphasized: ‘The discovery of important hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean can serve as a catalyst for peace,

³⁶ As the last member of the EU fully isolated without any electricity or gas interconnections.

³⁷ Located in the Republic of Cyprus and the project’s operator.

³⁸ As the East-Med Pipeline, this endeavor is listed also among EU’s PCIs.

³⁹ In August 2013, a subsidiary of Israel’s National Water Company, Mekorot, opened desalination plants in Limassol and Larnaca. Both projects are destined to meet 40% of the island’s water consumption, seeking to curb the increasingly problematic water shortages it faces (Udasin 2013)

stability and cooperation in the region' (State of Israel Embassy in Cyprus 2016). At the second trilateral summit, held in Jerusalem on December 8 2016, they announced the establishment of a 'Permanent Ministerial Committee on Energy designed to consider strategic and practical aspects of joint action in the field of energy cooperation' (Proto Thema 2016). They stressed the strategic value of the trilateral energy projects, such as the East-Med pipeline to Europe and 'EuroAsia Interconnector'.⁴⁰ In April 2017, the energy ministers of the three countries, in the presence of Italy's energy minister and the EU Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, Miguel Arias Cañete, pledged their commitment to the East-Med project (Euractiv.com 2017). Finally, in the third trilateral summit, held in Thessaloniki on June 15, 2017, the leaders of the three countries announced once again their commitment to and the strategic value of the two projects (State of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017).

What is the logic driving the cooperation among the three countries? Was it economy, security or different considerations motivating this partnership? One theory is that the lack of experience or expertise in securing their natural resources through their coast-guard, navy and air force motivated Greek-Cypriots (Interviewee 5). From Greek-Cypriots' point of view, 'Israel was a practical resort, in line with latter's effort to alter the diplomatic balances vis-à-vis Turkey' (Interviewee 5). By approaching Israel and considering that Noble, a company of American-Jewish interests, was drilling in Block 12, 'Cyprus aimed at creating a nexus of interests that would potentially benefit the Republic of Cyprus against Turkey' (ibid). Inspired by a neorealist view, the 'anarchic environment' in the Eastern Mediterranean was the main imperative behind these initiatives. Given that Syria was in a state of chaos and that the pipeline between Israel-Egypt and from the latter to Europe through Algeria could not be utilized – mainly because of political risk calculations – 'Israel was also urged to turn its attention to Cyprus, having discovered its own gas, and to Greece as being the natural extension of the Eastern Mediterranean in geostrategic terms and because of the latter's bonds with Cyprus' (Interviewee 5).

Another interviewee expressed a different theory, according to which the triangles were based on a consolidated perception: the 'enemy of my enemy is my friend' (Interviewee 13). These developments matched the priorities of Israel because of Liberman. Liberman, who is of Russian origin, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'being obsessed with Turkey, contributed to the establishment of these triangles with Greece and Cyprus in order to counter-balance the losses supervened after the dissolved cooperation with Turkey' (Interviewee 9).

Another theory pinpoints domestic calculations behind the rapprochement between the two countries. The leftist Cypriot government of Christofias at that time allegedly initiated the whole

⁴⁰ They also agreed to expand their cooperation in various fields, such as tackling the humanitarian aspects of the migration crisis, facilitating the dialogue among the diaspora communities and enhancing the EU-Israel relations.

rapprochement towards Israel in order to restore its shaken image after the Mari events in 2011 (Interviewee 13). The poor economic performance of the government and its reluctance to take austerity measures made him launch these plans in order to distract attention from the reforms needed.' (ibid).

4.3.3.6i *The Egyptian option*

One potential outlet for the Greek-Cypriot gas reserves is that 'Egypt has two LNG termination plants at its disposal (Damietta and Idku), which are not operational at the moment, due to miscalculations of the Egyptian authorities.' In recent years, Egypt has been suffering natural gas supply shortages due to 'a lack of investment in the country's upstream sector, political unrest, and a struggling regulatory environment' (Norlen and Maddock 2015). By 2015, the country had largely shut down its two LNG facilities (in Idku and Damietta) as well as its pipeline to Israel, transforming Egypt from a dynamic exporter into a net natural gas importer.

Nevertheless, the 2015 discovery of a giant field (850 bcm) in the Zohr basin offshore Egypt reshaped the country's prospects and rendered it once again the cornerstone of the energy security architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean. According to McKinsey (Norlen and Maddock 2015), the supplies from the Zohr discovery are destined to satisfy growing domestic demand, while the existing LNG plants on its coast (Idku and Damietta) may crop up as an opportunity to export the Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe and beyond. In August 2016, Cyprus and Egypt signed an agreement paving the way for the supply of Cypriot gas to Egypt via an undersea pipeline, without determining whether the gas would be used for Egypt's domestic needs or be liquefied at Egypt's LNG plants for export to other markets (Hadjicostis 2016). A year later, in November 2017, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to begin transferring NG and began discussions about the construction of a pipeline (*Daily News Egypt* 2017).

Royal Dutch Shell, owner of the Egyptian LNG facilities in Idku, reportedly launched negotiations to buy natural gas from Israel's Leviathan field, 'combine it with output from the Aphrodite field'⁴¹ and pump it to Idku (Bloomberg 2017). Linking the Leviathan and Aphrodite fields to the Idku plant in Egypt held an additional advantage: it would bypass politically contested and sensitive zones in the Eastern Mediterranean as such a route would only require permission to solely pass through Egypt's Exclusive Economic Zone. The to export gas to Egypt would be the best option for the Greek-Cypriots according to one of my interviewees, given that the Zohr field might need a couple of years to be explored (Interviewee 5).

Besides their economic implications, these developments had a political impact as well. Since 2014, Egypt has begun different forms of cooperation with Cyprus and Greece. Between

⁴¹ In which it owns a 35% stake through the BG Group.

November 2014 and November 2017, five trilateral summits⁴² took place with the participation of the three countries' leaders. According to the joint declaration published in the aftermath of the fifth trilateral summit (21.11.2017), the three leaders reached an agreement to broaden 'strategic cooperation' on energy, devising plans to transport Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe and linking the grids of Europe and North Africa via an undersea cable (Hadjicostis 2017). This cable, the EuroAfrica Interconnector, with a length of approximately 1,648 km and a capacity of 2000 mw, would create an electricity highway from Egypt-Cyprus-Crete-mainland Greece to Europe through which the EU could securely access electricity produced by the gas reserves in Cyprus and Egypt as well as from available renewable energy sources (EuroAfrica Interconnector). The realization of such a project would contribute to the completion of the European internal market (ibid.).

In these declarations, they also pledged to launch negotiations on the delimitation of their maritime zones where it is not yet done. While the Republic of Cyprus and Egypt have delimited their exclusive economic zones since 2003, the respective delimitation between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus as well as Greece and Egypt is still pending.

4.4 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS, CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES

I have presented in a detailed fashion most of the technical, legal, financial and geopolitical aspects of the energy setting in the Eastern Mediterranean. Without these aspects, readers cannot gain an adequate understanding of the realities in which the recent Cyprus gas dispute has unfolded. These aspects are enriched by the statements of analysts and officials directly or indirectly involved in this scenario.

Before I provide some conclusions to this Chapter, I present some of the concerns of analysts on how the key actors among the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, as well as the other surrounding states in the Eastern Mediterranean, have handled the issue so far and the future prospects of the gas reserves.

4.4.1 Critical reflection on the energy debate

According to one of my interviewees (No. 9), all the regional actors, such as Egypt, Israel and Cyprus, approached the whole debate purely from a political point of view and prioritized it over the business logic. Tremendous opportunities were being missed of monetizing the gas reserves both in Cyprus and Israel from political and economic viewpoints (Interviewee 9). This view was shared by another interviewee, who asserted that the policymakers in the region

⁴² 8.11.2014, 29.4.2015, 9.12.2015, 11.10.2016 and 21.11.2017.

looked at the situation narrowly (Interviewee 6). They allegedly did not have a good grasp of what was happening at a global level, including the development policies in relation to a global energy perspective (Interviewee 6). Another interviewee mentioned that the parties involved should not look at the issue narrowly, but in a regional dimension in order to involve other stakeholders and consider their interests (Interviewee 11). The same interviewee mentioned that the energy issue had been handled by both sides in a very Cold War-style fashion –in a win-lose competition-oriented way and not in light of a win-win logic.

So the fundamental question is how an issue that emerged as recently as 2011 has been viewed through the prism of the existing conflict and became another link in the chain of the Cyprus crisis (Interviewee 9). One explanation is that in cases where political securitization has reached high levels, such as the case between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, the possibilities for energy cooperation are low. Energy can become a game changer as a peace catalyst, but the main prerequisite is a low degree of political securitization, which allows energy to be put on the agenda and become manageable in both political as well as securitized terms (Interviewee 4). In the case of political-military conflicts, drawn from existing practices and experience, energy as such has not been a factor conducive to their resolution. Instead, it has evolved into an essential chapter of the pre-existing conflict, despite the ability to smoothen things out at a later stage and under concrete circumstances (Interviewee 4). Cyprus is not an exception in this respect.

4.4.2 Greek-Cypriot concerns and priorities

What are the stakes that both sides attach to the monetization of the natural resources? To what extent can economic calculations outweigh the security ones? As confirmed by the assertions of the interviewees above, security gains take primacy over economy, especially for the Greek-Cypriot side, which seems to prioritize the containment of Turkey's influence over reaping the economic benefits from the natural resources. For instance, although the Greek-Cypriot participants acknowledged that the transportation of natural gas through Turkey was in financial terms a much more viable option than any other solution, in political terms and with the current gas reserves detected, exports to Turkey would be the wrong choice, even after a settlement (Interviewees 4 & 7). The reason was because 'Turkey is unpredictable. We do not know whether tomorrow Turkey will bring two warships. If we are not ready to guarantee our sovereignty, why should we expect from Turkey to respect it?' (Interviewee 4). Even if Greek-Cypriots are willing to discuss the energy issue, Turkey cannot get the pipelines whilst simultaneously asking the Republic of Cyprus to abolish itself as a state entity. Turkey does not allow any room for compromise (Interviewee 3). 'You cannot assign a price to the political cost or to the political risk. How can you talk about energy cooperation with your enemy when he does not recognize you as a state entity' (Interviewee 4)? The energy issue as presented here not as a question of economics but of high politics. As aptly put by one of the interviewees, 'energy in our case is deeply securitized at a political level: screw the economics' (Interviewee 4). This

approach justifies to a great extent why the trilateral agreements between Cyprus-Egypt-Greece and Cyprus-Israel-Greece are oriented in the right direction (Interviewee 3).

It becomes clear that for Greek-Cypriots, Turkey is the main problem. How do they view the role of Turkish-Cypriots? Should they participate in hydrocarbons management or not? Should they reap any economic benefits from the extraction of the natural resources or not? I recognized a division on this topic by the Greek-Cypriot respondents. 'Without knowing the realities attached to the potential solution [of the Cyprus conflict], such a discussion is purely speculative' according to one of them' (Interviewee 4). Greek-Cypriots might find an economic formula to distribute the economic benefits, but not a political formula that would grant rights to the Turkish-Cypriots (ibid). 'In this way, Turkish-Cypriots would not accuse them of seeking the profits of these reserves solely for their own benefit' (Interviewee 4). What is the problem with Turkish-Cypriots' participating in the decision-making? 'No company in the world feels ready to invest millions or billions if it does not know who it is dealing with. Who is putting down the signature? The Republic of Cyprus signs now and its signature is abiding for the state' (Interviewee 4).

If the issue reaches a bi-communal level and every community has the right to exercise its veto, no company in the world would want to invest millions if it had to face any form of obstructiveness (ibid). Obstructiveness for the interviewee meant a Turkish-Cypriot veto. As argued, if Greek-Cypriots had to strike a deal with the Egyptians, with Total or ENI they would have first to reach an agreement with Turkish-Cypriots. This would give Turkish-Cypriots the chance to tell the Greek-Cypriots: 'No, we do not agree, except for the case we agree on a rotating presidency' (Interviewee 4). In the face of a deadlock, Greek-Cypriots could expect an oil company to tell them to wait until the Cyprus conflict was resolved, although in 46 years this has not been the case and high financial costs are at stake (Interviewee 4). There is an additional impediment to the Turkish-Cypriots' participation in hydrocarbons' management: that is their overreliance on Turkey. 'If the cooperation in the management of these resources were a solely bi-communal issue, someone would claim that a *modus vivendi* could be reached' (Interviewee 4). 'If the approval of Turkey – which is behind this– is requested, then what happens? We are especially talking about today's Turkey, which is unpredictable and unreliable' (ibid).

Another Greek-Cypriot participant counter-argued this and warned that 'without a meeting with the Turkish-Cypriots – not with Turkey – to discuss these issues, the Greek-Cypriots would find themselves under the Damoclean sword of Turkey' (Interviewee 8). The same person came up with a suggestion: Greek-Cypriots could keep the drilling activities, 'but under the supervision of an international authority, within which a Turkish-Cypriot could also participate' (Interviewee 8). The Turkish-Cypriots would not be eligible to participate in the management of these reserves but they could supervise the whole procedure under an

international banner (Interviewee 8). Such a proposal would include a disclaimer: ‘whatever is agreed on the energy topic does not constitute a precedent for the other arrangements-items of the Cyprus question’ (Interviewee 8). Moreover, the same person pitched the idea of creating an escrow account for the distribution of the economic benefits even before a settlement was reached and for every \$100 that the Greek-Cypriots would earn, a proportion of this amount could be directed to the Turkish-Cypriots (Interviewee 8).

The debate on the economic cooperation with Turkey and the participation of the Turkish-Cypriots in the hydrocarbons’ management boil down to the assumption that the most important stake for the Greek-Cypriots is the guarantee of the republic’s sovereignty and of its rights. The sovereignty of Cyprus should not be compromised and it should be solely the Greek-Cypriots making the decisions (Interviewees 3; 4; 7; 8). This explains how security considerations outweigh economic calculations.

4.4.3 Turkish-Cypriot concerns and priorities

Turkish-Cypriots seem to pursue incompatible objectives. They are after decision-making powers. What they want is to have a say in decision-making and conduct the explorations jointly, despite the negative reaction of the Greek-Cypriots, for which the explorations constitute a sovereignty issue (Interviewee 10). One of my Turkish-Cypriot respondents mentioned: ‘Everybody agrees that hydrocarbons belong to both communities’⁴³ (Interviewee 10). Greek-Cypriots’ claim: ‘we have the Republic of Cyprus which is capable of using all these sovereign rights, so we don’t really want to bring in the Turkish-Cypriots because that would imply that the Republic of Cyprus is actually problematic’. The respondent further argued that the Republic of Cyprus was problematic, just as the ‘TRNC’ was problematic, ‘although the ‘TRNC’ may be more problematic, of course, because it’s also not recognized’ (Interviewee 10). Therefore the approach of Greek-Cypriots, summarized as ‘don’t bother guys, we will give you your money’ is also problematic (Interviewee 10). The interviewee urged Greek-Cypriots to find a different way of defending their rights. They were requested to consider how to cooperate with Turkish-Cypriots ‘without prejudicing the existing political status quo as regards the Republic of Cyprus’ (Interviewee 10). Greek-Cypriots should not render the monetization of gas reserves as an existential question for the Republic of Cyprus, as if the Republic of Cyprus’s existence depended on talking about hydrocarbons with Turkish-Cypriots or not (ibid). That is why the hydrocarbons’ issue should be put on the negotiation table as a parallel process that would not prejudice any other issues.

According to Interviewee 10, Greek-Cypriots were ‘blinded by a misperception that the discovery of natural resources has granted them bargaining chips in their confrontation

⁴³ Turkish Cypriots, on their part, recall a resolution issued by the UNGA in 1962, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, which attributes access rights not only to states, but to people and nations.

vis-à-vis Turkey'. Greek-Cypriots 'falsely assume that the discovery of natural resources has brought Turkey on its knees and Turkey has to make concessions in order to gain access' (Interviewee 10). The same respondent implied that by doing this, Greek-Cypriots were 'trying to strengthen their position and ownership rule within the Republic of Cyprus' and the treatment of Turkish-Cypriots as an insignificant political minority: 'they want to patch us up' (Interviewee 10).

Turkey's stance, in the words of the Turkish-Cypriot respondents, has not been constructive either. 'Turkey is an important country in the region and obviously a big country in the region will have certain priorities as to its presence and geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. If left out of the regional energy plans, 'Turkey will getting angrier and angrier I'm not saying it is handling it well, but it's getting angrier and angrier and this is not a good idea' (Interviewee 10).

Another respondent mentioned that Greek-Cypriots' fear of the negative impact that the Turkish-Cypriots' participation would have on the decision-making procedure was based on the presumption that the 'Turkish-Cypriots will continuously exercise their veto' (Interviewee 14). Such an assumption underscores the absence of federal culture in the Cypriot context (ibid). That is why they made a call to Greek-Cypriots to form a joint body, a joint committee under the UN even before a comprehensive settlement on the Cyprus conflict was reached. In this body, the parties would deliberate about developments, management and perhaps create some kind of mechanism which would not prejudice their political positions in the negotiations (Interviewee 14). The only way for the average person to see the benefits of a settlement is to 'bring some of the benefits of the settlement in the short run and feel them in their pocket in a concrete way' (ibid). A system-project could be created for the use of natural gas, especially for the production of electricity, which is more environment-friendly (ibid). This would not be about sharing the money but the resources within an inter-connected system, destined for industrial purposes and housing as well as in the kitchen (ibid). This is something concrete that could bring the two sides together (ibid). Another Turkish-Cypriot respondent called on the Greek-Cypriots to create a peace fund for reconstruction after a settlement was reached (Interviewee 13). This fund would be used to introduce new things on the island, for example, fixing the traffic across the island, a problem that affects both sides (ibid). A final suggestion was that if 'Greek-Cypriots want these resources, to utilise them, to exploit them properly, they really need to make peace with Turkey, somehow' (Interviewee 10).

4.5 CONCLUSIONS

Summarizing the answers above, it seems that most of the Greek-Cypriots have traced their 'red lines': 'no cooperation with Turkey because peace pipelines do not exist' and 'no negotiations with Turkish-Cypriots on the hydrocarbons management' in order to avoid a future impasse on

this topic. Greek-Cypriots claim that they will provide some economic profits to the Turkish-Cypriots either with or without a settlement. On the other hand, many of the Turkish-Cypriot interviewees required their involvement in the discussion over the hydrocarbons' management even before reaching a settlement, while they underscored how Greek-Cypriots do not have the luxury of excluding Turkey as a player in the region. Some participants from both sides accused all actors involved of a 'narrow mindset' concerning the energy debate, while some did not rule out some options to open up small-scale cooperation on the energy field regardless of whether a settlement is reached.

It has been clearly established that the discovery of the gas reserves has exacerbated the conflict. While in Chapter 3, I elaborated on the lessons that both sides have drawn from the conflict as well as the reasons why no settlement has been reached so far, in this chapter, I set out the various energy realities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Egypt have embarked upon partnerships that would safeguard the utilization of these reserves. Their task is hampered by the low gas prices (at the time of writing), which jeopardize the competitiveness of their final product, the depth of the waters wherein the drilling companies have to operate and by Turkey's resistance, which wants to impose its involvement in future energy projects.

The Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot historical and energy views I outlined through open-ended interviews in Chapters 3 and 4 form the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses of my study, meaning the 'universe' of subjective communicability regarding the topic as articulated by the two sides. These positions will be subject to further introspection through the aid of Q-methodology.

5

Q-methodology

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The objective in this exploratory research is to endogenize agency by letting the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriot elites articulate what is meaningful and significant when it comes to hydrocarbons' management and its association with the Cyprus conflict. To tackle such a challenge, I apply Q-methodology, a method described as 'the best-developed paradigm for the investigation of human subjectivity' (Dryzek and Holmes 2002, 20). I begin this chapter by laying out some background information about Q-methodology and its utility in social science research. I then present the necessary steps for its implementation: (a) the forming a universe of subjective statements regarding the topic (concourse), (b) the reduction of these statements to a manageable number (Q-sample) through discourse analysis, (c) the sorting procedure by the P-Set and (d) the factor or centroid analysis. Table 5.1 displays the stages I followed in the Q-research design.

5

5.2 THE UTILITY OF Q-METHODOLOGY

As a research method, Q-methodology was introduced by William Stephenson (1953) to quantitatively study individuals' subjectivity. It enables a structured approach to identifying people's understandings of particular issues by highlighting significant differences in respondents' attitudes (Brown 1993). Among the key premises of Q is that subjectivity can be communicated and systematically analysed. It allegedly provides a rigorous measure of human subjectivity (Brown 1980). It uncovers ways of thinking about an issue although it does not quantify the prevalence of those ways of thinking (Brown, 1980). The results of a Q-study reflect a population of viewpoints, but not a population of people (van Exel and de Graaf 2005). It requires a relatively small number of possibly diverse respondents, but the sample does not have to be representative of the population. Therefore, results cannot be generalized.

Table 5.1. The stages for this study's Q-research design

Phases	Techniques	Outcome
1. Concourse	Answers from open-ended interviews with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot opinion-leaders in November 2014 and November-December 2015	300 statements
2. Q- Sample	Classification through two criteria: Vital elements of statements Claims of elements	48 statements
3. Q-sort	Reaching out to 23 Greek-Cypriots and 21 Turkish-Cypriot opinion-leaders Presentation of 48 statements on 48 imprinted cards to each side	Factor-Centroid Analysis

Some may question why I used Q-methodology instead of R-methodology in the form of surveys and questionnaires in my effort to decipher the perceptual quality of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities on this topic. Multiple reasons account for this choice. While R-methodology is used to get respondents to articulate their views on isolated statements, Q-methodology identifies respondents' views in statements after they have evaluated all statements presented to them (Silvius, et al. 2017). Furthermore, in contrast with R-methodology, Q-Methodology traditionally seeks to provide a picture of the pre-existing perspectives among the population (as articulated in the opinion articles), rather than investigating the level of support for those perspectives among the population, a logic represented by R-methodology (Silvius, et al. 2017). This implies that the procedure for sampling respondents differs from that in R-methodology (*ibid.*). Rather than random sampling and large sample sizes as used in R-methodology, Q-methodology uses purposive sampling and smaller sample sizes, involving people who have exhibited adequate knowledge with respect to the topic under investigation (Karakasis, 2019). In my case, I searched for policymakers, journalists, NGO representatives, academics and businessmen from both sides to articulate their views on the gas reserves and the conflict.

Q-methodology has been widely used in the fields of public administration, political sciences and conflict studies. In the field of public administration, Brown and Ungs (1970) used Q-methodology to study reactions to Kent State violence, Yarwood and Nimmo (1976) to examine definitions and attitudes about bureaucracy and Brewer et al. (2000) to investigate public service motivation. Jeffares and Skelcher (2011) adopted Q-methodology to examine how public managers think about questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability within network forms of governance. Steunenberg et al (2011) adopted Q-methodology to examine the main discourses in Germany and Turkey on Turkey's accession to the EU. Van Eijk et al. (2017) made use of Q-methodology to map citizens' views on their engagement in co-production activities in the domain of community safety, with special reference to neighbourhood watch schemes in Belgium and the Netherlands. Niedzialkowski et al. (2018) applied Q-methodology to investigate the attitudes of key stakeholder groups (local communities, NGOs, scientists, protected area staff, foresters, public officials, general public) towards the involvement of local communities in managing various forms of biodiversity conservation in Poland.

In the field of political science, Johnston and Feldman (1984) used Q-methodology to formulate a schematic model of how people organize their beliefs about the political world by integrating aspects from sociological and psychological perspectives. Sullivan et al. (1992) did the same to systematically assess how patriotism is factored into US electoral politics. Callahan et al. (2006) made use of Q-methodology to explore the way individuals processed the war on terror as articulated by officials in the Bush administration and captured by the media. Kanra and Ercan (2012) explored the changes in attitudes among Islamic and secular groups in Turkey through a Q-analysis of discourses regarding Islam, democracy, secularism and dialogue.

More recently, scholars from conflict studies have embraced Q-methodology to decipher the perceptual quality of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. More particularly Uluğ and Cohrs (2016) explored representations of the Kurdish conflict among laypeople in a multi-ethnic city in Turkey based on comprehensive models of conflict analysis. Furthermore, the same authors, working on the same subject, explored the conflict understandings of Track II actors in the Kurdish conflict context and compared them with conflict understandings of Track I actors in order to spot the similarities and differences between these actors (Uluğ and Cohrs 2017). However, no academics so far have investigated the Cyprus conflict through this method. Therefore, from a strictly methodological point of view, this research constitutes a methodologically pioneering work in examining the Cyprus conflict along with its energy nuances. In my view, Q offers a person-centred stance on this topic, which is essential if someone seeks to comprehend the subjective ‘underlayers’ accounting for ‘intractability’ and the protracted character of the conflict.

5.3 THE STEPS OF Q-METHODOLOGY

Four distinct stages account for the implementation of Q-methodology: (a) the formation of the *concourse*, (b) the Q-sample, (c) the P-sets and the sorting procedure and (d) the factor or centroid analysis.

5.3.1 The concourses: answers to the open-interview questions

Q-methodology has its roots in the *concourse*, meaning the universe of subjective communicability surrounding the gas developments in and around Cyprus. I can find this communicability in ‘ordinary conversation, back-fence gossip, commentary deposited on Internet blogs and exchanged in chat rooms and extending to the high-level discourses of epistemic communities across all the sciences’ (Brown & Good, 2010, 1151). There is no doubt that facts may be invariably interlaced with opinions. The division between the two turns on the principle of self-reference, which constitutes a focal point of Q-methodology (ibid.). The volume of opinion representing the universe of communicability is, in principle, infinite in magnitude (ibid.). Unlike sampling in surveys, where we can determine the population boundaries and the number of cases, when it comes to the boundaries of communicability on energy security, we cannot fix them because the latter’s content is limitless.

To form the *concourse*, I employed open-ended interviews with dozens of Cypriot policymakers, research analysts, academics and journalists. There is a particular reason why I resorted to open-ended interviews. According to McKeown and Thomas (1988), the use of interviewing for the purpose of identifying a *concourse* is consistent with the principles of Q. They suggest that a few interviews could suffice in this respect. An important aspect to be addressed is the language of conduct with the subjects of my research. While as a Greek I

could communicate with my Greek-Cypriot interlocutors in Greek, with the Turkish-Cypriots, the situation was quite different. Having studied for two years at Istanbul Bilgi University (2006-2008), I gained a good understanding of the Turkish language. This helped me ask some questions to the Turkish-Cypriot opinion-leaders in Turkish. Some of my respondents articulated their thoughts in Turkish. In cases where I could not understand their answers, I sent the transcripts to a Turkish-speaking colleague, who translated them. Most of my Turkish-Cypriot respondents were kind enough to give their answers in English. Without ruling out the possibility that the selection of English may have impacted the interpretation of my findings, I resorted to further research on these people: I searched for transcripts of other interviews they may have given in different fora and checked whether the meanings I took from their answers were deviating from ones they had articulated in different interviews. Via this form of 'triangulation', I sought to ensure that the English language did not distort the key message that my Turkish-Cypriot respondents delivered. In this way, I was able to guard against the bottom-up interpretation of my findings from not being compromised by any 'linguistic' misinterpretation.

Drawing on the content of chapters 3 and 4, where the historical background and the energy security stage were introduced, I conducted field research and open-ended interviews in order to construct the historical and energy shared positions in the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities; these positions involved interpretations over the conflict on the island, understandings of natural resources and the main stakes that the contending parties attach to the monetization of the gas reserves and the future prospects as regards the utilization of the natural resources and their impact on the peace negotiations. I created two concourses: one for the Greek-Cypriot side and one for the Turkish-Cypriot one. The statements forming the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses derived from the answers of Greek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot interviewees respectively.

There were several reasons to prefer interviews over other methods of collecting statements. Qualitative interviews in the local languages allowed me to see political life on the island in a comprehensive way, from all possible angles (Rubin and Rubin 2012, 4). Open-ended interviews are especially useful in circumstances where the policy deliberation on a sensitive issue, such as hydrocarbons' management in conflictual environments, is nearly invisible. They allowed me to examine the complexity of the real world by exploring multiple perspectives towards energy security questions in the context of a protracted conflict environment.

A question that arose was about my preference for open-ended interviews instead of structured interviews. The reason why I opposed the use of structured interviews is that they 'may override the rich qualitative nuances' that opinion-leaders from each side bring to the concourse (Ellingsen, Storksen and Stephens 2010, 397). Instead, I resorted to 'umbrella' questions, which enabled multiple possible answers from the selected interviewees. The concourse in

this respect is expressed through those answers that manifest the meanings that the selected interviewees ascribe to the monetization of the gas reserves and on the lessons they have drawn from the Cypriot conflict. Interviewing them led me to more thoughtful and nuanced conclusions about what is at stake from the perspective of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. The answers to my questions yielded a corpus of 300 related statements for both sides.

5.3.2 The Q-samples: the linguistic use of ‘political discourse analysis’

The next step was to take a sample from this ‘volume’ just as a ‘geologist requires a rock sample or a pollster requires a respondent sample for more detailed study’ (Durning & Brown, 2006, 538). The point here is to represent all potential elements displayed in the set of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot answers respectively. To reduce the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses to a more manageable volume, I made use of a procedure as independently as possible from my particular interests. Being completely independent is, of course, impossible, in the sense that I had to make judgements about including and excluding statements in the first place. According to Brown (1980, 73), ‘there is no standard Q sample for a concourse. Any suitably comprehensive sample is adequate for purposes of experimentation’. As stated, the point of the sampling process is first to ensure that the key elements of the discourses are identified. The key elements include the historical interpretations of the Cyprus conflict from both sides, the factors behind its intractability as explained by both contenting parties, the stakes behind the gas reserves, the perceived motives behind Turkey’s gunboat diplomacy, the role of Greece, the Turkish-Cypriots’ participation in the hydrocarbons’ management as well as the underpinning logic motivating the Republic of Cyprus’ agreements with Greece, Israel and Egypt.

So how could I ensure that the Q-study captured these quintessential elements of my statements of both concourses? Since there is no rigid guideline that could direct me in the sampling, I engaged in what Seidel (1985) calls ‘political discourse analysis’. Discourse, in this particular methodological framework, is not used as the theoretical instrument designed to navigate me throughout the meanings and understandings that the opinion-leaders apply to the gas reserves and their impact on the conflict. I rather used it as a ‘linguistic terrain’ that secured the representativeness of the elements displayed in the answers above and guaranteed as much variation as possible.

For this purpose, I adopted a method proposed by other Q-methodologists (Dryzek and Berejikian 1993, Steunenberget al. 2011). I sorted all statements according to two criteria which define ‘politically-charged’ statements, the vital elements of in such statements and the kind of claims about the general situation at hand. With respect to the first aspect, I sampled the statements based on (a) the identification of an ontology or set of entities, clearly mentioned in these statements (political or economic leaders, drilling companies, nations, states, EU, UN,

lobby groups); (b) the degrees of agency with which these entities are accredited to act or be acted upon; (c) the motivations that are acknowledged behind the courses of action of these entities or agents (maximization of material self-interests, greed, redressing grievances); and (d) conceptions of natural and unnatural political relationships (dependency or inter-dependency relations, trade-relationships, energy cooperation or any form of interaction between people, nations or any other entities).

Regarding the second criterion and particularly the types of claims embodied in a statement, I used a classification laid out by Toulmin (1958), Dryzek and Berejikian (1993, 51), and Steunenberg et al. (2011, 452). The sorts of claims that can be made in my statements are: (a) definitive (regarding the very meaning of terms in question); (b) designative (concerning questions of facts or speculations); (c) evaluative (apropos of the worth of something that does or could exist); and (d) advocative (speaking of something that should or should not exist). The combination of these two criteria produced a four-by-four matrix cell structure, used here as a 'heuristic device' to sample the concourse. I depict this matrix in [Table 5.2](#) and indicatively provide some statements (from both concourses) in each cell in order to illustrate my reasoning throughout the classification.

The next question that someone may raise is about the number of statements that the Q-sample should consist of. From my research, I observed that most Q-studies contain samples of 40 to 50 statements, without neglecting the possibility of more statements. What kind of criteria should I have considered in defining the boundaries of the sample? On the one hand, I flagged the representativeness and variation of the statements as the most important criterion. On the other hand, before approaching Cypriot opinion-leaders currently involved in the debate, such as policymakers, civil servants and energy affiliates, I was aware that most of them would not devote a lot of their time (more than one hour) to rank more than 50 statements. Therefore, I opted for 48 statements for each side. Appendix 7a presents the statements used for the Greek-Cypriot P-Set and Appendix 7b presents the statements used for the Turkish-Cypriot P-Set.

5.3.3 Explaining the sampling of the P-Sets and the Q-sort procedure

Having collected and classified the 48 statements into the categories described above, I placed every statement ('item') into a printed and numbered individual card. I needed a number of people who would rank these statements. In the language of Q-methodology, I needed to formulate my P-set. P-Sets, as in the case of Q samples, offer breadth and comprehensiveness, instrumental features that would increase my confidence that the major discourses under investigation would be clearly demonstrated. They are usually smaller than the Q sets (Brouwer 1999). The people comprising the P-Set are not randomly selected. On the contrary, they are theoretically relevant to the Cyprus conflict and with adequate knowledge on the importance of the natural resources. Therefore, on both sides of the island, I opted for opinion-leaders/elites with clear and distinct viewpoints regarding both 'items' under investigation. In their quality as

Table 5.2. A sample of the heuristic device for reducing discourse

Discourse Element ¹					
	Ontology	Agency	Motivations	Natural/unnatural relationships	
Type of claim	Definitive	(1) Energy in our case is deeply securitized at a political level: screw the economics.	(2) In the case of political-military conflicts, energy has not been, so far, a factor conducive to their resolution but evolved as an essential chapter of the pre-existing conflict.	(3) Americans want to clear the Cyprus question out of their way in order to normalize their relations with Turkey, while Syria is in between.	(4) The challenge of a pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey would be that if the single market we have is Turkey, then Turkey may dictate the prices.
	Designative	(5) Greek-Cypriots fear that Turkish-Cypriots will be potentially treated as the ‘Trojan horse’ of Turkey.	(6) Turkish diplomats are making plans on the construction of the gas pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey without consulting the Turkish-Cypriots.	(7) Turkish-Cypriots are after decision-making. What they actually want is to have a say in the decision-making: ‘let’s do the explorations jointly.’	(8) Exporting the current Cypriot gas reserves to Turkey establishes the conditions of a unilateral dependency on Turkey.
	Evaluative	(9) The construction of a pipeline to Greece is not a feasible option due mainly to the depth of the waters and to the lack of Israel’s interest in investing in such a pipeline.	(10) Even if the Turkish-Cypriots had natural gas reserves, they would have to engage with capitalism; unfortunately, that is life.	(11) All countries in our region, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, approached the whole debate purely from a political point of view having priority over the business logic.	(12) Through the potential utilization of natural gas, Greek-Cypriots thought they had gained a negotiation tool in their confrontation vis-à-vis Turkey.
	Advocative	(13) After the establishment of an escrow account, for every \$100 that the Greek-Cypriots would earn from the utilization of the hydrocarbons, a proportion could be directed to the Turkish-Cypriots. We can apply this proposal even without a settlement	(14) Cypriots could have a peace fund for reconstruction after peace. This fund should be used to introduce new things on the island (fixing traffic)	(15) The Greek-Cypriots should not make the energy issue an existential question for the Republic of Cyprus, as if its existence depends on talking about hydrocarbons with Turkish-Cypriots.	(16) Without a meeting with the Turkish-Cypriots – not Turkey – to discuss the energy issue, the Greek-Cypriots will find themselves under the ‘Damoclean sword’ of Turkey.

¹ The table is inspired by Dryzek and Berejikian (1993, 52). The numbers identify the cells from 1 to 16.

elites, they could define the discourses woven into the fabric of the resource-related debate on the island (Brown 1980).

5.3.3.1 *The formulation of the P-Sets*

I visited the Republic of Cyprus in July 2017 and approached a number of Greek-Cypriot opinion-leaders (23), who would eventually become the *P-Set* of my Q-analysis. I did the same in January 2018 and approached 21 Turkish-Cypriot opinion-leaders. Taking into consideration that Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriot are in a conflict, I decided to opt for two different P-Sets rather than one (the same way I opted for two concourses and two Q-sets). In the context of a conflict, where the division lines are natural distinct, divided by the Green-line I mentioned in Chapter 3, I had to investigate how each side formed its own positions.

What kind of criteria did I adopt for the selection of my participants on both sides? The first priority in the recruitment process was to identify participants who, due to their professional experience or affiliation, had a clearly defined viewpoint to express, while their viewpoint *per se* mattered in relation to the subject at hand. Thus, I selected policymakers, NGO representatives, energy affiliates (researchers, employees in oil refineries), civil servants and journalists with expertise on this topic. The second priority was to avoid an unduly homogenous participant group. Hence, besides the (professional) affiliation with the issue at hand, another criterion, age was also taken into consideration.

Pursuant to the first priority, I reached out to policymakers who have served as former foreign ministers, the incumbent leaders of different political parties and leading members of the Committee on Energy, Trade, Industry and Tourism in Cyprus. With respect to the policymakers, we strived for representativeness from the most popular parties in Cyprus.¹ While picking legislators and executives of various political colours, the hypothesis I wanted to test was whether the different official political positions of their representative parties (vis-à-vis the Cyprus conflict or other social and economic issues) predisposed their own position vis-à-vis the monetization of the gas reserves. For the same reason, I also sought for journalists who had worked in different newspapers or news websites and had published a handful of articles or analytical reports about the potential utilization of gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, I opted for civil servants with adequate knowledge and experiential insights into this topic. Furthermore, I contacted energy affiliates, mainly researchers and analysts, who had extensively published in newspapers and academic journals on this topic.

¹ From the Republic of Cyprus, the conservative 'Democratic Rally', the Communist 'Progressive Party of Working People', the centreright wing 'Democratic Party' and the centre-left wing 'Citizens' Alliance'. From the Turkish-Cypriot side, I opted for representatives from the Republican Turkish party (CTP) and Communal Democracy Party (TDP), which favor social-democratic values, the United Cyprus Party, which favors socialist/left-wing values and the People's Party, which supports centre-right wing ideas.

Finally, I searched for NGO representatives, including political activists and sociologists, who had demonstrated a clear viewpoint on this topic.

This segmentation in professions offers the possibility of insights that I would have missed by only checking on the aggregate data produced by the Q-sorts. Presumably, different professions could have influenced the elites' views on what the actual stakes in the debate were. For instance, if we asked an energy affiliate about the priorities in this debate, we would assume that their answers would stress the need for market-oriented calculations to outweigh geopolitical considerations. The NGO representatives, striving for a stronger voice of civil society in the Cypriot realities might adhere to the notion of the construction of a peace fund for the reconstruction of the island. I anticipated that these elites would prioritize the technical and financial aspects of the debate over geopolitical expediencies. Along the same lines, I hypothesized that the politicians would accentuate the historical and geopolitical nuances of the debate and downplay its financial and technical utterances.

Age was another important criterion in the selection. Whether our subjects in both sides experienced the 1963 and 1974 events might have defined their views on the conflict. A member who experienced a turbulent past might have promoted a more peaceful settlement of the energy security question than someone with no relevant experiences, who had learned to live on a divided island for more than two or three decades. This could work also the other way round: an aged member of our elite, due to the experiences he or she had gathered, might have opposed any cooperation scheme with the other side. Appendix 8a presents some details about the participants of the Greek-Cypriot P-Set and Appendix 8b the respective ones of the Turkish-Cypriot P-Set.

5.3.3.2 The sorting procedure or the Q-sort technique

I assigned the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot participants of the P-Sets to evaluate the collected 48 statements (items). More precisely, I asked them to sort the items into a specific kind of rank order, dictated by the guidelines of Q-methodology. Some may call it a 'forced distribution' process because, regardless of the number of statements that the respondents agree or disagree with, the latter are somehow 'compelled' to match their preferences against the number of cells indicated in a board distribution template ([Figure 5.1](#)).

I devised the procedure as follows. First, from the 48 statements, the participants had to initially identify 19 statements they agreed with, 19 statements they disagreed with and 10 statements they considered neutral. Second, after the first 'scanning' and classification, each individual had to place each statement in order from -4 (for the items they most disagreed with) to +4 (for the items they most agreed with). This order appeared significant from the standpoint of the participants (Brown 1980, 195).

[illegible]

Figure 5.1. Board distribution template.

At this point, I have to (re-)establish that a Q-sort is more akin to evaluating statements for which right answers do not exist. The issue here is to render the subjectivity involved inviolate and, therefore, the Q-sort merely provides a forum tailor-made for its very expression. Besides the ranking process, most of the participants were called to enrich this sorting with comments and personal reflections on the vast majority of the 48 statements. These insights play a twofold role. On the one hand, they stand for the justification needed for the ranking procedure. On the other hand, they comprise the findings I used in order to enrich the qualitative analysis and the interpretation of the results.

Before moving forward with the analysis, I need to draw the attention to the timing of the q-sorting and interviews. The q-sorting transpired after the collapse of the Crans Montana which I mentioned in Chapter 3. I conducted my interviews during a pre-electoral period. The Republic of Cyprus was expecting presidential elections in January 2018, while in the same month Turkish-Cypriots were running their own parliamentary elections. During these time periods reaching a settlement of the Cyprus conflict was not flagged as the highest priority

for the electorates. However, this did not discourage many policy-makers to not incorporate the failure of the reunification talks in the pre-electoral battles and start a blame-game for who should be held accountable for the deadlock. Greek-Cypriot policymakers were pinpointing Turkey's intransigent stance as the main cause of the collapse of the reunification talks. On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriot policymakers were casting blame on the President of the Republic of Cyprus for prioritizing the cost of his (non) re-election over reaching a settlement.

5.4 Q-CENTROID ANALYSIS

5

After gathering the Q-sort answers, I conducted a centroid analysis. In principle and in relation to multiple indicator measures, a centroid (or factor) analysis embodies a correlational method. Scholars routinely employ it in order to categorize variables and determine whether groups of indicators collected out of such Q-sorts tend to bunch together to form distinct clusters, referred to as factors or centroids (Bryman 2008, 161). While in the *R* method, the variables may refer to personality traits or psychological tests, in Q-methodology the observed variables are provided by the ranking of the 23 Greek-Cypriot and 21 Turkish-Cypriot Q-sorts.² The objective at this stage was to uncover the latent unobserved variables inferred from the larger set of these observed variables (Toshkov 2016, 139-140) and to determine the cluster of positions held by different groups within the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot P-Sets vis-à-vis the energy security debate across the island. The issue was to identify what kind of socially shared categories the 23 Greek-Cypriot and 21 Turkish-Cypriot participants fell into by virtue of demonstrating similar understandings on the topic under investigation. These similar understandings are preliminarily manifested through the correlation between the Q-sorts. I treat, hence, centroids (or factors) as 'natural complexes, manifestations of actual thinking defined operationally in terms of concrete human behaviour' (Brown 1980, 208).³

² 23 people of the Greek-Cypriot P-Set multiplied by 48 statements as well as 21 people of the Turkish-Cypriot P-Set multiplied by 48 statements

³ Within the context of Q-methodology, the correlation between Q-sorts provides a kind of measure about the nature and extent of the relationship between any two Q-sorts (Watts and Stenner 2012, 96-97). The calculation of the correlation among all respective Q-sorts (on both sides) resulted in a 23 x 23 matrix for the Greek-Cypriot sorts and a 21 x 21 matrix for the Turkish-Cypriot sorts. These matrices uncover the numerical nature and extent of relationships that pertain to all the 23 Greek-Cypriot and the 21 Turkish-Cypriot Q-sorts. The proportion of the meaning and variability in every Q-sort that is held in common by a group is generally called common variance (Kline 1994). In my case, the latter explains as much as possible about the existing relationships among the 23 and among the 21 Q-sorts in the group by reference to any sizeable portions of meanings present in the data. The basic task of centroid analysis is to account for as much of this common variance as possible.

Using the PQ Method,⁴ I adopted QCENT Horst's centroid method and varimax rotation (van Eijk, Steen and Verschuere 2017, 64, Abdi 2003). Principal Components analysis would have been an *alternative* option for extracting (unrotated) factors. However, I decided to follow Peter Schmolck's- the person who established the PQ Method software- suggestion: 'centroid analysis, the method of choice for Stephenson and his followers, is not much used outside the Q-community nowadays, whereas Principal Components analysis is the default method of factor extraction in statistical packages like SPSS' (Schmolck 2014). Q-methodologists consider centroid-method the most suitable factor extraction technique 'due to the permissiveness it enables in relation to data exploration' (Watts and Stenner 2012, 99-100). Through centroid analysis I could 'identify the number of natural groupings of Q-sorts by virtue of being similar or dissimilar to one another; that is, to examine how many basically different Q-sorts are in evidence' (van Exel and de Graaf 2005).

5.4.1 Factor loadings

After identifying the patterns of similarity in the Q-sort configurations, a number of centroids had to be extracted. The extraction option, in Q-methodology, leaves many possible solutions open to legitimately defer a decision about the best criteria for making such a decision (Watts and Stenner 2012, 107). Drawing on Brown's dictum (1980, 220), a prominent figure in the Q-community, the number of factor loadings that each centroid has is the most important criterion in the extraction of the centroids. The centroid to be extracted needs to involve at least two significant *factor loadings*. Factor loading 'measures' the degree to which each individual Q-sort loads in a potential factor and is expressed in the form of a correlation coefficient between each Q-sort and each factor⁵. A respondent is closer to the factor with which they have the highest loading (Zabala and Pascual 2016)⁶. All respondents loading significantly on a factor seemingly embrace similar viewpoints on this topic.

Through PQMethod, I manually 'flagged' the most representative Q-sorts (associated respondents) loading to each factor (Karakasis, 2019, 464). Through 'flagging', I pinpointed which Q-sorts would be used for subsequent calculations; I measured their idealized score for each statement and for each respective factor (ibid). The purpose of flagging is to obtain as many distinguishable perspectives as possible (ibid). The 'flagging' is based on a number of criteria (ibid). The first criterion is that the loading should be significantly high⁷ and much larger than

⁴ Downloaded from <http://schmolck.userweb.mwn.de/qmethod/> (Retrieved at 22.6.2017)

⁵ The range of values for the correlation coefficient is -1.0 (perfect negative correlation) to 1.0 (perfect positive correlation).

⁶ For a loading to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level, its correlation coefficient to a factor must exceed $2.58 \times (\text{standard error})$. The correlation coefficient per factor should equal or exceed a value of 0.38.

⁷ The significance threshold for a p-value < .05 is given by equation 1, where N is the number of statements (Brown 1980, Watts and Stenner 2012).

the loadings of the same Q-sort for other factors. The second criterion is that the square loading for a factor is higher than the sum of the square loadings for all other factors (Zabala and Pascual 2016). It goes without saying that Q-sorts with higher factor loadings will contribute proportionally more to each of the centroid estimates than Q-sorts with relatively lower factor loadings (*ibid*). After ‘flagging’ the individual Q-sorts that define the factors, I produced ‘idealized’ Q-sorts by aggregating across the flagged Q-sorts and weighing the loadings for each factor (*ibid*). I inspected the meanings of these aggregated Q-sorts and interpreted them by comparing and contrasting them, through the additional help of participants’ reflections on statements during and after sorting (Uluğ and Cohrs, 2017; Brown 1993; Watts and Stenner 2012). Finally, drawing on the work of other Q-methodologists like Uluğ and Cohrs (2017, 156) and Webler et. al (2009), I employed two additional criteria before deciding on the final number of centroids (factors) for each side. One criterion is clarity: the more sorts loading highly and uniquely on one factor, the better. The other criterion is distinctness: the lower the correlations between the idealized Q-sorts representing the factors, the better.

Conforming to these criteria, I extracted three distinct centroids (factors) as the most significant from the Greek-Cypriot P-Set and two from the Turkish-Cypriot P-Set. I proceeded with a varimax rotation of these five factors for each P-Set. The rotation, in general, ‘changes their positions along with their viewpoints relative to the Q-sorts. During the rotation, the factor loadings are placed under a series of carefully trained microscopes’ (Watts and Stenner 2012, 129) allowing for the re-examining of the nature of the correlations among the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot Q-sorts. After the rotation, I identified any Q-sorts that closely approximated with the viewpoint of each of the three factors from the Greek-Cypriot side and each of the two from the Turkish-Cypriot side. As the outcome of this procedure, Appendix 9a displays the factor loadings for each of the 23 Greek-Cypriot Q-sorts, while Appendix 9b shows the factor loadings for each of the 21 Turkish-Cypriot Q-sorts.

5.4.2 Factor arrays

I focus now on the total weighted scores of the 48 statements in relation to each of the three factors for the Greek-Cypriots and to each of the two factors for the Turkish-Cypriots. This process forms the ideal-model Q-sort for each factor and demonstrates how an ‘ideal’ participant with a 100% score on that factor would have sorted all the statements (van Eijk et. al 2017). In order to facilitate cross-factor comparisons among the five factors, the scores were converted into z (or standard) scores (Watts and Stenner 2012, 139, van Exel and de Graaf 2005).⁸ In turn, these z -scores for each individual item were converted into factor arrays. These are Q-sorts configured to represent the viewpoint of a particular factor and conform to the same distribution used in the original data collection. Ultimately, these rank-orders reveal

⁸ A z -score is a measure of how many standard deviations below or above the population-mean a raw score is.

the extent to which each of the items (statements) is representative of each of the three factors, and thus, becomes crucial to the interpretation of our results (Brown 1993). Appendix 11a outlines the three factor arrays for the Greek-Cypriots and Appendix 11b, the two factor arrays for the Turkish-Cypriots.⁹

After conducting these steps, I had three factor-centroids from the Greek-Cypriot P-Set and two factor-centroids from the Turkish-Cypriot P-Set. These centroids illuminate the central meanings that Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot opinion-leaders ascribe to the recently discovered gas reserves and their importance for the future of the divided island. These meanings come in the form of discourses and lay out the incompatible objectives that the contending parties pursue as regards the future exploitation of the gas reserves. These discourses are analysed in Chapter 6.

5.5 CONCLUSIONS

The introduction of Q-methodology in the study of resource-related conflicts facilitated further the implementation of a micro-level and discursive analysis of my project. It provided me with a systematic and rigorously quantitative means for examining ‘human subjectivity’, which comes under the spotlight here. Q-methodology is located in a rich stream of philosophical thinking about the formation and interpretation of discourses and chimes with my position on social constructionism while dealing with such convoluted topics. The exploratory logic governing Q-methodology rendered such a design a more suitable strategy to examine the stakes that the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot elites ascribe to the recently discovered gas reserves and the linkages they forge with the trajectory of the Cyprus conflict.

Through this procedure I identified five discourses in total: three discourses from the Greek-Cypriot opinion-leaders and two discourses from the Turkish-Cypriot ones. Through the identifying statements characterizing each discourse as well as the qualitative arguments that the P-Sets used to justify their ranking, I lay out the linkages that the contending parties forge between the discovery of the gas reserves and the development of the conflict.

⁹ Both appendixes point to the Q-sort values assigned to each of the three factors, along with their respective item numbers, wordings, the z-scores reached per factor and the ranking position acquainted per factor. The asterisk (*) attached to some of the z-scores displays significance at $P < .01$, which makes them significant solely for one of the factors extracted and not for any of the other two.



Analysis of the discourses

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The constellation of the identifying statements scoring high in each factor-centroid helped me uncover the discursive factors upon which the disputants build their competing energy strategies. Following the results of the factor-centroid analysis and based on how participants of the P-Set interpreted, analysed and justified their ranking and statements, I present five discourses here: (a) ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’, (b) ‘Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms’, (c) ‘Resentment matters’ from the Greek-Cypriot side, (d) ‘Gas stimulating political equality’ and (e) Micropolitics from the Turkish-Cypriot side.

This section sheds light on these discourses by first pinpointing the identifying statements scoring high in each of them and then the arguments that the respective participants used in order to rank the statements the way they ranked them. I start with the discourses of the Greek-Cypriot P-Set and then move onto the ones of the Turkish-Cypriot set.

6

6.2 GREEK-CYPRIOT DISCOURSES

6.2.1 ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’

6.2.2.1 *Identifying statements*

As shown in Appendix 10a, this discourse includes 8 participants out of the 23 and captures 16% of the common variance. The most striking characteristic in this discourse is the inclusion of all the policymakers that we included in our Greek-Cypriot P-set (PM1-PM5). As reiterated in the previous chapter, these policymakers represent different political parties (from communist to right-wing parties) and have served in the past (before and at the time of their recruitment) at crucial positions in the executive (Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism) and legislative (Committee of Energy Affairs in the House of Representatives) branches of the Cypriot state apparatus. The same factor includes the two civil servants (CS1 and CS2) of the study and one journalist. Although the people selected did not demographically represent the policymakers and the executive branch of the Republic of Cyprus but only their own views, the consensus among them was noticeable. Age was not a determinant demographic criterion in the sense that people born before and after the 1964 and 1974 events were included in this group.

Individuals praised the importance of the Greek-Cypriot partnership with Israel and Egypt in implementing their energy programme (by assigning a high positive value to statement 36). Furthermore, they ruled out every possibility to negotiate the future monetization of the gas reserves in the reunification talks with Turkish-Cypriots because they feared that the latter ‘will be potentially manipulated as the Trojan horse of Turkey’ (a +3 to statement 23). They also assigned a high positive value, +3 to statement 32: ‘There may be companies (ENI and TOTAL)

which would not hesitate to confront Turkey. If they want to make the decision to go, they will go because they think that Cyprus's entitlement in this region is very strong'. Finally, they highlighted that the most important aspect of the energy debate is to safeguard the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus; in this light, it should be solely the Greek-Cypriots making decisions on such matters (+2 to statement 39), while Turkish-Cypriots should be involved only after a settlement in Cyprus is reached. Table 6.1 displays the statements highlighting Greek-Cypriot discourse 1.

Table 6.1. Greek-Cypriot Discourse 1

Greek-Cypriot Discourse 1				
Gas boosting our geopolitical standing				
No.	Statement	Q-Sort Value	Z-score	
36	The trilateral agreements between Cyprus-Egypt-Greece and Cyprus-Israel-Greece are oriented towards the right direction.	3	1,54*	
24	Gas is an important issue but not the main factor that prompts the negotiations. Negotiations are driven by geopolitics.	3	1,48	
23	Greek-Cypriots fear that Turkish-Cypriots will be potentially manipulated as the 'Trojan horse' of Turkey.	3	1,48	
32	There may be companies (ENI and TOTAL) which would not hesitate to confront Turkey. If they want to make the decision to go, they will go because they think that Cyprus's entitlement in this region is very strong.	3	1,46*	
39	The most important stake in the energy debate is the guarantee of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and its rights. Therefore, the Greek-Cypriots should be the ones making the decisions.	2	1,40*	
1	The maritime disputes around Cyprus are linked to the Aegean Sea.	2	1,22*	
19	There is a succession principle in the delimitation agreement signed between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. All agreements of the predecessor states remain in place.	-3	-1,78*	
40	Greek-Cypriots can keep on the drilling activities, but under the supervision of an international authority, within which a Turkish-Cypriot representative could also participate. This proposal includes a disclaimer: whatever is agreed upon is not a precedent for other issues.	-4	-2,01*	

6.2.2.2 Interpretation

The constellation of the identifying statements above signals the triumph of 'geopolitics'. The portrayal of natural resources as a bargaining tool vis-à-vis Turkey and the need to protect them through its alliances with Greece, Israel and Egypt dominate the discourse and do justice to the assumption that 'geopolitics are not dead, but still extremely relevant'. Under the current circumstances, the participation of Turkish-Cypriots in any schema involving the natural resources should not be entertained because their management is solely a 'sovereignty issue'. Furthermore, Greek-Cypriot participants fear that Turkish-Cypriots would become greedy if they participated in the co-management of the hydrocarbons without a settlement; they would have no incentive to display a constructive stance during the negotiations. Finally, even if Greek-Cypriots were open to this scenario, they doubted that Turkish-Cypriots would promote their own agenda. This was framed as 'Turkey's Trojan horse': they would rather promote Turkey's interests than their own.

6.2.2.3 The triumph of geopolitics in the 'strategic rationality' of Greek-Cypriots

The respondents envision the gas reserves as a strategic good which could enhance the negotiation capacity of Cyprus vis-à-vis Turkey. They believe that energy could be key to 'boosting their geopolitical standing'. A respondent argued that although

'the legal nexus via UNLOS advances the position of the Republic of Cyprus in the exploitation of its gas reserves, Cypriots' military equipment is inadequate to enforce the implementation of this very legal nexus. This fully reflects the vision of an anarchic environment characterized by the absence of a strong international authority, like a Leviathan, that would enforce the application of international law. Therefore, the possession of military capabilities, as the natural resources are framed, constitutes a necessary ingredient for Cypriots' survival in their antagonistic relations against Turkey.'

Such a vision has serious implications for how someone formulates his strategy.

'In our energy design we prioritized security considerations. We planned to parcel out at least one block out of the 13 to every permanent member of the Security Council, despite the fact that this effort failed with Russians and Chinese.' To this effect, 'we authorized companies coming from countries with military strength to invest in our region. If we square our own interests in the region with the ones of the companies – and eventually their origin countries of origin – then the latter will have an extra motive in contributing to a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus conflict.'

The respondents assumed that the companies originating from countries with military strength would not have any problem to go through with their energy plans because they know that Turkey could not actually challenge their authority:

'The companies do not have to mess with Turkey. They know that they would execute their energy plans along the lines of international law, which eventually supports the official

Cypriot position.’ Close to the military aspects, the respondents heralded a diplomatic one with respect to the invitation of the companies: ‘If the offer comes from a company of a Muslim country origin, we evaluate its relations with Turkey. This factor is crucial to our final decision.’

Such calculations come at a price:

‘Embarking upon cooperation with such tycoons is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the companies ensure the installation of the drilling platform and alleviate security concerns. Turkey will not dare to attack the French or the Americans. On the other hand, you, as a Greek-Cypriot, cannot by any means impose your interests on them.’ The big powers ‘see the forest for the trees; they design a regional strategy. It is more than naïve to believe that the big powers fashion their strategy by fixating their concerns on the unilateral interests of Cyprus, Lebanon or any other country. Israel is an exceptional case.’

In commenting on how the superpowers, especially the ones in the Security Council, dictate the bi-communal negotiations in order to promote their own energy plans, the respondents provided a different view:

‘It is not the big powers that dictate the negotiations but Turkey. The key player in enabling the negotiations to move along is Turkey, who, due to its geopolitical relations with the big powers, drags them into the negotiations. The main actor is Turkey. This by no means implies that the big powers have no interest in the region, especially after the recent discoveries.’

Most participants indicated the importance of the trilateral agreements with Egypt, Israel and Greece (statement 36):

‘carving out strategic collaborations with neighbouring countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, while excluding Turkey from them at this stage – due to its illegal occupation of 37% of the Cypriot territory and the intransigent stance towards the Cyprus conflict – might work as the ‘carrot’ for Turkey to re-formulate its strategic calculations. The agreements and the prospect to participate in these partnerships might lure Turkey in the future into contributing to a peaceful settlement and render it one of the key players in this cooperation.’

The respondents deemed such initiatives necessary because the maritime disputes extend beyond the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone and include the dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea as well (statement 1). In their view,

‘Turkey considers the area surrounding both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean as a space vital to her interests. Therefore, Turkey’s vision validates windows of opportunities to muscle her military strength throughout the entire region by provoking occasional crises.’

One respondent underscored the stakes that Greek officials attach to the developments around Cyprus:

‘It is not a question of brotherhood and solidarity bonding Cyprus and Greece. The Greek officials have come to realize that if the Cypriot front crumbles, the Aegean is coming next’. This line of argument clearly integrates Greece in the regional security complex discussed in the theoretical chapter. The partnerships with Greece, Israel and Egypt are deemed essential if Cyprus wants to keep Turkey’s revisionist objectives in check.

In the eyes of the participants, the gas reserves symbolize the sovereignty of the Greek-Cypriots and this explains why, under the current circumstances, they should be the only ones making decisions on such matters (statement 39):

‘This is an issue of national sovereignty and concerns solely the sovereign state’. Forging linkages between the hydrocarbons’ issue and the settlement of the Cyprus conflict would hold the republic hostage to the Cyprus question and hamper the extraction of the hydrocarbons’.

That explains also why the respondents rejected the possibility of constructing a pipeline to Turkey:

‘it is a risky business because we talk about a country that is unstable and continuously resorts to geopolitical games. If we had to cope with a country wherein the law of geopolitical inertia has prevailed, like Luxembourg, things would have been easier for us’. Pursuant to this logic, another respondent claimed: ‘Turkey has not convinced us of being a reliable state. Turkey may lock the pipes anytime and exploit them as a diplomatic tool at the expense of our interests. Therefore, ‘I do not accept the transportation of gas reserves through a pipeline to Europe crossing Turkish territory. We will not depend on Turkey but Turkey will depend on us’.

One respondent made an export option to Turkey a condition of the resolution of the Cyprus conflict:

‘If Turkey recognizes the Republic of Cyprus, I really do not mind. For the time being, the fact is that no cooperation can be established with Turkey because she does not recognize the republic. In the future, and in the event of a settlement, Turkey would be treated as an economic option like all the other available ones. What matters is to conclude a settlement first’.

6.2.2.5 *Turkish-Cypriots as ‘Turkey’s Trojan’s horse’*

The ‘illegal entity’ of the breakaway regime in the north was portrayed as the central reason why Turkish-Cypriots should not participate in the decision-making:

‘the secessionist entity in the occupied part of Cyprus has been declared legally invalid by the UN Security Council in resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). In which official

capacity should the Turkish-Cypriots participate in the decision-making since they do not participate in the governance of the Republic of Cyprus at all? Their participation in the ‘management of the resources before a settlement is inconceivable’.

Besides the official and legal utterances supporting this position, there is an additional stimulant prompting Greek-Cypriots’ rejection of Turkish-Cypriot involvement in hydrocarbons’ management:

‘If they benefit from the monetization of the gas reserves without being committed to their obligations in the reunification talks, why should they actually live up to their obligations?’ ‘Many years have gone since Turkish-Cypriots waived their claims to participate in any sort of discussion about this issue. Since then, things have moved on and the energy developments have surpassed them. Explorations are already taking place, licences are granted... There is nothing to discuss. After the settlement of the Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Cypriots will be encouraged to participate in the discussion about the future monetization of the gas reserves. Before the settlement, there is nothing to discuss. If Turkish-Cypriots want to have a say in the energy debate, they have to profess their sincere commitment to the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Turkish-Cypriots have to realize one thing: they cannot question the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus if they keep acting as a distinct illegal entity while simultaneously requesting rights on how the republic should run its (domestic) affairs. If they want to be granted rights, they have to abolish the illegal state and take their responsibilities upon themselves, as stipulated in the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. There are no rights without responsibilities.’

Many of the respondents harbour reservations about Turkish-Cypriots’ ability to voice their own autonomous position on questions about energy security. They believe that Turkish-Cypriots may act as Turkey’s ‘Trojan horse’ (statement 23). Multiple reasons explain this conviction.

‘This unilateral dependence of Turkish-Cypriots on Turkey has reached such levels, where the Turkish-Cypriots feel that regardless of whether they work or not, Turkey will be always paying the bill for them. Furthermore, ‘the presence of more than 40.000 Turkish troops in the occupied part of Cyprus, the numerous settlers who by far outnumber the Turkish-Cypriots, and the economic control of the occupied area explain how Turkey manipulates to a great extent the Turkish-Cypriot community for its own interests. Turkey has deployed the Turkish-Cypriot community as a strategic accessory, which Turkey wants to control on all possible levels: after the invasion, on a military level, then on a state-level and soon on an energy level.’

When asked about the potential to cut the Gordian knot between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots, the respondents were negative.

‘If one day Akinci – like every other Turkish-Cypriot leader – decides to oppose the irrationality of Erdogan, then you would expect a news article the next day in Turkey linking Mustafa Akinci to the Gulenists in Cyprus. In that speculation, the Turkish authorities might arrest Akinci as a member of an alleged terrorist organization. We have

no clue about the *modus operandi* of Turkey's executive state power. Starting with Kemal Atatürk and continuing with successive governments, regardless of whether they were Muslim-friendly or not, the logic has been identical.'

One of the participants found refuge in historical analogies to pinpoint:

'How did the Turkish governments dismantle the Turkish Communist Party? They took all 50 members of its central committee to a lake and plunged them into the water.' These practices do not solely characterize Turkey: 'Turkey is not the only one resorting to such actions. The big powers pointing fingers at Turkey for such practices do not differ that much. Will the US allow the rise of a party that plans to overthrow the current establishment? They might class the people who embark upon such an effort as deranged and probably arrest them. Will Putin allow anyone to challenge his authority? All big powers throughout world history have had state terrorism in their back pockets.'

6

The conclusion was:

'The people in Cyprus and Greece try to judge the policies of the big powers in the light of our policies. You cannot draw any comparison. We have to pursue policies from the standpoint of the weak while the others operate from the standpoint of the powerful.'

6.2.2 'Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms'

6.2.2.1 *Identifying statements of 'Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms'*

The second discourse, named as 'Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms', involves 5 participants out of the 23 and captures 9% of the common variance (see Appendix 10a). Four of them work as journalists and one as NGO representative. All of them were born before and/or after 1964 and 1974 rendering age a useless criterion in the formation of the discourse. The respondents here assigned a +4 to statement 13: 'The Turkish-Cypriots believe that the way Greek-Cypriots envisage to shape the new state entails for them the risk of becoming second-class citizens.' They assigned a +3 to statement 12: Through the potential utilization of natural gas, Greek-Cypriots thought they had gained a negotiation tool in the confrontation vis-à-vis Turkey. They claim that these utterances have outweighed the essential technical and economic considerations the gas industry dictates (assigning a +3 to statement 9). They strongly supported that 'If a solution is to be found, the options for the utilization of the reserves will be expanded'. (+3 to statement 46). Table 6.2 presents the identifying statements of the Greek-Cypriot discourse.

6.2.2.2 *Interpretation of 'Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms'*

Greek-Cypriots here echo the fears and concerns of the Turkish-Cypriots. They also accuse Greek-Cypriot policy entrepreneurs of 'opportunism' because of the narrowly defined geopolitical thinking they have bequeathed and communicated as regards the role of the natural resources. They believe that the 'geopolitical language' sounds attractive to the Greek-

Table 6.2. Greek-Cypriot Discourse 2

Greek-Cypriot Discourse 2			
Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms			
No.	Statement	Q-Sort Value	Z-score
13	The Turkish-Cypriots believe that the way Greek-Cypriots envisage to shape the new state entails for them the risk of vigorously becoming second-class citizens.	4	1,60*
18	Under the current prices Greek-Cypriots cannot take any advantage of the gas reserves especially because they lie offshore, in 'ultra-deep' waters.	3	1,55*
25	The construction of a pipeline to Greece is not feasible due to the depth of the waters and the lack of Israel's interest in investing in such a pipeline.	3	1,50*
12	Through the potential utilization of natural gas, Greek-Cypriots thought they had gained a negotiation tool in the confrontation vis-à-vis Turkey.	3	1,46*
46	If a solution is to be found, the options for the utilization of the reserves will be expanded.	3	1,45*
9	All countries in the region, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, approached the whole debate purely from a political point of view having priority over the business logic.	3	1,39*
6	I do not believe in the philosophy of the constituent state and I do not think that it can practically work, as long as the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state will be under the control of Turkey.	-3	-1,45*
2	Energy in our case is deeply securitized in a political level: screw the economics.	-3	-1,76*
48	Greek-Cypriots do not want an agreement abolishing the Republic of Cyprus and paving the way for the federalization of a constituent state with the 'territorial extension' of Turkey	-3	-1,71*
38	If I cannot safeguard something that betters the <i>status quo</i> , then I handle things as they are, 'the theory of the second best'.	-4	-2,02*

Cypriots who, harbouring strong anti-Turkish sentiments due to the rage and embarrassment they experienced in 1974, need some kind of 'revenge'. This revenge is allegedly offered by the discovery of the gas reserves, which are used as a 'confrontation tool' against Turkey. Greek-Cypriots scoring here posit that many policy entrepreneurs invoke the grievances of the Greek-Cypriot constituents in order to gain popularity through anti-Turkish rhetoric.

6.2.2.3 The imported national myths

The participants underscored the 'us versus them' psychological mentality on the island.

‘Unfortunately, the reason why the Cyprus question remains alive is the very division between ‘them and us’. Generally speaking, the average Greek-Cypriot would have been much happier if he had had not to deal at all with the Turkish-Cypriots. This assumption gains ground especially if we consider the prospect of co-managing the hydrocarbons.’ Another participant added: ‘After the discovery of the gas reserves in the seabed of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek-Cypriots were, indeed, convicted that they could use natural gas leverage in their negotiations vis-à-vis the Turkish-Cypriots and, by extension, with Turkey.’

How can someone explain the roots of this ‘us versus them’ predicament? One respondent explained:

‘the nationalisms governing the interaction between the grassroots are not a genuine product of their own constituents: it is the product of the conflict between two ‘imported’ nationalisms on the island. On the one side, we observe the development of the Greek nationalism, a typical, radical and romantic type of nationalism that spread across Eastern Europe throughout the 19th century. On the other side, we view the evolution of the Turkish nationalism, represented by Kemalist nationalism, as being moulded throughout the early years after the establishment of the modern Turkish state.’

Historical grievances clearly matter.

‘The conflicts between two sides reached an ethnic level, especially in the 1950s. Back then, the perception of the Turkish-Cypriot as the mouthpiece and police officer of the British state was well consolidated among the Greek-Cypriots. The average Turkish-Cypriot resembled the traitor, the Muslim, the unfaithful, whatever... At the same time, among them you can find theorists of the Turkish nationalism that were building on the idea of dividing the island; they threw out the idea of unifying their own constituent part with Turkey while letting the Greek-Cypriots move on with their *enosis*’ ambitions.’

6.2.2.4 ‘Geopolitical’ opportunism’ and ‘Israel’s problematic strategy’

Most participants here disapproved of the geopolitical viewpoints governing the energy security debate. For instance, one of the participants noted:

‘The policy entrepreneurs in Cyprus have downplayed the technical and economic aspects associated with the energy debate. On the other hand, they have incorrectly emphasized the geopolitical dimension that prioritizes options like LNG or EastMed.’

The participants argued that the geological, economic and technical parameters, drawn from international experience, do not match such ‘pipe-dreams’. Most of them ruled out the feasibility of installing a pipeline from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe for two reasons:

‘The first one is the depth of the waters. Eastern Mediterranean has a greater depth than the Western Mediterranean basin and that is why it is possible to transport gas from Algeria and Morocco through pipelines to Europe. This possibility cannot be entertained

in our region. The second reason lies in other geological particularities of the area. Eastern Mediterranean is an earthquake region, a feature that increases the risks of such an enterprise. The tectonic plates underneath the seabed of Crete are moving all the time; how can you construct a pipeline transiting through such a geologically dangerous area?’

One of the participants expressed a personal experience:

‘I attended an EU energy-related seminar in Crete a couple of years ago. I met a representative of the respective ministry. East Med was on the spotlight back then. I asked him about the technical feasibility of such a project. I asked him whether technological advances allowed the construction of a subsea natural gas pipeline transiting through an earthquake area and operating at such a depth. After hearing this question, the representative, who had initially shown his enthusiasm about this project, started mincing his words. You can realize how sincere the whole project is.’

Another participant in this discourse argued that geology is not the only hardship in EastMed, but the ‘questionable Israeli energy strategy in pushing such a project through’:

‘The energy strategy of Israel is that it has no energy strategy. Israel has cultivated particular good or bad ties with some member states of the EU because of some thorny issues that emerged after the collapse of the Palestinian peace process in 2014. Israel strives for the approval of the East Med by Berlin and Paris. This project links the gas reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean – lying in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Israel and the Republic of Cyprus – to Greece and Italy. Nevertheless, this project, as noticed in the framework of the last trilateral meeting, is portrayed more as a political initiative rather than a viable economic project, tailor-made to exploit and trade the relevant hydrocarbons.’

So which parameters influence Israel’s strategic thinking vis-à-vis the EastMed?

‘The dominant criterion of Israel’s choices after the discovery of a huge amount of gas reserves in the Levant basin is energy security; these concerns gain ground if we consider that similar energy initiatives, like in Ashkelon have been either targeted by terrorists or failed due to economic irregularities and fraud. After the discovery of Leviathan, the Israelis thought: let’s keep Tamar for domestic needs, mainly electricity, and we will figure out what we will do with Leviathan. When Cyprus became a key player with the discovery of reserves in an area touching the Israeli Economic Zone, the Israelis re-designed their strategic calculations: Along with Cyprus, we will build up a huge reserve deposit and transform Cyprus into a super-hub. That explains why Israeli officials exerted enormous pressure to install an LNG in Cyprus at the dawn of this decade, even before the launch of the research drilling in Aphrodite. This drilling was essential because it would map out the amount of gas reserves in the region.’

The respondent explained:

‘the huge cost attributed to geological and technical considerations, could not support the establishment of an LNG. In order to justify the creation of an LNG, you need an

amount of more than 8 tcf. When we found less than 5 tcf in Aphrodite, an amount that could by no means justify the construction of LNG, Israelis got so disappointed that they examined other export options. That moment was also a critical juncture for us to go our own way, without Israel, and trace the opportunity to export our gas reserves to Egypt. Finally, 'we should not forget that Israel delayed our energy plans because of the regulations that antitrust authorities issued on how the detected gas reserves would be monetized'.

So, why insist on the East-Med project if the realities on ground obscure its realization? Political opportunism plays a significant role, according to the respondents:

'The prospects of East-Med would render Cyprus a 'transit hub' between the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Europe. The prospect of becoming 'a transit hub' sounds attractive to the public. Moreover, natural resources are framed as a diplomatic and military tool that allegedly enhances Cyprus's geopolitical standing vis-à-vis Turkey. Such language, as the participants posit, captures the public's wishful thinking and does not mirror the realities on the ground. The people who experienced rage and embarrassment in 1974 feel that Greek-Cypriots somehow feel the imperative need to curb Turkey's influence in the region. By attributing military and geopolitical properties to the gas reserves, people allegedly think that the Republic of Cyprus, through the interest of companies from militarily strong countries and through the 'alliances' with Greece, Egypt and Israel, is altering the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean for its benefit.'

Greek-Cypriot policy entrepreneurs, as my respondents argue, purposefully over-emphasize the supposed geopolitical benefits of Cyprus:

'they use such language in order to gain popularity among the public and in the media. The over-emphasis on Cyprus's geostrategic position and its ability to counter-balance Turkey's influence sounds attractive to the public, and some policy entrepreneurs use these narratives in order to remain topical, as the respondents argue.'

The respondents call for a more 'pragmatic' approach by focusing more on the technical and economic aspects of the monetization of the gas reserves, and less on geopolitical calculations. They also stress the great potential that gas reserves could have for an institutional cooperation between the two sides and mutually beneficial solutions. Some of the participants articulate their conviction that the maintenance of Greek-Cypriot drilling, but under the aegis of a UN committee wherein a Turkish-Cypriot could participate, would open windows of opportunities to establish and consolidate greater security conditions for the continuation of the programme. In such a scenario, Turkey would have fewer incentives to remain aggressive about the Greek-Cypriots' energy programme.

6.2.3 'Resentment matters'

6.2.3.1 Identifying statements

Five participants out of 23 are loading on this factor, which captures 10% of the common variance (see Appendix 10a). All of them work in NGOs. They asserted that in the eyes of both Cypriots and the international community, the conflict has been established as a rather 'dormant, comfortable crisis', which does not provide any actual incentives for its resolution (statement 3). The lack of incentives should be attributed to the absence of casualties, especially after 1974; in their view, a scenario involving casualties would prompt domestic and international actors to rapidly push for a settlement (statement 3). The participants here claim that the continuous political deadlock on the island is unfolding because a feeling of 'resentment' clouds the relationships at the grassroots level (statement 14); both sides feel underprivileged and deeply traumatized due to the events of the past. Table 6.3 presents the identifying statements for discourse 3.

6.2.3.2 Interpretation

The participants' loading here shed light on the significance of historical and psychological factors, which account for the current deadlock on the island. It is only in this perspective that someone should understand the negative trajectory of the conflict after the gas discoveries. While some disapproved of the continuation of the current status quo, others could not see a better way out than perpetuation of the division.

Table 6.3. Greek-Cypriot Discourse 3

Greek-Cypriot Discourse 3			
Resentment matters			
No.	Statement	Q-Sort Value	Z-score
3	Cyprus conflict is a dormant, 'comfortable crisis'. If we had to face the reality of people's losing their lives day by day, then we would have extra incentives to immediately resolve the conflict	4	2,32*
23	Greek-Cypriots fear that Turkish-Cypriots will be potentially manipulated as the 'Trojan horse' of Turkey.	3	2,14
14	Wherever grievances exist, the past never becomes a past.	3	1,94
46	If a solution is to be found, the options for the utilization of the reserves will be expanded.	-3	-1,15*
27	If this negotiation process fails, we head for a potential division, permanent and legitimate.	-3	-1,18*

6.2.3.3 *The power of resentment: the absence of casualties as a blessing & as a curse*

‘Personally, I cannot place my trust into the Turkish-Cypriots after the 1974 events.’ One of the respondents claimed that although this fear is existential, it is also reproduced by the Cypriot media: ‘The reproduction of the 1974 events has led to a brainwashing of the citizens.’

Some respondents underscore the imperative need to alter the heart-breaking plight within which the island finds itself today:

‘Which reasonable person can be satisfied with the current situation? Why shall I show my passport to the police-officers at the border line in order to cross the territory? I have to go through a passport control within my own land.’ These were the rhetorical questions that one of the participants set forth in our discussion. Another respondent articulated discontent with the continuation of the *de facto* division of the island: ‘Things have to change. We have to solve this problem immediately. I cannot stand living on a divided island.’

It is not all participants that share the need for the ‘wind of change’. One of the respondents had a different interpretation from the previous participants:

‘After 40 years of occupation, the Republic of Cyprus, administered *de facto* by Greek-Cypriots, is doing fine without the Turkish-Cypriots; that is why the Greek-Cypriots do not have to win something more out of the negotiations.’

Therefore, the participant does not foresee any imperative need to reach a settlement that would alter the status quo.

There is an additional parameter that factors into the consolidation of this impasse. ‘If the big players in the Security Council wanted to solve the problem, they would not have let things evolve the way they evolved. On the contrary, the interests of the US and Russia go handy with the current situation. They feel comfortable with the situation.’ Along these lines, one of the respondents claimed:

‘If the Cyprus question were still alive, probably the incentives to settle it would have been more intensive. Nevertheless, since some years have gone by, young people are not that keen on settling the dispute. If we had to deal with a growing number of fatalities today, the pressure to reach a sustainable settlement would have been higher.’

The participants remarked: ‘there is a significant proportion in the Cypriot population who prefer the solution to the Cyprus question than to compromise with a non-solution’.

6.3 THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT DISCOURSES

6.3.1 ‘Gas stimulating political equality’

6.3.1.1 *Identifying the statements*

As stipulated in Appendix 10b, 13 out of 21 participants are loading in this factor, which captures 23% of the common variance. Their professions vary, in the sense that policy-makers, energy affiliates, researchers and journalists are part of this discourse. People here clarified Turkish-Cypriot expectations of the gas reserves: ‘to have a say in the decision-making and do the explorations jointly’ (assigning a +4 to statement 37). They also assigned a +3 to statement 26, which pinpoints the ‘absence of federal culture’ and explains the Greek-Cypriots’ behaviour. Respondents assigned a +3 to statement 45: ‘Greek-Cypriots should not implicate the energy debate into the existential question of the Republic of Cyprus’. Table 6.4 presents the identifying statements.

6.3.1.2 *Interpretation*

Here I observe that the main expectation that Turkish-Cypriots have from the gas reserves is their participation in decision-making on such issues, regardless of whether a settlement is reached or not. The Turkish-Cypriot participants here lay out their main grievances deriving from Greek-Cypriot framing of the natural resources ‘as a matter of sovereignty’: they feel (once again) excluded from the debate and assert that Greek-Cypriots act as ‘being the sole owner of the Island’.

6.3.1.3 *We need to have a say: grievances against Greek-Cypriots*

Some of the Greek-Cypriots have clearly expressed their will to share the revenues stemming from the exploitation of the gas reserves, conditioning it on a potential settlement. However, such a deliberation does not satisfy Turkish-Cypriot demands:

‘the discussion should not be restricted to how the profits out of the exploitation should be shared. The participants provided examples from different parts of the world: ‘There are four federal states that drill the sea for oil in the world. These are the USA, Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil. All of these states are federations. None of them suggested giving one out of five of the revenues to their black or natives or Spanish origin citizens. On the contrary, on the Greek side, both Anastasiades¹ and Christodoulides² suggested giving us one out of five. This is racism’.

According to the participants, Turkish-Cypriots should have a say in the decision-making about the monetization of the gas reserves. ‘Based on the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus,

¹ The incumbent President of the Republic of Cyprus.

² At that time (January 2018) Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus.

Table 6.4. Turkish-Cypriot Discourse 1

Turkish-Cypriot Discourse 1			
Gas stimulating political equality			
No.	Statement	Q-Sort Value	Z-Score
37	Turkish-Cypriots are after decision-making. What they actually want is to have a say in the decision-making: 'let's do the explorations jointly.'	4	1,96*
26	The presumption that Turkish-Cypriots will prevent decisions from being taken if they participate in a decision making body on energy issues underlines another missing element in the Cyprus conflict: the federal culture.	3	1,49*
45	The Greek-Cypriots should not make the energy issue into the existential question for the Republic of Cyprus, as if its existence depends on talking about hydrocarbons with Turkish-Cypriots or not.	3	1,23*
42	Even if the Turkish-Cypriots had natural gas reserves, they would have to bring international development in, mainly companies to take it out. Then, they would have to engage with capitalism; unfortunately, that is life.	2	1,03
4	I can understand why Greek-Cypriots do not make use of the Turkish export option. Despite the economic benefits, you cannot assign a price to the political risk.	-3	-1,17*
7	Christofias' government initiated the whole energy endeavour in order to restore his shaken image after the Mari events in 2011 and distract attention from the economic reforms needed.	-3	-1,44*
27	Another deadlock will not take anything out of the tensions and I am afraid that Cyprus will surely go through another war.	-4	-2,00*

Turkish-Cypriots have some rights in the state apparatus. Therefore, it is not only the Greek-Cypriots who have rights on the energy issue but also the Turkish-Cypriots'. Along these lines, a respondent argued: 'This island belongs to all of us. Therefore, if you give the exploration rights to drilling companies, you have to do it as a federal government.' Pursuant to this logic, a participant stated:

'Natural resources in Cyprus should be under the authority of the federal government. There is a consensus between Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots about this topic. It does not differ from the UBP (National Unity Party) to the CTP (Republican Turkish Party). Everyone holds the same position.'

In addition, they argued that the Greek-Cypriots do not have the luxury of keeping the Turkish-Cypriots out of the discussion: ‘The UN Secretary General, Antonio Gutierrez, recently said that all these resources belong to the Cypriots’. According to the Turkish-Cypriot participants, the regional context should force both sides to put their act together:

‘We need to see the big picture here. There is an ongoing war in Syria while other problems exist in Palestine as well as between Israel and Lebanon. All these countries must live in peace and perform a clear demarcation of their sovereignty zones. They have to work together and export the gas together. Right now, the prices are not ripe for the Greek-Cypriots to initiate exports. Hence, this money can be spent for the sake of the island’s development; social policies and infrastructure. That’s why it is urgent for the Turkish-Cypriots to participate in the decision-making’.

The exclusion of the Turkish-Cypriots from the decision-making made many respondents point fingers at the Greek-Cypriots and blame them indirectly for an ‘identity crisis’:

‘Turkish-Cypriots are excluded because they are considered as foreigners. Not because they are Turkish-Cypriots, (but) because they are seen as foreigners. Greek-Cypriots think Cyprus belongs to them and they don’t want to share it with anyone.’ Such exclusion contradicts Cypriots’ obligations deriving from their EU membership I think the Greek-Cypriots need to work on this with the education system, through the media, through the youth. Because this is a fundamental problem within society and they cannot solve it by concentrating on the Turkish-Cypriots-Greek-Cypriots relationship. They need to go back and work on the way for Cypriots to construct their own national identity.’

6.3.1.4 EU’s role could have been more constructive

The participants accused the Europeans of inaction by allowing Greek-Cypriots to maintain the implementation of their energy programme. ‘I think the Europeans are doing nothing not because they have any specific interest; they genuinely believe that the Greek-Cypriots are the main owners of this Island and able to take decisions on their own.’ The respondent concluded:

‘I think the European officials are missing the point, they are looking at the small picture here; they are looking at the relationship between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. They need to look broader. What is the relationship of Greek-Cypriots with non-Greek-Cypriots, including Armenians and Maronites. Greek-Cypriots perceive their EU membership as a blessing from God. You can always play that card; you can always get funds from there. If the worst comes to the worst, they think that they can bring the European Commission in.’

6.3.1.5 Absence of a concrete agenda and ‘obsession with political equality’

I put forward a scenario where Turkish-Cypriots would participate in a committee to discuss the gas reserves. I asked them what kind of priorities they would set in a hypothetical discussion with the Greek-Cypriots about this issue. What kind of agenda would they promote? Their answers raised eyebrows:

‘The Turkish-Cypriots do not have an agenda. Actually, this is the main problem. Since it is a very new topic, it requires also time, I guess at some point, to bring people with some scientific knowledge in order to formulate the Turkish-Cypriot positions.’

Another participant informed us: ‘the economic advisor of Akinci made a call to Turkish-Cypriots all around the world who possess scientific knowledge about this topic in order to formulate the relevant Turkish-Cypriot positions’. The results of this call were not positive:

‘They couldn’t find them; I mean we have none actually around. If we build up a technical commission, it would be a really tiny one, consisting of one to three real experts. So, that is a huge concern. You cannot all of a sudden expect to find 60-year-old Turkish-Cypriot experts out of nowhere; so you have to basically wait. You have to wait for the younger generation, young academics, young professionals to deal with this issue in the coming years or you have to get some assistance from abroad.’

6

Could the Turkish-Cypriots formulate their own agenda in the future? A respondent was negative:

‘Turkish-Cypriots do not have a right to declare their own views under the hidden ruling of Turkey. They are not the real decision-makers in their own country.’

In the absence of a concrete agenda, why do Turkish-Cypriots care that much about participating in the discussion?

‘Turkish-Cypriots are obsessed with political equality’. We want to have a say in the procedure, in the decision-making. Through our participation in the decision-making, we seek to upload ourselves as a state entity. We are afraid that things basically will not work out well for us when the companies start drilling and especially when Turkey intervenes to interrupt the drilling. So, at that point, I think Turkish-Cypriots will be marginalized a lot. Therefore, it won’t be our issue at all. That is why Turkish-Cypriots are in fear of Turkey’s incursions in the Eastern Mediterranean.’

Without autonomous economic governance, Turkish-Cypriot hands would be tied in voicing and promoting their own agenda, confirming Greek-Cypriots’ accusation of acting as Turkey’s ‘Trojan Horse’. A Turkish-Cypriot respondent leading in this P-Set asserted:

‘In reality as long as Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots do not negotiate with Turkey, they do not have any power to make decisions on their own. Even if Greek-Cypriots were dealing with Turkish-Cypriots on this matter, the latter would go and ask Turkey what they should do.’

Despite this, Turkish-Cypriots consider a pipeline to Turkey the best option:

‘Let me clear something up. The Greek side continuously alters its policy. Initially, they were talking about a pipeline that goes through Crete and Italy. But the cost of such

a pipeline was very high and the amount of gas or oil was not enough to cover it. That was a fantasy. Afterwards, they discussed the feasibility of transferring Israeli and Cypriot oil together over Turkey. Now there is news about Egypt discovering a major gas reservoir in Zohr Basin. Experts such as financial analysts, risk analysts and those who prepare feasibility reports argue that Egyptian gas, Cypriot gas and Israeli gas must be transferred through Cyprus to Ceyhan, and must be carried via TANAP. TANAP is the pipeline from Azerbaijan to Europe. This is the correct option. This is the rentable option. This is the cheaper option. And this is the closest option.'

In such a scenario, would Turkey dictate the prices, as many Greek-Cypriots fear?

'I disagree. Turkey cannot determine prices on its own. Prices are determined in the world. There is a price per barrel of oil. There is the price of gas. Turkey cannot determine the prices on its own.'

According to the Turkish-Cypriot respondent, a joint solution could be found to partially address this issue:

'Under the separation of authority, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots could finally discuss who would sign and what kind of international agreement. So, the Greek side would put the Israeli-Greek side agreement or Cyprus-Lebanon agreement on the table. Oil agreements with Exxon and Shell would be also put on the table. The Turkish side, as well, would put its own agreements on the table.'

Furthermore, some of the Turkish-Cypriot participants expressed their belief that Greek-Cypriots

'will eventually discuss the energy issue ... because it is one integral part of the dynamic security architecture for the transitional period and for post-conflict settlement'. One way or another, during negotiations, after negotiations, during the transitional period, this topic will be part of the broader discussion about security, the broader security architecture in order to tackle the conflict'. This question affects 'development, resources and is part of the broader security architecture of Cyprus'.

What is the main message that Turkish-Cypriots signal to the Greek-Cypriots?

'It is quite important to humanize your 'enemy' in order to reach the potential for integration. You need to start talking. That is the first step, which is often neglected. Otherwise, this enemy becomes an even bigger and more dangerous enemy. Therefore, you need to lead off with this acknowledgment. The Greek-Cypriots need to recognize the Turkish-Cypriots as an entity, not even in legal terms. They need to recognize them as a human entity and ask them what they actually want, how they feel.'

6.3.2 'Micro-politics'

6.3.2.1 Identifying statements

This discourse involves 2 participants out of the 21 and captures 13% of the common variance (see Appendix 10b). One of them is a policy-maker and the other a NGO representative. No conclusions on the demographic synthesis can be drawn here, the other discourses alike. Participants assigned +4 to statement 5 (Özersay played an important role in the crisis with the seismic survey in 2011). In addition, they assigned +3 to statement 7 (Christofias' government initiated the whole energy endeavour in order to restore his shaken image after the Mari events in 2011 and distract attention from the economic reforms needed). Table 6.5 presents the identifying statements.

6.3.2.2 Interpretation

The participants here stress the role of political expediencies in pushing the energy security agenda through. By political expediency, we mean here either pre-electoral motives, personal calculations to rise in power and mobilization of 'grievances' to divert attention from domestic turmoil or economic crisis at the grassroots level. Respondents describe the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot deliberation on the future monetization of the gas reserves as the product of politicking and the decentralized coordination of the various pressures emanating from the Cypriot public opinion on both sides. On the one hand, the Greek-Cypriot leader, Dimitris Christofias, had to manage the implications of the Mari crisis in July 2011. The latter might have found refuge in various tactics. The participants implied that both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders embarked on an adventurous foreign policy in 2011 in order to divert attention from the unrest in the domestic arena to the international arena. In their

Table 6.5. Turkish-Cypriot Discourse 2

Turkish-Cypriot Discourse 2			
Micro-Politics			
No.	Statement	Q-Sort Value	Z-score
5	Özersay played an important role in the crisis with the seismic survey in 2011.	4	2,59*
7	Christofias' government initiated the whole energy endeavour in order to restore his shaken image after the Mari events in 2011 and distract attention from the economic reforms needed.	3	1,54*
44	In case Turkey and Israel normalize their bilateral relations, Greek-Cypriots have to decide what kind of policy they should follow.	-3	-1,49*
48	Turkish Cypriots also had this ambivalent attitude towards Turkey, in a sense that Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey to be there always for them	-4	-1,54*

view, crises about natural gas could help leaders score extra points among constituents of a nationalist temperament.

6.3.2.3 Pre-electoral calculations behind the 2011 crisis

The respondents here ascribe the escalation of the 2011 crisis to the personal motives of Turkish-Cypriot policymakers.

The signing of the delimitation agreement with Turkey, the authorization of TPAO to initiate drilling in areas encroaching on the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus and the explorations of the Turkish seismic vessel, Piri Reis, were all initiatives which deepened the crisis in 2011. These initiatives were undertaken by the former Turkish-Cypriot chief negotiator and current politician, Kudret Özersay. He wanted to drag Turkey into the energy security debate in order to 'upgrade' himself as a valuable asset to Turkey's energy visions in the region and score extra points among the Turkish-Cypriot constituents, who would foresee in his figure a determined policy-maker who would include Turkish-Cypriots in the hydrocarbons' management. He gambled on the 2011 crisis in order to lay the ground for a career in politics through Turkey's support.

6.3.2.4 Diversionary tactics: the Mari events and the economic crisis

The participants also blamed the former president of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias, for the 2011 crises across the Mediterranean. They made an inference to the domestic pressure that his government had been facing since July 2011. On July 11, 2011, a tragic incident occurred at the Mari navy base in Limassol. A fire broke out at the munitions base next to the Vasilikos Power Station, the largest in Cyprus, which provides 53% of the country's electricity. Two out of 98 containers of gunpowder, rockets, explosives and guns exploded.³ The explosion not only wiped out the power station, causing major blackouts across the entire island but also killed 13 people from the ranks of the armed forces and the Cyprus Fire Service. AKEL's government, under President Christofias, was held accountable by the entire political world of Cyprus:

'In the light of repeated warnings from the United Nations Sanctions Committees about the exposure of the containers to extreme weather conditions over extended periods of time, his government was accused of 'unforgivable negligence' for allowing the munitions to be stored out in the open and not undertaking any measures to avert the risks. Tens of thousands of Cypriot citizens demonstrated against the government, seeking its resignation. At an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers, Christofias demanded his entire cabinet resign to pave the way for a full reshuffle.'

According to the participants, this was not the only occasion in which Christofias' government found itself under intense pressure. Two weeks after the incident, the credit rating agency

³ These containers had been seized from a Cypriot-flagged ship, the Monchegorsk, which was intercepted in January 2009 while travelling from Iran in January. According to the allegations of the Cypriot officials at that time, the shipment violated UN sanctions against Iran

Moody's cut its growth outlook for Cyprus to zero. Other agencies, such as Fitch and Standard and Poor's, had already downgraded the economic outlook of the country. The reason of the downgrading should not be solely attributed to the vulnerable Cypriot banking sector, which was holding a significant amount of non-sustainable-Greek debt – and necessitated financial support from the Greek-Cypriot government.

From the beginning of July 2011, the country embarked upon a fiscal plan to cut spending in the civil service and scrap a number of state-owned organizations. The expected austerity measures to effectively address the crisis, encountered significant political hurdles, because opposition accused Christofias' government of backtracking on reforms because it feared an angry backlash from Cyprus's powerful labour unions.

While coping with domestic pressures, he embarked on adventurous, diversionary policies, according to the Turkish-Cypriot participants:

He made a big deal out of the Cypriot energy plans in 2011, when Noble Energy announced the discovery of gas reserves in the Aphrodite field. Amid the tensions between Israel and Turkey at that time, an announcement to move forward with the energy plans would deliberately provoke Turkey's incursions. Such announcement would divert attention away from the domestic situation in Cyprus to the regional arena of the Eastern Mediterranean. If the crisis overshadowed the domestic problems the Christofias government was facing at that time, then the latter would deflect the blame from the crisis and would not be held accountable for the economic crisis. Given the unpopularity the government was facing, a crisis with Turkey would allegedly draw the attention from the domestic problems (the explosion and the economic hardships) to the traditional 'arch-enemy', Turkey; on such occasions, the Greek-Cypriot constituents would not blame the Cypriot president for fiscal mismanagement or the blast but would treat him as the embodiment of national unity against Turkey.

6.4 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I found five discourses that illustrate the incompatible objectives of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots concerning the exploitation of gas reserves: (a) 'gas boosting our geopolitical standing', (b) 'pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms', (c) 'resentment still matters' from the Greek-Cypriot side, (d) 'gas stimulating political equality' and (e) micro-politics from the Turkish-Cypriot side. The first discourse, along the lines of the geopolitical perspectives, frames the energy landscape in the Eastern Mediterranean as an 'anarchic environment', wherein the Greek-Cypriots correctly carved out strategic collaborations with Greece, Egypt and Israel in order to safeguard the smooth implementation of their energy programme. Gas reserves are treated here as an 'energy-diplomatic weapon' which would incentivize Turkey to change its allegedly intransigent stance vis-à-vis a potential settlement. The second discourse expresses fierce opposition to the geopolitical rationale that inspires the first discourse. The respondents echo Turkish-Cypriot grievances about the future architecture of the island ration and illuminate the role of opportunism (greed) behind the articulation of the 'geopolitical overtones'

associated with the gas reserves. In the third discourse, 'resentment matters', the participants shed light on the intangible factors sustaining the Cyprus conflict. The fourth discourse, 'Gas stimulating political equality', emphasizes the grievances of the Turkish-Cypriots as regards their exclusion from the energy security debate and underline their need to achieve 'political equality' through the gas developments, regardless of whether they have an autonomous agenda to promote. The fifth discourse, 'micro-politics', showcases how the greed hypothesis, in the form of diversionary tactics, operates in real-world cases. Table 6.6 summarizes the key elements in every discourse.

A question that arises from the analysis of these discourses is whether the timing of the Q-sorting and the analysis of the findings are factored into the discourse analysis. I will explain the extent to which such a point would be justifiable and then establish why I do not believe this to be the case.

As explicitly mentioned in the methodological chapter, I interviewed my Greek-Cypriot participants in July 2017 and the Turkish-Cypriot ones in January 2018. The interviews and the analysis of my discourses took place after the collapse of the Crans Montana. Moreover, in both cases, my interviews took place in a pre-electoral period for each side. The Republic of Cyprus was expecting presidential elections in January 2018, while in the same month Turkish-Cypriots were running their own parliamentary elections. It seemed to me that the settlement of the Cyprus conflict was not a priority for any of the contending parties. Nonetheless, the failure of the reunification talks had become embroiled in the pre-electoral battles. Political opportunism easily flourished during that period. Greek-Cypriot policymakers were attributing this standoff to Turkey's intransigent stance. On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriot policymakers were casting blame on the President of the Republic of Cyprus. They asserted that Greek-Cypriots wanted to maintain the negotiations not because they expected they would achieve a settlement but for their 'image' as a compromising side; such an 'image' receives the 'blessings' of the international community and they can continue undisturbed with their 'unilateral' drilling. Turkish-Cypriot opinion-leaders believe that Greek-Cypriots are the uncompromising side and the ones reluctant to reach a settlement. In light of this timing, the only discourse that could have been a 'by-product' of that timing is the Turkish-Cypriot discourse, 'Micropolitics'. Turkish-Cypriots clearly articulated that the escalation of the conflict was the outcome of the political expediencies of political leaders in a 'troubled situation'. The timing of the situation could have accounted for the formulation of such a discourse, without being certain about this claim.

On the other hand, from a methodological point of view, I do not believe that the post-Crans-Montana 'timing' factored in any way into the formulation and analysis of the other discourses. Indicatively, the Greek-Cypriot discourse, 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing', involved all policymakers; people who took a positive stance towards a 'bicomunal and bizonal' federation and accused the Greek-Cypriot leader of not taking a more firm position on this direction and

Table 6.6. Key points of the discourses

Key points	Greek-Cypriot Discourses		Turkish-Cypriot Discourses		
	Gas boosting our geopolitical standing	Pipe dreams and imported nationalisms	Resentment matters	Gas stimulating political equality	Micro-politics
	Anarchic environment in the Eastern Mediterranean- diplomatic tool vis-a-vis Turkey	Slow down the geopolitical overtones	Focus on psychological aspect of conflict	Demand for active involvement in the hydrocarbons' management	Opportunism manifested through gas
	Gas as sovereign aspect- no involvement of Turkish-Cypriots without settlement	Need to understand Turkish-Cypriot fears	Need for more active involvement of UN	Gas as the pillar for future architecture on the Island	No technical considerations

people who took a negative stance on this prospect and accused the Greek-Cypriot leader of having a 'submissive' stance on the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. If the timing had been important, these people might have made different statements. But this was not the case. On the contrary, the participation of policymakers across different political spheres has led me to believe that 'geopolitical' and 'sovereignty' attributes share a wide consensus in the Republic of Cyprus and are not susceptible to any pre- electoral momentum. The Turkish-Cypriot discourse pinpointed the will of the Turkish-Cypriots to participate in the hydrocarbons' management. Such a discourse, based on the energy context of Chapter 4, has been clearly articulated since 2011 when the first estimation of the amount of natural resources was announced. This manifests its 'diachronic' relevance. The same applies to the other grievance-related discourses, 'Resentment matters' and 'Pipedreams and imported nationalisms', which are clearly articulated in the historical context that I presented in Chapter 3.

These five discourses highlight the incompatible objectives that both sides pursue with respect to the future management of the gas reserves. Taking these aspects into consideration, the pending issue is to bring them together and address the research question: what is the impact of the natural resources on the complication of the conflict? In Chapter 7, I reflect on my findings by bringing the selected theoretical preconceptions back in.



Theoretical Reflections on the findings

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Following the empirical analysis of the five (3 Greek-Cypriot and 2 Turkish-Cypriot) discourses in Chapter 6, I return to the theoretical expectations of Chapter 2. According to my expectations, discourses should include the logic of at least one of the three Gs (geopolitics, greed and grievance) as well as the logic of their interplay. As I will show here, the three theoretical perspectives and their interplay motivate all five discourses. In other words, some of the premises of all three of the theoretical perspectives, either in a single form or mixed form, are identified across the five discourses.

7.2 DISCOURSES WITH A SINGLE PERSPECTIVE

7.2.1 Geopolitics

In Chapter 2, I raised a geopolitics-related expectation: ‘The survival in the ‘anarchic system’ motivates the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of the natural resources’. Two discourses seem to confirm this expectation. More concretely, according to the Greek-Cypriot discourse, ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’, the persistence of anarchy in the security complex of the Eastern Mediterranean compels Greek-Cypriots to formulate their military strategy by using their natural resources as assets. To paint a portrait of the ‘anarchic environment’, they illustrated the inadequacy of the law of the sea to safeguard Greek-Cypriot access to the recently discovered gas reserves, although the law of the sea allegedly supports their official positions and rights to access them. In the same discourse, they praised the importance of the Greek-Cypriot partnership with Israel and Egypt (statement 36) in implementing their energy programme. As a respondent mentioned, ‘the possession of the natural resources as military capabilities constitutes a necessary ingredient for Cypriots’ survival in their antagonistic relations against Turkey’.

In addition, a Greek-Cypriot respondent underlined how, ‘in our energy design, we prioritised security considerations. We planned to parcel out at least one block out of the 13 to every permanent member of the Security Council’. The respondents in the same discourse argued: ‘we authorised companies coming from countries with military strength to invest in our region. If we square our own interests in the region with the ones of the companies – and eventually their countries of origin – then the latter will have an extra motive in contributing to a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus conflict’. They also assigned a highly positive value to statement 32, according to which companies originating from countries with military strength would not hesitate to go through with their energy plans in spite of Turkey’s challenges. This, once again, shows how geopolitical calculations factor into this discourse.

Geopolitical perspectives apply to one of the two Turkish-Cypriot discourses. Turkish-Cypriots consider the monetization of gas reserves as an integral part of the island’s ‘future

security architecture'. Although some of the Turkish-Cypriots did not agree with Turkey's incursions into the Eastern Mediterranean, they claimed, that Turkey, in being provoked by the Greek-Cypriot partnerships with Israel and Egypt, 'has no other choice' than to perform these incursions. Without these incursions, they would let Greek-Cypriots and Israelis create a *fait accompli* in the Eastern Mediterranean. The participants in this discourse insisted on the establishment of a bi-communal committee that would grant them decision-making powers as regards any hydrocarbons management. If decisions are made by the Greek-Cypriots without their involvement, then, after the potential unification of the island, they will have to pay the consequences of Greek-Cypriots' decisions. They fear that they will become irrelevant and become even more dependent on Turkey's aid. Their understanding of sovereignty is at stake; therefore, they justify, to a certain extent, Turkey's "gunboat diplomacy" in the Eastern Mediterranean, although it may threaten their bargaining position as well.

7.2.2 Greed

Another theoretical expectation that I raised in Chapter 2 is that 'political opportunism' motivates the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of natural resources. From the five discourses, opportunism was clearly found in one Turkish-Cypriot discourse: 'micro-politics'. The respondents in this discourse attribute the escalation of the 2011 crises to the personal motives of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot policymakers. For instance, they claim that the signing of the delimitation agreement with Turkey, the authorisation by TPAO to launch drilling in areas encroaching on the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus and the explorations of the Turkish seismic vessel, *Piri Reis*, were all initiatives which deepened the crisis in 2011. The participants here believe that the former Turkish-Cypriot chief-negotiator, Kudret Özersay, wanted to drag Turkey into the energy security debate in order to portray himself as a valuable asset to Turkey's energy visions in the region. They claim that taking up such initiatives would help him score extra points among the Turkish-Cypriot constituents, who would envision him as a determined 'statesman', capable of including Turkish-Cypriots – initially excluded from any energy initiative – in the hydrocarbons' management. The Turkish-Cypriot negotiator was accused of 'gambling on such crises in order to lay the ground for a career in politics through Turkey's support'.

7.2.3 Grievance

As regards grievance, I raised the following expectation: the traumas of the past motivate the behaviour of the contending parties on the use of natural resources. This expectation is found in two discourses: the Greek-Cypriot 'resentment matters' and Turkish-Cypriot 'Gas stimulating political equality'.

The most striking sentence in 'Resentment Matters' was: 'If we had to deal with a growing number of fatalities today, the pressure to reach a sustainable settlement would have been higher' (statement 3). The sense of injustice was captured by different rhetorical questions set

by the respondents: 'Why should I show my passport to the police officers at the border line in order to cross the territory? I have to go through a passport control within my own land'. According to this discourse, Greek-Cypriots feel alone and should act as they are alone.

The Turkish-Cypriot discourse 'Gas stimulating political equality' articulates their 'obsession with political equality' (as one respondent emphasised), which they have been deprived of due to the lack of recognition of their status. The discourse expresses Turkish-Cypriot fears that Greek-Cypriots 'will make them irrelevant to the future of the island' (statement 13). Their exclusion from hydrocarbons management conjures up memories from the past, when the Greek-Cypriot call for *'enosis'* was ignoring their own security needs on the island. The fear of isolationism on the Turkish-Cypriot side articulates the Turkish-Cypriot grievances and confirms the respective expectations.

Grievance seems to apply as a theoretical perspective in the escalation of the conflict. It is clearly identified in two discourses, one Greek-Cypriot ('Resentment matters') and one Turkish-Cypriot ('Gas stimulating political equality').

7

7.3 DISCOURSES WITH 'MIXED PERSPECTIVES'

7.3.1 Geopolitics-Grievance

I set forth one expectation regarding the interplay between geopolitics and grievance on the basis of 'critical geopolitics': 'The traumas of the past in tandem with the survival in the 'anarchic system' motivate the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of the natural resources'. Two discourses confirm this assumption.

According to the Greek-Cypriot discourse, 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing', the 'non-involvement' of Turkish-Cypriots in the management of hydrocarbons was justified on two grounds: first, the framing of the whole issue as a matter of sovereignty (statement 39), which should involve only the recognised entity of the Republic of Cyprus, and second, the portrayal of Turkish-Cypriots as 'Turkey's accessory', 'Turkey's strategic community', 'Turkey's Trojan horse', who advance Turkey's interests and support its 'bullying behaviour' (statement 23). Greek-Cypriots feel betrayed by the fact that Turkish-Cypriots 'opened the door' to Turkey's military intervention in 1974. Therefore, mistrust attributed to grievances, partially explains Greek-Cypriots' decision to exclude Turkish-Cypriots in the decision-making on such matters. However, these grievances unfold within the geopolitical perspectives, which dominate this discourse as shown above.

According to the Turkish-Cypriot discourse, 'Gas stimulating political equality', natural resources constitute a vital part of the future security architecture of the Island. Greek-Cypriots, according to this discourse, should not be left alone in making decisions because they

will unilaterally pursue their agenda and create *fais accomplis* for them. Invoking historical experience, the participants asserted that “Turkish-Cypriots are excluded because they are considered as foreigners. Not because they are Turkish-Cypriots, (but) because they are seen as foreigners. Greek-Cypriots think Cyprus belongs to them and they don’t want to share it with anyone.’

In any case, it seems that the interplay between geopolitics and grievance, as conceptualized by ‘securitization, explains the escalation of the Cyprus conflict. It is found in one Greek-Cypriot discourse, ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing.’

7.3.2 Greed- Geopolitics

With respect to the interplay between greed and geopolitics, as motivated by ‘securitization’ theory and stipulated by Christou and Adamides (2013), I had raised the following expectation: The low popularity of the leaders during domestic turmoil in tandem with the need for survival in an anarchic system motivates the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of the natural resources.

The Greek-Cypriot discourse, ‘Pipe dreams and imported nationalisms’, adheres to the opportunistic effects that gas reserves offer to policymakers in order to initiate risky policies against the ‘enemy’, especially during pre-electoral periods or times of domestic turmoil. The adoption of an ‘us versus them’ rhetoric on the eve of elections or in the face of economic downturn, such as the one Cyprus suffered between 2011 and 2013, gains political ground among ethnically divided societies, which support assertive policies. For instance, the discourse claims that the geopolitical overtones attached to the gas reserves serve the political expediencies of Greek-Cypriot policymakers and academics, who know how appealing these overtones are to the public and whose concerns are fixated on ‘balancing the Turkish threat’ (statement 12). In a similar vein, the same discourse claims that these overtones have outweighed the essential technical and economic considerations the gas industry dictates (statement 9). No Turkish-Cypriot discourse affirms this expectation.

This confirms the validity of the interplay between geopolitics and greed.

7.3.3 Greed-Grievance

Finally, departing from Humphreys’ (2005) mechanisms and ‘diversionary’ theories, I had formulated a theoretical expectation about how greed and grievance intertwine: ‘The low popularity of the leaders during domestic turmoil in tandem with the traumas of the past motivate the conflictual behaviour of the contending parties on the use of the natural resources.’

The Turkish-Cypriot discourse, ‘Micro-politics’, confirms that some policymakers in the face of economic crises exploit the dynamics of the energy debate by invoking the ‘grievances’ that

the two sides have suffered in the past. By reminding their constituents of the grievances they have suffered in the past, Turkish-Cypriot policymakers try to establish a ‘rally-around-the-flag-effect’ in order to deflect attention from the domestic challenges they are facing, which is politically expedient. By domestic challenges, they identify the lack of recognition by the international community, the economic embargo they have been suffering, as well as their unilateral economic dependence on Turkey. These challenges create grievances to the Turkish-Cypriots. These grievances are manipulated by some policy-makers who allegedly serve their political expediences. The manipulation unfolds through the launch of an ‘external crisis’ against the Greek-Cypriots, who are blamed for the challenges that Turkish-Cypriots face.

7.4 PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS

Based on my findings, it seems that the theoretical perspectives, either in their pure or in their ‘mixed’ form, account for the escalation of the Cyprus conflict. By taking an even closer look to my findings, I observe that grievance, either in its ‘pure’ form or in combination with geopolitics or greed, dominates the five discourses. I present the findings in accordance with the explanatory power of the 3Gs and in section 7.4 I conclude it with a theoretical reflection on them.

Relying on the findings shown in Table 7.4.1a, the geopolitics-related perspectives motivate two of the five discourses, one in each side. The greed-related perspectives motivate one of the five discourses in total and one of the two Turkish-Cypriot ones. Greed in its ‘single’ form is not found in the Greek-Cypriot side. Grievance-related perspectives inspire two of the five discourses, one of the three Greek-Cypriot discourses and one of the two Turkish-Cypriot discourses. Based on this figure, it seems that from the single perspectives, grievance is prioritised as the key theoretical explanation for the impact that the discovery of the gas reserves has had on the escalation of the Cyprus conflict. The reason for this claim is that grievance, in its ‘single’ form, is found in discourses produced by both sides.

Table 7.4.1a. Single perspectives motivating discourses

	Discourses	Geopolitics	Greed	Grievance
Greek-Cypriot	Gas boosting our geopolitical standing	✓	✗	✗
	Pipe dreams and imported nationalisms	✗	✓	✗
	Resentment matters	✗	✗	✓
Turkish-Cypriot	Gas stimulating political equality	✓	✗	✓
	Micro-politics	✗	✓	✗

From the single perspectives, I move to mixed perspectives motivating the discourses. As indicated in Table 7.4.1b, the geopolitics-grievance perspectives motivate one of the five discourses in total and, particularly one of the three Greek-Cypriot discourses. The interplay between geopolitics and grievance does not seem to inspire any of the two Turkish-Cypriot discourses. With respect to the geopolitics-greed perspectives, they motivate one of the five discourses and, particularly, one of the three Greek-Cypriot discourses but none out of the two Turkish-Cypriot discourses. Finally, the interplay between greed and grievance motivates only one of the five discourses in total and on the Turkish-Cypriot side, only one out of the two discourses.

Based on this presentation and as Table 7.4.3 shows, it seems that grievance, either in a single or in a mixed form, motivates four out of five discourses in total, in particular, two of the three Greek-Cypriot discourses and both Turkish-Cypriot discourses. Geopolitics, either in a single or a mixed form, motivates three of the five discourses. Both discourses are found on the Greek-Cypriot side, while none is found on the Turkish-Cypriot side. Greed, either in a single or in a mixed form, animates two of the five discourses, one for the Greek-Cypriot side and one for the Turkish-Cypriot side

Table 7.4.1b. Mixed perspectives motivating discourses

	Discourses	Geopolitics- Grievance	Geopolitics- Greed	Greed- Grievance
Greek-Cypriot	Gas boosting our geopolitical standing	✓	✗	✗
	Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms	✗	✓	✗
	Resentment matters	✗	✗	✗
Turkish-Cypriot	Gas stimulating Political Equality	✓	✗	✗
	Micro-politics	✗	✗	✓

Table 7.4.2. The 3Gs in a single and in a mixed form

	Discourses	Geopolitics (single or mixed)	Greed (single or mixed)	Grievance (single or mixed)
Greek-Cypriot	Gas boosting our geopolitical standing	✓	✗	✓
	Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms	✓	✓	✗
	Resentment matters	✗	✗	✓
Turkish-Cypriot	Gas stimulating Political Equality	✓	✗	✓
	Micro-politics	✗	✓	✓

7.5 CONCLUSIONS: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

The positions of the grievance theorists seem to dominate discourses in Cyprus. Grievance theorists clearly support the idea that the exclusion of local, proximate ethnic groups is likely to amplify the conflict-increasing effects of natural resources, due to the added ability to overcome collective action and coordination problems. It becomes clear that the sense of resentment, animating both sides, motivates the escalation of the Cyprus conflict. As supported by the Greek-Cypriot discourses, ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’ and ‘Resentment matters’, the mistrust vis-à-vis the Turkish-Cypriots and especially their ability to keep Turkey’s influence on check explains the decision of the Greek-Cypriots to politically exclude Turkish-Cypriots’ from the hydrocarbons’ management. This creates a sense of relative deprivation on the Turkish-Cypriot side, as evidenced in the discourse ‘Gas stimulating political equality’.

Mistrust is a key aspect that can easily be framed as a symptom of historical grievances. According to the Greek-Cypriot discourse ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’, Greek-Cypriots do not trust Turkish-Cypriots, not only because of their historical experiences but because they do not believe in the latter’s capacity to disentangle themselves from Turkey’s influence. The economic and military support which Turkey provides them does not give them any other choice than to ‘blindly’ rely on Turkey. Therefore, when it comes to the energy debate, Greek-Cypriots treat Turkish-Cypriots as irrelevant. This sparks Turkish-Cypriots’ reaction. They resort to Turkey’s help in order to make themselves relevant. This mistrust is further fuelled by the absence of a concrete policy agenda. According to the Turkish-Cypriot discourse, ‘Gas stimulating political equality’, although Turkish-Cypriots want to place the energy debate on the agenda of the negotiation talks, they lack the proper know-how to deal with such an issue. When asked about how energy could contribute to their economy, they cannot provide a concrete answer. This magnifies the mistrust of Greek-Cypriots against them and may be contributing to the escalation of the conflict.

Aligned with grievance-based explanations, the findings underscore the centrality of identity and group formation for understanding the escalation of the Cyprus conflict (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009). The relationship between Turkish-Cypriots as an identity group and the Republic of Cyprus as an official state lies at the core of the conflict. Based on the comparison of the incompatible objectives, the Cyprus conflict has escalated due to ‘the disarticulation between state and society as a whole’. According to the discourses, it seems that grievance holds the greatest explanatory power in the escalation of the Cyprus conflict. The sense of ‘deprivation’ expressed by both sides through different discourses is the stimulus that causes the competing parties to objectify the pre-existing conflict in terms of interests, stakes and goals in the energy arena. This confirms the work of other grievance theorists such as Aspinall (2007), Azar (1985, 1986, 1990) and Bensted (2011), who have prioritized ‘grievances’ as the key factor in the eruption of conflicts.

This does not mean that grievance can be claimed to be the unipolar cause in this interpretation of the escalation of the conflict. Greed also matters but not to the extent that grievance does. The Turkish-Cypriot discourse, 'Micro-politics' enriches our understanding of how greed and grievance intertwine. Through diversionary theory, borrowed from the literature of foreign policy, readers observe how policymakers under societal and political pressure pursue risky policies in order to deflect the blame from their own responsibilities. They embark upon 'rally-around-the-flag' actions in order to divert the public's opinion from the economic or social crisis transpiring at that moment. While the benefits which policymakers or rebels reap from the continuation of the conflict are significant for greed advocates, they should also consider how and whether the timing of a domestic turmoil factors into their 'greedy' behaviour. The counter argument is that the distinction line between political survival and greedy behaviour is blurry. Nonetheless, such behaviour represents a political expediency that may be fatal for the escalation of a conflict. In the fertile ground where such behaviour can operate, the importance of pre-existing grievances is unquestionable.

Finally, geopolitics matters as well according to my discourses. Indicatively, two out of the three Greek-Cypriot discourses (Gas boosting our geopolitical standing and Pipe dreams and imported nationalisms) and one Turkish-Cypriot discourse (Gas stimulating political equality) pinpointed the sovereignty attributes of the debate either in a single or a mixed form. In the discourse 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing', 'geopolitical perspectives' were not portrayed as purely dogmatic guidelines underpinning Greek-Cypriots' behaviour; they were inspired by the lessons and traumas distilled from the past experience and within the context of the Cyprus conflict. The same discourse implies particular historical and cultural properties represented by the grievances which Greek-Cypriots have suffered from the 1974 events. Things would have been probably different if Greek-Cypriots were not treating Turkish-Cypriots as Turkey's 'Trojan horse'. Turkish-Cypriots were portrayed as the ones 'opening' the island's doors to Turkey. Therefore, a new understanding of geopolitics as a mechanism for resource-related conflicts should include the role of grievance. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriot discourse, 'Gas stimulating political equality' considers natural resources as an integral part of the islands future 'security architecture' and therefore should be involved from the very beginning. A matter of survival underpins their logic: they fear that if they are excluded, their presence on the island will become irrelevant. If their demands for participation in the hydrocarbons are not satisfied, Turkey has every right to take over and protect their interests.



Conclusions

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The discourses I analysed in Chapters 6 and 7 represent well-consolidated and widely shared assumptions on both sides. In this Chapter, I will explain why is this the case by laying out their implications. By elaborating on them, I stipulate the discursive factors underpinning the escalation of the conflict. I stress, though, that due to the contextual factors explained in length in Chapters 3 and 4, my findings are by no means testable to the study of other resource-related conflicts. Ultimately, this is not the objective of an exploratory research. As I argue in the second section of this concluding Chapter, importance of my study lies in the adoption a discursive framework in tandem with Q-methodology. I encourage the discursive shift to conflict studies because it helps scholars discern the *modus operandi* of the intangible factors in underpinning the escalation of a conflict. Moreover, another innovation of this research lies in the use of Q-methodology. The adoption of such a methodological approach has been never employed in the rich literature of the Cyprus conflict and has been rarely used in the examination of conflicts between ethnic groups (O' Connor 2016; Uluğ and Cohrs 2017).

8

8.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISCOURSES

The events in February 2018 between the Italian state-owned company ENI and Turkish warships confirm the security concerns of the Greek-Cypriot discourse, 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing'. Adding to this, in March 2019, Turkey launched a military exercise named 'Blue Motherland' (Mavi Vatan). This exercise covered a terrain comprising the Aegean, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (a total area of 462,000-square metres), with the involvement of over 100 ships, SAT and SAS commando units, land forces and the Turkish coastguard. It was the largest navy drill ever conducted across the three seas. These exercises represented a flexing of Turkey's military strength and signalled its firm stand on Cyprus's hydrocarbons exploration programme in its own Exclusive Economic Zone (Iseri and Bartan 2019).

According to the discourse, 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing', Greek-Cypriot policymakers have fixated on Turkey's threat in the energy calculations, especially in light of Turkey's repeated incursions into areas that encroach on Cyprus's Exclusive Economic Zone.¹ According to the respondents in my discourses, who participated either directly or indirectly in the licensing rounds, military criteria had gained prominence in the selection criteria for the bidding companies. More specifically, as some of them underlined, during the licensing procedures, they had to consider the military strength that the country of origin of each company held before granting the licenses. The logic behind such a policy formulation was

¹ See Chapter 4

quite clear: the drilling company had to be able to counter-balance Turkey's incursions into the Greek-Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone. Without military strength of the home country, the personnel and equipment of the drilling company would be in danger. The rhetoric of Turkish officials, besides Turkey's incursions, seems to justify, in their view, why Greek-Cypriots prioritize military power of the home countries in the selection of the drilling companies: 'Greek-Cypriots understand the importance of the issue only by show of force; so, in order to bring them [the Greek-Cypriots] to the negotiation table you need to do your own drilling, and the best way to do it is to go to where they found their gas' (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2017).

Nonetheless, if, assuming that the escalation and prolongation of conflict are costly and risky for the disputants, one would expect that 'rational' Greek-Cypriot leaders should have cultivated incentives to prioritize negotiated settlements with the Turkish-Cypriots rather than gambling over the possibility of an armed conflict with Turkey. This is what Greek-Cypriot discourse 'Pipedreams and imported nationalism' would assert. However, such 'rationalistic' assumptions cannot live up to the realities of the Cyprus conflict, at least as represented throughout my discourses. Despite the fact that an agreement with Turkish-Cypriots before a Cyprus settlement would reduce the costs and risks of the continuous power struggle, especially vis-à-vis Turkey, the Greek-Cypriot discourse, 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing' explains what prevents Greek-Cypriots leaders from reaching *ex ante* bargains with Turkish-Cypriots on the natural resources. Natural resources are a matter of sovereignty which cannot be compromised by letting Turkish-Cypriots participate in hydrocarbons management without reaching a settlement on the Cyprus conflict beforehand. The president of Cyprus, Nikos Anastasiades, seems to have embraced this discourse by stating that he would never accept 'any issue touching on the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus to be on the negotiating table' (al Jazeera 2017). Hydrocarbons' management, as clearly articulated in the discourses, falls within the sphere of Greek-Cypriots' sovereignty: that is why it cannot be discussed. An official dialogue on the use of the gas reserves would infringe on Cyprus's sovereignty, as exercised through natural resources management, in the sense that the reunification talks are 'dictated by Turkey', according to the Greek-Cypriot discourse. Therefore, natural resources management, as a matter of sovereignty, is presented as *indivisible* in any relevant discussion with Turkish-Cypriots.

In both Greek-Cypriot discourses, 'Resentment matters' as well as 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing', there is an extra reason not to share the management of the gas reserves with the Turkish-Cypriot community. Greek-Cypriots, according to both discourses, cannot trust the Turkish-Cypriots, who are considered as Turkey's mouthpiece and a promoter of Turkey's interests in hydrocarbons management. The mistrust vis-à-vis Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots dominates the two Greek-Cypriot discourses. This historical trauma allegedly underpins the issue's *indivisibility* and pinpoints the important role of grievances in the Greek-Cypriots' discourses. Following Schmitt's approach, sovereignty is determined by the act of decision, by the capacity to definitely decide contested normative disputes with the state, and particularly to

decide when a threat to the status quo has reached a point where it constitutes an ‘emergency’ and necessitates suspension of normal rules and procedures so that the status-quo itself can be preserved (Schmitt 1932, Williams 2003). So, in that case, the sovereignty is exercised by the people who make the decisions on the hydrocarbons management; who are authorized to sign delimitation agreements, invite drilling companies and take military measures² when things spiral out of control. These ‘survival’ attributes are clearly articulated in both Greek-Cypriot discourses.

In line with the Turkish-Cypriot discourse, ‘Gas stimulating political equality’, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akinci, asserted that the continuation of the Greek-Cypriot drilling initiatives would trigger Turkey’s reaction.³ As predicted by the Turkish-Cypriot discourse before this announcement, Akinci (TRNC-PIO 2018) clarified that if Greek-Cypriots move on ‘with their unilateral drilling and exploration activities’, they will leave the Turkish-Cypriot side with ‘no other option than to launch their own hydrocarbon explorations in cooperation with Turkey’. According to the ‘Gas stimulating political equality’ discourse, Turkish-Cypriots have been aware of the alleged Greek-Cypriot strategy behind the licensing rounds. In this vein, Akinci has accused the Greek-Cypriot side of attempting to put Turkey in a tight corner, briefly in confrontation with the ‘big powers’. So, what should the Greek-Cypriots do, according to him? In line with this analysis, Greek-Cypriots should downplay the ‘sovereignty attributes’ of their energy policy and promote the establishment of a bi-communal committee along with Turkish-Cypriots. Akinci called on both sides to co-design this committee in order to jointly explore ‘the common resources in cooperation’ (TRNC-PIO 2018).

According to the discourse, ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’, Greek-Cypriots are not likely to entertain such a possibility; they clarify, however, that, in all events, the wealth emanating from the exploitation of the gas resources would be distributed to all Cypriot citizens, both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, after a settlement is reached.

The prospect of sharing profits does not lure the Turkish-Cypriots into terminating their own exploration initiatives in tandem with Turkey. As already explained in the discourse, ‘Gas stimulating political equality’, what Turkish-Cypriots actually want is to have a say in the management of the hydrocarbons rather than anticipate potential profits coming from their utilization (whenever this occurs). They also assign their sovereignty attributes to the natural resources. They push the ‘uploading’ of energy on the negotiation agenda. Their primary concern is to share the legal competence over who controls energy policy and not just gas reserves. The Schmittian definition of sovereignty is also displayed in their discourses.

² By invoking military partnerships when necessary

³ As it did in the case of ENI in February 2018 (see introduction).

Eventual participation in the hydrocarbons management could allegedly help them upgrade their status in the eyes of the international community and gain a form of legitimacy, which they were deprived of after their unilateral declaration as a state entity in 1983. Moreover, they consider it as integral part of the ‘future security architecture’ on the Island. The Greek-Cypriots, according to the two discourses, ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’ and ‘Resentment matters’, underscore that since Turkish-Cypriots have abstained from the state apparatus since 1964 and have established their own ‘illegal secessionist entity’, they cannot point out how the Greek-Cypriots should run their own domestic affairs, within which the management of the hydrocarbons allegedly falls. Had they allowed the Turkish-Cypriots to participate in the hydrocarbons’ management before reaching a settlement, the latter would have no actual incentive –no carrot – to take a constructive stance in the negotiations. The contrasting ‘sovereignty discourses’, manifested through the Greek-Cypriot discourse ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’ and the Turkish-Cypriot discourse ‘Gas stimulating political equality’ visualize the mechanisms through which an economic commodity becomes a matter of contention.

Besides the over-emphasis on the ‘geopolitical’ and ‘sovereignty’ aspects of the debate, another implication of the discourses is, in my view, the ill-developed economic logic that the contending parties follow as regards the monetization of the gas reserves. A slight exception to this assumption is probably the second Greek-Cypriot discourse, ‘Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms’. This discourse proposes to put the expected revenues into a particular wealth fund, such as the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway (known as the Oil Fund).⁴ Could this prospect work for Cyprus? One of my participants does not believe so: ‘The Oil Fund has become the prey of populists that still govern today; they use the hydrocarbons in order to cover the mistakes from the mismanagement of the social insurance funds in the past’. According to the same discourse, an issue like the gas industry, being treated as an economic commodity, could offer some solutions. Side payments through attractive export options or linkages with other issues could be possible. Such a logic could bring the two communities closer through energy cooperation, while it would render Turkey’s gunboat diplomacy more costly because it would ‘bully’ not only the Greek-Cypriots but also the Turkish-Cypriots, who, in general, fall under its ‘protection umbrella’.

The policy deliberation between both sides did not evolve around a cost-benefit analysis of the available monetization projects on how the potential profits would be shared between

⁴ Established in 1990, the fund was set up to provide every Norwegian government with some room to maneuver in its fiscal policy in case oil prices dropped (incurring losses in petroleum revenues for an exporting country like Norway) or the domestic economy faced recession. According to the regulations running the administration of this fund, each Norwegian government is allowed to use only returns of this investment and only 4% in a given year (if necessary).

the two communities before or after a settlement. This is an observation drawn from the discourses. Some energy analysts would justifiably argue that, on the basis of the existing geological and financial realities, such deliberation would be ‘premature and misguided’ (Tsakiris 2017). Preliminary findings on the Aphrodite field in 2013 indicated a range of natural gas volumes of 3.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf) to 6 tcf, with a gross mean of 5 tcf. This amount would not do justice to the high expectations that were raised about the profitability of that particular gas field.⁵ We should note, though, that on February 8, 2018, the drilling company ENI made a lean gas discovery in Block 6 offshore of Cyprus. This reversed Cyprus’s hydrocarbon fortunes, especially after the initially ‘bad’ news from Aphrodite (ENI 2018). Besides the uncertainty around the available quantities, the challenge of accessing the available monetization options is global gas prices (Ellinas 2018)⁶.

The size of the gas reserves and low prices, albeit neglected as factors, are not the only ones inhibiting the development of the Aphrodite field. The latter’s south-eastern section extends over the maritime boundary dividing the Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone from that of Israel (Roberts 2017).⁷ At the time of writing, both sides were about to apply for international arbitration to decide on the distribution of the gas there. Furthermore, any eventual positive economic effects would materialize after 2021 because almost all of the revenues – produced during the first years after the production – have to be channelled to the gas developers in order for them to recapture their initial investment (Tsakiris 2017). All of these geological and financial hardships succinctly explain why a dialogue over the economic utilization of the gas could be rather premature at this stage.

Nonetheless, despite the gravity of these thorny questions around the monetization of the gas reserves, most participants had not paid particular attention to them amid this four-year ‘informal debate’. Most of them did not treat energy as a commodity that could

⁵ As Hadjistassou (2013) asserts, ‘in order to reach credible estimates, an offshore operator (such as Noble Energy) collects data using various techniques with the ultimate purpose of minimizing uncertainties while understanding the characteristics of a hydrocarbons field as exhaustively as possible’. The companies operating there have manifested little interest in developing it as a stand-alone site and decided to render it adjunct to other fields in the region, such as Egypt’s Zohr with its 32 tcf of proven reserves or Israel’s Leviathan, with 18 tcf.

⁶ At the current level, the ‘Cypriot gas that has been discovered so far cannot match average gas prices in Europe (in the range \$5-\$6/mmBTU). Whenever gas reaches Europe, whichever way it is exported – as liquefied natural gas (LNG) or through pipelines – the asking price would outweigh this range’ (Ellinas 2018). Even politically desirable US LNG, at prices just above the EU market range, is struggling to make inroads into Europe (ibid).

⁷ Since 2011, the two countries concerned, Israel and Cyprus, have been negotiating an agreement to settle the development of the Aphrodite’s joint reservoir in order to safeguard its efficient production and maximize the economic recovery of the gas from the licenses of the contract areas

somehow factor into the future economic fabric of a potentially united island; they rather portrayed it as a question of ‘sovereignty’, an ‘energy weapon to alter Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis the Cyprus conflict’ or a ‘means to achieve political equality’. Rather than shedding light on the economic challenges as well as the costs that the exploration and the exploitation of the gas reserves incur, the logic underpinning our discourses gave these particular reserves a new twist in the Cyprus question. Along the substantive issues of territorial adjustment, governance, property, guarantees and intervention rights, it seems that hydrocarbons’ management may gain the first place and lead to an impasse. The most important implication following this study is that the dynamics of the conflict seem to produce a new material stake, which, in its turn, may contribute to the perpetuation of the conflict *per se*.

8.3 ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION AND LIMITATIONS

Through the discursive framework, my study integrated theoretical premises from the agency-structure dilemma by delving into the strategic rationality articulated by opinion leaders from both sides. The discursive framework rendered the pursuit of the incompatible objectives intelligible and ‘rational’ to a reader who was not familiar with the complexities of the Cyprus conflict. Such a framework could be used in reanalysing other examples of resource-related conflicts (Sudan and Aceh). I repeat, though, that the discourses I broached here are by no means replicable. This approach, nevertheless, enhances the efforts of other conflict scholars, such as Alkhoper (2005), Campbell (1993), Jackson (2002, 2007, 2009) and Jabri (1996), to embrace the discursive framework as a method of analysis.

I did not imply that the theoretical premises emanating from the agency-structure dilemma are irrelevant. These theoretical preconceptions are relevant, but the aim through this discursive framework was to illuminate their plausibility and potential interplay. The discursive framework enabled my research subjects to draw on these theoretical preconceptions in order to ‘rationalize’ their decisions and articulations. They helped them render their fears and calculations intelligible to a reader not familiar with the context of a particular conflict. The discursive approach illustrated the ‘contextualization’ of these theoretical preconceptions.

I adopted the discursive framework to move beyond the agency-structure dilemma and offer a ‘synthetic approach’ in the study of resource-related conflicts. While the rich literature on the resource-related conflicts, especially after the 1990s, has concentrated on the interplay between greed and grievance, through the discursive framework I was able to underscore the importance of geopolitics as well. Although mainstream traditional geopolitics initially lost its theoretical capacity to investigate intra-state rivalries, geopolitics, as is clear from my findings, should be re-assessed as an explanatory construct that can account for the eruption, escalation or prolongation of resource-related conflicts. Constructivist and post-structuralist ‘critical geopolitics’, along with ‘securitization’, as provided by other scholars investigating the energy aspects of the Cyprus conflict (Christou and Adamides 2013), can offer a toolkit

for researchers to meticulously investigate the potentially conflict-inducing role of natural resources in these instances. Both ‘critical geopolitics’ and ‘securitization’ put key agents’ ‘inter-subjective understandings’ in the spotlight. Within these understandings, as illuminated through discourses, researchers can assess the simultaneous impact of both structure and agency on the escalation of conflicts. The discursive framework enables researchers to understand how the protagonists of a conflict decipher their ‘anarchic environment’; the ‘structural imperatives’ of such an environment is filtered through the interplay between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. The latter are used to highlight the strategic rationale that leaders use to decipher their anarchic environment and, thus, prompt their reactions towards the stimuli emanating from it. Thus, the interdisciplinary synthesis of two unrelated schools of thought, greed-grievance theory, on the one hand, and ‘geopolitics’, on the other, signifies the academic contribution of this approach to conflict studies.

The neorealist/geopolitical approach that has been conducted by a vast number of scholars on the Cyprus conflict and the energy developments in the Eastern Mediterranean (Aydin and Dizdaroğlu 2018; Bilgin 2015; Ifestos 2013; Kahveci-Özgür 2017; Karbuz 2018; Kentas 2013; Koktsidis 2014; Kontos and Bitsis 2018; Kouskouvelis 2015; Mazis 2008; Paraschos 2013; Proedrou 2014; Sitalides 2014; Stergiou 2016, 2017; Stivachtis 2019, Tsakiris 2014, 2017; Turan 2015; Tziampiris 2019; Winrow 2016) notify readers on what “systemic” pressures are exerted and what constraints and possibilities are posed by the regional security complex in the Eastern Mediterranean to the disputants. They also inform scholars on how effectively, the member-states, key units of the system will respond to those pressures, constraints and possibilities. Nonetheless, such approaches, with few exceptions (Adamides and Christou 2013, Tziarras 2016, 2018) downplay the discursive factors that could act as transmission belts linking the above mentioned systemic imperatives to the disputants’ behavior. They dismiss the role of perceptions that leaders may have vis-à-vis this anarchic environment. I do not disagree that systemic pressures and incentives may formulate the broad contours and general direction of the disputants’ behavior. Nonetheless, through this research, I closely examined how these contours are grasped by the opinion leaders “from the inside”. I showed that the broad contours of this anarchic environment are not benign but rather murky and difficult to discern. Therefore, by displaying the competing discourses, I explored the socially shared subjective models that help leaders filter these systemic pressures.

Moreover, through the discursive framework, I laid out how greed, in the form of political opportunism, has affected the escalation of the Cyprus conflict, as manifested in the recent tensions. Adamides and Constantinou (2012), Adamides (2015), Charalambous (2015) and Christophorou (2009), Heraclides, (2011), Kaymak (2009, 2012) and Richmond (1999) have pinpointed the routine-like, risk-averse attitude of political parties and assessed its impact on the reunification talks. The authors correctly attributed such behaviour to the unwillingness of the political parties across the island to distance themselves from their domestic surroundings and the historical experiences of their constituents. Their political survival would be threatened.

What the literature missed are potential causal links between the political expediencies of the political elites and the recent escalation of the Cyprus conflict. Through the aid of diversionary theory, my participants demonstrated that political elites, under the pressure of domestic turmoil, may embark upon assertive and risky policies against the 'well-known' enemy from the past. When the image of the political elites is shaken, they may try to restore it by diverting the attention to a crisis with the 'external' enemy. Such an approach confirms the 'in-group/out-group' hypothesis and resonates with Humphreys' (2005) approach. Therefore, policymakers, according to some of my participants, are not that risk averse, despite the claims of the scholars cited above. If their institutional position is at stake, they may engage in risky behaviour and initiate a crisis with the 'old enemy'. The motive behind such a move is to deflect constituents' attention from their accountability as regards the domestic turmoil to an external crisis against the 'well-known' enemy. That being the case, their political expediencies may hijack not only potential energy cooperation but also reunification talks. Such an approach is not widely shared among my participants. Nonetheless, it could be used as a theoretical preconception and be subjected to further qualitative research in the rich literature of the Cyprus conflict.

From a grievance point of view, the literature on the Cyprus conflict is vast. Bryant (2008, 2012), Burke (2019), Hadjipavlou (2007), Hatay and Papadakis (2012), Heraclides (2011), Kizilyurek (2006, 2009) and Yilmaz (2010) have clearly explained how denial of identity, relative deprivation and security-needs factor into the intractability of the conflict. However, the way such grievances are reproduced on the energy issue in Cyprus has not been adequately explored, with the exception of Birgel's work (2018). Through my discursive research, I established how the opinion leaders of the contending parties have made use of history in order to 'legitimize' the current energy conflictual strategies.

There are additional ways in which my study contributes to the literature of resource-related conflicts. While the vast majority of studies have focused on armed conflicts involving a significant number of casualties, my research focused on a 'frozen' conflict, which, since 1974, has developed as a 'dormant' crisis with no casualties, or at least none as the outcome of organised violence. In diplomatic parlance, a frozen conflict is defined as a predicament in which an active armed conflict has been terminated, but with the absence of a peace treaty or a comprehensive settlement which would resolve the conflict to the satisfaction of the contending parties. Thus, in legal terms at least, the conflict can flare up again at any moment. From Cyprus to the Balkans (such as Kosovo) or to the former Soviet Union (the situation in the post-2008 Georgia-Ossetia war), a series of nasty, small wars have been settled not via peace deals but by freezing each side's positions (*The Economist* 2008). In many, if not most of such cases, external conflict resolution efforts brokered by the UN, the EU or other regional organizations seem 'underpowered, stalled, failing, or nonexistent' (*The Economist* 2008).

The conflict dynamics in such cases are highly fluid (Sandole 1999; Steward 2002; Ballentine and Sherman 2003). In the face of evolving constellations of constraints and opportunities, the conflict ‘transforms, mutates, degenerates, or consolidates’ (Ballentine and Sherman 2003, 8). The longer such frozen conflicts last, the more likely they are to go through many stages and the more likely the factors sustaining them will differ from the ones which initially escalated them. Using the conflict of Cyprus as a ‘microcosm’ of such conflicts, scholars conducting similar studies should meticulously investigate the potential conflict-inducing role which the discovery of natural resources may play in exacerbating pre-existing tensions in the context of frozen conflicts. While the findings are not replicable, as I said before, the approach is encouraged.

Finally, one of the key factors sustaining the conflict is its subjective and perceptual quality: the perceptions that constituents have of each other. This subjectivity lies at the heart of this study, without downplaying the ‘ontological realities’ at hand. Q-methodology serves this purpose in the sense that it allows participants to articulate their ‘subjective perspectives’ by actively rank-ordering statements on the issue at hand. While this method has been previously used to examine other conflicts, such as the Kurdish one (Uluğ and Cohrs 2017, Uluğ and Cohrs 2017), it has never been employed to investigate resource-related ethnic conflicts. Such an approach differs from survey methodology, where participants are passively exposed to measurement (*ibid*). It is an interactive approach, which helps the researcher to clearly identify participants’ perspectives on the issue at hand. Therefore, if someone wants to explore how systemic imperatives from the anarchic environment are converted into policy responses or how the greed-grievance play out, the Q-method provides the necessary tools for its ‘qualitative operationalization’.

To my knowledge at the time of writing, no one so far has attempted to use this methodology to examine any aspect of the Cyprus conflict. From a strictly methodological point of view, this research constitutes a methodologically pioneering work in examining the Cyprus conflict. My study encourages the employment of such methodology if someone was seeking to discern the subjective qualities and “intangible factors” underpinning the Cyprus conflict and other, similar conflicts. This methodology renders terms such as ‘relative deprivation’, ‘resentment’ and ‘denial of identity’ more substantive and specific to readers not familiar with the realities of the conflict under investigation and brings the insights of the respondents to the forefront of the analysis. This is a contribution that my study makes particularly to the study of the Cyprus conflict and other resource-related ethnic conflicts.

Some concerns about the theoretical and methodological approach of my research cannot go unnoticed. It goes without saying that ‘language matters’ when it comes to the development of a discursive framework in a conflict study. Since I am Greek, some may justifiably assume that I intentionally impose my own ‘Greek’ interpretation on the discursive model. Readers

may think that because I have a vested interest, I have ‘cherry-picked’ certain historical dates, events or opinion leaders who would favour the Greek-Cypriot discourse over the Turkish-Cypriot one. Some might assume that I would lay out a historical background that failed to sufficiently flesh out events that would have been placed more centrally in an account if I were Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot. To assuage such valid concerns, I went to great lengths to provide a protracted history of the conflict across many pages (as shown in Chapter 3, where I presented the historical background of the conflict). I relied on material that came from English, Turkish, Turkish-Cypriot, Greek and Greek-Cypriot sources.

Moreover, in this research I did not investigate the perceptions of the other ethnic groups that live on the island: Maronites, Armernians and Latins. Since the key protagonists of my case study were Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, I did not delve into the viewpoints and discourses of these groups. Interviewing these ethnic groups might have enriched the understanding of how minorities interpreted the situation and how they feel when they are trapped in a conflict between two other dominant ethnic groups. Do they take sides on the energy debate depending on where they live or do they adopt a neutral stance in order to avoid involvement in the Cypriot imbroglio? Future research could take their insights into consideration.

As a final remark, the impact of natural resources on the escalation of conflicts is a convoluted topic, where multiple factors might not gain the publicity they probably merit. Through the presentation of the discursive framework and the adoption of Q-methodology, I have laid out from a bottom-up logic which contradictory tendencies from the agency-structure dilemma are at play. Geopolitical perspectives could be more likely to prevail under certain conditions than greed or grievance and vice versa. This raises the question of defining the conditions within which one perspective would or could actually prevail in the eruption or escalation of conflict. Unfortunately, despite my detailed analysis, this cannot be accurately predicted in the social sciences. Experience has shown that international politics is exposed to continuous fluidity. In Morgenthau’s (1948, 7) words, ‘world affairs conceal surprises in store for everyone attempting to read the future from his knowledge of the past and from signs of the present’. Therefore, the realities inherent in the conflicts are too complex for the existing tendencies to capture their essence.

Epilogue

In this epilogue I lay out the practical applications of my findings and set forth my personal policy-recommendations to tackle the current impasse. Key international actors, such as the UN and the EU, have repeatedly expressed their optimism that the recently discovered gas reserves could become a catalyst in terminating the political division of the island and transforming it into a modern federate state. This optimism is tempered by the discourses identified in this study. Here, based on the the approach taken and the discourses find in this study, I proceed with some policy recommendations to the EU officials purposing to cope with the impasse. Solving the Cyprus conflict seems out of the question, at least on the basis of the relevant discourses. I conclude with a personal outlook about the future of the divided island.

1. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU

Bearing the implications of the discourses in mind, how could other key international actors such as the EU reverse the negative spiral of the Cyprus conflict? The EU has been following the UN-sponsored reunification talks as an observer. This status may not change anytime soon, or even ever, because Turkish-Cypriots have not put any trust in the impartiality of the EU, since as they pretend, the EU admitted the Republic of Cyprus without a settlement, leaving Turkish-Cypriots on the outside. But the fact that the EU cannot operate, in the eyes of both Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots, as an honest broker in the negotiations does not imply that it cannot play any role in facilitating the conditions to overturn the negative trend that the conflict has taken upwards.

Based on the key messages from the discourses, I propose a number of policy recommendations, whose appropriateness and effectiveness might be judged by the EU competent organs. These recommendations could help the EU officials to find a strategy for their involvement. They incorporate two principles: (a) a relation-centred approach to the conflict instead of a problem-solution oriented logic, as the UN Good Offices Mission has followed so far, (b) a regional approach to the energy developments that would multilateralize the stakeholders and disentangle the Cyprus conflict from the hydrocarbons' management.

1.1 A relation-centred approach to the conflict

The Turkish-Cypriot discourse 'Micro-politics' emphasizes how policymakers from both sides exploit the grievances of their constituents in order to serve their political expediencies. In order to tackle this, policymakers should consider the alteration of such an environment, where the 'grievances' of the people may not fall prey to the dictates of such political expediencies. Eliminating the grievances is out of the question. However, regardless of whether a settlement is to be reached in the near future, the two communities are destined to live together on

the island.¹ They have to live with each other despite the grievances that each contending party holds against the other. Their grievances, expressed and exacerbated through distorted images of both sides, inevitably increase the information costs of their interaction. This makes their interaction an even more difficult task. This situation, according to the Greek-Cypriot discourse 'Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms' as well as the Turkish-Cypriot discourse 'Micro-politics' is further exacerbated by the policymakers, who, resorting to the 'grievances of their constituents', find opportunities to add fuel to the fire and gain popular support because of that.

The Cypriots of both sides need to interact repeatedly and indefinitely over time, introducing, testing and experiencing avenues of cooperation on aspects touching their everyday life. Their leaders need to engage in a dialogue which will not be contingent on desire and political will. Such a dialogue would not put 'hard politics' on the agenda, but the everyday lives of the people, covering areas such as telecommunications, tourism, education and environmental protection. The central idea is to create new realities in the sphere of 'low politics', wherein a policy-maker who wants to 'sell' a political settlement in the future encounters a different environment than now; a human environment, wherein the grievances will be counterbalanced, but not replaced, by a culture of practical cooperation and gradual interdependence. These new realities would help to reduce, even if to a small extent, the room for policymakers engaged in micro-politics to mobilize the constituents' grievances for their own ends. Even if a potential round of negotiations failed, these avenues for cooperation might provide a blueprint for the future. This should be outside the dimensions of a UN-sponsored comprehensive plan.

Before laying out some recommendations, I need to establish that tackling grievances is not the only challenge. Although the ideas below – which could be seen as new confidence building measures – might seem promising in the long run, it would be difficult to put them in practice soon, given the existing network of legal restrictions, impediments of a political nature and expediencies of every kind. As clearly stipulated in the Greek-Cypriot discourse 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing', these difficulties lie mainly in Turkey's preponderant role in taking decisions on behalf of the Turkish-Cypriot community in many instances, as if it were its own territory. To get out of this stalemate, the condition for the fulfilment of these suggestions could be a fruitful area of negotiation between the EU's, Turkey's and Turkish-Cypriots' bureaucrats in the form of technical committees.

For instance, the European Commission could immediately start to study how a roaming agreement for the mobile phones on both sides could be made. In our interview, the Turkish-Cypriot Professor Ahmet Sozen (2014) complained:

¹ Issues concerning the identity and the composition of each community's population, as well as any other distinct community, ethnic, religious or linguistic group they belong to should have to be first clarified and then agreed upon by the engaged parties, in line with UN guidelines.

‘For God’s sake, it’s so stupid that my phone works everywhere in the world – in the last few months I’ve been to Iraqi Kurdistan, Austria, a couple of years ago, to Russia – but when I cross a few hundred metres to the other side, it stops. The same is true for Greek-Cypriots, when they cross to the North a few hundred metres, it stops working. This is ridiculous’.

Under the auspices of the European Commission’s Structural Reform Support Service, the EU could include Turkish-Cypriots in the ‘roam like at home’ regulations. According to this regulation, every Cypriot could use their mobile phone while travelling across the whole territory of the island without losing their signal or paying any additional roaming charges. Such a policy would decrease the costs of communication for both sides and probably increase their mutual interaction for personal and professional reasons.

As suggested by the Greek-Cypriot discourse ‘Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms’, another field tailor-made for practical cooperation is tourism involving the whole gamut of tourism – medical, cultural, cruise, agro-tourism, ecotourism, ‘religious tourism’ and gambling entertainment (Tzimitras and Hatay 2016). A more integrated tourism product could include, for instance, combined itineraries diminishing the industry’s costs. As Tzimitras and Hatay (2016) point out, cultural and ‘religious’ tourism could attract tourists to holy and ancient sites on the whole island. For instance, the Hala Sultan Teke mosque in Larnaca (in the south)² and the church of St Barnabas in Famagusta would attract more people of different religions (ibid.). Similar initiatives could involve the rebuilding of Varosha – the so-called ghost town – or transform Famagusta into an eco-city.³ Such initiatives would incur high infrastructure costs covered mainly by private sector investments. Given the profits that the tourism sector already produces on both sides, the European Investment Bank, through the initiative of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and with the coordination of the Structural Reform Support Service of the European Commission, could provide the guarantees and unlock private investments for such ambitious projects.

An additional field for cooperation is the environment, an aspect that has been ignored in the discourses. While the discussion has focused on the ‘sovereignty’ attributes of the natural resources, the environmental challenges have been left aside. The effects of climate change, long drought periods, forest fires and invasive species jeopardize nature and biodiversity on both sides of the island. Furthermore, due to high consumption patterns, Cyprus has one of the worst rising waste generation rates, with grave environmental, health and socioeconomic effects. Bearing this in mind, both sides could consider the idea of running a technical dialogue process on monitoring and crisis- management (Gurel, Kahveci and Tzimitras 2014). Under

² The fourth praying place for the Muslim world, after Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem (Interviewee 2)

³ For a detailed discussion, see F. Mullen, A. Apostolides and M. Besim, ‘The Cyprus Peace Dividend Revisited: A Productivity and Sectoral Approach,’ PRIO Cyprus Centre Report 1 (2014).

the auspices of the DG Directorate of Environment of the European Commission, both sides could formulate an East Med Environmental Regime, designed to tackle the dangers emanating from the use of the hydrocarbon potential of the region. Along these lines, they could also institutionalize standard operating procedures for dealing with blackouts or forest fires on the island. In addition, they could establish a cooperation platform for waste management.

I should reiterate that measures of this nature are not destined to resolve the conflict because they do not entail the character of ‘high politics’, such as questions of governance, territorial adjustment, security guarantees and intervention rights. Despite their seemingly limited potential, under certain conditions, they could lay the groundwork for peace from a bottom-up perspective. Since the two communities have to co-exist regardless of a settlement, these initiatives could become the departure point for their peaceful co-existence irrespective of the successful conclusion of the long-lasting reunification talks. They do not redress one of the core aspects of the conflict, which is grievances, but they add an extra element that could counter-balance them. The realization of the suggested measures would, hopefully, make the vision of togetherness much more concrete, tangible and ‘measurable’ instead. Finally, as iterated, it is a counter-balance to policymakers mobilizing existing grievances in order to satisfy their political expediencies and putting the peace process at risk.

1.2 Changing the dominant logic of the ‘informal debate’

The ‘geopolitical’ and ‘sovereignty’ attributes of the ‘informal debate’ between the competing discourses have been extensively analysed. Whilst the economic rationale behind the exploitation of the gas reserves was not extensively explained, some of the discourses articulated their preferable monetization options. ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’ mentioned that the export option to Egypt and the FLNG would be economically the best while LNG is the most preferable one geopolitically. With respect to the Turkish-Cypriot discourse, ‘gas stimulating political equality’ articulated Turkey as the best option for the exporting of Cypriot gas reserves. Based on these competing preferences, how could the EU play a role to bring the two sides together, on the one hand, and support the monetization options of the Greek-Cypriots, on the other?

Departing from the discourse, ‘Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms’, the EU might rather develop a regional and proactive approach instead of hammering out a Cypriot-centric strategy. The Directorate General of Energy, Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, with the joint action of the European External Action Service, could found an ‘Eastern Mediterranean Energy Diplomacy Task Force’ (European Parliament 2017). The objective of such an initiative would be to establish a framework unifying regional stakeholders and facilitating regional dialogue towards the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean as a gas hub through prioritizing Egypt’s existing LNG facilities as its cornerstone. While striving for diversification of its energy supplies, the EU should provide the opportunity to the gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean to emerge as a ‘vibrant center for a pipeline network transporting

gas to continental Europe' (Baconi 2017). Regional stakeholders include, among others, industry players, technical experts, energy analysts, parliamentary members of the energy affairs committees and bureaucrats from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, Lebanon and Turkey, as well as Turkish-Cypriots. The gatherings could bring the various stakeholders in, forming working groups to specify cooperation agendas in elaborating 'Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership Action Plans' (Weber 2017).

In order to alleviate the fears over questioning Cypriots' sovereignty, as expressed in the 'gas boosting our geopolitical standing' discourse, such agreements need not to be legally binding nor raise questions of *de jure* recognition. This should help to avoid potential impasses between Lebanon and Israel, Turkey and Cyprus or the potential upgrading of the Turkish-Cypriots' community status into a state. The action plans, along the lines of the European Neighbourhood Policy, should rather set out a broader road map for cooperation, conveying the overall objective of approximation towards EU norms and expressing the commitments of the stakeholders towards the development of projects of common interest (PCI) (ibid). In these meetings, the experience of institutions like the German Marshall Fund⁴ might prove useful in organizing such working groups and gatherings.

At the time of writing and after the discovery of the gas field in Zohr, Egypt is the key player at the energy chessboard of the Eastern Mediterranean. With its LNG facilities in place (Idku and Damietta) and a number of gas fields coming into operation (West Nile Delta, Atoll and Nooros) in the coming years (Tsafos 2015; Ellinas 2018), Egypt will not only cover its increasing domestic demand but might produce surplus gas for export. Therefore, at this moment and with the current reserves detected, the only realistically available option for Cyprus to export its gas would be through Egypt's LNG facilities. This resonates with the preferences stipulated in the discourse, 'Gas boosting our geopolitical standing'. The energy ministers of both countries have signed an agreement to facilitate the construction of an underwater pipeline from Cyprus's Aphrodite gas field to the Egyptian shores and then to the LNG facility in Idku (Psyllides 19.9.2018).⁵

However, challenges still lie ahead and the role of the EU in addressing them is crucial. Because of the turbulent period that the Egyptian economy has gone through, investors may feel alarmed about its current state of affairs. Therefore, the EU schema discussed above, along with the help of the IMF with which Egypt signed an agreement in 2016, should facilitate the latter in implementing reforms of its energy sector in accordance with EU norms. Such an initiative might induce Egyptian officials to create an environment tailor-made to meet the preferences

⁴ For more details on its work, see <http://www.gmfus.org/forum/eastern-mediterranean-energy-and-geopolitics>

⁵ The price at which the gas would be sold is strictly up to the companies operating in the Aphrodite gas field (Noble Energy, Delek, Shell) and the LNG plant in Egypt.

of investors such as ENI and BP (Bacconi 2017; European Parliament 2017). The European Commission could consider the possibility of including this pipeline into the PCI. Such a development would clear the way for the allocation of resources, including budget and staff, to the task of exploring the financial and technical viability of this option.

In the context of this regional approach and amid the efforts to develop the Eastern Mediterranean into a gas hub, a settlement of the Cyprus conflict would be extremely useful. However, on the basis of the existing political realities and the competing discourses, such a prospect does not seem close. The politicization of the energy debate and its linkage with the reunification talks have made the situation even worse. The emphasis on the power-political dimension and the inadequate awareness of the economic benefits of a sound energy policy form the constraints under which the EU can participate in the debate.

What could the EU do? An energy diplomat, potentially a member of the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Diplomacy Task Force, might invite the members of the energy affairs committees of both sides for an informal dialogue process and set forth suggestions centred on the 'de-politicization' of this issue. By asking them to tone down the public rhetoric around the sovereignty aspects of the energy debate, the content of this dialogue would not be the exploitation of the gas reserves because such a discussion would undermine the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus; it should rather focus on future revenue sharing. Starting an unofficial dialogue scheme to discuss how potential revenue sharing (the modality of which depends on the availability of the gas reserves) could take place, should not be a taboo for Greek-Cypriots. By encouraging such an informal type of dialogue, the EU would kill two birds with one stone: it would not question the sovereignty of Cyprus over its hydrocarbons' management, but it would satisfy the demand of the Turkish-Cypriots for a forum of dialogue to discuss this topic. Bringing the two sides into the framework of such a dialogue would partially take away the pretext invoked by Turkey for its repeated incursions into the Eastern Mediterranean: that Turkish-Cypriots are excluded from hydrocarbons' management.

In this context, EU could advance 'Track II' or 'backchannel' diplomacy, involving an unofficial, informal interaction between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to develop common strategies about the future monetization of the gas reserves. This contrasts with the official or 'Track I' diplomacy, which unfolds through government channels. In a Track II approach, under the aegis of an EU energy diplomat, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot NGO representatives, academic scholars, former diplomats, businessmen and retired policy-makers could run workshops bringing members of conflicting groups together in order to develop personal relationships, see the dispute from the perspective of the other side and hammer out strategies for tackling the current impasse. Track II diplomacy cannot replace Track I diplomacy; it is designed to assist official actors to resolve disputes by exploring potential solutions without the requirements of formal negotiations or bargaining for advantage. Track II diplomacy was

successfully adopted in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict back in the 1990s and led to the 1993 Oslo Accords between the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and Israel.

Finally, in order to discuss the potential profits, Greek-Cypriots have to reconsider their thoughts about the risks they ascribe to the management of hydrocarbons. The greatest challenge to exporting is not the (geo)political risk but the commercial one because of low global gas prices. As Ellinas (2018) points out: ‘you experience political risk when you reach the point of selling. If the prospect of selling is not there, where is the risk?’ Despite Turkey’s incursions, the potential of gas finds has not prevented gas companies from acquiring blocks and carrying on with exploration and drilling in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone. This implies that the fears stipulated in the ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’ discourse may be exaggerated.

While moving on with the explorations, what matters for the Greek-Cypriot policymakers is to put ‘project-bankability’ (the ability to secure finance) and ‘project-financing’ at the forefront of the policy discussion; geopolitics is not the only obstacle. Although Greek-Cypriots’ concerns over Turkey are not unjustified, the economic rationale, present in the discourse ‘Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms’, needs to gain ground in the debate. Given that low gas prices threaten the economic viability of the development of the Aphrodite field, the most important issue is which financial partners will be involved in the project development. Large corporations such as ENI and Total have undertaken initial exploration, and their participation could offer financial strength and enhanced access to export markets for large-scale projects.

The EU could play a crucial role in this respect by becoming a source of funds for energy infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean. The European Investment Bank could promote strategic infrastructure around Cyprus:

- a. The Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership, which could provide loans for the development of energy projects in the south and east of the Mediterranean (this facility funded Egypt’s LNG facilities)
- b. The European Fund for Strategic investments, which facilitates private investment with higher risk
- c. The Connecting Europe Facility, which provides grants for the development of trans-European energy infrastructure (pipelines, storage, LNG terminals)
- d. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Tsafos & Giamourides 2015)

2. PERSONAL REMARKS AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

Could utilization of Cypriot gas reserves lead to a peaceful settlement? The Greek-Cypriot discourses, ‘Gas boosting our geopolitical standing’ and ‘Resentment matters’, would suggest not, while the Greek-Cypriot discourse, ‘Pipe-dreams and imported nationalisms’, and the Turkish-Cypriot discourse, ‘Gas stimulating political equality’, would suggest it could. Comments from international analysts uphold that the gas question will not help political settlement. ‘Energy trade reflects existing peaceful relations; it does not create them’ is what Shaffer (2012) asserts. As Tsafos (2016) aptly puts it: ‘It is energy relations following political relations and not vice versa. Energy relations can reinvigorate ties when relations are cordial and get in the way when relations deteriorate’. To this end, it is the tenor of the reunification talks that determines whether gas will be treated as a problem or as a solution, not the opposite. Hence, the conclusion is that gas discoveries cannot be the game changer for the Cyprus conflict, as was hoped.

This brings the discussion back to the reunification talks about a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus conflict, with special reference to the future role of the UN. ‘Outline papers’, the opening statements of the Secretary General, ‘food for thought’ papers, and ‘convergence papers’ have been written to bridge the gap between the competing sides (ICG 2014). Despite these efforts, the future role and involvement of the UN Good Offices Mission are still subject to questioning. Whereas the UN has done an excellent job in preserving – through its blue-helmet peace corps and through bi-communal talks- negative peace (no armed conflict since 1974), it has not managed to produce a breakthrough in the politically problematic relations between the adversaries. A couple of years ago, a veteran Turkish-Cypriot negotiator asserted: ‘the talks maintain and preserve the status quo. So, when you fail, you start again... The UN parameters are the tool we always use against each other... It’s like a tennis match’ (ICG 2014). In the immediate aftermath of the failed talks in Crans Montana (July 2017), Turkey’s foreign minister Mevlüt Cavusoglu stated: ‘This outcome shows that within the UN’s Good Offices Mission parameters, a resolution cannot be found. There is no meaning left in continuing within these parameters’ (*Daily Sabah* 2017). Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Hami Aksoy said: ‘A federal solution cannot be achieved with the Greek-Cypriots’ mentality... We now believe that a new path should be tried’ (Cyprus-Mail 2018a). What kind of paths do the Turkish officials mean? A lot of interpretations have been given to these statements.

One of them is that Turkey might devise a plan to legalize Cyprus’s divided status quo. In this framework, Turkey could intensify diplomatic efforts to enable Turkish-Cypriots to consolidate their self-declared independence. Turkey’s officials, for instance, in close consultation with some of the 56 member states from the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, could lobby for *de jure* recognition of the breakaway regime and attract economic investment for speeding up financial development in the North. Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary 2001-2006, has bluntly

echoed this prospect: 'It's time, in my view, for the international community to acknowledge this reality and recognize the partition of the island. That would be far more likely to improve relations between the two communities than continuing the useless merry-go-round of further negotiations for a settlement that never can be' (Straw 2017). According to Faustmann, 'permanent partition is secretly favoured by a significant proportion of the Greek-Cypriots, though they would not dare to say so publicly' (ICG 2014). What could the implications emanating from the fulfilment of such a scenario be? As Rolandis (2017) predicts, Turkey, acting as the 'Big Brother', may make a claim for a bigger share of the hydrocarbons reserves. In such a scenario, Cyprus, Greece and other members of the EU would express their opposition to this scenario because it would otherwise give their blessing to Turkey's military invasion and occupation of 37% of Cyprus's territory (Rolandis 2017).

A second path, along the lines of the first one, would be a negotiated partition, a so-called 'velvet divorce' between the two sides or even a confederation, including a loose association between the constituent states. Such an agreement could include territorial adjustments in favour of the Greek-Cypriots and a *modus operandi* for the distribution of the gas reserves. However, the Greek-Cypriot negotiator, Andreas Mavroyannis, clarified that this scenario is 'another covert Turkish approach, which is euphemistically presented as attractive, painless, mutually desirable and profitable' (*Cyprus-Mail* 2018b). Greek-Cypriots could not give their consent to this because a Greek-Cypriot signature would promote the *de jure* division of the island. 'The effects of the invasion and occupation are not negated by their legitimacy and our people will not be vindicated by the waiving of their rights; the future is not ensured by the embellishment of the problems' were the remarks of Mavroyiannis (*Cyprus-Mail* 2018b). Mustafa Akinci, on his part, added that the idea of a confederation or a two-state solution was not something the Turkish-Cypriot side could get on the negotiating table: 'The political atmosphere is not favourable [for that]. It is not realistic' (J. Christou 2018)

A third 'path' would be the annexation of 37% of the island's territory by Turkey. There is a historical precedent for such a scenario. In 1939 and after a referendum, Turkey, with the aid of the French troops under the League of Nations French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon, annexed the province of Iskenderun (now known as Alexandretta), which belonged to Syria. In a similar fashion, the Turkish-Cypriots could become the 82nd province of Turkey, while probably maintaining a special status of self-governance. Such a prospect is not likely to ease the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea because Turkey might make the same territorial claims over the exploitation of the gas reserves (Rolandis 2015).

Regardless of these scenarios, I conclude with an additional personal note. All international actors involved have come to realize that the Cyprus question is not only about gas or the above-mentioned substantive issues of security, guarantees and territory, but also about 'mistrust, fear and suspicions' (Yılmaz 2010). This is fully justified by the discourses I found. A chronic

conflict, whose latest phase has lasted over 50 years, has led to the accumulation of grievances incorporated into each adversary's version of history and, consequently, to the conflicting energy security discourses. The long narrative of violence in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the continuous deadlocks in several negotiation rounds for a settlement, have probably penetrated the minds of the Cypriots to such a degree that each side fears becoming a victim once again. From the moment that these thoughts dominated the public consciousness and amplified the emotional refusal of the Cypriots to utilize the benefits of togetherness or the common exploitation of gas, each contending party developed a vested interest in the continuation of the conflict and a zero-sum perception of the negotiations. The decision-makers and chief negotiators of both sides are typically continuing the existing status quo, rather than seeking efforts to alter it. The benefits and costs of the existing power configurations are known to policy actors, unlike the uncertainties that new arrangements bring forth after a settlement. Therefore, securing agreement on major changes in power-sharing, the withdrawal of Turkish troops, territorial adjustment, addressing property issues and hydrocarbons' management for Cypriots' interest in the long run have become an extremely difficult task to cope with.

The solution of the Cyprus conflict is not the highest priority of the communities and the neighbouring states. Based on the findings, I consider that what comes first, in the long-run, is to de-politicize and de-securitize the energy debate, de-link it from the development of the Cyprus conflict, tone down the rhetoric over geopolitics and try hard to make the current monetization options bankable. If these policies resonate with the confidence-building measures mentioned above, a wind of change might blow over the island. Otherwise, people of Cyprus and neighbouring states stand to lose important economic and political benefits.

Appendices

APPENDIX 1: RECRUITMENT OF INTERVIEWEES

With respect to the Republic of Cyprus, one of the key figures I interviewed is Nikos Rolandis, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1983) and Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (1998-2003) in the coalition-government formed up by the late President Clerides. During his incumbency in the latter Ministry (which included the portfolio of Energy), N. Rolandis had been the pioneer in setting the offshore oil and gas reserves of Cyprus in the political agenda. In Cairo, on February 17, 2003, he signed an Agreement delineating the Exclusive Economic Zones of Cyprus and Egypt -the first delimitation agreement signed in the Eastern Mediterranean. His insights into the domestic and external challenges he met while bringing this problem up, the main lessons he drew out from his experience along with his predictions on the future monetization of the gas reserves, are the main stimulants that prompted the interview with him. I approached, among others, Dr. Charles Ellinas, Greek-Cypriot in origin, CEO of Cyprus-based energy consultancy e-CNHC at the time of our interview. He has served as a CEO for the Cypriot National Hydrocarbon Company (KRETYK) and has over thirty-five years of experience in the oil and gas sector. His business-oriented approach has been considered more than useful in putting forward the economic challenges and prospects that the monetization of gas reserves might encounter in the future. I also discussed this topic with Dr. Tsakiris, who is Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Energy Policy at the University of Nicosia's Business School and the director of the Energy & Geopolitics Program at Greece's seminal Foreign Policy think-tank ELIAMEP. His deep knowledge on the energy field would provide me insights on which monetization options would be the most feasible ones for the Greek-Cypriots.

I also talked to Pr. Theophanous, currently Director of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, who had also served as Economic Advisor to Georgios Vasiliou, former President of the Republic of Cyprus (September 1990-February 1993). A set of questions related to the political economy of the Cyprus conflict as well as the limitations in establishing a federated state was addressed to him. I engaged in an interesting discussion with Dr. Constantinos Adamides, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Nicosia, who serves too as a member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus. The questions he was called to address concentrated on his research expertise in securitization, energy security and energy geopolitics. I also interviewed Dr. Moudouros, member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus and adviser to the former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias (2008-2013) on Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot issues. His deep knowledge of the developments in the Turkish-Cypriot side and his understanding of the geopolitical 'viewpoints' explaining the Turkish behaviour around the Island, offered significant insights into our concourse. Similar questions were posed to Dr. Tziarras, whose expertise and research interests lie in Turkish politics and foreign policy. I also interviewed, the Greek-Cypriot Associate Professor on History, Michael N. Michael in order to identify the roots of the Greek-Cypriot nationalism.

Furthermore, I contacted Dr. Tzimitras in the UN Buffer Zone, the Greek Director of Peace Research Institute Olso (PRIO) Cyprus Centre. Before joining PRIO, Dr. Tzimitras held a post at Istanbul Bilgi University, where he was both the director of the International Relations master's programme and the Director of the Turkish-Greek studies division. Having conducted a detailed report on the hydrocarbons' issue¹ and organized several international conferences on this topic, he was considered the person that could enlighten us on the legal dimensions of the question at stake and on the conflictual milieu within which the energy debate unfolds. Table 11.1 lists the people we interviewed for this purpose.

From the Turkish-Cypriot side, I had an interesting conversation with Pr. Kızılyürek, former advisor to President Nicos Anastasiades on Turkish affairs in the Geostrategic Advisory Council, and former Dean of the Faculty of Humanities in the University of Cyprus. He currently serves as a member of the European Parliament. His insights into the amalgam of sociological and psychological factors that sustain the intransigent position of the conflicting sides shed light on the intractable nature of this conflict. I also interviewed the former Turkish-Cypriot negotiator and founder of 'The People's Party' in the northern side, Pr. Kudret Özersay, in order to understand the challenges he experienced during the negotiations, and to better comprehend whether and how the energy developments got intertwined with the reunification talks in 2011 and 2014. Dr. Kahveci -with her expertise in energy politics- spelled out the main economic concerns of the Turkish-Cypriots over the future monetization of the gas reserves as well as the prospects of the water pipeline -between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side- as a negotiation tool in the future of the reunification talks. Dr. Ayla Gürel, Senior Research Consultant of PRIO, whose research concerned the issue of hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation offshore Cyprus, delineated the stakes both sides are met with in the hydrocarbons' issue. I also talked to Pr. Ahmet Sözen -Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU) - former member of the Turkish-Cypriot team in the UN-led peace negotiations, who set forth the limitations that the conflict resolution approaches deal with when it comes to their application on the Cyprus conflict. With respect to the Turkish-Cypriot side, the persons we contacted are listed in Table 1.2.

¹ Gürel Ayrel, Mullen Fionna, Tzimitras Harry (2013), 'The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios', in *PRIO Cyprus Center Report*

Table 1.1. Interviewees in the Republic of Cyprus (in chronological order)

Name of the interviewee	Professional Expertise	Date of interview	Code for the interviewee
Dr. Michalis N. Michael	Associate Professor of History at the University of Cyprus	8.11.2014	Interviewee 1
Dr. Nikos Moudouros	Member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus and adviser to the former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias (2008-2013) on Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot issues	18.11.2014	Interviewee 2
Pr. Andreas Theophanous	Director of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs and Ex Economic Advisor to former President of the Republic of Cyprus (September 1990-February 1993), Georgios Vasiliou	19.11.2014	Interviewee 3
Dr. Constantinos Adamides	Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Nicosia, member of the Geostrategic Council of the Republic of Cyprus	30.11.2015	Interviewee 4
Dr. Zenon Tziarras	Associate Lecturer at UCLAN with expertise in Turkish politics and foreign policy	3.12.2015	Interviewee 5
Dr. Charles Ellinas	CEO of Cyprus-based energy consultancy e-CNHC and former CEO for the Cypriot National Hydrocarbon Company (KRETYK)	4.12.2015	Interviewee 6
Dr. Thodoros Tsakiris	Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Energy Policy at the University of Nicosia's Business School, Research Associate of ESCP's London-based Research Center for Energy Management, director of the Energy & Geopolitics Program at Greece's seminal Foreign Policy think-tank ELIAMEP	10.11.2015	Interviewee 7
Nikos Rolandis	- Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1983) and Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism in the coalition-government formed up by the late President Clerides	11.12.2015	Interviewee 8
Dr. Harry Tzimitras	Director of PRIO (Peace Research Institute of Oslo)	21.12.2015	Interviewee 9

Table 1.2. Turkish-Cypriot Interviewees (in chronological order)

Name of the interviewee	Professional Affiliation-Expertise	Date of interview	Code name for the interviewee
Dr. Ayla Gürel	Senior Research Consultant of PRIO	11.11.2014	Interviewee 10
Pr. Ahmet Sözen	Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU)- former member of the Turkish-Cypriot team in the UN-led peace negotiations	17.11.2014	Interviewee 11
Pr. Niyazi Kızılyürek	Member of the European Parliament (2019-2024)- first Turkish-Cypriot to ever achieve this/advisor to the Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades on Turkish affairs in the Geostrategic Advisory Council, and Dean of the Faculty of Humanities in the University of Cyprus	20.11.2014	Interviewee 12
Dr. Hayriye Kahveci	Analyst in energy politics	1.12.2015	Interviewee 13
Pr. Kudret Özersay	Former Turkish-Cypriot negotiator and founder of 'The People's Party'	18.12.2015	Interviewee 14

APPENDIX 2: TYPE OF QUESTIONS IN OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEWS

Type of open-ended interview questions for the field research in 2014	Type of open-ended interview questions for the field research in 2015
The historical component of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses	The energy component of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot concourses
What are the main impediments in reaching a settlement and looking at the win-win side in exploiting these gas reserves	What is the importance of the gas reserves for you
What difficulties emerged from the protracted conflict	What geopolitical and/or economic factors have to be examined
Which factors make the conflict sustain	What kind of lessons can you draw from international experience and how do they apply in the realities of the Eastern Mediterranean
How does the one side view the other	Which alternatives exist for the Greek-Cypriots to export their gas reserves



APPENDIX 3: BIDDERS FOR THE 2ND ROUND

Company/Consortium	Country of Origin
Petra Petroleum Inc	Canada
ATP East Med No 2 / Naphtha Israel Petroleum / DOR Chemicals / Modiin Energy	USA/Israel/Israel/Israel
Total	France
Total / Novatek / GazpromBank	France/Russia/Russia
Premier Oil/Vitol	UK/UK
Premier Oil / Vitol / Petronas	UK/UK/Malaysia
Edison / Delek Drilling / Avner Oil / Enel / Woodside	Italy/Israel/Israel/Italy/Australia
Eni/Kogas	Italy/South Korea
AGR Energy / CO Cyprus Opportunity Energy	Norway/Israel
Oak Delta NG Exploration	USA/Israel
Capricorn Oil / Marathon Oil / Orange Nassau Energie / CC Energie	UK/USA/Netherlands/Lebanon
Winevia Holdings	Cyprus
RX-Drill Energy Cyprus	Cyprus
PT Energy Mega Persada & Frastico Holdings	Indonesia/Canada/Cyprus
Emmannuelle Geoglobal Rosario	Israel

Source: (Poten & Partners 2012)

APPENDIX 4: BIDDERS FOR THE 3RD ROUND

Block	Company or Consortium	Operator
6	ENI Cyprus Limited/Total E&P Cyprus B.V	ENI Cyprus Limited
8	Capricorn Oil (Cairn Energy from the UK) /Delek Drilling / Avner Oil Exploration	Capricorn Oil
	ENI Cyprus Limited	ENI Cyprus Limited
10	ENI Cyprus Limited/Total E&P Cyprus B.V	ENI Cyprus Limited
	ExxonMobil Exploration and Production Cyprus (Offshore) Limited /Qatar Petroleum International Upstream O.P.C	ExxonMobil
	Statoil Upsilon Netherlands B.V.	Statoil Upsilon Netherlands B.V.

Source: (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry 2016)

APPENDIX 5: THE DISPUTE OVER THE AEGEAN

Turkey's position is that UNCLOS Articles 3 (on the breadth of territorial sea), 33 (on the contiguous zone) and 121 (on the international jurisprudence on islands) imperil Turkey's interests in the Aegean. In the early 1970s, the discovery of oil off the Greek island Thasos set off the tension between Greece and Turkey over continental shelf rights in the Aegean. According to the Greek side's official stance, the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean is the only dispute dividing the two sides. Furthermore, it considers it to be of a purely legal nature and therefore only amenable to a judicial solution (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017a, Tzimitras 2012, Syrigos 2014). From Turkey's standpoint, the dispute in Aegean should be treated as a set of four separate (and interrelated sometimes) issues: (1) the delimitation of the maritime boundaries and continental shelf including claims over the sovereignty of small islets and rocks; (2) the breadth of territorial waters; (3) control of the airspace beyond the territorial waters and (4) Greece's militarization of its Eastern Aegean islands (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017; Karakasis, 2019).

With respect to (2), at this moment, Greece's territorial sea is at 6nm. Under the current status, Greece controls 43.5% of the Aegean, while Turkey's territorial sea covers 7.5% of the area (the remaining 49% is high seas). Nevertheless, the Greece's position is that customary international law, as codified in Article 3 of UNCLOS, grants it the right to extend its territorial sea to 12nm (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017a). Although Turkey has exercised this right in Black Sea² and the EM, in the Aegean it keeps a territorial sea of 6nm. During the negotiation stage of the UNCLOS, Turkey had made proposals (that failed to be adopted) obligating the coastal states surrounding enclosed or semi-enclosed seas (like the Aegean which is regarded in the Turkish view as a *sui generis* case) to define the breadth of their territorial seas by agreement (Bahçeli 1990, 142). After its failure to get her proposals across, Turkey has projected itself as a persistent objector to the extension of territorial sea in the Aegean considering the convention as *res inter alios acta*, i.e. a treaty that can only be binding to the signing parties but not to others.

Turkey went a step further. After Greece ratified the UNCLOS (Law 2321/1995), Turkey's Grand Assembly issued a resolution on June 8, 1995, which authorized the Turkish government to undertake all necessary measures, including military steps, deemed necessary to defend Turkey's vital interests (Republic of Turkey Grand Assembly 1995). Had Greece made use of its rights granted by the UNCLOS to extend its territorial sea to 12nm, she would acquire 71.5% of the area while the same proportion for Turkey would be 8.8%, with the proportion of the high seas shrinking to a 19.7% (Başeren 2010), as shown in Figure 5.1. In that case, Turkish ships

² Being party to bilateral agreements for delimitation with Bulgaria, Georgia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

should (particularly military vessels) transit Greek territorial waters when sailing between Turkey's Aegean ports and the Mediterranean Sea (Gurel, Mullen and Tzimitras 2013). Were Greece to claim its Exclusive Economic Zone from the baselines of its mainland and island territories (drawing on UNCLOS Article 121, par. 3) the maritime territory to delimit with Turkey is also depicted in Figure A5.1 (ibid).




Figure A5.1. Map of the Aegean, with approximate extent of territorial waters if extended from 6nm (left pic) to 12nm (right pic). Source: [Image]. (n.d.). *Aegean from 6 to 12 nautical miles*. Retrieved at 7.6.2017 from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aegean_12_nm.svg

APPENDIX 6: THE LEVIATHAN-CEYHAN PIPELINE

Such a deal would be significant for Turkey. Located between Europe -the world's second largest natural gas consumer after the US- and major natural gas reserves in Central Asia, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey sees itself as a transit state (Karakasis, 2016). To this effect, several gas pipeline projects are moving forward to help transport Caspian gas to Europe through Turkey, which in the long run will enable Turkey to address its dependence on imported oil and gas (Winrow 2016, Tekin and Williams 2011). Turkey aspires to play the same role in the Eastern Mediterranean. It entertains the possibility of exporting Israeli gas from the Leviathan field to Europe. In March 2014, two Turkish companies, Zorlu Group and Turcas Holding, participated in a tender for the possible laying of a 7-10 bcm/y capacity pipeline across the EM connecting Leviathan to the Turkish mainland (Amiram 2014).

Besides seeing itself as a transit state for the transportation of gas, there are further material stimulants prompting Turkey's involvement in such a deal. For several decades the Turkish economy was characterized by a guided industrialization based on import substituting protectionism (Karakasis, 2016). A decision by the Council of Ministers on January 24, 1980, to remove many of the foreign currency controls that came under the banner of 'Regulations to Protect the Value of the Turkish Lira' contributed to a fundamental transformation of the Turkish economy (Turan 2015). This decision aimed at changing the country's economic strategy from import substitution industrialization to export-led growth and embedding the national economy in the global market system (ibid). This resulted in a rapid growth of the Turkish economy and consequently in the increase of Turkey's energy needs. The main energy fuel source it uses in order to cover its electricity, consumption, industry and transportation needs is natural gas, representing 35% of the country's energy mix (BP 2015). Turkey's 'rush to gas' occurred in the past decade, as the country's demand tripled from 15b cubic metres (bcm) annually in 2000 to 47.6 bcm in 2013, registering the greatest increase in the world demand after China (ibid).

Nevertheless, what makes things problematic from an energy security standpoint is Turkey's asymmetric reliance on a single supplier, Russia (Tuncalp 2015). Figure A6.1 demonstrates this uneven distribution. Russia's multifaceted involvement in Turkey's neighbourhood over the past seven years³ has stressed the critical need for Turkey to diversify its energy suppliers and supply routes (Karakasis, 2016).

We shall conclude, though, that such a project (the Turkish-Israeli pipeline) presents important economic complications due to the low gas prices on a global scale. These economic hardships

³ I.e. the invasion of Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 2015 incident when Turkish authorities shut down a Russian helicopter in the Syrian-Turkish border.

are not even the most significant ones for the realization of the project. This pipeline would cross the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone in order to avoid the turbulent Syrian waters. Given, however, that Turkey persists in not recognizing the Republic of Cyprus as a state entity under its current status⁴ the examination of additional projects is more than imperative.




Figure A6.1. Energy suppliers Turkey. Source: (EIA 2013a).

⁴ Since Turkish Cypriots are not part of the administration of the Republic of Cyprus.

APPENDIX 7A: Q-SAMPLE FOR GREEK-CYPRIOT P-SET

1 The maritime disputes around Cyprus are linked to the Aegean Sea.	5 The energy developments have been hijacked by the domestic politics.
2 Energy in our case is deeply securitized in a political level: screw the economics.	6 I do not believe in the philosophy of the constituent state and I do not think that it can practically work, as long as the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state will be under the control of Turkey.
3 Cyprus conflict is a dormant, 'comfortable crisis'. If we had to face a reality of people's losing their lives day by day, then we would have extra incentives to immediately resolve the conflict.	7 Instead of taking steps to tackle the crisis, Christofias launched the energy debate.
4 The challenge of a pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey would be that if the single market we have is Turkey, then Turkey may dictate the prices.	8 The water project is almost like taking the pipeline and hitting the Greek-Cypriots.
9 All countries in our region, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt approached the whole debate purely from a political point of view having priority over the business logic.	13 The Turkish-Cypriots believe that the way Greek-Cypriots envisage to shape the new state entails for them the risk of vigorously becoming second-class citizens.
10 Exporting the current Cypriot gas reserves to Turkey establishes the conditions of a unilateral dependency on Turkey.	14 Wherever grievances exist, the past never becomes a past.
11 How can you talk about energy cooperation with your enemy when the latter does not recognize you as a state entity?	15 There is a danger to have a pipeline transiting the 'TRNC'.
12 Through the potential utilization of natural gas, Greek-Cypriots thought they had gained a negotiation tool in their confrontation vis-à-vis Turkey.	16 People are cautious after the Annan enthusiasm. It is good that the leaders are drinking coffee and zivania, but what is really happening is not convincing.
17 Americans want to clear the Cyprus question out of their way in order to normalize their relations with Turkey, while Syria is in between.	21 The rationale driving the cooperation with Israel is the lack of Cypriots' experience in securing its natural resources through coast-guard, navy and air force.
18 Under the current prices Greek-Cypriots cannot take any advantage of the gas reserves especially because they lie offshore, in 'ultra-deep' waters.	22 Without a meeting with the Turkish-Cypriots –not Turkey– to discuss on the energy issue, the Greek-Cypriots will find themselves under the 'Damoclean sword' of Turkey.
19 There is a succession principle in the delimitation agreement signed between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. All agreements of the predecessor states continue.	23 Greek-Cypriots fear that Turkish-Cypriots will be potentially treated as the 'Trojan horse' of Turkey.
20 The energy triangles are based on a consolidated perception: the 'enemy of my enemy is my friend'.	24 Gas is an important issue but not the main factor that prompts the negotiations. Negotiations are driven by geopolitics.

Appendix 7A. (continued)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>25 The construction of a pipeline to Greece is not feasible due to the depth of the waters and the lack of Israel's interest in investing in such a pipeline.</p> | <p>29 In Cyprus, the companies face a jumble of bureaucratic procedures in order to safeguard a corporate licence; the oil companies need 16 distinct licensing rounds for technical reasons. Why should they get further involved?</p> |
| <p>26 If Greek-Cypriots exhaust all possibilities with no results, then they have to do all necessary to facilitate the best possible cooperation with Turkey.</p> | <p>30 The hyperbolic opinion 'from now on, we are friends and partners with Israel' corresponds to Mediatic needs of the Greek-Cypriots' mentality that an external player is going to 'save us'.</p> |
| <p>27 If this negotiation process fails, we head for a potential division, permanent and legitimate.</p> | <p>31 The pipeline prospects will not be a trigger for peace. The presence of pipelines is just a reflection of peace or stability, not the other way round.</p> |
| <p>28 In economic terms, I cannot rule out that the best option is to export gas through Turkey. In political terms -with the current gas reserves detected-I would consider the export to Turkey a wrong choice, even after a settlement.</p> | <p>32 There may be companies (ENI and TOTAL) that would not hesitate to confront Turkey. If they want to make the decision to go, they will go because they think that Cyprus' entitlement in this region is very strong.</p> |
| <p>33 In Cyprus, we do not find cases where cooperation extends beyond the micro-level: they were few and did not have any spill-over effect, with a more sustainable character.</p> | <p>37 If the issue reaches the bi-communal level and every community has the right to exercise its veto, no company in the world would invest millions, if it had to face any form of obstructiveness</p> |
| <p>34 If Greek-Cypriots hurry up, they might sell some gas to Egypt for 2 to 4 years, until they discover more gas and earn some money in order to invest into another option.</p> | <p>38 If I cannot safeguard something that betters the <i>status quo</i>, then I handle things as they are, 'the theory of the second best'.</p> |
| <p>35 In the case of political-military conflicts energy, as such, has not been, so far, a factor conducive to their resolution but evolved as an essential chapter of the pre-existing conflict.</p> | <p>39 The most important stake in the energy debate is the guarantee of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and its rights. Therefore, the Greek-Cypriots should be the ones making the decisions.</p> |
| <p>36 The trilateral agreements between Cyprus-Egypt-Greece and Cyprus-Israel-Greece are oriented towards the right direction.</p> | <p>40 Greek-Cypriots can keep on at the drilling activities, but under the supervision of an international authority, within which a Turkish-Cypriot representative could also participate. This proposal includes a disclaimer; whatever agreed upon is not a precedent for other issues.</p> |
| <p>41 The way the profits will be distributed among the two communities is something to be seen. Greek Cypriots are ready in case of an external pressure to find an economic formula, but not a political one.</p> | <p>45 Akkinci wants to reach a settlement, he is a reasonable man. We should not forget, however, that he is a Turkish-Cypriot and has to address the interests of his constituency.</p> |

Appendix 7A. (continued)

42	If it weren't for Turkey, nobody would take any interest in the Turkish-Cypriots.	46	If a solution is to be found, the options for the utilization of the reserves will be expanded.
43	Russia has been conspicuously absent from the whole energy debate. If Israel approaches Turkey, then Russia will get involved.	47	After the establishment of an escrow account, for every 100 dollars that the Greek-Cypriots would earn out of the utilization of the hydrocarbons, a proportion could be directed to the Turkish-Cypriots. We can apply this proposal even without a settlement
44	If we trust Turkey to build a federated state (which means that the Turkish-Cypriots are reliable in their commitments), why shall we not trust Turkey for the construction of a pipeline?	48	Greek-Cypriots do not want an agreement abolishing the Republic of Cyprus and paving the way for the federalization of a constituent state with the 'territorial extension' of Turkey

APPENDIX 7B: Q-SAMPLE FOR TURKISH-CYPRIOT P-SET

1 The gas reserves were something that would not make Turkey and Greece step back.	5 Özersay played an important role in the crisis with the seismic survey in 2011.
2 If you talk about energy, it is always the realist school that comes at play. It is the state's safety at stake.	6 Turkish-Cypriots had become invisible in the eyes of the Greek-Cypriots to such a degree that they did not evoke even national hatred.
3 The incentives to resolve the conflict drop day by day, since it constitutes a manageable-dormant crisis.	7 Christofias' government initiated the whole energy endeavour in order to restore his shaken image after the Mari events in 2011 and distract the attention from the economic reforms needed.
4 I can understand why Greek-Cypriots do not make use of the Turkish export option. Despite the economic benefits, you cannot assign a price to the political risk.	8 Bringing water from Turkey to Cyprus as an option might be adopted as a negotiation tool vis-à-vis a common gas exploitation in the foreseeable future.
9 Greek-Cypriots failed to do something creative and substantive about the resolution of the problem and preferred to divert the public opinion towards something which is abstract, like the monetization of the gas reserves.	13 Turkey has always this heavy, oppressing presence. There is too much dependence on Turkey which is not a liberal country, and all the things that come with that create certain awareness.
10 Exporting the current Cypriot gas reserves to Turkey establishes the conditions of a unilateral dependency from Turkey.	14 Cyprus is a space wherein resentment exists; a space in which people, communities and citizens feel underprivileged and deeply traumatized.
11 In the case of energy, had international community sent the message to the Greek Cypriots: 'you know what, you can proceed on this matter, but you would need the consent of the Turkish Cypriots', then you would have better chances to resolve the conflict.	15 There might be options that a potential pipeline starting from Israel might not go through the Republic of Cyprus' controlled territory but through Karpaz.
12 The Greek Cypriots have a lot of problems with Turkey blaming everything on it. They like to think that Turkish-Cypriots are the good elements and Turkey is the bad element.	16 Turkish diplomats are making plans on the construction of the gas pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey without consulting the Turkish-Cypriots.
17 The existing status quo offers itself a level of stability and enables countries like the UK to continue to use the sovereign bases, without any dispute.	21 It is not easy to bring all actors involved given the continuous struggle in the region in the same way the Black Sea countries in 1972 came together and made an agreement in a Cold War environment.
18 The Security Council says that the Turkish Cypriots have political rights and Greek Cypriots have legal rights. It had not been taking one side or another. It mainly wanted to keep a kind of balance	22 The Greek Cypriots are pushed into a situation where they say 'For once, we are strong against Turkey so we're going to make the best of this, bring Turkey to its knees. This gives them all this false hope.

Appendix 7B. (continued)

19 All agreements of the predecessor states continue to apply after a potential reunification.	23 Even being considered the good element by Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots' overreliance on Turkey is problematic, because they can be the fifth column.
20 The cooperation between Cyprus, Greece and Israel has been perceived as a sign that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'.	24 The US in the background have played a very big role in bridging the gap between the two sides.
25 Turkey is getting angrier and angrier if it remains left out from the energy developments.	29 The format in accordance with which the two leaders as well as a handful of other men and a couple of women in the negotiation team who meet in the UN buffer zone are totally cut off from the rest of the society, does not seem the best way to go.
26 The presumption that Turkish-Cypriots will prevent decisions from being taken, if they participate in a decision-making body on energy issues underlines another missing element in the Cyprus conflict: the federal culture.	30 The Church had lost a lot financially due to the banking crisis. That's why Archbishop was initially convinced by some actors that following a non-solution or anti-solution stance or anti-federation stance is not the way to go.
27 Another deadlock will not take anything out of the tensions and I am afraid that Cyprus will surely go through another war.	31 The Cypriots – Greek, Turkish doesn't matter –are very successful in making things more complicated, instead of solving problems, simply because we are focusing too much on the constraints instead of having a very clear focus; that's we want to solve.
28 In order to safeguard the European perspective and utilize it against the Kemalist structure, Erdogan says 'yes' to the Annan plan hoping that the Greeks would say 'no'. The Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan was a relief and fantastic opportunity for Erdogan.	32 Erdogan talks about the Cyprus conflict by synthesizing the two discourses that every Turkish nationalist embraces in his rhetoric over Cyprus: geopolitical significance and the Turkish nationalist narrative.
33 Turkish-Cypriots do not want to change their economy because they do not really care. A state was established without oil but with aid. That has been a mistake of the Turkish policy-making.	37 Turkish-Cypriots are after decision-making. What they actually want is to have a say in the decision-making: 'let's do the explorations jointly'.
34 Due to the gas that will be transported from Azerbaijan, Europeans need Turkey and that is why they are going to re-open the energy chapter.	38 For the Greek-Cypriots, the explorations constitute a sovereignty issue. They are the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus now and the world knows that.
35 A settlement is not going to happen just from one day to the other. It's not going to be peace and reconciliation once we get an agreement and we will actually be able to implement it.	39 You could identify there the age-old problem: there is no agreement on what the Cyprus Problem is. It is two different things: When the Greek- Cypriots talk about reunifying the island they mean one thing while Turkish-Cypriots mean something else.

Appendix 7B. (continued)

36 Turkey is an important country in the region and obviously it will demand certain priorities as to its presence and geopolitical interests.	40 All these discussions about bringing the hydrocarbon issue do not have to be on the settlement negotiations. There could be perhaps a parallel process that would not prejudice any precedents.
41 The hydrocarbons' issue should be put on the negotiation table, but the way it's framed by the Greek-Cypriot side makes it impossible.	45 The Greek-Cypriots shall not make the energy issue the existential question for the Republic of Cyprus, as if its existence depends on talking about hydrocarbons with Turkish-Cypriots or not.
42 Even if the Turkish-Cypriots had natural gas reserves, they would have to bring the international development in, mainly companies to take it out. Then, they would have to engage with capitalism; unfortunately, that is life.	46 Cypriots should establish a fund: not like a bank, but investment bank. They could have a peace fund for reconstruction after peace. This fund should be used to introduce new things in the island (fixing traffic)
43 Turkey should do something on non-Russian gas resources.	47 The electricity cable linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece makes a crazy business. If you look at the feasibility plan, which is part of EU's common interest projects, only Cyprus and Israel are included.
44 In case Turkey and Israel normalize their bilateral relations, Greek-Cypriots have to decide what kind of policy they should follow.	48 Turkish-Cypriots also had this ambivalent attitude towards Turkey, in a sense that Turkish-Cypriots trust it to be there always for them.

APPENDIX 8A: Q-SAMPLE IN THE ORIGINAL GREEK LANGUAGE

1	Οι ναυτικές διαμάχες γύρω από την Κύπρο σχετίζονται και με το Αιγαίο.	5	Οι ενεργειακές εξελίξεις είναι έρμαιο μικροπολιτικών σκοπιμοτήτων.
2	Ξέχνα τα οικονομικά: η ενέργεια στην δική μας περίπτωση είναι καθαρά θέμα ασφάλειας.	6	Δεν πιστεύω στη φιλοσοφία του συνιστώντος κρατιδίου και δεν θεωρώ ότι μπορεί πρακτικά να λειτουργήσει όσο αυτό θα υπόκειται στον έλεγχο της Τουρκίας.
3	Η Κυπριακή σύγκρουση είναι μια υπνώττουσα, «βολική κρίση». Αν είχαμε να αντιμετωπίσουμε μια πραγματικότητα στην οποία οι άνθρωποι θα έχαναν τη ζωή τους της μέρα με τη μέρα, τότε θα είχαμε επιπρόσθετα κίνητρα για τη λύση της.	7	Αντί μέτρων προς διαχείριση της οικονομικής κρίσης, ο Χριστόφιας εκκίνησε την ενεργειακή κρίση.
4	Η πρόκληση για έναν αγωγό από το Λεβιάθαν στη Τουρκία θα ήταν το ότι η Τουρκία θα υπαγόρευε τις τιμές, σε περίπτωση που θα αποτελούσε τη μόνη αγορά για μας.	8	Ο υδάτινος αγωγός ήταν κακή εξέλιξη: σα να αρπάξεις ένα σωλήνα και να βαράς τους Ελληνοκύπριους.
9	Κύπρος, Ισραήλ και Αίγυπτος προσέγγισαν το όλο «ντιμπέιτ» από καθαρά πολιτικό πρίσμα, δίνοντάς του προτεραιότητα έναντι της επιχειρηματικής λογικής.	13	Με τον τρόπο που οι Ελληνοκύπριοι οραματίζονται να «στήσουν» το νέο κράτος, οι Τουρκοκύπριοι θεωρούν ότι διατρέχουν τον σοβαρό κίνδυνο να καταστούν πολίτες β' διαλογής.
10	Τυχόν εξαγωγή των υπαρχόντων Κυπριακών κοιτασμάτων στη Τουρκία θα δημιουργούσε συνθήκες μονομερούς εξάρτησης.	14	Όπου υφίσταται πνεύμα αδικίας, το παρελθόν δεν γίνεται παρελθόν.
11	Πως μπορείς να συνομιλείς για ενεργειακή συνεργασία με τον εχθρό σου, όταν ο τελευταίος δεν σου αναγνωρίζει καν την κρατική υπόσταση;	15	Υπάρχει κίνδυνος ο αγωγός προς Τουρκία να διέρχεται μόνο από τα κατεχόμενα.
12	Μέσω της πιθανής χρήσης του φ.α, οι Ελληνοκύπριοι νόμιζαν ότι είχαν διασφαλίσει ένα διαπραγματευτικό εργαλείο στην αντιπαράθεσή τους με τη Τουρκία.	16	Μετά τον ενθουσιασμό της περιόδου Αννάν οι άνθρωποι είναι επιφυλακτικοί. Δεν είναι κακό που οι ηγέτες πίνουν καφέ και ζιβανία, όμως, αυτό που συμβαίνει στην πραγματικότητα δεν μας πείθει.
17	Ενόσω εκκρεμεί το Συριακό, οι Αμερικανοί θέλουν να «απαλλαγούν» από το Κυπριακό για να διευκολυνθούν οι σχέσεις τους με τη Τουρκία.	21	Η λογική της συνεργασίας μας με το Ισραήλ υπαγορεύεται από την έλλειψη εμπειρίας μας στη διαφύλαξη των φυσικών πόρων μέσω λιμενικού, ναυτικού και πολεμικής αεροπορίας.
18	Ένα σημαντικό εμπόδιο εν σχέσει με τους υδρογονάνθρακες μας είναι ότι με τις τρέχουσες τιμές δεν μπορούμε να τους εκμεταλλευτούμε, πόσω μάλλον όταν αυτοί κείνται σε πολύ βαθιά ύδατα.	22	Αν δεν γίνει συνάντηση με τους Τουρκοκύπριους -όχι τη Τουρκία- προκειμένου να συζητήσουμε το ενεργειακό, θα βρεθούμε υπό την «δαμόκλειον σπάθην» της Τουρκίας.

Appendix 8A. (continued)

19 Υφίσταται αρχή διαδοχής στη συμφωνία οριοθέτησης μεταξύ Τουρκοκυπρίων και Τουρκίας. Ως εκ τούτου όλες οι συμφωνίες που έχουν προηγηθεί συνεχίζουν να ισχύουν.	23 Οι Ελληνοκύπριοι έντονα φοβούνται μήπως οι Τουρκοκύπριοι καταστούν ο «δούρειος ίππος» της Τουρκίας.
20 Τα «ενεργειακά τρίγωνα» βασίζονται σε μια εδραιωμένη αντίληψη: «ο εχθρός του εχθρού μου είναι φίλος μου».	24 Παρότι το «αέριο» είναι σημαντικό ζήτημα, δεν αποτελεί τον κύριο μοχλό που κινεί τις διαπραγματεύσεις. Αυτές υπαγορεύονται από γεωπολιτικά συμφέροντα.
25 Η κατασκευή αγωγού προς Ελλάδα δεν είναι μια εφικτή εναλλακτική λόγω κυρίως του βάθους των υδάτων και της έλλειψης Ισραηλινού ενδιαφέροντος να επενδύσει σε ένα τέτοιο αγωγό.	29 Στην Κύπρο οι εταιρείες συναντούν ένα κυκεώνα διαδικασιών για μια εταιρική αδειοδότηση. Στην περίπτωση δε των πετρελαϊκών χρειάζονται 16 διαφορετικοί κύκλοι αδειοδοτήσεων ένεκα τεχνικών λόγων. Πιατί να ασχοληθούν οι εταιρείες αυτές περαιτέρω;
26 Αν οι Ελληνοκύπριοι εξαντλήσουν όλες τις πιθανές επιλογές χωρίς αποτέλεσμα, τότε πρέπει να κάνουν κάθε τι που να διευκολύνει τη καλύτερη δυνατή συνεργασία με Τουρκία.	30 Ο υπερτονισμός, τουλάχιστον επικοινωνιακά, της φιλίας με το Ισραήλ, τελεί σε συνάρτηση με τη νοοτροπία του μέσου Κύπριου που, στα δύσκολα, προσπαθεί να πιαστεί από κάποιον εξωτερικό παίχτη «ο οποίος θα μας σώσει».
27 Αν αυτή η διαδικασία διαπραγματεύσεων αποτύχει, οδηγούμεθα σε μια πιθανή διχοτόμηση, μόνιμη και νόμιμη.	31 Οι πετρελαϊκές δεν επενδύουν τα δισεκατομμύριά τους για την επίτευξη ειρήνης. Η παρουσία των αγωγών αντανakλά απλώς τις υφιστάμενες συνθήκες ειρήνης και σταθερότητας. Δεν ισχύει το αντίστροφο.
28 Με οικονομικούς όρους, η εξαγωγή φ.α μέσω Τουρκίας δεν αποκλείεται να ήταν η καλύτερη λύση. Πολιτικά, όμως κρίνοντας, με τα διαθέσιμα πάντα κοιτάσματα, θα τη θεωρούσα λανθασμένη ακόμα και αν ήθελε επιλυθεί το Κυπριακό.	32 Υπάρχουν εταιρείες (ENI, TOTAL) που δεν θα δίσταζαν να τα βάλουν με τη Τουρκία. Εφόσον αποφασίσουν να προχωρήσουν τις έρευνες/γεωτρήσεις θα το κάνουν γιατί πιστεύουν ότι η Κυπριακή δικαιοδοσία στη συγκεκριμένη περιοχή είναι πολύ ισχυρή.
33 Στην Κύπρο δεν βρίσκουμε περιπτώσεις συνεργασίας πέραν τομέων «χαμηλής πολιτικής»: ήταν λιγιστές και δεν είχαν οιαδήποτε σημαντική επίπτωση σε τομείς «υψηλής πολιτικής».	37 Καμία εταιρεία στον κόσμο δεν θα διακινδύνευε επένδυση δισεκατομμυρίων μπροστά στο ενδεχόμενο κωλυσιεργίας που θα προέκυπτε αν το θέμα έφτανε ΣΕ δικαιοδοτικό επίπεδο, λόγω πιθανού βέτο εκατέρας πλευράς.
34 Εφόσον βιαστούμε, ενδεχομένως για πολιτικούς λόγους, μπορεί να πουλήσουμε (αέριο) στην Αίγυπτο για 2-4 χρόνια - μέχρις ότου δε βρούμε κι άλλο αέριο- να εξοικονομήσουμε πόρους και να επενδύσουμε σε εναλλακτική λύση.	38 Αν δεν μπορώ να διασφαλίσω κάτι που να βελτιώνει το status quo, τότε διαχειρίζομαι την κατάσταση ως έχει.

Appendix 8A. (continued)

35 Σε περιπτώσεις πολιτικών-στρατιωτικών συγκρούσεων, η ενέργεια ποτέ δεν συνέβαλε, έως τώρα, στην επίλυσή τους. Αντιθέτως, ανελισσόταν ως ένα σημαντικό κεφάλαιο για τις συγκρούσεις αυτές.	39 Το σημαντικότερο διακύβευμα στη συζήτηση περί ενέργειας είναι η διασφάλιση της κυριαρχίας και των δικαιωμάτων της ΚΔ. Για αυτό οι Ελληνοκύπριοι είναι αυτοί που πρέπει να λαμβάνουν τις αποφάσεις.
36 Οι τριμερείς συμφωνίες μεταξύ Κύπρου-Αιγύπτου-Ελλάδος και Κύπρου-Ισραήλ-Ελλάδος είναι προς τη σωστή κατεύθυνση.	40 Θα κάναμε εμείς τη δουλειά αλλά υπό επιτήρηση. Θα μπορούσαν να ήσαν διεθνείς επιτηρητές ή κάποιος Τουρκοκύπριος. Από την αρχή θα υπήρχε ένα disclaimer: αυτά που συμφωνούμε επί του θέματος αυτού δεν δημιουργούν προηγούμενο για άλλες διευθετήσεις στο Κυπριακό.
41 Το πως θα διανεμηθούν τα κέρδη ανάμεσα στις δυο κοινότητες θα φανεί στο μέλλον. Σε περίπτωση εξωτερικής πίεσης, οι Ελληνοκύπριοι είναι έτοιμοι να βρουν μια οικονομική αλλά όχι πολιτική φόρμουλα.	45 Ο Ακιντζί θέλει να βρεθεί λύση, είναι ένας λογικός άνθρωπος. Μη ξεχνάμε όμως, ότι είναι Τουρκοκύπριος και πρέπει να εξυπηρετήσει τα συμφέροντα των ψηφοφόρων του.
42 Αν δεν υπήρχε η Τουρκία, κανένας δεν θα ενδιαφερόταν για τους Τουρκοκύπριους.	46 Εφόσον βρεθεί λύση, οι δυνατές επιλογές για τη χρήση των υδρογονανθράκων θα αυξηθούν.
43 Η Ρωσία είναι καταφανώς απύσχα από τις εδώ ενεργειακές εξελίξεις. Τώρα που βλέπουν ότι το Ισραήλ επαναπροσεγγίζει τη Τουρκία, οι Ρώσοι θα θέλουν να εμπλακούν.	47 Μετά τη δημιουργία ενός ειδικού λογαριασμού, για κάθε 100 δολάρια που θα εξοικονομούν οι Ελληνοκύπριοι από τη χρήση των υδρογονανθράκων, ένα μέρος μπορεί να κατευθύνεται στους Τουρκοκύπριους. Δυνάμεθα να εφαρμόσουμε την πρόταση αυτή ακόμα και χωρίς διευθέτηση ΤΟΥ Κυπριακού .
44 Αν εμπιστευόμασταν τη Τουρκία (που είναι το μείζον) για τη σύσταση ενός ομοσπονδιακού κράτους -άρα οι Τουρκοκύπριοι θα αποδεικνύονταν φερέγγυοι-γιατί να μην την εμπιστευτούμε στο θέμα του αγωγού;	48 Δεν θα ήθελα μια συμφωνία με την οποία να καταλύεται η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία και ένα συνιστών ελληνοκυπριακό κρατίδιο να ομοσπονδοποιείται με τη Τουρκία, μέσω της προέκτασής της αυτής στην Κύπρο.

APPENDIX 8B: Q-SAMPLE IN THE ORIGINAL TURKISH LANGUAGE

1	Gaz rezervleri, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın geri adım atmayacağı bir konudur.	5	2011'deki sismik araştırma ile Özersay krizde önemli bir rol oynamıştır.
2	Konu enerji olduğunda devreye realist ekol girer. Söz konusu olan devletin güvenliğidir.	6	Kıbrıslı Türkler, Kıbrıslı Rumların gözünde o derece görünmez hale gelmiştir ki ulusal nefret bile uyandırmamışlardır.
3	Anlaşmazlık, yönetilebilir-etkisiz bir kriz olduğu için çözüm çalışmalarını teşvik edecek noktalar günden güne azalmaktadır.	7	Christofias hükümeti bütün enerji girişimini 2011 yılındaki Mari olaylarının ardından zayıflayan imajını sağlamlaştırmak ve dikkati gerekli iktisadi reformlardan uzaklaştırmak için başlatmıştır.
4	Kıbrıslı Rumların neden Türkiye üzerinden ihraç seçeneğini kullanmadıklarını anlayabiliyorum. İktisadi faydalarına rağmen siyasi riske bir bedel biçilemez.	8	Görünür gelecekte Türkiye'den Kıbrıs'a su götürmek ortak gaz çıkarma çalışmalarına karşı bir müzakere aracı olarak kullanılabilir.
9	Kıbrıslı Rumlar soruna yaratıcı ve kapsamlı bir çözüm geliştirmeyi başaramamış ve bunun yerine kamuoyunu gaz rezervlerini para kaynağı hâline getirmek gibi soyut bir konuya yönlendirmişlerdir.	13	Türkiye'nin ağır, baskıcı varlığı her zaman mevcut olmuştur. Liberal bir ülke olmayan Türkiye'ye bağımlılık çok yüksektir ve bunun sonucu belirli bir farkındalık doğmaktadır.
10	Kıbrıs'taki mevcut gaz rezervlerinin Türkiye'ye ihraç edilmesi Türkiye'ye tek taraflı bağımlılık yaratır.	14	Kıbrıs kırılganlıkların olduğu; insanların, toplulukların ve vatandaşların kendilerini yoksun hissettikleri ve derin travmalar yaşadıkları bir yerdir.
11	Enerji konusunda eğer uluslararası toplum Kıbrıslı Rumlara 'devam edebilirsiniz ama Kıbrıslı Türklerin onayını almanız lazım,' mesajını vermiş olsaydı anlaşmazlığı çözme şansınız daha yüksek olurdu.	15	İsrail'den başlayacak bir boru hattının Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nden değil, Karpaz üzerinden geçme seçeneği gündeme gelebilir.
12	Kıbrıslı Rumlar pek çok sorun için Türkiye'yi suçlar. Kıbrıslı Türklerin iyi, Türkiye'nin kötü bileşen olduğunu düşünürler.	16	Türk diplomatlar Kıbrıslı Türklerle danışmadan Leviathan'dan Türkiye'ye gaz boru hattı inşası planları yapmaktadır.
17	Mevcut durum bir derece istikrar vadetmekte ve Birleşik Krallık gibi ülkelerin egemenlik bölgelerini herhangi bir anlaşmazlık olmaksızın kullanmaya devam etmelerini sağlamaktadır.	21	Bölgede devam eden mücadele düşünüldüğünde ilgili tüm aktörleri 1972 yılında Soğuk Savaş ortamına rağmen bir araya gelip anlaşılan Karadeniz ülkeleri gibi aynı masaya oturtmak kolay değildir.
18	Güvenlik Konseyi Kıbrıslı Türklerin siyasi hakları olduğunu ve Kıbrıslı Rumların yasal hakları olduğunu söylemektedir. Konsey herhangi bir taraftan yana olmamıştır. Daha çok bir tür dengeyi sağlamaya çalışmıştır.	22	Kıbrıslı Rumlar, 'İlk defa Türkiye'ye karşı güçlü durumdayız ve bunu en iyi şekilde değerlendirip Türkiye'ye diz çöktüreceğiz,' deme konumuna itilmiştir. Bu durum boş beklentilere girmelerine neden olmaktadır.
19	Muhtemel bir birleşmenin ardından selef devletlerin imzaladıkları bütün anlaşmalar geçerliliklerini koruyacaktır.	23	Kıbrıslı Rumlar tarafından iyi bileşen olarak görülseler bile Kıbrıslı Türklerin Türkiye'ye aşırı bağımlılığı sorun yaratabilir, çünkü beşinci kol faaliyetinde bulunabilirler.

Appendix 8B. (continued)

20	Kıbrıs, Yunanistan ve İsrail arasındaki işbirliği 'düşmanımın düşmanı benim dostumdur,' denildiğinin işareti olarak algılanmıştır.	24	Arka planda A.B.D., iki taraf arasında köprü kurulmasında çok önemli bir rol oynamıştır.
25	Türkiye enerji konusundaki gelişmelerin dışında bırakıldıkça öfkelenmektedir.	29	İki liderin ve müzakere takımındaki birkaç erkek ve kadının BM tampon bölgesinde bir araya gelme şeklinin toplumun geri kalanından tamamen uzakta tutulması, olumlu bir davranış olmamıştır.
26	Kıbrıslı Türklerin enerji konularında karar veren bir organda yer almaları durumda kararların alınmasına engel olacakları varsayımı Kıbrıs çatışmasındaki başka bir eksik bileşeni işaret etmektedir: federal kültür.	30	Bankacılık krizi nedeniyle Kilise maddi olarak büyük kayıplar yaşamıştır. Bu nedenle bazı aktörler başlangıçta Başpiskopos'u çözümsüzlük veya çözüm karşıtlığı ya da federasyon karşıtlığı yaklaşımı benimsemenin doğru olmadığına ikna etmiştir.
27	Yeni bir çıkmaz, gerilimi azaltmayacak ve korkarım Kıbrıs'ı kesinlikle yeni bir savaşa sürükleyecektir.	31	Kıbrıslılar – Rum veya Türk fark etmez – sorunları çözmek yerine her şeyi daha karmaşık hale getirmekte çok başarılıdır. Bunun nedeni odak noktamızı korumak yerine sıkıntıların üstünde çok fazla durmamızdır. İşte çözmek istediğimiz tam da budur.
28	Avrupa perspektifini korumak ve Kemalist yapıya karşı kullanmak için Erdoğan, Annan planına 'evet' derken Rumların 'hayır' diyeceğini ummuştur. Kıbrıslı Rumların Annan planını reddetmesi Erdoğan'ı rahatlatmış ve ona muazzam bir fırsat sunmuştur.	32	Erdoğan Kıbrıs sorunundan bahsederken bütün Türk milliyetçilerinin Kıbrıs konusunda benimsediği iki söylemi birleştirmektedir: jeopolitik önem ve milliyetçi Türk anlatısı.
33	Kıbrıslı Türkler ekonomilerini değiştirmek istememektedir çünkü umurlarında değildir. Devletleri petrolle değil, yardımla kurulmuştur. Bu, Türk siyasetinin bir hatası olmuştur.	37	Kıbrıslı Türkler karar verme mekanizmalarında yer almak istemektedir. Asıl istedikleri karar verme kuvvetine sahip olmaktır: 'Hadi aramaları birlikte yapalım.'
34	Azerbaycan'dan nakledilecek gaz nedeniyle Avrupalıların Türkiye'ye ihtiyacı vardır ve bu nedenle enerji faslı yeniden açılacaktır.	38	Kıbrıslı Rumlar için aramalar bir egemenlik meselesidir. Bu bölgeler Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin egemenlik alanıdır ve bunu bütün dünya bilmektedir.
35	Anlaşma bir günden diğerine gerçekleşmeyecektir. Bir anlaşmaya vardığımız zaman huzur ve uzlaşi kendiliğinden kurulmayacak, bunu uygulamamız gerekecektir.	39	Burada çok eski bir sorun olduğu anlaşılmaktadır: Kıbrıs sorununun ne olduğu konusunda bir anlaşma yoktur. Burada iki farklı konu vardır: Kıbrıslı Rumlar adanın birleşmesi açısından bir şeyden bahsederken Kıbrıslı Türkler bambaşka bir şeyden bahsetmektedir.
36	Türkiye, bölgede önemli bir devlettir ve mevcudiyeti ve jeopolitik çıkarları doğrultusunda bazı ayrıcalıklar talep edeceği aşikârdır.	40	Hidrokarbon konusunu gündeme getirmek konusundaki bütün tartışmaların anlaşma müzakerelerinde olmasına gerek yoktur. Emsalleri dikkate almayan paralel bir süreç başlatılabilir.

Appendix 8B. (continued)

41 Hidrokarbonlar konusu masaya getirilmelidir, ancak Kıbrıslı Rumların çizdiği çerçevede bunu yapmak imkansızdır.	45 Kıbrıslı Rumlar enerji konusunu Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin beka sorunu hâline getirmeyecek, varlığı Kıbrıslı Türklerle hidrokarbon konusunu konuşmaya dayanıyormuş gibi davranmayacaktır.
42 Kıbrıslı Türklerin doğal gaz rezervleri olsa bile, çıkarmak için uluslararası gelişmeleri, yani şirketleri içeri almaları gerekecektir. O zaman kapitalizmle uğraşmak zorunda kalacaklardır. Maalesef, hayat böyle bir şeydir.	46 Kıbrıslılar bir fon kurmalıdır: bankadan çok yatırım bankası gibi bir oluşum. Barışın tesisinin ardından yeniden yapılanma için bir barış fonu olabilir. Bu fon adaya yenilikler getirmek için kullanılmalıdır (trafik sorununu çözmek)
43 Türkiye, Rusya dışındaki gaz kaynakları konusunda bir adım atmalıdır.	47 İsrail, Kıbrıs ve Yunanistan'ı bağlayan elektrik hattı çılgınlıktır. AB'nin ortak çıkar projelerinden biri olan fizibilite planına bakarsanız, yalnızca Kıbrıs ve İsrail'in dahil olduğu görülür.
44 Türkiye ve İsrail arasındaki ikili ilişkiler normalleşirse, Kıbrıslı Rumlar nasıl bir siyaset izleyeceklerine karar vermemelidir.	48 Kıbrıslı Türkler, Türkiye'ye karşı birbiriyle çelişen bir yaklaşım benimsemekte, bir anlamda Türkiye'nin hep yanlarında olacağına güvenmektedir.

APPENDIX 9A: GREEK-CYPRIOT P-SET (JULY 2017)

	Professional Affiliation	Q-sort coding	Year of birth
1	Civil Servant	CS1	1982
2	Journalist	Jour1	1967
3	Policy-Maker	PM1	1958
4	NGO representative	NGO1	1962
5	Journalist	Jour2	1966
6	NGO representative	NGO2	1988
7	Journalist	Jour3	1982
8	Energy Affiliate	EA1	1984
9	NGO representative	NGO3	1993
10	NGO representative	NGO4	1984
11	NGO reprsentative	NGO5	1984
12	Energy Affiliate 2	EA2	1981
13	Policy-Maker 2	PM2	1949
14	Policy-Maker 3	PM3	1951
15	Energy Affiliate 3	EA3	1953
16	Policy-Maker 4	PM4	1963
17	Policy-Maker 5	PM5	1960
18	NGO reprsentative	NGO6	1984
19	NGO reprsentative	NGO7	1961
20	CS 2	CS2	1982
21	Journalist 4	Jour4	1988
22	NGO representative	NGO8	1975
23	Journalist 5	Jour5	1985

APPENDIX 9B: TURKISH-CYPRIOT P-SET (JANUARY 2018)

	Affiliation	Q-sort	Year of birth
1	Policy-Maker	PM1	1987
2	Policy-Maker	PM2	1991
3	Energy Affiliate	EA1	1987
4	Energy Affiliate	EA2	1992
5	Researcher	R1	1962
6	Journalist	J1	1991
7	Journalist	J2	1979
8	NGO representative	NGO1	1979
9	NGO representative	NGO2	1981
10	NGO representative	NGO3	1991
11	Energy Affiliate	EA3	1989
12	Researcher	R2	1991
13	Energy Affiliate	EA4	1987
14	Policy-maker	PM3	1981
15	NGO representative	NGO4	1996
16	Researcher	R3	1978
17	Researcher	R4	1986
18	Researcher	R5	1976
19	Policy-Maker	PM4	1981
20	Journalist 3	J3	1982
21	Policy-Maker	PM5	1954

APPENDIX 10A: FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE GREEK-CYPRIO P-SET

	Q-Sort Coding Name	1	2	3
1	CS1	0,65	0,05	0,13
2	Jour1	-0,13	0,65	-0,37
3	PM1	0,89	0,06	0,25
4	NGO1	0,29	0,14	0,06
5	Jour2	0,19	0,58	0,03
6	NGO2	0,24	-0,02	0,47
7	Jour3	-0,05	0,57	0,08
8	EA1	0,36	0,11	0,34
9	NGO3	0,20	0,15	0,50
10	NGO4	0,08	-0,07	0,60
11	NGO5	0,02	0,51	0,20
12	EA2	0,25	-0,14	0,22
13	PM2	0,60	0,00	0,02
14	PM3	0,39	0,09	-0,18
15	EA3	0,28	0,04	0,03
16	PM4	0,57	0,17	0,02
17	PM5	0,50	-0,08	0,35
18	NGO6	-0,12	-0,10	0,49
19	NGO7	0,08	0,14	0,62
20	CS 2	0,78	-0,09	0,25
21	Jour4	0,20	0,62	-0,26
22	NGO8	0,26	0,27	0,29
23	Jour5	0,45	-0,08	0,34
	% Variance	16%	9%	10%

APPENDIX 10B: FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT P-SET

	Q-Sort Coding Name	1	2
1	PM 1	0,54 	0,55 
2	PM 2	0,47 	0,45 
3	EA1	0,52 	0,41 
4	EA2	0,77 	-0,06
5	R1	0,46 	-0,38
6	J1	0,06 	-0,38
7	J2	0,71 	0,22 
8	NGO1	0,32 	-0,20
9	NGO2	-0,17	0,61 
10	NGO3	0,39 	-0,16
11	EA3	0,34 	0,23 
12	NGO4	0,15 	0,26 
13	EA4	0,34 	0,23 
14	R2	0,51 	0,32 
15	NGO5	0,75 	-0,34
16	R3	0,53 	-0,20
17	R4	0,41 	-0,36
18	R5	0,62 	-0,03
19	PM3	0,36 	0,00
20	J3	0,13 	0,36 
21	PM4	0,69 	-0,07
	% Variance	23	11

APPENDIX 11A: FACTOR ARRAYS FOR THE GREEK-CYPRIO P-SET

No.		Factor Arrays					
		Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3	
		Q-Sort Value	Z-score	Q-Sort Value	Z-score	Q-Sort Value	Z-score
1	The maritime disputes around Cyprus are linked to the Aegean Sea.	2	1,22	0	-0,34	-2	-0,65
2	Energy in our case is deeply securitized in a political level: screw the economics.	-1	-0,44	-3	-1,76	2	0,41
3	Cyprus conflict is a dormant, 'comfortable crisis'. If we had to face a reality of people's losing their lives day by day, then we would have extra incentives to immediately resolve the conflict.	1	0,62	1	0,84	4	2,32
4	The challenge of a pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey would be that if the single market we have is Turkey, then Turkey may dictate the prices.	0	-0,05	-1	-0,45	-3	-1,12
5	The energy developments have been hijacked by the domestic politics.	0	0,07	-1	-0,47	0	0
6	I do not believe in the philosophy of the constituent state and I do not think that it can practically work, as long as the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state will be under the control of Turkey.	-1	-0,49	-3	-1,45	0	-0,15
7	Instead of taking steps to tackle the crisis, Christofias launched the energy debate.	-3	-1,37	-2	-0,94	2	0,47
8	The water project is almost like taking the pipeline and hitting the Greek-Cypriots.	-3	-1,46	0	0,01	2	1,03
9	All countries in our region, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt approached the whole debate purely from a political point of view having priority over the business logic.	0	-0,07	3	1,39	0	-0,35
10	Exporting the current Cypriot gas reserves to Turkey establishes the conditions of a unilateral dependency from Turkey.	2	0,98	-2	-1,19	-1	-0,58
11	How can you talk about energy cooperation with your enemy when the latter does not recognize you as a state entity?	4	1,53	0	-0,05	3	1,93
12	Through the potential utilization of natural gas, Greek-Cypriots thought they had gained a negotiation tool in their confrontation vis-à-vis Turkey.	2	0,84	3	1,46	0	-0,42
13	The Turkish-Cypriots believe that the way Greek-Cypriots envisage shaping the new state entails a risk that they become second-class citizens.	1	0,41	4	1,6	0	-0,09
14	Wherever grievances exist, the past never becomes a past.	0	0,25	2	1,41	3	1,94
15	There is a danger to have a pipeline transiting the "TRNC".	-3	-1,34	0	-0,13	-3	-1,24
16	People are cautious after the Annan enthusiasm. It is good that the leaders are drinking coffee and zivania, but what is really happening is not convincing.	1	0,74	2	0,99	1	0,54
17	Americans want to clear the Cyprus question out of their way in order to normalize their relations with Turkey, while Syria is in between.	0	-0,09	-2	-0,79	-1	-0,57
18	Under the current prices Greek-Cypriots cannot take any advantage of the gas reserves especially because they lie offshore, in 'ultra-deep' waters.	-1	-0,33	3	1,55	-2	-0,77
19	There is a succession principle in the delimitation agreement signed between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. All agreements of the predecessor states continue.	-3	-1,78	-1	-0,8	0	-0,18

20	The energy triangles are based on a consolidated perception: the "enemy of my enemy is my friend".	0	-0,23	0	-0,33	-3	-1,04
21	The rationale driving the cooperation with Israel is the lack of Cypriots' experience in securing its natural resources through coast-guard, navy and air force.	-1	-0,3	-1	-0,34	0	-0,47
22	Without a meeting with the Turkish-Cypriots -not Turkey- to discuss on the energy issue, the Greek-Cypriots will find themselves under the 'Damoclean sword' of Turkey.	-2	-0,34	0	-0,1	-2	-0,74
23	Greek-Cypriots fear that Turkish-Cypriots will be potentially treated as the 'Trojan horse' of Turkey.	3	1,48	1	0,74	3	2,14
24	Gas is an important issue but not the main factor that prompts the negotiations. Negotiations are driven by geopolitics.	3	1,48	1	0,57	2	0,97
25	The construction of a pipeline to Greece is not feasible due to the depth of the waters and the lack of Israel's interest in investing in such a pipeline.	0	-0,28	3	1,3	0	0,2
26	If Greek Cypriots exhaust all possibilities with no results, then they have to do all necessary to facilitate the best possible cooperation with Turkey.	-2	-1,22	1	0,29	1	0,78
27	If this negotiation process fails, we head for a potential division, permanent and legitimate.	-1	-0,33	2	1,16	-3	-1,18
28	In economic terms , I cannot rule out that the best option is to export gas through Turkey. In political terms -with the current gas reserves detected-I would consider the export to Turkey a wrong choice, even after a settlement.	1	0,48	-3	-1,35	2	0,97
29	In Cyprus, the companies face a jumble of bureaucratic procedures in order to safeguard a corporate licence; the oil companies need 16 distinct licensing rounds for technical reasons. Why should they get further involved?	-2	-1,14	0	-0,18	-1	-0,68
30	The hyperbolic opinion 'from now on, we are friends and partners with Israel' corresponds to Mediatric needs of the Greek-Cypriots' mentality that an external player is going to 'save us'.	1	0,4	1	0,89	1	0,29
31	The pipeline prospects will not be a trigger for peace. The presence of pipelines is just a reflection of peace or stability, not the other way round.	3	1,47	-1	-0,42	3	1,74
32	There may be companies (ENI and TOTAL) that would not hesitate to confront Turkey. If they want to make the decision to go, they will go because they think that Cyprus' entitlement in this region is very strong.	3	1,46	-1	-0,38	-1	-0,46
33	In Cyprus, we do not find cases where cooperation extends beyond the micro-level: they were few and did not have any spill-over effect, with a more sustainable character..	0	0,17	0	0,03	0	-0,47
34	If Greek-Cypriots hurry up, they might sell some gas to Egypt for 2 to 4 years, until they discover more gas and thereby earn some money in order to invest into another option.	1	0,49	-2	-0,71	-1	-0,63
35	In the case of political-military conflicts energy, as such, has not been, so far, a factor conducive to their resolution but evolved as an essential chapter of the pre-existing conflict.	0	0,22	2	0,86	2	1,09
36	The trilateral agreements between Cyprus-Egypt-Greece and Cyprus-Israel-Greece are oriented towards the right direction.	3	1,54	1	0,57	0	-0,27
37	If the issue reaches the bi-communal level and every community has the right to exercise its veto, no company in the world would invest millions, if it had to face any form of obstructiveness	-1	-0,32	0	-0,07	3	1,18

Appendix

38	If I cannot safeguard something that better the <i>status quo</i> , then I handle things as they are, 'the theory of the second best'.	-2	-1,04	-4	-2,01	1	0,67
39	The most important stake in the energy debate is the guarantee of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and its rights. Therefore, the Greek-Cypriots should be the ones making the decisions.	2	1,4	-2	-1,19	1	0,02
40	Greek-Cypriots can keep at the drilling activities, but under the supervision of an international authority, within which a Turkish-Cypriot representative could also participate. This proposal includes a disclaimer; whatever agreed upon is not a precedent for other issues.	-4	-2,01	2	1,32	-1	-1,79
41	The way the profits will be distributed among the two communities is something to be seen. Greek Cypriots are ready in case of an external pressure to find an economic formula, but not a political one.	-3	-1,98	0	-0,16	-4	-1,82
42	If it weren't for Turkey, nobody would take any interest in the Turkish-Cypriots.	-2	-0,9	-2	-0,9	-2	-1,1
43	Russia has been conspicuously absent from the whole energy debate. If Israel approaches Turkey, then Russia will get involved.	-1	-0,35	-3	-1,19	1	0,31
44	If we trust Turkey to build a federated state (which means that the Turkish-Cypriots are reliable in their commitments), why shall we not trust Turkey for the construction of a pipeline?	1	0,59	2	1,16	-1	-0,63
45	Akkinci wants to reach a settlement, he is a reasonable man. We should not forget, however, that he is a Turkish Cypriot and has to address the interests of his constituency.	2	0,92	-1	-0,16	-2	-0,9
46	If a solution is to be found, the options for the utilization of the reserves will be expanded.	0	0,21	3	1,45	-3	-1,15
47	After the establishment of an escrow account, for every 100 dollars that the Greek-Cypriots would earn out of the utilization of the hydrocarbons, a proportion could be directed to the Turkish-Cypriots. We can apply this proposal even without a settlement	-2	-0,98	1	0,67	-2	-0,98
48	Greek-Cypriots do not want an agreement abolishing the Republic of Cyprus and paving the way for the federalization of a constituent state with the 'territorial extension' of Turkey	2	0,79	-3	-1,71	1	0,87

APPENDIX 11B: FACTOR ARRAYS FOR THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT P-SET

		Q-Sort Value	Z-score	Q-Sort Value	Z-score
1	The gas reserves were something that would not make Turkey and Greece step back.	-1	-0,74	0	0,2
2	If you talk about energy, it is always the realist school that comes at play. It is the state's safety at stake.	1	0,51	1	0,45
3	The incentives to resolve the conflict drop day by day, since it constitutes a manageable-dormant crisis.	3	1,39	0	-0,2
4	I can understand why Greek-Cypriots do not make use of the Turkish export option. Despite the economic benefits, you cannot assign a price to the political risk.	-3	-1,17	3	1,74
5	Özersay played an important role in the crisis with the seismic survey in 2011.	-1	-0,66	4	2,59
6	Turkish-Cypriots had become invisible in the eyes of the Greek-Cypriots to such a degree that they did not evoke even national hatred.	0	-0,02	2	0,89
7	Christofias' government initiated the whole energy endeavour in order to restore his shaken image after the Mari events in 2011 and distract the attention from the economic reforms needed.	-3	-1,44	3	1,54
8	Bringing water from Turkey to Cyprus as an option might be adopted as a negotiation tool vis-à-vis a common gas exploitation in the foreseeable future.	0	-0,31	2	0,74
9	Greek-Cypriots failed to do something creative and substantive about the resolution of the problem and preferred to divert the public opinion towards something which is abstract, like the monetization of the gas reserves.	-1	-0,53	3	1,54
10	The prestige loss that the Greek Cypriots had suffered after the Annan Plan was an extra incentive for them to initiate the energy endeavor.	-2	-0,87	3	1,54
11	In the case of energy, the international community had no leverage to change the attitude of Greek-Cypriots.	-2	-0,94	2	1,29
12	The Greek Cypriots have a lot of problems with Turkey blaming everything on Turkey. They like to think that Turkish Cypriots are the good elements and Turkey is the bad element.	2	0,97	2	1,29
13	Turkey has always this heavy, oppressing presence. There is too much dependence on Turkey which is not a liberal country, and all the things that come with that create certain awareness.	3	1,7	2	1,29

&

14	Cyprus is a space wherein resentment exists; a space in which people, communities and citizens feel underprivileged and deeply traumatized.	2	0,99	1	0,49
15	There might be options that a potential pipeline starting from Israel might not go through the Republic of Cyprus but through Karpaz.	-1	-0,41	1	0,49
16	Turkish diplomats are making plans on the construction of the gas pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey without consulting the Turkish-Cypriots.	0	0,21	0	-0,16
17	The existing status quo embraces itself a level of stability and enables countries like the UK to continue to use the sovereign bases, without any dispute.	-3	-1,55	0	0,25
18	The Security Council says that the Turkish Cypriots have political rights and Greek Cypriots have legal rights. It had not been taking one side or another. It mainly wanted to keep a kind of balance.	2	1,06	1	0,45
19	All agreements of the predecessor states continue to apply after a potential reunification.	-1	-0,67	0	0,25
20	The cooperation between Cyprus, Greece and Israel has been perceived as a sign that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'	0	-0,04	2	0,6
21	It is not easy to bring all actors involved given the continuous struggle in the region in the same way the Black Sea countries in 1972 came together and made an agreement in a Cold War environment.	0	0,02	0	0
22	The Greek Cypriots are pushed into a situation where they say "For once, we are strong against Turkey so we're going to make the best of this, bring Turkey to its knees. This gives them all this false hope.	0	0,28	0	-0,2
23	Even being considered the good element by Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots' overreliance on Turkey is problematic, because they can be the fifth column.	1	0,77	0	0
24	The US in the background have played a very big role in bridging the gap between the two sides.	2	1,02	-1	-0,8
25	Turkey is getting angrier and angrier if it remains left out from the energy developments.	1	0,47	1	0,4
26	The presumption that Turkish-Cypriots will prevent decisions from being taken, if they participate in a decision-making body on energy issues underlines another missing element in the Cyprus conflict: the federal culture.	3	1,49	0	0
27	Another deadlock will not take anything out of the tensions and I am afraid that Cyprus will surely go through another war.	-4	-2	2	0,85

28	In order to safeguard the European perspective and utilize it against the Kemalist structure, Erdogan says "yes" to the Annan plan hoping that the Greeks would say "no". The Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan was a relief and fantastic opportunity for Erdogan.	-2	-1,02	-1	-0,4
29	The format in accordance with which the two leaders as well as a handful other men and couple of women in the negotiation team who meet in the UN buffer zone are totally cut off from the rest of the society, does not seem the best way to go.	0	-0,2	1	0,45
30	The Church had lost a lot financially due to the banking crisis. That's why Archbishop was initially convinced by some actors that following a non-solution or anti-solution stance or anti-federation stance is not the way to go.	-1	-0,57	-1	-0,25
31	The Cypriots - Greek, Turkish doesn't matter -are very successful in making things more complicated, instead of solving problems, simply because we are focusing too much on the constraints instead of having a very clear focus; that we want to solve this.	3	0,83	-1	-1,05
32	Erdogan talks about the Cyprus conflict by synthesizing the two discourses that every Turkish nationalist embraces in his rhetoric over Cyprus: geopolitical significance and the Turkish nationalist narrative.	-3	-1,51	-1	-0,85
33	Turkish-Cypriots do not want to change their economy because they do not really care. A state was established without oil but with aid. That has been a mistake of the Turkish policy-making.	-2	-0,85	-2	-1,09
34	Due to the gas that will be transported from Azerbaijan, Europeans need Turkey and that is why they are going to re-open immediately the energy chapter.	-2	-0,96	-2	-1,14
35	A settlement is not going to happen just from one day to the other. It's not going to be peace and reconciliation once we get an agreement and we will actually be able to implement it.	2	0,88	-1	-0,29
36	Turkey is an important country in the region and obviously it will demand certain priorities as to its presence and geopolitical interests.	0	-0,31	-1	-0,25
37	Turkish-Cypriots are after decision-making. What they actually want is to have a say in the decision-making: 'let's do the explorations jointly.'	4	1,96	-1	-0,45

Appendix

38	For the Greek Cypriots, the explorations constitute a sovereignty issue. They are the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus now and the world knows that.	0	-0,28	-2	-1,05
39	You could identify there the age-old problem: there is no agreement on what the Cyprus Problem is. It is two different things: When the Greek- Cypriots talk about reunifying the island they mean one thing while Turkish-Cypriots mean something else.	-3	-1,96	-3	-1,29
40	All these discussions about bringing the hydrocarbon issue do not have to be on the settlement negotiations. There could be perhaps a parallel process that would not prejudice any precedents.	0	0,23	-1	-0,74
41	The hydrocarbons' issue should be put on the negotiation table, but the way it's framed by the Greek-Cypriot side makes it impossible.	1	0,54	-2	-1,18
42	Even if the Turkish-Cypriots had natural gas reserves, they would have to bring the international development in, mainly companies to take it out. Then, they would have to engage with capitalism; unfortunately, that is life.	1	0,72	-3	-1,29
43	Turkey should do something on non-Russian gas resources.	-2	-0,83	-2	-1,09
44	In case Turkey and Israel normalize their bilateral relations, Greek-Cypriots have to decide what kind of policy they should follow.	1	0,84	-3	-1,49
45	The Greek-Cypriots shall not make the energy issue into the existential question for the Republic of Cyprus, as if its existence depends on talking about hydrocarbons with Turkish-Cypriots or not.	2	1,03	0	0,16
46	Cypriots should establish a fund: not like a bank, but investment bank. They could have a peace fund for reconstruction after peace. This fund should be used to introduce new things in the island (fixing traffic)	3	1,21	-3	-1,34
47	The electricity cable linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece makes a crazy business.	-1	-0,5	-3	-1,34
48	Turkish Cypriots also had this ambivalent attitude towards Turkey, in a sense that Turkish Cypriots trust Turkey to be there always for them.	3	1,23	-4	-1,54

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

1. *Official documents and reports*

Baconi, Tamer. 2017. *A flammable peace: Why gas deals won't end conflict in the Middle East*. London, UK: European Council on Foreign Relations.

Başeren, Hami Sertac. 2010. *Dispute over Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction Areas*. Istanbul: Törk Deniz Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları.

BP. 2017. *Statistical Review of World Energy*. London: BP.

BP. 2015. *Statistical Review of World Energy*. BP.

CIA Factbook. 2018. *CIA Factbook Cyprus*. Accessed July 25, 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html>.

—. 2019. *cia.gov*. Accessed January 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/print_id.html.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2001. *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. New York: World Bank.

Council on Foreign Relations. 2017. 'China's Maritime Disputes.' 10 October. Accessed December 20, 2017. <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/chinas-maritime-disputes#!/>

De Micco, Pasquale. 2014. *The prospect of Eastern Mediterranean gas production: An alternative energy supplier for the EU?* Brussels: European Parliament-Directorate-General for External Policies.

Delek-Group. 2017. 'Leviathan Final Investment Decision.' 23 February. Accessed December 10, 2017. <https://ir.delek-group.com/news-releases/news-release-details/leviathan-final-investment-decision>

—. 2010. 'Project Description.' 12 December. Accessed December 8, 2017. <https://www.delek-group.com/portfolio-items/1999-2/>

DEPA. 2018. 'IGI Poseidon: Interconnector Greece-Italy Pipeline.' 13 January. Accessed January 15, 2018. http://www.depa.gr/uploads/files/poseidon/Poseidon%20pipeline%20for%20PCIs_ENG_final.pdf.

DNV.GL. 2017. *The future for gas in the energy mix*. Accessed 12 1, 2017. <https://www.dnvgl.com/oilgas/perspectives/the-future-for-gas-in-the-energy-mix.html>.

EIA. 2013a. *Eastern Mediterranean Region*. Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration.

EIA. 2013b. *Overview of oil and natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean*. Energy Information Administration.

—. 2017c. 'Three important oil trade chokepoints are located around the Arabian Peninsula.' 4 August. Accessed December 7, 2017. <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32352#>.

—. 2017c. 'Three important oil trade chokepoints are located around the Arabian Peninsula in <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32352#>.' 4 August.

—. 2013a. 'Turkey,' 14 March. Accessed January 27, 2016. http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/rankings/#?product=44-2&iso=TUR&pid=44&aid=2&tl_id=2-A&tl_type=a&cy=2013.

Ellinas, Charles, John Roberts, and Harry Tzimitras. 2016. *Hydrocarbons Development in the Eastern Mediterranean: The case for Pragmatism*. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council: Global Energy Center and DINU Patricia Eurasia Center.

ENI. 2018. 'ENI announces a gas discovery offshore Cyprus.' 9 February. Accessed September 17, 2018. https://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/2018/02/eni-announces-a-gas-discovery-offshore-cyprus.

—. 2015. 'Press Release: Eni discovers a supergiant gas field in the Egyptian offshore, the largest ever found in the Mediterranean Sea.' 30 August. Accessed October 30, 2015. https://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/2015/08/eni-discovers-a-supergiant-gas-field-in-the-egyptian-offshore-the.

Eran, Odet. 2013. *Political-Strategic Dimensions to Israel's Natural Gas Debate*. Jerusalem: The Institute of National Security Studies Insight.

EU Council. 1999. 'Presidency Conclusions.' Helsinki: EU Council.

European Commission. 2017. *The Union List of Projects of Common Interest*. Brussels: European Commission.

European External Action Service. 2016a. *European External Action Service*. Brussels: Union for the Mediterranean.

European External Action Service. 2016b. *European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)*. Brussels: European External Action Service.

European Parliament. 2017. *Energy: a shaping factor for regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean?* Brussels: European Parliament.

European Parliament. 2009. *Gas and Oil Pipelines in Europe*. Brussels: European Parliament: Directorate-General for Internal Policies.

Eurostat. 2017. *Energy production and imports*. Luxembourg: Eurostat: Directorate General of the European Commission.

Filis, Konstantinos. 2017. 'Stratfor Analysis: The Strategic Value of the Eastern Mediterranean.' 21 March. Accessed December 6, 2017. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/strategic-value-eastern-mediterranean>.

Giamourides, Anastasios. 2013. *Natural Gas in Cyprus: Choosing the Right Option*. Mediterranean Paper Series, Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund.

Gürel, Ayla, Fiona Mullen, and Harry Tzimitras. 2013. *The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios*. Nicosia: PRIO (Peace Research Institute of Oslo).

Hatay, Mete. 2017. *Population and Politics in north Cyprus: An overview of the ethno-demography of north Cyprus in the light of the 2011 census*. Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Center and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2011. 'Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the Turkish Foreign Ministry's announcement of exploration in a region overlapping the Greek continental shelf.' 20 September. Accessed December 22, 2017. <http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statements-speeches/foreign-ministry-spokesmans-statement-on-the-turkish-foreign-ministrys-announcement-of-exploration-in-region-overlapping-the-greek-continental-shelf.html>.

—. 2017a. 'Issues of Greek Turkish Relations.' 20 February. Accessed November 4, 2017. <http://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/>

—. 1960. *Treaty of Establishment (1960)*. Accessed March 5, 2018. https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_establishment.pdf

—. 1960. *Treaty of Guarantee (1960)*. Accessed March 5, 2018. https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_guarantee.pdf

Human Rights Watch. 2003. <https://www.hrw.org>. Accessed January 27, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/10.htm>.

İşeri, Emre and Ahmet Çağrı Bartan. 2019. 'Turkey's Geostrategic Vision and Energy Concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean Security Architecture: A View from Ankara' in *The New Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean: Trilateral Partnerships and Regional Security. Re-imagining the Eastern Mediterranean* by Zenonas Tziarras, 111-124. Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre

ICG. 2013. *Aphrodite's Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power Dialogue?* Brussels: International Crisis Group.

ICG. 2014. *Divided Cyprus: Coming in terms on an Imperfect Reality*. Istanbul: International Crisis Group.

ICG. 2002. *God, Oil and Country Changing the Logic of War in Sudan*. Brussels: International Crisis Group.

ICJ. 1985. *Judgement: Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta)*. The Hague: International Court of Justice.

ICJ. 2009. *Judgment of 3 February 2009: Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine)*. The Hague: International Court of Justice.

ICJ. 1969. *North Sea Continental Shelf*. The Hague: International Court of Justice.

IHS Markit. 2007. 'Cyprus Attracts Just Three Bids in First Phase of Licensing Round.' 17 August. Accessed December 13, 2017. <https://www.ihs.com/country-industry-forecasting.html?ID=106597757>.

IMF. 2013. *Cyprus request for arrangement under the extended fund facility*. IMF Country Report, Washington: IMF.

Karagoz, Murat. 2004. *US Embargo on Turkey*. Ankara: Center for Strategic Research Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Koktsidis, Pavlos. 2014. *The Cyprus Question in the Contemporary Regional-Security Environment*. Working Paper No. 53, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.

Kyriakou, Nikolas, and Nurcan Kaya. 2011. *Minority rights: Solutions to the Cyprus conflict*. London: Minority Rights Group International.

Luengo-Cabrera, Jose. 2012. *The Incidence of Civil War Outbreak: Balancing Greed and Grievances*. London: Partnership for Research in International Affairs and Development.

Mason, Michael, and Rebecca Bryant. 2017. Water Technology and Sustainability in North Cyprus: Climate Change and the Turkey-North Cyprus Water Pipeline, PRIO Cyprus Centre Report, 1. Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre.

Migdalovitz, Carol. 2005. *Cyprus Status of UN negotiations*. Issue Brief for Congress, Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists.

Minority Rights Group International. 2019. *Briefing: Aceh*. London: Minority Rights Group International.

Noble Energy. 2015. 'Noble Energy and BG International Agree to Partnership in Block 12 Offshore Cyprus.' 23 November. Accessed December 17, 2017. <http://investors.nblenergy.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=943967>.

—. 2011. 'Press Release: Noble Energy Announces Significant Natural Gas Discovery Offshore Republic of Cyprus.' 28 December. Accessed December 17, 2017. <http://investors.nblenergy.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=635912>

Norlen, Andres, and Kerri Maddock. 2015. *Giant gas field discovery in Egypt likely to impact global gas markets*. McKinsey Energy Insights.

Official Journal of the European Union. 2007. Notice from the Government of the Republic of Cyprus concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations to drilling companies. Nicosia: Republic of Cyprus.

Permanent Mission of Israel to the UN. 2011. *Letter of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations*. New York: UN.

Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN. 2010. *Letter of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the Secretary General of the United Nations*. New York: UN.

Pfeffer, Anshel. 2010. 'IAF Conducting Joint Exercise with Greek Air Force.' 27 May. Accessed January 17, 2018. <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5125632>.

Poten & Partners. 2012. *Cyprus Deems Second Bid Round A Success*. New York: Poten & Partners.

Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Defense. 2014. 'The Armed Forces of the Republic of Cyprus and the State of Israel hold a joint exercise named 'ONISILOS-Gideon'.' 2011 February. Accessed January 18, 2018. <http://www.mod.gov.cy/mod/mod.nsf/All/FF3E4C24E329CBC9C2257D9E002A91F6?OpenDocument>.

Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry. 2016. 'Hydrocarbons Services: Licensing Rounds.' 28 December. Accessed December 12, 2017. <http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/All/9D1FB4E966F93F27C2257FA200235A16?OpenDocument>.

Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism. 2012. 'Hydrocarbons' Services: 2nd Licensing Round Offshore Cyprus.' 11 February. Accessed December 17, 2017. [http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/All/9D1FB4E966F93F27C2257FA200235A16/\\$file/Guidance_Note_2LR.pdf](http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/All/9D1FB4E966F93F27C2257FA200235A16/$file/Guidance_Note_2LR.pdf).

Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Finance. 2017. 'Macroeconomic outlook.' 30 March. Accessed December 12, 2018. http://mof.gov.cy/assets/modules/wnp/articles/201711/373/docs/macroeconomic_outlook_september_2017.pdf.

Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2016. 'Joint Statement: Second Political Consultations at the level of Secretaries General of Israel, Greece and Cyprus MFA's.' 26 April. Accessed January 18, 2018. <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/All/E128656F7F7F22B5C2257FA000459B1E?OpenDocument>.

Republic of Cyprus Press Information Office. 2016. 'Joint statements to the Press by the Minister of Energy and the Government Spokesman.' 24 March. Accessed December 17, 2017. <https://www.pio.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio2013.nsf/All/06DA307E436F3982C2257F8B004AD706?OpenDocument&L=E>.

Republic of Turkey Grand Assembly. 1995. 'Resolution on Turkey's National Security.' 8 June. Accessed December 24, 2017. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_b_sd.birlesim_baslangic?p4=692&p5=t&page1=1&page2=2.

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2015. 'Economic and Commercial Relations with Israel.' 5 January. Accessed January 2, 2018. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/economic-and-commercial-relations-with-israel.en.mfa>.

—. 2018. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>. 11 February. Accessed 2018 July. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-43_-gkrynin-dogu-akdenizdeki-hidrokarbon-faali.

—. 2007. 'Press Release regarding the efforts of the Greek-Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus to sign bilateral agreements concerning maritime jurisdiction areas with the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean.' 30 January. Accessed December 24, 2017. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_30-january-2007_-press-release-regarding-the-efforts-of-thegreek-cypriot-administration-of-southern-cyprus-to-sign-bilateral-agreementsconcerning-maritime-jurisdiction-areas-with-the-countries-in-the-easternmediterranean_br___p_.e.

—. 2011a. 'Press Statement on the continental shelf delimitation agreement signed between Turkey and the "TRNC" 21 September. Accessed October 23, 2015. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-216_-21-september-2011_-press-statement-on-the-continental-shelf-delimitation-agreement-signed-between-turkey-and-the-trnc.en.mfa.

—. 2011b. 'Statement by Prime Minister Erdogan following the signing of continental shelf delimitation agreement between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus New York.' 21 September. Accessed October 23, 2015. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-by-prime-minister-erdogan-following-the-signing-of-continental-shelf-delimitation-agreement-between-turkey-and-the-tur.en.mfa>.

—. 2017. 'Turkish-Greek Relations/Aegean Problems.' 20 February. Accessed November 4, 2017. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?deb1dc4c-926f-45bd-9a7c-27b45654c0e4>

Scovazzi, Tullio. 2012. *Maritime Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea*. Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund.

Shaffer, Brenda. 2012. *Energy Resources and Markets in the Eastern Mediterranean Region*. Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund.

Sozen, Ahmet. 2007. *The Cyprus Negotiations and the Basic Parameters: From the 1963 Inter-communal Negotiations to the Annan Plan*. Famagusta: Eastern Mediterranean University. Accessed April 2012. Sozen Ahmet (2007) " " in <http://ir.emu.edu.tr/staff/asozen/conferencepapers/leadershippaper.pdf>.

State of Israel Embassy in Cyprus. 2016. 'Tripartite meeting in Cyprus.' 28 January. Accessed January 18, 2018. <http://embassies.gov.il/nicosia-en/NewsAndEvents/Pages/Tripartite-meeting-in-Cyprus.aspx>.

State of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014. 'Greece, Israel and Cyprus hold political consultations in Athens.' 12 November. Accessed January 18, 2018. <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2014/Pages/Political-consultations-Greece,-Israel-and-Cyprus-12-Nov-2014.aspx>.

—. 2017. 'Greece-Cyprus-Israel Trilateral Summit, Thessaloniki 15.06.2017 Joint Declaration.' 15 June. Accessed January 18, 2018. <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2017/Documents/IsraelGreeceG2GJointDeclaration.pdf>.

—. 1993. 'Historical Documents 1992-1994.' Accessed January 16, 2018. <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook9/Pages/1993-%20Introduction.aspx>.

Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus. 2011. '14th Census of Population in Cyprus.' <http://www.mof.gov.cy>. 30 December. Accessed February 2015. http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/census-2011_cystat_en/census-2011_cystat_en?OpenDocument.

SUMED. 2017. *Arab Petroleum Pipelines Company*. Accessed November 30, 2017. <http://www.sumed.org/>

Tagliapietra, Simon. 2013. *Towards a New Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor? Natural Gas Developments Between Market Opportunities and Geopolitical Risks*. Rome: Nota Di Lavoro Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

TRNC-PIO. 2018. 'President Akinci: The Greek Cypriot side must agree a way forward with Turkish Cypriots on the issue of natural gas.' 19 February. Accessed September 20, 2018. <http://pio.mfa.gov.ct.tr/en/president-akinci-the-greek-cypriot-side-must-agree>.

Tsafos, Nikos, and Anastasios Giamourides. 2015. *Financing Gas Projects in the Eastern Mediterranean*. Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund.

Tsafos, Nikos. 2016. *Israeli Gas: Too Soon to Declare Victory*. Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund.

Tsafos, Nikos. 2018. *What Does Calypso Mean for Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean Gas?* Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Tsakiris, Theodoros. 2014. *Greece and the Energy Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean*. London: London School of Economics. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/59078/>.

Turkish Navy. 2012. 'Noble Dina 2012.' 29 March. Accessed January 15, 2018. <https://turkishnavy.net/2012/03/29/noble-dina-2012/>.

Tziarras, Zenon. 2018. *Turkish Foreign Policy and Security in Cyprus: Greek-Cypriot Security Perceptions*, PRIO (Peace Research Institute of Oslo).

Tzimitras, Harry. 2012. 'The Prospects for Exploration and Exploitation in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean: Some Observations.' In *Cyprus Offshore Hydrocarbons: Regional*

Politics and Wealth Distribution, edited by Hubert Faustman, Ayla Gürel and Friedrich Reichber. Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Center & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Tzimitras, Harry, and Mete Hatay. 2016. *The Need for Realism: Solving the Cyprus Problem through Linkage Politics*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions.

UN. 1960. Accessed March 5, 2018. <https://peacemaker.un.org/cyprus-greece-turkey-alliance60>.

UN. 2011. *Agreement between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone*. New York: UN.

UN. 2004. *Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone*. New York: UN.

UN Center for Policy Research. 2017. *Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict*. New York: UN.

UN. 1982. *Convention on the Law of the Sea*. New York: UN.

UN Department of Political Affairs. 2015. *Natural Resources and Conflict*. New York: UN Department of Political Affairs & UN Environment Programme.

UN. 2004c. *Law of the Sea Bulletin*. New York: UN.

UN. 2003. *Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 52*. New York: UN.

UN. 2004b. *Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 54*. New York: UN.

UN. 2006. *Law of the Sea No. 59*. New York: United Nations.

UN Security Council. 1983. 'Resolution 541.' 18 November. Accessed March 10, 2018. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/541>.

—. 1974. 'UN SC Resolution 353.' 20 July. Accessed March 2, 2018. <http://unscr.com/files/1974/00353.pdf>.

UN. 2005. *UN Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 57*. New York: UN.

US Geological Survey. 2010. *Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean*. Washington: US Geological Survey.

2. News sources

al Jazeera. 2017. 'Nicos Anastasiades: Cyprus, Turkey and the gas standoff.' 28 March. Accessed September 20, 2018. <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2018/03/nicos-anastasiades-cyprus-turkey-gas-standoff-180316093537586.html>.

al Jazeera. 2006. ' Hamas leader in surprise Turkey visit.' 16 February. Accessed January 2, 2018. <http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/02/200849161241248931.html>

Amiram, Baket. 2014. '10 bids for Leviathan export tender to Turkey.' *Globes.co.il*. 23 March. Accessed January 28, 2016. <http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-10-bids-for-leviathan-export-tender-to-turkey-1000926526>.

ANSA. 2018. *Ansa.it*. 2 February. Accessed September 2018. http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2018/02/12/turkish-blockade-of-eni-rig-for-cyprus-drilling-continues_ad40ca43-91f3-441d-b8e2-fb01ed1fd14e.html.

Barber, Tony. 1997. 'Turkey hints at strike on Cypriot missiles.' *Independent.co.uk*. Independent. 11 January. Accessed March 12, 2018. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/turkey-hints-at-strike-on-cypriot-missiles-1282572.html>.

BBC. 2003. 'Emotion as Cyprus border opens.' April 23. Accessed March 9, 2018. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2969089.stm>.

BBC. 2004. 'Brussels Anger at Greek Cypriots'. April 21. Accessed March 12, 2018. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3647481.stm>

—. 2016. 'Nagorno-Karabakh Profile.' 6 April. Accessed December 12, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18270325>

Bloomberg. 2015. 'Israel Antitrust Commissioner Resigns on Natural Gas Policy' (Retrieved at 10.12.2017). 25 May. Accessed December 10, 2017. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-25/israel-s-antitrust-commissioner-resigns-on-natural-gas-policy>

—. 2017. 'Shell to Mull Buying Israeli, Cyprus Gas for Egypt Plant.' 20 August. Accessed January 20, 2018. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-20/shell-is-said-to-mull-buying-israeli-cyprus-gas-for-egypt-plant>

Christodoulides, Nikos. 2012. 'The Enosis Referendum in Cyprus [in Greek].' *kathimerini.gr*. Kathimerini. 2 September. Accessed March 2018. <http://www.kathimerini.gr/467141/article/epikairothta/ellada/to-enwtiko-dhmoyhfisma-sthn-kypro>

Christou, Jean. 2018. 'Akinci hints at acceptance of Guterres framework.' *Cyprus-Mail*. 30 April. Accessed September 15, 2018. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/04/30/akinci-hints-at-acceptance-of-guterres-framework/>

Cyprus-Mail. 2018b. 'There can be no velvet divorce for Cyprus.' 25 August. Accessed September 17, 2018. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/08/25/there-can-be-no-velvet-divorce-for-cyprus/>.

—. 2018a. 'Turkey hints at two-state solution again, as 'framework' debate rages on.' 3 May. Accessed September 22, 2018. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/05/03/turkey-hints-at-two-state-solution-again/?hilit=%27guterres%27%2C%27framework%27>.

Daily News Egypt. 2017. 'Egypt, Cyprus discuss construction of natural gas pipeline next month.' 21 November. Accessed January 19, 2018. <https://dailynewsegypt.com/2017/11/21/egypt-cyprus-discuss-construction-natural-gas-pipeline-next-month/>.

Daily Sabah. 2017. 'FM Çavuşoğlu: Cyprus failure reveals impossibility of solution within UN parameters.' 8 July. Accessed September 22, 2018. <https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/07/08/fm-cavusoglu-cyprus-failure-reveals-impossibility-of-solution-within-un-parameters>

—. 2011. 'Is Cyprus swimming in oil? [in Turkish].' 21 September. Accessed October 23, 2015. <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2011/09/21/kibris-petrol-icinde-mi-yuzuyor>.

—. 2018. 'Turkey sends out first drilling vessel to eastern Mediterranean Sea to find oil, natural gas.' 31 May. Accessed September 18, 2018. <https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2018/06/01/turkey-sends-out-first-drilling-vessel-to-eastern-mediterranean-sea-to-find-oil-natural>.

Drousiotis, Makarios. 2012. 'Awarding of gas licenses could cost billions.' *Cyprus-Mail.com*. 11 November. Accessed December 2017. <http://cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/awarding-gas-licences-could-cost-billions/20121111>.

Economist. 2014. 'Economist.' *The Cyprus Problem: A glimmer of hope*. 14 February. Accessed February 21, 2014. <https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21596573-yet-another-round-talks-reunify-divided-island-begins-glimmer-hope>.

—. 2008. 'Frozen Conflicts.' 9 November. Accessed July 18, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/news/2008/11/19/frozen-conflicts>.

Ellinas, Charles. 2018. 'Price, not politics, stymying East Med gas.' *Cyprus-Mail.com*. 28 January. Accessed September 19, 2018. <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/01/28/price-not-politics-stymying-east-med-gas/>

—. 2017b. *Significant role for gas in rapidly changing energy mix*. 1 October. Accessed December 1, 2017. <http://cyprus-mail.com/2017/10/01/significant-role-gas-rapidly-changing-energy-mix/>

Euractiv.com. 2017. 'Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Israel eye longest offshore gas pipeline.' 3 April. Accessed January 18, 2018. <http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/italy-greece-cyprus-and-israel-eye-longest-offshore-gas-pipeline/>

Financial Times. 2016. 'Israel's Leviathan signs \$10bn gas deal with Jordan's Nepco.' 26 September. Accessed December 10, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/0cbeecda-3712-3889-89e8-a38173a96b67>.

Geropoulos, Kostas. 2018. 'Cyprus mulls EU gas export options, may renegotiate Noble deal.' 27 August. Accessed September 15, 2018. <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/cyprus-mulls-eu-gas-export-options-may-renegotiate-noble-deal/>

Globes Online. 2013. 'Israel, Greece, Cyprus sign new energy MOU.' 8 June. Accessed January 18, 2018. <http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-1000870108>.

Guardian. 2008. 'Israel launches deadly Gaza attacks.' 27 December. Accessed January 2, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/27/israelandthepalestinians>.

Gundem Kibris. 2011. 'We do not want crisis [in Turkish].' 16 September. Accessed November 4, 2015. <https://www.gundemkibris.com/ozersay-atilacak-adimlar-karsilikli-askiya-alinmali-13864h.htm>.

Haaretz. 2011. 'Lebanon Warns UN: Israel's Proposed Maritime Border Threatens Peace and Security.' 5 September. Accessed December 25, 2017. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/lebanon-warns-un-israel-s-proposed-maritime-border-threatens-peace-and-security-1.382658>.

Hadjicostis, Menelaos. 2016. 'Cyprus, Egypt sign deal paving way for gas pipeline.' 31 August. Accessed January 19, 2018. <https://apnews.com/778ec804905f40b096fad34a4cfb58a0>.

Hadjicostis, Menelaos. 2017. 'Cyprus, Egypt, Greece pledge closer cooperation on migration.' 21 November. Accessed January 21, 2018. <https://www.apnews.com/26416151cc04464aad9a4efc181e9642/Cyprus-Egypt-Greece-pledge-closer-cooperation-on-migration>.

Hadjistassou, Constantinos. 2013. 'Explanations for downsizing of Aphrodite gas field.' 13 October. Accessed September 17, 2018. <http://www.cyprusprofile.com/en/articles/view/explanations-for-downsizing-of-aphrodite-gas-field>.

Hazou, Elias. 2013. '1963 is still a historical minefield.' *Cyprus-Mail*. 13 December. Accessed February 2018. <https://cyprus-mail.com/2013/12/22/1963-is-still-a-historical-minefield/>.

Hurriyet Daily News. 2011b. 'Don't attempt to test Turkey's past.' 6 September. Accessed October 23, 2015. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=8216don8217t-attempt-to-test-turkey8217s-past8217-2011-09-06>.

—. 2013. 'Israel must do more to normalize ties with Turkey, FM Davutoğlu says.' 26 September. Accessed January 2, 2018. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/israel-must-do-more-to-normalize-ties-with-turkey-fm-davutoglu-says-55172>

—. 2015. 'Pipeline pumps first water to northern Cyprus from Turkey.' 9 October. Accessed March 26, 2018. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pipeline-pumps-first-water-to-northern-cyprus-from-turkey-89637>.

—. 2017. 'Turkey should start drilling where Greek-Cypriots discovered gas.' 24 July. Accessed September 19, 2018. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-should-start-drilling-where-greek-cypriots-discovered-gas-115867>.

—. 2011a. 'Turkish official: Israel Navy's bullying is over.' 2 September. Accessed October 23, 2015. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=8216israel8217s-bullying-in-eastern-med-is-over8217-2011-09-02>.

Hydrocarbons-Technology. 2017. *Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP), Jordan, Syria, Lebanon*. Accessed December 6, 2017. <https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/arab-gas-pipeline-agp/>

Independent Online. 2003. 'Shell makes new gas discovery in Egypt.' 25 November. Accessed December 13, 2017. <https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/shell-makes-new-gas-discovery-in-egypt-761769>

Israel National News. 2008. 'IAF 'Glorious Spartan 08' Exercise Details Revealed.' 23 June. Accessed January 17, 2018. <https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/148688>.

Jordan News Agency. 2014. 'Arab Potash, Jordan Bromine companies to imports gas from US company' (Retrieved at 10.12.2017). 19 February. Accessed December 12, 2017. http://petra.gov.jo/Public_News/Nws_NewsDetails.aspx?Site_Id=1&lang=2&NewsID=140807.

Kanli, Yusuf. 2016. 'Revisiting the Acheson Plan.' *Hurriyet Daily News*. 29 April. Accessed March 21, 2018. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/yusuf-kanli/revisiting-the-acheson-plan-98478>.

Keinon, Herb. 2009. 'Turkish FM cancels visit over Gaza Row.' *Jerusalem Post*. 9 September. Accessed January 2, 2018. <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Turkish-FM-cancels-visit-over-Gaza-row>.

Lewis, Ori, and Humeyra Pamuk. 2016. 'Israel and Turkey agree to normalize ties.' *Reuters*. 26 June. Accessed January 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-turkey/israel-and-turkey-agree-to-normalize-ties-officials-idUSKCN0ZC0YF>.

LNG World News. 2013. 'Cyprus Inks MoU for LNG Project with Delek, Noble and Avner.' 26 June. Accessed January 18, 2018. <https://www.lngworldnews.com/cyprus-inks-mou-for-lng-project-with-delek-noble-and-avnear/>.

LNG World Shipping. 2018. 'Egypt completes return to LNG export nation status.' 12 September. Accessed September 14, 2018. https://www.lngworldshipping.com/news/view,egypt-completes-return-to-lng-export-nation-status_54198.htm.

Naftemporiki. 2011. 'Pangalos warns Ankara [in Greek].' 9 September. Accessed January 17, 2018. <http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/322927/austiri-proeidopoiisi-th-pagkalou-stin-agkura>.

NaturalGas.Org. 2013 'Processing Natural Gas'. 25 September. Accessed November 14, 2015. <http://naturalgas.org/naturalgas/processing-ng/>

New Europe. 2015. 'Total mulls quitting Cyprus offshore gas search.' 22 January. Accessed December 17, 2017. <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/total-mulls-quitting-cyprus-offshore-gas-search/>.

New York Times. 1973. 'Five Arab States Agree on Company For Sumed Pipeline.' 11 December. Accessed November 27, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/12/archives/five-arab-states-agree-on-company-for-sumed-pipeline-five-arab.html>.

—. 1964. 'Johnson warns Inonu on Cyprus.' 6 June. Accessed March 4, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/06/archives/johnson-warns-inonu-on-cyprus-invites-him-to-us-for-talksturkey.html>.

Newsit.gr. 2011. 'Quick trip of Cypriot Foreign Minister to Israel to discuss about natural gas' Turkey continues her provocations' [in Greek]. 24 August. Accessed January 17, 2018. <https://www.newsit.gr/kosmos/episkepsi-astrapi-sto-israil-tis-kyprias-ypeks-gia-to-fysiko-aerio-synexizoy-n-tis-prokliseis-oi-toyrkoi/1957473/>

Offshore Energy Today. 2016b. 'Cyprus selects Eni, Exxon, Total for three offshore blocks.' 22 December. Accessed December 17, 2017. <https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/cyprus-selects-eni-exxon-total-for-three-offshore-blocks/>.

—. 2016a. 'Energean to buy two gas fields off Israel.' 17 August. Accessed December 10, 2017. <https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/energean-to-buy-two-gas-fields-off-israel/>

Oil and Gas Journal. 2007. 'Greek Cyprus receives bids for offshore licenses.' 17 September. Accessed December 13, 2017. <http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-105/issue-35/general-interest/greek-cyprus-receives-bids-for-offshore-licenses.html>.

Proto Thema. 2016. 'Declaration of trilateral meeting between Greece, Israel and Cyprus.' 9 December. Accessed January 18, 2018. <http://en.protothema.gr/declaration-of-trilateral-meeting-between-greece-israel-and-cyprus/>.

Reuters. 2014. *Cyprus says Turkish vessel encroaching on its offshore gas areas*. 20 October. Accessed August 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/cyprus-turkey-gas/cyprus-says-turkish-vessel-encroaching-on-its-offshore-gas-areas-idUSL6N0SF32C20141020>.

—. 2013. 'Erdogan says Israeli apology shows Turkey's new clout.' 23 March. Accessed January 2, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-israel-erdogan/erdogan-says-israeli-apology-shows-turkeys-new-clout-idUSBRE92M0AP20130323>.

—. 2017b. 'Greece, Israel and Cyprus back natgas pipeline to Europe.' 5 December. Accessed January 15, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/energy-mediterranean-natgas/greece-italy-israel-and-cyprus-back-natgas-pipeline-to-europe-idUSL8N1O537F>.

—. 2017a. 'reuters.com.' 7 July. Accessed July 8, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-conflict/cyprus-reunification-talks-collapse-u-n-chief-very-sorry-idUSKBN19S02I>

Roberts, John. 2017. 'Keep gas off the Cypriot peace talks agenda.' 11 January. Accessed September 20, 2018. <https://www.naturalgasworld.com/comment-keep-gas-off-the-cypriot-peace-talks-35303>.

—. 2017b. 'Two wishes, one faltering population and a cloudy future [in Greek].' 20 July. Accessed September 17, 2018. <http://www.typos.com.cy/cat/14/article/28873>.

Sengul, Ebru, and Muhsin Baris Tiryakioglu. 2017. 'Turkey, Israel discuss price, route of gas pipeline.' *Anadolu Agency*. 13 October. Accessed January 2018. <http://aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkey-israel-discuss-price-route-of-gas-pipeline/934833>.

Signalive. 2013. '77 pages Downers' convergence plan.' 17 May. Accessed January 4, 2015. <http://www.signalive.com/news/politics/45703/apokalyptiko-diavaste-to-77selido-egrafo-ntaouner>.

Straw, Jack. 2017. 'Only a partitioned island will bring the dispute between Turkish and Greek-Cypriots to an end.' 1 October. Accessed September 17, 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/cyprus-turkish-greek-cypriots-partition-eu-international-community-should-act-a7976711.htm>.

Tavernise, Sabrina, and Ethan Bronner. 2010. 'Days of Planning Led to Flotilla's Hour of Chaos' *New York Times*, (Retrieved at 2.1.2018). *New York Times*. 4 June. Accessed January 2, 2018. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/world/europe/05reconstruct.html>.

Today's Zaman. 2011b. 'Erdoğan: Military option not on table for now in East Med gas row.' 21 September. Accessed October 23, 2015. http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_erdogan-military-option-not-on-table-for-now-in-east-med-gas-row_257471.html.

—. 2011c. 'KKTC to start drilling in eastern Mediterranean soon.' 25 September. Accessed October 22, 2015. http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_kktc-to-start-drilling-in-eastern-mediterranean-soon_257919.html

—. 2011a. 'Turkish minister warns Greek Cypriots about oil exploration in Mediterranean.' 4 September. Accessed October 23, 2015. http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkish-minister-warns-greek-cypriots-about-oil-exploration-in-mediterranean_255674.html.

Turkish Daily News. 2002. 'Verheugen hopes Cyprus talks will end until June' 9 March

Udasin, Sharon. 2013. 'Israel's National Water Company Mekorot launches Cyprus desalination plant.' 7 August. Accessed January 2018, 2018. <http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Israels-National-Water-Company-Mekorot-launches-Cyprus-desalination-plant-322359>.

Venizelos, Costas. 2019. 'https://hellasjournal.com.' *The unbelievable dialogue between Simitis and Clerides for the S-300*. April 26. Accessed June 4, 2019. <https://hellasjournal.com/2019/04/o-apisteytos-dialogos-simiti-kai-kliridi-gia-toys-s-300-den-itan-mono-to-athlio-schedio-anan/>.

Wootliff, Raoul. 2016. 'With no designated deputy Netanyahu keeps spotlight to himself.' *TimesofIsrael.com*. Times of Israel. 22 September. Accessed December 2017. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-no-designated-deputy-netanyahu-keeps-spotlight-to-himself/>

Academic sources

1. Books

Agnew, John. 2003. *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, 2nd ed. London : Routledge.

Alastos, Doros. 1955. *Cyprus in History*. London: Zeno Publishers

Alecou, Alexios. 2016. *Communism and Nationalism in Postwar Cyprus, 1945-1955: Politics and Ideologies under British Rule*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Allison, Graham. 1971. *Allison, Graham (1971). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 1st. New York: Little Brown.

Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2nd. New York: Longman.

Andrews, John. 2015. *The World in Conflict: Understanding the world's troublespots*. London: The Economist.

Anagnostopoulou, Sia. 2004. *Turkish Modernization: Islam and Turkish-Cypriots in the Labyrinthical Route of Kemalism [in Greek]*. Athens: Vivliorama.

Asmussen, Jan. 2008. *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Attalides, Michalis. 1979. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*. Edinburgh : Palgrave Macmillan.

Azar, Edward E. 1990. *The management of protracted social conflict: theory and cases*. Alderton: University of Maryland.

Bahçeli, Tozun. 1990. *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Ballentine, Karen, and Jake Sherman. 2003. *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Beckett, Ian. 1988. *The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerrilla Warfare 1900–1945*. London: Blandford Press.

Birgel, Serkan. 2018. *The Association of Natural Resources and Human Conflict — Natural Gas and the Peace Process in Cyprus*. PhD thesis, University of Oxford.

Bitsios, Dimitris. 1975. *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Blay, Samuel Kwaw Nyameke. 1981. *Self-Determination in Cyprus: The New Dimensions of an Old Conflict*. Australian Year Book of International Law.

- Brown, Steven. 1980. *Political Subjectivity*, New Heaven: Yale University Press.
- Bryman, Alan. 2008. *Social Research Methods*. 3rd. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burke, John. 2017. *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Conflict, Colonialism and the Politics of Remembrance in Greek Cypriot Society*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Buzan, Barry. 2009. *People, States and Fear An agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Essex: ECPR Press.
- Buzan, Barry, O Waever, and J de Wilde. 1998. *Security A New Framework for Analysis*., Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Campbell, David. 1993. *Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Carr, Edward. 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.
- Caruth, Cathy. 1996. *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Christodoulides, Nikos. 2009. *Peace plans for the Cyprus conflict* [in Greek], Athens: Kastaniotis
- Coser, L A. 1956. *The function of social conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- Davutoglu, Ahmet. 2010. *Strategic Depth Doctrine : Turkey's International Standing* [in Greek]. 3rd Edition. Translated by Nikolaos Raptopoulos. Athens: Poitita.
- Denktaş, Rauf .2004. Let Not Cyprus become Crete [in Turkish], Istanbul: Önder Printing System.
- Deutsch, Morton. 1973. *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- di Tiro, Hasan Muhammed. 1984. *The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary*. Norsborg, Sweden: Information Department, National Liberation Front Aceh Sumatra.
- Dodd, Clement. 2010. *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dodds, Klaus. 2005. *Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction*. Harlow: Pearson.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1996. *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Dryzek, John, and Leslie Holmes. 2002. *Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses Across Thirteen Countries*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ellis, Donald G. 2006. *Transforming Conflict: Communication and Ethnopolitical Conflict*. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.

Elson, Robert E. 2001. *Suharto: A Political Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, Jon. 1999. *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Emilianides, Achilleas. 2006. *The Transgression of the Cypriot Constitution [in Greek]*. Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas.

Fairclough, Isabela, and Norman Fairclough. 2012. *Political Discourse Analysis A Method for Advanced Students*. New York: Routledge-Taylor and Francis Group.

Faustmann, Hubert. 1999. *Divide and Quit? The History of British Colonial Rule in Cyprus 1878 – 1960*. PhD Thesis. University of Mannheim

Fisher, Ronald J. (1994) *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution*, Ontario: Springer-Verlag

Fischer, Stanley. 1980. *Rational Expectations and economic policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1972. *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Fouskas, Vassilis K, and Alex O Tackie . 2009. *Cyprus: The Post-Imperial Constitution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fox, Annette Baker. 1959. *The Power of Small States Diplomacy in World War II*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

George, Jim. 1994. *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*. London: Macmillan.

- Georgiades, Kleanthis P. 2017. *The History of Cyprus* [in Greek]. Nicosia
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Goldstein, Joshua S. 2005. *International Relations*. New York: Pearson-Longman
- Grigas, Agnia. 2017. *The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas*,. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Grivas, Digenis-Georgios. 1961. *The Memoires of EOKA's Struggle* [in Greek], Athens: Pelasgos
- Grob-FitzGibbon, Benjamin. 2011. *Imperial Endgame: Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gurr, Ted. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hadjigregoriou, Spyros. 2014. *The Facilitators: The UN Representatives & Advisers to Cyprus, 1964-2014*. Nicosia: Livadiotis Ltd
- Hanioglu, Sükrü. 1995. *The Young Turks in Opposition*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Hannay, David. 2005. *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*. London: I. B Tauris.
- Helmis, Georgios. 2006. *The troubled two years (1973-1974): The personal calendar of an eye-witness* [in Greek]. Athens: Kastaniotis.
- Herod, Andrew, Gearoid Ó Tuathail, and Susan Roberts. 1997. *An Unruly World? Globalization, Governance and Geography*. London: Routledge.
- Hill, George. 1952. *A History of Cyprus*. Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holland, Robert. 2004. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hodgson, Douglas. 2000. *Discourse, discipline and the subject: a Foucauldian analysis of the UK financial services industry*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Ifestos, Panagiotis, and Athanasios Platias. 1992. *Greek Deterrence Strategy*. Athens: Papazisis

- Isachenko, Daria. 2012. *The Making of Informal States: Statebuilding in Northern Cyprus and Transnistria*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jabri, Vivienne. 1996. *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered*. Manchester: Manchester University Press
- Jervis, Rober. 1976. *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Jervis, Robert. 2017. *How statesmen think: The psychology of international politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, Douglas H. 2003. *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Joseph, Joseph. S. 1997. *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press
- Juneau, Thomas. 2015. *Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press
- Kell, Tim. 1995. *The Roots of the Acehnese Rebellion, 1989–1992*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Kelly, George A. 1955. *A Theory of Personality: The Psychology of Personal Constructs*. New York: W.W Norton.
- Kentas, Giorgos. 2013. *Security in the Context of a Settlement of the Cyprus Problem: The International Dimension [in Greek]*, Athens: Livanis
- Ker-Lindsay, James. 2005. *EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Ker-Lindsay, James. 2011. *The Cyprus Problem What everyone needs to know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kizilyurek, Niyazi. 2009. *Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey and the Cyprus Conflict [in Greek]*. Athens: Papazisis.
- Kline, Paul. 1994. *An Easy Guide to Factor Analysis*. London: Routledge.

- Koufoudakis, Vaggelis. 2008. *Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in a Historical Perspective [in Greek]*, Athens: Patakis
- Kranidiotis, Giannos. 1981. *Difficult Years. Cyprus 1950-1960 [in Greek]*, Athens: Estia
- Kranidiotis, Giannos. 1984. *The Cyprus Problem. 1960-1974 [in Greek]*, Athens: Estia
- Ktoris, Sotos. 2013. *Turkish-Cypriots: From the fringes to partnership [in Greek]*. Athens: Papazisis.
- Lacoste, Yves. 1976. *Geography is used first to make war [in French]*. 1st. Paris: La Decouvertes.
- Le Billon, Philippe. 2014. *Wars of Plunder, Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources*. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.
- Lewin, Kurt . 1948. *Resolving Social Conflicts*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Mallinson, William. 2011. *Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents since World War II*. London: IB Tauris.
- Markides, Kyriacos C. 1977. *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
- Mayer, Bernard. 2000. *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner's Guide*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Mazis, Ioannis Th. 2008. *The Geopolitics of the Wider Middle East and Turkey [in Greek]*. Athens: Livanis
- McKeown, Bruce, and Dan Thomas. 1988. *Q-Methodology*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York: Norton.
- Meier, Daniel. 2013. *Lebanon's Maritime Boundaries: Between Economic Opportunities and Military Confrontation*. Oxford, UK: Centre for Lebanese Studies, University of Oxford.
- Melacopides, Costas. 2016. *Russia-Cyprus Relations: A Pragmatic Idealist Perspective*,. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Meerts, Paul. 2015. *Diplomatic Negotiation: Essence and Evolution*. The Hague: Clingendael.

Mintz, Alex, and Karl DeRouen. 2010. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mirbagheri, Farid. 2009. *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*. Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press.

Mokhatab, Saeid, William A. Poe, and Johny Y. Mak. 2016. *Handbook of Natural Gas Transmission and Processing*. 3rd. Oxford, UK: Elsevier

Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power*. 1st. New York: Knopf.

Mütercimler, Erol. 2003. *Island for Sale, Cyprus, [in Turkish]*. Istanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları.

Neuman, Lawrence W. 2014. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Edinburgh: Pearson.

Nevzat, Altay. 2005. *Nationalism Among the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*. Oulu, Finland: Oulu University Press.

O' Malley, Brendan, and Ian Craig. 1999. *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*. London: IB Tauris.

Organski Abramo FK. 1958. *World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Orr, Sir Charles W.J. 1918. *Cyprus under British Rule*. London: Robert Scott Roxburghe House.

Palley, Claire. 2005. *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus: 1999-2004*. Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing

Papadakis, Yannis. 2005. *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, London: I.B. Tauris.

Papageorgiou, Spyros. 2000. *The Critical Documents of the Cyprus Question: 1959-1967, Vol. 1 [in Greek]*. Nicosia: K. Epiphanios LTD

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. 2011. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. 3rd. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Rothman, Jay. 1997. *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Communities and Organizations*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

- Rubin, Herbert, and Irene Rubin. 2012. *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data*. 3rd. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Sandole, D. 1999. *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era*. London: Pinter.
- Scarry, Elaine. 1985. *The body in Pain. The Making and Unmaking of the World*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press
- Schelling, Thomas. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schmitt, Carl. 1932. *The Concept of the Political [in German]*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot GmBh.
- Seidel, Gill. 1985. *Political Discourse Analysis*. London: Academic Press.
- Shue, Henry. 1980. *Basic Rights: Subsistence Affluence and US Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Snyder, Jack. 1991. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
- Solsten, Eric. 1993. *Cyprus : A country study*. Washington, DC: US Library Congress.
- Spyridakis, Constantinos. 1974. *A Brief History of Cyprus*. Nicosia: Zavallis Press.
- Stavrou, Michail. 2009. *Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stefanidis, Ioannis. 1999. *Isle of Discord: Nationalism and Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*. London: Hurst & Co.
- Stephenson, William. 1953. *The study of behavior: Q-technique and its methodology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Suurmond, Jeannine M. 2005. *Our Talk and Walk: Discourse Analysis and Conflict Studies*. The Hague: Clingendael.
- Svolopoulos, Konstantinos. 2004. *Greek Foreign Policy 1945-1981 [in Greek]*. Athens: Estia.
- Syrgios, Aggelos. 2014. *Greek-Turkish Relations [in Greek]*. Athens, Greece: Pataki.

Tajfel, Henri. 1978. *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. London: Academic Press.

Taras, Raymond. 2015. *Fear and the Making of Foreign Policy. Europe and Beyond*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Tekin, Ali, and Paul Andrew Williams. 2011. *Geo-Politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus: The European Union, Russia and Turkey*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tenekides, Georges. 1964. *Cyprus: Recent History and Future Prospects [in French]*. Paris: Nagel.

Tenekides, George and Giannos Kranidiotis. 1982. *Cyprus: History, Problems and the struggles of its people [in Greek]*, Athens, Estia

Tocci, Nathalie. 2004. *EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution*. Hampshire, England: Ashgate.

Toshkov, Dimiter. 2016. *Research Design in Political Science*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Toulmin, Stephen. 1958. *The Uses of Argument*,. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tziarras, Zenon and Nikos Moudouros. 2016. *Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean: Ideological Views of Foreign Policy [in Greek]*. Athens: Tourikis

Tziampiris, Aristotle. 2015. *The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation*. Cham, Springer.

Uzer, Umut. 2010. *Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy: The Kemalist Influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus*. London: IB Tauris.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1999. *Causes of War: Power and Roots of Conflict*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

van Exel, Job, and Gjalst de Graaf. 2005. *Q-Methodology: A sneak preview*. Qmethod.

Venizelos, Costas, and Michalis Ignatiou. 2002. *The Secret Files of Kissinger, Vol. I, [in Greek]*. Athens: Livanis.

Vickers, Adrian. 2005. *A history of Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vlachos, Angelos. 1980. *Ten Years of Cyprus Question [in Greek]*. Athens: Estia.

Voorhoeve, Joris. 2007. *From War to the Rule of Law: Peace Building After Conflicts*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Walt, Stephen M. 2002. The Enduring relevance of the realist tradition. New York: W.W. Norton Company

Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. California: Addison-Wesley.

Watts, Simon, and Paul Stenner. 2012. *Doing Q Methodological Research: Theory, Method and Interpretation*,. 2nd. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Webler, Thomas, Stentor Danielson, and Seth Tuler. 2009. *Using Q method to reveal social perspectives in environmental research*. Greenfield, MA: Social and Environmental Research Institute.

Weisbrode, Kenneth. 2001. *Central Eurasia – Prize or Quicksand?: Contending Views of Instability in Karabakh, Ferghana and Afghanistan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weldes, Jutta. 1999. *Constructing National Interests: The United States and Cuban Missile Crisis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. *Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus*. London: Keegan Paul, Trubner & Co., Ltd.

Xydis, Alexandros. 1993. *Politics: The Cyprus Question [in Greek]*, Athens: Plethron

Yakinthou, Chrystalla. 2009. *Political Settlements in Divided Societies*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Yergin, Daniel. 2012. *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World*. 2nd. London: Penguin Press.

Zembylas, Michalinos. 2015. *Emotion and Traumatic Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press.

2. Book Chapters

Abdi, Herve. 2003. 'Factor Rotations in Factor Analyses.' In *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, edited by Beck Lewis and Bryman A Futing. Thousand Oaks, CA: Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage.

Adamides, Constantinos (2014). 'Negative Perceptions of Foreign Actors: An Integral Part of Conflict-Perpetuating Routines,' In *Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions* by Michalis Kontos, Nikos Panayiotides, by Haralambos Alexandrou, and Sozos-Christos Theodoulou, 197-222. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholar Publishing.

Adamides, Constrantinos. 2015. 'Conflict-Perpetuating Routines in the Cypriot Comfortable Problem' In *Resolving Cyprus*, by James Ker-Lindsay, 1-15 London: I.B Tauris.

Adamides Constantinos and Constantinou, Costas M. 2012. 'Comfortable Conflict and Illiberal Peace in Cyprus,' In *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism*, by Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell, 242-259, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Agnew, John. 1988. 'Beyond Reason: Spatial and Temporal Sources of Ethnic Conflicts.' In *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation*, edited by L Kriesberg, T Northrup and St Thorson, 40-52. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Azar, Edward. 1986. 'Protracted international conflicts: ten propositions.' In *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, by Edward Azar and John Burton, 28-39. Brighton: Whatsheaf.

Ballentine, Karen, and Jake Sherman. 2003. 'Introduction.' In *Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed & Grievance*, edited by Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, 1-18. London: Lynner Rienner.

Barnes, Joe, Mark Hayes, Amy Jaffe, and David Victor. 2006. 'Introduction to the Study.' In *Natural Gas and Geopolitics. From 1970 to 2040*, edited by D Victor, A Jaffe A and M Hayes, 1-20. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Steven, and James Good. 2010. 'Q Methodology.' In *Encyclopaedia of research design*, edited by Neil Salkind, 1150-1156. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Bryant, Rebecca, and Yannis Papadakis. 2012. 'Modalities of Time, History and Memory in Ethnonational Conflicts.' In *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory*, by Rebecca Bryant and Yannis Papadakis, 1-26. London: I.B Tauris.

Cascão, Ana Elisa. 2017. 'Resource-based conflict in South Sudan and Gambella (Ethiopia): when water, land and oil mix with politics.' In *State and Societal Challenges in the Horn of Africa: Conflict and processes of state formation, reconfiguration and disintegration*, edited by Alexandra Magnólia Dias, 143-165. Lisboa: Centro de estudos internacionais.

Charalambous, Giorgos. 2015. 'The Party Politics of the Problem.' In *Resolving Cyprus*, by James Ker-Lindsay. London: IB Tauris.

Charmaz, Kathy. 2001. 'Qualitative interviewing and grounded theory analysis.' In *Handbook of interview research*, by J.F. Gubrium and J.A. Holstein, 675-694. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Christophorou, Christophoros. 2009. 'The evolution of Greek Cypriot party politics.' In *The Government and Politics of Cyprus*, by James Ker-Lindsay and Herbert Faustmann. Oxford: Peter Lang.

Durning, Dan, and Steven Brown. 2006. 'Q Methodology and Decision-Making.' In *Handbook of Decision Making*, edited by Goktug Morcol, 537-563. Boca Raton: CRC Press.

Emilianides, Achilles C. 2009. 'Contra: Constitutional Structure of the Annan Plan.' In *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, by Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, 93-104. London: I.B Tauris.

Faustmann, Hubert. 2001. 'The UN and the Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 1949-58,' In *The Work of the UN in Cyprus. Promoting Peace and Development* by Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, 3-49, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan

Goker, Aybil. 2012. 'Senses of belongings and making home away from home,' In *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory*, by Rebecca Bryant and Yannis Papadakis, 118-139. London: I.B Tauris.

Goldsmith, Paul, and Lydia A Abura, and Jason Switzer. 2002. 'Oil and Water in Sudan.' In *Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*, edited by Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman. Pretoria: ISS.

Gürel, Ayrel, Hayriye Kahveci, and Harry Tzimitras. 2014. 'How to Build Confidence over Energy Issues in the Context of a Cyprus settlement.' In *Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Promise or Peril*, edited by Sami Andoura and David Koranyi, 59-68. Brussels: Egmont Institute.

Guzzini, Stefano. 2012. 'The framework of analysis: geopolitics meets foreign policy identity crises.' In *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises*, edited by Guzzini Stefano, 45-74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hansen, Lene. 2016. 'Discourse analysis, post-structuralism, and foreign policy.' In *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Time Dunne, 95-110. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hatay, Mete, and Yannis Papadakis. 2012. 'A Critical Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Historiographies.' In *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory*, by Rebecca Bryant and Yannis Papadakis, 27-50. London: I.B Tauris.

Jackson, Richard. 2002. 'The Social Construction of War: Towards A Framework of Understanding.' In *Cultures of Violence, 3rd Global Conference: Diversity within Unity*.

Jackson, Richard. 2009. 'Constructivism and Conflict Resolution', in *Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, by Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman. 172-189, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage

Ifestos, Panagiotis. 2013. The post-war international system: stable and variable criteria of the Cyprus question before and after 1974 and the causes of an absent national strategy, In *The Cyprus Question and the International System, 1945-1974: Searching a position in the globe [in Greek]* by Petros Papapolyviou, Angelos Syrigos and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 423-440. Athens: Papazisis.

Karbuz, Sohbet. 2018. 'Geostrategic Importance of East Mediterranean Gas Resources.' In: *Energy, Economy, Finance and Geostrategy* by André Dorsman, Volkan S. Ediger, Mehmet Baha Karan, 237-255. Cham: Springer

Kaymak, Erol. 2009. 'The Development of Turkish-Cypriot Politics', In *The Government and Politics of Cyprus* by James Ker-Lindsay and Hubert Faustmann, New York Peter Lang.

Ker-Lindsay, James. 2009. 'United Nations peace-making in Cyprus: from mediation to arbitration and beyond', In *Cyprus: a conflict at the crossroads* by Thomas Diez and Nathalie Tocci, 147-162, Manchester: Manchester University Press

Kizilyurek, Niyazi. 2010. 'Rauf Denktaş: Fear and Nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot Community' in. In *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*, by Aktar Ayhan, Niyazi Kizilyurek and Umut Ozkirmli, 175-193. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kizilyurek, Niyazi. 2006. 'The Turkish-Cypriots from an Ottoman-Muslim Community to a National Community' In *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-1960*, by Herbert Faustmann and Nikos Peristianis. Berlin: Bibliopolis.

Koumas, Manolis P. 2013. 'Greek governments and the Cypriot referendum for Enosis.' In *The Cyprus Question and the International System, 1945-1974: Searching a position in the globe [in Greek]*, by Petros Papapolyviou, Angelos Syrigos and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 19-37. Athens: Papazisis.

Kouskouvelis, Ilias. 2013. The Strategies of the Small States in the International System: the case of Cyprus, In *The Cyprus Question and the International System, 1945-1974: Searching a position in the globe [in Greek]* by Petros Papapolyviou, Angelos Syrigos and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 397-416. Athens: Papazisis.

Kouskouvelis Ilias. 2015. 'Smart Leadership in a Small State: The Case of Cyprus' in *The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition Multipolarity, Politics and Power*, by Spyridon Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris, 93-117. Dorchester, UK: Ashgate

Kyriakides, Kleanthis A. 2009. 'Contra: The Political Workability of the Annan Plan.' In *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, by Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, 63-79. London: I.B Tauris.

Lakatos, Imre. 1974. 'Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programs.' In *Criticism and the growth of knowledge*, by Imre Lakatos, 20-26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Le Billon, Philippe. 2009. 'Economic and Resource Causes of Conflict.' In *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, by J Berkovitch, v Kremenjuk and W I Zartman, 210-224. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Levy, Jack S. 1989. 'The diversionary theory of war: A critique.' In *Handbook of war studies*, by Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Levy, Jack. S. 2009. 'Case Studies and Conflict Resolution.' in *Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, by Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenjuk and I. William Zartman. 72-85, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. 'Introduction: integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining.' In *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, by Peter B Evans, Harold K Jacobson and Robert D Putnam, 3-42. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Moudouros, Nikos. 2013. 'Dimensions of Turkish Policy in Cyprus: Exporting the AKP Model in the Turkish-Cypriot Community', In *Republic of Cyprus: Foreign Policy Dimensions* by Marios P. Efthimiopoulos and Zenon Tziarras, 97-112. Thessaloniki: Studio University Press

Ortmann, Stefanie, and Nick Whittaker. 2013. 'Geopolitics and Grand Strategy.' In *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, by John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Collin S. Gray, 299-318. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Papadakis, Yannis, Nicos Peristianis, and Gisela Welz. 2006. 'Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict in Divided Cyprus an Overview.' In *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict*, by Yannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gisela Welz, 1-29. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Rothman, Jay. 2012. 'Engaging the Painful Past and Forging a Promising Future.' In *From Identity-Based Conflict to Identity-Based Cooperation*, by Jay Rothman, 3-20. New York: Springer.

Sheehan, Michael. 2014. 'The Changing Character of War.' In *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to international relations*, by John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 223-237. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Soysa, Indra. 2000. 'The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?' In *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars.*, by Mats Berdal and David Malone. Boulde, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Sözen, Ahmet (2011). 'The Cyprus Challenge in Turkey-EU relations: Heading Towards a Defining Moment?', In *Turkey and the European Union – Facing New Challenges and Opportunities* by Firat Cengiz and Lars Hoffmann, 46-63. London: Routledge.

Stergiou, Andreas, Kivanc Ulusoy, and Menahem Blondheim. 2017. 'Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Bridge Under Troubled Water?' In *Conflict and Prosperity: Geopolitics and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean*, edited by Menahem Blondheim Andreas Stergiou and Kivanc Ulusoy, 7-15. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press.

Steward, Frances. 2002. 'Horizontal Inequalities as a Source of Conflict.' In *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: opportunities for the UN System*, edited by David M Hampson and David M Malone, 105-136. Boulder: Lynner Rienner.

Stivachtis, Yannis. 2019. 'Eastern Mediterranean: A New Region? Theoretical Considerations.' In *The New Eastern Mediterranean: Theory, Politics and States in a Volatile Era*, edited by Litsas Spyridon and Tziampiris Aristotle, 45-59, Cham: Springer

Toal, Gerard, and John Agnew. 2005. 'Introduction: Political Geographies, Geopolitics and Culture.' In *The Handbook of Cultural Geography*, edited by K Anderson, M Domosh, S Pile and N Thrift, 455-461. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Tsakiris, Theodoros. 2016. 'The Gifts of Aphrodite: The Need for Competitive Pragmatism in Cypriot Gas Strategy.' In *Energy Cooperation and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Seismic Shift towards Peace or Conflict*, edited by Angelos Giannakopoulos, 22-36. Tel-Aviv: The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies.

Tuathail, Gearoid O, and Simon Dalby. 1998. 'Introduction: Rethinking geopolitics: towards a critical geopolitics.' In *Rethinking Geopolitics*, edited by Gearoid O Tuathail and Simon Dalby. New York: Routledge.

Turan, Ilter. 2015. 'Reorienting Turkish Foreign Policy: Successes, Failures, Limitations.' In *The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition Multipolarity, Politics and Power*, edited by Spyridon Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris, 133-145. Dorchester UK: Ashgate.

Tziampiris, Aristotle. 2019. 'The New Eastern Mediterranean as a Regional Subsystem' In *The New Eastern Mediterranean: Theory, Politics and States in a Volatile Era*, edited by Litsas Spyridon and Tziampiris Aristotle, 1-30, Cham: Springer

Varnava, Andrekos. 2013. 'Sophronios III 1866-1900 The last of the 'old' and the first of the new archbishop-ethnarchs.' In *The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarchs: their identities and politics*, by Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N Michael, 106-140. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1986. 'Reflections on theory of international politics: A response to my critics.' In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by Robert Keohane, 322-345. New York: Columbia University Press

Weber, Bernard. 2017. 'The European Neighbourhood Policy and energy.' In *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy*, edited by Tobias Schumacher, Andreas Marchetti and Thomas Demmel, 381-392. London: Routledge.

Woodward, Peter. 1995. 'Sudan: War without End.' In *Conflict in Africa*, edited by Oliver Furley. London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

Young, Crawford. 2003. 'Explaining the Conflict Potential of Ethnicity.' In *Contemporary peacemaking. Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, by John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, 9-20. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Yuksel, Inan, and Gözen Pınar Ercan. 2017. 'Maritime Relations of Peninsular Turkey: Surrounded by Hostile or Peaceful Waters.' In *Turkish Foreign Policy International Relations, Legality and Global Reach*, edited by Gözen Pınar Ercan, 281-300. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zartman, William I. 2000. 'Ripeness: The hurting stalemate and beyond. Stern, P. & Druckman, D.,' In *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*, by Paul C Stern and Daniel Druckman, 225-250. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Zartman, William I. 2003. 'Ripeness.' In *Beyond Intractability*, by Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado: Boulder.

Zartman, William I. 2009. 'Conflict Resolution and Negotiation.' In *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, by Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and William I Zartman, 322-339. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

3. Academic Articles

Alkopher, Tal Dingott. 2005. 'The Social (And Religious) Meanings That Constitute War: The Crusades as Realpolitik vs. Socialpolitik, *International Studies Quarterly*, 49 (4): 715-737

Ahmadov, Anar K. 2014. Oil, Democracy, and Context: A Meta-Analysis.' *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (9): 1238-1267.

Anderson, Perry. 2008. 'The Divisions of Cyprus.' *London Review of Books* 30 (8): 7-16.

Aspinall, Edward. 2007. 'The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources Identity in a Separatist Conflict.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (6): 950-972.

Aydın, Mustafa and Cihan Dizdaroğlu. 2018. 'Levantine Challenges on Turkish Foreign Policy.' *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 15 (60): 89-103.

Azar, Edward E. 1985. 'Protracted international conflicts: Ten propositions.' *International Interactions* 12 (1): 59-70.

Bahgat, Gawdat. 2005. 'Energy partnership: Israel and the Persian Gulf.' *Energy Policy* 33: 671-677.

Bahgat, Gawdat. 2012. 'Preliminary assessment of Arab Spring's impact on oil and gas in Egypt, Libya.' *Online Oil and Gas Journal* 11 (1).

Balzaq, Thierry. 2005. 'The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context.' *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (2): 171-201.

Basedau, Matthias, and Jan Pierskalla. 2014. 'How Ethnicity Conditions the Effect of Oil and Gas on Civil Conflict: A Spatial Analysis of Africa from 1990 to 2010.' *Political Geography* 38 (1): 1-11.

Basedau, Matthias, and Jann Lay. 2009. 'Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict.' *Journal of Peace Research* 757-776.

Beckingham, Charles Fraser. 1957. 'Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus.' *Die Welt des Islams* 5 (1): 65-83.

Bensted, Roland. 2011. 'A critique of Paul Collier's 'greed and grievance' thesis of civil war.' *African Security Review* 20 (3): 84-90.

Berdal, Mats. 2005. 'Beyond Greed and Grievance- and not too soon.' *Review of International Studies* 31: 687-698.

Bilgin, Mert. 2015. 'Turkey's Energy Strategy: Synchronizing Geopolitics and Foreign Policy with Energy Security.' *Insight Turkey* 17 (2): 67-81.

Braun, Bruce. 2006. 'Environmental Issues: Global Natures in the Space Assemblage.' *Progress in Human Geography* 30 (5): 644-654.

Brewer, Gene, Sally Selden, and Rex Facer. 2000. 'Individual Conceptions of Public Service Motivation.' *Public Administration Review* 60 (3): 254-264.

Brouwer, Marten. 1999. 'Q is accounting for tastes.' *Journal of Advertising Research* 39 (2): 35-39.

Brown, Steven. 1993. 'A primer on Q methodology.' *Operant Subjectivity* 16 (1): 91-138.

Brown, Steven, and Thomas Ungs. 1970. 'Representativeness and the Study of Political Behavior: An Application of Technique to Reactions to the Kent State Incident.' *Social Science Quarterly* 51 (3): 514-526.

Bryant, Rebecca. 2001. 'Justice or Respect? A Comparative Perspective on Politics in Cyprus,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24 (6), 892-924.

Bryant, Rebecca. 2008. 'Writing the Catastrophe: Nostalgia and Its Histories in Cyprus,' *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 26 (2): 399-422

Bryant, Rebecca. 2012. 'Partitions of Memory: Wounds and Witnessing in Cyprus.' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54 (2): 332-360.

Burke John (2019) 'Homes Lost in Conflict: Reframing the Familiar into New Sites of Memory and Identity on a Divided Island,' *History & Memory*, 31 (2): 155-182

Callahan, Kathe, Melvin J Dubnick, and Dorothy Olshfski. 2006. 'War Narratives: Framing Our Understanding of the War on Terror.' *Public Administration Review* 66 (4): 554-568.

Christou, George. 2010. 'The European Union, borders and conflict transformation.' *Cooperation and Conflict* 45 (1): 55-79.

Christou, George. 2012. 'The European Commission as an Actor in the Cyprus Conflict.' *Journal of European Integration* 35 (2): 117-133.

Christou, Odysseas, and Constantinos Adamides. 2013. 'Energy securitization and desecuritization in the New Middle East.' *Security Dialogue* 44 (6): 507-522.

Ciuta, Felix. 2010. 'Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?' *Security Dialogue* 41 (3): 123-144.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. 'On economic causes of civil war.' *Oxford Economic Papers* 50: 563-573.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. 'On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (1): 13-28.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. 'Greed and grievance in civil war.' *Oxford Economic Papers* 56: 563-595.

Companjen, Francoise. 2010. 'Nagorno-Karabakh – Embedded in Geopolitics.' *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies* 1 (2): 230-240.

Constantinou, Costas. 2010. 'Cypriot In-Dependence and the Problem of Sovereignty', *The Cyprus Review*, 22 (2), 17-33.

Correlje, Aad and Coby van der Linde. 2006. 'Energy supply security and geopolitics: A European perspective', in *Energy Policy*, 34 (5): 532-543

Demetriou, Olga. 2004. 'EU and the Cyprus Conflict.' *Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies*.

DeRouen, Karl J. 1995. 'The indirect link: Politics, the economy, and the use of force.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (4): 671-695.

Dryzek, John, and Jeffrey Berejikian. 1993. 'Reconstructive Democratic Theory.' *The American Political Science Review* 87 (1): 48-60.

Dryzek, John S. 1988. 'The Mismeasure of Political Man.' *The Journal of Politics* 50 (3): 705-725.

- Ellingsen, Ingunn T., Ingunn Storksen, and Paul Stephens. 2010. 'Q methodology in social work research.' *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 13 (5): 395-409.
- Ercan, Yılmaz Muzzafer. 2010. 'Past hurts and relational problems in the Cyprus Conflict.' *International Journal on World Peace* 27 (2): 35-62.
- Erim, Nihat. 1974. 'Reminiscences on Cyprus.' *Dış politika* 4 (2-3): 156-163.
- Erişen, Cengiz. (2013) Emotions as a Determinant in Turkish Political Behavior. *Turkish Studies*, 14 (1): 115-135
- Faustmann , Hubert . 2006. 'The Role of Security Concerns in the Failure of the Annan Plan and in the Post-Annan Plan Period.' *Cyprus- a conflict at the crossroads*. Nicosia: ECPR. 1-23.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. 'Rationalist Explanations for War 379-414.' *International Organization* 49 (3): 379-414.
- Fearon, James D, and David D Laitin. 2003. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.' *American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 75-90.
- Foster, Dennis M, and Jonathan W Keller. 2014. 'Leaders' Cognitive Complexity, Distrust, and the Diversionary Use of Force.' *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (4): 205-223.
- Frynas, George, Geoffrey Wood, and Timothy Hinks. 2017. 'The resource curse without natural resources.' *African Affairs* 116 (463): 233-260.
- Gates, Christianne. 2013. 'The "Turkish Minority in Cyprus: An Artificial identity?"' *he Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41 (5): 870-886.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1988. 'The Theory of Hegemonic War.' *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18 (4): 591-613
- Grieco, Joseph, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal. 1993. 'The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation.' *The American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 727-743.
- Grieco, Joseph. 1988. 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.' *International Organization* 42 (3): 485-507.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. 2014. 'Energy Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Conflict or Cooperation?' *Middle East Policy* 21 (3): 124-133.

Gürel, Ayla and Laura Le Cornu. 2014. 'Can Gas Catalyse Peace in the Eastern Mediterranean?' *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 49 (2): 11-33

Guzansky, Yoel. 2014. 'Israel's Periphery Doctrine 2.0: The Mediterranean Plus.' *Mediterranean Politics* 19 (1): 99-116.

Habermas, Jurgen. 1981. 'New Social Movements.' *Telos Press* 49 (1): 33-37.

Hadjipavlou, Maria. 2007. 'The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding.' *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (3): 349-365.

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis. 2009. 'Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960.' *Journal of Military History* 73 (4): 1143-1166.

Herz, John H. 1950. 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,' *World Politics*, 2 (2): 157-180

Humpreys, Macartan. 2005. 'Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 508-537.

Inbar, Efraim. 2001. 'Regional Implications of the Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership.' *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 5 (2): 48-65.

Jackson, Richard. 2007. 'Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse,' *Government and Opposition*, 42 (3): 394-426

James, Patrick, and John R Oneal. 1991. 'The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (4): 307-332.

Jeffares, Stephen, and Chris Skelcher. 2011. 'Democratic Subjectivities in Network Governance: A Q-methodology Study.' *Public Administration* 89 (4): 1253-1273.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. 'Cooperation under Security Dilemma.' *World Politics* 30 (2): 167-214

Johnson, Edward. 2000. 'Britain and the Cyprus problem at the United Nations, 1954-1958.' *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28 (3): 113-130.

Johnson, Douglas H. 2012. 'The Heglig oil dispute between Sudan and South Sudan.' *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6 (3): 561-569.

Johnston, Pamela, and Stanley Feldman. 1984. 'How people organize the political world: A schematic model.' *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (1): 95-126.

Joseph, Joseph S. 2009. 'Cyprus: Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflict and International Politics.' *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 15 (3-4): 376-397.

İşeri, Emre and Panagiotis Andrikopoulos. 2013. 'Energy Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean: Will Aphrodite's Lure Fuel Peace in Cyprus?'. *Middle Eastern Analysis* 5 (51): 37-46.

Kahveci Özgür, Hayriye 2017. 'Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons: Regional Potential, Challenges Ahead, and the 'Hydrocarbon-ization' of the Cyprus Problem.' *Perceptions* 12 (2-3): 31-56.

Kaliber, Alper. 2005. 'Securing the Ground through securitized 'Foreign Policy': The Cyprus case,.' *Security Dialogue* 36 (3): 319-337.

Kanra, Bora, and Selen Ayirtman Ercan. 2012. 'Negotiating Difference in a Muslim Society: A Longitudinal Study of Islamic and Secular Discourses in Turkey.' *Digest of Middle East Studies* 21 (1): 69-88.

Karakasis, Vasileios P. 2019. ' The 2017 incidents in the Aegean and Turkish foreign policy: using Q-methodology to examine Greek viewpoints.' *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 19(3): 451-472

Karyotis, Theodore. 2011. 'Hydrocarbons and the Law of the Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.' *Mediterranean Quarterly* 22 (2): 45-56.

Kaymak, Erol. 2012. 'If at first you don't succeed, try, try again: (Re)designing referenda to ratify a peace treaty.' *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 18 (1): 88-112

Ker-Lindsay, James. 2007. 'The European Union as a Catalyst for Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Cyprus on the limits of conditionality.' *Helen Bamber Centre for the Study of Rights and Conflict*, April 1.

Khadduri, Walid. 2012. 'Eastern Mediterranean Gas: Opportunities and challenges.' *Mediterranean Politics* 17 (1): 111-117.

Khan, Islam M.Z. 2016. 'Beyond Greed or Grievance Theory – What Explains Civil War?.' *Peace and Security Review* 7 (15): 26-49.

Klapisis, Antonis. 2013. 'The Strategic Importance of Cyprus and the Prospect of Union with Greece, 1919-1931: The Greek Perspective.' *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41 (5): 765-782.

Kontos, Michalis and George Bitsis. 2018. 'Power Games in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus: The Trouble with Turkey's Coercive Diplomacy.' *The Cyprus Review* 30 (1): 51-70.

Laffey, Mark and Jutta, Weldes. 1997. 'Beyond belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations.' *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (2): 193-237

Law, John. 1999. 'After ANT: Complexity, Naming and Topology.' *The Sociological Review* 47 (1): 1-14.

Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. 'The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts.' *Political Geography* 20 (5): 561-584.

Leigh, James, and Predrag Vucovic. 2011. 'A Geopolitics of Cyprus.' *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 15 (4): 1-14.

Levy, Jack S. 1988. 'Domestic Politics and War.' *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (4): 653-673.

Loizides, Neophytos G. 2007. 'Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus.' *International Studies Perspectives* 8 (2): 172-189.

Mackinder, Halford John. 1904. 'Geographical Pivot of History.' *The Geographical Journal* 23 (4): 421-437.

Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. 'The False Promise of International Institutions.' *International Security* 19 (3): 5-49.

Melander, Erik. 2001. 'The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited: Was the War Inevitable?' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3 (2): 48-75.

Miller, Ross A. 1995. 'Domestic structures and the Diversionary Use of Force.' *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (3): 760-785.

Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations:: A Critique of Research and Methods.' *European Journal of International Relations* 5 (2): 225-254.

- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Brandon C Prins. 2004. 'Rivalry and diversionary uses of force.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (6): 937-961.
- Morag, Nadav. 2004. 'Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Ethnic Politics.' *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 4 (1): 1-20.
- Morelli, Massimo, and Dominic Rohner. 2015. 'Resource Concentration and Civil Wars.' *Journal of Development Economics* 117 (1): 32-47.
- Morgan, Clifton T, and Kenneth N Bickers. 1992. 'Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (1): 25-32.
- Murshed, Syed Mansoob, and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeeddin. 2009. 'Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict.' *Journal of International Development* 21 (1): 87-111.
- Muth, John F. 1961. 'Rational Expectations and the theory of price movements.' *Econometrica* 29: 315-335.
- Niedzialkowski, Krzysztof, Ewa Komar, Agata Pietrzyk-Kaszynska, Agnieszka Olszanska, and Malgorzata Grodzinska-Jurczak. 2018. 'Discourses on Public Participation in Protected Areas Governance: Application of Q-Methodology in Poland.' *Ecological Economics* 145: 401-409.
- O'Connor, Karl. 2017. 'What are the ideas and motivations of bureaucrats within a religiously contested society?' *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 83 (1): 63-84
- Ó Tuathail, Gearoid, and John Agnew. 1992. 'Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy.' *Political Geography* 11 (2): 190-204.
- Papadakis, Yannis. 2003. 'Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus', *History and Anthropology*, 14(3), 253-270.
- Paraschos, Peter. 2013. 'Offshore Energy in the Levant Basin: Leaders, Laggards, and Spoilers.' *Mediterranean Quarterly* 24 (1): 38-56.
- Powell, Robert. 1991. 'Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.' *The American Political Science Review* 85 (4): 1303-1320.
- Prontera, Andrea, and Mariusz Ruszel. 2017. 'Energy Security in the Eastern Mediterranean.' *Middle East Policy* 24 (3): 145-162.

Proedrou, Filippou. 2014. 'Reconceptualising the Energy and Security Complex in the Eastern Mediterranean', *The Cyprus Review* 24(2): 15-28.

Putnam, Robert. 1988. 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.' *International Organization* 42 (3): 427-460.

Richmond, Oliver P. (1999), 'Ethno-nationalism, Sovereignty, and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus Conflict: Obstacles to a Settlement', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35(3), 42-63.

Robbins, Simon. 2012. 'The British counter-insurgency in Cyprus.' *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23 (4): 720-743.

Ross, Michael. 2006. 'A closer look at oil, diamonds and civil war.' *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 265-300.

Russett, Bruce M. 1981. 'Security and the resources scramble.' *International Affairs* 58 (1): 42-58.

Sakkas, John, and M Zhukova. 2013. 'The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem.' *Les cahiers Irice* 1 (10): 123-135.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. 'What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (6): 814-858.

Schmidt, Vivian. 2008. 'Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse.' *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (1): 303-326.

Schweller, Randall. 1994. 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,' *International Security*, 19 (1): 72-107

Shaffer, Brenda. 2011. 'Israel: New Natural Gas Producer in the Mediterranean.' *Energy Policy* 38 (6): 5379-5387.

Shaffer, Brenda. 2013. 'Natural gas supply stability and foreign policy.' *Energy Policy* 56 (2): 114-125.

Shafir, Eldar, Itamar Simonson, and Amos Tversky. 1993. 'Reason-based Choice.' *Cognition*, 49 (1-2): 11-36

Silvius, Gilbert. A., Martin Kampinga, Silvana Paniagoua and Herman Mooi. 2017. 'Considering sustainability in project management decision making; An investigation using Q-methodology.' *International Journal of Project Management* 35 (6): 1130-1150.

- Sirin, Cigdem. 2012. 'Examining the role of identity in decision making: the case of Cyprus', in *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 23 (4): 413-439
- Sitilides, John. 2014. 'Modern Geopolitics of the Cyprus Question.' *Mediterranean Quarterly* 25 (1): 77-94.
- Singer, J. David. 1961. 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations.' *World Politics* 14 (1): 77-92.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. 'The limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory.' *International Organization* 39 (4): 579-614
- Snidal, Duncan. 1991. 'International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers.' *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (4): 387-402.
- Sözen, Ahmet and Kudret Özersay. 2007. 'The Annan Plan: State Succession or Continuity', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43 (1): 125-141.
- Stergiou, Andreas. 2016. 'Turkey-Cyprus-Israel relations and the Cyprus conflict.' *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 18 (4): 375-392.
- Steunenberg, Bernard, Simay Petek, and Christiane Ruth. 2011. 'Between Reason and Emotion: Popular Discourses on Turkey's membership of the EU.' *South European Society and Politics* 16 (3): 449-468.
- Stocker, James. 2012. 'No EEZ Solution: The Politics of Oil and Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean.' *Middle East Journal* 66 (4): 579-597.
- Stuart, Douglas, and Harvey Starr. 1982. 'The Inherent Bad Faith Model Reconsidered: Dulles, Kennedy, and Kissinger.' *Political Psychology* 3 (1): 1-33.
- Sullivan, John L, Amy Fried, and Mary G Dietz. 1992. 'Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988.' *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (1): 200-234.
- Tang, Shiping, Yihan Xiong, and Hui Li. 2017. 'Does Oil Cause Ethnic War? Comparing Evidence from Process-tracing with Quantitative Results.' *Security Studies* 26 (3): 359-390.
- Tsakiris, Theodoros. 2017. 'Cyprus' Natural Gas Strategy: Geopolitical and Economic Preconditions.' *Mediterranean Quarterly* 28 (1): 29-57.
- Tucker, R. 1965. 'The Dictator and Totalitarianism.' *World Politics* 17 (5): 555-583.

- Tuncalp, Emre. 2015. 'Turkey's Natural Gas Strategy: Balancing Geopolitical Goals & Market Realities.' *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 14 (3): 67-79.
- Tundander, Ola. 2001. 'Swedish-German geopolitics for a new century: Rudolf Kjellén's 'The State as a Living Organism.' *Review of International Studies* 27 (3): 451-463.
- Tziarras, Zenon. 2016. 'Israel-Cyprus-Greece: a 'Comfortable' Quasi-Alliance.' *Mediterranean Politics* 21 (3): 407-427.
- Uluğ, Ö M, and J C Cohrs. 2016. 'An exploration of lay people's Kurdish conflict frames in Turkey.' *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 22 (2): 109-119.
- Uluğ, Özden M, and Christopher J Cohrs. 2017. 'How do experts differ from politicians in understanding a conflict? A comparison of Track I and Track II actors.' *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 35 (2): 147-172.
- Vallacher, R, P Coleman, A Nowak, and A Bui-Wrzosinska. 2010. 'Rethinking intractable conflict: the perspective of dynamical systems.' *American Psychology* 65 (4): 262-278.
- van Eijk, Carola, Trui Steen, and Bram Verschuere. 2017. 'Co-producing safety in the local community: A Q-methodology study on the incentives of Belgian and Dutch members of neighbourhood watch schemes.' *Local Government Studies* 43 (3): 323-343.
- Varnava, Andrekos. 2010. 'Cyprus Review.' *Reinterpreting Macmillan's Cyprus Policy, 1957-1960* 22 (1): 79-106.
- Volkan, Vamık D. 2008. 'Trauma, Identity and Search for a Solution in Cyprus.' *Insight Turkey* 10 (3): 95-110.
- Vuori, Juha A. 2008. 'Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders.' *European Journal of International Relations* 14 (1): 65-99.
- Weller, Nicholas, and Jeb Barnes. 2014. 'Pathway Analysis and the Search for Causal Mechanisms.' *Sociological Methods & Research* (1): 1.
- Wendt, Alexander E. 1987. 'The agent-structure problem in international relations theory.' *International Organization* 41 (3): 335-370.
- Wendt, Alexander E. 1992. 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.' *International Organization* 46 (2): 391-425

- Williams, Michael. 2003. 'Words, images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics.' *International Studies Quarterly*, 47 (4): 511-531.
- Winrow, Gareth. 2016. 'The Anatomy of a Possible Pipeline: The Case of Turkey and Leviathan and Gas Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean.' *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 18 (5): 431-447.
- Yilmaz, Muzzafer Ercan. 2010. 'Past hurts and relational problems in the Cyprus Conflict.' *International Journal on World Peace* 27 (2): 35-62.
- Yarwood, Dean L, and Dan D Nimmo. 1976. 'The Role Approach to Participation and Administration Behavior.' *Policy Studies Journal* 5 (1): 41-50.
- Zabala, Aiora, and Unai Pascual. 2016. 'Bootstrapping Q-Methodology to Improve the Understanding of Human Perspectives,' *PLOS One* 11 (2).
- Zabala, Aiora. 2014. 'qmethod: A Package to Explore Human Perspectives Using Q-Methodology.' *The R Journal* 6 (2): 163-173.
- Zartman, William I. 2001. 'The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments.' *Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1 (1): 8-18.
- Zartman, William I. 2011. 'Greed and Grievance: Methodological and Epistemological Underpinnings of the Debate.' *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11 (2): 298-307

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PhD may be a lonely business but without the contribution of some people, this research would have never come into fruition. From Leiden University College, I would like to thank Maja and Anar, whose insights were instrumental in the formulation of my theoretical framework. From the Institute of Public Administration, I am thankful to my colleague, Elitsa, who shared her valuable experience on Q-methodology with me. From the Dual PhD center, I am grateful to Johan and Mark, who were tracking my semi-annual performance and supporting me when things did not go according to my plans. I also thank Petra, Charlotte and Adriaan who have also been supportive in the administrative procedures. I also feel grateful to Manon and Liselore from the Graduate School for the administrative support they offered. I would like to thank my two supervisors, Pr. Joris Voorhoeve and Pr. Bernard Steunenberg. Joris encouraged my initial idea and enabled to communicate my work in several reports for Sen Foundation and during the courses he was teaching. Bernard helped me establish a solid methodological framework

I feel more than lucky to have completed my field research in the beautiful island of Cyprus before COVID-19 broke out. Had the pandemic occurred a couple of years ago, I would have not been able to fly to Cyprus and meet so many people. Most of the research participants, Greek-Cypriots or Turkish-Cypriots shared their valuable time and personal experiences with me. I would like to thank Andreas and Maria who let me stay with them during the time of my research. I am also grateful to the Cyprus Center of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and most particularly to my former Professor at Bilgi University and current Director of this organization, Dr. Tzimitras. He helped me grasp a better understanding of what is happening on the ground and facilitated my contact with most of my research participants.

I am thankful to all my friends and colleagues who showed their compassion to me by listening to my complaints about the ups and downs of the PhD procedure: Giorgos, Pantelis, Orestis, Giannis, Dimitris, Aris P., Kostas, Zenon, Aris K., Electra, Haris, Manthos, Kostis, Ioanna, Manos, Antoaneta, Dimiter, Neli, Emily, Catalina, Honorata, Stephanie, Valerie, Arco, Geor, Ilia, Paul, Leticia, Michaela, Rosa, Paul, Jeane and so many others. I would like to thank Nikos, Alexandra, Anestis and Matina for helping me with the transcription of the interviews and Aristarchos for giving me tips about the presentation of my findings. I am grateful to Spyros who helped me with the translation of the Turkish transcripts.

I am thankful to my family who endured this difficult adventure with me. My father devoted endless hours of reading and reviewing pieces of my manuscript, while offering his critical insights whenever he deemed it necessary. My mother and brother, who has experienced the challenges of a PhD, supported me when things were going downhill.

Finally, I close this section with my wife and life partner, Kelly. She endured my endless complaints and ups and downs during all these years. She has been offering her well-grounded piece of advice when I was unable to think clearly. Her dynamism and calmness have been a source of inspiration for me.

DUTCH SUMMARY

Wat is de invloed van de recent ontdekte gasvelden op de escalatie van het conflict in Cyprus, gebaseerd op de Grieks-Cypriotische en Turks-Cypriotische discourse?

In dit onderzoek evalueer ik de invloed van de recent ontdekte gasvelden ten zuiden van Cyprus op de escalatie van het Cypriotische conflict. Ik onderzoek de ideationele dynamiek, die de conflictopwekkende rol van natuurlijke hulpbronnen kan versterken. Theoretisch gemotiveerd door de discursieve verschuiving in conflictstudies, geef ik in mijn analyse prioriteit aan de collectief gedeelde betekenissen die de Grieks-Cypriotische en Turks-Cypriotische opinieleiders aan de gasreserves toekennen. Daarnaast onderzoek ik hoe deze betekenissen hun conflicterende strategieën rechtvaardigen. Om deze verhoudingen bloot te leggen, pas ik Q-methodologie toe, een op maat gemaakte onderzoeksvorm om menselijke subjectiviteit te 'meten'. Ik onderscheid vijf verschillende verhoudingen. Aan de Grieks-Cypriotische kant identificeer ik (a) 'gas dat onze geopolitieke positie versterkt', wat de soevereiniteitsattributen van de natuurlijke hulpbronnen benadrukt, (b) 'pijpdromen en geïmporteerde nationalisme', die de politiek-electorale motieven achter de 'geopolitieke ondertoon' van de Grieks-Cypriotische kant veroorzaken, en (c) politieke en historische wrok, die de Grieks-Cypriotische grieven benadrukt. Wat de Turks-Cypriotische kant betreft, kwam ik twee verschillende redeneringen tegen: (e) door de gasvondsten gestimuleerde politieke gelijkheid', waarin Turks-Cyprioten hun grieven benadrukken over hun gebrek aan internationale status en de risico's die voortvloeien uit de ontdekking van gasreserves om terug te keren naar hun internationale isolement, en (f) 'micropolitiek', die electorale kansen benadrukt van bepaalde beleidsmakers die profiteren van de spanningen om hun politieke loopbaan te dienen in het licht van binnenlandse turbulentie. Het geheel van deze vijf vertogen biedt een holistisch kader met betrekking tot de discursieve factoren die de conflictopwekkende rol van natuurlijke hulpbronnen binnen het langlopende Cyprus-conflict ondersteunen.

CV VASILEIOS P. KARAKASIS

Date /place of Birth: 07.06.1984/Athens, Greece

I launched my Bachelor studies in Political Science and Public Administration at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (2002-2006). I continued with a 2-year MA in International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University where I focused on Turkish-Greek Relations (2006-2008). After having completed my 1-year compulsory military service in Greece, I launched a MSc in Public Administration at the University of Leiden, with a focus on Crisis and Security Management (2011-2012). In September 2012, I did a research internship at Sen Foundation of Research and Education on International Cooperation. I published reports and academic articles on the energy security developments in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as other aspects of the Greek-Turkish relations, including the Cyprus conflict. This triggered the idea to start my PhD on the energy dimensions of the Cyprus conflict which has traditionally been a significant point of dispute between Greece and Turkey.

From 2014 I have been lecturing on International and European Governance at the Institute of Public Administration in the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs at the University of Leiden. Along with my PhD research, my teaching portfolio included courses like Politics of Crisis Management, Public Policy and Values, Institutions of Governance and Development and Qualitative Research Methods. I have also supervised a dozens of Master theses on international organizations, foreign policy, energy security and crisis management. I have also taught European Public Policy and International Organizations at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. Through my involvement in Sen Foundation of Research and Education on International Cooperation, I have also organized and lectured Summer School Modules on Human Security, Rights and Development at The Hague University of Applied Sciences.

I speak 6 languages (Greek, English, German, Dutch, French and Turkish). I did internships in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Consulate of Greece in Istanbul and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo in Cyprus.

