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Embedded remembering : memory culture of the 1965 violence in rural East Java

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CHAPTER 3

EXECUTING THE ORDER: RE-EXAMINING THE VIOLENCE IN EAST JAVA

Before going deeper into the embedded memories of violence, it is important to analyse how the violence itself occurred. By trying to understand the characteristics of the violence in East Java (and also after examining the historical process of the patronage network in chapter 2), we will be able to comprehend how local villagers perceive the violence. The aim of this chapter is to re-examine the violence, particularly in East Java, by arguing that the violence that occurred in the attempt to overthrow Sukarno's government would not have resulted in mass atrocities if the army or civilians had acted solely on their own. This does not mean that the military is not responsible for the violence. On the contrary, as we will see in this chapter, the case study on East Java shows that the army was structurally involved in the violence, specifically by coordinating scattered civilian mass movements under a single military command. Moreover, this army-civilian coalition was not one-directional, it was a beneficial (yet unequal) collaboration not only for the military, but also for the civilian groups themselves. Therefore, the important question that I propose in this chapter is no longer to seek 'who is responsible for the violence', but how did this collaboration come into existence? What made it possible? How did it develop? What kind of instruments (laws, decrees, instructions) were issued to facilitate this coalition? To answer these questions, I agree with Kammen & MacGregor that the killings should not be treated in isolation. Instead, this should be examined together with other forms of violence (detention, property seizure, torture, sexual violence, and so on) and its periodisation should be extended from 1965 to 1968 to see that the violence was not only an attack against the left, but also a counter-revolutionary movement to establish a new regime in the making.¹⁷⁸

Existing analyses of the 1965 violence can be categorised broadly into three different trajectories: the horizontal conflict, the vertical or structural violence, and the dualistic thesis. The first one framed the violence as a horizontal rupture, caused by rooted conflict between the communists and religious groups. This type of analysis often emerged in official statements and government publications, such as the white book of the September 30th Movement written by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, which stated that "... tensions finally exploded into communal clashes resulting in bloodbaths in certain areas of Indonesia".¹⁷⁹ In this framework, the military presented their operation as an attempt to secure the situation from an explosive conflict. They justified the violence against the left during the operation with the argument of maintaining peace and order. Participation of civilians in the violence also led some scholars to believe that the army only had a minor role in the violence.¹⁸⁰ However, these communal-conflict analyses fail to explain how collective tensions could escalate into nationwide mass killings in a relatively short period of time.

In contrast to this horizontal conflict theory, another group of critical scholars and activists argue a different stance, emphasising that the state (in this case, the army) played a central role in the violence. A structural order was given by the central command to their subordinate military commands in the regions to organise the mass killings. As Geoffrey Robinson argues, genocide and mass killings are political acts, which means that they do not occur 'naturally', but were intentionally and politically initiated by the authorities. Whether the killings started early or later, depended

¹⁷⁸ Kammen & McGregor 2012, 11-12.

¹⁷⁹ Notosusanto & Saleh 1968, 77.

¹⁸⁰ Sulistyono 2000.

largely on the alliance between the authority and local civilians to carry out this violence.¹⁸¹ For example, in areas where the regional military command was united and had sufficient troops, the killing took place earlier (such as in the case of Aceh), but delayed in areas where the regional army command was politically divided (such as in East Java).¹⁸²

This line of argument became stronger when two recent regional studies analysed military reports that pointed to the army's structural coordinating role in the violence. The first is Ahmad Luthfi's article on the violence in Banyuwangi, where he uses reports of Kodam (district military command) 0825 Banyuwangi. In his study, he argues that the violence was structurally coordinated by the army through, for example, the establishment of the army-directed Vigilance Command Body (Badan Komando Siaga/ BKS) in every village.¹⁸³ The other is Jess Melvin's study on Aceh's military command, in which she shows that the commander actively went on a tour to different districts in order to coordinate the annihilation of communists in the province. Melvin also argues that the anti-communist operation in Aceh took place with the support and knowledge of the national military command, and therefore can be regarded as an intentional act to eliminate certain groups of people, or an act of genocide.¹⁸⁴ Both studies are even capable of providing numbers of detainees and victims that were killed during the military operation.

In between these two analyses, another group of scholars argue that although the army directed the violence, they did not necessarily have absolute control over societies in different areas. Even though the killings followed a national pattern,¹⁸⁵ regional differences also occurred and may not be easily analysed to correspond with this uniform national pattern.¹⁸⁶ This dualistic thesis argues that the killings cannot be regarded as the responsibility of a single party or institution,¹⁸⁷ and therefore no general-national pattern of violence could be generated. For example, Robert Cribb highlighted the connection between national (the September 30th Movement) and local dimensions that resulted in regional variations of the killings. In some areas, such as Java and Bali, the killings occurred between late 1965 to 1966, whereas in other areas, such as West Kalimantan, the worst massacres occurred in 1967.¹⁸⁸ Even within Java itself, the magnitude of the killings differ between West, Central and East Java, with the last province being recorded as having the worst killings due to the tension between religious and leftist groups.¹⁸⁹

This chapter supports and elaborates further the existing vertical or structural analysis of the violence through examination of the archives of Kodam (Regional Military Command) V Brawijaya,¹⁹⁰ East Java from 1965 to 1968. Adding to the vertical analysis argument, I would argue that a national pattern of violence can indeed be found. Examination of these archives, particularly on the Malang military command, shows that the military played a major role in the violence, and that participation

¹⁸¹ Robinson 2018, 15-17.

¹⁸² Robinson 2018, 151-2.

¹⁸³ Luthfi 2018.

¹⁸⁴ Melvin also presents a critical analysis of the genocide definition, as stated in the 1948 Genocide Convention. She includes previous discussions that pointed to the intentionality of the 1965-66 violence and the target group in the violence that went beyond members of a political party. Melvin 2018, 300.

¹⁸⁵ The national pattern in this case shows that the killings were usually preceded by mass detention and disappearance. Roosa 2016, 12.

¹⁸⁶ Young 1990.

¹⁸⁷ Gerlach 2010.

¹⁸⁸ Cribb 1990.

¹⁸⁹ Cribb 1990, 25-27.

¹⁹⁰ The archives is stored in the Brawijaya military museum in Malang municipality along with other inventories, from the revolutionary war to the military operation in East Timor.

of civilians took place under their coordination. Both the dualistic thesis and the horizontal conflict theory are considered unsubstantiated as this chapter will demonstrate that the violence became mass violence in East Java not because civilians acted on their own, but because the army created a situation where collaboration between them became highly possible. The military utilised the long-existing and historically shaped factions in society to eliminate the left. However, elaborating further the vertical or structural analysis, I argue that at the same time, these factions were also taking advantage of their supra-local attachment to the military. The military operation was not a one-directional alliance, it was a beneficial collaboration, where both military and civilian factions benefited from the violence. The case of Donomulyo shows that certain factions actually profited from the rise of military power in rural society. Burmudji's story in Chapter 2, for example, illustrates how the position of rural elites was secured after threats against their land ownership were eliminated with the killings of the PKI and other leftist members in Donomulyo.

The primary base of this chapter is the analysis of Kodam V Brawijaya-East Java archives, located in the Brawijaya military museum in Malang. The collection consists of the history of the East Java military command and their various operations from early independence (1945) to East Timor (1975). For the purpose of this article, I use their specific inventory called 'G30S/ PKI tahun 1965' (September 30th Movement/ PKI in 1965). The inventory consists of reports, radiograms, instructions, and other documents from different levels and regions of military commands in East Java from 1965 to 1967. In this inventory, documents from the Military Resort Command (Korem) 083 Malang contain daily situation report from 8 October to 29 December 1965.

Although this specific inventory of the Brawijaya archive collection contains important information on the anti-communist operation in East Java, it should be read carefully for several reasons. First, the records are basically reports written by military officers in certain divisions and sent to their superiors or other divisions. This means that these records may only capture what is needed or accepted within the military circle, and exclude other facts. Therefore, it is important to analyse the reports together with other different sources, for example, interviews. Second, reading the Brawijaya documents can create the impression that the army is an autonomous and powerful body. Instructions related to civilian groups that were released in 1965-66 may falsely led readers to believe that these civilians were agentless individuals who only followed orders. This is not the complete case. The army was not only a government defence body, it is a political institution that constantly formed alliances with different groups for certain aims. Within these alliances, civilians also acted based on their political or individual goals, which were often not explicitly stated. The presentation of this chapter will be on this relational (and not directive) basis between the army and civilian groups.

The third reason to read the archives carefully is because the language that is used in these army documents is often vague, and none of them explicitly mentioned the killings or other forms of violence that the army conducted. This is very much a characteristic of Indonesian military reports, which can also be found in the case of East Timor, where the documents did not point to any military crimes, instead they repeated the government's propaganda on the occupation of East Timor, which transformed into a belief that justified the military violence.¹⁹¹ In the case of the Brawijaya documents, the propagandic terms created an image of a civilian war in 1965-66 and at the same time, dehumanized the victims. Throughout this chapter, I will point out these three critical aspects (the selective nature of the report, the image of an autonomous body, and the vague language) in analysing the Brawijaya documents.

¹⁹¹ Moore 2001, 10.

This chapter will begin with a description of the expansion of the army's power prior to the September 30th Movement. They did not only expand their territorial command (stretching their institutions down to the district level), but also in political terms, which included building alliances with civilian groups. The next section will discuss the alliance in East Java, specifically in the first month after the September 30th Movement. In the later section, I will highlight the major findings from the Brawijaya military archives; that the local movement of civilians became structurally coordinated under the military towards the end of October 1965. This section includes the military operation in Donomulyo. Furthermore, the army's role also extended to the establishment of the New Order through the New Orderisation (*Peng-Order Baru-an*) programmes in all government levels, including districts and villages.

Expansion of the Army's Power

Apart from being a national defence institution, the Indonesian army has always been a political body. Their political nature can be traced back to the period of struggle for independence, where guerrilla fighters were politically aligned into irregular units (local *laskar*) besides serving as regular armed forces.¹⁹² Its political character also means that the Indonesian army is quite diverse, with extra-military political loyalties and a stronger commitment from soldiers to their commanders than to the army institution as a whole.¹⁹³ Throughout the 1950s to 1960s, the army's power had expanded, not only in terms of organisational structure, but also in their political power, including in regional authorities. This period also witnessed the tension between three political powers: the army, President Sukarno, and the PKI that ended along with the September 30th Movement.¹⁹⁴ Until 1965, the army was not a professional Armed Forces in the Western sense of understanding – they had no cohesion, no obedience to government directions except when it was to the Armed Forces' advantage, and their performance in facing foreign opponents had been insufficient.¹⁹⁵

The crucial period for the expansion of the army's power occurred in 1957, along with the introduction of martial law (State of War and Siege/ Staat van Oorlog en Beleg or more well-known as SOB) as a response to the increasing regional Darul Islam rebellions in Aceh (1953-62), West Java (1948-62), South Sulawesi (1953-65), and the PRRI/ Permesta rebellion in West Sumatra and Sulawesi (1958-61). The army became more firmly entrenched in the political (and also economic) field, by placing their members in the cabinet, upper echelons of the civil service, and regional administration.¹⁹⁶ They also tried to dominate the National Front, a coordinating body that was established in August 1960 with a main goal to complete the national revolution and "organise the closest cooperation between the Government, the people and other state bodies".¹⁹⁷ Among the 73 members of the Executive Board (including representatives from the PKI), at least 11 of them were military men, and of the 17 provincial branches established by April 1961, 9 of them were chaired by the local army commander.¹⁹⁸ With a structural organisation from the central government down to the district level, in 1962, the National Front allowed membership of individuals and political parties.¹⁹⁹ In March 1964, members of the National Front were incorporated into the *Tjatur Tunggal*,

¹⁹² The guerilla strategy used during the war also contributed to the political character of the army. With lack of professional training and modern equipment, the army relied heavily on the support of local civilians. This had created a thin boundary between military and civilian life during the guerilla. Crouch 1988, 25.

¹⁹³ Crouch 1988, 27.

¹⁹⁴ Melvin 2018, 63-69.

¹⁹⁵ MacFarling, Ian. 1996. *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia*. Canberra: Defence Studies Centre. P.73

¹⁹⁶ Crouch 1988, 41.

¹⁹⁷ Mortimer 1974, 101.

¹⁹⁸ Sundhaussen 1982, 152.

¹⁹⁹ Mortimer 1974, 101.

an administrative system in which four government elements, consisting of the governors or regents, local army commanders, police chiefs and public persecutors, made collaborative decisions on their regional issues. By placing their officers in the position of governors and regents, the army tried to increase their power over the regional administration.²⁰⁰ With the integration of the National Front into *Tjatur Tunggal*, the name was changed into *Pantja Tunggal*.

Another point of expansion of the army occurred against the backdrop of the confrontation with Malaysia, where in 1964, Sukarno issued a decree for the formation of the Regional Dwikora Executive Authority (*Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah*), or *Pepelrada*.²⁰¹ In 1964, its main task was to organise and supervise all activities concerning or affecting the anti-Malaysia campaign.²⁰² The decree also stated that in carrying out its duty, the *Pepelrada* should consult with *Pantja Tunggal* in their own regions to obtain suggestions for policy development, assistance for coordination between government bodies, and support for the implementation of related policies.²⁰³ The authority of the *Pepelrada* included confiscating properties, prohibiting a person to reside or leave a certain place, detaining people for 30 days, and transferring a person to certain locations under high surveillance if the person is indicated as disrupting security.²⁰⁴ The *Pepelrada* was also obliged to report directly to the President, and thus, bypassing the central military headquarters. Furthermore, the President himself appointed the head of the *Pepelrada*, which was dominated by the provincial army commander. Therefore, regional decisions relied mostly on the commander, including decisions related to actions to eliminate communists.²⁰⁵ As we shall see in this chapter, existing bodies such as *Panca Tunggal* and *Pepelrada* became a significant institution in supporting the annihilation operation against the left. *Pantja Tunggal*'s inclusiveness of civilian members not only facilitated coordination between the army and anti-communist civilian organisations during the 1965-66 operation, but also provided the opportunity for political parties or other civilian groups to gain advantages from their alliance with the military even before the September 30th Movement.

Together with the expansion of political power, the army also increased their territorial power. The concept of territorial warfare was derived from the guerrilla warfare strategy during the Independence war. This strategy was regarded as the most effective tactic to defeat Dutch soldiers who were considered better equipped and larger in numbers. In 1958, a Committee on Army Doctrine emphasised that guerrilla warfare was the only adequate strategy for the Indonesian army, and therefore, support from civilians became a prerequisite for successful military operations.²⁰⁶ This thesis became the Army's Concept of Territorial Warfare, highlighting the advancement of people's national consciousness (especially villagers) 'to the extent that they will be willing to sacrifice anything in the defence of the higher cause', and in return, the army should establish stability, internal security and social justice.²⁰⁷ One year later, the army used this guideline to expand their Territorial Organisation. The *Tentara and Territorium* (T&T),²⁰⁸ which was established at the

²⁰⁰ Sundhaussen 1982, 175.

²⁰¹ Dwikora is an acronym for *Dwi Komando Rakyat* (People's Two Commands), released in 1964. President Sukarno announced Dwikora in relation with the confrontation movement against Malaysia, instructing the people to thwart the formation of Malaysia as Britain's puppet state, and to form volunteers to assist this movement. Setiawan, 2003. P. 74.

²⁰² Crouch 1988, 168.

²⁰³ Muhono 1966, 1245.

²⁰⁴ Muhono 1966, 1246-7.

²⁰⁵ Sundhaussen 1982, 186.

²⁰⁶ Sundhaussen 1982, 138.

²⁰⁷ Sundhaussen 1982, 140.

²⁰⁸ In this territorial concept, there were seven military territories (during 1950-1957): North Sumatra (T&T I), South Sumatra (T&T II), West Java including Jakarta (T&T III), Central Java (T&T IV), East Java (T&T V),

provincial level, were renamed into *Komando Daerah Militer* (Regional Military Command/ *Kodam*) and the number was increased from seven to sixteen. At the lower level, *Komando Resort Militer* (Military Resort Commands/ *Korem*), which incorporated several regencies, were established in several areas, followed by the formation of *Komando Distrik Militer* (District Military Command/ *Kodim*) at the district or regency level, and *Komando Rayon Militer* (Military Precinct Commands/ *Koramil*) in the subdistricts. The logic behind *Koramil* was to prepare the mentality of the people for territorial warfare, and prevent mental unrest.²⁰⁹ This, according to Sundhaussen, was basically the military's strategy to tackle the PKI's growing influence of the grassroots masses, especially since the escalation of the unilateral action (see chapter 1), although the military never explicitly stated this.




Figure 2. Structure of Kodam VIII/ Brawijaya Territorial Command

In line with Sundhaussen's argument, the expansion period (between 1963-1966) of the command units in East Java indicates that it was geared to confront the increasing support of the PKI in the lowest administrative levels. The T&T V Brawijaya became Kodam VIII Brawijaya based on the army decree dated 24 October 1959.²¹⁰ New military units were established, such as Korem 083 on 16 October 1963 (based on *Surat Keputusan Pangdam VIII/ Brawijaya no. Kep 152/10/1963*), Korem 081 and 082 on 25 November 1963 (based on *Surat Keputusan Pangdam VIII/ Brawijaya no. Kep 185/11/1963*), and Korem 084 on 9 July 1966 (through *Surat Keputusan Pangdam VIII/ Brawijaya no.*

Kalimantan (T&T VI) and East Indonesia (T&T VII). These T&Ts were established to conduct guerilla warfare independently of orders and supplies from the headquarters. Within the regiments in the T&T, a subordinate body of Military District Commands was specifically responsible for liaison with the civilian population.

Sundhaussen 1982, 58-60.

²⁰⁹ Sundhaussen 1982, 175.

²¹⁰ The territorial code for the Brawijaya command was changed from VIII to V, based on the decision of the Army Chief of Staff no. Kep/411/1985 on 12 January 1985. Since then, the East Java Regional Military Command is known as Kodam V/ Brawijaya. Setiawan 2006, 43.

Skep-1 03/7/1966 although the unit was already incorporated into Kodam VIII Brawijaya since 1964).²¹¹ Meanwhile, the Kodim structure was established through a commander's decree on 25 January 1964, where 10 Kodim were formed in Korem 081, 7 Kodim in Korem 082, 9 Kodim in Korem 083, and 7 Kodim in Korem 084.²¹² With this new territorial structure, the army started civic action programmes, such as public indoctrination or cultural events, while at the same time, connected closely to the civilian administration, religious and cultural organisations, youth groups, veterans, trade unions, peasant organisations, political parties and groups at regional and local levels. They even sent doctors, engineers, and entertainment groups for the purpose of winning the hearts and minds of the people.²¹³

However, the army's growing power was not uncontested by the PKI, who was fully aware of their strategy. The PKI chairman Aidit, for example, expressed criticism against the army for becoming increasingly authoritarian and endangering Indonesia's democracy. Aidit captured the intention of the military 'to create a Martial Law rule without the Martial Law itself', for 'continuing a dictatorial rule in the name of Catur Tunggal in the provinces', and for activating their units in villages.²¹⁴ The PKI was aware of its weak influence in the army and also used its close connection with Sukarno to propose the expansion of the Nasakom principle (stand for *Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis* or Nationalist, Religious, Communist—a principle that represented the unity of three major socio-political tendencies in Indonesian society)²¹⁵ into the military by establishing advisory teams to work with the commanders of the four services.²¹⁶ This tension between the PKI and the army illustrates that both parties did not only compete for upper-level political support (in this case, from Sukarno and political elites), but also for lower grassroots civilian endorsement. After the 30th September Movement, this tension ended with the military's control at both levels.

Key Features of East Java's Military Operation

Previous studies in East Java focus on two main features of the military operation. First, The army had already announced the official line in their newspapers since 8 October 1965: that the September 30th Movement (now branded as Gestapu, acronym for Gerakan September Tiga Puluh/ 30th September Movement) was masterminded by the PKI.²¹⁷ However, since this official propaganda started, Kodam VIII Brawijaya had not taken any action against the communists. They were considered slow, and the commander, Basuki Rahmat was regarded as undecisive. Second, in relation to the first point, civilian organisations took the initiative to start the anti-communist persecutions, resulting in the most gruesome bloodbaths in the nation. However, these civilians did not move independently, at least they would not have decided to act against the left if they were not assured of the military's support of their action. Furthermore, keeping in mind that the army was a political body, they would certainly need political allies to execute the persecution. Therefore, Brawijaya command's hesitancy or slowness was not only a reflection of their diverse political stance, but should also be seen as a moment of shifting political alliance: from one that was subordinated to Sukarno, to a coup-oriented military faction dominated by Suharto. A shift which assured that once the elimination of the left started in East Java, it would receive the most significant support that it needed.

²¹¹ Setiawan 2006, 37-38.

²¹² Setiawan 2006, 37.

²¹³ Sundhaussen 1982, 141-2.

²¹⁴ Aidit stated this criticism in a report to the Central Committee on 10 February 1963. Sundhaussen 1982, 176.

²¹⁵ Sukarno used this term to bring together competing forces during Indonesia's Guided Democracy period (1959-1965) to foster a sense of national unity. Crouch 1988, 43-44.

²¹⁶ Crouch 1988, 87.

²¹⁷ Kammen & McGregor 2012, 2.

So far, researchers argue that regional differences in the 1965-66 violence existed because the army's capacity and political unity differed in the regions. The case of Aceh shows an example of unity between the military commander Brigadier General Ishak Djuarsa and his direct superior, Lieutenant General Ahmad Mokoginta. Both opposed Sukarno and the PKI which led to the immediate launch of military operations against the PKI in early October. Meanwhile, in areas where the army command was politically divided, faced resistance, or did not have sufficient troops, mass killings were delayed for some time, but then accelerated dramatically when the balance of forces tipped in favour of the anti-communist position.²¹⁸ This was the case in East Java, where the regional military commander, Brigadier General Basuki Rachmat was considered indecisive about moving against the communists. The killings in this region only began in early November along with Rachmat's replacement.²¹⁹ In other cases where there was no consensus within the military leadership or where the strength of loyalist troops was insufficient, the onset of mass killings coincided with or immediately followed the deployment of troops loyal to Suharto from outside the command area. This was the case in Central Java and Bali, where the Army Paracommando Regiment (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat/ RPKAD*) units took the lead in the operation.²²⁰

East Java in the 1960s was certainly an example of a diverse political orientation of its authorities. The Surabaya Major, Moerachman, was a BTI who was later detained after the accusation of being involved in the September 30th Movement. Eight regents (*bupati*) and mayors as well as the PKI-nominated representatives in regional government bodies and assemblies were also suspended on 29 October 1965 by the East Java Governor Wijono as a response to the Movement.²²¹ Meanwhile, the Kodam VIII Brawijaya officers were considered fairly Sukarnoist as they were personally loyal to Sukarno but sporadically did express an anti-communist stance.²²² The Brawijaya Commander, Basuki Rachmat, was one of the 'moderate reformers' group and was more critical of but not directly hostile towards Sukarno. However, dissention increased after 1 October 1965.²²³ Both Rachmat and the Pepelrada chief of staff, Colonel Widjaja Sukardanu, were seen as hesitant to issue instructions for large-scale operations against the communist.²²⁴ Besides the problem of insufficient troops,²²⁵ the delay of action was also because Rachmat was a strong supporter of Suharto even before the September 30th Movement,²²⁶ but at the same time, loyal to President Sukarno. This suggests that Rachmat and his officers needed time to ensure that the political shift that they were going to make would not disadvantage them. In this case, the Brawijaya Command is an interesting example that being anti-communist and loyal to Sukarno's was not at opposite ends of the spectrum.

²¹⁸ Robinson 2018, 151.

²¹⁹ Robinson 2018, 151.

²²⁰ Robinson 2018, 152.

²²¹ Setiyawan 2014, 215. In *Report from East Java*, the reporter noted that Governor Wijono was irresolute. His subordinates complained about his slowness in commencing purges against the communists, even those directly under his supervision. "Report from East Java" 1986, 148. Wijono's decision to dismiss Leftist-oriented officials may be a result of his political shift.

²²² Sundhaussen 1982, 212.

²²³ Sundhaussen 1982, 227.

²²⁴ "Report from East Java" 1986, 146. This article is a translation of a report by an intelligence officer to his superior in East Java, written on 29 November 1965.

²²⁵ Eight of the province's sixteen battalions were serving elsewhere at that time. Robinson 2018, 151. In addition, thirty percent of them were involved in the coup. "Report from East Java" 1986, 146. Dahlia Setiyawan also supports this analysis using US intelligence documents that reported Rachmat's conversation with the American embassy's political officer, Jacob Walkin, stating that the commander now had enough troops to continue the anti-communist purge in East Java (based on a telegram sent on 19 November 1965). Setiyawan 2014, 247.

²²⁶ Rachmat was appointed as the Minister of internal affairs (1966-69) in Suharto's cabinet.

As a consequence of Rachmat's irresolute attitude, two of his subordinates moved more aggressively against the communists, in accordance with the national anti-communist statement that had already been launched publicly in the army's newspaper since 8 October 1965. One of them was Willy Soedjono, Madiun Regional Commander, who was recorded as having initiated arrests of the PKI cadres (about 200 in the city of Madiun alone).²²⁷ The other is Colonel Sumardi, the Regional Commander in Malang-Besuki, who was reported as being the most firm in arresting the PKI leaders and activists. On 14 November 1965, Sumardi organised a meeting with several local Heads, Regents, Residents and former Governors and Residents, in order to establish a policy which would achieve more intensive cooperation between military and civilian authorities; solve problems resulting from the extermination of the PKI; and solve economic problems, which could be exploited by the PKI.²²⁸ It is unclear to what extent the meeting initiated the killings, but intelligence reports mentioned that killings were already taking place in the residencies of the Kediri, Jombang, Mojokerto, Malang, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, and Besuki region even before the meeting.²²⁹ In Kediri, NU's youth wing Ansor had already organised a mass demonstration on 13 October 1965, which accelerated the killings in rural areas.²³⁰

This brings us to the second key element of the violence in East Java, which is the participation of civilian groups. Some scholars concluded that the killings in East Java were the result of initiatives of lower-level military and civilian forces without clear direction from their military superiors.²³¹ In this case, the civilian force that took the lead in East Java was NU's youth wing Ansor. Their involvement resonated with the religious reasoning of Holy War and defending Islam that was widely circulated by their respected Islamic teachers (the *Kyais*).²³² However, it is important to note that there were different factions within the NU itself regarding the September 30th Movement. The young generation of the NU, led by Zainur Ehsan Subchan, was determined to move more aggressively against the PKI, while their senior leaders were more passive.²³³ Studies and reports about the violence in East Java also described gruesome acts involved in the killings, such as public torture, mutilation and decapitation.²³⁴ For many areas, body parts and corpses were left in public spaces to generate terror.²³⁵ Massive involvement of religious organisations such as Ansor and the Catholic Youth in the violence in East Java led a number of scholars to argue that the violence was a result of rooted conflict between religious organisations and the PKI while the army remained largely passive.²³⁶

²²⁷ "Report from East Java" 1986, 147.

²²⁸ "Report from East Java" 1986, 148.

²²⁹ "Report from East Java" 1986, 145.

²³⁰ Young 1990, 80-81.

²³¹ Kammen & MacGregor 2012, 16-17.

²³² Other reasoning includes statements such as "If the PKI were not killed first, then we would be killed"; "A person is not a real Muslim if he does not want to exterminate PKI members"; "They had attacked our faith". Robinson 2018, 173. Harold Crouch also noted that it was common to find religious teachers (*kyai*) and scholars (*ulama*) of NU mobilizing their students at religious schools (*pesantren*) to take communists from their homes and kill them at certain places. Crouch 1988, 152.

²³³ Feillard, André 1996, 45-47.

²³⁴ See "Additional Data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty in Indonesia, Especially in East Java" 1990.

²³⁵ Pipit Rochijat told a story where body of corpses were stacked together on rafts with the PKI banner on top. Rochijat 1985, 44.

²³⁶ Hermawan Sulisty recorded that the military remained passive in the massacre in Kediri and Jombang. He only noted that the Kodim commander in Kediri sent his officers in civilian clothes to join Ansor's mass actions. Sulisty 2000, 166.

However, both the horizontal conflict and state-led violence analysis seem to overlook that neither civilian organisations nor the army worked independently. They had been forming a political alliance even before the September 30th Movement, which culminated in the violence throughout 1965-68. Few socio-historical analyses of the involvement of civilian groups in the violence implicitly pointed to advantages that these groups gained by eliminating the PKI. For example, Greg Fealy and Katherine McGregor argued that political and socioeconomic forces such as electoral popularity and attacks against NU landowners were more significant than religious reasons for the killings.²³⁷ This implies that the elimination of the PKI created secure political and economic positions for the NU.

Not only the NU, but the Catholic Party (*Partai Katolik*) and Catholic Youth (*Pemuda Katolik Republik Indonesia/ PMKRI*) also formed an alliance with the military even before the September 30th Movement. Acting independently from their central leadership, the Catholic Party and PMKRI used the Catholics within the military to safeguard their movement. FX Trikatmo, a former PMKRI activist in Malang explains the relationship between the PMKRI and the military prior to 1965:

It was [19]63 and very intense²³⁸. Intimidation was also strong. Ah, why did we dare to organise a Bishop's mass meeting (*apel Uskup*)? Because at that time in Malang, Catholic figures were dominant. Amongst others; the chairman of Askam (*Aksi Sosial Katolik Malang/ Catholic Social Action in Malang*) was Colonel Moedjiono. He was the Commander of the Military Police (POM) in East Java – Brawijaya. The POM Korem Commander was also a Catholic. Their auditor, in East Java, in Malang, the military auditor was also a Catholic. The air force commander was also a Catholic, but apparently, he was in Oemar Dhani's²³⁹ cadre. So he was arrested. There were a lot of Catholic figures. When the military was dominant, then, who will dare [laughing]. They were the ones who supported us in Malang.²⁴⁰

Instead of being used by the army, it was the other way around for these civilian activists– Trikatmo portrayed the PMKRI as an organisation with the objective to utilise the army. They took advantage of the Catholics within the military body to secure their mass movements, and strengthen the position of Catholics within the tense and intimidated rivalry with the PKI around 1963. With this kind of alliance and political support, civilian organisations seem to move firmly against the communists in early October. For example, Jess Melvin mentioned that as early as 1 October 1965, PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia/ Indonesian Islamic High School Students) activist in Banda Aceh already produced anti-communist posters without direction from the army. Melvin argues that in this early stage, it is highly possible that civilian groups acted independently but were soon organised under the military's command.²⁴¹ However, reflecting on Trikatmo's account, I think that even when civilian organisations seem to act independently, they would not have made the decision to do so if they were not completely sure about the army's support for their actions. This indicates that coalitions between the army and civilian groups were continuously maintained before, during and after the violence.

From Chaos to Extermination

The first weeks after the September 30th Movement were filled with ambiguity. Authorities and civilians in the regions were not certain about what the movement was, and how to respond to it.²⁴²

²³⁷ Based on correspondence between central and local NU officials, the central leadership played a role in encouraging the violence in the local regions. Fealy & McGregor 2012, 105-130.

²³⁸ Trikatmo was referring to the political rivalry between the PKI and anti-communist organisations such as the NU and the Catholic Party.

²³⁹ Oemar Dhani was the national air force commander (1962-65), but was accused of being involved in the September 30th Movement.

²⁴⁰ Interview with FX Trikatmo, Malang, 11 June 2016 #20.36-22.32.

²⁴¹ Melvin 2018, 119-120.

²⁴² In Aceh, an activist who was putting up posters accusing the PKI of being the mastermind behind the September 30th Movement was confronted by a military guard using his bayonet. This happened because in the

As this chapter will show, in the first weeks of October 1965, military actions in East Java were geared towards maintaining peace and order. However, as soon as the political tendency shifted into an anti-Leftist stream, these actions transformed into creating and facilitating anti-communist violence. Civilian groups that were once more-or-less independent allies of the army, now became clients of their military patrons, believing that the nation was entering into a war against the communists.

In East Java, weeks after the September 30th Movement were rather chaotic: both the communists and anti-communists groups mobilised themselves to convey a public statement. From early to mid-October 1965, mass movements included demonstrations (by rightist and leftist groups), destruction of Leftist's properties (houses or offices), and clashes between the two parties.²⁴³ During that period, authorities were still trying to take control of the situation. For example, on 10 October 1965 in Pasuruan, Panca Tunggal dismissed 2000 demonstrators from religious groups targeting communists.²⁴⁴ On 11 October 1965, the battalion commander of Zeni 5 was instructed to cooperate with *Puterpra* (*Perwira Urusan Teritorial dan Perlawanan Rakyat* which later on became *Koramil*) in Lawang to keep demonstrations in order (*menjaga ketertiban demonstrasi*), and prevent destruction of houses, stores and officers, and to release a warning shot, if necessary.²⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the communists also organised their mass movements. On 21 October 1965, for example, 300 communists in Cluring village, Banyuwangi organised a demonstration.²⁴⁶ Received by the local Panca Tunggal, the demonstrators made several statements: they will continue to support Sukarno as reminded by the PKI central committee; create national revolutionary unity on the basis of NASAKOM; execute five revolutionary principles (*Panca Ajimat Revolusi*); and persecute the people who are responsible for burning down innocent people's houses. Up to this point, it seems that mass mobilisations were organic and uncoordinated, while the authorities were still attempting to prevent a high number of casualties from these movements.

A turning point in East Java's purge against the left occurred after the formation of Pupelrada. A telegram to the regional Panca Tunggal and Kodim mentioned *Pepelrada* Decree No. Kep-15/10/65 about the formation of *Pepelrada* in *Korem/ Kopursiaga* (*Komando Tempur Siaga/ Battle Command*) and the establishment of *Pupelrada* or *Pembantu Pepelrada* (Assistant *Pepelrada*) in *Korem 083 Malang* on 13 October 1965. Located in Bromo street 17, *Pupelrada Korem 083* operated under the leadership of Colonel Sumadi, the *Korem* (Military Resort Command) 083 Commander.²⁴⁷ *Pupelrada* was also established in other districts and regents.²⁴⁸ Its formation meant that now the *Korems* also

early days after the September 30th Movement, even the military was not sure who was behind the movement. Melvin 2018, 121.

²⁴³ This also included destruction of houses or properties of Chinese residents in the area, accusing them of supporting the Indonesian communists. "Laporan G30S/PKI di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki", 1965.

²⁴⁴ "Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki", 1. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁴⁵ Radiogram T. 582/1965 directed to Komandan Batalyon Zeni Tempur (Dan Jon Zipur) 5 on 11 October 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 1. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁴⁶ "Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki", 5. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁴⁷ Radiogram T. 591/1965 directed to Regional Panca Tunggal ex Residence/ Besuki (Panca Tunggal Tk. II ex Karesidenen/ Besuki) through Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 16 October 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 2. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁴⁸ Another document from the Brawijaya archives also shows the existence of *Pupelrada* in *Korem 081, Madiun*. Laporan *Korem 081*. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

had extra-judicial powers such as prohibiting a person to reside or leave a certain place, detaining people for 30 days, and so on. Furthermore, the information division of *Pupelrada* 083 clearly stated that “all parties are obliged to assist efforts to normalise the situation and to prevent the misuse of the people’s current emotional state”.²⁴⁹ This was basically an explicit call for every group, including the civilians, to be involved in the anti-communist operations.

One day after the formation of *Pupelrada* in Malang, religious youth groups held an Action Command (*Komando Aksi*) public meeting in the Malang town square on 14 October 1965.²⁵⁰ At this meeting, the youths stated publicly that they would assist the army in crushing the September 30th Movement and was received by Colonel Soemadi, Commander of Kopur III/ 83 (*Komando Tempur*/ Battle Command under Korem 083). The meeting also handed over 250,000 youths from 30 mass organisations under the *Front Pemuda* (Youth Front) of Malang City. It did not state further to whom the youths were handed over. Although the number seems to be exaggerated, public meetings became a common starting point of a more coordinated mass mobilisation that also occurred elsewhere.²⁵¹ On the same date, the military began to issue orders to arrest and investigate members of Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat in order to search for ‘complete information related to the September 30th Movement’.²⁵² This radiogram instructed every Kodim (District Military Command) to cooperate with the local police command and *Pantja Tunggal* to investigate Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat members who were involved in the training of volunteers in Jakarta. The investigation should focus on their knowledge about the September 30th Movement and its implementation in the regions. Whether or not this radiogram influenced the mass killings is still unclear, but it shows that previous mass demonstrations started to shift into an attack against the left.

On 23 October 1965, the Head of Staff *Pupelrada* 0825/ Brawijaya (presumably referred to Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi) conducted a limited meeting attended by *Puterpra*, *PP* (presumably *Pemuda Pancasila*), *Hansip* (*Pertahanan Sipil*/ civil defence), and the heads of government Departments (*Djawatan*) to inform them about the establishment of *Pupelrada* in East Java.²⁵³ The meeting also stressed the military operations to secure and stabilize local government. Since then, the nature of the Korem 083 daily report started to change. Since late October to December 1965, the report frequently mentioned the killing of members of Leftist organisations by unidentified killers (*pembunuh tidak dikenal*)²⁵⁴. For example, on 16 November 1965, four cases of killings were recorded in the report and in one of those cases, four bodies were found in a rice field.²⁵⁵ The document also reported self-disbandment of Leftist organisations in different areas. However, a

²⁴⁹ “Pokok-Pokok Kebijaksanaan Penerangan Staf *Pupelrada* Korem 083 Dalam Menghadapi Penyelesaian Apa Yang Dinamakan Gerakan 30 September”, November 6, 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia. This document sometimes uses *Pupelrada* and *Pupepelrada*. It refers to the same body.

²⁵⁰ “Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki”, 2. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵¹ In Surabaya, a mass rally took place on 16 October 1965 at the Heroes Monument, which was organized by the East Java and Surabaya Action Committee to Crush Gestapu (Panitia Aksi Mengganjang Gestapu). Setiyawan 2014, 210.

²⁵² Radiogram T. 587/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 14 October 1965. “Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083”, 1. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵³ “Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki”, 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵⁴ The language that is used in the document is vague. It did not reveal any actors, but focused on the finding – bodies that were predominantly of members of Leftist groups.

²⁵⁵ “Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki”, 12. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

radiogram on 30 November 1965 stated that disbandment of political or mass organisations that were involved in the September 30th Movement should be accepted by the District Military Commander (*Dandim*) as head of *Pupelrada* and witnessed by *Pantja Tunggal* and other organisations in the National Front.²⁵⁶ This indicates the possibility that self-disbandment was not voluntary, but occurred under the pressure of the military.

When Local Acts Became Coordinated

The formation of *Pupelrada* became a turning point where spontaneous movements from Rightist and Leftist groups in the first weeks of October 1965 were transformed into attacks against the left by mid-October in Malang. The diverse political orientation amongst East Java's authorities was now becoming increasingly coherent in support of eliminating the left. In this case, involvement of civilian masses in the anti-communist purges should not be perceived as a solution for the insufficiency of troops, but as an effort to create the impression that the violence against the PKI was the result of spontaneous communal anger – a feature of a civil war.²⁵⁷ While in fact, it was certainly the army that had made civilian movements increasingly massive and aggressive towards the left in East Java. On 21 October 1965, Basuki Rachmat finally established *Pancasila Operation* to move against the left in East Java. This decision secured Rachmat's own career, and he was appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs (1966-68) in Suharto's cabinet.

The *Pancasila Operation* instruction stated that "with all authorities in all Kodam VIII/Brawijaya, together with other *Angkatan, Panca Tunggal*, and other apparatus, we should improve the implementation of *Dwikora* and continue the extermination of the remaining contra-revolutionary September 30th Movement down to its roots to create peace and order in East Java" (*Dengan segala wewenang yang ada, seluruh slagorde Kodam VIII/ Brawijaya bersama-sama dengan lain ANGKATAN, PANTJA TUNGGAL dan segenap aparatur lainnya tetap meningkatkan pelaksanaan Dwikora dan terus membasmi sisa-sisa golongan kontra revolusi "Gerakan 30 September" sampai seakar-akarnya untuk menciptakan suasana aman dan tertib di wilayah Jatim*).²⁵⁸ In this operation, every battalion was obliged to report on the local situation every six hours to a joint command post in Surabaya.²⁵⁹ The operation also instructed every Korem to "execute every military or non-military act, by our own troops or by other parties, in accordance with the Commander's policy" (*mengadakan usaha dan tindakan-tindakan yang diperlukan sesuai kebijaksanaan yang telah digariskan oleh PANGLIMA baik dalam segi militer maupun non militer, baik ke dalam pasukan sendiri maupun keluar*).²⁶⁰ This instruction implied the need to align every action under one military command. Furthermore, the operation also targeted the left within military bodies. Any military personnel who committed disciplinary offences related to the September 30th Movement were to be handed over to the screening team of KODAM VIII.²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ Radiogram T. 715/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 30 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 8. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵⁷ Robinson 2018, 212.

²⁵⁸ "Perintah Operasi No. 05 Pantja Sila", 2. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵⁹ "Perintah Operasi No. 05 Pantja Sila", 5. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁰ "Perintah Operasi No. 05 Pantja Sila", 3-4. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶¹ "Prinmin No. 57/1965 Dari Prinop No. 5", 2. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

The Pancasila Operation also explicitly authorised the use of civilian forces. The document stated that “for the purpose of the operation, local civilian forces that have clearly expressed their support for the army can be used in eliminating the September 30th Movement” (*Untuk keperluan operasi dapat menggunakan tenaga sipil setempat yang telah nyata-nyata mendukung gerakan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia dalam rangka penumpasan Gerakan 30 September*).²⁶² Although the document did not specify further the involvement of civilians, it opened a spectrum of possibilities for civilians to conduct violence against the left. Furthermore, the Pancasila Operation instruction was acknowledged by the National Army Commander (*Panglima Angkatan Darat/ Menpangad*) A.H. Nasution (1962-66) and the Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Panglima Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat/ Pangkostrad*) Suharto (1963-65).²⁶³ This suggests that the operation was structurally coordinated among every level in the army, from the central level to the regional level.

After the issue of the Pancasila Operation instruction, a number of radiograms were sent to the Kodim under Korem 083 Malang to organise the use of civilians. A radiogram released on 26 October 1965 instructed that “progressive revolutionary organisations that stand behind the army to crush the counter-revolutionary movement should be under *Puterpra*” (former name for Koramil), including combative military trainings by individuals or groups.²⁶⁴ This suggests the army’s intention to stop random mass actions and consolidate actions under the *Puterpra*. Later in November 1965, the *Puterpra* was ordered to be armed, including the Technical Assistance Unit (*Unit Bantuan Teknis*) which would be assigned later on to the weak *Puterpras*.²⁶⁵ Arming the *Puterpra* also meant that military forces at the lowest level (subdistrict) should be more aggressive in eliminating Leftists.

Soon after this radiogram, a series of documents also issued similar instructions regarding civilian forces. On 23 November 1965, a radiogram ordered:²⁶⁶

1. Headquarters should be provided to mass action movements that do not yet have any. Catur Tunggal should provide this for these mass action movements, and combine them with *Hansip* (civil defence).
2. KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia/ Indonesia University Students Action Front*) should be united with the aforementioned AA²⁶⁷ and include the University Students Regiment (*Resimen Mahasiswa*)

²⁶² “Prinmin No. 57/1965 Dari Prinop No. 5”, 3. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶³ The Pancasila Operation instructions were sent to the Battle Command in Korem 081 to 083, commanders of the battalions in East Java, Menpangad, Pangkostrad, the commander of Kodam/ Regional Military Command Diponegoro (Central Java) and Udayana (Bali), and to other units in the Brawijaya command. “Prinmin No. 57/1965 Dari Prinop No. 5”, 4. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁴ The radiogram also ordered the formation of investigation teams (*tim pengusut*) at district and subdistrict levels, of which members should be adjusted to the local situation. Radiogram T. 298/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 26 October 1965. “Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083”, 3. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁵ Radiogram T. 658/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 6 November 1965. “Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083”, 4. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁶ Radiogram T. 702/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 23 November 1965. “Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083”, 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁷ The document did not provide any further explanation of AA. However, a term of Golongan Agama/ Ansor (Religious group/ Ansor) was used in a situation report of Korem 081 Madiun and Kediri. It is highly possible that the AA in this document referred to this specific civilian group. “G30S/ PKI di Daerah Korem 081 Madiun-

3. The task of the aforementioned AA is to assist the army by:
 - a. Forming teams to register residents at the level of the village neighbourhood, village, subdistrict, district or regents, national companies, private companies, universities, and so on in order to abolish the PKI internally (it should be abolished by the end of November)
 - b. Providing information
 - c. Providing information and indoctrination for former PKI sympathisers who want to be good citizens
 - d. Conducting operations together with the ABRI
 - e. Creating psy-war defence
 - f. Conducting counter²⁶⁸
 - g. Staying anti Neo-colonialism (Nekolim)²⁶⁹

The document did not further explain the details of each point. However, it is clear that the army was organising civilian forces under their command to register residents (presumably using screening teams similar to Central Java's Teperda),²⁷⁰ provide assistance in military operations and participate in indoctrination efforts, presumably amongst villagers and detainees.

Instructions to organise civilian forces under the army command continued towards the end of November 1965. For example, a radiogram on 25 November 1965 ordered middle-rank officers (*Pama/ perwira menengah*) to directly lead mass actions.²⁷¹ Meanwhile, two days later, another radiogram instructed cessation of all mass movements; and to channel AA through *Hansip*, provide them (mass movements) with uniforms and let the army direct them.²⁷² This was a very explicit order of transforming civilians into military personnel. Another radiogram clearly stated the acknowledgement of KAMI as the only student organisation permitted by the military, in which all students were obliged to be involved with the main task of annihilating the September 30th Movement under the army leadership.²⁷³ Through these instructions of civilian's involvement, it is not surprising that by 4 December 1965, the Commander of Korem 083 reported to the Brawijaya Commander that all the PKI under *Korem 083* area 'were terminated'.²⁷⁴

Kediri". 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁸ "Melaksanakan counter" (original text). There was no further explanation about this instruction, but it may relate to strategies in countering the communists.

²⁶⁹ The term Nekolim was introduced by Sukarno in relation to the independence revolution. While during the Sukarno period, anti-Nekolim refers to independence, anti-Dutch or foreign intervention, in 1965, Nekolim means anti-communists, because the communists were seen as endangering Indonesia's revolution.

²⁷⁰ This is similar to Central Java's Teperda or Regional Investigation Teams (Team Pemeriksa Daerah), which had the duty to interrogate and collect information from prisoners. The formation of Teperda was at the direct instruction of Suharto. Hammer 2013, 53.

²⁷¹ Radiogram T. 706/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 25 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁷² Radiogram T. 702/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 27 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁷³ Radiogram ST.705/1965 on 25 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 8. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁷⁴ "Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki", 16. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

To conclude, there are two strategies that are highly significant in the anti-communist operation in East Java. First is the establishment of *Pupelrada* that provide a legal basis for the Korems under the Brawijaya command to perform arrests, confiscate property, and perform other extra-judicial acts. The second is the use of civilian forces in the Pancasila Operation, which had been assigned various tasks ranging from providing information to directly assisting in the operation. Although detailed evidence about civilian involvement can only be found (so far) in Korem 083 Malang, it is highly possible that other Korem in East Java, and even in other provinces, also issued similar instructions. This shows that although the civilian forces acted locally in the first weeks after the September 30th Movement, these forces were eventually coordinated under the structural command of the East Java army command as from late October 1965.

Records of Detention

Another indication that the army was monitoring the violence was through their records of detainees. In the report on the September 30th Movement (G30S – the term that the army use) in Korem 083, a specific log was available to track the number of detainees. These numbers were recorded daily, starting in early November (at least in Korem 083 – it may be earlier or later in other regions) until December 1965. The mechanism for recording the numbers of detainees was not mentioned, but on several dates, the document also provides numbers of prisoners in each Kodim (see data from 10, 13 and 16 November). This suggests that the numbers were generated hierarchically, presumably from Koramil, to Kodim, and then to Korem 083, and maybe reported further to Kodam V/ Brawijaya. Prisoners' data at the Kodim level was also found in other regions, such as Kodim 0809 Kediri which listed 245 civil services, 211 village officials and 2955 civilians in detention.²⁷⁵

Table 3

NUMBER OF PRISONERS IN KOPUR SIAGA III/083, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1965

Date	Military Personnel	Civilians in the Armed Forces	Public Civilians	Total Prisoners	Prisoners in Kodim
4 November 1965				2472	-
10 November 1965				2337	Kodim 0818: 471 people Malang, Kodim 0819 Pasuruan: 165 people, Kodim 0820 Probolinggo: 262 people, Kodim 0821 Lumajang: 118 people, Kodim 0822 Bondowoso: 271 people, Kodim 0823 Situbondo: 158 people, Kodim 0824 Jember: 215 people, Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi: 553 people, Kodim 0831 Ponorogo: 129 people
13 November	39		2428	2467	Kodim 0818: 529 people Malang, Kodim 0819 Pasuruan: 241 people, Kodim 0820 Probolinggo: 106 people, Kodim 0821 Lumajang: 222

²⁷⁵ The date of this record is not available. Rekapitulasi: Daftar korban-korban penumpasan GESTAPU/ PKI di wilayah Kodim 0809/ Kediri. Komando Distrik Militer 0809 Kediri. No. Inventaris 316-a. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

Date	Military Personnel	Civilians in the Armed Forces	Public Civilians	Total Prisoners	Prisoners in Kodim
					people, Kodim 0822 Bondowoso: 271 people, Kodim 0823 Situbondo: 196 people, Kodim 0824 Jember: 215 people, Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi: 558 people, Kodim 0831 Ponorogo: 129 people
16 November				2821	Kodim 0818: 543 people Malang, Kodim 0819 Pasuruan: 253 people, Kodim 0820 Probolinggo: 204 people, Kodim 0821 Lumajang: 235 people, Kodim 0822 Bondowoso: 441 people, Kodim 0823 Situbondo: 243 people, Kodim 0824 Jember: 215 people, Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi: 558 people, Kodim 0831 Ponorogo: 129 people
20 November	34	1	3959	3997	-
21 November	45	1	3974	4020	-
23 November				1509	-
27 November	102	1	4903	5006	-
28 November				5034	-
4 December 1965	91	1	5450		-
6 December				6175	-
7 December, until 08.00	106	2	6183		-
7 December, until now (the hour is not available)	133	20	5652	5805	-
8 December	18	100	6109	6217	-
9 December	106	17	6087	6210	-
12 December, until 12.00	134	14	6111	6259	-
12 December, until 24.00	134	14	5650	5798	-
15 December	133	20	5454	5607	-
17 December	134	14	5904	6052	-
21 December	133	20	5480	5633	-
23 December	163	19	5435		-
27 December	224	27	4193	4444	-
29 December	213	27	4191	4431	-

Source: "Laporan SEPTEMBER 30TH MOVEMENT/PKI di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki" 1965, 8-18.

Based on the tables above, we can see that the number of prisoners increased from early November (2472 people) to early December (6259 people), and decreased slowly towards the end of December (4431 people). Note that on 12 December 1965, the number of prisoners decreased sharply within only twelve hours. No further explanation of this change is provided. However, keeping in mind that mass killings were usually preceded by detention; it is highly possible that the numbers declined

because the detainees were killed.²⁷⁶ Their detention period was also uncertain. In Korem 082 in Mojokerto, for example, 7398 people still remained detained until the end of 1966. The report further explained that since October 1966, Korem 082 no longer received maintenance funds or donations for the prisoners, so they have to rely on their own families for food for the remaining detention period.²⁷⁷ Where the acts of recording prisoners occurred in different places, it indicates that the violence occurred under the organisation and observation of the army.²⁷⁸

Military Operations in South Malang

Even though the Pancasila Operation was launched on 21 October 1965, it was not until 29 November 1965 that it commenced in South Malang, under the command of Captain Hasan Basri.²⁷⁹ As I mentioned earlier, the delay may be related to the shortage of troops, but it is also possible that the army needed time to consolidate internal forces to support the anti-communist operation. A report on the operation stated that the troops entered Donomulyo on 29 November and that they searched for information directly by establishing a connection with the local *Tjatur Tunggal*.²⁸⁰ Oral sources also confirmed this mechanism, and explained that village heads were summoned to the Koramil office once the army entered the area.²⁸¹ This was the starting point of army-civilian collaboration to execute the rank and file of communists in Donomulyo. The following day, one platoon raider already started a cleansing operation in Tlogosari complex and another in Sumberoto, two subdistricts located in Donomulyo.²⁸² Next, the troops were divided over three other districts in Sumbermanjing Kulon, Pagak and Bantur, for a two-day operation. During the night, *Kodim* instructed the extension of the operation for another 7 days, which provided more time for the army to execute another cleansing operation in Donomulyo up to the Blitar area. Therefore, on 2-3 December 1965, one platoon raider was assigned to move into the Wates area in Blitar, while other troops under the *Puterpra* Donomulyo moved into different subdistricts of Donomulyo. Also on 2 December 1965, a meeting was conducted in Turen to discuss the progress of the September 30th Movement operation and the cleansing operation against rampant robbers in South Malang. Besides the army, the marines (*Korps Komando Angkatan Laut/ KKO*) were also involved in the operation, covering the Karangsari area on 5-6 December 1965. The next day, 7 December 1965, a meeting was organised between *Kodim*, troop commanders, including *Brimob* Commander (Mobile Brigade/ *Brigade Mobil*, a special operation unit under the National Police force) and the District Head/ *Camat* of Bantur. From 9 December 1965, *Brimob* supplied additional troops, including troops assigned to guard prisoners in Wonokerto. On 19 December 1965, investigators were assigned to the operation,

²⁷⁶ See Kammen & Zakaria 2012.

²⁷⁷ "Kegiatan Kopur II/ Rem-082 Dalam Penumpasan Gerakan 30 September", 5. 1965. No. Inventaris 316-a. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁷⁸ Not only in East Java, the military in Aceh also recorded 1,941 public deaths since early October 1965. Melvin 2017, 496.

²⁷⁹ Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 1. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸⁰ Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 1. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸¹ Conversation with Jono, 8 August 2019.

²⁸² Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 1. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

two from *Korem* 083 (assigned in Wonokerto and Pagak) while other posts were filled with investigators from *Brimob*. The operation continued to move around different districts in South Malang and ended on 18 January 1966.

The Pancasila Operation report also described the result of the operation. It stated that 90% of the residents in Donomulyo were allegedly PKI. They also reported the discovery of 12 firearms in the Western part of Donomulyo²⁸³. During the examination by the investigation team (consisting of *Tjatur Tunggal*), the suspects easily admitted the existence of those firearms. The report then continues:

Despite the secured activists in Batu, there are still 24 activists of the PKI, PR, BTI and Lekra. Following the screening, they will certainly be terminated (*diselesaikan*). Remaining PKI members in 8 villages in Donomulyo have disbanded themselves. For those people, education on state administration, *Pancasila*, and religion have been organised.²⁸⁴

The report ends by stating that the people felt lively and secure again, and they thank the military for restoring the situation. This was a typical military narrative, portraying the PKI as the villain and the military as the national hero. Reading against the grain, as a report to their superior, the army needed to construct such a narrative and to make the reader believe in it (we will see in later chapters that this narrative is also part of the villagers' memories). Therefore, facts and numbers that are written in the document should be read critically. The report shows that the army intended to 'secure' a few leftist villagers in Donomulyo. Euphemistic terms, such as secured (*diamankan*) and terminated (*diselesaikan*), were used by the reporters.²⁸⁵

However, what happened in Donomulyo was much more than what was recorded in the report. Villagers clearly stated that the killings occurred in the area. Jono, for example, was a Catholic Youth activist who was assigned as a local guard in Donomulyo. He describes that the prisoners were taken away and killed in a public cemetery:

I saw it [the military operation]. People were detained, including my friends. They were brought to the police station, and punished, but not through a judge, prosecutors and so on. They were accused of being militant PKI members, such as members of a branch, sub-branch, and so on. Others were only followers – many of them. ... It was the army who did the killings. ... In the public cemetery, next to the main road, they dug a large pit. People's hands were tied in the back, then they were shot with an AK (presumably referring to AK-47, a type of firearm). ... Ansor assisted, sometimes they were also slaughtered. It was mob rule. Maybe they have a grudge, so this was their chance to get rid [of them].²⁸⁶

Besides stressing that the killings happened, Jono also explicitly pointed to the involvement of Ansor. This may explain why an anti-communist operation was a success even in an area where 90% of the

²⁸³ Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 2. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸⁴ Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 2. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸⁵ This is a common practice that also happened in other areas in East Java, such as Banyuwangi. See Luthfi 2018.

²⁸⁶ Interview with Jono. Donomulyo, 23 August 2016 # 17.25-31.30

residents were considered to be communists. It was an operation which heavily utilised civilian forces, and therefore, resulted in little resistance on the ground.

Establishing The New Order

As discussed in chapter 2, the aim of the 1965-66 violence was not only to eliminate the left, but also to establish a new regime. In order to succeed in the establishment, the New Order government had to secure support for their policies not only from the elites, but also from the rural masses. This was also conducted through coalitions with civilians, using intellectuals and local elites to disseminate the New Order's propaganda. This section will focus on the East Java military's strategy to build such a regime, including civilians in Donomulyo who participated in supporting and maintaining the New Order in the next chapter.

The effort to establish the New Order started with a coordination meeting between all army commanders in Java, together with the Commander of the Army Reserve Command (*Kostrad*) and the Commander of *Puspasus/ RPKAD* (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat/ RPKAD) on 5-7 July 1967 in Jogjakarta. In the meeting, the Commanders agreed to act more strictly against those who wanted to revive Sukarno's Old Order, and they emphasised their support for the New Order.²⁸⁷ The meeting was not only a statement of consolidation between the regional commands (which previously were not solidly unified), but also an agreement to purge the remains of Sukarno's supporters and support the establishment of the New Order. In East Java, the purge began under the command of the New Brawijaya Commander, Major General Jasin. Under the campaign of New Orderisation (*Pengorde Baruan*), Jasin dismissed and replaced many military and government officers, including the Surabaya resort commander Willy Sudjono; the East Java Governor, Major General Wijono and almost all PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia/ Indonesia Nationalist Party* – Sukarno's political party) members in the local government.²⁸⁸

Thus, New Orderisation was not only directed at purging the government and military elites, but also at ensuring support for the New Order down to the district level. In September 1967, the Brawijaya Commander authorised the Provincial New Order Guidance Team (*Tim Pembina Order Baru*) which had already been established in Surabaya since July 1967.²⁸⁹ The main function of the team was to assist the Brawijaya Military Commander to execute New Orderisation in East Java, which means that the team would receive direct instructions from the Commander. More interestingly, the personnel of this team included elements from the army, action force or *kesatuan aksi*, mass and political organisations, the ministry of internal affairs, joint secretariat of Golkar (Suharto's ruling party), the Women's Organisation Cooperation Body (*Badan Kerjasama Organisasi Wanita/ BKOW*), the press and other interested parties.²⁹⁰ Again, this suggests that the cooperation between the military and civilians, presumably those that existed before and during the 1965 violence, continued during the period of the New Order. Furthermore, the Commander also instructed all *Korems* and *Kodims* to establish New Orderisation Guidance teams in every district and city in East Java. While the provincial

²⁸⁷ "Siaran Kilat No. 1/ 1967. Keputusan Tekad Para Panglima Komando Se-Djawa, Panglima *Kostrad* Serta Komandan Pus Pusus/ RPKAD." 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸⁸ Crouch 1988, 233-234.

²⁸⁹ "Surat Keputusan No. Kep-001/ ORBA/9/1967 Panglima Daerah Militer VIII/ Brawidjaja Selaku Pembina Orde Baru Tingkat I/ Propinsi Djawa Timur." 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.


²⁹⁰ "Lampiran Surat Keputusan Panglima Daerah Militer VIII/ Brawidjaja Selaku Pembina Orde Baru Tingkat I/ Propinsi Djawa Timur No. Kep-001/ ORBA/9/1967. Struktur/ Procedure Kerdja Team Pembina Orde Baru Djawa Timur", 5. 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

New Orderisation Guidance team was authorized to plan, conceptualise and control New Orderisation in East Java; the coordinating team (which was established at *Korem*) had the duty to coordinate all New Orderisation teams at the district and city level. As we can see, the structure of the New Orderisation teams followed the military territorial command structure exactly.

The New Order Guidance teams had 7 short-term programmes, among them were New Orderisation of civilian leaders, military leaders, mass and political organisations; to eliminate obstacles, such as latent power, subversion, infiltration and so on, in developing the New Order; and to execute the general election to ensure the victory of the New Order.²⁹¹ The programmes imply a structural coercive attempt to control the region and generate votes for Suharto's political party, Golkar, for the election. In the next chapter, we will see how patrons in Donomulyo were mobilized to generate votes from villagers. The New Order Guidance teams also set targets that by October 1967, New Orderisation teams should be established at each level. By December 1967, the people of East Java should have understood the meaning of New Order through information from the mass media; and by January 1968, all control actions should be implemented (no further information is provided on the meaning of 'control actions' in the document). Under this attempt to 'control', the military replaced all of the village heads with army officers (which was commonly known as *caretaker*) and postponed village head elections in the former PKI areas.²⁹² Through this systematic and structural control, the New Order built an easy path to implement their new development policies, including agrarian transformation that I already elaborated on in chapter 2.

²⁹¹ "Lampiran Surat Keputusan Panglima Daerah Militer VIII/ Brawidjaja Selaku Pembina Orde Baru Tingkat I/ Propinsi Djawa Timur No. Kep-001/ ORBA/9/1967. Struktur/ Procedure Kerdja Team Pembina Orde Baru Djawa Timur", 1-2. 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁹² Major General Jasin sent a letter on 9 September 1967 to the Governor of East Java, stating that placement of military care takers village heads have prevented the revival of PKI and brought development to the villages. Therefore, replacement of village head caretakers was considered unnecessary. "Surat No.R.02/1967 Tentang Penangguhan Pemilihan Kepala Desa Di Desa-Desa Ex Pengaruh PKI." 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.



PICTURE 5. MAP OF REGION CLASSIFICATION IN EAST JAVA

Source: Brawijaya military command archive collection

In the early years of the New Order, remaining PKI members managed to regroup in the Eastern part of Java, specifically in South Blitar. They planned an armed struggle against Suharto's government by forming a guerrilla detachment with around 150 people headed by an ex-army officer.²⁹³ They survived with the help of local villagers and by constructing cave-like hiding places along the river or on the slopes in the hills, which they called *ruba* (*rumah baru* or new house). According to one of the survivors, the army detected their movements because the guerrilla group started to attack former executioners of the 1965 operation and some *preman* (members of the underground organisation, usually involved in street-level crimes but who also offered their services to high officials, politicians or businessman) around South Blitar.²⁹⁴ Therefore, in 31 May 1968, the army launched the Trisula Operation Command Unit (*Komando Satuan Tugas/ Satgas Trisula*) to eliminate these remaining ex-communists.²⁹⁵ While most of the operation was concentrated in South Blitar, it also reached several areas in South Malang such as Binangun, Gondangtapen, Sumber Manjing Kulon, Kalipare and Donomulyo.²⁹⁶ In Donomulyo, the army moved in on 27 to 30 June 1968, under the operation 'Sharp Bamboo I' (*Bambu Runcing I*) where they managed to capture 12 people and confiscate one hand grenade, with the assistance of Donomulyo's subdistrict civil defence.²⁹⁷

The Trisula operation was no match for the leftist fugitives as they were poorly organized and poorly armed. Brawijaya military command, M. Jasin, also mentioned the imbalance of power, but also pointed out the support of civilians for the communists in hiding. Jasin stated that "the army's

²⁹³ Waskito 2017, 87-89.

²⁹⁴ Waskito 2017, 90.

²⁹⁵ Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 64.

²⁹⁶ Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 68.

²⁹⁷ Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 122-123.

fighting forces are far larger than the enemy's. However, we (the army) must consider the power of local civilians who are generally on the enemy's side".²⁹⁸ In three months, 2000 people were killed and thousands more detained and displaced as a result of the operation.²⁹⁹ Furthermore, the army interrogated and screened villagers and also destroyed their villages during the army's search for the fugitives. Until today, South Blitar and their residents remain stigmatised and fearful to talk about this past.³⁰⁰ Compared to the violence in 1965-66, the Trisula operation differs in two aspects.³⁰¹ First, the involvement of civilians was low, and even when they were involved, their roles were limited only to intelligence, providing assistance in patrols and capturing fugitives. They did not execute mass violence as in 1965-66. Second, leaders and detainees of the South Blitar movement were trialled rather than killed. This act of following the judicial system was aimed at showing that the New Order was following the rule of law in handling the PKI's retaliation attempt. In short, the Trisula Operation was a public statement that a new regime had been firmly established.

Conclusion

The case of East Java leads us to rethink three different analyses that I described in the beginning of this chapter – the horizontal conflict, structural violence, and dualistic thesis. This chapter has shown that the alliance between the military and civilians during the 1965-66 violence was part of Indonesia's military political nature, modelling the guerrilla warfare during the Indonesian revolution. I agree with the analyses that argue that the violence was executed through a network of army and civilians, as the dualistic thesis proposes. However, I disagree with the point of this thesis that suggests the army did not have a profound role in it, and no national pattern can be drawn in the absence of such a structural command. It is true that the 1965-66 violence has an element of participation, where coalitions with civilians occurred. But this participation could not have been possible if the military had not given any room for such a thing to occur. The new analysis of the Brawijaya archives in this chapter pointed to this room, created by official structures and commands, which triggered opportunities for such massive bloodbaths.

In East Java, two important instructions were released in relation to this. First was the establishment of *Pupelrada* in mid-October 1965, which became a turning point for East Java's military resort commands (Korem) to have extra-judicial powers in executing their anti-communist purge. The second was the release of the Pancasila Operation instructions on 21 October 1965 by East Java's military commander, which clearly stated the use of civilians in the army's operation against the communists. Although it is true that the instruction for the anti-communist purge in East Java came a bit late compared to other areas such as Aceh or Central Java, it was not merely a problem of an indecisive attitude of the commander or a technical limitation (shortage of troops). Nevertheless, I argue that the delay should also be seen as a period of alliance shift – that the Brawijaya command needed to form new alliances (both at the top structural level and the grassroots level) against the communists and to assure that it would be sufficient to start a massive purge in the province.

Even within this alliance between the military and civilians, the latter should not be seen as agentless individuals. The collaboration succeeded because these civilians also had their own agendas during the violence. These agendas may have ranged from organisational or ideological reasons (for example eliminating political rivals or securing economic properties) to individual motives (for example acts of revenge against a communist neighbour or attempts to grab other villagers' properties). Added to these motives, are the rewards that the civilians obtained from their

²⁹⁸ Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 43.

²⁹⁹ Hearman 2017, 519.

³⁰⁰ Hearman 2017, 526.

³⁰¹ Hearman 2018, 165.

collaboration in the 1965-66 violence and the Trisula operation. Rewards took different forms, from property to civil service employment and development projects. In short, civilians had gained benefits from their supra-local attachment to the army. Losses and profits that were experienced after the violence constituted the context of Donomulyo's embedded memories. I will discuss this further in chapter 4.

This collaboration also continued in the establishment of the New Order. In this period, the army was not only targeting the communists, but also the remaining supporters of Sukarno. The East Java New Order Guidance teams were established at every structural government level to achieve this purpose, including ensuring the victory of the New Order in the public election. This strategy also maintained the military's grip down to the village level and paved the way for massive rural transformation during the New Order. Furthermore, reflecting on the newly found regional archives in Aceh, Banyuwangi and East Java (particularly Malang), I can strongly conclude that participation of civilians in the 1965-66 violence could not have been this massive without the army's leadership. In other words, the army clearly coordinated such violence.