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Embedded remembering : memory culture of the 1965 violence in rural East Java

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The owner was the village, and the village had a mind; it could say no to sacrilege. But in the affairs of the nation there was no owner, the laws of the village became powerless.

Chinua Achebe – A Man of The People

This thesis explores how society remembers past state violence in the present. The concept of remembering in this study elaborates the idea that memory is not merely a process of storing and recalling information, but an active strategy of survival and adaptation, especially in the aftermath of violence. This approach to analysing memory as a strategy, has two repercussions. First, there is no uniformity of memories of violence although they refer to the same event, in this case, the anti-communist state violence in 1965-66. This is not only caused by different experiences of violence, but also because of the various interpretations and different meanings of those experiences in people's lives – some lost everything, while others gained something after the violence. Second, rather than merely representing the past, these memories are actually embedded in their present local context, particularly in social relationships and their transformations before and after the violence erupted. This idea of embeddedness was first raised by, among others, Fentress and Wickham who highlight the embeddedness of memory of the past in the present, arguing that memory is strongest when it is constantly exercised, tested, and validated through present experiences.¹ For Fentress and Wickham, an event is continuously remembered because of their power to legitimize the present and tend to be interpreted in ways that are closely linked (or even contrasted) with present conceptions.² Therefore, memory, is never absolutely certain nor static.

Fentress and Wickham's argument on the presentness of the past is corroborated by several case studies from Western Europe which cover different forms of memories and their level of significance, including the varying reasons that one memory is worth remembering than the other. When discussing peasants' memories, they refer to existing studies on Camisard Protestant peasants' revolts in 1702-4 France, and Carlo Levi's work on peasant's resistance in Aliano, Italy, in 1860s. On a larger scope, Fentress and Wickham also discuss the formation of national memory, consisting of past events that help build a nation and construct its identity, such as the French Revolution and World War I. In both cases, i.e. peasant's resistance and national identity, violence and atrocities are striking features and inherent parts of these memories. The issue of violence, along with problems of power and politics of memory, generate many other questions, as mass violence grows increasingly severe during the course of the 20th century. In this case, do assumptions about social memory as strategy still ring true when we examine a more extreme case of state violence? How do the role of the state and politics of memory fit into the conception of memory as a strategy? Is it still relevant to conduct studies on social memory in post-violence situation through a state-centric approach, as indeed most scholars have done until now? This is the major aim of this dissertation, which is to test the limits of a new approach to the social memory of violence.

¹ Fentress & Wickham 1992, 24.

² Fentress & Wickham 1992, 88.

To move towards that aim (and to decentralize Eurocentric memory studies), I will examine one of the most gruesome state violence in the 20th century that occurred in Southeast Asia. This event is the anti-communist violence in 1965-66 Indonesia, where approximately 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed within those period. The trigger behind this violence (which re-occurred in 1968 in some areas in East Java) was a movement called the September 30th Movement or *Gerakan 30 September*, in which six army generals and one middle-rank army officer were kidnapped and killed by a small group of military officers. Although there is still an ongoing debate regarding who was behind the movement and why, the Indonesian army accused the Indonesian Communist Party or PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) of being the perpetrator behind this movement.³ This accusation was followed by an extermination project against the communists and other members and supporters of Leftist organisations and their family members. Approximately 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed during those years; others experienced gross human rights violations which involved extermination, forced migration, torture, forced disappearances, forced labour, sexual abuse and persecutions.⁴ This event became one of the most controversial events in Indonesia's historiography, not only because of the debate regarding who was behind the September 30th Movement, but also because narratives about the mass violence have been largely marginalised in Indonesia's national history. The following New Order regime, which was led by Suharto in 1966, developed a nationwide memory project of eliminating any narratives about the mass violence against accused communists and members of Leftist organisations. The regime constantly commemorated the seven army officers, the 30th September Movement, and the 'evil' communists with monuments, museums, a commemoration day and media propaganda while excluding the anti-communist killings and the army's role in Indonesia's history.

The above narrative is not only an official version of the national history, but it is also an elitist one. It revolves around a political coup, removal, and establishment of a national regime. It says nothing about ordinary people, who also constitute the nation and were affected directly by the violent events in the course of 1965-66. In an attempt to decentralise this narrative, and also to understand how memories of violence persist (or do not persist) in present day Indonesia, I decided to go into an area where most of the violent acts, especially the killings, took place. I wanted to examine how people remember (or forget) the violence in these places, particularly under the state's memory project that excludes most of the narratives of violence. Donomulyo, a district in the southern part of Malang, East Java, is such a place. More than 40 km away from Malang municipality, this agrarian society relies on their dry-land cultivated crops such as corn, cassava, and sugar cane. The district is also famous for its touristic beaches that stretch along the southern coast of Java. Apart from its tourist destinations, from my conversations with residents in Malang (especially older generations who lived in Malang in the 1960s), it appears that Donomulyo has a reputation as a PKI village. One

³ The first critical analysis came from Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey with their famous Cornell Paper, arguing that G30S was an internal army coup by junior officers. See Anderson, B, Ruth McVey & Frederic Bunnell 1971. A new analysis was proposed by John Roosa, arguing that the September 30th Movement had no clear 'mastermind', whether one person or a tight cluster of people. Although there was one person who served as a bridge between the PKI leaders and progressive military officers, he was not in a position of command nor a decision-maker. In short, the September 30th Movement was a disorganized attempted coup which was easily terminated by Suharto. Roosa 2006, 203-204.

⁴ *Ringkasan Eksekutif Laporan Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia Berat* 2012, 3-40.

hamlet that I visited was even known in the district as the hamlet of widows, because most of the men disappeared during the 1965-66 and 1968 military operation.

I started my fieldwork in Donomulyo in August 2016, at the same time as the Independence Day celebration in the village. At the invitation of my local contact person, who is a respected local leader, I attended one of the activities. Javanese called it *tasakuran*, a form of communal gathering where villagers and officials gather to pray and eat together, expressing their gratitude to Indonesia's deceased heroes. Since there are two major religions in the district, Catholic and Islam, the prayers on the Independence Day *tasakuran* were organized in two separate places. Afterwards, both groups gather together again in one place to hear the village head speech and feast. I followed the Catholic communal prayer which was led by Suparman, my local contact person. While standing in front of the room, Suparman introduced me to all of the attendees, in a way that sounded more like an announcement. After briefly explaining the purpose of my stay, which was to write a history about the village, he then encouraged all the attendees to be open and 'tell the truth' (*bercerita apa adanya*) to me. There was no preparation for this formal introduction, and what came afterwards was rather shocking to me because I did not expect him to speak of the violence so bluntly at a communal event. Suparman began to point to a few attendees, who he said were the 'victims of history'. One had been detained for years without clear allegations, and another had been obliged to follow *santiaji* or *wajib lapor* (a programme developed by the army for accused communists to report regularly to the local army office) for years.⁵ I was surprised that he was able to mention 1965 in a very outspoken manner, but it made me realise that the violence was not a taboo for the community. It is actually part of their everyday lives, a kind of public secret in the village, where everybody knows about what happened to certain people. Only on particular occasions, and among certain people, it reappears in distinct ways, such as in this moment of *tasakuran*.

On another occasion, I was interviewing Marwono, a small farmer who was obliged to followed *santiaji* since 1968, with the accusation of being a member of the BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia/* Indonesian Peasants' Front), the leftist organisation closely linked to the PKI. It took several meetings before he actually revealed that he knew more about the leftist movement in Donomulyo, in contrast with other people who usually think of Marwono merely as a 'victim of history' who did not know anything about the left. On our third meeting, he began to admit that he usually read publications by leftist organisations in 1960s, such as the *Harian Rakjat* newspaper and BTI's book about land reform. While he explained about this experience, a car stopped in front of his house and he suddenly became silent. I noticed the change in his behaviour and also the existence of the car, but was not fast enough to make the connection. I continued with another question, but he did not give a clear answer. He seemed restless and kept looking outside at the car. At this point, I realised that he was bothered by the car in front of the house. I asked whether he was expecting anybody, and he said no. Seeing his uneasiness, I decided to also stay silent with him. A few minutes later, the car drove away. His body language showed signs of relief, so I asked him whether he wanted to take a rest. He said no and then apologised to me. He said he was still 'traumatised', and that the appearance of the car reminded him of the moment when the military came to his house and asked him to report to the office.⁶ This silence appeared while we were talking about leftist publications and I doubt that it would have occurred if we had been talking about something else.

I found these two different experiences perplexing. Why, then, can a community be so open and yet so silent at the same time, as in the case of Suparman and Marwono? Are these differences in remembering simply the result of the state's repressive memory project that placed the violence in

⁵ Field note 15 August 2016

⁶ Field note 13 December 2016

the margins of history? If that is the case, why do the ways of remembering past violence remain the same (indicating trauma and silence) while the state is actually moving towards democracy? How is memory of violence constructed? Who are involved in its construction? How does a national event become entwined with local experiences in forming the collective memory? What kind of memories are remembered and silenced? Why? These are the questions that surrounded my confusion and curiosity, which I will explore in the following chapters. In the end, I discovered that the ways people remember the violence is highly contextual. In other words, the process of remembering past violence is also embedded in its local context, rather than being exclusively influenced by the state's repressive forces.

Function and Meaning of Memory

My fieldwork experience above illustrates the function of memory beyond a mere 'store and recall' individual cognitive process. The silence and openness point to the fact that these memories are social acts – actions taken to convey or retain a certain meaning not only about an event, but about a certain individual or community. As Fentress and Wickham note, remembering is a process of representation, and by articulating what we remember, we are explaining who we are.⁷ Memory is certainly social – it constitutes a person's or a community's identity. Therefore, memory also works beyond its mere function to reconstruct events, but also to generate the meaning of a certain event for a particular group.

Perceiving memory as a social process also means that remembering is part of the collective memory of society. Maurice Halbwachs, the pioneer of memory studies, sets the introduction to collective memory by arguing that memory is not an individual, but a communal process influenced by the collective framework in societies. He describes this framework as the instrument to reconstruct an image of the past which is in accordance with the predominant thoughts of the society.⁸ He went further by stating that "society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess".⁹ Halbwachs emphasises the malleable character of collective memory, and therefore, studying it should not revolve on internal processes of the mind, but on identifying its shifting social frameworks.¹⁰ He also distinguishes between autobiographical and historical memory.¹¹ The first refers to events that are remembered directly, including those that surround a particular event. For example, one may remember his or her own activities during a historical event, such as the 30th September Movement, although the historical event does not affect the individual directly. Meanwhile, historical memory refers to the effects of events where certain groups assert continuous identity through time. As we will see in the chapters, both types of memories are entwined in the case of the 1965-66 violence.

Others scholars have further developed Halbwach's initial concept of autobiographical and historical memory. Jan Assmann, for example, tried to elaborate memory, identity and institutionalisation of heritage by differentiating communicative and cultural memory. The first is characterised exclusively by everyday communication which, for example, constitutes the field of oral history. Its dependency on everyday communication also makes it unavailable to extend more than eighty to one hundred

⁷ Fentress & Wickham 1992, 9.

⁸ Coser (ed) 1992, 40.

⁹ Coser (ed) 1992, 51.

¹⁰ Olick, et al. 2011, 18

¹¹ Olick, et al. 2011, 19.

years into the past – a limited temporal horizon, as Assmann underlines.¹² On the contrary, cultural memory is characterised by the distance from daily forms of communication. It has its fixed point, which makes its horizon consistent through time. Memories related to these fixed points are maintained through ‘figures of memory’ that include cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance).¹³ Assmann continues to elaborate the characteristics of cultural memory, focusing on its influence on group identity and the capacity to reconstruct.

While Fentress & Wickham, Halbwachs, and Assmann portray the function of memory as identity formation, scholars from the field of oral history offer another meaning of memory. One example is the work of Alessandro Portelli on the death of a factory worker, Luigi Trastulli, in the city of Terni in central Italy. Portelli argues that what makes oral history sources valuable actually lies in the discrepancy between memory and the actual event. For him, this is not a weakness of oral history, instead it illuminates an active process of remembering and imagining in order to make sense of certain events in the past and also history in general. Through the case study, Portelli continues by showing that Terni’s working-class memory of Trastulli’s death serves three major functions: a symbolic representation of the post-war working-class experience in Terni; a strategy to deal with psychological consequences (such as humiliation and loss of self-esteem) of the worker’s community following upon the inadequacy to react to a comrade’s death; and a formal time-marking function for the community.¹⁴ For Portelli, memory is not merely a part of identity formation of a certain group, as Halbwachs and Assmann argue, but also a *strategy* to understand the meaning of the past and its outcomes in the present.

Both as identity formation and as a strategy, memory is filled with the tension of power. In Assmann’s elaboration of cultural memory, he stresses the existence of experts in forming memory, such as shamans, priests, clerks, scholars, and so on. Participation in the cultural memory is not egalitarian – some are almost forced into participation while others remains excluded.¹⁵ This indicates the role of hierarchy and power play in constructing cultural memory. A more explicit explanation of the notion of power in memory was presented by the Marxist scholars in the *Popular Memory Group*. They indicated ‘dominant memory’, which points to “the power and pervasiveness of historical representations, their connections with dominant institutions and the part they play in winning consent and building alliances in the processes of formal politics”.¹⁶ These historical representations in dominant memory are definitely public and closely connected to the state, but it does not mean that the general public is always in line with their dominance. On the contrary, dominant memory is always in contestation, where certain representations became central while others remain in the periphery. The Popular Memory Group also highlights representation of the past that is produced in daily life, where they are usually limited to the level of private remembrance. They became hidden and sometimes silenced. However, the Group argues that a study of popular memory should be a *relational study*, by looking at interactions between representations of dominant history in the public, and also subordinate or private experiences.¹⁷

Discussions about power and memory become more complex within the huge genre of war and conflict studies. Paul Fussler and Jay Winter, amongst others, put forward the study of remembrance,

¹² Assmann 1995, 126-7.

¹³ Assmann 1995, 129.

¹⁴ Portelli 1991, 26.

¹⁵ Assmann 2008, 114-116.

¹⁶ Popular Memory Group 1982, 207.

¹⁷ Popular Memory Group 1982, 211.

trauma, and mourning of World War I as a collective representation of European society.¹⁸ Their studies pointed to the connection between the past and present, particularly on how societies deal with their traumatic violent events in the past. Moreover, their studies also show that violent past events become part of the cultural identity and memory of present society. This approach influenced studies of 20th century atrocities, such as genocides and ethnic-based conflicts, later on. However, scholars have also been examining this idea with regard to memories of violence with a critical remark on whose truth is being told,¹⁹ and claims of collective representations that may exclude certain groups.²⁰ This critical view also triggered a distinctive approach of memory studies in post-colonial settings. In relation to post-colonial studies in Indonesia, some examples of memory-related works are Mary Steedly, who explores memories of North Sumatran women of the Indonesian revolution;²¹ Ann Stoler & Karen Strassler, with their studies on domestic workers in the colonial Netherlands East Indies;²² Ana Dragojlovic, who examine memory of an Indisch woman born in the Dutch East Indies and lives in the Netherlands;²³ Marieke Bloembergen and Martijn Eickhoff, who pointed at the tension and continuity of the meaning and memory of Indonesia's UNESCO heritage site, Borobudur.²⁴ By examining the complex layers of memory of colonialism and the war of independence in Indonesia's present culture, these studies drew attention to a further exploration of Indonesia's memory culture that should go beyond binary identification (colonial vs present; remembering vs forgetting; public vs private) of past and present.

In the case of 1965-66, Indonesia's memory politics have been largely dominated by the military. For example, the army released its official publication in 1966 titled *40 Hari Kegagalan "G-30-S" 1 Oktober-10 November 1965* (The Forty Day Failure of the G30S 1 Oktober-10 November 1965), which accused the PKI of being the mastermind behind the killings of the seven military officers.²⁵ This book has been the main reference for the 1965 historiography, including the seven volumes of the Indonesian National History Textbook (*Sejarah Nasional Indonesia/ SNI*) that were released in 1976 and most of the history textbooks for educational purposes. In 1973, the Suharto government opened The *Pancasila Sakti* (Sacred Pancasila) Monument complex in Jakarta, which was intended to depict the violence by the PKI against the seven army officers through visualisations such as the torture diorama of the officers.²⁶ None of these state-sponsored commemorative acts incorporate the violence against civilians in the anti-communist operation.

State Patronage in the Politics of Memory

With the knowledge of military-led memory projects, I tried to explore how far these practices resonate in Donomulyo. I started to ask local residents how did they know about the September 30th Movement and understand that the violence in their area was related to PKI. When villagers tried to answer my questions, certain figures started to emerge (and not necessarily the military-centric memory projects): the military commanders who later on became village heads in Donomulyo, *kyai* (religious leader) of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia), and activists from other mass organisations. These figures play a central role in disseminating the anti-communist

¹⁸ See Fussell 2013 and Winter 2014.

¹⁹ Bauer-Clapp 2016, 2.

²⁰ Langenohl 2008, 171.

²¹ Steedly 2013.

²² Stoler & Strassler 2000.

²³ Dragojlovic 2011.

²⁴ Bloembergen & Eickhoff 2015.

²⁵ "40 Hari kegagalan "G-30-S" 1 Oktober-10 November 1965" 1966.

²⁶ Autopsy report of the Officers' bodies only found gunshots as the main cause of death. There were no signs of torture. See Anderson 1987.

narrative, connecting an event in the central capital with the violence in rural areas. Interestingly, villagers also described the role of these figures after the violence, particularly in the 'development' era of the New Order. For example, military village leaders confiscated properties of accused PKI members in Donomulyo and coercively encouraged locals to participate in the election campaign aiming at the success of Suharto's ruling party, *Golongan Karya/ Golkar*. In return, safety and freedom from detention as accused communists became incentives offered by these military leaders. Some villagers were given jobs at the village office, and became part of the authority's forces, or were even given a share of the properties that were confiscated from the accused communists. These descriptions express perfectly the patron-client relationship, which is a strong feature of Southeast Asian politics.

The patron-client relationship is defined as an "exchange relationship between roles, involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron".²⁷ This relationship has three distinguished features.²⁸ First, it is based on inequality. The imbalanced exchange in patron-client relationships expresses the disparity in wealth, power and status. The patron has the ability to provide goods and services unilaterally which the client and his family need to survive. The second feature is the face-to face, personal quality of the relationship. This continuing reciprocal relationship usually creates trust and affection between the two parties. In many cases, these mutual relationships are supported by communal beliefs, tradition, and values, resulting in a bond that can persist through generations. The last feature of the patron-client relationship is its "diffuse, whole-person relationship rather than explicit, impersonal-contract bonds". The bond with the patron may incorporate multiple backgrounds, for example, tenancy of cultivated land, friendship, the ritual of co-parenthood, and so on. This means that the services that the client can provide have a very wide range, for example, they can range from cultivating crops and preparing celebrations to winning an election campaign.

Although the patronage relationship has a traditional background (for example, since pre-colonial Asia and in subsistence farming communities), it persists until the present. In Indonesia, this relationship already existed in pre-colonial society, transforming from personal-affective ties between patrons and clients in colonial society into an expanding patronage network covert in bureaucratic institutions in the New Order period – showing the long lasting characteristic of patronage that persists through different courses of Indonesia's historical period.²⁹ Even today, clientelism remains a strong feature in Indonesia's democracy, leading some scholars to argue that patronage can coexist with democracy and also exacerbate further the democratic shortcomings such as economic and cultural inequalities.³⁰ In the context of agrarian societies, Gillian Hart even predicts that state patronage can become a threat to state intervention in agrarian policies in the long run, because patronage has been used as a means for those who control the state to pursue their own agrarian interests, within and beyond the rural sector.³¹ This was exactly what happened in Donomulyo, where the 1965-66 and 1968 violence not only resulted in the loss of lives, but also reconfigured this patronage network, by including the army. It is these networks which later on influenced the memory of violence.

²⁷ Scott 1972, 92.

²⁸ Scott 1972, 93-95.

²⁹ Nordholt 2015.

³⁰ Klinken 2009, 156.

³¹ Hart 1989, 31.

Remembering 1965: Beyond the Binary

This research in the rural community was conducted more than fifty years after the 1965 violence occurred and more than 20 years after the advent of Indonesia's democratic era in 1998, or famously known as Reformasi, which marked the end of Suharto's authoritarian New Order. Since Reformasi, human rights communities began to accelerate agendas of transitional justice, demanding reconciliation and truth seeking of past human rights abuses. Suharto's successor, President B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) took several important steps regarding 1965, such as putting an end to the 'national ritual' to air the film *The Treachery of the September 30th Movement/Indonesian Communist Party* on national television every October 1st and releasing the remaining 10 political prisoners.³² The next president, Abdurrachman Wahid (1999-2001) continued these progressive steps by allowing all the exiles³³ to return to Indonesia and apologising to the victims' families for the 1965-66 violence. He also carried out some structural changes by dismissing the Coordinating Body for the Enhancement of National Stability (*Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional/ Bakorstanas*) whose main task was to assist the State Intelligence Service. Dismissing this body also put an end to the 'special investigation' of a person's ideology during selections of government officials or promotions within government institutions.³⁴ This act invited series of protests from the rightists, including within Wahid's political party – the National Revival Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/ PKB*), accusing it of paving the way for the resurgence of communism and PKI.³⁵ After Wahid's resignation, human rights communities pushed for the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which ended after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Law was struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2006.³⁶

Meanwhile, reconciliation efforts were also initiated at the grassroots level. For example, the Foundation for Research into Victims of the 1965-1966 Killings (*Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965-66/ YPKP*) conducted an exhumation of a mass grave in Wonosobo, Central Java in 2000. They had planned for a reburial of the victims, but a mass demonstration by a religious leftist organisation accused them of being PKI supporters who wanted to revive communism.³⁷ Another example was the formation of Syarikat, a Nahdlatul Ulama/ NU (one of the prominent Islam organisations in Indonesia that was involved in the killings of communists) organisation of youths who initiated reconciliation programs between NU perpetrators and victims of the 1965 violence.³⁸

³² Budiawan 2004, 40.

³³ There are around 1400 Indonesians living in political exile in European countries. Most of them are diplomats, students or correspondents who worked in socialist countries such as Cuba, China, the Soviet Union or other Eastern European countries when the 1965 violence occurred. They refused to acknowledge the 1965 violence as a coup attempt by the communists, so their passports were revoked and they were threatened to be detained if they returned to Indonesia. Budiawan 2004, 44.

³⁴ Budiawan 2004, 44-45. The justification behind this 'special screening' was to prevent ex political prisoners, their family or other 'contaminated parties' to become government officers, members of the military or the police force.

³⁵ Budiawan 2004, 7.

³⁶ One of the controversial article that was revoked in the constitutional court was article 27, which regulated amnesty for perpetrators as a prerequisite for compensation for victims. The constitutional court then decided that without article 27, the law itself will be non-functional. Therefore, the court decided to revoke the whole law. This was very different from the request of the litigant group, who only wanted to revoke three problematic articles. See Saptaningrum, Wahyu Wagiman, Supriyadi Widodo Eddyono & Zainal Abidin 2007.

³⁷ See McGregor 2012.

³⁸ Syarikat was established in 2000 in Yogyakarta as a young NU activists' study group. The background of this establishment is the acknowledgement that NU was involved in the 1965-66 violence and their victims were their own neighbors or people from the same village. Therefore, grassroots reconciliation must take place between them. Budiawan 2004, 196-203. Documents of Syarikat's activities are stored as their organisation's archives.

Moreover, these attempts to unravel the violence of 1965 also took form in literary publications. In (auto)biographies, survivors wrote their own narratives of the violence, such as works from Hersri Setiawan, Putu Oka Sukanta, and younger generations, such as Soe Tjen Marching.

The slow progress of the judicial processes drove the international community of victims (especially those who are living in the Netherlands) and activists to organise the International People's Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia 1965 (IPT 1965) in The Hague, the Netherlands, from 10 to 13 November 2015.³⁹ Meanwhile, at the national level, under the era of President Joko Widodo, a symposium titled *Simposium Nasional: Membedah Tragedi 1965, Pendekatan Kesenjangan* (National Symposium: Examining 1965 Tragedy, A Historical Approach) was held on 18-19 April 2016. This was the first official collaborative work between government institutions, NGOs and academics to openly discuss this issue.⁴⁰ All of these examples illustrate the tension in Indonesia's democratic era, where the counter-narrative that had been repressed during the New Order started to appear in public. It developed into an emerging genre, which Mary S. Zurbuchen noted as *historical memory*, where individual and social processes continued to be intertwined in representing the past in the present.⁴¹ Historical memory is characterised by the distance from textual sources and the incorporation of other forms of narrative, particularly personal memory.⁴² In other words, it brings these 'private' or counter-memories forward in the 'public' sphere.

The effort to bring private counter-memories to the public is perceived as a means to continue human rights advocacy for the case of the 1965-66 violence. Publications and literary works that are related to the violence (memoirs, autobiographies, oral history, and so on) are regarded as 'cultural resistance' to continue to remember the violence that was silenced so much in Suharto's New Order.⁴³ This human rights approach is part of a larger framework of 'facing the past' in the international community. Within newly emerging democratic countries, dealing with the past (through truth-telling, memorialisation, and so on) is perceived as a precondition for democracy.⁴⁴ International communities, such as UN bodies, have tried to formulate policies on memorialisation under the term cultural rights.⁴⁵ In the report, Western memorial models, particularly commemoration of the victims of Nazism, "while not always the most adequate or appropriate, have become a template or at least a political and aesthetic inspiration for the representation of past tragedies or mass crimes".⁴⁶ This policy is of course problematic, because it implies that every society should remember the past in a similar way, referencing to the Holocaust memorial practices.

However, this is not only a problem in standard policy on commemoration, but also an indication of a larger problem in memory discourse that often centres on the Holocaust in memory studies. Scholars

³⁹ The tribunal judges not only find the "state of Indonesia responsible for and guilty of crimes against humanity", but that the State also "failed to prevent the perpetration of these inhumane acts or punish those responsible for their commission". Klinken (ed) 2017, 117-121.

⁴⁰ The initiator of this symposium was Forum Silaturahmi Anak Bangsa/ FSAB, an organisation of family members of national heroes who were killed in G30S. The idea was communicated to the Presidential Advisory Board (Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden) who then continued to involve other NGOs and universities in the symposium. Utama 2016.

⁴¹ Zurbuchen (ed) 2005, 7.

⁴² Zurbuchen 2002, 579-581; Zurbuchen (ed) 2005, 16.

⁴³ See Hill 2012.

⁴⁴ Theodore Adorno argues on the culture of forgetting that threatens democracy, and the need of self-critical reflection of the past to build real democracy. David 2017, 302.

⁴⁵ In 2013 and 2014, two important reports on history textbooks and memorialization in general were presented at the UN General Assembly as part of dealing with the promotion and protection of human rights. David 2017, 305.

⁴⁶ David 2017, 308.

such as Olick, Vinitzky-Serousi & Levy, in their *Collective Memory Reader*, stated that “when one speaks of the memory boom, one is indeed speaking in part – though far from exclusively – of the vast terrains of Holocaust memory, and other terrains of memory modelled on it”.⁴⁷ This western-centric statement came from the background that most memory studies’ theories and approaches are derived from atrocities that occurred in the West. Although I do not deny this, it is preposterous to assume that there is a linear and direct progression between past violence, truth seeking, and acts of remembering, which occurred in the same way in every nation. On the contrary, the background and impact of mass violence are different in each case, including its aftermath, which highly affects the possibility of reconciliation. The case of the 1965-66 violence in Indonesia shows how perpetrators of violence (and their supporting group) remain part of Indonesia’s current government. This means that truth-seeking and reconciliation efforts are difficult, and those who seek truth and reconciliation risk legal prosecution. However, this does not mean that commemoration of violence is not possible. As I have explained before, memories of violence remain part of Indonesia’s memory culture, expressed in our everyday lives, and through different commemorative practices. Therefore, it is more important to explore these existing practices themselves, rather than creating forms of remembrance with a reference to the Holocaust.

The limitation of a human rights approach in analysing the memory of the 1965-66 violence does not only lie in directing ways of remembering the violence in reference to the ‘success story’ of dealing with the past, but also in intensifying the binary position of the dominant and public narrative. The anti-communist narrative is seen as a state-constructed public memory which should be confronted with the counter-narrative, in this case, private narratives of violence against the communists, leftists, and other civilians. Human rights advocates for reconciliation usually bring these private narratives of violence into the public as proof that the violence occurred and, consequently, demand actions from the state. On the one hand, this is understandable, in the context where impunity and silence are salient, private narratives have legal functions. On the other hand, the obsession with making the private narratives public (and countering the anti-communist public narrative) entraps us in taking a similar state or public-centric approach and falling into the practice of standard commemoration. It distances us from the fact that the silence and hidden narratives have created their own language and distinct ways of representing the past in the present. For example, in different places, ruins of a burnt house, a crack on a cupboard or a shattered window caused by the weapons of anti-communist militia attacks are left unrepaired because they remind the surviving families and communities of how their loved ones were taken away.⁴⁸ This shows that the private narratives are not always ‘hidden’ or ‘silenced’, but are actually communicated in their distinct way. This also means that silence should not always be seen as forgetting, or absence of memory, but should be interpreted as a different way of remembering. This is how current memory of the 1965 violence can be understood better: not in the binary competing position of official versus counter-narrative or the public versus private narrative, but through their co-existence,⁴⁹ entanglement, and as I will show in the chapters, embeddedness in their local context and social relationships.

Embedded Remembering: Memory in Its Context

Apart from existing studies of the 1965-66 violence, there are only a few that focus on how this past is represented in the present. In a compilation of oral history essays in *Tahun yang Tak Pernah Berakhir*, the researchers started their volume with a discussion of oral history and the memory of

⁴⁷ Olick, et al. 2011, 30.

⁴⁸ Santikarma 2008, 207.

⁴⁹ Eickhoff, van Klinken and Robinson regarded this as a dualism: although Indonesians still believe in the formal narrative about communism, it does not necessarily mean that they do not sympathise with victims. Eickhoff, van Klinken & Robinson. 2017, 458.

the 1965 violence. They point to the fact that memories of violence are a 'public secret' that never diminish even under Suharto's authoritarian regime.⁵⁰ One of the examples that the editors mentioned was literary works in the early New Order that present the 1965 killings as a central theme in their stories. In terms of intergenerational memory amongst victims of the 1965-66 violence, Andrew Conroe examines post-memory and memory transmission between generations of the 1965-66 victims' family.⁵¹ Conroe elaborated the activism and tension among families of victims' in Central Java, as a dynamic manifestation of remembering the violence. Meanwhile, another group of scholars have traced memory of the 1965 violence that exists in or relates to certain places. The work of Eickhoff, Danardono, Rahardjo & Sidabolok shows how certain sites of memory in Semarang, Central Java, preserved the memory of the 1965 violence. These places became significant in conveying narratives of the 1965 violence in the present because of the constant interaction and re-interpretation by the surrounding people.⁵²

Besides these studies, the anthropological approach in the study of memory of the 1965 violence has added a critical stance to the discussion about the representation of violence. Leslie Dwyer & Degung Santikarma, who studied the 1965 violence in Bali, pointed to the fact that the violence in Bali is entangled in local communities and kin groups, where 'neighbours killed neighbours and relatives killed relatives'.⁵³ Because of this entanglement, memories of violence amongst Balinese should not be seen as 'homogenous repositories of shared understandings of the past'.⁵⁴ In Bali, practices of everyday life, social interaction and language shifted to accommodate memory of the violence and its further consequence (such as being labelled as communists even when the violence had ended). Dwyer & Santikarma argue to focus on the context where memories are formed and transformed, and also on the agency of victims of violence in Bali in remembering 1965, including their silence. They argue that silence is also an active way of remembering and not an absence of memory. Dwyer & Santikarma also stress the insufficient binary approach to memory of the 1965 violence and its reconciliation prescription – to suggest that talking about violent memories (instead of keeping silent) is part of revealing truth and moving towards healing -- because the process of remembering violence is part of a complex and dynamic social interaction.

With the attempt to further develop these initial discussions on memory of violence, I decided to delve into the region of East Java's rural community. It is in these places that most of the killings occurred and community members (who played different roles in the violence) continued to live together in the aftermath. As their social environment and interactions were heavily damaged during the violence, they simultaneously need to cope and adjust to the post-violence situation.

Before commencing my research, I was reminded of the complex diversity and class differentiation in rural society through Robert Hefner's ethno-history study on Tengger communities in lowland and highland Pasuruan, East Java. Hefner examines how the transformation of economic life in different historical periods shaped the identity of the Tengger community. In doing so, he found how 1965 had drastically transformed the socio-economic contour of the community. According to Hefner, the lowlands were dominated by Muslims of NU, while the highlands were a domain of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and PKI. The study criticised the perception of the PKI struggle as merely a class struggle, because in highland Pasuruan, the activists of local PKI consisted of villagers from different class background, campaigning against corruption and demanding the removal of

⁵⁰ Roosa, Ratih & Farid (eds) 2004, 1-23.

⁵¹ Conroe 2017.

⁵² Eickhoff, Danardono, Rahardjo, & Sidabalok 2017.

⁵³ Dwyer & Santikarma 2006, 198.

⁵⁴ Dwyer & Santikarma. 2006, 202.

authorities who mistreated the usage of land.⁵⁵ The party did not demand redistribution of property, or any demands that can be perceived as challenging local class structure. Moreover, Hefner also concluded that the NU acted independently against the communists in the lowlands during the first period after the September 30th Movement, without causing any significant violent acts. The tables were turned when the military began to take control and intensified the anti-communist violence both in the lowlands and highlands of Pasuruan.⁵⁶

Hefner's research indicated that the violence did not erupt in a void. It utilised existing tensions in a community, and transformed it further in the aftermath of violence. This is also the case in the Donomulyo district. Class differences, although not explicitly stated in my fieldwork interviews, are implied through the description of family properties, status, inheritance, and so on. Furthermore, a prominent feature of the patronage relationship in the village shows a continuation of clientelist practices through the course of history. It is this relationship, along with the post-violence rural transformation, that affected remembrance of the 1965-66 violence. Power in memory politics, then, actually resides in this complex network of local power in rural society, which was transformed in violent periods. It explains why one community that experienced the same event, has different ways of remembering the past, including different acts of silence and forgetting. It is because every community member has their own position and tension in the complex social network, before and after the violence. Therefore, they interpret the meaning and impact of violence differently— some benefited from the violence, while others experienced severe losses. This indicates that memory of violence is not solely a result of state propaganda against the left, but more closely connected to its local context, particularly with the social relationships which surround the event. Remembering the 1965-66 violence also shows that memory is a historical process – it is not directly constructed right after a particular event, but continuously evolves through time, even long after the event itself, and is influenced by the outcomes of that event. By zooming in to localities, we can also understand how memories of violence remain alive even under the state's authoritarian repression, preserved through stories of places and family narratives.

Research Methods

In order to understand how memory of violence becomes a survival strategy and also to comprehend the context in which these memories develop, I took two interrelated approaches in this study. First, using historical analysis, I examined how the patronage network and the agrarian transformation have evolved, including their continuity and ruptures in three different periods; namely the colonial period, the revolution and Sukarno's leadership, and the New Order. The analysis includes a specific study on the 1965-66 operation itself, focusing on how the army activated these patronage networks to execute such massive violence and establish the New Order regime.

The second approach is a combination of ethnography and oral history, which aims to explore how society remembers the past in the present. In order to delve into the connection between local experiences and national events, I follow villagers' life history, probing experiences throughout their lifespan. This enables me not only to uncover information that is not documented in formal sources (such as history books, government documents or archives), but also to learn about their understanding and interpretation of the past. This ethnographic approach also allows me to look into transformations that occur at a local level, as a cause of national affairs and policies, specifically after the Reformasi era. Moreover, combining historical analysis and ethnographic methods enables me to look at the continuity of events in different periods of time, connecting their causes and effects.

⁵⁵ Hefner 1990, 209.

⁵⁶ Hefner 1990, 210-211.

Research Area



PICTURE 1. MALANG REGENCY IN EAST JAVA

The Case of East Java

As I have mentioned earlier, I opted to focus in East Java to study memory of the 1965-66 violence because it is one of the worst-affected areas in the violence (the other areas being Central Java and Bali). Using statistical methods and population data, Siddarth Chandra estimates a total loss of 175,169 lives in East Java alone, although his study could not further explain the reasons behind this number.⁵⁷ Violence in this province is characterised mainly by salient participation of civilian and religious organisations, predominantly the Nahdlatul Ulama or NU. Religious reasons are seen as the main motive for their involvement in the violence, for example by portraying the violence against the atheist communists as *jihad* (holy war in Islam).⁵⁸ This resulted in some of the most gruesome killings throughout 1965-66. Body parts were exposed in public, to exhibit the fate of these communists.⁵⁹ This fact has led some scholars to believe that the nature of the conflict in East Java was basically a group clash between religious organisations and the PKI. This was reflected, for example, in Hermawan Sulitstyo's study in Kediri and Jombang which emphasises the minor role of the army in those two areas, by giving the arena to NU protagonists to end previous political conflicts with violence. The slaughter became uncoordinated when local Moslem youths, with the approval of their religious leaders, were given the opportunity to kill the communists.⁶⁰ A similar study by Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko on the violence in Bali and East Java also emphasises the role of political men or

⁵⁷ Chandra 2017, 1078.

⁵⁸ Young 1990, 87.

⁵⁹ Pipit Rochijat's account of the violence in Kediri recorded the hanging of male genitals in front of houses in the prostitution complex. Rochijat 1985, 44.

⁶⁰ Sulistyo 2000, 244.

activists (instead of ordinary peasants, *santri*, or villagers), who were members of or had ties to anti-PKI organisations, in the violence.⁶¹

Other scholars have a different opinion about the case of East Java. Regarding the portrayal of the 1965-66 killings as religious conflict, Kate McGregor and Greg Fealy argued that socioeconomic and political factors were more dominant than religion. This was reflected, for example, by the growing popularity of the PKI in East Java and their campaign against the elitist *kyais* (Islamic religious leaders).⁶² Another study in East Java, specifically South Blitar, by Vannessa Hearman, also reflects a different opinion than Sulistyono's and Sudjatmiko's horizontal conflict approach. Relying on oral history interviews of survivors, perpetrators and community members in the areas where the violence occurred, she highlights that although violence in East Java was often portrayed as a horizontal conflict, structure and organisation by the army were a crucial element in triggering the violence against the left.⁶³ In accordance with these previous studies on the violence in East Java, in chapter 3, I will elaborate more on the military operation in East Java based on the Military Regional Command (Komando Daerah Militer/ Kodam) V Brawijaya archives. This strengthens the argument that the military structurally encouraged and coordinated the involvement of civilians in the violence.

The Donomulyo District

The Donomulyo district is one of the 33 districts in the Malang regency.⁶⁴ Located 34 km south of Kepanjen, the Regency capital of Malang. The subdistrict of Donomulyo covers an area of 6.47% of the whole regency, or about 192.6 km².⁶⁵ With only 62,627 people in Donomulyo, the population density in the district is only 325.17 people/km², making it the least populated district in the Regency.⁶⁶ The district is a typical dry-land area, not a wet-rice or *sawah* cultivated land. The total area of dry land in the district is much larger (16,279 Ha) compared to *sawah* land (3,173.40 Ha).⁶⁷ This explains why the most common crops in Donomulyo are corn and sugar cane,⁶⁸ instead of rice. As we will see in the next chapter, as a result of the stagnation of the agricultural sector in South Malang, villagers have had to seek other opportunities, such as migrant labour. Currently, Donomulyo has become the second largest supplier of migrant workers from Malang Regency, with Hongkong as their top destination.⁶⁹

Donomulyo consists of 10 villages (*desa*) and 39 hamlets.⁷⁰ However, considering the distance and availability of informants, this research only covers three villages and six hamlets. For ethical and security reasons, which I will explain in more detail below, I will not mention the name of the villages, instead I will use a pseudonym "Banyujati" area to refer to the three villages covered in this study. Within a few weeks after I started my fieldwork, I realised that Donomulyo has a complex history.

⁶¹ Sudjatmiko 1992, 236-237.

⁶² McGregor & Fealy 2012, 129-130.

⁶³ Hearman 2018, 80.

⁶⁴ The administrative division of territory in Indonesia is as follows: (1) province (*propinsi*), (2) city or regency (*kota/ kabupaten*), (3) district (*kecamatan*), (4) village (*desa*), (5) hamlet (*dusun*), (6) citizen associations (*Rukun Warga/ RW*), and (7) neighborhood associations (*Rukun Tetangga/ RT*).

⁶⁵ Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Malang 2018, 12.

⁶⁶ Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Malang 2018, 109.

⁶⁷ Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Malang 2017, 58-60.

⁶⁸ Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Malang 2017, 57.

⁶⁹ In 2017, Sumbermanjing has the highest number of migrant workers (288 people), while Donomulyo has 240 migrant workers. These numbers might be understated, because the statistics bureau (BPS) usually uses data from formal agencies of migrant workers. However, there are also unregistered agencies, which means that their workers are not recorded in the statistics. Kabupaten Malang dalam Angka 2018, 129.

⁷⁰ http://donomulyo.malangkab.go.id/?page_id=5, accessed on 10 December 2018.

Donomulyo was founded by refugees of the 18th century Javanese war⁷¹ and became part of the colonial economy once a Dutch rubber and coffee plantation was established. The story of plantation in Donomulyo resembles the dynamics of the South Malang ex-colonial plantation belt, from the west (Donomulyo) to the east (Dampit and Tirtoyudho), which later shaped the patronage network in this area. Leftist organisations, mainly the PKI and the peasants' union (Barisan Tani Indonesia/ BTI) tried to organise and mobilise the agrarian movement in the district, but this was suppressed during the 1965 military operation. The adjacent location of Donomulyo with South Blitar also turned the district into one of the escape areas of PKI leaders, which was later targeted by the Trisula military operation in 1968.



PICTURE 2. LOCATION OF DONOMULYO DISTRICT IN MALANG REGENCY

Sources and Approaches

The historical approach in this research uses archival study to reconstruct different historical periods of Donomulyo, and to highlight some continuities between those periods. For the colonial period, I used different sources of colonial archives, company reports of NV. Kali Tello, and Dutch newspapers. I also combined these sources with oral history information from villagers whose families had worked on the plantations. Reconstructing the history of Donomulyo is very challenging, because the sources are limited and scattered. Not to mention that the administrative government of the area during the colonial era was different from the present administration, making it difficult to locate the information on colonial Donomulyo in the archives. Eventually, I managed to reconstruct the administrative structure of Donomulyo during the colonial administration. During that period, Donomulyo was part of the Pagak subdistrict, in the Senggoeroeh district, the Malang regency, the Pasoeroean residency. Apart from the NV Kali Tello company report, there are only very few documents that mention Donomulyo. However, there are more sources about the Pagak subdistrict

⁷¹ For the description about the Java war, see Ricklefs 2001.

and Senggoeroeh district, which I used to construct a more or less overall picture of Donomulyo in the colonial period. Nevertheless, I realise that although descriptions of districts and even the regency are more accessible, variations at village level may exist.

The early independence period is even more difficult to reconstruct as sources on this war period are more limited, scattered and patchy. Most of the information that I used to reconstruct this period came from newspapers, several agrarian research reports in the 1960s, and oral history interviews with villagers in Donomulyo. The period after independence in this research specifically focuses on the leftist movement around 1950s-1960s, although it is very hard to find accurate information on this movement in the Donomulyo district. Meanwhile, the military operation and violence in 1965-1968 in Malang were reconstructed based on the analysis on the Kodam V Brawijaya military archives and oral history of the villagers. Classified CIA documents, archives from the Malang Regency, the Regional Development Body (Bappeda), and East Java provincial archives also added to this period, and constitute most of the rural dynamics in the New Order era. Moreover, documents from the Malang diocese were also used to elaborate the dynamics of the Catholic community in Donomulyo, especially in the post-1965 period.

Meanwhile, the ethnography and oral history approach include interviews of 38 people who are residents of Donomulyo, former activists in Malang city and other sub-districts. The informants from Donomulyo have a wide range of backgrounds: those who directly experienced the violence, who can be considered as being victims, local collaborators, witnesses; and those who have not directly experienced the violence, such as local school teachers and younger generations in the village. Besides the interviews, I also conducted two focus group discussions with young people in the Banyujati area, who are not necessarily connected to the 1965-66 violence (i.e. not part of the victim's or perpetrator's family). I encountered my informants through an informal snowballing method – one interviewee led me to another. I realise that this method can entail some disadvantages, for example, a person may only refer to people in his or her own network. To overcome this, I tried to go beyond the network of my key informants, and to delve into different groups in the area. In order to capture historical continuity and local interpretations, I usually started the interviews with questions on the interviewee's childhood experiences and then continued to discuss different periods of their lifespan. I asked them to describe their surroundings: activities, festivities, food, education, relationship with families and other children, and so on. This strategy is not only efficient to gather narratives on the pre-and post-independence situation, but also to avoid resistance that usually occurs when talking directly about the 1965-66 violence. It is important to note that I did not experience avoidance or reluctance from the interviewees on this matter – which reflects that the violence was an open secret. I recorded all of the interviews and also made field notes.⁷²

As part of an ethnographic and oral history study, I also participated in some of the villagers' activities, such as the Independence Day festivities, Catholic community prayer, and other celebrations (*tasakuran*). I also visited and observed activities in several places, such as the village head's office, a pilgrimage site (i.e. the cemetery of the village pioneer) and a spiritual site (i.e. St. Mary's Grotto/ *Goa Maria*). When I discovered that narratives of violence are also attached to places, I visited some of the sites that frequently appear in my interviews. This includes two monuments, one community hall, and two mass graves. In order to explore these sites, I discussed with several

⁷² Due to security reasons, these data (recordings and field notes) are under embargo. I am currently thinking and discussing with professionals to make the data available in the far future.

people who are attached to them (such as the victim's family, caretaker or *juru kunci*), and also to the people who live nearby.

Ethics

Looking at the political developments in Indonesia today, where communism is still prohibited, this research topic can be considered a sensitive topic. At present, the Indonesian government still refuses to consider the communists and other leftists as 'victims'. Villagers in Donomulyo who were accused of being communists, have experienced different kinds of repression by the state, i.e. detention, confiscation of properties, prohibition to vote, and so on. Some of these people, although quite open about the violence, still feel uneasy and anxious when talking about this particular past. Their position is also prone to re-labelling by the state. Therefore, I prioritise their safety. In terms of consent, I could not request a written consent, because signing a paper is associated with formalities and it may cause discomfort, suspicion, distrust, and even rejection to participate in this research. To replace the written consent, I asked verbal consent from every interviewee before I started to record the interviews. In each of the interviews, I explained my identity and the purpose of this study, which was to write the history of Donomulyo. I presented the research topic as something broad, to avoid creating discomfort if I directly pointed to the 1965-66 violence. I also confirmed the privacy aspect to all interviewees, ensuring that their names would be changed into pseudonyms (although some of them wanted to use their real name). Therefore, all the names of informants in this thesis, in and outside Donomulyo, are pseudonyms. This includes villagers whom I did not interview or meet directly, but are part of the narratives of violence, such as deceased members of a victim's family and former village heads. An exception applies for prominent national figures such as military generals or commanders (i.e., Basuki Rachmat, Suharto, and so on), and activists of mass organisations at the national level (i.e., Cosmas Batubara, Father Beek, Harry Tjan Silalahi, and others). The use of the term the Banyuwangi area also serves the purpose of protection, to avoid any lead that can point to certain interviewees.

Structure Of the Thesis

This thesis consists of seven chapters, divided into two main parts. The next two chapters focus on the historical reconstruction, while the remaining three chapters focus on the memory culture of 1965-66 violence. I arranged the structure in such a way, so that the first historical chapters will provide a clearer context of the historical event itself, in this case, the violence, that will be the main focus of this memory study. By understanding the rural context, the military operation, and the transformations that these events caused, readers will be able to comprehend how and why memories of violence develop in such a way. After building an introduction of this study in chapter 1, the second chapter postulates the continuity of rural differentiation and how events in Indonesian history reshape this differentiation along with its embedded patronage network. The chapter begins with a description of a colonial plantation in Donomulyo, followed by its destruction in 1948, during the war of independence. The chapter also describes Donomulyo's situation in the period from the 1950s to the 1960s, especially the leftist movement promoting agrarian reform, followed by the agrarian development project in the New Order era.

The third chapter describes the anti-communist operation in East Java, specifically in Malang. This chapter elaborates further the argument that the Indonesian military, since its establishment, has always been a political body that continues to form alliances with civilian elites. Furthermore, these civilians use their patronage connections with the military for their own agendas. I begin this chapter by describing the growing power of the military at the local level prior to 1965. I will also describe existing studies and analyses about the violence in East Java, particularly arguments about the NU and the military. Using documents from the Kodam V Brawijaya archives, and interviews with the

villagers, I will show the structural nature of the military operation in Malang, where the military issued explicit instructions to use civilian forces. The documents also show the army's involvement in establishing the New Order regime at the regional level.

Chapter four is the first memory chapter, which discusses the memory culture of the 1965-66 violence in a rural context. The main argument of this chapter is that instead of being formed exclusively by the state, memories of violence are embedded in their localities. The local context in this case is the patronage network that highly influences villagers' interpretation of their local experiences, connecting the national with the local. Another context is the agrarian transformation that emerged after the violence, which aggravated rural differentiation through its capitalistic policies which only benefited a few groups in the village. Embeddedness in this context also shows the intersection of the personal and political in the villagers' memory culture. More importantly, embedded memories also reflect silence as a strategy to deal with the past.

The last two chapters discuss the means of remembering that preserved memory of violence in the village, despite denial and repression from the state. Chapter five discusses the memory landscape in Donomulyo, which refers to *lieux de memoire* or sites of memory that relate to the anti-communist violence. In this landscape, state-initiated monuments exist together with locally-initiated sites of memory, such as mass graves. While the first have lost their relevance today because of their top-down nature, the latter are still commemorated by villagers. Some of these sites are also used by villagers as an instrument to maintain their relationship with state patrons.

Chapter six discusses the memories of the young generation, especially the second generation of victims' and perpetrators' families. By looking at stories of four families, we will see how their memory of violence develops, and how silence becomes an integral part of it. Silence itself does not simply mean forgetting or an absence of knowledge, but is a result of negotiation between the past and present; and also between the private and the political. This chapter also describes history education and community gatherings as moments where narratives of violence travel between generations. The conclusion in chapter seven will summarise the main findings of this study and discuss the major questions in the field of memory studies and state violence. I will also reflect on these results and the methods used, and share the implications for reconciliation processes in the present and future.