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## **What's the issue? : the lobbying and representativeness of political parties on specific policy issues**

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### **Citation**

Romeijn, J. (2020, June 2). *What's the issue? : the lobbying and representativeness of political parties on specific policy issues*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/92367>

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



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**Author:** Romeijn, J.

**Title:** What's the issue? : the lobbying and representativeness of political parties on specific policy issues

**Issue Date:** 2020-06-02



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

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# Appendix





## APPENDIX 1.1: DIVISION OF LABOUR

This dissertation benefitted from being written as part of the GovLis project led by Anne Rasmussen. The embedding in this larger project, which among other things studied the extent to and conditions under which interest groups mediate the relationship between public opinion and policy outputs, enabled analyses on a much larger scale than would otherwise have been possible, especially for chapter 4. This appendix briefly outlines the contributions of the author to the data collection for the different empirical chapters in the dissertation.

The 102 German policy issues studied in *chapter 2* were selected and coded by the principal investigator and other project members. The author of the dissertation did, however, develop the coding scheme for the media coding of party positions, as well as conducted and oversaw the coding done by student assistants. The application of MRP was developed in close cooperation with Lars Mäder and all analyses were conducted by the author of the dissertation.

The four regulatory issues in *chapter 3* were selected jointly by the co-authors of the chapter, with the author of the dissertation conducting large parts of the data collection himself. While based on code-books used in other parts of the project (to which the candidate also contributed) all coding of media articles by student assistants for this study was coordinated and checked by the author of the dissertation. The quantitative analyses were primarily conducted by Dimiter Toshkov in close cooperation with the author of the dissertation, with the latter being primarily responsible for the qualitative analysis (in close cooperation with both co-authors).

Out of all the chapters, *chapter 4* benefitted most from being embedded in the GovLis project. Here, the author was an active part of the team that conducted the media coding and administered and developed the survey of policy advocates (taking several months' fulltime work), but many of the choices (for example the selection of countries, policy issues, design of the media coding as well as the survey's focus) were the result of the choices made by Anne Rasmussen in cooperation with the entire team. The interviews for determining the positions of political parties in five countries would also have been impossible without the GovLis project, even if the author did conduct some of these interviews. All analyses in the paper, as well as the collection of data about political parties and data cleaning were conducted by the author of the dissertation.

Finally, for *chapter 5*, all data collection, cleaning, codebook development, supervision of a student assistant as well as analyses were conducted by the author of this dissertation.

## APPENDIX 2.1: THE POLITBAROMETER QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY PARTY SUPPORTERS

The original formulation of the survey questions in German:

1. In Deutschland neigen viele Leute längere Zeit einer bestimmten politischen Partei zu, obwohl sie auch ab und zu eine andere Partei wählen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen: Neigen Sie - ganz allgemein gesprochen - einer bestimmten Partei zu?
2. Falls die/der Befragte einer Partei zuneigt  
Wie stark oder wie schwach neigen Sie - alles zusammengenommen - dieser Partei zu? ...  
0 TNZ  
1 Sehr stark,  
2 ziemlich stark,  
3 mäßig,  
4 ziemlich schwach,  
5 sehr schwach?  
9 KA

Translation by the author:

1. In Germany many people tend to support a specific political party over a longer period of time, even if they sometimes also vote for another party. How is that for you? Do you – speaking generally – tend towards a specific political party?
2. In case the respondent does tend to favour a political party:  
All things considered, how strongly or weakly do you tend to favour this party?...  
0 – TNZ  
1 – Very strongly  
2 – Rather strongly  
3 – Moderately  
4 – Rather weakly  
5 – Very weakly  
9 – Don't know

## APPENDIX 2.2: STRUCTURE OF THE STACKED DATASET ILLUSTRATING TWO HYPOTHETICAL POLICY ISSUES

Case	Policy Issue	General public support	Political party	Party position	Government party
1	1	.6	SDP	Favour	1
2	1	.6	CDU/CSU	Against	0
3	1	.6	FPD	Against	0
4	1	.6	Greens	Favour	1
5	1	.6	Linke	Neutral	0
6	2	.2	SDP	Against	0
7	2	.2	CDU/CSU	Favour	1
8	2	.2	FPD	Favour	1
9	2	.2	Greens	Against	0
10	2	.2	Linke	Against	0




## APPENDIX 2.3: MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING WHETHER A PARTY WAS IN FAVOUR OF A POLICY ISSUE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Supporter preferences	4.55*** (0.88)	4.54*** (0.89)	0.28 (1.92)	7.76*** (1.45)	6.90* (3.09)
Nicheness		3.23* (1.50)	-0.72 (2.23)	3.83* (1.60)	3.15 (2.72)
Supporter preferences*			7.60* (3.23)		1.23 (3.96)
Nicheness					
Government party		0.58 (0.54)	0.48 (0.54)	3.38*** (0.92)	3.22** (1.04)
Supporter preferences*				-5.57*** (1.46)	-5.31** (1.68)
Government Party					
<b>Controls</b>					
Party (ref: SPD)					
CDU/CSU	-0.07 (0.48)	-1.21+ (0.73)	-1.17 (0.73)	-1.27+ (0.74)	-1.27+ (0.74)
FDP	-0.44 (1.15)	-0.38 (1.17)	-0.33 (1.16)	0.33 (1.33)	0.31 (1.32)
Grüne	0.43 (1.24)	-0.42 (1.28)	-0.41 (1.28)	0.22 (1.47)	0.19 (1.47)
Linke	0.15 (1.21)	-0.58 (1.25)	-0.66 (1.25)	-0.11 (1.43)	-0.15 (1.42)
Party size	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
Media Salience	-0.09 (0.39)	-0.08 (0.38)	-0.05 (0.38)	-0.05 (0.41)	-0.05 (0.41)
Constant	-2.87+ (1.57)	-4.66* (1.88)	-2.46 (2.07)	-7.71** (2.36)	-7.18* (2.87)
Coalition fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Policy-level random intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of cases	334	334	334	334	334
AIC	416	414	411	399	401
BIC	465	472	472	460	466

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## APPENDIX 2.4



**Figure A2.4.1:** Predicted probability of a position in favour of a policy issue for government parties and opposition parties (left axis) and the distribution of cases (right axis), based on the proportion of party supporters in favour of the issue

*Figure note:* The black solid line indicates the predictions for government parties and the red dashed line for opposition parties (left axis) with 95% confidence intervals, based on Model 5 in Appendix 2.3. The shaded grey area indicates the distribution of the cases (as a percentage of the total N) across public support (right axis).

## APPENDIX 2.5: EXPLORING ISSUE-CHARACTERISTICS

This appendix explores the conjecture that niche parties may not generally side more with their supporters than more mainstream parties, but only do so on the policy issues they own (Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014; Klüver & Spoon, 2016). The argument has so far been tested in terms of the attention that niche parties paid to issue dimensions like the environment or immigration (Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014; Klüver & Spoon, 2016). Applying issue-ownership to specific policy issues is not straightforward. In order to establish issue ownership, the section below relied on data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens et al., 2017). Firstly each specific policy issue was tied to a policy dimension (see Appendix 2.7). Secondly the topics of quasi sentences in the manifestos of the political parties that were dedicated to the same policy dimension were calculated (see table A2.5.2). A party's ownership of an issue is then defined as the share of sentences in the manifesto that were dedicated to the general dimension at the time of the statement by the political party (Klüver & Spoon, 2016). Since manifestos are only written before elections, the 'ownership' score of a single manifesto was applied from one year before the election for which the manifesto was written to one year before the next election. The one-year period is chosen because it is the period during which the manifesto was written.

Table A2.5.1 reports on models that investigate whether niche parties' positions are more related to those of their supporters on issues they own. Model 1 demonstrates that the three way interaction (testing whether the effect of being a more niche party on the effect of public opinion depends on the extent to which the party owns an issue) is not strong nor significant. Importantly and against the expectations, Model 2 shows the same for the effect on the relation between (niche) party positions and the preferences of supporters. Moreover, Models 3 and 4 show the same results but with congruence (whether a majority of the public (Model 3) or a party's supporters (Model 4) are on the same side of a policy issue). Here the effect of owning an issue does not affect (neither strongly nor significantly) the likelihood that a niche party's position is congruent with those of its supporters – again disconfirming the expectation. Of course, this is a very tentative test and future studies could more systematically assess the ownership of specific policy issues by political parties and the consequences it has for the public - party position linkage.

**Table A2.5.1:** Multilevel logistic models exploring issue-ownership. Models 1 and 2 predict a party's position and models 3 and 4 whether a party's position was congruent with public (3) or supporters' (4) preferences. Tests of issue ownership theory marked in bold.

Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable:	Party position	Party position	Congruence public	Congruence supporters
Public support	0.76 (3.41)			
Nicheness	-0.88 (3.36)	0.19 (3.91)	0.54 (1.67)	0.94 (1.85)
Ownership	0.17 (0.32)	0.17 (0.37)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.11)
Public support*Nicheness	4.42 (5.77)			
Public support*Ownership	-0.49 (0.55)			
Nicheness*Ownership	0.01 (0.54)	-0.18 (0.62)	<b>0.20</b> <b>(0.18)</b>	<b>0.19</b> <b>(0.19)</b>
Public support*Nicheness* Ownership	<b>0.38</b> <b>(0.91)</b>			
Supporter preferences		3.92 (3.94)		
Supporter preferences*Nicheness		2.14 (6.48)		
Supporter preferences*Ownership		-0.61 (0.63)		
Supporter preferences* Nicheness*Ownership		<b>0.91</b> <b>(1.04)</b>		
<b>Controls</b>				
Party (ref: SPD)				
CDU/CSU	-0.91 (0.66)	-1.08 (0.73)	-1.15+ (0.66)	-0.68 (0.69)
FDP	-0.58 (1.04)	-0.49 (1.19)	-1.80+ (1.09)	-2.57* (1.24)
Grüne	-0.59 (1.14)	-0.58 (1.32)	-0.97 (1.20)	-1.28 (1.40)
Linke	-0.65 (1.10)	-0.87 (1.28)	-0.72 (1.19)	-2.15 (1.34)
Party size	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)
Media salience	0.19 (0.34)	-0.03 (0.39)	-0.44 (0.35)	-0.59 (0.38)
Constant	-1.35 (2.39)	-3.02 (2.73)	1.96 (1.76)	3.20+ (1.93)
Coalition fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Issue random-intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of cases	334	334	334	334
AIC	456	413	454	416
BIC	529	486	511	474

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table A.5.2:** Additive policy scale dimensions from the CMP categories.

Names	CMP Left	CMP Right
Education spending	506 Educational Provision Expansion: Positive	507 Education Expenditure Limitation: Positive
Environmental Protection	501 Environmental Protection: Positive + 416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	410 Productivity: Positive
Foreign Alliances	101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	102: Foreign Special Relationships: Negative
Free Market Economy	403 Market Regulation: Positive + 412 Controlled Economy: Positive + 413 Nationalisation: Positive + 415 Marxist Analysis: Positive	401 Free Enterprise: Positive + 402 Incentives: Positive
Internationalism	107 Internationalism: Positive	109 Internationalism: Negative
Justice and Freedom	201 Freedom and human rights: positive + 202 Democracy: positive	605 Law and order: positive
Macroeconomic	409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive
Militarism	105 Military: Negative	104 Military: Positive
Multiculturalism	607 Multiculturalism: Positive	608 Multiculturalism: Negative
Target groups	705 Underprivileged minority groups/positive	704 Middle-class and professional groups/positive
Traditional Morality	604 Traditional Morality: Negative	603 Traditional Morality:
Welfare State	504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive	505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive
Labour groups	701 Labour groups: Positive	702 Labour groups: Negative
Political system	301 Decentralisation	302 Centralisation
European Union	108 European Community/Union: Positive	110 European Community/Union: Negative
Constitutionalism	204 Constitutionalism: Negative	203 Constitutionalism: Positive
National way of life	602 National Way of Life: Negative	601 National Way of Life: Positive
General left right scale	103 Anti-Imperialism: Anti-Colonialism + 105 Military: Negative + 106 Peace: Positive + 107 Internationalism: Positive + 202 Democracy: Positive + 403 Market Regulation: Positive + 404 Economic Planning: Positive + 406 Protectionism: Positive + 412 Controlled Economy: Positive + 413 Nationalisation: Positive + 504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive + 506 Education Expansion: Positive + 701 Labour Groups: Positive	104 Military: Positive + 201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive + 203 Constitutionalism: Positive + 305 Political Authority: Positive + 401 Free Enterprise: Positive + 402 Incentives: Positive + 407 Protectionism: Negative + 414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive + 505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive + 601 National Way of Life: Positive + 603 Traditional Morality: Positive + 05 Law and Order: Positive + 606 Social Harmony: Positive

The second part of this Appendix explores whether the link between political parties and the positions of the general public and their supporters is affected by the media salience of a policy issue. There is some evidence that policy outputs are more aligned with public preferences on issues that attract media attention (e.g. Lax & Phillips, 2012). The argument is usually that the actions of politicians are more scrutinized on such issues which should increase the electoral costs of ignoring public opinion (Erikson et al., 1995). Moreover, politicians may be more aware of public preferences as a result of media attention.

On the other hand and applied to political parties, media salience should make it harder for parties to hide or blur unpopular positions (Rovny, 2012). Similarly to how government parties may be more pressured into voicing unpopular policy decisions (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010), media attention for an issue may reduce the opportunities for hiding an unpopular position.

Table 2.5.3 shows that the latter of these two arguments bears out in the data. Both the effects of public opinion (Model 1) and of supporter preferences (Model 2) on party positions are weakened on salient issues. However, the interaction effect between media salience and supporter preferences is only significant at the 10% level in Model 2 and not at all for models predicting congruence in Models 3 and 4, even if they are in the same general direction. Taken together, the models provide some (but not strong) evidence for the conclusion that political parties – at least when it comes to the positions they take in the media – take less popular positions on salient issues. The fact that party positions are also measured through the media *and* the fact that missing party positions mainly occurred on non-salient issues means that these results may be dependent on the method used here – even if the support for blurring behaviour (Rovny, 2012) is interesting in its own right.

**Table A2.5.3:** Multilevel logistic models exploring media salience. Models 1 and 2 predict a party's position and models 3 and 4 whether a party's position was congruent with public (3) or supporters' (4) preferences. Effects of media salience highlighted in **bold**.

Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable:	Party position	Party position	Congruence Public	Congruence Supporters
Public support	2.71*** (0.64)			
Media salience	3.71** (1.40)	2.49+ (1.39)	<b>-0.43</b> <b>(0.34)</b>	<b>-0.58</b> <b>(0.36)</b>
Public support* Media salience	<b>-4.75**</b> <b>(1.78)</b>			
Supporter preferences		4.99*** (0.93)		
Supporter preferences*Media salience		<b>-3.47+</b> <b>(1.80)</b>		
Nicheness	2.74* (1.36)	3.07* (1.48)	1.34 (1.36)	1.38 (1.49)
Party in government	0.50 (0.50)	0.60 (0.53)	-1.28* (0.54)	-1.66** (0.64)
<b>Controls</b>				
Party (Ref: SPD)				
CDU/CSU	-1.09+ (0.66)	-1.20+ (0.72)	-1.13+ (0.66)	-0.56 (0.70)
FDP	-0.58 (1.02)	-0.54 (1.17)	-1.43 (1.11)	-2.09+ (1.27)
Grüne	-0.45 (1.11)	-0.48 (1.27)	-0.66 (1.21)	-0.83 (1.42)
Linke	-0.58 (1.08) (0.68)	-0.69 (1.25) (0.76)	-0.31 (1.20) (0.69)	-1.58 (1.36) (0.76)
Party size	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)
Constant	-3.28* (1.57)	-4.76* (1.87)	0.83 (1.64)	2.11 (1.81)
Coalition fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Issue- level random intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of cases	334	334	334	334
AIC	451	413	448	408
BIC	508	474	501	462

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## APPENDIX 2.6: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

**Table A2.6.1:** Multilevel Logistic models predicting congruence between a party's position and the preferences of the general public (models 1 and 2) and between a party's position and the preferences of its supporters (models 3 and 4).

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	Congruence party public	Congruence party public	Congruence party supporter	Congruence party supporter
Nicheness	1.70 (1.34)	1.34 (1.36)	2.07 (1.48)	1.38 (1.49)
Party in government		-1.28* (0.54)		-1.66** (0.64)
<b>Controls</b>				
Party (ref: SPD)				
CDU/CSU	-1.20+ (0.65)	-1.13+ (0.66)	-0.72 (0.69)	-0.56 (0.70)
FDP	-1.78 (1.08)	-1.43 (1.11)	-2.60* (1.24)	-2.09+ (1.27)
Grüne	-0.96 (1.19)	-0.66 (1.21)	-1.33 (1.39)	-0.83 (1.42)
Linke	-0.67 (1.17)	-0.31 (1.20)	-2.14 (1.34)	-1.58 (1.36)
Party size	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Media salience	-0.45 (0.34)	-0.43 (0.34)	-0.60 (0.37)	-0.58 (0.36)
Constant	1.06 (1.61)	0.83 (1.64)	2.38 (1.79)	2.11 (1.81)
Coalition fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Issue level random intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Cases	334	334	334	334
AIC	452	448	414	408
BIC	501	501	464	462

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001



**Table A2.6.2:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a party is in favour of a policy issue, excluding one political party at a time. Based on Model 5 from Table 2.2.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Excluding SPD	Excluding CDU/CSU	Excluding FDP	Excluding Grüne	Excluding Linke
Public support	-2.35 (3.66)	2.88 (3.02)	4.11 (2.87)	3.06 (2.74)	2.66 (2.52)
Nicheness	-0.29 (3.51)	-0.04 (3.75)	1.83 (2.51)	3.12 (2.94)	3.54 (2.50)
Public support*	8.67 (5.29)	3.65 (4.41)	0.51 (3.83)	1.68 (4.04)	1.47 (3.62)
Nicheness					
Government party	1.98* (0.88)	3.49** (1.24)	2.57** (0.95)	2.67* (1.06)	2.28** (0.87)
Public support*	-2.64+ (1.41)	-5.27** (1.95)	-4.52** (1.58)	-4.12** (1.51)	-3.74** (1.43)
Government party					
<b>Controls</b>					
Party (ref: SPD <sup>1</sup> )					
CDU/CSU			-0.66 (0.72)	-0.89 (0.70)	-1.68* (0.73)
FDP	1.66 (1.85)	-1.57 (1.48)		-0.72 (1.18)	0.65 (1.18)
Grüne	1.47 (1.88)	-0.71 (1.53)	-0.72 (1.33)		0.40 (1.26)
Linke	1.25 (1.95)	-0.93 (1.51)	-0.72 (1.28)	-1.03 (1.39)	
Party size	0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Media salience	-0.23 (0.38)	0.58 (0.55)	0.35 (0.42)	-0.09 (0.37)	0.04 (0.39)
Constant	-3.49 (3.17)	-2.07 (3.24)	-3.14 (2.50)	-3.51 (2.29)	-5.59* (2.45)
Coalition fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Issue level random-intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Cases	253	256	268	264	295
AIC	337	331	366	358	400
BIC	390	388	424	412	459

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

<sup>1</sup>In Model 1 (which excludes SPD), the reference category is CDU/CSU

## APPENDIX 2.7: LIST OF POLICY ISSUES

Policy Issue	Policy Scale	Public support (%)	Don't know (%)	Majority of party's supporters on other side than the public
Making Hartz IV receivers do "generally useful work" more strongly than before <sup>1</sup>	WelfareState	81%	4%	
Cutting government expenditure on welfare	WelfareState	31%	4%	FDP
Cutting government expenditure on healthcare	WelfareState	15%	2%	SPD
Cutting government expenditure on traffic and street construction	Free Market Economy	35%	2%	
Cutting government expenditure on defence	Militarism	85%	3%	CDU/CSU
Cutting government expenditure on childcare	WelfareState	6%	2%	
Cutting government expenditure on pensions	WelfareState	8%	1%	
Cutting government expenditure on family promotion/support	WelfareState	14%	2%	SPD
Introducing a tax on buying and selling securities ("Wertpapieren")	Free Market Economy	82%	7%	
Reversing the raise of the VAT level	Free Market Economy	78%	6%	SPD
Abolishing the rule that allows people who self-report their tax evasion to only pay back the evaded taxes without additional penalties	Free Market Economy	60%	3%	
Only returning soldiers from Afghanistan later than 2011 <sup>2</sup>	Militarism	79%	5%	
Government intervention in levels of wages of managers <sup>3</sup>	Free Market Economy	69%	3%	CDU/CSU
Providing a government loan of 50 million Euros to Quelle (a company) <sup>4</sup>	Free Market Economy	19%	5%	
Extending the duration of the military deployment in Afghanistan <sup>2</sup>	Militarism	40%	3%	CDU/CSU, Grüne
Increasing the number of German soldiers in Afghanistan	Militarism	38%	57%	
There are different rules for cancelling long term rental contracts for those to rent a property and those who own it. The term for cancellation is three months for renters, but depends on the duration of the contract for owners. The proposal is to equalise these terms.	Free Market Economy	50%	9%	CDU/CSU, Linke

**APPENDIX 2.7: LIST OF POLICY ISSUES (CONTINUED)**

Policy Issue	Policy Scale	Public support (%)	Don't know (%)	Majority of party's supporters on other side than the public
Selling a part of fully state owned Deutsche Bahn (the national railway company)	Free Market Economy	36%	10%	
Ensuring that pensioners who have paid into the pension system for an extensive period of time receive a pension that is above the poverty line	WelfareState	86%	3%	SPD
Give financial support (from the state) to Opel (car manufacturer)	Free Market Economy	43%	6%	
Giving out consumer coupons ("Konsumgutscheine") to all citizens <sup>5</sup> .	Macroeconomy	17%	3%	
Lowering taxes for private persons	Macroeconomy	83%	4%	
Giving financial support to individual companies that get into trouble	Free Market Economy	59%	7%	
Providing stronger tax reliefs for companies	Free Market Economy	67%	7%	
Introducing a wealth tax for the wealthy	Targetgroups	68%	5%	
Reintroducing the tax return for commuters from the first-kilometer <sup>6</sup>	Free Market Economy	88%	3%	
Also employing German soldiers in parts of Afghanistan with more conflict	Militarism	17%	4%	
Changing the constitution to allow the military to assist the police in cases where the threats are of such a nature that the policy alone cannot deal with them	Militarism	71%	4%	CDU/CSU, Grüne
Raising the unemployment benefits II ("Arbeitslosengeldes II") in the Hartz-IV regulation	WelfareState	81%	8%	
Introduction of a minimum wage for people delivering mail	Free Market Economy	87%	5%	
Introducing state-controlled electricity prizes	Free Market Economy	66%	5%	
Stopping all nuclear power plants by 2021	Environmental Protection	47%	7%	CDU/CSU, FDP
Storing fingerprints of all German citizens and making them available to the police	Justice and Freedom	62%	2%	Grüne
Increasing taxation on flying	Environmental Protection	60%	4%	

## APPENDIX 2.7: LIST OF POLICY ISSUES (CONTINUED)

Policy Issue	Policy Scale	Public support (%)	Don't know (%)	Majority of party's supporters on other side than the public
Raising the level of obligatory contributions to health insurance to match health care expenditure	WelfareState	17%	2%	
Banning computer games that celebrate violence ("gewaltverherrlichenden") in response to the school shooting in Emsdetten	Justice and Freedom	72%	2%	
During times of peace the army is only allowed to operate on German territory in case of disasters: allowing the army to assist the police also when there are no disasters	Militarism	71%	3%	Grüne
In the construction sector the minimum wage is set as the lowest wage level of the collective labour agreement to protect workers from cheaper foreign labour. Expanding this provision to all sectors of the economy	Free Market Economy	67%	6%	
Raising income taxes on very high incomes	Targetgroups	72%	3%	
Abolishing a number of tax returns to introduce a flat-rate income tax	Targetgroups	45%	37%	FDP
Unemployed spouses receive health insurance through their partner. Introducing a contribution to health insure for the unemployed spouses of high income employees	WelfareState	76%	4%	
Additional compensation payments for working nights, Sundays and holidays are not taxed. Limiting the extent to which this is the case.	Free Market Economy	34%	3%	
Reducing the subsidies on coal	Free Market Economy	76%	14%	
Raising the VAT-level	Free Market Economy	23%	2%	
Allowing the taking of DNA not just in case of severe crimes and sexual assaults, but also for less severe offences	Justice and Freedom	73%	4%	Grüne
Making it obligatory for parliamentarians (in the Bundestag) to report income from external sources to the chair of the parliament	Justice and Freedom	81%	3%	

## APPENDIX 2.7: LIST OF POLICY ISSUES (CONTINUED)

Policy Issue	Policy Scale	Public support (%)	Don't know (%)	Majority of party's supporters on other side than the public
Banning paternity tests without permission from the mother	Justice and Freedom	24%	6%	
After a road-toll for trucks, introducing a road-toll for cars	Environmental Protection	57%	5%	
Introducing a limited ban of Diesel-cars and trucks without air filters from inner-cities with air pollution	Environmental Protection	64%	3%	
Creating a new health insurance where all people, including the self-employed and civil servants, pay a certain percentage of their income (including interest and income from renting) as health insurance	WelfareState	62%	27%	CDU/CSU, FDP
Lowering the contributions to health insure and letting people pay a part of treatment costs directly	WelfareState	29%	4%	
Prosecuting illegal work ("Schwarzarbeit") in private homes including babysitting and cleaning	Justice and Freedom	30%	2%	
Founding elite-universities	Education spending	38%	8%	
Abolishing one holiday	Macroeconomy	38%	3%	
Raising the contribution of those without children to the care-insurance (Pflegeversicherung) by up to 9 euros a month to compensate those with children (in line with a judgement of the constitutional court) <sup>7</sup>	WelfareState	57%	3%	
Abolishing the subsidies for buying a house (Eigenheimzulage)	Macroeconomy	26%	6%	
Reducing the tax return for commuters by car, so that they are only compensated from travel above 21 kilometres	Macroeconomy	28%	3%	
Cutting government expenditure on policies to (re)educate employees ('Umschulungsmassnahmen')	Free Market Economy	49%	4%	CDU/CSU
Reducing subsidies on coal	Free Market Economy	73%	17%	
Letting only employees pay for the cost of health insurance instead of splitting the cost between employers and employees	WelfareState	17%	3%	

## APPENDIX 2.7: LIST OF POLICY ISSUES (CONTINUED)

Policy Issue	Policy Scale	Public support (%)	Don't know (%)	Majority of party's supporters on other side than the public
Removing dental care from the obligatory health insurance and instead making employees take out an obligatory private insure for dental care	WelfareState	23%	2%	
Making people pay a 15 euro contribution when visiting a doctor	WelfareState	21%	3%	
Making patients pay 10% of all health care costs themselves to a maximum of 2% of their total annual income	WelfareState	29%	4%	
Replacing the income-adjusted contribution for obligatory health insurance to a flat rate with tax measures to compensate low-income groups	WelfareState	66%	31%	
Abolishing a number of tax returns (for home owners, commuters and others) to lower taxation rates	Free Market Economy	60%	11%	
Loosening regulations against the dismissal of employees for small companies	Free Market Economy	50%	10%	
Forcing companies that fail to provide education placements to pay an education-tax if there is a shortage of such placements <sup>8</sup>	Free Market Economy	58%	4%	CDU/CSU
Treating people with children more favourably than people without children for the pension-insurance	Free Market Economy	58%	3%	
Raising the tobacco tax to increase the price of a pack of cigarettes by 1 euro	Free Market Economy	63%	3%	
Lowering unemployment benefits to motivate receivers of the benefits to take lower paying jobs	WelfareState	64%	5%	SPD
Not raising pensions for one year to solve financial problems in the pension system	Macroeconomy	53%	5%	
Not raising pensions for one year to solve financial problems in the pension system (next year)	Macroeconomy	41%	4%	Grüne
Increasing the contribution to pensions for employers and employees	Free Market Economy	24%	6%	
State involvement to address rising price levels as a result of the introduction of the Euro <sup>9</sup>	Free Market Economy	57%	2%	

## APPENDIX 2.7: LIST OF POLICY ISSUES (CONTINUED)

Policy Issue	Policy Scale	Public support (%)	Don't know (%)	Majority of party's supporters on other side than the public
Temporarily increasing taxes to compensate flood-damages <sup>10</sup>	Macroeconomy	26%	4%	
Should the tax reform for 2003 be postponed by one year to pay for the flood damages? <sup>10</sup>	Macroeconomy	73%	12%	
Raising the retirement age to 67	Macroeconomy	7%	1%	
Paying a .5 Mark deposit ("Pfand") on all drink packaging	Environmental Protection	67%	3%	
Changing agricultural policy to put more emphasis on natural agricultural constructions and specie-specific animal keeping	Environmental Protection	95%	3%	
Stronger state involvement against the abuse of social benefits	Justice and Freedom	97%	4%	
Abolishing military conscription and introducing a professional army instead	Militarism	51%	4%	
The introduction of a limited work permit ("Green Card") for foreign workers in the IT sector	Multiculturalism	43%	4%	Grüne
Banning the extreme-right NPD party	Justice and Freedom	76%	6%	
Introducing stricter legislation to fight right-wing radicalism	Justice and Freedom	67%	4%	Grüne
Spending additional income from selling mobile phone frequencies (100 billion D-Mark) on reducing public debt	Macroeconomy	59%	6%	
Making registered partnerships between same-sex partners legally equivalent to marriage	Traditional Morality	54%	5%	
Treating same-sex couples with a registered partnership like married couples regarding income taxes	Traditional Morality	62%	6%	CDU/CSU
Making it easier for foreign workers that are in demand to enter Germany	Multiculturalism	69%	4%	
Abolishing the environmental tax (Ökosteuer) to reduce gasoline prices	Environmental Protection	69%	9%	Grüne
The introduction of an energy tax on all energy types finance a decrease in the cost of wages	Environmental Protection	30%	5%	Grüne
Raising the inheritance tax	Targetgroups	30%	9%	

## APPENDIX 2.7: LIST OF POLICY ISSUES (CONTINUED)

Policy Issue	Policy Scale	Public support (%)	Don't know (%)	Majority of party's supporters on other side than the public
Re-introduction of the wealth-tax	Targetgroups	51%	7%	CDU/CSU, FDP
Only increasing pensions to correct for inflation	Macroeconomy	39%	8%	FDP, Grüne
Obliging all employees to pay into a private pension fund in addition to the existing pension insurance ("Rentenversicherung")	Macroeconomy	0,53	5%	
Allowing children of foreigners who have lived in Germany for an extended period of time to get the German nationality upon birth and choosing which nationality they want to keep at age 23	Multiculturalism	62%	3%	
Allowing women to serve in the army ("Bundeswehr")	Militarism	68%	3%	
Financially contributing to post-war reconstruction in Kosovo	Internationalism	69%	3%	
Abolishing the law that regulates shop opening times	Free Market Economy	60%	2%	
Allowing shops to open on Sundays	Free Market Economy	48%	2%	Grüne
To increase the price of gasoline to 5 D-mark per litre over the next 10 years	Environmental Protection	12%	2%	Grüne
Banning double citizenship (of two countries)	Multiculturalism	38%	9%	FDP, Grüne
Building a holocaust memorial in Berlin	Internationalism	51%	7%	

1. Hartz IV is a program offering unemployment benefits. The issue concerns the extent to which receivers of the benefits are required to do 'voluntary' work for society in return for receiving the benefits.
2. In 2010 the Bundestag had given a mandate for the deployment of German troops in Afghanistan until the end of February 2011. The issue is about whether the mandate should be extended until after 2011.
3. In response to the economic crisis the issue is about whether the government should limit the wages and the development of wages earned by managers.
4. Quelle, the mail order branch of Arcandor (a German company) found itself on the brink of bankruptcy in during the financial crisis. The issue is about whether the German government should provide Quelle with loans to make it solvent again and avoid bankruptcy.



5. Konsumgutscheine are coupons provided by the state that citizens can spend on consumer goods, with the idea of increasing consumer spending to boost the economy. The issue is whether the German government should provide such coupons.
6. German commuters could deduct the costs of commuting to work, but only for part of the total distance. The issue is about reintroducing the tax-deduction of commuting costs from the first kilometre.
7. The Constitutional Court ruled that the fact that people without children were treated more favourably than people with children by the existing regulations about the obligatory care-insurance. The issue is about raising contributions by those without children by 9 euros a month to offset this.
8. The issue is about ensuring that there are enough places that enable students pursuing practical education programs to gain work experience.
9. The issue is about hikes in the prices of goods that (allegedly) resulted from the introduction of the Euro – and whether the government should intervene or offset the increased prices.
10. Parts of Southern Germany (especially Bavaria) suffered severe damages due to a large flood. The issue is about a temporary tax increase to pay for a compensation scheme.

## APPENDIX 4.1: LIST OF POLICY ISSUES

**Table A4.1:** Overview of policy-issues.

	Policy issue	Policy type	Salience	Public support in %
Denmark	Building of a bridge for vehicles and trains across the Kattegat	distributive	low	54
	Reducing mortgage interest deduction from 33% to 25%	redistributive	high	31
	Granting asylum to families with children among rejected Iraqi asylum seekers	regulatory	high	46
	Reducing the unemployment benefit period by half from four to two years	redistributive	high	53
	Strengthening the control of the Danish agriculture in order to take action against the misuse of antibiotics	regulatory	low	90
	Controlled delivery of heroin for particularly vulnerable drug addicts at special clinics as a pilot scheme	regulatory	high	85
	Introducing differentiated VAT	redistributive	low	8
	Making schools' average test results public	regulatory	low	45
	Cutting the allowances paid to young people between 25 and 29 years by half	redistributive	low	27
	Creation of an equal pay commission	regulatory	high	82
Germany	Financial support of Arcandor through public money	redistributive	high	19
	Guaranteeing a pension above the poverty line for pensioners who have paid contributions for many years	redistributive	high	86
	Supplying citizens with consumption vouchers to boost the economy	redistributive	high	17
	Establishing a wealth tax	redistributive	low	68
	State control of electricity prices	regulatory	low	66
	Banning of computer games that glorify violence	regulatory	high	72
	Cutting the tax exemption for night, Sunday, and holiday supplements	redistributive	low	34
	Cutting coal subsidies	distributive	low	76
	Making it illegal to carry out a paternity test without the consent of the mother	regulatory	high	24
	Cutting social benefits	redistributive	low	31

**Table A4.1:** Overview of policy-issues. *(continued)*

	Policy issue	Policy type	Salience	Public support in %
Netherlands	Allowing all illegal immigrants who have lived in the Netherlands for a long time to stay	regulatory	high	52
	Raising the retirement age to 67	redistributive	high	33
	Abolishing the mortgage interest	redistributive	high	18
	Spending more money on development aid	redistributive	high	48
	Obligating stores to be closed on Sunday	regulatory	high	34
	Ban of smoking in restaurants	regulatory	low	65
	Banning embryonic stem cell research	regulatory	low	35
	Allowing more asylum seekers	regulatory	high	25
	Banning euthanasia	regulatory	low	8
	Building new nuclear power plants	distributive	low	34
Sweden	Permanent introduction of a congestion charge in Stockholm	redistributive	high	37
	Reinstating the wealth tax, which was abolished in 2007 and meant that anyone with a fortune of 1.5 million paid 1.5% in taxes	redistributive	low	45
	Rescuing Saab through government funds	redistributive	high	40
	Banning the construction of minarets in Sweden	regulatory	high	63
	Reducing third-world aid	distributive	low	19
	Introducing a language test for Swedish citizenship	regulatory	high	67
	Restricting the right to free abortion	regulatory	low	14
	Making household and domestic services tax deductible	redistributive	low	64
	Allowing free download of all films and music from the Internet	regulatory	low	62
	Increasing the old age retirement age	regulatory	high	14

**Table A4.1:** Overview of policy-issues. (continued)

	Policy issue	Policy type	Saliency	Public support in %
	Giving amnesty to illegal immigrants who have spent ten years in Britain without getting into trouble with the police	regulatory	high	32
	Scrapping ID cards	regulatory	high	69
	Requiring food manufacturers to reduce the fat/salt content in their products	regulatory	low	73
	Introducing a graduate tax, where graduates would pay an extra income tax on their income after graduating	redistributive	high	55
UK	Allowing a third runway to be built at Heathrow Airport	distributive	high	45
	Reducing corporation tax	redistributive	low	41
	Increasing Air Passenger Duty, to be paid by people taking both short-haul and long-haul flights	redistributive	high	35
	Subsidising the building of new nuclear power stations	distributive	low	57
	Increasing the tax on large executive-style, estate, and 4x4 vehicles	redistributive	low	77
	Downgrading 'ecstasy' from a class-A drug to a class-B drug	regulatory	low	23

### Selection of policy issues

Collected as part of the GovLis project, policy issues were sampled from a set of issues that were included in public opinion polls and formulated as proposals to change the status quo. We started with an extensive mapping of all issues on which public opinion was polled in our five countries both by (academic) surveys like election studies and the German Politbarometer, and by companies providing high-quality opinion polls like Gallup. We then checked whether the response was measured on an agreement scale and checked whether each issue indeed fell under the competence of the national government (as opposed to the EU or regional governments). From this total population of issues we then drew a stratified sample ensuring that there was variation on a number of independent variables that previous studies have shown affect advocacy and/or preference attainment: media saliency, policy type and public opinion.

## APPENDIX 4.2: ANALYSIS OF SURVEY (NON) RESPONSE

**Table A4.2.1:** Response rates per country.

Country	Not Completed	Completed	Total Invited
Germany	175 77%	50 22%	225 100%
UK	339 82%	73 18%	412 100%
Denmark	114 45%	134 54%	248 100%
Sweden	173 64%	96 36%	269 100%
Netherlands	131 51%	125 49%	256 100%
Total	932	478	1,410
Total %	66%	34%	100%

**Table A4.2.2:** Logistic regression including all invited advocates, with whether they responded to the survey as the dependent variable.

	(1)
Actor type (ref: Business)	
Hobby & identity groups	0.64* (0.32)
Public interest groups	0.88*** (0.25)
Trade unions & occupational groups	0.78*** (0.23)
Firms	-0.41+ (0.25)
Experts, think tanks & institutional associations	0.51* (0.21)
Articles per day	0.04 (0.31)
Policy type (ref: Distributive)	
Regulatory	0.10 (0.21)
Redistributive	0.03 (0.23)
Policy change on issue	-0.15 (0.17)
Country (ref: Germany)	
UK	-0.16 (0.24)
Denmark	1.47*** (0.23)
Sweden	0.88*** (0.22)
Netherlands	1.32*** (0.22)
Constant	-1.76*** (0.30)
Number of advocates	1394
McFadden R-square	0.11

Standard errors in parentheses. +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Changing the baseline categories in the regression shows that firms are the least likely advocate type to respond, followed by business groups. All other advocates were more likely to respond, but response rates were not significant across these other advocate types. Similarly, advocates from Germany and the UK were significantly less likely to respond than those from other countries. Swedish respondents were in the middle and Dutch and Danish advocates were most likely to respond to the survey invitation. There are no significant differences between different types of policy issues, nor is the response rate related to the media salience of the issue.

## APPENDIX 4.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

**Table 4.3.1:** Descriptive statistics

Variable	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	St. dev.
Dep var: Preference attainment (binary)	0	.55	1	.50
Worked with any party (binary)	0	.72	1	.45
Power index	0	0.25	0.78	0.23
Worked with parties on same side	0	.45	1	.41
Share of parties on same side	0	.41	0	.34
Articles per day	0	.17	1.65	.30
Economic resources (binary)	0	.42	1	.49
Media attention (binary)	0	.88	1	.33
Public support	.10	.51	.92	.23
Other actors' support	0	.51	1	.19
Pro policy change (binary)	0	.55	1	.50

## **APPENDIX 4.4: OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ORGANIZED INTERESTS**

### *Public interest groups*

Environment and animal welfare  
Humanitarian – international  
Humanitarian – national  
Consumer Group  
Government reform  
Civil liberties  
Citizen Empowerment  
Other public interest

### *Business groups occupational associations*

Peak-level business group  
Sector-wide business group  
Breed associations  
Technical business associations  
Other business group

### *Firms*

### *Labour groups and occupational associations*

Blue-collar union  
White-collar union  
Employee representative committee  
Other labour groups  
Doctors' associations  
Other medical professions  
Teachers' associations  
Other occupational associations

### *Religious, identity and hobby groups*

Patients  
Elderly  
Students  
Friendship groups (i.e. non-specific groups related to a country)  
Racial or ethnic  
Women  
Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transsexual  
Other – undefined - identity group  
Sports groups



## Appendix |

Other hobby/leisure groups

Groups associated with the protestant church

Roman/Catholic groups

Other religious group

*Experts, think thank organizations and institutional associations*

Expert organizations

Individual experts

Think tanks

Associations of local authorities

Associations of other public institutions

Associations of managers of public institutions

Other Institutional associations

## APPENDIX 4.5: ADDITION OF CONTROL VARIABLES

**Table 4.5:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an actor on an issue. Models 1-3 from table 1 including control variables.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
H1: Worked with any party	0.30 (0.40)		
H2: Party power		1.31+ (0.76)	
H3: Worked with parties on same side			1.82** (0.66)
<b>Controls</b>			
Parties on same side	1.40** (0.49)	1.46** (0.49)	1.07* (0.51)
Articles per day	1.56 (0.96)	1.56 (0.97)	1.52 (0.96)
Economic resources	-0.45 (0.33)	-0.44 (0.33)	-0.54 (0.34)
Perceived media attention	-0.62 (0.51)	-0.68 (0.52)	-0.77 (0.52)
Other actors' support	2.76** (0.89)	2.84** (0.91)	3.05*** (0.92)
Public support	1.93** (0.73)	1.99** (0.74)	2.01** (0.75)
Pro policy change	-0.69* (0.32)	-0.71* (0.32)	-0.83* (0.33)
<b>Actor type (ref: Business)</b>			
Religious & identity groups	-0.25 (1.06)	-0.25 (1.08)	-0.33 (1.10)
Public interest groups	0.89 (0.73)	0.99 (0.74)	0.82 (0.73)
Trade unions & occupational groups	-0.55 (0.66)	-0.53 (0.66)	-0.60 (0.67)
Firms	-0.12 (0.75)	-0.17 (0.75)	-0.18 (0.76)
Experts, think tanks & institutional associations	-0.01 (0.63)	0.06 (0.63)	0.03 (0.63)
<b>Country (ref: Germany)</b>			
UK	0.16 (0.67)	0.16 (0.68)	0.40 (0.71)
Denmark	0.58 (0.67)	0.82 (0.70)	0.77 (0.69)
Sweden	0.10 (0.77)	0.23 (0.79)	0.36 (0.81)

**Table 4.5:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an actor on an issue. Models 1-3 from table 1 including control variables. (*continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Netherlands	0.19 (0.65)	0.38 (0.67)	0.32 (0.68)
Constant	-2.30* (1.07)	-2.61* (1.10)	-2.52* (1.08)
Variation issue level	0.31 (0.28)	0.35 (0.31)	0.38 (0.31)
Number of advocates	264	264	264
Number of issues	34	34	34
AIC	330	327	322
BIC	398	395	390

Standard errors in parentheses. +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## APPENDIX 4.6: ROBUSTNESS

**Table 4.6.1:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an advocate on an issue. Replacing measures for working with any party with activity measures.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Direct contact with parliament	-0.57+ (0.31)	-0.53 (0.37)		
Direct contact with cabinet			-0.17 (0.29)	0.21 (0.35)
Controls				
Parties on same side	1.48*** (0.44)	1.43** (0.49)	1.52*** (0.43)	1.51** (0.49)
Articles per day		1.34 (0.91)		1.48 (0.93)
Economic resources		-0.31 (0.34)		-0.43 (0.33)
Perceived media attention		-0.46 (0.51)		-0.64 (0.52)
Other actors' support		3.02*** (0.92)		2.92** (0.91)
Public support		1.81* (0.73)		1.91* (0.74)
Pro policy change		-0.58+ (0.32)		-0.64* (0.32)
Actor type (ref: business)				
Religious & identity groups		-0.30 (1.05)		-0.28 (1.06)
Public interest groups		0.73 (0.73)		0.84 (0.72)
Trade unions & occupational groups		-0.49 (0.67)		-0.55 (0.66)
Firms		-0.36 (0.76)		-0.17 (0.75)
Experts, think tanks & institutional associations		-0.36 (0.64)		-0.10 (0.62)
Country (ref: Germany)				
UK	0.18 (0.71)	-0.14 (0.66)	0.30 (0.69)	-0.10 (0.67)
Denmark	0.10 (0.67)	0.23 (0.65)	0.19 (0.66)	0.34 (0.65)
Sweden	-0.14 (0.76)	-0.25 (0.76)	0.03 (0.75)	-0.15 (0.76)
Netherlands	0.04 (0.66)	0.04 (0.64)	0.11 (0.65)	0.04 (0.65)

**Table 4.6.1:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an advocate on an issue. Replacing measures for working with any party with activity measures. (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	-0.05 (0.60)	-1.63 (1.05)	-0.40 (0.57)	-2.09* (1.04)
Variation issue level	0.55 (0.40)	0.24 (0.25)	0.52 (0.38)	0.27 (0.26)
Number of actors	259	259	261	261
Number of issues	34	34	34	34
AIC	348	323	352	325
BIC	377	390	381	393

Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

The models in table 4.6.1 are based on the following survey question:

*“Please indicate how important the following activities were to you (experts)/your organisation (associations)/ your company (firms) on the issue of xxx.”*

With advocates answering whether *“Direct contact with national cabinet members and their staff”*, or *“Direct contact with national members of Parliament or their offices”*, respectively, were *“Not at all important”* to *“Very important”*.

The original survey question used in the main analyses in the chapter then read:

*“For each of these political parties, please indicate how important they were for your work(experts)/the work of your organisation(associations)/the work of your company(firms) concerning the issue of xxx.”*

With respondents indicating for each party in parliament during the observation period whether it was *“not at all important”* to *“very important”*.

## APPENDIX 4.7: ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS

**Table 4.7.1:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an advocate on an issue. Alternative operationalizations for model 4.


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Worked with parties on same side	-0.51 (1.29)	-1.08 (1.46)	-1.23 (1.44)	
Government status	-0.40 (0.69)			
Worked with parties on same side*Government status	4.86+ (2.57)			
Party size		-2.95 (2.07)		
Worked with parties on same side*Party size		17.89* (8.02)		
Party power (in government 20% of observation period)			-0.95 (1.07)	
Worked with parties on same side * Party power (20% of days)			9.37* (4.22)	
Number of parties worked with on same size				-0.29 (0.26)
Party power				-1.42
Number of parties worked with on same side*Party power				2.73** (0.95)
Controls				
Parties on same side	1.06* (0.53)	1.01+ (0.52)	1.03+ (0.53)	1.08* (0.51)
Articles per day	1.32 (0.99)	1.21 (0.92)	1.24 (0.98)	1.34 (0.94)
Economic resources	-0.44 (0.35)	-0.42 (0.35)	-0.42 (0.35)	-0.44 (0.34)
Perceived media attention	-0.77 (0.55)	-0.67 (0.55)	-0.73 (0.55)	-0.81 (0.53)
Other actors' support	3.24*** (0.96)	3.14*** (0.95)	3.27*** (0.97)	3.23*** (0.94)
Public support	2.22** (0.78)	2.18** (0.76)	2.24** (0.78)	2.24** (0.75)
Pro policy change	-0.79* (0.34)	-0.72* (0.34)	-0.76* (0.34)	-1.01** (0.34)
Actor type (ref: Business)				
Religious & identity groups	-0.40 (1.11)	-0.35 (1.07)	-0.37 (1.10)	-0.36 (1.10)
Public interest groups	0.93 (0.76)	0.69 (0.74)	0.90 (0.76)	0.83 (0.72)

**Table 4.7.1:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an advocate on an issue. Alternative operationalizations for model 4. (*continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Trade unions & occupational groups	-0.61 (0.68)	-0.66 (0.68)	-0.60 (0.69)	-0.31 (0.67)
Firms	-0.53 (0.79)	-0.55 (0.78)	-0.59 (0.79)	-0.37 (0.78)
Experts, think tanks & institutional associations	0.03 (0.64)	-0.12 (0.64)	0.00 (0.65)	0.21 (0.63)
Country (ref: Germany)				
UK	0.57 (0.77)	0.47 (0.75)	0.58 (0.77)	0.79 (0.67)
Denmark	1.19 (0.77)	1.06 (0.74)	1.29 (0.78)	0.97 (0.67)
Sweden	0.52 (0.87)	0.57 (0.84)	0.61 (0.87)	0.37 (0.74)
Netherlands	0.63 (0.74)	0.77 (0.74)	0.79 (0.75)	0.53 (0.64)
Constant	-2.87* (1.15)	-2.62* (1.13)	-2.94* (1.16)	-2.77* (1.09)
Variation issue level	0.53 (0.41)	0.42 (0.34)	0.52 (0.41)	0.14 (0.23)
Number of advocates	264	264	264	264
Number of issues	34	34	34	34
AIC	321	320	320	316
BIC	396	395	395	391

Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## APPENDIX 4.8



**Figure 4.8.1:** Inverse marginal effects plot, showing the effect of working with powerful parties at different levels of lobbying parties on the same side. Based on Model 5 in table 1.



## APPENDIX 5. 1. CODING AND MEASUREMENT OF PREFERENCE ATTAINMENT

### Coding process

Following extensive training a student assistant was first instructed to identify and code the requests in each of the letters. They then searched through the coalition agreement to determine whether the content of the request was mentioned in the coalition agreement. Initially, preference attainment was coded on a five-point scale running from “not at all fulfilled” to “completely fulfilled”, with a Krippendorff’s alpha of .70 (two coders and 50 coded units). However, an ordinal dependent variable requires ordinal logistic regression modelling. Even though results from such a model were similar to those presented in the chapter, a Brant test showed that the relationship between each of the outcome pairs is not the same. Despite the relatively high number of observations there is not enough data to reliably estimate generalized ordinal logistic regression models instead. Preference attainment was therefore dichotomized to compare advocates who attained their preferences at least somewhat (categories 2 through 5) to those who did not attain them at all (category 1). Moving the point of dichotomization does not substantively change the results.

### Description of the original coding categories:

- 1- Not at all fulfilled: This code is applied when the request is not fulfilled at all. It is applied when the request seeks to change the status quo and is not at all mentioned in the coalition agreement. The category also applies if the coalition agreement does mention the requested policy, but does not deliver the policy, or proposes policy in the opposite direction (for example if the request was to lower the retirement age and it is not lowered, or kept at the same level).
- 2- Fulfilled to a very limited degree: This code is applied to cases where the request is mentioned, but only a small part of it is fulfilled. An example is a request to raise spending on welfare benefits by 20 million euros and the coalition agreement raising the benefits by 1 million only. Another example would be a request to implement a full policy program, and the coalition agreement only promising a small part of that program.
- 3- Partial fulfilment: This code is applied to requests that are fulfilled to a substantial extent, but not hardly nor (almost) fully. It is therefore applied to instances where a substantial part of the request is fulfilled, but another substantial part is not. An example is a request to ban the sale of cigarettes in supermarkets and gas stations, and the coalition agreement promising to ban the sale of cigarettes in supermarkets.
- 4- Almost completely fulfilled: This code is applied when the request is almost completely fulfilled, but some small part of the request is not. Examples are requests to spend a

given amount on a certain policy, and the coalition agreement promising almost that amount. Another example would be a request to spend 20 million on building houses that rent for 700 – 1000 euros a month, and the coalition agreement promising to spend 20 million on building houses that rent for 700 to 1100 euros a month instead.

- 5- Complete fulfilment: this category is applied to requests that are fulfilled completely. Apart from the obvious case where the coalition agreement mentions the exact policy and promises what was requested, this category also applies to those instances where the actor requests that the status quo is kept, and the coalition agreement does not mention the policy.

## APPENDIX 5.2. DATASET DESCRIPTION

Since lobbying during coalition negotiations is hardly studied in the literature this appendix provides additional information about the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the chapter (table A5.2.1) and also discusses some descriptive findings in more detail.

**Table A5.2.1:** Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Range	Values	Mean	St. Dev
Preference attainment	0 – 1	0,1	.35	.48
Party support	0 – 1	0,1	.34	.47
VVD support	0 – 1	0,1	.11	.31
CDA support	0 – 1	0,1	.13	.34
Business actor	0 – 1	0,1	.32	.47
Coalition size	0 – 1	1 – 29	6.01	6.83
Access	0 – 1	0,1	.08	.27
Pro policy change	0 – 1	0,1	.94	.25

### Description of lobbying coalition negotiations

Over a third of all requests (35%) are in the end somewhat to fully implemented in the coalition agreement suggesting that advocates often make relevant requests that are discussed at the formation table. A request by the council for the judiciary (“Raad voor de Rechtspraak”) requesting room to experiment with new ways of punishment was even copied verbatim from the letter to the coalition agreement. Although almost all letters received a standardized response, a letter by VNO-NCW (the main employers’ organization) received a response asking for further elaboration. These two examples show at the very least some of the letters are read by the negotiators.

Turning to the nature of the requests, these underline the image that lobbying around elections focuses on policy change. 94% of all requests are requests to change the status quo, which is much higher than comparable figures in studies of general lobbying (Baumgartner et al, 2009), but comparable to the distribution of pledges in election manifestos (Thomson et al., 2017). Moreover, the vast majority of requests are indeed policy-centred with 82% covering substantive policies. 8% of all requests ask the new government to explicitly prioritize a certain issue and another 10% are procedural requests. Examples are requests to appoint a minister for Agriculture, or to let go of party discipline when voting on medical-ethical issues. The main farmer’s organization (LTO), asked farmers to send letters asking for the appointment of a separate minister for agriculture. This means that there are 70 identical letters asking for this request (which was supported by the CDA). The models in the chapter exclude these 70 letters, but

results do not change substantially when they are included. The results presented in the chapter do include the other requests about procedures and prioritization, but Appendix 4 shows that they do not affect the findings.

**Table A5.2.2:** Share of requests made by respective advocate types.

Advocate type	Share of requests
Trade unions and professional groups	15%
Public interest groups	16%
Hobby, religious and identity groups	13%
Firms and business groups	33%
Experts and think tanks	7%
Sub national governments and institutions	16%

As shown in table A5.2.2, the requests are made by a wide range of policy advocates. At the same time, individual firms and business groups are by far the most prevalent type of advocate as they account for 33% all requests.

## REFERENCES


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## APPENDIX 5.3. POLICY AREA AND ISSUE OWNERSHIP

This appendix explores an alternative explanation for the results in table 5.1 in the chapter that issue-ownership instead of requests by firms, business groups and employers' organizations is driving the results. The argument is in line with issue-ownership theory (Petrocik et al., 2003, Klüver and Spoon, 2016) suggesting that political parties will want to 'stand out' on issues they own or are perceived as competent on. This may translate into political parties being less willing to compromise on such issues during coalition negotiations. If a certain category of policy advocate is predominantly making requests in a policy area and a party 'owns' the issue, a party's issue-competition driven desire not to compromise on these promises may drive the higher rates of preference attainment for some policy advocates. For this chapter, it seems likely that firms and business groups would make relatively many requests on issues concerning the economy, regulations and taxation. At the same time, the VVD and the CDA are likely 'issue owners' of this policy field.

To ensure this alternative explanation does not drive the reported results, all requests were coded into the 21 major categories outlined by the Dutch version of the Comparative Agendas Project (Breeman & Timmermans, 2017). 20 of these categories also overlap with the general codebook of the Comparative Agendas Project, but the Dutch version of the codebook adds a category about the management of spatial ordering and water. Figure A5.3.1 shows the distribution of all requests across policy areas.

The figure shows that most requests are made in the areas of healthcare and education and culture, with defence and foreign trade attracting the lowest number of requests. To create a binary variable identifying economic requests, requests in the categories "macro economy and taxes" and "companies, trade and commerce" were coded as a 1 and all requests in other policy areas as a 0.



**Figure A5.3.1:** Requests by policy area.

Model 1 in table A5.3.1 then interacts whether any request was shared by either of the right-wing parties in its election manifesto with whether the request was made in an economic policy area. The positive significant interaction shows that requests about economic issues benefit more from being present in the right-wing parties' manifestos than requests in other policy areas. When adding the interaction between right-wing support and business advocates in model 2, the interaction reported in table 5.1 of the chapter remains significant, suggesting that this issue-ownership effect comes in addition to, rather than instead of, the expectation in Hypothesis 2.

**Table A5.3.1:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their policy preferences, controlling for policy area.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Right-wing support	1.82*** (0.16)	1.41*** (0.20)				
Right-wing support*Economic policy	1.88** (0.58)	1.49* (0.59)				
Right-wing support * Business		1.12*** (0.33)				
VVD support			1.54*** (0.22)	0.53+ (0.28)		
VVD support * Economic policy			3.13*** (0.72)	2.38** (0.76)		
VVD support * Business				2.52*** (0.45)		
CDA support					2.40*** (0.20)	2.27*** (0.24)
CDA support * Economic policy					-0.49 (0.71)	-0.60 (0.73)
CDA support * Business						0.32 (0.36)
Economic policy	-1.23*** (0.35)	-1.09** (0.36)	-1.41*** (0.34)	-1.30*** (0.35)	-0.28 (0.29)	-0.25 (0.29)
Business	0.28 (0.20)	-0.10 (0.23)	0.27 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.21)	0.27 (0.20)	0.19 (0.22)
<b>Controls</b>						
Access	0.36 (0.36)	0.36 (0.37)	0.41 (0.37)	0.40 (0.37)	0.37 (0.36)	0.37 (0.36)
Coalition size	0.05+ (0.03)	0.05+ (0.03)	0.05+ (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Pro policy change	-3.69*** (0.36)	-3.77*** (0.36)	-3.62*** (0.36)	-3.74*** (0.37)	-3.41*** (0.34)	-3.42*** (0.34)
Constant	1.91*** (0.37)	2.09*** (0.38)	2.03*** (0.37)	2.24*** (0.38)	1.66*** (0.36)	1.70*** (0.36)
Letter random intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of requests	2281	2281	2281	2281	2281	2281
Number of letters	346	346	346	346	346	346
AIC	2126	2116	2194	2162	2122	2124
BIC	2178	2174	2246	2219	2174	2181

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Models 3 and 4 then repeat the same process, but only for the VVD, with models 5 and 6 doing the same for the CDA. In these models the main conclusions from the chapter remain unchanged. Similar to the results reported in the chapter, it is mainly the VVD

that seems to distinguish between requests in different policy areas: the interaction effect for the CDA is negative and not significant. Again this suggests that where the VVD was aiming to fulfil its promises on economic and business issues, the CDA was not. It should be noted that the variables 'business' and 'economic policy' are as expected correlated, but only moderately so. All VIF-values are <2.6, indicating that there is no problematic multicollinearity in the model.

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## APPENDIX 5.4: PARTY POSITIONS AND DISAGREEMENT

We know from existing studies that political parties are especially likely to pay attention to policy issue areas (like the environment) in coalition agreements when their positions in these areas diverge (Klüver & Bäck, 2019). One may therefore expect that advocates are most likely to attain their preferences on issues where (at least) two coalition parties disagree. To explore whether this is the case, model 1 in table A5.4.1 replicates model 1 from table 1 in the main text, but replaces the variable ‘party support’ with a ‘party position index’ which ranges from -3 (three parties disagree with the advocate’s request) to +4 (all parties agree with the advocate), with the middle point meaning that either no party had a position, or the known party positions were balanced. The strong positive effect clearly suggests that the more (unanimously) the negotiating parties share positions outlined in the policy request, the more likely the request is fulfilled in the coalition agreement.


**Table A5.4.1:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their policy preferences, using the party position index

	(1)	(2)
Party position index	0.95*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.08)
<b>Controls</b>		
Access	0.41 (0.37)	0.92+ (0.54)
Coalition size	0.06* (0.03)	0.13** (0.04)
Pro policy change	-3.65*** (0.35)	-2.84*** (0.66)
Business	0.18 (0.20)	0.25 (0.28)
Constant	1.67*** (0.36)	2.21** (0.67)
Letter random intercepts	Yes	Yes
Number of requests	2281	924
Number of letters	346	202
AIC	2057	959
BIC	2097	993

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Model 2 in table A5.4.1 then shows the same model, but only including those 924 cases where at least one party has a known policy position on the request. This means that the ‘0’ value only includes cases where at least 2 parties disagreed with each other on

the request. Even if the effect size is smaller the effect remains positive and significant, suggesting that rather than disagreement among coalition partners, it is the number of negotiating parties that have a position in line with a request that matters. Finally, to preclude the possibility that this is an artifact of the modeling strategy chosen, figure A5.4.1 shows the share of policy advocates that attain their preferences at different levels of the party position index (descriptive data, not model based). Like in model 2 of table A5.4.1 this figure includes only those cases where at least one party position is known: meaning that the value 0 indicates issues over which the coalition partners disagreed.



**Figure A5.4.1:** Unmodeled share of fulfilled requests at different levels of the party position index, only including the 924 instances where at least 1 party position was known.

The figure shows that levels of preference attainment increase with each step on the party position index. The only exception is when 3 parties disagree with the advocate (-3). At this data point, there are only 15 requests, of which 13 are the same request by a large coalition of 13 local media organizations for more funding, with which 3 of the negotiating parties disagreed in their election manifestos. Against these odds the advocates did see their request partially fulfilled, which accounts for the very high level of preference attainment at -3 in the party position index. At every other step of the index, the number of requests is much higher.

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## APPENDIX 5.5: TRADE UNIONS

It may be the case that the interaction between VVD positions and business groups on preference attainment is simply about the fact that these business groups credibly signal support from a large party of society, regardless of the shared ideological and interpersonal links between the party and business groups. This appendix therefore replaces the business advocates in table 1 in the main text with trade unions. While these groups were ideologically clearly not aligned with the major negotiating parties (especially the VVD), Dutch trade unions did still have more members than most interest groups in 2017 (with the largest trade union Federation FNV representing around 1 million members, more than the negotiating parties' membership combined). Representatives from the FNV also joined the coalition negotiations on some days.

In other words, if the mechanism is only about the size of membership, rather than either the ties between the party and a type of policy advocate (or the electoral importance of the group membership), we would expect requests by trade unions to also be fulfilled more readily when shared with one of the negotiation parties than requests by other advocates: a request by a trade union is likely shared by a substantial share of the public. Table A5.5.1 therefore replicates models 2 through 4, interacting right-wing support, CDA support and VVD support respectively with whether a request was by a labour group. The insignificant interaction effects show that there is no such interaction effect in the data: groups need to do more than 'just' represent a large constituency to increase their levels of preference attainment in coalition agreements.

**Table A5.5.1:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their policy preferences interactions with trade unions

	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right-wing support	1.97*** (0.16)		
Right-wing support * Labour	-0.26 (0.72)		
VVD support		1.87*** (0.21)	
VVD support * Labour		0.53 (1.07)	
CDA support			2.40*** (0.19)
CDA support * Labour			-0.05 (0.83)
Labour	0.54 (0.47)	0.33 (0.45)	0.44 (0.48)
<b>Controls</b>			
Access	0.30 (0.37)	0.39 (0.37)	0.31 (0.37)
Coalition Size	0.06* (0.03)	0.06+ (0.03)	0.06+ (0.03)
Pro policy change	-3.54*** (0.34)	-3.39*** (0.34)	-3.46*** (0.34)
Constant	1.68*** (0.34)	1.73*** (0.35)	1.69*** (0.35)
Letter random intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of requests	2281	2281	2281
Number of letters	346	346	346
AIC	2169	2249	2151
BIC	2215	2295	2197

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## APPENDIX 5.6. POLICY REQUEST TYPES

The models presented in table 5.1 in the chapter also include both policy-related requests, as well as more procedural requests. These are for example requests that the government explicitly has to mention an issue as a priority in the government agreement. Given that mentioning something as a priority is arguably less costly than promising to implement a policy (change), table A5.6.1 replicates models 1 and 2 in Table 5.1, but only includes requests that imply a legislative change or a policy change that costs money to implement. The results remain substantively unchanged, included when they are split by party (not shown).

**Table A5.6.1:** Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their policy preferences, including only requests for actual policy change.

	(1)	(2)
Party support	2.58*** (0.16)	
Right-wing support		1.45*** (0.21)
Right-wing support * Business		1.37*** (0.34)
Business group	0.29 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.23)
Public group		
<b>Controls</b>		
Access	0.68+ (0.40)	0.55 (0.39)
Coalition size	0.06* (0.03)	0.06+ (0.03)
Pro policy change	-3.76*** (0.37)	-3.55*** (0.37)
Constant	1.29*** (0.38)	1.86*** (0.39)
Letter random intercepts	Yes	Yes
Number of requests	1981	1981
Number of letters	329	329
AIC	1724	1866
BIC	1763	1910

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## APPENDIX 5.7. CLUSTERING

To demonstrate that most results remain the same when robust standard errors are used at the letter level (rather than random intercepts) table A5.5.1 replicates models 1 – 4 from table 5.1 in the main text. The models fit robust standard errors for letters instead of the multilevel modelling in table 5.1 in the chapter. The results remain unchanged.

**Table A5.7.1:** Replication of models 1 – 5 in tables 5.1 and 5.2. predicting whether a policy advocate attained their policy preferences, replacing random intercepts with robust standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Party support	2.15*** (0.28)			
Right-wing support		1.43*** (0.38)		
Right-wing support * Business		0.60 (0.46)		
VVD support			1.07* (0.49)	
VVD support * Business			1.33* (0.57)	
CDA support				1.77*** (0.43)
CDA support * Business				0.09 (0.54)
Business	0.27 (0.20)	0.20 (0.34)	0.19 (0.28)	0.44 (0.32)
Public group				
<b>Controls</b>				
Access	0.52* (0.23)	0.33 (0.25)	0.41 (0.26)	0.34 (0.22)
Coalition size	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Pro policy change	-3.49*** (0.37)	-3.12*** (0.35)	-2.99*** (0.34)	-3.00*** (0.35)
Constant	1.38*** (0.35)	1.65*** (0.36)	1.66*** (0.35)	1.57*** (0.36)
Number of letters	2281	2281	2281	2281
McFadden Pseudo R square	.25	.17	.15	.16

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

In addition, advocates often made more than one request in a letter. To account for this possible clustering of the data at the level individual advocates, table A5.7.2 replicates models 1, 3 and 4 – 4 from table 1 in the main text. Models 1ri, 3ri and 4ri in table A5.7.2

fit random intercepts (ri) and models 1rse, 3rse and 4rse fit logistic models with robust standard errors (rse) at the level of the individual advocate (as opposed random errors for letters in table 1 in the main text). Results remain substantively unchanged.

**Table A5.7.2:** Replication of models 1, 3 and 4 in table 5.1, predicting whether a policy advocate attained their policy preferences, fitting random intercepts (ri) and robust standard errors (rse) at the level of individual advocates.

	(1ri)	(3ri)	(4ri)	(1rse)	(3rse)	(4rse)
Party support	2.28*** (0.12)			2.15*** (0.12)		
VVD support		1.04*** (0.23)			1.07*** (0.24)	
VVD support * Business		1.75*** (0.37)			1.33*** (0.34)	
CDA support			1.99*** (0.20)			1.77*** (0.22)
CDA support * Business			0.23 (0.31)			0.09 (0.30)
Business	0.26+ (0.14)	0.12 (0.15)	0.40** (0.16)	0.27* (0.13)	0.19 (0.13)	0.44*** (0.13)
Controls						
Access	0.48+ (0.26)	0.47+ (0.27)	0.34 (0.28)	0.52** (0.17)	0.41* (0.18)	0.34* (0.17)
Coalition size	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Pro policy change	-3.64*** (0.29)	-3.24*** (0.29)	-3.25*** (0.29)	-3.49*** (0.31)	-2.99*** (0.28)	-3.00*** (0.29)
Constant	1.43*** (0.28)	1.82*** (0.29)	1.70*** (0.29)	1.38*** (0.29)	1.66*** (0.28)	1.57*** (0.29)
Advocate random intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Advocate robust SE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of requests	2281	2281	2281	2281	2281	2281

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001