



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

A contractor empire : public-private partnerships and overseas expansion in Habsburg Portugal (1580-1640)

Cravo Bertrand Pereira, E.F.

Citation

Cravo Bertrand Pereira, E. F. (2020, May 28). *A contractor empire : public-private partnerships and overseas expansion in Habsburg Portugal (1580-1640)*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/92348>

Version: Publisher's Version

License: [Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/92348>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page



Universiteit Leiden



The handle <http://hdl.handle.net/1887/92348> holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

Author: Cravo Bertrand Pereira, E.F.

Title: A contractor empire : public-private partnerships and overseas expansion in Habsburg Portugal (1580-1640)

Issue Date: 2020-05-28

Chapter 4: Garrisoning contracts: Provisioning the Portuguese strongholds on the Barbary Frontier (Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan)

After two centuries of military presence in the Northern Africa, the Portuguese still held sway over three fortified outposts: Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan (present day El Jadida).³⁴⁹ These strongholds were a military-commercial hybrid.³⁵⁰ Unable to hold on to large tracts of land, the areas controlled by the Portuguese were restricted to an ensemble of scattered fortified towns and the close-by hinterlands. These towns and their forts ensured that local garrisons, royal officials and the residing population, comprised of immigrants from Portugal and of autochthonous Maghrebi, could defend themselves, although, at times, they served to launch military incursions in the region. Simultaneously, these outposts were designed to serve as commercial nodes enabling the Portuguese to access the caravan trade crossing the Sahara East-West and South-North.³⁵¹

By 1600 the Northern African forts seemed to be nothing more than a financial and logistic burden.³⁵² The Portuguese had long stopped entertaining the idea of territorial occupation and settlement in Morocco and had already reduced their presence in the region when they abandoned several of their holdings in the 1540s and 1550s.³⁵³ At the same time, however, Ceuta and Tangier, the two port cities located by the Strait of Gibraltar, were a prized strategic asset to the Portuguese Crown, as they allowed the Portuguese to anticipate Barbary and Ottoman attacks on the ports of the Algarve and Southern Spain, as well as against Iberian ships sailing between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In turn, Mazagan, located on the West coast of the Maghreb, served as a logistical base to curb raiding expeditions against Iberian ships arriving from overseas on to the Peninsula.³⁵⁴

From a geo-strategic point of view, the continuation of the Iberian military involvement in the Maghreb was meant to keep in check the influence of the Sublime Porte in the Western Mediterranean and the Strait of Gibraltar, while at the same time curbing the growing Dutch interest in the region in the wake of Ahmed Al-Mansour's ambitious military campaigns in the Sahara and the Sahel. The armies of this Saadian sultan of Morocco were equipped with modern weapons imported from the United Provinces and the development of the sultanate's own arms industry at the turn of the sixteenth century owed a lot to the diplomatic brokerage of the Dutch Republic. Moreover, Dutch privateers used the Moroccan ports, such as Larache in the North, as safe havens from where they launched attacks against

³⁴⁹ Joaquim Romero Magalhães, 'As Incursões No Espaço Africano', in *História Da Expansão Portuguesa. Do Índico Ao Atlântico (1570-1697)*, vol. 2 (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1998), 65–66; António Dias Farinha, *História de Mazagão durante o período filipino* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1970).

³⁵⁰ This same logic was replicated elsewhere in the Portuguese empire. It is, for one, very reminiscent to the dwellings in Angola, which have been described as a "discontinuous territorial space centered on garrisons and markets, organized along a network of land routes", Catarina Madeira Santos, 'Luanda: A Colonial City between Africa and the Atlantic, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', in *Portuguese Colonial Cities in the Early Modern World*, ed. Liam Matthew Brockey (New York: Routledge, 2016), 254.

³⁵¹ Filipe Themudo Barata, 'The Portuguese in the Islamic World', in *Portuguese Heritage around the World. Architecture and Urbanism. Africa, Red Sea, Persian Gulf*, ed. Themudo Barata, Filipe and José Manuel Fernandes (Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 2012), 38–40.

³⁵² Godinho, *Os Descobrimientos e a Economia Mundial*, 3:245.

³⁵³ Themudo Barata, 'The Portuguese in the Islamic World', 38–41; Maria Leonor Garcia Cruz, 'As Controvérsias Ao Tempo de D. João III Sobre a Política Portuguesa No Norte de África', *Mare Liberum* 13 (1997): 123–99.

³⁵⁴ A. J. R. Russell-Wood, 'Políticas de Fixação e Integração', in *História Da Expansão Portuguesa. Do Índico Ao Atlântico (1570-1697)*, vol. 2 (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1998), 126–27; Farinha, *História de Mazagão durante o período filipino*.

Iberian vessels passing by the strait.³⁵⁵ The Dutch-Moroccan rapprochement eventually culminated in the signing of a treaty of commercial and military cooperation in 1610, between Muley Zaydan, Al Mansour's successor to the Marrakech throne, and the States General.³⁵⁶

Madrid looked apprehensively towards the alliance between two of its sworn enemies and to the growing Ottoman influence in the region during the civil war that broke out shortly after Al Mansour's death in 1603. The Spanish Monarchy reacted to the changing balance of power in Northern Africa by expanding its military presence in the region through a string of military campaigns. Occupied during the Twelve Years' Truce, Larache and la Mamora became holdings of the house of Habsburg in 1610 and 1614, respectively. These conquests added to the areas that had been under Habsburg control since the beginning of the sixteenth century, in Mazalquivir, Vélez de la Gomera, Oran and Melilla.³⁵⁷ In a context of political and civic unrest and of greater 'Castilian' involvement, the Portuguese forts ended up playing second fiddle in the Moroccan policies of the Hispanic Monarchy.

Geopolitical considerations aside, the decaying Portuguese fortified towns were also maintained for ideological reasons. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, the centuries' old rhetoric of fighting the infidel still served as an ideological bedrock for the Portuguese military presence in the region.³⁵⁸ The need to justify the lives lost to conquer and keep the territories acquired in the fifteenth century, including that of a previous king and members of the royal family, also explains why the Portuguese refused to abandon those places.³⁵⁹

But perhaps the most compelling reason why elites and common people alike supported the Portuguese presence in the Maghreb were the opportunities for social upward mobility the outposts provided for soldiers, royal officials, squires and noblemen. Repealing attacks by enemy Muslim forces and serving the king in a precarious administrative post made royal clerks and men of arms eligible for pecuniary rewards and honorific grants, whilst sojourning in Portuguese Morocco provided plenty of opportunities for the quick personal gains by participating in raiding and pillage.³⁶⁰

For all these reasons, rather than abandoning the three remaining garrison towns, the Crown considered narrowing down the perimeter of the strongholds (especially in Tangier), and reducing the amount of men, weapons and infrastructures it maintained there. However, despite the acknowledgement that the up keeping of the fortified outposts was a drain on the royal finances, during the years of Habsburg rule, no significant steps were taken to scale down the Portuguese presence in Northern Africa.³⁶¹

³⁵⁵ Mark and Horta, *The Forgotten Diaspora*, 106, 110, 125–31; Mercedes García-Arenal and Gerard Albert Wieggers, *A Man of Three Worlds: Samuel Pallache, a Moroccan Jew in Catholic and Protestant Europe* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 28–31.

³⁵⁶ García-Arenal and Wieggers, *A Man of Three Worlds*, 71–72, 76.

³⁵⁷ Mercedes García-Arenal and Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, *Los españoles y el Norte de África, siglos XV-XVIII* (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992).

³⁵⁸ The historiography considers that the first campaigns of occupation in Barbary soil should be seen as an extension of the wars waged by the Iberian Christian powers against the Muslim rule of the Al-Andalus, which would culminate in the fall of the kingdom of Granada in 1492. The Portuguese and Castilian were, therefore, replicating the so called *Reconquista*, except this time on the other side of the Straight's sea.

³⁵⁹ The first event that springs to mind was the demise of king Sebastian, who led the Portuguese armies in the disastrous campaign of Ksar el Kebir in 1578. But this was not the first time a member of the royal house perished in the Northern African expansionist enterprise. More than one hundred years before, the failed initial attempt to take Tangier in 1437 ended up with the king's brother, Prince D. Fernando, being captured by the forces of the besieged town. D. Fernando would spend the remaining years of his life in captivity, as a result of the Portuguese Crown refusing to negotiate the surrender of their Moroccan holdings as ransom.

³⁶⁰ Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial*, 3:248–49.

³⁶¹ A. R. Disney, 'Scaling down and Holding on: Life in Portuguese Tangier in the Early Seventeenth Century', in *The Portuguese in India and Other Studies, 1500-1700*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Farnham (Surrey) & Ashgate (Burlington): Ashgate Variorum, 2009), 147–61.

4.1 The regional context, the frontier and the challenges to supplying

The Portuguese fortified towns in the Maghreb depended heavily on the effective and timely provisioning of victuals, military equipment and means of payment under penalty of local the authorities facing disruption of social order and in the worst case losing control over the strongholds. Matters were further complicated by the fact that there was a civilian population of a few thousands living next to the garrisons, and they too had to be supplied.³⁶²

Although the Maghrebi coast, especially around Gibraltar and throughout the Mediterranean facade, was well endowed with natural resources and had for centuries been known for its dynamic productive and trading sectors, the immediate surroundings of the Portuguese outposts were in economic decay by the end of the sixteenth century. With the exception of looting, a characteristic occupation of contentious border-areas, the garrison towns and their adjacent hinterlands were devoid of economic activities of significance from which revenue could be generated or extracted.³⁶³ Productive activities like agriculture, live-stock and manufacturing were overall incipient, since the pockets of land under Portuguese control outside the city walls were too small for the local population to grow their own food. In addition, the constant threat of pillaging discouraged inhabitants from working the land or growing cattle in a sustained manner. In the three garrison towns, manufacturing and trade with the surrounding region had become, by the 1600s, obsolete and impossible to promote.³⁶⁴

Garrison commanders and local treasury officials who attempted to borrow from local money lenders or buy supplies on credit had little to offer as security. Local merchants and institutions were reluctant to extend credit to the Crown, as they were aware of the difficulties Madrid and Lisbon had in paying their own military personnel in a timely manner.³⁶⁵

The hostile environment surrounding the towns prevented their potential as trading hubs, nodal points for the Portuguese to tap into the Northern African trade networks. The Maghrebi powers, such as the kingdom of Fez to the North, the kingdom of Morocco centred in Marrakesh, and a number of chieftains living in the vicinities, tried to cut off the three fortified dwellings from the surrounding regions and had diverted the main trade routes. This commercial choke prevented the garrison towns from provisioning themselves with foodstuffs and other basic economic resources in the nearest surroundings, leaving them at the mercy of outside support. If external supplies, including wages, rations, arms and

³⁶² Farinha, *História de Mazagão durante o período filipino*, 218, 226.

³⁶³ Luís de Figueiredo Falcão, Phillip III's secretary for Portuguese affairs, estimated the net revenue of the customs of Ceuta in 1607 bellow 3,000,000 réis, whereas Tangier's were worth the royal treasury about 1,000,000 réis. In turn, a budget of the royal revenues from 1621 grossly overestimated the combined the receipts generated by the customs of the Northern African towns at 52,000,000 réis. Luiz de Figueiredo Falcão, *Livro em que se contém toda a fazenda e real patrimonio dos reinos de Portugal, India, e ilhas adjacentes e outras particularidades* (Lisbon: Imprensa nacional, 1859), 30; Hespanha, 'Os Poderes Do Centro. A Fazenda', 198.

³⁶⁴ A. R. Disney, *A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire from Beginnings to 1807. Volume 2, The Portuguese Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 15; Isabel M. R. Drumond Braga, 'Comércio e Abastecimento de Ceuta (1580-1640)', *Cuadernos Del Archivo Municipal de Ceuta*, no. 11 (1997): 128–29; Godinho, *Os Descobrimientos e a Economia Mundial*, 3:248–49.

³⁶⁵ For some reflections on the supplying of military contingents through the personal credit of regiment commanders and the financial assistance of local moneyed-men; Jose Miguel Escribano Paez, 'War, Conquest and Local Merchants. The Role of Credit in the Peripheral Military Administration of the Hispanic Monarchy during the First Half of the Sixteenth Century', in *Working Papers 14* (Department of Economic and Social History, University of Cambridge, 2012); Parrott, *The Business of War*, 203–4.

munitions, were not allocated on a timely and regular basis, the economically decaying fortified outposts would be vulnerable to attacks.

For all these reasons, the military enclaves were not attractive destinations for those considering to emigrate from Portugal to the overseas offshoots, except if they were looking for military action, the rich prizes of looting and for advancement in the imperial administration, preferably with a follow-up commission in Asia. With the exception of a few traders and artisans, as well as the wives and children of the town's soldiers, the Christian population included the civil servants and the men-of-arms, both the sojourning *fidalgos* (the so called *fronteiros*) and the permeant regiment. The towns also hosted a good number of clergymen, who stood for the principle that the Moroccan dwellings were intended to be outposts for the spread of the Catholic faith in the land of Islam.³⁶⁶

These challenges faced by the Portuguese in their Northern African enclaves are all in all similar to those faced by frontier settlements elsewhere in the world. Over the past decades, historians and social scientists have discussed the concept of “frontier”, fleshing out its many permutations and attempting to do justice to its complexity. Frontiers are nowadays understood as more than just a line on a map demarcating between two or more political units or loosely-defined cultural areas. Instead, they are perceived as zones of exchange rather than of containment and separation. Frontiers were a contentious social-construct, and, hence, could not be further away from being the fated outcome of top-down processes.³⁶⁷ Approaches to the concept of frontier range from a “middle-ground” for cross-cultural interaction, to comfort zone for “go-betweeners” at the crossroads of different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, or as zone of contact where identity is multiform and ever shifting.³⁶⁸ Frontiers were thus “negotiated” sociological spaces.

Frontiers, when considered as fringes, did not necessarily imply geographical distance (Northern-Africa was closer to Iberia than any other colonial or overseas trading settlement) but rather the incapacity to project power and stir the course of events on the spot. The reach of the state was here at its shortest and its authority at its most nominal and least effective. Precisely because of these constraints, the officials on the ground were forced to act pragmatically and acquiesce to idiosyncratic policies, which stood, at times, at odds with the empire's official discourse.

Locally, garrison commanders and the people living under their protection could make their own arrangements to ensure some measure of supplies in the vicinity.³⁶⁹ The cities' inhabitants owned livestock from which they could derive dairy products and some meat and, since these were coastal towns, there was also fish in abundance in the nearby sea. Despite the existence of some orchards and cultivable plots of land outside the cities' walls, the three towns and their surrounding vicinities did not grow their own cereals. Before the Portuguese occupation, Ceuta had been an outlet for the Northern Morocco's agricultural surplus, but after 1415, the grain circuits were quickly moved away from the new Portuguese settlement, which did not become a grain reservoir for Portugal, but rather the opposite.

In the Portuguese and Spanish garrison towns two groups took on the role of brokers; the ‘moors of peace’ (*mouros de paz*), Muslims who acknowledged the suzerainty of the king of Portugal, who were allowed to reside in areas under Portuguese control and keep their faith in exchange for the payment of tribute, and the Jews. The Sephardim were

³⁶⁶ Russell-Wood, ‘Políticas de Fixação e Integração’, 126–27; António Dias Farinha, *Os Portugueses Em Marrocos* (Lisbon: Instituto Camões, 1999), 50–52, 62.

³⁶⁷ Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2015).

³⁶⁸ Alida C. Metcalf, *Go-Betweeners and the Colonization of Brazil: 1500–1600* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013); Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³⁶⁹ Beatriz Alonso Acero, ‘Trenes de Avituallamiento En Las Plazas Españolas de Berbería’, in *Guerra y Sociedad En La Monarquía Hispánica: Política, Estrategia y Cultura En La Europa Moderna, 1500-1700*, ed. Davide Maffi and Enrique García Hernán, vol. 1 (Madrid: Editorial CSIC, 2006), 739–66.

particularly well-equipped to play the role of middlemen in the Portuguese forts. They mastered Arabic, Portuguese and Spanish and held contacts outside the Portuguese sphere of influence, a position that provided them with the ability to gather information and conduct secret diplomatic missions.³⁷⁰ Moreover, their networks had access to credit and trading circuits all over the Maghreb, through which they sometimes acquired merchandises for the Portuguese bulwark-towns. For these reasons, even though the Portuguese Crown was known to be a champion of Catholic orthodoxy, observant Jewish communities were allowed to reside within these frontier outposts and even received legal recognition, through patent letters.³⁷¹ Yet, cooperation with members of the Jewish communities was always regarded with suspicion, as authorities could not guarantee that the individuals they hired to spy or procure goods were not double-agents.

Alongside the lawful options to locally supply the forts, there was a multitude of illegal exchanges between Portugal and the Muslim polities that played an important role in the up-keeping of the Portuguese interests in the region. The frontier was, however, an idiosyncratic space. Although this string of bastions was supposed to serve as a zone of containment, designed to keep what was behind it at bay, these towns ended-up as bridges connecting old political and religious enemies.

Among the Maghrebi goods in high demand in the Iberia were wax, lead, tin, gum, ostrich feathers and hides, while Northern African consumers looked, in turn, for tobacco, woolen cloths, and silver specie, although trade in the latter was forbidden. It was even suggested that the reason why the rulers of Algiers refrained from making an all-out assault on the Iberian garrisons was their second-thoughts about losing one of their main sources of bullion.³⁷² However, the most politically sensitive exchanges between Muslims and Christians was the ransoming of captives.³⁷³ Since the Portuguese fortified towns bordered Muslim territories and empires, the Papacy had granted permission to the Christian inhabitants to trade in non-politically sensitive goods,³⁷⁴ although grain, wood, iron, and weaponry were forbidden. As far as the official stance of the Portuguese authorities was concerned, these exchanges weakened the Portuguese position and empowered those who were not only their contenders for the control of the *presídios*, but also all enemies of the faith. In order to curb the trade in weapons, the Crown issued numerous proscriptive decrees and went as far as granting the Inquisition jurisdiction over this crime as of 1552.³⁷⁵

Religious authorities were equally concerned that the Iberian-Maghrebi trade was championed by the Sephardic Jews. It was believed that they acted in collusion with the New-Christian traders from Portugal and Spain (*conversos*) to take advantage of the trade between the two religious territories without intervention of either Church or State, not to mention

³⁷⁰ Juan Ignacio Pulido Serrano and Mercedes García-Arenal, 'Consentir Por Necesidad. Los Judíos de Oran En La Monarquía Católica Durante Los Siglos XVI y XVII', in *Entre El Islam y Occidente: Los Judíos Magrebíes En La Edad Moderna* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2003).

³⁷¹ José Alberto da Silva Tavim, 'In the Shadow of Empire: Portuguese Jewish Communities in the Sixteenth Century', in *Portuguese Colonial Cities in the Early Modern World*, ed. Liam Matthew Brockey (New York, London: Routledge, 2016), 17–39; José Alberto da Silva Tavim, *Os judeus na expansão portuguesa em Marrocos durante o século XVI: origens e actividades duma comunidade* (Braga: Edições APPACDM Distrital de Braga, 1997), 320–30.

³⁷² Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *Les Juifs Du Roi d'Espagne. Oran 1509-1669* (Paris: Hachette, 1998), 172.

³⁷³ Wolfgang Kaiser and Guillaume Calafat, 'The Economy of Ransoming in the Early Modern Mediterranean. A Form of Cross-Cultural Trade between Southern Europe and the Maghreb (Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)', in *Religion and Trade. Cross Cultural Exchanges in World History, 1000-1900*, ed. Francesca Trivellato, Leor Halevi, and Cátia Antunes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 108–30.

³⁷⁴ The papal bull in *Coena Domini*, first issued in 1364, but renewed time and time again until 1774, forbade the sale of weapons to Muslim Powers under penalty of excommunication. Giuseppe Marcocci, 'Trading with the Muslim World. Religious Limits and Proscriptions in the Portuguese Empire (ca. 1480-1570)', in *Religion and Trade. Cross-Cultural Exchanges in World History, 1000-1900*, ed. Francesca Trivellato, Leor Halevi, and Cátia Antunes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 91–107; Mark and Horta, *The Forgotten Diaspora*, 108.

³⁷⁵ Giuseppe Marcocci, *A consciência de um império: Portugal e o seu mundo (séc. XV-XVII)* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra / Coimbra University Press, 2012), 303.

to spread heretical beliefs.³⁷⁶ The enforcement of the proscriptions on the cross-religious and cross-cultural contraband proved, nevertheless, problematic. The lack of administrative means to enact the proscriptions, not to mention the opportunistic behavior of royal officials, who often turned a blind eye to illegal practices in exchange for a share of the profits, was just the tip of the iceberg. Judging by the evidence of eminent figures of the aristocracy and the royal administration that were implicated in the smuggling of forbidden goods to the Muslim polities, a business that generated handsome profits, stands for the widespread practice of illegality and inadequacy of the royal proscriptions.³⁷⁷

The official proscriptive policies did not, however, prevent foodstuffs from being exchanged during periods of appeasement between Portugal and the Moroccan sultans. For instance, in the 1530s and 1540s, the Jews of Fez were authorized by the sultan to ship wheat from his domains to Portugal.³⁷⁸ During the best period of the Portuguese-Fez relations, a diplomatic agent was even allowed to travel to that Moroccan kingdom to purchase grain for the Portuguese towns. Notwithstanding periods of amicable relations between Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan and the neighboring Maghrebi powers, and the rivalries between Muslim powers from which the Iberians sought to gain some leverage, peace was precarious and only so much aid could be expected.³⁷⁹ Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan could also turn to other Iberian outposts in Northern Africa. Grain from the vicinities of Oran was regularly used to supply Spanish garrison-towns,³⁸⁰ and was at times allocated to the Portuguese garrisons in the region, and even to Lisbon.³⁸¹

Despite the best attempts by the Portuguese to procure supplies locally and in the surrounding regions, the bulk of the provisions arrived from outside Northern Africa and the Maghreb. In order to acquire all types of goods and especially foodstuffs, the closest and most obvious place to turn to was Southern Iberia. Algarve and especially Andalusia enjoyed commercial proximity to the forts and traditionally played a leading role in exporting wheat, barley and biscuit, as well as guns and ammunition to Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan.³⁸²

Before contract leasing became the standard procedure to provision the towns, royal factors were often dispatched to Seville, El Puerto de Santa María, nearby Cadiz, and Malaga,³⁸³ with the specific purpose of buying and dispatching foodstuffs and military supplies to the Northern African garrison towns.³⁸⁴ The acquisition of grain, weaponry and

³⁷⁶ García-Arenal and Wieggers, *A Man of Three Worlds*, 14–20; Tavim, *Os judeus na expansão portuguesa em Marrocos durante o século XVI*, 107.

³⁷⁷ Bethencourt, 'A Administração Da Coroa', 387–92.

³⁷⁸ García-Arenal and Wieggers, *A Man of Three Worlds*, 33.

³⁷⁹ Farinha, *Os Portugueses Em Marrocos*, 63.

³⁸⁰ Alonso Acero, 'Trenes de Avituallamiento En Las Plazas Españolas de Berbería', 763.

³⁸¹ In the early months of 1622, Lisbon's City Council wrote the king calling for aid in the supply of Portugal with grain: "and your majesty ought to write to vice-roy of Sicily and to the governor and captain of Oran, to favor and grant passage to the merchant, who from those parts bring bread into this country" e que V. Mag(estade) mande escrever ao vice-rei de Sicília e ao governador e capitão de Oran, que favoreçam e franqueiem os mercadores que d'aquellas partes trouxerem pão a este reino", Eduardo Freire de Oliveira, ed., *Elementos para a História do Município de Lisboa*, vol. 3, (Lisbon: Typographia Universal, 1988), 31.

³⁸² Joaquim Romero Magalhães, *O Algarve económico, 1600-1773* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1993), 302–4; Isabel Drumond Braga and Paulo Drumond Braga, *Ceuta Portuguesa (1415-1656)* (Ceuta: Instituto de Estudios Ceuties, 1998), 88–90; Braga, 'Comércio e Abastecimento de Ceuta (1580-1640)', 129.

³⁸³ Godinho, *Os Descobrimientos e a Economia Mundial*, 3:269–85; Tomás García Figueras and Hipólito Sancho Mayi, *Dos Expedientes de Abastecimiento de Mazagán, Tánger y Ceuta, Por Factores Portugueses Del Puerto de Santa Maria (1563-1567)* (Tangier: Instituto General Franco, 1939).

³⁸⁴ Following the end of the Twelve Year's Truce and with the embargos on Dutch exports and freightage reinstated, Santa María and other Southern Spanish ports regained their former importance as suppliers of the Portuguese garrison towns in North Africa. In 1622, with Lisbon's granaries nearly empty, a royal official charged with delivering bread cereals to the three towns (the contractors were struggling to meet their contracts' supplying quotas) was advised by the local city council to turn to the town of Santa Maria. Eduardo F. de Oliveira, *Elementos para a História do Município de Lisboa*, vol. 3 (Lisbon: Typographia Universal, 1888), 36–37.

silver, required the procurement of a license (*licencia de saca*) from the Castilian authorities. These permits already issued on a regular basis even before Portugal's incorporation into the Hispanic Monarchy thanks to the amicable relationship between the Portuguese royal house, Charles V and Philip II and their mutual interests in Northern Africa. For example, in the 1560s, Portugal was authorized to import up to 40,000 *fanegas* (bushel) of grain from Southern Castile yearly.³⁸⁵

Some procedural simplification aside, the post 1580 status-quo did not introduce major novelties in Portuguese-Spanish cooperation in Northern African affairs. The role of Andalusia as a logistic platform for the Maghreb garrisons was not questioned either, when the provisioning system changed from a factor-run direct administration into contract-adjudication.³⁸⁶ The strong economic links between the Lusitanian strongholds and Andalusia reached the Duke of Medina Sidonia, head of one the most important aristocratic houses in Andalusia, *capitán del mar océano* for the coast of Andalusia, as well as captain-general of the Portuguese armies. In that capacity, and owing to his influence in the politics and economics of Southern Spain, the Duke often intervened in the provisioning of the garrison towns across the sea, ensuring that key material resources were acquired and shipped there when the royal factory in Andalusia or contractors in Lisbon struggled to do so.

The North African towns were also supported by trading networks that spawned Northern Europe and the Baltic, and extended westwards towards the wide Atlantic Ocean, connecting them to the Portuguese Atlantic archipelagoes and even to Brazil.³⁸⁷ In the 1400s and 1500s, wheat grown in Madeira was exported to the Moroccan strongholds, as well as part of the grain surplus of the islands of Terceira and São Miguel, in the Azores.³⁸⁸ It is known that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, grain from Sicily and the Baltic were seldom imported into the towns.³⁸⁹ Neither of these commercial connections, east- and westwards, come across as surprising, considering the strategic location of, at least Ceuta and Tangier, right by the Strait of Gibraltar, the gateway between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.³⁹⁰

One the structural features of the Portuguese military presence in Northern Africa was that the external supplying of the garrison towns was entrusted more often than not to private entrepreneurs under contract with the Crown. The realization that the fortified posts were by no means self-sufficient and depended on the transfer of financial and material resources from outside the region was, therefore, not a novelty of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The system of supplying concessions pre-dated the Philippine period, going back many years into the rule of the House of Avis, but the outsourcing of the garrison's provisioning were expanded in scope during the Union of the Crowns.³⁹¹

³⁸⁵ Braga, 'Comércio e Abastecimento de Ceuta (1580-1640)', 138–40; Manuel Henrique Corte-Real, *A Feitoria Portuguesa Na Andaluzia (1500-1532)* (Lisbon: Instituto de Alta Cultura-Centro de Estudos Históricos, 1967).

³⁸⁶ For example, as late as July 1639, the contractors of Magazan, Pedro Ramires Pereira and Duarte da Silveira, asked for permission to ship 15,000 *fanegas*, that is 1,000 *moios* of grain, from Andalusia into that garrison town. The concessionaires had requested the vice-queen, Duchess of Mantua, to reach out to the Castile authorities and secure a grain export permit (*licencia de saca*) on their behalf. They intended to acquire the grain in several Southern Spanish-ports, such as Cadiz, Sanlucar, Puerto de Santa Maria or Jerez. AGS, SSP, lib. 1471, fl. 237-39v, published by Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. LXXXIV. Four years prior, other two contractors, Álvaro Fernandes de Elvas and Diogo Fernandes de Sequeira had requested and obtained an identical permit, which allowed for exact same 1,000 *moios* of Andaluzian grain to be shipped off Southern Spanish ports and delivered in Ceuta. AGS, SSP, lib. 1478, fl. 147v.

³⁸⁷ Antunes, Post, and Salvado, 'Het omzeilen van monopoliehandel', 38.

³⁸⁸ John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 34.

³⁸⁹ Godinho, *Os Descobrimientos e a Economia Mundial*, 3:250–51.

³⁹⁰ Braga and Braga, *Ceuta Portuguesa (1415-1656)*, 74, 75, 88–90.

³⁹¹ Braga, 'Comércio e Abastecimento de Ceuta (1580-1640)'.

While before 1580 the bulk of the supplying was ensured by means of the royal factors, the Crown resorted from time to time to incidental outsourcing contracts. Metropolitan merchants and traders residing in the Moroccan towns were expected to deliver one or several specific commodities without the promise or expectation of continuity, although the Crown could agree on a new contract with the same supplier if it was happy with his services. Still, the (sparse) available sources convey the idea that prior to the Union of the Crowns direct administration was the prime *modus operandi* and private contractors, although not infrequently employed, complemented the work of the royal factors. The Crown itself, either through the factors or through the subsidiary branch of the House of India, the *Casa de Ceuta*, freighted merchant fleets to ensure the transportation of grain, manufactured goods, arms and ammunitions to the Moroccan frontier enclaves.

During the rule of Phillip II, concessions to private investors became increasingly more frequent and their scope was broadened. Funds for the payment of wages, foodstuffs and semi-transformed commodities were delivered in Lisbon or other designated ports in Iberia, and the Crown ensured their transport through royal freightage. However, soon thereafter, the Crown also transferred the transport responsibilities to the contractors, who became responsible for the deployment of these resources in the fortified towns.³⁹²

4.2 The provisioning needs of the Portuguese strongholds

The costs incurred by the furnishing contracts did not undergo much variation, since the prices of the victuals and commodities to be supplied remained relatively stable. What did vary, however, was the relative weight of the provisioning costs of the Northern African enclaves in the total expenditure of the royal budget. It decreased by virtue of most other expenses, particularly with the debt service and the war effort, undergoing an upward trend since the mid-1620s.³⁹³ The contractors spent close to 100,000,000 *réis* to supply Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan in the course of the first two decades of the seventeenth century, although, at least in the case of Tangier, the supplying costs marginally dropped by the 1620s, due to a decrease in grain prices.

Moving on to a comparative analysis of the supplying requirements of each town, table 17 below shows that Tangier, a town with a larger population than the other two fortified outposts, had much greater consumption and wage paying demands, almost doubling Ceuta's and Mazagan's combined. There are unfortunately no consistent figures for the number of inhabitants and troops stationed in these garrisons for the period under-consideration. Scattered indicators suggest that by 1540, when the Portuguese presence in Morocco was more substantial than forty years later, between 25 to 30,000 people lived in the garrison towns, of which between 3,000 to 5,000 served in the local regiments.³⁹⁴ Towards the end of the Avis rule, it is known that Mazagan hosted 200 cavalrymen, 500 young cadets (*infantes*) and 50 artillerymen, alongside a number of civilians ranging from 1,500 to 2,000. Therefore, the garrison amounted to 40 to 50 per cent of the inhabitants.³⁹⁵

³⁹² Braga and Braga, *Ceuta Portuguesa (1415-1656)*, 94; Farinha, *História de Mazagão durante o período filipino*, 69–70.

³⁹³ Hespanha, 'Os Poderes Do Centro. A Fazenda', 201–3.

³⁹⁴ Jorge Pedreira, "'To Have and to Have Not'. The Economic Consequences of Empire: Portugal (1415-1822)', ed. Patrick K. O'Brien and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, *Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History* 16, no. 1 (The costs and benefits of european imperialism from the conquest of Ceuta, 1415, to the treaty of Lusaka, 1974 (1998): 106.

³⁹⁵ Francisco Bethencourt, 'Configurações Do Império. As Capitanias', in *História Da Expansão Portuguesa. A Formação Do Império (1415-1570)*, ed. Kirti Chaudhuri and Francisco Bethencourt (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1998), 344.

Although information about the maintenance costs of Ceuta during the Dual Monarchy is slim, according to some evidence from 1607, its retailing requirements seemed to have been on par with those of Mazagan. Some population figures for Ceuta in the 1660s seem to confirm this impression. In 1607, the combined costs of provisioning the two locations was 72,917,740 réis.³⁹⁶

Table 17. Requirements and costs of the contracts for Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan

Town	Year					
	1607	1609-1612	1613	1620	1621-1626	
Tangier	Annual consumption (moios)	2.160		~ 2.400	2.400	2.400
	Sale Price per unit of wheat (réis/moio)	8.700		8.700	8.700	7.800
	Annual costs of Wheat (réis)	18.792.000		~ 21.750.000	20.880.000	18.720.000
	Clothing	~ 17.500.000		~ 18.200.000	17.897.333	17.893.333
	Specie	~ 8.700.000		~ 9.100.000	8.948.667	8.946.667
	Weaponry & Amunition	2.245.000				
	Ecclesiastic pension				510.000	510.000
	Total expenditure	47.237.000		49.050.000	48.236.000	46.070.000
Ceuta	Annual consumption (moios)	1.300				
	Sale Price per unit of wheat (réis/moio)	8.700				
	Annual costs of Wheat (réis)	11.310.000				
	Clothing					
	Specie					
	Weaponry & Amunition	3.115.474				
	Total expenditure	25.700.474				
Mazagan	Annual consumption (moios)	1.416	1.400	~ 1.600		
	Sale Price per unit of wheat (réis/moio)	8.850	9.000	8.700		
	Annual costs of Wheat (réis)	12.528.060	12.600.000	~ 13.050.000		
	Clothing	~ 7.552.000	8.266.666	~ 7.900.000		
	Specie	~ 3.776.000	4.133.333	~ 3.900.000		
	Weaponry & Amunition	1.824.700				
	Total expenditure	25.680.740	25.000.000	~24.850.000		
Total	Annual consumption (moios)	4.876		4.000		
	Annual costs of Wheat (réis)	42.630.040		34.800.000		
	Clothing			39.100.999		
	Specie					
	Weaponry & Amunition	7.185.174				
	Total expenditure	98.616.214		73.900.099		

Sources: AGS, SPP, lib. 1466, fl. 1-2v, published in Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. XLI; AGS, SSP, lib. 1466, fl. 340-343v, published in Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. XXXIII; AGS, SSP, lib. 1472, fl. 418-419, published in Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. XLVII; AGS, SSP, lib. 1474, fl. 439-452; BA, 51-VI-54, no. 44, fl. 168.

³⁹⁶ AGS, SSP, lib. 1466, fl. 1-2v, published in Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. XLII: 226-228.

Luxán Meléndez's calculates that by the mid-1660s, Ceuta, at the time under Spanish rule for two decades, needed about 2,000 *fanegas* of wheat monthly. The town comprised at this point a population of 2,000 people, not counting the 400 men at arms that served in the garrison's four regiments. In the mid-1660s, the average inhabitant of Ceuta consumed about 1,5 kg of bread monthly.³⁹⁷ By comparison, in 1571, Oran's grain needs were estimated at 30,000 *fanegas* of wheat plus 15,000 *fanegas* of rye, the latter being used as forage to feed horses and mules too. These amounts concerned not only the military in active duty and the veterans, but also their families, but did not include the civil population. Adding to the estimate, the civil servants, ecclesiastics and others, the needs probably reached 50,000 *fanegas*. In 1617, the provision contract for this town, held by Jacinto Corvary and Bartolomé Baldezanos, required a supply of 20,000 *fanegas* of wheat and 5,000 of rye for an unspecified price.³⁹⁸

Bread aside, little is known about the consumption patterns of the local populations and the stationed regiments. For Oran, a projection made in 1652 posited that 4,000 *arrobas* of Spanish wine, 2,400 *arrobas* of olive oil, 1,800 *arrobas* of eau de vie (*agua ardiente*), 1,600 *arrobas* of figs and 500 *arrobas* of dried cod were consumed on average yearly, as well as an unspecified amount of sardines.³⁹⁹

4.3 The Legal Framework of the Moroccan Logistics

Manuel da Paiva, André Lopes Pinto and Gabriel Ribeiro were the contractors for the supply to Tangier in the 1610s and early 1620s,⁴⁰⁰ and with the exception of a few differences, their respective contracts were almost identical. Unfortunately, it has been impossible to trace the complete contractual provisions for Mazagan and Ceuta, meaning that the contracts underwritten with those three business entrepreneurs for the supply of Tangier will serve as a proxy for an analysis of the public-private partnerships pertaining to the three strongholds.⁴⁰¹

The contracts took three distinctive provisioning operations: the supplying of the towns with grain; the payment of wages to the garrisons and royal officials; and the payment of pensions to the local clergy, in accordance to the ecclesiastical patronage duties of the king of Portugal.

As far as the grain supplies were concerned, the contracts were not specific about the origin of the wheat, highlighting Germany, Flanders, England and France as possible purchasing markets. The omission of the Netherlands is not surprising, considering the Twelve Years Truce (1609-1621) would come to an end when the contract was still in effect. At the same time, it was stated that the cereals could come from anywhere, as long as the

³⁹⁷ Santiago de Luxán Meléndez, 'Contribución al Estudio de Los Presidios Españolas Del Norte de Africa. Las Dificultades de La Plaza de Ceuta Para Abastecerse de Trigo (1640-1668)', *Hispania*, no. 130 (1975): 321–42.

³⁹⁸ Alonso Acero, 'Trenes de Avituallamiento En Las Plazas Españolas de Berbería', 763.

³⁹⁹ Jonathan Israel, 'The Jews of Spanish North Africa. 1580-1669', in *Diasporas within a Diaspora. Jews, Crypto-Jews and the World Maritime Empires (1540-1740)* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2002), 174.

⁴⁰⁰ AGS, SSP, lib. 1474, fl. 439-452.

⁴⁰¹ Of the three fortified towns, Mazagan was the furthest away from Portugal. Mazagan's needs seem to have been close to those of Ceuta, considering that, according to the government budgets, the cost of maintaining the two towns was about the same. Tangier was the largest, most populated and required the biggest military apparatus, making it the most expensive of the three to maintain by quite some margin.

shipments met the quality requirements.⁴⁰² This somewhat enigmatic phrasing opened the door for grain to be potentially imported from more politically sensitive markets and leaves one wondering if this vague formulation was intentional, rather than an inadvertent loophole. It was almost certainly the former.⁴⁰³ In turn, no mentions were made in the provisions to wheat from Sicily or Sardinia, where the suppliers for the Spanish *presidios*, and also contractors hired by the municipal authorities to supply the Portuguese towns, often procured wheat and rye. Around this time, the price of wheat in those regions was 24 *reales* per *fanega*, whereas French wheat was slightly cheaper, averaging 23 *reales* per *fanega*. A shipment of wheat from the South of Spain, which was arranged by royal officials in Malaga, reached a purchasing price of 21 *reales* per *fanega*.⁴⁰⁴ The clauses of the contracts equally stipulated that concessionaires were free to purchase as much as grain in Portugal or in Andalusia as they could, and, to that effect, they could expect all possible cooperation from the local authorities (which in theory included the often uncooperative municipalities) in Iberia and the lands of the king's demesne.⁴⁰⁵ This aid included the use of state buildings to store grain and other supplies, as well as the means of transportation (traction animals and ships), provided that contractors covered the usage costs. Contractors also received support from the Crown in other ways. Ships chartered to transport supplies to the bulwarks were protected by royal fleets at sea, for as long as they would sail in the vicinity of such fleets.

The second rubric of these contracts, the payment of wages to military and royal personnel, was divided in two items. One third of the payments was to be carried out in specie, while the other two in kind, by way of victuals like olive oil, wine, vegetables, cheeses, linen and wool cloths. As was customary in this type of governmental concessions, the quantities to be deployed in the town's public stores and the price of each commodity were agreed to *ex post*. Unlike the price of grain, which was discussed during the negotiations and then put in writing in the contract provisions, the price of the other foodstuffs was determined by the local authorities following the ratification of the contract. Still, to prevent speculation, the Crown set a maximum price to pay for all other foodstuffs.⁴⁰⁶ The price of cloth was equally set after the ratification of the contract, but, contrary to foodstuffs, it was determined by the Council of the Exchequer, not by the local officials. Unlike the grain instalments, which were due monthly, wages were paid every three months (*quarteis*). These disbursements in specie and kind occurred one trimester in advance, as the contractor only started being paid by the Crown three months after his scheduled delivery. This meant that past three months of the end of his concession, the contractor still had to be pay one last instalment.⁴⁰⁷ For formality sake, the payment of wages was carried out in a public setting, in the presence of the captain of Tangier, the local judge (*ouvidor*) and other civil servants. The captain and the factor handed-over the money, foodstuffs and commodities to the *almoxarifes*, from whose hands the garrison corps and the inhabitants received their share of wages and rations.⁴⁰⁸ The presence of the factor, next to the captain, embodied the symbolism of royal protection by private outsourcing, a dangerous association as power appeared to be shared, rather than delegated.

⁴⁰² This provision was not always carried out successfully. For instance, in 1615 the Crown instructed her functionaries in Ceuta and Tangier to accept nothing other than Baltic grain, or as the authorities in Lisbon put it, wheat from Hamburg; AGS, SSP, lib. 1512, fl. 79, 79v.

⁴⁰³ AGS, SSP, lib. 1474, fl. 441-441v.

⁴⁰⁴ Alonso Acero, 'Trenes de Avituallamiento En Las Plazas Españolas de Berbería', 758.

⁴⁰⁵ AGS, SSP, lib. 1747, fl. 441.

⁴⁰⁶ For both André Lopes Pinto and Manuel de Paiva's contracts the cap for the additional victuals was set at 2,000,000 *réis*.

⁴⁰⁷ AGS, SSP, lib. 1474, fl. 453v. The corresponding clause for the concession of Manuel de Paiva can be found in *ibid.*, fl. 442,

⁴⁰⁸ Braga and Braga, *Ceuta Portuguesa (1415-1656)*, 91.

The third and final operation included in this contract was the supply of the towns' religious institutions. For example, the financial endowment of the monastery of São Domingos of Tangier, comprising fourteen brothers, consisted of 250,000 *réis* yearly in specie, nineteen *moios* of wheat from Alentejo or Castile, eight measures of wine, one barrel and a quarter of vinegar and one barrel and a quarter of olive oil.⁴⁰⁹

Contracts followed a very precise timeline, although the scheduling could be made flexible to the Crown's convenience if contractors were willing to cater to urgent needs. It was not uncommon for deliveries to start before the final approval of the contract. Manuel da Paiva vowed to supply Tangier with 800 *moios* of wheat and ammunition with immediate effect and deliver them before the end of the year, while negotiations were still ongoing in November and December of 1620.⁴¹⁰

The Monarchy, as it did with all other provisioning contracts, devised quality control mechanisms to guarantee that the suppliers did not take advantage of the royal administration. The textiles and additional victuals were inspected at the House of Ceuta (*Casa de Ceuta*).⁴¹¹ Only after the supplies had been sealed by the royal officials and the quantities and value registered, António Lopes Pinto and Manuel de Paiva got permission to load the ships and set sail to Tangier.⁴¹² Inspections continued upon arrival, as royal officials had to be present when the agents of the contractor unloaded the ships and before distribution started.⁴¹³ All incoming cargoes of the contractors were examined by the captain major and the tax collector (*almoxarife*), who registered the entry and issued a receipt to the agents of the contractors. The same happened when it was time to pay the garrison, the royal officials and the ecclesiastics, as local treasury officials had to issue proof of payment in writing.⁴¹⁴

There was a great discrepancy between how grain shipments were monitored and those involving other foodstuffs and commodities. This omission is revealing as all foodstuffs could not be exported directly to Tangier and had to be previously inspected at the House of Ceuta, but all imported grain from outside Iberia did not. This looser approach can be explained by the fact that Portugal was recurrently plagued by shortages of grain and the authorities could not afford to relinquish part of the kingdom's domestic production or imports to feed Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan. A second possible explanation is that since the grain was frequently procured outside Iberia, it made little sense to force a ship to call at Lisbon for inspection, when efficiency and cost determined that a direct journey would be more profitable to all parties. The fact that grain could be potentially coming from enemy states, lead the Crown to overlook inspection to avoid delivery delays in the towns.

As far as the storage of the commodities was concerned, the supplies for Tangier were kept in the town's granaries at the care of the contractor's factor in the cities. The tasks of the factor were all in all similar to those of the pantry men on board the ships of the *Carreira da Índia* and their liability for distribution and accounting closely related.⁴¹⁵ The

⁴⁰⁹ Robert Ricard, *Études sur l'histoire des Portugais au Maroc* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1955), 219–37.

⁴¹⁰ AGS, SSP, lib. 1474, fl. 435v.

⁴¹¹ AGS, SSP, lib. 1474, fl. 441v, 442; Francisco Mendes da Luz, ed., *Regimento Da Casa Da Índia. Manuscrito Do Século XVII Existente No Arquivo Geral de Simancas* (Lisbon: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1992), 26–27.

⁴¹² Before being shipped from Lisbon, these cargoes also paid the *consulado* duty and some additional impositions.

⁴¹³ As with any public-private partnership of the period, the contractor had to inform the central authorities of the people they appointed as their attorneys in all places where they did not travel to. The Crown would then report this information to the peripheral administrative branches. If the contractor's representatives would not be *de jure* recognized by the local bureaucracy, they would not be able to carry out the obligations of the contract on behalf of their principals.

⁴¹⁴ AGS, SSP, lib. 1474, fl. 442, clause 4; *ibid.* fl. 443, clause 9.

⁴¹⁵ See chapter 2.

factors were also in charge of overseeing the storage of textiles. Upon arrival, the textiles were deposited at the contractor's warehouses in the presence of officials, but kept under the scrutiny of the factor until the end of the contract.

Even if the Crown preferred contracts that covered the supply of each of the towns in their entirety, contracts involving the supply of particular commodities in smaller amounts had to be auctioned for lack of investors interested in taking on the all-encompassing contracts. Between mid October 1613 and throughout 1614, Alonso de Cisneiros contracted a delivery of clothing apparels to Mazagan and Tangier. The price was agreed in advance with the Council of the Exchequer, and would be made by delivering in brazilwood from Pernambuco to the contractor. To prevent speculation, the value was agreed at 4,600 *réis* per *quintal*. In the absence of enough brazilwood upon payment, Cisneros would be paid in pepper bound to arrive in the 1615 fleet sailing from India. Unlike other contractors who were given the pepper and sold it themselves, Cisneros requested to be paid from the proceeds of the sales arranged by the Crown.⁴¹⁶

Next to the regular and supplementary contracts, local inhabitants and travelling merchants who traded in Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan were also involved in the provisioning of the strongholds. A series of contracts granted for the supply of Ceuta will illustrate how public-private partnerships were also negotiated on the spot.⁴¹⁷ These contracts, some of which are summarized on table 18, lasted between six and eighteen months and included foodstuffs and commodities that were not interesting for the Lisbon based contractors. Moreover, like all other provisioning concessions, the price per unit and the amounts were agreed upon in advance.

Table 18. Some manifests of contracts for the supply of particular commodities to Ceuta

Commodity	Contractor	Price per unit (<i>réis</i>)	Date of signature	Duration of the contract
Coal	Juan de Arroyo	4/ <i>arratel</i>	January 1622	
Pork Meat	João Lopes	34/ <i>arratel</i>	December 1624	
Coal	Juan de Arroyo	5/ <i>arratel</i>	January 1625	
Olive oil	João Rodrigues Calvo	950/ <i>arroba</i>	February 1626	
Whitewash	António Martins Baptista	40/ <i>fanega</i>	March 1627	
Coal	Juan de Arroyo	4,5/ <i>arratel</i>	November 1631	
Olive oil	Domingos Vaz de Mendonca	26/ <i>arroba</i>	May 1631	18 months
Olive oil	Domingos Vaz de Mendonca	29/ <i>arroba</i>	November 1632	12 months
Olive oil	Domingos Vaz de Mendonca	30/ <i>arroba</i>	March 1633	
Olive oil	Domingos Vaz de Mendonca	23/ <i>arroba</i>	April 1634	12 months
Vinegar	Manuel Ribeiro	12/ <i>quartilho</i>	June 1631	12 months
Soap	Bartolomeu Rodrigues Colaco	38,5-40/ <i>arratel</i>	November 1631	
Salt	Manuel Fernandes Valongo	34/ <i>alqueire</i>	May 1633	
Spirits (<i>agua-ardente</i>)	João Pere	38/ <i>quartilho</i>	August 1635	

Source: Isabel M. R. Drumond Braga, 'Comércio e Abastecimento de Ceuta (1580-1640)', *Cuadernos Del Archivo Municipal de Ceuta*, no. 11 (1997): 148-149.

⁴¹⁶ AGS, SPP, lib. 1472, fl. 1-2v published in Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. XLI

⁴¹⁷ Unfortunately, the amounts to be supplied are omitted, and only the price per unit and the names of the concessionaires were disclosed.

Table 18 highlights the importance of the commercial ties with Andalusia, as these contracts were often underwritten with Andalusian merchants. Table 3.2 also suggests a degree of specialization of certain suppliers, like Domingos Vaz de Mendonça(za), supplier of olive oil, and Juan de Arroyo, supplier of coal.⁴¹⁸

The wholesale provisioning contracts that were negotiated at the highest level of the Portuguese administration also detailed how these public private partnerships ought to be serviced. Payment for supplying Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan was ensured by earmarked revenue streams collected or attainable in the Portuguese kingdom. Since there were no fiscal receipts of significance in the strongholds, and because most contractors were businessmen operating in Portugal, in 1607 a long-term solution was considered, as the Portuguese Crown could not rely on patchy, improvised arrangements to service its contracts. An ad-hoc committee specialized in matters of Portuguese royal finances (a *Junta*) suggested that the contractors should be paid with the receipts from the duties levied on the salt trade, combined with the lump-sums received for the farming out of the contract for the archipelago of São Tomé and from the revenues of the dry-ports.⁴¹⁹ Three revenues were, however, not enough to meet the expenses of the contracts and in 1607 the royal treasury still had 33,618,214 *réis* to bridge with the contractors. The matter was addressed in 1612 and 1613 by the Portuguese Council of the Exchequer and the Council of Portugal in Madrid, when without a solution in sight, Manuel Gomes Galego opted to drop out from the Mazagan concession in 1613.⁴²⁰ This incident put pressure on the king to add the revenues from the brazilwood monopoly and the Bull of Crusade to cover the expenses of provisioning the Moroccan outposts.⁴²¹

The efforts by the Portuguese institutions to stabilize the servicing of the Moroccan towns' contracts during the first quarter of the seventeenth century were not exclusive to Portugal. While these discussions were underway in Lisbon and Madrid, the Crown of Castile also took steps towards endowing its *presidios* with predictable sources of funding.⁴²² Table 19 summarizes the streams of revenue that could be claimed in Portugal to service the contracts.

⁴¹⁸ Alonso Acero, 'Trenes de Avituallamiento En Las Plazas Españolas de Berbería', 756.

⁴¹⁹ AGS, SSP, lib. 1466, fl. 268-269v., published in Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. XXXI

⁴²⁰ Following complaints made by the captain of Tangier (and similar ones by its Mazagan counterpart, which was, coincidentally, also being provisioned by Gomes Galego) to the Exchequer Council, Gomes Galego, presented the receipts by the local garrison authorities vouching he had in fact delivered alone, 350 moios e 14 alqueires of grain. AGS, SSP, lib. 1466, fl. 1-2v., published in Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. XLII, p. 227; AGS, SSP, lib. 1472, fl. 104, 113-114v.

⁴²¹ AGS, SSP, Lib. 1472, fl. 112-113v.

⁴²² Carlos Álvarez-Nogal, 'Centralized Funding of the Army in Spain: The Garrison Factoría in the Seventeenth Century', in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300-1800*, by Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014), 240.

Table 19. Revenue streams servicing the Tangier's contract (million réis)

	Manuel Gomes Galego (1613-1615)	André Lopes Pinto (1620-1621)	Manuel de Paiva (1621-1626)	João da Silva (1626-1631)	Pedro de Baeça (1631-1636)
New Duty on Salt		17	29	17	10
Border customs with Castile	20	5	4.326	5	4
Customs of Porto		4	5	2	
Customs of Viana		4	5.	4	4
Almoxarifado of Porto	3				
Almoxarifado of Viana	3				
Almoxarifado of Sintra and Campo de Ourique					1
The Cruzade Bull's income		6	2.84	6	3
Brazilwood	4.6	12.236		12.236	8
Sete Casas de Lisboa	4.2				
Casa dos Cinco					2
King's Pepper					6.750
TOTAL	34.8	48.236	46.076	46.236	38.750

Sources: AGS, SSP, lib. 1472, fl. 1-2, published in Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. XLII; AGS, SSP, lib. 1462, 112-113v; AGS, SSP, lib. 1474, fl. 453; AGS, SSP, lib. 1516, fl. 41v; AHU, CU, cod. 31, fl. 107.

The table shows the royal revenue streams earmarked to the servicing of the contract for the retailing of Tangier. They included the income from the Bull of Crusade and the yields from the new duty on salt, which since the 1620s were always earmarked to the contractor. The same could be said about the receipts from the brazilwood monopoly, with the exception of Manuel de Paiva's contract in the early 1620s. However, no other revenue stream came close to the importance of the new duty on salt, as it was from this income that contractors derived the largest share of their payments. The receipts from the salt duty oscillated between 10 and 27,000,000 réis, consistently covering more than half of the costs of the contracts. Although not as important as the salt duty, the most regularly assigned receipt were the tariffs levied on the *portos secos*, that is Portugal's inland border customs, while funds from the maritime custom houses of the two most important port-cities in Northern Portugal, Porto and Viana, were often enlisted for the servicing of the contracts too. By contrast, consumption taxes levied in Lisbon (the *Sete Casas*), the collected output from the *almoxarifados*, or the hand-over of royal pepper were only assigned as an extraordinary measure. This was normally the case when the Crown was just a few million réis short of reaching the contracts' price. In order to collect payments, contractors relied on a network of correspondents who lived or operated close to the fiscal agencies in question. For instance, in 1601, the contractor Gabriel Ribeiro da Costa gave power of attorney to Fernão Lopes Caminha, a prestigious merchant in Caminha, a Northwestern town in Portugal, to collect the earmarked revenue streams from the *almoxarifados* of Northern Portugal and from other tax-agencies in that region.⁴²³

Among the operational costs of the contracts, were those of collecting the revenue streams, which included paying commission to the agents who secure those sums on the behalf contractors and subsequently remit them to their principals. It must be stated that, in order to secure the agreed-upon payments, the agents appointed by the contractor were required to interact with tax-farmers, who were often fellow merchants and not rarely their competitors, since tax-collection was more often than not leased-out. Even if the

⁴²³ ANTT, ADL; 1º Cartório Notarial, cx. 1, livro 4, 56v-57v.

disbursement of the instalment money was done by the Crown's fiscal officials, the cash they had at hand likely came from the lump-sums paid by those tax-farmers and not collected by the treasury bureaucracy. This placed the supplying contractors at the mercy, albeit indirectly, of the leaseholders honouring their commitments to the royal treasuries, paying their concession fees were paid on time and were at the disposal of local tax-officials.

4.4 Enacting contractual requirements and the wider-reaching connections of the Portuguese towns in Northern Africa

The most important task of the North African provision contracts was undoubtedly the purchase and transportation of grain. Like the victualing of the fleets for *Carreira da Índia*, the supplying of bread was a perennial cause of unrest. As argued before, the importance of Andalusia and other Southern Spanish ports was considerable, and it is only logic that the provisions of the contracts authorized contractors to import grain from those areas. However, Southern Spain did not have the capacity to supply all the commodities and in the amounts needed to fulfil the needs of the Portuguese garrisons on a consistent basis.⁴²⁴

Scholarship regarding the provisioning of the North African strongholds has focused almost exclusively on the links between North Africa and Southern Portugal and Spain, particularly with Andalusia. This narrow approach overlooks the fact that by the end of the sixteenth century the Western Maghreb became increasingly exposed to political and economic developments taking place far away from the Western Mediterranean and the Iberian Peninsula. I refer specifically to the successful inroads of English and, especially, Dutch skippers and traders past the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean basin.⁴²⁵ Diaspora studies, particularly those dealing with the Sephardim, have raised awareness for the connections and exchanges between Northern Africa, including both the Iberian controlled enclaves and the Islamic controlled territories, with the Northern Atlantic world. Notwithstanding a few exceptions, these works have mostly underlined the interpersonal, intellectual and material-cultural exchanges, and sidelined the economic dimension, which is clearly on display in the case of the provisioning of Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan.⁴²⁶

Although the Portuguese authorities resorted to Northern European and Baltic imports since the fifteenth century, the contractors of the early seventeenth century took advantage of the new economic winds that were blowing in the Maghreb and the western Mediterranean, relying more forcefully on the Northern European markets for the wholesale supplying of the towns. They did so at a time when Dutch merchants and skippers became preferential suppliers of manufactured goods and especially bulk goods across the Strait of Gibraltar, through their burgeoning *Straatvaart*.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁴ Braga, 'Comércio e Abastecimento de Ceuta (1580-1640)'; Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial*, 3:269–85.

⁴²⁵ Maria Fusaro, 'After Braudel: A Reassessment of Mediterranean History between the Northern Invasion and the Caravane Maritime', in *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Braudel's Maritime Legacy*, ed. Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood, and Mohamed-Salah Omri (London-New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), 10–14; Richard T. Rapp, 'The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution', *The Journal of Economic History* 35, no. 3 (September 1975): 499–525.

⁴²⁶ García-Arenal and Wieggers, *A Man of Three Worlds*; Eloy Martín Corrales, 'Comercio En La Frontera. Judíos Magrebíes Intermediarios En Los Intercambios Mercantiles Hispano Norteafrikanos (Ss. XVI-XVIII)', in *Entre El Islam y Occidente. Los Judíos Magrebíes En La Edad Moderna*, ed. Mercedes García-Arenal (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2003); Israel, 'The Jews of Spanish North Africa. 1580-1669'.

⁴²⁷ Maartje van Gelder, 'Supplying the Serenissima: The Role of Flemish Merchants in the Venetian Grain Trade during the First Phase of the Straatvaart', *International Journal of Maritime History* 16, no. 2 (1 December 2004):

As the previous chapters demonstrated, one of the most compelling reasons why the Habsburg authorities turned to contractors whenever foreign supplies were needed was their awareness that these individuals maintained steady business relationships with the key trading nodes of Northwestern Europe, Scandinavia and the Baltic. By contracting out the provisioning of the North African towns to these private entrepreneurs, the Crown hoped to benefit from their international contacts, and the information, credit and maritime services they could secure. There is good reason to believe that the provisioning of Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan was to a great extent (but by no means exclusively) organized around trading networks of “strong-ties” of kin and religious filiation.⁴²⁸ Evidence strongly suggests that shipments of grain were frequently commissioned to a relative or a co-religionist living and trading in Antwerp, Amsterdam or Hamburg, who would make the necessary arrangements for the cargo to be purchased, loaded and shipped to its final destination. The contractors’ agents in Amsterdam could guarantee shipping at competitive freight rates and knew how to best secure commodities from Scandinavia and the Baltic.⁴²⁹ A few examples will illustrate how the operationalization of the contract drew on kinship ties.

The Baltic connections of Portugal’s Northern African outposts and the role played by kinship can be better assessed by looking at André Lopes Pinto and Manuel Álvares Pinto e Ribeiro, father and son, contractors for Ceuta and Tangier during the 1610s. They relied on Bento Osório, one of the wealthiest merchants of the Portuguese Nation of Amsterdam, and Gil Lopes Pinto, André’s nephew and their correspondent in Antwerp to have access to cheap and reliable shipping of grain and timber from the Baltic and Scandinavia. The maritime services sector of the Dutch Republic and the bulk commodities that these two well connected representatives facilitated proved instrumental in the fulfilment of the contract’s supplying quotas.⁴³⁰ Bento Osório and Gil Lopes Pinto were also important because André and Manuel farmed the duties of the Portuguese salt exports and the brazilwood monopoly, two activities that relied heavily on the international markets to be successful and could be easily combined with the provisioning of the Moroccan garrison towns.⁴³¹

The preamble of the contract over the salt duty monopoly makes it abundantly clear that taking on the Tangier provisioning contract was a pre-requisite for securing that tax-farm.⁴³² Through this decision, the Crown temporally granted Lopes Pinto what Drelichman and Voth described as “revenue-yielding assets” to service the remittance contracts for victuals, commodities and means of payment.⁴³³ The revenue yielding asset was, in this case, the contract of the new-duty on salt. A tax-farm, that is, the right to collect one of the Crown’s revenue streams, as opposed to receiving payments from a royal treasurer, whose cash more often than not came from the lump-sum payments of another revenue farmer was

39–60; Jonathan Israel, “The Phases of the Dutch “*Straatvaart*”, 1590-1713: A Chapter in the Economic History of the Mediterranean”, in *Empires and Entrepôts: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews, 1585-1713* (London-Ronceverte: The Hambledon Press, 1990), 133–62.

⁴²⁸ Xabier Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and Their Overseas Networks* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2013), 45–46; Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation upon the Ocean Sea*; McCabe, Harlaftis, and Minoglau, *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks*.

⁴²⁹ Unger, *The Ship in the Medieval Economy, 600-1600*, 267.

⁴³⁰ Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626-1650*, 73–75; Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567 - 1648)*, 151, 158.

⁴³¹ The importance of these revenue farms in the fortune of the Pintos was acknowledged by the members of the family who decamped from Antwerp to the Netherlands in the late 1640s. “my father’s business was augmented by my uncle André Lopes Pinto’s contracts in salt and Brazil wood, in which my father was responsible for obtaining a huge profit for my uncle as well as for his father’s establishment, by dint of the good management and disposition of the large quantities being delivered both at Antwerp and to the order of Bento Osório in Amesterdam”; H. P. Salomon, “The “de Pinto” Manuscript. A 17th Century Marrano Family History”, *Studia Rosenthaliana* IX, no. 1 (January 1975): 21.

⁴³² AGS, SSP, lib. 1474, fl. 453; Virgínia Rau, *Estudos sobre a história do sal português* (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1984); Salomon, “The “de Pinto” Manuscript. A 17th Century Marrano Family History”.

⁴³³ Drelichman and Voth, *Lending to the Borrower from Hell*, 182.

a more convenient mean of payment.⁴³⁴ This option spared the contractor from interactions with royal officials and from depending on another tax-farmer making disbursements on time to be paid for his own contract. As a result of this policy, when Lopes Pinto was responsible for the salt tax-farming contract, this commodity became closely linked to the deployment of victuals to the Portuguese bastions in Northern Africa.

The connections between Tangier, Lisbon, Antwerp and Amsterdam transpire in a notarial deed from September 1617. Skipper Thijs Janssen Bol, from Hoorn, appeared before a notary in Amsterdam to testify that he had delivered 117 *last* of wheat and rye imported from Danzig, at Tangier on behalf of Marcus Pieter and Abraham Pels, residents in Danzig, who commissioned the contract for Bento Osório.⁴³⁵ Abraham Pels was a relative (probably brother) of Marcus Pels, an Amsterdam merchant who partnered several times with Bento Osório and served as his liaison with the Baltic export markets for cereals. Starting a cooperating relation with someone like Pels was inevitable for Osório, given that the Portuguese Nation did not establish a permanent foothold in ports like Danzig, Königsberg, Reval or Riga, where the Dutch had been trading for many decades.⁴³⁶

For instance, in November 1618, Marcus Pels sold to Bento Osório, 24 lasts of the best quality Polish wheat and also assisted him in the purchase of another consignment from a certain Arendt Dirxsz Bosch, amounting to a total of 70 lasts. This wheat was shipped from Danzig to Tangier or Ceuta with the assistance of Abraham Pels, who delivered the cargo to the skipper hired by Osório in Amsterdam.⁴³⁷ The cargo onboard the *Damsel Wedia*, the ship freighted by Osório, had been insured by Gil Lopes Pinto in Antwerp, and the fact that Osório mentions the need to supply Gil Lopes Pinto with a proof of delivery, it can be assumed that the shipment was chartered on behalf of the Moroccan towns contractor.⁴³⁸

In March of the following year, Bento Osório freighted yet another ship under similar terms, although this time to fetch German rather than Baltic grain. Skipper Gerrit Gerritsen from Assendelft, overseeing the *'t Huijs van Assendelft* (100 lasts) was hired to sail from Amsterdam, first to the bay of Hohwacht, near Oldenburg, and then to the port-city of Heiligenhafen, in Schleswig-Holstein, where two shipments of wheat were taken on board. The ship sailed onwards towards the Strait of Gibraltar, to Tangier or Ceuta where the grain would be delivered. The freight rate for voyage was set at 25 guilders per last.⁴³⁹ One year later, on March 1619, Bento Osório, signed yet another freight contract with Sijmen Lucassen, skipper from Zuiderwoude, to take the *St. Jacob* (120 lasts), armed with eight iron pieces and four stone guns, to sail from Amsterdam to Danzig and from there to Tangier or

⁴³⁴ The bundling up of provision *assentos* and revenue farms was a recurring strategy, knowingly employed by both the Crown and merchant-bankers in Iberia. In Spain it was used all-throughout the early modern period. For examples of early-modern public-private partnerships “whereby payments would be offset between both activities”, provisioning and tax-farming; Torres Sánchez, ‘In the Shadow of Power: Monopolist Entrepreneurs, the State and Spanish Military Victualing in the Eighteenth Century’, 270, 277; Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs*, 157–58; This same procedure, of linking provisioning deals, involving not only the supply of goods and logistical services but also of credit, was also common in seventeenth century France. As Noel Johnson recalls, ‘by the seventeenth century, tax farmers were making significant loans to the crown that were hypothecated on the tax revenues they planned to collect.’. Johnson, ‘Banking on the King’, 965, 976.

⁴³⁵ Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567 - 1648)*, 151. Koen, “Notarial Records,” *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XIII, nr. 2 (July 1979): 223 (deed nr. 1565), *ibid.* : 235 (deed 1570)

⁴³⁶ Koen, “Notarial Records,” *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XIII, nr. 2 (July 1979): 238 (deed nr. 1590). It confirms the Pels brothers, Abraham, Marcus and Pieter, as the factors of the Lopes Pinto and Osório in Danzig.

⁴³⁷ Koen, “Notarial Records,” *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XX, no. 1 (July 1986), (deed no. 2500). The relation between Abraham and Marcus Pels reminds us that the overlap between commercial agency and kinship was absolutely not exclusive to the Portuguese Nation, and also seldom underpinned the long distance trade of Dutch and other Germanic speaking Northerners operating in the orbit of the Amsterdam staple market. Tielhof, *The Mother of All Trades*, 169.

⁴³⁸ Felix Archief (FA), Notariaat (Antwerpen, 1480-1810), N#3615, unfoliated.

⁴³⁹ E. M. Koen, “Notarial Records Relating to the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam up to 1639”, *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XVIII, no. 1 (January 1984): 72 (deed nr. 2305).

Ceuta, carrying 110 lasts of wheat. The freight rate was set at 27 guilders for every last, payable at Sanlucar de Barrameda, Seville or Lisbon, where André Lopes Pinto or one of his agents would pay the skipper.⁴⁴⁰

Osório's pivotal role in supplying the North African garrisons continued in 1619. On May 8, he paid Pieter Pauwelsen, Jacob Martsz Botamn and Pieter Cornelisz Van Marcken, burghers of Enkhuizen and owners of the *Ide Jaeger*, Aris Martsz, also from Enkhuizen, 428.9.8 guilders in exchange for 1.602 *reales* of eight. Skipper Martsz had taken his ship from Danzig to Tangier with wheat.⁴⁴¹ Later that year, on August 12, Osório freighted the *Het Bonte Paert*, skipper Willem Pietersz, resident in Rotterdam. Pietersz should load a cargo of 90 lasts of wheat from either the bay of Hohwacht, the Danish island of Laaland in the Baltic (present-day Lolland), or the port city of Fehmarn in Schleswig-Holstein, and then deliver it in Ceuta. The freight rate amounted to 9 cruzados for each last.⁴⁴²

Not all the voyages went smooth sailing, as Osório was beset by the typical problems affecting maritime communications during this period. In December 1618, the *Hercules*, skipper Thijs Sijvertsz sailed from Texel to Cadiz and Ceuta. The *Hercules* was loaded with 70 lasts of wheat that sustained damages during a heavy storm in the Bay of Biscay. Not only did the storm cause the wheat to get wet, but the inclement weather sent the ship into Kinsale, Ireland, where the crew stayed for the following six weeks. Once the ship had been repaired, the voyage continued for Cadiz and Ceuta. Since the grain was damaged by sea water, the contractor's agent in Ceuta refused the wheat, leaving Sijvertsz no choice but to sail to Cartagena, where he, once again failed to sell the cargo. The third attempt to sell the wheat at Setubal worked and the ship returned to Amsterdam with a cargo of salt.⁴⁴³ Piracy was another major threat to the steady provisioning of the garrison towns and Osório was well acquainted with it. Prior to 1618, Osório had lost a cargo of 155 lasts of grain at the hands of Barbary pirates, who seized the ship that was carrying the cereals to Tangier.⁴⁴⁴ The losses generated by these misfortunes were contained through insurance policies, which could be undersigned fairly easily on the Amsterdam staple market.

The successful inroads of the Dutch merchant marine across the Strait of Gibraltar raised the issue of what could be loaded into the ships' holds for the return voyage, since the Barbary strongholds lacked bulk cargoes to dispatch to Northern Europe. Portugal, on the other hand, did not suffer from this problem, since it had a commodity with a low value per unit of volume that enjoyed great demand in Northern Europe and the Baltic: salt. The contractors in Lisbon and their agents in Amsterdam made use of the established grain-salt exchange to foster the efficiency of their operations and maximize their returns. Payments in kind (involving overwhelmingly salt) were also frequently used to settle accounts of the freight contracts and in all likelihood a way for André Lopes Pinto, in his capacity as tax-farmer of the salt duties, and Osório to profit from these voyages. The integration of the two royal contracts is clear and reveals that Portuguese salt already served as a hard currency for international payments almost fifty years before it was agreed that salt would be paying for the damages suffered by the Dutch West India Company with the fall of Dutch Brazil in 1654.⁴⁴⁵ Before a notary in Amsterdam, Osório declared to have freighted more than 200 ships to export salt on behalf of André Lopes Pinto.⁴⁴⁶ Since the routes of exports of Baltic grain into the Mediterranean and those of the import of Portuguese salt to Northern Europe

⁴⁴⁰ Koen, "Notarial Records," *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XVI, no. 1 (January 1980): (deed no. 1679).

⁴⁴¹ Koen, "Notarial Records," *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XVI, no. 1 (January 1980): (deed no. 1719).

⁴⁴² Koen, "Notarial Records," *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XVIII, no. 1 (January 1984): (deed no. 2311).

⁴⁴³ Koen, "Notarial Records," *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XVII, no. 1, (January 1983): (no. 2155)

⁴⁴⁴ Roitman, *The Same but Different?*, 167.

⁴⁴⁵ Antunes, 'The Commercial Relationship between Amsterdam and the Portuguese Salt-Exporting Ports'.

⁴⁴⁶ Osório himself stated this before an Amsterdam notary, claiming to have freighted hundreds of ships to transport grain from the Baltic to Portugal and Portuguese salt in the opposite direction. Koen, "Notarial Records," *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XIII, no. 2 (January 1979): 238 (deed nr. 1590).

were usually combined into one single circuit, it is likely that several of these salt voyages were preceded by deliveries in Ceuta or Tangier.⁴⁴⁷

The ventures described above show the diasporic entrepreneurial networks of the Portuguese-Nations at work, but, as David Hancock as suggested, these personal-horizontal and reciprocal networks of kin, community, coreligionists, language and culture were not exclusivist. They were not necessarily designed to keep outsiders at bay and restrict exchanges to those who already found themselves inside the confines of the group. Like the Scottish Madeira wine merchants studied by Hancock, the networks of the Portuguese Nations “cast their nets beyond family and patron connections, first to draw in people to whom they were more distantly connected through shared nationality, religion, and political belief, and then to recruit people even more remotely connected, whom they may not even have known personally”.⁴⁴⁸

Bridgeheads like Osório granted the Lopes Pinto access to Amsterdam, “a multicultural city, where language, religion, and cultural particularities did not threaten the host community, which was all too happy to receive the newcomers”, and offered a competitive market for services to investors based in Portugal and operating in the Maghreb.⁴⁴⁹ The Amsterdam liaison, functioned as the bridge through which the network of the Lopes Pintos was expanded to include “strangers” and outsiders, firstly members of the Portuguese nation with whom Lopes Pinto might not be privy with, then insurers, skippers and suppliers in the Netherlands, the Baltic or Scandinavia.⁴⁵⁰ This outreach was indispensable to successfully provision the *assentos*. Men like Osório, knew to whom contractors should turn to in order to meet the contractual clauses. He ultimately served as the broker who enabled an ethnically homogenous/intra-communitarian enterprise, involving the contractor, their factors in Morocco and the Portuguese authorities, both in Lisbon and in the garrison towns, to expand into cross-cultural, trans-religious and inter-imperial ventures. Osório’s intervention allowed the Lopes Pinto to tap into supplying markets and freightage that best served his interests in profitably serving the Crown.

Hamburg based merchants also participated in the grain trade with Mazagan during the 1610s and 1620s. In 1614, a shipment of rye was dispatched by Diogo Carlos and António Fernandes Homem (merchants of the Portuguese Nation) of Hamburg to Mazagan.⁴⁵¹ These merchants must have used an autochthonous merchant as their a proxy in this transaction, since the Hamburg authorities reserved the “mother of all trades” for the town’s burgomasters.⁴⁵² Merchants from the emporium of the Lower Elbe often relied on Dutch bottoms to export grain to the Portuguese enclaves in the Maghreb. Afonso Gil da Costa, a Portuguese merchant in Amsterdam acting on behalf of Rodrigo Álvares, Francisco Vaz de Castro and Gabriel Lopes, merchants in Hamburg contracted skipper Ewout Maertensz to take the *Reus* (a 110 lasts’ ship), from Amsterdam to Hamburg and from there with 105 Hamburg lasts of rye, wheat or other bulk goods to Mazagan. The contract set a freight of 9 ducats at 10 reals a last, payable in Seville. The skipper would receive a bonus of 2 ducats if the cargo was of-loaded at the destination without incidents or delays.⁴⁵³

⁴⁴⁷ Roitman, *The Same but Different?*, 192; Jonathan Israel, ‘Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660’, in *Empires and Entrepôts. The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews, 1585-1713* (London-Ronceverte: The Hambleton Press, 1990), 359.

⁴⁴⁸ David Hancock, ‘The Trouble with Networks: Managing the Scots’ Early-Modern Madeira Trade’, *The Business History Review* 79, no. 3 (2005): 480.

⁴⁴⁹ Cátia Antunes and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, ‘Cross-Cultural Entrepreneurship in the Atlantic: Africans, Dutch and Sephardic Jews in Western Africa, 1580-1674’, *Itinerario* 35, no. 1 (2011): 54.

⁴⁵⁰ Cátia Antunes, ‘Amsterdam Cross-Cultural Partnerships in the Baltic-Atlantic Link, 1580-1674’, ed. Leos Müller, Phillip Robinson Rössner, and Toshiaki Tamaki (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011), 113.

⁴⁵¹ Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ *Studia Rosenthaliana*, VII, no. 1 (January 1973): (deed nr. 700).

⁴⁵² Poettering, *Migrating Merchants*. Chapter 2.

⁴⁵³ Koen, ‘Notarial Records,’ *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XVII, no. 1 (January 1983): (deed no. 2134)

The supplies from Northern Europe also included timber. In 1617, Osório freight the *St. Jacob* (55 lasts). Skipper Cornelis Jansen from Hoorn sailed to Trondheim or Romsdal (Norway) and from there to Lisbon with wood logs. There he would get word whether to sail to Tangier or Ceuta. For the route Amsterdam-Norway-Lisbon-Barbary the freight was 13.10 guilders for every 100 boards, payable upon return in Amsterdam. After departing from Northern Africa, Jansen was to sail to Castro Marim, Aveiro or Setúbal load salt at 12 guilders per last and return to Amsterdam, Hoorn or Enkhuizen.⁴⁵⁴ This voyage provides further evidence that the royal salt farm and the Morocco garrison contracts were inextricably linked, and that their combination was part of André Lopes Pinto's entrepreneurial strategy to maximize the profits to be made from deals with the Crown.

4.5 Concluding remarks

In Morocco, as elsewhere in Portugal and its overseas dependencies, contracting was not the cure but a palliative to the organizational pains of ruling over a vast and spatially discontinuous empire. The reliance on private entrepreneurs, as an alternative to the involvement of the royal bureaucracy, did not offer miraculous solutions to the problem of having the military enclaves well provisioned at all times.

Although there must have been years when the garrisons were supplied in timely and efficient fashion,⁴⁵⁵ the purveying of victuals, weapons, munitions and foodstuffs to the garrisons was often erratic and the quality of the exported grain and textiles could vary.⁴⁵⁶ The same could be said about the payment of wages, which suffered from frequent delays. This scenario is corroborated in the correspondence exchanged between the governors of the three strongholds and Lisbon, and by frequent complaints against the contractors' inadequate services. These testimonies paint a gruesome picture of outposts on the brink of collapse, with payments in arrears for months, local garrisons standing by with broken artillery and no ammunition and soldiers walking in rags and looking for scraps to feed themselves.⁴⁵⁷ Hyperbole aside, it seems clear that the militarized enclaves in Northern Africa found themselves lacking in basic material resources with an alarming frequency.

Even with properly serviced government contracts, public-private partnerships for the supplying of the Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagan were far from being ideal solutions. Delays and inconsistencies in the deliveries continued, and they certainly did not allow the Portuguese empire to expand in the region, or even for the fortified dwellings to become self-sustainable.⁴⁵⁸ The Crown was partially responsible for the problems affecting of the

⁴⁵⁴ Koen, "Notarial Records," *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XI, no. 1 (January 1977).

⁴⁵⁵ This seems to have been the case in 1607. On that year, Ceuta received shipments of grain surpassing 1,271 *quintais*. It also known that both Ceuta and Tangier were well provisioned in 1615, given that on that year the authorities in Lisbon and Madrid could afford to be picky about the origin of the grain. It was decided that no cereals other than imports from Northern Europe should be accepted, that is, that Andalusian or Portuguese grain was to be excluded. Braga and Braga, *Ceuta Portuguesa (1415-1656)*, 95.

⁴⁵⁶ Braga and Braga, 92.

⁴⁵⁷ See the complaints made by the inhabitants of Mazagan against the contractor Gabriel Ribeiro da Costa in 1606, whom they accused of gross oversight in the provisioning of the town and of leaving them at the mercy of enemy attacks, ANTT, Corpo Cronológico (CC), parte 2, ms. 331, doc. 47, published in Farinha, *História de Mazagão*, appendix, doc. XXIII. Similar complaints were made by the captains of Mazagan and Tangier against Manuel Gomes Galego in 1613. AGS, SSP, lib. 1462, fl. 104.

⁴⁵⁸ Even a contractor with a well-oiled provisioning machine, underpinned by sustained links to the grain markets of the Baltic, as was the case of André Lopes Pinto, faced problems to meet the supplying quotas of his royal concession. For instance, in 1620, he was requested to carry out part of his contract's disbursements in specie, which required him to acquire up to 4,000,000 *réis* in Castilian reales of silver in Andalusia. This last minute requirements by the Crown forced him to secure the required paperwork from the Castilian authorities,

contracts. Firstly, it took some time for the state to settle on the revenue streams it would earmark to pay for the public-private partnerships, and, secondly, even when it was clear which revenues were assigned to the contractors, an emergency resulted in the diversion of resources to more pressing matters.

The absence of complete series on the terms of the contracts and on the lack of consistent evidence on how the clauses were enacted by contractors prevents a fair assessment on the cost-efficiency of these public-private partnerships. But judging by the fact that concessions continued to be leased-out at a regular pace, it seems clear that it offered better warranties to the Crown than direct, executive administration of the provisioning. Moreover, the fact that the Crown was consistently able to find investors eager to take on the contracts shows, in turn, that these partnerships with the government remained, at least in theory, enticing investments. The fact that these concessions sometimes came bundled with tax-farms and revenue yielding assets, such as the duties on the salt trade or the right to exploit the Crown's monopoly on brazilwood, also goes a long way to explain the interest of some portfolio-capitalists.

The linking-up of revenue-farms and supplying concessions was part of a conscious strategy by the Crown to lure merchant capital and organization into taking on state contracts and foster the concentration of public credit and logistics in the hands of a selected few. Historian Luís Nuno Madureira correctly argues that this strategy resulted in the “vertical integration” of contracts.⁴⁵⁹ However, unlike what this author contends, this integration was not necessarily forced upon the contractors, since they demanded to be given the rights of exploitation over royal monopolies or tax-farms in order to take on the provisioning of the military and the civil populations living in frontier settlements. In addition to the opportunity to exploit royal monopolies and collect the Crown's fiscal receipts, these public-private partnerships should be seen as *de facto* socio-political ‘contracts’ between the kingdom's leading merchant-bankers, the Monarch and the dominant patronage networks at work at the Spanish court and within the high-councils in Portugal. The signing of such politically sensitive purveying contracts (sensitive because the survival of these outposts was largely depended on them), resulted in the sharing power with an elite of financiers and wholesale traders and in opportunities for upward mobility for the contractors. In practice, the expenses with provisioning and logistics were diluted in the returns generated by revenue-farms related to places far away from Northern Africa and the Maghreb. Those potentially lucrative side investments served as a warranty against these costly and hard to enact provisioning contracts, or as a supportive operation that the leaseholders could easily combine with the management of their tax-farms. The loading of salt at Setúbal into the very same Dutch ships that had delivered batches of grain and wood in Morocco on the return leg of their voyages are a testament to this complementarity.

For each garrison town, the Habsburg administration bundled together the most important provisioning task under a single concession, rather than outsourcing the different supplies to different merchant-bankers. Written contracts were drafted, specifying annual quotas for the goods to be delivered and establishing the unit costs of the single most important commodity to be purveyed: wheat. The contractors' rates of return were, hence, partially determined by the variation of the grain prices on the markets and the costs of shipping. Operating under a fixed price-per unit, contractors, especially those who managed the provisioning for longer periods, were exposed, for good and bad, to the volatility of

not always the swiftest bureaucratic procedure, and caused him to clash with the authorities in Cadiz, who denied the Portuguese contractor the right to dispatch those money remittances. The result of the obstruction by the Cadiz authorities was a significantly delay the payment of the troops serving in Ceuta. AGS, SSP, cod. 1552, fl. 392.

⁴⁵⁹ Nuno Luís Madureira, *Mercado e Privilégios. A Indústria Portuguesa Entre 1750 e 1834* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1997), 85.

commodity prices in the international markets as well as the insecurity of navigation, which could increase transaction costs. The umbrella contracts that were *en vogue* at the start of the century did not, however, encapsulate full spectrum of public-private partnerships involving the garrisons. A number of disparate contracts were underwritten with merchants from the Algarve and Southern Spanish ports, small supply arrangements were made with the town's own traders, and there is also evidence of traders based elsewhere exporting into the towns from across great distances of their own volition.

Finally, this chapter has also shown how the supplying of the Portuguese enclaves in North Africa needs to be looked beyond the region, taking into account the Northern Sea and Baltic regions at a moment of increasing Northern European engagement with the Mediterranean. The connections of the Lisbon business establishment with their correspondents in the expatriate communities of the Northern Sea outlets proved instrumental to ensure that construction materials, weaponry, munitions, and especially grain, were used to ensure that a Portuguese flag remained hoisted in the Maghreb.