Collective violence offenders and offending : the role of individual characteristics

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COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

OFFENDERS AND OFFENDING

The role of individual characteristics

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01.
Introduction

Background

History provides many examples of seemingly 'ordinary' men who take part in acts of collective violence that support the economic, political or social goals of 'their' group, such as genocide, mass killings, insurgencies and terrorism. For long, social scientists have debated whether engaging in such violence is driven solely by circumstances or whether individual characteristics also are important (e.g. Browning, 1992; De Swaan, 2015; Littman & Paluck, 2014). This goes as well for collective violence that is resorted to by crowds, which is the subject matter of this thesis. This latter form of collective violence may occur around demonstrations, protests, football matches, recreational events and community disturbances, and distinguishes itself from for instance war and state-perpetrated acts (Adang, 2011; WHO, 2002). For the sake of readability, collective violence by crowds in this thesis is simply referred to as collective violence. For the purpose of this thesis, both confronting others physically and the destroying or damaging of objects, or attempts to do so, are listed as under violence.

The first explanations of collective violence date back till the end of the 19th century. Le Bon (1895) assumed that within a group, individuals behave irrationally and may come to act violently because they shift from a conscious to an unconscious personality. This so-called 'classical perspective' on collective violence is linked to the later developed concept of deindividuation: a tempxorary state of reduced self-awareness due to an increased feeling of anonymity and a decreased feeling of individual responsibility (Diener, 1980; Zimbardo, 1969). Furthermore, within the classical perspective on collective violence some authors assume that violent crowd behavior reflects the criminal or deviant nature of the individuals who are a part of it. This latter notion is incorporated in so-called convergence explanations (Ball & Drury, 2012; Reicher, 2001).

The classical perspectives on collective violence have been misused to criminalize crowds and, in turn, as a justification to treat crowds as criminal (Reicher, 2001). Uproars by ethnic minorities in the 1960s and 1970s and the rise of hooliganism in the 1980s refueled scholarly interest in collective violence. Dissatisfied with the absence of context in classical perspectives (decontextualizing), alternative explanations were developed. Turner & Kilian (1987), for instance, argued that group norms are established through joint consultation between individuals within the crowd, witah some having more influence than others. Although this line of reasoning provided a link between individuals and their actions in crowds, their emergent norm theory failed to explain how such crowd unity can be quickly achieved in changing circumstances (Wright, 1978). Furthermore, the context in which collective violence emerged, including its intra- and intergroup dynamics, kept being disregarded (Reicher, 2001).

To address these shortcomings and to illustrate that – for those involved – involvement in collective violence is meaningful behavior, in the 1980s, the concept of social identity was introduced. By arguing that crowd behavior is guided by an individual's self-understanding as a member of a group (social identity) instead of his own goals and desires (personal identity), the focus shifted to the relevance of perceived similarities with the in-group and differences with the out-group. Consequently, the social identity perspective on collective violence maintains that individual behavior in crowds is guided exclusively by social category-based processes (Reicher, 1984, 1987). Over

the past decades, the social identity perspective on collective violence has been further elaborated (Reicher, 2001). One of its main premises is that individual characteristics do not in any way guide individual behavior in crowds: '*there has been precious little success in finding any individual attributes which reliably predict riot participation*' (Reicher, 2001, p. 191). This stance has remained virtually undisputed (Brown, 2000) but, at the same time, has also been insufficiently studied. This introductory chapter intends to explain why sticking to this premise is unsatisfactory and why individual characteristics should be a legitimate component of collective violence research. In addition, in this chapter the thesis' aim, exploring the contribution of individual characteristics to collective violence, and its outline are described.

A social identity perspective on collective violence

From the 1960s onwards, study results indicated that collective violence was not – as proposed by the "classical" theories – irrational, unfocused and uncontrolled (e.g. Reicher, 1984, 1987). Convergence explanations stressing that the crowd reinforces and intensifies the already existing criminal and deviant character of individuals who are a part of it, were also increasingly challenged. For instance, research showed that the majority of those involved in collective violence around protests and demonstrations had no substantial criminal history and did not routinely engage in violent behavior. Furthermore, no other links between individual characteristics and partaking in collective violence could be established (Reicher, 2001). Individual characteristics were argued not to predict or explain individual behavior in social situations at all or, if they did, their influence would quickly diminish in larger crowds (McPhail & Pickens, 1981; McPhail, 1991; Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Turner, 1964).

To offer a counterpart to the classical perspectives on collective violence, scholars aimed to provide a link between individuals, their actions in crowds, and the context in which these actions arise (Reicher, 2001). To this end, Tajfel and Turner's (1979) concept of social identity was adapted to explain collective violence. These scholars assumed that individuals have many social identities (e.g. family, nationality, neighborhood and work), which ensures that individual thoughts, emotions and behaviors are in accordance with the situation at hand (Tajfel & Turner's, 1979; Turner & Kilian, 1987). This concept of social identity is at the core of the Social Identity Model (SIM), which currently is one of the dominant vantage points for explaining collective violence. The SIM maintains that in response to underlying causes and/or precipitating incidents (hereafter: trigger events) individuals in a crowd may shift from a personal to a social identity. Subsequently, situation-specific norms are assumed to guide group and individual behavior, suggesting that an 'us-them' perspective is a main catalyst of collective action (Postmes & Spears, 1998; Reicher, 1984, 1987). From a social identity perspective, partaking in collective violence entails neither irrational, unfocused and uncontrolled behavior nor an influence of pre-existing individual characteristics. Instead, it assumes a shift from individual to categorical bases of behavioral control (Reicher, 2001).

The social identity perspective on collective violence has received extensive empirical support (see Reicher (2001) for an overview). The

categorical level of perceived relationships is particularly well reflected in the dynamics between police action – treating the whole crowd as potentially disruptive – and its consequences for crowd behavior. In such cases previously 'neutral' individuals in the crowd may come to act violently (e.g. Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000), reflecting the notion that individuals tend to gravitate to a position minimizing intra-group differences compared to intergroup differences (Haslam & Turner, 1992, 1995; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992). The results of these and other studies also underscore that collective violence is aimed only at the out-group linked to the trigger event, and that behavioral norms are defined by looking at the behavior of others who are considered to share the same social identity (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005; Postmes & Spears, 1998; Reicher, 1984, 1987, 1996). Unlike previously developed theories, the social identity perspective on collective violence explains the rapidity with which consensus within crowds can arise and why any person in a crowd may come to act violently (Reicher, 2001; Terry, Hogg & White, 1999).

Even in the face of trigger events and intergroup dynamics gravitating towards collective violent action however, only a minority of the individuals present actually involve themselves in violent behavior (Adang, 2011). This observation may be explained by differences in the social categories that individuals identify, in the contents of these categories and in the persons prototypical thereof (Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b; Reicher & Sani, 1998; Sani & Reicher, 1998, 1999). Furthermore, experiencing anger or joy has been pointed to as a factor contributing to intergroup conflict and offensive action tendencies in crowds (Levy et al., 2017; Mackie et al., 2000; Spaaij, 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Such findings suggest that cognitive processes and resultant emotions may play a key role in collective violence involvement. Consequently this also indicates that individual-level factors may have explanatory value with regard to this matter.

Individual-level explanations for violent behavior

Anger is a strong negative emotional state that is explicitly linked to violent behavior (DeWall, Anderson & Bushman, 2011). Individuals vary in their propensity to experience anger due to the way social information is processed and the emotions this evokes (see Crick & Dodge, 1994). This, in turn, suggests that in a given context chances of behaving violently differ between individuals (Hazebroek, Howells & Day, 2001; Martinko & Zellars, 1998; Owen, 2011). Heightened impulsivity and emotion regulation deficits (ED) are examples of behavioral and psychological characteristics that have been implicated in the etiology of violence, particularly violent behavior disproportionate to the actual situation (Coccaro, 2003; Fetich et al., 2014; Kulper et al., 2015; Puhalla et al., 2016). This goes as well for a hostile attribution bias – the tendency of interpreting others' intent as hostile also in ambiguous or benign situations – which is often present in people suffering from antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) (e.g. Bailey & Ostrov, 2008; Babcock, Green, & Webb, 2008; Douglas & Martinko, 2001).

Not only social information processing but also explicit and implicit attitudes towards violent behavior have been pointed to as a contributing factor to actual violence (Anderson & Huesmann, 2007). Explicit attitudes refer to deliberate behaviors that can be traced back to a positive view on

the behavior in question (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Examples of positive attitudes towards violent behavior are reflected in the belief that this behavior is acceptable or that it contributes to self-esteem and social image (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997; Slaby & Guerra, 1988). Such attitudes have been found to be more prevalent among individuals suffering from ASPD (Gilbert et al., 2015), indicating again that psychological characteristics may contribute to behaving violently.

Despite negative explicit attitudes towards violence, individuals may still come to act violently due to uncontrolled emotional reactions. The risk of uncontrolled emotional reactions may increase due to a lack of cognitive resources, motivation and/or time to make the cognitive effort required to behave in accordance with explicit attitudes (Dodge, 1993). The extent to which this cognitive effort can be made appears to be linked to an individual's ability to inhibit impulses and regulate emotions. This may explain why heightened impulsivity and ED – as well as ADHD – are associated with an increased risk of displaying violent behavior (Coccaro, Bergeman & McClearn, 1993; Davidson, Putnam & Larson, 2000; Kim & Lee, 2010; Retz & Rösler, 2010).

Due to the course of the scientific debate on collective violence so far, individual agency in crowds has been approached almost exclusively from a group-dynamic vantage point (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017). However, the current empirical literature on violent behavior indicates that psychological characteristics a) influence how individuals interpret and evaluate their social environment, b) affect an individual's attitude to violent behavior and c) are vital to the ability to inhibit spontaneous emotional-driven responses. This suggests that individual agency in crowds may not exclusively be affected by trigger events and subsequent social processes as assumed in the social identity perspective. Potential relevant individual characteristics and contributing mechanisms as derived from prior empirical work discussed above on solo violence are displayed in table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Individual characteristics that may contribute to collective violence involvement

Individual characteristic	Contributing mechanism(s)
Emotion-regulation deficits	Deficiencies in inhibition of impulses and regulating emotions
Heightened impulsivity	Deficiencies in inhibition of impulses and regulating emotions
ADHD	Deficiencies in inhibition of impulses and regulating emotions
ASPD	Hostile attribution bias Positive explicit attitude towards violence

Recent theoretical developments

Based on observations of collective violence around football matches and protest events, Adang (2011) introduced the initiation-escalation model of public disorder (hereafter: initiation-escalation model). This model posits that context, intergroup interaction, intergroup relationships and individual differences together may more adequately explain who becomes involved in collective violence and why (Adang, 2011).

To explain the initiation of collective violence, the initiation-escalation model distinguishes between violence that occurs in response to a trigger event (reactive violence) and violence merely requiring the presence of a rival group (proactive violence). The target of reactive violence is usually linked to the trigger preceding the violence. On the other hand, individuals and groups who aim for a confrontation to occur seek violence proactively.

These confrontations may even be preplanned (also see Adang, 2002; Spaaij, 2007). In the initiation-escalation model, two mechanisms explain why individuals decide to involve themselves in collective violence. The first mechanism, an 'us versus them' antagonism, parallels the principles of the social identity perspective as set out in a previous section of this chapter. The second escalation mechanism involves opportunity and (perceived) risk of retaliation. This escalation mechanism is substantiated by observations, which indicate that a) collective violence is more likely when the police are absent, b) confrontations are being avoided or fled from when perceived as unable to win and c) only a minority of those present engages in risky behaviors such as physical fighting. This links to criminological principles central to rational choice and opportunity theory. Rational choice theory, in short, states that an individual will engage in an offense only when the risks associated with offending do not outweigh the perceived benefits. Opportunity theory builds on this assumption by specifically focusing on situational conditions that make committing an offense more or less 'profitable' (Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Clarke, 1995).

Referring to the so-called young male syndrome – a high prevalence of risk-taking and criminal behaviors in young males, particularly in the presence of like-minded peers – sex (male) and age (young) are identified as individual characteristics, which may contribute to collective violence involvement (Adang, 2011). This line of thought fits with the notion that pronounced changes in personality occur in adolescence, with changes being partly attributable to social demands and experiences (Specht, Egloff & Schmukle, 2011). As most young males do not display antisocial and criminal behavior, the demographic characteristics central to the young male syndrome, however, are rather unspecific. Given the key role of cognitive processes and resultant emotions in collective violence involvement, psychological characteristics associated with violent behavior may contribute to participating in collective violence.

A need for further research

Although psychological characteristics are likely to affect an individual's interpretation and evaluation of a given situation, his or her attitude to violence and the ability to inhibit spontaneous emotional-driven responses, scholars adhering to a social identity perspective on collective violence have put forward various arguments for not taking psychological characteristics into account. For instance, it has been argued that – if individual characteristics contribute – this contribution is insignificant in large groups. As violent behavior is not displayed continuously, it also has been stated that the violent behavior of individuals who participate in collective violence relates specifically to the situation at hand. Finally, it has been posited that in the empirical literature no indications can be found that substantiate a contribution of individual characteristics to engaging in collective violence (Reicher, 2001). There is something to be said of these arguments. First, some lack empirical evidence. To our knowledge, it has, for instance, not been examined whether the influence of individual characteristics on collective violence indeed diminishes when crowd size increases. Second, some arguments contrast prior empirical work. For instance, risk factors for solo and collective violence offending have been found to largely overlap.

Furthermore, subgroups of violent offenders have been identified who frequently display violent behavior both alone and in groups (e.g. hooligans) (Piquero et al., 2015; Van de Valk & Linckens, 1988). These findings oppose, at least to some extent, the argument that underlying causes of solo and collective violence behavior differ significantly from one another. Third, several studies have indicated a link between psychological characteristics and an increased chance of participating in collective violence (Arms & Russell, 1997; Mustonen et al., 1996; Russell, 1995). In addition, empirical studies that do not find evidence for a contribution of individual characteristics are in fact very limited with a focus on US ghetto riots and do not include the – from the point of view of this thesis – 'right' individual characteristics. This suggests that currently dominant explanations of collective violence may fail to adequately address the full scope of potentially relevant characteristics when it comes to understanding collective violence.

All over consideration leads to the conclusion that the social identity perspective emphasizes that trigger events and subsequent social processes exclusively guide partaking in collective violence, whereas convergence explanations stress the contribution of individual characteristics. The empirical literature that has evolved over the past decades indeed suggests that the social processes central to social identity are at the core of explaining collective violence (Reicher, 2001). At the same time, however, it seems that individual characteristics play their part in the etiology of participating in collective violence. Research indicates that the individual characteristics at play may affect the perception of social relations (e.g. in-group and out-group), the evaluation of events (e.g. it being experienced as a provocation) and the responses considered to be appropriate (e.g. considering violence as justified or being unable to suppress an aggressive response). This suggests that a common ground, between the social identity perspective and the convergence explanations it so eagerly dismisses, may be found in their interaction with one another.

Current study and research questions

As was argued above, the common ground between the social identity model and theories implicating individual characteristics in explanations of (collective) violence, relates to questions like a) whether trigger events or opportunities are perceived, b) how these events and opportunities are evaluated, and c) how these events and opportunities are subsequently responded to. Personal cognitions and emotions influence perceptions, evaluations and responses to social events and can therewith be expected to contribute to an individual becoming involved in collective action, including collective violence.

From the premise that stable psychological characteristics contribute to collective violence involvement, it follows that those found to participate in collective violence can be expected to display violent behavior outside of collective settings as well. Likely, their cognitions and emotions will apply to their social interactions in general, so both within and outside crowd situations. The large majority of those involved in collective violence however has been found to rarely behave violently outside collective settings and to do so in crowd settings only under very specific conditions (Reicher, 2001). A small subgroup of collective violence offenders may

however be an important exception to these findings: members of hard-core hooligan groups. Several studies indicate that these individuals are frequently and perpetually involved in both solo and collective violence, and to be so from early age on (Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015). Moreover, prior research suggests that their psychological characteristics may indeed contribute to their violent behavior. Hard core hooligans, for instance, have been found to suffer disproportionally from psychological disorders such as ADHD and ASPD (Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015). In addition, they have been implicated to participate in mutually arranged confrontations, indicating that – for some of them – the mere presence of a rival group is sufficient to engage in collective violence (Adang, 2011; Cleland & Cashmore, 2016; Giulianotti & Armstrong, 2002; Marsh & Harré, 1978).

In sum, the current empirical literature suggests that the majority of young men who are involved in collective violence only act violently on a one-off basis in a specific setting, without having repeated police contacts. Their violent behavior may be explained by antagonistic group relationships, which emerge due to a specific course of events (Reicher, 2001). On the other hand, a small subgroup of individuals can be identified whose violent behaviors – alone and as part of a collective – have an early onset and continue well into adulthood. Their (collective) violence may even be preplanned. Rather than contextual factors, their violent behavior seems to be driven by psychological characteristics associated with violent behavior (Piquero et al., 2015; Lösel & Bliesener, 2003), which may make them more susceptible to participating in collective violence (Russell, 2004).

Although there is a subtle difference between violent behavior and offending (not all offending entails violent behavior), the individual differences in frequency of and persistence in violent behavior may be interpreted and explained by means of Moffitt's (1993, 1997) dual taxonomy. She identified two developmental offending pathways: the adolescence-limited trajectory and a life-course persistent pathway.[1] Adolescence-limited offenders display risky behavior and minor offending particularly in groups. They generally have a regular childhood and mostly desist from offending shortly after initiating it. Their offending behavior may be attributed to feeling a need to belong and to the relevance adolescents assign to social status (Wilson & Daly, 1985; Weerman et al., 2015; Young & Weerman, 2013). Life-course persistent offenders, however, suffer from inborn deficiencies in neurological functioning and display behavioral problems already from an early age on. Their behavioral and psychiatric characteristics and the inability of others (e.g. parents) to adequately cope with these during childhood, in turn, are linked to their early age of onset of and persistence in offending (Moffitt, 1993, 1997). The dual taxonomy thus offers different explanations for different groups who, during adolescence, are engaging in rather similar behaviors.

Thus far, studies taking a typological vantage point to interpret the contrasting offending patterns of individuals involved in collective violence suffer from various methodological shortcomings. These shortcomings for instance concern sample size (relatively small) and sample inclusion criteria, which are biased towards individuals resembling Moffitt's life-course persistence offenders (e.g. Farrington, 1994; Lösel & Bliesener, 2003;

1 Although more recent studies identify more offending trajectories, the heart of this line of thought remains undisputed (Moffitt, 2007; Monahan et al., 2009; Piquero, 2007).

Piquero et al., 2015). Consequently, these studies stress individual-level explanations without considering prior empirical work from the social identity perspective. The current study aims to provide empirical data to bridge differences between convergence and social identity explanations and seeks to find a common ground between opposing explanations for collective violence. To this end, the current studies aim at answering the following research questions:

(1) Do developmental pathways in delinquency and crime differ across individuals up to the moment they become involved in collective violence?
(2) Are individual characteristics linked to persistence in collective violence offending and, if so, which ones?
(3) Does the contribution of contextual and individual determinants differ between various types of collective violence (reactive vs. proactive) and, if so, in what way?

Methods

Study Focus

By looking at collective violence around football matches and recreational events in the Netherlands, this thesis' focus is upon collective violence that is, at least by outsiders, perceived as issue-irrelevant and hedonistic (Marx, 1970). Therefore, structural, political/ideological and cultural aspects of collective violence (see Waddington, 2010) are not explicitly considered. The social identity perspective has been utilized to explain collective violence irrespective of the situation in which it occurs. So, given this thesis' aim, the specific situation in which collective violence is studied therefore does not seem theoretically relevant.

There are however several practical reasons for focusing on collective violence around football matches and recreational events. First, although the Netherlands have known times in which protests and demonstrations got out of hand repeatedly – for instance during the squatters' riots in the 1980s (Rosenthal &' t Hart, 1990) – collective violence in the Netherlands occurs most frequently around football matches. Second, over the past years, with the aim of identifying those involved, the Dutch police have extensively investigated multiple cases of collective violence around football matches. This, in turn, increased the chance that a representative sample of collective violence offenders can be obtained (see Ball & Drury, 2012). Third, as individuals involved in collective violence around football matches and recreational events are central to this thesis, it is relevant to know that between 1997 and 2014 the Dutch government developed and implemented various policies aiming to increase security around football matches. Particularly relevant is that reducing football violence by targeting those repeatedly involved in football violence and facilitating 'neutral' supporters became standard policy during this period. This resulted in setting up a database in which known hooligans are registered by means of the 'Hooligans in Beeld' approach (see Ferwerda & Adang, 2007). The presence of such policies, which pay attention to individuals and groups at high risk for partaking in collective violence, increases the availability of suitable data.

Pursuing these policies has resulted in a gradual decline in serious violent incidents and a decrease of police deployment around football matches in the Netherlands (Ferwerda et al., 2014). At the same time, violent confrontations between hooligan sides still occur from time to time. Over the past five years, several incidents of collective violence around football matches have taken place, with some being investigated by an external commission due to their vehemence (Auditteam Voetbal & Veiligheid, 2012a, 2012b). Furthermore, arranged confrontations between sides outside match days and away from the stadium surroundings are an upcoming phenomenon (Ferwerda et al., 2014). This indicates that collective violence around football matches is still a current topic, assuring not only this thesis' scientific merit but also its societal relevance.

Research methods and data sets

A multimethod study consisting of quantitative and qualitative research methods was conducted to answer the research questions prominent to this thesis. For quantitative research purposes, various samples were used.

(1) Crime and delinquency sample (n=438)

In absolute numbers collective violence is a rarely occurring event, and when it does occur, usually only a minority of individuals who partake in the violent behavior is identified and arrested (Ball & Drury, 2012). In order to determine developmental pathways in delinquency and crime of individuals involved in collective violence, a representative sample of collective violence offenders (n=438) was identified and criminal career data were gathered.

Collective violence offenders were identified based on two sources. The first source was a hooligan database managed by the Dutch National Football Intelligence Point (Dutch: *Centraal Informatiepunt Voetbalvandalisme*, CIV). A side note regarding the CIV-database is that registered individuals are well known due to their prominence in hooliganism, increasing the risk of bias towards individuals more frequently and perpetually involved in collective violence. Therefore, in addition, individuals apprehended due to their involvement in a recent collective violence incident were included in the study. Only incidents where the police had made a great deal of effort to arrest those involved – including extensive analysis of available camera footage as well as sharing footage with the public to facilitate identification of involved individuals – were selected. This way it was ensured that arrested individuals did not merely consist of individuals already known to the police due to their prior offending (see Ball & Drury, 2012). Between 2011 and 2017, this applied to three collective violence incidents: two cases of collective violence erupting around a football match (Auditteam 2012a, 2012b) and one case of collective violence around a spontaneous recreational event (Cohen Commission, 2013). The latter incident was not football-related. However, as this disturbance was 'non-political' and, just like football-related incidents, could be characterized as issue-irrelevant, it was included in the current thesis.

Criminal career data included arrests up to the moment of involvement in collective violence as well as data from the national police registration system BVH (Dutch: *Basisvoorziening Handhaving*). Records in the BVH include all incidents that police officers have been concerned with during

their shifts over the past five years and also cover non-arrested persons. This offered the possibility to gain insight into incidents in which individuals were involved, also when their involvement was not followed by an arrest.

(2) Persistence sample (n=438)

To be able to determine whether and, if so, which individual characteristics are linked to persistence in collective violence additional criminal career data (up to 2016) were gathered for the crime and delinquency sample. In addition, behavioral and psychiatric characteristics data were obtained. Because Dutch legislation does not allow researchers to independently approach former arrestees with the request to complete psychological tests or cooperate with an interview, existing data needed to be relied on. Three sources of information were consulted. First, forensic reports written by the Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (Dutch: *Nederlands Instituut voor Forensische Psychiatrie en Psychologie*, NIFP) on request of the magistrate or the Public Prosecution Service (PPS). Such forensic reports are, however, prepared only in cases of very serious offending and were often not present for individuals who participated in collective violence. Second, police data were utilized for gathering information on psychological characteristics. The police may make references to psychological characteristics in the registration system BVH, which entails verbatim elaborations of interrogations and suspect and witness statements. BVH records of collective violence offenders therefore were consulted. Third, we consulted Dutch Probation Service data recorded in a recidivism risk assessment instrument (the RISc) - which has been used for suspects who are fifteen years and older since 2004 (Hildebrand & Bosker, 2011). To increase the validity of the data gathered, a coding list aimed to identify references to psychological characteristics was used. The presence of psychological characteristics was recorded only when, in the sources consulted, either the individuals included in the study themselves, their educators or professionals aware of the individual's personal circumstances a) mentioned that disorders had been diagnosed or there had been pronounced suspicions thereof without psychological examination, b) made references to the required use of specific medication or c) described a behavioral pattern indicative of the psychological characteristics this study focuses upon.

(3) Reactive violence sample (n=108)

Data on a subgroup of the crime and delinquency sample (n=108) were utilized for case study purposes. In addition to police registration data on their prior offending up to becoming involved in collective violence, BVH data up to that moment were utilized to record the presence of psychological characteristics.

(4) Mutually arranged confrontation sample (n=40) and reactive football-related collective violence sample (n=76)

Despite the regular occurrence of arranged confrontations, obtaining case files proved to be difficult due to an absence of criminal investigations. In the end, only two recent case files (2012 and 2015) concerning instances of collective violence that could be classified as mutually arranged

confrontations could be studied. A dataset consisting of individuals (n=40) who, as established by these two recent case files, had been involved in a mutually arranged confrontation were included in this sample. Available data concern involvement in delinquency and crime as apparent from police registration data about offending up to 2016. In addition, psychological characteristics data were obtained from police and Dutch Probation Service data. Suspects in the studied case files were compared to individuals who had been involved in collective violence in a non-arranged football-related setting with regard to their criminal career and psychological characteristics. Data were recorded in a way similar to the two former samples.

Next to these quantitative datasets, qualitative information was gathered. For the case study of a reactive collective violence incident 105 interviews with authorities, police officers and municipal workers (of which 94 face-to-face) were conducted, and written documentation and audio-visual materials of a collective violence incident in a recreational setting were analyzed. Findings were, where appropriate, complemented with the results of other studies conducted in response to this incident (Van Dijk et al., 2013; Van den Brink et al., 2013). To gain insight into mutually arranged confrontations, two recent case files were studied and additional face-to-face interviews with police representatives involved in both investigations were held. In addition, a questionnaire was sent out to international and Dutch police professionals (the latter working covertly and non-covertly) involved in football and safety. With several international and Dutch police professionals who responded, subsequent semi-structured interviews were held.

Aim and outline of the thesis

This introductory chapter described developments in the field of collective violence research and the theoretical stance to which this has led are described. By bringing together prior empirical work from a variety of disciplines, a potential common ground between the social identity perspective and the convergence explanations that scholars adhering to the first point of view so vividly dismiss was identified. This thesis' aim is to empirically substantiate this common ground by examining whether, and if so how and for whom, individual determinants of collective violence can be identified.

In chapter 2 of this thesis, the criminal career trajectories of 438 individuals who have been involved in collective violence are examined by using group-based models. The main aim of the study reported in this chapter is to provide a detailed description of the criminal careers of those involved in collective violence (onset, frequency, and diversity of offending), their developmental pathways in delinquency and crime, and the extent to which other violent offenses are committed.

In chapter 3, persistence in collective violence offending and behavioral and psychiatric characteristics of those involved are described and analyzed. This chapter, therefore, is centered on the question whether individual determinants of collective violence can be identified and, if so, which psychological characteristics are associated with collective violence offending.

A case study of the so-called 'Haren Facebook riot' in September 2012 is provided in chapter 4. This riot is analyzed by means of the initiation-escalation model. The questions this chapter aims to answer is how events escalated, what contextual and individual factors played a role and why the police were eventually attacked.

The notions of contextual and individual contributing factors are further elaborated in chapter 5, which focuses on mutually arranged confrontations between hooligan groups. To date, no empirical studies into this matter have been conducted. Chapter 5 aims to provide a detailed description about the significance of arranged confrontations to those who participate and to explore determinants of becoming involved in such fights.

The sixth and final chapter provides a summary of all findings and a discussion of their theoretical and practical implications.

02.
Jekyll or Hyde?
Examining the criminal careers of collective violence offenders

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*In the original article, instead of 'collective violence' the term 'public violence' was used. For the sake of readability and consistency, in this chapter the term collective violence is used.

Abstract

Since the 1970s theoretical and empirical work on collective violence has mainly focused on the context in which collective violence takes place, assuming that collective violence offenders are ordinary people acting in extraordinary circumstances. Recent studies however indicate that 'hooligans' share many characteristics with other violent offenders, which has (re)fueled the notion that individual propensity is important in explaining collective violence, and that collective violence offenders generally fit the small group of serious and persistent offenders identified by Moffitt. Based on Dutch police data on 438 individuals involved in collective violence, we examined the criminal careers of collective violence offenders leading up to the date of registration as a collective violence offender. Using group-based models, we distinguished three criminal career trajectories in our sample. Although we found many collective violence offenders had no criminal records whatsoever, we also found a small group of collective violence offenders who exhibited a high frequency of offending, displayed both solo and group violence, and acted violently across different settings. Our results leave us to take a middle ground in the context-propensity debate, because we argue that different categories of collective violence offenders may exist whose behaviour is triggered by different processes. Incorporating the notion of different types of collective violence offenders helps explain the seemingly contradictory findings of prior studies, and suggests new avenues for future research into the intra- and intergroup dynamics of collective violence.

Keywords: *Criminal careers, hooliganism, collective violence, violent crime*

Introduction

Large-scale collective violence incidents have been common throughout modern history. For example, think of the US riots in the 1960s (for example, Caplan and Paige, 1968), the mass demonstrations, strikes and riots in the UK at the end of the 1980s (Burns, 1992; Reicher, 1996; Walton and Ragin, 1990), confrontations between protesters and the police at international summits such as G8 and G20 meetings (Della Porta and Reiter, 2006; Ericson and Doyle, 1999; Herbert, 2007) and reoccurring disturbances between supporters of different football teams (Spaaij, 2006, 2008; Williams et al., 1986). Urban violence and escalated protest events may find grounds in felt injustices at, for instance, the economic, political or social level (Body-Gendrot, 2012; Reicher, 1996; Waddington and King, 2009). Consequently, these types of collective violence can be characterized as issue relevant. Crowd violence surrounding (sport) events on the other hand is considered, at least by outsiders, as issue irrelevant (Marx, 1970; Wann et al., 2001). Despite differences in the nature of collective violence, there are roughly two types of explanation for it (Reicher 1996; Waddington and King, 2005). First, there are theories that focus on the context in which collective violence occurs. Trigger events, group dynamics and (the emergence of) temporary deviant norms in crowds in particular have received scholarly attention (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Second, there are theories that focus on individual characteristics of collective violence offenders (hereafter propensity theories). Central to propensity theories is the notion that collective violence reflects the character of

those belonging to the crowd (LeBon, 1895; Taylor, 1984; Waddington, 2003). Taking the argument to the extreme, contextual theories hold that everyone is at equal risk of getting caught up on the spur of the moment and engaging in collective violence. In this sense, collective violence offenders resemble the famous Dr Jekyll, an ordinary person turning to crime and deviance only under very specific conditions (Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). In contrast, propensity theories view collective violence offenders much more as a Mr Hyde. According to these theories, collective violence offenders are not different from other (violent) offenders whose personal and background characteristics constantly put them at risk of frequent offending, both alone and in groups, and not only during adolescence – when delinquency is most common – but also in adulthood. Prevalence, incidence and duration of offending are key elements by which criminal career studies characterize persistent offenders (for example, Blumstein et al., 1986). Propensity theories therefore seem to suggest that collective violence offenders are at risk of developing persistent criminal careers.

Prior research mainly concerns the contextual perspective on collective violence (for example, Reicher et al., 2004, 2007; Waddington, 2007). However, groups of football supporters are known to prearrange confrontations with rival groups. Therefore, not every incident of collective violence seems to be the result of previous trigger events (Adang, 1988, 2011; Armstrong and Harris, 1991; Kerr and De Kock, 2002; Williams et al., 1986; Spaaij, 2008). Furthermore, many people abstain from collective violence even in the face of such trigger events despite evolving group dynamics and the emergence of temporary deviant norms (Adang and Van Ham, 2015). Consequently, the question of who becomes involved in collective violence and why remains in part unanswered when taking a contextual vantage point. Some studies however indicate that collective violence involvement and individual violent offending are explained by similar risk factors and show considerable overlap in their development over the life-course (for example, Farrington, 2006). Therefore, insights from a propensity perspective may fill the void left by contextual theories in explaining collective violence offending (also see Spaaij, 2014). Empirical research into the personal characteristics and criminal careers of collective violence offenders however is scarce, and as yet provides too narrow a foundation to support any general conclusions. The current study therefore aims to broaden knowledge about collective violence offending by examining the criminal careers of a sample of collective violence offenders using Dutch police data. Trajectory modelling is used to distinguish developmental pathways leading up to collective violence, and detailed incident data taken from police records are used to scrutinize the nature of and contexts in which (public) violence takes place.

Why do people engage in collective violence?

Propensity theories hold that collective violence is the outcome of the convergence of individuals who are predisposed towards creating 'disorder'. The 'riff raff' explanation of collective violence – which states that collective violence reflects the deviant or criminal minded character of those involved – is an illustrative example of this approach (for example, LeBon, 1895; Allport, 1924). From the 1960s onwards this point of view suffered heavy criticism. Critics have argued that propensity theories in general

and the 'riff raff' explanation in particular are reductionist approaches that ignore the social context in which people enter into collective conflict. Therefore, propensity theories are considered ill equipped to explain or predict individual behaviour (violent and non-violent) in social situations (McPhail, 1985, 1991; Smith, 1983; Turner, 1964; Reicher et al., 2004). Furthermore, reasoning that personality characteristics are a constant, it has been pointed out that propensity theories cannot explain why some events do not result in collective violence despite the presence of groups (for example, hooligans[2]) known for their frequent engagement in such behaviour (Waddington and King, 2005). Finally, in an influential review of empirical studies on the personal and background characteristics of collective violence offenders, Reicher (2001) concluded that no specific individual attributes (for example, being a migrant, educational level, social status) that reliably predict collective violence involvement can be identified. Thus, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, the view that collective violence offenders have normal social backgrounds has been dominant since the early 1980s. This in turn has resulted in a lack of further elaboration of propensity theory in the context of collective violence (also see Spaaij, 2014).

Yet the relationship between objective, structural conditions (for example, economic circumstances) and collective action is weak (Green et al., 1998; Tilly et al., 1975). Therefore, contextual theories have mainly focused on three subjective sociopsychological determinants of collective violence: perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and social identity. Perceived injustice relates to economically, politically or socially felt injustices, such as discrimination in education or job opportunities. Perceived efficacy considers collective violence to be the result of rational actions by groups that try to advance their goals and interests (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Social identity relates to the emergence of a 'shared social definition' within a crowd and is at the heart of explaining collective violence (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). The emergence of a shared social definition within a crowd results in an us-them perspective. This us-them perspective serves as a catalyst for collective action in which situation-specific norms guide the behaviour of groups and individuals (Drury and Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2005; Postmes and Spears, 1998; Reicher, 1984, 1987, 1996, 2001). People – including individuals who ordinarily do not resort to violence – thus may participate in collective violence when they feel that they are being treated unjustly, certain events confirm this belief and bring people together in a sense of shared outrage, and this leads to feelings of empowerment to strike back (for example, Hornsey et al., 2006; Reicher and Stott, 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). These findings connect with the notion that crowd events are typically intergroup encounters and consequently the position of any one party must be understood in relation to the ongoing intergroup dynamic (Drury and Reicher, 1999).

Contextual approaches, however, lack the inclusion of consistent data on the age (young) and gender (male) of collective violence offenders (for example, Adang and Van Ham, 2015; Caplan and Paige, 1968; Feagin, 1968; Roversi, 1991; Trivizas, 1980; Zani and Kirchler, 1991) and other individual attributes that have been found to correlate with violent offending and collective violence involvement (Farrington, 1994, 2006; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). In particular, contextual approaches have difficulty explaining why,

2 There are different definitions of the term 'hooliganism' (see Piquero et al., 2015). In this article, we will not dwell further on this discussion.

even in the face of specific circumstances conducive to collective violence, the majority of people abstain from collective violence. Adang and Van Ham (2015), for instance, note that, during a Project X event[3], a process of self-selection occurred amongst the youngsters present: those who felt uncomfortable with the changing atmosphere left, while others stayed out of curiosity. Only a minority (less than 10 percent) actually got involved in collective violence. Furthermore, relative to all individuals present in a football stadium or during a demonstration, it is always less than 1 percent acting violently (Adang, 2011).

The foregoing suggests that a more interactive understanding of the relationship between collective violence offenders' attributes and the contextual determinants of collective violence is needed, as has also been argued by Spaaij (2014). Although differences in riot behaviour have been addressed (for example, Adang, 1988, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011), differences between collective violence offenders generally have not (Newburn, 2015; Spaaij, 2014). A notable exception is the aforementioned case study of a Project X event by Adang and Van Ham (2015), in which these authors identify two types of collective violence offenders: incidental public order offenders and notorious troublemakers. Both types of collective violence offenders are argued to differ not only in the frequency with which they engage in collective violence but also in the extent to which contextual determinants and individual attributes influence their collective violence involvement. Thereby a position is taken between contextual theories stressing the specific conditions under which people get involved in collective violence, and propensity theories that emphasize the influence of individual characteristics.

Differentiating between different types of collective violence offenders connects with research that has studied collective violence offenders from a developmental life-course perspective in general and Moffitt's taxonomy (Moffitt, 1993, 1997) in particular (Farrington, 1994, 2006; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015). Within this taxonomy two distinct groups of (violent) offenders are identified: (1) offenders whose criminal career remains limited to adolescence (adolescence-limited offenders), and (2) offenders who persist in delinquency well into adulthood (life-course-persistent offenders). The delinquency of adolescence-limited offenders is mainly attributed to contextual circumstances. The continuing of delinquency into adulthood however is explained amongst other things, by individual determinants (for example, (neuro)psychological deficits).

Prior empirical work

Only a limited number of prior studies provide empirically based information on the criminal career of collective violence offenders, more specifically hooligans.[4] Based on self-report information, Lösel and

3 On 21 September 2012, thousands of young people responded to an invitation to a sweet 16 party erroneously posted publicly on Facebook. The term refers to the movie 'Project X', which had been released earlier that year, which deals with a birthday party getting out of hand. The movie inspired other events that resulted in public violence, for example in the US, France and Germany (Adang and Van Ham, 2015).

4 Marsh et al. (1978) also discuss the 'careers' of hooligans. However, these careers relate to the fan group within the overall fan base of a football club with which supporters (were) identified (for example, novices, hooligans). This classification of careers is based on an ethnographic approach that does not explicitly include criminal career characteristics (for example, age of onset, frequency of offending).

Bliesener (2003) compiled 33 detailed case reports of male football hooligans from different German cities that were part of the local hard-core hooligan scene. These males were contacted via social workers, special police units and others in close contact with the hooligan scene. The profile resulting from these interviews is very similar to that of Moffitt's persistent offender. First, 75 percent of the hard core hooligans interviewed reported behavioral problems already at an early age. Over 70 percent of those interviewed reported having engaged in multiple property offences, and 57 percent admitted to having committed multiple robberies. For over two-thirds, these crimes resulted in their having a criminal record for crimes unrelated to hooliganism. Many reported other forms of deviance as well, including alcohol and substance abuse, and one in four reported having lost their driver's license because of that. Apart from their criminal careers, these hard-core hooligans fitted the image of life-course persistent offenders in terms of personal and childhood risk factors. Over half came from a broken home, and nearly one in four had experienced domestic violence. The majority had been subjected to poor parenting, and one-third reported having an alcoholic father. Many could be categorized as aggressive and highly impulsive, and 72 percent showed a tendency towards antisocial personality disorder; 27 percent showed signs of psychopathy. The fact that at an average age of 29.4 years they were still active in the hard-core hooligan scene by itself signifies that, unlike the bulk of adolescent offenders, these individuals persisted in their deviant behaviour well into their adult years.

A second series of studies (Farrington, 1994, 2006; Piquero et al., 2015) used data from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development. Football hooligans in the Cambridge study were identified at age 18 based on (1) self-reported attendance at professional football matches and (2) involvement in at least one fight inside or outside football grounds in the three preceding years. Of the 238 males attending matches, 39 reported having been involved in fights, and 17 of them were apprehended by the police (226 persons of whom 34 reported having been involved in fights for the Piquero et al., 2015 study). The profile of hooligans resulting from these studies is also very similar to that of Moffitt's persistent offender. Farrington (1994) showed that hooligans were raised in large families with poor parental supervision and left school at an early age. They were also more likely to display impulsive and sexually promiscuous behaviour, to use drugs and to drink heavily. In 2006, Farrington provided evidence that hooligans were similar to violent offenders in terms of childhood, adolescence and adulthood risk factors. In their 2015 study, Piquero et al. found that males involved in hooliganism incurred more convictions up to age 56 compared with non-fighting counterparts, and were more likely to be found in chronic offending trajectories.

Furthermore, their findings supported the view that hooliganism and criminal offending over the life-course are well explained by the same early risk and other correlates. Results from the aforementioned studies connect with other – albeit scarce (see Newburn, 2015; Spaaij, 2014) – research on collective violence offenders' characteristics. Although studies do not address these issues for urban violence or escalated protest events, findings regarding hooliganism and events getting out of hand, for instance, imply that being impulsive or sensation-seeking or having ADHD contributes to

being involved in collective violence (Adang and Van Ham, 2015; Arms and Russell, 1997; Mustonen et al., 1996; Russell, 1995; Russell and Arms, 1995, 1998). Furthermore, some studies show that those involved in hooliganism repeatedly display aggressive and violent behaviour in other circumstances as well (Van den Brug, 1986; Van de Valk and Linckens, 1988; Ferwerda et al., 2010). Of notable relevance, however, is that most persons involved in collective violence have normal social backgrounds (Reicher, 2001) and only a minority of those involved have a criminal record or suffer from psychopathology (Adang and Van Ham, 2015).[5] Furthermore, studies show that collective violence offenders are generally male minors and adolescents (Adang and Van Ham, 2015; Caplan and Paige, 1968; Feagin, 1968; Roversi, 1991; Zani and Kirchler, 1991), rather than individuals who have continued with (violent) crime well into adulthood. All in all, prior empirical work thus not only supports contextual theory (i.e. that collective violence offenders have normal social backgrounds) but also supports propensity theory by suggesting a resemblance between collective violence offenders and life-course-persistent offenders. From a developmental life-course perspective then, the current empirical evidence seems to suggest that criminal career trajectories of collective violence offenders – and therewith the root causes of collective violence involvement – might diverge. Thus far, however, this perspective has not been put forward in the theoretical debate on the initiation and escalation of collective violence, and it is unclear whether and to what extent this may be of relevance.

Current Study

Hooligans in the Cambridge study were identified by reportedly being involved in a fight surrounding a football match between 15 and 18 years of age (15–17 years in the Piquero et al., 2015, study). No longitudinal information on hooliganism is available in these data. Therefore it remains unclear how hooliganism develops over the life-course in conjunction with other types of (violent) crime. Furthermore, although these studies gathered detailed data, owing to their limited sample size the extent to which their findings can be generalized remains unclear. Also, the Cambridge data pertain to those involved in hooliganism in the 1970s. To ascertain whether the nature of hooliganism and with it those involved in collective violence did or did not change, research on present-day samples is warranted. Finally, restricted by the available data, prior studies did not address the way collective violence develops with age and over the course of the individual's criminal career. The current study addresses these shortcomings by using longitudinal data on a large and contemporary sample of registered collective violence offenders. Extending previous studies, the current study has three aims: (1) to provide a detailed description of the criminal careers of those involved in collective violence in terms of the onset, frequency and diversity of their offending; (2) to explore their developmental pathways in delinquency and crime, and (3) to examine the extent to which other violent offences are committed.

5 Please note that these findings are based on a limited number of case studies. Without being clear whether these cases are representative, it is uncertain to what extent findings can be generalized.

Data and methods

Sample

Over the past few years, the Netherlands has faced several incidents of large-scale collective violence. Collective violence incidents that have attracted much attention and have been investigated by independent bodies concern two football matches in 2011[6] and a Project X event in September 2012. Given their excessive nature, these incidents were thoroughly investigated by the Dutch police and camera footage was made public to facilitate arrests. For these three incidents a total of 214 persons were arrested (hereafter, incident sample). In all three cases, police were confident the persons arrested formed an adequate representation of those responsible and/or involved in the violence. Case studies conducted by independent bodies concluded these incidents were not specifically related to salient social issues in Dutch society (Auditteam Voetbal and Veiligheid, 2012a, 2012b; Cohen Commission, 2013).

Furthermore, the Dutch National Football Intelligence Unit (CIV in Dutch) maintains a database of those frequently involved in hooliganism. To assess whether individuals are to be recorded in this database, the 'Focus on Hooligans' (Dutch: *Hooligans in Beeld*) approach is used. In short, this method aims to monitor and control football fans whose behaviour is considered problematic by means of targeted intelligence. Information on problematic fan groups and individual football fans associated with these groups is obtained from various data systems and concerns behaviour on match days as well as offences and disorderly behaviour at other times and locations (Spaaij, 2013). The information held by the police on problematic fan groups and the individuals associated with these groups is 'quite good' (Auditteam Voetbal and Veiligheid, 2013). In August 2012, the names of all 228 persons registered in the CIV database at that time were recorded (hereafter, CIV sample). Four people from the CIV sample had already been included in the incident sample as a result of their arrest during one of these incidents. Therefore, the sample for the current study consists of a total of 438 unique individuals.

Data

For this study, we used information about our sample population recorded in two separate police registration systems: HKS and BVH. The HKS system contains information on every suspect detained by the Dutch police and the indictable offences involved. Indictable offences that at a later stage result in an acquittal or discharge from further prosecution are, in principle, removed from the HKS, as are prosecutorial dismissals owing to illegally obtained evidence, unlawful use of force or being wrongly accused. Individuals who accept an out-of-court settlement remain in the HKS, as do prosecutorial waivers for policy reasons or technical reasons other than those already mentioned. Note that we use the term 'in principle' here, because the removal of acquittals and discharges from prosecution from the HKS has not always been carried out accurately. Though in use since 1986, the HKS is suitable for scientific research only since 1996 (Bijleveld, 2007). For the individuals in our sample we thus have retrospective HKS data on their criminal careers from the year they were included in the sample (either 2011 or 2012) back to 1996. Given that the minimum age of legal responsibility in the Netherlands is 12, for those aged 27–28 or under this age period

6 Feyenoord v. De Graafschap (17 September 2011) and FC Utrecht v. FC Twente (4 December 2011).

pertains to their entire officially registered criminal career. For those aged over 27–28 in 2011–12, however, registered information on the onset of offending may be lacking. For the purpose of this study, all offences recorded in the HKS were categorized as either *group violence* or *non-group violence*. Offences were categorized as group violence when they could be committed only in association. With only a few exceptions, all offences categorized as group violence concerned 'collective violence in association' (section 141 of the Dutch Penal Code).

The BVH system is the operational system of the Dutch police which contains information on all incidents that police officers were concerned with during their shift, including civilians involved either as suspects, victims or bystanders as identified by witnesses and police officers. Unlike the HKS system, which contains information only on the sections of the legal code under which suspected offenders were indicted, the BVH allows police officers to add a more detailed dvescription of the situation and the behaviours of those involved. For privacy reasons, however, the BVH records are accessible for a five-year period only. Therefore, BVH records for the CIV sample and those arrested for their involvement in the Project X disorder cover the period 2008–12. BVH records obtained from the other people in the incident sample concern the period 2007–11.[7]

Results

Collective violence offenders' main characteristics

Table 1 displays the number of collective violence offenders per age category. Most people in the incident sample were young adults aged 18-24, as were those included in the CIV sample. However, compared with people from the incident sample, the proportion of minors in the CIV sample was smaller (2 percent versus 24 percent) and the proportion of adults was bigger (57 percent versus 21 percent).

Table 1. Number of collective violence offenders per public order incident, by age category

Incident	Age category						Total	
	12-17		18-24		25+			
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Feyenoord v. De Graafschap	3	10	23	77	4	13	30	100
FC Utrecht v. FC Twente	18	24	31	41	27	36	76	100
Project X	30	28	65	61	13	12	108	100
Total incident	**51**	**24**	**119**	**56**	**44**	**21**	**214**	**100**
CIV sample	5	2	93	42	126	56	224	100
Total sample	**56**	**13**	**212**	**48**	**170**	**39**	**438**	**100**

Collective violence offenders' offending frequency

The persons included in the incident sample accounted for 262 records in the HKS. The persons included in the CIV sample had a total of 1568 HKS records. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the criminal records of collective violence offenders. For both the incident sample and the CIV sample this distribution is heavily skewed, with a relatively small group being responsible for a disproportionate share of all registered offences. The distribution is less skewed – yet far from negligible – for those included in the

7 Individuals registered in the HKS (indicted offenders) and the BVH (suspects) differ in legal status. However, for reasons of readability and to adhere to the criminal career terminology, we refer to individuals registered in the HKS or the BVH as 'offenders'

CIV database. This may reflect the fact that those included in the CIV sample are considered 'problematic' fans to begin with.

Figure 1. Skewness in the general offending of collective violence offenders



In order to assess whether the age of onset of offending influences offending frequency, the mean number of registered offences per life year was calculated.[8] Individuals offending before reaching the age of 18 on average had a higher offending rate than individuals whose first offence was registered at age 18 or over ($p < .01$).[9] This finding was replicated when the analysis was limited to individuals who had at least one registration for group violence either before or after reaching the age of 18 (see Table 2). These differences may to some extent be confounded by the age at time of selection, for which early- and late-onset offenders in our sample differ ($p < .01$). Additional analysis, however, indicates that this difference in mean age did not influence our results: for both young adults (18-24, $n = 137$) and adults (25+ older, $n = 144$) at the time of selection, overall offending frequency was higher for individuals who were under-age at the time of their first HKS-registered offence ($p < .01$).[10]

Table 2. The relationship between age of onset, type of registered offense and overall offending frequency

	Age of onset <18			Age of onset >17		
	Overall offending frequency per life year	n	Mean age	Overall offending frequency per life year	n	Mean age
Overall offending	0.71	158	24.7	0.32	128	27.3
Group violence	0.24	79	24.1	0.16	128	28.4

8 Because a person can be registered in the HKS only from the age of 12, the previous 11 years were not used in calculating mean scores.

9 The HKS is suitable for scientific research only since 1996 (Bijleveld, 2007). Results, however, were significant as well when those born before 1984 were left out of the analyses (available upon request).

10 For minors ages between 12 and 17 ($n = 5$) at the time of selection, this analysis is not possible.

Criminal career trajectories of collective violence offenders

To explore whether distinct criminal career patterns leading up to collective violence could be distinguished in our data, we used Nagin's (2005) semi-parametric group-based model, with the number of registered offences in HKS in a given year as the dependent variable.[11] Unlike growth-curve models, group-based models do not model individual development as diversions from the overall group mean. Rather, both the level and the shape of the developmental curve are allowed to vary across a preset number of groups. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (higher values indicating better model fit), average posterior group probabilities (values above .7 indicating good model fit) and the odds of correct classification (values above 5 indicating good model fit) can be used to determine the optimal number of groups (Nagin, 2005: 75). To account for the fact that, even for frequent offenders, registered offences are relatively rare events, we fitted zero-inflated Poisson models so as to allow subjects to have short periods of non-offending without this resulting in disjunct changes in the modelled rate of offending (Bushway et al., 2003).

A total of 152 individuals were not registered in the HKS at the time of selection (also see Figure 1). They were excluded from trajectory modelling and were categorized as trajectory '0' Consequently, trajectory modelling was applied for the 286 remaining individuals. This resulted in the identification of two additional criminal career trajectories.[12] The mean age of onset and the frequency of offending characteristics for both trajectories are displayed in Table 3. From this table it can be derived that a minority of 57 people have been categorized in a separate criminal career trajectory (trajectory '2'). They differed significantly ($p < .01$) in mean age of onset of offending (earlier) and in frequency of offending (higher) compared with the 229 individuals categorized in trajectory '1'.

Table 3. Main characteristics of distinct criminal careers of collective violence offenders

	Trajectory 0 34.7 percent (*n*=152)	Trajectory 1 52.3 percent (*n*=229)	Trajectory 2 13.0 percent (*n*=57)
Mean age of onset	N/A	18.1	15.1
Frequency of offending			
Mean (SD)	N/A	4.0 (3.1)	16.2 (11.2)
Median	N/A	3.0	14.0
Mode	N/A	2	9[a]

a. Multiple modes exist – the smallest value is shown; the higher value is 12.

As noted in the method section of the article, the BVH system allows police officers to add more detailed descriptions of incidents and those involved as either a suspect, victim or bystander. We will further detail differences between the trajectories identified on the basis of these BVH records.

The extent of violent behaviour over the previous five years

In the five-year period prior to the sampling year, the 438 offenders in our sample generated 6878 BVH records. These records were screened to verify whether the record pertained to a particular offence. Screening resulted in the exclusion of 4715 records that were general in nature and/

11 The BVH records are accessible for a five-year period only. Therefore, BVH records are of no use for trajectory modelling.

12 BIC = –3201.71 (n = 4387), average fit = .967, OCC = 51.91.

or did not relate to any particular offence (for example, reports about the course of football matches, monitoring and surveillance, reports of nuisance). The remaining 2163 records were screened for violent offences for which the sampled individual was considered a 'suspect' in the broad sense of the term. This resulted in selecting 1174 violent incidents for further analysis. Table 4 presents the number of violent offenders and number of violent offences per criminal career trajectory. With respectively 82 and 98 percent, individuals categorized in criminal career trajectories '1' and '2' were registered relatively more often in the BVH for a violent incident over the previous five years than those in trajectory '0'. Furthermore, the mean, mode and median of violent offences generally supported the conclusions drawn on the basis of HKS data, more specifically a heavily skewed distribution of (in this case violent) offending.

Table 4. Main characteristics of distinct criminal careers of collective violence offenders

Criminal career trajectory	Number of violent offenders in the BVH (percent of offenders in this trajectory)	Number of violent offenses in the BVH		
		Mean (SD)	Mode	Median
0	72 (47.4%)	1.1 (1.7)	0	0
1	188 (82.1%)	2.7 (2.5)	1	2
2	56 (98.2%)	7.1 (4.6)	9	6
Total	316	2.7 (3.3)	0	1

The 1174 violent incidents registered in the BVH concerned 298 cases of violence against objects and 876 aimed at persons. Analysis indicated that, of the individuals belonging to trajectory '0', about one-third (30 percent) had been involved in person-oriented aggression.[13] With a prevalence of respectively 75 percent and 95 percent, person-oriented aggression was more common for individuals belonging to criminal career trajectories '1' and '2'. For person-oriented aggression it was determined whether the violent act was verbal (for example, insulting, threatening) or physical (for example, hitting, kicking, assaulting) in nature.

Table 5. Number of violent offenses in the BVH against objects and persons, by criminal career trajectory (mean per registered offender in parentheses)

Criminal career trajectory	Objects	Persons		Total
		Verbal	Physical	
0 (n=72)	73 (1.0)	1.1 (1.7)	60 (0.8)	159 (2.2)
1 (n=188)	132 (0.7)	2.7 (2.5)	367 (2.0)	608 (3.2)
2 (n=56)	93 (1.7)	7.1 (4.6)	201 (3.6)	407 (7.3)
Total (n=316)	298 (0.9)	2.7 (3.3)	628 (2.0)	1174 (3.7)

Per criminal career trajectory, Table 5 displays the total and mean number of violent offences against objects and persons, distinguishing between verbal and physical violence for the latter. The distribution of violent offences is skewed for collective violence offenders belonging to trajectory '2', who comprise 18 percent (56/316) of the sample registered in BVH but are responsible for about one-third of object-oriented aggression (31 percent), about half of verbal person-oriented aggression (46 percent) and about one-third of physical person-oriented aggression (32 percent).[14]

13 Because these incidents did not result in the individual being arrested (and consequently having a record in the HKS), the seriousness of these offences may be debatable.

14 Mean scores based on individuals who have been registered in the BVH for a violent incident. Including individuals who have not been registered in the BVH for a violent incident results in even more pronounced differences. The same is true for the results displayed in Table 6.

Subsequent analysis indicates that collective violence offenders categorized in trajectory '2' on average commit significantly more ($p < .01$) violent offences, whether object or person oriented, than do other collective violence offenders.

Incidents that, as became evident from the incident description in the BVH data, involved more than one perpetrator and/or whose development was influenced by the perpetrators' peer group (for example, encouraging or spurring on) were categorized as group violence. Incidents that involved one perpetrator and lacked peer or group influences were categorized as individual violence. In total, the BVH contained 372 cases of individual violence.

Table 6. Number of violent offenses in the BVH against objects and persons, by criminal career trajectory (mean per registered offender in parentheses)

Criminal career trajectory	Incidents of individual violent offending	Violent incidents in a private setting
0 (n=72)	48 (0.7)	21 (0.3)
1 (n=188)	163 (0.9)	68 (0.4)
2 (n=56)	161 (2.9)	59 (1.1)
Total (n=316)	372 (1.2)	148 (0.5)

Table 6 displays the number of individually committed violent offences per criminal career trajectory. As before, the distribution of individual violence offences is skewed: collective violence offenders belonging to trajectory '2', who comprise 18 percent of the sample, are responsible for 43 percent of all individual violence incidents. Furthermore, collective violence offenders categorized in trajectory '2' more often (70 percent) have committed at least one act of individual violence compared with collective violence offenders in trajectories '0' (18 percent) and '1' (36 percent). Additional analyses showed that individuals belonging to criminal career trajectory '2' were significantly ($p < .01$) more often involved in individual violent offending than were other collective violence offenders.

The settings in which violent offending occurred were also categorized, either as (semi)public or private. Private violence pertained almost exclusively to domestic violence against a (former) spouse, but also to some incidents of violent offending at work. Violence that was committed on the streets, while going out, during events or around football matches was categorized as violence in a (semi)public setting.[15] In total, the BVH contained 148 cases of private violence. The distribution of private violence is skewed for collective violence offenders belonging to trajectory '2', who comprise 18 percent of the sample but are responsible for 40 percent of all private violence incidents. Furthermore, the prevalence of private violence was higher for collective violence offenders categorized in trajectory '2' (44 percent) compared with collective violence offenders in trajectories '0' (10 percent) and '1' (15 percent). Additional analyses showed that individuals belonging to criminal career trajectory '2' were significantly ($p < .01$) more often involved in private violent offending than were other collective violence offenders.

15 However, when the victim was the (former) spouse of the assailant, the incident was categorized as private violence.

Results

The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate on the initiation and escalation of collective violence, which concerns the relative contribution of individual and contextual determinants. Given that there are almost no current points of reference that include individual determinants, despite compelling arguments to do so (see Spaaij, 2014), we have done this by building on recent research conducted from a developmental life course perspective. The results of these prior studies indicate amongst other things that those involved in hooliganism, a specific form of collective violence, resemble Moffitt's life-course-persistent offender, and that specific individual attributes of those involved can be identified (Piquero et al., 2015). This, however, contradicts findings of studies indicating that many of those involved in collective violence come from unproblematic social backgrounds and that only a few show signs of psychopathology (Adang and Van Ham, 2015; Reicher, 2001).

Our analyses show that the age of onset of overall and group violence offending predicts overall offending frequency. Together with the age-collective violence offending distribution in our sample, this addresses a potential bias that was introduced in other studies either by including only those who reported being involved in collective violence between the ages of 15 and 17 (Piquero et al., 2015) or by including only individuals who have persisted in deviant behaviour well into their adult years (Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). Indeed, different criminal career trajectories of collective violence offenders can be identified, with only a minority of all collective violence offenders offending frequently from an early age – individually and in groups – in a variety of situations (including domestic violence).

However, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of our data. Individuals are registered in the HKS when they have been detained by the Dutch police. Although self-reported and registered crimes often show a fairly similar pattern (Farrington et al., 2003), the chances of being apprehended are low. First, victims and witnesses may not recognize crimes as such and thus leave them unreported to the police. Furthermore, registration of a particular (type of) crime and subsequent arrest are dependent on the investigation policy of the police and the prosecution policy of the Public Prosecution Service. In other words, before the police record a crime and an arrest is made a number of filters have already been passed through (Wittebrood and Junger, 2002). Reliance on official data therefore is likely to underestimate the actual criminal behaviour of those in the sample. More problematic is that we have no way of knowing whether this bias is similar across groups. For instance, it could be argued that individuals who are already known to the police are more likely to be identified (that is, arrested), thus reducing the gap between actual and registered offending, but only for those with already extensive criminal careers (Ball and Drury, 2012). On the other hand, it can be argued that 'experienced' collective violence offenders are better at evading arrest (for example, by concealing their face or taking into account the position of CCTV). To (partly) address these issues, collective violence incidents where the police arrested every suspect they wanted to detain on the basis of camera footage (which is not selective) were included in the study. Furthermore, we used not only HKS data but also data from incidents registered in the BVH. Using BVH data diminishes the chance of bias because all incidents that police officers are concerned with

during their shifts are registered, and non-arrested persons who have been involved in the incident are also recorded.

Conclusion

Thus far, two opposing theoretical perspectives have been used to explain collective violence. These theoretical perspectives differ in the explanatory power assigned to contextual and predispositional influences. Research has mainly been conducted from a contextual perspective, leaving the subject of predispositions largely untouched. Consequently, an interactive approach to explain collective violence is missing.

Our results suggest that there is a minority group of collective violence offenders who, from an early age, frequently offend well into adulthood. Their violent behaviour is not limited to football matches, but extends to other (semi-)public and private settings and is committed both in groups and alone. Their criminal career characteristics and the frequency and seriousness of their violent offending are in sharp contrast with those of other collective violence offenders, many of whom have no or only marginal prior criminal records up to their involvement in collective violence. The findings of this study therefore are supportive of a Moffitt-like typology of collective violence offenders, connecting with the notion that a one size fits all approach does not suffice to explain and tackle criminal behaviour (Lambie and Seymour, 2006).

Although differences in criminal career characteristics and violent offending between collective violence offenders in themselves are insufficient to explain collective violence, our findings suggests that a developmental life-course perspective could be fruitfully employed to contribute to our understanding. The developmental life-course perspective in general and Moffitt's taxonomy in particular suggest that individual risk factors mainly predict those fitting a life-course-persistent criminal trajectory, whereas contextual aspects are of specific relevance for adolescence-limited offenders. From such a perspective, the historical idea of the 'riff raff' approach may be broadened by assessing the predictive value of attributes that are associated with general violent behaviour (for example, impulsivity, hyperactivity) to explain collective violence as well – at least for a certain group of offenders. This connects with the recent notion that underscores the relevance of context, intergroup interaction and intergroup relationships in the initiation of public disorder but also stresses variations in the willingness of individuals to become involved in violence (Adang, 1988, 2011; Adang and Van Ham, 2015).

Our findings offer additional empirical data for the point of view that the contextual and predispositional perspectives are not mutually exclusive (also see Spaaij, 2014). Future research needs to address the feasibility of an offender typology to further empirically support the notion of such an interactive approach. To what extent are theoretically relevant individual characteristics associated with distinct collective violence offenders' criminal trajectories? Although determining these trajectories in hindsight is informative, a true test of any offender typology would also need to involve prediction. A recidivism study within the current sample group of known offenders could be employed to test the predictive value of collective violence offenders' predispositions for various criminal career features

to shed further light on the influence of individual attributes on repeat collective violence offending. Such studies not only have the potential to further shape collective violence theory, but may also provide input for future crowd management policies and situational preventive measures as well as a person-oriented approach targeting persistent collective violence offenders.

03.

Determinants of persistence in collective violence offending

Criminal career characteristics and individual traits

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Abstract

This study explores individual characteristics linked to an increased risk of persistence in collective violence. A sample of collective violence offenders (n=438) was identified based on individuals' involvement in a collective violence incident in 2011/2012 or due to them being recorded in a police database of 'known' football hooligans. For the current analyses, persistence was defined as recidivism to collective violence assessed over a 4 to 5 year time span. Criminal career data were obtained from the police (register data). Individual characteristics concerned criminal career measures, behavioral indicators of personality traits and childhood problematic behavior. Due to a lack of other available data sources, behavioral indicator data were largely obtained from police and probation service information. The results of this study indicate that offender characteristics can be linked to persistence in collective violence. Results contrast currently dominant theoretical perspectives on the etiology of collective violence. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Keywords: *collective violence, persistence, offender typology, personality traits*

Introduction

Mass public disturbances are characterized by the involvement of large numbers of people acting violently against other individuals and/or destroying or damaging property. Recent instances of mass public disturbances include confrontations between authorities and protesters in Ferguson (USA, 2014) and Hamburg (Germany, 2017), between left- and right-wing activists in Charlottesville (USA, 2017), and numerous confrontations between authorities and football supporters around the EURO2016 tournament (France, 2016). Group violence around demonstrations, protests, football matches and other recreational events generally is referred to as collective violence (Adang, 2011). The provided phenomena suggest that collective violence may be defined as a violent form of collective action, to which large numbers of people may resort in response to a common stimulus (also see Reicher, 2001). However, around the EURO2016 tournament hooligan sides[16] were also engaged in mutually arranged confrontations, which involved mutual consultation between the parties involved. In this article we use the term collective violence to denote participation in hooliganism, riots and/or (arranged) group fights.

In the aftermath of incidents of collective violence, the question how and why 'things went wrong' is often posed. In efforts to provide an answer to this question, some scholars point towards the context in which the collective violence emerged, whereas others emphasize the personal characteristics of those involved. These contrasting views reflect an on-going theoretical debate on the causes of collective violence. Already in the early 1900's, it was assumed that either people lose themselves entirely in a crowd, their behavior then becoming uncontrolled, unfocused and irrational, or that the violent behavior of crowds reflects the pre-existing tendencies of those belonging to it. This is a line of reasoning known as convergence theory. Both points of view were used as justifications to treat crowds as criminal (Reicher, 2001). From the 1960's onwards these 'classic' perspectives were increasingly challenged. Studies suggested that

16 There are various definitions of the term 'hooliganism' (see Piquero, Jennings and Farrington, 2015). In this article, we will not dwell further on this discussion.

collective violence largely is the outcome of rational behavior within a certain context, with crowd violence usually aimed at and being limited to the party held responsible for a certain course of events (Caplan and Paige, 1968; Reicher, 1984, 1987). Furthermore, studies challenged the notion that crowds in itself are deviant or criminal-minded (for an overview see Reicher, 2001). Consequently, a group-dynamic approach to collective violence was developed to explain how crowd unity can be quickly achieved in changing circumstances and to explain why large numbers of people, despite the absence of an affiliation to violent groups or any prior criminal history, may come to participate in collective violence (Reicher, 1984, 1987; Turner and Kilian, 1987).

This group-dynamic approach eventually resulted in the development of the social identity model (SIM) of crowd behavior (Reicher, 1996). Social identity refers to an individual's self-understanding as a member of a group and ensures that in an associated context an individual thinks, feels and behaves in accordance with the group he/she identifies with (salient identity). The SIM pertains that in crowds individual behavior is guided by the activated social identity, therewith presuming a shift from an individual to a categorical basis of behavioral control. Convergence theories emphasizing personal characteristics are, as a matter of principle, rejected by the SIM (Reicher, 2001). Still, research finds that individuals differ in the social categories they identify, over the content of these categorical stereotypes and in their perception of who is prototypical of the groups identified (Herrera and Reicher, 1998; Reicher and Hopkins, 1996a,b; Reicher and Sani, 1998; Sani and Reicher, 1998, 1999). Furthermore, offensive action tendencies in crowds have been linked to the experiencing of anger i.e. an individual's evaluation of the context (Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). This suggests that, despite renunciation by the SIM, individual characteristics linked to social information processing may render some individuals more susceptible than others for participating in collective violence.

Linking individual action in crowds to both social and individual-level processes may offer a possibility to bridge the theoretical gap between the SIM and convergence explanations for collective violence, and provide a more detailed account of who are most likely to engage in future collective violence. Until now, given the intellectual dominance of the SIM, whether and to what extent individual characteristics predict participation in collective violence has not been adequately addressed (Spaaij, 2014; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). Therefore, in this study we examine the personal characteristics of known collective violence offenders up to the moment of involvement in collective violence and the extent to which these characteristics predict persistence in collective violence offending. For this purpose we gathered longitudinal data on a sample of 438 Dutch collective violence offenders. offenders.

Theories of collective violence

As research provided more and more evidence that collective violence was not uncontrolled, unfocused and irrational, classic theories of crowd behavior stressing these issues gradually lost their credibility. Currently dominant theories on collective violence instead emphasize the context in

which collective violence occurs - with social identity being central to this point of view (Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears, 2008). From a social identity perspective, trigger events and intergroup dynamics are assumed to facilitate (spontaneous) group forming and the emerging of antagonistic relationships between groups. Individuals involved in collective violence indeed often describe their relationships with others on a categorical, ingroup-outgroup level (Reicher, 2001). Furthermore, individual behavior in crowds tends to remain within the boundaries defined as appropriate by the social identity of the group with which individuals identify, and only the behavior of those who are seen as belonging to the same group is followed (Drury and Reicher, 1999, 2000; Reicher, 1996). By implying a causal relation between shifting from a personal identity to a social identity and violent behavior, the social identity perspective suggests that any person, regardless of individual characteristics, may get involved in collective violence given the 'right' circumstances (Reicher, 2001).

Convergence theory however, still has its supporters (Ball and Drury, 2012). This in particular seems a consequence of the so-called specificity problem: The SIM does not account for the observation that, even in the face of trigger events and intergroup dynamics gravitating towards collective violence, a large majority (>90%) of individuals tends to leave the scene at the moment or just prior to the moment of violence occurring, or merely observes how the course of violent events unfolds, without themselves actively participating in any violent behavior (Adang, 2011). Individual differences in behavior within groups during collective violence incidents suggest that, in addition to group level triggers and processes, personal characteristics may have explanatory value with regard to individuals' participation in collective violence.

Violent behavior, both in groups and alone, has been linked to social information processing and the experiencing of anger (Crick and Dodge, 1994; Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Prior studies indicated that antisocial features, especially a tendency to interpret others' intent as hostile, heightened impulsivity, emotion-regulation deficits and attention/hyperactivity features are linked to aggressive responses disproportionate to the actual situation (Bailey and Ostrov, 2008; Schönenberg et al., 2013; Coccaro, Bergeman, and McClearn, 1993; Fetich et al., 2014; Owen, 2011; Retz and Rösler, 2010). In addition, sensation-seeking behavior was found to increase the likelihood of participating in collective violence (Mustonen, Arms and Russell, 1996). Convergence theory is further supported by studies which find that perpetual engagement in collective violence is linked to personal characteristics like ADHD and ASPD, and a history of prior offending and violent behavior (Farrington, 1994; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015). At the same time however, many collective violence offenders have no criminal history up to their involvement in collective violence (Reicher, 2001).

Rather than the general approach that characterizes both SIM and convergence theory stressing personal characteristics, an approach seems needed to accommodate both theoretical contradictions and contrasting empirical results. The problem behavior theory offers an approach capable of doing so. This theory explains problem behavior – behavior that may result in sanctions or other formal social responses, such as participating

in collective violence – as an outcome of person-environment interaction (Jessor and Jessor, 1977). More specifically, this theory suggests that personality characteristics, social environmental factors, and involvement with conventional values or institutions all contribute to the likelihood of engaging in problem behavior (Jessor, 1991). This perspective suggests, then, that on the individual level values, expectations, beliefs and attitudes may contribute to participating in collective violence, while at the same time social environmental factors – such as high peer approval, the presence of peer models and high peer influence – may contribute. This fits observations of Adang (2011) who stresses variations in individual willingness to participate in collective violence while also underlining the relevance of group-dynamics.

In addition, the divergent criminal histories of individuals involved in collective violence as apparent from prior empirical work (Farrington, 1994; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015; Reicher, 2001) suggest that a typological approach may accommodate theoretical contradictions and contrasting empirical results. Moffitt's (1993, 1997) dual taxonomy provides the archetypical example of such a typological approach.[17] Central to the dual taxonomy is a distinction in the root causes of offending between offender types. Individual neurobiologically based determinants are deemed particularly relevant for those frequently and persistently involved in crime from a young age onward (life course persistent offenders), whereas the criminal behavior of those who engage in crime only temporarily (adolescence-limited offenders) is thought to be governed predominantly by contextual clues (Moffitt, 1993, 1997). Similarly distinguishing collective violence offenders that only sporadically get involved in collective violence from those repeatedly getting involved in collective violence, may help to reconcile theoretical and empirical inconsistencies in extant collective violence research.

Offender typologies and prior empirical findings

The exact merit of a typological approach to collective violence offenders thus far remains unclear. The few available studies into the criminal careers of collective violence offenders however, seem supportive of a Moffitt-like typology. For instance, Van Ham et al. (2016) found that while most collective violence offenders had no or only marginal criminal records, a small group of collective violence offenders displayed a high frequency of both solo and collective violence offending from an early age onward. Studies utilizing data from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development additionally suggested that individuals involved in football-related fights are more likely to be found in chronic offending trajectories (Piquero et al., 2015), to display impulsive behavior, to use alcohol and drugs heavily, to drop out of school at an early age and to be raised in families with poor parental supervision (Farrington, 2006). These results are consistent with those of a study of 33 adult male hooligans from Germany who reported problem behavior as a child, problems with anger management and impulse control, and to be suffering from psychopathology associated with violent behavior (Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). Prior cross-sectional studies linking personal characteristics to the self-reported likeliness of participating in collective violence largely confirm these results (Arms and Russell, 1997; Russell, 1995;

17 **Although studies have identified more offending trajectories, the heart of this line of thought remains undisputed (see Moffitt, 2007).**

Russell and Arms, 1995, 1998). Finally, these findings connect to systematic observations which show important between-individual variation in the willingness to participate in collective violence (Adang, 2011).

Taken together the violent behavior of different types of collective violence offenders may be triggered by different constellations of contextual and individual determinants. Thus far, a typological approach has been sparsely considered in the scientific debate about the contributing factors of collective violence involvement. The current study aims to contribute to knowledge on this matter.

Current study

Prior longitudinal studies on collective violence offenders have several shortcomings. First, samples have been relatively small – i.e. less than forty (Farrington, 1994, 2006; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015) – precluding any meaningful distinction between offender types. Second, prior samples seem to be biased towards persistent offenders. Lösel and Bliesener (2003) for instance studied individuals who at age 30 were still considered hard-core hooligans. Others only included individuals who self-reportedly had been in a group fight already as a minor (Farrington, 1994, 2006; Piquero et al., 2015). Both persistence in offending in adulthood and early onset of offending are characteristics of the life course persistent pathway (Moffitt, 1993, 1997). Third, prior cross-sectional research (Russel, 1995; Russell and Arms, 1995) focused upon hypothetical involvement in collective violence by administering questionnaires around sport matches. As these studies also did not apply a vignette design, contextual influences were not taken into consideration. Finally, results of the before mentioned Van Ham et al. (2016) study, using a sample of collective violence offenders that compared to previous studies was less biased towards persistent offenders, indicated that various types of collective violence offenders can be distinguished based on the level and shape of their criminal trajectories. However, their study did not provide further information on the possible etiology of these offender typologies.

The current study aims to address the aforementioned shortcomings and to extend the findings of earlier research by studying personality traits, criminal career history and recidivism over a 4- to 5-year period (as a measure of persistence) of a current, representative, and, compared to prior studies, large sample of 438 known collective violence offenders. The questions around which this article is centered are whether individual characteristics associated with collective violence involvement can be identified and, if so, to what extent these characteristics can be linked to persistence in collective violence.

Methods

Sample

The 438 individuals included in the current sample were either (a) arrested for their involvement in at least one of two specific football-related collective violence incidents in 2011, (b) arrested during riots around a recreational event in 2012, or, (c) were registered in 2012 in a database maintained by the Dutch Police due to their frequent involvement in football hooliganism in general. Individuals' criminal history from age 12

up to 2017 was assessed by means of retrieving data from the HKS (Dutch: *Herkenningsdienstsysteem*) police system. The HKS contains information on every suspect arrested by the Dutch police and the indictable offences involved. Acquittals or discharges from further prosecution are removed, as are prosecutorial dismissals due to illegally obtained evidence, unlawful use of force or being wrongly accused. Since January 1st 2016 the HKS police system has been replaced by the BVI/BOSZ-system. Information registered in the HKS from 1 January 2010 was migrated to the BVI/BOSZ-system, which therefore also was consulted. The minimum age of legal responsibility in the Netherlands is 12. The HKS is only suitable for research since 1996 (Bijleveld, 2007). Consequently, although data about their juvenile criminal career were retrieved, these data might be incomplete for individuals aged 33 or over in 2017 (n=101 in our sample).

Recidivism

The moment of being involved in a collective violence incident or being registered due to frequent involvement in hooliganism (in respectively 2011 or 2012) was labeled as the index date. For all individuals in our sample the age at the index date was recorded. In order to be able to assess the extent and type of recidivism (general, special, specific), all indictable offenses were categorized as non-violence (e.g. theft, burglary), violence offending (e.g. assault, aggravated assault) or collective violence offending. General recidivism was defined as being registered for any indictable offense after the index date, while special recidivism was defined as being registered for a violence offense after the index date. Finally, reregistration for participation in collective violence was regarded as specific recidivism.

For each type of crime identified in the current study, the following variables were created: 1) the total number of crime registrations before the index date, 2) age of officially registered onset of offending, 3) type of crime at age of onset, 4) time span between index date and first instance of re-offending, and 5) the total number of criminal registrations since the index date. Furthermore, when the individual had a history of violent offenses, a dichotomous variable was created indicating the number of settings (i.e. private – in a home; semi-public – in a bar or club; public – on the street) in which violence was resorted to (one setting versus multiple settings). To this end, the Dutch National Police registration system BVH (Dutch: *Basisvoorziening Handhaving*), in which police officers can provide a detailed description of events, was consulted. Due to data retention and privacy limitations however, the latter data only concerned a time span of five years up to the index date, thus starting from 2007/2008.

Behavioral indicators of psychological traits

Privacy legislation prevented us from approaching sampled individuals in person with a request to participate in scientific research. In the absence of self-report, alternatives for gathering psychological data in the present setting had been limited. Institutions offering psychological care for instance are bound by privacy legislation concerning the nondisclosure of privacy-sensitive information. Furthermore, data available from Statistics Netherlands are limited due to the specific time frames to which these data relate and the aggregate level on which data could be disclosed. Confronted

with these limitations, we resorted to the available police, Probation Service and forensic psychological data.

Only for 15 individuals in our sample forensic psychological reports prepared by the Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP) were available. In addition, for 113 individuals we obtained data from the Probation Service. The latter concerned information taken from a recidivism risk assessment instrument called the RISc (n=66), or a shortened version thereof (n=47) (see Hildebrand and Bosker, 2011). For the entire sample we also consulted the police registration system BVH. The BVH system allows police officers to add detailed descriptions of the behaviors and characteristics of those involved in the incident reported upon, and includes verbatim elaborations of interrogations and individual statements. An implication of the various sources consulted is that data gathered on psychological traits either reflect diagnoses by validated instruments (NIFP), information about diagnoses based on conducted anamneses (NIFP and Probation Service) or information indicative of psychological and behavioral characteristics that, as far as can be derived, are not ascertained by psychological tests but rely on the disclosing of information by individuals themselves, by their family or by professionals well aware of the individual's personal situation (BVH). As the available data do not allow for a reliable assessment of psychiatric disorders, the current study is concerned with behavioral indicators reflecting individuals' psychological traits.

Particularly traits associated with violent behavior – such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), emotion regulation deficits, heightened impulsivity, sensation-seeking behavior and antisocial tendencies – have been implicated in participating in collective violence (Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015; Russel, 2004). Therefore, the psychological traits we focused upon are: 1) antisocial features, 2) attention/hyperactivity features, 3) heightened impulsivity, 4) emotion-regulation deficits and 5) sensation seeking features. For each of these five behavioral indicators, a dichotomous variable was constructed indicating whether that behavioral indicator was present in the individuals' documentation or not. Presence of attention/hyperactivity features was scored when in the consulted sources specific references were made to Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) because of earlier diagnosis or pronounced suspicions without psychological examination, or when references were made to the non-recreational, required use of prescription drugs (methylphenidate). The presence of antisocial features was scored when specific references were found to Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) because of earlier diagnosis. Aggression regulation deficits were scored when sampled individuals were reported to have followed an aggression control training, when they were reported to suffer from frequent tantrums, or when they were said to have an explosive or angered character. References to often acting impulsively, needing to learn to 'count to ten', or to act before thinking (especially in stressful situations) were considered indicative of heightened impulsivity. The presence of sensation-seeking behavior was scored when sampled individuals were described in the sources consulted as showing an increased need for excitement, looking for exciting situations, or getting a kick out of or loving exciting situations.

Because the behavioral indicators assessed may have manifested themselves already in childhood (Moffitt, 1993, 1997), problematic childhood behaviors at home and at school were also assessed by a number of dichotomous variables. Indicative of problematic childhood behavior at home were aggressive behavior against family members and having been placed out of the family home. Likewise, problematic childhood behavior at school was considered present in case of aggressive behavior against peers or teachers, when attending special education – which consists of specialized or intensive supervision due to disability, chronic illnesses or psychological disorders – or in case of frequent truancy.

In order to prevent coding bias, behavioral indicators and problematic childhood behaviors were scored prior to analysis, thus without detailed knowledge of either the individuals' criminal histories or the nature and extent of their recidivism after the index date.

Analysis

The current study used survival models to analyze the time in days until the first subsequent general, violence or collective violence offense following the index offense. Unlike linear regression models, survival models can handle censored data, that is cases in which the exact time to the first subsequent offense is unknown due to limitation of the follow-up period (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2008). Survival models control for censoring by decomposing the dependent variable into two parts: The time to event, and the event status – whether the event of interest occurred or not. Two time-dependent functions were estimated: The survival function representing the likelihood of survival – that is not experiencing the event of interest – and the hazard function representing the likelihood of the event occurring conditional on having survived up to that time. Here we estimated non-parametric Kaplan Meier models (Kaplan & Meier, 1958) in order to graph overall survival in our data and univariately compare subgroups in our data. In order to conduct the multivariate analyses, Cox proportional hazard models (Cox, 1972) were applied. For the Cox proportional hazard models we present only the results of the final model, which used the forward stepwise procedure to trim the model of non-significant variables.

Results

Distribution of behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior

Table 1 displays the presence of each of the behavioral indicators and measures of childhood problematic behavior in our sample of collective violence offenders. The figures displayed in Table 1 indicate that attention-deficit/hyperactivity features (13%), heightened impulsivity (13%), aggression regulation deficits (18%) and increased need for excitement (10%) were present in a significant part of our sample. Furthermore, a significant part (16%) scored positively on at least two of the behavioral indicators assessed in this study. Childhood problematic behavior was present in a significant part of our sample as well. About one in ten had displayed aggression against family members (9%), was placed out of home (7%), behaved aggressively at school (11%), attended special education (10%) or was reported to regularly miss classes (7%). Furthermore, a significant part (13%) scored positively on childhood problematic behaviors at home and at school.

In order to assess the association between behavioral indicators, childhood problematic behavior and collective violence offending, we utilized a variable that was constructed for the same sample in a prior study by Van Ham et al. (2016). In this study three criminal career trajectories up to becoming involved in collective violence were identified. These trajectories may be characterized as 'non-offending up to collective violence involvement (n=152)', 'prior offending up to collective violence involvement (n=229)' and 'early onset and high frequency prior offending up to collective violence involvement (n=57)'. To the extent that group dynamics instead of selection or convergence are relevant for participating in collective violence, an even distribution of the behavioral indicators of personality traits and childhood problematic behaviors among these three distinguished groups is expected. In contrast, an uneven distribution of these behavioral indicators would be supportive of a typological approach to collective violence offending incorporating both the SIM and convergence explanations, with psychological traits and childhood behavior problems expected to be particularly present among collective violence offenders with an early age of onset and high frequency of prior violent offending.

Table 1 provides the presence of behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior for each group. Chi-square analysis indicated that attention-deficit/hyperactivity features ($x^2(2)=52.795$, $p<.01$), antisocial features ($x^2(2)=48.4908$, $p<.01$), aggression-regulation deficits ($x^2(2)=39.9014$, $p<.01$), heightened impulsivity ($x^2(2)=78.0585$, $p<.01$) and an increased need for excitement ($x^2(2)=62.711$, $p<.01$) were more prevalent among early onset and high frequency prior offenders. This pattern also emerged for childhood problematic behavior. Significant differences between groups were found for aggression against family members ($x^2(2)=36.110$, $p<.01$), having been placed out of home ($x^2(2)=26.4081$, $p<.01$), aggressive behavior at school ($x^2(2)=72.070$, $p<.01$), having attended special education ($x^2(2)=31.069$, $p<.01$) and frequent truancy ($x^2(2)=53.49$, $p<.01$). Additional analysis taking into account the total number of behavioral indicators reflect the multi-problem character of early onset and high frequency prior offenders. Chi-square analyses indicated that this subgroup more often had two ($x^2(2)=22.6051$, $p<.01$) or more ($x^2(2)=85.3341$, $p<.01$) behavioral indicators. Similar results were found for the prevalence of two ($x^2(2)=39.616$, $p<.01$) or more ($x^2(2)=35.608$, $p<.01$) problematic childhood behaviors. In addition, a cumulative risk factor index was calculated for the 75 individuals who scored positive on at least 1 behavioral indicator and at least 1 childhood problematic behavior. Chi-square analysis indicated that at least one of both ($x^2(2)= 97.877$, $p<.01$), at least two of both ($x^2(2)= 86.161$, $p<.01$) and at least 3 of both ($x^2(2)= 44.617$, $p<.01$) were more prevalent among early onset and high frequency prior offenders.

Our analyses thus suggest an uneven distribution of behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior in our sample of collective violence offenders. These findings appear to contrast a core principle of the SIM, which propagates that offender characteristics do not contribute to explanations of collective violence. Specifically, the uneven distribution of behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behaviors, their higher presence among the early onset and high frequency prior offending group, and the multi-problem character of this subgroup indicate that root causes

Table 1. Prevalence of Behavioral Characteristics and Childhood Problematic Behaviors for a Sample of Collective Violence Offenders (n=438) per subtype as identified by Van Ham et al. (2016)

Measure	Non-offenders up to involvement (n=152) %	Prior offenders up to involvement (n=229) %	Early onset and high frequency prior offenders (n=57) %	**Total (n=438) %**
Behavioral characteristics				
Attention-deficit/ hyperactivity features*	10%	7%	42%	**13%**
Antisocial features*	0%	1%	18%	**3%**
Aggression-regulation deficits*	8%	18%	46%	**18%**
Heightened impulsivity*	3%	11%	49%	**13%**
Increased need for excitement*	3%	7%	39%	**10%**
Number of behavioral characteristics				
Single behavioral characteristic	13%	14%	12%	**13%**
Multiple behavioral characteristics (n=2)*	3%	9%	25%	**9%**
Multiple behavioral characteristics (n>2)*	1%	4%	37%	**7%**
Childhood problematic behavior				
Aggression against family members*	3%	8%	30%	**9%**
Placed out of home*	5%	4%	23%	**7%**
Aggressive behavior at school*	7%	5%	42%	**11%**
Attending special education*	7%	7%	30%	**10%**
Frequent truancy*	6%	2%	30%	**7%**
Number of childhood problematic behaviors				
Single childhood problematic behavior*	8%	9%	23%	**10%**
Multiple childhood problematic behaviors (n=2)*	5%	3%	26%	**7%**
Multiple childhood problematic behaviors (n>2)*	3%	3%	23%	**6%**
Cumulative risk factor index				
At least 1 of both*	10%	10%	63%	**17%**
At least 2 of both*	3%	3%	37%	**7%**
At least 3 of both*	1%	1%	18%	**3%**

*p<.01

for these offenders' participating in collective violence may diverge. We therefore interpret this finding as a first sign that a typological approach incorporating insights from both social identity and convergence theories may have merit in the explanation of collective violence.

Survival analysis

When involvement in collective violence is the mere result of coincidentally being in the wrong place at the wrong time, chances are low that an individual becomes involved in collective violence more frequently. Recidivism therefore may be regarded as reflecting persistence. Insofar as convergence and selection are involved in collective violence offending, expectations were that individuals' criminal career history, behavioral indicators, and childhood problematic behaviors assessed in this study

would predict collective violence reoffending. On the other hand, when instead of convergence mainly social processes affect becoming involved in collective violence, no differences are expected between individuals who re-offended and those who didn't.

Figure 1. Survival Analysis within a Sample (n=438) of Collective Violence Offenders for General, Special and Specific Recidivism in Number of Days.



In order to establish general, special and specific recidivism in our sample (n=438) after the index date, we conducted survival analysis. From Figure 1 it can be derived that for about the first six months the survival rate follows a similar trend for general, violence and collective violence offending. Thereafter survival rates dropped sizably faster for general crime compared to violent crime and collective violence, while the survival rate for violent crime dropped faster for violent crime compared to collective violence. Survival rates at the end of the follow up period were about 50% for general recidivism, 64% for special (violent) recidivism and 80% for specific (collective violence) recidivism. Consequently, results indicate that about a third of our sample reoffends violently (36%) and a fifth does so in a group (20%).

Subsequently, a series of bivariate analyses was conducted to examine whether collective violence recidivists (n=89) and non-recidivists (n=349) differed on criminal career measures, behavioral indicators of psychological traits and childhood problematic behavior (see Table 2). From Table 2 can be derived that recidivating collective violence offenders more often displayed violent behavior in multiple settings (21%) compared to collective violence offenders who did not re-offend (12%) ($x^2(1)=5.132$, $p=.023$). ANOVAs further indicate that recidivating collective violence offenders were younger at the moment of their first police contact for general ($F(1, 436=7.605$,

p<.01), violent (F(1, 436=6.385, p=.012) and collective violence offending (F(1, 436=6.231, p=.013). Furthermore, the mean number of prior general (F(1, 436=7.467, p<.01), violent (F(1, 436=11.763, p<.01) and collective violence offenses (F(1, 436=19.317, p<.01) was higher among those persisting in collective violence. With regard to behavioral indicators, significant results were found for the prevalence of attention-deficit and/or hyperactivity features (x^2(1)=3.996, p=.046), heightened impulsivity (x^2(1)= 6.389, p=.011) and an increased need for excitement (x^2(1)=6.247, p=.012). No significant differences were found with regard to antisocial features and aggression-regulation deficits or with regard to childhood problematic behavior. Finally, analyses indicated that recidivating collective violence offenders more often (12%) had at least three behavioral indicators compared to those who did not re-offend (6%)(x^2(1)=4.212, p=.004), and that recidivating collective violence offenders more often (12%) displayed two childhood problematic behaviors than non-recidivists (5%) (x^2(1)=5.316, p=.021). One significant difference between collective violence recidivists and non-recidivists was found within the cumulative factor index; collective violence recidivist more often had at least two or more risk factors with regard to both behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behaviors (x^2(1)=6.294, p=.012).

Again, these findings suggest that convergence or selection processes may contribute to collective violence offending. This in particular concerns criminal career measures with regard to age of onset and frequency of offending as measured by police arrest, and behavioral indicators associated with violent behavior, particularly when multiple behavioral indicators are present. Additional analyses not displayed here furthermore indicated that offender characteristics associated with collective violence recidivism overlap with those of solo violence re-offending. Together these findings indicated that individuals who re-offended violently, whether alone or in a group, differ significantly from individuals who did not on similar criminal career measures and behavioral indicators. This suggests that risk factors for solo and collective violence offending are partly the same and that more frequent involvement in collective violence appears to not only be determined by social processes as stated by the SIM.

Table 2. Differences between Collective Violence Offending Recidivists and Non-recidivists (n=438)

	Collective violence re-offending	
	Yes (n=89)	No (n=349)
Measures	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Criminal career		
Mean age of onset criminal career**	17.8 (3.0)	19.3 (4.9)
Mean age of onset violent crime*	18.6 (3.0)	20.0 (5.0)
Mean age of onset collective violence*	19.7 (3.4)	21.2 (5.4)
Offenses before index date**	5.9 (6.7)	3.7 (6.8)
Violent offenses before index date**	3.9 (4.4)	2.3 (3.8)
Collective violence offenses before index**	2.1 (2.6)	1.1 (1.7)
Measures	%	%
Criminal career		
Being violent in various settings*	21%	12%
Behavioral indicators		
Attention-deficit and/or hyperactivity features*	19%	11%
Antisocial features	0%	3%
Aggression-regulation deficits	24%	17%
Heightened impulsivity**	22%	11%
Increased need for excitement*	17%	8%
Number of behavioral indicators		
Single behavioral indicator	15%	13%
Multiple behavioral indicators (n=2)	12%	8%
Multiple behavioral indicators (n>2)*	12%	6%
Childhood problematic behavior		
Aggression against family members	10%	9%
Placed out of home	6%	7%
Aggressive behavior at school	16%	9%
Attending special education	15%	9%
Frequent truancy	10%	6%
Number of childhood problematic behaviors		
Single childhood problematic behavior	12%	9%
Multiple childhood problematic behaviors (n=2)*	12%	5%
Multiple childhood problematic behaviors (n>2)	6%	5%
Cumulative risk factor index		
At least 1 of both	27%	22%
At least 2 of both*	13%	6%
At least 3 of both	4%	3%

*p<.05 **p<.01

Cox-regression analysis

Finally, a multivariable Cox-regression analysis was conducted, of which the results are depicted in Table 3. From Table 3 can be derived that behavioral indicators contribute to collective violence re-offending. Of the three behavioral indicators (attention-deficit/hyperactivity features, heightened impulsivity and increased need for excitement) that, given the results of prior research might be of relevance in explaining persistence in collective violence, only attention-deficit/hyperactivity features were found to contribute independently. This behavioral characteristic was found to more than double the likelihood of persistence in collective violence (Exp(B)=2.135, p=.006). In addition, criminal career measures - age at

onset of offending (Exp(B)=.937, p=.047) and the number of prior collective violence offenses (Exp(B)=1.17, p=.001) – were found to influence survival. Because the current sample of collective violence offenders was identified from different sources – a database of known hooligans, two football-related collective violence incidents and a riot around a recreational event – we controlled for the diverging nature of the 'index event' by distinguishing between football-related and non-football related samples (Exp(B)=2.303, p=.018). We found recidivism as measured by police registrations was higher in the non-football related sample. In the Netherlands, a comprehensive preventive and individual-oriented repressive approach is applied to persons who partake in football-related violence. Although data are lacking to substantiate this claim, for the football-related subsamples this approach may have influenced persistence.

Table 3. Determinants of Persistence in Collective Violence in a Sample of Collective Violence Offenders (n=438)

Measure	B	SE	Exp (B)	95% interval (low / high)
Collective violence offending				
Age at onset*	-.065	.033	.937	.879 / .999
Number of collective violence offenses before index date**	.157	.047	1.170	1.067 / 1.282
Context of incident: recreational event*	.834	.351	2.303	1.157 / 4.585
Attention-deficit and/or hyperactivity features **	.759	.274	2.135	1.247 / 3.654

* p<.05 ** p<.01

In sum, findings of the Cox-regression analysis indicated that a number of offender characteristics are associated with persistence in collective violence. This again suggests that individual characteristics are not to be totally disregarded when explaining collective violence, as has been argued by the SIM.

Discussion

Over the past decades collective violence has been predominantly explained from a group-dynamic perspective stressing the role of social processes. Central to this group-dynamic perspective is the SIM. The SIM explains how trigger events and group dynamics may result in antagonistic intergroup relationships, which subsequently may affect an individual's decision to participate in collective violence (Reicher, 2001). Doing so, the SIM disregards that personal characteristics of those participating in collective violence may also have explanatory value– the position taken by convergence theories (Ball and Drury, 2012).

While there is little doubt that group dynamics influence crowd behavior, individual evaluations of crowd situations do vary (Reicher and Sani, 1998; Sani and Reicher, 1998, 1999). Furthermore, the emotions these evaluations invoke, particularly anger, have been implicated in aggressive action tendencies in crowds (Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Various psychological traits have been implicated in aggressive behavior in both non-provocative and provocative situations, a number of which have been previously linked to behaving violently in a group (Farrington, 1994; Piquero et al., 2015; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). Supporting the core principle of convergence theory, this suggests that offender characteristics may be linked to violent behavior in collective settings after all.

In Western societies such as the Netherlands, collective violence generally occurs around demonstrations, protests, football matches, and other recreational events (Adang, 2011). The current article is concerned with individuals who have been involved in collective violence around football matches and recreational events, which may – at least by outsiders – be perceived as issue-irrelevant and hedonistic (Marx, 1970). The social identity perspective aims to explain how and why collective violence occurs, regardless of the setting in which it takes place. Consequently, though limited in its scope, the sample used in this study offers a possibility to assess whether individual characteristics contribute to participating in collective violence.

The results of our study showed that our sample of collective violence offenders is characterized by a problematic background with regard to behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior. This finding fits with behavior theory, which suggests that involvement in any one problem behavior increases the likelihood of an individual displaying other problem behaviors as well (Jessor, 1991). Differentiating between three groups – 'non-offending up to involvement', 'prior offending up to involvement' and 'early onset and high frequency prior offending up to involvement' – our analysis indicated behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior were particularly present among collective violence offenders with an early age of onset and high offending frequency. Furthermore, co-occurrence of these characteristics in particular was prevalent among this subgroup of collective violence offenders, indicating their multi-problem character. As such, this subgroup is reminiscent of Moffitt's life course persistent offender, suggesting that the premise of convergence theory might be limited to a subgroup of collective violence offenders, namely those who more frequently and persistently offend. About one in five offenders showed persistence in collective violence offending, in the sense that they had been apprehended for this offense at least once more by the police within four to five years after the index date. Substantiating our findings, behavioral indicators of psychological traits linked to violent offending predicted collective violence recidivism. Also, multi-problem backgrounds as reflected in the presence of multiple behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behaviors were more prevalent among individuals persisting in collective violence. Finally, Cox regression analyses indicated that various individual characteristics independently contribute to persistence in collective violence offending. Taken together, contrasting currently dominant theoretical views on collective violence, our findings showed that persistence in collective violence is associated with the presence of distinguishing offender characteristics.

Our findings have implications for collective violence research. Many collective violence studies have emphasized the social processes leading up to collective violence and disregarded personal and psychological characteristics of those actually involved (for an overview see Reicher, 2001). These studies to a large extent rely on participant observations and interviews (Adang, 2018). It, however, has been argued that these research methods are unable to construct trustworthy accounts of events i.e. may be biased or even speculative (Johnson and Sackett, 1998; Waddington, 2012). Our findings suggest that in a given collective violence incident different subgroups may be distinguished for which the root causes of participating

in the violence diverge. For some, the reasons for participating appear to not, or at least to not only be related to antagonistic group dynamics, but may also concern motives more directly linked to individuals themselves. First of all then, our results suggest that future collective violence studies should account for, and incorporate both group-dynamic and convergence explanations. This connects to the recently proposed initiation-escalation model of public disorder, which – by referring to the so-called young male syndrome – also argues for an approach to collective violence that includes a contribution to collective violence of contextual and individual determinants (Adang, 2011). Particularly with regard to the latter, possibilities of gathering data on individual characteristics data need to be explored. As, in the present absence of large scaled (survey) studies particularly aimed at collective violence offenders, validated measures or clinical interview data are likely to be unavailable, researchers may have to rely on alternative measures, as we did here. Another aspect deserving research attention, given the likely different underlying causes of participating in collective violence, is to what extent the presence and ratio of these specific subgroups may influence the total crowd's group dynamics. This question in particular concerns the presence of groups of individuals who are repeatedly involved in collective violence. A qualitative case study in the Netherlands concluded that such groups may actively instigate a large-scale riot (Muller et al., 2010).

Our study may also offer input for discussing the conceptualization of collective violence. Its current conceptualization, around which social identity explanations are centered, assumes collective violence is reactive and largely centered around the motive of retribution. This conceptualization appears limited compared to current typological distinctions of violence. The quadripartite violence typology (QVT), for instance, states that differentiating between the affect underlying violence (negative/positive) and its nature (impulsive/controlled), allows for a richer representation of motivations for violence (Howard, 2015). The main motivations distinguished in the QVT are 1) excitement-seeking (positive affect, impulsive), 2) greed for social dominance or goods (positive affect, controlled), 3) revenge (negative affect, controlled) and 4) self-defense (negative affect, impulsive). The results of our study indicate that underlying causes for participating in collective violence may diverge between individuals. Consequently, future research may conceptualize collective violence around the motivations for violence identified in the QVT and/or the recently proposed initiation-escalation model of public disorder, which argues that collective violence may also arise by the mere presence of a rival group (Adang, 2011). The fact that groups known for their frequent participating in collective violence are also involved in arranging confrontations with like-minded groups (e.g. Cleland and Cashmore, 2016), further substantiates this reasoning.

In sum, our findings indicate that some individuals are more likely than others to persist in collective violence. This specifically appears to concern a relatively small subgroup of collective violence offenders whose personal and criminal profiles resemble that of Moffitt's life course persistent offender. Participating in collective violence for these individuals appears to reflect a general violent lifestyle that can be linked to the presence of multiple problem traits and behavioral characteristics. A first implication for intervention and prevention strategies may be to consider the relevant characteristics

for determining the individual's risk of recidivism. Subsequently, such information may be utilized in order to assess which collective violence offenders qualify for a person-oriented approach – a kind of approach that, at least in the Netherlands, is already customary for individuals who regularly participate in football-related collective violence and might be broadened to individuals repeatedly engaging in other types of collective violence as well. During the course of the current research however, it has proven to be extremely difficult to find reliable information on the personal characteristics of collective violence offenders. At the same time, this study suggests that such information is relevant both theoretically and in practice. The consistent gathering and recording of such information in the aftermath of future collective violence incidents is therefore recommended.

When drawing conclusions based on the current findings, it is however important to keep in mind the limitations of our data. First, official police data in all likelihood underestimate actual offending. Although those having extensive criminal careers may be more likely to be apprehended (Ball and Drury, 2012), chances of apprehension in general are low. Furthermore, as applies to all criminological studies making use of register data, registration of a particular (type of) crime and subsequent arrest are dependent on the investigation policy of the police and the prosecution policy of the Public Prosecution Service. The extent that collective violence is either high or low on the political agenda may therefore have influenced our measure of persistence (recidivism). Second, police data regarding collective violence incidents do not address its context or its scale beyond the legal minimum of three individuals involved (i.e. a full-blown riot or a bar room brawl). As the social identity model has been utilized to explain both large scale rioting as well as the escalation of night-time economy aggression (Levine, Lowe, Best, and Heim, 2012), this seems less problematic for making a contribution to the theoretical debate on explanations for collective violence. Third, the behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior data gathered in this study did not reflect psychiatric disorders and personality traits as assessed by clinical diagnoses. Two aspects play a role here. First of all that – precisely due to adhering to the currently dominant theoretical insights – in practice no systematic attention is paid to the psychological characteristics of those engaging in collective violence. In Dutch practice, forensic psychological reports are usually only drawn up in case of serious offenses such as murder, manslaughter and sexual offenses. Consequently, to assess the presence of psychological traits and childhood problematic behavior there are few alternative data sources for the current sample outside of law enforcement parties such as the police and the Dutch Probation Service. Limited availability of suitable data is thus to some extent intrinsic to exploring new research directions. In order to address this issue, the presence of behavioral indicators of psychological traits and childhood problems were operationalized by means of standardized criteria applied to the sources consulted. Our results show that behavioral indicators are linked to persistence in collective violence offending. Although the currently applied method has its limitations, this suggests it does not result in findings that contrast earlier studies on violent offending.of standardized criteria applied to the sources consulted. Our results show that behavioral indicators are linked to persistence in collective violence offending. Although the

currently applied method has its limitations, this suggests it does not result in findings that contrast earlier studies on violent offending.

Conclusion

Over the past decades scholars have predominantly taken a group-dynamic approach to explain why individuals partake in collective violence despite the absence of an extensive criminal record or an affiliation with violent groups. This point of view disregards that even in the 'right' circumstances most people do not act violently, leaving unexplained why some individuals involve themselves in collective violence while others don't. Individuals have been found to differ in their evaluation of social situations. As social information processing is influenced by psychological traits that are linked to violent offending, in this article we argue that, next to group-dynamic processes, psychological traits may influence collective violence involvement.

Combining criminal career measures, behavioral indicators and information on childhood problematic behaviors suggests that particularly those persistently involved in collective violence offending show psychological traits that may predispose them towards violence. Therewith our findings are in line with the typological approach common in life course criminology, suggesting that different types of collective violence offenders may be identified for whom the root causes of collective violence involvement diverge. Given the association between behavioral indicators and specific recidivism, crowd composition may influence the extent to which individual and contextual determinants contribute to collective violence per given collective violence incident.

In the continuing debate concerning the relative contribution of individual and contextual determinants on collective violence, so far offender typologies have not been considered. The current study, which included a relatively large sample of collective violence offenders, suggests that a typological approach may be employed to address and reconcile contrasting empirical findings and theoretical vantage points. Our results may be utilized to further develop a theoretical approach that addresses a contextualized group-dynamic understanding of collective violence as well as variations in individuals' willingness to become involved.

04.

Contextual and individual factors determining escalation of collective violence

Case study of the project X riot in Haren, the Netherlands

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Abstract

Two dominant perspectives explaining collective violence differ in the extent to which they ascribe influence to individual and contextual factors. Our analysis of a project X disorder in the Netherlands shows organized groups were not involved. Instead spontaneous group formation and identification were observed, confirming socio-contextual theory. Arrested suspects, however, were no cross section of youths, with a minority mirroring the personality profile of individuals disproportionally involved in collective violence. This suggests predispositions are of relevance as well in explaining public disorder. This case study shows the recently developed initiation/escalation model provides a useful framework that incorporates both perspectives, i.e. both theoretical perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Research suggestions are discussed.

Keywords: *public disorder, collective violence, predispositions, socio-contextual theory*

Introduction

Nothing ever happens in the sleepy, 16,000 inhabitants villa town of Haren, designated twice as the 'best municipality in the Netherlands'. Yet, on 21 September 2012, thousands of youngsters descended on the small town after a Facebook invitation for a sweet 16 party was turned into an open invitation for a *project X* party, referring to a film released earlier that year. The film 'Project X' depicts three high school seniors who have the idea of throwing a birthday party that no one will ever forget. They advertise it via their school, a website and a local radio station. Hundreds of youngsters show up at the home were the party is given. Things get out of hand, authorities intervene, a ravaged residential area is left behind.[18] In several countries, parties inspired by the film had earlier led to public order problems, e.g. United States (Houston, 14 March 2012[19]), France (Roques sur Argens, 17 May 2012[20]) and Germany (Backnang, 30 June 2012[21]).

In Haren too, things got out of hand. In the course of the evening, a violent confrontation between youngsters and police lasting several hours erupted (called excessive and without precedent by authorities) and some shops were looted. Thirtyfour people were arrested during the riot (after subsequent investigations in the following weeks, the number of arrested individuals totaled 108). Events drew a lot of national and international media attention including from the BBC (*Facebook party invite sparks riot in Haren, Netherlands*[22]) and CNN (*Facebook birthday invite leads to mayhem in Dutch town, authorities say*[23]). The so-called Haren Facebook riot led to a lot of copycat behaviour: in the weeks following the riot, more than 40 invitations for new project X parties all over the Netherlands were announced via social media. Most never materialized, others were actively prevented from

18 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RI1TJG17Wk (accessed 22 March 2015)

19 http://abcnews.go.com/US/project-movie-inspires-teen-parties/story?id=15922034 (accessed 22 March 2015).

20 http://www.rczeitung.com/index.php/provence-cote-dazur-artikel/items/villa-in-les-issambres-nach-massen-party-verwuestet.html (accessed 22 March 2015).

21 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQZgtq0SF2s (accessed 22 March 2015).

22 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19684708 (accessed 22 March 2015).

23 http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/22/world/europe/netherlands-facebook-riot/index.html (accessed 22 March 2015).

happening by authorities. Nevertheless, similar to the England riots of 2011, the role social media played in the run up to and during these events became a hot topic and was seen as a distinguishing feature of the riot. Newburn (2015) puts the England riots ('the most significant civil disorder on the British mainland in at least a generation') in recent historical perspective and notes four ways in which these riots deviate significantly from other riots in the post-war period, through (1) their speed and malleability as the consequence of the information flows made possible through social media, (2) the amount of looting as a possible expression of violent consumerism, (3) the criticism levelled at police by politicians and (4) the most distinctive, the nature and extent of the response by the penal state: special court settings, utilizing massive resources to analyze CCTV data to bring unprecedented numbers of people before the courts that are subsequently remanded in or sentenced to custody.

Although the scale of the violence in Haren cannot be compared to what happened during the 2011 England riots and the looting was limited, it is not difficult to apply Newburn's four 'points of distinction' to the project X riot in Haren. Authorities in Haren were surprised by the mobilization power of social media (1), several commentators blamed the hedonistic behaviour of the youths involved (2), and the response of the criminal justice system was extraordinary (4): a dedicated police investigative team of the type usually reserved for capital crimes was set up, police analyzed a total of 120 hours of video material (filmed by police cameras, obtained from the public and downloaded from YouTube. There were no CCTV cameras in Haren), fast-track court proceedings were used and, as an innovation, perpetrators were convicted to contribute to a specifically established fund to cover damages (in other respects, punishments did not deviate from what was normal). Because of all the criticism levelled at them, police and authorities chose to commission an independent investigation into the riots and the way they were handled. Following the publication of the critical report, the mayor, as the one responsible for public order in the Dutch system, resigned (3). There is another similarity: the day after the project X riot, police and authorities blamed 'scum' (specifically, outside organized groups of 'hooligans') for the chaos and violence. The same happened after the 2011 England riots where some (especially politicians) blamed career criminals and gang members for the riots (prime minister David Cameron in a statement to Parliament: 'it is criminality, pure and simple'). Others, however, pointed to the importance of a social context of deprivation and discriminating police tactics in London and other English cities that caused normally non-criminal individuals to participate (e.g. Guardian/LSE 2011; Reicher and Stott 2011). Haren is in no way a disadvantaged place, with an average household income that is the highest in the north of the Netherlands, a virtual absence of inhabitants of migrant origin and less than 1 per cent of inhabitants dependent on welfare/social security (well below the national average). Other than with the England riots, there was no suggestion that the violence and looting in Haren was some kind of political protest, but the question did arise what role social context and group dynamics played in the project X riot.

This question links neatly to the theoretical debate that is going on between different explanations for collective violence (Reicher 1996; Stott and Reicher 1998). One perspective suggests that collective violence is an

outcome of the convergence of individuals who are predisposed toward creating 'disorder' (e.g. 'hooligans' or 'career criminals'). This approach does not explain how and why collective violence erupts in specific circumstances but not in others. The other side of the theoretical debate argues the need for a contextualized, group-dynamic understanding of collective violence. This paper wants to contribute to that debate. In analyzing the riot, we will make use of the initiation/escalation model for collective violence (Adang 2011). The model was developed on the basis of systematic observations of 225 so-called 'high-risk' football and protest events as a first step toward combining both theoretical approaches. The model made clear the relevance of context, intergroup interaction and intergroup relationships while at the same time indicating variations in the willingness of individuals to become involved in violence, with some actively seeking opportunities to be violent, without the need for external triggers (other than the presence of a rival group). The model, as outlined in Adang (2011), posits that as far as the initiation of collective violence is concerned, a distinction should be made between two types of violence:

(1) Violence that is linked to a clearly identifiable trigger. This type of violence is reactive – it is a response to specific elements or frictions in a given situation, be it provocations by other groups or third parties, events on the pitch (in the case of football), measures taken by police or some other identifiable trigger. Theoretically, this type of violence is easily linked to familiar aggression theories (e.g. aggression out of frustration), competition for limited resources or as a response to threats. As with other forms of aggression, males are more likely to react aggressively than females, and adolescents/young adults are more likely to react aggressively than individuals from other age groups. The targets of the violence are usually linked with the trigger preceding the behaviour.

(2) Violence that is not linked to a clearly identifiable trigger. This type of violence is not reactive, and thus seems to arise more spontaneously in the situation (although it might be preplanned). It is performed by groups of male adolescents/young adult males and is directed specifically at similar, rival groups of young males. The individuals and groups concerned seem to actively seek out opportunities to confront rival groups. Theoretically, this type of violence can be seen as another expression of the so-called 'young male syndrome' (Wilson and Daly 1985), the tendency of young males to take risks and be violent because they discount the future in favour of short-term gains, which is socially facilitated by the presence of peers in pursuit of the same goals.

The distinction between the two types of violence is not absolute and an obvious overlap is created by the fact that the young male syndrome may also be expressed in response to triggers that may seem trivial to outsiders. However, the model posits that different mechanisms are responsible for the *escalation* of violence (in the sense that more individuals decide to involve themselves):

(1) On the one hand, there is the opportunity and (perceived) risk of retaliation. Only a small minority of a group engages in the most risky types of behaviour, whereas the majority of participants opt for less risky alternatives (shouting, gesturing, running) or do not become involved at all. Even for those being violent, there is a lot more missile throwing than physical fighting, and redirected aggression at inanimate objects (fences, buses, trains) rather than at individuals who can fight back. The fact that the young males, when violent, operate in groups is a form of risk reduction in itself, as is the fact that they avoid or flee from confrontations that they seem unable to win. In several respects, the data show that violence became more likely when there was no police present at risk locations. Violent fans and protestors regularly took measures to hide their faces to make recognition more difficult and avoid identification and arrest. These risk-reducing attempts to maintain 'anonymity' (to authorities, not to their fellows!) are to be distinguished from the so-called deindividuation effect of 'anonymity', for which there is no support (Postmes and Spears 1998).[24] The evidence for bounded rationality in combination with the relevance of opportunities to be violent with limited risk for escalation provide a link between collective violence and principles of situational crime prevention (Clarke 1995).

(2) The second important escalation mechanism is the existence of an 'us versus them' antagonism. The more antagonistic the relationships between different groups, the higher the frequency of observed violence. This was clearly the case for the relations between rival fan groups and for the relationship between certain groups of protestors ('autonomen/black block') and police. Theoretically, the elaborated social identity model (ESIM), which states that collective 'disorder' is made possible through the shared psychological salience of a common social identity among crowd participants is relevant here (Reicher 1984; 1996). The defining dimensions of this identity serve to explain the normative limits of collective action (what people do) and the extent of participation (who does and does not join in) during a crowd event. This 'social identity' analysis argues that the dynamics of intergroup interaction are integral to the psychology of widespread 'disorder'. Stott and Reicher (e.g. 1998) indicate that when an initially heterogeneous crowd has come to be treated as a homogeneous whole by the police, this has led crowd members to reconceptualize themselves as members of a common category, thus setting up a cycle of tension and escalating conflict.

In this model, alcohol and drugs may indirectly contribute to the initiation and escalation of violence through one of the factors in the model, e.g. by increasing the likelihood that a trigger is reacted to or by altering perceptions of opportunity. The effects of alcohol consumption may make violence more likely under specific circumstances because of self-overestimation, less impulse control, less accurate assessment of social and risky situations, less fear of sanctions and contributing to a feeling of 'everything goes' (van Hasselt 2013: 210). We want to explore if the escalation in Haren can be explained using this model, which was developed in the quite different context of football and protest events. In terms of the six levels of the widely used 'flashpoints' analytical model (e.g. Waddington 2010), we focus on the role contextual, situational and interactional aspects play in the

24 According to deindividuation theories, anonymity causes antinormative and disinhibited behaviour.

initiation and escalation of collective violence (rather than on the structural, political/ ideological or cultural aspects that usually receive more attention). The questions this paper seeks to address is *how events escalated, what individual, situational and contextual factors played a role and why police were attacked*. Our analysis will focus on events at the day itself. After a description of the methodology used, we present a reconstruction of events, analyze contextual factors and present an analysis of individual factors, based in large part on a detailed analysis of apprehended suspects. In the end, we discuss the theoretical implications of our findings.

Methodology

This study was performed as part of the official independent investigation into events in Haren (Commission Project X Haren 2013) and made use of written documents, audio and video material and interviews. A factual reconstruction was made based on interviews and an analysis of written documentation and audio-visual material. The researchers had access to all relevant material from authorities. Audio was available of police communication. Video material was available that was made by a police officer wearing a bodycam (containing recordings made mainly in the lead up to the riot) and from two cameras fixed to two different riot police vehicles. Also video material from open sources was analyzed, both from media reports and YouTube. Police and authorities provided documentation of preparations, evaluations and official meetings held in relation with the event. In addition, 94 face-to-face and 11 phone interviews were held with authorities, police officers and municipal workers that played a role in preparation, on the day itself or in the aftermath. An information and interview protocol guaranteed anonymity of respondents and complete independence of the researchers from authorities. Because of the wealth of the information available, it was possible to make a highly accurate reconstruction of events (Adang 2013). Where appropriate, the findings in this paper are complemented with the results of other studies done for the Commission: a study on the mobilization for Haren (Van Dijk *et al.* 2013) and a study on societal aspects of project X Haren (van den Brink et al. 2013). For this last study, 16 youngsters who were present in Haren during the riots were interviewed. After the riot, a total of 74 suspects were arrested after an extensive large-scale investigation to identify, arrest and prosecute as many suspects as possible (in addition to the 34 who had already been arrested during the riot itself). For our analysis of all 108 arrested suspects and in conformity with Dutch Law, permission was sought and obtained from the Minister of Safety and Justice to obtain and use the relevant individual data from police files. This includes data contained in police systems and reports of police interrogations of these suspects. Also, interviews were held with two officers who conducted many of the interviews with suspects.

The 108 arrested suspects in all likelihood form a good representation of those that were violent on the night of 21st September in Haren. According to police officers on the scene that night at most 300 individuals (highest estimate) were violent that night. Arresting over one third of them is a relatively high percentage. Because of the outrage following the riot, the police got a lot of cooperation from the public as evidenced by 722 tip-offs and many hours of video material made by citizens. Almost all of the suspects

police sought to identify and arrest following their analysis of the 120 hours of available video material were in fact arrested. For the study, this meant that the potential bias of mainly those already known to police being arrested was avoided (cf. Ball and Drury 2012). All but three were convicted.

In our analysis of suspects, we specifically looked for data that could provide information on suspects' previous police contacts and previous offences and convictions, and for indications of any form of psychosocial problems. The following police systems were consulted:

- To assess whether arrested suspects can be considered to belong to so-called 'hooligan' groups, a query on arrested suspects was conducted in the Dutch police national Football Tracking System (Voetbalvolgsysteem). Since 1997, all misconduct and misbehavior of persons around football matches is registered in this system to monitor the prevalence of football-related delinquency for management and policy goals.

- The extent to which arrested suspects had been brought to justice for felonies prior to the project X disorder was investigated by consulting a police registration system called HKS. This system has been in use by the Dutch national police since 1986 and registers all persons that have been prosecuted due to committing a felony and the felony concerned.

- The police registration system BVH is used among other things to register persons who are involved in or suspects of felonies and misdemeanor. Due to legal rules records that had been registered five years or more ago could not be consulted. Therefore, only records between 2008 and 2012 were included. All available records in BVH were also analyzed for information on problem behaviour during education and at home, personality aspects and alcohol and drug habits.

To put these data in perspective, we will compare them where possible with the analysis of arrested suspects following the so-called Hoek van Holland beach-riot of August 2009. This riot took place at a freely accessible dance party attended by between 30,000 and 50,000 visitors.

Late in the evening of this event, police officers were attacked by a group of 200-300 persons and persecuted into the dunes. Police officers fired a total of 75 (mostly warning) shots in self-defense; one person was killed by a police bullet. Statements of police officers and witnesses depicted violence of – by Dutch standards – almost unprecedented severity and intensity. Independent investigators Muller *et al.* (2010) showed that this riot was unequivocally caused by an organized group of 'hooligans' that is frequently involved in public disorder, calling themselves Rotterdam Jongeren Kern (RJK, Rotterdam Youth Core, fans of football club Feyenoord Rotterdam). The comparison with project X Haren is interesting because it also involves an escalation in a party atmosphere.

Results: A Reconstruction of Events

Anticipation: 6-20th September

On Thursday, 6th September, a 15-year-old girl from Haren opens an event on Facebook to celebrate her 16th birthday. The party is to take place on the 21st.[25] The next day she notices the invitation is being spread widely and as much as 3,500 people on the first day announce they will attend. When the number keeps increasing and a link is being made with the film project X, she contacts her father. They decide to remove the invitation from Facebook. That doesn't help much because several new Facebook events are started that highjack her original event. Eventually, one event remains active and the number of registrations keeps growing day by day (eventually, some 250,000 invitations were sent out with some 30,000 people indicating they would attend).

On 18th September, three days before the event is supposed to take place, several national media pick up on the news and (falsely) mention that the municipality has taken emergency measures. From this moment onwards, national attention is growing, activity on social media keeps growing exponentially (van Dijk *et al.* 2013: 72). Although they do not know what to expect, authorities start preparations. No measures are taken to prevent people from travelling to Haren. It is decided that the police should adopt a low-profile approach[26], using regular patrol officers without deployment of riot police.[27] In case a large number of people show up, an abandoned field is designated as a place for them to meet and be transported to nearby Groningen by bus. A special ordinance is issued, prohibiting the use (but not the possession) of alcohol in the evening of the 21st.

Project X Haren: 21st September

In line with the low key approach, police deployment this day is mainly focused on monitoring the number of people travelling to Haren and patrolling the road where the non-existing party is supposed to take place and surrounding streets. In the course of the afternoon and early evening, several hundreds of people enter Haren by various means (e.g. train, walking, car). The ordinance that it is forbidden to drink alcohol in the street is not communicated or enforced: police feel unable to do so, given the number of people arriving, many of whom carry alcoholic drinks. The atmosphere is happy, festive, jovial and upbeat. By the time it starts to get dark, after a quarter to eight, the total numbers of visitors is already well over a 1,000, with probably around 700 of them converging at the crossroads where most of the media representatives have taken up position. The first signs of trouble are beginning to show. Occasionally fireworks are thrown. Individuals climb in traffic signs and lantern poles, and offensive chants are at times directed to the police. At some point, all police officers present at the crossroads take up position behind a barrier that had been placed in the afternoon to close off the street. The crowd advances to the barriers and leans on them. At no

25 She deliberately makes the event 'public' to give her friends the opportunity to invite a few others who are not Facebook friends of hers.

26 This is a common approach in the Netherlands, specifically intended to avoid being seen as provocative and allowing for easier communication with citizens.

27 Riot police units in the Netherlands are composed of regular patrol officers who received a four-week basic riot police training and are equipped with protective padding, a shield, a helmet and a long baton ('full riot gear'). One group of riot police consists of six officers with a group commander and a driver. Three groups form a section, three sections form a platoon. They are mobilized as needed, there are no full-time riot units.

point do they try to break through it, but occasionally, empty bottles and beer cans are thrown around, at first randomly, then in the direction of police officers. Several of the officers feel increasingly uncomfortable and threatened. By 20.00 hours, reinforcements are called up, both in the form of additional patrol officers in daily uniform (the idea is to have them enter the crowd and engage them) as well as in the form of riot police as a form of back up. The first group consisting of seven riot police officers arrives on the scene at 20.49 hours. These seven riot officers descend from their vehicle and, carrying helmets and shields (i.e. full riot gear), take up position as a human barrier. They do not charge at the crowd, which had already backed away at their approach. Nevertheless, immediately a barrage of objects is thrown at the officers. They have difficulty maintaining their position and at times have to retreat. The riot has started in earnest and it the police clearly are not in control of the situation. It takes time for additional riot police officers to arrive on the scene. Lack of manpower, lack of a properly functioning command and communication structure and the severity of the violence in combination with local infrastructure (wide alleyways, big gardens, many side streets) result in the violence continuing and displacing itself. On two occasions, a car is turned over and set on fire. Shopping windows are being smashed in and goods are stolen. A fire is started on the market square. The disorder finally ends almost four hours later, after it has started raining and mounted police officers in riot gear charge the remaining rioters. The damage to properties of citizens and authorities is somewhat in excess of 200,000 euro.

Analysis of Events

The reconstruction of events makes clear that there are two different phases: before and after the arrival of the first unit of riot police. Below, events are analyzed for factors that might help explain why this escalation occurred. First, by looking at the mobilization for the event, the background of arrested suspects and their actions and motives. Following that, attention will be paid to contextual factors in the phase leading up to the attack on police and the escalation.

Visitors and perpetrators of violence

Why did people come to Haren and where did they come from? van Dijk *et al.* (2013) report on a web survey of youngsters/young adults between 15 and 25 that was conducted two months after events in Haren.[28] The most important motivators to go, according to the youngsters themselves, were curiosity, excitement, the fact that something was happening at last and the fact that others would be going too. Most of the respondents knew about the film project X (many because they had seen the trailer rather than the film itself). Although it may have served as an inspiration for some, for many, knowledge of the film was an incentive NOT to go. The initial mobilization to Haren was facilitated by a combination of social media and traditional media activities, easy availability of transport and inconsistent communication by authorities. Mobilization for Haren was not mobilization for a riot. Most

28 All 3,115 young people between the ages of 15 and 25 from the three northern provinces that formed part a representative national online panel were approached, 990 or 31 per cent started answering the survey, 855 or 27 per cent fully completed it – to obtain a representative sample, a weighting was done for sex and educational level. Eight per cent of respondents actually went to Haren.

youngsters came to Haren to have a party, either because they genuinely believed some kind of party was going to take place or because they were curious, wanted to take part in something special or defy authorities in showing up to party anyway. As one female participant noted with regard to the fact that they had come to the party that authorities did not want to happen: '*in the beginning it was all beautiful. Youths against older people. Haha. We prevailed*', but '*Later, only scum remained*' (van den Brink *et al.* 2013: 105[29]). Another participant: '*You arrive and it is real! You see a large crowd. That is cool. It's like: this is really big, a lot of people have come. There was a good atmosphere…*' (van den Brink *et al.* 2013: 105). It is not possible to know exactly how many people attended the project X event in Haren, there was a coming and going of people. Authorities estimated that this number over the day totaled to between 3,000 and 5,000 people.

At the moment of escalation at 20.49 hours, police estimated that there were less than 1,000 people at the crossroads, with a gradual build-up taking place in the hours before that time. Interviewed police officers indicate that the groups from which they were confronted numbered a few hundred people. The highest police estimate of the total number of people that actually were violent in the course of the evening is 300. After the first violent eruption, groups of from five up to several tens of youngsters committed acts of violence while the rest looked on or were merely present. Officers at the scene agreed that the violence directed at them was not really organized. This seems to confirm the fact that in the lead up to 21st September, police, using their regular intelligence sources, did not have information that any particular groups of youngsters or 'hooligans' were organizing to go to Haren to create public order disturbances.

When, in the afternoon of the 21st, rumors surfaced that hard core 'hooligans' from next door Groningen might be interested to go to Haren, police deployed two plainclothes officers with specific knowledge of this group to see whether they were present. According to their observation, this group (or individuals from this group) were not present at the crossroads at all. At a later stage, they did spot a group of several tens of these hard core supporters at another location in Haren; however, these supporters did not participate in the violence against the police. The hard core fans themselves stated in the press that they did not participate in the disturbances (they refused to be interviewed by researchers). In the week following the riot, police football coordinators from other Dutch police forces reported there were no indications that any hooligans known to them had been present in Haren. Video images also provide no such evidence.[30] There was also no evidence that individuals were coordinating violence by means of mobile phones or social media. An analysis of tweets sent on 21st September provides no indications that this medium played a role in a mobilization for violence. No weapons of any kind were brought along by those who acted violently, except for fireworks, objects used in the violence were those at hand. It is good to note that the violence, although severe, was not without bounds. It was mainly aimed at riot police and inanimate objects (cars, street

29 All quotes are translated from the original Dutch by the authors.

30 Images show only one individual with a flag from a football club (FC Utrecht) being present (but not being violent). It is well known that 'hooligans' do not display club colours. Within a few seconds after showing himself, he is being attacked by known hard core FC Groningen fans, so in this sense, they were involved in some violence, but not in the violence directed at the police or objects.

furniture, shop windows), but not at inhabitants of Haren.[31] The few people within the crowd that actively attempted to stop the violence (videos show at least three individuals from within the crowd who tried, unsuccessfully) did not meet with repercussions. Some of the perpetrators even abided by requests of home owners to stop damaging their goods (van den Brink *et al.* 2013: 119).

Background of arrested suspects

More than half of 108 arrested suspects are between 18 and 25 years old and more than a quarter has not yet reached adult age. The most common age (mode) as well as the median age is 19 years and the mean age of those arrested is 19.6 years. With only two arrested suspects being female, the arrestees are almost exclusively male. Arrested suspects mainly (87 per cent) live in the three northern provinces of the Netherlands. The vast majority of the arrested suspects therefore had to cover only a relatively short distance (but only four of them were inhabitants of Haren itself). This fits with the finding of van den Brink *et al.* (2013: 108) that very few youngsters of Haren were involved in the violence and that the general feeling or norm among them was not to damage the place where they themselves lived.

Two of the 108 arrestees are registered in the Dutch police national Football Tracking System once following misconduct in a train transporting football fans. For this behaviour they received a fine, but no stadium ban. From other police documentation, it can be derived that two more arrested suspects have been involved in football-related delinquency. Although five other arrestees are thought to belong to groups of (young) fanatical supporters of three professional football teams in the north part of the country, none of them is considered to be actively involved in hooliganism. This means that none of the arrestees are known as hooligans by police at the moment project X Haren took place.

On the basis of official police reports and analysis of interrogation transcriptions, it has been assessed whether some kind of previous relationship existed between arrested suspects. Five small groups consisting of three or four persons each were identified. These findings stand in stark contrast with the profile of arrested suspects (n = 34) in the Hoek van Holland beach riot, where 23 members of the self-identified Rotterdam Youth Core RJK were seen to be present (with 12 of them being arrested). Seven of those were suspected of partaking in a criminal organization (aimed at creating disturbances) and five of them had received a stadium ban (Muller *et al.* 2010).

Criminal career

Looking at the 'prosecuted felonies' HKS system, 84 of the arrested suspects had no registrations and 24 (22 per cent) were registered for a total of 99 times, an average of four times. Fifteen of those had committed a violent crime at some point prior to the *project X* disorder. Seven of the arrested suspects were responsible for most of the registrations, having well over four each. Felonies registered mainly involve property crime (46 per cent) and violent crime (31 per cent). Again, data from the Hoek van Holland beach riot provide a stark contrast, with 76 per cent of 34 arrested

31 An assault on an 84-year-old man at his own home just outside the area where the riot took place falls outside this pattern. Despite a dedicated extensive police investigation, a suspect could not be identified.

suspects already having a HKS registration, and the average number of records in HKS amounting to seven for all involved in the disorder, and 12 (especially in relation to violence) for the 12 arrestees identified as belonging to the RJK (Muller *et al.* 2010). As a further comparison, Adang and Van der Torre (2008: 70) note that 56 per cent of 250 individuals arrested during New Year's eve disorder in the Netherlands were already registered in HKS an average of six times (especially in relation to violence) and Bruinsma *et al.* (2010: 41) report that 59 per cent of arrestees made during a riot in Utrecht were already registered in HKS an average of seven times (especially in relation to violence). Nationally, in 2012, 62 per cent of arrested suspects in the Netherlands was already registered in HKS, mostly for property crime (Kalidien and de Heer-Lange 2013). Nationally, 10 per cent of all felonies involve violent crime.

In all, 94 out of the 108 Haren suspects were found in the more encompassing BVH system, for a total of 626 records. Registrations found are mainly (26 per cent) concerned with groups of youth being checked by police officials or causing a nuisance, meaning that it is not certain they actually committed a misdemeanor. Vandalizing objects, spraying graffiti and the consumption of alcohol and drugs in public space are other acts for which persons were frequently registered (21 per cent). Sixteen percent of all records concerns violent acts like quarrels and disputes and 13 per cent is related to property crime (e.g. bicycle theft). Unfortunately, reference material (national averages) for BVH is not available, neither for the Hoek van Holland riot (Muller *et al.* 2010) nor nationally.

Arrestees' backgrounds

In as far as could be deduced from police documentation, the majority (74) of the arrestees did not seem to experience personal problems (e.g. substance abuse, psychopathology) or to display problem behaviour at school or at home. For a total of 34 arrested suspects (31 per cent), background information on problem behaviour during education and at home, personality and alcohol and drug habits were found. Thirteen arrested suspects had shown aggressive and problematic behaviour at school, five of them having been expelled due to their misbehavior. Of the arrested suspects showing problematic behaviour at school, three behaved unruly at home as well. Additionally, the behaviour of eight other arrestees was considered troublesome by their parents. This unruly behaviour ranged from walking away from home one or more times, not being susceptible to parental authority or trying to withdraw themselves from it, to threatening and assaulting their parents and siblings. For ten arrestees, there is information indicative of psychopathology. Especially indications of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (seven cases, or 6 per cent of all 108 arrestees) are referred to, sometimes combined with an inability to control aggressive impulses. The most recent estimated national average for ADHD is 2.9 per cent for children and 2.1 per cent for young adults, with the prevalence in males two to three times as high as that in females (Tuithof *et al.* 2010). For the Hoek van Holland beach riot, no comparable information on the background of arrestees is available.

Arrestees' actions and motives

Analysis of the interrogation transcripts learns that most of the arrested suspects told they had come to Haren because of the party they expected (61 per cent) or out of curiosity (24 per cent). Only one arrestee acknowledges to having been present because disorder could result. For ten arrestees, their motives for being present are unknown, four arrested suspects were in Haren for other reasons and one arrestee denies having been present.

Arrestees have been arrested predominantly for throwing objects (e.g. cans, bottles, stones) towards police officers (78 per cent). To a lesser extent they have (as well) been arrested for vandalism and destruction of property (including arson; 18 per cent) or the looting of a nearby super market (19 per cent). Seven arrestees are accused of inciting other people to join in the disorder and five have been detained for disregarding police instructions. Sixteen individuals deny their involvement in the disorder, 76 give one or more explanations for their actions and for 16 arrested suspects the self-stated motives for their actions remain unknown. Of those that give an explanation for their behaviour, 47 per cent state they felt influenced by the behaviors of others and 'got carried away'. Of the 95 arrested suspects being asked, almost all (92 per cent) confirm having consumed alcohol. Twenty arrestees say they feel their substance use – especially alcohol – influenced their behaviour during the disorder. Nineteen arrested suspects felt actions of the police were unnecessary and disproportional, and used this to explain their actions. Sensation- and thrill-seeking, being tough, feeling worked up or behaving impulsively due to personality deficits (e.g. ADHD) are referred to a much lesser extent. For the Hoek van Holland beach riot, no comparable information on the arrestees actions and motives is available from interrogation transcripts. However, prior to the riot, police repeatedly received information (which proved to be correct) from covert sources that a large group of hooligans intended to riot at the event.

To summarize, the Hoek van Holland riot was characterized by participation of a number of repeat offender individuals, many of whom were known as hooligans by police, who knew each other and actively looked for a confrontation. By contrast, those arrested in relation to the disorder in Haren generally did not know one another and were not known hooligans. Some (those who video images show were most active) can at most be characterized as marginally involved in felonies and to some extent displaying antisocial behaviour or having done so in their adolescent years. This indicates that contextual factors might be more important to explain why disorder occurred in Haren and why police were attacked.

Contextual factors

Contrary to the 2011 England riots, nothing in media accounts or in the interviews that were held alludes to specific grievances or state repression as factors in the project X riot. On the contrary, hedonistic behaviour by spoiled adolescents under the influence of alcohol was blamed mostly, in conjunction with the mobilizing influence of (social) media and inadequate anticipation by authorities. The film Project X obviously provided a contextual factor, and to this day, events are known as the Haren Project X riots. Van den Brink *et al.* (2013) argue that the Project X film fits in a tradition of adolescent movies and as such resonated with youngsters, but that the film itself played only

a minor role in events on the day itself. In the case of Haren, social media (especially Facebook and YouTube) did play a significant role in mobilizing youngsters. van Dijk *et al.* (2013) make clear that some traditional media (especially radio stations) played an active role in mobilizing for the event and that the media attention and social media activity fed into each other. However, national media attention did not lead to mobilization on a national level: the event in Haren was, as far as visitors were concerned, mainly a regional event. Whereas both traditional and social media played a role in mobilizing for the event, there are no indications that they played a significant role in the violence that erupted.

Van den Brink *et al.* (2013) argue how events in Haren fit with an existing youth culture characterized by drinking, dancing, partying and a craving for intense physical experiences where events function as a kind of 'moral holiday'. The likelihood of violence increases in a context that creates such a 'time out' feeling (van der Linden *et al.* 2004). This type of argument is similar to an explanation of the 2011 England riots as an expression of violent consumerism (e.g. Treadwell *et al.* (2012) suggest that '*consumer culture supplied rioters with a compelling motivation to join the rioting*'). It is clear that the youngsters gathered in Haren for a party and that a lot of alcohol was consumed. Having said that, there are many occasions where youths consume a lot of alcohol without violence erupting and while all of this set the scene for the events that unfolded in Haren, they are still not sufficient to explain the violence that occurred. After all, less than 10 per cent of those that had converged in Haren partook in the violence, meaning that the vast majority did not. These figures are in line with Adang (2011) who found that even in highly escalated situations, a maximum of 10 per cent (and usually much less) of those present are actually violent. At the crossroads, several elements contributed to the opportunity that arose for disturbances to start. Many youngsters gathered at the crossroads because it was close to house of the girl who sent out the original invitation, the place of the so-called party that was widely published on social media. Also, the largest number of media representatives were gathered there. The media served as an attraction point: every time a camera was turned on, a group of youngsters started jumping and singing in front of the camera. By default, this crossroads became the place to be. Where people had arrived individually or in small groups of friends, gradually spontaneously groups of young males formed that synchronized their behaviour by jointly jumping and singing together, at first especially when cameras were turned on, but later independent of camera presence or activity. However, there was nothing to do, there was in fact no party, and everybody seemed to be waiting for things to come. Gradually, the festive atmosphere turned more rowdy: '*People started to get bored and that's one things went wrong. There was nothing to do*' (van den Brink *et al.* 2013: 106).

This was recognized by many of those present, for some of them this was reason to leave, which could be seen as a form of self-selection: those who remained group were looking for excitement. It was also recognized by the police officers who felt increasingly uncomfortable. Van Hasselt (2013) argues that Haren offered an accumulation of risk factors for recreational violence: there were a lot of people under influence with no entertainment and no facilities offered. This does not mean that escalation was inevitable.

Other areas in Haren where hundreds of young people had converged under the influence of alcohol (the designated area, the railway station) were not affected by violence at all, or only after the riots had been displaced as a result of police action. Once the violence escalated, clear (perceived) opportunities presented themselves to be violent with limited risk of retaliation: the number of police present was clearly not capable of controlling the situation. It is impossible to know whether or not a riot would have occurred that day in Haren had the seven riot police officers not arrived on the scene at the crossroads when they did.

Looking at the social context at the crossroads, we would suggest that more and more of the youngsters present started to identify as a common group, even though most of them were unknown to each other. This was mediated via increased synchronicity in joint jumping, singing and chanting. Through the reactions of those present, a kind of spontaneous norm developed about what was acceptable or desired behaviour. The bangs of firework every few minutes were greeted with cheers, as was the climbing of a traffic pole. The occasional throwing of objects, at first random, but later in the general direction of police officers did not meet with disapproval. Whereas at first, the crowd was spread out over the crossroads and neighboring streets, with police moving in between them, later police took up position behind the barrier, separated from the crowd. The police officers did not let themselves be provoked by crowd members, but the separation contributed to an 'us' versus 'them' group perspective. Although an occasional object was thrown in the direction of the officers behind the barrier, there was no pressure at all against the physical barrier or the police line. Occasionally, an officer approached the barrier and talked to one of the individuals present, and on a few occasions, an officer enters the crowd without problem. One could say violence at these unprotected officers was not normative in this situation. Only when the riot police arrived (without doing anything other than taking up position), did this change: violence directed at these officers in full riot gear did seem acceptable and things escalated rapidly. In terms of *opportunity*, our interviews show that it was clear to everyone present that these seven riot police officers were unable to take effective action against the crowd and that arrests had to await the arrival of backup. By that time, violent perpetrators will probably not have had the feeling that arrest was likely in the existing chaos. For some, it was a unique opportunity to be in charge: '*Now the roles are reversed. A kind of spontaneous anarchy. All of the sudden the police is no longer in charge. It was anarchy, the street was in charge and that had to be celebrated*' (van den Brink *et al.* 2013: 110). Most of the 16 youngsters interviewed by van den Brink *et al.* (2013) who were present in Haren were not involved in the violence: in the interviews, they distanced themselves from the violent perpetrators, seeing them as outsiders: '*they look different*', '*they are not from here*', '*it was nasty people*' and '*people from elsewhere with hoods and scarves*' (p. 104). However, other respondents described them as '*normal youths*', young males '*who thought they were tough*', '*not dangerous people*' and '*It is just impulsive behaviour, a kind of mischief*' (p. 105). Many of the respondents stressed the opportunity that existed: '*Now it is just possible, you can just act out*', people were '*throwing stuff at police because they could*', '*the number of police officers was minimal. There was just no authority*'. Those youngsters who did

not participate in the riot were not hostile to police (they were critical of police lack of control of the situation) and often felt sorry for the police who were clearly overwhelmed (van den Brink *et al.* 2013: 109–11).

Although the appearance of the seven riot police officers certainly was directly followed by the escalation, the start of the riot cannot be blamed on disproportionate or undifferentiated police action (crowd conflict is often blamed on police action, e.g. Stott and Reicher 1998), and there is nothing in the interviews or media reports that would indicate the escalation to be a reaction to some kind of frustration or action that was seen as inappropriate by (members of) the crowd. In fact, police was passive before the escalation and remarkably restrained after it. This is confirmed by the interviews with youngsters present (van den Brink *et al.* 2013: 111). It is true that, after police were present in larger numbers following the escalation, some eyewitnesses observed instances of disproportionate use of force by individual police officers and some of the arrested suspects pointed to police use of force as a reason for their own violence. At the same time, however, police officers assisted people who wanted to leave the situation.

Conclusion

This paper sought to address the question how events in Haren escalated, what individual, situational and contextual factors played a role. That a riot erupted in the affluent place of Haren was shocking, Haren is far from a deprived municipality, there was no politically contentious context, nor was there previous antagonism between police and youths. The big question was how and why events unfolded as they did, in a context that was seen as devoid of the usual potential causes for collective violence. Our analysis does not provide a clear-cut answer as to why police were attacked in this 'issueless', seemingly recreational riot. There were no indications that the riot erupted because members of the crowd had grievances against the riot police, or saw them as symbols of state repression. None of the numerous factors mentioned in the media or by authorities (e.g. the film project X, 'Facebook', social media in general, use of alcohol, youth culture, 'hooligans') are in themselves sufficient to explain the causation of the violence. Instead, a mixture of contextual, situational and individual factors played a role.

Our analysis of events and the comparison with the Hoek van Holland riot shows that there is a need to move forward the debate on the role contextual and individual factors play in the initiation and escalation of collective violence. The analysis of events shows that the initiation/escalation model, developed in relation to collective violence in the context of football and protest events, can also be used to explain other types of collective violence, such as the recreational project X riot in Haren. The importance to distinguish between initiation and escalation of violence is confirmed. In this case, escalation was quite sudden and triggered by the arrival of seven riot police officers, but this was preceded by an on-scene initiation process lasting more than two hours, where no real starting point could be discerned (the first evidence of an object being thrown occurred 1 hour and 37 minutes before the escalation). The situation at the crossroads presented an opportunity for those wishing to be violent with the following ingredients: youth culture, darkness, alcohol, the number of people present and inadequate measures by authorities. Some took advantage of the opportunity that presented itself, or helped

create that opportunity. Research into the 2011 England riots also pointed to the importance of opportunity (e.g. Guardian/LSE 2011; Morell *et al.* 2011). However, the opportunity present in Haren was not enough in itself to trigger escalation (even in combination with the preceding group formation). Something had to happen first before isolated acts of object throwing could turn into collective violence. It was the spontaneous 'charging' or build-up process that took place within the gathered crowd before the arrival of the seven riot police officers who made escalation ever more likely. In the course of this process, those taking initiatives received support and felt supported, and spontaneous norms about acceptable or expected behaviour seemed to develop. A process of self-selection occurred as those that felt uncomfortable with the changing atmosphere left. Other stayed, curious to see what would happen. As evidenced by synchronous jumping, singing and chanting, a social identity developed within the crowd, distinct from the police. The withdrawal of the police from the crowd and their taking up position behind barriers (well before the escalation) contributed to a setting where police and the crowd were not only physically but also psychologically separated from one another, contributing to an us versus them situation.

The contextual factors contributing to the escalation fit very well with the ESIM (e.g. Reicher 1984; 1996). At the same time, only a minority of those present actively involved themselves, showing the variability in the readiness to be involved in violence. The build-up involved spontaneous group formation of young males not necessarily knowing each other beforehand, but fitting with the *young male syndrome*. For those who were actively involved in the violence, our analysis shows that many of the violent perpetrators were first offenders without previously being prosecuted and with minimal previous police contacts. They seemed to be influenced especially by the contextual factors that were conducive to participation. Arrested suspects (or their lawyers) overwhelmingly indicated they were 'dragged along' and acting under the influence of alcohol. Of course, this could be seen as self-serving attempts to minimize their own involvement and even those that played a more prominent role or were more actively involved in creating a situation that could lead to escalation often used this excuse. The analysis of suspects however also suggests that a small minority (those most actively involved in the violence according to video evidence), were not simply representative of Dutch young males in general. Fifteen arrestees who had been in the frontline of the violence had been prosecuted before for violent felonies, and seven had been brought to justice at least four times. Some also displayed problem behaviour at school and/or at home. For these arrestees, aggressive and violent behaviour is not limited to event settings alone but is both continuous (from childhood into young adulthood) and consistent (in various settings). Information indicative of psychopathology (mainly ADHD) is present more often for arrestees compared to the estimated Dutch national average.

These findings mirror results of Farrington (2006), who studied individuals repeatedly being involved in public disorder, and Russell (Russell 1995; Russell and Arms 1995; 1998) who concluded that those likely to escalate a crowd disturbance may be characterized as impulsive or sensation seeking compared to those who are not. More generally within criminology, evidence is emerging that predispositions are related to the etiology of antisocial and aggressive acts (e.g. Raine 1993; Rowe

2001; Portnoy *et al.* 2013). Psychopathology in general, childhood ADHD psychopathology, current ADHD and increased impulsivity measures are specifically related to an increased risk of committing reactive violence (Helfritz and Stanford 2006; Retz and Rösler 2010). This suggests predispositions are of influence on (individual) riot behaviour.

This is not to say that we favor simplistic (and often ideologically driven) *riff-raff* theories of collective violence (cf. Reicher 2001). Our analysis of the project X riot clearly indicates the important role social context (including actions by authorities) played and it was not the case, as authorities initially assumed, that the escalation was the result of premeditated and organized action by hooligans. On the contrary, a relatively low number of arrestees had previous convictions. The contrast with the Hoek van Holland beach riot, where hard core hooligans were involved in premeditated violence, clearly illustrates the difference. Comparing the Project X public disorder to the Hoek van Holland beach riot suggests the existence of two different types of perpetrators at different ends of a continuum: incidental public order offenders and notorious troublemakers. Both types of perpetrators seem to differ not only in their frequency of offending but also qualitatively, i.e. in the extent to which contextual influences and predispositions influence public disorder behaviour. Each riot situation presents a unique intergroup context and, looking at the initiation/escalation model, has its own unique and dynamic mix of different (sub)groups with different social identities and with the presence or absence of young males of varying propensities and social backgrounds in situations with (potential) frictions and opportunities. The contribution of this paper, and of the initiation/escalation model, is that it helps to integrate different theories and to pay attention to the interactional and individual aspects of riots that usually receive less emphasis (Newburn 2015: 49). Further study into the characteristics of individuals who are repeatedly involved in public disorder is needed to further develop theory. This is a challenging enterprise, given that it is difficult to gather the necessary data.

05.
Planned hooligan fights

Contributing factors and significance for individuals who take part

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Abstract

Several European countries have recently been confronted with mutually arranged confrontations between hooligan groups in a predesignated setting. This article explores the significance of this form of collective violence for those involved and how this relates to existing collective violence theory. In addition to international and national questionnaires and subsequent in-depth interviews with police officials, two case studies were conducted and compared with a 'regular' (not mutually arranged) hooligan confrontation. We also assessed the criminal history and psychological traits of individuals participating in mutually arranged fights (n = 38) and individuals taking part in a regular confrontation (n = 76). Our results indicate that the meaning of mutually arranged confrontations differs importantly from that of spontaneous collective violence. Furthermore, data indicate that criminal career measures differ between individuals who are involved in mutually arranged confrontations and spontaneous collective violence. Theoretical implications are discussed.

Key words: *hooliganism, mutually arranged confrontations, collective violence, psychological traits*

Introduction

Since the 1980s, violent confrontations between supporter groups in and around football stadiums, endangering both those directly involved as well as other spectators, have been a source of concern (Dunning et al., 1986). In broad terms, three explanations have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. Taylor (1971) focused on the crumbling traditional relationship between football clubs and the working-class community from the 1960s onwards, which led to resistance from this particular fan base, who subsequently engaged in confrontations with rival fans and the police. Marsh (1978) focused upon the intragroup dynamics and the rituals and performance of violence within hooligan groups, whereas the Leicester School emphasized the emergence of a working-class subculture in which behaviour was underpinned by uncivilized moral standards (Dunning et al., 1988).

Explanations for violent confrontations around football that take a class approach are widely rejected nowadays (Dunning, 2000; Taylor, 1987). This also goes for so-called convergence explanations of collective violence in general, which focus on the criminal and deviant character of those involved (Ball and Drury, 2012; Reicher, 2001). Instead, explanations of collective violence have taken a group-dynamic discourse, to which the concept of social identity is central (Reicher, 2001). From this perspective, precipitating incidents (trigger events) may result in the emergence of an individual's self-understanding as a member of a group. Subsequently, an accentuation of perceived similarities (with the in-group) and differences (from the out-group) may serve as a catalyst for violent collective action, with situation-specific norms guiding group and individual behaviour (Postmes and Spears, 1998; Reicher, 2001). The social identity perspective, then, provides meaning to collective violence by pointing to specific circumstances in which a social identity may become salient, making escalation against another group whose behaviour is seen as illegitimate more likely. A role of individual characteristics of those involved in collective violence is explicitly dismissed (Reicher, 2001).

In line with this group-dynamic discourse, the long-term declining trend of football-related disorder has been explained by improvements in the policing of crowds (Cleland and Cashmore, 2016). At the same time, various authors have pointed out an apparent increase in mutually arranged violent confrontations between hooligan groups away from the stadium and outside of match days (Cleland and Cashmore, 2016; Jewell et al., 2014). These fights are characterized by mutual consultation between the two parties involved, at a minimum about time and place. Furthermore, arrangements may be made with regard to the wearing of distinctive clothing and informal codes of legitimate action, such as group size and the fighting rules participants are required or expected to adhere to (Adang, 1999; Spaaij, 2007). Also, the fight may be recorded by individuals who are part of the participating groups but who are not involved in the fight itself. [32]

Prior studies indicate that hooligan groups consist of individuals who are regularly involved in violence, both in groups and alone (Piquero et al., 2015; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). Furthermore, individuals belonging to such groups have been observed to seek out opportunities to behave violently around football matches (for example, Adang, 2011). This may lead to the assumption that it is particularly individuals inclined to behave violently who participate in mutually arranged confrontations. Thus far, prior empirical work has an exclusive focus on 'regular' confrontations. Consequently, the question remains whether mutually arranged confrontations merely reflect a difference on a continuum from completely spontaneous to fully planned collective violence, or whether the contributing factors to mutually arranged confrontations differ from the antagonistic relationships around which 'regular' confrontations revolve. Therefore, the current article aims to provide insight into whether and to what extent (individuals participating in) mutually arranged confrontations differ from (those participating in) 'regular' confrontations and how this fits with existing theories on football violence, specifically the social identity perspective.

Theoretical considerations

From the 1960s onwards, scholars aimed to explain collective violence by providing a link between individuals, their actions in crowds and the context in which these actions arise (Reicher, 2001). The social identity perspective on collective violence emerged as a counterpart to then popular convergence explanations stressing the role of individual characteristics. Within the social identity perspective, trigger events and their resulting intergroup dynamics are assumed to facilitate group forming and the emerging of antagonistic relationships between groups. More specifically, it is argued that, in an associated context, an individual thinks, feels and behaves in accordance with the group he/she identifies with (Reicher, 2001).

Prior empirical work supports this line of thought. For instance, individual behaviour in violent crowds usually is aimed at and limited to the party held responsible for a certain course of events, and violent behaviour tends to remain within the boundaries defined as appropriate by the groups with which individuals identify (Drury and Reicher, 1999, 2000; Reicher, 1984, 1987, 1996). The specific strengths of social identity theory are its ability to explain the rapidity with which consensus within

32 Footage of arranged confrontations can be found online, for instance, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjU2S01wya0 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OqB6_BFEFIQ (accessed 2 June 2020).

crowds can arise and why any person may come to act violently in crowds (Reicher, 2001; Terry et al., 1999). However, even in the face of trigger events and intergroup dynamics gravitating towards collective violence, only a minority of the individuals present actually involve themselves in violent behaviour (Adang, 2011). Such variations in the willingness to participate in collective violence, as well as actively seeking opportunities for violence in collective settings, remain unaccounted for by social identity theory.

Prior empirical work shows that differences in offensive action tendencies in crowds can be traced back to the social categories with which individuals identify, the content of these categories, and the persons prototypical thereof (Herrera and Reicher, 1998; Reicher and Hopkins, 1996a, b; Reicher and Sani, 1998; Sani and Reicher, 1998, 1999), as well as the extent to which individuals experience anger (Levy et al., 2017; Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). This indicates that cognitive processes, especially those that deal with the processing of social cues, and their resultant emotions may play a key role in collective violence involvement (also see Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). Consequently, a common ground between the social identity perspective and the convergence explanations it dismisses may be found in the way group identification dynamics and personal characteristics interact.

Previously, the so-called 'young male' syndrome has been linked to collective violence involvement (Adang, 2011). This syndrome refers to a high prevalence of risk-taking and criminal behaviours among males between 15 and 35 years of age, particularly in the presence of like-minded peers (Tamás et al., 2019). At the same time, pointing towards demographic characteristics (sex: male, age: young) is too unspecific, particularly because by far the larger part of young males do not engage in this type of risk-taking and antisocial behaviour. Given the relatively high prevalence among hard-core hooligans of, in particular, traits associated with violent behaviour – such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), emotion-regulation deficits, heightened impulsivity, sensation-seeking behaviour and antisocial tendencies – such traits have been implicated in repeated and continuous participation in collective violence (Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015; Russell, 2004). In addition, the presence of antisocial tendencies has been found to contribute to positive attitudes towards violent behaviour, such as the belief that violence is acceptable or that violence contributes to self-esteem and social image (Huesmann and Guerra, 1997; Slaby and Guerra, 1988). The inclusion of individual psychological characteristics in explanations of involvement in collective violence therefore may provide a more detailed picture of who participates in collective violence and why.

Spectator violence around football matches manifests itself in the form of competitive violence between socially organized fan groups (Spaaij, 2007). Among such groups, a degree of shared identity exists both within countries and across societies, which revolves around 'their explicit interest in violent confrontation with rival fan groups' (Spaaij, 2008: 373). However, improvements in stadium management and the increased risks of arrest, mean there are limited opportunities to behave violently around football matches and at stadium grounds. Arguably, this has led hooligan groups to seek alternatives in confronting one another (Cleland and Cashmore, 2016; Jewell et al., 2014). Given the specific context in which mutually arranged confrontations occur and the actions required from individuals to

organize these fights, a process of self-selection may occur. This suggests that individual characteristics may have value in explaining this type of collective violence. At the same time, prior studies demonstrate that mutually arranged confrontations are more than just an outlet for the violent tendencies of those taking part. In 1997, a pre-arranged and well-organized confrontation between rival hard-core sides (Ajax and Feyenoord) took place in the Netherlands; this confrontation resulted in the death of one Ajax-supporting participant and in several participants on both sides getting seriously wounded. A case study of this confrontation by Kerr and De Kock (2002) indicated that specific events further increased an already existing antagonistic relationship between the hard-core sides involved, which subsequently served as a motive for a mutually arranged confrontation between these groups. Although not mentioned as such by Kerr and De Kock (2002), their account of these events fits social identity theory by referring to trigger events and intergroup dynamics to explain why these groups confronted one another. Groups that participate in mutually arranged confrontations seem to adhere to a priori set rules (Adang, 1999), and the death of an Ajax-supporting participant in the case studied by Kerr and De Kock (2002) was recognized by participants as a clear and unwelcome transgression of these rules. Because violent behaviour during mutually arranged confrontations tends to remain within predefined boundaries, this indicates another link between individuals' behaviour and the group the individual identifies with, which is also in line with social identity theory.

It has been argued that the predefined boundaries around mutually arranged confrontations provide a relatively safe domain for displaying aggression while at the same time maintaining an image of the hooligan culture as exciting (Adang, 1999; Kerr and De Kock, 2002; Spaaij, 2006). This suggests that specific values of the hooligan culture may add significance for those who participate in mutually arranged confrontations. Spaaij (2008) has identified six fundamental features of the hooligan subculture. First, violence in the football context is associated with individual peak experiences, such as excitement and pleasurable emotional arousal. This may equally apply to mutually arranged confrontations (see Kerr and De Kock, 2002). Second, individual and collective reputations may be managed by putting oneself in dangerous situations regardless of potential physical injuries. In this regard, it is of particular relevance that mutually arranged confrontations may be more often concerned with establishing or maintaining a collective reputation than with resolving ongoing conflicts (Newson, 2017). Third, territorial identifications are considered a fundamental feature of the hooligan culture. This refers to defending territory such as the stadium or surrounding grounds and invading rivals' territory. However, since mutually arranged confrontations usually take place outside of football grounds (Giulianotti and Armstrong, 2002), this feature of the hooligan culture appears to be of less relevance. Fourth, the hooligan culture has been described as providing a sense of solidarity and belonging owing to the shared collective experiences. Indeed, peer groups may accommodate an individual's need for prestige, status or sense of security (Crosnoe and McNeely, 2008; Megens and Weerman, 2010). At the same time, this results in interdependence between individual interest and group membership, which may manifest itself in peer pressure to take part in violent confrontations (King, 2001). Fifth, hard

masculinity – a social construct that is primarily based on physical prowess, fighting ability and physical health – is considered a fundamental feature of the hooligan culture (Spaaij, 2008). Sixth and finally, representations of sovereignty and autonomy are reflected in attempts to manipulate, disrupt or circumvent security regimes (Spaaij, 2008). From this perspective, mutually arranged confrontations may be seen as an unintended consequence of police measures aimed at reducing football-related violence.

Taken together, the current literature seems to indicate that – in addition to satisfying individual needs for excitement and sensation – mutually arranged confrontations are a way of establishing, maintaining and increasing status within the hooligan subculture. A shared social identity on the one hand appears to provide a platform for violence while on the other hand restricting it. Violence, within certain limits, may be experienced as something good and desirable. First, this suggests that self-selection into mutually arranged confrontations may be stronger compared with that into spontaneous acts of collective violence and that, consequently, the individual characteristics of those participating may diverge depending on the context in which collective violence comes to be. Second, the current literature suggests that, unlike in spontaneous acts of collective violence, although a trigger event and antagonistic relations between groups may provoke mutually arranged confrontations they are no prerequisite. This implies that contributing factors at the individual (psychological characteristics) and contextual level (trigger events, intergroup relationships) around mutually arranged confrontations diverge from those around spontaneous collective violence. Contrary to social identity theory (Reicher, 2001), this implies that offender characteristics may not be completely irrelevant when explaining collective violence.

Current study

Despite regular references to mutually arranged confrontations (Adang, 1999; Giulianotti and Armstrong, 2002; Newson, 2017; Spaaij, 2007), to our knowledge only one empirical study into this matter has been conducted (Kerr and De Kock, 2002). This study, however, has several limitations. First, the data available for analysis were limited to newspaper reports and a few minutes of grainy publicly available camera footage that recorded part of the events from a distance of more than 100 metres. Second, their case study dates back to an event that occurred in 1997, leaving open the option that there have been changes in the hooligan subculture. Third, no attempt was made to systematically compare the confrontation under scrutiny with 'regular' collective violence between hooligan groups. In the current study, the context in which mutually arranged confrontations occur is addressed on the basis of more recent data and compared with a 'regular' not mutually arranged confrontation around a football match.

Methodology

Data

There was no realistic possibility of conducting participative observation or to interview individuals involved in mutually arranged confrontations. Although potential respondents were approached for interviews, the media attention on this topic at the time of the study resulted in restraint

among potential respondents. Consequently, information provided by the police and related parties was the only reasonable alternative. An implication is that data are based on information from secondary sources and not on information from participants themselves. This means that no first-hand information was available about participants' experience of mutually arranged confrontations and their motives for taking part (for example, excitement, peer pressure). As a result, in this study we were dependent on the impressions and experiences of expert respondents, which possibly may have led to bias with regard to participant experiences and motives. Figure 1 displays the various data sources used for the study. In the following paragraphs, these data sources are further explained.

Figure 1. Overview of the data sources used in the current study

Source		Method
European National Football Information Points (n=13)		International questionnaire
Overt police (n=24)	Covert police (n=11)	National questionnaire
Overt police (n=3)	Covert police (n=6)	Additional in-depth interviews
2012	2015	Case study (mutually arranged confrontations)
Police (n=3)	Police (n=2)	Additional in-depth interviews
Document analysis		Case study (comparison)
Arranged confrontation sample (n=38)	Comparison sample (n=76)	Offender analysis

International and national questionnaire

In 2016, an international questionnaire was sent out by the Dutch National Football Information Point (NFIP) of the Dutch National Police to officials from other European NFIPs to assess whether other European countries also face mutually arranged confrontations. Of the 15 officials from 13 countries who responded, 7 reported experiences with mutually arranged confrontations. Also in 2016, a questionnaire was sent out to Dutch police officers who had security and public order around professional football within their remit and to police professionals involved in gathering covert information on these topics. A total of 35 national questionnaires – of which 11 were from police officers involved in gathering covert information – were returned. The number of football clubs about which information was obtained was assessed as a measure of representativeness. This showed that (at least one) questionnaire was returned for 31 out of the then 35 football clubs (89 percent) playing professional football in the Netherlands. The national questionnaires provided information on involvement in mutually arranged confrontation of supporter groups linked to 25 of those football clubs. In both the international and national questionnaires, respondents were asked about observed trends, developments and implications for public order policing. Following the international and national surveys, semi-structured interviews were held with six foreign and nine Dutch police officials (of whom six worked covertly). Topics that were discussed in the interviews aligned with the topics addressed in the questionnaires. Interviews therefore mainly served to provide additional information on the answers respondents had already provided in writing.

Case studies

At the time the study was conducted, the Dutch NFIP had gained knowledge of 47 mutually arranged confrontations in the Netherlands concerning the years 2009–13. Of these confrontations, 31 had actually materialized and 16 were either prevented by the police or cancelled by the groups involved themselves. However, to our knowledge, only one of the fights that materialized – between supporters of PSV and Roda JC Kerkrade (2012) – resulted in arrests and a police investigation. Therefore, this case was included in the current study. Information on more recent mutually arranged confrontations was provided in May 2016 by the Dutch police. Information covered 5 out of 35 (14 percent) Dutch clubs playing professional football and led to information on 17 additional mutually arranged confrontations, of which 8 were prevented or did not occur. To our knowledge only 1 of the other 9 cases, a mutually arranged confrontation between supporters of SC Heerenveen and FC Groningen (2015), resulted in arrests and a police investigation. Consequently, this case was also included for case analysis.

Several criteria led to these cases being labelled as mutually arranged confrontations. In both cases, police investigations revealed contacts between the leaders of the groups involved prior to the confrontation. Furthermore, information was found in these case files on rules that were set prior to the confrontations, including group size, clothing to distinguish groups from one another and 'rules of engagement'. However, with only two police investigations conducted into a total of 40 confrontations that actually occurred, available recent empirical data are limited. Various suspects in the case files that were studied refused to make a statement and invoked their right to remain silent, further illustrating the challenge of gathering empirical data on this topic. To add to the material from the criminal investigations that were conducted (which contained transcripts of police interviews with suspects and witnesses, wiretap reports of suspects' phone conversations, digital data from seized mobile phones – such as WhatsApp and text messages – and/or camera footage), we also conducted semi-structured interviews with police personnel involved in these criminal investigations (n = 5).[33]

Comparison case

During the match between FC Utrecht and FC Twente on 4 December 2011, fireworks were thrown from the visitors' section towards the FC Utrecht family section. A number of FC Utrecht supporters reacted furiously to this event and tried to reach the stand holding the visiting FC Twente supporters. Owing to the stewards in the stadium, they did not succeed. In a second attempt, about 80–100 FC Utrecht supporters then tried to reach the visitors' stand from outside the stadium, resulting in a violent confrontation with police officers. No specific information that supporter groups would seek the confrontation with each other had been present prior to the match and generally the fireworks thrown towards the family section were considered to be the trigger event. For the comparison case, police were confident the individuals arrested represented those responsible and/or involved in the violence. Furthermore, the comparison case was extensively investigated by an external commission that conducted a document analysis in relation to this match, held 26 interviews with the parties involved in

33 No interviews with those involved in the confrontations were conducted. Quotes from those involved thus come from (transcripts of) police interviews that were held as part of a criminal investigation.

football safety around this specific match and reviewed police documentation of arrested suspects (Auditteam Voetbal en Veiligheid, 2012).

Offender analysis

In both the 2012 and 2015 mutually arranged confrontations, about 40–50 individuals were involved. However, not all individuals were arrested for their involvement. Based on the information available in the police files, we, as researchers, established the involvement of 38 people (*mutually arranged confrontation sample*). Our data are limited to these individuals. Involvement was determined based on their being caught redhanded, reading digital communications and telecommunication history, viewing camera footage, obtaining covert information and recording suspects' communication by secretly placed equipment. In addition, information on 76 individuals involved in the comparison case was collected (*comparison sample*).

To assess an individual's criminal career history, the police registration system HKS (Dutch: Herkenningsdienstsysteem) was consulted. The HKS contains information on every suspect detained by the Dutch police and the indictable offences involved, and it has been suitable for scientific research since 1996 (Bijleveld, 2007).[34] Given that the minimum age for legal responsibility is 12 in the Netherlands, criminal career information may be incomplete for the nine subjects who were born before 1984. In order to assess psychological characteristics, we turned to available police, Probation Service and forensic psychological data. These data largely rely on information provided by the individuals themselves, by their family or by professionals aware of the individual's personal situation, and they do not entail validated clinical assessments of psychological characteristics. Consequently, the current study uses behavioural indicators as proxies for psychological characteristics. However, because not all behavioural indicators may be recorded as such, this strategy implies a risk of false negatives. Table 1 presents the behavioural indicators focused upon and references indicative of their presence. We explored whether significant differences emerged in relation to criminal career and psychological trait measures between the mutually arranged confrontation and comparison samples by utilizing Chi-square and *t*-tests.

Table 1. Behavioral indicators and information indicative of their presence

Behavioral indicators	Information indicative of presence
Antisocial features	Diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder or suspicions thereof
Attention/hyperactivity features	Diagnosis of ADHD or suspicions thereof Required use of prescription drugs (Concerta, Ritalin)
Heightened impulsivity	Often acting impulsively Needing to learn 'to count to ten' Act before thinking (especially in stressful situations)
Emotion-regulation deficits	Having followed training to control aggression Suffering from tantrums or outbursts To be of explosive or angered character
Sensation seeking features	Showing an increased need for excitement Looking for exciting situations Getting a kick out of or loving exciting situations

34 Information that was registered in the HKS since 1 January 2010 has been migrated to the BVI/BOSZ system. Therefore, these systems were also consulted.

Results

Contributing factors

Of the covertly working police officials, only two respondents mention the need to settle a score or extreme rivalry between hooligan groups supporting different teams from the same region as a significant contributing factor in arranged confrontations. The majority indicate that they do not consider trigger events or antagonistic relationships between the groups involved to be the main reason for the occurrence of these fights. Subsequent interviews with six respondents working covertly further illustrate this point of view. They report that mutually arranged confrontations also occur between hooligan groups whose clubs have never played against one another and between whom no troubles are known of. [35] Respondents mention social media in this respect, which allows hooligan groups to easily contact each other without having to have ever physically met during football matches.

Survey data of the Dutch police professionals responsible for security and public order around professional football and European NFIP representatives further emphasize the role of the group's reputation. One respondent notes that taking on a bigger club especially adds to the reputation of the group: 'one does not want to lose to the little one, while the other gains status by taking on that specific big one.' Respondents further elaborate on this matter by referring to the existence of an informal ranking revolving around the collective reputation of hooligan groups. Collective reputation in this regard is dependent on whether groups are able to mobilize enough people, to show up and fight, adhere to the rules and come out the winner. In addition, some point to the posting of footage of the confrontation in (private) social media communities as a way to enhance a group's status. Their answers furthermore indicate that confrontations may be arranged by leading members of the older hard cores to provide the young cores with an opportunity to gain status, or that these confrontations may be organized by young hard-core groups themselves with the same objective in mind.

The foregoing indicates that mutually arranged confrontations predominantly are not the result of antagonistic relationships or trigger events. Most often, survey data indicate that a need for excitement (n = 6) or to defend the collective reputation of the hooligan group involved or the town from which they originate (n = 4) are perceived to underlie the occurrence of a mutually arranged confrontation. Rather than being spontaneous and prompted by feelings of hostility and anger, the motivations of arranged confrontations appear to be more distant, not only fulfilling participants' current need for excitement but also securing or increasing the long-term subcultural standing of the group as a whole. At times these motivations coincide. This is illustrated by hooligan groups recruiting outsiders to participate in arranged confrontations in order to be able to mobilize a fighting group of respectable size and with sufficient fighting ability to increase the likelihood of winning confrontations, with the purpose of safeguarding or increasing the group's collective reputation. According to the respondents interviewed, these outside recruits usually are individuals who have shown that they are willing and capable to fight, for instance those skilled in martial arts.

Our case study information also illustrates the importance of excitement and collective reputation. Audio recordings made secretly by

35 In June 2018, for instance, footage surfaced online of a confrontation between supporter groups linked to a Dutch club and a German club that had never played one another. The footage referred to can be found at https://www.dumpert.nl/item/7444327_02de1fb9 (accessed 1 June 2020).

the police in the aftermath of the arranged confrontation in the 2015 case file indicate that participants derive pleasurable feelings from participating in the arranged confrontation, revealing that suspects regarded the confrontation as 'a top fight' and labelled it as 'cool'. During subsequent police interrogations, one suspect explicitly acknowledged that he likes to fight: 'I think it's a kick. It may not be the right word, but it feels good. I love it.' Furthermore, in both the 2012 and 2015 cases, no current or historical troubles between the supporter groups involved were known of. For the 2015 case, WhatsApp conversations obtained in the criminal investigation indicated that an individual with a leading role in an older generation firm feels that 'the youngsters should earn a reputation'. To this end, he arranged fights with other groups, including the 2015 confrontation. The relevance attributed to collective reputation is also underscored by the reaction of FC Groningen hard-core members to the fact that, contrary to agreements, at least one individual in their group had used a weapon. A police-recorded conversation shows that some of those involved – including the group leader, who had been making arrangements – felt the use of a weapon might result in damage to the collective reputation of their group and in a decrease in the willingness of other groups to confront them. Therefore, they are determined to identify and punish those who had transgressed the collective norm.

Finally, our comparison case shows that – despite some prior incidents (that is, violence against FC Utrecht players by FC Twente supporters) – there seemed to be no current tensions between the supporter groups involved. Disturbances appeared to be triggered by FC Twente supporters repeatedly throwing fireworks towards FC Utrecht supporters in the family stand. A spontaneously formed group of enraged FC Utrecht supporters then tried to reach the area where the FC Twente supporters were located and from where the fireworks had been thrown. The view that the hostilities were generated by the circumstances is further substantiated by the outcome of the police investigation, which indicated that the violence could not be related to specific, already existing groups of problematic supporters or the presence of identifiable 'leaders' or so-called 'key hooligans' who played an important connecting or leading role in orchestrating the violence.

Rituals surrounding collective violence

In the survey and subsequent interviews, respondents specifically mentioned the involvement of hooligan groups or groups of fanatical supporters in mutually arranged confrontations. Some, in addition, explicitly stated that only a very small proportion of the hooligans known to the police participated in these fights. From the respondents' answers it can be deduced that individuals participating in mutually arranged confrontations often frequent pubs known to be patronized by hard-core supporter groups, have identifying tattoos linking them to the hard core or are designated by the police as hard-core members. Furthermore, several respondents stated that international bonds of friendship between hooligan groups may result in several hooligan groups confronting others together. For instance, friendship ties between supporters of Dutch and Belgian football clubs were mentioned. One of the respondents explicitly stated that they considered mutually arranged fights and the individuals participating in them to belong to a specific hooligan subculture to which many unwritten rules apply.

According to survey and interview data, mutually arranged confrontations mainly take place at remote 'neutral' places (for example, forests, industrial sites and large parking lots). Thus, mutually arranged confrontations mostly cannot be traced back to territorial identifications. Survey and interview data, however, also indicate that – in addition to agreement about time and location – clear terms are set in advance about the number of people (per group) that will participate and the use of weapons. Our data suggest that the use of weapons is generally not accepted and that other 'rules of engagement' are used (for example, when someone is lying on the ground they are to be left alone). The 2012 case file contains footage indicating that, prior to the actual fighting, group sizes were checked, which was followed by shouting "*it's fair, it's fair, we'll take you on, we'll take you on*" and by the two groups physically confronting one another. In addition, the police investigation revealed that, when planning the confrontation, both parties agreed that the fight would stop if "*things go too far*". Furthermore, although suspects in the 2015 case investigation invoked their right to remain silent with regard to their involvement, they did make statements about the illicit use of a weapon by one of their own, illustrating their disapproval: "*I think it is outrageous that someone has been stabbed. I am strongly against this*", "*stabbing is a cowardly deed that does not fit*" and "*I heard that someone has been stabbed with a knife, I am quite shocked*". Although these answers may have been socially desirable in an interrogation setting, also from the secret recording in a suspect's car it becomes clear that, by using a weapon, a collective norm had been transgressed: "*Using a knife goes way too far. Together we should talk about that.*" Rather than being impulsive and uncontrolled, mutually arranged confrontations are thus characterized by strict norms in the run-up to the confrontation, in the actual confrontation and in its aftermath. The provision of a relatively safe domain in which to display aggression represents sovereignty and autonomy. These aspects of the hooligan subculture are also reflected in the fact that the police, according to respondents, generally are not aware of when and where these confrontations will take place.

Survey and interview data also relate to the behaviour that is expected from individuals who associate with hooligan groups: "*Individuals have to be there, and they can't say that they don't want to fight*". Although survey and interview data with regard to expected behaviour may be subject to bias owing to their second-hand nature, they are substantiated by case file information that shows intergroup solidarity and the mutual agreement of groups and the individuals who are a part of it to fight. For instance, camera footage of the 2012 confrontation showed that, once the fighting had stopped, individuals belonging to both groups gave one another high-fives and briefly embraced before walking back in the direction they had come from. Furthermore, one suspect in the 2015 case stated to the police officers first to arrive on the scene – thus outside of an interrogation setting – that mutually arranged confrontations are something "*that happen between people wanting the same: just taking each other on, and then it's over.*" In addition, the police investigation reveals that, after the 2015 confrontation, leaders of both cores expressed their satisfaction. A microphone secretly placed in a suspect's car recorded a participant in the confrontation saying "*I shook hands with one of the leaders and a few more boys shook hands. And*

then it was just nicely finished". Survey and interview data additionally suggest that taking part in arranged confrontations may result in individuals being 'rewarded' – for example, by allowing them to visibly identify with the hooligan group from then on by wearing a particular tattoo – and as such contribute to the individual's standing and reputation in the group.

Collective and individual reputation management, as well as excitement, seem to underlie mutually arranged confrontations, but case file information also allows for the hypothesis that individuals may feel pressured to participate. Although suspects in interrogations may try to reduce their responsibility vis-à-vis the police, their statements suggest that resorting to violence may sometimes be perceived as necessary: "*I drove them there, while I knew they wanted to fight. When I was in the car, turning back was not an option.*" In addition, anecdotal stories from police officers imply that individuals whose performance during the confrontation is considered insufficient may be punished (for example, being beaten up, being outcast or not being allowed to watch matches from the same stand in the stadium). Given the anecdotal nature of the data gathered in the current study, the data do not permit statements about the frequency of such punishments, or whether punishments may result from other behaviour (such as the leaking of information about confrontations).

Taken together, the survey data, interviews and case studies illustrate that individuals may be intrinsically motivated to participate in mutually arranged confrontations. At the same time, these data give room to the hypothesis that perceived pressure to meet norms of hooligan culture may play a role in an individual's decision to participate. The lack of first-hand information about participants' experiences and motives for participating, however, necessitates caution with regard to this matter. At the same time, the findings in our comparison case are starkly different, because, in their attempt to reach the visiting supporters, provoked FC Utrecht supporters used violence against the authorities – notably stewards (in the stadium) and the police (outside the stadium). Suspects in the comparison case also reacted less rationally when confronted with footage of their behaviour and some appeared genuinely shocked. Asked about their motives and thoughts at the time by the police judge, they stated they had *"just been angry with the FC Twente supporters*" and they had *" not thought things through*". This strongly contrasts with the premeditated and regulated nature of the violence displayed during mutually arranged confrontations.

Offender characteristics

Mutually arranged confrontations appear to stem from a specific subculture of which violence is a core aspect. Furthermore, to strengthen collective reputation, individuals with a known status of being capable of violence are recruited to participate in mutually arranged confrontations. Therefore, we expect that individuals participating in such fights more often have a violent criminal history (both solo and in groups) compared with individuals involved in 'regular' hooligan confrontations. By extension, we also expect higher levels of behavioural indicators associated with violent offending for the mutually arranged confrontation sample.

Table 2 provides a comparative analysis with regard to criminal career measures of the mutually arranged confrontation and comparison samples.

Table 2. Criminal career characteristics of mutually arranged confrontation and comparison sample.

	Mutually arranged confrontation sample (n=38)	Comparison sample (n=76)
Measures	%	%
Criminal career		
% with prior criminal history**	84	53
% with prior violent offending**	84	39
% with prior individual violent offending**	58	26
% with prior collective violence offending**	66	29
Measures	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Criminal career		
Age at moment of involvement*	25.5 (4.6)	22.9 (6.9)
Prior offenses	4.6 (6.4)	2.5 (6.5)
Prior violent offenses**	3.1 (3.0)	1.3 (3.6)
Prior individual violent offenses	1.4 (1.7)	0.8 (2.3)
Prior collective violence offenses**	1.7 (1.9)	0.5 (1.5)
Measures	%	%
Psychological traits		
Antisocial features	5	5
Attention/hyperactivity features	13	9
Emotion-regulation deficits	18	20
Heightened impulsivity	16	12
Sensation-seeking features	8	7

*p<.05 **p<.01

From Table 1 it can be seen that the mean age of the mutually arranged confrontation sample is significantly higher ($p < .03$) than that of the comparison sample. Chi-square analyses indicated that the prevalence of general as well as violent offending was significantly higher ($p < .01$) in the mutually arranged confrontation sample than in the comparison sample. At the same time, however, prior violent offending in the comparison sample (39 percent) proved not to be an exception. The higher level of prior violent offending in the mutually arranged confrontation sample appeared to be related to their significantly ($p < .01$) higher level of collective violence offending rather than to individual violent offending.[36] Finally, contrary to our expectations, the prevalence of individual traits associated with violent behaviour did not differ between the two samples.

Results from the conducted analyses fit with the image that emerges from the surveys and interviews, indicating that it is particularly individuals who are used to committing violence – whether alone or in a group – who participate in mutually arranged confrontations. The absence of differences between the mutually arranged confrontation sample and the comparison sample with regard to the presence of psychological traits may be explained by the fact that, in the comparison case, arrested individuals were located in the same stand as hard-core supporters. This may be linked to an interest in hooligan culture to say the least, a line of thinking that is underscored by the comparison case report. This report notes that some of those arrested may be described as the new generation of hooligans. This may also explain why a large proportion of those arrested (39 percent) had been involved in violence prior to taking part in this specific incident.

36 **Due to probable violations of normality, we conducted a robustness check by running the Welch *t*-test. Findings from these checks indicated that results remained significant. Therefore, we assume that our results are robust to violations of the assumption of normality. Furthermore, also when accounting for age, by calculating the mean number of offenses per life year, differences in frequency of offending remained significant.**

Discussion

The current article has examined to what extent the meanings attributed to the participants' violence overlap when spontaneous and mutually organized acts of collective violence are compared, who participates in these different types of collective violence, and how this relates to the currently dominant theoretical views on this topic.

In line with the social identity perspective, our data show that the groups involved in mutually arranged confrontations have common norms that are actively enforced when these are transgressed by individuals participating in these fights. At the same time, in contrast to our comparison case and a wide body of literature on spontaneous collective violence (see Reicher, 2001), our data indicate that trigger events and antagonistic relationships between the groups involved do not seem to be primary drivers of mutually arranged confrontations. Instead, the meaning of mutually arranged confrontations – compared with spontaneous collective violence – may be traced back to rituals of violence, which are characteristic of the hooligan culture (Spaaij, 2008).

The taking place of mutually arranged confrontations particularly relates to the need to maintain or establish a collective reputation, although the excitement, fun and pleasure derived from participating in these fights may also play an important role. In addition, based on the data gathered, it may be hypothesized that individuals feel pressured to conform to hooligan group norms. Although individuals who do not belong to hooligan groups also get involved in mutually arranged confrontations, survey and interview data indicate that they are purposefully approached by leading hooligan group members because of their skills in martial arts, which may serve to benefit the hooligan group's standing. Furthermore, our data indicate that those involved in mutually arranged confrontations are characterized by a more elaborate history of registered violent offences and are older at the time of involvement compared with the individuals involved in regular hooligan violence. In addition, our data suggest the presence of behavioural problems among a significant portion of both the mutually arranged sample and the comparison sample. Taking into consideration that some of the arrestees in the comparison case were described as 'the new generation' of hard-core hooligans, our data are in line with prior findings that violent hooligan groups are made up of both young adolescent males and generally violent individuals who have outgrown adolescence and suffer from problems on a range of psychological traits associated with violent behaviour (Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Russell, 2004). At the same time, because psychological traits were not assessed with validated psychological measurements, caution in interpreting this finding is required.

Taken together, our results indicate that the main motivations for mutually arranged confrontations relate to social dominance and excitement -seeking. Our findings therefore largely differ from the perceived injustice and efficacy around which spontaneous acts of collective violence revolve (Reicher, 2001) but fit the recently proposed quadripartite violence typology, which differentiates between excitement-seeking, greed for social dominance or goods, revenge and self-defence as the main motivations for violence (Howard, 2015).

In the case of mutually arranged confrontations, the unwritten norms and rules of the hooligan culture appear to ensure that the violence can

take place in a controlled and relatively safe environment that prevents predetermined boundaries being crossed in the heat of the moment. This raises the question of who might be attracted to such opportunities for controlled violence. Our data suggest a self-selection process with regard to the individuals who do and do not participate, particularly concerning the interest in and level of prior violent offending. Given the prevalence of personal characteristics associated with violence – such as heightened impulsivity and emotion-regulation deficits – for a significant proportion of those taking part in mutually arranged confrontations, these traits may be of importance in this regard, facilitating or contributing to the observed self-selection process. The sample sizes, however, may have been too small to detect statistically significant differences between the mutually arranged confrontation sample and the comparison sample. This study, then, suggests that individual characteristics are not to be disregarded – as maintained by the social identity perspective – at least not in the case of mutually arranged confrontations. Our findings thereby support the inclusion of an individual-oriented approach to the study of mutually arranged confrontations – a stance further underscored by a typical lack of the type of antagonistic group dynamics in mutually arranged confrontations that are held to be characteristic of spontaneous collective violence. However, processes of self-selection also appear to exist in cases of spontaneous acts of collective violence, with the majority of individuals present not involving themselves in actual violence (Adang, 2011). The findings of the current study, then, may serve as a starting point for future studies assessing the relative contribution of individual characteristics to participation in collective violence in general.

When considering the current findings, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of our data. First, given the secrecy of mutually arranged confrontations, this study relies almost exclusively on second-hand sources on participants' experiences and motives. The information from our police respondents is limited to the fights that have become known to them. In addition to this, police respondents may be biased in their understanding with regard to participants' experiences and motives for participating in mutually arranged confrontations. Second, the aim of police investigations as laid down in the case files is to inform and convince a judge, which also creates a certain bias. However, given the fact that we had access to the original transcripts of interrogations and subjects' communications (telephone, WhatsApp), we were able to triangulate the findings extensively. Despite their obvious downsides and not having been able to gain direct access to individuals (formerly) involved in mutually arranged confrontations, the police investigations offered a unique perspective on the backgrounds of mutually arranged confrontations. Third, most individuals involved in the selected cases were not arrested. The 2012 and 2015 confrontations resulted in fewer arrests than might have been expected given the reported number of individuals involved (about 40–50 in each case) and we have no way of knowing to what extent those arrested were representative of the section of the hooligan population involved in arranged confrontations. Fourth, with regard to criminal career measures, in general when committing a crime the chances of arrest (and thus being registered in the HKS) are low. Reliance on official data is therefore likely to underestimate an individual's actual criminal behaviour; at the same time,

this might give more significance to our finding of enhanced involvement in violence among participants in mutually arranged confrontations. Fifth and finally, information on individual traits was assessed on the basis of Dutch National Police and Probation Service data. Because specific diagnostics were not available in these data, the current findings should primarily be seen as indicators of behavioural traits. Future research may seek to address the personal characteristics of those involved in different types of collective violence using validated clinical instruments. Summarizing, in this study we relied on key informants such as police professionals with many years of experience in football and security. Interviewing and surveying this group of respondents enabled us to place findings from the police investigation files and offender data into a broader context. By combining a criminological perspective, incorporating a reference group and triangulating data sources, we have sought to fill a lacuna in the current collective violence literature.

Conclusion

In this study, qualitative and quantitative data were used to explore the contributing factors of mutually arranged confrontations and the significance of these fights for those involved. For comparison purposes, the data were matched to data on a 'regular' spontaneous football-related confrontation. An important limitation of our data was their restriction to secondary instead of first-hand sources. Consequently, bias may have occurred with regard to participants' experience of mutually arranged confrontations and their motives for participating in these fights.

The results of our study indicate that antagonistic relationships between the hooligan groups involved are not a prerequisite for mutually arranged confrontations to occur. Instead, there needs to be a basis of mutual understanding, respect and trust. In addition, mutually arranged confrontations appear to predominantly revolve around establishing or maintaining a 'tough' collective reputation, with motivations for taking part being linked to excitement-seeking, positive attitudes towards violent behaviour and establishing or maintaining social goods or dominance. This largely contrasts with spontaneous acts of collective violence, which are the result of feelings of anger in response to specific events. Analyses furthermore show that individuals in the mutually arranged confrontation sample are older and have a more extensive history of violent offending than the comparison sample. With regard to individual traits associated with violent offending, no statistically significant differences between the mutually arranged confrontation sample and the comparison sample were found. This fits an interpretation of hooligan culture as a whole being attractive to individuals with personal characteristics that fit the hard masculinity and frequent violence displayed by these groups. Taken together, the results of our study suggest that the various, and seemingly conflicting, explanations that thus far have been offered for football-related disorder and collective violence all have relevance in understanding this phenomenon. More specifically, convergence explanations for collective violence stressing individual characteristics appear applicable to instances of collective violence that occur in an organized manner and in a predesignated setting. Inclusion of an individual-oriented approach alongside the current context-oriented approach, may therefore prove useful in future studies on mutually arranged confrontations as well as on collective violence in general.

06.
Summary, general discussion and conclusion

Rationale and aim of the research project

This thesis aimed to assess whether differences between social identity and convergence explanations of collective violence can be bridged by focusing on psychological characteristics that play a key role in the processing of social information and that have been linked to the display of violent behavior. In this thesis, a typological approach (Moffitt, 1993, 1997) that distinguishes between different types of offenders served as a vantage point. This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the conducted studies, discusses the thesis' scope and limitations and reflects on its scientific progress, implications for practice and directions for future study

Summary of the main results

Variation within a group of collective violence offenders

The first study assessed the developmental pathways as measured by timing and frequency of offending leading up to becoming involved in collective violence for a sample of 438 individuals. Their involvement was established due to being arrested for partaking in collective violence incidents that occurred in 2011 or 2012 or due to being recorded in a database of 'known' hooligans maintained by the Dutch National Football Intelligence Point (Dutch: *Centraal Informatiepunt Voetbalvandalisme, CIV*) during that same period.

Individuals' criminal history up to their known involvement in collective violence was assessed by utilizing data from the Dutch police registration system HKS (Dutch: *Herkenningsdienstsysteem*). The distribution of registered offenses across individuals was heavily skewed: a small number of individuals were responsible for the majority of criminal records. Group-based modelling of the criminal career data (see Nagin, 2005) showed a minority of collective violence offenders (n=57, 13%) which started offending at an early age and had a high frequency of offending compared to other collective violence offenders in the sample. To further assess the patterns that emerged, the Dutch police registration system BVH (Dutch: *Basisvoorziening Handhaving*) was consulted to assess, over the past five years, incidents that did not result in arrest. The distribution of BVH-registered incidents was also heavily skewed. Particularly the minority identified by group-based modelling of HKS-data as early-starter high frequency offenders was more often involved in violent incidents in general and involved in more serious violent offenses in particular, both alone and collectively, than collective violence offenders following other developmental trajectories.

Taken together, this study indicates that there are important differences between collective violence offenders with regard to criminal career measures that are central to typological approaches. Findings therefore suggest that offender typologies may be useful in interpreting these pronounced differences and may help explain the contrasting results of prior empirical research on collective violence offenders' characteristics.

Individual determinants of persistence in collective violence

The second study explored whether behavioral and psychological characteristics were linked to an increased risk of recurrent collective violence involvement. To this end, criminal career and individual trait data

of the sample utilized in the first study were gathered. Criminal career data additional to those used in the first empirical study concerned offenses registered in the HKS over a 4- to 5-year period after collective violence involvement. Persistence was defined as collective violence recidivism within this follow-up period.

Prior empirical work (e.g. Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015) was utilized to identify potentially relevant behavioral and psychological characteristics. Individual characteristics data with regard to ADHD, ASPD, impulsivity, emotion-regulation deficits and sensation-seeking behavior were derived from three sources: the Dutch National Police (BVH records, n=438), the Dutch Probation Service (reports of a (shortened) recidivism risk assessment instrument, n=113) and the Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (forensic psychological/psychiatric reports, n=15). In addition, problematic childhood behaviors at home and at school were assessed from these sources. Study results indicated that behavioral and psychological characteristics were linked to continued collective violence involvement. Individuals that persist in collective violence display significantly more problematic criminal career and individual trait measures. By applying Cox proportional hazard models (Cox, 1972) we found that particularly age at onset of offending, number of prior collective violence offenses and ADHD were associated with persistence in collective violence offending, with the latter more than doubling its risk.

Taken together, findings contradict a core assumption of the social identity perspective that offender characteristics are not linked to collective violence involvement. The skewness in the distribution of individual traits linked to persistence across trajectory groups and the finding that individual traits are predictors of persistence in collective violence however suggest that convergence theories do have some explanatory power, especially when it comes to early-starter high frequency collective violence offenders. Herewith the study results offer further support for a collective violence offender typology, which suggests that the relative contribution of individual and contextual determinants and their interaction differs between various types of collective violence offenders.

Mechanisms of reactive collective violence

The third study assessed the relative contribution of individual determinants, social processes and their interaction for reactive acts of collective violence. To this end, a case study of a 2012 Project X party that got out of hand was conducted. Data utilized to reconstruct the course of events consisted of 105 interviews, written documentation and open-source and police audio-visual material. Data of the 108 arrestees concerned criminal history and psychological traits and were gathered in the police registration systems HKS and BVH. Where possible, findings were compared to data concerning another riot in a party atmosphere, the Hoek van Holland beach riot that occurred in 2009 (see Muller et al., 2010).

The Project X riot originated from a public Facebook event opened by a then 15-year old girl inviting friends to celebrate her birthday. This event got hijacked and on the day of the event between some 3.000 to 5.000 individuals showed up in the vicinity of the girl's parental home. As a prevention measure, the police were already present. A gradual build-up occurred from

the moment of sundown, when about 700 youngsters advanced to the barriers behind which the police had taken position. When police reinforcements by means of riot police arrived, escalation occurred. At that moment, the police did not engage with the crowd and in our data no evidence surfaced for disproportionate or undifferentiated police action. Social identity seemed to have emerged spontaneously due to the party atmosphere among those involved: predominantly adolescent males without discernible criminal history or links to hooligan groups. Contextual factors (opportunity, risk) and alcohol consumption may have contributed to escalation. Nevertheless, the selection processes that occurred around the build-up (with changing dynamics for some being the reason to leave) and escalation (with less than 10 percent of those present partaking in actual violence) also indicated that individual determinants – particularly ADHD – may have contributed to participating in the collective violence that followed. These findings were in sharp contrast with collective violence at the Hoek van Holland beach riot in 2009. Around this event, deliberate mobilization of repeat offenders already affiliated with an upcoming violent hooligan group occurred with the specific goal of rioting in mind (Muller et al., 2010).

Taken together, the study shows that various types of collective violence offenders can be identified, between whom the relative contribution of contextual and individual factors may vary. Particularly for a small group of collective violence offenders characterized by persistent violent behavior problematic individual characteristics may have a significant contribution.

Mechanisms of proactive collective violence

The fourth study assessed the relative contribution of individual determinants, social processes and their interaction to proactive collective violence. To this end, mutually arranged confrontations between hooligan groups in the Netherlands – in which arrangements concern at least time and location of the confrontation and informal codes of legitimate action – were studied.

The study was based on qualitative data (police case files, questionnaire and semi-structured interviews with police officials) and quantitative data concerning the criminal history and behavioral and psychological characteristics of those partaking in mutually arranged confrontations. Quantitative data were compared to similar data of collective violence offenders who participated in a spontaneous confrontation between supporters around a football match. The data indicate that mutually arranged confrontations are organized in a secretive manner and are less likely to take place when the perceived risk of apprehension or severe injuries is deemed high. Instead of temporary norms as assumed in social identity theory, structural values characteristic of the hooligan culture – such as the importance of collective reputation and individual status – appeared contributing factors to the occurrence of and becoming involved in mutually arranged confrontations. Offender data indicated that the individuals involved in arranged confrontations were older than reactive collective violence offenders, were more likely to have a history of violent offending and had committed more violent offenses.

In sum, the findings of the study suggested that mutually arranged confrontations are not explicitly guided by trigger events and antagonistic

relationships between groups. Instead, these fights more often are driven by a subculture, which assigns value to behaving violently. Individual determinants (early onset, prior violent offenses) appeared to increase the likelihood of being part of this subculture. This again suggests that characteristics of those involved in collective violence are important for explaining why collective violence occurs and who becomes involved.

Discussion

This section discusses the data selection and methodological considerations of this thesis. It then elaborates on the challenges brought along by taking a typological vantage point. Finally, the thesis' findings and its theoretical contribution are addressed.

Data selection and restrictions

The first study of this thesis aimed to assess developmental pathways of collective violence offenders up to becoming involved in collective violence. The second study aimed to explore whether behavioral and psychological characteristics were linked to an increased risk of recurrent collective violence involvement. An important methodological challenge was to only include individuals who have actually participated in large-scale riots, which are the focus of the current thesis. Within the Dutch Penal Code, as long as the number of participants meets the legally required minimum of two, the actual number of people involved in a particular incident is not legally relevant for an incident to be regarded as collective violence. Incidents of collective violence as registered by the police hence cover a broad spectrum of barroom brawls in which as little as two individuals participate, up to large scale incidents of public disorder in which significant crowds of people participate.

To identify collective violence offenders, a hooligan database maintained by the Dutch police served as an important data source. This database was created to store data on the most prominent hooligans of each club playing professional soccer in the Netherlands. Being registered in this database is dependent on input of local police officers who have football and security in their remit and who are required to provide input for 'their' football team or teams (Ferwerda & Adang, 2007; Van Ham *et al.*, 2012). To minimize a potential bias towards known offenders, we also included suspects who were apprehended due to their involvement in recent collective violence incidents. Important with regard to the selected incidents was the comprehensive nature of the subsequent police investigations. This comprehensiveness was reflected by for example providing suspect photos to the media with the aim of identifying as many suspects as possible. Based on the number of individuals that had been involved in the selected incidents, police were confident that most perpetrators – including up to then unknown individuals – were arrested. As such, a potentially broad range of individuals, from already known individuals (e.g. hooligans) to one-time collective violence offenders, were identified. Furthermore, compared to previous empirical studies on the topic (e.g. Farrington, 2006; Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015), the sample employed in the first and second study of this thesis is relatively large and less biased towards individuals (at risk of) persisting into (violent) offending. Nevertheless, the collective violence offenders

that were identified are by no means a statistically random reflection of all collective violence offenders in the Netherlands.

Furthermore, the current thesis considered both reactive and proactive types of collective violence. Around the time of the study, however, investigating mutually arranged confrontations between hooligan groups was no police priority. Consequently, there was no other option than to rely on the – to our knowledge – only two investigations into this matter that were conducted relatively recently. Though we do not have reasons to suppose they are not, we could not ascertain the extent to which findings are representative for all mutually arranged confrontations and the individuals involved in these fights. Compared to the only other empirical study into this matter (Kerr & De Kock, 2002), the current study was based on much more detailed information on the situation in which the mutually arranged confrontation came to be and more extensive data with regard to the individual characteristics of the individuals involved.

In sum, though the current thesis comprises a heterogeneous sample of both collective violence incidents and collective violence offenders, constructing a truly random sample of collective violence incidents and offenders was not possible. Findings, therefore, primarily relate to the samples included in this thesis. Consequently, caution is required when generalizing the current findings to other contexts in which collective violence occurs. Future studies employing other samples are necessary to substantiate the present results.

Methodological considerations

The current study is the first to link individual level criminal history data and psychological traits data to participation in collective violence. Criminal career histories were based on the individual's registered history. Being recorded in the police registration system, however, not only reflects individual behavior, but is also highly influenced by police priorities that make some criminal activities more prone to police interference and registration than others. Prior research for instance indicates that the strong decrease in registered juvenile offending may be linked to police practices (Van Ham *et al.*, 2015). Reliance on police data therefore, is likely to underestimate actual criminal behavior. Subsequently, this may have affected the prevalence of the trajectories identified with group-based modelling, as well as the assignment of individuals to these trajectories. Registered crime bias may also affect the level of persistence among collective violence offenders (as measured by recidivism in collective violence) found. Furthermore, obtaining validated data on the sampled individual's psychological characteristics relevant for the current study proved to be unfeasible since psychological testing of offenders involved in collective violence is uncommon. Therefore, the current study had to rely largely on derivative measures of psychological characteristics instead of diagnostics with clinical instruments. Although it was not tested here whether these derivative measures are indeed associated with social information processing, this may be deduced post-hoc from the study's findings. The current findings, for instance, are in line with that of prior empirical work with regard to a) the distribution of psychological characteristics among criminal trajectories and b) their association with persistence in violent behavior. That being said, future studies should strive

to use standardized psychological measures. In addition, the current thesis was limited to psychological characteristics which are, as ascertained by prior empirical work, associated with solo violence. Taking prior empirical work on solo violence as a vantage point, however, disregards the intergroup and intragroup dynamics that characterize collective violence. Individual characteristics, such as the sensitivity to peer pressure, for instance, may influence the felt need to conform to group norms and, therewith, also affect collective violence involvement. This suggests that psychological characteristics not taken into account in this thesis may be relevant in explaining collective violence as well.

The semi-parametric group-based trajectory modelling used to identify collective violence offenders with similar criminal patterns over time also has its limitations. Although group-based modelling is objective in that the groups found do not reflect random variation (Piquero, 2008), a limitation is that trajectory modelling always will identify a small number of latent classes and, as such, a priori assumes offender types in the data (Skardhamar, 2010). Furthermore, identified trajectories are an approximation. Criminal careers of individuals may fit best with the aggregated pattern of a particular group but may not follow the trajectory curve perfectly (see Nagin and Tremblay, 2005a, 2005b; Sampson & Laub, 2005). In order to avoid reification of trajectory groups, group membership should be linked to relevant risk- and protective factors to ascertain their theoretical relevance.

The relative contribution of individual and contextual determinants to collective violence was addressed by conducting qualitative studies into reactive and proactive acts of collective violence. To this end, various methodological approaches and data sources were utilized, including a detailed analysis of underlying case files (including interrogations and other evidence such as footage and confiscated chat conversations). Using police case files for scientific purposes, however, requires a certain level of restraint, since this information is primarily gathered for investigative purposes such as searching for the truth and creating a body of evidence to be used in court. In addition, unlike collective violence offenders involved in reactive acts of collective violence, those involved in mutually arranged confrontations were not forthcoming in answering police questions about their motivations and almost exclusively exercised their right to remain silent. Likely, this was not only because any statement made would contribute to the evidence against them, but also reflected the informal code within hooligan subculture that states that the police are not to be talked with. Consequently, second-hand sources of information such as survey data and semi-structured interviews with police professionals working in football and security had to be relied on specifically with regard to the cases of proactive collective violence studied. Part of the police professionals consulted had acquired the trust of individuals who partake in these mutually arranged confrontations. Furthermore, police officers working covertly were consulted. These police officers are able to obtain information from informants who are part of the hooligan groups involved in such fights. Although bias with regard to motivational aspects in play for the individuals participating in mutually arranged confrontations cannot be completely ruled out, the information obtained from these police officers clearly contributes to identifying the relevant mechanisms giving cause to this type of collective violence.

Despite the limitations set out above, by employing a wide variety of sources and several methodological approaches, the data gathered for the current study allowed for a comprehensive exploration of whether social identity and convergence perspectives on collective violence could be fruitfully reconciled.

Theoretical notions and scientific progress

Collective violence research encompasses opposing theoretical views, with one view stressing the relevance of context and the other underscoring the importance of individual traits. Over the past decades the context in which collective violence occurred has become the all but sole research focus. Core assumptions of social identity explanations of collective violence are that collective violence is preceded by trigger events, that antagonistic relations are present among the groups involved and that offender characteristics do not, in any way, guide an individual's decision to partake (Reicher & Stott, 2011; Reicher, 2001; Waddington, 2012). Furthermore, by arguing that no individual attributes are known of that reliably predict riot participation (Reicher, 2001), social identity explanations do not take into account individual characteristics of collective violence offenders. In the theoretical debate on collective violence, the intersection of contextual and convergence explanations for collective violence has remained mainly untouched. This thesis aimed to provide directions for uniting opposing theoretical views on collective violence and furthering the debate on its determinants by combining quantitative and qualitative data and methods.

The social identity perspective acknowledges individual differences between collective violence offenders to the extent that they may identify different social categories in a given situation, in the contents of these categories and in the persons prototypical thereof (Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b; Reicher & Sani, 1998; Sani & Reicher, 1998, 1999). Differences in individual characteristics of collective violence offenders are, however, rejected as a matter of principle. The first question this thesis sought to address was whether developmental pathways in delinquency and crime differ across individuals up to the moment they become involved in collective violence. Indeed the age of onset at and frequency of offending was found to differ substantially between collective violence offenders. These pronounced differences within the sample with regard to criminal career measures fit existing ideas on criminal careers and extant typological theories on crime causation. This thesis therewith, as a first, offers an indication that different types of collective violence offenders may be identified based on their criminal career characteristics.

The second question central to this thesis was whether there are individual characteristics that are linked to persistence in collective violence and, if so, which ones. The results presented in this thesis indicate that there are indeed individual characteristics that contribute to persistence in collective violence, as measured by recidivism. Not only criminal career measures but also ADHD was found to significantly contribute to a heightened chance of having been registered for repeated involvement in collective violence. Furthermore, confirming the results of the first study, individual characteristics associated with the processing of and reacting to social cues (ADHD, ASPD heightened impulsivity, emotion-regulation

deficits, sensation-seeking behavior) were found significantly more often in early-starter high frequency collective violence offenders compared to collective violence offenders who followed different developmental trajectories. These findings substantiate prior empirical work, which has implicated these individual characteristics in contributing to intergroup conflict and offensive action tendencies in crowds (Levy et al., 2017; Mackie et al., 2000; Russell, 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). In addition, the distribution of these individual characteristics among the different developmental trajectories distinguished in the sample of collective violence offenders offers further support for a typological vantage point to bridge differences between contextual and convergence explanations for collective violence.

Collective violence not only occurs reactively in response to trigger events, but may also be preplanned without necessarily being preceded by trigger events or requiring antagonistic relations between the sides involved (also see Adang, 2011). The third question this thesis aimed to address, was whether the contribution of contextual and individual determinants differs between these different types of collective violence and, if so, how. The data presented in this thesis indicate that the distinction between reactive and proactive violence is not straightforward. Particularly the Hoek van Holland beach riot (Muller et al., 2010) – which was used as a comparison case in the Project-X case study – showed that a small group of individuals belonging to an upcoming but already notorious hooligan group were already in advance intent on instigating public disorder; the majority of those participating responded to how events subsequently unfolded. This indicates that contributing factors may differ between individuals who participate in collective violence, and that various types of collective violence offenders may be involved in a single incident. Consequently, the relative contribution of contextual and individual determinants then appears to vary between incidents and between the individuals who involve themselves.

The data gathered in this thesis, furthermore, suggest that particularly persistent offenders involve themselves in both reactive and proactive acts of collective violence. The most prominent contributing factors seem to be a violent criminal history, individual characteristics associated with the processing of social information and the subculture of which this group of perpetrators are part. As a result, the individuals who may be characterized as persistent collective violence offenders appear to have a low threshold for using violence, both alone and in a group, confirming prior empirical work (Piquero et al., 2015; Lösel & Bliesener, 2003). In addition to negative emotions such as revenge, current results are in line with prior studies, which suggest that there are individuals who may experience positive affect (such as joy or the gaining of status among their peers) when acting violently (Adang, 2011; Spaaij, 2008). Taken together, this argues for an approach incorporating both reactive and proactive collective violence and the inclusion of both negative and positive affect when considering the relative contribution of contextual and individual determinants of collective violence. Theoretically, this fits the recently introduced quadripartite violence typology (QVT) used to explain why individuals may behave violently (see Howard, 2015). This typology may complement currently dominant contextual approaches on collective violence stressing trigger events and the emergence of social identity.

Theoretical implications

The initiation-escalation model (Adang, 2011) describes that collective violence may initiate in response to trigger events or with individuals and groups actively seeking out opportunities for confrontation. Furthermore, Adang (2011) identifies two mechanisms for the escalation of violence (in the sense that more individuals decide to involve themselves). Next to opportunity and (perceived) risk of retaliation, Adang (2011) identifies an 'us versus them' relationship as an important escalation mechanism, with a higher frequency of violence observed when relationships between groups are more antagonistic. The initiation-escalation model thus differentiates between collective violence type (spontaneous and premeditated) and its significance for those involved (negative affect/positive affect). Herewith, this model largely parallels the recently introduced quadripartite violence typology (QVT).

To explain violent behavior, the QVT distinguishes between the type of violence (impulsive or controlled) and the feelings the individual(s) involved associate with behaving violently (appetitively or aversively) (Howard, 2015). The QVT has identified four incentives for violent behavior: a desire for excitement and exhilaration is central to appetitive/impulsive violence, whereas in the case of appetitive/controlled violence self-gratification – either in material goods or social dominance – is the key incentive. Self-protection against an interpersonal threat (whether physical or psychological) is considered to underlie aversive/impulsive violence, whereas vengeance or retribution is the incentive for aversive/controlled violence.

At least three arguments can be brought forward for the relevance of the QVT to explain collective violence. First, the point of view that main reasons for partaking in a collective violence event may vary between individuals is acknowledged by our Project-X case study. This study, for instance, indicated that many arrestees had – according to their own statement – acted violently in response to unnecessary and disproportionate police actions. Be it to a much lesser extent, others, however, referred primarily to sensation- and thrill-seeking to explain their own behavior. Second, aversive violence and its core underlying incentives of self-protection and vengeance are reflected in the thesis' finding that a significant part of collective violence offenders only engage in violence under specific conditions. This, for instance, may be in case of trigger events and the resultant emerging relationships between the groups present. Third, appetitive violence and its core underlying incentives of excitement and self-gratification are reflected in the significance of spontaneous and premeditated acts of collective violence, such as planned fights, particularly for individuals who belong to a hooligan subculture that glorifies behaving violently.

This thesis' findings have provided evidence that psychological characteristics may underlie the incentive(s) of engaging in violence as identified by the QVT. For instance, psychological characteristics contribute to persistence in collective violence, indicating that these characteristics may affect trigger event and intergroup relationships perception. Furthermore, these characteristics were particularly present in early-onset high frequency offenders, who appear to derive intrinsic (excitement) and/or extrinsic value (social dominance) from behaving violently. Taking into account the results of prior empirical work, this indicates that explaining why collective violence occurs and who becomes involved, requires analysis

on various levels. In order of aggregation level, the first level of analysis is that of context such as trigger events and intergroup relations, on which the SIM focuses. The second level of analysis is that of intragroup relations, which focuses on intragroup dynamics, norms and expectations (e.g. role models, synchronizing behaviors). The third level of analysis is that individual characteristics that are associated with behaving violently, such as heightened impulsivity, sensation-seeking behavior and a hostility bias. As individual characteristics influence perception of intra- and intergroup relations, individual characteristics interrelate with the other two levels of analysis. Future studies may make clear how these levels of analysis interrelate and both its theoretical and practical implications.

Implications for practice

Results presented in this thesis indicate that particularly early-onset high frequency collective violence offenders show psychological characteristics associated with violent behavior. In addition, data presented in this thesis indicate that criminal history and psychological characteristics are linked to persistence in collective violence offending. Furthermore, the results of this thesis indicate that those involved in proactive collective violence incidents have a more criminal and violent history than most individuals who partake in reactive collective violence. These findings combined suggest that distinguishing between various types of collective violence offenders for whom the root causes of partaking in collective violence are likely to vary – as well as taking into account the varying nature of collective violence – may help extend our understanding of why collective violence occurs.

The Netherlands has had a common national football policy since 1997. While initially, this policy focused upon formulating a joint approach by professional football clubs, the police, municipalities and the Public Prosecution Service, later on, emphasis shifted to normalization. Normalization adheres to confronting supporters who visit a football match with as few restrictions as possible. To further develop accessibility, hospitality and safety around football, various spearheads have recently been drawn up. Next to increasing supporter involvement in football safety policy and providing municipalities – as the authority for maintaining public order – leverage points to deal with football safety, a person-oriented approach is considered a priority. This originates from the point of view that, as long as so-called 'notorious troublemakers' are present around football matches, accessibility and hospitality for other supporters remain limited. Criteria that are considered to be at the core of taking on a successful person-oriented approach are: a) the presence of a comprehensive approach to problem supporters consisting of appropriate punishment as well as preventing recidivism, b) communication of intended measures and penalties by all partners involved (club, municipality, police and the Public Prosecution Service), c) sufficient intelligence gathering about hard core hooligans and d) operational follow-up on this intelligence. Taken these criteria in mind, it may be concluded that the person-oriented approach aims for a nationally consistent approach to notorious troublemakers while at the same time warranting customization for each individual (Auditteam Football & Safety, 2019).

The thesis' findings that psychological characteristics affect persistence in collective violence have various implications for practice. With regard to the sufficient intelligence gathering about hard core hooligans, this thesis has made clear that, for the time being, it is a major challenge to collect data on the individual characteristics of collective violence offenders. This is partly due to the fact that the police and partners – such as the Public Prosecution Service and the Probation Service – pay limited attention to individual characteristics when individuals are arrested due to becoming involved in collective violence. Besides psychological assessment being costly and time consuming, this seems based on the prejudice that group dynamics are the main determinant of becoming involved in collective violence. The thesis findings, however, imply that more often than currently is the case psychological reports and risk assessments of individuals arrested for their involvement in collective violence will need to be written and conducted, for instance by the Probation Service or the Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (Dutch: *Nederlands Instituut voor Forensische Psychiatrie en Psychologie, NIFP*). This way, a better picture may be obtained of underlying explanations of an individual's involvement in collective violence, recidivism risk and the required measures to prevent recidivism i.e. appropriate punishment and operational follow-up.

Also, with regard to the sufficient intelligence gathering about hard core hooligans, identifying individuals for whom a person-oriented approach may contribute to football safety may be considered a key challenge. Currently, a database of those frequently involved in hooliganism is maintained by the Dutch National Football Intelligence Unit (CIV in Dutch). This national database is filled with individuals whose names – usually limited to a maximum of 10 – are provided bottom-up by local police officers who are required to utilize the 'Focus on Hooligans' (Dutch: Hooligans in Beeld) method. In short, this method aims to monitor and control individuals whose behaviour on match days is considered problematic by local police officers and who commit offences at other times and locations as well (Spaaij, 2013). The findings of this thesis suggest that in this way – by requiring and maximizing local input – individuals are regarded as a notorious troublemaker while differing markedly from one another on key characteristics. For instance, there were 228 persons in this study who belonged to the CIV database, but only 57 persons appeared to have the highest risk of persisting into collective violence. This thesis findings, therefore, argue for a top-down approach to identifying notorious troublemakers as well. This top-down approach may utilize inclusion and exclusion criteria by means of the current thesis findings and, therewith, contribute to an intelligence-based police strategy that also considers characteristics of collective violence offenders.

A subsequent intelligence-based police strategy may be aimed at preventing notorious troublemakers' presence in crowds. This working method goes beyond the main dilemma of public order policing, namely controlling crowd members with violent intent without alienating crowd members whose aims are legitimate (Reicher et al., 2004). Instead of taking action specifically towards individuals who have frequently behaved violently in crowds, the current results argue as well for preventive action taken towards persons who, based on their criminal history and individual characteristics, are at high risk of repeatedly displaying violent behavior

in crowds. The data presented in this thesis indicate that particular for individuals who suffer from psychological and psychiatric problems associated with social information processing measures such as stadium bans or obligations to report at a police station at a given time or place should be considered, despite the current absence of a comprehensive track record with regard to collective violence offending. Without paying attention to these individual's underlying problems and needs, there will be no incentive for them to change their behavior. Although limiting their freedom around football matches may be suitable to reduce the risk of collective violence from occurring, behavioral interventions would need to be imposed to further reduce recidivism.

The results of the thesis suggest that different types of collective violence offenders can be identified for whom the root causes of becoming involved in collective violence differ. Paralleling the relative small number of early-starter high frequency collective violence offenders found in the conducted studies, prior research indicates that often only a small minority of the individuals present may be intent on instigating violence (Adang, 2011; Reicher et al., 2004). The thesis' results indicate that for a minority of collective violence offenders behavior is driven by individual rather than contextual factors. Their behavior, however, may in turn be a contextual factor contributing to the involvement of other groups in the crowd. Taking preventive actions towards this minority of persistent collective violence offenders, then, may prevent violent behavior in crowds both directly and indirectly. However, the reality of collective violence is complicated by the notion that groups intent on instigating collective violence are not automatically a role model for other groups in the crowd. The chances that individuals with violent intent become role models for other groups in the crowd without such an intent particularly has been linked to the response of the police (Reicher, 1984; Stott et al., 2001). Therefore, a major emphasis is to be placed on supporting and facilitating crowd members pursuing legal goals and activities, even under conditions where one is aware of the presence of groups with illegal goals and even at points where these groups start to act in illegal or violent ways (Reicher et al., 2004). A better insight in which people and groups – i.e. social identities – are present in a crowd may help the police to develop strategies to act in an appropriate and targeted manner, therewith preventing that behaviors of the violent-intent minority contribute to escalation of collective violence in crowds.

In addition to finding support for taking a typological vantage point when explaining collective violence, this thesis differentiated between various types of collective violence: trigger-related and preplanned. Preplanned acts of collective violence particularly concern mutually arranged confrontations between hooligan groups. Such fights are, in the Netherlands and in other European countries, prosecutable under criminal law. Mutually arranged confrontations have been taking place now for several years, indicating the structural character of such fights in the Netherlands. The increasing number of mutually arranged confrontations may be traced back to improvement in stadia management and increased risks of apprehension, which limit opportunities to behave violently around football matches and at stadium grounds (Cleland & Cashmore, 2016; Jewell, Simmons & Szymanski, 2014). This suggests that the police should focus on increasing the perceived

risk of apprehension among potential participants as to ensure that mutually arranged confrontations do not materialize. In addition, the findings presented in this thesis indicate that such fights are participated in by only a small part of 'known' hooligans who have an extensive history of violence, both solo and alone. This suggests that priority should be given to identifying people involved in these fights. Bringing together various information flows (e.g. police registration data, police professionals working covertly) and implementing new technology – such as artificial intelligence to analyze footage of fights – may provide insight into the persons which are involved in mutually arranged confrontations. Writing and conducting psychological reports and risk assessments of individuals arrested for their involvement in such fights, may help in identifying risk factors – both individual and contextual – that increase the risk of partaking in these fights. Information from such reports and assessments subsequently can be used to draw up a person-oriented approach (Dutch: *Persoonsgerichte Aanpak*, PGA), which may focus on raising barriers for these individuals' future participation in these fights. In addition, decreasing the number of individuals willing or able to participate in mutually arranged confrontations, may increase the efforts necessary to organize these fights and as such contribute to their preclusion.

Future research directions

The findings of this thesis are an inducement for several future research directions. This thesis suggests that the relative contribution of individual and contextual determinants to collective violence differs between individuals. This thesis' findings have substantiated that to explain collective violence, three levels of analysis (intergroup relations, intragroup dynamics and individual characteristics) can be distinguished. Although this thesis is limited to collective violence in settings generally considered as issue-irrelevant (Wann et al., 2001), this suggests that to explain collective violence around protests and demonstrations – issue-relevant collective violence – these levels of analysis also need to be accounted for. The motives underlying issue-relevant collective violence, however, may deviate from issue-irrelevant collective violence (less hedonistic and more ideologically driven). Consequently, future studies may assess individual characteristics of collective violence offenders involved particularly in issue-relevant collective violence, their association with persistence in this type of collective violence and the interaction of individual characteristics at the intra- and intergroup level. Conducting such studies may not only provide data that are currently lacking, but may also offer further substantiation for the theoretical implications that may be derived from the findings of this thesis.

The findings in this thesis are supportive of a hybrid perspective on collective violence in which intergroup relationships, intergroup dynamics, opportunity and individual determinants all contribute. Particularly, results indicate that individuals who come to participate in collective violence are not a homogeneous group. Up to now, it has not been adequately assessed whether and, if so, to what extent and through which mechanisms small groups of individuals known for their frequent and repeated involvement in collective violence may be able to affect intergroup relationships and intergroup dynamics in collective settings.

Also, the results of the conducted studies suggest that psychological characteristics linked to the processing of social information increase the risk of more frequent involvement in collective violence. Up to now, collective violence researchers seem to prefer a reconstruction of events based on observations, in-depth interviews and case file studies. These studies result in detailed reports of the context in which collective violence occurs, although to some extent trigger events and motives identified in these studies may resemble theoretical assumptions more than that they reflect objective data (Waddington, 2012). The emphasis in this thesis has been mainly on providing evidence that psychological characteristics associated with solo violence may serve as a predictor of collective violence involvement for, at least, a subgroup of collective violence offenders. As a result, the social component of collective violence and the interaction between the individual and social component has not been explicitly studied in this thesis. Incorporating behavioral and psychological determinants linked to social information processing identified in this thesis – which up to now have been disregarded – may provide additional knowledge on who becomes involved in collective violence and why. Noteworthy in this regard is that the processing of social information may also be affected temporarily. For instance, the findings derived from the Project-X case study indicate that a considerable part of the arrestees blamed their involvement on being under the influence of alcohol. The use of alcohol has been found to heighten impulsive behavior, to alter perceptions of opportunity and to decrease sensitivity to social cues (Van Hasselt, 2013). Furthermore, future research may also assess whether, and if so, which psychological characteristics affect intragroup dynamics and make individuals – regardless of context – more susceptible to joining a violent crowd or to conform to group norms.

Furthermore, internet in general and social media in particular have become indispensable in social life. Social media played a prominent role in one of the case studies; a crowd was mobilized via Facebook. At the same time, it is important to realize that an extensive reconstruction of this incident showed that the simple fact that many young people were on their feet cannot be identified as the leading contextual cause. Since then, in the Netherlands no more incidents have occurred in which social media were primarily the means by which crowds were mobilized and events subsequently resulted in collective violence. In relation to mutually arranged confrontations, however, social media do seem to play an important role. The contact between hooligan groups by social media is easy and quick to realize and (relatively) safe with regard to chances of apprehension; moreover, social media offer an outlet to hooligan groups to be able to distribute footage of mutually arranged confrontations that materialize quickly and with a large reach. The dynamics of social media on proactive collective violence therefore appear of interest for future research. Not only for identifying individuals who participate in these fights, but potentially also to predict when and where these fights will occur. However, to be able to arrive at reliable predictions about future fights, accuracy and completeness of social media and other open source data (e.g. hooligan sides involved, location, date, time) would need to be assessed.

Conclusion

The current thesis has brought together opposing views on the causes of collective violence. To this end, various data sources and scientific disciplines were considered. The thesis finds that different types of collective violence offenders can be identified, who differ qualitatively with regard to criminal history, individual traits, and their likelihood of persistence in collective violence. Furthermore, it finds reasons for differentiating spontaneous from pre-planned instances of collective violence. Whereas contextual factors appear most salient for individuals engaging in spontaneous collective violence, individual traits seem to govern a subsample of persistent collective violence offenders engaging in both spontaneous and pre-planned collective violence incidents. Whereas persistent collective violence offenders constitute only a small part of all individuals engaging in spontaneous collective violence, their presence is more outspoken among those engaging in pre-planned collective violence.

07.
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)

Titel: Groepsgeweldplegers en groepsgeweld. De rol van individuele kenmerken

Aanleiding

Sinds de jaren ’60 van de vorige eeuw ontstond in toenemende mate weerstand tegen verklaringen voor groepsgeweld die stelden dat dit geweld irrationeel, ongericht en ongecontroleerd van aard is. Dit gold eveneens voor de ‘klassieke’ veronderstelling dat een gewelddadige menigte de criminele, gewelddadige inslag weergeeft van de mensen die daarvan deel uitmaken. Daarmee verschoof de focus naar de context waarin groepsgeweld plaatsvindt, en meer in het bijzonder naar het concept ‘sociale identiteit’. Dit begrip verwijst naar iemands bewustzijn dat hij of zij tot een bepaalde groep behoort en door anderen zo behandeld wordt. Vanuit dit perspectief beredeneerd zijn niet de eigen doelen en verlangens maar groepsnormen bepalend voor het gedrag van mensen in een menigte, en spelen persoonskenmerken hierin geen rol van betekenis. Tegelijkertijd werd duidelijk dat slechts een klein deel van een menigte overgaat tot geweld. Verschillen in welke groepen mensen binnen een menigte onderscheiden en welke emoties zij in een situatie ervaren, zijn individuele factoren die hierin een rol kunnen spelen. Dit suggereert dat niet alleen de context maar ook individuele factoren groepsgeweld kunnen verklaren. De in dit proefschrift beschreven studies onderzochten in hoeverre uiteenlopende verklaringen voor groepsgeweld kunnen worden samengebracht. De nadruk lag hierbij op psychologische kenmerken die een sleutelrol spelen bij de verwerking van sociale informatie en waarvan eerder is aangetoond dat zij verband houden met het vertonen van individueel gewelddadig gedrag.

Deelonderzoeken en bevindingen

Dit proefschrift beslaat vier deelonderzoeken. Deze deelonderzoeken richtten zich op de volgende vragen:

(1) verschillen criminele ontwikkelingspaden van groepsgeweldplegers tot aan hun betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld (hoofdstuk 2)?
(2) bestaat er een verband tussen bepaalde individuele kenmerken en persisterend groepsgeweld en, zo ja, om welke individuele kenmerken gaat het (hoofdstuk 3)?
(3) verschilt de bijdrage van contextuele en individuele factoren voor reactieve (hoofdstuk 4)
(4) en voor proactieve vormen van groepsgeweld (hoofdstuk 5) en, zo ja, op welke wijze?

In de eerste kwantitatieve studie van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2) werd voor een groep van 438 groepsgeweldplegers de criminele carrière tot aan hun betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld in beeld gebracht. Deze steekproef bestond uit personen die de politie had aangehouden vanwege hun deelname aan groepsgeweld, dan wel personen die in een landelijke hooligandatabase geregistreerd stonden. Het onderzoek liet zien dat de bij de politie geregistreerde delicten voor deze steekproef scheef verdeeld waren: een klein deel van de groepsgeweldplegers was verantwoordelijk voor een aanzienlijk deel van alle bij de politie geregistreerde delicten. Een

klein deel van de groepsgeweldplegers (n = 57, 13%) kon bovendien worden getypeerd als 'vroeg-startende hoogfrequente dader'. Personen binnen deze groep waren veelvuldig betrokken bij gewelddadige incidenten in het algemeen en ernstige geweldsdelicten in het bijzonder, zowel alleen als in groepsverband. De hoofdconclusie van dit onderzoek luidde dat er belangrijke verschillen zijn tussen groepsgeweldplegers in de leeftijd ten tijde van het eerste delict en het aantal gepleegde delicten. Deze verschillen sluiten aan bij criminele carrièrekenmerken die centraal staan in typologische benaderingen. Een implicatie van deze bevinding is dat er verschillende typen groepsgeweldplegers kunnen worden onderscheiden, waarvoor de oorzaken die ten grondslag liggen aan hun betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld kunnen verschillen.

In het tweede kwantitatieve onderzoek van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 3) werd onderzocht of gedrags- en psychologische kenmerken verband hielden met een verhoogd risico op herhaald daderschap van groepsgeweld in een periode van vier tot vijf jaar. Voor het identificeren van mogelijk relevante kenmerken werd geput uit eerder empirisch werk (zie Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015). Dit leidde tot een focus op de rol van *Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorde*r (ADHD), antisociale persoonlijkheidsstoornis, impulsiviteit, sensatiezoekend gedrag en deficiënties in de emotieregulatie. De mate waarin deze kenmerken aanwezig waren binnen de onderzoeksgroep uit studie 1 werd geïnventariseerd aan de hand van politiedata, data van de drie Reclasseringsorganisaties (3RO) en Pro Justitia-rapportages die waren opgesteld door het Nederlands Instituut voor Forensische Psychiatrie en Psychologie (NIFP). Uit het onderzoek kwam naar voren dat recidivisten – in vergelijking met personen die dat niet doen – jonger zijn ten tijde van het eerste geregistreerde delict, een uitgebreidere criminele historie hebben en vaker lijden aan ADHD. Dit suggereert dat daderkenmerken een verklarende waarde hebben voor betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld. Aanvullende analyses suggereerden dat dit in het bijzonder geldt voor 'vroeg-startende hoogfrequente daders'.

Het derde onderzoek voor dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 4) betrof een casestudy van een spontane grootschalige ordeverstoring. Deze casestudy baseerde zich op interviews (n=105) met professionals en bij het evenement aanwezige burgers, een analyse van schriftelijke documentatie, open-source en politie-audiovisueel materiaal en data van de 108 aangehouden verdachten. Het onderzoek liet zien dat de menigte tot geweld tegen de politie overging toen de Mobiele Eenheid (ME) arriveerde; van disproportioneel en/of ongericht politieoptreden was op dat moment geen sprake. De daders waren met name mannelijke adolescenten zonder banden met hooligangroepen of een aanmerkelijke criminele voorgeschiedenis. Contextuele factoren (gelegenheid, pakkans) en alcoholconsumptie hebben mogelijk bijgedragen aan de escalatie. Tegelijkertijd maakte het onderzoek duidelijk dat de opbouw richting de rel – in de vorm van een grimmiger wordende sfeer – voor een groot deel van de aanwezigen een reden was om te vertrekken. Bovendien nam minder dan tien procent van de aanwezigen daadwerkelijk deel aan het geweld. Deze bevindingen impliceren dat selectieprocessen bijgedragen kunnen hebben aan het collectieve geweld dat volgde. In het bijzonder kwam ADHD daarbij als een mogelijk relevant individueel kenmerk naar voren, in ieder geval voor een klein deel van de betrokkenen.

Het vierde onderzoek van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 5) ging nader in op de betekenis van wederzijds afgestemde vechtpartijen ('vechtafspraken') voor personen die betrokken zijn bij deze vorm van groepsgeweld. Deze studie baseerde zich op kwalitatieve data (waaronder een survey en twee opsporingsonderzoeken) en kwantitatieve data (criminele geschiedenis en de gedrags- en psychologische kenmerken van deelnemers aan vechtafspraken). De uitkomsten van dit onderzoek suggereerden dat onderliggende normen en waarden van de hooligancultuur bijdragen aan het deelnemen aan vechtafspraken: de waarde die gehecht wordt aan de reputatie van de eigen hooligangroep en de individuele status c.q. hiërarchie binnen deze groepen. In dit licht past de bevinding dat het plaatsvinden van vechtafspraken meestal níet te herleiden is tot triggers of spanningen tussen de betrokken groepen. Ook de bevinding dat deelnemers aan vechtafspraken een uitgebreidere geweldshistorie hebben ten opzichte van personen die betrokken zijn geweest bij een spontane ordeverstoring, lijkt te passen binnen een subcultuur die waarde toekent aan gewelddadig gedrag. Daarmee suggereren ook de bevindingen van deze studie een zekere mate van 'selectie'. Dit impliceert wederom dat daderkenmerken zinvol kunnen zijn om groepsgeweld en de betrokkenheid van personen daarbij te verklaren.

Punten van discussie

De juridische formulering van 'geweld in vereniging' (art. 141 SR) – wat de facto verwijst naar groepsgeweld – bestrijkt een breed spectrum; van kleine vechtpartijen tot grootschalige verstoringen van de openbare orde. Daar de focus van deze dissertatie op het laatste lag, zijn in de steekproef van de eerste twee studies uiteindelijk die personen meegenomen die bij de Nederlandse politie als 'hooligan' geregistreerd waren, of die – om een mogelijke vertekening naar bekende daders te minimaliseren – bij recente ordeverstoringen zijn aangehouden als verdachte. Belangrijk voor de laatste groep was het alomvattende karakter van de opsporingsonderzoeken, waardoor de meeste relschoppers, inclusief tot dan toe onbekende personen, konden worden aangehouden. In dit proefschrift is verder een onderscheid gemaakt tussen reactief en proactief groepsgeweld. Vechtafspraken waren ten tijde van het onderzoek echter (nog) geen prioriteit voor de politie. Het aantal opsporingsonderzoeken dat binnen de vierde studie kon worden geanalyseerd bleef derhalve beperkt tot twee. Hoewel er geen redenen zijn om aan te nemen dat deze twee vechtafspraken dat niet zijn, kon niet worden vastgesteld in welke mate de huidige bevindingen representatief zijn voor alle vechtafspraken en de daarbij betrokken personen. Kortom, hoewel het proefschrift een beredeneerde steekproef van zowel groepsgeweldincidenten als groepsgeweldplegers omvat, bleek een geheel willekeurige steekproef van collectieve geweldsincidenten en daders niet mogelijk. Derhalve is voorzichtigheid geboden bij het veralgemeniseren van de huidige bevindingen naar andere contexten waarin groepsgeweld voorkomt (zoals demonstraties).

Voor het inventariseren van de criminele voorgeschiedenis en recidive van groepsgeweldplegers is gebruikgemaakt van politieregistratiegegevens. Deze data kunnen sterk beïnvloed zijn door beleidsprioriteiten van de politie en het Openbaar Ministerie (OM). Om die reden kan het daadwerkelijke

criminele gedrag van personen zijn onderschat (onderrapportage). Deze beperking kan de in de eerste studie onderscheiden criminele carrière-trajecten van groepsgeweldplegers en het toewijzen van personen aan deze trajecten hebben beïnvloed. Dit geldt eveneens voor de waargenomen mate van persistentie onder groepsgeweldplegers. Aanvullend bleken objectieve data aangaande psychologische kenmerken c.q. diagnoses vrijwel geheel afwezig. Dit betekent dat binnen het huidige proefschrift vrijwel uitsluitend gebruikgemaakt is van afgeleide variabelen in plaats van met klinische instrumenten verkregen data. In de derde en vierde studie van dit proefschrift is daarnaast gebruikgemaakt van kwalitatief materiaal. In het bijzonder de vierde studie naar vechtafspraken vraagt om een zekere mate van terughoudendheid bij het interpreteren van de onderzoekbevindingen. Het aantal casestudies was, in de vorm van twee strafrechtelijke onderzoeken, beperkt. Bovendien werd deze informatie uitsluitend verzameld ten behoeve van de bewijsvoering in de context van een strafrechtelijk onderzoek, en beriepen bij vechtafspraken betrokken personen zich vrijwel altijd op hun zwijgrecht. Hierdoor was vanuit de eerste hand vrijwel geen informatie over motieven om deel te nemen aan vechtafspraken beschikbaar. In plaats daarvan moest worden vertrouwd op informatie uit de tweede hand (i.c. politieprofessionals werkzaam op het gebied van voetbal en veiligheid), waarbij vertekening in de mogelijke motieven voor deelname aan een vechtafspraak niet volledig kon worden uitgesloten.

Implicaties voor theorie en praktijk

Ondanks voornoemde beperkingen maakten de verzamelde data, dankzij een breed scala aan bronnen, grote steekproeven en verschillende methodologische benaderingen, een uitgebreid onderzoek mogelijk naar de vraag of verschillen tussen tegenstrijdige verklaringen voor groepsgeweld konden worden overbrugd.

Het proefschrift levert een belangrijke bijdrage aan de theorievorming op het vlak van groepsgeweld. De bevindingen uit de eerste twee onderzoeken laten uitgesproken verschillen binnen de steekproef van groepsgeweldplegers zien waar het gaat om criminele carrièrekenmerken en de aanwezigheid van psychologische kenmerken. Deze uitkomsten passen bij bestaande typologische theorieën over de achterliggende verklaringen voor criminaliteit. Dit proefschrift geeft daarmee als eerste een empirisch onderbouwd argument om meerdere typen groepsgeweldplegers te onderscheiden (in ieder geval: 'vroeg-startende hoogfrequente daders' en 'incidentele groepsgeweldplegers'). De achterliggende verklaringen voor betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld verschillen per type dader. Dit biedt handvatten om ogenschijnlijk tegenstrijdige verklaringen voor groepsgeweld met elkaar te verbinden. Dit proefschrift laat tevens zien dat groepsgeweld niet alleen kan voortkomen uit triggers en spanningen tussen de betrokken groepen; vanuit de hooligancultuur wordt gewelddadig gedrag positief gewaardeerd, wat onder andere tot uiting komt in vechtafspraken tussen hooligangroepen. Tegelijkertijd is het maken van een onderscheid tussen reactieve en proactieve vormen van groepsgeweld geen sinecure. De strandrel in Hoek van Holland (Muller et al., 2010) – die werd gebruikt als vergelijkingscase in de Project-X casestudy – liet zien dat een kleine groep personen die behoorden tot een opkomende maar beruchte hooligangroep

het voornemen hadden een rel te veroorzaken. De meerderheid van de bij het geweld betrokken personen reageerde vervolgens op hoe gebeurtenissen zich ontvouwden. Dit geeft aan dat verklarende factoren voor een rel kunnen verschillen tussen de personen die daarbij betrokken zijn. Dit pleit voor een theoretische benadering waarin aandacht is voor zowel reactieve als proactieve vormen van groepsgeweld en waarin zowel negatieve (gevoel van onrecht) als positieve (status, behoefte aan spanning) aspecten van gewelddadig gedrag worden meegewogen. Theoretisch past dit bij de recent geïntroduceerde quadripartiete geweldstypologie (QVT) (zie Howard, 2015).

De uitkomsten van het proefschrift hebben verschillende implicaties voor de praktijk. Zo is het binnen de uitgevoerde onderzoeken moeizaam gebleken om gegevens te verzamelen over de persoonskenmerken van groepsgeweldplegers. De bevindingen van de uitgevoerde studies impliceren echter dat vaker dan nu het geval is psychologische rapporten en risicotaxaties uitgevoerd moeten worden bij groepsgeweldplegers. Zo kan een beter beeld worden verkregen van de onderliggende oorzaken van iemands betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld, het recidiverisico en de vereiste maatregelen om recidive te voorkomen. Het nemen van preventieve maatregelen tegen personen die als persistent groepsgeweldpleger kunnen worden aangemerkt, kan bijdragen aan het beperken van situaties waarin het tot groepsgeweld kan komen. Een kanttekening daarbij is wel dat alleen passende gedragsinterventies recidive daadwerkelijk kunnen verminderen. De uitkomsten van deze thesis bieden aanvullend zicht op criminele carrière- en persoonskenmerken die behulpzaam kunnen zijn bij het identificeren van personen met een hoog risico op recidive. Hiermee kunnen de bevindingen van het proefschrift bijdragen aan het verder vormgeven en ontwikkelen van een in 2007 door de politie opgezette database van notoire ordeverstoorders. Tot slot blijkt uit het onderzoek dat een klein deel van 'bekende' hooligans deelneemt aan vechtafspraken. Het feit dat deze vechtafspraken in kleine kring worden georganiseerd, pleit voor een focus op het identificeren van bij deze gevechten betrokken personen. Het samenbrengen van verschillende informatiestromen (bijv. Politieregistratiegegevens en politieprofessionals die heimelijk werken) kan hierbij behulpzaam zijn en richting geven aan een persoonsgerichte aanpak (PGA). Vanuit de bevinding dat gelegenheid en pakkans een belangrijke contextuele factor zijn voor het al dan niet doorgaan van vechtafspraken, kan ook worden geïnvesteerd op het vergroten van de (waargenomen) pakkans onder potentiële deelnemers.

Tot slot

In dit proefschrift is voor het eerst een poging gedaan om tegengestelde opvattingen over de achterliggende oorzaken van groepsgeweld samen te brengen. Vanuit de in dit proefschrift opgenomen studies kan worden geconcludeerd dat er meerdere typen groepsgeweldplegers zijn, die verschillen qua criminele geschiedenis, individuele kenmerken en recidiverisico. Waar contextuele factoren het meest in het oog springen voor bij spontaan groepsgeweld betrokken personen, lijken individuele kenmerken een belangrijke verklarende factor onder groepsgeweldplegers die betrokken zijn bij zowel spontane als vooropgezette vormen van groepsgeweld. Laatstgenoemde groep vormt een klein deel van alle

personen die spontaan betrokken raken bij groepsgeweld; andersom is hun betrokkenheid bij vooropgezette vormen van groepsgeweld aanmerkelijk groter. Dit proefschrift suggereert dat het theoretisch relevant is om te differentiëren tussen verschillende vormen van groepsgeweld en groepsgeweldplegers.

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Ferwerda, H., T. van Ham, H. de Man & S. Vos (2016). *Samen D'ran. Naar veilig voetbal in Doetinchem*. Den Haag: Auditteam Voetbal en Veiligheid.

Auditteam Voetbal & Veiligheid (2017). *Auditteam Voetbal & Veiligheid 2013-2016*. Den Haag: Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie.

List of relevant presentations

June 2014	Poster presentation on the backgrounds of collective violence offenders Leiden University
June 2014	Reading about hard core hooligans and their individual characteristics National Football Intelligence Point Netherlands
June 2016	Poster presentation about a new type of sanction imposed on collective violence offenders Leiden University
March 2016	Symposium about the backgrounds of collective violence offenders Logacom
August 2018	Reading about public disorder risks associated with the entry of Sinterklaas Dutch National Police
March 2019	Poster presentation of the PhD-project University of Groningen
April 2019	Thinking session about mutually arranged confrontations Dutch National Police
July 2019	Reading about mutually arranged confrontations Dutch National Police

Curriculum Vitae

Tom van Ham was born on 19 September 1983 in Haren, the Netherlands. In 2002 he started studying psychology at the VU University Amsterdam and, between 2003 and 2007 followed courses in other scientific disciplines (anthropology, criminology). In 2007 he obtained his MSc degree in both clinical neuropsychology and criminology. After a 3-month sabbatical in South-Eastern Asia, he started working at the Dutch police force (2008) and later on became employed at Bureau Beke (2009-2019) and TwynstraGudde (2019). Over the years, he has increasingly provided guest lectures for training and academic purposes and has made several appearances in Dutch national news media. Next to his fulltime job he became in 2013 an external PhD candidate in a project about the determinants of collective violence involvement at Leiden Law School of Leiden University. Currently, he is employed at The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.