The roots of intentionality in Aristotle's theory of psychology

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CHAPTER 2: THE ROOTS OF INTENTIONALITY IN ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION

This chapter has two aims: the first aim is to uncover whether a root of intentionality can be found in Aristotle's theory of perception by using the working definition of intentionality we set in chapter one.[127] The second aim is an evaluation of Brentano's notion of intentionality in Aristotle's perceptual theory. This will enable us to evaluate whether Brentano is right to refer to Aristotle in his own work, and then to discern the differences between their respective theories. As will become clear, our inquiry will revolve around an analysis of Aristotle's perceptual theory from the perspective of intentionality.

The structure of this chapter will be the following: I will first list several fundamental tenets that underlie the theory of perception, and then set forth the survey of Aristotle's theory under the heading of the two characteristics of intentionality: intentional directedness and immanent content. Correspondingly, we will reach our conclusions at the end of these two parts. Lastly, I shall reveal the implication of intentionality in Aristotle's perceptual theory by using both the working definition of intentionality we set up previously and the criterion of Brentano's intentionality thesis.

2.1 The foundations of Aristotelian psychology

Before diving into a detailed analysis of Aristotle's theory of perception, several general tenets about his philosophical framework deserve prior discussion. Given that these fundamental positions lay the foundation of Aristotle's perceptual theory,[128] this

[127] See p.52-58.

[128] Anna Marmodoro inspired me to takes this approach. That is, before getting into a detailed analysis of Aristotle's perceptual theory, Marmodoro undertakes an analysis of the metaphysical foundations of perception and tries to formulate Aristotle's psychology from the standpoint of his metaphysics. As she states, "this book makes an original contribution to the debate by motivating the view that Aristotle's theory of perception is aligned with one of his most fundamental positions in metaphysics – namely that all properties are causal powers (δυνάμεις, potentialities), and that causation is to be accounted for in terms of powers and their activation (ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ or ἐνεργείᾳ, actuality)." Cf. Anna Marmodoro (2014), p.3. Compared to Marmodoro's adoption of the fundamental position of causal powers (for Marmodoro, it means potentiality and actuality), I adopt the tenets of matter and form, four types of causes, and potentiality and actuality to articulate perception.

initial part of the chapter will provide a concise conceptual elucidation of the various principles we find in Aristotle – viz. his theory of causes, hylomorphism, and actuality and potentiality.

2.1.1 Four types of causes

In order to obtain knowledge, the first step is to inquire about the causes. As Aristotle says, "for since the aim of our investigation is knowledge, and we think we have knowledge of a thing only when we think we can answer the question about it 'on account of what?" (*Phys*. 194b19-20)[129] In other words, only when we grasp the causes of perception, can we say that we acquire knowledge of it. Aristotle lays out his theory of causes in *Physics* and it is also applied to explain the mechanism of perception in *De Anima*.[130] Considering this, I shall first undertake an analysis of the theory of causes.

Aristotle defines four types of causes to instruct the investigation of knowledge:

> Well then, (1) the existence of material for the generating process to start from (whether specifically or generically considered) is one of the essential factors we are looking for. Such is the bronze for the statue, or the silver for the phial. (Material *aitia*.) Then, naturally, (2) the thing in question cannot be there unless the material has actually received the form or characteristics of the type, conformity to which brings it within the definition of the thing we say it is, whether specifically or generically. Thus, the interval between two notes is not an octave unless the notes are in the ratio of 2 to 1; nor do they stand at a musical interval at all unless they conform to one or other of the recognized ratios, (Formal *aitia*.) Then again (3), there must be something to initiate the process of the change or its cessation when the process is completed, such as the act of a voluntary agent (of the smith, for instance), or the father who begets a child; or more generally the prime, conscious or unconscious, agent that produces the effect and starts the material on its way to the product, changing it from what it was to what it is to be. (Efficient *aitia.)* And lastly, (4) there is the end or purpose, for the sake of which the process is initiated, as when a man takes exercise for the sake of his health. 'Why does he take exercise?' we ask. And the answer 'Because he thinks it good for his health' satisfies us. (Final *aitia.*) (*Phys*. 194b25-35, tr. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford.)[131]

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[129] Translated by P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford (1957).

[130] Except for Marmodoro who provides a causal analysis of perception. See also Corcilius (2014), Everson (1997), Sorabji (2001), Caston (1996).

[131] Unless otherwise indicated all translations of Aristotle are taken from J. Barnes (Ed.) Revised Oxford Translation.

This outline of the four types of causes explains the process of change and rest of nearly all beings. To understand what is meant by this, let's take the case of a sculpture. A sculpture can exemplify the four types of causes: the material—such as the marble that constitutes the substrate of the sculpture—is the material cause; the sculptor who engraves the sculpture is the efficient cause; the idea or design that is embodied in the sculptor is the formal cause that also shapes the finished sculpture; and lastly, the purpose of the sculpture itself is the final cause and the final aim of all these actions.[132]

When it comes to psychology, Aristotle describes the soul as the efficient, formal and final cause of the living being *(DA* 415b10-19).[133] In *De Anima*, Aristotle summarizes the soul in the following manner: (a) "the soul is an actuality of the first kind of a natural body having life potentially in it" (*DA* 412a30); (b) "it is the substantial being that is a thing's logos, or the being-what-it-is of a certain kind of body" (*DA* 412b10-12); and (c) "the soul is the source of these phenomena and is characterized by the power of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking and movement" (*DA* 413a24-26).[134] The living being thus differs from the non-living being in that the former has the soul's potential of "knowing, perceiving, opening, and further desiring, wishing, and generally all other modes of appetition", and produces "the local movements of animals, and growth, maturity, and decay" (*DA* 411a25-411b1). The

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[132] It is worth noting that the final three causes sometimes coincide with one another. For example, the final cause can be regarded as being the same as the formal cause in some cases.

[133] "The soul is the cause and first principle of the living body. The words cause and first principle are used in several separate senses. But the soul is equally the cause in each of the three senses which we have distinguished; for it is the cause in the sense of being that from which motion is derived, in the sense of the purpose or final cause, and as being the substance of all bodies that have souls. (1) That the soul is the cause in the sense of substance is obvious; for substance is the cause of existence in all things, and for living creature's existence is life, and of these the soul is the cause and first principle. Also the actuality of that which exists potentially is its essential formula. (2) Clearly the soul is also the cause in the final sense. For just as mind acts with some purpose in view, so too does nature, and this purpose is its end." Translated by W. S. Heff (1934).

[134] The difference between (a) and (b) lies in that Aristotle attributes actuality and potentiality to the assessment of the substance: actuality means that the substance has fulfilled its potentials and possesses the feature which makes the substance as such. Potentiality implies that the substance has the potential to become such but has not yet accomplished this. As to the formulation of (a), the actuality of the first kind refers to the stable status of capacity, as the case that we own the knowledge or have the capacity of something, but the knowledge or capacity is not in practice yet. The actuality of the second kind is a realized or performing status in which the knowledge or capacity we have is in practice. All the living beings are born with a soul and owning a soul is the first step to being alive. We are also born with the capacities of the soul, which is the potential to be used. In this sense, the soul can be regarded as the actuality of the first kind, where (c) is the capability of soul.

soul's potential to initiate growth, local movement and cognition in living beings therefore acts as the efficient cause. Aristotle delineates the substantial being in three ways: the form, the matter and the composite of form and matter– of which the form is the actuality while the matter is the potential.[135] As the formal cause, the soul is the actuality and the *logos*, which gives the potential living being their life and which defines what kind of creature it is. The soul is also the final cause of the living being, whose final goal is to fully actualize all the potential capacities of the soul in living their life according to their species.[136] In the case of plants, the final cause is to absorb nutrition for survival; with regard to animals, it is to live well by the virtue of their senses; for humans, it is to pursue a good life with the use of their intellect. And thus, this is the description of the soul as the efficient, formal, and final cause of the living being.

However, in terms of perception, the efficient cause and the formal cause of perception coincide in the sensible object. The sensible object's stimulation on the sense organ is like that of fire on wood, in which sense the sensible object or fire works as an efficient cause.[137] Since the efficient cause is to cause either change or rest in beings,[138] the sensible object is the active agent which brings about a change to what is percipient. Meanwhile, the sensible form is what defines the sensible object as it is. The sensible form is the *logos* or definition of a substantial being. When the sensible object acts on the patient by virtue of the efficient cause, it is the formal cause that defines the perceptual state and decides what perception is about. Aristotle elucidates this as the perceptual soul's "receiving form without matter".[139] That is how the sensible object works as the efficient and formal cause in sensation.

The material and final cause also play a role in perception. The material cause is the sense organ which provides a physiological substrate for perception. As Aristotle says, "an eye is the material of vision" (*DA* 412b20). The final cause of perception is to

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[135] "As we have already said, substance is used in three senses, form, matter, and a compound of the two. Of these matter is potentiality, and form actuality." *DA* 414a 15-19, tr. W. S. Heff (1934).

[136] The soul as the final cause of the living being points to a tendency of Aristotle's "teleological" understanding of nature. For instance, Mark Shiffman comments that "for the sake of perpetuating this enactment of the form that they are, living things 'do whatever they do according to nature' (*On the Soul* II.4, 415b 1-2). Soul in this sense is an unmoved mover for all living beings, the natural inner principle in accord with which they are self-moved. Soul moves as an end or *telos*, and this is the cornerstone of Aristotle's 'teleological' understanding of nature." Cf. Shiffman (2011), p. 20-21.

[137] *DA* 417a5-8.

[138] As we referred to in *Physics* 194b30, "Again, the primary source of the change or rest; e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause, the father is the cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what changes of what is changed."

[139] *DA* 424a18-20.

fully actualize the potential perceptual capacity to assist the subject's well-being and it is the four causes working together that explain the perceptual activity. However, to serve the purpose of this chapter I will focus in particular on the efficient and formal cause in perception in order to reveal to what extent intentionality may be found in Aristotle's theory of perception. I will separately deal with these two causes in the discussion of intentional directedness and immanent content when we return to them later in this chapter.

2.1.2 Hylomorphism

Aristotle delineates the relation between body/matter and soul/form as hylomorphism, contending that every physical object is a compound of both matter and form. The form is "the arrangement, or the knowledge of music, or some other thing said of something in the same way" (*Phys*. 190b28-30). The seed of an apple tree will grow out to become an apple tree, with all the characteristics of the apple tree. For the same reason, the embryo of a human being will not grow into a monkey but rather a human. In this sense, the form is the essence or definition which defines the nature of a substance. The material component is what constitutes the substrate of the substance and suffers privation. However, when it comes to the query of what represents the core nature of the substance, Aristotle attributes it to the form.[140] That is to say, the axiety is the form of the axe, the one which makes the axe as it is, rather than its material substrate. Once the axe loses the function of axiety, it can hardly be called the axe anymore.[141] Or, for example, the form of a house is what guides the construction of the house in such a way that the house functions as a shelter.[142] In these cases, the function of the axe and the structure of the house are the form of the substance. Broadly speaking, the form can be interpreted as the shape, the *logos*, the essence, the core qualities or the function of the substance, as well as the definition that defines the substance as it is.

Matter and form are inseparable from one another in composing the substance. Hylomorphism finds a range of application across Aristotle's corpus. For example, it directly applies to the body/soul relation found in *De Anima*, in which the body is regarded as the material constituent while it is the soul that is the form of the living being and enables the living being to be active as such. But this is not a Platonic or

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[140] *Phys*. 194b25-35.

[141] *DA* 412b10-15.

[142] *DA* 403b3-7; *Met*. 1043a29-36. In most cases, the formal cause of a substance is also the final cause. The structure or definition of the house (such as to be a shelter) is also the house's function or purpose.

Cartesian concept of dualism in that body and the soul remain separate. Rather, Aristotle delineates an inseparable relation between soul and body. He assesses that all of our affections such as anger, desire, love, pity, etc., are involved with the body. That is to say, these affections are en-mattered (*DA* 403a25). Hylomorphism also applies to explain perception. We find that both the perceiver and the perceived are composed of matter and form,[143] and Aristotle describes perception as receiving form without matter.[144]

2.1.3 Motion as the change from potentiality to actuality

Potentiality and actuality are general descriptions that depict changes in the state of a thing.[145] In particular, the basic elaboration of motion as the change from potentiality to actuality is applied to perception, since perception is also defined by Aristotle as a kind of motion. "Sensation depends, as we said, on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some sort of change of quality" (*DA* 416b34-35). Therefore, the reference to a general description of motion will aid our interpretation of perception. In *Phys.* III, motion is described in the following manner:

> We can now define motion or change as the progress of the realizing of a potentiality. (*Phys.* 201a11)
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> The mover will always transmit a form, either a 'this' or 'such' or 'so much', which, when it moves, will be the principle and cause of the motion, e.g. the actual man begets man from what is potentially man. (*Phys.* 202 a 10-11)
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> Motion is in the movable. It is the fulfilment of this potentiality by the action of that which has the power of causing motion, and the actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is not other than the actuality of the movable; for it must be the fulfilment of both. A thing is capable of causing motion because it can do this; it is a mover because it actually does it. But it is on the movable that it is capable of acting. Hence there is a single actuality of both alike, just as one to two and two to one are the same interval, and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one--for these are one and the same, although their definition is not one. So it is with the mover and the moved. (*Phys.* 202a 14-22)

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[143] For the perceiving part, the sense organ is the material substrate, while the perceiving capacity (such as vision, taste, hear, etc,) is the formal part. (*DA* 412b20). For the perceived part, the sensible object is composed of the sensible mater and the sensible form. When perceive, we receive the sensible form without the matter.

[144] *DA* 424a18-20.

[145] *Phys*. III 1*; GC* I 3, I 7*; Met*. VII 7-9; *DA* II 5, etc.

The mover and the moved are necessary for motion, given that an act of motion or change requires agent and patient. Before motion occurs, both the mover and moved remain in their state of potentiality. But since the mover has the innate power of causing motion, once conditions are satisfied (for instance, the potential mover and moved are in sufficient proximity), the mover will act on the moved because of its capacity of doing so, and at that moment, both of them actualize their potential in one shared activity. And so, two points flow from this delineation: first, motion needs to be activated by a mover which transmits a form as the working principle or cause; second, motion that occurs in the patient actualizes two potentialities at the same time.

Aristotle conforms to the general rule of motion when he expounds perception. What is percipient and the perceptible object are analogous to the moved and mover respectively. The perceptible object is the active agent which acts on what is percipient by transmitting a form, which defines the nature of the perceptual content. The perceiving subject actualizes its potential perceiving capacity—such as vision, hearing, taste, touch and smell—by receiving the sensible form. The potential sensible object becomes the actualized sensible object because it is perceived by the perceiving subject. The actualization of these two potentialities is initiated by the sensible object, which results in a change in the perceiving subject. The system of perception expresses the detailed application of the principle of motion Aristotle outlined and to which we will return to later.

2.2 Intentional directedness in perception

In order to investigate the possible roots of intentional directedness in Aristotle's theory of perception, I shall arrange my analysis of Aristotle's perceptual theory according to the topics that are relevant for the topic of intentional directedness. I shall discuss the process of perception – notably, how perception is initiated, what its external conditions are, and what role the perceptual soul plays in this process. In addition, I shall look more closely at the correlation between the perceptual soul and the perceptible, as well as at the active tendency that is implied in perception.

2.2.1 the efficient cause of perception

The general definition of intentional directedness implies that there is a conscious active agent in the act of directing toward something. In the strict sense, it implies a

relational mode between the active agent and the object. We find in Aristotle's theory of perception the delineation of the efficient cause which plays an active initiating power.

There are several components in Aristotle's perceptual theory: the sensible object, the medium, and the perceiving subject. The sensible object is the agent of perception because it initiates a perceptual activity and stimulates the passive perceiving subject.[146] The medium works as the transmission channel, without which the form of the object cannot be transmitted.[147] The perceiving subject has the capacity of perception. The activity of perception occurs when the present object stimulates the corresponding perceiving subject by transmitting its form through a medium to the perceiving subject, resulting in the subject's reception of the sensible form, which is the qualities, properties, essence or definition of the object. From this general description of perception, the directionality of perception runs from the perceptible object to the perceiving soul. I will now flesh it out.

When Aristotle sets out to explicate the perceptual activity, he asks, "why do we not perceive the senses themselves, or why without the stimulation of external objects do they not produce sensation…." (*DA* 417a 4-6). This question sheds light on the efficient cause of perception – that is, the external object. Aristotle explains that the perceiving subject is passive and potential, which can only be acted upon by the active agent: "it is clear that what is sensitive is so only potentially, not actually. The power of sense is parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously, but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition." (*DA* 417a 7-10) This active agent with the power of initiating motion is the sensible object.

The reason why Aristotle delineates sensation as such is likely owing to his criticism of his predecessors. Among them, it was popularly claimed that sensation adheres to the principle of "like affected by unlike"– or as qualified by Democritus as "like by like." Aristotle proposes instead a quite distinct opinion: the patient and agent are like in kind but unlike in species (*GC* 323b30). The identity in kind makes sure that the singular sense— vision, for instance—will not be affected by another kind of sensible object. In addition, the unlike in species makes it possible for the potential perceiving subject to perceive what it does not have yet. If the perceiving subject is the same as the sensible object, it will suffer no alteration from this group of sensible objects at that moment.

Since the sensible object is the mover which initiates motion, it either contains the origin of motion, or it is the last agent next to the patient (*GC* 324a25). Aristotle

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[146] *DA* 417b20-28.

[147] *DA* 419a14-15, 25-30.

instantiates the sensible form's innate capacity to set in motion as that, "the visible, then, is color, i.e. that which overlies what is in itself visible; by 'in itself' we mean not that the object is by its definition visible but that it has in itself the cause of its visibility." (*DA* 418 b1);[148] and "what has the power of producing sound is what has the power of setting in motion a single mass of air which is continuous up to the organ of hearing" (*DA* 420a 4-6). Extending the case of vision and sound to sense in general, it can be reasonably inferred that the power of the sensible object to initiate motion is therefore in its nature.

It is worth noting that the occurrence of sensation cannot lack an intermediary and that we cannot perceive the object if it is placed immediately upon the sense organ. Except for the sensible object—which has the innate nature to cause motion—Aristotle attributes a role to the medium – that of the last agent next to the patient.[149] The medium is the flesh and tongue needed for touch and taste, while air and water serve as the medium for sight, hearing, and smell (*DA* 423b17-423b26). For example, in the process of vision, color can only be transferred through a medium that has the character of transparency, such as air and water (*DA* 418b1). Light, which is the actuality of transparency, makes the medium capable of receiving color, transferring the color from a sensible body and passing it to the sense of sight, which also has the characteristic of transparency. That is, in the case of vision, color transfers through the transparent medium (water or air) to the eye and acts on it, which results in the seeing color. In the case of sound, air works as the medium which transfers the sound to the organ of hearing, so that the sound can act on the percipient.

For perception in general, the sensible object is the efficient cause, which is also the mover. The occurrence of perception follows a line from the sensible object, to the medium, and then to the perceiving subject. The efficient cause effects a change in the patient, and the passive feature of the perceptual soul provides the possibility for the sensible object to act on it so that it can receive the incoming information.[150]

2.2.2 The passive and potential perceptual soul

Up to this point, we have examined how the efficient cause of the sensible object allows for perception to occur. As observed, what is percipient is depicted as being both passive and potential (*DA* 417a5-8), which corresponds to the efficient power of

[148] Translated by P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford.

[149] *DA* 419a15-20; *DA* 419a25-30.

[150] For more details about this change, see section 3 in this chapter.

the external object. What is percipient and the perceptible object constitute two ends of perception: one is active, exercising a causal influence; while the other is passive in suffering that influence. Except for the differences in being active and passive, both of their potencies are in potentiality before perception occurs, and the actualization of both potentials is realized at the same time when perception occurs.[151]

The elaboration of potentiality and actuality goes as follows:

> But we must now distinguish different senses in which things can be said to be potential or actual; at the moment we are speaking as if each of these phrases had only one sense. We can speak of something as a knower either as when we say that man is a knower, meaning that man falls within the class of beings that know or have the knowledge or as when we are speaking of a man who possesses a knowledge of grammar. Each of these has a potentiality, but not in the same way: the one because his kind or matter is such and such, the other because he can reflect when he wants to if nothing external prevents him. And there is the man who is already reflecting—he is a knower in actuality and in the most proper sense is knowing, e.g. this A. Both the former are potential knowers, who realize their respective potentialities, the one by change of quality, i.e. repeated transitions from one state to its opposite under instruction, the other in another way by the transition from the inactive possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise. (*DA* 417 a23-b2)

Aristotle clarifies two pairs of potentiality and actuality through the example of a "knower". The first pair is from potentiality1 to potentiality2/actuality1, which can be visualized as the process of a man moving from not knowing to knowing; the second pair is from potentiality2/actuality1 to actuality2, indicating a reflective knower who has the knowledge to practically use it. Sensation also follows these two pairs of change:

> In the case of what is to possess sense, the first transition is due to the action of the male parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect of sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge. Actual sensation corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge. (*DA* 417b16-20)

The perceptual capacity is what we receive from birth. Therefore, it is an actual state compared to the state without the capacity to perceive. However, it is still potential given that it has not realized its function even though it has the power to do so. The actuality of a potential perceptual capacity requires a perceiving activity. Following the

[151] *DA* 418a 4-7.

two pairs of transition: the transition from having no sense to having the sense is the transition from potentiality1 to potentiality2/actuality1. The transition from having the sense to exercising the sense is from potentiality2/actuality1 to actuality2.

Aristotle is more focused on the second pair of sensations. That is, the potential sensation means that we have the power to see or hear, while the actual sensation is when we are actually seeing or hearing. This is what Aristotle means by the sense's potentiality and actuality. The shift of the sense from the potential state to the actual state needs to have a causal agent because the potential sense cannot initiate action by itself but only by something which produces motion.[152] Correspondingly, the sense has the capacity to receive the motion and exercise the act of sensing. In this way, the potential sensible object and the potential sensing capacity become actualized together in sensing.

Conclusion

It is now clear that in sensation, the sensible object is the active agent that can influence the other. The sensing subject can only be passively acted upon by the sensible object and thus exercise sensing. At this stage, I would like to state that there is no directedness emanating from the sensing subject to the sensible, let alone intentional directedness. What is more, intentional directedness does not necessarily result in a change in something, while the directedness from the sensible object does have an effect on the sensing subject. Therefore, even though we find that the efficient cause of the sensible object is with the active factor when directed at something, it is not what intentional directedness means.

2.3 Immanent content in perception

I have previously explained immanent content as a type of presentation or information content pertaining to the ordinary object, properties, and state of affairs.[153] Systematically speaking, to say that P is an immanent content is to say that 1) P is possessed by a conscious subject S; 2) P is something S itself constitutes when S is concerned with a particular P'; 3) P is a presentation or information content of P'.

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[152] "All things are acted upon and moved by what already is at work and productive of motion." *DA* 417 a19, tr. Shiffman 2011.

[153] See: Chapter 1, p.52-58.

In this part I shall investigate the roots of immanent content in Aristotle's theory of perception. Concretely speaking, I shall pay attention to issues such as how the perceptual content is composed and comes into being, the relation of the perceptual content and its object, and how the perceiving subject comes to be aware of the perceptual content. These issues directly relate to our judgement about whether and how the roots of immanent content are revealed in Aristotle's perceptual theory.

My approach to addressing these issues boils down to these steps: firstly, I will aim to probe how the formal cause works in perception. In doing so, I will elaborate on the principle of "receiving form without matter" so as to see how the perceptual content comes into being. What is more, the three categories of the sensible object directly determine what kind of sensible content we can have, and the perception of these sensible objects implies the mechanism of how we perceive things and constitute the perceptual content. Secondly, Aristotle articulates an identity between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, which guarantees that the perceptual content is exactly about its perceptible object. Thirdly, Aristotle claims that when we perceive, we perceive not only the sensible object but also the sensation of sensing the object (*DA* 425b12-13). This is generally acknowledged as the implication of perceptual awareness, which shows that we are conscious of what we are perceiving, and that there is first-person access to the perceptual content.

2.3.1 the formal cause of perception

Brentano refers to Aristotle's perceptual theory when he proposes the thesis of intentional in-existence in the following manner: "the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter" (2009, 67). This reveals the principle of "receiving form without matter", which Aristotle expounds as follows: "about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter" (*DA* 424a18-19). He explicates that it is the signet of bronze or gold that produces the impression but not qua bronze or gold. Similarly, the sense is affected by what is colored or flavored and not by virtue of the object itself – but rather, by what makes the thing as it is, by its form (*DA* 424a20-24). Since the sensible form is the definition or *logos* of the sensible object as such,[154] and the reception of the sensible form marks

[154] Hicks explains the form as *logos*. He states that "such a form is properly called a *logos* because it alone can be rationally defined or (in other words) is the content of the definition." (p. 418). Meanwhile, he proposes that it is also a *dunamis*, which represents what a thing is good for, or is able to effect or be. (p.

that the cognitive subject becomes somehow characterized by the form of the sensible object and exemplifies the information coming from outside. As we discussed in the first part of this chapter, this follows the general pattern of *Phys.* III 2.[155] Aristotle instantiates this pattern using the case of a single sense. For example, vision is the activity of taking on color, and hearing is the activity of taking on sound. In both, color and sound are the forms of the sensible object (*DA* 418b27). That is how the formal cause works in perception.

Henceforth, the form shapes what the sensible object is and when it acts on the sense, it directly determines what the perceptual content will be about.[156] To be specific, when the sensible object presents itself, it transmits the sensible form to the perceiving subject and a new perceptual state comes into being.[157] For example, different color constitutes a different perceptual experience, determined by the kind of form that is applied. However, the material substrate also plays a role in the composition of sensation. Since the material substrate of sensation and that of the sensible object are different, the perceptual state—after receiving the sensible form and the sensible object defined by the sensible form—are therefore different in being. Probing this will help us further elaborate on how the perceptual content is composed, and I will deal with it separately in the upcoming section on the alteration in the perceiving subject.[158] Next, as planned, I shall expound the perception of the three categories of perceptible objects.

2.3.2 Perceptual content

2.3.2.1 The perception of three kinds of sensible objects

The specific type of the perceptible object directly determines what kind of perception it will be. This spells out a causal model of perception from the sensible object to the

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418) Cf. Hicks (1907). In p. 6 of this dissertation, we also declared that "the form is the essence or definition which defines what kind of nature a substance has".

[155] "the mover will always transmit a form, either a 'this' or such or so much, which, when it moves, will be the principle and cause of the motion, e.g. the actual man begets man from what is potentially man." Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye(1957).

[156] Brentano comments that "the proper object of the sense, that property of the perceived object which is the principle of the alteration of the sense, and which we have to use in order to determine the nature of the sense." Cf. Brentano (1977), p. 56. This corresponds with my interpretation that the sensible object determines the property of the sensible content.

[157] As is seen in *Phys*. 202a 14-22. As discussed in part one of this chapter: the mover will cause a motion which happens in the moved.

[158] See p.78-88.

perceiving subject. Correspondingly, the structure of the perceiving subject is well-designed to accommodate the input from the sensible object. In practice, hardly have we ever had the perceptual experience of a single sensible quality. Sensation is always about multiple and vivid sensible objects. In addition, Aristotle claims that the specific sense never errs in reporting whether it is color or sound, but he admits that it may err as to what it is that is colored or where it is, as well as what it is that is making or where it is (*DA* 418a16-17).[159] That is why Aristotle introduces the common and incidental sensible over and above the proper objects of the five singular senses.[160]
The definition of the common sensible is as follows:

> But perception of movement, rest, number, shape and size is shared by several senses. For things of this kind are not proper to any one sense, but are common to all; for instance, some kinds of movement are perceptible both by touch and by sight. (*DA* 418a18-20, tr. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, 1957).

The common sensible does not exclusively belong to any singular sense.[161] While Aristotle insists that the common sensible is common to all senses, we can perceive it simply by the singular sense.[162] This may appear to be an inconsistency – after all, on the one hand, the singular sense has its specific sensible objects and the common sensible is not listed as its object; and yet on the other, the singular sense can perceive the common sensible. More importantly, Aristotle denies there are more senses than the five singular senses. Therefore, which sense is responsible for the common sensible then? There are two possibilities: the first, we perceive the common sensible by the

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[159] Also "For the perception of the special objects of sense is always free from error". The errors in perceiving the common and incidental sensible may due to *phantasia*, as is said, "sensations are always true, imaginations are for the most part false." Cf. *DA* 428b19-24.

[160] Aristotle's clarification of the perceptual soul follows his explanation of different kinds of sensible objects, which he claims at the beginning of *DA*. He formally distinguishes three kinds of perceptual objects in *DA* II 6: the proper sensible, the common sensible and the incidental sensible. From II 7- II 11 the five senses are separately described in detail – and correspondingly in III 1, he turns to the clarification of the nature of sense responsible for the common and incidental sensible.

[161] *DA* II 7- II 11.

[162] See *DA* 418a19 "some kinds of movement are perceptible both by touch and by sight" (Translated by P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, 1957); *DA* III 1, 425b5-10 "why we need more than one sense to perceive common sensible. The common sensible is given in the objects of more than one sense reveals their distinction from each and all of the individual sensible"; and in *Sense and Sensibilia* 437a6-7, "The faculty of seeing, thanks to the fact that all bodies are colored, brings tidings of multitudes of distinctive qualities of all sorts, whence it is through this sense especially that we perceive the common sensibles."

singular sense incidentally; and the second, there is something else that is the ultimate faculty for the common sensible.[163]

The first implication is supported by the proposition that "there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common sensible either, i.e. the objects which we perceive incidentally through this or that special sense, e.g. movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, unity" (*DA* 425a15-17). According to a literal interpretation, this claim depicts the common sensible as perceived incidentally by the singular sense, which makes sense given that the common sensible is not the orthodox object of the five singular senses. However, the "incidental" description gives rise to confusion since in 'the sequel Aristotle stresses that the common sensible is not perceived incidentally (*DA* 425a28). Moreover, "incidental" is used in the description of the incidental sensible – for instance, the son of Daires is perceived incidentally by perceiving white (*DA* 425a25-26). It is also used to describe the perception of the bitterness and the yellowness of bile (*DA* 425b4).

Owens concludes three approaches to the interpretation of the incidental perception of the common sensible in *DA* 425a15: 1) there should be a negative prefix emended to αἰσθανόμεθα; 2) this is merely Aristotle's reference to certain opinions that he aims to oppose; 3) the incidental perception has a different meaning in the opening sentence from the meaning given it later in the text. I am in favor of the third approach. According to Owens, this is widely accepted by modern interpretation, represented by Trendelenburg, Brentano, Hicks, Ross, etc.[164] My consideration is that Aristotle addresses one sense of "incidental" as "which belongs to the thing and is truthfully attributed to it, but neither with necessity nor for the most part" in *Metaphysics*. This claim works in the case of the son of Diares. However, there is another usage about "incidental" according to which the incidental perception of the common sensible means that it is incidental for the singular sense to perceive the common sensible,

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[163] *DA* 425a 20-23.

[164] According to Owens' generalization, Trendelenburg clarifies three types of "incidentals" in Aristotle: 1), the closest type of conjunction is between two objects of one and the same sense, as in the case of the special and the common sensible; 2), between objects of different special senses, as when something bitter is seen; and 3), between object of sense and object of speech and mind, as in the case of Cleon's son. According to Trendelenburg, the common sensible is perceived incidentally by the specific sense but not incidentally perceived by sensation. Whereas in the case of Cleon's son, it is conjoined by the singular sense with the mind. Hicks holds that a singular sense is affected by the common sensibles incidentally, and the perception of the common sensible by the *sensus communis* is direct and not incidental. Ross allows two meanings for incidental perception: one is wide enough to include the perception of the common sensible as secondary and not primary objects of each singular sense. The other and narrower meaning is seen in the case of Cleon's son. Brentano believes that they are secondary, not primary objects of each special sense. Cf. Owens (1982).

because the common sensible is not the special object of the singular sense. We can find this usage in Aristotle's elaboration of the singular sense's perceiving of the sensible object which does not belong to its scope:

> The senses perceive each other's special objects incidentally; not because the percipient sense is this or that special sense, but because all form a unity: whenever at one and the same moment perception comes to be with respect to the same thing, e.g. with respect to bile that it is bitter and yellow. The assertion of the identity of both cannot be the act of either of the senses; hence the illusion of sense, e.g. the belief that if a thing is yellow it is bile. (*DA* 425a30-425b5) (Tr. RevOT , slightly modified)

In this way, Aristotle explains one singular sense's incidental perception of a sensible object which does not belong to its proper scope. For instance, at first, there must be two singular senses—sight and taste—working together to perceive the bile for the first time. Given that the sight of yellow and the taste of bile once were present together on the same object (the bile), there is a tendency for us to think that anything yellow is bile the next time we see it. What underlies is therefore a unity composed by several senses. In this sense, to perceive bitterness through vision is to perceive incidentally. Further, Aristotle delineates is what is seen as color or what has the color (*DA* 425b19). However, what contains the color is usually a substrate or material entity, which is not the proper sensible object of vision. It turns out that Aristotle attributes "what contains the color" to vision as well – and, one should add, incidentally.

Even though the common sensible is incidentally perceived by the singular sense, it is not incidental to the common power of sense, which is its faculty.[165] It should be noted that compared to the sense organ which receives the sensible form by suffering alteration, the common sensibility will not suffer alteration by the common sensible because it is not a bodily organ. However, the common sensible acts on the sense organ because it incidentally unites with the singular sensible, which is the primal acting power on the sense organ.[166]

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[165] *DA* 425a28.

[166] According to Everson, "the common sensibles do not constitute sets of contraries as the proper sensibles do and so there can be no organ which constitutes a mean between such contraries. For there to be an organ proper to the common sensibles, there would need to be something capable not only of being affected *kath' hauto* by shape, rest, unity, etc. but of thereby becoming like the *kath' hauto* agent of change. Within Aristotle's *physics*, this is not possible." (p.151) He proposes that the common sensible has an affection on the sense organ by being an accidental unity with the proper sensible," the change brought about in the organ by the proper sensibles will have accidental features which are determined by the common sensibles with which it forms an accidental unity." (p.152) See Everson (1999).

The definition of the incidental sensible is as follows:

> We speak of an incidental object of sense where, e.g. the white object which we see is the son of Diares; here because being the son of Diares is incidental to the white which is perceived, we speak of the son of Diares as being incidentally perceived. (*DA* 418a20-24)

Similarly, there is no specific sense working for the incidental sensible. It is incidental in the sense that the son of Diares is incidental to white, neither with necessity nor for the most part. The son of Diares and the color are independently combined as the sensible object. Also, the reason why we perceive him as the son of Diares by the associated sight of "white" is because of the repeated combination of white and the son of Diares in the past has made them familiar. When the son of Diares ceases wearing his white coat, the association ceases to be made. This is what Aristotle means by incidental for the incidental sensible. As I see it, Aristotle adopts "incidental" in two senses and the incidental sensible can also be described as incidentally perceived by the singular sense.[167] I shall mark it as incidental$_1$ (in the case of the incidental sensible) and incidental$_2$ (the singular sense which incidentally perceives the object but does not belong to its scope). According to this division, the incidental object is both incidental$_1$ and incidental$_2$, whereas the common sensible is incidental$_2$. In the instance of the son of Diares, we perceive both the color white and the son of Diares through sight. This raises the question as to why our sight can perceive a person that is colorless, as it is far beyond the sight's function if we abide by Aristotle's restriction of the proper sense. It turns out that the perception of the son of Diares is only incidental$_2$ to the sense of sight. The perception of the son of Diares cannot go without sight for without sight, we cannot perceive anything. That may be the reason why Aristotle associates the incidental function to the sense of sight. So, the sense of sight is therefore a necessary but not satisfactory condition for the perception of Diares.

The incidental sensible also differs from the common sensible in that the former is directly perceived by the common sense while Aristotle depicts the latter as being indirectly perceived by sense.[168] To recognize and define whom he/she is, it requires the dispatching of memory and the intellectual capacity to identify this man before us. In this case, the sense of sight incidentally perceives what the intellectual faculty can do. That is why the incidental sensible is indirectly perceived by the singular sense. In the instance of the bile (which is bitter and yellow), it is obvious that

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[167] It means that the incidental object is not the orthodox object of the singular sense either. However, it can be perceived by virtue of the singular sense.

[168] *DA* 425a28; *DA* 418a 21.

by virtue of sight, we perceive the yellowness of the bile – and by virtue of taste, we perceive the bitterness of it. However, since it happens that we perceive it as bitter and yellow at the same time, a connection of bitter and yellow is attributed to the bile all at once. Because this constant connection remains in the memory, by perceiving the yellow of the bile by sight, we incidentally perceive its bitterness too. The explanation of the incidental perception of the bitter bile appeals to the unity that is composed by several senses, as well as the sensory experience of the subject. That is why the perception of the bitterness of the bile is directly perceived by the sense.

By virtue of the elaboration of the three types of sensible objects, we get to know how the perception of its object works. The common and incidental sensible provides more possibilities for perception and the structure of the perceptual subject is designed as such so that it can perceive more complex objects rather than the specific singular object.

2.3.2.2 The change in sensation

I would now like to deal with the long-lasting puzzle concerning what kind of process sense perception is – that is, how can we interpret the qualitative change that sensation suffers.[169] On the one hand, the elaboration of this issue will help clarify what exactly is the meaning behind the claim that the sense organ receives the sensible form and becomes identical with this sensible object which affects it (so as to provide a comprehensive interpretation of immanent content). On the other hand, this topic stirs up an interest from the perspective of the contemporary philosophy of mind. For example, the discussion between the 'spiritual' and 'literalist' interpretations of sensation is related in some sense with the issue as to whether a reductionism or physicalism of mind (or "soul" in Aristotelian term) is possible in Aristotle, or whether Aristotle can be called a functionalist.[170]

As has been clarified in virtue of the efficient and formal cause, the sensible object asserts its function by acting on what is percipient. Sensation occurs by suffering the change in itself. This is also implied in *Phys.* VII 3,

> That everything which undergoes alteration is altered by sensible causes, and that there is alteration only in things that are said to be affected in their own right by sensible things, can be seen from the following considerations. (*Phys.* 245b3-5)

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[169] The problem concerning the change in perception is first proposed by Burnyeat and Sorabji, who separately hold the spiritual and literal interpretation of perception. Representatives such as Shields, Caston, Scaltsas try to solve this puzzle from the third approach. Cf. Marmodoro (2014).

[170] For the debate about functionalism, see Hilary Putnam (1973), Nussbaum (1978), Robinson (1978), (1983), Shields, C. (1988), (1990), M. F. Burnyeat (1995), Everson (1997), Irwin (1991).

The interpretation of "being affected" or "being acted upon" has two meanings, which is described in *De Anima* II 5,

> Also the expression "to be acted upon" has more than one meaning; it may mean either the extinction of one of two contraries by the other or the maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, as actual to potential. For what possesses knowledge becomes an actual knower by a transition which is either not an alteration of it at all (being, in reality, a development into its true self or actuality) or at least an alteration in a quite different sense. (*DA* 417b 2-8)

Aristotle provides two senses of being acted upon: in the first sense, it is an alteration from what is not to what is – such as the case of a man from having no knowledge and then coming in possession of knowledge. In the second sense, it can be exemplified by the transition of a knowledgeable man from possessing knowledge to using it. The first transition can be called the transition from the first potentiality to first actuality (which entails a second potentiality), and the second transition can be called the transition from second potentiality to second actuality. The second transition is regarded by Aristotle not as an alteration nor as an entirely different kind of alteration compared with the first transition. That is to say, one is destroyed by what is contrary while the other is the fulfilment of potential. Therefore, it is not an ordinary alteration.

When it comes to sensation, we already have the capacity of sense with which we are born. The actual sensation is like the shift from the possession of knowledge to the exercise of knowledge, which is the transition from second potentiality to second actuality. As certified by Aristotle, "the initial change in the perceiving being comes about from its progenitor; once it is generated, it already has perception, in the manner in which one possesses knowledge"[171] (*DA* 417b16-19). Meanwhile, when Aristotle depicts two senses of "perceive", he points out that one has the power to see or hear, and one is actually seeing or hearing. These can thus be respectively referred to as potentiality 2 and actuality 2 (*DA* 417a10-13). Henceforth, it seems to imply that the practice of sensation is to actualize its potential sensing capacity, which is either no alteration at all or an alteration in an entirely different sense: "what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted up the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with

[171] Translated by Mark Shiffman (2011).

it" (*DA* 418a 3-6). The alteration that perception suffers is not destruction by what is contrary, but an actuality of what is potential.

However, there remains a difference between having knowledge and having sense. In the former case, the subject may not need the external thing because it is armed with knowledge itself, and the activity of thinking can be initiated with the knowledge in one's possession. But sensation always requires the presence of the sensible object for its occurrence (*DA* 417b20-30). Actually, the elaboration that what is percipient is capable of receiving the sensible object, can also be interpreted as that which is different from the sensible object initially: "what is capable of taking on color is what in itself is colorless, as what can take on sound is what is soundless" (*DA* 418b28-29). Through the process of actualization they become identical, implying that what is percipient receives what it does not possess beforehand. Considering that if what is percipient is the same as the sensible object at first, then no perception will occur, in adherence to Aristotle's statement that "the unlike is acted upon, but once acted upon it is like" (*DA* 417a20). For example, if the temperature of our hand is the same as that of the water, we feel no change of the temperature. From this line of argument, it seems to follow that what is percipient will suffer an alteration from what is not to what is, just like the first transition of a man from not knowing to have knowledge. Henceforth, it turns out that sensation can be both interpreted as not an alteration at all and an alteration from contraries. How to deal with this contradiction?

The crucial point is to make clear what "what is percipient" means. In my opinion, it should be divided into the perceptual soul (or the perceptual capacity) and the sense organ. The perceptual soul has the potential capacity to perceive, and the sense organ is the material substrate of perception that suffers the alteration. My supposition derives from Aristotle's statement regarding the difference between the sense-faculty and its organ. As is said,

> A primary sense-organ is that in which such a power is seated. The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same. What perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not admit that either the having the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude; what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude. This enables us to explain why excesses in objects of sense destroy the organs of sense; if the movement set up by an object is too strong for the organ, the form which is its sensory power is disturbed. (*DA* 424 a24-30)

It is explicated that the sense organ and the perceptual power are different in being but the same in activity. The sense organ is the material substrate in which the percipient

power is located. One can ascribe the magnitude of the sense organ, which directly suffers the alteration brought by the sensible object, and that which has the power to perceive is not the material part that undergoes this alteration. The excess of the sensible object will affect the material substrate, which is the sense organ rather than the power of perceiving. Even in *DA* II.5, Aristotle implies that "sense perception is in this way (as the two senses of being potential)" (*DA* 417b32-33) after elaborating the necessity that sense perception requires an object to be present.

In *Physics* VII.3, Aristotle states that we should not refer to alteration as the change of the figure or the shape of a thing, neither the excellence and the perishing of the state.[172] Rather, he does point out that there is an alteration in the sensitive part of the soul, and this part is altered by the sensible object, while the state of the soul itself suffers no alteration (*Phys.* 247a1-b1).[173] Therefore, I would like to argue that what goes on in perception is a qualitative alteration owing to the sense organ (from potentiality1 to actuality 1) as well as the actualization of the potential percipient soul (from potentiality 2 to actuality 2).

I would like to conceive that the sense organ suffers a non-ordinary physical change, and the potential perceptual power becomes actualized in perception. Since the form cannot exist independently without matter, the form received by the sensible patient will be combined with the physical sense organ as long as the stimulation of the sensible object continues. Because the form defines what the substance is and carries the *logos*—that is to say, the qualities and properties of the object—so it is the *logos*, qualities, and properties which represent the substance that redefine the state and content of sensation. By virtue of this, the potential state of the perceptual power becomes actualized, and the sense organ captures the corresponding *logos* of the form to become identified with it in sense (not literally, but rather qualitatively). For example, when the color red is present, the sense organ is impressed by that color, and at that moment, the characteristic or state the sense organ reveals is red. But, since the hosts to which the color is associated can differ, so too do the states of coloration in

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[172] "Again, states, whether of the body or of the soul, are not alterations. For some are excellences and others are defects, and neither excellence nor defect is an alteration." *Phys*. 246a1-5.

[173] Moreover, the suggestion that the sense faculty and the sense organ are inseparable but essentially different is also proposed by Hicks in his commentary on *De Anima*, where he points out that "the one is an organ, the other a faculty, the one has magnitude, the other is unextended." They are essentially different, but "the organ and the faculty are the same". They are inseparable in that the sense faculty resides in the sense organ and without each the sensation cannot occur (*DA* 412b14, *Met*. 1035b14-18, 22-25, 1036b28-32, *Pol*.1253a 21). But they can be separated in thought, "if we look at the organ as a concrete thing and take account of its matter, it is an extended magnitude; if we abstract from the matter and attend only to the form, it is a power or faculty residing in this extended magnitude, but itself unextended and immaterial." See: Hicks (1907). p, 417.

sensation and in the sensible object differ. Therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that the sense organ literally turns red by receiving the red color patch.

Opinions vary as to the interpretation of what occurs in sensation, which can be generally organized as either a spiritual interpretation (such as Burnyeat; Brentano), a literal interpretation (such as Sorabji, Everson), as well as a third-approach which opposes both the literal and spiritual interpretations (such as Magee, Caston, Lorenz).[174]

Brentano observes that "sensation, as also intellectual thought, is affection, but not a proper affection; it is not an actual alteration, but a movement of a different kind" (p. 96). Brentano's spiritual interpretation of sensation advocates that sensation is an alternation without any corruption. The explanation goes that:

> A warm hand touching something cold becomes colder during the sensation and through the influence of the sensed object. But we do not sense the cold insofar as we become cold; otherwise, plants and inorganic bodies would also sense. Rather, we sense the cold insofar as the cold exists objectively, i.e., as a cognized object within us, hence insofar as we take in the cold without being ourselves its physical subject; the latter can receive this or any other form only by being altered. (p.54-55).[175]

Brentano adopts a distinction between objective existence in sensation and physical/material existence in the physical object to declare that sensation does not suffer the affection as a physical object – which is consistent with Thomas Aquinas's supposition of two kinds of existence, being intentional existence and natural existence. Brentano instead claims that we feel cold because there is cold that objectively exists in the sensing body, but which is not materially and physically. Sensing is just a simple actualization of what was potentially present in the subject to begin with, implying that in sense, the actualized cold has an objective existence. Therefore, it is not a corruption but is included in the category of affection.[176]

Brentano's proposal that what suffers in sensation and what suffers in the physical object cannot be the same kind of alteration is quite promising for our work. However, since the sensing subject is within the material composition, it is difficult to state that there is no qualitative alteration of any kind in sensation. How else to explain that the excess of the sensible object distorts the sense organ?[177] Meanwhile, if in adherence to Brentano, it seems that the sensible form that is received by what is

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[174] Sorabji (1995), (2001); Burnyeat (1995); Caston (1996); Everson (1997); Lorenz (2007); Magee (2000).
[175] Franz Brentano (1977). p, 54-55.
[176] Ibid. p. 55.
[177] *DA* 424a28-30.

percipient is just bare properties (such as cold or color), then that is not what Aristotle proposed. Moreover, I do not agree with Brentano's claim that we do not sense the cold by becoming cold, because in such a case plants and inorganic bodies would also sense. As far as I am concerned, the reason why we can sense cold is that we have the capacity for sensation, which is a passive capacity to be acted on by the active sensible form. Because becoming cold does not equal sensing cold, it allows for plants and inorganic bodies become cold. For example, we can put an apple in the fridge to make it cold, but the apple cannot sense the cold because it lacks the power of perception.

Sorabji is one of the representatives of literal interpretation who argues that "receiving form without matter" is a literal physiological occurrence, which involves a change between opposites. It is similar to the transformative stage of "having no knowledge" to "having the knowledge". For instance, according to Sorabji, our perception of color is in the eye jelly's (rather than pupil) receiving color patches (which is understood by him as perceptible form).[178] Sorabji's consideration arises from the view that the sensible form is enmattered in a concrete substance. Thus, receiving form without matter is interpreted by him as receiving the real qualified substance in the same sense that the color patch acts on the sensible object in coloration. The sense organ literally suffers the physiological change, and this is the material cause of perception.

Even though admitting to the alteration that the sense organ suffers, I do not believe it is meant to be taken as a literal material change in the same sense as the sensible quality's acting on the sensible object. Instead, I adopt the position that because of the different material substrates, the alteration caused by the sensible form in sensation will inherently be different from that in the sensible object.[179] Hence, the sensible form (for example, "redness"), can color the sensible object as such, but it is not plausible to state that the sense organ will equally suffer the same change. Because the material substrate of the percipient patient is the bodily organ, it differs from the material constitution of the sensible object. This can be certified by the claim in *On Generation and Corruption*,

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[178] The reasons why Sorabji replaces the pupil with eye jelly, and describes the perceptible form as a color patch, are that: first, it can resist the attack that it is weird to say people's eyes are going colored when perceiving, because eye jelly is deep installed and cannot easily be seen; second, he uses the more concrete material substance "color patches" to replace the abstract, obscure concept of perceptible form, which will be a powerful testimony to his physiological interpretation. See: Sorabji (1995).

[179] Thomas Aquinas equally expresses that the form in sense organ and the form that appears in the sensible object will have a different effect because the material substrates are different. And this idea is also taken up by Burnyeat. See: Aquinas (1999), Burnyeat (1995).

> In action, there is nothing to prevent the first agent being unaffected, while the last agent only acts by suffering action itself. For if things have not the same matter, the agent acts without being affected; thus, the art of healing produces health without itself being acted upon in any way by that which is being healed. (*CC*. 324a34-36)

In typical cases, the agent which initiates motion should also be affected, but the exception occurs when the agent does not share the same kind of matter with the patient. It makes me argue that the sensible form which makes the sensible object as such may not produce the same alteration when it acts on the sense organ, because the sense organ and the matter in the sensible object are different. However, since the sense organ is also a material composite, it nevertheless incurs a qualitative change – though not the same kind of change as the sensible object.

Sorabji's standpoint is rejected by Burnyeat (1992). Burnyeat treats perception as the stage from "having the knowledge" to "practicing the knowledge" because we are born with the sensible organ and our perception is just the realization of our potential capacity. He assesses that what Aristotle means by "receiving form without matter" is not a literal material process as Sorabji proposed, but rather it is an awareness of what the perceptible is. According to Burnyeat, perception is a change in and of the body; it is a natural or physical change, because perception is of physics, and physics is the study of natural bodies which are capable of undergoing change. But it is not a material change. Since there is no material change in Aristotle's physics, therefore it is not a credible assertion.

> We are forced to conclude that the organ's becoming like the object is not it's literally and physiologically becoming hard or warm but a noticing or becoming aware of hardness or warmth. All these physical-seeming descriptions—the organ's becoming like the object, it's being affected, acted on, or altered, it's taking on the sensible form without the matter—all these are referring to what Aquinas calls a "spiritual" change, a becoming aware of some sensible quality in the environment.[180] (p. 24)

Burnyeat adopts a reductionist approach by reducing perception to a spiritual change of perceptual awareness. To support this stance, he provides two examples: first, he uses the case of touch to show that we do not perceive the same degree of hardness or hotness as the organ of perception, which implies that there is no consistency between perceptual awareness and the sense organ's physiological change; second, he uses the example of wax, to certify that Aristotle's original meaning of this example is to show

[180] Burnyeat (1992).

that sensation has awareness, rather than sensation's real materialization.[181] The spiritual interpretation of "receiving form without matter" seems to agree with Brentano's interpretation of the intentional object, but Burnyeat states that Brentano has gone too far.[182]

The main difference between Sorabji and Burnyeat, as far as I am concerned, lies in that Sorabji refers to the alteration of the sense organ which suffers the stage from "having no knowledge" to "having knowledge" – that is to say, from the first potentiality to first actuality. By contrast, Burnyeat claims that the sense organ endures the change from "having knowledge" to "practicing knowledge" – or rather, from the second potentiality to second actuality.[183] Burnyeat's idea is therefore unfavorable as I prefer to spell out that it is the perceptual power (rather than the sense organ) that ensures the change from "having the knowledge" to "practicing the knowledge". I am in favor of the supposition that there is an alteration suffered by the sense organ, but I do not agree with Sorabji's proposal that "receiving form without matter" is a literal physiological occurrence by receiving a physical substance in the same sense as that of the sensible object; nor is it a spiritual change as Burnyeat offered. Staying in line with Caston, I agree that "it may well be that Aristotle requires material or physiological changes in perception, without requiring that the same predicate that applies to the object also applies to the organ and in just the same sense."[184]

Everson takes a literal interpretation of the sense organ's alteration by the sensible object, by virtue that 1) sense organs must have a material constitution if they are to function as sense organs[185] (p. 80); 2) the alteration happens in that the agent and the patient must be neither absolutely alike nor entirely dissimilar (p. 83); 3) the sense is the *logos* of the organ, and it is being affected by virtue of the *logos* of the object (p.

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[181] Sorabji (1995) responds to what Burnyeat's rejections. As to Burnyeat's first example of touch, Sorabji adopts the text from *DA* 423b27-424a10, where Aristotle clearly shows that the reason why we do not perceive what is similarly hot or cold, hard or soft is that sense is a sort of mid-point of the extremes, and in actuality the sense and its sensible qualities are the same. As to the example of signet ring's being imprinted in wax, Sorabji says differently that in *On Memory*, Aristotle clearly intends it a physiological interpretation, "explaining various different forms of memory failure by the surface imprinted being too hard, too fluid like running water, or too worn like the old parts of buildings". p. 221.

[182] Burnyeat means that Brentano develops the spiritual interpretation of perception into the intentional object.

[183] Sorabji and Burnyeat also differs in that Sorabji believe that receiving form without matter includes a physiological change – a change is in the same sense as that of the sensible object. Burnyeat, however, does not believe that it is the change of the same sense. He argues instead that it is a physical change with no material basis, and that perceiving is simply awareness of the sensible quality.

[184] Victor Caston (1996), p.264.

[185] Ibid. "since, as we have seen, each sense is essentially such as to be affected by its proper objects, we should expect that this will determine the material nature of the sense organ." p.80.

96). He preserves Aristotle's distinction between sense organ and perceptual capacity and stresses that it is the sense organ that incurs the alteration rather than the perceptual capacity. Everson's assessment about "receiving form without matter" is that "for the organ to take on the form of the sensible object, then, is for it to take on a property which is distinctive of the substance's matter." (p. 102) According to him, both alteration1 (the change between contraries) and alteration2 (the preservation of a thing's nature and disposition) happen in perception, and alteration1 is required for the occurrence of alteration2 – which echoes my interpretation that the sense organ implies a transformation from potentiality1 to actuality1 and the perceptual soul's capacity is actualized from potentiality2/actuality1 to actuality 2. However, the cooperation of alteration 1 and alteration2 is rejected by Magee, who refers to *DA* 417b12-22 to prove that there is only alteration2 in sensation. But according to my above assessment, I hold that Aristotle does indeed have the two kinds of alteration of sensation in mind. Nevertheless, Magee inspires me with his proposal of non-ordinary alteration of perception, which is still a physical process.

Continuing this argument, Lorenz (2007) claims that the perceptual power suffers the alteration of the second kind, that is non-destructive change. It is the sense or intellect which are the potentialities that are open to be informed by the perceptible and intelligible form which constitutes the assimilation between sense or intellect and their object. However, considering the material basis (that is, the sense organ, which is the substrate of the perceptual activity), he provides a comprehensive explanation of perception as "involving both an ordinary change or modification in a sense organ and a certain kind of change or quasi-change undergone by a sensory power."[186] The so-called ordinary change or modification that the sense organ endures, is to lose one property and pick up another. However, it is a non-standard change compared to the alteration of the first kind. In this sense, I stand with Lorenz and support a middle approach of perception.

All in all, the perception process means both the potential perceptual faculty's act of becoming actualized as well as the sense organ's suffering the alteration in a non-ordinary physical manner. The percipient faculty changes from the state of second potentiality/first actuality to second actuality. In this event, that which is percipient actualizes that which is otherwise only potentially perceiving by virtue of the sense organ's suffering a qualitative alteration, rather than physical change. That is to say, by receiving form without matter, sensation acquires a principle that defines what kind of sensation it will become, along with the qualitative change in the sense organ. By virtue of the qualitative alteration, the sensory state is prepared with the sensory

[186] Lorenz (2007), p.214.

content concerning that particular sensible object, and thus getting defined by the form of that sensible object. When I say "get defined by something", it implies that the sensory state is *about* the thing which defines it. It is in this way that Aristotle elaborates on what is taking place in sensation. In my opinion, this wording implies the roots of immanent content. What is more, it is not the only clue embedded within his words. Ultimately, I will return to the others later in this dissertation.

2.3.2.3 Intentional dimension in modern Aristotelianism

Sorabji (1995)[187] proposes that intentionality is implied on the basis of the alteration of perception. To support this, he primarily discusses perception at the level of animals using the Aristotelian background that perception is neither belief nor reason. Hence, he analyzes Aristotle's expansion of perceptual content so as to understand how perceptual appearance can guide animals in the world. During this process, he also refers to the Stoics and the Epicureans, drawing the general conclusion that perceptual appearance is propositional,[188] and this "propositional" characteristic is what he believes can provide animals with guidance to future experiences. Importantly, this propositional content is the intentional implication or the formal part of perception.

He concludes that Aristotle does not reduce perception to the physiological states, nor behavior and the performance of functions; rather, he relates perception to capacities at the same level of belief, reason, memory, experience, and concept formation (p. 208). This non-physiological interpretation concerns the formal cause of perception. He says "the specification of the formal cause by reference to other capacities is meant to tell us something about what we should call the intentional aspect of anger and perception, even if he does not himself characterize it as intentional." (p. 208) But it is also worth noting that prior to this remark, Sorabji does not provide a definition nor description of "intentional." From the above remark, it seems that the formal, propositional, non-physiological aspect of perception is regarded by him as "intentional". Sorabji views the basic activity of perception (becoming like, being potentially such, receiving form without matter, etc.) as physiological process or material cause. He expresses the intentional aspect of perception as the formal, propositional characteristic.

The reason why Sorabji views receiving form without matter as the material component is because of the literal interpretation he attributes to it. Since in his opinion,

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[187] Sorabji (1995).

[188] Sorabji means that in Aristotle, perception includes perceiving a proposition, that something is the case. Sorabji does not suppose that this propositional perception really involves an inference of reason. He means that something is predicated of something. See Sorabji (1995), p.196-197.

that which is percipient literally receives the sensible quality, which then plays a material role in perception to which the formal part is related. In my view, I disagree that what is percipient suffers an alteration in the same sense as that which the sensible object does; second, by the principle of receiving form without matter, what is percipient receives the incoming sensible information so as to compose perceptual content. This perceptual content is something immanent in the soul concerning the sensible object – and in this way, it expresses intentional implication.

In contrast to Sorabji, from the perspective of intentionality, Burnyeat follows Brentano in taking the spiritual interpretation of perception and regards perceptual awareness of the sensible quality as intentional. However, Burnyeat does not agree with Brentano's claim that the received form is the intentional object.

Caston[189] combines together a contemporary interpretation of intentionality from Chisholm to Aristotle and tries to formulate the possible answers from Aristotle concerning the problem of intentionality. He claims that Aristotle is fully aware of the problem of intentionality – and what is more, Aristotle already provides his own solution with regard to the problem in his corpus, notably in *De Anima*.[190] The point that Caston inspires in me concerns his description of the problem of intentionality, where he says, "the problem of intentionality, as I shall call it, is to provide a philosophical account of this feature, in all its peculiarities……Our primary concern here is simply what, if anything, gives mental states their intentionality and how it accounts for differences in the content of various mental states" (p. 250). In this way, I can also get myself out of various debates and problems concerning intentionality and focus on the nature of intentionality itself – for instance, to explain how its peculiarity of directedness or inner containment is revealed.

Caston listed five problems of intentionality that he derived from Chisholm and Anscombe and Geach, and he would like to solve the first two: thinking about the object and thinking about the propositional attitude, which is more or less involved in an intentional relation.[191] Caston defines intentionality as to be of or about something –

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[189] Caston (1998).

[190] As far as I am concerned, Aristotle's *De Anima* is not focused on investigating intentionality. Rather, he seeks to clarify what the soul is and what its faculties are. But among his words, we can find the roots of intentionality that later scholars paid attention to.

[191] Chisholm's criterion of intentionality has become quite influential in recent decades, which is regarded as a criterion to distinguish the psychological and appeal to a non-reductionist standpoint of psychological phenomena. Caston lists several criteria for failures of entailment from Chisholm (1955/56), Anscombe (1965/1981), and Geach (1964,1980), which I will list here:

Failure of existential commitment;

Failure of truth-functionality;

Failure of intersubstitutivity of coextensive expressions *salva veritate;*

or more generally, to possess content. But he denies that Brentano's reference to Aristotle about receiving form without matter supports the acceptance of a general mode of intentionality. To this he lists three objections: first, he believes that the example of the wax and signet ring is not about an intentional state; second, he does not believe that there is an aboutness involved there, because "receiving form without matter" does not signal the notion of being about something; third, he believes that this formulation is still a causal doctrine and the sensible form's acting upon the patient shows a causal relation. However, in the case of thinking about non-existent objects, there does not seem to be a form.

Meanwhile, Caston holds that the similarity principle which Brentano relies on is also problematic. According to Brentano's adoption of this principle:

a. Intentionality is revealed in sensation where the perceptual activity and the sensible object are the same;
b. The equality of agent and the patient lies in every causal interaction;
c. Intentionality occurs in every causal interaction.

Caston believes that it is not plausible that intentionality is at stake in every causal interaction. Therefore, the similarity principle cannot be adopted to argue for intentionality. In this regard, I agree with Caston that there is no intentionality in sensation in the sense of intentional reference, given that the perceptual soul is passive and has no causal power. Caston ascribes the intentional reference or relation as causal efficiency of intentionality, and there is no such causal efficiency from the perceptual soul to its object in Aristotle – at most it is just an awareness. That is also the reason why Caston believes there is no general mode of intentionality in sensation in Aristotle's theory.

Nevertheless, I do believe that receiving form without matter and the similarity principle can express the immanent content in perception, even though this mode cannot widely be used to express the content in other cognitive activities – such as dreams, desires, wishes, fears, etc. As to Caston's denial that the example of the wax and signet ring is about an intentional state, I prefer to hold that this is just an example, from which we cannot get that it is an intentional state – but rather, we can use it to prove that there is content in the soul when we are perceiving or thinking. Receiving form without matter, the similarity principle, and perceptual awareness (even though

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Failure of the excluded middle;

Failure of quantifier exportation.

These criteria spell out the peculiarity of intentional sentences of a mental states. Even though it shows a different route from the standpoint of logic to speculate about intentionality, it shares some common concerns about the nature of intentionality with the other depiction of intentionality, for example about the non-exist object. Cf. Caston (1998).

they are not sufficient to provide a general model for intentionality in Aristotle's cognition), can sufficiently describe the fact that we are aware of the sensible properties received by perception and it is this fact that inspires Brentano's intentionality. However, the sensing subject is not the mentally active subject as Brentano proposed and what is immanent by virtue of receiving form without matter is more correctly called intentional content, rather than intentional object.[192]

Caston further proposes the intentionality model of representation based on *phantasia*, which he identifies as an efficient cause that can simulate the sensible as a causal power, takes *phantasia* as an echo of the initial disturbance. This representation is not the noetic ray's structure which would provide a direct relation between thinking and the object thought about, but a relation of the agent to "something distinct within the subject" that models or simulates the objects thought about. The internal changes, as one side of the relation, play a representative role, thus comprising the representation theory of intentionality.

Corcilius and Gregoric[193] propose that intentionality has its place in Aristotle's causal structure of the world, and they refer to it in their comprehensive discussion of animal motion as the centralized incoming and outgoing motions system (CIOM). As such, a comprehensive picture of perceptual activity should include the inner perceptual mechanism as well as the external conditions. By virtue of the CIOM model, they provide a single description from an animal's perception, to its feelings of pleasure and pain or desire, to its motion. The perceptual soul and intentionality are introduced into this model as "an un-extended and unmoved internal supporting point of animal motion", which is "an inner representation of the goal of the animal's motion, what the animal 'has in mind'" (p.76). "The intentional state of animal, i.e. the activity of its soul, be it perception or appearance of a pleasant or painful object—provides a pivot upon which the mechanism 'hangs', or around which it 'turns'" (p.76). What they believe the intentional state to be is the perception or appearance of a specific object or the object of desire. In this case, perception and appearance play a role of presentation, which is composed in the soul in perceptual cognition. Moreover, the perceptual content caused by the external object is an alteration with intentional dimension, which makes a world of difference in that it distinguishes animate living beings from inanimate and insensitive beings. Animals do not react blindly to their environment (p.77). The intentional dimension of the soul's activity claimed by them is also involved with perceptual awareness, as they say, "the perceptual soul is not to be

[192] Or else there will be a doubling of objects. Brentano later changed his idea and abandoned the immanent object based on the distinction of content and object. See the Brentano part in Chapter 1, p. 28-29.

[193] Corcilius and Gregoric (2013).

understood as a process in addition to the physical motions that the animal body undergoes. Rather, the activity of the soul is the point at which perceptual awareness kicks in" (p.65).

From a certain standpoint, Corcilius and Gregoric provide an intentional interpretation of perceptual activity. It seems that Corcilius and Gregoric not only regard the inner representation of perception as the intentional state, but also a means to interpret objects as being meaningful to its host. Meanwhile, the intentional state based upon representation works as the starting point for further activity by the subject. Corcilius and Gregoric argue that the motion of animals relies on the sensory content to "turn", implying that animals have the active power to initiate their activity. Since intentional directedness as defined in the first chapter of this dissertations concerns an active directing relatedness to something else, I therefore wonder in which sense the subject is active in terms of having the initiating power. I find two possible explanations for the active power in Corcilius and Gregoric's model of the motion of animals. First, the desiring activity is active in producing motion based on the perception of the object, given that the sensory desire acts as a moved mover. Second, from the perspective of body and soul, the soul is the efficient, formal and final cause of the living being, which implies that the movement of the body is initiated by the soul. In my view, both of these two approaches imply active intentions in the practical sense, which means intention or desire to do something. To probe intentionality, however, we should focus on intentionality in the theoretical sense. Intentional directedness is after all a theoretical relatedness between the psychic faculty and its object. As our investigation shows, the perceptual soul is passive and can only be acted upon by the external object. Therefore, the active factor revealed in the motion of animal cannot provide support for intentional directedness.

As it turns out, my consideration is partly consistent with Corcilius and Gregoric's comment on intentionality and animals' motion. They point out that the model of animal's motion partly overlaps with the intentionality thesis insofar as the awareness of an object is concerned, but there are differences in that the motion of animals does not require a psychic capacity for "seeing as"—that is, the capacity of *phantasia*—to initiate desire. In addition, the intentionality thesis presents desire as a primitive psychic capacity but for Aristotle, desire is a moved mover (p.91). The intentionality implication—that is the perceptual representation or appearance composed in the soul that they highlight—is also what I believe as the intentional content, which is about something.

Are the formal cause and the category of sensible object sufficient for an appeal to immanent content? It is true that by the reception of the sensible form there is corresponding sensible content in sensation, but my answer is that it is not enough – if

we are looking for immanent content from the standpoint of intentionality. As Mark Eli Kalderon says, "sheer receptivity is insufficient for sensory presentation. It requires, as well, the assimilation of the sensory object" (p.172).[194] Besides, apart from abiding by a causal line from the perceptual object to the perceptual capacity, Corcilius (2014) proposes a further causal line from the perceptual soul in actuality to the production of phenomenal content. According to him, "the soul is neither affected nor does it act as the subject of perception; instead, the incoming perceptual input actualizes the neutral value which causes the living body to generate phenomenal content, and this is something that living bodies do, even if only on a subpersonal level" (p. 34). Both Kalderon and Corcilius propose further conditions that should explain sensory presentation or sensory content, together admitting the insufficiency of the explanatory power of the formulation of "receiving form without matter." As I proposed in the beginning of the section on immanent content, it is the three principles— "receiving form without matter", "the assimilation between the percipient sense and sensible object" and "the perceptual awareness"—working together that contribute to the formulation of perceptual content. Next, I would like to clarify the other two formulations.

2.3.3 Perceptual relations

2.3.3.1 Intentional relation

In Brentano's 1911 edition of PES, he states the mental reference as distinguished from relation in the strict sense as follows:

> What is characteristic of every mental activity is, as I believe I have shown, the reference to something as an object. In this respect, every mental activity seems to be something relational. And in fact, where Aristotle enumerates the various main classes of his category of πρός τι (relation) he mentions mental reference. But he does not hesitate to call attention to something which differentiates this class from the others. In other relations both terms—both the fundament and the terminus—are real, but here only the first term— the fundament—is real. [195]

Brentano refers to Aristotle's delineation of relation to argue for what he means intentional relation, which spells out a quasi-relation in that the mental act must exist,

[194] Kalderon (2015).
[195] PES, p.211.

whereas the object that this mental act directs to may not exist in reality. Aristotle delineates relation in both *Categories* and *Metaphysics*. In *Categories*, he demonstrates that:

> Let us now turn to Relation. We call a thing relative, when it is said to be such as it is from its being of some other thing or, if not, from its being related to something in some other way. Thus 'the greater' is said to be greater by reference to something outside it. For, indeed, when we call a thing 'greater,' we mean by that greater than something. 'The double' is called what it is from its being the double of something. For 'double' means double of something. And so, with all terms of that kind. Other relatives also there are, such as habit, disposition, perception, position or attitude, knowledge. All these are explained by a reference to something to which they belong, and in no other way whatsoever. A habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge-of-something, position position-of-something. We speak, then, of relative terms, when a thing's being such as it is is explained by a genitive following or else by some phrase or expression designed to bring out the relation. (*Cat*. 6b1-9)[196]

It turns out that for a thing to be relative, it is named by a genitive following or something else which initiates this relation. In the case of perception and knowledge, it means that perception and knowledge are named after the perceptible and the knowable given that without the latter, the relation cannot be constituted – it is the perceptible and the knowable which bring out the relation. Orna Harari gives an explanation of psychic states (perception and knowledge) from the standpoint of the active and passive that, "the dependence of noetic states on the presence of their objects is similar to the dependence of somatic and psychic states on the passivity or impassivity of proper affections with regard to the qualities, objects or circumstances that are apt to affect them. In thinking and perceiving, according to Aristotle, the soul is affected by the objects of thought and perception (*DA* 429a13–18); thus, like somatic and psychic states, knowledge and perception are relative to their objects because they come about when the thinking or perceiving parts of the soul become passive by the agency of their objects." (p. 528)[197] In Aristotle's contention, intellect and perception are passive and to be acted on by the intelligible and perceptible – and at that point, they become identical with their object in actuality.[198] Even though the knowable/perceptible is also

[196] Translated by H. P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick.

[197] Harari (2011).

[198] The depiction of the power of perception and intellect is connected to an entity to be acted upon, but it is not suitable to call its relation "connecting power in potentiality to its actuality", as Marmodoro puts forward. Marmodoro's opposition is considered then from two senses, "on the one hand, if a power is defined in terms of its actuality, where the definition defines the power's nature(e.g., the power to heat) it

regarded as occurring prior to thinking/perception, its independence and priority are better to be interpreted as potentiality2/actuality1 before the thinking/perception of it. Once in the activity of thinking/perception, the knowable/perceptible constitutes knowledge/perception at the state of actuality2.

Aristotle lists three classes of relatives in *Metaphysics*:

> Things are relative (1) as double to half and treble to a third, and in general that which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else, and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded; (2) as that which can heat to that which can be heated, and that which can cut to that which can be cut, and in general the active to the passive; (3) as the measurable to the measure and the knowable to knowledge and the perceptible to perception. (*Met*.1020b26-33)

The classification of relative in *Metaphysics* is consistent with the elaboration of relatives of state, condition, perception, knowledge, and position in *Categories*: Class 1 defines the numerical relatives; Class 2 is a description of the active and passive characteristic of states or conditions; Class 3 states that the measurable/knowable/perceptible objects are measured/known/perceived in relation to the state (measure, knowledge or perception) that involves them, but not in the state which is in relation to the objects. Otherwise, one would be arguing the same thing twice.[199]

It is worth noting that the reference from the mental act to the intentional object that Brentano emphasized in his later stage is inspired by Aristotle's third classification of the "measurable to the measure" and the "knowable to knowledge" and the "perceptible to perception" – each of which is described by Brentano as revealing the core characteristic of intentional relation. That is to say, the mental act can refer to objects that do not exist. It implies that Brentano attributes both the state of knowing and the state of perceiving to mental acts. However, according to Aristotle, even though perception is always the perception of something, and knowledge is the knowledge of something, perception does not belong to the mental act. In addition,

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should be the case that the power is one with its essential nature; the essential nature of a power should not be a different entity to which the power is related……Nor should a power only tend towards its powerfulness---as if its powerfulness were external to the power itself---because this latter view would not make philosophical sense." Ibid. p. 26.

[199] *Met*. 1020b33-1021a35.

Aristotle is more inclined to describe the relatedness from the perceptible / intelligible to perception / intellect.[200]

2.3.3.2 The assimilation between what is percipient and the perceptible

Identical assimilation between that which perceives and that which is the external object in actuality is spelt out so as to alleviate the error we subjectively make about the objective world. By setting up the correlation between the psychological state and its object, Aristotle implies a tendency towards realism and externalism.[201]

Aristotle delineates the correlation between the perceiving subject and the sensible object in various aspects: first, they are two potentialities which become actuality in one activity; second, they become identical in this actuality. Aristotle describes the simultaneous actualization of the potential perceiving subject and the potential sensible object as follows:

> The activity of the sensible object and that of the percipient sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains. Take as illustration actual sound and actual hearing: a man may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and that which has a sound is not always sounding. But when that which can hear is actively hearing and which can sound is sounding, then the actual hearing and the actual sound are merged in one (these one might call respectively hearkening and sounding). (*DA* 425b27-426a2)

Before perception occurs, both the perceiving subject and the sensible object remain in potentiality and it is in perception that they each actualize their potentiality. Aristotle provides the example of a man having the ability to hear but who does yet hear anything, and a sound which is not yet become a sound. In either case, no activity is occurring. It is through perception that the two entities both become actualized. The claim that even though the perceiving subject and the sensible are in one activity and actualization, their beings are different. This is crucial for Aristotle so that he can avoid falling into a strong identity between the perceiving subject and the sensible object. What kind of assimilation is it?

> What has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two

[200] For more details, see Brentano's appendix of the 1911 version of *PES,* also Taieb's investigation of intentional relation in Brentano. See Hamid Taieb (2018). *Relational intentionality, Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition*.

[201] Ibid. p. 52.

> interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it. (*DA* 418a4-7)

The occurrence of perception requires both capacities working together – the initiative power of the sensible object and the receptive power of the sensitive soul. The sensitive faculty possesses a passive and potential power, and the sensible object directly determines what kind of perception it will be and what qualities or characteristics the perceptual content will reveal. The sense is potentially the sensible object and is ready to be affected by the form of the sensible object. Once the object becomes present—and if nothing prevents—sensation will immediately occur, and the potentiality becomes actuality through the receipt of the form provided by the object. Moreover, by receiving the form in actuality, what is percipient becomes defined by the sensible form and constitutes a sensible content that exemplifies the sensible quality, this sensible content is about the sensible quality, which makes them identical in quality.

> Nor is there anything to prevent the same one thing being the actualizing of two potentialities—not in the sense of unqualified identity, but in the sense of being in the one relation of actuality to potentiality with regard to the two potentialities. So it does not follow that the teacher must be learning, even though we admit that action and passion coincide, not in the sense of being the same in the definitions that determine them (like 'garments' and 'clothes'), but in the sense in which (to vary the illustrations already given) the road from Thebes to Athens is the same as the road from Athens to Thebes; for things need not be identical in all respects because they are the same in some, but only if they are identical in what they actually are—in a word if they are not two 'things' at all, but only two names or definitions of the same thing. Nor yet, even if the actualizing of teaching is identical with the actualizing of learning, does it follow that to be learning is the same thing as to be teaching; any more than, if the interval between two distant points A and B is one interval, it follows that being distant from B when you are at A is the same as being distant from A when you are at B, To put it generally; there is, in the strict sense, no absolute identity even between the actualization of teaching and that of learning, or between action and passion; but only the thing which has these two aspects—the motion—is one and the same thing; for there is a conceptual distinction between the aspects—between 'being the actualizing of this in that' and 'being the actualizing of that by this.' (*Phys.* 202b9-23, tr. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford. 1934)

As stated, the two entities share one and the same actualization but are of the different being. The one and the same activity provides a platform for these two beings to function. In the end, it is their qualitative character that turns out to be the same rather than the entities themselves, given that they are neither of the same substrates (the

sensible content is possessed by the perceiving subject, and the sensible form is of the sensible material), nor do they have the same being (perception and the sensible form are, after all, different in being).

The correlation between the percipient sense and the sensible in Aristotle is quite different from later scholars' interpretation of intentionality, which surmises an intentional relation that directs the mental act to the intentional object. The relation between sense and the sensible may not necessarily be suitable to be called relation but at best one might speak of identity in actuality. The advantage of this formulation of identity between the percipient sense and the sensible object is clear. First, it dramatically diminishes mistakes we make in perceiving. Every perceptual state or content we have is directly determined by the present perceptible, and by virtue of the actualization of these two potential entities, the perceptual content becomes identical in quality as the perceptible. Considered in this way, it is no wonder that perception is largely reliable. Second, and more importantly, it avoids the tendency of psychologism which separates the inner world from the external reality. Psychologism happens to be the criticism which Brentano confronted in the early stage of his work, where he proposed intentionality as the mental act intentionally directed to the immanent object. However, he did not mention its correlation with the external world which created a barrier between the psychic activity and the external world.

As it stands, that which is percipient and the perceived object are at best referred to as an identity of quality in actuality. The identity between what is percipient, and the perceptible object perfectly reveals Aristotle to be a realist, connecting the immanent content with the external world. Moreover, it once again supports my claim that there is no relation directed from the cognitive subject to the object in Aristotle's theory of perception.

2.3.4 Perceptual awareness

We have surveyed the principle of "receiving form without matter" which provides the perceptual content as well as the assimilation between the perceiving subject and the sensible object in actuality – which spells out the credibility of the perceptual content. Now, it is time to illustrate the first-person access to the perceptual experience and content. Brentano believes that the inner perception is responsible for ensuring that what we experience is totally true in the sense of mental existence.[202] However, I shall

[202] Brentano (1977), p. 64-65.

argue that by virtue of inner perception, the perceptual content is under the state of consciousness.

Perceiving that we see or hear, which Aristotle first puts forth in *DA* III 2 415b12-14, turns our attention to sensuous awareness or reflexivity (Kahn (1966), Kosman (1975), Caston (2002), Johansen (2006), De Haas (2009)). Here, we find that one kind of sense can only sense a specific group of sensible qualities – for example, the sense of sight can only sense colors, hearing can only receive the form of sound, taste the flavor, touch the temperature or texture, and smell the odor (*DA* 418a14). Now, on this basis, to which sense organ should the capacity of sensing the sensation itself be attributed? If it is not any of the previously-formulated five single senses but a sixth sense, then this will not only contradict Aristotle's claim that there are no more than five senses, but will it also result in an infinite regress of the capacity of sensing? As such, the role of sensing the sensation itself must still fall within the purview of the five senses, and this resonates with the explanation that there is no extra sense responsible for the common and incidental sensible in *DA* III 1 (*DA* 425a14-16).

To better explain this perceptual capacity, Aristotle argues that though by the sense of sight we can sense color, we also discriminate darkness from light, even when no sensible object is present (*DA* 425b20-23). We can infer from this that sense has two different roles: one is its conventional activity of sensing the specific sensible object that it is capable of sensing; the other is the capacity of discernment or discrimination, even for sensing the sensation itself.

Even though it seems that it is by virtue of the singular sense that we perceive the sensation itself as well as distinguish between sensibles, that is not the end of the story, considering that: first, Aristotle sets forth that there are only five senses and each sense is responsible to one specific group of sensibles, among which there is no sensation itself apart from the sensation of the sensible object (*DA* 424b22-24); and second, when Aristotle addresses the issue of distinguishing between different sensibles, he implies that there must be at least two senses. The singular senses can only distinguish sensibles of their own kind, but cannot distinguish sensibles of any other kinds. That is the reason why Aristotle expounds that there should be an underlying entity. To support this, he offers the metaphor of the dot, which acts as the unity of all the five senses (*DA* 427a10-15). In this metaphor, sense is depicted as a dot with five diffusing lines. Therefore, when we perceive using a specific sense, it appears that it is the specific line that does the exact work, but the common powers of discrimination and awareness that are different yet shared among the five senses cannot be ignored. Without the converging point, discrimination and perceptual awareness are not possible.

In *On Sleep*, Aristotle attributes the role of perceptual-awareness to a common power that every sense shares.

> Now, since every sense has something special and also something common; special, as, e.g., seeing is to the sense of sight, hearing to the auditory sense, and so on with the other senses severally; while all are accompanied by a common power, in virtue whereof a person perceives that he sees or hears (for, assuredly, it is not by sight that one sees that he sees; and it is not by taste, or sight, or both together that one discerns, and that sweet things are different from white things, but by a part common to all the organs of sense)……(*DSV*, 455a12-20)

By adopting Kahn's suggestion that *DA* and *PN* are an integrated exposition and thus closely related,[203] we can see that the explanation of the common power of sense can be applied to these issues in *De Anim*a.[204] This common power of sense is not a separate sense – it is what each sense has in common and plainly accompanies each of the five single senses. That is to say, when the single sense works, it not only plays the role of receiving the corresponding sensible object, but also exhibits the capacity of sensing sensation itself as well as discriminating and discerning sensibles by virtue of the common character of sense. As clarified by *Sense and Sensibilia,*

> We must assume also, in the case of the soul, that the faculty of perception in general is in itself numerically one and the same, but different in its being: different, that is to say, in genus as regards some of its objects, in species as regards others. Hence too, we may conclude that one can perceive numerically different objects simultaneously with a faculty which is numerically one and the same, but not the same in its account. (*DS*, 449a17-19)

There are then several functions of the perceptual faculty. One is to perceive the perceptual object. For example, when I am looking at a red apple, my sense organ is acted on by the redness and there is a qualified alteration happening so that my eye's apparatus is affected by the redness. The second is perceptual awareness, and it is what the singular senses share by virtue of the common power of sensation behind it. The third is perceptual discrimination, which is enforced by the unity of senses. The three functions are different in being but each belongs to same perceptual faculty. To generalize, the perceptual faculty is able to perceive the ongoing sensible activity and acquire an awareness of the perceptual experience, as well as discriminating between the differences in sensible objects. It is by virtue of the underlying common sense that I

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[203] Kahn (1966), p. 61.

[204] The comprehensive interpretation of the common sense is also revealed in Gregorić, Pavel (2007). *Aristotle on the Common Sense*.

believe the sensory content composed on the basis of sensory input is perceived and made aware of and discriminated by the perceiving subject, insofar as the sensory content is to be called immanent content.[205]

In *GA,* Aristotle explicates that the sense organ is correlated with the heart through blood-vessels. Using the example of ears and nose, he states that "smell and hearing are passages full of connate pneuma, connecting with the outer air and terminating at the small blood vessels around the brain which extend thither from the heart." (*GA*. 744a1-5). So, it is no wonder that Aristotle sometimes attributes the perception of the non-five special sensibles incidentally to the five singular senses since the five singular senses will pass the information to the next part, where I believe the common power of sense resides.[206]

If there is one points that I would like to highlight here, it is concerning the active factor in sensation, given that Brentano as well as some contemporary scholars have traced the active factor to sensation in Aristotle. In Hamlyn's (1966) interpretation, even though "being acted on" makes the sense passive, *DA* III 2 reveals an active characteristic of the sense because of the common sense's judgment of the objects. The sense's ability to make declarations about their objects implies that sensation is an active process.[207] As such, Hamlyn attributes the active factor to perception, owing to the involvement of judgment. A similar interpretation can be found in Kahn (1966), who indicates that the word "κρίνει" (*krinei*) can be translated as "judge" as well as "discriminate."[208] In this vein, Ebert (1983) regards the active side of sense perception as a judgmental activity, and he argues that judgment is an intentional act.[209] Caston (2002) holds that Brentano's claim about intentionality and consciousness in *PES* is inspired by an extended meditation found in *On the Soul* III.2.

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[205] Corcilius (2014) proposes we shift to causal line from the perceptual soul in actuality to the production of phenomenal content. According to him, "the soul is neither affected nor does it act as the subject of perception; instead, the incoming perceptual input actualizes the neutral value which causes the living body to generate phenomenal content, and this is something that living bodies do, even if only on a subpersonal level" (p.34). And further, he claims that Aristotle manages to explain how perceptual discrimination turns physical events—notably, incoming sensory input—into something non-physical, namely phenomenal content about the physical world. My disagreement from him is that I believe the sensory content is composed on the basis of sensory input in actualization. The actualization of perception avails the perceptual soul which perceives it, makes discrimination and becomes aware of it, rather than the perceptual discrimination turns the sensory input into phenomenal content by separating the sensible form from the sensible matter.

[206] In his work *On Sleep and Waking* and *On Sensation*, Aristotle names this sense as "the common power of sense" (*DSV*, 455a12-22) and "the faculty of perception for all" (*DS*, 449a5-20).

[207] Hamlyn (1966).

[208] Kahn (1966), p. 55.

[209] Ebert (1983).

Correspondingly, he says that "it is precisely in virtue of certain mental states being directed at mental states that we are transitively conscious" (p. 768) to Aristotle's formulation of "perceptions of perceptions". It seems that Caston views perception as a mental state which is capable of directing itself toward something.[210] Corcilius separates perceptual awareness and perceptual discrimination as two distinct activities and argues that the separation of the sensible form from the matter is the task of discrimination. In this manner, we become aware of the perceptual content after the separation of the sensible form from matter.[211] De Haas has a different view than Corcilius. According to De Haas, perceptual discrimination has nothing to do with an alleged active aspect of perceptual cognition, and there is no good reason to say that it is the act of discrimination that separates the sensible form from matter.[212]

Let us consider then these various arguments with an initial question: could Aristotle's notion of perceptual discrimination or perceptual awareness be regarded as in an active and judging capacity? Firstly, as to the active or passive tendency, it should be clear from the preceding citations and explanations that the sensible object is the efficient cause of sensation because Aristotle attributes the active tendency to the form, and correspondingly, the percipient sense is the passive partner in the perceptual process. In this sense, it is hard to say that the percipient sense exhibits an active tendency just because it can discriminate among objects and be aware of itself. Furthermore, neither the active nor passive sense should be overstated, since it is not a point Aristotle emphasizes nor one with which he is especially concerned. When we touch a hot object, its temperature is immediately perceived by us and we will have an instant reaction to withdraw our hands. It is just an organism's self-reactive mechanism – and, following De Haas (2020)'s suggestion, that makes it difficult, even improper, to set apart its passive and active behaviors.

Consequently, as to the implication of judgment, it should be noted that perceptual awareness belongs to the perceptual faculty, which has no intellectual capacity. Judgment is by contrast, a capacity of the intellect. So, it is improper to attribute judgment to perceptual awareness. Even though the word "κρίνει" does in some contexts mean judgement, it is better to understand it as "discern" or "discriminate" in Aristotle's perceptual theory.[213]

Lastly, it is even more inappropriate to ascribe the "perception of perception" to "mental states being directed at mental states."[214] On the one hand, while the

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[210] Caston (2002).

[211] Corcilius (2014), p. 37.

[212] De Haas (2020).

[213] For a detailed investigation of "κρίνει", see Ebert (1983).

[214] Caston (2002), p. 768.

"perception of perception" can minimally be interpreted as perception itself and—at most—as perceptual awareness, it has nothing to do with the issue of directedness. As was clarified above, directedness and the active tendency are not implicit in the sense organs themselves – and not to mention in the common power of sense. On the other hand, Aristotle attributes the perceptual capacity to both animals and humans, and animals do not have the intellect which is exclusively owned by humans. And so, when Caston refers to perception as a mental state, he extends intellect to the sphere of animals, which is something Aristotle explicitly avoids.

I submit that perceptual awareness is one essential component for my argument concerning immanent content, but perceptual awareness—and even perceptual discrimination, as capacities possessed by the common sense—contain no active directing capacity. Up to now, I have objected to the proposal of attributing the active factor to the sensation by virtue of perceptual awareness or perceptual discrimination. However, I need to be careful since the perceptual soul, as a multi-functional perceptual composite, has the power for receiving forms, for striving for something, as well as for movement.[215] Although the perceptual soul is passive, the act of desiring is active and it is the desiring act itself which transforms the potential perceptual desire into actuality. But sensory desire is a different kind of activity of the perceptual faculty, and when it comes to sensation,[216] I insist on the claim that there is no active factor in sensation.

A comprehensive picture of the perceptual theory thus far can be summarized as: the sensible object transmits its sensible form to the percipient sense, by virtue of the efficient and formal causation, and by acting upon the percipient sense along with a kind of qualitative change in the sense organ. The relation between sensible content and the sensible external object is guaranteed by the assimilation principle in one and the same activity, so as to make sure our sensible content corresponds to reality. The diversity of sensible objects and the complex circumstances of sensation require a multi-level perceptual faculty, which can perceive itself as well as discern between different sensibles. This faculty has the capacity of awareness, and in this way, it can be said that the perceptual soul is aware of the sensible content. To generalize, the formal cause of the sensible object, the identity between what is percipient and the perceptible object in actuality, and the perceptual awareness, are the three pillars which sustain the concept of immanent content in Aristotle's theory of perception.

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[215] See: Brentano (1977), p.45.

[216] I will claim in Chapter 3 that what sensory desire plays is an intentional action in the practical sense, and not the theoretical intentionality that lies in.

2.4 The implication of intentionality in the theory of perception

2.4.1 The criterion of Brentano's intentionality

As revealed in the previous chapter, Brentano's formulation of "intentionality" can be divided into two stages: in his first stage, he proposes "intentional in-existence" which means that there is an intended object that is in-existent or immanent in every mental act, and the mental act is directed to this in-existent object; at his later stage, he abandons the supposition of in-existence or immanence of the intended object, resulting in his conclusion that intentionality is just a relation between the mental act and the real thing.[217] Bearing this in mind, I shall now investigate whether we can find a parallel to these two stages in Aristotle's work or not.

2.4.1.1 The early stage of intentional in-existence

As we previously stated, Brentano refers to Aristotle's principle of "receiving form without matter" in proposing his intentional in-existence thesis.[218] What is more, Aristotle states that "even when the sensible objects are gone, the sensings and imaginings continue to exist in the sense-organs" (*DA* 425b24-26). For Aristotle, immanence and in-existence follow from these. In this sense, I would like to state that Brentano is correct to refer to Aristotle when proposing something immanent in the sensing subject.

But there are still inconsistencies between Brentano's thesis of intentional in-existence and the immanence in Aristotle's perceptual theory. First, intentional in-existence is formulated by Brentano as a reference by which the mental act points to the immanent object. However, according to Aristotle, the perceptual soul is a passive faculty. We do find that Aristotle proposes perceptual awareness, which means that we are aware of sensation when we are sensing, and which promisingly adds the fact that we are aware of the sensible content. But it is untenable to ascribe to this perceptual awareness a capability of active reference.[219] What we draw from Aristotle's perceptual theory is, first: a directedness from the sensible object to the perceiving subject, and not the other way around; second, by receiving form without matter, what the perceiving subject suffers is a qualitative alteration on the sense organ and an actualization of the potential perceptual soul, it is not an intentional object that is

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[217] *PES*, p. 211.

[218] *PES*, p.67.

[219] I elaborated on the reasons on p. 100-102.

immanent in the sensing subject; and third, in Brentano's formulation of intentional in-existence, we see no hint of the external world and the correlation between the intentional object and the external world. Such is the reason why Brentano was criticized for blocking the psychological phenomena from the external world. However, Aristotle avoids this trap by assimilating sensation and the sensible object in actuality.

2.4.1.2 The later stage of Brentano's intentionality

In his later stage, Brentano changes his intentional in-existence thesis into a relation between the mental act with a real thing, which means that the mental act is conscious of a thing and has the thing as its object. However, as we claimed, the relation between the sensing subject and the sensible object in Aristotle is at best to be interpreted as identical in quality in actuality. In addition, it is a directedness from the sensible object to the perceiving subject by virtue of the efficient cause. The primal inconsistency still lies in that Brentano attributes an active factor to the mental act, including perception. However, Brentano nevertheless excludes the actualized form in Aristotle as the thing which is referred or directed toward by the mental act. At this stage, Brentano only values the independent thing as object.[220]

2.4.2 The criterion of general intentionality

2.4.2.1 Directedness rather than intentional directedness

The general interpretation of intentional directedness is the mental act's capacity of being directing at or referring to ordinary objects, properties or states of affairs. This implies a relational mode in the strongest sense. However, as clarified previously, it is not a relation from the sensing subject to the sensible object which is found in Aristotle's theory of perception – but rather, an identity of quality in actuality. In addition, it is revealed by virtue of the efficient cause that there is only a directedness from the sensible object to the sensing subject, and it is not what we referred to as intentional directedness. What is more, an alteration occurs in the sensing subject when the sensible form acts on it, and the intentional directedness from the mental act to the intentional object does not bring about any change in the object.

Nevertheless, I have emphasized the passivity of perception in a strict sense, as being limited to the activity of the perceptual soul's ability to receive the form from the perceptible object. Moreover, it is in this sense that we find a pure passivity of

[220] *PES*, p. 229.

perception. However, it should be admitted that the perceptual soul is composed of several capacities: the capacity of receiving forms, the capacity for sensory desire, as well as the capacity for movement.[221] The sensory desire and movement reveal a practical sense of intention, which means striving towards or aiming at something and further triggering motion. However, this practical sense of intention is not the concern of a theoretical sense of intentionality and is not the focus of this project.[222]

It is certain that perception in the strict sense, as the activity of receiving form without matter, is passive. However, some commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, hold that perception has the capacity of directing towards the perceptible—or rather, in actuality—whereas perception is inactive when it is not perceiving. In his view, the power for perception requires the perceptible to be active just like the power for nourishment requires nourishment to be active.[223] This capacity of being directed towards the perceptible is correlated with the perception's active characteristic in actualization. Lisska explains that in Aquinas, the unique characteristic of "tending towards" of the immaterial disposition provides the ontological possibility for intentionality. It is realized by the subject's possession of the innate cognitive capacity, that which is able to be actualized and activated by the form of the object. Lisska's endorsement of intentionality in Aquinas is helpful for us to look back to Aristotle, because Aquinas' perception of the subject's ability to be actualized and activated comes from his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*.[224] We thus see both Alexander and Aquinas attribute the active factor to the actualized perceptual state.

I, however, am not in favor of this idea. In my opinion, the actualized perceptual state is the perceiving subject's act of being aware of the perceptual content, and perceptual awareness does not imply an active factor. Second, the actualized

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[221] For the category of the perceptual soul's capacity, I refer to Brentano where he depicts the manifold function of the soul. In the sensitive and intellectual soul, there are three genera of powers: 1), the power to receive forms, i.e. the ability to represent; 2), appetitive power, i.e. the capacity for striving; and 3), capacities for movement. p.45. He adds later that there must be a fourth power that intellectual power unconsciously exercises an influence upon the bodily part. p.49. See: Brentano (1977).

[222] The mechanism of sensory desire works like this: the object of desire works as the unmoved mover, which is in the first place to trigger the power of desire, which further triggers the motion. Meanwhile, Brentano claims that the desiring act itself can make the potential perceptual desire into actuality. In this sense, the perceptual activity reveals a kind of active implication. However, as we said, it is a practical sense of intention. For more details, see *DA* III 9-11, where a practical motion is revealed.

[223] "In general about the soul for perceiving that it is a power of soul in virtue of which that which possesses it can, when it becomes like the perceptible to be received through a certain kind of alteration, have cognition of them by means of the activity directed towards them." (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima*. 38, 21-39,9. p. 36) It implies that the power of perception can direct towards perceptible in actuality, and thus have the cognition of the perceptible.

[224] Lisska (2016). p. 35.

perceptual state may provide content for the subject to move or act, and it is safe to attribute the active factor to the subject since it is the subject which takes action rather than the perceptual soul/faculty.[225] The intentional action the content incurs is intentional in the practical sense, considering that it is the subject's desire or intention to do something. The perceptual faculty thus remains passive and there is no intentional directedness deriving from it.

Drawing a comprehensive picture, sensation occurs when the sensible object is present. The initiating or active power of the sensible object is bound up with its form, which has the efficient capacity to set up the movement, so as to incur the corresponding motion of the media – which is the following agent that directly acts on the sensitive by transferring the sensible form. It is from this sense that I find the roots of directedness, but it is worth noting that this directedness is not qualified as intentional directedness because it is not driven by the psychic subject. Hence, conservatively speaking, Aristotle does not touch upon the issue of intentional directedness and there is no root of intentional directedness in Aristotle's perceptual theory, at least from the definition I set up.

2.4.2.2 The roots of immanent content

In my discussion concerning the immanent content rooted in Aristotle, I adopt three principles: "receiving form without matter", "the assimilation between the percipient sense and sensible object in actuality" and "the perceptual awareness of the sensible content", which together contribute to the immanent content. In other words, the roots of immanent content can be found in that: first, we can receive the sensible forms (of single five senses, common sensible, incidental sensible and the sensation itself) so as to specify the sensible content; second, the sensible content is identical in quality with the sensible object in actuality; and third, the whole activity is under the state of awareness, which means that we are aware of the sensible content. Hence, we can confirm that in perception, the correlative content concerning the specific object has an inner containment for us, of which we are aware, so that we can call it immanent content. In addition, it is this particular formulation of "immanent content" that we claim constitutes one of the roots of intentionality.

[225] Corcilius (2014).