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## **The roots of intentionality in Aristotle's theory of psychology**

Liu, H.

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**Author:** Liu, H.

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## CHAPTER 5: A COMPARISON BETWEEN BRENTANO AND ARISTOTLE ON INTENTIONALITY AND THE CONTEMPORARY FOCUS OF INTENTIONALITY IN ARISTOTLE

At the very beginning of chapter one, I stated that the aim of this dissertation was firstly to investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle’s psychology—which we have covered in Chapters 2 to 4; and second, to make a comparison between Brentano and Aristotle. At this stage in our journey, I will begin addressing the second task more fully than has been done in the preceding chapters.

It should be acknowledged that when Brentano referred to Aristotle in the proposal of intentional in-existence, he had by then already published a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle’s work – not the least of which, Aristotle’s psychology. This can be gleaned from Brentano’s academic research on Aristotle before his *PES* was published. The series of works he published on Aristotle include *OSS*; *PA*; *AW*.<sup>338</sup> The first two were written before *PES*. The necessity of a comprehensive investigation of Brentano’s relation with Aristotle was previously noted by Barry Smith (1988) and Edmund Runggaldier (1989). Smith made an effort to deal with Brentano’s works apart from *PES* in the hopes of achieving a more complete interpretation of Brentano’s work on psychology. In addition, Runggaldier suggested that whoever wished to understand Brentano’s early use of “intentional in-existence” should first explore earlier Brentano’s works on Aristotle, “especially the doctrine of the multiple use of ‘being’ (‘on’, ‘Seiendes’) and ‘is’” (p.99), so as to interpret the correlation between intentionality and in-existence. Henceforth, to adequately evaluate Aristotle’s impact on Brentano’s psychology—and to what extent it is revealed in Brentano’s formulation of intentional in-existence—it is imperative to investigate Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotle before proceeding any further.<sup>339</sup>

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<sup>338</sup> See: Brentano, F. *The Psychology of Aristotle*, 1977.

--- *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. 1973.

--- *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*. 1975.

--- *Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung*. 1978.

<sup>339</sup> For a consideration of Brentano’s other writings and their implications of Aristotle’s illumination, see Smith (1988); George (1978); Runggaldier (1989).

## 5.1 Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's psychology

### 5.1.1 *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*

Brentano began his academic research working on Aristotle—expressed through his doctoral dissertation—which revealed his interest in the various senses of “being” in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*.<sup>340</sup> Since Brentano valued Aquinas and Aquinas set forth the distinction between intentional existence (the content, essence, concept, etc.) and natural existence (the extra-mental object) in his own theory,<sup>341</sup> it is not unlikely that Brentano’s starting point regarding the ontology of being should be somewhat related with his consideration of the being of the intentional in-existence – a topic which he proposed several years later in *PES*. Chrudzimski and Smith claim that for Brentano, even the non-existent entity can be categorized as *being* in the sense of *being true*. This results from Brentano’s adoption of the Aristotelian concept of being and the Scholastic doctrine of *ens objectivum*, which means “a subject is thinking of an object A, he is said to have that object objectively (i.e. as object) in his mind.”<sup>342</sup> The objective existence of being within the mind makes sense for the in-existence object in Brentano. Even though we are unsure as to whether Brentano had the “being of intentional in-existence” in mind at this first stage, we shall see how Brentano’s early attempts culminated into his novel contribution of intentionality. In the following chapter, I will not go into the book in great detail, but I will nevertheless pick out several parts which will be of interest to our own investigation in the “being of intentional in-existence.”

Brentano uses a fourfold classification of being: accidental being; being in the sense of being true; potential and actual being; and lastly, being in the categories. It is in the sense of being true or false that Brentano touches upon the “being of immanent content” by virtue of judgement – as well as another kind of mental cognizing, “through which we grasp the undivided, the simple, and conceptually represent to ourselves the nature of things” (p.15).<sup>343</sup> Brentano refers to Aristotle in arguing that

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<sup>340</sup> According to Brentano, there are four types of “being”: being in the sense of categories, being in the sense of being true, being in the sense of accidental being, being in the sense of potentiality and actuality. See: Brentano, *OSS*.

<sup>341</sup> “First of all I had to apprentice myself to a master. But since I was born when philosophy had fallen into most lamentable decay, I could find none better than old Aristotle. To understand him, which is not always easy, I enlisted the help of Thomas Aquinas.” (ANR, p. 291) Cf. George and Koehn, “Brentano’s relation to Aristotle”. 2004. p.20.

<sup>342</sup> Chrudzimski and Smith (2004), p.198.

<sup>343</sup> *OSS*.

truth and falsehood cannot be found in things outside the mind (p.15); rather, mental entities have their own mode of being. In the case of judgement, these beings may not be counterparts of what they are in the extra-mental world, nor even exist in the extra-mental world –thus resulting in false judgment. Brentano, in reading Aristotle, argues that this happens both through sensation and the act of thinking. Such false sensation is thereby expressed by the common and incidental sense, given that compared to the five singular senses, the common and incidental sensible may not have a reliable appearance in the soul. In the case of thinking, thinking is false when the being it represents is not what the concept means.<sup>344</sup>

Brentano uses the term “representation” in his interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology to express the phenomena (or appearance of phenomena) which somehow appear to the subject through cognition.<sup>345</sup> “Being” here is the existence of what we represent in thought. The truth or falsity of this is based on whether the concept represents the act of either being or not being – so also the case of sense-perception, where truth or falsity is based on whether it represents the being of the proper object or not. Therefore, if what thinking and sense-perception represent is *non-being*, then the act of thinking and sense-perception will be false.

### 5.1.2 *The psychology of Aristotle*

Brentano was not only interested in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, but also paid special attention to Aristotle’s psychology, which laid a foundation for his lifelong concern with psychological issues. In the following section, I shall address Brentano’s endorsement of Aristotle’s psychology to ascertain what sort of interpretation he holds to be true and which speculative discovery enables him to propose an empirical psychological framework based on a neo-Aristotelian background.

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<sup>344</sup> Brentano refers to Aristotle’s claim in *DA* 430b26-29. Aristotle elaborates that “the thinking of the definition in the sense of what is is for something to be is never in error.” (*DA* 430b28). Brentano interprets it as “a thought is true if it represents a being according to its concept”. Cf. Brentano. *OSS*, p.17. It spells out that Brentano uses “represent” to express “the thinking of the definition”.

<sup>345</sup> Representation or phenomena composed of representations constitute the basis for Brentano’s endorsement of psychological activity. For example in *PES*, he says “nothing can be judged, nothing can be desired, nothing can be hoped or feared, if it is not represented”. p.61. Brentano distributes the term “represent” to Aristotle in his interpretation of *Met.V*. 29: “a concept, however, is false if, insofar as it is false, it represents non-being...” *OSS*, p.17.

### 5.1.2.1 The Objective Existence in the Cognized Subject and Material Existence in the Physical Subject

In *DA* II.5 Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of being acted on: one, is “the extinction of one of two contraries by the other”; the other, is “the maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, as actual to potential” (*DA* 417b 1-5).<sup>346</sup> Sensation is considered to instantiate the second kind of being acted on. Brentano follows this endorsement and uses the example of when a warm hand touches cold and becomes colder during this sensation, there is an alteration, “but we do not sense the cold insofar as we become cold; otherwise plants and inorganic bodies would also sense. Rather, we sense the cold insofar as the cold exists objectively, i.e., as a cognized object within us –and hence, insofar as we take in the cold without being ourselves its physical subject.” (*PA*, p.54-55) He elaborates that the sensing body feels something warm because it has warmth objectively within itself. A warm object (for instance, a warm cup) has warmth physically, materially within itself (*PA*, p.54). Therefore, for Brentano, the sensing body just suffers an actualization of what is potentially in the subject.

Brentano argues that the cold exists objectively within us as the reason why the percipient subject can be altered in a way that differs from the alteration of cold caused in its physical subject. Frankly speaking, their realization substrates are different: one is the percipient subject, while the other is the physical subject. He points out two kinds of the existence of warmth: one warmth exists objectively in the cognizing subject, while the other exists physically in a warm object. We should not be astonished at this distinction since even in *OSS*, he professes a representation of being which resides in the perceiver or knower. Further, Brentano points out that the cold that exists objectively in the percipient subject is the sensible form.<sup>347</sup> Therefore, the sensible form that is received in the sensing body is regarded by Brentano as having objective existence.

Brentano adopts a spiritual interpretation of the received sensible form in the cognizing subject by regarding it as an objective quality (cold, warm, or other) potentially in the subject. That is not in line with my interpretation of Aristotle concerning the alteration of the sensible form as detailed in Chapter 2. As I see it, sensation is a psychophysical process and what is sensitive can be interpreted as the power of sense and the sense organ. They are the same in function but different in being, and the sense organ is the material substrate where the percipient capacity is located. In alteration, the sense organ will suffer a qualitative change from what it is

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<sup>346</sup> For an explanation of these two kinds of being acted upon, see Chapter 2, p. 78-83.

<sup>347</sup> *PA*, p.54.

*not* and the percipient soul will actualize its potentiality from having the potential capacity to actually perceiving something. In this way, different from Brentano's elaboration that what is immanent is the potential objective sensible form's being actualized—by which Brentano regards the sensible form as an entity or object that has a mode of being within the soul—I shall claim that what is immanent in perceiving is an actualized perceptual state – a state which is about the sensible object and the underlying physiological change of the sense organ. That is, for Aristotle, the sensible form is not an object that has a mode of being; rather, it is the perceptual content exist in the soul that has a mode of being.

Brentano's spiritual interpretation of the alteration in sensation enables him to stress his idea that there is an objective existence in the subject. Now it seems that in his reference to Aristotle, the so-called sensed object in the sensing subject is the objective sensible property that exist in the cognizing subject, as "Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect" (p.67). Brentano regards the immanent sensed property as the immanent object, but this is not how I interpret Aristotle. As I see it, the perceptual soul's reception of form is not in accordance with an immaterial object in the subject – but rather, a newly composed sensing state incurred by the sensible form.<sup>348</sup>

### 5.1.2.2 Inner sense

In addition to apprehending sensible forms, the perceptual soul is able to discriminate different sensible objects – for example, sweet and white. Brentano suggests that the several senses are not separate but are in fact one and the same subject. By taking in two different objects through different faculties, the subject is able to distinguish one from the other. However, Brentano refutes the proposal that there is an extra distinguishing power which is responsible for perceiving the difference between the two.<sup>349</sup> Instead, Brentano states that five senses unites to a point, which works as the boundary for one to finish and the other to begin. When two sensations occur, we

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<sup>348</sup> For more details of my interpretation of perception, see Chapter 2.

<sup>349</sup> Brentano's argument opposing a separate distinguishing power is that 1) the problem is that in actuality there can be only one sensation as to the sensory faculty. One and the same sensory faculty can only sense a single sensation at a given time. 2) if we assume that we recognize the distinction between the sweet and the white through one sense, then this is possible only if we ascribe to the sense the capacity for sensing the sweet as well as the white as such. Hence, for one and the same sensory capacity we must assume several proper objects of sense. *PA*. p.60.

recognize their difference at the moment of their change. Meanwhile, this unity of the senses is also responsible for perceiving that we see or hear. The depiction of such a unity of senses in Aristotle drives Brentano to hold that:

There is an inner sense differing from all external senses, of a special sense directed toward the inner movements of the sensitive part itself. It must be this sense that perceives not only what we sense, but also the remaining perceiving operations. For example, sensual desire, and that gives us self-consciousness to the extent to that it belongs to the sensory part (p. 64-65).

The notion of an inner sense (in this case, the sensory-consciousness) that Brentano grasps from Aristotle lays the foundation for his description of an immediate conscious experience of psychic activity – and for his proposal of empirical psychology. Since Brentano ascribes every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination as an example of a mental phenomenon, he attributes a role of mental subjectivity to the inner perception and considers it as indistinguishable from other mental acts in *PES*.<sup>350</sup> For Brentano, the act of inner perception is also a case of a mental phenomenon—which shares the capacity of being reference to the intended object—but that is not Aristotle’s description of the perceptual soul. For in Aristotle, the perceptual soul does not direct to or refer to the intended object. As we clarified, in Aristotle, the common power of sense and the five singular senses are one and the same activity and belong to the passive perceptual soul, which lacks the peculiarity of mental subjectivity.<sup>351</sup> That is where Brentano ultimately differs from Aristotle.

### 5.1.2.3 Representation, *phantasia*, and non-existence

Brentano follows Aristotle in dealing with situations when there is no object present or when the perceptual faculty is dealing with the non-existent object. According to Aristotle, it is other capacities of the sensory soul (such as *phantasia*, memory, etc.), and not perception, that are the cognizing subject of a non-existent object. In these cases, it is the residual images that were composed in perception—and which remain in the sensing body—that work as the stimulator, playing a role as the perceptible object does in perception. The residual image has a distinct being that exists objectively within us, as Brentano claims that “even without sensory perception we have sensible forms objectively (as representations) within us” (p. 67). Further, Brentano describes the non-existent object as that “we remember previous seeing or hearing and have their

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<sup>350</sup> *PSE*, p. 60.

<sup>351</sup> See: Chapter 2.

representations within us even though they do not now actually exist and cannot now actually be sensed” (*PA*, p. 68). By establishing an objective being of the immanent images, Brentano attributes an independent ontological status to the intended object in cognition, whether the object exists in the external world or not. This is also the ontological basis of Brentano’s intentional in-existence.

It appears then that in *PA*, Brentano at least admits that it is the present sensible object or the residual images that act as the stimulator, rather than that the perceptual capacity itself acts as the efficient cause in Aristotle. However, in the later development of his framework of empirical psychology, Brentano adopted the view that it was the mentally active subject that was concerned with the objective object in consciousness – a notion which deviates from Aristotle.<sup>352</sup>

By virtue of representation, Brentano aims to clarify the working mechanism of *phantasia*, whose difference from sense-perception lies in that there may be no sensible object present for *phantasia*. However, the representation of the previous act of seeing or hearing will exist within us even though they do not now actually exist nor can they be sensed. In this manner, the representation that remains in the sensing body helps the agitation of *phantasia*: “There are images in which color, others in which tone, and still others in which other sensible properties form the basic determination. There are also images that have the peculiarity of that inner sense which is directed toward sensations themselves” (p. 67). This implies that in the absence of the sensible object, the inner image plays the same efficient role for *phantasia* as the sensible object plays in simulating sensation.

#### 5.1.2.4 Sense-perception in general

Brentano interprets Aristotle’s theory of sense-perception from the causal standpoint and the formulation of four causes in *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. These causes work as such:

The affected object now receives in actuality the form it had contained potentially; for the effect is in the affected object, not in the agent, at least not in the agent as such. But that which had the capacity to be affected is actually affected by the very same thing through which that which had the capacity for action became actually active. One and the same actuality is received by the passive capacity and also actualizes the corresponding active thing; by being the affection of the one it belongs at the same time to the other as effect.<sup>353</sup>

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<sup>352</sup> *PES*, p. 140.

<sup>353</sup> *PA*, p. 43.

Brentano provides an adequate interpretation of Aristotle's depiction of sense-perception – meaning, that which is being moved or affected by the object it senses. There is a natural relation between sense and the object: the former has the power to be affected, while the object has the specific property that has the power of acting on sensation. The sensing body is only potentially possessing the sensible form – but when actualized, the sensing form of the sensible object will be received by the sensing body and have objective existence in itself.<sup>354</sup> This is also the reason why sense perception does not suffer a physical corruption – but rather, a simple actualization of its potentiality. The actuality of the potentially sensing body and the actuality of the potentially sensible object are one and the same actuality and this actualization happens in the affected entity – that is, in the sensing body. The peculiarity of Brentano's interpretation is that he attributes the objective existence to the sensing form in the sensing body. He also holds a spiritual explanation of sense perception's alteration by adopting Aquinas' distinction between intentional existence (which Brentano calls objective existence) and natural existence. Ultimately, this is Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of sense perception.

#### 5.1.2.5 Intellect

Brentano follows the line of argument that Aristotle takes in dealing with intellect, by turning to its nature and its working mechanism. For both of them, intellect is an unmixed and spiritual faculty and it functions with the aid of sensation – especially the sensing images that derive from sensation. Brentano describes the working mechanism of intellect as follows:

It is nothing but the consummate disposition of the receptive intellect to begin thinking through the influence of its own proper active principle, in the same way in which sense begins to sense through the influence of its proper object. Hence knowledge is analogous to our innate capacity for seeing and hearing and having other sensory perception (p.85).

Brentano calls the sensible image that is present in the soul as the form of memory or knowledge—which is representation—and depicts the intellect's dependence on the sensing images as relying on representation. Meanwhile, intellect itself works by

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<sup>354</sup> I am also inspired by Barry Smith's interpretation of Brentano's *PA*, "Forms or universals exist, accordingly, in two different ways: within the soul, and within corporeal substance. Within the former they are actual whenever the soul cognizes a species. Within the latter they become actual whenever a thing of a given species comes into existence" p.2. See Smith (1988).

transforming the sensory representation.<sup>355</sup> As such, all intellectual activities, contemplative penetration of a particular thought, intentional retention, reasoning, thinking, etc., rely determinately on the sensory image. It may seem that the sensory part contains a principle to act upon the mental part, but this supposition is rejected by Brentano since the corporeal part cannot act on the intellectual thing.<sup>356</sup> If the sensitive part which holds the images cannot act on the origin of the concepts, then the explanation of the origin of a single thought will be difficult.

There are two ways to produce the effect of intellect: by proceeding from the thing itself or by an impulse imparted from outside. The sensitive part cannot act on the mental part and therefore there is an intellectual principle penetrating into the sensitive part so as to make it move the intellectual soul and cognition. By distinguishing between two levels of desire, sensory desire and intellectual will, Brentano claims that there is an intellectual principle which penetrates into the sensory part and influences the sensory activity – just like sensory desire is to act on the movement of the body. This intellectual principle is not will, because it unconsciously acts on the sensitive part and causes in it an impulse to react upon the mental. That is to say, this active intellectual power acts unconsciously on the corporeal part and carries out sensory representation. However, the intellectual will is connected with the principle of intellect which unconsciously acts on the sensitive part, as different beings in one subject. Penetrating into the sensitive part, this intellectual principle generates super-corporeal things, which the corporeal cannot attain through its own power. Hence, even though the intellectual part depends on the sensory part to organize the activity, the intellectual part is still in charge.

Brentano provides three arguments for his view that this active intellectual principle does not immediately generate the thought process: first, this would dissolve the connection between sensory representation and concept; second, the intellectual part has to think continually; third, as in sensation, the influence that makes intellect into something that actually thinks must come from somewhere else. Even though the active intellectual principle does not initiate the thought process immediately, it works as an efficient cause of our thinking,<sup>357</sup> and the intellectual will is thus the main factor which initiates thinking.

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<sup>355</sup> “The power of the intellect which acts consciously upon the body initially always brings forth a transformation of the sensory representations.” *PA*, p.105

<sup>356</sup> Brentano’s argument goes that if we suppose that corporeal things can act on intellectual things (since every action is initiated by desire), we should accept that either the corporeal things contain an unconscious drive or a conscious desire to exercise such an influence. But both of these two options are implausible. *PA*, p.99.

<sup>357</sup> “According to this doctrine the active intellect appears as a power of the intellectual part of our soul which acts before all thought and thus without consciousness; initially it is directed toward the sensitive

Based on this analysis, Brentano implies that what Aristotle says about *nous poietikos* in *DA* III.5 is this intellectual principle. The active principle of our thoughts does not immediately act upon the receptive intellect, but initially upon the sensitive part to make potential intelligible form – which in turn acts on the receptive intellect just in the way like the sensible form acts on what is percipient. This explains the mechanism of thinking. It is clear that Brentano later abandons Aristotle's explanation of intellectual mechanism in the sense of active intellect and receptive intellect. What he seems to adopt from Aristotle instead is the notion of the intelligible object existing within consciousness as pure intelligible and immaterial forms, as well as the intellect's capacity to abstract or grasp the intelligible form from a concrete object, which process the intellect is said to know itself secondarily:

The intellect does not by nature have a single thing actually within it [*nicht ein einziges der Dinge wirklich in sich*], and...its operation is an affection [*ein Leiden*];...it comes to know corporeal things, but...it also knows itself; that it is itself mental [*er selbst sei geistig*], that it is free of all corporeal characteristics; finally, that, although it knows itself, it does not know itself either always or in the beginning, but only secondarily. (*PA*, 88/PdA, 136)

The above quote spells out the immediate availability of our mind to gain access to what appears to it, including the act of thinking itself. This echoes with Brentano's later view in *PES*. By elaborating on Aristotle's psychology of the demarcation of the soul to its multi-cognizing activities (sensation, *phantasia*, intellect), Brentano is inspired by the Aristotelian narration about how the soul grasps and composes knowledge – and by the specific status of sensible form and intelligible form that is received in the soul, which in turn is an inspiration for his proposal of intentional inexistence. We also discover that Brentano attributes the efficient cause to the active intellect to enable the thought process, which is an approach taken by Themistius, Simplicius and Alexander (and clarified in Chapter 4). That is perhaps the reason why Brentano depicts the subject of intentional relation as a mentally active subject to direct to objects.

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part and thus provides it with the necessary impulse to act back upon the intellectual part; in this way, it becomes the efficient cause of our thinking. It is the light that illumines the images, and makes noticeable to the mind's eye the intellectual within the sensory." *PA*, p.121.

### 5.1.3 *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*

The aim of *PES* is to set forth psychology from the empirical experience of mental phenomena. This approach is built upon Brentano's Aristotelian foundations and the influence of his contemporaries. Brentano's era witnessed the development of experimental psychology, which investigated psychological activities through quantitative analysis and lab work. Brentano, following his teacher Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-72), attempted to deal with psychology by adopting philosophical and qualitative analysis and providing philosophical rationality for our direct experience of conscious content or object.

The notion of inner perception was adopted by Brentano to express an immediate source of knowledge. These philosophical roots of inner perception can be traced back to Aristotle's formulation of the unity of senses and the identity between the psychic act and the object – which together provide first-person access to the thing itself.<sup>358</sup> Further, Brentano interprets Aristotle's psychological description of the intellect as direct consciousness of our own thinking. But Brentano also modifies Aristotle's ontological formulation to suit for his own purposes. For instance, in clarifying the classification of “mental phenomena” in Aristotle, Brentano provides three categories of classification, which turn out to be a substitution of the term “mental” to what Aristotle regulates as “soul.” As to the first distinction that is made among the nutritive, sensory and rational soul, Brentano argues that Aristotle had a broader concept of the soul than simply the modern “mind” as Aristotle's formulation of the soul included plants as well.

In his second distinction, Brentano set aside the activity of plants and classifies the activity of animals and humans into what he calls “mental activities”, which reveals that Brentano was sorting out the classification based on the modern concept of “mental”, and has the classified order “determined by the degree to which their existence is general” (p.139).

In the last step, Brentano directly interprets Aristotle's classification for his aim of defining mental phenomena. This classification divides mental phenomena into thought and desire, according to which sensory activities such as perception, imagination, and memory, etc., are included into thought. The underlying consideration, according to Brentano, is that there is “a certain similarity between sensual presentation and appearance, and intellectual and conceptual presentation and

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<sup>358</sup> For an elaboration of the common sense and the assimilation of the percipient sense and the sensible object in actuality, see Chapter 2, p. 92-94.

affirmation” (*PES*, p.139). In this way, both the immanent perceptual and intellectual content are characterized by the mental phenomenon’s “intentional in-existence.”

Brentano proposes intentional in-existence as the mental activity’s reference to the immanent object: either as sensual presentation or intellectual and conceptual presentation. In a footnote in *PES*, Brentano further explains what he means by intentional in-existence, and I think it is valuable to quote it here:

This expression had been misunderstood in that some people thought it had to do with intention and the pursuit of a goal. In view of this, I might have done better to avoid it altogether. Instead of the term ‘intentional’ the Scholastics very frequently used the expression “objective”. This has to do with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, and, as such, is present in some manner in his consciousness, whether it is merely thought of or also desired, shunned, etc. I preferred the expression ‘intentional’ because I thought there would be an even greater danger of being misunderstood if I had described the object of thought as “objectively existing”, for modern-day thinkers use this expression to refer to what really exists as opposed to mere subjective appearances.<sup>359</sup>

From this explanation, we should exclude the practical sense of intention from Brentano as it turns out that what Brentano adopts from the Scholastic tradition is an ontology for what is immanent in the mentally active subject – and what is immanent is a presented object in some manner in consciousness.

We have previously elaborated on the roots of immanent content in Aristotle by clarifying the formulation of receiving an immaterial form.<sup>360</sup> Brentano takes the spiritual interpretation of this principle as an immanent object with a mode of being that can be directly referred to or directed to by the mental act. However, for Aristotle, what is immanent is hardly an object in a mental act.

In the 1911 Appendix of *PES*, Brentano modifies and elaborates some of his formulations in the 1874 edition of *PES*. Brentano emphasizes that “what is characteristic of every mental activity is, as I believe I have shown, the reference to something as an object. In this respect, every mental activity seems to be something relational.” (p.211) However, this is not a relation in the strict sense, as one term of the relation—the terminus—does not need to be real. That is to say, for mental reference, the cognitive subject must exist while the cognized object can be absent in reality. Therefore, Brentano describe mental reference as “quasi-relation.” In order to clarify this point, Brentano refers to Aristotle’s distinction of relatives in *Metaphysics*, in

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<sup>359</sup> *PES*, p.140.

<sup>360</sup> See the clarification in Chapter 2.

which Brentano assigns the intentional relation to the third group of relations – from sensation to the sensible, from thought to the thinkable.<sup>361</sup> Brentano believes that Aristotle’s intention is to spell out a relation that is about the mental act’s reference to non-existent objects. The credibility of the non-existence of an object is elaborated by Brentano by virtue of the distinction between “being” and “existing” – that is, even though the intentional object may not exist, it still has its real being.<sup>362</sup> But it seems that Brentano does not insist that the intentional object must be an immanent object, given that he argues in the 1911 edition that “one of the most important innovations is that I am no longer of the opinion that mental relation can have something other than a thing [*Reales*] as its object”.<sup>363</sup> In general terms, Brentano’s later intentionality proposal is that, in every act of consciousness, the mentally active subject has something as an object – whether it exists in reality or not.

Brentano further explains how we are able to think about non-existent objects – that is, the objects that do not exist in reality. As Brentano claims:

But we have the further ability to unite the most diverse objects by identifying them with one another whether they are compatible with each other in reality or not, and we thus arrive at an integral object which has attributes, but not intuitive unity. For example, I am capable of thinking in this way of a round square, a white stallion which is black, and a red which is blue..... (*PES*, p.219).

Since, in Brentano’s view, the mentally active subject is equipped with the capacity to compose a cognized object, it is not implausible that the cognized object is mentally dependent.

What Brentano means is that the mentally active subject’s reference to its object is better understood as the soul’s reflexive consciousness in Aristotle – given that Aristotle’s depiction of perceptual awareness or consciousness in *DA* III 2, the soul is able to perceive both the sensible object as well as the sensation, which is consistent with Brentano’s emphasis that what we are conscious of is both the object and the mental act of the object. It is also where Brentano certifies the direct accessibility and infallibility of the mental act. However, in my view, Aristotle’s perceptual awareness is what accompanies the perceiving activity and it is not a separate active activity to

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<sup>361</sup> *PES*, p.212-213.

<sup>362</sup> “I do not wish to bring this discussion of mental reference to a close without having given a word of consideration to the view that there is a distinction between ‘being’ and ‘existing.’ According to this view both are to be taken in a very peculiar sense. Namely, a person might be led to say that if someone is mentally referring to an object, the object really always has being just as much as he does, even if it does not always exist as he does.” *PES*, p.213.

<sup>363</sup> See the Foreword to the 1911 Edition of *PES*, the Classification of Mental Phenomena.

direct or refer to something. In addition, perceptual awareness is aware of the actualized sensible content that is in the soul and what is immanent is not a mental-dependent object.<sup>364</sup>

#### 5.1.4 Descriptive Psychology

As Chisholm explains in his introduction to the English translation of *DP*, although Brentano considered descriptive psychology, he never explicitly published a book entitled *DP*. Fortunately, many of his writings and lectures about this topic have been preserved and are available for study.<sup>365</sup> These originally unpublished works were organized and published as *DP*, first in German in 1982, and then translated into English in 1995. The reason why I choose to focus on this books is because Brentano both refers to Aristotle and frequently comments on the theme of intentionality within.

It is the intentional relation, the act of consciousness's being directed to something, that Brentano traces back to Aristotle. The intentional object is something that is not real, as revealed by Brentano, "as highlighted already by Aristotle, these correlates display the peculiarity that the one alone is real, [whereas] the other is not something real [*nichts Reales*]." (*DP*, p. 24) By this claim, Brentano traces the intentional relation back to Aristotle – and according to the editor's note (*DP*, 180), specifically to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, V.15, 1021 a, 30. There, Aristotle distinguishes between three categories of relatives in *Metaphysics*: the first is with respect to number; the second is with respect to power; and the last is the relation between measure and the measurable, sensation and the sensible, intellection and the intelligible. According to Hamid Taieb's observations, Brentano describes the three categories as comparative, causal, and intentional. Considering that Aristotle attributes opinion and the opinable into the third group, both Brentano and Taieb argue that it implies that the psychic relation can be directed to something that does not explicitly exist.<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>364</sup> More details about how perception works and what the perceptual faculty is aware of is clarified in Chapter 2.

<sup>365</sup> Introduction, xv. *DP*. Translated and edited by Benito Müller, Routledge, 1995.

<sup>366</sup> Taieb refers to Brentano's *Wahrheit und Evidenz* "[Aristoteles] teilte die Relationen in drei Klassen, von denen die eine die komparativen, die andere die kausalen, die dritte die intentionalen Relationen enthielt." (p.117) Trans. Chisholm et al., in *The True and the Evident*, (p.70). As well as Aristotle's depiction about opinion and the opinable in *De int.* and *Top.* It is not true to say that which is not, since it is opinable, and something that is; for the opinion about it is not that it is, but that it is not. (*De int.* 11, 21a32-33)

Moreover, see if the term placed in the genus has a wider denotation than the genus, as (e.g.) the opinable has, as compared with being; for both what is and what is not are opinable, so that the opinable could not be a species of being; for the genus is always wider of denotation than the species. (*Top.* 4.1, 121b2-4)

Still, in depicting the intentional relation, Brentano elaborates that the consciousness of consciousness itself, which he traces back to Aristotle, is “every consciousness, upon whatever object it is primarily directed, is concomitantly directed upon itself [*geht nebenher auf sich selbst*]. In the presenting [*im Vorstellen*] of the color hence simultaneously a presenting of this presenting. Aristotle already [emphasizes] that the psychological phenomenon contains the consciousness of itself.” (p.25) This can clearly be traced back to Aristotle’s elaboration of perceptual awareness, which perceives both the perceptible object as well as the act of perception. Further, Brentano attributes this relational characteristic to the nature of every psychological act, “The fact that there is no consciousness without any intentional relation at all is as certain as the fact that, apart from the object upon which it is primarily directed, consciousness has, on the side, itself as an object. This is, in an essential way, part of the nature of every psychological act” (p.26). Brentano’s relational interpretation of consciousness therefore expresses the characteristic of intentional directedness. When it comes to Aristotle, as we clarified, it is not the case that the perceptual awareness is actively directed to the sensible object. Rather, in my view, the relation between perceptual or intellectual consciousness and its object, is the actualized perceptual or intellectual faculty and the actualized perceptual or intelligible object, which in fact become identical in the same actualization. Henceforth, the reference to an object is not quite what Aristotle had in mind.

## 5.2 The divergence between Brentano and Aristotle

In this section, I shall deal with the similarities and differences between Brentano and Aristotle. Before elaborating on my own view, I will begin with an inquiry with several scholarly perspectives on the matter.

Chrudzimski<sup>367</sup> highlights several points about Brentano’s intentionality:

1. The relation between subject and immanent object is an extensional relation; while the relation between subject and the external object is a pseudo-relation.
2. The immanent object has the property of the external object in a modified sense. If the property is that of the external object, then the external object exists; if not, then the external object does not exist.<sup>368</sup>

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See Hamid Taieb. *Relational intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition*. 2018.

<sup>367</sup> Chrudzimski (2013).

<sup>368</sup> As is clarified in Chapter 1, there is some debate as to whether Brentano elaborates the existence/non-existence of external object or not. In my view, Brentano does not mention that the property that the intended object carries reveals the existence of the external object. In fact, we can have the intended object, which may have some properties of the external object, but this intended object may have no counterpart

Chrudzimski further concludes with several similarities and differences between Brentano and Aristotle:

1. Both introduce entities which mediate the intentional reference.
2. Both assume that it is the very same property that, on the one hand, stands before the subject's mind and, on the other hand, can be exemplified by the reference object.
3. Both introduce a certain non-standard mode of exemplifying properties.

According to Chrudzimski, the differences lie in that for Brentano, the mediating entities are immanent objects, and cognitive accessibility of the identifying properties is only encoded by immanent objects via relation IMM,<sup>369</sup> and the non-standard exemplification is encoding. For Aristotle, the mediating entities are 'bare properties', and the cognitive accessibility of the identifying properties are ontologically directly by exemplification, and the non-standard exemplification is exemplification.<sup>370</sup>

Chrudzimski further believes that Brentano adopts from Aristotle a perceived property which has a non-standard mode of being within the subject. According to Brentano, the immanent object is an encoding (non-standard sense) of the external object. Meanwhile, in Aristotle, "a soul which is intentionally directed at something *red* takes, according to Aristotle, the 'form' of a red thing (i.e. the redness), leaving behind its 'matter', and thus becomes – as Aristotle tells us – 'in a sense' *red*" (p.5). I agree with Chrudzimski's insight that it is the characteristic of immanence that connects Brentano and Aristotle. But as to the interpretation of Aristotle's elaboration of immanence, I think the form which affects the cognized subject in Aristotle is not a bare property. Rather, the reception of the form marks that the cognitive subject is defined by the *logos* of the object and exemplifies the information coming from outside. The form is therefore the thing which defines it as it is – and when it is received in the cognitive subject, it defines the state or content of the subject. In addition, in

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in the external world. For example, we can have the alien ET as an intended object which has some properties of a living body which is shared by animals and human beings, but ET nevertheless does not exist in the external world.

<sup>369</sup> Chrudzimski (2013) depicts IMM as "to be in an intentional state means for Brentano to have an immanent object before one's mind, and this 'having' is symbolised in our notation as standing to the appropriate immanent entity in the relation IMM." p.4.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid. p.7.

Aristotle's view, the perceptual soul is passive when receiving the sensible and immaterial form. It is therefore not plausible to suggest that the soul is intentionally directed at the sensible object in receiving its form. Further, Chrudzimski depicts the relation between the subject and the immanent object as an extensional relation, and the relation between subject and the external object as a pseudo-relation in Brentano's intentionality. However, it seems to me that at Brentano's first stage, he simply focuses on the immanent object without a clear distinction between the immanent and external object. At this time, intentionality is a reference or directedness from the mental act to the immanent object.<sup>371</sup> In his 1911 appendix of *PES*, he clarifies that the intentional relation is not a real one considering that the cognizing subject must exist, whereas it is unnecessary that the object that is cognized exists. However, even in his 1911 rectification, he does not claim that the relation to the immanent object is different from the relation to the external object. The intentional relation, in general, is a quasi-relation.<sup>372</sup>

Rolf George and Glen Koehn comment on the relations between Brentano and Aristotle. Of particular interest is their clarification of Brentano's finding concerning the root of intentionality in Aristotle. They regard the characteristic of the mind's ability to cognize itself, and to consider the acts of thinking or perceiving, as its own object and secondarily as a cornerstone of Brentano's own philosophy and the roots of intentionality (p.28-29).<sup>373</sup> This establishes a peculiar inner object for the mind. George & Koehn refer to Aristotle's elaboration of the soul in potentiality and actuality so as to stress that only in actuality does the mind think and become known to itself, leading to a state in which there is an in-existent object, as the mind is thus actualized by this in-existent object. In addition, they highlight Aristotle's identification of the object of desire as the object of cognition, which lead to Brentano's position of representation in cognition.<sup>374</sup> They argue that it is the intentional in-existence of an object connects Aristotle and Brentano.

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<sup>371</sup> *PES*, p. 68.

<sup>372</sup> *PES*, p. 212-213.

<sup>373</sup> George and Koehn refer to Brentano's claim that "knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only on the side (*en parergo*)" (pp. 85 and 89ff., *Met.* XII.9, 1074b35). See George and Koehn (2004).

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid.* "Aristotle's view that the object of desire must also be an object of cognition (*De Anima* III.10, 433b10) leads directly to Brentano's position that "representation forms the basis . . . of desire and every other mental act. Nothing can be judged . . . desired, nothing can be hoped or feared if it is not represented" (*PES*, p. 61). If then the objects of desire, etc., are also objects of cognition, it follows from Aristotle's premise that no mental act can be experienced *en parergo*, or even exist, unless an object intentionally in-exists in the mind." p.30

I agree that it is the characteristic of intentional in-existence that Brentano traces back to Aristotle. In *DA* III 2, Aristotle proposes perceptual awareness which can perceive the sensible object as well as sensation itself. Brentano draws his inspiration here for the two-level object that can be referred to or directed to by the cognizing subject. Intentional in-existence is formulated by Brentano as a reference that directs a mentally active subject to the immanent object. Concretely speaking, it is the reception and actualization of the cognized object—as well as the actualized cognizing soul’s awareness—that boil down to Brentano’s proposal of the cognized subject’s reference to the object. It appears that Brentano adopts a spiritual interpretation of Aristotle’s account of perception and regards the actualized, cognized object as an immanent object. From my perspective, I can infer two conclusions: first, receiving the immaterial form in perception is not a purely spiritual process, as I argued in Chapter 2; second, what is immanent in actualization is not simply a revealing of an in-existent object but rather the cognized content. Brentano proposes that what we cognize are two-level objects: one is the object cognized; the other, the act of cognition. He attributes these two as primary and secondary objects. Considering that in most cases what we cognize is not a pure object but a description, proposition, event, etc. of an object. The act of cognition itself, as I see it, is also an event which can be described as content and that is the reason why I prefer to speak of immanent content rather than object.

Sorabji<sup>375</sup> holds that Brentano interpreted “receiving form without matter” or “immaterial form” as becoming aware of the intentional object. It is Brentano’s non-literal interpretation of “receiving form without matter” that therefore leads him to the idea of intentional object. The form received by sense-perception is taken by Brentano as intentionally in-existent object. Sorabji claims that from his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, the intentional aspect of perception is revealed – but he disagrees with Brentano who says that Aristotle framed the concept of an intentional object himself, when Brentano implies “intentional in-existence” from the theory of “receiving form without matter.” Sorabji believes that this interpretation is not Aristotle’s intended meaning, but was rather influenced by the later commentators Alexander, Themistius, and Philoponus, who de-physiologized Aristotle’s theory of the reception of the immaterial form. Elsewhere<sup>376</sup> Sorabji proposes that Aristotle does not incorporate the intentional object because both perceptible and intelligible are the efficient causes – neither of which are intentional objects and only the final cause such

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<sup>375</sup> Sorabji (1995).

<sup>376</sup> Sorabji (2001).

as the object of desire can be regarded as intentional object.<sup>377</sup> Sorabji therefore agrees with Caston in arguing that the intentional object is a philosophical term developed by the later Stoics, but not found in Aristotle.

Brentano's proposal of "in-existence"—in the sense that there is always an inner possession of something—can, however, be traced back to Aristotle. In this aspect, I came to a similar conclusion to Sorabji in that Sorabji claimed that the intentional aspect of perception is grounded in his physiological interpretation of sense-perception and is revealed by the formal cause of perception. Sorabji gives the example of anger, which includes the physiological process as the material cause as well as the formal cause relating to desire. He regards the formal cause of sense perception as being linked to other cognitive capacities, such as belief or concept-formation. He emphasizes that perception is a preliminary process for these higher cognitive functions, to which perception is unequal. According to Sorabji, the intentional aspect of perception—specified by the formal cause—lies in the reference of other cognitive capacities to sense-perception. The reference is demonstrated by the content of perception, as Sorabji describes, which is clarified from Aristotle's expansion of perception's function.

In general, it can be inferred that according to Sorabji, intentionality points to the reference from the active subject to the intentional object. Meanwhile, the content points to an essential component of intentionality. This description of intentionality corresponds to my working definition of intentionality as intentional directedness and immanent content – as explained in Chapter one. Both Sorabji and I do not regard the sensible and intelligible objects as intentional objects; whereas, to Sorabji's claim that the object of desire is the intentional object, I prefer to regard it as the object of practical intention – meaning that we desire to do something. This is the reason I preclude it from intentionality in the theoretical sense. When it comes to intentional content, I value Brentano's implication of awareness of what we cognize as a plausible reference to Aristotle, and indicate that this is one element which helps imply the intentional content. Since Sorabji regards perception in Aristotle as literally material change, he therefore introduces other cognitive capacities to explain the content in perception. But in my opinion, perception in Aristotle includes immanent content even without the aid of other cognitive capacities.

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<sup>377</sup> As to the intentional interpretation about sense-perception, I agree with Sorabji that the sensible cannot be regarded as intentional object. The reason he proposes this is that the sensible and intelligible are efficient causes, and only the final cause (such as the object of desire) can be the intentional object. That is to say, the sensible cannot be regarded as intentional because what is sensitive is not an active agent – which is to direct to the sensible object; rather, it is a patient being passively acted on so as to acquire sensible content.

When Brentano describes the two-level objects of mental phenomena, he claims that every mental act is conscious since it includes in a consciousness of itself.<sup>378</sup> Take hearing for instance: its first level object is sound and the second level object is hearing. In this way, the first-level object—sound—means the external object; while the second-level object means hearing itself. These two aspects constitute the two different aspects of mental phenomena. Further, with the aid of inner consciousness, according to Brentano, every mental act is intentional and every intentionality is conscious or derived from consciousness.<sup>379</sup> When he emphasizes the reference or directedness of relation from the mental act to the intentional object, he is depicting the role of consciousness: “The fact that there is no consciousness without any intentional relation at all is as certain as the fact that, apart from the object upon which it is primarily directed, consciousness, on the side, has itself as an object.”<sup>380</sup>

It goes almost without saying that when Brentano argues for the above point, he is adopting Aristotle’s elaboration about perceptual awareness in that we can sense the object as well as the sensation itself. This characteristic of perceptual awareness is modified by Brentano to be intentional, and according to him, the soul’s being aware of its object is called reference or directedness to the object. Brentano thus adopts Aristotle’s elaboration of the common power of sense to stress the immediate experience of mental activity itself. That is why he proposed intentional in-existence as the most characterized feature of mental phenomena, given that the consciousness of the mental act itself is in this way self-revealing. Even though in his later period, he does not keep “in-existence”, but continues to insist that the intentional relation lies in the directedness or reference from the mental act to the thing in question. The mental directedness or reference he refers to is becoming aware or conscious of something, effectively creating a correlation once again with Aristotle.

However, even though becoming aware of—or conscious of—the cognized object can be correlated to Aristotle, Aristotle does not ascribe an active role to the subject as Brentano does. As such, Brentano’s deviation from Aristotle begins with his classification of mental phenomena whereby he adopts a modern notion of the mind, which includes both the capacity of sensation as well as the ability to think, effectively replacing Aristotle’s formulation of the soul. According to the modern definition of the mind, the mind is an active subject when it comes to carrying out all kinds of mental activities. However, according to Aristotle, the perceptual soul and the intellectual soul

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<sup>378</sup> *PES*, p. 26.

<sup>379</sup> However, in the contemporary philosophy of mind, it is not unanimously accepted that every consciousness is intentional. For more discussion on this, see Siewert, Charles (2017), “Consciousness and Intentionality”.

<sup>380</sup> *PES*, p.26.

carry out different cognitive activities. Since perception is possessed by the perceptual soul rather than by the intellectual soul, Brentano instead attributes to perception the active mental feature that it does not have in Aristotle.<sup>381</sup> Brentano states that “in-existence”, a concept which is derived from the Scholastics tradition, means that the intended object is immanent in the mentally active subject.<sup>382</sup> But the perceptual soul is a passive faculty which shall be activated by its object and only then we can be aware of this object. Brentano makes no distinction in claiming that this mentally active subject carries out both activity of perception and thinking. In addition, when it comes to intellect according to Aristotle, even though it is free to think whatever it wants, it is still passively receiving the intelligible form that allows it to know the intelligible object. Henceforth, not only is the perceptual soul a passive entity, but the intellectual soul too is a complex entity that is not merely active.<sup>383</sup>

Brentano further claims that intentional in-existence means that the intended object is immanent in the mentally active subject (or consciousness) and this object is present to us as a sensory, intellectual or conceptual presentation.<sup>384</sup> What is immanent in the cognitive activity can be traced back to Aristotle’s immaterial form, “in each case the sense-organ is capable of receiving the sensible object without its matter. That is why even when the sensible objects are gone the sensible images continue to exist in the sense-organs.”<sup>385</sup> Brentano regards the immanent as having objective existence, which is the ontological basis of the intentional object. The cognitive subject’s receiving form is the change that occurs in the cognitive subject because of the formal cause. Considering that Aristotle regards the form as which defines the thing as it is, it is therefore a defining principle which defines what the nature and meaning of cognition. As such, it is difficult to accept that Aristotle depicts an intentional object which is actualized in cognition. First, in receiving the immaterial form, Aristotle does not delineate a reference to the intentional object. Second, in cognition, what is realized is the identity of the cognitive subject and the object. The cognitive subject possesses content that is said to be of or about the object, but it is not that content which is immanent nor which the subject is directing.

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<sup>381</sup> “Hearing a sound, seeing a coloured object, feeling warmth or cold . . . every judgment, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt is a mental phenomenon [or act].” *PES*, p. 79.

<sup>382</sup> *PES*, p. 140.

<sup>383</sup> Taieb underlines the receptive tradition of Aristotle’s theory about the cognitive subject’s activity, in which an active factor is elaborated and can be referred to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus. As it stands, Brentano’s clarification about the mentally active subject is influenced by the later Aristotelian interpretations. For more on this, see Taieb (2018).

<sup>384</sup> *PES*, p. 140.

<sup>385</sup> *DA* III 425b24-26.

All things considered, the intentional in-existence can find its roots in Aristotle even though there are still detailed distinctions between his work and Brentano's later theory. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian background Brentano refers to in support of this formulation of intentional in-existence falls to the wayside when he focuses on *Reales*. There, Brentano adopts sense and the intellect's immaterial receiving form in Aristotelian framework to argue for the immanent object. However, in intellect, the intellectual soul's reception of the intellectual form includes the universals and other abstractions that Brentano rejected in his later stage. Therefore, there is an inconsistency whereby Brentano continues to adopt Aristotelian framework of receiving the immaterial form. Brentano turns to the mental subject's reference to the sensible, intellectual object in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to argue for his later proposal,<sup>386</sup> though the mentally active subject he attributes to Aristotle is not Aristotelian either. Most importantly, Brentano's deviation from Aristotle has its roots in their different metaphysical suppositions. We may compare Haldane's worry about Putnam that "one cannot enjoy the benefits of Aristotelian epistemological realism without accepting aspects of its attendant metaphysics" (p.61).<sup>387</sup> Aristotle sets up his metaphysical foundation of cognition by a set of formulations: the theory of form and matter, potentiality and actuality, receiving form without matter, the assimilation between the knower and the known in actuality, and so forth. Brentano adopts the cognitive subject's awareness of the object from Aristotle to work for his intentionality proposal – however, he does not accept all of Aristotle's metaphysical suppositions.

### 5.3 Aristotle and modern philosophy of mind

From the contemporary perspective, Aristotle is hardly a substance dualist given that he does not set apart the psychic capacity and the bodily substrate as being independent from each other. The soul is the efficient, formal, and final cause of the living being. Meanwhile, the soul depends on the bodily instrument to perform its functions. This fundamental formulation of the soul-body relation enables soul to carry out psychic activities based on physiological foundation and thus both soul and body are inseparable components of the living being, with the soul endowed with the power of consciousness and cognition. As Everson claims, "in contemporary philosophy of mind, the central question is how ordinary physical substances can be capable of

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<sup>386</sup> PES, p. 211-212.

<sup>387</sup> Lisska (2016).

consciousness and cognition, and that is not a question which lies at the heart of Aristotelian psychology.”<sup>388</sup>

In Aristotle’s psychological world, the higher psychic capacity relies on the lower one. For example, the intellectual capacity relies on the perceptual and the nutritive power, and the perceptual power relies on the nutritive power. In the first part of this thesis, we have seen the essential role of sense data in all other psychic activities – such as memory, dreams, recollection, and intellect. It is worth noting once more that sensation occurs with the sensible object out there working as the efficient cause. This guarantees the correlation of all psychic activities with the external world. Therefore, on Aristotle’s view, there is no doubt that psychological phenomena fit into the natural world.

At the same time, according to Aristotle, the psychic power cannot be reduced to its physiological foundation. To certify this, we have already elaborated what perception is. The occurrence of perceiving the perceptible quality is neither a spiritual event as proposed by Burnyeat—which is the perceptual subject’s ability to be aware of what is happening—nor a literal event in the same sense that the object holds the perceptible quality, as Sorabji proposed. As I see it, perceiving includes the engagement of a special kind of physiological change in the sense organ and, moreover, perception cannot be reduced to the physiological basis given that the perceptual soul suffers an alteration from potentiality to actuality to become aware of what is perceived.

The claim that mental states cannot be reduced to physical states is adopted by Cohen as revealing functionalism – a theory which Cohen claims, that mental states are defined in terms of their relations to causal inputs, behavioral output, and other mental states. According to functionalism, the relation of matter and form is contingent. Functionalism is attributed to Aristotle by other scholars as well – such as Hilary Putnam (1973), Martha Nussbaum (1978), and Christopher Shields (1988). Sorabji’s literal interpretation of perception as a physiological process is adopted to prove the functionalism in Aristotle’s philosophy. However, that is what Burnyeat rejects. In Burnyeat’s opinion, the material basis is also capable of awareness, while functionalism holds that the material basis is simply the structure which provides the basis for psychological functions. Functionalism in Aristotle is further rejected by Howard Robinson (1983), as he argues that Aristotle’s body-matter relation is dualistic, and not functionalist for that reason.<sup>389</sup>

Nussbaum and Putnam underline the characteristic of intentionality in Aristotle when they argue for functionalism. The reliance of functionalism on matter

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<sup>388</sup> Everson (1997), p.5.

<sup>389</sup> For a comprehensive overview of functionalism and Aristotle, see Green (1998).

determines the essential role of matter in intentionality – which is the psychological function. According to Nussbaum and Putnam, “we cannot describe the natural functions that are the essential natures of animals and plants without making these functions embodied in some matter that is suitable to them. Matter is not only the inert background, but also the very vehicle of functioning itself.”<sup>390</sup> Correspondingly, intentionality of awareness is concerned with its physical embodiment as well. The soul is regarded by them as the functional structure in and of the matter rather than as being housed in the body. The en-mattered characteristic of intentionality, they claim, frees Aristotle from Brentano’s tendency of treating all intentionality as a unitary phenomenon.<sup>391</sup> In my opinion, their rejection of Brentano’s spiritual interpretation of intentionality in Aristotle also contributes to this end result.

Caston values Aristotle as implying supervenience – that is, the mental supervenes on the physical and certain events can have the virtue of falling under a mental type. In such a case, the body does not hold the entire responsibility in causality – or to say, some behavior lacks a complete physical cause. He supports this by claiming that there is a downward causation of mental events. Each mental event supervenes on the physical, along with giving it causation because it falls into a mental type. He gives the example of Aristotle’s elaboration of action whereby the bodily motion results from a combination of desire and thought or *phantasia*. Caston regards this integration as the efficient cause, which affects the muscles. According to Caston, the bodily change is treated by Aristotle as an instrument of the mental change and does not constitute a complete cause. Instead, it is the mental change qua mental that is the cause (p.330). That is the reason Caston believes Aristotle adopts a downward causation.

None of this need violate the causal closure of the physical: it may still be the case that only physical events cause other physical events. What downward causation violates is rather the comprehensiveness of the physical: in Aristotle’s terminology, it would not be the case that every efficient cause of behavior qua physical is its cause properly speaking. Aristotle may simply hold that some psychophysical events, rather than being ghostly hands reaching down from above, are causes qua mental, even in the absence of complete physical causes. (p.330)

The mental and bodily parts of the living being thus correspond to form and matter in Aristotle’s terminology and these two parts act together to compose an event. Based on the above elaboration, Caston attributes emergentism to Aristotle – that is, a mental

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<sup>390</sup> Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p.32.

event supervenes on the physical event, at the same time that there is causal power in the mental event.<sup>392</sup>

I agree with Caston's proposal to contribute supervenience and emergentism to Aristotle. However, I remain cautious when attributing functionalism to Aristotle, even though supervenience and functionalism are always closely related. The point on which I disagree with functionalism is its multi-realization. Functionalism defines the mental state as a functional state, and this functional state can be multi-realized in different physical substrates. But in my view, the soul's power can be applied to the specific kind of body only, and not to any physical substrate.

Except for the contemporary revival of topics related to the body-soul relation in Aristotle, Brentano's proposal of intentionality—with its abundant roots in Aristotle—influenced his followers, such as Husserl's phenomenology. As we disclosed in the dissertation, the characteristic of immanent content is an important feature in Aristotle's theory. That is what distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena, as Brentano points out at his first stage. The specific immanent content constitutes animate beings' inner life and explains how they differ from other non-animate beings. Besides, Brentano is insightful when valuing the direct experience of one's inner life, which is done with the aid of inner consciousness. The concomitant psychic consciousness of every psychological activity provides the subject with first personal access to the inner experience, and the subject introspectively notices it. This kind of description depicts the phenomenological basis of intentionality and affects the research of intentionality from the approach of phenomenology.<sup>393</sup>

Thus, Aristotle's philosophy continues to hold treasure for contemporary philosophy of mind, in that the irreducible characteristic of the soul's power and its supervenience on a physiological basis provides insightful ideas for discussion thousands of years after their inception. The internal structure of knowledge formation and cognition and the role of intentionality continue to inspire modern research in the philosophy of the mind.

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<sup>392</sup> Caston (1997).

<sup>393</sup> For more about phenomenology and intentionality, see Mendelovici (2018); Tassone (2012).