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Embedded remembering : memory culture of the 1965 violence in rural East Java

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EMBEDDED REMEMBERING: MEMORY CULTURE OF THE 1965 VIOLENCE IN RURAL EAST JAVA

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ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY

Ansor/ Pemuda Ansor	a youth organisation affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
Babinsa/ Badan Pembina Desa	village-level monitoring officials
Bimas/ Bimbingan Masyarakat	mass guidance, a farming credit programme which lasted until the late 1960s
Brimob/ Brigade Mobile	Mobile Police Brigade
BTI/ Barisan Tani Indonesia	Indonesian Peasants' Front
Bouw	unit of land measurement during the colonial era. 1 bouw = 0.7 hectare
Bupati	regent
Camat	Subdistrict head
Dwikora	acronym for Dwi Komando Rakyat (People's Two Commands), released in 1964. President Sukarno announced Dwikora in relation with the confrontation campaign against Malaysia, instructing the people to thwart the formation of Malaysia as Britain's puppet state, and to form volunteers to assist this campaign.
Front Nasional	National Front
FDR/ Front Demorkasi Rakyat	People's Democratic Front
Gerakan 30 September/ G30S	September 30 th Movement
Gerwani/ Gerakan Wanita Indonesia	Indonesian Women's Movement
Golkar/ Golongan Karya	Party of Functional Groups, Suharto's ruling political party
Gulden (f)/ Netherlands Guilders	currency of the Netherlands since the middle ages until 2002. 1 f = € 0,45
Hadji/ Haji	people who went to the pilgrimage in Mecca, which made them respected Islamic leaders in a community
Hansip/ Pertahanan Sipil	civil defence
Harian Rakjat	the Indonesian Communist Party newspaper
Jihad	holy war in Islam
Juru kunci	guardian of monuments, graves, or other sacred sites
KAMI/ Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia	Indonesian Students Action Front
Kamituwo	local leaders who are appointed formally by village authorities
Ketoprak	Javanese theatrical performance
Kodam/ Komando Daerah Militer	Regional Military Command
Kodim/ Komando Distrik Militer	District Military Command
Koramil/ Komando Rayon Militer	Military Precinct Command
Korem/ Komando Resort Militer	Military Resort Command
Kopur/ Komando Tempur	battle command
Kyai	Islamic religious leader
Lekra/ Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat	Institute of People's Culture
Marhaen	a term coined by Sukarno to refer to a category of poor Indonesians who were oppressed by capitalism and imperialism, but who were not part of the traditional peasant or proletarian classes as they were small landowners and owned a few tools

Nasakom – Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme	Nationalism, Religion, Communism, a doctrine in the Guided Democracy era that officially recognised the role of these three major political tendencies in Indonesian political life
NU/ Nahdlatul Ulama	a large, traditionalist Islamic group in Indonesia
Pagar betis	‘fence of legs’, a counter-insurgency encirclement strategy used by the Indonesian military
Pancasila	the five principles of the Indonesian state, consist of: 1) belief in Almighty God, 2) humanity that is just and civilized, 3) the unity of Indonesia, 4) democracy guided by the wisdom of representative deliberation, 5) social justice for all Indonesians
Pangad/ Panglima Angkatan Darat	Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
Pandam/ Panglima Daerah Militer	Regional Military Commander
Pantja Tunggal	an administrative coordinating body established around 1960s at provincial to the district level. It consisted of governors or regents, local army commanders, police chiefs, public persecutors and the National Front
Pamong	village authorities
Partai Katolik	Catholic Party
PKI/ Partai Komunis Indonesia	the Indonesian Communist Party
PNI/ Partai Nasional Indonesia	the Indonesian Nationalist Party
PDI-P/ Partai Demokratik Indonesia-Perjuangan	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
PMKRI/ Pemuda Katolik Republik Indonesia	Indonesian Catholic Youth
Pemuda Rakyat	People’s Youth organization
Pepelrada/ Penguasa	Regional Authority to Implement Dwikora
Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah	
Pupelrada/ Pembantu Penguasa	Assistant of Regional Authority to Implement Dwikora
Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah	
Puterpra/ Perwira Urusan Teritorial dan Perlawanan Rakyat	Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance Officer
RPKAD/ Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat	Army Paracommando Regiment
Santiaji/ wajib lapor	one of the programmes under Mental Building for accused ex-communists, where participants were obliged to report and follow indoctrination programmes on Pancasila in the local military office.
Sawah	wet cultivated land
Tasakuran	village communal activity to express gratitude and ask for blessing
Tegal	dry cultivated land
Tokoh	local leader(s)
Tjatur Tunggal	an administrative system in which four government elements, consisting of the governors or regents, local army commanders, police chiefs and public persecutors, made collaborative decisions on their regional issues
Walikota	city mayor

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The owner was the village, and the village had a mind; it could say no to sacrilege. But in the affairs of the nation there was no owner, the laws of the village became powerless.

Chinua Achebe – A Man of The People

This thesis explores how society remembers past state violence in the present. The concept of remembering in this study elaborates the idea that memory is not merely a process of storing and recalling information, but an active strategy of survival and adaptation, especially in the aftermath of violence. This approach to analysing memory as a strategy, has two repercussions. First, there is no uniformity of memories of violence although they refer to the same event, in this case, the anti-communist state violence in 1965-66. This is not only caused by different experiences of violence, but also because of the various interpretations and different meanings of those experiences in people's lives – some lost everything, while others gained something after the violence. Second, rather than merely representing the past, these memories are actually embedded in their present local context, particularly in social relationships and their transformations before and after the violence erupted. This idea of embeddedness was first raised by, among others, Fentress and Wickham who highlight the embeddedness of memory of the past in the present, arguing that memory is strongest when it is constantly exercised, tested, and validated through present experiences.¹ For Fentress and Wickham, an event is continuously remembered because of their power to legitimize the present and tend to be interpreted in ways that are closely linked (or even contrasted) with present conceptions.² Therefore, memory, is never absolutely certain nor static.

Fentress and Wickham's argument on the presentness of the past is corroborated by several case studies from Western Europe which cover different forms of memories and their level of significance, including the varying reasons that one memory is worth remembering than the other. When discussing peasants' memories, they refer to existing studies on Camisard Protestant peasants' revolts in 1702-4 France, and Carlo Levi's work on peasant's resistance in Aliano, Italy, in 1860s. On a larger scope, Fentress and Wickham also discuss the formation of national memory, consisting of past events that help build a nation and construct its identity, such as the French Revolution and World War I. In both cases, i.e. peasant's resistance and national identity, violence and atrocities are striking features and inherent parts of these memories. The issue of violence, along with problems of power and politics of memory, generate many other questions, as mass violence grows increasingly severe during the course of the 20th century. In this case, do assumptions about social memory as strategy still ring true when we examine a more extreme case of state violence? How do the role of the state and politics of memory fit into the conception of memory as a strategy? Is it still relevant to conduct studies on social memory in post-violence situation through a state-centric approach, as indeed most scholars have done until now? This is the major aim of this dissertation, which is to test the limits of a new approach to the social memory of violence.

¹ Fentress & Wickham 1992, 24.

² Fentress & Wickham 1992, 88.

To move towards that aim (and to decentralize Eurocentric memory studies), I will examine one of the most gruesome state violence in the 20th century that occurred in Southeast Asia. This event is the anti-communist violence in 1965-66 Indonesia, where approximately 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed within those period. The trigger behind this violence (which re-occurred in 1968 in some areas in East Java) was a movement called the September 30th Movement or *Gerakan 30 September*, in which six army generals and one middle-rank army officer were kidnapped and killed by a small group of military officers. Although there is still an ongoing debate regarding who was behind the movement and why, the Indonesian army accused the Indonesian Communist Party or PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) of being the perpetrator behind this movement.³ This accusation was followed by an extermination project against the communists and other members and supporters of Leftist organisations and their family members. Approximately 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed during those years; others experienced gross human rights violations which involved extermination, forced migration, torture, forced disappearances, forced labour, sexual abuse and persecutions.⁴ This event became one of the most controversial events in Indonesia's historiography, not only because of the debate regarding who was behind the September 30th Movement, but also because narratives about the mass violence have been largely marginalised in Indonesia's national history. The following New Order regime, which was led by Suharto in 1966, developed a nationwide memory project of eliminating any narratives about the mass violence against accused communists and members of Leftist organisations. The regime constantly commemorated the seven army officers, the 30th September Movement, and the 'evil' communists with monuments, museums, a commemoration day and media propaganda while excluding the anti-communist killings and the army's role in Indonesia's history.

The above narrative is not only an official version of the national history, but it is also an elitist one. It revolves around a political coup, removal, and establishment of a national regime. It says nothing about ordinary people, who also constitute the nation and were affected directly by the violent events in the course of 1965-66. In an attempt to decentralise this narrative, and also to understand how memories of violence persist (or do not persist) in present day Indonesia, I decided to go into an area where most of the violent acts, especially the killings, took place. I wanted to examine how people remember (or forget) the violence in these places, particularly under the state's memory project that excludes most of the narratives of violence. Donomulyo, a district in the southern part of Malang, East Java, is such a place. More than 40 km away from Malang municipality, this agrarian society relies on their dry-land cultivated crops such as corn, cassava, and sugar cane. The district is also famous for its touristic beaches that stretch along the southern coast of Java. Apart from its tourist destinations, from my conversations with residents in Malang (especially older generations who lived in Malang in the 1960s), it appears that Donomulyo has a reputation as a PKI village. One

³ The first critical analysis came from Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey with their famous Cornell Paper, arguing that G30S was an internal army coup by junior officers. See Anderson, B, Ruth McVey & Frederic Bunnell 1971. A new analysis was proposed by John Roosa, arguing that the September 30th Movement had no clear 'mastermind', whether one person or a tight cluster of people. Although there was one person who served as a bridge between the PKI leaders and progressive military officers, he was not in a position of command nor a decision-maker. In short, the September 30th Movement was a disorganized attempted coup which was easily terminated by Suharto. Roosa 2006, 203-204.

⁴ *Ringkasan Eksekutif Laporan Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia Berat* 2012, 3-40.

hamlet that I visited was even known in the district as the hamlet of widows, because most of the men disappeared during the 1965-66 and 1968 military operation.

I started my fieldwork in Donomulyo in August 2016, at the same time as the Independence Day celebration in the village. At the invitation of my local contact person, who is a respected local leader, I attended one of the activities. Javanese called it *tasakuran*, a form of communal gathering where villagers and officials gather to pray and eat together, expressing their gratitude to Indonesia's deceased heroes. Since there are two major religions in the district, Catholic and Islam, the prayers on the Independence Day *tasakuran* were organized in two separate places. Afterwards, both groups gather together again in one place to hear the village head speech and feast. I followed the Catholic communal prayer which was led by Suparman, my local contact person. While standing in front of the room, Suparman introduced me to all of the attendees, in a way that sounded more like an announcement. After briefly explaining the purpose of my stay, which was to write a history about the village, he then encouraged all the attendees to be open and 'tell the truth' (*bercerita apa adanya*) to me. There was no preparation for this formal introduction, and what came afterwards was rather shocking to me because I did not expect him to speak of the violence so bluntly at a communal event. Suparman began to point to a few attendees, who he said were the 'victims of history'. One had been detained for years without clear allegations, and another had been obliged to follow *santiaji* or *wajib lapor* (a programme developed by the army for accused communists to report regularly to the local army office) for years.⁵ I was surprised that he was able to mention 1965 in a very outspoken manner, but it made me realise that the violence was not a taboo for the community. It is actually part of their everyday lives, a kind of public secret in the village, where everybody knows about what happened to certain people. Only on particular occasions, and among certain people, it reappears in distinct ways, such as in this moment of *tasakuran*.

On another occasion, I was interviewing Marwono, a small farmer who was obliged to followed *santiaji* since 1968, with the accusation of being a member of the BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia/* Indonesian Peasants' Front), the leftist organisation closely linked to the PKI. It took several meetings before he actually revealed that he knew more about the leftist movement in Donomulyo, in contrast with other people who usually think of Marwono merely as a 'victim of history' who did not know anything about the left. On our third meeting, he began to admit that he usually read publications by leftist organisations in 1960s, such as the *Harian Rakjat* newspaper and BTI's book about land reform. While he explained about this experience, a car stopped in front of his house and he suddenly became silent. I noticed the change in his behaviour and also the existence of the car, but was not fast enough to make the connection. I continued with another question, but he did not give a clear answer. He seemed restless and kept looking outside at the car. At this point, I realised that he was bothered by the car in front of the house. I asked whether he was expecting anybody, and he said no. Seeing his uneasiness, I decided to also stay silent with him. A few minutes later, the car drove away. His body language showed signs of relief, so I asked him whether he wanted to take a rest. He said no and then apologised to me. He said he was still 'traumatised', and that the appearance of the car reminded him of the moment when the military came to his house and asked him to report to the office.⁶ This silence appeared while we were talking about leftist publications and I doubt that it would have occurred if we had been talking about something else.

I found these two different experiences perplexing. Why, then, can a community be so open and yet so silent at the same time, as in the case of Suparman and Marwono? Are these differences in remembering simply the result of the state's repressive memory project that placed the violence in

⁵ Field note 15 August 2016

⁶ Field note 13 December 2016

the margins of history? If that is the case, why do the ways of remembering past violence remain the same (indicating trauma and silence) while the state is actually moving towards democracy? How is memory of violence constructed? Who are involved in its construction? How does a national event become entwined with local experiences in forming the collective memory? What kind of memories are remembered and silenced? Why? These are the questions that surrounded my confusion and curiosity, which I will explore in the following chapters. In the end, I discovered that the ways people remember the violence is highly contextual. In other words, the process of remembering past violence is also embedded in its local context, rather than being exclusively influenced by the state's repressive forces.

Function and Meaning of Memory

My fieldwork experience above illustrates the function of memory beyond a mere 'store and recall' individual cognitive process. The silence and openness point to the fact that these memories are social acts – actions taken to convey or retain a certain meaning not only about an event, but about a certain individual or community. As Fentress and Wickham note, remembering is a process of representation, and by articulating what we remember, we are explaining who we are.⁷ Memory is certainly social – it constitutes a person's or a community's identity. Therefore, memory also works beyond its mere function to reconstruct events, but also to generate the meaning of a certain event for a particular group.

Perceiving memory as a social process also means that remembering is part of the collective memory of society. Maurice Halbwachs, the pioneer of memory studies, sets the introduction to collective memory by arguing that memory is not an individual, but a communal process influenced by the collective framework in societies. He describes this framework as the instrument to reconstruct an image of the past which is in accordance with the predominant thoughts of the society.⁸ He went further by stating that "society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess".⁹ Halbwachs emphasises the malleable character of collective memory, and therefore, studying it should not revolve on internal processes of the mind, but on identifying its shifting social frameworks.¹⁰ He also distinguishes between autobiographical and historical memory.¹¹ The first refers to events that are remembered directly, including those that surround a particular event. For example, one may remember his or her own activities during a historical event, such as the 30th September Movement, although the historical event does not affect the individual directly. Meanwhile, historical memory refers to the effects of events where certain groups assert continuous identity through time. As we will see in the chapters, both types of memories are entwined in the case of the 1965-66 violence.

Others scholars have further developed Halbwach's initial concept of autobiographical and historical memory. Jan Assmann, for example, tried to elaborate memory, identity and institutionalisation of heritage by differentiating communicative and cultural memory. The first is characterised exclusively by everyday communication which, for example, constitutes the field of oral history. Its dependency on everyday communication also makes it unavailable to extend more than eighty to one hundred

⁷ Fentress & Wickham 1992, 9.

⁸ Coser (ed) 1992, 40.

⁹ Coser (ed) 1992, 51.

¹⁰ Olick, et al. 2011, 18

¹¹ Olick, et al. 2011, 19.

years into the past – a limited temporal horizon, as Assmann underlines.¹² On the contrary, cultural memory is characterised by the distance from daily forms of communication. It has its fixed point, which makes its horizon consistent through time. Memories related to these fixed points are maintained through ‘figures of memory’ that include cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance).¹³ Assmann continues to elaborate the characteristics of cultural memory, focusing on its influence on group identity and the capacity to reconstruct.

While Fentress & Wickham, Halbwachs, and Assmann portray the function of memory as identity formation, scholars from the field of oral history offer another meaning of memory. One example is the work of Alessandro Portelli on the death of a factory worker, Luigi Trastulli, in the city of Terni in central Italy. Portelli argues that what makes oral history sources valuable actually lies in the discrepancy between memory and the actual event. For him, this is not a weakness of oral history, instead it illuminates an active process of remembering and imagining in order to make sense of certain events in the past and also history in general. Through the case study, Portelli continues by showing that Terni’s working-class memory of Trastulli’s death serves three major functions: a symbolic representation of the post-war working-class experience in Terni; a strategy to deal with psychological consequences (such as humiliation and loss of self-esteem) of the worker’s community following upon the inadequacy to react to a comrade’s death; and a formal time-marking function for the community.¹⁴ For Portelli, memory is not merely a part of identity formation of a certain group, as Halbwachs and Assmann argue, but also a *strategy* to understand the meaning of the past and its outcomes in the present.

Both as identity formation and as a strategy, memory is filled with the tension of power. In Assmann’s elaboration of cultural memory, he stresses the existence of experts in forming memory, such as shamans, priests, clerks, scholars, and so on. Participation in the cultural memory is not egalitarian – some are almost forced into participation while others remains excluded.¹⁵ This indicates the role of hierarchy and power play in constructing cultural memory. A more explicit explanation of the notion of power in memory was presented by the Marxist scholars in the *Popular Memory Group*. They indicated ‘dominant memory’, which points to “the power and pervasiveness of historical representations, their connections with dominant institutions and the part they play in winning consent and building alliances in the processes of formal politics”.¹⁶ These historical representations in dominant memory are definitely public and closely connected to the state, but it does not mean that the general public is always in line with their dominance. On the contrary, dominant memory is always in contestation, where certain representations became central while others remain in the periphery. The Popular Memory Group also highlights representation of the past that is produced in daily life, where they are usually limited to the level of private remembrance. They became hidden and sometimes silenced. However, the Group argues that a study of popular memory should be a *relational study*, by looking at interactions between representations of dominant history in the public, and also subordinate or private experiences.¹⁷

Discussions about power and memory become more complex within the huge genre of war and conflict studies. Paul Fussler and Jay Winter, amongst others, put forward the study of remembrance,

¹² Assmann 1995, 126-7.

¹³ Assmann 1995, 129.

¹⁴ Portelli 1991, 26.

¹⁵ Assmann 2008, 114-116.

¹⁶ Popular Memory Group 1982, 207.

¹⁷ Popular Memory Group 1982, 211.

trauma, and mourning of World War I as a collective representation of European society.¹⁸ Their studies pointed to the connection between the past and present, particularly on how societies deal with their traumatic violent events in the past. Moreover, their studies also show that violent past events become part of the cultural identity and memory of present society. This approach influenced studies of 20th century atrocities, such as genocides and ethnic-based conflicts, later on. However, scholars have also been examining this idea with regard to memories of violence with a critical remark on whose truth is being told,¹⁹ and claims of collective representations that may exclude certain groups.²⁰ This critical view also triggered a distinctive approach of memory studies in post-colonial settings. In relation to post-colonial studies in Indonesia, some examples of memory-related works are Mary Steedly, who explores memories of North Sumatran women of the Indonesian revolution;²¹ Ann Stoler & Karen Strassler, with their studies on domestic workers in the colonial Netherlands East Indies;²² Ana Dragojlovic, who examine memory of an Indisch woman born in the Dutch East Indies and lives in the Netherlands;²³ Marieke Bloembergen and Martijn Eickhoff, who pointed at the tension and continuity of the meaning and memory of Indonesia's UNESCO heritage site, Borobudur.²⁴ By examining the complex layers of memory of colonialism and the war of independence in Indonesia's present culture, these studies drew attention to a further exploration of Indonesia's memory culture that should go beyond binary identification (colonial vs present; remembering vs forgetting; public vs private) of past and present.

In the case of 1965-66, Indonesia's memory politics have been largely dominated by the military. For example, the army released its official publication in 1966 titled *40 Hari Kegagalan "G-30-S" 1 Oktober-10 November 1965* (The Forty Day Failure of the G30S 1 Oktober-10 November 1965), which accused the PKI of being the mastermind behind the killings of the seven military officers.²⁵ This book has been the main reference for the 1965 historiography, including the seven volumes of the Indonesian National History Textbook (*Sejarah Nasional Indonesia/ SNI*) that were released in 1976 and most of the history textbooks for educational purposes. In 1973, the Suharto government opened The *Pancasila Sakti* (Sacred Pancasila) Monument complex in Jakarta, which was intended to depict the violence by the PKI against the seven army officers through visualisations such as the torture diorama of the officers.²⁶ None of these state-sponsored commemorative acts incorporate the violence against civilians in the anti-communist operation.

State Patronage in the Politics of Memory

With the knowledge of military-led memory projects, I tried to explore how far these practices resonate in Donomulyo. I started to ask local residents how did they know about the September 30th Movement and understand that the violence in their area was related to PKI. When villagers tried to answer my questions, certain figures started to emerge (and not necessarily the military-centric memory projects): the military commanders who later on became village heads in Donomulyo, *kyai* (religious leader) of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia), and activists from other mass organisations. These figures play a central role in disseminating the anti-communist

¹⁸ See Fussell 2013 and Winter 2014.

¹⁹ Bauer-Clapp 2016, 2.

²⁰ Langenohl 2008, 171.

²¹ Steedly 2013.

²² Stoler & Strassler 2000.

²³ Dragojlovic 2011.

²⁴ Bloembergen & Eickhoff 2015.

²⁵ "40 Hari kegagalan "G-30-S" 1 Oktober-10 November 1965" 1966.

²⁶ Autopsy report of the Officers' bodies only found gunshots as the main cause of death. There were no signs of torture. See Anderson 1987.

narrative, connecting an event in the central capital with the violence in rural areas. Interestingly, villagers also described the role of these figures after the violence, particularly in the 'development' era of the New Order. For example, military village leaders confiscated properties of accused PKI members in Donomulyo and coercively encouraged locals to participate in the election campaign aiming at the success of Suharto's ruling party, *Golongan Karya/ Golkar*. In return, safety and freedom from detention as accused communists became incentives offered by these military leaders. Some villagers were given jobs at the village office, and became part of the authority's forces, or were even given a share of the properties that were confiscated from the accused communists. These descriptions express perfectly the patron-client relationship, which is a strong feature of Southeast Asian politics.

The patron-client relationship is defined as an "exchange relationship between roles, involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron".²⁷ This relationship has three distinguished features.²⁸ First, it is based on inequality. The imbalanced exchange in patron-client relationships expresses the disparity in wealth, power and status. The patron has the ability to provide goods and services unilaterally which the client and his family need to survive. The second feature is the face-to face, personal quality of the relationship. This continuing reciprocal relationship usually creates trust and affection between the two parties. In many cases, these mutual relationships are supported by communal beliefs, tradition, and values, resulting in a bond that can persist through generations. The last feature of the patron-client relationship is its "diffuse, whole-person relationship rather than explicit, impersonal-contract bonds". The bond with the patron may incorporate multiple backgrounds, for example, tenancy of cultivated land, friendship, the ritual of co-parenthood, and so on. This means that the services that the client can provide have a very wide range, for example, they can range from cultivating crops and preparing celebrations to winning an election campaign.

Although the patronage relationship has a traditional background (for example, since pre-colonial Asia and in subsistence farming communities), it persists until the present. In Indonesia, this relationship already existed in pre-colonial society, transforming from personal-affective ties between patrons and clients in colonial society into an expanding patronage network covert in bureaucratic institutions in the New Order period – showing the long lasting characteristic of patronage that persists through different courses of Indonesia's historical period.²⁹ Even today, clientelism remains a strong feature in Indonesia's democracy, leading some scholars to argue that patronage can coexist with democracy and also exacerbate further the democratic shortcomings such as economic and cultural inequalities.³⁰ In the context of agrarian societies, Gillian Hart even predicts that state patronage can become a threat to state intervention in agrarian policies in the long run, because patronage has been used as a means for those who control the state to pursue their own agrarian interests, within and beyond the rural sector.³¹ This was exactly what happened in Donomulyo, where the 1965-66 and 1968 violence not only resulted in the loss of lives, but also reconfigured this patronage network, by including the army. It is these networks which later on influenced the memory of violence.

²⁷ Scott 1972, 92.

²⁸ Scott 1972, 93-95.

²⁹ Nordholt 2015.

³⁰ Klinken 2009, 156.

³¹ Hart 1989, 31.

Remembering 1965: Beyond the Binary

This research in the rural community was conducted more than fifty years after the 1965 violence occurred and more than 20 years after the advent of Indonesia's democratic era in 1998, or famously known as Reformasi, which marked the end of Suharto's authoritarian New Order. Since Reformasi, human rights communities began to accelerate agendas of transitional justice, demanding reconciliation and truth seeking of past human rights abuses. Suharto's successor, President B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) took several important steps regarding 1965, such as putting an end to the 'national ritual' to air the film *The Treachery of the September 30th Movement/Indonesian Communist Party* on national television every October 1st and releasing the remaining 10 political prisoners.³² The next president, Abdurrachman Wahid (1999-2001) continued these progressive steps by allowing all the exiles³³ to return to Indonesia and apologising to the victims' families for the 1965-66 violence. He also carried out some structural changes by dismissing the Coordinating Body for the Enhancement of National Stability (*Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional/ Bakorstanas*) whose main task was to assist the State Intelligence Service. Dismissing this body also put an end to the 'special investigation' of a person's ideology during selections of government officials or promotions within government institutions.³⁴ This act invited series of protests from the rightists, including within Wahid's political party – the National Revival Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/ PKB*), accusing it of paving the way for the resurgence of communism and PKI.³⁵ After Wahid's resignation, human rights communities pushed for the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which ended after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Law was struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2006.³⁶

Meanwhile, reconciliation efforts were also initiated at the grassroots level. For example, the Foundation for Research into Victims of the 1965-1966 Killings (*Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965-66/ YPKP*) conducted an exhumation of a mass grave in Wonosobo, Central Java in 2000. They had planned for a reburial of the victims, but a mass demonstration by a religious leftist organisation accused them of being PKI supporters who wanted to revive communism.³⁷ Another example was the formation of Syarikat, a Nahdlatul Ulama/ NU (one of the prominent Islam organisations in Indonesia that was involved in the killings of communists) organisation of youths who initiated reconciliation programs between NU perpetrators and victims of the 1965 violence.³⁸

³² Budiawan 2004, 40.

³³ There are around 1400 Indonesians living in political exile in European countries. Most of them are diplomats, students or correspondents who worked in socialist countries such as Cuba, China, the Soviet Union or other Eastern European countries when the 1965 violence occurred. They refused to acknowledge the 1965 violence as a coup attempt by the communists, so their passports were revoked and they were threatened to be detained if they returned to Indonesia. Budiawan 2004, 44.

³⁴ Budiawan 2004, 44-45. The justification behind this 'special screening' was to prevent ex political prisoners, their family or other 'contaminated parties' to become government officers, members of the military or the police force.

³⁵ Budiawan 2004, 7.

³⁶ One of the controversial article that was revoked in the constitutional court was article 27, which regulated amnesty for perpetrators as a prerequisite for compensation for victims. The constitutional court then decided that without article 27, the law itself will be non-functional. Therefore, the court decided to revoke the whole law. This was very different from the request of the litigant group, who only wanted to revoke three problematic articles. See Saptaningrum, Wahyu Wagiman, Supriyadi Widodo Eddyono & Zainal Abidin 2007.

³⁷ See McGregor 2012.

³⁸ Syarikat was established in 2000 in Yogyakarta as a young NU activists' study group. The background of this establishment is the acknowledgement that NU was involved in the 1965-66 violence and their victims were their own neighbors or people from the same village. Therefore, grassroots reconciliation must take place between them. Budiawan 2004, 196-203. Documents of Syarikat's activities are stored as their organisation's archives.

Moreover, these attempts to unravel the violence of 1965 also took form in literary publications. In (auto)biographies, survivors wrote their own narratives of the violence, such as works from Hersri Setiawan, Putu Oka Sukanta, and younger generations, such as Soe Tjen Marching.

The slow progress of the judicial processes drove the international community of victims (especially those who are living in the Netherlands) and activists to organise the International People's Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia 1965 (IPT 1965) in The Hague, the Netherlands, from 10 to 13 November 2015.³⁹ Meanwhile, at the national level, under the era of President Joko Widodo, a symposium titled *Simposium Nasional: Membedah Tragedi 1965, Pendekatan Kesejarahan* (National Symposium: Examining 1965 Tragedy, A Historical Approach) was held on 18-19 April 2016. This was the first official collaborative work between government institutions, NGOs and academics to openly discuss this issue.⁴⁰ All of these examples illustrate the tension in Indonesia's democratic era, where the counter-narrative that had been repressed during the New Order started to appear in public. It developed into an emerging genre, which Mary S. Zurbuchen noted as *historical memory*, where individual and social processes continued to be intertwined in representing the past in the present.⁴¹ Historical memory is characterised by the distance from textual sources and the incorporation of other forms of narrative, particularly personal memory.⁴² In other words, it brings these 'private' or counter-memories forward in the 'public' sphere.

The effort to bring private counter-memories to the public is perceived as a means to continue human rights advocacy for the case of the 1965-66 violence. Publications and literary works that are related to the violence (memoirs, autobiographies, oral history, and so on) are regarded as 'cultural resistance' to continue to remember the violence that was silenced so much in Suharto's New Order.⁴³ This human rights approach is part of a larger framework of 'facing the past' in the international community. Within newly emerging democratic countries, dealing with the past (through truth-telling, memorialisation, and so on) is perceived as a precondition for democracy.⁴⁴ International communities, such as UN bodies, have tried to formulate policies on memorialisation under the term cultural rights.⁴⁵ In the report, Western memorial models, particularly commemoration of the victims of Nazism, "while not always the most adequate or appropriate, have become a template or at least a political and aesthetic inspiration for the representation of past tragedies or mass crimes".⁴⁶ This policy is of course problematic, because it implies that every society should remember the past in a similar way, referencing to the Holocaust memorial practices.

However, this is not only a problem in standard policy on commemoration, but also an indication of a larger problem in memory discourse that often centres on the Holocaust in memory studies. Scholars

³⁹ The tribunal judges not only find the "state of Indonesia responsible for and guilty of crimes against humanity", but that the State also "failed to prevent the perpetration of these inhumane acts or punish those responsible for their commission". Klinken (ed) 2017, 117-121.

⁴⁰ The initiator of this symposium was Forum Silaturahmi Anak Bangsa/ FSAB, an organisation of family members of national heroes who were killed in G30S. The idea was communicated to the Presidential Advisory Board (Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden) who then continued to involve other NGOs and universities in the symposium. Utama 2016.

⁴¹ Zurbuchen (ed) 2005, 7.

⁴² Zurbuchen 2002, 579-581; Zurbuchen (ed) 2005, 16.

⁴³ See Hill 2012.

⁴⁴ Theodore Adorno argues on the culture of forgetting that threatens democracy, and the need of self-critical reflection of the past to build real democracy. David 2017, 302.

⁴⁵ In 2013 and 2014, two important reports on history textbooks and memorialization in general were presented at the UN General Assembly as part of dealing with the promotion and protection of human rights. David 2017, 305.

⁴⁶ David 2017, 308.

such as Olick, Vinitzky-Serousi & Levy, in their *Collective Memory Reader*, stated that “when one speaks of the memory boom, one is indeed speaking in part – though far from exclusively – of the vast terrains of Holocaust memory, and other terrains of memory modelled on it”.⁴⁷ This western-centric statement came from the background that most memory studies’ theories and approaches are derived from atrocities that occurred in the West. Although I do not deny this, it is preposterous to assume that there is a linear and direct progression between past violence, truth seeking, and acts of remembering, which occurred in the same way in every nation. On the contrary, the background and impact of mass violence are different in each case, including its aftermath, which highly affects the possibility of reconciliation. The case of the 1965-66 violence in Indonesia shows how perpetrators of violence (and their supporting group) remain part of Indonesia’s current government. This means that truth-seeking and reconciliation efforts are difficult, and those who seek truth and reconciliation risk legal prosecution. However, this does not mean that commemoration of violence is not possible. As I have explained before, memories of violence remain part of Indonesia’s memory culture, expressed in our everyday lives, and through different commemorative practices. Therefore, it is more important to explore these existing practices themselves, rather than creating forms of remembrance with a reference to the Holocaust.

The limitation of a human rights approach in analysing the memory of the 1965-66 violence does not only lie in directing ways of remembering the violence in reference to the ‘success story’ of dealing with the past, but also in intensifying the binary position of the dominant and public narrative. The anti-communist narrative is seen as a state-constructed public memory which should be confronted with the counter-narrative, in this case, private narratives of violence against the communists, leftists, and other civilians. Human rights advocates for reconciliation usually bring these private narratives of violence into the public as proof that the violence occurred and, consequently, demand actions from the state. On the one hand, this is understandable, in the context where impunity and silence are salient, private narratives have legal functions. On the other hand, the obsession with making the private narratives public (and countering the anti-communist public narrative) entraps us in taking a similar state or public-centric approach and falling into the practice of standard commemoration. It distances us from the fact that the silence and hidden narratives have created their own language and distinct ways of representing the past in the present. For example, in different places, ruins of a burnt house, a crack on a cupboard or a shattered window caused by the weapons of anti-communist militia attacks are left unrepaired because they remind the surviving families and communities of how their loved ones were taken away.⁴⁸ This shows that the private narratives are not always ‘hidden’ or ‘silenced’, but are actually communicated in their distinct way. This also means that silence should not always be seen as forgetting, or absence of memory, but should be interpreted as a different way of remembering. This is how current memory of the 1965 violence can be understood better: not in the binary competing position of official versus counter-narrative or the public versus private narrative, but through their co-existence,⁴⁹ entanglement, and as I will show in the chapters, embeddedness in their local context and social relationships.

Embedded Remembering: Memory in Its Context

Apart from existing studies of the 1965-66 violence, there are only a few that focus on how this past is represented in the present. In a compilation of oral history essays in *Tahun yang Tak Pernah Berakhir*, the researchers started their volume with a discussion of oral history and the memory of

⁴⁷ Olick, et al. 2011, 30.

⁴⁸ Santikarma 2008, 207.

⁴⁹ Eickhoff, van Klinken and Robinson regarded this as a dualism: although Indonesians still believe in the formal narrative about communism, it does not necessarily mean that they do not sympathise with victims. Eickhoff, van Klinken & Robinson. 2017, 458.

the 1965 violence. They point to the fact that memories of violence are a 'public secret' that never diminish even under Suharto's authoritarian regime.⁵⁰ One of the examples that the editors mentioned was literary works in the early New Order that present the 1965 killings as a central theme in their stories. In terms of intergenerational memory amongst victims of the 1965-66 violence, Andrew Conroe examines post-memory and memory transmission between generations of the 1965-66 victims' family.⁵¹ Conroe elaborated the activism and tension among families of victims' in Central Java, as a dynamic manifestation of remembering the violence. Meanwhile, another group of scholars have traced memory of the 1965 violence that exists in or relates to certain places. The work of Eickhoff, Danardono, Rahardjo & Sidabolok shows how certain sites of memory in Semarang, Central Java, preserved the memory of the 1965 violence. These places became significant in conveying narratives of the 1965 violence in the present because of the constant interaction and re-interpretation by the surrounding people.⁵²

Besides these studies, the anthropological approach in the study of memory of the 1965 violence has added a critical stance to the discussion about the representation of violence. Leslie Dwyer & Degung Santikarma, who studied the 1965 violence in Bali, pointed to the fact that the violence in Bali is entangled in local communities and kin groups, where 'neighbours killed neighbours and relatives killed relatives'.⁵³ Because of this entanglement, memories of violence amongst Balinese should not be seen as 'homogenous repositories of shared understandings of the past'.⁵⁴ In Bali, practices of everyday life, social interaction and language shifted to accommodate memory of the violence and its further consequence (such as being labelled as communists even when the violence had ended). Dwyer & Santikarma argue to focus on the context where memories are formed and transformed, and also on the agency of victims of violence in Bali in remembering 1965, including their silence. They argue that silence is also an active way of remembering and not an absence of memory. Dwyer & Santikarma also stress the insufficient binary approach to memory of the 1965 violence and its reconciliation prescription – to suggest that talking about violent memories (instead of keeping silent) is part of revealing truth and moving towards healing -- because the process of remembering violence is part of a complex and dynamic social interaction.

With the attempt to further develop these initial discussions on memory of violence, I decided to delve into the region of East Java's rural community. It is in these places that most of the killings occurred and community members (who played different roles in the violence) continued to live together in the aftermath. As their social environment and interactions were heavily damaged during the violence, they simultaneously need to cope and adjust to the post-violence situation.

Before commencing my research, I was reminded of the complex diversity and class differentiation in rural society through Robert Hefner's ethno-history study on Tengger communities in lowland and highland Pasuruan, East Java. Hefner examines how the transformation of economic life in different historical periods shaped the identity of the Tengger community. In doing so, he found how 1965 had drastically transformed the socio-economic contour of the community. According to Hefner, the lowlands were dominated by Muslims of NU, while the highlands were a domain of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and PKI. The study criticised the perception of the PKI struggle as merely a class struggle, because in highland Pasuruan, the activists of local PKI consisted of villagers from different class background, campaigning against corruption and demanding the removal of

⁵⁰ Roosa, Ratih & Farid (eds) 2004, 1-23.

⁵¹ Conroe 2017.

⁵² Eickhoff, Danardono, Rahardjo, & Sidabalok 2017.

⁵³ Dwyer & Santikarma 2006, 198.

⁵⁴ Dwyer & Santikarma. 2006, 202.

authorities who mistreated the usage of land.⁵⁵ The party did not demand redistribution of property, or any demands that can be perceived as challenging local class structure. Moreover, Hefner also concluded that the NU acted independently against the communists in the lowlands during the first period after the September 30th Movement, without causing any significant violent acts. The tables were turned when the military began to take control and intensified the anti-communist violence both in the lowlands and highlands of Pasuruan.⁵⁶

Hefner's research indicated that the violence did not erupt in a void. It utilised existing tensions in a community, and transformed it further in the aftermath of violence. This is also the case in the Donomulyo district. Class differences, although not explicitly stated in my fieldwork interviews, are implied through the description of family properties, status, inheritance, and so on. Furthermore, a prominent feature of the patronage relationship in the village shows a continuation of clientelist practices through the course of history. It is this relationship, along with the post-violence rural transformation, that affected remembrance of the 1965-66 violence. Power in memory politics, then, actually resides in this complex network of local power in rural society, which was transformed in violent periods. It explains why one community that experienced the same event, has different ways of remembering the past, including different acts of silence and forgetting. It is because every community member has their own position and tension in the complex social network, before and after the violence. Therefore, they interpret the meaning and impact of violence differently— some benefited from the violence, while others experienced severe losses. This indicates that memory of violence is not solely a result of state propaganda against the left, but more closely connected to its local context, particularly with the social relationships which surround the event. Remembering the 1965-66 violence also shows that memory is a historical process – it is not directly constructed right after a particular event, but continuously evolves through time, even long after the event itself, and is influenced by the outcomes of that event. By zooming in to localities, we can also understand how memories of violence remain alive even under the state's authoritarian repression, preserved through stories of places and family narratives.

Research Methods

In order to understand how memory of violence becomes a survival strategy and also to comprehend the context in which these memories develop, I took two interrelated approaches in this study. First, using historical analysis, I examined how the patronage network and the agrarian transformation have evolved, including their continuity and ruptures in three different periods; namely the colonial period, the revolution and Sukarno's leadership, and the New Order. The analysis includes a specific study on the 1965-66 operation itself, focusing on how the army activated these patronage networks to execute such massive violence and establish the New Order regime.

The second approach is a combination of ethnography and oral history, which aims to explore how society remembers the past in the present. In order to delve into the connection between local experiences and national events, I follow villagers' life history, probing experiences throughout their lifespan. This enables me not only to uncover information that is not documented in formal sources (such as history books, government documents or archives), but also to learn about their understanding and interpretation of the past. This ethnographic approach also allows me to look into transformations that occur at a local level, as a cause of national affairs and policies, specifically after the Reformasi era. Moreover, combining historical analysis and ethnographic methods enables me to look at the continuity of events in different periods of time, connecting their causes and effects.

⁵⁵ Hefner 1990, 209.

⁵⁶ Hefner 1990, 210-211.

Research Area



PICTURE 1. MALANG REGENCY IN EAST JAVA

The Case of East Java

As I have mentioned earlier, I opted to focus in East Java to study memory of the 1965-66 violence because it is one of the worst-affected areas in the violence (the other areas being Central Java and Bali). Using statistical methods and population data, Siddharth Chandra estimates a total loss of 175,169 lives in East Java alone, although his study could not further explain the reasons behind this number.⁵⁷ Violence in this province is characterised mainly by salient participation of civilian and religious organisations, predominantly the Nahdlatul Ulama or NU. Religious reasons are seen as the main motive for their involvement in the violence, for example by portraying the violence against the atheist communists as *jihad* (holy war in Islam).⁵⁸ This resulted in some of the most gruesome killings throughout 1965-66. Body parts were exposed in public, to exhibit the fate of these communists.⁵⁹ This fact has led some scholars to believe that the nature of the conflict in East Java was basically a group clash between religious organisations and the PKI. This was reflected, for example, in Hermawan Sulitstyo's study in Kediri and Jombang which emphasises the minor role of the army in those two areas, by giving the arena to NU protagonists to end previous political conflicts with violence. The slaughter became uncoordinated when local Moslem youths, with the approval of their religious leaders, were given the opportunity to kill the communists.⁶⁰ A similar study by Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko on the violence in Bali and East Java also emphasises the role of political men or

⁵⁷ Chandra 2017, 1078.

⁵⁸ Young 1990, 87.

⁵⁹ Pipit Rochijat's account of the violence in Kediri recorded the hanging of male genitals in front of houses in the prostitution complex. Rochijat 1985, 44.

⁶⁰ Sulistyo 2000, 244.

activists (instead of ordinary peasants, *santri*, or villagers), who were members of or had ties to anti-PKI organisations, in the violence.⁶¹

Other scholars have a different opinion about the case of East Java. Regarding the portrayal of the 1965-66 killings as religious conflict, Kate McGregor and Greg Fealy argued that socioeconomic and political factors were more dominant than religion. This was reflected, for example, by the growing popularity of the PKI in East Java and their campaign against the elitist *kyais* (Islamic religious leaders).⁶² Another study in East Java, specifically South Blitar, by Vannessa Hearman, also reflects a different opinion than Sulistyono's and Sudjatmiko's horizontal conflict approach. Relying on oral history interviews of survivors, perpetrators and community members in the areas where the violence occurred, she highlights that although violence in East Java was often portrayed as a horizontal conflict, structure and organisation by the army were a crucial element in triggering the violence against the left.⁶³ In accordance with these previous studies on the violence in East Java, in chapter 3, I will elaborate more on the military operation in East Java based on the Military Regional Command (Komando Daerah Militer/ Kodam) V Brawijaya archives. This strengthens the argument that the military structurally encouraged and coordinated the involvement of civilians in the violence.

The Donomulyo District

The Donomulyo district is one of the 33 districts in the Malang regency.⁶⁴ Located 34 km south of Kepanjen, the Regency capital of Malang. The subdistrict of Donomulyo covers an area of 6.47% of the whole regency, or about 192.6 km².⁶⁵ With only 62,627 people in Donomulyo, the population density in the district is only 325.17 people/km², making it the least populated district in the Regency.⁶⁶ The district is a typical dry-land area, not a wet-rice or *sawah* cultivated land. The total area of dry land in the district is much larger (16,279 Ha) compared to *sawah* land (3,173.40 Ha).⁶⁷ This explains why the most common crops in Donomulyo are corn and sugar cane,⁶⁸ instead of rice. As we will see in the next chapter, as a result of the stagnation of the agricultural sector in South Malang, villagers have had to seek other opportunities, such as migrant labour. Currently, Donomulyo has become the second largest supplier of migrant workers from Malang Regency, with Hongkong as their top destination.⁶⁹

Donomulyo consists of 10 villages (*desa*) and 39 hamlets.⁷⁰ However, considering the distance and availability of informants, this research only covers three villages and six hamlets. For ethical and security reasons, which I will explain in more detail below, I will not mention the name of the villages, instead I will use a pseudonym "Banyujati" area to refer to the three villages covered in this study. Within a few weeks after I started my fieldwork, I realised that Donomulyo has a complex history.

⁶¹ Sudjatmiko 1992, 236-237.

⁶² McGregor & Fealy 2012, 129-130.

⁶³ Hearman 2018, 80.

⁶⁴ The administrative division of territory in Indonesia is as follows: (1) province (*propinsi*), (2) city or regency (*kota/ kabupaten*), (3) district (*kecamatan*), (4) village (*desa*), (5) hamlet (*dusun*), (6) citizen associations (*Rukun Warga/ RW*), and (7) neighborhood associations (*Rukun Tetangga/ RT*).

⁶⁵ Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Malang 2018, 12.

⁶⁶ Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Malang 2018, 109.

⁶⁷ Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Malang 2017, 58-60.

⁶⁸ Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Malang 2017, 57.

⁶⁹ In 2017, Sumbermanjing has the highest number of migrant workers (288 people), while Donomulyo has 240 migrant workers. These numbers might be understated, because the statistics bureau (BPS) usually uses data from formal agencies of migrant workers. However, there are also unregistered agencies, which means that their workers are not recorded in the statistics. Kabupaten Malang dalam Angka 2018, 129.

⁷⁰ http://donomulyo.malangkab.go.id/?page_id=5, accessed on 10 December 2018.

Donomulyo was founded by refugees of the 18th century Javanese war⁷¹ and became part of the colonial economy once a Dutch rubber and coffee plantation was established. The story of plantation in Donomulyo resembles the dynamics of the South Malang ex-colonial plantation belt, from the west (Donomulyo) to the east (Dampit and Tirtoyudho), which later shaped the patronage network in this area. Leftist organisations, mainly the PKI and the peasants' union (Barisan Tani Indonesia/ BTI) tried to organise and mobilise the agrarian movement in the district, but this was suppressed during the 1965 military operation. The adjacent location of Donomulyo with South Blitar also turned the district into one of the escape areas of PKI leaders, which was later targeted by the Trisula military operation in 1968.



PICTURE 2. LOCATION OF DONOMULYO DISTRICT IN MALANG REGENCY

Sources and Approaches

The historical approach in this research uses archival study to reconstruct different historical periods of Donomulyo, and to highlight some continuities between those periods. For the colonial period, I used different sources of colonial archives, company reports of NV. Kali Tello, and Dutch newspapers. I also combined these sources with oral history information from villagers whose families had worked on the plantations. Reconstructing the history of Donomulyo is very challenging, because the sources are limited and scattered. Not to mention that the administrative government of the area during the colonial era was different from the present administration, making it difficult to locate the information on colonial Donomulyo in the archives. Eventually, I managed to reconstruct the administrative structure of Donomulyo during the colonial administration. During that period, Donomulyo was part of the Pagak subdistrict, in the Senggoeroeh district, the Malang regency, the Pasoeroean residency. Apart from the NV Kali Tello company report, there are only very few documents that mention Donomulyo. However, there are more sources about the Pagak subdistrict

⁷¹ For the description about the Java war, see Ricklefs 2001.

and Senggoeroeh district, which I used to construct a more or less overall picture of Donomulyo in the colonial period. Nevertheless, I realise that although descriptions of districts and even the regency are more accessible, variations at village level may exist.

The early independence period is even more difficult to reconstruct as sources on this war period are more limited, scattered and patchy. Most of the information that I used to reconstruct this period came from newspapers, several agrarian research reports in the 1960s, and oral history interviews with villagers in Donomulyo. The period after independence in this research specifically focuses on the leftist movement around 1950s-1960s, although it is very hard to find accurate information on this movement in the Donomulyo district. Meanwhile, the military operation and violence in 1965-1968 in Malang were reconstructed based on the analysis on the Kodam V Brawijaya military archives and oral history of the villagers. Classified CIA documents, archives from the Malang Regency, the Regional Development Body (Bappeda), and East Java provincial archives also added to this period, and constitute most of the rural dynamics in the New Order era. Moreover, documents from the Malang diocese were also used to elaborate the dynamics of the Catholic community in Donomulyo, especially in the post-1965 period.

Meanwhile, the ethnography and oral history approach include interviews of 38 people who are residents of Donomulyo, former activists in Malang city and other sub-districts. The informants from Donomulyo have a wide range of backgrounds: those who directly experienced the violence, who can be considered as being victims, local collaborators, witnesses; and those who have not directly experienced the violence, such as local school teachers and younger generations in the village. Besides the interviews, I also conducted two focus group discussions with young people in the Banyujati area, who are not necessarily connected to the 1965-66 violence (i.e. not part of the victim's or perpetrator's family). I encountered my informants through an informal snowballing method – one interviewee led me to another. I realise that this method can entail some disadvantages, for example, a person may only refer to people in his or her own network. To overcome this, I tried to go beyond the network of my key informants, and to delve into different groups in the area. In order to capture historical continuity and local interpretations, I usually started the interviews with questions on the interviewee's childhood experiences and then continued to discuss different periods of their lifespan. I asked them to describe their surroundings: activities, festivities, food, education, relationship with families and other children, and so on. This strategy is not only efficient to gather narratives on the pre-and post-independence situation, but also to avoid resistance that usually occurs when talking directly about the 1965-66 violence. It is important to note that I did not experience avoidance or reluctance from the interviewees on this matter – which reflects that the violence was an open secret. I recorded all of the interviews and also made field notes.⁷²

As part of an ethnographic and oral history study, I also participated in some of the villagers' activities, such as the Independence Day festivities, Catholic community prayer, and other celebrations (*tasakuran*). I also visited and observed activities in several places, such as the village head's office, a pilgrimage site (i.e. the cemetery of the village pioneer) and a spiritual site (i.e. St. Mary's Grotto/ *Goa Maria*). When I discovered that narratives of violence are also attached to places, I visited some of the sites that frequently appear in my interviews. This includes two monuments, one community hall, and two mass graves. In order to explore these sites, I discussed with several

⁷² Due to security reasons, these data (recordings and field notes) are under embargo. I am currently thinking and discussing with professionals to make the data available in the far future.

people who are attached to them (such as the victim's family, caretaker or *juru kunci*), and also to the people who live nearby.

Ethics

Looking at the political developments in Indonesia today, where communism is still prohibited, this research topic can be considered a sensitive topic. At present, the Indonesian government still refuses to consider the communists and other leftists as 'victims'. Villagers in Donomulyo who were accused of being communists, have experienced different kinds of repression by the state, i.e. detention, confiscation of properties, prohibition to vote, and so on. Some of these people, although quite open about the violence, still feel uneasy and anxious when talking about this particular past. Their position is also prone to re-labelling by the state. Therefore, I prioritise their safety. In terms of consent, I could not request a written consent, because signing a paper is associated with formalities and it may cause discomfort, suspicion, distrust, and even rejection to participate in this research. To replace the written consent, I asked verbal consent from every interviewee before I started to record the interviews. In each of the interviews, I explained my identity and the purpose of this study, which was to write the history of Donomulyo. I presented the research topic as something broad, to avoid creating discomfort if I directly pointed to the 1965-66 violence. I also confirmed the privacy aspect to all interviewees, ensuring that their names would be changed into pseudonyms (although some of them wanted to use their real name). Therefore, all the names of informants in this thesis, in and outside Donomulyo, are pseudonyms. This includes villagers whom I did not interview or meet directly, but are part of the narratives of violence, such as deceased members of a victim's family and former village heads. An exception applies for prominent national figures such as military generals or commanders (i.e., Basuki Rachmat, Suharto, and so on), and activists of mass organisations at the national level (i.e., Cosmas Batubara, Father Beek, Harry Tjan Silalahi, and others). The use of the term the Banyuwangi area also serves the purpose of protection, to avoid any lead that can point to certain interviewees.

Structure Of the Thesis

This thesis consists of seven chapters, divided into two main parts. The next two chapters focus on the historical reconstruction, while the remaining three chapters focus on the memory culture of 1965-66 violence. I arranged the structure in such a way, so that the first historical chapters will provide a clearer context of the historical event itself, in this case, the violence, that will be the main focus of this memory study. By understanding the rural context, the military operation, and the transformations that these events caused, readers will be able to comprehend how and why memories of violence develop in such a way. After building an introduction of this study in chapter 1, the second chapter postulates the continuity of rural differentiation and how events in Indonesian history reshape this differentiation along with its embedded patronage network. The chapter begins with a description of a colonial plantation in Donomulyo, followed by its destruction in 1948, during the war of independence. The chapter also describes Donomulyo's situation in the period from the 1950s to the 1960s, especially the leftist movement promoting agrarian reform, followed by the agrarian development project in the New Order era.

The third chapter describes the anti-communist operation in East Java, specifically in Malang. This chapter elaborates further the argument that the Indonesian military, since its establishment, has always been a political body that continues to form alliances with civilian elites. Furthermore, these civilians use their patronage connections with the military for their own agendas. I begin this chapter by describing the growing power of the military at the local level prior to 1965. I will also describe existing studies and analyses about the violence in East Java, particularly arguments about the NU and the military. Using documents from the Kodam V Brawijaya archives, and interviews with the

villagers, I will show the structural nature of the military operation in Malang, where the military issued explicit instructions to use civilian forces. The documents also show the army's involvement in establishing the New Order regime at the regional level.

Chapter four is the first memory chapter, which discusses the memory culture of the 1965-66 violence in a rural context. The main argument of this chapter is that instead of being formed exclusively by the state, memories of violence are embedded in their localities. The local context in this case is the patronage network that highly influences villagers' interpretation of their local experiences, connecting the national with the local. Another context is the agrarian transformation that emerged after the violence, which aggravated rural differentiation through its capitalistic policies which only benefited a few groups in the village. Embeddedness in this context also shows the intersection of the personal and political in the villagers' memory culture. More importantly, embedded memories also reflect silence as a strategy to deal with the past.

The last two chapters discuss the means of remembering that preserved memory of violence in the village, despite denial and repression from the state. Chapter five discusses the memory landscape in Donomulyo, which refers to *lieux de memoire* or sites of memory that relate to the anti-communist violence. In this landscape, state-initiated monuments exist together with locally-initiated sites of memory, such as mass graves. While the first have lost their relevance today because of their top-down nature, the latter are still commemorated by villagers. Some of these sites are also used by villagers as an instrument to maintain their relationship with state patrons.

Chapter six discusses the memories of the young generation, especially the second generation of victims' and perpetrators' families. By looking at stories of four families, we will see how their memory of violence develops, and how silence becomes an integral part of it. Silence itself does not simply mean forgetting or an absence of knowledge, but is a result of negotiation between the past and present; and also between the private and the political. This chapter also describes history education and community gatherings as moments where narratives of violence travel between generations. The conclusion in chapter seven will summarise the main findings of this study and discuss the major questions in the field of memory studies and state violence. I will also reflect on these results and the methods used, and share the implications for reconciliation processes in the present and future.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONTEXT OF REMEMBERING: AGRARIAN INEQUALITIES AND PATRONAGE IN DONOMULYO

During my fieldwork, I noticed the different backgrounds and status of the people whom I interviewed. Some of them are local businessmen, retired school teachers or retired village officials who usually own land, pursue higher education in the city, and were involved in political activism either in the past or present. Their children also attended higher education institutions, sometimes national or even foreign universities, and many of them have permanent well-paid jobs in the city. These types of interviewees are usually well-known by other villagers, because they are considered as *tokoh*, a respected figure in the area and a counsellor for community or family matters. Meanwhile, other interviewees that I encountered live a very different life. Their houses are usually much smaller, sometimes almost in ruins. Some of them still do not have a legal land certificate, and struggle to till their land because of their physical condition or limited capital. They could not afford to send their children to universities, so most of these children work as hard labourers, such as sand miners, tire repairmen, or small entrepreneurs. In short, in the first few months of my fieldwork, I realised that villagers in Donomulyo are very different socially and economically.

This social and class differentiation existed far before the 1965 violence. Interviews with villagers soon unravelled stories about the village's first settlers with supernatural powers, where some of their descendants also became *tokoh* (local leaders) and village landowners today. Other stories revolved around a colonial plantation, where some of my interviewees' parents used to work, either as daily labourers or in higher positions such as overseer. These stories reflect the village as "the basis of a complex political and economic framework" in contrast to rural society as a static void, filled with subsistence-oriented peasants.⁷³ This complexity reflects the position of the state, which is not an external factor that resides far in central-national politics, but fully present and can be seen by zooming into patronage relationships that influence rural dynamics.⁷⁴ These relationships that already existed in pre-colonial societies were used and sharpened further by the colonial economy, the war of independence, and the New Order regime.

The aim of this chapter is to explore how patronage relationships evolved through the course of history, increasing the inequality in an agrarian society. To understand the presence of the state in these rural patronage politics, I used Joel Migdal's concept of the State in Society. Migdal perceives the state not as an independent and autonomous power, nor as a separate hierarchy from society, but the state is part of a *mélange* of social organisations within society.⁷⁵ For Migdal, the state in society model should explore its two main elements; first, the strong image of a clearly bounded, unified organisation that can be spoken of in singular terms, as if it were a single, centrally motivated actor performing in an integrated manner to rule a clearly defined territory. Second, the practices of a heap of loosely connected parts or fragments, which stands inside and outside the official state borders and often triggers a conflicting set of rules with one another and the official law.⁷⁶ Migdal then sees society not as a static formation, but as a result of struggles and conflicts between the

⁷³ Elson 1984, 12.

⁷⁴ Hart 1989, 31-32.

⁷⁵ Migdal 2001, 49.

⁷⁶ Migdal 2001, 22.

above two elements, which includes numerous strategies chosen for individual survival or upward mobility.

This framework is beneficial when we zoom in to localities such as Donomulyo, because in this context of rural community, the state does not reside far away in central or national politics, but is part of a *mélange*, comprising a network of civilians and local elites, and very much present in everyday life. It is this same context and network that later constitute the memory of violence in rural Donomulyo. This chapter aligns with previous micro-agrarian studies in Java that use a historical-anthropology approach.⁷⁷ These studies follow the structural agrarian transformation in a particular setting and delve into the impact of those changes in society. Following a similar approach, this chapter will explore these questions: how were inequalities shaped and maintained in different historical periods in Donomulyo? Who were involved in maintaining and confronting those inequalities? How did violent episodes in Indonesia's history affect rural differentiation in Donomulyo?

Colonial Era: Village Establishment and the Village Elites

From different oral sources, the origin of the Banyujati area⁷⁸ relates to the Javanese wars that took place in Central Java against Dutch colonialism, against the backdrop of the global capitalism and imperialism of the Netherlands. Villagers believed that the first settlers of Banyujati were the surviving troops from these wars who migrated to East Java to build a new livelihood. In some interviews, villagers mentioned *Pangeran Samber Nyawa* (Prince of Catcher of the Soul) – a prominent figure in several wars in mid-18th century Central Java. He was an aristocrat from Surakarta-Central Java, whose real name is Prince Mangkunegara I of Surakarta, or better known as Mas Said.⁷⁹ Meanwhile, other villagers believe that the first settlers of Banyujati were the former troops from a different Java war in 1825-30 between Diponegoro (eldest son of Central Java's aristocrat, Sultan Hamengkubuwana III) and the colonial government.⁸⁰ Despite the limitations with regard to confirming these stories of Banyujati's origin, both versions imply a wave of migration from Central Java because of the colonial wars, resulting in the emergence of new inhabitants in some parts of East Java. Although these groups arrived as migrants, they became a privileged group, assuming the role of village headmen and landowners.⁸¹ Up to today, the graveyard of the village pioneer became a site of pilgrimage and a centre for traditional village activities (such as village cleansing or *bersih desa* – an annual communal activity to pray for a better condition of the village in the upcoming years).

Records from the 1870s showed that the land tenure system in Java was bounded by communal regulations in the village. Analysing a survey report from 1868-69 in Java, Hiroyoshi Kano describes two main features of land tenure: the heritable individual possession and the communal possession.⁸² In the individual possession system, the system works as follows: a particular individual

⁷⁷ For examples of similar studies, see Kanō 1990; Hefner 1990; and Yuwono 2018.

⁷⁸ Pseudonym for 3 villages where I conducted my fieldwork. See chapter 1.

⁷⁹ Ricklefs 2001, 127-8. Ricklefs also argued that the appellation 'Samber Nyawa' came from his troop's battle-banner, which expressed the fierce power of Mangkunegara I. Ricklefs 2015, 543-547.

⁸⁰ Ricklefs 2001, 151-2.

⁸¹ In the village of Gondosari, Central Java, the first settlers owned about half of the village's sawah and approximately one-sixth of the village tegal. Throughout generations, not only was their ownership of land extended, but also their control over land, usually by renting to needy villagers. Huskens 1989, 309.

⁸² This survey, called *Eindresume van het onderzoek naar de rechten van den inlander op den grond* (Final summary of the survey on the rights to land of the native population), was conducted by the Dutch colonial authorities and resulted in three-volume reports presented in late 1872. The main aim of this survey was to examine the land right practices of the Indonesians (or natives at that time). The survey area covered all

occupies a plot of land, can hand over the land (due to death or by will) and can freely dispose of it by selling, leasing or pawning the land. However, there were communal restrictions surrounding this individual possession. For example, sometimes it is completely forbidden to sell land, and the right of the possessor is usually recognised by the totality of the village only when he is actually cultivating or interested in cultivating the land.⁸³ Transfer of land to others from another village is prohibited. Meanwhile, in the communal possession system (which was more common in Java at that period), an individual or family uses certain land that is part of the village or hamlet communal land, and therefore, the person does not have the right to hand over or dispose of the land. This system also involves periodic rotation of shares, except in Malang where the distribution of the tenure period and its sharers are fixed (in this case, Kano noted that communal possession in Malang can be considered equal to individual possession, except that there is no freedom of disposition). Moreover, while individual possession does not allow people outside the village to receive land, the communal system allows people from other villages to become sharers after spending a certain period of time in that particular village.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, Kano noted that the sharing system within the communal possession is not completely egalitarian in practice. In some areas, larger shares and priority to choose a site are given to those who own livestock. In other cases, where the village officials have the power to decide on the distribution, it was done arbitrarily in their favour.⁸⁵ Both the individual and communal land tenure system already included a patronage network between landowners and land cultivators, which delineates most of the early agrarian societies.

Kano also argued that this land tenure system in the 1800s does not seem to resemble a landlord system, although the salary land contains a strong element of class relation.⁸⁶ It was the development of a commercial economy, especially an estate economy that further developed the landlord-tenant relationship, by increasing the transfer of arable land and penetrating into class relationships in the village.⁸⁷ This condition was exacerbated by the implementation of several colonial policies on *corvée* labour.⁸⁸ As a result, the communal system expanded, such as was the case in Central and East Java, where land without owners was designated as communal land in order to share the heavy burden of *corvée* labour.⁸⁹

The system also used village heads as brokers, linking cultivator and higher level Indonesian officials not only in terms of tax collection, but also in providing labour for the plantation.⁹⁰ In the districts of Karanglo, Pakis, Sengguruh (in the colonial administration, Donomulyo was part of Sengguruh

residencies in Java and Madura, except Batavia, Kedu, Jogjakarta and Solo. Not all villages in each residency were examined, but at least two of them were selected. For Malang, the survey included villages in the district of Gondanglegi, Pakis, Penanggoengan, Karanglo and Ngantang. Kano 1977.

⁸³ Kano 1977, 11-12.

⁸⁴ Kano 1977, 15-17.

⁸⁵ There are three common methods of distribution of communal land: 1) the village authorities decides on the distribution, 2) an agreement is made among sharers, 3) the shares of village authorities are first determined based on agreement among sharers, and then shares are rotated among the sharers in the same order each time. Kano 1977, 19-20.

⁸⁶ Salary land is land assigned to officials for their private use. For village heads, 5-10 percent of the total communally possessed paddy fields were salary land, which cannot be cultivated by the working hands of the village head's household, resulting in the use of a number of the village labour force to till the land. Kano 1977, 31.

⁸⁷ Kano 1977, 40.

⁸⁸ *Cultuurstelsel*, for example, demanded land allocation to produce export crops to be sold at fixed prices to the colonial government. Ricklefs 2001, 156.

⁸⁹ Paulus (ed) 1917, 824.

⁹⁰ Breman 1983, 6.

district), Turen, and Gondanglegi in Malang, a high official received f 2.50-f 5 per bouw⁹¹ from the company for their services in helping to rent land. Village officials received f 0.50-f 2 for their role in arranging contracts with labourers and crop transporters.⁹² This system often bred corruption and also led to the exploitation of villagers.⁹³ In the Sengguruh district, village heads were involved in tax evasion and land leasing fraud.⁹⁴ The traditional patronage relationship that existed earlier gradually shifted to accommodate the colonial economy. Patronal ties that previously relied on crop-sharing and household chores were now expanded into practices of the money economy.

In the early 1900s, village officials became village elites and landlords, playing a role as brokers, while at the same time enjoying their privileged position in society. Another group that can be considered as being landlords were the *Hadjis* (title for people who went to the pilgrimage in Mecca, which made them respected Islamic leaders in the community), who could own up to 50 bouw of *tegal* land (dry land used for planting non-rice crops), such as was the case in Sumberpucung, Malang.⁹⁵ These elites were the patrons in colonial times. On the one hand, they became a concrete manifestation of the 'state' at the local level, implementing colonial policy and taking advantage of 'the rewards' given for their efforts. On the other hand, this was done through coercive means towards villagers which gradually reinforced the elite's economic and cultural power in society. In return, their clients would receive jobs as plantation workers or land cultivators.

The establishment of the 1870 Agrarian Law enabled private enterprises to rent uncultivated land from the government for up to 75 years.⁹⁶ In the Malang regency, private companies soon made investments particularly in coffee and sugar industries. From 1881 to 1884, almost one-third of the coffee production in Java came from Malang, and in 1922, the regency contributed 19.6% of the whole coffee production in Java and Madura.⁹⁷ Donomulyo also became part of this industry, through the establishment of a coffee and rubber company, NV Kali Tello, which operated in the Northern part of Donomulyo. Starting with 370 bouw of land, the company faced multiple challenges during their first years of production, such as drought, plant diseases and unfavourable market prices of coffee.⁹⁸ Their high-quality products were sent to Holland, while inferior coffees were sold in Surabaya. The challenging first years slowly began to improve through expansion (by adding another 130 bouw of coffee plantation) and diversification of crops (cacao and pepper) in 1902.⁹⁹ Leaf or other plant-related diseases and extreme weather condition (drought and heavy rainfall) remained

⁹¹ One bouw equals 0.7 hectare.

⁹² Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 125. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

⁹³ Ricklefs 2001, 157.

⁹⁴ Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 161-2. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

⁹⁵ Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 18-19. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.


⁹⁶ Paulus (ed) 1917, 18.

⁹⁷ Kanō 1990, 13.

⁹⁸ Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1895. 1895. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

⁹⁹ Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1902. 1902. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

influencing factors of the harvest in Kali Tello throughout the years. In 1910, the company started to invest in rubber by planting more than 17,000 trees aged one to four years, and continued by building a rubber factory two years later.¹⁰⁰



PICTURE 3. RUBBER FACTORY IN KALI TELLO, CA 1934

Source: Verslag over het boekjaar NV. Cultuur-Maatschappij Kali Tello 1934

World War I and disasters affected the distribution of Kali Tello's crops to the Netherlands.¹⁰¹ However, the company continued to operate and in 1922, it occupied 1465 bouw, of which 207 bouw was used for the factory, houses, kampongs, roads; and the other 1258 bouw was used for the coffee and rubber plantations. A few years later, NV Kali Tello started to acquire other companies, namely the adjacent Poerwodadie coffee company, Soember Nongko I-IV rubber company, and Kali Gentong kapok plantation (both in Kediri). However, in 1929, the company started to deteriorate along with the fall of global coffee and rubber prices. The company entered into a financial deficit that resulted in a 10% salary reduction for their European staff, and ceased rubber production in the Soember Nongko plantation in 1931.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1910. 1910. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

¹⁰¹ The yearly report recorded earthquake, Kelud volcano eruption, fire on the plantation, and plague, which affected the plantation's activities. Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1917. 1917. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

¹⁰² Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1931. 1931. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.


Table 1

Size of land, number of trees and harvest of NV Kali Tello in 1928

Plantation	Coffee			Rubber	
	Total size of land (bouw, 1 bouw= 0.7 ha)	Total number of trees	Harvest 1928 (picols; 1 picol = c 61,7 kg)	Total number of trees	Harvest 1928 (in ½ kg)
Kali Tello	1460	932900	14688	103526	486630
Poerwodadie	1568	699572	5008	146773	934364
Soember Nongko	833			86649	304030
Total	3861	1632472	19696	336948	1725024

Source: Verslag Over Het Boekjaar NV. Cultuur-Maatschappij Kali Tello 1931.

Modern infrastructure was built by the company to process coffee and rubber. For example, modern machinery and running fresh water were used to produce latex in the rubber factory.¹⁰³ Electricity was used in the factory and became accessible to the neighbouring kampong, Oemboel Dawe.¹⁰⁴ After the acquisition of the Poerwodadie plantation, the entire coffee factory in Kali Tello was electrically driven from a power plant located in the nearby rubber factory. To enhance the transportation of coffee from Powerwodadie to the factory in Kali Tello, a 2600 m cable car (*kabelbaan*) was operated in July 1926.¹⁰⁵ The company also invested in infrastructure, such as the main road to the railway station (presumably Ngebroek station in Sumberpucung, Malang), and a private road from the plantation to the main road, which made the area accessible for small cars.¹⁰⁶



PICTURE 4. MACHINE ROOM OF THE RUBBER FACTORY IN POERWODADIE

Source: Verslag over het boekjaar 1934 NV. Cultuur-Maatschappij Kali Tello

¹⁰³ Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1914. 1914. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

¹⁰⁴ Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1919. 1919. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

¹⁰⁵ Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1925. 1925. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

¹⁰⁶ Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1925. 1925. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

The opening of new plantations in South Malang increased the number of migrants. Between 1880-85, the population in the Pagak subdistrict tripled due to the opening of new coffee plantations in Sengguruh, Turen and Gondanglegi, facilitated by the opening of the Surabaya-Malang train connection.¹⁰⁷ Besides new labourers who arrived from Central Java, Madurese were also reported as immigrants to this area and were even preferable and more trusted compared to the locals.¹⁰⁸ Migration seems to have increased the labour supply, but was not followed by a rise in job opportunities. This condition caused a fall in wages for labourers within the period of twenty years:

Table 2
Wages for labourers in 1880 and 1900

Type of earnings	Labour Wages	
	1880	1900
Overall earnings per day	f 0.40 and f 0.75 (for men) ¹⁰⁹ f 0.30 and f 0.50 (for women)	f 0.20 (for men) f 0.30 (for women)
Coffee picking	f 0.75 – f 1.25	f 0.50 – f 0.60
Cultivation per bouw (around 30 days of work)	f 20- f 25	f 15
Tilling land for planting (around 90 days of work)	f 50- f 60	f 40

Source: Onderzoek naar de mindere welvaart 1907.

There were no pensions, financial compensations or compensation in labour time when a worker was unable to work.¹¹⁰ Wages fluctuated, and companies often had to compromise between demand by the government to ease the welfare of ‘indigenous people’, and the company’s own budget and harvest.¹¹¹ For example, wages for coffee pickers in Lebak Roto (a coffee plantation in Turen, Malang) fluctuated between f 4.13 per kg in September/ November 1936 to f 2.80 per kg in March/ May 1937 and increased to f 4.68 per kg in September/ November 1937. The plantation administrator in Lebak Roto estimated that these wages were still sufficient to cover the workers’ living cost of 12.5 cents per day.¹¹² For families, the amount was estimated as much lower compared to a single person because of the assumption that married women also worked as labourers and thus also contributed to the total amount of wages per family. However, it seems that this calculation did not take family

¹⁰⁷ Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 5. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

¹⁰⁸ Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 83-4. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

¹⁰⁹ 1 f or Netherlands Guilders = € 0.45

¹¹⁰ Dutch East Indies Welvaartcommissie, Batavia. Onderzoek Naar de Mindere Welvaart Der Inlandsche Bevolking Op Java En Madoera. [IX, Economie van de Desa] : Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten Der Onderzoekingen, 85. 1907. Box 21, folder 21.4, Inventory 2.10.64. Collectie Grijs, Ministerie van Koloniën. Nationaal Archief The Hague, Netherlands.

¹¹¹ Correspondence from NV. Kooy & Coster van Voorhout to De Directie der NV Lebak Roto Cultuur Maatschappij in Amsterdam, 10 December 1937. 2.20.01, inventory 11638. Inventaris van het archief van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), 1824-1964. Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Netherlands.

¹¹² Correspondence from NV. Kooy & Coster van Voorhout to De Directie der NV Lebak Roto Cultuur Maatschappij in Amsterdam, 10 December 1937. 2.20.01, inventory 11638. Inventaris van het archief van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), 1824-1964. Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Netherlands.

size into account, where children and extended family members often live together in one household.

With these unstable conditions, workers tended to move from one type of work to another, depending on the wages and facilities they could obtain. Kali Tello management repeatedly reported difficulty in finding labourers, because of higher wages that were offered by neighbouring plantations, especially the sugar industry, or simply because the people preferred to work in their own fields.¹¹³ To tackle the shortage of labour, besides offering higher wages, the company also provided facilities, such as housing or health care.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, these were not the only way to keep the workers on the plantation. From my conversation with Prambodo, who was born in 1933 on the rubber plantation Gledekan Pancur in Dampit - Malang regency, plantation owners provided workers with other facilities to informally bind them to the plantation. He was the son of a high-overseer assistant. His father organised lower level foremen in different divisions, such as factory, rubber tappers, maintenance, and so on. Prambodo grew up on the plantation, but went to elementary school in the Malang municipality and returned to the plantation during school holidays. During his stay on the plantation, he realised that providing entertainment was one of the Dutch's strategies to keep the workers attached to the company:

[the workers'] wages were paid every week, each Saturday. Lower level foremen, in different divisions, were gathered together by their superiors and their data were submitted to the factory overseer who was responsible for the wages. ... I think the Dutch were very smart. We lived on a plantation, in an isolated area, so they provide us with entertainment [every Saturday]. There were dancers, and also people who played dice [gambling], so I realised the workers were busy with these entertainments. Meanwhile, the Dutch took a break to Malang [municipality], stayed in a hotel or went to *kamar bola* [a place to play billiards]. The workers were drinking, having fun, dancing, and so on. After that, their money was gone, spent just like that. Because they didn't have more money, they would work vigorously again on Monday. ... There were a lot of Madurese workers. ... They were cheap labour on the plantation. ... The Madurese like to play [the dice] or cock fight, and this was allowed by the Dutch. Because by the end [of the week], their money would be gone. Madurese were usually involved in a fight. ... The police usually came to take those people who were fighting. ... That's the life of uneducated workers, maintained by the Dutch to work [on the plantation].¹¹⁵

Prambodo described a lively situation of workers that is not usually recorded in the companies' reports. He depicted the existence of Madurese workers (as also mentioned in colonial reports) and the entertainment that was provided by the companies. According to Prambodo, this was a 'smooth' strategy to keep workers on the plantation. At the same time, he also highlighted the gap between Dutch administrators and ordinary labourers.

A common incident in the 1920s on Javanese plantations was coffee thefts. The first case of coffee theft in Kali Tello was recorded in the company's 1922- annual report, where around 20% of its coffee beans were stolen by a group of coffee thieves. In the following years, women were also

¹¹³ Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1913. 1913. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands

¹¹⁴ Medicine was provided for free, while patients with serious illnesses were sent to a clinic in Malang. An outpatient clinic was established in 1927 near Kali Tello and Poerwodadie, where the plantation's residents can be treated by a doctor who comes from Malang every once a week. Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1927. 1927. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

¹¹⁵ Interview with Prambodo, Malang municipality, 29 July 2016 #14.04-18.15

involved in these thefts.¹¹⁶ NV. Kali Tello used several means to eliminate coffee thefts, including severe punishment for the thieves, erecting barbed-wire around the plantation, special plantation police, and cooperation between plantation police and *desa* (village) police.¹¹⁷ The company reported that the numbers of thefts increased due to the abolishment of the *koffie-passen stelsel* (a pass that authorised coffee transport) around 1931. Initially, in Malang, a pass or permission was required for local owners to possess, process, or transport coffee. The pass was considered necessary because of the frequent occurrence of coffee theft, caused by the coffee boom (high prices for coffee) in the 1920s and insufficient security on plantations.¹¹⁸ When coffee prices fell dramatically during the great depression around 1929-1930, and the security system had been improved, the passes were abolished. However, it did not diminish the acts of thievery. Therefore, it is highly possible that the abolishment of the *koffiepassen stelsel* may not have been the determining factor for the higher degree of coffee thefts, but the combined factors of economic crisis, migration, and fluctuation in labour wages. For the locals, thievery was an act of surviving the dire living condition in colonial times.

Workers on the Plantation

The plantation affected the livelihood of villagers in Banyuwati, especially for those who worked on the plantation. Different positions within the labour force (for example, coffee pickers and overseers or *mandor*) generated different amounts of income for the locals, which enabled them to accumulate more or less capital for their families. Today, these differences can still be seen in the lives of the second or third generation of those former workers. One of these families was that of Burmudji, who was born in 1952, a former school teacher and a retired staff member in the district education office. His father, Darsa, was born in 1917 and was one of the descendants of Banyuwati's first settlers. He managed to finish school in *Ongko Loro* and *Ongko Telu* (schools established by the Dutch for the natives) and became a teacher in Kebon Agung, another district in Malang. Around 1930, he became a Catholic and, as part of the Catholic mission, Darsa was assigned to teach in a newly established Catholic school in Donomulyo.¹¹⁹ After a few years, he established another Catholic school in a village outside the Banyuwati area. Together with two other Catholics in the village, Darsa was respected as the pioneer of the Catholic community in the district. His ability to read, write, and count, also enabled him to work as an overseer in the Kali Tello plantation.

When the plantation still existed, my father was a *mandor* (overseer) of labourers. But don't imagine it was like a *mandor* today. It was more like a group chief. For example, there were ten labourers, so my father was the chief. This chief is called *mandor*. Because my father was considered 'educated' [quotation marks emphasised by Burmudji], although he only attended *Ongko Loro* and *Ongko Telu*... he was considered educated. So he was assigned administrative matters. ... So [for] wages or other [matters], it was enough to only call for the chief, and then the boss gave instructions. ... My father also distributed the wages. Although we were poor, we were not *that* poor compared to other people around us.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ A newspaper article in 1939 reported that a woman together with a 15-year-old girl were arrested after stealing 3.5 kg of coffee beans. While the girl was returned to her parents, the woman was imprisoned for six weeks and fined f 7.50 for using a fake name. "De Koffiediefstallen in Zuid Malang", 12. 1939. *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad*. September 22, 1939.

¹¹⁷ Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1929; 1930. 1929 & 1930. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

¹¹⁸ "De Nieuwe Koffie Ordonantie", III-1. 1931 *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad*. July 13, 1931.

¹¹⁹ In 1938, *Sekolah Rendah Katolik* was established in Donomulyo, but later closed during the Independence war. It was reopened in 1948 and obtained official permission from the Regent of Malang in 1950 as a *Sekolah Rakyat Katolik*/ Catholic Elementary School. Suhadiyono et.al 2010

¹²⁰ Interview with Burmudji, Kepanjen, 6 December 2016 #01.09.29-01.11.20

Burmudji is fully aware of his family's status in the village. Darsa's educational background had led him to become a teacher, an overseer of plantation labourers, and a respected Catholic leader in the area. Reflected by the case of Burmudji's family, the existence of the Kali Tello plantation had contributed to the class and status formation of the villagers.

Being part of the plantation also enabled villagers to extend their capital ownership. This was the experience of Mrs Aji Marlan's father. Aji Marlan himself was the village secretary in the New Order era and the son of a local businessman, who traded cattle (mostly cows) around different areas in the district. His father-in-law, later joined the business and both of them became the village's 'rich men', according to Marlan. Furthermore, his father also became a respected religious figure, with connections to Hajj around the area because of his trading business. Aji Marlan's father built the first mosque in the hamlet, and Marlan became an Ansor (a youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama, one of Indonesia's prominent Islamic organisations) activist later on. Both fathers of Mr and Mrs Marlan had already shown economic managerial capabilities even before they collaborated in the business, which started through the work on the plantation.

Mrs Aji Marlan: [it was] my father. My grandmother sold *gethuk* (Javanese sweets made with cassava and shredded coconut) in the place where the people worked. And her son, my father, was the only child. He worked with the Dutch, but only to tap the rubber, not as an overseer. He was always given a packet of food [by his mother], but he did not eat it, instead he sold it to his friend. Then when he ate, he ate with my grandmother. He constantly saved the money, so he could buy a *sawah* (rice paddy field). He was always an economist ever since he was young. He worked with the Dutch. ... The Dutch paid their labourers, there was no forced labour. People were paid daily, but the wages were low.¹²¹

Although wages for labourers were low, Mrs Aji Marlan's father managed to overcome this by selling his food ration. The money that he saved by working on the plantation, and from the cattle business later on, was used to purchase large amounts of land in the village. This, together with the land that he inherited from Marlan's grandfather, and his network of Islamic figures, also positioned the family in the village elite group.

However, there were also other villagers outside the elite circle who worked on the plantation. This was the case of Marwono, which was very different from the family of Aji Marlan or Burmudji. Marwono, born around 1936 or 1937, is currently a farmer who owns a small plot of land. His land is planted with food crops, mainly cassava and a few cacao trees, and also timber (*sengon* type). In our conversation, he admitted that he had had a difficult childhood, growing up without knowing his parents and then he lost his aunt who took care of him.

I was born in Beji Rejo (an area in the Kasembon district, Malang). There was a coffee and rubber plantation there [in Banyuwati area]. My aunt and grandmother worked as labourers in the factory. There was a factory and a plantation. They picked coffee beans during the harvest season, and at other times, they worked as labourers on the plantation. ... When I was small, I remember my grandmother and aunt worked on the plantation. My brother and uncle, who also worked there, usually came home and brought firewood. Then they sold it. Wages at that time were very low, but I don't remember how low they were. But it was not enough for us to live on. We ate more vegetables. The value of firewood was really unpredictable. Sometimes we traded it for food, *tiwul* (cassava-based meal), to add to our daily menu. ... The people worked in the factory, they came from the surrounding area. There were no migrants from outside. The Dutch managed the factory, but the overseers were mostly Javanese. There were Dutch people, but only a few. ... There were usually feasts during holidays, all the workers gathered in the factory. Some of the food crops, including corn in the factory, were distributed to the workers. Once I also grilled the corn until dry. There was no entertainment

¹²¹ Interview with Mr and Mrs Aji Marlan, Donomulyo, 15 May 2017 #01.10.33-01.12.43

during the feast, but only an invitation to eat together. We did not use plates at that time, but only banana leaves.¹²²

Marwono's family migrated to Banyujati because of the work opportunities on the plantation. Similar to Aji Marlan, Marwono mentioned the low wages for plantation workers, especially for his large extended family. They relied only on their limited wages, selling firewood, and free crops from feasts, Marwono's family did not have any reserved funds, let alone were they able to buy land for their property.

The family history of Burmudji, Aji Marlan, and Marwono illustrates the aggravated class relationship that was influenced by colonial industry, enabling village elites to extend their capital, leading to intensified landlordism and escalating inequality in the village. Participating in the colonial plantation industry enhanced their position as patrons, increasing their capital and connection to the colonial state. From the case of Donomulyo, it is interesting to note that people like Burmudji or Aji Marlan became members of the village elite not only because of their economic status, but also because of their religious and cultural connections. Aji Marlan came from a religious elite circle, while Burmudji is the descendant of the village's first settlers who were considered sacral by the locals. In other words, their positions as patrons in society are a result of intertwined factors of tradition, religion and economic position. However, challenges against the position of these patrons started to emerge after the independence war in 1945-50. The closing of the Dutch company because of the war provided the opportunity for villagers to occupy former plantation land.

The War of Independence, 1945-1950

The remains of the Kali Tello plantation are hard to find in Donomulyo today. Buildings, traces of the *kabelbaan*, or coffee and rubber trees are no longer present in the Banyujati area. The only remaining trace of this colonial plantation was the road that became the village's main road. From the story of the villagers, I understand that the Japanese occupation (1942-45) and the Indonesian war of independence (1945-49) had destroyed everything owned by NV. Kali Tello. Whereas there were no strong memories or archive information about the Japanese occupation in this area, memories about the independence war still linger in the villagers' memories, such as in Marwono's story.

When I went to school, the plantation was already gone, occupied by the people. Because people did not have any land, and the Dutch had already been evicted. ... If we do not destroy it, they will return, that was what people said. All the coffee and rubber trees were destroyed, and replaced by food crops, to be consumed by the people. [Grace: Did you see the destruction?] I was still very young, I did not understand much. I saw people running around, burning the factories, like a riot. There was a commander, but I did not know who it was. The factory was burned down, but I did not know by whom. Back then, during the coffee harvest period, the coffee was sent with a kind of box, automatically moved by itself with a hanging cable (Marwono was referring to the *kabelbaan*). ... I also did not know about the land distribution, but I think there was somebody who arranged it. [Grace: How much did your family receive?] We got one yard, one hectare, if I'm not mistaken. They calculated the number of family members, small or large.¹²³

This incident in Marwono's childhood memory happened in 1947. During the revolutionary war in 1945-1948, most plantations in the South Malang plantation belt were destroyed. Prambodo, who spent his childhood years in a rubber plantation in another South Malang plantation area (Dampit), also witnessed how the Japanese destroyed the rubber trees and removed them (although no further information can be obtained on the use of these rubber trees). In the first years of

¹²² Interview with Marwono, Donomulyo, 16 September 2016 #02.45-10.38.

¹²³ interview with Marwono, Donomulyo, 16 September 2016 #14.36-21.02.

independence, most of the rubber trees were gone, so the people started to convert the abandoned area into farmland. Even people from outside the plantation migrated to the area, destroy the remaining trees, and established land for themselves. In 1948, the factory in Dampit was scorched, bombed by the Indonesian guerrillas.¹²⁴ The materials from the factory, such as iron, were looted. Some of them were sold, others were used as materials to build villagers' houses. There seemed to be no law enforcement, according to Prambodo. People just took whatever they wanted; even Prambodo's family house was built with some of the materials from the factory. Prambodo also mentioned that guerrillas and refugees from outside the village also used the plantation land in order to survive.¹²⁵

It was difficult to trace how and who coordinated the squatting of ex-plantation land. However, this during this period of war and land-squatting, a new player in the agrarian business started to emerge: the Indonesian army. For example, a report from NV Kooy & Coster van Voorhout in 1951 mentioned that a former TNI (Indonesian army) formed an alliance to established NV. Sumi, which used the former plantation lands of Wonokoio, Banduardjo, Alas Tledak, Donowarie and Kali Tello.¹²⁶ There is no further information on NV. Sumi, but it is likely that the company was unable to survive after independence. With new inhabitants in the area, former plantation land soon became *desa darurat* (emergency village) and in the 1950s, it became a source of conflict with companies or the government during the reclamation period.

In general, Dutch plantations in Indonesia were either destroyed during the Revolution or occupied by surrounding villagers. If they survived, they were returned to their previous Dutch owners and became nationalised in the late 1950s. The case of Kali Tello is an example of the first,¹²⁷ while other plantations in South Malang (and some areas in Indonesia) fall into the second category. In cases where plantations were destroyed, land occupation became a major issue. Opinions differed as, on the one hand, land-squatting was considered a progressive realisation of land reform and, on the other hand, it was considered as an act of theft by plantation owners and Indonesian government institutions.¹²⁸ When the government eventually 'tolerated' this massive land squatting, it was faced with an incongruity between 'the actual land situation, the official rules and the state registration system'.¹²⁹ In cases where plantations were nationalised, the role of Leftist organisations was prominent in the process. Local administrations formed *Panitia Pengembalian Milik Asing*

¹²⁴ This was known as the scorched earth (*bumi hangus*) tactics, part of the Indonesian Republican Army's guerilla tactics, geared towards inhibiting Dutch economic reconstruction. Nasution 1953, 20. The yearly report 1941-1949 of NV Kali Tello also stated that their factories, plantations and dwellings were destroyed as a result of the scorched earth tactic.

¹²⁵ Interview with Prambodo, Malang municipality, 29 July 2016 #46.11-49.39

¹²⁶ In this period, there was competition between different military groups to legalize ownership of former plantation lands. The group from NV. Sumi was competing with TNI group led by Oemar Maksim, who had strong connections with ALS (*Algemeen Landbouw Syndicaat*). Correspondence from NV. Kooy & Coster van Voorhout to De Directie der NV Lebak Roto Cultuur Maatschappij in Amsterdam, 12 March 1951. 2.20.01, inventory 11636. Inventaris van het archief van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), 1824-1964. Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Netherlands.

¹²⁷ When an Agricultural and Technical expert, R. Ismantri, visited the south Malang area in August 1948, he reported that all the estates of Poerwodadie and Kali Tello had been completely destroyed and only 2% of the rubber remained. Copy Certificate Re: Condition of Estates and Factories South Malang Area, August 3, 1948. Inventory 11636. Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij (NHM). Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Netherlands. NV Kali Tello decided not to reinvest in the plantation and decided to divert their assets to established a tobacco company. Verslag Over Het Boekjaar 1940-49. 1949. NEHA ZK 60163. Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

¹²⁸ Lund & Rachman 2016, 1317.

¹²⁹ Bedner 2016, 41.

(Committee of Restoration of Foreign Property), who had the duty to restore foreign property to the owners. The committee consisted of union representatives, peasants, civil and military officials and plantation owners; and the first two had strong positions in the restoration processes.¹³⁰ In many cases, negotiations in this committee were difficult and even resulted in deadlocks, such as the case in South Malang, where no agreement could be reached on compensation funds for the plantation land.¹³¹

It could be said that the strongest union in the negotiation process was Sarbupri (*Serikat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia*/ The Indonesian Plantation Labour Union), which was founded in 1947 and subsequently became closely related to PKI. In the North Sumatra plantation, for example, Sarbupri became the vanguard to strive for better working conditions for plantation workers. They organised strikes to demand shorter working hours, and protested against sexual abuse of female workers by their superiors.¹³² During the nationalisation around 1957-1959, a number of plantations fell into the hands of the army, such as in the case of the Ngadirejo sugar plantation in Kediri.¹³³ Intense disputes (often intermingled with religious and cultural factors) between the military-backed sugar company and the Sarbupri union together with the peasants continued in most of these plantations until the fall of the leftist movement in 1965.

When villagers in the Banyujati area started to occupy the former plantation land, it did not automatically lead to an improvement of their economic situation. Destruction of the plantation meant that the villagers lost the village's largest economic sector, including its infrastructure (i.e. electricity, housing) and facilities (i.e. health care). It also means that the village's money economy that was introduced by the colonial plantation industry became disrupted with the loss of the plantation. Even when villagers eventually managed to own their land, tilling and planting was a whole different story. The quality of soil had changed after the intense exploitation of the coffee and rubber plantation. The dry-soil character and limited rainfall also made food crop farming very difficult. It was not surprising when East Java experienced a food crisis in 1963 and the Donomulyo population suffered extreme malnutrition.¹³⁴ Furthermore, even when the state shifted (from colonial to independent Indonesia), patronage relationships in rural areas remained the same. Crop-sharing, land tilling, and the communal land system remained mostly the same, including the patron-client relationships that operate these systems. The only difference was the patron's connection to the state. In the colonial era, the plantation industry was the link between rural patrons and the state, while in the post-independence period, the military became a leading representation of the state. Moreover, the end of the Dutch plantation in Donomulyo was not followed by changes in their class relationships. Overall, the colonial plantation industry in Indonesia managed to increase socio-economic differentiation, concentration of land against the landlessness or near-landlessness, semi-proletarianisation and the emergence of a core of modern skilled labour.¹³⁵ No significant changes occurred during the early independence years, as in Donomulyo. At that time, there was a famous expression among the villagers: "When is this independence going to end (*Kapan yo entekne*

¹³⁰ For example, while the companies were supposed to be returned to their owners, Sarbupri demanded f42,500 for the return of Margomulio company. Although the company paid only f 10,000, this case showed how strong the union was at that time. Keppy 2010, 212.

¹³¹ Kementerian Penerangan 1953, 429.

¹³² Agustono 2002, 134.

¹³³ Knight 2012, 409.

¹³⁴ "Notes Ketjil dari Malang Selatan: Tragedi Busung Lapar Perlu Perhatian", 4. 1964. *Trompet Masjarakat*. 25 Januari 1964.

¹³⁵ Slamet-Velsink 1988, 167.

merdeka)?"¹³⁶ This does not mean that the villagers wanted to be recolonised, but according to them, the Indonesian independence was not bringing any improvements for their lives.

Confronting Class Differentiation: The Left and Agrarian Reform

Class differentiation also influenced the ways in which villagers overcame hardships in the district. For example, during a period of starvation in Donomulyo, Burmudji's father received donations such as rice, oil, milk, sugar and even cigars because he was working for the church Carmelite foundation.¹³⁷ In contrast, Marwono's family only ate *tiwul* (a dish made from fermented cassava) and the inner-side of papaya stem to survive the famine. It was the leftist organisations, mainly the PKI and the Indonesia Peasant Front (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*/ BTI) who started to confront and criticise these village inequalities together with practices of 'feudalistic' patronage. Information on how the BTI started to establish their branch in Banyujati is not clear. Some of the interviewees were certain that the organisation became active because of the agrarian reform, which was marked by the establishment of the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) no. 5 in 1960. However, the BTI's advocacy on land issues already started even before the law was introduced. In 1951, the BTI criticised the new Indonesian government because of their tardiness in legalising the occupied former plantation land. The BTI strongly urged the government to be more aggressive and to even opt for forced handover of those land to the people.¹³⁸ They also supported advocacy and mass actions by the people to defend their land, the *desa darurat*, which were also formed on forestry land during the war. They condemned forestry officials in the ministry who still argued that squatted forestry land should be returned without considering the lives of the villagers.¹³⁹

It is highly possible that the BTI's advocacy of land for the people and their position against feudalistic village administration,¹⁴⁰ led to their success in the 1955 legislative election. In the Malang Regency, the NU party received the highest number of votes (231,918 votes), followed by the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia – Sukarno's party) with 193,297 votes and the PKI with 164,159 votes.¹⁴¹ In contrast with the provincial result, the PKI actually received the highest number of votes in the Donomulyo district, up to 12,981 votes. The second place was for the PNI with 3609 votes, followed by the NU in third place with 591 votes.¹⁴² The dominance of the PKI was also reflected at the village level, where village heads in the Banyujati area were members of the PKI.

The BTI's mobilisation became more intensive when the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) no.5 was introduced. The law had several functions: it asserted the 'social function' of land and other resources; reiterated the state's responsibility for managing those resources in the interests of 'the people'; prohibited absentee and foreign ownership of land, and paved the way for the redistribution of land through subsequent land reform legislation.¹⁴³ In short, the law aimed to provide land for the

¹³⁶ Interview with Burmudji, Kepanjen, 6 December 2016 #19.29

¹³⁷ Interview with Burmudji, Kepanjen, 6 December 2016 #01.03.50

¹³⁸ Tj. "Okupasi Tanah", 3-4. 1951. *Suara Tani*, 31 Djanuari 1951. Edisi Tahun VI.

¹³⁹ Sardju, Imam. "Aksi-Aksi Kaum Tani Mempertahankan Tanah Bekas Kehutanan Jang Sudah Lama Dikerdjakan", 2. 1957. *Suara Tani*. July 1957, tahun VIII no. 8.

¹⁴⁰ In a *Suara Tani* article, the BTI criticized the undemocratic mechanism in forming village authorities. The existing practices at that time relied on family relationships to choose the village apparatus. The BTI suggested the formation of village law (Undang-undang Desa) to tackle this problem. Djojohadiwikarso, Kasno. "Keadaan Desa", 19. 1951. *Suara Tani*. Djanuari 1951, Tahun VI.

¹⁴¹ The number of voters (478,454 people) in East Java was small compared to the total number of residents in the province (1,226,754 people). There is no explanation for this discrepancy. Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia 1955.

¹⁴² "Hasil Pemungutan Suara Di Kabupaten Malang", 2. *Suara Masyarakat*, Oktober 1955.

¹⁴³ Lucas & Warren 2013, 2.

landless. However, the implementation of the law tells a different story. In 1963, the Central Land Reform Committee recorded that only 153,043 ha of land had been distributed of a total of 403,000 ha of government land.¹⁴⁴ Up to the end of 1964, the Agrarian minister noted difficulties in executing the Law, such as deficiencies in the registration of land; lack of understanding of the necessity and significance of the Law; and the inhibition of peasants' organisations from playing a significant role in the committee.¹⁴⁵ In extreme cases, obstruction of land distribution by the landlords was found in forms of deception by converting surplus lands into false grants, divorce, leasing and even deaths that led to false inheritance.¹⁴⁶ These landlords were apparently reluctant to give up their land which served as the basis of their status as patrons in society. The government was seen to be very slow in implementing the law, which led the PKI to take an aggressive step by launching unilateral actions. These actions took several forms, including physical attacks against landowners (usually followed by acts of retaliation towards the peasants); land grabbing; or refusal to hand in part of the harvest to the landowners.

In the Donomulyo district, 41,001 ha of land was already registered as excess land (*tanah kelebihan*) and 75 people were registered as candidates for the redistribution of this land.¹⁴⁷ There was no further information whether this redistribution was implemented or not. Land reform policy generated opposite reactions amongst Banyuwati villagers. Village (*desa*) capitalists perceived this policy as a threat to their property. This was the case with Burmudji. He explained his position on the policy:

My father was the head of the Catholic party. He was an opponent figure. The [PKI] village head's policies were always opposed. In front of my house, there was a plaque "Head of the Indonesian Catholic Party", and beside it "Head of Catholic Youth". My father was brave. "If I died, I died in the name of Jesus". ... There was a policy called land reform. ... At that time, my father was leading the resistance against the village head. Because land reform was really making the people suffer ... the land was controlled by the bureaucrats. ... So even if I had inherited land, those bureaucrats would decide only this [size] is your land. I cannot do anything, because it was restricted. Individual ownership was restricted, because of the PKI influence. There was a promise that members of the BTI will receive a piece of land. That land was actually obtained by reducing [ownership] through land reform. ... My father was supporting the people who felt harmed [by the land reform policy], so he took a role as the vanguard. Father had two missions, besides defending those oppressed people, he also had a private agenda. By generating goodwill, people will become Catholics. Directly or indirectly, they will be interested in Catholicism ... realising that those who suffered were defended.¹⁴⁸

In Burmudji's perspective, the agrarian reform was a threat to his family's private property. Implying resentment against bureaucracy, he sees his family as the victim of the law and blamed the PKI as the initiator of the law.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, Burmudji's account also shows how land issues are intertwined with

¹⁴⁴ Asmu. "Keterangan Asmu Tentang Aksi Sepihak: Aksi Sepihak Kaum Tani, Karena Ada Aksi Sepihak Tuan Tanah II." 1964. *Harian Rakjat*. June 29, 1964.

¹⁴⁵ These difficulties were disclosed in a report by the Agrarian Minister in 14 January 1965. See Utrecht 1969, 78-79.

¹⁴⁶ Asmu. "Keterangan Asmu Tentang Aksi Sepihak: Aksi Sepihak Kaum Tani, Karena Ada Aksi Sepihak Tuan Tanah II." 1964. *Harian Rakjat*. June 29, 1964.

¹⁴⁷ Sagijati 1968.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Burmudji, op cit. #02.32.13-02.35.57

¹⁴⁹ This is not accurate. During debates about the law in the Supreme Advisory Council and the parliament, the PKI had objections to some features of the law. Despite this, the party still voted in favour of the amended Bill that was finally adopted. According to Rex Mortimer, the PKI was playing consensus politics, guarding their alliance with the President, and demonstrating to the elite groups that they were moderate and responsible men. In other words, rather than influencing representatives of the political parties in the Parliament, they were conforming to negotiations on the law. Mortimer 1972, 16-17.

religion. His father was using his advocacy against agrarian reform as a strategy to expand Catholic followers in the village. In other areas, unilateral conflict turned into religious clashes because most landowners were part of Muslim religious institutions.¹⁵⁰ This became intensified when religious propaganda was used, i.e. portraying communists as atheist and therefore, as a threat to Islam and Catholicism.

In my interviews, the villagers explained that although there was resentment between the leftist organisations (PKI and BTI) and religious ones (NU, Catholic Party) in the village, there were no physical clashes during the land reform. This is different compared to other places in East Java, such as Kediri and Jombang, where violent conflicts occurred between these two polarised organisations. Aji Marlan, the former village secretary, described that both parties constantly bullied each other, and public events were used to show off the power that they both had through mass mobilisations. For example, during celebration of Indonesia's Independence Day, each organisation paraded around the district, wearing costumes and holding each organisation's banner. Aji Marlan himself, once participated in Ansor's (the youth organisation of Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's Islamic organisation) drum band. This festivity became an occasion to show off each organisation's forces, which can be seen in the number of participants and appearance in the parade. Ridicules and threats between the BTI and the NU or Catholic Party usually circulated in the parade as they tried to prove themselves. However, villagers admitted that everyday activities in the village went on as usual. Communal work or *soyo*,¹⁵¹ and other communal traditions such as the village cleansing or *bersih desa*, were still attended by everyone, including members of these conflicting parties. Given this background, it is hard to believe that the conflict between these parties resulted in mass killings in 1965 without external interference, in this case, the military.

One possible explanation of why no violent acts occurred during land reform in Donomulyo may stem from the differences of grassroots activities of leftist organisations in rural areas, which may not fit in with the solidity of the peasant's mobilisation that the PKI central committee had imagined. A study conducted in 1961 in nine subdistricts in the Malang Regency by the *Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri* (Internal Affairs Academy) reported that people in the region were reluctant to engage in political activity. For example, in the Purworedjo, Ngantang district, the presence of political parties and organisations were extensive. The PKI was the largest, followed by the PNI and NU. They existed together with many leftist organisations such as the BTI, Pemuda Rakyat (Youth organisation) and Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*/ Indonesia Women's Movement). The latter was reported to have a sub-branch in every four hamlets in the subdistrict. However, these parties and organisations were basically stagnant, because they had lost the support and belief of the locals.¹⁵² Even some of these locals admitted that they were already bored with political activities. In the Ngadas, Tumpang district, it was reported that even political campaigns did not exist and therefore, no villagers joined political parties. The reporter himself was also puzzled, because in the last election, every party in this area had voters. Unfortunately, the study did not explain further the causes for such disinterest.

¹⁵⁰ Mortimer 1972, 50-51

¹⁵¹ *Soyo* is usually held when a person needs a large workforce to do something, for example build a house, till land, or prepare festivities (such as a wedding or circumcision). Neighboring villagers usually work together for the person on a voluntary basis.

¹⁵² This research aimed at providing input for political and social-economic re-organisation and development. The Malang Regency was intended as a first case study which would then be extended to other regions in Indonesia. The nine subdistricts were considered as sites that had sufficient democratic institutions based on the results of the village elections since 1955. Six research assistants, who were second year students from *Perguruan Tinggi Hukum dan Pengetahuan Masyarakat Kota Pradja Malang* (Law and Public Knowledge University in Malang City), were involved for a minimum one-week stay in the subdistricts. Ruspana, 44-45.

Four years later, a participatory study by the BTI and PKI cadres found similar results. This research started in early 1965 by the Academy of Social Science 'Aliarcham' and was supported by the government. Covering Java, Bali and Lampung, the research report reflected on the variety of grassroots PKI and BTI movements. In some areas, the movements were rather passive, lacking consolidation and support; while in other areas, BTI members were aggressive, more demanding and no longer willing to rely on peaceful means.¹⁵³ These variations, according to Slamet-Velsink, resulted from a combination of several factors, such as the local political context, colonial capital penetration, and cultural elements (religion and ethnicity).¹⁵⁴ In other words, there was a huge discrepancy between the political strategies of the peasants' movement designed by the BTI's political elites with the actual grassroots situation.

This may also be the case in the Banyujati area. Although the PKI dominated the political sphere in the Banyujati area, this does not mean that villagers (including landless peasants) were also progressively leftist. These different levels of activism and participation might also relate to the fact that there was no continuous dispute over former plantation land in Donomulyo. It could not be said that the whole village lived up to the same level of Leftist ideology. Another reason why the BTI was not very active, although politically strong in Donomulyo, is because most of the former plantation land had already been occupied by the locals during 1945-49. Sarbupri (labour union affiliated with the PKI) also did not exist in the area, which led to less resistance against the state during the reclamation and nationalisation of plantations compared to other areas in South Malang.¹⁵⁵ Despite this discrepancy between central and rural politics, friction in the village was later used by the military to annihilate the leftists.

Rural Transformation under the New Order

The anti-communist operation in Donomulyo occurred in 1965, under the name of the Pancasila Operation, and in 1968, namely the Trisula operation. Both of these operations had the same impact: mass disappearance, detention, killing, and continuous surveillance of villagers accused of being members or sympathisers of Leftist organisations (see Chapter 3). Villagers that were not detained were required to report continuously to the district military office (Koramil). This was a programme of *Bina Mental* or Mental Building, a screening programme to direct people's ideology to the Pancasila (the national ideology). Bina Mental methods consisted of three elements: *bina rohani*/ spiritual building (aimed at rebuilding faith in God through religious teachings), *santiaji* (aimed at enforcing the mental ideology of the Pancasila) and *pembinaan tradisi*/ tradition building (to achieve spiritual welfare and fighting spirit).¹⁵⁶ Although the programme claimed to build a nationalistic character, it was basically applied to control and ensure the establishment of the New Order at every administrative level in Indonesia. In Donomulyo, the people who were obliged to undergo the *bina*

¹⁵³ Slamet-Velsink 1988, 47.

¹⁵⁴ Slamet-Versink 1988, 164.

¹⁵⁵ Compare to Yuwono study in Central Java, where many plantation workers joined the Sarbupri because they thought that the organisation would defend their rights, as the workers fell further into poverty after nationalization. Even then, Yuwono also noted that not all motives to be involved in the Sarbupri were ideological. See Yuwono 2018.

¹⁵⁶ Tim Skrining Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur 1984, 31.

mental were known as the *santiaji* or *walap/ wajib lapor*. In 1997, there was 2,731¹⁵⁷ *santiaji* in Donomulyo, which decreased to 1,850 people in 1999.¹⁵⁸

This monitoring mechanism also involved replacing all village heads with military officer and removing all leftist elements in the village apparatus. This happened to the PKI village head in Banyujati area, Ario Dursam, who disappeared. Political activities vanished throughout the late 1960s, but re-emerged under the New Order command. Its ruling party, the Golongan Karya or Golkar, dominated the political sphere in the village by mobilising all of the village elites to join them. Furthermore, while leftists' organisations have already been dismissed and banned, other organisations, such as religious-based women's organisations, also struggled to exist. Santi, Head of the village branch of the Catholic Women's Organisation (*Wanita Katolik Indonesia/ WKRI*) and organiser of the Family Welfare Education programme (*Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga/ PKK*) in the 1980s, described that villagers were too scared to be involved in any of the organisation's activities. They believed that the violence against communist activists was a result of their political involvement in mass organisations. Santi and her fellow organisers in the WKRI and PKK struggled to convince people that both organisations were not political in any way. In WKRI, through guidance from the Regional Officials, Santi started to revive the organisation through routine communal prayers. In this manner, she convinced villagers that it was safe to participate in the WKRI.¹⁵⁹ Similar reluctance was also experienced by traditional theatre groups or *Ketoprak*. Before 1965, these groups were the vanguard of mass education and mobilisation by conveying revolutionary messages to the villagers. After the anti-communist military operation, all *Ketoprak* players were accused of being members of Lekra (the leftist cultural organisation, closely related to PKI) and were either killed or became *santiaji*. Since then, cultural performances disappeared, but started to re-emerge again in the early 1970s. This was monitored closely by the Babinsa (*Badan Pembina Desa*, a village-level monitoring officials) and became the funnel of New Order propaganda. In short, all political activities in the village were highly controlled under New Order authoritarian ideology.

Another prominent transformation in the village was the conversion of religion, because the New Order government instructed that every Indonesian should have one of the five monolithic religions approved by the state. This was a national phenomenon as a result of the 1965 violence.¹⁶⁰ A letter from a former priest in Donomulyo parish, B. Soedarmodjo, stated that parishioners increased rapidly especially in the years of 1966 to 1968. "Most of them have the motive of political security as a result of the communist rebellion Gestapu/ G30S. Therefore, they have not reached the maturity of faith", said Soedarmodjo.¹⁶¹ Data from the Catholic parish in the district showed that only 378 people were baptized in 1960-1965, and 290 people received communion. These numbers increased sharply in 1966-1970 where 3,472 people were baptized and 2,666 people received communion.¹⁶² A report from the Carmelite foundation mentioned that villagers were protected by the catholic priests,

¹⁵⁷ "Surat Kepada Kepala Direktorat Sosial Politik Propinsi Dati I Jawa Timur – Daftar Rekapitulasi Bekas Tahanan Narapidana Dan Walap G30S/ PKI Se-Wilayah Kabupaten Malang Dan Se-Kotatiff Batu Bagian Bulan Desember 1997". January 18, 1998. Arsip Badan Perencanaan Daerah Jawa Timur, Surabaya, Indonesia.

¹⁵⁸ "Daftar Nama WNRI Yang Terlibat G30S/PKI (Walap) Atau Organisasi Terlarang Lainnya (ELA) Di Wilayah Kecamatan Donomulyo, Kabupaten DATI II Malang," September 1999. Pendidikan, Sosial, Politik. Badan Arsip Propinsi Jawa Timur, Surabaya Indonesia.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Santi, Donomulyo, 20 September 2016 #05.04-10.55.

¹⁶⁰ In Central Java, Catholic Church members grew 126% in 1966 and onwards. Meanwhile, Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan or GKJW in East Java, reported an increase of around 32,500 baptized members and eight new congregations between 1964 and 1967. Hearman 2018, 181.

¹⁶¹ Soedarmodjo. "Ikhtisar Mengenai Paroki Purworejo Keuskupan Malang," March 5, 1977. Arsip Keuskupan Malang. Keuskupan Malang, Jawa Timur.

¹⁶² Appendix in Suhadiyono, et.al. 2002, 37.

teachers and students during the G30S turmoil. This became the reason why most of the villagers turned to Catholicism instead of Islam because the latter became perpetrators of the mass killings, according to the report.¹⁶³ People who converted to Catholicism or Christianity were formerly not devoted religious people (some of them also practiced *Kejawen*, a spiritual Javanese belief), but chose these religions to avoid being accused of being a communist. In Central Java, Christianity was chosen for several reasons, such as the use of the Javanese language instead of a foreign language (such as Arabic), the use of traditional cultural performances in their prayers or masses, and in some cases, Christian organisations provided economic support (for example, scholarship or sponsored transmigration programmes).¹⁶⁴ In other cases, people were also attracted to Christianity because of its principle of equality.¹⁶⁵

At the national level, the development agenda was completely transformed after 1965. During Sukarno's leadership, economic policy in the 1960s revolved around control of the state in all sectors of the Indonesian economy; destruction of imperialism and subordination of foreign capital to national social and economic goals; and replacement of the colonial import/export economy by a more self-sufficient and industrialised economy.¹⁶⁶ This policy took a capitalistic turn in the hands of the New Order government. In 1965-1968, the National Planning Board (*Badan Perencanaan Nasional/ Bappenas*) technocrats were convinced by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) / IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) ideology of free-market economics, which limited the state in providing the fiscal and monetary conditions for capital accumulation, and trusted in the mechanisms of the market to generate maximum growth and efficiency.¹⁶⁷ When Bappenas released the five-year development programme (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun/ Repelita*), 60% of the programme's budget expenditure was derived from foreign loans.¹⁶⁸ This drastic transformation of the economic policy leads several scholars to argue that the 1965-66 killings happened in order to set the foundation for the growth of capitalism in Indonesia.¹⁶⁹

This change in economic policy directly affected the agrarian strategy. Emphasising increasing food production, the New Order created one of the well-known intensification programmes BIMAS or *Bimbingan Massal* (mass guidance). It started in 1965-1966 under the supervision of a state-owned enterprise 'Pertani' which was tasked with giving information, providing the peasants with seedlings, fertilizer, insecticides and fodder for the plough-oxen, and granting credits.¹⁷⁰ This programme then took a different turn under the New Order with the involvement of multinational corporations. Companies such as the Swiss Ciba and West German Hoechst were contracted by the state and paid about US\$50 per hectare for provision of the necessary Green Revolution inputs including fertilizers, insecticides, extension and management, and the new IR/ rice varieties. Peasants were expected to repay these inputs by delivering one-sixth of their crop to a national collection agency.¹⁷¹ Although

¹⁶³ Hogenkamp. "Beberapa Pandangan Mengenai Jajasan Karmel Bagian Pengadjaran (Diterangkan Dan Dibitjarakan Dalam Rapat Definitorium)." 1972. Jajasan Karmel. Arsip Keuskupan Agung Malang, Indonesia.

¹⁶⁴ Nugroho 2008, 176-180.

¹⁶⁵ Sevenster-Brouwer 2017, 46.

¹⁶⁶ Robison 2009, 71-72.

¹⁶⁷ Robison 2009, 133.

¹⁶⁸ In December 1966, the Indonesian government delegation made a statement at the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) conference in Paris that resulted in reopening access to international networks of finance. See Robison 2009, 137-138.

¹⁶⁹ Farid 2005, 4. Foreign countries, such as the US, were expecting this kind of transformation. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman have noted that the massacres in Indonesia represented a 'benign bloodbath' and a 'constructive terror because they served US foreign policy interests'. Roosa 2006, 16.

¹⁷⁰ Utrecht 1973, 161.

¹⁷¹ White & Huskens 1989, 252.

BIMAS resulted in a substantial increase in rice production, it only lasted until the late 1980s because it became very problematic, involving corruption.¹⁷² A study in Gondanglegi, South Malang, concludes that BIMAS was only effective for middle- or upper-class farmers, because this group tended to have larger plots of land and more capital to access farming credit, compared to lower-class farmers.¹⁷³

Meanwhile, the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law continued to be used by the New Order, although the law's principle of state control became deviated. Land distribution was implemented under patronage politics and top-down control so that concessions were centralised in the establishment of an alliance between a property-owning elite and government-backed-army.¹⁷⁴ The military's interference can be seen, for example, in the case of a land dispute between villagers and the PT. Swadaja/ State Estate Company (*Perusahaan Perkebunan Negara/ PPN*) in Ampelgading, in the Malang Regency in 1968. Villagers, who lived on former plantation land converted to *desa darurat*, were forced to return the land to the company and relocate to another area. To execute this demand, Military Resort Command 083 released an instruction decree, which was soon followed by another decree by the East Java Land Reform Committee. Both documents instructed the termination of the certification process of former plantation land that was inhabited by villagers. Even land certificates that had already been issued should be reassessed.¹⁷⁵

In Donomulyo, by replacing the leftist village apparatus, the army and village elites easily formed a new alliance. After the 1965 violence, local patrons who were once confronted by the left, remained unshakable with this new alliance. People such as Burmudji's family, who resented the land reform policy, benefited from the loss of the leftists. The property and social status of these groups in the village were no longer questioned. Alliance with the military reinforced their position, while at the same time, paving the way for establishing the New Order in rural areas. This also led to several forms of arbitrary action, such as land confiscation. For example, Marwono's father-in-law lost 18 are¹⁷⁶ of land to village officials which was later distributed between them and the local army. It was not possible to resist, because Marwono and his father-in-law were following *santiaji* at that time. "It was confiscated because he was accused of being a BTI. It was only one reason, a member of BTI is PKI", said Marwono. Local patrons repeatedly used this communist label to benefit themselves not only through land confiscation, but also by controlling the distribution of farming credits. This case reflected how village elites in the New Order era became "political and economic agents of the state in the countryside and were co-opted into the larger structure of power as preferred but dependent clients and in return, they were granted access to subsidised credit, inputs, licenses, guaranteed prices, and so forth for their service in monitoring the village".¹⁷⁷

Conclusion

The history of Donomulyo illustrates the connections between larger global state economic policy and local livelihoods. Through this historical narrative, Donomulyo shows the continuity of inequality and patronage that persisted throughout different periods of history. This continuity occurred not only because of state penetration in rural areas, but also because rural elites that attempted to maintain their privileged position, access, and ownership, needed to form alliances with the state.

¹⁷² Utrecht 1973, 161; Crouch 1988, 290-291.

¹⁷³ Kano 1990, 120-21.

¹⁷⁴ Lund & Rachman 2016, 1320.

¹⁷⁵ The documents include Surat Perintah 001/10/1967 by Korem 083, and Surat Panitia Landreform Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur No.7/Agr/Lf/01/67 on 12 June 1967. Sagijati 1968.

¹⁷⁶ 1 are = 100 square meters.

¹⁷⁷ Hart 1989, 33.

The case of Burmudji above, shows an example of how village elites despised land reform, and were relieved when the left ended their advocacy. During the colonial era, alliances were formed between village authorities and administrators of colonial plantations or colonial government. The traditional patron-client relationships that was formed through the land tenure and crop-sharing system were transformed into economy-driven patronage relationships since the establishment of the Dutch plantations. Practices such as elites who became middlemen for collecting taxes and recruiting labourers are some of the examples of this shift. When this relationship accommodated the colonial economy, it also exacerbated the inequality in Donomulyo. In the independence era, it was the leftist organisations, mostly the PKI and BTI, that became the vanguard in challenging this village inequality. It was also during this period that the patrons' alliance with the state started to transform – from economy oriented to authoritative and power oriented (involving the creation of security and order). The opposition from the left had completely vanished along with the anti-communist operation in 1965 and establishment of the New Order. Rather than reforming the village patronage, the New Order created a new alliance of patrons between the local elites and the military. It is within this context of patronage and inequalities that memories of the 1965 violence were formed and shaped.

CHAPTER 3

EXECUTING THE ORDER: RE-EXAMINING THE VIOLENCE IN EAST JAVA

Before going deeper into the embedded memories of violence, it is important to analyse how the violence itself occurred. By trying to understand the characteristics of the violence in East Java (and also after examining the historical process of the patronage network in chapter 2), we will be able to comprehend how local villagers perceive the violence. The aim of this chapter is to re-examine the violence, particularly in East Java, by arguing that the violence that occurred in the attempt to overthrow Sukarno's government would not have resulted in mass atrocities if the army or civilians had acted solely on their own. This does not mean that the military is not responsible for the violence. On the contrary, as we will see in this chapter, the case study on East Java shows that the army was structurally involved in the violence, specifically by coordinating scattered civilian mass movements under a single military command. Moreover, this army-civilian coalition was not one-directional, it was a beneficial (yet unequal) collaboration not only for the military, but also for the civilian groups themselves. Therefore, the important question that I propose in this chapter is no longer to seek 'who is responsible for the violence', but how did this collaboration come into existence? What made it possible? How did it develop? What kind of instruments (laws, decrees, instructions) were issued to facilitate this coalition? To answer these questions, I agree with Kammen & MacGregor that the killings should not be treated in isolation. Instead, this should be examined together with other forms of violence (detention, property seizure, torture, sexual violence, and so on) and its periodisation should be extended from 1965 to 1968 to see that the violence was not only an attack against the left, but also a counter-revolutionary movement to establish a new regime in the making.¹⁷⁸

Existing analyses of the 1965 violence can be categorised broadly into three different trajectories: the horizontal conflict, the vertical or structural violence, and the dualistic thesis. The first one framed the violence as a horizontal rupture, caused by rooted conflict between the communists and religious groups. This type of analysis often emerged in official statements and government publications, such as the white book of the September 30th Movement written by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, which stated that "... tensions finally exploded into communal clashes resulting in bloodbaths in certain areas of Indonesia".¹⁷⁹ In this framework, the military presented their operation as an attempt to secure the situation from an explosive conflict. They justified the violence against the left during the operation with the argument of maintaining peace and order. Participation of civilians in the violence also led some scholars to believe that the army only had a minor role in the violence.¹⁸⁰ However, these communal-conflict analyses fail to explain how collective tensions could escalate into nationwide mass killings in a relatively short period of time.

In contrast to this horizontal conflict theory, another group of critical scholars and activists argue a different stance, emphasising that the state (in this case, the army) played a central role in the violence. A structural order was given by the central command to their subordinate military commands in the regions to organise the mass killings. As Geoffrey Robinson argues, genocide and mass killings are political acts, which means that they do not occur 'naturally', but were intentionally and politically initiated by the authorities. Whether the killings started early or later, depended

¹⁷⁸ Kammen & McGregor 2012, 11-12.

¹⁷⁹ Notosusanto & Saleh 1968, 77.

¹⁸⁰ Sulistyono 2000.

largely on the alliance between the authority and local civilians to carry out this violence.¹⁸¹ For example, in areas where the regional military command was united and had sufficient troops, the killing took place earlier (such as in the case of Aceh), but delayed in areas where the regional army command was politically divided (such as in East Java).¹⁸²

This line of argument became stronger when two recent regional studies analysed military reports that pointed to the army's structural coordinating role in the violence. The first is Ahmad Luthfi's article on the violence in Banyuwangi, where he uses reports of Kodam (district military command) 0825 Banyuwangi. In his study, he argues that the violence was structurally coordinated by the army through, for example, the establishment of the army-directed Vigilance Command Body (Badan Komando Siaga/ BKS) in every village.¹⁸³ The other is Jess Melvin's study on Aceh's military command, in which she shows that the commander actively went on a tour to different districts in order to coordinate the annihilation of communists in the province. Melvin also argues that the anti-communist operation in Aceh took place with the support and knowledge of the national military command, and therefore can be regarded as an intentional act to eliminate certain groups of people, or an act of genocide.¹⁸⁴ Both studies are even capable of providing numbers of detainees and victims that were killed during the military operation.

In between these two analyses, another group of scholars argue that although the army directed the violence, they did not necessarily have absolute control over societies in different areas. Even though the killings followed a national pattern,¹⁸⁵ regional differences also occurred and may not be easily analysed to correspond with this uniform national pattern.¹⁸⁶ This dualistic thesis argues that the killings cannot be regarded as the responsibility of a single party or institution,¹⁸⁷ and therefore no general-national pattern of violence could be generated. For example, Robert Cribb highlighted the connection between national (the September 30th Movement) and local dimensions that resulted in regional variations of the killings. In some areas, such as Java and Bali, the killings occurred between late 1965 to 1966, whereas in other areas, such as West Kalimantan, the worst massacres occurred in 1967.¹⁸⁸ Even within Java itself, the magnitude of the killings differ between West, Central and East Java, with the last province being recorded as having the worst killings due to the tension between religious and leftist groups.¹⁸⁹

This chapter supports and elaborates further the existing vertical or structural analysis of the violence through examination of the archives of Kodam (Regional Military Command) V Brawijaya,¹⁹⁰ East Java from 1965 to 1968. Adding to the vertical analysis argument, I would argue that a national pattern of violence can indeed be found. Examination of these archives, particularly on the Malang military command, shows that the military played a major role in the violence, and that participation

¹⁸¹ Robinson 2018, 15-17.

¹⁸² Robinson 2018, 151-2.

¹⁸³ Luthfi 2018.

¹⁸⁴ Melvin also presents a critical analysis of the genocide definition, as stated in the 1948 Genocide Convention. She includes previous discussions that pointed to the intentionality of the 1965-66 violence and the target group in the violence that went beyond members of a political party. Melvin 2018, 300.

¹⁸⁵ The national pattern in this case shows that the killings were usually preceded by mass detention and disappearance. Roosa 2016, 12.

¹⁸⁶ Young 1990.

¹⁸⁷ Gerlach 2010.

¹⁸⁸ Cribb 1990.

¹⁸⁹ Cribb 1990, 25-27.

¹⁹⁰ The archives is stored in the Brawijaya military museum in Malang municipality along with other inventories, from the revolutionary war to the military operation in East Timor.

of civilians took place under their coordination. Both the dualistic thesis and the horizontal conflict theory are considered unsubstantiated as this chapter will demonstrate that the violence became mass violence in East Java not because civilians acted on their own, but because the army created a situation where collaboration between them became highly possible. The military utilised the long-existing and historically shaped factions in society to eliminate the left. However, elaborating further the vertical or structural analysis, I argue that at the same time, these factions were also taking advantage of their supra-local attachment to the military. The military operation was not a one-directional alliance, it was a beneficial collaboration, where both military and civilian factions benefited from the violence. The case of Donomulyo shows that certain factions actually profited from the rise of military power in rural society. Burmudji's story in Chapter 2, for example, illustrates how the position of rural elites was secured after threats against their land ownership were eliminated with the killings of the PKI and other leftist members in Donomulyo.

The primary base of this chapter is the analysis of Kodam V Brawijaya-East Java archives, located in the Brawijaya military museum in Malang. The collection consists of the history of the East Java military command and their various operations from early independence (1945) to East Timor (1975). For the purpose of this article, I use their specific inventory called 'G30S/ PKI tahun 1965' (September 30th Movement/ PKI in 1965). The inventory consists of reports, radiograms, instructions, and other documents from different levels and regions of military commands in East Java from 1965 to 1967. In this inventory, documents from the Military Resort Command (Korem) 083 Malang contain daily situation report from 8 October to 29 December 1965.

Although this specific inventory of the Brawijaya archive collection contains important information on the anti-communist operation in East Java, it should be read carefully for several reasons. First, the records are basically reports written by military officers in certain divisions and sent to their superiors or other divisions. This means that these records may only capture what is needed or accepted within the military circle, and exclude other facts. Therefore, it is important to analyse the reports together with other different sources, for example, interviews. Second, reading the Brawijaya documents can create the impression that the army is an autonomous and powerful body. Instructions related to civilian groups that were released in 1965-66 may falsely led readers to believe that these civilians were agentless individuals who only followed orders. This is not the complete case. The army was not only a government defence body, it is a political institution that constantly formed alliances with different groups for certain aims. Within these alliances, civilians also acted based on their political or individual goals, which were often not explicitly stated. The presentation of this chapter will be on this relational (and not directive) basis between the army and civilian groups.

The third reason to read the archives carefully is because the language that is used in these army documents is often vague, and none of them explicitly mentioned the killings or other forms of violence that the army conducted. This is very much a characteristic of Indonesian military reports, which can also be found in the case of East Timor, where the documents did not point to any military crimes, instead they repeated the government's propaganda on the occupation of East Timor, which transformed into a belief that justified the military violence.¹⁹¹ In the case of the Brawijaya documents, the propagandic terms created an image of a civilian war in 1965-66 and at the same time, dehumanized the victims. Throughout this chapter, I will point out these three critical aspects (the selective nature of the report, the image of an autonomous body, and the vague language) in analysing the Brawijaya documents.

¹⁹¹ Moore 2001, 10.

This chapter will begin with a description of the expansion of the army's power prior to the September 30th Movement. They did not only expand their territorial command (stretching their institutions down to the district level), but also in political terms, which included building alliances with civilian groups. The next section will discuss the alliance in East Java, specifically in the first month after the September 30th Movement. In the later section, I will highlight the major findings from the Brawijaya military archives; that the local movement of civilians became structurally coordinated under the military towards the end of October 1965. This section includes the military operation in Donomulyo. Furthermore, the army's role also extended to the establishment of the New Order through the New Orderisation (*Peng-Order Baru-an*) programmes in all government levels, including districts and villages.

Expansion of the Army's Power

Apart from being a national defence institution, the Indonesian army has always been a political body. Their political nature can be traced back to the period of struggle for independence, where guerrilla fighters were politically aligned into irregular units (local *laskar*) besides serving as regular armed forces.¹⁹² Its political character also means that the Indonesian army is quite diverse, with extra-military political loyalties and a stronger commitment from soldiers to their commanders than to the army institution as a whole.¹⁹³ Throughout the 1950s to 1960s, the army's power had expanded, not only in terms of organisational structure, but also in their political power, including in regional authorities. This period also witnessed the tension between three political powers: the army, President Sukarno, and the PKI that ended along with the September 30th Movement.¹⁹⁴ Until 1965, the army was not a professional Armed Forces in the Western sense of understanding – they had no cohesion, no obedience to government directions except when it was to the Armed Forces' advantage, and their performance in facing foreign opponents had been insufficient.¹⁹⁵

The crucial period for the expansion of the army's power occurred in 1957, along with the introduction of martial law (State of War and Siege/ Staat van Oorlog en Beleg or more well-known as SOB) as a response to the increasing regional Darul Islam rebellions in Aceh (1953-62), West Java (1948-62), South Sulawesi (1953-65), and the PRRI/ Permesta rebellion in West Sumatra and Sulawesi (1958-61). The army became more firmly entrenched in the political (and also economic) field, by placing their members in the cabinet, upper echelons of the civil service, and regional administration.¹⁹⁶ They also tried to dominate the National Front, a coordinating body that was established in August 1960 with a main goal to complete the national revolution and "organise the closest cooperation between the Government, the people and other state bodies".¹⁹⁷ Among the 73 members of the Executive Board (including representatives from the PKI), at least 11 of them were military men, and of the 17 provincial branches established by April 1961, 9 of them were chaired by the local army commander.¹⁹⁸ With a structural organisation from the central government down to the district level, in 1962, the National Front allowed membership of individuals and political parties.¹⁹⁹ In March 1964, members of the National Front were incorporated into the *Tjatur Tunggal*,

¹⁹² The guerilla strategy used during the war also contributed to the political character of the army. With lack of professional training and modern equipment, the army relied heavily on the support of local civilians. This had created a thin boundary between military and civilian life during the guerilla. Crouch 1988, 25.

¹⁹³ Crouch 1988, 27.

¹⁹⁴ Melvin 2018, 63-69.

¹⁹⁵ MacFarling, Ian. 1996. *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia*. Canberra: Defence Studies Centre. P.73

¹⁹⁶ Crouch 1988, 41.

¹⁹⁷ Mortimer 1974, 101.

¹⁹⁸ Sundhaussen 1982, 152.

¹⁹⁹ Mortimer 1974, 101.

an administrative system in which four government elements, consisting of the governors or regents, local army commanders, police chiefs and public persecutors, made collaborative decisions on their regional issues. By placing their officers in the position of governors and regents, the army tried to increase their power over the regional administration.²⁰⁰ With the integration of the National Front into *Tjatur Tunggal*, the name was changed into *Pantja Tunggal*.

Another point of expansion of the army occurred against the backdrop of the confrontation with Malaysia, where in 1964, Sukarno issued a decree for the formation of the Regional Dwikora Executive Authority (*Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah*), or *Pepelrada*.²⁰¹ In 1964, its main task was to organise and supervise all activities concerning or affecting the anti-Malaysia campaign.²⁰² The decree also stated that in carrying out its duty, the *Pepelrada* should consult with *Pantja Tunggal* in their own regions to obtain suggestions for policy development, assistance for coordination between government bodies, and support for the implementation of related policies.²⁰³ The authority of the *Pepelrada* included confiscating properties, prohibiting a person to reside or leave a certain place, detaining people for 30 days, and transferring a person to certain locations under high surveillance if the person is indicated as disrupting security.²⁰⁴ The *Pepelrada* was also obliged to report directly to the President, and thus, bypassing the central military headquarters. Furthermore, the President himself appointed the head of the *Pepelrada*, which was dominated by the provincial army commander. Therefore, regional decisions relied mostly on the commander, including decisions related to actions to eliminate communists.²⁰⁵ As we shall see in this chapter, existing bodies such as *Panca Tunggal* and *Pepelrada* became a significant institution in supporting the annihilation operation against the left. *Pantja Tunggal*'s inclusiveness of civilian members not only facilitated coordination between the army and anti-communist civilian organisations during the 1965-66 operation, but also provided the opportunity for political parties or other civilian groups to gain advantages from their alliance with the military even before the September 30th Movement.

Together with the expansion of political power, the army also increased their territorial power. The concept of territorial warfare was derived from the guerrilla warfare strategy during the Independence war. This strategy was regarded as the most effective tactic to defeat Dutch soldiers who were considered better equipped and larger in numbers. In 1958, a Committee on Army Doctrine emphasised that guerrilla warfare was the only adequate strategy for the Indonesian army, and therefore, support from civilians became a prerequisite for successful military operations.²⁰⁶ This thesis became the Army's Concept of Territorial Warfare, highlighting the advancement of people's national consciousness (especially villagers) 'to the extent that they will be willing to sacrifice anything in the defence of the higher cause', and in return, the army should establish stability, internal security and social justice.²⁰⁷ One year later, the army used this guideline to expand their Territorial Organisation. The *Tentara and Territorium* (T&T),²⁰⁸ which was established at the

²⁰⁰ Sundhaussen 1982, 175.

²⁰¹ Dwikora is an acronym for *Dwi Komando Rakyat* (People's Two Commands), released in 1964. President Sukarno announced Dwikora in relation with the confrontation movement against Malaysia, instructing the people to thwart the formation of Malaysia as Britain's puppet state, and to form volunteers to assist this movement. Setiawan, 2003. P. 74.

²⁰² Crouch 1988, 168.

²⁰³ Muhono 1966, 1245.

²⁰⁴ Muhono 1966, 1246-7.

²⁰⁵ Sundhaussen 1982, 186.

²⁰⁶ Sundhaussen 1982, 138.

²⁰⁷ Sundhaussen 1982, 140.

²⁰⁸ In this territorial concept, there were seven military territories (during 1950-1957): North Sumatra (T&T I), South Sumatra (T&T II), West Java including Jakarta (T&T III), Central Java (T&T IV), East Java (T&T V),

provincial level, were renamed into *Komando Daerah Militer* (Regional Military Command/ *Kodam*) and the number was increased from seven to sixteen. At the lower level, *Komando Resort Militer* (Military Resort Commands/ *Korem*), which incorporated several regencies, were established in several areas, followed by the formation of *Komando Distrik Militer* (District Military Command/ *Kodim*) at the district or regency level, and *Komando Rayon Militer* (Military Precinct Commands/ *Koramil*) in the subdistricts. The logic behind *Koramil* was to prepare the mentality of the people for territorial warfare, and prevent mental unrest.²⁰⁹ This, according to Sundhaussen, was basically the military's strategy to tackle the PKI's growing influence of the grassroots masses, especially since the escalation of the unilateral action (see chapter 1), although the military never explicitly stated this.




Figure 2. Structure of Kodam VIII/ Brawijaya Territorial Command

In line with Sundhaussen's argument, the expansion period (between 1963-1966) of the command units in East Java indicates that it was geared to confront the increasing support of the PKI in the lowest administrative levels. The T&T V Brawijaya became Kodam VIII Brawijaya based on the army decree dated 24 October 1959.²¹⁰ New military units were established, such as Korem 083 on 16 October 1963 (based on *Surat Keputusan Pangdam VIII/ Brawijaya no. Kep 152/10/1963*), Korem 081 and 082 on 25 November 1963 (based on *Surat Keputusan Pangdam VIII/ Brawijaya no. Kep 185/11/1963*), and Korem 084 on 9 July 1966 (through *Surat Keputusan Pangdam VIII/ Brawijaya no.*

Kalimantan (T&T VI) and East Indonesia (T&T VII). These T&Ts were established to conduct guerilla warfare independently of orders and supplies from the headquarters. Within the regiments in the T&T, a subordinate body of Military District Commands was specifically responsible for liaison with the civilian population.

Sundhaussen 1982, 58-60.

²⁰⁹ Sundhaussen 1982, 175.

²¹⁰ The territorial code for the Brawijaya command was changed from VIII to V, based on the decision of the Army Chief of Staff no. Kep/411/1985 on 12 January 1985. Since then, the East Java Regional Military Command is known as Kodam V/ Brawijaya. Setiawan 2006, 43.

Skep-1 03/7/1966 although the unit was already incorporated into Kodam VIII Brawijaya since 1964).²¹¹ Meanwhile, the Kodim structure was established through a commander's decree on 25 January 1964, where 10 Kodim were formed in Korem 081, 7 Kodim in Korem 082, 9 Kodim in Korem 083, and 7 Kodim in Korem 084.²¹² With this new territorial structure, the army started civic action programmes, such as public indoctrination or cultural events, while at the same time, connected closely to the civilian administration, religious and cultural organisations, youth groups, veterans, trade unions, peasant organisations, political parties and groups at regional and local levels. They even sent doctors, engineers, and entertainment groups for the purpose of winning the hearts and minds of the people.²¹³

However, the army's growing power was not uncontested by the PKI, who was fully aware of their strategy. The PKI chairman Aidit, for example, expressed criticism against the army for becoming increasingly authoritarian and endangering Indonesia's democracy. Aidit captured the intention of the military 'to create a Martial Law rule without the Martial Law itself', for 'continuing a dictatorial rule in the name of Catur Tunggal in the provinces', and for activating their units in villages.²¹⁴ The PKI was aware of its weak influence in the army and also used its close connection with Sukarno to propose the expansion of the Nasakom principle (stand for *Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis* or Nationalist, Religious, Communist—a principle that represented the unity of three major socio-political tendencies in Indonesian society)²¹⁵ into the military by establishing advisory teams to work with the commanders of the four services.²¹⁶ This tension between the PKI and the army illustrates that both parties did not only compete for upper-level political support (in this case, from Sukarno and political elites), but also for lower grassroots civilian endorsement. After the 30th September Movement, this tension ended with the military's control at both levels.

Key Features of East Java's Military Operation

Previous studies in East Java focus on two main features of the military operation. First, The army had already announced the official line in their newspapers since 8 October 1965: that the September 30th Movement (now branded as Gestapu, acronym for Gerakan September Tiga Puluh/ 30th September Movement) was masterminded by the PKI.²¹⁷ However, since this official propaganda started, Kodam VIII Brawijaya had not taken any action against the communists. They were considered slow, and the commander, Basuki Rahmat was regarded as undecisive. Second, in relation to the first point, civilian organisations took the initiative to start the anti-communist persecutions, resulting in the most gruesome bloodbaths in the nation. However, these civilians did not move independently, at least they would not have decided to act against the left if they were not assured of the military's support of their action. Furthermore, keeping in mind that the army was a political body, they would certainly need political allies to execute the persecution. Therefore, Brawijaya command's hesitancy or slowness was not only a reflection of their diverse political stance, but should also be seen as a moment of shifting political alliance: from one that was subordinated to Sukarno, to a coup-oriented military faction dominated by Suharto. A shift which assured that once the elimination of the left started in East Java, it would receive the most significant support that it needed.

²¹¹ Setiawan 2006, 37-38.

²¹² Setiawan 2006, 37.

²¹³ Sundhaussen 1982, 141-2.

²¹⁴ Aidit stated this criticism in a report to the Central Committee on 10 February 1963. Sundhaussen 1982, 176.

²¹⁵ Sukarno used this term to bring together competing forces during Indonesia's Guided Democracy period (1959-1965) to foster a sense of national unity. Crouch 1988, 43-44.

²¹⁶ Crouch 1988, 87.

²¹⁷ Kammen & McGregor 2012, 2.

So far, researchers argue that regional differences in the 1965-66 violence existed because the army's capacity and political unity differed in the regions. The case of Aceh shows an example of unity between the military commander Brigadier General Ishak Djuarsa and his direct superior, Lieutenant General Ahmad Mokoginta. Both opposed Sukarno and the PKI which led to the immediate launch of military operations against the PKI in early October. Meanwhile, in areas where the army command was politically divided, faced resistance, or did not have sufficient troops, mass killings were delayed for some time, but then accelerated dramatically when the balance of forces tipped in favour of the anti-communist position.²¹⁸ This was the case in East Java, where the regional military commander, Brigadier General Basuki Rachmat was considered indecisive about moving against the communists. The killings in this region only began in early November along with Rachmat's replacement.²¹⁹ In other cases where there was no consensus within the military leadership or where the strength of loyalist troops was insufficient, the onset of mass killings coincided with or immediately followed the deployment of troops loyal to Suharto from outside the command area. This was the case in Central Java and Bali, where the Army Paracommando Regiment (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat/ RPKAD*) units took the lead in the operation.²²⁰

East Java in the 1960s was certainly an example of a diverse political orientation of its authorities. The Surabaya Major, Moerachman, was a BTI who was later detained after the accusation of being involved in the September 30th Movement. Eight regents (*bupati*) and mayors as well as the PKI-nominated representatives in regional government bodies and assemblies were also suspended on 29 October 1965 by the East Java Governor Wijono as a response to the Movement.²²¹ Meanwhile, the Kodam VIII Brawijaya officers were considered fairly Sukarnoist as they were personally loyal to Sukarno but sporadically did express an anti-communist stance.²²² The Brawijaya Commander, Basuki Rachmat, was one of the 'moderate reformers' group and was more critical of but not directly hostile towards Sukarno. However, dissention increased after 1 October 1965.²²³ Both Rachmat and the Pepelrada chief of staff, Colonel Widjaja Sukardanu, were seen as hesitant to issue instructions for large-scale operations against the communist.²²⁴ Besides the problem of insufficient troops,²²⁵ the delay of action was also because Rachmat was a strong supporter of Suharto even before the September 30th Movement,²²⁶ but at the same time, loyal to President Sukarno. This suggests that Rachmat and his officers needed time to ensure that the political shift that they were going to make would not disadvantage them. In this case, the Brawijaya Command is an interesting example that being anti-communist and loyal to Sukarno's was not at opposite ends of the spectrum.

²¹⁸ Robinson 2018, 151.

²¹⁹ Robinson 2018, 151.

²²⁰ Robinson 2018, 152.

²²¹ Setiyawan 2014, 215. In *Report from East Java*, the reporter noted that Governor Wijono was irresolute. His subordinates complained about his slowness in commencing purges against the communists, even those directly under his supervision. "Report from East Java" 1986, 148. Wijono's decision to dismiss Leftist-oriented officials may be a result of his political shift.

²²² Sundhaussen 1982, 212.

²²³ Sundhaussen 1982, 227.

²²⁴ "Report from East Java" 1986, 146. This article is a translation of a report by an intelligence officer to his superior in East Java, written on 29 November 1965.

²²⁵ Eight of the province's sixteen battalions were serving elsewhere at that time. Robinson 2018, 151. In addition, thirty percent of them were involved in the coup. "Report from East Java" 1986, 146. Dahlia Setiyawan also supports this analysis using US intelligence documents that reported Rachmat's conversation with the American embassy's political officer, Jacob Walkin, stating that the commander now had enough troops to continue the anti-communist purge in East Java (based on a telegram sent on 19 November 1965). Setiyawan 2014, 247.

²²⁶ Rachmat was appointed as the Minister of internal affairs (1966-69) in Suharto's cabinet.

As a consequence of Rachmat's irresolute attitude, two of his subordinates moved more aggressively against the communists, in accordance with the national anti-communist statement that had already been launched publicly in the army's newspaper since 8 October 1965. One of them was Willy Soedjono, Madiun Regional Commander, who was recorded as having initiated arrests of the PKI cadres (about 200 in the city of Madiun alone).²²⁷ The other is Colonel Sumardi, the Regional Commander in Malang-Besuki, who was reported as being the most firm in arresting the PKI leaders and activists. On 14 November 1965, Sumardi organised a meeting with several local Heads, Regents, Residents and former Governors and Residents, in order to establish a policy which would achieve more intensive cooperation between military and civilian authorities; solve problems resulting from the extermination of the PKI; and solve economic problems, which could be exploited by the PKI.²²⁸ It is unclear to what extent the meeting initiated the killings, but intelligence reports mentioned that killings were already taking place in the residencies of the Kediri, Jombang, Mojokerto, Malang, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, and Besuki region even before the meeting.²²⁹ In Kediri, NU's youth wing Ansor had already organised a mass demonstration on 13 October 1965, which accelerated the killings in rural areas.²³⁰

This brings us to the second key element of the violence in East Java, which is the participation of civilian groups. Some scholars concluded that the killings in East Java were the result of initiatives of lower-level military and civilian forces without clear direction from their military superiors.²³¹ In this case, the civilian force that took the lead in East Java was NU's youth wing Ansor. Their involvement resonated with the religious reasoning of Holy War and defending Islam that was widely circulated by their respected Islamic teachers (the *Kyais*).²³² However, it is important to note that there were different factions within the NU itself regarding the September 30th Movement. The young generation of the NU, led by Zainur Ehsan Subchan, was determined to move more aggressively against the PKI, while their senior leaders were more passive.²³³ Studies and reports about the violence in East Java also described gruesome acts involved in the killings, such as public torture, mutilation and decapitation.²³⁴ For many areas, body parts and corpses were left in public spaces to generate terror.²³⁵ Massive involvement of religious organisations such as Ansor and the Catholic Youth in the violence in East Java led a number of scholars to argue that the violence was a result of rooted conflict between religious organisations and the PKI while the army remained largely passive.²³⁶

²²⁷ "Report from East Java" 1986, 147.

²²⁸ "Report from East Java" 1986, 148.

²²⁹ "Report from East Java" 1986, 145.

²³⁰ Young 1990, 80-81.

²³¹ Kammen & MacGregor 2012, 16-17.

²³² Other reasoning includes statements such as "If the PKI were not killed first, then we would be killed"; "A person is not a real Muslim if he does not want to exterminate PKI members"; "They had attacked our faith". Robinson 2018, 173. Harold Crouch also noted that it was common to find religious teachers (*kyai*) and scholars (*ulama*) of NU mobilizing their students at religious schools (*pesantren*) to take communists from their homes and kill them at certain places. Crouch 1988, 152.

²³³ Feillard, Andr  e 1996, 45-47.

²³⁴ See "Additional Data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty in Indonesia, Especially in East Java" 1990.

²³⁵ Pipit Rochijat told a story where body of corpses were stacked together on rafts with the PKI banner on top. Rochijat 1985, 44.

²³⁶ Hermawan Sulisty recorded that the military remained passive in the massacre in Kediri and Jombang. He only noted that the Kodim commander in Kediri sent his officers in civilian clothes to join Ansor's mass actions. Sulisty 2000, 166.

However, both the horizontal conflict and state-led violence analysis seem to overlook that neither civilian organisations nor the army worked independently. They had been forming a political alliance even before the September 30th Movement, which culminated in the violence throughout 1965-68. Few socio-historical analyses of the involvement of civilian groups in the violence implicitly pointed to advantages that these groups gained by eliminating the PKI. For example, Greg Fealy and Katherine McGregor argued that political and socioeconomic forces such as electoral popularity and attacks against NU landowners were more significant than religious reasons for the killings.²³⁷ This implies that the elimination of the PKI created secure political and economic positions for the NU.

Not only the NU, but the Catholic Party (*Partai Katolik*) and Catholic Youth (*Pemuda Katolik Republik Indonesia/ PMKRI*) also formed an alliance with the military even before the September 30th Movement. Acting independently from their central leadership, the Catholic Party and PMKRI used the Catholics within the military to safeguard their movement. FX Trikatmo, a former PMKRI activist in Malang explains the relationship between the PMKRI and the military prior to 1965:

It was [19]63 and very intense²³⁸. Intimidation was also strong. Ah, why did we dare to organise a Bishop's mass meeting (*apel Uskup*)? Because at that time in Malang, Catholic figures were dominant. Amongst others; the chairman of Askam (*Aksi Sosial Katolik Malang/ Catholic Social Action in Malang*) was Colonel Moedjiono. He was the Commander of the Military Police (POM) in East Java – Brawijaya. The POM Korem Commander was also a Catholic. Their auditor, in East Java, in Malang, the military auditor was also a Catholic. The air force commander was also a Catholic, but apparently, he was in Oemar Dhani's²³⁹ cadre. So he was arrested. There were a lot of Catholic figures. When the military was dominant, then, who will dare [laughing]. They were the ones who supported us in Malang.²⁴⁰

Instead of being used by the army, it was the other way around for these civilian activists– Trikatmo portrayed the PMKRI as an organisation with the objective to utilise the army. They took advantage of the Catholics within the military body to secure their mass movements, and strengthen the position of Catholics within the tense and intimidated rivalry with the PKI around 1963. With this kind of alliance and political support, civilian organisations seem to move firmly against the communists in early October. For example, Jess Melvin mentioned that as early as 1 October 1965, PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia/ Indonesian Islamic High School Students) activist in Banda Aceh already produced anti-communist posters without direction from the army. Melvin argues that in this early stage, it is highly possible that civilian groups acted independently but were soon organised under the military's command.²⁴¹ However, reflecting on Trikatmo's account, I think that even when civilian organisations seem to act independently, they would not have made the decision to do so if they were not completely sure about the army's support for their actions. This indicates that coalitions between the army and civilian groups were continuously maintained before, during and after the violence.

From Chaos to Extermination

The first weeks after the September 30th Movement were filled with ambiguity. Authorities and civilians in the regions were not certain about what the movement was, and how to respond to it.²⁴²

²³⁷ Based on correspondence between central and local NU officials, the central leadership played a role in encouraging the violence in the local regions. Fealy & McGregor 2012, 105-130.

²³⁸ Trikatmo was referring to the political rivalry between the PKI and anti-communist organisations such as the NU and the Catholic Party.

²³⁹ Oemar Dhani was the national air force commander (1962-65), but was accused of being involved in the September 30th Movement.

²⁴⁰ Interview with FX Trikatmo, Malang, 11 June 2016 #20.36-22.32.

²⁴¹ Melvin 2018, 119-120.

²⁴² In Aceh, an activist who was putting up posters accusing the PKI of being the mastermind behind the September 30th Movement was confronted by a military guard using his bayonet. This happened because in the

As this chapter will show, in the first weeks of October 1965, military actions in East Java were geared towards maintaining peace and order. However, as soon as the political tendency shifted into an anti-Leftist stream, these actions transformed into creating and facilitating anti-communist violence. Civilian groups that were once more-or-less independent allies of the army, now became clients of their military patrons, believing that the nation was entering into a war against the communists.

In East Java, weeks after the September 30th Movement were rather chaotic: both the communists and anti-communists groups mobilised themselves to convey a public statement. From early to mid-October 1965, mass movements included demonstrations (by rightist and leftist groups), destruction of Leftist's properties (houses or offices), and clashes between the two parties.²⁴³ During that period, authorities were still trying to take control of the situation. For example, on 10 October 1965 in Pasuruan, Panca Tunggal dismissed 2000 demonstrators from religious groups targeting communists.²⁴⁴ On 11 October 1965, the battalion commander of Zeni 5 was instructed to cooperate with *Puterpra* (*Perwira Urusan Teritorial dan Perlawanan Rakyat* which later on became *Koramil*) in Lawang to keep demonstrations in order (*menjaga ketertiban demonstrasi*), and prevent destruction of houses, stores and officers, and to release a warning shot, if necessary.²⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the communists also organised their mass movements. On 21 October 1965, for example, 300 communists in Cluring village, Banyuwangi organised a demonstration.²⁴⁶ Received by the local Panca Tunggal, the demonstrators made several statements: they will continue to support Sukarno as reminded by the PKI central committee; create national revolutionary unity on the basis of NASAKOM; execute five revolutionary principles (*Panca Ajimat Revolusi*); and persecute the people who are responsible for burning down innocent people's houses. Up to this point, it seems that mass mobilisations were organic and uncoordinated, while the authorities were still attempting to prevent a high number of casualties from these movements.

A turning point in East Java's purge against the left occurred after the formation of Pupelrada. A telegram to the regional Panca Tunggal and Kodim mentioned *Pepelrada* Decree No. Kep-15/10/65 about the formation of *Pepelrada* in *Korem/ Kopursiaga* (*Komando Tempur Siaga/ Battle Command*) and the establishment of *Pupelrada* or *Pembantu Pepelrada* (Assistant *Pepelrada*) in *Korem 083 Malang* on 13 October 1965. Located in Bromo street 17, *Pupelrada Korem 083* operated under the leadership of Colonel Sumadi, the *Korem* (Military Resort Command) 083 Commander.²⁴⁷ *Pupelrada* was also established in other districts and regents.²⁴⁸ Its formation meant that now the *Korems* also

early days after the September 30th Movement, even the military was not sure who was behind the movement. Melvin 2018, 121.

²⁴³ This also included destruction of houses or properties of Chinese residents in the area, accusing them of supporting the Indonesian communists. "Laporan G30S/PKI di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki", 1965.

²⁴⁴ "Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki", 1. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁴⁵ Radiogram T. 582/1965 directed to Komandan Batalyon Zeni Tempur (Dan Jon Zipur) 5 on 11 October 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 1. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁴⁶ "Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki", 5. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁴⁷ Radiogram T. 591/1965 directed to Regional Panca Tunggal ex Residence/ Besuki (Panca Tunggal Tk. II ex Karesidenen/ Besuki) through Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 16 October 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 2. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁴⁸ Another document from the Brawijaya archives also shows the existence of *Pupelrada* in *Korem 081, Madiun*. Laporan *Korem 081*. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

had extra-judicial powers such as prohibiting a person to reside or leave a certain place, detaining people for 30 days, and so on. Furthermore, the information division of *Pupelrada* 083 clearly stated that “all parties are obliged to assist efforts to normalise the situation and to prevent the misuse of the people’s current emotional state”.²⁴⁹ This was basically an explicit call for every group, including the civilians, to be involved in the anti-communist operations.

One day after the formation of *Pupelrada* in Malang, religious youth groups held an Action Command (*Komando Aksi*) public meeting in the Malang town square on 14 October 1965.²⁵⁰ At this meeting, the youths stated publicly that they would assist the army in crushing the September 30th Movement and was received by Colonel Soemadi, Commander of Kopur III/ 83 (*Komando Tempur*/ Battle Command under Korem 083). The meeting also handed over 250,000 youths from 30 mass organisations under the *Front Pemuda* (Youth Front) of Malang City. It did not state further to whom the youths were handed over. Although the number seems to be exaggerated, public meetings became a common starting point of a more coordinated mass mobilisation that also occurred elsewhere.²⁵¹ On the same date, the military began to issue orders to arrest and investigate members of Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat in order to search for ‘complete information related to the September 30th Movement’.²⁵² This radiogram instructed every Kodim (District Military Command) to cooperate with the local police command and *Pantja Tunggal* to investigate Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat members who were involved in the training of volunteers in Jakarta. The investigation should focus on their knowledge about the September 30th Movement and its implementation in the regions. Whether or not this radiogram influenced the mass killings is still unclear, but it shows that previous mass demonstrations started to shift into an attack against the left.

On 23 October 1965, the Head of Staff *Pupelrada* 0825/ Brawijaya (presumably referred to Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi) conducted a limited meeting attended by *Puterpra*, *PP* (presumably *Pemuda Pancasila*), *Hansip* (*Pertahanan Sipil*/ civil defence), and the heads of government Departments (*Djawatan*) to inform them about the establishment of *Pupelrada* in East Java.²⁵³ The meeting also stressed the military operations to secure and stabilize local government. Since then, the nature of the Korem 083 daily report started to change. Since late October to December 1965, the report frequently mentioned the killing of members of Leftist organisations by unidentified killers (*pembunuh tidak dikenal*)²⁵⁴. For example, on 16 November 1965, four cases of killings were recorded in the report and in one of those cases, four bodies were found in a rice field.²⁵⁵ The document also reported self-disbandment of Leftist organisations in different areas. However, a

²⁴⁹ “Pokok-Pokok Kebijaksanaan Penerangan Staf *Pupelrada* Korem 083 Dalam Menghadapi Penyelesaian Apa Yang Dinamakan Gerakan 30 September”, November 6, 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia. This document sometimes uses *Pupelrada* and *Pupepelrada*. It refers to the same body.

²⁵⁰ “Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki”, 2. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵¹ In Surabaya, a mass rally took place on 16 October 1965 at the Heroes Monument, which was organized by the East Java and Surabaya Action Committee to Crush Gestapu (Panitia Aksi Mengganjang Gestapu). Setiyawan 2014, 210.

²⁵² Radiogram T. 587/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 14 October 1965. “Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083”, 1. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵³ “Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki”, 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵⁴ The language that is used in the document is vague. It did not reveal any actors, but focused on the finding – bodies that were predominantly of members of Leftist groups.

²⁵⁵ “Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki”, 12. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

radiogram on 30 November 1965 stated that disbandment of political or mass organisations that were involved in the September 30th Movement should be accepted by the District Military Commander (*Dandim*) as head of *Pupelrada* and witnessed by *Pantja Tunggal* and other organisations in the National Front.²⁵⁶ This indicates the possibility that self-disbandment was not voluntary, but occurred under the pressure of the military.

When Local Acts Became Coordinated

The formation of *Pupelrada* became a turning point where spontaneous movements from Rightist and Leftist groups in the first weeks of October 1965 were transformed into attacks against the left by mid-October in Malang. The diverse political orientation amongst East Java's authorities was now becoming increasingly coherent in support of eliminating the left. In this case, involvement of civilian masses in the anti-communist purges should not be perceived as a solution for the insufficiency of troops, but as an effort to create the impression that the violence against the PKI was the result of spontaneous communal anger – a feature of a civil war.²⁵⁷ While in fact, it was certainly the army that had made civilian movements increasingly massive and aggressive towards the left in East Java. On 21 October 1965, Basuki Rachmat finally established *Pancasila Operation* to move against the left in East Java. This decision secured Rachmat's own career, and he was appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs (1966-68) in Suharto's cabinet.

The *Pancasila Operation* instruction stated that "with all authorities in all Kodam VIII/Brawijaya, together with other *Angkatan, Panca Tunggal*, and other apparatus, we should improve the implementation of *Dwikora* and continue the extermination of the remaining contra-revolutionary September 30th Movement down to its roots to create peace and order in East Java" (*Dengan segala wewenang yang ada, seluruh slagorde Kodam VIII/ Brawijaya bersama-sama dengan lain ANGKATAN, PANTJA TUNGGAL dan segenap aparatur lainnya tetap meningkatkan pelaksanaan Dwikora dan terus membasmi sisa-sisa golongan kontra revolusi "Gerakan 30 September" sampai seakar-akarnya untuk menciptakan suasana aman dan tertib di wilayah Jatim*).²⁵⁸ In this operation, every battalion was obliged to report on the local situation every six hours to a joint command post in Surabaya.²⁵⁹ The operation also instructed every Korem to "execute every military or non-military act, by our own troops or by other parties, in accordance with the Commander's policy" (*mengadakan usaha dan tindakan-tindakan yang diperlukan sesuai kebijaksanaan yang telah digariskan oleh PANGLIMA baik dalam segi militer maupun non militer, baik ke dalam pasukan sendiri maupun keluar*).²⁶⁰ This instruction implied the need to align every action under one military command. Furthermore, the operation also targeted the left within military bodies. Any military personnel who committed disciplinary offences related to the September 30th Movement were to be handed over to the screening team of KODAM VIII.²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ Radiogram T. 715/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 30 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 8. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵⁷ Robinson 2018, 212.

²⁵⁸ "Perintah Operasi No. 05 Pantja Sila", 2. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁵⁹ "Perintah Operasi No. 05 Pantja Sila", 5. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁰ "Perintah Operasi No. 05 Pantja Sila", 3-4. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶¹ "Prinmin No. 57/1965 Dari Prinop No. 5", 2. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

The Pancasila Operation also explicitly authorised the use of civilian forces. The document stated that “for the purpose of the operation, local civilian forces that have clearly expressed their support for the army can be used in eliminating the September 30th Movement” (*Untuk keperluan operasi dapat menggunakan tenaga sipil setempat yang telah nyata-nyata mendukung gerakan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia dalam rangka penumpasan Gerakan 30 September*).²⁶² Although the document did not specify further the involvement of civilians, it opened a spectrum of possibilities for civilians to conduct violence against the left. Furthermore, the Pancasila Operation instruction was acknowledged by the National Army Commander (*Panglima Angkatan Darat/ Menpangad*) A.H. Nasution (1962-66) and the Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Panglima Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat/ Pangkostrad*) Suharto (1963-65).²⁶³ This suggests that the operation was structurally coordinated among every level in the army, from the central level to the regional level.

After the issue of the Pancasila Operation instruction, a number of radiograms were sent to the Kodim under Korem 083 Malang to organise the use of civilians. A radiogram released on 26 October 1965 instructed that “progressive revolutionary organisations that stand behind the army to crush the counter-revolutionary movement should be under *Puterpra*” (former name for Koramil), including combative military trainings by individuals or groups.²⁶⁴ This suggests the army’s intention to stop random mass actions and consolidate actions under the *Puterpra*. Later in November 1965, the *Puterpra* was ordered to be armed, including the Technical Assistance Unit (*Unit Bantuan Teknis*) which would be assigned later on to the weak *Puterpras*.²⁶⁵ Arming the *Puterpra* also meant that military forces at the lowest level (subdistrict) should be more aggressive in eliminating Leftists.

Soon after this radiogram, a series of documents also issued similar instructions regarding civilian forces. On 23 November 1965, a radiogram ordered:²⁶⁶

1. Headquarters should be provided to mass action movements that do not yet have any. Catur Tunggal should provide this for these mass action movements, and combine them with *Hansip* (civil defence).
2. KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia/ Indonesia University Students Action Front*) should be united with the aforementioned AA²⁶⁷ and include the University Students Regiment (*Resimen Mahasiswa*)

²⁶² “Prinmin No. 57/1965 Dari Prinop No. 5”, 3. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶³ The Pancasila Operation instructions were sent to the Battle Command in Korem 081 to 083, commanders of the battalions in East Java, Menpangad, Pangkostrad, the commander of Kodam/ Regional Military Command Diponegoro (Central Java) and Udayana (Bali), and to other units in the Brawijaya command. “Prinmin No. 57/1965 Dari Prinop No. 5”, 4. 21 Oktober 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁴ The radiogram also ordered the formation of investigation teams (*tim pengusut*) at district and subdistrict levels, of which members should be adjusted to the local situation. Radiogram T. 298/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 26 October 1965. “Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083”, 3. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁵ Radiogram T. 658/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 6 November 1965. “Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083”, 4. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁶ Radiogram T. 702/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 23 November 1965. “Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083”, 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁷ The document did not provide any further explanation of AA. However, a term of Golongan Agama/ Ansor (Religious group/ Ansor) was used in a situation report of Korem 081 Madiun and Kediri. It is highly possible that the AA in this document referred to this specific civilian group. “G30S/ PKI di Daerah Korem 081 Madiun-

3. The task of the aforementioned AA is to assist the army by:
 - a. Forming teams to register residents at the level of the village neighbourhood, village, subdistrict, district or regents, national companies, private companies, universities, and so on in order to abolish the PKI internally (it should be abolished by the end of November)
 - b. Providing information
 - c. Providing information and indoctrination for former PKI sympathisers who want to be good citizens
 - d. Conducting operations together with the ABRI
 - e. Creating psy-war defence
 - f. Conducting counter²⁶⁸
 - g. Staying anti Neo-colonialism (Nekolim)²⁶⁹

The document did not further explain the details of each point. However, it is clear that the army was organising civilian forces under their command to register residents (presumably using screening teams similar to Central Java's Teperda),²⁷⁰ provide assistance in military operations and participate in indoctrination efforts, presumably amongst villagers and detainees.

Instructions to organise civilian forces under the army command continued towards the end of November 1965. For example, a radiogram on 25 November 1965 ordered middle-rank officers (*Pama/ perwira menengah*) to directly lead mass actions.²⁷¹ Meanwhile, two days later, another radiogram instructed cessation of all mass movements; and to channel AA through *Hansip*, provide them (mass movements) with uniforms and let the army direct them.²⁷² This was a very explicit order of transforming civilians into military personnel. Another radiogram clearly stated the acknowledgement of KAMI as the only student organisation permitted by the military, in which all students were obliged to be involved with the main task of annihilating the September 30th Movement under the army leadership.²⁷³ Through these instructions of civilian's involvement, it is not surprising that by 4 December 1965, the Commander of Korem 083 reported to the Brawijaya Commander that all the PKI under *Korem 083* area 'were terminated'.²⁷⁴

Kediri". 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁶⁸ "Melaksanakan counter" (original text). There was no further explanation about this instruction, but it may relate to strategies in countering the communists.

²⁶⁹ The term Nekolim was introduced by Sukarno in relation to the independence revolution. While during the Sukarno period, anti-Nekolim refers to independence, anti-Dutch or foreign intervention, in 1965, Nekolim means anti-communists, because the communists were seen as endangering Indonesia's revolution.

²⁷⁰ This is similar to Central Java's Teperda or Regional Investigation Teams (Team Pemeriksa Daerah), which had the duty to interrogate and collect information from prisoners. The formation of Teperda was at the direct instruction of Suharto. Hammer 2013, 53.

²⁷¹ Radiogram T. 706/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 25 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁷² Radiogram T. 702/1965 directed to Kodim 0818-0825 and 0831 on 27 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 6. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁷³ Radiogram ST.705/1965 on 25 November 1965. "Daftar Chekking Pelaksanaan Surat-Surat Skorem 083", 8. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya, Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia.

²⁷⁴ "Laporan G30S/ PKI Di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki", 16. 1965. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

To conclude, there are two strategies that are highly significant in the anti-communist operation in East Java. First is the establishment of *Pupelrada* that provide a legal basis for the Korems under the Brawijaya command to perform arrests, confiscate property, and perform other extra-judicial acts. The second is the use of civilian forces in the Pancasila Operation, which had been assigned various tasks ranging from providing information to directly assisting in the operation. Although detailed evidence about civilian involvement can only be found (so far) in Korem 083 Malang, it is highly possible that other Korem in East Java, and even in other provinces, also issued similar instructions. This shows that although the civilian forces acted locally in the first weeks after the September 30th Movement, these forces were eventually coordinated under the structural command of the East Java army command as from late October 1965.

Records of Detention

Another indication that the army was monitoring the violence was through their records of detainees. In the report on the September 30th Movement (G30S – the term that the army use) in Korem 083, a specific log was available to track the number of detainees. These numbers were recorded daily, starting in early November (at least in Korem 083 – it may be earlier or later in other regions) until December 1965. The mechanism for recording the numbers of detainees was not mentioned, but on several dates, the document also provides numbers of prisoners in each Kodim (see data from 10, 13 and 16 November). This suggests that the numbers were generated hierarchically, presumably from Koramil, to Kodim, and then to Korem 083, and maybe reported further to Kodam V/ Brawijaya. Prisoners' data at the Kodim level was also found in other regions, such as Kodim 0809 Kediri which listed 245 civil services, 211 village officials and 2955 civilians in detention.²⁷⁵

Table 3

NUMBER OF PRISONERS IN KOPUR SIAGA III/083, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1965

Date	Military Personnel	Civilians in the Armed Forces	Public Civilians	Total Prisoners	Prisoners in Kodim
4 November 1965				2472	-
10 November 1965				2337	Kodim 0818: 471 people Malang, Kodim 0819 Pasuruan: 165 people, Kodim 0820 Probolinggo: 262 people, Kodim 0821 Lumajang: 118 people, Kodim 0822 Bondowoso: 271 people, Kodim 0823 Situbondo: 158 people, Kodim 0824 Jember: 215 people, Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi: 553 people, Kodim 0831 Ponorogo: 129 people
13 November	39		2428	2467	Kodim 0818: 529 people Malang, Kodim 0819 Pasuruan: 241 people, Kodim 0820 Probolinggo: 106 people, Kodim 0821 Lumajang: 222

²⁷⁵ The date of this record is not available. Rekapitulasi: Daftar korban-korban penumpasan GESTAPU/ PKI di wilayah Kodim 0809/ Kediri. Komando Distrik Militer 0809 Kediri. No. Inventaris 316-a. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

Date	Military Personnel	Civilians in the Armed Forces	Public Civilians	Total Prisoners	Prisoners in Kodim
					people, Kodim 0822 Bondowoso: 271 people, Kodim 0823 Situbondo: 196 people, Kodim 0824 Jember: 215 people, Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi: 558 people, Kodim 0831 Ponorogo: 129 people
16 November				2821	Kodim 0818: 543 people Malang, Kodim 0819 Pasuruan: 253 people, Kodim 0820 Probolinggo: 204 people, Kodim 0821 Lumajang: 235 people, Kodim 0822 Bondowoso: 441 people, Kodim 0823 Situbondo: 243 people, Kodim 0824 Jember: 215 people, Kodim 0825 Banyuwangi: 558 people, Kodim 0831 Ponorogo: 129 people
20 November	34	1	3959	3997	-
21 November	45	1	3974	4020	-
23 November				1509	-
27 November	102	1	4903	5006	-
28 November				5034	-
4 December 1965	91	1	5450		-
6 December				6175	-
7 December, until 08.00	106	2	6183		-
7 December, until now (the hour is not available)	133	20	5652	5805	-
8 December	18	100	6109	6217	-
9 December	106	17	6087	6210	-
12 December, until 12.00	134	14	6111	6259	-
12 December, until 24.00	134	14	5650	5798	-
15 December	133	20	5454	5607	-
17 December	134	14	5904	6052	-
21 December	133	20	5480	5633	-
23 December	163	19	5435		-
27 December	224	27	4193	4444	-
29 December	213	27	4191	4431	-

Source: "Laporan SEPTEMBER 30TH MOVEMENT/PKI di Daerah Kopur Siaga III/ 83 Malang-Besuki" 1965, 8-18.

Based on the tables above, we can see that the number of prisoners increased from early November (2472 people) to early December (6259 people), and decreased slowly towards the end of December (4431 people). Note that on 12 December 1965, the number of prisoners decreased sharply within only twelve hours. No further explanation of this change is provided. However, keeping in mind that mass killings were usually preceded by detention; it is highly possible that the numbers declined

because the detainees were killed.²⁷⁶ Their detention period was also uncertain. In Korem 082 in Mojokerto, for example, 7398 people still remained detained until the end of 1966. The report further explained that since October 1966, Korem 082 no longer received maintenance funds or donations for the prisoners, so they have to rely on their own families for food for the remaining detention period.²⁷⁷ Where the acts of recording prisoners occurred in different places, it indicates that the violence occurred under the organisation and observation of the army.²⁷⁸

Military Operations in South Malang

Even though the Pancasila Operation was launched on 21 October 1965, it was not until 29 November 1965 that it commenced in South Malang, under the command of Captain Hasan Basri.²⁷⁹ As I mentioned earlier, the delay may be related to the shortage of troops, but it is also possible that the army needed time to consolidate internal forces to support the anti-communist operation. A report on the operation stated that the troops entered Donomulyo on 29 November and that they searched for information directly by establishing a connection with the local *Tjatur Tunggal*.²⁸⁰ Oral sources also confirmed this mechanism, and explained that village heads were summoned to the Koramil office once the army entered the area.²⁸¹ This was the starting point of army-civilian collaboration to execute the rank and file of communists in Donomulyo. The following day, one platoon raider already started a cleansing operation in Tlogosari complex and another in Sumberoto, two subdistricts located in Donomulyo.²⁸² Next, the troops were divided over three other districts in Sumbermanjing Kulon, Pagak and Bantur, for a two-day operation. During the night, *Kodim* instructed the extension of the operation for another 7 days, which provided more time for the army to execute another cleansing operation in Donomulyo up to the Blitar area. Therefore, on 2-3 December 1965, one platoon raider was assigned to move into the Wates area in Blitar, while other troops under the *Puterpra* Donomulyo moved into different subdistricts of Donomulyo. Also on 2 December 1965, a meeting was conducted in Turen to discuss the progress of the September 30th Movement operation and the cleansing operation against rampant robbers in South Malang. Besides the army, the marines (*Korps Komando Angkatan Laut/ KKO*) were also involved in the operation, covering the Karangsari area on 5-6 December 1965. The next day, 7 December 1965, a meeting was organised between *Kodim*, troop commanders, including *Brimob* Commander (Mobile Brigade/ *Brigade Mobil*, a special operation unit under the National Police force) and the District Head/ *Camat* of Bantur. From 9 December 1965, *Brimob* supplied additional troops, including troops assigned to guard prisoners in Wonokerto. On 19 December 1965, investigators were assigned to the operation,

²⁷⁶ See Kammen & Zakaria 2012.

²⁷⁷ "Kegiatan Kopur II/ Rem-082 Dalam Penumpasan Gerakan 30 September", 5. 1965. No. Inventaris 316-a. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁷⁸ Not only in East Java, the military in Aceh also recorded 1,941 public deaths since early October 1965. Melvin 2017, 496.

²⁷⁹ Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 1. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸⁰ Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 1. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸¹ Conversation with Jono, 8 August 2019.

²⁸² Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 1. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

two from *Korem* 083 (assigned in Wonokerto and Pagak) while other posts were filled with investigators from *Brimob*. The operation continued to move around different districts in South Malang and ended on 18 January 1966.

The Pancasila Operation report also described the result of the operation. It stated that 90% of the residents in Donomulyo were allegedly PKI. They also reported the discovery of 12 firearms in the Western part of Donomulyo²⁸³. During the examination by the investigation team (consisting of *Tjatur Tunggal*), the suspects easily admitted the existence of those firearms. The report then continues:

Despite the secured activists in Batu, there are still 24 activists of the PKI, PR, BTI and Lekra. Following the screening, they will certainly be terminated (*diselesaikan*). Remaining PKI members in 8 villages in Donomulyo have disbanded themselves. For those people, education on state administration, *Pancasila*, and religion have been organised.²⁸⁴

The report ends by stating that the people felt lively and secure again, and they thank the military for restoring the situation. This was a typical military narrative, portraying the PKI as the villain and the military as the national hero. Reading against the grain, as a report to their superior, the army needed to construct such a narrative and to make the reader believe in it (we will see in later chapters that this narrative is also part of the villagers' memories). Therefore, facts and numbers that are written in the document should be read critically. The report shows that the army intended to 'secure' a few leftist villagers in Donomulyo. Euphemistic terms, such as secured (*diamankan*) and terminated (*diselesaikan*), were used by the reporters.²⁸⁵

However, what happened in Donomulyo was much more than what was recorded in the report. Villagers clearly stated that the killings occurred in the area. Jono, for example, was a Catholic Youth activist who was assigned as a local guard in Donomulyo. He describes that the prisoners were taken away and killed in a public cemetery:

I saw it [the military operation]. People were detained, including my friends. They were brought to the police station, and punished, but not through a judge, prosecutors and so on. They were accused of being militant PKI members, such as members of a branch, sub-branch, and so on. Others were only followers – many of them. ... It was the army who did the killings. ... In the public cemetery, next to the main road, they dug a large pit. People's hands were tied in the back, then they were shot with an AK (presumably referring to AK-47, a type of firearm). ... Ansor assisted, sometimes they were also slaughtered. It was mob rule. Maybe they have a grudge, so this was their chance to get rid [of them].²⁸⁶

Besides stressing that the killings happened, Jono also explicitly pointed to the involvement of Ansor. This may explain why an anti-communist operation was a success even in an area where 90% of the

²⁸³ Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 2. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸⁴ Komando Distrik Militer 0818 Pos Komando Malang Selatan. 1966. "Laporan Singkat Selama Operasi Pantjasila Malang Selatan Berdasarkan P.O.004/1965. Pantjasila Tanggal 19-11-1965 Jang Dilaksanakan Sedjak Tanggal 29-11-1965 Hingga 18-1-1966", 2. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸⁵ This is a common practice that also happened in other areas in East Java, such as Banyuwangi. See Luthfi 2018.

²⁸⁶ Interview with Jono. Donomulyo, 23 August 2016 # 17.25-31.30

residents were considered to be communists. It was an operation which heavily utilised civilian forces, and therefore, resulted in little resistance on the ground.

Establishing The New Order

As discussed in chapter 2, the aim of the 1965-66 violence was not only to eliminate the left, but also to establish a new regime. In order to succeed in the establishment, the New Order government had to secure support for their policies not only from the elites, but also from the rural masses. This was also conducted through coalitions with civilians, using intellectuals and local elites to disseminate the New Order's propaganda. This section will focus on the East Java military's strategy to build such a regime, including civilians in Donomulyo who participated in supporting and maintaining the New Order in the next chapter.

The effort to establish the New Order started with a coordination meeting between all army commanders in Java, together with the Commander of the Army Reserve Command (*Kostrad*) and the Commander of *Puspasus/ RPKAD* (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat/ RPKAD) on 5-7 July 1967 in Jogjakarta. In the meeting, the Commanders agreed to act more strictly against those who wanted to revive Sukarno's Old Order, and they emphasised their support for the New Order.²⁸⁷ The meeting was not only a statement of consolidation between the regional commands (which previously were not solidly unified), but also an agreement to purge the remains of Sukarno's supporters and support the establishment of the New Order. In East Java, the purge began under the command of the New Brawijaya Commander, Major General Jasin. Under the campaign of New Orderisation (*Pengorde Baruan*), Jasin dismissed and replaced many military and government officers, including the Surabaya resort commander Willy Sudjono; the East Java Governor, Major General Wijono and almost all PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia/ Indonesia Nationalist Party* – Sukarno's political party) members in the local government.²⁸⁸

Thus, New Orderisation was not only directed at purging the government and military elites, but also at ensuring support for the New Order down to the district level. In September 1967, the Brawijaya Commander authorised the Provincial New Order Guidance Team (*Tim Pembina Order Baru*) which had already been established in Surabaya since July 1967.²⁸⁹ The main function of the team was to assist the Brawijaya Military Commander to execute New Orderisation in East Java, which means that the team would receive direct instructions from the Commander. More interestingly, the personnel of this team included elements from the army, action force or *kesatuan aksi*, mass and political organisations, the ministry of internal affairs, joint secretariat of Golkar (Suharto's ruling party), the Women's Organisation Cooperation Body (*Badan Kerjasama Organisasi Wanita/ BKOW*), the press and other interested parties.²⁹⁰ Again, this suggests that the cooperation between the military and civilians, presumably those that existed before and during the 1965 violence, continued during the period of the New Order. Furthermore, the Commander also instructed all *Korems* and *Kodims* to establish New Orderisation Guidance teams in every district and city in East Java. While the provincial

²⁸⁷ "Siaran Kilat No. 1/ 1967. Keputusan Tekad Para Panglima Komando Se-Djawa, Panglima *Kostrad* Serta Komandan Pus Pusus/ RPKAD." 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-a. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁸⁸ Crouch 1988, 233-234.

²⁸⁹ "Surat Keputusan No. Kep-001/ ORBA/9/1967 Panglima Daerah Militer VIII/ Brawidjaja Selaku Pembina Orde Baru Tingkat I/ Propinsi Djawa Timur." 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.


²⁹⁰ "Lampiran Surat Keputusan Panglima Daerah Militer VIII/ Brawidjaja Selaku Pembina Orde Baru Tingkat I/ Propinsi Djawa Timur No. Kep-001/ ORBA/9/1967. Struktur/ Procedure Kerdja Team Pembina Orde Baru Djawa Timur", 5. 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

New Orderisation Guidance team was authorized to plan, conceptualise and control New Orderisation in East Java; the coordinating team (which was established at *Korem*) had the duty to coordinate all New Orderisation teams at the district and city level. As we can see, the structure of the New Orderisation teams followed the military territorial command structure exactly.

The New Order Guidance teams had 7 short-term programmes, among them were New Orderisation of civilian leaders, military leaders, mass and political organisations; to eliminate obstacles, such as latent power, subversion, infiltration and so on, in developing the New Order; and to execute the general election to ensure the victory of the New Order.²⁹¹ The programmes imply a structural coercive attempt to control the region and generate votes for Suharto's political party, Golkar, for the election. In the next chapter, we will see how patrons in Donomulyo were mobilized to generate votes from villagers. The New Order Guidance teams also set targets that by October 1967, New Orderisation teams should be established at each level. By December 1967, the people of East Java should have understood the meaning of New Order through information from the mass media; and by January 1968, all control actions should be implemented (no further information is provided on the meaning of 'control actions' in the document). Under this attempt to 'control', the military replaced all of the village heads with army officers (which was commonly known as *caretaker*) and postponed village head elections in the former PKI areas.²⁹² Through this systematic and structural control, the New Order built an easy path to implement their new development policies, including agrarian transformation that I already elaborated on in chapter 2.

²⁹¹ "Lampiran Surat Keputusan Panglima Daerah Militer VIII/ Brawidjaja Selaku Pembina Orde Baru Tingkat I/ Propinsi Djawa Timur No. Kep-001/ ORBA/9/1967. Struktur/ Procedure Kerdja Team Pembina Orde Baru Djawa Timur", 1-2. 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.

²⁹² Major General Jasin sent a letter on 9 September 1967 to the Governor of East Java, stating that placement of military care takers village heads have prevented the revival of PKI and brought development to the villages. Therefore, replacement of village head caretakers was considered unnecessary. "Surat No.R.02/1967 Tentang Penangguhan Pemilihan Kepala Desa Di Desa-Desa Ex Pengaruh PKI." 1967. Arsip Komando Daerah Militer V/ Brawijaya No. Inventaris 316-b. Museum Brawijaya Malang, Indonesia.



PICTURE 5. MAP OF REGION CLASSIFICATION IN EAST JAVA

Source: Brawijaya military command archive collection

In the early years of the New Order, remaining PKI members managed to regroup in the Eastern part of Java, specifically in South Blitar. They planned an armed struggle against Suharto's government by forming a guerrilla detachment with around 150 people headed by an ex-army officer.²⁹³ They survived with the help of local villagers and by constructing cave-like hiding places along the river or on the slopes in the hills, which they called *ruba* (*rumah baru* or new house). According to one of the survivors, the army detected their movements because the guerrilla group started to attack former executioners of the 1965 operation and some *preman* (members of the underground organisation, usually involved in street-level crimes but who also offered their services to high officials, politicians or businessman) around South Blitar.²⁹⁴ Therefore, in 31 May 1968, the army launched the Trisula Operation Command Unit (*Komando Satuan Tugas/ Satgas Trisula*) to eliminate these remaining ex-communists.²⁹⁵ While most of the operation was concentrated in South Blitar, it also reached several areas in South Malang such as Binangun, Gondangtapen, Sumber Manjing Kulon, Kalipare and Donomulyo.²⁹⁶ In Donomulyo, the army moved in on 27 to 30 June 1968, under the operation 'Sharp Bamboo I' (*Bambu Runcing I*) where they managed to capture 12 people and confiscate one hand grenade, with the assistance of Donomulyo's subdistrict civil defence.²⁹⁷

The Trisula operation was no match for the leftist fugitives as they were poorly organized and poorly armed. Brawijaya military command, M. Jasin, also mentioned the imbalance of power, but also pointed out the support of civilians for the communists in hiding. Jasin stated that "the army's

²⁹³ Waskito 2017, 87-89.

²⁹⁴ Waskito 2017, 90.

²⁹⁵ Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 64.

²⁹⁶ Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 68.

²⁹⁷ Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 122-123.

fighting forces are far larger than the enemy's. However, we (the army) must consider the power of local civilians who are generally on the enemy's side".²⁹⁸ In three months, 2000 people were killed and thousands more detained and displaced as a result of the operation.²⁹⁹ Furthermore, the army interrogated and screened villagers and also destroyed their villages during the army's search for the fugitives. Until today, South Blitar and their residents remain stigmatised and fearful to talk about this past.³⁰⁰ Compared to the violence in 1965-66, the Trisula operation differs in two aspects.³⁰¹ First, the involvement of civilians was low, and even when they were involved, their roles were limited only to intelligence, providing assistance in patrols and capturing fugitives. They did not execute mass violence as in 1965-66. Second, leaders and detainees of the South Blitar movement were trialled rather than killed. This act of following the judicial system was aimed at showing that the New Order was following the rule of law in handling the PKI's retaliation attempt. In short, the Trisula Operation was a public statement that a new regime had been firmly established.

Conclusion

The case of East Java leads us to rethink three different analyses that I described in the beginning of this chapter – the horizontal conflict, structural violence, and dualistic thesis. This chapter has shown that the alliance between the military and civilians during the 1965-66 violence was part of Indonesia's military political nature, modelling the guerrilla warfare during the Indonesian revolution. I agree with the analyses that argue that the violence was executed through a network of army and civilians, as the dualistic thesis proposes. However, I disagree with the point of this thesis that suggests the army did not have a profound role in it, and no national pattern can be drawn in the absence of such a structural command. It is true that the 1965-66 violence has an element of participation, where coalitions with civilians occurred. But this participation could not have been possible if the military had not given any room for such a thing to occur. The new analysis of the Brawijaya archives in this chapter pointed to this room, created by official structures and commands, which triggered opportunities for such massive bloodbaths.

In East Java, two important instructions were released in relation to this. First was the establishment of *Pupelrada* in mid-October 1965, which became a turning point for East Java's military resort commands (Korem) to have extra-judicial powers in executing their anti-communist purge. The second was the release of the Pancasila Operation instructions on 21 October 1965 by East Java's military commander, which clearly stated the use of civilians in the army's operation against the communists. Although it is true that the instruction for the anti-communist purge in East Java came a bit late compared to other areas such as Aceh or Central Java, it was not merely a problem of an indecisive attitude of the commander or a technical limitation (shortage of troops). Nevertheless, I argue that the delay should also be seen as a period of alliance shift – that the Brawijaya command needed to form new alliances (both at the top structural level and the grassroots level) against the communists and to assure that it would be sufficient to start a massive purge in the province.

Even within this alliance between the military and civilians, the latter should not be seen as agentless individuals. The collaboration succeeded because these civilians also had their own agendas during the violence. These agendas may have ranged from organisational or ideological reasons (for example eliminating political rivals or securing economic properties) to individual motives (for example acts of revenge against a communist neighbour or attempts to grab other villagers' properties). Added to these motives, are the rewards that the civilians obtained from their

²⁹⁸ Semdam VIII Brawijaya 1969, 43.

²⁹⁹ Hearman 2017, 519.

³⁰⁰ Hearman 2017, 526.

³⁰¹ Hearman 2018, 165.

collaboration in the 1965-66 violence and the Trisula operation. Rewards took different forms, from property to civil service employment and development projects. In short, civilians had gained benefits from their supra-local attachment to the army. Losses and profits that were experienced after the violence constituted the context of Donomulyo's embedded memories. I will discuss this further in chapter 4.

This collaboration also continued in the establishment of the New Order. In this period, the army was not only targeting the communists, but also the remaining supporters of Sukarno. The East Java New Order Guidance teams were established at every structural government level to achieve this purpose, including ensuring the victory of the New Order in the public election. This strategy also maintained the military's grip down to the village level and paved the way for massive rural transformation during the New Order. Furthermore, reflecting on the newly found regional archives in Aceh, Banyuwangi and East Java (particularly Malang), I can strongly conclude that participation of civilians in the 1965-66 violence could not have been this massive without the army's leadership. In other words, the army clearly coordinated such violence.

CHAPTER 4

EMBEDDED REMEMBERING: MEMORIES WITHIN THE PATRONAGE NETWORK AND RURAL TRANSFORMATION

The military operations in 1965-66 and 1968 were launched under the premise of creating peace and order, and saving the nation. This, in any case, was the legitimization of the violence. However, when we zoom into the rural context, where most of the violence took place, we will see a different perspective about this particular event. This is what I encountered during my first weeks in Donomulyo, when I met Mbok Menik in September 2016, a local merchant who sells materials for religious prayers (such as myrrh from Central Java) in the Banyujati³⁰² area. She moved to the village in 1963 from Yogyakarta, Central Java, following her father who established a small shop in the Donomulyo market, which had now been inherited by Mbok Menik. During our interview in the Javanese language, I asked about her childhood experiences as a migrant to the area. When I eventually asked her about the period of 1965, she instantly said, “Oh, it was *gégér*!” (*Oh, gégér, mbak!*). *Gégér* is a Javanese word meaning uproar, frenzy or rumble.³⁰³ This was the first time I heard this word used to describe the violence in 1965-66. It is a common term in Javanese language, especially in shadow play (*wayang*) performances, where *gégér* usually refers to wars between good and evil such as in the epic battle of Bharatayuddha or Hanoman’s battle with Rahwana’s army of giants.³⁰⁴ During my interview with Mbok Menik, I thought *gégér* appeared because our conversation was in Javanese. However, after several interviews with other villagers, even when using Bahasa Indonesia, the term *gégér* repeatedly appeared. It was used very often, so that I also began to adopt it when talking about the 1965 violence. “What was it like during the *gégér*?” (*Bagaimana situasinya waktu gégér?*), I asked, followed by answers about numerous violent episodes surrounding the elimination of the PKI in Donomulyo. Although the term is sometimes used as an expression for other war situations such as the independence war, this was the first time I encountered an association between the local perspective of *gégér* with a national turmoil.

This is how the villagers remember the violence. For them, it was not an operation to create peace and order, or to defend Pancasila, as the state constantly argued. The killings and violence in 1965 and 68 were definitely unbearable; a time of chaos, confusion, nearly apocalyptic – a period in which villagers lost everything. These different perceptions of the violence (between the state and society) illustrate the disparity of meaning between a military response to a political coup that happened in the central capital with the killings that occurred mostly in rural areas. Most villagers knew nothing of the September 30th Movement even when the killings commenced in their areas. Moreover, as the use of *gégér* shows, the perception of violent episodes in Donomulyo does not only show disparity, but also connectivity between the national and local.

To return to Fentress & Wickham’s point that remembering is a process of representation (see chapter 1), in this chapter, I will explore how disparity and connectivity of the public and private narratives interplay in the process of remembering the 1965 violence. More importantly, the chapter will also examine how villagers use this interplay to represent themselves – a performative act that does not necessarily relate merely to recalling past events. At the centre of their memories lies

³⁰² The pseudonym for the research area in this study, covering 3 villages in the Donomulyo district.

³⁰³ Zoetmulder 2004, 285.

³⁰⁴ Brandon & Guritno (eds) 1993.

specific figures, such as the military village head, religious leaders (*kyai* from Nahdlatul Ulama – the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia), or local activists, who played a role as patrons in the village.³⁰⁵ These figures connect the national and local by firstly establishing a connection between the military response to the 30th September Movement and the killings in Donomulyo. They describe to other villagers why the violence *should* take place, under the reasoning of security and order. In return, villagers who complied with this version of the narrative would receive protection from being accused of being a communist, avoid detention or killing, or would be rewarded with property and government positions. Secondly, these figures also became clients of the state during the New Order regime. They became supporters of the New Order's establishment in rural areas, ranging from being political brokers (gathering votes for Suharto's ruling party *Golkar*) to policing the rural area (ensuring all residents follow the New Order policies).³⁰⁶

Memories of violence are very much embedded in these patron-client relationships. When patronage relationships are created, or enforced by the violence, those who are in this network tend to support the narrative that legitimised the violence. While for others who fall outside this network, who were excluded and suffered from the violence, perceived the violence as a form of injustice and a setback for their rural livelihood. The patronage network can also help to explain why one event generates different memories and representations, as well as different forms of silence amongst villagers. Moreover, it also blurred the boundaries between perpetrators and collaborators of violence and the victims, because patron-client relationships are flexible – they will weaken when the relationship no longer provides any benefits. Therefore, this chapter will discuss these questions: who are these patrons? What are their roles in memory formation? How did the patrons' relationships with their clients evolve in the post-violence situation? In what ways did these patronage networks influence different ways of remembering the 1965-66 and 1968 violence?

This chapter is written by putting emphasis on the person, their individuality, and agency, not in a binary position that places memories of violence as a 'counter' to the hegemonic state narrative (see the discussion on the limitations of a human rights approach in chapter 1), but to see how both the private and public narratives of violence converge, diverge and even shape each other. Of course, this type of approach has some shortcomings, and one of them is the conception of time. Villagers in Donomulyo do not record events in terms of years as historians usually do, but relate these to other events (large or small scale) that happened in the village. Starvation, village heads leadership and planting seasons are regular points of reference to refer to certain time periods. Their distinct way of identifying periods also affected the distinction or lack of distinction that they make between the violence in 1965 and 1968. In many occasions, villagers seemed to blur those two events and were unable to differentiate between the Trisula (1968) and Pancasila operations (1965). But this actually shows that, for them, these two events have the same apocalyptic nature. Most of the information that I use in this chapter is based on the ethnographic study in Donomulyo, particularly the life history interviews of villagers who were involved or impacted by the 1965-68 violence.

³⁰⁵ See chapter 1 for a definition of the patron-client relationship and chapter 2 for the historical evolution of this relationship in Donomulyo. James Scott describes the patron-client relationship as an "exchange relationship between roles, involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron". Scott 1972, 92.

³⁰⁶ This is what James Scott refers to as the patron-client pyramid: a client who becomes a patron for other clients – reflecting a vertical extension downward to the patron-client links. Scott 1972, 66.

Patronage in Memory Construction

I first raised the question of connectivity between the local and national event when I met Karsono and his wife, Parminah. Karsono himself used to work as an elementary school teacher in Donomulyo. Now retired, he spends most of his time tilling his land and looking after their cattle. Meanwhile, Parminah is a member of the Catholic Women's organisation and devotes most of her time to raising their grandson, while his parents work abroad as migrant workers. During my visits, we talked in the living room, with a neatly decorated interior showing elements of Catholicism and pictures of their families, including Karsono's brother who is a Catholic priest in Jember, East Java. Karsono began to tell his childhood experiences, including when he was in the 4th grade of elementary school in 1968, where his parents' house was transformed into a military post during the Trisula operation. Karsono witnessed villagers being taken away by the army.

They (the army) stigmatised this area as PKI. The fact is, not all of them [were PKI]. Only a few of them, but others were only accused. So they brought in [battalion] 513, the army. My house was the base ... As far as I know, some people were taken every day to the district office. I didn't know what happened to them. They were usually tied in the back, five, six people, and walked this way. Here (showing his wrist) are all tied. I saw it here (in front of the house).

Karsono was only a child at that time, but he was telling about the army battalion, stigmatisation of the area, and the fact that not all the victims were PKI. But the event that he saw was only a group of people being tied and taken away by the military. How did he know all of this information when as a child, he only experienced one fragment? I asked him about this, and he explained:

They said it was the PKI. **They** said (Karsono emphasised). [Grace: Who told you about that?] well... (stammered)... everybody knows if there were people being taken away, it must be PKI. People were guarded in the posts. The Army, together with the villagers. Villagers were obliged [to guard] at night. And all the women were told to be in one place. For instance, I should be with the others in a house across the street. Nobody dared to be alone in the house. Children were brought along. **They said** (Karsono emphasises) back then, if we didn't do it, the PKI will kill us if we are home alone. We were scared.³⁰⁷

It was an extremely frightening experience for Karsono to have a group of people with guns entering his daily life and taking other villagers away. But understanding what this fragment means is a very different process. Karsono himself repeatedly emphasised the word 'they said' (*katanya*) which implies that this knowledge was provided by an external party. When I tried to clarify who these people were, Karsono was a bit confused and explained as if this was common knowledge ("if there were people being taken away, it must be PKI"). His reactions imply that he was also confused about how such knowledge came into being. Thus, Karsono continued to explain that not all of the detainees were PKI. This statement related to Karsono father's experience, which I found out towards the end of our interview. Apparently, his father, who was assigned by the army as a night guard, slept during his shift. Karsono's father was later punished by being detained in the local military office for half day. Karsono emphasised that this was the reason for his father's short detention and not because his father had any involvement with political parties. Apart from this story, it is also possible that Karsono's criticism of the PKI label stemmed from his father's political experience. Indonesian teachers in 1960s were highly political. Even the Minister of Basic Education and Culture together with the Coordinating Minister of Education, Knowledge, and Culture in 1961

³⁰⁷ Interview with Karsono and Parminah, 3 December 2016 #48.17-49.28; 49.42-50.39

were supported by the PKI.³⁰⁸ It is very likely that Karsono's father may have been involved in leftist activism through a teachers' association, which Karsono did not openly share with me. This also adds to the reason for his father's detention – that he was considered to be part of the communists, and not only because he slept during his guard shift. Karsono's statement that not all people who were detained were PKI originated from his family's experience. He was bringing his personal experience into a general interpretation about the violence in Banyuwati.

It seems that turning several civilian homes into command posts was part of the military's strategy to mobilise and coordinate civilian involvement in the operation.³⁰⁹ Besides Karsono, I also talked to Sardono, whose house was also used as a command post. As one of the descendants of the village's first settlers, Sardono is regarded as a local and spiritual leader. Although his exact birthdate is not recorded, he remembered that he was in second grade during the Japanese occupation. This is another example of a localising time frame that I have mentioned before. Based on his description, I estimated that he was more than 80 years old when this study was conducted. When I asked him about 1965, Sardono explicitly stated that the army informed villagers about the events that occurred in Jakarta:

It started in [19]65, until [19]68. Oh, [19]65 was intense, coupled with [19]68. People were shot in [19]68. A lot of people were detained in [19]65. [Grace: How did you first hear about G30S and the coup attempt?] Lha, the fact that they were against the *pamong*, police, wasn't that an attempt to destroy the government? I didn't [read newspapers]. I just knew. What newspaper at that time? Compared with the present day, everybody knows everything because of television. Back then, there was nothing. I didn't know about the Generals. I only heard from those ABRIs (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*/ The Indonesian Army). ... they stayed in the village head's house. That was their base.³¹⁰

By bringing local incidents into a national narrative, Sardono's account reflects a connection between the local and national. Through (unequal) collaboration between the army and villagers, information became one directional, placing the army as their main source of news about incidents that occurred at the centre. This was illustrated through Sardono's statement that he did not know anything about the Generals (referring to the army officers who were killed in the September 30th Movement), and that the news was brought into the area by the army. Interestingly, Sardono portrayed communists as trouble makers who always opposed local authorities such as *pamong* (village officials) and police. Although he did not specify the case or incident, he used this image to support the information about the September 30th Movement and the portrayal of communists as 'national traitors'.³¹¹ Localities were used to justify the importance of a military operation in Donomulyo. Moreover, Sardono's account also shows the early stage of new patronage alliances between the army and villagers. Their new patrons became the source of information about the violence that later constituted the villagers' memory of the event.

The army was not the only source of information. Religious leaders, such as those of the NU or Catholic Party, actively disseminated anti-communist propaganda after 1965. I acknowledged this while talking to Aji Marlan, the former village secretary that I described in Chapter 1. In 1965, Marlan

³⁰⁸ On the other hand, the Department of Higher Education and Science was controlled by the army. These factions competed in influencing policy development. In addition, institutions under the Ministry of Education, including professional teachers' organisations were also fragmented. Suwignyo 2011.

³⁰⁹ The selection of these houses were not very clear. I assume that it was because the people living in those houses had close relationships with authority or were members of the village apparatus.

³¹⁰ Interview with Sardono, 19 August 2016 # 31.57-35.26

³¹¹ This portrayal of the PKI as being responsible for the September 30th Movement is actually propaganda launched by the army to provoke and legitimise mass violence. Robinson 2017, 467.

was a member of Ansor (Islamic youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia) and later became the treasurer of the Ansor sub-branch in the Banyujati area. When I asked him about the situation in 1965, he explained about the NU leaders and the war-like condition in his neighbourhood.

... it was the NU leaders who told us [about the September 30th Movement]. Then it expanded. The army was the one who brought peace. If the army didn't come, perhaps there will be war. Everybody brings their war tools, sickle or sword. Those who didn't have any, brought sharp bamboo. ... But it didn't happen. My father's house in the back [of my current house] was surrounded by shouting communists. But our house was strong, so they couldn't enter. Although my father ignored them, inside the house he was prepared with a sickle. I was with him, because I'm his oldest son. After that, we were too scared to sleep at home. We slept in the field with father, perhaps there were 5 to 7 people. After that, party members were gathered together, NU with NU, the Catholics with the Catholic party. We guarded [the village].³¹²

Aji Marlan's memory presents a different perspective. For him, the PKI and NU were at war; they were attacking each other. The presence of the army was to secure the situation and it brought an end to this situation of 'civil war'. For Marlan, the one who created *gégér* was not the army, but the PKI, who tried to attack his family. Marlan's account resonates with the horizontal conflict approach that I described in Chapter 3. This construction of a 'war' situation between the NU and PKI created a belief among the NUs that the Muslim community would never be safe until communism was annihilated.³¹³ Whether or not this was the actual state in Banyujati should be questioned because, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, no significant conflicts occurred in the village before the arrival of the army during the Pancasila Operation in 1965.

Both Sardono and Aji Marlan's stories echo the state's narrative of the 1965 violence – that it was the PKI that was the threat to society, and that the violence was the result of an excess of communal hatred. This type of reproduction became important for them considering their background. Aji Marlan's family was a renowned Haji in Donomulyo. Aji himself was one of the Ansor sub-branch officials in the area. Meanwhile, Sardono was the descendant of the village's first settlers. He was one of the acknowledged local leaders in the area, and presumably also owns large amount of land. Both of these people are members of the village's elites, and it is important for them to preserve their position without being threatened by the left. Even long after the violence ended, they needed to maintain the narrative of the PKI as the villain in order to legitimise their annihilation. It became *their* collective memory. While Sardono and Marlan needed to maintain the state narrative, Karsono's story is different because his family was aggrieved by the military operation. Karsono implied that the PKI label was imposed from outside Donomulyo. In this case, narratives and memories depend on what patronage relationships can bring to their clients. It will correspond with the state's narrative as long as patrons and clients both benefited from the violence. When the situation is the opposite and either clients or patrons became disadvantaged from the violence, memories will diverge from the official line.

Nevertheless, although patronage networks affect the representation of the past, in some cases, it does not instantly show this linear causal relation. I came to this conclusion when I met Jono, a local merchant, who owns a grocery shop and other businesses (middleman in a cassava business – collecting the crop from farmers and selling it to larger collectors before going to the factory). He used to be part of the sub-branch of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P, Indonesia's nationalist party) in 1990s. Though not a formal member, Jono's main task was to gather votes in

³¹² Interview with Aji Marlan, 22 August 2016 # 32.11-34.26

³¹³ See Fealy & McGregor 2012.

Donomulyo for the party. His track record of political activity stretched back to the period of the 1960s, when he became a member of the Indonesian Catholic Students Association (*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia/ PMKRI*). During the 1965-68 operation, at around 14 or 15 years old, he was assigned to assist the military as a civil guard, where he witnessed the disappearance of detainees from the *Koramil/* office of the military precinct command in Donomulyo (see Chapter 3). After the September 30th Movement occurred in Jakarta, Jono frequently travelled from Donomulyo to the Malang municipality to meet and discuss with other PMKRI activists, following the developments of the political situation. Several Catholic activists from Jakarta frequently travelled to different regions to consolidate the movement between central Jakarta and the regions. Among these figures were Harry Tjan Silalahi, Cosmas Batubara and the controversial father Beek, who often visited Malang city.³¹⁴ This shows the structural chain of information within religious organisations such as the Catholic Youth, from central Jakarta to other cities, and later to different districts in the regency. We have to keep in mind that at that time, the military had already established close cooperation with youth organisations which resulted in the mobilisation of anti-communist actions.³¹⁵ Within this background, Jono was summoned to the regional military command (Korem) in Malang municipality to give information about the communists in his village.

So I stayed there [PMKRI office in Malang] for a couple of days. Then I was summoned to Korem. There was the three of us, if I'm not mistaken. Wignyo, the one who is ill right now, was also summoned. Me, and Yusup. We were asked for information about this or that person, their location and what they look like. It was the villagers in here, and perhaps villagers of Lohdalem [another district in Malang regency]. Those who were summoned were Catholics, and the ones that the Korem indicated were also Catholic.

Jono's account shows that while the city resonates the official narrative of the PKI as dangerous and should be eliminated, the local narrative tells a different story, that the PKI did not resist, almost helpless, and that they were killed. Jono's experience also reflected the use of the patron-client network. In this case, the network was not based on individual relationships, but on organisational connections that were utilized for the military operation (between the army and the PMKRI). The network was used by the patrons to obtain information on a specific area, such as Jono's story. He eventually did not give the names to the Korem officers. He stated that if he did, it would only give the army an opportunity to extract money from those alleged communists in exchange for their safety or freedom. Jono took a risky decision within a repressive situation at that time. The motives for this decision emerged when Jono continued his story:

When I joined the meeting in Malang, Donomulyo looked very scary. Even when I returned to Donomulyo, I felt scared, because I heard from Malang about this and that. But for the villagers here, everything was normal and fine. But for those, who did not know the real condition in here, it was

³¹⁴ Father Beek, a Catholic priest, initiated the intensive one-month leadership training known as Kaderisasi Sebulan/ Kasbul. It succeeded in creating generations of militant anti-communist Catholic leaders, some of them managed to be high level politicians in the Suharto years. The travels of these Catholic figures to the regions, as mentioned by Jono, also took place even before the September 30th Movement, with the purpose to disseminate information, especially about the latest political situation. During the violence in 1965, Cosmas Batubara and NU activist, Samroni, travelled to different regencies in East Java not only to disseminate information from Jakarta, but also to gather reports of the situation in the regions and report them back to the center. Cosmas Batubara was supplied with a gun from Kodim Malang. Interview with FX Trikatmo, Malang municipality, 11 June 2016 # 07.45, 48.30

³¹⁵ On 2 October 1965 in Jakarta, a meeting between the military, and young generation leaders of anti-communist parties established the Action Front to Crush the Thirtieth of September Movement (KAP-Gestapu). Two of the prominent leaders of this front were Subchan Z.E of the NU and Harry Tjan Silalahi from the Catholic Party. Crouch 1988, 141.

scary because the communists here were fierce, able to kill, etc. But there was never a communist movement that killed marhaenists (a nationalist supporter) like me. Nobody was killed by the PKI. It was the other way around, like I mentioned before, a lot of the PKI were killed.³¹⁶

It is highly possible that Jono did not submit the names to Korem because he did not believe that those names were communists, or if they were, they were not as dangerous as the army had depicted. Later on, Jono told me that his family members were politically diverse. While he was in PMKRI, his father was a PNI (Indonesia Nationalist Party – Sukarno’s political party), and few of his siblings were PKI, who also suffered during the military operation. Within this diverse political nuance in the family, the situation and decisions became more complex, and it would be difficult to remain loyal to a patron’s agenda. It led Jono to be more critical of his patron (the army), enabling him to conclude that Donomulyo’s communists were not creating any danger.

In areas such as Donomulyo, where infrastructure, mobility, and access to central politics are limited, information is highly dependent on local patrons. The role of the army, religious leaders, and also village heads was crucial in ‘rationalising’ the violence in Donomulyo. These patrons established a connection between violence experienced at the local level and a movement that occurred in the capital, which later constituted the villagers’ memory of the violence. On the other hand, it was important for clients to maintain the state’s anti-communist narratives because they were benefitting from the elimination of leftists in the village, for example in maintaining their status, properties, or gaining benefits after supporting the violence. In contrast, people who were harmed by the violence remember the event in an opposite way than the state-constructed narrative. Patronage in memory making will be more complicated when a person has a diverse background, either politically or socially, making them more critical towards these patrons such as in the case of Jono and Karsono.

Local Collaborators and Memory Work

The patronage network was not static. In some cases, the network became stronger in the post-violence situation in which villagers obtained concrete benefits from their coalition with the patrons. However, in other cases, where loyalties shifted for various reasons, patronage alliances could have become weaker. As a result, villagers who used to be clients of their patrons were also experiencing the same coercive treatment which was usually directed towards the leftists. In other words, villagers who used to be perpetrators or collaborators could also become victims, once their relationship with their patrons lost its solidity. Furthermore, this dynamic patronage alliance can be seen in the ways individual experiences were used to legitimise national violence, and through practices of distancing oneself from the violence.

Although I was not able to interview perpetrators of the violence, I managed to get in touch with a few of the local collaborators in the Banyujati area. Their collaborative acts ranged from guarding prisoners to assisting the army during house raids. The concept of collaboration itself emerged to include more dynamic relationships of actors in genocide that could not easily be categorised into victims and perpetrators. Anton Weiss-Wendt and Ügür Ümit Üngör describe acts of collaboration as collective actions where subordinate groups, resulting from structural inequality, assist the hegemonic power to destroy another group with the aim of improving the collaborator group’s status.³¹⁷ Furthermore, Weiss-Wendt and Üngör also pointed out that collaborators usually participate without a centralised authority that orders the mass killings, rather there is an unspoken consensus within the minorities that resulted in their participation. Weiss-Wendt and Üngör’s

³¹⁶ Interview with Jono, 23 August 2016 #40.41-46.25

³¹⁷ Weiss-Wendt & Üngör 2011, 427.

explanation of collaborators highlights the beneficial relationship between them and the hegemonic power, which in Donomulyo was reflected by the connection between villagers and their patrons.

Like many villages in Java, victims, collaborators, and perpetrators continued to live together in Donomulyo after the 1965-68 violence (see the illustration about Suparman, Jarso, and Marwono in the beginning of chapter 1). One of the collaborators that I met in the Banyujati area was Parjito, who assisted the army during house arrests in 1965 and 1968. Our first encounter occurred when I visited a monument in Donomulyo where Parjito serves as the guard (*juru kunci*). Although my initial intention was to explore stories about the monument (more about the monument on chapter 5), I became interested in Parjito's own life history. He was born in 1942 and spent most of his life in the Banyujati area. He currently lives with his daughter, son-in-law and two grandchildren; and works as a farmer, growing cassava and corn. His daughter also manages a small store (*warung*) in front of their house. Once in a while, Parjito also taps rubber from a small plantation just a few meters away from his home. He was assigned as the guard of the monument because of his close relationship with the police and army since the 1965-68 operation. He became a collaborator in the operation because he was already a member of the village civil defence (*pertahanan sipil/ hansip* – usually responsible for village security) before the army entered Donomulyo.

I decided to further explore Parjito's experience in the violence, particularly during his involvement in military raids.

I became the civil guard, so I followed the army. I already joined them in 65. I wore a uniform and I was proud. Bayonets [and] rifles were not allowed. Only the army was allowed to carry rifles. If they were tired, they told us to carry them for them. Even before there was the caretaker, I was already a civil guard. Back then it was called *Hanra* (*Pertahanan Rakyat/ People's Defense*), and then *Pertahanan Sipil* (Civilian Defense)/ *Hansip*. I guarded every day. ... I didn't go around the village, but every day I went to guard in the village meeting hall (*balai desa*). There was a post there. ... The army embraced the civilian guards. When they came, they instantly approached us. They gathered every civilian guard in the afternoon, together with the *pamong*. We follow them when it was time for operations or for gatherings.

Civilian guards were automatically used by the army once they arrived in the village. They became close collaborators of the army, although they could not perform all duties, such as handling arms, as Parjito explains. Parjito also felt very proud to take part in the operation. When I asked why he participated, he explain clearly that "They (the communist) resisted, they were the enemy. For the state, they were the enemy of the government". As a collaborator, Parjito mirrors the official narrative that justified the violence against the left. He felt proud to be able to participate in an act to capture the enemies and save the nation, in his perception.

I was curious to know more about his specific role in the operation. Parjito described:

I went with the soldiers to houses. Oh, it was fierce when we go to houses. We brought flashlights, in daylight. Even if there was nobody in the house, the door was forced open, and we searched with the flashlight. We searched inside, upstairs, it was very meticulous. I followed to people's houses every day. They usually did it during the day. ... If someone was caught, we took them to the posts. For example, if the post was in my house, then when somebody was captured, they tied them like a prisoner. Handcuffs were not available at that time. Then they took them to the post and interrogated them, "Why did you become this or that?" ... Back then, there was no limit to beating people. Not like nowadays, where violence is not allowed. The soldiers, they had no mercy. A lot of people confessed but they still beat them, though. My friends were gone because of that. ... Not so many people gave themselves up [to the army]. Rather than giving up, they chose to hide until it was safe. I saw them [soldiers making mass graves]. I followed them everywhere. ... I saw the process. I saw the victims sat. I

saw the soldiers beating the detainees. It was the army who did it, not civilians. We were not allowed and we didn't have the right. It was their *special right* (italic emphasis by author), because it was a heavy issue, about the rebels.³¹⁸

This was an intriguing conversation for me, because there are many confusing aspects, which Parjito stitched together to present it as a reasonable argument. First, he explained how the army was fierce and used physical force to search for communists, interrogate, and later detain them. Second, he stated that his friends also became victims of the army's operation. Third, Parjito seemed to distance himself from the violence by stressing that it was the army who did it. It was the army's 'special right' to kill, because the PKI affair was a serious issue to be dealt with. Parjito implies that not only the violent operation was justifiable, but also that his losses were inevitable. It was the consequence of such critical national interference. There was no statement of proudness in this case. In the first part of Parjito's statement, he implies the importance of civilians for the army. But when it comes to cases of mass killings, he draws a strict line by stating that the killings were the army's business. This is what I frequently encounter when talking to collaborators: on the one hand they emphasise the importance of the operation, but on the other hand, they demarcate their involvement in the killings.

Parjito also told me a bit about his family's background. His father was a PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia/ *Indonesian Nationalist Party*), and according to Parjito, this political affiliation saved his family from being a victim in 1965. However, some of his relatives were killed during the 1965 and 1968 operations because they were involved in the PKI. Remembering Jono's family's political diversity and his critical stance against the formal narrative (see previous section), I was very curious to know what Parjito thought about his family's experience and the state's depiction of the violence. I asked him how he felt about his losses.

[It was] not only my friends, but also cousins, uncles. Around nine people, relatives from my parents: uncle, younger nephew. There were even two persons taken from one house, they were brothers. Yes, I joined [the soldiers who took them]. I didn't want to follow people who went hiding. [How did it feel?] Well, horrifying. But what can I do? I think I was also heartless. I told you before that I was stopped on my way home from the Quran recital (*ngaji*). They [members of Pemuda Rakyat/ leftist Youth Movement] grabbed me on the sides, and put a knife. ... They said, "Stop the recital. I'll kill you if you don't stop". They already grabbed me in the rice field. "If you want to kill me, then kill me. If you hurt me, I will kill you and your friends", I told them. Then they retreated. "If you don't believe me, just watch". They backed off [and said], "Okay then, go home". The next day, I went to my Quran recital, and they stopped me again. "Go away, I'm going for my recital. Mind your own business. Go away". And they left.³¹⁹

While answering my question about his feelings of loss, Parjito slowly shifted the conversation to his experience of being threatened by people from *Pemuda Rakyat* (leftist youth organisation affiliated with PKI). In this fragment, Parjito framed the intimidation as something that is more significant and important than his emotions or loss. The tendency to portray communists as anti-religious troublemakers dominated Parjito's story.

All *pamong* of Banyuwati were substituted with caretakers. ... The village head was from ABRI. The *kamituwo* were also from ABRI, not to mention the Babinsa. If they didn't do it, it would be dangerous. The old *pamong* were dismissed from their positions, replaced by the army. They were not even involved. If they did not take this action, it would be hard. It could never be safe here. There would always be incidents; thievery or other things. The main purpose was [to create] commotion in the

³¹⁸ Interview with Parjito, 8 September 2016 # 37.42-39.55; 47.15-56.59; 57.23-58.51

³¹⁹ Interview with Parjito, 8 September 2016 # 01.05.19-01.08.21

kampongs. ... That was the act of people who disagreed with the government. Perhaps they were [PKI].³²⁰

Similar to Sardono's statement before, here Parjito portrayed the PKI as the source of the problems in the neighbourhood. In his view, the army ought to be part of the village apparatus in order to secure the village. It is only through such a way that villagers can live in harmony. Parjito's perspective on this matter follows the military's reasoning for the Pancasila operation exactly, which was to create peace and order.

Parjito's role after the 1965-68 operation may explain his reproduction of the state's narrative. He was appointed as the caretaker of a police monument in 1971 in the Banyujati area. Being proud about his position, he repeatedly emphasised his close relationship to one of the local police officers (*Polsek* Donomulyo) who initiated the monument. He also showed me the decision letter for his appointment as the monument caretaker, which means that he also received a government payment for this task. For an ordinary villager to be appointed in such a position and to have a close relationship with the state authority was regarded as upward mobility. In the case of Parjito, this mobility was made possible by assisting the patrons in the violence and also afterwards, through a new assignment of preserving the symbol of the state (police monument) in the Banyujati area. Therefore, it is important for collaborators such as Parjito to support and recreate the anti-communist narrative by making his personal experience (being threatened for reciting Koran) fit in with the national narrative. It became an individual example of the national enemy, portraying them as troublemakers and traitors of the nation. Furthermore, I realise that Parjito's story, regardless of its truthfulness, was a story that he *wanted* me to believe. The image of the PKI as evil was far more important to maintain, compared to his grief of losing family members and friends in the anti-communist operation. This illustrates 'orientation toward the good', as Steedly highlights in her research, where individuals build certain moral values into their narratives, creating a framework and interpretation of their actions.³²¹ For local collaborators, their moral values served to sustain the national importance of eliminating the dangerous communists.

However, the role of collaborators cannot be narrowed down to supporting the state's narrative alone. The post-violence situation could create changes in patronage relationships, which resulted in ambiguities of the position of collaborators. I acknowledged this through the experience of Suparman, my landlord (*bapak kost*) in Donomulyo, who previously introduced me to Marwono (see chapter 1). Born in 1945, Suparman currently lives with his youngest grandson. He became a central person in my fieldwork, who introduced me to the area, the villagers, and their history. I stayed in his house and after a while I became accustomed to the mixture of elements of Catholicism and Javanese culture. Sometimes I joined them for a Catholic community prayer in a neighbour's house and I became acquainted with Catholic members in this community. While observing his interaction with other villagers, I realised that he is well-known and highly respected amongst villagers for several reasons: his higher educational background, his former profession as a school teacher of Catholicism, and his previous political role in the Catholic Youth organisation (PMKRI) in the 1960s. He came from the family of the village's first settlers, with a *modin* (village apparatus who arrange spiritual or religious matters) grandfather, and a father who introduced Catholicism in the district. Suparman inherited his grandfather's extensive knowledge of Javanese culture, which became his well-known expertise amongst villagers. People from areas in and outside Donomulyo would come to consult him about spiritual matters, from deciding on a perfect day for celebrations (weddings, engagements, and so on) to spiritual problems (such as troubled spirits inside a house). During the

³²⁰ Interview with Parjito, 8 September 2016 # 21.42-24.58

³²¹ Steedly 2013, 56.

Javanese New Year or 1 *Suro*, his house would be filled with *Keris* (Javanese traditional weapons) from various people who asked for a spiritual cleansing of their weapon. Suparman also works as a Master of Ceremony in Javanese weddings due to his intense skill in reciting Javanese *tembang*. Although he never sets a price for his services, it became his source of income besides his pension fund as a former Catholic school teacher.

Around 1955 or 1956, Suparman's father became one of the candidates for the village head. His rival was the PKI leader, Brahmantyo. His father received 515 votes, while Brahmantyo successfully received more than 900 votes. This, according to Suparman, was because the villagers were mainly PKI. After Suparman finished his elementary education, he continued his junior high school in a Catholic seminary. Around this time, his father died and he did not return to the seminary, but moved to a pedagogic academy (*Sekolah Pendidikan Guru/ SPG*) in Malang, based on a recommendation from a Catholic priest. This is where he became intensely involved in the PMKRI. In 1965, he was in Malang, participating in the anti-communist demonstrations:

[In] 65 the G30S/PKI happened. The exam was postponed for 6 months. It was supposed to be in June, but they started in January. So I spent those empty months in politics, in Malang. My mother told me not to come home, but it was calm in Donomulyo, nothing happened. Malang was full of demonstrations. I went to Pasuruan, Surabaya. ... Furniture was dragged outside; books were burned in the education office [of East Java]. For six months, it was only those activities.

Since early to mid-October 1965, these kinds of mass demonstrations were intense throughout the nation. In Surabaya, for example, a mass rally took place on 16 October 1965 at the Heroes Monument, which was organised by the East Java and Surabaya Action Committee to Crush Gestapu (Panitia Aksi Mengganjang Gestapu). This group, presumably a branch of the KAP Gestapu, claimed to have the backing of sixty-seven political and mass organisations.³²² Catholic communities were strongly involved in this group, such as in the case of Suparman. As the secretary of the Catholic Party branch in Donomulyo, he became one of the core activists in the anti-communist demonstration in Malang.

When I returned, around junior high school, I was already the [Catholic] party's [branch] secretary. My name was only written, those who did the work were the other members. But because my name was written, then I learnt about politics. ... I came home during the vacation and became active in the party's meetings. ... Then from the city monument [in Malang], [we walk] to Ijen (main road in Malang) to ask for the Bishop's blessing. We demanded to disband the communists. All of us kneeled, and the Bishop blessed us. After that, there was no fear to join the demonstrations to Pasuruan, Surabaya, Bangil. I read [the declaration] to disband the communists. We read it in the square [in Malang municipality] and also in front of the Bishop. We were The Catholic Students Union (*Persatuan Pelajar Sekolah Katolik/ PPSK*). ... The Catholic Youth then gave birth to the Yellow Cross (*Salib Kuning*). During the 68 cleansing (the Trisula operation), the Yellow Cross was victorious. By chance, the commander of one of the Yellow Cross company was me. I trained them in self-defence.³²³

Yellow Cross is an alias for the Catholic Command Force (*Pasukan Komando Katolik/ Paskokat*), a security group that was established as guards for the church as a response to the September 30th Movement. The first members reached up to 150 people and were inaugurated in Jakarta by Mgr. A. Djajasepoetra, with the main task to guard the church, deliver logistics to demonstrators and accompany the injured to hospital, if needed.³²⁴

³²² Setiyawan 2014, 209-211.

³²³ Interview with Suparman, 21 September 2016 # 37.46-40.12; 45.56-47.09

³²⁴ Djokopranoto et.al. 2010, 307-308.

For the Catholic activists in Malang, Suparman emphasised the prohibition from the Bishop not to participate in the killings.

For the Bishop, the main thing was that we didn't take part in the killings. For example, if there were people who were placed in trucks, we let them go and we didn't take part. We are not even sure if they were wrong. Sometimes they were just indirect supporters, but because one person accused them, they could be killed directly. It was not a secret anymore that the most frequent questions asked among Ansor leaders was "How many did you slaughter?". But after it was safe, around [19]71 [or] 1973 the leaders of Ansor became stressed. ... They targeted people who were not directly involved [with the communist party], only accused, but then got slaughtered anyway. Most of these perpetrators are already dead.

Nevertheless, the Bishop's appeal was not entirely obeyed in the field. Former PMKRI activist in Malang, FX Trikatmo, told of his experience that Catholic activists were 'invited' by Kodim (district military office) Malang to 'send' prisoners. Sending usually meant killing, which commonly took place in Southern Semeru. Trikatmo himself followed a group of NU and witnessed them killing detainees in fish ponds around Pasuruan. During PMKRI's monitoring observation to other regencies such as Kediri, Trikatmo saw bodies along the road from Malang-Pujon to Pare-Kediri. In a big banyan tree, bodies had been hanged with the trees' tendrils, forming a display of terror.³²⁵ However, during my interview with Trikatmo, he never explicitly stated that he also participated in the execution.³²⁶

Another obvious involvement of the Catholics in the 1965-66 operations was in the screening team of detainees. In the case of Semarang, Central Java, the late Vicar General of the Archdiocese of Semarang, P. Carri, SJ, wrote letters in 6 November 1965 to forbid priests and religious members of the Archdiocese to join military actions to screen for membership of the Communist Party. However, in 6 January 1966, another letter was released to encourage lay people to support the military actions by taking part as members of the screening team with the prerequisite not to get involved in violent actions.³²⁷ Although this was the case in Semarang, it is highly possible that similar structural instructions or appeals also occurred within the Archdiocese of Malang. For Suparman, the instruction not to participate in killings was an important element. This, as he implies, differentiated the Catholics from the Ansor who lived an unhappy life after slaughtering many villagers in the operation. I continue by asking how exactly the screening process was conducted. Suparman explains:

I was already in Jogja in 68. I returned with KAMI, the Indonesian student group, who was appointed to assist with the screening [of prisoners]. ... For example, the passengers of a whole truck were brought, not only once. ... So [for example] in Mrs Mujanah house, they got off one by one. They were asked, interrogated. For example, "Don't go with them". "No, I follow Aidit". So it's done. "Don't you feel pity for your relatives?". "No, it's fine. I will take the consequences by myself. Send my regards to my relatives". Then they got in again in the truck and were taken somewhere, I don't know. Those who obey the army were listed to *santiaji*. I think [the post in Mrs Mistri] was the second screening. The third was in Sumberoto, on the border with Blitar. They were taken from the detention centre. They were captured and detained in Donomulyo or Pagak. There was a detention centre in the sub-Regency (*Kawedanan*). I don't know how they eat and where they took them from there. But I know several places where they were shot.³²⁸

³²⁵ Interview with FX. Trikatmo, Malang, 11 June 2016, #48.27-52.49

³²⁶ A more explicit case occurred in South Blitar. Vanessa Hearman pointed out the explicit involvement of Catholics in the 1965-66 killings. See Hearman 2018.

³²⁷ Subanar 2001, 239-240.

³²⁸ Suparman, 21 September 2016 # 51.37-52.54, 54.58- 55.41

The screening procedure was not very clear. Without guidelines, screening teams seemed to rely mainly on individual questions to confirm the detainee's political alliance. From Suparman's account, it is very likely that the team's decision depends mainly on the interrogator's opinion. In other words, screening team members such as Suparman had the ability to decide whether or not a person deserved to be killed. Although Suparman seems to differentiate himself from the brutal executors of Ansor, at the same time, he participated in the process of sending villagers to the killing fields. He builds a self-consciousness that distances himself (the collaborator) from the perpetrators, without fully admitting that he also made the killings possible. It is also hard to believe that such a submissive act was expressed by the victim. A portrayal of 'ready to be killed' reduces the coerciveness image of perpetrators and their collaborators, and at the same time builds an image that perpetrators and victims have the same objective: to remove the communists.

Nevertheless, the coalition of civilian collaborators with their military patrons changed in the post-violence situation. When Suparman finally returned to the Banyujati area in 1971, he tried to ease the tense situation by reviving the traditional Javanese theatre performance group (*Ketoprak*). In this post-violence period, as I discussed in chapter 3, the military had put intense surveillance on rural life, which included cultural activities in the village.

I put forward the cultural approach [when I returned]. Why? So I could reach out to [people with] other religions, [and] because the cultural approach was easier. In our first performance, Pak Wahid [and] Mustaji argued with the Babinsa. "Take it (the costumes) off. Do not perform", [said the Babinsa] but I had already prepared the actors. It was during a person's wedding. We were devastated, but we couldn't argue. I still continued the play, but I eliminated their roles. I shortened the play.

The argument with Babinsa happened because two of the players, Wahid and Mustaji, were *santiaji* (a propaganda programme for accused Leftists, where they have to report weekly to the local military office), who were accused of being former BTI members. As the director of the play, Suparman was responsible for the players.

So I was fetched the next day, with a bicycle to Koramil. I had to be responsible for the play where the actors were *santiaji*. We reached an agreement, although through a hard way. They said, "So whose side will you follow: The Catholic Party or Golkar?". "Golkar" [I said]. So that's it, I just wanted to be safe. After we talked, they said, "Hold the microphone". They took me for a motorcycle ride where I had to shout "Come, join Golkar!", along this road. ... I knew one victim, Pak Handi who was beaten in Koramil. Why? Because he remained in the Catholic Party.

The treatment of Suparman shows how patron-client relationships in the New Order period were not static. Once the patrons saw signs that their clients were not in line with their agendas, they acted coercively towards them, sometimes in similar ways as towards the left. In order to maintain the client's benefits from the patronage network, they needed to prove their loyalty to the patron again. In the case of Suparman, this meant aligning his *Ketoprak* group with the demands of the patrons. Moreover, he became a vote-gatherer for the New Order's political party, Golkar, assuring that the newly established regime had a supporting mass in rural areas.

The patronage network was realigned once both parties were assured that they benefited from the same agenda. This was reflected in Suparman's description of his *Ketoprak* performance after the warning from the local military officer:

Not long after I became a Golkar, [the Babinsa said] "All right, you can play. The important thing is that you should arrange it very carefully. The main characters should not be the *santiaji*". That was after Pak Mustaji and Pak Wahid were dismissed. I know it hurt them very badly. Pak Mustaji cried in front of me. "What am I supposed to do?". We still have 3 performances to go. ... I met with the assigned

Babinsa. He was placed in Karangrejo. His name was Pak Dandi. ... I said, "So if you have to report to your superior, tell him that I will still continue the Ketoprak. They had already summoned me [to the Koramil]. You should be there during our [*Ketoprak*] practice [and] also during our meetings". So he attended [the meeting]. In the end, every time we performed, I took him in his army uniform, to guard. I bought him cigarettes and snacks, and he was happy. ...I gave the opening speech [at the *Ketoprak* performance] and announced the message from the government. [For example] There is a message: "there will be a public meeting tomorrow", announcements from the government. It was usually announced during the opening speech or through the comedian [in the performance]. It always had to be inserted. Because, if we obeyed and stayed loyal, they gave us the freedom to perform. I had a *sinden* (singer of Javanese songs) who was involved (a victim of the 1965 violence), but she was allowed to perform eventually. At first she was not allowed because she was part of Lekra. They kept an eye on us until [19]78.³²⁹

In the end, the Ketoprak group managed to continue their performances. In return, they had to be a funnel for New Order programmes, and become representatives of Golkar in their community. Both the patrons and the clients regained their advantages in the network. This was the prerequisite for the existence of cultural groups in rural societies in the early years of the New Order. None of them was able to maintain a critical stance and function against authorities as they did before in the 1950s-60s.

These cases of local collaborators show the dynamic patronage relationships. Although established through coalitions in the 1965-66 and 1968 violence, their relationships did not always continue to exist in similar conditions after the violence. Collaborators were used to support and guard the establishment of the new regime, and in return, they gained security to continue their activities in the village (such as Suparman's ketoprak group), or were rewarded with certain positions in society (such as Parjito, who became a monument caretaker). It is important for collaborators to support the official narratives of violence that were spread by the patrons, because collaborators benefited from these patronage relationships. Maintaining such relationships and their narratives, came at the expense of marginalising their own losses. On the other hand, participating in the killings may have triggered a sense of guilt that cannot easily be articulated, because its expression could be regarded as a form of disloyalty to the patrons' past role in the violence. As a result, collaborators distanced themselves from participation in the killings, which reflects their attempts to reconcile their collaboration in violence and loyalty to their patrons on the one hand, with their personal losses on the other.

From these cases of local collaborators, it is more fruitful to understand actors in mass violence as a dynamic process rather than identifying them as categories. This approach will help us to understand what makes mass violence possible, and specifically, the relationship between the state and society in such violence. Dwyer & Santikarma's work on Bali in 1965 pointed to the blur and overlap of categories of perpetrators and victims, because the violence in Bali was entangled in local kinship and relationships. Therefore, different roles in violence were not established instantly when the violence erupted, but were attached to their social backgrounds in a specific society and utilised by the military to eliminate the left. In Bali, those who were victimised by seeing their family members killed eventually participated in violent acts themselves.³³⁰ As studies of bystanders during the Holocaust also point out, the category of bystanders should be seen as a "specific and inherently dynamic subject position that arises in the genocidal process". The term bystander and even

³²⁹ Interview with Suparman, 21 September 2016 # 07.09-11.38; 12.35-12.55; 13.49-14.37; 14.59-16.48

³³⁰ Dwyer & Santikarma 2006, 200.

perpetrator or victim should not be considered as a reference to a particular group, but as a process.³³¹

Post-Violence Rural Development

Besides the rural patronage network, another framework that influences the memory of violence is the post-violence rural development. In chapter 2, I described the massive transformation in the village in the early years of the New Order. Political activities were confined to one political party, Golkar, that supported the new regime. All village heads were replaced with military men, who were commonly known as caretakers. The same also happened in the cultural sphere, where traditional theatrical performances were heavily monitored and had to be in line with the New Order national agendas. However, the major transformation in the post-1965 period was the changes in agrarian policy. Under the capitalistic orientation, national agrarian programmes such as the Green Revolution and BIMAS (Bimbingan Masyarakat or Mass Guidance) farming credit brought more problems to rural areas. In Donomulyo, it increased inequality in the village because most of these programmes only benefited middle-class farmers, were not accessible to local peasants, and distribution relied heavily on the local patronage network. The question of 'who gets what' after the violence lingered in the minds of Donomulyo villagers and also constituted their memories of violence. This shows that memory formation is an ongoing historical process, which is not instantly complete once the defining event occurs. Memory is shaped by years of subsequent experiences after the 1965-68 violence.

I started to give close attention to this matter of post-violence transformation when I encountered stories of a central figure in Donomulyo during the early New Order period. I became interested in this figure because villagers, either benefited or harmed by the violence, frequently mentioned him – stressing his central role in Donomulyo's infrastructure development. His name is Ario Dursam, a caretaker village head who won the village election (presumably in a pseudo-democratic election) in 1973 against his predecessor, Susanto, who was also an army officer, assigned directly to Donomulyo after 1965 to replace the PKI village head who had disappeared. Before being stationed in Donomulyo, Dursam was assigned to Kalimantan and West Java. In the later province, Dursam was involved in a battle with Darul Islam and injured his leg. Later, he was assigned to East Java and served in the Subdistrict Military command (Koramil) in Ngajum, another district in Malang, 25 km from the regency capital of Kepanjen. Around 1968, he was transferred to *Koramil* in Donomulyo. He sold all his properties in Ngajum and used the money to buy land in Donomulyo, taking his wife and four children to settle in the new district. Through his appointment in Koramil, he initially became the *Babinsa* (village security apparatus) in the Banyujati area and later, he became one of the *kamituwo* (local leaders) under Susanto's leadership.

Dursam died in 1992, but I was able to talk to his son, Hadiman, who is still living in Banyujati. He was born in 1958 in Ngajum, and moved with his parents to the Banyujati area, Donomulyo, in 1968. He recalled the decrease in their standard of life in Donomulyo, because in his childhood eyes, "rice was very scarce in Donomulyo while it was very abundant in Ngajum". After finishing his middle school in Donomulyo, Hadiman worked as a farmer, tilling his inherited land. Around 2000, together with another villager, he initiated a local NGO to deal with environmental issues in their village, which only lasted for several years. Both Suparman and Hadiman ran as village head candidates in 1998 but lost to Sulaiman Chodir, who became the village headman until 2006.

³³¹ Victoria Barnett as quoted in Ensels & Gans 2018, 112.

In one of our conversations, I asked Hadiman about the start of his father's career as one of the *kamituwo* or village authority. He explained that although the village head was elected by villagers, *kamituwo* was appointed by the village head and district leader (*camat*). The main consideration in this appointment was whether or not *kamituwo* could cooperate with the village head. This top-down nature of their election also suggests that *kamituwo* are more likely to put forward the agenda of village heads (and other leaders above him, i.e. the district officer), rather than villagers. During the New Order, *kamituwo* was an extended part of the army's grip on the village and became the vanguard to establish New Order's policies. This was Dursam's initial position before he was elected as Banyujati's village head.

According to Hadiman, when his father became village head during the 1970s, he gave special attention to programmes for village youth, especially sports. Dursam himself was a sports lover and joined many sports clubs in the surrounding area, such as volley, football, and martial arts. His preference for sports led him to provide villagers with facilities, such as attempting to provide a football field in every hamlet, and organised football tournaments. Sometimes, Dursam even provided transportation by borrowing trucks from the air force or marines, so that all villagers could watch football tournaments in different districts. He also facilitated cultural activities, by creating *Ludruk Karya Bakti* (*ludruk* is a traditional East Java theatre performance. This is different from *Ketoprak*, which originated from Central Java and is closely related to wayang stories). It was famous but also expensive to ask the group to perform, according to Hadiman.³³²

Besides a man of sports and culture, Dursam was also famous for his initiative in coordinating infrastructure development in the village. Before his leadership, roads in Banyujati were made of dirt. Dursam then gathered villagers to do collective work (*kerja bakti*), gathering stones and putting them on the dirt road, making it a semi-solid one so it would be easier for vehicles to use this road.³³³ Obviously, collective work during the New Order and under a military caretaker village head is not fully voluntary. Hadiman noted that this kind of collective work was *instructed* by village authorities. This was a typical situation during the New Order – that authorities would exert their power even for something that was considered a 'communal' effort. However, according to Hadiman, although such coercive instruction existed, his father was still considered to be a good leader and preferred by villagers. Towards the end of our conversation, Hadiman compared his father's leadership with the previous village headman, Susanto. "Before 1975", Hadiman said, "they [village leaders] were militaristic. They gave orders. Perhaps that was what people didn't like. Pak Susanto used to carry guns everywhere. Second, Pak Susanto was appointed as a village head caretaker".³³⁴ The word 'appointed', was what differentiated Dursam from Susanto. While the first was elected by the villagers, the latter was appointed as the caretaker. When telling about his father's life, Hadiman seems to present an image of a responsible leader, who was elected by the people and facilitated people's aspirations. As we will see later, rather than representing a democratic and ideological leader, Dursam actually resembled an authoritative and pragmatic figure of the New Order.

Apart from Ario Dursam's contribution to sports, culture, and infrastructure development, Hadiman pointed to another characteristic of his father that interests me. Hadiman started to mention his father's vicious character.

Probably that was why people were interested, according to me, although my father was vicious. ... If it's wrong, then it's wrong. For example, if people gambled, he would take the people to the police

³³² Interview with Hadiman, 13 December 2016 #11.20-16.58, 22.38-22.58, 29.27-30.51, 41.23-42.35

³³³ Interview with Hadiman, 13 December 2016 # 02.44-09.23

³³⁴ Interview with Hadiman, 13 December 2016 # 41.23-42.35

station. ... This is my analysis today. Back then, Kamituwo and the village head were monitoring their territory 24 hours a day. If there was a burglary, my father would do his very best to find the burglar. He worked with the police. To find the burglar, he sold my mother's necklace, or our goat. We had goats, but a goat was sold and the money was used to cover the cost to find the burglar. For example, if they knew the stolen property was taken to Pucung, he would go there using his own money.

Hadiman portrayed his father as a forceful person against illicit acts and willing to use his own funds to solve criminal cases. From Hadiman's description, I had the impression that Dursam's leadership character was full of commitment, intense attention to youth and cultural activities, forceful and authoritative. However, keeping in mind that Dursam's period of appointment was during the New Order, his leadership reflected how the regime actually initiated development through coercive means. Furthermore, the commitment to resolve criminal cases or illegal activities may not only stem from the motive to protect the village, but also to ensure stability and order, as the prerequisite for New Order policy implementation. Indications of instability in a certain area could put a person's career at risk, which Dursam was definitely seeking to avoid.

I also encountered a similar impression of Ario Dursam when I talked to Aji Marlan, who worked as a village secretary (*carik*) in 1975-1996, during Dursam's leadership. Aji was a son of a Haji in Banyujati, who later became the treasurer of the Ansor (the NU youth wing) sub-branch in Donomulyo prior to 1965. In the 1968 Trisula operation, he was involved in capturing remaining leftists in Donomulyo (see chapter 2). Marlan's position in the Ansor and his role during the anti-communist operation made it possible for him to be appointed as a village secretary – an illustration of the benefits resulting from the patronage network after the 1965-68 violence. When I explained that I would like to know more about Ario Dursam, who replaced Brahmantyo, the PKI village head who was killed, Marlan instantly corrected my statement. He said, "Not killed, but disappear" – a simple statement that diminishes intentionally aggressive acts targeted against the leftist village head. Although this is not the case, it made Marlan's position clearer – that he will always side with the authorities of the state, no matter how bad the situation is.

He started as an informal assistant during Susanto's leadership and was officially appointed as the village secretary under Dursam for two consecutive periods. When I asked Aji about Dursam's character, he portrayed Dursam as a vicious figure.

It [Dursam's leadership] was good. If it was not, then I would not have stayed that long. The way he leads: if it's not right, he will be angry. He was harsh. Back then, it was not like today. Apparatus had to struggle, not like today where there is a lot of money from above (central government). In the old days, village heads acted like the coloniser. ... but village heads were prestigious. If someone was wrong, he or she would be scolded. People were frightened, because it reflected colonisers. But the relationship was good with the people. He was elected, so he must have been good. The village was further developed during his period. ... I liked Pak Ario Dursam the most, because I was his man. He built the village meeting hall (*balai desa*). The offices surrounding it were also Pak Ario Dursam's [initiative].³³⁵

This conversation with Aji Marlan depicted how he was actually trying to make Dursam's negative character sound justifiable. First, he explained that Dursam was harsh and could easily get angry. Then Aji Marlan stressed that this was understandable, because during the New Order, the challenges and workload of the village head were very different compared to the current situation. In Marlan's example, these days the local authorities have abundant funds from the regency and central government, which was not the case during the New Order. I assume this was not because there were less funds during the New Order period, but because the structural administrative

³³⁵ Interview with Mr and Mrs Aji Marlan, 31 August 2016 #01.08.33-01.11.32, 01.15.10-01.17.04

hierarchy was also filled with informal connections of patronage between villages and their district or regency officials to access such funds. While at present, policies and budgets for village development are regulated clearly in the Village Law (*Undang-undang Desa*). Second, Marlan described Dursam's character as harsh and feared by the people. But Marlan continued by saying that people still voted for Dursam despite his character, because he brought infrastructure development to the village. He then compares Dursam's leadership to the former colonial authority, where viciousness was legitimised for modern development. Keeping in mind the military's domination of the village, it is hard to believe that the election process was free from coercion. Overall, Aji Marlan's description of Ario Dursam was full of legitimisation of his negative behaviour towards the people, presenting loyalty to the authorities. I received a similar impression when collaborators of violence explained the 1965-66 operation in Donomulyo.

The image of Ario Dursam as the motor of Donomulyo's development soon shifted into a different perspective once I heard the story from Marwono, a simple farmer. Compared to most of the villagers' houses that I had visited, his was very plain with no decorations on the table and walls. Their living room furniture only consisted of old wooden chairs and a table. A small television was located in the family room with a small bed in front of it to lie down while watching their favourite channels. He had six children with his wife, who still lives with him. All of them already have their own families and only two of them still live in Donomulyo. Although Marowono's identity card stated his year of birth as 1940, he is certain that he was born earlier, perhaps in 1936 or 1937. His age has led to several health problems which has made it difficult for him to work on his own land. Nevertheless, with the help of his wife, he still tries to plant timber (*kayu sengon*), cassava, a few cacao trees, and tend their livestock.

Marwono had a rough past. Living in poverty during his childhood (see chapter 2), he and his father-in-law were accused of being BTI members. The head of the village neighbourhood (*ketua RT*) arrived at his house one day in 1968, and told him to go to Koramil Donomulyo. Since then, he had to undergo *santiaji*, where he was obliged to report once a week at the same time for around two years, and listen to lectures given by the military officers at the office. Despite this treatment, Marwono still considers himself fortunate compared to other villagers, because his friends who were leaders of the BTI were summoned and never returned. Their property was confiscated, including their land and houses. "They (the authorities) will collect whatever they want. If necessary, even the wives will be taken. ... *Babinsa* (*Badan Pembina Desa*, a village-level monitoring official) came to the village. Nobody could resist", said Marwono. Compared to the previous description by Aji Marlan and Hadiman where they made the impression that village officials were crucial in village development, Marwono presented a different picture. For him, these officials were actually destroying villagers' lives.

Marwono's father-in-law also lost his land. He stated, "It was confiscated because he was accused of being a BTI. It was only one reason, a member of the BTI is PKI". This act of confiscating land was implemented under the same 1960 Agrarian Law. However, the aim of the law was twisted. Instead of distributing it to peasants, they were used for individual advantages. When Marwono explained these practices of land confiscation, the name of Ario Dursam appeared.

Ah, there was this committee, formed in the village. The village head was Ario Dursam, who is already dead. [They included] members of village head, the village apparatus, ... and the *pamong*. [How about the Koramil?] Although they did not participate, they received some amount. It would have been impossible without their support. So the committee said to me, "You have this much land, [it should be] reduced to this". They took more or less 18 aré, which is 1800 square meter. It was 66 aré before. We bought it with three cows. My mother and father bought the land that was confiscated. [What

about the documents?] We didn't have the certificate yet, only the Letter of Land Tax Payment (*Surat Pembayaran Pajak Tanah/ SPPT*). I had the letter for each year's payment. When they confiscated, they changed it, arranged by the village head. They changed the letter because the village head had the power. Then the land was sold by the committee.³³⁶

Here, Dursam was a very different figure. He was not the figure of development, as some villagers mentioned before, but as an extortionist. Dursam used his position as a local patron, and the labelling of villagers as communists, to confiscate their properties. Marwono's story reflects a transforming village under the New Order, where patronage alliances between the military and the village apparatus became stronger and drove village development, but at the same time, this was executed under exploitation and extortion practices against villagers.

Land was not the only element that the authorities took advantage of. Farmer's credit, such as BIMAS, also developed as a breeding ground for corruption by village authorities. Initially, according to Aji Marlan, the former village secretary, BIMAS seems to benefit the villagers. From his observation, around 50-60% of the villagers participated in the programme. It involved a series of seminars or meetings about farming techniques, new varieties of rice seeds and fertilizers. These seminars were organised by the Agricultural Department, and also attended by the district chief, police, and Koramil. For farmers who participated in this programme, using new types of rice seeds with shorter harvesting period (such as the famous PB or IR), rice production increased threefold.³³⁷ Nevertheless, Marlan's observation actually only pertains to a particular group of farmers. As a research in the Pagelaran district shows, BIMAS was only accessible to middle- or upper-class farmers, because they tended to have larger plots of land and capital to access farming credit, compared to lower-class farmers.³³⁸

This discrepancy with regard to credit access resonated with the Marwono's experience. He described that the village apparatus actually used their position for corruption and to gain advantage from the credit programme.

It [BIMAS] existed, but I didn't join. BIMAS, as far as I knew, was assistance for the people. They gave credit in the form of seeds. Farmers were given seeds by the government. (Marwono whispers) But it was controlled by a group of people, those in power, the *pamong* (village authorities). So if there was a credit, the money was gone. People didn't know. The programme existed, but we never received the money. I heard from the *pamong*, but they did not say anything about money. BIMAS was like this, there were seeds, but they never told us there was money. They gathered us in the village meeting hall for a lecture by the *pamong* and district leaders. ... Pamong were rich. I had one friend who became a *pamong* back then, until now he is still rich. Because of that [BIMAS], but it was not our money, it was the government's. Although they said it was for the people, but it was only for a group of people.³³⁹

Pamong, or village apparatus, controlled the distribution of BIMAS by selecting and listing potential beneficiaries.³⁴⁰ Those who received the credit were more likely to be the people who were close to this group of patrons. This clientelist relationship lasted until the present, in the practices of the KUT (*Kredit Usaha Tani* – farming credit) distribution. To access the credit grant from the regional budget,

³³⁶ Interview with Marwono, 16 September 2016# 01.12.13-01.22.32. Conversation with Rimando and his wife, another farmer who was accused of being a BTI in Donomulyo, also confirmed that land confiscation after 1965 only started during the period of Ario Dursam.

³³⁷ Interview with Aji Marlan, 15 May 2017# 00.16-10-22

³³⁸ Kano 1990, 120-21.

³³⁹ Interview with Marwono, 16 May 2017#07.33-12.04

³⁴⁰ Interview with Suparman, 19 July 2017#15.20-20.15

village officials collected copies of the villagers' identity cards, because the number of eligible villagers would influence the amount of funding granted from the budget. After receiving the funds, village officials would embezzle it, instead of distributing it to the villagers who had hand in copies of their identity cards.³⁴¹

The story of Ario Dursam and the village authorities reflected two interesting yet conflicting aspects. First, it showed the circle of patrons, consisting of village heads and their apparatus, and army men; that controlled most of the rural development projects after the 1965 violence. The question of 'who gets what' after the violence, also affected how villagers perceived the violence. 1965 can be seen as a point where a village that had once fallen behind, was transformed into a modern and developed one. Its progress lies in the success of the village headman in endorsing infrastructure development. Second, this progress that Donomulyo experienced, was achieved at the expense of a specific group that consisted of peasants, accused of being BTI, and *santiaji*. Ario Dursam is not just a story of multi-faceted leadership in a village, but a reflection of how a memory framework is established. For people who were involved in the violence or were representatives of the state in the New Order period, individual and communal gains in the post-violence New Order developed into a memory of progress and village improvement. On the contrary, for villagers who experienced losses during and after the violence, the early years of the New Order were not about development, but a memory of marginalisation and extortion. This shows that memories of 1965 are not only influenced by structural memory projects at the national level, but are also deeply embedded in the rural transformation which followed the violence.

Navigating Silence

Some scholars believe that the national anti-communist memory project repressed narratives of violence, and turned them into 'silenced memory'. The New Order is considered successful in creating the 'wholesale destruction of the memories of 1965-1966, especially because the stigma and fear are still alive and strong in relation to the incidents of 1965-1966'.³⁴² I agree that fear and stigma against the communists are still present in Indonesia today. However, it should not be seen merely as a passive reaction to repression which resulted in silenced memory. In other words, being stigmatised and silenced do not automatically result in diminishing memories. If we zoom in to the everyday lives in rural areas such as Donomulyo, we will have a different understanding of silence – that it is a navigating device to continue living within a community, years after the violence took place.

Marwono brought me to this conclusion. Our first encounter was made possible through Suparman, one of the prominent local leaders that I described in the previous section in this chapter. Suparman presented Marwono as one of the ex-*santiaji*, as "Our brother who became a *victim of history*" (*Saudara kita yang menjadi korban sejarah*). *Victim of history*, and in other cases where victims such as Marwono are depicted as 'accused of being communist', is a common phrase often used by victims of the anti-communist purge to suggest they were falsely accused and that they have nothing to do with the left. This evasive term is understandable, given the demonic status that communism has acquired in Indonesia, and the social ostracism against those associated with it. But, as we shall see below, the portrayal of a victim of history as someone who did not have any knowledge or support for the left is not necessarily always the case.

In our first meeting, Suparman played a perfect role as a mediator. In a very simple way, he gave a brief explanation of my background, my research and my purpose in the village. After that, he let me

³⁴¹ Conversation with Burhan, 12 July 2017.

³⁴² Marching 2017, 33.

introduce myself. I wanted to change the atmosphere to be more informal, so I started to talk about everyday things, such as family, church, and so on. The conversation flowed, but in this first meeting, I did not ask anything yet about the 1965-1968 violence.

As I continued visiting Marwono on my own, we became close friends. Apart from Suparman's term of victim of history, I sensed that Marwono knew more about the left in Donomulyo. But every time I asked something about the BTI before the 1965 violence, he always said that he did not know much about it. This statement was usually followed by questions regarding my research. At first, I thought my explanation was not clear enough or too academic, so I repeated it in a simpler way. I also stressed the confidentiality aspect in my research because I thought Marwono was too afraid to talk. However, after several visits, I realised that Marwono was not confused, but he was trying to convince himself that I could be trusted.

As our relationship grew closer, and on a mission to find out more from Marwono, on our third meeting, I began to speak openly about my thoughts on the 1965-66 violence. I told him that I thought that the violence was a form of state violence which caused injustice for the victims. I also expressed my fascination of the leftist movement in the context of anti-colonialism in Indonesia's pre-independence era and that I regret its exclusion from Indonesia's historiography. As a student during the New Order, I am one of those young generation who wanted to know more about this particular history, and that I considered Marwono as a source of this history. That meeting reached into another level of the relationship, where Marwono started to realise that we were on the 'same side' of history. In the conversation, he told me that although he was not a member of the BTI, he knew about kaderisation courses that took place in Donomulyo. He also read a book about agrarian reform which he borrowed from his BTI friend. He continued to share about his involvement in the measurement of land in the Banyujati area, for the purpose of land distribution before the 1965 violence happened. It did not proceed because the PKI village head, Brahmantyo, had already been detained and killed. He then continued to express his admiration of Brahmantyo, even placing him in contrast with Ario Dursam, the caretaker village head. We were talking about this particular experience, when a car parked in front of Marwono's house and he suddenly became silent (see Chapter 1). The situation was very different when he told the story of mass killings in the village. He was very open, and was not hesitant to talk about this horrifying period. For Marwono, it is not the killings that were kept hidden, but his admiration and support for the leftist movement in Donomulyo. This latter part is not in line with the 'working consensus', to use Erving Goffman's term, of a *victim of history* – a portrayal that places Marwono as an individual who has nothing to do with the left. The working consensus refers to the informal agreement in everyday interaction, where individuals usually suppress their own feelings or thoughts to deliver an impression or situation that is viewed as acceptable by others.³⁴³ Silence is a way to maintain oneself within this consensus.

Even when my life history interview with Marwono was mostly finished, I still visited him for a friendly meeting. One week after his story about the BTI activities, we were talking about trifling things related to our families and the current national situation. During this conversation, he suddenly asked, "Did you tell my stories to Suparman?". I was quite surprised, because we were not even talking about Suparman at that time. I only replied, "Not all of them". After a few minutes of silence, I asked him why he asked such a question, but he did not answer and only smiled. I continued by saying, "I understand who Suparman is and his position in 1965-68". Suparman, as a Catholic Youth activist at that time, participated in the anti-communist demonstration in 1965-66 and became a member of a screening team for PKI prisoners in 1968. Marwono said, "Ah, that's it

³⁴³ Goffman 1959, 9.

(*Nah, itu dia*)”, and laughed. It was more than enough for me to understand his complex relationship with Suparman. Both of them stand in very different position in the past. Suparman, a devoted Catholic and activist in 1960s, was surely anti-communist. Meanwhile, Marwono, an *abangan* who became Catholic after 1968, was supportive of the movement of the BTI and PKI in the 1960s. Today, Suparman is a highly respected cultural and religious leader, while Marwono is an ordinary farmer with no such status in society. For Suparman (and perhaps other villagers), Marwono was only a victim of history. But this victim, apparently, was also a Leftist supporter. He kept silent about this particular aspect, realising who Suparman is and their contrasting roles during and after the violence.

On a different occasion, I accidentally became involved in a conversation about Suparman with Jardito, another one of the Banyujati villagers that Suparman introduced. He was an army officer, who was detained in Malang’s Lowokwaru prison for seven years because his battalion and commander were accused of being involved in the September 30th Movement. After his release, he returned to his parents’ house in the Banyujati area and rebuilt his life. Together with his wife, they owned a grocery store in the main road of Banyujati. On one of my visits, I specifically asked about Suparman’s position after the violence.

It is hard to find out his [Suparman’s] exact position. Which side is he on? Sometimes he follows that side, or this side.... When I first return to this village, I heard that he participated in the [anti-communist] movement. But I didn’t ask directly, “How was [19]65?”. Suparman was still young at that time, and we never talked openly. ... if we see his life at that time, most of his friends are actually the *santiaji*. Suparman was also involved in *Ketoprak*, *Reog*, and there were many *santiaji* in that group. I do not dare talk about it, but I know his position. ... We should be careful. I don’t want to blame the past, because that is how history is.³⁴⁴

As is clear from Jardito’s statement, he could not categorise Suparman on one side – either as a victim or a perpetrator. Jardito understands very well that Suparman was basically anti-communist, but he also acknowledges that Suparman had many friends that were later accused of being BTI. Similar with what I mentioned in the earlier section, Suparman was highly involved in reviving traditional cultural groups where most of its members were *santiaji*. This complex position of Suparman made Jardito keep some distance from him. He remained silent about Suparman’s contrasting role in the village, not due to fear of repression, but because he realised that in order to move forward, some things should remain hidden.

These silences reflect the strategies of different individuals within society to be able to keep living together with others who had different positions in the violence. Silence is a negotiation between past and present, between the individual and the communal, and not necessarily a direct result of repression from the state. People who experienced violence, consciously select narratives that they want to express or hide. In other words, being silent is in the first place an active process of reconciling the past, and not exclusively a passive act caused by fear or structural stigmatisation. Silence should be seen not as an absence, but a co-presence of memory of violence in everyday life.³⁴⁵ I will elaborate more about the notion of silence in Chapter 6.

Conclusion

The case study in Donomulyo has shown that memory of the 1965-66 and 1968 violence is not directly formed by the national memory project (such as museums, books, films about the 30th September Movement) or state repression, but is embedded in social relationships in a particular locality. Throughout this chapter, I have pointed to two main features of the memory culture of the

³⁴⁴ Interview with Jardito, 13 Mei 2017 # 20.13-23.41

³⁴⁵ Kidron 2009, 16.

1965-66 violence. First, within the context of the salient rural patronage network, memory of violence is also embedded within this network. Patrons and clients who benefited from the violence maintain the anti-communist narratives (i.e. PKI as traitors to the nation) to provide legitimate grounds for their violent operations and support for the establishment of the New Order. This can be seen in cases of local collaborators, where their personal experiences were performatively extrapolated to fit in with the national narrative, sometimes at the expense of marginalising their personal losses. At the same time, collaborators also distanced themselves from the act of killing, by differentiating themselves with the army or Muslim groups who directly executed the left. This was a way of reconciling their past guilt with the need to sustain the official narrative. Meanwhile, for other villagers who were harmed by the violence, they remember the event as a turning point of continuous exploitation by authorities. Moreover, relationships between clients and their patrons are not always static. They can change once the clients do not comply anymore with their patron's demands, as shown in the case of Suparman; the local collaborator who included victims of the 1965 violence in his cultural performance group.

The second feature of memory culture of the 1965-66 and 1968 violence is their function as a survival strategy. In situations such as in the rural society in Donomulyo, villagers who were at opposite sides before and during the violence (i.e. as perpetrators and victims) needed to continue their lives in the same space, under post-violence rapid changes of agrarian policies. Therefore, the process of remembering (and forgetting) the violence is part of their effort to be able to continue living together in their community after the violence. Memory, in this case, becomes a strategic performance and representation which reconcile the past and present. In some cases, it also becomes a way to conform to a certain identity, or certain aspects of identity that seem acceptable; for example, maintaining the reputation of a victim of history – someone who had no connection at all with the left. By comprehending memory as a strategy, we can understand that silence is not exclusively a passive reaction to state repression, but also an active mechanism of agents to navigate through post-violence situations.

CHAPTER 5

MEMORY LANDSCAPES IN DONOMULYO: NEGOTIATING THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

Apprehending memory as a strategy to reconcile past and present enables us to understand that memories of violence actually never diminish even under the state's repressive acts. In these last two chapters, we will see the ways in which those memories have survived through changing political spheres and regimes, mainly through stories of places and family narratives. During my stay in Donomulyo, I realised that stories of 1965-68 violence are not only about people, but also about places. These places, which have different characteristics, will be discussed thoroughly in this chapter. Some of them were created by the state and thus, resemble much of the official narrative. Meanwhile, others have strong family stories attached to them and cannot be easily recognised publicly. While some of these sites are still maintained and used, others are practically abandoned. However, all of these places carry different meanings for the villagers that reflect how the past is represented today. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the interaction between places, people, and their memory of violence.

I consider these places as sites of memory, or *lieux de mémoire*, a concept that Pierre Nora introduced as sites where memory is crystallised, and a residual sense of continuity with the past remains.³⁴⁶ He also proposed two main characteristics of *lieux de mémoire* that differ them from other historical objects. First is the willingness or intent to remember, which reflects the interplay between memory and history. This implies that sites of memory are created, either authoritatively or collectively, and their meaning can be constructed. Second, Nora also stresses the fluidity of *lieux de mémoire*. They mix and combine many factors such as life and death, and most importantly, "they only exist because of their capacity for metamorphosis, and endless recycling of their meaning and an unpredictable proliferation of their ramifications".³⁴⁷ I would like to take Nora's concept further, especially on his idea of intent in *lieux de mémoire*, because this is where the power of memory politics lies. Who has the intent to remember and what kind of past do they intend to remember, are the main questions.

In this chapter, I elaborate on Nora's concept to analyse the sites of memory in Donomulyo. The main feature of the 1965 case is its different layers of history that influence Indonesia's collective memory. Sites of memory, then, is a field of a contested yet intertwined past – representing the violence of national treason of the September 30th Movement, but also the gruesome mass violence against the communists in the regions. Yet, all these different sites of memory lie in the same space where communities continue their lives after the violence. They form memory landscapes,³⁴⁸ where different sites (despite the various narratives that they convey) are connected and continuously (re)shape the memory of violence. Furthermore, as James Young argues, sites of memory should not only be examined in relation to their representation of the past, but also in relation to their role in

³⁴⁶ Nora 1996, 1.

³⁴⁷ Nora 1989, 19.

³⁴⁸ Eickhoff, et al. uses the concept of memory landscapes to show connection between memory and its spatial dimension, including the crucial role of sites in evoking, shaping, communicating or controlling memories. Eickhoff, et al. 2017, 531. Echoing with Eickhoff, et al., in this study I use the term landscapes not only to refer to the various sites of memory, but also to the different layers of memory and its dialogical process with the surroundings.

the present.³⁴⁹ A point that Ben Anderson also highlighted in his study of visuals and monuments in the New Order Indonesia is that monuments commemorate the past at the same time that they are intended for the future.³⁵⁰ This means that Nora's point on the fluidity of *lieux*, should not only be examined on the representation of the sites itself, but also on their shifting interaction with the people in these landscapes of memory. This is what Bloembergen & Eickhoff called the agency of sites; how sites influence their surrounding individuals or parties in and beyond the national and international framework of heritage.³⁵¹ In the context of a society filled with complex patronage relationships, sites of memory do not only function as a remembrance of the past, but they have also developed into instruments for negotiating the present.

Therefore, this chapter is an exploration of the agency of memory landscapes of violence: what they represent in the past and how they shape the present. This chapter will ask questions such as: why are some sites abandoned, and others not? How are the sites and the surrounding people or parties connected? To what extent do they influence the villagers' current life and their perception of the past? More importantly, to what extent are the sites intermingled with the personal and the social, or the public and the private? The sites that I will discuss in this chapter were selected because they constantly appeared in my conversations with villagers specifically in Donomulyo (though there are more sites of violence in the area). Some of these sites can be easily recognised through, for example, the engraved names, dates, or events. While others are hidden, but constantly preserved by the villagers' memorialisation practices. The sites' diversity also shows that not all *lieux* are 'alive', in a sense that although they preserve history, they have become meaningless in the present.

The memory landscapes in the Banyujati area (the pseudonym for three villages covered in this research) convey different interpretations of the past – some resonate with the national narrative, while others do not. Therefore, I will start the chapter by describing the national commemoration project on 1965 through the creation of a museum and a monument. One of the important examples is the Crocodile Pit or Lubang Buaya memorial complex in Jakarta. The main feature of this memorial site is the glorification of the death of the seven military officers during the September 30th Movement, and the construction of the PKI as a threat to the nation. In the next part, I will explore the memory landscapes in Banyujati which consist of five sites: the Trisula community building, the Trisula monument, Bhayangkara or Ngerendeng monument, and two mass graves. For each site, I will start by describing their current condition, representation, and also their connection with the surrounding people. I will continue with analysing how the sites connect past and present, and how they have been reinterpreted by the surrounding people.

Indonesia's National Site of Memory: Lubang Buaya

In 1973, the New Order government opened The *Pancasila Sakti* (Sacred Pancasila) Monument in Jakarta.³⁵² This public memorial complex consists of three main parts: a monument, a well called *Lubang Buaya* (Crocodile Pit) where the officers' bodies were found, and the diorama of torture of the Generals.³⁵³ The monument depicts seven Generals who died in the September 30th Movement, standing in front of a large Garuda Pancasila, the national emblem that carries a shield containing

³⁴⁹ Young 1993, 12-13.

³⁵⁰ Anderson 1973, 61.

³⁵¹ Bloembergen & Eickhoff 2015, 36.

³⁵² Pancasila is Indonesia's national ideology which consists of five points. The first point is "Believe in God". The PKI, who were accused of being atheists, were also accused of hatred of the Pancasila especially because of that first point.

³⁵³ In the September 30th Movement in 1965, six generals and one captain of the army were kidnapped and killed. Their bodies were thrown into this pit, which was later commemorated as the Crocodile Pit.

five symbols of the Pancasila (Picture 1).³⁵⁴ They were regarded as national heroes; victims of national treason. The interesting part attached to the monument is the base relief below the statue of the Generals. Its relief shows a summary of Indonesia's official historiography from independence from Dutch colonialism, the September 30th Movement, and the establishment of the New Order. The portrayal of the September 30th Movement in the relief only describes scenes of torture and death of the army officers, including scenes when the bodies were thrown into the Pit. Visualizations of the torture in the diorama depicts members of the BTI (Indonesia Peasants Movement) and Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*/ Indonesian Women's Movement) as the perpetrators of the violence (Picture 2).

Source: all pictures in this chapter are produced by the author



PICTURE 7. THE SACRED PANCASILA MONUMENT/ MONUMEN PANCASILA SAKTI



PICTURE 6. THE TORTURE DIORAMA IN THE PANCASILA MONUMENT COMPLEX

These visuals of the official narrative present a number of incorrect facts. The autopsy reports of the officers' bodies found no signs of torture, only gunshots as the main cause of death.³⁵⁵ Another example of the fabrication of history in the monument is the relief of Gerwani women dancing the *Dance of The Fragrant Flowers*. The state accused this as being a lustful dance performed by Gerwani just before they tortured the generals. Apparently, such an event never happened. Based on a witness's account, the women who were present in Lubang Buaya were in fact 'scared and huddled in a corner'.³⁵⁶ Stories about Gerwani's acts of torture were created through military pressure during the interrogation of women detainees after the September 30th Movement.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁴ For further analysis of this memorialisation complex, see McGregor 2007, 68-95.

³⁵⁵ Anderson 1987, 109-134.

³⁵⁶ Some members of Leftist organisations such as Pemuda Rakyat (Youth Association), Gerwani and BTI were in Lubang Buaya prior to the September 30th Movement. They were following a training for the Free West Papua (*Pembebasan Irian Barat*) movement. When the movement erupted, these members were still in the area, but were definitely not part of the movement. Wieringa 2002, 295.

³⁵⁷ John Hughes, a foreign reporter requested an interview with the accused Gerwani women prisoners. At the first meeting, the women did not say anything about the torture. However, in the second meeting, Hughes met with the same women together with the information officers who had extracted confessions from the young women. An officer from the division for psychological services was also present in the room. This situation resulted in a statement from one of the women, saying that the women had received razor blades along with orders to tear out the eyeballs of the generals, but that she was unaware of any sexual mutilation. See Lecrec 1997, 297-298. Sexual tortures were widely used against women in detention camps during the period of 1965-1970 to extract information that benefited the army. Pohlman 2017, 576.

Since its establishment, the Pancasila Sakti monument has been the centre for commemoration of the *Kesaktian Pancasila* Day on 1 October. The day functions as a reminder to Indonesians of the successful military actions in defending the nation's ideology. During that day, the president, his cabinet, and the families of the national heroes gather to attend the official state ceremony. The president customarily reads his official speech. He is then followed by the laying of a wreath beneath the statue of the 7 army officers. Up to today, Indonesians still celebrate *Kesaktian Pancasila* Day with a ceremony in schools and government offices. The monument complex is also a destination for historical tours and school excursions. Nevertheless, neither the monument nor the commemoration practices touch upon the death of half a million Indonesians who perished in the attempt to annihilate communism. The Lubang Buaya monument became a site that only commemorates 'the permissible aspects of the past' as Klaus Schreiner claims³⁵⁸ - by only depicting the military as heroes, and communists as a constant threat to the nation.

Although erecting a monument is not the only means that the state uses to preserve anti-communist memory, it is a widely-adopted practice in other provinces and districts.³⁵⁹ Through monuments, the official narrative is adopted in local governments. Another example of these regional monuments is the Trisula monument in Bakung subdistrict, Blitar, East Java. It was erected in 1972 and comprises five statues depicting three military figures and two peasants. All of them are standing together, symbolising unity against communism and a successful cooperation between the army and civilians during the Trisula operation in 1968.³⁶⁰ This feature of cooperation is prominent in similar monuments in other districts, as we will see in the next section. To what extent does the narrative that they convey influence villagers in the surrounding area, is the question I will discuss further.

Memory Landscapes in Donomulyo

Trisula Public Meeting Hall

A site of memory can be a point of contestation, rather than a mere description of a particular historical event. Through a story of a certain site, we are confronted with the questions 'whose history do these sites serve?' and 'what narratives do they contain?' . In the context of the 1965 violence, no single answer can be offered. In this first site in the Banyujati area, we will see that numerous layers of different narratives are located within one site which reflects the entanglement of the official and unofficial narratives of violence.

³⁵⁸ Schreiner 2005, 273.

³⁵⁹ Besides the monument, the government also released the film *The Treachery of the 30 September Movement/ Indonesian Communist Party (Pengkhianatan Gerakan 30 September/ PKI)* in 1983, directed by Arifin C. Noor, along with Brigadier General Dwipayana and Nugroho Notosusanto, who both played a prominent role in constructing official narrative of 1965. McGregor 2007, 96-100.

³⁶⁰ Hearman 2017, 521.



PICTURE 8. TRISULA PUBLIC MEETING HALL

The Trisula meeting hall (Picture 3) is easily recognised when we pass the main road, Jl. Raya Donomulyo. It is located in front of Donomulyo's district office, Koramil, and the Sector Police (Polsek), and next to one of the district's village offices. the Trisula building is the largest multi-functional hall amongst other buildings in the area and is managed by the district office. It is often closed, but on one rare occasion during our observation the doors were open for an event. Although I was not informed about the purpose of this event, it seemed to be a public seminar attended mostly by uniformed government officials. The initial purpose of the building was to provide a space for the village's public events. In the beginning, it was only intended for government events, but now the function has expanded, and Trisula hall can be rented out to laymen for non-government related events, such as weddings.

The construction started around the early 1970s, during the era of intense village infrastructure development in the Donomulyo district. Although the building is a reputation as a modern public facility, it also contains stories related to the 1965 violence. I learned about the construction process of the Trisula public meeting hall from Marwono, a BTI supporter in 1965 who was sent for *santiaji* during the New Order.³⁶¹ In the *santiaji* period, Marwono and other Leftists were instructed to bring bricks for the construction of the Trisula meeting hall.³⁶² Although this is not similar to forms of forced labour, it contains coercive acts by the authorities, where they mandated 'participation and contribution' from the villagers. Under the guise of valuing communal work (*kerja bakti*), authorities requested *santiaji* to bring bricks and assist the builders/constructors of the building. For Marwono and the others, their vulnerable position as *santiaji* was used by the authorities to extract materials for the development projects in the village. It was basically an order that if refused, could threaten their lives. Saying 'no' was impossible, because they might be sent to detention under the accusation

³⁶¹ A surveillance system under which every accused Leftist member should report regularly to the district military command. See Chapter 2.

³⁶² Interview with Marwono, Donomulyo, 16 September 2016 # 01.08.53-01.11.30.

of not supporting the new government. Out of fear of the official authorities, some members of the *santiaji* who did not have bricks or money to buy any decided to tear out bricks from grave tombs. In Marwono's words: "They were more scared of the military officers than the spirits of the dead". Marwono himself was fortunate because he had a supply of bricks at home, from which he brought deliveries to the construction site four times.

During the early years of the New Order, the meeting hall was also used as a venue for the seminars on Pancasila and P4 (*Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila/* Guidance on the Application of Pancasila), targeting especially the *santiaji*. In 1978, the People's Consultative Assembly released a decision to upgrade courses on Pancasila, which became well known as the P4. These became mandatory courses for all civil servants, students, and later were extended to diverse functional and political groups of society.³⁶³ There has been a lot of criticism on this project, especially by pro-democratic national groups, arguing that it only provides ideological justification for the New Order's policies. P4 was later abolished in the *Reformasi* period in 1998.³⁶⁴ Others perceived it as sheer indoctrination, which only stressed memorisation of the thirty-six formulaic precepts (*butir*) of the Pancasila.³⁶⁵ This type of indoctrination also took place in Donomulyo, as experienced by Marwono and his fellow villagers.

The Trisula building contains no traces of the *santiaji* people who 'contributed' to its construction. Nowadays, it appears to be an ordinary function hall, serving anybody who has the need to organise large events. However, for villagers, especially those who were under constant surveillance by the military during the New Order, the place serves as a reminder of the past. It recalls the exploitation and repression of the *santiaji*, who were accused of being involved in the BTI or PKI. Giving the name Trisula to the hall connected the building with the military operation in 1968 that managed to 'secure' the village from the remaining communists. It is a symbol of security and development (two main features of the New Order – *keamanan dan pembangunan*), and at the same time, it is a symbol of violence and repression. While the first interpretation appears publicly through its name, the latter circulates in more discrete narratives. The Trisula meeting hall serves as a complex example of a *lieux de mémoire*. It contains layers of different intentions to immortalize the past while simultaneously diverges from the initial official narrative it was designed to represent.

The Trisula Monument (*Monumen Trisula*)

The Trisula monument resembles the same event as the Trisula meeting hall. For official authorities, this anti-communist military operation in 1968 became more important in Donomulyo than the violence in 1965. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the Trisula operation became the military's show of force to state that a new regime had been firmly established. This message is conveyed in two sites in Donomulyo which use the name Trisula (the meeting hall and the monument). However, this message seems to have lost its influence in Donomulyo's society today as it is no longer a point of commemoration of the event. It could partly be because of *Reformasi* (a turn of Indonesia's democratic era in 1998), which provided more space for the narrative of violence to emerge on the surface, making propagandist monuments only symbols of manipulation of the New Order. On the other hand, it could also be because these official sites were initiated through a top-down approach and only imposed authorities' agenda. Therefore, they were not rooted in society and became futile as soon as the authoritarian state diminished.

³⁶³ Morfit 1981, 838.

³⁶⁴ Morfit 1981, 839.

³⁶⁵ Saunders 1998, 63.

The Trisula monument is easily recognised in Donomulyo. It lies in the middle of a T-junction, which connects the district to three other adjacent districts. The year of its establishment is not very clear. Based on oral information, it was erected around 1968 or 1969. The monument depicts two statues raising their fists, a military officer and a local villager (Picture 4). Similar to the Trisula monument in Blitar, this monument attempts to depict the strong cooperation between the military and civilians during the 1968 Trisula operation. This message can also be seen in the base relief under the statue that depicts a civilian holding a sharp bamboo weapon and an army officer standing behind him (picture 5).

On the other side of the monument, the base relief describes villagers' activities in different themes such as religion, agriculture, and education (picture 6). The religious symbol is depicted by a relief of a mosque, and a woman with a headscarf, which represents the Islamic nuance in the monument. Meanwhile, the relief of cassava, a tree, and a woman cooking, represent daily activities in agricultural society. Cassava is a typical harvest for a dry-land soil and a common food in Donomulyo. Another relief, depicting a man reading a book, is also a symbol of education, or knowledge enhancement of a villager. An interesting aspect of this monument is the image of women in the relief. They are all depicted with certain common elements: wearing a head scarf, carrying a wallet, and cooking. All of these resemble an image of 'polite and decent' women, a New Order construction of apolitical and domesticised Indonesian women. Overall, the monument conveys a message of modernity, or to be precise, what a modern village should look like. The elements attached to modernity, such as the construction of women's role, education, religiosity, and improved farming, are key elements of the New Order. Similar representations can also be seen in the Pancasila Sakti Monument in Jakarta, where the New Order juxtaposed visual representations of their government with religion and morality, in contrast to the 'immoral' communists in the previous period.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁶ McGregor 2007, 82-83.



PICTURE 9. TRISULA MONUMENT IN DONOMULYO



PICTURE 10. BASE-RELIEF ON THE TRISULA MONUMENT

The other side of the base relief contains a Javanese inscription: “*Angesthi Raras Trus Manunggal. Manunggaling ABRI lan Rakyat Minongko Ketahanan Nasional*” (Picture 7). This inscription is written in the high-level Javanese language known as *Krama*. It is the language of the *priyayi* (elites), derived from a Sanskritic sub-language, honorific in character, largely spoken higher up in the social hierarchy as its mastery requires a high degree of education.³⁶⁷ The character of *Krama* is in contrast with *Ngoko*, the everyday Javanese language, which is more direct, spoken lower down the social hierarchy and among very close equals. However, the first sentence, *Angesthi Raras Trus Manunggal* refers to something else. This is a form of *Candrasengkala* or *Sengkala*, a year that is written in a sentence, instead of in numbers.³⁶⁸ A good *Candrasengkala* is not only a combination of words, but an entire sentence that forms a profound meaning, conveying philosophical messages to its readers.³⁶⁹ In the case of the Trisula Monument’s inscription, *Angésthí* is derived from the word *ésthí*, which means thought, willingness, and feeling (*pemikiran, kehendak, perasaan*). It also represents the number eight. The next word, *Raras*, refers to feeling (*rasa, perasaan*) and represents the number six. Meanwhile, *Trus* in *Candrasangkala* means fulfilled or continue (*terpenuhi, terus*) and is related to the number nine. The last word, *Manunggal*, originates from *Tunggal*, meaning to gather, to come together, to unite and be one (*berkumpul, satu*). *Candrasengkala* starts with the last unit in the year, and therefore, *Angésthí Raras Trus Manunggal* refers to the year 1968. It also conveys the message of ‘focusing on harmony to achieve unity’. The type of unity is explained in the second sentence in the inscription: *Manunggaling ABRI lan Rakyat Minongko Ketahanan Nasional* – the unity of ABRI with the people is a form of national defence.

³⁶⁷ Anderson 1966, 96.

³⁶⁸ Bratakesawa & Hadisoepapta 1980, 15.

³⁶⁹ Bratakesawa & Hadisoepapta 1980, 16.



PICTURE 11. BASE RELIEF ON THE MONUMENT



PICTURE 12. INSCRIPTION ON THE MONUMENT

Although the use of *Candrasengkala* is not a common everyday practice, the use of Old Javanese words can frequently be found in many government terms, for example Pantja Tunggal, Bhayangkara and so on. By using this type of language, the government implies a certain prestige and majesty—a phenomenon that Benedict Anderson coined as the *kramanization* of public Indonesian. Official Indonesian has tended to become a language of political politeness; a mark of a high level of political sophistication and civilization – something that differentiates the *prijaji* with ordinary people.³⁷⁰ The use of *Candrasengkala* and *Krama* in the Trisula monument symbolises this sense of sophistication. Through the monument, the idea of unity between the army and the people became grand and almost sacral.

So far, we have recognised the Trisula monument as a site that was meant to be sacral, a reminder of the successful cooperation between the army and civilians, and the hope that this relationship will continue in the future. It also functions to remind people of what the village should be: modern and sophisticated. However, when I discussed the monument with villagers in the Banyujati area, the monument is currently seen only as a landmark rather than as a site of commemoration. Located in the middle of the intersection of three main roads, the monument does not have its own 'space'. This is different from the Trisula monument in Blitar, for example, where a space has been created around the monument and marked by a fence. The space surrounding Blitar's Trisula monument also invites people to pay more attention to the monument and to read the inscription or the name of the army who fought during the Trisula operation. Similar to the Pancasila Sakti monument in Jakarta, the monument in Blitar has become an iconic tourist site. These things do not appear in the monument in Donomulyo. Since its establishment, no significant activities appeared on the monument. Local villagers realise that the monument resembles the Trisula operation in 1968 because of its name and the reliefs, but that is not the only representation of the monument. In a discussion with young generations of villagers, I asked them what the Trisula monument resembles and whether they heard stories related to it. Here is what they described:³⁷¹

Villager 1: The monument at the intersection, that was about Blitar and PKI. It was '68. ... The southern part of Madiun became the hiding area of the remaining PKI. Without the help of the people, [the army] would not have found out their hiding place. The people informed the army, so it was the collaboration between the state apparatus and the people to eliminate PKI. In Modangan beach, there were many PKI hiding places. I heard the place is haunted. That [the collaboration] was a concrete expression of synergy between the army and the people.

³⁷⁰ Anderson 1966, 110.

³⁷¹ Focus Group Discussion RT 15, Donomulyo, 15 Mei 2017 #29.04-31.27

Villager 2: I heard it from my parents-in-law (original residents of Donomulyo) [about 1968]. Everybody was shot. It was tense. Bodies were scattered on the road, every day. But we did not know who did it. Suddenly in the morning, they saw bodies, in the drain, and farm. Those who died were *considered* (emphasis from the villager) to be PKI. Although it had not yet been proven.

Therefore, although the Trisula monument aims to convey the official narrative, its present state resembles a completely different one. This case shows that although the monument was constructed by the state, the current meaning is not determined by the state. It resonates with existing studies by heritage scholars who criticise the frame of colonial determinism.³⁷² Colonial heritage that we see today is not necessarily defined by colonialism itself nor a representation of the colonial past, although it may have been established in colonial times. This implies that the influence of a power structure that created these heritages, or sites of memory, may not always remain the same. In the case of the Trisula monument, this site became less meaningful in commemorating its constructed history. This history and image of the New Order's modernity, development and security is far removed from what villagers remember, while the 1965-68 violence lingers more deeply in their memories.

The Ngerendeng/ Bhayangkara Monument

As I mentioned earlier, the 'intent to remember' that characterises a site of memory can be analysed critically. In the case of the Ngerendeng monument in this section, we can see that the intent has been largely to create an anti-communist memory, if not a fabricated one. This reflects the power structure creating the *lieux de mémoire*. The monument itself is a simplification of a complex event that occurred in Madiun in 1948, making it a story of good versus evil-- story that results in the legitimization of the military operation to eliminate communism down to its roots in 1965-68. As we will see, the background of the monument's establishment may relate more to sustaining the New Order's coercive ideology of security and order rather than to commemorating the past itself (the Madiun event). Furthermore, in a society filled with complex patronage relationships, sites of memory also play a role in creating and transforming these relationships. Using the site, clients move closer to their patrons under the New Order agenda to construct an anti-communist memory. On the other hand, their relationship weakened after the *Reformasi*, in which the function of these official monuments also became meaningless.

Accompanied and introduced by Suparman (one of my key informants, a Catholic Youth activist in the 1960s), I came across a police monument, known as the Ngerendeng monument. The small complex was built to commemorate the death of four police officers during the 1948 Madiun affair (an armed struggle in pre-independent Indonesia). On our second visit to the monument, we managed to find Parjito, a local farmer and also the monument caretaker (*juru kunci*), who assisted the army in the anti-communist operation (see Chapter 4). According to Parjito, four police officers (Lilik Puguh, Jusuf, Musiatun and Pramu) died during the 1948 Madiun affair. They were first buried in the public cemetery in Ngerendeng (located behind the monument), but were later transferred to the heroes' cemetery in Turen in the Malang regency. A monument complex was later constructed, precisely in 1971, to commemorate these four heroes. The police brigadier at that time, Brigadier General Police Samsuri Mertodjoso formally inaugurate the monument precisely on 1 October 1971, during the commemoration of *Kesaktian Pancasila* Day. The complex consists of two stones; the first one contains the names and ranks of the four police officers as the victims of the PKI movement in 1948 (Picture 8). Meanwhile, the other monument depicts solely the symbol of Bhayangkara, the symbol of the Indonesian National police force (Picture 9). The construction and management of the

³⁷² Legêne, Purwanto & Schulte Nordholt 2015, 8.

complex occurred under the leadership of Bambang Kusdiyanto, the head of the police sector (Kapolsek) of Donomulyo at that time.



PICTURE 13. THE BHAYANGKARA MEMORIAL COMPLEX IN NGERENDENG

In order to find more information about the monument, we visited the police sector office in Donomulyo. The current head police officer, although unaware of the story behind the monument, was kind enough to share a document about it. It is a written guide, as Parjito already mentioned, developed by Drs. Moerdjiono, SH on 10 November 2010. Titled a “Short History of The Killings of Sector Police Officers in Donomulyo By the Indonesian Communist Party in 1948” (*Sejarah Singkat Pembunuhan Anggota Polri Kepolisian Sektor Donomulyo Oleh PKI Tahun 1948*), the document consists of only 8 pages. In the foreword page, the author states that the history of this monument is less known, and therefore, the document should fulfil the necessity. But in making such an attempt, he also mentions the limitation of time and reference, which makes the guide document not very comprehensive. The main chapters start with the background of the Madiun affair. According to Moerdjiono, a group of Indonesian leftists were unsatisfied with the Dutch-Indonesian ‘Renville’ agreement and established the People’s Democratic Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakyat/ FDR*) led by Amir Syarifuddin.³⁷³ Moerdjiono also states that FDR programmes were constantly rejected by the government, which strengthened their opposition and led to collaboration with the PKI to build a communist-Russian state in Indonesia. “PKI and FDR strengthened themselves within an unstable state at that time, creating chaos to increase tension by using criminals to perform criminal acts especially in Madiun, Surakarta and Pati”, the guide document states. This led to the Madiun ‘revolt’ that involved kidnapping and killing of Indonesian police officers in Madiun, Magetan and other areas including Donomulyo. How and why the ‘revolt’ in Madiun is connected to Donomulyo is not explained in the document. The PKI in Donomulyo, led by Cokro Bagong, attacked the sector police office one night in 1948 (the date is not stated) and arrested four police officers.³⁷⁴ Those officers

³⁷³ Amir Sjarifoeddin was the Minister of Information during Sukarno’s cabinet. He resigned on 23 January 1948, after the signing of the Renville agreement. The next cabinet, vice-president Hatta’s Presidential cabinet, did not include any of the leftists’ representation, leaving them on the margins of the Republic power since Sjarifoeddin’s resignation. Poeze 2011, 10-11.

³⁷⁴ An interview with a military veteran, Slamet Hardjo Utomo, also stated that the movement of the PKI troops in South Malang called Batallion Zein (or better known as the Red Battalion) led by Cokro Bagong. Slamet

were killed and their bodies were found in the cemetery of the Ngerendeng hamlet. Their bodies were transferred to the Heroes' cemetery in Turen, Malang regency. The Monument Bhayangkara, or the Ngerendeng monument complex, was erected at the site where the bodies were found. The monument was inaugurated on 1 October 1971.

The official narrative of the Madiun case, which is also referred to in the guide document of the Ngerendeng Monument, portrays the PKI as evil traitors of the nation. This narrative also frequently emphasizes the PKI's violence towards the Moslem residents in Madiun. However, the event is more complicated than merely a treacherous act by the PKI, as there other factors that contributed to the violence in Madiun still reimain. One of them is the conflict between the Siliwangi division and the Senopati division of the armed forces in Solo, Central Java, which resulted in acts of atrociocity at Madiun as the FDR's last resort. It culminated in a physical confrontation, where government officials, police officers, and Islamic leaders were slaughtered in Madiun. However, as Harry Poeze stated, a lot of FDR members were also executed after being caught in the battle against the soldiers of the Republic.³⁷⁵ The movement ended because it was not supported by the people, and it became a difficult strategy to maintain while the party itself was still in the process of consolidation.³⁷⁶ In short, by eliminating the complex background of the Madiun affair, official Indonesia historiography often focuses on the violence and treachery of the PKI during the event. It is frequently used as an



PICTURE 14. FOUR OFFICERS WHO DIED IN 1948 MADIUN AFFAIR

event to strengthen the portrayal of the PKI as violent and evil in G30S, and to legitimise the violent annihilation of the PKI in 1965-66.

This brings us back to the Ngerendeng monument in Donomulyo. Although it depicts the Madiun Affair in 1948, it still generates many questions. What is the connection between the monumentin

served as the platoon command that moved against the PKI troops in September 1948. He did not mention the attack on the police office in his interview. Utomo 1997.

³⁷⁵ Poeze 2011, 382.

³⁷⁶ Poeze 2011, 382.

Madiun and Donomulyo? Why did it take more than 20 years to build that monument? The objective of this site may not have a strong connection with the past, but more with the present. To further explore this point, we should look at the narratives that the monument conveys. First, there is the official scenario proposed by Drs. Moerdjiono in the guide document about the short history of the monument. A missing link in the document is the connection between the incidents in Donomulyo and the Madiun affair. Although oral sources mention the military's attack against the PKI in South Malang, this does not explain why an FDR movement in Madiun expanded to Malang.³⁷⁷ It is highly possible that the sources that explain this Madiun-Malang connection are not available, or that there is actually no connection at all. The military operation in 1948 in Malang could be an insignificant chase to capture those who escaped from Madiun. If this is the case, then we are still left with the question what the monument actually represents. Furthermore, this official scenario could not explain the long interval between the event in 1948 and the monument construction in 1971.

The second scenario emerges against the background of the early independence situation. Since its declaration of independence in 1945, Indonesia has undergone a series of negotiations and war with the Dutch and additionally, attacks from different kinds of national groups who were not satisfied with the situation in the country. The situation at that time was filled with chaos and violence, involving confrontation between the republican army and militias or *lasykar*. On 20 March 1949, one of these militias killed three army officers and their men in Donomulyo after kidnapping them for several days.³⁷⁸ there is a possibility that the death of the officers was caused by such militia violence, with no connection to Madiun. However, this event occurred in 1949, and not in 1948. A third possible scenario comes to the fore when looking back at the Brawijaya document about the Pancasila operation in Donomulyo (see chapter 3). According to the files, the operation also targeted a group of thieves (perhaps members of a larger network outside Malang) that had been operating for quite a while in Donomulyo, in addition to communists. It is also possible that Cokro Bagong and the incident at the police office was related to acts of thievery, rather than to the Madiun affair. This is, again, just a possibility. To examine this event any further is also beyond the scope of this research.

It is highly possible that the death of the four police officers in Donomulyo does not have a strong connection with the Madiun affair. But why did the police force provide such a huge effort to build a monument? To answer this question, we should go back to the other sites in Jakarta and Blitar that have the same heroic depiction of the military. The Pancasila Sakti monument was opened to the public in 1973, and the Trisula monument in Blitar was established in 1972. Meanwhile, the Ngerendeng monument, although it represents a different period and event, was built in 1971. These monument projects occurred relatively close to the first 1971 national election during the New Order. This election used the army's systematic structure, their domination in villages, and collaboration within local bureaucracies, resulting in the Golkar or Golongan Karya (Suharto's ruling party) as the winner.³⁷⁹ In other words, the Ngerendeng monument maybe part of a national project to convey dominant features of the New Order: security (*keamanan*) and development (*pembangunan*), which was basically a message to support anti-communism and economic enhancement of the New Order.³⁸⁰ This explains the long time interval between the Madiun event and the establishment of the Ngerendeng monument, and also the determination of the authorities

³⁷⁷ The source also confirms the official story of Cokro Bagong's attack on the police station. Utomo 1997.

³⁷⁸ The officials were Major Banuredjo, Captain Rustamadji, Lieutenant Pamudji, Sergeant Saelan and their four men. Poeze 2014, 230-231.

³⁷⁹ See Ward 1974.

³⁸⁰ Ken ward 1974, 3.

to build the monument, even though the facts are highly questionable. Madiun became an event in the past that was needed to maintain the portrayal of the treacherous communists. The military's successful elimination of the movement became the New Order's symbol of security or *keamanan*. The Ngerendeng monument shows that instead of commemorating the past (Madiun 1948), the site of memory was created to fulfill the needs of the present (the New Order).

When I visited the monument complex, it was filled with wild grass and dried leaves. According to Parjito, the monument caretaker, the complex used to be a centre of commemoration during the National Heroes Day (*Hari Pahlawan*) on 10 November. On that day, sector police officers and school children visited the monument and paid their respects to the heroes. Parjito also mentioned that the school children sometimes cleaned the complex with their teachers. Even officers from Surabaya or other districts, sometimes even the Mobile Brigade (*Brigade Mobil/ Brimob*) also joined the ceremony. Family members of the deceased from Malang, Blitar and other places in East Java occasionally visited the monument to pay their respects. However, these practices ceased around 2010 (probably longer than that). Since then, nobody visits the monument or talks about its maintenance to Parjito. According to Parjito, this reflects the negligence of the head of police sector, because that person should be responsible for maintaining the monument and continuing the commemoration practices at the monument. To the same end, according to Parjito, the officer is also neglecting him as the caretaker of the monument. Parjito uses the analogy of a relationship between father and son. If a father takes care of his son, then the son will always be with him. "He should consider me as the guardian of the monument. And he should consider me as one of his subordinates. That way, I will always be close to him", Parjito explained. I asked him whether or not he asked the current head of the police sector about his status and he answered "No. Because he does not want to come down here". In this sense, Parjito thinks that the police officer is not only abandoning the monument, but also himself and his relation with the patron (police).

However, towards the end of June 2019, the sector police of Donomulyo cleaned the monument complex. This activity was part of Bhakti Religi, a series of actions in assisting with the maintenance of religious sites. During that time, they also cleaned the local church together with the locals. These actions were part of the preparations for the 73rd anniversary of the police force (Bhayangkara) on 1 July 2019.³⁸¹ Although there is still an effort to maintain the monument, it implies a structurally top-down nature of the attempt.

The case of the Ngerendeng monument and its *juru kunci* highlights two important points about sites of memory in the context of patronage society. First, commemoration practices surrounding monuments are not spontaneous, but mobilised by the authorities and patrons, who are, in this case, the police officers or school teachers. This reflects the power structure in Nora's notion of intent in a *lieux de mémoire*. A *lieux de memoire* is not an empty void, it is always filled with tension of power. In some cases, as the Ngerendeng monument shows, a *lieux de mémoire* does not serve the function of commemorating the past, but a construction to support the established regime. Second, sites of memory play a role within the complex patronage relationships in a society. When the site was at its most important function, the patronage relationship between the authorities in power and the people who preserve the monument was also strong. This is the case reflected by Parjito and his relationship with the head of the police sector. However, when the function of the site as a propaganda tool begins to deteriorate, the patronage relationship also starts to erode. The function of a site of memory in this context goes beyond remembering the historical past, but becomes a device to negotiate the patron-client relationship in present society.

³⁸¹ Kiswara 2019.

Kaliasri Public Cemetery

While the previous sites of memory are easy to recognise, the following ones are more hidden. They cannot be identified unless the locals choose to reveal them. Nevertheless, I still consider these places as sites of memory, as they still play an important role in society, or at least to the community of victims in Donomulyo. These sites reflect the entanglement of public and private narratives, resulting in places that do not proclaim themselves as sites of remembrance, but exist strongly among the public through narratives of past violence experienced by families of victims.

I had heard about the mass grave in the Kaliasri public cemetery several times in my conversations with the locals. I had not visited the cemetery until my encounter with one of the victim's family members, who turned out to be someone whom I had known for a while. Her name was Susi, and she works as a helper in my friend's house in Malang. Susi has been working for the family for more than twenty years. After I moved to Malang, I visited the family more often, and they were very helpful in assisting my navigation around the city. From my frequent encounters, I understand that Susi is originally from Donomulyo, though I have never really known her family background.



PICTURE 15. KALIASRI PUBLIC CEMETARY

When I started my field research in 2016, I paid a visit to her and my friend's family. During my light conversation with Susi, I started to mention a couple of people that I had become acquainted with in Donomulyo. She asked how I knew them, and I started to explain briefly about my research. At this point, she started sharing her stories. She started by saying that "People are wrong when they say that our village is a PKI village. There was no PKI there. My father was killed in 1965 by the army, but he was not a PKI. In fact, my hamlet became a widow's hamlet because all the men were taken away by the army" and she continued to share the story about her father. Since I met Susi in 2006, she has witnessed the work in human rights that I participate with our mutual connection (my friend, her employer). With this knowledge, she was comfortable in sharing information about PKI and her family.

A couple of days after that meeting with Susi, I received a phone call from my friend. She said, "I just heard about Susi's father. She said that her father was killed by the army. She never told us before. Since she started working here, she always said that her father *died because of the PKI*. After she found out what you are doing in Donomulyo, she started to tell a different story". I was really surprised, because I thought my friend's family already knew her background. On the contrary, Susi kept her story discreet, despite her knowledge of our position against the fabricated official history.

This drove us to visit Susi's family in Donomulyo. As soon as we arrived, we were introduced to her sister, Lina, and their mother. Her mother has a hearing problem, but apart from that, she is very healthy. We were also introduced to Susi's uncle, who shared a similar story about the death of Susi's father. On my second visit, I talked to several other people in the neighbourhood in order to understand what happened to her father. This is the chronology that I managed to reconstruct based on their stories:

One night in 1968, a group of villagers were guarding the neighbourhood at a security post (*gardu*). There were around 15 people in the group, including the village security or *jogoboyo* named Tokromo.³⁸² Suddenly, Tokromo was killed with a sharp weapon during his night watch. Although the details and exact reason for this act are still unclear, there was indication of a motive of robbery. After the incident, all of the villagers who guarded the *gardu* were taken to the Donomulyo district office. Only five of them returned. From the testimony of one of the survivors, the villagers were questioned about their party affiliation. Those who survived are the ones who claimed affiliation to PNI. While others who did not have any affiliation, or were indicated as BTI, were taken to the public cemetery and killed. Tokromo's murder seemed to be used as a reason to get rid of the remaining communists in the village. Most of the men were taken, but some of them returned. It is difficult to further investigate the incident of Tokromo. However, victims that disappeared from the Trisula operation and the Tokromo affair have infamously declared this particular hamlet as the hamlet of widows.³⁸³

Susi's father was one of those villagers who was accused of murdering Tokromo. He disappeared after he was taken to the district office for further investigation. A number of the 15 villagers who returned to the village told Susi's family that her father had been killed and buried in a mass grave in the public cemetery. Since then, her sister Lina and her mother usually visit the grave before the fasting month and on Eid Mubarak. The mass grave where Susi's father was buried is difficult to identify, because there are no specific markings (Picture 10). Despite its discreet location, the public cemetery is a reminder (not only to families of victims, but also to other villagers who know the story)³⁸⁴ of the mass killings and violence in 1965, 1968, and the Tokromo incident. It does not resemble any notion of creating peace and order, as the military operation claimed it would. The cemetery illustrates that sites of memory are rarely one-directional –never containing a single narrative. A site often reflects multidirectional memory, as Michael Rothberg defined as “a series of interventions through which social actors bring multiple traumatic pasts into a heterogeneous and changing present”.³⁸⁵ Memory, for Rothberg, is subjected to “ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and not privative”. The Kaliasri public cemetery not only reflects the multi-directionality of national (the anti-communist operation) and a local event (the murder of Tokromo), but also the private (experience of Susi's family) and public narrative (shared recognition of the hamlet of widows).

Mulyosari Mass Grave

Multidirectional memory that is attached to a site can also be seen in spiritual practices that are related to sites of violence. For example, a mass grave of 1965 victims in Semarang, Central Java,

³⁸² In Javanese villages, Javanese terms are used for the positions in the village apparatuses. For example, the village secretary is commonly known as *carik*; and the village security is known as *jogoboyo*. All of the apparatuses are responsible to their village head or *lurah*.

³⁸³ Interview with Sukisman and Minto, 15 November 2016.

³⁸⁴ Although the mass grave does not have any specific markings, the story of Susi's family is quite well known among villagers in her hamlet. The story circulates wider outside Susi's hamlet, I also encountered the same story from local villagers.

³⁸⁵ Rothberg 2009, 3-4.

attracts people with different intentions: most commonly to win a lottery, to achieve economic success in their life, or to search for spiritual guidance (*petunjuk*) from the grave. A *sinden* (traditional Javanese singer), who was killed and buried there during the 1965 operation, is believed to be bulletproof. Her supernatural powers are believed to have the capacity to guide people in the present on a path to achieve their life goals.³⁸⁶ The practices of worshipping spirits in the afterlife can be commonly found in Indonesian society, not only in relation to indigenous beliefs, but also as part of daily practices of modern Indonesian life. Sacred graves that lie all over Indonesia have become sites of worship and pilgrimage, carrying the *potent dead* – the power that the dead (ancestors, saints, national heroes) exert over the living in contemporary Indonesia.³⁸⁷ However, particular mass graves that resulted from the 1965-68 violence generate the same treatment as the potent dead, yet the dead in this case were not saints or heroes. They were communists and outcasts but it was exactly the gruesome violence against them that produced stories of their supernatural powers. It was the violence that transformed these ordinary people into the potent dead.

My encounter with the site of the potent dead started with my acquaintance with Parminah. She was the only child of her mother and father, Purnomo Sukimin. When she was seven months old, her father moved away and she was brought up by her mother and grandmother. Later on, Purnomo Sukimin married Parminah's aunt who gave birth to Tarno, Parminah's half-brother. According to Parminah, Tarno was much closer to Sukimin because they all lived together until Sukimin disappeared and was killed during the 1968 Trisula operation. Although Parminah was not really proud of her father's complex relationship, she still cried the first time she shared the loss with us. In our second conversation, Parminah explained in more detail about the day when her father was executed:

I was around 14 or 15 years old. I heard that my father had been taken to the police station. After several months, my brother came. "*Mbak*, you have to see father at the [police] office. He's going to be sent away". My grandmother didn't give me permission. It turns out that the same night, father was really gone. He had been taken to a quiet place, which already had a hole. My father was put in there. He was not alone; there were five or six people. They were placed together. Those who had money to pay were set free, but there were also those who could not [pay]. ... My parents were poor, so they could not pay anything. But there was Pak Wisto, my father's friend who paid [for his freedom] and is still alive.³⁸⁸

I continue to ask Parminah about the source of this information. According to her, the news about her father's detention came from her brother who was informed by the police themselves. Meanwhile, the news about the killing came from the survivor, Pak Wisto, who told several people in the area. It is from these people that the family knows about the mass grave.

Parminah told us that her father was accused of being a PKI, but she does not know whether this is true or not. After they heard about his death, they could not search for his grave right away. "The situation was still critical. Nobody dared to search, everybody just stayed at home", according to Parminah. It was not until around 2004 that they found the location of his grave. This was the result of her brother's persistent efforts in searching for the grave. Parminah also told us about the inaccessible location, which became the reason for her less frequent visits to the site itself. In order to send her blessings to her father, she combinesthem with the *nyadran* (traditional religious practice to pay respect to the dead, especially to special events) at her mother's grave.

³⁸⁶ Eickhoff, et al. 2017, 538.

³⁸⁷ Chambert-Loir & Anthony Reid (eds) 2002, xvii.

³⁸⁸ Interview with Parminah and Karsono, Donomulyo, 3 December 2016 #10.35-12.34.

Parminah connected us with her stepbrother, Tarno. He is a farmer who grew up in Donomulyo and later lived in Jakarta for several years. After his return, he dedicates most of his time to farming and taking care of his son while his wife works abroad as a migrant worker. After several visits, I asked about his father. It was in 1968 (Tarno was around seven years old) when his father was detained. When he visited the detention centre with his grandmother, he remembered that the place was very crowded. His father's cell was full of people, but they let him out to receive his family's visit. Tarno remembered being cuddled by his father, and after that, he never saw him again. After a few years, he was informed about the location of his father's grave by a person who lived near the market. Around 1974, before he moved to Jakarta, he tried to search for the location. It was almost Idul Fitri, the Islamic holy day, and it is common to do *nyadran* before this day. It became a motive and desire for Tarno to have a spiritual visual of his father. Therefore, he went in search for the place in the direction indicated by locals. When he succeeded, he was determined to sleep beside the grave in order to experience an encounter with his father's spirit. But what happened was really unexpected: he saw a large black creature without a face. It was horrifying, and according to Parminah (although Tarno did not mention this), Tarno fainted and was assisted by their uncle who had been waiting for him nearby. Tarno interpreted this single experience as a sign that he was not allowed to speak with his father's spirit.

The first time Tarno visited the grave, there was only a pole and several bricks. He does not know whether the killer or somebody else marked the grave. After spending a number of years working in Jakarta, he decided to return to Donomulyo, and he realised the grave had changed. It had become more solid, with a proper tomb. From the information that he gathered, this was done by someone who asked the grave for spiritual guidance in order to win a national lottery.³⁸⁹ The person successfully won the lottery, and as an expression of gratitude, he restored the grave. This happened when Tarno was still in Jakarta. The present condition of the grave is well-maintained, with a grave stone without inscriptions (Picture 11). According to Tarno, although there is only one tomb, the bodies inside are possibly up to ten people. When I visited the grave with him, there were three other tombs beside his father's. Tarno does not have any information about the other graves.

³⁸⁹ During the Suharto government, this lottery was famously known as SDSB (Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah or Awarded Social Donation Funds).



PICTURE 16. MULYOSARI MASS GRAVE

Tarno visits the grave with his family (even his grandchildren) quite often, especially during important events. For example, when his daughter was going to get married, he took his family and the family of his future son-in-law to the grave. For Tarno, paying his respects is important, “So they know our origins”, as he explains.³⁹⁰ I asked whether there were questions or any resentment from the other family, but that was not the case. The only question came from his son, who asked what happened to their grandfather. Tarno explained that he did not know much because he was still very young at that time. His son continued to ask why his grandfather was buried in such a place. Tarno only replied, “It’s fine. Everywhere is just the same”.³⁹¹ From the time I spent with Tarno, I didn’t sense any anger about the violence that his father suffered, instead only a strong motivation to maintain the family connection.

The case of this particular mass grave illuminates the complexity of the memory of violence as it shows the layers of connection between different people with the grave. I encountered this impression during one of my conversations with Suparman, a former Catholic Youth activist in the 1960s, and a cultural- spiritual counsellor in the Banyujati area (see chapter 4). It is actually through him that I came into contact with Parminah, who visited Suparman for a ‘spiritual consultancy’. Parminah’s daughter was getting married, so they asked Suparman to choose a good day based on the Javanese calendar. Parminah also asked him to be the Master of Ceremony at her daughter’s wedding. However, this was not the only reason that brought Parminah to Suparman. As the wedding approached, Parminah was also thinking about her father’s grave. In Javanese, it is a traditional practice that the family visits and pays their respects to the grave of their deceased family members prior to important events. To do *nyadran* is difficult for Parminah, because her father’s grave lies somewhere in the woods and is difficult to access. Parminah consulted Suparman to determine whether or not it was necessary to pay her respects directly at the site of her father’s grave. Suparman then convinced Parminah that the most important aspect of the process is the prayer, which must not necessarily be given at the grave site, but can be sent from home or the church.

³⁹⁰ “*Supaya tahu asalnya*”. Interview with Tarno, Donomulyo, 16 Mei 2017 #5.18

³⁹¹ “*Gak apa-apa. Dimana saja sama*”. Interview with Tarno, Donomulyo, 16 Mei 2017, #09.35.

For Tarno's family, the grave represents their connectivity with older generations. For Suparman, the grave has a different meaning. After spending several days with Parminah and Tarno, I shared some information with Suparman. When I told him that Parminah was not certain of her father's involvement in the Leftist organisation that allegedly manifested his death, Suparman directly stated that her father was in fact a member of the Pemuda Rakyat (the leftist youth organisation closely linked to the PKI). According to him, Purnomo Sukimin was not very compassionate toward other villagers, although he did not elaborate further on this particular comment. However, the most surprising thing for Suparman was how Parminah's family managed to find the location of their father's grave. Suparman himself had known about the grave from an army officer even before Parminah came to consult with him, but he remained silent about his knowledge of the grave. Revealing the grave seemed to have caused uneasiness for Suparman. It was intended to remain unmentioned, while the victim's identity as a Pemuda Rakyat lives on.

Mulyosari mass grave illustrates a complex way of remembering the mass killings in 1965-68. On the one hand, violence turned these ordinary villagers into the *potent dead*. They are sites of intense spiritual activity, such as the lottery winner and Tarno's experience with the black creature. The site not only carries the intimate narrative of a family's loss, but it is also transformed into a public domain, where others besides the family members invoke the spirituality of the site. The grave reflects the entanglement of private and public domain connected by the narrative of violence. There is a relationship of give and take between the site and its 'spiritual public'. Maintenance of the site not only becomes a private matter, but also a semi-public one. On the other hand, for those who have a strong connection with the site's patrons, the location of the mass grave should be kept hidden. When the site starts to be recognised in 'public', it generates discomfort for them.

Conclusion

The landscape of memory in this chapter presents a complex representation of violence in contemporary society. There are some general conclusions that we can draw from the case of Donomulyo. First, sites of memory do not contain single narratives, but a complex entanglement of various dichotomies (public-private, past-present, or silence-shared knowledge). This is illustrated, for example, by the case of the Mulyosari mass grave, where the deceased are not only a reminder of the family's private origins and the 1965-68 violence that disrupted them, but also a spiritual site of an active, potent dead for a larger public. Second, despite the initial intention during the creation of these sites, their meaning could transform over time. This refers to Nora's point on the fluid meaning of the sites. Most of the official sites in Donomulyo were built not only to commemorate past events, but also to maintain anti-communist propaganda in the present and future, as shown in the case of the Ngerendeng and Trisula monuments. But even then, this function is in contestation with narratives of violence that are not concretised through these typical monuments. As the state who developed these monuments diminished, the intended commemorative functions of these monuments have become less important. This brings us to the third point, that the sites are always in a dialogical process with the people that surround them. The sites become devices of negotiation in present society, rather than symbols of remembrance of the past. For example, the case of Ngerendeng monument and its caretaker Parjito shows how the site is used for an employee/client to remain in proximity with his patrons. Therefore, sites of memory function to strengthen or even disconnect the patron-client relationship. For others, discovering hidden sites of memory, such as a mass grave, is an indication that past violence is starting to be recognised by a wider public, and is no longer a private matter of the victim's family.

CHAPTER 6

GENERATION OF POSTMEMORY: RETHINKING SILENCE AND TRAUMA IN FAMILY NARRATIVES

As decades have passed since 1965, human rights workers advocating justice for victims of the 1965-68 violence have raised concerns on whether or not Indonesia's younger generations will still be able to remember the violence. Concern also emerges around the lack of significant changes in the national historiography, let alone judicial procedures against the perpetrators of the violence itself. In the last few years, the intergenerational memory of the 1965 violence has been a major highlight in the conversation around human rights in Indonesia. For example, in 2016 and 2017, two books presented compilations of family accounts of the 1965 violence,³⁹² filled with stories from the children and grandchildren of victims. These books put forward the main themes of the intergenerational connection of victims of the 1965 violence and point to the fact that the second and third generations of victims are also experiencing effects of the violence. This is reflected through their memory and trauma related to the atrocities and more importantly, their silences. This silence is a result of the successful structural memory projects of that New Order that depict the PKI as a threat to the nation, and led to continuous exclusion and stigmatisation of the victims' families. Although some of these families have had the courage to publish their stories for a wider public, other first generation victims have decided to remain silent about the effects of the violence on their progeny. This is unpacked by Okky Tirto, editor in chief of the Humanitarian Creativity Institute (Lembaga Kreativitas Kemanusiaan), in his prologue to Putu Oka Sukanta's (a former 1965 prisoner, writer, and member of Lekra – a leftist culture organisation closely linked to the PKI) book. He calls it a collective forgetting, explaining that forgetting is not organic, but a structural mechanism constructed by the state to diminish the narrative of violence that the victims have experienced.³⁹³

Okky Tirto's concept of collective forgetting, is closely related to silence, which can often be interpreted as an absence of memory of violence. However, this is not always the case. As this chapter will show, the connection between intergenerational memory, trauma and silence does not always result in the complete absence of memory of violence. Instead, I argue that the silence that I encountered in both families of victims or collaborators of violence is not merely a result of the repressive mechanism of the state, but also a means of survival of the victims and their families; a instrument to navigate and cope with the aftermath of a violent event. By portraying silence as a form of agency, I will show in this chapter that far from being a result of structural repression, silence is a complex process of distancing and juxtaposing the past and present; also between the private and the political public. By expounding on agency, I do not disregard the structural forces, but instead give attention to an uncommon examination of the ways in which agency is used to negotiate between the individual and the structural. This chapter deals with the following questions: How do the first and second generations remember the 1965 violence? How do they obtain information about the past? How do they react to the silence of the first generation? To what extent does the state (public) narrative intertwine with the family's (private) narratives?

Until now, we do not have any exact information on the traumatic impact of the 1965 violence amongst the victims and their families. However, we can take an example from another similar case of state violence in Indonesia, such as the military operation in Aceh. More than 28,000 conflict-

³⁹² For the latest publications on this issue, see Sukanta 2016; and Marching 2017.

³⁹³ Sukanta 2016, xv-xvi.

related deaths occurred during the most intensive years of the Indonesian military's counter-insurgency operation (1989-2005) against the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/ GAM) who demanded full independence from Indonesia.³⁹⁴ The conflict ended after the devastating tsunami on 26 December 2004, marked by a peace agreement in Helsinki on 15 August 2005. A study by Grayman, et al. in 2009 estimates that 33% of the total population met the criteria for major depressive disorder, and 19% for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).³⁹⁵ The symptoms ranged from psychological symptoms (such as sadness, helplessness, loss of spirit, inability to sleep) to psychosomatic symptoms (such as headaches, uncontrollable shaking, and even heart problems).³⁹⁶ Although the case of Aceh and the case of the 1965 violence were different in duration and scale, this study presents the cases in tandem as an impression of the traumatic impact following the occurrence of state violence.

A different approach from psychological studies highlights how trauma becomes part of the memory of the second and third generations of Holocaust victims. Literary scholars such as Marianne Hirsch proposed the concept of postmemory to portray such a process of intergenerational memory. She describes postmemory as:

The relationship that the 'generation after' bears to the personal, collective and cultural trauma of those who came before – the experiences they 'remember' only by means of the stories, images, and behaviours among which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to *seem* to constitute memories in their own right. Postmemory's connection to the past is thus actually mediated not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection and creation.³⁹⁷

According to Hirsch, postmemory is not a mere recollection of the first generation's experience in the past, but a (re)interpretation of those experiences by the later generations. In the case of the 1965 violence, postmemory exists in a highly political context, where the dominant power decides what can be remembered and what cannot. However, as this chapter will show, postmemory of the 1965 violence demonstrates not only this constructed official narrative, but also the complexity of the connection between the official-national and the personal-family narrative. This interrelatedness between the national and the private is also shown through Andrew Conroe's study on intergenerational memory amongst the family members of victims of the 1965 violence. Conroe argues that both knowledge and silence surrounding the 1965 violence in the families are dynamic, their meaning transforms over time. Most importantly, families may hide the past in order to avoid the consequences that it brings.³⁹⁸

Within the trauma debate, the anthropological approach to mass violence has critically questioned the concept of trauma and silence. Studies such as Carol Kidron's shows that Jewish-Israeli Holocaust and Canadian-Cambodian genocide survivors do not identify themselves as traumatic victims.³⁹⁹ In the case of the Canadian-Cambodian families, descendants assert that their silence is not a form of repressed traumatic memory, but a cultural normative behaviour based on Buddhist values. Furthermore, it is actually these values that helps them through the aftermath of violence – "Buddhism tells us that suffering is part of life".⁴⁰⁰ Thus Kidron argues that the choice not to talk about the past is not an indication of pathology. In the case of families of Holocaust survivors, Kidron

³⁹⁴ Grayman, et al. 2009, 292.

³⁹⁵ Grayman, et al. 2009, 298

³⁹⁶ Grayman, et al. 2009, 299.

³⁹⁷ Hirsch 2012, 5.

³⁹⁸ Conroe 2012, 86-87.

³⁹⁹ Kidron 2012, 723–54.

⁴⁰⁰ Kidron 2012, 736.

pointed to the 'silent traces' where memories of the Holocaust are actually present without verbal communication between the first and second generations.⁴⁰¹ These findings also serve as Kidron's criticism of Eurocentric psychosocial norms that view silence as negatively marked absence, which "neglect the phenomenon of silence as a medium of expression, communication, and transmission of knowledge in its own right or as an alternative form of personal knowing that is not dependent on speech".⁴⁰²

This chapter builds on Hirsch's and Kidron's work on intergenerational trauma, memory and silence, with particular focus on how silence travels and influences memories within families who experienced the 1965-68 violence. Taking this critical approach does not mean that I neglect traumatic behaviour amongst these families. For example, the case of Marwono in Chapter 1 illustrates the traumatic effect of the violence when he became restless and silent at any presence of an unrecognised car parked in front of his house. In many cases, expressions of traumatic silence can still be found in families who experienced the 1965 violence. But the important point that this critical approach highlights is to examine silence not as a negative effect of violence, but a deliberate choice to deal with the trauma itself. Therefore, the chapter explores further the interplay between trauma and silence or knowledge of violence, and how it (re)creates memories of the past within families. Different from the concern of a 'collective forgetting' that I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, my study in Donomulyo demonstrates how the memory of violence still travels within a community, and through generations. However, their postmemory is not a clear-cut reproduction of the first generation's whole experience, but a mix between a private and contextually embedded memory, with a larger socio-political dimension of the nation.

Memories of an Activist – The Family of Superman

The families in this chapter have different backgrounds. The first generations had different positions in the 1965 violence; ranging from victims (former activists of Leftist organisations) to collaborators of violence. Some of them are better economically positioned with highly-educated children working in well-paid jobs in the city. Others are in a different situation, with children who have to struggle as labourers to make a living. Meanwhile, almost all of the second generations that I interviewed had lived through the New Order period and became intensively exposed to the anti-communist propaganda either within or outside their school curricula. They also have different types of relationship with their parents. To explore further the younger generation's memory of the 1965 violence, I also spoke to village youths in two separate discussions. These discussions were filled with stories of violence, either those experienced by their own families and relatives, or stories that they heard from surrounding villagers. Local high school teachers were the next group that I visited in order to explore how 1965 is discussed in their classrooms. Interestingly, stories of violence were also brought up by students during their history lessons, including the stories of their families who experienced the 1965-68 violence.

Families of perpetrators or collaborators reflected the specific act of reproducing narratives to their second generations. In one narrative, their parents' experiences that were retold to their children were the ones that supported the national anti-communist narrative. In another narrative, their collaboration in the 1965-68 violence was buried in silence. The memory of the second generation reflects the interconnectedness of the formal narrative with the family's personal experiences. The story that we will see in this family illustrates a narrative of victimisation from the Madiun 1948

⁴⁰¹ Kidron 2009, 6.

⁴⁰² Kidron 2009, 7.

affair⁴⁰³ (see chapter 5) and an intense involvement of rebuilding the village after dire destruction caused by the 1965-68 violence.

Suparman (pseudonym-see previous chapters), is a former Catholic Youth activist in the 1960s, who became a respected local leader in Donomulyo. He was married to a woman with Central-Javanese roots, who previously lived in Malang. Unfortunately, she died in 2009 due to cervical cancer, leaving behind Suparman and their four sons. All of them are married and live in larger cities outside Donomulyo, except for one, who still lives in the district. While he works as a farmer and handyman, the other three are professionals working at well-known institutions. I had the opportunity to meet with Suparman's oldest son, Josua, who lives in Malang and works as the head of an administrative office in a prestigious private high school.

Josua was born in 1971, and spent most of his childhood in Donomulyo until he finished middle school. In 1987, he moved to Malang and continued his high school education until he gained his current position in the administration department of a private school in Malang. As the oldest child, his first memory of the past was his responsibility to take care of his younger brothers. On school days, he had the task to sweep the house, prepare breakfast and help his brothers to get ready for school. He remembered his childhood years as an adventurous time. They usually walked to school, through the sugarcane fields, stealing some of the stalks along the way. During celebrations of the planting season, along with other children, Josua would wait to get the offerings that were used for the traditional rituals. Donomulyo back then was very 'nationalist', according to Josua. People from different religions would visit each other during Christmas or Eid Mubarak. Even when the Catholics were having their communal prayer, the Moslems would join and pray according to their own customs. This situation is different from nowadays, according to Josua, where migrant villagers from outside of Donomulyo have established their lives there and spread a more fundamentalist view. The nationalist view of Josua actually referred to the *abangan* lifestyle (see chapter 2, especially the section on religious conversion), which is characterised by supporting loose boundaries around religious practices.

The relationship between Josua and his father was not an intimate one. As Josua recalls that after his father finished his education at the Teacher's Education School (*Sekolah Pendidikan Guru/SPG*), he continued to study at the Indonesian Catechist Academy (*Akademi Katekis Indonesia/AKI*) in Jogjakarta. For villagers in Donomulyo, people who attended such a high level of education were highly respected. In my conversation with other villagers, they called Suparman 'Suparman BA', not only to differentiate this particular Suparman from other people in the village with the same name, but also to emphasise his different educational and social status in the community. When Suparman returned to Donomulyo in 1971, he did not only become a teacher in a Catholic school, but also a religious assistant for the Catholic community in Donomulyo. Suparman frequently visited houses of Catholic villagers, led community prayers, assisted in the church masses, or counselled villagers through family problems. With a schedule that involved teaching in the morning followed by Catechist works in the afternoon until late at night, Suparman could not spend much time with his family. According to Josua, his father used a personal approach to the Catholic community in the village through doing house visits. Josua expressed that this intense activity resulted in almost no quality time for the family.⁴⁰⁴ Furthermore, Josua also explained that his father's parenting style was quite militaristic. The children usually received physical punishment, including instructions to do

⁴⁰³ This refers to the revolt by the People's Democratic Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakyat/ FDR*). In national history, the event of Madiun was recorded as another PKI attempt to rebel against the nation. See chapter 5.

⁴⁰⁴ Interview with Josua, 23 Mei 2017

push-ups and squat jumps. Josua perceived this as the influence of his grandfather, who had a similar parenting style.

Josua's story about Superman should be analysed in a larger context. His catechist work, which involved spreading Catholic teachings to the locals, existed during the early years of the New Order. This is highly related to the rise of a religious community and political masses that support the New Order's political party Golongan Karya/ Golkar. After the 1965-66 violence, many villagers who were *abangan* (Javanese-traditionalist) had to convert to the formal religions acknowledged by the state. This was part of the state-imposed ideological programme to prevent resurgence of communism in society. In Donomulyo, the number of Catholics who were baptised increased from 378 people in 1960-1965, to 3,472 people in 1966-1970.⁴⁰⁵ A church document from 1977 explains that religious life in Donomulyo was still unstable, and therefore, the role of the parish's management (*pengurus paroki*) was to change this situation. To assist with the strengthening of religious life, the Malang Diocese paid one Catechist and two members from ALMA⁴⁰⁶ to support apostolic works.⁴⁰⁷ It is highly possible that Superman was involved in this kind of work to help the Catholic converts and explain Catholicism to these former *abangan*. Besides being a Catechist, Superman who was previously a member of the Catholic Party moved to Golongan Karya/ Golkar. Against this political backdrop, it is highly possible that Superman's 'outreach' work during the early New Order period was geared to transforming previously Leftist villagers into the homogenous political masses of Golkar. As Ken Ward suggests, Golkar's strategy in villages was to use the *tokoh* (local leaders) as agents to generate support and votes from villagers (clients). The *tokoh* in general were not economically powerful individuals, but those who traditionally had influence over the population, such as religious leaders, teachers, and so on.⁴⁰⁸ When Superman was involved in a traditional Javanese performance *Ketoprak*, the group became the funnel for the government's information, as I described in chapter 4. Superman was playing this typical role of a New Order patron, a Catholic apostle and a political agent of Golkar, without his family realising what he was really contributing to. For Josua, his father's work was merely a *pelayanan* or service work for the people.

In our conversation, I asked Josua about his father's political activity. The most frequent story that Josua heard from his father was his experience in the AKI (Akademi Katekis Indonesia-Indonesian Catechist Academy)-Jogjakarta. It was in this period that Superman was encouraged to be involved directly in the community, and not only to study religious texts. The academy also created a strong brotherhood among the students, which they have sustained until the present. Josua, however, did not know much about Superman's activism in the Catholic Youth organisation (Pemuda Katolik Republik Indonesia/ PMKRI), let alone his involvement in the anti-communist persecutions. According to Josua, his father's activism in the Catholic Youth organisation was automatically attached to his status as an SPG (Sekolah Pendidikan Guru/ Pedagogic Academy) and AKI student. But Josua did not really know what his father did in the Catholic Youth organisation. When I asked Josua if he had heard stories about the PKI from his father, he only mentioned the loss of Superman's siblings in 1948. The cause of their death, according to Superman, was because his brother and sister were exposed to decomposed bodies of the 1948 affair. Superman believes that the Madiun revolt had reached Donomulyo and caused deaths of a number of villagers, although in the previous chapter, I discussed the difficulty to verify the connection between an affair in Madiun with Donomulyo. The bodies were in the process of burial when his mother and siblings passed on their way to the

⁴⁰⁵ Appendix in Suhadiyono, et. Al. 2002. Also see chapter 2.

⁴⁰⁶ A catholic association consisting of Catholic nuns who serve disabled people.

⁴⁰⁷ Soedarmodjo 1977.

⁴⁰⁸ Ward 1974, 172.

market. His siblings fell ill on that same day, and Suparman suspects the bacteria and germs in the corpses led to his siblings' illness and death. Suparman, who was only 3 years old at that time, was alive because he stayed at home. Before meeting Josua, I already heard this same story directly from Suparman, although it is difficult to verify. It is interesting to see that the retold past narrative in the family is not related to Suparman's involvement in the 1965-68 violence, but to the 1948 event in Madiun, with an emphasis on his family's loss.

The intergenerational relationship in this case reflects a positioning of the family in relation to the violence. A narrative of the past that is considered important to preserve through generations was the experience of loss against the backdrop of the 1948 Madiun affair. Although Suparman's family members were not direct victims of violence in the Madiun affair, it is important to maintain the portrayal of their family who lost their loved ones – as a 'victims'. This can be interpreted as Suparman's act to use his personal family experience to support the state's formal narrative against the PKI. On the other hand, preserving the portrayal of the family members as the victims, and being silent about Suparman's involvement in the 1965-68 violence, may also be an expression of trauma and guilt of the past. In this case, conserving their memory as victims of Madiun is not only an act to support the state's narrative, but also a way to cope with the past guilt of collaborating in violence – by distancing oneself from the violence. Therefore, what the second generation understands about their parents is only about the loss that they experienced in 1948 and the involvement in rebuilding the community after the 1965-68 violence through religious and cultural activities. None of these memories contain traces of their parents' patronage and connections in annihilating the communists and establishing the New Order.

Memories of the Lost Land – The Family of Marwono

The violence that is retold to the second generation often appears in fragments and is sometimes difficult to understand by people external to the family members themselves. Interestingly, when these fragments intersect with other sources, for example through Indonesian history education, they construct a comprehensive yet critical understanding of the past. Furthermore, memories of violence in this case include conditions that emerged after the mass killings ended. Similar to chapter 4, the second generations of the 1965-68 victims also depict this early period of the New Order as a turning point for their family, in which they lost their property.

In previous chapters, we encountered the story of Marwono, a farmer who supported the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia/ Indonesian Peasants Front) in the 1960s. My interaction with him was suspenseful, because it was not until after several meetings that Marwono started to recount his supportive views about the BTI, PKI, and land reform. From here, I became curious whether or not he also shared these views with his children. Marwono has six children, and two of them are living in Donomulyo. The other four are scattered over Malang, Bogor and Surabaya. I first met Burhan, his eldest son, in June 2017. Born in 1963, Burhan went to the elementary and middle school in Donomulyo, but he did not succeed in finishing high school. He originally wanted to study at an engineering school (STM- *Sekolah Teknik Mesin*, vocational school of engineering), but was forced by his parents to enter the Teacher's Education School (*Sekolah Pendidikan Guru/ SPG*). He did not like it, so after one year, he left school and returned to Donomulyo. Unfortunately, his parents did not have sufficient funds to support his education further. Soon after, he followed his grandfather, who was trying to find work in Malang. Since then, Burhan has migrated to different cities to work. He started as a construction labourer (*buruh bangunan*) in Surabaya, building the famous market *Pasar Atom*. Before the project was finished, he moved to another job in an ice factory in Ngawi. From there, he went to Malang to try several jobs in the craft and convection industry. In 1987, he migrated to Palembang, South Sumatera. He married in 1990 and lived in Malang city with his wife.

They returned to Donomulyo in 1999 to settle down and had two children there. Now, his eldest son is still looking for work, and the younger one had almost finished high school at the time that we met during my fieldwork. Burhan himself is currently working in various jobs, such as small-scale construction worker and sand miner in the adjacent district of Blitar.

Born before the 1965 violence, Burhan remembered seeing an army officer holding a weapon in the 1968 operation. He was still very young, but he remembered that in this period, his grandfather was summoned by Babinsa (*Badan Pembina Desa*, a village-level monitoring official). He was taken and later detained in Koramil (the district-level military command) Donomulyo for 8 months. After he was released, Burhan's grandfather was obliged to report to Koramil every month. The same as Marwono, both of them had to follow *santiaji*, an indoctrination programme during the New Order, designed to 're-route' accused communists to the national ideology of Pancasila (see chapter 2). After a few months of *santiaji*, Burhan's grandfather was summoned to produce bricks to build the Trisula community hall. In the previous chapter, Marwono also gave his testimony that the *santiaji* villagers were instructed to bring bricks for the construction of the Trisula community hall. As the first grandson in the family, Burhan spent a lot of time with his grandfather and he admits that he was much closer to his grandfather than to Marwono.

Burhan told me that he has no knowledge of his father's and grandfather's involvement in the PKI or other Leftist organisations before 1965. This statement should be considered critically. Reflecting on my own process with Marwono in obtaining his views and support on the BTI, it is possible that stories related to Leftist groups before 1965 are not passed onto the children. On the other hand, there is also a probability that Burhan himself was holding back information from me, just as Marwono did in the first occasions of our meeting. Burhan explained that he witnessed directly the violence, encountering an army officer with a weapon and hearing sounds of gunshots. As a five-year-old child, he remembered how frightening the situation was at that time. When he was older, he also heard stories from other villagers about mass graves and that people were killed at these locations. All of these accounts were like fragments or pieces of puzzle that he obtained directly and indirectly. Another fragment that he acquired emerged during his school years. Burhan's history lessons appeared when I asked him how he knew about the PKI and September 30th Movement:

When I was in school. Before that, I did not understand the reason (of the violence in Donomulyo). The locals only said *geger*.⁴⁰⁹ I knew it from school, through history lessons. They discuss it there that in 1965, there was a revolt of the G30S/PKI in South Blitar. I paid attention, and I dared myself to ask the elderly in the village (on whether or not this is true). ... They told me the story (about people being killed). I do not know whether the story is true or not. I think it was related to G30S, but people used the opportunity, taking advantage [for themselves] of the political situation. ... About the September 30th Movement, this village was not recorded in history. If there was really a revolt, why wasn't it recorded? Was it really a revolt? Of course, people were afraid, and that is why they hid. They were frightened, they ran away, but they were pursued.⁴¹⁰

We can see how Burhan's memory of violence combines different fragments that he received since his childhood years. Stories of killings and detention are connected with the state's narrative of the September 30th Movement that he learned from school. Interestingly, these fragments not only resulted in an almost-comprehensive understanding of the violence, but also in scepticism regarding the cause behind it. The history lessons that he received at school were compared with his own

⁴⁰⁹ A Javanese word that describes an apocalyptic situation. This is a common word to describe situations of war and violence. I discussed the juxtaposition of the word *geger* with the local violence of 1965-68 in Donomulyo in chapter 4.

⁴¹⁰ Interview with Burhan, 12 July 2017 #12.07-13.43, 01.07.00-01.09.00.

experience and other adults in the village. Burhan saw a connection between this national rupture and local violence, and questioned it. He implies that the agenda of exterminating the rebellious communists was not reasonable, and that civilians were also taking advantage of the situation. This is an example of how the official and counter narrative coexist in the younger generation. Different sources of fragments constituted a peculiar postmemory, making the 1965 violence understandable (the violence happened under the pretext of annihilating communists behind the September 30th Movement), but also highly questionable.

Another interesting aspect of Burhan's story relates to land confiscation that happened during the early years of the New Order. One day after his grandfather was released, a Koramil officer came to his grandfather's house. Burhan was there, so he still remembered the incident. The Koramil officer demanded an 'expression of gratitude' because his grandfather was released from detention. Because the family did not have any money, the officer started to raise the idea of giving land as a 'token of appreciation'. The whole process was highly pressurized, Burhan said, because the family was still 'traumatized' (Burhan's own words) from being accused as PKI and then killed or detained. In the end, the family relented in giving up their land. Burhan described this method of creating fear and terror as a common strategy by village officials to mobilise their villagers. Those who did not comply with or obey requests from the village apparatus could easily be accused of being PKI and taken away from their homes. In the context of land confiscation, Burhan was certain that the village head also obtained advantages from this act. Again, the name Ario Dursam (the military village head or caretaker in Donomulyo during the early New Order period – see chapter 4) appeared during our conversation. Burhan realised that during Ario Dursam's leadership, the village was considered developed. However, Burhan argues that this was done through coercion; people were forced to paint their houses, build roads and construct bamboo fences.

Burhan also went on to explain that corruption and nepotism practices which were once visible during Dursam's leadership still exist in the village. The recent Farmer's Credit (*Kredit Usaha Tani/KUT*, a national farming credit programme) that is currently being implemented in the village exists only in rumours, as the villagers themselves in Burhan's hamlet never accepted it. It is suspected that the credit is only used by a certain group of villagers. Burhan also explained the common practice of credit corruption in Donomulyo. To access the funds, the village leaders need to gather copies of their villagers' identity cards, either directly or through farmer's groups (*kelompok tani*). The copies have definitely been made, but when the funds had arrived from the central government, they were not distributed to those villagers who gave copies of their identity cards. The funds were used only for the advantages of the village apparatus. Burhan said that during the early years of the Farmer's Credit programme, a number of villagers became rich because of such practices.

For families of victims, such as Burhan and Marwono, the violence in 1965-68 did not end when the killings ended. On the contrary, it continued during the early period of the New Order by instigating fear and oppression amongst villagers. This was an efficient means for local patrons and village apparatus to gain benefits (land, position, status, and so on) under the guise of rural development. In this case, intergenerational memory shows an interconnectedness of the past and present. Second generations linked past violence against the PKI with continuous inequality in the village, marked by a stronger patronage relationship that benefits certain groups, and excludes others. Another important conclusion that we can draw from the case of Burhan's family is the way the second generation uses different fragments of information (sometimes incomplete) to develop an interpretation of the past. This information comes from local and national narratives, showing the co-existence of the state and the counter narrative that grows not only into understanding of the violence but also criticism against it.

Escaping Lifetime Imprisonment – The Family of Baharjo

Like Burhan, many children of victims experienced the horror of witnessing their parents being taken away during the military operation in 1965-68. However, when it comes to the reason for these detentions, narratives are modified. Involvement and activism in Leftist organisations were usually kept silent or transformed into a different narrative that distanced the parents from such activism. Interestingly, memories of violence are often anchored in objects, which juxtapose domestic elements with a national event. This is illustrated in the case of Baharjo family.

My encounter with the family started when I was trying to search for the living descendants of Donomulyo's first settlers. One of the villagers suggested that I go to the house of Mrs Baharjo, who is currently living with her daughter's family. Although we were not accompanied by fellow villagers, on our first visit we were welcomed warmly by Mrs Baharjo and her daughter, Lastri. From this visit, I understood that Mr Baharjo had died in 1982. Nevertheless, the life of Mrs Baharjo interested me, so I continued to visit the family. Mr and Mrs Baharjo met in Solo, Central Java, when Mr. Baharjo replaced his sister to teach at Mrs Baharjo's school. They got married in 1958 in Solo, and two years later moved to Donomulyo, where Mr Baharjo's parents lived. His father was the first Haji and *penghulu* (state religious officer) in the village. He also owned a large plot of (inherited) land and a slaughterhouse business, which made him one of the wealthiest residents in Donomulyo.

Mrs Baharjo did not get along with her husband's family mostly because of class difference. Yet, she managed to stay in Donomulyo until now. During their first years in Donomulyo, Mr Baharjo started working as a teacher in the Catholic middle school and Teacher's Higher Education School (*Sekolah Guru Atas/SGA*) in the district. Mrs Baharjo also worked as a teacher in the local private school Taman Siswa, but she quit to raise three small children. Mr Baharjo was also a vanilla farmer when the crop was one of the important commodities in the area. According to Mrs Baharjo, her husband was a teacher, a businessman, an artist, who was not into activism or political organisations. He also had a good relationship with everybody in the village, including those of different religious backgrounds. Mr Baharjo's father was a close friend to the village's Catholic priest. The priest often visited the family and spent time talking with Baharjo's father. The interaction with the priest made Mrs Baharjo interested in Catholicism and later converted to it, while her husband remained Muslim.

Our conversation became more interesting when I asked Mrs Baharjo about the situation in 1965-68 in Donomulyo. In 1965, Mr Baharjo was doing business as a kerosene agent. He was on his way to deliver money to his supplier in Porong, another district in Surabaya, but he never returned. Later on, a stranger came to Mrs Baharjo's house with a small note made from a cigarette-box label, informing her that her husband was detained in Koramil Batu (another district in Malang). According to Mrs Baharjo, her husband had written that message himself, although she did not recognise the messenger. It is hard to believe that a complete stranger would make a long journey from Batu to Donomulyo only to deliver a small note to Baharjo's family. It may be possible that the messenger was someone who was quite well known by Mr Baharjo, whom his wife did not know (or pretended not to know). Following the message, Mrs Baharjo went to Koramil with her baby accompanied by her niece:

My youngest child was just 29 days old. Then I went to Korem in Malang, with my baby. A military officer, his name was Pak Noto, gave the name for my baby, Trisula.⁴¹¹ I asked him why my husband did not come home. He only said, "I'll take care of it". There were a lot of weapons in his room, terrifying. People said Pak Noto was vicious, tough, but to me, he was very soft. It was because one

⁴¹¹ Trisula also refers to the Trisula operation that occurred in 1968. It is not clear why the name Trisula was given to the baby, but it illustrates the close relationship between the officer and the Baharjo family.

time, he slept in our place for seven days. Then I was informed that Mr Baharjo can return after 7 days. I picked him up from Koramil in Batu, and then we went to my niece's place in Malang, where she bathed Mr Baharjo. After that, we went home to Donomulyo. But my husband was stressed. He had asthma, and it recurred many times. He saw many things in the detention centre, people were beaten and tortured. We sacrificed a lot in one week. I mean, the guard should be given cigarettes... what do you call it? Incentives. "I want to see this person, sir", then [we should give him] money, food, cigarettes, although we already gave it to the front officer. In the examination desk, we should give another one. In the back, all of the officer's friends should get a portion. ... There were a lot of people in Koramil Batu. I don't know if they were PKI or not. They were taken there, and gone at night, nobody knows where. If I didn't fetch him, Mr Baharjo may have been gone too.⁴¹²

Mr Baharjo was one of the fortunate victims from Donomulyo. His family probably had a certain connection with the military officer in Malang that Mrs Baharjo mentioned, Mr Noto, who was able to order his release. Another factor was the family's wealth that made them able to bribe the Koramil officers, which was a common practice at that time. In order to escape the killings, detainees had to provide a large amount of 'incentives' for the army officers.⁴¹³ Furthermore, based on information obtained from other villagers, Mr Baharjo was not only a farmer and businessman, but he was also one of the leaders of *Pemuda Rakyat* (the youth organisation affiliated with the PKI) in Donomulyo.⁴¹⁴ This is highly possible, as Mr Baharjo was not only detained in Donomulyo, but was sent further to Batu, where high-level organisation leaders were usually detained.⁴¹⁵ While it's also possible that Mrs Baharjo was not aware of her husband's activism, but it is more likely that she was hiding this information and disguised the reason for Mr Baharjo's detention as merely a result of business rivalry. While experiences of violence are easier to discuss with others (including their children), the preceding events, such as activism and involvement in *Pemuda Rakyat*, are kept hidden. It is highly possible that Mrs Baharjo thinks that this information may put her family in danger, or that it would legitimise the violence against her husband. Mrs Baharjo also told me that she did not tell her children about her husband's detention to avoid it becoming one of the 'bad memories' in the family. In this case, rather than seeing Mrs Baharjo's silence as trauma or fear of repression, I consider her act of silence as an expression of agency – a conscious decision to protect the family, and therefore, to enable them to continue living in the same environment where violence previously erupted.

A few months after my conversation with Mrs Baharjo, and driven by curiosity to explore her children's knowledge of the 1965 violence, I had a chance to talk to her daughter, Lastri. Born in 1966, she spent her elementary and high school years in Donomulyo. After finishing high school, she tried to register for Brawijaya University, but unfortunately was not admitted. Lastri then chose to follow administrative courses and was able to find work in Malang. After three years, she moved to Semarang, Central Java, to work for her brother's shop. She did not like it, so she returned to Donomulyo in 1994. Lastri is now married and her husband works in Kepanjen, another district in Malang. She has two children. The oldest works in Malang city as a cashier in a noodle restaurant, while the second child is a high school student in Donomulyo. When Mr Baharjo died, Lastri was only two months away from her middle-school final exam. Her memory of her father was quite mixed. In one instance, Lastri remembered her father as a smart, art-loving person, but in another instance,

⁴¹² Interview with Mrs Baharjo, 20 January, 2017 #01.03.33-01.10.53

⁴¹³ This was also mentioned during the interview with Jono, 23 August 2016.

⁴¹⁴ Field notes 26 May 2017. Information from Jono and Suparman.

⁴¹⁵ The Pancasila Operation report from the Brawijaya military archive collection also mentioned that activists from Donomulyo were 'secured' in Batu. See chapter 3.

she recalled his character as harsh and how he sometimes used physical punishment to educate his children.

I asked Lastri about her father's detention, curious to know whether or not she acknowledged that event. She immediately told a story similar to Mrs Baharjo's story; that her father had been detained in Batu, and her mother had tried to arrange his release. This story was shared by her mother when Mr Baharjo was still alive, including the way the family knew of Mr Baharjo's detention: the message on a cigarette box label sent by an anonymous messenger. Mr Baharjo himself, never said anything about this bitter experience. I asked if Lastri knew why her father was detained, and she explained:

It was a mistake. My father likes to sew. He was asked to sew a uniform. He didn't know, but it was the uniform of those people. So, he was detained. ... It was the uniform of the PKI. ... Many villagers disappeared, they were taken by Kodim. We didn't know where. But my father was taken to Batu. ... My mother gave compensation. She sold her jewellery. Every time my father got his business profit, my mother bought jewellery with it. That was what she used to release my father.⁴¹⁶

Looking at Lastri's account, we can see how the memory of violence is reproduced and then modified in the second generation.. Narratives of activism are still concealed in a similar fashion to the way Mrs Baharjo explained the reason for her husband's detention. A progressive organisational involvement transforms the event with reasoning that does not sound harmful: benign business rivalry and sewing uniforms. Since my first visit to the family, Lastri was quick to share her father's art work, which includes a number of decorative sewing patterns, paintings, and sketches. She described her father's talent in art, painting and decoration, which apparently was produced to distance him from the actual progressive character. For this family, the detention and violence against Mr Baharjo appears to be more 'acceptable' to remember than the memory of his previous Leftist activism.

Through her research on Sumatran-Karo women who were involved in the 1945-49 independence war, Mary Steedly portrays how major public events are anchored in domestic elements in the memories of these women, such as a white hand towel, bathing, or doing laundry. This illustrates a sort of mnemonic link between then and now, between domestic activities and the grand events of national history, according to Steedly.⁴¹⁷ The intergenerational memory in the Baharjo family also reflects a similar case. Through stories of a cigarette box label, selling jewellery, or sewing a uniform, Mrs Baharjo and Lastri connect their private domain to a much larger and violent historical event. For this family, remembering 1965 is far from memories of September 30th Movement, the kidnapped generals, or anti-communist military operations. The national violence became a story of a mother who tried to release her husband. This is what Luisa Passerini called self-representation that features the personal and collective memory.⁴¹⁸ Moreover, this domestic way of remembering does not mean that they are trivial memories and irrelevant to the discussion of 1965. On the contrary, these memories are a reminder that the national violence *is also* a private matter.

Memories of a Survivor – The Family of Jarso

Postmemory, as Hirsch argues, represents the past not only by recalling the event, but also through imaginative investment, projection, and creation.⁴¹⁹ In the case of the Jarso family, postmemory is constituted upon human rights values, considering the unjust mistreatment of the first generation who became victims in the 1965 violence. While the first generation chose to 'forgive and forget', the second generation moves toward a progressive attitude of 'straightening history' (*meluruskan*

⁴¹⁶ Interview with Lastri, 26 July 2017 #21.15-24.02

⁴¹⁷ Steedly 2013, 52.

⁴¹⁸ Passerini 1987, 19.

⁴¹⁹ Hirsch 2012, 5.

sejarah). This generational difference has resulted in a memory filled with imagination of human rights advocacy, which highlights critical questions, disappointment, and anger against the national government.

Jarso was born in 1942 in Blitar, but later moved with his parents to Donomulyo. After finishing middle school in the local Catholic school and doing odd jobs, he decided to join the army in 1960. After following basic training in Kediri and advance training in Malang, Jarso was assigned as military staff in Situbondo, Jember and Kalimantan. At first, he prepared to be part of the army's general reserve command (*Cadangan Umum Angkatan Darat/ CADUAD*) for the West Irian campaign. But rather than being sent to Irian, Jarso was assigned to Kalimantan for the Crush Malaysia campaign. He was part of Brigade IX, battalion 509 Jember, serving the communication company (*kompri perhubungan*) with five other staff members.

During his assignment in Kalimantan, the September 30th Movement took place. At that moment, Jarso was still serving in his battalion as usual, without any significant ruptures. He married in 1967, and lived in Jember until September 1971 when he was arrested. Leaving behind his pregnant wife, Jarso and 6 other communication company staff members were detained first in Jember for one month. From there, he was transferred to Lowokwaru prison in Malang, where he received the news that his wife had given birth. He did not see his child until his release in 1978. It was also in this prison that Jarso converted to Catholicism. After his release, Jarso went back to his family in Jember, only to discover that his wife had remarried and rejected Jarso's return. After that, Jarso decided to return to and live in Donomulyo.

Jarso was detained because his commander was accused of being involved in the September 30th Movement. At that time, Jarso had lived in a rented room (*kost*) in his commander's house, who already died in 1962. During his detention, Jarso was interrogated with questions about the commander's guests who visited his house and about Jarso's family-like relationship with the commander. During Jarso's imprisonment in Lowokwaru, he met around one thousand military officers and staff members from other brigades and regions. Even before Jarso was captured in September 1971, many of his fellow staff members had already been detained previously. Looking at this period and the number of the military staff's detention, it is very likely that this act was part of the East Java's New Orderisation campaign (see chapter 3). In this campaign, led by East Java's military commander M. Jasin, a purge was launched against government and military officials, to 'clean' those institutions from communism and to ensure support for the New Order. This explains why Jarso was detained years after his commander died in 1962, because the communist label was not only attached to individuals but to the whole group that individual was assigned. Apparently, Jarso was one of the victims of this state campaign.

Ever since his release, Jarso's identity card was marked ET (*Eks-Tapol/ Ex-political prisoner*) and he was assigned to follow the *santiaji* programme. Despite all of this, Jarso did not find it difficult to reconnect to the society with his ET background. There was no significant stigmatisation from other people in the neighbourhood. According to Jarso, being an ex-political prisoner in Donomulyo was very common; many other villagers shared the same situation because the area used to be a PKI base. Five years after he moved to Donomulyo, he married a local resident and had three children. His eldest son lives in Pasuruan and works in a mineral water factory. The second child, his daughter, lives in Gresik, and Jarso's youngest son is currently following an education in Malang to become a Catholic priest. Although Jarso's pension fund was abolished right after his imprisonment, he is able to finance his family from their small grocery store (*warung*), timber plantation (on Jarso's inherited land), and his wife's savings from her previous occupation as a migrant worker. According to Jarso,

he never told his children about his imprisonment because he did not want it to be “a burden for this family” (*menjadi beban untuk keluarga*).

Curious to discuss the family’s experience of 1965 (I only approached Jarso’s current family, and not the previous one), I went to meet Rio, Jarso’s youngest son, at his education centre in Malang. Born in 1994, he spent his elementary school years in Donomulyo and joined the Catholic seminary in 2009. A dominant topic in our conversation was Donomulyo’s latest phenomena: migrant workers. According to Rio, waves of migrant workers from Donomulyo that left to go abroad to Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and other countries brought massive changes to the cultural life in his village. Lifestyle in Donomulyo has become increasingly cosmopolitan, while traditions and interactions between villagers have lost their communal character. The conversation also addressed the fact that Rio’s mother worked as a migrant worker in Brunei for approximately 10 years.

From a young age, Rio was already involved in managing their family’s small grocery store. As his brother and sister had their own families and moved out of the village, Rio was the only child left in the house. When I asked him about his father, he immediately explained that Jarso was an ex-army officer, but was imprisoned because his commander was involved in the September 30th Movement. I was surprised to hear about this, because Jarso said that he never mentioned this past to any of his family members. Even his wife did not know about this part of her husband’s life.⁴²⁰ I asked Rio about how he had obtained the information:

Father told me directly. ... I heard it when I was in junior high school, but I was not paying close attention. When I was in the seminary, I understood it. Because I had already learned history, so I knew more and became more aware. There was more information that I obtained from school. When I was in the seminary or junior high, father’s ex-military friends, the ex-political prisoners, gathered and applied for a court appeal in Jakarta, to clean their names, that they were innocent. They succeeded. They were cleared; they were innocent and were only victims. Their retirement funds are now accessible. Previously, because of the case, they did not receive their pension funds. When the court decided that they were only victims, the funds were released again. But my father did not want to take it, because the amount was very low. He was probably already offended by the imprisonment.⁴²¹

I was really surprised and confused when I heard Rio’s side of the story. At first glance, I sensed a similar interconnectedness between the official and counter-narrative as in the case of Burhan, son of Marwono. Rio’s memory fragment of his father was not easily understood at that time, but became clearer once he was exposed to history lessons at school. But when he continued his story, matters became more complicated, at least for me as an outsider. First, contrary to what Jarso told me, Rio seemed to know more about his father’s imprisonment – the innocence, victimisation, and the retirement fund. More than that, Rio even shared a story that I never heard before from Jarso himself: the court appeal case. In a situation in which the 1965-68 violence has not yet been resolved in Indonesia, a court appeal by a group of ex-political prisoners had to be a huge breakthrough. The only court appeal that resembles Rio’s story is the one arranged by Indonesia Legal Aid (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum/ LBH*) together with a number of ex-political prisoners of 1965-68 in 2005 through the Central Jakarta Court. They prosecuted five Indonesian presidents from Suharto to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for their complicity in the 1965 violence.⁴²² The victims demanded rehabilitation and financial compensation for their losses, but the result was disappointing.

⁴²⁰ In my first meeting with Jarso, we were introduced by Suparman. During our conversation, Jarso already started to share his experience related to 1965. His wife was sitting beside him during our visit, and at the end of our meeting, she admitted that she never knew about this particular story.

⁴²¹ Interview with Rio, 6 June 2017 #25.30-27.18.

⁴²² For the court appeal case, see Conroe, 2017.

Meanwhile, what little involvement Jarso had in this court appeal was hazy, at best.. Rio was pretty certain that he remembered seeing preparation meetings at his house where many of his father's fellow officers came from outside of Malang. Rio even argued that they won the case.

I was very puzzled with this conflicting account between father and son. After my meeting with Rio, I thought that Jarso did not tell me his whole story. With an agenda to clear up this confusion, once again, I approached Jarso. I asked him directly whether or not a court appeal had taken place, without stating explicitly that I obtained this information from Rio. Interestingly, Jarso was also surprised at this information and said that such a thing never took place. He repeatedly emphasised that he was already 'at peace' after his release. Jarso also explained that he had no resentment against the government nor a drive to demand the rehabilitation of his name. He is quite satisfied with his current life, even generating more money compared to his retirement fund for serving the country. In Jarso's own words, he was 'saved by God' and has reconciled his life.⁴²³ When he repeated that he never told his family about his imprisonment, I asked him how Rio knew about this. Jarso suspected that the story was told by his ex-wife's family in Jember, as they are still in contact. Their relationship may have come to the fore during Rio's admission to the seminary, where the pastors usually investigate the background of each candidate meticulously. I realised that I had taken a step to interfere with a family's life by confronting a son's story with his father's. Therefore, I decided not to take further actions to verify Jarso's family story (i.e. return to Rio and explain my conversation with Jarso about the court case). However, the intergenerational memory of Jarso's family shows an interesting distortion that has resulted in a whole new narrative about the past. This narrative may be constituted out of hope or an 'imaginative investment', as Hirsch's describes, for justice against victims of the 1965-68 violence.

My assumption about Rio's imaginative reconstruction became stronger when I heard about his views on his father's status as an ex-political prisoner. He clearly stated that he was proud of his father's survival of the years in prison especially as he was not guilty. His family story became a sort of 'testimony' of hardship and survival in his circle. For example, during a workgroup about 1965 in his history class, Rio combined his family's history with the textbook information. He also shared his father's experiences during a few sessions of a Catholic group-faith meeting, where life stories are used as testimonies of God's power. Rio continued to explain to me about his concerns about history lessons, which he thinks are urgently in need of revision. He stated that a 'true' history is needed to replace the fabricated previous version. But Rio doubts whether this will happen, because he thinks that the government is no longer interested in such issues. From his statements, I assume that Rio, to some extent, has an understanding of human rights values. Depicting 1965 as a fabricated history by the government, Rio stressed the need to straighten out the details of history (*meluruskan/membenarkan sejarah*). In his own way, Rio tried to advocate the victims based on his father's case, by telling his family's experience of violence to a wider audience. At the same time, Rio may feel the injustice and anger of mistreatment of his father, and perhaps became disappointed about his father's non-confrontational attitude. With his background in mind, I understand why such an imagination of a progressive advocacy for victims of the 1965-68 violence appeared in Rio's narrative.

The intergenerational memory in the case of Jarso's family shows the complexity of how memory works. Not only does it illustrate the entanglement between the official and counter narrative about the past, but also about the future. To be precise, about *how the future should be* for the family. Past injustices are projected towards the future, which resulted in testimonies of survival, and in a larger discourse, to advocate the national history. Through the study of children of ex-political prisoners of

⁴²³ Fieldwork notes, conversation with Jarso, 26 July 2017

1965-66, Andrew Conroe pointed to these similar intergenerational linkages that also trigger a challenge to the state's authority.⁴²⁴ Furthermore, this intergenerational memory actually took shape within silence in the family. Fragments of information received by the second generation from various sources (such as other families, school textbooks) outside the first generation, constitute a narration of criticism, confrontation and progressive approach against the state. Silence in the family, in this case, became elevated into a projection of justice.

Beyond Families

Outside family circles, narratives of violence also circulate among young generations in Donomulyo. There are at least three contexts where these stories appear: in places or sites of violence (I have elaborated this in chapter 5), communal celebrations, and history lessons at school. All of them show intersections between private or family experiences with the national grand narrative of anti-communism. By examining how stories circulate in these contexts, we shall see how young generations are continuously exposed to other narratives of violence, despite the ongoing official narrative that denies this revealing.

To explore how young generations in a rural context are exposed to stories of the 1965-68 violence, I conducted two focus group discussions (FGD) in two different hamlets. In order to arrange this, I coordinated with the head of village neighbourhood (*ketua RT*), who gathered young people in the area. Most of them are members of the youth organisation *Karang Taruna*, which exists in every hamlet in the district, although not all of them are active. Unfortunately, this mechanism of gathering participants through *Karang Taruna* resulted in FGDs filled with male villagers age 20 to 40. This reflects how youth (*orang-orang muda/ pemuda*) is interpreted in rural Indonesian society, which is predominantly men in their 20s (and possibly) up to mid-40s. As a result of rural-urban migration, only a small number of young people in their productive age stayed in the village, while others left agricultural work to work in urban areas or even to go to foreign countries as migrant workers. The trend of the migrant workforce is also one of the contributing factors to the lack of females in youth organisations.

Even in such a male-dominated discussion, many of the family experiences of violence emerged in the discussions. The first context where stories of violence usually appear is through stories of places in the village. During these discussions, villagers mentioned some of the mass killings sites that they heard from their parents, grandparents, or aging neighbours. Sometimes young villagers occasionally saw offerings (*sesajen*) placed on the road or in the middle of the rice field, to commemorate the victims of mass killings. These offerings are part of *Kejawen/ Javanese* practices to pay respect to the spirits of the deceased. For example, in one of the discussions, the youth group mentioned a mass grave located in a five-intersection in a nearby hamlet. The regular offerings on the location mark the mass grave in the absence of a tombstone or other commemorative signs. Another site that was also mentioned in the discussion was the 'lost lands' that were confiscated after 1968. Young people heard stories about certain locations that they pass on their way to farm work (such as tilling, looking for grass to feed the cattle, checking irrigation, and so on) with their parents or other adults. These locations were previously owned by a villager that they know, but were confiscated after 1968. In other words, certain locations trigger memories about the 1965-68 violence, and it is through these places that stories were retold to the younger generations.

The second context where stories of violence has emerged is during traditional communal activities. One example that the youth explained was the tradition of birth celebrations (*slametan*). In Javanese tradition, when a baby is born, extended family members and neighbours will gather continuously for

⁴²⁴ Conroe 2017, 216.

five or sometimes seven days in the newborn family's house. This is the community's contribution to the family, to assist the recovering mother, care for the newborn, and ensure that the whole family stays healthy. During these traditional rituals, villagers usually gather until late at night (they used the Javanese term *jagong*) and it is within this moment that stories of the 1965-68 are usually unfolded, sometimes in passing, but also often in great detail.⁴²⁵ Horrifying stories of the 1965-68 killings often appear at this moment (similar to the FGD excerpt in chapter 5). These communal activities became an opportunity for interaction for young and old people to talk about the past.

The third context, and also the most intriguing one, of exposure to stories of violence exists through history lessons in schools. Besides two FGDs with village youths, I also visited two high schools in the village. One is a private school called Taman Siswa high school and the other is a *Madrasah Aliyah Negeri* or MAN (state-sponsored Islamic high school). In both schools, I was only able to talk to the teachers and not to the students, because another formal mechanism of a permit is needed to arrange discussions with the students. Nevertheless, by talking to the teachers, I understand that the topic of 1965 history is the most debated issue in class. Internet has become increasingly accessible for the students in those schools, which contributes to the exposure of diverse information about 1965. According to the teachers, students show a high level of curiosity, asking which version of history is true.⁴²⁶ Since 2003, the Indonesian Ministry of Education has taken major steps to transform the educational curriculum to replace their top-down approach and accommodate diversity in educational level, local potentials and students' capabilities. This curriculum is known as the Competency-Based Curriculum (*Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi*, KBK), and it also gives teachers the independence to develop their own teaching materials.⁴²⁷ It seems that this curriculum has made significant changes in the discussion of 1965 in history classes. Teachers usually return to textbooks as references, and keep the debate as an open discourse, without drawing conclusions based on only one interpretation of history.⁴²⁸ Moreover, from the experience of one teacher, a student also brings his/ her family's experiences to the class. It is usually the grandparents' experience as victims, or stories of mass killings that they have heard from the village elderly, that were never mentioned in the textbooks.

The contexts that I discussed above show that even when the official narrative still dominates national history, other narratives of violence still circulate in localities. This is one of the effects of Reformasi, where there is more room to talk about the violence compared to the years of the New Order. As a result, current younger generations are slowly acknowledging stories of violence. In the case of Donomulyo, village youth are being introduced to the 1965-68 violence through history education, communal activities, and stories about sites. Through these channels, narratives about families have expanded to others outside the family circle, and sometimes mingle with the formal

⁴²⁵ Focus Group Discussion RT 15, 15 May 2017.

⁴²⁶ The history textbook for class XII (high school) released by the Ministry of Culture and Education explains seven different analyses about the actors behind the September 30th Movement. However, the New Order version of the September 30th Movement still resonates in the textbook, by depicting the event as a threat to the nation's integration and by presenting a simplified narrative of the 1948 Madiun event. Abdurakhman, et al. 2018. However, information on 1965 that is available on the internet covers many other aspects of the violence, (i.e. victims' experiences of violence) which is not always similar to information in the textbooks.

⁴²⁷ Leksana 2009, 184-5.

⁴²⁸ According to the teachers in Jakarta, this is kept open because the main objective of history lessons is for students to be able to analyze historical events, rather than concluding the truth. See Leksana. *Reconciliation Through History Education*, ibid. From another conversation with a teacher in 2006, returning to the textbook is recommended for students to be able to pass the exam, although the teachers discuss more materials than those in the textbooks.

narrative. Years after the Reformasi, formal memory construction that was imposed by the state is still continuously challenged.

Conclusion

The case studies centre on different generations of families who have had various experiences in 1965-68. Postmemory in these cases illustrates the complexities of representations in the past. In some cases, memory of the past is connected to the present, such as the case of Marwono's family, who remembered 1965 as the turning point that increased village inequality and clientelist practices in the village. Postmemory in the second generation also reflects interconnectedness between the public and the private, or the local and the national. In the family of Suparman, private experiences were retold to sustain the image of the PKI as troublemakers. Meanwhile, in the case of the Baharjo family, the national event was coined in private elements in their family.

These family cases also point to the dominant existence of silence in their families, which is not always the same as forgetting or the absence of narratives. Silence may be a covert expression of guilt for collaborators by distancing themselves from the violence, as in the case of Suparman's family. It can also be projected into an imaginative investment of reconciliation and justice, as reflected by the case of Jarso's family and the court case that did not take place. All of these practices show that silence is not merely an expression of trauma, but also a navigating device, a strategy to be able to continue living together in a community where members have had different positions in the violence, either as individuals who participated and benefited from the violence or as those who were harmed by it. To add to Hirsch's concept of postmemory, the way young generations remember the 1965-68 violence is not merely within family relations, but also in larger communal interactions. In rural contexts such as Donomulyo, traditional communal activities, sites of violence, and history education provide spaces where stories of violence circulate.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: EMBEDDED MEMORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

For many decades after *Reformasi* (a turning point in Indonesia's democratic era in 1998), scholars and human rights activists believed that the different ways of remembering were created by the repressive anti-communist memory projects of the state, in this case, the New Order. These projects, which used various media (museums, monuments, books, films, commemoration days, and so on), constructed the official memory that centred around the September 30th Movement and the death of the seven army officers. In contrast, the violent military operations in 1965-66 and 1968 in East Java, including the deaths of more than 500,000 people, were mostly suppressed from the public discourse. In this case, scholars and human rights activists perceive Indonesia's collective memory of 1965-66 as a manifestation of power in memory politics, where the state decides how the public should remember 1965. However, through this local study in the Donomulyo district, I argue that this is not the complete case. Society's different ways of remembering occurred because memories are also embedded in their local context, in the rural situation where violence erupted and where people continued to live together in the aftermath of the event. Power in memory-making, then, resembles not state power in central politics, but its concrete existence in daily life, manifested in authority figures such as *Babinsa*, army officers, village heads, and other patrons on which villagers' lives depend. This embeddedness also demonstrates that memory is a social act. In the context of mass violence, memory becomes a strategy to survive, to continue living as a community in the aftermath of violence, and to reconcile an individual experience of violence in the past with the present. Memory is also a historical process, it develops through time by interpreting information that is collected gradually over time, including transformations that occurred at the national level (such as the end of the authoritarian regime that led to advocacies of the 1965-66 violence). The community's interpretation of the past is therefore not static, because it changes when the context transforms.

The backbone of this study elaborates further Maurice Halbwachs' theory of collective memory, in which he argues that memory is not an individual act, but a communal process influenced by the collective framework in society. How and what we remember is part of society's existing thoughts and values, which in this case, provide meaning to memories of violence. However, as society is not static, collective memory is also malleable. Therefore, studying collective memory is also a study of its shifting social framework. In chapter 2, I examined the social framework of the agrarian society in Donomulyo and how it was shaped historically. Following Donomulyo's history from the colonial period to the post-New Order, this research highlights the inequality and patronage relationships that remain consistent under the changing state. One of the factors that created this *longue durée* of clientelist features in rural society is the fact that rural elites were also gaining benefits through their alliance with the state. In the colonial era, village authorities played a role as brokers of tax collection, land rent, and labour for the colonial government or plantation administrators. In return, these village elites received money or employment in colonial companies or government offices. These practices exacerbated the inequality in the village: those who are in the network with the colonial patrons gain economic and social advantages, while those outside the networks are left with nothing. In the 1950s to early 1960s, the leftist movement started to criticise the growing rural

inequality, the dominance of rural elites in controlling rural resources, and continuous marginalisation of peasants. However, their progressive movement ended along with the anti-communist military operation in 1965-66. When the New Order established its power in rural areas, new alliances of patrons were formed between the local elites and the military. While tracing the village's history, we can see that the state does not reside far away in central-national politics, but is actually manifested through these rural patrons. This reflects Joel Migdal's theory of the state in society, where he argues that instead of residing at the top of a hierarchical structure, the state works through a complex network in society.⁴²⁹ In chapter 3, I examine the anti-communist killings that occurred in East Java. I argue that the military itself was never an independent state body, but a political one which continuously (re)establishes its alliance with civilians. My reading of the Brawijaya archives pointed to the fact that the killings in East Java, although they began in late October 1965, became massive and intense because the military activated its coalition with civilians. Documents on the Pancasila operation in East Java explicitly described the use of civilian groups in the annihilation operation of communists. However, these civilians also carried their own agendas during the violence, ranging from organisational or ideological reasons to individual motives. In other words, civilians were also obtaining advantages from their cooperation with the army. The findings that I discuss in this chapter strengthen previous studies on the 1965-66 violence in Aceh (Jess Melvin) and Banyuwangi (Ahmad Luthfi) that stress the role of the army in orchestrating the violence against civilians. Melvin's study in Aceh even goes as far as concluding that the violence is an act of genocide. Adding to these findings, the study in Donomulyo highlighted the mutualistic (yet unequal) cooperation between the army and civilians, where the latter gained benefits from this coalition in the New Order period.

In chapter 4, I highlight how remembering the violence is actually embedded in localities. Local patrons connect the local and national, influencing how villagers understand and remember the violence that they experienced in their area. For some people, usually those who have close ties with the state through the patronage network and who benefited from the violence, their memories reflect a similar construction of the state's narrative of the violence – for example, expressing the need to eliminate the PKI, because they were troublemakers in the village. While for others, who experienced great losses after the violence, they became critical of the official narrative. Some even perceived the advocacy of PKI and BTI against landlords and local elites as a means to break the patronage relationship in the village, but this movement ended along with the anti-communist military operations. Furthermore, for the community, their memories of violence are not about the violent acts per se, but also about what the violence brings to the village. Vanessa Hearman, in her study of the violence in South Blitar, also portrays the connection of the violence with transformations that occurred in the aftermath.⁴³⁰ In the case of Donomulyo, memories of violence are also connected to the rural transformation that occurred in its aftermath, particularly during the early New Order period. Therefore, the question of 'who gets what after the violence', also constitutes memories of the 1965-66 violence. Moreover, to be able to continue their lives in the aftermath of violence, silence became a tool for survival, a navigating device (more than merely an expression of trauma) that enables perpetrators, collaborators, victims, bystanders and their families to continue their lives in a community.

The case study in a rural community also highlights that memories of violence did not diminish even under state repression. Narratives of violence travel within communities through stories of places, or what Pierre Nora called sites of memory. In chapter 5, I analyse a number of sites in Donomulyo,

⁴²⁹ Migdal 2007.

⁴³⁰ Hearman 2018.

including those that were created by authorities and others that are still maintained and used by the community. However, rather than representing the past, these sites function more as a negotiating instrument in the present, as they are always in a dialogical process with their surrounding society. In some cases, sites of memory are used as a means for social mobilisation, connecting villagers to a new patron. When these sites lose their meaning in the present, the patronage network that surrounded them was also weakened. This study also shows that sites that were built by the state are losing their function in the present, while sites that are maintained by the community, such as mass graves, remain meaningful not only for the family of victims, but also for a larger public who seek spiritual guidance.

Family is another context where narratives of violence also exist. In chapter 6, I use Marianne Hirsch's concept of postmemory – a distinct way of remembering by the second or third generation, which not only involves recollection of the narrative, but also (re)interpretation, reconstruction, and re-creation of the past.⁴³¹ Case studies of four families show that memories of violence are preserved in a complex way, through interconnectedness of the past and present, and between the private and the public. Silence is also another dominant aspect in family narratives. However, silence in this context is not a form of repressive trauma, but a resilient mechanism to deal with the past. These silences enable communities to navigate and continue living together in the present society in which people had different roles in the violence. Therefore, it is important to examine these silences, and to study how and why they emerge.

Furthermore, although this study is conducted in a particular district in East Java, I believe the results point to some general aspects in studies of collective memory in post-violence societies. First, as the case studies also show, power in memory politics is manifested in everyday life. Zooming into people's everyday lives illuminates the complexities of remembering, the different representations of the past, and more importantly, their connections with the present. In Donomulyo, the power lies in patronage politics, but it might be different in another context. Second, there is no single collective memory. Even for a devastating event such as the 1965-66 violence, there are different ways in which societies remember the event. Moreover, these different narratives are not negating each other, but tend to co-exist and becomes interrelated. Third, silence should not be disregarded. It is not the same as forgetting or an absence of knowledge, but on the contrary, silence is also a different way of remembering, an active strategy to reconcile the past and present. Therefore, studying memories should also pave the way to studies on silences and their dynamics.

Insights on Methodology and Historiography in Indonesia

To a larger extent, while moving towards the end of my research, there are two things that linger in my thoughts. The first is how research on memory can contribute to a larger discussion on Indonesian historiography, and not only constitute research that adds to 'revealing the truth'. The second is how these research findings can bring insights to the discussion of reconciliation in Indonesia.

Regarding the first, I realised that this research is being conducted decades after Reformasi, in times where we are still working to demilitarise and decentralise Indonesia's historiography.⁴³² Research on 1965 has made significant contributions to the discussions on methods of researching Indonesia's history. The use of oral sources, the detachment from the state's historiography, the criticism of military-centric history, and so on, are some of the issues that research on the 1965 violence has

⁴³¹ Hirsch 2012.

⁴³² Both of these agendas were expressed by history students in Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta and Universitas Andalas, Padang, in September 2000. Nordholt, Purwanto, and Saptari 2008, 20.

highlighted. However, as Degung Santikarma discussed in his article, while 1965 is a good case to reflect about power in history, and to advocate for the straightening of history or *pelurusan sejarah*, we are still using the state conception of 'history' in the same way that they write our national historiography.⁴³³ The obsession on making private narratives of violence as a public narrative geared scholars and activists to construct a monolithic counter narrative which tend to overlook the complexities and different ways of remembering.

I am not suggesting that the method in this local study is a remedy to such a case. But while working in the field, I encountered different conceptions, or we can say local conceptions of history. For villagers, 1965 is not about the kidnapped generals in the 30th September Movement, but about a wife's experience of releasing her husband, a farmer who lost his land, and collaborators who aim for an upward mobility of their social status. Through their narratives, a different kind of history is written and more importantly, an interaction between the structural and the individual is developed. History, in this case, is no longer in its grandeur narratives of heroes and nation. History manifests itself in everyday life in the village, and it is the villagers who define what their nation is. Therefore, local history is not only a counter to the national or the state, as Santikarma reminds us, but an exploration of a new meaning of nationhood and citizenship through various historical events.

Reflecting on the case study of Donomulyo, there are two aspects that can be elaborated further in studies of state violence in order to contribute critically to a nation's historiography. First, is to go beyond a national or centralistic examination of the state. As most of this violence occurred at the local level, it is more significant to look at how and in what ways the state is actually manifested at these levels. This will also enable us to see the dynamics that surrounded and contributed to the violence. Second, although the aim of studying cases of violence usually is to answer the question how the violence occurred, it is also important to go beyond the violence per se, and examine situations before and after the violence. This will enable researchers to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the losses and gains of state violence. Moreover, by looking at processes that occurred before and after the violence, this can shed light on how violence fundamentally transforms nationhood. These two aspects should be elaborated further to develop an alternative strategy to the human rights approach that has its limitations in studying cases of state violence in the past. For example, the use of victims' narratives in research on 1965 may romanticise the narratives and fall into a historiography of sympathy and empathy, while moving further from the attempt to contribute to critical historiography.⁴³⁴ This is not to suggest that victims' narratives should not be used anymore, but these types of sources should be analysed more broadly than merely focusing on the injustices that they experienced.

Insights on Reconciliation and Transitional Justice – Limitations of the Human Rights Approach

Although providing suggestions for reconciliation is far beyond the scope of this research, it is impossible not to think about how this research could add to the existing movement of reconciliation. Years before I started this research, I was involved in different advocacies for the victims of the 1965 violence. I was quite exposed to concepts and works on human rights, transitional justice, and reconciliation. Human rights framework has contributed greatly to the progress of advocacy for the victims of past human rights violations through numerous political, legal and cultural strategies. However, when listening to the villagers' ideas and conceptions of justice and reconciliation in Donomulyo, I realised that the human rights framework, to some extent, tends to

⁴³³ Santikarma 2008, 202-3.

⁴³⁴ Purwanto & Adam 2005, 24.

gloss over important things that occurred at the local level. A perfect example is the practice of silence. Under the human rights approach, silence is seen as a result of state repression and an expression of trauma and stigmatisation of being PKI. However, for villagers, silence is a way to reconcile their past experiences and their present livelihood. Understanding their silence provides an insight that nobody, neither victims, perpetrators nor bystanders of violence, is autonomous to speak of their past. There are always 'strings attached', be it to their own family, neighbours, friends, or even their local patrons, which influence the representations of the past. This complexity shows that there is no linear connection from victimhood or experience of injustice to a victim's ability to speak about their own mistreatments.

Another point that shows the limitation of the human rights approach in reconciliation is the conception of the state as an autonomous body in executing state violence. This conception leads to advocacy practices that solely target the state. In other words, it is only the state that is seen to be responsible for the mass violence. I agree that the state should be held responsible, particularly because the military had structurally mobilised and facilitated the violence which became massive and bloody. But I also cannot deny that civilians were highly involved in this violence, often voluntarily, carrying their own ideas and agendas. Therefore, it is true that the military politically orchestrated the extermination of communists, but it is also us, Indonesia's middle class, who killed, excluded, stigmatised, and erased the left from our own history. The responsibility, then, lies not only on the state, but also on us, as citizens.

The human rights approach also brings us to the discussion of categorising the 1965 violence as a case of genocide. Scholars and activists have been working intensively to gather evidence that this event should be considered as such a case, even though there is still an ongoing debate on the definition of genocide. The analysis of the Brawijaya documents that I used in chapter 3 adds to this evidence of the intent and structural nature of the violence. I do agree that within international and national contexts, the genocide status can give a certain pressure on the Indonesian state, and also provide some leverage to the victims advocating for their rights. However, I doubt that this status significantly contributes to the discussion on reconciliation. In the case of 1965, arguing that this state violence is an act of genocide will only have an impact at the judicial level. But at the community level, this legal conception is interpreted differently. It becomes losses of family members and properties, insecurity, repression, trauma, and many other things that locals portrayed as *gégér* (a Javanese term that refers to turmoil, chaos, a nearly-apocalyptic situation). Therefore, in order to have more fruitful insights on reconciliation, it is important to go beyond the attempts of proving that certain state violence were acts of genocide or crimes against humanities, and move closer to examining how societies actually deal with such violence.

I do not suggest that the human rights approach should be neglected in formulating the reconciliation of 1965 violence. What I would like to suggest is to shift the discussion of reconciliation from topics of perpetratorship and acts of violence (which is usually the case in the human rights approach) to issues of massive transformation following violence and how societies deal with these transformations. Think not only about generals who authorised military operations against communists, but also about villagers who lost their land to village authorities or about performers of *Ketoprak* who could never perform again. Reconciliation, then, should consider how to re-create spaces, relationships, connectivity and knowledge that were destroyed after the violence, not only for victims and perpetrators of violence, but also for the generations after. Reconciliation, after all, is not an issue between perpetrators and victims alone, but a matter for the whole Indonesian nation.

Grassroots communities and organisations have moved towards this idea of national reconciliation. For example, victims' organisations, such as Pakorba (*Paguyuban Korban Orde Baru*/ Community of

Victims of New Order) and YPKP 1965 (*Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan/* Research Institute of Victims of 1965 Killings), are still attempting to reveal the truth about the 1965 by recording mass graves, particularly in Java. Other religious communities, such as Syarikat of NU has initiated reconciliation between former perpetrators of NU and victims in their local regions. However, what seems to be the current development is the growing movement of younger generations – those who did not directly experience the violence nor belong to families who experienced the violence – to discuss the violence in 1965. The online platform Ingat 65 (<https://medium.com/ingat-65>), which is managed by young journalists, publishes experiences of Indonesians (mainly young generations) who encountered the 1965 violence in their lives, for example, through their families' narratives, supranatural stories, or disagreement with the contents of history school textbooks. Not to mention other creative expressions to commemorate the violence, such as theatre performances, films, or exhibitions, that are arranged by groups of young artists.

All of these practices show that 1965 has moved further from a matter between perpetrators' and victims' groups, and is becoming a matter of Indonesia's nationhood. In the future, I believe these socio-cultural (as distinct from the legal) approaches will expand and develop, taking different forms, involving different people, and more importantly, raising more questions about how we, as a nation, should deal with the violence.

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SUMMARY

This dissertation examines the dynamics of memory culture of the anti-communist violence in 1965 Indonesia. The problem starts with the contrasting narrative about this particular event. On the one hand, the national narrative by the state commemorates the death of six generals and one low rank army officer during the September 30th Movement or *Gerakan 30 September 1965/ G30S*. The military accused the Indonesian Communist Party or *Partai Komunis Indonesia/ PKI* as the mastermind behind the movement. The movement was followed by a regime shift from Sukarno to Suharto. This new regime initiated a nation-wide purge against communists, leftists, and their affiliates in 1965-66 and in 1968 in some parts of East Java. On the other hand, the purge that had turned into a violent bloodbath continued to be excluded from Indonesia's national historiography until today. Popular memories of this violence are marginalized, silenced, and excluded, and are considered as the counter-narrative of 1965.

This dissertation goes beyond this binary approach of state versus counter narrative. Through a case study in rural area of Donomulyo district in East Java, this research discovered that memories of violence are multi-layered. They are not exclusively determined by the repressive memory project of the state, but are actually embedded in social relations and local context where the violence occurred. The first two chapters after the introduction explain and analyze how these relations and transformations evolved in three different eras: the colonial, pre-independence, and early New Order period. Combining different sources, chapter 2 portrays the early connections between state and society, especially regarding the position of rural elites. The traditional patron-client relationships that were formed through the land tenure and crop-sharing system during pre-colonial era were transformed into economy-driven patronage relationships since the establishment of the Dutch plantations in the area. Even though state transformation (from colonial East Indies to independent Indonesia) took place, this state-society patronage relations persisted and were even utilized during the 1965-66 violence. The collaboration between the army and certain mass organizations resulted in severe violence in Donomulyo, as described in chapter 3. There was an unequal, yet mutual collaboration between the army and civilians. Using archives of the Brawijaya military command in East Java, this dissertation also presents a new interpretation of the 1965-66 killings in the area. One of the main findings is that the killings were structurally organized by the army by gathering, coordinating, and managing anti-communist civilian forces under the regional army.

From the backgrounds of these developments in Donomulyo, the dissertation continues to examine the memory culture of 1965 violence in rural community in chapter 4. The main finding is that remembering the violence is locally embedded, rather than exclusively constructed by memory projects of the state. Local patrons connect the local and national, influencing how villagers understand and remember the violence that they experienced in their area. The memories of people who have close ties with the state through the patronage network and who benefited from the violence, reflect a similar construction of the state's narrative of the violence – for example, expressing the need to eliminate the PKI, because they were troublemakers in the village. Whereas others, who experienced great losses after the violence, became critical of the official narrative. Furthermore, at the community level, memories of violence are not about the violent acts per se, but also about what the violence brought afterwards. In Donomulyo, memories of violence are also

connected to the rural transformation that occurred after 1965, particularly during the early New Order period when the military controlled the local economy. Therefore, the question of 'who gets what after the violence', is also central to an examination of memories of 1965-66 violence.

SAMENVATTING (Summary in Dutch)

Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de dynamiek van de geheugencultuur die ontstond als gevolg van het anticomunistische geweld in Indonesië in 1965. Het uitgangspunt van dit onderzoek is het contrasterende verhaal over deze specifieke gebeurtenis. Enerzijds herdenkt men van staatswege en als deel van het nationale narratief de dood van zes generaals en een lage legerofficier in het kader van de 30 september-beweging of *Gerakan 30 september 1965 / G30S*. De toenmalige regering wees de Indonesische Communistische Partij of *Partai Komunis Indonesia / PKI* aan als het brein achter deze beweging. De regimeverschuiving van Soekarno naar Soeharto vond plaats in het kielzog van deze beweging. In 1965-66 en 1968 resulteerde dit in sommige delen van Oost-Java tot een landelijke zuivering van communisten, links-georiënteerden en mensen die aan hen waren geaffilieerd. Anderzijds wordt deze zuivering, die zich omzette in een gewelddadig bloedbad, tot op de dag van vandaag weggelaten uit de nationale geschiedschrijving van Indonesië. De herinnering aan dit geweld; gemarginaliseerd, het zwijgen opgelegd en uitgesloten, wordt gezien als het tegenverhaal van 1965.

Dit proefschrift gaat echter verder dan de binaire benadering van staat versus tegenverhaal. Door middel van een casestudy in het Oost-Javaanse plattelandsgebied van het district Donomulyo stelt dit onderzoek vast dat herinneringen aan geweld uit meerdere lagen bestaan. Deze worden niet exclusief gevormd door het repressieve geheugenproject van de staat, maar zijn in feite ingebed in sociale relaties en de lokale context waarin het geweld plaatsvond. In de eerste twee hoofdstukken, volgende op de introductie, wordt uitgelegd en geanalyseerd hoe deze relaties en transformaties tot stand kwamen tijdens drie verschillende perioden: koloniaal, pre-onafhankelijk en de vroege Nieuwe Orde. Hoofdstuk 2 combineert verschillende bronnen en beschrijft de historische verbinding tussen staat en samenleving, vooral met betrekking tot de positie van de plattelandselites. De traditionele patroon-cliënt verhoudingen, die tijdens het prekoloniale tijdperk werden gevormd door het systeem van landbezit en het delen van gewassen, werden vanaf de oprichting van Nederlandse plantages in het gebied getransformeerd in economisch gedreven patronage-relaties. Ondanks de staatstransformatie (van koloniaal Nederlands Indië tot onafhankelijk Indonesië) bleef deze patronage-relatie tussen staat en samenleving bestaan en werd ze zelfs benut tijdens het geweld van 1965-66. De samenwerking tussen het leger en bepaalde massaorganisaties resulteerde in ernstig geweld in Donomulyo. Het ging hier om een ongelijke maar wederzijdse samenwerking tussen het leger en burgers. Op basis van archieven van het militaire bevel van Brawijaya in Oost-Java biedt dit proefschrift derhalve een nieuwe interpretatie van de moorden in 1965-66 in dit gebied. Eén van de belangrijkste bevindingen is dat de moorden tevens structureel werden georganiseerd door het leger, door anticomunistische civiele troepen te verzamelen, te coördineren en te beheren onder het regionale leger.

Vanuit deze achtergrond in Donomulyo richt het proefschrift zich op de geheugencultuur van het geweld in 1965 in deze plattelandsgemeenschap in hoofdstuk 4. De belangrijkste bevinding is dat het herinneren van dit geweld is ingebed in plaatsen. Lokale cliënten verbinden de lokale met de nationale sfeer en beïnvloeden zodoende hoe dorpingen het geweld dat ze in hun omgeving hebben ervaren interpreteren en onthouden. Bij mensen die vanuit het patronagenetwerk nauwe banden onderhouden met de staat en destijds

profiteerden van het geweld, weerspiegelen de herinneringen een vergelijkbare constructie met het staatsverhaal omtrent het geweld - bijvoorbeeld door de noodzaak te uiten om de PKI te elimineren omdat ze onruststokers waren in het dorp. Tegelijkertijd werden anderen, die na het geweld grote verliezen leden, kritisch op het officiële verhaal. Voor de gemeenschap gaan herinneringen aan het geweld bovendien niet alleen over de gewelddadige handelingen op zich, maar ook over de zaken die het geweld met zich meebracht. In Donomulyo houden herinneringen aan geweld tevens verband met de landelijke transformatie die plaatsvond haar nasleep, vooral tijdens de vroege Soeharto-periode van de Nieuwe Orde. De vraag “wie wat krijgt na het geweld” creëert daarom eveneens herinneringen aan het geweld van 1965-66.

De casestudy van Donomulyo laat tevens zien dat herinneringen aan geweld niet zijn afgenomen, zelfs niet onder de repressie van de staat. Middels verhalen over plaatsen, of *sites of memory*, reizen verhalen over geweld binnen gemeenschappen. In hoofdstuk 5 zijn een aantal specifieke sites in Donomulyo geanalyseerd, waaronder sites gemaakt door autoriteiten en sites die door de gemeenschap zijn geïnitieerd en worden onderhouden. Meer nog dan het verleden te vertegenwoordigen, functioneren deze sites echter als een onderhandelingsinstrument voor het heden, omdat ze altijd in een proces van dialoog staan met de omringende samenleving. In sommige gevallen worden geheugenplaatsen gebruikt als middel voor sociale mobilisatie, waarbij dorpelingen met een nieuwe beschermheer worden verbonden. Zodra deze sites hun betekenis verliezen, verzwakt ook het omringende patronagenetwerk. Deze studie toont eveneens aan dat sites die door de staat zijn gebouwd hun hedendaagse functie aan het verliezen zijn, terwijl sites die door de gemeenschap worden onderhouden, zoals massagraven, niet alleen voor de familie van slachtoffers betekenisvol blijven, maar ook voor een groter publiek op zoek naar spirituele begeleiding.

Familie is een andere context waarin verhalen over geweld voortbestaan. Aan de hand van vier casestudies van families in hoofdstuk 6, laat het proefschrift zien dat herinneringen aan geweld op een complexe manier bewaard blijven, gevoed door onderlinge verbondenheid van het verleden en het heden, en het privé- en publiekelijke leven. Ook stilte vormt een dominant aspect in familie verhalen. In deze context is zwijgen echter geen vorm van repressief trauma, maar een veerkrachtig mechanisme om met het verleden om te gaan. Stilte werd een instrument om te overleven, een navigatiemiddel (in plaats van alleen maar een expressie van trauma) waarmee daders, medewerkers, slachtoffers, omstanders en hun families hun levens als gemeenschap kunnen voortzetten.
family of victims, but also for a larger public who seek spiritual guidance.

Family is another context where narratives of violence also exist. Through four case studies of families in chapter 6, this thesis shows that memories of violence are preserved in a complex way, through interconnectedness of the past and present, and between the private and the public. Silence is also another dominant aspect in family narratives. However, silence in this context is not only a form of repressive trauma, but a resilient mechanism to deal with the past. Silence became a tool for survival, a navigating device, and more than merely an expression of trauma, that enables perpetrators, collaborators, victims, bystanders and their families to continue their lives in a community.

Curriculum Vitae

Grace Leksana was born on August 7, 1980, in Jakarta, Indonesia. She completed her primary education in Jakarta in 1992, and secondary education in Jakarta in 1998. In 1998, she started her B.A in Psychology from Atma Jaya Catholic University, Jakarta, and graduated in 2004. In 2007, she received a fellowship from Nuffic to study in the Netherlands. She graduated in 2008 from the International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague with an M.A in Development Studies. After obtaining her Master's degree, she returned to Jakarta in 2009 and continued to work at the Indonesian Institute of Social History (*Institut Sejarah Sosial Indonesia*), where she became highly involved in the discussions of 1965-66 violence and history education. She was also appointed as a part-time lecturer at the Psychology Department of Atma Jaya Catholic university. In 2011, she moved to Malang and became an independent researcher affiliated to the Centre for Cultural and Frontier Studies (CCFS) Brawijaya University, Malang. In 2015, she received a KNAW grant to follow a PhD program on post 1965 memories in Indonesia at the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asia and Caribbean Studies/ KITLV and the Leiden Institute of Area Studies (LIAS) of Leiden University. She is also a fellow of the Netherlands Institute of War, Holocaust and Genocide (NIOD).