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The roots of intentionality in Aristotle's theory of psychology

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THE ROOTS OF INTENTIONALITY IN ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGY



Hao LIU

The Roots of Intentionality in Aristotle's Theory of Psychology

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The Roots of Intentionality in Aristotle's Theory of Psychology

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in this dissertation:
Aristotle's work:

<i>Cat.</i>	<i>Categoriae</i>
<i>APo.</i>	<i>Analytica Posteriora</i>
<i>Phys.</i>	<i>Physica</i>
<i>DA</i>	<i>De Anima</i>
<i>PN</i>	<i>Parva Naturalia</i>
<i>DS</i>	<i>De Sensu et Sensibilibus</i>
<i>DM</i>	<i>De Memoria et Reminiscentia</i>
<i>DI</i>	<i>De Insomniis</i>
<i>DSV</i>	<i>De Somno et Vigilia</i>
<i>Met.</i>	<i>Metaphysica</i>

References to Aristotle's works are given in the following form: abbreviated title, followed by page, column, and lines. e.g. *DA* 403a20-25.

Brentano's work:

<i>PES</i>	<i>Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint</i>
<i>OSS</i>	<i>On the several senses of being in Aristotle</i>
<i>PA</i>	<i>The Psychology of Aristotle</i>
<i>DP</i>	<i>Descriptive Psychology</i>
<i>AW</i>	<i>Aristotle and his worldview</i>

INTRODUCTION

In modern philosophy of mind, we find a tendency to gain new inspiration from Aristotle's psychology, aiming to activate new interest in ancient texts as well as to enlighten contemporary research. Examples are the debate about Aristotle and functionalism (Hilary Putnam (1973), Martha Nussbaum (1978), Howard Robinson (1978), (1983), Christopher Shields (1988), (1990), M. F. Burnyeat (1992), Stephen Everson (1997), T. H. Irwin (1991), etc.); intentionality in Aristotle (Sorabji (1995), (2001), Burnyeat (1992), Caston (1998), Corcilius & Gregoric (2013), Shields (1994), etc.); Aristotle and emergentism (Caston (1997)). Connecting Aristotle with contemporary philosophy of mind is not only a way to refresh Aristotle's thoughts and revive his insightful theories, but also provides opportunities to introduce ancient perspectives into modern discussions. Except for the comprehensive investigation about intentionality in Aristotle by Victor Caston and Richard Sorabji, in other scholars the topic of Aristotle and intentionality is rather a by-product of other research interests. Generally speaking, the topic of intentionality in Aristotle has not been sufficiently studied.

The relevance of intentionality to the interpretation of Aristotle was first suggested by Brentano in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Brentano had a solid Aristotelian background and aimed to set up empirical psychology with the inspiration of ancient and medieval ontology and epistemology. As we know, Aristotle's psychology and philosophy of mind are mainly concentrated in his works *DA* and *PN*. *DA* sets out to clarify what the soul is, or the essence of the soul, but at an abstract level. More details are found in the collection of the *PA*. In order to deal with the essence of the soul Aristotle develops the relationship of soul and body as inseparable, thus opposing Platonic (and later Cartesian) dualism of body and soul. Aristotle believes that all our affections, such as anger, desire, love, pity, happiness, etc., are involved with the body, and he defines these affections as enmattered (*DA* 403a25).

Brentano has the reputation of introducing the notion of intentionality into modern philosophy of mind. However, Brentano does not use the term 'intentionality', but what Brentano uses is a modified Medieval term: intentional in-existence. According to Brentano's early idea, the distinct feature of mental phenomena is the intentional in-existence of the object, which means that every mental phenomenon is characterized by the intended object immanent in the mental act and the mental act is

directed to this immanent object. As revealed later, Brentano turned to a thesis of intentionality, which means the mental subject has the *Reales* as the object in his late stage.¹ Even though Brentano's early definition of intentional in-existence is somewhat ambiguous, and even though he changed this idea to some extent in his later work, it is this term that widely influences his contemporaries and later research.

Here we take our starting point from Brentano and investigate how Brentano's concept of intentionality is rooted in Aristotle, given that he refers back to Aristotle when he frames his notion of intentional in-existence.² How is it expressed in the ancient context, and does it indeed provide us with a new perspective on the modern philosophy of mind? Most importantly, what does it mean for our understanding of Aristotle's psychology if we approach his theory with the modern notion of intentionality in mind? Do the implications of intentionality in Aristotle reveal different aspects in Brentano's proposal? In this dissertation, I would like to investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle's psychology and make a comparison between Aristotle and Brentano on the topic of intentionality. In order to achieve this result, I will first set up a working definition of intentionality by tracing the development of "intention" along historical lines. Then I shall deal with Aristotle's psychology—perception, *phantasia*, memory, dream, recollection, and intellect one by one, to survey whether any sign of intentionality is revealed in these psychic activities and how. Finally, I would like to make a comparison between Aristotle and Brentano on intentionality based on Brentano's Aristotelian background and to survey the echo of Aristotle in modern philosophy of mind.

Chapter One aims to provide a definition of intentionality both from Brentano and from a general standpoint. Nearly all contemporary debate about intentionality dates back to Brentano, who developed and modified the Medieval Scholastic term "objective inexistence" to characterize the psychological phenomena and reintroduce the term of intentional in-existence into modern philosophy. Henceforth, a brief inquiry into Brentano's theory of intentionality is necessary for us as a starting point of our investigation. Following Brentano's reference, this term has a historical tradition through Aristotle, Philo of Alexandria, the Neoplatonists, Augustine, Anselm to Thomas Aquinas.³ It is his particular reference to Aristotle that induces me to investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle. Therefore, the main aim of this

¹ For Brentano's two stages of intentionality thesis and what does *Reales* mean, see p. 19, 21.

² "Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect." Brentano (2009), p.67. I shall use the abbreviation of *PES* for *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* in this dissertation.

³ Brentano (2009), p. 67.

chapter is to investigate Brentano's proposal of intentionality, his thesis of intentional in-existence, and the doubts and influences it gave rise to. Then I shall walk along the historical route Brentano provides to survey how the figures Brentano refers to indicate or express the notion of intentional in-existence. What is more, are there any others who can be added to this historical line? Based on this new historical analysis, a more general working definition of intentionality is to emerge.

"Directedness" or "aboutness" is generally regarded as the symbol of intentionality in the contemporary interpretation, as the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states, "intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs."⁴ Nevertheless, to state a definition of intentionality without controversy is no easy task, given that there are so many different theories of intentionality. The etymology of intentionality: *intentio*, has a long tradition dating back to ancient times. The connotation and extension of it vary at different times, so a modest reading of intentionality should consider its historical background. Also, the investigation of the term "*intention*" is just one side of the story because "philosophers have sometimes possessed certain concepts before having the actual words to go with them." If philosopher possesses the concept but not the word, it is usually "revealed by his periphrases or his general discussion of the subject".⁵ Therefore, a comprehensive investigation of intentionality concerns both sides.

Whereas I aim to reconsider intentionality from the standpoint of Aristotle's psychology, most contemporary discussions of intentionality deviate from the aim and the context I would like to reconstruct. Henceforth, I focus on the tradition of the development of intentionality up to Brentano. In this way, we will get closer to Aristotle instead of being confused by ever more complicated contemporary discussions of intentionality. Through a rough investigation of the development of intentionality from ancient times to Brentano, two obvious characteristics will appear: intentional directedness and immanent content. Armed with Brentano's notion of intentionality in the two stages of its development in Brentano, as well as a general working definition of intentionality, I shall be ready to deal with Aristotle's theory of psychology.

The project of chapter Two is to survey the root of intentionality in Aristotle's theory of perception. For the sake of clarity, I divide the investigation of perception into two parts: one part serves for the survey of intentional directedness and one part for the survey of immanent content. Aristotle's perceptual theory, starts from the

⁴ Jacob, Pierre, "Intentionality", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/intentionality/>>.

⁵ Hamlyn (1961), p. 2-3.

sensible object, which is composed of matter and form. It is the sensible form that acts on the medium, which further acts on the sense organ, during which event what is percipient receives the sensible form rather than its matter. From this general description, it is revealed that the occurrence of perception is initiated by the sensible object which affects the perceiving soul. Correspondingly, the perceptual soul is passive to be acted upon by the sensible object. As such, the perceptual soul cannot work as the mentally active subject, which refers to its object as Brentano and modern scholars state. We find roots of immanent content in that, first, the sensible forms that we receive directly specify the sensible content; second, we find Aristotle's proposal that the sensitive soul is identical with the sensible object in activity, which guarantees that the perceptual content provides reliable information about the perceived object; third, the whole activity is accompanied by awareness, which entails that we are aware of the sensible content being contained in the soul, so as to be called immanent content.

In Chapter Three, I investigate the role of *phantasia* in Aristotle's psychological framework, especially its role in explaining the immanent content in various cognitive activities, even when there is no corresponding external object. Considering that an active stimulator like the sensible object shall work as the formal cause to provide sensible information to the perceptual soul, we shall see that the *phantasma*, which is the inner image, acts as such a power when there is no external object to initiate cognition. Except for the function of presenting sensible material, *phantasia* is also designed to explain error and sense-illusion in cognition. In general, *phantasia* is used by Aristotle in several different meanings: it presents images for the cognitive activity to compose its immanent content, it explains the problem of error or sense-illusion, and accompanies desire in initiating intentional action in the practical sense. By presenting images, *phantasia* plays an essential role in cognitive activities, thus providing the possibility for immanent content in these cognitive activities.

Chapter Four aims to investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle's theory of intellect. The first step is to have a general interpretation of the mechanism of intellect, which has received numerous different interpretations; then I shall identify the possible correlation of intellect to intentionality from the perspective of immanent content and intentional directedness. On my interpretation, the initiating factors of thinking, i.e. the efficient cause of thinking, is not the active intellect, but a human being's power of soul. The intellectual activity rests on a combination of initiators: a human being by means of the active intellect. Therefore, the intentional directedness in intellect is not from the active intellect to the object. Instead, it is the human being who can pay attention to, select something based on a remaining image or previously acquired knowledge. The immanent content is composed by the passive intellect's reception of the intelligible object, which is provided by *phantasia*.

Chapter Five makes a thorough investigation of Brentano's Aristotelian background and aims to make a comprehensive comparison between Aristotle and Brentano on intentionality. I surveyed Brentano's work, such as *OSS*, *PA*, *DP*, *PES*. I will not go into these books in great detail, but pick out several parts which will be of interest to our investigation in the "being of intentional in-existence." Except for a comparison between Aristotle and Brentano that appears in this last chapter, I also delineate the echo of Aristotle in modern philosophy of mind.

CHAPTER 1: TWO FRAMEWORKS OF INTENTIONALITY: BRENTANO AND GENERAL

Intentionality, as reintroduced and reconstructed by Brentano in his work *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, is primarily a notion made in modern philosophy of mind. Brentano speaks of “intentional in-existence” as the defining feature of mental phenomena, which means for him that mental phenomena possess intended objects as immanent or in-existent in the mental activity.⁶ Following Brentano, intentionality was further developed into a central topic in phenomenology, analytic philosophy and philosophy of mind. Brentano traces the notion of “intentional in-existence” back to ancient and medieval philosophers, notably Aristotle,⁷ and this attribution has inspired ongoing contemporary discussions among Aristotelian scholars.⁸

Following this line of inquiry, I would like to elaborate on Brentano’s notion of intentionality and the following debates about this concept so as to produce a dynamic picture of Brentano’s framework of intentionality. Next, I shall refer back to the philosophers⁹ whom Brentano quotes in proposing his intentionality thesis, and discover the ways in which these philosophers influenced and inspired Brentano’s

⁶ I shall disclose that Brentano’s intentionality thesis can be divided into two stages, and what is emphasized as intentional in-existence at his first stage (1874) is modified to a great extent in his later edition (1911) of *PES*. More details will be clarified further in this chapter.

⁷ It runs as follows: “Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect. In Philo, likewise, we find the doctrine of mental existence and in-existence. However, since he confuses them with existence in the proper sense of the word, he reaches his contradictory doctrine of the logos and Ideas. The same is true of the Neoplatonists. St. Augustine in his doctrine of the Verbum mentis and of its inner origin touches upon the same fact. St. Anselm does the same in his famous ontological argument; many people have observed that his consideration of mental existence as a true existence is at the basis of his paralogism (cp. Überweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II). St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that the object which is thought is intentionally in the thinking subject, the object which is loved in the person who loves, the object which is desired in the person desiring, and he uses this for theological purposes. When the Scriptures speak of an indwelling of the Holy Ghost, St. Thomas explains it as an intentional indwelling through love. In addition, he attempted to find, through the intentional in-existence in the acts of thinking and loving, a certain analogy for the mystery of the Trinity and the procession ad intra of the Word and the Spirit.” Cf. Franz Brentano (2009). *PES*. p. 67.

⁸ See: Sorabji (1992), (2001), Burnyeat (1995), Caston (2002), Cohoe (2013), Corcilius (2013).

⁹ They are Aristotle, Philo, Neoplatonists, St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, as shown in Note 3.

notion of intentionality. Then, I will roughly sketch the historical development of the concept of intentionality by exploring how later thinkers drew upon and departed from Brentano to put forward a general definition of intentionality which deviates from Brentano's account of intentionality (though greatly influenced by Brentano). It is this general portrait of intentionality that will serve as our working definition as we further survey the roots of intentionality in Aristotle in the upcoming chapters.

It is worth noting that Brentano referred to a long list of figures (Aristotle, Philo, Neoplatonists, Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas) who inspired his account of intentionality. The reason why I chose to pay special attention to Aristotle—and develop his psychological theory in the following chapters—derives from Brentano's close academic relationship with Aristotle. Brentano began his academic career as an Aristotelian philosopher and prior to the publication of *PES* he had already released several commentaries on Aristotle's work. In addition, throughout *PES*, we find his references to Aristotle.¹⁰ Aristotle, as the first figure that is referred to in his list of influences, has been a major interlocutor throughout Brentano's philosophical thinking. Importantly, the topic of intentionality and Aristotle has aroused contemporary interest, but it is not thoroughly researched. This dissertation makes a contribution to the debate by undertaking a comparison between Brentano and Aristotle on intentionality which likewise will allow for an investigation of the roots of intentionality in Aristotle.

1.1 Brentano's notion of intentional in-existence

Brentano's discussion of intentionality stands out as one of the notable milestones in modern philosophy of mind. The famous paragraph containing Brentano's notion of intentional in-existence is the following:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) in-existence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing) or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgement

¹⁰ Except for Brentano's well-known reference to Aristotle in his notion of intentional in-existence (*PES*, p.67), he also refers to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* for the mental reference in the 1911 edition of *PES* (*PES*, p.211).

something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.¹¹

In this paragraph, Brentano provides us with not only a further indication of his sources of inspiration, i.e. the Scholastic tradition, but also a definition of the term “intentional in-existence.” As we read, he defines it as: the “reference to a content” or “direction towards an object”; “immanent objectivity”; and “the including of something as an object within itself.”¹² From this general proposition, Brentano seems to describe what is immanent as both a ‘content’ and an ‘object’, and the mental act refers to or is directed to something immanent. If that is the case, Brentano roughly formulates two kinds of directedness: the reference from the mental act to its content and the directedness from the mental act to the immanent object. The ambiguity between content and object plants the seeds to several questions with regard to Brentano’s proposal of intentional in-existence of which we will turn to later.¹³

Brentano’s notion of intentionality has received considerable attention and produced a heated debate. The debate centers on the distinction between mental and physical phenomena, how to interpret intentional in-existence, the non-existent object, and the implication of “in” in “in-existence”, etc.¹⁴ Roderick Chisholm (1976) interprets that “intentionally contain an object in themselves” shows how the mental attitudes have an object even though the object does not actually exist. This is a peculiar relation which is sustained even though one of their “terms” does not exist. He interprets physical phenomena as those which cannot intentionally contain objects in themselves. There must be a real material object existing to finalize the relation of physical phenomena.¹⁵ Linda McAlister (1976) contends that Chisholm’s distinction

¹¹ *PES*, p. 68.

¹² Even though Brentano mentions both content and object, it is rather confusing what “content” and “object” exactly are. The English translators of *PES* (1995) comment that “Brentano here uses ‘content’ synonymously with ‘object’. He later came to prefer the term ‘object’”. p.68.

¹³ According to Carlo Ierna’s interpretation: he divides Brentano’s intentionality thesis into three stages. in Brentano’s middle stage, Brentano in fact means the immanent object as content, which is revealed in the descriptive psychology lectures, “every presentation has a content of presentation, but not every presentation has an object.” Ierna claims that Twardowski’s position about the distinction between content and object draws directly on Brentano’s lectures. Cf. Ierna (2015), p.11. In my division of Brentano’s stages, I divide it into two stages based on the two editions of *PES*. At Brentano’s first stage, it seems that Brentano uses content and object without distinction. However, in his appendix of 1911 version of *PES*, he makes a distinction between content and object. p.227.

¹⁴ Tim Crane says that Brentano’s claims about intentional inexistence are well understood, especially by analytical philosophers in the second half of the 20th century. Cf. Crane, (2006).

¹⁵ Chisholm is depicting Brentano’s intentionality at his first stage, that is, Brentano says the immanent object is to interpreted as a non-Reales. Chisholm interprets it as saying mental phenomenon can have

between mental phenomena and physical phenomena is incorrect. She argues that Brentano's concern is not that the mental phenomenon can have an object which can exist as well as not exist, nor that physical phenomena refer to objects that must exist. Instead, according to McAlister, Chisholm wrongly understands the *realia* and *irrealia* as what exists and what does not exist in Brentano, thus resulting in an incorrect distinction between mental phenomena and physical phenomena. In McAlister's opinion, the German word *Reales* that Brentano uses is to be translated as an individual thing rather than as existence. This means that mental phenomena refer to a *Reales*, i.e., an individual thing. Even though some objects of the mental phenomena (for example, a unicorn) do not exist, according to Brentano they have independent meaning in themselves and can be the intended object given that the intended object is an individual thing, rather than a universal, species, genus, a state of affairs or values. McAlister argues that the main difference between mental phenomena and physical phenomena is that mental phenomena are relational to object, while physical phenomena do not have this relational characteristic.¹⁶

Tim Crane (2006) follows the same line of reasoning as McAlister and rejects that Brentano's opening point in proposing intentional inexistence is to deal with the problem of non-existent objects. According to his investigation on this issue, "Brentano's view is not that there is a distinction between 'physical objects' which exist, and 'intentional objects' which do not exist" (p.5). Crane continues by arguing that "Brentano's view is rather that none of the things which are studied by science 'really and truly exist': they are phenomena, mere appearances, which are signs of an underlying reality but which are not real themselves" (p.5). Philip J. Bartok (2005) is also in line with McAlister's rejection of Chisholm's distinction between mental and physical phenomena. He disagrees with Chisholm's characterization of existence/ non-existence, internal/ external as the relevant distinctions. According to Bartok, both mental and physical phenomena are conscious appearances and experiential facts which the mind can immediately access.¹⁷

object which does not exist. That is why McAlister criticizes that Chisholm misunderstands non-*Reals* as non-existence. Chisholm (1976).

¹⁶ Another objection which McAlister proposed is that the physical phenomena are not what Chisholm says of physical activities, but rather sensible qualities, such as "a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odour which I sense, as well as similar images which appear in the imagination" Cf. McAlister (1976).

¹⁷ Philip J. Bartok concludes Chisholm's psychology thesis and ontological thesis of intentional inexistence by arguing that the psychological thesis means that the intentional relatedness to an object serves as a "mark of the mental" – a criterion mental phenomena may be distinguished from physical phenomena. The ontological thesis is that the objects intended by mental acts are objects with a special ontological status or unique mode of being – that is, intentional inexistence (a mode of being that is short of actuality

Another issue that deserves our attention is the implication of “in” in the term “in-existence.” Daniel C. Dennett (1986) argues that it is not clear whether the prefix “in” means that the intentional object enjoys a form of non-being, or an existence in the mind, or both.¹⁸ Dale Jacquette assesses it as locative, meaning that the intended object or content is located in the psychological state. Quoting Brentano’s description “In presentation, something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on” (*PES*, p. 68), Jacquette holds that the intended object of the psychological activity is contained immanently in the psychological act (p.102).¹⁹ Crane (2006) says “intentional inexistence of an object means, literally, existence in the mental act itself.” (p.10)²⁰ This local interpretation is also adopted by Barry Smith, who states that “every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself is to be taken literally – against the grain of a seemingly unshakeable tendency to twist Brentano’s words at this point.” (p.40)²¹

These debates around Brentano’s intentionality are partly due to the fact that intentionality is a developing concept in Brentano’s work. Therefore, in order to give a comprehensive interpretation of Brentano’s notion of intentionality one must take into account his later development. I divide Brentano’s thesis of intentionality into two stages based on the two editions of *PES*: the first stage is the first edition of *PES* (1874); and the second stage, based on the foreword and appendix of the 1911 edition of *PES*. The obvious distinction between these two stages is that Brentano turns his focus from what is immanent to the mental reference to the thing and the ontology of the intentional object is veered from *nicht Reales* to *Reales*. In the following discussion, I shall first examine the formulation of “intentional in-existence” in the first stage, and then expound his revision of this notion at the later stage of his philosophical thinking.

Brentano claims that the intentional in-existence of an object is the peculiar and exclusive character possessed by each mental phenomenon. It signifies that mental phenomena have a relational characteristic in the mental activity and it is worth noting that intentional in-existence applies to an act-immanent object which is different from the mental act as such. As Brentano declares in the example of hearing, the immanent object of our hearing is different from the act of hearing (*PES*, p.95).

but more than nothingness). For more, please see Philip J. Bartok. “Brentano’s intentionality thesis: beyond the analytic and phenomenological reading”.

¹⁸ Daniel C. Dennett. *Content and Consciousness*. 1986.

¹⁹ Cf. Dale Jacquette, “Brentano’s concept of intentionality” (2004). The supporters for the locative in-existence also include Smith (1994) and Tim Crane (2006).

²⁰ Crane, (2006).

²¹ Smith, (1994).

The distinction of mental and physical phenomena is Brentano's main concern in setting up the empirical psychology. Brentano states that:

Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon. By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term.²²

It thus appears that Brentano regards mental phenomena as mental acts – such as the acts of presentation, hearing, seeing, feeling, etc. Even though intentional in-existence of the object mostly characterizes mental phenomena, Brentano also provides other distinctions between mental and physical phenomena. For instance, he states that “mental phenomena are only perceived in inner consciousness, while in the case of physical phenomena only external perception is possible.” Inner perception has the distinguishing characteristic of immediate, infallible self-evidence (*PES*, p.70). The objects of external perception are mentally-independent entities – such as sound, color, horse, tree, etc. When we hear a sound, the sound is the primary object and physical phenomenon which we perceive. At the same time, we are aware of our own act of hearing of the sound. That is to say, in the perceptual experience as hearing, it is not only directed to the primary object (the sound), but also incidentally directed to itself as a secondary object.²³ In this way, the mental phenomenon mediates the external perception in that the external perception itself is perceived by inner perception. In addition, all mental phenomena are unextended (*PES*, p.74), whereas physical phenomena are extended. Mental phenomena appear to us as a unity, while physical phenomena do not appear in the same way as part of one single phenomenon (*PES*, p.75). Mental phenomena possess real (*wirklich*) existence²⁴ as well as intentional

²² *PES*, p.60.

²³ “The presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound form one single mental phenomenon; it is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations. In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the sound as content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time.” (*PES*, p.98)

²⁴ Brentano's explanation of the real existence of mental phenomena is that “we went on to define mental phenomena as the exclusive object of inner perception; they alone, therefore, are perceived with immediate evidence. Indeed, in the strict sense of the word, they alone are perceived. On this basis we proceeded to define them as the only phenomena which possess actual existence in addition to intentional existence.” *PES*, p. 75.

existence, whereas physical phenomena only have a phenomenal and intentional existence. (*PES*, p.70). Conscious experience can concern both mental phenomena and physical phenomena, and they are immediately cognized by the mental activity. That is why both of them share the intentional existence. The real existence that the mental phenomena exclusively hold spells out that knowledge, joy and desire really exist because they are immediate, infallible self-evident – whereas color, sound and warmth, and similar physical phenomena are intentionally given, can be had as objects as well, but cannot be proved to exist.²⁵ (*PES*, p.72) Maria van der Schaar explains that physical phenomena are not real in the sense that they do not enter into relations of cause and effect (p.5),²⁶ meaning that physical phenomena are not the effect produced by the mental act, and neither are they mentally-dependent objects.

According to Brentano, the characteristic of intentional in-existence of objects belong to all mental activities. Whenever we carry out mental activity, it will contain a specific immanent object. For example, in the cases where: I see a bird; I desire a bottle of water; I hope that there is no war in the world, etc. In each of these, the bird, the bottle of water, and the state of affairs where there is no war in the world, have a kind of immanence in first-person experience. It would thus be odd to say that I am perceiving or thinking, but that there is nothing in that perception or thought.

Therefore, with regard to the debate surrounding Brentano's intentionality in the beginning, I agree with McAlister, Crane and Bartok's stance that the non-existent object is not Brentano's primary concern when he distinguishes between mental and physical phenomena in his 1874 edition of *PES*.²⁷ However, we do find Brentano's mention of the non-existing object in the appendix of the 1911 edition of *PES*.²⁸ McAlister also attempts to explain the nature of the non-exist object by proposing that the intentional object has an independent meaning in itself. But in the distinction of

²⁵ Crane explains that the distinction between physical phenomenon and mental phenomenon on real existence means that the physical phenomena have relative truth, whereas mental phenomena are phenomena of inner perception which are true in themselves. As they appear to be, so are they in reality. Cf. Crane, (2006).

²⁶ Maria van der Schaar, (2016).

²⁷ However, even though it is not an idea found in Brentano's original meaning in the 1874 edition of *PES* that mental phenomena can contain a non-exist object, this can be reasonably implied from a letter written by Brentano to Anton Marty in the later period (1905), in which he refers to the situation when there is no external object, "I spoke of an object of the presentation, which it likewise is about, when there is nothing outside the mind corresponding to it".²⁷ This implies that non-existing objects can be presented to the mental state even though they do not exist in the external world. But given that at this period Brentano already modified the intentional relation as directing from the mental act to the real thing, the object of presentation which is presented to the mental act should better be interpreted as mental content, or else Brentano will contradict himself. See: Dale Jacquette, "Brentano's concept of intentionality". p. 116.

²⁸ *PES*, p.227.

mental phenomena and physical phenomena, Brentano does not necessarily have non-existent objects in mind. Chisholm's interpretation of Brentano's distinction between mental phenomena and physical phenomena seems to regard phenomena as activities. According to him, mental phenomena have a peculiar relation between the mental attitude and an intentional object even though this object is non-existent; while for physical phenomena both relata must exist. In this way, the intentional object is regarded by Chisholm as a unique mode of being, different from that of any physical object, and the intentional relation still holds between the mental act and this peculiar intentional being. But for Brentano, he regards mental phenomena as being characterized by their intentional relation to the object, whereas physical phenomena are like sensible qualities (for example color or sound or so forth) which do not imply a relation, nor are they activities. This reminds us of Brentano's explication that mental phenomena possess real existence as well as intentional existence in consciousness. According to Brentano, what real existence means is that they are immediate, with infallible evidence. Even though Brentano does not necessarily have non-existent objects in mind when he describes the distinct character of mental phenomena, the non-existent object as the intentional object is hardly implausible given that it has real existence and can be infallibly perceived in mental act.

When it comes to the implication of "in" of "in-existence", I agree with Jacquette when he argues that this immanent intentionality is Brentano's early standpoint, and that Brentano later adopts more neutral terminology to avoid the many criticisms on his thesis (p. 103).²⁹ As to the intentional in-existence theory of Brentano, it indicates the immanence of the intended object in the psychic act. It is in this sense that the "in" has a locative implication. As such, I am in line with Smith, Crane and Jacquette. However, the description of reference or direction to this immanent thing unavoidably suggests an active subject which introduces a relation from the mental act to this immanent thing – though, not a relation in the normal sense. Carlo Ierna suggests not to interpret "*Beziehung*" as "relation": first, because it is in the four kinds of relations Brentano discusses in his logic lectures, and intentionality is not mentioned as the relation between the mental act and the intentional object; second, Ierna adopts from Brentano's *DP* that "everything psychical has an object; this 'having-an-object' is not a relation, because it does not involve the existence of another thing."³⁰

We can see later that Brentano describes the reference as a quasi-relation, which is a special kind of relation.³¹ In *DP*, Brentano highlights the relational characteristic of consciousness as follows:

²⁹ Jacquette, (2004).

³⁰ Carlo Ierna (2005), p.9.

³¹ See also: *PES*, p. 211-212.

1. Hence, the peculiarity which, above all, is generally characteristic of consciousness, is that it shows always and everywhere, i.e. in each of its separable parts, a certain kind of relation, relating a subject to an object. This relation is also referred to as ‘intentional relation’. To every consciousness belongs essentially a relation.
2. As in every relation, two correlates can be found here. The one correlate is the act of consciousness; the other is that which it is directed upon.
 Seeing and what is seen,
 Presenting and what is presented,
 Wanting and what is wanted,
 Loving and what is loved,
 Denying and what is denied etc.
 As highlighted already by Aristotle, these correlates display the peculiarity that the one alone is real, [whereas] the other is not something real [*nichts Reales*].
3. Explanation of the term object: some internal object-like thing [*ein innerlich Gegenständliches*] is meant. It need not correspond to anything outside.
 To avoid misunderstandings, one may call it ‘in-dwelling’ [*inwohnendes*] or ‘immanent’ object.³²

The characteristic of the intentional relation lies in the intricacy of the psychic domain, which spells out a relation with no requirement of external existence of the intentional object at all. The intentional object, in this sense, is dependent upon the mental act and is immanent in consciousness. We see that Brentano insists on the intentional object not as a thing during this period,³³ considering that the immanent object can be the presented, wanted, loved, and denied object, rather than an individual thing. It is not until the 1911 edition of *PES* that he claims the intentional relation can only direct to a real thing [*Reales*].³⁴ For now, it spells out that intentionality consists of a relation between the mental act and the immanent object (as *nicht Reales*), which does not require a counterpart in reality. The immanent object is thus mentally-dependent.

In the appendix of the 1911 edition of *PES*, Brentano continues to support his claim that mental reference can be distinguished from relation in the strict sense in that “the terminus of the so-called relation does not need to exist in reality at all” (p. 212). As stated previously, the term Brentano uses is “quasi-relation” (“*Relativliches*”). However, what differs in the 1911 edition is that Brentano stresses that a mental

³² Franz Brentano. *DP*, p. 23-24. I will use the abbreviation *DP* in this dissertation.

³³ *PES*, p. 68.

³⁴ We will discuss “*Reales*” and “*nicht Reales*” in a later section of this dissertation.

relation cannot have something other than a thing [*Reales*] as its object.³⁵ This implies a change of the ontological status of the intentional object from *nicht Reales* to *Reales*.

Considering Brentano's aim of elaborating upon the peculiarity of the mental activity which provides us direct experience of the thing we are conscious of, intentional in-existence is qualified to undertake this task by signifying the immanence that can be directly cognized by the mental activity. Meanwhile, since a mental phenomenon is directly accessible by presentation or another psychic activity (and since we immediately are conscious of its real experience), the empirical psychology Brentano is constructing boils down to this foundation.

This is the picture of Brentano's framework of intentional in-existence we have arrived at thus far: It is the most notable characteristic of mental phenomena – meaning that there will be an immanent object contained in consciousness and this intended object can be directed or referred to by the mental act. Mental phenomena are equally characterized as intentional in-existence which Brentano regards as a mode of real existence that is different from that of physical phenomena.³⁶ However, upon further scrutiny, some limitations appear within the framework of intentional in-existence. First, the intentional relation that is outlined by Brentano is a relation between the mental act and its immanent object. If so, it seems that there will be a rift between the mental act and the external world. Since the immanent object is independent of the external world, a tendency of idealist dogmatism seems to be unavoidable – or, as Dale Jacquette argued, we will arrive at epistemic idealism.³⁷ There will be a barrier between our interpretation of the external world and the external world itself, given that what we directly experience is a mentally dependent object which possess its own existence. Its mode of being is different from the external object, and thus cannot give us certainty about the external world.³⁸ Since there is a direct

³⁵ In the foreword of the 1911 version of *PES*, “one of the most important innovations is that I am no longer of the opinion that mental relation can have something other than a thing [*Reales*] as its object.” xxv.

³⁶ Even though Brentano attributes a special mode of being to the intended object, it is not quite clear what kind of ontological status the intended object has. For example, Dale Jacquette thinks that either from Brentano's *PES* or his 1880 *Logik-Vorlesung* and 1867 *Ontologie and Metaphysik-Vorlesung*, there is no clue as to the ontic status of intended objects. Cf. Dale Jacquette. “Brentano's concept of intentionality”. (ed.) by Dale Jacquette. *The Cambridge companion to Brentano*. 2004. p.104.

³⁷ Jacquette's charge is that “if the intended objects are somehow internal to the thoughts by which they are intended, then it appears that no two persons can ever possibly think about precisely the same thing.....It is unclear how thoughts can ever reach beyond their own internal states in order to contact or make reference to entities in the external world.” Ibid, p.103.

³⁸ Rolf George and Glen Koehn propose another clue about Brentano's ignorance concerning the external world. This appears in *Psychologie III*, published in English as *Sensory and Noetic Consciousness*, where Brentano talks about the primary knowledge of objects, and secondary knowledge of the mental activity.

relationship between the mental act and the immanent object, the external object or the external world is always secondarily cognized. What is more, although Brentano stresses that the immanent object need not correspond to anything outside, we have to admit that in cases when we are conscious of the existent object, there is always a real counterpart existing in reality. Therefore, it seems that Brentano is confronted with the danger of doubling the object by providing another object in the psychic realm. So, should we still call the immanent thing an object? The ambiguity of object and content which we brought to attention in the opening stages of this chapter causes trouble for Brentano.³⁹

Brentano's followers try to complete and modify the program of intentional inexistence by addressing the ambiguity in it. Alexius Meinong and Alois Höfler make a distinction between objects: the immanent object⁴⁰ and the transcendent, mind-independent intentional object. Kazimierz Twardowski clearly distinguishes the mental act, the content of presentation and the transcendent object, clarifying that the intended object Brentano claims is, in fact, the content of the presentation.⁴¹ On this theory, the intentional object is independent of the mental act and transcendent to the thought. The relation between the content of the presentation and the transcendent object is a kind of representation.⁴² With regard to the dilemma that Brentano's proposal of intentional inexistence faces, Twardowski suggests a distinction between object and content. Yet Brentano expresses a relation between the psychical act and the immanent object, which he expounds as the reference to a content, or directing towards an object. Hence, it is quite different from Twardowski's claim that the intentional relation is directed to the transcendent object, and not to the content that is presented in the mind. If for

Brentano addresses that "mental activity always includes the evident consciousness of that activity" (SNC, p. 4), and even more strongly when he states that "[a]side from our knowledge of ourselves as mentally active beings, we have no directly evident knowledge of facts" (SNC, p. 5). Cf. George and Koehn (2004).

³⁹ Neil Allan points out other problems in Brentano. He refers to Frege and Russell's concern about how natural language could refer to unicorns or the present king of France without such sentences being obviously distinct, grammatically or logically. He proposes a similar problem arose for Brentano: the "non-existent" object could be presented in intentional states in the same manner as truly existent entities. This leads to the outcome that there is no basis from which to distinguish between such non-veridical objects of intentionality. Cf. Neil Allan, "The Brentano School".

⁴⁰ According to Jacquette, the immanent object Meinong adopts is what Twardowski refers to as the content of presentation, that which is part of or contained within the experience. Cf. Dale Jacquette (2004), p. 114-115.

⁴¹ Twardowski, (1977). Translated by R. Grossmann.

⁴² Husserl presents his objection to Twardowski's proposal of the relation of content and object. Twardowski links the relation between content and object as a kind of picture or image theory, which depicts the content as the sign or picture of the object. Husserl criticizes the degree of resemblance between them and clarifies that the relation is not a limited resemblance. Cf. Hickerson (2007).

Brentano what is immanent works as a relatum of the intentional relation, then Brentano is required to explain the problem of doubling objects and provide a description of the correlation between the immanent object and the external world.

In his later work, Brentano is concerned about the problem of universals. He adopts a reist standpoint⁴³ and claims that “I am no longer of the opinion that a mental relation can have something other than a thing [*Reales*] as its object”,⁴⁴ by which he emphasizes that a mental act can only be directed at a real thing (*ens reale*), and that the insubstantial thing cannot be the intentional object.⁴⁵ According to McAlister’s comment:

Brentano later acknowledged that the way he attempted to describe consciousness here, adhering to the Aristotelian tradition which asserts ‘the mental inexistence of the object’, was imperfect. The so-called ‘in-existence of the object’, the immanent objectivity, is not to be interpreted as a mode of being the thing has in consciousness, but as an imprecise description of the fact that I have something (a thing, real entity, substance) as an object, am mentally concerned with it, refer to it.⁴⁶

According to this claim, it turns out that the intentional relation, at Brentano’s later stage, lies in the reference of the mental act to the individual thing, *concretum* or *ens reale*.⁴⁷

Brentano’s shift to the intentional relation with a real thing is based on the distinction between content and object made by him in the Appendix of the 1911 version of *PES*.⁴⁸ The content is analogous to the object in a very loose and improper

⁴³ Reism means that only things can exist and only things can be objects of thought.

⁴⁴ In the new Foreword of the 1911 edition of *PES*.

⁴⁵ According to Linda L. McAlister’s interpretation, what Brentano means is “a *reales* is a particular individual thing, while an *irreales* is a non-thing, as for example, a universal, a species, a genus, state of affairs or values.” Cf. McAlister. “Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality.” p. 331.

⁴⁶ According to McAlister’s comment at the footnote in *PES*, p.68. 2009.

⁴⁷ According to Benito Müller’s introduction part in *DP*, “following Aristotle, the ‘early’ Brentano was an advocate of a correspondence theory of truth and of the doctrine that the ontologically relevant sense of ‘existing’ is that of ‘being true’, and thus he was obliged to accept non-real things, or *irrealia*, in his ontology. The first of these views was later rejected in favor of his theory of evidence (mainly developed in his Vienna years) which has been considered by some to be Brentano’s most important achievement. As concerns ontology, he later rejected all *irrealia* as linguistic fictions. Indeed, after his ‘reistic turn’, Brentano saw expressions such as ‘existence’, ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ as merely synsemantic in nature—like prepositions and conjunctions—as devoid of any descriptive meaning.” xiii.

⁴⁸ In fact, as Fréchette points out, the distinction between content and object is not only revealed in the 1911 version of *PES*, as it appears the late 1860s and early 1870s logic lectures given by Brentano, as well as his descriptive psychology lecture from the mid-and late-1880s. See: Fréchette (2017). But in the 1874

sense because the content can be said to have its being in the active subject. For example: there are trees, but it is not just that the trees exist, but the existence of trees has *being*, which corresponds to the claim that some trees have being outside of the subject in the strict sense and in reality. But strictly speaking, “a content is never presented in the sense of being object of the presentation, nor is it ever affirmed, in the sense in which an object is affirmed, not even by those who believe that it is to be affirmed.” (p. 229). It is not that we agree or deny that the content of a judgement exists, but we agree or deny that the thing exists. Content is “something which is in some way more than the object, for it includes the latter within itself, and is likewise within the subject” (p. 227). The word “content” is a name, which has no meaning and does not name anything. According to Fréchette’s investigation of content and object in Brentano’s lectures, Brentano’s content and object are distinct in that “the content (or the object-presented-as-it-is-presented) serves as a mediator for the referential function of the expression, and the object may or may not exist” (p. 3617). The content is always there when the object is presented; however, the object may not exist in reality at all. That means that for a non-existent object, like a unicorn, even though it does not exist in reality, we can have a presentation of the unicorn as content in mind. The object is what is presented through the content, but in the case of the presented unicorn, no corresponding external object can be found. When we refer to the Academy Building in Leiden, this expresses the content of the presentation, but this also refers to the object (the Academy Building in Leiden) through the mediation of the content.⁴⁹

Fréchette emphasizes that for Brentano, the distinction between content and object is based on that “both the expressive and referential functions of language are at play” (p. 3617).⁵⁰ In fact, as Fréchette points out, the distinction between content and object is not only revealed in the 1911 version of *PES*, but appears in the late 1860s and early 1870s logic lectures of Brentano, as well as his descriptive psychology lecture from the mid-and late-1880s.⁵¹ Though, in the 1874 edition of *PES*, we see that Brentano does not yet distinguish content and object when putting forward intentional in-existence, and it is only in his 1911 edition that he especially marks it out. Van der

edition of *PES*, we see that Brentano does not distinguish between content and object in proposing intentional in-existence, and it is only in his 1911 edition that he demarcates the two.

⁴⁹ I make use of Guillaume Fréchette’s example of “the highest bell tower in Salzburg”. Cf. Fréchette, (2017). p. 3616-3617.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* Fréchette analyzes the cases of intuitive presentation where the presentation has a determinateness of the object, so that it is not plausible to forcefully make a conceptual distinction between content and object. The distinction is possible when the content of a presentation has an innate language and referential function and is expressed in language, meanwhile it should allow a degree of determinateness.

⁵¹ See: Fréchette (2017).

Schaar also points out that Brentano makes a distinction between content and object in his logic lectures, and she does not believe the distinction plays a prominent role in Brentano's notion of intentionality. She contends instead that, in Brentano's framework of intentionality, the content may be a physical phenomenon as well as a mental phenomenon.⁵² It turns out that for Brentano, the content is something that is immanent in the mental act and contains the object – or to say, is about the object.

The object is defined by Brentano as follows:

And so it holds true generally that only that which falls under the concept of a thing (*Reales*), can provide an object for mental reference. Nothing else can ever be, like a thing, that to which we mentally refer as an object—neither the present, past, nor future, neither present things, past things, nor future things, nor existence and non-existence, nor necessity nor non-necessity, neither possibility nor impossibility, nor the necessary nor the non-necessary, neither the possible nor the impossible, neither truth nor falsity, neither the true nor the false, nor good nor bad. Nor can the so-called actuality of Form, of which Aristotle speaks, and which we express in our language by means of such abstractions as redness, shape, human nature, and the like, ever be the objects of a mental reference, and this is true further of objects as objects (*Objekte als Objekte*) as for example, the affirmed, the denied, the loved, the hated, the presented.⁵³

Dale Jacquette also refers us to Brentano's draft of *Entwurf zur Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* in 1910 about the real thing:

We have only things as objects, all fall under a higher concept.

The majority of things are also regarded as real. Look at the so-called objective [*Objektiv*] (contents of judgments such as for example that all men are mortal).

Negatives are not objects. Past and future tenses are not objects. Possibilities are not objects. Origin of the so-called concept of possibility . . . Psychic correlates such as that which is acknowledged, that which is denied, the loved, the hated, the presented, are not objects. Truth, error, good, bad, are not objects. That for which the abstract names are signs, are not objects.⁵⁴

Brentano vigorously rejects universals as objects, as well as psychological correlates, negations, modalities or emotions. Further, concepts and abstract signs are all abandoned. Brentano regards individual things and substances as intended objects and now takes these things to be *Reales* (*entia realia*) in the strict sense. To be more

⁵² Van der Schaar (2016), p. 5-6.

⁵³ *PES*, p. 229.

⁵⁴ Brentano, "Entwurf zur Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene," March 1910, ANR, pp. 219–20 (Dale Jacquette's translation). Cf. Jacquette (2004), p. 118.

explicit, Brentano regards the intended objects as individual entities or substances instead of the presented objects or the acknowledged, denied, loved, and hated objects which need to be presented by the mind. Besides, the non-existent object (such as a unicorn), is also the individual thing which can be the relatum of this quasi-relation.

The reference to something as an object is regarded by Brentano as what is characteristic of every mental activity, according to his Appendix added to the 1911 edition of *PES*.⁵⁵ In this Appendix, he stresses that to have something as an object equates to being conscious of something. “Object” is not an independently meaningful word, but an expression which is only dependently meaningful (synsemantic).⁵⁶ It shows that even though Brentano changes the intended object from *Nicht Reales* to *Reales*, he nevertheless continues to insist on the characteristic of reference of the mental act to this intended object, whose existence or non-existence in reality is irrelevant. As he discloses, it is a different style of mental reference, in which the one who carries out the mental act must exist, but the intended object need not exist at all. That is why it is better to call it something which is “quasi-relational” (“*Relativliches*”). Meanwhile, it implies that at the later stages of Brentano’s work, the intentional object can be a mentally independent object.

Edmund Runggaldier claims that Brentano fails to clearly state what is meant by the immanent-object-quality, the intentional in-existence of an object and the reference to an object in his 1874 edition of *PES*. He believes this is the reason why Brentano abandons the formulation of mental in-existence and later adopts the directedness towards something.⁵⁷ This is consistent with Benito Müller’s introduction in *DP* which states:

The intentional object is always ‘immanent’; it is something that is non-real, or insubstantial [*unwesenhaft*], but it may be said to exist – and to exist in itself – to the extent that the thinker has it as his intentional object. It is a non-real correlate of the thinking that has it as its object. The intention thus involves as relation a pair of correlates of which ‘the one alone is real, [whereas] the other is not something real [*nichts Reales*]’ (p. xix).

Brentano was later to reject this doctrine of intentional in-existence, or mental holding [*geistiges Inhaben*]. According to his final view, the statement ‘There is something which is being thought [*ein Gedachtes*]’ is an improper formulation of ‘There is a thinking-thing [*ein Denkendes*]’; statements ostensibly about immanent objects are actually statements only about the thinker who may be said to have those objects.

⁵⁵ *PES*, p. 214-215.

⁵⁶ According to the translator’s note about this mental reference. *Ibid*, p.211.

⁵⁷ Runggaldier (1989).

According to this final view, there are no insubstantial entities; everything is an *ens reale*. (p.xx)⁵⁸

Comprehensively speaking, I would like to generalize the interpretation of Brentano's intentionality thesis as follows: in his early stage, intentionality means that in every mental phenomenon, there would be something immanent within the psychic realm. This immanent object is something non-real or insubstantial and is of a mode of being which the thing has in consciousness. Correspondingly, a directing or reference relation can be constituted between the mental act and this intended object. But as to what is immanent, Brentano uses 'content' and 'object' indistinguishably.⁵⁹ In his later stage,⁶⁰ Brentano emphasizes that the peculiar characteristic of the mental activity is its reference to a thing by modifying the intended object from the presented, wanted, and denied object, and so forth, to something as Reales – the individual thing, entity or substance. Correspondingly, the intentional relation is a quasi-relation from the mental act to this individual thing, entity or substance.⁶¹ It is a quasi-relation in that it merely requires the existence of the thinking subject.

1.2 Brentano's reference to the Scholastic tradition

Tracing Brentano's references of intentional in-existence to Aristotle and the ancient tradition, we can better understand Brentano's notion of intentionality and get closer to the historical background which inspired it. Most modern discussions of intentionality deviate from his original intention and context. As such, I shall focus on the tradition of the earlier development of intentionality. Perhaps in this way, can we draw closer to the academic atmosphere that is impressed by Aristotle rather than be confused by the numerous contemporary discussions about intentionality, as the historical and philosophical exposition of Brentano's echo of the Scholastic tradition has already been carried out by scholars such as Herbert Spiegelberg, Edmund Runggaldier, C. McDonnell, A. Marras, and P. Engelhardt.⁶²

⁵⁸ Cf. Brentano, *DP*. Translated by Benito Müller. The Introduction, pp. xix-xx.

⁵⁹ According to Ierna's interpretation, he divides Brentano's theory into three stages and in the middle stage Brentano means the immanent object as content. See: note 12. I primarily divide it into two stages based on the diversion from the mental in-existence to the mental reference to a thing.

⁶⁰ For Brentano's later stage, I mean especially his ideas found in the 1911 version of *PES*.

⁶¹ The intentional in-existence Brentano proposed is not just a conception about containment – but rather, the relational characteristic is quite obvious, in that it is revealed from the claim of the relation between mental act and intentional object. To be more concrete, this relation is a kind of directedness or reference driving from the mental act to the object, though it is still ambiguous with regard to what kind of intentional object Brentano refers.

⁶² Besides these I would like to introduce one collection about the intentionality in the ancient and Medieval traditions. That is Perler, Dominik. *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*. 2 ed. Klosterman

Spiegelberg makes a detailed investigation of intention and intentionality from the Scholastics to Brentano and to Husserl. He first divides intention into practical intention and extra-practical intention. The practical intention has the characteristic of “intention to do something or a purpose; striving toward, exertion” (p. 110), which he argues has nothing to do with philosophical speculation, and thus regards “directedness” as a common characteristic of both the practical and extra-practical acts.⁶³ The practical sense of intention is regarded by him as the characteristic of early philosophy before High Scholasticism. It is not until in Avicenna’s “ma’na”—which denotes sense, meaning, idea, concept and matter—that intention starts to show the theoretical sense, but it works as the object of the mental act rather than something mental.⁶⁴ Spiegelberg rejects the implication of extra-practical intention in the sense of directedness in Thomas Aquinas, given that the nature of *intentio* Aquinas defines is ‘striving toward’, or ‘aiming at’ something, which implies a practical sense of intention. But by virtue of Aquinas’ *species* theory, the *intentiones* are the *likenesses*, *similitudines*, or even *imagines* absorbed in the soul which represents the object, and which expresses the sense of extra-practical intention. Along with this historical line, Spiegelberg also points to Peter Aureol, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Harvaeus Natalis, Lexicon of Goclenius, all of whom elaborate *intentio* to some extent. When it comes to Brentano, Spiegelberg carefully distinguishes Brentano’s proposal of intentionality into two stages: the first stage is characterized by intentional in-existence, which means that the immanent object exists in the mind and that there is a relation from the mental act directing to this immanent object, which is a doubling of the external object. At the second stage, Brentano turns to a reference to something as object. Spiegelberg does not regard Brentano’s proposal of intentional in-existence as the real meaning of intentionality, but rather proposes that the modern terms of intention and intentional first arrive through Husserl. Because Husserl was the first to separate the concept of intentionality from the notion of immanent in-existence and to

Seminar. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004. Since I am not able to consult the German scholarly literature, I have used an English volume edited by Perler as a supplement, that is Perler, Dominik, ed. *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*. Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2001.

⁶³ Herbert Spiegelberg (1976).

⁶⁴ Ibid. “It seems that the theoretical intention comes along with the translation of Arabic philosophers’ (for example Avicenna) work.....In arabic philosophy, *intentio* seems to correspond to the word “ma’na”, which denotes sense, meaning, idea, concept, matter..... Intention is understood as something which is the object of an act, never as something act-like or mental. Furthermore, the intentions are always cognitive constructs, *intentiones intellectae*, ie. something that the cognising subject grasps in the sense-given objects.” p.110.

interpret it – or rather, reinterpret it as relatedness to, direction toward the object.⁶⁵ Spiegelberg proposes that for Brentano, “intentional refers to the property of an object which is immanent in consciousness in a way analogous to that in which the *species* are immanent in the Thomistic-Aristotelian theory of knowledge.”⁶⁶ That is the reason why he attributes the intentional directedness of the mental act in the modern sense to Husserl.⁶⁷

Marras points out that the term *intentio*, which is used in Scholastic philosophy, signifies the peculiar image or likeness formed in the soul in the process of acquiring knowledge, thus representing a kind of distillate from the world outside. He claims that both the characteristic of reference to an object and in-existence can have their roots traced to Scholastic philosophy through the implication of the formulation of *intentio* or *species*. Therefore, he defends a view that is different from Spiegelberg’s who holds that there is no element of intentional directedness in the Scholastic tradition. According to Marras, the Scholastic texts reveal the formal existence of an object in a subject as an attribute or modification of the subject. He refers especially to Thomas Aquinas, who distinguishes three aspects of form: 1) the form of the stone as it exists in the material stone; 2) the form of the stone as it exists in the soul; 3) the form of the stone in the soul as it represents the form existing in the material stone. In the first case

⁶⁵ For Husserl, intentional directedness is not a directedness to mental objects, but rather the possession by mental acts of matter/quality structure. See Siewert, Charles (2017), “Consciousness and intentionality”.

⁶⁶ Spiegelberg says that intentional in-existence is an inheritance from the Thomistic-Aristotelian theory of knowledge, while mental reference is a modern concept, deriving from Husserl. I do acknowledge that intentional in-existence has a traditional inheritance – but in my opinion, the mental reference is what accompanies intention even in ancient times (such as the early instances of directedness in the Stoics and Augustine as revealed by Victor Caston), and intention plays an active role in linking the subject with the desired object. It is even more clear in Brentano, who holds that the object-theory of intentionality and the reference of the intentional object are his main claim about mental phenomena. That is to say, except for the intentional (which is a substitution of objective) existence of the object, Brentano also depicts a mentally active subject which refers to—or is aware of—the intentional object. Brentano emphasizes that between the two correlates, the mentally active subject and the intentional object, the existence (or non-existence) of the latter in reality does not matter, which implies that the intentional object is mentally dependent. He especially emphasizes the mental reference to a thing in his later period. From this sense, I attribute the characteristic of intentional directedness to Brentano as well. Spiegelberg thinks that Brentano’s concept of mental reference does not bear the modern meaning of “intentional”, that is why he does not attribute the modern intentionality, that is, direct or refer to the object, to Brentano.

⁶⁷ In fact, in *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (1960), Spiegelberg points out that of two characterization of psychic phenomenon in Brentano—that is intentional in-existence and reference to an object—the reference to an object is the most important and the only permanent one that is original to Brentano. Since this book is written after the paper “‘Intention’ and ‘Intentionality’ in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl,” it is likely that Spiegelberg changed his idea about directedness in Brentano afterwards. p.40-41.

the *species* is not an actual universal, for it is as such an accidental modification of a particular subject (it simply in-forms the external object). It is only in the second sense, as a likeness or representation of the object, that the form or *species* acquires the logical status of an actual universal and plays a role in cognition. Meanwhile, the representational likeness of the *species* is said to be a directedness relation to the external object. Therefore, the *species* or *intentio* not only exists in a special mode of being in the subject, but also intends and directs to the object which is represented. In this sense, Marras concludes that both the roots of in-existence and directedness are revealed in the Scholastic tradition.⁶⁸

Runggaldier holds that from the Middle Ages onwards, there came to be two different senses of *intentio*: the first is the practical sense, which refers to the act of intending or desiring; the second is the theoretical sense, meaning the essential content of a thing which the intellect grasps. In the theoretical sense, it also refers to what the soul grasps or perceives from sensual things. When it comes to intentionality as the immanence or in-existence of the intentional object, Runggaldier refers to the Arabic philosophical terminology of “ma’na”, which means essential content, idea, concept and essence – as well as the intentional being in the Thomistic doctrine as a certain mode of being which is characteristic of images, intentions and the goal of an intention, differing from the being of any real object. Accordingly, Runggaldier concludes that Brentano’s intentional in-existence of objects seems to be an indwelling according to Scholastic or Thomistic intention.⁶⁹

McDonnell depicts the similarities and differences between Brentano’s framework of intentionality and that of the Scholastics both in the conceptualization of the intentional relation and the intentional in-existence. As to the former, McDonnell argues that Brentano enlarges the intentional characteristic of the mental act’s directing towards the object to all the psychological phenomena or conscious acts, including sensation. However, McDonnell holds that this is not in accordance with the Aristotelian and Scholastic elaboration of sensation, but an attribute of intellect or will. He believes that in proposing an enlarged concept of mental act, Brentano is influenced by a modern Lockean-Humean approach. When it comes to intentional in-existence, McDonnell believes that Brentano’s proposal of in-existence is inspired by Aristotle’s un-enmattered form existing in the soul, and by Thomas Aquinas’s different mode of being of the intentional object. But he claims, the immanent object of consciousness does not have the real substantial existence either inside or outside of mind, given that it depends entirely on the mental act. As a conclusion, McDonnell concludes that

⁶⁸ Marras (1974).

⁶⁹ Runggaldier (1989).

“Brentano literally modifies the entire scope and application of the Scholastic concept of ‘intentional in-dwelling’ to designate one thing, and one thing only – namely, the kind of mind-dependent-existence that is characteristic of the immediate contents of the actual acts present in human consciousness” (p. 174). Therefore, Brentano adds a new meaning to the immanent object using what the Scholastic tradition called intentional indwelling.⁷⁰

To summarize, the characteristic of intention in the Scholastic tradition Brentano refers to focuses on two senses: on the one hand, intention acts as the representation or counterpart of the external object in consciousness, and this intention has a mode of being that is different from that of the external object; on the other hand, it may depict an intentional relation directing from the mental act or the representation to the object.

In *PES*, Brentano proposed his own list of the predecessors who inspired his proposal of intentionality. Hereafter, I will follow Brentano’s references, to demonstrate how the roots of intentional in-existence are revealed in course of history. Brentano refers to his influence in the ancient and medieval traditions as follows:

Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect. In Philo, likewise, we find the doctrine of mental existence and in-existence. However, since he confuses them with existence in the proper sense of the word, he reaches his contradictory doctrine of the logos and Ideas. The same is true of the Neoplatonists. St. Augustine in his doctrine of the *Verbum mentis* and of its inner origin touches upon the same fact. St. Anselm does the same in his famous ontological argument; many people have observed that his consideration of mental existence as a true existence is at the basis of his paralogism (cp. Überweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II). St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that the object which is thought is intentionally in the thinking subject, the object which is loved in the person who loves, the object which is desired in the person desiring, and he uses this for theological purposes. When the Scriptures speak of an indwelling of the Holy Ghost, St. Thomas explains it as an intentional indwelling through love. In addition, he attempted to find, through the intentional in-existence in the acts of thinking and loving, a certain analogy for the mystery of the Trinity and the procession ad intra of the Word and the Spirit. (p.67)

As an Aristotelian, Brentano is greatly impressed by Aristotle. Before beginning the work on *PES*, he wrote two books on Aristotle, and throughout his life continued to

⁷⁰ Cyril McDonnell (2015).

remain an avid follower of the ancient philosopher. For now, I will set Aristotle aside, because he will be the main concern of this dissertation in later sections. My next step at this stage is to survey Philo, the Neoplatonists, St. Augustine, St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas' work so as to see what Brentano finds in them about intentional in-existence. This will enable us to better estimate Brentano's proposal of intentional in-existence.

Philo's philosophical thought is inseparable from his theological elaboration, in which *logos* is the central topic. As Hillar depicts, Philo endeavors to combine the Hebrew scriptures with the Greek speculative philosophy, and he is indeed a supporter of Plato's thought of *Idea* or *Form*. *Idea* or *Logos* is generally used by Philo as the first principle of cosmos and it formulates the terrestrial beings in their form. What is more, Philo uses *Logos* in more than one sense: such as the divine mind; the immanent reason; multi-named archetype, etc.⁷¹ In Philo's work, we find his use of intention many times, but it is primarily applied in the practical sense, such as the following example:

Showing first of all that he is polluted and accursed, not now for the first time when he has committed the murder, but that he was so before, the moment that he conceived the idea of it, the intention being of equal importance with the perfected action; (97) for as long as we only conceive wicked things in the bad imagination of our minds, still, during that time, we are guilty of thoughts only, for the mind is capable of being changed even against its will; but when performance is added to the intention that has been conceived, then our deliberate purpose becomes also guilty; for this is the chief distinction between voluntary and involuntary sin. (98) But the scripture here pronounces that the mind shall be accursed, not from anything else, but from the earth; for of all the most grievous calamities which can happen to it, the earthly portion which exists in each of us is found to be the cause. At all events, when the body is afflicted with disease, it adds the miseries which are derived from itself, and so fills the mind with grief and despondency; or, on the other hand, if it has grown fat immoderately through enjoyment of pleasures, it makes all the faculties of the mind duller for the comprehension of nobler objects. (99)⁷²

In this paragraph, Philo depicts the psychic activity of conceiving something, which will result in the change of state of our mind. He further claims that the body can fill the mind with spiritual things. Even though it is uncertain whether this is the root that Brentano refers to Philo, Philo uses intention in several practical senses to elaborate on the state of mind.

⁷¹ For more detail, see Hillar, Philo of Alexandria, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

⁷² Philo Judaeus, trans. Charles Duke Yonge, (2010), p.170.

Hamid Taieb surveyed the reception of *krisis* in Aristotle's Greek commentators and discovered that the active aspect of the psychic faculties forms a tradition from Alexander of Aphrodisias to the Neoplatonists. The active factor of the cognitive subject—and the discriminating relation from the psychic faculties—are the criterion of intentionality for Hamid Taieb. According to Taieb, in Neoplatonists, the active dimension is revealed by the soul's "projection" of the *logos* to what is related to it. These can be found in Simplicius' commentary on *Categories*, *Physics*, Iamblichus's commentary on *Metaphysics* Δ.15, as well as in Plotinus' use of *krisis* as the active dimension of sensation. These are the sources of the active and relational dimension in Neoplatonism that Taieb regards as the roots of Brentano's intentionality.⁷³ It seems then that Brentano's ascription of the mentally active subject can be traced back to the active interpretation the Neoplatonism made.

With regard to the characteristic of in-existence that is revealed in the Neoplatonism tradition, I would like to give the example of Plotinus. Plotinus' psychology is built on the basis of the inter-independence between the soul and the body. Correspondingly, he divides sense-perception into the affection of the body and the judgement or act of cognition of the soul. Plotinus adopts the similar mechanism of sense-perception from Aristotle—that is "receiving form without matter"—but modifies it to be "the perception of the soul or the living being of sensible objects, the soul grasping the quality attached to bodies and receiving an imprint of their forms" (IV.4.23.1-3). The roots of in-existence that can be found in Plotinus is that "the soul's power of perception is exercised on the impressions which sensation has produced in the living being: these have by then become intelligible (I.1.7.9-12)." (p.47) This implies that by receiving form without matter, there is a corresponding sensible quality or form that is in the soul. Based on sensible impressions innate in the soul, the intelligible object can be composed.⁷⁴

Augustine is regarded by Caston as the bridge between the ancient and medieval traditions, given that "many of the terms used by later theories of intentionality can be traced back to him".⁷⁵ According to Caston, Augustine's interpretation of "intention" is best revealed in his clarification of our cognitive activities, such as sensation, memory and thought in *The Trinity* XI. The activity of vision is analyzed into three parts: the visible object; the vision which is produced after the perception of the visible object; and the intermediate; the attention of the mind to fix the sense of sight on the visible object. This attention of the mind is also called the power of the mind, the will, the intention, love, desire or passion. It is the definite

⁷³ Hamid Taieb (2018).

⁷⁴ Blumenthal (1993), p. 41-58.

⁷⁵ Caston (2001).

description of the function of “fixing the vision on the specific object”, “directing the sense to the sensible thing”, “uniting the two parts”, “turning the gaze”, etc., of the intention that provides us with a close correlate of the modern definition of intentionality as “directedness” and “reference”.

The will is an active power which not only directs our sense to the object that we desire, but it also leads the attention away from the things which we fear. On the basis of form or *species*, this active feature is further strengthened in the formation of thought. The cognitive activity—sensation, memory and thought—happens step by step. In sensation, “the will possess such power in uniting these two that it moves the sense to be formed to that thing which is seen, and keeps it fixed on it when it has been formed.”⁷⁶ In this way, the *species* of the object is united with the form in our mind to combine into the one visual activity. Next, in memory the previous forms constituted by sense are faded as various images stored in the mind. When the attention of mind is focused on these images and unites the forms in memory with the inward vision itself, thought emerges. From sensation to thought, four kinds of form are clarified in total, and it is obvious that for Augustine the intention can focus itself on these different kinds of forms or *species*, whether it is outward or inward. Besides, the inward forms, especially the forms of sensation, the images in memory, and the forms of thinking, are constituted with the aid of the sensible body, and are contained inside of the mind. This characteristic of inner containment gives us some insight about Brentano’s reference of intentional in-existence.

Augustine also touches upon the issue of thinking about the non-existent object, and error. The will of the mind has such a great power to unify and separate things that it can form the images in memory as well as imagine the things as they are, and even as they are not in reality. In his ethical claim, “when the will renounces the better things and greedily wallows in these things, it becomes unclean; so it is harmful to think of them when they are present, and more harmful to think of them when they are absent.”⁷⁷ This indicates that there is no hindrance for him to think about the absent thing, and what he cares more about is the morality issue concerning thinking greedily. The capacity of thinking about the absent thing can be interpreted from the standpoint that the will has the power to create the images and focus on the images. That explains why our thinking can go wrong and why we can think about non-existent objects.

St. Anselm adopts a prior deductive argument – that is, the ontological argument for the existence of God, which is formulated in *Proslogion*.⁷⁸ Brentano’s

⁷⁶ Saint Augustine. *The Trinity*.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ “Truly there is a God, although the fool has said in his heart, there is no God. And so, Lord, do you, who do give understanding to faith, give me, so far as you know it to be profitable, to understand that you are

reference to Anselm is that Anselm regards what is imagined: the mental existence, as a real existence – by which he believes Anselm touches upon the issue of the mental in-existence. Therefore, a survey about how mental existence is revealed in Anselm is necessary.

Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God can be stated as follows:

1: God gives us understanding and this capacity can guarantee the validation that whatever we believe is in our understanding. So, God—or the being than which nothing greater exists—is in our understanding.

2: This seems to be commonsense for those who believes in God but how could we persuade a fool who has no God in his heart? First it should be argued that the fool does have the understanding of “a being that which nothing greater can be conceived” because he understands the concept when we discuss it. Hence, “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived” is also in the fool's understanding.

3: Both the fool and the believer have “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived” in the understanding by virtue of the capacity of understanding.

as we believe; and that you are that which we believe. And indeed, we believe that you are a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak --a being than which nothing greater can be conceived --understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.

Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.” See: Anselm of Canterbury. Trans. Sidney N. Deane.

4: If the object exists in the understanding, then it could also be thought of as existing in reality. For example, the painter can have both the painting in his understanding and in existence when he takes action to create it.

5: The object that exists is greater than the object that is in understanding.

6: But if “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived” can only exist in thought, then it is not a being than which nothing greater can be conceived any more. Therefore, “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived” cannot exist only in thought.

Upon closer inspection, 3 and 6, “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived” exists in thought and “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived” cannot exist only in thought. These two claims are contradicting one another and therefore, “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived” exists both in thought and in reality.

Anselm’s argument of the existence of God rests upon one decisive presupposition: the object that exists is greater than the object that is in understanding. But the facticity of this presupposition is not argued by Anselm. Instead, Anselm replaces God with “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived”—and in accordance with his presupposition that the object that exists is greater than the object that is in understanding—it turns out that “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived” should exist, or else it won’t be the greatest being of all. Therefore, he concludes that God must exist. But since the presupposition that the object which exists is greater than the object that is in understanding lacks a proper argument, the validity of the whole ontological argument is jeopardized.

It should be acknowledged that we do encounter mental inexistence in Anselm, as he states that we can have an object in understanding just because we have the capacity to understand it. It implies that whatever is understood by us can have a mode of existence in understanding, including non-existing objects. However, it is debatable whether Anselm can infer that the mental inexistence of God entails the real existence of God in the external world.

Aquinas proposes the intelligible *species* theory to elaborate upon the cognitive process.⁷⁹ According to Aquinas, the sensible *species* in the sensible object is what impresses itself onto the medium and the sense organ.⁸⁰ It is observed by the sense,

⁷⁹ “Thomas Aquinas introduced the notion of the intelligible species as formal principle of intellectual cognition”. See the footnote in Spruit (1997), p.4.

⁸⁰ Aquinas uses the terms *species* and *intentio* interchangeably.

initiating the corresponding activities of abstraction and illumination of the intellect. With the aid of the *phantasma*, the intellect is able to cognize the intelligible *species* from the sensible *species*. The sensible *species* is secondarily cognized, whereas the object itself is the mind's main goal.⁸¹ There is a series of *species* organized by Aquinas, as Spiegelberg concludes, which are: *intentio sensibilis* (or *intentio formae sensibilis*) that coincides with the *species sensibilis*; the *intentio intelligibilis* produced in the intellectual activity; and a third kind of *intentio* which is *intentio intellecta*.⁸² In relation to understanding, the role the *species* plays can generally be regarded as a kind of intermediary. As Thomas says, "our intellect knows bodies through immaterial and intelligible *species*, which can be in the soul by their own essence."⁸³ It is the bridge that connects the subject and the known object and it is by virtue of this principle that the subject comes to cognize the object.

According to Aquinas, *species* or *intentio* plays an essential role in assisting cognition. More importantly, they exist in the soul through their own essence – that is, in their own mode of being. This mode of existence is referred to by Brentano in his proposal of intentional in-existence. Meanwhile, there is another characteristic of intention. Aquinas points out that *intentio* signifies 'pertaining to an end.' It tends to something and is the act of the will. However, this is the description of intention in the practical sense, which is not the concept of intentionality philosophically discussed afterwards. In sum, the existence of the *intentio* (or *species*) in Thomas's theory helped shape the Scholastic tradition of intentionality, which can be adequately referred to as a source of Brentano's intentional in-existence.⁸⁴

Thomas Aquinas' psychological theory is analyzed in detail by Lisska⁸⁵ from the standpoint of intentionality. According to him, "Aquinas' characterization of

⁸¹ Summa Theologica, 1, q 85, a2.

⁸² For more detail, see Spiegelberg (1976).

⁸³ Summa Theologica, 1, q 84, a1.

⁸⁴ The two different uses of the term "intentio" are also claimed by Runggaldier, "Since the time of the translations of Aristotle from the Arabic in the High Middle Ages there have been two fundamentally different uses of the term 'intentio'. Thomas says "intentio" is used equivocally, that is, with two basically different meanings. The one is the practical meaning. It refers to the act of intending or desiring: it stands '*pro actu mentis, qui est intendere*.' This meaning corresponds somewhat to the modern usage in the sense of directedness toward something other. The second meaning is theoretical. "Intentio" in this sense means the essential content of a thing which the intellect grasps: it stands for "*pro ratione quam significat definite*." The definition expresses the essential content (*ratio*) which the human mind abstracts from the things known. "Intentio" in this second sense can also mean that which the soul grasps or perceives from sensual things." Cf. Edmund Runggaldier. "On the roots of 'intentionality' in Brentano". p. 100.

⁸⁵ Lisska concludes 7 principles of intentionality presupposed in Thomas Aquinas' philosophy of mind:

Principle A. an act can only be an act of some 'X' or other that has a potency.

Principle B. A potency as such can only be affected by some 'X' or other that is in act.

intentionality, moreover, is not merely as an ordinary dispositional property. Rather, the built-in characteristic of ‘tending towards’ or ‘aboutness’ is part of the ontological structure of this dispositional property.”⁸⁶ (p.51) The property of “tending toward” is a capacity the knower has to go beyond itself and immaterially become identical with the object. Evidently, Aquinas inherits Aristotle’s formulation of “the assimilation between the cognized and the cognizer in actuality”, and this formulation is valued by Lisska as revealing the characteristic of intentionality as well as Aquinas’ tendency towards externalism and realism. More so, Aquinas’ distinction between *esse intentionale* and *esse naturale* is set by virtue of “receiving form without matter”,⁸⁷ giving validity to the ontology of the in-existent being. “*Esse intentionale*” echoes in Brentano’s proposal of “intentional in-existence” and his comment on Aquinas that “the object which is thought is intentionally in the thinking subject, the object which is loved in the person who loves, the object which is desired in the person desiring” (*PES*, p.67).

Even though there are far more abundant thoughts and concepts found in the work of these predecessors, the similarity in these references is that they have all proposed a mode of being of mental content, which specifies the peculiarity of psychic activity. It is this characteristic that inspires Brentano to mark out intentional in-existence. Although Brentano turns to a more modern concept of intentionality in his later period, it is his early proposal of “intentional in-existence” that receives the most attention in academic circles and led to a series of theoretical developments in the later philosophy of intentionality. After Brentano, several approaches and camps attempted to formulate intentionality from various perspectives. For example: the

Principle C. A potency of any ‘X’ must be species or properly disposed in order to receive any given act.

Principle D. An act remains ‘specifically’ the same, but it may have different embodiments or exemplifications in different potencies.

Principle D-1. A knower is, by definition, any ‘X’ which has a set of dispositional properties to acquire or to exemplify acts in a non-entitative or non-materialist manner.

Principle E. A form is, by definition, an act.

Principle F. An ‘X’ is knowable only insofar as it is in act.”

See Lisska. *Aquinas’s theory of perception. An Analytic Reconstruction*.

⁸⁶ By “tending toward” or “aboutness” Lisska means the correlation that the content of an awareness, or the intentional existence, has with the external object. Hence, it is not the mental act’s tending toward or about something – but rather, indicating that the mental content is about the external object.

⁸⁷ “Every potency receives something from the agent insofar as it is an agent. Yet an agent acts through its form, and not through its matter. Therefore, every potency receives a form without matter.

Sometimes, however, a form is received into a potency according to a different mode of being than that found in the agent.....In this way, the senses receive form without matter, because the form has a different mode of being in sense knowledge than in a physical object. For in a physical object, the form has natural being (*esse naturale*) while in sense knowledge, it has intentional being” (*esse intentionale*). Cf. Aquinas. *Commentary on the Soul*, no. 553.

phenomenological approach of intentionality carried out by Husserl, followed by Heidegger and Sartre; the analytical approach which is carried forward by Russell, Frege;⁸⁸ and the work of contemporary scholars such as Dennett, Searle, etc. Undoubtedly, most of these later discussions surrounding the term “intentionality” derive from Brentano’s work and the correlations he has drawn from the ancient and Medieval tradition.

Now, with the exception of the reference Brentano makes above, I would like to introduce several other concepts into this historical line to help us more fully grasp the development of intentionality.

The etymology of “intentio” found in the Lewis and Short *Latin Dictionary*, reads as follows: “1) stretching out, straining, tension; 2) a directing of the mind towards anything. a, exertion, effort, b, attention; application to anything; c, a design, purpose, intention; d, a charge, accusation; e, the first or major premise in a syllogism”.⁸⁹ Investigating the terminology “intention” presents just one side of the story, as “philosophers have sometimes possessed certain concepts before having the actual words to go with them.”⁹⁰ When philosopher possesses the concept but not the word, it is usually “revealed by his periphrases or his general discussion of the subject”.⁹¹ Taking this into consideration, it is best to bear in mind the historical occurrence which implies the correlated problem of intentionality. According to a detailed analysis of intentionality in ancient philosophy by Victor Caston,⁹² the ancient philosophers more or less proposed or confronted the issue of “presence in absence”—that is, the possibility or impossibility of thinking about a non-existent or non-factual object— as well as observing issues about incorrect beliefs in their formulation of knowledge acquisition. Socrates and Plato’s metaphors of the wrong goal of the arrow and the Stoic’ explication of vision, hint at the directedness of the mental act.

During the Middle Ages, intention was correlated with cognitive activity in that it reveals the characteristics of mental representation, the logical structure of inner cognition and the directedness to the cognitive object. It is worth noting that the terms ‘mental representation’ and ‘mental causation’ can be traced to this period as well. Going further, I will refer to two Arabic philosophers, Avicenna and Averroes in detail in order to investigate the implications of intentionality they raised. After all, the translation and the reintroduction of Arabic works into the West provided new

⁸⁸ For a rough description of these two approaches of intentionality after Brentano, see Rowlands (2010); Bartok (2005).

⁸⁹ Intentio, In Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short (1879). *A Latin Dictionary*.

⁹⁰ Hamlyn (1961), p. 2-3.

⁹¹ Loc.Cit.

⁹² Caston (2007).

materials for the Medieval discussion. Accompanying the translation of texts from Arabic to Latin, Arabic philosophy left a lasting influence on Western philosophy among various fields – notably, natural philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, logic and ethics. My primary interest here lies in their related work on “*intentio*”, and to what extent the Arabic philosophers’ interpretation on *intentio* had an effect on later Medieval philosophers in the West.

As we previously observed, “*ma’na*” corresponds to the Latin word “*intentio*”, the general meaning of “*ma’na*” in Arabic is sense, meaning, idea, concept, or matter, but it varies when used by different philosophers. For example, Avicenna uses it as “concept”, or “meaning”, or something “intelligible”, or “perceptible”; whereas, Averroes regards it as the object of memory or the abstracted content of sensory, imaginative or intelligible forms,⁹³ which refers to the specific image or content in the soul when we grasp or acquire external knowledge. Special attention should be paid to Avicenna, whose use of “*intentio*” sheds light on the later medieval followers of this tradition. Though as Hasse remarks, the original meaning of “*intentions*” in Avicenna has little to do with intentionality or the later scholars’ interpretation, Avicenna is nevertheless generally acknowledged and referred to when modern scholars implement their Scholastic research (Hasse, Black, Spiegelberg, Sorabji, Runggaldier, Alwishah).⁹⁴ In his use of the term, Avicenna allocates the estimative power to the soul and attributes the object of estimation as intention.⁹⁵ Moreover, intention is in the sensible object rather than in the subject. For example, in his example of the sheep and wolf (see n. 74), intention in the wolf indicates negative information that allows the sheep to flee. Intentions of the estimation faculty are equally nonmaterial so that they enjoy the role of intelligibles in the soul.⁹⁶

The existence of intention in the sensible object is not the only character of Avicenna’s doctrine. In Avicenna’s logical doctrine,⁹⁷ he puts forward two orders of

⁹³ Hasse (2008).

⁹⁴ For their separate work, see Hasse (2000); Black (2010); Spiegelberg (1976); Runggaldier (1989); Sorabji (1991); Alwishah (2006).

⁹⁵ In Avicenna’s *de Anima* I. 5, “then (follows) the estimative faculty and this is the faculty which is located in the end of the middle ventricle of the brain and perceives non-sense-perceptible ‘intentions’ which exist in the particular sense-perceptible objects; like the faculty existing in the sheep judging that this wolf is something to flee from and that this child is something to have affection for. It is likely that this faculty is also responsible for combining and separating the forms stored in the faculty of imagination” (ed. Rahman, p.43, line 14)

⁹⁶ Black (2010).

⁹⁷ In Avicenna’s *The Healing* and *Metaphysics*. According to Dag Nikolaus Hasse’s translation of a relevant part of *Metaphysics* I,2 in “Influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West”: “The subject matter of logic is the secondary intelligible concepts (*al-ma’anî al-ma’qûla al-*

intentions: first intention and secondary intention. As previously discussed, Spiegelberg explains that the first intention is the object of knowledge which exists as the object of estimation; while the second intention, refers to the logical intention that represents the sensible/intelligible object in the soul. According to his interpretation of Avicenna, these two levels of intention (intention in the soul and as the external object) belong to the same subject and the two modes of existence (inner existence and extra-mental existence) belong to the same nature.⁹⁸ Moreover, in Black's survey of intentionality in Medieval Arabic philosophy, she holds that Avicenna forges a connection between the object-directedness and mental-existence by the account of "impressions in the soul", which mediate between language and the extra-mental thing it signifies. Black argues that Avicenna's underlying metaphysical doctrine is that there are two equally authentic modes of existence: one in of individuals, and one in the soul.⁹⁹

According to Black, Averroes does not attribute the two intentions to the same subject. For him, the extra-mental being and the mental being are two distinct beings – that is, the intention of something is not identical to the object. Inspired by Aristotle's metaphor of the light he uses to describe agency in the intellect, Averroes believes that the imagined intention can be upgraded to the intelligible intention through abstraction.¹⁰⁰ That is to say, there are different levels of intention, and that the lower one needs the causal effect to move to the upper level.

The discussion about first and second intention gradually became a philosophical topic from the 13th century on, but philosophers were primarily concerned with logical issues about the universal. In the Late Medieval period, the debate turned to intelligible *species* and intentions – such as the role the intelligible *species* play in cognition, the identity of intention with the known object or its representative role in the mental act. It gradually came to be that except for the feature of directedness, intention was conceptualized as having an effect on the psychological processing of cognition, working as the representation or replica of the external perceptual or intellectual object, and thus plays an important role in the acquisition of knowledge. This characteristic of intention has a long tradition going back to the Hellenistic era when the followers of Aristotle attempted to bridge the link between the immaterial soul and the external matter through mental representation. It is thus related

thâniyya, intentiones intellectae secundo), which depend on the primary intelligible concepts with respect to the manner by which one arrives through them at the unknown from the known".

⁹⁸ Spiegelberg (1976).

⁹⁹ Black, (2010).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

to “the species theory”,¹⁰¹ which is discussed in Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the *species intelligibilis*. Moreover, in the Medieval period, discussions of mental cognition or mental representation becomes major concerns for philosophers. Many scholars (Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, John Buridan, etc.,) examined: how our cognitive process took place; how our thoughts can be about something, or how they can intentionally have something as mental content; what the cognitive process looks like; the nature of the intelligible species; the causal relation between the cognitive agent and the object; and so forth. yet, it appears that the concept of mental representation and the causal relation between the thing and the cognitive agent was neither proposed nor discussed until this period.¹⁰²

In contemporary philosophy, various issues concerning intentionality and the nature of the intentional relation have been raised: is it a causal relation or a non-causally noetic relation? Can this relation be naturalized? As well, what about the ontology of the intentional object, content and object theories, relation theories, adverbial theories, theories regarding the role of phenomenally in defining mental content, inferentialist theories, and so on?¹⁰³ It is not a simple task to capture all the issues surrounding it, nor answers each of them. Henceforth, I will simply focus on the nature of intentionality to extract its core elements, that is, to extract a working definition that will allow us to investigate whether the roots of intentionality do indeed stem from Aristotle’s theory, and to what extent they may not.

It will become clear that there is no singular rigid notion of intentionality, and scholars have attempted to comprehend it from multiple angles. For example: Tim Crane¹⁰⁴ interprets it as being characterized by directedness and its aspectual shape. In his opinion, intentional states involve presentations of intentional objects with aspectual shapes; Black generalizes the four most common proponents of intentionality as object-directedness, mental existence, consciousness and knowledge of non-

¹⁰¹ Spruit (1997).

¹⁰² Perler’s book is helpful for providing us with an understanding of the topic of intentionality in Medieval times. See: Perler, Dominik, ed. *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*. 2001.

¹⁰³ Moran gives a comprehensive investigation of intentionality from Brentano onward. For more, see Moran, “Intentionality: Some lessons from the history of the problem from Brentano to the Present.”

¹⁰⁴ Tim Crane depicts intentionality as foregrounding the characteristics of directedness and aspectual shape. He explains the directedness of intentionality as the mind’s direction or directedness upon its object, and this object can also be called the intentional object. They are, by contrast, a group of unspecific objects such as ordinary objects, properties, events or states of affairs. According to Tim Crane, aspect shape means that when something is presented to a subject (in thought, perception, desire and so on), it is always presented under a certain aspect, or in a certain way. See Crane (2003).

existents¹⁰⁵; Siewert¹⁰⁶ understands it as directedness/aboutness/of-ness, as conditions of satisfaction, to have content; Dale Jacquette¹⁰⁷ argues that to say thought is intentional is to say that it intends or is about something, that it aims at or is directed upon an intended object, and thus intentionality is the aboutness of thought, the relation whereby a psychological state intends or refers to an intended object; Pierre defines intentionality as that “intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and state of affairs.”¹⁰⁸

Thus far, I have discussed Brentano’s proposal of intentionality and its interpretation along with the queries surrounding it after Brentano. I have also provided a historical survey to several earlier philosophers. Looking back at the long history of intentionality, it is difficult to define it as a unified concept. However, we do find several common features about intentionality that continue across the developing line, and we are now well placed to develop a reliable working definition of intentionality that we shall use in our investigations of Aristotle. It can be generally concluded that intentionality is an aspect of the mental act of directing to something and that it possesses mental content.¹⁰⁹ The act of directing towards something and the immanent content can be characterized as what intentionality implies.

¹⁰⁵ For Black, object-directedness means mental acts are directed towards objects distinct from the perceiver. Mental existence means a special mode of being—*esse intentionale* or “intentional in-existence”, to use Brentano’s phrase—which is proper to the objects of cognition inasmuch as they are cognized. As such, consciousness means that intentionality is the distinctive property of consciousness: all (and only) conscious states are intentional. Knowledge of non-existents means intentional existence is invoked to solve the problem of how we can be said to know objects that do not exist in the external world”. See Black (2010), p. 66.

¹⁰⁶ Siewert (2017).

¹⁰⁷ Jacquette (2004).

¹⁰⁸ Jacob (2014).

¹⁰⁹ The definition of “directedness” and “in-existence” is not the same thing in Brentano. According to Edmund Runggaldier, “Anzenbacher and Ineichen hold that one must distinguish between intentionality as directedness toward an object and intentionality as (actual) immanence or in-existence of the intentional object. This distinction may be seen to correspond to Brentano’s distinction between representation as act and the content of the representation or that which is represented.” Cf. Runggaldier (1989). Therefore, I modify the in-existence as the immanent content rather than the immanence of the intentional object based on a distinction between content and object. In this way, the characteristics of directedness and immanence can exist consistently in one definition.

1.3 The working definition of intentionality

Comprehensively considering Brentano's reference to Aristotle and the historical line of the development of intentionality, I prefer to keep "in-existence" as the characteristic of intentionality. That is, the peculiar characteristic pertaining to intentionality is that there is something immanent in the mental act. This not only conforms to the view of the philosophers to whom Brentano refers, but is also consistent with the others works as I mentioned in the previous section. However, given that Brentano's characterization of intentional in-existence is vulnerable to a series of issues (the confusion of content and object in particular), I therefore modify intentional in-existence to refer to the immanent content. As such, what is immanent in mental activity is no longer an intended object, but an immanent content through which the object is presented. I hope this can not only keep Brentano's reference to Aristotle secure but also avoid the trouble Brentano creates in his own definition. Second, instead of keeping Brentano's description of the reference to this immanent content, I demarcate the characteristic of the mental act's tending towards or directing towards something as the other aspect of intentionality together with the immanent content.

This separation is inspired by Twardowski who makes a distinction between content and object of presentations. Twardowski provides three reasons for the necessity of this distinction. First, if content and object are not actually different, then if the content exist, the object must exist as well. Nonetheless, in the case of a correct judgment which denies an object—for instance, stating that the unicorn does not exist—we make a correct judgment about this content, and the content therefore exists, although the object (which is the unicorn) does not. If the unicorn exists, then there will be a contradiction with the judgment – and therefore, content and object are not identical. Second, the object has the properties of and relations to other objects. For instance, a golden mountain has the properties of being golden and of being spatially extended and being larger than other mountains. These properties of and relations to others do not belong to the content of the presentation of the golden mountain, but only belong to the golden mountain as an object. Third, considering equivalent presentations, we can have presentations which have the same extension but different content. We can also define equivalent presentations as presentations with different content which nevertheless point to the same object. For instance, "the city located at the site of the Roman Juvavum" and "the birthplace of Mozart" designate the same thing but have

different meanings.¹¹⁰ According to Twardowski, the object is that which is presented in a presentation whereas the content is that through which the object is presented.

Inspired by Twardowski's distinction of content and object, I have differentiated above two aspects of intentionality.¹¹¹ The "in-existence" line emphasizes the aspect of content of intentionality. Except for this, we see that the capacity of "tending towards", "directing towards" of the mental subject appears here and there in the history of the development of intentionality. Also in Brentano, especially at his second stage, where he spells out the reference from the mentally active subject to a thing. Brentano points this relational characteristic back to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. As we pointed out earlier, the attribution of this active factor to the mental subject is revealed in the Neoplatonic tradition, but whether it is implied in Aristotle or not requires further scrutiny.¹¹²

From the previous analysis, it can be derived that the concept of intentionality contains two elements: 1) intentional directedness; 2) immanent content.¹¹³ As explored earlier, philosophers throughout history have discerned these two features, which further demonstrates the connection between Brentano and Aristotle. Such a working definition is particularly beneficial to our project here, insofar as upon adopting this working definition, we will be able to investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle. I will expound the two elements in more detail.

Dermot Moran points out that many mental states have a property called "directedness" or "aboutness", and "although there is no agreement on the terminology, there is a general recognition that mental states are directed towards, invoke or refer to, something beyond or transcendent to the subjective, phenomenal experience of the state itself".¹¹⁴ For example, in every mental activity, there is always something that we are concerned about. When we are thinking, our mental act of thinking is always about something; when we imagine, the act of imagining is also about something; when we desire, the act of desiring is specially about an object or an event, and so forth. In each

¹¹⁰ Twardowski (1977), p.27-29.

¹¹¹ According to R. Grossmann, the ordinary perceptual object in Twardowski as well as in Meinong and Husserl's view is a complex entity consisting of a number of properties (or relations). P.xxi. The introduction of Twardowski, *On the content and object of presentation*.

¹¹² The investigation into the active factor in Aristotle is detailed in Chapter 2(p.104-105) and Chapter 4. (p.171-173).

¹¹³ The reason why I adopt the immanent content rather than the mental content is that this is to investigate Aristotle. However, the contemporary terminology of "mental" has a broader usage than what Aristotle allows. I do not use intentional content because "intentional" itself may imply the characteristic of intentionally directing to something, whereas I want to separate the characteristic of directedness and immanence.

¹¹⁴ Moran (2013).

of these cases, the mental act can be said to be directed toward or refer to a particular event or object, etc. And so, in each case, the mind can be said to be directed toward or refer to a particular event or object.¹¹⁵ This interpretation tends to infer a kind of relation between the mental act/state and the object, event or state of affairs, proposition, even the non-existent object, etc, indicating the various intentional objects the psychic subject directs itself to, also resulting in the obscuring of the nature of intentional relation and the ontological status about the intentional object.¹¹⁶

It is worth noting, however, that the attribution of “directedness, aboutness, or of-ness” to intentionality, without any further clarification, is very ambiguous. It seems to me that these terminologies can create different and notably distinct implications. On the one hand, they imply a strong relational mode between mental act and things, such as something existing outside of mental life. In the meantime, it can also imply a relation between mental act and what Brentano first names as the in-existent object, or a strictly internal object. Both these two relational formulations can be further scrutinized. Since one kind can be called the external-object theory, what about the cases in which there is no object existing externally to a mental state, such as a unicorn? The latter case could be called inner-object theory which has a popular tradition lying behind it, and Brentano adopts this approach at his first period. Earlier we have visited the shortcomings of the latter position when we spoke of the doubling-object problem and the raising of barriers between the psychic and the external world. However, despite these limitations, we see that the characteristic of “directing, referring” is endemic to how intentionality has been understood in its several theoretical versions and this consistency can thus be taken as a basic root of the theory. It appears then that the key of intentional directedness is how to deal with the ontology of the intentional object, which may be a non-existent object. At the first stage of Brentano, it will not be a problem for him since he regards all objects that our mental act is concerned with as

¹¹⁵ Ibid. As Moran reminds us, directedness or aboutness also implies the question of the nature of intentional relations – and whether it is a causal relation or a non-causal relation, which is the “noetic ray” that links the mind to its intended object.

¹¹⁶ The problem that this seemingly relation mode of intentionality creates is that it can constitute a relation between the mental act and extra-mental object that is not intentional or inherently involved with the mental act. For instance, in perception, the object that we perceive creates a causal line between the object that the perception is of or about and perception, which would result in intentionality as “nothing peculiarly mental or ‘internal’ to mental states or acts but a matter of how the mind is ‘externally’ related to ordinary sorts of extra-mental objects.” And this relation cannot be applied to other mental experience such as imagination and desire. Meanwhile, it can also denote a relation between the mental act and the represented or intentional object. But the shortcoming of this theory is that it is difficult to ascertain that the two mental states are about the same object, the barrier between the external world and our cognition, as well as an infinite regress. Cf. Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith. “Theory of Intentionality”.

phenomena. Objects of mental acts—be it existing or not—have the same mode of existence, which he adopts from the Scholastic tradition of the objective existence.¹¹⁷

However, at his second stage, since he turns to a realist standpoint and holds that the intentional relation can only direct to a real thing, which is an individual entity and the non-existent object is also included, he immediately confronts the query about the ontology of the non-existent object. Twardowski follows his teacher Brentano in proposing the intentional nexus (relation) as a quasi-relation between mental act and the intentional object. According to Twardowski, the non-existent object is also the intentional object that we can direct to and it may belong to the realm of non-being. But this proposal is incompatible with an interpretation of intentional relation from the perspective of realism, according to which the two parts in this relation must exist. Therefore, according to the realist, the non-existing object cannot be a relatum in the intentional relation. Both Brentano and Twardowski attribute to the non-existent object a metaphysical status as entity, but this is unacceptable to many.¹¹⁸ Crane provides a way to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of some sort. In his view, the intentional object is just the object for some subject of an intentional state or act.¹¹⁹ I aim not to provide an explanation for the intentional object or whether the non-existent object shall be the object we direct to or not, but follow Black in arguing that “knowledge of non-existents means intentional existence is invoked to solve the problem of how we can be said to know objects that do not exist in the external world”.¹²⁰ That is why the two aspects of intentionality are both necessary.

Charles Siewert admits that “a coherent and satisfactory theoretical grasp of this phenomenon of ‘mental pointing’ in all its generality is difficult to achieve.”¹²¹ I would, therefore, like to cautiously adopt the characteristic of “directedness”, “aboutness” or “reference” of the mental act to something as intentional directedness.¹²² Intentional directedness should be distinguished from a practical sense of intention, which is what common psychology refers to as intention or desire to do

¹¹⁷ Brentano calls it intentional existence.

¹¹⁸ For how to deal with the non-existent object as the intentional object, see Tim Crane, “Intentional objects.”

¹¹⁹ Crane, (2001)

¹²⁰ Cf. Black (2010), p. 66.

¹²¹ Siewert (2017).

¹²² A model of intentionality—that is, intentional directedness—which is widely accepted as the standard model both in the phenomenological and analytic traditions and is depicted as a tripartite structure: act, object, and mode of presentation of that object. The adoption of this standard model is taken by Mark Rowlands, who admits that this model is not universally accepted and has been under attack in recent decades, but it is still valuable because according to him, there are still some forms of intentional directedness which conform to it. See Rowlands (2010).

something, or aiming for a goal. What I adopt as one characteristic of intentionality is intentional directedness in the theoretical sense. It is a mental act which has the innate structure to direct toward the object.¹²³ We find this characteristic in Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Neoplatonists, and Avicenna. However, another characteristic of intentionality is immanent content. It implies a content-intentionality, which means that there is corresponding content composed in mental acts. This content is about—or of—the intended object, and even non-existent objects. It differs from the mental act's directing to something in that this term emphasizes what is “in” the mental act. Its existence is independent from the external object, which means that there is always immanent content composed in the psychic activity no matter if the object exists in reality or not. What is more, the immanent content is subject-dependent, which implies that it is composed by the mental subject. Different subjects can have quite different mental content with regard to the same object.¹²⁴

This is the second peculiar characteristic I would like to examine which I refer to as the immanent content – or as the mental content in the contemporary context. Unlike Brentano's intentional in-existence, the proposal of immanent content excludes the characteristic of the mental act's directedness to the immanent content/object as proposed at Brentano's first stage. I modify the immanent intended object in Brentano as the immanent content considering the ambiguity of content and object we met in Brentano. That is to say, it retains the characteristic that there is something immanent in the psychic acts but modifies the immanent object as the immanent content. No matter what kind of object our mind is directing toward, there is invariably immanent content composed about that object. This immanent content is mind-dependent and as we clarified, it is a mode of presentation¹²⁵ of the object. That is why we can have non-existent objects presented by the mental content and people can generate different mental content about one object.¹²⁶

¹²³ It is a group of unspecific objects such as ordinary objects, properties, events or states of affairs (Tim Crane); Things, properties and states of affairs (Jacob, Pierre); Something beyond or transcendent to the subjective, phenomenal experience of the state itself (Dermot Moran); Objects distinct from the perceiver (Black). Etc.

¹²⁴ The adoption of the immanent content is primarily based on a reflection about Brentano's intentional in-existence and the later follower's modification about it because of the ambiguity of content and object in Brentano. For example Meinong's distinction of two kinds of object, Twardowski's distinction of the content of presentation and object, Husserl's emphasis that an act's being intentional depends on its content. For Husserl's modification, see McIntyre and Smith, “Theory of Intentionality”.

¹²⁵ Mode of presentation refers to the objects of thought which are presented to the thinker from a certain point of view.

¹²⁶ I'd like to refer to Mendeiovid's elaboration of content, with which I mostly agree and which can be adopted as my elaboration about immanent content, that is, “the contents might turn out to be ordinary objects and properties, propositions, facts, sense data, ideas in a world of forms, ways of representing,

The immanent content is a presentational or informative content of the ordinary object. It is composed in our mind to mediate the mental act and the ordinary objects, properties and state of affairs. The immanent content is available in and accessible to the first-person experience. For instance, when it comes to presidential election, everyone can have his or her opinion and this opinion cannot be known by others unless he or she pronounces it or expresses it in a way others can understand. Meanwhile, each person can compose different content with regard to the ordinary object.

To conclude, in this chapter, we have set up two frameworks of intentionality. One is Brentano's framework, which should be divided into two stages, the first stage being characterized by intentional in-existence, denoting the immanence of the intended object and further implying a relation of directedness between the mental act and its immanent object; the second stage formulates an intentional relation between the mental act and the individual thing, abandoning the early immanence characteristic of intentional in-existence. Brentano's two stages of intentionality constitute a dividing line between the ancient tradition and modern interest in intentionality. When dealing with Aristotle's psychology in the following sections, I will compare Brentano's intentionality in these two stages with Aristotle.

In the meantime, I have produced a much more general definition of intentionality. This working definition is based on a comprehensive survey of the historical development of intentionality and I focus on two characteristics as our working definition: the intentional directedness and the immanent content. The intentional directedness is primarily the act of an agent to actively direct to—or refer to—the intentional object – which is different from Brentano's intentional relation at the first stage, which is a relation directing the mental act only to the immanent object. The immanent content/mental content implies a mode of presentation by virtue of which the intentional object is presented to the subject. Whenever there is mental activity, there is always a particular immanent content and this content is referring to the ordinary object, properties, state of affairs or non-existent objects.

properties of intentional states, or even intentional states or properties themselves.” Cf. Angela A. Mendeiovid, *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*.

CHAPTER 2: THE ROOTS OF INTENTIONALITY IN ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION

This chapter has two aims: the first aim is to uncover whether a root of intentionality can be found in Aristotle's theory of perception by using the working definition of intentionality we set in chapter one.¹²⁷ The second aim is an evaluation of Brentano's notion of intentionality in Aristotle's perceptual theory. This will enable us to evaluate whether Brentano is right to refer to Aristotle in his own work, and then to discern the differences between their respective theories. As will become clear, our inquiry will revolve around an analysis of Aristotle's perceptual theory from the perspective of intentionality.

The structure of this chapter will be the following: I will first list several fundamental tenets that underlie the theory of perception, and then set forth the survey of Aristotle's theory under the heading of the two characteristics of intentionality: intentional directedness and immanent content. Correspondingly, we will reach our conclusions at the end of these two parts. Lastly, I shall reveal the implication of intentionality in Aristotle's perceptual theory by using both the working definition of intentionality we set up previously and the criterion of Brentano's intentionality thesis.

2.1 The foundations of Aristotelian psychology

Before diving into a detailed analysis of Aristotle's theory of perception, several general tenets about his philosophical framework deserve prior discussion. Given that these fundamental positions lay the foundation of Aristotle's perceptual theory,¹²⁸ this

¹²⁷ See p.52-58.

¹²⁸ Anna Marmodoro inspired me to take this approach. That is, before getting into a detailed analysis of Aristotle's perceptual theory, Marmodoro undertakes an analysis of the metaphysical foundations of perception and tries to formulate Aristotle's psychology from the standpoint of his metaphysics. As she states, "this book makes an original contribution to the debate by motivating the view that Aristotle's theory of perception is aligned with one of his most fundamental positions in metaphysics – namely that all properties are causal powers (δυνάμεις, potentialities), and that causation is to be accounted for in terms of powers and their activation (ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ or ἐνεργείᾳ, actuality)." Cf. Anna Marmodoro (2014), p.3. Compared to Marmodoro's adoption of the fundamental position of causal powers (for Marmodoro, it means potentiality and actuality), I adopt the tenets of matter and form, four types of causes, and potentiality and actuality to articulate perception.

initial part of the chapter will provide a concise conceptual elucidation of the various principles we find in Aristotle – viz. his theory of causes, hylomorphism, and actuality and potentiality.

2.1.1 Four types of causes

In order to obtain knowledge, the first step is to inquire about the causes. As Aristotle says, “for since the aim of our investigation is knowledge, and we think we have knowledge of a thing only when we think we can answer the question about it ‘on account of what?’” (*Phys.* 194b19-20)¹²⁹ In other words, only when we grasp the causes of perception, can we say that we acquire knowledge of it. Aristotle lays out his theory of causes in *Physics* and it is also applied to explain the mechanism of perception in *De Anima*.¹³⁰ Considering this, I shall first undertake an analysis of the theory of causes.

Aristotle defines four types of causes to instruct the investigation of knowledge:

Well then, (1) the existence of material for the generating process to start from (whether specifically or generically considered) is one of the essential factors we are looking for. Such is the bronze for the statue, or the silver for the phial. (Material *aitia*.) Then, naturally, (2) the thing in question cannot be there unless the material has actually received the form or characteristics of the type, conformity to which brings it within the definition of the thing we say it is, whether specifically or generically. Thus, the interval between two notes is not an octave unless the notes are in the ratio of 2 to 1; nor do they stand at a musical interval at all unless they conform to one or other of the recognized ratios, (Formal *aitia*.) Then again (3), there must be something to initiate the process of the change or its cessation when the process is completed, such as the act of a voluntary agent (of the smith, for instance), or the father who begets a child; or more generally the prime, conscious or unconscious, agent that produces the effect and starts the material on its way to the product, changing it from what it was to what it is to be. (Efficient *aitia*.) And lastly, (4) there is the end or purpose, for the sake of which the process is initiated, as when a man takes exercise for the sake of his health. ‘Why does he take exercise?’ we ask. And the answer ‘Because he thinks it good for his health’ satisfies us. (Final *aitia*.) (*Phys.* 194b25-35, tr. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford.)¹³¹

¹²⁹ Translated by P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford (1957).

¹³⁰ Except for Marmodoro who provides a causal analysis of perception. See also Corcilius (2014), Everson (1997), Sorabji (2001), Caston (1996).

¹³¹ Unless otherwise indicated all translations of Aristotle are taken from J. Barnes (Ed.) Revised Oxford Translation.

This outline of the four types of causes explains the process of change and rest of nearly all beings. To understand what is meant by this, let's take the case of a sculpture. A sculpture can exemplify the four types of causes: the material—such as the marble that constitutes the substrate of the sculpture—is the material cause; the sculptor who engraves the sculpture is the efficient cause; the idea or design that is embodied in the sculptor is the formal cause that also shapes the finished sculpture; and lastly, the purpose of the sculpture itself is the final cause and the final aim of all these actions.¹³²

When it comes to psychology, Aristotle describes the soul as the efficient, formal and final cause of the living being (*DA* 415b10-19).¹³³ In *De Anima*, Aristotle summarizes the soul in the following manner: (a) “the soul is an actuality of the first kind of a natural body having life potentially in it” (*DA* 412a30); (b) “it is the substantial being that is a thing's logos, or the being-what-it-is of a certain kind of body” (*DA* 412b10-12); and (c) “the soul is the source of these phenomena and is characterized by the power of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking and movement” (*DA* 413a24-26).¹³⁴ The living being thus differs from the non-living being in that the former has the soul's potential of “knowing, perceiving, opening, and further desiring, wishing, and generally all other modes of appetition”, and produces “the local movements of animals, and growth, maturity, and decay” (*DA* 411a25-411b1). The

¹³² It is worth noting that the final three causes sometimes coincide with one another. For example, the final cause can be regarded as being the same as the formal cause in some cases.

¹³³ “The soul is the cause and first principle of the living body. The words cause and first principle are used in several separate senses. But the soul is equally the cause in each of the three senses which we have distinguished; for it is the cause in the sense of being that from which motion is derived, in the sense of the purpose or final cause, and as being the substance of all bodies that have souls. (1) That the soul is the cause in the sense of substance is obvious; for substance is the cause of existence in all things, and for living creature's existence is life, and of these the soul is the cause and first principle. Also the actuality of that which exists potentially is its essential formula. (2) Clearly the soul is also the cause in the final sense. For just as mind acts with some purpose in view, so too does nature, and this purpose is its end.” Translated by W. S. Heff (1934).

¹³⁴ The difference between (a) and (b) lies in that Aristotle attributes actuality and potentiality to the assessment of the substance: actuality means that the substance has fulfilled its potentials and possesses the feature which makes the substance as such. Potentiality implies that the substance has the potential to become such but has not yet accomplished this. As to the formulation of (a), the actuality of the first kind refers to the stable status of capacity, as the case that we own the knowledge or have the capacity of something, but the knowledge or capacity is not in practice yet. The actuality of the second kind is a realized or performing status in which the knowledge or capacity we have is in practice. All the living beings are born with a soul and owning a soul is the first step to being alive. We are also born with the capacities of the soul, which is the potential to be used. In this sense, the soul can be regarded as the actuality of the first kind, where (c) is the capability of soul.

soul's potential to initiate growth, local movement and cognition in living beings therefore acts as the efficient cause. Aristotle delineates the substantial being in three ways: the form, the matter and the composite of form and matter— of which the form is the actuality while the matter is the potential.¹³⁵ As the formal cause, the soul is the actuality and the *logos*, which gives the potential living being their life and which defines what kind of creature it is. The soul is also the final cause of the living being, whose final goal is to fully actualize all the potential capacities of the soul in living their life according to their species.¹³⁶ In the case of plants, the final cause is to absorb nutrition for survival; with regard to animals, it is to live well by the virtue of their senses; for humans, it is to pursue a good life with the use of their intellect. And thus, this is the description of the soul as the efficient, formal, and final cause of the living being.

However, in terms of perception, the efficient cause and the formal cause of perception coincide in the sensible object. The sensible object's stimulation on the sense organ is like that of fire on wood, in which sense the sensible object or fire works as an efficient cause.¹³⁷ Since the efficient cause is to cause either change or rest in beings,¹³⁸ the sensible object is the active agent which brings about a change to what is percipient. Meanwhile, the sensible form is what defines the sensible object as it is. The sensible form is the *logos* or definition of a substantial being. When the sensible object acts on the patient by virtue of the efficient cause, it is the formal cause that defines the perceptual state and decides what perception is about. Aristotle elucidates this as the perceptual soul's "receiving form without matter".¹³⁹ That is how the sensible object works as the efficient and formal cause in sensation.

The material and final cause also play a role in perception. The material cause is the sense organ which provides a physiological substrate for perception. As Aristotle says, "an eye is the material of vision" (*DA* 412b20). The final cause of perception is to

¹³⁵ "As we have already said, substance is used in three senses, form, matter, and a compound of the two. Of these matter is potentiality, and form actuality." *DA* 414a 15-19, tr. W. S. Heff (1934).

¹³⁶ The soul as the final cause of the living being points to a tendency of Aristotle's "teleological" understanding of nature. For instance, Mark Shiffman comments that "for the sake of perpetuating this enactment of the form that they are, living things 'do whatever they do according to nature' (*On the Soul* II.4, 415b 1-2). Soul in this sense is an unmoved mover for all living beings, the natural inner principle in accord with which they are self-moved. Soul moves as an end or *telos*, and this is the cornerstone of Aristotle's 'teleological' understanding of nature." Cf. Shiffman (2011), p. 20-21.

¹³⁷ *DA* 417a5-8.

¹³⁸ As we referred to in *Physics* 194b30, "Again, the primary source of the change or rest; e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause, the father is the cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what changes of what is changed."

¹³⁹ *DA* 424a18-20.

fully actualize the potential perceptual capacity to assist the subject's well-being and it is the four causes working together that explain the perceptual activity. However, to serve the purpose of this chapter I will focus in particular on the efficient and formal cause in perception in order to reveal to what extent intentionality may be found in Aristotle's theory of perception. I will separately deal with these two causes in the discussion of intentional directedness and immanent content when we return to them later in this chapter.

2.1.2 Hylomorphism

Aristotle delineates the relation between body/matter and soul/form as hylomorphism, contending that every physical object is a compound of both matter and form. The form is "the arrangement, or the knowledge of music, or some other thing said of something in the same way" (*Phys.* 190b28-30). The seed of an apple tree will grow out to become an apple tree, with all the characteristics of the apple tree. For the same reason, the embryo of a human being will not grow into a monkey but rather a human. In this sense, the form is the essence or definition which defines the nature of a substance. The material component is what constitutes the substrate of the substance and suffers privation. However, when it comes to the query of what represents the core nature of the substance, Aristotle attributes it to the form.¹⁴⁰ That is to say, the axiety is the form of the axe, the one which makes the axe as it is, rather than its material substrate. Once the axe loses the function of axiety, it can hardly be called the axe anymore.¹⁴¹ Or, for example, the form of a house is what guides the construction of the house in such a way that the house functions as a shelter.¹⁴² In these cases, the function of the axe and the structure of the house are the form of the substance. Broadly speaking, the form can be interpreted as the shape, the *logos*, the essence, the core qualities or the function of the substance, as well as the definition that defines the substance as it is.

Matter and form are inseparable from one another in composing the substance. Hylomorphism finds a range of application across Aristotle's corpus. For example, it directly applies to the body/soul relation found in *De Anima*, in which the body is regarded as the material constituent while it is the soul that is the form of the living being and enables the living being to be active as such. But this is not a Platonic or

¹⁴⁰ *Phys.* 194b25-35.

¹⁴¹ *DA* 412b10-15.

¹⁴² *DA* 403b3-7; *Met.* 1043a29-36. In most cases, the formal cause of a substance is also the final cause. The structure or definition of the house (such as to be a shelter) is also the house's function or purpose.

Cartesian concept of dualism in that body and the soul remain separate. Rather, Aristotle delineates an inseparable relation between soul and body. He assesses that all of our affections such as anger, desire, love, pity, etc., are involved with the body. That is to say, these affections are en-mattered (*DA* 403a25). Hylomorphism also applies to explain perception. We find that both the perceiver and the perceived are composed of matter and form,¹⁴³ and Aristotle describes perception as receiving form without matter.¹⁴⁴

2.1.3 Motion as the change from potentiality to actuality

Potentiality and actuality are general descriptions that depict changes in the state of a thing.¹⁴⁵ In particular, the basic elaboration of motion as the change from potentiality to actuality is applied to perception, since perception is also defined by Aristotle as a kind of motion. “Sensation depends, as we said, on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some sort of change of quality” (*DA* 416b34-35). Therefore, the reference to a general description of motion will aid our interpretation of perception. In *Phys.* III, motion is described in the following manner:

We can now define motion or change as the progress of the realizing of a potentiality. (*Phys.* 201a11)

The mover will always transmit a form, either a ‘this’ or ‘such’ or ‘so much’, which, when it moves, will be the principle and cause of the motion, e.g. the actual man begets man from what is potentially man. (*Phys.* 202 a 10-11)

Motion is in the movable. It is the fulfilment of this potentiality by the action of that which has the power of causing motion, and the actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is not other than the actuality of the movable; for it must be the fulfilment of both. A thing is capable of causing motion because it can do this; it is a mover because it actually does it. But it is on the movable that it is capable of acting. Hence there is a single actuality of both alike, just as one to two and two to one are the same interval, and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one--for these are one and the same, although their definition is not one. So it is with the mover and the moved. (*Phys.* 202a 14-22)

¹⁴³ For the perceiving part, the sense organ is the material substrate, while the perceiving capacity (such as vision, taste, hear, etc.) is the formal part. (*DA* 412b20). For the perceived part, the sensible object is composed of the sensible mater and the sensible form. When perceive, we receive the sensible form without the matter.

¹⁴⁴ *DA* 424a18-20.

¹⁴⁵ *Phys.* III 1; *GC* I 3, I 7; *Met.* VII 7-9; *DA* II 5, etc.

The mover and the moved are necessary for motion, given that an act of motion or change requires agent and patient. Before motion occurs, both the mover and moved remain in their state of potentiality. But since the mover has the innate power of causing motion, once conditions are satisfied (for instance, the potential mover and moved are in sufficient proximity), the mover will act on the moved because of its capacity of doing so, and at that moment, both of them actualize their potential in one shared activity. And so, two points flow from this delineation: first, motion needs to be activated by a mover which transmits a form as the working principle or cause; second, motion that occurs in the patient actualizes two potentialities at the same time.

Aristotle conforms to the general rule of motion when he expounds perception. What is percipient and the perceptible object are analogous to the moved and mover respectively. The perceptible object is the active agent which acts on what is percipient by transmitting a form, which defines the nature of the perceptual content. The perceiving subject actualizes its potential perceiving capacity—such as vision, hearing, taste, touch and smell—by receiving the sensible form. The potential sensible object becomes the actualized sensible object because it is perceived by the perceiving subject. The actualization of these two potentialities is initiated by the sensible object, which results in a change in the perceiving subject. The system of perception expresses the detailed application of the principle of motion Aristotle outlined and to which we will return to later.

2.2 Intentional directedness in perception

In order to investigate the possible roots of intentional directedness in Aristotle's theory of perception, I shall arrange my analysis of Aristotle's perceptual theory according to the topics that are relevant for the topic of intentional directedness. I shall discuss the process of perception – notably, how perception is initiated, what its external conditions are, and what role the perceptual soul plays in this process. In addition, I shall look more closely at the correlation between the perceptual soul and the perceptible, as well as at the active tendency that is implied in perception.

2.2.1 the efficient cause of perception

The general definition of intentional directedness implies that there is a conscious active agent in the act of directing toward something. In the strict sense, it implies a

relational mode between the active agent and the object. We find in Aristotle's theory of perception the delineation of the efficient cause which plays an active initiating power.

There are several components in Aristotle's perceptual theory: the sensible object, the medium, and the perceiving subject. The sensible object is the agent of perception because it initiates a perceptual activity and stimulates the passive perceiving subject.¹⁴⁶ The medium works as the transmission channel, without which the form of the object cannot be transmitted.¹⁴⁷ The perceiving subject has the capacity of perception. The activity of perception occurs when the present object stimulates the corresponding perceiving subject by transmitting its form through a medium to the perceiving subject, resulting in the subject's reception of the sensible form, which is the qualities, properties, essence or definition of the object. From this general description of perception, the directionality of perception runs from the perceptible object to the perceiving soul. I will now flesh it out.

When Aristotle sets out to explicate the perceptual activity, he asks, "why do we not perceive the senses themselves, or why without the stimulation of external objects do they not produce sensation...." (*DA* 417a 4-6). This question sheds light on the efficient cause of perception – that is, the external object. Aristotle explains that the perceiving subject is passive and potential, which can only be acted upon by the active agent: "it is clear that what is sensitive is so only potentially, not actually. The power of sense is parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously, but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition." (*DA* 417a 7-10) This active agent with the power of initiating motion is the sensible object.

The reason why Aristotle delineates sensation as such is likely owing to his criticism of his predecessors. Among them, it was popularly claimed that sensation adheres to the principle of "like affected by unlike" – or as qualified by Democritus as "like by like." Aristotle proposes instead a quite distinct opinion: the patient and agent are like in kind but unlike in species (*GC* 323b30). The identity in kind makes sure that the singular sense— vision, for instance—will not be affected by another kind of sensible object. In addition, the unlike in species makes it possible for the potential perceiving subject to perceive what it does not have yet. If the perceiving subject is the same as the sensible object, it will suffer no alteration from this group of sensible objects at that moment.

Since the sensible object is the mover which initiates motion, it either contains the origin of motion, or it is the last agent next to the patient (*GC* 324a25). Aristotle

¹⁴⁶ *DA* 417b20-28.

¹⁴⁷ *DA* 419a14-15, 25-30.

instantiates the sensible form's innate capacity to set in motion as that, "the visible, then, is color, i.e. that which overlies what is in itself visible; by 'in itself' we mean not that the object is by its definition visible but that it has in itself the cause of its visibility." (*DA* 418 b1);¹⁴⁸ and "what has the power of producing sound is what has the power of setting in motion a single mass of air which is continuous up to the organ of hearing" (*DA* 420a 4-6). Extending the case of vision and sound to sense in general, it can be reasonably inferred that the power of the sensible object to initiate motion is therefore in its nature.

It is worth noting that the occurrence of sensation cannot lack an intermediary and that we cannot perceive the object if it is placed immediately upon the sense organ. Except for the sensible object—which has the innate nature to cause motion—Aristotle attributes a role to the medium – that of the last agent next to the patient.¹⁴⁹ The medium is the flesh and tongue needed for touch and taste, while air and water serve as the medium for sight, hearing, and smell (*DA* 423b17-423b26). For example, in the process of vision, color can only be transferred through a medium that has the character of transparency, such as air and water (*DA* 418b1). Light, which is the actuality of transparency, makes the medium capable of receiving color, transferring the color from a sensible body and passing it to the sense of sight, which also has the characteristic of transparency. That is, in the case of vision, color transfers through the transparent medium (water or air) to the eye and acts on it, which results in the seeing color. In the case of sound, air works as the medium which transfers the sound to the organ of hearing, so that the sound can act on the percipient.

For perception in general, the sensible object is the efficient cause, which is also the mover. The occurrence of perception follows a line from the sensible object, to the medium, and then to the perceiving subject. The efficient cause effects a change in the patient, and the passive feature of the perceptual soul provides the possibility for the sensible object to act on it so that it can receive the incoming information.¹⁵⁰

2.2.2 The passive and potential perceptual soul

Up to this point, we have examined how the efficient cause of the sensible object allows for perception to occur. As observed, what is percipient is depicted as being both passive and potential (*DA* 417a5-8), which corresponds to the efficient power of

¹⁴⁸ Translated by P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford.

¹⁴⁹ *DA* 419a15-20; *DA* 419a25-30.

¹⁵⁰ For more details about this change, see section 3 in this chapter.

the external object. What is percipient and the perceptible object constitute two ends of perception: one is active, exercising a causal influence; while the other is passive in suffering that influence. Except for the differences in being active and passive, both of their potencies are in potentiality before perception occurs, and the actualization of both potentials is realized at the same time when perception occurs.¹⁵¹

The elaboration of potentiality and actuality goes as follows:

But we must now distinguish different senses in which things can be said to be potential or actual; at the moment we are speaking as if each of these phrases had only one sense. We can speak of something as a knower either as when we say that man is a knower, meaning that man falls within the class of beings that know or have the knowledge or as when we are speaking of a man who possesses a knowledge of grammar. Each of these has a potentiality, but not in the same way: the one because his kind or matter is such and such, the other because he can reflect when he wants to if nothing external prevents him. And there is the man who is already reflecting—he is a knower in actuality and in the most proper sense is knowing, e.g. this A. Both the former are potential knowers, who realize their respective potentialities, the one by change of quality, i.e. repeated transitions from one state to its opposite under instruction, the other in another way by the transition from the inactive possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise. (*DA* 417 a23-b2)

Aristotle clarifies two pairs of potentiality and actuality through the example of a “knower”. The first pair is from potentiality1 to potentiality2/actuality1, which can be visualized as the process of a man moving from not knowing to knowing; the second pair is from potentiality2/actuality1 to actuality2, indicating a reflective knower who has the knowledge to practically use it. Sensation also follows these two pairs of change:

In the case of what is to possess sense, the first transition is due to the action of the male parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect of sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge. Actual sensation corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge. (*DA* 417b16-20)

The perceptual capacity is what we receive from birth. Therefore, it is an actual state compared to the state without the capacity to perceive. However, it is still potential given that it has not realized its function even though it has the power to do so. The actuality of a potential perceptual capacity requires a perceiving activity. Following the

¹⁵¹ *DA* 418a 4-7.

two pairs of transition: the transition from having no sense to having the sense is the transition from potentiality1 to potentiality2/actuality1. The transition from having the sense to exercising the sense is from potentiality2/actuality1 to actuality2.

Aristotle is more focused on the second pair of sensations. That is, the potential sensation means that we have the power to see or hear, while the actual sensation is when we are actually seeing or hearing. This is what Aristotle means by the sense's potentiality and actuality. The shift of the sense from the potential state to the actual state needs to have a causal agent because the potential sense cannot initiate action by itself but only by something which produces motion.¹⁵² Correspondingly, the sense has the capacity to receive the motion and exercise the act of sensing. In this way, the potential sensible object and the potential sensing capacity become actualized together in sensing.

Conclusion

It is now clear that in sensation, the sensible object is the active agent that can influence the other. The sensing subject can only be passively acted upon by the sensible object and thus exercise sensing. At this stage, I would like to state that there is no directedness emanating from the sensing subject to the sensible, let alone intentional directedness. What is more, intentional directedness does not necessarily result in a change in something, while the directedness from the sensible object does have an effect on the sensing subject. Therefore, even though we find that the efficient cause of the sensible object is with the active factor when directed at something, it is not what intentional directedness means.

2.3 Immanent content in perception

I have previously explained immanent content as a type of presentation or information content pertaining to the ordinary object, properties, and state of affairs.¹⁵³ Systematically speaking, to say that P is an immanent content is to say that 1) P is possessed by a conscious subject S; 2) P is something S itself constitutes when S is concerned with a particular P'; 3) P is a presentation or information content of P'.

¹⁵² "All things are acted upon and moved by what already is at work and productive of motion." *DA* 417a19, tr. Shiffman 2011.

¹⁵³ See: Chapter 1, p.52-58.

In this part I shall investigate the roots of immanent content in Aristotle's theory of perception. Concretely speaking, I shall pay attention to issues such as how the perceptual content is composed and comes into being, the relation of the perceptual content and its object, and how the perceiving subject comes to be aware of the perceptual content. These issues directly relate to our judgement about whether and how the roots of immanent content are revealed in Aristotle's perceptual theory.

My approach to addressing these issues boils down to these steps: firstly, I will aim to probe how the formal cause works in perception. In doing so, I will elaborate on the principle of "receiving form without matter" so as to see how the perceptual content comes into being. What is more, the three categories of the sensible object directly determine what kind of sensible content we can have, and the perception of these sensible objects implies the mechanism of how we perceive things and constitute the perceptual content. Secondly, Aristotle articulates an identity between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, which guarantees that the perceptual content is exactly about its perceptible object. Thirdly, Aristotle claims that when we perceive, we perceive not only the sensible object but also the sensation of sensing the object (*DA* 425b12-13). This is generally acknowledged as the implication of perceptual awareness, which shows that we are conscious of what we are perceiving, and that there is first-person access to the perceptual content.

2.3.1 the formal cause of perception

Brentano refers to Aristotle's perceptual theory when he proposes the thesis of intentional in-existence in the following manner: "the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter" (2009, 67). This reveals the principle of "receiving form without matter", which Aristotle expounds as follows: "about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter" (*DA* 424a18-19). He explicates that it is the signet of bronze or gold that produces the impression but not qua bronze or gold. Similarly, the sense is affected by what is colored or flavored and not by virtue of the object itself – but rather, by what makes the thing as it is, by its form (*DA* 424a20-24). Since the sensible form is the definition or *logos* of the sensible object as such,¹⁵⁴ and the reception of the sensible form marks

¹⁵⁴ Hicks explains the form as *logos*. He states that "such a form is properly called a *logos* because it alone can be rationally defined or (in other words) is the content of the definition." (p. 418). Meanwhile, he proposes that it is also a *dunamis*, which represents what a thing is good for, or is able to effect or be. (p.

that the cognitive subject becomes somehow characterized by the form of the sensible object and exemplifies the information coming from outside. As we discussed in the first part of this chapter, this follows the general pattern of *Phys.* III 2.¹⁵⁵ Aristotle instantiates this pattern using the case of a single sense. For example, vision is the activity of taking on color, and hearing is the activity of taking on sound. In both, color and sound are the forms of the sensible object (*DA* 418b27). That is how the formal cause works in perception.

Henceforth, the form shapes what the sensible object is and when it acts on the sense, it directly determines what the perceptual content will be about.¹⁵⁶ To be specific, when the sensible object presents itself, it transmits the sensible form to the perceiving subject and a new perceptual state comes into being.¹⁵⁷ For example, different color constitutes a different perceptual experience, determined by the kind of form that is applied. However, the material substrate also plays a role in the composition of sensation. Since the material substrate of sensation and that of the sensible object are different, the perceptual state—after receiving the sensible form and the sensible object defined by the sensible form—are therefore different in being. Probing this will help us further elaborate on how the perceptual content is composed, and I will deal with it separately in the upcoming section on the alteration in the perceiving subject.¹⁵⁸ Next, as planned, I shall expound the perception of the three categories of perceptible objects.

2.3.2 Perceptual content

2.3.2.1 The perception of three kinds of sensible objects

The specific type of the perceptible object directly determines what kind of perception it will be. This spells out a causal model of perception from the sensible object to the

418) Cf. Hicks (1907). In p. 6 of this dissertation, we also declared that “the form is the essence or definition which defines what kind of nature a substance has”.

¹⁵⁵ “the mover will always transmit a form, either a ‘this’ or such or so much, which, when it moves, will be the principle and cause of the motion, e.g. the actual man begets man from what is potentially man.” Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (1957).

¹⁵⁶ Brentano comments that “the proper object of the sense, that property of the perceived object which is the principle of the alteration of the sense, and which we have to use in order to determine the nature of the sense.” Cf. Brentano (1977), p. 56. This corresponds with my interpretation that the sensible object determines the property of the sensible content.

¹⁵⁷ As is seen in *Phys.* 202a 14–22. As discussed in part one of this chapter: the mover will cause a motion which happens in the moved.

¹⁵⁸ See p. 78–88.

perceiving subject. Correspondingly, the structure of the perceiving subject is well-designed to accommodate the input from the sensible object. In practice, hardly have we ever had the perceptual experience of a single sensible quality. Sensation is always about multiple and vivid sensible objects. In addition, Aristotle claims that the specific sense never errs in reporting whether it is color or sound, but he admits that it may err as to what it is that is colored or where it is, as well as what it is that is making or where it is (*DA* 418a16-17).¹⁵⁹ That is why Aristotle introduces the common and incidental sensible over and above the proper objects of the five singular senses.¹⁶⁰

The definition of the common sensible is as follows:

But perception of movement, rest, number, shape and size is shared by several senses. For things of this kind are not proper to any one sense, but are common to all; for instance, some kinds of movement are perceptible both by touch and by sight. (*DA* 418a18-20, tr. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, 1957).

The common sensible does not exclusively belong to any singular sense.¹⁶¹ While Aristotle insists that the common sensible is common to all senses, we can perceive it simply by the singular sense.¹⁶² This may appear to be an inconsistency – after all, on the one hand, the singular sense has its specific sensible objects and the common sensible is not listed as its object; and yet on the other, the singular sense can perceive the common sensible. More importantly, Aristotle denies there are more senses than the five singular senses. Therefore, which sense is responsible for the common sensible then? There are two possibilities: the first, we perceive the common sensible by the

¹⁵⁹ Also “For the perception of the special objects of sense is always free from error”. The errors in perceiving the common and incidental sensible may due to *phantasia*, as is said, “sensations are always true, imaginations are for the most part false.” Cf. *DA* 428b19-24.

¹⁶⁰ Aristotle’s clarification of the perceptual soul follows his explanation of different kinds of sensible objects, which he claims at the beginning of *DA*. He formally distinguishes three kinds of perceptual objects in *DA* II 6: the proper sensible, the common sensible and the incidental sensible. From II 7- II 11 the five senses are separately described in detail – and correspondingly in III 1, he turns to the clarification of the nature of sense responsible for the common and incidental sensible.

¹⁶¹ *DA* II 7- II 11.

¹⁶² See *DA* 418a19 “some kinds of movement are perceptible both by touch and by sight” (Translated by P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, 1957); *DA* III 1, 425b5-10 “why we need more than one sense to perceive common sensible. The common sensible is given in the objects of more than one sense reveals their distinction from each and all of the individual sensible”; and in *Sense and Sensibilia* 437a6-7, “The faculty of seeing, thanks to the fact that all bodies are colored, brings tidings of multitudes of distinctive qualities of all sorts, whence it is through this sense especially that we perceive the common sensibles.”

singular sense incidentally; and the second, there is something else that is the ultimate faculty for the common sensible.¹⁶³

The first implication is supported by the proposition that “there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common sensible either, i.e. the objects which we perceive incidentally through this or that special sense, e.g. movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, unity” (*DA* 425a15-17). According to a literal interpretation, this claim depicts the common sensible as perceived incidentally by the singular sense, which makes sense given that the common sensible is not the orthodox object of the five singular senses. However, the “incidental” description gives rise to confusion since in the sequel Aristotle stresses that the common sensible is not perceived incidentally (*DA* 425a28). Moreover, “incidental” is used in the description of the incidental sensible – for instance, the son of Daires is perceived incidentally by perceiving white (*DA* 425a25-26). It is also used to describe the perception of the bitterness and the yellowness of bile (*DA* 425b4).

Owens concludes three approaches to the interpretation of the incidental perception of the common sensible in *DA* 425a15: 1) there should be a negative prefix emended to αἰσθανόμεθα; 2) this is merely Aristotle’s reference to certain opinions that he aims to oppose; 3) the incidental perception has a different meaning in the opening sentence from the meaning given it later in the text. I am in favor of the third approach. According to Owens, this is widely accepted by modern interpretation, represented by Trendelenburg, Brentano, Hicks, Ross, etc.¹⁶⁴ My consideration is that Aristotle addresses one sense of “incidental” as “which belongs to the thing and is truthfully attributed to it, but neither with necessity nor for the most part” in *Metaphysics*. This claim works in the case of the son of Daires. However, there is another usage about “incidental” according to which the incidental perception of the common sensible means that it is incidental for the singular sense to perceive the common sensible,

¹⁶³ *DA* 425a 20-23.

¹⁶⁴ According to Owens’ generalization, Trendelenburg clarifies three types of “incidentals” in Aristotle: 1), the closest type of conjunction is between two objects of one and the same sense, as in the case of the special and the common sensible; 2), between objects of different special senses, as when something bitter is seen; and 3), between object of sense and object of speech and mind, as in the case of Cleon’s son. According to Trendelenburg, the common sensible is perceived incidentally by the specific sense but not incidentally perceived by sensation. Whereas in the case of Cleon’s son, it is conjoined by the singular sense with the mind. Hicks holds that a singular sense is affected by the common sensibles incidentally, and the perception of the common sensible by the *sensus communis* is direct and not incidental. Ross allows two meanings for incidental perception: one is wide enough to include the perception of the common sensible as secondary and not primary objects of each singular sense. The other and narrower meaning is seen in the case of Cleon’s son. Brentano believes that they are secondary, not primary objects of each special sense. Cf. Owens (1982).

because the common sensible is not the special object of the singular sense. We can find this usage in Aristotle's elaboration of the singular sense's perceiving of the sensible object which does not belong to its scope:

The senses perceive each other's special objects incidentally; not because the percipient sense is this or that special sense, but because all form a unity: whenever at one and the same moment perception comes to be with respect to the same thing, e.g. with respect to bile that it is bitter and yellow. The assertion of the identity of both cannot be the act of either of the senses; hence the illusion of sense, e.g. the belief that if a thing is yellow it is bile. (*DA* 425a30-425b5) (Tr. RevOT, slightly modified)

In this way, Aristotle explains one singular sense's incidental perception of a sensible object which does not belong to its proper scope. For instance, at first, there must be two singular senses—sight and taste—working together to perceive the bile for the first time. Given that the sight of yellow and the taste of bile once were present together on the same object (the bile), there is a tendency for us to think that anything yellow is bile the next time we see it. What underlies is therefore a unity composed by several senses. In this sense, to perceive bitterness through vision is to perceive incidentally. Further, Aristotle delineates what is seen as color or what has the color (*DA* 425b19). However, what contains the color is usually a substrate or material entity, which is not the proper sensible object of vision. It turns out that Aristotle attributes “what contains the color” to vision as well – and, one should add, incidentally.

Even though the common sensible is incidentally perceived by the singular sense, it is not incidental to the common power of sense, which is its faculty.¹⁶⁵ It should be noted that compared to the sense organ which receives the sensible form by suffering alteration, the common sensibility will not suffer alteration by the common sensible because it is not a bodily organ. However, the common sensible acts on the sense organ because it incidentally unites with the singular sensible, which is the primal acting power on the sense organ.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ *DA* 425a28.

¹⁶⁶ According to Everson, “the common sensibles do not constitute sets of contraries as the proper sensibles do and so there can be no organ which constitutes a mean between such contraries. For there to be an organ proper to the common sensibles, there would need to be something capable not only of being affected *kath' hauto* by shape, rest, unity, etc. but of thereby becoming like the *kath' hauto* agent of change. Within Aristotle's *physics*, this is not possible.” (p.151) He proposes that the common sensible has an affection on the sense organ by being an accidental unity with the proper sensible,” the change brought about in the organ by the proper sensibles will have accidental features which are determined by the common sensibles with which it forms an accidental unity.” (p.152) See Everson (1999).

The definition of the incidental sensible is as follows:

We speak of an incidental object of sense where, e.g. the white object which we see is the son of Diaries; here because being the son of Diaries is incidental to the white which is perceived, we speak of the son of Diaries as being incidentally perceived. (*DA* 418a20-24)

Similarly, there is no specific sense working for the incidental sensible. It is incidental in the sense that the son of Diaries is incidental to white, neither with necessity nor for the most part. The son of Diaries and the color are independently combined as the sensible object. Also, the reason why we perceive him as the son of Diaries by the associated sight of “white” is because of the repeated combination of white and the son of Diaries in the past has made them familiar. When the son of Diaries ceases wearing his white coat, the association ceases to be made. This is what Aristotle means by incidental for the incidental sensible. As I see it, Aristotle adopts “incidental” in two senses and the incidental sensible can also be described as incidentally perceived by the singular sense.¹⁶⁷ I shall mark it as incidental₁ (in the case of the incidental sensible) and incidental₂ (the singular sense which incidentally perceives the object but does not belong to its scope). According to this division, the incidental object is both incidental₁ and incidental₂, whereas the common sensible is incidental₂. In the instance of the son of Diaries, we perceive both the color white and the son of Diaries through sight. This raises the question as to why our sight can perceive a person that is colorless, as it is far beyond the sight’s function if we abide by Aristotle’s restriction of the proper sense. It turns out that the perception of the son of Diaries is only incidental₂ to the sense of sight. The perception of the son of Diaries cannot go without sight for without sight, we cannot perceive anything. That may be the reason why Aristotle associates the incidental function to the sense of sight. So, the sense of sight is therefore a necessary but not satisfactory condition for the perception of Diaries.

The incidental sensible also differs from the common sensible in that the former is directly perceived by the common sense while Aristotle depicts the latter as being indirectly perceived by sense.¹⁶⁸ To recognize and define whom he/she is, it requires the dispatching of memory and the intellectual capacity to identify this man before us. In this case, the sense of sight incidentally perceives what the intellectual faculty can do. That is why the incidental sensible is indirectly perceived by the singular sense. In the instance of the bile (which is bitter and yellow), it is obvious that

¹⁶⁷ It means that the incidental object is not the orthodox object of the singular sense either. However, it can be perceived by virtue of the singular sense.

¹⁶⁸ *DA* 425a28; *DA* 418a 21.

by virtue of sight, we perceive the yellowness of the bile – and by virtue of taste, we perceive the bitterness of it. However, since it happens that we perceive it as bitter and yellow at the same time, a connection of bitter and yellow is attributed to the bile all at once. Because this constant connection remains in the memory, by perceiving the yellow of the bile by sight, we incidentally perceive its bitterness too. The explanation of the incidental perception of the bitter bile appeals to the unity that is composed by several senses, as well as the sensory experience of the subject. That is why the perception of the bitterness of the bile is directly perceived by the sense.

By virtue of the elaboration of the three types of sensible objects, we get to know how the perception of its object works. The common and incidental sensible provides more possibilities for perception and the structure of the perceptual subject is designed as such so that it can perceive more complex objects rather than the specific singular object.

2.3.2.2 The change in sensation

I would now like to deal with the long-lasting puzzle concerning what kind of process sense perception is – that is, how can we interpret the qualitative change that sensation suffers.¹⁶⁹ On the one hand, the elaboration of this issue will help clarify what exactly is the meaning behind the claim that the sense organ receives the sensible form and becomes identical with this sensible object which affects it (so as to provide a comprehensive interpretation of immanent content). On the other hand, this topic stirs up an interest from the perspective of the contemporary philosophy of mind. For example, the discussion between the ‘spiritual’ and ‘literalist’ interpretations of sensation is related in some sense with the issue as to whether a reductionism or physicalism of mind (or “soul” in Aristotelian term) is possible in Aristotle, or whether Aristotle can be called a functionalist.¹⁷⁰

As has been clarified in virtue of the efficient and formal cause, the sensible object asserts its function by acting on what is percipient. Sensation occurs by suffering the change in itself. This is also implied in *Phys.* VII 3,

That everything which undergoes alteration is altered by sensible causes, and that there is alteration only in things that are said to be affected in their own right by sensible things, can be seen from the following considerations. (*Phys.* 245b3-5)

¹⁶⁹ The problem concerning the change in perception is first proposed by Burnyeat and Sorabji, who separately hold the spiritual and literal interpretation of perception. Representatives such as Shields, Caston, Scaltsas try to solve this puzzle from the third approach. Cf. Marmodoro (2014).

¹⁷⁰ For the debate about functionalism, see Hilary Putnam (1973), Nussbaum (1978), Robinson (1978), (1983), Shields, C. (1988), (1990), M. F. Burnyeat (1995), Everson (1997), Irwin (1991).

The interpretation of “being affected” or “being acted upon” has two meanings, which is described in *De Anima* II 5,

Also the expression “to be acted upon” has more than one meaning; it may mean either the extinction of one of two contraries by the other or the maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, as actual to potential. For what possesses knowledge becomes an actual knower by a transition which is either not an alteration of it at all (being, in reality, a development into its true self or actuality) or at least an alteration in a quite different sense. (*DA* 417b 2-8)

Aristotle provides two senses of being acted upon: in the first sense, it is an alteration from what is not to what is – such as the case of a man from having no knowledge and then coming in possession of knowledge. In the second sense, it can be exemplified by the transition of a knowledgeable man from possessing knowledge to using it. The first transition can be called the transition from the first potentiality to first actuality (which entails a second potentiality), and the second transition can be called the transition from second potentiality to second actuality. The second transition is regarded by Aristotle not as an alteration nor as an entirely different kind of alteration compared with the first transition. That is to say, one is destroyed by what is contrary while the other is the fulfilment of potential. Therefore, it is not an ordinary alteration.

When it comes to sensation, we already have the capacity of sense with which we are born. The actual sensation is like the shift from the possession of knowledge to the exercise of knowledge, which is the transition from second potentiality to second actuality. As certified by Aristotle, “the initial change in the perceiving being comes about from its progenitor; once it is generated, it already has perception, in the manner in which one possesses knowledge”¹⁷¹ (*DA* 417b16-19). Meanwhile, when Aristotle depicts two senses of “perceive”, he points out that one has the power to see or hear, and one is actually seeing or hearing. These can thus be respectively referred to as potentiality 2 and actuality 2 (*DA* 417a10-13). Henceforth, it seems to imply that the practice of sensation is to actualize its potential sensing capacity, which is either no alteration at all or an alteration in an entirely different sense: “what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted up the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with

¹⁷¹ Translated by Mark Shiffman (2011).

it” (*DA* 418a 3-6). The alteration that perception suffers is not destruction by what is contrary, but an actuality of what is potential.

However, there remains a difference between having knowledge and having sense. In the former case, the subject may not need the external thing because it is armed with knowledge itself, and the activity of thinking can be initiated with the knowledge in one’s possession. But sensation always requires the presence of the sensible object for its occurrence (*DA* 417b20-30). Actually, the elaboration that what is percipient is capable of receiving the sensible object, can also be interpreted as that which is different from the sensible object initially: “what is capable of taking on color is what in itself is colorless, as what can take on sound is what is soundless” (*DA* 418b28-29). Through the process of actualization they become identical, implying that what is percipient receives what it does not possess beforehand. Considering that if what is percipient is the same as the sensible object at first, then no perception will occur, in adherence to Aristotle’s statement that “the unlike is acted upon, but once acted upon it is like” (*DA* 417a20). For example, if the temperature of our hand is the same as that of the water, we feel no change of the temperature. From this line of argument, it seems to follow that what is percipient will suffer an alteration from what is not to what is, just like the first transition of a man from not knowing to have knowledge. Henceforth, it turns out that sensation can be both interpreted as not an alteration at all and an alteration from contraries. How to deal with this contradiction?

The crucial point is to make clear what “what is percipient” means. In my opinion, it should be divided into the perceptual soul (or the perceptual capacity) and the sense organ. The perceptual soul has the potential capacity to perceive, and the sense organ is the material substrate of perception that suffers the alteration. My supposition derives from Aristotle’s statement regarding the difference between the sense-faculty and its organ. As is said,

A primary sense-organ is that in which such a power is seated. The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same. What perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not admit that either the having the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude; what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude. This enables us to explain why excesses in objects of sense destroy the organs of sense; if the movement set up by an object is too strong for the organ, the form which is its sensory power is disturbed. (*DA* 424 a24-30)

It is explicated that the sense organ and the perceptual power are different in being but the same in activity. The sense organ is the material substrate in which the percipient

power is located. One can ascribe the magnitude of the sense organ, which directly suffers the alteration brought by the sensible object, and that which has the power to perceive is not the material part that undergoes this alteration. The excess of the sensible object will affect the material substrate, which is the sense organ rather than the power of perceiving. Even in *DA* II.5, Aristotle implies that “sense perception is in this way (as the two senses of being potential)” (*DA* 417b32-33) after elaborating the necessity that sense perception requires an object to be present.

In *Physics* VII.3, Aristotle states that we should not refer to alteration as the change of the figure or the shape of a thing, neither the excellence and the perishing of the state.¹⁷² Rather, he does point out that there is an alteration in the sensitive part of the soul, and this part is altered by the sensible object, while the state of the soul itself suffers no alteration (*Phys.* 247a1-b1).¹⁷³ Therefore, I would like to argue that what goes on in perception is a qualitative alteration owing to the sense organ (from potentiality 1 to actuality 1) as well as the actualization of the potential percipient soul (from potentiality 2 to actuality 2).

I would like to conceive that the sense organ suffers a non-ordinary physical change, and the potential perceptual power becomes actualized in perception. Since the form cannot exist independently without matter, the form received by the sensible patient will be combined with the physical sense organ as long as the stimulation of the sensible object continues. Because the form defines what the substance is and carries the *logos*—that is to say, the qualities and properties of the object—so it is the *logos*, qualities, and properties which represent the substance that redefine the state and content of sensation. By virtue of this, the potential state of the perceptual power becomes actualized, and the sense organ captures the corresponding *logos* of the form to become identified with it in sense (not literally, but rather qualitatively). For example, when the color red is present, the sense organ is impressed by that color, and at that moment, the characteristic or state the sense organ reveals is red. But, since the hosts to which the color is associated can differ, so too do the states of coloration in

¹⁷² “Again, states, whether of the body or of the soul, are not alterations. For some are excellences and others are defects, and neither excellence nor defect is an alteration.” *Phys.* 246a1-5.

¹⁷³ Moreover, the suggestion that the sense faculty and the sense organ are inseparable but essentially different is also proposed by Hicks in his commentary on *De Anima*, where he points out that “the one is an organ, the other a faculty, the one has magnitude, the other is unextended.” They are essentially different, but “the organ and the faculty are the same”. They are inseparable in that the sense faculty resides in the sense organ and without each the sensation cannot occur (*DA* 412b14, *Met.* 1035b14-18, 22-25, 1036b28-32, *Pol.* 1253a 21). But they can be separated in thought, “if we look at the organ as a concrete thing and take account of its matter, it is an extended magnitude; if we abstract from the matter and attend only to the form, it is a power or faculty residing in this extended magnitude, but itself unextended and immaterial.” See: Hicks (1907). p, 417.

sensation and in the sensible object differ. Therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that the sense organ literally turns red by receiving the red color patch.

Opinions vary as to the interpretation of what occurs in sensation, which can be generally organized as either a spiritual interpretation (such as Burnyeat; Brentano), a literal interpretation (such as Sorabji, Everson), as well as a third-approach which opposes both the literal and spiritual interpretations (such as Magee, Caston, Lorenz).¹⁷⁴

Brentano observes that “sensation, as also intellectual thought, is affection, but not a proper affection; it is not an actual alteration, but a movement of a different kind” (p. 96). Brentano’s spiritual interpretation of sensation advocates that sensation is an alternation without any corruption. The explanation goes that:

A warm hand touching something cold becomes colder during the sensation and through the influence of the sensed object. But we do not sense the cold insofar as we become cold; otherwise, plants and inorganic bodies would also sense. Rather, we sense the cold insofar as the cold exists objectively, i.e., as a cognized object within us, hence insofar as we take in the cold without being ourselves its physical subject; the latter can receive this or any other form only by being altered. (p.54-55).¹⁷⁵

Brentano adopts a distinction between objective existence in sensation and physical/material existence in the physical object to declare that sensation does not suffer the affection as a physical object – which is consistent with Thomas Aquinas’s supposition of two kinds of existence, being intentional existence and natural existence. Brentano instead claims that we feel cold because there is cold that objectively exists in the sensing body, but which is not materially and physically. Sensing is just a simple actualization of what was potentially present in the subject to begin with, implying that in sense, the actualized cold has an objective existence. Therefore, it is not a corruption but is included in the category of affection.¹⁷⁶

Brentano’s proposal that what suffers in sensation and what suffers in the physical object cannot be the same kind of alteration is quite promising for our work. However, since the sensing subject is within the material composition, it is difficult to state that there is no qualitative alteration of any kind in sensation. How else to explain that the excess of the sensible object distorts the sense organ?¹⁷⁷ Meanwhile, if in adherence to Brentano, it seems that the sensible form that is received by what is

¹⁷⁴ Sorabji (1995), (2001); Burnyeat (1995); Caston (1996); Everson (1997); Lorenz (2007); Magee (2000).

¹⁷⁵ Franz Brentano (1977). p, 54-55.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 55.

¹⁷⁷ DA 424a28-30.

percipient is just bare properties (such as cold or color), then that is not what Aristotle proposed. Moreover, I do not agree with Brentano's claim that we do not sense the cold by becoming cold, because in such a case plants and inorganic bodies would also sense. As far as I am concerned, the reason why we can sense cold is that we have the capacity for sensation, which is a passive capacity to be acted on by the active sensible form. Because becoming cold does not equal sensing cold, it allows for plants and inorganic bodies become cold. For example, we can put an apple in the fridge to make it cold, but the apple cannot sense the cold because it lacks the power of perception.

Sorabji is one of the representatives of literal interpretation who argues that "receiving form without matter" is a literal physiological occurrence, which involves a change between opposites. It is similar to the transformative stage of "having no knowledge" to "having the knowledge". For instance, according to Sorabji, our perception of color is in the eye jelly's (rather than pupil) receiving color patches (which is understood by him as perceptible form).¹⁷⁸ Sorabji's consideration arises from the view that the sensible form is enmattered in a concrete substance. Thus, receiving form without matter is interpreted by him as receiving the real qualified substance in the same sense that the color patch acts on the sensible object in coloration. The sense organ literally suffers the physiological change, and this is the material cause of perception.

Even though admitting to the alteration that the sense organ suffers, I do not believe it is meant to be taken as a literal material change in the same sense as the sensible quality's acting on the sensible object. Instead, I adopt the position that because of the different material substrates, the alteration caused by the sensible form in sensation will inherently be different from that in the sensible object.¹⁷⁹ Hence, the sensible form (for example, "redness"), can color the sensible object as such, but it is not plausible to state that the sense organ will equally suffer the same change. Because the material substrate of the percipient patient is the bodily organ, it differs from the material constitution of the sensible object. This can be certified by the claim in *On Generation and Corruption*,

¹⁷⁸ The reasons why Sorabji replaces the pupil with eye jelly, and describes the perceptible form as a color patch, are that: first, it can resist the attack that it is weird to say people's eyes are going colored when perceiving, because eye jelly is deep installed and cannot easily be seen; second, he uses the more concrete material substance "color patches" to replace the abstract, obscure concept of perceptible form, which will be a powerful testimony to his physiological interpretation. See: Sorabji (1995).

¹⁷⁹ Thomas Aquinas equally expresses that the form in sense organ and the form that appears in the sensible object will have a different effect because the material substrates are different. And this idea is also taken up by Burnyeat. See: Aquinas (1999), Burnyeat (1995).

In action, there is nothing to prevent the first agent being unaffected, while the last agent only acts by suffering action itself. For if things have not the same matter, the agent acts without being affected; thus, the art of healing produces health without itself being acted upon in any way by that which is being healed. (*CC*. 324a34-36)

In typical cases, the agent which initiates motion should also be affected, but the exception occurs when the agent does not share the same kind of matter with the patient. It makes me argue that the sensible form which makes the sensible object as such may not produce the same alteration when it acts on the sense organ, because the sense organ and the matter in the sensible object are different. However, since the sense organ is also a material composite, it nevertheless incurs a qualitative change – though not the same kind of change as the sensible object.

Sorabji's standpoint is rejected by Burnyeat (1992). Burnyeat treats perception as the stage from "having the knowledge" to "practicing the knowledge" because we are born with the sensible organ and our perception is just the realization of our potential capacity. He assesses that what Aristotle means by "receiving form without matter" is not a literal material process as Sorabji proposed, but rather it is an awareness of what the perceptible is. According to Burnyeat, perception is a change in and of the body; it is a natural or physical change, because perception is of physics, and physics is the study of natural bodies which are capable of undergoing change. But it is not a material change. Since there is no material change in Aristotle's physics, therefore it is not a credible assertion.

We are forced to conclude that the organ's becoming like the object is not it's literally and physiologically becoming hard or warm but a noticing or becoming aware of hardness or warmth. All these physical-seeming descriptions—the organ's becoming like the object, it's being affected, acted on, or altered, it's taking on the sensible form without the matter—all these are referring to what Aquinas calls a "spiritual" change, a becoming aware of some sensible quality in the environment.¹⁸⁰ (p. 24)

Burnyeat adopts a reductionist approach by reducing perception to a spiritual change of perceptual awareness. To support this stance, he provides two examples: first, he uses the case of touch to show that we do not perceive the same degree of hardness or hotness as the organ of perception, which implies that there is no consistency between perceptual awareness and the sense organ's physiological change; second, he uses the example of wax, to certify that Aristotle's original meaning of this example is to show

¹⁸⁰ Burnyeat (1992).

that sensation has awareness, rather than sensation's real materialization.¹⁸¹ The spiritual interpretation of "receiving form without matter" seems to agree with Brentano's interpretation of the intentional object, but Burnyeat states that Brentano has gone too far.¹⁸²

The main difference between Sorabji and Burnyeat, as far as I am concerned, lies in that Sorabji refers to the alteration of the sense organ which suffers the stage from "having no knowledge" to "having knowledge" – that is to say, from the first potentiality to first actuality. By contrast, Burnyeat claims that the sense organ endures the change from "having knowledge" to "practicing knowledge" – or rather, from the second potentiality to second actuality.¹⁸³ Burnyeat's idea is therefore unfavorable as I prefer to spell out that it is the perceptual power (rather than the sense organ) that ensures the change from "having the knowledge" to "practicing the knowledge". I am in favor of the supposition that there is an alteration suffered by the sense organ, but I do not agree with Sorabji's proposal that "receiving form without matter" is a literal physiological occurrence by receiving a physical substance in the same sense as that of the sensible object; nor is it a spiritual change as Burnyeat offered. Staying in line with Caston, I agree that "it may well be that Aristotle requires material or physiological changes in perception, without requiring that the same predicate that applies to the object also applies to the organ and in just the same sense."¹⁸⁴

Everson takes a literal interpretation of the sense organ's alteration by the sensible object, by virtue that 1) sense organs must have a material constitution if they are to function as sense organs¹⁸⁵ (p. 80); 2) the alteration happens in that the agent and the patient must be neither absolutely alike nor entirely dissimilar (p. 83); 3) the sense is the *logos* of the organ, and it is being affected by virtue of the *logos* of the object (p.

¹⁸¹ Sorabji (1995) responds to what Burnyeat's rejections. As to Burnyeat's first example of touch, Sorabji adopts the text from *DA* 423b27-424a10, where Aristotle clearly shows that the reason why we do not perceive what is similarly hot or cold, hard or soft is that sense is a sort of mid-point of the extremes, and in actuality the sense and its sensible qualities are the same. As to the example of signet ring's being imprinted in wax, Sorabji says differently that in *On Memory*, Aristotle clearly intends it a physiological interpretation, "explaining various different forms of memory failure by the surface imprinted being too hard, too fluid like running water, or too worn like the old parts of buildings". p. 221.

¹⁸² Burnyeat means that Brentano develops the spiritual interpretation of perception into the intentional object.

¹⁸³ Sorabji and Burnyeat also differs in that Sorabji believe that receiving form without matter includes a physiological change – a change is in the same sense as that of the sensible object. Burnyeat, however, does not believe that it is the change of the same sense. He argues instead that it is a physical change with no material basis, and that perceiving is simply awareness of the sensible quality.

¹⁸⁴ Victor Caston (1996), p.264.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. "since, as we have seen, each sense is essentially such as to be affected by its proper objects, we should expect that this will determine the material nature of the sense organ." p.80.

96). He preserves Aristotle's distinction between sense organ and perceptual capacity and stresses that it is the sense organ that incurs the alteration rather than the perceptual capacity. Everson's assessment about "receiving form without matter" is that "for the organ to take on the form of the sensible object, then, is for it to take on a property which is distinctive of the substance's matter." (p. 102) According to him, both alteration₁ (the change between contraries) and alteration₂ (the preservation of a thing's nature and disposition) happen in perception, and alteration₁ is required for the occurrence of alteration₂ – which echoes my interpretation that the sense organ implies a transformation from potentiality₁ to actuality₁ and the perceptual soul's capacity is actualized from potentiality₂/actuality₁ to actuality₂. However, the cooperation of alteration₁ and alteration₂ is rejected by Magee, who refers to *DA* 417b12-22 to prove that there is only alteration₂ in sensation. But according to my above assessment, I hold that Aristotle does indeed have the two kinds of alteration of sensation in mind. Nevertheless, Magee inspires me with his proposal of non-ordinary alteration of perception, which is still a physical process.

Continuing this argument, Lorenz (2007) claims that the perceptual power suffers the alteration of the second kind, that is non-destructive change. It is the sense or intellect which are the potentialities that are open to be informed by the perceptible and intelligible form which constitutes the assimilation between sense or intellect and their object. However, considering the material basis (that is, the sense organ, which is the substrate of the perceptual activity), he provides a comprehensive explanation of perception as "involving both an ordinary change or modification in a sense organ and a certain kind of change or quasi-change undergone by a sensory power."¹⁸⁶ The so-called ordinary change or modification that the sense organ endures, is to lose one property and pick up another. However, it is a non-standard change compared to the alteration of the first kind. In this sense, I stand with Lorenz and support a middle approach of perception.

All in all, the perception process means both the potential perceptual faculty's act of becoming actualized as well as the sense organ's suffering the alteration in a non-ordinary physical manner. The percipient faculty changes from the state of second potentiality/first actuality to second actuality. In this event, that which is percipient actualizes that which is otherwise only potentially perceiving by virtue of the sense organ's suffering a qualitative alteration, rather than physical change. That is to say, by receiving form without matter, sensation acquires a principle that defines what kind of sensation it will become, along with the qualitative change in the sense organ. By virtue of the qualitative alteration, the sensory state is prepared with the sensory

¹⁸⁶ Lorenz (2007), p.214.

content concerning that particular sensible object, and thus getting defined by the form of that sensible object. When I say “get defined by something”, it implies that the sensory state is *about* the thing which defines it. It is in this way that Aristotle elaborates on what is taking place in sensation. In my opinion, this wording implies the roots of immanent content. What is more, it is not the only clue embedded within his words. Ultimately, I will return to the others later in this dissertation.

2.3.2.3 Intentional dimension in modern Aristotelianism

Sorabji (1995)¹⁸⁷ proposes that intentionality is implied on the basis of the alteration of perception. To support this, he primarily discusses perception at the level of animals using the Aristotelian background that perception is neither belief nor reason. Hence, he analyzes Aristotle’s expansion of perceptual content so as to understand how perceptual appearance can guide animals in the world. During this process, he also refers to the Stoics and the Epicureans, drawing the general conclusion that perceptual appearance is propositional,¹⁸⁸ and this “propositional” characteristic is what he believes can provide animals with guidance to future experiences. Importantly, this propositional content is the intentional implication or the formal part of perception.

He concludes that Aristotle does not reduce perception to the physiological states, nor behavior and the performance of functions; rather, he relates perception to capacities at the same level of belief, reason, memory, experience, and concept formation (p. 208). This non-physiological interpretation concerns the formal cause of perception. He says “the specification of the formal cause by reference to other capacities is meant to tell us something about what we should call the intentional aspect of anger and perception, even if he does not himself characterize it as intentional.” (p. 208) But it is also worth noting that prior to this remark, Sorabji does not provide a definition nor description of “intentional.” From the above remark, it seems that the formal, propositional, non-physiological aspect of perception is regarded by him as “intentional”. Sorabji views the basic activity of perception (becoming like, being potentially such, receiving form without matter, etc.) as physiological process or material cause. He expresses the intentional aspect of perception as the formal, propositional characteristic.

The reason why Sorabji views receiving form without matter as the material component is because of the literal interpretation he attributes to it. Since in his opinion,

¹⁸⁷ Sorabji (1995).

¹⁸⁸ Sorabji means that in Aristotle, perception includes perceiving a proposition, that something is the case. Sorabji does not suppose that this propositional perception really involves an inference of reason. He means that something is predicated of something. See Sorabji (1995), p.196-197.

that which is percipient literally receives the sensible quality, which then plays a material role in perception to which the formal part is related. In my view, I disagree that what is percipient suffers an alteration in the same sense as that which the sensible object does; second, by the principle of receiving form without matter, what is percipient receives the incoming sensible information so as to compose perceptual content. This perceptual content is something immanent in the soul concerning the sensible object – and in this way, it expresses intentional implication.

In contrast to Sorabji, from the perspective of intentionality, Burnyeat follows Brentano in taking the spiritual interpretation of perception and regards perceptual awareness of the sensible quality as intentional. However, Burnyeat does not agree with Brentano's claim that the received form is the intentional object.

Caston¹⁸⁹ combines together a contemporary interpretation of intentionality from Chisholm to Aristotle and tries to formulate the possible answers from Aristotle concerning the problem of intentionality. He claims that Aristotle is fully aware of the problem of intentionality – and what is more, Aristotle already provides his own solution with regard to the problem in his corpus, notably in *De Anima*.¹⁹⁰ The point that Caston inspires in me concerns his description of the problem of intentionality, where he says, “the problem of intentionality, as I shall call it, is to provide a philosophical account of this feature, in all its peculiarities.....Our primary concern here is simply what, if anything, gives mental states their intentionality and how it accounts for differences in the content of various mental states” (p. 250). In this way, I can also get myself out of various debates and problems concerning intentionality and focus on the nature of intentionality itself – for instance, to explain how its peculiarity of directedness or inner containment is revealed.

Caston listed five problems of intentionality that he derived from Chisholm and Anscombe and Geach, and he would like to solve the first two: thinking about the object and thinking about the propositional attitude, which is more or less involved in an intentional relation.¹⁹¹ Caston defines intentionality as to be of or about something –

¹⁸⁹ Caston (1998).

¹⁹⁰ As far as I am concerned, Aristotle's *De Anima* is not focused on investigating intentionality. Rather, he seeks to clarify what the soul is and what its faculties are. But among his words, we can find the roots of intentionality that later scholars paid attention to.

¹⁹¹ Chisholm's criterion of intentionality has become quite influential in recent decades, which is regarded as a criterion to distinguish the psychological and appeal to a non-reductionist standpoint of psychological phenomena. Caston lists several criteria for failures of entailment from Chisholm (1955/56), Anscombe (1965/1981), and Geach (1964,1980), which I will list here:

Failure of existential commitment;

Failure of truth-functionality;

Failure of intersubstitutivity of coextensive expressions *salva veritate*;

or more generally, to possess content. But he denies that Brentano's reference to Aristotle about receiving form without matter supports the acceptance of a general mode of intentionality. To this he lists three objections: first, he believes that the example of the wax and signet ring is not about an intentional state; second, he does not believe that there is an aboutness involved there, because "receiving form without matter" does not signal the notion of being about something; third, he believes that this formulation is still a causal doctrine and the sensible form's acting upon the patient shows a causal relation. However, in the case of thinking about non-existent objects, there does not seem to be a form.

Meanwhile, Caston holds that the similarity principle which Brentano relies on is also problematic. According to Brentano's adoption of this principle:

- a. Intentionality is revealed in sensation where the perceptual activity and the sensible object are the same;
- b. The equality of agent and the patient lies in every causal interaction;
- c. Intentionality occurs in every causal interaction.

Caston believes that it is not plausible that intentionality is at stake in every causal interaction. Therefore, the similarity principle cannot be adopted to argue for intentionality. In this regard, I agree with Caston that there is no intentionality in sensation in the sense of intentional reference, given that the perceptual soul is passive and has no causal power. Caston ascribes the intentional reference or relation as causal efficiency of intentionality, and there is no such causal efficiency from the perceptual soul to its object in Aristotle – at most it is just an awareness. That is also the reason why Caston believes there is no general mode of intentionality in sensation in Aristotle's theory.

Nevertheless, I do believe that receiving form without matter and the similarity principle can express the immanent content in perception, even though this mode cannot widely be used to express the content in other cognitive activities – such as dreams, desires, wishes, fears, etc. As to Caston's denial that the example of the wax and signet ring is about an intentional state, I prefer to hold that this is just an example, from which we cannot get that it is an intentional state – but rather, we can use it to prove that there is content in the soul when we are perceiving or thinking. Receiving form without matter, the similarity principle, and perceptual awareness (even though

Failure of the excluded middle;

Failure of quantifier exportation.

These criteria spell out the peculiarity of intentional sentences of a mental states. Even though it shows a different route from the standpoint of logic to speculate about intentionality, it shares some common concerns about the nature of intentionality with the other depiction of intentionality, for example about the non-existent object. Cf. Caston (1998).

they are not sufficient to provide a general model for intentionality in Aristotle's cognition), can sufficiently describe the fact that we are aware of the sensible properties received by perception and it is this fact that inspires Brentano's intentionality. However, the sensing subject is not the mentally active subject as Brentano proposed and what is immanent by virtue of receiving form without matter is more correctly called intentional content, rather than intentional object.¹⁹²

Caston further proposes the intentionality model of representation based on *phantasia*, which he identifies as an efficient cause that can simulate the sensible as a causal power, takes *phantasia* as an echo of the initial disturbance. This representation is not the noetic ray's structure which would provide a direct relation between thinking and the object thought about, but a relation of the agent to "something distinct within the subject" that models or simulates the objects thought about. The internal changes, as one side of the relation, play a representative role, thus comprising the representation theory of intentionality.

Corcilius and Gregoric¹⁹³ propose that intentionality has its place in Aristotle's causal structure of the world, and they refer to it in their comprehensive discussion of animal motion as the centralized incoming and outgoing motions system (CIOM). As such, a comprehensive picture of perceptual activity should include the inner perceptual mechanism as well as the external conditions. By virtue of the CIOM model, they provide a single description from an animal's perception, to its feelings of pleasure and pain or desire, to its motion. The perceptual soul and intentionality are introduced into this model as "an un-extended and unmoved internal supporting point of animal motion", which is "an inner representation of the goal of the animal's motion, what the animal 'has in mind'" (p.76). "The intentional state of animal, i.e. the activity of its soul, be it perception or appearance of a pleasant or painful object—provides a pivot upon which the mechanism 'hangs', or around which it 'turns'" (p.76). What they believe the intentional state to be is the perception or appearance of a specific object or the object of desire. In this case, perception and appearance play a role of presentation, which is composed in the soul in perceptual cognition. Moreover, the perceptual content caused by the external object is an alteration with intentional dimension, which makes a world of difference in that it distinguishes animate living beings from inanimate and insensitive beings. Animals do not react blindly to their environment (p.77). The intentional dimension of the soul's activity claimed by them is also involved with perceptual awareness, as they say, "the perceptual soul is not to be

¹⁹² Or else there will be a doubling of objects. Brentano later changed his idea and abandoned the immanent object based on the distinction of content and object. See the Brentano part in Chapter 1, p. 28-29.

¹⁹³ Corcilius and Gregoric (2013).

understood as a process in addition to the physical motions that the animal body undergoes. Rather, the activity of the soul is the point at which perceptual awareness kicks in” (p.65).

From a certain standpoint, Corcilius and Gregoric provide an intentional interpretation of perceptual activity. It seems that Corcilius and Gregoric not only regard the inner representation of perception as the intentional state, but also a means to interpret objects as being meaningful to its host. Meanwhile, the intentional state based upon representation works as the starting point for further activity by the subject. Corcilius and Gregoric argue that the motion of animals relies on the sensory content to “turn”, implying that animals have the active power to initiate their activity. Since intentional directedness as defined in the first chapter of this dissertations concerns an active directing relatedness to something else, I therefore wonder in which sense the subject is active in terms of having the initiating power. I find two possible explanations for the active power in Corcilius and Gregoric’s model of the motion of animals. First, the desiring activity is active in producing motion based on the perception of the object, given that the sensory desire acts as a moved mover. Second, from the perspective of body and soul, the soul is the efficient, formal and final cause of the living being, which implies that the movement of the body is initiated by the soul. In my view, both of these two approaches imply active intentions in the practical sense, which means intention or desire to do something. To probe intentionality, however, we should focus on intentionality in the theoretical sense. Intentional directedness is after all a theoretical relatedness between the psychic faculty and its object. As our investigation shows, the perceptual soul is passive and can only be acted upon by the external object. Therefore, the active factor revealed in the motion of animal cannot provide support for intentional directedness.

As it turns out, my consideration is partly consistent with Corcilius and Gregoric’s comment on intentionality and animals’ motion. They point out that the model of animal’s motion partly overlaps with the intentionality thesis insofar as the awareness of an object is concerned, but there are differences in that the motion of animals does not require a psychic capacity for “seeing as”—that is, the capacity of *phantasia*—to initiate desire. In addition, the intentionality thesis presents desire as a primitive psychic capacity but for Aristotle, desire is a moved mover (p.91). The intentionality implication—that is the perceptual representation or appearance composed in the soul that they highlight—is also what I believe as the intentional content, which is about something.

Are the formal cause and the category of sensible object sufficient for an appeal to immanent content? It is true that by the reception of the sensible form there is corresponding sensible content in sensation, but my answer is that it is not enough – if

we are looking for immanent content from the standpoint of intentionality. As Mark Eli Kalderon says, “sheer receptivity is insufficient for sensory presentation. It requires, as well, the assimilation of the sensory object” (p.172).¹⁹⁴ Besides, apart from abiding by a causal line from the perceptual object to the perceptual capacity, Corcilius (2014) proposes a further causal line from the perceptual soul in actuality to the production of phenomenal content. According to him, “the soul is neither affected nor does it act as the subject of perception; instead, the incoming perceptual input actualizes the neutral value which causes the living body to generate phenomenal content, and this is something that living bodies do, even if only on a subpersonal level” (p. 34). Both Kalderon and Corcilius propose further conditions that should explain sensory presentation or sensory content, together admitting the insufficiency of the explanatory power of the formulation of “receiving form without matter.” As I proposed in the beginning of the section on immanent content, it is the three principles— “receiving form without matter”, “the assimilation between the percipient sense and sensible object” and “the perceptual awareness”—working together that contribute to the formulation of perceptual content. Next, I would like to clarify the other two formulations.

2.3.3 Perceptual relations

2.3.3.1 Intentional relation

In Brentano’s 1911 edition of PES, he states the mental reference as distinguished from relation in the strict sense as follows:

What is characteristic of every mental activity is, as I believe I have shown, the reference to something as an object. In this respect, every mental activity seems to be something relational. And in fact, where Aristotle enumerates the various main classes of his category of πρὸς τι (relation) he mentions mental reference. But he does not hesitate to call attention to something which differentiates this class from the others. In other relations both terms—both the fundament and the terminus—are real, but here only the first term— the fundament—is real.¹⁹⁵

Brentano refers to Aristotle’s delineation of relation to argue for what he means intentional relation, which spells out a quasi-relation in that the mental act must exist,

¹⁹⁴ Kalderon (2015).

¹⁹⁵ PES, p.211.

whereas the object that this mental act directs to may not exist in reality. Aristotle delineates relation in both *Categories* and *Metaphysics*. In *Categories*, he demonstrates that:

Let us now turn to Relation. We call a thing relative, when it is said to be such as it is from its being of some other thing or, if not, from its being related to something in some other way. Thus ‘the greater’ is said to be greater by reference to something outside it. For, indeed, when we call a thing ‘greater,’ we mean by that greater than something. ‘The double’ is called what it is from its being the double of something. For ‘double’ means double of something. And so, with all terms of that kind. Other relatives also there are, such as habit, disposition, perception, position or attitude, knowledge. All these are explained by a reference to something to which they belong, and in no other way whatsoever. A habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge-of-something, position position-of-something. We speak, then, of relative terms, when a thing’s being such as it is is explained by a genitive following or else by some phrase or expression designed to bring out the relation. (*Cat.* 6b1-9)¹⁹⁶

It turns out that for a thing to be relative, it is named by a genitive following or something else which initiates this relation. In the case of perception and knowledge, it means that perception and knowledge are named after the perceptible and the knowable given that without the latter, the relation cannot be constituted – it is the perceptible and the knowable which bring out the relation. Orna Harari gives an explanation of psychic states (perception and knowledge) from the standpoint of the active and passive that, “the dependence of noetic states on the presence of their objects is similar to the dependence of somatic and psychic states on the passivity or impassivity of proper affections with regard to the qualities, objects or circumstances that are apt to affect them. In thinking and perceiving, according to Aristotle, the soul is affected by the objects of thought and perception (*DA* 429a13–18); thus, like somatic and psychic states, knowledge and perception are relative to their objects because they come about when the thinking or perceiving parts of the soul become passive by the agency of their objects.” (p. 528)¹⁹⁷ In Aristotle’s contention, intellect and perception are passive and to be acted on by the intelligible and perceptible – and at that point, they become identical with their object in actuality.¹⁹⁸ Even though the knowable/perceptible is also

¹⁹⁶ Translated by H. P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick.

¹⁹⁷ Harari (2011).

¹⁹⁸ The depiction of the power of perception and intellect is connected to an entity to be acted upon, but it is not suitable to call its relation “connecting power in potentiality to its actuality”, as Marmodoro puts forward. Marmodoro’s opposition is considered then from two senses, “on the one hand, if a power is defined in terms of its actuality, where the definition defines the power’s nature (e.g., the power to heat) it

regarded as occurring prior to thinking/perception, its independence and priority are better to be interpreted as potentiality²/actuality¹ before the thinking/perception of it. Once in the activity of thinking/perception, the knowable/perceptible constitutes knowledge/perception at the state of actuality².

Aristotle lists three classes of relatives in *Metaphysics*:

Things are relative (1) as double to half and treble to a third, and in general that which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else, and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded; (2) as that which can heat to that which can be heated, and that which can cut to that which can be cut, and in general the active to the passive; (3) as the measurable to the measure and the knowable to knowledge and the perceptible to perception. (*Met.*1020b26-33)

The classification of relative in *Metaphysics* is consistent with the elaboration of relatives of state, condition, perception, knowledge, and position in *Categories*: Class 1 defines the numerical relatives; Class 2 is a description of the active and passive characteristic of states or conditions; Class 3 states that the measurable/knowable/perceptible objects are measured/known/perceived in relation to the state (measure, knowledge or perception) that involves them, but not in the state which is in relation to the objects. Otherwise, one would be arguing the same thing twice.¹⁹⁹

It is worth noting that the reference from the mental act to the intentional object that Brentano emphasized in his later stage is inspired by Aristotle's third classification of the "measurable to the measure" and the "knowable to knowledge" and the "perceptible to perception" – each of which is described by Brentano as revealing the core characteristic of intentional relation. That is to say, the mental act can refer to objects that do not exist. It implies that Brentano attributes both the state of knowing and the state of perceiving to mental acts. However, according to Aristotle, even though perception is always the perception of something, and knowledge is the knowledge of something, perception does not belong to the mental act. In addition,

should be the case that the power is one with its essential nature; the essential nature of a power should not be a different entity to which the power is related.....Nor should a power only tend towards its powerfulness---as if its powerfulness were external to the power itself---because this latter view would not make philosophical sense." Ibid. p. 26.

¹⁹⁹ *Met.* 1020b33-1021a35.

Aristotle is more inclined to describe the relatedness from the perceptible / intelligible to perception / intellect.²⁰⁰

2.3.3.2 The assimilation between what is percipient and the perceptible

Identical assimilation between that which perceives and that which is the external object in actuality is spelt out so as to alleviate the error we subjectively make about the objective world. By setting up the correlation between the psychological state and its object, Aristotle implies a tendency towards realism and externalism.²⁰¹

Aristotle delineates the correlation between the perceiving subject and the sensible object in various aspects: first, they are two potentialities which become actuality in one activity; second, they become identical in this actuality. Aristotle describes the simultaneous actualization of the potential perceiving subject and the potential sensible object as follows:

The activity of the sensible object and that of the percipient sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains. Take as illustration actual sound and actual hearing: a man may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and that which has a sound is not always sounding. But when that which can hear is actively hearing and which can sound is sounding, then the actual hearing and the actual sound are merged in one (these one might call respectively hearkening and sounding). (*DA* 425b27-426a2)

Before perception occurs, both the perceiving subject and the sensible object remain in potentiality and it is in perception that they each actualize their potentiality. Aristotle provides the example of a man having the ability to hear but who does yet hear anything, and a sound which is not yet become a sound. In either case, no activity is occurring. It is through perception that the two entities both become actualized. The claim that even though the perceiving subject and the sensible are in one activity and actualization, their beings are different. This is crucial for Aristotle so that he can avoid falling into a strong identity between the perceiving subject and the sensible object. What kind of assimilation is it?

What has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two

²⁰⁰ For more details, see Brentano's appendix of the 1911 version of *PES*, also Taieb's investigation of intentional relation in Brentano. See Hamid Taieb (2018). *Relational intentionality, Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition*.

²⁰¹ Ibid. p. 52.

interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it. (*DA* 418a4-7)

The occurrence of perception requires both capacities working together – the initiative power of the sensible object and the receptive power of the sensitive soul. The sensitive faculty possesses a passive and potential power, and the sensible object directly determines what kind of perception it will be and what qualities or characteristics the perceptual content will reveal. The sense is potentially the sensible object and is ready to be affected by the form of the sensible object. Once the object becomes present—and if nothing prevents—sensation will immediately occur, and the potentiality becomes actuality through the receipt of the form provided by the object. Moreover, by receiving the form in actuality, what is percipient becomes defined by the sensible form and constitutes a sensible content that exemplifies the sensible quality, this sensible content is about the sensible quality, which makes them identical in quality.

Nor is there anything to prevent the same one thing being the actualizing of two potentialities—not in the sense of unqualified identity, but in the sense of being in the one relation of actuality to potentiality with regard to the two potentialities. So it does not follow that the teacher must be learning, even though we admit that action and passion coincide, not in the sense of being the same in the definitions that determine them (like ‘garments’ and ‘clothes’), but in the sense in which (to vary the illustrations already given) the road from Thebes to Athens is the same as the road from Athens to Thebes; for things need not be identical in all respects because they are the same in some, but only if they are identical in what they actually are—in a word if they are not two ‘things’ at all, but only two names or definitions of the same thing. Nor yet, even if the actualizing of teaching is identical with the actualizing of learning, does it follow that to be learning is the same thing as to be teaching; any more than, if the interval between two distant points A and B is one interval, it follows that being distant from B when you are at A is the same as being distant from A when you are at B, To put it generally; there is, in the strict sense, no absolute identity even between the actualization of teaching and that of learning, or between action and passion; but only the thing which has these two aspects—the motion—is one and the same thing; for there is a conceptual distinction between the aspects—between ‘being the actualizing of this in that’ and ‘being the actualizing of that by this.’ (*Phys.* 202b9-23, tr. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford. 1934)

As stated, the two entities share one and the same actualization but are of the different being. The one and the same activity provides a platform for these two beings to function. In the end, it is their qualitative character that turns out to be the same rather than the entities themselves, given that they are neither of the same substrates (the

sensible content is possessed by the perceiving subject, and the sensible form is of the sensible material), nor do they have the same being (perception and the sensible form are, after all, different in being).

The correlation between the percipient sense and the sensible in Aristotle is quite different from later scholars' interpretation of intentionality, which surmises an intentional relation that directs the mental act to the intentional object. The relation between sense and the sensible may not necessarily be suitable to be called relation but at best one might speak of identity in actuality. The advantage of this formulation of identity between the percipient sense and the sensible object is clear. First, it dramatically diminishes mistakes we make in perceiving. Every perceptual state or content we have is directly determined by the present perceptible, and by virtue of the actualization of these two potential entities, the perceptual content becomes identical in quality as the perceptible. Considered in this way, it is no wonder that perception is largely reliable. Second, and more importantly, it avoids the tendency of psychologism which separates the inner world from the external reality. Psychologism happens to be the criticism which Brentano confronted in the early stage of his work, where he proposed intentionality as the mental act intentionally directed to the immanent object. However, he did not mention its correlation with the external world which created a barrier between the psychic activity and the external world.

As it stands, that which is percipient and the perceived object are at best referred to as an identity of quality in actuality. The identity between what is percipient, and the perceptible object perfectly reveals Aristotle to be a realist, connecting the immanent content with the external world. Moreover, it once again supports my claim that there is no relation directed from the cognitive subject to the object in Aristotle's theory of perception.

2.3.4 Perceptual awareness

We have surveyed the principle of "receiving form without matter" which provides the perceptual content as well as the assimilation between the perceiving subject and the sensible object in actuality – which spells out the credibility of the perceptual content. Now, it is time to illustrate the first-person access to the perceptual experience and content. Brentano believes that the inner perception is responsible for ensuring that what we experience is totally true in the sense of mental existence.²⁰² However, I shall

²⁰² Brentano (1977), p. 64-65.

argue that by virtue of inner perception, the perceptual content is under the state of consciousness.

Perceiving that we see or hear, which Aristotle first puts forth in *DA* III 2 415b12-14, turns our attention to sensuous awareness or reflexivity (Kahn (1966), Kosman (1975), Caston (2002), Johansen (2006), De Haas (2009)). Here, we find that one kind of sense can only sense a specific group of sensible qualities – for example, the sense of sight can only sense colors, hearing can only receive the form of sound, taste the flavor, touch the temperature or texture, and smell the odor (*DA* 418a14). Now, on this basis, to which sense organ should the capacity of sensing the sensation itself be attributed? If it is not any of the previously-formulated five single senses but a sixth sense, then this will not only contradict Aristotle's claim that there are no more than five senses, but will it also result in an infinite regress of the capacity of sensing? As such, the role of sensing the sensation itself must still fall within the purview of the five senses, and this resonates with the explanation that there is no extra sense responsible for the common and incidental sensible in *DA* III 1 (*DA* 425a14-16).

To better explain this perceptual capacity, Aristotle argues that though by the sense of sight we can sense color, we also discriminate darkness from light, even when no sensible object is present (*DA* 425b20-23). We can infer from this that sense has two different roles: one is its conventional activity of sensing the specific sensible object that it is capable of sensing; the other is the capacity of discernment or discrimination, even for sensing the sensation itself.

Even though it seems that it is by virtue of the singular sense that we perceive the sensation itself as well as distinguish between sensibles, that is not the end of the story, considering that: first, Aristotle sets forth that there are only five senses and each sense is responsible to one specific group of sensibles, among which there is no sensation itself apart from the sensation of the sensible object (*DA* 424b22-24); and second, when Aristotle addresses the issue of distinguishing between different sensibles, he implies that there must be at least two senses. The singular senses can only distinguish sensibles of their own kind, but cannot distinguish sensibles of any other kinds. That is the reason why Aristotle expounds that there should be an underlying entity. To support this, he offers the metaphor of the dot, which acts as the unity of all the five senses (*DA* 427a10-15). In this metaphor, sense is depicted as a dot with five diffusing lines. Therefore, when we perceive using a specific sense, it appears that it is the specific line that does the exact work, but the common powers of discrimination and awareness that are different yet shared among the five senses cannot be ignored. Without the converging point, discrimination and perceptual awareness are not possible.

In *On Sleep*, Aristotle attributes the role of perceptual-awareness to a common power that every sense shares.

Now, since every sense has something special and also something common; special, as, e.g., seeing is to the sense of sight, hearing to the auditory sense, and so on with the other senses severally; while all are accompanied by a common power, in virtue whereof a person perceives that he sees or hears (for, assuredly, it is not by sight that one sees that he sees; and it is not by taste, or sight, or both together that one discerns, and that sweet things are different from white things, but by a part common to all the organs of sense).....(*DSV*, 455a12-20)

By adopting Kahn's suggestion that *DA* and *PN* are an integrated exposition and thus closely related,²⁰³ we can see that the explanation of the common power of sense can be applied to these issues in *De Anima*.²⁰⁴ This common power of sense is not a separate sense – it is what each sense has in common and plainly accompanies each of the five single senses. That is to say, when the single sense works, it not only plays the role of receiving the corresponding sensible object, but also exhibits the capacity of sensing sensation itself as well as discriminating and discerning sensibles by virtue of the common character of sense. As clarified by *Sense and Sensibilia*,

We must assume also, in the case of the soul, that the faculty of perception in general is in itself numerically one and the same, but different in its being: different, that is to say, in genus as regards some of its objects, in species as regards others. Hence too, we may conclude that one can perceive numerically different objects simultaneously with a faculty which is numerically one and the same, but not the same in its account. (*DS*, 449a17-19)

There are then several functions of the perceptual faculty. One is to perceive the perceptual object. For example, when I am looking at a red apple, my sense organ is acted on by the redness and there is a qualified alteration happening so that my eye's apparatus is affected by the redness. The second is perceptual awareness, and it is what the singular senses share by virtue of the common power of sensation behind it. The third is perceptual discrimination, which is enforced by the unity of senses. The three functions are different in being but each belongs to same perceptual faculty. To generalize, the perceptual faculty is able to perceive the ongoing sensible activity and acquire an awareness of the perceptual experience, as well as discriminating between the differences in sensible objects. It is by virtue of the underlying common sense that I

²⁰³ Kahn (1966), p. 61.

²⁰⁴ The comprehensive interpretation of the common sense is also revealed in Gregorić, Pavel (2007). *Aristotle on the Common Sense*.

believe the sensory content composed on the basis of sensory input is perceived and made aware of and discriminated by the perceiving subject, insofar as the sensory content is to be called immanent content.²⁰⁵

In *GA*, Aristotle explicates that the sense organ is correlated with the heart through blood-vessels. Using the example of ears and nose, he states that “smell and hearing are passages full of connate pneuma, connecting with the outer air and terminating at the small blood vessels around the brain which extend thither from the heart.” (*GA*. 744a1-5). So, it is no wonder that Aristotle sometimes attributes the perception of the non-five special sensibles incidentally to the five singular senses since the five singular senses will pass the information to the next part, where I believe the common power of sense resides.²⁰⁶

If there is one points that I would like to highlight here, it is concerning the active factor in sensation, given that Brentano as well as some contemporary scholars have traced the active factor to sensation in Aristotle. In Hamlyn’s (1966) interpretation, even though “being acted on” makes the sense passive, *DA* III 2 reveals an active characteristic of the sense because of the common sense’s judgment of the objects. The sense’s ability to make declarations about their objects implies that sensation is an active process.²⁰⁷ As such, Hamlyn attributes the active factor to perception, owing to the involvement of judgment. A similar interpretation can be found in Kahn (1966), who indicates that the word “κρίνει” (*krinei*) can be translated as “judge” as well as “discriminate.”²⁰⁸ In this vein, Ebert (1983) regards the active side of sense perception as a judgmental activity, and he argues that judgment is an intentional act.²⁰⁹ Caston (2002) holds that Brentano’s claim about intentionality and consciousness in *PES* is inspired by an extended meditation found in *On the Soul* III.2.

²⁰⁵ Corcilius (2014) proposes we shift to causal line from the perceptual soul in actuality to the production of phenomenal content. According to him, “the soul is neither affected nor does it act as the subject of perception; instead, the incoming perceptual input actualizes the neutral value which causes the living body to generate phenomenal content, and this is something that living bodies do, even if only on a subpersonal level” (p.34). And further, he claims that Aristotle manages to explain how perceptual discrimination turns physical events—notably, incoming sensory input—into something non-physical, namely phenomenal content about the physical world. My disagreement from him is that I believe the sensory content is composed on the basis of sensory input in actualization. The actualization of perception avails the perceptual soul which perceives it, makes discrimination and becomes aware of it, rather than the perceptual discrimination turns the sensory input into phenomenal content by separating the sensible form from the sensible matter.

²⁰⁶ In his work *On Sleep and Waking* and *On Sensation*, Aristotle names this sense as “the common power of sense” (*DSV*, 455a12-22) and “the faculty of perception for all” (*DS*, 449a5-20).

²⁰⁷ Hamlyn (1966).

²⁰⁸ Kahn (1966), p. 55.

²⁰⁹ Ebert (1983).

Correspondingly, he says that “it is precisely in virtue of certain mental states being directed at mental states that we are transitively conscious” (p. 768) to Aristotle’s formulation of “perceptions of perceptions”. It seems that Caston views perception as a mental state which is capable of directing itself toward something.²¹⁰ Corcilius separates perceptual awareness and perceptual discrimination as two distinct activities and argues that the separation of the sensible form from the matter is the task of discrimination. In this manner, we become aware of the perceptual content after the separation of the sensible form from matter.²¹¹ De Haas has a different view than Corcilius. According to De Haas, perceptual discrimination has nothing to do with an alleged active aspect of perceptual cognition, and there is no good reason to say that it is the act of discrimination that separates the sensible form from matter.²¹²

Let us consider then these various arguments with an initial question: could Aristotle’s notion of perceptual discrimination or perceptual awareness be regarded as in an active and judging capacity? Firstly, as to the active or passive tendency, it should be clear from the preceding citations and explanations that the sensible object is the efficient cause of sensation because Aristotle attributes the active tendency to the form, and correspondingly, the percipient sense is the passive partner in the perceptual process. In this sense, it is hard to say that the percipient sense exhibits an active tendency just because it can discriminate among objects and be aware of itself. Furthermore, neither the active nor passive sense should be overstated, since it is not a point Aristotle emphasizes nor one with which he is especially concerned. When we touch a hot object, its temperature is immediately perceived by us and we will have an instant reaction to withdraw our hands. It is just an organism’s self-reactive mechanism – and, following De Haas (2020)’s suggestion, that makes it difficult, even improper, to set apart its passive and active behaviors.

Consequently, as to the implication of judgment, it should be noted that perceptual awareness belongs to the perceptual faculty, which has no intellectual capacity. Judgment is by contrast, a capacity of the intellect. So, it is improper to attribute judgment to perceptual awareness. Even though the word “κρίνει” does in some contexts mean judgement, it is better to understand it as “discern” or “discriminate” in Aristotle’s perceptual theory.²¹³

Lastly, it is even more inappropriate to ascribe the “perception of perception” to “mental states being directed at mental states.”²¹⁴ On the one hand, while the

²¹⁰ Caston (2002).

²¹¹ Corcilius (2014), p. 37.

²¹² De Haas (2020).

²¹³ For a detailed investigation of “κρίνει”, see Ebert (1983).

²¹⁴ Caston (2002), p. 768.

“perception of perception” can minimally be interpreted as perception itself and—at most—as perceptual awareness, it has nothing to do with the issue of directedness. As was clarified above, directedness and the active tendency are not implicit in the sense organs themselves – and not to mention in the common power of sense. On the other hand, Aristotle attributes the perceptual capacity to both animals and humans, and animals do not have the intellect which is exclusively owned by humans. And so, when Caston refers to perception as a mental state, he extends intellect to the sphere of animals, which is something Aristotle explicitly avoids.

I submit that perceptual awareness is one essential component for my argument concerning immanent content, but perceptual awareness—and even perceptual discrimination, as capacities possessed by the common sense—contain no active directing capacity. Up to now, I have objected to the proposal of attributing the active factor to the sensation by virtue of perceptual awareness or perceptual discrimination. However, I need to be careful since the perceptual soul, as a multi-functional perceptual composite, has the power for receiving forms, for striving for something, as well as for movement.²¹⁵ Although the perceptual soul is passive, the act of desiring is active and it is the desiring act itself which transforms the potential perceptual desire into actuality. But sensory desire is a different kind of activity of the perceptual faculty, and when it comes to sensation,²¹⁶ I insist on the claim that there is no active factor in sensation.

A comprehensive picture of the perceptual theory thus far can be summarized as: the sensible object transmits its sensible form to the percipient sense, by virtue of the efficient and formal causation, and by acting upon the percipient sense along with a kind of qualitative change in the sense organ. The relation between sensible content and the sensible external object is guaranteed by the assimilation principle in one and the same activity, so as to make sure our sensible content corresponds to reality. The diversity of sensible objects and the complex circumstances of sensation require a multi-level perceptual faculty, which can perceive itself as well as discern between different sensibles. This faculty has the capacity of awareness, and in this way, it can be said that the perceptual soul is aware of the sensible content. To generalize, the formal cause of the sensible object, the identity between what is percipient and the perceptible object in actuality, and the perceptual awareness, are the three pillars which sustain the concept of immanent content in Aristotle’s theory of perception.

²¹⁵ See: Brentano (1977), p.45.

²¹⁶ I will claim in Chapter 3 that what sensory desire plays is an intentional action in the practical sense, and not the theoretical intentionality that lies in.

2.4 The implication of intentionality in the theory of perception

2.4.1 The criterion of Brentano's intentionality

As revealed in the previous chapter, Brentano's formulation of "intentionality" can be divided into two stages: in his first stage, he proposes "intentional in-existence" which means that there is an intended object that is in-existent or immanent in every mental act, and the mental act is directed to this in-existent object; at his later stage, he abandons the supposition of in-existence or immanence of the intended object, resulting in his conclusion that intentionality is just a relation between the mental act and the real thing.²¹⁷ Bearing this in mind, I shall now investigate whether we can find a parallel to these two stages in Aristotle's work or not.

2.4.1.1 The early stage of intentional in-existence

As we previously stated, Brentano refers to Aristotle's principle of "receiving form without matter" in proposing his intentional in-existence thesis.²¹⁸ What is more, Aristotle states that "even when the sensible objects are gone, the sensings and imaginings continue to exist in the sense-organs" (*DA* 425b24-26). For Aristotle, immanence and in-existence follow from these. In this sense, I would like to state that Brentano is correct to refer to Aristotle when proposing something immanent in the sensing subject.

But there are still inconsistencies between Brentano's thesis of intentional in-existence and the immanence in Aristotle's perceptual theory. First, intentional in-existence is formulated by Brentano as a reference by which the mental act points to the immanent object. However, according to Aristotle, the perceptual soul is a passive faculty. We do find that Aristotle proposes perceptual awareness, which means that we are aware of sensation when we are sensing, and which promisingly adds the fact that we are aware of the sensible content. But it is untenable to ascribe to this perceptual awareness a capability of active reference.²¹⁹ What we draw from Aristotle's perceptual theory is, first: a directedness from the sensible object to the perceiving subject, and not the other way around; second, by receiving form without matter, what the perceiving subject suffers is a qualitative alteration on the sense organ and an actualization of the potential perceptual soul, it is not an intentional object that is

²¹⁷ *PES*, p. 211.

²¹⁸ *PES*, p. 67.

²¹⁹ I elaborated on the reasons on p. 100-102.

immanent in the sensing subject; and third, in Brentano's formulation of intentional in-existence, we see no hint of the external world and the correlation between the intentional object and the external world. Such is the reason why Brentano was criticized for blocking the psychological phenomena from the external world. However, Aristotle avoids this trap by assimilating sensation and the sensible object in actuality.

2.4.1.2 The later stage of Brentano's intentionality

In his later stage, Brentano changes his intentional in-existence thesis into a relation between the mental act with a real thing, which means that the mental act is conscious of a thing and has the thing as its object. However, as we claimed, the relation between the sensing subject and the sensible object in Aristotle is at best to be interpreted as identical in quality in actuality. In addition, it is a directedness from the sensible object to the perceiving subject by virtue of the efficient cause. The primal inconsistency still lies in that Brentano attributes an active factor to the mental act, including perception. However, Brentano nevertheless excludes the actualized form in Aristotle as the thing which is referred or directed toward by the mental act. At this stage, Brentano only values the independent thing as object.²²⁰

2.4.2 The criterion of general intentionality

2.4.2.1 Directedness rather than intentional directedness

The general interpretation of intentional directedness is the mental act's capacity of being directing at or referring to ordinary objects, properties or states of affairs. This implies a relational mode in the strongest sense. However, as clarified previously, it is not a relation from the sensing subject to the sensible object which is found in Aristotle's theory of perception – but rather, an identity of quality in actuality. In addition, it is revealed by virtue of the efficient cause that there is only a directedness from the sensible object to the sensing subject, and it is not what we referred to as intentional directedness. What is more, an alteration occurs in the sensing subject when the sensible form acts on it, and the intentional directedness from the mental act to the intentional object does not bring about any change in the object.

Nevertheless, I have emphasized the passivity of perception in a strict sense, as being limited to the activity of the perceptual soul's ability to receive the form from the perceptible object. Moreover, it is in this sense that we find a pure passivity of

²²⁰ *PES*, p. 229.

perception. However, it should be admitted that the perceptual soul is composed of several capacities: the capacity of receiving forms, the capacity for sensory desire, as well as the capacity for movement.²²¹ The sensory desire and movement reveal a practical sense of intention, which means striving towards or aiming at something and further triggering motion. However, this practical sense of intention is not the concern of a theoretical sense of intentionality and is not the focus of this project.²²²

It is certain that perception in the strict sense, as the activity of receiving form without matter, is passive. However, some commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, hold that perception has the capacity of directing towards the perceptible—or rather, in actuality—whereas perception is inactive when it is not perceiving. In his view, the power for perception requires the perceptible to be active just like the power for nourishment requires nourishment to be active.²²³ This capacity of being directed towards the perceptible is correlated with the perception's active characteristic in actualization. Lisska explains that in Aquinas, the unique characteristic of “tending towards” of the immaterial disposition provides the ontological possibility for intentionality. It is realized by the subject's possession of the innate cognitive capacity, that which is able to be actualized and activated by the form of the object. Lisska's endorsement of intentionality in Aquinas is helpful for us to look back to Aristotle, because Aquinas' perception of the subject's ability to be actualized and activated comes from his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*.²²⁴ We thus see both Alexander and Aquinas attribute the active factor to the actualized perceptual state.

I, however, am not in favor of this idea. In my opinion, the actualized perceptual state is the perceiving subject's act of being aware of the perceptual content, and perceptual awareness does not imply an active factor. Second, the actualized

²²¹ For the category of the perceptual soul's capacity, I refer to Brentano where he depicts the manifold function of the soul. In the sensitive and intellectual soul, there are three genera of powers: 1), the power to receive forms, i.e. the ability to represent; 2), appetitive power, i.e. the capacity for striving; and 3), capacities for movement. p.45. He adds later that there must be a fourth power that intellectual power unconsciously exercises an influence upon the bodily part. p.49. See: Brentano (1977).

²²² The mechanism of sensory desire works like this: the object of desire works as the unmoved mover, which is in the first place to trigger the power of desire, which further triggers the motion. Meanwhile, Brentano claims that the desiring act itself can make the potential perceptual desire into actuality. In this sense, the perceptual activity reveals a kind of active implication. However, as we said, it is a practical sense of intention. For more details, see *DA* III 9-11, where a practical motion is revealed.

²²³ “In general about the soul for perceiving that it is a power of soul in virtue of which that which possesses it can, when it becomes like the perceptible to be received through a certain kind of alteration, have cognition of them by means of the activity directed towards them.” (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima*. 38, 21-39,9. p. 36) It implies that the power of perception can direct towards perceptible in actuality, and thus have the cognition of the perceptible.

²²⁴ Lisska (2016). p. 35.

perceptual state may provide content for the subject to move or act, and it is safe to attribute the active factor to the subject since it is the subject which takes action rather than the perceptual soul/faculty.²²⁵ The intentional action the content incurs is intentional in the practical sense, considering that it is the subject's desire or intention to do something. The perceptual faculty thus remains passive and there is no intentional directedness deriving from it.

Drawing a comprehensive picture, sensation occurs when the sensible object is present. The initiating or active power of the sensible object is bound up with its form, which has the efficient capacity to set up the movement, so as to incur the corresponding motion of the media – which is the following agent that directly acts on the sensitive by transferring the sensible form. It is from this sense that I find the roots of directedness, but it is worth noting that this directedness is not qualified as intentional directedness because it is not driven by the psychic subject. Hence, conservatively speaking, Aristotle does not touch upon the issue of intentional directedness and there is no root of intentional directedness in Aristotle's perceptual theory, at least from the definition I set up.

2.4.2.2 The roots of immanent content

In my discussion concerning the immanent content rooted in Aristotle, I adopt three principles: “receiving form without matter”, “the assimilation between the percipient sense and sensible object in actuality” and “the perceptual awareness of the sensible content”, which together contribute to the immanent content. In other words, the roots of immanent content can be found in that: first, we can receive the sensible forms (of single five senses, common sensible, incidental sensible and the sensation itself) so as to specify the sensible content; second, the sensible content is identical in quality with the sensible object in actuality; and third, the whole activity is under the state of awareness, which means that we are aware of the sensible content. Hence, we can confirm that in perception, the correlative content concerning the specific object has an inner containment for us, of which we are aware, so that we can call it immanent content. In addition, it is this particular formulation of “immanent content” that we claim constitutes one of the roots of intentionality.

²²⁵ Corcilius (2014).

CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF *PHANTASIA* IN INTENTIONALITY

This chapter examines the role of *phantasia* in intentionality. I chose to focus a chapter on this topic because it is a perceptual capacity that concerns immanent content, which we previously discussed as being one of the essential characteristics of intentionality. As surveyed in the previous chapter, the root of intentionality in perception mainly consists of sensible content which is directly determined by the external object. However, the external object may be absent in certain cognitive activities – such as memory, dreaming and recollection. When the direct stimulation and change given by the external object is lacking, it is necessary for these activities to have another source of stimulation to act as the initiator. As it stands, the *phantasma*, the product of *phantasia*, can act as such a stimulation in these cognitive activities. Correspondingly, this compels us to understand how immanent content comes into being in these activities. In addition, except for the function of providing *phantasmata*, *phantasia* is also designed to deal with error and sensory illusion in cognition.²²⁶ This correlates with the problem of intentionality – notably, explaining how misconceptions are possible.

Generally speaking, *phantasia* assists the operation of cognition. Therefore, in order to have a comprehensive picture of Aristotle's theory of cognition—and more importantly, to investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle's cognition—it is essential that we elaborate on *phantasia*. The related problems I would like to survey are: what is *phantasia*? What role does it play in Aristotle's psychological framework – especially in memory, recollection, and dreaming? And, which roots of intentionality can we find in these cognitive activities?

3.1 What is *phantasia*?

Phantasia, a term which Aristotle inherits from Plato, was first used by Plato to connote a “misleading appearance.” It was used when referring to the unreliability of sense-perception as knowledge, and how it could thus be responsible for falsehood (*Theaetetus*). Aristotle modifies its meaning to some extent, while maintaining its embedded characteristic of unreliability and fallibility. However, the meaning of

²²⁶ DA 428a11; DA 428b20-429b2.

phantasia is nevertheless ambiguous and was never defined as a precise term in Aristotle's work.

As such, there is no consensus concerning the interpretation of *phantasia* in Aristotle. Instead, it has been variously interpreted as the power of appearing, imagining, presenting, or visualising. Correspondingly, its object noun—*phantasma*—connotes the resulting appearance, image, presentation, or visualization.²²⁷ Even though opinions vary as to whether *phantasia* refers to images—or whether Aristotle has a unified view of *phantasia*, an engagement of *phantasia* with appearance or image to some extent is basically accepted—Modrak (2016) holds that in Aristotle's view, *phantasia* is the awareness of an image, and it is the thing in virtue of which images arise in our perception (p.23). She comments on *phantasia*'s multiple functionality, and argues that Aristotle appeals to *phantasia* to explain behavior of all sorts – especially to explain behavior that seems to be guided by reason, but not in cases where the agent (a child, a drunken adult or a non-rational animal) lacks the capacity for rational judgment. She believes that Aristotle also appeals to *phantasia* to explain the human mind's ability to shift seamlessly between perception and thought and in this capacity, and *phantasia* is required for the act of thinking. Also, she claims that Aristotle assigns non-veridical perceptual experiences to *phantasia*, including cases of illusion, delusion, and dreaming (p.15). Schofield (1995) argues that *phantasia* has the capacity for allowing non-paradigmatic sensory experiences (such as dreams and the interpretation of indistinct or puzzling sense-data), and in this way, the skeptical, cautious, or non-committal *phainetai* may appear. He holds that *phantasia* for Aristotle is a loose-knit, family concept. It is not just imagination or imagery, but also a capacity of visualizing and judging (p.14). Frede (1992) observes three functions of *phantasia* by analogy of sense-perception –that is, the capacity to experience an appearance, the on-going appearance itself and what appears (p.282). Scheiter (2012) claims that the image explains perceptual appearances for Aristotle, so *phantasia* always refers to the image (p.252). White (1985) regards a *phantasma* as a special kind of appearance, which seems to involve a union between something which appears and someone to whom it appears – or rather, a union of the outer world and the inner act of recognition. He especially argues that the subject contains this appearance (p.487). All in all, it is *phantasia*'s function of presenting, visualizing, appearing of images or appearances that inspires me to probe how it aids the composition of immanent content since immanent content is (in one sense) the presentation of cognitive information.²²⁸

²²⁷ For the various discussions about *phantasia*, see Barnouw (2002), Nussbaum (1978), Scheiter (2012), Schofield (1995), White (1985), Papachristou (2013), Caston (1996), Modrak (2016), Frede (1992), etc.

²²⁸ However, we should be cautious here not to associate *phantasia* to imagination. Such an assimilation would limit its capacity and obscure its role in Aristotle's psychology. Since every perception comes along

In this chapter, I will primarily focus on three capacities concerning *phantasia*: 1), to assist the composition of immanent content by presenting the images for most cognitive activities;²²⁹ 2), to explain the problem of error or sense-illusion; 3), to accompany desire in initiating intentional actions. We shall review in more detail how these capacities are revealed and correlated to my understanding of intentionality. For now, let us consider how Aristotle describes *phantasia*.

The place where Aristotle primarily discusses *phantasia* is in *DA* III.3, following a lengthy discussion about perception, and preceding his clarification of intellect. This structural consideration may follow two lines of reasoning. First, the capacity of perception is attributed to all animals by Aristotle, whereas the capacity of intellect belongs exclusively to humans. Therefore, in order to explain the seemingly intelligent capacity of some animals in their daily activities, Aristotle attributes sensible *phantasia* to animals so as to expand the function of their perception. Second, *phantasia* is a necessary tool owing to the assistance it provides to intellectual activity. Hence, there seems to be a cognitive line: sensation-*phantasia*-thought and the occurrence of the latter relies upon the former.

As Aristotle remarks, *phantasia* is that through which an image (*phantasma*) arises for us (*DA* 428a1), and it is a movement resulting from an actual exercise of sensation.²³⁰ In its primitive sense, *phantasia* is a movement resulting from actual perception, which can create images (*phantasmata*) in us.²³¹ However, it does not mean that *phantasia* can only work when perception is working, because we will see cases in which there is no perception occurring but where *phantasia* continues to work. It is thus more accurate to interpret *phantasia* as a movement resulting from actual perception, as *phantasia* shares the same content as that of perception with no requirement of the sensible object being present. To be more concrete, the capacity of

with *phantasia*, if it is interpreted as imagination, an apparent inconsistency comes in that psychological life, it is not always the case that we perceive as well as image under the same circumstances. What is more, *phantasia* is included in a large group of psychic activities such as desire, memory, dream, etc.

²²⁹ There is some debate between Polansky and Wedin about whether *phantasia* underlies all cognition. Wedin thinks that *phantasia*'s function of presentation permeates all cognition, both sensation and thinking. Polansky argues that there is causal power in sensation, and the sensible object will present itself to sensation rather than through *phantasia*. Cf. Polansky (2007), p.417. Chapter 2 of this dissertation proves that without *phantasia*, there is still immanent content in sensation and, so, I am in line with Polansky's stance.

²³⁰ The first mention occurs in *DA* 428b12-15, "imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation...and since movement may be produced by actual sensation..." and the second instance occurs in *DA* 4289a2-4, "imagination must be a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of sense."

²³¹ As to the definition of *phantasia*, Modrak (1987) explains that "*phantasia* is the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception." (p.82)

phantasia to create the image in us can also be interpreted as a means to present the remaining sensible image in us. However, is *phantasia* engaged in synthesizing or manipulating the image (or imagery complex) for particular cognitive activities or not? Also, what draws my attention in this part is the explication of image (*phantasma*). Since *phantasia* is described as occurring after perception, *phantasia* provides an image (*phantasma*) for the subject; yet, in perception there is also sensible information or perceptual content which comes into being. Hence, the relation between images that *phantasia* creates, and the sensible content that perception provides, may direct us to the inner manipulation of the sensible retention, so as to help us investigate the mechanism of the composition of immanent content.

Most of *phantasia*'s features are revealed in the relation between *phantasia* and perception. The relation is that *phantasia* is different from perceiving, though it is not found without sensation (*DA* 427b7-427b27) – that is to say, they are different but inseparable. *Phantasia* is inseparable from sensation because *phantasia* can only “occur in beings that are percipient and have for its content what can be perceived” (*DA* 428b15-428b17), which may be taken to imply that both *phantasia* and perception occur in the perceptual faculty. The content of what can be perceived determines the content of *phantasia*, which can be interpreted in two ways: first, it is the content given by the five singular senses; second, it is the content of the common sensible and the incidental sensible that are perceived by the unity of senses. However, one obvious difference between *phantasia* and perception lies in that perception needs to be motivated by a present object, whereas *phantasia* can still function even when the perceptual object is gone.²³² In this way, *phantasia* can store sensible material left over by previous perceptual activities. That is to say, *phantasia* can make use of both the sensible content provided by the present object of perception as well as the internal material of the remaining sensible image that is produced by the previous perception.

The sensible form we receive first acts on the particular sense organ and is then transmitted to the central sense. The occurrence of actual perception actualizes *phantasia*. The sensible image is the first actuality / second potentiality state in the subject, indicating that although the sensible material is available, it must be activated to be used. Once the agent activates the sensible material, we can say that it realizes its full potentiality and turns to the state of second actuality. Given that the transformation of the sensible material from the potential state to the actual state requires an active power, what then acts as the agent?²³³ According to Aristotle's elaboration in *DA* III 3,

²³² *DA* 428a9.

²³³ *Phantasia* is a movement produced by sensation (*DA* III3 428b10-11, 429a1-2). Since the thing which is moved or acted upon may have the further tendency to move the next thing, *phantasia* receives its movement from sensation, and it can be inferred that it further moves to affect the sensible images.

he supposes that *phantasia*, unlike opinion, is available to us whenever we wish – implying that *phantasia* has the capacity to manipulate the sensible image, and activates the remaining image from potential to actual.²³⁴ *Phantasia* in this sense is akin to imagination, as the example shows: “when we think something to be fearful or threatening, emotion is immediately produced, and so too with what is encouraging, but when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging sense” (DA 427b20-25).²³⁵ This means that *phantasia* lacks the rational capacity of intellect. By virtue of *phantasia*, we imagine some contents out of the potential sensible images and we are aware that it is imagination, and therefore are not affected. Worth noting: it is not merely *phantasia* which can act as an active factor in the actualization of the potential sensible image – rather, as it will later be revealed, activities such as thinking, recollection, memory, dream, etc., can equally actualize the potential *phantasmata*. Working as imagination, *phantasia* therefore shows the capacity of freely synthesizing or manipulating the image, not just faithfully recording what is perceived.

Up to now, it seems that sometimes *phantasia* presents us with an image that is simply what we perceive – for instance, when the sensible object is present. However, sometimes, *phantasia* plays an independent role when it comes to organizing images from the remaining sensible images during the act of imagining or assisting other cognitive activities.²³⁶ Now the relation between the image *phantasia* creates, and the perceptual information the external object incurs is evident. They sometimes overlap (especially in the perception of proper sensible), and *phantasia* has the ability to present a new image based on the remaining sensible image in the soul. This answers my question proposed in the beginning, as to whether *phantasia* is engaged in synthesizing or manipulating the image (or imagery complex) for particular cognitive activities or not. It is therefore promising to see that *phantasia* does engage in the production of new images – such as in the case where *phantasia* works as an imaginary capacity to give rise to imagery in us.²³⁷ Therefore, the image that is produced by

²³⁴ DA 427b 16-24.

²³⁵ As well as in the cases “when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging sense” (DA 427b24-26); “we imagine the sun to be a foot in diameter though we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited part of the earth” (DA 428b2-5). *Phantasia* plays the role of imagination.

²³⁶ *Phantasia*’s assistance concerning other cognitive activities will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

²³⁷ *Phantasia* does in some cases refer to the capacity of imagination, but in others it is more focused on its additional capacities, such as White (1985)’s proposal of being the appearance or the tools to provide appearance. Moreover, it assumes this role in other cognitive activities such as memory, recollection, dream, etc.

phantasia has two senses: first, it presents what the external object is; second, it can be a newly formed image organized by *phantasia*.

Generally speaking, every time we perceive something, the sensible form acts on the sense organ with the alteration occurring in sensation. Further this sensible alteration is transmitted to the central sense, which on the one hand marks the perceiving of something, on the other hand, it activates *phantasia*. In this way, *phantasia* can deal with the received information for the application of other cognitive activity. Also, in the absence of the present sensible object, *phantasia* can still work on the stored sensible materials for thinking, memory, recollection, and so on.²³⁸ In this chapter, I would like to deal with the involvement of *phantasia* in memory, recollection, and dream, which are the topics in *PN*. However, before that, I shall point out that even in perception, *phantasia* may not faithfully present what the external object is, but rather a false image which results in hallucination or false perceptions.

3.2 The error and sense-illusion

In line with Plato, Aristotle also touches upon the issue of error in our cognition, which is a common concern found in the ancient philosophy of mind. However, contrary to Plato who believes sense-perception is unreliable, Aristotle claims that perception of the proper sensible is (nearly always) true, but nevertheless allows room for errors in the perception of the common and incidental sensibles, as well as sensory illusion (hallucination).²³⁹ Wedin (1998) suggests that *phantasia* is introduced owing to its role in explaining falsehood. It is plausible to agree with Wedin that, “we do not, when sense functions precisely about its object, say that we imagine it to be a man, but rather when there is some failure of accuracy in its exercise—then it is either true or false” (p.101).²⁴⁰

In the object of sense (*DA* II 6), Aristotle proposes the common sensible and the incidental sensible. It is stated that they are perceptible by each of the senses (*DA* 418a10). Once again, in the section on *phantasia*, *DA* III 3, Aristotle discusses the common and the incidental sensibles and addresses the fallibility of perception in perceiving them. It will not surprise us that *phantasia* is involved in the perception of

²³⁸ The matter of “thinking” will be set aside for the next chapter.

²³⁹ Although Aristotle states that sensations are almost always accurate (*DA* 428a10), it seems that such accuracy should be restricted to the five particular senses: sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. When it comes to common and incidental sensibles, it is more likely that no definite veridical perception can be guaranteed.

²⁴⁰ Wedin (1988), p.101.

the common and incidental sensibles.²⁴¹ However, what deserves further consideration is how *phantasia* can explain the fallibility of these two kinds of sensible.

Aristotle's explanation of falsehood in the perception of the common and incidental sensibles proceeds as follows:

Perception of the particular objects of sense is never in error or admits the least possible amount of falsehood. Next comes perception that what is incidental to the objects of perception is incidental to them: in this case certainly we may be deceived; for while the perception that there is white before us cannot be false, the perception that what is white is this or that may be false. Third comes the perception of the common attributes which accompany the incidental objects to which the special sensibles attach (I mean e.g. of movement and magnitude); it is in respect of these that the greatest amount of sense-illusion is possible. (*DA* 428b 19-24)

The sensation of the senses' special objects has the least possibility of going wrong because it embodies the ideal status of perception (for example, the vision of the color white). However, in daily life, we are consistently surrounded within complex circumstances, which provides us with a complex and multi-level perceptual situations. For instance, when perceiving what is white, Aristotle claims that perception of what is white may be false. The reason may be because the perceptual faculty has no intellectual function such as reason, judgment, or discursion to deliberate on the issue. Hence, when confronting a complex situation, it is easy to go wrong. Aristotle imputes the fault to *phantasia*, explaining that the perception of the common sensible and the incidental sensible are more liable to go wrong depending on whether the object is present or absent, and especially when the object is distant (*DA* 429 a1). It can be implied that when the object is distant, the sensible form may not cause sufficient alteration on the sense organ so as to allow the perceptual soul to perceive the sensible object with much accuracy. In this sense, the corresponding sensible content that *phantasia* receives is not accurate, and it is no wonder *phantasia* will have the wrong presentation about what we perceive. In the absence of the common/incidental sensible object, it depends on *phantasia* to make up the sensible image from the residual image to present to the subject. Thus, *phantasia* should be responsible for the error.

Going further, we can examine the issue of sensory illusion in the example of the sun as a foot's diameter: "we imagine the sun to be a foot in diameter though we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited part of the earth". (*DA* 428b1-5) The size of the sun belongs to the category of the common sensible. When the distance is

²⁴¹ According to Aristotle, the perception of the common sensible and the incidental sensible will also activate the motion of *phantasia*. *DA* 428b10-20.

too great, we may have a false appearance about the object provided by *phantasia*, and that image or appearance does not convey to us the real information, thus results in being false. In *Sense and Sensibilia*, Aristotle explains in more details:

Therefore, we must conclude that all magnitudes are perceptible, but their actual dimensions do not present themselves immediately in their presentation as objects. One sees the sun, or a four-cubit rod at a distance, as a magnitude, but their exact dimensions are not given in their visual presentation: nay, at times an object of sight appears indivisible, but vision like other special senses, is fallible respecting ‘common sensible’, e.g. magnitude, and nothing that one sees is really indivisible. The reason for this has been previously explained. (448b15-18)

Phantasia plays the role of presenting the perceptual appearance to us when the sensible object is the common/incidental sensible or when it is distant, but it may also provide us with a false appearance. The involvement of *phantasia* in the perception of the common and incidental sensibles once again reveal that the perception of a complex situation requires a comprehensive presentation of the current situation. This function belongs to *phantasia* because *phantasia* can present an image derived from the sensory images, but it also implies a lack of veracity.

3.3 *Phantasia*, representation and intentionality

Among the meanings of *phantasia* we find “a presentation to consciousness, whether immediate or in memory, whether true or illusory” (Liddell and Scott, *Lexicon*, “*phantasia*”). In contemporary Aristotle scholarship, there is a tendency of regarding *phantasia* as representation, i.e. as representing what the sensory appearance is. According to Lagerlund, “the word representation came to philosophy along with the Latin translation of Avicenna’s *De Anima*”.²⁴² Therefore, it was only in later medieval times that representation was widely used to explain the content of thought. Generally speaking, “representation” in the modern sense seems to imply that there is an active mental subject which carries on a presentation of the object. We have seen that *phantasia* plays a similar role as representation insofar as it consciously presents images. Everson argues that given Aristotle’s apparent emphasis on the connection between action and *phantasia*, it seems reasonable to take *phantasia* to constitute the activity of the rich representational system which perception is not, and which is required for a subject to be an agent. He attributes the active factor to *phantasia* so as

²⁴² Lagerlund (2017).

to make a distinction between perception and *phantasia*, which lies in that the former shows that it appears to be a man and the latter shows that I see a man. Modrak (2016) claims that “any object that can be the content of a perception can be presented in a *phantasma* (object of *phantasia*) and the content so presented may be an accurate representation of an actual object or it may fall short of accuracy due to the conditions under which it is realized.” (p.17) Nussbaum (1978) elaborates on *phantasia* stating that in all cases it involves images that represent the object in virtue of some similarity to the object. Polansky (2007) indicates that Aristotle does not depict *phantasia* as a critical and discriminative faculty (like sense and thought), but a faculty of presentation or representation.²⁴³

Victor Caston (1998) provides a detailed elaboration of *phantasia* as representation and attributes a representative theory of intentionality to Aristotle. Caston depicts two kinds of causal models: the single causal model of proper sensible and the causal model of *phantasia*. Caston proposes that *phantasia* can simulate the sensible soul as a causal power, and he depicts *phantasia* as an echo of the initial disturbance.²⁴⁴ This representation is not the noetic ray structure which depicts a direct relation between thinking and the object thought about, but a relation of the agent to “something distinct within the subject” (p.263), that models or simulates the objects thought about. The internal changes, as one side of the relation, play a representative role, thus comprising the representation theory of intentionality. He continues to explain the characteristic of this representation: it is abstract, and it is changed in the bloodstream. Hence, it is not a literal instantiation, leaving room for inadequate or abstract mental content. He thinks that the problem of error rests on misrepresentation, notably the wrong transformation of the properties of the object. *Phantasia* has the causal power to construct the content, and the causal process of *phantasia* is a form of reproduction, resulting in a change with features similar to the initial stimulation. This

²⁴³ Polansky (2007), p.415.

²⁴⁴ Nussbaum (1978) provides an approach of interpreting *phantasia* as intentionality in that “we are always passively receiving perceptual stimuli; but when we actively focus on some object in our environment, separating it out from its context and seeing it as a certain thing, the faculty of *phantasia*, or the *phantasia* aspect of aesthesis is called into play.” (p.259) Nussbaum spells out intentionality in *phantasia* because of *phantasia*’s active role in focusing on one thing. But Everson has a different opinion about *phantasia*’s role as perceptual interpretation. I agree with Everson’s comment that it makes sense to make use of *phantasia* to explain the cognition of the accidental sensible, to complement perception in perceiving the thing as a thing. However, Nussbaum makes a distinction that what perception receives is simply the proper sensibles and *phantasia* is the faculty responsible for perceptual interpretation. This is rejected by Everson (1997) in that he believes that Nussbaum restricts the activity of the senses as a whole to the perception of the proper sensible, whereas the activity of common sense can deal with the accidental sensible, common sensible and perceptual awareness. (p. 159-165).

is a modified relational theory based on his clarification of *phantasmata* as echo, or imagery imitation of the sensory stimulation. For Caston, echo means that it resembles the original affection and works as a side effect. Like the action of the sensible in sensation, *phantasmata* also affects the sense organ and causes the corresponding change in the physiological organism.

Many contemporary scholars propose a representational theory of intentionality – such as Searle, J. (1983), Smith and McIntyre (1984), and Drummond (2012). They argue for a mediating theory of intentionality, which stresses the intermediary role of intentional content, in virtue of which the intentional state or subject is able to direct toward the real object, whether the object exists or not. In this model, the immanent content is not what the subject cares about, but simply a medium. Caston also remarks about the representational theory of Aristotle, stating that: “the representation need only stand in the appropriate physical and causal relations to the rest of a subject’s cognitive apparatus, without being itself the object of any intentional state.....such changes are merely the means by which we think, not something which itself is thought about.” (p.259) It seems that Caston equally adopts the mediator-theoretical form of intentionality and ascribes such a theory to Aristotle as well.

Caston depicts *phantasia* as an echo. However, in my opinion, there are several points that we should consider when deciding if Aristotle attributes the causal power to *phantasia* as an echo. First, *phantasia* can work independently without the occurrence of perception, while an echo must happen closely after the initial disturbance. Second, an echo is always weaker compared to the initial disturbance, but *phantasia* is not always so. Except for the insufficiency of identifying *phantasia* as echo, it is reasonable to attribute such a causal power to *phantasia*, considering that *phantasia* has the capacity to make up cognitive information based on the residual image, even though it can also be initiated by perception.

Caston’s representation theory is heavily based on the interpretation of *phantasmata* as imaginary imitation, which in fact should be treated cautiously. As Nussbaum (1978) concludes, the imaginative theory usually regards *phantasmata* as “mental images that resemble the things they represent and are to be contemplated as internal pictures by the living being” (p. 222). It is also referred by Nussbaum as “pictorial representative image”, of which she is critical.²⁴⁵ In order to escape the

²⁴⁵ Nussbaum criticizes such a theory in that: first, the status of the image is obscure, and the similarity theory cannot provide more information about to what extent the image should be similar to the original object; second, the theory assumes that they can only represent some similarity. Nussbaum does not believe the degree of similarity can represent the object. Representation is a kind of reference or denotation, but the similarity is the resemblance of the object. It mirrors the image rather than representing the image. Moreover, reference can be obtained independently of resemblance. Third, the image theory

possible shortcoming, Caston depicts *phantasmata* as a propositional transformation of the object rather than a pictorial imitation, then proposes that *phantasmata* can be regarded as a token of the defined type of the object.²⁴⁶ The token-type explanation strongly implies that there is a type for the token to be tokened, but we know there are cases in which *phantasia* simply organizes some brute *phantasmata* which have no counterpart in the world at all, leading us to wonder what is their type? Also, how can this token be a propositional transformation of that type? These questions are difficult to answer by adopting the type-token structure.

Nussbaum (1978) provides an approach of interpreting *phantasia* as intentionality in that “we are always passively receiving perceptual stimuli; but when we actively focus on some object in our environment, separating it out from its context and seeing it as a certain thing, the faculty of *phantasia*, or the *phantasia* aspect of *aesthesis* is called into play.” (p.259) Nussbaum spells out intentionality in *phantasia* because of *phantasia*’s active role in focusing on one thing. But Everson (1997) has a different opinion about *phantasia*’s role as perceptual interpretation. Everson comments that it makes sense to make use of *phantasia* to explain the cognition of the accidental sensible, to complement perception in perceiving the thing as a thing. However, Nussbaum makes a distinction, stating that what perception gets is just proper sensible and *phantasia* is the faculty responsible for perceptual interpretation. This argument is rejected by Everson in that he believes Nussbaum restricts the activity of the senses as a whole to the perception of the proper sensible – and in fact, the activity of the common sense can deal with the incidental sensible, the common sensible and perceptual awareness (p.159-165). Polansky rejects the proposal by Wedin and Caston of attributing intentionality to *phantasia* based on its representational role alone, rather than acknowledging intentionality in the sense perception of proper sensibles. Polansky holds that sense also present things to itself, which reveals intentionality.²⁴⁷

strongly hints that there is a real object in the world because no image has a null denotation. Fourth, image theory does not provide a comprehensive account of the picture. Cf. Nussbaum (1978), p.225-226.

²⁴⁶ Caston sets the correlation of *phantasmata* and the external object as a token-type relation.

²⁴⁷ As Polansky says, “emphasis on this point answers Wedin 1988, ch. 2. He rightly holds that *phantasia* is presentational or representational rather than discriminative, but Wedin wishes to go further and contend that *phantasia* has no special object of its own and is not a separate faculty of the soul but rather that which underlies all cognition. *Phantasia* would then explain intentionality of cognition, i.e., that sense and thought are directed toward objects. *Phantasia* is what presents or represents to the soul what we perceive or think. Some of Aristotle’s predecessors, those supposing all appearances are true, similarly make *phantasia* pertain to all cognition. Instead for Aristotle sense as the cause of *phantasia* must already present things to itself. *Phantasia* can be presentational because its cause, sense, already is. (The nutritive capacity can also have an object, food, without requiring something further to direct it to this object.)

It turns out that there are different interpretations of intentionality and a difference of opinion whether there is a presentation or intentional implication in sensation. Nussbaum depicts intentionality as the agent's active focus on something and interpreting it as a certain thing. Polansky proposes it as sense and thought directing towards an object, but he also emphasizes the role of representation or presentation in intentionality. Caston prefers a representational theory of intentionality. As I have set up in this study, there are two characteristics of intentionality: intentional directedness and immanent content. Intentional directedness is what Nussbaum and Polansky mean by focusing on or directing towards something, which underlies an active agent's relatedness to something. Immanent content is the presentational or representational content in the psychic state that presents or represents the object. Since *phantasia*'s function is to present or represent something to the psychic subject, it therefore plays an essential role in immanent content, or intentionality in this sense.

However, there are two levels of directing to / focusing on / tending towards something. When it comes to the living being as a whole, a subject composed of body and soul, then the active factor is the soul, because soul is the efficient cause of the life activities of this living being. It makes sense to say that the subject is directing to / focusing on / tending towards something. But when it comes to cognitive activities, such as sensation, thinking, memory, recollection, dreaming, etc. it is the perceptual/intellectual faculty that acts as one end. As such, intentional directedness in cognitive activities should consider the relation between the perceptual/intellectual faculty and the object. Therefore, when *phantasia* plays an assisting role in other cognitive activities, we should consider directedness from the perspective of the real faculty. In this, I agree with Polansky that sense also presents things to itself, and therefore there is intentionality in perception in the sense of immanent content,²⁴⁸ rather than from the perspective of the agent's focusing on or directing to something.

3.4 *Phantasia* and cognitive activities

Aristotle's psychological building relies heavily on perception, which occupies a large part of the content in *De Anima*. However, the condition of the presence of the sensible

Caston 1998 reinforces Wedin's position by seeming to deny that sense perception of proper sensibles is intentional and that only higher-level psychical acts are for all of which *phantasia* forms the representational basis: that is, *phantasia* is the basis of intentionality. This ignores Aristotle's insistence that sense perception generally is a critical faculty and his clear assumption of the intentionality of proper perception." Cf. Polansky (2007), p.417.

²⁴⁸ The roots of intentionality in perception are revealed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, during which I did not refer to *phantasia*.

object also limits what we can conceive. *Phantasia* compensates for this disadvantage to some extent, by not only following closely after perception to conceive the sensible image and pass it to the central sense but also by making use of the residual image to create a new image even when there is no object present. Of course, it also introduces the consequences of fallibility – however, there is no better way than to formulate such an efficient capacity to explain the quasi-rational activity of animals and enlarge the function that the perceptual faculty can do. Ultimately, it has the additional advantage of offering an explanation for perceptual error.

As we clarified, *phantasia* can make use of the sensing/imagining for other cognitive activities, like memory, dreaming, recollecting, and thinking. By virtue of how the sensible images are being used in the cognitive activity, we can have a better view as to how immanent content is constituted in different cognitive activities. What is more, by demonstrating the immanent content that is characterized by each activity, we may be able to point out the roots of its intentionality.

3.4.1 “Immanent content” in memory

It is evident that the image plays a vital role in memory.²⁴⁹ The close connection between image and memory can be seen from the definition of memory or remembering, “what memory or remembering is, it has now been shown that it is the having of an image, related as a likeness to that of which it is an image” (*DM* 451a15-19), as well through the claim that “all objects of which there is imagination are in themselves objects of memory, while those that exist not without imagination are objects of memory incidentally.” (*DM* 450a22-25) Since memory is about what happened in the past, it is different from sense-perception, which focuses on the present object. It turns out that the image that memory contains is a collection of the previous sensible information. As is clarified, *phantasia* can call up images even in the absence of the present object. Hence, memory’s possession of the image cannot do without the participation of *phantasia*. This explains why Aristotle says that memory

²⁴⁹ Sorabji (2006) proposes that, “the present state may involve simply thinking over, or recounting, or re-enacting a childhood scene without imagery. It may involve merely finding something familiar when one sees it, or feeding the cat when one remembers to feed the cat, or striding over a missing step in the dark, when one remembers the missing step.” (p. 8) However, Sorabji also states that Aristotle would not admit all these cases nor the possibility of thinking over a scene without imagery. (p. 9) So, the close correlation between cognitive activity and image is an important feature for Aristotle.

and *phantasia* belong to the same part of the soul and memory shares its objects with *phantasia*.²⁵⁰

Since the object of memory is an image connected with past cognition,²⁵¹ the way in which the image is linked to the past experience sheds light on how the presentation is connected with external existence. Aristotle proposes that the inner image can be a copy or likeness of what is previously experienced, thus making a connection between the immanent content and external existence.²⁵² In addition, the image of memory has two modes of being, qua the image itself and qua the likeness, just as the example of a picture painted on a panel which is both a picture as well as a likeness.²⁵³

Just in the same way we have to conceive that the image within us is both something in itself and relative to something else. In so far as it is regarded in itself, it is only an object of contemplation or an image; but when considered as relative to something else, e.g., as its likeness, it is also a reminder. Hence, whenever its movement is actual, if the soul perceives this in its own right, it appears to occur as a mere thought or image; but if the soul perceives it qua related to something else, then—just as when one contemplates the painting in the picture as being a likeness, and without having seen the actual Coriscus, contemplates it as a likeness of Coriscus, and in that case the experience involved in this contemplation of it is different from what one has when he contemplates it simply as a painted figure—of the objects in the soul, the one presents itself simply as a thought, but the other, just because, as in the painting, it is a likeness, presents itself as a reminder.

This explicates the ontology of the inner image – it is both an image in itself and a counterpart of something else.²⁵⁴ The experiences of these two are different, but we can freely choose which one to perceive. When we focus on the image itself, the image works as the content of memory. While when we turn to something else that the image represents, the image works simply as a tool, and the content of memory will remind us of the original object by virtue of the image – or rather, the content will be the previous perception of that object. The feature that the image can also be regarded as the

²⁵⁰ *DM* 451a15-19.

²⁵¹ The past cognition that composes memory can be an object, an occurrence, a situation, a skill, etc.

²⁵² When it comes to likeness, it means that only some qualities or properties are kept similar but not identical. This can also explain why memory cannot ensure the validity of information compared to the perception.

²⁵³ Sorabji (2006) proposes that “the idea of likeness or copy is necessary for Aristotle, or the image can be anything, and we could not have memory of something absent” (p.7).

²⁵⁴ In Sorabji (2006)’s commentary on *De Memoria*, Sorabji also refers to the image as both a thing in its own right and as a copy of something.

reminder of something external avoids the trap of separating mental life and the external world. Besides, the image itself can be regarded as an independent entity.

By clarifying the close relationship between *phantasia* and memory, we are certain that memory is an image possessing and conducting activity. It is produced after perception, and keeps the perceptual material – that is, the sensible image, in the soul after the object is not present anymore. The remaining images can be organized by virtue of the likeness they have to a previous situation, during which process a specific immanent content for that situation is formed. In fact, the examples Aristotle gives out in *DM* are more about human beings (*DM* 449a16-449b24, 450a35-450b11, 450b15-b20, 450b30-451a2, 451a8-12). He correlates memory with contemplation because contemplation can gaze at the memory-image (*DM* 450b30-451a2, 451a8-12). But memory also belongs to the perceptual soul which animals also possess. Aristotle claims that only animals which perceive time can have memory, and they do so by means of that with which they perceive (*DM* 449b20-30). From this, it can be inferred that not all animals have memory.

I would like to propose that the immanent content which is formed in each individual about the same object may differ from that in other individuals. The cognitive activities of perception or intellect or memory, etc., are always connected in accomplishing a single cognitive task. For example, when a subject confronts an apple, except for the image of the apple that is formed by virtue of the perceptual faculty, the apple may stir up the related memory of the subject, and even stir up the subject's deliberation about how to deal with this apple, etc. All these cognitive activities are typically stimulated concerning a single object. Because of the difference of memory or the remaining image stored in each individual, the immanent content found in cognizing this apple will differ. This explains the difference in immanent content with regard to the same object among individuals.

To conclude, the content of the memory is the image based on the sensible material that remains in the soul. The manipulation of sensible materials shapes memory at a previous moment by composing the particular content (the memory-image) in the soul. As the sensible object determines what the sensible content will be about, the memory image specifies the immanent content of the soul at that moment. As such, the memory image has an independent mode of being when taken in itself. Also, it correlates with and refers to the actual occurrence at a previous time through likeness. The role of *phantasia* in memory is to stir up and organize the images to provide material for the content of memory. By this, it is plausible to state that there is

immanent content for memory, and this content is linked to external existence.²⁵⁵ Further, all these processes are under perceptual awareness.²⁵⁶ It is in this sense that I say that here the roots of immanent content are revealed in Aristotle's discussion of memory.

3.4.2 "Immanent content" in recollection

Another case which requires the involvement of *phantasia* is recollection, which is clarified as "a searching for an image in a corporeal substrate" (*DM* 453a15-16). Recollection begins from our looking for a specific item stored in our soul. This has the nature of an image, and searching happens by virtue of a series of images, since "acts of recollection happen because one change is of a nature to occur after another" (*DM* 451b12-13). Since it is a closely-related series of changes, we can either set up a starting point, an image which we would like to recollect, and we go through a series of associated images to get it (*DM* 451a5-8; *DM* 451b 29-33); or we can just undergo a series of images and finally get the desired image.²⁵⁷ The following paragraph explains how recollection happens:

Whenever, therefore, we are recollecting, we are experiencing one of the antecedent movements until finally, we experience the one after which customarily comes that which we seek. This explains why we hunt up the series, having started in thought from the present or some other, and from something either similar, or contrary, to what we seek, or else from that which is contiguous with it. That is how recollection takes place. (*DM* 451b15-20)

Aristotle claims that recollection is an activity which can happen out of oneself, with no other help than that of learning.²⁵⁸ We can recollect whenever we want. Recollection is composed of a series of movements or changes, which will not end until we reach the image that we are seeking.

In memory, the likeness or copy of the inner image to the past occurrence makes memory possible. Similarly, in recollection, the propositional relation between

²⁵⁵ It is also the divergence of Aristotle from Plato. All the perceptual and intellectual activities cannot do without sensible materials. All of them can find the correlation with the sensible world.

²⁵⁶ As we clarified in the previous chapter, perceptual awareness is concurrent with perceptual activities.

²⁵⁷ The two kinds of the recollective process are also referred by Sorabji in his commentary on *DM* p. 42.

²⁵⁸ "For remembering is the presence within of the power which excites the changes, and this in such a way that the man moves of himself and because of changes that he possesses, as has been said." (*DM* 452a10-12).

what is immanent and the external occurrence makes recollection possible. As Aristotle states, “for a person thinks of things large and distant not through stretching out his thought there, as some people say one stretches sight (for even if the things do not exist, he can think of them in the same way), but by means of a change which is in proportion. For there are in the thought similar shapes and changes...For everything within is smaller and in proportion to what is without.” (*DM* 452b13-18) It can be indicated that whatever kind of object it is, there is a related image that is in proportion to the object, which implies a counterpart between the immanence and the external.

The roots of intentionality lie in the immanent content of recollection. Compared with memory, the greatest feature of recollection is that it belongs to the faculty of intellect.²⁵⁹ Therefore, it happens whenever we want. This intentional action is accomplished by virtue of a series of images which is provided by *phantasia*. The series of images and the desired image that finally appears to us constitute the immanent content of recollection. Besides, the final appearance of the desired image is related proportionally to the previous occurrence, thus connecting what is in the soul to external reality.

3.4.3 “Immanent content” in sleep and dreams

Both sleeping and dreaming belong to the faculty of sense-perception, which implies that they commonly adhere to the perceptual mechanism and it is no wonder that their realization cannot do without the sensible image. As Aristotle claims, “some persons move in their sleep, and perform many acts like waking acts, but not without an image or an exercise of sense-perception; for a dream is in a certain way a sense-impression” (*DSV* 456a23-25). Meanwhile, the affiliation of the dream to the faculty of sense-perception is bridged by *phantasia* (*DI* 459a23), indicating the profound correlation between sensible images and dreams.

As opposed to memory and recollection, which occur when awake, dreams occur when perception is in a motionless state. However, that does not affect the appearance of the dream, which is composed of sensible residual materials. Two reasons are behind this: the first is the qualitative change that the external object brings to the perceptual sense, which we have previously discussed. When it comes to

²⁵⁹ Which can be certified from Aristotle’s explanation that “recollection is, as it were, a sort of reasoning. For in recollecting, a man reasons that he formerly saw, or heard, or had some such experience, and recollecting is, as it were, a sort of search. Moreover, this kind of search is an attribute only of those animals which also have the deliberating part. For indeed, deliberation is a sort of reasoning.” *On Memory and Recollection* 453a 8-14.

dreaming, it is caused not by directly perceiving the external object, but by the internal sensory impressions which are left by the previous perception. In this way, the internal sensory impressions work as the efficient cause in enacting a change in the psychic subject, as the external object does to the perceptual sense. This can be gleaned from the claim that “from this it is manifest that the movements based upon sensory impressions, whether the latter are derived from external objects or from causes within the body, not only when persons are awake, but also occur when this affection which is called sleep has come upon them, and at that time they appear more.” (*DI* 460b29-33) Second, the remaining sensible images in the soul can still be presented by virtue of *phantasia* even when there is no object present. That is also the reason why we always confuse the appearance in the dream as if it happens in reality.

Let us turn to dreams in themselves to analyze its components. We all have the experience of making up various kinds of dreams, which show a series of dynamic images in the soul. These dreams are a kind of sense-impression,²⁶⁰ showing that the sensible residual material is greatly engaged in the constitution of the content of the dream. What is more, there is always something appearing in the dream that we never experienced in reality, which might imply that *phantasia* creates new images of the dream based on sensory materials which have their roots in the external world.²⁶¹ Aristotle refers to the resemblance of the dream image with that in reality as a faint resemblance (*DI* 460b11, 461b25). What underlies this is that there is nevertheless a kind of correlation between the dream image and the external sensible object. Concretely speaking, it is true that a dream is what happens within psychic life, given that the component of a dream, the sense-impression, is found in the soul. However, it is not isolated since there is a weak link between the sense-impression and the external world.

I shall now investigate whether perceptual awareness works in the dream or not to determine whether it can be regarded as involving the roots of intentionality. As I claimed, the perceptual awareness of the immanent content marks one characteristic of intentionality in the psychological activity and *phantasia* plays an essential role in dream-making, as even though there is no present sensible object present, it still exists in the sense organ.²⁶² In dreaming, *phantasia* manipulates the remaining image for the central sense, which is located in the heart. In this way, the central sense becomes aware of the sensory image. This mechanism explains how perceptual awareness

²⁶⁰ *DI* 456a25.

²⁶¹ It is what distinguishes Aristotle from others. Nearly all cognitive activities involve the sensible image, and the sensible image is formed in perception. By virtue of this, all cognitive activities can be related to the sensible world.

²⁶² *DA* 425b24-25

becomes aware of what is happening even though all our senses are blocked. Correspondingly, it reveals how the immanent content is involved in dreaming and how we become aware of this immanent content.

To sum up, it is hardly surprising to discover that the sensible image permeates into nearly all kinds of cognitive activity. That is the reason why *phantasia* can be called the bridge of cognition by its indispensable role of presenting and manipulating images.

3.5 *Phantasia* and intentional action

In this part, I would like to survey the internal correlation between *phantasia* and the intentional act. Differing from his contemporaries, Aristotle proposed a broad conception of perception.²⁶³ Armed with the assistance of *phantasia*, the perceptual faculty is capable of guiding the daily activity of animals and helping them cope with the environment surrounding them and even result in the quasi-intelligible capacity of animals, which I refer to as the intentional action. However, it is worth noting that “intentional” used here is of a practical sense, which means an intention or desire to do something. It does not refer to the technical definition of intentionality as discussed elsewhere in this dissertation. This will become obvious in the following elaboration. As such, the reason I would like to deal with intentional action here is precisely to demarcate this practical sense of intention from intentionality.

In the clarification of *phantasia*’s role in preparing and manipulating images so as to assist various cognitive activities, we referred to the motion that is *phantasia* which results from the activity of sensation.²⁶⁴ Further, *phantasia* is also able to assist the actions of animals – including human beings.²⁶⁵ The perceptual faculty results in action by virtue of actualizing the faculty of appetite and avoiding the perception of the pleasant or painful object:

To perceive then is like bare asserting or thinking; but when the object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes a sort of affirmation or negation, and pursues or avoids the object. To feel pleasure or pain is to act with the sensitive mean towards what is good or bad as such. Both avoidance and appetite when actual are identical with this: the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not different, either from one another or from the faculty of sense-perception; but their being is different (*DA* 431a8-14).

²⁶³ See also: Sorabji (1995).

²⁶⁴ *DA* 428b15.

²⁶⁵ “Since when one thing has been set in motion another thing may be moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation.” *DA* 428b 10-11.

It seems that by virtue of the sensitive means, the perceptual soul is able to make a discernment and take corresponding actions. However, the action that starts from the faculty of sense-perception is not as deliberate as that of the intellect. The capacity to experience non-rational pleasure or pain is innate in animals, and its result of either pursuing or avoiding can be regarded as the organisms' natural bodily response. Appetite and avoidance belong to the perceptual faculty, and the corresponding action happens in the actualization of the faculty of appetite/avoidance: "and because imagination (*phantasmata*) remains in the organs of sense and resembles sensations, animals in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the non-existence in them of mind, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in them of mind by feeling or disease or sleep." (DA 429a4-8) Therefore, *phantasia* can take perception's role in assisting action – and in this case, *phantasia* provides a sensible image that may be pleasant or painful. By virtue of the soul's affirmation or negation of this sensible image, the subject takes the action of pursuing or avoiding.

In addition, action always happens by appetite or thought, accompanied by *phantasia*. As Aristotle claims, there are two sources of movement: appetite ("it is not capable of appetite without possessing *phantasia*" DA 433b30) and thought, ("if one may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking; for many men follow their imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in all animals other than man there is no thinking or calculation but only imagination" DA 433a11-13). Animals can only be stimulated to move by appetite, while appetite and thought can both cause human action. Their distinction lies in the degree of the elaboration: with intellect, we can design an elaborate scheme based on precise calculation and speculation, while what *phantasia* provides us is a bare sensible image that produces an immediate stimulation. Animals and humans who suffer from a temporary eclipse of mind through emotion or disease or sleep will be propelled by *phantasia*; whereas a rational person will make a more robust judgment upon the situation (which is usually in the form of an image) and then decide whether to take his/her action or not.²⁶⁶ Hence, even though no action can happen without *phantasmata*, it does not mean that all *phantasmata* will result in action. However, considering that *phantasia* is akin to thinking in that many people follow their *phantasmata* rather than acting on knowledge, *phantasia* can be regarded as an incomplete form of thinking – or as a quasi-intellectual capacity, at least in initiating action. Both appetite and thought cannot work without a sensible image or *phantasma*, which is provided by perception and *phantasia*. The capacity of *phantasia* in initiating action also shows that *phantasia* plays a larger role than perception

²⁶⁶ Unlike the act of thinking, *phantasia* does not have the capacity of inference (DA 434a10).

because action can be initiated when there is no perception occurring, and it is the remaining sensible image that acts as a cause.

Another instance in *On dreams* which reveals the quasi-intellectual capacity of *phantasia*, i.e. its role in dominating and determining judgement or belief, is that: “at times belief states, in sleep just as when awake, that what is seen is false; at other times it is bound by and follows the *phantasma*” (*DI* 459a6-8).²⁶⁷ It implies that *phantasia* plays the same role in animals as thinking does in human beings. In the case of thinking, the sensory image is a prerequisite since intellectual form emerges from the sensible image – and the same goes for appetite. In appetite, the desired object is depicted in the form of images, which give rise to the movement. Alternatively, appetite originates movement by virtue of the *phantasia* of animals and even in human beings, without requiring the need to think. In this way, *phantasia* imitates what intellect does by formulating the desired image in the soul, and stimulating the corresponding action.

What I should emphasize here is that, in playing the role of getting involved in animal or human action, *phantasia* is entangled with intentional action. I define it as a practical intentional action because of the following considerations: 1) an intentional act occurs in a conscious state. Animals and human beings satisfy this condition because of perceptual or intellectual awareness.²⁶⁸ For example, in the case that cold water is being changed by the temperature of hot water, it can be seen as a motion or change, but it can hardly be called intentional. 2) the intentional act means intention or desire to do something, in which the sensible image/*phantasma* provides us with the goal and desire for us to take action. For example, the mouse will go for the poison because it regards the white poison as a kind of food which it desires to take, because the white poison formalizes a white image in its soul which overlaps with the remaining image of a white food it took previously.

To sum up: first, *phantasia* is a capacity which is found in animals and humans— not plants—and it accompanies nearly all kinds of psychological activities in them; second, the inner image provided by *phantasia* reveals the concretization of what desire or ambition is. It is generally assumed that the intellectual soul can perform the practical intentional action, as is confirmed by Aristotle’s claim that “mind, that is, which calculates a means to an end, i.e. the practical mind (it differs from speculative mind in the character of its end)” (*DA* 433a 10-15). Correspondingly, animals can also perform a kind of intentional action, which is initiated by *phantasia* and appetite. So

²⁶⁷ Barnouw claims that this indicates that *phantasia* takes over the role of thinking. Jeffrey Barnouw (2002), p. 63.

²⁶⁸ In animals, it is perceptual awareness; whereas in humans, it is both perceptual awareness as well as intellectual awareness – we are aware that we are thinking.

phantasia plays an active role in initiating motion, and presenting sensible image to the psychic subject. The intentional action which *phantasia* is involved in is not the proper sense of intentionality under discussion here, even though *phantasia*'s role of presenting the sensible images for the composition of immanent content underlies intentionality.

Conclusion

Perceptual activities such as memory, recollection and dreams reveal the characteristic of the immanent content by virtue of *phantasia*'s power to present and manipulate the inner image in psychological life. In this way, when we imagine,²⁶⁹ memorize, recollect, and dream, there is always immanent content that is imagined, memorized, recollected or dreamed. In Aristotle's elaboration, the imagined, the memorized, the recollected and the dreamed stand in relation to the reality to some extent. Meanwhile, these are activities that occur under perceptual awareness, and that is what makes us aware of the immanent content of imagination, memory, recollect and dream. However, Aristotle does not depict an active directedness from the psychic faculty to the object, but a relation (for instance, a likeness) between what is immanent and the external object.

We should be cautious about two senses of intention: one is theoretical while the other one is practical. The practical sense is expressed through intentional action in which *phantasia*'s function is to provoke appetite to stimulate movement, but that is not what we are seeking in the theoretical sense of intentionality, even though the latter also requires a composition of immanent content. The practical intentional action is better understood as occurring after the composition of immanent content – for example, an immanent content composed in sense-perception or by virtue of *phantasia*. Based on this immanent content, the sensing subject can discern between the pleasure or pain and take the corresponding action. Therefore, the sensing subject is stimulated to move is an intentional action based on immanent content, but it is a practical intention. Meanwhile, if we regard the perceptual soul as a whole which is composed of the capacities of receiving form without matter, perceptual desire, perceptual *phantasia*, and perceptual motion, then it turns out that even though the actions of the perceptual desire and *phantasia* have the characteristic of selecting something out from the context, that is more accurately called intentional action in the practical sense.

Hence, what role can *phantasia* play with regard to the operation of intentionality? If we regard the awareness of the immanent content as a criterion of intentionality, then it is clear that *phantasia* is involved in the composition of

²⁶⁹ Imagine here indicates only one activity of *phantasia*.

immanent content in many ways, by rightly or wrongly presenting what is the case, or by creating new images. Aristotle is cautious to avoid stating that the immanent content becomes an isolated thing and this is the reason why he carefully proposes the relation of likeness between the inner image and previous events. In this way, intentionality is found in Aristotle as the awareness of the immanent content in many cognitive activities, while the immanent content is always in some way related to the external world.

CHAPTER 4: THE ROOTS OF INTENTIONALITY IN THE THEORY OF INTELLECT

Bearing our general description of intentionality in mind, I shall now deal with the roots of intentionality found in Aristotle's theory of intellect. We shall begin by detailing how Aristotle elaborates his theory of intellect, and then identify its possible correlation to intentionality in terms of immanent content and intentional directedness.

Generally speaking, immanent content means that in the psychic activity, the psychic content comes into being when the object is presented. It is impossible to say that when I am thinking, there is nothing in my mind, or when I am desiring, that I am desiring nothing. In our chapter on the roots of intentionality in perception, we have confirmed the notion that the sensible object directly determines the perceptual content. When it comes to intellect, the various intellectual objects provide much diversity for the composition of the intellectual content. For example, non-existent objects, state of affairs, abstract objects, simple concepts, etc. Thus, the investigation of the intellectual mechanism pertaining to how these intelligible objects are cognized will help us to elaborate the formation of immanent content.

As we have seen, intentional directedness is always connected with an intentional relation between the mental act and the intentional object. Therefore, an explanation of the ontology of non-existing objects (such as the ghost or unicorn) is required. However, the characteristic of immanent content does not have this complication. Instead, whether the object exists or not, we can always become aware of it by the representative or informative content about this object. Interestingly enough, Aristotle depicts intellect as a distinct and higher-level capacity compared to perception – which can carry out more complex activities, such as reasoning, contemplating, thinking, etc. One peculiar feature is that, by virtue of intellect, we can actively initiate these psychic activities or think whatever we want (*DA* 429b10). In addition, Aristotle speaks of an active intellect as part of the intellectual apparatus. Therefore, we shall carefully deal with it to see whether it echoes the characteristic of intentional directedness or not.

To be honest, it will be virtually impossible to produce an undisputed interpretation of Aristotle's intellectual theory, since it is already a furious battlefield inundated with commentators and scholars at odds with each other. However, by clarifying the mechanism of intellect and its application, a series of puzzling issues will be disclosed. The investigation of these issues will be necessary for us to find the traces

of intentionality in intellect which we are seeking. As such, my first step in this chapter will be to put forward my interpretation of the theory of intellect.

4.1 The mechanism of intellect

Aristotle's primary investigation of intellect can be found in *DA* III 4 to 7, in which he surveys the faculty of intellect and its objects. In *DA* III 4, he introduces the potential intellect (νοῦς δυνάμει), which is impassible and capable of receiving the form of an object (*DA* 429a15-16). In *DA* III 5, he proposes the inner mechanism of the structure of intellect, separating it into passive intellect (νοῦς παθητικός) and active intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός), but this causes confusion. *DA* III 6 concerns the intelligible objects – that is, the indivisibles, combining propositions and abstract objects. *DA* III 7 discusses the role of the image in thought, and it provides a supplement to a comprehensive picture of how thinking is accomplished. Among these four chapters, *DA* III 4 and 5 are about the structure of intellect – that is, the general intellectual soul, and the active and passive factor of intellect. *DA* III 6 and 7 explain the application of intellect and how we interpret intelligible objects. In examining these concepts, I shall divide Aristotle's elaboration into two parts: the first part focusing on the mechanism of intellect, found in *DA* III 4-5; the second part on the application of intellect based in *DA* III 6-7.

The section on intellect in *DA* is generally confusing and complicated by a long tradition of commentary and interpretation. Concretely speaking, the issues are primarily as follows: Is the potential intellect (νοῦς δυνάμει) in *DA* III 4 the same as or different from the passive intellect (νοῦς παθητικός) in *DA* III 5? What is the distinctive characteristic and nature of the active intellect? Is it of divine or human nature? Further, are the passive intellect and the active intellect two aspects of a single intellect or are they two distinct intellects? How are we to interpret the light and art analogy in the description of the active intellect? How is thought initiated? I have to concede that diving into all of these puzzles will not contribute much to my aim of surveying intentionality in this chapter, even though a reasonable interpretation of intellect is needed to illuminate my own questions. Considering my specific goal of probing the intentionality in intellect, I will tackle the more directly relevant puzzles. For instance, I will set aside the long quarrel regarding the divine or human nature of the active intellect, and focus instead on a workable interpretation of the relation of the passive intellect and the active intellect, so as to elaborate the mechanism of intellect and how its activity is initiated. More details will be revealed along with the following elaboration of intellect. First, let's examine the intellectual mechanism, the potential intellect and the ontology of intellect.

4.1.1 The potential intellect that is able to think all things

Before Aristotle, intellect (*nous*) had long been regarded as a mind with the ability to know. Aristotle follows this tradition in his inclination of regarding intellect as something connected with knowledge or reasoning. He especially refers to his predecessor, Anaxagoras, who claims that the full range of intellectual objects should be attributed to the purity of mind absent from all admixture. Plainly, Aristotle accepts this view and claims that “everything is a possible object of thought” (DA 429a18), but he also conservatively presupposes the impassive characteristic of thinking by the analogy of the perceptual soul and the intellectual soul.²⁷⁰ Aristotle notices that the impassivity between perception and thinking is somewhat different.²⁷¹ Thus, the question inevitably arises that, “if thinking is a passive affection, then if mind is simple and impassible and has nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras says, how it can come to think at all?” (DA 429b25) This question inquires after the initiative power and the mechanism of thinking,²⁷² and the answer to it is not only the key for the interpretation of intellect but is also closely related to my topic of intentionality. Next, I will explain why and how Aristotle depicts intellect as passive, simple, impassible and has nothing in common with anything else, and then in the next part I shall elaborate on the mechanism about how the intellect can come to think.

Although Aristotle agrees that thinking and understanding can be regarded as akin to a form of perceiving, he is opposed to some of his predecessors’ view that perceiving and thinking are the same. As to perception, the perceptual soul’s grasp of the sensible content is specific because the sensible object is present, and the sensible form can directly act upon the sense organ through the medium. In line with this, the perceptual soul naturally receives sensible information. Different from the sense perception’s straightforward reception of the present object, intellection is much more complicated, and Aristotle uses the active intellect and the passive intellect to explain it.

The difference between sensation and thinking mainly lies in two areas. First, the peculiarity of the intelligible object should be noted. The intelligible object may

²⁷⁰ DA 430a 10-25.

²⁷¹ “Observation of the sense-organs and their employment reveals a distinction between the impassibility of the sensitive faculty and that of the faculty of intellect. After strong stimulation of a sense, we are less able to exercise it than before, as, e.g. in the case of a loud sound we cannot hear easily immediately after, or in the case of a bright colour or a powerful odour we cannot see or smell. But in the case of thought thinking about a highly thinkable object renders it more and not less able afterwards to think of less thinkable objects: the reason is that while the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, thought is separable from it.” DA 429a29-429b5.

²⁷² Kosman (1992) regards DA III 5 as answering the question about why we are not always thinking and why thinking is not always taking place.

neither exist in the external world nor be present to us. For example, in theoretical thinking or mathematical contemplation, the object that we ponder is knowledge within the mind or even a new composition in the soul, rather than something external or present to us. Second, there is no restriction for the intellectual object; whereas when it comes to perception, the involvement of the sense organ limits the scope of the sensible objects that can be perceived. The sensible objects that can be perceived is not only limited in kind but also confined to a certain spectrum.²⁷³ That is because being the material component, the sense organ naturally has physiological restrictions. Meanwhile, it implies that there is no bodily restriction for thinking.²⁷⁴ The function of the intellectual soul is far more extensive than that of the perceptual soul so that we human beings can think whatever we want (*DA* 429b10).

The peculiarity and the absence of restrictions on the intelligible object require an intellectual soul which can receive all kinds of intelligible forms. That is why intellect is potentially everything. There is no bodily organ for the intellectual soul and the intellectual soul is unmixed with anything, making it capable of having everything as its objects. That is also the reason why Aristotle says that it is a good idea to call the intellectual soul “the place of forms” (*DA* 429a28). Furthermore, thought is also able to think of itself. Since thought is potentially all things, Aristotle may attribute thought itself as its object as well: “thought is itself thinkable in the same way as its objects are” (*DA* 430a1-5). Also, thought as an object is a form which is separated from matter, and thus can be thought by the thinking soul directly.

Henceforth, it is appropriate and necessary to regard the thinking soul as potentially all things. That is to say, when we reckon that we can think anything, we are implying exactly that potential, incorporeal intellect. Aristotle claims that thought has the potential to become all its objects (*DA* 429a15-16). In addition, Aristotle states that it is “somehow the intelligible in potentiality, but not by way of being-fully-itself until it thinks them” (*DA* 429b30). In these claims, we meet the doctrine of potentiality and actuality once again, which works as the fundamental principle in thinking, as it

²⁷³ Because the sense organ is the material substrate of the perceptual soul, and it is the sense organ that suffers the affection of the sensible object, so the sense organ may be injured. For example, a loud noise exceeds the limitation of our hearing will harm the ear. But it is not the case for thinking. We all have the shared experience that the stronger and deeper we think, the more profound impression we will have. As Aristotle depicts, “after a sense perceives something very perceptible, it cannot perceive; after hearing very loud sounds, it cannot hear sound.....but whenever intellect understands something that is very intelligible, it understands more, or less, about inferior objects.” (*DA* 429b4)

²⁷⁴ I agree with Malcolm F. Lowe (1993) who lists three distinctions between sensing and thinking, based on *DA* III.4: 1) there is no bodily organ for thinking; 2) although both of them need stimulus at first, mind can develop to operate autonomously; 3) the manner of being affected and unaffected is not the same in the case of sensing and thinking.

does in sensation. It reminds us of the depiction of a knower's potentiality/actuality in *DA* II 5, where it depicts different levels of thinking:

We can speak of something as a knower either as when we say that man is a knower, meaning that man falls within the class of beings that know or have the knowledge or as when we are speaking of a man who possesses a knowledge of grammar. Each of these has a potentiality, but not in the same way: the one because his kind or matter is such and such, the other because he can reflect when he wants to if nothing external prevents him. There is the man who is already reflecting—he is a knower in actuality, and the most proper sense is knowing, e.g. this A. Both the former are potential knowers, who realize their respective potentialities, the one by change of quality, i.e. repeated transitions from one state to its opposite under instruction, the other in another way by the transition from the inactive possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise.” (*DA* 417a23-417b1)

Under this explication, Aristotle provides two stages of potentiality: one stage is that we can gain knowledge but also one where we have yet not acquired that knowledge; the other stage is that we have already acquired that knowledge but have not yet applied it. Both of these stages are potentialities which require different conditions to be actualized. We call the first stage the first potentiality, and the second stage the second potentiality or first actuality. Take thought as an example: thought is potentially anything, meaning that we have the thinking capacity to think whatever we want but have not used it yet. This is the second potentiality or first actuality since we already possess this capacity to do so. When we are actually thinking about an object, this second potentiality or first actuality is actualized.

When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows is said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; and thought is then able to think of itself. (*DA* 429b 6-9)

When someone comes to be a knower, both stages are necessary: the first stage is to actualize the potentiality to accumulate knowledge, while the second stage actualizes the potentiality to exercise knowledge.²⁷⁵ However, the question of how thinking is

²⁷⁵ De Haas (2020) states that at birth we have only the first potentiality of intellect to receive the intelligible object, and it is with the help of memory that leads to experience and individual instances of thought concerning forms or concepts gradually which add up to the first actuality referred to as knowledge of general concepts and truths.

initiated concerns the intellectual soul moving from first actuality to second actuality, rather than the accumulating stage from potentiality 1 to potentiality 2. It is in the second stage that the active factor in the thinking activity is revealed. Next, I shall probe how thought is initiated based on the intellectual mechanism Aristotle proposes in *DA* III 5.

4.1.2 The structure of the intellectual mechanism

Aristotle proposes the active intellect and the passive intellect in *DA* III 5 to explicate the inner cognitive mechanism of thinking. It seems that Aristotle's proposal is aimed at solving the problem left in *DA* III 4, that "if thinking is a passive affection, then if the mind is simple and impassible and has nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras says how it can come to think at all?" (*DA* 429b25). In the previous part, we elaborated on the intellectual soul's potential to be all of the intellectual objects. However, there must be an active power to actualize this potential intellect. The structure of the intellectual mechanism is that:

(a) Since, however, in every nature there is something that is material for each kind (which is all those things in potential), while there is something else causal and active, by which they are all produced (for example, the way art is in relation to its material), these differences must necessarily also be present in the soul. (b) And indeed there is one sort of intellect that is such by becoming all things, and another by producing all things, as a kind of active disposition like light; (c) for, in some way, light makes the colors that exist in potential be colors at work. (d) And this latter intellect is separate and unmixed and not acted upon since it has being-at-work as its substantial being (for that which acts is always of higher stature than that which is acted upon, and so too the governing principle than the material). (e) Knowledge at work is the same thing as the thing it knows; knowledge as potential is prior in time in the particular knower but viewed more generally it is not even prior in time—for it is not at one time thinking and at another not thinking. (f) Only when separated is this just what it is, and this alone is undying and eternal. But we do not remember, because this is not acted upon, while the intellect that is acted upon is perishable, and without it, nothing thinks. (*DA* 430a10-25 tr. Mark Shiffman)

This elaboration of the active intellect gave rise to a heated discussion among his commentators. For example, past philosophers have asked whether this intellect is divine (Alexander of Aphrodisias) or human (Themistius, Thomas Aquinas,

Brentano).²⁷⁶ In contemporary interpretations, the supporters of the human interpretation are Hicks,²⁷⁷ Ross,²⁷⁸ Kosman,²⁷⁹ Polansky,²⁸⁰ De Haas,²⁸¹ Wedin;²⁸² whereas supporters of the divine interpretation include Frede²⁸³ and Caston,²⁸⁴ and so the debate continues.²⁸⁵ Even though I will not be going into the minutiae of their discussions concerning whether the active intellect is of the divine or human mind, a brief introduction of this issue can provide us with some insight. But I feel that I should however indicate that I am in favor of a human interpretation, based on my intuitive rejection of the divine interpretation – after all, since thought is the only divine capability attributed to God, and if the active intellect is a divine factor, then the divine intellect can only think or contemplate itself at all times, which is inconsistent with Aristotle’s depiction of intellect in *De anima*.²⁸⁶

²⁷⁶ Themistius is aware that the productive intellect humans is from Aristotle’s statement that “this alone is immortal and eternal.” It is quite intuitive and literal to infer that it is a part of the human soul because there is mortal and perishable intellect in the human soul and it makes sense for Aristotle to stress that the productive intellect in the human soul alone is immortal and eternal. Moreover, using the light metaphor, light is eternity and imperishability. But compared to Plato’s sun metaphor, light can be divided among the organs of sight and it is of a human being. See Themistius (1996). *On Aristotle On the Soul*.

Further, Brentano holds that the divine reading of the active intellect is in contradiction to each of Aristotle’s other utterances concerning the deity. As such, he believes that since the active principle of thought is out of thinking rather than from outside—and since the active intellect (*nous poietikos*) is the active principle of thinking, therefore—there is no extra necessity to prove that it belongs to the soul of the human being. Worth noting, Brentano states that he is following Themistius and Thomas Aquinas in stressing that not only the material principle but also the active principle is found in our soul from Aristotle’s statement that “en te psyche hyparchein tautas tas diaphoras”, and hence neither is alien to man’s nature. (p.109-111.) See: Brentano, *PA*.

²⁷⁷ See: Hicks’s commentary on Aristotle’s *De Anima*. 1907.

²⁷⁸ Ross (1961) is also a supporter of human-interpretation of the active intellect.

²⁷⁹ Except for holding a human-interpretation, Kosman (1992) ascribes the maker mind as what brings the first actuality of thinking into the second actuality. Nous—or to say the intellectual activity—is a principle of active consciousness to dematerialize the object and receive selective form without matter, as well as to distinguish and discriminate. The maker mind is not only the foundation for psychological theory but also for theology by linking the human mind with the divine source of the world’s order.

²⁸⁰ In Polansky’s (2007) detailed commentary of *De Anima*, he agrees with a human-interpretation of the active intellect.

²⁸¹ De Haas (2020) is in favor of a human interpretation of the active intellect.

²⁸² Wedin (1988) says that human thought is neither fully divine nor ontologically separate.

²⁸³ Frede (2008) supposes that if *DA* III.5 is about non-passive, non-receptive activity of the divine mind, then III.4 should be about the explication of human’s passive and receptive mind.

²⁸⁴ Caston (1999) proposes that passive and active intellect are two types of intellect.

²⁸⁵ It is worth noting that, although they take different approaches to the active intellect, most of modern scholars hold the identity between the receptive intellect in *DA* III.4 and the passive intellect in *DA* III.5.

²⁸⁶ Since I aim to probe how thinking occurs, whether the active intellect is divine or not is not relevant to my topic.

There are other issues related to *DA* III 5, such as, whether the receptive intellect in *DA* III 4 and the passive intellect in *DA* III 5 are the same intellect or different ones, as well as the relation between the passive and active intellect in *DA* III 5. As I see it, the possible approach toward having a better interpretation of the receptive intellect, the passive intellect and the active intellect can refer to the delineation of intellect elaborated in *DA* II 5 and *DA* III 4, where the two stages of potentiality are revealed. We also elaborated on this in the previous part where we described the potential characteristic of intellect. Most importantly, in this part, there will be a more explicit exposition of these concepts.

As we already know, Aristotle attributes two elements (matter and form) to each thing, in which the form is the first principle of the thing.²⁸⁷ In (a), Aristotle applies the tenet of matter and form to the thinking faculty. It should be reminded that the thinking faculty is unmixed with and separable from the body (*DA* 429b25), so the application of the matter and form analogy is just in a metaphorical sense, as Polansky emphasizes (p. 460).²⁸⁸ Taking the distinction of matter and form into consideration, it is explicitly noted that the active intellect works as the causal aspect while the passive thought performs as the material aspect. Considering that the causation in the thing is four-fold, the form therefore can be the efficient, formal or final cause. According to the art analogy, since art primarily acts as the formal cause in making artwork, the active intellect may henceforth have the same function.

The claim of (b) repeats that the passive factor is potentially all things and depicts the active intellect as the producer of all things. The analogy of the active intellect with light spells out the active intellect's capacity to make the activity possible.

In (c), Aristotle presents the light of active intellect as analogous to the natural light in perception. It is better to understand it as a metaphor. What Aristotle means is the function of light in perception, which enables perception because it allows the object to act upon the sense organ through the medium given that light is a quality of the medium. Thus, the active intellect acting as the light will have a role in providing possibility for the potential intelligible to act on the intellectual soul.

The depiction of the active intellect in (d) spells out the immaterial characteristic of it, and the claim that the governing principle is the active intellect rather than the passive intellect is correspondent to the metaphor in (a), where the active intellect is the causal and active factor.

(e) clarifies that when knowledge is the intelligible, the intellect is identical with knowledge (its object) in actuality, even though knowledge is prior in time to the

²⁸⁷ See the fundamental tenet of hylomorphism in Chapter 2, p. 58-59.

²⁸⁸ Polansky (2007).

intellectual soul when it is not cognized. This reminds us of the depiction of relatives of perception and intellect in *Categories*.²⁸⁹

In (f), Aristotle depicts the active intellect as undying and eternal when it is separate. I propose that Aristotle means “separate” just in definition, because for the occurrence of thought, both the active intellect and the passive intellect are necessary and it will never be the case that the active intellect sets apart or is separate from the intellectual mechanism of the human being. However, in definition, the active intellect can be separate, and its nature is undying and eternal. This is also where the human interpretation and divine interpretation come in. As I see it, it belongs to the human being, because the active intellect’s separation is separability in definition but not in reality. The perishable intellect plays the same role as the passive perceptual faculty, which is to be acted on by the object and becomes identical with the object in actuality.

There is in any case already considerable controversy surrounding whether the potential intellect depicted in *DA* III 4 is the same as the passive intellect in *DA* III 5.²⁹⁰ I prefer to regard them to be one and the same. As we clarified, the nature of intellect in *DA* III 4 is impassive, potential, and possible to become things. In *DA* III 5, the passive intellect is said to be all those things in potential—or by becoming all things—and it is “perishable, and without it, nothing thinks” (*DA* 429a15-16). We thus find a consistent description about the intellect in *DA* III 4 and III 5, which at least implies that they are of the same function. It makes no sense to propose two different intellects which have the same function when they can be one and the same.

The passive intellect is not what initiates thought but what is potential to become all things. By adhering to the potentiality of the intellect in *DA* II 5, the passive intellect is correspondent to potentiality at the first stage, meaning that the intellect shall undergo a change from the non-possession of the intelligible state to the possession state. Whereas the active intellect is the formal cause which illuminates the potential intelligible object, thus implying that it is in the actual state compared to the passive intellect.²⁹¹ Therefore, it is the active intellect which provides the potential intelligible form, which further acts on the passive intellect to become actualized. This

²⁸⁹ *Cat.* 7b35-8a10.

²⁹⁰ Jonathan A. Buttaci (2016) proposes that the receptive intellect in *DA* III 4 and the passive intellect in *DA* III 5 are distinct, and he provides a general investigation among scholars concerning this issue. See more in his dissertation “Thinking forms in images: Aristotle on intellectual capacities, activities and virtues”.

²⁹¹ Confronting the different commentaries such as the divergence that the active and passive intellect belong to distinct types of intellect (Caston), or that they are two aspects of a single human intellect (Polansky, Wedin), my interpretation is inclined toward Polansky’s comment that the passive and active intellect are two states of the same human intellect (potentiality and actuality) in which the active intellect is the intellect in activity.

is how the intellectual mechanism works. In the following sections, I shall investigate the ancient commentators' interpretation of the intellectual mechanism, such as Themistius, Simplicius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and several contemporary scholars' interpretation, before reaching a comprehensive picture of the intellect.

In Themistius' interpretation,²⁹² the intellect depicted in *DA* III 4 as separate, unaffected and unmixed is simply the potential intellect which appears once again in *DA* III 5. Since this potential intellect cannot perfect (Themistius uses "perfect" rather than "actualize") through itself, so there must be an actual intellect that perfects it. Correspondingly, the productive intellect which makes all things is the actual intellect. According to Themistius, this productive intellect is interpreted as directly related to the potential intellect and perfects the potential intellect. In the instance of crafting, a potential house and a statue can only receive the structure of the house or statue through the craft granting the power and imposing the form onto the materials, thus completing the compounds. Likewise, the actual intellect is to perfect the potential intellect by moving the potential intellect and thus perfecting the soul's natural disposition for thought. It implies that crafting provides the efficient and formal cause to the perfection of the potential soul. Another instance is the light metaphor. It is light that makes the medium of vision (air or water) actually transparent. Likewise, the actual intellect is just like light because it makes the potential intellect an actual intellect. The potential only has the ability to contain and store the imprints from imagination and perception, but with no ability to divide, distinct, or combine them. It is only when the productive intellect encounters the potential intellect and takes over the matter that the two become one. The potential intellect is perfected to divide, combine and deal with the imprints. Moreover, according to Themistius, the productive intellect is of the actual, active and perfecting capacity (compared to the potential intellect), and can actualize the disposition of thought. The active and efficient factor of the productive intellect is also shown from Themistius' statement that "for it is in its power, when it wishes, to comprehend and structure its thoughts since it is productive and thus the founder of these thoughts". (p. 123)²⁹³

As a Platonist, Simplicius provides an interpretation of Aristotle's intellect, which is significantly adjusted to be in accordance with Plato's soul. Simplicius regards the perfected intellect (*nous poietikos*) in *DA* III 5 as an intermediary which connects the pure perfection, the acting faculty, which is the more divine, with the secondary intellect or proceed intellect which is purely passive and potential and which needs to be acted upon. The perfected intellect is depicted as potential in the second

²⁹² For a comprehensive interpretation of Themistius's philosophy of mind, see De Haas, "Themistius", 2018.

²⁹³ Themistius (1996).

way as it is sometimes active and perfects itself through its activity, while sometimes passive and in need of being perfected by something else.²⁹⁴ In general, these intellects all belong to the intact soul's substance and can be unified together. But the perfected intellect can separate itself to act on the secondary life, and it can also be acted upon by the superior intellect.²⁹⁵ The superior intellect, which is pure perfection, is immortal and indestructible and always remaining, and is formulated by Simplicius to adhere to Plato's immortal self-moved soul. In his elaboration, the perfected intellect is not a fully active power and the efficient cause of intellect is the superior intellect.

Alexander of Aphrodisias regards the productive intellect as the intellect of the highest degree, and an intellect which comes into the human from outside. The nature of the productive intellect is depicted by three points: first, by the light metaphor. Since light is visible in the highest degree to lighten other visible things into visibility, the productive intellect is therefore also at such a highest level of actuality to actualize lower intellect. Second, the depiction of the productive intellect as impassible, unmixed with any matter and imperishable, is similar to the first cause. Third, even though the intelligible form, such as a concept, is intellect itself in actuality, they are not like this in potentiality. Rather, the productive intellect is always an actuality.²⁹⁶ It is in this sense that the productive intellect can be called knowledge, given that knowledge is the thing which is immaterial and does not require the intellect to separate it from matter and is always in actuality.²⁹⁷ However, it is nevertheless ambiguous concerning the cognitive mechanism of the productive intellect. As Sharple's notes in Alexander's *DA*, Alexander does not indicate how the productive intellect is productive of our thoughts.²⁹⁸ However, by referring to *The Supplement of DA*, we are a little bit relieved by Alexander's generalization that, "this thing that is both intelligible in its own and intellect in actuality comes to be the cause of the material intellect's, by reference to such a form, separating and imitating and thinking each of the enmattered forms as well, and making it intelligible. It is the intellect said to be 'from without', the productive intellect, not being a part or power of our soul, but coming to be in us from

²⁹⁴ "That he attributes rather to the forms which remain and perfect, and to those that have been perfected in the intellect that has proceeded." 244, 23. It implies that the perfected intellect can be perfected by the forms. See Simplicius (2000), *On Aristotle's On the Soul*. 3.1-5.

²⁹⁵ "In fact, even if it is perfected by the superior intellect, it is so perfected not having been torn away from it, but being joined to it and unified with it by virtue of its own high substance, so that it is united in the best possible way with what perfects it and, becoming what the thing that perfects it is, it is adequate to perfect itself." Ibid. 243, 20-24.

²⁹⁶ Alexander of Aphrodisias (2012). *De Anima*. p.82-83.

²⁹⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias (2014). *Supplement to On the Soul*. p.28. It reminds me of Polansky's supposition of treating the productive intellect as knowledge.

²⁹⁸ Ibid, see note 65.

outside, whenever we think of it, if indeed thought comes about in the apprehending of the form, and (if indeed) it is itself immaterial form, never being accompanied by matter nor being separated from matter when it is thought.”²⁹⁹ It implies that the productive intellect is the divine cause for the material intellect by providing it with intelligibility. Meanwhile, Alexander values the active power of the potential intellect in human beings as well—which is the intellect *in habitu*—by arguing that the perfected potential intellect (the intellect *in habitu*) is able to think the things that are intelligible by nature and makes sensible things intelligible to itself in the same manner as the productive intellect.³⁰⁰ During this process, the active intellect acts as an aid to assist thought.³⁰¹

It turns out that the ancient commentators to whom we referred each attribute an active factor to the active intellect. Themistius regards it as an active and efficient factor. Simplicius views it as secondary to the pure divine perfection and is empowered by this divine power to act on the potential intellect, but it is also a second potentiality to be acted upon by the divine power. Alexander holds that the active faculty is divine and comes into us from outside and it therefore possesses all the divine characteristics of being pure and active. With the ancients examined, now let us turn to contemporary interpreters.

Polansky describes the active intellect as knowledge. In his understanding, it seems that knowledge has the characteristic of the active intellect: it has the function to shed light on what a person can think, and it is pure and immaterial and ultimately unmixed with anything. Polansky begins with the analogy of knowledge and art:

- (a) Prior to thinking, mind that merely possibly thinks all things is in potentiality, and even when it has learned and is not thinking mind is somehow in potentiality, but since more prepared to think all things it has potentiality like matter ready to be given form.
- (b) Of course mind is separate and hardly matter, but the condition when it is not thinking resembles the potentiality of matter that might become whatever nature or art produces in it, and thus mind is receptive to intelligible forms that can put it to thinking.
- (c) What is active, then is like art with respect to the matter. Art is dispositional knowledge that can make things from matter. Art is the form in the soul of the craftsperson that makes as unmoved mover.
- (d) Analogously to art, what is active in the mind to generate thinking is the knowledge it has gained.
- (e) Hence Aristotle said in 429b6-10 that when someone becomes each thing as the actual knower does, then the person can think at will.
- (f) The agent aspect of intellect is just

²⁹⁹ Ibid. 108, 20-26.

³⁰⁰ Ibid. 111, 1-3.

³⁰¹ Ibid. 111, 27.

the knowledge mind has attained. It ‘makes all things’ as causing the transition from being a knower to thinking in actuality.³⁰²

I will separate the passage into several parts to make Polansky’s intention about the active intellect clear. (a) depicts the two stages of the potentiality of the mind. Either before learning (P1) or after acquiring the knowledge (P2), the mind is still potential to receive the intelligible form. In this way, the mind is passive and potential, just as that of the perceptual soul at the opening. (b) makes use of the metaphor of matter/form Aristotle puts forward at the beginning of *DA* III 5. Mind in the state of potentiality is functionally analogous to matter, while the intelligible form is what acts as the formal cause to the potential intellect. By the reception of the intelligible form, the potential intellect becomes actualized, and the actualization of the potential intellect is thought.

In (c), he spells out what is active as art compared to matter, which means that Polansky regards what is active and what is art as the form which works as the formal cause in making a craft. What role does art play in creating a craft? Referring back to *Physics* we can use the example of making a bed:

As elsewhere, so here, we should look always for the top-most cause of each thing. Thus a man builds because he is a builder, and a builder builds in accordance with the art of building; the art of building, then, is the prior cause, and similarly in all cases. (*Phys.* 196a 21-25)

From this elaboration, the technique or knowledge of crafting or making beds acts as the efficient cause, while the content of the craft or knowledge plays the formal cause. It shows that Polansky values art primarily as the form which corresponds to the matter of the craft. Following the role of art in (c), the analogy is expected to state that knowledge plays the formal cause in intellectual activity. Hence, it can be plainly followed in (d) that what is active in mind to generate thinking is the formal cause.³⁰³ It is the form which acts on the potential intellect to actualize thought. By the claim of (e),

³⁰² Polansky (2007) p.462.

³⁰³ Additional claims can be found to certify that he does have this intention in mind.

“Acquired knowledge serves as agent for thinking, with knowledge as unmoved mover leading mind to think what it knows. A knowledgeable mind need not remake itself in order to think, but it merely has to illuminate items already known.” (p. 463) “the knowledgeable mind can compellingly be called illumined or enlightened. This illumined mind only has to act within itself to give rise to thinking.” (p. 463) As well as “The knowledge is an active potentiality ever ready to cause thinking, as a kind of light, but we are not always thinking because mind that can be led to thinking is still somehow potentiality. Viewing what is agent as knowledge avoids having the active intellect something always thinking or having it as anything but an unmoved mover.” (p.465) See: Polansky (2007).

Polansky refers to Aristotle's depiction of thought at the stage of potentiality 2, a stage when the mind is able to think freely because it already possesses the knowledge which can be used for actual thought. (f) explains that the intellect at the state of potentiality 2 is a state of the knower – it is the agent aspect of intellect and it is from this state that actual thought occurs.

After declaring the possessed knowledge as the agent intellect which can act but cannot not being acted on, there must be something responsible to be acted on in mind. This is what Aristotle refers to the mind as being capable of becoming all things. Polansky, however, wonders how one mind can be both acted upon and affected (νοῦς παθητικός) and at the same time unaffected and separate (νοῦς ποιητικός). The unaffected characteristic of the agent intellect should extend to any other aspect of mind. It cannot be that some minds are affected while some are unaffected. Thus, *phantasia* is introduced to serve as this affected, destructible, perishable factor, which is necessary for all cognitive activities.

Polansky provides the following picture of the initiation of human thought:

Dispositional knowledge already possessed illumines intelligible objects so that thinking in actuality takes place. But *phantasia* also has a role in originating human thought, in the initial development of knowledge (see *Meta.* I 1 and *Post. An.* II 19) and more pertinently here for having knowledge cause actual thinking. That is what may be referred to in the chapter as *pathetikos nous*. Dispositional knowledge is always ready to illumine, and the intelligible objects are always available for thought, but actual thinking occurs when dispositional knowledge joins with *phantasia*. *Phantasia* is the occasion or the 'proximity' of agent and patient that enables agent mind to have the intelligible objects get us thinking (see *Physics* VII 2 on the need for contact of mover and moved).³⁰⁴

Up to now, Polansky explains how the active intellect works in the occurrence of thought.³⁰⁵ He does not believe that something is surprising or divine about this agent intellect, as the possessed knowledge acts as the unmoved mover and is accompanied by *phantasia*.³⁰⁶ This avails the intelligible object to act on the potential intellect. Hence, a comprehensive picture for him would be:

³⁰⁴ Polansky (2007), p.470.

³⁰⁵ For more details, see "what enables thinking to occur" in Polansky's *Aristotle's De Anima*. 2007.

³⁰⁶ As we spell out from the causes in *Physics* in chapter two, the efficient cause is primarily knowledge and secondarily the human being who owns the knowledge. Polansky (2007) does refer to the person as the agent, as he says, "possessed knowledge is not sometimes thinking, but a person is, and knowledge of humankind never is something that thinks, except as individuals think." (p. 466)

(*Phantasia* accompanied with the possessed knowledge) illumine (the intelligible form) —the potential intellect.

The line above shows that *phantasia* serves as a necessary condition to help initiate thoughts. The conjunction of *phantasia* and the agent mind occasions thinking, so that the intelligible object is illumined, and can act on the potential intellect. However, as Polansky admits, this line does not provide a detailed account of how *phantasia* and dispositional knowledge give rise to thinking. It simply clarifies the mechanism of how the agent intellect works in thought.³⁰⁷ As to how thoughts are initiated, other scholars, such as Corcilius and Wedin, provide their own distinct explanations.

Corcilius invites us to focus on how the transition from potentiality 2 to actuality 2 takes place, which is the occurrence of thinking at will provided there are no external condition blocks. There are two levels of autonomy: one is that, whenever we want to think, we can. Corcilius believes that it cannot fully account for episodes of thought, “our bare wanting to think seems inappropriate to capture what seems essential about thinking” (p. 3). The other level suggested by him is that “thinking is a kind of mental act as distinguished from physical processes. It refers to a special sort of causation of episodes of thinking such as it occurs once all the necessary conditions obtain. This interpretation includes both our wanting to think and the ensuing process-conditions of thinking, especially the *phantasmata* process (p. 3).”³⁰⁸

Corcilius’ interpretation of thought accompanied by the action-context explanation is designed to oppose Wedin’s opinion that the occurrence of thinking is an inner actualization process on the level of the mind itself. Corcilius believes that Wedin’s noetic theory is incompatible with *DA* II 5 because the actualization of rational capacities (such as thinking) depends on antecedent desires and does so decisively. He believes Wedin does not pay attention to antecedent desires. As I see it, their difference lies in that Corcilius considers the context or circumstance where thinking happens outside our bare wanting to think, and Wedin is much more concerned with the intentional level of mind itself. Corcilius believes that Wedin ignores the physical process and focuses merely on the inner cognitive mechanism. He proposes that Aristotle is referring to persons who somehow desire to think. Moreover, he holds that Wedin’s limitation ignores the fact that there is much in-between our desire to think and the actual process of thinking. After all, apart from our desire, there are also other moving sources that are responsible for the initiation of thought, and there is no immediate causal step from wishing to thinking. As to him, our thoughts are

³⁰⁷ Polansky (2007), p.472.

³⁰⁸ Corcilius (2009).

embedded in action-contexts, and he divides it into three situations: instrumental contexts, non-instrumental contexts, and contexts that are neither instrumental nor non-instrumental.

Corcilius' proposal that there is an antecedent desire to initiate the act of thinking takes into consideration the conditions that arise from the intellectual mechanism itself. In his depiction of thinking in the non-instrumental contexts, which means to think of exactly the object, Corcilius proposes the following problem of intentional directedness: how can we wish to think this particular "A" for its own sake—that is, with thinking "A" as a goal—without thinking "A" already (p. 10)? In my view, if we regard desire as a thought activity as well as an antecedent condition for thinking, it is easy to see why we face this problem. Worse still, when we are to think about a particular "A", there is already a desire for "A" as object of a thought activity, and correspondingly, there will be a desire about this desire for "A", which will lead to the above problem and an infinite regress. The problem of thinking "A" as a goal which entails thinking "A" already, we can trace back to Aristotle's proposal about local movement in *DA* III 10, where Aristotle gives out the causal factor of motion:

Both of these then are capable of originating local movement, thought and appetite: thought, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. practical thought (it differs from speculative thought in the character of its end); while appetite is in every form of it relative to an end; for that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of practical thought; and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the action. It follows that there is a justification for regarding these two as the sources of movement, i.e. appetite and practical thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to the movement, the object of appetite being to it a source of stimulation. So too, when imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite.³⁰⁹

Either through thought or appetite, Aristotle does not exclude the antecedent contemplation of an end—that is to say the desired object—in causing the local movement about that end or the desired object. It seems to be the fact that before reaching that end, we already have the end in mind, which touches upon Corcilius' concern about intentional directedness.

On the one hand, this issue places the intellectual object onto the table by instantiating the object of appetite or desire in stimulating thought. The question might

³⁰⁹ *DA* 444a13-21.

be relevant as to how the intellectual object works and appears in thought.³¹⁰ On the other hand, we should be cautious here, since even though the object of appetite or desire can be regarded as the factor which initiates thought, there is a tendency to regress. After all, if it is perceptual striving or desire,³¹¹ it will be strange since the corporeal cannot initiate the non-corporeal – as Brentano proposed.³¹² If it is intellectual striving or desire, then we still need to answer how thought is initiated because intellectual striving or desire is also a thought activity. Henceforth, the question remains as to how striving or desire is initiated. Because of the incompatibility of these two concerns, Brentano abandoned both of them.

I would like to state that striving or desire can be comprehended by the intellectual soul before the thought of a particular thing occurs, though it is composed on sensory life. As I contend, there are two levels of transition in thought: the first level is from the potentiality 1 to potentiality 2 / actuality 1; the second is from potentiality 2 / actuality 1 to actuality 2, of which I have previously pointed out that the activity of thinking freely about objects should belong to the second level. Now, striving or desire could be realized as a state of utilization of the thought capacity, as it is on the second level. But before this capacity can be used, there is a long series of accumulation. For example, a baby primarily depends on the sensory capacity to interact and accumulate experience, such as what the final chapter of the *Posterior Analytics* depicts, where there should be a process of sensory reception—memory—experience—understanding. So, striving or desire does not come out of nothing. Rather, it is composed out of a sensory foundation. Hence, when asked how desire or striving is initiated, it is better to interpret it as embodied in sensory life and providing the sensible information about the intelligible object, which can be comprehended by the intellectual soul. The whole

³¹⁰ If it is the object we desire which stimulates the motion, there must be a link that connects it to our cognitive activity and presents it in the way that our intellect can receive and comprehend. Moreover, Aristotle claims that the intellectual object is constituted in the form of an image that provides the basis and starting point for thought. In the next part, I will further clarify this issue.

³¹¹ The perception is striving, or desire, and can be formulated as the remaining sensible material in the soul that provides us with the basis to have the unspecific desire or the stimulation for thinking. These sensible materials may have some characteristics about “A” accumulating in the previous cognitive activity, but will not be the counterpart of this particular “A” as it is not until the intelligible form of this particular “A” acts on the intellectual soul that our thinking gains identity as its object in actuality. So, the antecedent desire or stimulation for thinking is best understood on the perceptual level. In this way, there will not be the problem about that “wish to think this particular ‘A’ while thinking ‘A’ already.” Because before the actual thought about this particular “A,” it is our remaining knowledge or memory that stimulates the desire. The actual thinking occurs when the particular “A’s” form is received by the intellect.

³¹² In “*Nous Poietikos: survey of earlier interpretations*” (1992), Brentano says that “Aristotle teaches that there is no activity without a striving towards activity” (p. 322). In its note the translator says that the reason Brentano gives is *DA* 415b1, *GC* 336b27, *Metaph.* 1046b4, 1047b35, *DA* 433a 30.

thought occurs with the desired object at actuality 1 as the stimulation, and the identity between the intelligible object and the intellectual soul as the realization of actuality 2. Looking from this perspective, the problem of intentional directedness Corcilius concerns with will not be a problem for Aristotle.

As an alternative interpretation of the case of thinking “A” as a goal entailing thinking “A” already, I suppose that by virtue of the striving or desire of a particular object, the active part of the thinking soul can be activated to illuminate the intelligible form of this object immanent in sensible images. If there is no such intelligible form, the active intellect can compose one based on the abundant sensory information we accumulated. Only then the intelligible form gets into motion—that is, is received by the potential intellect—and the identity between the potential intellect and the intelligible form represents that the thought is complete. Since it is a two-stage thing, it is not incompatible to state that we can think about a particular “A” with some basic knowledge about it already in mind.

It is apt that Corcilius considers the external context of the occurrence of the thought activity. Therefore, we should seriously consider his proposal that thought depends on antecedent factors. If we refer to the mechanism Corcilius proposes as the external mechanism, then Wedin’s explanatory mechanism can be referred to as the inner mechanism. Different from Corcilius’ approach, Wedin provides a rather explicate description of the cognitive process on the level of mind. He regards the active mind and the receptive mind as the subsystem of intellect, and the active thought is on the lower level of the cognitive system, which produces the object of thought: “the object of thought is produced by something located, functionally, at a lower level in the system, namely, active mind. Thus, at the intentional or systemwide level, the active factor in thinking is something actual and unmoved. Mind at the intentional level is a self-mover, not an unmoved mover. It is only active mind, located at a lower level in the system, what it produces that is the analogous to the unmoved mover.”³¹³ Thus, Wedin identifies the intelligible form as the unmoved mover, which works as the efficient cause to initiate thinking, and the receptive mind is the factor which is acted upon. Meanwhile, the intellect itself is autonomous because it is a self-mover, and it is also in this sense that intellectual activity is intentional. Based on the functional elaboration of mind, Wedin builds up a two-level mechanism of thinking, in which the lower level, composed by the receptive intellect and the active intellect, is responsible for the reception of the intelligible object – while the higher level, which is the mind, is autonomously thinking. Meanwhile, he emphasizes the image’s role of representation in thinking: an image is a vehicle for thought without being identical with thought. It is

³¹³ Wedin (1988). p. 216.

how thought is represented to the subject and because of the image, our internal cognitive system can represent triangularity without requiring the object triangularity.

Wedin holds that the active thought can be regarded as an efficient cause. As an efficient cause, the active soul can initiate motion – that is, to make up the intelligible form from the image. Once the intelligible form is formed, it becomes actualized, and the actualized intelligible object once again works as an efficient cause for the passive thought, and the passive thought finally becomes actualized by receiving the intelligible form³¹⁴.

To conclude, the two levels of the intellectual mechanism Wedin proposes can be depicted as,

- (1) Higher level (intentional/systemwide level): mind (self-mover) with the active intellect as actual and unmoved;
- (2) Lower level: the active mind (mover)—intelligible object (unmoved mover) —the receptive mind.

Ultimately, Wedin emphasizes the efficient causation of the active intellect. However, as I see it, by the analogy of art and light, the active intellect is supposed to be the possessed knowledge acting as the formal cause. In *DA* III 9, Aristotle points out that “the possessor of medical knowledge is not necessarily healing, which shows that something else is required to produce action in accordance with knowledge; the knowledge alone is not the cause.” (*DA* 433a3-7) This implies that the active intellect should not be the only and primary stimulation for thought.

Corcilius and Wedin’s dispute about the initiative factor of thinking sheds light on the intentionality involved in thinking. We cannot find another activity that is more representative of intentionality than thought because of its autonomy and particular mental content. Hence, the survey about how thought is initiated can be understood as the answer as to how intentionality is initiated. That is what makes the question so

³¹⁴ To have a better understanding, Corcilius (2009) raises several rejections to Wedin’s theory. “(i) the non-metaphorical locution of *moved* and *moving parts* within the Aristotelian mind (and hence within the soul) is adequate, (ii) active and receptive mind are such parts of the mind (i.e. noetic subsystems of the human individual mind), (iii) these parts do have *contact*, (iv) the object of thought is an *unmoved* cause for episodes of thought relative to the episode caused by it, but *moved* with regard to its causation (its, as Wedin puts it, retrieval from the receptive mind), and hence the object of thought is *moved*, (v) the receptive mind (before it thinks) is nothing other than potentiality² to grasp the object of thought *and* at the same time a sort of ‘storage place’ for formerly acquired concepts, (vi) thinking persons, as hylomorphic compounds, are causally autonomous with regard to episodes of thinking only derivatively, namely insofar as their noetic sub-system ‘active mind’ is causally autonomous.” p.6.

interesting and what especially inspires me is the importance of making clear the initiative factor of thinking.

I shall begin with the analogy of the mechanism between perception and intellect. I consider that, just as the occurrence of perception requires the spatial encounter between the potential sensible object and the potential perceptual soul, there must be such a period for the encounter between the intelligible object and the potential intellectual soul before they become identical in actuality.³¹⁵ Henceforth, how does the encounter between the intellectual soul and the intelligible form come true?

To answer this question, firstly we need to probe how the intelligible form comes to be. According to the detailed analysis of *DA* III 5, Aristotle clearly asserts that the active intellect is responsible for producing the intelligible form. If we interpret the active intellect as the possessed knowledge, it is appropriate that the possessed knowledge can offer a particular object for concern, but that is not enough. Aristotle clearly points out that “the possessor of medical knowledge is not necessarily healing, which shows that something else is required to produce action in accordance with knowledge; the knowledge alone is not the cause.” (*DA* 433a3-7) Aristotle also states that the mind is not always thinking (*DA* 430a5-6), so there must be some external conditions that initiate human thought. Therefore, I shall attribute the active intellect as an auxiliary cause in initiating thought.

The proposal of treating the active intellect—or the possessed knowledge—as the cause, may have some credential in Aristotle’s claim that both the art of the sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue (*Phys.* 195a 5). But there are different opinions as to whether the possessed knowledge can be regarded as a causal explanation. According to Frede (1992), the efficient cause, such as the abstract stuff, nature or essence, is difficult to be regarded as a cause – something which in virtue of its agency enters into a causal explanation. He elaborates that Aristotle explains that it is not the sculptor nor the builder who is the efficient cause, but the art of sculpting or building. However, we typically assume the causal explanation to be the sculptor or builder. Take the instance of building a house. Frede argues that there are two different kinds of explanation. One is the art, and the other are the thoughts, beliefs and intentions of the builder to build the house according to the art. The art explanation is a good explanation, but it is not a causal one because it does not involve any reference to episodes or dispositions in the builder’s mind.³¹⁶ If one adheres to Frede’s supposition,

³¹⁵ “What thinks and what is thought are identical; for speculative knowledge and its object are identical” (*DA* 430a4-5); “Actual knowledge is identical with its object” (*DA* 430a20); “Actual knowledge is identical with its object” (*DA* 431a1); “In every case the mind which is actively thinking is the objects which it thinks.” (*DA* 431b17).

³¹⁶ Frede (1992), p.95.

then the active intellect can be a reasonable explanation about the initiation of thought, but it is not a causal explanation. The real causal factor is the episodes or dispositions in the human mind.

Everson (1997) tends to ascribe efficient causation to the possessor of the art rather than the art itself by referring to the proof in *Metaphysics*,³¹⁷ where Aristotle rejects that Plato takes Form (the non-material item) as the cause. Everson proposes that the art can be said as the efficient cause only in general, and for each particular case, it is the sculptor rather than the art that works as the cause. Both their proposals do us a favor in supporting that the active intellect, which is the possessed knowledge, is not a primary cause in thought. It is the human being that initiates thought.

Corcilius' proposal of context-embedded thought inspires me to accept multiple factors that result in the occurrence of thought. I would like to generalize several cases in which the thought activity can be initiated. As Brentano claims, every activity proceeds from a striving, and this striving is either connected with the form which has the nature for motion or maybe a desire which can freely move (p. 42).³¹⁸ The form which has the nature of motion is either in an intelligible object that is present in the external world or a residual intelligible form in the soul, just like the present sensible object incurs the occurrence of the perception if nothing prevents it. The residual intelligible form appears by virtue of *phantasmata*. That is why Polansky (2007) states "*phantasmata* also have some role in determining what we think, as the direction of the eyes governs what we see." (p.471). Meanwhile, as he admits, "it does not limit what we think to merely what it presents. Here mind once again displays some separateness from the bodily apparatus." (p. 471) This is what I want to spell out: the subject of thought is able to actively think about one particular intelligible object which may or may not be limited to *phantasmata*, or carry out a math calculation, etc. It is beyond doubt that we can ponder and think about new objects which do not have exact counterparts in the memory, but we can somewhat compose it by virtue of one or more residual images. In this way, there must be an autonomy to select or ponder a particular intelligible object. To generalize, there are several accounts for the initiation of thinking: a) initiated by the present intelligible object; b) being driven by something

³¹⁷ "All arts, i.e. productive forms of knowledge, are capacities—for they are sources of change either in something else or in the thing itself in virtue of being other." (*Met.* 1046b2-4) This gives Everson (1997) sufficient evidence to say that the source of change should be the possessor "otherwise we would need to make sense of the possibility of the patient of the change forming an accidental unity with the art." (p.49) Besides, the treatment of the rational capacity (*Met.*1046b6-7; 1048a10-11, 1048a11-15) also refutes Frede's idea that it has nothing to do with the subject's episodes or dispositions in causation. It is by desire or choice in the mind that one particular state finally results.

³¹⁸ Brentano (1977).

in memory and to think; c) especially think of a particular object. These can be regarded as antecedent conditions for the thought activity.

Human beings are active in initiating thought activities. As Aristotle claims, “it is perhaps better to say, not that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the human being does these due to the soul” (*DA* 408b12-14. tr. Shiffman). A human being is a living being that has the capacity to freely select and decide what to think and ponder. When it comes to intentionality, I propose that a human being has the efficient soul to pay attention to, consider, desire, etc. a particular object or state of affairs. Henceforth, I attribute the primary causation for thinking to the human being. The human being’s efficient power provides the condition for the encounter of the intelligible object and the intellectual soul. After the thought activity is initiated, the active intellect, which is the possessed knowledge, illumines the intelligible object which we prefer. This intelligible object acts as the first actuality upon the passive intellect, so as to actualize the potential intellect and itself into second actuality.


The active intellect’s role in assisting thought cannot be ignored. From my perspective, the primary role of the active intellect is to illuminate and provide the intelligible form. Aristotle uses an analogy of the active intellect with light. Light is an essential factor in vision as it is the actuality of the transparency. It creates the possibility for sight to come true. However, it is not light but what is percipient that finally becomes identical with the color. Light only provides the condition for the perceptual form to be received by the patient. Henceforth, in this manner, the active intellect can be analyzed as providing the possibility for actualizing the first potential intelligible form into first actuality. When the intelligible form is not being cognized, it stays as the first potentiality. It is the active intellect that actualizes the first potential intelligible form into the first actuality, thus the actualized intelligible form (which is active) can act on the potential intelligible soul (the patient) given that the potential and passive intellect should be acted upon by an active factor. It is not until the intellectual soul receives the intelligible form that it becomes identical with the intellectual object in actuality.

In a concrete example of thought, the active intellect and the receptive thought cannot separate from one another. Once the initiating factor of thought is stimulated (it can be desire, habit, or just an idea popping up, etc.), the active intellect will illumine the corresponding intelligible form from the storage of knowledge or produce the intelligible object we want, and the actualized intelligible form will act on the receptive intellect, thus realizing one thought activity. So, the function of the active intellect is just to provide the possibility for thought. For example, when we think of a tree which is green and big with its own material substance, in order for the receptive thought to accept it and become identical with it (it is impossible to have a real material tree in

our soul, what we have is only the form), the active thought will illuminate the related sensible information about this tree from our memory and provide an intelligible form engaged in image for the receptive intellect. Because the receptive soul only has the capacity to receive, it cannot make the actuality come true by itself. Similarly, the approach from the intelligible form to the receptive intellect is like that of the sensible form to the perceptual soul. The occurrence of perception requires the presence of the sensible object, within which the sensible form is an active factor.

Therefore, my interpretation is that thought is initiated by human beings. Once we automatically think, the active intellect (the possessed knowledge) illuminates the potential intelligible form, and the actualized intelligible form (accompanied with the sensible image) acts on the receptive intellect. In this operation, the active intellect is responsible for illuminating the potential intelligible while *phantasia* serves to provide a sensible image to pack the intelligible form. To be more concrete, the initiating factors of thought can be desire, the external stimulation, etc., with the active intellect as the auxiliary cause. That is to say, the efficient cause of thinking is not the active intellect, but the human being's innate autonomous power. Henceforth, it is plain to say that the intellectual activity rests on a combination of initiators: a human being who has the auxiliary function of the active intellect.

In order to get a distinct picture, I depict the mechanism of perception and intellect as follows:



From this analogy, it is evident that the difference between perception and intellect appears at the very beginning. I call this the preparatory stage. A present object is indispensable for perception, and the appearance of the present sensible object is not totally beyond the patient's concern. The patient's perceptual mechanism can only be automatically responsive to the perceptible that appears to it, and not when the participant avoids this contact – for instance, closes her eyes or covers her ears. Meanwhile, the rejection or selection of certain perceptible objects discloses that the

participant can do something about what they perceive. I'd like to propose the case of animals to investigate to what extent the patient can determine what to perceive.

In describing the capacity of animals for local motion, it is revealed that animals can pursue or avoid an end based on its impulse. As is said, "for this kind of movement is always for an end and is accompanied either by imagination or by appetite; for no animal moves except by compulsion unless it has an impulse towards or away from an object." (*DA* 432b16-17) This impulse towards or away from an object will directly influence how the animal selects and responds to the perceptible. Because of the lack of intellect, it should be supposed that animals' tendency toward the perceptible is out of physiological desire, and meanwhile, it carries out motion in the practical sense of intention. However, since (in human beings) there may be no object present for the intellect to cognize, intellect should hence make something out in the preparatory stage. It can pay attention to something in the external reality, select what we already have from the storage of memory, or create a new intelligible form from it. That is the difference between perception and intellect at the starting point. In addition, intellect reveals more autonomous characteristics and is the active power that corresponds to intentional directedness.

As we know, Brentano attributes the characteristic of intentionality to the mentally active subject, which refers to or directs to an intentional object. However, as we disclose, even though the intellect of human beings is free to think whatever it wants, its inner mechanism is much more complex. It is composed of different stages of activity. The first stage is the intelligible form's acting on the potential intellect. In this activity, the intellect is passive in receiving what acts on it. The second stage is the actualized intellectual soul, which is identical with the intelligible object. In this way, the intellectual subject is occupied with the cognized content, and Aristotle does not especially depict a relation directed from the actualized intellectual subject to the object at this stage, since it is just the actualized intellectual subject's becoming identical with the intelligible object because of the object's efficient cause. In the third stage, because we are already occupied with the psychic content based on stage two, we can selectively pay attention to or focus on the intelligible object which is composed either on a remaining image or previous knowledge, or which is external. Intentional directedness is revealed on this level.

Up to now, we have a principal picture of the intellectual mechanism, and we have come to know that the active intellect and *phantasia* help provide the intelligible object so as to compose the intellectual content in actualization.³¹⁹ The efficient cause or the initiating factor of thought is the human being with an intellect at first actuality.

³¹⁹ In 4.2 I shall develop this more thoroughly.

The person can pay attention to or select an object whether this object exists or not. But in the activity of thinking, the potential intellect is passive when being received, and actualized, by the selected object. Therefore, on the stage of intellect's receiving of the intelligible form, there is no intentional directedness.

To investigate how the intellectual soul is taking effect is a way to examine the application of the mechanism. Moreover, an integrated picture about intentionality should also consider how we cognize the object so as to compose mental content. Therefore, the clarification of the application of intellect will provide insight into the interpretation of intentionality. Next, I will explicitly elaborate what the intelligible object is and how we cognize it.

4.2 How does intellect come to comprehend objects

4.2.1 The comprehension of various intelligible objects

This part undertakes an analysis as to how intellect comes to understand different kinds of intelligible objects,³²⁰ how the external object becomes meaningful to us, and how mental content comes into being. There are two approaches to deal with these problems: one is to investigate the intellectual mechanism itself, which we already undertook in the previous part; the other is to survey the peculiarity of the intelligible object. That is to say, these two always go together. On the one hand, the mental structure makes it possible for the intellect to receive and comprehend the incoming intelligible form; on the other hand, the intelligible object should appear in a certain way so as to be received by the intellectual soul.

The complexity of intellect is expressed by its cognition of much more sophisticated objects than perception. *DA* III 6 elaborates how intellect cognizes the indivisible or undivided object, enmattered substances and their attributes, while combining propositions or thoughts, abstracts object, etc. One sort of indivisible/undivided object is the pure essence or form, and the comprehension of this sort of intelligible objects is always true because it is not a composition or combination of something. Rather, it is indivisible both in actuality and in potentiality.

There is another type of indivisible/undivided intelligibles that are usually undivided in actuality whereas divided in potentiality – such as length or quantity. As Berti and Wedin interpret it, such indivisible/undivided intelligible objects are understood from the point of potentiality/actuality. Berti holds that in actuality, the

³²⁰ To clarify the character and nature of the cognitive soul by investigating its corresponding objects is part and parcel of Aristotle's methodology and we have already touched upon it in Chapter 2, p.69-74.

indivisibles are indivisible; while in potentiality, they can be divisible.³²¹ And Wedin has a similar statement that, “although one may grasp in a single period an actually undivided object, the object is potentially a divided object. For it could be or could have been, grasped in terms of its parts in two different periods. Equally, what is divided can be grasped in an undivided thought. Neither of these can apply to divine thought because both admit of potentiality.”³²² Their commitment can be confirmed from Aristotle’s definition of “indivisible”, which means either “not capable of being divided” or “not actually divided” (*DA* 430b7-8). That the indivisible cannot be divided in actuality but in potentiality implies that there is a unified means that synthesizes the indivisible in actuality, thus enabling intellect to grasp it in a unified way at one time. In potentiality, the attributes may be separate and distinct characteristics.

Meanwhile, intellect is able to combine a particular term into a proposition. What is more, we are able to think about an assertion,³²³ predication, etc. which is always about a composition and requires judgement. Thinking of the indivisible is regarded by Aristotle as rarely going wrong because it is not necessary to make a judgement, whereas the contemplation concerning combining objects or thoughts cannot guarantee the truth, once the judgement is involved.³²⁴ It implies that the intellect possesses the discerning or judging power of its objects – especially about the combining objects.

What was stated so far shows that the intellectual soul thinks of indivisibles and combining propositions in a unified way. Thinking as the unifying principle is revealed in *Posterior Analytics* II 19, where Aristotle points out how a principle of skill and understanding is possible for intellect, and he says the starting point is found in perception. Although perception is always about the cognition of particulars, by virtue of the connate discriminatory capacity (*APo* 99b 36), there will be a primitive universal in the soul (*APo* 100a16), with which the perceptual soul can distinguish what stands out and what does not.

³²¹ Berti (1978).

³²² Wedin (1988), p.241-242.

³²³ “Assertion is the saying of something about something, just as the affirmation, and is in every case either true or false; but this is not the case with all mind: the thought of what something is according to the essence is true, and is not something about something; but, just as the seeing of the proper sensible is true, whether the pale thing is a human or not is not always true, so it is for so many things as are without matter.” (*DA* 430b26–31) Trans. Polansky.

³²⁴ “The thinking of indivisibles is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible: where the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find a sort of combining of objects of thought in a quasi-unity.” (*DA* 430a27).

The unified mean in perception is concretely described in *DA* 427a10-15 as the capacity of perceptual awareness.³²⁵ Moreover, it is mentioned once again in the depiction of intellect's cognizing of complicated objects:

With what part of itself the soul discriminates sweet from hot I have explained before and must now describe again as follows: That with which it does so is a sort of unity, but in the way a boundary is; and these things being one by analogy and numerically, are each to each as the qualities discerned are to one another (for what difference does it make whether we raise the problem of discrimination between disparates or between contraries, e.g. white and black).³²⁶

It is quite clear that there is a unified means in perception, and based on perception, a series of cognitive capacities begin:

So from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience; for memories that are many in number from a single experience. And from experience, or from the whole universal that come to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things), there comes a principle of skill and of understanding—of skill if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals with what is the case.³²⁷

The cognitive chain for the intellectual soul is from perception to memory, then to experience, and finally comes the understanding. This causal series explain how we come to know principles, which begin from fundamental and immediate principles. It is now clear that the principles could be cognized at the beginning of the demonstration through the previous retention. Moreover, based on the primitive universal principle in the perceptual soul, Aristotle also applies such a unified means to the intellect. As is said when it comes to the indivisible, even though they can be divided in potentiality, “in them too there is something indivisible (though, it may be, not separable) which gives unity to the time and the whole of length” (*DA* 430b18-20). Henceforth, it is the

³²⁵ Kahn (1992) explains perceiving of universals, he says it is not the perception that perceives universals, it must be of the marriage with nous. The perceptual soul is responsible for receiving sensible materials, while the nous is with the capacity to apprehend forms and essences. See Charles H. Kahn, “Aristotle on thinking”, p. 357-359.

³²⁶ *DA* 431a20-25.

³²⁷ *APo.* 100a3-9.

unity by means of which the intellectual soul cognizes principles, but the unity in intellect can never work without the dependence on perception.³²⁸

Considering the formulation of two stages of potentiality in intellect, we find that the first potentiality is the stage of ignorance which serves to passively receive the intelligible forms. All the forms received at this stage will be accumulated and stored in a collection of knowledge, up to the point where we can freely initiate thought. That is to say, the stimulating factor for initiating thought is at the level of second potentiality, and it is from this stage that we have the unified means to discriminate and judge the intelligible input. Hence, unlike perception, which possesses a discriminative power from the very beginning, intellect needs an accumulation process. Meanwhile, the perceptual means provided by perception is not an active element as we saw in the last chapter. The unified means of intellect, on the contrary, plays an active role in that it can synthesize and judge composite propositions. Hence, it is appropriate to attribute the active factor of intellect to the unified means or its discerning/judging capacity.

As such, the intellect is characterized by the fundamental universal principle, which enables it to comprehend universals. The investigation of the intellect's capacity to comprehend indivisible objects, assertions, propositions, principles, and universals, etc. indicate how we can intentionally interpret objects. The intellectual activities are intentional activities because they are carried out by the intellectual power, which possesses an active, unified means to judge objects, so as to deal with all kinds of objects and make various appearances meaningful for us.

4.2.2 The role of image in thinking

As we already pointed out, the intelligible is received by the intellectual soul. Importantly, the intelligible object is presented with the aid of *phantasia*, which is able to present and manipulate inner images. I shall follow the image-line here as I did in the explication of memory, recollection, and dream, to further investigate the internal operation of the intellect.

The elaboration of *phantasia* that is after the theory of perception and before the theory of intellect arises out of Aristotle's concern to depict intellect by virtue of *phantasia*, especially image (*phantasma*). *Phantasia* is a sub-faculty belonging to the faculty of perception such that it can share the same present object with perception. The difference lies in that *phantasia* can call up sensible information from the past

³²⁸ In *DA* 431a 10-12, 19-20, Aristotle repeats the unified means in perception, by which his real aim is to introduce intellect's dependence on the sensible image.

while perception can only receive the present sensible forms. In various cognitive activities, *phantasia* plays a role in providing residual images from memory.

The claim that thinking takes effect based on the image is mainly expressed in *DA* III 7 and 8:

(a) to the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad, it avoids or pursues them). (b) That is why the soul never thinks without an image. (c) The process is like that in which the air modifies the pupil in this or that way, and the pupil transmits the modification to some third thing (and similarly in hearing), (d) while the ultimate point of arrival is one, a single mean, with different manners of being. (*DA* 431a15-20)

Perception provides us with the sensible qualities, while the higher faculty (thinking) depends on the sensible qualities to construct deliberative activity. When the sensible object is absent, it is the retained image or previous contents of perception that works as the sensible information for thinking. That is why (a), (b) says that the images/contents of perception are necessary for thinking. (c) constructs an analogy between how the image works in thinking and how the pupil works in perception. Unlike perception, which is composed of the sensible object, the medium (air, water or flesh) and the sense organ, there is no medium for the intellectual object to act through. But the analogy in (c) shows that the image can act as the medium for the intellectual faculty as it is the form that is embodied in the image. As to (d), it corresponds to the previous paragraph's claim, "the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not different, either from one another or from the faculty of sense-perception. But their being is different" (*DA* 431a10-15). Aristotle draws an analogy between the thinking faculty and the central sense to claim that there can be many kinds of intellectual activities. Even though their beings are different, they all belong to the same faculty: intellect.

Now, attention should be paid to the analogy of (c), which indicates that the image provides the intelligible form to the thinking agent. As declared in *DA* 431b1, "the faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images.....where there is no sensation, and it is engaged upon the images it is moved to pursuit or avoidance." Henceforth, we grasp the intelligible form in the image as the image is not merely an encoding of the present circumstance, but also a combination of other related sensible materials that are retained in the soul. We can also regard the sensible image as knowledge or a collection of sensible forms, both retained and present. The sensible image provides us with material to carry on the cognitive activity. This explains the case of theoretical thinking, when we can reconstruct and arrange the episode in our soul to strengthen our thinking:

(a) Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, (b) the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things. (c) Hence no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, (d) and when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; (e) for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter. (*DA* 432a3-9)

(a), (b), (c) emphasize the necessary presence of the sensible image for thinking. The objects of thought—which can be both individuals and universals—are in the sensible image, indicating that: first, it reveals a consistent sequence in our psychological activity. Thinking is inseparable from sensation— that is to say, thinking occurs based on the sensible activity and thinking is impossible with an agent who has no faculty of sensation. Second, what is cognized by the intellectual soul is the intelligible form. As Aristotle argues, the faculty of knowledge is potentially their forms, and it is not the stone that is present (*DA* 431b29-29). Let alone the fact that Aristotle likens thought—which is the form of forms—to the hand in that a hand is a tool of tools (*DA* 432a1-3). Third, the intelligible form, abstract as it is, will ultimately appear in the soul as embodied in the sensible image – that is to say, the sensible information assists our thinking.

The intellectual object's conjunction with the sensible form directly follows from Aristotle's claim in *DA* III 7, that the faculty of intellectual conjures the forms in the images (*DA* 431b2). That is why (d) claims that when the mind is actively aware of something, an image comes along. (e) once again verifies that the image is like the sensible form without matter.

I would like to refer to the role images play in thoughts to that of a tool or vehicle, in that the intelligible form appears to us by the vehicle of the image. To make it clear, it is the sensible image that packages the intelligible form and enriches its details and context and presents abundant and comprehensive intelligible materials for thinking. The conjunction of the intellectual object and the sensible image shows that the sensible form could be more concrete than the intellectual form. The intellectual object can be both universal and particular, whereas the sensible image is primarily of particulars. Therefore, it is possible that the relatively abstract intelligible object can be interpreted by means of perception. This provides us with another approach as to how we intentionally make sense of the intelligible object and, together with the one we proposed beforehand, that there is a unified mean or principle in the intellectual soul.

Malcolm F. Lowe distinguishes two kinds of thinking or two levels of thinking which are separately based on sensation and imagination. The former is called apprehensive thinking and happens in the first place before the latter level, the autonomous thinking. As to him, the object of apprehensive thinking is provided by the

sensible process, whereas the object of autonomous thinking is an image supplied by *phantasia*.³²⁹ Wedin rejects this distinction on account of two considerations: first, the object of thought is unrestricted, so there is no need to divide them into several categories; second, it is not said that only autonomous thinking requires the image.³³⁰ As it stands, I agree with Wedin's rejection. In my view, Lowe's distinction is strictly based on the difference between perception and *phantasia*, inferring that they are two distinct cognitive activities. But it is worth noting that *phantasia* occurs alongside perception. For instance, take the case "the sun seems to be a foot long in diameter", perception and *phantasia* overlap into one activity. We perceive the sun as well as being deceived by the image that *phantasia* provides us. And it is hard to say whether thinking that is based on this situation is an apprehensive thinking or autonomous thinking. Meanwhile, it seems that as to Lowe, once there is perception and *phantasia*, the occurrence of thinking naturally follows. But Aristotle's claim that "thought is not always thinking....." (*DA* 430a5-6) suggests that there are other conditions for the occurrence of thought.

The basic role the image plays in intellect does not assure its determinate role in what we think. In the case of sensation and memory, we can say that the corresponding *phantasmata* directly determine the content of sensation and memory. But the particular content of thinking is not merely determined by *phantasmata*. For instance, each individual can have the intelligible object of an apple, but the specific contents that you and I have are different. That is to say, the immanent content of each individual based on the same *phantasmata* can be different. Each individual will have a unique immanent content.

How then is this uniqueness of the immanent content formed? The general thinking mechanism is composed of the receptive intellect and the active intellect, but the inner material that the active intellect works on varies from person to person. This can be inferred from the depiction of how knowledge is developed in *Posterior Analytics* II 19. The formation of knowledge is described as a long cognitive process involving perception, memory, experience, and then knowledge. It indicates that each person will have a different cognitive foundation for composing knowledge. Since each individual's knowledge store is different, there is therefore a uniqueness to each individual's immanent content.

³²⁹ Lowe (1993), p. 110-127.

³³⁰ Wedin (1988).

4.3 The implication of intentionality

4.3.1 The criterion of Brentano's intentionality

4.3.1.1 The early stage of intentional in-existence

Brentano traces intentional in-existence to Aristotle's claim that "the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect" (2009,67). Brentano hits the mark since, according to Aristotle's theory of intellect, the thinking soul is simply the object of thought in actuality. Concretely speaking, the intelligible form that is received by the thinking soul defines the state of the thinking subject and brings the potential thinking power to actualization. In this sense, the thinking form plays the same function in the cognitive subject – apart from the fact that the sensing form carries with it an additional alteration on the sense organ compared to what happens in thinking.

The thinking soul turns from a potential state of thinking about the object to an actualized state of thinking about this object – and in this activity, the thinking soul becomes identical with the intellectual object, which means that the thinking state is about this intellectual object. In this sense, Brentano rightly refers to Aristotle concerning his in-existence theory, even though Aristotle does not use this terminology. One should be cautious in that the intelligible form initiates an alteration in the thinking subject—namely, the actualization of the potential thinking soul—though the intelligible form itself is not an objectively existent object in the thinking subject. Moreover, Brentano depicts intentional in-existence as a reference/directedness from a mentally active subject to the immanent object in thought.³³¹

The situation is much more complicated in Aristotle. In the sense of receiving the intelligible form and being conscious of what is thinking, the thinking soul is passive insofar as it suffers an alteration from potentiality to actuality. In this sense, the intellect is the first potentiality to receive the intelligible object, and it is what Aristotle means when he states that "the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect." Aristotle does not especially describe a directedness from the active intellectual soul to its object at this stage, nor an intentional object. It is much safer to say that the passive intellectual soul is identical with the object.

But Aristotle's claim that we are free to think at will (*DA* 408b5-18), as well as the claim that thinking originates in the soul (*DA* 429b10), shows that from the perspective of a human being, we, (because of the soul) have the efficient cause to initiate thought activities and to select or pay attention to a particular object or state of

³³¹ *PES*, p. 68.

affairs.³³² It is initiated by intellect as the first actuality, at which stage the intellectual subject already has knowledge, memory, etc to initiate thinking.³³³ Therefore, it makes sense to say that the mentally active subject is directed to a particular object in general. However, this object is not the received object yet, nor is it the intentional in-existent object. In order to receive this intellectual object, it requires the passive and potential intellect to be acted by this intellectual object so as to change from potentially knowing to actually knowing.

To conclude, Brentano's intentional in-existence can be referred to the Aristotle's discussion of the intellect's potential stage in receiving the thought object. But note that there is no active directing from the potential intellect to this received object, nor can it be called the intentional object.

4.3.1.2 The later stage of Brentano's intentionality

As we know, Brentano later changes the intentionality thesis as a relation from the mental activity to the real thing—which is an independent individual entity—rather than an abstract object or universal. This modification does not correlate with Aristotle any further, since the intelligible object for Aristotle can be universals, abstractions, etc. In addition, Brentano's proposal of intentionality as being a relation or quasi-relation between the mental subject and the intentional object³³⁴ can be interpreted from different stages of intellect in Aristotle. First, it is what Aristotle refers to by the actualized thinking soul's ability to be conscious of the received object. However, for Aristotle, the actualized thinking soul's consciousness of something is inseparable from the causality from the intelligible form to the receptive thinking soul, and the potential thinking soul in this sense is passive insofar as it is acted on by the intentional object and becomes actualized and aware of its thoughts. Therefore, there will be no directedness from the intellectual subject to its object. Second, with human being as the subject, if we interpret intellect at the first actuality, we find intentional directedness or reference to the object. If Brentano means intentionality of the second approach, then it works – apart from the fact that, for Aristotle, a human being is capable of paying attention to or focus on various objects, including universals or concepts that are abandoned by Brentano.

³³² “It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul.” *DA* 408b13-14.

³³³ As we clarified in Chapter two, the state of having no knowledge is potentiality 1; the state with possess of knowledge is potentiality 2/actuality 1; and the state of freely exercising knowledge is actuality 2.

³³⁴ In general, intentionality is said of the mental act to be in relation with something. But the peculiarity of intentionality is that it can direct to or refer to non-exist objects, thus violating the rule that in one relation the two relata must exist. Therefore, Brentano later turns to the standpoint that it is a quasi-relation.

4.3.2 The criterion of general intentionality

4.3.2.1 The implication of immanent content

The intelligible object that we are to cognize is never out of nothing. Aristotle spends quite a lot of time describing the perceptual basis, or the role of *phantasia* in supporting the appearance of the intelligible object. The conjunction of the intelligible form with the image composes the psychic content for intellect after the intelligible form is being cognized. In this way the roots of immanent content come to the fore in Aristotle's theory of intellect.

That we can think of a non-existent object is one major characteristic of intentionality. How then is the immanent content of the intelligible object composed, especially concerning an object that does not exist in reality? For example, we can think of Socrates, even though Socrates already died, and we can also think of a monster which has never existed. According to Aristotle's theory of intellect, it can be inferred that the conjunction of the active intellect and *phantasia* can make use of the image stored in the soul to make up an intellectual object. The monster we think of is always made up of different sensible features we once perceived in the real world. Henceforth, the immanent content in intellectual activity is based on the intelligible object with the help of *phantasmata*. According to Aristotle, every mental activity is based on sensible life. Although we can freely think whatever we want, we will never find ourselves thinking without any perceptual basis. In thinking, the immanent content either has a counterpart outside of the soul or is based on the retained sensible material stored in the soul. But neither of these two cases are composed out of nothing.

Take Aristotle's depiction of memory as an instance. Aristotle attributes two independent modes of being to the image in memory,³³⁵ which is both in itself an inner image and a counterpart of something external. When it comes to intellect, the situation varies a little in that the image of memory is always linked to an external counterpart by likeness, whereas for theoretical thought, the intellectual object can be composed totally out of a sensible inner image, without an external counterpart.

Apart from the case of non-existent objects, the complexity of intellect also lies in the abstract and non-specific nature of the intelligible object. How does intellect come to understand these objects, and how does the object become meaningful to us? The answer is to realize how we intentionally make sense of the world. As we elaborated in the intellectual soul's comprehension of its various kinds of object, it is supposed that, on the one hand, the abstract or complicated intelligible object is composed by virtue of the sensible images before it is received by us. On the other

³³⁵ *DM* 450b25-451a3

hand, there is a unified mean or principle in the intellectual soul, which helps us to think of an abstract object or proposition in a unified way.

In sum, the roots of immanent content are found in Aristotle's theory of intellect and how it makes sense in relation to different intellectual objects.

4.3.2.2 The implication of intentional directedness

Cohoe proposes an interpretation of intentionality in Aristotle's theory of perception and thinking. For him, the intentional state or activity is expressed by virtue of the distinctive way of possessing a form, because in both perception and thought's preservative change, the cognitive powers actively cognize a form.³³⁶ I do agree that the cognitive power's cognizing of the form expresses intentionality, but it seems inappropriate to ascribe this active cognitive power to perception and intellect at their cognition stage, which, according to me, is just passively receiving the form.

Foremost, I infer that the intellect in first actuality is intentional in that it has such an active power to select or pay attention to a particular object, which can both exist or not exist.³³⁷ Human beings initiate thinking out of multiple reasons, which can be desire, habit, memory, etc. The intellectual capacity to think whatever it wants explains the characteristic of being "selective", or the "directedness" of intentionality. It is able to select intelligible objects either based on the present object or the possessed knowledge. In addition, the active factor is also expressed by virtue of the unified means of intellect, which is able to discern and judge the intelligible object. By deliberately thinking and judging, we are able to make decisions to guide our action – and that is also the difference between animals and human beings.

The active aspect of intellect explains the so-called intentional directedness in the broad sense, expressing an active directing tendency to whatever we would like to ponder on or be concerned with. But it is intellect in a different stage compared to the intellectual soul's cognition, which is operated by the active intellect and the receptive intellect with the aid of sensible image. Our thought activity is based on sensation, which provides it with the sensible image, and when there is no sensation, it is *phantasia* that deploys the image for thought. The intelligible object cannot come to us without the image. Rather, it is the process that the active intellect illuminates the

³³⁶ Cohoe (2013).

³³⁷ The specific character of the cognitive activity's grasping of the intelligible form leads to what the medieval scholars' debate of "*species intelligibilis*", which has the direct connection with what Brentano calls the intentional inexistence when he refers to the Scholastic tradition of intentionality. See: Leen Spruit (1994). *Species Intelligibility: From Perception to Knowledge--volume one, Classical Roots and medieval Discussions*. p. 43.

intelligible form, and then the intelligible form is received by the receptive thought. Moreover, as we clarified in perception, the perceptual soul and the perceptual object are better referred to as being identical in actuality rather than being involved in a relational mode. The same is true for intellect: Aristotle does not especially elaborate a relation between the intellectual soul and its object. Therefore, at this stage, the potential intellectual soul is passive when receiving the intelligible form rather than actively directed towards it. It is only in the broad sense—that is, intellect in first actuality—that intellect is able to aim to, select, refer to the intelligible object, which implies intentional directedness.

In conclusion, there are various indications of intentional directedness (in a broad sense) and immanent content to be found in Aristotle's theory of intellect. I detected the roots of intentionality in Aristotle's intellect based on my interpretation of the mechanism of thought, which I presented in the first parts of this chapter. Because of the peculiarity of the thought mechanism, we found intentional directedness located on the level of the human being. When it comes into the intellectual soul's receipt of the intelligible form, it shows no intentional directedness but follows the same pattern as perception. The immanent content in intellect is composed by virtue of receiving the intelligible object, in which the activity of *phantasmata* is always involved.

CHAPTER 5: A COMPARISON BETWEEN BRENTANO AND ARISTOTLE ON INTENTIONALITY AND THE CONTEMPORARY FOCUS OF INTENTIONALITY IN ARISTOTLE

At the very beginning of chapter one, I stated that the aim of this dissertation was firstly to investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle's psychology—which we have covered in Chapters 2 to 4; and second, to make a comparison between Brentano and Aristotle. At this stage in our journey, I will begin addressing the second task more fully than has been done in the preceding chapters.

It should be acknowledged that when Brentano referred to Aristotle in the proposal of intentional in-existence, he had by then already published a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle's work – not the least of which, Aristotle's psychology. This can be gleamed from Brentano's academic research on Aristotle before his *PES* was published. The series of works he published on Aristotle include *OSS*; *PA*; *AW*.³³⁸ The first two were written before *PES*. The necessity of a comprehensive investigation of Brentano's relation with Aristotle was previously noted by Barry Smith (1988) and Edmund Runggaldier (1989). Smith made an effort to deal with Brentano's works apart from *PES* in the hopes of achieving a more complete interpretation of Brentano's work on psychology. In addition, Runggaldier suggested that whoever wished to understand Brentano's early use of "intentional in-existence" should first explore earlier Brentano's works on Aristotle, "especially the doctrine of the multiple use of 'being' ('on', 'Seiendes') and 'is'" (p.99), so as to interpret the correlation between intentionality and in-existence. Henceforth, to adequately evaluate Aristotle's impact on Brentano's psychology—and to what extent it is revealed in Brentano's formulation of intentional in-existence—it is imperative to investigate Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle before proceeding any further.³³⁹

³³⁸ See: Brentano, F. *The Psychology of Aristotle*, 1977.

--- *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. 1973.

--- *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*. 1975.

--- *Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung*. 1978.

³³⁹ For a consideration of Brentano's other writings and their implications of Aristotle's illumination, see Smith (1988); George (1978); Runggaldier (1989).

5.1 Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's psychology

5.1.1 *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*

Brentano began his academic research working on Aristotle—expressed through his doctoral dissertation—which revealed his interest in the various senses of “being” in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*.³⁴⁰ Since Brentano valued Aquinas and Aquinas set forth the distinction between intentional existence (the content, essence, concept, etc.) and natural existence (the extra-mental object) in his own theory,³⁴¹ it is not unlikely that Brentano’s starting point regarding the ontology of being should be somewhat related with his consideration of the being of the intentional in-existence – a topic which he proposed several years later in *PES*. Chrudzimski and Smith claim that for Brentano, even the non-existent entity can be categorized as *being* in the sense of *being true*. This results from Brentano’s adoption of the Aristotelian concept of being and the Scholastic doctrine of *ens objectivum*, which means “a subject is thinking of an object A, he is said to have that object objectively (i.e. as object) in his mind.”³⁴² The objective existence of being within the mind makes sense for the in-existence object in Brentano. Even though we are unsure as to whether Brentano had the “being of intentional in-existence” in mind at this first stage, we shall see how Brentano’s early attempts culminated into his novel contribution of intentionality. In the following chapter, I will not go into the book in great detail, but I will nevertheless pick out several parts which will be of interest to our own investigation in the “being of intentional in-existence.”

Brentano uses a fourfold classification of being: accidental being; being in the sense of being true; potential and actual being; and lastly, being in the categories. It is in the sense of being true or false that Brentano touches upon the “being of immanent content” by virtue of judgement – as well as another kind of mental cognizing, “through which we grasp the undivided, the simple, and conceptually represent to ourselves the nature of things” (p.15).³⁴³ Brentano refers to Aristotle in arguing that

³⁴⁰ According to Brentano, there are four types of “being”: being in the sense of categories, being in the sense of being true, being in the sense of accidental being, being in the sense of potentiality and actuality. See: Brentano, *OSS*.

³⁴¹ “First of all I had to apprentice myself to a master. But since I was born when philosophy had fallen into most lamentable decay, I could find none better than old Aristotle. To understand him, which is not always easy, I enlisted the help of Thomas Aquinas.” (ANR, p. 291) Cf. George and Koehn, “Brentano’s relation to Aristotle”. 2004. p.20.

³⁴² Chrudzimski and Smith (2004), p.198.

³⁴³ *OSS*.

truth and falsehood cannot be found in things outside the mind (p.15); rather, mental entities have their own mode of being. In the case of judgement, these beings may not be counterparts of what they are in the extra-mental world, nor even exist in the extra-mental world –thus resulting in false judgment. Brentano, in reading Aristotle, argues that this happens both through sensation and the act of thinking. Such false sensation is thereby expressed by the common and incidental sense, given that compared to the five singular senses, the common and incidental sensible may not have a reliable appearance in the soul. In the case of thinking, thinking is false when the being it represents is not what the concept means.³⁴⁴

Brentano uses the term “representation” in his interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology to express the phenomena (or appearance of phenomena) which somehow appear to the subject through cognition.³⁴⁵ “Being” here is the existence of what we represent in thought. The truth or falsity of this is based on whether the concept represents the act of either being or not being – so also the case of sense-perception, where truth or falsity is based on whether it represents the being of the proper object or not. Therefore, if what thinking and sense-perception represent is *non-being*, then the act of thinking and sense-perception will be false.

5.1.2 *The psychology of Aristotle*

Brentano was not only interested in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, but also paid special attention to Aristotle’s psychology, which laid a foundation for his lifelong concern with psychological issues. In the following section, I shall address Brentano’s endorsement of Aristotle’s psychology to ascertain what sort of interpretation he holds to be true and which speculative discovery enables him to propose an empirical psychological framework based on a neo-Aristotelian background.

³⁴⁴ Brentano refers to Aristotle’s claim in *DA* 430b26-29. Aristotle elaborates that “the thinking of the definition in the sense of what is is for something to be is never in error.” (*DA* 430b28). Brentano interprets it as “a thought is true if it represents a being according to its concept”. Cf. Brentano. *OSS*, p.17. It spells out that Brentano uses “represent” to express “the thinking of the definition”.

³⁴⁵ Representation or phenomena composed of representations constitute the basis for Brentano’s endorsement of psychological activity. For example in *PES*, he says “nothing can be judged, nothing can be desired, nothing can be hoped or feared, if it is not represented”. p.61. Brentano distributes the term “represent” to Aristotle in his interpretation of *Met.V*. 29: “a concept, however, is false if, insofar as it is false, it represents non-being...” *OSS*, p.17.

5.1.2.1 The Objective Existence in the Cognized Subject and Material Existence in the Physical Subject

In *DA* II.5 Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of being acted on: one, is “the extinction of one of two contraries by the other”; the other, is “the maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, as actual to potential” (*DA* 417b 1-5).³⁴⁶ Sensation is considered to instantiate the second kind of being acted on. Brentano follows this endorsement and uses the example of when a warm hand touches cold and becomes colder during this sensation, there is an alteration, “but we do not sense the cold insofar as we become cold; otherwise plants and inorganic bodies would also sense. Rather, we sense the cold insofar as the cold exists objectively, i.e., as a cognized object within us –and hence, insofar as we take in the cold without being ourselves its physical subject.” (*PA*, p.54-55) He elaborates that the sensing body feels something warm because it has warmth objectively within itself. A warm object (for instance, a warm cup) has warmth physically, materially within itself (*PA*, p.54). Therefore, for Brentano, the sensing body just suffers an actualization of what is potentially in the subject.

Brentano argues that the cold exists objectively within us as the reason why the percipient subject can be altered in a way that differs from the alteration of cold caused in its physical subject. Frankly speaking, their realization substrates are different: one is the percipient subject, while the other is the physical subject. He points out two kinds of the existence of warmth: one warmth exists objectively in the cognizing subject, while the other exists physically in a warm object. We should not be astonished at this distinction since even in *OSS*, he professes a representation of being which resides in the perceiver or knower. Further, Brentano points out that the cold that exists objectively in the percipient subject is the sensible form.³⁴⁷ Therefore, the sensible form that is received in the sensing body is regarded by Brentano as having objective existence.

Brentano adopts a spiritual interpretation of the received sensible form in the cognizing subject by regarding it as an objective quality (cold, warm, or other) potentially in the subject. That is not in line with my interpretation of Aristotle concerning the alteration of the sensible form as detailed in Chapter 2. As I see it, sensation is a psychophysical process and what is sensitive can be interpreted as the power of sense and the sense organ. They are the same in function but different in being, and the sense organ is the material substrate where the percipient capacity is located. In alteration, the sense organ will suffer a qualitative change from what it is

³⁴⁶ For an explanation of these two kinds of being acted upon, see Chapter 2, p. 78-83.

³⁴⁷ *PA*, p.54.

not and the percipient soul will actualize its potentiality from having the potential capacity to actually perceiving something. In this way, different from Brentano's elaboration that what is immanent is the potential objective sensible form's being actualized—by which Brentano regards the sensible form as an entity or object that has a mode of being within the soul—I shall claim that what is immanent in perceiving is an actualized perceptual state – a state which is about the sensible object and the underlying physiological change of the sense organ. That is, for Aristotle, the sensible form is not an object that has a mode of being; rather, it is the perceptual content exist in the soul that has a mode of being.

Brentano's spiritual interpretation of the alteration in sensation enables him to stress his idea that there is an objective existence in the subject. Now it seems that in his reference to Aristotle, the so-called sensed object in the sensing subject is the objective sensible property that exist in the cognizing subject, as "Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect" (p.67). Brentano regards the immanent sensed property as the immanent object, but this is not how I interpret Aristotle. As I see it, the perceptual soul's reception of form is not in accordance with an immaterial object in the subject – but rather, a newly composed sensing state incurred by the sensible form.³⁴⁸

5.1.2.2 Inner sense

In addition to apprehending sensible forms, the perceptual soul is able to discriminate different sensible objects – for example, sweet and white. Brentano suggests that the several senses are not separate but are in fact one and the same subject. By taking in two different objects through different faculties, the subject is able to distinguish one from the other. However, Brentano refutes the proposal that there is an extra distinguishing power which is responsible for perceiving the difference between the two.³⁴⁹ Instead, Brentano states that five senses unites to a point, which works as the boundary for one to finish and the other to begin. When two sensations occur, we

³⁴⁸ For more details of my interpretation of perception, see Chapter 2.

³⁴⁹ Brentano's argument opposing a separate distinguishing power is that 1) the problem is that in actuality there can be only one sensation as to the sensory faculty. One and the same sensory faculty can only sense a single sensation at a given time. 2) if we assume that we recognize the distinction between the sweet and the white through one sense, then this is possible only if we ascribe to the sense the capacity for sensing the sweet as well as the white as such. Hence, for one and the same sensory capacity we must assume several proper objects of sense. *PA*. p.60.

recognize their difference at the moment of their change. Meanwhile, this unity of the senses is also responsible for perceiving that we see or hear. The depiction of such a unity of senses in Aristotle drives Brentano to hold that:

There is an inner sense differing from all external senses, of a special sense directed toward the inner movements of the sensitive part itself. It must be this sense that perceives not only what we sense, but also the remaining perceiving operations. For example, sensual desire, and that gives us self-consciousness to the extent to that it belongs to the sensory part (p. 64-65).

The notion of an inner sense (in this case, the sensory-consciousness) that Brentano grasps from Aristotle lays the foundation for his description of an immediate conscious experience of psychic activity – and for his proposal of empirical psychology. Since Brentano ascribes every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination as an example of a mental phenomenon, he attributes a role of mental subjectivity to the inner perception and considers it as indistinguishable from other mental acts in *PES*.³⁵⁰ For Brentano, the act of inner perception is also a case of a mental phenomenon—which shares the capacity of being reference to the intended object—but that is not Aristotle’s description of the perceptual soul. For in Aristotle, the perceptual soul does not direct to or refer to the intended object. As we clarified, in Aristotle, the common power of sense and the five singular senses are one and the same activity and belong to the passive perceptual soul, which lacks the peculiarity of mental subjectivity.³⁵¹ That is where Brentano ultimately differs from Aristotle.

5.1.2.3 Representation, *phantasia*, and non-existence

Brentano follows Aristotle in dealing with situations when there is no object present or when the perceptual faculty is dealing with the non-existent object. According to Aristotle, it is other capacities of the sensory soul (such as *phantasia*, memory, etc.), and not perception, that are the cognizing subject of a non-existent object. In these cases, it is the residual images that were composed in perception—and which remain in the sensing body—that work as the stimulator, playing a role as the perceptible object does in perception. The residual image has a distinct being that exists objectively within us, as Brentano claims that “even without sensory perception we have sensible forms objectively (as representations) within us” (p. 67). Further, Brentano describes the non-existent object as that “we remember previous seeing or hearing and have their

³⁵⁰ *PSE*, p. 60.

³⁵¹ See: Chapter 2.

representations within us even though they do not now actually exist and cannot now actually be sensed” (*PA*, p. 68). By establishing an objective being of the immanent images, Brentano attributes an independent ontological status to the intended object in cognition, whether the object exists in the external world or not. This is also the ontological basis of Brentano’s intentional in-existence.

It appears then that in *PA*, Brentano at least admits that it is the present sensible object or the residual images that act as the stimulator, rather than that the perceptual capacity itself acts as the efficient cause in Aristotle. However, in the later development of his framework of empirical psychology, Brentano adopted the view that it was the mentally active subject that was concerned with the objective object in consciousness – a notion which deviates from Aristotle.³⁵²

By virtue of representation, Brentano aims to clarify the working mechanism of *phantasia*, whose difference from sense-perception lies in that there may be no sensible object present for *phantasia*. However, the representation of the previous act of seeing or hearing will exist within us even though they do not now actually exist nor can they be sensed. In this manner, the representation that remains in the sensing body helps the agitation of *phantasia*: “There are images in which color, others in which tone, and still others in which other sensible properties form the basic determination. There are also images that have the peculiarity of that inner sense which is directed toward sensations themselves” (p. 67). This implies that in the absence of the sensible object, the inner image plays the same efficient role for *phantasia* as the sensible object plays in simulating sensation.

5.1.2.4 Sense-perception in general

Brentano interprets Aristotle’s theory of sense-perception from the causal standpoint and the formulation of four causes in *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. These causes work as such:

The affected object now receives in actuality the form it had contained potentially; for the effect is in the affected object, not in the agent, at least not in the agent as such. But that which had the capacity to be affected is actually affected by the very same thing through which that which had the capacity for action became actually active. One and the same actuality is received by the passive capacity and also actualizes the corresponding active thing; by being the affection of the one it belongs at the same time to the other as effect.³⁵³

³⁵² *PES*, p. 140.

³⁵³ *PA*, p. 43.

Brentano provides an adequate interpretation of Aristotle's depiction of sense-perception – meaning, that which is being moved or affected by the object it senses. There is a natural relation between sense and the object: the former has the power to be affected, while the object has the specific property that has the power of acting on sensation. The sensing body is only potentially possessing the sensible form – but when actualized, the sensing form of the sensible object will be received by the sensing body and have objective existence in itself.³⁵⁴ This is also the reason why sense perception does not suffer a physical corruption – but rather, a simple actualization of its potentiality. The actuality of the potentially sensing body and the actuality of the potentially sensible object are one and the same actuality and this actualization happens in the affected entity – that is, in the sensing body. The peculiarity of Brentano's interpretation is that he attributes the objective existence to the sensing form in the sensing body. He also holds a spiritual explanation of sense perception's alteration by adopting Aquinas' distinction between intentional existence (which Brentano calls objective existence) and natural existence. Ultimately, this is Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of sense perception.

5.1.2.5 Intellect

Brentano follows the line of argument that Aristotle takes in dealing with intellect, by turning to its nature and its working mechanism. For both of them, intellect is an unmixed and spiritual faculty and it functions with the aid of sensation – especially the sensing images that derive from sensation. Brentano describes the working mechanism of intellect as follows:

It is nothing but the consummate disposition of the receptive intellect to begin thinking through the influence of its own proper active principle, in the same way in which sense begins to sense through the influence of its proper object. Hence knowledge is analogous to our innate capacity for seeing and hearing and having other sensory perception (p.85).

Brentano calls the sensible image that is present in the soul as the form of memory or knowledge—which is representation—and depicts the intellect's dependence on the sensing images as relying on representation. Meanwhile, intellect itself works by

³⁵⁴ I am also inspired by Barry Smith's interpretation of Brentano's *PA*, "Forms or universals exist, accordingly, in two different ways: within the soul, and within corporeal substance. Within the former they are actual whenever the soul cognizes a species. Within the latter they become actual whenever a thing of a given species comes into existence" p.2. See Smith (1988).

transforming the sensory representation.³⁵⁵ As such, all intellectual activities, contemplative penetration of a particular thought, intentional retention, reasoning, thinking, etc., rely determinately on the sensory image. It may seem that the sensory part contains a principle to act upon the mental part, but this supposition is rejected by Brentano since the corporeal part cannot act on the intellectual thing.³⁵⁶ If the sensitive part which holds the images cannot act on the origin of the concepts, then the explanation of the origin of a single thought will be difficult.

There are two ways to produce the effect of intellect: by proceeding from the thing itself or by an impulse imparted from outside. The sensitive part cannot act on the mental part and therefore there is an intellectual principle penetrating into the sensitive part so as to make it move the intellectual soul and cognition. By distinguishing between two levels of desire, sensory desire and intellectual will, Brentano claims that there is an intellectual principle which penetrates into the sensory part and influences the sensory activity – just like sensory desire is to act on the movement of the body. This intellectual principle is not will, because it unconsciously acts on the sensitive part and causes in it an impulse to react upon the mental. That is to say, this active intellectual power acts unconsciously on the corporeal part and carries out sensory representation. However, the intellectual will is connected with the principle of intellect which unconsciously acts on the sensitive part, as different beings in one subject. Penetrating into the sensitive part, this intellectual principle generates super-corporeal things, which the corporeal cannot attain through its own power. Hence, even though the intellectual part depends on the sensory part to organize the activity, the intellectual part is still in charge.

Brentano provides three arguments for his view that this active intellectual principle does not immediately generate the thought process: first, this would dissolve the connection between sensory representation and concept; second, the intellectual part has to think continually; third, as in sensation, the influence that makes intellect into something that actually thinks must come from somewhere else. Even though the active intellectual principle does not initiate the thought process immediately, it works as an efficient cause of our thinking,³⁵⁷ and the intellectual will is thus the main factor which initiates thinking.

³⁵⁵ “The power of the intellect which acts consciously upon the body initially always brings forth a transformation of the sensory representations.” *PA*, p.105

³⁵⁶ Brentano’s argument goes that if we suppose that corporeal things can act on intellectual things (since every action is initiated by desire), we should accept that either the corporeal things contain an unconscious drive or a conscious desire to exercise such an influence. But both of these two options are implausible. *PA*, p.99.

³⁵⁷ “According to this doctrine the active intellect appears as a power of the intellectual part of our soul which acts before all thought and thus without consciousness; initially it is directed toward the sensitive

Based on this analysis, Brentano implies that what Aristotle says about *nous poietikos* in *DA* III.5 is this intellectual principle. The active principle of our thoughts does not immediately act upon the receptive intellect, but initially upon the sensitive part to make potential intelligible form – which in turn acts on the receptive intellect just in the way like the sensible form acts on what is percipient. This explains the mechanism of thinking. It is clear that Brentano later abandons Aristotle's explanation of intellectual mechanism in the sense of active intellect and receptive intellect. What he seems to adopt from Aristotle instead is the notion of the intelligible object existing within consciousness as pure intelligible and immaterial forms, as well as the intellect's capacity to abstract or grasp the intelligible form from a concrete object, which process the intellect is said to know itself secondarily:

The intellect does not by nature have a single thing actually within it [*nicht ein einziges der Dinge wirklich in sich*], and...its operation is an affection [*ein Leiden*];...it comes to know corporeal things, but...it also knows itself; that it is itself mental [*er selbst sei geistig*], that it is free of all corporeal characteristics; finally, that, although it knows itself, it does not know itself either always or in the beginning, but only secondarily. (*PA*, 88/PdA, 136)

The above quote spells out the immediate availability of our mind to gain access to what appears to it, including the act of thinking itself. This echoes with Brentano's later view in *PES*. By elaborating on Aristotle's psychology of the demarcation of the soul to its multi-cognizing activities (sensation, *phantasia*, intellect), Brentano is inspired by the Aristotelian narration about how the soul grasps and composes knowledge – and by the specific status of sensible form and intelligible form that is received in the soul, which in turn is an inspiration for his proposal of intentional inexistence. We also discover that Brentano attributes the efficient cause to the active intellect to enable the thought process, which is an approach taken by Themistius, Simplicius and Alexander (and clarified in Chapter 4). That is perhaps the reason why Brentano depicts the subject of intentional relation as a mentally active subject to direct to objects.

part and thus provides it with the necessary impulse to act back upon the intellectual part; in this way, it becomes the efficient cause of our thinking. It is the light that illumines the images, and makes noticeable to the mind's eye the intellectual within the sensory." *PA*, p.121.

5.1.3 *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*

The aim of *PES* is to set forth psychology from the empirical experience of mental phenomena. This approach is built upon Brentano's Aristotelian foundations and the influence of his contemporaries. Brentano's era witnessed the development of experimental psychology, which investigated psychological activities through quantitative analysis and lab work. Brentano, following his teacher Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-72), attempted to deal with psychology by adopting philosophical and qualitative analysis and providing philosophical rationality for our direct experience of conscious content or object.

The notion of inner perception was adopted by Brentano to express an immediate source of knowledge. These philosophical roots of inner perception can be traced back to Aristotle's formulation of the unity of senses and the identity between the psychic act and the object – which together provide first-person access to the thing itself.³⁵⁸ Further, Brentano interprets Aristotle's psychological description of the intellect as direct consciousness of our own thinking. But Brentano also modifies Aristotle's ontological formulation to suit for his own purposes. For instance, in clarifying the classification of “mental phenomena” in Aristotle, Brentano provides three categories of classification, which turn out to be a substitution of the term “mental” to what Aristotle regulates as “soul.” As to the first distinction that is made among the nutritive, sensory and rational soul, Brentano argues that Aristotle had a broader concept of the soul than simply the modern “mind” as Aristotle's formulation of the soul included plants as well.

In his second distinction, Brentano set aside the activity of plants and classifies the activity of animals and humans into what he calls “mental activities”, which reveals that Brentano was sorting out the classification based on the modern concept of “mental”, and has the classified order “determined by the degree to which their existence is general” (p.139).

In the last step, Brentano directly interprets Aristotle's classification for his aim of defining mental phenomena. This classification divides mental phenomena into thought and desire, according to which sensory activities such as perception, imagination, and memory, etc., are included into thought. The underlying consideration, according to Brentano, is that there is “a certain similarity between sensual presentation and appearance, and intellectual and conceptual presentation and

³⁵⁸ For an elaboration of the common sense and the assimilation of the percipient sense and the sensible object in actuality, see Chapter 2, p. 92-94.

affirmation” (*PES*, p.139). In this way, both the immanent perceptual and intellectual content are characterized by the mental phenomenon’s “intentional in-existence.”

Brentano proposes intentional in-existence as the mental activity’s reference to the immanent object: either as sensual presentation or intellectual and conceptual presentation. In a footnote in *PES*, Brentano further explains what he means by intentional in-existence, and I think it is valuable to quote it here:

This expression had been misunderstood in that some people thought it had to do with intention and the pursuit of a goal. In view of this, I might have done better to avoid it altogether. Instead of the term ‘intentional’ the Scholastics very frequently used the expression “objective”. This has to do with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, and, as such, is present in some manner in his consciousness, whether it is merely thought of or also desired, shunned, etc. I preferred the expression ‘intentional’ because I thought there would be an even greater danger of being misunderstood if I had described the object of thought as “objectively existing”, for modern-day thinkers use this expression to refer to what really exists as opposed to mere subjective appearances.³⁵⁹

From this explanation, we should exclude the practical sense of intention from Brentano as it turns out that what Brentano adopts from the Scholastic tradition is an ontology for what is immanent in the mentally active subject – and what is immanent is a presented object in some manner in consciousness.

We have previously elaborated on the roots of immanent content in Aristotle by clarifying the formulation of receiving an immaterial form.³⁶⁰ Brentano takes the spiritual interpretation of this principle as an immanent object with a mode of being that can be directly referred to or directed to by the mental act. However, for Aristotle, what is immanent is hardly an object in a mental act.

In the 1911 Appendix of *PES*, Brentano modifies and elaborates some of his formulations in the 1874 edition of *PES*. Brentano emphasizes that “what is characteristic of every mental activity is, as I believe I have shown, the reference to something as an object. In this respect, every mental activity seems to be something relational.” (p.211) However, this is not a relation in the strict sense, as one term of the relation—the terminus—does not need to be real. That is to say, for mental reference, the cognitive subject must exist while the cognized object can be absent in reality. Therefore, Brentano describe mental reference as “quasi-relation.” In order to clarify this point, Brentano refers to Aristotle’s distinction of relatives in *Metaphysics*, in

³⁵⁹ *PES*, p.140.

³⁶⁰ See the clarification in Chapter 2.

which Brentano assigns the intentional relation to the third group of relations – from sensation to the sensible, from thought to the thinkable.³⁶¹ Brentano believes that Aristotle's intention is to spell out a relation that is about the mental act's reference to non-exist objects. The credibility of the non-existence of an object is elaborated by Brentano by virtue of the distinction between "being" and "existing" – that is, even though the intentional object may not exist, it still has its real being.³⁶² But it seems that Brentano does not insist that the intentional object must be an immanent object, given that he argues in the 1911 edition that "one of the most important innovations is that I am no longer of the opinion that mental relation can have something other than a thing [*Reales*] as its object".³⁶³ In general terms, Brentano's later intentionality proposal is that, in every act of consciousness, the mentally active subject has something as an object – whether it exists in reality or not.

Brentano further explains how we are able to think about non-exist objects – that is, the objects that do not exist in reality. As Brentano claims:

But we have the further ability to unite the most diverse objects by identifying them with one another whether they are compatible with each other in reality or not, and we thus arrive at an integral object which has attributes, but not intuitive unity. For example, I am capable of thinking in this way of a round square, a white stallion which is black, and a red which is blue..... (*PES*, p.219).

Since, in Brentano's view, the mentally active subject is equipped with the capacity to compose a cognized object, it is not implausible that the cognized object is mentally dependent.

What Brentano means is that the mentally active subject's reference to its object is better understood as the soul's reflexive consciousness in Aristotle – given that Aristotle's depiction of perceptual awareness or consciousness in *DA* III 2, the soul is able to perceive both the sensible object as well as the sensation, which is consistent with Brentano's emphasis that what we are conscious of is both the object and the mental act of the object. It is also where Brentano certifies the direct accessibility and infallibility of the mental act. However, in my view, Aristotle's perceptual awareness is what accompanies the perceiving activity and it is not a separate active activity to

³⁶¹ *PES*, p.212-213.

³⁶² "I do not wish to bring this discussion of mental reference to a close without having given a word of consideration to the view that there is a distinction between 'being' and 'existing.' According to this view both are to be taken in a very peculiar sense. Namely, a person might be led to say that if someone is mentally referring to an object, the object really always has being just as much as he does, even if it does not always exist as he does." *PES*, p.213.

³⁶³ See the Foreword to the 1911 Edition of *PES*, the Classification of Mental Phenomena.

direct or refer to something. In addition, perceptual awareness is aware of the actualized sensible content that is in the soul and what is immanent is not a mental-dependent object.³⁶⁴

5.1.4 Descriptive Psychology

As Chisholm explains in his introduction to the English translation of *DP*, although Brentano considered descriptive psychology, he never explicitly published a book entitled *DP*. Fortunately, many of his writings and lectures about this topic have been preserved and are available for study.³⁶⁵ These originally unpublished works were organized and published as *DP*, first in German in 1982, and then translated into English in 1995. The reason why I choose to focus on this books is because Brentano both refers to Aristotle and frequently comments on the theme of intentionality within.

It is the intentional relation, the act of consciousness's being directed to something, that Brentano traces back to Aristotle. The intentional object is something that is not real, as revealed by Brentano, "as highlighted already by Aristotle, these correlates display the peculiarity that the one alone is real, [whereas] the other is not something real [*nichts Reales*]." (*DP*, p. 24) By this claim, Brentano traces the intentional relation back to Aristotle – and according to the editor's note (*DP*, 180), specifically to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, V.15, 1021 a, 30. There, Aristotle distinguishes between three categories of relatives in *Metaphysics*: the first is with respect to number; the second is with respect to power; and the last is the relation between measure and the measurable, sensation and the sensible, intellection and the intelligible. According to Hamid Taieb's observations, Brentano describes the three categories as comparative, causal, and intentional. Considering that Aristotle attributes opinion and the opinable into the third group, both Brentano and Taieb argue that it implies that the psychic relation can be directed to something that does not explicitly exist.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁴ More details about how perception works and what the perceptual faculty is aware of is clarified in Chapter 2.

³⁶⁵ Introduction, xv. *DP*. Translated and edited by Benito Müller, Routledge, 1995.

³⁶⁶ Taieb refers to Brentano's *Wahrheit und Evidenz* "[Aristoteles] teilte die Relationen in drei Klassen, von denen die eine die komparativen, die andere die kausalen, die dritte die intentionalen Relationen enthielt." (p.117) Trans. Chisholm et al., in *The True and the Evident*, (p.70). As well as Aristotle's depiction about opinion and the opinable in *De int.* and *Top.* It is not true to say that which is not, since it is opinable, and something that is; for the opinion about it is not that it is, but that it is not. (*De int.* 11, 21a32-33)

Moreover, see if the term placed in the genus has a wider denotation than the genus, as (e.g.) the opinable has, as compared with being; for both what is and what is not are opinable, so that the opinable could not be a species of being; for the genus is always wider of denotation than the species. (*Top.* 4.1, 121b2-4)

Still, in depicting the intentional relation, Brentano elaborates that the consciousness of consciousness itself, which he traces back to Aristotle, is “every consciousness, upon whatever object it is primarily directed, is concomitantly directed upon itself [*geht nebenher auf sich selbst*]. In the presenting [*im Vorstellen*] of the color hence simultaneously a presenting of this presenting. Aristotle already [emphasizes] that the psychical phenomenon contains the consciousness of itself.” (p.25) This can clearly be traced back to Aristotle’s elaboration of perceptual awareness, which perceives both the perceptible object as well as the act of perception. Further, Brentano attributes this relational characteristic to the nature of every psychical act, “The fact that there is no consciousness without any intentional relation at all is as certain as the fact that, apart from the object upon which it is primarily directed, consciousness has, on the side, itself as an object. This is, in an essential way, part of the nature of every psychical act” (p.26). Brentano’s relational interpretation of consciousness therefore expresses the characteristic of intentional directedness. When it comes to Aristotle, as we clarified, it is not the case that the perceptual awareness is actively directed to the sensible object. Rather, in my view, the relation between perceptual or intellectual consciousness and its object, is the actualized perceptual or intellectual faculty and the actualized perceptual or intelligible object, which in fact become identical in the same actualization. Henceforth, the reference to an object is not quite what Aristotle had in mind.

5.2 The divergence between Brentano and Aristotle

In this section, I shall deal with the similarities and differences between Brentano and Aristotle. Before elaborating on my own view, I will begin with an inquiry with several scholarly perspectives on the matter.

Chrudzimski³⁶⁷ highlights several points about Brentano’s intentionality:

1. The relation between subject and immanent object is an extensional relation; while the relation between subject and the external object is a pseudo-relation.
2. The immanent object has the property of the external object in a modified sense. If the property is that of the external object, then the external object exists; if not, then the external object does not exist.³⁶⁸

See Hamid Taieb. *Relational intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition*. 2018.

³⁶⁷ Chrudzimski (2013).

³⁶⁸ As is clarified in Chapter 1, there is some debate as to whether Brentano elaborates the existence/non-existence of external object or not. In my view, Brentano does not mention that the property that the intended object carries reveals the existence of the external object. In fact, we can have the intended object, which may have some properties of the external object, but this intended object may have no counterpart

Chrudzimski further concludes with several similarities and differences between Brentano and Aristotle:

1. Both introduce entities which mediate the intentional reference.
2. Both assume that it is the very same property that, on the one hand, stands before the subject's mind and, on the other hand, can be exemplified by the reference object.
3. Both introduce a certain non-standard mode of exemplifying properties.

According to Chrudzimski, the differences lie in that for Brentano, the mediating entities are immanent objects, and cognitive accessibility of the identifying properties is only encoded by immanent objects via relation IMM,³⁶⁹ and the non-standard exemplification is encoding. For Aristotle, the mediating entities are 'bare properties', and the cognitive accessibility of the identifying properties are ontologically directly by exemplification, and the non-standard exemplification is exemplification.³⁷⁰

Chrudzimski further believes that Brentano adopts from Aristotle a perceived property which has a non-standard mode of being within the subject. According to Brentano, the immanent object is an encoding (non-standard sense) of the external object. Meanwhile, in Aristotle, "a soul which is intentionally directed at something *red* takes, according to Aristotle, the 'form' of a red thing (i.e. the redness), leaving behind its 'matter', and thus becomes – as Aristotle tells us – 'in a sense' *red* " (p.5). I agree with Chrudzimski's insight that it is the characteristic of immanence that connects Brentano and Aristotle. But as to the interpretation of Aristotle's elaboration of immanence, I think the form which affects the cognized subject in Aristotle is not a bare property. Rather, the reception of the form marks that the cognitive subject is defined by the *logos* of the object and exemplifies the information coming from outside. The form is therefore the thing which defines it as it is – and when it is received in the cognitive subject, it defines the state or content of the subject. In addition, in

in the external world. For example, we can have the alien ET as an intended object which has some properties of a living body which is shared by animals and human beings, but ET nevertheless does not exist in the external world.

³⁶⁹ Chrudzimski (2013) depicts IMM as "to be in an intentional state means for Brentano to have an immanent object before one's mind, and this 'having' is symbolised in our notation as standing to the appropriate immanent entity in the relation IMM." p.4.

³⁷⁰ Ibid. p.7.

Aristotle's view, the perceptual soul is passive when receiving the sensible and immaterial form. It is therefore not plausible to suggest that the soul is intentionally directed at the sensible object in receiving its form. Further, Chrudzimski depicts the relation between the subject and the immanent object as an extensional relation, and the relation between subject and the external object as a pseudo-relation in Brentano's intentionality. However, it seems to me that at Brentano's first stage, he simply focuses on the immanent object without a clear distinction between the immanent and external object. At this time, intentionality is a reference or directedness from the mental act to the immanent object.³⁷¹ In his 1911 appendix of *PES*, he clarifies that the intentional relation is not a real one considering that the cognizing subject must exist, whereas it is unnecessary that the object that is cognized exists. However, even in his 1911 rectification, he does not claim that the relation to the immanent object is different from the relation to the external object. The intentional relation, in general, is a quasi-relation.³⁷²

Rolf George and Glen Koehn comment on the relations between Brentano and Aristotle. Of particular interest is their clarification of Brentano's finding concerning the root of intentionality in Aristotle. They regard the characteristic of the mind's ability to cognize itself, and to consider the acts of thinking or perceiving, as its own object and secondarily as a cornerstone of Brentano's own philosophy and the roots of intentionality (p.28-29).³⁷³ This establishes a peculiar inner object for the mind. George & Koehn refer to Aristotle's elaboration of the soul in potentiality and actuality so as to stress that only in actuality does the mind think and become known to itself, leading to a state in which there is an in-existent object, as the mind is thus actualized by this in-existent object. In addition, they highlight Aristotle's identification of the object of desire as the object of cognition, which lead to Brentano's position of representation in cognition.³⁷⁴ They argue that it is the intentional in-existence of an object connects Aristotle and Brentano.

³⁷¹ *PES*, p. 68.

³⁷² *PES*, p. 212-213.

³⁷³ George and Koehn refer to Brentano's claim that "knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only on the side (*en parergo*)" (pp. 85 and 89ff., *Met.* XII.9, 1074b35). See George and Koehn (2004).

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.* "Aristotle's view that the object of desire must also be an object of cognition (*De Anima* III.10, 433b10) leads directly to Brentano's position that "representation forms the basis . . . of desire and every other mental act. Nothing can be judged . . . desired, nothing can be hoped or feared if it is not represented" (*PES*, p. 61). If then the objects of desire, etc., are also objects of cognition, it follows from Aristotle's premise that no mental act can be experienced *en parergo*, or even exist, unless an object intentionally in-exists in the mind." p.30

I agree that it is the characteristic of intentional in-existence that Brentano traces back to Aristotle. In *DA* III 2, Aristotle proposes perceptual awareness which can perceive the sensible object as well as sensation itself. Brentano draws his inspiration here for the two-level object that can be referred to or directed to by the cognizing subject. Intentional in-existence is formulated by Brentano as a reference that directs a mentally active subject to the immanent object. Concretely speaking, it is the reception and actualization of the cognized object—as well as the actualized cognizing soul’s awareness—that boil down to Brentano’s proposal of the cognized subject’s reference to the object. It appears that Brentano adopts a spiritual interpretation of Aristotle’s account of perception and regards the actualized, cognized object as an immanent object. From my perspective, I can infer two conclusions: first, receiving the immaterial form in perception is not a purely spiritual process, as I argued in Chapter 2; second, what is immanent in actualization is not simply a revealing of an in-existent object but rather the cognized content. Brentano proposes that what we cognize are two-level objects: one is the object cognized; the other, the act of cognition. He attributes these two as primary and secondary objects. Considering that in most cases what we cognize is not a pure object but a description, proposition, event, etc. of an object. The act of cognition itself, as I see it, is also an event which can be described as content and that is the reason why I prefer to speak of immanent content rather than object.

Sorabji³⁷⁵ holds that Brentano interpreted “receiving form without matter” or “immaterial form” as becoming aware of the intentional object. It is Brentano’s non-literal interpretation of “receiving form without matter” that therefore leads him to the idea of intentional object. The form received by sense-perception is taken by Brentano as intentionally in-existent object. Sorabji claims that from his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, the intentional aspect of perception is revealed – but he disagrees with Brentano who says that Aristotle framed the concept of an intentional object himself, when Brentano implies “intentional in-existence” from the theory of “receiving form without matter.” Sorabji believes that this interpretation is not Aristotle’s intended meaning, but was rather influenced by the later commentators Alexander, Themistius, and Philoponus, who de-physiologized Aristotle’s theory of the reception of the immaterial form. Elsewhere³⁷⁶ Sorabji proposes that Aristotle does not incorporate the intentional object because both perceptible and intelligible are the efficient causes – neither of which are intentional objects and only the final cause such

³⁷⁵ Sorabji (1995).

³⁷⁶ Sorabji (2001).

as the object of desire can be regarded as intentional object.³⁷⁷ Sorabji therefore agrees with Caston in arguing that the intentional object is a philosophical term developed by the later Stoics, but not found in Aristotle.

Brentano's proposal of "in-existence"—in the sense that there is always an inner possession of something—can, however, be traced back to Aristotle. In this aspect, I came to a similar conclusion to Sorabji in that Sorabji claimed that the intentional aspect of perception is grounded in his physiological interpretation of sense-perception and is revealed by the formal cause of perception. Sorabji gives the example of anger, which includes the physiological process as the material cause as well as the formal cause relating to desire. He regards the formal cause of sense perception as being linked to other cognitive capacities, such as belief or concept-formation. He emphasizes that perception is a preliminary process for these higher cognitive functions, to which perception is unequal. According to Sorabji, the intentional aspect of perception—specified by the formal cause—lies in the reference of other cognitive capacities to sense-perception. The reference is demonstrated by the content of perception, as Sorabji describes, which is clarified from Aristotle's expansion of perception's function.

In general, it can be inferred that according to Sorabji, intentionality points to the reference from the active subject to the intentional object. Meanwhile, the content points to an essential component of intentionality. This description of intentionality corresponds to my working definition of intentionality as intentional directedness and immanent content – as explained in Chapter one. Both Sorabji and I do not regard the sensible and intelligible objects as intentional objects; whereas, to Sorabji's claim that the object of desire is the intentional object, I prefer to regard it as the object of practical intention – meaning that we desire to do something. This is the reason I preclude it from intentionality in the theoretical sense. When it comes to intentional content, I value Brentano's implication of awareness of what we cognize as a plausible reference to Aristotle, and indicate that this is one element which helps imply the intentional content. Since Sorabji regards perception in Aristotle as literally material change, he therefore introduces other cognitive capacities to explain the content in perception. But in my opinion, perception in Aristotle includes immanent content even without the aid of other cognitive capacities.

³⁷⁷ As to the intentional interpretation about sense-perception, I agree with Sorabji that the sensible cannot be regarded as intentional object. The reason he proposes this is that the sensible and intelligible are efficient causes, and only the final cause (such as the object of desire) can be the intentional object. That is to say, the sensible cannot be regarded as intentional because what is sensitive is not an active agent – which is to direct to the sensible object; rather, it is a patient being passively acted on so as to acquire sensible content.

When Brentano describes the two-level objects of mental phenomena, he claims that every mental act is conscious since it includes in a consciousness of itself.³⁷⁸ Take hearing for instance: its first level object is sound and the second level object is hearing. In this way, the first-level object—sound—means the external object; while the second-level object means hearing itself. These two aspects constitute the two different aspects of mental phenomena. Further, with the aid of inner consciousness, according to Brentano, every mental act is intentional and every intentionality is conscious or derived from consciousness.³⁷⁹ When he emphasizes the reference or directedness of relation from the mental act to the intentional object, he is depicting the role of consciousness: “The fact that there is no consciousness without any intentional relation at all is as certain as the fact that, apart from the object upon which it is primarily directed, consciousness, on the side, has itself as an object.”³⁸⁰

It goes almost without saying that when Brentano argues for the above point, he is adopting Aristotle’s elaboration about perceptual awareness in that we can sense the object as well as the sensation itself. This characteristic of perceptual awareness is modified by Brentano to be intentional, and according to him, the soul’s being aware of its object is called reference or directedness to the object. Brentano thus adopts Aristotle’s elaboration of the common power of sense to stress the immediate experience of mental activity itself. That is why he proposed intentional in-existence as the most characterized feature of mental phenomena, given that the consciousness of the mental act itself is in this way self-revealing. Even though in his later period, he does not keep “in-existence”, but continues to insist that the intentional relation lies in the directedness or reference from the mental act to the thing in question. The mental directedness or reference he refers to is becoming aware or conscious of something, effectively creating a correlation once again with Aristotle.

However, even though becoming aware of—or conscious of—the cognized object can be correlated to Aristotle, Aristotle does not ascribe an active role to the subject as Brentano does. As such, Brentano’s deviation from Aristotle begins with his classification of mental phenomena whereby he adopts a modern notion of the mind, which includes both the capacity of sensation as well as the ability to think, effectively replacing Aristotle’s formulation of the soul. According to the modern definition of the mind, the mind is an active subject when it comes to carrying out all kinds of mental activities. However, according to Aristotle, the perceptual soul and the intellectual soul

³⁷⁸ *PES*, p. 26.

³⁷⁹ However, in the contemporary philosophy of mind, it is not unanimously accepted that every consciousness is intentional. For more discussion on this, see Siewert, Charles (2017), “Consciousness and Intentionality”.

³⁸⁰ *PES*, p.26.

carry out different cognitive activities. Since perception is possessed by the perceptual soul rather than by the intellectual soul, Brentano instead attributes to perception the active mental feature that it does not have in Aristotle.³⁸¹ Brentano states that “in-existence”, a concept which is derived from the Scholastics tradition, means that the intended object is immanent in the mentally active subject.³⁸² But the perceptual soul is a passive faculty which shall be activated by its object and only then we can be aware of this object. Brentano makes no distinction in claiming that this mentally active subject carries out both activity of perception and thinking. In addition, when it comes to intellect according to Aristotle, even though it is free to think whatever it wants, it is still passively receiving the intelligible form that allows it to know the intelligible object. Henceforth, not only is the perceptual soul a passive entity, but the intellectual soul too is a complex entity that is not merely active.³⁸³

Brentano further claims that intentional in-existence means that the intended object is immanent in the mentally active subject (or consciousness) and this object is present to us as a sensory, intellectual or conceptual presentation.³⁸⁴ What is immanent in the cognitive activity can be traced back to Aristotle’s immaterial form, “in each case the sense-organ is capable of receiving the sensible object without its matter. That is why even when the sensible objects are gone the sensible images continue to exist in the sense-organs.”³⁸⁵ Brentano regards the immanent as having objective existence, which is the ontological basis of the intentional object. The cognitive subject’s receiving form is the change that occurs in the cognitive subject because of the formal cause. Considering that Aristotle regards the form as which defines the thing as it is, it is therefore a defining principle which defines what the nature and meaning of cognition. As such, it is difficult to accept that Aristotle depicts an intentional object which is actualized in cognition. First, in receiving the immaterial form, Aristotle does not delineate a reference to the intentional object. Second, in cognition, what is realized is the identity of the cognitive subject and the object. The cognitive subject possesses content that is said to be of or about the object, but it is not that content which is immanent nor which the subject is directing.

³⁸¹ “Hearing a sound, seeing a coloured object, feeling warmth or cold . . . every judgment, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt is a mental phenomenon [or act].” *PES*, p. 79.

³⁸² *PES*, p. 140.

³⁸³ Taieb underlines the receptive tradition of Aristotle’s theory about the cognitive subject’s activity, in which an active factor is elaborated and can be referred to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus. As it stands, Brentano’s clarification about the mentally active subject is influenced by the later Aristotelian interpretations. For more on this, see Taieb (2018).

³⁸⁴ *PES*, p. 140.

³⁸⁵ *DA* III 425b24-26.

All things considered, the intentional in-existence can find its roots in Aristotle even though there are still detailed distinctions between his work and Brentano's later theory. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian background Brentano refers to in support of this formulation of intentional in-existence falls to the wayside when he focuses on *Reales*. There, Brentano adopts sense and the intellect's immaterial receiving form in Aristotelian framework to argue for the immanent object. However, in intellect, the intellectual soul's reception of the intellectual form includes the universals and other abstractions that Brentano rejected in his later stage. Therefore, there is an inconsistency whereby Brentano continues to adopt Aristotelian framework of receiving the immaterial form. Brentano turns to the mental subject's reference to the sensible, intellectual object in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to argue for his later proposal,³⁸⁶ though the mentally active subject he attributes to Aristotle is not Aristotelian either. Most importantly, Brentano's deviation from Aristotle has its roots in their different metaphysical suppositions. We may compare Haldane's worry about Putnam that "one cannot enjoy the benefits of Aristotelian epistemological realism without accepting aspects of its attendant metaphysics" (p.61).³⁸⁷ Aristotle sets up his metaphysical foundation of cognition by a set of formulations: the theory of form and matter, potentiality and actuality, receiving form without matter, the assimilation between the knower and the known in actuality, and so forth. Brentano adopts the cognitive subject's awareness of the object from Aristotle to work for his intentionality proposal – however, he does not accept all of Aristotle's metaphysical suppositions.

5.3 Aristotle and modern philosophy of mind

From the contemporary perspective, Aristotle is hardly a substance dualist given that he does not set apart the psychic capacity and the bodily substrate as being independent from each other. The soul is the efficient, formal, and final cause of the living being. Meanwhile, the soul depends on the bodily instrument to perform its functions. This fundamental formulation of the soul-body relation enables soul to carry out psychic activities based on physiological foundation and thus both soul and body are inseparable components of the living being, with the soul endowed with the power of consciousness and cognition. As Everson claims, "in contemporary philosophy of mind, the central question is how ordinary physical substances can be capable of

³⁸⁶ PES, p. 211-212.

³⁸⁷ Lisska (2016).

consciousness and cognition, and that is not a question which lies at the heart of Aristotelian psychology.”³⁸⁸

In Aristotle’s psychological world, the higher psychic capacity relies on the lower one. For example, the intellectual capacity relies on the perceptual and the nutritive power, and the perceptual power relies on the nutritive power. In the first part of this thesis, we have seen the essential role of sense data in all other psychic activities – such as memory, dreams, recollection, and intellect. It is worth noting once more that sensation occurs with the sensible object out there working as the efficient cause. This guarantees the correlation of all psychic activities with the external world. Therefore, on Aristotle’s view, there is no doubt that psychological phenomena fit into the natural world.

At the same time, according to Aristotle, the psychic power cannot be reduced to its physiological foundation. To certify this, we have already elaborated what perception is. The occurrence of perceiving the perceptible quality is neither a spiritual event as proposed by Burnyeat—which is the perceptual subject’s ability to be aware of what is happening—nor a literal event in the same sense that the object holds the perceptible quality, as Sorabji proposed. As I see it, perceiving includes the engagement of a special kind of physiological change in the sense organ and, moreover, perception cannot be reduced to the physiological basis given that the perceptual soul suffers an alteration from potentiality to actuality to become aware of what is perceived.

The claim that mental states cannot be reduced to physical states is adopted by Cohen as revealing functionalism – a theory which Cohen claims, that mental states are defined in terms of their relations to causal inputs, behavioral output, and other mental states. According to functionalism, the relation of matter and form is contingent. Functionalism is attributed to Aristotle by other scholars as well – such as Hilary Putnam (1973), Martha Nussbaum (1978), and Christopher Shields (1988). Sorabji’s literal interpretation of perception as a physiological process is adopted to prove the functionalism in Aristotle’s philosophy. However, that is what Burnyeat rejects. In Burnyeat’s opinion, the material basis is also capable of awareness, while functionalism holds that the material basis is simply the structure which provides the basis for psychological functions. Functionalism in Aristotle is further rejected by Howard Robinson (1983), as he argues that Aristotle’s body-matter relation is dualistic, and not functionalist for that reason.³⁸⁹

Nussbaum and Putnam underline the characteristic of intentionality in Aristotle when they argue for functionalism. The reliance of functionalism on matter

³⁸⁸ Everson (1997), p.5.

³⁸⁹ For a comprehensive overview of functionalism and Aristotle, see Green (1998).

determines the essential role of matter in intentionality – which is the psychological function. According to Nussbaum and Putnum, “we cannot describe the natural functions that are the essential natures of animals and plants without making these functions embodied in some matter that is suitable to them. Matter is not only the inert background, but also the very vehicle of functioning itself.”³⁹⁰ Correspondingly, intentionality of awareness is concerned with its physical embodiment as well. The soul is regarded by them as the functional structure in and of the matter rather than as being housed in the body. The en-mattered characteristic of intentionality, they claim, frees Aristotle from Brentano’s tendency of treating all intentionality as a unitary phenomenon.³⁹¹ In my opinion, their rejection of Brentano’s spiritual interpretation of intentionality in Aristotle also contributes to this end result.

Caston values Aristotle as implying supervenience – that is, the mental supervenes on the physical and certain events can have the virtue of falling under a mental type. In such a case, the body does not hold the entire responsibility in causality – or to say, some behavior lacks a complete physical cause. He supports this by claiming that there is a downward causation of mental events. Each mental event supervenes on the physical, along with giving it causation because it falls into a mental type. He gives the example of Aristotle’s elaboration of action whereby the bodily motion results from a combination of desire and thought or *phantasia*. Caston regards this integration as the efficient cause, which affects the muscles. According to Caston, the bodily change is treated by Aristotle as an instrument of the mental change and does not constitute a complete cause. Instead, it is the mental change qua mental that is the cause (p.330). That is the reason Caston believes Aristotle adopts a downward causation.

None of this need violate the causal closure of the physical: it may still be the case that only physical events cause other physical events. What downward causation violates is rather the comprehensiveness of the physical: in Aristotle’s terminology, it would not be the case that every efficient cause of behavior qua physical is its cause properly speaking. Aristotle may simply hold that some psychophysical events, rather than being ghostly hands reaching down from above, are causes qua mental, even in the absence of complete physical causes. (p.330)

The mental and bodily parts of the living being thus correspond to form and matter in Aristotle’s terminology and these two parts acts together to compose an event. Based on the above elaboration, Caston attributes emergentism to Aristotle – that is, a mental

³⁹⁰ Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p.32.

event supervenes on the physical event, at the same time that there is causal power in the mental event.³⁹²

I agree with Caston's proposal to contribute supervenience and emergentism to Aristotle. However, I remain cautious when attributing functionalism to Aristotle, even though supervenience and functionalism are always closely related. The point on which I disagree with functionalism is its multi-realization. Functionalism defines the mental state as a functional state, and this functional state can be multi-realized in different physical substrates. But in my view, the soul's power can be applied to the specific kind of body only, and not to any physical substrate.

Except for the contemporary revival of topics related to the body-soul relation in Aristotle, Brentano's proposal of intentionality—with its abundant roots in Aristotle—influenced his followers, such as Husserl's phenomenology. As we disclosed in the dissertation, the characteristic of immanent content is an important feature in Aristotle's theory. That is what distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena, as Brentano points out at his first stage. The specific immanent content constitutes animate beings' inner life and explains how they differ from other non-animate beings. Besides, Brentano is insightful when valuing the direct experience of one's inner life, which is done with the aid of inner consciousness. The concomitant psychic consciousness of every psychological activity provides the subject with first personal access to the inner experience, and the subject introspectively notices it. This kind of description depicts the phenomenological basis of intentionality and affects the research of intentionality from the approach of phenomenology.³⁹³

Thus, Aristotle's philosophy continues to hold treasure for contemporary philosophy of mind, in that the irreducible characteristic of the soul's power and its supervenience on a physiological basis provides insightful ideas for discussion thousands of years after their inception. The internal structure of knowledge formation and cognition and the role of intentionality continue to inspire modern research in the philosophy of the mind.

³⁹² Caston (1997).

³⁹³ For more about phenomenology and intentionality, see Mendelovici (2018); Tassone (2012).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Intentionality is a hot topic in modern philosophy of mind. The issues concerning intentionality involve the naturalization of intentionality; the nature of intentional relation; content and object theories; relation theories, adverbial theories, phenomenal intentionality; etc. The active pioneers in intentionality in recent years are John Searle, Daniel Dennett, and many others. Both Searle and Dennett refer back to the German philosophers, especially Brentano when putting forward their theory of intentionality. Accordingly, they accept the characteristic of directedness or aboutness of intentionality. Although holding different standpoints, both Searle and Dennett take advantage of the biological evolution theory and neuroscience to deal with the problem of intentionality, such as the possibility of naturalizing the intentional relation. The debates and explorations are still going on.

My journey into intentionality starts from the contemporary discussion of it, but I have directly been inspired by Brentano, who relates intentionality to the ancient and medieval tradition. It is also Brentano's reference to Aristotle that inspired me to research the roots of intentionality in Aristotle. Therefore, I set forth a comparison between Brentano and Aristotle on intentionality, based on the fact that when Brentano proposed the notion of intentionality in *PES*, he has an explicit indication that "Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect" (p. 67). Further, in his 1911 edition of *PES*, Brentano changed his intentionality thesis into the mentally active subject's reference to something as an object, and he turns to the mental subject's reference to the sensible, intellectual object in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to argue for his later proposal.³⁹⁴ These give us a direct clue to investigate whether Brentano's reference in Aristotle work for his aim. Except for the explicit references in *PES*, Brentano had published a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle's work, especially a commentary on Aristotle's psychology. Dealing with Brentano's earlier work on Aristotle helps to adequately evaluate Aristotle's impact on Brentano's notion of intentionality, and to assess whether Brentano modifies Aristotle's theory for his own theoretical aim.

³⁹⁴ *PES*, p. 211-212.

Brentano refers to Aristotle's principle of "receiving form without matter" in proposing his intentional in-existence thesis.³⁹⁵ What is more, Aristotle states that "even when the sensible objects are gone, the sensings and imaginings continue to exist in the sense-organs" (*DA* 425b24-26). From these follows some immanence or in-existence in the sensing subject for Aristotle. However, in Aristotle, by receiving form without matter, what the perceiving subject suffers is a qualitative alteration on the sense organ and an actualization of the potential perceptual soul, it is not an intentional object that is immanent in the sensing subject.

In addition, Brentano delineates a relation between a mental subject to an object, and he states that the relation is a quasi-relation because the object may not exist.³⁹⁶ However, the relational characteristic is not Aristotle's focus in *De anima*. Psychic activity in Aristotle, in general, is of three stages: the first stage is the sensible/intelligible form's acting on the potential sense/intellect. In this activity, the sense/intellect is passive in receiving what acts on it. The second stage is the actualized sensible/intellectual soul, which is identical to the sensible/intelligible object. In this way, the sensing/intellectual subject possesses the cognized content, and Aristotle does not especially depict a relation directed from the actualized sensing/intellectual subject to the object at this stage since it is just the actualized sensing/intellectual subject's becoming identical with the sensible/intelligible object because of the object's efficient cause. In the third stage, because we have the psychic content based on stage two, we can selectively pay attention to or focus on the object, which is either external, or composed on the basis of one or more remaining images or previous knowledge. It is on this level that we find intentional directedness.

In Brentano's early stage, Brentano emphasizes that there is a relation between the mental act and the intended object. This object is immanent and does not need to exist in reality. In this way, the object is mentally dependent. It seems that Brentano is referring to the psychic activity on the second stage. However, according to Aristotle, first, the object has priority, and it acts upon the patient to realize the actualization. It is not a mentally dependent object but an independent object. Second, for Aristotle, the patient and the object are the same in their common actualization. Therefore, the psychic content is closely correlated to reality rather than being independent of reality, as Brentano suggests. Third, Brentano's emphasis on the fact that the object is immanent and does not need to exist in reality or correspond to anything outside, may apply to human being's psychic activity at stage 3, at which a human being can select or pay attention to a psychic object which may have no counterpart in reality. That is to say, even though Brentano's notion of in-existence has its roots in Aristotle in psychic

³⁹⁵ *PES*, p. 67.

³⁹⁶ *PES*, p. 211-212.

activity on stage 2, according to Aristotle, what is immanent is not mental-dependent. In both perception and intellect, the immanent object is efficiently and formally caused by the perceptible/intelligible object, rather than by the subject. Only on stage 3, the mental subject can direct itself to an object, but this is a different stage and does not apply to all cognition. Besides, the object at stage three is not necessarily immanent.

In his second stage, Brentano gives up the view that the actuality of form, redness, shape³⁹⁷ is the object of a mental reference, thereby abandoning his insistence that the actualized form in Aristotle is an object. In this way, he hits the mark, given that Aristotle does not delineate the actualized form as an object. In his later stage, Brentano also does not regard the object as a mentally-dependent object anymore, but as an independent object. This change works for the psychic activity of human beings at stage three. However, Brentano attributes both perception and intellect to human being's intellectual capacity. That is not what Aristotle means.

Brentano's deviation from Aristotle begins with his classification of mental phenomena whereby he adopts a modern notion of the mind, which includes both the capacity of sensation as well as the ability to think, effectively replacing Aristotle's formulation of the soul. According to the modern definition of the mind, the mind is an active subject when it comes to carrying out all kinds of mental activities. However, according to Aristotle, the perceptual soul and the intellectual soul carry out different cognitive activities. Since perception is possessed by the perceptual soul rather than by the intellectual soul, Brentano instead attributes to perception the active mental feature that it does not have in Aristotle.³⁹⁸

It shows the difference between the soul in ancient Aristotle and the mind in modern Brentano. For Aristotle, the perceptual and intellectual soul is passive, and the occurrence of psychic activity is initiated by the efficient cause, which is the perceptual and intellectual object. For Brentano, the mind is the causally active subject directing itself to the object and initiating psychic activity. It not only shows the difference between Aristotle and Brentano but also the turn from ancient philosophy to modern philosophy in philosophy of mind.

Apart from the comparison between Aristotle and Brentano on intentionality, I investigated the roots of a general definition of intentionality in Aristotle's psychology. This definition comes out from a historical survey of intentionality in several ancient and medieval philosophers. I especially pay attention to the problem Brentano's intentionality thesis gets into—the ambiguity of content and object— so as to avoid the

³⁹⁷ *PES*, p. 229.

³⁹⁸ "Hearing a sound, seeing a coloured object, feeling warmth or cold . . . every judgment, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt is a mental phenomenon [or act]." *PES*, p. 79.

same problem. I adopt two characteristics of intentionality: intentional directedness, which means the mental act's directing to something as object, and immanent content, indicating that there is representative or informative content through which the object is presented.

I shall generalize what I find in Aristotle's psychology with this working definition of intentionality. Chapter 2 is about the roots of intentionality in Aristotle's theory of perception. I organize the perceptual theory into two parts based on the source for each characteristic of intentionality. Intentional directedness shall be initiated by an active factor. Therefore, I trace it to the active and efficient cause in perception, that is the sensible object. Correspondingly, the perceptual subject is passive and has the capacity to receive the sensible form. But this causal relation from the sensible object to the perceptual subject is not what a general definition of intentional directedness means. Immanent content is something the psychic act possesses through which the object can be presented. I argue for the roots of immanent content in Aristotle by an elaboration on the perceptual content, which composes the principle of receiving form without matter, the identity between the perceptual patient and the perceptual awareness.

Controversies surrounding perception include the question about what kind of change the perception undergoes in perceiving, whether there is an active role to the power of perception or not. I briefly discuss these two issues: First, my interpretation of what goes on in sensation is that the sense organ suffers a non-ordinary physical change, and the potential perceptual power becomes actualized in perception. This interpretation avoids the problem the spiritual and the literal interpretation get in.³⁹⁹ It also certifies that there is no spiritual intentional object as Brentano suggests in Aristotle's receiving form without matter. Second, it is certain that in the strict sense, perception, as the activity of receiving form without matter, is passive. However, some commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aquinas, Hamlyn, Ebert, and Caston attribute an active factor to the power of perception.⁴⁰⁰ I argued in chapter 2 that the perceptual awareness or perceptual discrimination in Aristotle has nothing to do with the active factor.⁴⁰¹ The actualized perceptual state may provide the content for the subject to move or act, but the intentional action the content produces is intentional in the practical sense considering that it is the subject's desire or intention to do something. The perceptual faculty stays passive and there is no intentional directedness deriving from it.

³⁹⁹ Chapter 2, p.72-81.

⁴⁰⁰ Chapter 2, p.97-98.

⁴⁰¹ Chapter 2, p. 97-101.

Chapter 3 is to deal with the role of *phantasia* in psychic activities. I primarily focus on several issues related to *phantasia*: What is *phantasia*? How does it play its role in Aristotle's psychological framework, especially in memory, recollection, and dreaming? Which roots of intentionality can we find in these cognitive activities? Even though opinions vary as to whether *phantasia* refers to images, or whether Aristotle has a unified view of *phantasia*, I adopt an interpretation of *phantasia* which is engaged with appearance or image. It is *phantasia*'s function of presenting, visualizing, appearing of images or appearances that helps the composition of immanent content in psychic activities, especially when there is no present object for these activities. In general, every time we perceive something, the sensible form acts on the sense organ with the alteration occurring in sensation, and further this sensible alteration is transmitted to the central sense, which on the one hand marks the perceiving of something, on the other hand, it activates *phantasia*. In this way, *phantasia* can deal with the received information for the application of other cognitive activity. Also, in the absence of the present sensible object, *phantasia* can still work on the stored sensible materials for thinking, memory, recollection, and so on. As some scholars (Modrak, Nussbaum, Polansky, Caston) point out, *phantasia* plays a similar role as representation in so far as it consciously presents images.⁴⁰²

There is a debate about whether sensation requires *phantasia* to present appearances or images to the perceptual subject as well and whether there is intentionality in sensation. For example, Wedin (1988) contends that *phantasia* underlies all cognition including sense, and sense requires *phantasia* to present or represent to the soul what we perceive. Caston (1998) reinforces this to say that *phantasia* is the basis of intentionality for higher-level psychical acts, and there is no intentionality in proper sense. However, Polansky (2007) states that sense perception generally is presentational, even in proper sensible. Therefore, he acknowledges intentionality in the sense perception of proper sensibles. I stand in line with Polansky and my investigation in Chapter 2 shows that there is a root of immanent content in sense perception even without the representational role of *phantasia*.

Perceptual activities such as memory, recollection and dreaming reveal the characteristic of the immanent content by virtue of *phantasia*'s power to present and manipulate the inner image in psychological life. In this way, when we imagine,⁴⁰³ memorize, recollect, and dream, there is always immanent content that is imagined, memorized, recollected or dreamed. However, Aristotle does not depict an active directedness in the theoretical sense from the perceptual faculty to the object, but a

⁴⁰² Chapter 2, p.113 – 114.

⁴⁰³ Imagine here indicates one activity of *phantasia*.

relation (for instance, likeness) between what is immanent and the external object, which correlates the psychic content to the external world.

Chapter 4 deals with the roots of intentionality in Aristotle's theory of intellect. The section on intellect in *DA* is confusing and complicated by a long tradition of commentary and interpretation. Before investigating the roots of intentionality in the intellectual part, I attempt to have a decent interpretation of Aristotle's theory of intellect at first. Aristotle elaborates on the intellectual mechanism especially in *DA* III 4-5. In *DA* III 4, Aristotle delineates intellect as passive and is potentially all things (*DA* 429a18; *DA* 429b25). In *DA* III 5 he continues to explain what is the initiating factor of the intellectual activity and how we come to think. After a general survey of the ancient and contemporary interpretation of *DA* III 5, I take the approach that the active intellect actualizes the first potential intelligible form into the first actuality, thus the actualized intelligible form (which is active) can act on the potential intelligible soul (the patient) given that the potential and passive intellect should be acted upon by an active factor. Intellect occurs by virtue of the potential and passive intellect's reception of the intelligible form. However, the active intellect is not the efficient cause which initiate thinking, rather, it is the formal cause. My interpretation is that thinking is initiated by human beings. Once we think, the active intellect (the possessed knowledge) illuminates the potential intelligible form, and the actualized intelligible form (accompanied with the sensible image) acts on the receptive intellect.

The intelligible object that we are to cognize is never out of nothing. Aristotle described the perceptual basis, or the role of *phantasia* in supporting the appearance of the intelligible object. The conjunction of the intelligible form with the image composes the psychic content for intellect after the intelligible form is being cognized. In this way, the roots of immanent content come into being in Aristotle's theory of intellect. The intellectual capacity to think whatever it wants explains the characteristic of being "selective", or the "directedness" of intentionality. We found intentional directedness located on the level of the human being with intellect at the first actualized state. However, when it comes into the intellectual soul's receiving of the intelligible form, it shows no intentional directedness but follows the same pattern as perception. According to the division of three stages of psychic activity, intentional directedness is revealed at the third stage with the human being as a subject. Still, in the actual activities of thinking or perceiving that belong to stage two, there is no intentional directedness.

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SUMMARY IN DUTCH

‘Intentionaliteit’ zoals Brentano het opnieuw introduceerde en reconstrueerde in zijn werk *Psychologie vanuit een empirisch standpunt*, is een belangrijke notie in de moderne philosophy of mind. Brentano spreekt over ‘intentioneel immanent bestaan’ (in-existentie) als het definiërende kenmerk van mentale fenomenen. Voor hem betekent dit dat mentale fenomenen de objecten waarop ze zijn gericht als immanent of in-existent bezitten in de mentale activiteit. Na Brentano werd intentionaliteit verder ontwikkeld tot een centraal thema in de fenomenologie, analytische filosofie en philosophy of mind. Brentano voert de notie ‘intentioneel immanent bestaan’ terug op antieke en middeleeuwse filosofen, met name Aristoteles (*PES* 67), en dit heeft een nog steeds voortgaande moderne discussie geïnspireerd onder interpreten van Aristoteles.

In deze dissertatie onderzoek ik de wortels van intentionaliteit in Aristoteles’ psychologie, en maak ik een vergelijking tussen Aristoteles en Brentano ten aanzien van intentionaliteit. Eerst zet ik een werkdefinitie op van intentionaliteit door de historische ontwikkeling van het begrip ‘intentie’ te volgen. Vervolgens behandel ik Aristoteles’ psychologie—waarneming, *phantasia*, geheugen, dromen, herinnering, en intellect—stuk voor stuk om na te gaan of er in deze psychische activiteiten een teken van intentionaliteit is te vinden, en zo ja hoe. Tenslotte maak ik de vergelijking tussen Aristoteles en Brentano ten aanzien van intentionaliteit, gebaseerd op de Aristotelische achtergrond van Brentano, om zo de echo van Aristoteles in de moderne philosophy of mind in kaart te brengen.

Brentano verwijst naar Aristoteles’ principe van het ‘ontvangen van de vorm zonder materie’ als hij zijn these van intentioneel immanent bestaan introduceert (*PES* 67). Daarnaast stelt Aristoteles dat “zelfs wanneer de waarneembare objecten er niet meer zijn, de waarnemingen en voorstellingen blijven bestaan in de zintuigen” (*DA* 425b24-26). Hieruit volgt een vorm van immanentie of in-existentie in het waarnemend subject volgens Aristoteles. Voor Aristoteles betekent het ontvangen van de vorm zonder materie het ondergaan van een kwalitatieve verandering in het zintuig, en een actualisatie van de potentiële waarnemende ziel. Er is daarbij geen sprake van een intentioneel object dat immanent is in het waarnemend subject.

Bovendien spreekt Brentano van een relatie tussen een mentaal subject en een object, en stelt hij dat deze relatie een quasi-relatie is omdat het object ook niet in de

werkelijkheid kan bestaan (*PES* 211-212). Echter, de notie van een dergelijke relatie komt niet ter sprake in de *De anima* van Aristoteles.

Psychische activiteit in Aristoteles kent in het algemeen drie stadia: het eerste stadium is de werking van de waarneembare of denkbare vorm op het potentiële waarnemings- resp. denkvermogen. In deze activiteit is het waarnemings- resp. denkvermogen passief voorzover het opneemt wat erop inwerkt. Het tweede stadium is de geactualiseerde waarnemende resp. denkende ziel, die identiek is aan het object van waarneming resp. denken. Op deze wijze bezit het waarnemende resp. denkende subject de gekende inhoud, zonder dat Aristoteles in dit stadium een relatie beschrijft die uitgaat van het geactualiseerde waarnemend resp. denkend subject naar het object. Het gaat er immers om dat het geactualiseerde waarnemend resp. denkend subject identiek wordt aan het waargenomen resp. gedacht object vanwege de werkoorzakelijkheid die van het object uitgaat. In het derde stadium kunnen we, omdat we in het tweede stadium psychische inhoud hebben, selectief aandacht besteden of de focus richten op een object, dat ofwel extern is, ofwel is samengesteld op basis van één of meer achtergebleven beelden of voorafgaande kennis. In dit stadium vinden we pas de gerichtheid die kenmerkend wordt geacht voor intentionaliteit.

In de eerste fase van Brentano's ontwikkeling benadrukt hij dat er een relatie is tussen de mentale act en het geïntendeerde object. Dit object is immanent en hoeft niet in de werkelijkheid te bestaan. Zo is het object afhankelijk van de mentale act. Het lijkt alsof Brentano met het tweede stadium verwijst naar werkzaamheid van de ziel. Maar, ten eerste, heeft het object volgens Aristoteles prioriteit, en werkt het object in op het subject om de actualisatie te bewerkstelligen. Het gaat dus niet om een object dat afhankelijk is van de mentale act, maar om een onafhankelijk object. Ten tweede zijn het subject en object volgens Aristoteles identiek in hun gezamenlijk actualiteit. Daarom heeft de psychische inhoud een sterk verband met de realiteit in plaats van ervan onafhankelijk te zijn zoals Brentano suggereert. Ten derde kan Brentano's nadruk op het feit dat het object immanent is en niet hoeft te bestaan in de werkelijkheid of met iets buiten de geest hoeft te corresponderen, van toepassing zijn op de psychische activiteit van de mens in het derde stadium, waarin een mens de aandacht kan richten op een psychisch object waarmee niets in de werkelijkheid correspondeert. Dat wil zeggen dat, hoewel Brentano's notie van in-existentie zijn wortels heeft in de psychische activiteit van stadium 2, dat wat immanent is niet afhankelijk is van de geest. Zowel in waarneming als in denken wordt het immanente object veroorzaakt door het waarneembare resp. denkbare object als werk- en vormoorzaak, niet door het subject. Alleen in het derde stadium kan het mentale subject zich direct richten op een object, maar dit is een ander stadium en is niet van

toepassing op alle vormen van cognitie. Bovendien is het object van stadium 3 niet noodzakelijkerwijs immanent.

In de tweede fase van Brentano's ontwikkeling geeft hij het standpunt op dat de actualiteit van de vorm, bijv. roodheid, het object is van een mentale gerichtheid, waarmee hij zijn nadruk opgeeft op het feit dat in Aristoteles de geactualiseerde vorm een object is. Hiermee heeft hij gelijk voorzover Aristoteles de geactualiseerde vorm niet als object ziet. In zijn latere fase beschouwt Brentano het object ook niet meer als afhankelijk van de mentale act, maar als een onafhankelijk object. Deze verandering van inzicht strookt met de psychische activiteit van mensen in stadium 3 volgens Aristoteles. Echter, Brentano schrijft zowel waarneming als denken toe aan de menselijke intellectuele capaciteit, en dat is niet wat Aristoteles doet.

Het verschil tussen Brentano en Aristoteles begint met Brentano's classificatie van mentale fenomenen waarbij hij uitgaat van de moderne notie van de geest, die zowel het vermogen tot waarnemen als het denkvormogen omvat. Hiermee vervangt hij Aristoteles' opvatting van de ziel. Volgens de moderne opvatting van de geest, is de geest een actief subject als het aankomt op het uitvoeren van allerlei mentale activiteiten. Volgens Aristoteles echter voeren de waarnemende en de denkende ziel verschillende cognitieve activiteiten uit. Omdat waarneming behoort bij de waarnemende ziel en niet bij de denkende ziel, schrijft Brentano aan de waarneming een actieve mentale eigenschap toe die het in Aristoteles niet heeft (*PES* 79). Dit laat het verschil zien tussen de ziel in de antieke Aristoteles en de geest in de moderne Brentano.

Naast de vergelijking tussen Aristoteles en Brentano ten aanzien van intentionaliteit, onderzoek ik de wortels van een algemene werkdefinitie van intentionaliteit in de psychologie van Aristoteles. Deze definitie komt voort uit een historisch overzicht van intentionaliteit in verschillende antieke en middeleeuwse filosofen. Ik besteed vooral aandacht aan het probleem waarmee Brentano's these van intentionaliteit te maken krijgt—de ambiguïteit van 'inhoud' en 'object'—om niet in dezelfde valkuil te stappen. Ik onderscheid twee eigenschappen van intentionaliteit: *intentionele gerichtheid*, nl. de gerichtheid van de mentale act op iets als object; en *immanente inhoud*, wat aangeeft dat er representatieve of informatieve inhoud is door middel waarvan het object wordt gepresenteerd.

In algemene termen leidt deze werkdefinitie tot de volgende resultaten ten aanzien van Aristoteles. Hoofdstuk 2 is gewijd aan de wortels van intentionaliteit in Aristoteles' theorie van de waarneming. Ik deel het hoofdstuk in in twee delen op basis van de bron voor elk van de twee eigenschappen van intentionaliteit. Intentionele gerichtheid wordt geïnitieerd door een actieve factor. Daarom richt ik mij op de werkoorzaak die actief is in de waarneming, nl. het waarneembaar object. Het

waarnemend subject is in die zin passief en heeft het vermogen om de waarneembare vorm op te nemen. Deze causale relatie van waarneembaar object naar subject is niet waar de werkdefinitie van intentionele gerichtheid over gaat. Immanente inhoud is iets wat de psychische act bezit door middel waarvan het object kan worden gepresenteerd. Ik betoog dat de wortels van immanente inhoud in Aristoteles te vinden zijn door het uitwerken van de perceptuele inhoud, waarbij sprake is van drie principes: het opnemen van de vorm zonder materie, de identiteit tussen subject en object in de waarneming, en het bewustzijn van de waarneming.

Controverses ten aanzien van de waarneming behelzen onder meer wat voor type verandering de waarnemer ondergaat bij het waarnemen, en of er een actief vermogen zit in de waarneming. In het kort komt mijn interpretatie hierop neer: het waarnemingsorgaan ondergaat een bijzondere fysische verandering, en het potentiële waarnemingsvermogen van de ziel wordt geactualiseerd. Deze interpretatie voorkomt de problemen waarin zowel de ‘spirituele’ als ‘letterlijke’ interpretaties belanden. Ik stel ook vast dat er geen sprake is van een spiritueel intentioneel object zoals Brentano suggereert op grond van Aristoteles’ opnemen van de vorm zonder materie. Ten twee staat vast dat waarneming in stricte zin, als het opnemen van vorm zonder materie, passief is. Sommige commentatoren, zoals Alexander van Aphrodisias, Thomas van Aquino, Hamlyn, Ebert en Caston schrijven aan het waarnemingsvermogen een actieve werking toe. Ik heb in Hoofdstuk 2 betoogd dat bewustzijn van de waarneming of het onderscheidend vermogen van de waarneming niets te maken hebben met zo’n actieve factor. De geactualiseerde staat van de waarneming kan wel inhoud produceren die het subject aanzet tot beweging of handeling, maar deze inhoud is intentioneel in de praktische zin: het is het verlangen of de intentie van het subject om iets te doen. Daarbij blijft het waarnemingsvermogen passief zonder dat er een intentionele gerichtheid van afgeleid kan worden in de hier onderzochte zin van het woord.

Hoofdstuk 3 is gewijd aan de rol van de *phantasia* in psychische activiteiten. Hoewel de meningen uiteen lopen over de vraag of *phantasia* te maken heeft met beelden, en of Aristoteles een coherente theorie van *phantasia* heeft, neem ik een interpretatie aan die een rol geeft aan een voorstelling of beeld. Het is de functie van de *phantasia* om beelden en voorstellingen te presenteren, te visualiseren of te laten verschijnen die het mogelijk maakt om immanente inhoud samen te stellen in psychische activiteiten, vooral wanneer er op dat moment geen extern object voor deze activiteiten voorhanden is. In het algemeen, bij iedere waarneming, werkt de waarneembare vorm in op het waarnemingsorgaan met een kwalitatieve verandering, en deze verandering wordt vervolgens doorgegeven aan het centrale waarnemingsorgaan wat aan de ene kant het waarnemen van een object markeert en aan de andere kant de *phantasia* activeert. Zo kan de *phantasia* de ontvangen

informatie hanteren ten behoeve van een andere cognitieve activiteit. Bij afwezigheid van een extern waarneembaar object, kan de *phantasia* nog steeds werken met de opgeslagen waarnemingsgegevens ten behoeve van denken, geheugen, herinnering e.d. Zoals sommige geleerden (Modrak, Nussbaum, Polansky, Caston) aangeven, speelt *phantasia* een rol die vergelijkbaar is met het voorstellingsvermogen voorzover het bewust beelden presenteert.

Er is discussie of de waarneming ook de *phantasia* nodig heeft om voorstellingen of beelden aan het waarnemend subject te presenteren, en of er ook daarom sprake is van intentionaliteit in de waarneming. Wedin (1988) beweert bijvoorbeeld dat *phantasia* ten grondslag ligt aan alle cognitie, inclusief waarneming, en dat waarneming de *phantasia* nodig heeft om voor de ziel te (re)presenteren wat we waarnemen. Caston (1998) versterkt deze visie door te zeggen dat de *phantasia* de basis is voor de intentionaliteit van hogere psychische acten, en dat er geen sprake is van intentionaliteit in de ware zin van het woord. Polansky (2007) daarentegen stelt dat waarneming op zich al presenteert, ook waar het gaat om de eigen objecten van de zintuigen. Daarom erkent hij ook intentionaliteit in de waarneming van de eigen objecten. Ik volg Polansky en mijn onderzoek in Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat er wortels van immanente inhoud zijn te vinden in de waarneming volgens Aristoteles, ook zonder de representerende rol van de *phantasia*.

Waarnemingsactiviteiten zoals geheugen, herinnering en dromen laten de eigenschap van immanente inhoud zien in het vermogen van de *phantasia* om het innerlijke beeld in het psychologisch leven te presenteren en te manipuleren. Vandaar dat, als we ons iets voorstellen, iets in het geheugen opslaan, herinneren of dromen, er altijd immanente inhoud is die wordt voorgesteld, in het geheugen opgeslagen, herinnerd of gedroomd. Toch beschrijft Aristoteles geen actieve gerichtheid van het waarnemingsvermogen op het object, maar een relatie van gelijkenis tussen wat immanent is en het externe object, die de psychische inhoud relateert aan de externe werkelijkheid.

Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de wortels van intentionaliteit in Aristoteles' theorie van het intellect. De passage over het intellect in *De anima* is verwarrend en de interpretatie wordt gecompliceerd door een lange traditie van commentaar en uitleg. Voordat ik de wortels van intentionaliteit onderzoek probeer ik dan ook eerst om een tot een werkbare interpretatie te komen van Aristoteles' theorie van het intellect. Aristoteles gaat vooral in op de werking van het intellect in *DA* III.4-5. In *DA* III 4 noemt Aristoteles het intellect passief en potentieel alle dingen (*DA* 429a18; 429b25). In *DA* III 5 legt hij verder uit wat de initiërende factor van intellectuele activiteit is en hoe we beginnen met denken. Na een overzicht van antieke en moderne contemporaine interpretaties van *DA* III 5 kies ik de benadering dat het actieve intellect de potentieel

denkbare vorm actualiseert tot eerste act, zodat dat de geactualiseerde denkbare vorm (actief) kan inwerken op de potentieel denkende ziel (passief) uitgaand van het principe dat het potentiële en passieve intellect moet worden geactiveerd door een actieve factor. Denken treedt op op grond van het opnemen van de denkbare vorm door het potentiële en passieve intellect. Het actieve intellect is daarbij echter niet de werkoorzaak die het denken initieert, maar eerder de vormoorzaak. Mijn interpretatie is dat denken door mensen wordt geïnitieerd. Als wij denken verlicht het actieve intellect (de kennis die we bezitten) de potentieel denkbare vorm, en de aldus geactualiseerde denkbare vorm, vergezeld van een waarneembaar beeld, werkt in op het ontvangend intellect.

Het denkbare object dat we gaan kennen komt nooit uit het niets. Aristoteles heeft de basis ervan in de waarneming beschreven, ofwel de rol die de *phantasia* speelt in het ondersteunen van het verschijnen van het denkbare object. De combinatie van de denkbare vorm met het beeld vormt de psychische inhoud voor het intellect zodra de denkbare vorm gekend wordt. Op deze wijze zien we de inspiratiebron voor immanente inhoud tot stand komen in Aristoteles' theorie van het intellect. Het intellectuele vermogen om te denken wat we willen laat de eigenschap zien 'selectief' te kunnen zijn, ofwel de 'gerichtheid' van intentionaliteit. Echter, als het gaat om het ontvangen van de denkbare vorm door de intellectuele ziel, zien we geen intentionele gerichtheid maar volgt Aristoteles hetzelfde patroon als bij de waarneming. In de indeling in drie stadia van psychische activiteit komt intentionele gerichtheid tot uiting in het derde stadium waar de mens als geheel het subject is. In de eigenlijke activiteiten van denken of waarnemen in het tweede stadium is echter geen sprake van intentionele gerichtheid.

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