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**Early Jaina epistemology: a study of the philosophical chapters of the
Tattvārthādhigama; With an English translation of the
Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya I, II.8 25, and V**

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II. Translation

Preliminary Remarks

The following sections provide an English translation of the philosophical chapters of the *Tattvārthādhigama* (TA) and the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* (TABh).⁵⁴² In addition, this part contains a translation of the *sambandhakārikās* (SK) and the *praśasti*.⁵⁴³

The transliteration of the Sanskrit text is primarily based on the edition of the TA and TABh by Keshavlal Premchand Mody.⁵⁴⁴ I have also consulted the edition by Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia.⁵⁴⁵ In a number of cases, I have followed Kapadia's instead of Mody's reading.⁵⁴⁶ The differences between the two editions are relatively minor and are mentioned in the footnotes.

The numbering of the *sūtras* in my transliteration follows Mody's edition. They indicate the chapter and *sūtra* number. E.g., '||1.1||' is the first *sūtra* of the first chapter. Some of the *sūtras* have a different number in the version of the TA that is accompanied by Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi* (SS). These variant numbers are given in parentheses.⁵⁴⁷ The numbers between square brackets in the *bhāṣya* are my own. They correspond to the *daṇḍas* in Mody's edition. E.g., the number '[1.2.3]' refers to the third sentence of the commentary on the second *sūtra* of the first chapter of the TA.⁵⁴⁸ An overview of the different abbreviations can be found in the references.

For my translation of the TA, I have consulted the following translations: Jacobi 1906, Sanghvi 1974, and Tatia 2011. For the translation of the *praśasti*, I have consulted Dhaky 1996 and Zydenbos 1983. The *bhāṣya* and the *sambandhakārikās*

⁵⁴² I.e., Chapter I, II.8 – 25, and V. In the general introduction (§ 1), I explain why these parts have been selected.

⁵⁴³ I.e., the introductory verses and colophon that accompany the *bhāṣya*.

⁵⁴⁴ See Mody 1903.

⁵⁴⁵ See Kapadia 1926, 1930. Kapadia's edition also contains Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā*.

⁵⁴⁶ All deviations from Mody's edition are mentioned in the footnotes.

⁵⁴⁷ E.g., TA 1.22 corresponds to *sūtra* 1.21 in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. I refer to the version of this *sūtra* in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* as '(SS 1.21)'.

⁵⁴⁸ In Part I of this study, I refer to these numbers as TA 1.1 and TABh 1.2.3. I have numbered the verses of the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti* in the same way as the TABh. The number '[0.1]' refers to the first line of the *sambandhakārikās*. Since the *praśasti* immediately follows the concluding verses of the commentary on TA 10.7, the numbering of the *praśasti* begins with '[10.7.224]'.

have not been translated into a European language before, with the exception of the tenth chapter of the *bhāṣya*.⁵⁴⁹

The TA is written in the style of the philosophical *sūtra* texts and the intended meaning of many passages cannot be understood without the help of a commentary. Yet, since it is highly unlikely that the TABh was written as an auto-commentary, we cannot be certain that the interpretation that the TABh offers is in line with the meaning that the composer of the TA had in mind when he composed the text. Therefore, I have tried to interpret the *sūtras* of the TA primarily in the context of the theories that are provided in the TA itself.⁵⁵⁰

For the same reasons, I have translated most of the technical terms in a literal way. As such, my translation of these terms differs from more conventional translations, which are often based on later interpretations. For example, I translate '*manahparyāyajñāna*' as 'knowledge from mental perception' instead of the more common translation 'telepathy'. Since the discussions of this notion in the TA and the TABh do not say anything about reading the minds of other people, I prefer to use a translation whose meaning is less specific. Since many passages in the TA and TABh are open to various interpretations, I have aimed to indicate as clearly as possible how my English rendering relates to the Sanskrit text. Therefore, I have kept my translation very literal and close to the Sanskrit syntax. Although this complicates the reading of my translation, I hope that my translation can be of help to other scholars who wish to investigate the actual content of the TA and TABh.

The textual analysis in the third chapter of this study discusses the main ideas and concepts that are expressed in the philosophical sections of the TA and TABh, which are translated in this part. The order of the topics in my analysis corresponds to the order of the topics in the translated passages. As such, the reader can consult my interpretation of the content together with the Sanskrit text and my English translation.

⁵⁴⁹ The tenth chapter has been translated by Zydenbos. See Zydenbos 1983.

⁵⁵⁰ For some passages, I have based my translation of the TABh on the explanation in Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā* (Kapadia 1926, 1930). In these cases, I mention the *ṭīkā* in the footnotes as the source of my interpretation.

Tattvārthādhigama⁵⁵¹ Chapter I

samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ ||1.1||

1.1 The path to liberation (*mokṣa-mārga*) [is constituted by] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*), [right] knowledge (*jñāna*) and [right] conduct (*cāritra*).⁵⁵²

[1.1.1] ***samyagdarśanaṃ samyagjñānaṃ samyakcāritram ity eṣa trividho mokṣamārgaḥ |***

‘Right worldview (*samyag-darśana*), right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) and right conduct (*samyak-cāritra*)’ — this (*etad*) [is] the threefold (*trividha*) path to liberation (*mokṣa-mārga*).

[1.1.2] ***taṃ purastāt lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca vistareṇopadekṣyāmaḥ |***

Later on (*purastāt*), we will explain (*upadekṣyāmaḥ*) this (*tad*) in detail (*vistara*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*)⁵⁵³ and (*ca*) classification (*vidhāna*)⁵⁵⁴.

[1.1.3] ***śāstrānupūrvivinyāsārthaṃ tūddeśamātram idam ucyate |***

However (*tu*), this [*sūtra*] (*idam*) has been formulated (*ucyate*) merely as (*mātra*) a brief statement (*uddeśa*), for the sake of (*artha*) arrangement (*vinyāsa*) [in accordance with] the order (*anupūrvin*) [in] the scriptures (*śāstra*).⁵⁵⁵

[1.1.4] ***etāni ca samastāni mokṣasādhanaṇi |***

And (*ca*) these (*etad*) combined (*samasta*) [are] the means [to] liberation (*mokṣa-sādhana*).

⁵⁵¹ Several other titles are used to refer to the *Tattvārthādhigama*. In this study, I use the title that is mentioned in the *Sambandhakārikās*. For a discussion of the title of the text, see § 2.3, *Authorship of the TA and the TABh*.

⁵⁵² For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see § 3.2 *The path to liberation*.

⁵⁵³ ‘Charakterischen Merkmal’, ‘Kennzeichen’, ‘Definition’ (Oberhammer 2006: 100).

⁵⁵⁴ ‘Anordnung’, ‘Erklärende Differenzierung’; ‘Er bezeichnet die Anordnung des Stoffes bzw. das Nennen der Abschnitte oder Themen einer Darstellung in der ihnen entsprechenden Reihenfolge’ (Oberhammer 2006: 141).

⁵⁵⁵ Alternatively, the order of the chapters in the TA itself, which is called a ‘*śāstra*’ in *prāśasti* 5.

[1.1.5] **ekatarābhāve 'py asādhānānīty atas trayāṇāṃ grahaṇaṃ |**

For (*itī*), even (*apī*) in the absence (*abhāva*) [of] one of them (*ekatara*), [they are] not leading [to liberation] (*a-sādhana*); hence (*atas*) [there should be] adoption (*grahaṇa*) [of] the threefold [means] (*traya*).

[1.1.6] **eṣāṃ ca pūrvalābhe bhajanīyam uttaraṃ |** [1.1.7] **uttaralābhe tu niyataḥ pūrvalābhaḥ |**

And (*ca*) in the case of acquisition of the first (i.e., *samyag-darśana*)⁵⁵⁶ (*pūrva-lābha*) of these (*idam*), the latter (i.e., *samyag-jñāna* and *samyak-cāritra*) (*uttara*) [have] to be cultivated (*bhajanīya*). But (*tu*) in the case of acquisition (*lābha*) of the latter (i.e., *samyag-jñāna* and *samyak-cāritra*) (*uttara*), the obtainment (*lābha*) [of] the first (*pūrva*) [is] certain (*niyata*)

[1.1.8] **tatra samyag iti praśaṃsārtho nipātaḥ samañcater vā bhāve⁵⁵⁷ darśana iti |**

In this [*sūtra*] (*tatra*) the word (*itī*) 'right' (*samañc*) [is] a particle (*nipāta*), for the sake of (*artha*) commendation (*praśaṃsā*), or (*vā*) [it is] 'worldview' (*darśana*) (*itī*) in the state (*bhāva*) of [the verb] 'samañc' (to correspond, i.e., the state of corresponding with reality) (*samañcatī*)⁵⁵⁸.

[1.1.9] **dṛṣer avyabhicāriṇī sarvendriyānindriyārthaprāptiḥ etat samyag-darśanam |**

The obtainment (*prāpti*) [of] all (*sarva*) the object[s] (*artha*) of the organs of sense (*indriya*) and the mind (*anindriya*) which does not deviate (*avyabhicārin*) from the [right] view⁵⁵⁹ (*dṛṣi*) — this (*etat*) [is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*).

[1.1.10] **praśastaṃ darśanaṃ samyagdarśanam |** [1.1.11] **saṅgataṃ vā darśanaṃ samyagdarśanam |**

'Right worldview' (*samyag-darśana*) [is] the best (*praśasta*) worldview (*darśana*). Alternatively (*vā*), 'right worldview' (*samyag-darśana*) [is] the correct (*saṅgata*) worldview (*darśana*).

[1.1.12] **evam jñānacāritrayor api ||**

The same (*evam*) [applies] to knowledge (*jñāna*) [and] conduct (*cāritra*) as well (*apī*).

⁵⁵⁶ My interpretation of 'pūrva' and 'uttara' follows the *ṭīkā*.

⁵⁵⁷ Mody reads 'bhāvaḥ darśana', and mentions the variant reading 'bhāve'. Kapadia places the *daṇḍa* before 'darśanam iti'.

⁵⁵⁸ The form 'samañcateḥ' is the gen. sg. of the pres. 3 sg. of *sam+√añc*.

⁵⁵⁹ Alternatively, 'which has no deviation of the view'.

tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam ||1.2||

1.2 Right worldview (*samyagdarśana*) [is] confidence (*śraddhāna*) in the categories (*artha*) of reality (*tattva*).

[1.2.1] *tattvānām arthānām śraddhānaṃ tattvena vārthānām śraddhānaṃ tattvārthaśraddhānam tat samyagdarśanam* |

Confidence in the categories of reality (*tattva-artha-śraddhāna*) [is] confidence (*śraddhāna*) in the categories (*artha*) of the entities⁵⁶⁰ (*tattva*) or (*vā*) confidence (*śraddhāna*) in the categories (*artha*) [in terms of] reality (*tattvena*); that (*tad*) [is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*).

[1.2.2] *tattvena bhāvato niścitam ity arthaḥ* |

The meaning [of] (*ity artha*) ‘*tattvena*’ [is]: ‘understood (*niścita*) in terms of [their] nature (*bhāva*)’.⁵⁶¹

[1.2.3] *tattvāni jīvādīni vakṣyante* |

The entities (*tattva*) will be explained (see TA 1.4) (*vakṣyante*) [to be] the soul (*jīva*) etc. (*ādī*).

[1.2.4] *ta eva cārthāḥ teṣāṃ śraddhānaṃ teṣu pratyayāvadhāraṇam* |

And (*ca*) they (*tad*) [are] indeed (*eva*) the categories (*artha*); confidence (*śraddhāna*) in these (*tad*) [is] ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa*) [of] trust (*pratyaya*) with respect to these [categories] (*tad*).

[1.2.5] *tad evaṃ praśamasamveganirvedānukampāstikyābhivyaṅgilakṣaṇam tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam iti* ||

In this way (*evaṃ*), this (*tad*) confidence in the categories of reality (*tattva-artha-śraddhāna*) — whose characteristic (*lakṣaṇam*) [is] the manifestation (*abhivyaṅgi*) [of] tranquillity (*praśama*), desire for liberation (*samvega*),⁵⁶² indifference (*nirveda*), compassion (*anukampā*) [and] faithfulness (*āstikya*) — [is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) (*iti*).

⁵⁶⁰ The word ‘*tattva*’ is used in both singular and plural in the *bhāṣya*. I translate ‘reality’ when used in singular and ‘the entities’ when used in plural. See also TABh 1.4.1 and TABh 1.4.2.

⁵⁶¹ The *ṭīkā* explains that this is a gloss (*vivaraṇa*) on the word ‘*tattvena*’ in the previous sentence.

⁵⁶² ‘desire for emancipation’ (MW). The term ‘*samvega*’ is mentioned as a variety of body-determining *karman* (*nāmakarman*) in TA 6.23.

tan nisargād adhigamād vā ||1.3||

1.3 That (i.e., the right worldview) [arises] by nature (*nisarga*) or from learning (*adhigama*).

[1.3.1] ***tad etat samyagdarśanam dvividhaṁ bhavati |*** [1.3.2] ***nisarga-samyagdarśanam adhigamasamyagdarśanam ca |***

That very (*tad etad*) right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) exists (*bhavati*) in two ways (*dvividha*); [i.e.,] right worldview by nature (*nisarga-samyag-darśana*) and right worldview [from] learning (*adhigama-samyag-darśana*).

[1.3.3] ***nisargād adhigamād utpadyate iti dvihetukaṁ dvividham ||***

‘It arises (*utpadyate*) from nature (*nisarga*) or (*vā*) by learning (*adhigama*)’ (*iti*), [that is the meaning of] ‘twofold’ (*dvividha*) (see TABh 1.3.1), [i.e.,] having two causes (*dvi-hetuka*).

[1.3.4] ***nisargaḥ pariṇāmaḥ svabhāvaḥ aparopadeśa ity anarthāntaram |***

‘Nature’ (*nisarga*), ‘[natural] transformation’ (*pariṇāma*), ‘innate disposition’ (*svabhāva*), ‘not taught by others’ (*apara-upadeśa*) (*iti*), [they are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.3.5] ***jñānadarśanopayogalakṣaṇo jīva iti vakṣyate |***

[It] will be explained (see TA 2.8) [that] (*iti*) ‘the soul (*jīva*) is characterised (*lakṣaṇa*) [by] the cognitive operation (*upayoga*) [in the form of] knowledge [and] worldview (*darśana*).’⁵⁶³

[1.3.6] ***tasyānādaḥ saṁsāre paribhramataḥ karmata eva karmaṇaḥ svakṛtasya bandhanikācanodayanirjarāpekṣam nārakatiryagyonimanuṣyāmarabhava-grahaṇeṣu vividhaṁ puṇyapāpaphalam anubhavato***

For the one (*tad*) [who is] wandering about (*paribhramat*) in beginningless (*anādi*) *saṁsāra* — for [him who is] experiencing (*anubhavat*) the varied (*vividha*) fruit of merit and demerit (*puṇya-pāpa-phala*), depending on (*apekṣā*, bah.) the bondage (*bandha*) *nikācanā*,⁵⁶⁴ rising (*udaya*), [and] destruction (*nirjarā*) of the *karman* made by himself (*svakṛta*), in taking states [of] hellish beings, animals, human beings [and] gods (*nāraka-tiryagyonimanuṣya-amara-bhava-grahaṇa*), indeed (*eva*) due to [one’s] *karman*;

⁵⁶³ Tatia translates *upayoga* as ‘sentience’ (Tatia 2011: 39). TA 2.9 explains the twofold character of *upayoga* (i.e., knowledge and worldview). See also § 3.3, *Cognitive operation*.

⁵⁶⁴ According to Tatia, the term ‘*nikācanā*’ refers to a karmic process (*karaṇa*) that is predetermined and cannot be altered (Tatia 1951: 259).

***jñānadarśanopayogasvābhāvyāt tāni tāni pariṇāmādhyavasāyasthānāntarāṇi
gacchato 'nādimithyādr̥ṣṭer api sataḥ***

for [him] going (*gacchat*) [through] all these (*tāni tāni*) differences (*antara*) of transformation (*pariṇāma*), determination (*adhyavasāya*),⁵⁶⁵ [and] states (*sthāna*), due to the own nature [of] the cognitive operation [in the form of] knowledge [and] worldview (*jñāna-darśana-upayoga-svābhāvya*), even though (*api*) he is (*sat*) [someone whose] wrong view [has] no beginning (*anādi-mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*) —

***pariṇāmaviśeṣād apūrvakaraṇaṃ tādṛg bhavati yenāsyānupadeśāt
samyagdarśanam utpadyate ity etat nisargasamyagdarśanam ||***

such (*tādṛk*) an *apūrvakaraṇa* [process]⁵⁶⁶ (*apūrva-karaṇa*) arises (*bhavati*) due to a particular transformation (*pariṇāma-viśeṣa*); by this [*apūrvakaraṇa* process] (*yad*) there arises (*utpadyate*) right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) for him (*idam*) without instruction (*anupadeśa*) — this (*etat*) [is] right worldview by nature (*nisarga-samyag-darśana*).

[1.3.7] ***adhigamaḥ abhigama āgama nimittaṃ śravaṇaṃ śikṣā upadeśa ity
anarthāntaram |***

‘Learning’ (see TA 1.3) (*adhigama*), ‘understanding’ (*abhigama*), ‘tradition’ (*āgama*), ‘instruction’⁵⁶⁷ (*nimitta*), ‘hearing’ (*śravaṇa*), ‘study’ (*śikṣā*), [and] ‘teaching’ (*upadeśa*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., these are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.3.8] ***tad evaṃ paropadeśād yat tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ bhavati tad
adhigamasamyagdarśanam iti ||***

Thus (*tad evaṃ*), confidence in the categories of reality (*tattva-artha-śraddhāna*), which (*yad*) arises (*bhavati*) [as a result of] instruction by others (*para-upadeśa*), that (*tad*) [is called] right worldview by learning (*adhigama-samyag-darśana*).

[1.3.9] ***atrāha tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam ity uktam |*** [1.3.10] ***tatra kiṃ tattvam iti |*** [1.3.11] ***atrocyate |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It has been] explained (*ukta*) [that] ‘right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [is] confidence in the categories of reality (*tattva-artha-śraddhāna*)’. Here (*tatra*), [one may ask]: What (*kim*) [is] reality (*tattva*)? At this point (*atra*), it is said (*ucyate*):

⁵⁶⁵ For a discussion of *adhyavasāya* in the Jaina theory of *karman*, see Wiley 2011.

⁵⁶⁶ ‘the process by which the soul attains to an unprecedented degree of purity’ (P.S. Jaini 1998: 337).

⁵⁶⁷ MW mentions ‘*ādeśa*’ (instruction) as a synonym of ‘*nimitta*’.

jīvājīvāsravabandhasaṃvaranirjarāmokṣās tattvam ||1.4||

1.4 [The categories of] reality (*tattva*) [are]:

- i. soul (*jīva*)
- ii. non-soul (i.e., inanimate entities) (*ajīva*)
- iii. influx (*āsrava*)
- iv. binding (*bandha*)
- v. stopping (*saṃvara*)
- vi. destruction (*nirjarā*), [and]
- vii. liberation (*mokṣa*).

[1.4.1] *jīvā ajīvā āsravā bandhaḥ saṃvaro nirjarā mokṣa ity eṣa saptavidho 'rthas tattvam* | [1.4.2] *ete vā sapta padārthās tattvāni* |

Souls (*jīva*), non-souls (i.e., inanimate entities) (*ajīva*), [types of] influx (*āsrava*), binding (*bandha*), stopping (*saṃvara*), destruction (*nirjarā*), [and] liberation (*mokṣa*) (*iti*) — this (*etad*) [is] the sevenfold (*saptavidha*) category⁵⁶⁸ (*artha*), [which is] reality (*tattva*). Or (*vā*), these (*etad*) seven (*sapta*) categories (*padārtha*) [are] the entities (*tattva*).

[1.4.3] *tāṃ lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca purastād vistareṇopadekṣyāmaḥ* ||

Later on (*purastāt*), we will explain (*upadekṣyāma*) them (*tad*) in detail (*vistara*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) and (*ca*) classification (*vidhāna*).

nāmasthāpanādravyabhāvatas tannyāsaḥ ||1.5||

1.5 The analysis of these [categories] (*tad-nyāsa*) [can be done] from [the perspective of]:

- i. name (*nāma*)
- ii. representation (*sthāpanā*)⁵⁶⁹
- iii. substance (*dravya*), [and]
- iv. state (*bhāva*)⁵⁷⁰.

⁵⁶⁸ It is somewhat odd that '*artha*' is used in singular in this sentence. For the sake of consistency, I have translated '*artha*' as 'category'.

⁵⁶⁹ Lit. 'causing to stand'. The *bhāṣya* refers to a painting or sculpture of the god Indra. (see TABh 1.5.8).

⁵⁷⁰ For a discussion of these modes of analysis, see § 3.2 *The modes of analysis*.

[1.5.1] **ebhir nāmādibhiś caturbhir anuyogadvārais teṣāṃ jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ nyāso bhavati |**

The analysis (*nyāsa*) of these (*tad*) entities (*tattva*), beginning with soul (*jīva-ādi*), takes place (*bhavati*) by these (*etad*) four (*catur*) doors of examination (*anuyoga-dvāra*), [i.e.], name etc. (*nāma-ādi*).

[1.5.2] **vistareṇa lakṣaṇato vidhānataś cādhigamārthaṃ nyāso nikṣepa ity arthaḥ |**

The analysis (*nyāsa*) for the sake of learning (*adhigama-artha*), based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) and (*ca*) classification (*vidhāna*), in detail (*vistara*) — that is the meaning (*ity artha*) [of] ‘*nikṣepa*’.

[1.5.3] **tad yathā |** [1.5.4] **nāmajīvaḥ sthāpanājīvo dravyajīvo bhāvajīvo iti |**

For instance (*tad yathā*), soul [from the perspective of] name (*nāma-jīva*), soul [from the perspective of] representation (*sthāpanā-jīva*), soul [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-jīva*) [and] soul [from the perspective of] state (*bhāva-jīva*).

[1.5.5] **nāma saṃjñākarma ity anarthāntaram |**

‘Name’ (*nāma*) [and] ‘giving a name’⁵⁷¹ (*saṃjñā-karman*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., these are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.5.6] **cetanāvato ‘cetanasya vā dravyasya jīva iti nāma kriyate |** [1.5.7] **sa nāmajīvaḥ ||**

[When] the name (*nāma*) ‘soul’ (*jīva iti*) is given (*kriyate*) to animate (*cetanāvat*) or (*vā*) inanimate (*acetana*) substance (*dravya*), that (*tad*) [is] soul [from the perspective of] name (*nāma-jīva*).

[1.5.8] **yaḥ kāṣṭapustacitrakarmākṣanikṣepādiṣu sthāpyate jīva iti sa sthāpanājīvo devatāpratīkṛtivad indro rudraḥ skando viṣṇur iti ||**

The soul (*jīva*) which (*yaḥ*) is represented (*sthāpyate*) [in the case of] visual representations (*akṣa-nikṣepa*)⁵⁷² [in] wood (*kāṣṭa*), a clay model (*pusta*), a painting (*citra-karman*) etc. (*ādi*) — that (*tad*) [is] soul [from the perspective of] representation (*sthāpanā-jīva*); like the images of deities (*devatā-pratīkṛtivat*), named (*iti*) *Indra*, *Rudra*, *Skanda* [or] *Viṣṇu*.⁵⁷³

⁵⁷¹ *saṃjñākarman* = *saṃjñākaraṇa* (MW). I follow Kapadia’s reading ‘*saṃjñākarma*’. Mody reads ‘*saṃjñā karma*’.

⁵⁷² Lit. ‘deposited in the senses’.

⁵⁷³ The same explanation is given in TABh 1.5.16.

[1.5.9] *dravyajīva iti guṇaparyāyaviyuktaḥ prajñāsthāpito 'nādirīṇāmika-bhāvayukto jīva ucyate* |

[When] the soul (*jīva*) is said (*ucyate*) [to be] destitute of qualities [and] modes (*guṇa-paryāya-viyukta*),⁵⁷⁴ represented by knowledge⁵⁷⁵ (*prajñā-sthāpita*), [and] connected with the condition of beginningless transformation (*anādi-pārīṇāmika-bhāva-yukta*) — [that is] ‘soul [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-jīva*)’ (*iti*).

[1.5.10] *athavā śūnyo 'yaṃ bhaṅgaḥ* |

However (*athavā*), this (*idam*) form of analysis (*bhaṅga*) [is] pointless (*śūnya*).⁵⁷⁶

[1.5.11] *yasya hy ajīvasya sato bhavyaṃ jīvatvaṃ syāt sa dravyajīvaḥ syāt aniṣṭaṃ caitat* ||

For (*hi*), this (*tad*) soul [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-jīva*) would imply (*syād*) [that] the quality of being a soul (*jīvatva*) might (*syāt*)⁵⁷⁷ occur (*bhavya*) for that (*yad*) which is (*sat*) not-soul (*ajīva*), and (*ca*) this (*etad*) is incorrect (*aniṣṭa*).

[1.5.12] *bhāvato jīvā aupāśamikakṣāyikakṣāyopāśamikaudayikapārīṇāmika-bhāvayuktā upayogalakṣaṇāḥ saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca dvividhā vakṣyante* ||

From [the perspective of] state (*bhāva*), souls (*jīva*) will be said (*vakṣyante*)⁵⁷⁸ [to be] twofold (*dvividha*): transmigratory [souls] (*saṃsārin*) — [which] are connected with the states (*bhāva-yukta*) [that are] resulting from the cessation [of *karman*] (*aupāśamika*), resulting from the annihilation [of *karman*] (*kṣāyika*), resulting from the annihilation and cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣāya-upāśamika*)⁵⁷⁹, resulting from the manifestation [of *karman*] (*audayika*) [and] resulting from a natural disposition (*pārīṇāmika*)⁵⁸⁰ — [and that are] characterised by [cognitive] operation (*upayogalakṣaṇa*) and (*ca*) liberated (*mukta*).

⁵⁷⁴ TA 5.37 explains that ‘substance has qualities and modes’ (*guṇaparyāyavad dravyam*).

⁵⁷⁵ The *ṭīkā* suggests an instrumental relationship between ‘*prajñā*’ and ‘*sthāpita*’. The meaning of this expression is not entirely clear to me. I have translated ‘*sthāpanā*’ (representation), which is frequently used in this passage. Perhaps, the intended meaning is ‘mental phenomenon’. Alternatively, ‘*prajñāsthāpita*’ can be translated as ‘established by knowledge’.

⁵⁷⁶ I.e., analysing the soul from the perspective of *dravya* does not make any sense. See also the following sentence (TABh 1.5.11).

⁵⁷⁷ Mody’s K manuscript omits the second ‘*syāt*’ (Mody 1903: 8).

⁵⁷⁸ TA 2.10 explains that there are two types of souls, i.e., ‘worldly and liberated [souls]’ (*saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca*).

⁵⁷⁹ Mentioned in TA 2.1 as ‘the mixed state’ (*miśra*).

⁵⁸⁰ These five states are also listed in TA 2.10.

[1.5.13] *evam ajīvādiṣu sarveṣv anugantavyam ||*

Likewise (*evam*), [the different perspectives are] to be applied (*anugantavya*) to all [other categories] (*sarva*), beginning with non-soul (*ajīva-ādi*).⁵⁸¹

[1.5.14] *paryāyāntareṇāpi nāmadravyaṃ sthāpanādravyaṃ dravyadravyam bhāvato dravyam iti |*

Also (*api*), with regard to (*antareṇa*) modes (*paryāya*)⁵⁸², [there is] ‘substance [from the perspective of] name (*nāma-dravya*), substance [from the perspective of] representation (*sthāpanā-dravya*), substance [from the perspective of] substance (*dravyadravya*) [and] substance (*dravya*) from [the perspective of] state (*bhāva*)’ (*iti*).

[1.5.15] *yasya jīvasyājīvasya⁵⁸³ vā nāma kriyate dravyam iti tan nāmadravyam |*
[When] the name (*nāma*) ‘substance’ (*dravya iti*) is given (*kriyate*) to that which (*yad*) [is] soul (*jīva*) or (*vā*) non-soul (*ajīva*), that (*tad*) is substance [from the perspective of] name (*nāma-dravya*).

[1.5.16] *yat kāṣṭapustacitrakarmākṣanikṣepādiṣu sthāpyate dravyam iti tat sthāpanādravyam devatāpratīkṛtivad indro rudraḥ skando viṣṇur iti |*

The substance (*dravyam*) which (*yad*) is represented (*sthāpyate*) [in the case of] visual representations (*akṣa-nikṣepa*) [in] wood (*kāṣṭa*), a clay model (*pusta*), a painting (*citra-karman*) etc. (*ādi*), that (*tad*) [is] substance [from the perspective of] representation (*sthāpanā-dravya*); like the images of deities (*devatā-pratīkṛtivad*), named (*iti*) *Indra*, *Rudra*, *Skanda* [or] *Viṣṇu*.⁵⁸⁴

[1.5.17] *dravyadravyaṃ nāma guṇaparyāyaviyuktaṃ prajñāsthāpitaṃ dharmādīnām anyatamat |*

‘Substance [from the perspective of] substance’ can be defined as (*nāma*) [that which is] without qualities [and] modes (*guṇa-paryāya-viyukta*), established by knowledge (*prajñāsthāpita*), [and] different from (*anyatama*) motion etc. (*dharmā-ādi*)⁵⁸⁵.

⁵⁸¹ I.e., the other categories that are mentioned in TA 1.4 can also be analysed from the four perspectives that are mentioned in TA 1.5.

⁵⁸² See TA 5.37 for a discussion of ‘modes’ (*paryāya*). The meaning of this passage is not entirely clear to me.

⁵⁸³ Mody reads ‘*jīvasya vā jīvasya vā*’. He mentions a variant reading that omits the first *vā*. I follow Kapadia, who reads ‘*jīvasyājīvasya vā*’.

⁵⁸⁴ Cf. TABh 1.5.8.

⁵⁸⁵ I.e. the inanimate entities, which are listed in TA 5.1: motion (*dharmā*), rest (*adharma*), space (*ākāśa*), and material elements (*pudgala*).

[1.5.18] *kecid apy āhur yad dravyato dravyam bhavati tac ca pudgaladravyam eveti pratyetavyam* |

Some [people] (*kecid*) also (*api*) say (*āhuh*): ‘And (*ca*) that which (*yad*) is (*bhavati*) substance (*dravya*) [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya*), that (*tad*) [is] just (*eva*) to be understood (*pratyetavya*) [as] ‘the substance [of] material elements’ (*pudgala-dravya*) (*iti*).’

[1.5.19] *aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca saṅghātabhedebhya utpadyanta iti vakṣyāmaḥ* |

We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) (see TA 5.25 - 26) [that] (*iti*) the atoms (*aṇu*) and (*ca*) the aggregates (*skandha*) result (*utpadyante*) from combination and disintegration (*saṅghāta-bheda*).

[1.5.20] *bhāvato dravyāṇi dharmādini saguṇaparyāyāṇi prāptilakṣaṇāni vakṣyante* |

From [the perspective of] state (*bhāva*), the substances (*dravya*) will be said (see TA 5.37) (*vakṣyante*) [to be]: motion etc. (*dharma-ādi*) (i.e., the five substances, see TA 5.1), [provided] with qualities [and] modes (*saguṇa-paryāya*), [and] characterised by reach (*prāpti-lakṣaṇa*) (i.e., having extension)⁵⁸⁶.

[1.5.21] *āgamataś ca prābhṛtajño dravyam iti bhavyam āha* | [1.5.22] *dravyam ca bhavye* |

And (*ca*) based on scripture (*āgama*), a learned person (*prābhṛta-jña*)⁵⁸⁷ names (*āha*) [that which] exists (*bhavya*) ‘substance’ (*dravya*) (*iti*). And (*ca*) [this is] substance (*dravya*) [in the sense of] ‘that which exists’ (*bhavya*).

[1.5.23] *bhavyam iti prāpyam āha* | [1.5.24] *bhū prāptāv ātmanepadī* | [1.5.25] *tad evaṃ prāpyante prāpnuvanti vā dravyāṇi* ||

[He] names (*āha*) that which exists (*bhavya*) (*iti*) as ‘attainable’ (*prāpya*). [The verb] ‘*√bhū*’ (existing) in the middle voice (*ātmanepadin*) [has the meaning of] ‘reaching’ (*prāpti*). In this respect (*tad evaṃ*), the substances (*dravya*) are reached (*prāpyante*), or (*vā*) they reach (*prāpnuvanti*) (i.e., they are either contactable or they come into contact).

⁵⁸⁶ Perhaps, ‘*prāptilakṣaṇa*’ is the opposite of the expression ‘*prajñasthāpita*’ in TABh 1.5.7 and TABh 1.5.15.

⁵⁸⁷ Lit. someone who knows the *āgamas*. The term ‘*prābhṛta*’ refers to a category of texts that are used in the Digambara tradition.

[1.5.26] *evam sarveṣāṃ anādinām ādimatām ca jīvādinām bhāvānām mokṣāntānām tattvādhigamārthaṃ nyāsaḥ kārya iti ||*

Likewise (*evam*), the analysis (*nyāsa*) [is] to be done (*kārya*) for all (*sarva*) states (*bhāva*) of souls etc. (*jīva-ādi*), [i.e., the categories]⁵⁸⁸ without beginning (*anādi*) and (*ca*) having a beginning (*ādimat*)⁵⁸⁹, whose end is liberation (*mokṣa-ānta*), for the sake of study of reality (*tattva-adhigama-artha*) (*iti*).

pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ ||1.6||

1.6 [The categories] can be understood (*adhigama*) through the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*)⁵⁹⁰ and the perspectives (*naya*).

[1.6.1] *eṣāṃ ca jīvādinām tattvānām yathoddiṣṭānām nāmādir nyastānām pramāṇanayair vistarādhigamo bhavati ||*

And (*ca*) the full understanding (*vistarādhigama*) of these (*etad*) entities (*tattva*) — [i.e., souls etc. (*jīva-ādi*) as listed (see TA 1.4) (*yathā-uddiṣṭa*), [which are] analysed (*nyasta*)⁵⁹¹ by name etc. (*nāma-ādi*) — takes place (*bhavati*) through the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) [and] perspectives (*naya*).

[1.6.2] *tatra pramāṇam dvividham parokṣam pratyakṣam ca vakṣyate |*

Among them (*tatra*), the twofold (*dvividha*) means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), [i.e., indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) and (*ca*) direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*), will be explained (see TA 1.10 – 1.12) (*vakṣyate*).

[1.6.3] *caturvidham ity eke |* [1.6.4] *nayavādāntareṇa ||*⁵⁹²

Some (*eka*) [say that] (*iti*) [the means of cognition are] fourfold (*caturvidha*),⁵⁹³ in accordance with (*antareṇa*) the doctrine of perspectives (*naya-vāda*).

⁵⁸⁸ See TA 1.4.

⁵⁸⁹ TA 5.42 says: '[There is transformation] without beginning and having a beginning' (*anādir ādimāṃś ca*).

⁵⁹⁰ Since a *pramāṇa* can also lead to false cognition (*ajñāna*) according to the *bhāṣya* (see TABh 1.12.15), I translate 'means of cognition' instead of the more commonly used phrase 'means of knowledge'. The difficulty of translating this term partly results from the fact that the word '*pramāṇa*' is used in different ways by different philosophical movements. For some traditions it means 'authoritative means of knowledge', while for others it does 'not necessarily yield true cognition' (Gokhale 1993: 675 - 676). The TABh adheres to the latter position.

⁵⁹¹ Cf. '*nyāsa*' in TA 1.5.

⁵⁹² Kapadia's edition omits the *daṇḍa* between '*ity eke*' and '*nayavādāntareṇa*'.

⁵⁹³ In § 3.2 *Classification of the means of knowledge*, I discuss who the adherents of this view might be.

[1.6.5] *na yāś ca naigamādayo vakṣyante* || [1.6.6] *kiṃ cānyat* |

And (*ca*) the perspectives (*naya*) will be said (see TA 1.34) (*vakṣyante*) [to be] the commonplace [perspective] etc. (*naigama-ādi*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

***nirdeśasvāmitvasāadhanādhikaraṇasthitiṣṭhānataḥ* ||1.7||**

1.7 [The categories can also be analysed] based on classification (*vidhāna*) [into]:

- i. description (*nirdeśa*)
- ii. ownership (*svāmitva*)
- iii. cause (*sādhana*)⁵⁹⁴
- iv. locus (*adhikaraṇa*)
- v. duration (*sthiti*), [and]
- vi. classification (*vidhāna*).

[1.7.1] *ebhiś ca nirdeśādibhiḥ ṣaḍbhir anuyogadvāraiḥ sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ vikalpaśo vistareṇādhigamo bhavati* |

And (*ca*) by these (*idam*) six (*ṣaṣ*) doors of examination (*anuyoga-dvāra*), [i.e.], description etc. (*nirdeśa-ādi*), there is (*bhavati*) varied (*vikalpaśas*) understanding (*adhigama*) in detail (*vistareṇa*) of all (*sarva*) states (*bhāva*) [of all] entities (*tattva*), beginning with soul (*jīva-ādi*).⁵⁹⁵

[1.7.2] *tadyathā* | [1.7.3] *nirdeśaḥ* | [1.7.4] *ko jīvaḥ* | [1.7.5] *aupaśamikādhībhāva-yukto dravyaṃ jīvaḥ* |

To illustrate (*tadyathā*), [from the perspective of] description (*nirdeśa*) — what (*kim*) [is] the soul (*jīva*)? The soul (*jīva*) [is] a substance (*dravya*) connected with states (*bhāva-yukta*), beginning with ‘resulting from the cessation [of *karman*]’ (*aupaśamika-ādi*) (see TA 2.1).

[1.7.6] *samyagdarśanaparīkṣāyām* | [1.7.7] *kiṃ samyagdarśanaṃ dravyam* |

[With regard to] the investigation (*parīkṣā*) [of] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*): What (*kim*) [is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*)? [It is] a substance (*dravya*).

⁵⁹⁴ Lit. ‘bringing about’ (MW). My translation of this term is based on Tatia’s translation of this *sūtra*.

⁵⁹⁵ The word order in this sentence is somewhat strange. One would rather expect ‘*sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ*’ after ‘*jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ*’ if the intended meaning is indeed ‘of all states [of all] entities, beginning with soul’.

[1.7.8] *samyagdr̥ṣṭijīvo 'rūpī noskandho nogrāmaḥ*⁵⁹⁶ ||

The soul [that possesses] right insight (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi-jīva*) [has] no extension (*arūpin*)⁵⁹⁷, [having] a quasi-combination [of atoms] (*no-skandha*), [being] a quasi-collection (*no-grāma*).⁵⁹⁸

[1.7.9] *svāmitvam* | [1.7.10] *kasya samyagdarśanam iti etad ātmasaṃyogena parasam̐yogenobhayasaṃyogena ceti vācyam* |

[From the perspective of] ownership (*svāmitva*): Who has (*kim*) right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) (*iti*)? [It is] to be said (*vācyā*): It [exists] (*etad*) [in terms of] connection with the self (*ātma-saṃyoga*), [in terms of] connection with the other (*para-saṃyoga*) and (*ca*) [in terms of] connection with both (*ubhaya-saṃyoga*) (*iti*).

[1.7.11] *ātmasaṃyogena jīvasya samyagdarśanam* |

[There is] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) of the soul (*jīva*) [in terms of] connection with the self (*ātma-saṃyoga*);

[1.7.12] *parasam̐yogena jīvasyājīvasya jīvayor ajīvayor jīvānām ajīvānām iti vikalpāḥ* |

[In terms of] connection with the other (*para-saṃyoga*) [there are] the varieties [of connection] (*vikalpa*):

- i. of soul (*jīva*) [and] non-soul (*ajīva*)
- ii. of two souls (*jīva*) [and] two non-souls (*ajīva*)
- iii. of [many] souls (*jīva*) [and many] non-souls (*ajīva*) (*iti*).

⁵⁹⁶ Mody separates the prefix 'no-' in this passage. I follow Kapadia's reading, which is in line with the way in which 'no-' appears in other passages of the TABh (e.g. TABh 1.7.13).

⁵⁹⁷ TA 5.4 explains that the substances (*dravya*) have no extension with the exception of the material elements (*pudgala*).

⁵⁹⁸ The intended meaning seems to be that, somehow, there is a connection between the soul and material elements (*pudgala*), even though the soul itself is a substance without extension. The peculiar prefix 'no' (< *na* + *u*, 'and not' or 'partly not') also appears in other passages of the TABh and has the meaning of 'quasi-'. For example, TABh 1.7.13 makes a distinction between 'jīva', 'ajīva', and 'nojīva', which indicates that 'nojīva' is different from 'jīva' (soul) and 'ajīva' (non-soul).

[1.7.13] **ubhayasaṃyogena jīvasya nojīvasya jīvayor ajīvayor jīvānām ajīvānām
iti vikalpā na santi śeṣāḥ santi ||**

Soul (*jīva*) [and] quasi-soul (*nojīva*), two souls (*jīva*) [and] two non-souls (*ajīva*), [many] souls (*jīva*) [and] many non-souls (*ajīva*) — [these] (*iti*) are not (*na santi*) varieties (*vikalpa*) [in terms of] connection with both (*ubhaya-saṃyoga*); the remaining [combinations] (*śeṣa*) are (*santi*).⁵⁹⁹

[1.7.14] **sādhanaṃ | [1.7.15] samyagdarśanaṃ kena bhavati | [1.7.16] nisargād
adhigamād vā bhavatīty uktam |**

[From the perspective of] cause (*sādhana*): By what (*kim*) does right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) come into existence (*bhavati*)? It has been said (see TA 1.3) (*ukta*) [that] it arises (*bhavati*) by nature (*nisarga*) or (*vā*) from learning (*adhigama*) (*iti*).

[1.7.17] **tatra nisargaḥ pūrvoktaḥ | [1.7.18] adhigamas tu samyagvyāyāmaḥ |**

Among them (*tatra*), ‘by nature’ (*nisarga*) has been explained before (*pūrva-ukta*) (see TABh 1.3.4). And (*tu*) learning (*adhigama*) [is] right exertion (*samyag-vyāyāma*).

[1.7.19] **ubhayam api tadāvaraṇīyasya karmaṇaḥ kṣayeṇopaśamena
kṣayopaśamābhyām iti ||**

Both (i.e., right worldview by nature and from learning) (*ubhaya*) also (*api*) [arise] by destruction (*kṣaya*), by cessation (*upaśama*) [and] by both destruction [and] cessation (*kṣaya-upaśama*) of *karman* [that is] covering that (i.e., right worldview)⁶⁰⁰ (*tad-āvaraṇīya*) (*iti*).

[1.7.20] **adhikaraṇaṃ trividham ātmasannidhānena parasannidhānenobhaya-
sannidhāneneti vācyaṃ |**

[From the perspective of] locus (*adhikaraṇa*) — [it is] to be said (*vācya*) [that] (*iti*) [the locus of right worldview is] threefold (*trividha*):

- i. in the presence of the self (*ātma-sannidhāna*)
- ii. in the presence of the other (i.e., non-self) (*para-sannidhāna*)
- iii. in the presence of both (*ubhaya-sannidhāna*).⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁹ The function of the dual and plural forms and the intended meaning of this passage are not entirely unclear to me. Perhaps, the intended meaning is that there are only five types of connection between substances: (i.) between souls (*jīva*) and non-souls (i.e. non-living substances, such as matter) (*ajīva*), (ii.) between quasi-souls (*no-jīva*) and non-souls (*ajīva*), (iii.) between different souls (*jīva*), (iv.) between different non-souls (*ajīva*), (v.) between different quasi-souls (*nojīva*).

⁶⁰⁰ TA 6.11 lists the different types of ‘knowledge and worldview covering [*karman*]’ (*jñānadarśanāvaraṇa*).

⁶⁰¹ I.e., *samyagdarśana* has something to do with the self, has reference to things other than the self, and is related to both at the same time.

[1.7.21] *ātmasannidhānam abhyantarāsannidhānam ity arthaḥ* | [1.7.22] *parasannidhānaṃ bāhyasannidhānam ity arthaḥ* | [1.7.23] *ubhaya-sannidhānaṃ bāhyābhyantarāsannidhānam*⁶⁰² *ity arthaḥ* |

In the presence of the self (*ātma-sannidhāna*) — the meaning is (*ity artha*) ‘in the presence of the interior’ (*abhyantara-sannidhāna*). In the presence of the other (*para-sannidhāna*) — the meaning is (*ity artha*) ‘in the presence of the exterior’ (*bāhya-sannidhāna*). In the presence of both (*ubhaya-sannidhāna*) — the meaning is (*ity artha*) ‘in the presence of the exterior [and] the interior’ (*bāhya-abhyantara-sannidhāna*).⁶⁰³

[1.7.24] *kasmin samyagdarśanam* |⁶⁰⁴

Right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [is] in what (*kim*)?

[1.7.25] *ātmasannidhāne tāvat jīve samyagdarśanam jīve jñānam jīve cāritram ity etadādi* |

First of all (*tāvat*), [the varieties of] ‘in the presence of the self (*ātma-sannidhāna*)’ [are]: right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) in the soul (*jīva*), [right] knowledge (*jñāna*) in the soul (*jīva*), [right] conduct (*cāritra*) in the soul (*jīva*), and so on (*ity etad-ādi*).

[1.7.26] *bāhyasannidhāne jīve samyagdarśanam nojīve samyagdarśanam iti yathoktā vikalpāḥ* |

The varieties (*vikalpa*) [of] ‘in the presence of the other (*bāhya-sannidhāna*)’ [are]: ‘right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) in the soul (*jīva*) [and] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) in the quasi-soul (*nojīve*)’ (*iti*) as it is said (*yathā-ukta*)⁶⁰⁵.

[1.7.27] *ubhaya-sannidhāne cāpy abhūtāḥ sadbhūtāś ca yathoktā bhaṅgavikalpā iti* ||

And (*ca*) also (*api*), the varieties [with respect to] analysis (*bhaṅga-vikalpa*) [of] ‘in the presence of both’ (*ubhaya-sannidhāna*) are: non-existent (*abhūta*) and (*ca*) fully existent⁶⁰⁶ (*sad-bhūta*)’ (*iti*), as it is said (*yathā-ukta*).

⁶⁰² Kapadia reads ‘*abhyantarabāhyayoḥ sannidhānam*’.

⁶⁰³ This passage comments on the previous sentence. It is somewhat strange that the composer of the *bhāṣya* provides a comment on his own text, which might indicate that this passage is a later addition.

⁶⁰⁴ Kapadia adds ‘*ātmasannidhāne parasannidhāne ubhaya-sannidhāne iti*’.

⁶⁰⁵ I have not been able to identify the reference of ‘*yathokta*’ in TABh 1.7.26 and 1.7.27.

⁶⁰⁶ The term ‘*sadbhūta*’ also appears in the commentary on TA 1.8 (TABh 1.8.1, 1.8.8), which deals with the different ‘doors of examination’ (*anuyogadvāra*).

[1.7.30] *sthitih* | [1.7.29] *samyagdarśanam kiyantaṃ kālam* |

[From the perspective of] duration (*sthitih*) — right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [lasts] up to what time (*kiyat kāla*)?

[1.7.30] *samyagdr̥ṣṭir dvividhā* | [1.7.31] *sādir saparyavasānā sādir aparyavasānā ca* |

Right insight (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*):

- i. having a beginning (*sa-ādi*) [and] having an end (*sa-paryavasāna*), and (*ca*)
- ii. having a beginning (*sa-ādi*) [and] not having an end (*a-paryavasāna*).

[1.7.32] *sādisaparyavasānam eva ca samyagdarśanam* |

And (*ca*) right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [is] only (*eva*) ‘having a beginning [and] having an end (*sa-ādi-saparyavasāna*)’.

[1.7.33] *tajjaghanyenāntarmuhūrtam utkr̥ṣṭena śatśaṣṭih sāgaropamāni sādhikāni* |

At its lowest (*tad-jaghanya*) [the duration is] less than an hour (*antar-muhūrta*); at [its] highest (*utkr̥ṣṭa*) [it is] more than (*sādhika*) 66 (*śatśaṣṭi*) ‘ocean-measured’ [periods] (*sāgara-upamā*)⁶⁰⁷.

[1.7.34] *samyagdr̥ṣṭih sādiraparyavasānā* | [1.7.35] *sayogaḥ śaileśiprāptaś ca kevalī siddhaśceti* ||

[Concerning] ‘right insight’ (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*) [that] has a beginning (*sa-ādi*) [and is] not having an end (*a-paryavasāna*) — [this type of right insight is found in]:

- i. [someone] possessed with *yoga* (*sa-yoga*),⁶⁰⁸ and (*ca*)
- ii. [in someone] reaching the top [of the *guṇasthānas*]⁶⁰⁹ (*śaileśi-prāpta*)
- iii. the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*), and (*ca*)
- iv. the perfected being (*siddha*) (*iti*).

⁶⁰⁷ For a discussion of the measurement of time in the TABh, see Tatia 2011: 271-274.

⁶⁰⁸ I.e., one of the 14 stages of spiritual development (*guṇasthāna*). For an overview of the *guṇasthānas*, see, e.g., Tatia 2011: 279 – 285.

⁶⁰⁹ I.e., the 14th *guṇasthāna*.

[1.7.36] *vidhānam hetutraividhyāt kṣayādi trividhaṃ samyagdarśanam* | [1.7.37] *tadāvaraṇīyasya karmaṇo darśanamohanīyasya ca kṣayādibhyaḥ* |

[From the perspective of] classification (*vidhāna*) — right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [is] threefold (*trividha*), [resulting] from a triple cause (*hetu-traividhya*), beginning with destruction (*kṣaya-ādi*). [I.e.], from the destruction etc. (*kṣaya-ādi*) of *karman* [that is] covering [worldview] (*tad-āvaraṇīya*) and (*ca*) deluding worldview (*darśana-mohanīya*).⁶¹⁰

[1.7.38] *tadyathā* | [1.7.39] *kṣayasamyagdarśanam upaśamasamyagdarśanam kṣayopaśamasamyagdarśanam iti* |

To illustrate (*tad-yathā*): ‘the right worldview [resulting from] destruction (*kṣaya-samyag-darśana*), the right worldview [resulting from] cessation (*upaśama-samyag-darśana*) [and] the right worldview [resulting from] destruction [and] cessation (*kṣaya-upaśama-samyag-darśana*) (*iti*).

[1.7.40] *atra caupaśamikakṣāyopaśamikakṣāyikāṇām parataḥ parato viśuddhiprakarṣaḥ* || [1.7.41] *kiṃ cānyat* |

And (*ca*) here (*atra*), [there is a] higher and higher (*paratas paratas*) intensity [of] purity (*viśuddhiprakarṣa*) for [respectively someone] with cessation (*aupaśamika*), [someone] with destruction [and] cessation (*kṣāya-upaśamika*), [and] [someone] with destruction (*kṣāyika*) [of worldview covering and deluding *karman*]. Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

***satsaṃkhyākṣetrasparśanakālāntarabhāvālpabahutvaiś ca* ||1.8||**

1.8 And by:

- i. existence (*sat*)
- ii. numeration (*saṃkhyā*)
- iii. region (*kṣetra*)
- iv. touching (i.e., reach) (*sparśana*)
- v. time (*kāla*)
- vi. interval (*antara*)⁶¹¹
- vii. state (*bhāva*), [and]
- viii. quantity⁶¹² (*alpa-bahutva*).

⁶¹⁰ See also TABh 1.7.19.

⁶¹¹ Alternatively, ‘*kāla*’ and ‘*antara*’ can also be read together as ‘*kālāntara*’ (interval). However, TABh mentions that there are eight doors of examination (*anuyogadvāra*). It is more likely, therefore, that these two words represent two different doors of examination.

[1.8.1] *sat saṁkhyā kṣetraṁ sparśanaṁ kālaḥ antaraṁ bhāvaḥ alpabahutvam ity etaiś ca sadbhūtapadaprarūpaṇādibhir aṣṭābhir anuyogadvāraiḥ sarvabhāvānāṁ vikalpaśo vistarādhigamo bhavati |*

And (ca) by these (etaḥ) eight (aṣṭa) doors of examination (anuyoga-dvāra), [namely] ‘existence (sat), numeration (saṁkhyā), region (kṣetra), touching (i.e., reach) (sparśana), time (kāla), interval (antara), state (bhāva), [and] quantity⁶¹³ (alpa-bahutva)’ (iti), — [i.e. by exposing]⁶¹⁴ that which is true, a sign, a metaphorical description etc. (sadbhūta-pada-prarūpaṇādi) — there is (bhavati) full (vistara) varied (vikalpaśas) understanding (adhigama) of all states (sarva-bhāva).⁶¹⁵

[1.8.2] *katham iti cet ucyate |* [1.8.3] *sat samyagdarśanaṁ kim asti nāsti astīty ucyate |*

If one asks (iti cet): ‘How [are these doors of examination to be applied]?’ (katham), [then] it is said (ucyate): [From the perspective of] ‘existence’ (sat) — does right worldview (samyag-darśana) exist [or] does it not exist (kim asti na-asti)? [Then] it is said (ucyate): It exists (asti) (iti).

[1.8.4] *kvāstīti ced ucyate |* [1.8.5] *ajīveṣu tāvan nāsti |* [1.8.6] *jīveṣu tu bhājyam |*

If one asks (iti cet): “Where is it⁶¹⁶ (kva-asti)?”, it is said (ucyate): First of all (tāvat), it is not (na-asti) in non-souls (ajīva). However (tu), [it is] distributed⁶¹⁷ (bhājya) in souls (jīva).

[1.8.7] *tadyathā |* [1.8.8] *gatīndriyakāyayogakaṣāyavedaleśyāsamyaktvajñāna-darśanacāritrāhāropayogeṣu trayodaśasv anuyogadvāreṣu yathā sambhavaṁ sadbhūtaprarūpaṇā kartavyā ||*

As here follows (tad-yathā), exposing that which is true (sad-bhūta-prarūpaṇā) [is] to be done (kartavya) respectively (yathā sambhava) in the case of the thirteen (trayodaśa) doors of examination (anuyoga-dvāra), [i.e.]:

- i. transmigration (gatī)
- ii. the senses (indriya)
- iii. body (kāya)

⁶¹² Tatia translates ‘relative numerical strength’.

⁶¹³ Lit. ‘being little or much’.

⁶¹⁴ Cf. ‘sadbhūtaprarūpaṇā’ in TABh 1.8.8.

⁶¹⁵ The word order of this sentence is somewhat strange. The syntax of this passage is similar to TABh 1.7.1.

⁶¹⁶ I.e., what is the locus of right worldview?

⁶¹⁷ Lit. ‘to be distributed’ (MW).

- iv. activity (*yoga*)
- v. passion (*kaṣāya*)
- vi. feelings (*veda*)
- vii. colouring (*leśyā*)
- viii. rightness (*samyaktva*)
- ix. knowledge (*jñāna*)
- x. worldview (*darśana*)
- xi. conduct (*cāritra*)
- xii. taking food (*āhāra*)
- xiii. [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*).⁶¹⁸

[1.8.9] *saṅkhyeyā* | [1.8.10] *kiyat samyagdarśanam kiṃ saṅkhyeyam asaṅkhyeyam anantam iti* |

[From the perspective of] numeration (*saṅkhyeyā*) — How many (*kiyat*) right worldviews (*samyag-darśana*) [are there]? Is it (*kim*) numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) [or] endlessly many (*ananta*) (*iti*)?

[1.8.11] *ucyate* | [1.8.12] *asaṅkhyeyāni samyagdarśanāni* | [1.8.13] *samyagdr̥ṣṭayas tv anantāḥ* ||

It is said (*ucyate*): [The number of] right worldviews (*samyagdarśana*) [is] innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) but (*tu*) [there are] endlessly many (*ananta*) right insights (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*).

[1.8.14] *kṣetram* | [1.8.15] *samyagdarśanam kiyati kṣetre* | [1.8.16] *lokasyāsaṅkhyeyabhāge* ||

[From the perspective of] place — in a region (*kṣetra*) of what extent (*kiyat*) [does] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [occur]? [It occurs] in an innumerable part (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga*) of the cosmos (*loka*).

[1.8.17] *sparśanam* | [1.8.18] *samyagdarśanena kiṃ spr̥ṣṭam* |

[From the perspective of] touching (i.e., reach) (*sparśana*): What (*kim*) [is] reached (*spr̥ṣṭa*) by right worldview (*samyag-darśana*)?⁶¹⁹

[1.8.19] *lokasyāsaṅkhyeyabhāgaḥ* | [1.8.20] *samyagdr̥ṣṭinā tu sarvaloka iti* ||

An innumerable part (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga*) of the cosmos (*loka*). However (*tu*), the whole cosmos (*sarva-loka*) [is reached] by right insight (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*) (*iti*).

⁶¹⁸ Several items in this list are also mentioned in TA 2.6, which enumerates 21 states (*bhāva*) of the soul, including four varieties of transmigration (*gatī*), four passions (*kaṣāya*), and six colourings of the soul (*leśyā*).

⁶¹⁹ In other words: ‘What is the range of right worldview?’

[1.8.21] *atrāha samyagdr̥ṣṭisamyagdarśanayoḥ kaḥ prativīṣeṣa iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) [is] the difference (*prativīṣeṣa*) between right insight and right worldview (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi-samyag-darśana*) (*iti*)?

[1.8.22] *ucyate* | [1.8.23] *apāyasaddravyatayā samyagdarśanam apāya ābhinibodhikam* | [1.8.24] *tadyogāt samyagdarśanam* |

It is said (*ucyate*): Right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [arises] from existent substance [through] elimination⁶²⁰ (*apāya-sad-dravyatā*); ‘elimination’ (*apāya*) [is] perceptual apprehension (*ābhinibodhika*); right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [arises] from the activity of that (*tad-yoga*).

[1.8.25] *tat kevalino nāsti* | [1.8.26] *tasmāt na kevalī samyagdarśanī samyagdr̥ṣṭis tu*⁶²¹ ||

That (i.e., right worldview) (*tad*) is not (*na-asti*) of the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*) is not [someone] possessing right worldview (*samyag-darśanin*); however (*tu*), [he does possess] right insight (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*).

[1.8.27] *kālaḥ* | [1.8.28] *samyagdarśanam kiyantaṃ kālam iti atrocyate* | [1.8.29] *tad ekajīvena nānājīvaiś ca parīkṣyam* |

[From the perspective of] time (*kāla*) — How long (*kiyat kāla*) [does] right worldview [last] (*samyag-darśana*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): That (*tad*) [is] to be examined (*parīkṣya*) with respect to an individual soul (*eka-jīva*) and (*ca*) with respect to all soul[s] (*nānā-jīva*).

[1.8.30] *tadyathā* | [1.8.31] *ekajīvaṃ prati jaghanyenāntarmuhūrtam utkr̥ṣṭena śaṭṣaṣṭīḥ sāgaropamāni sādḥikāni* | [1.8.32] *nānājīvān prati sarvāddhā* ||

Namely (*tad-yathā*), in the case of (*prati*) an individual soul (*eka-jīva*) [it is] less than an hour (*antar-muhūrta*) at its lowest (*jaghanya*), [and] more than (*sādḥika*) 66 (*ṣaṭṣaṣṭī*) *sāgaropamas* at [its] highest (*utkr̥ṣṭa*); in the case of (*prati*) all souls (*nānā-jīva*) [it exists] all the time (*sarva-addhā*).⁶²²

⁶²⁰ TA 1.15 lists ‘elimination’ (*apāya*) as the third phase of ordinary cognition (*matī*) (for a discussion of the phases of ordinary cognition, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*). The general idea of ‘elimination’ is that sensory cognition only becomes knowledge after investigating an object of sense and eliminating false ideas, such as the idea of silver in the case of mother-of-pearl. This passage in the *bhāṣya* seems to explain that right worldview is ultimately based on actual perceptions. For this reason, it is said that the *kevalin* cannot have right worldview (*samyagdarśana*) (TABh 1.8.25), since he is liberated from all bonds with the material world. Instead, the *bhāṣya* says that he has right insight (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) (TABh 1.8.26).

⁶²¹ Kapadia adds ‘*bhavati*’, mentioned by Mody as a variant reading.

⁶²² ‘*sarvāddhā*’ = ‘*savvadḥā*’ (Ardhamāgadhī), ‘gesamte Zeit’ (Mylius 2003: 621).

[1.8.33] *antaram* | [1.8.34] *samyagdarśanasya ko virahakālaḥ* |

[From the perspective of] interval (*antara*): What (*kim*) [is] the time [in] separation (*viraha-kāla*) of right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) (i.e., the time between two instances of right worldview)?

[1.8.35] *ekaṃ jīvaṃ prati jaghanyenāntarmuhūrtam utkr̥ṣṭena upārdhapudgalaparivartaḥ* | [1.8.36] *nānājīvān prati nāsty antaram* ||

In the case of (*prati*) an individual (*eka*) soul (*jīva*) [it is] less than an hour (*antar-muhūrta*) at its lowest (*jaghanya*) [and] nearly half [the time of] the expiration of material elements⁶²³ (*upa-ardha-pudgala-parivarta*) at [its] highest (*utkr̥ṣṭa*); in the case of (*prati*) many souls (*nānā-jīva*) there is no (*na-asti*) interval (*antara*).⁶²⁴

[1.8.37] *bhāvaḥ* | [1.8.38] *samyagdarśanam aupaśamikādīnāṃ bhāvānāṃ katamo bhāva ucyate* | [1.8.39] *audayikapāriṇāmikavarjaṃ triṣu bhāveṣu bhavati* ||

[From the perspective of] state (*bhāva*): Which (*katama*) state (*bhāva*) of the states (*bhāva*) beginning with ‘resulting from the cessation [of *karman*]’ (*aupaśamika-ādī*)⁶²⁵ [is suitable for] right worldview (*samyag-darśana*)? It is said (*ucyate*): It exists (*bhavati*) in three (*tri*) states (*bhāva*), [i.e., all states] with the exception of [the state] resulting from the manifestation [of *karman* and the state] resulting from a natural disposition (*audayika-pāriṇāmika-varja*).

[1.8.40] *alpabahutvam* | [1.8.41] *atrāha samyagdarśanānāṃ triṣu bhāveṣu vartamānānāṃ kiṃ tulyasaṃkhyatvam*⁶²⁶ *āhosvid alpabahutvam astīti* |

[From the perspective of] quantity (*alpa-bahutva*): At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Is there (*kim*) a state of having equal numbers (*tulya-saṃkhyatva*) or is there (*āhosvit*) a state of being little and much (*alpa-bahutva*) of right worldviews (*samyag-darśana*) existing (*vartamāna*) in the three (*tri*) states (*bhāva*) (*itī*) (in other words, is there a same amount of right worldviews in the three states or not)?

⁶²³ According to Tatia, ‘just short of half the time it takes karmic particles to undergo their complete course of binding and falling away from the soul’ (Tatia 2011: 11).

⁶²⁴ In other words, there is always right worldview.

⁶²⁵ The different states of the soul, including the ‘*aupaśamika*’ state, are listed in TA 2.1.

⁶²⁶ Kapadia reads –*saṃkhyātva*–.

[1.8.42] *ucyate* | [1.8.43] *sarvastokam aupaśamikam* | [1.8.44] *tataḥ kṣāyikam asaṅkhyeyaguṇam* |

It is said (*ucyate*): [In] the state ‘resulting from the cessation [of *karman*]’ (*aupaśamika*) [it is] the smallest of all (*sarva-stoka*). From that (*tatas*), [it is multiplied by] an innumerable number (*asaṅkhyeya-guṇa*) [in] the state resulting from the annihilation [of *karman*] (*kṣāyika*).

[1.8.45] *tato 'pi kṣāyopaśamikam asaṅkhyeyaguṇam* | [1.8.46] *samyagdr̥ṣṭayas tv ananta-guṇā iti* ||

Again (*api*) from that (*tatas*), [it is multiplied by] an innumerable number (*asaṅkhyeya-guṇa*) [in] the state resulting from the annihilation and cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣāya-upaśamika*). But (*tu*) right insights (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*) [are multiplied by] an endless number (*ananta-guṇa*).

[1.8.47] *evaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ nāmādibhir nyāsaṃ kṛtvā pramāṇādibhir abhigamaḥ kāryaḥ* ||

Thus (*evaṃ*), having done (*kṛtvā*) the analysis (*nyāsa*) by name etc. (*nāma-ādi*) of all states (*sarva-bhāva*), the study (*abhigama*) by the means of cognition etc. (*pramāṇa-ādi*) [is] to be done (*kārya*).

[1.8.48] *uktaṃ samyagdarśanam* | [1.8.49] *jñānaṃ vakṣyāmaḥ* |

Right worldview (*samyag-darśana*) [has been] discussed (*ukta*). [Now] we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) knowledge (*jñāna*).

***matīśrutāvadhimanaḥparyāyakevalāni jñānam* ||1.9||**

1.9 [The varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*) [are]:

- i. ordinary cognition (*matī*)
- ii. testimony (*śruta*)
- iii. cosmic perception⁶²⁷ (*avadhī*)
- iv. mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya*),⁶²⁸ [and]
- v. absolute [knowledge]⁶²⁹ (*kevala*).

⁶²⁷ This term is often translated as ‘clairvoyance’ (e.g., Soni 2000). Literally, the term ‘*avadhī*’ means ‘limit’, which might refer to the range of this variety of knowledge, which consists of all extended substance up to the limits of the cosmos (see also TABh 1.26.6 – 1.26.16).

⁶²⁸ This term is often translated as ‘mind-reading’ (e.g., Tatia 2011). However, ‘mind-reading’ usually refers to telepathy, i.e., reading other people’s mind. As will be explained in TA 1.29, *manaḥparyāya* should not be interpreted as telepathy. Sanghvi explains that *manaḥparyāyajñāna* apprehends the shapes or modes (*paryāya*) that the mind (*manas*) assumes while thinking, which correspond with the objects (Sanghvi 1974: 46).

[1.9.1] *matijñānaṃ śrutajñānaṃ avadhijñānaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ kevalajñānaṃ ity etat mūlavidhānataḥ pañcavidham jñānaṃ* | [1.9.2] *prabhedās tv asya purastād vakṣyante* ||

Knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*), knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*), knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhijñāna*), knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāyajñāna*) [and] absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) (*iti*) — thus (*etat*), knowledge (*jñāna*) [is] fivefold (*pañcavidha*) according to the basic classification (*mūla-vidhāna*). And (*tu*) the varieties (*prabheda*) of this (*idam*) will be explained (*vakṣyante*) later on (*purastāt*).

***tat pramāṇe* ||1.10||**

1.10 These [five varieties of knowledge are] the two means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).⁶³⁰

[1.10.1] *tad etat pañcavidham api jñānaṃ dve pramāṇe bhavataḥ parokṣaṃ pratyakṣaṃ ca* ||

That very (*tad etat*) full (*api*)⁶³¹ fivefold (*pañcavidha*) knowledge (*jñāna*) [is] the two (*dvi*) means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), being (*bhavataḥ*) indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) and (*ca*) direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*).

***ādye parokṣaṃ* ||1.11||**

1.11 The first two [varieties of knowledge are forms of] indirect cognition (*parokṣa*).⁶³²

⁶²⁹ Often translated as ‘omniscience’ (e.g., Soni 2000). A person who acquires absolute knowledge (i.e., a *kevalin*) will attain liberation at the end of their life (Wiley 2004: 123).

⁶³⁰ For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see § 3.2 *Classification of the means of cognition*.

⁶³¹ ‘Putting *api* after a cardinal expresses the completeness of the number’ (Speijer 1886, § 298).

⁶³² For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 *Direct and indirect types of knowledge*.

[1.11.1] *ādau bhavam ādyam* | [1.11.2] *ādye sūtrakramaprāmāṇyāt prathamadvitīye śāsti* | [1.11.3] *tad evam ādye matijñānaśrutajñāne parokṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhavataḥ* |

[That] which is (*bhava*) at the beginning (*ādi*), that is [the meaning of] ‘first’ (*ādya*). ‘The first [two]’ (*ādya*, du.) — [The author] teaches⁶³³ (i.e., he refers to) (*śāsti*) the first and the second [variety of knowledge] (*prathama-dvitīya*), following the authoritativeness of the order in the *sūtra* (see TA 1.9) (*sūtra-krama-prāmāṇya*); according to that (*tad evam*), the first two (*ādya*), [i.e.], knowledge from ordinary cognition and knowledge from testimony (*matijñāna-śruta-jñāna*), are (*bhavataḥ*) indirect (*parokṣa*) means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).

[1.11.4] *kutaḥ* | [1.11.5] *nimittāpekṣatvāt* | [1.11.6] *apāyasaddravyatayā matijñānam* | [1.11.7] *tad indriyānindriyanimittam iti vakṣyate* ||

Why (*kutaḥ*)? Due to the quality of being dependent on a cause (*nimitta-apekṣatva*); ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*) [arises] from existent substance [through] elimination (*apāya-sad-dravyatā*)⁶³⁴. It will be said (see TA 1.14) (*vakṣyate*) [that] ‘this [ordinary cognition] (*tad*) [is] caused by the organs of sense [and] the mind (*indriya-anindriya-nimitta*).’

[1.11.8] *tatpūrvakatvāt paropadeśajatvāc ca śrutajñānam* ||

Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) [is an indirect means of cognition] due to the quality of being preceded by that (i.e., since knowledge from testimony is preceded by ordinary cognition)⁶³⁵ (*tat-pūrvakatva*), and (*ca*) due to the quality of being caused by the instruction of others (*para-upadeśajatva*).

***pratyakṣam anyat* ||1.12||**

1.12 The other [varieties of knowledge] (*anya*) [are forms of] direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*).

⁶³³ The verb form ‘*śāsti*’ suggests that the author of the *bhāṣya* did not compose the *sūtra*. Siddhasenagaṇi comments on this issue and acknowledges that this is a problem. Nevertheless, he maintains that both texts are composed by the same person.

⁶³⁴ The same expression occurs in TABh 1.8.23 and TABh 1.31.16.

⁶³⁵ See the definition of testimony in TA 1.20.

[1.12.1] *matīśrutābhyāṃ yad anyat trividhaṃ jñānaṃ tat pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhavati* |

The threefold (*trividha*) knowledge (*jñāna*) that [is] different (*yad anyat*) from ordinary cognition and testimony (*matīśruta*),⁶³⁶ that (*tad*) is (*bhavati*) direct (*pratyakṣa*) cognition (*pramāṇa*).

[1.12.2] *kutaḥ* | [1.12.3] *atīndriyatvāt* |

Why (*kutaḥ*)? Due to the quality of being beyond [the cognisance] of the senses (*atīndriyatva*).

[1.12.4] *pramīyante 'rthās tair iti pramāṇāni* ||

Since (*iti*) the objects (*artha*) are cognised (*pramīyante*) through them (*tad*), [they are called] 'means of cognition' (*pramāṇa*).

[1.12.5] *atrāha* | [1.12.6] *iha avadhāritaṃ dve eva pramāṇe pratyakṣaparokṣe iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Here (*iha*) [it is] determined (*avadhārita*) [that] the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) [are] indeed (*eva*) two (*dvi*), [i.e.], direct and indirect cognition (*pratyakṣa-parokṣa*) (*iti*).

[1.12.7] *anumānopamānāgamārthāpattisambhavābhāvān api pramāṇāni iti kecid manyante* | [1.12.8] *tat katham etad iti* |

Some [people] (*kecid*) are of the opinion (*manyante*) [that] (*iti*) inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation, equivalence, [and] negation (*anumāna-upamāna-āgama-arthāpatti-sambhava-abhāva*) [are] also (*api*) means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).⁶³⁷ How (*katham*), then (*tad*), [can] this (*etad*) [be explained] (*iti*)?

[1.12.9] *atrocyate* | [1.12.10] *sarvāṇy etāni matīśrutayor antarbhūtāni, indriyārthasannikarṣanimittatvāt* | [1.12.11] *kiṃ cānyat* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): All (*sarva*) these (*etad*) are within (*antarbhūta*) ordinary cognition and testimony (*matīśruta*), due to the quality of being caused by the connection of the object with the sense organ (*indriya-artha-sannikarṣa-nimittatva*)⁶³⁸. Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

⁶³⁶ I.e., *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala* (see TA 1.9).

⁶³⁷ This is a peculiar list, which does not correspond to a known list of *pramāṇas* that were accepted by a specific school. For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 *Other means of cognition*.

⁶³⁸ The term '*sannikarṣa*' refers to 'the connection of an *indriya* with its *viśaya* or object' (MW). This term plays an important role in the epistemology of the Naiyāyikas. For a discussion of this term and the relationship between the theory in the TA and the *Nyāyasūtra*, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

[1.12.12] *apramāṇāny eva vā* | [1.12.13] *kutaḥ* | [1.12.14] *mithyādarśana-parigrahāt viparītopadeśāc ca* |

Or, (*vā*) [they are] indeed (*eva*) not means of cognition (*apramāṇa*). Why (*kutaḥ*)? [Since this results] from the adoption of wrong view (*mithyā-darśana-parigraha*) and (*ca*) from false teaching (*viparīta-upadeśa*).

[1.12.15] *mithyādr̥ṣṭer hi matiśrutāvadhayo niyatam ajñānam eveti vakṣyate* | Since (*hi*), it will be said (TA 1.32) (*vakṣyate*) [that] ordinary cognition, testimony [and] cosmic perception (*mati-śruta-avadhi*) [are] certainly (*niyata*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*) for someone who has wrong view (*mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*).

[1.12.16] *nayavādāntareṇa tu yathā matiśrutavikalpajāni bhavanti tathā parastād vakṣyāmaḥ* ||

And (*tu*), in accordance with the doctrine of perspectives (*naya-vāda-antareṇa*), we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) later on (*parastāt*) [that] they are (*bhavanti*) born from the varieties of ordinary cognition and testimony (*mati-śruta-vikalpaja*).

[1.12.17] *atrāha* | [1.12.18] *uktaṃ bhavatā matyādīni jñānāni uddiśya tāni vidhānato lakṣaṇataś ca purastād vistareṇa vakṣyāma iti* | [1.12.19] *tad ucyatām iti* | [1.12.20] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (*bhavat*) [that] ‘after having taught (*uddiśya*) the knowledges (*jñāna*), beginning with ordinary cognition (*mati-ādī*), we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) them (*tad*) below (*purastāt*) in detail (*vistareṇa*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) and (*ca*) classification (*vidhāna*)’ (see TABh 1.9.2) (*iti*). That (*tad*) should [now] be taught (*ucyatām*) (*iti*). At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

***matih smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintābhinibodha ity anarthāntaram* ||1.13||**

1.13 ‘Ordinary cognition’ (*matī*), ‘remembrance’ (*smṛtī*), ‘recognition’ (*saṃjñā*), ‘thought’ (*cintā*) [and] ‘apprehension’⁶³⁹ (*abhinibodha*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anāṛthantara*).

⁶³⁹ The primary meaning of the unusual word ‘*abhinibodha*’ is not given in the standard dictionaries. The *bhāṣya* on this *sūtra* uses a slightly different form of the word, i.e. ‘*abhinibodhikajñāna*’. It is evident that the word is used as a synonym of ‘*matī*’ (ordinary cognition). It is usually translated as ‘apprehension’ (see, e.g., Balcerowicz 2016d: 998), which is close to the primary meaning of ‘*ni-√budh* (to learn, to attend)’ + ‘*abhi*’ (towards).

[1.13.1] **matijñānaṃ smṛtijñānaṃ saṃjñājñānaṃ cintājñānaṃ
abhinibodhikajñānaṃ ity anarthāntaram ||**

‘Knowledge [from] ordinary cognition’ (*mati-jñāna*), ‘knowledge [from] remembrance’ (*smṛti-jñāna*), ‘knowledge [from] recognition’ (*saṃjñā-jñāna*), ‘knowledge [from] thought’ (*cintā-jñāna*), [and] ‘knowledge [from] apprehension’ (*abhinibodhika-jñāna*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

tad indriyānindriyanimittam ||1.14||

1.14 This [ordinary cognition] (*tad*) [is] caused by the organs of sense [and] the mind (*indriya-anindriya-nimitta*).

[1.14.1] ***tad etat matijñānaṃ dvividhaṃ bhavati |*** [1.14.2] ***indriyanimittam
anindriyanimittam ca |***

That very (*tad etat*) ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*) arises (*bhavati*) in a twofold way (*dvividha*): caused by the organs of sense (*indriya-nimitta*) and (*ca*) caused by the mind (*anindriya-nimitta*).

[1.14.3] ***tatrendriyanimittam sparśanādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ sparśādiṣu pañcasv
eva svaviśayeṣu |*** [1.14.4] ***anindriyanimittam manovṛttir oghajñānaṃ ca |***

Among them (*tatra*), ‘caused by the organs of sense’ (*indriya-nimitta*) [refers to] the respective ranges (*svaviśaya*), [which are] indeed (*eva*) the five [objects of sense] (*pañca*) beginning with the quality of tangibility (*sparśa-ādi*), which belong to the five [senses] (*pañca*), beginning with the organ of touch (*sparśana-ādi*). ‘Caused by the mind’ (*anindriya-nimitta*) [is] the activity of the mind (*manas-vṛtti*) and (*ca*) *oghajñāna*⁶⁴⁰.

⁶⁴⁰ Siddhasenagaṇi uses the word ‘*sāmānya*’ (general, common) to describe this type of knowledge, and he compares *oghajñāna* with the knowledge of a creeper. This is in line with Tatia’s explanation of ‘*ogha*’ as ‘instinct’ (Tatia 1951: 54). Perhaps, it could be translated as ‘basic knowledge’.

avagrahehāpāyadhāraṇāḥ ||1.15||

1.15 [The phases of ordinary cognition are]:

- i. sense perception (*avagraha*)
- ii. endeavour to obtain (*ihā*)
- iii. elimination (*apāya*),⁶⁴¹ [and]
- iv. holding (i.e., keeping in remembrance) (*dhāraṇā*).⁶⁴²

[1.15.1] ***tad etat matijñānam ubhayanimitam apy ekaśaḥ caturvidhaṃ bhavati*** | [1.15.2] ***tadyathā*** | [1.15.3] ***avagraha ihā apāyo dhāraṇā ceti*** |

That very (*tad etat*) ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*), even though (*api*) [it is] caused by both (i.e., by the senses and the mind)⁶⁴³ (*ubhaya-nimitta*), arises (*bhavati*) in every case⁶⁴⁴ (*ekaśas*) in a fourfold way (*caturvidha*). I.e. (*tad-yathā*), [it arises through] sense perception (*avagraha*), endeavour to obtain (*ihā*), elimination (*apāya*), and (*ca*) holding (*dhāraṇā*) (*iti*).

[1.15.4] ***tatrāvyaktaṃ yathāsvam indriyair viśayāṇām ālocanāvadhāraṇam avagrahaḥ*** |

Among them (*tatra*), sense perception (*avagraha*) [is] an indistinct (*avyakta*) perceptual ascertainment (*ālocana-avadhāraṇa*) of the ranges (*viśaya*) by the senses (*indriya*), each on their own account (*yathāsvam*).

[1.15.5] ***avagraho grahaṇam ālocanam avadhāraṇam ity anarthāntaram*** ||

‘Sense perception’ (*avagraha*), ‘seizing’ (*grahaṇa*), ‘perceiving’ (*ālocana*), [and] ‘ascertainment’ (*avadhāraṇa*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

⁶⁴¹ Sanghvi reads ‘*avāya*’. He remarks that both readings are possible according to Akalaṅka (1974: 4, n. 4). Balcerowicz notes that ‘*apāya*’ is used in the Śvetāmbara tradition and ‘*avāya*’ in the Digambara tradition (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001).

⁶⁴² My translations of the technical terms in this *sūtra* are based on the explanation in the *bhāṣya* (TABh 1.15.1 – 1.15.11).

⁶⁴³ See TABh 1.14.1.

⁶⁴⁴ I.e., in the case of the five varieties of ordinary cognition that are caused by the senses and the two varieties that are caused by the mind (see TABh 1.14.2 – 1.14.4).

[1.15.6] **avagr̥hīte viṣayārthaikadeśāc cheṣānugamanam niścayaviśeṣajijñāsā⁶⁴⁵ ihā |**

Seeking the remainder (*śeṣa-anugamana*) on the basis of a part of the objects [within one's] range (*viṣaya-artha-ekadeśa*) in the case of that which is perceived (*avagr̥hīta*), [or] the desire to know the particularities [by] inquiry (*niścaya-viśeṣa-jijñāsā*), [that is] the 'endeavour to obtain' (*ihā*).

[1.15.7] **ihā ūhā tarkaḥ parīkṣā vicāraṇā jijñāsety anarthāntaram ||**

'Endeavour to obtain' (*ihā*), 'comprehending' (*ūhā*), 'reasoning' (*tarka*), 'investigation' (*parīkṣā*), 'consideration' (*vicāraṇā*), [and] 'desire to know' (*jijñāsā*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.15.8] **avagr̥hīte viṣaye samyagasamyag iti guṇadoṣavicāraṇā adhyavasāyāpanodo 'pāyaḥ |**

[Making] a distinction [between] merits and defects (*guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā*) [by telling] (*iti*) 'right' from 'wrong' (*samyag-asamyāñc*) (*iti*) with respect to the perceived (*avagr̥hīta*) range⁶⁴⁶ (*viṣaya*) — [that is] elimination (*apāya*), [which] removes mere opinion⁶⁴⁷ (*adhyavasāya-apanoda*).

[1.15.9] **apāyo 'pagamaḥ apanodaḥ apavyādhaḥ apetaṁ apagataṁ apavidhāṁ apanuttaṁ ity anarthāntaram ||**

'Elimination' (*apāya*), 'going away' (*apagama*), 'removing' (*apanoda*), 'driving away' (*apavyādha*), 'gone' (*apeta*), 'departed' (*apagata*), 'rejected' (*apavidha*), 'removed' (*apanutta*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntaram*).⁶⁴⁸

[1.15.10] **dhāraṇā pratipattir yathāsvam matyavasthānam avadhāraṇam ca |**

'Holding' (*dhāraṇā*) [means] 'ascertainment' (*pratipatti*), 'properly'⁶⁴⁹ (*yathāsvam*) holding [in] the mind' (*maty-avasthāna*), and (*ca*) 'retaining' (*avadhāraṇa*).

⁶⁴⁵ Kapadia reads '*niścayaviśeṣajijñāsā ceṣṭā ihā*'. The word '*ceṣṭā*' can be translated as 'activity', or 'endeavour' (MW). Alternatively, it can be analysed as '*ca + iṣṭa* (desired)'. Siddhasenagaṇi interprets '*ceṣṭā*' as 'activity'.

⁶⁴⁶ See also TABh 1.15.6.

⁶⁴⁷ 'blosse Meinung' (*adhyavasāya*) (Böhtlingk 1855).

⁶⁴⁸ It is somewhat strange that this list of synonyms contains active and passive word forms (*apāya*, *apagama*, *apanoda*, and *apavyādha* vs. *apeta*, *apagata*, *apavidha*, and *apanutta*).

⁶⁴⁹ '*yathāsvam*' can also mean 'each on their own account' (MW). Siddhasenagaṇi explains '*yathāsvam*' as '*yathāviṣayam*' (in accordance with [one's] sphere of reference).

[1.15.11] *dhāraṇā pratipattir avadhāraṇāvasthānaṃ niścayo 'vagamaḥ avabodha ity anarthāntaram* ||

‘Holding’ (*dhāraṇā*), ‘assurance’ (*pratipattī*), ‘the condition of retaining’ (*avadhāraṇa-avasthāna*), ‘inquiry’ (*niścaya*), ‘understanding’ (*avagama*), [and] ‘knowledge’ (*avabodha*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

*bahubahuvidhakṣiprānīśritānukta*⁶⁵⁰*dhruvāṇām setarāṇām* ||1.16||

1.16 [The objects of ordinary cognition appear as] much (*bahu*), of many sorts (*bahuvidha*), swift (*kṣipra*), independent (*anīśrita*), non-verbal⁶⁵¹ (*anukta*) [and] constant (*dhruva*), together with [their] opposites (*setara*).

[1.16.1] *avagrahādayaś catvāro matijñānavibhāgā eṣāṃ bahvādīnām arthānām setarāṇām bhavanty ekaśaḥ* |

The four (*catūr*) varieties of ordinary cognition (*matijñāna-vibhāga*) — [i.e.], sense perception etc.⁶⁵² (*avagraha-ādī*) — exist (*bhavanti*) for these (*idam*) objects (*artha*), beginning with much (*bahv-ādī*), together with [their] opposites (*sa-itara*), in every case (*ekaśas*).⁶⁵³

[1.16.2] *setarāṇām iti* | [1.16.3] *sapratipakṣāṇām ity arthaḥ* |

Together with [their] opposites (*setara*) (*iti*) — the meaning is (*iti artha*) ‘with that which is opposite’ (*sa-pratipakṣa*).

[1.16.4] *bahv avagr̥hṇāti alpam avagr̥hṇāti* |

One perceives (*avagr̥hṇāti*) much⁶⁵⁴ (*bahu*) [and] one perceives little (*alpa*).

[1.16.5] *bahuvidham avagr̥hṇāti ekavidham avagr̥hṇāti* |

One perceives [something] of many sorts (*bahuvidha*) [and] one perceives [something] of one sort (*ekavidha*).

[1.16.6] *kṣipram avagr̥hṇāti cireṇāvagṛhṇāti* |

One perceives [something] swift (*kṣipra*) [and] one perceives [something] for a long time (*cireṇa*).

⁶⁵⁰ Kapadia reads ‘*nīśritāsandigdhadhruvāṇām*’ (‘independent, **unambiguous**, constant’). The reading of Mody corresponds to the reading in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

⁶⁵¹ Literally ‘unspoken’.

⁶⁵² See TA 1.15.

⁶⁵³ In other words, there is *avagraha*, *īhā* etc. of the objects that are much, of many sorts etc.

⁶⁵⁴ The word *bahu* seems to have an adverbial function. The same goes for *kṣipra* etc. in the next sentences.

[1.16.7] ***aniśritam avagr̥hṇāti niśritam avagr̥hṇāti |***

One perceives [something] independent (*aniśrita*) [and] one perceives [something] dependent (*niśrita*).

[1.16.8]⁶⁵⁵ ***anuktam avagr̥hṇāti uktam avagr̥hṇāti |***

One perceives [something] non-verbal (*anukta*) [and] one perceives [something that is] spoken (*ukta*).

[1.16.9] ***dhruvam avagr̥hṇāti adhruvam avagr̥hṇāti |***

One perceives [something] constant (*dhruva*) [and] one perceives [something] impermanent (*adhruva*).

[1.16.10] ***ity evam ihādīnām api vidyāt ||***

In the same way (*ity evam*), one should also know (*api vidyāt*) [these varieties] of ‘the endeavour to obtain’ etc. (see TA 1.15) (*ihā-ādī*).

arthasya ||1.17||

1.17 [There is ordinary cognition]⁶⁵⁶ of the sense object (*artha*).

[1.17.1] ***avagrahādayo matijñānavikalpā arthasya bhavanti ||***

The varieties of ordinary cognition (*matijñāna-vikalpa*), beginning with sense perception (*avagraha-ādī*), are (*bhavanti*) of a sense object (*artha*).⁶⁵⁷

vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ ||1.18||

1.18 [There is] sense perception (*avagraha*) of the *vyañjana*⁶⁵⁸.

[1.18.1] ***vyañjanasyāvagraha eva bhavati nehādayaḥ |***

There is (*bhavati*) indeed (*eva*) sense perception (*avagraha*) of the *vyañjana*, not ‘the endeavour to obtain’ etc. (*na ihā-ādī*).

⁶⁵⁵ Omitted by Kapadia. See Mody 1903: 28, footnote 3.

⁶⁵⁶ It is somewhat strange that ‘*artha*’ is given in singular since the qualifications of the sense object in the previous *sūtra* are given in plural (TA 1.16). It is also possible that TA 1.17 should be read together with TA 1.18. For a discussion of this possibility, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

⁶⁵⁷ In other words, the sense objects are the object of ordinary cognition.

⁶⁵⁸ The peculiar term ‘*vyañjana*’ seems to refer to the physical contact of a sense organ with its object. Tatia translates the term ‘*vyañjanāvagraha*’ as ‘contact-awareness’ (Tatia 1951:35). For a discussion of this term, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

[1.18.2] *evam dvividho 'vagraho vyañjanasyārthasya ca* | [1.18.3] *ihādayas tv arthasyaiva* ||

Thus (*evam*), sense perception (*avagraha*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], of the *vyañjana* and (*ca*) of the sense object (*artha*). But (*tu*) 'the endeavour to obtain' etc. (*ihā-ādi*) [is] only (*eva*) of the sense object (*artha*).

***na cakṣuranindriyābhyām* ||1.19||**

1.19 [There is] no [sense perception of the *vyañjana*]⁶⁵⁹ by the eyes (*cakṣus*) or the mind (*anindriya*).

[1.19.1] *cakṣuṣā noindriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati* | [1.19.2] *caturbhir indriyaiḥ śeṣair bhavati* |

There is no (*na bhavati*) sense perception (*avagraha*) of the *vyañjana* by the eye (*cakṣus*) and (*ca*) the mind (*noindriya*)⁶⁶⁰; [however] there is (*bhavati*) [sense perception of the *vyañjana*] by the four (*catur*) other (*śeṣa*) senses (*indriya*).⁶⁶¹

[1.19.3] *evam etat matijñānaṃ dvividhaṃ caturvidhaṃ aṣṭāviṃśatavidhaṃ aṣṭaṣaṣṭyuttaraśataavidhaṃ śaṭtriṃśattriśataavidhaṃ ca bhavati* ||

So (*evam*), this (*etat*) ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*) is (*bhavati*) twofold (*dvividha*), fourfold (*caturvidha*), 28-fold (*aṣṭāviṃśatavidha*), 168-fold (*aṣṭaṣaṣṭyuttaraśataavidha*) and (*ca*) 336-fold (*śaṭtriṃśattriśataavidha*).⁶⁶²

***śrutaṃ matipūrvam dvyanekadvādaśabhedam* ||1.20||**

1.20 Testimony (*śruta*) is preceded by ordinary cognition (*matī*). [It consists of] two [varieties], the many [outer limbs] and the twelve [inner limbs].⁶⁶³

⁶⁵⁹ See TA 1.18.

⁶⁶⁰ It is remarkable that the *bhāṣya* uses the word '*noindriya*' instead of '*anindriya*', which is used in the *sūtra*. For a discussion of the peculiar word formation '*noindriya*', see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

⁶⁶¹ An overview of this theory is given in § 3.2, table viii. *Types of ordinary cognition that have vyañjanāvagraha* and ix. *Objects of the different phases of ordinary cognition*.

⁶⁶² See § 3.2, table x. (*Varieties of ordinary cognition*) for a clarification of these numbers.

⁶⁶³ The 'inner limbs' (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) and 'outer limbs' (*aṅgabāhya*) refer to specific textual categories of the Jaina scriptures (see TABh 1.20.3). They are specified in TABh 1.20.7 and 1.20.10.

[1.20.1] *śrutajñānaṃ matijñānapūrvakaṃ bhavati |*

Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) is (*bhavati*) preceded by knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna-pūrvaka*).

[1.20.2] *śrutam āptavacanam āgamaḥ upadeśa aitihiyam āmnāyaḥ pravacanam jīnavacanam ity anarthāntaram ||*

‘Testimony’ (*śruta*), ‘the words of the *āpta*’ (*āpta-vacana*), ‘scriptural tradition’ (*āgama*), ‘teaching’ (*upadeśa*), ‘tradition’ (*aitihya*), ‘sacred tradition’ (*āmnāya*), ‘sacred writings’ (*pravacana*), [and] ‘the words of the *jina*’ (*jina-vacana*) (*itī*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

[1.20.3] *tad dvividham aṅgabāhyam aṅgapraviṣṭam ca |* [1.20.4] *tat punar anekavidham dvādaśavidham ca yathā saṅkhyam |*

That (i.e., testimony) (*tad*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], the [corpus of] outer limbs (*aṅga-bāhya*)⁶⁶⁴ and (*ca*) the [corpus of] inner limbs (*aṅga-praviṣṭa*). That (*tad*) [is] again (*punar*) manifold (*anekavidha*) and (*ca*) twelvefold (*dvādaśavidha*), according to (*yathā*) numbering (*saṅkhyā*).⁶⁶⁵

[1.20.5] *aṅgabāhyam anekavidham |* [1.20.6] *tadyathā |* [1.20.7] *sāmāyikaṃ caturviṃśatistavo vandanaṃ prati-kramaṇam kāyavyutsargaḥ pratyākhyānam daśavaikālikaṃ uttarādhyāyāḥ daśāḥ kalpavyavahārau niśītham ṛṣibhāṣitāny evam ādi ||*

The [corpus of] outer limbs (*aṅga-bāhya*) [is] manifold (*anekavidha*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- | | |
|------------------------------|---|
| i. <i>Sāmāyika</i> | vii. <i>Daśavaikālika</i> |
| ii. <i>Caturviṃśatistava</i> | viii. <i>Uttarādhyāyāḥ</i> |
| iii. <i>Vandana</i> | ix. <i>Daśāḥ</i> |
| iv. <i>Pratikramaṇa</i> | x. <i>Kalpavyavahārau</i> |
| v. <i>Kāyavyutsarga</i> | xi. <i>Niśītha</i> |
| vi. <i>Pratyākhyāna</i> | xii. <i>Ṛṣibhāṣitāni, etc. (evam ādi).</i> ⁶⁶⁶ |

⁶⁶⁴ Alternatively, ‘that which is outside the limbs’, i.e., ‘non-canonical’.

⁶⁶⁵ For an overview of these texts, see § 3.2, table xi. *Testimonial knowledge: The Jaina scriptures*.

⁶⁶⁶ For a discussion of this list, see § 3.2 *Testimony*.

[1.20.8] *aṅgapraviṣṭaṃ dvādaśavidham* | [1.20.9] *tadyathā* | [1.20.10] *ācāraḥ sūtrakṛtaṃ sthānaṃ samavāya vyākhyāprajñaptiḥ jñātadharmikathā upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ antakṛddaśāḥ anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ praśnavyākaraṇaṃ vipākasūtraṃ drṣṭipāta iti* ||

The [corpus of] inner limbs (*aṅga-praviṣṭa*) [is] twelvefold (*dvādaśavidha*).

Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| i. <i>Ācāra</i> | vii. <i>Upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ</i> |
| ii. <i>Sūtrakṛta</i> | viii. <i>Antakṛddaśāḥ</i> |
| iii. <i>Sthāna</i> | ix. <i>Anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ</i> |
| iv. <i>Samavāya</i> | x. <i>Praśnavyākaraṇa</i> |
| v. <i>Vyākhyāprajñapti</i> | xi. <i>Vipākasūtra</i> |
| vi. <i>Jñātadharmakathāḥ</i> | xii. <i>Drṣṭipāta</i> . |

[1.20.11] *atrāha* | [1.20.12] *matijñānaśrutajñānayoḥ kaḥ prativiśeṣa iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) [is] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) between knowledge from ordinary cognition and knowledge from testimony (*matijñāna-śruta-jñāna*) (*iti*)?

[1.20.13] *atrocyate* | [1.20.14] *utpannāvinaṣṭārthagrāhakaṃ sāmpratākāla-viṣayaṃ matijñānam* | [1.20.15] *śrutajñānam tu trikālaviṣayam utpanna-vinaṣṭānutpannārthagrāhakaṃ* ||

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): That which perceives objects [that have been] produced [and are] not [yet] destroyed (*utpanna-avinaṣṭa-artha-grāhaka*), having the present time as its range (*sāmprata-kāla-viṣaya*), [that is] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*); but (*tu*) knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*) has the three times as its range (*trikāla-viṣaya*) [and] perceives objects [that have been] produced, [that are] destroyed [and are] not [yet] produced (i.e., objects in the past, present and future) (*utpanna-vinaṣṭa-anutpanna-artha-grāhaka*).

[1.20.16] *atrāha* | [1.20.17] *grhṇīmo matīśrutayor nānātvam* | [1.20.18] *atha śrutajñānasya dvividham anekadvādaśavidham iti kiṃ kṛtaḥ prativiśeṣa iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): We understand (*grhṇīmaḥ*) the difference (*nānātva*) between ordinary cognition and testimony (*matī-śruta*). Now (*atha*), why (*kim*) [has one] made (*kṛta*) a difference (*prativīśeṣa*) [between] the twofold (*dvividha*), manifold, [and] twelvefold (*aneka-dvādaśavidha*)⁶⁶⁷ [varieties] of knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) (*iti*)?

⁶⁶⁷ See TABh 1.20.3 – 1.20.4.

[1.20.19] *atrocyate* | [1.20.20] *vakṭrviśeṣād dvaividhyam* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): The twofold nature (*dvaividhya*) [results] from the difference of speaker (*vakṭr-viśeṣa*).

[1.20.21] *yad bhagavadbhiḥ sarvajñaiḥ sarvadarśibhiḥ paramarṣibhir arhadbhis tatsvābhāvyāt paramaśubhasya ca pravacanapratiṣṭhāpana-phalasya tīrthakara-nāmakarmaṇo 'nubhāvād uktaṃ bhagavacchiṣyair atīśayavadbhir uttamātiśayavāgbuddhisampannair gaṇadharair dṛbdhaṃ tad aṅgapraviṣṭam* |

That which (*yad*) has been spoken (*ukta*) by the *jinas* (*bhagavat*) —

[who are] the all-knowing (*sarva-jña*) [and] all-seeing (*sarva-darśin*) most excellent sages (*parama-rṣi*), the *arhats*,⁶⁶⁸ on account of the experience (*anubhāva*) of body-determining *karman* [related to] the *tīrthakara* (*tīrthakara-nāma-karman*)⁶⁶⁹ — which is very positive (*parama-śubha*) [and] the result of which is the establishing of the doctrine (*pravacana-pratiṣṭhāpana-phala*) — [and] on account of their own nature (*tatsvābhāvyā*) —

[which has been] composed (*dṛbdha*) by the pupils of the *jinas* (*bhagavat-śiṣya*) —

[who are] the *gaṇadharas*, having supernatural qualities (*atīśayavat*),⁶⁷⁰ provided with the most eminent speech and mind (*uttama-atīśaya-vāgbuddhi-sampanna*) —

that (*tad*) [is the corpus] of inner limbs (*aṅga-praviṣṭa*).

[1.20.22] *gaṇadharānantaryādibhis tv atyantaviśuddhāgamaiḥ parama-prakṛṣṭavāṇmatibuddhiśaktibhir ācāryaiḥ kālasaṃhananāyurdoṣād alpa-śaktinām śiṣyāṇām anugrahāya yat proktaṃ tad aṅgabāhyam iti ||*

And (*tu*) that which (*yad*) [is] taught (*prokta*) by the succession of *gaṇadharas* etc. (*gaṇadhara-ānantarya-ādi*)⁶⁷¹ —

[who are] the teachers (*ācārya*), [whose] verbal testimonies [are] excessively pure (*atyanta-viśuddha-āgama*), [whose] powers of speech, ordinary cognition and mind [are] most superior (*parama-prakṛṣṭa-vāc-mati-buddhi-śakti*) —

⁶⁶⁸ The terms 'paramarṣi' and 'arhat' refer to the *jina*.

⁶⁶⁹ This type of *karman* is listed in TA 8.12.

⁶⁷⁰ The word 'atīśaya' refers to 'one of the superhuman qualities attributed to Jaina Arhats' (MW).

⁶⁷¹ Siddhasenagaṇi mentions Jambū as an example. He was the pupil of the *gaṇadhara* Sudharman (see, e.g., Wiley 2004: 104).

for the benefit (*anugraha*) of the pupils (*śiṣya*) —

[whose] power is little (*alpaśakti*) through defect brought about by time,
physical structure [and] vital power (*kāla-saṃhanana-āyur-doṣa*) —

that (*tad*) [is the corpus of] outer limbs (*aṅgabāhya*) (*iti*).

[1.20.23] **sarvajñapraṇītatvād ānantiyāc ca jñeyasya śrutajñānaṃ matijñānān mahāviṣayam |**

Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*), [due to] the quality of being conveyed by the all-knowing [beings] (*sarvajña-praṇītatva*) and (*ca*) [due to] the infinity (*ānantiya*) of [that what is] to be known (*jñeya*), [has] a greater range (*mahā-viṣaya*) [than] knowledge by ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*).

[1.20.24] **tasya mahāviṣayatvāt tāṃs tān arthān adhikṛtya prakaraṇasamāptyapekṣam aṅgopāṅganātvam |**

And (*ca*) [there is] a variety of ‘limbs’ and ‘additional limbs’⁶⁷² (*aṅga-upāṅganātvam*) — whose reference is the complete acquisition of the subjects (*prakaraṇa-samāptyapekṣā*), referring to (*adhikṛtya*) the various (*tad tad*) objects (*artha*) — due to the quality of having a great range (*mahāviṣayatva*) of this (i.e., of *testimony*) (*tad*).

[1.20.25] **kiṃ cānyat |** [1.20.26] **sukhagrahaṇavijñānāpohaprayogārthaṃ ca |**

Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*), [there is] also (*ca*) [a variety of scriptures] for the sake of (*artha*) easy understanding (*sukha-grahaṇa*), [easy]⁶⁷³ comprehending (*vijñāna*), [easy] reasoning (*apoha*), and [easy] operation of consciousness (*prayoga*).⁶⁷⁴

[1.20.27] **anyathā hy anibaddham aṅgopāṅgaśaḥ samudraprataraṇavad-duradhyavasānaṃ syāt |**

For (*hi*), otherwise (*anyathā*), it would be (*syāt*) a difficult task (*dur-adhyavasāna*), like crossing the ocean (*samudra-prataraṇavat*), unattached (*anibaddha*) to the limbs and additional limbs (i.e., without arms and legs) (*aṅga-upāṅga*).⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷² The terms ‘*aṅga*’ and ‘*upāṅga*’ refer to the inner and outer corpus, which are mentioned previously (see TABh 1.20.3).

⁶⁷³ Siddhasenagaṇi explains that ‘*sukha*’ qualifies all other elements in the compound. This interpretation is in line with the next sentence.

⁶⁷⁴ Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘*prayoga*’ as ‘*prayoga-vyāpāra*’. The exact meaning of this term is unclear to me.

⁶⁷⁵ In other words, mastering the different subjects without the help of the scriptures would be nearly impossible, just as crossing the ocean. The expression ‘*anibaddham aṅgopāṅgaśaḥ*’ (without arms and legs/without the inner and outer corpus) seems to be a pun.

[1.20.28] *etena pūrvāṇi vastūni prābhṛtāni prābhṛtaprābhṛtāni adhyayanāny uddeśās ca vyākhyātāḥ* ||

By this ⁶⁷⁶ (*etad*), the *pūrvas* ⁶⁷⁷, subjects (*vastu*), chapters ⁶⁷⁸ (*prābhṛta*), subdivisions ⁶⁷⁹ (*prābhṛta-prābhṛta*), readings (*adhyayana*), and (*ca*) brief statements (*uddeśa*), are fully explained (*vyākhyāta*).⁶⁸⁰

[1.20.29] *atrāha* | [1.20.30] *matīśrutayos tulyaviśayatvaṃ vakṣyati* | [1.20.31] *dravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu iti* | [1.20.32] *tasmād ekatvaṃ evāstv iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [There is] the quality of being of equal range (*tulya-viśayatva*) of ordinary cognition and testimony (*matī-śruta*),⁶⁸¹ [since the author of the *sūtra*] will say (*vakṣyati*)⁶⁸² that '[the domain of ordinary cognition and testimony extends] to [all] substances (*dravya*) [but] not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*)' (*iti*) (see TA 1.27). Therefore (*tasmāt*), there must indeed (*eva*) be (*astu*) the quality of being one (i.e., ordinary cognition and testimony must have the same range) (*ekatva*) (*iti*).

[1.20.33] *atrocyate* | [1.20.34] *uktam etat sāmpratākālaviśayaṃ matijñānaṃ śrutajñānaṃ tu trikālaviśayaṃ viśuddhataraṃ ceti* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [It has been] said (*ukta*) [that] this (*etad*) 'knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matī-jñāna*) [has] the present time as its range (*sāmprata-kāla-viśaya*) but (*tu*) [that] knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) has the three times as its range (*trikāla-viśaya*)' (see TABh 1.20.15) and (*ca*) [that knowledge from testimony is] purer (*viśuddhatara*) (*iti*).

⁶⁷⁶ I.e., the limbs (*aṅga*) and additional limbs (*upāṅga*) (see TABh 1.20.27).

⁶⁷⁷ The term '*pūrvā*' is used in the Jaina tradition with reference to a collection of 14 extinct scriptures, which are supposed to contain the oldest teachings of the *tīrthaṅkaras* (see, e.g., Wiley 2004: 176).

⁶⁷⁸ The term '*prābhṛta*' can be used to refer to the chapters of a work (MW). It is also a type of texts in the Digambara tradition (see also TABh 1.5.21). However, since the term is followed by the term '*prābhṛtaprābhṛta*', it is more likely that the intended meaning is 'chapter'.

⁶⁷⁹ The word '*prābhṛtaprābhṛta*' can be used with reference to subdivisions of chapters (MW).

⁶⁸⁰ The precise reference of the different terms in this passage is unclear to me. Siddhasenagaṇi interprets the terms that follow '*pūrvāṇi*' as increasingly smaller subdivisions of the *pūrvas*.

⁶⁸¹ In other words, ordinary cognition and testimony have the same range. This is an objection to TABh 1.20.15, which says that testimony has a greater range than ordinary cognition.

⁶⁸² It is remarkable that that the questioner in the *bhāṣya* refers to a *sūtra* (TA 1.27) that has not yet been discussed.

[1.20.35] *kiṃ cānyat* | [1.20.36] *matijñānam indriyānindriyanimittam ātmano jñasvabhāvyāt pārīṇāmikaṃ* | [1.20.37] *śrutajñānaṃ tu tatpūrvakam āptopadeśād bhavatīti* ||

Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*): Knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matī-jñāna*) [is] caused by the senses and the mind (*indriya-anindriya-nimitta*), resulting from a natural disposition (*pārīṇāmika*) due to the own nature of knowing (*jñā-svabhāvyā*) of the self (*ātman*) (i.e., since knowing is the essence of the self); but (*tu*) knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*), [which is] preceded by that (*tat-pūrvaka*), arises (*bhavatī*) from the teaching of the *āptas* (*āpta-upadeśa*) (*iti*).

[1.20.38] *atrāha* | [1.20.39] *uktaṃ śrutajñānam* | [1.20.40] *athāvadhi-jñānaṃ kim iti* | [1.20.41] *atrocyate* ||

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) [has now been] discussed (*ukta*). Now (*atha*), what (*kim*) [is] knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

***dvividho 'vadhiḥ* ||1.21||**

1.21⁶⁸³ Cosmic perception (*avadhi*) [has] two varieties (*dvividha*).

[1.21.1] *bhavapratyayaḥ kṣayopasāmanimittas ca* || *tatra*

[The two varieties of cosmic perception are]: [cosmic perception that] originates in birth (see TA 1.22) (*bhava-pratyaya*), and (*ca*) [cosmic perception that is] caused by the destruction [and] cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣaya-upasāma-nimitta*). Among them (*tatra*):

***bhavapratyayo narakadevānām* ||1.22||**

1.22 (SS 1.21) Hellish beings and gods [have cosmic perception that is] caused by birth (*bhava-pratyaya*).

[1.22.1] *narakāṇāṃ devānām ca yathāsvaṃ bhavapratyayam avadhijñānaṃ bhavati* |

There is (*bhavatī*) knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*) caused by birth (*bhava-pratyaya*) for hellish beings (*nāraka*) and (*ca*) gods (*deva*), in their own way (*yathāsvam*).

⁶⁸³ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* does not include this *sūtra*.

[1.22.2] ***bhavapratyayaṃ bhavahetukaṃ bhavanimittam ity arthaḥ |***

‘Caused by birth’ (*bhava-pratyaya*): The meaning [is] (*iti artha*) ‘effected by birth (*bhava-hetu*) [or] dependent on birth’ (*bhava-nimitta*).

[1.22.3] ***teṣāṃ hi bhavotpattir eva tasya hetur bhavati pakṣiṇām ākāśagamanavat na śikṣā na tapa iti ||***

Since (*hi*) the cause (*hetu*) of it (i.e., of cosmic perception) (*tad*) is (*bhavati*) indeed (*eva*) produced as a consequence of birth (*bhava-utpatti*) for them (*tad*), like flying (*ākāśa-gamanavat*) for birds (*pakṣin*), [it arises] without learning (*na śikṣā*) [and] without austerity (*na tapa*) (*iti*).

yathoktanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām ||1.23||

1.23 (SS 1.22) The other [beings] (*śeṣa*) [have cosmic perception] that is caused (*nimitta*) as it is said (see TABh 1.21.1) (*yathā-ukta*).⁶⁸⁴ [This variety of cosmic perception has] six forms (*ṣaḍ-vikalpa*).

[1.23.1] ***yathoktanimittaḥ kṣayopasamanimitta ity arthaḥ |*** [1.23.2] ***tad etad avadhijñānaṃ kṣayopasamanimittam ṣaḍvidhaṃ bhavati śeṣāṇām***⁶⁸⁵ |

‘Caused as it is said’ (*yathā-ukta-nimitta*): The meaning [is] (*ity artha*) ‘caused by the destruction [and] cessation [of *karman*] (see TABh 1.21.1)’ (*kṣaya-upasama-nimitta*). That very (*tad etad*) knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*) [that is] caused by the destruction [and] cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣaya-upasama-nimitta*) exists (*bhavati*) in a sixfold way (*ṣaḍvidha*) for the other beings (*śeṣa*).

[1.23.3] ***śeṣāṇām iti nārakadevebhyaḥ śeṣāṇām tiryagyonijānām manuṣyāṇām ca |***

‘The other [beings]’ (see TA 1.23) (*śeṣa*) (*iti*) [refers to beings] different (*śeṣa*) from hellish beings and gods (*nāraka-deva*), [beings] born from the wombs of animals (*tiryāṇc-yoni-ja*) and (*ca*) human beings (*manuṣya*).

⁶⁸⁴ It is remarkable that the *sūtra* refers to the *bhāṣya*. For a discussion of this passage, see § 2.3 *Is the TABh an auto-commentary*.

⁶⁸⁵ Kapadia’s edition omits ‘*śeṣāṇām*’. Note that the next sentence begins with ‘*śeṣāṇām*’.

[1.23.4] *avadhijñānāvaraṇīyasya karmaṇaḥ kṣayaopasaṁābhyaṁ bhavati śaḍvidham* | [1.23.5] *tadyathā* | [1.23.6] *anānugāmikaṁ ānugāmikaṁ hīyamānakaṁ, vardhamānakaṁ anavasthitaṁ avasthitaṁ iti* |

[It] arises (*bhavati*) from the destruction [and] cessation (*kṣaya-upaśama*) of *karman* that is covering knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna-āvaraṇīya*), in a sixfold way (*śaḍvidham*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- i. the one that is not following (*an-ānugāmika*)
- ii. the one that is following (*ānugāmika*)
- iii. the one that weakens (*hīyamānaka*)
- iv. the one that increases (*vardhamānaka*)
- v. the one that is not continuous (*an-avasthita*), [and]
- vi. the one that is continuous (*avasthita*) (*iti*).

[1.23.7] *tatrānānugāmikaṁ yatra kṣetre sthitasyotpannaṁ tataḥ pracyutasya pratipatati praśnādeśapuruṣajñānavat* ||

Among them (*tatra*), [there is] ‘the one that is not following’ (*an-ānugāmika*) whenever (*yatra*) [cosmic perception that is] produced (*utpanna*) for [someone who is] staying (*sthita*) in a region (*kṣetra*) goes away (*pratipatati*) [when that person is] gone away (*pracyuta*) from that [place] (*tatas*); like the knowledge of a person [when there is a] teaching of a lesson⁶⁸⁶ (*praśna-ādeśa-puruṣa-jñānavat*).

[1.23.8] *ānugāmikaṁ yatra kvacid utpannaṁ kṣetrāntaragatasyāpi na pratipatati bhāskaraprakāśavat ghaṭaraktabhāvavac ca* ||

[There is] ‘the one that is following’ (*ānugāmika*), [which can be] produced (*utpanna*) in any place (*yatra kvacid*) [but] does not go away (*na pratipatati*) for [that person], even when [that person has] gone to another place (*kṣetra-antara-gata ... api*), like the brightness of the sun (*bhāskara-prakāśavat*) and (*ca*) like the condition of being coloured⁶⁸⁷ of a jar (*ghaṭa-rakta-bhāvavat*).

⁶⁸⁶ The meaning of this simile is unclear to me. Perhaps, it refers to a situation in which students are connected with knowledge when they are listening to a teacher but forget about the teaching when they leave the class.

⁶⁸⁷ Alternatively, ‘red’.

[1.23.9] *hīyamānakam asaṃkhyeyeṣu dvīpeṣu samudreṣu pṛthivīṣu vimāneṣu tiryag ūrdhvam adho vā yad utpannaṃ kramaśaḥ saṃkṣipyamāṇaṃ pratipatati ā aṅgulāsaṃ saṃkhyeyabhāgāt pratipataty eva vā paricchinneṇ dhanopādāna saṃtaty agniśikhāvat ||*

[There is] ‘the one that weakens’ (*hīyamānaka*), which (*yad*), [after being] produced (*utpanna*) with regard to⁶⁸⁸ innumerable (*asaṃkhyeya*) islands (*dvīpa*), oceans (*samudra*), lands (*pṛthivī*), *vimāna*-heavens (*vimāna*) — horizontal (*tiryāñc*), upwards (*ūrdhvam*), or (*vā*) below (*adhas*) — goes away (*pratipatati*), gradually (*kramaśas*) contracting (*saṃkṣipyamāṇa*) up to an innumerable part of a finger’s breadth (*ā aṅgula-asaṃkhyeya-bhāga*); or (*vā*), it goes indeed away (*pratipatati eva*) like a multitude (*saṃtati*) of fire flames (*agni-śikhāvat*) [that is] dependent (*upādāna*) on fuel that has diminished (*paricchinna-indhana*).

[1.23.10] *vardhamānakam yad aṅgulasyāsaṃkhyeyabhāgādiṣṭupannaḥ vardhate ā sarvalokāt adharottarāraṇinirmathanotpann⁶⁸⁹opāttaśuṣkopaciya-mānādhiyamānendhanarāśyagnivat ||*

[There is] ‘the one that increases’ (*vardhamānaka*), which (*yad*) [is] produced (*utpanna*) with regard to an innumerable part etc. (*asaṃkhyeya-bhāga-ādī*) of a finger’s breadth (*aṅgula*) [and] increases (*vardhate*) up to the whole world (*ā sarvalokāt*), like a fire (*agnivat*) from a heap of fuel (*indhana-rāśi*) [that is] gathered (*upātta*⁶⁹⁰), dried up (*śuṣka*), accumulated (*upacīyamāna*), [and] placed in a fire (*ādhiyamāna*) [that is] risen (*utpanna*) by rubbing (*nirmathana*) the lower and upper piece of wood [used for kindling fire] (*adhara-uttara-araṇi*)⁶⁹¹.

[1.23.11] *anavasthitam hīyate vardhate vardhate hīyate ca pratipatati cotpadyate ceti punaḥ punar ūrmivat ||*

‘The one that is not continuous’ (*anavasthita*) diminishes (*hīyate*) [and] increases (*vardhate*), and (*ca*), [it] increases [and] (*vardhate*) diminishes (*hīyate*) (i.e., it fluctuates constantly); and (*ca*) it goes away (*pratipatati*) and (*ca*) is produced [again] (*utpadyate*) (*iti*), like a wave (*ūrmivat*) [that is coming and going] again and again (*punar punar*).

⁶⁸⁸ In other words, the range of this type of cosmic perception includes innumerable islands, oceans, etc.

⁶⁸⁹ Kapadia reads ‘*nirmathanāśannopātta*’ (from near hand, *āsanna*).

⁶⁹⁰ ‘contracted fr. *upā-datta*’ (MW)

⁶⁹¹ The term ‘*araṇi*’ refers to ‘the piece of wood used for kindling fire by attrition’; ‘generally distinction is made between the lower one and the upper one (*adharāraṇi* & *uttarāraṇi*)’ (MW).

[1.23.12] *avasthitaṃ yāvatī kṣetre utpannaṃ bhavati tato na pratipataty ā kevalaprāpteḥ*⁶⁹² *ā bhavakṣayād vā jātyantarasthāyi vā*⁶⁹³ *bhavati liṅgavat ||23||*

‘The one that is continuous’ (*avasthita*) is (*bhavati*) produced (*utpanna*) in whatever (*yāvat*) region (*kṣetra*), it does not go away (*na pratipatati*) from there (*tatas*) [and] it remains (*avatiṣṭate*) up to the reaching of absolute knowledge (*ā kevala-prāpti*); [it] is (*bhavati*) either (*vā*) remaining [till] the next birth (*jāti-antara-sthāyin*) or (*vā*) up to the termination of [one’s] state (*ā bhava-kṣaya*), like gender (*liṅgavat*).

[1.23.13] *uktam avadhijñānam* | [1.23.14] *manaḥparyāyajñānam vakṣyāmaḥ* |
Knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*) [has now been] discussed (*ukta*).
[Next], we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāya-jñāna*).

rjuvipulamatī manaḥparyāyah ||1.24||

1.24 (SS 1.23) Mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya*) [has] two [varieties], [i.e.], direct perception (*rju-matī*) [and] extensive perception (*vipula-matī*).⁶⁹⁴

[1.24.1] *manaḥparyāyajñānam dvividham* | [1.24.2] *rjumatīmanaḥparyāya-jñānam vipulamatīmanaḥparyāyajñānam ca* ||

Knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) is twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], knowledge from direct mental perception (*rju-matī-manaḥparyāya-jñāna*) and (*ca*) knowledge from extensive mental perception (*vipula-matī-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*).

[1.24.3] *atrāha* | [1.24.5] *ko ’nayoḥ prativīṣeṣa iti* | [1.24.6] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) [is] the difference (*prativīṣeṣa*) [between] these two (*idam*) (*itī*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

viśuddhyapratipātābhyāṃ tadviśeṣaḥ ||1.25||

1.25 (SS 1.24) The difference between them [results] from purity (*viśuddhi*) and permanence⁶⁹⁵ (*a-pratipāta*).

⁶⁹² Kapadia reads ‘*kevalaprāpter avatiṣṭhate*’.

⁶⁹³ Kapadia omits the second ‘*vā*’.

⁶⁹⁴ Tatia translates ‘simple’ and ‘complex’. See also § 3.2 *Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge*. See also the discussion of these terms in § 3.2 *Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge*.

⁶⁹⁵ Lit. ‘not falling away’.

[1.25.1] *viśuddhikṛtaś cāpratipātakṛtaś cānayoḥ prativīśeṣaḥ* | [1.25.2] *tadyathā* | [1.25.3] *rjumatimanaḥparyāyād* ⁶⁹⁶ *vipulamati manaḥparyāya-jñānaṃ viśuddhataram* | [1.25.4] *kiṃ cānyat* |

The difference (*prativīśeṣa*) [between] these two (*idam*) is brought about by purity (*viśuddhi-kṛta*) and (*ca*) is brought about by permanence (*a-pratipāta-kṛta*).

Namely (*tad-yathā*), knowledge from extensive mental perception (*vipula-mati-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) [is] purer (*viśuddhatara*) than [knowledge] from direct mental perception (*rju-mati-manaḥ-paryāya*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

[1.25.5] *rjumatimanaḥparyāyajñānaṃ pratipataty api bhūyo vipulamati-manaḥparyāyajñānam tu na pratipatātī* ||

Knowledge from direct mental perception (*rju-mati-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) goes away (*pratipatātī*) again (*api bhūyas*)⁶⁹⁷ but (*tu*) knowledge from extensive mental perception (*vipula-mati-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) does not go away (*na pratipatātī*).

[1.25.6] *atrāha* | [1.25.7] *athāvadhimanaḥparyāyajñānayoḥ kaḥ prativīśeṣa iti* | [1.25.8] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), what (*kim*) [is] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) [between] cosmic perception and mental perception (*avadhi-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*), it is said (*ucyate*):

***viśuddhikṣetrasvāmiviśayebhyo 'vadhimanaḥparyāyayoḥ* ||1.26||**

1.26 (SS 1.25) [The difference between] cosmic perception (*avadhi*) and mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya*) [results] from purity (*viśuddhi*), region (*kṣetra*), owner (*svāmin*), [and] range (*viśaya*).

[1.26.1] *viśuddhikṛtaḥ kṣetrakṛtaḥ svāmikṛto viśayakṛtaś cānayoḥ viśeṣo bhavaty avadhimanaḥparyāyajñānayoḥ* |

The difference (*viśeṣa*) [between] this (*idam*) knowledge from cosmic perception and mental perception (*avadhi-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) is (*bhavati*):

- i. brought about by purity (see TABh 1.25.1) (*viśuddhi-kṛta*)
- ii. brought about by region (*kṣetra-kṛta*)
- iii. brought about by owner (*svāmi-kṛta*), and (*ca*)
- iv. brought about by range (*viśaya-kṛta*).

⁶⁹⁶ Kapadia reads '*rjumatimanaḥparyāyajñānād*'.

⁶⁹⁷ The word order is somewhat odd. One would rather expect '*bhūyo 'pi*'.

[1.26.2] *tadyathā* | [1.26.3] *avadhijñānāt manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ viśuddhataram* |

Namely (*tad-yathā*), knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) [is] more pure (*viśuddhatara*) than knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*).

[1.26.4] *yāvanti hi rūpīṇi dravyāṇy avadhijñānī jānīte tāni manaḥparyāyajñānī viśuddhatarāṇi manogatāni jānīte* || [1.26.5] *kiṃ cānyat* |

For (*hi*), as many (*yāvat*) extended (*rūpin*) substances⁶⁹⁸ (*dravya*) [as] the one with knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*), so many (*tad*) the one endowed with knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*) [as] more⁶⁹⁹ refined (*viśuddhatara*) thoughts (*manas-gata*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

[1.26.6] *kṣetrakṛtāś cānayoḥ prativīśeṣaḥ* | [1.26.7] *avadhijñānam aṅgulasyāsaṅkhyeyabhāgādiśūtpannaṃ bhavaty ā sarvalokāt* | [1.26.8] *manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ tu manuṣyakṣetra eva bhavati nānyakṣetra iti* || [1.26.9] *kiṃ cānyat* |

And (*ca*) [concerning] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) between these two⁷⁰⁰ (*idam*) resulting from region (*kṣetrakṛta*): Knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhijñāna*) is (*bhavati*) produced (*utpanna*) in an innumerable part etc. (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādi*) of a finger's breadth (*aṅgula*), up to the whole world (*ā sarvalokāt*)⁷⁰¹. In contrast (*tu*), knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāya-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) only (*eva*) in the region of men (*manuṣyakṣetra*), [and] not (*na*) in another region (*anyakṣetra*) (*iti*). Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*):

[1.26.10] *svāmikṛtāś cānayoḥ prativīśeṣaḥ* | [1.26.11] *avadhijñānam saṃyatasya asaṃyatasya vā*⁷⁰² *sarvagatiṣu bhavati* |

And (*ca*) [concerning] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) between these two (*idam*) resulting from the owner (*svāmikṛta*): Clairvoyant knowledge (*avadhijñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) for [beings with] restraint (*saṃyata*)⁷⁰³ or (*vā*) [beings] without restraint (*asaṃyata*), in all varieties of transmigration (*sarvagati*).

⁶⁹⁸ For a discussion of the substances (*dravya*), see TA 5.1 - 5.3.

⁶⁹⁹ The suffix '-tara' can also mean 'particularly', instead of 'more'. However, given the meaning of the term 'viśuddhatara' in the previous sentence (TABh 1.26.2), I translate 'more'.

⁷⁰⁰ I.e., *manaḥparyāyajñāna* and *avadhijñāna* (see TABh 1.26.1).

⁷⁰¹ See also TABh 1.23.10.

⁷⁰² Kapadia reads 'asaṃyatasya, [saṃyatāsaṃyatasya ca] (vā)'.

⁷⁰³ Siddhasenagaṇi explains that 'saṃyata' excludes the first six *guṇasthānas*. See also Wiley 2003: 100.

[1.26.12] *manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ tu manuṣyasamṃyatasyaiva bhavati nānyasya* ||
[1.26.13] *kiṃ cānyat* |

By contrast (*tu*), knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāya-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) only (*eva*) for beings with restraint that are human (i.e., not for gods and hellish beings)⁷⁰⁴ (*manuṣyasamṃyata*), [and] not (*na*) for another (*anya*). Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*):

[1.26.14] *viṣayakṛtaś cānayoḥ prativīśeṣaḥ* | [1.26.15] *rūpidravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣv avadher viṣayanibandho bhavati* | [1.26.16] *tadanantabhāge manaḥparyāyasyeti* ||

And (*ca*) [concerning] the difference (*prativīśeṣa*) between these two (*idam*) resulting from the range (*viṣaya-kṛta*): The scope of the range⁷⁰⁵ (*viṣaya-nibandha*) of cosmic perception (*avadhi*) exists (*bhavati*) with respect to all extended substances (*rūpi-dravya*), [but] not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*) (see TA 1.27). [It will be said] (see TA 1.29) [that] (*iti*) [the domain of] mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) [extends to] an infinitesimal part (*ananta-bhāga*) of that (*tad*).

[1.26.17] *atrāha* | [1.26.18] *uktaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ* | [1.26.19] *atha kevalajñānaṃ kim iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāya-jñāna*) [has now been] discussed (*ukta*). Now (*atha*), what (*kim*) [is] absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) (*iti*)?

[1.26.20] *atrocyate* | [1.26.21] *kevalajñānaṃ daśame 'dhyāye vakṣyate* | [1.26.22] *mohakṣayāt jñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāyakṣayāc ca kevalam iti* ||

At this point (*atra*), it is said (*ucyate*): Absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) will be discussed (*vakṣyate*) in the tenth (*daśama*) chapter (*adhyāya*). [It will be said that] (see TA 10.1) 'absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [results] from the destruction [of] deluding [*karman*] (*moha-kṣaya*) and from the destruction [of] knowledge[covering], worldview-covering, [and] obstacle-creating [*karman*] (*jñāna-darśana-āvaraṇa-antarāya-kṣaya*)' (*iti*).

⁷⁰⁴ See also TABh 1.26.9. Knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāyajñāna*) only occurs in the human realm (*manuṣyakṣetra*).

⁷⁰⁵ Lit. 'the binding of the range' (*viṣayanibandha*).

[1.26.23] *atrāha* | [1.26.24] *eṣāṃ matijñānādīnāṃ jñānānāṃ kaḥ kasya viṣayanibandha iti* | [1.26.25] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*), one says (*āha*): Of these (*etad*) [varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*), beginning with ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna-ādi*), what (*kim*) scope of the range (see TABh 1.26.15) (*viṣaya-nibandha*) [is there] for whom (*kim*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

matīśrutayor nibandhaḥ sarvadravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu ||1.27||

1.27 (SS 1.26) The scope (*nibandha*) of ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*) [includes] all substances (*sarva-dravya*) [but] not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*).

[1.27.1] ***matijñānaśrutajñānayor viṣayanibandho bhavati sarvadravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu*** |

The scope of the range (*viṣaya-nibandha*) of knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*) and knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) with respect to all substances (*sarva-dravya*) [but] not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*).

[1.27.2] ***tābhyāṃ hi sarvāṇi dravyāni jānīte na tu sarvaiḥ paryāyaiḥ*** ||

For (*hi*), one knows (*jānīte*) all (*sarva*) substances (*dravya*) by these two⁷⁰⁶ (*tad*) but (*tu*) not (*na*) by⁷⁰⁷ all (*sarva*) modes (*paryāya*).

rūpiṣv avadheḥ ||1.28||

1.28 (SS 1.27) [The scope of the range] of cosmic perception (*avadhi*) [includes all things] that have extension (*rūpin*).

[1.28.1] ***rūpiṣv eva dravyeṣv avadhijñānasya viṣayanibandho bhavati asarvaparyāyeṣu*** |

The scope of the range (*viṣaya-nibandha*) of knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) indeed⁷⁰⁸ (*eva*) with respect to the substances (*dravya*) that have extension (*rūpin*), but not in all modes (*a-sarva-paryāya*).

⁷⁰⁶ I.e., *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna*.

⁷⁰⁷ The meaning of the instrumental case is not entirely clear to me. Perhaps, the intended meaning is '[accompanied] by all modes'.

⁷⁰⁸ Alternatively, 'only'.

[1.28.2] *suviśuddhenāpy avadhijñānena rūpīṇy eva dravyāṇy avadhijñānī jānīte tāny api na sarvaiḥ paryāyair iti ||*

Even when (*api*) the one endowed with clairvoyant knowledge (*avadhi-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*) the substances (*dravya*) that have indeed (*eva*) extension (*rūpin*) by a very pure (*su-viśuddha*) cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna*), even then (*api*), [he can] not (*na*) [know] them (*tad*) by all (*sarva*) modes (*paryāya*) (*iti*).

tadanantabhāge manaḥparyāyasya ||1.29||

1.29 (SS 1.28) [The scope] of mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya*) [extends to] an infinitesimal part (*tad-ananta-bhāga*) of that (see TABh 1.29.1).

[1.29.1] *yāni rūpīṇi dravyāṇy avadhijñānī jānīte tato 'nantabhāge manaḥparyāyasya viśayanibandho bhavati |*

The scope of the range (*viśaya-nibandha*) of mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya*) exists (*bhavati*) with respect to an infinitesimal part (*ananta-bhāga*) of that (*tatas*), [i.e.], the substances (*dravya*) that have extension (*rūpin*), which (*yad*) the one endowed with knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*) (see TABh 1.28.1).

[1.29.2] *avadhijñānaviśayasyānantabhāgaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānī jānīte rūpi-dravyāṇi manorahasyavicāragatāni ca mānuṣa⁷⁰⁹ kṣetraparyāpannāni viśuddhatarāṇi ceti ||*

The one endowed with knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñānin*) knows (*jānīte*) an infinitesimal part (*ananta-bhāga*) of the range of knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhi-jñāna-viśaya*) — [i.e.], extended substances (*rūpi-dravya*), and (*ca*) the movements of thought, [which are] hidden in the mind (*mano-rahasya-vicāra-gata*), and (*ca*) [that which is] beyond the human region (*mānuṣa-kṣetra-paryāpanna*) — [as] more refined [thoughts]⁷¹⁰ (*viśuddhatara*) (*iti*).

sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya ||1.30||

1.30 (SS 1.29) [The scope] of absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [extends to] all modes of all substances (*sarva-dravya-paryāya*).

⁷⁰⁹ Mody mentions the variant reading 'manuṣya-' The term 'manuṣyakṣetra' also appears in TABh 1.26.9.

⁷¹⁰ See TABh 1.26.4.

[1.30.1] *sarvadravyeṣu sarvaparyāyeṣu ca kevalajñānasya viṣayanibandho bhavati* |

The scope of the range (*viṣaya-nibandha*) of absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) exists (*bhavati*) with respect to all substances (*sarva-dravya*) and (*ca*) in all modes (*sarva-paryāya*).

[1.30.2] *taddhi sarvabhāvagrāhakaṃ sambhinna-lokāloka-viṣayam* |

For (*hi*), that [absolute knowledge] (*tad*) is the seizer of everything (*sarva-bhāva-grāhaka*), [whose] range [is] both the world and that which is beyond the world (*sambhinna-loka-aloka-viṣaya*).

[1.30.3] *nātaḥ paraṃ jñānam asti* | [1.30.4] *na ca kevalajñānaviṣayāt paraṃ kiṃcid anyaj jñeyam asti* |

There is (*asti*) no (*na*) higher (*para*) knowledge (*jñāna*) than this (*atas*). And (*ca*) there is (*asti*) not (*na*) something else (*kiṃcid anyaj*) to be known (*jñeyam*) [that is] higher (*para*) than the range of absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna-viṣaya*).

[1.30.5] *kevalaṃ paripūrṇaṃ samagram asādhāraṇaṃ nirapekṣaṃ viśuddhaṃ sarvabhāvajñāpakaṃ lokāloka-viṣayam anantaparyāyam ity arthaḥ* ||

‘Absolute’ (*kevala*) — The meaning is (*ity artha*): ‘complete’ (*paripūrṇa*), ‘entire’ (*samagra*), ‘extra-ordinary’ (*asādhāraṇa*), ‘independent’ (*nirapekṣa*), ‘pure’ (*viśuddha*), ‘causing to know everything’ (*sarva-bhāva-jñāpaka*), ‘[whose] range is the world and that which is beyond the world’ (*loka-aloka-viṣaya*), ‘[whose] modes [are] infinite’ (*ananta-paryāya*).

[1.30.6] *atrāha* | [1.30.7] *eṣāṃ matijñānādīnāṃ yugapad ekasmiṃ jīve kati bhavantīti* | [1.30.8] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): How much (*kati*) of these (*idam*) [varieties of knowledge], beginning with knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna-ādī*), exist (*bhavanti*) simultaneously (*yugapad*) in one (*eka*) soul (*jīva*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

ekādīni bhājyāni yugapad ekasmin ā caturbhyaḥ ||1.31||

1.31 (SS 1.30) One up to four [varieties of knowledge] (*eka-ādī ā catur*) can be shared (*bhājya*) simultaneously (*yugapad*) in one [soul] (*eka*).

[1.31.1] ***eṣāṃ matyādināṃ jñānānām ādita ekādini bhājyāni yugapad ekasmiṅ jīve ā caturbhyah |***

Starting from (*āditas*) the [varieties] of knowledge (*jñāna*), beginning with ordinary cognition (*mati-ādi*), one up to four (*eka-ādi ā catur*) of these (*tad*), can be shared (*bhājya*) simultaneously (*yugapad*) in one (*eka*) soul (*jīva*).

[1.31.2] ***tadyathā - kasmimścij jīve matyādināṃ ekaṃ bhavati |*** [1.31.3] ***kasmimścij jīve dve bhavataḥ |*** [1.31.4] ***kasmimścit trīṇi bhavanti |*** [1.31.5] ***kasmimścic catvāri bhavanti |***

To illustrate (*tad-yathā*), in some (*kaścid*) soul[s] (*jīva*) there is (*bhavati*) one (*eka*) of the [varieties of knowledge, i.e.], ordinary cognition etc. (*mati-ādi*). In some (*kaścid*) soul[s] (*jīva*) there are (*bhavataḥ*) two (*dvi*). In some (*kaścid*) there are (*bhavanti*) three (*tri*). In some (*kaścid*) there are (*bhavanti*) four (*catur*).

[1.31.6] ***śrutajñānasya tu matijñānena niyataḥ sahabhāvas tatpūrvakatvāt |***

However (*tu*), the concomitance (*sahabhāva*) of knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*) with knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*) [is] certain (*niyata*) due the quality of being preceded by that (i.e., ordinary cognition precedes testimony) (*tat-pūrvakatva*).

[1.31.7] ***yasya śrutajñānaṃ tasya niyataṃ matijñānam |*** [1.31.8] ***yasya tu matijñānaṃ tasya śrutajñānaṃ syād vā na veti ||***

For whom (*yaḥ*) [there is] knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*), for [that person] (*tad*) [there is] certainly (*niyata*) knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*). But (*tu*) for whom (*yaḥ*) [there is] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna*), for him (*tad*) knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) might either exist (*syāt vā*) or not (*na vā*) (*iti*).

[1.31.9] ***atrāha |*** [1.31.10] ***atha kevalajñānasya pūrvair matijñānādibhiḥ kim sahabhāvo bhavati nety⁷¹¹ ucyate |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), is there (*kim ... bhavati*) concomitance (*saha-bhāva*) of absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*) with the foregoing [varieties of knowledge] (*pūrva*), [i.e.], knowledge from ordinary cognition etc. (*mati-jñāna-ādi*)? It is said (*ucyate*): '[This is] not [the case]' (*na*) (*iti*).

⁷¹¹ Kapadia reads 'neti? | atrocyate'.

[1.31.11] *kecid ācāryā vyācakṣate* | [1.31.12] *nābhāvaḥ* | [1.31.13] *kiṃ tu tadabhibhūtatvād akiṃcitkarāṇi bhavanti indriyavat* |

Some (*kecid*) teachers (*ācārya*) explain (*vyācakṣate*) [that there is] no absence [of the other varieties of knowledge for the one endowed with absolute knowledge] (*na-abhāva*); nevertheless (*kiṃ tu*), due to the quality of surpassing them (*tadabhibhūtatva*), they are (*bhavanti*) non-functional⁷¹² (*akiṃcitkara*), like the senses (*indriyavat*).⁷¹³

[1.31.14] *yathā vā vyabhre nabhasi āditya udite bhūritejastvād ādityenābhibhūtāny anyatejāṃsi jvalanamaṇicandranakṣatraprabhṛtini prakāśanam prati akiṃcitkarāṇi bhavanti tadvad iti* |

Or (*vā*), just as (*yathā*) when the sun (*āditya*) rises (*udita*) in the cloudless (*vyabhra*) sky (*nabhas*), the other lights (*anya-tejas*) — beginning with shining jewels, the moon, and the stars (*jvalana-maṇi-candra-nakṣatra-prabhṛtin*), [which are] surpassed (*abhibhūta*) by the sun (*āditya*), due to the quality of being a great light (*bhūri-tejastva*) — become (*bhavanti*) likewise (*tadvat*) non-functional (*akiṃcitkara*) with regard to (*prati*) [that which is] illuminating (*prakāśana*) (*iti*).

[1.31.15] *kecid apy āhuḥ* | [1.31.16] *apāyasaddravyatayā matijñānam tatpūrvakam śrutajñānam avadhijñānamanaḥparyāyajñāne ca rūpidravyaviṣaye tasmān naitāni kevalinaḥ santīti* ||

Some (*kecid*) also (*api*) say (*āhuḥ*): ‘Knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñānam*) [arises] from existent substance [through] elimination⁷¹⁴ (*apāya-saddravyatā*); Knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna*) [is] preceded by that (*tatpūrvaka*); And (*ca*) knowledge from cosmic perception [and] knowledge from mental perception (*avadhi-jñāna-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*) — [their] range [consists of] substances having form (*rūpi-dravya-viṣaya*). Hence (*tasmāt*), these (*etad*) exist not (*na santī*) for the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*)’ (*iti*).

[1.31.17] *kiṃ cānyat* | [1.31.18] *matijñānādiṣu caturṣu paryāyeṇopayogo bhavati na yugapat* |

Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*): In the case of the four [varieties of knowledge]⁷¹⁵ (*catur*), beginning with ordinary cognition (*matijñāna-ādī*), [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) takes place (*bhavati*) successively (*paryāyeṇa*), not simultaneously (*na yugapat*).

⁷¹² *a-kiṃcid-kara*: ‘not able to do anything’, ‘insignificant’ (MW).

⁷¹³ For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 *Concomitance of the varieties of knowledge*.

⁷¹⁴ See also TABh 1.8.23 and TABh 1.11.6.

⁷¹⁵ Alternatively, ‘[people endowed with] the four [varieties of knowledge]’.

[1.31.19] *sambhinnajñānadarśanasya tu bhagavataḥ kevalino yugapat sarvabhāvagrāhake nirapekṣe kevalajñāne kevaladarśane cānusamayam upayogo bhavati* ||

But (*tu*) [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) takes place (*bhavati*) simultaneously (*yugapat*) for the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*), [which is] the *jina* (*bhagavat*), [whose] knowledge and worldview [are] combined (*sambhinnajñāna-darśana*); [in other words, cognitive operation takes place] jointly (*anusamaya*) with respect to absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) — [which is] the seizer of everything⁷¹⁶ (*sarva-bhāva-grāhaka*) [and which is] independent⁷¹⁷ (*nirapekṣa*) — and (*ca*) with respect to absolute worldview (*kevaladarśana*).

[1.31.20] *kiṃ cānyat* | [1.31.21] *kṣayopaśamajāni catvāri jñānāni pūrvāṇi kṣayād eva kevalam* | [1.31.22] *tasmān na kevalinaḥ śeṣāṇi jñānāni bhavantīti* ||

Moreover (*kiṃ cānyat*): The former (*pūrvā*) four (*catur*) [varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*) [are] born from the destruction and cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣaya-upaśamaja*); absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [is born] from destruction [of *karman*] (*kṣaya*) alone (*eva*). Hence (*tasmāt*), the other (*śeṣa*) [varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*) exist not (*na bhavantī*) for the one endowed with absolute knowledge (*kevalin*) (*iti*).

***matīśrutāvdhayo viparyayaś ca* ||1.32||**

1.32 (SS 1.31) [There is knowledge from] ordinary cognition (*matī*), testimony (*śruta*), [and] cosmic perception (*avadhi*), and the opposite (*viparyaya*).

[1.32.1] *matijñānaṃ śrutajñānaṃ avadhijñānaṃ iti* | [1.32.2] *viparyayaś ca bhavaty ajñānaṃ cety arthaḥ* |

[There is] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*), knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*), [and] knowledge from cosmic perception (*avadhijñāna*) (*iti*). And (*ca*) there is (*bhavati*) the opposite (*viparyaya*). The meaning (*ity artha*) [is] ‘false knowledge’ (*ajñāna*).

[1.32.3] *jñānaviparyayo ’jñānaṃ iti* |

The opposite of knowledge (*jñāna-viparyaya*) is false knowledge (*ajñāna*).

⁷¹⁶ See also TABh 1.30.2.

⁷¹⁷ Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘*nirapekṣa*’ as ‘independent of the *indriyas*’. He interprets this as a qualification of both *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana*. The same goes for ‘*sarvabhāva-grāhaka*’. However, these two terms are used in TABh 1.30.2 and TABh 1.30.5 with reference to *kevalajñāna* only.

[1.32.4] *atrāha* | [1.32.5] *tad eva jñānaṃ tad evājñānam iti* | [1.32.6] *nanu cchāyātapavac chītoṣṇavac ca tadatyantaviruddham iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): That (*tad*) [is] indeed (*eva*) knowledge (*jñāna*) [and] that (*tad*) [is] indeed (*eva*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*) (*iti*); surely (*nanu*) [there is] an extreme opposition of them (*tad-atyanta-viruddha*) like shade [and] sunshine (*chāyā-ātapavat*) and (*ca*) like cold [and] hot (*śīta-uṣṇavat*) (*iti*).

[1.32.7] *atrocyate* | [1.32.8] *mithyādarśanaparigrahād viparītagrāhakatvam eteṣām* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [There is] the quality of being a seizer of the opposite (*viparīta-grāhakatva*) of them (i.e., the varieties of knowledge) (*etad*), due to the adoption of wrong view (*mithyā-darśana-parigraha*).⁷¹⁸

[1.32.9] *tasmād ajñānāni bhavanti* | [1.32.10] *tadyathā* | [1.32.11] *matyajñānaṃ śrutājñānaṃ vibhaṅgajñānam iti* |

The [varieties of] false knowledge (*ajñāna*) arise (*bhavanti*) from that (*tasmāt*). Namely (*tad-yathā*), false knowledge from ordinary cognition (*maty-ajñāna*), false knowledge from testimony (*śruta-ajñāna*), [and] deceptive knowledge (i.e., the opposite of *avadhi*) (*vibhaṅgajñāna*) (*iti*).

[1.32.12] *avadher*⁷¹⁹ *viparīto vibhaṅga ity ucyate* ||

It is said (*ucyate*) that (*iti*) deceptive knowledge (*vibhaṅga*) [is] the opposite (*viparīta*) [of] cosmic perception (*avadhi*).

[1.32.13] *atrāha* | [1.32.14] *uktaṃ bhavatā samyagdarśanaparigṛhītaṃ matyādi-jñānaṃ bhavaty anyathā*⁷²⁰ *jñānam eveti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (*bhavat*) (see TABh 1.32.1 – 1.32.6) [that] ‘knowledge, beginning with ordinary cognition (*maty-ādi-jñāna*), is (*bhavati*) obtained by right worldview (*samyag-darśana-parigṛhīta*) [and that] everything contrary to this (*anyathā*) [is] indeed (*eva*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*)’ (*iti*).

⁷¹⁸ Cf. TABh 1.12.14.

⁷¹⁹ The edition of Modi has ‘*avadhir*’ even though he mentions ‘*avadher*’ as a variant reading. Since the word is followed by ‘*viparīta*’, I choose the reading with the ablative ending.

⁷²⁰ Mody reads *anyathājñānam*.

[1.32.15] *mithyādr̥ṣṭayo 'pi ca bhavyāś cābhavyāś cendriyanimittān aviparītān sparśādīn upalabhante upadiśante ca sparśaṃ sparśa iti rasaṃ rasa iti* |
 [1.32.16] *evam śeṣān* | [1.32.16] *tat katham etad iti* |

And although (*api ca*) [they may have] wrong view (*mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*), [both those who are] suitable for liberation⁷²¹ (*bhavya*) and (*ca*) [those who are] not suitable for liberation (*abhavya*) perceive (*upalabhante*) [that which is perceptible by the sense of] touch etc. (*sparśa-ādi*) without mistakes (*aviparīta*), caused by senses (*indriya-nimitta*). And (*ca*) they point out (*upadiśante*): “[there is] touching (*sparśa*) [of] a tangible object (*sparśa*)” (*iti*)⁷²², “[there is] tasting (*rasa*) [of] taste (*rasa*)” (*iti*), [and] likewise (*evam*) [in the case of] the remaining [senses] (*śeṣa*). Then (*tad*), how (*katham*) [is] this [possible] (*etad*) (*iti*)?⁷²³

[1.32.17] *atrocyate* | [1.32.18] *teṣāṃ hi viparītam etad bhavati* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): surely (*hi*), this (*etad*) is (*bhavati*) false (*viparīta*) for them (*tad*).⁷²⁴

sadasator aviśeṣād yadṛcchopalabdher unmattavat ||1.33||

1.33 (SS 1.32) [Erroneous cognition results] from accidental-perception (*yadṛccha-upalabhdī*) because of indistinction (*aviśeṣa*) between [things that are] real and unreal (*sad-asat*), like a madman (*unmattavat*).⁷²⁵

[1.33.1] *yathonmattaḥ karmodayād upahatendriyamatir viparītagrāhī bhavati so 'śvaṃ gaur ity adhyavasyati gāṃ cāśva iti loṣṭaṃ suvarṇam iti suvarṇam loṣṭa iti loṣṭaṃ ca loṣṭa iti suvarṇam suvarṇam iti tasyaivam aviśeṣeṇa loṣṭaṃ suvarṇam suvarṇam loṣṭam iti viparītam adhyavasyato niyatam ajñānam eva bhavati – tadvan mithyādarśanopahatendriyamater matiśrutāvadhayo 'py ajñānam bhavanti ||*

Just as (*yathā*) a madman (*unmatta*), whose senses and mind are damaged (*upahata-indriya-mati*) from the rising of *karman* (*karma-udaya*), is (*bhavati*) perceiving the opposite (*viparīta-grāhin*). He (*tad*) determines (*adhyavasyati*) a

⁷²¹ TA 2.7 says: ‘[There are] the qualities of being suitable (i.e. for liberation) and unsuitable (*abhavya*) etc. [in the case] of the soul etc.’ (*jīvabhavyābhavyatvādīni ca*).

⁷²² Alternatively, ‘they name tangible objects tangible’ etc. That is, they teach them as they are.

⁷²³ Put differently, how is it possible that people with a wrong view make right observations?

⁷²⁴ In other words, this is false knowledge.

⁷²⁵ For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 *False knowledge*.

horse [as a] cow (*go*) (*aśva*) (*iti*) and (*ca*) a cow (*go*) [as] a horse (*aśva*) (*iti*), gold (*suvarṇa*) [as] clay (*loṣṭa*) (*iti*) [and] clay (*loṣṭa*) [as] gold (*suvarṇa*) (*iti*), and [sometimes]⁷²⁶ (*ca*) [he determines] clay (*loṣṭa*) [as] clay (*loṣṭa*) (*iti*) [and] gold (*suvarṇa*) [as] gold (*suvarṇa*) (*iti*). Thus (*evam*), [that] is (*bhavati*) certainly (*niyata* ... *eva*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*) for him (*tad*) [who is] determining (*adhyavasyat*) the opposite (*viparīta*) without distinction (*aviśeṣeṇa*), [saying] ‘clay (*loṣṭa*) [is] gold (*suvarṇa*) [and] gold (*suvarṇa*) [is] clay (*loṣṭa*)’ (*iti*).

In the same way (*tadvat*), ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception (*matī-śruta-avadhi*) of [a person] whose senses and mind are damaged [due to] wrong worldview (*mithyā-darśana-upahata-indriya-matī*) are (*bhavanti*) also (*api*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*).

[1.33.2] **uktaṃ jñānaṃ** | [1.33.3] **cāritraṃ navame ’dhyāye vakṣyāmaḥ** | [1.33.4] **pramāṇe cokte** | [1.33.5] **nayān vakṣyāmaḥ** | [1.33.6] **tadyathā** |
[So far] knowledge (*jñāna*) [has been] discussed (*ukta*). We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) conduct (*cāritra*) in the ninth (*navama*) chapter (*adhyāya*). And (*ca*) the two means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) [have been] discussed (*ukta*). [Now] we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) the perspectives (*naya*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

naigamasāṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdā nayāḥ ||1.34||

1.34 (SS 1.33, variant)⁷²⁷ The perspectives (*naya*) [are]:

- i. the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*)
- ii. the collecting [perspective] (*sāṅgraha*)
- iii. the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*)
- iv. the linear [perspective] (*rju-sūtra*)
- v. the literal [perspective] (*śabda*).⁷²⁸

⁷²⁶ This reading is based on Siddhasenagaṇi’s interpretation.

⁷²⁷ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* adds ‘*samabhirūḍhaivambhūta*’ (*naigamasāṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdasamabhirūḍhaivambhūta nayāḥ*) (*Sarvārthasiddhi* 1.33). For a discussion of this variant reading, see § 3.2 *The perspectives*.

⁷²⁸ See § 3.2 *The perspectives* for an analysis of the different perspectives.

[1.34.1] **naigamaḥ saṅgrahaḥ vyavahāraḥ ṛjusūtraḥ śabda ity ete pañcanayā bhavanti** | [1.34.2] **tatra**

‘The commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*), the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*), the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*), the linear [perspective] (*ṛju-sūtra*) [and] the literal [perspective] (*śabda*)’ (*iti*) — these (*etad*) are (*bhavanti*) the five (*pañca*) perspectives (*naya*). Among them (*tatra*):

ādyasābdau dvitribhedau ||1.35||

1.35⁷²⁹ The first [perspective] (i.e., the commonplace perspective, *naigama*) (*ādya*) [and] the literal perspective (*śabda*) [have respectively] two [and] three varieties (*dvi-tribheda*).

[1.35.1] **ādya iti sūtrakramaprāmāṇyān naigamam āha** |

[The author of the *sūtra*] refers (*āha*) to the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*) [as] ‘the first’ (*ādya iti*), following the authoritativeness of the order [in] the *sūtra* (*sūtra-krama-prāmāṇya*).

[1.35.2] **sa dvibhedo deśaparikṣepī sarvaparikṣepī ceti** |

This [perspective] (i.e., *naigama*) (*sa*) [has] two varieties (*dvibheda*): [the one that is] encompassing partially (*deśa-parikṣepin*) and (*ca*) [the one that is] encompassing everything (*sarva-parikṣepin*) (*iti*).⁷³⁰

[1.35.3] **śabdas tribhedaḥ sāmprataḥ samabhirūḍha evambhūta iti** ||

The literal perspective (*śabda*) has three varieties (*tribheda*): the present [viewpoint] (*sāmprata*), the etymological [viewpoint] (*samabhirūḍha*), [and] the exact [viewpoint] (*evam-bhūta*) (*iti*).

[1.35.4] **atrāha** | [1.35.5] **kim eṣāṃ lakṣaṇam iti** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of these?

⁷²⁹ This *sūtra* is not included in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

⁷³⁰ Tatia explains: ‘regarding a part as the whole and vice versa’ (Tatia 2011: 24).

[1.35.6] *atrocyate* | [1.35.7] *nigameṣu ye 'bhihitāḥ śabdās teṣām arthaḥ śabdārthaparijñānaṃ ca deśasamagragrāhī naigamaḥ* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): The object (*artha*) and (*ca*) the ascertainment of the meaning of the words⁷³¹ (*śabda-artha-parijñāna*) of those (*tad*) words (*yad śabda*) [that are] employed (*abhihita*) in 'daily undertakings' (*nigama*), [that is] the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*), which is grasping either partially or wholly (*deśa-samagra-grāhin*).

[1.35.8] *arthānāṃ sarvaikadeśagrahaṇaṃ saṅgrahaḥ* |

Seizing [both] the whole and the part⁷³² (*sarva-ekadeśa-grahaṇa*) of objects (*artha*), [that is] the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*).

[1.35.9] *laukikasama upacāraprāyo viśṛṭtārtho vyavahāraḥ* |

The practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*) [is] equal to the [view of] worldly men⁷³³ (*laukika-sama*), applied in a pragmatic way⁷³⁴ (*upacāra-prāya*), having a broad meaning (*viśṛṭta-artha*).

[1.35.10] *satāṃ sāmpratānām arthānām abhidhānaparijñānaṃ ṛjusūtraḥ* |

The linear [perspective] (*ṛjusūtra*) [is] the ascertainment of the name (*abhidhāna-parijñāna*) of objects (*artha*) existing (*sat*) presently (i.e., not in the past or future) (*sāmprata*).

[1.35.11] *yathārthābhidhānaṃ śabdaḥ* |

The literal perspective (*śabda*) [is] the designation in accordance with reality (*yathārtha-abhidhāna*).

[1.35.12] *nāmādiṣu prasiddhapūrvāc chabdād arthe pratyayaḥ sāmprataḥ* |

The present [viewpoint] (i.e., the first variety of 'śabda') (*sāmprata*) [is] the idea (*pratyaya*) in the case of an object (*artha*) [from] a literal perspective (*śabda*), preceded by being known (i.e., whose conventional meaning is already fixed)⁷³⁵ (*prasiddha-pūrva*), with respect to name etc.⁷³⁶ (*nāma-ādī*).

⁷³¹ It is unclear to me what the precise meaning of 'artha' and 'śabdārthaparijñāna' is in this context. Perhaps the author tries to differentiate between the sense (*śabdārtha-parijñāna*) and reference (*artha*) of a word.

⁷³² Siddhasenagaṇi analyses 'sarvaikadeśagrahaṇaṃ' as a *dvandva* compound.

⁷³³ Siddhasenagaṇi interprets 'laukika' as worldly people.

⁷³⁴ Alternatively, 'by way of metaphor'. Siddhasenagaṇi refers to metaphors in his commentary on this passage. However, this perspective deals with objects in a practical way. See also TABh 1.35.29.

⁷³⁵ Cf. TABh 1.35.31.

⁷³⁶ I.e., the four modes of analysis (see TA 1.5).

[1.35.13] **satsv artheṣv asaṅkramaḥ samabhirūḍhaḥ |**

The etymological [viewpoint] (*samabhirūḍha*) [is] non-going together (i.e., making distinctions) (*asaṅkrama*) in the case of objects (*artha*) [that are] existent (*sat*).

[1.35.14] **vyañjanārthayor evambhūta iti ||**

The exact [viewpoint] (*evam-bhūta*) [makes a distinction]⁷³⁷ between the sign (*vyañjana*)⁷³⁸ [and] the object⁷³⁹ (*vyañjana-artha*) (*iti*).

[1.35.15] **atrāha |** [1.35.16] **uddiṣṭā bhavatā naigamādayo nayāḥ |** [1.35.17] **tan⁷⁴⁰ nayā iti kaḥ padārtha iti |**

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): The perspectives (*naya*) beginning with [the perspective of] the common man (*naigama-ādi*) [have now been] listed (*uddiṣṭā*) by you (*bhavat*). What (*kim*) [is] the meaning (*pada-artha*) [of] the there (*tad*) [mentioned term] (*iti*) ‘perspectives’ (*naya*)?

[1.35.18] **atrocyate |** [1.35.19] **nayāḥ prāpakāḥ kārakāḥ sādhakā nirvartakā nirbhāsakā upalambhakā vyañjakā ity anarthāntaram |**

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): ‘Perspectives’ (lit. ‘leading’) (*naya*), ‘[that which is] causing to reach’ (*prāpaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to make’ (*kāraka*), ‘[that which is] causing to accomplish’ (*sādhaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to bring about’ (*nirvartaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to illuminate’ (*nirbhāsaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to perceive’ (*upalambhaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to appear’ (*vyañjaka*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms).

[1.35.20] **jīvādīn padārthān nayanti prāpnuvanti kārayanti sādhayanti nirvartayanti nirbhāsayanti upalambhayanti vyañjayantīti nayāḥ ||**

The perspectives lead (*nayanti*), [i.e.], reach (*prāpnuvanti*), cause to make (*kārayanti*), cause to accomplish (*sādhayanti*), cause to bring about (*nirvartayanti*), cause to illuminate (*nirbhāsayanti*), cause to perceive (*upalambhayanti*), and cause to clarify (*vyañjayanti*) the categories (*padārtha*), beginning with soul (*jīva-ādi*) (*iti*).

⁷³⁷ See the previous sentence (TABh 1.35.13).

⁷³⁸ For a discussion of the term ‘*vyañjana*’, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*. The meaning of the term in this context seems to be ‘sign’ or ‘word’. However, the term has a different meaning in the theory of perception in the TA (see TA 1.8). See also TABh 1.35.33.

⁷³⁹ Cf. TABh 1.18.2: ‘Thus, sense perception [is] twofold, [i.e.], of the *vyañjana* and of the sense object’ (*evam dvividho ’vagraho vyañjanasyārthasya ca*).

⁷⁴⁰ Kapadia reads ‘*tatra nayā iti*’.

[1.35.21] *atrāha* | [1.35.22] *kim ete tantrāntarīyā vādina āhosvit svatantrā eva codakapakṣagrāhiṇo matibhedena vipradhāvitā iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [Are] (*kim*) these (*etad*) [perspectives] the proponents (*vādin*) of other sects⁷⁴¹ (*tantrāntarīya*) or (*āhosvit*) [proponents of] our own school (*svatantra*) [who are] taking the side of the objector (*codaka-pakṣa-grāhin*), [and who are] running in different directions (i.e., disagreeing) (*vipradhāvita*) by difference in opinion (*mati-bheda*) (*iti*)?

[1.35.23] *atrocyate* | [1.35.24] *naite tantrāntarīyā nāpī svatantrāḥ matibhedena vipradhāvitāḥ* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): These (*etad*) [perspectives are] not (*na*) [the proponents belonging to] other schools (*tantrāntarīya*) nor (*na-api*) [proponents belonging to] our own school (*svatantra*) [who are] running in different directions (i.e., disagreeing) (*vipradhāvita*) by difference in opinion (*mati-bheda*).

[1.35.25] *jñeyasya tv arthasyādhyavasāyāntarāṇy etāni* |

On the contrary (*tu*), these (*etāni*) [are] different apprehensions (*adhyavasāya-antara*) of the object (*artha*) to be known (*jñeya*).

[1.35.26] *tadyathā* | [1.35.27] *ghaṭa ity ukte yo 'sau ceṣṭābhinirvṛtta ūrdhvakuṇḍalauṣṭhāyatavṛttagrīvo 'dhastāt parimaṇḍalo jalādīnām āharaṇa-dhāraṇasamartha uttaraguṇanirvartanānirvṛtto dravyaviśeṣas tasmīn ekasmin viśeṣavati tajjātīyeṣu vā sarveṣv aviśeṣāt parijñānaṃ naigamanayaḥ* |

To illustrate (*tad-yathā*), the understanding (*parijñāna*) [when the word] 'pot' (*ghaṭa*) (*iti*) [is] said (*ukta*) — [i.e.], that [object] (*adas*) which (*yad*) [is] resulting from activity (*ceṣṭā-abhinirvṛtta*), having round handles on top (*ūrdhva-kuṇḍala-auṣṭha*) [and] a stretched circular neck (*āyata-vṛtta-grīvā*), with a globe (*parimaṇḍala*) below (*adhastāt*), [which is] fit for taking and holding (*āharaṇa-dhāraṇa-samartha*) of water etc. (*jala-ādī*), completed by the application of other qualities (i.e., colour etc.) (*uttara-guṇa-nirvartanā-nirvṛtta*), having some specific material (*dravya-viśeṣa*) — [as] that (*tad*) single (*eka*) particularised⁷⁴² [object] (*viśeṣavat*) or (*vā*) [as] all [objects] (*sarva*) of the class of that (*taj-jātīya*) in general (*aviśeṣāt*), [that is] the commonplace perspective (*naigama-naya*).

⁷⁴¹ Siddhasenagaṇi mentions the Vaiśeṣika tradition as an example.

⁷⁴² Lit. 'having a particular'.

[1.35.28] *ekasmin vā bahuṣu vā nāmādiviśeṣiteṣu sāmpratātītānāgateṣu ghaṭeṣu sampratyayaḥ saṅgrahaḥ* |

The understanding (*sampratyaya*) in the case of pots (*ghaṭa*) [as being] either (*vā*) one (*eka*) or (*vā*) many (*bahu*), specified by name etc. (*nāma-ādi-viśeṣita*), [existing in] the present, past, and future⁷⁴³ *sāmprata-atīta-anāgata*), [that is] the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*).

[1.35.29] *teṣv eva laukikaparīkṣakagrāhyeṣūpacāragamyeṣu yathāsthūlārtheṣu sampratyayo vyavahāraḥ* |

The understanding (*sampratyaya*) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (*tad eva*) [as] having a broad meaning (*yathā-sthūla*⁷⁴⁴-*artha*), to be understood by the investigator [for the sake] of worldly matters (*laukika-parīkṣaka-grāhya*), to be understood in a pragmatic way⁷⁴⁵ (*upacāra-gamya*), [that is] the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*).

[1.35.30] *teṣv eva satsu sāmprateṣu sampratyayaḥ rjusūtraḥ* |

The understanding (*sampratyaya*) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (*tad eva*) [as] existing (*sat*) at present (*sāmprata*), [that is] the linear [perspective] (*rju-sūtra*).

[1.35.31] *teṣv eva sāmprateṣu nāmādīnām anyatamagrāhiṣu prasiddha-pūrvakeṣu ghaṭeṣu sampratyayaḥ sāmpratāḥ śabdaḥ* |

The understanding (*sampratyaya*) [in the case of] the very same (*tad eva*) pots (*ghaṭa*) [that are] present (*sāmprata*), [which are] previously known⁷⁴⁶ (*prasiddha-pūrvaka*) expressive of any (*anyatama-grāhin*) of [the modes of analysis] beginning with name (*nāma-ādi*), [that is] the present (*sāmprata*) literal perspective (*śabda*).

[1.35.32] *teṣām eva sāmpratānām adhyavasāyāsaṅkramo vitarkadhyānavat samabhirūḍhaḥ* |

The delimitation of the apprehension (*adhyavasāya-asāṅkrama*) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (*tad eva*) [that are] present (*sāmprata*), as in *vitarka* meditation⁷⁴⁷ (*vitarka-dhyānavat*), [that is] the etymological [viewpoint] (*samabhirūḍha*).⁷⁴⁸

⁷⁴³ Lit. 'gone' (*atīta*) and 'not arrived' (*anāgata*).

⁷⁴⁴ *yathāsthūla*: 'not detailed' (MW).

⁷⁴⁵ Cf. TABh 1.35.9.

⁷⁴⁶ I.e., whose conventional meaning has already been fixed. Cf. TABh 1.35.12.

⁷⁴⁷ I.e., focused on singleness. The ninth chapter of the TA discusses *vitarka* meditation (TA 9.41, TA 9.43, and TA 9.45).

⁷⁴⁸ Cf. TABh 1.35.13.

[1.35.33] *teṣām eva vyañjanārthayor anyonyāpekṣārthagrāhitvam evambhūta iti ||*

The quality of understanding objects [by] mutual dependence (*anyonya-apekṣā-artha-grāhitva*) of the sign⁷⁴⁹ (*vyañjana*) [and] the object⁷⁵⁰ (*vyañjana-artha*) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (*tad eva*), [that is] the exact [viewpoint] (*evam-bhūta*).

[1.35.34] *atrāha |* [1.35.35] *evam idānīm ekasminn arthe 'dhyavasāyanānātvān nanu vipratipattiprasaṅga iti |*

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): In this way (*evam*), [is there] not (*nanu*) the unwanted consequence of a contradiction (*vipratipatti-prasaṅga*) at this point (*idānīm*), due to the difference of apprehensions (*adhyavasāya-nānātvā*) in the case of a single (*eka*) object (*artha*) (*iti*)?

[1.35.36] *atrocyate |* [1.35.37] *yathā sarvaṃ ekaṃ sadaviśeṣāt*

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): Just as (*yathā*) everything (*sarva*) [is] a unity (*eka*) on account of non-distinction [with respect to] existence (*sad-aviśeṣa*);⁷⁵¹

sarvaṃ dvitvaṃ jīvājīvātmakatvāt

everything (*sarva*) [is] twofold (*dvitva*) on account of the quality of being characterised by soul and non-soul (*jīva-ajīva-ātmakatva*);

sarvaṃ tritvaṃ dravyaguṇaparyāyāvarodhāt

everything (*sarva*) [is] threefold (*tritva*) on account of the delimitation of qualities, modes and substance (*dravya-guṇa-paryāya-avarodha*);

*sarvaṃ catuṣṭvaṃ*⁷⁵² *caturdarśanaviśayāvarodhāt*

everything (*sarva*) [is] fourfold (*catuṣṭva*) on account of the delimitation of the range of the four views⁷⁵³ (*catur-darśana-viśaya-avarodha*);

*sarvaṃ pañcatvaṃ astikāyāvarodhāt*⁷⁵⁴

everything (*sarva*) [is] fivefold (*pañcatva*) on account of the delimitation of the [five] categories (*astikāya-avarodha*);

⁷⁴⁹ Siddhasenagaṇi interprets *vyañjana* as 'word' (*śabda*).

⁷⁵⁰ Perhaps the intended meaning is that the exact viewpoint analyses the relationship between word and the nature of objects. For example, when people bake, they can be called 'baker'.

⁷⁵¹ In other words, seen from the perspective of existence, everything is the same, i.e. existent.

⁷⁵² Kapadia reads '*catuṣṭayaṃ*'.

⁷⁵³ The reference of these four views eludes me. Perhaps it refers to the eye, the ear, the tongue, and touch. Alternatively, it might refer to the four modes of analysis (TA 1.5).

⁷⁵⁴ Kapadia reads '*pañcāstikāyātmakatvāt*' ('on account of the quality of being characterised by the five categories').

sarvaṃ ṣaṭtvam ṣaḍdravyāvarodhā iti |

everything (*sarva*) [is] sixfold (*ṣaṭtvā*) on account of the delimitation of the six substances (*ṣaḍ-dravya-avarodha*).

[1.35.38] **yathaitā na vipratipattayo 'tha cādhyavasāyasthānāntarāṇy etāni tadvan nayavādā iti |**

Just as (*yathā*) these (*etad*) [are] not (*na*) contradictory (*vipratipatti*) but (*ca*) these (*etad*) [are] rather (*atha*) different states of apprehension (*adhyavasāya-sthāna-antara*), likewise (*tadvat*), the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda*) [are not incompatible] (*iti*).

[1.35.39] **kiṃ cānyat |** [1.35.40] **yathā matijñānādibhiḥ pañcabhir jñānair dharmādīnām astikāyānām anyatamo 'rthaḥ pṛthak pṛthag upalabhyate paryāyaviśuddhiviśeṣād utkarṣeṇa na ca tā⁷⁵⁵ vipratipattayaḥ bhavanti tadvan nayavādāḥ |**

Further (*kiṃ cānyat*): Just as (*yathā*) any (*anyatama*) object (*artha*) of the categories (*asti-kāya*), beginning with motion (*dharma-ādī*), is perceived (*upalabhyate*) separately (*pṛthak pṛthak*) by the five (*pañca*) knowledges (*jñāna*), beginning with knowledge from ordinary cognition (see TA 1.9) (*mati-jñāna-ādī*), [resulting] from a difference in the purity of the modes (*paryāya-viśuddhi-viśeṣa*), gradually (*utkarṣeṇa*), and (*ca*) these (*tad*) are (*bhavanti*) not (*na*) contradictory (*vipratipatti*), likewise (*tadvat*), the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda*) [are not incompatible] (*iti*).

[1.35.41] **yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇair eko 'rthaḥ pramīyate svaviśayaniyamāt na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan nayavādā iti |**

Or (*vā*), just as (*yathā*) one (*eka*) object (*artha*) is understood (*pramīyate*) by the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), [i.e.], direct cognition, inference, comparison and verbal testimony (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana*) — and these (*tad*) are (*bhavanti*) not (*na*) contradictory (*vipratipatti*) on account of the limitation of their respective ranges (*svaviśaya-niyama*) — likewise (*tadvat*), the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda*) [are not incompatible] (*iti*).

⁷⁵⁵ Kapadia reads 'tāni'.

*āha ca*⁷⁵⁶

[1.35.42] *naigamaśabdārthānām ekānekārthanayagamāpekṣaḥ* |

[1.35.43] *deśasamagragrāhī vyavahārī naigamo jñeyah* ||1||

And (*ca*) one says (*āha*): Grasping either partially or wholly⁷⁵⁷ (*deśa-samagragrāhin*), depending on the understanding [from] a perspective on objects that are single and many (*eka-aneka-artha-naya-gama-apekṣaḥ*) [with reference to] meanings of common words (*naigama-śabda-artha*), [this is] to be known (*jñeya*) [as] the ordinary⁷⁵⁸ (*vyavahārin*) commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*).

[1.35.44] *yat saṅgrhītavacanam sāmānye deśato 'tha ca viśeṣe* |

[1.35.45] *tat saṅgrahanayanīyatam jñānam vidyān nayavidhijñāh* ||2||

One who knows the perspectives (*naya-vidhijñā*) should know (*vidyāt*) that (*tad*) knowledge (*jñāna*) [which is] established⁷⁵⁹ by the collecting perspective (*saṅgrahanaya-niyata*) [as the one] which (*yad*) [is] expressive of the collective (*saṅgrhītavacana*), in general terms (*sāmānya*), in partial terms (*deśatas*), and (*ca*) specific terms (*viśeṣa*).⁷⁶⁰

[1.35.46] *samudāyavyaktyākṛtisattāsamjñādinīścayāpekṣam* |

[1.35.47] *lokopacārānīyatam vyavahāram vistr̥tam vidyāt* ||3||

[He] should know (*vidyāt*) the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*) [as] broad (*vistr̥ta*), established by worldly usage (*loka-upacāra-niyata*), depending on the ascertainment of 'group, individual, form, existence, name, etc.' (*samudāya-vyaktyākṛti-sattā-samjñā-ādi-nīścaya-apekṣa*).⁷⁶¹

⁷⁵⁶ It is remarkable that this passage is introduced with '*āha ca*', which suggests that the verses that follow are quoted from another source. For a discussion of this issue, see § 3.5 *Quotations in the TABh*.

⁷⁵⁷ See TABh 1.35.7.

⁷⁵⁸ It is somewhat strange that the author uses the word '*vyavahārin*' to qualify the *naigama* perspective since the *vyavahāra* perspective is discussed separately (see TABh 1.35.47). This suggests that this passage was written by a different author.

⁷⁵⁹ Alternatively, 'delimited' (*niyata*).

⁷⁶⁰ It is unclear to me how '*sāmānye deśato 'tha ca viśeṣe*' should be analysed, and the syntax allows for several interpretations. The word '*deśatas*' can be interpreted as a third option, apart from '*sāmānya*' and '*viśeṣa*'. Alternatively, it might qualify '*viśeṣa*', or '*sāmānya*' and '*viśeṣa*'. The vocabulary suggests a link with the Vaiśeṣika theory of universals and particulars.

⁷⁶¹ It is unclear to me what the source of this list is. In his study on Vaiśeṣika philosophy, Halbfass writes that in 'early Nyāya, *ākṛti* is defined as the "mark" (*liṅga*) of the universal (*jāti*). [...] In classical Mīmāṃsā and some grammatical traditions, *ākṛti* can be used as a synonym of *jāti/sāmānya* and refer to the universal itself' (Halbfass 1992: 121).

[1.35.48] *sāmprataviṣayagrāhakam rjusūtranayaṃ samāsato vidyāt |*

[1.35.49] *vidyād yathārthaśabdaṃ viśeṣitapadaṃ tu śabdanayaṃ ||4|| iti ||*

[He] should know (*vidyāt*) concisely (*samāsatas*) the linear perspective (*rju-sūtra-naya*) [as the kind of] grasping [having] the present [as its] range (*sāmprata-viṣaya-grāhaka*); and (*tu*) [he] should know (*vidyāt*) the verbal perspective (*śabda-naya*) [as the one in which] a word [is] in accordance with the object (*yathā-artha-śabda*), which has qualified stages⁷⁶² (*viśeṣita-pada*).

[1.35.50] *atrāha |* [1.35.51] *atha jīvo nojīvaḥ ajīvo no'jīva⁷⁶³ ity ākārīte kena nayena ko 'rthaḥ pratīyate iti |*

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), if [the words] (*iti*) 'soul' (*jīva*), 'quasi-soul' (*nojīva*), 'non-soul' (*ajīva*), [or] 'quasi-non-soul' (*no-ajīva*) are brought into play (*ākārīte*), which (*kim*) object (*artha*) is understood (*pratīyate*) by which (*kim*) perspective (*naya*)?

[1.35.52] *atrocyate |* [1.35.53] *jīva ity ākārīte naigamadeśasaṅgrahavyavahāra-rjusūtrasāmpratasamabhirūḍhaiḥ pañcasv api gatiṣv anyatamo jīva iti pratīyate |*

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [When] the word 'soul' (*jīva iti*) is brought into play (*ākārīte*), any (*anyatama*) soul (*jīva iti*) is understood (*pratīyate*) — in all (*api*) the five (*pañca*) varieties of transmigration (*gati*)⁷⁶⁴ — by the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*), the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*) [with respect to] the part⁷⁶⁵ (*deśa*), the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*), the linear [perspective] (*rju-sūtra*), the present [viewpoint] (*sāmprata*), [and] the etymological [viewpoint] (*samabhirūḍha*).⁷⁶⁶

[1.35.54] *kasmāt |* [1.35.55] *ete hi nayā jīvaṃ praty aupaśamikādiyukta-bhāvagrāhiṇaḥ |*

Why (*kasmāt*)? Since (*hi*) these (*etad*) perspectives (*naya*) [are] grasping the states of existence, connected with 'the state resulting from the cessation' [of *karman*] etc. (*aupaśamika-ādi-yukta-bhāva-grāhin*), applied to (*prati*) the soul (*jīva*).

⁷⁶² It is not clear to me what the intended meaning is. Perhaps this refers to the three varieties of *śabda*, i.e., *sāmprata*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*.

⁷⁶³ Kapadia reads 'noajīva'.

⁷⁶⁴ Siddhasenagaṇi explains: animals, hell-beings, humans, gods, and *siddhas*.

⁷⁶⁵ TABh 1.35.69 explains that it is pointless to analyse the words 'soul' (sg.) or 'souls' (du., pl.) from the *saṅgraha* perspective with respect to the whole (*sarva*).

⁷⁶⁶ This seems to be a selective list of *nayas* that can be applied to the word 'soul'.

[1.35.56] **nojīva ity ajīvadravyaṃ jīvasya vā deśapradeśau |**

‘Quasi-soul’ (*nojīva iti*) [implies] inanimate substance (*ajīva-dravya*), or (*vā*) larger and smaller parts⁷⁶⁷ (*deśa-pradeśa*) of the soul (*jīva*).

[1.35.57] **ajīva ity ajīvadravyam eva |**

‘Non-soul’ (*ajīva iti*) [implies] only (*eva*) inanimate substance (*ajīva-dravya*).

[1.35.58] **no’jīva iti jīva eva tasya vā deśapradeśān iti ||**

‘Quasi-non-soul’ (*no’jīva iti*) [implies] indeed (*eva*) soul (*jīva*), or (*vā*) larger and smaller parts (*deśa-pradeśa*) for this [soul] (*tad*) (*iti*).

[1.35.59] **evambhūtanayena tu jīva ity ākārīte bhavastho jīvaḥ pratiyate |**

But (*tu*) [when] the word ‘soul’ (*jīva iti*) is brought into play (*ākārīta*) from the exact perspective (*evam-bhūta-naya*), the soul (*jīva*) is understood (*pratiyate*) [as] being in existence (*bhava-stha*).

[1.35.60] **kasmāt |** [1.35.61] **eṣa hi nayo jīvaṃ praty audayikabhāvagrāhaka eva |**

Why (*kasmāt*)? For (*hi*) this (*etad*) perspective (*naya*) [is] only (*eva*) grasping the state [resulting from] the manifestation [of *karman*] (*audayika-bhāva-grāhaka*), applied to the soul (*jīva prati*).

[1.35.62] **jīvatīti jīvaḥ prāṇīti prāṇān dhārayatīty arthaḥ |**

‘The soul (*jīva*) lives (*jīvatī*)’ (*iti*) — ‘[it] lives’ (*prāṇīti*), ‘[it] continues living’ (*prāṇān dhārayatī*),⁷⁶⁸ [that is] the meaning (*ity artha*).

[1.35.63] **tac ca jīvanam siddhe na vidyate tasmād bhavastha eva jīva iti |**

And (*ca*) that (*tad*) [which is] being alive (*jīvana*) is not seen (*na vidyate*) [in the case of] the perfected being (*siddha*); therefore (*tasmāt*), [the word] ‘soul’ [from the exact perspective]⁷⁶⁹ (*jīva iti*) [is] only (*eva*) [understood as] being in existence (*bhava-stha*).⁷⁷⁰

[1.35.64] **nojīva ity ajīvadravyaṃ siddho vā |**

[The word] ‘quasi-soul’ [from the exact perspective] (*nojīva iti*) [refers to] inanimate substance (*ajīva-dravya*), or (*vā*) the perfected being (*siddha*).

⁷⁶⁷ The term ‘*pradeśa*’ also occurs in the fifth chapter of the TA as ‘space-points’. The word seems to have a more general meaning in this context. Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘*deśapradeśa*’ as larger and smaller parts (see also TABh 1.35.67).

⁷⁶⁸ √*dhṛ* with *prāṇān*: ‘to preserve soul’, ‘continue living’ (MW).

⁷⁶⁹ See above (TABh 1.35.59).

⁷⁷⁰ In other words, *siddhas* are not alive, even though they exist.

[1.35.65] *ajīva ity ajīvadṛavyam eva |*

[The word] ‘non-soul’ [from the exact perspective] (*ajīva iti*) [refers] indeed (*eva*) [to] inanimate substance (*ajīva-dṛavya*).

[1.35.66] *no’jīva iti bhavastha eva jīva iti |*

[The word] ‘quasi-non-soul’ [from the exact perspective] (*no-ajīva iti*) [refers] indeed (*eva*) [to] ‘soul’ (*jīva iti*) [as] being in existence (*bhava-stha*).

[1.35.67] *samagrārthagrāhitvāc cāsyā nayasya nānena deśapradeśau gṛhyete |*

And (*ca*) on account of the quality of seizing the objects entirely (*samagra-artha-grāhitva*) of this (*idam*) perspective⁷⁷¹ (*naya*), larger and smaller parts⁷⁷² (*deśa-pradeśa*) are not (*na*) perceived (*gṛhyete*) by it (*idam*).

[1.35.68] *evam jīvau jīvā iti dvitvabahutvākārīteṣv api |* [1.35.69] *sarvasaṅgrahaṇe⁷⁷³ tu jīvo nojīvaḥ⁷⁷⁴ ajīvo no’jīvo jīvau nojīvau ajīvau no’jīvau ity ekadvitvākārīteṣu śūnyam |*

The same applies (*evam*) also (*api*) [when the words] (*iti*) ‘two souls’ (*jīva*) [and] ‘[many] souls’ (*jīva*) [are] brought into play [on account of] the quality of being [respectively] dual and plural (*dvitva-bahutva-ākārīta*).⁷⁷⁵ But (*tu*) in the case of grasping the whole⁷⁷⁶ (*sarva-saṅgrahaṇa*), [when the words] (*iti*) ‘soul’ (*jīva*), ‘quasi-soul’ (*nojīva*), ‘non-soul’ (*ajīva*), ‘quasi-non-soul’ (*no-ajīva*), ‘two souls’ (*jīva*), ‘two quasi-souls’ (*nojīva*), ‘two non-souls’ (*ajīva*) [and] ‘two quasi-non-souls’ (*no-ajīva*) [are] brought into play [on account of] the quality of being single or dual (*eka-dvitva-ākārīta*), [it is] pointless⁷⁷⁷ (*śūnya*).

⁷⁷¹ I.e., *evambhūtanaya*.

⁷⁷² See also TABh 1.35.56.

⁷⁷³ Since this passage deals with the perspectives, including the ‘*saṅgraha*’ perspective, it is somewhat strange that the text reads ‘*sarvasaṅgrahaṇe*’. Moreover, TABh 1.35.53 mentions ‘*deśasaṅgraha*’, and this seems to be the opposite of that term. Siddhasenagaṇi reads ‘*sarvasaṅgrahēṇa*’.

⁷⁷⁴ Kapadia’s edition has a *daṇḍa* at this point (*nojīvaḥ | ajīvo*). The fact that Mody’s edition reads ‘*nojīvaḥ ajīvo*’ instead of ‘*nojīvo jīvo*’, suggests that there was originally a *daṇḍa* between these two words. However, it is unclear to me how the reading in Kapadia’s edition can be interpreted.

⁷⁷⁵ In other words, one can also apply the above analysis to the dual and plural forms of the words ‘*jīva*’.

⁷⁷⁶ Cf. TABh 1.35.53.

⁷⁷⁷ The same expression appears in TABh 1.5.10.

[1.35.70] *kasmāt* | [1.35.71] *eṣa hi nayaḥ saṅkhyānantyāḥ jīvānām bahutvam evicchati yathārthagrāhī* |

Why (*kasmāt*)? Since (*hi*) this (*etad*) perspective (*naya*), [which is] grasping in accordance with reality (*yathā-artha-grāhin*), indeed (*eva*) seeks for (*icchatī*) the quality of being many (*bahutva*) of souls (*jīva*), on account of the infinity of the number [of souls] (*saṅkhyā-anantya*).

[1.35.72] *śeṣās tu nayāḥ jātyapekṣam ekasmin bahuvacanatvaṁ bahuṣu ca bahuvacanaṁ sarvākāritagrāhiṇa iti* |

But (*tu*) the remaining (*śeṣa*) perspectives (*naya*), [which are] seizing all that is brought into play (*sarva-ākārita-grāhin*), [seek for] plurality⁷⁷⁸ (*bahu-vacanatva*), [which is] depending on genus (*jāty-apekṣa*), [even when referring to] a single thing (*eka*), and (*ca*) for the plural number (*bahu-vacana*) in the case of many (*bahu*) (*iti*).⁷⁷⁹

[1.35.73] *evam sarvabhāveṣu nayavādādhigamaḥ*⁷⁸⁰ *kāryaḥ* |

Likewise (*evam*), the approach⁷⁸¹ of the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda-adhigama*) [is] to be done (*kārya*) in the case of all states (*sarva-bhāva*).

[1.35.74] *atrāha* | [1.35.75] *atha pañcānām jñānānām*⁷⁸² *saviparyayāṇām kāni ko nayaḥ śrayata*⁷⁸³ *iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), which (*kim*) perspective (*naya*) applies to⁷⁸⁴ (*śrayate*) which (*kim*) of the five (*pañca*) [varieties of] knowledge (*jñāna*) together with [their] opposites⁷⁸⁵ (*sa-viparyaya*) (*iti*)?

⁷⁷⁸ *bahuvacana*: ‘the pl. number, the case endings and personal terminations in the pl. number’ (MW).

⁷⁷⁹ The meaning seems to be that plurality is always implied by the other perspectives, even when these perspectives are applied to a singular object.

⁷⁸⁰ Kapadia reads ‘*nayavādānugamaḥ*’.

⁷⁸¹ I translate ‘*adhigama*’ as ‘learning’ in the rest of the chapter. However, this translation does not fit very well in this passage, which might explain why Kapadia’s edition reads ‘*anugama*’.

⁷⁸² Kapadia omits ‘*jñānānām*’.

⁷⁸³ Kapadia reads ‘*samāśrayata*’.

⁷⁸⁴ Lit. ‘rests on’, ‘clings to’ (< *śrī*) (MW).

⁷⁸⁵ I.e., varieties of false knowledge. See TABh 1.32.9 - 1.32.11.

[1.35.76] *atrocyate* | [1.35.77] *naigamādayas trayah sarvāṇy aṣṭau śrayante* |
[1.35.78] *rjusūtranayo matijñānamatyajñānavarjāni śaṭ* ||

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): The three [perspectives] (*trī*), beginning with the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama-ādi*), apply to (*śrayante*) all (*sarva*) eight [varieties of knowledge]⁷⁸⁶ (*aṣṭa*); the linear perspective (*rju-sūtra-naya*) [applies to] six (*ṣaṣ*), leaving out knowledge from ordinary cognition and false knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati-jñāna-maty-ajñāna-varja*).

[1.35.79] *atrāha* | [1.35.80] *kasmān matiṃ saviparyayāṃ na śrayata iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Why (*kasmāt*) does [the linear perspective] not apply to (*na śrayate*) ordinary cognition (*mati*) together with its opposite (*saviparyaya*) (*iti*)?

[1.35.81] *atrocyate* | [1.35.82] *śrutasya saviparyayasyopagrahatvāt* | [1.35.83] *śabdanayas tu dve eva śrutajñānakevalajñāne śrayate* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [The linear perspective does not apply to ordinary cognition together with its opposite] due to the quality of seizing (*upagrahatva*) of scriptural [knowledge] (*śruta*) together with its opposite⁷⁸⁷ (*saviparyaya*). And (*tu*) the literal perspective (*śabda-naya*) applies (*śrayate*) only (*eva*) to two [varieties of knowledge] (*dvi*), [i.e.], knowledge from testimony and absolute knowledge (*śruta-jñāna-kevala-jñāna*).

[1.35.83] *atrāha* | [1.35.84] *kasmān netarāṇi śrayata iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Why (*kasmāt*) does [it] not apply to (*na śrayate*) other [varieties of knowledge] (*itarā*) (*iti*)?

[1.35.85] *atrocyate* | [1.35.86] *matyavadhimanaḥparyāyāṇāṃ śrutasyaivopagrahakatvāt* | [1.35.87] *cetanājñāsvābhāvyaḥ ca sarvajīvanāṃ nāsyā kaścīn mithyādr̥ṣṭir ajño vā jīvo vidyate* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): Due to the quality of being a seizer (*upagrāhakatva*) of [this] very (*eva*) testimony (*śruta*) of ordinary cognition, cosmic perception and mental perception⁷⁸⁸ (*maty-avadhi-manaḥ-paryāya*). And (*ca*) due to the own nature [and] intelligence⁷⁸⁹ (*cetanā-jñā-svābhāvya*) of all souls (*sarva-jīva*),

⁷⁸⁶ I.e. five varieties of knowledge and three types of false knowledge (see TABh 1.32.11).

⁷⁸⁷ In other words, the linear perspective (*rjusūtra*) can be applied to knowledge from testimony and false knowledge from testimony, but not to knowledge from ordinary cognition.

⁷⁸⁸ In other words, since knowledge from testimony includes ordinary cognition, cosmic perception, and mental perception.

⁷⁸⁹ Siddhasenagaṇi analyses this as a *dvandva* compound.

[there is] not (*na*) seen (*vidyate*) any (*kaścid*) soul (*jīva*) that has⁷⁹⁰ (*idam*) wrong view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) or (*vā*) false knowledge (*ajñā*).⁷⁹¹

[1.35.88] ***tasmād api viparyayān na śrayata iti*** |

Therefore (*tasmāt*) [it] also (*api*) does not apply to (*na śrayate*) the opposites (*viparyaya*) (*iti*).

[1.35.89] ***ataś ca pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanānām api prāmāṇyam abhyanuñjāyata iti | āha ca –***

And (*ca*) hence (*atas*), the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) of direct perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āpta-vacana*) [is] also (*api*) approved (*abhyanuñjāyate*) (*iti*).⁷⁹² And (*ca*) one says (*āha*) –

[1.35.90] ***viññāyaikārthapadāny arthapadāni ca vidhānam iṣṭaṃ ca*** |

[1.35.91] ***vinyasya parikṣepān nayaiḥ parikṣyāṇi tattvāni ||1||***

Having understood (*viññāya*) words of single meaning⁷⁹³ (*eka-artha-pada*) and (*ca*) words referring to objects (*artha-pada*), and (*ca*) [their] appropriate (*iṣṭa*) classification⁷⁹⁴ (*vidhāna*), having set them out (*vinyasya*) completely (*parikṣepāt*), the entities (*tattva*) [are] to be examined (*parikṣya*) by the perspectives (*naya*).

[1.35.92] ***jñānaṃ saviparyāsaṃ trayaḥ śrayanty ādito nayāḥ sarvam*** |

[1.35.93] ***samyagdṛṣṭer jñānaṃ mithyā-dṛṣṭer viparyāsaḥ ||2||***

The first (*āditas*) three (*tri*) perspectives (*naya*) apply to (*śrayanti*) all⁷⁹⁵ (*sarva*), [i.e.], knowledge (*jñāna*) together with its opposite (*sa-viparyāsa*). Knowledge (*jñāna*) [results] from right view (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*), delusion (*viparyāsa*) [results] from wrong view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*).

⁷⁹⁰ I interpret ‘*asya*’ as ‘*jīvasya*’. However, it is not entirely clear to me what the reference of ‘*asya*’ in this sentence is.

⁷⁹¹ Cf. TABh 1.35.96 – 1.35.97.

⁷⁹² It is remarkable that the four means of cognition that are accepted by the Nyāya tradition are said to be valid. For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2, *The perspectives*.

⁷⁹³ Perhaps ‘synonyms’.

⁷⁹⁴ Siddhasenagaṇi refers to the four modes of analysis (*nāma, sthāpana*, etc.).

⁷⁹⁵ I.e. the eight varieties of knowledge and false knowledge.

[1.35.94] *rjusūtraḥ ṣaṭ śrayate mateḥ śrutopagrahād ananyatvāt |*

[1.35.95] *śrutakevale tu śabdaḥ śrayate nānyac chrutāṅgatvāt ||3||*

The linear perspective (*rju-sūtra*) applies to (*śrayate*) six⁷⁹⁶ (*ṣaṣ*) due to identity (*ananyatva*), [i.e.], due to the seizing of testimony (*śruta-upagraha*) of ordinary cognition⁷⁹⁷ (*matī*). And (*tu*) the literal perspective (*śabda*) applies to (*śrayate*) testimony [and] absolute knowledge⁷⁹⁸ (*śruta-kevala*) due to the quality of being dependent on testimony (*śruta-aṅgatva*), not on anything else (*na-anyat*).

[1.35.96] *mithyādrṣṭyajñāne na śrayate nāsyā kaścīd ajñō 'sti |*

[1.35.97] *jñāsvābhāvyaḥ jīvo mithyādrṣṭir na cāpy ajñāḥ*⁷⁹⁹ ||4||

[The literal perspective]⁸⁰⁰ does not apply to (*na śrayate*) wrong view or false knowledge (*mithyā-drṣṭy-ajñāna*) [because] there is not (*na astī*) any (*kaścīd*) false knowledge (*ajñā*) for [the soul] (*idam*). The soul (*jīva*) [is] not (*na*) ignorant (*ajñā*) and (*ca*) also (*apī*) [not] having false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi*), due to the own nature of having knowledge (*jñā-svābhāvya*).

[1.35.98] *iti naya-vādās citrāḥ kvacid viruddhā ivātha ca viśuddhāḥ |*

[1.35.99] *laukika-viṣayātītās tattvajñānārtham adhigamyāḥ ||5||*

In this manner (*iti*), the statements [from the different] perspectives (*naya-vāda*) [are] manifold⁸⁰¹ (*citra*), first they appear to be opposed (*kvacid viruddhā iva*), and (*ca*) yet (*atha*), [they are] free from vice (*viśuddha*). Surpassing the worldly range (*laukika-viṣaya-atīta*) [they are] to be studied (*adhigamya*) for the sake of knowledge of reality (*tattva-jñāna-artha*).

[1.35.100] *iti tattvārthādhigame 'rhatpravacanasaṅgrāhe prathamō 'dhyāyāḥ samāptaḥ* ||⁸⁰²

Thus (*iti*), the first (*prathama*) chapter (*adhyāya*) of the *Tattvārthādhigama*, [which is] a summary of the words of the *arhat* (*arhat-pravacana-saṅgraha*), [is now] completed (*samāpta*).

⁷⁹⁶ According to Siddhasenagaṇi, the varieties of knowledge with the exception of knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matī*).

⁷⁹⁷ I.e., because testimony (*śruta*) is preceded by ordinary cognition (*matī*) (see TA 1.20).

⁷⁹⁸ See also TABh 1.35.83.

⁷⁹⁹ Kapadia reads '*cāpyasti*'.

⁸⁰⁰ See TABh 1.35.83.

⁸⁰¹ The word '*citra*' also means 'excellent' (MW).

⁸⁰² Kapadia has a different concluding sentence, which refers to the *bhāṣya* and the *ṭīkā*.

Tattvārthādhigama Chapter II (II.8-25)

[2.0.1] *atrāha* | [2.0.2] *uktaṃ bhavatā jīvādīni tattvānīti* | [2.0.3] *tatra ko jīvaḥ kathaṃlakṣaṇo veti* | [2.0.4] *atrocyate* | [...]

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): You have mentioned (*uktaṃ bhavatā*) ‘[the categories of] reality (*tattva*) beginning with soul (*jīva-ādi*)’ (see TA 1.4) (*itī*). Here (*tatra*), [one may ask]: ‘What (*kim*) [is] the soul (*jīva*), or (*vā*), how [is it] characterised (*kathaṃ-lakṣaṇa*) (*itī*)?’ At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [...]⁸⁰³

upayogo lakṣaṇam ||2.8||

2.8 [Cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) [is] the characteristic [of the soul] (*lakṣaṇa*).

[2.8.1] *upayogo lakṣaṇam jīvasya bhavati* |

[Cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) is (*bhavati*) the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the soul (*jīva*).

sa dvividho ’ṣṭacaturbhedaḥ ||2.9||

2.9 This [cognitive operation] (*tad*) is twofold (*dvividha*), [having] eight [and] four varieties (*aṣṭa-caturbheda*).

[2.9.1] *sa upayogo dvividhaḥ sākāro ’nākāraś ca jñānopayogo darśanopayogaś cety arthaḥ* |

This (*tad*) [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*): having shape (*sākāra*) and (*ca*) shapeless (*anākāra*).⁸⁰⁴ The meaning is (*ity artha*): [cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge (*jñāna-upayoga*) and (*ca*) [cognitive] operation [in the form of] worldview (*darśana-upayoga*).

⁸⁰³ The second chapter of the TA deals with the soul. The first *sūtras* (TA 2.1 - 2.7), which follow the opening sentences of the *bhāṣya*, deal with the states of the soul (*bhāva*) and the Jaina theory of *karman*. They are not included in this study.

⁸⁰⁴ I.e., representational and non-representational. For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.3, *Cognitive operation*. Sanghvi translates ‘determinate’ and ‘indeterminate’ (Sanghvi 1974: 82).

[2.9.2] ***sa punar yathāsaṅkhyam aṣṭacaturbhedo bhavati |***

This [twofold cognitive operation] (*tad*) is (*bhavati*) again (*punar*) respectively (*yathā-saṅkhyam*) eight- and fourfold (*aṣṭa-caturbheda*).

[2.9.3] ***jñānopayogo 'ṣṭavidhaḥ |*** [2.9.4] ***tadyathā |*** [2.9.5] ***matijñānopayogaḥ śrutajñānopayogo 'vadhijñānopayogo manaḥparyāyajñānopayogaḥ kevalajñānopayogo matyajñānopayogaḥ śrutājñānopayoga vibhaṅgajñānopayoga iti |***

[Cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge (*jñāna-upayoga*) [is] eightfold (*aṣṭavidha*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- i. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matī-jñāna-upayoga*)
- ii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge from testimony (*śruta-jñāna-upayoga*)
- iii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] cosmic knowledge (*avadhī-jñāna-upayoga*)
- iv. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] mental knowledge (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna-upayoga*)
- v. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna-upayoga*)
- vi. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] false knowledge from ordinary cognition (*maty-ajñāna-upayoga*)
- vii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] false knowledge from testimony (*śruta-ajñāna-upayoga*)
- viii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] deceptive knowledge⁸⁰⁵ (*vibhaṅga-jñāna-upayoga*) (*iti*).

[2.9.6] ***darśanopayogaś caturbhedaḥ |*** [2.9.7] ***tadyathā |*** [2.9.8] ***cakṣur-darśanopayogo 'cakṣurdarśanopayogo 'vadhidarśanopayogaḥ kevala-darśanopayoga iti |***

[Cognitive] operation [in the form of] worldview (*darśana-upayoga*) [has] four varieties (*caturbheda*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- [cognitive] operation [in the form of] visual worldview (*cakṣur-darśana-upayoga*)
- [cognitive] operation [in the form of] non-visual⁸⁰⁶ worldview (*acakṣur-darśana-upayoga*)

⁸⁰⁵ I.e., the opposite of *avadhijñāna* (see TABh 1.32.12).

- [cognitive] operation [in the form of] cosmic worldview (*avadhi-darśana-upayoga*)
- [cognitive] operation [in the form of] absolute worldview (*kevala-darśana-upayoga*) (*iti*).

saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca ||2.10||

2.10 [There are] worldly (*saṃsārin*) and liberated (*mukta*) [souls].

[2.10.1] ***te jīvāḥ samāsato dvividhā bhavanti saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca*** | [2.10.2] ***kiṃ cānyat*** |

Succinctly (*samāsatas*), these (*tad*) souls (*jīva*) are (*bhavanti*) twofold (*dvividha*): worldly (*saṃsārin*) and liberated (*mukta*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

samanaskāmanaskāḥ ||2.11||

2.11 [Souls exist] with minds (*samanaska*) and without minds (*amanaska*).

[2.11.1] ***samāsatas ta⁸⁰⁷ eva jīvā dvividhā bhavanti samanaskāś cāmanaskāś ca*** | [2.11.2] ***tān parastād vakṣyāmaḥ*** ||

Succinctly (*samāsatas*), these (*tad*) souls (*jīva*) are (*bhavanti*) twofold (*dvividha*): with minds (*samanaska*) and without minds (*amanaska*). We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) them (*tad*) later on (see TA 2.25) (*parastāt*).

saṃsāriṇas trasasthāvarāḥ ||2.12||

2.12 Worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) [are] mobile (*trasa*) and immobile (*sthāvara*).

[2.12.1] ***saṃsāriṇo jīvā dvividhā bhavanti trasāḥ sthāvarāś ca*** | [2.12.2] ***tatra***

Worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) are (*bhavanti*) twofold (*dvividha*): mobile (*trasa*) and (*ca*) immobile (*sthāvara*). Among them (*tatra*):

⁸⁰⁶ It is not entirely clear to me what the intended meaning of ‘*cakṣus-*’ and ‘*acakṣus-*’ in this context is. Siddhasenagaṇi interprets ‘*acakṣus-*’ as the other senses, which I follow in my translation. This distinction resembles TA 1.14, which says that ordinary cognition is caused by the organs of sense and the mind (*indriya-anindriya-nimitta*). Siddhasenagaṇi illustrates *acakṣurdarśanopayoga* with the example of feeling a snake behind one’s back.

⁸⁰⁷ Mody reads ‘*te*’. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘*ta*’.

pr̥thivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ ||2.13||⁸⁰⁸

2.13 Earth (*pr̥thivī*), water (*ap*), [and] plants⁸⁰⁹ (*vanaspati*) [are] immobile [souls] (*sthāvara*).

[2.13.1] ***pr̥thivīkāyikā apkāyikā vanaspatikāyikā ity ete trividhā sthāvarā jīvā bhavanti |***

These (*etad*) immobile (*sthāvara*) souls (*jīva*) are (*bhavanti*) threefold (*trividha*):

- i. earth-bodied (*pr̥thivī-kāyika*)
- ii. water-bodied (*ap-kāyika*) [and]
- iii. plant-bodied (*vanaspati-kāyika*) (*iti*).

[2.13.2] ***tatra pr̥thivīkāyo 'nekavidhaḥ śuddhapr̥thivīśarkarāvālukādīḥ |***

Among them (*tatra*), the earth-bodied [immobile souls] (*pr̥thivī-kāya*) [are] manifold (*anekavidha*), beginning with pure earth, small stones, [and] sand (*śuddha-pr̥thivīśarkarā-vāluka-ādī*).

[2.13.3] ***apkāyo 'nekavidho himādīḥ |***

The water-bodied [immobile souls] (*ap-kāya*) [are] manifold (*anekavidha*), beginning with snow (*hima-ādī*).

[2.13.4] ***vanaspatikāyo 'nekavidhaḥ śaivalādīḥ ||***

The plant-bodied [immobile souls] (*vanaspati-kāya*) [are] manifold (*anekavidha*), beginning with *śaivala*⁸¹⁰ (*śaivala-ādī*).

tejavāyū dvīndriyādayaś ca trasāḥ ||2.14||⁸¹¹

2.14 Fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), and (*ca*) [beings with] two or more senses (*dvi-indriya-ādī*) [are] mobile [souls] (*trasa*).

[2.14.1] ***tejahkāyikā aṅgārādayaḥ |***

The fire-bodied [mobile souls] (*tejah-kāyika*) [are] charcoal⁸¹² etc. (*aṅgāra-ādī*).

⁸⁰⁸ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* has a different reading and includes fire- and air-bodied beings in the class of immobile souls (SS 2.13-14).

⁸⁰⁹ The primary meaning of '*vanaspati*' is 'tree' (MW). However, the explanation of '*vanaspati-kāya*' in TABh 2.13.4 clearly indicates that the term refers to the category of plants in general.

⁸¹⁰ 'Blyxa Octandra', 'a kind of duck-weed or green moss-like plant growing in pools' (MW).

⁸¹¹ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* includes '*tejas*' and '*vāyu*' in the class of immobile souls (see also TA 2.13).

[2.14.2] **vāyukāyikā utkalikādayaḥ |**

The air-bodied [mobile souls] (*vāyukāyika*) [are] the outgoing etc.⁸¹³ (*utkalikā-ādi*).

[2.14.3] **dvīndriyās trīndriyāś caturindriyāḥ pañcendriyā ity ete trasā bhavanti |**

[Beings with] two senses (*dvi-indriya*), [beings with] three senses (*tri-indriya*), [beings with] four senses (*catur-indriya*) [and] [beings with] five senses (*pañca-indriya*) (*iti*) — these (*etad*) are (*bhavanti*) mobile (*trasa*).

[2.14.4] **saṃsāriṇas trasāḥ sthāvarā ity ukte etad uktaṃ bhavati muktā naiva trasā naiva sthāvarā iti ||**

When it is said (see TA 2.12) (*ity ukta*) ‘worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) [are] mobile (*trasa*) [and] immobile (*sthāvara*)’, this (*etad*) is (*bhavati*) said (*ukta*): ‘liberated [souls] (*mukta*) [are] neither (*na-eva*) mobile (*trasa*) nor (*na-eva*) immobile (*sthāvara*)’ (*iti*).

pañcendriyāṇi ||2.15||

2.15 [There are] five senses (*pañca-indriya*).

[2.15.1] **pañcendriyāṇi bhavanti |** [2.15.2] **ārambho niyamārthaḥ ṣaḍādipratīṣedhārthaś ca ||**

[There] are (*bhavanti*) five senses (*pañca-indriya*). The beginning [of the subject]⁸¹⁴ (*ārambha*) [is] for the sake of restriction (i.e., of the number of senses) (*niyama-artha*) and (*ca*) for the sake of exclusion of six etc. (*ṣaḍ-ādi-pratīṣedha-artha*).

[2.15.3] **indriyaṃ |** [2.15.4] **indralingam indradiṣṭam indradṛṣṭam indrasṛṣṭam indrajuṣṭam iti vā⁸¹⁵ |**

‘Sense’ (*indriya*) [means] ‘mark of the soul’ (*indra-liṅga*), ‘directed by the soul’ (*indra-diṣṭa*), ‘perceived by the soul’ (*indra-dṛṣṭa*), ‘brought forth by the soul’ (*indra-sṛṣṭa*), or (*vā*) ‘welcomed by the soul’ (*indra-juṣṭa*)’ (*iti*).

⁸¹² It is somewhat strange that charcoal is seen as a mobile soul. Perhaps the idea is that charcoal is inhabited by fire-bodied mobile souls. The classification in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, which classifies fire-bodied souls as immobile (SS 2.13), is easier to understand.

⁸¹³ Siddhasenagaṇi explains: ‘Air (*vāyu*) [has the following] varieties (*bheda*): eastern, western etc. (*prācyā-pratīcyā-ādi*), [and] outgoing (*utkalikā*), circular etc. (*maṇḍalikā-ādi*) (*prācyapratīcyādyutkalikāmaṇḍalikādibhedo vāyuh*).

⁸¹⁴ I.e., TA 2.15, which opens the passage on the senses.

⁸¹⁵ This is a quote from Pāṇini 5.2.93. However, Umāsvāti skips ‘*indradatta*’ and adds ‘*indradiṣṭa*’ (Ohira 1982: 59).

[2.15.5] **indro jīvaḥ sarvadravyeṣv aiśvaryayogād viṣayeṣu vā paramaiśvaryayogāt |**

The soul (*jīva*) [is called] ‘*indra*’ on account of the power (*aiśvaryayoga*) with respect to all substances (*sarvadravya*), or (*vā*) on account of the highest power (*parama-aiśvaryayoga*) with respect to the range [of the senses] (*viṣaya*).

[2.15.6] **tasya liṅgam indriyaṃ liṅganāt sūcanāt pradarśanād upaṣṭambhanād vyañjanāc ca jīvasya liṅgam indriyam ||**

The sense (*indriya*) [is] the mark (*liṅga*) of this (*tad*), [i.e.], the sense (*indriya*) [is] the mark (*liṅga*) of the soul (*jīva*) [on account of its] marking (*liṅgana*), indicating (*sūcana*), pointing out (*pradarśana*), supporting (*upaṣṭambhana*), and (*ca*) manifesting (*vyañjana*).

dvividhāni ||2.16||

2.16.1 [The five senses are] twofold (*dvividha*).

[2.16.1] **dvividhānīndriyāṇi bhavanti |** [2.16.2] **dravyendriyāṇi bhāvendriyāṇi ca ||** [2.16.3] **tatra**

[The five] senses (*indriya*) are (*bhavanti*) twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], the sense organs⁸¹⁶ (*dravya-indriya*) and (*ca*) the sense faculties (*bhāva-indriya*).⁸¹⁷ Among them (*tatra*):

nirvṛtṭyupakaraṇe dravyendriyam ||2.17||

2.17 The sense organ (*dravya-indriya*) [consists of] the ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtṭi*) [and] the ‘instrument’ (*upakaraṇa*).

[2.17.1] **nirvṛtṭīndriyam upakaraṇendriyaṃ ca dvividhaṃ dravyendriyam |**

The sense organ (*dravya-indriya*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], the manifested sense (*nirvṛtṭi-indriya*) and (*ca*) the instrumental sense (*upakaraṇa-indriya*).

[2.17.2] **nirvṛttir aṅgopāṅganāmanirvartitānīndriyadvārāṇi karmaviśeṣa-saṃskṛtāḥ śarīrapradeśāḥ |**

The ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtṭi*) [is] the regions of the body (*śarīra-pradeśa*) [that are] conditioned [by] a particular type of *karman*⁸¹⁸ (*karma-viśeṣa-saṃskṛta*), [i.e.], the

⁸¹⁶ Literally ‘material sense’.

⁸¹⁷ For a discussion of this distinction, see § 3.3, *The five senses*.

apertures [of] the senses (*indriyadvāra*) [that are] brought about (*nirvartita*) [by] body determining [*karman* that causes] the limbs and additional limbs⁸¹⁹ (*aṅga-upāṅga-nāma*).

[2.17.3] ***nirmāṇanāmāṅgapratyayā mūlagaṇanirvartanety arthaḥ*** ||

The meaning is (*ity artha*): [whose] accomplishment [is due to] the basic virtues⁸²⁰ (*mūla-guṇa-nirvartana*) [and whose] cause⁸²¹ (*pratyaya*) [of] the body-parts (*aṅga*) [is the *karman* that causes] the formation [of the body]⁸²² (*nirmāṇa-nāma*).

[2.17.4] ***upakaraṇaṃ bāhyam abhyantaraṃ ca*** | [2.17.5] ***nirvartitasyānupa-ghātānugrahābhyām upakārīti*** ||

The ‘instrument’⁸²³ (*upakaraṇa*) [is] outer (*bāhhyā*) and (*ca*) interior (*abhyantara*). [Is is] assisting (*upakārīn*) [by] not-obstructing (*anupaghāta*) [and] favouring (*anugraha*) [that which is] brought about (*nirvartita*)⁸²⁴ (*iti*).

labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam ||2.18||

2.18 The sense faculty (*bhāva-indriya*) [consists of] acquisition (*labdhi*) and [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*).

[2.18.1] ***labdhir upayogaś ca bhāvendriyaṃ bhavati*** |

The sense faculty (*bhāvendriya*) is (*bhavati*) acquisition (*labdhi*) and (*ca*) [cognitive] operation (*upayoga*).

⁸¹⁸ Alternatively, ‘for a particular type of action’. However, Siddhasenagaṇi glosses ‘*karmaviśeṣa*’ as ‘*nāmakarman*’.

⁸¹⁹ I.e., a particular type of body determining *karman* (*aṅgopaṅganāmakarmanī*). For a discussion of the 93 varieties of *nāmakarman*, see Glasenapp 1925: 188ff.

⁸²⁰ In the Śvetāmbara tradition, the word ‘*mūlagaṇa*’ usually refers to the list of *aṇuvrata*, i.e., the minor vows that a householder should observe. See Williams 1963: 50ff for a discussion of the different lists of *mūlagaṇa*.

⁸²¹ Siddhasenagaṇi glosses ‘*nimitta*’.

⁸²² Glasenapp explains *nirmāṇanāmakarman* as the *karman* that ‘causes that the parts of a being are in the right place’ (Glasenapp 1925: 190).

⁸²³ I.e., the *dravyendriya* as instrument (see TA 2.17).

⁸²⁴ Perhaps the intended meaning is ‘brought about [by *aṅgopaṅganāmakarman*]’ (see ‘*nivartita*’ in TABh 2.17.2).

[2.18.2] **labdhir nāma gati-jātyādināmakarmajanitā tadāvaraṇīyakarma-kṣayaopasamajanitā cendriyāśrayakarmodayanirvṛttā ca jīvasya bhavati |**

[That which is] called (*nāma*) ‘acquisition’ (*labdhī*), is (*bhavati*) [that which is]:

- i. produced (*janita*) by body-determining *karman* (*nāmakarman*), beginning with [the varieties of] transmigration [and] birth (*gati-jāti-ādi*), and (*ca*)
- ii. produced (*janita*) by both destruction [and] cessation (*kṣaya-upasama*) of *karman* [that is] covering that (i.e., knowledge- and worldview)⁸²⁵ (*tad-āvaraṇīya-karman*), and (*ca*)
- iii. resulting (*nirvṛtta*) from the rising (*udaya*) of *karman* [that is] attached to the senses (*indriya-āśraya-karman*), of the soul (*jīva*).

[2.18.3] **sā pañcavidhā |** [2.18.4] **tadyathā |** [2.18.5] **sparsānendriyalabdhiḥ rasanendriyalabdhiḥ ghrāṇendriyalabdhiḥ cakṣurindriyalabdhiḥ śrotrendriya-labdhir iti ||**

It (i.e., *labdhī*) (*tad*) [is] fivefold (*pañcavidha*). Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- i. acquisition [related to] the sense of touch (*sparsāna-indriya-labdhi*)
- ii. acquisition [related to] the sense of taste (*rasana-indriya-labdhi*)
- iii. acquisition [related to] the sense of smell (*ghrāṇa-indriya-labdhi*)
- iv. acquisition [related to] the sense of sight (*cakṣus-indriya-labdhi*)
- v. acquisition [related to] the sense of hearing (*śrotra-indriya-labdhi*) (*iti*).

upayogaḥ sparsādiṣu ||2.19||⁸²⁶

2.19 [Cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) relates to touch (i.e., touchable objects) (*sparsā*) etc.

[2.19.1] **sparsādiṣu matijñānopayoga ity arthaḥ |**

The meaning is (*ity artha*): [Cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge from ordinary cognition (*matijñāna-upayoga*) with respect to touch etc. (*sparsā-ādi*)

[2.19.2] **uktam etad upayogo lakṣaṇam |**

It (*etad*) has been said (see TA 2.8) (*ukta*) [that] ‘[cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) [is] the characteristic [of the soul] (*lakṣaṇa*)’.

[2.19.3] **upayogaḥ prañidhānam āyogas tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāma ity arthaḥ ||**

⁸²⁵ See, e.g., TABh 1.7.19.

⁸²⁶ This *sūtra* is not included in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

‘[Cognitive] operation’ (*upayoga*) — the meaning is (*ity artha*): ‘directing’⁸²⁷ (*prañidhāna*), ‘joining’ (*āyoga*), ‘becoming’ (*tad-bhāva*), ‘developing’ (*pariṇāma*).

[2.19.4] *eṣāṃ ca satyāṃ nirvṛttāṃ upakaraṇopayogau bhavataḥ* | [2.19.5]

satyāṃ ca labdhau nirvṛttypakaraṇopayogā bhavanti | [2.19.6]

nirvṛttyādīnām ekatarābhāve viṣayālocanaṃ na bhavati |

And (*ca*) among these (i.e., *nirvṛtti*, *upakaraṇa*, *labdhi*, and *upayoga*)⁸²⁸ (*idam*), when there is (*satī*) the manifestation (*nirvṛtti*), [then] there are (*bhavatas*) the instrument and cognitive operation (*upakaraṇa-upayoga*). And (*ca*) when there is (*satī*) acquisition (*labdhī*), there are (*bhavanti*) the manifestation, the instrument, and cognitive operation (*nirvṛtti-upakaraṇa-upayoga*). [There] is (*bhavati*) no (*na*) perception of the range [of the senses] (*viṣaya-ālocana*) in the absence of one (*ekatarā-abhāva*) of the ‘manifestation’ etc. (*nirvṛtti-ādi*).⁸²⁹

[2.19.7] *atrāha* | [2.19.8] *uktaṃ bhavatā pañcendriyānīti* | [2.19.9] *tat kāni*

tānīndriyānīty ucyate |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (*bhavat*) [that] ‘[there are] five senses (*pañca-indriya*)’ (see TA 2.15) (*iti*). Now (*tad*), which (*kim*) [are] these (*tad*) senses (*indriya*)? It is said (*ucyate*):

sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥśrotrāṇi ||2.20||

2.20 [The five senses are]:

- i. [sense of] touch (*sparśana*)
- ii. [sense of] taste (*rasana*)
- iii. [sense of] smell (*ghrāṇa*)
- iv. [sense of] sight (*cakṣus*) [and]
- v. [sense of] hearing (*śrotra*).

[2.20.1] *sparśanaṃ rasanam ghrāṇam cakṣuḥ śrotram ity etāni pañcendriyāṇi* |

[Sense of] touch (*sparśana*), [sense of] taste (*rasana*), [sense of] smell (*ghrāṇa*), [sense of] sight (*cakṣus*), [and] [sense of] hearing (*śrotra*) (*iti*) — these (*etad*) [are] the five senses (*pañca-indriya*).

⁸²⁷ *pra+ni+√dhā*: ‘to turn or direct (the eyes or thoughts) upon’ (MW).

⁸²⁸ See TA 2.17 – 2.18.

⁸²⁹ Sanghvi explains the order as follows: *labdhi* is a prerequisite for *nirvṛtti*. Again, *nirvṛtti* is a prerequisite for *upakaraṇa* and *upayoga*. *Upayoga* is the combination of *labdhi*, *nirvṛtti* and *upakaraṇa* (Sanghvi 1974: 89-90).

sparśarasagandhavarṇaśabdās teṣām arthāḥ ||2.21||

2.21 The objects (*artha*) of them (i.e., of the senses) (*tad*) [are]:

- i. touch (*sparśa*)
- ii. taste (*rasa*)
- iii. smell (*gandha*)
- iv. colour (*varṇa*)
- v. and sound (*śabda*).

[2.21.1] ***eteṣām indriyāṇām ete sparśādayo 'rthā bhavanti yathāsaṅkhyam ||***

These (*etad*) objects (*artha*), beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*), are (*bhavanti*) respectively (*yathāsaṅkhyam*) [the objects] of these (*etad*) senses (*indriya*).

śrutam anindriyasya ||2.22||

2.22 Testimony (*śruta*) [is the object] of the mind (*anindriya*).

[2.22.1] ***śrutajñānaṁ dvividham anekadvādaśavidhaṁ noindriasyārthaḥ |***

Knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*), [i.e.], manifold [and] twelvefold (see TABh 1.20.3 – 1.20.4) (*aneka-dvādaśavidha*). [It is] the object (*artha*) of the mind (*noindriya*).⁸³⁰

[2.22.2] ***atrāha |*** [2.22.3] ***uktaṁ bhavatā pṛthivyabvanaspatitejovāyavo dvīndriyādayaś⁸³¹ ca nava jīvanikāyāḥ |*** [2.22.4] ***pañcendriyāṇi ceti |*** [2.22.5] ***tat kiṁ kasyendriyam iti |*** [2.22.6] ***atrocyate |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 2.13 – 2.14) (*bhavat*) [that] earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), plants (*vanaspati*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), and (*ca*) [beings with] two senses etc. (*dvi-indriya-ādi*) [are] the nine classes of souls (*jīva-nikāya*). And [is has also been said by you] (*ca*) [that there are] five senses (*pañca-indriya*) (see TA 2.15) (*iti*). Now (*tad*), which sense (*kim ... indriya*) [belongs to] which [class of beings] (*kim*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

⁸³⁰ The *bhāṣya* reads 'noindriya' instead of 'anindriya'. The same phenomenon occurs in TABh 1.19.1. For a discussion of this peculiar word formation, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

⁸³¹ Mody erroneously reads 'dvīndriyādayaś'. Kapadia has the correct reading '-ādayaś'.

vāyvantānām ekam ||2.23||

2.23 [Souls] up to the air[-bodied]⁸³² (vāyv-anta) [have] one [sense] (i.e., touch) (eka).⁸³³

[2.23.1] **pr̥thivyādīnām vāyvantānām jīvanikāyānām ekam evendriyaṃ sūtrakramaprāmāṇyāt prathamam sparsanam evety arthaḥ |**

The meaning [is] (ity artha): [There is] only (eva) one (eka) sense (indriya) for the classes of souls (jīva-nikāya) beginning with earth (pr̥thivī-ādī) up to air (vāyu-anta). Following the authoritativeness of the order [in] the sūtra (sūtra-krama-prāmāṇya), the first [is] indeed (eva) sense of touch (sparsana).

kṛmipipīlikābhramaramanuṣyādīnām ekaikavṛddhāni ||2.24||

2.24 [The number of senses of] worms (kṛmī), ants (pipīlikā), bees (bhramara), human beings (manuṣya) etc. (ādī) increases one by one (i.e., worms have two senses, ants three etc.) (ekaika-vṛddha).

[2.24.1] **kṛmyādīnām pipīlikādīnām bhramarādīnām manuṣyādīnām ca yathāsaṅkhyam ekaikavṛddhānīndriyāṇi bhavanti |**

The senses (indriya) of

- i. [the class of souls] beginning with worms (kṛmī-ādī),
- ii. [the class of souls] beginning with ants (pipīlikā-ādī),
- iii. [the class of souls] beginning with bees (bhramara-ādī), and (ca)
- iv. [the class of souls] beginning with human beings (manuṣya-ādī)

are (bhavanti) respectively (yathāsaṅkhyam) increasing one by one (ekaika-vṛddha).

[2.24.2] **yathākramam |** [2.24.3] **tadyathā |** [2.24.4] **kṛmyādīnām apādika-nūpurakagaṇḍūpadaśaṅkhasuktikāśambūkājālūkāprabhṛtīnām ekendriye-bhyaḥ pr̥thivyādibhya ekena vṛddhe sparsanarasanendriye bhavataḥ |**

Successively⁸³⁴ (yathākramam) — Namely (tad-yathā): The senses of touch and taste (sparsana-rasana-indriya) are (bhavatas) increased (vṛddha) by one (eka) from [the class of souls] beginning with earth etc. (pr̥thivī-ādī) for [the class of souls]

⁸³² The Sarvārthasiddhi reads 'vanaspatyantānām', 'up to the plant-bodied'.

⁸³³ For a discussion of this passage, see §3.3, *Number of senses in classes of beings*.

⁸³⁴ Kapadia adds 'yathākramam' to the previous sentence.

beginning with worms⁸³⁵ (*kṛmi-ādi*) — [i.e., beginning with (*prabhṛtin*) *apādika*, *nūpuraka*, *gaṇḍūpada*, conch-shells (*śaṅkha*), *śuktikā*, *śambūkā*, [and] leeches (*jalūkā*)].⁸³⁶

[2.24.5] ***tato 'py ekena vṛddhāni pipīlikārohiṇikāupacikākunthūtuburukatra-
pusabījakarpāsāsthikāśatapadyutpatakatṛṇapatrakāṣṭahāarakaprabhṛtīnām
trīṇi sparśanarasanaghrāṇāni |***

Again (*api*), from that (i.e., the class of souls beginning with worms) (*tatas*), the three (*tri*) [senses of] touch, taste, [and] smell (*sparśana-rasana-ghrāṇa*) [are] increased (*vṛddha*) by one (*eka*) for [the class of souls] beginning with (*prabhṛtin*) ants (*pipīlikā*), *rohiṇikā*, *upacikā*, *kunthū*, *tuburuka*, *trapusabīja*, *karpāsāsthikā*, centipedes (*śatapadī*), *utpataka*, *tṛṇapatra*, [and] *kāṣṭa-hāraka*.

[2.24.6] ***tato 'py ekena vṛddhāni bhramara-vaṭara-sāraṅga-makṣikā-puttikā-
daṁśa-maśaka-vṛścika-nandyāvarta-kīṭa-pataṅgādīnām catvāri sparśana-
rasanaghrāṇacakṣūṁṣi |***

Again (*api*), from that (i.e., the class of souls beginning with ants) (*tatas*), the four (*catur*) [senses of] touch, taste, smell, [and] sight (*sparśana-rasana-ghrāṇa-cakṣus*) [are] increased (*vṛddha*) by one (*eka*) for [the class of souls] beginning with (*ādī*) bees (*bhramara*), *vaṭara*, *sāraṅga*, flies (*makṣikā*), *puttikā*, gnats (*daṁśa*), mosquitos (*maśaka*), scorpions (*vṛścika*), *nandyāvarta*, worms (*kīṭa*), [and] moths (*pataṅga*).

[2.24.7] ***śeṣānām ca tiryagyonijānām matsyoragabhujāṅgapakṣicatuṣ-
padānām sarveṣāṃ ca narakamanuṣyadevānām pañcendriyāṇīti ||***

And (*ca*) [there are] five (*pañca*) senses (*indriya*) for the remaining [classes of souls] (*śeṣa*), [i.e.]:

- i. [beings] born from the womb of an animal (*tiryag-yoni-ja*) and (*ca*)
- ii. all (*sarva*) fishes, snakes, serpents, birds, [and] quadrupeds (*matsya-uraga-
bhujāṅga-pakṣi-catuṣpada*) [and]
- iii. hellish beings, human beings, [and] gods (*nāraka-manuṣya-deva*) (*iti*).

⁸³⁵ In other words, the class of souls that includes worms etc. has one sense more than the class of souls that includes earth etc.

⁸³⁶ I have been unable to identify most of the species in this list and the following two lists.

[2.24.8] *atrāha* | [2.24.9] *uktaṃ bhavatā dvividhā jīvāḥ* | [2.24.10] *samanaskā amanaskāś ceti* | [2.24.11] *tatra ke samanaskā iti* | [2.24.12] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TABh 2.11.1) (*bhavat*) [that] souls (*jīva*) [are] twofold (*dvividha*): with minds (*samanaska*) and without minds (*amanaska*). Among them (*tatra*), which [souls] (*kim*) [are provided] with minds (*samanaska*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

saṃjñīnaḥ samanaskāḥ ||2.25||

2.25 Conscious [beings] (*saṃjñīn*) [are provided] with minds (*samanaska*).

[2.25.1] *saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñāyāṃ saṃjñīno jīvāḥ samanaskā bhavanti* |

Souls (*jīva*) [that are] conscious (*saṃjñīn*) with respect to the awareness of deliberation⁸³⁷ (*saṃpradhāraṇa-saṃjñā*) are (*bhavanti*) [provided] with minds (*samanaska*).

[2.25.2] *sarve nārakadevā garbhavyutkrāntayaś ca manuṣyās tiryagyonijās ca kecit* ||

[I.e.], all (*sarva*) hellish beings and gods (*nāraka-deva*), and (*ca*) [beings] born from the womb (*garbhavyutkrānti*), [and] human beings (*manuṣya*), and (*ca*) some⁸³⁸ (*kecid*) [beings] born from the womb of animals (*tiryagyonija*).

[2.25.3] *ihā* ⁸³⁹ *pohayuktā guṇadoṣavicāraṇātmikā saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā* |

[2.25.4] *tāṃ prati saṃjñīno vivakṣitāḥ* |

The awareness of deliberation (*saṃpradhāraṇa-saṃjñā*), the nature of which [is] the distinction [between] merits and defects⁸⁴⁰ (*guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā-ātmikā*), [is] connected with desire and exclusion (*ihā-apoha-yuktā*). [Souls are] said (*vivakṣita*) [to be] ‘conscious’ (see TA 2.15) (*saṃjñīn*) with respect to (*prati*) this (i.e., *saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā*) (*tad*).

⁸³⁷ I.e., with moral consciousness (see TABh 2.25.3). According to Sanghvi, the term ‘*saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā*’ refers to ‘reflection over the merits and demerits of things’ (Sanghvi 1974: 95-96).

⁸³⁸ The Sanskrit is ambiguous; it is not clear whether *kecid* should be connected with both *manuṣya* and *tiryagyonija* or only with the latter. Siddhasenagaṇi connects *kecid* with *tiryagyonija* only.

⁸³⁹ Mody reads *ihopoha-*. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘*ihā-*’.

⁸⁴⁰ See also TABh 1.15.8.

[2.25.5] *anyathā hy āhārabhayamaithunaparigrahasaṃjñābhiḥ sarva eva jīvāḥ saṃjñina iti ||*

For (*hi*), otherwise (*anyathā*), all (*sarva*) souls (*jīva*) [would be] indeed (*eva*) conscious (*saṃjñin*), by the awareness of taking food, fear, sexual intercourse [and] possession (*āhāra-bhaya-maithuna-parigraha-saṃjñā*).

Tattvārthādhigama Chapter V

[5.0.1] *uktā jīvāḥ* | [5.0.2] *ajīvān vakṣyāmaḥ* ||

Souls (*jīva*) have been discussed (*ukta*). [Now] we will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) non-souls (i.e., inanimate entities) (*ajīva*).⁸⁴¹

ajīvakāyā dharmādharmākāśapudgalāḥ ||5.1||

5.1 The inanimate entities⁸⁴² (*ajīva-kāya*) [are]:

- i. motion (*dharmā*)
- ii. rest (*adharma*)
- iii. space (*ākāśa*) [and]
- iv. material elements⁸⁴³ (*pudgala*).

[5.1.1] *dharmāstikāyo 'dharmāstikāya ākāśastikāyāḥ pudgalāstikāya ity ajīvakāyāḥ* | [5.1.2] *tān lakṣaṇataḥ parastād vakṣyāmaḥ* |

We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) them (*tad*) below (see TABh 5.16.11) (*parastāt*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*). The category of motion (*dharmāstikāya*), the category of rest (*adharmaastikāya*), the category of space (*ākāśastikāya*) and the category of material elements (*pudgalastikāya*) — [these are] (*iti*) the inanimate entities (*ajīvakāya*).

[5.1.3] *kāyagrahaṇaṃ pradeśāvayavabahutvārtham addhāsamaya-pratiṣedhārthaṃ ca* ||

The expression ‘entity’ (*kāya-grahaṇa*) [denotes] the plurality of space-points and parts (*pradeśa-avayava*⁸⁴⁴-*bahutva-artha*) and (*ca*) the exclusion of ‘real-time’⁸⁴⁵ (*addhā-samaya-pratiṣedha-artha*).

⁸⁴¹ For a discussion of the different substances in the TA, see § 3.4, *The substances*.

⁸⁴² I translate ‘*kāya*’ as ‘entity’. The primary meaning ‘body’ does not fit in this context, since the list of entities (*kāya*) also includes space, motion, and rest.

⁸⁴³ The word ‘*pudgala*’ consistently appears in plural in the TA. Therefore, I translate ‘material elements’.

⁸⁴⁴ The word ‘*avayava*’ is also used in Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which postulates ‘[a] “whole” (*avayavin*) as an entity over and above its constituent parts (*avayava*)’ (Halbfass 1992: 94).

⁸⁴⁵ Jacobi translates the term ‘*addhāsamaya*’ as ‘real-time’ (*Uttarādhyayana* 35: 5-6). He explains: ‘It has no divisions or parts as the other things, because of time only the present

dravyāṇi jīvās ca ||5.2||

5.2 [These inanimate entities] together with (*ca*) the souls (*jīva*) are the substances (*dravya*).

[5.2.1] *ete dharmādayaś catvāro prāṇinaś ca pañca dravyāni ca bhavantīti* |

And (*ca*) these (*etad*) four [entities] (*catur*), beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*), together with (*ca*) the living [entities] (*prāṇin*) are (*bhavantī*) the five (*pañca*) substances (*dravya*) (*iti*).

[5.2.2] *uktaṃ hi matiśrutayor nibandho dravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasyeti* ||

Indeed (*hi*), it has been said (see TA 1.27, 1.30) (*ukta*) [that] ‘the binding (i.e., the range) (*nibandha*) of ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*) [extends to all] substances (*dravya*)⁸⁴⁶ [but] not in all modes (*asarva-paryāya*)’ and ‘[the domain of] absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [extends to] all modes of all substances (*sarva-dravya-paryāya*)’.

***nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi ||5.3||*⁸⁴⁷**

5.3 [These substances] are eternal (*nitya*), fixed⁸⁴⁸ (*avasthita*) [and] formless (*arūpa*).

moment is existent. And a moment cannot be divided’ (Jacobi 1885: 208, n1). Time is not included in the list of ‘entities’ (*kāya*) or ‘substances’ (*dravya*) in TA 5.1, even though TA 5.38 mentions that some people regard time as a substance.

⁸⁴⁶ TA 1.27 reads ‘*sarvadravyeṣu*’.

⁸⁴⁷ Siddhasenagaṇi discusses several interpretations of this *sūtra* and mentions the variant reading ‘*rūpīṇi*’, which is also given in Mody. Kapadia adds ‘*ca*’ after *arūpāṇi*. It is unclear to me why the *sūtra* presents ‘*nitya*’ and ‘*avasthita*’ in compound, unlike ‘*arūpa*’. The syntax is somewhat odd if the author is trying to express that the five *dravyas* have these three qualities, as the *bhāṣya* suggests. In fact, there are two other possibilities to translate this *sūtra*:

- I. ‘The formless [substances] [are] eternal and fixed.’
- II. ‘[The five substances are] eternal and fixed. [There are] formless [substances].’ (By contrast, the material elements do have form. See TA 5.4).

However, both alternatives are contradicted by TABh 5.3.5.

⁸⁴⁸ I.e., their number is fixed (Jacobi 1906: 512). See also 5.3.4.

[5.3.1] *etāni dravyāṇi nityāni bhavanti* | [5.3.2] *tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam iti vakṣyate* ||

These (*etad*) substances (*dravya*) are (*bhavanti*) eternal (*nitya*). It will be said (see TA 5.30) (*vakṣyate*) [that] '[that] whose state is not changing (*tad-bhāva-avyaya*), [is] eternal (*nitya*)' (*iti*).

[5.3.3] *avasthitāni ca* | [5.3.4] *na hi kadācit pañcatvaṃ bhūtārthatvaṃ ca vyabhicaranti* ||

And (*ca*) [these substances are] fixed (*avasthita*). For (*hi*), [they] never (*na ... kadācit*) transgress (*vyabhicaranti*) the quality of being five (*pañcatva*) and (*ca*) the quality of being real (*bhūtārthatva*).

[5.3.5] *arūpāṇi ca* | [5.3.6] *naiṣāṃ rūpam astīti* | [5.3.7] *rūpaṃ mūrtir mūrtyāśrayās ca sparśādaya iti* ||

And (*ca*) [these substances are] formless (*arūpa*).⁸⁴⁹ [There] is (*asti*) no (*na*) form (*rūpa*) for them (*idam*). 'Form' (*rūpa*) [is] 'embodiment' (*mūrti*), and (*ca*) [the objects of the senses (see TA 2.21)] beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) [are] dependent on embodiment (*mūrti-āśraya*) (*iti*).

***rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ* ||5.4||**

5.4 [However], material elements (*pudgala*) [are] having form (*rūpin*).

[5.4.1] *pudgalā eva rūpiṇo bhavanti* | [5.4.2] *rūpam eṣāṃ asty eṣu vāstīti rūpiṇaḥ* ||

Only (*eva*)⁸⁵⁰ material elements (*pudgala*) are (*bhavanti*) having form (*rūpin*). [There] is (*asti*) form (*rūpa*) for them (*idam*), or (*vā*), [there] is (*asti*) [form] in the case of them (*idam*) — [that is the meaning of] (*iti*) 'having form' (*rūpin*).

***ākāśād ekadravyāṇi* ||5.5||**

5.5 [The substances] up to space (i.e., motion, rest and space) (*ā-ākāśa*)⁸⁵¹ [are] unique substances (*eka-dravya*).

⁸⁴⁹ Alternatively, 'And there are formless [substances].' See the footnote on TA 5.3.

⁸⁵⁰ Alternatively, 'material elements are **indeed** (*eva*) having form'.

⁸⁵¹ The *bhāṣya* explains '*ākāśād*' as '*ā ākāśād*'.

[5.5.1] *ā ākāśād dharmādīny ekadravyāṇy eva bhavanti* | [5.5.2] *pudgalajīvās tv anekadravyāṇīti* ||

[The substances] up to space (*ā ākāśa*), beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*) are (*bhavanti*) indeed (*eva*) unique substances (*ekadravya*). However (*tu*), material elements [and] souls (*pudgala-jīva*) [are] non-unique substances (*aneka-dravya*).

niṣkriyāṇi ca ||5.6||

5.6 And [they] (i.e., motion, rest, and space) (*ca*) [are] inactive (*niṣkriya*).

[5.6.1] *ā ākāśād eva dharmādīni niṣkriyāṇi bhavanti* | [5.6.2] *pudgalajīvās tu kriyāvantaḥ* | [5.6.3] *kriyeti gatikarmāha* |

[The substances] up to space (*ā ākāśa*), beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*) are (*bhavanti*) indeed (*eva*) inactive (*niṣkriya*). However (*tu*), material elements [and] souls (*pudgala-jīva*) [are] active (*kriyāvat*). It has been said (*āha*)⁸⁵² [that] ‘action’ (*kriyā*) (*iti*) [is] ‘the action of going’⁸⁵³ (*gati-karman*).

[5.6.4] *atrāha* | [5.6.5] *uktaṃ bhavatā pradeśāvayavabahutvaṃ kāyasaṃjñam iti* | [5.6.6] *tasmāt ka eṣāṃ dharmādīnāṃ pradeśāvayavaniyama iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TABh 5.1.3) (*bhavat*) [that] the term ‘entity’ (*kāya-saṃjñā*) [denotes] ‘the plurality of space-points and parts’ (*pradeśa-avayava-bahutva*) (*iti*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), what (*kim*) [is] the limitation (i.e., number) of space-points and parts (*pradeśa-avayava-niyama*) for these (*idam*) [substances] beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*)?

[5.6.7] *atrocyate* | [5.6.8] *sarveṣāṃ pradeśāḥ santi anyatra paramāṇoḥ* | [5.6.9] *avayavās tu skandhānām eva* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): For all [substances] (*sarva*) there are (*santi*) space-points (*pradeśa*), except for an infinitesimal particle (*parama-aṇu*). However (*tu*), [there are] parts⁸⁵⁴ (*avayava*) for the aggregates (*skandha*) only (*eva*).

⁸⁵² Siddhasenagaṇi comments that ‘*āha*’ refers to the author of the *sūtra*. However, I have not been able to identify the source of this reference.

⁸⁵³ Alternatively, ‘the *karman* of transmigration’. Siddhasenagaṇi explains that the author of the *bhāṣya* uses an alternative root, i.e., ‘*gam-dhātu*’ instead of ‘*kr-dhātu*’.

⁸⁵⁴ See TABh 5.1.3.

[5.6.10] *vakṣyate hy aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca saṃghātabhedebhya utpadyante iti* ||
[5.6.11] *tatra*

For (*hi*), it will be said (see TA 5.25, TA 6.26) (*vakṣyate*) [that] '[material elements exist as] atoms (*aṇu*) and aggregates (*skandha*)' [and that] '[they] result (*utpad*) from combination (*saṃghāta*) [and] disintegration (*bheda*)' (*iti*). Among them (i.e., the substances) (*tatra*):

asaṅkhyeyāḥ pradeśā dharmādharmayoḥ ||5.7||

5.7 [There are] innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) space-points (*pradeśa*) for motion [and] rest (*dharmā-adharma*).

[5.7.1] *pradeśo nāmāpekṣikaḥ sarvasūkṣmas tu paramāṇor avagāha iti* ||

[That which is] called (*nāma*) 'space-point' (*pradeśa*) [is] relative⁸⁵⁵ (*āpekṣika*). However (*tu*), the abidance⁸⁵⁶ (*avagāha*) of the infinitesimal particle (*parama-aṇu*) [is] most subtle (*sarva-sūkṣma*).⁸⁵⁷

jīvasya ca ||5.8||

5.8 Likewise (see TA 5.7) (*ca*), [there are innumerable space-points] for the soul (*jīva*).

[5.8.1] *ekajīvasya cāsaṅkhyeyāḥ pradeśā bhavantīti* ||

Likewise (*ca*), [there] are (*bhavanti*) innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) space-points (*pradeśa*) for an individual soul (*eka-jīva*).

ākāśasyānantāḥ ||5.9||

5.9 There are infinitely many [space-points] (*ananta*) for space (*ākāśa*).

[5.9.1] *lokālokākāśasyānantāḥ pradeśāḥ* | [5.9.2] *lokākāśasya tu dharmādharmāikajīvais tulyāḥ* ||

The worldly realm and that which is beyond the world (*loka-aloka-ākāśa*) have infinitely many (*ananta*) space-points (*pradeśa*). However, [the space-points] of the

⁸⁵⁵ TABh 5.24.5 distinguishes relative (*āpekṣika*) and ultimate (*antyā*) subtlety of matter.

⁸⁵⁶ For an explanation of the term 'abidance' (*avagāha*), see TA 5.12.

⁸⁵⁷ For a discussion of the size of space-points (*pradeśa*) and the infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*), see § 3.4, *Space and space-points*.

worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa*) [are] equal to (*tulya*) [the space-points occupied by] motion, rest, and souls (*dharma-adharma-jīva*).⁸⁵⁸

saṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyāś ca pudgalānām ||5.10||

5.10 [There are infinitely many]⁸⁵⁹ and (*ca*) numerable (*saṅkhyeya*) [and] innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) [space-points] for material elements (*pudgala*).

[5.10.1] ***saṅkhyeyā asaṅkhyeyā anantāś ca pudgalānām pradeśā bhavanti |***

[5.10.2] ***anantā iti vartate ||***

There are (*bhavanti*) numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) and (*ca*) infinitely many (*ananta*) space-points (*pradeśa*) for material elements (*pudgala*). [The expression] ‘infinitely many’ (*ananta iti*) is present (i.e., is carried over from TA 5.9) (*vartate*).⁸⁶⁰

nāṇoḥ ||5.11||

5.11 [There are] no [space-points] for an atom (*aṇu*).

[5.11.1] ***aṇoḥ pradeśā na bhavanti |*** [5.11.2] ***anādir amadhyo 'pradeśo hi paramāṇuḥ ||***

There are (*bhavanti*) no (*na*) space-points (*pradeśa*) for an atom (*aṇu*). For (*hi*), the infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) [is] without beginning (*anādi*), without centre (*amadhya*), [and] without space-point (*apradeśa*).⁸⁶¹

lokākāśe 'vagāhaḥ ||5.12||

5.12 [There is] abidance (*avagāha*)⁸⁶² in the worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa*).

[5.12.1] ***avagāhinām avagāho lokākāśe bhavati ||***

The abidance (*avagāha*) of [those entities that are] abiding (*avagāhin*) is (*bhavati*) in the worldly realm (*lokākāśa*).

⁸⁵⁸ In other words, the space-points in *loka* are innumerable but not infinitely many. The space-points in *aloka* are infinitely many.

⁸⁵⁹ See TABh 5.10.2.

⁸⁶⁰ For an explanation of the meaning of ‘*vartate*’, see Tubb & Boose 2007: 165-166.

⁸⁶¹ See also TABh 5.14.1.

⁸⁶² The prime meaning of the word ‘*avagāha*’ is ‘plunging’ or ‘bathing’ (MW). In this passage, the term refers to the act of occurring or existing in a specific part of the cosmos.

dharmādharmayoḥ kṛtsne ||5.13||

5.13 [There is abidance of] motion [and] rest (*dharmā-adharma*) in the entire (*kṛtsna*) [worldly realm].

[5.13.1] ***dharmādharmayoḥ kṛtsne lokākāśe 'vagāho bhavatīti ||***

There is (*bhavatī*) abidance (*avagāha*) of motion [and] rest (*dharmā-adharma*) in the entire (*kṛtsna*) [worldly realm].

ekapradeśādiṣu bhājyaḥ pudgalānām ||5.14||

5.14 [There is] distribution (*bhājya*) of material elements (*pudgala*) in one space-point etc. (*eka-pradeśa-ādi*).

[5.14.1] ***apradeśasaṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyānantapradeśānām pudgalānām ekādiṣv ākāśapradeśeṣu bhājya 'vagāhaḥ |***

Abidance (*avagāha*) [is] distribution (*bhājya*) of material elements (*pudgala*) — [which are] without space-points, with numerable, innumerable, and infinitely many space-points (*apradeśa-saṅkhyeya-asāṅkhyeya-ananta-pradeśa*) — in [a number of] units of space⁸⁶³ (*ākāśa-pradeśa*), beginning with one (*eka-ādi*).⁸⁶⁴

[5.14.2] ***bhājyo vibhājyo vikalpa ity anarthāntaram |***

'Distribution' (*bhājya*), 'to be divided' (*vibhājya*), 'arranged' (*vikalpa*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).⁸⁶⁵

[5.14.3] ***tadyathā |*** [5.14.4] ***paramāṇor ekasminn eva pradeśe |*** [5.14.5]

dvyaṇukasyaikasmin dvayoś ca | [5.14.6] ***tryaṇukasyaikasmin dvayos triṣu ca |***

Namely (*tadyathā*):

- i. [the abidance] of the infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) [is] only (*eva*) in one (*eka*) space-point (*pradeśa*);
- ii. [the abidance] of [an aggregate of] two atoms (*dvi-aṇuka*) [is] in one (*eka*) and (*ca*) two (*dvi*) [space-points];

⁸⁶³ The general meaning of '*pradeśa*' in this chapter of the TA is 'space-points'. However, it seems that the author of the *bhāṣya* tries to explain this notion by describing space-points as '*ākāśa-pradeśa*', which I translate in this passage as 'units of space'.

⁸⁶⁴ In other words, material elements occupy one or more space-points (see TABh 5.15.4 – 5.14.6).

⁸⁶⁵ Kapadia reads '*bhājyo vibhāṣyo vikalpya*'.

- iii. [the abidance] of [an aggregate of] three atoms (*tri-aṇuka*) [is] in one (*eka*), two (*dvi*), and (*ca*) three (*tri*) [space-points].

[5.14.7] **evam caturaṇukādīnām saṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyapradeśasyaikādiṣu saṅkhyeyeṣv asaṅkhyeyeṣu ca** | [5.14.8] **ananta-pradeśasya ca** ||

Likewise (*evam*), [the abidance] of

- i. [an aggregate of] four atoms etc. (*catur-aṇuka-ādī*)
- ii. [an aggregate] whose space-point[s]⁸⁶⁶ (*pradeśa*) [are] numerable (*saṅkhyeya*)
- iii. [and an aggregate whose space-points are] innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*)

[is respectively] in

- i. one [space-point] etc. (*eka-ādī*),
- ii. numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), and (*ca*)
- iii. innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) [space-points].

And (*ca*) [the same applies] to [an aggregate] whose space-points [are] infinitely many (*ananta-pradeśa*).

asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām ||5.15||

5.15 [The abidance] of souls (*jīva*) [is] in innumerable parts etc. (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādī*).

[5.15.1] **lokākāśapradeśānām asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāho bhavati** |

[5.15.2] **ā sarvalokād iti** ||

There is (*bhavati*) abidance (*avagāha*) of souls (*jīva*) in innumerable parts⁸⁶⁷ etc. (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādī*) of the space-points in the worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa-pradeśa*), up to the whole world (*ā sarva-loka*).

[5.15.3] **atrāha** | [5.15.4] **ko hetur asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāho bhavatīti** | [5.15.5] **atrocyate** ||

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): What (*kim*) is (*bhavati*) the cause (*hetu*) [of the fact that] ‘there is (*bhavati*) abidance (*avagāha*) of souls (*jīva*) in innumerable parts etc. (*asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādī*)⁸⁶⁸ (*iti*)’? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

⁸⁶⁶ It is unclear to me why the word ‘-*pradeśasya*’ appears in a singular rather than plural form.

⁸⁶⁷ Siddhasenagaṇi analyses the compound as a *karmadhāraya*.

⁸⁶⁸ See TABh 5.15.1.

pradeśasaṃhāravisargābhyāṃ pradīpavat ||5.16||

5.16 [It is caused] by contraction (*saṃhāra*) [and] expansion (*visarga*) [of] space-points (*pradeśa*), like a light⁸⁶⁹ (*pradīpa*).

[5.16.1] ***jīvasya hi pradeśānāṃ saṃhāravisargāṃ iṣṭau pradīpasyeva |***

For, contraction (*saṃhāra*) [and] expansion (*visarga*) of the space-points (*pradeśa*) of the soul (*jīva*) [are] desired (*iṣṭa*), like (*iva*) [the contraction and expansion] of a light (*pradīpa*).

[5.16.2] ***tadyathā |*** [5.16.3] ***tailavartyagniyupādānapravṛddhaḥ pradīpo mahatīm api kūṭāgāraśālāṃ prakāśayaty aṇvīm api māṇikāvṛtaḥ māṇikāṃ droṇāvṛto droṇam āḍhakāvṛtaścāḍhakaṃ prasthāvṛtaḥ prasthaṃ pāṇyāvṛto pāṇim iti |***

Namely (*tadyathā*), a light (*pradīpa*) [whose] increase [is] dependent on fuel, a wick and fire (*taila-vartī-agni-upādāna-pravṛddha*), illuminates (*prakāśayati*) also (*api*) a big (*mahat*) room [of] a house [up to] the top (*kūṭa-agāra*⁸⁷⁰-*śāla*), as well as (*api*) a small [room] (*aṇvī*). [To illustrate],

- [when there is] a *māṇika*⁸⁷¹ [of fuel], [the light is] limited by a *māṇika* (*māṇika-āvṛta*);
- [when there is] a *droṇa*⁸⁷² [of fuel], [the light is] limited by a *droṇa* (*droṇa-āvṛta*);
- and (*ca*) [when there is] an *āḍhaka*⁸⁷³ [of fuel], [the light is] limited by an *āḍhaka* (*āḍhaka-āvṛta*);
- [when there is] a *prastha*⁸⁷⁴ [of fuel], [the light is] limited by a *prastha* (*prastha-āvṛta*);
- [when there is] a *hand* [of fuel] (*pāṇi*) [the light is] limited by a hand (*pāṇi-āvṛta*) (*iti*).

⁸⁶⁹ I.e., like the reach of a light, which adapts to the size of the space in which the light is placed.

⁸⁷⁰ Or: *āgāra*.

⁸⁷¹ A particular weight.

⁸⁷² Idem.

⁸⁷³ Idem.

⁸⁷⁴ Idem.

[5.16.4] *evam eva pradeśānām saṃhāraṇīyāṃ jīva mahāntam aṇuṃ vā pañcavidhaṃ śarīraskandhaṃ dharmādharmākāśapudgalajīvapradeśa-samudāyaṃ vyāpnotīty avagāhata ity arthaḥ* |

Exactly so (*evam eva*), the soul (*jīva*) pervades (*vyāpnoti*)

- a big (*mahānta*) or (*vā*) small [space] (*aṇu*),
- the fivefold (*pañcavidha*) types of the body⁸⁷⁵ (*śarīra-skandha*),
- [or] the totality of space-points of motion, rest, space, material elements, and souls (*dharma-adharma-ākāśa-pudgala-jīva-pradeśa-samudāya*)

by contraction [and] expansion (*saṃhāraṇīya*) [of] space-points (*pradeśa*); ‘it abides’ (*avagāhate*) — [that is] the meaning (i.e., of *vyāpnoti*) (*ity artha*).

[5.16.5] *dharmādharmākāśajīvānām paraspāreṇa pudgaleṣu ca vṛttir na virudhyate ’mūrtatvāt* ||

The activity (*vṛtti*) of motion, rest, space, and souls (*dharma-adharma-ākāśa-pudgala-jīva*) and (*ca*) [the activity] in the case of⁸⁷⁶ the material elements (*pudgala*) is not (*na*) mutually (*paraspara*) obstructed (*virudhyate*), on account of the absence of form (*amūrtatva*).

[5.16.6] *atrāha* | [5.16.7] *sati pradeśasaṃhāraṇīyāṃ saṃbhava kasmād asaṃkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāho bhavati naikapradeśādiṣv iti* | [5.16.8] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): If it is (*sat*) caused⁸⁷⁷ by contraction [and] expansion [of] space-points (*pradeśa-saṃhāra-visarga-sambhava*), why (*kasmāt*) is [there] (*bhavati*) abidance (*avagāha*) of souls (*jīva*) in innumerable parts etc.⁸⁷⁸ (*asaṃkhyeya-bhāga-ādi*) [but] not (*na*) in a single space-point etc. (*eka-pradeśa-ādi*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

⁸⁷⁵ TA 2.37 lists the five types of body as follows: ‘[The varieties of] body [are]: the gross [body] (*audārīka*), [the body that is] subject to change (*vaikriya*), the conveyance [body] (*āhāraka*), the fiery [body], (*taijasa*) [and] the karmic [body] (*kārmaṇa*)’ (*audārīka-vaikriyāhārakataijāsakārmaṇāni śarīrāṇi*).

⁸⁷⁶ My interpretation of this sentence is based on Siddhasenagaṇi’s analysis of the syntax.

⁸⁷⁷ See TABh 5.15.4 (*ko hetur*) and TA 5.16.

⁸⁷⁸ See TABh 5.15.2.

[5.16.9] *sayogatvāt saṃsāriṇām caramaśarīratribhāgaḥināvagāhitvā ca siddhānām iti* |

Due to the quality of being possessed with *yoga*⁸⁷⁹ (*sayogatva*) of worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) and (*ca*) due to abidance [of] the final body, [which is] free from the three parts⁸⁸⁰ (*carama-śarīra-tri-bhāga-hīna-avagāhitva*), of the perfected beings (*siddha*).⁸⁸¹

[5.16.10] *atrāha* | [5.16.11] *uktaṃ bhavatā dharmādīn astikāyān parastāl lakṣaṇato vakṣyāma iti* (5.1) | [5.16.12] *tat kim eṣāṃ lakṣaṇam iti* | [5.16.13] *atrocyate*

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*) — [The following] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TABh 5.1.1 - 5.1.2) (*bhavat*): ‘We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) the categories (*astikāya*) beginning with motion (*dharmā-ādī*) below (*parastāt*), based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*)’. Now (*tad*), what (*kim*) [are] the characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) of them (*idam*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

gatiṣṭhityupagraho dharmādharmayor upakāraḥ ||5.17||

5.17 The function (*upakāra*) of motion and rest (*dharmā-adharma*) [is] the support (*upagraha*) [of] movement (*gati*) and inertia⁸⁸² (*sthiti*).

[5.17.1] *gatimatāṃ gateḥ sthitimatāṃ ca sthiter upagraho dharmādharmayor upakāro yathāsaṅkhyam* |

The support (*upagraha*) of movement (*gati*) of [those entities] having movement (*gatimat*, gen.pl.) and (*ca*) [the support] of inertia (*sthiti*) of [those entities] having inertia (*sthitimat*), [that is] the function (*upakāra*) of motion and rest (*dharmā-adharma*) respectively (*yathā-saṅkhyam*).

[5.17.2] *upagraho nimittam apekṣā kāraṇam hetur ity anarthāntaram* |

‘Support’ (*upagraha*), ‘condition’ (*nimitta*), ‘requirement’ (*apekṣā*), ‘ground’ (*kāraṇa*), ‘reason’ (*hetu*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

⁸⁷⁹ See also TABh 1.7.35.

⁸⁸⁰ My analysis of the compound follows Siddhasenagaṇi’s interpretation.

⁸⁸¹ It is not entirely clear to me how this passage answers the question that is raised in the previous sentence (TABh 5.16.7).

⁸⁸² In TA 1.7 ‘*sthiti*’ has been translated as ‘duration’. However, in this passage ‘*sthiti*’ refers to the opposite of movement.

[5.17.3] **upakāraḥ prayojanaṃ guṇo 'rtha ity anarthāntaram ||**

‘Function’ (*upakāra*), ‘purpose’ (*prayojana*), ‘quality’ (*guṇa*), ‘use’ (*artha*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*anarthāntara*).

ākāśasyāvagāhaḥ ||5.18||

5.18 [The function, *upakāra*] of space (*ākāśa*) [is] abidance⁸⁸³ (*avagāha*).

[5.18.1] **avagāhinām dharmādharmapudgalajīvānām avagāha ākāśasyopakāraḥ |** [5.18.2] **dharmādharmayor antaḥpraveśasaṃbhavena pudgalajīvānām saṃyogavibhāgaiś ceti ||**

The function (*upakāra*) of space (*ākāśa*) [is] abidance (*avagāha*) of motion, rest, material elements, and souls (*dharmādharmapudgala-jīva*). [It is] made possible by permeation⁸⁸⁴ (*antaḥpraveśa-saṃbhava*) of motion and rest (*dharmādharmā*) and (*ca*) by the varieties of connection⁸⁸⁵ (*saṃyoga-vibhāga*) of material elements [and] souls (*pudgala-jīva*).

śarīravāṇmanahprāṇāpānāḥ pudgalānām ||5.19||

5.19 [The function] of material elements (*pudgala*) [is] body, speech, mind, inhalation, [and] exhalation (*śarīra-vāc-manas-prāṇa-apāna*) [...] ⁸⁸⁶

[5.19.1] **pañcavidhāni śarīrāṇy audārikādīni vāṇ manah prāṇāpānāv iti pudgalānām upakāraḥ |**

The function (*upakāra*) of material elements (*pudgala*) [is]: the fivefold (*pañcavidha*) [varieties] of bodies (*śarīra*), beginning with the gross [body]⁸⁸⁷ (*audārika-ādi*), speech (*vāc*), mind (*manas*), inhalation, [and] exhalation (*prāṇa-apāna*).

[5.19.2] **tatra śarīrāṇi yathoktāni |**

Among them (*tatra*), the [varieties of] bodies (*śarīra*) [are] as it is said (see TA 2.37) (*yathokta*).

⁸⁸³ See also TA 5.12.

⁸⁸⁴ Böhtlingk translates ‘*antaḥpraveśa*’ as ‘das Hinenschlüpfen’ (Böhtlingk 1855).

⁸⁸⁵ See also TABh 1.7.10.

⁸⁸⁶ The list continues in TA 5.20.

⁸⁸⁷ See TA 2.37.

[5.19.3] ***prāṇāpāna ca nāmakarmaṇi vyākhyātau |***

And (*ca*) inhalation [and] exhalation (*prāṇa-apāna*) are explained (TA 8.12)⁸⁸⁸ (*vyākhyāta*) in [the discussion of] body-determining *karman* (*nāma-karman*).

[5.19.4] ***dvīndriyādayo jihvendriyayogād⁸⁸⁹ bhāṣātvena grhṇanti nānye |***

[Beings with] two senses etc. (*dvi-indriya-ādi*) understand (*grhṇanti*) by the quality of being [provided with] language (*bhāṣātva*), because [they are] provided with speech [and] mind (*jihvā-indriya-yoga*), not (*na*) others (i.e., not one-sensed beings) (*anya*).

[5.19.5] ***saṃjñīnaś ca manastvena grhṇanti nānye iti |***

And (*ca*) conscious [beings] (see TA 2.25) (*saṃjñīn*) understand (*grhṇanti*) by the quality of being [provided with] a mind (*manastva*), not (*na*) others⁸⁹⁰ (*anya*).

[5.19.6] ***vakṣyate hi sakaṣāyatvāj jīvaḥ karmaṇo योग्याṇ pudgalān ādatta iti || kiṃ cānyat***

Indeed (*hi*), it will be said (see TA 8.2) (*vakṣyate*) [that] ‘due to the quality of being with passions (*sakaṣāyatva*) the soul (*jīva*) attracts (*ādatte*) material elements (*pudgala*) appropriate to (*yogya*) karmic activity (*karman*)’ (*iti*). Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

sukhaduḥkha-jīvitamaraṇopagrahāś ca ||5.20||

5.20 [...] and the support⁸⁹¹ (*upagraha*) [of] pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), life (*jīvita*), [and] death (*marāṇa*).

[5.20.1] ***sukhopagraho duḥkhopagraho jīvitopagraho maraṇopagrahaś ceti pudgalānām upakāraḥ |***

The function (*upakāra*) of material elements (*pudgala*) [is] the support of pleasure (*sukha-upagraha*), the support of pain (*duḥkha-upagraha*), the support of life (*jīvita-upagraha*), and (*ca*) the support of death (*marāṇa-upagraha*) (*iti*).

[5.20.2] ***tadyathā |*** [5.20.3] ***iṣṭāḥ sparśarasagandhavarṇaśabdāḥ sukhasyopakāraḥ |*** [5.20.4] ***aniṣṭā dukhasya |***

⁸⁸⁸ TA 8.12 lists 42 varieties of body-determining *karman*. One of these varieties is ‘breath’ (*ucchvāsa*).

⁸⁸⁹ Kapadia reads ‘*saṃyogād*’.

⁸⁹⁰ I.e., not the beings without a mind (*amanaska*) (see TA 2.11 and TA 2.25).

⁸⁹¹ Lit. ‘supports’ (pl.), i.e., the support of pleasure, the support of pain, etc.

Namely (*tad-yathā*), [objects of] touch, tastes, smells, colours, and sounds⁸⁹² (*sparsā-rasa-gandha-varṇa-śabda*) [that are] desirable (*iṣṭa*) — [their] function (*upakāra*) [is the support] of pleasure (*sukha*). [The function of the objects of the senses that are] undesirable (*aniṣṭa*) [is the support] of pain (*dukha*).

[5.20.5] *snānācchādanānulepanabhojanādīni vidhiprayuktāni jīvitasyānapavartanaṃ cāyuskasya* | [5.20.6] *viśaśastrāgnyādīni maraṇasyāpavartanaṃ cāyuskasya* ||

[Actions] performed according to rule (*vidhi-prayukta*), beginning with bathing, clothing, anointing, and eating (*snāna-ācchādana-anulepana-bhojana-ādī*) – [their function is] sustenance⁸⁹³ (*an-apavartana*) of life (*jīvita*) and (*ca*) of life span determining *karman*⁸⁹⁴ (*āyuska*). [Objects beginning with] poison, weapons, [and] fire (*viśa-śastra-agnī*) – [their function is] death (*marāṇa*) and (*ca*) the removal (*apavartana*) of life span determining *karman* (*āyuska*).

[5.20.7] *atrāha* | [5.20.8] *upapannaṃ tāvad etat sopakramāṇām apavartanīyāyusām* | [5.20.9] *athānapavartyāyusām katham iti* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): First of all (*tāvat*), this (*etat*) [is] appropriate (*upapanna*) for [those whose] lives [can] be shortened (*apavartanīya-āyus*), [who are provided] with life span reducing factors⁸⁹⁵ (*sa-upakrama*). Now (*atha*), how [is this] (*kim*) for [those whose] lives cannot be shortened⁸⁹⁶ (*anapavartya-āyus*) (*iti*)?

[5.20.10] *atrocyate* | [5.20.11] *teṣām api jīvitamarāṇopagrahaḥ pudgalānām upakāraḥ* | [5.20.12] *katham iti cet tad ucyate* | [5.20.13] *karmaṇaḥ sthitiḥkṣayābhyām* | [5.20.14] *karma hi paudgalam iti* |

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): The function (*upakāra*) of these (*tad*) material elements (*pudgala*) [is] also (*api*) the support of life and death⁸⁹⁷ (*jīvita-maraṇa-upagraha*). If one asks (*iti cet*) “How?” (*katham*), then (*tad*) it is said (*ucyate*): By maintenance and destruction (*sthiti-kṣaya*) of *karman*. For (*hi*), *karman* [is] material (*paudgala*) (*iti*).

⁸⁹² I.e., the objects of the senses (see TA 2.21).

⁸⁹³ Lit. ‘non-removal’.

⁸⁹⁴ This type of *karman* is listed in TA 8.5.

⁸⁹⁵ The term ‘*upakrama*’ is discussed in the *bhāṣya* on TA 2.52 and refers to factors that reduce one’s life span (Balcerowicz 2016c: 165). It is also mentioned in the *Ṭhāṇaṃgasutta* as one of the six states ‘according to the manner in which *karman* can be operated upon’ (Balcerowicz 2016c: 163).

⁸⁹⁶ The term ‘*anapavartyāyus*’ is also used in TA 2.52. The life span of some classes of beings cannot be shortened.

⁸⁹⁷ See TABh 5.20.1.

[5.20.15] *āhāraś ca trividhaḥ sarveṣāṃ evopakurute* | [5.20.16] *kiṃ kāraṇam* |
And (*ca*) the threefold (*trividha*) livelihood (*āhāra*) assists (*evopakurute*) all (*sarva*).
What (*kiṃ*) [is] the reason [for this] (*kāraṇa*)?

[5.20.17] *śārīrasthityupacayabalavṛddhiprītyartham hy āhāra iti* ||
Indeed (*hi*), livelihood (*āhāra*) [is] for the sake of maintenance, growth, strength, flourishing, [and] satisfaction [of] the body (*śārīra-sthity-upacaya-bala-vṛddhi-prīty-artha*).

[5.20.18] *atrāha* | [5.20.19] *grhṇīmas tāvad dharmādharmākāśapudgalā*⁸⁹⁸
jīvadrvayāṇām upakurvantīti | [5.20.20] *atha jīvānām ka upakāra iti* | [5.20.21] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*), one says (*āha*): So far (*tāvat*), we understand (*grhṇīmaḥ*) [that] motion, rest, space, and material elements (*dharmādharmākāśa-pudgala*) assist (*upakurvantī*) the animate substances (*jīva-dravya*) (*iti*). Now (*atha*), what (*kiṃ*) [is] the function (*upakāra*) of souls (*jīva*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

parasparopagraho jīvānām ||5.21||

5.21 [The function] of souls (*jīva*) [is] mutual support (*paraspara-upagraha*).⁸⁹⁹

[5.21.1] *parasparasya hitāhitopadeśābhyām upagraho jīvānām iti* |
[The function] of souls (*jīva*) [is] the support (*upagraha*) by teaching (*upadeśa*) [about that which is] beneficial and disadvantageous (*hita-ahita-upadeśa*) for each other (*paraspara*).

[5.21.2] *atrāha* | [5.21.3] *atha kālasyopakāraḥ ka iti* | [5.21.4] *atrocyate* |
At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), what (*kiṃ*) [is] the function (*upakāra*) of time (*kāla*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

vartanā pariṇāmaḥ kriyā paratvāparatve ca kālasya ||5.22||

5.22 [The function, *upakāra*] of time (*kāla*) [is] beginning⁹⁰⁰ (*vartanā*), transformation (*pariṇāma*), activity (*kriyā*), [temporal] priority (*paratva*) and posteriority (*aparatva*).

⁸⁹⁸ Kapadia reads *-pudgala-jīva-*.

⁸⁹⁹ It seems that the TA is the first text that makes this claim. For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see § 3.4, *Function of the substances*.

⁹⁰⁰ Alternatively, 'continuation'. TABh 5.22.3 seems to interpret 'vartanā' as 'beginning'.

[5.22.1] **tadyathā** | [5.22.2] **sarvabhāvānām vartanā kālāśrayo vṛttiḥ** |

Namely (*tad-yathā*), the beginning (*vartanā*) of all things (*sarvabhāva*) [is] a state (*vṛtti*) [that is] dependent on time (*kāla-āśraya*).

[5.22.3] **vartanā utpattiḥ sthitiḥ prathamasaṁyāśrayā ity arthaḥ** ||

‘Beginning’ (*vartanā*), ‘occurrence’ (*utpatti*), ‘the state’ (*sthiṭi*) [that is] depending on the first moment’ (*prathama-samaya-āśraya*) — [that is] the meaning (*ity artha*).⁹⁰¹

[5.22.4] **pariṇāmo dvividhaḥ** | [5.22.5] **anādir ādimāṁś ca** | [5.22.6] **taṁ parastāt vakṣyāmaḥ** ||

Transformation (*pariṇāma*) [is] twofold: without beginning (*anādi*) and (*ca*) having a beginning (*ādimat*). We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) this (*tad*) later on (see TA 5.42) (*parastāt*).

[5.22.7] **kriyā gatiḥ** | [5.22.8] **sā trividhā** | [5.22.9] **prayogagatir visrasā⁹⁰²gatir miśriketi** ||

Activity (*kriyā*) [is] movement (*gati*). It (*tad*) [is] threefold: beginning movement (*prayoga-gati*), declining movement (*visrasā-gati*), [and] mixed [movement] (*miśrika*) (*iti*).

[5.22.10] **paratvāparatve trividhe praśaṁsākṛte kṣetrakṛte kālakṛte iti** |

The quality of being uppermost and the quality of being lowermost⁹⁰³ (*paratva-aparatva*) [are] threefold (*trividha*): resulting from praiseworthiness (*praśaṁsā-kṛta*), resulting from region (*kṣetra-kṛta*), resulting from time (*kāla-kṛta*) (*iti*).⁹⁰⁴

[5.22.11] **tatra praśaṁsākṛte paro dharmāḥ param jñānaṁ aparo 'dharma'⁹⁰⁵ aparam ajñānam iti** |

Among them (*tatra*), resulting from praiseworthiness (*praśaṁsā-kṛte*) [are]:

- i. the uppermost (*para*) *dharma*
- ii. the uppermost (*para*) knowledge (*jñāna*)
- iii. the lowermost (*apara*) *adharma*, [and]

⁹⁰¹ The syntactical structure of this sentence is not entirely clear to me. I interpret ‘*prathama-samaya-āśrayā*’ as a *bahuvrīhi* compound that qualifies ‘*sthiṭi*’. However, it is also possible that ‘*sthiṭi*’ is given as a separate synonym.

⁹⁰² Mody reads ‘*visrasāgatir*’ and mentions ‘*visrasāgatir*’ as a variant reading. Kapadia reads ‘*visrasāgatir*’. The word seems to be derived from the verbal root ‘*√sras*’ (falling, dropping). Therefore, I follow the reading ‘*visrasāgatir*’.

⁹⁰³ In TA 5.22 I translate ‘[temporal] priority (*paratva*) and posteriority (*aparatva*)’ since both terms are clearly related to the function of time. However, the *bhāṣya* comments on those terms in a more general way.

⁹⁰⁴ The *bhāṣya* seems to point out that the terms ‘*paratva*’ and ‘*aparatva*’ can refer to moral, geographical, and temporal differences.

⁹⁰⁵ Mody reads ‘*dharma*’. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘*adharma*’.

iv. the lowermost (*apara*) false knowledge (*ajñāna*) (*iti*).

[5.22.12] ***kṣetrakṛte ekadikkālāvasthitayor viprakṛṣṭaḥ paro bhavati sannikṛṣṭo 'paraḥ*** |

Resulting from region (*kṣetra-kṛta*) — [Amongst two things that are] placed in a single space [and] time (*eka-diś-kāla-avasthita*), remote (*viprakṛṣṭa*) is (*bhavati*) the uppermost (*para*), proximate (*sannikṛṣṭa*) [is] the lowermost (*apara*).

[5.22.13] ***kālakṛte dviraṣṭavarṣād varṣaśatikāḥ paro bhavati varṣaśatikād dviraṣṭavarṣo 'paro bhavati*** ||

Resulting from time (*kālakṛta*) — Someone of hundred years (*varṣa-śatika*) is (*bhavati*) higher (i.e., older) (*para*) than someone of sixteen years (*dvi-aṣṭan-varṣa*). Someone of sixteen years⁹⁰⁶ (*dvi-aṣṭan-varṣa*) is (*bhavati*) lower (i.e., younger) than someone of hundred years (*varṣaśa-tika*).

[5.22.14] ***tad evaṃ praśaṃsākṣetrakṛte paratvāparatve varjayitvā vartanādīni kālakṛtāni kālasyopakāra iti*** ||

Thus (*tad evaṃ*), with the exception of (*varjayitvā*) the quality of being uppermost and lowermost [that are] resulting from praiseworthiness and region (*praśaṃsā-kṣetra-kṛta*), the function (*upakāra*) of time (*kāla*) [are the things] resulting from time (*kāla-kṛta*), i.e., beginning etc. (*vartanā-ādī*) (*iti*).

[5.22.15] ***atrāha*** | [5.22.16] ***uktaṃ bhavatā śarīrādīni pudgalānām upakāra iti*** |

[5.22.17] ***pudgalān iti ca tantrāntarīyā jīvān paribhāṣante*** | [5.22.18]

sparsādirahitās cānye | [5.22.19] ***tat katham etad iti*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): You have mentioned (*uktaṃ bhavatā*) [that] the function (*upakāra*) of material elements (*pudgala*) [are] the body etc. (*śarīra-ādī*) (see TA 5.19). Yet (*ca*), other schools⁹⁰⁷ (*tantrāntarīya*) teach (*paribhāṣante*) [that] (*iti*) souls (*jīva*) [are] material elements (*pudgala*). And (*ca*) others (*anya*) [teach that they are] destitute of touch etc. (*sparsā-ādi-rahita*). Then (*tad*), how (*katham*) [is] this [possible] (*etad*) (*iti*)?

⁹⁰⁶ Siddhasenagaṇi explains 'dvyāṣṭan' as 'sixteen' (*ṣoḍaśavarṣa*).

⁹⁰⁷ This might be a reference to the pudgalavādins.

[5.22.20] *atrocyate* | [5.22.21] *etadādivipratipattipratīṣedhārthaṃ viśeṣa-vacanavivakṣayā cedam ucyate* ||

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): For the sake of exclusion of contradictory [views] beginning with this⁹⁰⁸ (*etad-ādi-vipratipatti-pratīṣedha-artha*) and (*ca*) by the wish to explain⁹⁰⁹ the different teachings (*viśeṣa-vacana-vivakṣā*), this (*idam*) is said (*ucyate*):

***sparsārasagandhavarṇavantah pudgalāḥ* ||5.23||**

5.23 The material elements (*pudgala*) possess:

- i. touch (*sparsā*)
- ii. taste (*rasa*)
- iii. smell (*gandha*) [and]
- iv. colour (*varṇa*);

[5.23.1] ***sparsāḥ rasāḥ gandhaḥ varṇa ity evamlakṣaṇāḥ pudgalā bhavanti* |**

Touch (*sparsā*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), [and] colour (*varṇa*) (*iti*) — the material elements (*pudgala*) are (*bhavanti*) characterised in this way (*evamlakṣaṇa*).

[5.23.2] ***tatra sparśo 'ṣṭavidhaḥ kaṭhino mṛdur gurur laghuḥ śīti uṣṇaḥ snigdhaḥ rūkṣa iti* |**

Among them (*tatra*), touch (*sparsā*) [is] eightfold (*aṣṭavidha*):

- i. hard (*kaṭhina*)
- ii. soft (*mṛdu*)
- iii. heavy (*guru*)
- iv. light (*laghu*)
- v. cold (*śīti*)
- vi. hot (*uṣṇa*)
- vii. smooth (*snigdha*) [and]
- viii. rough (*rūkṣa*) (*iti*).

⁹⁰⁸ I.e., the alternative views that are mentioned in TABh 5.22.17 – 5.22.18.

⁹⁰⁹ Perhaps the intended meaning is 'oppose'. The term '*vivakṣā*' can also mean 'doubt' or 'uncertainty' (MW).

[5.23.3] **rasaḥ pañcavidhaḥ tiktāḥ kaṭuḥ kaṣāyo 'mlo madhura iti |**

Taste (*rasa*) [is] fivefold (*pañcavidha*):

- i. bitter (*tikta*)
- ii. sharp (*kaṭu*)
- iii. astringent (*kaṣāya*)
- iv. acid (*amla*) [and]
- v. sweet (*madhura*) (*iti*).

[5.23.4] **gandho dvividhaḥ surabhir asurabhiś ca |**

Smell (*gandha*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*):

- i. fragrant (*surabhi*) and (*ca*)
- ii. non-fragrant (*asurabhi*).

[5.23.5] **varṇaḥ pañcavidhaḥ kṛṣṇo nīlo lohitaḥ pītaḥ śukla iti ||** [5.23.6] **kiṃ cānyat |**

Colour (*varṇa*) [is] fivefold (*pañcavidha*):

- i. black (*kṛṣṇa*)
- ii. blue (*nīla*)
- iii. red (*lohita*)
- iv. yellow (*pīta*) [and]
- v. white (*śukla*) (*iti*).

Further (*kiṃ cānyat*):

śabdabandhasaukṣmyasthaulyasaṃsthānabheda tamaśchāyātapodyotavantaś ca ||5.24||

5.24 And⁹¹⁰ [the material elements] possess:

- i. sound (*śabda*)
- ii. connection (*bandha*)
- iii. subtlety (*saukṣmya*)
- iv. largeness (*sthaulya*)
- v. shape (*saṃsthāna*)
- vi. partition (*bheda*)
- vii. darkness (*tamas*)
- viii. shade (*chāyā*)

⁹¹⁰ This is a continuation of TA 5.23. TABh 5.24.21 — 5.24.25 explains why these *sūtras* are separated.

- ix. heat (*tapas*) [and]
- x. light (*uddyota*).

[5.24.1] ***tatra śabdaḥ ṣaḍvidhaḥ tato vitato ghaṇaḥ śuṣīro gharṣo bhāṣa iti ||***

Among them (*tatra*), sound (*śabda*) [is] sixfold (*ṣaḍvidha*):⁹¹¹

- i. far reaching (*tata*)
- ii. diffused⁹¹² (*vitata*)
- iii. firm (*ghana*)
- iv. hollow (*śuṣīra*)⁹¹³
- v. frictional (*gharṣa*), [and]
- vi. spoken (*bhāṣa*) (*iti*).

[5.24.2] ***bandhas trividhaḥ |*** [5.24.3] ***prayogabandho visrasābandho***⁹¹⁴ ***miśra iti |***

Connection (*bandha*) [is] threefold (*trividha*):

- i. yoked connection⁹¹⁵ (*prayoga-bandha*)
- ii. loose connection (*visrasā-bandha*), [and]
- iii. mixed [connection] (*miśra*) (*iti*).

[5.24.4] ***snigdharūkṣatvād bhavatīti vakṣyate ||***

It will be said (see TA 5.32) (*vakṣyate*) [that a connection of material elements] arises (*bhavati*) due to smoothness and roughness (*snigdha-rūkṣatva*) (*iti*).

[5.24.5] ***saukṣmyaṁ dvividham antyaṁ āpekṣikaṁ ca |***

Subtlety (*saukṣmya*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*): ultimate (*antya*), and (*ca*) relative (*āpekṣika*).

[5.24.6] ***antyaṁ paramāṇuṣv eva |*** [5.24.7] ***āpekṣikaṁ dvyāṇukādiṣu saṁghātapariṇāmāpekṣaṁ bhavati |***

Ultimate [subtlety] (*antya*) [is] only (*eva*) in the infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*). Relative [subtlety] (*āpekṣika*) exists (*bhavati*) dependent on combination⁹¹⁶ [and] transformation (*saṁghāta-pariṇāma-apekṣā*) in the case of [aggregates] beginning with [an aggregate of] two atoms (*dvi-āṇuka-ādi*).

⁹¹¹ Siddhasenagaṇi explains each sound with the example of a musical instrument. E.g., the sound of a drum is ‘far reaching (*tata*), the sound of a lute is ‘diffused’ (*vitata*), etc.

⁹¹² Alternatively, ‘not far reaching’.

⁹¹³ = ‘*suṣīra*’ (MW).

⁹¹⁴ Mody reads ‘*viśrasābandha*’. I follow Kapadia’s edition, which reads ‘*visrasābandha*’. Cf. TABh 5.22.9.

⁹¹⁵ Siddhasenagaṇi explains this as related to the soul (*jīva-vyāpāra*).

⁹¹⁶ See TA 5.26.

[5.24.8] **tadyathā** | [5.24.9] **āmalakād badaram iti** ||

Namely (*tadyathā*): a jujube (*badara*) [compared with] a gooseberry (i.e., a jujube is relatively subtle compared to a gooseberry) (*āmalaka*) (*iti*).

[5.24.10] **sthaulyam api dvividham antyam āpekṣikaṃ ca** |

Largeness (*sthaulya*) [is] also (*api*) twofold (*dvividha*): ultimate (*antya*) and (*ca*) relative (*āpekṣika*).

[5.24.11] **saṃghātapariṇāmāpekṣam eva bhavati** | [5.24.12] **tatrāntyaṃ sarvalokavyāpini mahāskandhe bhavati** | [5.24.13] **āpekṣikaṃ badarādibhya āmalakādiṣv iti** ||

It exists (*bhavati*) indeed (*eva*) dependent on combination [and] transformation (*saṃghāta-pariṇāma-apekṣā*). Among them (*tatra*), ultimate [largeness] (*antya*) exists (*bhavati*) in the great aggregate⁹¹⁷ (*mahā-skandha*), [which is] pervading the whole world (*sarva-loka-vyāpin*). Relative [largeness] (*āpekṣika*) [exists] in gooseberries etc. (*āmalaka-ādi*) [compared to] jujubes etc. (*badara-ādi*) (*iti*).

[5.24.14] **saṃsthānam anekavidham** | [5.24.15] **dīrghahrasvādyanitthantva⁹¹⁸-paryantam** ||

Shape (*saṃsthāna*) [is] manifold (*anekavidha*): including indefinite [shapes]⁹¹⁹, beginning with long and short (*dīrgha-hrasva-ādy-anitthantva-paryanta*).

[5.24.16] **bhedah pañcavidhah** | [5.24.17] **autkārikah caurṇikah khaṇḍah pratarah anutaṭa iti** ||

Partition (*bheda*) [is] fivefold:⁹²⁰

- i. split (*autkārika*)
- ii. pulverised (*caurṇika*)
- iii. a piece (*khaṇḍa*)
- iv. layered⁹²¹ (*pratara*)
- v. from the sides⁹²² (*anutaṭa*) (*iti*).

⁹¹⁷ The precise meaning of ‘*mahāskandha*’ is not clear to me. Perhaps it refers to the conceptual opposite of a *paramāṇu*.

⁹¹⁸ Mody reads ‘-*anitthatva*’-. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘*anitthantva*’.

⁹¹⁹ Lit. ‘not-thusness’ (*an-itthantva* <*ittham*). Sanghvi refers to the shapes of clouds (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

⁹²⁰ My translation of the following terms is based on Sanghvi’s interpretation (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

⁹²¹ Like chopped off layers of mica (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

⁹²² Like the removal of the bark of bamboo or sugar cane (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

[5.24.18] **tamaśchāyātapoddyotās ca pariṇāmajāḥ ||**

And (*ca*) darkness, shade, heat, [and] light (*tamas-chāyā-tapas-uddyota*) [are] produced by transformation (*pariṇāma-ja*).⁹²³

[5.24.19] **sarva evaite sparśādayaḥ pudgaleṣu eva bhavantīti |** [5.24.20] **ataḥ pudgalās tadvantaḥ ||**

All these (*sarva etad*) [characteristics]⁹²⁴ beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) exist (*bhavantī*) indeed (*eva*) in the very (*eva*) material elements (*pudgala*) (*iti*). Hence (*atas*), the material elements (*pudgala*) [are] like that (*tadvat*).

[5.24.21] **atrāha |** [5.24.22] **kim arthaṁ sparśādīnāṁ śabdādīnāṁ ca prthak sūtrakaraṇam iti |**

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Why (*kim arthaṁ*) [is] the composition of the *sūtra* (*sūtra-karaṇa*) separate (*prthak*) for [the objects of the senses] beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) and (*ca*) for [the objects of the senses] beginning with sound (*śabda-ādi*) (*iti*)?⁹²⁵

[5.24.23] **atrocyate |** [5.24.24] **sparśādayaḥ paramāṇuṣu skandheṣu ca pariṇāmajā eva bhavantīti |** [5.24.25] **śabdādayas tu skandheṣv eva bhavanty anekanimittās cety ataḥ prthak karaṇam ||**

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): [The objects of the senses] beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) exist (*bhavantī*) indeed (*eva*), produced by transformation⁹²⁶ (*pariṇāma-ja*), in [the case of] the infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*) and (*ca*) aggregates⁹²⁷ (*skandha*). However (*tu*), [the objects of the senses] beginning with sound (*śabda-ādi*) exist (*bhavantī*) only (*eva*) in [the case of] aggregates (*skandha*). And (*ca*) [they are] caused differently (*aneka-nimitta*) (*iti*). Hence (*atas*), the composition [of the *sūtras*] (*karaṇa*) [is] separate (*prthak*).

[5.24.26] **ta ete pudgalāḥ samāsato dvividhā bhavanti |** [5.24.27] **tadyathā**

Succinctly (*samāsatas*), these (*tad*) very (*etad*) material elements (*pudgala*) are (*bhavantī*) twofold (*dvividha*), namely (*tadyathā*):

aṇavaḥ skandhās ca ||5.25||

5.25 [The material elements exist as] atoms (*aṇu*) and aggregates (*skandha*).

⁹²³ It is somewhat strange that this explanation differs from the previous explanations, which all mention different varieties.

⁹²⁴ See TABh 5.23.1: '*lakṣaṇa*'.

⁹²⁵ In other words, why are TA 5.23 and TA 5.24 separated?

⁹²⁶ See TABh 5.24.18.

⁹²⁷ See TA 5.25.

[5.25.1] **uktaṃ ca kāraṇam eva tad antyaṃ⁹²⁸ sūkṣmo nityaś ca paramāṇuḥ |**

[5.25.2] **ekarasagandhavarṇo dvisparśaḥ kāryaliṅgaś ca ||** [5.25.3] **iti |⁹²⁹**

And (*ca*) [it has been] said (*ukta*):

‘The cause (*kāraṇa*) [is] indeed (*eva*) that (*tad*), the ultimate (*antya*). The infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) [is] subtle (*sūkṣma*) and (*ca*) eternal (*nitya*).

[It has] one taste, smell, [and] colour (*eka-rasa-gandha-varṇa*), two [types of] touch⁹³⁰ (*dvi-sparśa*), and (*ca*) its mark [is] the effect (*kārya-liṅga*) (*iti*).’

[5.25.4] **tatrāṇavo ’baddhāḥ skandhās tu baddhā eva ||**

Among them (*tatra*), the atoms (*aṇu*) [are] unconnected (*abaddha*) but (*tu*) the aggregates (*skandha*) [are] indeed (*eva*) connected (*baddha*).

[5.25.5] **atrāha |** [5.25.6] **katham punar etad dvaividhyaṃ bhavatīti |** [5.25.7] **atrocyate |** [5.25.8] **skandhās tāvat |**

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Again (*punar*), why (*katham*) does this (*etad*) exist (*bhavatī*) in a twofold manner (*dvaividhya*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): First of all (*tāvat*), [with respect to] the aggregates (*skandha*):

saṃghātabhedebhya utpadyante ||5.26||

5.26 They (i.e., the aggregates) result (*utpad*) from combination (*saṃghāta*) [and] disintegration (*bheda*).

[5.26.1] **saṃghātād bhedād saṃghātabhedād iti |** [5.26.2] **ebhyas tribhyaḥ kāraṇebhyaḥ skandhā utpadyante dvipradeśādayaḥ |**

From combination (*saṃghāta*), from disintegration (*bheda*), [and] from combination and disintegration (*saṃghāta-bheda*) — the aggregates (*skandha*) beginning with [those having] two space-points (*dvi-pradeśa-ādī*) result (*utpadyante*) from these (*īdam*) three (*tri*) causes (*kāraṇa*).

[5.26.3] **tadyathā |** [5.26.4] **dvayoḥ paramāṇvoḥ saṃghātād dvipradeśaḥ |**

Namely (*tad-yathā*): [An aggregate having] two space-points (*dvi-pradeśa*) [results] from combination (*saṃghāta*) of two (*dvi*) infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*).

⁹²⁸ Alternatively, one can read ‘*antyaṃsūkṣmo*’ in compound, as ‘ultimately subtle’.

⁹²⁹ It is unclear to me what the source of this verse in *upagīti* metre is. For a discussion of this quotation, see § 3.5. *Quotations in the TABh*.

⁹³⁰ Cf. TA 5.23.

[5.26.5] ***dvipradeśasyāṇoś ca saṃghātāt tripradeśaḥ*** |

[An aggregate having] three space-points (*tri-pradeśa*) [results] from combination (*saṃghāta*) of [an aggregate that has] two space-points (*dvi-pradeśa*) and (*ca*) an atom (*aṇu*).

[5.26.6] ***evam saṅkhyeyānām asaṅkhyeyānām anantānām⁹³¹ ca pradeśānām saṃghātāt tāvatpradeśāḥ*** ||

Likewise (*evam*), from the combination (*saṃghāta*) of numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*), and (*ca*) infinitely many (*ananta*) space-points (*pradeśa*), [result aggregates having] such a number of space-points (*tāvat-pradeśa*).

[5.26.7] ***eṣām eva bhedaḥ dvipradeśaparyantāḥ*** ||

[Aggregates] ending with two space-points (i.e., two or more) (*dvi-pradeśa-paryanta*) [result] from disintegration (*bheda*) indeed (*eva*) of these (*idam*).

[5.26.8] ***eta eva saṃghātabhedābhyām ekasāmāyikābhyām dvipradeśādayaḥ skandhā utpadyante*** |

These (*etaḥ*) very same (*eva*) aggregates (*skandha*), beginning with [aggregates having] two space-points (*dvi-pradeśa-ādi*), [result] from single-momentary (*eka-sāmāyika*) combination and disintegration (*saṃghāta-bheda*).

[5.26.9] ***anyasya saṃghātenānyato bhedeneti*** ||

[I.e.], by combination (*saṃghāta*) with another (*anya*) [and] by disintegration (*bheda*) from another (*anyatas*) (*iti*).⁹³²

[5.26.10] ***atrāha*** | [5.26.11] ***atha paramāṇuḥ katham utpadyate iti*** | [5.26.12] ***atrocyate*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), how (*katham*) does the infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) arise (*utpadyate*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

bhedāḥ anuḥ ||5.27||

5.27 An atom (*aṇu*) [results] from disintegration (*bheda*) [only].

⁹³¹ Mody reads ‘*anantām anantānantānām*’ and mentions the variant reading ‘*anantānām anantānām*’. However, in other passages of the *bhāṣya* the list is simply ‘*saṅkhyeya, asaṅkhyeya, ananta*’ (see, for example, TABh 1.8.9 and TABh 5.10.1). Kapadia omits ‘*ananta*’ but gives the variant reading ‘*anantānām anantānantānām*’ in the footnote.

⁹³² According to Siddhasenagaṇi, by combination with another atom and by separation from another aggregate.

[5.27.1] **bhedāḥ eva paramāṇur utpadyate na saṃghātāḥ iti ||**

The infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) results (*utpadyate*) indeed (*eva*) from disintegration (*bheda*), not (*na*) from combination (*saṃghāta*).

bhedasaṃghātābhyāṃ cākṣuṣāḥ ||5.28||

5.28 The perceptible [aggregates] (*cākṣuṣa*) [result] from disintegration (*bheda*) [and] combination (*saṃghāta*).

[5.28.1] **bhedasaṃghātābhyāṃ cākṣuṣāḥ skandhā utpadyante |**

The aggregates (*skandha*) [that are] perceptible (*cākṣuṣa*) result (*utpadyante*) from disintegration (*bheda*) [and] combination (*saṃghāta*).

[5.28.2] **acākṣuṣās tu yathoktāt saṃghātāḥ bhedāt saṃghātabhedāc ceti ||**

However (*tu*), [the aggregates that are] imperceptible (*acākṣuṣa*) [result] ‘from combination (*saṃghāta*), from disintegration (*bheda*), and (*ca*) from combination and disintegration (*saṃghātabheda*)’ (*iti*), as it is said (see TABh 5.26.1) (*yathokta*).

[5.28.3] **atrāha |** [5.28.4] **dharmādīni santīti katham grhyate iti |**

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): How (*katham*) is [the saying that] (*iti*) [substances] beginning with motion⁹³³ (*dharmā-ādi*) are existent (*santi*) understood (*grhyate*) (*iti*)?

[5.28.5] **atrocyate |** [5.28.6] **lakṣaṇataḥ ||** [5.28.7] **kiṃ ca sato lakṣaṇam iti |**

[5.28.8] **atrocyate |**

At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*): based on the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*). And (*ca*) what (*kiṃ*) is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of existence (*sat*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

utpādayayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat ||5.29||

5.29 Existence⁹³⁴ (*sat*) [is] endowed with (*yukta*) production (*utpāda*), decay (*vyaya*), [and] duration (*dhrauvya*).

⁹³³ See TA 5.1.

⁹³⁴ Alternatively, ‘things that exist’.

[5.29.1] *utpādayayābhyāṃ dhrauvyeṇa ca yuktaṃ sato lakṣaṇam yad utpadyate yad vyeti yac ca dhruvaṃ tat sat ato 'nyad asad iti* ||⁹³⁵

The characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of existence (*sat*) [is] endowed with (*yukta*) production and decay (*utpāda-vyaya*), and (*ca*) duration (*dhrauvya*). That which (*yad*) is produced (*utpadyate*), that which (*yad*) decays (*vyeti*), and (*ca*) that which (*yad*) [is] enduring (*dhruva*), that (*that*) [is] existent (*sat*). Hence (*atas*), [that which is] different [from this] (*anya*) [is] non-existent (*asad*) (*iti*).

[5.29.2] *atrāha* | [5.29.3] *grhṇīmas tāvad evaṃ lakṣaṇam sad iti* | [5.29.4] *idaṃ tu vācyam tat kiṃ nityam āhosvid anityam iti* | [5.29.4] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): So far (*tāvat*), we understand (*grhṇīmaḥ*) [that] existence (*sat*) [is] thus (*evam*) characterised (*lakṣaṇa*) (*iti*). However (*tu*), this (*idaṃ*) [is] to be said (*vācya*): [Is] it (i.e., existence) (*tad kim*) eternal (*nitya*) or (*āhosvid*) non-eternal (*anitya*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam ||5.30||

5.30 [An entity that] does not change its state (*tad-bhāva-avyaya*), [is] eternal (*nitya*).

[5.30.1] *yat sato bhāvān na vyeti na vyeṣyati tan nityam iti* |

That which (*yad*) does not change (*na vyeti*) [and] will not change (*na vyeṣyati*) from the state (*bhāva*) of existence (*sat*), that (*tad*) [is] eternal (*nitya*) (*iti*).

arpitānarpitasiddheḥ ||5.31||

5.31 [The apparent contradiction] results from the validity (*siddhi*) of the conventional [standpoint] (*arpita*) and the non-conventional [standpoint] (*anarpita*).⁹³⁶

⁹³⁵ This reading follows Kapadia. Mody reads '*utpādayayau dhrauvyaṃ ca yuktaṃ sato lakṣaṇam*'. After this sentence, Mody adds a substantial passage between square brackets (Mody 1903: 131-133). This passage seems to be a later addition and is omitted by Kapadia. However, the last sentence of the omitted part (*yad utpadyate yad vyeti yac ca dhruvaṃ tat sat ato 'nyad asad iti*) is given by Kapadia, immediately following '*sato lakṣaṇam*' (*yad utpadyate yad vyeti yac ca dhruvaṃ tat sat ato 'nyad asad iti*).

⁹³⁶ It seems that the author tries to explain the apparent contradiction between TA 5.5, which says that substance is eternal, and TA 5.29, which says that substance is connected with decay. For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see Soni 2003: 29ff. The terms '*arpita*' and '*anarpita*' are explained in TABh 5.31.2 as '*vyāvahārika*' and '*avyāvahārika*' (see below). See also § 3.4, *Existence and permanence of substance*.

[5.31.1] *sac ca trividham api nityam cobhe*⁹³⁷ *api arpitānarpitasiddheḥ* |

And (*ca*) existence (*sat*) [is] also (*api*) threefold (see TA 5.29) (*trividha*), [namely] eternal (see TA 5.30)⁹³⁸ (*nitya*) and (*ca*) also (*api*) both⁹³⁹ (*ubhe*), [which] results from the validity (*siddhi*) of the conventional [standpoint] (*arpita*) and the non-conventional [standpoint] (*anarpita*).

[5.31.2] *arpitaṃ vyāvahārikam anarpitaṃ avyāvahārikam*⁹⁴⁰ *cety arthaḥ* |

‘Conventional’ (*arpita*) [is the standpoint that is] relating to common life (*vyāvahārika*) and (*ca*) ‘non-conventional’ (*anarpita*) [is the standpoint that is] not relating to common life (*avyāvahārika*) — that is the meaning (*ity artha*).

[5.31.3] *tac ca*⁹⁴¹ *sac caturvidham* | [5.31.4] *tadyathā* | [5.31.5] *dravyāstikaṃ māṭṛkāpadāstikaṃ utpannāstikaṃ paryāyāstikaṃ iti* |

And (*ca*) that (*tad*) existence (see TABh 5.31.1) (*sat*) [is] fourfold (*caturvidha*). Namely:

- i. [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-āstika*)
- ii. [the view on] existence [from] the linguistic perspective⁹⁴² (*māṭṛkā-pada-āstika*)
- iii. [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] production (*utpanna-āstika*)
- iv. [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] transformation (*paryāyā-āstika*) (*iti*).

[5.31.6] *eṣām arthapadāni dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vā sat* | [5.31.7] *asan nāma nāsty eva dravyāstikasya* ||

The objects ⁹⁴³(*artha-pada*) of these [perspectives] (*idam*) [are as follows]:

For [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] substance (*dravya-āstika*) —

Either (*vā*) a [single] substance (*dravya*), or (*vā*) two substances (*dravya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] substances (*dravya*, pl.) [are] existent (*sat*); [that which is] called (*nāma*) non-existence (*asat*), [that] does not exist (*nāsti*) indeed (*eva*).

⁹³⁷ Mody reads ‘*ca ubhe*’.

⁹³⁸ Is ‘*nitya*’ interpreted as ‘*dhrauvya*’ (see TA 5.29)?

⁹³⁹ This seems to refer to TA 5.29, which says that existence is also endowed with production and decay.

⁹⁴⁰ Kapadia reads ‘*anarpitavyāvahārika*’.

⁹⁴¹ Kapadia reads ‘*tatra*’.

⁹⁴² Lit. ‘letters and words’.

⁹⁴³ Cf. TABh 1.35.90.

[5.31.8] *māṭṛkāpadāstikasyāpi* | [5.31.9] *māṭṛkāpadaṃ vā māṭṛkāpade vā māṭṛkāpadāni vā sat* | [5.31.10] *amāṭṛkāpadaṃ vā amāṭṛkāpade vā amāṭṛkāpadāni vā asat* ||

And likewise (*apī*), for [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] letters and words (*māṭṛkā-pada-āstika*) — Either (*vā*) a [single] linguistic [entity] (*māṭṛkā-pada*), or (*vā*) two linguistic entities, (*māṭṛkā-pada*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] linguistic [entities] (*māṭṛkā-pada*, pl.) [are] existent (*sat*); Either (*vā*) a [single] non[-existent] linguistic expression (*amāṭṛkā-pada*), or (*vā*) two non[-existent] linguistic expressions (*amāṭṛkā-pada*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] non[-existent] linguistic expressions (*amāṭṛkā-pada*, pl.) [are] non-existent (*asat*).

[5.31.11] *utpannāstikasya* | [5.31.12] *utpannaṃ votpanne votpannāni vā sat* | [5.31.13] *anutpannaṃ vānutpanne vānutpannāni vāsat*⁹⁴⁴ ||

For [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] production (*utpanna-āstika*) — either (*vā*) [a single object that is] produced (*utpanna*), or (*vā*) two [objects that are] produced (*utpanna*, du.), or (*vā*) [many objects that are] produced (*utpanna*, pl.) [are] existent (*sat*); either (*vā*) [a single object that is] not produced (*anutpanna*), or (*vā*) two [objects that are] not produced (*anutpanna*, du.), or (*vā*) [many objects that are] not produced (*anutpanna*, pl.) [are] non-existent (*asat*).

[5.31.14] *arpite 'nupanīte na vācyaṃ sad ity asat iti vā* |

When the conventional [standpoint]⁹⁴⁵ (*arpita*) [is] not applied (*anupanīta*), [it] should not be said (*na vācya*) [to be] existent (*sat*) or (*vā*) non-existent (*asat*) (*iti*).⁹⁴⁶

[5.31.15] *paryāyāstikasya sadbhāvaparyāye vā sadbhāvaparyāyayor vā sadbhāvaparyāyeṣu vā ādiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vā sat* | [5.31.16] *asadbhāvaparyāye vā asadbhāvaparyāyayor vā asadbhāvaparyāyeṣu vā ādiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vāsat* |

For [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] transformation (*paryāya-āstika*) — Either (*vā*) a [single] substance (*dravya*), or (*vā*) two substances (*dravya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] substances (*dravya*, pl.) pointed out (*ādiṣṭa*) [with respect to] either (*vā*) a transformation of the real state (*sad-bhāva-paryāya*), or (*vā*) two transformations of the real state (*sad-bhāva-paryāya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many]

⁹⁴⁴ Kapadia reads 'vā 'sat'.

⁹⁴⁵ See also TABh 5.31.2.

⁹⁴⁶ Cf. TABh 5.31.17. The meaning seems to be that things are either existent or non-existent from a conventional standpoint. However, from a non-conventional standpoint, this is not the case.

transformations of the real state (*sad-bhāva-paryāya*, pl.) [are] existent (*sat*); Either (*vā*) a [single] substance (*dravya*), or (*vā*) two substances (*dravya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] substances (*dravya*, pl.) pointed out (*ādiṣṭa*) [with respect to] either (*vā*) a non-transformation of the real state (*asad-bhāva-paryāya*), or (*vā*) two non-transformations of the real state (*asad-bhāva-paryāya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] non-transformations of the real state (*asad-bhāva-paryāya*, pl.) [are] non-existent (*asat*).

[5.31.17] ***tadubhayaparyāye vā tadubhayaparyāyayor vā tadubhayaparyāyeṣu vā ādiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vā na vācyaṃ sad ity asad iti vā*** |

[5.31.18] ***deśādeśena vikalpayitavyam iti*** ||

Either (*vā*) a [single] substance (*dravya*), or (*vā*) two substances (*dravya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] substances (*dravya*, pl.) pointed out (*ādiṣṭa*) [with respect to] either (*vā*) a transformation of both of them⁹⁴⁷ (*tad-ubhaya-paryāya*), or (*vā*) two transformations of both of them (*tad-ubhaya-paryāya*, du.), or (*vā*) [many] transformations of both of them (*tad-ubhaya-paryāya*, pl.), should not be said (*na vācya*) [to be] existent (*sat iti*) or (*vā*) non-existent (*asat iti*).⁹⁴⁸ It should be explained (*vikalpayitavya*) by the application⁹⁴⁹ (*ādeśa*) of partial [viewpoints] (*deśa*).

[5.31.19] ***atrāha*** | [5.31.20] ***uktaṃ bhavatā saṃghātabhedebhyaḥ skandhā utpadyante iti*** | [5.31.21] ***tat kiṃ saṃyogamātrād eva saṃghāto bhavati*** | [5.31.22] ***āhosvid asti kaścīd viśeṣa iti*** | [5.31.23] ***atrocyate*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 5.26) (*bhavat*) [that] the aggregates (*skandha*) result (*utpadyante*) from combination and disintegration (*saṃghāta-bheda*). Now (*tad*), is (*bhavati*) combination (*saṃghāta*) in fact (*eva*) [resulting from] connection only (*saṃyoga-mātra*)? Or (*āhosvid*), is (*asti*) [there] something (*kiṃcid*) specific [to the connection]⁹⁵⁰ (*viśeṣa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.31.24] ***sati saṃyoge baddhasya saṃghāto bhavatīti*** ||

When there is (*sat*) a connection (*saṃyoga*), there is (*bhavati*) a combination (*saṃghāta*) with [an aggregate that is] connected⁹⁵¹ (*baddha*).

⁹⁴⁷ I.e., *sadbhāva* and *asadbhāva* (see TABh 5.31.15 – 5.31.16).

⁹⁴⁸ In other words, from the perspective of transformation, the labels ‘existent’ and ‘non-existent’ cannot be applied to a substance that is subject to both transformation and non-transformation.

⁹⁴⁹ Siddhasenagaṇi interprets the compound as ‘*deśa-ādeśena*’. The term ‘*ādeśa*’ seems to be related to ‘*ādiṣṭa*’ in the previous sentence.

⁹⁵⁰ Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘*viśeṣa*’ as ‘*saṃyogaviśeṣa*’.

⁹⁵¹ See TABh 5.25.4.

[5.31.25] *atrāha* | [5.31.26] *atha katham bandho bhavatīti* | [5.31.27] *atrocyate* |
At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Now (*atha*), how (*katham*) [does] a connection (*bandha*) arise (*bhavati*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

snigdharūkṣatvād bandhaḥ ||5.32||

5.32 A connection (*bandha*) [results] from smoothness (*snigdha*) and roughness (*rūkṣatva*).

[5.32.1] ***snigdharūkṣayoḥ pudgalayoḥ sprṣṭayor bandho bhavatīti*** |

A connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) [between] two material elements (*pudgala*) [that are] smooth and rough (*snigdha-rūkṣa*) [and that are] touching [each other] (*sprṣṭa*).

[5.32.2] *atrāha* | [5.32.3] *kim eṣa ekānta iti* | [5.32.4] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [Does] this (*kim etad*) [happen] invariably (*ekānta iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

na jaghanyaguṇānām ||5.33||

5.33 [Such a connection does] not (*na*) [take place between material elements having a] low [degree] of [these] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) (*jaghanya-guṇa*).

[5.33.1] ***jaghanyaguṇasnigdhānām jaghanyaguṇarūkṣānām ca paraspareṇa bandho na bhavatīti*** ||

A mutual (*paraspara*) connection (*bandha*) does not exist (*na bhavati*) [between material elements having] a low smooth quality (*jaghanya-guṇa-snigdha*) and (*ca*) [material elements having] a low rough quality (*jaghanya-guṇa-rūkṣa*) (*iti*).

[5.33.2] *atrāha* | [5.33.3] ***uktaṁ bhavatā jaghanyaguṇavarjānām snigdhānām rūkṣeṇa rūkṣānām ca snigdheṇa saha bandho bhavatīti*** | [5.33.4] *atha tulyaguṇayoḥ kim atyantapratishedha iti* | [5.33.5] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TABh 5.32.1) (*bhavat*) [that] a connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) [between] smooth [material elements] (*snigdha*) [and] rough [material elements] (*rūkṣa*) and (*ca*) [between] rough [material elements] (*rūkṣa*) and (*saha*) smooth [material elements] (*snigdha*), with the exception of [those whose] quality [is] low (*jaghanya-guṇa-varja*). Now (*atha*), is there (*kim*) an absolute exclusion (*atyanta-pratishedha*) of [material

elements that have an] equal [degree] of [these] qualities (*tulya-guṇa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.33.6] ***na jaghanyaguṇānām ity adhikṛtyedam ucyate ||***

Referring to (*adhikṛtya*) [the *sūtra* that says] (see TA 5.33) '[Such a connection does] not (*na*) [take place between material elements having a] low [degree] of [these] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) (*jaghanya-guṇa*)' (*iti*), this (*idam*) is said (*ucyate*):

guṇasāmye sadṛśānām ||5.34||

5.34 [Likewise, such a connection does not take place] when [there is] an evenness of the qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) (*guṇa-sāmya*) between similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*).⁹⁵²

[5.34.1] ***guṇasāmye sati sadṛśānām bandho na bhavati |***

When there is (*sati*) an evenness of the qualities (*guṇa-sāmya*), there is (*bhavati*) no (*na*) connection (*bandha*) between similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*).

[5.34.2] ***tadyathā |*** [5.34.3] ***tulyaguṇasnigdhasya tulyaguṇasnigdhenā tulyaguṇarūkṣasya tulyaguṇarūkṣeṇeti |***

Namely (*tad-yathā*),

- i. between a [material element whose] smoothness [is] of equal quality (*tulya-guṇa-snigdha*) [and another material element whose] smoothness [is] of equal quality (*tulya-guṇa-snigdha*), [and]
- ii. between a [material element whose] roughness [is] of equal quality (*tulya-guṇa-rūkṣa*) [and another material element whose] roughness [is] of equal quality (*tulya-guṇa-rūkṣa*) (*iti*).

[5.34.4] ***atrāha |*** [5.34.5] ***sadṛśagrahaṇam kim apekṣate iti |*** [5.34.6] ***atrocyate |***

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): To what (*kim*) does the expression 'similar' (*sadṛśa-grahaṇa*) refer (*apekṣate*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.34.7] ***guṇavaiśamyē sadṛśānām bandho bhavatīti ||***

A connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) [between] similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) [when there is] a diversity of qualities (*guṇa-vaiśamya*) (*iti*).

⁹⁵² In other words, two material elements that have the same degree of smoothness or roughness cannot connect.

[5.34.8] *atrāha* | [5.34.9] *kim aviśeṣeṇa guṇavaiṣamye sadṛśānām bandho bhavatīti* | [5.34.10] *atrocyate* |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): Is it so [that] (*kim*) a connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) between similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) [when there is] a diversity of qualities (*guṇa-vaiṣamya*) without exception (*aviśeṣeṇa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

dvyadhikādiguṇānām tu ||5.35||

5.35 However (*tu*), [a connection exists between material elements whose] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) [have a] difference of two or more⁹⁵³ (*dvy-adhika-ādi-guṇa*).

[5.35.1] ***dvyadhikādiguṇānām tu sadṛśānām bandho bhavati*** |

A connection (*bandha*) exists (*bhavati*) [between] similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) [whose] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) [have] a difference of two or more (i.e., when there is a difference of at least two degrees in smoothness or roughness) (*dvy-adhika-ādi-guṇa*).

[5.35.2] *tadyathā* | [5.35.3] *snigdhasya dviguṇādyadhikasnigdhenā* | [5.35.4] *dviguṇādyadhikasnigdhasya snigdhenā* | [5.35.5] *rūkṣasyāpi dviguṇādy-adhikarūkṣeṇa* | [5.35.6] *dviguṇādyadhikarūkṣasya rūkṣeṇa* |

Namely (*tad-yathā*):

- i. [between] a smooth [material element] (*snigdha*) [and another material element whose] smoothness [is] different by two or more degrees (*dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-snigdha*) [and]
- ii. [between] a [material element whose] smoothness [is] different by two or more degrees (*dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-snigdha*) [and another] smooth [material element] (*snigdha*);

And likewise (*api*):

- i. [between] a rough [material element] (*rūkṣa*) [and another material element whose] roughness [is] different by two or more degrees (*dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-rūkṣa*) [and]

⁹⁵³ I.e., when there is a difference of at least two degrees in smoothness or roughness.

- ii. [between a material element whose] roughness [is] different by two or more degrees (*dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-rūkṣa*) [and another] rough [material element] (*rūkṣa*).

[5.35.7] ***ekādiguṇādhikayoś tu sadṛśayor bandho na bhavati*** |

However (*tu*), a connection (*bandha*) does not exist (*na bhavati*) [between] two similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) whose difference is one or less [than one]⁹⁵⁴ degree (*eka-ādi-guṇa-adhika*).

[5.35.8] ***atra tu śabda vyāvṛttiviśeṣaṇārthaḥ pratiśedhaḥ vyāvartayati bandhaḥ ca viśeṣayati*** ||

Here (i.e., in the foregoing sentence) (*atra*) the word (*śabda*) ‘however’ (*tu*) [is] an indication of exclusion [and] specification (*vyāvṛtti-viśeṣaṇa-artha*); it singles out (*vyāvartayati*) an exception (*pratiśedha*) and (*ca*) it specifies (*viśeṣayati*) the connection (*bandha*).

[5.35.9] ***atrāha*** | [5.35.10] ***paramāṇuśu skandheśu ca ye sparśādayo guṇās te kiṃ vyavasthitās teṣv āhosvid avyavasthitā iti*** | [5.35.11] ***atrocyate*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): These (*tad*) qualities (*guṇa*), beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*), which (*yad*) [exist] in the case of infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*) and (*ca*) in the case of aggregates (*skandha*), [are they] (*kiṃ*) fixed (*vyavasthita*) or (*āhosvid*) not fixed (*avyavasthita*) to these [infinitesimal particles and aggregates] (*tad*)?⁹⁵⁵ At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.35.12] ***avyavasthitāḥ*** | [5.35.13] ***kutaḥ*** | [5.35.14] ***pariṇāmāt*** ||

[They are] not fixed (*avyavasthita*). Why (*kutaḥ*)? On account of transformation (*pariṇāma*).

[5.35.15] ***atrāha*** | [5.35.16] ***dvayor api badhyamānayoḥ guṇavattve sati katham pariṇāmo bhavatīti*** | [5.35.17] ***ucyate*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): When there is (*sati*) the state of possessing a quality (*guṇavattva*) for two [material elements] (*dvi*) that are connected⁹⁵⁶ (*badhyamāna*), how (*katham*) does a transformation (*pariṇāma*) exist (*bhavati*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

⁹⁵⁴ It seems that the suffix ‘*ādi*’ means ‘or less than one’ in this context, unlike the previous sentences, in which it means ‘or more’.

⁹⁵⁵ See also TABh 5.24.24 – 5.24.25.

⁹⁵⁶ In other words, ‘when two connected elements share a quality’.

bandhe samādhikau pārīṇāmikau ||5.36||

5.36 [When there is] a connection (*bandha*), [two material elements whose smoothness or roughness is] equal [or] more (*samādhika*) [are] subject to transformation (*pārīṇāmika*).

[5.36.1] ***bandhe sati samaguṇasya samaguṇaḥ pariṇāmako bhavati*** | [5.36.2] ***adhikaguṇo hīnasyeti*** ||

When there is (*sat*) a connection (*bandha*) [with a material element] whose quality is equal (*sama-guṇa*), [the material element] whose quality is equal (*samaguṇa*) becomes (*bhavati*) subject to transformation (*pārīṇāmika*); [when there is a connection] [with a material element] whose quality is less (*hīna*), [the material element] whose quality is more (*adhika-guṇa*) [becomes subject to development] (*iti*).

[5.36.3] ***atrāha*** | [5.36.4] ***uktaṃ bhavatā dravyāṇi jīvās ceti*** (5.2) | [5.36.5] ***tat kim uddeśata eva dravyāṇāṃ prasiddhir āhosvil lakṣaṇato 'pīti*** | [5.36.6] ***atrocyate*** |

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 5.2) (*bhavat*) [that] '[the inanimate entities] together with (*ca*) the souls (*jīva*) are the substances (*dravya*).' Now (*tad*), [is there] (*kim*) only (*eva*) an explanation (*prasiddhi*) of the substances (*dravya*) by a brief statement (*uddeśa*) or (*āhosvid*) also (*apī*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

[5.36.7] ***lakṣaṇato 'pi prasiddhiḥ tad ucyate*** –

[There is] also (*apī*) an explanation (*prasiddhi*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*). It (*tad*) is said (*ucyate*):

guṇaparyāyavad dravyam ||5.37||

5.37 Substance (*dravya*) has qualities [and] modes (*guṇa-paryāyavat*).⁹⁵⁷

⁹⁵⁷ For a discussion of this *sūtra*, see § 3.4, *Qualities, modes, and transformation*. See also Soni 1991.

[5.37.1] *guṇān lakṣaṇato vakṣyāmaḥ* | [5.37.2] *bhāvāntaraṃ saṃjñāntaraṃ ca paryāyaḥ* | [5.37.3] *tadubhayaṃ yatra vidyate tad dravyam* |

We will explain (*vakṣyāmaḥ*) the qualities (*guṇa*) based on [their] characteristic[s] (*lakṣaṇa*). Another state (*bhāva-antara*) and (*ca*) another recognition (*saṃjñā-antara*) – [that is] a mode (*paryāya*). Where (*yatra*) the combination of them (i.e., of a quality and a mode) (*tad-ubhaya*) is seen (*vidyate*), that (*tad*) [is] substance.

[5.37.4] *guṇaparyāyā asya santi asmin vā santīti guṇaparyāyavat* ||

‘Having qualities [and] modes’ (*guṇa-paryāyavat*) [means that] (*iti*) qualities [and] modes (*guṇaparyāya*) exist (*santi*) for this (*idam*) or (*vā*) they exist (*santīti*) in the case of it (*idam*).

***kālaś cety eke* ||5.38||**

5.38 Time (*kāla*) [is] also [a substance] (*ca*) according to some (*iti eke*).

[5.38.1] *eke tv ācāryā vyācakṣate kālo ’pi dravyam iti* ||

And (*tu*) some (*eka*) teachers (*ācārya*) explain (*vyācakṣate*) [that] time (*kāla*) [is] also (*api*) a substance (*dravya*) (*iti*).

***so ’nantasamayaḥ* ||5.39||**

5.39 That (i.e., time) (*tad*) [consists of] infinitely [many] moments (*ananta-samaya*).

[5.39.1] *sa caiṣa kālo ’nantasamayaḥ* | [5.39.2] *tatraika eva vartamāna-samayaḥ* | [5.39.3] *atītānāgatayos tv ānantyam* ||

And (*ca*) ‘that’ (*tad*) [refers to] this (*etad*) time (*kāla*), [which consists of] infinitely [many] moments (*anantasamaya*). Among them (i.e., the *dravyas*) (*tatra*), [time is] a single substance (see TA 5.5) (*eka*), [which has] moments [that are] existent (*vartamāna-samaya*). And (*tu*) [there is] infinity (*ānantya*) of past and future [moments] (*atīta-anāgata*).

[5.39.4] *atrāha* | [5.39.5] *uktaṃ bhavatā guṇaparyāyavaddravyam iti* | [5.39.6] *tatra ke guṇā iti* | [5.39.7] *atrocyate*

At this point (*atra*) one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 5.37) (*bhavat*) [that] ‘substance (*dravya*) has qualities [and] modes (*guṇa-paryāyavat*)’ (*iti*). Among them (*tatra*), what (*kim*) [are] qualities (*guṇa*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ ||5.40||⁹⁵⁸

5.40 Qualities (*guṇa*) inhere in substance⁹⁵⁹ (*dravya-āśraya*) [and are themselves] devoid of qualities (i.e., qualities cannot inhere in qualities but only in matter) (*nirguṇa*).

[5.40.1] ***dravyam eṣām āśraya iti dravyāśrayāḥ*** | [5.40.2] ***naiṣaṃ guṇāḥ santīti nirguṇāḥ*** |

Substance (*dravya*) [is] the locus (*āśraya*) of them (i.e., of qualities) (*idam*) (*iti*) — [that is the meaning of] ‘inhering in substance’ (*dravya-āśraya*). [There] are no (*na santi*) qualities (*guṇā*) for them (i.e., for qualities) (*idam*) (*iti*) — [that is the meaning of] ‘devoid of qualities’ (*nirguṇa*).

[5.40.3] ***atrāha*** | [5.40.4] ***uktaṃ bhavatā bandhe samādhikau pāriṇāmikau iti*** (5.36) | [5.40.5] ***tatra kaḥ pariṇāma iti*** | [5.40.6] ***atrocyate***

At this point (*atra*), one says (*āha*): [It] has been said (*ukta*) by you (see TA 5.36) (*bhavat*) [that] ‘[the material elements whose smoothness or roughness is] equal [or] more (*samādhika*) [are] subject to transformation (*pāriṇāmika*) [when there is] a connection (*bandha*)’ (*iti*). Here (i.e., in this *sūtra*) (*tatra*), what (*kim*) [is] transformation (*pariṇāma*) (*iti*)? At this point (*atra*) it is said (*ucyate*):

tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ ||5.41||

5.41 The existence of these [substances]⁹⁶⁰ (*tad-bhāva*) [is characterised by] transformation (*pariṇāma*).

[5.41.1] ***dharmādīnāṃ dravyāṇāṃ yathoktānāṃ ca guṇānāṃ svabhāvaḥ svatattvaṃ pariṇāmaḥ*** | [5.41.2] ***sa dvividhaḥ*** |

Transformation (*pariṇāma*) [is] the essence (*svabhāva*) [or] own nature (*svatattva*) of the substances (*dravya*) beginning with motion (*dharma-ādi*) — as it is said (*yathokta*) — and (*ca*) of the qualities (*guṇa*). This [transformation] (*tad*) [is] twofold (*dvividha*):

⁹⁵⁸ Halbfass suggests that this *sūtra* reflects VS I.1.15 (Halbfass 1992: 107, n.21). See also § 3.4, *Qualities, modes, and transformation*.

⁹⁵⁹ Lit. ‘whose locus is matter’ (bah.).

⁹⁶⁰ Siddhasenagaṇi interprets ‘*tad*’ as a reference to the *dravyas*.

anādir ādimāś ca ||5.42||

5.42 [There is transformation] without beginning (*anādi*) and having a beginning (*ādimat*).⁹⁶¹

[5.42.1] ***tatrānādir arūpiṣu dharmādharmākāśajīveṣv iti |***

Among them (*tatra*), [transformation] without beginning (*anādi*) [applies to] motion, rest, space, and souls (*dharmādharmākāśa-jīva*), [which are] formless (*arūpin*) (*iti*).

rūpiṣv ādimān ||5.43||

5.43 [Transformation] with a beginning (*ādimat*) [applies to substances that are] having form (*rūpin*).

[5.43.1] ***rūpiṣu tu dravyeṣu ādimān |*** [5.43.2] ***pariṇāmo 'nekavidhaḥ sparśapariṇāmādir iti ||***

And (*tu*) [transformation] with a beginning (*ādimat*) [applies to] substances (*dravya*) that are] having form (*rūpin*). Transformation (*pariṇāma*) [is] manifold (*anekavidha*), beginning with the transformation of touch (*sparsā-pariṇāma-ādi*) (*iti*).

yogopayogau jīveṣu ||5.44||

5.44 [There is] action [and] cognitive operation (*yoga-upayoga*) in the case of souls (*jīva*).

[5.44.1] ***jīveṣv arūpiṣu api satsu yogopayogau pariṇāmān ādimantau bhavataḥ |***

Action [and] cognitive operation (*yoga-upayoga*) are (*bhavatas*) the two transformations (*pariṇāma*) having a beginning (*ādimat*), in the case of the souls (*jīva*), being (*sat*) indeed (*api*) formless (*arūpin*).

[5.44.2] ***tatropayogaḥ pūrvoktaḥ |***

Among them (*tatra*), cognitive operation (*upayoga*) has been discussed before (see TA 2.19) (*pūrvokta*).

⁹⁶¹ See also TABh 5.22.4 – 5.22.6.

[5.44.3] *yogas tu parastād vakṣyate* ||

And (*tu*) action (*yoga*) will be explained (*vakṣyate*) later on (see TA 6.1) (*parastāt*).

iti tattvārthadhigame 'rhatpravacanasaṅgrāhe pañcama' dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ ||

Thus (*iti*), the fifth (*pañcama*) chapter (*adhyāya*) of the *Tattvārthādhigama*, [which is] a summary of the words of the *arhat* (*arhat-pravacana-saṅgraha*), [is now] completed (*samāpta*).

Sambandhakārikās⁹⁶²

[The Jaina ideal]⁹⁶³

[0.1] *samyagdarśanaśuddhaṃ yo jñānaṃ viratiṃ eva cāpnoti |*

[0.2] *duḥkhanimittam apīdaṃ tena sulabdhaṃ bhavati janma ||1||*

[For] him who (*yaḥ*) obtains (*āpnoti*) knowledge (*jñāna*), [which is] pure [through] right worldview (*samyak-darśana-śuddha*),⁹⁶⁴ and (*ca*) indeed (*eva*) non-passion (*virati*), for him (*tad*) there is (*bhavati*) good (*sulabdha*) birth (*janman*), even though (*api*) this (*idam*) [is] the cause of pain (*duḥkha-nimitta*).

[0.3] *janmani karmakleśair anubaddhe 'smiṃs tathā prayatitavyam |*

[0.4] *karmakleśābhāvo yathā bhavaty eṣa paramārthaḥ ||2||*

Pains have to be taken (*prayatitavya*) in this (*idam*) birth (*janman*), [which is] connected with (*anubaddha*) the afflictions of *karman* (*karma-kleśa*), in such a way that (*yathā ... tathā*) the absence of the afflictions of *karman* (*karma-kleśa-abhāva*) occurs (*bhavati*); this (*etad*) [is] the highest aim (*parama-artha*).

[0.5] *paramārthālābhe vā doṣeṣv ārambhakasvabhāveṣu |*

[0.6] *kuśalānubandham eva syād anavadyaṃ yathā karma ||3||*

Or (*vā*), when there is no acquirement of the highest aim (*paramārtha-alābha*), [when there are] faults (*doṣa*), [being] the inherent nature of someone who

⁹⁶² The verses of this introductory text are labelled '*sambandhakārikāḥ*' at the end of the passage. See SK 0.63.

⁹⁶³ The description of the content of the sections of the *sambandhakārikās* is based on Ohira 1982: 27.

⁹⁶⁴ Alternatively, one could interpret the compound as '*samyagdarśanaṃ śuddham*'. The general content of this verse deviates from TA 1.1 (*samyagdarśana-jñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ*), in which *darśana* and *jñāna* seem to play an equal role. It is remarkable that '*virati*' is mentioned instead of '*cāritra*'. For a discussion of this verse, see § 3.5, *The sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*.

performs [violent activities]⁹⁶⁵ (*ārambhaka-svabhāva*), [pains have to be taken] in such a way (*yathā*) [that] *karman* might be (*syāt*) faultless (*anavadya*), [having] indeed (*eva*) a suitable⁹⁶⁶ connection (*kuśala-anubandha*).

[Classification of human beings]

[0.7] ***karmāhitam iha cāmutra cādhamatamo naraḥ samārabhate |***

[0.8] ***iha phalam eva tv adhamo vimadhyamas tūbhayaphalārtham ||4||***

The very lowest (*adhamatama*) man (*nara*) undertakes (*samārabhate*) evil deeds (*karma-ahita*) here (*iha ca*) and there (i.e., the next life) (*amutra ca*). But (*tu*) the low [man] (*adhamo*) [undertakes deeds which give] fruit (*phala*) here (*iha*) only (*eva*). And (*tu*) the exactly mediocre⁹⁶⁷ [man] (*vi-madhyama*) [undertakes deeds] for the sake of the fruit in both [lives] (*ubhaya-phala-artha*).

[0.9] ***paralokahitāyaiva pravartate madhyamaḥ kriyāsu sadā |***

[0.10] ***mokṣāyaiva tu ghaṭate viśiṣṭamatir uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ ||5||***

The middling [man] (*madhyama*) always (*sadā*) engages (*pravartate*) in actions (*kriyā*) for the sake of the future world (*paralokahita*) only (*eva*), while (*tu*) the highest (*uttama*) man (*puruṣa*), having excellent cognition (*viśiṣṭa-matī*) is suitable (*ghaṭate*) for liberation (*mokṣa*) only (*eva*).

[0.11] ***yas tu kṛtārtho 'py uttamam avāpya dharmam parebhya upadiśati |***

[0.12] ***nityam sa uttamebhyo 'py uttama iti pūjyatama eva ||6||***

But (*tu*) [he] who (*yaḥ*) has indeed accomplished [his] goal (*kṛta-artha api*), having obtained (*avāpya*) the highest (*uttama*), teaches (*upadiśati*) the *dharmā* to others (*para*). He (*tad*) [is] always (*nityam*) the highest (*uttama*) of the very highest (*uttama api*). Thus (*iti*), [he is] indeed (*eva*) the most venerable (*pūjyatama*).

⁹⁶⁵ The term '*ārambha*' has a very negative connotation in Jainism, and carries the meaning of violent action (Johnson 1995: 38).

⁹⁶⁶ The term '*kuśala*' is not very common in Jainism but frequently appears in Buddhist texts.

⁹⁶⁷ The prefix '*vi-*' is interpreted as '*viśiṣṭa-*'.

[Nature of the *Tīrthakara*]

[0.13] *tasmād arhati pūjām arhann evottamottamo loka |*

[0.14] *devarṣinarendrebhyaḥ pūjyebhyo 'py anyasattvānām ||7||*

Therefore (*tasmāt*), the *arhat* alone (*eva*), [who is] the very highest (*uttamottama*) in this world (*loka*), is worthy (*arhati*) of veneration (*pūjā*) [from] gods, sages, and lords (*deva-rṣi-narendra*), even though (*apī*) [they are] worthy of veneration (*pūjyā*) [from] other beings (*anya-sattva*) [themselves].

[0.15] *abhyarcanād arhatāṃ manaḥprasādas tataḥ samādhiś ca |*

[0.16] *tasmād api niḥśreyasam ato hi tatpūjanam nyāyyam ||8||*

From the worship (*abhyarcana*) of the arhats (*arhat*) [comes] peace of mind (*manaḥ-prasāda*), and (*ca*) from that (*tatas*) *samādhi*. And from that (*tasmāt api*) [comes] ultimate bliss⁹⁶⁸ (*niḥśreyasa*). Therefore (*atas hi*), worship of them (*tat-pūjanam*) is appropriate (*nyāyya*).

[0.17] *tīrthpravartanaphalam yat proktaṃ karma tīrthakaranāma |*

[0.18] *tasyodayāt kṛtārtho 'py arhaṃs tīrtham pravartayati ||9||*

That which [is] (*yad*) called (*prokta*) 'body-determining *karman* [related to] the *tīrthakara*'⁹⁶⁹ (*tīrthakara-nāma*) [has] the commencement of a ford [as its] result (*tīrtha-pravartana-phala*). From the occurrence (*udayāt*) of that (*tad*), the *arhat*, having his goal accomplished (*kṛtārtha*), also (*api*) proceeds to initiate (*pravartayati*) a ford (*tīrtha*).

⁹⁶⁸ This term is uncommon for the Jaina tradition. See also § 3.5, *The sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*.

⁹⁶⁹ This type of *karman* is listed in TA 8.12.

[0.19] *tatsvābhāvyād eva prakāśayati bhāskaro yathā lokam |*

[0.20] *tīrthapravartanāya pravartate tīrthakara evam ||10||*

Just as (*yathā*) the sun (*bhāskara*) illuminates (*prakāśayati*) the world (*loka*) out of its own nature (*tat-svābhāvyā*), in the same way (*evam*) the *tīrthakara* is occupied with⁹⁷⁰ (*pravartate*) making a ford (*tīrtha-pravartana*).

[Life of Mahāvīra]

[0.21] *yaḥ śubhakarmā sevanabhāvitabhāvo bhaveṣv anekeṣu |*

[0.22] *jajñe jñāteḥsvākuṣu siddhārthanarendrakuladīpaḥ ||11||*

He who [is] (*yaḥ*) of virtuous conduct⁹⁷¹ (*śubha-karman*), whose being is pervaded by serving (*sevana-bhāvita-bhāva*) in many (*aneka*) lives (*bhava*), was born (*jajñe*) in the well-known Ikṣvāku [clan] (*jñāta-ikṣvāku*), [being] the lamp of the lineage of kings whose goals are accomplished (*siddhārtha-narendra-kula-dīpa*)

[0.23] *jñānaiḥ pūrvādhigatair apratipatitair matiśrutāvadhibhiḥ |*

[0.24] *tribhir api śuddhair yuktaḥ śaityadyutikāntibhir ivenduḥ ||12||*

... endowed (*yukta*) with knowledge (*jñāna*), acquired previously (*pūrvādhigata*), which does not disappear⁹⁷² (*apratipatita*), [being] ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception (*mati-śruta-avadhi*), which [are] all three (*tri api*) pure (*śuddha*), like (*iva*) the moon (*indu*), [which is endowed] with coolness, splendour, and brightness (*śaitya-dyuti-kānti*), ...

[0.25] *śubhasārasattvasaṃhananavīryamāhātmyarūpaguṇayuktaḥ |*

[0.26] *jagati mahāvīra iti tridaśair guṇataḥ kṛtābhikhyāḥ ||13||*

... endowed with auspiciousness, energy, strength, firmness, power, magnanimity, beauty, and virtue (*śubha-sāra-sattva-saṃhanana-vīrya-māhātmya-rūpa-guṇa-*

⁹⁷⁰ The middle voice fits the 'svābhāvyā' character of the activity.

⁹⁷¹ Alternatively, 'auspicious *karman*'.

⁹⁷² See also TABh 1.23.8.

yukta), [who] is made famous (*kṛta-abhikhyā*) as ‘Mahāvīra’ (*mahāvīra iti*) in this world (*jagat*) by the gods (*tridaśa*) because of his virtues (*guṇa*), ...

[0.27] *svayam eva buddhatattvaḥ sattvahiṭābhyudyatācalitasattvaḥ* |

[0.28] *abhinanditaśubhasattvaḥ sendrair lokāntikair devaiḥ* ||14||

... he himself (*svayam*) indeed (*eva*), whose essence is enlightened (*buddha-tattva*), whose strength is unshakable, [who is] engaged in beneficial [deeds] for [other] beings (*sattva-hita-abhyudyata-acalita-sattva*), whose auspicious essence is venerated (*abhinandita-śubha-sattva*) by the *lokāntika* gods⁹⁷³ (*lokāntika deva*), including Indra (*sa-indra*), ...

[0.29] *janmajarāmarañārttaṃ jagad aśaraṇam abhisamīkṣya niḥsāram* |

[0.30] *sphītam apahāya rājyaṃ śamāya dhīmān pravavrāja* ||15||

... after having seen (*abhisamīkṣya*) the world (*jagat*) [being] without refuge (*aśaraṇa*), without essence (*niḥsāra*), afflicted by birth, old age, and death (*janma-jarā-maraṇa-ārtta*), the wise one (*dhīmat*) renounced the world (*pravavrāja*), for the sake of peace (*śama*), leaving behind (*apahāya*) a prosperous (*sphīta*) kingdom (*rājya*).

[0.31] *pratipadyāśubhaśamanaṃ niḥśreyasasādhakaṃ śramaṇaliṅgam* |

[0.32] *kṛtasāmāyikakarmā vratāni vidhivat samāropya* ||16||

After taking up (*pratipadya*) the mark of asceticism (*śramaṇaliṅga*), [which is] destroying [that which is] inauspicious (*aśubhaśamana*), [and which is] the means to ultimate bliss (*niḥśreyasa-sādhaka*), [he who is] engaged in the performance of *sāmāyika*⁹⁷⁴ (*kṛta-sāmāyika-karman*), after undertaking (*samāropya*) the vows (*vrata*) according to the rules (*vidhivat*), ...

⁹⁷³ TA 4.25 explains that the *lokāntika* gods dwell in Brahmaloḥka (*brahmalokālayā lokāntikāḥ*) (Mody 1903: 112).

⁹⁷⁴ I.e., the totality of the Jaina path.

[0.33] *samyaktvajñānacāritrasaṃvaratapahsamādhibalayuktaḥ* |

[0.34] *mohādīni nihatyāśubhāni catvāri karmāṇi* ||17||

... endowed with righteousness, knowledge, stopping,⁹⁷⁵ asceticism, *samādhi*, power⁹⁷⁶ (*samyaktva-jñāna-cāritra-saṃvara-tapaḥ-samādhi-bala-yukta*), having destroyed (*nihatya*) four (*catur*) [types of] inauspicious (*aśubhāni*) *karman*, beginning with deluding [*karman*]⁹⁷⁷ (*moha-ādi*), ...

[0.35] *kevalam adhigamya vibhuḥ svayam eva jñānadarśanam anantam* |

[0.36] *lokahitāya kṛtārtha 'pi deśayām āsa tīrtham idam* ||18||

... after having attained (*adhigamya*) absolute knowledge (*kevala*), [which is] unlimited (*ananta*) knowledge and worldview (*jñāna-darśanam*), the lord (*vibhu*) himself (*svayam eva*), even though (*api*) he has accomplished his goals (*kṛta-artha*), taught (*deśayām āsa*) this (*idam*) path (*tīrtha*)⁹⁷⁸ for the benefit of this world (*loka-hita*), ...

[0.37] *dvividham anekadvādaśavidhaṃ mahāviśayam amitagamayuktam* |

[0.38] *saṃsārārṇavapārāgamanāya duḥkhakṣayāyālam* ||19||

... [i.e.], the twofold (*dvividha*), manifold, [and] twelvefold [varieties of knowledge from testimony]⁹⁷⁹ (*aneka-dvādaśavidha*), having great range (*mahā-viśaya*), endowed with many perspectives⁹⁸⁰ (*amita-gama-yukta*), [being] adequate for the annihilation of pain (*duḥkha-kṣayāya-alam*), in order to go to the other shore of the ocean of *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāra-arṇava-pāra-gamana*).

⁹⁷⁵ I.e., of karmic influx (see TA 1.4).

⁹⁷⁶ Alternatively, 'power acquired by austerities' (*tapo[bala]*) and 'force of meditation' (*samādhibala*).

⁹⁷⁷ This type of *karman* is listed in TA 10.1. See also TABh 1.26.22.

⁹⁷⁸ Alternatively, 'showed this ford'.

⁹⁷⁹ I.e., the canonical Jaina scriptures. See TABh 1.20.18.

⁹⁸⁰ The term '*gama*' is a synonym of '*naya*' (see also Mody 1903: 30, footnote 1).

[0.39] *granthārthavacanapaṭubhiḥ prayatnavadbhir api vādibhir nipuṇaiḥ* |
[0.40] *anabhibhavanīyam anyair bhāskara iva sarvatejobhiḥ* ||20||

[It] cannot be surpassed (*anabhibhavanīya*) by other (*anya*) skilful (*nipuṇa*) teachers (*vādin*), even (*api*) [not by those] who are diligent (*prayatnavat*) [and] skilful [with respect to] the meaning and words of scripture (*grantha-artha-vacana-paṭu*), just like (*iva*) the sun (*bhāskara*) [cannot be surpassed] by all lights (*sarva-tejas*).

[Salutation]⁹⁸¹

[0.41] *kṛtvā trikaraṇaśuddhaṃ tasmai paramarṣaye namaskāram* |
[0.42] *pūjyatamāya bhagavate vīrāya vilīnamohāya* ||21||

After having made (*kṛtvā*) homage (*namaskāra*) to that (*tad*) great sage (*parama-rṣi*) with purity of the three faculties⁹⁸² (*tri-karaṇa-śuddham*), [to him who is] a most venerable (*pūjyatama*) illustrious (*bhagavat*) hero (*vīra*), whose delusion is gone (*vilīna-moha*), ...

[Nature of the work]

[0.43] *tattvārthādhigamākhyam bahvartham saṃgraham laghugrantham* |
[0.44] *vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya* ||22||

..., I will teach (*vakṣyāmi*) this (*idam*) short text (*laghu-grantha*), called ‘*Tattvārthādhigama*’ (*tattvārtha-adhigamā-ākhyā*) — an important⁹⁸³ (*bahu-artha*) compendium (*saṃgraha*) of some⁹⁸⁴ of the words of the *arhat* (*arhat-vacana-ekadeśa*), [which is] beneficial for students (*śiṣya-hita*).

[Difficulty of the task of the author]

⁹⁸¹ Ohira writes that SK 21, 22, and 31 are the ‘essential three *kārikās*’, and observes that the *maṅgalācaraṇa* in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* was ‘directly derived from SK 21 and 31’ (Ohira 1982: 29-30). See also § 3.5.

⁹⁸² I.e., body, speech, and mind. See, e.g., Balcerowicz 2008: 36.

⁹⁸³ Lit. ‘having much meaning’.

⁹⁸⁴ Lit. ‘a part’.

[0.45] *mahato 'timahāviṣayasya durgamagranthabhāṣy*⁹⁸⁵ *apārasya* |

[0.46] *kaḥ śaktaḥ pratyāsaṃ jinavacanamahodadheḥ kartum* ||23||

Who (*kim*), in enunciating a difficult text (*durgama-grantha-bhāṣin*), [is] able (*śakta*) to make (*kartum*) a summary⁹⁸⁶ (*pratyāsa*) of the great ocean of the words of the *jina* (*jina-vacana-maha-udadhi*), [which is] boundless (*apāra*), [whose] scope [is] way larger (*atimahā-viṣaya*) [than] large (*mahat*)?

[0.47] *śīrasā giriṃ bibhīset uccikṣipsec ca sa kṣitiṃ dorbhyām* |

[0.48] *pratitīrṣec ca samudram mitsec ca punaḥ kuśāgreṇa* ||24||

[He who would desire to comprehend the word of the *jina*, which is the subject of a very extensive text],⁹⁸⁷ he (*tad*) could desire to break (*bibhīset*) a mountain (*giri*) with the head (*śīrasa*), and (*ca*) he could desire to throw up (*uccikṣipset*) the earth (*kṣiti*) with two arms (*dos*), and (*ca*) he could desire to cross (*pratitīrṣet*) the ocean (*samudra*), and (*ca*) further (*punaḥ*), he could desire to measure (*mitset*) [the ocean] with the tip of the *kuśa* grass (*kuśa-agra*) ...

[0.49] *vyomnīnduṃ cikramiṣen merugiriṃ pāṇinā cikampayīset* |

[0.50] *gatyānilaṃ jigīṣec caramasamudraṃ pipāsec ca* ||25||

... [and] he could desire to move (*cikramiṣet*) the moon (*indu*) in the sky (*vyoman*), [and] he could desire to shake (*cikampayīset*) mount Meru (*merugiri*) with one hand (*pāṇi*), [and] he could desire to move (*jigīṣet*) [along with] the wind [by his own] movement⁹⁸⁸ (*gaty-ānila*), and (*ca*) he could desire to drink (*pipāset*) the deepest ocean (*carama-samudra*) ...

⁹⁸⁵ There are different ways to analyse '*durgamagranthabhāṣyapārasya*'. It is tempting to read '*bhāṣya-pārasya*' since the *sambandhakārikās* seem to introduce the main text (*grantha*) and the *bhāṣya*. However, this is syntactically unlikely. Therefore, '*bhāṣy apārasya*' seems to be the correct word division. For a discussion of this verse, see § 3.5, *The sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti*.

⁹⁸⁶ This is an unusual word. Haribhadra interprets '*pratyāsa*' as '*saṃgraha*' (Mody 1903: 30, footnote 3).

⁹⁸⁷ See SK 0.52.

⁹⁸⁸ I.e., going as fast as the wind.

[0.51] *khadyotakaprabhābhiḥ so 'bhibubhūṣec ca bhāskaraṃ mohāt |*

[0.52] *yo 'timahāgranthārthaṃ jinavacanāṃ saṃjighṛkṣeta ||26||*

... and (*ca*) he (*tad*) could desire to surpass (*abhibubhūṣet*) the sun (*bhāskara*) with the light of fireflies (*khadyotaka-prabhā*) out of delusion (*mohāt*). He [who] (*yaḥ*) would desire to comprehend (*saṃjighṛkṣeta*)⁹⁸⁹ the word of the *jina* (*jinavacana*), [which is] the subject of a very extensive text (*atimahā-grantha-artha*), [he could desire to ... (see SK 0.47 – 0.52)]

[Benefits for the author and others]

[0.53] *ekam api tu jinavacanād yasmān nirvāhakaṃ padaṃ bhavati |*

[0.54] *śrūyante cānantāḥ sāmāyikamātrapadasiddhāḥ ||27||*

Because (*yasmāt*), even though⁹⁹⁰ (*api tu*) one (*eka*) state (*pada*) which brings about deliverance (*nirvāhaka*) comes into being (*bhavati*)⁹⁹¹ from the word of the *jina* (*jina-vacana*), yet (*ca*), infinitely [many] (*ananta*) are heard (*śrūyante*) [to have] accomplished a state consisting of *sāmāyika* (*sāmāyika-mātra-pada-siddha*), ...

[0.55] *tasmāt tatprāmāṇyāt samāsato vyāsataś ca jinavacanam |*

[0.56] *śreya iti nirvicāraṃ grāhyaṃ dhāryaṃ ca vācyam ca ||28||*

... therefore (*tasmāt*), from the authority of that⁹⁹² (*tat-prāmāṇya*), the word of the *jina* (*jina-vacana*) in a brief (*samāsa*) and (*ca*) extended [form] (*vyāsataś*), should be accepted (*grāhya*), without doubt (*nirvicāra*), [thinking] '[this is] the best (*śreyas*)' (*iti*), and (*ca*) [it] should be remembered (*dhārya*), and (*ca*) [it] should be taught (*vācyam*).

⁹⁸⁹ Middle voice, metri causa.

⁹⁹⁰ Alternatively, 'in fact'.

⁹⁹¹ In other words, the highest accomplishing state becomes possible.

⁹⁹² I.e., because many people have reached the *sāmāyika* state by the words of the *jina*.

[0.57] *na bhavati dharmaḥ śrotuḥ sarvasyaikāntato hitaśravaṇāt |*

[0.58] *bruvato 'nugrahabuddhyā vaktus tv ekāntato bhavati ||29||*

There is no (*na bhavati*) exclusive⁹⁹³ (*ekāntatas*) *dharma* for the hearer (*śrotr*) from the act of hearing [which is] beneficial (*hita-śravaṇa*) for all (*sarva*). However (*tu*), [that] final [dharma] (*ekāntatas*) comes into being (*bhavati*) [for someone who is] speaking (*vaktṛ*) because the mind (*buddhi*) of the speaker (*bruvat*) is promoting a good thing⁹⁹⁴ (*anugraha*).

[0.59] *śramam avicintyātmagatam tasmāc śreyaḥ sadopadeṣṭavyam |*

[0.60] *ātmānaṃ ca paraṃ ca hi hitopadeṣṭānugṛhṇāti ||30||*

Therefore (*tasmāt*), the bliss of final emancipation (*śreyas*) should always (*sadā*) be taught (*upadeṣṭavya*) without thinking about (*avicintya*) the trouble (*śrama*) for oneself (*ātmagata*). Certainly (*hi*), someone who teaches [that which is] beneficial (*hita-upadeṣṭṛ*) favours (*anugṛhṇāti*) himself (*ātman*) as well as (*ca ... ca*) the other (*para*).

[Nature of the work]

[0.61] *na rte ca mokṣamārgād dhitopadeśo 'sti jagati kṛtsne 'smin |*

[0.62] *tasmāt param imam⁹⁹⁵ eveti mokṣamārgaṃ pravakṣyāmi ||31||*

And (*ca*) besides (*na rte*) the path to liberation (*mokṣamārga*), there is (*asti*) no (*na*) beneficial teaching (*hita-upadeśa*) in this (*idam*) entire (*kṛtsna*) world (*jagat*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), I will teach (*pravakṣyāmi*) indeed (*eva*) this (*idam*) very (*itī*) highest (*para*) path to liberation (*mokṣa-mārga*).

[0.63] *iti sambandhakārikāḥ samāptāḥ ||*

Thus (*itī*), the introductory verses (*sambandha-kārikā*) [are now] completed (*samāpta*).

⁹⁹³ I.e., focused on one thing.

⁹⁹⁴ Lit. 'from the mind, [which is] showing favour (*anugraha-buddhi*), of the speaker (*bruvat*)'.

⁹⁹⁵ Kapadia reads '*idam*'.

Praśasti

[10.7.224] *vācakamukhyasya śivaśriyaḥ prakāśayaśasaḥ praśiṣyeṇa |*

[10.7.225] *śiṣyeṇa ghoṣanandikṣamaṇasyaikādaśāṅgavidāḥ ||1||*

[This compendium was composed by *vācaka* Umāsvāti],⁹⁹⁶ the pupil of the pupil (*praśiṣya*) of Śivaśrī, [whose] fame [is] widely known (*prakāśa-yaśas*), [who is] the best among the *vācakas* (*vācaka-mukhya*), the pupil (*śiṣya*) of *kṣamaṇa* Ghoṣanandin, knower of the eleven main scriptural texts⁹⁹⁷ (*ekādaśa-aṅga-vid*) ...

[10.7.226] *vācanayā ca mahāvācakakṣamaṇamuṇḍapādaśiṣyasya |*

[10.7.227] *śiṣyeṇa vācakācāryamūlanāmanḥ prathitakīrteḥ ||2||*

... and (*ca*) [based on] the interpretation⁹⁹⁸ (*vācanā*) of the pupil of *mahāvācaka* *kṣamaṇa* Muṇḍapāda⁹⁹⁹ (*mahā-vācaka-kṣamaṇa-muṇḍapāda-śiṣya*), the pupil (*śiṣya*) of *vācaka ācārya* Mūla (*vācaka-ācārya-mūla-nāman*) [whose] fame [is] known (*prathita-kīrti*), ...

[10.7.228] *nyagrodhikāprasūtena viharatā puravare kusumanāmnī |*

[10.7.229] *kaubhīṣaṇinā svātitanayena vātsīsutenārghyam ||3||*

... [who was] born in Nyagrodhikā (*nyagrodhikā-prasūta*), [who was] spending time (*viharat*) in the chief town (*puravara*) called Kusuma¹⁰⁰⁰ (*kusuma-nāman*), [belonging to the] *Kaubhīṣaṇi*[-gotra] (*kaubhīṣaṇi*), the son of Svāti (*svāti-tanaya*), [and] Vātsī (*vātsī-suta*).¹⁰⁰¹

⁹⁹⁶ See 10.7.232 – 10.7.233.

⁹⁹⁷ I.e., eleven out of the twelve ‘inner limbs’ or ‘aṅgas’ (see TA 1.20).

⁹⁹⁸ Lit. ‘by the lesson/recitation’.

⁹⁹⁹ The names Mūla and Muṇḍapāda (lit. the venerable baldhead) are unusual for Jaina ascetics.

¹⁰⁰⁰ I.e., Pāṭaliputra.

¹⁰⁰¹ It seems that ‘*arghyam*’ has to be taken with the next verse. This is exceptional and does not occur in the other verses of the *praśasti* and *sambandhakārikās*.

[10.7.230] *arhadvacanaṃ samyaggurukrameṇāgataṃ samupadhārya* |

[10.7.231] *duḥkhārtam ca durāgamavihatamatiṃ lokamavalokya* ||4||

[After having] reflected (*samupadhārya*) on the priceless (*arghya*)¹⁰⁰² word of the *arhat* (*arhat-vacana*), [which] arrived (*āgata*) through the succession of right teachers¹⁰⁰³ (*samyak-guru-krama*), after having seen (*avalokya*) the people (*loka*) [whose] mind [is] impeded by wicked teachings¹⁰⁰⁴ (*dur-āgama-vihata-matī*) and (*ca*) [who are] afflicted by pain (*duḥkha-ārta*), ...

[10.7.232] *idam uccairnāgaravācakena sattvānukampayā dṛbham* |

[10.7.233] *tattvārthādhigamākhyam spaṣṭam umāsvātinā śāstram* ||5||

... this (*idam*) compendium (*śāstra*), called ‘*Tattvārthādhigama*’ (*tattva-artha-adhigama-ākhyā*) [was] composed (*dṛbdha*)¹⁰⁰⁵ in an intelligible way (*spaṣṭa*) out of compassion for the living beings (*sattva-anukampā*) by *vācaka* Umāsvāti of the *uccairnāgara* [*śākhā*]¹⁰⁰⁶ (*uccais-nāgara-vācaka ... umāsvātī*).

[10.7.234] *yas tattvādhigamākhyam jñāsyati ca kariṣyate ca tatroktam* |

[10.7.235] *so ’vyābādhasukhākhyam prāpsyaty acireṇa paramārtham* ||6||

He who (*yaḥ*) will know (*jñāsyati*) [this compendium] called ‘*Tattvādhigama*’ (*tattva-adhigama-ākhyā*) and (*ca*) also (*ca*) does (*kariṣyate*) what is said (*ukta*) therein (*tatra*), he (*tad*) will soon (*acireṇa*) attain (*prāpsyati*) the highest goal (*parama-artha*), [which is also] called unimpeded happiness (*avyābādha-sukha-ākhyā*).

¹⁰⁰² The word ‘*arghya*’ appears in verse 3.

¹⁰⁰³ In other words, the teachings of the *arhat* were passed down by the succession of teachers.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Alternatively, ‘whose ordinary cognition (*matī*) is hindered (*vihata*) by the difficult verbal testimonies (*durāgama*)’.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Unlike ‘*saṃdṛbdha*’, ‘*dṛbdha*’ is not a common word.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Translation based on Dhaky 1996: 60. Zydenbos mistranslates ‘the lofty nāgaravācaka Umāsvāti’ (Zydenbos 1983: 38).